Case Title: Cheminova America Corp. v. Corker

Citation: 779 So. 2d 1175

Docket Number: 1982176, 1982177

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
779 So. 2d 1175 (2000)
CHEMINOVA AMERICA CORPORATION
v.
Iris CORKER et al.
Acuderm, Inc.
v.
Iris Corker et al.
1982176 and 1982177.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 30, 2000.
Rehearing Denied September 1, 2000.
*1176 Edward G. Isaacs Bowron, John Charles S. Pierce, and Michael A. Montgomery of Pierce, Ledyard, Latta & Wasden, P.C., Mobile, for appellant Acuderm, Inc.
Clarence M. Small, Jr., and Rhonda Pitts Chambers of Rives & Peterson, Birmingham, for appellant Cheminova America Corp.
Steve Olen and Steven L. Nicholas of Olen & Nicholas, P.C., Mobile; and Patrick H. Sims of Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas & O'Neal, Mobile, for appellees Iris Corker and Tommy Bell.
ENGLAND, Justice.
These appeals are from a class-certification order, filed pursuant to Act No. 99-250, Ala. Acts 1999, codified at §§ 6-5-640 through -642, Ala.Code 1975 (Cum.Supp. 1999). The Act requires a trial court to hold a "full evidentiary hearing" on class certification under Rule 23, Ala. R. Civ. P. This Court has consistently held that a trial court's class-certification order is to be reviewed by an abuse-of-discretion standard. Ex parte Government Employees *1177 Ins. Co., 729 So. 2d 299, 303 (Ala.1999). We find no abuse of discretion in the court's entering the class-certification order; therefore, we affirm.
The trial judge held a full evidentiary hearing, which met the requirements of §§ 6-5-640 through -642. The trial judge made the following findings of fact:
On February 20, 1998, Iris Corker, acting individually and on behalf of a national class of similarly situated individuals, filed a complaint in Mobile County against Laboratories Cheminova Internacional, S.A.,[1] Cheminova America Corporation, Acuderm, Inc., and Nixon Drugs, Inc. Her complaint asserted fraud claims and a claim under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine ("AEMLD"). As last amended, the complaint contained five counts. Counts One and Two stated claims alleging fraud and suppression arising from the alleged mislabeling of the contents of the product. Count Three stated a claim alleging breach of warranty; Count Four stated a claim for restitution of the purchase price paid by the plaintiffs; and Count Five stated a breach-of-contract claim.
On February 2, 1999, Ms. Corker filed a motion seeking certification of the following class:
Ms. Corker filed a third amended complaint on March 31, 1999, in which she added Tommy Bell as an additional class representative. The amended complaint asserted that Acuderm had sold Skin Cap directly to Bell and, therefore, that Acuderm was liable for the purchase price of the product. In April 1999, Cheminova filed a motion to continue the class-certification hearing that was set for April 28.
The trial court orally denied the continuance, at a hearing held on April 23, 1999. A full hearing on Ms. Corker's motion for class certification was held on April 28, 1999, at which the plaintiffs offered 21 documents in support of their argument. Acuderm filed a motion to strike the affidavit of the plaintiff Tommy Bell, but the court never ruled on this motion.
On August 3, 1999, the trial court entered an order certifying the action under Rule 23(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., as a nationwide class action for the recovery of economic damages. The trial judge rejected class treatment of the fraud and suppression claims and rejected class treatment of claims for personal-injury damages under any theory, and it wrote:
The trial judge limited the certification to claims for refunds sought by members of the class:
Thus, the trial judge certified a class whose claim is that class members are entitled to get their purchase money back because the defendants mislabeled, in a critical way, the product they sold to the class members.
On September 13, 1999, Cheminova and Acuderm appealed from the certification order.
We must determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion in performing his analysis of the four prerequisites for conditionally certifying a class action under Rule 23(a), Ala. R. Civ. P.:
These four prerequisites are commonly referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. Warehouse Home Furnishing Distribs., Inc. v. Whitson, 709 So. 2d 1144, 1148 (Ala.1997).
The record indicates that the trial judge, in deciding to conditionally certify a limited class, made the "rigorous analysis" required by this Court's caselaw. See Ex parte Citicorp Acceptance Co., 715 So. 2d 199 (Ala.1997), and Ex parte Exxon Corp., 725 So. 2d 930, 932 (Ala.1998). We will discuss the four prerequisites.
The first requirement for a class-action certification is numerosity. The trial judge's certification order states:
"Approximation of the number of potential class members in consumer actions is generally the rule." Ex parte Government Employees Ins. Co., supra, at 303, citing 2 H. Newberg and A. Conte, Newberg on Class Actions § 7.22 (3d ed.1992). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the plaintiffs meet the numerosity requirement.
Commonality is the second requirement under Rule 23(a) that the class must satisfy. The trial court stated in its certification order:
