Case Title: MONIQUE JOY CRAIN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING; MICHAEL MAY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0215

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-10-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
MONIQUE JOY CRAIN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING; MICHAEL MAY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 128218 P.3d 934Case Number: S-08-0215, S-09-0002Decided: 10/22/2009Modified: 10/30/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
MONIQUE 
JOY CRAIN,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

MICHAEL 
MAY,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeals 
from the District Courts of: Campbell County and Teton 
County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and 
Eric Alden and Kirk A. Morgan, Senior Assistants Appellate 
Counsel

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General; and Nicole G. Krieger, Special Assistant Attorney 
General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The Appellants in 
these consolidated cases challenge their convictions for sexual abuse of a minor 
under the comprehensive 2007 amendments to Wyoming's sexual assault 
statutes.  Although each Appellant 
articulated the issues in slightly different terms, we deem the following to 
capture the essence of their claims:  
(1) Where those amended statutes criminalize sexual abuse of a minor "on 
a victim who is thirteen (13) through fifteen (15) years of age," does that 
descriptive phrase include victims who are one day or more past his/her 
15th birthday; and, (2) is that descriptive phrase unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to each of these Appellants' cases?  We hold that the statutes at issue are 
not ambiguous and do not require this Court to construe them beyond their plain 
language.  In addition, we conclude 
that the statutes are not unconstitutionally vague as applied to these two 
Appellants.1

 
 
[¶2]      In Case No. 
S-08-0215, Monique Joy Crain v. State of 
Wyoming, Crain entered a conditional plea of guilty to violating Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-315(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2009) which provides:

 
 
§ 
6-2-315. Sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree; 
penalties.

 
 
(a)  Except 
under circumstance constituting sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree as 
defined by W.S. 6-2-314, an actor commits the crime of sexual abuse of a minor 
in the second degree if:

                        
(i)  Being seventeen 
(17) years of age or older, the actor inflicts sexual intrusion2 on a victim who is thirteen 
(13) through fifteen (15) years of age, and the victim is at least four (4) 
years younger than the actor;

                        
(ii)  Being sixteen (16) years of age or older, the actor 
engages in sexual contact of a victim who is less than thirteen (13) years of 
age;

                        
(iii)  Being eighteen (18) years of age or older, the actor 
engages in sexual contact with a victim who is less than eighteen (18) years of 
age and the actor is the victim's legal guardian or an individual specified in 
W.S. 6-4-402;  
or

                        
(iv)  Being eighteen (18) years of age or older, the actor 
engages in sexual contact with a victim who is less than sixteen (16) years of 
age and the actor occupies a position of authority in relation to the 
victim.

            
(b)  A person convicted under subsection (a) of this section is 
subject to imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years, unless the person 
convicted qualifies under W.S. 6-2-306(e).3  
[Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶3]      In order to fully 
comprehend the above statute in context, we must also briefly consult Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 6-2-314, 6-2-316, and 6-2-317 (LexisNexis 2009):

 
 
§ 
6-2-314. Sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree; 
penalties.

 
 
            
(a)  An actor commits the crime of sexual abuse of a minor in 
the first degree if:

(i)  Being 
sixteen (16) years of age or older, the actor inflicts sexual intrusion on a 
victim who is less than thirteen (13) years of age;

(ii)  Being 
eighteen (18) years of age or older, the actor inflicts sexual intrusion on a 
victim who is less than eighteen (18) years of age, and the actor is the 
victim's legal guardian or an individual specified in W. S. 
6-4-402;

(iii)  Being 
eighteen (18) years of age or older, the actor inflicts sexual intrusion on a 
victim who is less than sixteen (16) years of age and the actor occupies a 
position of authority in relation to the victim.

            
(b)  A person convicted under subsection (a) of this section is 
subject to imprisonment for not more than fifty (50) years, unless the person 
convicted qualifies under W.S. 6-2-306(e).3

 
 
§ 
6-2-316. Sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree.

