Case Title: Wietzke v. Chesapeake Conference Ass'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: 122/10

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2011-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Douglas Wietzke, et ux., v. The Chesapeake Conference Association, et al., No. 122,
September Term 2010.
PROPERTY LAW – PRIVATE NUISANCE – JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The doctrine of private nuisance dictates that the fact finder should consider the
reasonableness of an offending landowner’s use of his or her property in determining
nuisance liability.
TORT LAW – VIOLATION OF COUNTY ORDINANCE – PRIMA FACIE
EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
Evidence that Section 19-16(a) of the Montgomery County Code was violated, at least in
part, due to liquid bearing sediment escaping from an offending landowner’s property onto
an affected landowner’s property was sufficient to constitute prima facie evidence of
negligence.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 122
September Term, 2010
DOUGLAS WIETZKE, et. ux.
v.
THE CHESAPEAKE CONFERENCE
ASSOCIATION, et al.
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:   August 17, 2011
Douglas and Vanessa Wietzke, Petitioners, filed a four-count complaint against the
Chesapeake Conference Association of Seventh-Day Adventists, and various others,1
Respondents, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County alleging nuisance, trespass, and
negligence in connection with the construction of a new parking lot by the Church, which,
the Wietzkes claimed, was ultimately the cause of the “repeated and continu[ed] flooding”
of their home in Silver Spring, Maryland.  The Wietzkes requested some three million dollars
in damages against the Church, as well as injunctive relief requiring the Church to “take any
and all necessary steps to prevent further flooding of the [Wietzkes’] home as a result of the
changed topography, excavation, construction and/or drainage conditions on the Church
property.”  
At the ensuing jury trial, after the close of the Wietzkes’ case, the Montgomery
County Circuit Court granted the Church’s motion for judgment as to the Wietzkes’
negligence claim.  After the close of the Church’s case, but before the jury was instructed,
the trial judge, over the Wietzkes’ objections, denied several of the Wietzkes’ requested jury
instructions: one requested, but denied, jury instruction would have directed the jury that
interference with the comfortable enjoyment of the affected property was the only
consideration; another rejected instruction would have admonished the jury that Montgomery
After  amending  their initial complaint, the Wietzkes proceeded against the 
1
Chesapeake Conference Association of Seventh-Day Adventists, the Chesapeake Conference
of Seventh-Day Adventists, Columbia Excavating Co., Inc., and Devona Malcolm, who
apparently was the project manager for the Church’s construction project.  At the end of trial,
but before the jury was instructed, the Wietzkes entered into a stipulation to dismiss with
prejudice Columbia Excavating Co. from the lawsuit.  For the sake of brevity, we shall refer
to the remaining co-defendants together as “the Church.”
County’s approval of the Church’s construction project was not a defense to the Wietzkes’
claim for private nuisance;  yet another rejected instruction would have advised the jury that
the existence of other contributing sources to a nuisance was not a defense to an offending
landowner’s own contribution to the same nuisance.  
Thereafter, the jury found in favor of the Church on nuisance and trespass, and
judgment was entered.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported opinion, and
we granted certiorari, Wietzke v. The Chesapeake Conference Ass’n, 417 Md. 501, 10 A.3d
1180 (2011), to answer the following questions:
1. Do Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions 20:1 and 20:2, which
fail to include any reference to strict liability, but instead require
a finding of “unreasonable conduct”, conflict with the Maryland
law of strict liability nuisance established by the Maryland Court
of Appeals?
2. Were the Wietzkes improperly denied a jury instruction which
reflected the strict liability law of nuisance in Maryland when
the instructions given by the Court completely failed to address
strict liability?
3. Were the Wietzkes improperly denied a jury instruction
reflecting Maryland law that County approval does not absolve
a Defendant of nuisance liability?
4. Were the Wietzkes improperly denied a jury instruction
reflecting Maryland law that a Defendant is not absolved of
nuisance liability merely because other sources may have
contributed to the nuisance?
5. Did the trial court err in dismissing the negligence count
when the evidence established that the Defendants violated, and
were given notices of violations, of Montgomery County Code
ordinances as a result of the flooding of the Wietzke property? 
2
We shall hold that the doctrine of private nuisance dictates that the fact finder should
consider the reasonableness of the offending landowner’s use of its property, and that the jury
instructions in issue were, then, a correct exposition of the law.  We shall further hold that,
because the Church did not raise County approval of its construction project as a defense to
the Wietzkes’ nuisance claim, the Wietzkes’ requested jury instruction was not generated by
the evidence adduced at trial.  Similarly, we shall hold that, because the Church did not
introduce evidence that other sources “contributed” to the conditions on the Wietzkes’
property as a defense to the Wietzkes’ nuisance claim, the Wietzkes’ requested jury
instruction regarding other sources was inapplicable.  Finally, we shall hold that the trial
judge erred in granting the Church’s motion for judgment on the Wietzkes’ negligence claim.
Testimony adduced at trial reflected the following: 
The Church and the Wietzkes owned two adjacent properties in Silver Spring,
Maryland.  The Wietzkes’ property sits at the corner of Mill Grove Place and Magnolia
Street, while the Church’s property is situated at the corner of Timber Ridge Road and
Magnolia Street.  A topographical map establishes that the properties are situated together
such that the Wietzkes’ property sits at the bottom of a hill and the Church’s property sits
atop a hill. 
In 2000, the Church made the decision to construct a new parking lot on its property,
though construction did not begin immediately.  On March 4, 2004, the Church sent
correspondence to all neighboring, downstream property owners, including the Wietzkes,
3
informing them it intended to develop its property and employ a “stormwater management”
concept to deal with any increased runoff the construction may cause.  The letter invited
neighboring landowners to provide comments and concerns to the Montgomery County
Government.  Though some neighbors responded, the Wietzkes did not.  
The Church, in conjunction with the construction of the parking lot, developed a
stormwater runoff and sediment control strategy, which was intended to control the flow of
surface water from the Church property.  On October 26, 2006, the Church held a pre-
construction meeting, which was attended by a team of engineers, contractors, excavators and
sediment control experts, and the stormwater and sediment control concept was discussed at
length.  Moreover, a large portion of the pre-construction meeting focused on the placement
of certain limitations on how much earth could be disturbed during the construction of the
parking lot.
Thereafter, between October 26, 2006 and mid-to-late summer of 2007, a large
stormwater pond was constructed on the Church’s property.  The stormwater pond, which
held thousands of gallons of water, was designed to collect excess water runoff from the
Church’s property to release it in a slow, controlled manner.  Moreover, the stormwater pond
was designed to filter solid matter out of the water by guiding it through a “silt fence” made
of woven fabric.  Also, to maintain the purity of the stormwater on the Church’s construction
site, earth dikes, or trenches fashioned out of dirt, were dug to direct stormwater around the
construction site.
4
On two occasions, once on November 28, 2006, and once on June 14, 2007, the
Church was visited by a County Inspector and issued a “Notice of Violation” for being in
non-compliance with certain County ordinances relating to stormwater and sediment control. 
The November 28, 2006 Notice, issued pursuant to Section 19-7 of the Montgomery County
Code,  was issued because the Church had not yet built an earth dike and other sediment
2
controls. The November 28, 2006 Notice itself provided:
The site is out of compliance due to the sequence of
construction not being followed.  Install the earth dike and other
sediment controls listed and call for an inspection.
The November 28, 2006 Notice was accompanied by an “Inspection Summary,” which
instructed the church to cease construction until it built an earth dike:
Inspection this date reveals the following:
Section 19-7 of the Montgomery County Code provides in pertinent part:
2
In granting any permit, the director may attach the conditions
that the director deems reasonably necessary to prevent
sedimentation to public or private property or any sewer, storm
drain, or watercourse, to prevent the operation from being
conducted in a manner hazardous to life or property, or in a
manner likely to create a nuisance.  Those conditions may
include the erection or installation of walls, drains, dams and
structures, plantings, erosion and sediment control measures or
devices, furnishing necessary easements and a specified method
of performing the work.  These items must be identified on the
sediment control plan submitted for approval.  A permit must
not be issued until an erosion and sediment control plan is
approved by the department and the district, and the owner
certifies that all land-disturbing activities will be performed
pursuant to the erosion and sediment control plan.
5
1) 
The site is out of sequence for construction.  A notice of
violation is being issued.
