Case Title: State v. Scott

Citation: 2001-Ohio-111

Docket Number: 20010807

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Scott, 91 Ohio St.3d 1268, 2001-Ohio-111.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SCOTT, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Scott (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 1268.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — R.C. 2949.28 — Defendant appeals denial 
of his claim that his severe mental illness precludes carrying out death 
sentence — Discretionary appeal allowed — Stay denied. 
(No. 01-807 — Submitted and decided April 30, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 79506. 
__________________ 
 
Upon consideration of the jurisdictional memoranda filed in this case, the 
court hereby allows the appeal. 
 
Upon consideration of appellant’s motion for stay of execution scheduled 
for May 15, 2001, pending consideration of Scott’s competency to be executed, 
 
IT IS ORDERED by the court that the motion for stay be, and hereby is, 
denied. 
 
IT IS ORDERED by the court, sua sponte, that the Clerk of the Court of 
Appeals for Cuyahoga County shall transmit the record by May 4, 2001. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED by the court, sua sponte, that the parties file 
their merit briefs no later than May 8, 2001.  No responsive briefs shall be filed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents in part because he would grant the motion for stay. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissenting.  Believing that the statute, R.C. 2949.28(A) and 
(B)(1), was never properly invoked in that there was never any supporting 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
information that would warrant a suggestion of insanity of Jay D. Scott, it is my 
opinion that the trial court never had appropriate jurisdiction.  Accordingly, any 
appeal to the court of appeals was likewise not proper and since that court had no 
jurisdiction, there was nothing to appeal to this court wherein our jurisdiction 
could properly be invoked.  Because the majority finds otherwise, I respectfully 
dissent. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision 
to allow Scott’s appeal and to impose an expedited briefing schedule.  This 
court’s review at this stage is discretionary, and I would not exercise that 
discretion in this case. 
 
Today’s decision is flawed in two respects.  First, by permitting expedited 
consideration of this cause, the majority sets in place an unwarranted procedural 
scheme.  Second, the majority has erroneously accepted jurisdiction over issues 
that cannot be addressed on the merits. 
I 
 
As a threshold matter, the majority provides no explanation for its decision 
to impose an expedited briefing schedule.  If a majority of this court deems 
Scott’s propositions of law sufficiently meritorious to warrant review (which I do 
not, for the reasons discussed infra), it is not clear why it chooses to deviate from 
our usual procedures.  An order requiring simultaneous briefing to be completed 
just one week before Scott’s scheduled execution date provides this court with an 
unnecessarily limited opportunity to assess Scott’s claims.  Though our rules of 
practice provide for expedited consideration of election matters, S.Ct.Prac.R. 
X(9), or appeals involving termination of parental rights or adoption, S.Ct.Prac.R. 
VI, our rules contain no provision for expedited consideration of death penalty 
cases. 
II 
January Term, 2001 
3 
 
On April 10, 2001, Scott filed in the trial court an R.C. 2949.28 “Notice of 
Apparent Insanity and, in the Alternative, His Motion for a Judicial Determination 
that It Violates the Ohio and United States Constitutions to Execute a Person with 
a Diagnosed Severe Mental Illness.”  R.C. 2949.28, however, does not provide a 
proper procedural vehicle through which Scott can challenge the constitutionality 
of executing an individual who has been diagnosed with a severe mental illness 
such as schizophrenia.  Instead, R.C. 2949.28 only provides a vehicle through 
which an individual sentenced to death can contest the execution of that sentence 
when he or she is insane as defined in R.C. 2949.28(A).  The statutory scheme 
neither provides a movant with the ability to assert alternative constitutional 
arguments nor empowers the trial court to address such arguments. 
 
But construing the dual nature of Scott’s filing in a light most favorable to 
him, his alternative motion to declare unconstitutional the Ohio death penalty 
scheme as applied to severely mentally ill individuals is in truth a petition for 
postconviction relief.  This court has previously held that “[w]here a criminal 
defendant, subsequent to his or her direct appeal, files a motion seeking vacation 
or correction of his or her sentence on the basis that his or her constitutional rights 
have been violated, such a motion is a petition for postconviction relief as defined 
in R.C. 2953.21.”  State v. Reynolds (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 679 N.E.2d 1131, 
syllabus.  In this instance, Scott in effect argues that his status as a severely 
mentally ill individual warrants correction of his sentence.  And because Scott has 
previously filed a postconviction relief petition, this court must construe his filing 
as a successive postconviction relief petition under R.C. 2953.23(A). 
 
R.C. 2953.23(A)(1) provides that “a court may not entertain * * * a second 
petition or successive petitions” unless “[e]ither of the following applies”: 
 
“(a) The petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented 
from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the 
claim for relief. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“(b) Subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 
2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United 
States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies 
retroactively to persons in the petitioner’s situation, and the petition asserts a 
claim based on that right.” 
 
Additionally, Scott must also satisfy R.C. 2953.23(A)(2), which provides: 
 
“The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 
constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the 
petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was convicted or, if the 
claim challenges a sentence of death that, but for constitutional error at the 
sentencing hearing, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner 
eligible for the death sentence.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
At a minimum, Scott has failed to satisfy R.C. 2953.23(A)(2), because he 
does not allege a constitutional error that occurred at trial.  Instead, the gravamen 
of his argument is that, because he was subsequently diagnosed as schizophrenic 
following trial, it is unconstitutional to carry out his sentence of death.  Scott’s 
failure to satisfy R.C. 2953.23(A)(2) would render moot any analysis of Scott’s 
ability to satisfy the (A)(1) factors. 
 
Scott arguably tries to overcome the (A)(2) procedural hurdle by arguing 
that evidence of his mental illness was not presented to the jury, thereby 
“cast[ing] a dark shadow over the death sentence that was imposed.”  Scott thus 
implies that the jury may not have sentenced him to death had it known of his 
schizophrenia.  Assuming arguendo that this allegation satisfies R.C. 
2953.23(A)(2) by raising a defect “at the sentencing hearing,” his successive 
postconviction relief petition is still procedurally barred for its failure to satisfy 
R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) or (b).  Scott would not satisfy (A)(1)(a) because he cannot 
establish that he was “unavoidably prevented” from discovering his 
schizophrenia.  Scott’s own memorandum in support of jurisdiction admits that 
January Term, 2001 
5 
“[o]ne prison doctor suggested way back in 1974, nine years before the Vinnie 
Prince murder, that Mr. Scott ‘apparently is psychotic and should perhaps be 
diagnosed as a chronic schizophrenic.’ “  And Scott fails to satisfy (A)(1)(b) 
because he makes no argument that the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to him.  Indeed, 
Scott seeks a new Eighth Amendment rule in this very case, based on what he 
perceives as “evolving standards of decency” and/or an analogy between his 
condition and mental retardation. 
 
Accordingly, by accepting jurisdiction over Scott’s propositions of law—
propositions that raise his constitutional arguments—this court has accepted 
jurisdiction over issues that cannot be addressed on the merits.  Scott’s 
constitutional arguments were not properly before the trial court, were not 
properly before the court of appeals, and cannot be properly before this court. 
 
I would therefore deny leave to appeal and deny Scott’s motion for a stay. 
__________________ 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, David M. Gormley, State 
Solicitor, James V. Canepa, Assistant Attorney General; William D. Mason, 
Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and L. Christopher Frey, Assistant 
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Gold, Schwartz & Co., L.P.A., and John S. Pyle; Law Office of Timothy 
Farrell Sweeney and Timothy F. Sweeney, for appellant. 
__________________