Case Title: Coulter v. State. ICA s.d.o., filed 01/05/2007 [pdf], 113 Haw. 160. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 05/29/2007 [pdf].

Citation: 116 Haw. 181

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HANAT'T

---000---

 

MICHAEL EDWARD COULTER, &
Petitsoner/Petitioner-Appellant S
2

   

STATE OF HAWAI'I,
Respondent /Respondent Appellee

 

No. 27025
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(SPP NO. 03-1-0038; CR. NO. 2-1-1513)
NOVEMBER 30, 2007

C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

DUFFY,

Petitioner Michael Edward Coulter seeks review of the
(ICA) January 22, 2007 judgment,

MOON,

Intermediate Court of Appeals’
which affirmed the circuit court of the first circuit's

November 29, 2004 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
Denying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.’ We accepted

Coulter's application for a writ of certiorari and vacate the

judgment of the ICA.

K. Perkine presided over this matter.

 
 

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Coulter asserts that the ICA gravely erzed in affirming
the circuit court order which denied his Hawai'i Rules of Penal
Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 Petition for post-conviction relief.
Coulter argues that the manner in which the Hawai'i Paroling
Authority (HPA) set his minimum terms of imprisonment was in
violation of his constitutional rights, the applicable statute,

and. the HPA’s own guidelines.

 

jecause we agree that the HPA violated its guidelines
in setting Coulter’s minimum term, we reverse the judgment of the
ICA, vacate the circuit court’s order, and remand to the circuit
court with instructions to order the HPA to provide Coulter with
a néw minimum-term hearing under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)
§ 706-669.
1. BACKGROUND

a te Minsmuy and & io

In July 2002, Coulter pleaded guilty to one count of
Negligent Homicide in the First Degree, in viclation of HRS
§ 707-702.5 (1993), and one count of Accidents Involving Death or
Serious Bodily Injury, in violation of HRS § 291C-12 (1993). The
circuit court, in September 2002, sentenced Coulter to ten years
of imprisonment for each count, to run concurrently.

Subsequently, in November 2002, Coulter received =
notice informing him that the HPA would hold a hearing to fix his
minimum term of imprisonment and explaining his rights in such a
 

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hearing. A later notice set the minimum term hearing date of
January 6, 2003, which was continued until March 11, 2003 at
coulter’s request. On January 7, 2003, Covlter’s counsel sent
copies of support letters, Coulter’s autobiography, and two
transcripts to the HPA for review by the HPA Board prior to the
minimum term hearing.

Coulter appeared with counsel at the minimum term
hearing that was held on March 11, 2003.

on March 15, 2003, the HPA issued a notice and order
(“order”) setting Coulter's minimum terns of imprisonment at
seven years for each count. The Order did not specify Coulter's
level of punishment and the significant criteria upon which his
minimum decision was besed, as required by Section 111 of the
HPA’s 1969 Guidelines for Establishing Minimum Terms of
Imprisonment.

Section III of the Guidelines, entitled “Issuance of
Decision,” states:

‘he Order Establishing Minimum Terns of Inprisonment
(voc 430025) will include the specific minimum terns(s)
[sie established in years ond/er months, ‘the level of
poniensent (Level I, II, or 111) under which the inmate
Felis, and the significant criteria upon which the decision
wae Besed.

 

 

 

HPA's Guidelines for Establishing Minimum Terms of Imprisonnent

(1989), available at http://hawaii.cov/psd/documents/hpa/

 

Minimom_Guidelines.pdf (hereinafter, “HPA Guidelines
 

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Coulter, acting pro se, filed a Rule 40 Petition

challenging his minimum term order on August 21, 2003. In the
petition, Coulter made six allegations, including claims that the
HPA hearing did not comply with the statutorily-required
procedural requirements, that the HEA violated his statutory
Fight to be considered for parole, and that the minimum term
established by the HPA violated his constitutional equal
protection rights. Relevant to the present action, Coulter also
challenged the Order itself, asserting (1) that he was placed
into the wrong level of punishment, and (2) that the HPA failed
to follow its guidelines when it set his minimum terms without
stating in the Order Coulter's level of punishnent or providing
any written criteria upon which the HPA based its decision.

The State filed an answer to Coulter's petition on
September 19, 2003 and a supplemental answer on Decenber 4, 2003.
Coulter filed replies to both answers.

On December 31, 2003, the HPA, sua eponte and without
holding a hearing, issued an anended Notice and Order of Fixing
Minimum Term(s) of Imprisonment (“Amended Order”). In the
Amended Order the HPA set Coulter's mininum terms at seven years
for each count, the level of punishment at Level ITT, and

identified the significant factors used in determining Coulter's
 

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level of punishment as the nature of the offense and the degree
of injury/loss to person.?