2) 
Install the earth dikes per sequence of construction.
3) 
Bring the site into compliance and call for inspections
per the sequence of construction and preconstruction
memo.  
4) 
If any changes are wanted, first contact the inspector and
your engineer.
The second Notice, dated June 14, 2007, issued pursuant to Section 19-16(a) of the
Montgomery County Code,  was issued after an usually heavy rainfall, when stormwater had
3
escaped from the earth dikes into the Church’s construction site, permitting soil to be washed
away.  The June 14, 2007 Notice contained a brief narrative, which provided:
Sediment left the site after a storm event.  There was flooding in
Section 19-16(a) of the Montgomery County Code provides:
3
A person must not engage in any land-disturbing activity or by
any action cause or permit any soil, earth, sand, gravel, rock,
stone, or other material, to be deposited upon or to roll, flow, or
wash upon or over the premises of another in a manner to cause
damage to the premises without the express written consent of
the owner of the premises affected.  A person must not engage
in any land-disturbing activity or by any action cause or permit
any soil, earth, sand, gravel, rock, stone, or other material to be
deposited to roll, flow, or wash upon or over any public street,
streetimprovement, road, sewer, storm drain, watercourse, right-
of-way, or any public property in a manner to damage or to
interfere with the use of that property.
Section 19-1(15) of the Montgomery County Code defines “land-disturbing activity”
as “[a]ny earth movement and land changes which may result in soil erosion from water or
wind or the movement of sediments into state waters or onto lands in the state, including
tilling, clearing, grading, excavating, stripping, stockpiling, filling and related activities, and
the covering of land surfaces with an impermeable material.”
6
the neighborhood.  Contact your engineer for a Solution.
The June 14, 2007 Notice was also accompanied by an Inspection Summary, which stated
“there was flooding of the house,” without identifying any specific property: 
Inspection this date reveals the following:
1) 
A rainfall event last evening caused sediment to leave the
site.  The clean water diversion worked but there were
wash outs on the private roadway below the site.  
2) 
The water built up on the super silt fence and because of
the head pressure of the water caused the water to be
forced under the fence.  
3) 
There was sediment water and deposition on the property
below.  There was flooding of the house.
4) 
The site is not in sequence with the plans.  The parking
lot area was cleared earlier and some of the area was to
receive excess dirt from the pond.  The dirt is now being
hauled off.  Complete the remaining removal of dirt (the
dewatering device and riser are installed[)].  Stabilize
and install the safety fence.  Call for inspection of the
sediment basin.  
5) 
A notice of violation and a civil citation are being issued.
During the Wietzkes’ case, the Wietzkes themselves testified that they had
experienced three major flooding events in their basement, which they used as a family room,
one in June of 2006, one in November 2006, and one in June of 2007.  The Wietzkes also
testified that they had experienced somewhere between forty to fifty more minor flooding
events in their basement during the same time period.  Due to the flooding, the Wietzkes
testified that they had ceased using their basement entirely.  
The Wietzkes produced no expert testimony.  Rather, apparently in an attempt to link
the Church’s construction of the parking lot with the flooding in their basement, the Wietzkes
7
themselves, as well as two neighbors, gave testimony that, based on their perception, water 
appeared to flow towards the Wietzkes’ property from the portion of the Church’s property
which abutted Magnolia Drive.  James Jamison, one of the Wietzkes’ neighbors, shot video
footage of the June 2007 flooding of the Wietzkes’ house, which they charged came from the
Church.
The Wietzkes also called Devona Malcolm, a contractor the Church had hired to
oversee the building of the new parking lot.  Ms. Malcolm admitted that the Church’s
construction project increased runoff from the Church property, but that the Church had
installed a stormwater pond to control it.  She also testified that the Church had considered
whether it would be beneficial to utilize sandbags during a heavy rainfall, but before action
could be taken, the rain had stopped.  Moreover, Ms. Malcolm testified that the Church had
inquired into whether they could install a permanent concrete curb on their property, but that
the County never issued the proper permit. 
At the close of the Wietzkes’ case, the Church moved for judgment on both the
Wietzkes’ negligence and trespass claims.  The trial judge granted the Church’s motion as
to the negligence count, explaining as follows:
[W]ith regard to the negligence count, there is evidence that
there were citations read in (unintelligible) alleged violations in
connection with the sediment and control plan and so forth
during the construction.  But in order for negligence, or in order
for a violation of the statute to be evidence of negligence you
would have to show that the statute was designed to prevent the
type of harm that, you know, ultimately occurred, and, and here
we don’t have that, and there’s no proof, at this point, that the
8
specific alleged violation was the cause of water flooding the
basement.  So, without that evidence, we’re back to the 
standard (unintelligible) of negligence and the duty of the breach
and the injury and the cause, and there’s not been testimony with
regard to a duty.  And it seems to me that the negligence you’re
[4] 
talking about would have to do with the construction and
whether appropriate methods were or were not employed and
that that would be the subject of expert testimony to establish a
duty and a breach of a duty, and I don’t think that that’s been
done.   
The trial judge denied the Church’s motion for judgment as to the trespass count, reasoning
that, contrary to the Church’s argument, the evidence showed that the Church exercised
dominion and control over their property: 
I’ll deny the motion with regard to the other counts, because I
think it’s different from a supplier of gasoline to a facility here.
There was active involvement on the property, on the premises,
of the defendants, that they did exercise certain control over the
property, and I think, at least at this point looking at it in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is evidence from
which the jury could find for the plaintiff with regard to those
other counts.
The Church presented a case rife with expert testimony.  Thomas Wheadon, a
sediment control and stormwater management specialist, testified that the Church had
employed an effective concept for managing stormwater runoff.  
Thomas Woodhouse, the County Inspector issuing the November 28, 2006 and June
14, 2007 Notices to the Church, and stormwater expert, testified that, in his opinion, the
Prior  to  trial,  the trial judge granted one of the Church’s motions in limine
4
in part, precluding the Wietzkes themselves, and other lay witnesses, from testifying as to the
standard of care the Church owed during the construction.
9
November 28, 2006 sequencing violation would not have increased surface water flow from
the Church property onto the Wietzke property, and that when he issued the Notice, the
Wietzkes’ property was not “a thought in [his] mind.”  Further, Mr. Woodhouse testified that
when he issued the June 14, 2007 Notice to the Church, he did not determine whether water
or sediment from the Church’s property had reached the Wietzkes’ home.  Mr. Woodhouse
also reviewed the videotape made by Mr. Jamison and concluded that the water flowing onto
the Wietzkes’ property originated from more than one direction.   
The Church also called David O’Bryan, an expert in the areas of civil-engineering,
land-use planning, and stormwater management.  Mr. O’Bryan testified that, after visiting
and observing the Church’s property, the construction of the new parking lot did not cause
water to flow “where it wasn’t previously flowing.”  Mr. O’Bryan also testified that, based
on his review of Mr. Jamison’s videotape and a topography map, the surface water flowing
onto the Wietzkes’ property most likely originated from multiple properties, but that it was
impossible to determine which properties in particular without a detailed runoff study. 
Moreover, Alan Beal, a real estate construction specialist, testified that he recommended the
Wietzkes regrade their property and improve the drainage system to control surface waters.
At the close of trial, the parties met with the trial judge regarding their requested jury
instructions.  The Wietzkes requested several jury instructions relating to their nuisance
claim, one of which would have advised the jury that the Church was liable if the Wietzkes’
comfortable enjoyment of their property had been interfered with, without more:  
10
Nuisance is a strict liability cause of action.  This means that it
does not matter whether or not the nuisance was the result of
illegal or negligent conduct.  Even if a business is lawful and
conducted in the most approved method, it is still a nuisance if
it interferes with the comfortable enjoyment by another of his
property.
Another of the Wietzkes’ requested jury instructions would have advised the jury that County
approval of the Church’s construction project was not a defense to nuisance liability:
In this case, there has been evidence that the County approved
some of the Church’s activities.  The County approval, however,
is not a defense to an action for nuisance.  If the Church’s
activities constituted a nuisance to the Wietzke’s, then the
Church is liable for that nuisance regardless of any county
approval.
Yet another of the Wietzkes’ requested jury instructions would have advised the jury that
evidence the flood waters at issue came from sources other than the Church was not a
defense to nuisance liability:
If water from the Church property contributed to flooding of the
Wietzke property, it is not a defense that water from other
sources may have also contributed.  If you find that the water
from the Church property contributed to flooding of the Wietzke
property then the Church is liable for any resulting nuisance to
the Wietzkes.
