Case Title: Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility v. Patrick R. Russell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1997AP003619-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-3619-D 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Patrick R. Russell, Attorney at  
Law.  
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST RUSSELL 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 12, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
No. 97-3619-D 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-3619-D 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against PATRICK R. RUSSELL, Attorney at 
Law. 
FILED 
 
MAR 12, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney’s 
license 
suspended.  
¶1 
PER CURIAM   We review, pursuant to SCR 21.09(3m),1 the 
stipulation of Attorney Patrick R. Russell and the Board of 
Attorneys 
Professional 
Responsibility 
(Board) 
concerning 
Attorney Russell’s professional misconduct. That misconduct 
consisted of numerous instances over a period of several years 
                     
1 SCR 21.09 provides, in pertinent part: Procedure.  
 . . .  
(3m) The board may file with a complaint a stipulation by 
the board and the respondent attorney to the facts, conclusions 
of law and discipline to be imposed. The supreme court may 
consider the complaint and stipulation without appointing a 
referee. If the supreme court approves the stipulation, it shall 
adopt the stipulated facts and conclusions of law and impose the 
stipulated 
discipline. 
If 
the 
supreme 
court 
rejects 
the 
stipulation, a referee shall be appointed pursuant to sub. (4) 
and the matter shall proceed pursuant to SCR chapter 22. A 
stipulation that is rejected has no evidentiary value and is 
without prejudice to the respondent’s defense of the proceeding 
or the board’s prosecution of the complaint.  
No. 97-3619-D 
 
2 
of misappropriating funds belonging to the law firm where he was 
employed, misrepresenting his personal expenses as law firm 
expenses 
and 
obtaining 
reimbursement 
for 
them, 
obtaining 
employee benefits to which he was not entitled, and receiving 
and retaining fees for legal work he performed but did not 
report to the law firm. The parties stipulated that the 
discipline imposed for that misconduct be an 18-month license 
suspension.  
¶2 
We treat a lawyer’s misappropriation of law firm funds 
as we do misappropriation of funds belonging to a client. 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Casey, 174 Wis. 2d 341, 496 
N.W.2d 94 (1993). “In each case, the lawyer violates the basic 
professional duty of trust, not only as attorney but also as 
fiduciary, and a refusal to fulfill that responsibility will be 
disciplined severely.” Id., 342. Over several years, Attorney 
Russell engaged in a scheme to take money to which he was not 
entitled from the law firm employing him. That scheme included 
his falsifying and having another employee falsify law firm 
financial 
records. 
Under 
the circumstances 
stipulated, we 
determine 
that 
the 
18-month 
license 
suspension 
is 
the 
appropriate 
discipline 
to 
impose 
for 
that 
professional 
misconduct.  
¶3 
Attorney Russell was admitted to the practice of law 
in Wisconsin in 1980 and at the time relevant to this proceeding 
practiced in Milwaukee. He currently resides in Menomonee Falls 
and is not engaged in the practice of law. He has not been the 
No. 97-3619-D 
 
3 
subject 
of 
a 
prior 
disciplinary 
proceeding. 
The 
parties 
stipulated to the following facts.  
¶4 
Beginning in 1985, Attorney Russell was a partner-
shareholder and the treasurer of a Milwaukee law firm. In July, 
1995, while he was on vacation, members of the firm reviewed 
some of the firm’s disbursement accounts. When the firm’s 
bookkeeper telephoned him that his partners were looking at the 
books, Attorney Russell called the firm and resigned. The law 
firm expected Attorney Russell to return to work and wind down 
his practice, but soon after his return from vacation, it was 
discovered that the bookkeeper had been embezzling from the 
firm. The bookkeeper was fired in August of 1995, and, because 
of its suspicions of Attorney Russell’s involvement in the 
embezzlement, the firm promptly dismissed him. The bookkeeper 
had asserted that Attorney Russell knew of firm checks the 
bookkeeper had written to himself in 1995, but Attorney Russell 
has denied knowledge of the embezzlement.  
¶5 
In March, 1995, while setting up an office for the 
firm in another city, Attorney Russell requested and received a 
check from the bookkeeper for $2500, ostensibly to purchase 
equipment and desks for that office. Attorney Russell deposited 
that check into his personal checking account and did not use 
the money to buy equipment and supplies for the firm’s office. 
Some six weeks later, the balance in his personal checking 
account was just over $800. The $2500 payment he received was 
never listed as an advance on the firm’s books but was accounted 
No. 97-3619-D 
 
4 
for by the bookkeeper as a miscellaneous office expense. 
Attorney Russell has reimbursed the firm for that amount.  
¶6 
In July, 1995, Attorney Russell signed a law firm 
check to himself for $1100, characterizing $1000 of the amount 
as an advance taken in anticipation of a vacation. He neither 
obtained preapproval for the personal disbursement, as required 
by the law firm’s rules, nor did he discuss the propriety of the 
personal advance with any attorney in the firm. He obtained the 
check from the bookkeeper, who accounted for it not as an 
advance but as a miscellaneous office expense.  
¶7 
In 1994, Attorney Russell obtained the law firm’s 
payment of a $1687 invoice for computer equipment he bought for 
personal use. On his instructions, the bookkeeper issued the 
check to the vendor and debited it as a miscellaneous office 
expense. 
Attorney 
Russell 
had 
not 
discussed 
or 
sought 
preapproval of the expenditure with the law firm’s attorneys, 
and the expenditure did not appear as a prepaid bonus on the 
yearend accounts. The following month, Attorney Russell had the 
bookkeeper issue him a law firm check for $2000 for the purchase 
of computer hardware. This was reflected as a prepaid bonus, but 
Attorney Russell had not discussed or sought preapproval of what 
amounted to an interest free loan of law firm funds to purchase 
a computer for a relative.  
¶8 
From 1993 to mid-1995, Attorney Russell used his law 
firm credit card for payment of expenses incurred for other than 
law firm business. For example, he allowed the firm’s bookkeeper 
to use it to charge two vacation trips, for which Attorney 
No. 97-3619-D 
 
5 
Russell has made reimbursement. He used the card himself to make 
personal purchases that were never repaid and did not appear as 
advances or prepaid bonuses. In April, 1995, he purchased $677 
worth of video equipment for personal use, listed it as office 
expense, and had the bookkeeper pay the bill and debit the law 
firm’s account. In 1994, his personal expenses paid with the 
firm’s credit card totaled $2773; the total for the first-half 
of 1995 was $1616.50. In 1993, he charged purchases totaling 
$548.14. 
Attorney 
Russell 
had 
not 
discussed 
or 
obtained 
preapproval for those charges but had the bookkeeper pay them. 
He knew that none of the personal expenses he charged with the 
credit card were deducted from his payroll checks or accounted 
for as prepaid bonuses, and he did not reimburse the firm for 
them.  
¶9 
After he left the law firm, it was discovered that 
Attorney Russell had provided legal services in matters he did 
not report to the law firm, despite the requirement that any 
legal fees received be turned over to the firm. At least two 
such files were identified, as they had not been assigned law 
firm file numbers. Between November, 1990 and early February, 
1991, 
Attorney 
Russell 
received 
three 
payments 
totaling 
approximately $1850 from a lawyer relative as a portion of legal 
fees generated in two cases. Attorney Russell endorsed those 
payments and deposited them into his personal bank account. He 
had neither sought nor received permission from his firm to 
retain fees from work he performed outside the firm.  
No. 97-3619-D 
 
6 
¶10 Between 1993 and 1995, Attorney Russell received 
reimbursements under an employee benefit plan to which he was 
not entitled. He received tax-free reimbursements of almost 
$9000 in 1993, over $9000 in 1994, and over $5000 in 1995, the 
majority of which were for dependent care expenses. However, at 
the time those expenses were incurred, Attorney Russell’s wife 
was not employed and did not otherwise qualify for coverage 
under the benefit plan. In addition, many of the checks Attorney 
Russell had written to the child care providers coincided with 
weekend evenings and days, consistent with non-work-related 
baby-sitting services.  
¶11 In May, 1995, Attorney Russell was informed by persons 
at the firm and a representative of the employment benefit 
company that he was not entitled to reimbursement of child care 
expenses for the reason that his wife did not qualify. 
Nonetheless, 
he 
continued 
to 
claim 
and 
receive 
tax-free 
reimbursements from the plan for at least $1269 for child care 
expenses in June and July, 1995. He also received reimbursements 
exceeding his payroll deductions in 1994 and 1995, which he was 
not entitled to do. Also, in June, 1994, Attorney Russell twice 
claimed reimbursement for the same $172 charge for dental 
services rendered to his children.  
¶12 We accept the stipulation of the parties in respect to 
the facts, as well as their stipulation that Attorney Russell’s 
conduct involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, 
No. 97-3619-D 
 
7 
in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).2 We determine that the appropriate 
discipline to impose for his misconduct is the suspension of his 
license to practice law for a period of 18 months. As a 
condition of reinstatement of his license following that 
suspension, Attorney Russell will be required to demonstrate, 
pursuant to SCR 22.28(4)(k),3 that he has made restitution to the 
law firm for its funds that he misappropriated or provide a 
satisfactory explanation why he has not done so.  
¶13 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Patrick R. Russell 
to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for 18 months, 
commencing April 27, 1998.  
¶14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Patrick R. Russell comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a 
person whose license to practice law has been suspended.  
                     
2 SCR 20:8.4 provides, in pertinent part: Misconduct 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
 . . .  
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation;   
3 SCR 22.28 provides, in pertinent part: Reinstatement. 
 . . .  
(4) The petition for reinstatement shall show that:  
 . . .  
(k) The petitioner has made restitution or settled all 
claims from persons injured or harmed by petitioner’s misconduct 
or, if the restitution is not complete, petitioner’s explanation 
of the failure or inability to do so.  
No. 97-3619-D 
 
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