Case Title: Keller v. Branton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-49

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Keller v. Branton1983 WY 76667 P.2d 650Case Number: 83-49Case Number: 83-49Decided: 07/26/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
VAUGHN KELLER AND JEANNE 
KELLER, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

CLIFFORD D. BRANTON AND 
RUTH B. BRANTON, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

Stephen H. 
Kline, Cheyenne, 
for 
appellants.

Wallace L. 
Stock, of Loomis, Lazear, Wilson & Pickett, Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellees brought an 
action to enforce residential protective covenants. The trial court determined 
that the protective convenants were valid, that appellants were subject to them, 
that appellants had knowledge of the covenants and notice of their violation 
prior to completing construction, that appellants had violated the covenants as 
contended by appellees, and that appellees had standing to bring suit to enforce 
the protective covenants. The court then ordered the removal of a front yard 
fence, payment of $300 to correct a drainage problem and awarded attorneys' 
fees.

[¶2.]     Appellants do not 
appeal the trial court's finding that they were in technical violation of the 
protective covenants, but rather the court's findings that they were not excused 
from these violations because of the action or inaction of 
appellees.

[¶3.]     According to 
appellants, the issues before us are whether a suit to enjoin construction must 
be commenced prior to completion of the construction, whether appellees 
themselves were in violation of the protective covenants, whether appellees had 
waived the right to enforce the covenants, and whether the attorneys' fees were 
proper.

[¶4.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶5.]     Appellants and 
appellees are next door neighbors in a subdivision subject to protective 
covenants. Both parties acquired their homes in the forepart of 1981. Later, 
appellants constructed a carport and front yard chain link fence. The 
construction of the carport caused a drainage problem for appellees. Appellees 
sued appellants for violation of the protective covenants and prayed that the 
court order the removal of the carport and the front yard fence, that the 
drainage problem be corrected and that attorneys' fees be 
awarded.

I

[¶6.]     Appellants contend that 
the protective covenants required that a suit to enjoin construction must be 
commenced prior to completion of the wrongful construction, or the covenants 
should be deemed to be fully complied with. Appellants say that since no action 
was brought to enjoin construction of the fence or carport prior to completion 
of the construction, no actionable violation of the covenants 
occurred.

[¶7.]     Section II, paragraph 
1, of the protective covenants provides:

"1. Architectural Control: No building shall 
be erected, placed or altered on any lot until the construction plans and 
specifications and a plan showing the location of the structure have been 
approved by the architectural control committee * * *. No fence or wall shall be 
erected, placed or altered on any lot nearer to any street than the minimum 
building set-back line. There shall be no front yard fencing. Approval shall be 
as provided in paragraph 13."

[¶8.]     Paragraph 13 
provides:

"Procedure: The committee's approval or 
disapproval as required in these covenants shall be in writing. In the event the 
committee, or its designated representative, fails to approve within 30 days 
after plans and specifications have been submitted to it, or in any event, if no 
suit to enjoin the construction has been commenced prior to the completion 
thereof, approval will not be required and the related covenants shall be deemed 
to have been fully complied with."

[¶9.]     The trial court held 
that Section II, paragraphs 1 and 13, of the protective covenants relate to the 
original house construction and not to subsequent remodeling, and that 
paragraphs 1 and 13 did not apply to the construction of the carport and front 
yard fence. The court further determined that there was no evidence that plans 
and specifications had been presented to the Architectural Control Committee for 
approval, and therefore appellants could not rely on paragraph 13 to justify the 
building of the carport and front yard fence.

[¶10.]  Although the trial court found that the 
carport was wrongfully constructed, appellants, for equitable reasons, were not 
required to remove it. The court disposed of this matter in a sensible way. It 
determined that the cost of constructing the carport and the cost of its removal 
outweighed the harm resulting to appellees.

[¶11.]  We agree with the result reached by the 
trial court. Appellants' contention regarding paragraph 13 does not apply to 
construction of the front yard fence because such fence is prohibited by the 
terms of Section II, paragraph 1: "There shall be no front yard fencing." There 
is no provision in the covenants for acquiescence in construction that is 
prohibited. Paragraph 13 is only operative when the Architectural Control 
Committee may approve a deviation from the restrictions. Thus, appellants cannot 
complain if no suit was commenced until construction of the fence was 
completed.

[¶12.]  Interference with drainage is prohibited 
by Section II, paragraph 2, of the protective covenants. Section II, paragraph 
13, obviously is not applicable to a drainage problem, and there is no provision 
in the protective covenants for acquiescence in this type of violation either. 
Accordingly, we must reject appellants' first contention.1

II

[¶13.]  Appellants assert that appellees should 
be denied the equitable relief prayed for because they themselves are in 
violation of the same protective covenants. Appellants, however, are in a poor 
position to appeal to the equitable powers of the court. Within a day of the 
time appellants commenced the construction of the fence and carport, an attorney 
at the request of appellees notified appellants that they were in violation of 
the protective covenants. One of the appellants responded by saying that she did 
not care what the covenants said and that "hell would freeze over before she 
would remove her fence."

[¶14.]  Appellants, nonetheless, assert as a 
defense the "clean hands" doctrine.

"The clean hands doctrine 
is based upon the maxim of equity that he who comes into equity must come with 
clean hands. It provides in substance that no person can obtain affirmative 
relief in equity with respect to a transaction in which he has, himself, been 
guilty of inequitable conduct. [Citation.]" Fuqua v. Hanson, 222 Kan. 653, 567 P.2d 862 
(1977)

[¶15.]  Appellees do not disagree with the "clean 
hands" doctrine but claim they are not in violation of the protective covenants. 
Appellants argue that appellees have a fence on the east side of their house, a 
foot and one-half from the sidewalk, and that a fence is a structure prohibited 
by Section I, paragraph 3, of the protective covenants. Section I, paragraph 
3(C), supra, provides: "No structure shall be located closer than three feet 
from the side lot lines." In the broadest sense, a fence may be said to be a 
structure because it was constructed; however, in the context of the covenants a 
fence cannot be said to be a structure. Also, all the testimony is to the 
contrary. Paul H. Gertsch, the construction supervisor, testified that Section 
I, paragraph 3, refers to residential structures and that a fence is "by no 
means a residential structure," and is not "encroaching on the side building 
line." Peter J. Hutchison, Engineer and Land Surveyor, testified that in the 
context of Section I, paragraph 3(C), a fence is not considered a structure. 
Furthermore, a side yard fence is not prohibited by the covenants as is a front 
yard fence.

[¶16.]  Appellants also claim that appellees 
violated Section II, paragraph 1, of the protective covenants, which states that 
"no fence or wall shall be erected, placed or altered on any lot nearer to any 
street than the minimum building set back line." Mr. John A. Steil, a land 
surveyor, testified that the policy in the City of Cheyenne is that yards on 
a corner lot consist of certain set-back lines, in this case approximately 25 
feet. Since the wooden fence on the east side of appellees' property is nearer 
to the street than 25 feet, appellants argue that appellees are in violation of 
Section II, paragraph 1.

[¶17.]  Considering Mr. Steil's testimony, 
appellees may have violated a city zoning ordinance; however, city ordinances 
are not at issue here. In any event, William A. Thomas, City Zoning Officer of 
the City of Cheyenne, Wyoming, testified that with regard to the minimum 
building set-back line, appellees were in compliance with the city ordinance and 
the covenants in issue. Mr. Hutchison testified that Section I, paragraph 2 
(apparently the witness was referring to Section II, paragraph 1), did not apply 
to the east side of appellees' property facing Hays Avenue, but that Section I, 
paragraph 3, applied, and appellees were not in violation of the 
covenants.

[¶18.]  Appellants assert that appellees are in 
violation of Section II, paragraph 5, because their trailer is parked in their 
side yard, and in violation of Section II, paragraph 11(A), regarding planting a 
lawn. However, the evidence is that neither section was violated. First, there 
was testimony that the trailer was parked in the back yard. Also, appellees 
testified that seed had not been planted in this specific area because of 
interference by appellants.

[¶19.]  Finally, appellants raise the issue of 
appellees' violation of Section II, paragraph 10, regarding sight distance at 
intersections, but presented no evidence to support the allegation. However, Mr. 
Hutchison testified that appellees were not in violation of this provision of 
the covenants.

[¶20.]  We find that the record is sufficient to 
sustain the trial court's finding that appellants failed to prove that appellees 
had violated the covenants, and that appellants had deliberately violated the 
covenants in a substantial manner.

III

[¶21.]  Appellants assert that appellees waived 
the right to enforce the alleged covenant violations by their acquiescence in 
and failure to object to similar violations by other residents of the 
subdivision.

[¶22.]  In appellants' third assignment of error 
they urge that the doctrine of laches should prevent appellees from obtaining 
the injunctive relief prayed for and awarded by the court, that is, the removal 
of the front yard fence. In determining what constitutes a waiver of a 
protective covenant, laches or estoppel, each case must stand on its own facts. 
Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. 
Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, Utah, 535 P.2d 1256 (1975). Whether 
acquiescence in the violation of restrictions will defeat a right to equitable 
relief also depends upon the circumstances of each case. Frequent violations of 
covenants by property owners have been found to constitute justification for 
courts to refuse to enforce the same covenants against other violators. Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747, 68 A.L.R.Fed. 1229 (1974).

[¶23.]  According to the testimony there were 157 
lots in the subdivision, and approximately 120 to 130 homes had been built at 
the time of trial. Twenty of these homes had some kind of front yard fence. 
There was evidence that the structures denominated fences were decorative 
structures and were really not fences in the ordinary sense, that is, indicating 
boundaries or holding something in or out.

[¶24.]  To warrant a refusal of equitable relief 
against breaches of a protective covenant, the breaches acquiesced in must 
ordinarily be so great, or so fundamental or radical as to neutralize the 
benefits of the restriction to the point of defeating the purpose of the 
covenant. In other words, the violations must be so substantial as to support a 
finding that the usefulness of the covenant has been destroyed, or that the 
covenant has become valueless and onerous to the property owners. Riley v. Stoves, supra. Furthermore, 
"[f]or a change in neighborhood to justify termination of an equitable 
servitude, such change must be of a radical and permanent nature." 7 Thompson on 
Real Property, § 3174 (Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. (1962)). Finally, "[t]he 
burden of proving such a change in the neighborhood is on the party attacking 
the restrictive covenant." Moore v. 
McDaniel, 48 Ill. App.3d 152, 5 Ill.Dec. 911, 362 N.E.2d 382 
(1977).

[¶25.]  Thus, in order to prove that the general 
scheme has been abandoned, it must be shown that the plan has been violated to 
such an extent as would reasonably lead to the conclusion that it has been 
abandoned. Where a violation is immaterial, minor, unoffensive, or remote from 
the land, no acquiescence will be presumed. 7 Thompson on Real Property, supra, 
§ 3173. 

[¶26.]  The failure of a property owner to take 
action for violations that do not affect him does not constitute waiver by the 
individual owner. 7 Thompson on Real Property, supra, § 3175. In order for 
appellants to prevail under the theory of "change of neighborhood" it is 
necessary for them to develop the circumstances that would warrant its 
application. Kindler v. Anderson, 
Wyo., 433 P.2d 268 (1967). The trial court found that appellants failed to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that appellees had acquiesced in the building 
of any of the front yard fences. We agree with the court's determination that 
appellants failed in their burden of proof.

IV

[¶27.]  Section II, paragraph 15, of the 
protective covenants provides for the recovery for attorneys' fees which arise 
from an action to enforce any of the covenants. Appellants raise the issue of 
the propriety of attorneys' fees, asserting that they were unjustified because 
appellants were not in violation of the covenants and that therefore an action 
was not necessary to enforce the covenants. Because of our determination that 
appellants were in violation of the covenants and that there had been no waiver, 
estoppel or acquiescence in the violation by appellees, the action to enforce 
the covenants was justified. The basis for appellants' objection to attorneys' 
fees has been decided adversely to them. Since appellants raise no objection 
regarding reasonableness of the amount of the attorneys' fees, we affirm the 
trial court on this issue.

[¶28.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The trial court made no 
finding whether or not appellees commenced their action to enjoin construction 
before appellants completed their fence or carport. This determination was not 
necessary in view of its ruling.