Case Title: State v. McFadden

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC89429

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2013-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
State of Missouri, 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC89429 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Vincent McFadden, 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
)  
 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Louis County 
Honorable Gary M. Gaertner Jr., Judge  
 
Opinion issued January 29, 2013 
 
 
Vincent McFadden (McFadden) was found guilty of first-degree murder, section 
565.020, RSMo 2000,1 and armed criminal action, section 571.015.  The circuit court 
sentenced McFadden to death.  This Court has exclusive jurisdiction.  Mo. Const. art. V, 
sec. 3.  The judgment is affirmed. 
Facts 
 
McFadden does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence.  Viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that on May 15, 2003, McFadden 
confronted Eva Addison and told her that she and her sisters needed to leave the city of 
Pine Lawn.  Shortly after this confrontation, Eva’s sisters, Leslie and Jessica, arrived.  
                                                 
1 All references to statutes are to RSMo 2000, unless noted otherwise. 
 
1
 
2
                                                
Eva told them that they needed to leave Pine Lawn.  Before they could leave, McFadden 
returned.  He pointed a gun at Leslie and pulled the trigger.  The gun did not fire.  Before 
leaving, McFadden stated that “one of these ho’s has got to die tonight.” 
 
Leslie left the scene in order to call for a ride out of Pine Lawn.  As Leslie was 
walking down the street, Eva saw the car in which McFadden had been riding drive 
around the corner.  Eva watched as McFadden shot Leslie several times.  Leslie died 
from a gunshot wound to her head.  
 
Following a jury trial, McFadden was found guilty of first-degree murder and 
armed criminal action.  During the penalty phase, the State submitted six statutory 
aggravating circumstances based on McFadden’s previous serious assualtive convictions 
for first-degree murder, assault and armed criminal action.2  The jury found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that McFadden had committed each of the six serious assaultive 
convictions alleged in statutory aggravators submitted by the State.   The jury assessed a 
sentence of death.  McFadden appeals.  
Standard of review 
 
On direct appeal, a death sentence is reviewed for prejudice, not just mere error.  
State v. McFadden, 369 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Mo. banc 2012).   This Court will reverse a 
trial court’s decision only when an alleged error is so prejudicial that the defendant was 
deprived of a fair trial.  Id.   Prejudice exists when there is a reasonable probability that 
 
2 The alleged serious assaultive convictions included McFadden’s convictions for first-
degree murder and armed criminal action for killing Todd Franklin in 2002.  This Court 
recently affirmed those convictions and McFadden’s death sentence in State v. 
McFadden, 369 S.W.3d 727 (Mo. banc 2012).   
the trial court’s error affected the outcome at trial.  Id. Evidence admitted at trial is 
reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict and is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.  Id.  
 
Many of the points on appeal raised by McFadden are not preserved for appeal.  
Accordingly, these points can be reviewed only for plain error.  Rule 30.20.  Plain error is 
found when the alleged error “ ‘facially establish[es] substantial grounds for believing a 
manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice occurred.’ ”  McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 736, 
quoting State v. Dorsey, 318 S.W.3d 648, 652 (Mo. banc 2010).  
Point One: Juror non-disclosure 
 
McFadden asserts that the trial court plainly erred in entering a judgment of 
conviction for first-degree murder and sentencing him to death because juror Jimmy 
Williams failed to disclose that, three years prior to the trial in this case, he was a 
member of the venire panel in McFadden’s trial for assault and armed criminal action.  
Although Williams did not serve as a juror in that case, the trial court clearly and 
specifically asked Williams and a number of other prospective jurors if any of them 
recognized McFadden.  Although Williams had acknowledged in a written questionnaire 
that he was a prospective juror in a trial for assault and armed criminal action, he did not 
indicate to the trial court that he recognized McFadden.  McFadden asserts that Williams’ 
disclosure was intentional and prejudicial. 
 
Nondisclosure can occur only after a clear question is asked during voir dire.  
Saint Louis University v. Geary, 321 S.W.3d 282, 295 (Mo. banc 2009).  In this case, the 
trial court clearly asked Williams whether he knew or recognized McFadden.  Williams 
 
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did not indicate that he knew or recognized McFadden.  McFadden asserts that Williams’ 
response that he did not know or recognize McFadden constituted intentional 
nondisclosure.   
 
Intentional nondisclosure occurs when:  1) there is no reasonable inability to 
comprehend the information solicited by the question asked of the prospective juror, and 
2) the prospective juror remembers the experience or that it was of such significance that 
the juror’s purported forgetfulness is unreasonable.   Geary, 321 S.W.3d at 295-296.  
“[B]ias and prejudice will normally be presumed if a juror intentionally withholds 
material information.”  Id., quoting State v. Mayes, 63 S.W.3d 615, 625 (Mo. banc 2002).   
Accordingly, a finding of intentional nondisclosure of a material issue is tantamount to a 
per se rule mandating a new trial.  Id.   
 
In contrast, unintentional nondisclosure “exists where, for example, the experience 
forgotten was insignificant or remote in time, or where the [venireperson] reasonably 
misunderstands the question posed.”   Geary, 321 S.W.3d. at 295, quoting Williams By 
Wilford v. Barnes Hosp., 736 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Mo. banc 1987).    If the nondisclosure was 
unintentional, “a new trial is not warranted unless prejudice resulted from the 
nondisclosure that may have influenced the jury’s verdict.”  Id.; quoting Mayes, 63 
S.W.3d at 625.   In the case of unintentional nondisclosure, the party seeking the new trial 
has the burden of proving prejudice.  Geary, 321 S.W.3d at 296.   Allegations of 
nondisclosure are not self-proving and must be proven.  State v. Smith, 922 S.W.2d 901, 
922 (Mo. banc 1997).  The record must support all allegations of nondisclosure and 
 
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prejudice, and the trial court’s findings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Geary, 321 
S.W.3d at 296.    
 
