Case Title: Robinson v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 060417

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
ELISA K. ROBINSON 
 
v.  Record No. 060417 
           
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
January 12, 2007 
GEORGE F. ROBINSON 
 
v.  Record No. 060426 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In these consolidated appeals, we consider whether a 
warrantless search and seizure within the curtilage of a 
private residence violated the Fourth Amendment either because 
the investigating officer (1) did not act within the scope of 
the implied consent for uninvited individuals, including law 
enforcement, to enter the curtilage of the residence in order 
to contact the occupants, or (2) did not have probable cause 
and exigent circumstances under the facts presented. 
FACTS 
Our recitation of the facts is based both on a Joint 
Stipulation (Stipulation) executed by the attorney for the 
Commonwealth, Elisa K. Robinson (Elisa) and George F. Robinson 
(George), and on the testimony of Corporal Scott Cox of the 
Albemarle County Police Department (Officer Cox).  On 
appellate review, we are bound by the familiar principle that 
  
2
"we must consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
fairly deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the prevailing party below."  Rose v. 
Commonwealth, 270 Va. 3, 6, 613 S.E.2d 454, 455 (2005). 
According to the Stipulation, on August 16, 2002, Elisa 
and George hosted a party for Elisa's son Ryan to celebrate 
his sixteenth birthday.  Elisa purchased food and beverages 
for the party in the amount of $1,013.97, including $350.48 
for alcoholic beverages.  She also purchased "five [large] 
trashcans for the purpose of icing down" the beverages. 
Prior to the party, George and Elisa spoke with the 
parents of some of the invited juveniles.  Elisa told these 
parents that she intended to collect the juveniles' car keys 
and that she would "move [her] sports utility vehicle across 
the driveway once all the guests had arrived to prevent the 
juveniles from leaving" the party.  Elisa did not tell any of 
the parents she intended to serve alcoholic beverages.  
Further, during the party, one juvenile overheard George 
stating to someone on the telephone "that there was no alcohol 
at the party." 
Approximately thirty juveniles attended the party.  The 
trash cans containing the alcoholic beverages were placed in 
the backyard behind the fence "so that they would not be 
visible to any parent who brought their children to the 
  
3
party."  Elisa and George neither encouraged the juveniles to 
consume alcoholic beverages nor discouraged them from doing 
so.  George, however, instructed several of the juveniles not 
to drink near the pool "because he did not want [any] broken 
glass in [the] pool." 
 
Officer Cox testified that on the night of the party, the 
Albemarle County Police Department received three telephone 
calls reporting the possibility of juveniles consuming 
alcoholic beverages at a party at the Robinsons' home.  In 
response to these calls, Officer Cox drove to the Robinson 
home at around 11:00 p.m. in a marked police vehicle.  
As Officer Cox approached the property, he observed 
approximately 10 to 20 vehicles parked along the adjacent 
public road.  He also saw "two or three" vehicles parked on 
the left side of the driveway.  Based on these observations, 
Officer Cox contacted other Albemarle County police officers 
waiting in the vicinity and instructed them to "start heading 
this way" because it "appears that there's a party." 
When Officer Cox turned his vehicle into the driveway, he 
could see the house, the front door and porch, and the front 
yard, but he could not see the end of the driveway, the garage 
area, or the backyard.  As Cox proceeded up the driveway, he 
observed several additional vehicles parked near the right 
side of the driveway.  He was also able to see, in front of 
  
