Case Title: Glasrud v. City of Laramie

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Glasrud v. City of Laramie1997 WY 27934 P.2d 1242Case Number: 96-135Decided: 02/21/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

Matthew GLASRUD, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

CITY OF LARAMIE, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal from the District Court, Albany County, Arthur 
T. Hanscum, J.

 

R. Michael Vang, of 
Kirkwood, Nelson & Huber, Laramie, for 
appellant.

  Douglas 
K. Bryant of Corthell and King, P.C., Laramie, for 
appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

      GOLDEN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]            Matthew 
Glasrud's (Glasrud) prosecution and conviction in municipal court for driving 
under the influence followed the administrative suspension of Glasrud's driver's 
license, eliciting double jeopardy concerns. In response to Glasrud's appeal 
from his prosecution and conviction, the district court presents certified 
questions pursuant to Wyoming Rule of Appellate Procedure 11. We hold Wyoming's 
implied consent laws, providing for suspension of a driver's license for driving 
while under the influence, do not constitute "punishment" for purposes of double 
jeopardy.

 

ISSUE

 

[¶2]            Faced with an 
appeal from a case involving the suspension of a driver's license pursuant to 
Wyoming's implied consent laws and a criminal trial for driving while under the 
influence of alcohol, the District 
Court, Second Judicial District, Albany County, submitted the following 
certified questions, which we subsequently agreed to 
answer:

 

Does Wyoming's statutory scheme for an administrative 
suspension or revocation of a driver's license for driving while under the 
influence, (specifically, Wyo. Stat. §§ 31-7-125, 31-7-127, and 
31-7-128             [1994]),1 constitute punishment for purposes 
of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 11 of 
the Wyoming Constitution?

 

If so, may Wyoming reasonably convict and sentence a 
person for DWUI and also subject [that person] to an administrative license 
suspension involving the same conduct without violating the double jeopardy 
clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 
11 of the Wyoming Constitution?

 

FACTS

 

  [¶3]        The district court presented 
the following statement of facts to this Court in its Order Certifying 
Question[s] to Supreme Court:

 

There are no disputed facts which impede an answer to 
a question of law presented. There is no question that there were two separate 
proceedings; that both proceedings were instituted under authority granted by 
the State of Wyoming; and, that both proceedings were based upon the same 
proscribed behavior. The undisputed facts relevant to this question are as 
follows:

 

        
    Appellant, 
Matthew Glasrud was arrested for DWUI [driving while under the influence] on 
April 1, 1995. He agreed to chemical 
testing and was found to have a .16% BAC [blood alcohol content]. He appeared in 
municipal court on April 7, 1995 and pled not guilty.

 

Appellant requested a contested case hearing on his 
driver's license suspension under the implied consent statute. The hearing 
examiner upheld the suspension.

 

        
    At the 
subsequent trial in municipal court, Appellant moved to dismiss, claiming that 
the criminal proceeding violated 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. and Wyoming Constitutions. 
The municipal court denied the 
motion. On July 13, 1995, [the municipal court] found Appellant guilty 
of driving under the 
influence.

 

[¶4]            The municipal 
court subsequently sentenced Glasrud to thirty days in the Albany County Jail, 
then suspended the thirty days with conditions, including no alcohol or alcohol 
related offenses for twenty-four months and ordered him to pay a fine and court 
costs totaling $460. Glasrud's appeal to the district court resulted in the certified questions 
above.

 

                           STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶5]            Glasrud 
challenges the constitutionality of the municipal and state statutory schemes 
which provide for criminal prosecution of drunk drivers and administrative 
license suspensions or revocations for drunk driving as violative of the 
prohibition against double jeopardy. "[E]very law must be presumed to be 
constitutional, with all doubt resolved in its favor." Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Luplow v. State, 897 P.2d 463, 466 (Wyo. 
1995)).  "[O]ne who would deny the 
constitutionality of a statute has a heavy burden. The alleged 
unconstitutionality must be clearly and exactly shown beyond any reasonable 
doubt." Nickelson v. State, 607 P.2d 904, 910 (Wyo. 1980). 

 

                               
DISCUSSION

 

 [¶6]          The Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "[N]or 
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of 
life or limb." United States v. Ursery, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2139, 
135 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1996). The Fifth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Wyoming Constitution provides the same protection, stating: 
"nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Cook v. 
State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Wyo. 1992) (citing WYO. CONST. Art. 1, § 11; Vigil 
v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1350 (Wyo. 1977); Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 68 
(Wyo. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1983)). 
The Double Jeopardy Clause "protects against a second prosecution for the same 
offense after acquittal, against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same offense." Cook, 841 P.2d  at 1347 (citations omitted).