 
McFadden has not proven that Williams intentionally failed to disclose the fact 
that he was a prospective juror in McFadden’s prior trial for assault and armed criminal 
action.  McFadden notes correctly that Williams was on the venire panel at his earlier 
trial for assault and armed criminal action.  However, McFadden’s intentional 
nondisclosure argument is premised solely on the assumption that it is unreasonable to 
presume that Williams failed to recognize McFadden when, three years earlier, Williams 
had been questioned during voir dire at McFadden’s trial for assault and armed criminal 
action.  The fact that Williams participated in a voir dire three years before he was 
questioned in this case does not necessarily mean that he intentionally failed to disclose 
that information.  Just as it is plausible to assume that Williams may have remembered 
McFadden from the earlier trial, it is equally plausible to assume that Williams’s memory 
had faded.  If Williams had no recollection of McFadden, then there was no intentional 
nondisclosure.   McFadden offers no evidence to prove that Williams recalled that 
McFadden was the defendant in the previous trial and intentionally failed to disclose that 
fact.  Furthermore, McFadden has failed to prove that he was in any way prejudiced so as 
to warrant a new trial based on unintentional nondisclosure.   There is no basis for finding 
that the trial court plainly erred by declining to declare a mistrial based on Williams’ 
service as a juror in this case.   
 
5
Point Two: Improper statutory aggravator instruction 
 
McFadden asserts that the trial court erred in submitting Instruction No. 21, based 
on MAI-CR 3d 314.40, because it submitted his prior serious assaultive convictions in six 
separately numbered paragraphs.  McFadden argues that by submitting the previous 
convictions in separate paragraphs, the jury was encouraged to believe that there were 
more aggravating circumstances than mitigating circumstances and that death was the 
appropriate sentence.   
 
This Court repeatedly has rejected the argument that statutory aggravators must be 
submitted in one paragraph.  See McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 742; State v. Taylor, 18 
S.W.3d 366 (Mo. banc 2000) (it is permissible to separate prior convictions rather than 
listing all of the prior convictions together as one statutory aggravator); State v. Black, 50 
S.W.3d 778, 792 (Mo. banc 2001) (finding the trial court properly listed prior convictions 
as separate statutory aggravators).  The trial court did not err in submitting the statutory 
aggravators in separate paragraphs. 
Point Three: Removal of prospective jurors for cause 
 
The trial court sustained the State’s motion to strike three venire members for 
cause after finding that these jurors indicated that they would not sign a verdict that 
imposed a death sentence.  McFadden asserts that the trial court plainly erred in striking 
venire members Behrens and Stevens and abused its discretion in striking venireperson 
Brunetti.   
 
A prospective juror in a capital case may be excluded for cause when “the juror’s 
views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a 
 
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juror in accordance with his [or her] instructions and his [or her] oath.” McFadden, 369 
S.W.3d at 738; quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).  A juror’s 
qualifications are not determined conclusively by a single answer but rather from the 
entire voir dire examination.  Id., citing State v. Davis, 318 S.W.3d 618, 639 (Mo. banc 
2010). 
 
Whether reviewed for plain error or abuse of discretion, McFadden has not 
demonstrated that the trial court erred in striking Behrens, Stevens or Brunetti.  These 
venire members stated that they could consider both life imprisonment and the death 
penalty, but they also all testified that they could not sign a death verdict as a jury 
foreperson.   
 
A prospective juror’s reluctance to sign a death verdict is not necessarily 
conclusive.  State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 538 (Mo. banc 2010).  However, where, as in 
this case, a prospective juror indicates that he or she can consider both life imprisonment 
and the death penalty while also stating unequivocally that he or she cannot sign a death 
verdict, the trial court is in the best position to consider whether that person fully can 
consider both punishments.  Id.  Each of these venire members stated that they could not 
sign a death verdict.  This amounts to an admission that they may be unwilling to follow 
the law by holding the State to a higher burden of proof.  See State v. Middleton, 995 
S.W.2d 443, 460 (Mo. banc 1999) (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
striking a venireperson for cause after a statement that the venireperson would require 
proof beyond all doubt).  The trial court did not plainly err or abuse its discretion in 
striking these venire members for cause. 
 
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Point Four: Serious Assaultive Convictions 
 
McFadden asserts that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that it was 
required to make a factual determination that his prior convictions were “serious 
assaultive” convictions.  McFadden bases his argument on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 
McFadden raised this same argument in the appeal from his conviction for the 
first-degree murder of Todd Franklin.   This Court rejected this argument then and rejects 
it again because the determination of whether a prior offense is “serious assaultive” is a 
question of law for the court to decide   McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 744.   
Point Five: Instructions failed to state proper burden of proof 
 
McFadden argues the trial court erred in submitting Instructions Nos. 22 and 24, 
based on MAI-CR3d 313.44, the mitigating circumstances instruction, and MAI-CR3d 
314.48, the unanimity instruction.  McFadden claims these instructions shift the burden 
of proof from the State to the defendant and are in conflict with State v. Whitfield, 107 
S.W.3d 253 (Mo. banc 2003); Ring, 536 U.S. 584; Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466; and section 
565.030.4. 
 
This Court repeatedly has rejected the argument that these instructions improperly 
shift the burden of proof.  McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 744; see also Davis, 318 S.W.3d at 
643; Johnson, 284 S.W.3d at 587-89; Zink, 181 S.W.3d at 74; and State v. Taylor, 134 
S.W.3d 21, 30 (Mo. banc 2004).  The trial court did not err in submitting Instructions 
Nos. 22 and 24. 
 
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Point Six: Prosecutor’s statements and arguments 
 
McFadden argues that the prosecutor made dozens of improper arguments and 
statements at various stages of the trial.  The majority of McFadden’s claims are not 
preserved, and he asserts that the trial court should have granted him a mistrial sua 
sponte.  Under a plain error standard of review, McFadden must show that the alleged 
improper argument had a decisive impact on the outcome of the trial.  McFadden, 369 
S.W.3d at 746.  For the few statements to which McFadden objected, he asserts that the 
trial court abused its discretion. 
(1) Voir dire 
 
McFadden alleges the State made improper arguments during voir dire.  First, 
McFadden claims the prosecutor improperly introduced himself as working for the 
county’s elected prosecutor.  McFadden offers no support for how or why this 
introduction by the State prejudiced the venire panel.  This Court rejected the same 
argument in McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 746. 
 
Second, McFadden asserts that the prosecutor misstated the law by telling every 
panel without objection that, if all jurors found mitigators outweighed aggravators, a life 
verdict would result, but if only one juror found aggravators outweighed mitigators, the 
jury continued considering death.  McFadden asserts that these statements could have led 
the jury to interpret the instructions and verdict form to preclude considering mitigators 
unless the jury unanimously found the existence of mitigating circumstances.  However, 
as established in response to McFadden’s fifth point on appeal, the instructions pertaining 
to aggravating and mitigating circumstances are correct.  Juries are presumed to follow 
 
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the instructions, and there is no indication in this case that the jurors did not.  The trial 
court did not plainly err by declining to declare a mistrial sua sponte. 
(2) Guilt phase closing argument 
 
McFadden asserts that the State made a number of improper guilt-phase closing 
arguments.  First, McFadden asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing 
the prosecutor to comment about McFadden’s failure to testify.  As McFadden notes, the 
prosecutor asked the jury whether “you heard of anyone else that was mad at her other 
than the defendant?”  The prosecutor went on to argue that there was “zero evidence” that 
the killer was anyone other than McFadden and that there was “no evidence the defendant 
was anywhere else ….”  At that point, defense counsel objected, and the trial court 
instructed the jury to disregard the statement.  
 
“The State may refer to a defendant's failure to offer evidence, State v. Tolliver, 
839 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Mo. banc 1992), so long as there is no reference to the defendant’s 
failure to testify.”  State v. Phillips, 940 S.W.2d 512, 519 (Mo. banc 1997).  The 
defendant’s failure to testify is encompassed within the defendant’s failure to offer 
evidence.  Comments that the evidence is uncontradicted, therefore, are not necessarily 
prohibited references to a defendant’s failure to testify.  State v. Walters, 363 S.W.3d 
371, 376 (Mo. App. 2012)(citing State v. Quinn, 871 S.W.2d 80, 81 (Mo. App. 1994)).  
In this case, the State made the permissible argument that McFadden’s defense did not 
contradict the State’s evidence.  The trial court intervened and prevented any argument 
that included an improper comment about McFadden’s decision not to testify.  The trial 
court did not err in overruling McFadden’s objection.   
 
10
 
Second, McFadden asserts the state improperly argued two facts that were not in 
the record.  McFadden argues that the prosecutor improperly told the jury that Eva had 
made a taped statement but that the jury would be unable to hear it.   According to 
McFadden, the prosecutor was permitted to argue, therefore, that the jury should believe 
evidence it never heard.   The prosecutor’s argument was that Eva had made multiple 
statements that she witnessed McFadden shoot and kill Leslie and that McFadden had 
been unable to identify any material inconsistencies in any of her prior statements.  In this 
context, the State’s argument was that the jury could draw a reasonable inference that 
McFadden would have impeached Eva with any inconsistent taped statement.  The State 
is allowed to argue the reasonable inferences from the evidence.  McFadden, 369 S.W.3d 
at 748.   
 
McFadden also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling his 
objection to the State’s argument that McFadden would have killed Eva if he had known 
that Eva had witnessed Leslie’s murder.  McFadden asserts there was no evidence to 
support this argument.  That is incorrect.  There was evidence that McFadden had 
threatened to kill Eva if she identified him as the killer.  Eva was allowed to testify that 
McFadden had threatened her, and the jury heard a taped conversation involving Eva, 
McFadden and another inmate in which McFadden indicated that Eva should not testify 
against him. The State’s argument was a reasonable inference from evidence in the case.  
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling this argument.  
 
McFadden’s next argument is that the State improperly vouched for Eva’s 
credibility during closing argument.  On direct examination, the prosecutor questioned 
 
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Eva regarding her eyesight and asked her to read a clock at the back of the courtroom.  
Eva initially said that the clock indicated the time as 10:18.  She then clarified that the 
clock indicated that the time was 11:18.  Eva then testified that she did not wear glasses 
and that she had no known vision problems.  During closing argument, the prosecutor 
argued that Eva had good eyesight and attributed her initial misreading of the clock in the 
courtroom to glare on the clock face.  McFadden did not object.  There was no improper 
vouching because the State’s argument was based on evidence in the case and the 
physical condition of the courtroom in which the trial was conducted.  The trial court did 
not plainly err in declining to declare a mistrial sua sponte.   
 
McFadden argues that the trial court plainly erred in permitting the prosecutor to 
make two improper arguments that appealed to the jury’s emotion.  In his first claim, the 
prosecutor argued that that the worst place to shoot a woman is in the face and that 
McFadden’s actions were particularly vile because he shot Leslie in the face.  This claim 
is without merit.  First, the argument is supported by the evidence because McFadden did 
shoot Leslie in the face. Second, the argument that the “worst place to a shoot a woman” 
is in the face is a permissible rhetorical flourish that does not constitute plain error.  State 
v. Rhodes, 988 S.W.2d 521, 527 (Mo. banc 1999).   
  
In McFadden’s second claim, the prosecutor asserted that he would “answer 
[Leslie’s] questions” because she “is not here to tell you.”  This argument was in 
response to McFadden’s argument that it made no sense for Leslie to walk to a skating 
rink if McFadden in fact had threatened to kill her.  The prosecutor stated that he would 
speak for Leslie and then explained her decision to walk to the rink by stating that “I 
 
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wanted to get the hell out of there because he had come back with a gun after I got there 
… [w]ell, I’m getting out of Pine Lawn.  That’s why.” This argument was a rebuttal to 
McFadden’s argument, and prosecutors are given considerable leeway in rebuttal, even if 
the comment otherwise would be improper.  State v. Sanchez, 186 S.W.3d 260, 265 (Mo. 
banc 2006).   
(3) Penalty phase closing argument 
 
McFadden argues that the prosecutor made numerous improper statements and 
arguments that warrant a new trial.  Most of these claimed errors are not preserved, and 
none have merit.  
 
McFadden asserts that the prosecutor improperly told the jury to count all of 
McFadden’s six serious assaultive convictions as separate statutory aggravators.  What 
the prosecutor said was that any one of the six convictions was a sufficient basis for the 
jury to find the existence of prior serious assaultive convictions as an aggravating 
circumstance.    That is a correct statement of the law and is not plain error.  See State v. 
Gill, 167 S.W.3d 184, 193 (Mo. banc 2005)(only one statutory aggravating circumstance 
must be found for the jury to recommend the imposition of the death penalty).    
 
McFadden asserts that the prosecutor improperly argued that the sentencing 
decision should be based on McFadden’s actions and the fact that he came from a good 
family should not be considered.  McFadden does not develop any argument as to why 
the prosecutor’s argument was improper.  This Court likewise is unable to identify any 
cases indicating that this type of argument constitutes reversible error.  
 
13
 
McFadden asserts that the prosecutor improperly argued that it was time for the 
jury to hold McFadden accountable because “[h]e’s been spitting on the floor of 
courtrooms for years in all those cases and no one held him accountable … [a]nd 
murderers have no right not to pay for their crimes.” “The State may assert its opinion 
regarding the imposition of the death penalty as long at it is based upon the evidence 
presented.”  McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 751, quoting State v. Strong, 142 S.W.3d 702, 726 
(Mo. banc 2004). 
 
McFadden asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in not ordering a new 
trial based on the prosecutor’s improper argument relating to McFadden’s prior 
conviction for first-degree murder for killing Todd Franklin.  Defense counsel objected 
and requested that the trial court instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s statement.  
The trial court sustained the objection and so instructed the juryt.  McFadden received the 
relief he requested and, therefore, has no claim of reversible error.  See State v. Scurlock, 
998 S.W.2d 578, 586 (Mo. App. 1999). 
 
McFadden asserts that the prosecutor improperly argued that the jury already had 
agreed to vote for the death penalty by agreeing to serve as jurors in the case.  This 
misstates the prosecutor’s argument.  The prosecutor stated that all jurors had agreed that, 
“in the proper case,” they could impose the death penalty.   McFadden omits the fact that 
immediately prior to this statement, the prosecutor reminded the jury that “the law never 
says you have to vote for one and the law never says you have to vote for the other one, 
but you got to be fair and impartial.”  This is a correct statement of the law.  
 
14
 
McFadden asserts that the prosecutor improperly referred to him as an “evil” 
person while referring to Leslie as a “good” person.  A prosecutor is free to characterize a 
defendant’s criminal conduct if the evidence supports such a characterization.  State v. 
Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 182 (Mo. banc 1997), reversed on other grounds in Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  For instance, in Simmons, this Court held that it was 
permissible to refer to the defendant as a “predator” and argue that he had an “evil mind” 
based on evidence that he deliberately and with premeditation murdered the victim by 
throwing her off a bridge.  As in Simmons, the evidence in this case supports the 
prosecutor’s characterization of McFadden.  The argument was not improper.  
 
McFadden asserts the State exceeded the scope of victim impact evidence by 
telling the jury to consider the impact of McFadden’s actions on Franklin’s family as well 
as the victim and family members in this case.  McFadden argues that evidence regarding 
the Franklin family is inadmissible and prejudicial.  “Victim impact evidence, and related 
argument about the impact of the crime upon the victim and victim's family, is admissible 
in the penalty phase.”  McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 751, quoting State v. Bucklew, 38 
S.W.3d 395, 399 (Mo. banc 2001).    In this case, the evidence pertaining to the 
consequences of McFadden’s murder of Franklin was admissible to support the State’s 
argument for aggravating circumstances. 
 
McFadden asserts that the prosecutor improperly argued that “the defendant does 
not deserve mercy” and that “justice deserves and demands the death penalty.”  A 
prosecutor is allowed to argue that the defendant does not deserve mercy.  State v. Storey, 
40 S.W.3d 898, 911 (Mo. banc 2001).   
 
15
 
McFadden asserts that the prosecutor improperly argued that the mitigating 
circumstances were actually aggravating circumstances.  The prosecutor argued that 
“[s]ometimes we hear people are too crazy, too insane, retarded” at which point the trial 
court sustained McFadden’s objection.  The prosecutor went on to argue that McFadden 
had the capacity to know right from wrong.  To the extent that the prosecutor’s pre-
objection argument implied that mitigating circumstances such as mental capacity should 
be downplayed, the argument was improper.  However, the trial court sustained 
McFadden’s objection, and the jury properly was instructed about how to consider 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.   The jury is presumed to follow the trial 
court’s instructions.  McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 752,  citing State v. Barton, 240 S.W.3d 
693, 703 (Mo. banc 2007).  McFadden alleges no facts to overcome this presumption. 
This argument does not warrant a new trial.   
 
McFadden asserts that the prosecutor improperly argued that McFadden’s family 
are “good people.”  The argument that McFadden’s family members are good people is a 
legitimate argument to support the State’s position that there were no mitigating 
circumstances in this case.  None of these statements warrant reversal. 
 
McFadden asserts that the prosecutor made several statements that expressed the 
prosecutor’s personal opinion and raised facts outside the record.  The prosecutor 
asserted that he did not see any mitigating circumstance in this case because there was no 
evidence that McFadden had been abused as a child. McFadden objected.  The trial court 
did not err in overruling this objection because the “State may assert its opinion regarding 
 
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the imposition of the death penalty as long at it is based upon the evidence presented.”  
McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 751; quoting Strong, 142 S.W.3d at 726.  
 
The prosecutor also asserted that McFadden was evil and mean and, unlike his 
victims, was able to enjoy his life. McFadden did not object to these statements.  These 
statements are reasonable inferences from the evidence and do not constitute plain error 
warranting a new trial.  
 
McFadden asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his 
objection to the prosecutor’s argument that McFadden’s family members knew he was a 
fugitive from justice in California.  Defense counsel introduced evidence that McFadden 
went to California following the Todd Franklin murder.  One of McFadden’s relatives 
testified that McFadden had traveled to California for a family reunion.  In response, the 
State introduced evidence that McFadden was on a nationwide “wanted” list for shooting 
two people in California.  This argument was a permissible attempt to rebut the testimony 
of defense witnesses. 
 
McFadden asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his 
objection to the prosecutor’s argument that a .44 caliber handgun produces a “big kick.”  
The trial court did not err because a prosecutor is free to argue matters of common 
knowledge.  Strong, 142 S.W.3d at 725.  
 
McFadden asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his 
objection to the prosecutor’s argument that “if this ain’t a death penalty case, then there 
ain’t no such thing.”  This is a permissible argument that the death penalty is warranted 
under the facts of the case.  McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 751.   
 
17
 
McFadden asserts that the trial court plainly erred in permitting the prosecutor to 
argue that “in the old days, we would have allowed the Addison and Franklin families to 
hunt down like he deserves and get retribution” and that McFadden was Leslie’s jury and 
judge.  The prosecutor qualified this argument by noting that is what would have 
happened “in the old days” and that “[w]e’re more civilized now” because McFadden has 
the right to a jury and to counsel.  Even though vividly framed, the argument was not 
erroneous because it assisted the jury in understanding both the evidence and legal 
process in this case.  “Arguments likely to inflame and excite prejudices of the jury are 
not improper if they help the jury understand and appreciate evidence that is likely to 
cause an emotional response.”  McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 751; quoting Rhodes, 988 
S.W.2d at 528. 
 
McFadden asserts that the prosecutor made several impermissible “send a 
message” arguments.  This Court has held that “send a message” statements are 
permissible.  See State v. Smith, 944 S.W.2d 901, 919 (Mo. banc 1997).   The State is 
permitted to argue “the need for strong law enforcement, the prevalence of crime in the 
community, and that conviction of the defendant is part of the jury's duty to uphold the 
law and prevent crime.”    McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 750, quoting Forrest v. State, 290 
S.W.3d 704, 717 (Mo. banc 2009).  The State is also allowed “to argue to the jury that the 
protection of the public rests with them.”  McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 749, quoting State v. 
Burton, 219 S.W.3d 778, 781 (Mo. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Kee, 956 S.W.2d 298, 
304 (Mo. App. 1997)).  These arguments do not warrant reversal. 
 
18
 
McFadden asserts that the prosecutor improperly commented about McFadden’s 
failure to testify.  The entirety of McFadden’s argument is as follows: 
Larner argued Vincent’s failure to testify.  State v. Barnum, 14 
S.W.3d 587, 591(Mo. banc 2000);  §546.270. Over objection, “This is 
all aggravating. It’s all lack of remorse. It’s all aggravating.”  And, 
“There’s no remorse. He doesn’t feel bad about any … why did he 
keep doing it? ... why does he keep doing it if he feels so bad about 
shooting people? 
 
The context of the prosecutor’s argument was that McFadden had demonstrated no 
remorse for his actions.  This argument is proper because it was a reasonable inference 
from the evidence in the case.  There was no error. 
 
McFadden asserts that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jury’s “visceral 
emotion.”  The trial court overruled McFadden’s objection to the following argument: 
 “If it had been a dog, people would be clamoring for the death 
penalty, if you killed an animal like that … He shot her down like a 
dog. And you know what? To him, she is a dog. To him, she’s a dog.”  
 
The prosecutor went on to argue as follows: 
“Ladies and gentlemen, I leave you with Leslie and Todd. Hold them. 
Hug them. Tell them you love them. But most of all, don’t let them 
down. This verdict is for Leslie and Todd.” 
 
 
These arguments are emotionally charged; however, the facts of this case are 
inherently emotionally charged.  “Arguments likely to inflame and excite prejudices of 
the jury are not improper if they help the jury understand and appreciate evidence that is 
likely to cause an emotional response.”  McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 751, quoting Rhodes, 
988 S.W.2d at 528.  The trial court did not plainly err in allowing this argument. 
 
19
 
Finally, McFadden asserts that the prosecutor engaged in improper personalization 
with the following argument: 
Ladies and gentlemen, everybody that has a sister or children knows 
and prays that they never had to look upon the horror that the Addison 
and Franklin families had had to endure. Because you now know how 
fleeting life, innocent life, can be, and how quickly innocent life can 
be taken away by someone with a cruel, evil intent that that man had. 
Think of the terror. Think of the terror that Leslie went through the 
last moments of her life on that street. The sheer terror with him 
putting the gun in her face and clicking it and laughing and her 
begging for her life, knowing that she was 18 years old and about to 
die for his pleasure. Think of the terror that Eva went through 
watching all of this, helplessly watching, from the bushes as this 
entire murder unfolds. Think of the terror, the horror of Todd’s sister, 
Tara, and mother coming home from the store … Think of it. They 
come home. They see this body of their son in the driveway and the 
blood next door to where they live. Think of the terror and the horror 
of the mother and the sister of Todd Franklin. 
 
 
“Improper personalization is established when the State suggests that a defendant 
poses a personal danger to the jurors or their families.”  McFadden,  369 S.W.3d at 750, 
quoting Deck, 303 S.W.3d at 540.  The prosecutor’s argument did not suggest a 
personalized danger to the jurors or their families.  For this reason, the argument in this 
case is distinguishable from cases such as Storey, 901 S.W.2d at 901, in which the 
following argument was found to be improperly personalized:  
Think for just this moment.  Try to put yourselves in [the victim]'s 
place.  Can you imagine?  And, then--and then, to have your head 
yanked back by its hair and to feel the blade of that knife slicing 
through your flesh, severing your vocal cords, wanting to scream out 
in terror, but not being able to.  Trying to breathe, but not being able 
to for the blood pouring down into your esophagus.   
 
Unlike the argument in Storey, the argument in this case does not ask the jurors to  
imagine that they personally were suffering the graphic aspects of the crime.  Instead, it 
 
20
asked the jurors to empathize with the victims in a manner consistent with the facts of the 
case.  There was no reversible error in this argument or in any of the other arguments that 
McFadden has identified. 
Point Seven: Evidence of motive for the Todd Franklin murder 
 
McFadden asserts that the trial court erred in overruling objections to evidence and 
argument in the penalty phase regarding the State’s theory that McFadden killed Franklin 
because Franklin was a witness in a prior prosecution.  In McFadden’s first direct appeal 
from his conviction for murdering Franklin, the jury rejected this statutory aggravator.  
State v. McFadden, 191 S.W.3d 648 (Mo. banc 2006) (McFadden I).   McFadden argues 
that, as a result, the State was collaterally estopped from presenting that evidence in this 
trial and that allowing the evidence violates double jeopardy. 
 
This Court rejected essentially the same argument in McFadden’s most recent 
appeal from his convictions in the Franklin case.   McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 738.   A 
jury’s failure to find a particular aggravating circumstance alleged by the prosecution 
does not constitute an “acquittal” so as to invoke double jeopardy protections.  Poland v. 
Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 106 S.Ct. 1749 (1986).  Instead, “the failure to find a particular 
aggravating circumstance forms the basis for judgment of acquittal on the imposition of 
the death sentence only when there is a complete failure to find that any aggravating 
circumstance exists to support the death sentence.” State v. Simmons, 955 S.W.2d 752, 
760 (Mo. banc 1997). 
 