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the house, a "small circular portion of the driveway" that 
encircled a stand of trees.  Instead of parking in the 
circular portion of the driveway, Officer Cox drove his 
vehicle along the main portion of the driveway, which 
continued past the trees and led to the garage area on the 
right side of the house.  A path leading to the front door 
intersected the driveway beyond the stand of trees but a few 
feet before the garage area.  A large bush was located 
adjacent to the driveway immediately in front of this path. 
Before Officer Cox reached the point where the path 
intersected the driveway, he saw two individuals holding clear 
beer bottles.  Both were standing approximately seven to ten 
yards "into the back yard" and appeared to be younger than 21 
years of age.  When the individuals saw Officer Cox's vehicle 
they yelled "cops," dropped their beer bottles, and ran along 
a fence line toward the woods behind the house. 
Officer Cox then pulled his vehicle into the garage area 
and parked on the concrete pad.  From there, Officer Cox saw a 
patio table covered with beer bottles as well as "[b]eer 
bottles spread throughout the [back]yard."  Officer Cox 
stepped out of his vehicle, "yelled for [people] to stop 
[running]," and "got on the radio, and . . . told everybody 
that was arriving on the scene that the kids were running 
  
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east, past the house, into the woods."  He then went into the 
backyard to locate "the juvenile hosting the party." 
Officer Cox testified that he wanted to locate the host 
to "find out what was going on [and] find out who the people 
were that were running away."  He was "worried for their 
safety" and "wanted to find out who they were, so [the police] 
could contact parents."  In the backyard, Officer Cox spoke 
with one of the juveniles and, "based on that conversation," 
approached the back of the house.  Through the sliding glass 
door at the back of the house, Officer Cox saw George and 
Elisa sitting at a kitchen table. 
According to the Stipulation, when the other police 
officers arrived at the Robinsons' home, they found four trash 
cans in the backyard filled with alcoholic beverages, empty 
alcoholic beverage bottles in the yard, and half-empty bottles 
on the table and on the rear deck.  Despite the Robinsons' 
professed intentions to collect the car keys of all the party 
guests and have them remain overnight, the Robinsons had only 
collected five or six sets of keys.  They also had not blocked 
the driveway in order to prevent guests from leaving.  While 
the police were conducting their investigation on the 
premises, Elisa told several of the juveniles to "swallow 
vinegar in order to fool the Alcosensor."  Elisa also 
instructed one girl to "tell her parents that a boy had 
  
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spilled alcohol on her" to explain why she "tested positive" 
on the Alcosensor.  Nine of the juveniles at the Robinsons' 
residence had "measurable levels" of alcohol in their systems 
when the police arrived. 
The Robinsons were arrested and each was charged with 16 
counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor under 
Code § 18.2-371.  Both Elisa and George filed motions to 
suppress the evidence obtained from Officer Cox's entry onto 
their property, arguing that Officer Cox's conduct violated 
the Fourth Amendment because he was not in a place that he was 
legally entitled to be when he witnessed the illegal activity. 
In a letter opinion, the trial court denied the 
Robinsons' motions to suppress, finding as matters of fact 
that Officer Cox "planned to enter the property to investigate 
the allegations of underage consumption of alcohol," and that 
he saw the juveniles with beer "[b]efore he reached the point 
where the front walkway to the front door intersected with the 
driveway."  After finding that the driveway was not part of 
the curtilage of the Robinsons' home, and therefore did not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment, the trial court determined 
that Officer Cox's presence on the driveway was lawful because 
he had the right to approach a home and knock on the front 
door to speak to an occupant.  The trial court also found that 
Officer Cox's warrantless entry into the backyard was 
  
7
permissible because he "had the requisite probable cause, 
which requires that an officer's knowledge of the facts and 
circumstances are sufficient to justify a reasonable person to 
think an offense is being committed."  The trial court denied 
the Robinsons' joint motion for reconsideration. 
The trial court later granted the Commonwealth's motion 
to terminate by nolle prosequi seven of the charges against 
each of the Robinsons.  Although the Robinsons stipulated that 
the evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions on the nine 
remaining charges against each of them, they pleaded not 
guilty to the charges, thereby preserving their position that 
the evidence was illegally obtained and should have been 
suppressed.  The trial court found both the Robinsons guilty 
and sentenced each of them to consecutive terms of six months' 
imprisonment, with three months suspended, on each charge. 
The Robinsons appealed their convictions to the Court of 
Appeals, which consolidated the appeals and affirmed the 
convictions in a decision by a three-judge panel.  Robinson v. 
Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 592, 622, 612 S.E.2d 751, 765 
(2005).  The Robinsons later sought and were granted a 
rehearing en banc.  Robinson v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 23, 
24, 614 S.E.2d 667, 667 (2005). 
Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals held that the 
Robinsons had impliedly consented to have the public, 
  
