Case Title: Rodriguez v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC15-1795

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-1795 
____________ 
 
JUAN DAVID RODRIGUEZ, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[April 20, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before this Court on appeal from an order denying a motion to 
vacate a sentence of death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We 
have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.  For the 
reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment and sentence. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The instant case is Juan David Rodriguez’s second successive 
postconviction appeal.  “Juan David Rodriguez was convicted of first-degree 
murder, armed robbery, conspiracy to commit a felony, attempted armed robbery, 
armed burglary with an assault, aggravated assault, and attempted first-degree 
 
 
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murder.”  Rodriguez v. State (Rodriguez I), 609 So. 2d 493, 495 (Fla. 1992).  
Rodriguez’s convictions stem from a shooting at a shopping center on May 13, 
1988, and an attempted home invasion robbery the next day.  The facts are 
summarized in detail in Rodriguez’s direct appeal.  Id. at 495-97.  We briefly 
discuss the facts as they relate to Rodriguez’s postconviction claims. 
Seeking to discharge a debt, Rodriguez led Ramon Fernandez and Carlos 
“Tata” Sponsa to a shopping center.  Id. at 495.  Rodriguez accosted Abelardo 
Saladrigas in the shopping center parking lot, shot him, and took his watch and 
briefcase, which held cash and a revolver.  Id. at 496.  Saladrigas died after 
hospitalization.  Id.  Eye-witnesses observed the attack and the men fleeing in a 
blue Mazda.  Id. at 495. 
The next day, Rodriguez joined Fernandez, Sponsa, and several other men at 
a residence to stage a home invasion robbery.  Rodriguez v. State (Rodriguez II), 
919 So. 2d 1252, 1259 (Fla. 2005).  On the way to the residence, Rodriguez told 
Sergio Valdez about the shooting in the shopping center parking lot.  Id.  The 
owner of the residence averted the home invasion by firing a gun at the men.  Id.  
Fernandez dropped the stolen revolver from the previous day as the men ran from 
the home.  Id. at 1260.  When arrested, Fernandez confessed, told police about his 
role in the shopping center shooting, and described Rodriguez’s involvement.  Id.  
Rodriguez was arrested, charged, and found guilty of all charges.  Id. 
 
 
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Prior to the penalty phase, Rodriguez moved for appointment of a mental 
health expert to evaluate him for mitigation, and the trial court granted the motion.  
Id. at 1270.  Dr. Leonard Haber testified that Rodriguez claimed to have left school 
after the first grade to work and that he demonstrated a lack of effort during Dr. 
Haber’s evaluation.  Id.  Dr. Haber found signs that Rodriguez might be brain 
damaged, but determined that “the activities in which Rodriguez engaged . . . 
belied a finding of [intellectual disability].”  Id. at 1265.  Dr. Haber suggested 
further testing, which Dr. Noble David conducted and which revealed that 
Rodriguez was normal. 
The penalty phase began on March 25, 1990: 
 
Rodriguez was found guilty of all charges which were tried 
together.  By a vote of twelve to zero the jury recommended that he be 
sentenced to death in connection with the Saladrigas murder.  The 
court followed this recommendation, finding three aggravating 
factors: 1) prior conviction of violent felony; 2) the murder was 
committed during a robbery and for financial gain; and 3) the murder 
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and one nonstatutory 
mitigating factor: Rodriguez had a good marriage and family life. 
 
Rodriguez I, 609 So. 2d at 497.  Rodriguez raised multiple claims related to his 
guilt and penalty phases on direct appeal,1 and this Court affirmed his death 
sentence.  Id. at 501. 
                                          
 
 
1.  Rodriguez raised the following guilt phase claims on direct appeal: 
 
(1) It was error to compel him to proceed without the presence of a 
defense witness and to refuse to permit him to introduce that witness’s 
 
 
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Rodriguez filed his initial postconviction motion on September 12, 1994, 
and filed amended motions in October 1995, April 1997, and July 1997.2  
                                          
 
prior deposition testimony; 2) it was fundamental error to conduct a 
joint trial for the first-degree murder and the charges stemming from 
the attempted home invasion; 3) it was error to admit the victim’s 
sister-in-law’s identification testimony; and 4) inadmissible hearsay 
testimony was introduced to improperly bolster the testimony of the 
State’s chief witnesses. 
 
