Case Title: KRYSTAL DAWN NELSON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0085

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
KRYSTAL DAWN NELSON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 159Case Number: No. S-10-0085Decided: 12/08/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

KRYSTAL 
DAWN NELSON,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; John S. 
Burbridge, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Affie B. Ellis, Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Ms. 
Ellis.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  A jury convicted Krystal Dawn Nelson of 
delivering cocaine.  She appeals, 
claiming error in the district court's refusal to give an entrapment instruction 
and the prosecutor's failure to give notice of intent to use W.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence.  We 
reverse.

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  Ms. Nelson states the issues for this 
Court's determination as follows:

 
 

I.              
Did 
the trial court err in refusing to give an entrapment 
instruction?

 
 

II.            
Did 
the prosecutor use W.R.E. 404(b) evidence without notice to defense 
counsel?

 
 
The 
State asserts the district court properly refused to give an entrapment 
instruction and it was not reversible error under the circumstances for the 
prosecutor to introduce W.R.E. 404(b) evidence at trial.

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  In May of 2008, after spending thirty 
days in jail in Campbell County, Wyoming on charges of felony distribution of 
cocaine, a twenty year old individual (informant) accepted an offer to assist 
the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) with drug 
investigations.  Pursuant to the 
agreement, the informant was to assist DCI by contacting people from whom he 
thought he could obtain controlled substances and arranging recorded buys.  In exchange, DCI agreed to recommend 
reduction of his felony charge to a misdemeanor.  The informant provided Deputy Robert 
Proffitt with a list of individuals from whom he thought he could obtain 
drugs.  Ms. Nelson's name was one of 
those on the list.  The informant 
had known Ms. Nelson casually in junior and senior high school and had worked 
with her a couple of times more recently at Papa John's Pizza.  

 
 
[¶4]  Under the direction of Deputy Proffitt, 
the informant began contacting individuals on the list.  In July of 2008, he told Deputy Proffitt 
that he had been talking with Ms. Nelson about purchasing cocaine.  Deputy Proffitt arranged to monitor and 
record a telephone call from the informant to Ms. Nelson.  During the telephone conversation, Ms. 
Nelson told the informant she could get him drugs but was at work and would call 
him when she returned from delivering a pizza.  The informant later received a call from 
Ms. Nelson stating that she was back at Papa John's.  The informant said he would get the 
money and meet her there.  

 
 
[¶5]  Deputy Proffitt placed a wire on the 
informant and gave him $100.  He 
followed the informant as he drove to Papa John's and watched from a nearby 
location as the informant handed Ms. Nelson the money and she handed something 
back to him.  After the exchange, 
the informant met Deputy Proffitt back at the DCI office.  He gave the deputy a plastic bag 
containing white powder.  Deputy 
Proffitt placed the bag on a scale; it weighed 1 gram.  Upon subsequent testing, the powder was 
identified as cocaine.  

 
 
[¶6]  For reasons that do not appear in the 
record, a warrant for Ms. Nelson's arrest was not issued until May 29, 2009, ten 
months later.  At that time, she was 
arrested and charged with one count of delivering cocaine in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2009).  Prior to trial, Ms. Nelson served the 
prosecution with a motion pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b) for disclosure of any 
evidence of other misconduct it intended to introduce at trial.  The prosecution did not respond to the 
motion.  Also prior to trial, Ms. 
Nelson asked the district court to instruct the jury concerning the entrapment 
defense.  After the pretrial 
conference but before the trial, the district court advised counsel that it had 
concluded the entrapment defense was not relevant and it would not give the 
instruction.    

 
 
[¶7]  At trial, during the prosecution's 
questioning, Deputy Proffitt testified that Ms. Nelson had told him at the time 
of her arrest that she had sold cocaine to the informant "either once or twice 
in July."  Defense counsel objected 
on the grounds that the prosecution had not given notice that it intended to 
introduce evidence of other misconduct.  
The district court overruled the objection.  During cross-examination of Ms. Nelson, 
the prosecution also inquired about her involvement with drugs prior to the July 
2008 delivery to the informant.  The 
district court again overruled defense counsel's objection and allowed the 
testimony.   

 
 
[¶8]  After the close of the evidence, defense 
counsel renewed his request for an entrapment instruction.  The district court declined to give the 
instruction, concluding the evidence presented did not support a contention that 
law enforcement improperly induced Ms. Nelson to act illegally.  The jury found Ms. Nelson guilty of 
delivering cocaine.  The district 
court sentenced her to a term of three to five years in prison, suspended the 
sentence and imposed five years probation.  
Ms. Nelson timely appealed from the judgment and sentence.       

