Case Title: Maria Soto v.Lisa Scaringelli and James Scaringelli

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-17-06

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Soto sued the Scaringellis, who then moved for summary judgment following completion of discovery. In part, the Scaringellis alleged that the observable results from Soto s surgery were insufficient to vault the significant disfigurement or significant scarring threshold. Addressing the standard to be applied, the motion court noted that it had to make a determination as to whether or not any reasonable find[er] of fact, in a group of six people in this courtroom, would . . . find, that this is a scar of some significance, that it qualifies[.] Applying that standard, the motion court concluded that the scar was not readily discernible or readily apparent and that unless somebody were looking with great particularity at that shoulder, under a good strong light, that scar is not visible . . . Furthermore, the motion court did not find that the hardware in her shoulder is of any consequence in this evaluation[,] concluding that I do not see any deformity, any bulges, and so forth, in her shoulder. Based on those conclusions, the motion court granted the Scaringellis motion for summary judgment. Soto appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed and remanded the case for trial. The panel was uncertain whether the motion court had applied the proper summary judgment standard and, exercising its original jurisdiction, further determined that the scarring/disfigurement is not so insubstantial that no rational fact-finder could determine that it does not impair plaintiff s appearance, rendering her unsightly, misshapen, or imperfect. The Supreme Court granted the Scaringellis petition for certification. HELD: No rational fact-finder would find that plaintiff s scar or surgically implanted plate and screw constituted disfigurement or scarring sufficiently significant to justify vaulting the limitation on lawsuit threshold of New Jersey s Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act of 1998 (AICRA), thus overriding AICRA s exemption from liability. 1. In this case of first impression, the Court s task is to ascertain the Legislature s intent when it defined significant disfigurement or significant scarring as a category that vaults AICRA s verbal threshold and permits recovery. The Court first addresses the standard to be applied to Soto s claim that she is entitled to suit under AICRA either because the scar on her left shoulder constitutes significant scarring, or because the metal plate and screw surgically implanted in her shoulder constitute significant disfigurement. The Court then addresses the Scaringellis contention in respect of the quantum of proofs adduced in the record in respect of Soto s claims. In doing so, the Court applies that standard to the record on appeal. (Pp. 10-12) 2. Among the categories permitted to vault AICRA s limitation on lawsuit threshold are those cases, similar to this, involving a claim of significant disfigurement or significant scarring. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a. Although susceptible to a plain language interpretation, the terms significant disfigurement or significant scarring can be construed to have a special or accepted meaning in the law[.] Save for a reference in a colloquy between legislators to the effect that AICRA was patterned after comparable Florida law, nothing in the statute s legislative history or jurisprudence breathes life into that phrase. Guidance can be gleaned from pre-AICRA cases and seemingly parallel workers compensation settings, as well as actions brought under the Tort Claims Act provisions that limit recovery against a public entity for, among other things, permanent disfigurement. The Court sees no difference between the standard to be applied for overcoming the verbal threshold in no-fault automobile cases under AICRA, and the now well-known standard applied in pre-AICRA permanent significant disfigurement cases, pre-AICRA significant disfigurement cases, or permanent disfigurement cases under the Tort Claims Act. Therefore, the Court holds that, to satisfy the limitation on lawsuit threshold of AICRA in respect of either significant disfigurement or significant scarring, a plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that, on an objective basis, the disfigurement or scarring substantially impair[s] or injure[s] the beauty, symmetry, or appearance of a person, rendering the bearer unsightly, misshapen or imperfect, deforming her in some manner. The Court further holds that, in making that objective determination, a number of factors are relevant, including appearance, coloration, existence and size of the scar, as well as shape, characteristics of the surrounding skin, remnants of the healing process, and any other cosmetically important matters. (Pp. 12-19) 3. In order to resist a claim that a plaintiff s injuries do not vault AICRA s significant disfigurement or significant scarring limitation on lawsuit threshold, a