The trial judge and counsel met over a two-day period to discuss the proposed instructions,5
Prior to instructing  the  jury,  the  trial  judge recounted the jury  instruction 
5
process:
[THE COURT]: I want to apologize to you for keeping you
waiting this morning. . . . [W]e’ve actually been working on
these instructions since . . . last night . . . after you left, and
(continued...)
11
and eventually, the judge denied the Wietzkes’ requested jury instructions, opting to instruct
the jury in accordance with Sections 20:1, 20:2, and 20:4 of the Maryland Civil Pattern Jury
Instructions (4th ed., 2008 Supp.), with specific portions omitted, as noted:6
A nuisance is any unreasonable conduct which causes real,
substantial, and unreasonable damage to, or interference with,
another person’s ordinary use and enjoyment of his or her
property. 
Conduct is unreasonable if it is prohibited by law or violated
regulations which were adopted to control the use of property,
or it is not suitable for the nature of the area and the use being
made of other property in the area, or it causes interference with
the other person’s use and enjoyment and the interference could
have been reduced or eliminated without too much hardship or
too much expense.
 
(...continued)
5
we’ve been working on them since 8:30 this morning. . . . I want
to compliment counsel for their cooperation in working with me
on these, and I think we have perhaps simplified some of these
matters for you.
The  trial court,  in delivering the jury instructions, omitted subsections one, 
6
two, and four from the Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instructions § 20:2 (4th ed., 2008 Supp.),
apparently, as the Court of Special Appeals noted, “in order to tailor [the pattern instructions]
to the evidence” in the case.  The omitted portions provide as follows:
Conduct is unreasonable if:
(1) it is motivated by spite or malice; or
(2) it is for the purpose of interfering with the other person’s use
and enjoyment of (insert the real property involved); or
* * * 
(4) it is the type of conduct which is unusually hazardous or
dangerous. . . .
12
In determining whether the conduct was unreasonable, you
should consider whether it was the kind of conduct an ordinary
person would expect might interfere with the use and enjoyment
of another person’s property or cause real and substantial injury
to another person’s health or comfort.  You should also consider
the right of both parties to make a reasonable use and enjoyment
of their property.  The plaintiff’s right to be free from
interference with his or her use and enjoyment should be
balanced against defendant’s right to use his or her property. 
And the plaintiff must expect to endure some inconvenience or 
discomfort which results from the defendant’s reasonable use of
his or her property. 
In determining what reasonable amount of interference,
inconvenience, or discomfort the plaintiff should be expected to 
tolerate you should consider the right of the defendant to use his
or her property or to conduct his or her affairs in a reasonable
manner.  The extent of interference which would result from the
defendant’s reasonable use of his or her property or conduct of
his or her affairs, the circumstances under which the interference
occurred, the nature of the area in which the real property is
located, and the uses being made of other property in the area.
A person who creates or continues a nuisance is responsible for
the injury or damage caused to others by the nuisance.  
The defendants in this case have asserted that the natural flow
of water in the neighborhood leads to plaintiff’s property.  You
are instructed that even if the natural flow of water in the
neighborhood leads to plaintiff’s property, the defendants are
liable if they created a change in that water flow which created
a nuisance to the Wietzkes.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Church on the remaining nuisance and
trespass counts, and the verdict sheet provided as follows, regarding the Church’s liability:
1. Do you find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs on their claim of nuisance?
13
Yes ______                          No     X     
2. Do you find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs on their claim of trespass?
Yes ______                          No     X     
If you answered “Yes” to either of the above questions,
proceed to questions 3 and 4.  If you answered “No” to any of
the above questions, your verdict is complete. 
The Wietzkes noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing the same five
points they raise before us.   The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment, reasoning
7
The  Wietzkes  raised five issues before the Court of Special Appeals, all of 
7
which are now before us:
1. Were the Wietzkes improperly denied a jury instruction which
reflected the strict liability law of nuisance in Maryland when
the instructions given by the Court failed to address strict
liability?
2. Do Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions 20:1 and 20:2, which
fail to include strict liability, but instead require a finding of
“unreasonable conduct”, conflict with Maryland nuisance law?
3. Were the Wietzkes improperly denied a jury instruction
reflecting Maryland law that County approval does not absolve
a Defendant of nuisance liability?
4. Were the Wietzkes improperly denied a jury instruction
reflecting Maryland law that a Defendant is not absolved of
nuisance liability merely because other sources may have
contributed to the nuisance?
5. Did the Court err in dismissing the negligence count when the
evidence established that the Defendants had violated, and were
given notices of violations, of Montgomery County Code
(continued...)
14
that  as to the nuisance count, “the pattern jury instructions given by the court were a correct
statement of, and adequately covered, the law of nuisance as a strict liability cause of action.”
As to the trial judge’s denial of the Wietzkes’ county approval instruction, the court reasoned
that the record did not reflect that the Church was seeking to defend the action “on the basis
that they were in compliance with County mandates,” and thus, the Wietzkes’ requested
instruction was inapplicable.  With respect to the Wietzkes’ requested “other source”
instruction, the court reasoned that the Church “did not contend that other sources absolved
them from liability if the existence of a nuisance and causation were otherwise established,”
likewise rendering the Wietzke’s instruction inapplicable.  As to the negligence count, the
court reasoned that the Wietzkes “introduced no evidence” that the Montgomery County
ordinance violated was designed to prevent the type of harm claimed. 
In challenging the propriety of the jury instructions on the issue of nuisance, the
Wietzkes contended at trial, before the Court of Special Appeals, and now before us, that it
was error for the trial judge to instruct the jury to consider the reasonableness of the Church’s
use of its property.  The Wietzkes argue that, because the doctrine of private nuisance is a
matter of strict liability, it was irrelevant how the Church used its property if the Wietzkes’
use and enjoyment of their property was substantially interfered with.  The Wietzkes also
have argued that it was error for the trial judge not to instruct the jury to disregard the
County’s approval of the Church’s project or that other sources may have contributed to the
(...continued)
7
ordinances as a result of the flooding of the Wietzke property?
15
Wietzkes’ flooding as defenses.  To this end, the Wietzkes offered the following instruction
in lieu of that which was given:
Nuisance is a strict liability cause of action.  This means that it
does not matter whether or not the nuisance was the result of
illegal or negligent conduct.  Even if a business is lawful and
conducted in the most approved method, it is still a nuisance if
it interferes with the comfortable enjoyment by another of his
property.
In this case, there has been evidence that the County approved
some of the Church’s activities.  The County approval, however,
is not a defense to an action for nuisance.  If the Church’s
activities constituted a nuisance to the Wietzke’s, then the
Church is liable for that nuisance regardless of any County
approval.
If water from the Church property contributed to flooding of the
Wietzke property, it is not a defense that water from other
sources may have also contributed.  If you find that the water
from the Church property contributed to flooding of the Wietzke
property then the Church is liable for any resulting nuisance to
the Wietzkes.
In essence, the Wietzkes’ instructions would have had the jury instructed only as to
whether their comfortable use and enjoyment was adversely affected, without any other
consideration.  
In reviewing the propriety of a jury instruction, we use an abuse of discretion standard. 
In Collins v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 417 Md. 217,  9 A.3d 56 (2010), we
explained that, “[a] trial judge exercises discretion by assessing whether the evidence
produced at trial warrants a particular instruction on legal principles applicable to that
evidence and to the theories of the parties.”  Id. at 228, 9 A.3d at 63.  To succeed on a claim
16
that a trial judge abused his or her discretion in denying a party’s requested jury instructions,
we determined that three criteria must be met:
(1) the requested jury instruction must be a correct exposition of
the law;
(2) the particular law must have been applicable to the evidence
before the jury; and 
(3) the substance of the requested instruction must not have been
fairly covered by the instructions actually given. 
Id. at 229, 9 A.3d at 63 (citations omitted).
The Wietzkes’ first two certiorari questions espouse separate, but inextricably linked,
legal conclusions, that only the level of interference to an affected landowner can be
considered in assessing a nuisance claim and that strict liability must be imposed once the
nuisance is established.  As a result, we will address the first two questions together in our
initial discussion of the nuisance doctrine.  