‘The circuit court held a hearing on Coulter’s Rule 40
Petition on August 24, 2004. On November 28, 2004, the circuit
court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order
denying Coulter's petition.

B. HEA Board Composition

‘The HPA is composed of three members, one of which
serves as chairperson, and each of which is appointed for four-
year terms. HRS § 353-61 (1993).

The March 15, 2003 order setting Coulter’s minimum term
of imprisonment was signed by the Acting Chair Mary Juanita
Tiwanak. The letterhead at the top of the March Order also
Listed Lani Rae Garcia as an HPA member and Tommy Johnson as
administrator.

‘The December Amended Order, on the other hand, wa
signed by Chairman Albert Tufono. The letterhead of that order

indicates that the HPA at that time was compo:

 

d of two other
members, Dane K. Oda and Edvard M. Slavish, as well as

administrator Tommy Johnson. Therefore, none of the individuals

 

+ this information wes represented in the Anended Order in the

following fashion:
‘Level of Punishment:
factors

Level 111
\dentified in determining the level of punishnent
‘nd 2) Degree of Injury/Loss to Person.

   

   
 

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who Were HPA members at the time that the March Order was issued
continued to be HPA members by December 2003, when the Anended

order was released.

 

‘The ICA's Decision

Before the ICA, Coulter argued that the circuit court
erred in denying his Rule 40 Petition because it wrongly
concluded that (1) Coulter's constitutional rights to due process
and equal protection were not violated and (2) the HPA properly
followed its guidelines in identifying Coulter as a Level IIT

offender. The ICA rejected these argunents, stating

Upon careful review of the record ané tl
submitted by the parties and havin,

fo the arguments advanced and the by the
Farties, we conclude that Coulter's contentions are without
Rerit. The circuit court aid not err in coneloding that
Coulter failea to prove facts sufficient to justify relic
on any of his clains, Furthernore, the HPA did not abuss
Ste dlecretion nor violate the constitutional rights of
Couiter, in setting Coulter's minimum terms of inprisennent.

9) hawal't 163,

        

 

  

 

185, 35 F.3d 210, 222 (2002)
ICA's S00 at 6.

We heard oral argument in this case on August 22, 2007.

IT, STANDARD OF SEVIEW

An HRPP Rule 40 petition is an appropriate means to
challenge a minimum term of imprisonment set by the HPA.
Williamson v, Hawai'i Paroling Auth., 97 Hawai"i 156, 34 P.34 1055
(wp. 2000), rev'd on other arounds, 97 Hawai 163, 34 P.3d 210

(2001).
 

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“the disposition of an HRPP Rule 40 petition is based
on FOF [findings of fact] and COL [conclusions of law].” Raines
ws State, 79 Hawai'i 219, 222, 900 P.3d 1286, 1289 (1995).
Accordingly, we review the circuit court’s conclusions of lew de
novo and findings of fact for clear error. See id. (citing Dan
ws State, 76 Hawai'i 423, 428, 879 P.2d 528, 533 (1994).

With respect to HPA decisions establishing a minimum
term, this court has stated that “judicial intervention is
appropriate where the HPA has failed to exercise any discretion
at all, acted arbitrarily and capriciously so as to give rise to
a due process violation, or otherwise violated the prisoner's
constitutional rights.” Williamson 97 Hawai at 195, 34 P.3d at
222.

With respect to claims of procedural violations, the
court will assess whether the HPA conformed with the procedural
protections of HRS § 706-669 and complied with its own
guidelines, which the HPA was required to establish by statute.
HRS § 706-669(8) (1993).

IIT, — puscUSSION
A. Coulter's pue Process Claim

In his Application, Coulter separately challenges the

March 2003 and December 2003 actions of the HPA, alleging that

both were in violation of his due process rights. The challenges
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

he mounts are based on three grounds: constitutional due process
protections; violation of the HPA’s own guidelines; and
violations of the statutory procedural requirements.

Although Coulter raises separate challenges to each of
the two HPA actions, they are factually linked. Coulter asserts
that the first violation was committed by the HPA board as
composed on March 11, 2003, which issued the March 15, 2003
minimum-term order that failed to specify either the level of
punishment or the significant criteria upon which the decision
was based, both of which must be specified according to Section
IIT of HPA’s 1989 Guidelines. This failure, Coulter maintains,
violated his due process rights.

The second violation was allegedly committed by the HPA
board as composed on Decesber 31, 2003, when it issued the
Amended Order -- maintaining the term decision but providing the
level of punishment and significant criteria information --
without providing the normal procedures set out in HRS § 706-669,
such as notice and a hearing. Although the amended decision
could be considered a “cure” of the conclusory March Order,
Coulter contends that because the membership of the HPA

completely changed in the interim, the decision wi

 

in reality a
“new” decision for which he was entitled to another hearing under

HRS § 706-669. As an alternative, Coulter argues that the mere
SL EOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER“.
fact that the HPA Board completely changed composition between

the original and amended orders effected a violation of Coulter's
due process rights. In support of this argument Coulter asserts
that the new HPA Board had no basis to provide the justification
for the decision of the original, March HPA Board, in the absence
of a showing that it considered the evidence adduced at the March

hearing before issuing the December Amended Order.”

 

The March Order Violated the HPA Guidelines

Because we find that the HPA's minimum term decision
was in violation of the HPA Guidelines, we do not reach the
question whether the HPA violated Coulter’s constitutional due
process rights.

‘The HFA adopted the HPA Guidelines for Establishing

Minimum Terns of Imprisonment pursuant to HRS § 706-669(8), which
states:

‘The authority shall establish guidelines for the uniform
Geternination of minimum sentences which shall take inte
Secount both the nature ane degree of the offense of the
Prisoner end the prisoner's criminal history and character.
The guidelines shall be public records and shall be made
avilable to the prisoner and to the prosecuting attorney
anc other interested goverment agencies.

 

 

 

 

In connection with this alternative claim, Coulter highlights
critically important whet he terms “the complete Lack of evidence tha
32/31/03 HPA Beard reviewed oF coneidered any of the evidence eaduced at the
3/11/03 HPA hearing before Aseuing its 12/31/03 Anendea Orcer.” This fact is
Important, Coulter seerte, because “the 12/31/03 HPA Board, not having been
privy to the discussions of the 3/11/03 HPA Board, could not substitute its
bin reasoning (e.g. level of penisment and sienificent criteria upen which
the minimums were based) in support of the 3/11/03 HPA Boord’ e minimums.”

  

 

 

 

   
TTL EOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***_
HRS § 706-669(8) (1993). Section III of the Guidelines, entitied
“Issuance of Decision,” states that “[t)he Order Establishing
Minimum Terms of Imprisonment [] will include the specific
minimum terms(s) . . . , the level of punishment . . . , and the
significant criteria upon which the decision was based.”

Coulter asserts that the HPA violated its guidelines
because its March 2003 minimum term order failed to specity
either the level of punishment or the significant criteria upon
which the decision was based, as required by the HPA Guidelines.
The failure to include this information, Coulter argues, was
arbitrary and capricious.

‘The proposition that the government must follow the
rules it sets out for itself is not controversial. Here, where
the legislature has delegated the creation of guidelines for the
uniform determination of minimum sentences to the HPA, the HPA is
not free to ignore the guidelines it has established. Cf. Peek
vs Thompson, 980 P.2d 178, 161 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (plurality
opinion) ("Even if an agency is not required to adopt a rule,
once it has done so it must follow what it adopted.”). Even
though these guidelines do not have the force of statutory law,
compliance with such rules is required to serve the legislature's
goal of “uniform determination” of minimum sentences. HRS § 706-

669(8). Indeed, this court has described the availability of

10
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such guidelines as one of the procedural protections afforded to
prisoners by statute. See Williamson, 97 Hawai'i at 194, 35 P.3d
at 221. Deviating from such rules, without explanation,
constitutes arbitrary or capricious action that violates a
prisoner's right to uniform determination of his or her minimum
sentence.‘ See id, at 195, 35 P.3d at 222 ("(JJudicial
intervention is appropriate where the HPA has . . . acted
arbitrarily and capriciously so as to give rise to a due process
violation... .")-

Nor does the State contest the fact that the March
order was not in conformity with the HPA Guidelines. The only
remaining question, then, is whether any other consideration
renders HPA’s omission harmless or otherwise deprives Coulter of
‘a remedy. The State makes two arguments: (1) that the
deficiency was “cured” by the Decenber 2003 order, rendering
Coulter's complaint moot; and (2) that Coulter did not suffer any
“actual prejudice” such that he is entitled to a remedy.

c. ecenbe: o cure”
Violation

The State argues that “at best, what (Coulter) is

entitled to is to have the HPA reissue his minimum term order

 

+ the Guidelines thenselves provide that the HPA nay deviate either
above or below the minimum tern Lengths that the Guidelines suggest, but that
ny such deviation “ehell be acconpenied by written justification and be nace
a'pert of the Order Establishing Minimum Terme ef Imprisonment.”

 

 

n
 

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with the level of punishnent and significant criteria stated,
which 1s what the [HPA] did in issuing the 12/31/03 Notice.”

