Case Title: JERALD KORWIN HOFSTAD v. CATHRYN ANNE CHRISTIE

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0246

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-10-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
JERALD KORWIN HOFSTAD v. CATHRYN ANNE CHRISTIE2010 WY 134Case Number: No. S-09-0246Decided: 10/07/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

JERALD 
KORWIN HOFSTAD,Appellant (Respondent),v.CATHRYN ANNE 
CHRISTIE,Appellee (Petitioner).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Keith 
R. Nachbar, Casper, WY

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Harry 
G. Bondi, Casper WY

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief Justice at 
time of expedited conference.

 
 
 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Jerald 
Korwin Hofstad challenges the district court's judgment equally partitioning a 
home owned by him and Appellee Cathryn Anne Christie as tenants in common.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Hofstad lists 
four issues:

 
 

1.    
Did 
the district court below commit reversible error when it applied Alaska and 
Montana law and treated an unmarried couple as family members for purposes of 
dividing real property owned jointly as tenants in common?

2.    
Did 
the district court below commit reversible error when it found unequal 
contributions toward the purchase price of the property, there was no specific 
evidence of a gift, and yet the district court presumed that a gift of the 
excess contribution was intended?

3.    
Did 
the district court below improperly assign the burden of proof to the donor to 
prove the negative  that no gift was made?

4.    
Where 
there was no family relationship, and no specific evidence of any intended gift, 
should the property be divided according to the proven unequal contributions of 
the parties?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      From February of 
1996 to July of 2007, Mr. Hofstad and Ms. Christie were involved in a 
relationship and lived together for extended periods of time, but never 
married.  However, their 
relationship produced twin boys born in 1996.  The couple and their children, including 
five children from Mr. Hofstad's prior relationship, lived together in Casper 
from 1998 to 2005.  Their home, 
located on Monument Road, was owned alone by Mr. Hofstad.

 
 
[¶4]      In 2005, Hofstad 
decided to purchase a new home in Casper located at 1120 Donegal Street.  At the time he entered into the contract 
on the Donegal home, he and Ms. Christie were separated.  However, in April of 2005, the parties 
reconciled, and the warranty deed of the Donegal home conveyed the property to 
"Jerald K. Hofstad and Cathryn Anne Christie, grantee(s)."  Mr. Hofstad paid the down payment, the 
closing costs, and entered into the loan obligation for the Donegal home.  He used $124,053.15 from the sale of the 
Monument Road home, which was sold in May of 2005, to pay down the mortgage on 
the Donegal home.

 
 
[¶5]      From May of 2005 
until July of 2007, the parties and their children lived in the Donegal 
home.  Mr. Hofstad paid all mortgage 
payments and utilities.  Christie 
contributed to various improvements and was the homemaker of the home.  In July of 2007, Christie moved out of 
the Donegal home.

 
 
[¶6]      In December of 
2007, Christie filed suit seeking partition of the Donegal home.  After a bench trial, the court ruled 
that the home should be partitioned equally.  The court reasoned that although Mr. 
Hofstad and Christie contributed unequal monetary amounts to the Donegal home, 
with Mr. Hofstad contributing substantially more money than Ms. Christie, Mr. 
Hofstad nevertheless failed to prove that there was not a family relationship or 
donative intent.  Ms. Christie was 
awarded $70,767.40, one-half of the home's equity.  Mr. Hofstad appealed that 
decision.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      When a matter is 
tried to the district court sitting without a jury, our standard of review is as 
follows: 

 

 
Following 
a bench trial, this court 
reviews a district court's findings and conclusions using a clearly erroneous 
standard for the factual findings and a de novo standard for the 
conclusions of law. Piroschak v. Whelan, 2005 WY 26, ¶ 7, 106 P.3d 887, 890 (Wyo. 2005) 
(citing Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp., 2003 WY 165, ¶ 13, 81 P.3d 215, 218 (Wyo.2003) and 
Rennard v. Vollmar, 977 P.2d 1277, 1279 (Wyo.1999)).

 
 
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict. While the findings are presumptively correct, the appellate court 
may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record.  Due regard is given to the opportunity of 
the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and our review does 
not entail re-weighing disputed evidence.  Findings of fact will not be set aside 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.