            

(a)  Except 
under circumstance constituting sexual abuse of a minor in the first or second 
degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-314 and 6-2-315, an actor commits the crime of 
sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree if:

(i)  Being 
seventeen (17) years of age or older, the actor engages in sexual contact with a 
victim who is thirteen (13) through fifteen (15) years of age, and the victim is 
at least four (4) years younger than the actor;

(ii)  Being 
twenty (20) years of age or older, the actor engages in sexual intrusion with a 
victim who is either sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years of age, and the victim 
is at least four (4) years younger than the actor, and the actor occupies a 
position of authority in relation to the victim;

(iii)  Being 
less than sixteen (16) years of age, the actor inflicts sexual intrusion on a 
victim who is less than thirteen (13) years of age, and the victim is at least 
three (3) years younger than the actor; or

(iv)  Being 
seventeen (17) years of age or older, the actor knowingly takes immodest, 
immoral or indecent liberties with a victim who is less than seventeen (17) 
years of age and the victim is at least four (4) years younger than the 
actor.

            
(b)  A person convicted under subsection (a) of this section is 
subject to imprisonment for not more than fifteen (15) 
years.

            
(c)  A person charged with violating the provisions of 
paragraph (a)(iii) of this section shall be subject to the original jurisdiction 
of the juvenile court, except the matter may be transferred to the district 
court having jurisdiction of the offense as provided in W.S. 
14-6-237.

 
 
§ 
6-2-317. Sexual abuse of a minor in the fourth degree.

 
 
            
(a)  Except under circumstance constituting sexual abuse of a 
minor in the first, second or third degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-314 through 
6-2-316, an actor commits the crime of sexual abuse of a minor in the fourth 
degree if:

(i)  Being 
less than sixteen (16) years of age, the actor engages in sexual contact with a 
victim who is less than thirteen (13) years of age, and the victim is at least 
three (3) years younger than the actor; or

(ii)  Being 
twenty (20) years of age or older, the actor engages in sexual contact with a 
victim who is either sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years of age, and the victim 
is at least four (4) years younger than the actor, and the actor occupies a 
position of authority in relation to the victim.

            
(b)  A person convicted under subsection (a) of this section is 
subject to imprisonment for not more than five (5) years.

            
(c)  A person charged with violating the provisions of 
paragraph (a)(i) of this section shall be subject to the original jurisdiction 
of the juvenile court, except the matter may be transferred to the district 
court having jurisdiction of the offense as provided in W.S. 
14-6-237.

 
 
[¶4]      On March 1, 2008, 
Crain (who was 22 years, four months and 17 days of age) engaged in consensual 
sexual intercourse with her male victim (who was 15 years, five months and eight 
days of age) in the backseat of a car.  
As noted above, Crain entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charged 
offense, reserving the right to appeal the issues raised herein.  Crain raised both of the issues recited 
above in a motion to dismiss filed in the district court, and the district court 
denied that motion.

 
 
            
*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

 
 
[¶5]      In Case No. 
S-09-0002, Michael May v. State of 
Wyoming, May entered pleas of guilty to one count of violating Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-316(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2009) and one count of violating § 
6-2-316(a)(iv):

 
 
§ 
6-2-316. Sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree; 
penalties.

 
 
(a)  Except 
under circumstance constituting sexual abuse of a minor in the first or second 
degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-314 and 6-2-315, an actor commits the crime of 
sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree if:

(i)  Being seventeen (17) years of age or 
older, the actor engages in sexual contact4 with a victim who is thirteen 
(13) through fifteen (15) years of age, and the victim is at least four (4) 
years younger than the actor;

(ii)  Being 
twenty (20) years of age or older, the actor engages in sexual intrusion with a 
victim who is either sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years of age, and the victim 
is at least four (4) years younger than the actor, and the actor occupies a 
position of authority in relation to the victim;

(iii)  Being 
less than sixteen (16) years of age, the actor inflicts sexual intrusion on a 
victim who is less than thirteen (13) years of age, and the victim is at least 
three (3) years younger than the actor;  
or

(iv)  Being 
seventeen (17) years of age or older, the actor knowingly takes immodest, 
immoral or indecent liberties with a victim who is less than seventeen (17) 
years of age and the victim is at least four (4) years younger than the 
actor.

            
(b)  A person convicted under subsection (a) of this section is 
subject to imprisonment for not more than fifteen (15) 
years.

