Case Title: Large v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0068

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
JERAMIE JOHN EDWIN LARGE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 159Case Number: No. S-11-0068Decided: 11/30/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
JERAMIE 
JOHN EDWIN LARGE,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County
The 
Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Westling.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Stewart M. 
Young, Faculty Director, Prosecution Assistance Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Young.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      The appellant, 
Jeramie John Edwin Large, was charged with six crimes arising from an incident 
when he stole and crashed a vehicle.  
In this appeal he claims that his right to a speedy trial was violated 
and that he was denied his right to counsel without being adequately instructed 
and warned of the dangers of proceeding without counsel.  Finding no error, we 
affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      1.    Whether the appellant 
received a speedy trial.
 
            
2.    Whether the 
district court properly informed the appellant of the dangers of proceeding 
without counsel and the penalties he faced. 
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      A felony 
information charging the appellant with burglary, larceny, interference with a 
police officer, failure to provide personal information after a vehicular 
accident, and failure to give notice of an accident to police, was filed against 
the appellant on October 2, 2009.  
That same day, the appellant executed an affidavit requesting 
court-appointed counsel and an order appointing a public defender was 
entered.  In the affidavit, the 
appellant wrote, “Rep[resent] myself w[ith] stand in counsel.”  Also, on October 2, 2009, the appellant 
waived his preliminary hearing.
 
[¶4]      Ten days after 
the appellant completed his application for appointed counsel, but before his 
arraignment, the public defender’s office moved to vacate its appointment 
because the appellant “wrote on [the affidavit] that he would represent himself 
'with stand in counsel’.”1  Shortly thereafter, but before 
arraignment, the appellant filed handwritten pro se motions asking the district court 
for, among other things, a separation of the charges, full discovery, and 
medical care.
 
[¶5]      On October 19, 
2009, the district court conducted a hearing to address the appellant’s request 
to represent himself with standby counsel, and the public defender’s response 
that such was precluded by statute.  
At that hearing, however, a public defender advised that the appellant 
had recently “resubmitted an application for appointment of the public 
defender’s office . . . with the full understanding that we don’t do it as 
stand-by counsel.”  The appellant 
confirmed that counsel’s statement was correct.
 
[¶6]      At an arraignment 
hearing on October 28, 2009, some confusion arose as to which particular public 
defender had been assigned to the appellant’s case.  The district court stated it was “not 
going to have this hearing without you having a lawyer,” to which the appellant 
responded, “I’d like to proceed . . . and just set it for jury trial at this 
time.”  The district court then 
explained to the appellant that “if technically there has been an order entered, 
then we need to allow that counsel to be here.  But I’m going to get this set as quickly 
as I can.”
 
[¶7]      A week later, on 
November 4, 2009, the public defender’s office filed another motion to vacate 
its appointment, stating:
 
[The 
appellant] has implied he will continue to make filings on his own behalf even 
though he has court-appointed counsel; [the appellant] has requested he be given 
access to a law library 1 to 2 hours a week for his legal 
research.
 
. 
. . . 
 
[The 
appellant] is not open to any counseling or recommendations by his 
court-appointed attorney.
 
The 
district court set a hearing on this motion to vacate for January 6, 
2010.
 
[¶8]      Before the 
district court had an opportunity to hear the motion to vacate, the appellant 
filed various handwritten motions, including a motion for permission to attend 
his grandmother’s funeral, “Motion to Represent Myself,” “Motion to Set Dates 
for Jury Trial,” “Motion to be Granted Access to Law Library,” “Motion for 
Complete File, Discovery,” “Motion Requesting Public Defenders,” and a request 
for an “evidentiary hearing . . . regarding inconsistencies and statues [sic], 
degree of charges, etc.”  A few 
weeks later, on December 7, 2009, the appellant filed additional motions for 
change of venue, allegedly on “due process” grounds, including “complications of 
misrepresentation by public defenders [sic] office on two separate occasions” 
and one appointed attorney’s “failing to appear to my set arraignment . . . and 
failure to properly represent me on my matters.”
 
