Case Title: Commonwealth v. Laltaprasad

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11970

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-10-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11970 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  IMRAN LALTAPRASAD. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 5, 2016. - October 14, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
 
Massachusetts Sentencing Commission.  Practice, Criminal, 
Sentence, Judicial discretion.  Supreme Judicial Court, 
Superintendence of inferior courts.  Controlled Substances. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on August 20, 2015.  
 
 
The case was reported by Cordy, J.  
 
 
 
Thomas C. Maxim, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Matthew R. Segal (Keith J. Nicholson, Adriana Lafaille, & 
Nancy Gertner with him) for the defendant. 
 
Benjamin H. Keehn & Paul R. Rudof, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, & Barbara J. Dougan, Michael B. Keating, 
Daniel N. Marx, & Daniel McFadden, for Committee for Public 
Counsel Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Emma Quinn-Judge, Monica R. Shah, & Daniel K. Gelb, for The 
Constitution Project & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  In this case we consider whether G. L. 
c. 211E, § 3 (e), authorizes a sentencing judge to depart from 
the mandatory minimum terms specified by statute for subsequent 
drug offenses.  We conclude that because the Legislature has not 
yet enacted into law sentencing guidelines recommended by the 
Massachusetts Sentencing Commission (commission), a sentencing 
judge currently may not impose a sentence that departs from the 
prescribed mandatory minimum term.  We do not reach in this case 
the constitutional claims that the defendant has raised for the 
first time in this court.2   
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services; Families Against Mandatory 
Minimums; American Friends Service Committee, Arise for Social 
Justice; Black and Pink; Blackstonian; Brookline PAX; Center for 
Church and Prison, Inc.; Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for 
Race and Justice; Coalition for Effective Public Safety; 
Coalition for Social Justice; Community Resources for Justice; 
Criminal Justice Policy Coalition; Ex-Prisoners and Prisoners 
Organizing for Community Advancement; Families for Justice as 
Healing; Greater Boston Interfaith Organization; Greater Boston 
Legal Services; Jewish Alliance for Law and Social Action; Jobs 
Not Jails; Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Economic 
Justice; Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; 
Massachusetts Black Lawyers Association; Massachusetts 
Conference of the United Church of Christ; Massachusetts 
Institute for a New Commonwealth; Massachusetts Law Reform 
Institute; Massachusetts Organization for Addition Recovery; 
NAACP, New England Area Conference; National Association of 
Social Workers, Massachusetts Chapter; National Lawyers Guild; 
Massachusetts Chapter; New Start Project; Out Now; Partakers; 
Prison Policy Initiative; Prisoners' Legal Services of 
Massachusetts; Real Cost of Prisons Project; Social Workers for 
Peace and Justice; South Asian Bar Association of Greater 
Boston; Span; Trinity Chapel; Union of Minority Neighborhoods; 
and Universalist Unitarian Mass Action.  We also acknowledge the 
amicus brief submitted by the Constitution Project, Drug Policy 
Alliance, and National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.   
3 
 
 
Background.  In August, 2013, a Middlesex County grand jury 
indicted the defendant, Imran Laltaprasad, on a charge of 
possession with intent to distribute heroin, subsequent offense, 
G. L. c. 94C, § 32 (a), (b); and two charges of possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine, subsequent offense, G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32A (c), (d).  In July, 2015, a jury found the defendant 
guilty of possession with intent to distribute heroin, and one 
count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine; the 
defendant was found not guilty on the other count of that crime.3  
The defendant pleaded guilty to the subsequent offense portion 
of each of these charges.  See G. L. c. 94C, §§ 32 (b) (heroin), 
32A (d) (cocaine).  Both counsel presented their sentencing 
recommendations,4 and after hearing, the trial judge stated that 
                     
 
3 The facts underlying the charges, in summary, are the 
following.  The defendant was arrested in 2013 by Somerville 
police officers who were conducting surveillance of the home of 
a resident in the city.  The defendant picked up the resident 
from her house, drove in a short loop, then let her out of the 
automobile in front of her house.  The police stopped the 
resident and found six small bags of cocaine on her person.  
Police then stopped and subsequently searched the defendant, 
finding $350 in cash and, inside the defendant's prosthetic leg, 
ten small bags of cocaine weighing an unknown amount (the police 
had mixed the cocaine found on the defendant with the cocaine 
recovered from the resident), and two small bags of heroin 
weighing a total of 0.81 grams.   
 
