Case Title: County of Dunn v. Goldie H.

Citation: 2001 WI 102

Docket Number: 2000AP001137

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 102 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
00-1137 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In the Matter of the Guardianship and Protective 
Placement of Goldie H.: 
 
County of Dunn,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Goldie H.,  
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  239 Wis. 2d 232, 619 N.W.2d 307 
 
 
(Ct. App. 2000-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 10, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
April 25, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dunn 
 
JUDGE: 
Rod W. Smeltzer 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there 
were briefs by John E. Joyce, Menomonie, and oral argument by 
John E. Joyce. 
 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief 
and oral argument by Nicholas P. Lange, assistant corporation 
counsel. 
 
2001 WI 102 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No.  00-1137 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of the Guardianship and  
Protective Placement of Goldie H.: 
 
County of Dunn,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Goldie H.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   Goldie H. was protectively 
placed at the Dunn County Health Care Center in 1998.  The 
circuit court conducted a summary hearing and made the requisite 
findings that she was incompetent and required residential care 
and custody as the result of the infirmities of aging.  In 
making this initial placement, the authorities in Dunn County 
afforded Goldie H. all the procedural rights to which she was 
entitled by law. 
¶2 
A year later, the Dunn County Department of Human 
Services 
petitioned 
the 
court 
for 
Goldie 
H.'s 
continued 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 00-1137 
 
2 
placement.  The court appointed a guardian ad litem, and, in 
time, after carefully reviewing all the incoming documentation, 
it signed an order continuing her placement.  The court did not 
hold a hearing or make findings of fact. 
¶3 
The issues presented in this case are (1) whether 
Goldie H. had a right to a hearing before her protective 
placement was continued; and (2) whether the circuit court had a 
duty to make findings of fact to support its continuation order. 
¶4 
These issues transcend the fortunes of a single 
elderly woman in Dunn County.  They implicate the rights of 
thousands of persons who have been protectively placed in 
Wisconsin institutions because of the infirmities of age, 
chronic mental illness, developmental disabilities, or similar 
incapacities.  They address the legislature's concern that these 
citizens 
be 
given 
the 
maximum 
freedom 
with 
the 
minimum 
restriction that their troubled conditions allow. 
¶5 
In 
this 
case, 
the 
circuit 
court 
continued 
the 
protective placement of Goldie H. without holding a summary 
hearing and without making factual findings.  The court made the 
correct determination, but it did not make it in the correct 
way.  As a result, Goldie H. is aggrieved. 
¶6 
We hold that a person is entitled to a hearing on the 
record before his or her protective placement is continued, and 
that the circuit court must make factual findings to support the 
need for continuation, as required by Wis. Stat. § 55.06(1) 
No. 00-1137 
 
3 
(1999-2000).1  Here the circuit court did not strictly comply 
with these requirements.  Nonetheless, we cannot help but 
conclude that in this case, the circuit court's review of the 
reports submitted to it, supplemented by a motion hearing in 
which the relevant issues were discussed, was sufficient to 
ensure that Goldie H. was being properly cared for and that her 
protective placement was properly continued in a facility 
appropriate for her needs.  Consequently, we affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶7 
The Dunn County Department of Human Services (Dunn 
County DHS or DHS) first petitioned the circuit court for 
guardianship and protective placement of Goldie H. on October 
20, 1998.  The DHS asserted that Goldie H. was incompetent and 
"substantially incapable of managing her property or caring for 
herself by reason of infirmities of aging."  Two physicians 
examined Goldie H. on October 14 and 15, 1998, before the 
petition was filed, and they ultimately determined her to be 
incapacitated.  
¶8 
When Dunn County Circuit Judge Rod W. Smeltzer 
received the DHS petition, he appointed John E. Joyce as Goldie 
H.'s guardian ad litem.  Joyce filed a written report with the 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 00-1137 
 
