Case Title: ELLISON v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98-89

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
ELLISON v. STATE2000 WY 763 P.3d 845Case Number: 98-89Decided: 04/06/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
CHRISTOPHER ELLISON, 
Appellant (Defendant), v.THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Natrona County, The Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, 
Judge.

Sylvia L. Hackl, 
State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Walter Eggers 
III, Assistant Public Defender, Representing Appellant.William U. 
Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Assistant 
Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; 
and Sheri K. Jones, Student Intern, Representing 
Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] In this 
appeal, the primary complaint of Christopher Ellison (Ellison) addresses an 
instruction to the jury that he asserts created a mandatory presumption. He was 
charged with making a terroristic threat in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-505 (Lexis 1999),1 and the instruction dealt with the 
intent to cause serious public inconvenience articulated in the statute. Ellison 
also contends that MY, the female co-owner of the establishment against which 
the threat was made, should not have been permitted to testify about her 
purchase of a pistol after the threat was uttered. Our review of the record in 
light of the pertinent authorities persuades us that the instruction did not 
create a mandatory presumption, and no error can be found in the giving of the 
instruction. The admission of the testimony concerning the pistol was 
discretionary on the part of the trial court, and we fail to discern any abuse 
of the court's discretion. The Judgment and Sentence entered in the trial court 
is affirmed.

[¶2] This 
statement of the issues is found in the Brief of Appellant, filed on behalf of 
Ellison:

I. Did the district court 
improperly relieve the State of its burden to prove each element of the charge 
when the court instructed the jury that the summoning of police and fire 
agencies was a "serious public inconvenience"?

II. Should [MY] have been 
allowed to testify she bought a gun after her argument with 
appellant?

[¶3] In the 
Brief of Appellee, filed by the State of Wyoming, the issues are stated in this 
way:

I. Did the district court 
properly instruct the jury that in determining whether a "serious public 
inconvenience" had been proved, it should consider all the evidence of 
inconvenience, including inconvenience caused by summoning police and fire 
agencies?

II. Whether [MY]'s 
testimony that she purchased a pistol in response to appellant's threats, was 
relevant to elements of the crime of making terroristic 
threats.

[¶4] On May 13, 
1996, Ellison, accompanied by his two year old son and an adult companion, went 
into Frosty's Bar and Lounge in Casper. They seated themselves at a table near 
the bar. MY, a co-owner of the bar, promptly informed Ellison that he could not 
bring the child into the bar and he would have to leave. Ellison responded with 
anger and belligerence, and he threatened to kill MY and burn Frosty's down. 
Ellison then left Frosty's and obtained a gasoline can from his truck. He threw 
gasoline on the exterior wall of the bar, and quickly drove 
away.

[¶5] A patron of 
the bar called 911 and reported the incident. The call produced a prompt 
response from both the police and fire departments. Investigators found a wet 
spot on the wall and sidewalk that smelled of gasoline. Samples were collected 
and sent to the State Crime Laboratory, which confirmed that the substance was 
gasoline. Ellison was arrested by Casper police officers, and on May 14, 1996, 
an information was filed in Natrona County Court in which he was charged with 
making a terroristic threat in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-505.

[¶6] On June 6, 
1996, after a preliminary examination, Ellison was bound over to the district 
court for trial. On August 24, 1996, Ellison entered a plea of not guilty at his 
arraignment, and a jury trial was held on October 21 and 22, 1996. At the trial, 
over a defense objection that such testimony was irrelevant, MY testified that, 
in response to Ellison's threats, she had purchased a pistol and had begun to 
practice firing it. After the evidence was completed, the jury was given 
Instruction No. 7, which reads:

YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that 
in determining if a public inconvenience" has been proven in this case, you 
should consider all of the evidence including evidence of inconvenience to 
individuals within the building at the time of the alleged threat, as well as 
the inconvenience caused by the summoning of police or fire 
agencies.

[¶7] No 
objection was made to the giving of Instruction No. 7 to the 
jury.