plaintiff, at a bare minimum, must (1) present the plaintiff s disfigurement or scarring for direct observation by the trial court; (2) ensure that the record contains the trial court s description of the disfigurement or scarring; and (3) create and preserve for meaningful appellate review an accurate photographic record of the plaintiff s claimed disfigurement or scarring. In this case, however, the Appellate Division did not remand the matter for the development of the record. Instead, the panel opted to exercise its original jurisdiction in reversing the trial court. The Supreme Court disagrees. Requiring that the record on appeal contain both the motion court s description of its observations as well as preserved visual evidence of the scar or deformity claimed by a plaintiff to qualify as significant disfigurement or significant scarring allows for a more meaningful appellate review than what is provided by a description alone. The Court concludes that no rational fact-finder would find that plaintiff s scar or surgically implanted plate and screw constituted disfigurement or scarring sufficiently significant to justify vaulting AICRA s limitation on lawsuit threshold and, thus overriding AICRA s exemption from liability. The Court concludes that no rational fact-finder could find that plaintiff s scar or surgically implanted plate and screw rendered plaintiff s appearance unattractive, objectionable, or as the subject of pity or scorn, or that they, individually or collectively, substantially detract from plaintiff s appearance or impair or injure plaintiff s beauty, symmetry, or appearance so as to render her unsightly, misshapen, or imperfect. In those circumstances, only one legal conclusion is statutorily mandated: defendants are exempted from tort liability for noneconomic loss to [plaintiff.] (Pp. 19-24) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the judgment of the Law Division granting summary judgment in favor of defendants is REINSTATED. CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE, and HOENS join in JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO s opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 17 September Term 2006 MARIA SOTO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LISA SCARINGELLI and JAMES SCARINGELLI, Defendants-Appellants. Argued January 3, 2007 Decided March 21, 2007 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 384 N.J. Super. 431 (2006). Scott L. Puro argued the cause for appellants (Backes & Hill, attorneys; Mr. Puro and Robert C. Billmeier, on the brief). Albert P. Mollo argued the cause for respondent. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO delivered the opinion of the Court. New Jersey s compulsory automobile insurance statutory scheme distinguishes between those who seek recovery for economic loss -- uncompensated loss of income or property, or other uncompensated expenses, including, but not limited to, medical expenses[,] N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2k -- and those who seek recovery for nonecomonic loss -- that is, loss for pain, suffering and inconvenience[,] N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2i. The noneconomic loss category of cases is further defined. If the verbal threshold See footnote 1 or limitation on lawsuit option applies, an injured person may not maintain a lawsuit for nonecomonic damages unless that person has sustained a bodily injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement or significant scarring; displaced fractures; loss of a fetus; or a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a. If, however, the verbal threshold or limitation on lawsuit option does not apply, every owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of an automobile . . . and every person or organization legally responsible for his acts or omissions, shall be liable for noneconomic loss to a person . . . as a result of bodily injury, arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of such automobile in this State. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8b. In this appeal, we are called on to define, in the context of a plaintiff s appearance, what level of disfigurement or scarring is significant, that is, what degree of disfigurement or scarring is required to overcome the bar to recovery for noneconomic loss set forth in the limitation on lawsuit option provisions of the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act of 1998 (AICRA), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a. On summary judgment, the trial court ruled that the claimed injuries were insufficient to constitute significant disfigurement or significant scarring. The Appellate Division, exercising its original jurisdiction and relying on Gilhooley v. County of Union, 164 N.J. 533, 546 (2000), reversed, concluding that the scarring/disfigurement is not so insubstantial that no rational fact-finder could determine that it does not impair plaintiff s appearance, rendering her unsightly, misshapen, or imperfect. Soto v. Scaringelli, 384 N.J. Super. 