4 
circuit court stating that he informed Goldie H. of the upcoming 
hearing relating to guardianship and protective placement, and 
informed her of her rights to a jury trial, adversary counsel, 
independent medical and psychological exams, presentation and 
cross-examination of witnesses, and appeal.  Joyce stated that 
Goldie H. did not contest the proceedings and did not wish to 
exercise any of these rights.    
¶9 
On December 3, 1998, Judge Smeltzer held a hearing at 
which Goldie H. was present and represented by Joyce.  The 
circuit court found that Goldie H. was incompetent and had a 
primary need for a guardian and for residential care and custody 
because of the infirmities of aging.  It found that she was 
totally 
incapable 
of 
providing 
for 
herself 
and 
posed 
a 
substantial risk of serious harm to herself or others, and that 
her condition was permanent or likely permanent.  The court 
appointed "House Calls," a service agency in Menomonie, as 
Goldie H.'s permanent guardian, and it ordered her protectively 
placed at the Dunn County Health Care Center. 
¶10 Close to one year later, on October 20, 1999, the Dunn 
County DHS petitioned the circuit court for the required annual 
review of Goldie H.'s placement.  At the same time, it filed an 
annual review report.  The report asserted that Goldie H. "has a 
disability which is permanent or likely to be permanent" and is 
"so totally incapable of providing for her own care and custody 
as to create a substantial risk of serious harm to herself or 
others."  It therefore recommended a continuation of her 
guardianship and protective placement. 
No. 00-1137 
 
5 
¶11 On October 27, 1999, Judge Smeltzer again appointed 
Joyce to serve as Goldie H.'s guardian ad litem.  He ordered 
Joyce to file the annual report of the guardian ad litem by 
November 19, 1999. 
¶12 Joyce filed his report on November 12.  He indicated 
on the report form that Goldie H. continued to meet the 
standards for protective placement, did not contest the finding 
of incompetency, and did not request a change in placement.  He 
also indicated that he believed Goldie H. was in the least 
restrictive environment consistent with her needs.  Joyce said 
that Goldie H. did not require counsel or a full due process 
hearing, but he indicated that she was able to attend a hearing. 
¶13 To supplement this form, Joyce submitted a written 
report recommending a continuation of Goldie H.'s protective 
placement and explaining in detail her condition and the basis 
for his recommendation.  Joyce wrote that he had met with Goldie 
H. and with her court-appointed guardian, and had reviewed the 
report of the Dunn County DHS and Goldie H.'s file at the Dunn 
County Health Care Center.  He then explained why he believed 
Goldie H. was incompetent and met the standards for protective 
placement. 
¶14 Joyce asserted that "Goldie's memory is so obviously 
impaired as to make her disability readily apparent" and that 
her "disability is so obvious as to make adversary counsel and a 
due process hearing unnecessary.  This case is not a close call, 
it is a case of obvious memory impairment and disability." 
No. 00-1137 
 
6 
¶15 Joyce's report also stated that Goldie H.'s court-
appointed guardian at House Calls agreed with his recommendation 
of continued protective placement. 
¶16 The day he received Joyce's report, Judge Smeltzer 
reviewed all the reports about Goldie H. in chambers.  He then 
issued an order for her continued placement for another year.  
His November 12 order stated that: 
a. 
No additional information is requested; 
b. 
The appointment of counsel has not been requested; 
c. 
A full due process hearing is not necessary. 
The circuit court did not hold a hearing or make specific 
findings of fact to support the order continuing Goldie H.'s 
placement. 
¶17 Joyce did not learn of the court's action until near 
the end of November.  On December 13, 1999, he asked the court 
to hold a hearing.  He asserted that this court's decision in 
State ex rel. Watts v. Combined Community Services Board of 
Milwaukee County, 122 Wis. 2d 65, 362 N.W.2d 104 (1985), 
requires courts to hold a hearing on the record to continue a 
protective placement.  Dunn County responded through its 
Assistant Corporation Counsel Nicholas P. Lange, asserting that 
the court was not required to hold a hearing and had properly 
continued the protective placement. 
¶18 The circuit court ordered a hearing, which it held on 
February 24, 2000.  At the close of the hearing, the court 
declared in an oral decision that it had reviewed and considered 
the annual reports of the Dunn County DHS and of the guardian ad 
No. 00-1137 
 
