Case Title: Northwood v. Wood Cty. Regional Water & Sewer Dist.

Citation: 1999-Ohio-350

Docket Number: 19980522

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Northwood v. Wood Cty. Regional Water & Sewer Dist., 86 Ohio St.3d 92, 1999-Ohio-
350.] 
 
 
 
 
CITY OF NORTHWOOD, APPELLANT, v. WOOD COUNTY REGIONAL WATER AND 
SEWER DISTRICT, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Northwood v. Wood Cty. Regional Water & Sewer Dist. (1999), 86 Ohio 
St.3d 92.] 
Municipal corporations — Public utilities — Water and sewer district — 
Municipality may exercise eminent domain over public utility facilities 
owned by a regional water and sewer district — Such exercise of eminent 
domain is constitutional as long as the water and sewer district is not 
thereby destroyed. 
A taking may be enjoined if it will result in the destruction of an existing public 
use or the destruction, including economic destruction, of an existing public 
utility operated by a municipality or political subdivision. 
(No. 98-522 — Submitted January 26, 1999 — Decided July 14, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Wood County, No. WD-97-010. 
 
In 1991, a petition to form the Wood County Regional Water and Sewer 
District was filed in the Wood County Common Pleas Court.  On May 18, 1992, 
the district was formed by the authorization of the court.  The district includes the 
city of Rossford, the villages of Custar, Cygnet, Jerry City, and Millbury; and the 
townships of Bloom, Center, Freedom, Henry, Lake, Liberty, Middleton, Milton, 
Perrysburg, Plain, Portage, Troy, Washington, and Weston.  Northwood chose not 
to join the district.  However, residents of Northwood received services from the 
district.  Many water lines and sewer lines, as well as pump and lift stations, 
metering stations, and other facilities owned by the district, are located in 
Northwood. 
 
As a result of an analysis by outside consultants originating two years 
earlier, Northwood concluded that it would be in its best interests to own and 
 
 
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operate its own water and sewer system.  Consequently, on August 24, 1995, 
pursuant to Section 4, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 163.04, 
Northwood passed Resolution 95-7, authorizing an offer to purchase the district’s 
facilities in the city.  The offer was made the next day, and on October 12, 1995, 
the district formally rejected it.  Accordingly, pursuant to Section 5, Article XVIII 
of the Ohio Constitution, Northwood passed Ordinance 95-49, which declared its 
intent to appropriate the facilities owned by the district within Northwood. 
 
On August 1, 1995, the district filed a complaint for declaratory and 
injunctive relief against Northwood, seeking to prohibit Northwood from tapping 
into the district’s utility lines without authorization.  On October 20, 1995, the 
district also filed a verified complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that 
Northwood’s threatened appropriation was unlawful.  On December 28, 1995, 
Northwood filed a petition for appropriation. 
 
The trial court ruled that Northwood had the authority to appropriate the 
district’s local water and sewer distribution lines that serve only the residents of 
Northwood.  The trial court also concluded that there is no express or implied grant 
of authority under the Ohio Constitution or applicable statutes for Northwood to 
appropriate the district’s main lines and related facilities passing through the city 
limits.  Both parties appealed. 
 
The court of appeals determined that for purposes of Section 4, Article 
XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, the district was not a company or person from 
which Northwood had the constitutional right to appropriate and that Northwood 
had no statutory right to appropriate the district’s property because the district was 
not an owner as defined in R.C. Chapter 163.  The court of appeals also determined 
that Northwood had no express or implied power to appropriate the public utility 
facilities of another political subdivision. 
 
 
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The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., John F. Birath, Drew H. Campbell, Matthew J. 
Arnold; Ballenger & Moore Co., L.P.A., and Brian J. Ballenger,  for appellant. 
 
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, L.L.P., Orla E. Collier III, N. 
Victor Goodman, James F. DeLeone; Spitler, Vogtsberger & Huffman and Daniel 
T. Spitler, for appellee. 
 
Barry M. Byron, Stephen L. Byron and John Gotherman, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Ohio Municipal League. 
 
Peck, Shaffer & Williams, L.L.P., and Thomas A. Luebbers, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae County Commissioners’ Association of Ohio. 
 
Janet E. Jackson, Columbus City Attorney, and Daniel W. Drake, Assistant 
City Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae city of Columbus. 
 
Stephen J. Smith, Dublin Law Director, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
city of Dublin. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  The principal issue in this case is whether a municipality may 
exercise eminent domain over public utility facilities owned by a regional water 
and sewer district.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that such an exercise of 
eminent domain is constitutional as long as the water and sewer district is not 
thereby destroyed.  We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to 
the trial court for a determination of whether, in this instance, the regional water 
and sewer district would be destroyed by the proposed exercise of eminent domain. 
 
Section 4, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution provides:  “Any 
municipality may acquire, construct, own, lease and operate within or without its 
corporate limits, any public utility the product or service of which is or is to be 
 
 
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supplied to the municipality or its inhabitants, and may contract with others for any 
such product or service.  The acquisition of any such public utility may be by 
condemnation or otherwise, and a municipality may acquire thereby the use of, or 
full title to, the property and franchise of any company or person supplying to the 
municipality or its inhabitants the service or product of any such utility.” 
 
