Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. John Miller Carroll

Citation: 2013 WI 101

Docket Number: 2011AP001820-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 101 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1820-D   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John Miller Carroll, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
John Miller Carroll, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST CARROLL  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 19, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013 WI 101
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP1820-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John Miller Carroll, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
John Miller Carroll, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 19, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report filed by the 
referee, Richard P. Mozinski, recommending the court suspend 
Attorney John Miller Carroll's license to practice law in 
Wisconsin for five months for seven counts of professional 
misconduct.  No appeal has been filed, so we review the 
referee's report and recommendation pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).1  
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) states as follows: 
No. 
2011AP1820-D   
 
2 
 
Upon careful review of the matter, we adopt the referee's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We agree with the 
referee that Attorney Carroll's professional misconduct warrants 
a five-month suspension of his license to practice law.  We also 
find it appropriate to require him to pay the full costs of this 
proceeding, which were $27,438.26 as of May 13, 2013. 
¶2 
Attorney Carroll was admitted to the practice of law 
in Wisconsin in 1987 and practices in Appleton.  In 1992 he 
received a private reprimand for failing to hold funds in trust 
in which both he and his former law firm claimed an interest.  
In 1997 he received a private reprimand for performing work for 
a 
client 
after 
his 
services 
were 
terminated 
and 
for 
misrepresenting that he had filed a motion on behalf of the 
client.  In 1999 he received a public reprimand for neglect of a 
matter, failing to communicate with a client, and failing to 
return a retainer.   
¶3 
In 2002 Attorney Carroll's license was suspended for 
one year for eight counts of professional misconduct, four of 
which related to trust account and fee matters, and the other 
four involving failure to diligently pursue a client's claim, 
failure to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2011AP1820-D   
 
3 
 
a matter, failure to disclose to and cooperate with the Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility (the predecessor to the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR)), and engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.  In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, 248 
Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 718.  While suspended, Attorney Carroll 
consented to the issuance of a public reprimand for pre-
suspension conduct involving loaning funds to a personal injury 
client in conjunction with pending litigation.  
¶4 
On August 9, 2011, the OLR filed a complaint against 
Attorney Carroll alleging ten counts of misconduct arising out 
of his handling of two client matters.  Attorney Carroll filed 
an answer on September 26, 2011.  He admitted the allegations in 
Count Two of the OLR's complaint and denied all other 
allegations. 
¶5 
The first four counts in the complaint arose out of 
Attorney Carroll's representation of T.R.  In January 2007 T.R. 
was charged in two separate criminal cases.  In one case, T.R. 
was charged with operating while intoxicated—fourth offense and 
operating after revocation.  In the other case, he was charged 
with two counts of disorderly conduct.  T.R. hired Attorney 
Carroll to represent him in both cases and paid Attorney Carroll 
$2,500 pursuant to a written fee agreement. 
¶6 
During pretrial proceedings Attorney Carroll made a 
timely demand for discovery.  The discovery provided by the 
State did not include a tape of a 911 call made by a witness. 
No. 
2011AP1820-D   
 
4 
 
¶7 
The two cases were tried at the same time to the same 
jury but were not formally consolidated.  During the trial, 
Attorney Carroll learned that a 911 tape might exist.  He 
discussed with T.R. whether a tape of the 911 call should be 
obtained.  He did not request a continuance of the trial and 
advised T.R. to proceed with the trial, saying that if the 911 
tape was obtained after trial and proved exculpatory, then 
Attorney Carroll would file a motion for a new trial based on 
the prosecutor's failure to produce the tape.  T.R. agreed to 
proceed with the trial based on Attorney Carroll's advice.  The 
jury found T.R. guilty on all counts on April 10, 2007. 
¶8 
On or before May 14, 2007, Attorney Carroll received 
the 911 tape and gave it to T.R. to review.  T.R. promptly 
called Attorney Carroll and advised that the 911 tape showed 
that a witness had lied at trial.  During the phone call, 
Attorney Carroll advised T.R. that he would postpone the 
sentencing, obtain the transcripts from the trial and, if the 
911 tape proved exculpatory, he could then file a motion for a 
new trial.  The sentencing was postponed at Attorney Carroll's 
request. 
¶9 
The day before the scheduled sentencing, a telephone 
conference took place between Attorney Carroll and T.R. during 
which they discussed whether Attorney Carroll had yet received 
the trial transcripts.  Upon being informed he had not, T.R. 
inquired whether the sentencing should again be postponed.  
Attorney Carroll advised T.R. to proceed with the sentencing and 
said if the transcription of the 911 tape later proved 
No. 
2011AP1820-D   
 
