Case Title: Michael Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1994AP001523-FT

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1996-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 94-1523-FT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-1523-FT 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
Michael Jungbluth, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Hometown, Inc.,  
a Wisconsin Corporation, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 MAY 23, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
JON P. WILCOX, J. 
   The 
nature 
of 
this 
controversy 
involves a statutory interpretation of the Wisconsin Fair 
Dealership Law (WFDL), Wis. Stat. Ch. 135 (1993-94).  The 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
Michael 
Jungbluth 
(Jungbluth) 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals, 
Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 192 Wis. 2d 450, 531 N.W.2d 412 (Ct. 
App. 1995), reversing a judgment of the circuit court which had 
awarded Jungbluth damages and attorney fees totalling over 
$25,000, for the defendant-appellant Hometown, Inc.'s (Hometown) 
 
No. 94-1523-FT 
 
 
 
2 
violation of the 90-day notice requirement in Wis. Stat. § 135.04
1 
(1993-94).
2  Finding the statute at issue to be ambiguous, the 
court of appeals opined that the notice requirement of Wis. Stat. 
§ 135.04 applies to a substantial change in the competitive 
circumstances of a dealership agreement.  Jungbluth, 192 Wis. 2d 
at 456.  The appellate court further held that because Hometown's 
conduct was permitted under the terms of the lease agreement, no 
substantial change in competitive circumstances of the dealership 
agreement had occurred.  Id. at 462. 
 
On review before this court, Jungbluth raises two issues for 
our consideration.  The first question is a very narrow one, and 
requires us to consider whether the court of appeals' attachment 
of the phrase "of a dealership agreement" on the end of the 
"substantial change in competitive circumstances" language in Wis. 
Stat. § 135.04 conflicts with the remedial purpose underlying the 
WFDL, as enunciated by the legislature.  In accord with the well-
established goal of statutory interpretation, we conclude that the 
insertion of the phrase "of a dealership agreement" within the 
                     
     
1  Section 135.04 provides in relevant part as follows: 
 
Notice of termination or change in dealership. Except as 
provided in this section, a grantor shall provide a 
dealer at least 90 days' prior written notice of 
termination, cancellation, nonrenewal or substantial 
change in competitive circumstances. 
     
2  All future references to Wis. Stats. will be to the 1993-
94 statutes unless otherwise indicated. 
 
No. 94-1523-FT 
 
 
 
3 
statute would profoundly undermine the expressed intent of the 
legislature.  The decision of the court of appeals unnecessarily 
confers power upon the grantor, a party the legislature has 
already concluded enjoys superior bargaining power, at the expense 
of the inherently inferior dealer. 
 
The second issue before this court requires us to determine 
whether Hometown's conduct substantially changed the competitive 
circumstances of Jungbluth's dealership so as to require notice 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 135.04.  Based upon the facts before us, 
we conclude that the seven-month period of construction, during 
which Hometown replaced the fuel storage tanks and embarked upon 
an 
extensive 
remodeling 
of 
the 
service 
station 
premises, 
constituted a substantial change in competitive circumstances.  As 
such, Hometown was required to provide Jungbluth with 90 days' 
prior written notice as stated in § 135.04, before undertaking 
such action.  We therefore reverse the court of appeals' decision 
to the contrary. 
 
The relevant facts on this appeal are uncontested.  In 
September 1990, Jungbluth and Hometown executed a lease agreement 
and a representative agreement by which Jungbluth would operate a 
service station owned by Hometown and located in New Berlin.  
Jungbluth had engaged in the ownership and operation of service 
stations in the Milwaukee suburbs since the early 1980's.  Under 
the terms of the dealership agreement, Hometown had reserved the 
right to install underground fuel storage tanks; and though not 
 
No. 94-1523-FT 
 
 
 
4 
expressly articulated, Jungbluth does not contest Hometown's 
authority to remodel the service station.  At the time the 
dealership agreement was signed, the station consisted of three 
service bays, a business office and convenience store, a lighted, 
paved driveway with access area, two gasoline islands equipped 
with pumps, eight dispensing hoses, and three grades of gasoline. 
 
