Case Title: Sizer v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1/17

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2017-11-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jamal Sizer v. State of Maryland, No. 1, September Term, 2017. Opinion by Greene, J. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – FOURTH AMENDMENT – REASONABLE 
SUSPICION 
The Court of Appeals held that the hearing court erred in suppressing evidence that was 
seized after a Terry stop because the hearing court did not consider the totality of the 
circumstances.  On the basis that an officer has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity 
is afoot, an officer may conduct a Terry investigatory stop.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 
S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1969).  When reviewing whether reasonable suspicion exists, 
a hearing court must apply the totality of the circumstances test, such that no one factor in 
the analysis is dispositive.  The Court of Appeals held that where officers observed a group 
of individuals openly drinking what appeared to be an alcoholic beverage and one of them 
threw a bottle to the ground, the officers had reasonable suspicion to investigate a potential 
open container violation and to determine who threw the bottle.  The defendant’s flight 
from the group upon the officers’ approach should have been considered as one factor 
among others in the totality of the circumstances analysis. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – FOURTH AMENDMENT – EXCLUSION OF THE 
EVIDENCE –  ATTENUATION DOCTRINE  
As explained by the United States Supreme Court recently in Utah v. Strieff, -- U.S. --, 136 
S. Ct. 2056, 195 L. Ed. 2d 400 (2016), to remove the taint from evidence obtained as a 
result of an illegal stop or search and seizure, the attenuation doctrine is the appropriate 
law to apply to determine admissibility of evidence when the defendant is arrested pursuant 
to the discovery of a pre-existing arrest warrant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 1  
 
September Term, 2017 
 
______________________________________ 
 
JAMAL SIZER 
 
 
 
v. 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene, 
Adkins, 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Greene, J. 
Adkins and Hotten, JJ., concur and dissent. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: November 28, 2017
Circuit Court for Howard County 
Case No. 13-K-15-056103 
Argued: September 6, 2017 
 
 
 
In the case before us, we are asked to consider the constitutionality of the stop and 
the subsequent search incident to the arrest of Petitioner, Jamal Sizer.  On the evening of 
November 20, 2015, five or six officers of the Howard County Police Department 
Pathways Patrol Unit, a bicycle patrol unit, observed Mr. Sizer and others congregating in 
a public parking lot, drinking from what appeared to be an open alcohol container.  The 
officers described the group as “loud and disorderly.”  The officers observed a bottle being 
thrown and heard it hit the ground, but could not see who threw the bottle.  The officers 
approached the group to investigate who in the group threw the bottle.  Mr. Sizer fled upon 
the officers’ approach.  A chase ensued and ended with the seizure of Mr. Sizer, which led 
to the discovery that he possessed a .38 caliber revolver in his backpack.  
Contemporaneously with the seizure of Mr. Sizer, an officer recognized Mr. Sizer as 
having an outstanding arrest warrant.  Subsequently, pursuant to the discovery of the 
outstanding warrant, Mr. Sizer was arrested and taken to the local police precinct, where 
an officer searched Mr. Sizer incident to his arrest and recovered a baggie containing 
twenty-seven pills of oxycodone, a controlled dangerous substance, hidden in his sock.   
Mr. Sizer filed a motion to suppress the firearm and the pills recovered from his 
person, and after a hearing, the Circuit Court for Howard County granted his motion.  The 
State appealed, pursuant to Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 12-
302(c)(4) (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.).  In a reported opinion, the Court of Special 
Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, holding that the stop was 
constitutional.  State v. Sizer, 230 Md. App. 640, 658, 149 A.3d 706, 717 (2016).  The 
intermediate appellate court held in the alternative that, assuming arguendo that the stop 
2 
 
was unlawful, the evidence recovered would have been admissible under the independent 
source doctrine because Mr. Sizer was arrested on a valid pre-existing warrant that was 
independent of the illegal stop.  Id. at 669, 149 A.3d at 723.  A concurring member of the 
three-judge panel, Judge Kathryn Graeff, concluded that, assuming arguendo that the stop 
was illegal, the evidence that was recovered from Mr. Sizer would have been admissible 
under the attenuation doctrine, rather than the independent source doctrine, in light of this 
Court’s decisions in Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261, 909 A.2d 1048 (2006), Cox v. State, 397 
Md. 200, 916 A.2d 311 (2007), and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Utah v. 
Strieff, -- U.S. --, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 195 L. Ed. 2d 400 (2016).  Id. at 680–81, 149 A.3d at 
730.  
 
We review the issue of whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. 
Sizer.  We hold that the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop when they 
witnessed what appeared to be criminal activity occurring immediately before the 
investigatory stop.  In the alternative, we hold that, even assuming the stop was unlawful, 
the evidence recovered from Mr. Sizer would be admissible in evidence because the 
attenuation doctrine would apply, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Strieff.  
 
For reasons stated in this opinion, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Special Appeals to the extent that it held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop 
Mr. Sizer.  We also, alternatively, affirm the judgment of the intermediate appellate court 
and adopt the reasoning of the concurring opinion, penned by Judge Graeff, with respect 
to the application of the attenuation doctrine. 
 
3 
 
I. 
Initial Stop 
 
The relevant undisputed facts are taken from testimony presented at the suppression 
hearing. On the evening of November 20, 2015, five or six officers, from the Howard 
County Police Department Pathway Patrol Unit (“Patrol Unit”), on routine patrol, biked 
the footpaths that “lead all throughout Columbia, [Maryland].”  While on the footpath, 
officers in the Patrol Unit observed a group of individuals “play fighting and passing 
around an alcoholic beverage back and forth.”  The Patrol Unit suspected that the beverage 
was alcohol because it was in a brown paper bag and the group’s body language was 
“consistent with individuals drinking.” The officers, from 25-35 yards away from the 
group, observed a bottle being thrown and heard it hit the ground, but could not see who 
threw the bottle.  At that point, the officers approached the group to investigate.  When the 
officers were approximately five feet away, Mr. Sizer fled on foot, away from the officers.   
Officer Andrew Schlossnagle, one of the officers in the Patrol Unit, gave immediate 
chase and “physically took [Mr. Sizer] to the ground.”  As Mr. Sizer was being tackled to 
the ground, he revealed that he was carrying a handgun on his person.  Within seconds of 
the takedown, another officer from the Patrol Unit recognized Mr. Sizer as the subject of 
an outstanding arrest warrant.  At that point Mr. Sizer was arrested and taken to the police 
satellite station in the Village Center pursuant to the officers’ belief that he was the subject 
of a pre-existing warrant.  At the satellite station, the officers confirmed the existence of 
the warrant and performed a search of Mr. Sizer incident to his arrest.  The officers 
recovered a .38 caliber handgun from Mr. Sizer’s backpack and twenty-seven pills of 
4 
 
oxycodone, a controlled dangerous substance, from Mr. Sizer’s sock.  Additional facts will 
be discussed as needed.   
Suppression Hearing 
Mr. Sizer moved to suppress the weapon and the pills, arguing that the evidence was 
obtained pursuant to an unlawful stop.  At the suppression hearing, members of the Patrol 
Unit testified that the Owen Brown Village Center was a “high” or “higher crime area,” 
compared to other parts of Columbia, Maryland.  The State argued that Mr. Sizer’s flight 
in a high crime area was enough to give the officers reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop 
under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968) (“Terry stop”); 
see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000) (“Terry 
stop in a high crime area”). 
The three testifying officers similarly characterized the Owen Brown Village Center 
as a high crime area.  Officer Schlossnagle testified that the Owen Brown, Long Reach, 
and Oakland Mills Village Centers “tend to [have] an increase in calls for service and just 
general issues.  There tends to be more calls for service in that – in those congested areas.”  
When asked about what types of crimes he had investigated in the Owen Brown Village 
Center, the officer responded, “[W]e were tasked to Owen Brown because of the increased 
calls for service and on-going trends in the area.”  The Circuit Court judge interjected: 
[COURT]: Is “increased calls for service” a nice way of saying “high 
crime[]?” 
[OFFICER SCHLOSSNAGLE]: Yes, Your Honor.  
[COURT]: Thank you.  I mean, just so I know what we’re talking about.  
 
5 
 
Officer Schlossnagle explained that at the time of the incident, there was “an 
ongoing robbery series” and that “business owners . . . were complaining of quality of life 
issues, [such as controlled dangerous substance] violations, loitering, drinking, where the 
business centers requested an increased presence.”  Officer Schlossnagle also explained 
that “there was a report of a subject displaying a handgun the day before in the footpaths 
and fields that abut up to the village center.” 1  He testified that “there is a network of 
footpaths that leads up to the back side of [the village center].”  A second officer, Corporal 
James Zammillo, testified that the Owen Brown Village Center was a “high crime area” as 
compared to other parts of Columbia.  Corporal Zammillo explained that his assignment as 
a member of the bike team patrol included “passively patrolling the ninety-plus miles of 
pathway that traverses through Columbia.” Corporal Zammillo confirmed Officer 
Schlossnagle’s testimony that there was “an ongoing robbery series” in the area.   
A third officer, Officer Ronald Baker, the only witness called by the defendant, 
testified that the patrol officers had been “traveling the pathways, and we came across the 
Owen Brown Village Center, but we stopped at the entrance to the Owen Brown Village 
Center via [the] pathway.”  He explained that, at the time of observing the group of 
                                                          
 
1 Collectively, the testimony from two officers about the location of the handgun incident 
can, at best, be described as ambiguous.  On cross examination, one officer described the 
incident as having been reported “that there was a handgun seen in the area the day 
before[.]”  On redirect, that officer testified that the handgun was displayed “near a school 
and also near a community center and a library[.]”  Another officer testified that “there was 
an individual reportedly armed with a handgun and pointing it in the area [] passing the 
parking lot of the Howard County Library off Cradlerock.” 
6 
 
individuals, he recognized one individual whom he knew had been banned from the Owen 
Brown Village Center: 
[STATE]: Is Mr. Davis banned from the -- I believe it’s the Owen Brown 
Village Center? 
[OFFICER BAKER]: Yes, he is. 
[STATE]: And you indicated -- did you indicate you were waiting for him, 
to see if he would enter where he was banned from? 
[OFFICER BAKER]: Yes. 
[STATE]: And where specifically was that? 
[OFFICER BAKER]: That particular area we were at, to the best of  my 
knowledge, that parking lot isn’t part of the village center. So, we was [sic] 
watching him and the group to see if they were going to enter  
the 
banned 
part of the village center. 
 
Officer Baker also testified that when the officers were about five feet away, the group 
noticed the officers.  Officer Baker testified that his uniform consisted of a badge and the 
word “Police” on the front of the jacket in neon lettering.   Two other officers testified with 
a similar description of their uniform.  Later, in Officer Baker’s testimony, he stated that it 
appeared that Mr. Sizer ran as soon as Mr. Sizer observed the officers: 
[STATE]: How far away were you from this group of suspects -- subjects 
when you believed they noticed you? 
[OFFICER BAKER]: Well, as we approached, probably about five feet when 
they turned around to see us. 
[STATE]: And as soon as they noticed you, did Mr. -- did one of the suspects 
run? 
[OFFICER BAKER]: Yes. 
[STATE]: And did you write in your report that as soon as the suspect 
observed officers . . . Is that correct? 
[OFFICER BAKER]: Yes. 
 
 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
[STATE]: You indicated in your report that the subject ran as soon as he 
recognized you were there. 
[OFFICER BAKER]: It appeared that way; yes. 
 
7 
 
The officers testified that they were concerned with the group’s general 
disorderliness and possible open container violations.  None of the officers testified that 
they believed the group was connected to the “ongoing robbery series,” or that they 
suspected any member of the group was the individual who had displayed a gun on the 
previous night.   
After the three officers testified, the hearing judge first analyzed whether Mr. Sizer’s 
flight was legally sufficient to conduct a Terry stop.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 
1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).  The hearing judge found all three testifying officers “to be 
truthful and credible” and that they had “testified today without embellishment.”  She 
found that “somebody [in] the group they cannot be sure whether it was Mr. Sizer or not -
- threw a bottle.  The police were concerned, understandably, and approached the group.”  
The hearing judge found that “there had been a complaint made of someone brandishing 
or displaying a handgun in the parking lot of the Owen Brown Cradlerock Library, and 
there was, understandably, concern.  In general, the area is considered a high or higher-
crime area in Columbia.”  Nevertheless, the hearing judge suppressed the evidence, and, in 
doing so, indicated that she questioned whether “all the rules [were] followed[.]”  The 
hearing judge explained, “[T]he fact that Mr. Sizer ran, in and of itself, based on the 
particular scenario that’s being given here today, is not sufficient.”  Further, the hearing 
judge concluded that the pre-existing arrest warrant did not attenuate the taint of the 
unconstitutional stop. 
 
 
8 
 
Procedural History 
The State appealed the Circuit Court’s decision to suppress the evidence.  The Court 
of Special Appeals reversed the suppression of the weapon and the pills, and held that given 
the totality of the circumstances, the stop was reasonably justified.  Sizer, 230 Md. App. at 
658, 149 A.3d at 717.  The Court of Special Appeals alternatively held that had the stop 
not been constitutional, the evidence would not have been suppressed due to Mr. Sizer’s 
pre-existing arrest warrant, although the three-judge panel disagreed as to the reason for 
non-suppression of the evidence.  Id. at 669, 149 A.3d at 723.  
Mr. Sizer petitioned this Court for certiorari, which we granted.  Sizer v. State, 452 
Md. 3, 155 A.3d 890 (2017).  In the interest of clarity, we have condensed Mr. Sizer’s 
questions for certiorari into two questions: Did the arresting officers have reasonable 
suspicion to stop Mr. Sizer, and if the arresting officers did not have reasonable suspicion 
to stop and detain Mr. Sizer, was the suppression of the evidence justified?2        
                                                          
 
2 Mr. Sizer’s petition for certiorari raised the following questions:   
 
(1)  Where the police illegally stop a person, discover a valid, pre-existing arrest 
warrant, and seize evidence from the person during a search incident to arrest, 
must the admissibility of that evidence be determined based on an application 
of the “attenuation factors,” as held in Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016), 
Cox v. State, 397 Md. 200 (2007), and Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261 (2006), 
or may a court, as the Court of Special Appeals did in this case, reject the 
attenuation doctrine and find that such evidence will always be admissible 
because the arrest warrant constitutes an “independent source”? 
 
(2)  Did the hearing judge correctly rule that the discovery of a valid, pre-existing 
arrest warrant did not attenuate the connection between the illegal 
“takedown” of Petitioner and the evidence seized from him shortly 
thereafter? 
9 
 
II. 
Standard of Review 
When reviewing a hearing judge’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under 
the Fourth Amendment, we consider only the facts generated by the record of the 
suppression hearing.  Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 498, 924 A.2d 1129, 1135 (2007).  
We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the party prevailing on the motion, in this case, Mr. Sizer.  Id.  We review the 
hearing judge’s findings for clear error.  Id.    
Finally, we review the hearing judge’s legal conclusions de novo, making our own 
independent constitutional evaluation as to whether the officer’s encounter with the 
defendant was lawful.  Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999).  In 
other words, our plenary review of the record for error requires application of the facts 
under a totality of the circumstances analysis.  
                                                          
 
 
(3)  Where a person is under no obligation to interact with the police, does flight 
to avoid that interaction, by itself, justify a Terry stop; and if so, does it still 
justify the stop where there is evidence that flight was provoked by the 
threatening or startling actions of police officers? 
 
(4)  Did the hearing judge correctly rule that the police violated Petitioner’s 
Fourth Amendment rights where, inter alia, six officers patrolling the 
footpaths of Columbia on unmarked bicycles after dark, who testified that, 
especially at night, people do not immediately recognize them as police, rode 
towards a loud group of people to investigate the improper disposal of a glass 
bottle, the group first noticed the officers when they were five feet away and 
was visibly “startled,” and the only observation officers made regarding 
Petitioner before tackling him was that he immediately ran upon noticing the 
six bicyclists riding towards him? 
10 
 
III. 
Parties’ Contentions 
 
Mr. Sizer’s arguments generally focus on the officers’ consideration of Mr. Sizer’s 
flight in what the officers characterized as a high crime area.  He asserts that the officers 
did not have a “particularized and objective basis” to support reasonable suspicion for the 
stop.  Mr. Sizer correctly acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court has not 
imposed a bright-line rule that flight in a high crime area is always sufficient to generate 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  Mr. Sizer postulates, however, that if this Court 
affirms the suppression court’s decision, it will effectuate a bright-line rule that neither the 
Supreme Court nor this Court has endorsed.  Mr. Sizer relies on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Wardlow for his contention that flight is merely a display of a citizen’s 
constitutional “right to ignore the police and go about his business.”  Illinois v. Wardlow, 
528 U.S. 119, 125, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676, 145 L. Ed. 570, 577 (2000).  Finally, Mr. Sizer 
urges us to hold that flight should be given minimal weight in a totality of the circumstances 
analysis.   
 
The State contends that Mr. Sizer’s flight was merely one of many factors that the 
officers considered before attempting to conduct an investigatory stop.  The State describes 
these factors as Mr. Sizer’s flight, his presence in a high crime area, the group’s general 
disorderliness, the suspected open container violation, and the improper disposal of a glass 
bottle.  The State implicitly concedes that the officers did not have a particularized 
suspicion to stop Mr. Sizer at the moment they approached the group.  Instead, the State 
argues that at the moment the officers approached the group, they had observed enough 
11 
 
suspicious activity to warrant further investigation based on the suspected littering and the 
passing around of an apparent open alcoholic container.   
Fourth Amendment Terry Stop 
 
 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.”  Generally, 
when the government has violated a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, courts are 
required to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search or seizure.  
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340–41, 60 S. Ct. 266, 267, 84 L. Ed. 307, 311 
(1939); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391–92, 40 S. Ct. 182, 
182–83. 64 L. Ed. 319, 321 (1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398, 34 S. Ct. 
341, 346, 58 L. Ed. 652, 657 (1914).  The exclusionary rule is “ordinarily . . . the 
appropriate remedy for a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”  Myers v. State, 395 Md. 
261, 278, 90 A.2d 1048, 1058 (2006).  Where there is a valid, pre-existing and untainted 
arrest warrant, however, an exception to the exclusionary rule applies and the evidence 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is admissible under the attenuation 
doctrine.  Strieff, -- U.S. at --, 136 S. Ct. at 2063, 195 L. Ed. 2d at 410.   
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as it pertains to stops and seizures, operates along 
an escalating plane that begins with “unparticularized suspicion[s] or hunch[es]” and 
crescendos at probable cause.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883, 20 L. Ed. at 909 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Reasonable suspicion exists somewhere between 
unparticularized suspicions and probable cause.  See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 
110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 309 (1990).  “And in determining whether the 
officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his 
12 
 
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable 
inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”  Terry, 
392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883, 20 L. Ed. at 909.  
Reasonable suspicion “has been defined as nothing more than ‘a particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’”  Stokes 
v. State, 362 Md. 407, 415, 765 A.2d 612, 616 (2001) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 
U.S. 411, 417–18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 628–29 (1981)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341, 356, 958 A.2d 356, 365 (2008).  
Moreover, reasonable suspicion is a “common sense, nontechnical conception that 
considers factual and practical aspects of daily life and how reasonable and prudent people 
act.” Bost, 406 Md. at 356, 958 A.2d at v365, (quoting Stokes v. State, 362 Md. 407, 415, 
765 A.2d 612, 616 (2001)).  The reasonable suspicion standard “‘does not allow [a] law 
enforcement official to simply assert that innocent conduct was suspicious to him or her.’” 
Crosby v. State, 408 Md. 490, 508, 970 A.2d 894, 904 (2009) (citing Bost v. State, 406 Md. 
341, 357, 958 A.2d 356, 365 (2008)).  “Rather, the officer must explain how the observed 
conduct, when viewed in the context of all of the other circumstances known to the officer, 
was indicative of criminal activity.”  Id.; see Derricott v. State, 327 Md. 582, 591, 611 A.2d 
592, 597 (1992). 
When explaining the degrees of suspicion necessary for reasonable suspicion, the 
Supreme Court has explained that it is a lesser degree of suspicion than probable cause.  
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L. Ed. 301, 309 (1990).  
Specifically: 
13 
 
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not 
only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with 
information that is different in quantity or content than that required to 
establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can 
arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable 
cause.  
 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
There is no universal starting point when it comes to our analysis of a Fourth 
Amendment violation.  We decide where along the plane to begin our analysis depending 
on the circumstances before us.  Here, our analysis begins at reasonable suspicion.  We 
recognize that it is “importan[t] . . .  not [to] focus[] on any set list of facts that must be 
present for reasonable suspicion to exist, but rather to examine the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether an officer could reasonably suspect that criminal 
activity is afoot.”  State v. Holt, 206 Md. App. 539, 558, 51 A.3d 1, 12 (2012), aff'd, 435 
Md. 443, 78 A.3d 415 (2013).  
Cartnail explains the two analytical techniques used in assessing the totality 
of the circumstances:  
The idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized 
suspicion contains two elements, each of which must be present before a stop 
is permissible. First, the assessment must be based upon all the 
circumstances.  The analysis proceeds with various objective observations, 
information from police reports, if such are available, and consideration of 
the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers.  From 
these data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions—
inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person. 
 
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.  
 
* 
* 
 * 
 
14 
 
The second element contained in the idea that an assessment of the whole 
picture must yield a particularized suspicion is the concept that the process 
just described must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being 
stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.  Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the 
Court in Terry v. Ohio . . . said that, “[t]his demand for specificity in the 
information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of 
this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” 
 
Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 288, 753 A.2d 519, 527–28 (2000) (quoting United States 
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 698, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981)) (some 
internal quotations omitted).  
The Totality of the Circumstances Analysis 
Both parties agree that our totality of the circumstances analysis must focus on 
reasonable suspicion, but they dispute whether the factors rise to the level of reasonable 
suspicion.  Petitioner contends that the totality of the circumstances do not rise to 
reasonable suspicion, even if flight is considered in the Court’s analysis.  To the contrary, 
Respondent argues that even if flight is not considered the officers had reasonable suspicion 
to stop Mr. Sizer.  Petitioner draws our focus to the unprovoked flight factor to refute the 
officers’ reasonable suspicion, whereas Respondent focuses our attention on the high crime 
area factor as a means of justifying the officers’ reasonable suspicion surrounding the stop.  
Because the totality of the circumstances analysis “does not deal with hard certainties,” we 
determine that an individual’s unprovoked flight or presence in a high crime area, or both, 
are individual factors that may contribute to the reasonable suspicion calculus.  Id.   
In Wardlow, which both parties rely on to advance their opposing views, the United 
States Supreme Court discussed the weight to be given unprovoked flight in a high crime 
area as one factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis.  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 
15 
 
U.S. 119, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000).  In Wardlow, a team of eight officers, 
in a four car caravan, travelled through a Chicago neighborhood known for “heavy 
narcotics trafficking.”  Id. at 124, 120 S. Ct. at 676, 145 L. Ed. at 576.  The defendant, 
Wardlow, held an opaque bag in his hand, and upon noticing the last car in the police 
caravan, fled on foot from the outside area where he stood.  Id. at 122, 120 S. Ct. at 675, 
145 L. Ed. at 575.  Two officers chased him on foot, and when they finally caught him, 
they conducted a pat-down and search for weapons.  Id.  The opaque bag he held contained 
a .38 caliber handgun.  Id.  The suppression hearing judge denied Wardlow’s motion to 
suppress the handgun, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed, and the Illinois Supreme Court 
affirmed the intermediate appellate court’s conclusion that the evidence should be 
suppressed.  Id.   
 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of Illinois’ highest court as 
to suppression of the evidence.  Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126, 120 S. Ct. at 677, 145 L. Ed. at 
577.  The Supreme Court held that flight in a high crime area was relevant in a totality of 
the circumstances analysis.  It opined that: 
An individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing 
alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the 
person is committing a crime.  But officers are not required to ignore the 
relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the 
circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.  
Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a 
“high crime area” among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry 
analysis.   
 
Id. at 124, 120 S. Ct. at 676, 145 L. Ed. at 576 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added).  Specifically, the Supreme Court explained: 
16 
 
In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent’s presence in an area of 
heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the officers’ suspicion, but his 
unprovoked flight upon noticing the police.  Our cases have also recognized 
that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable 
suspicion.  Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of 
evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly 
suggestive of such. 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  
In Bost v. State, we had occasion to consider whether a defendant’s flight in a high 
crime area supplied officers with the necessary reasonable suspicion to stop him.  406 Md. 
341, 348, 958 A.2d 356, 359 (2008).  Officers observed Mr. Bost and a group of people 
drinking alcohol and loitering on a sidewalk in a drug-trafficking area, located in 
Washington, D.C., three blocks from the Maryland border.  Id. at 346, 958 A.2d at 360.  
As the officers approached Mr. Bost, he began briskly walking away and took flight “while 
clutching his right waistband . . . .”  Id.  An officer pursued him on foot, under the suspicion 
that he was concealing a weapon and based on the officer’s experience that Mr. Bost’s 
clutching of his waistband was consistent with someone trying to conceal a weapon.  Id.  
Officers tackled him to the ground and then found a gun tied around his neck.  Id.  Officers 
arrested him, and upon a search incident to the arrest, discovered $140 in cash and two, 
white, rock-like substances, later determined to be crack cocaine, on his person.  Id.  Mr. 
Bost moved to suppress the seized cocaine and weapon on the basis that the evidence was 
17 
 
seized in violation of the Maryland Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit.3  Id. at 347, 958 A.2d at 
358.   
Upon review, we held that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Bost 
because he was seen in a high crime, drug-trafficking area, he took off in unprovoked flight, 
and he was clutching his side, in what appeared to be an attempt to conceal a weapon.  Id. 
at 359–60, 958 A.2d at 360.  In the case, we relied on Wardlow for the generalized 
proposition that that case “had made clear that unprovoked flight is enough to support 
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed.”  Id. at 348, 958 A.2d at 360 
(emphasis added).  Notwithstanding our focus on unprovoked flight, in Bost we applied a 
totality of the circumstances analysis, as the Wardlaw Court had done, and held that Mr. 
Bost’s unprovoked flight was properly considered in the totality of the circumstances 
analysis.  Id. at 359, 958 A.2d at 360. 
In Crosby, we emphasized the need for hearing courts to consider the totality of the 
circumstances when wholly innocent actions take place in a high crime area.  Crosby v. 
State, 408 Md. 490, 508, 970 A.2d 894, 904 (2009).  In that case, an arresting officer, at 
the suppression hearing, testified that he made the decision to approach a driver in a parked 
car because: the driver was in a high crime area, he pulled in and out of “parking pads,” he 
was in an area where a recent homicide had occurred, he switched his left turn signal to a 
                                                          
 
3 The Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit [Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure § 2-305 (2001, 
2006 Cum. Supp.)] permits “[a] member of a state, county, or municipal law enforcement 
unit of another state who enters [Maryland] in fresh pursuit and continues within 
[Maryland] in fresh pursuit of a person to arrest the person on the ground that the person is 
believed to have committed a felony in the other state has the same authority to arrest . . . 
the person.”  Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341, 345, 958 A.2d 356, 358 n.1 (2008). 
18 
 
right turn signal, and he drove in a “big loop.”  Id. at 500, 970 A.2d at 899.  We reversed 
the Circuit Court’s denial of Mr. Crosby’s motion to suppress the evidence and held that 
the factors the arresting officer relied on “[did] not constitute ingredients that [were] 
sufficiently potent enough in [that] case to enrich the porridge to the constitutionally 
required consistency of reasonable suspicion,” because “the combination of [innocent] 
factors, viewed in their totality, [were] no more indicative of criminal activity than any one 
factor assessed individually.”  Id. at 511–513, 970 A.2d at 906–07. 
The Hearing Judge’s Analysis of the Totality of the Circumstances 
 In the instant case, although we determine that the police officers had reasonable 
suspicion to stop Mr. Sizer, we conclude that the suppression hearing judge erred in her 
application of the totality of the circumstances analysis because she based her decision on 
ambiguous testimony and identified Mr. Sizer’s flight as the dispositive factor in the 
analysis.  The suppression hearing judge did not properly consider other pertinent factors in 
her application of the totality of the circumstances analysis.   
There was no evidence at the suppression hearing that established that the parking 
lot was located in the Owen Brown Village Center or established how near it was to the 
Owen Brown Village Center or the area where the handgun violation had occurred.  In fact, 
Officer Baker testified that “to the best of [his] knowledge, that parking lot isn’t part of the 
[V]illage [C]enter.”  He also testified that the Patrol Unit was “waiting to see if [one of the 
members of Mr. Sizer’s group] would enter where he was banned from.”  Given that the 
officer was waiting to see whether a certain individual would enter the banned Village 
19 
 
Center area, this individual, along with the remaining group members, including Mr. Sizer, 
was not in the Owen Brown Village Center. 
The suppression hearing judge did not receive any testimony regarding whether the 
group was connected in any way to the Owen Brown Village Center.  None of the officers 
testified that the group, or any member of the group, was seen leaving or approaching the 
Village Center at any time during the officers’ patrol of the pathways. The officers did not 
observe anyone joining or leaving the group during their time of observation.  Nor did they 
testify that they observed the group demonstrating behavior consistent with the nature of 
the crimes that led them to conclude that the Village Center was a high crime area.  
Furthermore, none of the officers testified that they suspected any member of Mr. Sizer’s 
group to be connected to the weapon violation that had been reported the previous day.  As 
was true for the location of the Village Center, the two officers who testified about the 
handgun violation did not provide any proximal description of the area where the violation 
had occurred and its relation to the parking lot where Mr. Sizer was observed.   
 
Because we determine that the Circuit Court erred in its application of the totality 
of the circumstances analysis, we need not decide whether the Circuit Court’s erred in 
finding that the parking lot was a “high or higher crime area.”  In her analysis, the 
suppression hearing judge did not consider other pertinent factors in their totality, such as 
the officers’ suspicion of an open container violation or their attempt to investigate the 
littering.  Instead she found that, “the fact that Mr. Sizer ran, in and of itself, based on the 
particular scenario . . . [was] not sufficient” to justify the stop.  The hearing judge had 
sufficient facts before her to apply the reasonable suspicion test from Terry, but she 
20 
 
overlooked the import of two possible crimes that had occurred in the officers’ presence 
along with Mr. Sizer’s unprovoked flight as officers approached to investigate.  In other 
words, her analysis abandoned consideration of the totality of the circumstances.  “Under 
the totality of circumstances, no one factor is dispositive.”  In re David S., 367 Md. 523, 
535, 789 A.2d 607, 614 (2002).  Therefore, the hearing judge erred when she failed to 
consider the totality of the circumstances. 4  
Our Analysis of the Totality of the Circumstances 
Upon our independent review of the factors that were before the hearing judge, we 
hold that under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion to 
stop Mr. Sizer to investigate a possible open container violation as well as the improper 
disposal of a glass container, whether he was in a high crime area or not.  Even Mr. Sizer 
concedes that when the officers approached him they were “investigating the improper 
disposal of a bottle.”  Pursuant to Maryland Code, Criminal Law § 10-110 (2002, 2012 
Repl. Vol., 2015 Supp. Vol.), the improper disposal of waste is a criminal misdemeanor 
punishable by imprisonment or fines.5  Pursuant to the Howard County Code, Title 8, 
                                                          
 
4 According to the Concurring/Dissenting Opinion, the Majority Opinion mischaracterizes 
the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.  Concurrence/Dissent Slip Op. at 7. The 
Concurrence/Dissent concludes that the hearing judge considered the totality of the 
circumstances in her “scenario” but fails to explain what law the hearing judge applied to 
the facts in order to conclude that Mr. Sizer’s flight and the “scenario” was not sufficient.  
Without more, neither we, nor the Concurrence/Dissent can say precisely what the hearing 
judge meant when she concluded that the “scenario”  was insufficient. 
 
5 Mr. Sizer was not charged with improper disposal of waste or with an open container 
violation. 
 
21 
 
Subtitle 7, § 8.700 (2016), consuming or possessing alcoholic beverages on posted 
commercial property or posted public parking lots is a criminal misdemeanor punishable by 
imprisonment or fines.  Therefore, when officers observed that a bottle was passed among 
the group and then was discarded or thrown to the ground, they had reasonable suspicion to 
believe that criminal activity was afoot.  Mr. Sizer’s flight from the group as the officers 
approached to investigate probable crimes committed in their presence shifted their focus 
to Mr. Sizer, which could have reasonably heightened their suspicion that he was the 
individual responsible for throwing the bottle.  When Mr. Sizer ran, his flight obviously 
drew the officers’ attention and intensified the officers’ investigation by shifting their focus 
from the group to him as an individual.  In fact, according to Officer Baker, who testified at 
the suppression hearing, it appeared that Mr. Sizer ran as soon as he realized that the people 
approaching were police.  Thus, in conducting their investigation the officers were not 
required to “simply shrug [their] shoulders and allow . . . [an apparent] criminal 
[misdemeanant] to escape.”  Holt v. State, 435 Md. 443, 459, 78 A.3d 415, 424 (quoting 
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 616)).   
Mr. Sizer asserts that “officers can ‘investigate’ whatever they want, for any reason 
they want, but they cannot stop a person without reasonable suspicion that criminal activity 
is afoot,” and that here the officers’ testimony was insufficient to establish reasonable 
suspicion that a crime was being committed.  We disagree that the investigating officers’ 
testimony in this case was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of suspected 
criminal activity because Mr. Sizer overlooks the significance of the officers’ decision to 
investigate based on the improper disposal of the bottle.  The investigatory nature of a stop 
22 
 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on a reasonable suspicion.  See 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883, 20 L. Ed. at 909 (“And in determining whether the 
officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given . . . to the specific 
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 
experience.”).  
This Court has previously examined how the Supreme Court has reconciled the 
tension between an individual’s right to freedom from unlawful detainment and the extent 
to which an officer may conduct an investigatory stop and we recognized that the Supreme 
Court held that officers may “stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if 
the officers have a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that ‘criminal 
activity’ may be afoot.”  In re David S., 367 Md. at 532, 789 A.2d at 612 (citing Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1969);  see United States 
v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 41 (1st Cir. 2001) (recognizing that “[a]n individual's flight from 
police combined with other observations by a police officer may support reasonable 
suspicion sufficient for detention under Terry” and also acknowledging that “[i]n Wardlow 
itself, the only relevant fact other than flight known to the detaining officer was the 
suspect's presence in an area known for crime,” and noting that “prior behavior . . . 
suggest[s] guilt more strongly than would simple presence in such an area”) (internal 
citations omitted).   
In summation, the officers had reasonable suspicion to investigate the group prior to 
Mr. Sizer’s flight.  The officers suspected that members of the group were consuming 
alcohol; then the officers observed the improper disposal of a bottle.  Because a bottle was 
23 
 
thrown to the ground, it logically follows that at least one member of Mr. Sizer’s group 
was responsible for the improper disposal of the bottle.  Mr. Sizer’s flight, however, drew 
the officers’ attention away from the group and towards him individually.  Based on these 
circumstances, we conclude that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Sizer.  
After being informed that he was armed with a weapon, the officers had reasonable 
suspicion to frisk him.6  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the intermediate appellate 
court on the basis that upon witnessing the likelihood that criminal activity was afoot, the 
officers had reasonable suspicion to approach the group and investigate an apparent open-
container violation and littering and to stop Mr. Sizer.  
Application of the Attenuation Doctrine 
Our primary holding is that the apprehension of Mr. Sizer after he ran from the 
group that was assembled in the parking lot constituted a valid Terry stop.  We hold, in the 
alternative, that assuming the stop of Mr. Sizer was unlawful, the police officer’s discovery 
of a valid pre-existing arrest warrant attenuated the connection between any unlawful 
investigatory stop and evidence seized from Mr. Sizer during the search incident to his 
                                                          
 
6 The Concurring/Dissenting Opinion describes the stop of Mr. Sizer as a “hard take-down” 
and criticizes the officer’s conduct as unreasonable.  Con./Diss. Slip Op. at 10-11.  To 
support its contention that the take-down was unreasonable, the Concurring/Dissenting 
Opinion cites to Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 
(1989).  In that case, however, the Supreme Court points out that “whether [the suspect] is 
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight” is among the factors 
considered under the objective reasonableness standard.  Id. at 396, 109 S. Ct. at 1872, 104 
L. Ed. 2d at 445 (emphasis added).  Moreover, “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must 
embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second 
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the 
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”  Id. at 396–97, 109 S. Ct. at 
1872, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 455–56. 
24 
 
arrest.  Accordingly, there would be no justification for applying the exclusionary rule to 
the facts of this case.    
The State and Mr. Sizer concur that Utah v. Strieff would control the outcome of 
this case if the stop were deemed unlawful.  In its brief, the State pressed the argument that 
the independent source doctrine or the attenuation doctrine would apply; however, at oral 
argument, counsel for the State conceded that the attenuation doctrine was on point based 
on the facts.  Mr. Sizer agrees that the outstanding arrest warrant is an intervening 
circumstance pursuant to Strieff; however, he bifurcates the evidence recovered from his 
person to suggest that the pre-existing arrest warrant operates as an intervening 
circumstance only with respect to the pills, not the revolver.  Mr. Sizer argues that the 
evidence of the revolver “came to light before the officers discovered a valid warrant for 
Petitioner’s arrest.” 
Recently, in Strieff, the United States Supreme Court applied the attenuation 
doctrine when it evaluated whether a pre-existing arrest warrant sufficiently attenuated “the 
causal link between the government’s unlawful act and the discovery of evidence[.]”  -- 
U.S. at --, 136 S. Ct. at 2061, 195 L. Ed. 2d at 408.  We follow the precedent of that Court, 
which directs us to evaluate the three factors articulated in Brown: 
First, we look to the “temporal proximity” between the unconstitutional 
conduct and the discovery of evidence to determine how closely the 
discovery of evidence followed the unconstitutional search.  Second, we 
consider “the presence of intervening circumstances.”  Third, and 
“particularly” significant, we examine “the purpose and flagrancy of the 
official misconduct.”  
 
25 
 
Strieff,  -- U.S. at --, 136 S. Ct. at 2062, 195 L. Ed. 2d at 408 (citing to Brown v. Illinois, 
422 U.S. 590, 603–04, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261–62, 45 L. E. 2d 416, 427 (1975) (internal 
citations omitted).  In Strieff, the Supreme Court reasoned that that an outstanding arrest 
warrant was “a critical intervening circumstance that is wholly independent of the illegal 
stop” and therefore the illegal stop was “sufficiently attenuated by the pre-existing arrest 
warrant.”  -- U.S. at --, 136 S. Ct. at 2063, 195 L. Ed. 2d at 410 (internal citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261, 290, 909 A.2d 
1048, 1065 (2006); Cox v. State, 397 Md. 200, 209–10, 916 A.2d 311, 316–17 (2007).   
 
The application of the attenuation doctrine is a fact-specific analysis that focuses on 
when and the manner in which the evidence seized was obtained in relation to the unlawful 
conduct.  Where there is an outstanding arrest warrant, the attenuation doctrine applies 
because the discovery of the warrant breaks the causal chain from any possible taint to the 
evidence collected.  Here, even assuming that the stop of Mr. Sizer was unlawful, the 
discovery of a valid pre-existing arrest warrant as well as absence of flagrant police 
misconduct, notwithstanding the close temporal proximity between the illegal seizure and 
the discovery of the pistol, would result in the non-suppression of the evidence.  Mr. Sizer 
focuses on the closeness of the timing of the discovery of the revolver in relation to the 
discovery of the outstanding arrest warrant.  He argues that because his admission about 
the revolver came before the discovery of the outstanding warrant, the warrant could not 
attenuate the taint of the alleged unlawful stop.  We disagree.  We have previously held 
that “the question of timing is not dispositive on the issue of taint, especially because there 
was an outstanding arrest warrant between the initial stop and the subsequent search 
26 
 
incident to arrest, even though some of the evidence was discovered shortly after the illegal 
stop.”  Myers, 395 Md. 261, 292, 909 A.2d at 1066 (emphasis added).  The “temporal 
proximity” between Mr. Sizer’s alleged unlawful stop and the discovery of the revolver 
favors suppression of the evidence; however, this factor is outweighed by the intervening 
circumstance and the absence of flagrant police misconduct.  See e.g. Cox v. State, 397 Md. 
200, 218, 916 A.2d 311, 322 (2007) (holding that a two minute time lapse weighed in the 
defendant’s favor but recognizing that, “[t]he temporal proximity factor must depend . . . 
on other factors to which it relates, because a ‘lengthy detention can be used to exploit an 
illegal arrest at least as easily as a brief detention.’” (quoting Ferguson v. State, 301 Md. 
542, 550 483 A.2d 1255, 1259 (1984)).  The discovery of the pre-existing warrant 
sufficiently broke the causal chain between any Fourth Amendment violation alleged by 
Mr. Sizer and the recovery of the evidence against Mr. Sizer.  Therefore, had the stop of 
Mr. Sizer been unlawful, the evidence recovered would still be admissible under the 
attenuation doctrine.   
Conclusion 
The officers of the Patrol Unit had reasonable suspicion to investigate what 
appeared to be criminal acts occurring in their presence and, thus, had reasonable suspicion 
to stop Mr. Sizer to investigate whether he had improperly disposed of a bottle.  The stop 
was not unconstitutional.  During the course of the stop, Mr. Sizer alerted the officers to 
the presence of a gun, which justified the officers’ frisk of his person.  The gun and the 
pills should not have been suppressed because they were recovered after a lawful detention.  
Alternatively, the gun and the pills would be admissible into evidence as a result of the 
27 
 
search incident to the lawful arrest of Mr. Sizer, pursuant to the discovery of the 
outstanding arrest warrant.  We affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, albeit 
for different reasons.  Accordingly, the motion to suppress should have been denied.    
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED.  
COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID 
BY PETITIONER. 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Howard County 
Case No.:  13-K-15-056103 
Argued: September 6, 2017  
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 1 
September Term, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JAMAL SIZER 
v. 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene 
Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty, 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Adkins, J., 
which Hotten, J., joins. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: November 28, 2017 
 
 
 
 
At a suppression hearing, the State has the burden to “articulat[e] a sufficient factual 
basis for the stop, and appellate courts cannot fill in blanks in the evidentiary record.”  In 
re Jeremy P., 197 Md. App. 1, 22 (2011).  Most respectfully, I write separately because the 
State did not meet its burden of showing that the totality of the circumstances created 
reasonable suspicion justifying the officers’ decision to chase Mr. Sizer and use a hard 
take-down.  We should not resolve this case by repairing the deficiencies in the State’s 
arguments and evidence to provide a sufficient factual basis for reasonable suspicion.  
 
Despite my conclusion that this was an unreasonable seizure, the discovery of a 
valid arrest warrant was a sufficiently attenuating circumstance that the evidence located 
is admissible.  For that reason, I dissent from the Majority’s holding that the stop was 
reasonable, but concur in the alternative holding that the evidence should have been 
admitted through attenuation.  
REASONABLENESS OF THE CHASE AND HARD TAKE-DOWN 
 
When evidence is obtained pursuant to a warrantless search or seizure, the State 
carries the burden in a suppression hearing to justify the lawfulness of the officers’ conduct 
and demonstrate that the evidence is admissible.  See Grant v. State, 449 Md. 1, 30 (2015) 
(“[W]ithout satisfying its burden of proof, the State did not establish that the evidence was 
admissible . . . .”); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971).  
“[T]he officer must explain how the observed conduct, when viewed in the context of all 
the other circumstances known to the officer, was indicative of criminal activity.”  Crosby 
v. State, 408 Md. 490, 508 (2009).  A reviewing court accepts the suppression court’s 
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.  Raynor v. State, 440 Md. 71, 81 (2014).  
2 
Because Mr. Sizer’s Motion to Suppress was granted, inferences in this case should be 
drawn in the light most favorable to him.  Id. 
 
Here, the Majority concludes that the hearing “judge erred in her application of the 
totality of the circumstances analysis because she based her decision on ambiguous 
testimony and identified Mr. Sizer’s flight as the dispositive factor in the analysis.”  Maj. 
Slip Op. at 18.  In the Majority’s view, the hearing judge “did not consider other pertinent 
factors in their totality, such as the officers’ suspicion of an open container violation or 
their attempt to investigate the littering.”  Id. at 18.  Instead, the Majority rules that she 
“abandoned consideration of the totality of the circumstances” by concluding that “‘the 
fact that Mr. Sizer ran, in and of itself, based on the particular scenario . . . [was] not 
sufficient,’” to find that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Sizer was engaged 
in criminal activity.  Id. at 19–20 (Emphasis in original).  
 
The Majority uses this conclusion to evade the deficiencies in the State’s claims that 
the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Sizer.  The State relied heavily on 
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), as well as our own similar precedent, for the 
proposition that unprovoked flight in a “high crime area”1 provides sufficient reasonable 
suspicion to justify an investigatory detention in this case.  The Majority rightfully appears 
skeptical of the evidence the State supplied that suggests that this incident took place in a 
“high crime” area, but avoids addressing the issue by deciding that the Circuit Court for 
                                              
1 The term “high crime area” has never been defined in legal jurisprudence.  See 
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High Crime Area” Question: 
Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable 
Suspicion Analysis, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1587, 1590–91 (2008).   
3 
Howard County erred in applying the totality of the circumstances analysis.  The Majority 
concludes that upon a review of the factors before the hearing judge, the officers had 
reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Sizer for a possible open container violation and 
improper disposal of a bottle regardless of whether or not he was in a high crime area.   
 
Reasonable suspicion requires a determination that, under the totality of the 
circumstances, officers had a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the 
particular person stopped of criminal activity.”  United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 
417–18 (1981) (emphasis added); see also Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 507 (2007).  
In evaluating the constitutionality of an investigatory detention, we consider “whether the 
officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope 
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”  Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 20 (1968).  The issue is, whether under the totality of the circumstances, officers 
had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. Sizer was engaged in criminal activity that 
justified their decision to seize him, and whether that seizure was “reasonably related in 
scope” to the circumstances justifying that suspicion.  Id.  
 
The tenor of the State’s arguments suggest that reviewing courts should simply 
accept the “high crime” designation when officers provide general information about some 
criminal activity in an area (whatever area that may be), and opine that the area is “high” 
or “higher” crime.  Whether an activity occurs in a high crime area can inform a police 
officer’s analysis about the activity that is taking place.  Bailey v. State, 412 Md. 349, 383–
84 (2010).  A suspect need not be connected to previous crimes in the area, Holt v. State, 
435 Md. 443, 466 (2013), but the nature of the area is relevant to reasonable suspicion 
4 
when the suspect’s activities appear to be the kind of criminal activity that is likely to be 
occurring there.  A generalized description of an area as “high crime,” without a greater 
connection to the observed activities, does not support reasonable suspicion.  See Bailey, 
412 Md. at 384.  Other Maryland cases addressing Terry stops in high crime areas 
demonstrate that the nexus between the nature of the area and the observed activities is 
significant in determining whether officers had reasonable suspicion.  See Chase v. State, 
449 Md. 283, 289 (2016) (detaining individuals for suspicion of drug trafficking based on 
behavior in area known for drug trafficking); Cox v. State, 161 Md. App. 654, 671–74 
(2005) (individual suspected of drug dealing had been warned away from intersection 
known for heroin trafficking earlier, when officers saw him again, he fled, committing a 
traffic infraction); Wise v. State, 132 Md. App. 127, 134 (2000) (suspect’s actions in 
neighborhood known for drug trafficking coupled with flight after seeing officers justified 
investigatory detention).   
 
Federal precedent provides further support.  In Wardlow, the suspect was in an area 
of Chicago “known for heavy narcotics trafficking” and the officers expected to encounter 
individuals who were involved in those activities.  528 U.S. at 124.  Wardlow’s behavior 
and subsequent flight triggered the officer’s suspicion that he was engaged in drug 
trafficking.  In United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 53–54 (1st Cir. 2007), relying on 
Wardlow and other circuits’ precedent, the First Circuit identified three specific factors 
relevant to the “high crime” designation, and the designation’s relationship to reasonable 
suspicion.  First, “the nexus between the type of crime most prevalent or common in the 
area and the type of crime suspected in the instant case”; second, the “limited geographic 
5 
boundaries of the area”; and third, “temporal proximity between evidence of heightened 
criminal activity and the date of the stop or search at issue . . . .”  Id.  See also United States 
v. Carruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bailey, 417 F.3d 873, 
877 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Edmonds, 240 F.3d 55, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).   
 
Applying these factors, I conclude that the State failed to show that the Owen Brown 
Village Center is a high crime area—a conclusion the Majority seems poised to reach, but 
then abandons.2  Increased calls for service3 and concerned business owners do not permit 
a conclusion that an area is “high crime.”  An ongoing series of robberies at unknown 
locations and times, as well as a single sighting of an individual with a handgun do not 
suffice absent greater specificity.  Even assuming that these incidents could be sufficient 
for a finding that the area is “high crime,” there is no nexus between these crimes and the 
activity in this case, or between these crimes and Mr. Sizer.4  For these reasons, I do not 
                                              
2 The Majority points out that the group was not in the Owen Brown Village Center, 
which the officers testified was a “high crime area.”  The Majority also notes that the 
officers did not testify that the group’s behavior was “consistent with the nature of the 
crimes that led them to conclude that the Village Center was a high crime area.”  The 
officers’ testimony did not connect the string of robberies or the suspected gun violation to 
the group.  Maj. Slip Op. at 19.   
 
3 Officer Schlossnagle admitted that increased calls for service are not necessarily 
indicative of criminal activity, but only demonstrate that someone called the police.   
 
4 Corporal Zammillo’s testimony about the satellite office is not particularly 
persuasive in the “high crime” analysis.  During cross-examination, he explained that there 
are five satellite offices at five villages in Columbia.  Mr. Sizer points out that because 
there are ten villages in Columbia, half the villages have a satellite office.  The presence of 
this office, absent further evidence, does not support a conclusion that Owen Brown Village 
is “high crime.”   
6 
find sufficient evidence to support the State’s contention that Wardlow is dispositive 
precedent.   
 
The Majority’s determination that the hearing judge abandoned the totality of the 
circumstances appears to be a mischaracterization of the hearing judge’s conclusions of 
law.  The hearing judge concluded “the fact that Mr. Sizer ran, in and of itself, based on 
the particular scenario that’s being given here today, is not sufficient.”  The Majority 
explains that this is erroneous because no single factor is dispositive in the analysis.  Maj. 
Slip Op. at 20.  It is evident, upon review of the record that the hearing judge did apply the 
totality of the circumstances analysis.   
The officers observed a loud group in a parking lot from 25 to 35 yards away, and 
the officers thought that some individuals in the group might be consuming alcohol.5  The 
officers also testified that someone threw a bottle, but they did not know who threw it, or 
even where the bottle originated in the group.  They approached to determine who threw 
the bottle.  The State highlights these facts, as well as two others—that the group was in a 
“high crime area” and that only Mr. Sizer fled when the officers approached—to argue that 
the officers had sufficient reasonable suspicion to seize Mr. Sizer.6   
                                              
5 The officers’ testimony is vague regarding which, if any, individuals might have 
been committing alcohol violations, or indeed whether an alcohol violation was occurring.  
The officers testified that some of the individuals in the parking lot “appeared to be” 
drinking alcohol.  Schlossnagle testified that “[t]here were bottles that appeared to be 
alcohol bottles and cans . . . [A]nd a brown bag, a—bottle in a bag . . . .”  Zammillo 
testified that he saw “body language [that] was consistent with individuals that were 
consuming alcohol; hanging around, passing a bottle back and forth.”   
 
6 Mr. Sizer was seized when the officers tackled him.  See California v. Hodari D., 
499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (seizure requires either physical force, or if no force, submission 
7 
 
The hearing judge considered all of these factors in reaching her decision that the 
seizure was unreasonable.7  She did not doubt what the officers had observed, but the 
officers never saw Mr. Sizer engaging in any of these activities.  Thus, at the moment the 
officers reached the group, they had no reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. Sizer was 
engaged in criminal activity.  He was with a group of individuals, some of whom might 
                                              
to authority).  Terry stops are undisputedly seizures.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 
(1968) (“It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and 
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.”).   
 
7 In formulating the “scenario,” the hearing judge explained:   
 
The police testified today without embellishment.  The Court 
found them to be truthful and credible.  The issue for the Court, 
as I outlined it at the beginning, is the time-line.  So as I 
understand it, and from the testimony of the officers, it’s that 
they’re there.  They’re in a darker less lit area.  They see this 
group of individuals which includes the Defendant, Mr. Sizer.  
That the group appears to be loitering; that the group appears 
to be drinking alcohol, open containers, and that somebody of 
the group—they cannot be sure whether it was Mr. Sizer or 
not—threw a bottle.  The police were concerned, 
understandably, and approached the group.  They were in 
uniform.  On their bright-blue jackets are their respective 
names and the word “Police”, and they verbally identified 
themselves as police.  While they themselves had been in a 
darker area, the testimony was that there was sufficient lighting 
in the parking lot area to see the group.  
 
The issue before the Court is, when Mr. Sizer ran, was it 
reasonable for the police to run after him?  
*** 
And although I can understand the heat of the moment, I can 
understand the high crime area, the fact that Mr. Sizer ran, in 
and of itself, based on the particular scenario that’s being given 
here today, is not sufficient.  
8 
have been engaging in misdemeanor activities.8  The hearing judge decided that this 
“scenario,” combined with Mr. Sizer’s flight, could not provide a sufficiently particularized 
reasonable suspicion to detain him.  
The Majority notes that the State “implicitly concedes that the officers did not have 
a particularized suspicion to stop Mr. Sizer at the moment they approached the group.”  
Maj. Slip Op. at 10.  It is unclear whether the Majority thinks that the officers were stopping 
the entire group under Terry, or whether the officers were merely accosting the group.  The 
Majority reasons that “Sizer’s flight from the group as the officers approached to 
investigate probable crimes committed in their presence shifted their focus to Mr. Sizer, 
which could have reasonably heightened their suspicion that he was the individual 
responsible for throwing the bottle.”  Id. at 21.  The Majority places too much weight on 
Mr. Sizer’s flight.   
Unprovoked flight is a factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis.  See 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125; Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341, 358 (2008); Collins v. State, 376 
Md. 359, 372 (2003).  Based on the evidence presented, it appears that the officers had a 
                                              
8 Littering is a misdemeanor.  See Maryland Code (1957, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2016 
Supp.), § 10-110 of the Criminal Law Article.  On brief, and at argument, the State also 
suggested that officers could have reasonably suspected that Mr. Sizer was violating a 
Howard County Ordinance that prohibits possessing an open container, or consuming 
alcoholic beverages in posted areas.  See Howard County, Maryland, Code of Ordinances 
§ 8.700: Consumption and possession of alcoholic beverages in opened containers (2016).  
References to laws and ordinances do not provide a particularized basis for suspecting Mr. 
Sizer of wrongdoing, they only particularize the offense the officers thought might be 
occurring.   
9 
hunch that Mr. Sizer was engaged in criminal activity because he ran at their approach.9  
We do not accord weight to an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch[.]’”  
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.  Officers may certainly investigate ambiguities, but they must still 
be able to articulate a particularized basis for suspicion that comports with constitutional 
standards.   
The Majority’s analysis is unpersuasive and accords the State too much credit.  The 
Majority claims that Mr. Sizer “overlooks the significance of the officers’ decision to 
investigate based on the improper disposal of the bottle.”  Maj. Slip Op. at 21.  But under 
the Majority’s reasoning, and the State’s implied concession, there is no reason to suspect 
Mr. Sizer was littering without placing unwarranted weight on his flight.  The officers 
never testified that they believed there was a connection between Mr. Sizer’s flight and the 
littering or the alcohol violations. Put simply, he ran, so they chased him.   
Although much of the evidence the hearing judge relied on was ambiguous, as the 
Majority points out, this is not to either the hearing judge’s or Mr. Sizer’s detriment.  The 
State must demonstrate a sufficient factual basis for the stop.  See Jeremy P., 197 Md. at 
22.  If the hearing judge resolved this issue based on ambiguous evidence, it is because the 
State failed to satisfy its burden.  Any inferences from these ambiguities should be drawn 
                                              
9 Mr. Sizer’s brief suggests that he may have run because he was startled.  The 
officers approached out of darkness, and Officer Baker testified that the group first noticed 
the officers when they were five feet away from the group. The officers testified that they 
identified themselves as police during their approach, but they also described the group as 
“loud.”  Based on this evidence, it is not unreasonable to draw an inference that Mr. Sizer’s 
flight may have not been entirely unprovoked.   
10 
in Mr. Sizer’s favor because the motion to suppress was granted.  See Longshore, 399 Md. 
at 498.   
Turning to the question of the use of a hard take-down, the Supreme Court in Terry 
explained that “[t]he manner in which [a] seizure and search were conducted is, of course, 
as vital a part of the inquiry as whether they were warranted at all.”  392 U.S. at 28.  The 
Supreme Court has held that claims that “law enforcement officials used excessive force 
in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’” of an individual 
must be analyzed under the “objective reasonableness” standard of the Fourth Amendment.  
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).  The Fourth Amendment permits “some 
degree of physical coercion or threat thereof” in making an investigatory stop.  Id. at 396.  
The “reasonableness” of a seizure depends both on when it occurred and how it is carried 
out.  See id. at 395 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1985)).   
 
Whether a seizure is reasonable “requires careful attention to the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether 
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether 
he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id.; see also Cty. of 
Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017).  A court must consider “whether the 
officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances 
confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham, 490 
U.S. at 397.  
 
Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers’ conduct was not reasonable.  
The officers lacked a particularized basis to suspect Mr. Sizer of criminal activity.  There 
11 
was no reason to believe that he was a threat to officer safety at the time of the chase and 
tackle because he stated that he had a gun during the tackle.10  The officers seized Mr. 
Sizer before they were aware that he armed.  See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 
626 (1991).  
 
Maryland permits warrantless arrests for individuals who have committed or 
attempted to commit a misdemeanor “in the presence of or within the view of the police 
officer.”  Maryland Code (1957, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 2-202(a) of the Criminal Procedure 
Article.  If the officer has probable cause to believe that the misdemeanor is being 
committed in his presence or in his view, he may arrest any person whom the officer 
reasonably believes has committed the crime.  Id. § 2-202(b).  Assuming that throwing 
the bottle was littering, or that someone in the group was consuming alcohol, the officers 
did not know who committed these offenses.  The officers could not reasonably believe it 
was Mr. Sizer when they testified that they had not observed anyone in particular doing 
those activities.  See Parks v. State, 4 Md. App. 432, 434 (1968) (warrantless arrest for 
littering was unlawful when officers did not see arrestee littering and there was no evidence 
of a common criminal design to litter).  
Finally, the nature of the suspected offenses does not suggest that a hard take-down 
was reasonable.  Our prior cases on the use of force in investigatory detentions have dealt 
                                              
10 There was some dispute during the hearing regarding precisely when Mr. Sizer 
said “I have a pistol,” and whether that statement occurred before or after Schlossnagle 
tackled him.  The hearing judge also found that Mr. Sizer made the statement “in the 
process of Officer Schlossnagle taking him down . . . .”  This factual finding was not 
clearly erroneous given the speed of events and the ambiguities in timing.  See Raynor v. 
State, 440 Md. 71, 81 (2014).  
12 
with crimes that presented a threat to public safety, with identified suspects.  See In re 
David S., 367 Md. 523, 539 (2002) (officers saw a suspect with what appeared to be a 
handgun); Lee v. State, 311 Md. 642, 661–67 (1988) (officers detained suspects in an armed 
robbery who had injured an individual and were believed to be armed); Cf. Longshore, 399 
Md. at 517.  I am reluctant to extend our reasoning in those cases to minor misdemeanor 
offenses when the officer lacks particularized suspicion that the detained individual is 
engaged in criminal activity.  Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, I conclude 
that it was unreasonable for the officers to chase and tackle Mr. Sizer.  
ATTENUATION  
 
Although I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that this stop was constitutional, 
I concur in their alternative holding, that the officer’s unlawful conduct was attenuated by 
the discovery of the arrest warrant.11  To determine whether attenuation applies, a 
reviewing court considers three factors first set forth in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 
(1975); see also Miles v. State, 365 Md. 488, 522 (2001).  First, we examine the “‘temporal 
proximity’ between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of the evidence to 
determine how closely the discovery of evidence followed the unconstitutional search.”  
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (2016) (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 603).  Second, 
we examine the intervening circumstances.  Third, we “examine ‘the purpose and flagrancy 
of the official misconduct.’”  Id. (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 604).   
                                              
11 I agree with the Majority that the independent source doctrine is not applicable.  
Because attenuation applies, there is no reason to reach this issue.   
13 
Temporal Proximity  
 
The temporal proximity factor weighs against attenuation if there is no “substantial 
time” between the “unlawful act and when the evidence is obtained.”  Id.; see also Cox v. 
State, 397 Md. 200, 218 (2007).  The officers testified that the sequence of events happened 
very quickly.  Mr. Sizer stated that he had a gun as he was being tackled, and the search 
took place almost immediately after the officers cuffed Mr. Sizer and discovered the 
warrant.  Generally, an unlawful stop and near-contemporaneous discovery of evidence 
will not be a sufficient lapse in time to “attenuate the taint of a presumptively illegal 
stop . . . .”  Cox, 397 Md. at 218.  Thus, the temporal proximity factor here favors rejecting 
attenuation because no substantial time elapsed.  See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062; Cox, 397 
Md. at 218.   
Intervening Circumstances  
 
“[A]n intervening circumstance is an event that breaks the causal connection 
between the unlawful conduct and the derivative evidence.”  Ferguson v. State, 301 Md. 
542, 551 (1984).  Even before Strieff,12 we have found that discovery of a valid arrest 
warrant after an unconstitutional detention is an intervening circumstance that weighs in 
favor of attenuation.  See Cox, 397 Md. at 219; Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261, 227–28 
(2006).  The discovery of an arrest warrant that is “wholly independent of the illegal 
                                              
12 The Supreme Court applied Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) in its 
reasoning in Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).  The Court acknowledged that Segura 
applied the independent source doctrine, not attenuation, but concluded that the principle 
relating to a valid arrest warrant was applicable in attenuation.  Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062.   
14 
stop”13 breaks the causal chain because the warrant compels the officer to arrest the 
suspect.  Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063.   
 
Corporal Zammillo was compelled to arrest Mr. Sizer when he recognized him from 
prior interactions and knew that he had an open warrant.  See id. at 2062.  Officer 
Schlossnagle became aware of the gun through Mr. Sizer’s statement during an unlawful 
seizure before Zammillo recognized Mr. Sizer and discovered the arrest warrant, however, 
officers searched the backpack and found the gun after the warrant discovery.  The 
question is whether this fact affects the intervening circumstance factor such that it weighs 
against attenuation.   
 
In Cox, after detaining two individuals without reasonable suspicion, the officers 
learned that Cox had an outstanding warrant for failure to appear in court on drug charges 
and arrested him.  397 Md. at 205.  After the arrest, the officers found marijuana on the 
ground where Cox had been sitting.  Id.  We concluded that the presence of the warrant 
favored attenuation because the valid arrest warrant gave officers probable cause to arrest 
Cox before they found the marijuana.  Id. at 219.  
 
In Myers, an officer initiated a traffic stop and observed a screwdriver in plain view 
that could make pry marks consistent with those found at some recent burglaries.  The 
officer learned that Myers had outstanding warrants from another jurisdiction and took him 
into custody.  A search incident to arrest revealed further evidence of burglary.  395 Md. 
                                              
13 In Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 692 (1982), the Supreme Court determined 
that an arrest warrant filed after an unconstitutional arrest did not serve as an intervening 
circumstance because the officers secured the warrant using information obtained from the 
illegality.   
15 
at 268–69.  We assumed the stop was invalid, but concluded that the arrest warrant 
“sufficiently attenuated” the tainted stop such that the exclusionary rule did not apply.  Id. 
at 277–78.  As the Majority opinion notes, we determined in Myers that the timing was not 
“dispositive” because “there was an outstanding arrest warrant discovered between the 
initial stop and the subsequent search incident to arrest, even though some of the evidence 
was discovered shortly after the illegal stop.”  Id. at 292 (emphasis added).   
Mr. Sizer cites People v. Maggit, No. 335651, 2017 WL 2351500 (Mich. Ct. App. 
May 30, 2017), suggesting that case supports rejecting attenuation here.  In Maggit, the 
Michigan Court of Appeals paid careful attention to the timing of the seizure and the 
discovery of a warrant to determine whether intervening circumstances favored 
suppression.  Id. at *10.  The court pointed out that Strieff involved a “fact pattern[] of (1) 
invalid seizure; (2) discovery of a valid arrest warrant; and (3) search and discovery of 
contraband . . . .”  Id.  The court distinguished Maggit based on the difference in the fact 
pattern: “(1) invalid seizure; (2) search and discovery of contraband; and (3) discovery of 
a valid arrest warrant.”  Id.  The court determined that the warrant in that case was not an 
intervening act because it “had no effect on the actions taken by the police in this case, nor 
did it have any effect on the evidence that was recovered from the defendant.”  Id.   
Here, the fact pattern diverges from both Strieff, Cox, and Maggit, but is consistent 
with Myers:  (1) An invalid seizure and some evidence; (2) discovery of an arrest warrant; 
and (3) search and discovery of contraband.  Like Myers, although some evidence was 
obtained before the discovery of the warrant, the gun was found after the discovery of the 
warrant and the arrest.  Unlike in Maggit, the search was incident to a lawful arrest. In 
16 
Maggit, the arrest itself was unlawful, despite the later discovery of a valid warrant.  See 
2017 WL 2351500, at *10.  I agree with the Majority that Myers sufficiently resolves the 
issue.  The presence of a valid unrelated arrest warrant supports attenuation, even if some 
evidence is found before the arrest warrant.  See 395 Md. at 292.  I reach this conclusion 
because there was no substantial lapse in time between the illegality and the intervening 
circumstance, and the officers had not taken any significant action based on Mr. Sizer’s 
statement, such as searching his bag.  Thus, this factor weighs in favor of the State.   
The Purpose and Flagrancy of Police Misconduct  
This factor reflects the exclusionary rule’s goal of deterring police misconduct by 
“favoring exclusion only when the police conduct is most in need of deterrence—that is, 
when it is purposeful or flagrant.”  Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063.  Flagrancy requires more 
severe police misconduct than the mere absence of proper cause for a seizure.  Id. at 2064; 
see also Myers, 395 Md. at 293 (officer’s conduct was not flagrant only because the stop 
was invalid).   
Here, the officers accosted the group after an unknown member of the group made 
an ill-advised decision to throw a bottle in the parking lot, and the officers suspected that 
some members of the group might be drinking.  Although they lacked suspicion that Mr. 
Sizer had done anything, it was not unreasonable for the officers to approach the group.  
There is no evidence in the record of a pattern of systemic police misconduct by the Howard 
County Police Department.  See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063; Maggit, 2017 WL 2351500, at 
*10.  While the officers’ decision to chase and tackle Mr. Sizer may have been an error in 
judgment, given the lack of reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity, 
17 
absent further evidence of misconduct, I do not conclude their conduct was purposeful or 
flagrant.  Thus, this factor weighs in favor of the State.  The arrest warrant, therefore, 
sufficiently attenuated the illegality, and the evidence of the gun should have been 
admitted.14 
CONCLUSION  
I agree with the Majority that the evidence is admissible because the valid, unrelated 
arrest warrant sufficiently attenuated the unreasonable seizure.  I do not agree, however, 
with the Majority’s conclusion that the seizure of Mr. Sizer was reasonable under the 
totality of the circumstances.  I do not suggest officers should permit individuals suspected 
of committing crimes to escape.  But at a suppression hearing, the State must demonstrate 
that the officers had a sufficient factual basis to stop a citizen—especially when that stop 
is a hard take-down.  Grant, 449 Md. at 30; Jeremy P., 197 Md. App. at 22.  They failed to 
do so.  This Court should not shoulder that burden.   
Judge Hotten has authorized me to state that she joins this Concurring and 
Dissenting Opinion.  
                                              
14 When Mr. Sizer was being processed for detention at Booking, a corrections 
officer located a bag of pills in Mr. Sizer’s sock.  Schlossnagle referred to this as a “search 
incident to detention” as a matter of “protocol.”  This appears to be an inventory search, 
which is a well-recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.  See 
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 645–47 (1983).