5 
 
exculpatory, Attorney Carroll would then represent T.R. in an 
appeal of the convictions rather than filing a motion for a new 
trial. 
¶10 The following day T.R. was sentenced in both cases.  
At the same time, Attorney Carroll filed a notice of intent to 
pursue postconviction relief in the OWI case but not in the 
disorderly conduct case.   
¶11 On July 9, 2007, Attorney Carroll filed a notice of 
intent to pursue postconviction relief in the disorderly conduct 
case.  The appeal was untimely; however, the court of appeals 
extended the time to file a notice of intent.  After T.R. 
terminated Attorney Carroll's representation, successor counsel 
represented T.R. in both appeals. 
¶12 Sometime prior to sentencing, Attorney Carroll and 
T.R. had discussed whether T.R. should obtain successor counsel 
for his appeals.  Attorney Carroll advised T.R. he did not 
believe that T.R. had any ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims stemming from Attorney Carroll's representation of him at 
trial, and as a result, Attorney Carroll could represent T.R. in 
the appeal of the convictions.  Based on Attorney Carroll's dual 
representations, T.R. agreed to be represented by Attorney 
Carroll on appeal. 
¶13 Despite a potential conflict based on T.R.'s reliance 
on Attorney Carroll's advice and Attorney Carroll's opinion that 
T.R. had no ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Attorney 
Carroll did not obtain from T.R. a written waiver of any 
conflict of interest that might exist due to Attorney Carroll's 
No. 
2011AP1820-D   
 
6 
 
trial and appellate representation of T.R. on the appeals.  
Attorney Carroll entered into a written fee agreement for 
representation in the appeals. 
¶14 Between the time Attorney Carroll filed the notice of 
intent to appeal in the OWI case and the time he filed the 
notice of intent in the disorderly conduct case, he filed a 
proposed order for a stay pending appeal in both cases even 
though the cases were never consolidated and no timely notice of 
intent had been filed in the disorderly conduct case.  The 
circuit court granted the motion to stay the sentence in the OWI 
case, but denied the motion in the disorderly conduct case 
because no notice of intent had been filed.  
¶15 Attorney Carroll scheduled another hearing in the 
disorderly conduct case, purportedly to reargue the motion to 
stay the sentence.  He did not, however, file a new motion to 
stay the sentence or a written motion for a rehearing of the 
motion to stay.  The circuit court ruled there was no motion 
before the court seeking a stay of sentence in the disorderly 
conduct case because the first motion had been denied and no new 
motion for a stay had been filed. 
¶16 On August 17, 2007, T.R. terminated Attorney Carroll's 
representation 
because 
he 
was 
dissatisfied 
with 
Attorney 
Carroll's performance, particularly the failure to timely file 
the notice of intent to seek postconviction relief and failure 
to effectively argue for a stay of the sentence in the 
disorderly conduct case.   
No. 
2011AP1820-D   
 
7 
 
¶17 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Carroll's representation of 
T.R.: 
 
[COUNT ONE]  By failing to timely file a Notice 
of Intent to Pursue Post-Conviction Relief on behalf 
of [T.R.] in [his disorderly conduct case], [Attorney] 
Carroll violated SCR 20:1.3.2 
 
[COUNT 
TWO]  By 
failing 
to 
obtain 
[T.R.'s] 
written waiver of any conflicts of interest that might 
exist due to [Attorney] Carroll's representation of 
[T.R.] in the appeal of [his cases], [Attorney] 
Carroll violated former SCR 20:1.7(b),3 in effect 
through June 30, 2007, and SCR 20:1.7(a)(2)4 and 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.3 states, "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
3 Former SCR 20:1.7(b) (effective through June 30, 2007) 
provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 
 
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client may be materially 
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another 
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own 
interests, unless: 
 
(1) the 
lawyer 
reasonably 
believes 
the 
representation will not be adversely affected; and 
 
(2) the 
client 
consents 
in 
writing 
after 
consultation.   . . . . 
4 SCR 20:1.7(a)(2) states as follows: 
 
Except as provided in par. (b), a lawyer shall 
not represent a client if the representation involves 
a concurrent conflict of interest.  A concurrent 
conflict of interest exists if:  . . .   
 