Piroschak, 
¶ 7, 106 P.3d  at 890.  Findings 
may not be set aside because we would have reached a different result. Harber 
v. Jensen, 2004 WY 104, 
¶ 7, 97 P.3d 57, 60 
(Wyo.2004). Further, 

 
 
we 
assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that 
party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from 
it.  We do not substitute ourselves 
for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings 
unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of 
law.

 
 

Id. 
(quotation marks omitted).

 
 

Belden 
v. Thorkildsen, 
2007 WY 68, ¶ 11, 156 P.3d 320, 323 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 

Garwood 
v. Garwood, 
2008 WY 129, ¶ 16, 194 P.3d 319, 325 (Wyo. 
2008).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      It is widely 
accepted that, "if the instrument does not specify the shares of each co-tenant, 
it will be presumed that they take equal, undivided interests."  Bixler v. Oro Management, 2004 WY 29, ¶ 19, 86 P.3d 843, 850 (Wyo. 2004); see 
also 20 Am.Jur. 2d Cotenancy and 
Joint Ownership § 121 (1995).  However, this presumption may be rebutted 
by parol evidence, such as proof that the co-tenants contributed unequal amounts 
toward the purchase price of the property, and there is neither a family 
relationship among the co-tenants nor any evidence of donative intent on the 
part of those who contributed more than their pro rata amounts toward the 
purchase price.  Bixler, ¶ 19, 86 P.3d  at 850 (citations 
omitted); see also D.M. v. D.A., 885 P.2d 94, 96 (Alaska 1994).  See Lawrence v. Harvey, 607 P.2d 551, 556-57 
(Mont. 1980).

 
 
[¶9]      In the instant 
case, both parties agree that the Donegal property is held by them as tenants in 
common, inasmuch as the warranty deed did not specify a joint tenancy.  Also, both parties agree with the 
district court's assessment that Mr. Hofstad contributed a substantially greater 
financial amount.  Having 
established that the parties are tenants in common, but that Mr. Hofstad 
contributed substantially more money than Ms. Christie towards the property, we 
are faced with considering whether there is either evidence of a family 
relationship or evidence of donative intent on the part of Mr. Hofstad, or lack 
thereof.

 
 
[¶10]   First, we consider the more 
difficult of the two questions: whether there is evidence of the existence of a 
family relationship.  Mr. Hofstad 
argues that the district court improperly applied a family presumption to 
himself and Ms. Christie as an "unmarried couple."  Mr. Hofstad insists that there is 
absolutely no family relationship between himself and Ms. Christie because they 
are not related and they are unmarried.1  This is a matter of first impression in 
Wyoming, so we therefore look to other jurisdictions for guidance.  A Missouri court stated as 
follows:

 
 
The 
record is clear that for several years prior to his death Phillips and Margaret 
conducted their joint household in the same manner as if they were married. 
 Such a relationship, even in the 
absence of sexual relations, gave rise to a "family relation" between Margaret 
and Phillips.  Wells v. Goff, 
239 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. 1951); Manning v. Driscoll's Estate, 174 S.W.2d 921 
(Mo.App. 1943).  In each of those 
cases a woman filed a claim against the estate of a male decedent for general 
housework performed for him during his lifetime. In each case, a "family 
relation" was found to exist.

 
 

Johnston 
v. Estate of Phillips, 
706 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).  Similarly, an Oregon court 
stated:

 
 
[T]he 
legislature expressly defined "members of the same family" to mean "persons who 
are members of a family as parents, stepparents, grandparents, spouses, 
sons-in-law, daughters-in-law, brothers, sisters, children, stepchildren, 
adopted children or grandchildren."  The definition 
expressly requires a family 
relationship between "persons."  In particular, those persons must be 
members of a family "as" parents, stepparents, and so on.  As the department correctly observes, a 
person cannot be a parent to himself, a spouse to himself, his own child, his 
own in-law, or have any of the other relationships specified in the statute. 
 In keeping with that understanding 
of the legislature's intended meaning, the statute consistently uses plural 
rather than singular references (e.g., corporate "officers," corporate 
"directors," and family "members").  See Schuette v. Dept. of Revenue, 
326 Ore. 213, 217-18, 951 P.2d 690 (1997) (the repeated use of a singular or 
plural noun form provides some indication of the legislature's intent). 
[Emphasis in original.]