            
(c)  A person charged with violating the provisions of 
paragraph (a)(iii) of this section shall be subject to the original jurisdiction 
of the juvenile court, except the matter may be transferred to the district 
court having jurisdiction of the offense as provided in W.S. 14-6-237.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶6]      The victim in 
this case was 15 years, four months, and 25 days old.  May was 39 years old.  The record indicates that May was first 
seen sitting on a bed in his boxer shorts and the victim was standing between 
his legs facing him, naked from the waist down.  About five minutes later May was seen in 
bed with the victim, his shorts pulled down to his mid thighs, and the victim 
atop him with her naked genitals over May's naked genitals.  As noted above, May entered conditional 
pleas of guilty to the charged offenses, reserving the right to appeal the 
issues raised herein.  May did not 
raise either of these two issues in the district court.  However, the issues have been raised in 
Crain's case and we deem the prompt construction of these statutes to be issues 
of significant public importance.  
See Stokes v. State, 2006 WY 
134, ¶¶ 6-11, 144 P.3d 421, 423-24 (Wyo. 2006) (we review constitutional 
challenge not raised in district court for plain error; "immodest, immoral, or 
indecent liberties" not unconstitutionally vague).  Thus, we will substantively apply our 
decision of the issues raised herein to both cases.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Statutory 
Construction

 
 
[¶7]      Crain and May 
first contend that the statutes under which they were convicted should be 
construed to mean that if the victim is one day or more past his/her 
15th birthday, then the respective statutes do not criminalize the 
conduct at issue in these cases.

 
 
[¶8]      We begin our 
discussion by reciting our most elementary rules of statutory 
construction:

 
 
Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law which we review de novo.  In re Estate of Seader, 2003 WY 119, ¶ 
23, 76 P.3d 1236, 1244 (Wyo.2003).  
"[T]he plain, ordinary, and usual meaning of words used in a statute 
controls in the absence of clear statutory provisions to the contrary."  Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 266 
(Wyo.1985).  "[W]here there is 
plain, unambiguous language used in a statute there is no room for construction, 
and a court may not properly look for and impose another meaning."  Id.  "[W]here legislative intent is 
discernible a court should give effect to that intent."  Id.

 
 

Harris 
v. State, 
2006 WY 76, ¶ 11, 137 P.3d 124, 128 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶9]      Of particular 
importance here is our long-standing rule that we read statutes relating to the 
same subject in pari materia, which 
means that they "may be construed together, so that inconsistencies in one 
statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the same subject."  Black's Law Dictionary, 807 
(8th ed. 2004); see Shaw v. 
State, 2009 WY 18, ¶ 27, 201 P.3d 1108, 1114 (Wyo. 2009); and Schafer v. State, 2008 WY 149, ¶ 9, 
197 P.3d 1247, 1249 (Wyo. 2008).  We 
have set out several of the sexual assault statutes that are interrelated 
above.  When we look at them as a 
tightly structured scheme of statutory protections designed to effectuate a 
method of carefully crafted gradations within the subject of sexual assault 
crimes, then it is readily evident that the Appellants' argument that victims 
between the age of exactly 15 years and one day through 15 years and 364 days 
(365 in a leap year) are not protected by the statute is absurd.  It is another time-honored principle of 
statutory construction that we will not construe statutes in such a manner as to 
render any portion of the statute meaningless or to produce an absurd 
result.  Brown v. State, 2004 WY 119, ¶ 8, 
99 P.3d 489, 492 (Wyo. 2004).  Our 
conclusion is that the statutes under challenge are not ambiguous and that their 
meaning and scope can be readily determined by reading the sexual assault 
statutes in pari materia.  Our holding is consistent with that of 
the Supreme Court of Iowa in State v. 
Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d 493, 500-501 (Iowa 1997):

 
 
Iowa 
Code section 709.4(2)(c) is commonly referred to as the statutory rape 
provision. It provides that a sex act between persons not cohabiting as husband 
and wife constitutes third-degree sexual abuse if the victim is "fourteen or 
fifteen years of age" and the defendant is "five or more years older than" the 
victim.

 
 
R.C.S. 
was fifteen years, ten months, and five days old on the date of her alleged 
sexual abuse. Thus, Mitchell argues, R.C.S. was not fifteen, but was in fact 
over fifteen and she ceased to be fifteen the day after her fifteenth birthday. 
Mitchell raised these arguments in his motion for judgment of acquittal, which 
the district court overruled.