8
including police officers, "enter the driveway and front 
sidewalk" of their property, and that Officer Cox did not 
exceed the scope of this consent either at the point he 
observed the juveniles holding beer bottles or when he drove 
his car onto the cement pad by the garage.1  Robinson v. 
Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 533, 549-53, 557, 625 S.E.2d 651, 
658-59 (2006).  The Court of Appeals further held that Officer 
Cox's subjective intent was "irrelevant under the 
circumstances of this case."  Id. at 555, 625 S.E.2d at 661. 
The Court of Appeals rejected an argument made by George 
that when Officer Cox saw the juveniles with beer bottles, he 
should have "left the property or otherwise secured the 
premises and then obtained a search warrant."  Id. at 543, 625 
S.E.2d at 656.  The Court of Appeals concluded that there were 
exigent circumstances, including possible destruction of 
evidence and fleeing suspects, and that Officer Cox did not 
manufacture these circumstances, because "the development of 
probable cause and the creation of the exigencies were 
virtually contemporaneous."  Id. at 561-62, 625 S.E.2d at 665.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Robinsons' convictions.  Id. 
at 562, 625 S.E.2d at 665. 
                     
1 Upon rehearing en banc, the Commonwealth conceded that 
the driveway was within the curtilage of the Robinsons' home 
and this question was, therefore, not before the entire Court 
of Appeals.  Robinson, 47 Va. App. at 542, 625 S.E.2d at 655. 
  
9
The Robinsons filed separate petitions for appeal.  We 
awarded both appeals and consolidated the cases for our 
consideration. 
DISCUSSION 
 
We begin by reviewing principles established by the 
United States Supreme Court regarding the Fourth Amendment 
protection afforded residents and occupants of a dwelling 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  The "Fourth 
Amendment protects the curtilage of a house and . . . the 
extent of the curtilage is determined by factors that bear 
upon whether an individual reasonably may expect that the area 
in question should be treated as the home itself."  United 
States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987).  When government 
agents conduct a search or seizure within protected areas of a 
dwelling without a warrant such actions are presumptively 
unreasonable, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87 (1980), 
and unlawful unless they are supported by both probable cause 
and exigent circumstances.  Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 
638 (2002). 
 
The Supreme Court has not addressed what expectation of 
privacy a resident of a dwelling has in those areas of the 
curtilage, such as driveways and sidewalks, that are generally 
used by the public to contact the resident.  However, a number 
of federal and state courts have held that a resident of a 
  
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dwelling impliedly consents to a police officer entering the 
curtilage to contact the dwelling's residents.  This implied 
consent has the effect of deeming such an entry into the 
curtilage a reasonable intrusion into an area otherwise 
protected by an expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment.  See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 
1204 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Taylor, 90 F.3d 903, 
909 (4th Cir. 1996); Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303 
(9th Cir. 1964); State v. Christensen, 953 P.2d 583, 587 
(Idaho 1998); City of Eugene v. Silva, 108 P.3d 23, 27 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2005).  Implied consent can be negated by obvious 
indicia of restricted access, such as posted "no trespassing" 
signs, gates, or other means that deny access to uninvited 
persons.  See, e.g., Christensen, 953 P.2d at 587-88.   
We now turn to the specific issues raised by the 
Robinsons in their appeals. 
IMPLIED CONSENT 
The Robinsons argue that the Court of Appeals erred in 
holding that Officer Cox did not exceed the scope of implied 
consent to enter the curtilage of their home.  The Robinsons 
do not challenge the doctrine of implied consent but, instead, 
challenge the standards for its application articulated by the 
Court of Appeals. 
  