During the early part of October 1990, while Jungbluth was 
preparing to begin operation and promotion of the station, 
Hometown conducted routine testing on the underground gasoline 
storage tanks.  Although the initial tests yielded inconclusive 
results for tank defects, Hometown was aware at that time that the 
tanks may have to be replaced.  Rather than informing Jungbluth of 
this potential delay in operations, Hometown turned over control 
of the pumps to him on October 31, 1990.  Shortly thereafter, 
additional tests conducted on November 7, 1990, confirmed that the 
tanks were leaking and would have to be replaced.  In accord with 
federal and state regulation, Hometown immediately undertook the 
appropriate action to replace the tanks, informing Jungbluth that 
such a process typically required a window of two to four weeks. 
 
During this period of tank replacement, soil contamination 
was discovered in the area near the old pumps.  Steps to remediate 
the contaminated area were immediately undertaken by Hometown.  As 
this work progressed, Hometown unilaterally decided to implement a 
service station remodeling plan, without any prior notification to 
Jungbluth.  The renovations consisted of a new canopy, lights, 
 
No. 94-1523-FT 
 
 
 
5 
islands and pumps.  The remediation, tank replacement and 
remodeling involved a construction period which spanned from 
November 1990 through July 1991.  The seven-month renovation of 
the station caused a substantial disruption in Jungbluth's 
business, as his consumer fuel availability was reduced to one 
functioning pump providing regular unleaded gasoline, and the 
station premises were in constant disrepair. 
 
Thereafter, Jungbluth brought this action under the WFDL 
seeking damages for the losses incurred during the extensive 
period of excavation, a project initiated by Hometown without 
notification, as required by Wis. Stat. § 135.04.  The complaint 
alleged that Hometown had "failed to notify the Plaintiff at least 
ninety (90) days prior to substantially changing the competitive 
circumstances of MICHAEL JUNGBLUTH'S dealership."  Jungbluth, 192 
Wis. 2d at 454-55.  A trial to the court was held in October 1993, 
the Honorable Michael J. Skwierawski presiding.  Jungbluth 
presented evidence which demonstrated that the disarray of his 
service station operations precluded him from realizing sales of 
gasoline, convenience-store goods, auto repair items, and labor 
charges associated with auto repair.  The circuit court concluded 
that Hometown's actions had substantially changed Jungbluth's 
competitive circumstances, and thus, their failure to provide 90 
days' prior written notice had violated Wis. Stat. § 135.04.  Id. 
at 456.  The court affixed Jungbluth's damages at $4,666.38, and 
 
No. 94-1523-FT 
 
 
 
6 
awarded $21,000 in attorney fees as permitted by the fair 
dealership law.  Id. at 455; see also Wis. Stat. § 135.06. 
 
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the circuit 
court, holding that the phrase "of a dealership agreement" should 
be inserted into Wis. Stat. § 135.04 so as to harmonize what the 
court felt was an ambiguous section with Wis. Stat. § 135.03, 
while still remaining within the meaning and intent of the 
legislature.  Jungbluth, 192 Wis. 2d at 458.  The appellate 
court's conclusion arose from the argument as advocated by 
Hometown, in which it claimed that § 135.04 must be read in 
conjunction with § 135.03
3 to require 90 days' notice when the 
grantor substantially changes the competitive circumstances of the 
dealership agreement.  Id. at 456.   
 
The court thereafter considered the question of whether 
Hometown's actions constituted a substantial change in the 
competitive circumstances of Jungbluth's dealership agreement.  
Contemplating the fact that fuel tank replacement and service 
station remodeling were allowed under the agreement, the court of 
appeals concluded that no substantial change in the competitive 
                     
     
3  Section 135.03 provides in relevant part as follows: 
 
Cancellation and alteration of dealerships.  No grantor, 
directly or through any officer, agent or employe, may 
terminate, cancel, fail to renew or substantially change 
the competitive circumstances of a dealership agreement 
without good cause. 
 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
No. 94-1523-FT 
 
 
 
7 
circumstances of the dealership agreement had occurred, and thus, 
the notice requirement expressed in Wis. Stat. § 135.04 had not 
been triggered.  Id. at 462. 
 
An interpretation of the meaning of a statute presents a 
question of law.  J.A.L. v. State, 162 Wis. 2d 940, 962, 471 
N.W.2d 493 (1991).  As such, we employ a de novo standard of 
review in ascertaining the intent of the legislature.  Ball v. 
District No. 4, Area Bd., 117 Wis. 2d 529, 537-38, 345 N.W.2d 389 
(1984).  This court's first resort is to the plain language of the 
statute itself.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we are 
prohibited from looking beyond the language to ascertain its 
meaning.  Marshall-Wis. Co., Inc. v. Juneau Square Corp., 139 
Wis. 2d 112, 133, 406 N.W.2d 764 (1987).  The duty of the court is 
merely to apply that intent to the facts and circumstances of the 
question presented.  J.A.L., 162 Wis. 2d at 962.  If and only if 
the language of the statute does not clearly or unambiguously set 
forth the legislative intent, however, will this court construe 
the statute so as to ascertain and carry out the legislative 
intent.  Green Bay Redev. Auth. v. Bee Frank Inc., 120 Wis. 2d 
402, 409, 355 N.W.2d 240 (1984).  In such case, we examine the 
history, context, subject matter, scope and object of the statute. 
 Id.  In the exercise of this process, we are guided by a 
fundamental axiom of judicial construction which is to avoid any 
result that would be absurd or unreasonable.  Id.   
 
 
No. 94-1523-FT 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
I. 
 
The first issue that we address is whether the court of 
appeals' insertion of the phrase "of a dealership agreement" into 
Wis. Stat. § 135.04 is at odds with the legislative purpose and 
intent of the fair dealership law.  We conclude that indeed it is. 
 
In drafting the regulatory framework of the WFDL, the 
legislature very clearly articulated the intent and purpose to be 
embodied within the statute: 
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this chapter are: 
 
(a) To promote the compelling interest of the public in fair 
business relations between dealers and grantors, and in 
the continuation of dealerships on a fair basis; 
 
(b) To protect dealers against unfair treatment by grantors, 
who inherently have superior economic power and superior 
bargaining power in the negotiation of dealerships;  
 
(c) To provide dealers with rights and remedies in addition 
to those existing by contract or common law; 
See Wis. Stat. § 135.025(2) (emphasis added).  In addition, in 
Wis. Stat. § 135.025(1), the legislature sought to ensure that 
this statutory section would be "liberally construed and applied 
to promote its underlying remedial purposes and policies."
4    
 
In light of this legislative directive, we consider the 
ramifications of the appellate court's expansion of the statutory 
                     
     
4  See also May v. Wheelabrator Corp., 811 F.Supp 416, 418 
(E.D. Wis. 1993) (recognizing the WFDL's remedial purpose of 
protecting dealers from economically superior grantors); Meyer v. 
Kero-Sun, Inc., 570 F.Supp 402, 405 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (same). 
 
No. 94-1523-FT 
 
 
 
9 
language at issue.  In this case, the court held that the notice 
requirement of Wis. Stat. § 135.04 applies to a substantial change 
in competitive circumstances of a dealership agreement, Jungbluth, 
192 Wis. 2d at 456, and because Hometown's conduct was permitted 
under the parties' contract, no violation of the notice provision 
had occurred.  Id.  If this court were to adopt such a reading of 
§ 135.04, a grantor would not be required to provide a dealer with 
90 days' prior written notice unless the grantor's actions 
substantially altered a specific term of the dealership agreement. 
 Therefore, as long as the dealership agreement, as drafted by the 
grantor, provides the basis for the grantor's conduct, notice will 
not be required, despite the patently disadvantageous position 
into which a dealer may be placed.  It is this result that we must 
consider in the present case. 
 
Jungbluth asserts that the appellate court's decision has 
undermined the intent of the legislation because it seeks to 
protect a piece of paper, the dealership agreement, rather than 
the individual business person, or dealer, who inherently occupies 
a position of inferior economic and inferior bargaining power.  
See Wis. Stat. § 135.025(2)(b).  We agree.  By insulating the 
dealership agreement, the court of appeals' decision protects 
those terms which the grantor was able to "negotiate" at the onset 
of the business venture.  The problem with this result, however, 
is that it overlooks a fundamental aspect of the nature of the 
grantor-dealer relationship.   
 
No. 94-1523-FT 
 
 
 
10 
 
The dealership agreement is generally drafted by the grantor, 
who is in a position of both superior economic and superior 
bargaining power.
5  The result of this disparity in the parties' 
relative positions is identifiable in the terms of the dealership 
agreement.  Judicial protection of the terms of the agreement, 
rather than the individual dealer, or his business, systematically 
elevates the rights of the grantor over those of the dealer.  We 
find that this outcome runs contrary to the explicit purpose of 
the WFDL "[t]o protect dealers against unfair treatment by 
grantors, who inherently have superior economic power and superior 
bargaining power in the negotiation of dealerships."  See Wis. 
Stat. § 135.025(2)(b).   
 
A decision which clearly strengthens the relative position of 
grantors at the expense of dealers does not embrace the spirit of 
the fair dealership law.  We cannot conclude that the WFDL was 
formulated to simply protect the dealership agreement.  Limiting 
                     
     
5  Though confronted with a case involving Wis. Stat. 
§ 135.03, Judge Shabaz, in Meyer v. Kero-Sun, Inc., 570 F.Supp 402 
(W.D. Wis. 1983), recognized one of the primary purposes of the 
WFDL as protecting the dealer, stating: 
 
The WFDL is a legislative scheme designed to protect the 
inherently weaker grantee of a dealership from the power 
of the stronger grantor.  Designs in Medicine, Inc. v. 
Xomed, Inc., 522 F.Supp 1054 (E.D. Wis. 1981).  It is 
fair to say that the legislature viewed dealership 
arrangements as contracts of adhesion, the grantee being 
in no position to resist the terms that the grantor 
might wish to impose, and attempted to equalize the 
bargaining position of the grantee. 
 
Id. at 405. 
 
No. 94-1523-FT 
 
 
 
11 
the protective scope of this regulatory scheme to the terms of the 
grantor-generated contract obfuscates the question of who should 
be protected by the statute.  While we recognize that the 
dealership agreement is essential in defining the various terms of 
the business relationship between the parties, we are also mindful 
that 
the 
relationship 
itself 
can 
be 
one-sided, 
typically 
characterized 
by 
unequal 
bargaining 
power 
and 
economic 
dependence.
6  Therefore, one should not focus merely upon 
contractual provisions.  By doing so, the shared financial 
interests and interdependence which creates a community of 
interest among the parties may be overlooked. 
 
The interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 135.04 offered by the 
court of appeals fails to protect dealers in the day to day 
operations of their respective businesses.
7  The statutory notice 
                     
     
6  Recognizing the disparity associated with the parties' 
relative positions at the bargaining table, the legislature sought 
to 
protect 
a 
dealer 
from 
the 
unscrupulous 
inclusion 
of 
overreaching provisions within a dealership agreement, in Wis. 
Stat. § 135.025(3), which states: "The effect of this chapter may 
not be varied by contract or agreement.  Any contract or agreement 
purporting to do so is void and unenforceable to that extent 
only." 
     
7  Jungbluth expresses his concern that following the 
appellate court's decision in this case, the grantor has been 
provided with a virtual blueprint to terminate a dealership at any 
time, without good cause as required under Wis. Stat. § 135.03, 
and with absolute disregard for the policies which underlie the 
WFDL.  
 
  
Stated 
simply, 
the 
economically 
superior 
grantor 
may 
undertake 
conduct, 
without 
notice 
to 
the 
dealer, 
which 
substantially disrupts the daily operations of the dealership, 
rendering it financially crippled.  As long as the action is 
permitted within the four corners of the agreement, the grantor 
 
No. 94-1523-FT 
 
 
 
12 
requirement provided in § 135.04 is designed to afford the 
dealership the opportunity to react and protect itself from the 
potentially devastating affects of an overreaching grantor, who 
with 
superior 
bargaining 
power, 
changes 
the 
competitive 
circumstances, not of the dealership agreement, but rather the 
business itself.  The principle that the notice requirement is 
designed to protect the small business person, not the document 
memorializing the parties' arrangement, was recognized in the case 
of St.Joseph Equip. v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 546 F.Supp 1245 
(W.D. Wis. 1982)
8, wherein Judge Evans explained: 
(..continued) 
may "contractually" put the dealership out of business with total 
impunity.  Worse yet, in the case of a multi-year lease agreement, 
the dealer would thereafter be faced with a potential breach of 
contract claim by the grantor. 
  