 
 
  
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 

1.    
 Entrapment 
Instruction

 
 
[¶9]  Ms. Nelson contends the district court 
erred in refusing to give the jury an instruction on her defense theory that she 
was entrapped into delivering cocaine to DCI's informant.  After she submitted her proposed 
entrapment instruction, the district court during the pretrial conference asked 
the prosecutor what his position was regarding the instruction.  The prosecutor responded that the 
instruction appeared to be a standard pattern jury instruction on the entrapment 
defense but it should not be given to the jury in this case unless there was 
evidence at trial of overreaching on the part of law enforcement.  He asserted there was no such 
evidence.  The district court 
indicated it would look into the matter.

 
 
[¶10]  The next day, the district court sent a 
letter to counsel stating that it had reviewed the probable cause statement and 
Wyoming precedent and had concluded the entrapment defense was not relevant in 
Ms. Nelson's case.  The court quoted 
Swartz v. State, 971 P.2d 137, 140 (Wyo. 1998), for 
the holding that the entrapment defense requires proof of government inducement 
of the crime and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant engaged 
in the criminal conduct.  The 
district court stated:  

 
 
The 
evidence does not support a contention that the police induced [Ms. Nelson] into 
the illegal action, and as such I will not include a jury instruction related to 
the defense of entrapment.

 
 
[¶11]  Defense counsel responded to the 
district court's letter with his own letter stating:

 
 
I 
assume that this is a decision not to include an entrapment instruction in the 
package of jury instructions to be prepared in advance of trial and that it is 
not intended as a final decision to disallow an entrapment instruction after the 
close of evidence at the time of trial.  
I recognize that an entrapment instruction would be premature at this 
point, but I fully expect that there will be substantial evidence produced in 
support of an entrapment defense during the course of the 
trial.

 
 
Defense 
counsel asked the district court to let him know if his assumption was 
incorrect.  

 
 
[¶12]  Nothing further appears in the record 
concerning the entrapment instruction until after the parties had presented 
their evidence at trial and the district court met with counsel to finalize the 
jury instructions.  At that time, 
defense counsel renewed his request for the entrapment instruction.  The district court, relying on Swartz, 971 P.2d 137, declined to give the 
instruction on the ground that no competent evidence of improper inducement by 
law enforcement had been presented. 

 

[¶13]  Ms. Nelson contends the entrapment 
instruction should have been given because it was her theory of defense and 
competent evidence was presented to support it.  The failure to give an instruction on 
the law related to a theory of defense is a due process issue, which this Court 
reviews de novo.  Ewing v. State, 2007 WY 78, ¶ 7, 157 P.3d 943, 946 
(Wyo. 2007). 

 
 
[¶14] 
The law in Wyoming is well settled with respect to instructing a jury on a 
defendant's theory of the case. 

 
 
Due 
process requires the trial court to give a correct instruction to the jury that 
details the defendant's theory of the case.  Blakely v. State, 474 P.2d 127, 129 (Wyo. 1970).  The instruction must sufficiently inform 
the court of the defendant's theory and must be supported by competent 
evidence.  Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 490 (Wyo. 1992).  A theory of the case is more than a 
comment on the evidence that tells the jury how to consider the evidence.  Ellifritz v. State, 704 P.2d 1300 (Wyo.1985).  Fundamentally, the instruction must in 
the first instance be a proper theory of the case, or theory of defense, 
instruction.  That is, the offered 
instruction must present a defense recognized by statute or case law in this 
jurisdiction.  Bouwkamp, 833 P.2d  at 490. 

. 
. . .

Any 
competent evidence is sufficient to establish a defense theory even if it 
consists only of testimony of the defendant.  Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739, 745 (Wyo. 1987).  We view the evidence in a light 
favorable to the accused and the accused's testimony must be taken as entirely 
true to determine if the evidence is competent.  Duckett v. State, 966 P.2d 941, 944 (Wyo. 1998).  Even if the court deems the evidence to 
be weak, or unworthy of belief, the instruction must be given if a jury could 
reasonably conclude the evidence supports the defendant's position.  Id. 

 
 

Iseli 
v. State, 
2007 WY 102, ¶ 10, 160 P.3d 1133, 1136 (Wyo. 2007), 
quoting Holloman v. State, 2002 WY 117, ¶¶ 15-16, 51 P.3d 214, 219 (Wyo. 2002).  However, not every instruction must be 
given simply because there is a claim that it incorporates a theory of the 
case.  Iseli, ¶ 10, 160 P.3d  at 1136, quoting 
Farmer v. State, 2005 WY 162, ¶ 23, 124 P.3d 699, 707 (Wyo. 2005).  Instructions not based on the evidence 
can be properly refused.  Id.      

