Case Title: Estate of Robert V. Genrich v. OHIC Insurance Company

Citation: 2009 WI 67

Docket Number: 2007AP000541

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2009 WI 67 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP541 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Estate of Robert V. Genrich and Kathy Genrich, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
     v. 
OHIC Insurance Company, Wisconsin Injured 
Patients & Family Compensation Fund, Meriter 
Hospital, Inc., Margaret Bjelde, R.N., Shelly 
White, O.R.T., Kimberly A. Brown, O.R.T., David 
Melnick, M.D., Brenda Satchie, M.D., University 
of Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics Authority and 
Dawn M. Shaw, O.R.T., 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 312 Wis. 2d 811, 754 N.W.2d 254 
(Ct. App. 2008-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 3, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Columbia   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel S. George   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR & DISSENT: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs in part/dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and CROOKS, J., join the 
concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
DISSENT & CONCUR: 
CROOKS, J., dissents in part/concurs in part 
(opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J., join the 
dissent/concurrence. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
filed by Jason T. Studinski and Kammer & Studinski Chartered, 
Portage, and oral argument by Jason T. Studinski. 
 
 
 
2 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by David 
J. Pliner and Corneille Law Group, LLC, Madison, and oral 
argument by David J. Pliner. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert L. Jaskulski, 
Linda M. Meagher, and Habush Habush & Rottier, S.C., Milwaukee, 
on behalf of Wisconsin Association for Justice. 
 
 
 
2009 WI 67
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP541  
(L.C. No. 
2006CV352) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Estate of Robert V. Genrich and Kathy Genrich, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
OHIC Insurance Company; Wisconsin Injured 
Patients & Families Compensation Fund; Meriter 
Hospital, Inc.; Margaret Bjelde, R.N.; Shelly 
White, O.R.T.; Kimberly A. Brown, O.R.T.; David 
Melnick, M.D.; Brenda Satchie, M.D.; University 
of Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics Authority; 
and Dawn M. Shaw, O.R.T., 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J.   We 
review 
an 
unpublished decision1 of the court of appeals that affirmed a 
                                                 
1 Estate of Genrich v. OHIC Ins. Co., No. 2007AP541, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 22, 2008). 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
2 
 
decision of the circuit court2 granting summary judgment in favor 
of OHIC Insurance Company and other defendants (collectively, 
OHIC).  Our review requires us to address two issues:  (1) 
whether the claim of the Estate of Robert V. Genrich (the 
estate) for "injury" to Robert Genrich (Robert) that resulted in 
his death and allegedly was caused by medical negligence is 
precluded by Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a) (2005-06)3 as untimely-
filed; and (2) whether Kathy R. Genrich's (Kathy) wrongful death 
claim based on Robert's death accrued on the date of Robert's 
"injury." 
¶2 
Because we conclude that Robert suffered an "injury" 
for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a) when he experienced a 
"physical injurious change," and that the "physical injurious 
change" occurred more than three years prior to the filing of 
the estate's claim, we conclude that the estate's claim is time-
barred by § 893.55(1m)(a).  We further conclude that Kathy's 
wrongful death claim based on Robert's death that allegedly was 
caused by medical negligence accrued on the same date as the 
estate's 
claim. 
 
Therefore, 
it, 
too, 
is 
precluded 
by 
§ 893.55(1m)(a).  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals that affirmed the circuit court's decision 
granting summary judgment in favor of OHIC. 
                                                 
2 The 
Honorable Daniel S. George of Columbia County 
presided. 
3 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version, unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
3 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On July 23-24, 2003, Robert underwent surgery to have 
an 
ulcer 
repaired. 
 The surgery appeared to have been 
successfully completed.  However, Robert soon developed a fever 
and his white blood cell count became elevated, suggesting an 
infection.  On August 8, 2003, it was determined that a sponge 
had been left inside Robert's abdominal cavity at the conclusion 
of the surgery on July 24, 2003, and that the sponge probably 
was the source of the infection.  That same day, a second 
surgery 
was 
performed 
and 
the 
sponge 
was 
removed.  
Unfortunately, in the days following the second surgery, 
Robert's health did not improve, and on August 11, 2003, he died 
from sepsis allegedly associated with the retained sponge. 
¶4 
On August 9, 2006, the estate and Kathy filed suit 
against the doctors and support staff involved in Robert's 
surgery, as well as OHIC Insurance Company and others.  The 
estate 
alleged 
medical 
negligence 
in 
Robert's 
care 
and 
treatment, and made claims for damages.  Kathy sued for wrongful 
death, also based on alleged medical negligence in Robert's care 
and treatment.  OHIC moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
both the estate's and Kathy's claims were barred by the medical 
negligence statute of limitations, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a).  
Section 893.55(1m) provides: 
[A]n action to recover damages for injury arising from 
any treatment or operation performed by, or from any 
omission by, a person who is a health care provider, 
regardless of the theory on which the action is based, 
shall be commenced within the later of:   
No. 
2007AP541   
 
4 
 
(a) Three years from the date of the injury, or 
(b) One year from the date the injury was 
discovered 
or, 
in 
the 
exercise 
of 
reasonable 
diligence should have been discovered, except that 
an action may not be commenced under this paragraph 
more than 5 years from the date of the act or 
omission.4 
¶5 
The estate and Kathy countered OHIC's motion by 
arguing that (1) under Paul v. Skemp, 2001 WI 42, 242 Wis. 2d 
507, 625 N.W.2d 860, Robert's "injury" did not occur until on or 
after August 9, 2003, because his condition did not become 
irreversible until at least that date, and the claims were 
therefore timely, having been filed within three years of such 
"injury"; (2) under Miller v. Luther, 170 Wis. 2d 429, 489 
N.W.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1992), even if the estate's survival action 
was time-barred, the statute of limitations on Kathy's wrongful 
death claim did not start to run until the date of Robert's 
death, August 11, 2003, and her claim was therefore timely, 
having been filed within three years of Robert's death; and (3) 
even if either or both of the claims were not timely asserted, 
the defendants were estopped from raising the statute of 
limitations because an OHIC claims adjuster had told their 
attorney that the claims would not expire until August 13, 2006. 
¶6 
The circuit court granted OHIC's motion, concluding 
that, under Fojut v. Stafl, 212 Wis. 2d 827, 569 N.W.2d 737 (Ct. 
App. 1997), Robert suffered an "injury" triggering the statute 
                                                 
4 There is no argument that Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(b) 
applies instead of § 893.55(1m)(a).  Under § 893.55(1m)(a), the 
date of "injury" is the operative inquiry, rather than the date 
of the discovery of the injury under § 893.55(1m)(b). 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
5 
 
of limitations no later than August 8, 2003, when the second 
surgery to remove the sponge occurred.  As a result, the circuit 
court dismissed the estate's claim, filed on August 9, 2006, as 
untimely under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a). 
¶7 
The circuit court also rejected Kathy's argument that 
her wrongful death claim accrued on the date of Robert's death.  
Instead, 
the 
court 
concluded 
that 
Estate 
of 
Hegarty 
v. 
Beauchaine, 2001 WI App 300, 249 Wis. 2d 142, 638 N.W.2d 355, 
had decided that Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a) was the operative 
statute of limitations for wrongful death claims based on 
medical negligence, and that those claims run from the date of 
the underlying "injury."  As a result, because Kathy's claim was 
filed more than three years after Robert's "injury," her claim 
was time-barred by § 893.55(1m)(a).  
¶8 
Finally, the circuit court rejected the plaintiffs' 
estoppel argument.  The court concluded that the plaintiffs' 
reliance on the statements of an insurance claims adjuster, in 
deciding not to file earlier, was not reasonable.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision for largely the 
same reasons expressed by the circuit court.5   
¶9 
We granted review and now affirm. 
                                                 
5 For purposes of our review, we note that the estate and 
Kathy no longer assert that OHIC is estopped from arguing that 
the statute of limitations precludes their claims based on the 
statements of the insurance claims adjuster.  Instead, they have 
limited their arguments to the two issues we enumerated:  (1) 
whether Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1m)(a) time-bars the estate's 
medical negligence claim, and (2) whether § 893.55(1m)(a) time-
bars Kathy's wrongful death claim. 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
6 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶10 This case requires us to review the circuit court's 
decision granting OHIC's motion for summary judgment.  We review 
a decision on a motion for summary judgment independently, 
employing the same methodology as the circuit court.  Blunt v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 2009 WI 16, ¶13, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 760 N.W.2d 
396 (citing Acuity v. Bagadia, 2008 WI 62, ¶12, 310 Wis. 2d 197, 
750 N.W.2d 817).  Resolution of the questions presented requires 
us to interpret and apply Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a).  "The 
interpretation and application of a statute to an undisputed set 
of facts are questions of law that we review independently."  
McNeil v. Hansen, 2007 WI 56, ¶7, 300 Wis. 2d 358, 731 N.W.2d 
273 (citing Rocker v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2006 WI 26, ¶23, 289 
Wis. 2d 294, 711 N.W.2d 634; State v. Sostre, 198 Wis. 2d 409, 
414, 542 N.W.2d 774 (1996)). 
B. 
Medical Negligence  
¶11 The estate's survival action is a claim for medical 
negligence asserted on Robert's behalf.  The parties do not 
dispute, and we agree, that Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a) is the 
applicable statute of limitations for this claim, and that the 
claim accrued on the date that Robert sustained an "injury" as 
that term is used in the statute.  Where the parties differ is 
with respect to the meaning of the term "injury."   
¶12 The statute does not define "injury."  However, the 
parties point to decisions by Wisconsin courts that purportedly 
support their proposed interpretations of the term.  The estate 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
7 
 
and Kathy cite to our decision in Paul to argue that an injury 
does not occur under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a) until the 
underlying condition is no longer treatable.  That is, only 
after a medical condition has become irreversible does a claim 
accrue.  Because Robert's condition did not become irreversible 
until on or after August 9, 2003, the estate argues that its 
claim was timely filed. 
¶13 In Paul, we determined when an actionable "injury" 
based on medical negligence for misdiagnosis occurred, thereby 
causing the claim to accrue.  Paul, 242 Wis. 2d 507, ¶¶12-13.  
We concluded that the estate's claim accrued, at the latest, on 
the 
date 
that 
the 
decedent's 
undiagnosed 
arteriovenous 
malformation ruptured.  Id., ¶45.  The estate and Kathy cite the 
following language in Paul in support of their argument that an 
"injury" triggering the limitations period does not occur until 
the patient's condition becomes untreatable or irreversible: 
That actionable injury which resulted from the alleged 
misdiagnosis occurred either at the time that [the 
arteriovenous malformation] AVM ruptured, or at the 
time that [the] AVM could no longer be treated. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [B]ased on the information presented, the injury 
that resulted from the alleged misdiagnosis occurred 
when the rupture of the AVM in [decedent]'s brain 
happened . . ., or it occurred at that point . . . 
when, more likely than not, [decedent]'s AVM could not 
have been successfully treated. 
Id. at ¶¶45, 53.  In this case, the estate and Kathy contend 
that Robert's condition did not become untreatable until on or 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
8 
 
after 
August 9, 
2003, 
resulting 
in 
the 
estate's 
medical 
negligence claim being timely-filed on August 9, 2006. 
¶14 OHIC, on the other hand, asserts that Robert sustained 
an "injury" on the date he first suffered a "physical injurious 
change," as that term was used by the court of appeals in Fojut.  
In Fojut, the court of appeals determined the date of "injury" 
for a woman who had undergone tubal ligation surgery.  Fojut, 
212 Wis. 2d at 830-31.  The surgery was unsuccessful, and the 
woman subsequently became pregnant.  Id. at 829.  The court 
decided that the date of the plaintiff's unwanted conception, 
rather than the date of the surgery, was the "injury" that 
triggered Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a).  The court explained:   
There is no evidence that on the date the tubal 
ligation was performed that [the plaintiff] suffered 
any physical injury.  The purpose of the surgery was 
to 
render 
[the 
plaintiff] 
infertile——to 
avoid 
pregnancy.  There was no physical injurious change to 
[the 
plaintiff]'s 
body 
until 
she 
became 
pregnant. . . .  Using this date as the date of 
injury, [the plaintiff]'s claim was untimely because 
the complaint was not filed within three years. 
Id. at 831.   
¶15 OHIC contends that Robert suffered an injury on 
July 24, 2003, when the sponge was left in his abdominal cavity 
and he developed an infection.  This was a "physical injurious 
change" to Robert's body, as that term was used in Fojut.  In 
the alternative, OHIC asserts that any "physical injurious 
change" could have occurred no later than August 8, 2003, when 
Robert underwent the second surgery to remove the sponge.  As a 
result, because the claims were filed on August 9, 2006, and 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
9 
 
more than three years had passed, the estate's and Kathy's 
claims are time-barred by Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a). 
¶16 In response, the estate and Kathy assert that Paul and 
Fojut are inconsistent, and that their interpretation of Paul 
should control the questions presented here.  We disagree.  
Although the estate and Kathy have selected the language from 
Paul most favorable to their interpretation, Paul and Fojut are 
entirely consistent with one another.  Neither of them concludes 
that an injury must be untreatable or irreversible to trigger 
the limitations period imposed by Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a).  
As we noted in Paul, a condition need not be untreatable before 
an "injury" occurs; rather, an "actionable injury arises when 
the [negligent act or omission] causes a greater harm than [that 
which] existed at the time of the [negligent act or omission]."  
Paul, 242 Wis. 2d 507, ¶25.  This language articulates the same 
concept set forth by the court of appeals' decision in Fojut, 
i.e., that an "injury" does not occur until there is a "physical 
injurious change." 
¶17 Furthermore, our conclusion, that the determination of 
a "physical injurious change" is the appropriate benchmark for 
establishing 
the 
date 
of 
"injury" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1m)(a), is consistent with the facts set forth in Paul.  
In 
Paul, 
the 
rupturing 
of 
the 
plaintiff's 
arteriovenous 
malformation 
was 
the 
first 
"physical 
injurious 
change" 
experienced by the plaintiff following the doctor's negligent 
misdiagnosis.  There was no point prior to that rupture where "a 
greater harm than existed at the time of the misdiagnosis" 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
10 
 
occurred. 
 
Id. 
 
Even 
though 
plaintiff's 
condition 
was 
irreversible once the arteriovenous malformation ruptured, that 
was not the reason that the rupture was the "injury."  Rather, 
it was the "injury" because there was no point prior to that 
rupture in which the plaintiff experienced a "physical injurious 
change."  Therefore, we reject plaintiffs' contention that Paul 
and Fojut are in conflict. 
¶18 Applying Paul and Fojut to this case, we conclude that 
Robert's "injury" that triggered the three-year limitations 
period in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a) occurred on July 24, 2003.  
It was on that date that an infection-producing sponge was left 
in Robert's abdomen, which eventually caused his death.6  The 
                                                 
6 The estate and Kathy argue that because OHIC set forth 
several potential dates on which Robert's injury could have 
occurred, and because the parties' legal theories produce 
disputed dates of "injury," there are disputed questions of 
material fact here that preclude summary judgment.   
We disagree.  While it is true that summary judgment may be 
granted only where there are no disputed issues of material 
fact, Oneida County Dep't of Social Services v. Nicole W., 2007 
WI 30, ¶8, 299 Wis. 2d 637, 728 N.W.2d 652 (citing Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2)), and there may be factual disputes here, none of 
those disputes relate to material facts.  All of the potential 
dates for Robert's "injury" suggested by OHIC occurred before 
August 9, 2003, and therefore, even if it is legitimately 
disputed on which of those dates Robert sustained an "injury" 
triggering the statute of limitations, all of those dates 
suffice to cause the estate's claim to be time-barred by Wis. 
Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a).  Therefore, any factual dispute about 
which date should be applied is not material.  Maroney v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 12 Wis. 2d 197, 202, 107 N.W.2d 261 (1961) 
(concluding that disputed facts that are "immaterial to the 
questions of law presented . . . do not afford a basis for 
denying summary judgment" (citing Hafemann v. Korinek, 266 Wis. 
450, 63 N.W.2d 835 (1954))).   
No. 
2007AP541   
 
11 
 
second surgery performed on August 8, 2003, while it may have 
inflicted an additional injury on Robert because he was 
subjected to more surgery, mainly confirmed Robert's injury from 
the first surgery.   
¶19 It was the negligence during the first surgery that 
resulted in an infection-producing sponge being present in 
Robert's abdomen.  Stated otherwise, by leaving the sponge 
inside of Robert, the doctors "cause[d] a greater harm than 
existed at the time of the [negligent act]."  Paul, 242 Wis. 2d 
507, ¶25.  Robert suffered an injury when the doctors left an 
infection-producing sponge in his abdominal cavity, and the 
sponge was not there prior to the doctors' negligent conduct.   
¶20 Accordingly, the presence of an infection-producing 
sponge in Robert's abdominal cavity is the type of "physical 
injurious change" discussed in Fojut, and our conclusion that it 
constitutes an "injury" is consistent with Paul.  When the 
doctors negligently left a sponge inside of Robert, which caused 
the sepsis that resulted in his death, he sustained an "injury" 
                                                                                                                                                             
Furthermore, although the parties' various legal theories 
set forth different dates for Robert's "injury," our adoption of 
one legal theory over another, and thereby one date of "injury" 
over another, does not resolve a disputed question of fact.  The 
historic 
facts 
are 
not disputed; it is only the legal 
consequences that flow from those facts that are subject to 
dispute.  Therefore, our choice of a date resolves a disputed 
question of law, for which summary judgment is entirely 
appropriate.  Snider v. N. States Power Co., 81 Wis. 2d 224, 
230, 260 N.W.2d 260 (1977) (explaining that summary judgment 
shall be rendered where "no material facts are in dispute and 
only a question of law is presented" (citing Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2))). 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
12 
 
that 
triggered 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1m)(a)'s 
three-year 
limitations period.7  Because this injury occurred more than 
                                                 
7 Justice Bradley purposefully misinterprets the majority 
opinion, asserting that it "confuses the law"  and is subject to 
"additional 
infirmities." 
 
Justice 
Bradley's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶53.  However, what Justice Bradley misses 
is that this case arises from an occurrence when negligence and 
injury happened simultaneously, as is often the case.  For 
example, consider the tortfeasor who negligently stumbles while 
carrying a pot of boiling water which he pours on the victim.  
The negligence (pouring boiling water on the victim) and the 
injury (scalding the victim) occur simultaneously.   
The negligence and injury in this case arise in a similar 
fashion.  That is, the doctors left a sponge in Robert's 
abdominal cavity.  This was a negligent act.  This negligent act 
resulted in an infection-causing sponge being present in 
Robert's abdominal cavity.  The presence of an infection-causing 
sponge in Robert's abdominal cavity was an injury.  Accordingly, 
the negligent act occurred simultaneously with the injury in 
this case. 
Justice 
Bradley 
accuses 
the 
majority 
opinion 
of 
impermissibly finding facts.  Id., ¶58.  This stems from her 
fundamental misunderstanding of the conclusions we reach.  
Contrary to her assertions, we do not conclude that the injury 
in this case was the infection.  See id.  Rather, we conclude 
that it was the presence of the infection-causing sponge in 
Robert's abdomen that was the injury.   
The circuit court considered a number of different events 
that might have constituted an injury to Robert, but did not 
expressly find the date upon which Robert's injury occurred. 
Instead, the circuit court found that August 8, 2003, the date 
of Robert's second surgery, was the last possible date on which 
he 
could 
have 
suffered 
an 
injury 
triggering 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1m)(a).  Because the claims were filed more than three 
years after this date, the court held that they were barred. 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
13 
 
three years prior to August 9, 2006, when the claim was filed, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
estate's 
claim 
is 
time-barred 
by 
§ 893.55(1m)(a). 
¶21 Furthermore, 
accepting 
the 
estate's 
and 
Kathy's 
definition of "injury" would contradict the maxim that "'[a] 
later injury from the same tortious act does not restart the 
running of the statute' of limitations."  Fojut, 212 Wis. 2d at 
832 (quoting Segall v. Hurwitz, 114 Wis. 2d 471, 482, 339 N.W.2d 
333 (Ct. App. 1983)).  That is, even though an infection-
producing sponge was present inside of Robert's abdomen as a 
result of the first surgery, the estate and Kathy urge us to 
restart the statute of limitations by concluding that Robert 
sustained an injury only when his condition became irreversible.  
We decline to do so.   
¶22 Were we to conclude as the estate and Kathy suggest, 
it would logically follow that Robert could not have filed a 
medical negligence action once the infection-producing sponge 
was present inside of his abdomen, even if that injury led only 
to a protracted recovery course, rather than to death.  However, 
                                                                                                                                                             
However, it is an undisputed fact that the infection-
causing sponge was present in Robert's abdomen on the date his 
first surgery concluded, and this is the date on which we 
conclude that Robert suffered an injury.  We do not, contrary to 
Justice Bradley's assertions, find as a fact the date on which 
Robert's infection developed.  Rather, because there was no 
dispute about the date on which the infection-causing sponge 
first was present in Robert's abdomen, we determine when the 
injury occurred as a question of law.  State ex rel. Flores v. 
State, 183 Wis. 2d 587, 609, 516 N.W.2d 362 (1994) (explaining 
that when the facts are undisputed, a question of law is 
presented, which we decide independently).  
No. 
2007AP541   
 
14 
 
many 
claims 
of 
medical 
negligence 
are 
not 
grounded 
in 
untreatable injuries.  For example, in Fojut, a tubal ligation 
was negligently performed; however, the ligation was re-done 
subsequently.  Fojut, 212 Wis. 2d at 832.  Because all injuries 
that result from medical negligence do not lead to death or to 
an irreversible medical course, it is not reasonable to 
interpret the word "injury" as the estate and Kathy suggest.  As 
we also have explained, "once a claimant has sustained an injury 
and has an enforceable claim, that claimant cannot sit on that 
claim until all consequential damages have come to fruition."  
Paul, 242 Wis. 2d 507, ¶39 (citing Nierengarten v. Lutheran Soc. 
Servs. of Wis. & Upper Mich., Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 686, 701, 580 
N.W.2d 320 (1998)).  Accordingly, we conclude that the estate's 
claim for medical negligence accrued more than three years 
before the estate filed suit.  Therefore, it is untimely under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a).   
C. 
Wrongful Death 
¶23 Having concluded that the estate's medical negligence 
claim is time-barred by Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a), we now turn 
to Kathy's wrongful death claim.  A claim for damages due to 
wrongful death is purely statutory, as it was unknown at common 
law.  Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶56, 
293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216 (citing Brown v. Chicago & N.W. 
Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 137, 140, 77 N.W. 748 (1898)).  When a claim 
for 
damages due to wrongful death is based on medical 
malpractice, the eligible claimants are those claimants listed 
in Wis. Stat. § 655.007.  Czapinski v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
15 
 
2000 WI 80, ¶2, 236 Wis. 2d 316, 613 N.W.2d 120.  A claim for 
damages due to wrongful death arising from medical malpractice 
does not incorporate all of the persons who are entitled to 
bring a claim for damages due to wrongful death under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04(2), which applies when the claim does not arise from 
medical malpractice.  Id., ¶¶18-19.  As the surviving spouse of 
Robert, Kathy falls within the class of claimants listed in 
§ 655.007 who are entitled to bring a claim for damages due to 
wrongful death arising from medical malpractice.   
¶24 The claim that she brings is a derivative claim, based 
on the injury that Robert suffered due to medical negligence.  
See Lornson v. Siddiqui, 2007 WI 92, ¶¶18-19, 302 Wis. 2d 519, 
735 N.W.2d 55 (concluding that Wis. Stat. § 655.007 creates two 
general types of claims, one of which is a derivative claim in 
favor of enumerated family members of a patient who has suffered 
injury or death from medical malpractice).  
¶25 OHIC has asserted the statute of limitations found in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a) as a bar to Kathy's claim because she 
brought suit more than three years after Robert was injured by 
medical negligence.  Kathy counters that she could not file a 
wrongful death claim until Robert's death.  Therefore, her claim 
could have accrued no earlier than the date he died, August 11, 
2003.  Since her claim was filed on August 9, 2006, less than 
three years later, she argues that it was timely-filed.   
¶26 Kathy cites to the wrongful death statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.03, for the proposition that a wrongful death claim cannot 
be brought until there is a death.  That statute provides: 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
16 
 
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a 
wrongful act, neglect or default and the act, neglect 
or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, 
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action 
and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in 
every such case the person who would have been liable, 
if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action 
for damages notwithstanding the death of the person 
injured; provided, that such action shall be brought 
for a death caused in this state. 
§ 895.03.  However, § 895.03 does not provide when a claim for 
damages due to wrongful death accrues, or when it must be 
brought, or when it will be lost.   
¶27 Furthermore, because Kathy's claim for damages due to 
wrongful death is based on alleged medical negligence, we turn 
to the controlling statute of limitations for all claims arising 
from alleged medical negligence, Wis. Stat. § 893.55.  Hegarty, 
249 Wis. 2d 142, ¶2.  The language of § 893.55 is very broad.  
It addresses "damages for injury arising from any treatment or 
operation performed by . . . a health care provider, regardless 
of the theory on which the action is based."  § 893.55(1m) 
(emphasis added).  Here, Kathy's theory of recovery is based on 
the provisions of the wrongful death statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.03.   
¶28 That Kathy's derivative claim for damages due to 
wrongful death is controlled by the specific statute of 
limitations for medical malpractice is further supported by Wis. 
Stat. § 655.007.  It provides: 
[A]ny patient or the patient's representative having a 
claim or any spouse, parent, minor sibling or child of 
the patient having a derivative claim for injury or 
death on account of malpractice is subject to this 
chapter.   
No. 
2007AP541   
 
17 
 
§ 655.007 (emphasis added).  Chapter 655 is entitled, "Health 
Care Liability and Injured Patients and Families Compensation."  
It is a very comprehensive approach to injuries and death that 
result from medical malpractice.  Accordingly, by expressly 
establishing that death resulting from medical malpractice is 
subject to the same rules as is injury that results from medical 
malpractice, § 655.007 supports the directive that Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.55(1m)(a) applies regardless of whether the claim for 
damages is based on injury or death.  
¶29 Furthermore, we disagree with Kathy's conclusion that, 
because a claim for damages due to wrongful death may be brought 
only if there is first a death, the claim for damages due to 
wrongful death must accrue on the date of death.  As we have 
stated previously, "there is no logical distinction between 
injury and death claims arising out of medical malpractice.  
Once medical malpractice produces a loss, a remedy exists 
regardless whether the consequence is injury or death."  Rineck 
v. Johnson, 155 Wis. 2d 659, 671, 456 N.W.2d 336 (1990), 
overruled on other grounds, Chang v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 
Co., 182 Wis. 2d 549, 566, 514 N.W.2d 399 (1994).  Kathy's claim 
for damages due to wrongful death is based on Robert's 
underlying claim for medical negligence; therefore, Kathy's 
claim is a "death claim[] arising out of medical malpractice," 
and it is governed by the statute of limitations in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(1m)(a).  Id.  Under that statute, Kathy's claim for 
damages due to wrongful death accrued on the same date that the 
estate's claim accrued:  the date of Robert's "injury."  As a 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
18 
 
result, because Kathy's claim for damages accrued more than 
three years prior to when she filed her claim, it is time-
barred.  
¶30 The amicus curiae brief of the Wisconsin Association 
for Justice takes issue with this conclusion, arguing that Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1m)(a) 
is 
not 
the 
operative 
statute 
of 
limitations for Kathy's wrongful death claim, and that Wis. 
Stat. § 893.54(2) is the statute of limitations that should 
govern.  Section 893.54(2) is the general statute of limitations 
for wrongful death actions.  It provides:  "The following 
actions shall be commenced within 3 years or be barred:  . . . 
(2) An action brought to recover damages for death caused by the 
wrongful act, neglect or default of another."  However, 
§ 893.54(2) does not address the issue presented here:  When 
does a wrongful death action that is based on medical negligence 
accrue?  
¶31 Furthermore, our conclusion, that the statute limiting 
pre-death medical malpractice claims also limits claims for 
damages 
due 
to 
wrongful 
death 
that 
arise 
from 
medical 
malpractice, is consistent with our conclusion in Czapinski.  In 
Czapinski, we concluded that the class of claimants who are 
entitled to sue for damages due to wrongful death in a medical 
malpractice context differs from the class of claimants who may 
sue for damages due to wrongful death in other contexts.  
Czapinski, 236 Wis. 2d 316, ¶¶18-19. 
¶32 We acknowledge that some of our past decisions, 
outside of the medical malpractice context, could be interpreted 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
19 
 
to conclude that claims for damages due to wrongful death accrue 
on the date of the decedent's death.  See, e.g., Terbush v. 
Boyle, 217 Wis. 636, 640, 259 N.W. 859 (1935), overruled on 
other grounds, Pufahl v. Williams, 179 Wis. 2d 104, 111, 506 
N.W.2d 747 (1993) (interpreting a former statute of limitations 
consistent with an even earlier statutory provision that 
provided, "'every such action shall be commenced within two 
years after the death of such deceased person'").   
¶33 However, as indicated above, we do not agree that Wis. 
Stat. § 893.54(2) is the operative statute of limitations for 
Kathy's claim, because her claim arises from alleged medical 
malpractice.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(1m) states that it is the 
governing statute of limitations for "damages for injury arising 
from any treatment or operation performed by . . . a health care 
provider, regardless of the theory on which the action is 
based."  (Emphasis added.)  The plain language of the statute 
instructs that it is to control, "regardless of the theory on 
which the action is based," whether it be the estate's claim for 
medical negligence or Kathy's claim for damages due to wrongful 
death, so long as the action is one for "damages for injury 
arising from any treatment or operation performed by . . . a 
health care provider."  § 893.55(1m).  Kathy's claim for damages 
due to wrongful death most certainly falls within § 893.55(1m)'s 
description of the claims it governs.  As the court of appeals 
noted in Hegarty, "it is apparent that the legislature intended 
that any claim alleging negligence against a health care 
provider would be controlled by § 893.55, even though the 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
20 
 
medical malpractice claim is based on a wrongful death."  
Hegarty, 249 Wis. 2d 142, ¶18. 
¶34 Finally, even though Wis. Stat. § 893.54(2) provides a 
general statute of limitations for claims for damages due to 
wrongful death, "[w]here two statutes apply to the same subject, 
the more specific controls."  Clean Wis., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n of Wis., 2005 WI 93, ¶175, 282 Wis. 2d 250, 700 N.W.2d 
768 (citing Martineau v. State Conservation Comm'n, 46 Wis. 2d 
443, 449, 175 N.W.2d 206 (1970)); see also Clark v. Erdmann, 161 
Wis. 2d 428, 436, 468 N.W.2d 18 (1991) (holding that where 
either Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55 or 893.54 "considered independently 
could be applicable, only one actually can be applied").  We 
have previously concluded that, as between §§ 893.55 and 893.54, 
§ 893.55 is the more specific statute: 
Section 893.55 clearly is the more specific of the two 
statutes.  Unlike sec. 893.54, it concerns itself not 
only with injury to the person, but also with a 
particular way in which the injury arises, i.e., 
resulting from an act or omission of a "health care 
provider." 
Clark, 161 Wis. 2d at 436-37.  The claim for the damages that 
Kathy seeks, like the estate's claim for damages, accrued on the 
date of Robert's "injury," not on the date of his death, and 
because Robert's injury occurred more than three years prior to 
the 
filing 
of 
Kathy's 
claim, 
her 
claim 
is 
time-barred.  
§ 893.55(1m)(a). 
¶35 Kathy also contends that interpreting the wrongful 
death statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.03, as a statute of entitlement 
that establishes a statutory claim brings her claim within the 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
21 
 
court of appeals' opinion in Miller.  We agree that § 895.03 
establishes the entitlement to a claim for damages due to 
wrongful death that the legislature created.  However, as we 
explain below, Miller never reaches the argument Kathy presents 
here.   
¶36 In Miller, as in this case, the plaintiffs were an 
estate, asserting a medical negligence claim on behalf of the 
decedent, and the decedent's surviving spouse, asserting a 
wrongful death claim.  Miller, 170 Wis. 2d at 434.  The 
underlying negligent act in Miller was the misdiagnosis and 
treatment of the decedent's skin cancer, which misdiagnosis and 
treatment occurred in 1982.  Id.  In 1984, the decedent learned 
of the misdiagnosis.  Id.  However, the decedent and his spouse 
did not bring an action for medical negligence until 1990.  Id.  
When the decedent died later that year, his estate continued the 
medical negligence action on his behalf, and his wife commenced 
a wrongful death action.  Id.  The circuit court dismissed the 
estate's medical negligence claim as barred by the statute of 
limitations, Wis. Stat. § 893.55.  Id. at 434-35.  This decision 
was not appealed, and the parties did not dispute that the 
estate's action was correctly held to be time-barred.  Id. at 
435.  However, the circuit court allowed the wife's wrongful 
death claim to proceed because her action was filed within three 
years of her husband's death.  Id.  The subject of the appeal in 
Miller was whether the wife could maintain her claim for damages 
due to wrongful death.  Id. at 434. 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
22 
 
¶37 The court of appeals determined that the wife could 
not maintain her claim for damages due to wrongful death 
because, in order for a claim for damages due to wrongful death 
to be maintained, it is necessary that the decedent, at the time 
of death, "could have maintained an action and recovered damages 
had his death not ensued."  Id. at 438.  Because the decedent's 
underlying claim for medical negligence was time-barred at the 
time of his death, his wife's claim for damages due to wrongful 
death was also barred.  Id. at 439 (stating that if "the 
decedent's action was not barred by the applicable statute of 
limitation [at the time of the decedent's death], the wrongful 
death action is not barred.") (citing Holifield v. Setco Indus., 
Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969)). 
¶38 We acknowledge that Miller, like this case, dealt with 
a claim for damages due to wrongful death based on underlying 
medical malpractice, and that Wis. Stat. § 893.55 was the 
operative statute of limitations.  Id. at 434.  We also 
acknowledge Miller's statement, despite its context, that "a 
wrongful death action accrues at the time of the decedent's 
death."  Id. at 436 (citing Terbush, 217 Wis. at 640).   
¶39 However, Miller did not confront the issue presented 
to us in this review, i.e., whether a surviving relative's claim 
for damages due to wrongful death accrues on the same date as 
does the medical negligence action on which it is based.  
Miller's statements regarding the date of accrual of a claim for 
damages due to wrongful death based on underlying medical 
malpractice were dicta, as they were not necessary to the theory 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
23 
 
on which the court of appeals decided the case.  State v. 
Sartin, 200 Wis. 2d 47, 60 n.7, 546 N.W.2d 449 (1996) 
(explaining that dictum "is a statement or language expressed in 
a court's opinion which extends beyond the facts in the case and 
is broader than necessary and not essential to the determination 
of the issues before it").  As a result, those statements have 
no precedential value.  Id. at 65 (reasoning that "dicta does 
not amount to legal precedent"); DOR v. Howick, 100 Wis. 2d 274, 
286, 303 N.W.2d 381 (1981) (concluding that "dicta does not have 
any precedential value"). 
¶40 The conclusion upon which the Miller decision was 
based was that the decedent, himself, had no actionable claim 
for medical negligence at the time of his own death.  Miller, 
170 Wis. 2d at 441 ("[A] wrongful death action cannot be brought 
unless the decedent, at the time of his death, was entitled to 
maintain an action and recover damages.").  The court concluded 
that because a wrongful death claim cannot be maintained if a 
decedent had no claim at the time of his death, id., Miller's 
wife's claim was barred.  Accordingly, the accrual date for the 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
24 
 
wife's wrongful death action was not relevant to the reasoning 
of the court in deciding the case.8   
¶41 Our conclusions about Miller are further strengthened 
because Miller relied on our decision in Terbush to say that 
claims for damages due to wrongful death accrue on the date of 
death.  Id. at 436 (citing Terbush, 217 Wis. at 640).  Terbush 
is a case from 1935 that was decided long before the adoption of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55 (originally passed in 1979).  Furthermore, 
Terbush dealt with a claim for wrongful death based on an 
underlying automobile collision.  Terbush, 217 Wis. at 636.  
Therefore, Miller's reliance on Terbush to say that a wrongful 
death action based on medical negligence accrues on the date of 
                                                 
8 Justice Crooks' dissent/concurrence quotes the following 
language from Miller v. Luther, 170 Wis. 2d 429, 489 N.W.2d 651 
(Ct. App. 1992), and argues that the court of appeals' 
statements with regard to the accrual date of a claim for 
damages due to wrongful death were not dicta:  "[Miller's] 
wrongful death action was not barred by the application of its 
own statute of limitation," id. at 441.  Justice Crooks' 
dissent/concurrence, ¶98 n.2 (emphasis added in Justice Crooks' 
dissent/concurrence).  However, the court of appeals in Miller 
engaged in no substantive analysis of the statute of limitations 
applicable to Miller's wrongful death claim, and made this 
quoted statement only after concluding that Miller's claim for 
damages due to wrongful death was barred because her husband 
could not have maintained a cause of action at the time of his 
death, Miller, 170 Wis. 2d at 441.  Accordingly, the accrual 
date of Miller's claim for damages due to wrongful death was not 
necessary to the holding that her claim was barred; the court of 
appeals' statements were dicta in this respect.  State v. 
Sartin, 200 Wis. 2d 47, 60 n.7, 546 N.W.2d 449 (1996) 
(explaining that dictum "is a statement or language expressed in 
a court's opinion [that] extends beyond the facts in the case 
and is . . . not essential to the determination of the issues"). 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
25 
 
the decedent's death is misplaced.  Terbush does not apply in 
the medical negligence context.   
¶42 Justice Crooks' concurrence/dissent also relies on 
Holifield, a case cited in Miller, for the same premise.9  
However, Holifield, like Terbush, is inapposite in this case.  
First, Holifield predates adoption of Wis. Stat. § 893.55, the 
controlling statute in this case.  Second, the claim for damages 
due to wrongful death in Holifield was based on underlying 
actions for products liability and negligent manufacture based 
on injuries that resulted when the grinding wheel on a grinding 
machine exploded.  Holifield, 42 Wis. 2d at 752, 754-56.  
Accordingly, Holifield, like Terbush, cannot serve as a basis 
for concluding that Kathy's claim for damages due to wrongful 
death accrued on the date of Robert's death; its holding does 
not apply in the medical negligence context.10 
¶43 Finally, we note that, because the decision in Miller 
was exclusively based on the conclusion that the decedent had no 
actionable claim for medical negligence at the time of his 
death, Miller, 170 Wis. 2d at 441, the court of appeals' did not 
answer a number of other questions that appear to have been 
                                                 
9 Justice Crooks' dissent/concurrence, ¶96.  
10 Our discussions of Terbush v. Boyle, 217 Wis. 636, 640, 
259 N.W. 859 (1935), and Holifield v. Setco Industries, Inc., 42 
Wis. 2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969), are made in the context of 
examining a claim for damages arising from medical negligence.  
Stated otherwise, we have decided this case in the context in 
which it arose, alleged medical malpractice, and based on the 
statute of limitations that controls all medical malpractice 
actions, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a). 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
26 
 
posed by the facts of that case.  Id. at 434-35 (noting that the 
defendants in Miller did challenge the wife's claim for damages 
due to wrongful death on the basis that it "was barred by  the 
medical 
malpractice 
statute 
of 
limitations, 
sec. 
893.55, 
Stats.").  For example, the underlying medical negligence 
occurred in 1982, and Wis. Stat. § 893.55 was the controlling 
statute of limitations, yet the plaintiffs did not assert claims 
until 1990.  Id.  The date of the decedent's "injury" for 
purposes of § 893.55 was never discussed by the court.   
¶44 In addition, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(b) provides that 
if § 893.55(1m)(a) does not yield a later limitations period, 
the action shall be commenced within: 
One year from the date the injury was discovered 
or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have been discovered, except that an action may not be 
commenced under this paragraph more than 5 years from 
the date of the act or omission. 
§ 893.55(1m)(b).11  As is apparent, § 893.55(1m)(b) provides a 
statute of repose, wherein no action may be commenced for 
                                                 
11 We also note that Justice Crooks' dissent/concurrence 
would lead to a result that is inconsistent with the five-year 
statute of repose set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(b).  
Specifically, if claims for damages due to wrongful death in the 
medical negligence context were held to accrue on the decedent's 
date of death, rather than on the date of injury, a situation 
could arise where a claim for damages due to wrongful death 
could be brought almost six years after the date of the 
underlying medical negligence that caused the injury——three 
years for the claim of the medical patient subjected to medical 
negligence, plus an additional three years for the claim for 
damages due to wrongful death.  This result would directly 
contravene 
the 
five-year 
statute 
of 
repose 
contained 
in 
§ 893.55(1m)(b). 
No. 
2007AP541   
 
27 
 
medical malpractice "more than 5 years from the date of the act 
or omission," regardless of when the injury occurred, was 
discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.  Id.  The 
plaintiffs in Miller were arguing that the negligent "act or 
omission" occurred in 1982, yet they did not file until 1990, 
eight years later.  Miller, 270 Wis. 2d at 434.  Certainly the 
five-year statute of repose precluded their actions.  However, 
the court of appeals did not address § 893.55(1m)(b).12 
¶45 As a result, because of the limited and exclusive 
basis for the court of appeals' decision, the lack of any 
discussion regarding Wis. Stat. § 893.55, and the fact that the 
court's statements regarding the accrual date for the wife's 
claim for damages due to wrongful death were no more than dicta, 
we conclude that Miller does not persuasively support the 
proposition that claims for damages due to wrongful death based 
on underlying allegations of medical negligence accrue on the 
date of the decedent's death, rather than on the date of the 
underlying "injury" to the decedent.  
¶46 As a final contention, Kathy asserts that to reject 
Miller's statements regarding the accrual date of claims for 
damages due to wrongful death in the medical malpractice 
context, and to hold that her claim for damages due to wrongful 
death accrued on the date of Robert's "injury," will lead to 
                                                 
12 Oft times a court's decision seems incomplete because 
statutory provisions that appear to apply are not addressed.  
However, the focus of court decisions is generally controlled by 
the litigants, and if they do not raise a particular issue, 
generally the court does not address it.   
No. 
2007AP541   
 
28 
 
unduly harsh results.  Specifically, Kathy argues that our 
interpretation of the statute as applied to her wrongful death 
claim will mean that some claims may accrue before they can be 
brought.  We acknowledge that this may be a result of our 
decision.  However, harshness is not a permissible basis for 
reaching a different conclusion.  Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, ¶37, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715 
(rejecting plaintiffs' claims even though "[t]he outcome of this 
case is harsh, and the harshness of our holding is especially 
palpable because the negligence is so clear"). 
¶47 In addition, it is not our place to question the 
policy decisions of the legislature.  Hoida, Inc. v. M&I 
Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶24, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17 
(reasoning that "[t]he legislature . . . establishes public 
policy for the state through the statutes it enacts, and we are 
limited 'to applying the policy the legislature has chosen to 
enact, and may not impose [our] own policy choices'" (quoting 
Fandrey v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 WI 62, ¶16, 272 
Wis. 2d 46, 680 N.W.2d 345)).  It is apparent that "the 
legislature intended to set medical malpractice cases involving 
death apart from other death cases."  Rineck, 155 Wis. 2d at 
671.  The preamble of Wis. Stat. § 893.55 shows that the purpose 
of the statute was to limit the liability of health care 
providers 
in 
certain 
circumstances 
based 
on 
a 
difficult 
balancing of a number of competing policies.  § 893.55(1d)(a).  
It is not our place to second-guess those policy decisions.  
No. 
2007AP541   
 
29 
 
Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶24.  We therefore reject Kathy's 
argument.13 
¶48 We have concluded that Kathy's wrongful death claim is 
derivative of a medical negligence claim, for which the 
applicable statute of limitations is Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a).  
Because the accrual date for claims under § 893.55(1m)(a) is the 
date of "injury" caused by the underlying act of medical 
negligence, and the "injury" Robert suffered here occurred more 
                                                 
13 Justice Crooks suggests that our conclusion here "may 
foster a public perception that common sense sometimes is 
lacking 
in 
court 
decisions." 
 
Justice 
Crooks' 
dissent/concurrence, ¶89.  However, his criticism may be more 
appropriately viewed as an expression of frustration with the 
unambiguous language of Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a).  The fact 
is, the legislature has expressly stated that "an action to 
recover damages for injury arising from any treatment or 
operation performed by, or from any omission by, a person who is 
a health care provider, regardless of the theory on which the 
action is based, shall be commenced within . . . [t]hree years 
from the date of the injury."  Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a).  
Kathy's claim for damages due to wrongful death is "an action to 
recover damages for injury arising from any treatment or 
operation performed by, or from any omission by, a person who is 
a health care provider."  We are bound to apply the statute, and 
under the statute's plain language, Kathy's wrongful death claim 
accrued on the "date of the injury."  Id.   
We appreciate Justice Crooks' concern that it may appear 
that one could be required to file a claim for damages due to 
wrongful death before the death occurs.  However, this concern 
is misplaced because a claim for wrongful death damages is a 
derivative claim for damages that may be added by amending a 
complaint for medical negligence that was brought before the 
patient dies.  Wis. Stat. § 802.09(3); see Korkow v. Gen. Cas. 
Co. of Wis., 117 Wis. 2d 187, 196, 344 N.W.2d 108 (1984).  Or, 
the claim for damages due to wrongful death may be brought 
simultaneously with the pre-death claim of medical negligence if 
the patient is deceased at the time the claims are filed.  
No. 
2007AP541   
 
30 
 
than three years prior to the filing of Kathy's wrongful death 
claim, 
we 
conclude 
that 
her 
claim 
is 
time-barred.  
§ 893.55(1m)(a). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶49 Because we conclude that Robert suffered an "injury" 
for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a) when he experienced a 
"physical injurious change," and that the "physical injurious 
change" occurred more than three years prior to the filing of 
the estate's claim, we conclude that the estate's claim is time-
barred by § 893.55(1m)(a).  We further conclude that Kathy's 
wrongful death claim based on Robert's death that allegedly was 
caused by medical negligence accrued on the same date as the 
estate's 
claim. 
 
Therefore, 
it, 
too, 
is 
precluded 
by 
§ 893.55(1m)(a).  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals that affirmed the circuit court's decision 
granting summary judgment in favor of OHIC. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2007AP541.awb 
 
1 
 
¶50 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, J.   (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Is death a condition precedent to a 
wrongful death claim?  It seems pretty obvious that the answer 
should be "yes."   
¶51 Yet, 
the 
majority 
answers 
this 
question 
"no."  
Acknowledging some displeasure with its own response, the 
majority attempts to blame the legislature for the majority's 
interpretation.  See majority op., ¶46, ¶47 n.11.  The 
legislature could not have intended such a result. 
¶52 I instead conclude that a wrongful death claim accrues 
upon death——not before death——and therefore join Justice Crooks 
in dissenting.  As he aptly discusses, it is impossible to read 
the language of Wis. Stat. § 895.03 or our prior cases "in any 
way other than that death is a condition precedent, which must 
be met, before there can be such a lawsuit for wrongful death."  
J. Crooks' dissent/concurrence, ¶93.   
¶53 I write separately, however, to address two additional 
infirmities of the majority opinion.  First, although I agree 
with the majority that Robert's estate's claim for medical 
malpractice is barred by the statute of limitations, I do not 
join its analysis.  In determining that Robert suffered an 
injury on the date that an "infection-producing sponge" was left 
in his abdomen, the majority's discussion fails to elucidate a 
clear holding and in fact confuses the law.   
¶54 Second, 
I 
write 
separately 
to 
comment 
on 
the 
majority's discussion of dicta.  Instead of providing a clear 
definition of dicta, the majority provides multiple incomplete 
No.  2007AP541.awb 
 
2 
 
definitions.  It fails to acknowledge as we have previously 
explained that Wisconsin has two lines of cases defining dicta, 
and the majority does not even mention one of them.  Rather, 
with minimal analysis, it dismisses as dicta a difficult 
proposition from a previous case, avoiding any meaningful 
discussion.  Such an approach fosters an end run around stare 
decisis and undermines our common law tradition of fidelity to 
precedent.   
I 
¶55 The 
circuit court correctly observed that under 
Wisconsin law, the cause of action accrues on the date of injury 
and injury is defined as a "physical injurious change."  See 
Fojut v. Stafl, 212 Wis. 2d 827, 831, 569 N.W.2d 737 (Ct. App. 
1997).  The court explained that in this case, there were three 
events which were advanced as the possible dates of a physical 
injurious change to the plaintiff's body: (1) the date "when the 
sponge was left inside him," (2) the undetermined date, sometime 
"shortly after the first surgery and prior to the second, when 
Mr. Genrich developed infection and was running a fever," and 
(3) the date of the second surgery which "involved an invasive 
procedure 
of 
Mr. 
Genrich being cut open to remove the 
sponge . . . ." 
¶56 Ultimately, the court made a finding that the physical 
injurious change in this case occurred on the date of the second 
surgery: "[T]he Court finds that the latest point where the 
injury occurs that forms the first justification for a claim 
No.  2007AP541.awb 
 
3 
 
would be the second surgery, which would not have been necessary 
but for the negligence of the medical staff."  
¶57 The majority, however, determines otherwise.  It 
states, "It was the negligence during the first surgery that 
resulted in an infection-producing sponge being present in 
Robert's abdomen."  Majority op., ¶19.  Further, "the presence 
of an infection-producing sponge in Robert's abdominal cavity is 
the type of 'physical-injurious change' discussed in [our case 
law.]"  Id., ¶20.  The majority concludes: "When the doctors 
negligently left a sponge inside of Robert, which caused the 
sepsis that resulted in his death, he sustained an 'injury' that 
triggered Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a)'s three-year limitations 
period."  Id. 
¶58 In focusing on the first surgery, it is unclear 
whether the majority intends to be making a finding of fact or a 
conclusion of law.  To the extent that the majority is finding 
the fact of when the physical injurious change occurred, the 
majority 
ignores 
the 
well-established 
principle 
that 
an 
appellate court will not disturb a finding of fact of the 
circuit court unless it is clearly erroneous.  The majority 
offers no analysis as to why it can supplant its finding for 
that of the circuit court. 
¶59 If the majority's determination is a conclusion of 
law, then it fails to elucidate a clear test and confuses the 
law.  I cannot join the majority opinion because I do not 
understand what the majority holds.   
No.  2007AP541.awb 
 
4 
 
¶60 Under the majority's test, when is there a "physical 
injurious change"?  That is, when does the cause of action 
accrue?   
 ¶61 Does it accrue on the day that a foreign object is 
left in the body?  I am unsure.  The majority's test seems to 
require more.   
¶62 Does the majority's conclusion mean that when there is 
no subsequent physical change, sponges and other foreign objects 
can be left in a patient's body with impunity?  I don't know.  
But if so, how could the law countenance such a conclusion? 
¶63 Throughout the opinion, the majority repeatedly refers 
to the sponge as "infection-producing."  See majority op., ¶¶18, 
19, 20, 20 n.7.  This grammatical construction suggests that it 
is not the leaving of a foreign object in the body that is the 
injury——rather, an injury occurs when a foreign object is left 
and the object produces an infection. 
¶64 This begs the question.  The majority finds that "the 
infection-causing sponge was present in Robert's abdomen" on the 
date of the first surgery.  Majority op., ¶20 n.7.  The majority 
states further that there is no dispute that "the infection-
causing sponge first was present in Robert's abdomen" on the 
date of the first surgery.  Id.   
¶65 The 
majority's 
assertion 
is 
only 
half 
correct.  
Certainly, there is no dispute that the sponge was present on 
the date of the first surgery.  Yet, there are no facts in the 
record that indicate that the sponge was "infection-producing" 
when the first surgery was performed.   
No.  2007AP541.awb 
 
5 
 
¶66 There is nothing in the record that indicates whether 
the doctors selected a clean, sterile sponge to use during 
surgery, or whether the sponge was infected when it was 
initially left in Robert's abdomen.  Arguably, the sponge 
started producing an infection at some point after the surgery 
occurred.1   
¶67 The majority can point to no facts in the record that 
demonstrate that the sponge was "infection-producing" the moment 
it was initially left in Robert's abdomen.2  The majority's 
unfounded 
factual 
assumption 
that 
the 
events 
occurred 
simultaneously allows it to evade a more thorough examination of 
its new test. 
                                                 
1 There are a plethora of medical malpractice sponge cases.  
Even sponges which reportedly were sterile have been the subject 
of claims involving infectious injury.  See, e.g., Faherty v. 
Gracias, 874 A.2d 1239, 1247 (Pa. Super. 2005); Hutchins v. 
Fletcher Allen Health Care, 776 A.2d 376, 377 (Vt. 2001); Fritz 
v. Horsfall, 163 P.2d 148, 161 (Wash. 1945).   
One such case is Seals v. Gosey, 565 So. 2d 1003 (La. App. 
1990).  There, the court observed that it was the consensus of 
medical experts that sponges which are initially sterile can be 
the nesting place for infections to grow, thereby exacerbating 
an infectious condition.  In that instance, the sponge may not 
be the cause but rather is a cause of the infectious injury.  
"The medical experts unanimously testified that sterile gauze 
will not itself cause an infection but that it can be a nesting 
place for an infection to grow."  Id. at 1010. 
2  The majority can only assert that the infection developed 
"soon" after the July 24 surgery.  Majority op., ¶3.  This fact 
is consistent with the record, but it does not establish when 
the sponge became "infection-producing."   
Only two and one-half weeks elapsed between the first 
surgery and Robert's death.  At some time during this period, 
the infection developed.  Stating that the infection developed 
"soon" after the surgery does nothing to pinpoint when in fact 
the sponge started producing an infection. 
No.  2007AP541.awb 
 
6 
 
¶68 Consider the facts of a California case where the 
events were not simultaneous.3  A curved surgical needle was left 
in the soft tissue of the patient's abdomen.  About two and one-
half years after the surgery, the patient sought medical 
treatment 
because 
he 
had 
enlarged 
lymph 
glands 
and 
was 
experiencing attacks of high fever.  X-rays revealed the 
presence of the needle.  He was advised by the original surgeon 
that it was not necessary to remove the needle because it was 
safely encased in scar tissue.  Another surgeon, however, 
performed the surgery to remove the needle and later testified 
that "it was necessary to remove the needle, that it had 
punctured the colon, caused peritonitis and the illness which 
plaintiff suffered preceding the finding of the needle."  Bowers 
v. Olch, 260 P.2d 997, 1001 (Cal. App. 2d 1953). 
¶69 If the majority's test was applied to the facts of 
that case, would the cause of action accrue on the date that the 
surgeon left the needle which caused the subsequent rupture, 
peritonitis, and fever?  I think so, but am unsure.  It seems 
odd that the cause of action could accrue two and one-half years 
before the injury even occurs.  How could the law support such 
an incongruous result?  The answer is that it does not.  Such a 
result would be contrary to well-established Wisconsin law. 
¶70 For years, Wisconsin cases have repeatedly held that 
"the date of the negligent act and the date of the injury in 
medical malpractice cases are not always one and the same."  
Fojut, 212 Wis. 2d at 830; see also Paul v. Skemp, 2001 WI 42, 
                                                 
3 See Bowers v. Olch, 260 P.2d 997 (Cal. App. 2d 1953). 
No.  2007AP541.awb 
 
7 
 
¶20, 242 Wis. 2d 507, 625 N.W.2d 860 ("The plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(a) 
indicates 
that 
it 
is 
not 
the 
negligence, but the injury resulting from the negligent act or 
omission which initiates the limitations period.").   
¶71 There are strong policy reasons for keeping negligence 
and injury analytically separate.  "If a negligent act or 
omission . . . triggered the limitations period . . . potential 
claimants who have not yet been injured would be seeking relief 
for damages that may never occur."  Paul, 242 Wis. 2d 507, ¶42.  
¶72 What is particularly troublesome is that all of the 
uncertainty 
engendered 
by 
the 
majority's 
analysis 
is 
unnecessary.  The majority has no need to determine that "the 
presence of an infection-causing sponge" is an injury.     
¶73 The estate's claim for medical malpractice was not 
filed until August 9, 2006, three years and one day after the 
circuit court determined that the action accrued.  Even if 
Robert's injury occurred as late as August 8, 2003, the estate's 
medical malpractice claim accrued more than three years before 
the claim was filed.  Thus, I agree that the claim is barred by 
the statute of limitations. 
II 
¶74 I also write separately to comment on the majority's 
categorization of a previous court of appeals statement as 
"dicta."  See majority op., ¶39, ¶40 n.8 (discussing Miller v. 
Luther, 170 Wis. 2d 429, 489 N.W.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1992)).   
¶75 The contours of a jurisprudence are shaped in part by 
how dicta is defined and applied.  Yet, it has recently been 
No.  2007AP541.awb 
 
8 
 
observed that because judges often select definitions as needed 
for the resolution of a particular case, the definitions of 
dicta vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and across courts: 
"Through a loose set of practices that vary considerably across 
jurisdictions, and, perhaps more problematically, across courts 
and cases, judges, entirely on their own, define such terms as 
needed to assist in the task of resolving particular cases."  
Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 Stan. 
L. Rev. 953, 958 (2005). 
¶76 The problem with the majority opinion lies not in the 
varying and often inconsistent definitions of dicta across 
multiple jurisdictions or courts.  Rather, the problem is that 
the 
majority 
fails 
to 
elucidate 
a 
clear 
and 
consistent 
definition of dicta within this one opinion.  Within the same 
opinion, it provides four different tests for determining 
whether a statement is dicta.   
¶77 It first describes dicta as a statement that is "not 
necessary to the theory on which the court . . . decided the 
case."  Majority op., ¶39.  Next, it employs a three-part test 
defining dicta as a statement "which [1] extends beyond the 
facts in the case and [2] is broader than necessary and [3] not 
essential to the determination of the issues before it."  Id.  
Then, focusing on the "relevan[cy]" and the "reasoning," it 
defines dicta as a statement that is "not relevant to the 
reasoning of the court in deciding the case."  Id., ¶40.  
Finally, it focuses on the necessity and the holding and defines 
No.  2007AP541.awb 
 
9 
 
dicta as a statement that is "not necessary to the holding."  
Id., ¶40 n.8.  
¶78 The 
majority 
fails 
to 
acknowledge, 
as 
we 
have 
previously explained, that in Wisconsin there are two lines of 
cases defining dicta.  State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶22 n.16, 
253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341.  Under one line of cases, a 
court's 
discussion 
of 
a 
question 
"germane 
to . . . the 
controversy" is not dicta: 
It is deemed the doctrine of the cases is that when a 
court 
of 
last 
resort 
intentionally 
takes 
up, 
discusses, and decides a question germane to, though 
not necessarily decisive of, the controversy, such 
decision is not a dictum but is a judicial act of the 
court which it will thereafter recognize as a binding 
decision. 
State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, ¶61, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 
N.W.2d 381 (quoting Chase v. Am. Cartage Co., 176 Wis. 235, 238, 
186 N.W. 598 (1922)); see also State v. Kruse, 101 Wis. 2d 387, 
392, 305 N.W.2d 85 (1981) ("While the statement in [a prior 
case] was not decisive to the primary issue presented, it was 
plainly germane to that issue and is therefore not dictum.").  
¶79 The court of appeals has also noted that "[w]hen an 
appellate court intentionally takes up, discusses and decides a 
question germane to a controversy, such a decision is not a 
dictum but is a judicial act of the court which it will 
thereafter recognize as a binding decision."  State v. Holt, 128 
Wis. 2d 110, 123, 382 N.W.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1985); see also State 
v. Sanders, 2007 WI App 174, ¶25, 304 Wis. 2d 159, 737 
N.W.2d 44; State v. Rushing, 2007 WI App 227, ¶12, 305 Wis. 2d 
739, 740 N.W.2d 894.  
No.  2007AP541.awb 
 
10 
 
¶80 A competing line of cases defines dicta as "a 
statement or language expressed in a court's opinion which 
extends beyond the facts in the case and is broader than 
necessary and not essential to the determination of the issues 
before it."  State v. Sartin, 200 Wis. 2d 47, ¶60 n.7, 546 
N.W.2d 449 (1996).  This is one of the four definitions of dicta 
used by the majority in this case.  See majority op., ¶¶39, 40.   
¶81 Yet, 
the 
majority 
never 
discusses 
whether 
the 
statement it dismisses as dicta was "germane to the controversy 
before the court."  It never acknowledges the line of cases 
quoted above.  Instead, it simply ignores the question.4     
                                                 
4 The majority never examines whether the Miller court 
intentionally took up, discussed, and decided the question of 
when Miller's wife's claim for wrongful death accrued.  See 
majority 
op., 
¶¶35-45 
(discussing 
Miller 
v. 
Luther, 
170 
Wis. 2d 429, 489 N.W.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1992)).  Miller died on 
October 22, 1990, and his wife filed a wrongful death action 
based on medical malpractice one month after his death.  Miller, 
170 Wis. 2d at 434.  The circuit court denied the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, concluding that the wrongful death 
action was timely because it was filed within three years of 
death.  Id. at 435.   
 
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's decision.  
Id. at 442.  It determined that even though the action was not 
barred by the wrongful death statute of limitations, it could 
not be maintained for other reasons.  Id.  The court stated: "As 
indicated earlier, a wrongful death action accrues at the time 
of death, and this opinion does not change that rule."  Id.   
 
Surely, this proposition was germane to the issue before 
the court——the statute of limitations for a wrongful death 
action was the basis of the circuit court's decision.  Further, 
if the claim was barred by the wrongful death statute of 
limitations, the court would have no need to reach out and 
decide that the claim could not be maintained on other grounds. 
 
No.  2007AP541.awb 
 
11 
 
¶82 How a court defines and applies dicta is important to 
our common law tradition of fidelity to prior cases.  The 
principle of stare decisis——the obligation to adhere to past 
opinions——"promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent 
development of legal principles."  Jordan Wilder Connors, 
Treating Like Subdecisions Alike:  The Scope of Stare Decisis as 
Applied to Judicial Methodology, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 681 (2008).  
The constraint placed on courts by stare decisis inhibits courts 
from acting arbitrarily and capriciously.   
¶83 Yet, loose and unpredictable standards for determining 
whether a statement is dicta can undermine stare decisis and the 
principles of judicial restraint.  As Judge Brown of the court 
of appeals has stated, "[t]he term 'dicta' . . . is often too 
broadly defined, usually by a lawyer who is searching for a way 
not to be bound by a prior published decision."  Sanders, 304 
Wis. 2d 159, ¶41 (Brown, J., concurring).   
¶84 Commentators have noted that "[a]s the distinction 
between holding and dicta becomes increasingly vague, past 
precedents can be increasingly manipulated.  Judges will face 
greater temptation to cheat . . . when they can offer some 
facially plausible argument for disregarding a statement in a 
prior case."  Abramowicz & Stearns, supra, at 1024.   
¶85 Here, the majority fails to elucidate a clear standard 
for determining whether a court's statement is dicta.  Instead, 
it employs the term dicta selectively to dismiss a difficult 
proposition from a prior decision without meaningful analysis.  
No.  2007AP541.awb 
 
12 
 
This end run around stare decisis undermines our common law 
tradition of fidelity to precedent.  
¶86 For the reasons discussed above, I respectfully concur 
in part and dissent in part. 
¶87 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON 
and 
Justice 
N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS 
join 
this 
concurrence/dissent.   
 
No.  2007AP541.npc 
 
1 
 
¶88 N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J.   (dissenting 
in 
part, 
concurring 
in 
part). 
 
There 
are 
undoubtedly 
statute 
of 
limitations cases where the crucial question of the date the 
claim accrued is a close question that requires a court to make 
a difficult decision.  A wrongful death case, however, should 
not be such a case.  
¶89 The approach adopted by the majority in this case——
that a three-year statute of limitations on a wrongful death 
claim somehow runs before three years have elapsed after the 
date of death1——unfortunately may foster a public perception that 
common sense sometimes is lacking in court decisions. 
¶90 Because 
long-standing 
precedent 
in 
Wisconsin 
establishes the date of death as the date on which a wrongful 
death claim accrues, and because the majority rule creates an 
unnecessary exception to this sensible approach, I respectfully 
dissent from that portion of the majority opinion. 
¶91 I agree with the majority, however, that the estate's 
claim for injury to Robert Genrich allegedly caused by medical 
malpractice is time-barred because of the application of Wis. 
Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a). 
¶92 In regard to the wrongful death action of Kathy 
Genrich, as the surviving spouse of Robert Genrich, the place to 
start the analysis is with the wrongful death entitlement 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.03, which states: 
Recovery for death by wrongful act.  Whenever the 
death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶34. 
No.  2007AP541.npc 
 
2 
 
neglect or default and the act, neglect or default is 
such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled 
the party injured to maintain an action and recover 
damages in respect thereof, then and in every such 
case the person who would have been liable, if death 
had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for 
damages notwithstanding the death of the person 
injured; provided, that such action shall be brought 
for a death caused in this state. 
¶93 The statute seems quite clear that in order to recover 
for a death, the party responsible for the injury resulting in 
death may be sued for damages despite the death of the person 
injured.  It seems impossible to me to read the statute in any 
way other than that death is a condition precedent, which must 
be met, before there can be such a lawsuit for wrongful death. 
¶94 That conclusion is consistent with Wisconsin case law.  
An action for wrongful death did not exist at common law, but 
rather is a statutory remedy, available under the terms and 
conditions specified in the statutes.  Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 
97 Wis. 2d 260, 312, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).  In Wisconsin, the 
legislature created a wrongful death action in 1858.  Terbush v. 
Boyle, 217 Wis. 636, 638, 259 N.W.2d 859 (1935). 
¶95 In Terbush, the question was when did the claim 
accrue:  (1) on the date of injury; (2) on the date of death; or 
(3) when the administrator was appointed.  This court, in a 
unanimous opinion authored by then Chief Justice Marvin B. 
Rosenberry, clearly answered the question:  "The action for 
wrongful death accrues at time of death . . . ."  Id. at 640. 
¶96 In Holifield v. Setco Indus., Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 
168 N.W.2d 177 (1969), we were asked to answer the question of 
when the statute of limitations began to run in a wrongful death 
No.  2007AP541.npc 
 
3 
 
action based on product liability or negligent manufacture.  We 
focused on the language in Wis. Stat. § 895.03, and concluded 
that if the decedent could not have brought an action, then his 
special administratrix could not have brought an action.  Id. at 
757.  In concluding that the decedent could have brought the 
action 
for 
damages, 
and, 
therefore, 
that 
the 
special 
administratrix could bring a wrongful death action, we stated:  
"Since he would not have been barred by the applicable statute 
of limitations, the special administratrix of his estate is not 
barred, provided, of course, the action is brought within three 
years of the death, as was here done."  Id. (emphasis added).  
We clearly stated that the action accrued at the date of death. 
¶97 In the case of Miller v. Luther, 170 Wis. 2d 429, 440-
41, 489 N.W.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1992), a case involving allegations 
of medical malpractice, it was stated: 
Section 895.03 is not a statute of limitation, but 
rather is an entitlement statute.  Although a wrongful 
death action accrues at the time of the decedent's 
death, a beneficiary is not even entitled to bring a 
wrongful death action unless the conditions in sec. 
895.03 exist.  Section 895.03 mandates that a wrongful 
death action cannot be brought unless the decedent, at 
the time of his death, was entitled to maintain an 
action and recover damages.  [Emphasis added.] 
No.  2007AP541.npc 
 
4 
 
¶98 In Miller, the court of appeals went on to emphasize, 
again, that "a wrongful death action accrues at the time of 
death . . . ."  Id. at 442.2 
¶99 In the case before the court, since Robert Genrich had 
a claim at the time of his death on August 11, 2003, his 
surviving spouse, Kathy Genrich, had a claim for wrongful death 
                                                 
2 The majority claims that these statements are dicta.  
Majority op., ¶39.  The court of appeals' holding in Miller that 
a wrongful death action accrues at the time of the decedent's 
death, but that such "action cannot be brought unless the 
decedent, at the time of his death, was entitled to maintain an 
action and recover damages," was essential to the court's 
determination of the issues based on the particular facts before 
it.  Miller v. Luther, 170 Wis. 2d 429, 441, 489 N.W.2d 651 (Ct. 
App. 1992). 
In setting forth its holding, the court of appeals went on 
to emphasize the significance of accrual at the time of death:  
"Thus, Miller's wrongful death action was barred by a statute of 
limitation only to the extent that her husband failed to 
preserve his medical malpractice claim against Luther, and, 
subsequently, barred Miller's action under sec. 895.03.  Her 
wrongful death action was not barred by the application of its 
own statute of limitation."  Id. (emphasis added). 
No.  2007AP541.npc 
 
5 
 
that accrued on that date——the date of his death.  This wrongful 
death claim, therefore, was brought within the applicable 
statute of limitations when commenced on August 9, 2006. 
¶100 For the foregoing reasons, focusing on the relevant 
statutory language and long-standing precedent in Wisconsin, I 
respectfully dissent in part and concur in part. 
¶101 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this opinion. 
 
No.  2007AP541.npc 
 
 
 
1