Rodriguez I, 609 So. 2d at 497.  Rodriguez raised the following penalty phase 
claims: 
(1) the death penalty is disproportionate in this case; 2) the 
prosecutor’s comments on the defendant’s demeanor off the witness 
stand rendered the sentencing proceedings unfair; 3) the homicide 
was not heinous, atrocious, or cruel; 4) the sentencing order is 
deficient and reflects that the trial court failed to consider certain 
mitigating factors; 5) the trial court considered the impassioned pleas 
of family members, contrary to Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 
(1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); and 
6) Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional.  
 
Id. at 500. 
 
2.  Rodriguez raised 12 issues regarding the original denial of postconviction 
relief and three claims relating to relinquishment of jurisdiction: 
(1) [T]he trial court erred in denying a new penalty phase where the 
evidentiary hearing showed that trial counsel failed to investigate and 
present mental health mitigation and the mental health expert rendered 
inadequate mental health assistance; (2) the trial court erred in 
allowing the State to prepare the sentencing order; (3) the trial court 
erred in summarily denying his claims of a Brady[ v. Maryland, 37 
U.S. 83 (1963)] violation based on the State’s failure to disclose 
information concerning Tata, an Ake[ v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 
(1985)] violation based on failure to provide him with an adequate 
mental health evaluation, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
based on counsel’s failure to investigate or prepare for trial, to request 
 
 
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Rodriguez II, 919 So. 2d at 1260.  Following a Huff3 hearing, the circuit court 
granted an evidentiary hearing on two ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims 
relating to his alleged intellectual disability.  Id. at 1260-61.  Both Dr. Haber, who 
evaluated Rodriguez for trial, and Dr. Latterner, who evaluated Rodriguez for his 
postconviction claims, testified at the hearing.  Id. at 1275.  Dr. Latterner’s 
evaluation contradicted Dr. Haber’s findings.   
                                          
 
a severance of offenses, and to object to various other errors at trial; 
(4) Rodriguez was denied effective assistance of counsel due to the 
failure of various agencies to comply with his public records requests; 
(5) the trial judge displayed judicial bias at trial and during the 
postconviction proceedings; (6) trial counsel was ineffective in failing 
to object to jury instructions regarding the aggravating circumstances, 
burden shifting, the jury’s responsibility for sentencing, and an 
automatic aggravating circumstance; (7) prosecutorial misconduct 
occurred during the closing argument; (8) the Florida death penalty 
statute is unconstitutional; (9) an incomplete record on direct appeal 
led to ineffective assistance of counsel; (10) the Rule Regulating the 
Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4) prohibition on communication with jurors 
restricts Rodriguez’s access to the courts; (11) impermissible victim 
impact was considered in Rodriguez’s sentencing; and (12) Rodriguez 
did not receive a fundamentally fair trial because of cumulative error. 
. . . (13) [T]he trial judge should have disqualified himself from 
presiding over Rodriguez’s original postconviction proceedings; (14) 
he was not afforded a full and fair hearing on the sentencing order 
issue during relinquishment of jurisdiction; and (15) the trial court 
erred in denying him relief on the merits of the sentencing order issue 
after the evidentiary hearing. 
Rodriguez II, 919 So. 2d at 1262. 
 
3.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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Dr. Latterner assessed Rodriguez with an IQ score of 64, found he was likely 
to have been born intellectually disabled, and opined that Rodriguez had difficulty 
appreciating the criminality of his actions and conforming his behavior to the law.  
Id. at 1265-66.  Based on the conflicting expert testimony and Rodriguez’s 
courtroom behavior, which demonstrated awareness and understanding of the 
proceedings, the circuit court found that while Rodriguez had a low IQ, he was not 
intellectually disabled.  Id. at 1266.  This Court concluded that because Rodriguez 
was not intellectually disabled, he could not establish that any alleged deficiency of 
trial counsel prejudiced him for the purposes of his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.  Id. at 1267.  This Court also denied Rodriguez’s petition for 
habeas corpus relief. 4  Id. at 1259. 
 