[¶9]      Given the 
appellant’s erratic behavior and apparent desire to represent himself, defense 
counsel moved for a competency evaluation.  On January 6, 2010, the district court 
heard that motion and another motion by the public defender to withdraw.  At the hearing, the State argued that 
the motion to withdraw had “been filed partly on the request of [the appellant] 
making that indication that he’d like to represent himself.”  The appellant stated that he was 
“definitely [] going to trial on these charges, with or without a public 
defense.”  The district court told 
the appellant that before it would allow him to represent himself, it wanted to 
be positive that he was capable of doing so and understood that he would be held 
to the same standard as an attorney.  
The appellant responded that he would like the district court to appoint 
a different attorney.  To that, his 
current public defender responded, “Your honor, we have numerous letters, 
correspondence from [the appellant], indicating that he chooses to 
represent himself.”  Pointing to the 
inconsistencies, the public defender advocated for a competency determination 
because “[i]t appears that one minute he would like to use our office, the next 
he wouldn’t.”
 
[¶10]   The district court took the 
competency evaluation request under advisement and on February 3, 2010, issued 
an order finding “that Wyoming Statute § 7-11-304(d) requires an examination of 
the Defendant” and the court ordered the Wyoming State Hospital to conduct an 
examination.  On April 14, 2010, 
after the evaluation was complete, the district court held a hearing on the 
appellant’s competency.  At that 
hearing, the appellant’s counsel noted that the appellant’s examiner had found 
him competent to proceed and able to either aid and assist an attorney with his 
defense or represent himself.  His 
current public defender then noted that the appellant had informed him that he 
would like other counsel and orally moved to withdraw as counsel.  Based on the State Hospital’s report, 
the district court found the appellant had “the capacity to comprehend his 
position, to understand the nature and object of the proceedings, to conduct his 
defense in a rational manner, and the ability to cooperate with counsel to the 
end that any defense may be interposed on his behalf.”  The court then arraigned the appellant 
on the six charges against him.
 
[¶11]   On April 29, 2010, the appellant, 
through his third appointed counsel, filed a demand for a speedy trial.  Then, on July 21, 2010, he filed a 
handwritten pro se “Motion to Address 
the Courts of Violating My Right to a Speedy Trial, By [sic] Constitutional 
Rights and Amended Rights.”  On 
September 2, 2010, he filed another handwritten pro se “Motion Requesting the Courts to 
Order Listed Expert Witnesses Reqiuered [sic] for Trial.”
 
[¶12]   The appellant’s third attorney 
moved to vacate his appointment on grounds that he had been “appointed as [the 
appellant]’s counsel . . . after two other Public Defenders were permitted to 
withdraw the Public Defender’s Office due to the [appellant] acting as his own 
attorney by filing motions on his own behalf without conferring with 
counsel.”  Counsel also informed the 
district court that the appellant had resumed filing motions without informing 
counsel or sending copies of those motions to counsel.  Furthermore, counsel advised the court 
that the appellant had “implied that he will continue to make filings on his own 
behalf even though he has Court-Appointed Counsel.”  Counsel requested that he be relieved of 
his appointment “[b]ecause the [appellant] acts as his own attorney and works at 
cross purposes with [the appellant’s] Counsel’s trial 
preparation.”
 
[¶13]   The next day, the district court 
heard counsel’s motion to vacate his appointment.  Counsel stated that he was concerned 
that 
 
we’re 
kind of working at cross purposes here.  
[The appellant] has continued to file motions with the Court. . . .  [The appellant] evidently feels that he 
has a great deal of knowledge regarding criminal law proceedings, and it’s very 
difficult to work with a client if he’s going to be filing his own motions and 
acting as his own attorney.  
 
