Case Title: Warren v. State

Citation: 336 So. 2d 726

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1976-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
336 So. 2d 726 (1976) Mable WARREN v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 49080. Supreme Court of Mississippi. August 17, 1976. *727 George S. Monroe, Newton, for appellant. A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Ben H. Walley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before GILLESPIE, SMITH and WALKER, JJ. SMITH, Justice, for the Court: Mable Warren was tried in the Circuit Court of Newton County upon an indictment charging her with murder in the shooting death of Janet Bishop. She was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to serve eight years in the penitentiary. It appears from the record that Mable Warren and her husband had separated during the first week in December, 1973. There was evidence that the marriage had been a painful and tumultuous relationship. On December 23, 1973, Mable Warren returned to their home and shot her estranged husband and Janet Bishop, his paramour. The husband recovered from his wounds but Janet Bishop died. The defense interposed at the trial was self-defense and a great deal of evidence was introduced by both sides. Since the case must be reversed and remanded we deem it unnecessary to set out in detail the circumstances which brought about the shooting. On appeal the action of the trial court in granting an instruction which set out in detail the entire schedule of punishments which might be imposed upon the defendant if the jury should convict her of manslaughter is assigned as error. The case went to the jury at 11:10 on Friday morning and the jury remained deadlocked throughout that day. At 9:35 the next morning the trial judge gave the jury an additional instruction in which he stated the maximum penalty for murder and manslaughter. The jury having returned to its deliberation and having failed to reach a verdict, at 10:50 that same morning the trial judge gave another instruction specifying the minimum penalty for manslaughter. An objection was interposed by the defendant upon the ground that under the circumstances this instruction amounted to an implication on the part of the court that if the jury would convict her of manslaughter the lesser punishment would be imposed. Twenty minutes after receiving this instruction the jury returned a verdict of guilty of manslaughter, the verdict having contained a recommendation of the defendant to mercy. In Ellerbe v. State, 79 Miss. 10, 30 So. 57 (1901) this Court said: In Smith v. State, 288 So. 2d 720 (Miss. 1974), the Court stated: In the case now before us, the circumstances were as follows: At 3:10 in the afternoon of the day on which the jury retired to consider its verdict, the jury, through its bailiff, requested that they be returned to the courtroom. The jury having been seated in the box the court inquired if it had reached a verdict and was informed by the foreman that it had not. The court then inquired as to how the jury was divided numerically and was told "8 to 4." Whereupon the court said to the jury: At 5:23 of the afternoon the trial judge presented the District Attorney and defense counsel with an additional instruction which he proposed to give to the jury on his own motion. At 5:30 p.m. the sheriff was instructed to return the jury to the box and it was determined by the court that the jury, at that time, stood 11 to 1. The court then directed the jury to return to deliberate further. At 6:55 p.m. the court directed the sheriff to return the jury to the jury box. It was thereupon determined that the jury had not reached a verdict and stood 11 to 1. Following some remarks to the jury from the trial judge who pointed out the length of time which had been consumed in the trial and the need that the case be decided by a jury the court recessed until 9:00 the next morning and directed the jury to return to the jury room. The next morning at 9:35 the trial judge had the sheriff return the jury to the box. Upon being asked by the court the foreman stated that no verdict has been reached whereupon the following transpired: There was no objection to the above instruction. At 10:55, the jury again having been returned to the courtroom and having reported that it was unable to reach a verdict, the foreman stated to the court: "Your Honor, I don't think this jury will ever come to a decision." Thereupon, the court of its own motion, over appellant's objection that the instruction implied "... that the court will give a lesser sentence to the defendant ..." if the jury convicted of manslaughter, gave the following instruction: The only function of this instruction was to inform the jury of the lesser punishments for manslaughter. According to the record, this occurred at 10:55. Twenty minutes later, at 11:15, the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of manslaughter "with the mercy *730 of the Court." The trial judge sentenced the defendant to serve eight years in the penitentiary. The giving of this instruction by the trial court, particularly under the circumstances outlined above, was prejudicial error and added nothing to the instructions already given except to point out the lesser penalties which might be imposed on conviction of manslaughter. For this error the case must be reversed and the defendant awarded a new trial. Of other errors assigned, one other should be noticed. The State called and placed upon the stand appellant's husband. An objection was immediately interposed by appellant and sustained. This took place in the presence of the jury. The harmful effect of this incident was aggravated by the District Attorney in his remarks to the jury to the effect that there were three people who were present at the time of the shooting, the defendant, Mable Warren, the deceased, Janet Bishop and L.T. Warren, the husband of Mable Warren, who the State was not permitted to call as a witness. Appellant's objection was sustained and a motion for a mistrial, made shortly after the jury had retired, was denied. Mississippi Code Annotated section 13-1-5 (1972) provides that a husband and wife shall not be competent witnesses against each other except in "controversies between them ... . without the consent of both." (Emphasis added). There is no suggestion that the State had obtained the consent of Mable Warren to use her husband as a witness against her. Although the trial court sustained the objection on the part of appellant to the use of her husband as a witness and sustained the objection to the improper remarks of the District Attorney, it is doubtful that the prejudicial effect could be effectively removed from the minds of the jurors. While it is not likely that these circumstances will recur upon retrial of the case we consider the matter of sufficient gravity to be mentioned here. Appellant's right to withhold her consent would mean little or nothing if the exercise of this right is made the means of prejudicing the jury against her. We find it necessary to say that the verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and that the record discloses that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction. Other matters assigned as error have been examined and are without merit. REVERSED AND REMANDED. GILLESPIE, C.J., PATTERSON and INZER, P. JJ., and ROBERTSON, SUGG, WALKER and BROOM, JJ., concur. LEE, J., took no part.