Case Title: Scarpinato v. Nehring

Citation: 

Docket Number: 626, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2003-09-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DERRIK SCARPINATO, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 626, 2002 
 
 
Petitioner Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Family Court of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
JANIFFER NEHRING,  
 
) File No. CN99-10451 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent Below, 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  September 3, 2003 
Decided:  September 26, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER, and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This  26th day of September, 2003 upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties, it appears to the Court as follows: 
1. 
Derrik Scarpinato appeals from an order of the Family Court awarding 
attorney’s fees to his ex-wife, Janiffer Nehring.  Specifically, Scarpinato claims 
that the Family Court judge failed to provide sufficient explanation for the 
discretion he exercised by entering the order. 
2. 
Family Court granted a final decree of divorce on September 28, 
2000.  A Family Court judge heard and decided the financial ancillary matters in 
December 2001.  Scarpinato contested the property division order by requesting 
Reargument.  The judge granted his motion in part and denied it in part.  In August 
 
2
2002, Scarpinato’s appealed and this Court summarily affirmed both the ancillary 
orders.  Thereafter, Nehring timely filed a motion for attorneys fees and the Family 
Court judge found that Scarpinato’s appeal “created unnecessary and excessive 
litigation,” and awarded Nehring $3,550.00 in counsel fees.  Scarpinato appealed.   
3. 
By Order dated May 2, 2003 this Court remanded and asked the 
Family Court to explain the basis for its award of attorney’s fees and to compare 
the parties’ litigation behavior.  In its Report following remand, the Family Court 
judge explained that Scarpinato’s elusive behavior during the proceedings 
precluded any possibility of settlement.  Scarpinato failed, before and at the 
ancillary hearing, to make full disclosure of certain marital assets that were under 
his control and failed to produce the documentation regarding the value of his 
401(k) and stock purchase plans.  Further, after failing to provide this evidence and 
refusing to proceed with full candor, Scarpinato claimed error in the judge’s stock 
valuation.  The trial judge found Scarpinato’s testimony evasive, his conduct 
egregious, and his appeal wholly without merit. 
4. 
The general rule regarding attorneys’ fees is that each party bears its 
own expenses regardless of the outcome of the case.1  However, in Smith v.  
                                                 
1 Goodrich v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., Del. Supr., 681 A.2d 1039 (1996). 
 
3
Francisco,2 we interpreted 13 Del.C. §7313 to allow a Family Court judge to award 
attorney’s fees where, “the enumerated factors and any other equitable 
considerations warrant an exception…”4 
5. 
In this case, the Family Court judge awarded attorney’s fees because 
Scarpanito’s improper conduct at trial and wholly meritless appeal from the 
alimony award imposed a bevy of unfair and burdensome additional costs upon 
Nehring.  We conclude that the Family Court judge articulated reasons that were 
entirely supported by the original record.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Order of the Family Court  
dated October 11, 2002 is hereby AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
2 Del. Supr., No. 230, Berger, J. (May, 16 2001); 2001 Del. LEXIS 216. 
3 Attorney's fees. The Court from time to time, after considering the legal and factual basis for 
the action, the results obtained, the financial resources of the parties, and such other factors as 
the Court deems just and equitable, may order a party to pay all or part of the cost to another 
party of maintaining or defending any proceedings under this chapter and for attorney's fees, 
including sums for legal services rendered and costs incurred prior to the commencement of such 
proceedings. The Court may order that the amount be paid directly to the attorney, who may 
enforce the order in his or her name. 
 
4 Francisco, Del. Supr., No. 230, Berger, J. (May, 16 2001); 2001 Del. LEXIS 216.