(2) there 
is 
a 
significant 
risk 
that 
the 
representation 
of 
one 
or 
more 
clients 
will 
be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to 
another client, a former client or a third person or 
by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
No. 
2011AP1820-D   
 
8 
 
SCR 20:1.7(b)(1) and (4),5 in effect as of July 1, 
2007. 
 
[COUNT THREE]  By stating in his August 27, 2007 
letter to [T.R.] that "Notice of Intent for Post-
Conviction Relief was filed on June 26, 2007, with 
both matters on the caption, as both matters were 
consolidated for trial . . . ," when no Notice of 
Intent was filed by [Attorney] Carroll on June 26, 
2007 
and 
when 
two 
Notices 
of 
Intent 
filed 
by 
[Attorney] Carroll were filed on June 14, 2007 and 
July 11, 2007, and each related only to, and referred 
only to, one of the two cases, [Attorney] Carroll 
violated SCR 20:8.4(c).6 
 
[COUNT FOUR]  By misrepresenting to OLR that "I 
want to make it clear that once I determined that 
there was no basis for the Motion for a New Trial, I 
advised [T.R.] to seek other counsel, which he did.  
Therefore, I did not think it was necessary to 
actually have a written waiver.  This occurred prior 
to filing the Notice of Appeals with the Court of 
Appeals, to the best of my recollection . . . ," when 
[T.R.] hired [Attorney] Carroll to represent him on 
his appeal after [Attorney] Carroll's advice that 
[T.R.] might want to seek other counsel until [T.R.] 
later 
terminated 
[Attorney] 
Carroll's 
appellate 
representation due to dissatisfaction with [Attorney] 
                                                 
5 SCRs 20:1.7(b)(1) and (4) provide: 
 
Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent 
conflict of interest under par. (a), a lawyer may 
represent a client if: 
 
(1) the 
lawyer 
reasonably 
believes 
that 
the 
lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent 
representation to each affected client; 
 
. . .  
 
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, 
confirmed in a writing signed by the client. 
6 SCR 20:8.4(c) says it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation; . . . ." 
No. 
2011AP1820-D   
 
9 
 
Carroll and to seek successor counsel, [Attorney] 
Carroll violated SCR 22.03(6)7 via SCR 20:8.4(h).8 
¶18 The 
other 
client 
matter 
detailed 
in 
the 
OLR's 
complaint involves Attorney Carroll's representation of J.H.  In 
early July 2007, J.H. hired Attorney Carroll to represent him in 
a case in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Wisconsin, in which J.H. had been charged with 
conspiracy 
to 
distribute 
and 
possession 
with 
intent 
to 
distribute methamphetamine.  J.H. paid Attorney Carroll a 
$10,000 retainer fee for the representation.  J.H. denied 
signing a written fee agreement.  Although Attorney Carroll 
claimed there was a signed fee agreement, he could not produce 
it. 
¶19 J.H.'s trial was scheduled for August 20, 2007, but 
the proceeding was converted to a plea hearing.  Prior to that 
date Attorney Carroll received a proposed plea agreement from 
the federal prosecutor.  J.H. denied seeing the plea agreement 
or reviewing its terms with Attorney Carroll at any time before 
being asked to sign it.  Attorney Carroll disputed J.H.'s 
testimony. 
                                                 
7 SCR 
22.03(6) 
provides, 
"In 
the 
course 
of 
the 
investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance." 
8 SCR 20:8.4(h) states it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "fail to cooperate in the investigation of a grievance 
filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required by 
SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), or 
SCR 22.04(1); . . . ." 
No. 
2011AP1820-D   
 
10 
 
¶20 J.H. said that prior to August 20, 2007, Attorney 
Carroll did not (1) hire an investigator to work on the case, 
(2) discuss with J.H. whether he would testify at trial, (3) 
prepare J.H. to testify, or (4) review the consequences of the 
federal sentencing guidelines regarding false testimony and the 
range of penalties.  Attorney Carroll admitted not hiring an 
investigator, but disputed that he had not interviewed potential 
witnesses and denied not discussing whether J.H. should testify 
at trial.  Attorney Carroll said he also had discussed with J.H. 
the potential sentencing consequences of a conviction. 
¶21 Attorney Carroll said that prior to August 20, 2007, 
he was aware that J.H. was concerned that a criminal conviction 
could result in the loss of his commercial driver's license 
(CDL).  J.H. testified at a November 2007 motion hearing to 
withdraw his plea that he was told he would not lose his CDL as 
the result of the plea agreement.  At the hearing before the 
referee, J.H. testified that Attorney Carroll did not represent 
this to him prior to signing the plea agreement, and that he 
learned about the consequences of a controlled substance 
conviction on his CDL after being incarcerated.  Attorney 
Carroll said that as of the date J.H. entered the plea, he knew 
a felony conviction would impact J.H.'s CDL status and the plea 
agreement was modified to attempt to positively impact the CDL 
reinstatement process.   
¶22 On August 20, 2007, on Attorney Carroll's advice, J.H. 
pled guilty to a one-count information charging him with 
possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine.  As part of 
No. 
2011AP1820-D   
 
11 
 
the plea, J.H. gave a "proffer" statement to federal authorities 
regarding his knowledge of criminal activities.  The federal 
prosecutor handling the case testified at the hearing before the 
referee that he had no specific recollection whether any 
sentencing enhancement was sought against J.H. related to 
purportedly untrue statements made by J.H. during the proffer. 
¶23 J.H. testified at the hearing before the referee that 
in mid- to late-October 2007 he met with a supervisor at the 
U.S. probation office and this was the first time he was told he 
had pled guilty to a controlled substance violation that 
involved selling drugs out of his home.  J.H. also testified at 
the hearing before the referee that he had an unclear or 
confused understanding whether he had pled to a felony or a 
misdemeanor because he had been focused on the penalty for the 
conviction being probation.   
¶24 After the meeting with the probation officer, J.H. 
said he contacted Attorney Carroll because he was concerned 
about the statement in the plea agreement that he sold drugs out 
of his home.  In late October 2007, Attorney Carroll filed a 
motion to withdraw J.H.'s plea.  In a supporting brief, Attorney 
Carroll asserted, "It should be noted that [J.H.] was informed 
by the United States attorney that the language of the plea 
agreement, stating that the offense occurred in the home, would 
assure that the conviction would not affect his commercial 
driver's license."  No such assurances were ever made by the 
U.S. attorney. 
No. 
2011AP1820-D   
 
12 
 
¶25 Sentencing in the case was set for November 13, 2007, 
but the court scheduled a hearing for the same date on J.H.'s 
motion to withdraw his plea.  Prior to November 13, 2007, 
Attorney Carroll failed to obtain a written waiver of conflicts 
of interest as related to his representation of J.H. with regard 
to the plea agreement and the events of August 20, 2007.  
Attorney Carroll admitted at the November 13 hearing that there 
could be a conflict of interest between him and his client in 
connection with his representation of J.H. on the motion to 
withdraw J.H.'s guilty plea.   
¶26 Prior to November 13, 2007, Attorney Carroll prepared 
an affidavit for the signature of government witness P.E., 
essentially recanting statements P.E. had made to a DEA agent 
investigating J.H.  Attorney Carroll faxed the affidavit to 
J.H.'s wife and directed J.H. to find P.E. and get him to sign 
the affidavit.  
¶27 J.H.'s trial was rescheduled for December 17, 2007.  
J.H. testified at the hearing before the referee that between 
November 13, 2007, and December 17, 2007, Attorney Carroll did 
not discuss J.H.'s trial testimony, assist in preparing him to 
testify, or discuss the consequences of false trial testimony.  
The OLR offered no proof to corroborate J.H.'s testimony.   
¶28 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Carroll's representation of 
J.H.: 
 
[COUNT FIVE]  By advising [J.H.] prior to or on 
November 13, 2007 to personally obtain the signature 
No. 
2011AP1820-D   
 
13 
 
of [a government witness] on an affidavit, [Attorney] 
Carroll violated SCR 20:1.1.9 
 
[COUNT SIX]  By (i) prior to August 20, 2007, 
failing 
to 
adequately 
discuss 
the 
offered 
plea 
agreement with [J.H.]; (ii) on August 20, 2007, 
failing to adequately and accurately advise [J.H.] of 
the implications of the plea agreement prior to 
signature; (iii) failing to adequately discuss with 
[J.H.] whether [J.H.] should testify at trial; (iv) 
failing to advise [J.H.] of possible civil forfeiture 
implications of stating in the plea agreement that 
[J.H.] had sold narcotics from his home; (v) failing 
to adequately explain to [J.H.] the federal sentencing 
guidelines; 
and 
(vi) 
failing 
to 
advise 
[J.H.] 
regarding the sentence enhancements that would result 
if he was found to have given materially false 
testimony 
at 
trial, 
[Attorney] 
Carroll 
violated 
SCR 20:1.2(a)10 and SCR 20:1.4(b).11 
                                                 