The circuit court summarily denied Rodriguez’s first successive 
postconviction motion.5  This Court remanded the summary denial for an 
                                          
 
 
4.  In his habeas petition, “Rodriguez raise[d] several claims of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel.  He also question[ed] this Court’s harmless error 
analysis on direct appeal and ask[ed] this Court to revisit the constitutionality of 
his indictment in light of the subsequent decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).”  Rodriguez II, 919 
So. 2d at 1262. 
 
5.  Rodriguez’s first successive postconviction motion raised two claims: (1) 
Rodriguez is intellectually disabled under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); 
and (2) Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203 violates the Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Rodriguez II, 919 So. 
2d at 1267. 
 
 
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evidentiary hearing on Rodriguez’s intellectual disability claim.  Rodriguez v. 
State (Rodriguez III), 968 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 2007) (table).  The circuit court held the 
evidentiary hearing on January 3, 2011, and subsequently denied relief.  Rodriguez 
appealed, and this Court determined that Rodriguez failed to demonstrate adaptive 
behavior deficits or a reliable IQ score below 70.  Rodriguez v. State (Rodriguez 
IV), 2013 WL 462069 (Fla. Feb. 6, 2013). 
 
On December 19, 2013, Rodriguez filed a habeas petition in the Southern 
District of Florida, which was ultimately denied after the Southern District denied 
a motion to stay pending the determination of Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 
(2014).  Order Denying Petition, Rodriguez v. State, Case No. 13-cv-62567 (S.D. 
Fla. Jan. 4, 2016).  Rodriguez filed a second successive motion for postconviction 
relief on May 26, 2015.  Rodriguez claimed that Hall entitled him to further litigate 
his intellectual disability claim.     
The circuit court conducted a Huff hearing on his intellectual disability 
claim at which Rodriguez agreed that he had presented evidence regarding all the 
elements of intellectual disability in prior proceedings.  Rodriguez claimed that he 
was entitled to a new evidentiary hearing under Hall because Hall made improper 
the requirement of concurrent adaptive deficits to establish intellectual disability.  
Over the State’s objection, the circuit court allowed Rodriguez to file a 
memorandum of law containing additional arguments following the Huff hearing.   
 
 
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Rodriguez’s subsequent memorandum argued that he had satisfied all 
pleading requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and that 
evidence from his prior hearings had been improperly evaluated under Hall.  The 
circuit court summarily denied the second successive postconviction motion, 
finding that Rodriguez’s prior evidentiary hearing on intellectual disability and 
other proceedings provided him with the full protections afforded by Atkins and 
Hall. 
ANALYSIS 
Rodriguez appealed the circuit court’s denial of his Hall claim on February 
19, 2016.  Rodriguez also filed in this Court a motion requesting permission for 
supplemental briefing on Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), which was 
decided January 12, 2016.  This Court allowed the supplemental briefing, and 
Rodriguez challenged his death sentence as unconstitutional under Hurst.  We 
address both Rodriguez’s Hall and Hurst claims. 
I.  Whether Rodriguez is Entitled to Relief under Hall 
 
Rodriguez argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to grant an 
evidentiary hearing on his intellectual disability claim.  A circuit court may 
summarily deny a claim if it is legally insufficient or positively refuted by the 
record.  Mann v. State, 112 So. 3d 1158, 1161 (Fla. 2013).  A decision on whether 
 
 
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to grant an evidentiary hearing for a successive postconviction motion is a pure 
question of law reviewed de novo.  Id. at 1162. 
This Court has determined that Hall is retroactive under Witt v. State, 387 
So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980).  Walls v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S466, S469 (Fla. Oct. 
20, 2016).  Thus, we must determine whether Hall requires relief in this case.  Hall 
established that Florida courts should allow defendants with IQ scores above 70 to 
present evidence of the other prongs of intellectual disability at an evidentiary 
hearing.  This Court has also interpreted Hall to mean that no single factor may be 
dispositive and that “if one of the prongs is relatively less strong, a finding of 
intellectual disability may still be warranted based on the strength of the other 
prongs.”  Oats v. State, 181 So. 3d 457, 467-68 (Fla. 2015).  Rodriguez argues that 
Hall also requires postconviction courts to make all determinations, including 
credibility findings, in a manner deferential to the standards of the medical 
community and that the use of those standards entitles him to a new evidentiary 
hearing.   
In summarily denying the claim, the circuit court below considered the 
entire record and the evidence presented at Rodriguez’s July 20, 2015, Huff 
hearing.  The circuit court determined that Rodriguez received the full benefit of 
the protection provided by Atkins and Hall in prior proceedings.  To determine 
whether summary denial was appropriate, this Court must determine whether Hall 
 
 
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requires increased deference to the standards of the medical community.  We also 
consider whether the record conclusively refutes Rodriguez’s claim that the circuit 
court below improperly relied upon one single factor and it was dispositive in 
violation of Oats and Hall.  Finally, we consider whether Rodriguez is entitled to a 
new evidentiary hearing based on the changes in Hall in light of similar cases. 
A.  Whether Hall Requires Courts to Make Credibility Findings in 
Accordance with Medical Authorities  
 
Rodriguez contends that his prior evidentiary hearing does not comport with 
Hall because the circuit court made credibility findings that conflict with medical 
standards not in evidence.  Specifically, Rodriguez contends that credibility 
findings made by the circuit court contradict medical standards detailed in a 
publication of the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities (AAIDD).  See American Association on Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities, The Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability, 
(Edward A. Polloway, ed., 2015).  Rodriguez also contends that Cardona v. State, 
185 So. 3d 514 (Fla. 2016), supports his position because it held that a circuit court 
wrongfully discarded the opinions of medical experts in evaluating intellectual 
disability.  Id. at 527.  Rodriguez further argues that he is entitled to a new 
evidentiary hearing because Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 2007), guided the 
previous determination regarding his disability in violation of Hall.  We affirm the 
 
 
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summary denial below because Rodriguez’s claims are conclusively refuted by the 
record.  See Mann, 112 So. 3d at 1162. 
The language Rodriguez cites in Hall does not stand for the proposition that 
credibility findings are improper when they conflict with medical standards.  
Instead, the language justifies the expansion of Florida’s definition of intellectual 
disability to encompass more individuals than just those with full-scale IQ scores 
below 70.  See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1993-95.  Hall looks to the medical community 
“[t]o determine if Florida’s cutoff rule is valid,” but does not change credibility 
determinations in intellectual disability proceedings.  Id. at 1993.  The United 
States Supreme Court has clarified that “Hall indicated that being informed by the 
medical community does not demand adherence to everything stated in the latest 
medical guide.”  Moore v. Texas, 2017 WL 1136278, slip op. at 10 (March 28, 
2017).6  This Court does not reweigh evidence or second guess a circuit court’s 
credibility determinations.  Nixon v. State, 2 So. 3d 137, 141 (Fla. 2009) (quoting 
Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 146, 149 (Fla. 2007)).   
Even if Hall increases deference to medical standards as Rodriguez claims, 
the circuit court in the prior proceeding weighed the testimony of multiple experts 
                                          
 
 
6.  Unlike the defendant in Moore, Rodriguez’s intellectual disability was 
evaluated under “the generally accepted, uncontroversial intellectual-disability 
diagnostic definition,” and this Court follows the same three-part standard.  Moore, 
2017 WL 1136278, slip op. at 6. 
 