The 
appellant then explained why he had filed some of his motions, asserting, “I 
just want to go to trial and get some closure on this.”  When the district court asked him how he 
would like to proceed, he stated, “I’m proposing that I have my trial on the 
28th, if that’s okay with you, Your Honor.”  The district court explained to the 
appellant that he had placed his attorney in a difficult position and had again 
placed the court “in the situation of finding someone else to represent 
[him.]”  The appellant responded 
that, after going through three attorneys, he “would be happy” representing 
himself.  He then stated, “I’m 
definitely not waiving my speedy trial, and I’ll represent myself if so be 
needed. . . . I want to keep my trial.  
I want to go forward with whatever it is and get closure on this 
situation.”  The district court then 
sought to clarify whether the appellant wanted to decline representation by the 
public defender’s office and proceed representing himself.  The appellant replied affirmatively to 
both inquiries, suggesting that self-representation was the only option that 
would allow him to proceed to trial without additional delay.  The district court agreed that 
appointing a new attorney would likely require a continuance and that it could 
not make such an appointment at that point unless the appellant waived his right 
to a speedy trial.  The appellant 
indicated that he understood and stated that he did not want a continuance but 
would proceed without counsel.
 
[¶14]   Two weeks later at a pretrial 
hearing, the district court again addressed the appellant’s decision to waive 
his right to counsel and represent himself.  The court placed the appellant under 
oath and asked if he was knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to 
counsel.  The court informed him 
that, at any time, he could change his mind about proceeding pro se and either retain a lawyer or ask 
that one be appointed.  The court 
cautioned, however, that it would permit no further postponements of the trial, 
even if the appellant brought a new attorney into the case.  The court also warned that it would no 
longer allow the appellant to represent himself if the appellant’s “conduct 
deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct before the Court . 
. . .”  Finally, the court 
admonished as to specific “dangers and disadvantages to self-representation” and 
that the appellant’s failure to accept or employ an attorney might be 
detrimental to his case.  The 
appellant stated that he was not under the influence of anything that might 
prevent him from understating the court’s advice and acknowledged that he 
understood the court’s explanations and warnings.
 
[¶15]   At the court’s request, the 
prosecutor then outlined the substance of all six of the charges against the 
appellant, the range of sentences that could be imposed upon conviction of those 
crimes, and that the sentences could run consecutively.  The appellant again stated that he 
understood.  At that point, the 
court found and concluded as follows:
 
. 
. . the defendant has clearly been advised of his right to assistance, including 
his right to the assignment of counsel when he is so entitled, that the 
defendant possesses the intelligence and the capacity to appreciate the 
consequences of his decision, and that the defendant comprehends the nature of 
the charges and the proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any 
additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the 
case.
 
            
So you have knowingly and intelligently waived your right to 
counsel.
 
[¶16]   A jury trial commenced on September 
27, 2010, and ended the next day.  
The appellant was found guilty of two counts of burglary and each count 
of failing to report; however, he was acquitted of larceny and the jury could 
not reach a verdict on the interference with a police officer charge.  The appellant timely appealed his 
convictions.
 
DISCUSSION
 
Whether 
the appellant received a speedy trial.
 
[¶17]   In the first of two issues raised 
by the appellant, he asserts that he was denied his right to a speedy 
trial.  “We examine de novo the constitutional question of 
whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.”  Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81 ¶ 17, 93 P.3d 222, 227 (Wyo. 2004).  “The district 
court's findings of fact on the speedy trial issue are reviewed for clear 
error.”  Sisneros v. State, 2005 WY 139, ¶ 16, 
121 P.3d 790, 797 (Wyo. 2005).
 
[¶18]   Speedy trial questions are governed 
by both the rules of criminal procedure and the federal constitution.  “W.R.Cr.P. 48 governs the time period 
between arraignment and trial; however, delays between the time of charge and 
the time of trial are subject to the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.”  Walters v. State, 2004 WY 37, ¶ 9, 87 P.3d 793, 795 (Wyo. 2004) (internal citations omitted).  W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(2) requires that: “A 
criminal charge shall be brought to trial within 180 days following arraignment 
unless continued as provided in this rule.”  In deciding this issue, we must first 
determine the proper date of arraignment.
 
[¶19]   The appellant argues that we should 
construe the hearing on October 28, 2009, as his arraignment because that was 
the date originally set for that purpose.  
The appellant’s trial began on September 27, 2010, which would have 
resulted in a 334-day delay between arraignment and trial – far exceeding the 
180 days allowed in W.R.Cr.P. 48.  
While the appellant advocates for that date, he also concedes that the 
October 28, 2009, hearing did not meet the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 10, as no 
charges were read and no plea was entered.
 