 
 
Mitchell's 
arguments raise a statutory interpretation question. Our scope of review 
involving the interpretation of a statute is at law. State v. Haberer, 
532 N.W.2d 757, 758 (Iowa 1995).

 
 
For 
his remarkable position, Mitchell relies heavily on Knott v. Rawlings, 
250 Iowa 892, 96 N.W.2d 900 (1959). In Knott, this court interpreted a 
statute that covered children "of the age of sixteen years, or under." 
Knott, 250 Iowa at 893, 96 N.W.2d  at 901. The court was called upon to 
answer the question whether one who is sixteen years, six months, and three days 
old is "a child of the age of sixteen years, or under" within the contemplation 
of the statute. Id. at 894, 96 N.W.2d  at 901. Answering the question in 
the negative, the court said:

 
 
A 
child is one year old on the first anniversary of his birth and is sixteen years 
old on the sixteenth anniversary. Before the sixteenth anniversary he is under 
the age of sixteen and after that anniversary he is over the age of sixteen. 
Sixteen years is an exact and definite period of time. It does not mean or 
include sixteen years and six months. We should be realistic and not read 
something into the statute which is not there and which clearly was not intended 
to be there. This is a criminal statute and cannot be added to by strained 
construction.

 
 

Id.

 
 
We 
agree with the State that Knott is distinguishable because the statute in 
Knott employed the language "sixteen years, or under" and the present 
statute reads "fifteen years of age." The words "or under" made it clear that 
the legislature did not intend to include anyone who was a day over sixteen. 
Id.

 
 
Moving 
to the present statute, we think the State's common usage example is convincing. 
A person's common response to a question about his or her age is to state only 
the age at the last anniversary of birth. One does not add the additional months 
and days over that anniversary. We think this is the sense in which the 
legislature used the words "fifteen years of age" in the present statute. Thus, 
"fifteen years of age" would include all the months and days over fifteen until 
the person reaches the sixteenth anniversary of his or her 
birth.

 
 
As 
the State points out, a contrary interpretation would yield an absurd result. 
The statute prohibits a sex act with a person "fourteen or fifteen years of 
age." Mitchell's interpretation would prohibit a defendant from having sexual 
intercourse with a young girl on her fourteenth birthday but would allow him to 
do so for the 364 days thereafter until she reaches her fifteenth birthday. The 
statute in Knott would not have produced a similar absurd result no 
matter how it was interpreted. See State v. Green, 470 N.W.2d 15, 18 
(Iowa 1991) (holding that court interprets a statute to avoid absurd results 
even when a literal interpretation would yield a contrary 
result).

 
 
The 
district court correctly concluded that because R.C.S. had not yet reached her 
sixteenth birthday when the alleged sexual abuse occurred, she was fifteen years 
of age.

 
 
[¶10]   Appellants further contend that the 
"rule of lenity" requires that their proposed construction of the statutes be 
adopted by this Court.  However, we 
have long held that where the statute under consideration is unambiguous, the 
rule of lenity has no role to play.  
Fraternal Order of Eagles Sheridan 
v. State, 2006 WY 4, ¶¶ 16-17, 126 P.3d 847, 855 (Wyo. 2006); and see 
generally 3 Singer and Singer, Statutes 
and Statutory Construction, Chapter 59 (Punitive Legislation), esp. § 59:4 at 
184-207 (7th ed. 2008).

 
 
Constitutionality 
 Vague as Applied

 
 
[¶11]   Appellants also contend that the 
statutes at issue are so uncertain in their meaning that persons of ordinary 
intelligence might be required to guess at their meaning and, thus, they are 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts and circumstances of these two 
cases.

 
 
[¶12]   The standard of review we apply in 
circumstances such as these is well-known.  
Such a challenge is reviewed de 
novo:

 
 
In 
conducting such review, we accept as true the facts evident from the stipulated 
record, affording the State every favorable inference that may be drawn 
therefrom.

