Case Title: Fred Anderson, Jr. v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC07-648

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
________________________ 
 
Nos. SC07-648 & SC08-644 
________________________ 
 
FRED ANDERSON, JR.,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
 
FRED ANDERSON, JR.,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
WALTER A. MCNEIL, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[July 9, 2009] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Fred Anderson, Jr., appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion 
to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  He also petitions this Court for a writ 
 
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of habeas corpus.1  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the circuit court‘s 
order denying Anderson‘s motion for postconviction relief, and we deny 
Anderson‘s petition for writ of habeas corpus.   
OVERVIEW 
 
Anderson was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1999 murder of 
Heather Young.  During a bank robbery, Anderson shot Young several times and 
inflicted multiple fatal wounds.  Anderson shot a second victim, Marisha Scott, 
leaving her paralyzed.  Anderson was also convicted of grand theft of a firearm, 
robbery with a firearm, and the attempted first-degree murder of Marisha Scott.  
We affirmed Anderson‘s conviction and sentence on direct appeal, and we set forth 
detailed facts in that opinion.  See Anderson v. State, 863 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 2003). 
 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied Anderson‘s 
motion for postconviction relief.  Anderson now challenges the circuit court‘s 
postconviction order and raises various claims.  He also seeks habeas relief.  We 
begin our opinion by examining the relevant facts of this case.  We then turn to the 
claims raised in Anderson‘s 3.851 motion.  Finally, we address Anderson‘s habeas 
claims. 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.     
 
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On March 15, 1999, Anderson appeared in court for a violation of 
community control.  Anderson, who was on community control for committing 
grand theft, was ordered to pay more than $4000 in restitution, but had paid less 
than $100 at the time that he returned to court.  On March 15, the court ordered 
Anderson to serve one year at a restitution center beginning on March 19, 1999.   
On March 18, Anderson visited a friend at the United Southern Bank (USB) 
in Mount Dora.  Also on that day, he stole a single-action revolver from a 
neighbor‘s storage building.  The hammer on this revolver had to be pulled back 
and cocked each time before firing.   
On the morning of March 19, Anderson returned to the same bank, where he 
pretended to be a student writing a paper on banking and finance.  While there, he 
spoke with the bank manager and observed the security VCR located in the 
manager‘s office.  Anderson intended to rob this bank and deposit the money at a 
second bank in order to pay his outstanding restitution.  After visiting the second 
bank, Anderson called his community control officer to inform her that he had the 
full amount of restitution.   
On March 20, Anderson took a second revolver from his mother‘s house and 
headed to the USB with doughnuts and juice, ostensibly to thank the employees for 
their help the day before.  Victims Young and Scott were the only employees 
 
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working at the time.  After leaving the bank briefly, he returned with both 
revolvers, forced Young and Scott into the bank vault, and ordered them to fill a 
trash bag with money.  Then, after asking the women who wanted to die first, 
Anderson began firing both revolvers, killing Heather Young and paralyzing 
Marisha Scott.  Anderson fired a total of ten shots, nine of which hit the victims.    
The first police officer to arrive on the scene saw Anderson ripping the 
security equipment from the wall and holding a trash can containing one of the 
revolvers and more than $70,000 in cash.  Another officer at the scene heard 
Anderson say that he ―did it.‖ 
Forensic evidence showed that Anderson‘s hands tested positive for gunshot 
residue, and his clothes were stained with blood that matched Scott‘s DNA.  
Moreover, each of seven bullets retrieved from the scene or from Young‘s body 
was linked to or conclusively matched with one of the revolvers.  Pathology 
testimony revealed that decedent Young received seven gunshot wounds, all but 
one of which could have been fatal by itself.  Both Young and Scott suffered blunt 
force trauma to their heads in addition to gunshot wounds.   
Anderson testified on his own behalf at trial.  Acknowledging that he had 
financial problems, Anderson admitted to taking both revolvers, robbing the bank, 
and shooting Young and Scott.  
 
