Case Title: Commonwealth v. Garcia

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11423

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11423 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JESUS GARCIA. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     February 27, 2019. - June 7, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Sentence, Public trial.  
Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Sentence, Public 
trial, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 13, 2010. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Mary-Lou Rup, J., and a motion 
for a new trial was heard by her. 
 
 
 
Alan Jay Black for the defendant. 
 
Katherine E. McMahon, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Ryan M. Schiff & David Rossman, for Omar Abdur-Rahim & 
others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  A jury convicted the defendant of murder in the 
first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme 
2 
 
 
atrocity or cruelty.1  The judge sentenced the defendant to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole on the murder 
conviction.2  On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the judge 
erred in declining to instruct the jury on voluntary 
manslaughter; (2) the defendant's age at the time of his crimes 
-- nineteen years old -- renders his sentence unconstitutional; 
and (3) the judge should have granted a new trial due to a 
partial court room closure.  The defendant also requests that we 
exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to either reduce 
his convictions or grant a new trial.  Because we find neither 
reversible error nor a reason to exercise our authority under 
§ 33E, we affirm.3 
 
Background.  We recite certain facts the jury could have 
found, reserving other details for later discussion.  In July 
2010, the fifteen year old daughter of the murder victim (victim 
                     
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of armed assault with 
intent to murder; two counts of burglary assault on an occupant, 
one of which the judge set aside as legally inconsistent with 
other verdicts; breaking and entering in the nighttime with 
intent to commit a misdemeanor; two counts of assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon; assault and battery; and 
assault with intent to rape.  He was found not guilty of attempt 
to commit rape. 
 
 
2 The judge also sentenced the defendant to from seven to 
eight years' imprisonment from and after the life sentence to 
account for crimes committed against individuals other than the 
murder victim. 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Omar Abdur-
Rahim, Gary Johnson, and Lonnie Watkins. 
3 
 
 
or mother) was dating the defendant, who was nineteen.  The 
daughter lived in Hampden with her sister, her stepfather, and 
her mother.  The daughter awoke in her bedroom on July 21 to a 
gloved hand over her mouth.  There was a knife against her 
throat and a masked face staring at her.  The daughter knew from 
the assailant's voice and clothing that he was the defendant, 
and she later recognized him when he took off his mask.  The 
defendant tried to pull the daughter's shorts off multiple times 
but never entirely removed them.  He eventually put the knife 
down and explained to the daughter, "I was trying to see what 
you would do in that situation. . . .  I was trying to show you 
the world wasn't safe." 
 
The daughter then told her mother the defendant was in her 
room.  They went into the room and found the defendant hiding in 
a closet.  After the victim told the defendant to "[g]et out," 
the defendant left. 
 
Following the July 21 incident, the victim became scared 
that the defendant would return to the house.  She started 
locking the doors at night.  The victim also told her daughter 
that the victim would not let anything bad happen to her, and 
that if the defendant came back he would have to get through the 
victim. 
 
At night on July 29, the daughter sent a text message to 
the defendant stating that their relationship was over.  In the 
4 
 
 
morning on July 30, the family dog started barking in the 
victim's house.  The stepfather investigated and noticed the 
cellar door was open.  He closed it, and then went into the 
kitchen to find the victim running toward him.  The victim said 
the defendant was in the daughter's room.  According to the 
stepfather's testimony, "Before she finished saying it, [the 
defendant] came storming out towards us" with a knife.  The 
defendant sliced the stepfather's throat and cut him above the 
eye.  The stepfather went to the door leading outside but could 
not open it, so he turned around and saw the defendant "standing 
over" the victim with the knife.  Although the victim was hidden 
behind a counter, the stepfather heard the victim making sounds 
similar to "somebody getting punched."  As the stepfather 
escaped outside through the door, the defendant stabbed him in 
the back multiple times. 
 
The victim's daughter left her bedroom when she heard her 
stepfather's screams.  She saw the defendant stabbing her 
mother.  When the daughter tried to escape, the defendant 
dragged her into the kitchen by her hair.  The daughter saw the 
defendant slice her mother's throat, and then she escaped 
outside. 
 
At trial, defense counsel admitted in the opening statement 
that the defendant killed the victim, and then stated that the 
evidence would show the defendant was guilty of manslaughter 
5 
 
 
rather than murder.  After the judge declined to instruct the 
jury on manslaughter, defense counsel argued in closing that the 
defendant was not guilty of murder because he did not act with 
malice, but rather in response to the victim confronting him 
with a knife.  The defendant presented one witness:  an expert 
who testified about, among other things, brain development of 
teenagers. 
 