The Wietzkes’ first instruction equated nuisance with a determination of whether the
Wietzkes’ “comfortable enjoyment” of their property was interfered with:
Nuisance is a strict liability cause of action.  This means that it
does not matter whether or not the nuisance was the result of
illegal or negligent conduct.  Even if a business is lawful and
conducted in the most approved method, it is still a nuisance if
it interferes with the comfortable enjoyment by another of his
property.
In contrast, the trial judge’s instruction involved a much more comprehensive inquiry, in
which the use of its property by the alleged offender must be balanced against the right of the
affected landowner to be free from interference:
17
A nuisance is any unreasonable conduct which causes real,
substantial, and unreasonable damage to, or interference with,
another person’s ordinary use and enjoyment of his or her
property. 
Conduct is unreasonable if it is prohibited by law or violated
regulations which were adopted to control the use of property,
or it is not suitable for the nature of the area and the use being
made of other property in the area, or it causes interference with
the other person’s use and enjoyment and the interference could
have been reduced or eliminated without too much hardship or
too much expense.
 
In determining whether the conduct was unreasonable you
should consider whether it was the kind of conduct an ordinary
person would expect might interfere with the use and enjoyment
of another person’s property, or cause real and substantial injury
to another person’s health or comfort.  You should also consider
the right of both parties to make a reasonable use and enjoyment
of their property.  The plaintiff’s right to be free from
interference with his or her use and enjoyment should be
balanced against defendant’s right to use his or her property. 
And the plaintiff must expect to endure some inconvenience or 
discomfort which results from the defendant’s reasonable use of
his or her property. 
In determining what reasonable amount of interference,
inconvenience, or discomfort the plaintiff should be expected to
tolerate you should consider the right of the defendant to use his
or her property or to conduct his or her affairs in a reasonable
manner.  The extent of interference which would result from the
defendant’s reasonable use of his or her property or conduct of
his or her affairs, the circumstances under which the interference
occurred, the nature of the area in which the real property is
located, and the uses being made of other property in the area.
A person who creates or continues a nuisance is responsible for
the injury or damage caused to others by the nuisance.
The defendants in this case have asserted that the natural flow
18
of water in the neighborhood leads to plaintiff’s property.  You
are instructed that even if the natural flow of water in the
neighborhood leads to plaintiff’s property, the defendants are
liable if they created a change in that water flow which created
a nuisance to the Wietzkes.
Whether the trial judge gave a correct exposition of the law of nuisance is the issue. 
Nuisance is “one of the most ancient concepts in the Anglo-American common law,”
existing at least as far back as 1066 A.D.  David A. Thomas, Thompson on Real Property §
67.01, at 111 (2d ed., 2010 Supp.).  The doctrine was originally conceived to protect private
landholders from being dispossessed of their property.  Id.  As the doctrine of nuisance
evolved, however, it also became one of the primary tools for protecting private landholders
against “substantial interferences” with their possession of the land.  Importantly, the claim
is “phrased as a harm or nuisance to the land” itself, not as a harm to the individual
landholder.  Id.  Nuisance, then, is somewhat of a hybrid cause of action, involving property
tenets, as well as tort principles.  
Since its inception, moreover, the doctrine of nuisance has evolved to protect the
property rights of the public as well, where a “right common to the general public” has been
interfered with.  Thomas, § 67.02, at 113.  Regarding the distinction between a public and
private nuisance, we have explained that “public nuisance is an injury to the public at large
or to all persons who come in contact with it,” while “private nuisance is an injury to an
individual or a limited number of individuals only.”  Adams v. Commissioners of Trappe, 204
Md. 165, 170, 102 A.2d 830, 834 (1954).  Thus, while the same activity may give rise to both
19
a public and a private nuisance, the difference is in whether the property rights affected are
either confined to private ownership or are cast broadly across the general public:
   
A livestock feed lot or a refinery may produce pests or odors
over such a wide area that the rights of the general public are
affected and, at the same time, nearby private landowners may
suffer extraordinary interference with the use and enjoyment of
their own lands.
  
Thomas, § 67.02(a), at 114.  Because the case before us involves interference with only the
Wietzkes’ use and enjoyment of their own private property, we hereafter confine our analysis
to private nuisance, which we have defined as “a nontrespassory invasion of another’s
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.”  Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 335 Md.
58, 80, 642 A.2d 180, 190 (1994), quoting Section 821D of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts (1965).
The universe of private nuisance is split into a further dichotomy, nuisances per se and
nuisances in-fact.  See Thomas, § 67.03, at 117.  A nuisance per se, or a nuisance at law,
involves the use of one’s land, which is “so unreasonable,” that it is deemed to constitute an
actionable nuisance “at all times and under any circumstances.”  Id.; Leatherbury v. Gaylord
Fuel Corp., 276 Md. 367, 377, 347 A.2d 826, 832 (1975) (“To constitute a nuisance per se,
the activity sought to be enjoined must be a nuisance ‘at all times and under any
circumstances regardless of location or surroundings.’” (quoting Commissioners of Trappe,
204 Md. at 170, 102 A.2d at 834)).  Such nuisances are typically found only where a
particular land use is “motivated by malice toward the plaintiff landowner,” is “forbidden by
20
law,” or is “flagrantly contrary to generally accepted standards of conduct.”  Thomas, §
67.03(a), at 118; Commissioners of Trappe, 204 Md. at 175, 102 A.2d at 836 (“to engage in
any form of business in defiance of laws regulating or prohibiting [a] business constitutes a
nuisance per se”); State use of Bohon v. Feldstein, 207 Md. 20, 34, 113 A.2d 100, 106 (1955)
(explaining that it is a nuisance per se if “the thing itself” works “some unlawful peril to
health or safety of person or property.” (quoting Sherwood Bros., Inc. v. Eckard, 204 Md.
485, 494, 105 A.2d 207, 211 (1954))); see, e.g., Patapsco Electric Co. v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore City, 110 Md. 306, 312, 72 A. 1039, 1041-1042 (1909) (concluding that
the City of Baltimore could seek an injunction against a power company from operating on
city property because the company had not yet received the required consent from the Mayor
and City Council).
Nuisances in-fact, or nuisances per accidens,  arise where, considering the “particular
8
setting” and surrounding circumstances, a particular land use constitutes a nuisance even
though “the conduct might not be a nuisance in another locality or at another time or under
some other circumstances.”  Thomas, § 67.03(b), at 124; Commissioners of Trappe, 204 Md.
at 170, 102 A.2d at 834 (“A nuisance in fact is an act, occupation, or structure, not a nuisance
per se, but one which becomes a nuisance by reason of the circumstances, location, or
surroundings.”).  As early as 1879, we had occasion to consider the issue of nuisance in fact
In  Adams  v.  Commissioners  of  Trappe, 204 Md. 165, 170, 102 A.2d 830, 
8
834 (1954), we recognized that nuisances are “classified as nuisances per se and nuisances
in fact, or per accidens.”
21
in Dittman & Berger v. Repp, 50 Md. 516 (1879), in which we determined that the
maintenance of loud and vibratory beer brewing devices created a private nuisance sufficient
to justify the issuance of an injunction.  We explained that, in order to be actionable, a
nuisance must be one which “in view of the circumstances of the case, is unreasonable and
in derogation of the rights of the complainant.”  50 Md. at 522 (emphasis added).  We
ordained that consideration of the circumstances of a given nuisance claim necessarily
involved a review of “the locality, the nature of the trade, the character of the machinery, and
the manner of using the property producing the annoyance and injury complained of.”  Id.;
see also Hendrickson v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Md. 577, 588, 95 A. 153, 157 (1915) (“The
facts of each case must determine the question whether a nuisance exists against which a
neighboring proprietor is justly and reasonably entitled to call upon a Court of equity” for
relief).  