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The jury convicted Anderson of the first-degree murder of Heather Young, 
the attempted first-degree murder of Marisha Scott, grand theft of a firearm, and 
robbery with a firearm.  At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury 
unanimously recommended the death penalty.  The trial court sentenced Anderson 
to death after finding four aggravating factors and ten nonstatutory mitigating 
factors.  The four aggravating factors were:  (1) the murder was committed in a 
cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal 
justification (CCP); (2) the defendant was previously convicted of another capital 
felony or of a felony involving the use of threat or violence to the person (prior 
violent felony)2; (3) the murder was committed by a person previously convicted of 
a felony and under sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control or 
on felony probation; and (4) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain.  See 
Anderson v. State, 863 So. 2d 169, 175 n.5 (Fla. 2003).  This Court affirmed 
Anderson‘s conviction and sentence on direct appeal.  See id. at 189.   
Seeking postconviction relief pursuant to rule 3.851, Florida Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Anderson filed a motion to vacate judgment of conviction and 
sentence that raised numerous claims.  The circuit court held a Huff3 hearing to 
                                          
 
 
2.  Anderson‘s contemporaneous conviction for the attempted murder of 
Marisha Scott was the basis for the prior violent felony aggravating factor.  
 
 
3.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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determine whether the claims Anderson raised in his motion required an 
evidentiary hearing.  Following the Huff hearing, the court granted an evidentiary 
hearing where the court considered each of Anderson‘s claims.  Both Anderson 
and the State presented witnesses at the evidentiary hearing, after which the court 
entered an order denying relief.  Anderson now appeals the circuit court‘s denial of 
postconviction relief; he also raises additional claims in his petition for writ of 
habeas corpus.  We will address Anderson‘s appeal first, then Anderson‘s habeas 
petition.   
ANDERSON’S 3.851 CLAIMS 
The Issues on Appeal 
Anderson raises multiple issues in his appeal of the circuit court‘s denial of 
postconviction relief.  Anderson contends that (1) trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to uncover evidence that Anderson was sexually abused as a child; (2) trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure an adequate and thorough mental 
health evaluation that would have uncovered additional mitigating evidence; 
(3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek the jury instruction regarding 
merging aggravating factors; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object 
to or seek to limit the admission of the victims‘ photographs or both; (5) trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to witness testimony regarding the 
victims‘ condition; (6) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly object to 
 
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the admission of blood spatter evidence; (7) trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object to prosecutorial statements regarding the balancing of aggravating and 
mitigating factors; (8) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly object to 
and preserve certain comments by the prosecutor during closing argument; 
(9) Anderson was denied due process when he was shackled at trial; (10) the trial 
court erred in denying Anderson‘s motion to interview jurors; (11) Anderson was 
deprived of a competent mental health evaluation; and (12) the combination of 
procedural and substantive errors deprived Anderson of a fundamentally fair trial. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Anderson asserts various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and 
argues that the circuit court should have granted postconviction relief.  Following 
the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984), this Court has held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to 
be successful, two requirements must be satisfied:  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards. 
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  A court 
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a 
specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is 
clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. 
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted).   
 
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Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law 
and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit 
court‘s factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but 
reviewing the circuit court‘s legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 
So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).   
 
There is a strong presumption that trial counsel‘s performance was not 
ineffective.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  ―A fair assessment of attorney 
performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel‘s challenged conduct, and to 
evaluate the conduct from counsel‘s perspective at the time.‖  Id. at 689.  The 
defendant carries the burden to ―overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action ‗might be considered sound trial strategy.‘ ‖ 
Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  Moreover, trial 
counsel‘s ―strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if 
alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel‘s decision was 
reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.‖  Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 
2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000). 
Sexual Abuse Mitigation 
 
Anderson argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to uncover and 
present mitigating evidence that Anderson was sexually abused as a child.  We 
 
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note that the State‘s postconviction expert found the abuse allegations credible, and 
we also assume their credibility for the purpose of this analysis.  Nonetheless, we 
conclude that trial counsel‘s performance was not deficient, in large part because 
Anderson himself was a barrier to the discovery of this evidence.  We also 
conclude that the absence of this mitigation did not satisfy Strickland‘s 
requirement of prejudice.  
 