7 
litem, as well as Joyce's detailed written report, before 
issuing its November order.  The court did not make specific 
findings of fact to support continuation, but on March 31, 2000, 
it issued a written order continuing its previous order. 
¶19 Goldie H. appealed.  She contended that the circuit 
court was required to hold a hearing and to make findings of 
fact. 
 
Nevertheless, 
she 
did 
not 
contest 
her 
continued 
placement. 
¶20 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, 
determining that even if the circuit court were required to hold 
a hearing and make factual findings, Goldie H. did not contest 
the continuation of her protective placement and so she had not 
been aggrieved by the circuit court order.  County of Dunn v. 
Goldie H., No. 00-1137, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Sept. 19, 2000). 
¶21 We granted Goldie H.'s petition for review. 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
 
¶22 This case concerns the annual review of protective 
placements that previously have been ordered under Wis. Stat. 
Ch. 55.  Protective placements may not be ordered under Chapter 
55 "unless there is a determination of incompetency . . . and 
there is a finding of a need for protective placement in 
accordance with sub. (2)."  Wis. Stat. § 55.06(1). 
No. 00-1137 
 
8 
 
¶23 Wisconsin Stat. § 55.06(2) enumerates the four factors 
required for a finding that a person has a "need for protective 
placement."  Such a person: 
 
(a)  Has a primary need for residential care and 
custody; 
 
(b) Except in the case of a minor who is alleged 
to be developmentally 
disabled, 
has either 
been 
determined to be incompetent by a circuit court or has 
had submitted on the minor's behalf a petition for 
guardianship; 
 
(c) As a result of developmental disabilities, 
infirmities of aging, chronic mental illness or other 
like 
incapacities, 
is 
so 
totally 
incapable 
of 
providing for his or her own care or custody as to 
create a substantial risk of serious harm to oneself 
or others.  Serious harm may be occasioned by overt 
acts or acts of omission; and 
 
(d) Has a disability which is permanent or 
likely to be permanent. 
Wis. Stat. § 55.06(2). 
 
¶24 In Watts, this court invalidated portions of the 
Chapter 55 protective placement law on equal protection grounds 
because 
it 
did 
not 
provide 
for 
"an 
automatic 
periodic 
reexamination of the need for continued protective placement," 
while persons civilly committed under Chapter 51 were guaranteed 
an extensive annual due process hearing.  122 Wis. 2d at 72. 
¶25 The 
Watts 
court 
established 
rules 
for extending 
Chapter 55 protective placements.  Id. at 84-85.  It required an 
annual review by a judicial officer and the appointment of a 
guardian ad litem, who is to meet with the protectively placed 
person, review the protective service agency's report, and after 
No. 00-1137 
 
9 
consultation with the protectively placed individual, report to 
the court with recommendations regarding the need for protective 
placement.  Id.  In addition, the Watts decision declared: "Upon 
its review of the report of the guardian ad litem, the court 
should decide whether to order additional information, whether 
to appoint defense counsel, and whether to hold a full due 
process hearing under sec. 55.06(6), Stats., or a summary 
hearing."  Id. at 85 (emphasis added). 
¶26 The parties disagree as to the meaning of the Watts 
requirements.  Goldie H. claims that a circuit court is required 
to review the guardian ad litem's report and to hold either a 
full due process hearing or a summary hearing to determine 
whether to continue the protective placement. 
¶27 The county contends that the circuit court must review 
the guardian ad litem's report, and then make a determination 
whether to hold a full due process hearing, a summary hearing, 
or no hearing at all.  "Having a hearing 'on the record' solely 
for the sake of having a hearing 'on the record' isn't 
responsive to anything, and adds time to the overall procedure 
without adding substance," the county declares. 
¶28 We held in Watts, and now reaffirm, that a circuit 
court must hold some form of hearing on the record either a 
full due process hearing or a summary hearing——to continue a 
protective placement.  The circuit court must also make findings 
based on the factors enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 55.06(2) in 
support of the need for the continuation, as required by Wis. 
Stat. § 55.06(1). 
No. 00-1137 
 
