Case Title: Jones v. State ex rel. Wyoming Dept. of Transp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98-262

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-12-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jones v. State ex rel. Wyoming Dept. of Transp.1999 WY 160991 P.2d 1251Case Number: 98-262Decided: 12/07/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
MICHAEL SANDERS JONES, Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, ex 
rel., WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee 
(Respondent).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Carbon County, Honorable Kenneth E. Stebner, 
Judge.

R. Michael Vang 
of Kirkwood, Nelson & Vang, P.C., Laramie, Wyoming, representing 
Appellant.

Gay Woodhouse, 
Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Clinton D. 
Beaver, Senior Assistant Attorney General, representing 
Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Michael Sanders 
Jones (Jones) appeals from the district court's order affirming the Office of 
Administrative Hearing's (OAH) decision to uphold the per se suspension of 
Jones' driver's license for driving while under the influence of alcohol. Jones 
argues he was denied his constitutional rights to due process and confrontation 
of witnesses when he did not receive discovery until the day before the hearing 
and the arresting officer did not attend the hearing.

[¶2]      Jones was not 
entitled to the discovery he received on the day before the hearing, he did not 
subpoena the arresting officer, and he did not ask for a continuance after 
learning the officer would not attend the hearing. Therefore, we affirm the 
decision of the district court.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Jones presents 
the following issues for our review:

I. Does Wyoming 
Statute § 31-6-105(e) apply to implied consent hearings?

II. Did the 
hearing examiner err in denying Appellant's motion for a continuance based on 
Appellant's due process claim?

III. Was the 
Appellant's due process right to cross examination and right to confrontation of 
the only witness against him violated where the record indicated the arresting 
officer had been subpoenaed but he did not appear for the contested case 
hearing?

The Wyoming 
Department of Transportation (Department) responds with this statement of the 
issues:

1. Did the 
Hearing Examiner commit reversible error in denying Appellant's fourth motion to 
continue the evidentiary hearing after having granted Appellant's three previous 
motions for continuances?

2. Was Appellant 
denied his right to confront and cross-examine the arresting officer, because 
the state did not call the arresting officer as a witness at the evidentiary 
hearing?

FACTS

[¶4]      A Saratoga police 
officer noticed Jones stopped in the middle of the road and with his headlights 
off at 10:49 p.m. on July 26, 1997. Upon investigation, the officer determined 
Jones was intoxicated and arrested him for driving while under the influence in 
violation of the municipal ordinance which substantially conforms with Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233 (LEXIS 1999). Following his arrest, Jones submitted to a 
chemical breath test, with readings taken at 11:26 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. The 
results of the test showed an alcohol concentration of 0.16 percent. Based on 
those results, the arresting officer gave Jones a notice of suspension which 
informed him that his license would be suspended for ninety days pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-103(b) (LEXIS 1999). The notice also informed him of his 
right to request a contested case hearing before the OAH.

[¶5]      Jones requested a 
contested case hearing pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-103 (LEXIS 1999). The 
Department referred the case to the OAH for hearing on August 26, 1997. On 
September 3, 1997, the OAH set the case for hearing to be held on October 15, 
1997. That hearing was vacated and continued three times because Jones' 
attorneys withdrew from the case. On December 19, 1997, Jones filed another 
motion for continuance because his expert witness had a scheduling conflict and 
he had not yet received requested discovery information for review by his expert 
witness. The OAH denied the motion for continuance, finding no good reason for 
further delay because the hearing had been continued three times, Jones' current 
attorney had a month to prepare for the hearing, and he had agreed to the date 
of the hearing.

[¶6]      After the 
December 23, 1997, hearing, the hearing examiner upheld the per se suspension of 
Jones' license. Jones filed a petition for judicial review with the district 
court. The district court determined the hearing examiner did not err in denying 
the continuance, Jones was not entitled to the information he was requesting, 
and Jones was not denied his right to confront and cross-examine the arresting 
officer because he did not subpoena the officer to ensure his attendance at the 
hearing. Jones filed a timely appeal with this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.

DISCUSSIOIN

Standard of 
Review

[¶7]      Our review of 
administrative action is limited to a determination of the matters specified in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 1999):

To the extent 
necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole 
record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of 
the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

* * 
*

(ii) Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D) Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or

(E) Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

[¶8]      The basic 
underlying facts in this case are undisputed, leaving only questions of law, 
which we review de novo. Jones contends the district court erred when it 
determined Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-103(c) limits the discovery available for a 
contested case hearing. He also contends that if the statute limits discovery, 
it violates his constitutional right to due process. As his third issue, he 
argues that the absence of the arresting officer at the hearing violated his 
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses.

Discovery 
Requests

[¶9]      Before the 
contested case hearing, Jones requested information concerning the equipment 
used to perform the chemical breath analysis, the Intoximeter 3000. He requested 
a continuance of the hearing on December 19, 1997, because he had not received 
the requested information. The OAH denied his motion on the same day. Jones 
contends the denial of his motion was reversible error because he was not able 
to defend himself by challenging the test results. Because Jones' motion for 
continuance was based on his belief that he was entitled to discovery before the 
contested case hearing, our resolution of the discovery issue also resolves the 
continuance issue.

[¶10]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-103 (LEXIS 
1999) provides for a contested case hearing before a license is suspended 
pursuant to our implied consent law. Section 31-6-103(c) 
states:

Prehearing 
discovery, available to any interested party is limited to access to the notice 
of suspension, signed statement and any accompanying documentation submitted by 
the arresting officer. Other types of discovery available under other law are 
not available in a hearing under this section.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-6-103(c) (LEXIS 1999) (emphasis added). 

[¶11]   However, Jones argues his request 
for information was authorized by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-105(e) (LEXIS 1999), 
which provides:

Upon the request 
of a person who submits to a chemical test or tests at the request of a peace 
officer, full information concerning the test or tests shall be made available 
to the person or his attorney.

Although the 
information Jones requested may be available to him pursuant to section - 
105(e), it clearly is not discoverable information in a contested case hearing 
under section -103(c). The district court correctly determined that the limited 
discovery provision in the section providing for the contested case hearing 
controls contested case practice. Contrary to Jones' contention that this 
interpretation renders section - 105(e) meaningless, the broader scope of 
information provided for by section - 105(e) is available for use in criminal 
trials. In fact, if the broad discovery allowed by section - 105(e) was allowed 
in a contested case, section - 103(c) would be rendered 
meaningless.

[¶12]   Jones further contends that if Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-6-103(c) is used to limit discovery in a contested case, the 
statute is unconstitutional because the legislature lacks the authority to limit 
discovery in a contested case hearing. He bases that contention on the 
procedural due process rights that apply to the suspension of a driver's license 
and his right to defend himself through access to the courts in accordance with 
Article 1, § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution.

[¶13]   In Miller v. Schwartz, 528 N.E.2d 507 (N.Y. 1988), Miller tried to compel discovery relating to the radar device 
used when he was charged with a speeding violation, claiming limited discovery 
unconstitutionally deprived him of due process of law. Id. at 508. The New York 
Court of Appeals held:

It is settled, 
however, that there is no general constitutional right to discovery in criminal 
cases (see, Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S. Ct. 837, 84[6], 51 L. Ed. 2d 30 [1977]) or administrative proceedings (see, National Labor Relations 
Bd. v. Interboro Contrs., 2 Civ., 432 F.2d 854, 857-858 [2nd Cir. 1970], cert. 
denied 402 U.S. 915, 91 S. Ct. 1375, 28 L. Ed. 2d 661 [1971]). Such matters are 
regulated by statute or rule and since petitioner had no statutory or regulatory 
right to pretrial discovery here, his request was properly 
denied.

Id.

[¶14]   Similarly, in implied consent 
contested case hearings, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-103(c) limits discovery and 
there is no constitutional right for broader discovery. Jones was not entitled 
to discovery of the information concerning the Intoximeter 3000, and his 
constitutional rights were not implicated when he did not receive the 
information until the day before the hearing.

Right to 
Confront Arresting Officer

[¶15]   Jones contends his due process 
right to confront and cross-examine the only witness against him was violated 
when the arresting officer did not appear for the hearing. Jones assumed that 
because a document in the certified record indicated a subpoena was issued for 
the contested case hearing, he did not have to subpoena the arresting officer. 
However, the subpoenas issued to the arresting officer were issued for the first 
two scheduled hearings. No subpoenas were issued for the hearing scheduled for 
November or the December 23, 1997, hearing.

[¶16]   A driver's constitutional rights to 
confront and cross-examine the arresting officer are satisfied by the driver's 
ability to subpoena the officer. Dept. of Rev. and Taxation v. Hull, 751 P.2d 351, 355 (Wyo. 1988). If the hearing officer affords the driver the opportunity 
to secure the attendance of the arresting officer, due process has been made 
available. Id. The notice of suspension and temporary license form given to 
Wyoming drivers by the arresting officer advises the driver of his right to 
subpoena the officer, stating "[i]f you want the peace officer at the hearing, 
you must specifically request that the officer be subpoenaed and you will be 
liable for any expenses incurred because of the subpoena." The only reason Jones 
was not able to confront and cross-examine the officer was his own failure to 
utilize his right to subpoena the officer to secure his attendance at the 
hearing. He was not denied due process.

[¶17]   Jones contends he was misled into 
believing a subpoena was issued. Even if this were so, he admits he knew the day 
before the hearing that the officer was not going to be present. Yet he failed 
to request a continuance or to attempt to serve the officer with a subpoena 
before the hearing. Jones' failure to act does not amount to denial of due 
process.

The Observation 
Period

[¶18]   As a final matter, Jones contends 
he needed the discovery information and to question the arresting officer in 
order to challenge the breath test results. Specifically, he relies on State v. 
McCaslin, 894 S.W.2d 310, 311-12 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1994), to argue the officer did 
not properly observe him for twenty minutes prior to the test. McCaslin held 
that since the officer could not "say with certainty that the defendant did not 
regurgitate while out of his view in the backseat of the patrol car," the breath 
test was not admissible. Id.

[¶19]   Jones fails to recognize that the 
requirements for the observation period in McCaslin mirror the requirements 
found on the checklist for the breath test in this case, which the arresting 
officer completed and signed under oath. Id. at 311. The hearing examiner's 
conclusions of law included the following:

The Wyoming 
Chemical Testing Program Intoximeter 3000 Operational Checklist is the method 
approved for performing chemical analysis pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 31-6-105 
(1991). One part of the checklist is the requirement that the subject be 
observed, and not allowed to engage in certain activities, for 20 minutes prior 
to testing. The checklist in this case proves Licensee was observed for 37 
minutes (2249 hours to 2326 hours) prior to testing.

The officer's 
sworn statement that he observed Jones, and Jones did not engage in the 
activities which might affect the result of the test, distinguishes this case 
from McCaslin, where the officer could not make that statement with certainty. 
Id.

CONCLUSION

[¶20]   Discovery in an implied consent 
contested case hearing is limited to the information allowed pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-6-103(c) (LEXIS 1999). Jones was not entitled to the information 
he requested and therefore was not entitled to a continuance when the Department 
failed to provide him with that information until the day before the hearing. 
Jones had the opportunity to subpoena the arresting officer for the hearing, but 
failed to do so. He was not denied his constitutional right to due process when 
the officer was not present at the hearing. We affirm the order upholding the 
ninety day suspension of his license.