―[A]n attorney has a strict duty to conduct a reasonable investigation of a 
defendant‘s background for possible mitigating evidence.‖  State v. Riechmann, 
777 So. 2d 342, 350 (Fla. 2000).  However, ―when a defendant has given counsel 
reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even 
harmful, counsel‘s failure to pursue those investigations may not later be 
challenged as unreasonable.‖  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.   
 
At the evidentiary hearing, Anderson presented the testimony of his cousin, 
Raymond Green, who spent time with Anderson while they were growing up.  
Raymond testified that another cousin, Michael Green, sexually abused both of 
them, and he recounted a particularly violent episode when Anderson was about 
six years old.  Anderson did not provide his trial counsel or his trial mental health 
expert any information about the abuse.  Both trial counsel testified that had they 
known about the abuse, they would have presented the evidence during the penalty 
phase.  Although Anderson chose not to reveal this information to his attorneys or 
 
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to any experts until the postconviction stage, he asserts that had counsel been more 
thorough, counsel would have uncovered this information while preparing for trial. 
Before trial, to aid the defense in developing mitigation, Anderson was given 
a forensic assessment form to fill out.  The form contained a wide variety of 
questions designed to elicit information about the defendant‘s background, 
including, among other areas, his family history, history of drug use, physical and 
mental health history, educational history, and history of any physical, mental, or 
sexual abuse.  Anderson‘s lead trial counsel testified that he had never had a client 
be more thorough in completing the form than Anderson.  Anderson‘s answers, 
though, denied sexual abuse.  For example, in a section where Anderson was given 
a list of criteria and asked to underline each one that was a problem during his 
childhood, he did not underline ―a traumatic event,‖ ―witness to violence,‖ or most 
importantly, ―sexually molested.‖  In a section on family history, Anderson 
described his childhood as ―normal,‖ and where Anderson was asked ―[d]oes client 
think he/she was abused or neglected as a child,‖ Anderson answered, ―no.‖  In 
light of pointed answers like these and Anderson‘s failure to discuss the abuse with 
trial counsel or his trial mental health expert, counsel was not deficient for failing 
to uncover the sexual abuse.   
The failure to present sexual abuse mitigation was also raised in Morton v. 
State, 995 So. 2d 233, 240 (Fla. 2008).  There, Morton argued that trial counsel 
 
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was deficient for not presenting evidence that, as a child, he was sexually abused 
by his stepfather.  Id. at 239.  Counsel was aware that Morton was physically 
abused and that his stepfather sexually abused Morton‘s sister, but there was no 
evidence that Morton was sexually abused.  Id.  In fact, Morton specifically denied 
being sexually abused.  In determining that Morton‘s ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim had no merit, this Court said, ―Thus, we conclude that counsel in the 
instant case was not deficient in failing to present evidence of this abuse, 
particularly when the victim of the alleged abuse denied that he was ever 
assaulted.‖  Id. at 240; see also Davis v. State, 928 So. 2d 1089, 1110 (Fla. 2006) 
(―We cannot conclude that trial counsel was deficient for failing to pursue such 
mitigation when Davis himself failed to inform either counsel or mental health 
experts about this matter.‖).   
Because Anderson did not inform his trial counsel or his trial mental health 
expert about the sexual abuse and, when given the opportunity, he denied any 
abuse, he has not shown that trial counsel‘s performance was deficient.  Therefore, 
he is not entitled to relief on this claim.   
However, even if we were to conclude that counsel‘s performance was 
deficient, Anderson is still not entitled to relief as he has not satisfied Strickland‘s 
required showing of prejudice.  In sentencing Anderson to death, the trial court 
found four aggravating factors, including CCP and prior violent felony.  We have 
 