 

[¶15]  The law in Wyoming is also well settled 
with respect to Ms. Nelson's theory of defense.  Entrapment law serves the purpose of 
ensuring that a defendant is not punished who, but for government encouragement, 
would not have committed an offense.  
Rivera v. State, 846 P.2d 1, 4 (Wyo. 1993).  Entrapment does not arise where one is 
ready to commit the offense, given but the opportunity.  Higby v. State, 485 P.2d 380, 384 (Wyo. 1971).  Suspected persons can be tested by being 
offered an opportunity to transgress the law; however, they may not be put under 
any extraordinary temptation or inducement.  Id.  With respect to what constitutes undue 
persuasion or enticement, the question is not one of laying a trap or trickiness 
or deceit, but one of seduction or improper inducement to commit a crime.  Swartz, 971 P.2d  at 140.  Inducement may arise from persuasion, 
fraudulent representations, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises of 
reward, or pleas based on need, sympathy or friendship.  Id.  

 
 
[¶16]  We applied these principles in Swartz to uphold the district court's 
decision not to give the defendant's proposed entrapment instruction.  Swartz was charged with grand larceny 
after she took a sports car she had previously owned from the front yard of her 
former boyfriend Scott's new girlfriend.  
At the time, Scott owned the vehicle because he had paid off the loan 
after Swartz was unable to make the payments and signed the title over to him to 
avoid default.  

 
 
[¶17]  After his relationship with Swartz 
ended, Scott and his new girlfriend experienced several incidents of vandalism 
and suspected Swartz was responsible.  
They contacted police who set up a video camera across the street in the 
hope of catching the vandal.  Scott 
placed the car in the yard to entice Swartz. The testimony presented at trial 
conflicted as to whether the police were involved in that decision, with Scott 
and a police officer testifying that Scott alone made the decision, and Scott's 
parents testifying that the police suggested putting the car in the yard. 

 
 
[¶18] 
After the close of the evidence, Swartz offered an entrapment instruction.  The district court refused the 
instruction finding the evidence did not support it.  We upheld the district court's decision, 
stating:

 
 
Scott's 
actions fall short of the type of behavior that would amount to an inducement to 
commit larceny.  There is no 
evidence that Scott or any member of the Gillette Police Department had any 
contact with Swartz before the car was stolen.  Nor is there evidence that Scott or the 
police implanted the idea of the crime in Swartz' mind.   Scott did nothing more than offer 
Swartz an opportunity to act; an opportunity she grasped forthwith.  Because Swartz presented no competent 
evidence of improper inducement by the government, she was not entitled to have 
the defense of entrapment submitted to the jury.

 
 

Swartz, 
971 P.2d  at 140 (citation omitted).  
        
  

  

[¶19]  This Court also upheld a district 
court's refusal to give an entrapment instruction in Higby, 485 P.2d  at 384.  There, police officers gave two 
individuals money to buy narcotics.  
The person from whom they planned to buy marijuana did not show up at the 
arranged meeting place.  Higby, 
however, was there and they asked him if he knew where the person they were 
planning to meet was, explaining that he was to bring them marijuana.  Higby responded that he could get them 
some "stuff."  One of the 
individuals accompanied Higby to the house where he was living, gave him the 
money and Higby handed him drugs.  
The Court rejected Higby's claim of entrapment finding the most that 
occurred was that the defendant was offered an opportunity to transgress the 
law.  Id.  See also Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579, 581 (Wyo. 1986), 
upholding the district court's refusal to instruct on entrapment where the 
evidence showed agents went to a bar for the express purpose of meeting and 
attempting to purchase drugs from the defendant, a surveillance crew was already 
set up outside the bar, an informant introduced the agents to the defendant, 
they asked if he could get them some marijuana, and he returned thirty minutes 
later with two baggies of marijuana.

 
 
[¶20]  In contrast to the above cases, the 
district court gave an entrapment instruction in Munoz v. State, 849 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo. 1993), 
where an informant, fitted with a recorder, contacted Munoz and attempted to 
arrange a buy on behalf of DCI.  
Munoz expressed concern that he was being watched by drug agents.  The next day the informant and a DCI 
agent drove to Munoz's house.  As 
they drove up, he met them, jumped in the back seat and instructed them to drive 
around the block.  He asked the 
agent if he wanted a quarter ounce of marijuana, the agent said yes and Munoz 
handed him a bag of marijuana in exchange for $45 in cash.      

