Case Title: McLaughlin v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 262, 2001

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LAWRENCE McLAUGHLIN,     
    ' 
 
    ' 
No.  262, 2001   
Defendant Below,  
 
    ' 
Appellant,  
 
 
    ' 
Court BelowCSuperior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
    
    ' 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
    ' 
for Kent County in IK96-06- 
    ' 
0264 & 0265-R1. 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
    ' 
 
    ' 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
    ' 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
    ' 
Def.  ID No.  9606012699 
 
 
Submitted: August 23, 2001 
Decided: 
October 31, 2001 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER and STEELE, Justices.   
 
O R D E R 
 
This 31st day of October 2001, upon consideration of the appellant=s 
opening brief and the appellee=s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Lawrence McLaughlin, has appealed from the 
Superior Court=s denial of McLaughlin=s motion for postconviction relief 
pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (ARule 61").  The appellee, 
State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court 
 
 
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on the ground that it is manifest on the face of McLaughlin=s opening brief 
that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm.  
(2) 
In August 1996, McLaughlin was charged in a seven-count 
indictment with two sets of charges.  The charges arose from two incidents that 
occurred on June 13, 1996, at McLaughlin=s former girlfriend=s house in Dover, 
Delaware.2   
(3) 
In February 1997, after a jury trial in the Superior Court, 
McLaughlin was convicted of Burglary in the Second Degree and Assault in the 
Second Degree.  The jury found McLaughlin not guilty of Possession of a 
Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony.  The State entered a nolle 
prosequi on the remaining three charges of Aggravated Menacing, Offensive 
Touching and Criminal Mischief.   
(4) 
Prior to sentencing, McLaughlin=s trial counsel filed a motion for 
new trial.  The motion for new trial raised two issues: (i) that the Superior Court 
erred when it admitted evidence of prior bad acts; and (ii) that the Superior 
                                                           
1Supr.  Ct.  R.  25(a). 
2The first incident occurred at approximately 2:00 a.m. on June 13, 1996, and led to 
charges of Aggravated Menacing, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During Commission of a 
Felony, Offensive Touching and Criminal Mischief.  The second incident occurred at 
approximately 7:00 p.m. on June 13, 1996, and led to charges of Burglary in the Second 
Degree, Assault in the Second Degree, and Criminal Mischief. 
 
 
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Court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses.  By 
order dated August 8, 1997, the Superior Court denied the motion for new trial 
as untimely.3  On September 5, 1997, McLaughlin was sentenced as an habitual 
offender to life in prison.4  
(5) 
On direct appeal, McLaughlin=s appellate counsel5 raised only 
one of the two issues that trial counsel had raised in the untimely new trial 
motion, i.e., that the Superior Court erred when admitting evidence of prior 
bad acts.6  This Court concluded that McLaughlin=s argument was without 
merit and affirmed the Superior Court=s judgment.7 
(6) 
McLaughlin filed his motion for postconviction relief on 
October 18, 1999.  McLaughlin alleged four claims:  (i) he was denied due 
process at sentencing because authorities had never informed him that his 
                                                           
3See Super.  Ct.  Crim.  R.  33 (providing that a motion for new trial must be filed 
within seven days after the verdict). 
411 Del.  C.  4214(b). 
5McLaughlin=s appellate counsel was not his trial counsel. 
6D.R.E. 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, or prior bad acts, is not 
admissible to prove that the defendant is a bad person who had a propensity to commit the 
crimes charged.  It may be admissible, however Afor other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or 
accident.@  
7McLaughlin v. State, Del.  Supr., No.  416, 1997, Berger, J., 1998 WL 665056 (Sept. 
14, 1998) (ORDER). 
 
 
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1992 North Carolina felony drug conviction by nolo contendere plea could 
later be used as a basis for an enhanced sentence; (ii) McLaughlin=s trial 
counsel failed to contact McLaughlin=s North Carolina defense attorney Ato 
ascertain whether or not he could have been of any assistance@; (iii) both his 
trial and appellate counsel were ineffective when they failed to allege that 
the Superior Court should have instructed the jury on lesser included 
offenses; and (iv) the Superior Court relied upon an Aimpermissible basis@ 
when it sentenced him to life in prison. 
(7) 
By report dated December 12, 2000, a Superior Court 
Commissioner recommended that McLaughlin=s postconviction motion 
should be dismissed as procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(3).  By order 
dated May 16, 2001, the Superior Court adopted the Commissioner=s report 
and denied McLaughlin=s motion for postconviction relief.  This appeal 
followed. 
(8) 
In his opening brief on appeal, McLaughlin raises only one of 
the claims that he raised in his postconviction motion, i.e., that his trial and 
appellate counsel were ineffective when each failed to allege that the 
Superior Court should have instructed the jury on lesser included offenses.8  
                                                           
8Specifically, McLaughlin claims that the Superior Court should have instructed the 
 
 
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To the extent McLaughlin has failed to brief his other postconviction claims, 
those claims are deemed abandoned and will not be addressed by this Court.9 
(9) 
To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
McLaughlin must show that his counsel=s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel=s unprofessional errors, 
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would 
have been different.10  Although not insurmountable, the standard is highly 
demanding and leads to a Astrong presumption that the representation was 
professionally reasonable.@11   
(10) We have reviewed the record in this case, including trial and 
appellate counsel=s respective Rule 61(g)(2) affidavits,12 and conclude that trial 
counsel=s decision not to request instructions on lesser included offenses did not 
                                                                                                                                                                             
jury on the offenses of Criminal Trespass in the Second Degree, Criminal Trespass in the 
Third Degree, and Assault in the Third Degree. 
9Somerville v.  State, Del.  Supr., 703 A.2d 629, 631 (1997). 
10Strickland v.  Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
11Flamer v.  State, Del.  Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 753 (1990). 
12Rule 61(g)(2) provides that if the motion for postconviction relief alleges 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the judge may direct the lawyer who represented the 
movant to respond to the allegations. 
 
 
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fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.13  Moreover, in view of our 
conclusion that trial counsel=s representation was reasonable, we find that 
appellate counsel=s decision not to pursue the lesser included offenses issue on 
appeal was also reasonable.14 
(11) In his opening brief on appeal, McLaughlin raises two new claims. 
 McLaughlin alleges that the arrest warrants, indictment and habitual offender 
motion were Ainvalid and unconstitutional@ documents because they lacked 
proper court seals.  Second, McLaughlin claims that the two sets of charges 
stemming from the two incidents on June 13, 1996, were improperly joined in 
one indictment.  Because McLaughlin did not raise these claims in his 
postconviction motion, we will review the claims now only for plain error.15 
(12) There is no evidence in the record of plain error with respect to the 
arrest warrants, indictment or habitual offender motion.  Moreover, there is no 
apparent error, plain or otherwise, in the joinder of the two sets of charges.  The 
                                                           
13Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
14Id.  Moreover, it appears that the issue, which was not raised at trial, would have 
been procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3). 
15Supr.  Ct.  R.  8.  See Trump v.  State, Del.  Supr., 753 A.2d 963, 971 (2000) (citing 
Wainwright v.  State, Del.  Supr., 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (1986)) (providing that plain error is 
error that is Aso clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and 
integrity of the trial@). 
 
 
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purpose of joinder is to promote judicial economy.16  Two or more offenses 
may be joined in the same indictment if, as here, the offenses are of the same 
similar character.17  
(13) It is manifest on the face of McLaughlin=s opening brief that the 
appeal is without merit.  The issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law, and to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
clearly there was no abuse of discretion. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware=s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The 
judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
Justice 
 
 
oc: 
Clerk of the Court 
c: 
John Williams 
 
Lawrence McLaughlin 
 
Court’s Distribution List 
 
Hon. James T. Vaughn, Jr. 
                                                           
16Sexton v.  State, Del.  Supr., 397 A.2d 540, 545 (1979), overruled on other grounds, 
Hughes v.  State, Del.  Supr., 437 A.2d 559 (1981). 
17Super.  Ct.  Crim.  R.  8(a).