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said that CCP and prior violent felony ―are among the weightiest of aggravators.‖  
Deparvine v. State, 995 So. 2d 351, 381 (Fla. 2008).  Also, the trial court found as 
aggravating factors that Anderson committed the murder for pecuniary gain and 
that he had a prior felony conviction and committed the murder while on 
community control for that conviction.  
Moreover, Anderson murdered Young during the course of a bank robbery 
that he orchestrated to avoid being sent to a restitution center for failing to pay his 
outstanding restitution for grand theft.  The record reflects a comprehensive plan, 
replete with instances of deception.  Anderson visited the bank in the days leading 
up to the robbery, deceiving the manager and employees as to his true intent.  
Anderson obtained two loaded revolvers and took them with him to the bank on 
the morning of the offense.  At that time, Anderson was still in ―disguise‖ as a 
student seeking to show his appreciation to the bank employees for their help.  
Until the moment when Anderson walked back into the bank with the revolvers, he 
feigned a legitimate presence there.  Out of ten shots fired, six of them were fired 
from the single-action revolver which required that the hammer be cocked each 
time before it was fired.  Nine of the shots hit the victims, who also suffered blunt 
trauma in the incident.  Anderson was caught while trying to steal the bank‘s 
surveillance equipment.     
 
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Even if trial counsel were deficient in failing to present evidence of 
Anderson‘s childhood sexual abuse in mitigation, our confidence in Anderson‘s 
death sentence would not be undermined.  Therefore, we conclude that the trial 
court properly denied postconviction relief on this claim.  
Investigation and Presentation of Mitigation 
Anderson contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that he 
receive an adequate mental health evaluation and for failing to uncover and present 
certain mitigating evidence during the penalty phase.  Specifically, he claims that 
trial counsel did not ensure that the expert was given enough time and resources to 
conduct a thorough mental health evaluation and that additional mitigating 
evidence should have been uncovered and presented.  Had the development of 
mitigation been more thorough, Anderson argues, significant evidence would have 
been uncovered and presented at the penalty phase, including the existence of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), borderline personality disorder, psychosis, and 
brain damage.   
Counsel may be deemed ineffective at the penalty phase where the 
investigation of mitigating evidence is ―woefully inadequate‖ and credible 
mitigating evidence existed which could have been found and presented at 
sentencing.  See Hildwin v. Dugger, 654 So. 2d 107, 109 (Fla. 1995).  However, 
we conclude that Anderson is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
 
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Approximately three weeks before trial, the trial court appointed 
Dr. Elizabeth McMahon, a forensic psychologist with more than thirty years of 
experience as a psychologist and with experience in more than 100 penalty phase 
proceedings, to evaluate Anderson.  During four separate visits with Anderson, 
McMahon conducted a full neuropsychological screening, a full psychological 
battery of tests, and a full interview with Anderson.  McMahon used the MMPI-24 
to assess Anderson for mental illness, she reviewed a variety of documents 
provided by trial counsel, and she consulted with counsel concerning her findings.  
McMahon concluded that Anderson had heightened anxiety but that he did not 
suffer from any disease or defect of the mind, nor did he present any indicators of 
statutory or nonstatutory mitigation.  Anderson did not tell McMahon about any 
allegations of childhood abuse.  After fully evaluating Anderson, McMahon 
eliminated diagnoses of PTSD, psychosis, borderline personality disorder, and 
brain damage.  McMahon testified that she had sufficient time to fully evaluate 
Anderson.   
The circuit court, as did trial counsel, found McMahon‘s evaluation of 
Anderson adequate.  McMahon‘s evaluation did not reveal the mental health 
mitigation that Anderson now says exists; in fact, the evaluation eliminated it.  The 
fact that Anderson has subsequently found experts whose opinions conflict with 
                                          
 
 
4.  Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2.  
 
