Case Title: Matthews v. Riley

Citation: 162 Vt. 401, 649 A.2d 231

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
MATTHEWS_V_RILEY.93-562; 162 Vt. 401; 649 A.2d 231

[Opinion Filed July 22, 1994]


 Filed:  22-Jul-1994

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 93-562


 Mary Ellen Matthews                          Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Chittenden Family Court

 James H. Riley                               March Term, 1994


 Amy M. Davenport, J.

 Norman R. Blais, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant

 Andrew D. Mikell, Burlington, for defendant-appellee


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      ALLEN, C.J.   Plaintiff Mary Ellen Matthews appeals an order of the
 family court requiring her to show cause why she should not be held in
 contempt for her failure to comply with a custody order regarding visitation
 between her son, Matthew, and his father, defendant James Riley.  We
 affirm.
       The parties were divorced in Vermont in September 1986.  The divorce
 decree awarded the mother parental rights and responsibilities for Matthew,
 and provided for regular contact between father and son, to occur at
 reasonable times and places and with reasonable notice to the mother.  When
 this arrangement proved unworkable, the order was modified in January 1990
 to establish a fixed schedule for visitation.  The family had lived in
 Vermont before the divorce, and they continued to live in Vermont until July

 

 1991, when mother and son moved to Rhode Island.  Because of the relocation,
 the father moved to modify custody and visitation.  In an order dated
 September 15, 1991, the family court adjusted the father's visitation
 schedule to accommodate the substantial increase in travel.
      Visits took place as scheduled until May 1992, when the mother filed a
 motion for relief in the Rhode Island family court, alleging the father had
 abused Matthew.  The father appeared in Rhode Island to contest the court's
 jurisdiction.  After a hearing held June 12, 1992, the Rhode Island court
 assumed jurisdiction over custody and visitation pursuant to Rhode Island's
 version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)(FN1) and modified
 the Vermont order to decrease father-son visits from monthly to bi-
 monthly.  The father then petitioned the Vermont family court to enforce the
 September 1991 Vermont order and find the mother in contempt.  The Vermont
 family court concluded that the Rhode Island court lacked jurisdiction to
 modify visitation, which meant that the Vermont court's September 1991 order
 was enforceable.  The family court then ordered the mother to show cause why
 she should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the visitation
 provisions of the Vermont order.(FN2)

 

      On appeal, the mother contends that the Vermont family court cannot
 find her in contempt of its September 1991 modification order because that
 order was superseded by the 1992 Rhode Island modification, and Vermont is
 obliged to enforce the Rhode Island order.  The mother also argues that even
 if the Vermont order is enforceable, the Vermont family court should have
 declined to exercise jurisdiction as an inconvenient forum for enforcement.
                                     I.
      Jurisdiction over interstate enforcement and modification of child
 custody decrees is governed by the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
 (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. { 1738A.  See Shute v. Shute, 158 Vt. 242, 245, 607 A.2d 890, 893 (1992).  The PKPA prescribes that "every State shall enforce
 according to its terms, and shall not modify except as provided in [the
 PKPA], any child custody determination made consistently with [the PKPA] by
 a court of another State."  28 U.S.C. { 1738A(a).  The Act applies to
 related issues of visitation as well.  Id. { 1738A(b)(3).
      Resolution of this case turns on whether the Vermont court had
 exclusive jurisdiction to make a child custody determination when the Rhode
 Island court modified the visitation arrangement.  If Vermont's custody and
 visitation orders were consistent with the PKPA, they were entitled to full
 faith and credit, and the 1992 Rhode Island modification had to comply with
 PKPA requirements to be enforceable in other states.  See Shute, 158 Vt. at
 247, 607 A.2d  at 894 (original orders, to be enforceable under PKPA, must
 meet its requirements).  If the Rhode Island modification was consistent
 with the PKPA, the Act compels the Vermont family court to enforce the Rhode
 Island order instead of the 1991 Vermont order.  Otherwise, the Vermont
 family court may disregard the Rhode Island modification and seek to enforce

 

 its September 1991 order through contempt or other available remedies.  28
 U.S.C. { 1738A(a); see also 15 V.S.A. {{ 1041-1043 (Vermont must enforce
 foreign custody determination if rendering state had jurisdiction under
 terms substantially in accordance with UCCJA, unless foreign determination
 modified custody order of another state that had continuing jurisdiction and
 did not relinquish it).
                                     A.
      We turn first to the question of whether the original divorce judgment
 and subsequent modification orders issued in Vermont were consistent with
 the PKPA, and thereby binding in other states.  Under subsection (c) of the
 Act, a custody determination is consistent with the PKPA if two requirements
 are fulfilled.  First, the issuing court must have jurisdiction under state
 law, 28 U.S.C. { 1738A(c)(1), which in Vermont is governed by the UCCJA, 15
 V.S.A. {{ 1031-1051.  Second, one of the five conditions listed in PKPA
 subsection (c)(2) must be met.(FN3)

 

      For each of the three Vermont orders, the first criterion was satisfied
 because Vermont had jurisdiction under the UCCJA when the orders were
 issued.  The UCCJA confers jurisdiction on the family court if Vermont is
 the child's home state.  15 V.S.A. { 1032(a)(1).(FN4)  "Home state" is defined
 as "the state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved
 lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least
 six consecutive months."  Id. { 1031(5).
      When the 1986 divorce proceedings commenced, Matthew had lived in
 Vermont at least six months; the same was true prior to the 1990
 modification.  He and his mother moved to Rhode Island approximately two
 months before the September 1991 modification order was issued, but before
 the relocation they had lived in Vermont for six consecutive months, and
 Vermont was the only state that Matthew had lived in for six consecutive
 months before modification proceedings commenced.  This nearly continuous
 residency sufficed to qualify Vermont as his home state and confer

 

 jurisdiction under the UCCJA.  The Vermont court validly exercised
 jurisdiction under state law, and the orders satisfied the first PKPA
 consistency requirement under { 1738A(c)(1).
      Since Vermont was the home state of both parents and child, the orders
 also satisfied the second PKPA requirement of consistency set forth in
 { 1738A(c)(2).  This subsection lists five alternative conditions, the
 first of which is a home state criterion substantially identical to that
 found in the UCCJA.  See 28 U.S.C. { 1738A(c)(2)(A) (home state criterion),
 id. { 1738A(b)(4) (defining home state).  Vermont was the home state for
 purposes of both the UCCJA and the PKPA, and as a result the original 1986
 custody order and the January 1990 and September 1991 modification orders (FN5)
 were consistent with PKPA requirements.  The orders are entitled to
 enforcement in other states; any modification by another state would have to
 comply with PKPA requirements to be similarly enforceable.  28 U.S.C.
 { 1738A(a).
                                     B.
      The PKPA permits a court of one state (the modifying court) to modify a
 custody award made in another state (the rendering court) if:  (1) the
 modifying court has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination
 under PKPA subsection (c), and (2) the rendering court no longer has
 jurisdiction or has declined to exercise jurisdiction.  Id. { 1738A(f).  In
 this case, the Rhode Island family court's modification satisfied both
 subsection (c) requirements.  First, Rhode Island's UCCJA has home state

 

 criteria identical to Vermont's:  "the state in which the child immediately
 preceding the time involved lived with his or her parents [or] parent . . .
 for at least six (6) consecutive months."  R.I. Gen. Laws { 15-14-3(6).
 Mother and son moved from Vermont to Rhode Island in July 1991, and had
 lived there continuously for at least nine months when the modification
 proceedings in Rhode Island commenced.(FN6)  Because they resided in Rhode
 Island more than six consecutive months, the Rhode Island family court could
 take jurisdiction under its UCCJA, satisfying the first PKPA subsection (c)
 criterion.  As the home state for UCCJA purposes, Rhode Island also was the
 home state under the second subsection (c) criterion.  See 28 U.S.C.
 { 1738A(c)(2)(A).  Therefore, the Rhode Island family court could make a
 custody determination consistent with the PKPA, which satisfies the first
 criterion for modification.
      The second criterion permits modification only if the rendering court
 no longer has jurisdiction or has declined to exercise its jurisdiction.
 Id. { 1738A(f)(2).  Continuing jurisdiction under the PKPA depends on
 whether (1) the rendering court continues to have jurisdiction under state
 law, and (2) that state "remains the residence of the child or any
 contestant."  See id. { 1738A(d).(FN7)  Thus, the Vermont family court had

 

 continuing jurisdiction only if there was jurisdiction under the UCCJA, see
 id. { 1738A(c)(1), and if a parent or the child lived in Vermont.
      Ordinarily, the modifying court determines whether the rendering court
 has continuing jurisdiction under the law of the rendering state.(FN8) See Cann
 v. Howard,