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Elisa maintains that a police officer's subjective intent 
at the moment of entry onto the curtilage of a dwelling is 
relevant in determining whether the officer acted within the 
scope of the officer's implied consent.  Elisa contends that 
"[o]ne impliedly consents only to the approach to the front 
door to knock and make inquiry."  Thus, she asserts, an 
officer has implied consent "to go to the entrance of the home 
only by the most direct route and only if he is acting in good 
faith to contact the owners of the property for a purpose such 
as asking questions of the occupants." 
 
George concedes that Officer Cox had implied consent to 
enter the driveway.  George argues, however, that once Officer 
Cox was on the property and "actively searching for evidence 
of a crime within a constitutionally protected area," Cox's 
"legitimate reason" for entering the property, to contact the 
Robinsons, was "revoked," thereby rendering Cox's presence 
unlawful.  George further argues that implied consent could 
not extend beyond the point where the path to the front door 
intersected the driveway absent the development of "a new 
legitimate reason." 
Both Elisa and George urge us to adopt a bright line rule 
that the scope of implied consent is limited to the most 
direct path to the front door of a dwelling to "knock and 
talk" with one of its residents.  Elisa asserts that Officer 
  
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Cox's failure to comply with this rule rendered his initial 
entry onto the curtilage unconstitutional.  George argues that 
Officer Cox's actions became illegal when, after lawfully 
entering the property, he failed to proceed directly to the 
front door. 
In resolving these issues, we first consider whether an 
officer's subjective intent is relevant to a determination of 
whether the officer's entry onto the curtilage of a dwelling 
was constitutional under the implied consent doctrine.  
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor this Court has 
addressed this question.  We observe, however, that 
established jurisprudence concerning the constitutionality of 
police searches provides little, if any, support for 
application of a subjective standard in determining the 
constitutionality of an entry conducted pursuant to the 
doctrine of implied consent. 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected 
any consideration of the subjective motivation of a law 
enforcement officer in determining whether police searches 
were constitutionally infirm and, instead, has relied on an 
objective view of the facts and circumstances of each 
particular case.  See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 
769, 771-72 (2001) (reversing granting of motion to suppress 
based on officer's alleged "improper subjective motivation"); 
  
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United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3 
(1983) (rejecting argument that search was unlawful because 
officers' intent in boarding vessel was other than that 
contemplated by statute which authorized officers to board to 
examine vessel's documentation); Scott v. United States, 436 
U.S. 128, 138 (1978) ("[T]he fact that the officer does not 
have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons 
which provide the legal justification for the officer's action 
does not invalidate the action taken as long as the 
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action").2 
The Supreme Court recently reiterated this position in a 
case decided four months after the Court of Appeals issued its 
opinion in the present case.  In Brigham City v. Stuart, ___ 
U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1943 (2006), the Court was asked to 
consider the constitutionality of a search conducted after 
police officers went to a private residence in response to a 
report of a loud party.  When the officers arrived at the 
residence, they heard shouting coming from inside the house, 
                     
2 The exception to this rule involves searches "undertaken 
pursuant to a general scheme without individualized 
suspicion," in which the Court has examined the "programmatic 
purposes" of the action.  See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45-46 (2000).  In the present case, Elisa 
argues that the police action at her home constituted a 
"programmatic" search, thereby making Officer Cox's subjective 
intent relevant.  Because Elisa did not raise this argument to 
trial court or the Court of Appeals, we do not address it 
here.  Rule 5:25. 
  
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proceeded down the driveway to investigate, and entered the 
backyard after observing juveniles drinking alcoholic 
beverages there.  Once in the backyard, the officers observed, 
through a screen door and a window, an altercation occurring 
inside the house.  Acting without a warrant, the officers 
entered the residence in an attempt to halt the altercation.  
The officers later arrested the individuals inside the house 
for various offenses, including disorderly conduct and 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor.  ___ U.S. at ___, 
126 S.Ct. at 1946. 
 