  
We find that it would be unreasonable to assume that the 
legislature intended the dealership agreement to garner such 
protection at the expense of the dealer.  The result as depicted 
here would be absurd in light of the remedial purpose of the WFDL. 
     
8  The St.Joseph decision involved a grantor's withdrawal 
from the construction machinery market in North America, prompting 
a suit by the dealer alleging violation of the WFDL, in that the 
decision terminated the plaintiff or changed the competitive 
circumstances of its dealership agreement without good cause and 
without requisite notice.  Id. at 1246.  The court concluded that 
where "a grantor makes a non-discriminatory product withdrawal 
over a large geographic area, that, without more, is not a 
violation of § 135.03, Wis.Stats."  Id. at 1248.  Though holding 
that the market withdrawal constituted good cause under § 135.03, 
Judge Evans ordered further proceedings to determine whether the 
grantor had fully complied with the notice requirements of Wis. 
Stat. § 135.04.  Id. at 1251.  The court indicated that the 
statute should be interpreted to require 90 days' prior written 
notice of the termination of the dealership, even if the 
termination 
is 
for 
good 
cause, 
thereby 
highlighting 
the 
independent nature of a cause of action under § 135.04.  Id. at 
1249. 
 
No. 94-1523-FT 
 
 
 
13 
Even in cases such as this one, where there are no 
deficiencies for a dealer to cure, it furthers the Act's 
policy of fairness in business relations to require the 
grantor to provide the dealer with notice of an 
impending change in his business circumstance.  For even 
if the dealer is without power to rectify the problem 
and forestall future changes in his business operations, 
fairness would provide him with a reasonable opportunity 
to arrange for the orderly accomplishment of whatever 
changes are to be wrought including, if necessary, the 
investigation of new dealership opportunities. 
 
Id. at 1249.  (Emphasis added).  The significance of the statutory 
notice requirement is virtually self-evident.  It is designed to 
afford the economically inferior dealership the opportunity to 
mitigate financial loss in the aftermath of an arbitrary 
imposition of substantial change by the grantor, furthering the 
statute's policy of insuring fairness in dealership relations.
9   
 
 Hometown's 
position 
that 
the 
remodeling 
project 
was 
permitted under the dealership agreement, and therefore required 
no notice, despite the project's dramatic effect on Jungbluth's 
business circumstances, contravenes the equitable principles 
encompassed within the notice provision of the WFDL.  The argument 
is based upon the court of appeals' interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
                     
     
9  It is undisputed that Hometown did not comply with the 
notice provision of Wis. Stat. § 135.04.  The failure to furnish 
Jungbluth 
with 
notice 
deprived 
him 
of 
an 
opportunity 
to 
contemplate a multitude of alternatives to mitigate the potential 
damages to his business or consider the investigation of new 
dealership prospects.  See also Designs in Medicine, Inc. v. 
Xomed, Inc., 522 F.Supp 1054, 1057 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (stating that 
the court has "consistently held that the statutory notice 
requirement must be strictly complied with and that failure of a 
grantor to give the proper notice under the statute, in and of 
itself, constitutes a violation of the statute"). 
 
No. 94-1523-FT 
 
 
 
14 
§ 135.04.  Finding that interpretation unworkable in the daily 
operations of the business community, we conclude that the 
appellate court's insertion of the phrase "of a dealership 
agreement" 
into 
the 
"substantial 
change 
in 
competitive 
circumstances" language in Wis. Stat. § 135.04 is in direct 
conflict with the clearly pronounced objectives provided by the 
legislature within the WFDL.  Judicial protection of the terms of 
a dealership agreement, though meaningful in many other respects, 
should not come at the expense of the dealer, a party whom the 
legislature has sought to empower with an equalized bargaining 
position relative to that of the grantor.  We disagree with the 
court of appeals' reasoning on this issue. 
 
II. 
 
Next, we consider whether Hometown's conduct substantially 
changed the competitive circumstances of Jungbluth's business so 
as to require proper notice under Wis. Stat. § 135.04.  Reasoning 
that a dealership is nothing more than a dealership agreement, the 
court of appeals concluded that because the agreement permitted 
Hometown to replace fuel tanks and remodel the station, it had not 
substantially changed the 
competitive 
circumstances of 
the 
dealership agreement, and therefore, no notice was required.  
Jungbluth, 192 Wis. 2d at 462.  We disagree with this conclusion, 
however, as it is premised upon the appellate court's erroneous 
insertion of the phrase "of the dealership agreement" into 
§ 135.04, as discussed above.  Moreover, the quoted authority from 
 
No. 94-1523-FT 
 
 
 
15 
Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. D-Mart Food Stores, Inc., 146 Wis. 2d 
568, 431 N.W.2d 721 (Ct. App. 1988), relied upon by the appellate 
court, is not controlling here, as the holding in that case 
involved a grantor's alleged violation of Wis. Stat. § 135.03, not 
the notice provision in § 135.04 before us today. 
 
We agree with the finding of the circuit court that the 
actions 
of 
Hometown 
substantially 
changed 
the 
competitive  
circumstances of Jungbluth's dealership, and therefore reverse the 
court of appeals' holding to the contrary.  The evidence presented 
at trial overwhelmingly supports Judge Skwierawski's conclusion 
that Jungbluth's competitive circumstances were dramatically 
affected by the construction that took place.  Photographs 
contained within the record clearly depict the station as 
completely torn apart, resembling a virtual combat zone.   
 
For seven months, the dealership was under construction, and 
both lower courts concluded that Jungbluth's customers, at times, 
were unable to determine whether or not the service station was 
open for business.  After reviewing the photographic evidence, it 
certainly would not appear to be open to a mere passerby.  The 
dealership went from offering three grades of gasoline to merely 
one, and from two lighted gasoline islands in front of the 
premises to one on the side of the building.  The once lighted, 
paved driveway and service area was transformed into an unlighted 
obstacle course in which patrons would have to traverse a moat-
like trench through gravel and mud to reach a temporary office 
 
No. 94-1523-FT 
 
 
 
16 
housed within a service bay.  Furthermore, Jungbluth was forced to 
sell convenience store items out of a secondary service bay, which 
in turn, limited his capacity to perform auto repairs. 
 
The 
nature 
of 
the 
change 
in 
Jungbluth's 
competitive 
circumstances, which occurred as a result of the extensive 
remodeling 
project 
undertaken 
by 
Hometown 
was 
substantial, 
inhibiting his ability to operate his dealership on a daily basis. 
 Jungbluth was unable to develop his clientele as well as the 
reputation of his business, as he was powerless in his attempts to 
realize profit from the sale of gasoline, convenience-store goods, 
auto repair items, or labor associated with auto repairs.  
Moreover, his competitive position among the five other service 
stations located within one mile of his dealership was certainly 
diminished given his continued inability to fully service the 
limited number of customers that he was able to attract.   
 
We find that the only reasonable manner in which these facts 
can be viewed is to conclude that the seven-month service station 
remodeling 
project 
substantially 
changed 
the 
competitive 
circumstances of Jungbluth's dealership.  The fact that the 
dealership agreement permitted Hometown to act in this regard did 
not relieve it from the obligation of formal notification prior to 
the impending action.   
 
In furtherance of the well-defined policies and purposes 
articulated within the WFDL, we conclude that Hometown was 
required to provide 90 days' prior written notice in accord with 
 
No. 94-1523-FT 
 
 
 
17 
Wis. Stat. § 135.04.  Having failed to comply with this statutory 
mandate, we conclude that Jungbluth is entitled to the award of 
damages and attorney fees as prescribed by the circuit court. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No. 94-1523-FT 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-1523-FT 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
Michael Jungbluth, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Hometown, Inc., a Wisconsin Corporation, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  192 Wis. 2d 450, 531 N.W.2d 412 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
May 23, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 27, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
MICHAEL J. SKWIERAWSKI 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were 
briefs by Frank R. Terschan and Terschan & Steinle, Ltd., 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Frank R. Terschan. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Eric J. Van 
Vugt, Michael D. Zeka and Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee and oral 
argument by Eric J. Van Vugt.