431, 438 (App. Div. 2006) (citation, quotation marks and editing marks omitted). We disagree. We earlier explained that an automobile accident victim who is subject to the threshold and sues for noneconomic damages has to satisfy only one of AICRA s six threshold categories[.] DiProspero v. Penn, supra, 183 N.J. at 481-82. In respect of the significant disfigurement or significant scarring statutory threshold applicable to a plaintiff s appearance, we hold that the threshold is satisfied only if an objectively reasonable person would regard the scar or disfigurement as substantially detracting from the automobile accident victim s appearance, or so impairing or injuring the beauty, symmetry, or appearance of a person as to render him or her unsightly, misshapen, or imperfect. Applying that standard, we also hold that the trial court properly concluded that injuries claimed did not satisfy the significant disfigurement or significant scarring statutory threshold. Finally, we hold that, in the future and as a condition precedent to meaningful appellate review, a plaintiff who seeks to resist a defense based on that threshold bears the burden of establishing a proper record. That record must include the trial court s direct observations and description of the disfigurement or scarring alleged to be significant, together with an accurate photographic record thereof. In respect of plaintiff s claim of significant disfigurement, plaintiff explained that there is another issue, here[] with disfigurement, . . . that she has a metal plate and a screw, which is palpable through the skin, all of which are noted for the Court, in Dr. Shapiro s report, the plastic surgeon. Responding to the motion court s remark that visually, it s not noticeable[,] plaintiff asserted that her anatomy has been disfigured, . . . she has a plate and a screw, which [were] not there before, which [are] now palpable through her flesh[.] Addressing the standard to be applied, the motion court noted that it had to make a determination as to whether or not any reasonable find[er] of fact, in a group of six people in this courtroom, would . . . find, that this is a scar of some significance, that it qualifies[.] Applying that standard to plaintiff s scarring claim, the motion court concluded as follows: As I viewed the shoulder of the plaintiff today, the left shoulder area, there is a scar, it may be as much as four inches in length, See footnote 4 it is not readily discernible. I was within three feet of her . . . I did make out a line, it was very thin, apparently a very good surgeon. I ve seen lots of scars in my time, and this is a terrific, terrific job. It was not readily apparent to me, it took some looking before I was able to see the scar there. There are some other blemishes on the shoulder, as well, life blemishes, if you will, I don t know what caused those. They were more apparent, frankly, to me, than the scar, but not of any significance, I mean, but unless somebody were looking with great particularity at that shoulder, under a good strong light, that scar is not visible, it doesn t have any keloid features to it at all, it is very thin, it s a little lighter than the surrounding skin[.] In respect of plaintiff s disfigurement claim, the motion court did not find that the hardware in her shoulder is of any consequence in this evaluation[,] concluding that I do not see any deformity, any bulges, and so forth, in her shoulder. Based on those conclusions, the motion court granted defendants motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed and remanded the case for trial. Soto v. Scaringelli, supra, 384 N.J. at 439. According to the panel, it was uncertain whether the motion court applied the proper summary judgment standard, that is, the no rational fact-finder standard. Id. at 438 (citing Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 535); see also Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 523 (defining summary judgment standard as whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party ). The panel, exercising its original jurisdiction pursuant to R. 2:10-5, further determined that the scarring/disfigurement is not so insubstantial that no rational fact-finder could determine that it does not impair plaintiff s appearance, rendering her unsightly, misshapen, or imperfect. Soto v. Scaringelli, supra, 384 N.J. Super. at 438 (citation, quotation marks and editing marks omitted). The Appellate Division cautioned, however, that it did not hold that summary judgment is never appropriate in scarring/disfigurement cases. Clearly there can be scars that are so minimal and so concealed from view that no reasonable person could find them significant. Ibid. The panel explained that, while it did not find that to be the case here[,] a jury may yet find that plaintiff s scarring is not significant. Id. at 438-39. For that reason, the Appellate Division express[ed] no view on that prospect. Ibid. Defendants sought certification, and we granted their petition. 188 N.J. 218 (2006). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division, and we reinstate the judgment of the motion court. [Id. at 492 (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted).] Our inquiry is not without limits, as [a] court should not resort to extrinsic interpretative aids when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and susceptible to only one interpretation. On the other hand, if there is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to more than one plausible interpretation, we may turn to extrinsic evidence, including legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction. We may also resort to extrinsic evidence if a plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd result or if the overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language. [Id. at 492-93 (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted).] The point of departure of our analysis is clear: it begins with the plain language of the statute. Id. at 493 (citing Miah v. Ahmed, 179 N.J. 511, 520 (2004)). We address first the standard to be applied to plaintiff s claim that she is entitled to suit under AICRA either because the scar on her left shoulder constitutes significant scarring, or because the metal plate and screw surgically implanted in her shoulder constitute significant disfigurement. We then address defendants contention in respect of the quantum of proofs adduced in the record in respect of plaintiff s claims. In doing so, we apply that standard to the record on appeal. [N.J.S.A. 1:1-1.] Although susceptible to a plain language interpretation, the terms significant disfigurement or significant scarring can be construed to have a special or accepted meaning in the law[.] Therefore, we turn to extrinsic evidence, including legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction. DiProspero v. Penn, supra, 183 N.J. at 492-93. Save for a reference in a colloquy between legislators to the effect that AICRA was patterned after comparable Florida law, id. at 501, nothing in the statute s legislative history breathes life into that phrase. However, because of that reference, we have also looked to that state s jurisprudence for guidance in defining significant disfigurement or significant scarring. See Van Horn v. William Blanchard Co., 88 N.J. 91, 97 (1981) (holding that [a] legislative enactment patterned after a statute of another state is ordinarily adopted with the prior constructions placed on it by the highest court of the parent jurisdiction ). That search, too, proved fruitless. Guidance can be gleaned from pre-AICRA cases and seemingly parallel workers compensation settings. In Falcone v. Branker, 135 N.J. Super. 137 (Law. Div. 1975), the court defined the term permanent significant disfigurement -- the term appearing in AICRA s predecessor statute -- by adopting the definition announced by the Supreme Court of Illinois in an early workmen s compensation case: The act does not provide compensation for every mark or scar, nor for every disfigurement. A disfigurement is that which impairs or injures the beauty, symmetry, or appearance of a person or thing; that which renders unsightly, misshapen, or imperfect, or deforms in some manner. [T]hat disfigurement must be both permanent and serious. It was certainly not intended under this provision to authorize compensation for every trifling mark that could be discovered by the closest inspection. [Id. at 144-45 (quoting Superior Mining Co. v. Indus. Comm n, 141 N.E. 165, 166 (Ill. 1923).] The Falcone court concluded that the use of the word serious, as opposed to our statute s significant disfigurement, [is] a distinction without a substantive difference. Id. at 145. Applying the canon of construction noscitur a sociis -- that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it[,] Black s Law Dictionary 184 (7th ed. 1999) -- the Falcone court noted that the associated words [of New Jersey s no-fault automobile insurance statute] all connote injuries of a substantial nature. Falcone v. Branker, supra, 135 N.J. Super. at 147. It explained that the disfigurement must be more than a trifling mark discoverable on close inspection, and that a disfigurement becomes serious when it substantially detracts from the appearance of the person disfigured in order to vault the verbal threshold of New Jersey s no-fault automobile insurance act. Ibid. More recently, the Appellate Division defined the term significant disfigurement, which replaced the term permanent significant disfigurement in the 1988 amendments to the no-fault automobile insurance statute. L. 1988, c. 119, 6. In Puso v. Kenyon, 272 N.J. Super. 