The defendants moved to suppress all evidence obtained 
after the officers entered the home, arguing that the 
officers' warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment.  
The defendants asserted that the "emergency aid" exception to 
the warrant requirement was inapplicable because the officers 
did not intend to assist injured individuals in the home, and 
"were more interested in making arrests than quelling 
violence."  ___ U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 1948. 
 
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this argument, 
stating that, "[a]n action is 'reasonable' under the Fourth 
Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of 
mind, 'as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, 
justify [the] action.' . . .  The officer's subjective 
motivation is irrelevant."  ___ U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 1948 
  
15
(quoting Scott, 436 U.S. at 138).  Focusing solely on the 
objective facts presented, the Court concluded: 
It therefore does not matter here – even if their 
subjective motives could be so neatly unraveled – 
whether the officers entered the kitchen to arrest 
respondents and gather evidence against them or to 
assist the injured and prevent further violence. 
 
Stuart, ___ U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 1948. 
Although the holding in Stuart was based on the 
"emergency aid" exception to the warrant requirement, the 
Court's rejection of a subjective intent analysis did not rely 
exclusively on cases applying that particular exception.  The 
Court also relied on cases involving an officer's physical 
examination of a bus passenger's "carry-on luggage," Bond v. 
United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 n.2 (2000), a traffic "stop" 
and resulting seizure of drugs, Whren v. United States, 517 
U.S. 806, 813 (1996), claims of excessive force, Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989), and government wiretapping 
and telephone surveillance, Scott, 436 U.S. at 138.  See 
Stuart, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. at 1948.  And, as indicated 
above, in several other cases the Court likewise has rejected 
consideration of an officer's subjective intent.  Thus, we do 
not read the holding in Stuart as limited to application of 
the emergency aid exception. 
We conclude that the holdings in the above cases, when 
considered collectively, counsel against consideration of a 
  
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police officer's subjective intent in determining the legality 
of the officer's actions.  Because a contrary interpretation 
of these holdings would directly conflict with the Supreme 
Court's recent guidance in Stuart, we hold that the Court of 
Appeals did not err in concluding that Officer Cox's 
subjective intent was irrelevant to a determination of whether 
he exceeded the scope of the implied consent in conducting the 
challenged search and seizures. 
Our conclusion is not changed by other cases cited by the 
Robinsons involving the implied consent doctrine:  Rogers v. 
Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 2001); Alvarez v. Montgomery 
Cty., 147 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Taylor, 
90 F.3d 903 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bradshaw, 490 
F.2d 1097 (4th Cir. 1974); and Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 
F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2003).  Although these cases state that an 
officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment by entering onto 
private property for the limited purpose of contacting, 
interviewing, or speaking with an occupant of the property, 
the cases do not address the converse proposition advanced by 
the Robinsons:  that if an officer subjectively intends to do 
something other than make these kinds of contacts, the 
officer's entry onto private property constitutes a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.  The subjective intent of the 
officers when entering the premises was not at issue in any of 
  
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these cases.  Moreover, the conclusion urged by the Robinsons 
would conflict with the several decisions of the Supreme Court 
that we have already noted. 
 
We also observe that in the present case, the trial court 
concluded that the officer's purpose in entering the 
Robinsons' property was to investigate a report of juveniles 
consuming alcoholic beverages.  Because the Robinsons did not 
assign error to this factual finding, we accept the trial 
court's conclusion that Officer Cox's purpose was 
investigatory in nature.  An investigation may include, as 
George's counsel agreed at the suppression hearing, contacting 
the occupants of a residence and asking them questions.  In 
this case, before Officer Cox could contact the Robinsons, 
intervening circumstances caused him to pursue a different 
course of action. 
 