 
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and made its findings based on competent, substantial evidence.  See Rodriguez 
IV, 110 So. 3d at 441.  Dr. Weinstein evaluated Rodriguez’s IQ using the Mexican 
WAIS-III test and United States norms and testified that he believed Rodriguez 
was intellectually disabled.  Dr. Suarez opined that the appropriate test for a Cuban 
immigrant like Rodriguez was not the Mexican WAIS-III but the Spanish version 
because Cuban culture more closely aligns with Spanish culture.  Dr. Suarez 
further opined that the proper way to accommodate Rodriguez using the Mexican 
WAIS-III would be to use Mexican norms to obtain scaled scores and United 
States norms to calculate the final score.  Dr. Suarez also testified that according to 
his tests, Rodriguez was malingering and that none of his IQ scores below 70 were 
reliable.  Doctors Tasse and Oakland also offered expert opinions on evaluating 
intellectual disability. 
The circuit court ultimately found Dr. Suarez’s testimony most credible.  
The circuit court agreed that the Mexican WAIS-III test administered by Dr. 
Weinstein was unreliable because Rodriguez was not a member of the population 
with whom the test is intended to be used.  The circuit court also determined that 
the IQ scores obtained by Dr. Suarez were unreliable because of Rodriguez’s 
malingering.  The circuit court also found that Rodriguez had not provided 
sufficient evidence to establish adaptive functioning deficits or onset before age 
 
 
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18.  This Court does not reweigh evidence or second guess credibility findings on 
appeal.  See Nixon, 2 So. 3d at 141.   
Contrary to Rodriguez’s claim, the circuit court did not disregard his IQ 
scores by simply ignoring expert opinions as occurred in Cardona, 185 So. 3d at 
526-27.  In Cardona, the circuit court disregarded tests that experts recommended 
for the Spanish-speaking, Cuban defendant based solely on the translation of tests 
from English to Spanish.  Id. at 525-27.  The circuit court in Cardona followed a 
rigid interpretation of the Florida Administrative Code, which permits only 
“specific tests . . . interpreted by trained personnel in conformance with the 
instructions provided by the producer of the test,” rather than accepting the 
accommodations the experts “considered acceptable in the field in order to provide 
the best estimate possible as to [the defendant’s] IQ, in light of the fact that the 
tests available to them were not as reliable in this situation.”  Id. at 526.  The trial 
court in Cardona also failed to perform “a comprehensive analysis of all three 
prongs [of intellectual disability] as set forth in Hall and its progeny.”  Id. at 527.  
The circuit court’s evaluation of Rodriguez’s scores in this case does not suffer 
from the same errors.   
Unlike Cardona, the circuit court in this case did not evaluate the IQ scores 
based on a strict reading of the Florida Administrative Code, but a careful 
weighing of all the evidence presented.  The circuit court concluded that Dr. 
 
 
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Weinstein’s administration of the test was unreliable based on Dr. Suarez’s expert 
testimony about proper accommodations.  The circuit court found the score Dr. 
Suarez obtained unreliable because of Rodriguez’s malingering.  The circuit court 
noted that even if the scores below 70 were reliable, Rodriguez had not 
demonstrated adaptive deficits or onset before age 18.  The circuit court also 
considered all three prongs of intellectual disability, further distinguishing this case 
from Cardona. 
Finally, Rodriguez contends that he is entitled to a new hearing because 
Jones, 966 So. 2d 319, guided the evaluation of his intellectual disability in a 
manner contradicting standard medical practices and, therefore, is in violation of 
Hall.  In Jones, we rejected the argument that “in determining whether a person 
experiences deficits in adaptive functioning, only the person’s childhood behavior 
is considered,” in favor of evaluating both long-term and current adaptive 
functioning.  Id. at 325-27.  Medical standards indicate that experts cannot 
accurately evaluate adaptive functioning in a prison setting.  See AAIDD, The 
Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability, supra, at 189.  Rodriguez argues that to 
the extent that Jones requires a defendant to exhibit present deficits in adaptive 
functioning, Jones encourages the unreliable practice of evaluating defendants in 
prison.  Rodriguez asks this Court to find that his prior proceeding violated Hall to 
the extent that the circuit court relied on Jones. 
 
