Case Title: Sheboygan County Department of Health & Human Services v. Julie A.B.

Citation: 2002 WI 95

Docket Number: 2001AP001692

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 95 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1692 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights to 
Prestin T.B., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Sheboygan County Department of Health & Human 
Services,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Julie A.B.,  
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  248 Wis. 2d 529, 635 N.W.2d 906 
(Ct. App. 2001-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 10, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 9, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan   
 
JUDGE: 
James J. Bolgert   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there was a brief 
and oral argument by Mary T. Wagner, assistant district 
attorney, with whom on the brief was Robert J. Wells, Jr., 
district attorney. 
 
For the respondent-respondent there was a brief by Ronald 
J. Sonderhouse and Kay & Kay Law Firm, Brookfield, and oral 
argument by Ronald J. Sonderhouse. 
 
 
2002 WI 95 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1692   
(L.C. No. 
00 TP 53) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Termination of  
Parental Rights to Prestin T.B., 
a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Sheboygan County Department of Health &  
Human Services,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Julie A.B., 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished single-judge decision of the court of appeals which 
affirmed an order of the Circuit Court for Sheboygan County, 
James J. Bolgert, Judge.1  The issue presented in this appeal is: 
What standards must the circuit court apply in determining the 
                                                 
1 Sheboygan 
County 
DHHS 
v. 
Julie 
A.B., 
No. 
01-1692, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2001). 
No. 01-1692 
2 
 
appropriate disposition of a petition for termination of 
parental rights, after the court or a jury has found that 
statutory grounds for termination exist? 
¶2 
In this case, a jury found that a child placed in 
foster care because of parental neglect had a continuing need of 
protection or services.  This finding was made at a fact-finding 
hearing under Wis. Stat. § 48.424 (1999-2000).2  A "continuing 
need of protection or services" is one of the 11 grounds for 
termination of parental rights listed in § 48.415.  The circuit 
court then found the parent unfit, pursuant to § 48.424(4), 
after concluding that the evidence supported the verdict.  
However, at the dispositional hearing, the court determined that 
the conduct of the parent was not sufficiently egregious to 
warrant termination of parental rights and that termination was 
not essential to the child's safety or welfare.  It therefore 
dismissed the termination petition without ever considering the 
best interests of the child. 
¶3 
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, concluding 
that the standards applied by the circuit court were correct, 
based on language in B.L.J. v. Polk County Department of Social 
Services, 163 Wis. 2d 90, 103, 470 N.W.2d 914 (1991), and State 
v. Kelly S., 2001 WI App 193, 247 Wis. 2d 144, 634 N.W.2d 120, a 
case decided by the court of appeals earlier in the year.  
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 statutes unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 01-1692 
3 
 
Sheboygan County DHHS v. Julie A.B., No. 01-1692, unpublished 
slip op. at ¶¶1, 11-13 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2001). 
¶4 
We conclude that the standards applied by the circuit 
court and court of appeals were not correct because a portion of 
our B.L.J. opinion was not correct.  The statutes governing 
petitions for termination of parental rights require the court, 
in the exercise of its discretion, to consider the best 
interests of the child as the prevailing factor in a disposition 
under Wis. Stat. § 48.427.  After a jury or the court has found 
one of the grounds for termination listed in the statute and the 
court has found the parent unfit, the focus shifts to the 
child's best interests.  At the dispositional hearing, the court 
must consider any agency report submitted and the six factors 
enumerated in § 48.426(3) in determining the best interests of 
the child.  The court may also consider other factors, including 
factors favorable to the parent; but all factors relied upon 
must be calibrated to the prevailing standard: the best 
interests of the child.  The best interests of the child is the 
polestar for the court in a dispositional hearing, and a failure 
to apply that standard is an error of law. 
¶5 
Because 
the 
circuit 
court 
understandably 
applied 
incorrect 
legal 
standards, 
it 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals and remand the case to the circuit court.  Because 
the disposition standards set forth in B.L.J. and Kelly S. are 
inconsistent with this opinion, we modify B.L.J. and overrule 
Kelly S. 
No. 01-1692 
4 
 