This court has stated that Section 4, Article XVIII, the Utility Clause, was 
“primarily intended to confer the power of eminent domain on municipalities for 
the purpose of acquiring existing public utilities.”  Blue Ash v. Cincinnati (1962), 
173 Ohio St. 345, 352, 19 O.O.2d 274, 278, 182 N.E.2d 557, 562.  Thus, 
Northwood, in seeking to exercise eminent domain over the water and sewer 
facilities of the district, is using the Utility Clause for exactly the purpose for 
which it was intended. 
 
The question whether the Utility Clause can be used to the detriment of a 
municipality was answered by Blue Ash.  This court stated:  “Where a municipal 
corporation to which a general power of eminent domain is given by law seeks to 
exercise its power with respect to property in another municipal corporation 
already devoted to public use, its action may be enjoined if the proposed use will 
either destroy the existing use or interfere with it to such an extent as is tantamount 
to destruction, unless power so to do is expressly authorized or arises by necessary 
implication.”  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus; see 1A Sackman, Nichols on 
Eminent Domain (3 Ed.Rev.1998) 2-55, Section 2.2.  There is no question that a 
municipal corporation can appropriate the property of another municipal 
corporation, and we cannot discern a reason to treat property of a political 
subdivision other than a municipality differently. 
 
The issue of whether Northwood’s power to appropriate from a political 
subdivision is expressly authorized or arises by necessary implication is not 
necessary to the disposition of this case.  See Blue Ash, 173 Ohio St. at 351-352, 
 
 
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19 O.O.2d at 278, 182 N.E.2d at 562.  Accordingly, we leave that constitutional 
question for another day and proceed as if Northwood were using its general power 
of appropriation.  See Section 4, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution.  
Therefore, the issue devolves to whether Northwood’s appropriation of the 
district’s property will “destroy the existing use or interfere with it to such an 
extent as is tantamount to destruction.” 
 
It cannot be seriously contended that the taking will destroy the existing use.  
Northwood intends to use the facilities exactly as they are currently being used.  
Nor, of course, will the taking interfere with the existing use so as to destroy it.  
We construe the question more broadly, however, and inquire whether the 
proposed taking would interfere with the district to such an extent as is tantamount 
to destruction of the district.  We clarify Blue Ash by stating that a taking may be 
enjoined if it will result in the destruction of an existing public use or the 
destruction, including economic destruction, of an existing public utility operated 
by a municipality or political subdivision. 
 
This conclusion is a logical extension of Blue Ash.  In the case at hand, the 
economic destruction of the district would necessarily result in the loss of an 
existing public use, namely the water and sewer services that the district provides 
to municipalities other than Northwood.  Nothing in the Constitution or the laws of 
this state can be said to enable a municipality to effect any such outcome through 
the exercise of its otherwise lawful power of eminent domain.  Thus, the issue in 
this case becomes narrower still:  Will the proposed taking result in the destruction 
of the district? 
 
Neither lower court ruled upon this issue.1  While there is abundant evidence 
in the record, we are loath to make a factual determination, especially in the first 
instance.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
 
 
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remand to the trial court to review the current record to determine whether the 
proposed taking will result in the destruction of the district. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
KLINE and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the syllabus and judgment. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in judgment. 
 
DOUGLAS and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
ROGER L. KLINE, J., of the Fourth Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, J. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
The trial court did state that “allowing the City to take all of the water and 
sewer systems passing through the City would be tantamount to allowing the city 
to destroy the District’s system for the convenience and economic benefit of the 
City.”  Although this seems to be a finding that destruction of the district would 
result, the very next sentence states that the appropriation “would, at the very least, 
supersede the former control by the District over its water and sewer system and, at 
the worst, greatly restrict the District’s system.”  It is clear that the court did not 
focus on the issue as we have now defined it. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I concur in 
today’s decision to the extent that the majority finds that a municipality has the 
authority to acquire existing public utilities at least within its municipal 
boundaries.  This conclusion is clearly supported by the plain language of Section 
4, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution.  I disagree, however, with the remaining 
portion of today’s decision, and, specifically, the syllabus law composed by the 
majority.  The majority’s reliance upon, and “logical extension” of, Blue Ash v. 
Cincinnati (1962), 173 Ohio St. 345, 19 O.O.2d 274, 182 N.E.2d 557, is 
 
 
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misplaced.  Blue Ash needs little discussion other than to point out that it involved 
the proposed appropriation of a municipal street by another municipality for 
airport purposes.  Streets and highways are not “public utilities” under Ohio law.  
Id., 173 Ohio St. at 350, 19 O.O.2d at 277, 182 N.E.2d at 561.  Accordingly, I 
would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and find that Northwood, in 
accordance with Section 4, Article XVIII, has the absolute authority to appropriate 
the district’s water and sewer facilities located in Northwood. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.