Case Title: Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12544

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12544 
 
JUNE STEARNS, coexecutrix,1 & another2  vs.  METROPOLITAN LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY & others.3 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 4, 2018. - March 1, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, 
JJ. 
 
 
Asbestos.  Repose, Statute of.  Negligence, Statute of repose.  
Practice, Civil, Claim barred by statute of repose. 
 
 
 
 
Certification of a question of law to the Supreme Judicial 
Court by the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts. 
                     
 
1 Of the estate of Wayne Oliver. 
 
 
2 Clifford Oliver, coexecutor of the estate of Wayne Oliver. 
 
 
3 Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation; Aurora Pump Co.; Crane 
Co.; Ingersoll-Rand Company; Marotta Controls, Inc.; The Nash 
Engineering Company; Weir Valve & Controls USA, Inc., formerly 
known as Atwood & Morrill Co., Inc.; Viking Pump, Inc.; Warren 
Pumps, LLC; General Electric Company; IMO Industries, Inc., 
formerly known as Delaval Steam Turbine Company; NSTAR Electric, 
formerly known as Boston Edison Company; New England Insulation 
Company; O'Connor Constructors, Inc., formerly known as Thomas 
O'Connor Company, Inc.; Flowserve Corporation, formerly known as 
Byron Jackson Company; and Velan Valve Corp. 
 
 
General Electric Company (GE) is the only defendant 
involved with the questions certified to this court. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
John A. Heller, of Illinois (Catherine A. Mohan & Benjamin 
M. Greene also present) for General Electric Company. 
 
Michael J. McCann (Michael C. Shepard, Lisa M. Conserve, & 
Erika A. O'Donnell also present) for the plaintiffs. 
 
John R. Felice & Brad W. Graham for Massachusetts Defense 
Lawyers Association, amicus curiae, were present but did not 
argue. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Lawrence G. Cetrulo, Stephen T. Armato, Whitney K. Barrows, 
Elizabeth S. Dillon, Lauren K. Camire, & Brian D. Fishman for 
Massachusetts Asbestos Litigation Defendants' Liaison Counsel. 
 
Thomas R. Murphy, Kevin J. Powers, & John G. Mateus for 
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  In this case we are called on to answer a 
certified question from the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts concerning whether the six-year 
statute of repose set forth in G. L. c. 260, § 2B (§ 2B), 
operates to bar tort claims arising from diseases with extended 
latency periods, such as those associated with asbestos 
exposure, where the defendants had knowing control of the 
injurious instrumentality at the time of exposure.4  We answer 
the question in the affirmative.  Consistent with our precedent, 
we conclude that § 2B completely eliminates all tort claims 
arising out of any deficiency or neglect in the design, 
planning, construction, or general administration of an 
                     
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus curiae briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association and Coalition for 
Litigation Justice, Inc.; Massachusetts Asbestos Litigation 
Defendants' Liaison Counsel and Coalition for Litigation 
Justice, Inc.; and Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys. 
3 
 
 
improvement to real property after the established time period 
has run, even if the cause of action arises from a disease with 
an extended latency period and even if a defendant had knowing 
control of the instrumentality of injury at the time of 
exposure.  In so doing, we recognize that, considering the 
latency period for asbestos-related illnesses, this will have 
the regrettable effect of barring all or nearly all tort claims 
arising from negligence in the use or handling of asbestos in 
construction-related suits.  Nonetheless, the appropriate 
recourse is in the Legislature, not this court. 
Background.  Because our task is limited to responding to 
the certified question, we do not delve deeply into the factual 
complexities of this case.5  The underlying action concerns the 
death of Wayne Oliver, who died in 2016 of mesothelioma after 
exposure to asbestos during the construction of two nuclear 
power plants in the 1970s.  Relevant to the issue at hand, 
defendant General Electric Company (GE) designed, manufactured, 
and sold steam turbine generators for installation at each of 
the plants and supervised the installations.  GE's installation 
specifications called for the use of asbestos-containing 
insulation materials.  Oliver, who worked as a pipe inspector 
for a nonparty, was present while the insulation was cut, mixed, 
                     
 
5 We take our facts as the Federal District Court judge 
found them. 
4 
 
 
and applied to certain piping systems and equipment in the 
turbine halls of both plants, exposing him to the toxic asbestos 
particles within. 
Oliver came into contact with the tainted insulation 
between 1971 and 1978,6 received his malignant mesothelioma 
diagnosis in April 2015, and commenced the underlying action in 
the Superior Court in August 2015.  He alleged, among other 
things, that GE had negligently exposed him to asbestos during 
the construction of the two power plants and caused him to 
contract mesothelioma.  Thereafter, the case was removed to the 
Federal District Court and, when Oliver passed away in July 
2016, that court allowed the plaintiffs, as coexecutors of 
Oliver's estate, to submit an amended complaint and continue the 
litigation. 
GE moved for summary judgment on the ground that the 
plaintiffs' claims against it were barred by § 2B, which sets a 
firm six-year time limit for tort actions arising out of any 
deficiency or neglect in the design, planning, construction, or 
general administration of an improvement to real property.  The 
plaintiffs disputed that § 2B was intended to apply to cases 
involving diseases with extended latency periods because it 
                     
 
6 The plants opened commercial operations in 1972 and 1975, 
respectively. 
5 
 
 
otherwise would have the effect of extinguishing meritorious 
claims before they even come into existence. 
The judge found that GE's turbine generators, including 
their insulation materials, were "indisputably" improvements to 
real property under the statute.  Notwithstanding this finding, 
she denied GE's motion as to Oliver's claims arising from the 
alleged asbestos exposure because it was "not at all clear" that 
the statute was designed to bar a category of claims "known 
uniformly to have a latency period of at least twenty years," 
particularly where "GE had control of the site at the time of 
Oliver's asbestos exposure, conducted regular on-site 
maintenance and inspections for at least two decades after 
construction was complete, and continues . . . to perform 
[routine] refueling outages", removing it from the category of 
defendants customarily protected by the statute.  GE 
subsequently moved for the judge either to reconsider her 
decision or certify the ruling for an interlocutory appeal to 
the United States Court of Appeals.  The plaintiffs opposed 
interlocutory appeal but, in the event of any such appeal, moved 
instead for certification to this court pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 
1:03, as appearing in 382 Mass. 700 (1981).  The judge denied 
GE's motion and certified to us the following question: 
"whether or not the Massachusetts statute of repose, [G. L. 
c.] 260, § 2B, can be applied to bar personal injury claims 
arising from diseases with extended latency periods, such 
6 
 
 
as those associated with asbestos exposure, where 
defendants had knowing control of the instrumentality of 
injury at the time of exposure." 
 
We conclude that the answer to the reported question is 
controlled by the language of § 2B, the history of this and 
related statutes of repose, and our previous cases. 
Discussion.  We interpret a statute according to the intent 
of the Legislature, which we ascertain from all its words, 
"construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language" 
and "considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, 
the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object 
to be accomplished" (citation omitted).  Harvard Crimson, Inc. 
v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 
(2006).  See generally G. L. c. 4, § 6, Third.  Where, as here, 
the language is clear and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to 
the Legislature's intent.  Sharris v. Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 
586, 594 (2018). 
It is well established that a statute of repose "eliminates 
a cause of action at a specified time, regardless of whether an 
injury has occurred or a cause of action has accrued as of that 
date."  Bridgwood v. A.J. Wood Constr., Inc., 480 Mass. 349, 352 
(2018).  See Sisson v. Lhowe, 460 Mass. 705, 709 (2011) (statute 
of repose focuses on date defendant's negligent acts or 
omissions were alleged to have occurred regardless of whether 
cause of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted 
7 
 
 
[quotations and citation omitted]); Joslyn v. Chang, 445 Mass. 
344, 347 (2005) (same).  It places "an absolute time limit on 
the liability of those within its protection" and "abolish[es] a 
plaintiff's cause of action thereafter, even if the plaintiff's 
injury does not occur, or is not discovered, until after the 
statute's time limit has expired."  Bridgwood, supra at 353, 
quoting Nett v. Bellucci, 437 Mass. 630, 635 (2002).  See 
Black's Law Dictionary 1637 (10th ed. 2014) (defining statute of 
repose as "[a] statute barring any suit that is brought after a 
specified time since the defendant acted [such as by designing 
or manufacturing a product], even if this period ends before the 
plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury").  The effect is to 
"abolish the remedy . . . not merely to bar the action."  Tindol 
v. Boston Hous. Auth., 396 Mass. 515, 518 (1986).  See 
Bridgwood, supra at 352 (statutes of repose provide substantive 
right to be free from liability after given period of time has 
elapsed from defined event). 
In stark contrast to statutes of limitation, "statutes of 
repose may not be 'tolled' for any reason" (emphasis added).  
Nett, 437 Mass. at 635.  See, e.g.,  Rudenauer v. Zafiropoulos, 
445 Mass. 353, 358 (2005) (medical malpractice statute of repose 
not subject to tolling, even where medical treatment is 
ongoing); Joslyn, 445 Mass. at 350-351 (statute of repose not 
subject to any form of equitable estoppel or tolling, even in 
8 
 
 
instances of fraudulent concealment);  Sullivan v. Iantosca, 409 
Mass. 796, 798-799 (1991) (statute of repose bars action even if 
knowing and intentional wrongdoing is involved); Tindol, 396 
Mass. at 517-518 (statute of repose is not tolled by minority or 
mental illness).  Indeed, "[t]he only way to satisfy the 
absolute time limit of a statute of repose is to commence the 
action prior to the expiration of that time limit" (emphasis 
added; quotations and citation omitted).  Nett, 437 Mass. at 
635.  See Sisson, 460 Mass. at 716.  We previously concluded, 
and do so again, that § 2B is no exception to these rules.  
Bridgwood, 480 Mass. at 353 (§ 2B protects contractors from 
claims arising long after completion of work); Aldrich v. ADD 
Inc., 437 Mass. 213, 221 (2002), quoting Klein v. Catalano, 386 
Mass. 701, 702 (1982) ("Simply put, after six years, [§ 2B] 
completely eliminates a cause of action against certain persons 
in the construction industry"). 
 
The statute provides in relevant part: 
"Action[s] of tort for damages arising out of any 
deficiency or neglect in the design, planning, construction 
or general administration of an improvement to real 
property . . . shall be commenced only within three years 
next after the cause of action accrues; provided, however, 
that in no event shall such actions be commenced more than 
six years after the earlier of the dates of:  (1) the 
opening of the improvement to use; or (2) substantial 
completion of the improvement and the taking of possession 
for occupancy by the owner." 
 
9 
 
 
We recently had occasion to discuss both the language of and the 
legislative purpose behind the enactment of § 2B in Bridgwood, 
480 Mass. at 351-358.  In that case, we reiterated that the 
Legislature's primary objective in enacting § 2B was to limit 
the liability of architects, engineers, contractors, and others 
involved in the design, planning, construction, or general 
administration of an improvement to real property in the wake of 
case law abolishing the long-standing rule that once an 
architect or builder had completed his work and it had been 
accepted by the owner, absent privity with the owner, liability 
was cut off as a matter of law.  Id. at 353, discussing Klein, 
386 Mass. at 708-709.  The abolition of that rule exposed many 
participants in the construction industry "to possible liability 
throughout their professional lives and into retirement," 
liability that the Legislature sought to curtail with the 
enactment of § 2B.  Klein, 386 Mass. at 708-709.  "Otherwise, 
those engaged in the design and construction of real property 
may have to mount a defense when architectural plans may have 
been discarded, copies of building codes in force at the time of 
construction may no longer be in existence, persons individually 
involved in the construction project may be deceased or may not 
be located"7  (quotations and citation omitted).  Id. at 709–710.  
                     
 
7 Suppliers and manufacturers are not included in the class 
of persons protected from suit under G. L. c. 260, § 2B (§ 2B).  
10 
 
 
See Joslyn, 445 Mass. at 351 ("The object of a statute of repose 
. . . is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims from springing 
up at great distances of time, and surprising the parties, or 
their representatives, when all the proper vouchers and 
evidences are lost, or the facts have become obscure, from the 
lapse of time, or the defective memory, or death, or removal of 
witnesses" [quotation and citation omitted]). 
 
We have held that limiting the duration of liability in 
this way serves a legitimate public purpose, even though it may 
abolish a plaintiff's cause of action without providing any 
alternative remedy.  Bridgwood, supra at 353.  See Klein, 386 
Mass. at 712 n.16 (Legislature may enact statute that abolishes 
common-law cause of action without providing substitute remedy 
if statute is rationally related to permissible legislative 
objective).  And we have concluded that "[i]n establishing the 
six-year limit, the Legislature struck what it considered to be 
a reasonable balance between the public's right to a remedy and 
the need to place an outer limit on the tort liability of those 
                     
McDonough v. Marr Scaffolding Co., 412 Mass. 636, 641 (1992).  
See Dighton v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 399 Mass. 687, 694 n.10, 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953 (1987) ("It is clear from the 
language of the statute, and our decisions, that § 2B does not 
apply to materialmen and suppliers.  Any ambiguity that may 
arise in the application of § 2B arises only from the question 
whether a party acted as a materialman or supplier . . . .").  
In addition, Massachusetts has not limited products liability 
actions with a statute of repose.  Cosme v. Whitin Mach. Works, 
Inc., 417 Mass. 643, 648 (1994). 
11 
 
 
involved in construction."  Klein, supra at 710.  See Aldrich, 
437 Mass. at 221.  The plaintiffs' case is no exception. 
 
The plaintiffs contend that § 2B does not shield a 
defendant that was in control of the improvement to real 
property at the time of the incident giving rise to the cause of 
action, nor does it apply to diseases with extended latency 
periods, such as those associated with asbestos exposure.  We do 
not agree. 
 
The language of § 2B is unequivocal.  It provides that "in 
no event shall [an action of tort for damages covered herein] be 
commenced more than six years" after the earlier of two 
specified dates:  "(1) the opening of the improvement to use; or 
(2) the substantial completion of the improvement and the taking 
of possession . . . by the owner" (emphasis added).  The 
apparent intent of the Legislature was to place an absolute time 
limit on the liability of those protected by the statute.  
Bridgwood, 480 Mass. at 352-353.  Indeed, it "forbids us from 
considering the fact that a plaintiff did not discover or 
reasonably could not have discovered the harm before the six-
year period of the statute of repose expired," or any other 
circumstances that might have tolled the running of a statute of 
limitations.  Sullivan, 409 Mass. at 798.  See id. at 798-799 
(as § 2B is written, it makes no difference whether defendant 
caused deficiency or neglect "by gross negligence, wanton 
12 
 
 
conduct, or even knowing and intentional wrongdoing").  The 
plaintiffs are requesting that we imply exceptions to § 2B where 
there are none.  We decline to do so.  The "Legislature has 
fashioned an ironclad rule," Joslyn, 445 Mass. at 351, and we 
will not read into it any exception that the Legislature did not 
see fit to put there, whether by inadvertence or design.  
Fernandes v. Attleboro Hous. Auth., 470 Mass. 117, 129 (2014).  
See Tze-Kit Mui v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 478 Mass. 710, 712 
(2018) ("ordinarily we will not add language to a statute where 
the Legislature itself has not done so"), citing Dartt v. 
Browning–Ferris Indus., Inc. (Mass.), 427 Mass. 1, 9 (1998) 
(court will not add language to statute that Legislature could 
have, but did not, include).  Accord District Att'y for the 
Plymouth Dist. v. Selectmen of Middleborough, 395 Mass. 629, 633 
(1985), quoting 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction 
§ 47.11 (4th ed. 1984) (exceptions to statutes "are not to be 
implied").  Accord Porter v. Nowak, 157 F.2d 824, 825 (1st Cir. 
1946), quoting United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 103 
(1897) ("No mere omission, no mere failure to provide for 
contingencies, which it may seem wise to have specifically 
provided for, justify any judicial addition to the language of 
the statute").  "Had the Legislature intended to remove this 
shield and expose contractors to indefinite liability for claims 
13 
 
 
arising long after the completion of their work, it would have 
said so explicitly."  Bridgwood, 480 Mass. at 357–358.8 
 
Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the 
Legislature has expressly provided for an exception in another, 
similar statute of repose.  See G. L. c. 260, § 4 (statute of 
repose applicable to medical malpractice actions excludes 
actions arising from foreign object left in body); Joslyn, 445 
Mass. at 350 ("the Legislature allowed only one exception to the 
statute of repose, that pertaining to actions arising from a 
foreign object left in the body").  The fact that the 
                     
 
8 The plaintiffs argue, relying on Klein v. Catalano, 386 
Mass. 701, 717 (1982), that GE is not protected by § 2B because 
it was in "control" of the improvement to real property at the 
time Wayne Oliver was exposed to the asbestos-tainted 
insulation.  We are not persuaded.  In Klein, we noted that the 
Legislature could have reasonably concluded that it was 
appropriate to place different time limits on the liability of 
builders and other design professionals "from those placed on 
persons in possession or control as owner, tenant, or otherwise" 
because "[a]fter . . . acceptance of the work by the owner, 
there exists the possibility of neglect, abuse, poor 
maintenance, mishandling, improper modification, or unskilled 
repair of an improvement to immovable property by the owner, 
lessor or tenant," which could result in an injury that could 
not be prevented by the builder or design professional.  Id. at 
715-716.  We noted also that the Legislature could have 
reasonably concluded that "[a] limit on liability may be 
necessary to encourage those professionals to experiment with 
new designs and materials."  Id. at 717.  We did not, and do 
not, suggest that the degree of control over the improvement at 
the time of the alleged negligence should weigh on the 
consideration of whether a builder or other design professional 
is covered by the statute.  Indeed, it would seem that in every 
case the defendant would have some degree of control over the 
improvement for its actions to give rise to a viable claim of 
deficiency or negligence. 
14 
 
 
Legislature saw fit to specify an exception to the statute of 
repose applicable to medical malpractice actions and did not 
similarly do so in the circumstances of this case strengthens 
the inference that no exceptions were intended here.  Joslyn, 
445 Mass. at 350.  See Fernandes, 470 Mass. at 129 ("The 
omission of particular language from a statute is deemed 
deliberate where the Legislature included such omitted language 
in related or similar statutes"). 
 
Moreover, had the Legislature wanted to exempt claims 
arising from negligence involving asbestos from § 2B 
specifically, it has demonstrated that it knows how to do so.  
In G. L. c. 260, § 2D, the so-called asbestos revival statute, 
see Commonwealth v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 38 Mass. App. 
Ct. 600, 603 (1995), the Legislature established special time 
periods during which the Commonwealth and its subdivisions could 
bring an action, otherwise time-barred by § 2B, to recover the 
cost of asbestos removal from public buildings.9  See Boston v. 
Keene Corp., 406 Mass. 301, 303 (1989) (Keene); Owens-Corning 
                     
 
9 General laws c. 260, § 2D, provides: 
 
"Any action brought by . . . the [C]ommonwealth or any 
other political subdivision thereof to recover any costs 
associated with asbestos related corrective actions . . . 
shall be commenced only within six years next after . . . 
the [C]ommonwealth or any other political subdivision 
thereof knew of the presence of and the hazard or damage 
caused by the presence of such asbestos or material 
containing asbestos within its buildings." 
15 
 