FACTS 
¶6 
This case involves a petition for termination of the 
parental rights of Julie A.B. (Julie) and James T. (James) to 
Prestin T.B. (Prestin), who was born April 11, 1998.  The 
Sheboygan County Department of Health and Human Services 
(Department) initiated a petition for termination of parental 
rights (petition) on December 4, 2000, alleging that Julie and 
James 
were 
unfit 
parents 
and 
positing 
two 
grounds 
for 
termination: "abandonment" and "continuing need of protection or 
services."3 
¶7 
The Department had received previous referrals about 
Julie's parenting of Prestin.  On November 12, 1998, when 
Prestin was seven months old, the Department received a referral 
alleging neglect.  It was not substantiated.  On October 12, 
1999, when Prestin was 18 months old, the Department received a 
second referral.  It alleged that Julie was homeless, drank 
alcohol on a daily basis, moved from house to house to find 
shelter, and would often leave Prestin with people who were 
"drunk, high, or on cocaine."  The Department investigated but 
was unable to locate Julie or Prestin. 
¶8 
On January 20, 2000, the Department received a third 
referral, also alleging that Julie was neglecting Prestin.  The 
third referral alleged that Julie continued to have problems 
with alcohol and that her lodgings were "filthy." 
                                                 
3 James T. had moved out of state and effectively abandoned 
Prestin.  He was never engaged as a parent. 
No. 01-1692 
5 
 
¶9 
A Department social worker contacted Julie the next 
day at the apartment where she and Prestin were staying.  The 
social worker found that the apartment contained no milk, 
virtually no edible food, no crib or child bedding, and little 
clothing suitable for a child.  She noted old, inedible food in 
the refrigerator and on the stove, and that the apartment had 
dirty dishes, beer cans, and cigarette butts throughout, along 
with "dirty clothes, tools, dirt, and miscellaneous clutter 
which presented a safety hazard for a [21]-month-old child."  
The social worker observed Prestin pick up a nail and try to 
place it in his mouth, and also try to eat food items found on 
the floor.  The social worker deemed the apartment "unsuitable 
to meet the needs of Prestin." 
¶10 The 
Department's 
court report 
stated 
that 
Julie 
admitted to having a problem with alcohol and to drinking 
alcohol on "almost a daily basis."  She denied having a drug 
problem but admitted using cocaine once in the previous six 
months.  Julie allegedly stated that she and Prestin had lived 
in the apartment "off and on for several months" and that two 
males who were severe alcoholics and drank on a daily basis also 
resided there.  Prestin was taken into custody that day and 
placed in foster care.4 
¶11 After a child in need of protection or services 
(CHIPS) petition was filed, Julie failed to appear at the 
hearing.  On April 14, 2000, Sheboygan County Circuit Judge John 
                                                 
4 Julie waived a placement hearing, in writing. 
No. 01-1692 
6 
 
B. Murphy determined that Prestin was in need of protective 
services pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.13(10), thereby finding 
that he was a child whose parent neglects, refuses or is unable 
for reasons other than poverty to provide necessary care, food, 
clothing, medical or dental care or shelter so as to seriously 
endanger the physical health of the child.  Judge Murphy ordered 
Prestin placed in a foster home under supervision of the 
Department for one year.  The dispositional order also placed a 
number of conditions upon Julie.  She was ordered to undergo an 
alcohol 
and 
other 
drug 
assessment 
(AODA), 
submit 
to 
a 
psychological evaluation and follow through with treatment, 
participate in a regularly scheduled visitation program, make 
reasonable efforts to obtain employment, and establish and 
maintain a residence suitable to Prestin's needs.  Additionally, 
Julie and James were directed to meet with and cooperate with 
Prestin's social worker. 
¶12 Julie did not meet most of these conditions, and James 
satisfied none.  Hence, on December 4, 2000, the Department 
initiated termination of parental rights proceedings against 
them on grounds of abandonment and continuing need of protection 
or services.  Prestin's social worker attached to the petition a 
statement explaining that the Department had attempted to help 
Julie and James comply with the April 14, 2000 dispositional 
order, but that James had not met with or cooperated with 
Prestin's social worker and Julie had not followed through with 
her 
AODA 
outpatient 
program, 
had 
not 
submitted 
to 
a 
psychological evaluation, had missed numerous appointments with 
No. 01-1692 
7 
 