 

  [¶7]        "The law of double jeopardy 
is `confused, inconsistent, and less than a model of clarity.'" Cook, 841 P.2d  
at 1347 (citations omitted). The law became even less clear in the wake of three 
United States Supreme Court opinions: United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 104 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1989); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 125 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1993); and Dept. of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 
511 U.S. 767, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 128 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1994). In light of these 
opinions, defendants began arguing that the Supreme Court had expanded double 
jeopardy protection. Lower court judges 
in at least twenty-one states accepted the double jeopardy argument in drunk 
driving/administrative license suspension cases. Jennifer E. Dayok, Comment, 
Administrative Driver's License 
Suspension: A Remedial Tool That Is Not In Jeopardy, 45 AM. U.L.REV. 1151, 1157 
(1996). However, the Court attempted to set the record straight in its most 
recent double jeopardy opinion, United States v. Ursery, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1996).

 

[¶8]            Announcing that 
"Halper dealt with in personam civil penalties under the Double Jeopardy Clause; 
Kurth Ranch with a tax proceeding under the Double Jeopardy Clause; and Austin 
with civil forfeitures under the Excessive Fines Clause," the Court 
distinguished each of those cases from in rem civil forfeitures for purpose of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Ursery, ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S. Ct.  at 2147. The 
Court denied any jurisprudential shift 
in Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch and limited the use of those cases to their 
facts. Id. As such, because this case involves the suspension or revocation of a 
driver's license and does not involve the excessive civil fines of Halper, the 
tax of Kurth Ranch, or a challenge under the Excessive Fines Clause like Austin, 
those cases are of little import to our analysis and we turn to Wyoming case law 
to analyze the certified questions 
presented.

 

 [¶9]          In Nickelson v. State, 
607 P.2d 904, 909 (Wyo. 1980), we adopted a five criteria test to determine 
whether a penalty imposed by the State is "civil" or "criminal." Although 
Nickelson involved the right to remain silent in a proceeding in which the 
appellants contended the penalty was criminal in nature, the analytical 
framework is appropriate in this case, where we must determine whether an 
administrative license suspension 
penalty is civil/remedial, or criminal/punishment.

 

      Nickelson's five 
criteria are:

 

            (1) Type of 
offense. Is the offense one which is traditionally or by its very nature 
criminal? If not, it may be 
considered to be civil.

    

            (2) Penalty. What 
is the penalty and how severe is it? This has been isolated as the most 
significant factor, but it is by no 
means conclusive.  Imprisonment may 
not be used as punishment for a civil offense. The imposition of a fine or penalty 
may be entirely consistent with an offense being civil in nature. On the other hand, a fine or penalty 
may become so severe in the context of the circumstances in which it is imposed that the offense 
becomes criminal in nature and the constitutional protections associated with criminal prosecutions are 
necessarily called into play. An arbitrary dollar figure cannot be rigidly set as the touchstone.  Rather, the amount of the fine must be 
weighed in view of all the 
circumstances relevant to the offense in question.

 

      (3) Collateral 
Consequences. What other consequences are in the offing for the defendant in 
addition to the fine? Are there 
such collateral consequences and are they regulatory in nature or do they 
impose additional 
punishment?

 

      (4) Punitive Significance. 
This is perhaps the most difficult factor to weigh and the element 
of subjectivity must be 
scrupulously avoided. We must inquire whether the offense is one 
primarily motivated by punitive 
intent. Is the statute plainly one that inflicts "punishment"? Does the 
judgment have stigmatizing or 
condemnatory significance?

 

      (5) Arrest and 
Detention. Are the pretrial practices familiar to the criminal law utilized? If 
they are, that may serve to tip the 
balance in favor of a determination that the offense is 
criminal.

 

    Nickelson, 607 P.2d  at 
909.

 

 [¶10]       Glasrud contends WYO. 
STAT. § 31-6-102, the administrative license suspension statute, constitutes 
punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. WYO. STAT. § 31-6-102 provides that 
a person arrested for a violation of 
WYO. STAT. § 31-5-233, the drunk driving criminal statute, is deemed to have 
given consent to a chemical test or tests of his blood, breath or urine to 
determine blood-alcohol concentration. WYO. STAT. § 31-6-102 (Cum.Supp. 1996). 
If a person submits to chemical testing and the test result indicates a blood alcohol concentration of 
0.10% or more, the department suspends the person's driver's license or 
privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this state for ninety days. WYO. STAT. § 
31-6-102(e) (Cum.Supp. 1996).

 

 [¶11]       Applying the five 
factors from Nickelson to this statute, we find:

 

 [¶12]       (1) The offense is 
civil in nature. The purpose of the implied consent statute is to facilitate the 
removal of drunk drivers from our highways. Van Order v. State, 600 P.2d 1056, 
1058 (Wyo. 1979) (citing State v. Chastain, 594 P.2d 458, 461 (Wyo. 1979), 
overruled on other grounds, Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 1985)). This indicates the remedial purpose of 
the statute.