In this case, the State did not submit McFadden’s motive to kill Franklin as a 
statutory aggravator, but did present that evidence for the jury’s consideration during the 
 
21
penalty phase.  As established in Poland, the fact that the jury in McFadden I rejected 
this evidence as insufficient to establish one of the statutory aggravators in that case does 
not constitute an “acquittal” and, therefore, does not bar the State from presenting that 
evidence in this case.  McFadden was not subjected to double jeopardy, and there was no 
error. 
Point Eight: Evidence of the circumstances of Todd Franklin’s murder 
 
McFadden asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State, 
during the penalty phase, to introduce evidence of the circumstances of Franklin’s 
murder.  The State presented eight witnesses who testified about the Franklin case.  The 
testimony included that of an eyewitness to the murder, police officers, detectives and 
forensic examiners, who testified about the evidence in the case, as well as testimony 
from Leslie Addison’s cousin, who stated that McFadden said he felt good about killing 
Franklin and wanted to celebrate.  The State also introduced photographs of the Franklin 
murder scene.  McFadden asserts that this evidence should have been limited to the fact 
of McFadden’s prior conviction or, alternatively, that the evidence was admissible but 
was excessive and prejudicial. 
 
Contrary to McFadden’s argument, the State, during the penalty phase, is not 
limited to proving the fact of a prior conviction.  Instead, Missouri law provides that in 
the penalty phase of a capital trial, the character and history of the defendant, including 
prior crimes committed by that defendant, are admissible as relevant to the sentencing.  
State v. Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d 596, 618 (Mo. banc 1998).  This evidence can include 
the circumstances of the prior conviction.  See Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 463 (a videotape 
 
22
of the scene of a previous crime committed by the defendant, including bodies of the 
victims, was admissible during the penalty phase of a death penalty case).  
 
Alternatively, McFadden argues that some evidence of the circumstances is 
admissible but that, in this case, the trial court failed to limit the State’s introduction of 
excessive evidence regarding the Franklin murder.  The trial court’s decision about the 
scope of the evidence admitted at trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  See State v. 
Winfrey, 337 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. banc 2011).  In this case, the trial court permitted 
substantial amounts of evidence detailing the Franklin murder.  However, the trial court 
did exercise its discretion to limit the evidence, for instance, by restricting the scope of 
cross-examination of one witness and limiting the number of photographs the State was 
allowed to introduce into evidence.  The record does not demonstrate that the court 
abused its discretion or that McFadden was prejudiced.  This argument has no merit. 
Point Nine: Proportionality review 
 
This Court is required to conduct an independent review of all death penalty cases 
for proportionality.  Section 565.035.  Section 565.035.3 requires  this Court to 
determine: 
 (1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence 
of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and 
 
(2) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in  subsection 2 of 
section 565.032 and any other circumstance found; 
 
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to 
the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime, the 
strength of the evidence and the defendant. 
 
 
23
(1) Passion and prejudice 
 
McFadden’s death sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, 
prejudice or any other factor apart from the evidence in the case.  McFadden has not 
identified any such factor to this Court, and his allegations of trial error are without merit. 
(2) Aggravating circumstances 
 
The jury found multiple statutory aggravating circumstances.  The jury found 
McFadden has multiple serious assaultive criminal convictions.  There was sufficient 
evidence supporting each of the jury’s findings of statutory aggravators. 
(3) Similar cases 
 
The proportionality review mandated by section 565.035.3 requires consideration 
of all factually similar cases in which the death penalty was submitted to the jury, 
including those resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
probation or parole.  McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 754, (citing State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 
527, 555-63 (Mo. banc 2010) (J. Stith concurring), and State v. Anderson, 306 S.W.3d at 
544 (J. Breckenridge concurring).   
 
This Court has upheld the death sentence when one victim is murdered.  See 
McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 755;  State v. Freeman, 269 S.W.3d 422 (Mo. banc 2008); 
State v. McLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d 257 (Mo. banc 2008).  This Court affirmed death 
sentences when the defendant had a serious assaultive criminal history.  See  McFadden, 
369 S.W.3d at 754, citing Bowman, 337 S.W.3d 679; Davis, 318 S.W.3d 618; Barton, 
240 S.W.3d 693.  Further, death sentences have been upheld when a defendant murders 
someone who is helpless and defenseless.  See McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 755;  Anderson, 
 
24
306 S.W.3d 529; State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751 (Mo. banc 2002); State v. Cole, 71 
S.W.3d 163, 177 (Mo. banc 2002).   
 
Although the facts of this case are similar to numerous cases in which the death 
penalty has been affirmed, McFadden asserts that State v. Schnick, 819 S.W.2d 330 (Mo. 
banc 1991); State v. Blankenship, 830 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. banc 1992); State v. Gilyard, 257 
S.w.3d 654, (Mo. App. 2008); and State v. Beishline, 926 S.W.2d 501, 505 (Mo. App. 
1996), demonstrate that the death penalty is disproportionate.  This argument is without 
merit. 
  
As noted above, this Court’s proportionality review does not include consideration 
of cases in which the death penalty was not submitted to the jury. McFadden, 369 S.W.3d 
at 754.  The only case McFadden cites in which it is clear that the death penalty was 
submitted to the jury is Schnick, 819 S.W.2d at 330.  In Schnick, the defendant received a 
new trial due to an erroneous ruling on a motion to strike a prospective juror for cause.  
Id. at 332.   McFadden then asserts that the defendant in Schnick pleaded guilty in 
exchange for a sentence of life without parole.  Cases involving guilty pleas are not 
comparable cases for purposes of this Court’s proportionality review.  State v. Bolder, 
635 S.W.2d 673, 685 (Mo. banc 1982). 
 
In addition to this Court’s independent review, McFadden asserts three additional 
arguments to support his position that the death sentence is disproportionate in this case.  
First, he asserts that too many venire members were struck for cause because they 
indicated they could not impose the death penalty and that this proves an evolving 
standard of decency in St. Louis County that prohibits the death penalty.  Second, 
 
25
McFadden asserts that the jury did not represent a fair cross section of the community 
because 17.9 percent of the venire members were African-American while 21.8 percent 
of the population of St. Louis County is African-American.   Finally, he asserts that the 
State’s alleged repeated misconduct deprived him of a fair trial.  
(1) Evolving Standard of Decency  
 
McFadden asserts that the fact that approximately one-third of the prospective 
jurors in this case were removed for cause because they could not consider the death 
penalty proves an “evolving standard of decency” in St. Louis County that prohibits 
imposition of the death penalty.  This particular argument is without merit for one basic 
reason -- the opinion of one-third of one venire panel in one county does not conclusively 
establish a community standard of any constitutional significance.  This argument is 
without merit. 
(2) Fair cross-section 
 
McFadden asserts that the 21.8 percent of the population of St. Louis County is 
African-American but only 17.8 percent of the prospective jurors for his case were 
African-American.  McFadden then asserts, without any support, that this is a 
“statistically significant variation.”   
 
“It is well established that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the 
unbiased selection of a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.”  
Anderson, 306 S.W.3d at 542 (quoting State v. Brooks, 960 S.W.2d 479, 487 (Mo. banc 
1997)).  “In order to establish a prima facie case, defendant must show that the under-
representation of other groups was due to a systematic exclusion in the selection 
 
26
process.”  Id; (citing State v. Sumowski, 794 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Mo. banc 1990)).   
McFadden did not offer statistical evidence that the jury selection procedure 
systematically excluded black jurors.  He relied solely on  the jurors in the panel selected 
for this case.  “A single panel that fails to mirror the make-up of the community is 
insufficient to establish a prima facie case of systematic exclusion.”  Id., quoting State v. 
Ringo, 30 S.W.3d 811, 820 (Mo. banc 2000).  
(3) Prosecutorial misconduct 
 
As in his sixth point on appeal, McFadden asserts that the State repeatedly made 
improper arguments and statements.  These arguments were rejected in the analysis of 
McFadden’s sixth point on appeal and are rejected once again.  
 
 
In this case, the death penalty complies with all statutory proportionality 
requirements.  
Point 10: Improper bolstering 
 
McFadden claims that the trial court erred and plainly erred in not declaring a 
mistrial because the State improperly bolstered Eva Addison’s testimony by arguing that 
she consistently had identified McFadden as Leslie’s killer.    
 
Eva testified during the guilt phase that she was hiding behind a bush when she 
witnessed McFadden shoot Leslie.  She testified that the area was lighted, that she saw 
McFadden’s face, body and clothing, and that he was wearing the same clothing as when 
he had threatened Eva and Leslie just minutes earlier.  She did not testify regarding her 
prior statements.  Defense counsel cross-examined Eva and attempted to show that her 
view of the shooting was obstructed.  It was in this context that the prosecutor, on re-
 
27
direct examination, elicited testimony regarding Eva’s prior consistent statements to 
police in which she identified McFadden as the shooter.   
 
“Improper bolstering occurs when the out of court statement of a witness is 
offered solely to be duplicative or corroborative of trial testimony.”  State v. Biggs, 333 
S.W.3d 472, 479 (Mo. banc 2011)(quoting State v. Seever, 733 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Mo. 
banc 1987)).  McFadden’s argument fails because the references to Eva’s prior, 
consistent statements were made during re-direct examination in response to McFadden’s 
argument that Eva reliable could not see and identify who shot Leslie.  Prior consistent 
statements are admissible to rehabilitate the witness.  State v. Davis, 186 S.W.3d 367, 375 
(Mo. App. 2005).   The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling McFadden’s 
objection to the references to Eva’s prior, consistent statements.  
Point 11: Evidence of other crimes 
 
McFadden asserts that the trial court abused its discretion and plainly erred in not 
declaring sua sponte a mistrial and by admitting evidence and allowing argument 
regarding irrelevant, unrelated crimes.  
 
First, McFadden asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his 
objection to a taped jailhouse conversation between McFadden, Eva Addison and an 
inmate known as “Slim.”  In one portion of the tape, McFadden urged Eva to say that she 
did not witness Leslie’s murder and that her refusal to testify would be “[l]ike Al did.”  
The trial court overruled the objection.  McFadden asserts that reference to “Al” was 
irrelevant and suggested that McFadden had threatened other witnesses before.  However, 
McFadden was charged with witness tampering and his taped statement containing the 
 
28
reference to “Al” was an integral part of his statement telling Eva to say that she did not 
witness Leslie’s murder.  Evidence of other crimes or misconduct is admissible when it is 
part of the circumstances or sequence of events surrounding the charged offense.  State v. 
Wolfe, 13 S.W.3d 248, 262 (Mo. banc 2000).   
 
Second, McFadden asserts that the prosecutor improperly referred to the taped 
conversation during the guilt phase opening argument.  This argument fails because the 
point of an opening statement is to explain to the jury the evidence that the party intends 
to introduce.  There is no error in referencing evidence in an opening statement, 
therefore, if the party has a good faith belief that the evidence is admissible.  The taped 
statement was introduced into evidence during the Franklin trial, so the prosecutor had a 
good faith basis for concluding that the tape would be admissible in this case as well, and 
it was.  This argument has no merit. 
 
Finally, McFadden argues that the prosecutor improperly referenced Eva’s 
testimony that McFadden had told her to “get my name out of it or your next, bitch.”  
McFadden also argues that the prosecutor improperly referenced McFadden’s statement 
on the tape in which he stated he would “fuck that nigger up.”  The State is entitled to 
argue the reasonable inferences from the evidence.  McFadden was charged with witness 
tampering, and this evidence supported a reasonable inference that McFadden tampered 
with witnesses.  This argument has no merit. 
Point 12: Leading questions 
 
McFadden asserts that the trial court abused its discretion and plainly erred by 
repeatedly allowing the prosecutor to ask Eva Addison leading questions, which assisted 
 
29
her testimony and prevented the jury from effectively assessing her credibility.  Leading 
questions are generally impermissible because they suggest the desired answer to the 
witness.  State v. Miller, 208 S.W.3d 284, 289 (Mo. App. 2006).  However, leading 
questions are permissible for preliminary matters, when the witness is shy, hostile or has 
difficulty with English, and when the witness already has answered the question and the 
attorney simply is repeating the answer.  Id.  The trial court retains the discretion to allow 
leading questions, and the court’s decision will be overturned only if it constitutes an 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Taylor, 317 S.W.3d 89, 93 (Mo. App. 2010).   
 
McFadden disputes numerous individual questions and asserts with little analysis 
that the questions warrant a new trial.  Whether McFadden objected to a particular 
question or not, he bears the burden of demonstrating that the trial court erred in allowing 
the questions and that he was thereby prejudiced.  He has failed to make this showing.   
 
While the prosecutor did ask a number of leading questions, it is also true that the 
trial court specifically found that Eva was a “rough witness” and noted that it was 
difficult for the prosecutor to question her.  The court then noted that “I’ve given you 
leeway with your questions” and that the prosecutor needed to not lead the witness and 
“just get it out with open-ended questions.”   When counsel is faced with a difficult 
witness, the trial court properly may exercise its discretion to allow some leading 
questions to prompt the witness to give pertinent answers or to refer to a prior statement 
or testimony.  Miller, 208 S.W.3d at 289; State v. Edberg, 185 S.W.3d 290, 294 (Mo. 
App. 2006).   That is what happened in this case.  McFadden has not demonstrated that 
 
30
the trial court abused its discretion or committed plain error in not ordering a new trial 
based the prosecutor’s questioning of Eva Addison.  
Point 13: Admission of other testimony and denial of motion to produce records 
 
 
McFadden asserts that the trial court abused its discretion and plainly erred in 
admitting testimony from Stacy Stevenson and Eva Addison, overruling McFadden’s 
request for Eva’s school and medical records, and allowing the prosecutor to “testify” 
that Eva’s eyesight was excellent.   
(1) Stevenson testimony 
Stacy Stevenson lived near the site where Leslie was killed.  He testified that he 
overheard an argument between a man and a woman.  Stevenson stated that he heard the 
man say: “Fucking bitch, come here, where you fixing to go?  I told you and your sister 
to get the fuck down from here and stay the fuck from down here.”  Prior to trial, 
McFadden filed a motion in limine to exclude Stevenson’s testimony as hearsay.  The 
trial court overruled the objection.  At trial, Stevenson testified consistently with his prior 
statement and also noted that he could not identify the man who made the statement. 
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted.  
State v. Copeland, 928 S.W.2d 828, 848 (Mo. banc 1996).   While hearsay statements are 
generally inadmissible, there are a number of exceptions.  Stevenson’s testimony 
regarding the threatening statements fits within the “verbal acts” exception, which allows 
a court to admit into evidence a statement that tends to show motive or intent to 
undertake the act that is the subject of the litigation.  Id.  The relevance of Stevenson’s 
testimony that he overheard the threats was not dependent on the truth of the particular 
 
31
assertions in the threat.   Instead, relevance was based on the fact that Stevenson 
overheard a man making threatening statements to a woman right before and in the same 
area where McFadden shot and killed Leslie.  See State v. Joiner, 823 S.W.2d 50, 55 
(Mo. App. 1991)(evidence of threats are admissible independent of the truth of the 
particular statement in order to show motive and intent).  The trial court did not err in 
overruling McFadden’s objection to Stevenson’s testimony. 
(2) School and medical records 
McFadden asserted that Eva’s school and medical records should be disclosed 
because they contained information that would cast doubt on her credibility because the 
records would indicate whether Eva’s eyes had been tested.  Defense counsel contended 
that Eva’s eyesight was questionable because, during the Franklin murder trial, she had 
some difficulty reading a clock at the back of the courtroom.   To compel disclosure of 
Eva’s school and medical records, McFadden was required to demonstrate more than a 
mere possibility that the records might be helpful.  See State v. Taylor, 134 S.W.3d 21, 
26-27 (Mo. banc 2004).  He failed to do so.  As noted above, Eva was able to read the 
clock during the Franklin trial.  Further, there was no other indication that she had any 
visual impairment.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling McFadden’s 
motion to compel disclosure of Eva’s school and medical records.  
(3) Prosecutor “testified” about Eva’s eyesight 
 
McFadden asserts that the trial court plainly erred in not declaring a mistrial 
because, during closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Eva had good eyesight.  The 
State is permitted to argue the reasonable inferences from the evidence.  McFadden, 369 
 
32
S.W.3d at 748.  The prosecutor’s argument regarding Eva’s eyesight included a reference 
to her ability to read a car rental agreement that was introduced into evidence as well as 
her ability to read a clock in the back of the courtroom.  The argument that Eva had good 
eyesight is a reasonable inference from the evidence at trial.  The State was free to argue 
that Eva had sufficiently good eyesight to identify McFadden as the shooter.  There was 
no plain error.  
Point 14:  Tape of jailhouse telephone call 
 
McFadden claims the trial court plainly erred and abused its discretion in 
admitting into evidence a tape-recorded conversation between McFadden, Eva and 
another inmate known as “Slim.”  McFadden asserts that there was not an adequate 
foundation to admit the recording and because it contained hearsay.  
This same recording was admitted into evidence in McFadden’s trial for 
murdering Franklin, and McFadden made the same claim that the tape was admitted 
erroneously.  McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 752.  This Court held then that there was an 
adequate foundation to admit the tape into evidence because there was no indication that 
the recording was inaccurate and Eva identified the recording as the conversation she had 
with McFadden and Slim.  Id. at 753.  This Court also held that the tape was not 
inadmissible hearsay because it contained McFadden’s admissions.  Id.   
 Likewise, in this case, Eva testified about the same foundational facts that 
supported admission of the tape in McFadden’s trial for murdering Franklin.  There was 
an adequate foundation to admit the tape, and the tape contained McFadden’s admissions, 
which properly were admitted into evidence.  McFadden’s claim is without merit.   
 
33
Point 15: Striking prospective jurors who were unable to consider the death penalty 
 
 
McFadden asserts that the trial court plainly erred in allowing the State to strike 
for cause 20 prospective jurors who stated that their religious beliefs prevented them 
from imposing the death penalty.   
The State cannot strike a prospective juror for cause if he or she states a general 
objection to the death penalty or expresses a conscientious or religious objection to the 
death penalty.  Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 657-58 (1987).  However, the State can 
strike a prospective juror if his or her beliefs would prevent the juror from following the 
court’s instructions in a death penalty case.  For instance, in Storey, 40 S.W.3d at 905, a 
prospective juror stated that his moral and religious beliefs prevented him from 
considering the death penalty.  Later, he said that it was possible that he could consider 
the death penalty. The trial court sustained the State’s strike for cause.  This Court held 
that strike was permissible because the prospective juror’s equivocal and shifting 
responses provided a sufficient basis for the trial court to conclude that the juror would 
not be able to follow the court’s instructions regarding the death penalty. Id.  
 
In this case, the majority of stricken venire members voiced unequivocal religious 
or moral objections to the death penalty and plainly stated that they would not consider 
the death penalty.  Others, like the prospective juror in Storey, voiced equivocal 
objections to the death penalty and never stated that they would, without reservation, 
follow the court’s instructions.  The court did not plainly err in declining to overrule the 
State’s strikes.   
 
34
 
35
Conclusion 
 
The judgment is affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Chief Justice  
 
Russell, Breckenridge, Fischer, Stith and 
Draper, JJ., concur.  Wilson, J., not  
participating.