Accordingly, we reject the Robinsons' suggestion that we 
adopt a bright line rule holding that the implied consent 
given by a resident of a dwelling is limited in all cases to 
entry onto the premises to "knock and talk" to the resident, 
and that any deviation from this purpose precludes application 
of the implied consent doctrine.  As the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated in Alverez when 
rejecting the same bright line rule advocated by the 
defendants in that case: 
  
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The textual "touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness."  When applying this basic 
principle, the Supreme Court has "consistently 
eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the 
fact-specific nature of the reasonableness 
inquiry." 
 
147 F.3d at 358 (citations omitted). 
 
PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
We next address an argument made by both Elisa and George 
that when Officer Cox reached the path leading from the 
driveway to the front door, he lacked probable cause and there 
were no exigent circumstances to justify a search of the 
backyard or the seizure of any evidence or person in that 
location without a warrant.  According to the Robinsons, 
evidence thus obtained by Officer Cox after entering the 
backyard or garage area was the result of an unconstitutional 
search and should have been suppressed.3 
On review, we will not disturb the factual findings of 
the trial court unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the 
evidence.  Mercer v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 235, 243, 523 
                     
3 Elisa assigns error to the Court of Appeals' finding 
that the plain view doctrine justified Cox's actions.  George 
assigns error to the trial court's holding on the "'plain view 
doctrine,' as interpreted by the trial court."  Our review of 
the trial court's letter opinion, however, indicates that 
although the trial court characterized its analysis as a 
"plain view" inquiry, the court focused on the existence of 
probable cause and exigent circumstances.  Accordingly, while 
we address the existence of probable cause and exigent 
circumstances, we do not consider application of the plain 
view doctrine. 
  
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S.E.2d 213, 217 (2000).  The issue of whether an officer acted 
with probable cause and under exigent circumstances, however, 
is a mixed question of fact and law that we review de novo.  
See Brown v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 414, 419, 620 S.E.2d 760, 
762 (2005). 
We conclude that the record supports the trial court's 
factual finding that Officer Cox had not passed the path 
leading to the front door when he saw juveniles in the 
backyard holding beer bottles.  We also hold that Officer Cox 
acted with probable cause and under exigent circumstances when 
he proceeded past the path and into the garage area and 
backyard without a warrant. 
1.  Probable Cause 
At the hearing on the Robinsons' motions to suppress, the 
Commonwealth presented as exhibits photographs showing the 
Robinsons' property from various vantage points along the 
driveway.  On direct examination, Officer Cox identified on 
one of the exhibits a bush located immediately before the path 
leading to the front door.  He testified that when he was 
"about at th[at] point" and still in his vehicle, he saw what 
appeared to be juveniles holding beer bottles in the vicinity 
of a pine tree in the backyard.  On cross examination, Officer 
Cox testified that although he was able to see people standing 
by the pine tree before he reached the path to the front door, 
  
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he was unable to determine that they were juveniles holding 
beer bottles until he actually reached the path.  In response 
to questions posed by the trial court, Officer Cox testified 
that he was "at the bush" when he saw the two juveniles 
holding beer bottles. 
Because there is evidence in the record to support the 
trial court's finding that Officer Cox had not passed the path 
when he saw the juveniles holding beer bottles, we cannot say 
the trial court's factual conclusion was plainly wrong.  
Taking the finding as true, we therefore conclude that Officer 
Cox had probable cause to enter the backyard, after having 
observed a crime in progress, before he reached the path to 
the front door.  See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816, 820, 
284 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1981)("[P]robable cause exists when the 
facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of 
which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are 
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to 
believe that an offense has been or is being committed."). 
In order to proceed further without obtaining a warrant, 
however, exigent circumstances were also required.  Horton v. 
California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 n.7 (1990)("[N]o amount of 
probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure 
absent 'exigent circumstances.' ")(quoting Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971)); see also, Payton, 445 
  