 
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Even if Rodriguez’s interpretation of Hall were correct, the circuit court 
considered more than just adaptive functioning testing conducted in prison.  The 
circuit court evaluated long-term evidence, including testimony of Rodriguez’s 
friends who knew him as a child, Dr. Weinstein’s testimony regarding behavior 
alleged to demonstrate adaptive functioning deficits and regarding interviews of 
Rodriguez’s friends and family, and testimony of other experts who either 
evaluated Rodriguez or testified to medical standards related to intellectual 
disability.  While the circuit court followed Jones in considering IQ alongside 
present adaptive functioning, it also considered evidence from family and friends 
as Rodriguez argues that the AAIDD and Hall require.   
 
Hall does not change the standards for credibility determinations in prior 
proceedings.  The record conclusively refutes Rodriguez’s claim because the 
circuit court made findings supported by competent, substantial evidence in prior 
proceedings.  See Mann, 112 So. 3d at 1162.   
B.  Whether One Factor Was Dispositive of Rodriguez’s Intellectual Disability 
Claim in Violation of Oats 
 
 
In applying Hall, this Court has held that the test for intellectual disability 
must include comprehensive analysis of all three prongs.  See Oats, 181 So. 3d at 
459, 467 (citing Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2278-82 (2015)); Cardona, 
185 So. 3d at 527.  Rodriguez contends that the circuit court failed to evaluate all 
three prongs in tandem after his evidentiary hearing in the prior proceeding and 
 
 
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that this Court did not evaluate manifestation before age 18 in affirming the circuit 
court’s decision.  We affirm the circuit court’s summary denial because the record 
conclusively refutes Rodriguez’s claim.  See Mann, 112 So. 3d at 1162. 
 
The circuit court considered Rodriguez’s current IQ and adaptive deficits 
based on the experts’ tests and testimony.  Dr. Weinstein believed that there was 
no need to demonstrate previous adaptive deficits before age 18, and the other 
experts disagreed.  Rodriguez’s friends familiar with him before age 18 testified 
that he had good hygiene, could care for himself, and could drive.  The circuit 
court made findings as to Rodriguez’s IQ, adaptive functioning deficits, and age of 
onset in its order finding that he is not intellectually disabled: 
The court finds that the results obtained from Dr. Weinstein on 
the Mexican WAIS III are not reliable.  Dr. Weinstein conceded that 
IQ tests must be given to a representative example of the population 
with whom it is intended to be used.  IQ norming, according to Dr. 
Suarez, takes into account a person’s culture and level of education. 
He stated that if the person is not a member of the population that was 
used to formulate the norm, the results are meaningless.  The full scale 
score of 60 obtained on the WAIS is invalid according to Dr. Suarez, 
who administered the test, because of the Defendant’s malingering. 
There are no valid test results to establish that the Defendant’s IQ is 
less than 70. 
Even if this Court accepts the IQ test results of Dr. Weinstein 
and it is assumed that the Defendant’s IQ is less than 70, there is 
absolutely no evidence that Defendant exhibits deficits in his adaptive 
behavior and that they manifested before the age of 18.  Dr. Weinstein 
testified that the Defendant leaving the Merchant Marines because he 
fell in love is an example of poor judgment.  Millions of men who are 
not mentally retarded have left the military for a job, a family and 
even the love, or perceived love, of a woman.  The fact that he may 
 
 
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have acted on impulse and not reasoning does not render him mentally 
retarded. 
The Defendant has failed to carry his burden of proving the 
three elements necessary to establish that he is mentally retardation 
[sic]: significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing 
concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during 
the period from conception to age 18. 
 
