Case Title: Murphy v. Holman

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-301

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Murphy v. Holman1997 WY 124945 P.2d 1193Case Number: 96-301Decided: 10/29/1997Modified: 02/11/2009Supreme Court of Wyoming
Lillian Josephine MURPHY, 
f/k/a Lillian Josephine Holman,

 
 
Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
Scott Gordon 
HOLMAN,

 
 
Appellee 
(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
of NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
Larry R. Clapp of Clapp 
& Associates, P.C., Casper, for Appellant 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
Peter J. Feeney, 
Casper, for 
Appellee (Defendant).

 
 
Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, 
MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

 
 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Claiming a change of 
circumstance due to loss of her employment and declining health, appellant 
(Mother) petitioned to reduce her child support obligation. The court denied 
Mother's petition, finding no substantial change of circumstances, and ordered 
Mother to pay appellee's (Father) attorney fees. We affirm the district court's 
refusal to modify child support and reverse the award of attorney 
fees.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2.]     Although separately 
phrasing the issues in a self-serving light, both parties address two issues 
from the decision of the trial court:

 
 
I. Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion by finding Mother failed to prove a substantial change in 
circumstance to warrant modification of child support?

 
 
II. Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion when awarding attorney fees without itemization of time and 
rate and without evidence demonstrating reasonableness?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3.]     Precisely one year 
after the divorce decree issued awarding custody of the parties' child to Father 
and ordering Mother to pay $470 per month child support, Mother petitioned the 
court to be relieved of the child support obligation. Mother, a registered 
nurse, alleged a material change in circumstances based on the loss of her 
$52,448.93 annual income as Director of I.V. Therapy for the WyomingMedicalCenter.

 
 

[¶4.]     In her petition, Mother 
attributes her loss of employment to a reorganization by her employer and a 
diagnosis of asthma which precluded her from contact with various substances 
like chemical smells, animals, air conditioners and fungus and also precluded 
her from walking stairs. Based on that diagnosis, Mother stated that she will 
not be returning to work and cannot afford to pay child support. Father filed a 
traverse to the petition, which disputed a change of circumstances and included 
a counter-petition seeking child support arrearages and attorney fees. After a 
hearing on Mother's petition, the trial court found that Mother had not 
established a change of circumstances and ordered her to pay the child support 
arrearages and Father's attorney fees. Mother timely 
appeals.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard of 
Review

 
 

[¶5.]     A party seeking 
modification of a child support order must establish that there has been a 
material and substantial change in circumstances subsequent to the decree which 
outweighs the interests of society in applying the doctrine of res judicata. 
Smith v. Smith, 895 P.2d 37, 41 (Wyo. 1995); 
Pinther v. Pinther, 888 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Wyo. 
1995); Nuspl v. Nuspl, 717 P.2d 341, 345 (Wyo. 1986); see also W.S. 20-6-306(a). The 
district court's decision to modify a divorce decree is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Rocha v. Rocha, 925 P.2d 231, 233 (Wyo. 1996). An abuse of discretion occurs when 
a court's decision exceeds the bounds of reason or constitutes an error of law. 
Id.; see also Goody v. Goody, 939 P.2d 731, 733 
(Wyo. 
1997).

 
 

[¶6.]     Because the alleged 
abuse of discretion in this appeal centers upon the sufficiency of the evidence, 
we consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and 
resolve all conflicts in the testimony and exhibits in favor of that party. 
Jones v. Jones, 858 P.2d 289, 291 (Wyo. 1993). We will not set aside a district 
court's finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous; but a finding of fact 
not supported by the evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the great 
weight of the evidence cannot be sustained. Id.

 
 
Change in 
Circumstances

 
 

[¶7.]     In denying Mother's 
petition for modification, the district court concluded without explanation that 
"Plaintiff did not meet her burden of proving a substantial change in 
circumstances such that the decree should be modified." Mother asserts that this 
finding is against the great weight of the evidence, particularly the 
uncontradicted facts that her income went from approximately $52,000 to nothing 
and that her health deteriorated to the point that she cannot work. These facts, 
she argues, demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in failing 
to find a change of circumstances sufficient to relieve her from her child 
support obligation.

 
 

[¶8.]     Mother's own testimony 
and the testimony of her doctor, Dr. Hrnicek, however, sufficiently reflect that 
Mother's medical condition existed at the time of the divorce, September 1994, 
and support the district court's finding that her condition did not constitute a 
change of circumstances. Mother testified that she had had trouble breathing 
since 1982. She also testified that at the time of the divorce she had a 
bronchodilator available to treat her asthma. Her doctor testified that he had 
treated her for asthma since April 8, 1993, and that she had reported in her 
medical history that she had had severe attacks in the past. He also testified 
she rarely had attacks, and that he considered her able to work in an atmosphere 
free from air pollutants. We have previously held, as we do here now, that where 
the evidence demonstrates that the complainant's physical ailments existed at 
the time of the divorce, the condition does not constitute a material change of 
circumstances warranting modification of a divorce decree. See Crawford v. 
Crawford, 828 P.2d 1192, 1193 (Wyo. 1992).

 
 

[¶9.]     As for Mother's loss of 
income, we have established that the district court has the discretion to set 
child support at a level consistent with a parent's earning capacity. Rowan v. 
Rowan, 786 P.2d 886, 889 (Wyo. 1990). Wyoming Statute 20-6-301(a)(i) 
(Rpl. 1994) states in part: "Gross income also means potential income of parents 
who are voluntarily unemployed or underemployed." Additionally, W.S. 
20-6-302(b)(xi) (Rpl. 1994) provides 
that when a court is determining whether to deviate from the presumptive child 
support amount, it shall consider "[w]hether either parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed.  In 
such case the child support shall be computed based upon the potential earning 
capacity (imputed income) of the unemployed or underemployed 
parent."

 
 

[¶10.]  Sufficient evidence exists to support the 
district court's inference that Mother was voluntarily not attaining her 
potential earning capacity. Mother testified that as the director of I.V. 
Therapy she sometimes worked the floor shift. She also testified that she had 
refused to pay her child support obligation from her severance pay or assets, 
and, while she had applied for one position since she lost her job at the 
Wyoming Medical Center, she had not attempted to find a job which would conform 
to her physical restrictions. Mother's lack of diligence in pursuing another job 
despite her experience and training, as well as her failure to show a change in 
her physical capacities, support the district court's inference that Mother's 
earning capacity had not materially changed. We therefore hold that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion when it found no material change of 
circumstances existed which would justify a modification of child 
support.

 
 
Attorney 
fees

 
 

[¶11.]  Mother contends the district court abused 
its discretion when it ordered Mother to pay Father's attorney fees because 
Father failed to present evidence on the reasonableness of the fees claimed. 
Wyoming Statute 1-14-126(b) governs awards of attorney fees. The statute sets 
out a list of factors the court may consider when awarding attorney fees and 
authorizes the court to make a reasonable award to a prevailing party without 
requiring expert testimony. W.S. 1-14-126(b) (1997). The party seeking an award 
of attorney fees has the burden of proving the reasonableness of the fees. Pekas 
v. Thompson, 903 P.2d 532, 536 (Wyo. 1995). "In order to meet that burden of 
proof, the claimant must present not only an itemized billing reflecting the 
time and the rate, but there must be evidence demonstrating that the fee was 
reasonable." Pekas, 903 P.2d  at 536 (quoting Hinckley v. Hinckley, 812 P.2d 907, 
915 (Wyo. 
1991)).

 
 

[¶12.]  Here, Father testified at trial that he 
had been charged $750 by his attorney and he believed that amount to be 
reasonable. Father did not submit an itemized billing or offer any evidence upon 
which the court could evaluate the reasonableness of the fees based on the 
statutory factors. In Pekas, we established that

 
 
if a party has had the 
opportunity to present proof of attorney fees to the trial court, and they fail 
to do so, the award will be summarily reversed on appeal with no remand. Durdahl 
v. Bank of Casper, 718 P.2d 23, 31 (Wyo. 1986). A party will 
not be allowed "another bite of the apple" in order to prove an element of their 
claim. Downing v. Stiles, 635 P.2d 808, 817 (Wyo. 1981). A remand to allow additional proof 
on attorney fees will be allowed only in those instances where a party was 
denied an opportunity to make proof in the proceeding 
below.

 
 
903 P.2d  at 
537.

 
 

[¶13.]  We find nothing in the record to suggest 
that Father was denied the opportunity to present proof of the reasonableness of 
his attorney fees. In light of the rule articulated in Pekas, we summarily 
reverse the award of attorney fees as an abuse of discretion by the district 
court.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶14.]  We affirm the district court's refusal to 
modify Mother's child support obligation based on her failure to establish a 
material change in circumstances and reverse the attorney fee award for lack of 
substantiating evidence.