We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court here. The court properly identified the central question in this litigation as relating to the factual issues whether the product sold contained an undisclosed substance and whether the defendants knowingly or unknowingly sold a dangerous product. The principles of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") can be easily applied on a classwide basis. Under U.C.C. Article 2, some version of which has been adopted in all states except Louisiana, a description of a product on a label creates an express warranty. See, e.g., § 7-2-313, Ala.Code 1975. The label on the Skin Cap product contains a "core description" of what the defendants were selling; that description is an "express warranty" under the plain terms of § 7-2-313. A sale of a product that is not fit for use as described violates the implied warranty of merchantabilitythat the product is fit for its intended purposean implied warranty that under the U.C.C. accompanies each sale by a merchant. § 7-2-314, Ala.Code 1975.
The defendants contend that the variations in the degree of privity the separate class members had with the defendants, variations caused by the application of the laws of the several states, are so great that this action may not proceed as a class action. However, we believe any problems caused by those variations would be manageable. Those who are in the directpurchaser subclass are in privity with Acuderm. Second, the state-law variations can be recognized and dealt with by the trial court, because the facts of the transactions are uniform and are not in dispute insofar as they relate to privity. The questions of fact and law common to the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the class.
The third requirement of Rule 23(a) is typicality. That requirement focuses on the interests of the class representatives. The trial court stated in its certification order:
We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in regard to the requirement of typicality.
The fourth requirement for class certification is adequacy of representation. The trial court rigorously analyzed this fourth element in its certification order, as follows:
We find no abuse of discretion in regard to the fourth requirement.
Next, we consider whether the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiffs have met the elements of Rule 23(b)(3) for class certification. The trial court stated in its certification order:
We cannot say the court abused its discretion in finding the plaintiffs had satisfied the Rule 23(b) requirements for class certification.
The defendants claim the trial court abused its discretion in certifying the action as a class action because, they say, the plaintiffs failed to "prove" facts necessary to find liability. However, at this stage of the proceedings, the kind and level of proof are distinctly different from those required at a trial on the merits. A plaintiff seeking to represent a class need not prove its entire case in order to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23, Ala. R. Civ. P. Ex parte Government Employees Ins. Co., 729 So. 2d  at 303; Ex parte Amsouth Bancorporation, 717 So. 2d 357, 366 (Ala. 1998).
The defendants also claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Cheminova America's motion for a continuance of the class-action hearing. We review a trial court's denial of a motion for a continuance by asking whether the denial was a palpable abuse of the court's discretion. Copeland v. Samford Univ., 686 So. 2d 190 (Ala.1996). The defendants have not shown that the trial court abused its discretion.
Finally, the defendants claim that the plaintiffs' claims are preempted by Alabama's Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ala.Code 1975, §§ 8-19-1 to -15, specifically § 8-19-10(f). They cite Ex parte Exxon Corp., supra, 725 So. 2d 930. Ex parte Exxon decertified a class action, because of the preemption provision of § 8-19-10(f). 725 So. 2d  at 933-34. The plaintiffs in Ex parte Exxon sought relief specifically based on New Jersey consumerprotection laws and sought to apply, on a nationwide basis, the New Jersey statutory remedy to the defendants' course of conduct. Because Alabama law prevents consumers from representing a class seeking relief for a defendant's alleged deceptive trade practices, § 8-19-10(f), Ala.Code 1975, this Court held that the class representatives in that case could not maintain the action as a class action. The defendants argue that this Court's decision in Ex parte Exxon supports their claim that the plaintiffs here are preempted from filing a class action. We disagree.
The legislative intent behind Alabama's Deceptive Trade Practices Act was to require "a strong and effective consumer protection program to protect the interest of both the consuming public and the legitimate businessperson." § 8-19-2. Section 8-19-15 is a "saving clause"; it provides that the Act is cumulative and that a plaintiff can elect whether to sue for the remedies provided under the Act or to sue for remedies allowed by the common law. § 8-19-15(b). While § 8-19-10(f) makes no provision for a class action under the Act, the Act specifically states that consumers are not prohibited from seeking redress under the common law or under other statutes for conduct that could be redressed under the Act. See § 8-19-15. The defendants misconstrue the nature of the certification order. As we have noted above, the trial court specifically declined *1184 to certify the fraud-based claims. We see no preemption in this case.
We find no error in the trial court's class-certification order. That order is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, HOUSTON, COOK, SEE, BROWN, and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur.
LYONS, J., recuses himself.
[1]  Laboratories Cheminova Internacional has not been served.