Case Title: Leas v. Leas

Citation: 169 Vt. 364, 737 A.2d 889

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Leas v. Leas (97-452); 169 Vt. 364; 737 A.2d 889

[Filed 25-Jun-1999]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 97-452

Sandra Felice Leas	                             Supreme Court

                                                     On Appeal from
     v.		                                     Chittenden Family Court

James Marc Leas	                                     November Term, 1998

Amy M. Davenport, J.

       John J. Bergeron of Bergeron, Paradis, Fitzpatrick & Smith,
  Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

       Susan M. Murray of Langrock Sperry & Wool, Middlebury, for
  Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ, and Katz, Supr. J.,
  Specially Assigned.

       DOOLEY, J.  Father appeals from a Chittenden Family Court divorce
  decree that  includes a monthly maintenance supplement payable by father to
  mother pursuant to 15 V.S.A.  § 661.  The decree also incorporates the
  parties' agreement that each shall have physical custody  of the parties'
  two minor children for exactly 50 percent of the time.  Because we agree
  with  father that § 661 does not authorize the award of a maintenance
  supplement in such circumstances,  we vacate in part and remand for
  reconsideration of the economic issues resolved in the original  decree. 
  We also address father's contention that, in dividing the marital estate,
  the court  improperly sought to take into account any increase or decrease
  in the value of certain assets  between the date of the final hearing and
  the date of asset transfer.

 

       Upon their divorce, mother and father entered into an agreement to
  split parental rights  and responsibilities equally.  This agreement calls
  for the children to spend 50 percent of their  time at mother's home and 50
  percent of their time at father's home.  The family court found that,  upon
  moving to Vermont, mother left behind a lucrative career editing academic
  textbooks, which  she can  pursue only on a limited basis while remaining
  in Vermont.  By contrast, the family's  move to Vermont was motivated in
  part by the availability of a position with IBM for father.  At  the time
  of the divorce decree, father could have expected to earn at least $64,000
  per year while  mother's income was only $27,444.  The family court noted
  that both parties would have to make  some "downward adjustments" in
  standard-of-living as a result of the divorce.  However, the  court further
  determined that, "[w]ithout spousal maintenance or maintenance supplement, 
  [mother's] standard of living will be reduced to a far greater extent than
  [father's] even after child  support is factored into the equation."  As a
  result, the court awarded mother four years of spousal  maintenance under
  15 V.S.A. § 752 as well as a maintenance supplement under § 661, in
  addition  to child support.  The family court also divided the marital
  estate, requiring father to transfer to  mother the sum of $103,358, using
  specified assets from three specific accounts held under  father's name,
  plus a proportionate share of any appreciation or depreciation of the three
  accounts  that occurred between the date of the final hearing and the date
  of transfer.

       Father contends that a maintenance supplement is inappropriate because
  the statute  authorizing such awards contemplates only a situation where
  there is one custodial parent and one  noncustodial parent, as opposed to
  situations where, as here, parents share custody equally.  The  family
  court rejected this argument, reasoning that such a "narrow" interpretation
  of § 661 would  be inconsistent with the statute's purpose.  That purpose
  is "to correct any disparity in the 

 

  financial circumstances of the parties if the court finds that the
  disparity has resulted or will result  in a lower standard of living for
  the child than the child would have if living with the noncustodial 
  parent."  15 V.S.A. § 661(a).  While we share the family court's concern
  about a result that limits  the court's ability to correct a relevant
  disparity in the financial circumstances of some divorcing  parents, we
  agree with father that the plain meaning of the enactment dictates such a
  result.

       The concept of a maintenance supplement appears to be unique to
  Vermont law, having  been created by the Legislature in 1986.  See 1985,
  No. 180 (Adj. Sess.), § 9.  In other states,  awards available for ongoing
  living expenses are limited to child support and spousal maintenance  (or
  alimony).   By its express terms, the maintenance supplement statute
  requires that the recipient  of the supplement be "the custodial parent." 
  15 V.S.A. § 661(a).  In the same act, the Legislature  defined the term
  "custodial parent," specifically for the purposes of eligibility for a
  maintenance  supplement:  "The parent having custody for the greater period
  of time shall be considered the  custodial parent for the purposes of
  section 661 of this title."  See 1985, No. 180 (Adj. Sess.),  § 5 (codified
  as 15 V.S.A. § 657(a)).  The Legislature thus clearly expressed its intent
  to limit the  availability of maintenance supplement to the "parent having
  custody for the greater period of  time."  Id.  We are required to apply a
  statute according to its terms.  See Carter v. Gugliuzzi,  ___ Vt. ___,
  ___,