the social worker and visits with Prestin, and had been unable 
to maintain employment or a suitable residence.  The social 
worker attributed some of Julie's failure to comply with the 
order to her being in jail, absconding from jail, and being "on 
the run from jail."5 
¶13 On March 6, 2001, Judge Bolgert conducted a fact-
finding jury trial to determine whether a statutory ground 
existed for terminating the parental rights of Julie and James.  
The ground ultimately alleged by the Department was that Prestin 
had a "continuing need of protection or services."  See 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2).  To determine that Prestin had a 
continuing need of protection or services, the jury had to find 
that the state had proven each of four elements by clear and 
convincing evidence.  The questions for the jury were: 
(1) Has [Prestin] been adjudged to be in need of 
protection or services and placed outside the home for 
a cumulative total of six months or longer pursuant to 
one or more court orders containing the termination of 
parental rights notice required by law? 
                                                 
5 Julie acknowledged at trial that she had been convicted of 
"Operating under influence of intoxicant or other drug," fourth 
offense, and was to report to jail on March 20, 2000, to serve a 
180-day sentence.  Julie failed to do so, and was subsequently 
picked up by police on April 21.  She had work release 
privileges, but on May 27, she failed to report back to jail.  
When she was picked up by police on June 13, she "was 
intoxicated" and "had a fight with the police." 
Julie pled no contest to four felonies that she committed 
between March 20, 2000, and September 16, 2000.  She was 
convicted 
of 
"Failure 
to 
report 
to 
jail," 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 946.425(1m)(b); 
"Battery 
to 
a 
Law 
Enforcement 
Officer," contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.20(2); and two counts of 
"Escape," contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.42(3)(a). 
No. 01-1692 
8 
 
(2) Did the Sheboygan County Department of Health and 
Human Services make a reasonable effort to provide the 
services ordered by the court? 
(3) 
Has 
[Julie] 
failed 
to 
meet 
the 
conditions 
established for the safe return of [Prestin] to 
[Julie's] home? 
(4) Is there a substantial likelihood that [Julie] 
will not meet those conditions within the twelve-month 
period following the conclusion of this hearing? 
¶14 The court answered the first question for the jury, 
stating that Prestin had been placed outside the home for six 
months or more.  In fact, he had lived with the same foster 
family for 14 months.  The jury unanimously answered the 
remaining three questions "yes," thereby finding that Prestin 
remained a child in need of protection or services.  The court 
determined that there was an evidentiary basis for the jury's 
finding, and found on "that basis that the mother is unfit."  
The court then set a dispositional hearing for April 6, 2001. 
¶15 At the hearing, the court heard testimony from Julie 
and from the social worker who had filed the earlier reports.  
The social worker testified that Prestin was adoptable and that 
the foster parents with whom he had lived since January 21, 
2000, when he was first taken into custody, were interested in 
adopting him.  The social worker recommended that the court 
terminate Julie's parental rights.  The guardian ad litem 
assigned to Prestin's case agreed with the social worker's 
recommendation. 
No. 01-1692 
9 
 