10
¶29 The purpose of Wisconsin's protective service system, 
Chapter 55, is established in Wis. Stat. § 55.001: 
 
The legislature recognizes that many citizens of 
the state, because of the infirmities of aging, 
chronic mental illness, mental retardation, other 
developmental 
disabilities 
or 
like 
incapacities 
incurred at any age, are in need of protective 
services.  These services should, to the maximum 
degree of feasibility . . . allow the individual the 
same rights as other citizens, and . . . protect the 
individual from exploitation, abuse and degrading 
treatment.  This chapter is designed to establish 
those services and assure their availability to all 
persons when in need of them, and to place the least 
possible restriction on personal liberty and exercise 
of constitutional rights consistent with due process 
and protection from abuse, exploitation and neglect. 
Wis. Stat. § 55.001.  The protective service system, the 
legislature said, "shall be designed to encourage independent 
living and to avoid protective placement whenever possible."  
Wis. Stat. § 55.02.  
¶30 Some type of hearing is necessary to ensure that these 
goals are attained.  Protectively placed individuals are 
represented in their annual reviews by guardians ad litem.  
Watts, 122 Wis. 2d at 84.  If hearings were never required on 
annual reports, a guardian ad litem could fulfill his or her 
responsibilities under Watts simply by completing and filing a 
one-page form entitled "Annual Report of Guardian Ad Litem 
(Protective Placement)."  This document includes eight questions 
to be marked "yes" or "no."  It asks for explanation only if, 
for example, the answers indicate that the protectively placed 
person or the guardian ad litem is unsatisfied with the current 
No. 00-1137 
 
11
placement, contends that one or more of the factors enumerated 
in Wis. Stat. § 55.06(2) is not present, or requests a full due 
process hearing. 
¶31 A guardian ad litem could complete this form by 
checking boxes indicating that he or she and the protectively 
placed individual are satisfied with the current placement and 
do not contest the findings necessary for continuation or 
request a full due process hearing.  The circuit court could 
then review and sign the document in chambers, continuing a 
protective placement for a year, without having any contact with 
the protectively placed person or the guardian ad litem, and 
without any real review of the guardian ad litem's work, 
diligence, or judgment.    
¶32 A hearing on the record, however brief, promotes 
accountability.  It tends to assure the reliability of the 
protectively placed individual's court-appointed guardian and 
guardian ad litem.  It provides a method for the circuit court 
to satisfy itself that the protectively placed person continues 
to 
need 
protective 
care 
and 
placement, 
continues 
to 
be 
incompetent and incapable of caring for himself or herself, and 
has a condition that is likely to be permanent.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 55.06(2).  It also allows the circuit court to make informed 
findings of fact in support of the need for continuation of 
placement when continuation is appropriate.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 55.06(1). 
¶33 A hearing also gives the circuit court the opportunity 
to ask questions of the guardian ad litem (and, in some cases, 
No. 00-1137 
 
