Case Title: Shields v. Gerhart

Citation: 163 Vt 219, 658 A.2d 924

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
SHIELDS_V_GERHART.92-452; 163 Vt 219; 658 A.2d 924

[Filed 27-Jan-1995]


NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                                 No. 92-452


Carol Shields                                     Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
          v.                                      Addison Superior Court

Rolland Gerhart, Director,                        June Term, 1993
Division of Licensing &
Registrations, Social and Rehabilitation
Services; Durwood Collier, Frederick Satink


David A. Jenkins, J.

William A. Hunter, Ludlow, for plaintiff-appellant

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Michael O. Duane,
  Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury, for defendants-appellees


PRESENT:       Allen, C.J., Gibson and Dooley, JJ., and Fisher, D.J. and
               Peck, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned 


     DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiff Carol Shields appeals the dismissal of her
actions against the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS)
and its personnel based on the Vermont Constitution and 42 U.S.C.  1983. 
Plaintiff argues that she has a private cause of action for damages under the
Vermont Constitution, that sovereign immunity does not bar such a cause of
action, and that her failure to serve defendants should not bar an action
against them in their individual capacities.  We affirm the dismissal of the
actions against defendants in their 

 

individual capacities.  On the state constitutional claims, we affirm,
although on grounds different from those employed by the trial court. 

     The facts of this case are set forth in Shields v. Gerhart, 155 Vt. 141,
142-45, 582 A.2d 153, 154-56 (1990) (Shields I).  Plaintiff owned and
operated a child care facility and sued SRS and its agents when her day care
facility license was revoked and her application to become a registered
family day care home was denied.  Plaintiff alleges that defendants revoked
her license and denied her application in retaliation for her public
opposition to an SRS policy prohibiting corporal punishment.  She further
alleges that defendants used fraud and deception to induce her to abandon her
license and forego her appeal rights by encouraging her to apply as a
registered facility when they knew she could not qualify as such.  As a
result, plaintiff claims that defendants have deprived her of her property
interest in her day care center in violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C.  1983, and the Vermont Constitution. 

     In Shields I, we held that plaintiff's civil rights claims and Vermont
constitutional claims were not time barred.  155 Vt. at 150, 582 A.2d  at 159.
 We dismissed plaintiff's civil rights claims against SRS and other
defendants in their official capacities because a state agency and its
officials acting in their official capacities are not "persons" under 42
U.S.C.  1983.  Id. We left open the question of whether plaintiff could
maintain a cause of action under the Vermont Constitution. 

                                     I.

     Plaintiff first appeals the trial court's denial of her motion for an
enlargement of time to serve defendants in their individual capacities.  She
argues that because there would be no prejudice to defendants by late
service, the court should have granted her motion.  A motion to 

 

enlarge time will be granted only if the court finds, in its discretion, that
"the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect."  V.R.C.P. 6(b). 
Plaintiff, therefore, must show that the trial court abused its discretion in
order to prevail on appeal.  See  Miller v. Ladd, 140 Vt. 293, 297,