¶16 At the close of the dispositional hearing, the court 
dismissed the petition.6  The court stated: 
I do not think that the findings warrant termination.  
Under Section 48.427(2) it provides, "The court may 
dismiss the petition if it finds . . . the evidence 
does not warrant the termination of parental rights." 
Here's the legal issue: Is the evidence of 
unfitness so egregious as to warrant termination of 
parental rights?  That's from . . . the B.L.J. case, 
163 Wis. 2d 90 at 103.7  A finding of unfitness that 
warrants termination is not merely a find[ing] that 
termination is better for the child, "but essential to 
their safety or welfare, in some very serious and 
important respect." . . . After this finding regarding 
unfitness warranting termination, then look to the 
best interests of the child . . . (emphasis added). 
¶17 After the court discussed Julie's alcoholism and 
treatment needs and the relationship of Julie's jail stays to 
her failure to visit Prestin, it concluded that termination was 
not warranted: 
Therefore, this court finds the termination of 
contact between Julie [A.B] and Prestin is not 
essential to the child's safety or welfare.  The 
evidence 
of 
unfitness 
does 
not 
warrant 
termination. . . . I think it's obvious to all of us 
the child is still in need of protection and services 
now.  I fully anticipate that the CHIPS order will be 
renewed. . . .  
¶18 The Department appealed, asserting that the court had 
applied the wrong legal standards in dismissing the petition.  
                                                 
6 The court granted the petition to terminate the parental 
rights of James, who did not voluntarily relinquish his parental 
rights but who did not actively contest the petition or appear 
at the fact-finding or dispositional hearings. 
7 The circuit court's reference was to B.L.J. v. Polk County 
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 163 Wis. 2d 90, 470 N.W.2d 914 (1991). 
No. 01-1692 
10 
 
The court of appeals affirmed in a single-judge decision by 
Judge Snyder, determining that the circuit court had properly 
applied the standards established in B.L.J. and Kelly S.  Julie 
A.B., No. 01-1692, unpublished slip op., ¶¶1, 11-13.  The court 
stated the standards as follows: 
After 
a 
jury 
has 
found 
evidence 
supporting 
termination of parental rights, the trial court must 
then determine whether such evidence is sufficiently 
egregious 
to 
support 
a 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights. . . .  
In arriving at the appropriate disposition, the 
court must first contemplate whether the parental 
unfitness is so great that it undermines the ability 
to parent.  The trial court must then consider whether 
that inability to parent is seriously detrimental to 
the child. 
Id. at ¶¶9-10 (citation omitted). 
¶19 The Department appealed again, and we granted its 
petition for review to determine whether the standards for 
termination set forth in B.L.J. and Kelly S., and relied upon in 
this case, are correct. 
ANALYSIS 
¶20 This case concerns the standards to be applied by the 
circuit court in exercising its discretion at a dispositional 
hearing under Wis. Stat. § 48.427, after the court or a jury has 
found that grounds exist for termination of parental rights.   
¶21 Termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
is 
governed 
by 
Subchapter VIII of Chapter 48 of the Wisconsin Statutes, the 
Children's Code.  The "best interests of the child" represents a 
consistent legislative objective throughout the Children's Code.  
No. 01-1692 
11 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.01(1) provides in part: "In construing this 
chapter, the best interests of the child . . . shall always be 
of paramount consideration."  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1); see State 
v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 
42, ¶33, 
234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 
N.W.2d 475. 
¶22 Notwithstanding 
this 
broad 
language, 
the 
"best 
interests of the child" standard does not dominate every step of 
every 
proceeding, 
because 
other 
vital 
interests 
must 
be 
accommodated.  When the government seeks to terminate parental 
rights, the best interests of the child standard does not 
"prevail" until the affected parent has been found unfit 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4).8  "[A] parent's desire for 
and right to 'the companionship, care, custody, and management 
of his 
or her children' 
is an 
important 
interest 
that 
'undeniably 
warrants 
deference 
and, 
absent 
a 
powerful 
countervailing interest, protection.'"  Lassiter v. Dep't of 
Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).  This fundamental liberty 
interest of parents "does not evaporate simply because they have 
not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their 
child to the State."  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 
(1982).  "Even when blood relationships are strained, parents 
retain 
a 
vital 
interest 
in 
preventing 
the 
irretrievable 
                                                 