12
the protectively placed individual) to ensure that the court's 
appointees have performed their duties diligently and that the 
protectively placed individual is receiving proper care. 
¶34 We are mindful of court costs and the payments to 
guardians ad litem.  It is not our intention to increase the 
costs or workload of the circuit courts.  We also do not intend 
that protectively placed individuals, some of whom may be in no 
condition to travel, attend summary hearings for no purpose. 
¶35 A summary hearing is not an extensive hearing.  It is 
a brief hearing on the record.  The person whose protective 
placement is in question need not be present.  The hearing may 
be in court or may be held by other means, such as a telephone 
or video conference.  A summary hearing is not an evidentiary 
hearing.  It is an opportunity for the court to ascertain that 
the proper procedures have been followed to ensure a proper 
continuation of a protective placement, and to make factual 
findings required by Wis. Stat. § 55.06(1).  Taking a few 
moments to protect the rights of our most vulnerable citizens is 
not an unacceptable cost to society.  It is an expression of our 
humanity.  It is a commitment that no person will be warehoused 
and forgotten by the legal system.  We believe we can assure 
this objective by giving our holding prospective application 
because the statute already requires annual review.  Our goal is 
to firm up the rights of protectively placed persons, not to 
disrupt judicial calendars. 
¶36 In this case, although the circuit court did not hold 
a summary hearing before ordering the protective placement 
No. 00-1137 
 
13
continued or make specific factual findings of the four factors 
in Wis. Stat. § 55.06(2), we conclude that its continuation of 
Goldie H.'s protective placement was undoubtedly correct and 
does not require a second hearing. 
¶37 Judge Smeltzer was the same judge who originally 
ordered Goldie H. protectively placed after a hearing in 1998.  
John Joyce was the same guardian ad litem who had represented 
Goldie H. in 1998.  When Joyce recommended continuation of the 
protective placement, he submitted not only the standard form 
annual report but also a three-page written report regarding his 
investigation of Goldie H.'s protective placement. 
¶38 In this report, Joyce stated that he had reviewed the 
annual report of the Dunn County DHS, reviewed Goldie H.'s file 
at the Dunn County Health Care Center with her social worker, 
visited Goldie H. at the Dunn County Health Care Center to 
ascertain her status, advised Goldie H. of all her rights, and 
discussed 
those 
rights 
with 
Goldie 
H.'s 
court-appointed 
guardian. 
¶39 Joyce further stated that Goldie H. remains unable to 
care for herself, her condition has not improved since her 
initial placement, and her disability appears permanent or 
likely permanent.  He noted specific incidents demonstrating 
Goldie H.'s condition and incapacity, including an incident 
reported by Goldie H.'s social worker.  His report set forth the 
reasoning for his recommendation of continued placement and 
stated that Goldie H.'s court-appointed guardian shared in his 
recommendation. 
No. 00-1137 
 
14
¶40 The circuit court had knowledge of Goldie H. and her 
condition from her 1998 initial protective placement hearing.  
It had the benefit of detailed information demonstrating that 
Goldie H.'s guardian ad litem had acted to ensure that she was 
receiving proper care and that her protective placement should 
be continued. 
¶41 The 
circuit 
court 
was 
fully 
apprised 
of 
the 
recommendation of the guardian ad litem and the steps he had 
taken to arrive at his recommendation.  The court reasonably 
relied on Joyce's report and recommendation, just as a court 
could 
rely 
on 
a 
thorough, 
well-reasoned 
report 
and 
recommendation of a guardian ad litem in the context of a 
summary hearing. 
¶42 Finally, the circuit court held a hearing on Joyce's 
motion at which the relevant issues were discussed. 
¶43 We conclude that in this case the circuit court's 
review of the annual reports submitted by Joyce and the Dunn 
County DHS, supplemented by the motion hearing, was sufficient 
to ensure that Goldie H.'s protective placement was properly 
continued.   
¶44 The circuit court did not make specific findings of 
fact supporting the continuation order, either in the order 
continuing Goldie H.'s protective placement or at the motion 
hearing on February 24, 2000.  However, it is clear that in 
ordering the continuation of Goldie H.'s protective placement, 
the circuit court relied on information more than sufficient to 
make the findings based on the factors enumerated in Wis. Stat. 
No. 00-1137 
 