In support of this argument, the State relies on the
Utah Suprene Court’s decision in Preece v, House, 686 P.2d 508
(Utah 1994). In Preece, a prisoner petitioned for habeas release
after the parole board set his recommended sentence departing
from the sentencing guidelines, but did not give an explanation
for this departure as required by its rules. Agreeing that the
board failed to comply with its rules, the Utah Suprene Court
concluded that the petitioner was nonetheless not entitled to
habeas relief on this ground, stating that

the appropriate renedy in this case was to order the beard
to comply’ with its rules by giving Preece » written
explanation for its decision te retain the October 1996
Wowever, this relief ‘can no longer affect
of the Iitigants’” because the Board gave Ereece
‘planation for ite decision during the. pendency
Gr this appesl. Therefore, this aspect of the petition it

 

   

Id. at 512 (citation omitted). The State argues that because
‘the December Amended Order apparently satisfied the Guidelines by
including the information missing from the earlier order, that

Coulter received all the remedy to which he was entitled.

 

* the court in Eraece ultimately helé, however, that the parole board
violated hie procedural ane substantive due process rights uncer the Utah
Constitution which entitle 2 prisener to know, with resscnable edvance notice,

 inforsation the beard will be considering at the original parole grant
hearing. id, st £12. On this ereund, the court ordered a new hearing before
the board. Ia

 

 

   

2
 

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Without passing on the merits of the Preece analysis,
At is clear that the procedural defects in this case distinguish
Coulter's situation from that of the petitioner in Preece.
Because the HPA, at the time it issued the Amended Order,
consisted of completely different members, it is unclear whether
the Amended Order reflected the same level of punishment and
significant criteria “upon which the [original] decision was
based.” HPA Guidelines at 2. Moreover, the correction came a
full nine months later, only after Coulter sought relief through
a HRPP Rule 40 petition. Under these circumstances, the HPA has
veered from the legislature's directive of “uniform
determination” of minimum sentences, and the December Amended
order cannot be said to have “cured” the initial violation.

D. Coulter Need Not Demonstrate Prejudice to Seek Relief from a
Violation nes.

‘The State also argues that under State v. Monalim, 89
Hawai'i 474, 974 P.2d 1064 (App. 1998), Coulter did not suffer a
procedural due process violation because he has not shown that
the HPA’s actions caused hin “actual prejudice.” In Monalim, a
prisoner raised constitutional, statutory, and administrative-
rule based challenges to the failure of the HPA to hold his
parole revocation hearing within the statutory and rvle-based
sixty-day period, when a power outage necessitated that the
originally-scheduled hearing be cancelled. Id. at 475, 974 P.24

3
 

#** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,
at 1065. The ICA remanded the case for further consideration

after holding that:

 

2 petitioner is not entitied to relief for the HPA's failure
fo comply with the tine limit specified in HRS §.706-670(7)
Unless the record shows that the failure to comply (1) wae
unreasonable and (2) caused the petitioner actusl prejudice.

 

   

Id. In support of this proposition, the ICA relied on a case
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
which held that a habeas petitioner is not entitled to habeas
relief when the United States Penal Commission failed to grant a
parole revocation hearing within ninety days of arrest but no
actual prejudice to the petitioner was shown. See Villarreal v
WS. Barole Comm'n, 985 F.2¢ 835, 837 (Sth Cir, 1993).

The present case is distinguishable from Monalim, as
that case was confined to the parole revocation context and
concerned a time delay rather than other procedural
irregularities. The absence of the level of punishment and
significant criteria information in Coulter's minimum term order
Anfected the validity of the order itself in a very different way
than would the procedural delay of such a hearing due to
circumstances beyond the control of any party. When a hearing is
merely delayed, it is unclear what purpose @ remedy could serve
where a proper hearing is eventually held and no prejudice
results. In this case, however, it is possible that a new

hearing could lead to a different minimum term order because the
 

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HPA’s decision-making will be constrained by the requirement that
it provide a basis for its decision, or otherwise explain a
deviation from its guidelines. See supra note 4.
IV. GoNcLUSTON

Therefore, the HPA’s minimun term order was in
violation of the HPA Guidelines. Accordingly, the ICA erred in
affirming the ruling of the circuit court denying Coulter's HRPP
Rule 40 petition.

‘The January 22, 2007 judgment of the ICA is vacated and
the case is remanded to the circuit court to enter an order
(1) vacating its Novenber 29, 2004 order, and (2) directing the
HPA to hold a new hearing to determine Coulter's minimum term of

imprisonment, pursuant to HRS § 706-669.

Phyllis 3. Hironaka,
Deputy Public Defender, Gre
(sat K. Freedman, Deputy

Public Defender, with her MRLs

on the brief), for petitioner/
petitioner-appellant
Rescues © Tease Te
Lisa M. Itomura,
Deputy Attorney General,
(Bryan C. Yee and Diane K.
Taira, Deputy Attorneys General,
with her on the briefs), for Yores «Adi
respondent /respondent appellee

1s