8 "'Unfitness' is an absolute requirement before parental 
rights may be terminated. . . . Parental rights may only be 
terminated if the parent is unfit."  B.L.J., 163 Wis. 2d  at 
110. 
No. 01-1692 
12 
 
destruction of their family life."  Id.  Thus, when the state 
moves to terminate parental rights, "it must provide the parents 
with fundamentally fair procedures."  Id. at 754. 
¶23 "'Termination of parental rights' means that, pursuant 
to a court order, all rights, powers, privileges, immunities, 
duties and obligations existing between parent and child are 
permanently severed."  Wis. Stat. § 48.40(2).  The profound 
consequences of termination have necessitated the development of 
detailed statutory requirements.  They are set out in Subchapter 
VIII of Chapter 48.  This subchapter provides the procedures to 
follow and the standards to apply.  In its brief, the Department 
explains that "a parent is afforded numerous rights intended to 
safeguard his or her interests."  These rights include: 
a right to a written petition with a statement of the 
grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights 
[Wis. Stat. § 48.42(1)]; a right to be personally 
served 
with 
the 
summons 
and 
petition 
[Wis. Stat. § 48.42(2) and (4)]; a right to have a 
hearing 
on 
the 
petition 
within 
30 
days 
[Wis. Stat. § 48.422(1)]; a right to a jury trial of 
twelve jurors and to have the allegations proven by 
clear and convincing evidence [Wis. Stat. §§ 48.31(1) 
and 
48.422(4)]; 
a 
right 
to 
subpoena 
witnesses 
[Wis. Stat. §§ 48.31(2) and 805.07(1)]; and a right to 
an attorney [Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)].  
¶24 After 
the 
petition 
has 
been 
filed 
and 
the 
preliminaries have been completed, a contested termination 
proceeding involves a two-step procedure.  Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila 
S., 2001 WI 110, ¶22-23, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768.  The 
first step is the fact-finding hearing "to determine whether 
grounds exist for the termination of parental rights."  Wis. 
No. 01-1692 
13 
 
Stat. § 48.424(1). "During this step, the parent's rights are 
paramount."  Id. at ¶22 (citing Minguey v. Brookens, 100 Wis. 2d 
681, 689, 303 N.W.2d 581 (1981)).  During this step, the burden 
is on the government, and the parent enjoys a full complement of 
procedural rights. 
¶25 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415 sets out 11 different grounds 
for termination.9  These grounds include abandonment, child 
abuse, homicide or solicitation to commit homicide of parent, 
and continuing need of protection or services.  
¶26 At the close of the fact-finding hearing, the jury or 
the court determines "whether any grounds for the termination of 
parental rights have been proven."  Wis. Stat. § 48.424(3).  If 
the jury or court determines that the facts alleged in the 
petition have not been proven, the court dismisses the petition.  
Conversely, "[i]f grounds for the termination of parental rights 
are found by the court or jury, the court shall find the parent 
unfit."  Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4) (emphasis added). 
                                                 
9 The grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 48.415 are: (1) abandonment; (2) 
continuing need of protection or services; (3) continuing 
parental disability; (4) continuing denial of periods of 
physical placement or visitation; (5) child abuse; (6) failure 
to assume parental responsibility; (7) incestuous parenthood; 
(8) homicide or solicitation to commit homicide of parent; (9) 
parenthood as a result of sexual assault; (9m) commission of a 
serious felony against one of the person's children; and (10) 
prior involuntary termination of parental rights to another 
child. 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1)-(10). 
No. 01-1692 
14 
 
¶27 We recognized in B.L.J. that, notwithstanding a jury 
verdict, the court may dismiss a petition if it finds that the 
evidence "does not sustain any one of the jury's individual 
findings."  B.L.J., 163 Wis. 2d at 103.10  This statement is 
consistent 
with 
the 
sufficiency-of-evidence 
principles 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 805.14. 
¶28 When the fact-finding step has been completed and the 
court has made a finding of unfitness, the proceeding moves to 
the 
second 
step, 
the 
dispositional 
hearing. 
 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.427.  The outcome of this hearing is not predetermined, but 
the focus shifts to the interests of the child.  At the 
dispositional hearing, the court may enter an order terminating 
the 
parental 
rights 
of 
one 
or 
both 
parents, 
Wis. Stat. § 48.427(3), or it may dismiss the petition if it 
finds the evidence does not warrant the termination of parental 
rights.  Wis. Stat. § 48.427(2).  Either way, "[t]he best 
interests of the child shall be the prevailing factor considered 
by the court in determining the disposition" under section 
                                                 
