Case Title: Weston v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 182, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2003-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KASHAWN D. WESTON, 
 
§   No. 182, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr.A. Nos. 0208010834 and 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§      991008701A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  September 16, 2003 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:  September 30, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
John F. Brady, Esquire, Georgetown, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
Kim Ayvazian, Esquire, Department of Justice, Georgetown, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
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This is an appeal by the defendant-appellant, Kashawn D. Weston.  
After a contested hearing, the Superior Court found that Weston was in 
violation of his probation.  Weston was resentenced to be incarcerated for 
four and one-half years pursuant to Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4204(k), 
followed by various levels of supervised custody and probation. 
 
Weston has raised two issues on appeal.  First, he contends that the 
trial judge abused his discretion in delaying the violation of probation 
hearing for approximately one and one-half hours so that the State could 
locate its witnesses.  Second, Weston contends that the sentence imposed 
was excessive.  We have concluded that neither of Weston’s contentions are 
meritorious. 
Original Sentence 
 
On August 28, 2000, Weston pleaded guilty in the Sussex County 
Superior Court to Assault in the Second Degree, a lesser-included offense of 
Attempted Murder and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 
Felony.  He was sentenced to five years at Level V, suspended after serving 
three years, with the balance of two years to be served at Level II.  On 
September 17, 2002, an indictment charging Weston with Trafficking in 
Cocaine, Possession With Intent to Deliver Cocaine and Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, was filed in the Sussex County Superior Court.   
 
3 
 
On December 12, 2
002, Weston pleaded guilty to Possession With 
Intent to Deliver Cocaine and violations of probation on the Assault and 
Firearm offenses.  Pursuant to his plea agreement, Weston was sentenced on 
the drug offense to five years at Level V, with credit for time served, and the 
balance suspended for nine months at Level IV Home Confinement, 
followed by four years at Level III.  He received two years at Level V, 
suspended for two years at Level III, for the Firearm offense violation of 
probation, and was discharged as unimproved from probation on the Assault 
offense.   
Probation Violations 
 
In December 2002, Weston was placed on Level IV Home 
Confinement.  Among the conditions of his supervision, he was to report any 
change in employment or residence immediately.  According to his 
probation officer, Amber Esham, Weston violated his curfew schedule on 
December 28, 30, and 31, 2002 and on January 2, 3 and 6, 2003.  According 
to Esham, there had been no verification of any change in Weston’s curfew 
or employment status. 
 
On January 6, 2003, after receiving a tip from a confidential 
informant, Probation Officer Mark Dawson of the Governor’s Task Force 
executed an administrative warrant at Weston’s residence.  As the officer 
 
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approached the residence, someone opened the door and immediately shut it.  
Dawson then heard running inside of the residence.  After knocking and 
entering the residence, Dawson observed several people in the living room 
area, and others at the rear door of the residence.  One individual 
unsuccessfully attempted to flee. 
 
Dawson identified Weston and conducted a personal search of him.  
No contraband was found.  A search of Weston’s bedroom, however, 
uncovered several rounds of ammunition in a plastic bag in a green tote 
container.   
 
The police found a loaded .357 caliber revolver in a floor vent in a 
baby’s bedroom, a small rock of crack cocaine in the kitchen sink drain and, 
next to the sink, a small set of digital scales.  There was cocaine residue on 
the kitchen table.  The kitchen trashcan contained several torn plastic 
baggies.  The police also found cash in the amount of $3,455 in one of the 
bedrooms of the residence. 
 
On January 6, 2003, Weston was arrested on new charges after the 
administrative search was conducted at his residence.  At a Fast Track 
contested violation of probation hearing on March 4, 2003, Weston was 
found in violation of probation.  The Superior Court judge found Weston 
guilty of violating his probation based on the curfew violations, the evidence 
 
5 
showing that Weston’s residence was being used for drugs, and evidence 
showing the possession of bullets and a weapon. 
Hearing Delay Reasonable 
 
Weston’s first argument on appeal is that he was prejudiced and 
reversible error occurred when the Superior Court delayed the probation 
violation hearing for an hour and a half in order to allow time for State 
witnesses to arrive.  According to Weston, the State’s use of a “four corner 
stall” to get probation and police officers to the hearing interfered with the 
Superior Court’s schedule and created an unreasonable delay.  Weston 
acknowledges that “[r]equests for continuances ‘are left to the discretion of a 
trial judge whose ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling is 
clearly unreasonable or capricious.’”
1 
 
The record reflects that the violation of probation hearing began at 
approximately 9:45 a.m. on March 4, 2003.  The Superior Court indicated 
that it would handle another case while waiting for the prosecutor to locate 
the State’s witnesses.  Thus, there was no inconvenience to the court at that 
time.   
When the court’s other business finished an hour later, the State’s 
witnesses still had not arrived.  The prosecutor assured the court that they 
                                        
1 Secrest v. State, 679 A.2d 58, 64 (Del. 1996) (quoting Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 
1088 (Del. 1987)). 
 
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were “en route.”  The prosecutor explained that the officers had not received 
their subpoenas. 
 
The proceedings recessed again, and then resumed one-half hour later 
when the State indicated it could proceed with the alleged curfew violations 
because probation officer Amber Esham was present.  The total delay in the 
Superior Court proceedings, therefore, was only one and one-half hours. 
 