A jury convicted the defendant of various crimes, including 
murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The judge 
sentenced the defendant to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole on the murder conviction.4  The defendant 
appealed, and then moved for a new trial due to an asserted 
partial court room closure.  The judge denied the motion after 
an evidentiary hearing.  We have consolidated the defendant's 
direct appeal with his appeal from the denial of his motion for 
a new trial. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Voluntary manslaughter instruction.  We 
discern no error in the judge's decision not to instruct on 
voluntary manslaughter.  See Commonwealth v. Gulla, 476 Mass. 
743, 748 (2017).  "A manslaughter instruction is required if the 
evidence, considered in the light most favorable to a defendant, 
                     
 
4 After the defendant was convicted, he moved for a sentence 
of life with the possibility of parole.  The motion was denied. 
6 
 
 
would permit a verdict of manslaughter and not murder."  
Commonwealth v. Pina, 481 Mass. 413, 422 (2019).  "Voluntary 
manslaughter is an unlawful killing 'arising not from malice, 
but "from . . . sudden passion induced by reasonable 
provocation, sudden combat, or excessive force in self-
defense"'" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 
Mass. 435, 443 (2006). 
 
The defendant argues on appeal, as he did at trial, that 
the jury could have found that the victim armed herself with a 
knife on July 30 to protect her daughter, confronted the 
defendant, and then lost the knife to the defendant, who killed 
her with it.5  There was no direct evidence at trial of such a 
confrontation.  The defendant acknowledges as much and points 
instead to circumstantial evidence.  Viewed in the light most 
favorable to the defendant, that evidence is as follows:  (1) 
after the defendant attacked the victim's daughter on July 21, 
the victim told her daughter that the defendant would have to 
                     
 
5 On appeal, the defendant also suggests that he was 
provoked by the victim's daughter breaking up with him.  
However, the "provocation must come from the victim."  
Commonwealth v. Hinds, 457 Mass. 83, 90 (2010), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 442 Mass. 826, 838-839 (2004).  And 
"[m]ere words generally do not constitute sufficient provocation 
to warrant an instruction on [manslaughter]."  Commonwealth v. 
Tu Trinh, 458 Mass. 776, 783 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Vick, 454 Mass. 418, 429 (2009).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Zagrodny, 
443 Mass. 93, 106 (2004) ("victim's 'leaving' her husband and 
'taking' their children is not evidence of provocation 
sufficient to warrant a voluntary manslaughter instruction"). 
7 
 
 
get through her if he ever came back; (2) when the victim and 
her family peacefully confronted the defendant on July 21, the 
defendant left peacefully; (3) the murder weapon came from the 
victim's house; (4) the victim held the murder weapon at some 
point, as shown by her deoxyribonucleic acid on its handle; and 
(5) the defendant had fresh cuts and scratches on his body when 
he was interviewed by police on July 30. 
 
The defendant's theory of events "is entirely speculative." 
Pina, 481 Mass. at 424.  The evidence provides no detail about 
the victim's supposed attack against the defendant, and "a judge 
should not instruct the jury 'on a hypothesis not supported by 
the evidence.'"  Id. at 422, quoting Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 
367 Mass. 743, 746 (1975).  Thus, a voluntary manslaughter 
instruction was not warranted.  See Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 
461 Mass. 100, 108 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Espada, 450 
Mass. 687, 696-697 (2008) ("Generally, for sudden combat to be 
the basis of a voluntary manslaughter instruction, the 'victim 
. . . must attack the defendant or at least strike a blow 
against the defendant'").  See also Commonwealth v. Brum, 441 
Mass. 199, 206 n.12 (2004) ("Even if a victim brandishes a 
weapon or attacks a defendant, it does not necessarily create 
sudden combat or reasonable provocation").  Cf. Gulla, 476 Mass. 
at 748 (evidence did not support voluntary manslaughter 
instruction where defendant had "injury to the back of his head" 
8 
 
 
and "defendant told first responders that the victim bit him," 
but there was "no evidence that [the victim] initiated physical 
contact"). 
 
2.  Constitutionality of sentence.  The defendant argues, 
as he did at trial, that mandatory sentences of life in prison 
without the possibility of parole are unconstitutional as 
applied to defendants who committed murder in the first degree 
when they were teenagers or in their early twenties.  See G. L. 
c. 265, § 2.  Because the defendant was nineteen years old at 
the time of his crimes, he contends that his sentence violates 
the prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments" under the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and the prohibition on "cruel or unusual 
punishments" under art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  On this record, we decline to hold the defendant's 
sentence unconstitutional. 
 
In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465, 470 (2012), the 
United States Supreme Court held that mandatory sentences of 
life without parole violate the Eighth Amendment when imposed on 
those who are under the age of eighteen when they commit 
homicide.  In Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk 
Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 673 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015), we 
decided that sentences of life without parole, whether mandatory 
or discretionary, violate art. 26 where imposed on individuals 
9 
 
 
who are under the age of eighteen when they commit murder in the 
first degree.  See Commonwealth v. Lugo, 482 Mass. 94, 98-101 
(2019) (describing Miller and Diatchenko).  The rulings in 
Miller and Diatchenko do not apply to the defendant here, who 
committed his crimes at the age of nineteen. 
 