 
In Short v. Baltimore City Passenger Railway Company, 50 Md. 73 (1878), we
considered a private nuisance claim, such as that brought in the instant case, brought against
a commercial railroad where, after clearing its tracks of snow, the railroad had allegedly
created a large snow ridge that reportedly concentrated the flow of surface waters onto a
nearby property.  We were asked to determine whether it was error for the trial judge to
instruct the jury to consider the reasonableness of the railroad’s use of its property in finding
whether the railroad had created an actionable nuisance.  In framing our analysis, we
explained that the nuisance inquiry necessarily involved the balancing of conflicting property
22
rights, and to that end, a determination of whether the offending landowner’s use of its own
property was “reasonable, usual, and proper”:
As a general rule, it is conceded that every one must so use his
own property and exercise the rights incident thereto, in such a
manner as not to injure the property of another.  And it is
equally true, that the mere lawfulness of the act is not in itself a
test in all cases, of exemption from liability for injuries resulting
therefrom to the property of others.  But yet, there are certain
rights incident to the dominion and ownership of property, in the
exercise and enjoyment of which a person will not be liable for
damages, although injury may be occasioned thereby to the
property of another. . . . The question then is, what is the true
test in actions of this kind, by which the exemption from liability
is to be determined?  We think it may be safely said, both on
principle and on authority, that the true test is, whether in the act
complained of, the owner has used his property in a reasonable,
usual and proper manner, taking care to avoid unnecessary
injury to others.
Short, 50 Md. at 81-82.  We affirmed on the basis that the trial court’s instructions had
correctly admonished the jury to consider the reasonableness of the railroad’s use of its
property.  
In other late nineteenth century cases, we had occasion to flirt with discussing only
the unreasonableness of the interference caused to the affected landowner’s use and
enjoyment as a basis for relief, but never expressly adopted a view consistent with that
doctrine nor deflected one that balanced reasonable use versus unreasonable interference as
adopted in Short.  To illustrate, in Adams v. Michael, 38 Md. 123 (1873), we were asked to
determine whether a petition to prospectively enjoin the construction of a felt-roofing facility
23
in close proximity to a group of residential tenements was erroneously dismissed.  We framed
the nuisance analysis as one focusing solely on whether the activity complained of would
interfere with “the ordinary comfort of human existence”:
[W]hether it be smoke, smell, noise, vapors, or water, or any gas
or fluid . . . [t]he owner of one tenement cannot cause or permit
to pass over, or flow into his neighbor’s tenement, any one or
more of these things in such a way as materially to interfere with
the ordinary comfort of the occupier of the neighboring
tenement, or so as to injure his property. . . .  The real question
in all the cases is the question of fact, viz: whether the
annoyance is such as materially to interfere with the ordinary
comfort of human existence? 
Id. at 127-28. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Also, in both Dittman, 50 Md. at 516, and
Woodyear v. Schaefer, 57 Md. 1 (1881), we dealt with questions relating to the propriety of
granting injunctions to restrain the maintenance of nuisances and applied the framework set
forth in Adams.  In this regard, see Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine
in American Nuisance Law: 1850 to 1920, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1101, 1184 (1986).
Our opinion in Susquehanna Fertilizer Company v. Malone, 73 Md. 268, 280, 20 A.
900, 902 (1890), however, embraces the balance of use against interference test.  In
Susquehanna Fertilizer Company, in the context of a commercial fertilizer company’s
alleged creation of overwhelming and offensive odors, we suggested that the concept of
reasonable use of property by the alleged offender was essential to the discussion of nuisance
in fact.  Thus, we advised that not all inconveniences to surrounding landowners would
justify limiting the reasonable use of the offending landowner’s property:
24
[I]n actions of this kind, the law does not regard trifling
inconveniences. . . .  [I]n determining the question of nuisance
in such cases, the locality and all the surrounding circumstances
should be taken into consideration; and that where expensive
works have been erected and carried on, which are useful and
needful to the public, persons must not stand on extreme rights,
and bring actions in respect of every trifling annoyance,
otherwise, business could not be carried on in such places.  [I]f
the result of the trade or business thus carried on is such as to
interfere with the physical comfort, by another, of his property,
or such as to occasion substantial injury to the property itself,
there is wrong to the neighboring owner for which an action will
lie.
Id. at 280, 20 A. at 902.  
In more modern nuisance in-fact cases, we also have balanced the competing rights
of landowners.  In Evans v. Burruss, 401 Md. 586, 933 A.2d 872 (2007), an affected
landowner discovered that a neighbor had received a building permit to construct four
amateur radio towers on his property, only after contractors showed up and began developing
the neighbor’s land.  Unavailingly, the affected landowner requested a stop work order from
the Montgomery County Department of Permit Services.  Thereafter, the affected landowner
lost two appeals before the Board of Appeals and the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
on the basis that the appeals were untimely.  We were asked to determine whether the
affected landowner had a due process right to be given actual notice that his neighbor had
been issued a building permit.  In our analysis, we discussed the competing property rights
of adjoining landowners, significantly characterizing the doctrine of private nuisance as one
which “balance[d] the conflicting rights of landowners.”  Id. at 610, 933 A.2d at 886, quoting
25
Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 187 (Wis. 1982).  In the brief discussion, we determined
that because private nuisances existed “independently of the issuance of any public permits,”
they were “not a normal element of rights arising out of the issuance of building permits.” 
Id. at 610, 933 A.2d at 886.
In Battisto v. Perkins, 210 Md. 542, 124 A.2d 288 (1956), we addressed the flow of
surface waters from an offending landowner’s property to that of a neighboring property  in
the context of a claim for private nuisance.  Specifically, we considered whether the trial
court had erroneously directed a verdict for the offending landowner.  The affected
landowner alleged that, by “grading, bulldozing and building” new homes on a nearby
property, the offending landowner had accelerated “large quantities of mud and debris” upon
the property of the affected landowner, and had thus created a nuisance.  We framed our
analysis by establishing that, due to the competing property interests at stake, a court in
equity was obliged to balance the benefit versus the harm caused by an offending
landowner’s use of its property, leaving the question of whether the offending landowner had
used his or her property reasonably to the jury: 
[A]n upper owner has the right to have surface waters flow
naturally over the lands of lower owners, according to the civil
law doctrine adopted in Maryland and a number of other states.
[We have] adopted and applied the rule, known as
“reasonableness of use” involving a balance of benefit and
harm. . . . The Maryland cases make it clear that the upper
owner cannot, with impunity, artificially increase or concentrate
the natural flow.  The rule applies to urban as well as rural
lands. . . .  [The offending landowner] had a right to improve
their property and prepare it for the erection of houses, but it
26
was entirely foreseeable that the removal of all ground cover
might increase the runoff and cause damage to the lower
owners, and we think the upper owners were under a duty to use
reasonable precautions against harm.  What would be reasonable
is ordinarily a question for the jury.  
Id. at 546, 124 A.2d at 290 (citation omitted).  Thus, the balance of use and interference was
joined.  
We reiterated that the reasonableness of the offending landowner’s use of his or her
land was a matter for the fact-finder in yet another surface water case, Slaird v. Klewers, 260
Md. 2, 271 A.2d 345 (1970).  In Slaird, we considered whether the trial judge had
erroneously denied a landowner’s nuisance claim, which arose in part from the alleged
increased flow of surface waters originating from a neighboring property.  The affected
landowner claimed that their neighbor’s installation of a swimming pool “changed the
elevation and sloping” of the land such that chlorinated surface water flowed unrestrained
into their yard.  In affirming the dismissal, we determined that the judge had appropriately
considered the reasonableness of the offending landowner’s use and development of their
land: 
In regard to the alleged change of grade and increased flow of
surface and other water on the Slaird property, the testimony
was conflicting but there was substantial testimony to support
the Chancellor's conclusion that this condition, if it existed at all,
was not caused by the construction of the swimming pool, which
was done in accordance with the requirements of the
Montgomery County Code and with full compliance with the
recommendations of the building inspector.  The Chancellor,
himself, with the consent of counsel for both parties and
accompanied by them, visited the site after a heavy rain, as we
27
have noted, and observed that the drainage problem “is not acute
today.”
Id. at 10-11, 271 A.2d at 349.
We will not disturb a trial judge’s decision to deny a litigant’s requested jury
instructions if the instruction given is a correct exposition of the law.  Collins, 417 Md. at
228-229, 9 A.3d at 63.  In the present surface water case, the trial judge, in accordance with
our jurisprudence, properly instructed the jury that they should consider the reasonableness
of the offending landowner’s use of its property, the locality of the affected landowner’s
property, the surrounding circumstances, and the substantiality of the interference with the
Wietzkes’ use and enjoyment of their property.  Conversely, the Wietzkes’ formulation of
nuisance would have erroneously directed the jury to consider only whether the Wietzkes’
“comfortable enjoyment” of their property experienced interference.  Therefore, the trial
judge correctly instructed the jury regarding the elements of nuisance.9
We  believe  a  part  of  the  difficulty that the Wietzkes experience with the 
9
jury instruction given is with the inclusion of the word “conduct” in the first two paragraphs
of the jury instructions in which the concept of nuisance is introduced.  Although the word
“conduct” is an unfortunate addition to the nuisance pattern jury instructions, the gravamen
of the instruction includes the balancing of use principles that our jurisprudence embraces. 
As the Court of Special Appeals noted:
[The Wietzkes’] arguments highlight language in the pattern
instructions that we believe could be improved.  We suggest that
the Maryland State Bar Association Standing Committee on
Pattern Jury Instructions review the instructions in question and
consider a revision.
Wietzke, et ux. v. Chesapeake Conference Assoc. of Seventh-Day Adventists, et al., No. 1070,
(continued...)
28
In order to obviate our holding, however, the Wietzkes rely on Washington Suburban
Sanitary Comm’n v. CAE-Link Corp., 330 Md. 115, 622 A.2d 745 (1993), and argue that, in
that case, we substantially revised the law of nuisance in Maryland by prohibiting a trier of
fact from considering the reasonableness of an offending landowner’s conduct in arriving at
its verdict on nuisance in fact.  In that case, the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission
built and operated a sewage sludge facility, and as a part of its day to day operations, would
receive shipments of sewage sludge, mix the sludge with wood chips, divide the mixture into
“composting piles,” and essentially let the piles ferment for some fifty-one days.  Though the
Commission utilized a “vacuum blower” system to control the smells emitted, the sewage
facility created a radius of “noxious odors” which could be detected on nearby properties. 
Electro-Nucleonics, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 315 Md. 361, 378, 554
A.2d 804, 812 (1989), cited in CAE-Link Corp., 330 Md. at 119 n.2, 622 A.2d at 747 n.2. 
The question before us was whether negligence had to be proven in order to submit a
nuisance claim to the jury.  This question was generated by the Circuit Court’s grant of
partial summary judgment on the affected landowner’s nuisance claim, which required a
showing that the Commission had negligently operated the sewage sludge facility.  
At trial, the affected landowners failed to establish a prima facie showing of
negligence, and the trial court granted the Commission’s motion for judgment.  We framed
our analysis by explaining that a nuisance claim did not depend upon proof of negligence of
(...continued)
9
Sept. Term, 2009, at 40 (Filed September 24, 2010).
29
an offending landowner:
[N]uisance focuses not on the possible negligence of the
defendant but on whether there has been unreasonable
interference with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his or her
own property.  To prove the existence of a nuisance, therefore,
the complained of interference must cause actual physical
discomfort and annoyance to those of ordinary sensibilities,
tastes and habits; it must interfere seriously with the ordinary
comfort and enjoyment of the property.  
CAE-Link Corp., 330 Md. at 126, 622 A.2d at 750 (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted). We concluded that, because the creation of a nuisance resulted in strict liability,
making out a prima facie case of nuisance did not require a showing that the Commission
had been negligent.  In so doing, however, we did not dramatically revise our nuisance
jurisprudence, as the Wietzkes’ have argued, such that the finding of a private nuisance no
longer involves a balance of the competing property interests at stake.   
We also perceive little merit in the Wietzkes’ argument that the concept of “strict
liability” was not fairly covered by the trial judge’s instructions.  Strict liability is defined as: 
Liability that does not depend on actual negligence or intent to
harm, but that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make
something safe. 
Black’s Law Dictionary 998 (9th ed. 2009).  In the present case, the concept of strict liability
was articulated, correctly, in the trial judge’s instruction that,
A person who creates or continues a nuisance is responsible for
the injury or damage caused to others by the nuisance.
The [Church has] asserted that the natural flow of water in the
neighborhood leads to [Wietzkes’] property.  You are instructed
30
that even if the natural flow of water in the neighborhood leads
to [the Wietzkes’] property, the [Church is] liable if they created
a change in that water flow which created a nuisance to the
Wietzkes.
The jury, therefore, was correctly instructed as to strict liability.
The Wietzkes next allege that the trial judge abused his discretion by failing to instruct
the jury that County approval of the Church’s construction project did not absolve the Church
of liability for creating a nuisance.  The Wietzkes’ instruction provided:
In this case, there has been evidence that the County approved
some of the Church’s activities.  The County approval, however,
is not a defense to an action for nuisance.  If the Church’s
activities constituted a nuisance to the Wietzkes’, the Church is
liable for that nuisance regardless of any county approval.
The Wietzkes argue that the “linchpin” of the Church’s defense was the testimony of “a plan
reviewer and a plan inspector” from the Montgomery County government “who praised the
Church for its compliance with the County’s ‘approved’ plan.”  The Church responds that
they were not defending on the ground that they had complied with County requirements, in
and of itself, but on the grounds that they had developed and executed an exacting strategy
for controlling stormwater runoff.
Even if a requested jury instruction is a correct exposition of the law, a trial judge
should incorporate it only where it is generated by the evidence before the jury, and not
already fairly covered by the instructions given.  Collins, 417 Md. at 229, 9 A.3d at 63. In the
present case, it is clear that the Church introduced evidence that surface water runoff was a
serious consideration in its construction of a new parking lot.  As initially set forth in their
31
pretrial statement, the Church’s purpose in introducing testimony of a County plan reviewer
was to provide a basis for their claim that they had come up with an effective strategy to
“ease water flow impacting [the Wietzkes’] property and other low lying areas,”  and the
County plan reviewer testified that he reviewed the Church’s concept specifically to
determine whether it “[could] provide sediment control for the proposed disturbed area[,
and,] if required, provide stormwater management. . . .”  The Church’s project manager
admitted the parking lot project would increase runoff.  Likewise, as elucidated in the
Church’s opening statement, the purpose for providing testimony of a County Inspector was
to illustrate that the Church had actually followed through and executed their strategy to
control stormwater runoff:
When water runs downhill, stormwater management is about
controlling the rate of water. . . . [I]n Montgomery County, the
stormwater management [] is on the cutting edge. . . . [B]ecause
of Montgomery County’s requirements that are so exacting, both
on stormwater management and on forestation, reforestation . .
. this project ended up costing [] over $400,000. . . . [D]uring
this entire period of time, the County was monitoring the
property because they had a tree save plan, they had a
forestation plan going on, and a stormwater management plan. 
And before you get your building permit and have your pre-
construction meeting, you’re not allowed to disturb land. 
During closing, the Church summed up their case by asserting that, though the parking lot
project increased runoff from their property, they had controlled it effectively: 
We knew there was going to be a larger amount of runoff
because we were creating [an] impervious surface.  But how do
you deal with that runoff?  You control it. . . . 
32
Both the Church’s theory of the case, and the evidence presented at trial, therefore, were
aimed at illustrating the extent of the measures taken by the Church to prevent increased
surface water runoff due to the construction of the parking lot.  At no time did the Church
claim, nor did the evidence give rise to the inference, that County approval, without more,
insulated the Church from liability for contributing to a private nuisance.  Moreover, the trial
judge instructed that 
[a] person who creates or continues a nuisance is responsible for
the injury or damage caused to others by the nuisance . . . [and
the Church is] liable if they created a change in that water flow
which created a nuisance to the Wietzkes. 
We therefore conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in rejecting the
Wietzkes’ proposed “County approval” instruction.
The Wietzkes further argue that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying their
requested jury instruction that “the [Church was] not absolved of nuisance liability merely
because other sources may have contributed to the nuisance.”  The Wietzkes’ instruction
provided:
If water from the Church property contributed to flooding of the
Wietzke property, it is not a defense that water from other
sources may have also contributed.  If you find that the water
from the Church property contributed to flooding of the Wietzke
property then the Church is liable for any resulting nuisance to
the Wietzkes.
The Wietzkes argue that the Church presented expert testimony that water from “other
residences contributed to the Wietzke flooding,” and thus, sought to defend on the ground
33
that their property was one of many others releasing runoff.  The Church, in response, argues
they never contended, nor did the evidence tend to establish, that the flow of surface waters
from other properties was a defense for the creation of a nuisance, only that, because the
natural flow of water ran from high to low, with the Wietzkes’ property at the bottom,
surface water flowed onto the Wietzkes’ property from all directions.  The Church also
argues that the trial court’s instruction fairly covered the relevant law on contributing
sources.
In the present case, the Church introduced the testimony of several experts which
tended to establish that the Wietzkes’ property sat lower topographically than all other nearby
properties, and that because of this, water naturally flowed onto the Wietzkes’ property from
all directions.  For instance, a County Inspector and a civil-engineering expert, reviewed the
videotape adduced at trial of the June 2007 rainstorm and concluded that, contrary to the
Wietzkes’ contentions,  the water flowing onto their property originated from more than one
direction.  Similarly, a County employee testified that the Wietzkes’ home also sat lower
topographically than the neighboring properties.  Moreover, a real estate construction
specialist testified that he recommended the Wietzkes regrade their property and improve the
drainage system to control surface waters.  As set forth in the Church’s opening statement,
the Church’s purpose for introducing evidence that surface waters flowed from all directions
onto the Wietzkes’ property was to establish that the Wietzkes’ property sat at the “bottom
of [a] hill,” and in its natural state, took on surface water from all directions:
34
This case is about water running downhill.  That’s what it’s
about.  Water runs downhill.  We all know that. . . . [T]he law
does not require individuals or churches or anybody to stop the
water from flowing downhill.  If that’s the way it goes, and
you’re living at the bottom of the hill, you might get flooded. 
That can happen. . . . When water runs downhill, stormwater
management is about controlling the rate of water.  And there’s
no one in this case who’s going to tell you that the Church was
not allowed to have rainwater run downhill from its property. 
The key is controlling the rate at which that flows.
During closing argument, the Church again summed up their purpose for introducing
evidence that the Wietzkes’ property received surface water from many directions:
[T]his case is about water running downhill.  It’s really very
simple.  And we’ve stuck to that the whole time.  We like that
topographical map.  And the reason being[,] when it comes right
down to it[,] the water’s going to flow downhill.  The water
always has flowed downhill.  And that’s the history of this
whole neighborhood.
Thus, the Church’s purpose for introducing evidence of the runoff from other properties was
not, as has been contended by the Wietzkes, an attempt to accuse others of participating in
the same nuisance.  To the contrary, the Church introduced their theory of the case to negate
the Wietzkes’ claim that the Church’s parking lot project increased the flow of surface waters
onto the Wietzkes’ property.  
Moreover, the trial judge instructed that if the Church created any change in water
flow, that it would be liable:
The defendants in this case have asserted that the natural flow
of water in the neighborhood leads to plaintiff’s property.  You
are instructed that even if the natural flow of water in the
neighborhood leads to [the Wietzkes’] property, the [Church is]
35
liable if they created a change in that water flow which created
a nuisance to the Wietzkes.
We therefore conclude that the trial judge properly denied the Wietzkes’ proposed “other
source” instruction.
The Wietzkes also argue that the trial court erred in taking the negligence count away
from the jury.  Specifically, the Wietzkes dispute the trial judge’s conclusion that Section 19-
16(a) of the Montgomery County Code, which was cited in a Notice of Violation issued to
the Church on June 14, 2007, was not “designed to prevent the type of harm that . . .
ultimately occurred,” and that there was no proof that the Church’s violation of Section 19-
16(a) “was the cause of water flooding the [Wietzkes’] basement.”  The Church counters that
the Wietzkes were not members of any such class of persons protected by Section 19-16(a),
and that the testimony of the County Inspector who issued the June 14, 2007 Notice
established that the Notice was not issued because the Wietzkes’ home was flooded.
A prima facie case of negligence may be established by proof that an individual
violated an applicable statute or ordinance.  Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 78-
80, 835 A.2d 616, 620-622 (2003).  In Brooks, Judge John C. Eldridge stated that, in order
to place “sufficient evidence” in the record “to warrant the court in submitting the case to the
jury on a party’s negligence,” the plaintiff must show that:
(a) [T]he violation of a statute or ordinance [is] designed to
protect a specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff,
and 
(b) [T]he violation proximately caused the injury complained of.
36
Id. at 79, 835 A.2d at 621, quoting Crunkilton v. Hook, 185 Md. 1, 4, 42 A.2d 517, 519
(1945).  To make the requisite showing of proximate cause, the claimant must show both that
they are “within the class of persons sought to be protected,” and that the “harm suffered is
of a kind which the drafters intended the statute to prevent.”  Brooks, 378 Md. at 79, 835
A.2d at 621-622 (“It is the existence of this cause and effect relationship that makes the
violation of a statute prima facie evidence of negligence.” (quoting Brown v. Dermer, 357
Md. 349, 359, 744 A.2d 47, 55 (2000))).  Importantly, we have always required the statute
or ordinance allegedly violated to “set forth mandatory acts” that are “clearly for the
protection of a particular class of persons” and not merely for “the public as a whole.” 
Remsberg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 584, 831 A.2d 18, 27 (2003), quoting Ashburn v.
Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 635, 510 A.2d 1078, 1087 (1986).
In Brooks, 378 Md. at 70, 835 A.2d at 616, we considered whether a landlord’s
violation of the Baltimore City Housing Code’s lead-paint provisions, as established by a
child’s consumption of loose flakes of lead-paint on a leased premises, was sufficient to
establish a prima facie case of negligence.  We examined the language of the Housing Code,
and concluded that it imposed numerous duties upon landlords with respect to the tenants
they lease to, one of which was to ensure that any leased premises was entirely free of lead-
based paint:
§ 706. Painting.
* * * 
(b) Interiors.
37
(1) All interior loose or peeling wall covering or paint shall be
removed and the exposed surface shall be placed in a smooth
and sanitary condition.
(2) No paint shall be used for interior painting of any dwelling
. . . unless the paint is free from any lead pigment.
Baltimore City Code (2000, Supp. II 2002), Art. 13, § 706.  We determined that, under the
plain language of the Housing Code, it was “clear that the Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore mandated a continuing duty to keep the dwelling free of flaking, loose, or peeling
paint, at all times ‘while [the dwelling is] in use,’ in order for the landlord to remain in
compliance with the Housing Code.”  Brooks, 378 Md. at 83-84, 835 A.2d at 624.  Because
the Housing Code violation was issued for the presence of lead-paint in the leased apartment,
we determined that the requisite “cause and effect” relationship existed.  We concluded that,
because the lead-paint provision was “enacted to prevent lead poisoning in children,” and
that the injured child was “in the class of people intended to be protected” and “his injury,
lead poisoning, [was] the kind of injury intended to be prevented by the Code,” the child had
established a prima facie case sounding in negligence.  Id. at 89, 835 A.2d at 627.
In the case before us, the Church received two Notices for violating provisions of the
Montgomery County Code relating to erosion, sediment control and stormwater management. 
The November 28, 2006 Notice, which cited Section 19-7 of the Montgomery County Code,
was issued when the County discovered that the Church was out of sequence with its
approved construction plan.  Section 19-7 of the Montgomery County Code, which sets forth
a “sediment control” permitting scheme, provides in pertinent part:
38
In granting any permit, the director may attach the conditions
that the director deems reasonably necessary to prevent
sedimentation to public or private property or any sewer, storm
drain, or watercourse, to prevent the operation from being
conducted in a manner hazardous to life or property, or in a
manner likely to create a nuisance.  Those conditions may
include the erection or installation of walls, drains, dams and
structures, plantings, erosion and sediment control measures or
devices, furnishing necessary easements and a specified method
of performing the work.  These items must be identified on the
sediment control plan submitted for approval.  A permit must
not be issued until an erosion and sediment control plan is
approved by the department and the district, and the owner
certifies that all land-disturbing activities will be performed
pursuant to the erosion and sediment control plan. . . .
It is evident from the language of Section 19-7 that the County’s permitting scheme was
enacted, at least in part, to “prevent sedimentation” on “private property,” which would
appear to encompass the harm the Wietzkes complain of.  The Wietzkes were also required
to show, however, that the Church’s November 28, 2006 violation caused, at least in part, the
flooding of the Wietzkes’ basement.  The Notice itself is unhelpful in this regard, as it states
only that “the site is out of compliance due to the sequence of construction not being
followed,” and orders the Church to install an “earth dike” and “[o]ther sediment controls.” 
The “Inspection Summary,” which accompanied the Notice, is similarly unhelpful, providing
only that the Church was required to bring the construction site back into compliance:
Inspection this date reveals the following:
1) The site is out of sequence for construction.  A
notice of violation is being issued.