[¶20]   The State agrees that the October 
28, 2009, hearing lacked the hallmarks of an arraignment, and argues that the 
actual arraignment had to be delayed until April 14, 2010, which date resulted 
in a delay less than the 180 days prescribed by W.R.Cr.P. 48.  The State contends that the appellant 
caused most of the delay between his arrest and arraignment as he continually 
undermined his appointed attorneys’ efforts effectively to represent him.  We agree with the 
State.
 
[¶21]   The appellant significantly delayed 
both his arraignment and trial by asking numerous times for appointment of a new 
attorney.  The record is replete 
with efforts by the appellant to refuse, change or dismiss counsel.  The appellant initially requested 
“stand-in” counsel, he moved to represent himself, he requested new counsel, his 
third attorney moved to vacate appointment because of the appellant’s lack of 
cooperation, and, finally, at the competency hearing the appellant requested 
appointment of a different attorney.  
All three of the attorneys appointed to represent the appellant reported 
that he repeatedly filed his own motions without discussing them with counsel 
and would not follow instructions not to file such motions.  W.R.Cr.P. 48 specifically states that 
delays attributable to a “defendant’s change of counsel or application thereof” 
are excluded from the 180-day period under the rule.  W.R.Cr.P. 
48(b)(3)(D).
 
[¶22]   In addition to the delays caused by 
the appellant’s efforts to change counsel, further delay occurred when it became 
necessary to determine the appellant’s competency prior to arraigning him.  When the appellant’s competency became 
an issue, it was incumbent on the district court to address that matter prior to 
arraignment.  Follet v. State, 2006 WY 47, ¶ 8, 132 P.3d 1155, 1158 (Wyo. 2006) (“A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is 
competent, and he may not waive his right to counsel or plead guilty unless he 
does so competently and intelligently.” (quoting Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 2685, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993))).  Both this Court and the United States 
Supreme Court have made clear that the “competency requirement continues from 
the time of arraignment through sentencing.”  Id. (citing Godinez, 509 U.S.  at 403, 113 S.Ct. at 
2689).
 
[¶23]   W.R.Cr.P. 48 specifically excludes 
from the speedy trial computation “[a]ll proceedings related to the mental 
illness or deficiency of the defendant.”  W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(3)(A).  Indeed, we have said that “[w]here the 
primary reason for the delay is the determination of the defendant's mental 
competency to stand trial, Wyoming law requires suspension of all criminal 
proceedings until the district court can make a determination of the defendant’s 
mental competency.”  Hauck v. State, 2001 WY 119, ¶ 14, 36 P.3d 597, 601 (Wyo. 2001); see also Smith 
v. State, 871 P.2d 186, 190 (Wyo. 1994) (trial court suspended proceedings 
to evaluate defendant's competency and arraigned him only after determining he 
was fit to proceed).  In the present 
case, once the district court had adequately addressed the appellant’s 
competency, it arraigned him on the six charges and conducted his jury trial 
within 180 days of that arraignment.
 
[¶24]   The delays in the proceedings are 
attributable almost exclusively to the appellant.  W.R.Cr.P. 48 specifically excluded from 
the speedy trial computation time delays caused by the appellant’s changes of 
counsel and delays caused by proceedings necessary to determine the appellant’s 
competency.  Once these issues were 
properly addressed and settled, an arraignment was held and the appellant was 
tried within the required 180 days.
 
[¶25]   We turn now to the constitutionally 
imposed speedy trial requirements.  
The case of Barker v. Wingo, 
407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 1292, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972) “set forth the 
benchmark test that applies to the constitutional speedy trial claims.”  Humphrey v. State, 2008 WY 67, ¶ 20, 185 P.3d 1236, 1243 (Wyo. 2008).  The Barker v. Wingo test “requires 
consideration of four factors in determining whether a speedy trial violation 
has occurred: the length of delay; the reason for the delay; the defendant’s 
assertion of [his or her] right; and the prejudice to the defendant. . . . None 
of these factors alone are dispositive.”  Id. (internal citations omitted).
 
[¶26]   Regarding the first factor, we have 
said:
 
This 
first factor is a threshold factor which requires a calculation of the length of 
delay in bringing the appellant to trial. 
 Strandlien 
[v. 
State], 2007 
WY 66, ¶ 7, 156 P.3d [986,] 990 [(Wyo. 2007)]. 
 There 
is no precise length of delay that automatically constitutes a 
constitutional 
speedy trial violation. 
 Berry 
[v. 
State], 2004 
WY 81, ¶ 32, 93 P.3d [222,] 231 [(Wyo. 2004)]. 
 “However, 
when the delay is so protracted as to be presumptively prejudicial, inquiry into 
the other factors is required.” 
 Id.
 
Boucher 
v. State, 
2011 WY 2, ¶ 10, 245 P.3d 342, 349 (Wyo. 2011).  In the present case, although the 363-day 
delay between the appellant’s arrest and trial was long, it was not 
extraordinary.  See Id. at ¶ 11, at 349 (2,971 days); Humphrey, 2008 WY 67, ¶ 22, 185 P.3d  at 
1244 (561 days); Strandlien v. State, 
2007 WY 66, ¶ 9, 156 P.3d 986, 990 (Wyo. 2007) (762 days); Berry, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 34, 93 P.3d  at 232 
(720 days); Warner v. State, 2001 WY 
67, ¶ 12, 28 P.3d 21, 26 (Wyo. 2001) (658 days).  Nevertheless, we will analyze the other 
three factors inasmuch as we have found shorter delays to warrant such.  See Sisneros, 2005 WY 139, ¶ 19, 121 P.3d  at 797 (found 349 days to meet the threshold requirement).
 
[¶27]   Regarding the second factor – the reason 
for the delay – as noted above, the appellant was responsible for the majority, 
if not all, of the delay.  See supra ¶ 24.  Any delays attributable to the State are 
weighed against those attributable to the defendant.  Strandlien, 2007 WY 66, ¶ 10, 156 P.3d  at 991.  “Unquestionably, 
delays attributable to the defendant may disentitle him to speedy trial 
safeguards.”  Berry, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 35, 93 P.3d  at 
232.  While no single factor is 
dispositive, we find that under the particular facts presented here, this factor 
weighs heavily against the appellant’s speedy trial violation 
claim.
 
[¶28]   As to 
the third factor, the appellant obviously asserted his right to a speedy trial: 
once in his own handwritten motion, and once through his third appointed 
counsel.  However, he did so while 
at the same time making a consistent and seemingly calculated effort to 
undermine the efforts of his court-appointed attorneys, which actions caused 
significant delays.  Such conduct 
contradicted the appellant’s stated desire for a speedy disposition of his 
case.
 
[¶29]   Finally, the fourth factor focuses on 
the degree of prejudice that the appellant suffered as a result of the delay. 
 Humphrey, 2008 WY 67, ¶ 28, 185 P.3d  at 
1245; Strandlien, 2007 WY 66, ¶ 14, 
156 P.3d  at 991. “We assess prejudice in light of the particular evils the 
speedy trial right is intended to avert: (1) lengthy pretrial incarceration; (2) 
pretrial anxiety; and (3) impairment of the defense.”  Strandlien, 2007 WY 66, ¶ 14, 156 P.3d  
at 991; see also Barker, 407 U.S.  at 
532, 92 S. Ct.  at 2193.  “Of these, 
the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to 
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.”  Barker, 407 U.S.  at 532, 92 S. Ct.  at 
2193.  The appellant argues that he 
was prejudiced by the delay inasmuch as his incarceration “limited his legal 
research, hindered his ability to serve subpoenas and eliminated his ability to 
investigate.”  Such difficulties, 
however, are not the result of any delay in prosecution, but instead, as 
explained by the district court, are problems inherent in the appellant’s 
decision to represent himself.  We 
cannot say that the appellant suffered any delay-related prejudice that he did 
not cause.
 
[¶30]   After 
analyzing the present facts under the four-factor Barker v. Wingo test, we cannot say that 
the delay in this case violated the appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to a 
speedy trial.
 
Whether 
the district court properly informed the appellant of the dangers of proceeding 
without counseland the penalties he faced.
 