 

 [¶13]       (2) The penalty for a 
violation consists of suspension of the driver's license for six months for the 
first offense and eighteen months for the second or subsequent offense if the 
driver fails to submit to the tests; or if he submits to the tests and the 
results indicate a blood alcohol concentration of ten one-hundredths of one 
percent (0.10%) or more, the department suspends the license for ninety days, 
subject to the issuance of a temporary 
license, which is valid for thirty days. WYO. STAT. 31-6-102(a)(ii), (e), (f) 
(Cum.Supp. 1996). Further, if a criminal conviction results from the same 
incident, the suspension under the criminal conviction is reduced by ninety 
days. WYO. STAT. § 31-6-102(e) (Cum.Supp. 1996). We cannot say, based on all of 
the circumstances, that this penalty is so severe as to constitute 
punishment.

 

 [¶14]       (3) We see no 
collateral consequences to this statute. It is designed to work hand in hand 
with the DWUI statute. Chastain, 594 P.2d  at 461. It does not provide for an 
additional penalty, because if a criminal conviction results from the same 
conduct, any criminal suspension is reduced by ninety days. WYO. STAT. § 31-6-102(e) (Cum.Supp. 1996).

 

[¶15]         (4) Violation of 
the statute results in the suspension of a driver's license, removing drivers 
who drink and drive from our roadways for ninety days. The penalty does not 
carry a moral stigma or condemnatory significance with it. It is not primarily 
motivated by punitive intent, rather, it is "intended to impose a condition on 
the right to operate a motor vehicle on the streets and highways of this state." 
Chastain, 594 P.2d  at 461. A driver's license is defined as a license or 
privilege "which grants the privilege to drive or operate a motor vehicle on the 
public highways, streets and roads of this state." WYO. STAT. § 31-7-102(a)(xxv) 
(1994).  Revocation of a privilege 
is not ordinarily considered punishment. State v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d 49, 52 
(N.D. 1995) (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S. Ct. 630, 633, 
82 L. Ed. 917, 922 (1938)).

 

[¶16]         (5) The 
proceedings are civil in nature. Driver's license suspensions are civil 
proceedings, separate and distinct from DWUI prosecutions. McGuire v. Wyo. Dept. 
of Revenue and Taxation, 809 P.2d 271, 274 (Wyo. 1991). In holding that probable 
cause must only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence in a license revocation hearing, we cited 2 
DONALD H. NICOLS, DRINKING/DRIVING LITIGATION: CRIMINAL AND CIVIL § 20.01, at 3 
(1994), stating:

 

            An implied 
consent violation is purely administrative and separate from any traffic or 
criminal drinking/driving 
infraction even though the implied consent law and the law defining 
drinking/driving offenses may be 
contained in the same statute.

 

Wyo. Dept. of Revenue and 
Taxation v. Hull, 751 P.2d 351, 356 (Wyo. 1988).

 

  [¶17] 
    Therefore, we 
hold that the penalties provided in WYO. STAT. § 31-6-102 do not constitute 
punishment for purposes of double jeopardy.2 Having answered the first certified 
question in the negative, we need not 
answer the second certified question in this case. Because the administrative 
license suspension does not constitute punishment, Wyoming and its 
municipalities may convict and sentence 
a person for DWUI and subject the driver to an administrative license 
suspension.

 

CONCLUSION

 

 [¶18]       Wyoming's implied 
consent law and its administrative license suspension procedures are intended to 
facilitate the tests for intoxication and remove drunk drivers from our 
highways. As such, they properly impose a condition on the right to operate a 
motor vehicle on the streets and highways of our state and do not constitute punishment for purposes of double 
jeopardy.

           

FOOTNOTES

1 We note 
for the record that, although the district court couched the certified questions 
in light of WYO. STAT. §§ 31-7-125, 
-127, and -128, those statutes provide the administrative agency with authority 
to revoke or suspend a driver's 
license as part of the criminal penalty for conviction under WYO. STAT. § 
31-5-233. The real question at issue here is whether 
WYO. STAT. § 31-6-102, the implied consent statute, and the suspension provided 
under that statute constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 
Glasrud's license was suspended pursuant to the implied consent statute first, 
then he was convicted of DWUI for violation of Laramie Municipal Ordinance § 
10.24.010. Glasrud complains that WYO. STAT. § 31-6-102, not §§ 31-7-125, -127, 
and -128, constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Therefore, we 
have limited our discussion to the administrative license suspension 
statutory scheme found in § 31-6-102.
 

2 We note 
that our holding, that the administrative license suspension does not constitute 
punishment, is in accord with the vast majority of courts which have 
ruled on the issue. See Deutschendorf v. People, 920 P.2d 53, 61 n. 4 (Colo. 
1996).