9 SCR 20:1.1 states, "A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client. Competent representation requires 
the 
legal 
knowledge, 
skill, 
thoroughness 
and 
preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation." 
10 SCR 20:1.2(a) provides as follows: 
 
Subject to pars. (c) and (d), a lawyer shall 
abide 
by 
a 
client's 
decisions 
concerning 
the 
objectives of representation and, as required by SCR 
20:1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means 
by which they are to be pursued.  A lawyer may take 
such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly 
authorized to carry out the representation.  A lawyer 
shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a 
matter.  In a criminal case or any proceeding that 
could result in deprivation of liberty, the lawyer 
shall 
abide 
by 
the 
client's 
decision, 
after 
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be 
entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the 
client will testify. 
11 SCR 20:1.4(b) states, "A lawyer shall explain a matter to 
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make 
informed decisions regarding the representation." 
No. 
2011AP1820-D   
 
14 
 
 
[COUNT SEVEN]  By (i) failing to sufficiently 
research the implications of possible convictions on 
[J.H.'s] CDL prior to August 20, 2007; and (ii) 
failing to adequately prepare [Mr. and Mrs. J.H.] to 
testify, [Attorney] Carroll violated SCR 20:1.3. 
 
[COUNT EIGHT]  By representing [J.H.] on the 
Motion to Withdraw his plea when the Motion could be 
based, at least in part, on [Attorney] Carroll's acts 
and omissions with regard to the plea, and failing to 
obtain [J.H.'s] written waiver of those potential 
conflicts, [Attorney] Carroll violated SCR 20:1.7(a).12 
 
[COUNT NINE]  By stating in the Defendant's Brief 
in Support of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea that "it 
should be noted that [J.H.] was informed by the United 
States 
Attorney 
that 
the 
language 
of 
the 
plea 
agreement, stating that the offense occurred in the 
home, would assure that the conviction would not 
affect his commercial driver's license . . . ," when 
[Attorney] Carroll knew that no such assurances had 
been 
made, 
[Attorney] 
Carroll 
violated 
SCR 20:3.3(a)(1).13 
 
[COUNT TEN]  By advising [J.H.] on August 20, 
2007 that the government had made assurances regarding 
                                                 
12 SCR 20:1.7(a) states: 
 
Except as provided in par. (b), a lawyer shall 
not represent a client if the representation involves 
a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent 
conflict of interest exists if: 
 
(1) the representation of one client will be 
directly adverse to another client; or 
 
(2) there 
is 
a 
significant 
risk 
that 
the 
representation 
of 
one 
or 
more 
clients 
will 
be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to 
another client, a former client or a third person or 
by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
13 SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) states that a lawyer shall not knowingly 
"make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously 
made to the tribunal by the lawyer; . . . ." 
No. 
2011AP1820-D   
 
15 
 
[J.H.'s] 
CDL, 
[Attorney] 
Carroll 
violated 
SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶29 The hearing before the referee was held in Manitowoc, 
Wisconsin, on October 23, 24, and 25, 2012.  The referee filed 
his report and recommendation on April 22, 2013.  The referee 
said the testimony of both T.R. and J.H. raised serious 
credibility issues as to various factual matters alleged in the 
OLR's complaint.  The referee said J.H.'s testimony, in 
particular, was problematic as to the facts supporting Counts 
Six, 
Seven, 
and 
Ten, 
because 
his 
testimony 
was 
largely 
uncorroborated by other evidence of record.  The referee said 
although T.R.'s testimony was also suspect at points, there was 
sufficient corroborating evidence in the record for the OLR to 
meet its burden of proof as to the counts involving T.R.   
¶30 The referee said Attorney Carroll's testimony was at 
times credible and at other times less so, but when compared 
head-to-head with J.H.'s testimony, the referee generally found 
Attorney Carroll's testimony more persuasive in the absence of 
other evidence.  The referee found that the OLR met its burden 
of proof as to all counts related to T.R.   
¶31 The referee found that OLR failed to meet its burden 
of proof as to Counts Six, Seven, and Ten.  With respect to 
Counts Six and Seven (failure to inform and advise and failure 
to act with reasonable diligence), the referee said the OLR's 
inability to meet its burden of proof was directly related to 
J.H.'s lack of credibility on crucial facts not supported by 
corroborating evidence.   
No. 
2011AP1820-D   
 