 
 
[¶21]  An entrapment instruction was also given 
to the jury in Rivera, 846 P.2d  at 
3.  There, police officers used an 
informant to introduce suspected drug dealers to undercover officers.  He introduced Rivera to an undercover 
officer and Rivera agreed to meet them at a motel to transact a drug deal.  At the motel, the officer offered Rivera 
marijuana and, when Rivera did not have enough money to pay for the amount 
offered, agreed to front him the portion he could not afford.  They exchanged the money and the 
marijuana and Rivera was arrested.

 
 
[¶22]  In Janski v. State, 538 P.2d 271 (Wyo. 1975), the State 
presented evidence that an undercover narcotics agent went to Janski's residence 
and asked if he could buy hashish.  
Janksi left the residence and returned thirty minutes later with two 
packages of hashish, which the agent purchased from him.  Janski presented evidence that the agent 
had a gun when he arrived at his residence and that he pressed the gun into 
Janski's stomach while telling him to go get the hashish, bring it right back 
and not to mess around with him.  Id. at 273.  The district court instructed the jury 
on the defense of entrapment.  In 
addressing Janski's claim on appeal that the State presented insufficient 
evidence that he was predisposed to commit the crime, this Court 
stated:

 
 
            
The facts as submitted by the State's case in chief fulfilled the 
requirements of proof of predisposition.  
The jury chose to accept the State's evidence and reject the defendant's 
testimony of coercion with a firearm.  
A jury question was presented by the evidence.      

 
 

Id. 
at 277.  See also, LaFleur v. State, 533 P.2d 309, 314 (Wyo. 1975) and 
Montez v. State, 527 P.2d 1330, 1332 
(Wyo. 1974), stating that, given the conflicting evidence, the question of 
whether the defendant was entrapped was for the jury. 

 
 
[¶23]  In the present case, Ms. Nelson 
testified that the informant called her on her cell phone wanting to know if she 
could get him any drugs and she told him, "no."  He called again wanting the same thing 
and she again told him no.  He 
called two or three more times and she did not answer.  He called again, Ms. Nelson answered, he 
again wanted to know if she could get him drugs and she again told him no.  Ms. Nelson testified that she talked to 
the informant two or three more times after that.  Finally, she told him she would see what 
she could do if he would leave her alone.  
Ms. Nelson then contacted her boyfriend to see if he knew anyone with 
drugs.  He said a friend of his had 
a gram of cocaine.  He talked to the 
friend who said he would sell the gram for $100.     

 
 
[¶24]   Ms. Nelson testified that when the 
informant started calling her she did not have any cocaine or any other drugs 
and did not know where she could get any.  
She testified that she tried to ignore his phone calls but he kept 
calling.  She testified she tried 
telling him no but he would not take no for an answer.  She testified she finally said she would 
see what she could do because she was tired of him calling her.  

 
 
[¶25]  Ms. Nelson also testified that although 
she had been involved with drugs when she was younger, she had made a decision 
three to four years earlier that she did not want to live her life that way and 
had ended her involvement.  At the 
time the informant began calling her, she had not been involved with drugs for 
some time.  Also about the time he 
began calling her, she had learned that she was pregnant.   

 
 
[¶26]  The informant's testimony about his 
contact with Ms. Nelson largely corroborated her testimony.  He testified that he called and asked 
her if she would be able to get drugs and she responded "probably not."  He called her again about an hour and a 
half later, asked her if she knew anywhere he could get any drugs and she 
responded, "she didn't know, she didn't think so."  The next day he called her again and 
asked if she could get any drugs.  
She said "she didn't know, she didn't think so."  Approximately two to three hours later, 
he called again and received her voice mail.  He tried again a little while later and 
did not reach her.  He continued to 
try and finally reached her.  This 
time, when asked if she could find any drugs, she said "she probably could 
maybe, she didn't know, she would start looking."  He called her again two to three hours 
later, asked if she had found anything yet and she said she was still 
looking.  He waited an hour and 
called again.  This time Ms. Nelson 
said she could get a gram of cocaine.  
The informant testified that during the time he was contacting her he had 
no understanding that she had possession of any drugs, nothing she said 
indicated that she knew where she could get drugs and she did not express any 
interest in trying to get drugs for him.  
He agreed with defense counsel that Ms. Nelson's response to his requests 
was discouraging.   