Given this discussion of all three prongs in the circuit court’s order and the related 
evidence both in the record and described throughout the order, the record 
conclusively refutes Rodriguez’s claim that the circuit court did not consider each 
prong of the intellectual disability test in tandem.   
This Court did fail to discuss whether evidence below showed onset before 
age 18 in its opinion in affirming the circuit court’s order.  See Rodriguez IV, 110 
So. 3d at 441.  Nevertheless, this Court had the full record below at its disposal, 
including the circuit court’s holistic review of all three prongs, in determining that 
Rodriguez had not demonstrated intellectual disability.  See id.  While Rodriguez 
is correct that this Court did not mention evidence of onset before age 18 in 
affirming the circuit court’s decision, he cannot demonstrate that this Court did not 
consider the record, which shows no reliable evidence of early onset presented at 
his prior evidentiary hearing. 
Summary denial was appropriate because the record reflects that the circuit 
court made findings as to all three prongs and evaluated them as a whole in 
denying Rodriguez’s claim.  See Mann, 112 So. 3d at 1162.  Therefore, we deny 
 
 
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relief on this claim.  Finally, we consider whether Rodriguez is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing based on the changes in Hall in light of our recent decisions. 
C.  Whether Rodriguez is Entitled to a New Evidentiary Hearing under Hall 
 
Rodriguez contends that this Court cannot speculate as to whether Hall 
might affect the testimony of experts or how the defense presented his case at the 
prior hearing.  While the change in Hall could have affected how the defense 
prepared, it is unlikely that the change would affect the outcome in this case.  
Rodriguez had IQ scores below 70 such that a finding of intellectual disability was 
possible prior to Hall, and Rodriguez’s defense had every opportunity to present its 
best case at his prior Atkins evidentiary hearing.  Therefore, this case is 
distinguishable from cases warranting Hall relief. 
 
The facts in this case—specifically the findings made after the prior 
evidentiary hearing as to each prong of intellectual disability—distinguish this case 
from the clear Hall error this Court found in Oats, 181 So. 3d at 471, and Cardona, 
185 So. 3d at 527.  In Oats, the circuit court wrongfully determined that the 
defendant failed to establish onset before age 18 and limited its inquiry to that 
single prong in violation of Hall.  Oats, 181 So. 3d at 471.  In Cardona, the trial 
court wrongfully ignored expert recommendations as to the best language 
accommodation for IQ tests in rejecting the defendant’s IQ scores and wrongfully 
found IQ dispositive of the holistic intellectual disability inquiry.  185 So. 3d at 
 
 
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525-27.  In contrast, the circuit court considered evidence concerning all three 
prongs of intellectual disability in both Rodriguez’s prior proceeding and in the 
summary denial below.  In addition, Rodriguez introduced evidence of his 
intellectual disability at a hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
during his initial postconviction proceeding, which this Court found insufficient to 
demonstrate intellectual disability.  Rodriguez II, 919 So. 2d at 1267.   
Rodriguez had a full Atkins evidentiary hearing, a prior hearing discussing 
his intellectual disability in relationship to an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, and a robust defense at each proceeding.  Rodriguez’s argument regarding 
Hall’s effect on credibility determinations is legally insufficient.  The record 
conclusively refutes his argument that one prong was dispositive of his claim.  
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court’s summary denial of 
Rodriguez’s Hall claim.  Next, we turn to his claim under Hurst. 
II.  Rodriguez is Not Entitled to Relief under Hurst 
 
This Court has determined that Hurst should not be applied retroactively to 
those cases final on direct appeal before Ring was decided.  Asay v. State, No. 41 
Fla. L. Weekly S646, S648 (Fla. Dec. 22, 2016).  Because Rodriguez’s death 
sentence was final in 1993, Rodriguez is not entitled to Hurst relief.  Therefore, we 
deny relief on this claim. 
 
 
 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court’s summary denial of an 
evidentiary hearing on Rodriguez’s Hall claim, find that Rodriguez is ineligible for 
Hurst relief, and affirm his death sentence.   
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, CANADY, and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result. 
LAWSON, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County,  
Nushin G. Sayfie, Judge - Case No. 131988CF018180B000XX 
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Rachel Day, Assistant 
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Scott Gavin, Staff Attorney, Southern 
Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and C. Suzanne Bechard, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee