Case Title: State ex rel. Allen v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn.

Citation: 1997-Ohio-165

Docket Number: 19950676

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. ALLEN, APPELLEE, v. CLEVELAND BOARD OF EDUCATION; 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Allen v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn. (1997), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Workers’ compensation—Industrial Commission does not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to extend permanent total disability 
compensation beyond the closed period of time specified in an 
interlocutory order. 
 
(No. 95- 676—Submitted June 11, 1997—Decided July 16, 1997.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APD02-140. 
 
Appellee-claimant, Irma Allen, sustained three injuries while in the course 
of and arising from her employment as a counselor for the Cleveland Board of 
Education.  The most severe injury occurred on March 20, 1987, and claimant’s 
workers’ compensation claim was allowed for “cervical and dorsal sprain, vertigo 
and [cephalgia].”  Although treatment in all claims was conservative, claimant 
never returned to work after her last injury and began receiving temporary total 
disability compensation immediately thereafter. 
 
In February 1992, claimant moved appellant, Industrial Commission of 
Ohio, for permanent total disability compensation.  She submitted a report from 
attending physician Dr. Sheldon A. Friedman, who indicated that claimant could 
 
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not perform sustained remunerative employment.  Commission specialist Dr. 
Timothy L. Gordon, however, found just a thirty-five percent impairment.  Despite 
claimant’s impaired cervical motion, Gordon restricted her only from repetitive 
bending and twisting.  He opined that claimant could not return to her former 
position of employment.  Commission specialist Dr. Howard Tucker assessed a ten 
to fifteen percent impairment and recommended a rehabilitation trial. 
 
Pursuant to administrative procedures generated by our decision in State ex 
rel. Eaton Corp. v. Lancaster (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 404, 534 N.E.2d 46, a hearing 
was held before a staff hearing officer sitting as a deputy of the commission.  After 
the hearing, the following order issued: 
 
“FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER OF THE COMMISSION  
 
“INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
 
“This matter came on for hearing on August 20, 1993, before Sandra B. 
Reid, a Deputy of the Industrial Commission, pursuant to Section 4121.06, Ohio 
Revised Code[,] on the claimant’s Application for Permanent and Total Disability 
filed 10/14/91[sic, 2/13/92]. 
 
“It is the finding of the Commission that the claimant is permanently and 
totally disabled; that the compensation for such disability be awarded from 
 
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8/21/93 to 11/30/93; further payment of compensation to be considered at the next 
scheduled hearing on the issue of continuation of permanent and total disability; 
that the Application be granted to the extent of this order * * *. 
 
“Claim files to be referred to Claims Management-Special Projects, then to 
the Attorney Unit for preparation of a statement of facts to be completed within 43 
days from the date of publication of this order and then set for hearing before the 
members of the Industrial Commission on the issue of continuation of the award of 
permanent and total disability compensation. 
 
“The reports of Dr. Doctor(s) Gordon, [and] Friedman were reviewed and 
evaluated.  This order is based particularly upon the report(s) of Dr. Gordon, M.D. 
orthopedist, for the Industrial Commission, dated 4/22/93, who found claimant has 
35% permanent partial impairment, can’t return to [her] former position of 
employment, and [also that] the condition has become permanent [and the report 
of]  Dr. Friedman, M.D., for the claimant dated 4/4/91, who found claimant can’t 
return to former position of employment, can’t engage in sustained gainful 
employment and is permanently and totally disabled.  A consideration [was made] 
of the claimant’s age of 58, her Master[’]s degree [in] grade [sic] education, a 
work history, the evidence in the file and the evidence adduced at the hearing.  
 
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Additional factors considered in reaching this decision [included] the Vocational 
Evaluation of Mark Anderson [which] states that claimant has no transferable 
work skills due to her medical restrictions and has no return to work potential.  
Claimant is permanently and totally disabled.” 
 
Pursuant to that order, the claim was eventually set for hearing on the issue 
of continued compensation.  Further compensation was denied by the commission 
as follows: 
 
“The claimant is a 58 year old counselor with a Master’s degree.  Mark 
Anderson, vocational expert for the claimant, finds that Ms. Allen does have 
transferable skills, though his opinion is that her exertional capacities negate her 
ability to work.  Treatment has been conservative and there has been no surgery.  
 
“The reports of Dr[.](s) Gordon and Friedman were reviewed and evaluated.  
This order is based particularly upon the reports [sic] of Dr. Gordon. 
 
“Dr. Friedman in his 4/4/91 report found that the claimant was permanently 
and totally disabled from the work force.  Dr. Gordon in a 4/22/93 report found a 
35% impairment, but he noted only minimal paraspinal tenderness, no deltoid 
muscle atrophy, normal neurological examination of the lower extremities, 
negative straight leg raising, pulses intact and sensation. 
 
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“Dr. Gordon did find functional limitations which would prevent repetitive 
bending and twisting, but he did find that claimant could drive a car and walk with 
a cane. 
 
“Dr. Tucker in a 1/29/91 report found no evidence of neurological disease 
and opined a permanent partial disability of 10-15 [percent]. 
 
“In addition, the Staff Hearing Officers considered the following factors: 
 
“The claimant has a Master’s degree and has worked as a counselor.  She is 
58 years old and has limitations of bending and twisting, but Dr. Gordon’s 
examination revealed numerous negative findings and claimant’s educational 
background could provide transferable skills based on the report of claimant’s 
vocational expert.  Claimant’s application filed 2/13/92 is therefore denied.” 
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in refusing to 
extend permanent total disability compensation.  The court of appeals agreed and 
ordered the commission to vacate its order and reinstate permanent total disability 
compensation. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
___________________ 
 
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Mondello & Levey and Scott I. Levey, for appellee. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Sandra L. Nimrick, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellant. 
___________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Claimant successfully petitioned the court of appeals for a writ 
of mandamus to compel the continued award of permanent total disability 
compensation.  Two propositions have been advanced by claimant to affirm the 
court of appeals’ decision.  Claimant first asserts that the commission’s 
interlocutory award of permanent total disability compensation conclusively 
established her right to this compensation.  Claimant next asserts entitlement to 
permanent total disability compensation under State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm (1994), 
68 Ohio St.3d 315, 626 N.E.2d 666.  We disagree with both propositions and 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
The first issue was resolved in the commission’s favor in State ex rel. 
Draganic v. Indus. Comm. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 461, 663 N.E.2d 929.  There, we 
held that the commission did not abuse its discretion in refusing to extend 
permanent total disability compensation beyond the closed period of time 
 
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specified in an interlocutory order.  The issue is similarly resolved against 
claimant in this case. 
 
Claimant’s secondary assertion of an entitlement to compensation pursuant 
to Gay is also unpersuasive.  While the commission’s order is brief, it is apparent 
that the commission inferred from Dr. Gordon’s findings and his assessment of 
only a thirty-five percent permanent partial impairment that claimant was 
medically capable of some sustained remunerative employment.  Moreover, 
although the commission did not specify the range of work of which it believed 
claimant capable, we find that even if claimant were limited to sedentary work, the 
commission did not abuse its discretion in finding such work to be within the 
retrainable capacities of a claimant with a Master’s degree.  Claimant’s work 
history is similarly an asset.  While age is an impediment to reemployment, 
claimant’s education and work history distinguish her situation from those cases in 
which all of the claimant’s nonmedical factors were so overwhelmingly negative 
as to compel but one result—the award of permanent total disability 
compensation.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Soto v. Indus. Comm. (1994), 69 Ohio St. 3d 
146, 630 Ohio St.3d 714. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
 
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Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent.  I would affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals. 
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.