16 
 
¶32 With respect to Count Ten, the referee noted the OLR 
predicated that count upon the allegation that Attorney Carroll 
had advised J.H. that the government made assurances regarding 
J.H.'s CDL.  The referee said that "the disciplinary hearing 
testimony went in another direction."  The referee found that 
the 
evidence 
of 
record 
failed 
to 
establish 
such 
a 
misrepresentation occurred. 
¶33 Turning to the appropriate sanction, the OLR noted 
that Attorney Carroll has a significant disciplinary history, a 
pattern of misconduct in the current case that is similar to 
that present in his prior disciplinary cases, multiple counts of 
misconduct in the current case, a general refusal to acknowledge 
the 
wrongful 
nature 
of 
his 
misconduct, 
and 
substantial 
experience in the practice of law at the time the current 
offenses were committed.  The referee found no dishonest or 
selfish 
motive 
and 
also 
noted 
that 
neither 
victim 
was 
particularly vulnerable.  The referee found no mitigating 
factors with the exception of the remoteness of his prior 
disciplinary cases.   
¶34 The OLR had sought a six-month suspension of Attorney 
Carroll's license.  Attorney Carroll advocated for no suspension 
or a suspension not exceeding 30 days.  The referee said given 
the 
number 
of 
violations 
proven 
and 
Attorney 
Carroll's 
disciplinary history, the sanction suggested by Attorney Carroll 
was inappropriate and unduly lenient.  The referee concluded 
that a five-month suspension was appropriate.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the referee noted that the OLR failed to meet its 
No. 
2011AP1820-D   
 
17 
 
burden of proof as to three of the ten counts alleged in its 
complaint.  The referee found no proof of actual harm resulting 
from Attorney Carroll's misconduct.  The referee noted that both 
T.R. and J.H. were convicted after trials.  T.R.'s convictions 
were appealed.  Although Attorney Carroll failed to properly 
initiate the appeal process in one case, failed to obtain a 
written conflict waiver, and misrepresented certain information 
to T.R., the referee pointed out that the court of appeals 
allowed both appeals to go forward.  Thus, the referee reasoned 
Attorney Carroll's misconduct caused the potential for harm to 
T.R. in the appellate process as opposed to actual harm. 
¶35 The referee noted that J.H. initially entered a plea, 
then successfully withdrew the plea, then was convicted at 
trial.  While the OLR argued that J.H. might have received a 
lesser sentence if the matter had been handled properly, the 
referee noted the assistant U.S. attorney who handled the case 
could not definitively say that J.H. received a harsher sentence 
due to the decision to proceed to trial.   
¶36 The referee also noted a significant period of time 
had 
elapsed 
since 
Attorney 
Carroll's 
last 
disciplinary 
violation.    
¶37 In addition to recommending a five-month suspension, 
the referee recommended that Attorney Carroll be required to 
file with the court a written statement that he has read, 
understands, and agrees to be bound by and obey the court's 
rules concerning professional conduct for attorneys and the 
rules governing disciplinary proceedings.  The referee noted the 
No. 
2011AP1820-D   
 
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OLR did not seek restitution.  The referee deferred to this 
court on the issue of an appropriate award of costs. 
¶38 This court will affirm a referee's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are 
reviewed de novo.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Tully, 
2005 WI 100, ¶25, 283 Wis. 2d 124, 699 N.W.2d 882.  This court 
is free to impose whatever discipline it deems appropriate, 
regardless of the referee's recommendation.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 
N.W.2d 686.   
¶39 We adopt the referee's findings of fact because they 
have not been shown to be clearly erroneous, and we also agree 
with 
the 
referee's 
conclusions 
of 
law. 
 