Finally, 
as the department correctly argues, even apart from the 
definition provided by the legislature, the term "family" is a "quintessential 
example" of a collective noun--i.e., a noun that most naturally refers to 
a collection of things or persons as a unit.  See Webster's Third New Int'l 
Dictionary 444 (unabridged ed. 2002) (defining "collective": "1 a of a word or term: 
indicating a number of persons or things considered as constituting one group or 
aggregate family and flock are 
collective words> b 
of a noun or pronoun: singular in form but sometimes or always plural in 
construction family in the family 
were proud' is a collective word>"). Various dictionary definitions of 
the word "family" similarly denote a group of individuals with a common 
affiliation or ancestry.

 
 

Empl. 
Dep't v. Stock Secrets, Inc., 
150 P.3d 1090, 1092 (Or. App. 2007).

 
 
[¶11]   Our own statute defines "family 
members" as follows:

 
 
(x)  "Member of the minor's family" means the minor's parent, stepparent, spouse, 
grandparent, brother, sister, uncle or aunt, whether of whole or 
half blood or by adoption[.]

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 34-13-114 (a)(x) (LexisNexis 2009).

 
 
[¶12]   Even the United States Supreme 
Court recognizes that "family is a much broader term" than just parents and 
their children.  Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 543 (1977).   The 
district court in this case echoed that sentiment when it stated in its 
conclusions of law that:

 
 
Mr. 
Hofstad and Ms. Christie cohabited and shared an intimate relationship which 
resulted in the birth of two children of that relationship, and they resided 
together with their children at the 1120 Donegal residence, and accordingly, 
there was a family relationship[.]

 
 

[¶13]   Although the term "family 
relationship" is by no means absolute, we agree with the district court and Ms. 
Christie that in this case, the parties do share a family relationship, largely 
by way of their sharing two children.  
Even if Mr. Hofstad and Ms. Christie are not married, nor related by 
blood, that they lived together on and off for approximately ten years, all the 
while sharing an intimate relationship which resulted in the birth of their 
twins is evidence that a family relationship exists.  Mr. Hofstad and Ms. Christie may never 
consider themselves "family," having never been married; however, their twin 
sons bind the four of them inextricably and forever, resulting in a family relationship.  We disagree with Mr. Hofstad's argument 
that he does not share a family relationship with Ms. Christie.

 
 
[¶14]   Next we turn to whether or not 
there was any evidence of donative intent on the part of Mr. Hofstad, who argues 
that not only did he not gift Ms. Christie one-half of the value of the Donegal 
home, but also that she should have been required to actually prove that a gift 
of one-half of the value of the home was given to her.

 
 
[¶15]   
Again, because this is an issue of first impression in Wyoming, we 
look to other states for direction.  
Other states have applied the "equal share presumption rule" to tenancies 
in common.  In D.M., the plaintiffs rebutted the 
general presumption of equal shares between tenants in common by demonstrating 
unequal contribution to equity in real property.  There, the court found that this evidence 
created a presumption that they intended to share property in proportion to 
their respective contributions, and that was enough to rebut the general 
presumption of equal shares.  D.M., 885 P.2d  at 97-98.  The court held that if the parties intend to hold a tenancy in common in a 
particular proportion or if intent to determine proportion by a particular 
method can be discovered, this intent controls over the equal share presumption 
rule of cotenancy.  Id., at 97.  Nonetheless, the court recognized that 
the common law presumptions concerning the respective interests of tenants in 
common where one contributes unequally to the purchase price are not applicable 
where the relationship between the parties indicates that one might have 
intended to make a gift to the other.  Id., at 97, n.7 (citing People v. Varel, 184 N.E. 209, 211 (Ill. 
1932); Wood v. Collins, 812 P.2d 951, 
956 (Alaska 1991)).  In Wood, the court held that where the 
parties cohabitate and share an intimate relationship, it is more likely than 
otherwise that one party may contribute more of the acquisition or upkeep costs 
and still expect an equal share of the property.  Id., 812 P.2d  at 
956.  The court in Wood went on to explain that the court 
must still find, however, that it was in fact the intent of the party making the 
excess contribution to confer it on the other party as a gift.  Id., at 957.