[¶8] The jury 
returned a guilty verdict against Ellison. On January 6, 1997, he was sentenced 
to a term of not less than twelve months nor more than thirty months to be 
served in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Ellison appeals from the Judgment and 
Sentence.

[¶9] In his 
first claim of error, Ellison argues that Instruction No. 7 contained a 
mandatory presumption which relieved the State of its obligation of establishing 
every element of the offense beyond any reasonable doubt. Since Ellison made no 
objection at trial, W.R.Cr.P. 30, applied literally, would foreclose review. It 
provides:

No party may assign as 
error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless that party objects 
thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which 
the party objects and the grounds of the objection.

[¶10] Relief 
from the failure to object, however, may be found in W.R.Cr.P. 52(b), which 
says, "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed 
although they were not brought to the attention of the court." In the absence of 
objection at trial, we can consider this claim of error only under our test for 
plain error. Ortega v. State, 966 P.2d 961, 966 (Wyo. 
1998).

[¶11] Our 
requirements for plain error first were identified in Hampton v. State, 558 P.2d 504, 507 (Wyo. 1977). The plain error doctrine was applied with respect to a 
failure to object to a jury instruction in Sandy v. State, 870 P.2d 352, 358 
(Wyo. 1994):

Plain error exists when 
1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a 
transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming 
the error was denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him. Porth 
v. State, 868 P.2d 236, 241 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶12] It has 
been consistently applied by this Court with respect to claims of error arising 
out of jury instructions. Yetter v. State, 987 P.2d 666, 668 (Wyo. 1999); 
Ortega, 966 P.2d  at 966; Cook v. State, 929 P.2d 518, 521 (Wyo. 1996); Hodges v. 
State, 904 P.2d 334, 341 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶13] Ellison 
attacks Instruction No. 7 by asserting that it incorporated a mandatory 
presumption to the effect that the summoning of police and fire agencies 
constituted a serious public inconvenience, and he argues that the State was 
relieved of its burden of proving that element of the offense by the 
instruction. Relying upon Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979); Warren v. State, 835 P.2d 304 (Wyo. 1992); and Krucheck v. 
State, 671 P.2d 1222 (Wyo. 1983), Ellison contends that he was denied due 
process of law under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, and further that the requirements of W.R.E. 
303 were not satisfied. Ellison omitted from his argument any reference to 
Harley v. State, 737 P.2d 750 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶14] In Harley, 
737 P.2d  at 754, we stated:

The concept established 
in Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, which is explained in Francis v. Franklin, 
supra, is not novel or unique in Wyoming jurisprudence. In Krucheck v. State 
Wyo., 671 P.2d 1222 (1983), aff'd on appeal after remand 702 P.2d 1267 (1985), 
Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, was relied upon in part by this court in reversing 
a criminal conviction because the trial judge gave a mandatory inference 
instruction. In addition to holding that the mandatory inference violated due 
process, we also pointed out that the court had failed to comply with Rule 
303(c), W.R.E.

[¶15] In 
Krucheck, considering substantially the same arguments, the court said, in part 
reiterating principles from an earlier case:

Clearly the Wyoming Rules 
of Evidence were violated, as was the Fourteenth Amendment. When a jury is 
authorized to make use of presumptions, it must be informed that it may refuse 
to use them. As this court has previously said:

"* * * The use of the 
presumption assists the prosecutor in not having to produce evidence of 
intention, at least until the presumption is rebutted. But it clearly denies the 
jury of the opportunity to make up its own minds on the question of intention 
because there is no probative evidence introduced from which it can base its own 
finding. In this respect, the presumption instruction is diametrically opposite 
that of the use of deductions and inferences which the jury may logically and 
properly draw from facts and circumstances introduced which point toward 
intention. [Citations.]" Stuebgen v. State, Wyo., 548 P.2d 870, 884-885 
(1976).

Krucheck, 671 P.2d  at 1225.

[¶16] In Harley, 
737 P.2d  at 754, this Court undertook a comprehensive analysis of the invocation 
of presumptions in criminal cases. We opened that discussion by 
saying:

Evidentiary presumptions 
are unconstitutional if they "have the effect of relieving the State of its 
burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a 
crime." Francis v. Franklin, supra, 105 S. Ct.  at 1970; Sandstrom v. Montana, 
supra; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970); Brooks 
v. State, Wyo., 706 P.2d 664 (1985); Krucheck v. State, supra. Conversely, 
permissive inferences meet constitutional mandates so long as the connection 
between the inferred fact and the proven fact is one that reason and common 
sense justify in the light of the facts in a particular case. Francis v. 
Franklin, supra.

[¶17] Harley, 
737 P.2d  at 754. We adopted the classification by the Supreme Court of the 
United States embracing "mandatory presumptions, which tell the jury that it 
must infer presumed facts if the state establishes predicate facts," and 
"permissive presumptions, which advise the jury that a possible conclusion may 
be drawn if the state establishes predicate facts, but the jury is not required 
to draw the inference." Harley, 737 P.2d  at 754. We also recognized the 
classification of mandatory presumptions as "either irrebuttable or conclusive 
or rebuttable," noting that both are unconstitutional. The irrebuttable or 
conclusive mandatory presumption transgresses constitutional requirements 
because it removes an element of the offense from the consideration of the jury. 
The rebuttable mandatory presumption falls afoul of constitutional principles 
not because it removes an element from the consideration by the jury, but 
because of its effect of relieving the State of the burden of persuasion as to 
the element to which it attaches. We then adopted this test for determining the 
nature of the instruction:

In analyzing the 
instruction to determine its nature, the court should determine how the 
instruction on the inference would be understood by a reasonable juror. Francis 
v. Franklin, supra. The verb which is used, "may" or "shall" or "must," is 
afforded a high degree of significance in applying this 
test.

Harley, 737 P.2d  
at 754-55.

[¶18] Ellison 
and the State agree that this Court reviews jury instructions as a whole without 
singling out individual instructions or parts of instructions. The parties cite 
Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 663 (Wyo. 1993) and Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 700 (Wyo. 1993). This rule, having persisted for a full one hundred years 
(Streitmatter v. State, 981 P.2d 921, 925 (Wyo. 1999); Ross v. State, 8 Wyo. 
351, 57 P. 924, 930 (1899)), must be said to be not only well established, but 
indeed venerable. Our examination of the jury instructions in this case, as a 
whole, convinces us that the trial court correctly and fairly instructed the 
jury. The very first instruction admonished the jury "not to single out any 
certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction," but rather to 
"consider all the instructions as a whole" and "regard each [instruction] in the 
light of all the others." Instruction number four specified that the prosecution 
had the burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and in specifying the elements of the crime, it listed:

5. With the intent to 
cause or in reckless disregard of causing;

6. Evacuation of a 
building or otherwise to cause a serious public 
inconvenience.

[¶19] Even 
Instruction No. 7 told the jury to "consider all of the 
evidence."

[¶20] The 
instructions directed the jury to reach a verdict based solely on the evidence, 
and did not create a mandatory presumption. The instructions did not deprive the 
jury of the opportunity to consider any element of the charged crime nor did 
these instructions relieve the State of the burden of persuasion as to any 
element. Ellison hinges his argument upon language selected out of Instruction 
No. 7, "as well as the inconvenience caused by the summoning of police or fire 
agencies." We perceive this instruction as definitional in context, and as 
advising the jury to "consider all of the evidence including evidence of 
inconvenience to individuals within the building at the time of the alleged 
threat, as well as the inconvenience caused by the summoning of police or fire 
agencies," in arriving at a determination of whether Ellison had either the 
intent to cause or acted in reckless disregard of causing "serious public 
inconvenience."

[¶21] The trial 
court could have more artfully worded Instruction No. 7 by specifically advising 
the jury that "in determining if a serious public inconvenience has been proven 
in this case, you should consider all of the evidence including evidence of 
inconvenience, if any you so find, to individuals within the building at the 
time of the alleged threat, as well as evidence of the inconvenience, if any you 
so find, caused by the summoning of police or fire agencies." We are satisfied, 
however, that a reasonable juror would not have considered this instruction as 
requiring a finding that Ellison acted with the requisite "intent to cause or in 
reckless disregard of causing * * * a serious public inconvenience." The jury 
was told that it "should consider all of the evidence" in reaching a 
determination, not that it should or must make a particular 
determination.

[¶22] 
Furthermore, Ellison's argument ignores the proposition that the State was not 
required to prove that a "serious public inconvenience" occurred. It only needed 
to prove that Ellison made his threats "with the intent to cause or in reckless 
disregard of causing" one. The Wyoming statute is based on the Model Penal Code 
provision. Theodore E. Lauer, Goodbye 3-Card Monte: The Wyoming Criminal Code of 
1982, 19 Land & Water L.Rev. 107, 134 (1984). The comments to the American 
Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 211.3. (M.P.C. part 2, Vol. 1, at 204-207) 
demonstrate that the legislature did not intend to require the State to prove 
that the defendant actually caused a serious public inconvenience. The comments 
explain that "[e]ven where the actor has no intention of actually carrying out 
his threat, it occasions certain identifiable harms that are appropriate for 
redress by the penal law." The comments continue and also say "[w]here the 
threat involves destruction in a public place, there is the serious 
inconvenience of evacuation and the like. For these reasons, Section 211.3 
proscribes terroristic threats without regard to their sincerity." Since the 
rules relating to presumptions address elements of a crime, the definition of a 
phrase in the elements instruction does constitute a presumption even if 
erroneous.

[¶23] In arguing 
his second issue, Ellison contends that the trial court erred when it allowed MY 
to testify that she purchased a pistol and took other precautions in response to 
Ellison's threats. We afford considerable deference to a trial court's 
evidentiary rulings, and will not disturb them absent an abuse of discretion. 
E.g., Newport v. State, 983 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Wyo. 1999); English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 143 (Wyo. 1999); Horton v. State, 764 P.2d 674, 676-77 (Wyo. 1988); 
Sanville v. State, 593 P.2d 1340, 1345 (Wyo. 1979). In Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998), we confirmed our adoption, in Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986), of this definition of an abuse of 
discretion:

"Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Byerly v. 
Madsen, 41 Wn. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985)."

[¶24] In 
applying this standard, we primarily are concerned with the objective criteria 
found in the record, and whether sound judgment with respect to what is right 
under the circumstances is demonstrated. An affirmative answer to those queries 
usually demonstrates a ruling that is neither arbitrary nor 
capricious.

[¶25] Ellison's 
claim is that MY's testimony was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative. 
The State claims that the testimony was relevant because it showed that 
Ellison's threats were more than practical jokes and that his hearers took him 
seriously. Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." W.R.E. 
401. The testimony is relevant if it tends to prove a meaningful part of the 
State's case.

[¶26] The 
comments to the Model Penal Code, inform that "threats of personal attack 
insufficiently grave to amount to terrorization" are excluded from punishment 
under the statute. The testimony from MY demonstrated that Ellison's threats 
were perceived as serious, and thus supported a legitimate goal of the 
prosecution. This is consistent with our decision in McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 752 (Wyo. 1993), in which we held the trial court properly admitted 
testimony about the impact on other people of the defendant's threats. We 
determined such testimony was relevant "because it was probative of the risk of 
serious public inconvenience and was not unduly prejudicial." Id. at 
752.

[¶27] We hold 
that no error, plain or otherwise, can be found in Instruction No. 7. The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of MY's testimony. The 
Judgment and Sentence entered in the district court is 
affirmed.

1 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-505 provides:

(a) A person 
is guilty of a terroristic threat if he threatens to commit any violent felony 
with the intent to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility 
of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or 
in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such 
inconvenience.

(b) A 
terroristic threat is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
three (3) years.