Case Title: Eis v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co.

Citation: 192 Kan. 103, 386 P.2d 206

Docket Number: 43,241

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1963-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
192 Kan. 103 (1963)
386 P.2d 206
HAROLD EIS, Appellant,
v.
HAWKEYE-SECURITY INSURANCE CO., Appellee.
No. 43,241

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 2, 1963.
*104 Patrick L. Connolly, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Stanley R. Roose, and Milford M. Magee, both of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Charles L. Davis, Jr., of Topeka, argued the cause, and Byron M. Gray, and Maurice D. Friedberg, both of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This appeal involves the construction of an insurance policy, designated as a "Garage Liability Policy."
The construction, placed upon the policy by the district court, excluded plaintiff's claim as to defendant's liability and plaintiff has appealed.
The case was submitted to the lower court on a stipulated statement of facts which will be summarized.
Appellee issued a garage liability insurance policy to the appellant which included a physical damage supplement covering theft. The policy also contained an endorsement excluding theft under particular circumstances. The basic policy is not presented in the record.
The physical damage supplement to the policy contained a schedule of coverages and spaces for the insertion of the amounts of premiums. On this schedule were typewritten the words "$25.00 See False pretense End. attached." However, no false pretense endorsement was ever attached to the policy and no premium was paid for such an endorsement.
Subsequent to the issuance of the original policy containing the endorsements, and prior to the occurrence of the loss which is the subject matter of this action, a special endorsement was attached to the policy amending the schedule of coverage and premiums. The amended schedule showed the charge of $25.00 for "Dealers' Supplemental Coverage" instead of for false pretense and no mention was made in the special endorsement of the false pretense endorsement.
A dealer's supplemental coverage endorsement, insuring the appellant against malicious mischief or vandalism, was also attached to the policy.
The appellant did not pay the premium of $174.90, set out in the original schedule of premiums which included the charge for a false pretense endorsement, but did pay the $134.00 premium for the amended schedule of premiums which included coverage for *105 malicious mischief of vandalism. This coverage was added to the original policy subsequent to its issuance.
Appellant was the owner of a 1960 Buick convertible automobile which was insured under the policy. The stipulation states:
The action was to recover the reasonable cost of repairs to the automobile in the amount of $700.00.
The first question presented is whether the exclusionary provision, in the special endorsement, excluded coverage for the theft under the facts as stipulated. The special endorsement attached to the policy contained the following exclusion:
"The Policy does not apply:
The appellant seeks to apply a strained and unusual construction to the sentence. He admits that the sentence contains two exclusions but in his brief suggests:
The appellant ignores the fact that the words "or from" separate the two parts of the sentence in the disjunctive. The co-ordinating conjunction "or" introduces and connects the second clause of the introductory phrase "the policy does not apply under any coverage to loss resulting ..." The second clause is entirely independent of the first.
*106 Insofar as here material the exclusion states, "The policy does not apply: Under any coverage, to loss resulting from ..., theft ..., committed by any person entrusted by the insured with custody ... of the automobile."
Appellant's construction would render the second clause meaningless. An owner of an automobile does not part with title as the result of conversion, theft, larceny, robbery, etc.
Appellant directs our attention to Motor Co. v. Insurance Co., 111 Kan. 225, 207 Pac. 205, which holds that the action of a swindler who obtained an automobile by means of trick or artifice constituted "a species of theft for which the insurance company was liable."; Tripp v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 141 Kan. 897, 44 P.2d 236, which holds that the taking of an automobile by one who presented himself as a prospective purchaser constituted a theft; and Baker v. Continental Ins. Co., 155 Kan. 26, 122 P.2d 710, holding that even a temporary taking of the insured vehicle constituted a theft under automobile policies insuring against theft.
The cases are not helpful here for two reasons. First, the record does not inform us of the nature and purpose of the thief's custody of the automobile. Second, it is admitted that there was a theft of the automobile. The question is whether theft by a custodian was excluded from the policy.
Appellant insists Tripp v. United States Fire Ins. Co., supra, supports his contention. That case is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In Tripp the exclusion excluded theft by a person to whom possession had voluntarily been surrendered. The court held that mere custody was not equivalent of possession and therefore theft by a mere custodian was not excluded. In the opinion the court stated:
In the instant case the insurer has done that which was suggested in Tripp, supra. It excluded theft by a person entrusted with custody in addition to excluding possession.
*107 The cases of Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Harrison, (Tex. Civ. App.) 277 S.W.2d 256; and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Scroggs, 92 Ga. App. 548, 88 S.E.2d 703, construed an exclusionary clause such as we have here, and held theft by a custodian to be excluded.
In Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Scroggs, supra, it was said:
Appellant also contends that false pretenses should have been covered by the policy. The stipulation of facts in connection with the subject states:
..............
There is nothing in the stipulation of facts which indicates any mistake, misunderstanding, or deceit. It would appear from the record that the insured got the coverage for which he paid; that he *108 paid for the coverage which he desired; and that false pretense was not included.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the record which indicates that the thief got custody of the automobile by false pretenses. The facts as stipulated do not disclose the method or manner by which the thief got custody. Even though false pretenses were covered by the policy, such facts do not purport to show that false pretenses were used by the thief to obtain custody.
Appellant further contends that the damages to the automobile are covered by the provisions in the policy insuring against loss or damage resulting from malicious mischief or vandalism. The only facts stipulated touching the question are:
The district court found that the facts stipulated were not sufficient to constitute malicious mischief or vandalism. We agree. There is no showing as to how or in what manner the damages listed were incurred.
Malicious mischief is a well considered term under the law. It has been generally recognized as a distinct common law offense. Malice is an essential ingredient.
See 54 C.J.S., Malicious Mischief, p. 935 § 3[a], where the following statement appears: "Malice has been held to be an essential ingredient of malicious mischief both at common law and under most of the statute defining the offense..."
There are no facts presented in the stipulation of facts which tend to indicate malice.
The word "vandal" generally means a ruthless plunderer. The word was taken from one of the tribes of Vandali. Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridged (Second Edition), states:
The word "`vandalism" connotes the acts of vandal. It is defined in 91 C.J.S., Vandalism, p. 802, as follows:
There are no facts presented in the record which would establish that the damage to the car was an act of vandalism.
We find nothing in the record presented or in the contentions advanced by appellant which warrants or permits a reversal of the trial court's judgment.
In conclusion it should be stated that the appellant's claim for attorney fees was properly denied. Appellant having failed to recover under the policy of insurance, the insurer had just cause and excuse (G.S. 1961 Supp., 40-256) for refusing payment. See Lindesmith v. Republic Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 189 Kan. 201, 368 P.2d 35; and Parker v. Continental Casualty Co., 191 Kan. 674, 383 P.2d 937.
The judgment is affirmed.
ROBB and FATZER, JJ., dissenting.