 
 
            
Under the constitutions of Wyoming and the United States, our legislature 
may not promulgate vague or uncertain statutes.  Moore v. State, 912 P.2d 1113, 1114 
(Wyo.1996).  Consistent with 
principles of due process, a penal statute must "define the criminal offense 
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement."  Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 975 
(Wyo.1988) (quoting Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, [357], 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 
(1983)).  A statute may be 
challenged for vagueness on its face or as applied to particular conduct.  Griego, 761 P.2d  at 
975.

 
 
.

 
 
            
When "a statute is challenged on an 'as applied' basis, the court 
examines the statute solely in light of the complainant's specific 
conduct."  Giles, ¶ 15, fn.2.  In determining whether a statute is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to a defendant's conduct, "we must decide 
whether the statute provides sufficient notice to a person of ordinary 
intelligence that appellant's conduct was illegal and whether the facts of the 
case demonstrate arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."  Lovato, 901 P.2d  at 412 (citing Griego, 761 P.2d at 976).  Mr. Rabuck does not allege 
discriminatory enforcement.  He 
does, however, contend that the statute fails to provide him sufficient notice 
that his conduct would violate the terms of the statute.  In evaluating the sufficiency of the 
notice, we must consider:  (1) the 
statutory language and any prior court decisions which have placed a limiting 
construction on the statute or have applied it to specific conduct; and (2) 
whether the statute has been previously applied to conduct identical to that of 
appellant.  Giles, ¶ 23 (citing Griego, 761 P.2d at 
976).

 
 

Rabuck 
v. State, 
2006 WY 25, ¶¶ 13-14, 16, 129 P.3d 861, 864-65 (Wyo. 2006); also see Sanderson v. State, 2007 WY 127, 
¶¶ 12, 30-31, 165 P.3d 83, 88, 92 (Wyo. 2007); Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 265-68 
(Wyo. 1985).

 
 
[¶13]   Crain and May construct their 
assertion that the statutes are vague as applied to the circumstances of their 
cases on essentially the same basis as that brought forward in their statutory 
construction argument, i.e., that use of the language "through fifteen (15) 
years of age" is insufficient to give notice that the conduct that occurred in 
these cases would violate the terms of the statute.  As set out more fully above, we conclude 
that when the statute is read in pari 
materia with all the sexual assault statutes, and giving the words contained 
therein their ordinary and usual meaning, there is no uncertainty as to the 
reach of the statutes at issue here.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶14]   We reject both the Appellants' 
statutory construction contentions, as well as the unconstitutionally vague as 
applied challenges.  The judgments 
and sentences of the district courts are affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1We consolidated three cases that raised these two issues for purposes of 
preparing decisions, these two and Palmer 
v. State, 2009 WY 129, ___ P.3d ___ (Wyo. 2009).  We opted to publish Palmer as a separate decision, although 
we will apply our holdings herein to two of the issues raised in Palmer.  Palmer contained a third issue which we 
deemed significant enough to warrant a separate 
opinion.

 
 

2           
"Sexual intrusion" means:

            
(A)  Any intrusion, however slight, by any object or any part 
of a person's body, except the mouth, tongue or penis, into the genital or anal 
opening of another person's body if that sexual intrusion can reasonably be 
construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification or 
abuse;  
or

            
(B)  Sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus or 
anal intercourse with or without emission.

 
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a)(vii) (LexisNexis 
2009).

 
 

3Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306(e) (LexisNexis 2009) 
provides:

 
 
            
(e)  An actor who is convicted of sexual abuse of a minor under 
W.S. 6-2-314 or 6-2-315 shall be punished by life imprisonment without parole if 
the actor has one (1) or more previous convictions for a violation of W.S. 
6-2-302 through 6-2-304, 6-2-314 or 6-2-315, or a criminal statute containing 
the same or similar elements as the crimes defined by W.S. 6-2-302 through 
6-2-304, 6-2-314 or 6-2-315, which convictions resulted from charges separately 
brought and which arose out of separate occurrences in this state or 
elsewhere.

 
 

4" Sexual contact' means touching, with the intention of sexual arousal, 
gratification or abuse, of the victim's intimate parts by the actor, or of the 
actor's intimate parts by the victim, or of the clothing covering the immediate 
area of the victim's or actor's intimate parts[.]"  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a)(vi) 
(LexisNexis 2009).