280 (App. Div. 1994), the Appellate Division defined as significant a scar or disfigurement if a reasonable person viewing the plaintiff s [condition] in its altered state would regard the condition as unattractive, objectionable, or as the subject of pity or scorn[.] Id. at 288 (quoting Agudelo v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 460 N.Y.S.2d 416, 419 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983). The Puso court further explained the test is objective proof of injury and consequent disability; it is not a subjective standard. Id. at 291 (quotation and editing marks omitted). It noted that the factors relevant to this standard are [f]rom an objective, empirical standpoint, the appearance, coloration, existence and size of the plaintiff s scars are undisputed matters of fact. These factors, along with shape, characteristics of surrounding skin, the remnants of the healing process, and the factors which may be developed as being cosmetically important on a case-by-case basis, are all objective factors which may be utilized by the court in considering whether the scar is significant in a summary judgment motion in a verbal threshold case. Presumably many scars will not require judicial analysis. . . . Those scars which are subject to judicial analysis on a tort threshold motion must be scrutinized objectively by the court. [Ibid. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).] The Appellate Division made clear that a plaintiff intending to resist a motion for summary judgment as to a scar injury must appear in court on the return day of the motion and that [o]bviously a personal appearance before the court, either in open court or in camera, will be the optimum. Ibid. The Puso court also allowed that, [i]n lieu of a personal appearance, professional-quality photographs authenticated as to date or a professional-quality videotape may be sufficiently reliable for submission to the court. Id. at 292. In the end, however, [t]he court s observations, which should in every case be articulated, . . . will serve as the predicate for a determination whether the scar is objectively significantly disfiguring so as to defeat defendant s motion for summary judgment. Ibid. The standard for scarring/disfigurement adopted in Falcone and later ratified in Puso also has been applied to actions brought under the Tort Claims Act provisions that limit recovery against a public entity for, among other things, permanent disfigurement. N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). Thus, in Hammer v. Twp. of Livingston, 318 N.J. Super. 298, 308 (App. Div. 1999), the Appellate Division expressly adopted the Falcone standard in the Tort Claims Act setting, stating that [t]o determine whether a scar constitutes disfigurement, we apply the definition used in Falcone[.] As the Hammer court noted, we apply an objective standard for determining whether a scar is a permanent significant disfigurement under New Jersey's original no-fault statute and that [t]hat standard informs our decision here. Ibid. In the context of Tort Claims Act cases, we too have adopted the Falcone/Hammer objective standard, holding that, in order to be considered a permanent disfigurement, a scar must impair or injure the beauty, symmetry, or appearance of a person, rendering the bearer unsightly, misshapen or imperfect, deforming her in some manner. Gilhooley v. County of Union, 164 N.J. 533, 544 (2000). Further, in the application of that standard, we have explained that a number of factors should be considered, including appearance, coloration, existence and size of the scar, as well as, shape, characteristics of the surrounding skin, remnants of the healing process, and any other cosmetically important matters. Ibid. We see no meaningful difference between the standard to be applied for overcoming the verbal threshold in no-fault automobile cases under AICRA, and the now well-known standard applied in pre-AICRA permanent significant disfigurement cases (Falcone), pre-AICRA significant disfigurement cases (Puso), or permanent disfigurement cases under the Tort Claims Act (Hammer and Gilhooley). Therefore, we explicitly adopt Falcone s and Puso s standard and hold that, to satisfy the limitation on lawsuit threshold of AICRA in respect of either significant disfigurement or significant scarring, a plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that, on an objective basis, the disfigurement or scarring substantially impair[s] or injure[s] the beauty, symmetry, or appearance of a person, rendering the bearer unsightly, misshapen or imperfect, deforming her in some manner. Gilhooley, supra, 164 N.J. at 544. We further hold that, in making that objective determination, a number of factors are relevant, including appearance, coloration, existence and size of the scar, as well as, shape, characteristics of the surrounding skin, remnants of the healing process, and any other cosmetically important matters. Ibid. Because our application of this standard and its factors to this case is informed by the state of the record before us, we address next the quantum of proofs presented to the motion court, and then gauge those proofs in respect of the standard on summary judgment. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-17 SEPTEMBER TERM 2006 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court MARIA SOTO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LISA SCARINGELLI and JAMES SCARINGELLI, Defendants-Appellants. DECIDED March 21, 2007 Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY