Case Title: State v. Michelle L. Elders, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-42-06

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). In the early morning hours of September 17, 2004, Trooper Sean O'Connor and Sergeant Ronald Klem were patrolling the New Jersey Turnpike in the area of Edison Township when they saw a disabled Lincoln Town Car on the side of the highway. Parked in front of it was a Honda Accord. At the scene, Anthony Graham and Marcellius Love were under the Lincoln attempting to reattach the gas tank. Michelle Elders and Tasha Jones were sitting on the guardrail, and Christopher Leach and Ronald Stanley were sleeping in the Honda. As the troopers pulled up behind the Lincoln, they activated their video camera and audio equipment. Although Love signaled that everything was "okay," the troopers approached the car. Concerned that "something wasn't right," Klem and O'Connor began asking questions. On the basis of the nervousness of some of the parties, the absence of a registered owner, and the suspicion aroused by the gas tank falling off the car, Klem gave O'Connor permission to request a consent search of the Lincoln. O'Connor asked Leach for his consent. After saying he would consent, Leach initially balked at giving written authorization. Approximately an hour-and-a-half after the troopers had stopped at the scene, Leach signed the consent form. O'Connor found cocaine and marijuana under the hood. All six persons were arrested. Thereafter, the troopers found what they believed to be crack cocaine on Elders. Stanley was carrying $8,000 in cash and Leach $3,000. The six defendants were charged with first-degree conspiracy, first-degree possession of drugs with intent to distribute, and other lesser drug charges. Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized by the troopers. The matter was heard by Superior Court Judge Frederick DeVesa. He concluded that State v. Carty applies to situations involving disabled vehicles and that based on the videotape and the testimony of the two troopers (the defendants did not testify at the hearing), the seized drugs and money were the product of an unconstitutional, warrantless search. He suppressed the evidence. The State's motion for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division was granted. Although that court agreed with Judge DeVesa that Carty applies to disabled vehicles, it concluded that in this case it owed "no special deference to [the trial court's] factfinding" because the key evidence was the videotape and because there were no material factual disputes arising from the evidence. The Appellate Division reversed the suppression order, and the Supreme Court granted defendants' motion for leave to appeal. HELD: The "reasonable and articulable suspicion" standard of State v. Carty, 174 N.J. 351 (2002), which governs consent searches of cars that are validly stopped applies equally to disabled vehicles on the State's roadways. In this case, the Court concludes that there was sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the trial judge's findings that the troopers engaged in an unconstitutional investigatory detention and search. 1. In State v. Carty, the Court held that law enforcement officers have to have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity before requesting consent to search a car stopped for a motor vehicle infraction. That decision was based on Article I, Paragraph 7 of our State Constitution. The underlying constitutional concerns in Carty apply equally to the occupants of disabled cars stranded on the side of a roadway. Clearly, in the case of a disabled vehicle, if the officers are fulfilling a community caretaking function, the consent search of a car for evidence of criminality is hardly in keeping with that mission. (pp. 17-21) 2. Based on its own review of the record, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court, finding that the troopers possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion for an investigative detention and a consent search. An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as the findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. Further, an appellate court should give deference to the findings of the trial judge that are substantially influenced by the opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have a "feel" of the case. (pp. 21-24) 3. The Court cannot agree with the Appellate Division's conclusion that the availability of a videotape -- particularly in the context of a hearing where witnesses testified -- extinguishes the deference owed to a trial court's findings. The video camera for the most part was in a fixed position and could not record all of the events. The audio on the tape could not clearly capture all of the conversations because of the heavy Turnpike traffic. (pp. 24-26) 4. Not all interactions between law enforcement and citizens constitute "seizures," and not all seizures are unconstitutional. "Field inquiries" are permitted even if they are not based on a well-grounded suspicion of criminal activity. Encounters with police in which a person's freedom of movement is restricted, however, must satisfy acceptable constitutional standards. The "reasonable and articulable" standard for investigatory detentions applies as well to consent searches of automobiles under State v. Carty. (pp. 26-29) 5. The trial court maintained that the troopers' encounter with defendants quickly escalated from community caretaking -- responding to a disabled vehicle to provide assistance -- to an investigative detention. The judge's findings were close calls. Based on its review of the record, the Court cannot conclude, however, that those findings were so clearly mistaken that an appellate court should substitute its own judgment for that of the initial factfinder. (pp. 29-35) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED to the Law Division for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO has filed a separate DISSENTING opinion. He would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division on the grounds that the court applied the correct standard of review to the matter before it and appropriately concluded both the search and the consent to search were proper. CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, WALLACE, and HOENS join in JUSTICE ALBIN's opinion. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO has filed a separate, dissenting opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 42 September Term 2006 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MICHELLE L. ELDERS, Defendant-Appellant. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RONALD STANLEY, Defendant-Appellant. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. TASHA JONES, Defendant-Appellant. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER M. LEACH, Defendant-Appellant. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANTHONY GRAHAM, Defendant-Appellant. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MARCELLIUS M. LOVE, Defendant-Appellant. Argued February 13, 2007 Decided July 30, 2007 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 386 N.J. Super. 208 (2006). Mark H. Friedman, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellants (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). Marcia L. Silva, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Bruce J. Kaplan, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Silva and Simon Louis Rosenbach, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs). Leslie Stolbof Simenus argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Ms. Simenus, attorney; Steven G. Sanders, of counsel and on the brief). Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Stuart Rabner, Attorney General, attorney). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. In State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 635, modified on other grounds, 174 N.J. 351 (2002), we held that a police officer may not ask for consent to search a lawfully stopped vehicle or its occupants unless the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the occupants are engaged in criminal wrongdoing. A consent search of a validly stopped car without the requisite suspicion will result in exclusion of the evidence at trial. Id. at 647-48. In this appeal, we must decide whether the principles of Carty extend to the occupants of a car disabled on the shoulder of a highway. Here, both the trial court and Appellate Division agreed that Carty applies to a disabled vehicle on a roadway, but came to different conclusions concerning the constitutionality of the consent search in this case. The trial court determined, among other things, that the state troopers, who requested consent to search a car broken down on the side of the New Jersey Turnpike, did not have reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that the occupants were engaged in criminal wrongdoing and suppressed drugs and drug-related evidence seized from the car and its occupants. The Appellate Division reversed, maintaining that it owed no deference to the trial court s factual determinations, which were based in part on a videotape of the events on the highway, and found that the officers had the necessary level of suspicion to seek a consent search. We now hold that the reasonable and articulable suspicion standard governing consent searches of cars validly stopped equally applies to disabled cars on our roadways. In this case, in reversing the trial court s holding that defendants were subjected to an unconstitutional search, the Appellate Division did not apply the correct standard of review for a suppression hearing. The appellate panel should have determined only whether there was sufficient credible evidence to support the trial court s findings and should not have reviewed the evidence de novo or acted as a factfinder in the first instance. Because the trial court s findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record, we are compelled to reinstate the order suppressing the evidence. [Pineiro, supra, 181 N.J. at 27 (quoting State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 505 (1986)).] The reasonable and articulable standard for investigatory detentions set forth here applies as well to consent searches of automobiles under Carty. With those legal principles in mind, we next examine the motion judge s factual findings to see whether they are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. [(Emphasis added).] Those findings are amply supported by the record. The motion judge considered that the troopers never called for roadside assistance even though from the moment of their arrival they became aware of a serious mechanical problem with the Lincoln. After about two minutes on the scene, Trooper O Connor pulled defendant Elders to the side, away from the other defendants, and began questioning her about her whereabouts. The trooper did not inquire into the disabled car s condition or suggest that she leave in the functioning Honda for safety reasons. Arguably, the encounter turned into a detention before the troopers heard any seemingly inconsistent accounts of the locations defendants had been visiting in New York. Within six minutes of the stop, Trooper O Connor forcefully ordered, not asked, defendants Graham and Love to get up from underneath the Lincoln Town Car and to stand by the guardrail. Once up, Graham was questioned, not about the car s condition, but about the places he had visited during his trip to New York. Shortly afterwards, defendants Leach and Stanley also were told to stand by the guardrail. When Trooper O Connor sensed that Leach was not cooperating with him, he yelled, You will answer any questions. Leach s request for an attorney was followed by Trooper O Connor stating that he had a bad attitude. The motion judge addressed all of the evidence that the State argued supported a finding of reasonable and articulable suspicion: defendants nervous behavior, their conflicting statements, and the fallen-off gas tank. In the motion judge s view, there were many reasons that could explain the nervousness of some of the defendants and the conflicting statements at 3 a.m. on the shoulder of the Turnpike. Indeed, it is a sad fact that not all persons feel comfortable in the presence of the police. State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169 (1994) (recognizing [t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true ); State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J. Super. 275, 282 (App. Div. 1986) ( [N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude. ); see also Carty, 170 N.J. at 648 ( [A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop. ). With regard to defendants different accounts of where they were visiting in New York City (one said Brooklyn, another Manhattan, and yet another the Bronx), it was anything but clear that six defendants visiting over two days in two separate cars did not go their own ways, and even if they did not, that out-of-towners from North Carolina would have had a familiarity with the five boroughs. See State ex rel. J.G., 320 N.J. Super. 21, 33 (App. Div. 1999) (finding that conflicting answers to whereabouts -- first Brooklyn, then the Village -- did not, along with other nominal factors, amount to reasonable and articulable suspicion of drug activity). To be sure, nervousness and conflicting statements, along with indicia of wrongdoing, can be cumulative factors in a totality of the circumstances analysis that leads to a finding of reasonable and articulable suspicion of ongoing criminality. See State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 367 (2002) (noting that even though nervousness may be normal, it does not detract from fact that a suspect s nervousness plays a role in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists ). According to the motion judge, the State fell short in showing that there was an articulable suspicion. From his viewpoint, the information available to the troopers gave rise to nothing more than a hunch that something was wrong. With respect to Sergeant Klem s testimony that the hanging gas tank caused him to be suspicious, Judge DeVesa rejected the notion that any time there s a loose part on a motor vehicle that somehow that should give rise to believe that people are hiding drugs in the motor vehicle. He apparently acknowledged that although an officer s experience and knowledge must be afforded due weight to specific reasonable inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his [or her] experience, generalizations could not form the basis for reasonable and articulable suspicion. See id. at 361 (quoting Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 909) (alterations in original). The motion judge could not conclude that in the circumstances of this case, simple nervousness and conflicting statements gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that drugs [were] being secreted in this vehicle. In the end, he held that the troopers did not possess the requisite suspicion either to conduct the investigatory stop or request consent to search the Lincoln. The motion judge s findings concerning the timing of the investigatory detention and whether the troopers possessed the necessary suspicion were close calls. We cannot conclude, however, based on our review of the record, that those findings are so clearly mistaken that an appellate court should substitute its own judgment. Accordingly, we are compelled to reverse the Appellate Division and reinstate the motion judge s order suppressing the evidence. Because the unconstitutional investigatory detention and request for consent to search standing alone support suppression of the evidence, we need not reach the question of whether defendant Leach s consent was knowingly and voluntarily given to the troopers. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MICHELLE L. ELDERS, Defendant-Appellant. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RONALD STANLEY, Defendant-Appellant. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. TASHA JONES, Defendant-Appellant. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER M. LEACH, Defendant-Appellant. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANTHONY GRAHAM, Defendant-Appellant. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MARCELLIUS M. LOVE, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority s determination of this cause substantially for the reasons persuasively explained by Judge Wecker in State v. Elders, 386 N.J. Super. 208 (App. Div. 2006). I add only the following. The majority takes issue with what it characterizes as the Appellate Division s failure to apply the correct standard of review for a suppression hearing. Ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2007) (slip op. at 4). According to the majority, the panel engaged in its own factfindings, ante, at ___ (slip op. at 14), did not defer to the motion judge s factfindings, ante, at ___ (slip op at 21), and thus improperly substituted its own factfindings for those of the motion judge[,] ibid. In the end, the majority concludes that [t]he Appellate Division in this case did not apply the deferential standard of review to the motion judge s findings. Ante, at ___ (slip op. at 25). For the reasons that follow, I disagree. Instead of parsing out the panel s words on the subject, it is more instructive to read, as an integrated whole, how the panel viewed its task in this appeal: When the outcome of a suppression hearing is dependent upon the judge s findings of fact, including witness credibility, we defer to those findings as long as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. See State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999). Here, however, the outcome is based upon the judge s application of the law to facts that are essentially undisputed. The most telling evidence at the hearing was the videotape of the highway incident, and the only witnesses at the hearing were the two troopers most closely involved in the incident. No material factual dispute or contradiction arose from that evidence, and no special deference to judicial factfinding is warranted. We are satisfied that the troopers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that there was evidence of crime in the vehicle they sought to search. [Elders, supra, 386 N.J. Super. at 228.] There is nothing in the Appellate Division s decision that supports the conclusion that it willy-nilly jettisoned the motion judge s factual findings in favor of its own. Indeed, the panel explains -- and no one contests -- that there were no material factual disputes here. Thus, all that remained was the application of law to those undisputed facts. And, in that context, we have repeatedly and uniformly held that [a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). See Raspa v. Office of the Sheriff, 191 N.J. 323, 334-35 (2007) (same, quoting Manalapan Realty, supra); State v. Drury, 190 N.J. 197, 209 (2007) ( We therefore owe no deference to the interpretation of the trial court or the appellate panel, and apply instead a de novo standard of review (citation omitted)); State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004) (same, quoting Manalapan Realty, supra); Pheasant Bridge Corp. v. Twp. of Warren, 169 N.J. 282, 293 (2001) (same, citing Manalapan Realty, supra); In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997) ( If, however, an appellate court is reviewing a trial court s legal conclusions, the same level of deference is not required (citing Manalapan Realty, supra)). Applying the law to the facts, the panel concluded, in respect of the actual search of the car, that the troopers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that there was evidence of crime in the vehicle they sought to search. Elders, supra, 386 N.J. Super. at 228. That is a conclusion of law derived from the application of law to a given set of facts. It is only that legal conclusion that is at odds with the motion judge s legal conclusion; there is no substantive difference between factual findings relied on by the motion judge and those the panel referenced in support of its conclusion. The Appellate Division did reject the motion judge s factual findings in a limited respect: whether [defendant Christopher] Leach s apparent request for an attorney earlier in the confrontation was a sufficient basis for the judge to conclude that Leach s subsequent consent was not voluntary. Id. at 230. The panel recited at length the factual findings made by the motion judge concerning that matter, and it recognize[d its] obligation to give deference to the [factual] findings of the Law Division judge, as long as those findings are based upon sufficient credible evidence in the record. Id. at 231 (citing Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 474). The Appellate Division explained, however, that the rationale for according the trial judge s finding such deference is that those findings are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record. Id. at 232 (quoting State v. Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 474). The panel explained that, because the observations upon which the motion judge explicitly made his findings and drew his conclusions came from the videotaped encounter, and [because] that videotape is equally available to us[,] it readily was able to gauge whether those findings were supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. Ibid. It determined that they were not. As the Appellate Division noted, its own observations [of the videotape] do not support the findings cited by the judge to conclude that Leach did not voluntarily consent to the search. Ibid. The panel then listed five separate reasons for rejecting the motion judge s findings in respect of Leach s consent to the search of his car. Id. at 232-33. Having given due deference to the motion judge, the Appellate Division nonetheless concluded that his findings were not supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. It was for that reason -- and not from the application of an incorrect standard of review -- that the panel reversed the motion judge s ruling. Because the majority reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division based on its view that the panel applied an incorrect standard of review, because I disagree with that conclusion, and because I would affirm the panel s legal conclusion that both the search and Leach s consent to search were proper, I respectfully dissent. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-42 SEPTEMBER TERM 2006 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michelle Elders, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________ And other related matters. DECIDED July 30, 2007 Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Albin CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto