Case Title: State ex rel. Bonnlander v. Hamon

Citation: 2020-Ohio-4269

Docket Number: 2019-1386

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-09-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Bonnlander v. Hamon, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4269.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-4269 
THE STATE EX REL. BONNLANDER, APPELLANT, v. HAMON ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Bonnlander v. Hamon, Slip Opinion No.  
2020-Ohio-4269.] 
Workers’ compensation—Whether a claimant has voluntarily retired or has 
abandoned the workforce is a question of fact for the Industrial Commission 
to determine—A court must uphold a factual determination by the 
commission so long as it is supported by some evidence in the record, 
regardless of whether evidence supporting a contrary conclusion also 
exists, even if the contrary evidence is greater in quality or quantity—Court 
of appeals’ judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2019-1386—Submitted August 4, 2020—Decided September 2, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 18AP-501,  
2019-Ohio-3861. 
________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellee Industrial Commission denied the request of appellant, 
Timothy Bonnlander, for permanent-total-disability (“PTD”) compensation, 
because the commission found that Bonnlander had voluntarily abandoned the 
workforce.  Bonnlander asked the Tenth District Court of Appeals for a writ of 
mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its decision and grant his request.  
The Tenth District denied the writ because it found that the commission’s decision 
was supported by evidence in the record.  Bonnlander appealed.  We affirm the 
Tenth District’s judgment. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Bonnlander sustained severe injuries in a work-related vehicle 
accident in 1992.  His workers’ compensation claim was allowed for physical and 
psychological conditions.  Bonnlander worked as a laborer and construction worker 
from 1994 through 2000.  He worked for the United States Postal Service from 
2000 through 2009, first as a mail carrier and then as a custodian.  He has not 
worked since 2009. 
{¶ 3} In February 2014, Bonnlander applied for PTD compensation.  The 
commission denied that request in September 2014, finding that he could perform 
sedentary work for up to four hours a day.  In its order, the commission noted that 
Bonnlander’s failure to pursue vocational rehabilitation had reflected negatively on 
his application.  In October 2014, Bonnlander sought a writ of mandamus from the 
Tenth District vacating the commission’s order.  See State ex rel. Bonnlander v. 
Hamon, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-855, 2015-Ohio-4038, ¶ 30. 
{¶ 4} In the meantime, he also requested vocational-rehabilitation services.  
The commission granted that request in February 2015.  The vocational-
rehabilitation case manager (“VRCM”) gathered information, but some of what she 
sought was unavailable: Bonnlander’s treating psychologist did not respond to 
multiple requests about Bonnlander’s return-to-work outlook or his psychological 
January Term, 2020 
 
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restrictions, and the managed-care organization handling Bonnlander’s case denied 
the VRCM’s requests for additional neurological, psychological, and physical 
evaluations. 
{¶ 5} The VRCM therefore considered a May 2014 psychological report by 
an independent medical examiner, Dr. Debjani Sinha, who opined that Bonnlander 
could work part-time, up to four hours a day, with accommodations, and a January 
2015 application for wage-loss compensation in which Bonnlander’s treating 
physician stated that he had the physical ability to perform sedentary work, up to 
eight hours a day, with standing and walking for up to one hour. 
{¶ 6} The VRCM also “heavily” considered Bonnlander’s own statement 
that he suffered from memory issues that he believed would impede his ability to 
return to work.  She ultimately concluded: 
 
Without the benefit of reconditioning, or a Neuro-
Psychological evaluation, and in just relying on [Bonnlander’s] 
presentation, pain levels, and applicable physical and psychological 
restrictions, this VRCM has no confidence he would be able to 
actively participate in vocational rehab or [be] employable in a 
competitive labor market.  It is therefore the VRCM [sic] opinion, 
that without increased psychological, physical, and cognitive 
functional abilities, he is not feasible for vocational rehabilitation or 
return to work. 
 
Bonnlander’s rehabilitation file was closed in March 2015 “due to medical 
instability.” 
{¶ 7} In September 2015, the Tenth District denied Bonnlander’s 2014 
request for a writ of mandamus.  Bonnlander, 2015-Ohio-4038, at ¶ 8.  Bonnlander 
appealed, and in May 2017, this court unanimously affirmed the Tenth District’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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judgment, holding that “[i]t was within the commission’s discretion to rely on Dr. 
Sinha’s report as evidence to support the conclusion that Bonnlander was capable 
of up to four hours of sedentary work a day.”  State ex rel. Bonnlander v. Hamon, 
150 Ohio St.3d 567, 2017-Ohio-4003, 84 N.E.3d 1004, ¶ 20-21. 
{¶ 8} On October 12, 2017, Bonnlander submitted a new application for 
PTD compensation.  A staff hearing officer (“SHO”) found that Bonnlander’s 
psychological and orthopedic conditions both independently rendered him 
incapable of working and issued a “tentative order” awarding Bonnlander 
compensation effective September 20, 2017.  The SHO based this conclusion on 
medical opinions rendered in late 2017.  The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation 
objected to the tentative order, and a different SHO vacated it, finding that the order 
was inappropriate because there was a legal dispute over the issue of PTD. 
{¶ 9} In May 2018, a third SHO denied Bonnlander’s request for PTD 
compensation, based on a finding that Bonnlander had voluntarily abandoned the 
workforce.  The SHO found that (1) this court had upheld the commission’s 2014 
order denying PTD on the grounds that Bonnlander could work part-time, 
(2) Bonnlander had last worked in late 2008 or early 2009, (3) Bonnlander is 
receiving federal disability benefits arising from his employment at the post office 
as well as social-security-disability benefits and Bonnlander had testified that he 
did not believe that he could receive federal disability benefits if he was working, 
(4) Bonnlander had not looked for work for several years, at least since September 
11, 2014 (the date of the hearing on his 2014 PTD-compensation application), 
(5) the VRCM “was without an accurate assessment of [Bonnlander’s] cognitive 
function,” and (6) Bonnlander’s “pursuit of vocational rehabilitation over roughly 
a three week period” was not sufficient to establish “a meaningful effort in pursuing 
all reasonable avenues of accomplishing a return to sustained remunerative 
employment albeit on a part-time basis.”  The commission rejected Bonnlander’s 
request for reconsideration of the SHO’s decision. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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{¶ 10} In June 2018, Bonnlander filed the instant action in the Tenth 
District, seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its order 
and grant his application for PTD compensation.  The magistrate found that the 
commission’s determination that Bonnlander made an insufficient effort at 
rehabilitation was an abuse of discretion and recommended that the court grant the 
writ.  2019-Ohio-3861, ¶ 48-50. 
{¶ 11} However, the Tenth District sustained the commission’s objections 
to the magistrate’s recommendation and denied the writ.  Id. at ¶ 13, 25-26.  The 
court of appeals explained that “the SHO’s finding on relator’s effort at vocational 
rehabilitation was only one consideration among many used to support the SHO’s 
decision to deny PTD compensation,” id. at ¶ 17, and that other evidence in the 
record supported the decision that Bonnlander had voluntarily abandoned the 
workforce, id. at ¶ 21.  Specifically, the court of appeals pointed to 
(1) Bonnlander’s testimony that he believed working could result in the loss of his 
federal disability benefits, id., and (2) his failure to work or to seek work after the 
commission found him capable of sustained remunerative employment in 
September 2014, id. at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 12} The court of appeals acknowledged that Bonnlander had pursued 
vocational rehabilitation in 2015, but it pointed out that the commission’s 
September 2014 determination that he could work part-time was not conditioned 
on his undergoing vocational rehabilitation, so the vocational-rehabilitation 
determination was irrelevant.  Id. at ¶ 23.  In any event, the Tenth District explained 
that because Bonnlander’s testimony and inaction constitutes some evidence that 
he voluntarily abandoned the workforce, the existence of contrary evidence is 
immaterial and the commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Bonnlander PTD compensation.  Id. at ¶ 24. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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II. ANALYSIS 
A.  Mandamus Standard 
{¶ 13} Mandamus relief is appropriate only if the relator establishes “a clear 
legal right to the relief requested, a clear legal duty on the part of the commission 
* * * to provide the relief, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course 
of the law.”  State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm., 143 Ohio St.3d 56, 2015-Ohio-
1191, 34 N.E.3d 104, ¶ 12.  In matters before it, the commission is the exclusive 
evaluator of the weight and credibility of the evidence.  State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. 
v. Indus. Comm., 88 Ohio St.3d 284, 287, 725 N.E.2d 639 (2000).  Therefore, “[t]o 
be entitled to an extraordinary remedy in mandamus, the relator must demonstrate 
that the [commission] abused its discretion by entering an order not supported by 
any evidence in the record.”  State ex rel. WFAL Constr. v. Buehrer, 144 Ohio St.3d 
21, 2015-Ohio-2305, 40 N.E.3d 1079, ¶ 12.  The relator must make that showing 
by clear and convincing evidence.  Id. 
B.  The Commission’s Decision Was Supported by Some Evidence 
{¶ 14} “ ‘Permanent total disability’ means the inability to perform 
sustained remunerative employment due to the allowed conditions in the claim.”  
Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(1).  PTD compensation is not available to an injured 
worker who has voluntarily abandoned the workforce for reasons unrelated to his 
allowed conditions.  R.C. 4123.58(D)(3); Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(1)(d); see 
also State ex rel. Black v. Indus. Comm., 137 Ohio St.3d 75, 2013-Ohio-4550, 997 
N.E.2d 536, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 15} “Whether a claimant has voluntarily retired or has abandoned the 
workforce is a question of fact for the commission to determine.”  Id. at ¶ 18.  And 
a court must uphold a factual determination by the commission so long as it is 
supported by some evidence in the record, regardless of whether evidence 
supporting a contrary conclusion also exists, even if the contrary evidence is greater 
January Term, 2020 
 
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in quality or quantity.  State ex rel. Vonderheide v. Multi-Color Corp., 156 Ohio 
St.3d 403, 2019-Ohio-1270, 128 N.E.3d 188, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 16} In his first proposition of law, Bonnlander argues that the 
commission abused its discretion by considering his failure to participate in 
vocational rehabilitation.  This argument is based on two premises.  First, 
Bonnlander asserts that after the commission’s September 2014 determination that 
he could work four hours a day, his allowed medical conditions deteriorated to the 
point that he became permanently and totally disabled, as evidenced by the March 
2015 determination that he was not a feasible candidate for vocational rehabilitation 
and by medical opinions from November 2015 and late 2017.  Second, he asserts 
that the commission is not required to consider a claimant’s failure to participate in 
vocational rehabilitation when a finding of permanent and total disability is based 
solely on medical factors.  In support of this assertion, Bonnlander cites State ex 
rel. R & L Carriers Shared Servs., L.L.C. v. Indus. Comm., 151 Ohio St.3d 568, 
2017-Ohio-5833, 91 N.E.3d 711, State ex rel. Heinen’s, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 10th 
Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-635, 2019-Ohio-4690, and State ex rel. Tradesman 
Internatl. v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-122, 2014-Ohio-1064, 
aff’d sub nom. State ex rel. Tradesmen Internatl. v. Indus. Comm., 143 Ohio St.3d 
336, 2015-Ohio-2342, 37 N.E.3d 1203. 
{¶ 17} We reject Bonnlander’s first proposition of law.  His reliance on 
medical evidence from 2015 and 2017 overlooks the fact that the evidence the 
commission relied on in making its finding of voluntary abandonment dated from 
2014 at the latest.  And an injured worker who voluntarily abandons the workforce 
for reasons unrelated to the allowed conditions prior to becoming permanently and 
totally disabled is not entitled to PTD compensation.  State ex rel. Baker Material 
Handling Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 69 Ohio St.3d 202, 631 N.E.2d 138 (1994), 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 18} Moreover, the cases Bonnlander relies on are inapplicable.  They 
permit the commission to award PTD compensation based solely on medical factors 
without considering the claimant’s failure to participate in vocational rehabilitation, 
but they do not require the commission to ignore a failure to participate in 
vocational rehabilitation when making a finding of voluntary abandonment.  R & L 
Carriers at ¶ 18 (“Although the commission may consider a claimant’s 
nonparticipation in reeducation or retraining in its analysis of an injured worker’s 
nonmedical disability factors, * * * when permanent total disability is based solely 
on the claimant’s medical impairment, the commission is not required to consider 
nonmedical disability factors * * *” [emphasis added]); Tradesman Internatl., 
2014-Ohio-1064, at ¶ 18 (“Where * * * medical factors alone preclude sustained 
remunerative employment, * * * a consideration of the nonmedical factors, 
including whether [the] claimant had or should have pursued vocational 
rehabilitation, [is] unnecessary” [emphasis added]); Heinen’s at ¶ 12 (same). 
{¶ 19} In his second proposition of law, Bonnlander argues that because he 
sought vocational rehabilitation but was found to be a nonfeasible candidate, the 
commission abused its discretion by finding that he voluntarily abandoned his 
employment.  He further asserts that the commission’s decision is not supported by 
any evidence in the record. 
{¶ 20} We reject Bonnlander’s second proposition of law and conclude, as 
did the Tenth District, that some evidence in the record supports the commission’s 
finding that Bonnlander voluntarily abandoned the workforce.  See 2019-Ohio-
3861 at ¶ 21-22. 
{¶ 21} Specifically, the third SHO in this case found that Bonnlander 
testified that he was receiving federal disability benefits arising from his former 
employment with the post office and that he believed he could not receive those 
benefits if he was working.  In addition, the third SHO found that Bonnlander failed 
to work or seek work after the commission found him capable of sustained 
January Term, 2020 
 
9
remunerative employment in September 2014; in fact, he has not worked since 2009 
and has not sought work since at least September 11, 2014.  “[T]he commission 
may consider a claimant’s inaction after leaving a job as evidence that the claimant 
voluntarily decided to no longer be actively employed.”  State ex rel. McKee v. 
Union Metal Corp., 150 Ohio St.3d 223, 2017-Ohio-5541, 80 N.E.3d 491, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 22} It is true that Bonnlander sought vocational rehabilitation.  But while 
the commission’s 2014 order denying PTD compensation noted that his failure to 
have pursued vocational rehabilitation “to improve his prospects for returning to 
the workforce” was a negative factor with respect to his PTD-compensation 
application, the commission’s determination that Bonnlander could work four 
hours a day was not conditioned on his completion of vocational rehabilitation. 
{¶ 23} Moreover, 
although 
Bonnlander’s 
pursuit 
of 
vocational 
rehabilitation and the VRCM’s finding that he was not a feasible candidate for 
rehabilitation services may constitute evidence supporting a conclusion that 
Bonnlander did not voluntarily abandon the workforce, the commission is entitled 
to determine the appropriate weight and credibility of that evidence.  LTV Steel, 88 
Ohio St.3d at 287, 725 N.E.2d 639.  And the third SHO found that the VRCM “was 
without an accurate assessment of [Bonnlander’s] cognitive function.” 
{¶ 24} In any event, the mere existence of conflicting evidence does not 
render the commission’s determination of a factual question an abuse of discretion.  
Vonderheide, 156 Ohio St.3d 403, 2019-Ohio-1270, 128 N.E.3d 188, at ¶ 14.  
Because the commission’s decision that Bonnlander voluntarily abandoned the 
workforce was supported by some evidence in the record, the Tenth District 
correctly denied the writ. 
III. CONCLUSION 
{¶ 25} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Tenth District’s judgment. 
Judgment affirmed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Mark B. Weisser, for appellant. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Eric J. Tarbox, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio. 
_________________