[¶31]   In this second issue, the appellant 
asserts that the district court failed to advise him of the dangers of 
self-representation and, as a consequence, denied him his right to counsel.  Whether the appellant knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel is a constitutional issue and, 
therefore, a question of law we review de 
novo.  Wilkie v. State, 2002 WY 
164, ¶ 4, 56 P.3d 1023, 1024 (Wyo. 2002).  
We consider “the record as a whole when determining whether the defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily relinquished his right to representation of counsel.” 
 Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo. 
2000).
 
[¶32]   “The Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution requires that a defendant in state court shall have the 
right to represent himself if the accused himself timely, knowingly, and 
intelligently requests the right to forgo counsel, and does not do so to cause 
delay.”  Hauck, 2001 WY 119, ¶ 16, 36 P.3d  at 
601-02.  If a defendant elects to 
proceed without counsel, “the court must make him aware of the disadvantages and 
the dangers of self-representation.”  
Id.
 
Ideally, 
the trial judge should conduct a thorough and comprehensive formal inquiry of 
the defendant on the record to demonstrate that the defendant is aware of the 
nature of the charges, the range of allowable punishments and possible defenses, 
and is fully informed of the risks of proceeding pro se.
 
United 
States v. Willie, 
941 F.2d 1384, 1388 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1106, 112 S. Ct. 1200, 117 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1992) (some citations omitted).  The district court’s failure to conduct a 
complete inquiry on the record into the defendant’s understanding does not 
require reversal when “the surrounding facts and circumstances, including [the 
defendant’s] background and conduct, demonstrate that [the defendant] actually 
understood his right to counsel and the difficulties of pro se representation and knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel.”  941 F.2d  at 1389. “[A] defendant need not 
himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and 
intelligently to choose self-representation.”  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 
835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975).
 
Van 
Riper v. State, 
882 P.2d 230, 234 (Wyo. 1994).  “It 
is the district court’s responsibility to inquire into the defendant’s 
understanding of the charges against him, the allowable punishments, possible 
defenses, and the risks of proceeding pro 
se.” Vargas v. State, 963 P.2d 984, 990 (Wyo. 1998).
 
[¶33]   The appellant asserts that he “in 
no sense voluntarily waived counsel, because the trial court did not make the 
meaningful inquiry necessary before [the appellant] went to trial representing 
himself.”  This contention is simply 
inaccurate.  As noted above, the 
district court cautioned the appellant that it considered “it detrimental for 
[the appellant] to not accept or employ counsel to represent [him].”  See supra ¶ 14.  Also, it expressly detailed the numerous 
“dangers and disadvantages to self-representation.”  See supra ¶ 14.  Furthermore, the district court properly 
explained to the appellant the charges and potential sentences he faced, and the 
appellant told the court he understood this advice.  See supra ¶ 14.  The district court concluded clearly and 
on the record that the appellant had “knowingly and intelligently waived [his] 
right to counsel,” stating
 
that 
the defendant has clearly been advised of his right to assistance, including his 
right to the assignment of counsel when he is so entitled, that the defendant 
possesses the intelligence and the capacity to appreciate the consequences of 
his decision, and that the defendant comprehends the nature of the charges and 
the proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any additional facts 
essential to a broad understanding of the case.
 
Finally, 
the court expressly told the appellant “that at any time you can change your 
mind to retain counsel to represent you or to petition the Court for appointment 
of counsel to represent you to assist with your defense.”
 
[¶34]   After reviewing the record, we find 
that the district court adequately instructed the appellant on the dangers of 
proceeding without counsel and he was not denied the assistance of 
counsel.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶35]   We conclude that the appellant was 
afforded a speedy trial as it occurred within the 180-day time period required 
by W.R.Cr.P. 48 and met the constitutional requirements of the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.  
Also, we conclude that the appellant’s right to counsel was not violated 
as he was properly informed and warned of the dangers of proceeding without 
counsel.
 
[¶36]   We affirm.
 
FOOTNOTES
 
1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-6-107 (LexisNexis 2011) specifically states that a person who 
elects to represent himself shall not be entitled to “standby counsel” under the 
Public Defender Act.