15
§ 55.06(2), as required by Wis. Stat. § 55.06(1).  We therefore 
find that the court implicitly made those findings of fact.  See 
Schneller v. St. Mary's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 162 Wis. 2d 296, 311-
12, 470 N.W.2d 873 (1991).   
¶45 Under the specific facts of this case, nothing would 
be gained by remanding this case to the circuit court to hold a 
second hearing and enter factual findings based on the guardian 
ad litem's report.  We therefore affirm the court of appeals 
decision affirming the circuit court's order continuing Goldie 
H.'s protective placement. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
¶46 We hold that in determining whether to continue a 
protective placement, a circuit court must hold either a full 
due process hearing or a summary hearing, as described in this 
opinion, and must make factual findings to support the need for 
continuation of the protective placement, as required by Wis. 
Stat. § 55.06(1).  In the interests of judicial administration, 
we hold that this reaffirmation of Watts should be applied 
prospectively, so as not to undermine confidence in current 
placements.  The annual review required by statute will protect 
the interests of protectively placed persons.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 00-1137.jpw 
 
1 
¶47 JON P. WILCOX, J. (concurring).  I write separately 
because, while I concur with the majority’s disposition of this 
case, I disagree in part with its reasoning.  I agree with the 
majority insofar as it concludes that in light of the guardian 
ad litem's (GAL) thorough report which served as the basis for 
the circuit court order continuing Goldie H.'s protective 
placement, there is no reason to remand this case to the circuit 
court for a hearing.  However, I disagree with the majority that 
State ex rel. Watts v. Combined Community Services Board, 122 
Wis. 2d 65, 362 N.W.2d 104 (1985), invariably requires circuit 
courts to hold a hearing during every annual review.   
¶48 This court held in Watts, 122 Wis. 2d at 84, that 
"there must be an annual review of each protective placement by 
a judicial officer."  We then established the two procedures 
that, at a minimum, circuit courts must undertake during each 
review.  
¶49 First, the circuit court should appoint to each 
protectively-placed individual a GAL, whose duty it is to 
examine the placement.  Id. at 84.  Pursuant to this duty, the 
GAL must:  (1) "meet with the placed individual"; (2) "review 
the annual report made by the protective services agency under 
sec. 55.06(10)(a)"; (3) "explain to the placed individual and 
his or her guardian the right to have an attorney appointed, to 
an independent evaluation, and to request a full due process 
hearing on the need for continued protective placement or on the 
appropriateness of the present placement facility"; (4) if 
necessary, request an additional evaluation of the placed 
No. 00-1137.jpw 
 
2 
individual; and (5) using all of the information gathered while 
fulfilling the preceding duties, 
 
make a report to the court concerning whether the 
[placed] individual continues to meet the standards 
for 
protective 
placement, 
whether 
the 
current 
placement 
is 
the 
least 
restrictive 
environment 
consistent with the individual's needs, whether the 
individual or guardian requests a change in status or 
placement, whether counsel should be appointed, and 
whether a full due process hearing should be held. 
Id. at 84-85. 
 
¶50 Second, the circuit court must review the GAL's 
report.  Id. at 85.  Upon review of the report, the court must 
make at least three decisions:  (1) "whether to order additional 
information"; (2) "whether to appoint defense counsel"; and (3) 
"whether to hold a full due process hearing under sec. 55.06(6), 
Stats., or a summary hearing."  Id.   
 
¶51 In the present case, the circuit court dutifully 
followed these procedures, thus ensuring that Goldie H. received 
not only the precise placement which she had requested,2 but also 
the precise placement necessary to meet her needs.  Nonetheless, 
                     
2 Because the circuit court order extending Goldie H.'s 
placement granted the precise placement that Goldie H. had 
requested, I strongly question whether Goldie H. even has 
standing to appeal the order.  See County of Dunn v. Goldie H., 
Case No. 00-1137, unpublished slip op. at 2-4 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Sept. 19, 2000) (holding that Goldie H. had no standing to 
appeal); State ex rel. Opelt v. Crisp, 81 Wis. 2d 106, 113, 260 
N.W.2d 25 (1977) (explaining that in order to have standing to 
appeal, the party seeking to appeal must have been adversely 
affected by the judgment or order from which he or she seeks to 
appeal); Auer Park Corp. v. Derynda, 230 Wis. 2d 317, 322, 601 
N.W.2d 841 (Ct. App. 1999) ("A party cannot complain about an 
act to which he or she deliberately consents").  
No. 00-1137.jpw 
 
3 
the majority of this court holds that the circuit court did not 
do enough.  According to the majority, the circuit court also 
was required to hold a hearing on the record so Goldie H.'s GAL 
could recite to the circuit court the facts and recommendations 
in his annual report. 
 