After 
careful 
consideration of all of the circumstances of this case, we 
further agree with the referee that a five-month suspension of 
Attorney Carroll's license to practice law is an appropriate 
sanction.  
¶40 In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyd, 2009 
WI 59, 318 Wis. 2d 281, 767 N.W.2d 226, an attorney who was 
found to have engaged in 13 counts of misconduct arising out of 
five separate client matters, received a six-month suspension.  
The misconduct included failing to act with diligence and 
promptness in representing a client, failing to keep a client 
informed about the status of a matter, failing to refund a fee 
that was not earned, failing to hold property in trust, failing 
to cooperate with the OLR's investigation, and engaging in acts 
that resulted in a criminal conviction for disorderly conduct.  
No. 
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Attorney Boyd had been licensed to practice law for 20 years and 
had been professionally disciplined on three prior occasions. 
¶41 In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hartigan, 
2005 WI 3, 277 Wis. 2d 341, 690 N.W.2d 831, an attorney who was 
found to have engaged in six counts of misconduct involving two 
separate client matters received a six-month suspension.  The 
misconduct included engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; failing, upon termination of 
representation, 
to 
take 
steps 
to 
the 
extent 
reasonably 
practicable, to protect a client's interests; knowingly making a 
false statement of fact or law to a tribunal; failing to keep a 
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter; and 
failing to cooperate with the OLR's investigation. Attorney 
Hartigan had been practicing law for 15 years and had no prior 
disciplinary history.   
¶42 Since no two cases are precisely analogous, there is 
no "standard" sanction for particular misconduct.  Nevertheless, 
the sanctions imposed in prior cases are instructive in 
fashioning an appropriate remedy for the case at hand.  Attorney 
Carroll has been practicing law for 25 years.  He has been 
privately reprimanded on two occasions, publicly reprimanded on 
two occasions, and was previously suspended for one year.  Ten 
years have elapsed since he was last sanctioned.  The 
professional misconduct at issue here occurred in 2007.  Upon 
consideration of all of the facts of this particular case, we 
agree with the referee that a five-month suspension of Attorney 
No. 
2011AP1820-D   
 
20 
 
Carroll's license to practice law in Wisconsin is an appropriate 
sanction. 
¶43 Attorney Carroll has filed an objection to the 
statement of costs.  He asserts the amount of costs is 
unreasonable since the OLR failed to prove three of the six 
counts related to the J.H. grievance.  He also argues that a 
disproportionate amount of fees and costs relate to the J.H. 
matter.  Attorney Carroll asks that costs be reduced by 50 
percent.   
¶44 The 
court's 
general 
policy 
upon 
a 
finding 
of 
misconduct is to impose all costs on the respondent attorney.  
See SCR 22.24(1m).  Because the case presents no extraordinary 
circumstances, we conclude that Attorney Carroll should be 
required to pay the full costs of this proceeding. 
¶45 We choose not to follow the referee's recommendation 
that Attorney Carroll be required to file a written statement 
that he has read, understands, and agrees to be bound by and 
obey the court's rules concerning professional conduct for 
attorneys and the rules governing disciplinary proceedings.  As 
noted in the Preamble to Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct 
for Attorneys, "Compliance with the rules, as with all law in an 
open society, depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary 
compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public 
opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through 
disciplinary proceedings."  SCR Chapter 20 Preamble, ¶[16]; see 
also id., ¶[7] ("A lawyer should strive to attain the highest 
level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and 
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2011AP1820-D   
 
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to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service.")  
All lawyers who practice law in Wisconsin are bound by the rules 
of professional conduct for attorneys and are presumed to know 
the rules and follow them.  Requiring an attorney to file a 
written statement averring that he or she understands and agrees 
to be bound by the rules is redundant and unnecessary. 
¶46 IT IS ORDERED that the license of John Miller Carroll 
to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of five 
months, effective January 23, 2014. 
¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, John Miller Carroll shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are 
$27,438.26. 
¶48 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that John Miller Carroll shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended.   
¶49 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.28(2). 
 
No.  2011AP1820-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶50 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  Attorney 
Carroll has previously received two private reprimands, two 
public reprimands, and a one-year suspension.  In this case he 
was found to have committed seven counts of professional 
misconduct.  A five-month suspension of his license to practice 
law in Wisconsin is not in keeping with our system of 
progressive discipline.  I would impose a suspension of at least 
six months.1   
¶51 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶52 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
                                                 
1 An attorney whose license is suspended for misconduct for 
six months or more must file a petition for reinstatement.  See 
SCRs 22.28(3) and 22.29. 
No.  2011AP1820-D.ssa 
 
 
 
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