10 The court explained this proposition as follows: 
[W]here 
a 
jury 
finds 
all 
of 
the 
grounds 
for 
termination and the court enters its mandatory finding 
of unfitness pursuant to sec. 48.424 Stats., if the 
court 
determines 
the 
evidence 
for 
any 
one 
of 
the . . . findings does not support the jury finding, 
that would be reason to dismiss the petition because a 
"finding" of unfitness cannot be sustained if one of 
the . . . required findings is not, in the court's 
opinion, supported by "clear and convincing evidence." 
B.L.J., 163 Wis. 2d at 105. 
No. 01-1692 
15 
 
48.427.  Wis. Stat. § 48.426(1) and (2) (emphasis added).  "The 
court shall decide what disposition is in the best interest of 
the child."  Wis. Stat. § 48.424(3). 
¶29 The circuit judge is not an automaton.  The decision 
whether to terminate a parent's rights to a child can be one of 
the most wrenching and agonizing in the law.  "Any party may 
present evidence relevant to the issue of disposition, including 
expert 
testimony, 
and 
may 
make 
alternative 
dispositional 
recommendations to the court."  Wis. Stat. § 48.427(1).  The 
court should welcome this evidence.  It may consider factors 
favorable to the parent, including prognosis for the parent's 
markedly changed behavior.  But the court shall consider any 
report submitted by an agency under § 48.425, and it shall 
consider the six factors set out in § 48.426(3): 
(3) FACTORS.  In considering the best interests 
of the child under this section the court shall 
consider but not be limited to the following: 
(a) The likelihood of the child's adoption after 
termination. 
(b) The age and health of the child, both at the 
time of the disposition and, if applicable, at the 
time the child was removed from the home. 
(c) 
Whether 
the 
child 
has 
substantial 
relationships with the parent or other family members, 
and whether it would be harmful to the child to sever 
these relationships. 
(d) The wishes of the child. 
(e) The duration of the separation of the parent 
from the child. 
No. 01-1692 
16 
 
(f) Whether the child will be able to enter into 
a more stable and permanent family relationship as a 
result of the termination, taking into account the 
conditions of the child's current placement, the 
likelihood of future placements and the results of 
prior placements. 
Wis. Stat. § 48.426 (emphasis added). 
¶30 The 
court 
should 
explain 
the 
basis 
for 
its 
disposition, on the record, by alluding specifically to the 
factors in Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3) and any other factors that it 
relies upon in reaching its decision.  In every case the factors 
considered must be calibrated to the prevailing standard.  The 
"best 
interests 
of 
the 
child 
is 
the 
polestar 
of 
all 
determinations under ch. 48."  David S. v. Laura S., 179 Wis. 2d 
114, 149, 507 N.W.2d 94 (1993).  "The court shall decide what 
disposition 
is 
in 
the 
best 
interest 
of 
the 
child."  
Wis. Stat. § 48.424(3) (emphasis added). 
¶31 We think the statutory requirements are clear and 
unambiguous.  Nonetheless, in this case, the circuit court 
dismissed the petition without ever considering the best 
interests of the child. 
¶32 Julie asserts that the circuit court was correct, that 
it faithfully followed the standards established in B.L.J.  
Several passages in B.L.J. clearly imply that the circuit court 
is to consider standards other than the best interests of the 
child at the dispositional hearing.  The court of appeals 
heavily relied on these passages when it decided Kelly S.  As a 
result, we are bound to reexamine the B.L.J. decision. 
No. 01-1692 
17 
 
¶33 B.L.J. was decided in 1991.  It dealt with a parental 
termination that occurred five months after a significant change 
in 
the 
termination 
statute. 
 