¶52 The majority's holding is based on an erroneous 
interpretation of a single phrase in Watts.  The majority 
interprets the phrase "whether to hold a full due process 
hearing . . . or a summary hearing" in Watts to mean that the 
circuit court must hold one of the two types of hearings during 
every annual review.  Id.   
¶53 Contrary to the majority’s interpretation, however, 
this phrase does not require the circuit court to hold a hearing 
in every case.  Rather, it provides that the circuit court, in 
its sound discretion, may hold a full due process hearing, a 
summary hearing, or no hearing at all. 
 
¶54 Unlike the majority’s interpretation, this reading of 
Watts harmonizes the meaning of the word "whether" in each of 
the three clauses delineating the decisions that the circuit 
court must make while reviewing the GAL report——"whether to 
order 
additional 
information, 
whether 
to 
appoint 
defense 
counsel, and whether to hold a full due process hearing . . . or 
a summary hearing."  Id.  In the first and second clauses, there 
is no dispute that the word "whether" is being "[u]sed in 
indirect questions to introduce one alternative."  The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 2033 (3d ed. 1992). 
 That is, as used in those clauses, "whether" introduces a 
No. 00-1137.jpw 
 
4 
question that the circuit court must decide:  Should it "order 
additional 
information" 
and/or 
"appoint 
defense 
counsel"?  
Watts, 122 Wis. 2d at 85.  And while each clause indicates an 
option that the court may choose to pursue, it leaves open the 
possibility that the court may choose an alternative option——not 
to order additional information and/or not to appoint defense 
counsel.  Thus, as used in the first two clauses, the word 
"whether" essentially means "whether or not." 
 
¶55 Had the majority applied the same definition of the 
word "whether" to the last clause——"whether to hold a full due 
process hearing . . . or a summary hearing"——it would have 
correctly understood the Watts court's mandate:  Upon review of 
the GAL report, the circuit court must decide whether or not to 
hold a full due process hearing or a summary hearing.  Watts, 
122 Wis. 2d at 85.  That is, had the majority applied a 
consistent definition of the word "whether" in all three 
clauses, it would have acknowledged that Watts held that the 
circuit court has discretion to decide to have a full due 
process hearing or a summary hearing or, in the alternative, no 
hearing at all. 
 
¶56 To reach its conclusion that the last clause requires 
a hearing in every case, the majority necessarily applies a 
different definition of the word "whether" in the last clause 
than it does in the other two clauses.  Specifically, it reads 
"whether" in the last clause to be "[u]sed to introduce 
alternative possibilities."  The American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language 2033 (3d ed. 1992).  Thus, applying this 
No. 00-1137.jpw 
 
5 
second definition of the word "whether," the majority interprets 
the last clause to mean that the circuit court must choose one 
of two alternative possibilities:  a full due process hearing or 
a summary hearing.   
¶57 The majority fails to explain, however, why the word 
"whether" should be read differently in that last clause than it 
is 
in 
the 
other 
two 
clauses.3 
 
Indeed, 
the 
majority's 
interpretation conflicts with both the Watts holding and the 
majority's disposition of the present case. 
¶58 This court indicated in Watts that a hearing is not 
necessary in every case.  In the paragraph directly following 
the paragraph containing the clauses at issue, the Watts court 
explained that "the annual review of the necessity for a hearing 
and the hearing, if necessary, may be conducted by a court 
commissioner . . . ."  Watts, 122 Wis. 2d at 85 (emphasis 
added).  This indicates by negative implication that the Watts 
court recognized that in at least some annual reviews, a hearing 
will not be necessary. 
¶59 Further, in the case presently at hand, despite its 
interpretation of Watts, the majority acknowledges that a 
hearing is not necessary in every case.  Noting the overwhelming 
                     