2) Install the earth dikes per sequence of
construction.
3) Bring the site into compliance and call for
39
inspections per the sequence of construction and
preconstruction memo.  
4) If any changes are wanted, first contact the
inspector and your engineer. 
Moreover, the Wietzke’s case was silent as to whether the November 28, 2006 Notice was
in any way related to the flooding of their basement.  To be sure, the Wietzkes adduced
evidence that the Church received the Notice, and that the Notice was issued during the same
month as one of the Wietzkes’ flooding incidents, but they failed to show a “cause and effect
relationship” between the Notice and the flooding, Brooks, 378 Md. at 79, 835 A.2d at 621,
and thus failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence as to the November 28, 2006
Notice.  We therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling as to this particular Notice.
The June 14, 2007 Notice, which cited Section 19-16(a) of the Montgomery County
Code, however, was issued under different circumstances.  After  the County discovered that
sediment had actually escaped from the Church’s construction site onto the neighboring
private property, the County Inspector issued a Notice, which provided: 
Sediment left the site after a storm event.  There was flooding in
the neighborhood.  Contact your engineer for a Solution.
The June 14, 2007 Notice was also accompanied by an “Inspection Summary,” which, among
other details, provided that “[t]here was sediment water and deposition on the property
below” and that “[t]here was flooding of the house”:
Inspection this date reveals the following:
1) 
A rainfall event last evening caused sediment to leave the
site.  The clean water diversion worked but there were
wash outs on the private roadway below the site.  
40
2) 
The water built up on the super silt fence and because of
the head pressure of the water caused the water to be
forced under the fence.  
3) 
There was sediment water and deposition on the property
below.  There was flooding of the house.  
4) 
The site is not in sequence with the plans.  The parking
lot area was cleared earlier and some of the area was to
receive excess dirt from the pond.  The dirt is now being
hauled off.  Complete the remaining removal of dirt (the
dewatering device and riser are installed[)].  Stabilize
and install the safety fence.  Call for inspection of the
sediment basin.  
5) 
A notice of violation and a civil citation are being issued.
The ordinance cited in the June 14, 2007 Notice, Section 19-16(a), governs the “roll[ing],
flow[ing], or wash[ing]” of sediment from one property “over the premises of another in a
manner to cause damage to the premises”:
A person must not engage in any land-disturbing activity or by
any action cause or permit any soil, earth, sand, gravel, rock,
stone, or other material, to be deposited upon or to roll, flow, or
wash upon or over the premises of another in a manner to cause
damage to the premises without the express written consent of
the owner of the premises affected.  A person must not engage
in any land-disturbing activity or by any action cause or permit
any soil, earth, sand, gravel, rock, stone, or other material to be
deposited to roll, flow, or wash upon or over any public street,
streetimprovement, road, sewer, storm drain, watercourse, right-
of-way, or any public property in a manner to damage or to
interfere with the use of that property.
The language of Section 19-16(a) of the Montgomery County Code prohibits “land-
disturbing activity,” which causes materials such as “soil, earth, sand, gravel, rock, stone, or
other material,” from “being deposited upon,” or from “roll[ing], flow[ing], or wash[ing]
upon or over the premises of another in a manner to cause damage.”  “Land-disturbing
41
activity” has been defined broadly to encompass “[a]ny earth movement and land changes
which may result in soil erosion from water or wind or the movement of sediments into state
waters or onto lands in the state, including tilling, clearing, grading, excavating, stripping,
stockpiling, filling and related activities, and the covering of land surfaces with an
impermeable material.”  Montgomery County Code, Section 19-1(15).  Thus, in a plain
meaning analysis, the ordinance clearly encompasses the type of harm the Wietzkes complain
of, the washing of certain “materials” onto their property, and protects a class of persons
encompassing the Wietzkes, private landowners in Montgomery County.    
 Our plain meaning analysis of Section 19-16(a) of the Montgomery County Code is
bulwarked by the legislative record.  Originally enacted in 1975, part of Section 19-16(a)’s
purpose was to prohibit certain “conduct involving land disturbing activities,” including
those which caused “soil, earth, sand, gravel, rock, stone, or other material, or liquid” from
being deposited upon or washing over the “premises of another.”  1976 Montgomery County
Laws, Chapter 14.   In 1986, the word “liquid” was excised from Section 19-16(a)  in order
10
11
Section 19-16(a), as originally enacted, included “liquid,” and provided:
10
No person shall engage in any land disturbing activity or by any
action cause or permit any soil, earth, sand, gravel, rock, stone,
or other material, or liquid to be deposited upon or to roll, flow,
or wash upon or over the premises of another in a manner to
cause damage to such premises without the express consent of
the owner of such premises affected; no person shall engage in
any land disturbing activity or by any action cause or permit any
soil, earth, sand, gravel, rock, stone, or other material or liquid
(continued...)
42
to “remove the reference to liquid that does not contain sediment.”  1986 Montgomery
County Laws, Chapter 45; Summary of Proposed Amendments to Chapter 19, Article I,
“Erosion and Sediment Control” (1986).  Excising the word liquid, then, was to avoid
reference to “pure” liquids, while including reference to liquids that include sediment.
Notwithstanding this nuance, the trial court’s conclusion that Section 19-16(a) did not protect
against the harm the Wietzkes complained of was not supported, as the issue of whether the
flood waters in the Wietzkes’ basement bore sediment from the Church’s property formed
no part of the trial judge’s discussion in granting the Church’s motion for judgment.
(...continued)
10
to be deposited or to roll, flow, or wash upon or over any public
street, street improvement, road, sewer, storm drain, water
course, or right-of-way, or any public property in a manner to
damage or to interfere with the use of such property.
1976 Montgomery County Laws, Chap. 14, Section 19-16(a) (emphasis added).  
Section 19-16(a), as amended, removed the term “liquid,” and provided:
11
A person must not engage in any land disturbing activity or by
any action cause or permit any soil, earth, sand, gravel, rock,
stone, or other material, to be deposited upon or to roll, flow, or
wash upon or over the premises of another in a manner to cause
damage to the premises without the express written consent of
the owner of the premises affected.  A person must not engage
in any land disturbing activity or by any action cause or permit
any soil, earth, sand, gravel, rock, stone, or other material to be
deposited or to roll, flow, or wash upon or over any public
street, street improvement, road, sewer, storm drain,
watercourse, right-of-way or any public property in a manner to
damage or to interfere with the use of that property.
1986 Montgomery County Laws, Chap. 45, Section 19-16(a). 
43
Moreover, at trial, the Wietzkes presented the following testimony of Ms. Malcolm, who
stated that the “private property” referred to in the June 14, 2007 Notice was actually the
Wietzkes’ property:
[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL]: [T]hat violation was issued the,
the day after the Wietzkes had their June 2007 flood, correct?
[MS. MALCOLM]: Correct.
[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL]: [O]ne of the boxes checked
there is section 19-16A, correct?
[MS. MALCOLM]: Correct.
[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL]: Okay.  And can you read out
loud for what it says there for that box that’s checked?
[MS. MALCOLM]: “Permitted soil to be deposited on a
roadway, permitted soil to flow onto private property, or
permitted soil to flow, wash, or to be deposited in a water
course.”
[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL]: And the private property was the
Wietzke property, correct?
[MS. MALCOLM]: Correct.  
Because the purpose of Section 19-16(a) of the Montgomery County Code was to
prevent liquid containing sediment from being deposited onto the premises of another, which
protects the Wietzkes, as members of a particular class, and because, various evidence, if
believed and credited by the jury as favorable to the Wietzkes, could have supported a
negligence claim, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting the Church’s motion for
judgment on the Wietzkes’ negligence claim, as to the June 14, 2007 Notice, before
submitting the case to the jury.  As a result, we reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court as
to the negligence count, as it related to Section 19-16(a), and we remand for further
44
proceedings on the issue of negligence in accordance with this opinion.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED IN
PART AND REVERSED IN PART. 
CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH
DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT 
FOR 
MONTGOMERY
COUNTY AS TO THE NEGLIGENCE
COUNT AND TO REMAND THE
CASE TO THAT COURT FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT
INCONSISTENT 
WITH 
THIS
OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS COURT
AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY
PETITIONERS.
45