Prior 
to 
May 
3, 
1988, 
Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4) read in part: "If grounds for the 
termination of parental rights are found the court shall proceed 
immediately to hear evidence and motions related to the 
dispositions enumerated in s. 48.427."  Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4) 
(1985-86).  In 1988, the legislature enacted 1987 Wis. Act 383, 
amending subsection (4) to read in part: "If grounds for the 
termination of parental rights are found by the court or jury, 
the court shall find the parent unfit.  A finding of unfitness 
shall not 
preclude 
a 
dismissal of 
a 
petition 
under s. 
48.427(2)."  Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4) (emphasis added). 
¶34 In B.L.J. the mother whose parental rights were 
terminated 
challenged 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
revised 
subsection (4).  In upholding the statute, the B.L.J. court 
rejected the mother's argument that the circuit court had to 
make its own independent finding of unfitness.  It observed 
that, "The legislature has determined that where those facts are 
established 
[that 
is, 
where 
the 
jury 
finds 
grounds 
for 
termination], it shows that a parent is unfit."  B.L.J., 163 
Wis. 2d at 110. 
¶35 The court took pains, however, to emphasize that 
significant discretion remained with the circuit court.  It 
pointed 
to 
the 
new 
sentence 
in 
subsection 
(4) 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.424: "A finding of unfitness shall not preclude 
a dismissal of a petition under sec. 48.427(2)," and it quoted 
No. 01-1692 
18 
 
§ 48.427(2): "The court may dismiss the petition if it finds 
that the evidence does not warrant the termination of parental 
rights."  Id. at 103.  The court then reasoned: 
This means that even though the jury finds the 
"facts" 
that 
would 
constitute 
"grounds" 
for 
termination, the court may still dismiss the petition 
if the court finds either that the evidence does not 
sustain any one of the jury's individual findings or 
that even though the findings may be supported by the 
evidence, 
the 
evidence 
of 
unfitness 
is 
not 
so 
egregious 
as 
to warrant 
termination of 
parental 
rights.  This conclusion follows from the wording of 
sec. 48.427 (2), Stats., that the evidence "does not 
warrant the termination of parental rights."  Thus, it 
seems clear that in spite of what the evidence may 
show, whether such evidence warrants termination, is a 
matter within the discretion of the court.  This is so 
because the word "warrant" implies an overview of the 
evidence, the findings, and also the implication of 
what is in the best interest of the child. 
Id. at 103-04 (emphasis added). 
¶36 The 
court's 
arresting 
phrase——"the 
evidence 
of 
unfitness is not so egregious as to warrant termination of 
parental rights"——is unfortunate because it implies degrees of 
"unfitness" that have legal significance.  In addition, it has 
been interpreted as requiring an intermediate step between fact-
finding by the jury and disposition by the court, in which the 
court must decide whether the parent's already established 
unfitness 
is 
"egregious" 
enough 
to 
warrant 
considering 
termination as a disposition.  This interpretation cannot be 
squared with the statutory language. 
¶37 Once a basis for termination has been found by the 
jury and confirmed with a finding of unfitness by the court, the 
No. 01-1692 
19 
 
court must move to the second-step, the dispositional hearing, 
in which the prevailing factor——the polestar——is the best 
interests of the child. 
¶38 The 
termination 
statute 
does 
not 
require 
the 
termination of parental rights, but it does require the court to 
consider the best interests of the child.  Hence, at a 
dispositional hearing, the court must explore the child's best 
interests and then determine whether maintaining the parent's 
rights serves the child's best interests.  A court should not 
dismiss a petition for termination at a dispositional hearing 
unless it can reconcile dismissal with the best interests of the 
child.  The best interests of the child standard "is to be 
defined in relation to the child."  Sallie T. v. Milwaukee 
County DHHS, 219 Wis. 2d 296, 311, 581 N.W.2d 182 (1998). 
¶39 B.L.J. contains additional problematic language.  The 
court quoted language from Lemmin v. Lorfeld, 107 Wis. 264, 266, 
83 N.W. 359 (1900), a turn-of-the-last-century termination case, 
to the effect that termination "is not merely better for the 
children, but essential to their safety or to their welfare, in 
some very serious and important respect."11  B.L.J., 163 
Wis. 2d at 113.  The B.L.J. court said it agreed with this 
"standard," to be applied in the exercise of discretion in 
terminating parental rights.  Id.  The court summed up as 
follows: 
                                                 