3 I note that if these three clauses had been grouped in a 
single statutory provision, this court would entertain a 
presumption that the word "whether" should be interpreted the 
same in each clause.  See Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 
Wis. 2d 650, 663, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995) ("attributing the same 
definition to a word both times it is used in the same statute 
follows . . . [a] basic principle of statutory construction").   
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amount of evidence that the circuit court had before it when it 
signed Goldie H.'s continuation order, the majority holds that 
"[u]nder the specific facts of this case, nothing would be 
gained by remanding this case to the circuit court" for a 
hearing.4   Majority op. at ¶45.  Had the majority adhered to its 
interpretation of Watts, however, it could not have concluded 
that "nothing would be gained" by remanding Goldie H.'s case for 
a hearing.  It therefore seems that even the majority recognizes 
that in some cases, a hearing merely would be a redundant 
procedural formality. 
                     
4 The majority also bases it holding on the fact that the 
circuit court held a motion hearing on Goldie H.'s case.  See 
majority op. at ¶¶6, 36, 42-45.  According to the majority, this 
hearing "supplemented" the GAL report and examined the "relevant 
issues."  Id. at ¶6.  The majority mischaracterizes this 
hearing.  
The hearing to which the majority refers was an eight-
minute hearing on the issue presently before this court:  
whether Watts requires a hearing on the record during every 
annual review.  At no time during this hearing did the court ask 
Goldie H.'s GAL any questions regarding the propriety of Goldie 
H.'s placement or about the facts or recommendations in the 
annual report.  Similarly, at no time during this hearing did 
the GAL or opposing attorney offer any additional information or 
recommendations regarding Goldie H.'s placement.  And at no time 
during this hearing did the circuit court make any findings of 
fact relating to Goldie H.'s continued placement.  
In contrast to the majority, I fail to see that this 
hearing provided Goldie H. with any additional protection 
against wrongful placement.  If a hearing such as this——which in 
no way addresses the propriety of the protectively-placed 
individual's continued placement——is all that is necessary to 
meet the hearing requirement that the majority grafts onto 
Watts, I cannot help but conclude that the majority's hearing 
requirement ultimately may benefit no one but the attorneys paid 
to be present at such hearings.    
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¶60 This does not mean that hearings never should be 
required.  See majority op. at ¶30.  To be sure, for exactly the 
reasons that the majority posits in ¶¶30-31 of its opinion, 
many——if not most——cases will require a hearing.  But it does 
not follow from this fact that a hearing is necessary in every 
case.  
¶61 In accordance with Watts, I would leave the decisions 
of whether to hold a hearing and, if a hearing is necessary, 
what type of hearing to hold, within the sound discretion of the 
circuit court.  Where, as in the present case, the GAL provides 
the circuit court with a report supported by overwhelming 
evidence in favor of continued placement and there is absolutely 
no contested issue before the court, a hearing merely would 
involve the GAL reciting to the court the evidence in his or her 
annual report.  I see no need to spend our limited court 
resources and taxpayer money for this type of superfluity.  In 
such circumstances, the interests of judicial economy outweigh 
the need for what ultimately will be an empty formality.  Watts 
does not compel circuit courts to hold hearings on the record 
merely to hold hearings on the record. 
¶62 For the reasons set out above, while I agree with the 
majority that this case need not be remanded for a hearing on 
Goldie H.'s continued placement, I do not agree with the court's 
holding that——with the exception of the present case——a hearing 
is necessary in every annual review.  Accordingly, while I 
concur with the majority's disposition of the present case, I 
disagree in part with its reasoning. 
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