 
 
[¶27]  Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Ms. Nelson and taking her testimony as entirely true as we are 
required to do, we conclude she was entitled to an entrapment instruction.  Given her testimony, and that of the 
informant, a jury reasonably could have concluded that but for the government's 
encouragement, she would not have obtained the cocaine and delivered it to the 
informant.  Rivera, 846 P.2d  at 4.  A jury reasonably could have believed 
that rather than being ready to commit the offense given the opportunity, Ms. 
Nelson had distanced or was attempting to distance herself from drugs and the 
repeated phone calls from the informant, sometimes while she was at work, put 
her under extraordinary temptation to do as he asked.  Higby, 485 P.2d  at 381.  Stated differently, if the jury believed 
her testimony, it reasonably could have concluded that the informant's repeated 
calls were sufficiently harassing to induce her to commit a crime in order to 
get him to leave her alone.  Swartz, 971 P.2d  at 140.  The question was not whether she proved 
she was entrapped, but whether the evidence was sufficient to require giving the 
instruction and let the jury decide whether it believed she was entrapped.  We hold that it was.  

 
 
 
 

2.    
Rule 
404(b) Evidence  

 
 
[¶28]  In her second issue, Ms. Nelson contends 
the prosecutor introduced and the district court upheld the admission of 
evidence in violation of W.R.E. 404(b) in two instances:  first, when Deputy Proffitt testified 
she told him that she had sold cocaine to the informant once or twice in July 
2008, and second, when the prosecutor cross-examined her concerning her prior 
involvement with marijuana.  W.R.E. 
404(b) (emphasis added) provides:

 
 
            
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith.  It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, 
provided that upon request by the 
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in 
advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good 
cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce 
at trial.

 
 
When 
a defendant files a pretrial demand for notice of the State's intent to 
introduce evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), such demand is treated as a timely 
objection to the admission of such evidence.  Bromley v. State, 2009 WY 133, ¶ 27, 219 P.3d 110, 
117 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶29]  In the present case, defense counsel 
requested notice in advance of trial of any 404(b) evidence the prosecution 
intended to introduce at trial.  In 
the case of Deputy Proffitt's testimony, defense counsel also objected during 
trial on the basis of Rule 404(b).  
When proper objection is made, we review a district court's rulings on 
the admission of evidence in accordance with the following 
standards:

 
 
     A trial court's decision on 
the admissibility of evidence is entitled to considerable deference, and will 
not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant demonstrates a clear abuse of 
discretion.  As long as there exists 
a legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling, that ruling will not be 
disturbed on appeal.  

 
 
Even 
if the district court admitted evidence in error, we must consider whether the 
error was prejudicial or harmless.  
Error is prejudicial if there is a reasonable possibility that the 
verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if the error had not 
been made.  Prejudicial error 
requires reversal, while harmless error does not.  

 
 

Reay 
v. State, 
2008 WY 13, ¶ 8, 176 P.3d 647, 650 (Wyo. 2008) 
(citations omitted).

  

[¶30]  The first instance in which Ms. Nelson 
asserts evidence was improperly admitted occurred during the State's questioning 
of Deputy Proffitt about an interview he conducted with Ms. Nelson at the time 
of her arrest in May of 2009.  
Deputy Proffitt testified that he advised Ms. Nelson of her rights and 
had her initial the form acknowledging the advisement.  Then the following exchange 
occurred:

 
 
Q.        [By 
the prosecutor]  Did you then speak 
with her about her interactions with [the informant]?

A.        
[Deputy Proffitt]  Yes, I 
did.

Q.        What, 
if anything, did she tell you about [the informant]?

A.        That 
 Krystal Nelson stated that she had sold [the informant] cocaine either once or 
twice in July.

            
[Defense counsel]:  Excuse 
me, Your Honor.

            
The Court:  Would counsel 
approach.

            
(Bench conference outside the hearing of the jury)

            
[Defense Counsel]:  Your 
Honor, I thought we cleared the 404(b) notice and my understanding was there was 
to be no testimony whatever regarding any other sales, possession, transfer, or 
delivery of any controlled substance.

            
[Prosecutor]:  It's a 
statement made by the defendant when she's specifically asked about her contact 
with this individual, and that was going to be the sum and substance of the 
statement.  She said she got 
it.  I interpreted the 404(b) notice 
with respect to information she disclosed about involvement with marijuana and 
potential prescription medicine during the interview, not anything as it relates 
to this charge.

            
[Defense Counsel]:  Clearly, 
anything relating to any prior transfer or delivery of any cocaine is, I think, 
entirely for the purpose of showing she actually reacted in conformity and 
willingness.

            
The Court:  Well, I don't 
think it violates the 404(b) issue, and if that's what she said I guess that's 
what she said on this issue, so I'll overrule the 
objection.

 
 
The 
prosecutor then repeated his question and Deputy Proffitt testified again that 
Ms. Nelson had told him she sold cocaine to the informant either once or twice 
in July of 2008.

 
 
[¶31]  Ms. Nelson contends the testimony was 
improper because she filed a demand for notice of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence and the 
State did not respond, leading her to believe no such evidence would be 
introduced.  Because W.R.E. 404(b) 
expressly requires the State to give notice of its intent to use any prior 
misconduct evidence, she asserts its failure to do so is reversible error.  The State asserts the district court 
properly overruled defense counsel's objection because there was no showing the 
prosecutor intended or even expected Deputy Proffitt to testify concerning the 
number of times Ms. Nelson sold cocaine to the informant.  Citing Schreibvogel v. State, 2010 WY 45, 228 P.3d 874 (Wyo. 
2010), the State contends the testimony Deputy Proffitt offered in response to 
the prosecutor's question about what Ms. Nelson told him during the interview 
did not fall within the 404(b) notice requirement because it was not evidence 
the State intended to introduce; therefore, the usual pre-trial procedures for 
such evidence did not apply.

 
 
[¶32]  In Schreibvogel, the defendant was 
convicted of first degree sexual assault and robbery.  One of the State's witnesses had been in 
jail with the defendant and the thrust of his testimony was that the defendant 
had confessed to him that he committed the assault and robbery.  During the trial, the prosecutor asked 
the witness what the defendant had told him.  The witness responded that the defendant 
told him that he was "all coked up," went to a bar, met a woman, followed her to 
her business establishment and assaulted and robbed her.  In upholding the testimony under a plain 
error analysis, we said:

 
 
            
It does not appear from the record that the State, prior to trial, 
intended to utilize the evidence of Mr. Schreibvogel's drug use.  The pod-mate was not asked to testify 
regarding Mr. Schreibvogel's drug use.  
He was merely asked to tell the jury what he had been told by Mr. 
Schreibvogel.  If the prosecution 
did not intend to introduce such evidence, it was not required to provide the 
defense with notice.         

 
 

Id., 
¶ 35, 228 P.3d  at 886 (citation omitted).  
We also concluded Mr. Schreibvogel could not show that he was materially 
prejudiced by the testimony that he was "coked up" because it was cumulative of 
other evidence presented to the jury concerning his drug use.   

 
 
[¶33]  In Reay, ¶ 8, 176 P.3d  at 650, we applied 
the abuse of discretion standard to affirm the district court's admission of 
404(b) evidence.  Mr. Reay was 
convicted of burglary, aggravated kidnapping and battery on a household 
member.  On appeal, he claimed 
evidence of other wrongs under Rule 404(b) was improperly admitted when the 
prosecutor asked a witness who had helped get the victim away from her assailant 
what she had said to him.  The 
witness testified the victim had said there had been previous instances of 
violence against her by Reay.  Id., ¶ 15, 176 P.3d  at 652.  Defense counsel objected and the 
district court agreed to give a limiting instruction telling the jury to 
disregard the testimony.  We 
said:

 
 
            
Implicit in the district court's offer of a limiting instruction is the 
conclusion that the evidence was inadmissible under W.R.E. 404(b).  We agree.    
[the witness]'s comment was a direct assertion that there had been 
previous instances of violence against [the victim] . . . .  This was evidence of uncharged 
misconduct, and should not have been admitted into evidence without being 
analyzed as W.R.E. 404(b) requires.        

 
 

Id., 
¶ 16, 176 P.3d  at 652.  In 
performing the 404(b) analysis, however, we concluded:

 
 
[T]he 
prosecution in Mr. Reay's case did not intend to introduce [the witness]' 
testimony as evidence of uncharged misconduct.  The prosecution's question  "Is that 
pretty much all that you got out of her"  was not an intentional attempt to 
solicit improper evidence.  The 
district court concluded that the prosecution had not elicited  the comment, 
and that the comment "was somewhat nonresponsive." The prosecution also assured 
the district court that [the witness] had been admonished not to testify about 
Mr. Reay's previous assaults against [the victim].  Because the prosecution did not intend 
to introduce such evidence, it was not required to provide the defense with 
notice that it would attempt to introduce the evidence.  

 
 

Id., 
¶ 19, 176 P.3d  at 653. 

 
 
[¶34]  At first blush, the question and 
testimony at issue here seems much like that in Schreibvogel.  Deputy Proffitt was not asked to testify 
regarding any other drug sales Ms. Nelson had made to the informant.  He was merely asked to tell the jury 
what Ms. Nelson told him in the interview.  
Like the witness's comment in Reay, however, Deputy Proffitt's 
testimony was a direct assertion that the sale giving rise to her arrest may not 
have been the only time Ms. Nelson sold the informant drugs in July of 
2008.  Evidence concerning another 
sale of controlled substances by Ms. Nelson for which she was not charged 
clearly falls within the types of evidence Rule 404(b) addresses.         

 
 
[¶35]  The State asserts the prosecutor did not 
intend to introduce evidence of other drug sales by Ms. Nelson; therefore, it 
was not required to give notice of the evidence in response to her pre-trial 
demand.  This is not a case like Schreibvogel, where the witness giving 
the testimony was a former cellmate of the defendant's who may have been 
difficult to prepare for trial.  
Rather, the witness who gave the testimony here was an experienced deputy 
sheriff and trained drug investigator working with the prosecutor to convict Ms. 
Nelson.  It is difficult to believe 
the prosecutor had not discussed his testimony with him before trial.  If the intent was not to have him 
testify about other drug sales, the prosecutor should have directed him not to 
do so.  This case also is not like 
Reay, where the testimony was 
"somewhat nonresponsive" and the prosecution assured the district court the 
witness had been admonished not to testify about other assaults.   Deputy Proffitt responded directly 
to the prosecutor's question and the prosecutor made no assurances he had 
advised the deputy not to testify about Ms. Nelson's statement concerning other 
drug sales.  Under these 
circumstances, the prosecutor's assertion that he did not intend to introduce 
testimony of other drug sales is not sufficient to overcome the 404(b) notice 
requirement. 

 
 
[¶36]  Ms. Nelson also asserts the prosecutor 
improperly questioned her during cross-examination concerning her prior 
involvement with controlled substances when he had not provided notice of the 
evidence in response to her pre-trial motion.  The exchange was as 
follows:

 
 
            
Q.        Now, 
there were other times though prior to that where you would be aware that a 
person would have a controlled substance, whether it was marijuana or 
methamphetamine or cocaine, and you would know that there was another person who 
wanted to get it that you'd help those two people meet up?

            
A.        When 
I was younger.

            
Q.        
Okay.  And it was a pretty 
regular thing then, right?

            
A.        Not 
really regular, no.

            
Q.        
Okay.  Now when you say 

 
 
At 
this point, defense counsel interrupted and asked to approach the bench.  He objected that the testimony was not 
relevant and was beyond the scope of direct examination.  The district court overruled the 
objection.  The prosecutor then went 
on to solicit Ms. Nelson's testimony that four years earlier, when she was 
seventeen years old, she used marijuana with her friends and sometimes helped to 
connect people who were selling it with those who wanted to buy it.    

 
 
[¶37]  The State asserts the prosecutor was not 
required to provide notice of his intent to introduce evidence of Ms. Nelson's 
prior drug involvement if he did not intend to use such evidence at trial and 
there has been no showing that he intended to use the evidence.  The State also maintains Ms. Nelson has 
not shown she was materially prejudiced by the evidence and, in any event, 
defense counsel opened the door to use of the evidence when he asked Ms. Nelson 
on direct examination whether she knew at the time the informant began 
contacting her where she could obtain drugs. 

 
 
[¶38]  For the same reasons we concluded the 
prosecutor's asserted lack of intent to introduce Deputy Proffitt's testimony 
was not sufficient to overcome the 404(b) notice requirement, we conclude the 
prosecutor's assertion that he did not intend to introduce evidence that Ms. 
Nelson used marijuana three to four years earlier is not sufficient to overcome 
the 404(b) notice requirement.  Our 
holdings in Reay and Schreibvogel were not intended to 
suggest that prosecutors can avoid claims that they failed to give the required 
notice by simply asserting they did not intend to introduce the evidence.  Those cases were factually 
distinguishable from the circumstances before us here. 

 
 
[¶39]  We turn to the question of whether 
defense counsel opened the door to the testimony.  We have recognized that a defendant may 
open the door to otherwise inadmissible testimony when he inquires about a 
particular subject, including evidence of prior criminal misconduct.  Roden v. State, 2010 WY 11, ¶ 14, 225 P.3d 497, 501 
(Wyo. 2010), citing Gayler v. State, 
957 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo. 
1998).  "When the defendant 
initiates a line of questioning, the prosecutor is entitled to make a 
permissible inquiry without crossing into prosecutorial overkill."  Id., quoting Espinoza v. State, 969 P.2d 542, 546 (Wyo. 1998).  Succinctly stated, the "opening the 
door" rule is that a party who in some way permits the trial judge to let down 
the gates to a field of inquiry that is not competent but relevant cannot 
complain if his adversary is also allowed to avail himself of the opening within 
its scope.  Roden, ¶ 14, 225 P.3d  at 501, quoting Sanville v. State, 593 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Wyo. 
1979).  

 
 
[¶40]  We applied these principles in Roden to reject claimed error in the 
prosecutor's questioning of one of its witnesses about his relationship with the 
defendant.  During Roden's trial for 
conspiracy, aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, the prosecution called 
his co-conspirator to testify.  On 
direct examination, he testified that Roden gave him $5,000 to purchase 
methamphetamine.  On 
cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to discredit the witness by showing 
Roden had only known him for a couple of months, making it doubtful he would 
give him $5,000.  During redirect 
examination, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the witness that he trusted 
Roden because they had been in business selling drugs and stealing for a couple 
of months, had made a lot of money and it was not unusual for them to give each 
other large sums of money.  We 
said:

 
 
            
After careful consideration, we must agree with the State that the 
prosecutor's line of questioning on redirect was permissible under the 
circumstances.  When Roden's trial 
counsel made an issue of the plausibility of Ott's testimony concerning the 
nature of the money exchange, he opened the door for the prosecutor to inquire 
as to the nature and extent of Roden's and Ott's relationship, including 
information relating to the types of transactions in which the two men 
engaged.  The prosecutor's line of 
questioning merely sought to clarify their relationship and to refute defense 
counsel's implication that it was unlikely Roden would have given Ott $5,000.00 
for a drug deal after knowing him for only a few months.  The prosecutor limited his inquiry to 
the amount of information necessary to demonstrate why it was not uncommon for 
Ott and Roden to exchange large sums of money, and "did not cross the line 
between permissible inquiry and prosecutorial overkill." 

       

Roden, 
¶ 16, 225 P.3d  at 502.

 
 
[¶41]  The State contends defense counsel 
opened the door to questioning Ms. Nelson about her prior use of drugs during 
the following exchange on direct examination:

 
 
Q.        [By 
defense counsel]  On the 29th of July 2008, at the time [the 
informant] started calling you, did you have any cocaine?

            
A.        [Ms. 
Nelson]  No, I did 
not.

            
Q.        Did 
you have any methamphetamine or other drugs?

            
A.        No, I 
did not.

Q.        Did 
you know where you could get any of those drugs?

            
A.        No, I 
did not.

 
 
[¶42] 
 The State asserts the last question 
and answer opened the door for the prosecutor to question Ms. Nelson about her 
involvement with controlled substances three or four years earlier, when she 
knew people who had marijuana and people who wanted marijuana and would help get 
them together.  The State in essence 
asserts the question and answer opened the door for the prosecutor to introduce 
evidence he had not intended to introduce and of which he did not give notice in 
response to Ms. Nelson's motion for disclosure of 404(b) evidence.  There is a significant difference 
between the question and answer that opened the door in Roden and the testimony in Ms. Nelson's 
case.  In Roden, the testimony the prosecutor 
elicited on re-direct examination concerned the same transaction that led to the 
charges against the defendant.  
Here, the testimony the prosecutor elicited involved the very type of 
conduct Rule 404(b) addressesprior uncharged misconduct.  Moreover, the testimony elicited was the 
very type of evidence we would expect the prosecution to introduce in order to 
discredit a defense claim of entrapment.  
Again, we find unpersuasive the State's contention that the prosecutor 
did not intend to introduce the evidence.  
Whether or not defense counsel opened the door to the testimony, the 
prosecution should have provided notice of the evidence in response to Ms. 
Nelson's disclosure motion. 

 
 
[¶43]  Having concluded that the prosecutor did 
not give notice of other misconduct evidence as required under Rule 404(b), the 
next question for our consideration ordinarily would be whether Ms. Nelson was 
materially prejudiced by the testimony.  
However, our conclusion that error occurred when the district court 
declined to give an entrapment instruction makes it difficult to evaluate the 
question of whether prejudice resulted from lack of notice of the 404(b) 
evidence.  On remand for a new trial 
with an appropriate entrapment instruction, Ms. Nelson will have notice by 
virtue of the first trial of the 404(b) evidence the prosecution intends to 
introduce and the district court can convene a hearing in accordance with Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332 (Wyo. 2002).  Under these circumstances, we decline to 
consider whether the lack of notice under 404(b) led to material prejudice.       

    

[¶44]  Reversed and remanded for a new 
trial.