11 The court in Lemmin v. Lorfeld, 107 Wis. 264, 266, 83 
N.W. 359 (1900), actually quoted from an earlier decision, 
Markwell v. Pereles, 95 Wis. 406, 69 N.W. 798 (1897), which in 
turn was quoting from an English case. 
No. 01-1692 
20 
 
Even if the jury finds all of the grounds for 
termination of parental rights, and the judge thereby 
enters 
the 
statutory 
finding 
of 
unfitness, 
the 
evidence must still support the jury findings.  If 
not, the judge may dismiss the petition for lack of 
clear and convincing evidence.  If the evidence 
supports the jury's findings, the judge, pursuant to 
Lemmin, makes a determination of whether termination 
of contact between the parent and the child is 
essential to the child's safety or welfare, in a very 
serious and important respect.  If it does not then 
the judge may determine, pursuant to the statute, that 
termination is not warranted and may dismiss the 
petition.  The discretion that the statute vests in 
the court to dismiss the petition for termination if 
it finds termination is not warranted under the 
standards assures full, substantive due process. 
Id. at 115 (emphasis added). 
¶40 Given this language, it is not surprising that the 
court of appeals wrote in Kelly S. that: 
 
We 
conclude 
that 
B.L.J. 
sets 
forth 
a 
two-part 
sequential test in determining whether the parent's 
unfitness was to such an egregious degree that it 
warranted termination.  First, the trial court must 
answer whether the ability to function as a parent has 
been undermined.  Second, if so, then the trial court 
must determine whether further contact between child 
and parent will be detrimental to the child. 
Kelly S., 2001 WI App 193, ¶10. 
¶41 The additional standards and procedures set out in 
B.L.J. and Kelly S. are simply at war with the standards and 
procedures set out in Chapter 48 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  
This court's fidelity to outdated precedent in the face of a new 
statute and its exuberant effort to defend the new statutory 
scheme 
from 
constitutional 
attack, 
have 
together 
created 
doctrinal error that cannot stand.  We withdraw from B.L.J. any 
No. 01-1692 
21 
 
language, standards, or implied procedures not consistent with 
this opinion, and we overrule Kelly S. 
¶42 No inference should be drawn from this opinion that, 
at a dispositional hearing, dismissal is the exception and 
termination is the rule.  The best interests of the child will 
always drive the court's inquiry.  The facts of record should 
influence the result.  Ultimately, however, the wise and 
compassionate discretion of the court will determine whether 
termination will "promote the best interests of the child."  
Mrs. R. v. Mr. and Mrs. B., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 131, 306 N.W.2d 46 
(1981) (quoting In re Johnson, 9 Wis. 2d 65, 75, 100 N.W.2d 383 
(1960); Termination of Parental Rights of Kegal, 85 Wis. 2d 574, 
271 N.W.2d 114 (1978)). 
¶43 We now turn to this case.  A circuit court properly 
exercises its discretion when it employs a rational thought 
process based on an examination of the facts and an application 
of the correct standard of law.  David S., 179 Wis. 2d at 150.  
For understandable reasons, the circuit court in this case did 
not apply a correct standard of law at the dispositional 
hearing, and we must conclude that it erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  We therefore reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand this case to the circuit court for a new 
dispositional hearing consistent with this opinion.  The court 
should take into account the circumstances at the time of the 
new hearing, not those in existence at the time it dismissed the 
petition.  Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶39 n.6. 
CONCLUSION 
No. 01-1692 
22 
 
¶44 We conclude that the circuit court in this case 
applied incorrect legal standards in dismissing the petition for 
termination of parental 
rights, and 
therefore 
erroneously 
exercised its discretion.  We further conclude that the court of 
appeals applied the same incorrect standards in affirming the 
circuit court decision.  We therefore reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals, and remand the case to the circuit court 
so that it may conduct a new dispositional hearing focused on 
the best interests of the child, and enter a dispositional order 
consistent with that standard.  We also modify the legal 
standards set forth in B.L.J. and overrule Kelly S. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
 
 
 
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