Case Title: State ex rel. Danziger v. Yarbrough

Citation: 2007-Ohio-4009

Docket Number: 20070123

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Danziger v. Yarbrough, 114 Ohio St.3d 261, 2007-Ohio-4009.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. DANZIGER ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. 
YARBROUGH, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Danziger v. Yarbrough, 
 114 Ohio St.3d 261, 2007-Ohio-4009.] 
Writ of prohibition sought to prevent trial court from proceeding contrary to a 
mandate from this court – Court of appeals’ denial of writ affirmed. 
(No. 2007-0123 ─ Submitted July 10, 2007 ─ Decided August 22, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Sandusky County, 
No. S-06-034, 2006-Ohio-6811. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment denying a writ of prohibition to 
prevent a common pleas court from hearing additional evidence and proceeding 
contrary to a mandate of this court.  Because the common pleas court did not 
disregard our mandate, we affirm. 
{¶ 2} Appellants, Jared, Nathan, and Samuel Danziger, own stock in 
Croghan Bancshares, Inc. (“the company”), which is the sole shareholder of 
Croghan Colonial Bank (“the bank”).  The bank is the company’s only operating 
asset. 
{¶ 3} In February 2001, the Danzigers sent a letter to the company 
demanding to review the corporate minutes of both the company and the bank.  
When the company did not respond, the Danzigers commenced an action in the 
Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas to inspect the company’s and the 
bank’s corporate minutes.  The company later notified the Danzigers that it would 
permit them to inspect the company’s corporate minutes, but it would not permit 
them to inspect the bank’s corporate minutes because the Danzigers were not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
shareholders of the bank.  The trial court granted the company’s motion for 
summary judgment based on its contention that the Danzigers did not have a right 
to examine the bank’s minutes.  The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
trial court. 
{¶ 4} On appeal, we reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and 
held that “[s]hareholders have a right at common law to inspect the records of a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the corporation in which they own stock when the 
parent corporation so controls and dominates the subsidiary that the separate 
corporate existence of the subsidiary should be disregarded.”  Danziger v. Luse, 
103 Ohio St.3d 337, 2004-Ohio-5227, 815 N.E.2d 658, syllabus. 
{¶ 5} On remand to the common pleas court, appellee, Judge Stephen A. 
Yarbrough, denied the Danzigers’ motion for an amended final judgment in their 
favor based on our decision in Danziger, 103 Ohio St.3d 337, 2004-Ohio-5227, 
815 N.E.2d 658.  Judge Yarbrough concluded that “there are remaining issues that 
have not been resolved that require additional evidence.”  According to the 
company and the bank, these unresolved issues include the scope of any 
inspection, e.g., whether privileged portions of the requested records are subject 
to inspection. 
{¶ 6} In August 2006, the Danzigers filed a petition in the Court of 
Appeals for Sandusky County for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge 
Yarbrough from proceeding in the underlying case contrary to our mandate in 
Danziger.  Judge Yarbrough submitted an answer, and in December 2006, the 
court of appeals denied the writ. 
{¶ 7} In their appeal as of right, the Danzigers assert that the court of 
appeals erred in denying the writ of prohibition. 
{¶ 8} A writ of prohibition is appropriate to require a lower court to 
comply with and not proceed contrary to the mandate of a higher court.  State ex 
rel. United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am. v. Bur. of 
January Term, 2007 
3 
Workers’ Comp., 108 Ohio St.3d 432, 2006-Ohio-1327, 844 N.E.2d 335, ¶ 35; 
State ex rel. Frailey v. Wolfe (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 320, 321, 750 N.E.2d 164. 
{¶ 9} Judge Yarbrough is not acting contrary to our mandate in 
Danziger.  Nothing in Danziger precludes the judge from considering additional 
evidence on issues not resolved by our decision.  We did not enter a final 
judgment in favor of the Danzigers and did not order the common pleas court to 
do so. 
{¶ 10} Moreover, in the absence of a patent and unambiguous disregard of 
our mandate in Danziger, the Danzigers have adequate remedies by appeal and by 
motion for contempt to challenge Judge Yarbrough’s rulings on remand.  Dzina v. 
Celebrezze, 108 Ohio St.3d 385, 2006-Ohio-1195, 843 N.E.2d 1202, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 11} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals did not err by denying 
the writ of prohibition.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals.1 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. dissenting. 
{¶ 12} I believe that the court of appeals should have issued a writ of 
prohibition prohibiting the trial court from conducting further proceedings on 
remand and ordering the trial court to comply with our mandate.  Therefore, I 
respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 13} More than four years ago, the Danzigers filed an appeal in this 
court arguing that, as shareholders of Croghan Bancshares, Inc. (“Bancshares”), 
they had a right to inspect the corporate minutes of Croghan Colonial Bank 
                                                 
1.  Consistent with our opinion herein, the Danzigers’ request for oral argument is denied. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
(“Colonial Bank”), Bancshares’ wholly owned subsidiary.  We agreed, holding 
that “[s]hareholders have a right at common law to inspect the records of a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the corporation in which they own stock when the parent 
corporation so controls and dominates the subsidiary that the separate corporate 
existence of the subsidiary should be disregarded.”  Danziger v. Luse, 103 Ohio 
St.3d 337, 2004-Ohio-5227, 815 N.E.2d 658, syllabus.  Subsequently, we issued a 
judgment entry that reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and mandated that the 
Court of Common Pleas for Sandusky County carry our judgment into execution. 
{¶ 14} On remand, the Danzigers moved the trial court to amend its 
judgment to comply with our judgment.  Bancshares opposed the motion and 
requested supplemental proceedings to address issues concerning the scope and 
conditions of the inspection, which, it asserted, had not been resolved and had not 
been presented to or decided by any court.  The trial judge agreed and intends to 
conduct further proceedings to receive additional evidence. 
{¶ 15} The Danzigers filed a petition in the court of appeals seeking a writ 
of prohibition to prevent the trial court from considering additional evidence, 
thereby disregarding our mandate permitting the Danzigers to inspect the 
corporate records of Colonial Bank.  The court of appeals denied the Danzigers’ 
petition. 
{¶ 16} Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, “[a]bsent extraordinary 
circumstances, such as an intervening decision by the Supreme Court, an inferior 
court has no discretion to disregard the mandate of a superior court in a prior 
appeal in the same case.”  Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 11 OBR 1, 462 
N.E.2d 410, syllabus.  This doctrine precludes a litigant from attempting to rely 
on arguments at retrial which were fully litigated, or could have been fully 
litigated, in a first appeal.  Hubbard ex rel. Creed v. Sauline (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 
402, 404-405, 659 N.E.2d 781. 
January Term, 2007 
5 
{¶ 17} Writs of prohibition are “ ‘appropriate to require lower courts to 
comply with and not proceed contrary to the mandate of a superior court.’ ”  State 
ex rel. Frailey v. Wolfe (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 320, 321, 750 N.E.2d 164, quoting 
Berthelot v. Dezso (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 257, 259, 714 N.E.2d 888.  In order for a 
writ of prohibition to issue, the relator must establish that (1) the respondent will 
or is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that 
power is unauthorized by law, and (3) the relator has no remedy in the ordinary 
course of law.  State ex rel. White v. Junkin (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 335, 686 
N.E.2d 267.  However, if a court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, 
the existence of a remedy in the ordinary course is immaterial in determining 
whether the writ should issue.  State ex rel. Rogers v. McGee Brown (1997), 80 
Ohio St.3d 408, 686 N.E.2d 1126. 
{¶ 18} The majority holds that the trial judge did not act contrary to our 
mandate in Danziger by considering additional evidence pertaining to issues not 
resolved by our decision.  Bancshares alleges that the trial court has jurisdiction to 
consider issues pertaining to the scope and conditions of the inspection.  I 
disagree. 
{¶ 19} In Danziger, we placed no qualification on the right of 
shareholders to inspect corporate records.  That is the law of the case.  If 
Bancshares had reason to believe that there were issues qualifying the inspection 
of its subsidiary’s records, it should have raised them in response to the 
Danzigers' initial complaint seeking inspection of Colonial Bank’s minutes.  
Because it did not, Bancshares has waived these issues, and they are now res 
judicata. 
{¶ 20} Thus, the trial court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction 
to conduct further proceedings on remand and, by conducting further proceedings, 
the trial court has ignored our mandate that the Danzigers be permitted to inspect 
Colonial Bank’s corporate records.  More than two and a half years after our 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
mandate, the Danzigers are still being denied access to those records.  Therefore, I 
would issue a writ of prohibition preventing the trial court from conducting 
further proceedings and ordering the trial court to comply with our mandate that 
the Danzigers be permitted to inspect Colonial Bank’s records.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
PFEIFER AND LANZINGER, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Jared E. Danziger, Nathan G. Danziger, and Samuel R. Danziger, pro se. 
 
Thomas L. Stierwalt, Sandusky County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Norman P. Solze, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
______________________