21
U.S. at 587-88 ("[A]bsent exigent circumstances, a warrantless 
entry to search for weapons or contraband is 
unconstitutional.").  Therefore, we consider the arguments 
advanced by the Robinsons that exigent circumstances were not 
present when Officer Cox entered the backyard. 
2.  Exigent Circumstances 
On brief, both George and Elisa argue that Officer Cox 
entered the backyard unlawfully because, even if he had 
probable cause, there were no exigent circumstances.  George 
and Elisa further contend that, even if exigent circumstances 
did exist, such circumstances were manufactured by Officer Cox 
and thus did not justify his entry into the backyard.4  George 
claims that at the moment when Officer Cox passed the path to 
the front door and entered the garage area, he could not have 
reasonably concluded that exigent circumstances were present 
because the suspects had not yet seen him approaching.  George 
asserts Officer Cox entered the garage area for the express 
purpose of causing a panicked reaction among the juveniles, a 
                     
4 Although Elisa presents this argument to this Court, the 
Court of Appeals' en banc opinion notes that during oral 
argument she conceded that "if Officer Cox was legitimately 
present on the driveway, his subsequent entry into the 
backyard would be permissible because the officer had both 
probable cause and exigent circumstances."  Robinson, 47 Va. 
App. at 556 n.10, 625 S.E.2d at 662 n.10.  However, because 
George also claims that Officer Cox manufactured the exigency 
in this case, we must consider this issue on appeal regardless 
of any concession by Elisa.  
  
22
reaction Officer Cox himself described as "the effect when you 
flick on a light in a dark kitchen, and the cockroaches 
scatter."  George states this provocative conduct caused the 
juveniles to panic and run and thereby created the exigent 
circumstances Officer Cox used to justify his warrantless 
entry. 
A determination of whether exigent circumstances justify 
a warrantless entry is not based on an analysis of the 
circumstances considered in hindsight, but is focused on 
review of the "circumstances as they reasonably appeared to 
trained law enforcement officers to exist when the decision to 
enter was made."  Verez v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 405, 411, 337 
S.E.2d 749, 753 (1985) (quoting Keeter v. Commonwealth, 222 
Va. 134, 141, 278 S.E.2d 841, 846 (1981)).  The test for 
whether exigent circumstances were present is "fact-specific," 
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990), and we have not 
previously attempted to delineate a "final and comprehensive 
list of all exigent circumstances which might justify a 
warrantless entry."  Verez, 230 Va. at 410, 337 S.E.2d at 753.  
We have, however, recognized that the following factors have 
been considered relevant by other courts: 
(1) the degree of urgency involved and the time 
required to get a warrant; (2) the officers' 
reasonable belief that contraband is about to be 
removed or destroyed; (3) the possibility of danger 
to others, including police officers left to guard 
  
23
the site; (4) information that the possessors of the 
contraband are aware that the police may be on their 
trail; (5) whether the offense is serious, or 
involves violence; (6) whether officers 
reasonably believe the suspects are armed; (7) 
whether there is, at the time of entry, a clear 
showing of probable cause; (8) whether the officers 
have strong reason to believe the suspects are 
actually present in the premises; (9) the likelihood 
of escape if the suspects are not swiftly 
apprehended; and (10) the suspects' recent entry 
into the premises after hot pursuit. 
 
Id. at 410-11, 337 S.E.2d at 753 (citations omitted). 
 
Officer Cox testified that after the juveniles observed 
him in his vehicle, they yelled "cops," dropped their beer 
bottles, and began running toward the woods behind the house.  
When Officer Cox pulled his car into the garage area, he could 
still see "kids running towards the woods."  He could also see 
patio furniture covered with beer bottles, "[b]eer bottles 
spread throughout the yard, and kids running away." 
Officer Cox stepped out of his vehicle and "yelled for 
everybody to stop," but "[n]obody did."  He then entered the 
backyard to locate the juvenile hosting the party.  Officer 
Cox indicated that his intent was to "find out what was going 
on," and that he was concerned about the juveniles' safety and 
"wanted to find out who they were, so [the police] could 
contact parents."  
Based on this testimony, we conclude that exigent 
circumstances justified Officer Cox's entry into the garage 
  