We recognize that "[s]cientific and social science research 
on adolescent brain development . . . continues."  Commonwealth 
v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 59-60 (2015).  "For example, researchers 
continue to study the age range at which most individuals reach 
adult neurobiological maturity, with evidence that although some 
brain systems have fully matured in most individuals by around 
age fifteen, other brain functions are not likely to be fully 
matured until around age twenty-two."  Id. at 60 n.14.  Indeed, 
the defendant's expert testified that certain parts of the 
brain, the frontal lobes, take over twenty years to "finish 
developing."  According to the expert, these portions of the 
brain regulate important functions such as "controlling 
impulses, . . . inhibition of unwanted behaviors, [and] 
decision-making." 
 
Although this testimony and similar research may relate to 
the constitutionality of sentences of life without parole for 
individuals other than juveniles,6 "we appear to deal here with a 
                     
 
6 The term "juvenile" refers in this opinion to someone 
under the age of eighteen at the time of his or her crimes. 
10 
 
 
rapidly changing field of study and knowledge."  Id. at 60.  The 
minimal record on brain development in this case, consisting of 
one expert's testimony presented during trial rather than at 
sentencing, does not allow us to reach an informed conclusion on 
whether individuals in their late teens or early twenties should 
be given the same constitutional protections as juveniles for 
purposes of the Eighth Amendment and art. 26.  We decline on 
this record to extend beyond juveniles the decisions in Miller 
and Diatchenko.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Chukwuezi, 475 Mass. 597, 
610 (2016) (upholding constitutionality of mandatory sentence of 
life without parole for defendant who was eighteen years old at 
time of crime). 
 
3.  Court room closure.  The judge found the following 
facts after an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion for 
a new trial.  We accept the facts as they are not clearly 
erroneous.  See Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 36 (2017). 
 
An investigator with the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services (CPCS) was standing inside the court room during 
closing arguments because he did not see any seats available.  A 
court officer "approached [the investigator] and told him he 
could not stand there as the back doors of the courtroom needed 
to remain clear. . . .  [H]e told [the investigator] to take a 
seat or [the court officer] would find a seat for him."  The 
11 
 
 
investigator then left the court room after telling the court 
officer "he would wait outside."7 
 
While outside, the investigator told or suggested to two 
people, a relative of the victim and a CPCS attorney, that they 
could not enter the court room because standing was not allowed.  
After speaking with the investigator, the relative entered the 
court room, found a seat, and watched the proceedings for a time 
before leaving.  The CPCS attorney looked in the court room, saw 
that it was crowded, and left.  No court officer excluded either 
individual from the court room. 
 
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution guarantee defendants "the right to a . . . public 
trial."  Rather than risk violating this right by telling a 
spectator to leave, the court officer here offered to find the 
investigator a seat.  It is irrelevant that the investigator 
then told or suggested to other spectators that they could not 
                     
 
7 The investigator with the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services testified that the court officer told him he needed to 
wait outside the court room because there were no seats 
available.  The judge discredited this testimony, finding that 
the court officer "did not tell [the investigator] that he had 
to leave and remain outside the courtroom, but only that he 
could not stand blocking the public exit doors."  Although the 
defendant argues the judge should have believed the 
investigator, "[t]he judge was not required to credit the 
[investigator's] testimony," Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 
22, 36 (2017), and we accord special deference to the judge's 
findings "where, as here, the motion judge was also the trial 
judge."  Id. 
12 
 
 
enter the court room.  For there to be closure in the 
constitutional sense, "[s]ome affirmative act by the court or 
one acting on its behalf is required."  Commonwealth v. Rogers, 
459 Mass. 249, 263, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1080 (2011).  There 
was no official act of exclusion here. 
 
The defendant argues that attorneys should have been asked 
to move in front of the attorneys' bar to make room in the 
public seating area for nonattorney spectators.  The judge found 
that the district attorney for the Hampden district and an 
assistant district attorney entered around the time of closing 
arguments and sat in chairs in front of the attorneys' bar.  But 
the investigator never gave the court officer an opportunity to 
rearrange the seating, deciding instead to wait outside.  And 
the court was not obliged preemptively to seat in front of the 
attorneys' bar lawyers uninvolved in the case. 
 
The defendant argues also that the court officer should 
have brought to the judge's attention the investigator's 
inability to find a seat.  However, the judge did not need to 
address the issue because the court officer offered to find the 
investigator somewhere to sit, meaning there was no risk that a 
spectator would be excluded.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 478 
Mass. 725, 732-733 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Cohen 
(No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 115 (2010) (among other requirements, 
"judge must make 'findings adequate to support the closure'" 
13 
 
 
where there is partial closure, although "reviewing court may 
examine the record itself to see if it contains sufficient 
support for the closure . . . in the absence of formal or 
express findings by the judge").  There was no error in denying 
the defendant's motion for a new trial.8 
 
4.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After reviewing the 
entire record pursuant to our obligation under § 33E, we decline 
to reduce the murder verdict to a lesser degree of guilt or to 
order a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
                     
 
8 The defendant did not raise at trial the issue of court 
room closure, as it appears defense counsel did not learn of the 
asserted closure until after sentencing.  Therefore, the 
defendant's claim is procedurally waived and any error, instead 
of resulting in automatic reversal, is reviewed for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 480 Mass. 146, 149-150, 153, 154-155 
(2018).  Even if there were error, it would not warrant reversal 
under that standard.