 
 
[¶16]   Using the rules of cotenancy, when 
the conveyance is taken in both names, the parties would be presumed to share 
equally or to share based upon the amount contributed, if the contributions were 
traceable (rebuttable by donative intent or a family relationship).  West v. Knowles, 311 P.2d 689 (Wash. 1957); 
A. C. Freeman on Cotenancy and Partition, 172 § 105 Presumption of Relative Interests (2nd ed. 1886).  See, e.g., Mayo v. Jones, 505 P.2d 157 (Wash. App. 1972); Huls v. Huls, 130 N.E.2d 412 (Ohio 1954); 
Williams v. Monzingo, 16 N.W.2d 619 (Iowa 1944).  Such rules of cotenancy could also result 
in requiring a showing of who paid various items, such as taxes, mortgage 
payments, or repairs.  2 Tiffany, 
Law of Real Property 282, § 461 (1939 and 2001 Cum. Supp.).  The difficulty with the application of 
the rules of cotenancy is that their mechanical operation does not consider the 
nature of the relationship of the parties.  While this may be appropriate for 
commercial investments, a mechanistic application of these rules will not often 
accurately reflect the expectations of the parties.

 
 
[¶17]   In Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507 
(Ore. 1978), the Supreme Court of Oregon found that 
property accumulated during cohabitation should be divided by determining the 
express or implied intent of the parties.  Id., at 510.  There, Barbara and Raymond Beal, recently 
divorced, purchased property together, listing themselves as husband and wife. 
 Both contributed to the down 
payment, Barbara paying $500.00 more than Raymond. Barbara made the first 
monthly payment; Raymond made all subsequent payments.  The parties lived together in the house 
and both contributed to the household.  After two years, Barbara moved out.  Raymond remained and made all monthly 
payments on the house.  The court 
decided the property dispute should be resolved by looking at the parties' 
intent.  Before Barbara moved out, 
the trial court found that the parties intended to pool their resources for 
their common benefit.  Therefore, 
both parties were held to have an undivided 
interest in the property. Id.  The court rejected the regular rules of 
cotenancy, which would have required the parties to share expenses based upon 
their ownership share, because these rules failed to account for the 
relationship between the parties.  Instead, the court 
stated,

 
 
We 
believe a division of property accumulated during a period of cohabitation must 
be begun by inquiring into the intent of the parties, and if an intent can be 
found, it should control that property distribution. While this is obviously 
true when the parties have executed a written agreement, it is just as true if 
there is no written agreement. The difference is often only the sophistication 
of the parties. Thus, absent an express agreement, courts should closely examine 
the facts in evidence to determine what the parties implicitly agreed upon. 


 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
we 
hold that courts, when dealing with the property disputes of 
a man and a woman who have been living together in a nonmarital domestic 
relationship, should distribute the property based upon the express or implied 
intent of those parties.

 
 

Beal, 
577 P.2d  at 510.  We 
agree with Beal that property accumulated before separation should be 
divided by determining the express or implied intent of the parties.  Here, the district court stated 
that

 
 
Mr. 
Hofstad's representation and promise that Ms. Christie would be a "co-owner" or 
"equal owner" of the 1120 Donegal residence, and that if they would get back 
together again he would put title to the property in both names, is evidence of 
donative intent on his part with respect to the equal undivided one-half 
interest in the property vested in Ms. Christie. 

 
 
After 
reviewing the record, we agree with the district court.  Among the evidence that leads us to this 
conclusion is that in 2005, after the parties were briefly separated, they 
became engaged, and Mr. Hofstad represented to Ms. Christie that he would 
"change," they would be married within three months, that he would undergo 
counseling, and that Ms. Christie would be a co-owner or equal owner in the 
Donegal home.  Furthermore, as 
conclusive evidence of Mr. Hofstad's intent, he put Ms. Christie's name on the 
Donegal deed after they rekindled their relationship.  He initiated the purchase of the Donegal 
property of his own volition, but switched course after rekindling his 
relationship with Ms. Christie.  We 
find this to be persuasive evidence of Mr. Hofstad's donative 
intent.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶18]   The district court's judgment 
partitioning equally a home the parties owned as tenants in common is 
affirmed.  Given the parties' 
children and living situation over the course of the past ten years, a family 
relationship existed.  Furthermore, 
given the circumstances surrounding the purchase of 1120 Donegal and the 
parties' reconciliation, evidence of donative intent existed.  We affirm the district 
court.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Wyoming does not recognize common law 
marriage.