 
Fiberglas Corp., 38 Mass. App. Ct. at 603-604.  The effect of 
the legislation was, among other things, to revive asbestos 
claims on which the statute of repose period set forth in § 2B 
had already run.  Id. at 603.  That the Legislature excepted the 
Commonwealth from the ambit of § 2B, if only in limited 
circumstances and for only a limited time, and did not similarly 
except private plaintiffs in those or any circumstances, 
reinforces our conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to 
establish an exception here.  Moreover, we noted in Keene that 
in declining to provide a similar benefit to private plaintiffs, 
the Legislature "could well have concluded that the asbestos 
problem was most acute in public buildings, and thus decided to 
address that aspect of the crisis first."  Keene, 406 Mass. at 
309.  If the Legislature sees fit to likewise afford relief to 
private plaintiffs, now or in the future, then it is the 
Legislature's exclusive prerogative to do so.  Joslyn, 445 Mass. 
at 352 ("No exceptions ought to be made [to a statute of 
repose], unless they are found therein; and if there are any 
inconveniences or hardships growing out of such a construction, 
it is for the [L]egislature, which is fully competent for that 
purpose, and not for the court, to apply the proper remedy").  
See Keene, supra, quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 361 
Mass. 401, 417 (1972) ("When legislative authority is exerted 
within a proper area, it need not embrace every conceivable 
16 
 
 
problem within that field.  The Legislature may proceed one step 
at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which 
seems most acute to the legislative mind"). 
 
"As we have stated previously, we recognize that statutes 
of repose 'may impose great hardship on a plaintiff who has 
suffered injury and has a meritorious claim' but who does not 
suffer or discover the injury within the period permitted for 
initiation of suit."  Joslyn, 445 Mass. at 351, quoting Klein, 
386 Mass. at 713.  Notwithstanding this harsh reality, we do not 
interpret statutes based on such concerns.  See Bridgwood, 480 
Mass. at 353 ("Since deciding Klein, we have consistently 
enforced statutes of repose according to their plain terms, 
despite the hardship they may impose on plaintiffs"); Klein, 
supra ("In upholding [§ 2B], we realize that in some cases this 
statute may impose great hardship on a plaintiff who has 
suffered injury and has a meritorious claim.  However, 
'arguments as to hardship . . . are appropriate respecting the 
enactment of legislation.  They are not controlling in the 
interpretation of existing statutes.'" [citation omitted]).  
Accord Joslyn, supra at 351-352, quoting Zayre Corp. v. Attorney 
Gen., 372 Mass. 423, 433 (1977) (principle of judicial restraint 
includes recognition of inability and undesirability of 
judiciary substituting its notions of correct policy for that of 
popularly elected Legislature); Keene, 406 Mass. at 305 ("The 
17 
 
 
sole issue is whether the statute falls within the legislative 
power to enact, not whether it comports with a court's idea of 
wise or efficient legislation"). 
 
Although the six-year time limit "is in some manner 
arbitrary," it is the Legislature's task to draw the line, not 
ours (citation omitted).  Joslyn, 445 Mass. at 351.  See 
Rudenauer, 445 Mass. at 359 (court will not undo Legislature's 
"studied determination").  Our obligation is to adhere to the 
terms of the statute "and not, upon imaginary equitable 
considerations, to escape from the positive declarations of the 
text" (citation omitted).  Joslyn, supra at 352.  If doing so 
results in any "inconveniences or hardships," then it is for the 
Legislature, not for the court, to resolve10 (citation omitted).  
Id. 
Conclusion.  We answer the certified question as follows:  
Section 2B completely eliminates all tort claims arising out of 
any deficiency or neglect in the design, planning, construction, 
or general administration of an improvement to real property 
after the established time period has run, even if the cause of 
action arises from a disease with an extended latency period and 
                     
 
10 The plaintiffs point out that a number of other State 
Legislatures have effectively exempted asbestos-related 
illnesses from their respective statutes of repose concerning 
improvements to real property.  We encourage our Legislature to 
consider doing the same should it determine that such an 
exception is consonant with the Commonwealth's public policy. 
18 
 
 
even if a defendant had knowing control of the instrumentality 
of injury at the time of exposure. 
The Reporter of Decisions is to furnish attested copies of 
this opinion to the clerk of this court.  The clerk in turn will 
transmit one copy, under the seal of the court, to the clerk of 
the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, as the answer to the question certified, and will 
also transmit a copy to each party.