Case Title: Great American Surplus Lines Ins. v. Dawson

Citation: 468 So. 2d 87

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1985-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
468 So. 2d 87 (1985) GREAT AMERICAN SURPLUS LINES INS. CO. and Michael George Miller v. Wilmer DAWSON. No. 54697. Supreme Court of Mississippi. May 8, 1985. *88 James L. Carroll, Richard T. Lawrence, Watkins & Eager, Jackson, for appellant. Michael S. Allred, Thomas L. Kirkland, Jr., Satterfield & Allred, Jackson, MS, Donald E. Walsh, Watson, Wilkerson & Walsh, Liberty, for appellee. Before PATTERSON, C.J., and DAN M. LEE and SULLIVAN, JJ. PATTERSON, Chief Justice, for the Court: This appeal follows a judgment in the Circuit Court of Amite County in the aggregate amount of $550,000.00 in favor of the plaintiff/appellee Wilmer Dawson. We reverse and remand for a new trial. In our opinion the trial court improperly overruled defendants' motion for mistrial before any testimony was heard by the jury. Therefore we recount only those facts necessary for disposition on that ground. On January 3, 1979, Great American Surplus Lines Insurance Co. (Great American) and Lloyds, London (Lloyds) each issued to Wilmer Dawson a policy of insurance covering three pieces of logging equipment as follows: one (1) 1977 Viking loader in the amount of $10,500 each policy; one (1) 1974 Taylor skidder in the amount of $7,500.00 each policy; and one (1) 1975 Timer Jack skidder in the amount of $7,500 each policy. Thus Great American and Lloyds had each insured the equipment for $25,500.00, bringing the total amount of insurance issued on the property to $51,000.00. Both policies were brokered by a local agent in Gloster, Mississippi, through Dupuy-Busching, an agent of both Great American and Lloyds. On June 22, 1979, a fire destroyed all three pieces of logging equipment. The insurance companies denied Dawson's claim for the loss on the ground Dawson's violation of a warranty provision had voided the policies. Dawson filed suit on October 9, 1981, in the Circuit Court of Amite County against Great American; Michael George Miller, individually and as representative of certain of the underwriters at Lloyds, London; and Dupuy-Busching General Agency, Inc. The declaration alleged in part that Great American and Lloyds had in bad faith failed to pay the claim. Dawson prayed for contractual damages in the amount of $25,500.00 plus interest from the date of the claim under each policy; consequential damages in the amount of $250,000.00; and punitive damages in the amount of $1,000,000.00. Great American and Lloyds answered and pled affirmatively that Dawson had violated the policies' warranty provision that "all equipment shall be parked when discontinuing work with at least 25 feet separating each piece of insured equipment" and that Dawson was therefore not entitled to recover under the insurance contract. The case proceeded to trial in June 1982. After the jury was voir dired, selected, and sworn to try the case, defense counsel Richard Lawrence conducted the following examination of a witness scheduled to testify for the defense: After concluding the examination Attorney Lawrence stated the following: The court then allowed plaintiff's attorney Michael Allred to question Mr. Hess, and this colloquy transpired: The parties stipulated the two men conversing with Dawson were Keith Foster, the agent who sold him the insurance policies; and Richard Ivy, a logging inspector; both of whom were to testify for the plaintiff. Defense counsel then stated, "[W]e would also like for the record to show that the court instructed the jury before we went in here and selected the jury not to talk to any of the potential witnesses or parties to the suit, and that's in direct disobedience to the court's instructions." The court overruled the defendant's motion for mistrial stating in part, We are of the opinion this ruling was error. Our decision is based on the long honored principle that "Whatever tends to threaten public confidence in the fairness of jury trials, tends to threaten one of our sacred legal institutions." Lee v. State, 226 Miss. 276, 286, 83 So. 2d 818, 821 (1955). In that case the sheriff, a material witness for the state, served as jury bailiff, assisted by two of his deputies who were also state's witnesses. On the second day of trial the court overruled defendant's motion for a mistrial on the ground the jury had been in the charge of a material witness. Although there was no proof the sheriff and his deputies attempted to exert any influence on the jury, this Court held that fact was not dispositive, stating, Following Lee, Smith v. State, 251 Miss. 241, 169 So. 2d 451 (1964), held it was reversible error for deputy sheriffs to serve as bailiffs after having assisted in jury selection. The reasoning of the case was not that the officers committed any actual wrong, but that they must "avoid a situation that might weaken the confidence of the public in our courts and juries ..." 251 Miss. at 247, 169 So. 2d at 853-54. In Perkins v. State, 244 So. 2d 414 (Miss. 1971), we reversed a conviction on the ground that a deputy sheriff "was observed conversing with a juror shortly after he had testified as a witness for the State." 244 So. 2d at 415. The scope of these cases was broadened in Dunn v. State, 264 So. 2d 823 (Miss. 1972). In that case the sheriff, who was to be a key witness for the state, was not designated as bailiff and was not observed *91 conversing with jurors. He did, however, spend the night at the hotel where the jury was quartered. Quoting extensively from the Lee case, we held this constituted reversible error. We acknowledge the cases cited above involve criminal prosecutions, and that the rules there announced might apply less strictly in a civil case. For example, in Atwood v. Lever, 274 So. 2d 146 (Miss. 1973), the testimony of the plaintiff revealed that "one of the jurors, whose name she did not know, walked up to her, looked at her and said, `You are getting better looking all the time.' To which she replied, `Thank you,' and turned and walked away." 274 So. 2d at 147. Defendant's motion for a mistrial was overruled. This Court held, We are of the opinion the facts of this case distinguish it from Atwood and require us to apply the reasoning of the criminal cases cited above. Obviously, we think confidence in our system of jurisprudence is essential whether the case be criminal or civil, but since a different standard could be urged under Atwood, we need emphasize that it is distinguishable by its vastly different facts. Moreover, this case is legally different in that it is not the usual civil case, as it sought to punish by way of an award of punitive damages. As revealed by the excerpts from the record quoted earlier in this opinion, the conduct of the plaintiff and two of his material witnesses in the presence of the jury indicates there was at the very least a strong appearance of unfairness if not actual prejudice. Besides having the potential of fostering bias in the jury, such behavior trivializes a serious matter: the disposition of a lawsuit. A lawsuit may be joked about in many places, but not in the courtroom in the presence of those who have been voir dired and sworn to decide the case. Further, the outcome of a proceeding in the Circuit Court of Amite County, Mississippi, can be just as important, in terms of the effect on people's lives and pocketbooks, as one in Philadelphia or any other large city. Fraternizing of parties and their witnesses with or in the presence of jurors can and should be prevented without special facilities. When such conduct occurs, it should not be condoned. We are of the opinion the trial court improperly overruled the defendants' timely motion for mistrial. The case is reversed and remanded for a new trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED. WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.