24
area and the backyard.  At that time, he had already observed 
the juveniles consuming alcoholic beverages at the party.  Had 
Officer Cox left the property to obtain a warrant after the 
juveniles began to run from the yard, there is a high 
probability that evidence of the crimes would have been 
destroyed by the time he returned.  Moreover, given the number 
of cars parked on the street and in the driveway, Officer Cox 
could reasonably have believed that a number of juveniles in 
attendance may have been inebriated and could have injured 
themselves or others, either by running into the woods at 
night or by attempting to drive away from the residence.  
These factors constituted exigent circumstances and justified 
Officer Cox's warrantless entry into the backyard.5 
We find no merit in the argument that Officer Cox 
manufactured the exigency.  As discussed earlier, Officer 
Cox's testimony establishes that he first identified juveniles 
                     
5 Other courts have determined that exigent circumstances 
may be created by unsupervised juveniles who are under the 
influence of alcohol.  See, e.g., Radloff v. City of Oelwein, 
380 F.3d 344, 348 (8th Cir. 2004) ("Exigent circumstances 
existed both because of the loud noise created by the party 
and because of the threat to public safety if the juveniles 
left the house in cars while under the influence of 
alcohol."); Huset v. City of Roseville, No. 05-295, 2006 US 
Dist. LEXIS 60165, *12 (D. Minn. 2006) (finding that exigent 
circumstances existed when officers found juveniles drinking 
at a party, and noting " 'it would have been unreasonable 
. . . to quarantine the juveniles' cars during the period of 
time [it] would have taken to obtain a warrant' ") (quoting 
Radloff, 380 F.3d at 348). 
  
25
holding beer bottles when he was in his vehicle at a point 
before the driveway intersected the path to the front door, 
and that the juveniles observed him and began to run away when 
he was still "approximately in [that] location." 
Although there is no direct testimony regarding the 
period of time that elapsed between Officer Cox's sighting of 
the juveniles and the time that they, in turn, observed him 
and began to run, Officer Cox's testimony suggests that any 
intervening time period was negligible.  As the Court of 
Appeals stated, the "development of probable cause and the 
creation of exigencies were virtually contemporaneous."  
Robinson, 47 Va. App. at 561-62, 625 S.E.2d at 665.  Given 
that there was no significant period of time between the 
moment Officer Cox first saw illicit activity and the 
occurrence of the ensuing exigencies, we agree with the Court 
of Appeals' holding that Officer Cox did not have a meaningful 
opportunity to leave the Robinsons' property to obtain a 
warrant before proceeding further. 
As other courts have recognized, the lack of such 
opportunity to secure a search warrant strongly counsels 
against a conclusion that the police manufactured exigent 
circumstances.  See, e.g., United States v. Rico, 51 F.3d 495, 
502-03 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting manufactured exigency 
argument because officers "clearly lacked sufficient time 
  
26
between the point at which the circumstances that the agents 
claim motivated them to enter [one] residence and the point at 
which probable cause to enter [a second] residence 
developed"); United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 327 (5th 
Cir. 1984) ("Our first concern in analyzing a claim of 
manufactured exigency is whether agents could have obtained a 
search warrant prior to the development of the exigent 
circumstances upon which they relied.").  To suggest that an 
officer under the present circumstances was required to leave 
the property to obtain a warrant or to approach the front door 
to question the occupants ignores the reality of the 
situation, namely, that the evidence of juveniles consuming 
alcohol on the premises would have been destroyed or otherwise 
compromised, and that the juveniles and possibly other 
motorists could have been injured, in the absence of immediate 
and direct action.  Accordingly, we reject the Robinsons' 
arguments that Officer Cox's warrantless search was undertaken 
in the absence of probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
For the reasons expressed, we will affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
Record No. 060417  Affirmed. 
Record No. 060426  Affirmed.