 
4 The Commonwealth recommended concurrent sentences of from 
three and one-half to five years on the two convictions; the 
defendant recommended that the judge depart downward from the 
statutory mandatory minimum, and if the judge were to determine 
that she had no discretion to depart, that she sentence the 
defendant to concurrent sentences of from three and one-half 
years to three and one-half years and one day.   
4 
 
she would depart downward from the mandatory minimum sentence 
provisions of the two subsequent offense statutes, each of which 
requires a minimum term of three and one-half years in State 
prison, and would impose instead a sentence of two and one-half 
years in a house of correction.  In a written memorandum of 
decision, the trial judge explained her reasons:   
 
"(1) The defendant does not have a prior conviction for 
drug trafficking at seriousness levels 7 or 8; and  
 
 
"(2) The facts and circumstances surrounding this matter 
warrant a lesser sentence.  Specifically, the defendant was 
arrested with less than 1 gram of the controlled 
substances.  Further the defendant was severely injured 
when another individual shot a firearm at him.  He suffered 
11 gunshot wounds and endured 21 surgeries prior to trial.  
The defendant also lost his leg and sustained serious 
abdominal damage due to those injuries.  Evidence of his 
current medical condition was presented at trial.  Given 
both the relatively small amount of contraband involved in 
the arrest and the extreme medical condition of the 
defendant, the Court will depart downward and impose a 
sentence of 2.5 years in the House of Correction."   
 
 
On July 30, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a motion to 
reconsider the sentences imposed, which the judge denied.  The 
Commonwealth then filed in the county court a petition for 
relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  In October, 2015, the 
single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court 
without decision.   
 
Discussion.  1.  Statutory authority.  The sentencing 
provisions of three statutes are at issue in this case.  The 
first two are the statutory drug crimes of which the defendant 
was convicted:  possession of heroin with intent to distribute, 
5 
 
second or subsequent offense, G. L. c. 94C, § 32 (b); and 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, second or 
subsequent offense, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (d).  Upon a defendant's 
conviction and regardless of the amount of heroin or cocaine 
involved, the Legislature has prescribed in each of these 
statutes a mandatory minimum period of incarceration, three and 
one-half years, to be served in State prison.5   
The third statute, G. L. c. 211E, § 3 (e), is part of a 
chapter of the General Laws entitled "Massachusetts Sentencing 
                     
 
5 General Laws c. 94C, § 32 (b), provides in relevant part:   
 
"Any person convicted of violating this section after one 
or more prior convictions of manufacturing, distributing, 
dispensing or possessing with the intent to manufacture, 
distribute, or dispense . . . [heroin] shall be punished by 
a term of imprisonment in the state prison for not less 
than [three and one-half] nor more than fifteen years.  No 
sentence imposed under the provisions of this section shall 
be for less than a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment 
of [three and one-half] years and a fine of not less than 
two thousand and five hundred nor more than twenty-five 
thousand dollars may be imposed but not in lieu of the 
mandatory minimum [three and one-half] year term of 
imprisonment, as established herein."   
 
General Laws c. 94C § 32A (d), provides in relevant part:   
 
"Any person convicted of violating the provisions of 
subsection (c) [of G. L. c. 94C § 32A,] after one or more 
prior convictions of manufacturing, distributing, 
dispensing or possessing with the intent to manufacture, 
distribute, or dispense [cocaine] . . . shall be punished 
by a term of imprisonment in the state prison for not less 
than [three and one-half] nor more than fifteen years and a 
fine of not less than two thousand five hundred nor more 
than twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed but not in 
lieu of the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, as 
established herein."   
6 
 
Commission" that was added by the Legislature in 1996.  See St. 
1996, c. 12, § 9 (1996 act).  Section 3 of c. 211E focuses 
specifically on the responsibility of the commission to 
recommend sentencing guidelines for use in the District Court, 
the Boston Municipal Court, and the Superior Court.  See St. 
1993, c. 432, § 1 (a).  Although the sentence ranges to be set 
by the guidelines are to be presumptive in most circumstances, 
§ 3 (e) provides:   
"Except for the crimes set forth in [G. L. c. 265, § 1, 
(murder)], the sentencing judge may depart from the range 
established by the sentencing guidelines and impose a 
sentence below any mandatory minimum term prescribed by 
statute if the judge sets forth in writing reasons for 
departing from that range on a sentencing statement . . . 
based on a finding that there exists one or more mitigating 
circumstances that should result in a sentence different 
from the one otherwise prescribed by the guidelines and 
below any applicable mandatory minimum term."   
 
The trial judge did not expressly reference G. L. c. 211E, 
§ 3 (e), in sentencing the defendant or in her sentencing 
memorandum, but the record indicates that in departing from the 
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions, she relied on § 3 (e) 
for authority to do so.  The Commonwealth argues that the judge 
lacked authority to reach this result because the mandatory 
minimum sentence departure authorization in § 3 (e) only becomes 
operative when the commission's recommended sentencing 
guidelines are "enacted into law" by legislative vote, as 
7 
 
mandated by c. 211E, § 3 (a) (1),6 and the Legislature has not 
done so to date.  The defendant argues, however, that the plain 
language of § 3 (e) authorizes judges to depart from mandatory 
minimum sentences independently of the enactment of any 
sentencing guidelines and, even if § 3 (e)'s language and 
meaning were not so clear, applicable principles of statutory 
interpretation compel a construction that allows judges to 
depart downward from mandatory minimum sentences.  For the 
reasons that follow, we are constrained to agree with the 
Commonwealth.   
 
a.  History of G. L. c. 211E, § 3.  Chapter 211E has its 
origins in earlier legislation, specifically, St. 1993, c. 432 
(1993 act).  The 1993 act created the commission as an 
independent commission within the judicial branch for the 
purpose of "recommend[ing] sentencing policies and practices for 
the commonwealth," St. 1993, c. 432, § 2, including, in 
particular, recommended sentencing guidelines to be used by 
trial courts in every criminal case.  Id. at § 3 (a) (1), (2).  
The guidelines were to establish a target sentence for each 
offense within a range to be set by the commission with a 
                     
6 Section 3 (a) (1) of G. L. c. 211E provides:   
 
"The commission, by affirmative vote of at least six 
members of the commission and consistent with all pertinent 
provisions of this chapter and existing law, shall 
recommend sentencing guidelines, which shall take effect 
only if enacted into law" (emphasis added).   
8 
 
maximum range not greater than the maximum penalty established 
by statute for the offense, and a minimum no less than two-
thirds of the maximum, and not "below any mandatory minimum term 
prescribed by statute."  See id. at § 3 (a) (3) (C), (e).  
However, with the exception of murder, a judge in imposing a 
sentence would be entitled to "impose a sentence below any 
mandatory minimum term prescribed by statute," provided the 
judge set forth the reasons in a sentencing memorandum.  Id. at 
§ 3 (e).7  Section 5 of the 1993 act directed the commission to 
submit to the Legislature "initial sentencing guidelines" within 
twelve months of the act's effective date, and further stated 
that "[t]he guidelines shall take effect only if enacted into 
law."8  St. 1993, c. 432, § 5.   
                     
 
7 Section 3 (e) of St. 1993, c. 432 (1993 act), provides in 
relevant part:   
 
"The maximum sentence within the range established by the 
sentencing guidelines for each offense shall not exceed the 
maximum penalty for the offense as set forth in the General 
Laws.  The minimum sentence within said range shall not be 
below any mandatory minimum term prescribed by statute.  
However, except for the crimes set forth in [G. L. c. 265, 
§ 1, (murder)] the sentencing judge may depart from said 
range, and impose a sentence below any mandatory minimum 
term prescribed by statute, if the judge sets forth in 
writing reasons for departing from that range, on a 
sentencing statement . . . based on a finding that there 
exists one or more mitigating circumstances that should 
result in a sentence different from the one otherwise 
prescribed by the guidelines and below any applicable 
mandatory minimum term."   
 
 
8 In September, 1995, the commission sought an extension of 
its deadline to April, 1996.  See Commonwealth v. Russo, 421 
9 
 
 
In November, 1995, this court decided Commonwealth v. 
Russo, 421 Mass. 317 (1995), a case that answered two questions 
reported by a District Court judge concerning § 3 of the 1993 
act:  (1) whether § 3 (e) allowed a sentencing judge to impose a 
sentence that departed from a statutorily prescribed mandatory 
minimum sentence if the judge were to find one or more 
mitigating circumstances warranted the departure; and (2) if so, 
whether the authority of a judge to so depart became operative 
only on the promulgation of sentencing guidelines.  Id. at 319.  
The court answered that § 3 (e) was clearly intended, "at some 
time, to empower judges with discretion to impose a sentence 
below a mandatory minimum sentence established by statute."  Id. 
at 322.  However, based on the "plain and unambiguous language," 
id. at 323, of the statute, "§ 3 (e) of the [1993 act] is 
addressed to judges acting at some future time -- a time after 
the commission recommends guidelines, and after those guidelines 
are accepted by the Legislature and enacted into law."  Id.   
                                                                  
Mass. 317, 322 n.5 (1995).  On April 10, 1996, the commission 
submitted recommended sentencing guidelines.  Massachusetts 
Sentencing Commission, Report to the General Court (1996) 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/admin/sentcomm/ 
sentencing-comm-report-to-the-general-court-96.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R8XL-DFA4].  The suggested guidelines in the 
report were incorporated into proposed sentencing guidelines 
legislation, which is still pending before the Legislature.  
Massachusetts Sentencing Guidelines, Sentencing Guide (Feb. 
1998), http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/admin/sentcomm/guide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FX59-JKPX].   
10 
 
The Legislature passed St. 1996, c. 12 (1996 act), a few 
months after Russo was decided.  The 1996 act repealed the 
sections of the 1993 act that pertained to the commission, see 
St. 1996, c. 12, § 16, and effectively replaced those provisions 
with G. L. c. 211E, inserted into the General Laws by § 9 of the 
1996 act.  Most, but not all, sections of c. 211E are identical, 
in substance and frequently in language, to the repealed 
sentencing commission provisions of the 1993 act.  Compare G. L. 
c. 211E, §§ 1-3, as enacted by St. 1996, c. 12, § 9, with St. 
1993, c. 432, §§ 1-5.9  Of particular relevance here is the 
comparison between c. 211E, § 3 (a) (1), and St. 1993, c. 432, 
§§ 3 (e) and 5.  Both c. 211E, § 3 (e), and § 3 (e) of the 1993 
act, using the same language, authorize a sentencing judge to 
depart from a statutorily prescribed mandatory minimum sentence 
on any charge except murder, based on the judge's written 
"finding that there exists one or more mitigating circumstances 
that should result in a sentence different from the one 
otherwise prescribed by the guidelines and below any applicable 
                     
 
9 Thus, G. L. c. 211E, § 1, establishes the Massachusetts 
Sentencing Commission (commission) and outlines its powers and 
duties -- compare St. 1993, c. 432, § 1; c. 211E, § 2, defines 
the purposes the commission is intended to fulfill -- compare 
St. 1993, c. 432, § 2; c. 211E, § 3, describes the sentencing 
guidelines to be prepared and recommended by the commission, and 
also how the guidelines are to function once in effect -- 
compare St. 1993, c. 432, § 3; and c. 211E, § 4, preserves a 
defendant's and the Commonwealth’s right to appeal a sentence in 
certain circumstances -- compare St. 1993, c. 432, § 4.   
 
11 
 
mandatory minimum term."  And both provide that the commission's 
recommended sentencing guidelines "shall take effect only if 
enacted into law."  See G. L. c. 211E, § 3 (a) (1); St. 1993, 
c. 432, § 5.10   
The salient difference between the provisions relating to 
the commission in the 1993 act and in G. L. c. 211E is that the 
1993 act expressly prohibited the commission from proposing 
guidelines that contained recommended minimum sentence ranges 
below any mandatory minimum sentence imposed by statute, see St. 
1993, c. 432, § 3 (e), whereas c. 211E, § 3 (c), lifted this bar 
and specifically authorized the commission to recommend 
guidelines that departed from mandatory minimum or maximum 
sentence terms set by the Legislature.  After the 1996 act was 
passed by both legislative branches, the then Governor, William 
F. Weld, vetoed or disapproved certain sections that related to 
the sentencing guidelines.  He indicated that his veto was based 
on his belief that the commission should not be empowered to 
recommend sentencing guidelines that ignored the legislatively 
set mandatory minimum terms.  See Letter from the Governor to 
                     
10 Further, G. L. c. 211E and the 1993 act both provide that 
following the effective date of any sentencing guidelines 
enacted by the Legislature, any amendments to the guidelines are 
only to take effect "if enacted into law."  See G. L. c. 211E, 
§ 3 (g); St. 1993, c. 432, § 3 (g).   
 
12 
 
the Legislature, 1996 House Doc. No. 5843, at 1-2.11  The 
Legislature voted to override the Governor's veto, and therefore 
St. 1996, c. 12, § 9, in its entirety became law as G. L. 
c. 211E.   
 
b.  Authority to depart from mandatory minimum sentence 
terms.  The Russo case addressed whether the 1993 act permitted 
a judge to deviate from a mandatory minimum sentence term before 
the Legislature enacted sentencing guidelines recommended by the 
commission; we concluded that judicial deviation was not 
authorized.  Russo, 421 Mass. at 319.  In effect, the present 
case raises the same question in relation to the 1996 act, and 
G. L. c. 211E, § 3 (e), in particular.  The Commonwealth argues 
that given the nearly identical language in the 1993 act and 
c. 211E, § 3 (e), Russo controls and requires the same answer.  
The defendant disagrees, arguing that Russo considered a 
different statute, one that was uncodified, and considered it at 
a time before the commission had recommended any sentencing 
guidelines.   
                     
11 In his letter explaining his partial vetoes, the then 
Governor, William F. Weld, explained his disapproval of the 
provision in the 1996 act empowering the commission to disregard 
mandatory minimum sentences, but he did not indicate any 
disagreement with the provision in G. L. c. 211E, § 3 (e), 
authorizing judges to depart from mandatory minimum sentence 
terms.  In fact, the Governor had approved and signed the 1993 
act, which included the same provision authorizing judicial 
departures from mandatory minimum sentences.   
13 
 
 
It is true that Russo considered an uncodified act, and we 
consider in this case a statute that is codified.  However, 
"[t]he same standards of construction are applicable to both 
codified and uncodified provisions of the General Laws."  Chin 
v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 532 (2015).12  There does not appear 
to be any meaningful distinction between the 1993 act and G. L. 
c. 211E based on the different codification status of the two 
enactments.   
 
Apart from the codification issue, however, the defendant 
is correct that Russo does not directly control our inquiry in 
this case because the provisions of G. L. c. 211E that we 
consider here are part of a different statute from the one 
considered in Russo.  That being said, there is no dispute that 
the substantive language of G. L. c. 211E, § 3 (a) (1) and (e), 
is the same as §§ 3 (e) and 5 of the 1993 act and these were the 
specific provisions that served as the basis for the court's 
decision in Russo.  See Russo, 421 Mass. at 323.  Given that the 
Legislature enacted the 1996 act, including c. 211E, § 3 (a) (1) 
                     
 
12 The defendant cites Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 532 
(2015), and specifically the statement in Chin that "[a]s a 
general matter, uncodified provisions of an act . . . are not 
the source of the substantive provisions of the law."  However, 
it is clear from the context of the quoted language in Chin that 
the court was specifically referring to those uncodified 
provisions that serve to provide direction about an act's 
operation, such as when some or all of the provisions in the 
legislation will take effect; we did not intend to suggest in 
Chin that uncodified provisions cannot or by definition do not 
serve as a source of substantive law.   
 
14 
 
and § 3 (e), soon after Russo was decided, it is appropriate to 
infer that the Legislature intended the relevant provisions of 
the 1996 act to have the same meaning as Russo had opined that 
they had in the 1993 act.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Colturi, 
448 Mass. 809, 812 (2007).13   
 
The Russo case, however, is not the sole source of guidance 
on which we rely in interpreting the pertinent provisions of 
G. L. c. 211E.  We also look to the language of c. 211E, § 
3 (e), examined "in the context of the entire statute."  Chin, 
470 Mass. at 532.  See Commonwealth v. Doe, 473 Mass. 76, 80 
(2015).  When read in conjunction with c. 211E as a whole, it is 
clear that the grant of authority to a judge under § 3 (e) to 
sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum is tied to the 
guidelines and does not operate as an independent grant of 
judicial departure authority.  First, G. L. c. 211E, § 3 (e), 
itself explicitly references the sentencing guidelines in 
conferring authorization to depart from mandatory minimum 
                     
 
13 The defendant suggests that in contrast to Russo, here 
the commission has promulgated and proposed guidelines to the 
Legislature, so the guidelines should be deemed "in effect" for 
purposes of our analysis.  This argument fails.  If one accepts, 
as the defendant does and we as well, that the Legislature 
intended that the commission's recommended guidelines would not 
be operative until enacted into law, it is illogical to conclude 
that the Legislature intended G. L. c. 211E, § 3 (e), which is 
tied to the guidelines, to be effective as soon as the 
commission filed its proposed guidelines with the Legislature, 
regardless of whether the guidelines would ever get enacted and 
become operative.  We avoid construing a statute in a manner 
that leads to an absurd result.  See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. 
School Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass. 326, 336 (1982).   
15 
 
sentence provisions:  "the sentencing judge may depart from the 
range established by the sentencing guidelines and impose a 
sentence below any mandatory minimum term prescribed by statute" 
(emphasis added).  The section then states that such departure 
is permitted if the judge provides reasons for "departing from 
that range" based on "one or more mitigating circumstances."  
Id.  Reading this language in conjunction with other provisions 
in c. 211E, it is clear that the "mitigating circumstances" are 
those that the sentencing commission is charged with 
establishing pursuant to c. 211E, § 3 (a) (2) and (d), in order 
"to guide the sentencing judge."  G. L. c. 211E, § 3 (a) (2).  
Further, c. 211E, § 3 (e), references a judge's duty to "set[] 
forth in writing reasons for departing from the range on a 
sentencing statement as set forth in paragraph (h)" (emphasis 
added).  The term "paragraph (h)" is a reference to c. 211E, 
§ 3 (h), which charges the Chief Justice of the Trial Court, "in 
consultation with the sentencing commission," with the duty to 
promulgate "the form of a sentencing statement, conforming to 
the sentencing guidelines, which shall be used by the sentencing 
judge in the application of the guidelines when imposing a 
sentence."  As these examples show, the close interconnection 
between the judicial departure authorization in § 3 (e) and the 
sentencing guidelines is obvious.   
16 
 
 
In sum, we are persuaded that G. L. c. 211E, § 3 (e), is 
appropriately construed to mean that the authority to depart 
from mandatory minimum sentences set by statute was not intended 
to operate independently of sentencing guidelines recommended by 
the commission, and the guidelines themselves must be enacted by 
the Legislature before they take effect.  As we concluded about 
the 1993 act, see Russo, 421 Mass. at 323, this result is 
consistent with the plain meaning of the language of c. 211E, 
§ 3 (e), and reinforced when the section is considered within 
the context of c. 211E as a whole.14,15   
 
We add a final point.  Although G. L. c. 211E, § 3 (e), 
does not permit a judge to impose a sentence below any 
prescribed mandatory minimum term in the absence of 
legislatively endorsed sentencing guidelines, it is clear that 
at the time § 3 (e) was enacted in 1996, both the Legislature 
and the Governor supported a policy of authorizing a sentencing 
                     
 
14 We have examined the legislative history of the 1996 act, 
and found nothing in it that supports the defendant's 
interpretation that the 1996 act was intended to provide judges 
the authority to depart from mandatory minimum sentences 
independently of the Legislature's enactment of sentencing 
guidelines.   
 
 
15 Because we conclude that the meaning of G. L. c. 211E, 
§ 3 (e), is clear, we do not reach the defendant's alternative 
argument that the statute is ambiguous and therefore should be 
interpreted to avoid a reading that raises substantial 
constitutional concerns -- a result that he claims arises if 
§ 3 (e) is not read to include a judicial "safety valve," i.e., 
authorization for a judge to impose a sentence that departs from 
a mandatory minimum term set by statute. 
   
17 
 
judge, in certain circumstances, to depart from statutes 
imposing mandatory minimum sentences, so long as the judge 
provides a written statement of reasons for the departure.  See 
note 11, supra, & accompanying text.  Amici point out that in 
the twenty years since c. 211E, § 3 (e), was enacted, the 
Federal government16 and at least twenty-three States17 have 
enacted "safety valve" statutes authorizing judges to depart 
from mandatory minimum sentences in certain circumstances at 
least for drug offenses, and in some instances, more generally.  
The efficacy, or lack of efficacy, of mandatory minimum 
sentences, particularly in drug crimes, is the subject of 
substantial public debate.  But apart from the question of 
efficacy in terms of the purposes to be served by criminal 
sentences, data concerning convictions for drug offenses in 
                     
 
16 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2006 & Supp. IV).   
 
 
17 Amici cite the following State statutes:  Ala. Code § 15-
18-8(a) (2016); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-283a (2016); Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 11, § 4221 (2016); Fla. Stat. § 775.084(3)(a)(6), 
3(c)(5), 4(e) (2012); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-13-31(2), 16-13-31.1 
(2015); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-622.5 (2015); Ind. Code § 35-50-2-
2.1(b) (2016); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1252(5-A)(B) 
(2015); Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law § 5-609.1 (2016); Mich. Comp. 
Laws §§ 333.7410(5), 333.7413(4) (2016); Minn. Stat. § 152.025 
(2010); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-139(h) (2014); Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 558.046 (2016); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-9-202 (2015); N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:35-7 (2010); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-17(A) (2016); 
N.Y. Penal Law § 70.70(2)(c) (2011); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-
02.3 (2015); Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 985.1 (2016); S.C. Code Ann. 
§§ 44-53-370, 44-53-375 (2015); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-42-2.3, 
22-42-19 (2016); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-248 (2014).  See also 
State v. Dycus, 456 S.W.3d 918, 925 (Tenn. 2015).   
 
18 
 
Massachusetts raise a serious concern about the disparate impact 
of mandatory minimum sentences on defendants who are part of 
racial or ethnic minority groups.18   
 
We recognize that "[i]t is the province of the Legislature 
to define crimes and set penalties in the first instance."  
Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676, 684-685 (2013), S.C., 474 
Mass. 576 (2016), and cases cited.  However, twenty years have 
passed since G. L. c. 211E, § 3 (e), was enacted.  It may be 
appropriate for the Legislature to consider anew, guided by the 
work of the commission, the issue of authorizing sentencing 
judges to depart from mandatory minimum sentences in relation to 
certain types of drug offenses in appropriate circumstances.   
 
2.  Constitutionality of statutory mandatory minimum 
sentences for subsequent drug offenses.  The defendant argues 
that even if G. L. c. 211E, § 3 (e), did not permit the judge to 
impose a sentence below the otherwise applicable mandatory 
minimum sentences associated with his convictions, the sentence 
                     
 
18 The Survey of Sentencing Practices, FY 2013, published by 
the commission in 2014 (the most recent fiscal year reflected in 
published data) indicates the following:  55.3 per cent of 
defendants convicted of all drug offenses in Massachusetts were 
white, and 43.7 per cent were racial or ethnic minorities; of 
drug distribution offenses with nonminimum mandatory sentences, 
44.1 per cent of defendants convicted were white, and 55.0 per 
cent were racial or ethnic minorities; of distribution offenses 
with mandatory minimum sentences, 25.3 per cent of the 
defendants convicted were white, and 74.7 per cent were racial 
or ethnic minorities.  Massachusetts Sentencing Commission, 
Survey of Sentencing Practices, FY 2013 (Dec. 2014), http:// 
www.mass.gov/courts/docs/admin/sentcomm/fy2013-survey-
sentencing-practices.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH4C-U3GK]. 
19 
 
she imposed should be affirmed because the subsequent offense 
provisions at issue here, G. L. c. 94C, § 32 (b), and § 32A (d), 
are unconstitutional -- "in every case" and as applied to him.  
Specifically, he claims that mandatory minimum sentences for 
subsequent drug offenses are unconstitutional because they (1) 
inflict disproportionate punishment against people of color, 
evidencing a discriminatory purpose in violation of equal 
protection guaranteed by art. 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights; (2) severely punish drug addicted defendants who sell 
small amounts of drugs, constituting cruel or unusual punishment 
in violation of art. 26 of the Declaration of Rights; and (3) 
strip the judiciary of its inherent powers to sentence in 
violation of art. 30 of the Declaration of Rights.  Specifically 
as applied to him, the defendant argues that the mandatory 
minimum sentence of three and one-half years violates his right 
to equal protection as a person of color, and his right to 
protection from cruel or unusual punishment in light of his 
compromised physical state and the small amount of drugs found 
on him.19   
 
The defendant did not raise any constitutional challenge to 
the subsequent offense provisions in the Superior Court, either 
                     
19 In support of his equal protection challenge, the 
defendant presents the statistical evidence included in the 
report of the commission concerning sentencing practices in 
fiscal year 2013.  See note 18, supra.   
 
20 
 
at the time of sentencing or before.  Although we may reach 
constitutional issues raised for the first time on appeal, this 
is not an appropriate case to do so, because the record is 
inadequate to consider the defendant's claims.20  See Gagnon, 
petitioner, 416 Mass. 775, 780 (1994).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Guzman, 469 Mass. 492, 500-501 (2014).   
 
Conclusion.  The defendant's sentences must be vacated 
because they are not in accord with the statutes defining the 
                     
20 Although the statistical data on which the defendant 
relies for his equal protection claim are certainly troubling, 
the data alone likely would not suffice to support the claim.  
See United States v. Irizarry, 322 Fed. Appx. 153, 155 (3d Cir. 
2009); United States v. Lewis, 40 F.3d 1325, 1344-1345 (1st Cir. 
1994); United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 507, U.S. 1010 (1993).  In support of the claim 
that mandatory minimum sentences without a safety valve may 
inflict cruel or unusual punishment on subsequent drug 
offenders, the defendant points to the growing public consensus 
that substance use disorder is a disease whose sufferers require 
treatment, not imprisonment.  In light of this public 
recognition about substance use disorder, the defendant avers 
that without a safety valve, there is great risk of imposing 
sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed by 
drug offenders, citing Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 495, 
497 (1981).  Again, this claim lacks evidentiary support in the 
particular record before us.  Similarly, the defendant's third 
constitutional challenge -- that statutory mandatory minimum 
sentences violate separation of powers principles -- also fails 
based on the present record.   
 
 
Finally, the record does not establish that the imposition 
of a three and one-half year sentence in State prison violates 
the defendant's equal protection rights or results in a severe 
and disproportionate punishment.  See Commonwealth v. King, 374 
Mass. 5, 18 (1977) ("any inference of [discrimination] as 
applied . . . can rest only on conjecture").  The defendant's 
criminal record, before the sentencing judge in connection with 
the Commonwealth's motion to reconsider the sentence, clearly 
qualifies the defendant as a subsequent offender.   
21 
 
offenses of which the defendant was convicted.  The 
Commonwealth's petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is 
allowed, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for 
resentencing and further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.