After Weston appeared in the courtroom, his defense counsel moved 
to dismiss the violation of probation charges that were not supported by a 
probation officer present in the courtroom.  The Superior Court did not rule 
on Weston’s motion.  After the prosecutor assured the Superior Court that 
subpoenas for the officers had, in fact, been issued, the hearing began at 
11:15 a.m. with Esham’s testimony.  The other officers arrived in the 
courtroom a short time later. The Superior Court judge permitted them to 
testify after Esham.   
 
The State did not explicitly request a continuance in this case.  
Nevertheless, the standards for a continuance that were enunciated by this 
Court in Secrest v. State,2 are instructive in analyzing Weston’s argument: 
First, the party seeking the continuance has the burden of 
establishing a clear record of the relevant facts relating to the 
criteria for a continuance, including the length of the requested 
                                        
2 Secrest v. State, 679 A.2d 58 (Del. 1996). 
 
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continuance.  Second, the party seeking the continuance must 
show: 
 
(a) 
that it was diligent in preparing for the presentation 
of the testimony; 
(b) 
that the continuance will be likely to satisfy the 
need to present the testimony; and 
(c) 
that the inconvenience to the Court, opposing 
parties, witnesses and jurors is insubstantial in relation to 
the likely prejudice which would result from the denial of 
the continuance.3 
 
 
The record reflects that the State was diligent in preparing for the 
presentation of the testimony.  The hearing was originally scheduled for 
February 4th and rescheduled for a contested hearing on February 18th.  The 
State had subpoenas issued for its witnesses on February 11, but the 
February 18 hearing was cancelled because of snow.  The State then had 
subpoenas issued on February 20 for the rescheduled hearing on March 4.  
The police officers, however, did not receive the subpoenas.  The Superior 
Court noted on the record that this was the second time in recent weeks that 
the Delaware State Police had reported that they did not receive subpoenas.  
 
Without these police officers, the State would not have been able to 
present any testimony.  Thus, a one and one-half hour delay was necessary 
to prosecute the violation hearing, which had already been rescheduled 
                                        
3 Id. at 66. 
 
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twice.  There was no inconvenience to the Superior Court because the judge 
was able to conduct other business during the delay.   
Only Weston and his defense attorney were inconvenienced by the 
delay.  Weston’s defense counsel was scheduled to be in the Family Court at 
1 p.m. that afternoon.  The violation of probation hearing concluded at 12:30 
p.m., which was in time for defense counsel to attend the Family Court 
proceeding.  The record reflects it was not an abuse of discretion for the 
Superior Court to delay the violation of probation proceedings one and one-
half hours in order for the State’s witnesses to arrive.4 
Sentence Appropriate 
 
Weston’s second argument on appeal is that the sentence he received 
was excessive and that the judge exhibited a closed mind because the judge 
did not properly consider the nature of the violation but simply reimposed all 
of Weston’s unsuspended jail time.  Appellate review of a sentence is 
limited to whether the sentence is within the statutory limits prescribed by 
the General A
ssembly and whether it is based on factual predicates which 
are false, impermissible, or lack minimal reliability, judicial vindictiveness 
or bias, or a closed mind.5  When the sentence is within the statutory limits, 
                                        
4 Id. 
5 Siple v. State, 701 A.2d 79, 83 (Del. 1997); Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842-43 (Del. 
1992). 
 
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this Court will not find an abuse of d
iscretion unless it is clear that the 
sentencing judge relied on impermissible factors or exhibited a closed mind.6   
A judge sentences with a closed mind when the sentence is based on a 
preconceived bias without consideration of the nature of the offense or the 
character of the defendant.7  In this case, the judge considered the nature of 
the violation, in particular, the presence of the drugs, gun and ammunition in 
Weston’s residence.  He also considered the character of the defendant.  He 
concluded that Weston was a dangerous man who had been previously 
involved in violence, who was currently involved in a violent matter, and 
who was a “smart guy” who knew “what is going on,” and had his “eyes 
wide open.” 
The judge must have an open mind for receiving all information 
related to the question of mitigation.8  In this case, the judge listened to 
Weston’s claims that the electronic monitoring device must have been 
broken, that he had gotten permission from an unnamed officer to go to job 
interviews, that an employer had contacted the authorities about his job and 
received permission for him to work, as well as Weston’s denial of selling 
drugs.  Thus, the record reflects that the judge had an open mind for 
                                        
6 Samuel v. State, 1997 WL 317362, at *1 (Del. 1997). 
7 Ellerbe v. State, 2000 WL 949625, at *1 (Del. 2000). 
8 Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465, 513 (Del. 1999). 
 
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receiving all the information Weston offered that was related to the issue of 
mitigation.9   
 
The judge concluded the fact that drugs were discovered in Weston’s 
residence approximately three weeks after he was released from jail to be 
more compelling than Weston’s excuses or denials.  The record reflects that 
the reasoning behind the sentence, as expressed by the judge, was that 
Weston was “a dangerous individual” “involved in violence,” who had 
drugs, ammunition, and guns in his house.  According to Weston, the 
reasoning behind his sentence was flawed.  Given the evidence presented at 
the hearing, however, the judge’s reasoning was logical and rational.   
Weston has not presented any evidence to support his assertion that 
the judge exhibited a closed mind during sentencing.  Conversely, the State’s 
evidence of Weston’s probation violations was clear and convincing.  Based 
upon the record, it was entirely appropriate for the judge to sentence Weston 
to be imprisoned for the remainder of the unsuspended portion of his 
sentence. 
Conclusion 
 
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. 
                                        
9 See id.