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McMahon‘s opinion does not render the earlier evaluation inadequate.  See Sexton 
v. State, 997 So. 2d 1073, 1085 (Fla. 2008) (stating that finding a postconviction 
mental health expert who disagrees with ―the extent or type of testing performed, 
or the type of mitigation presented‖ does not automatically render trial counsel 
ineffective).  Counsel reasonably relied on McMahon‘s expertise not only as a 
forensic psychologist, but as one with a great deal of experience with death penalty 
cases.  Trial counsel was not required to continue searching for an expert who 
would give a more favorable assessment of Anderson‘s mental status.  We agree 
with the circuit court‘s assessment that McMahon‘s conclusions are not negated or 
deemed unreliable simply because other experts now disagree with them. 
Moreover, trial counsel and the investigator consulted a number of potential 
penalty phase witnesses in an effort to develop mitigation.  Anderson‘s lead trial 
counsel testified that based on that investigation, he made a strategic decision not 
to use some of the witnesses at the penalty phase because they would have been 
more harmful than helpful to Anderson.     
As with Anderson‘s sexual abuse claim, we will now explore whether 
Anderson himself acted in such a way as to adversely affect trial counsel‘s 
performance.  The forensic assessment form that Anderson completed contained a 
number of questions relating to possible mental health issues and other mitigation.  
The circuit court noted that Anderson provided different accounts of his 
 
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background and his mental health symptoms.  The court pointed out that while 
Anderson claimed certain symptoms, he denied others, ultimately impacting the 
direction of trial counsel‘s development of mitigation.  Anderson‘s answers denied 
any history of individual or family mental health problems.  He also denied any 
treatment for neurological problems or head injuries and said that he had never 
been unconscious.   
Moreover, Anderson denied problems with alcohol, and his answers 
regarding drug use suggested a person who only occasionally used marijuana.  He 
also denied any family history of such problems.  Counsel testified that it was a 
strategic decision not to present evidence of Anderson‘s prior drug use because it 
would be inconsistent with the penalty phase strategy of trying to humanize him 
and paint him as a good person. 
Anderson‘s answers relating to education describe a man with an advanced 
education and active involvement in extracurricular activities in grade school and 
college.  Common avenues of mitigation were limited, if not eliminated, as a result 
of Anderson‘s answers, which made certain lines of investigation and argument 
appear fruitless.  Given the information that counsel had available, we agree with 
the circuit court‘s decision that counsel‘s performance was not deficient.  
However, even if counsel‘s performance was deficient, Anderson has not 
demonstrated that he was prejudiced.  ―In assessing prejudice, we reweigh the 
 
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evidence in aggravation against the totality of the mental health mitigation 
presented during the postconviction evidentiary hearing to determine if our 
confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase trial is undermined.‖  Hannon v. 
State, 941 So. 2d 1109, 1134 (Fla. 2006); see also Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974, 
985 (Fla. 2000) (―When evaluating claims that counsel was ineffective for failing 
to present mitigating evidence, this Court has phrased the defendant‘s burden as 
showing that counsel‘s ineffectiveness ‗deprived the defendant of a reliable penalty 
phase proceeding.‘ ‖); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. 
Even if the mental health experts had testified at the penalty phase, the jury 
would have been presented with inconsistent testimony.  Four mental health 
experts testified at the evidentiary hearing.  Anderson hired two postconviction 
experts, Dr. Jorge Villalba and Dr. Robert Berland, and his trial mental health 
expert, Dr. McMahon, also testified.  The State called Dr. Harry McClaren, who 
evaluated Anderson during the course of postconviction proceedings.  Each expert 
reached his or her own conclusion about Anderson‘s mental health and those 
conclusions varied.   
We conclude that even if this evidence had been presented in mitigation, the 
significant aggravation would have outweighed it.  We again point to the trial 
court‘s finding of four aggravating factors, including CCP and prior violent felony.  
Considering the overwhelming aggravation and the inconclusive opinions 
 
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regarding Anderson‘s mental health, our confidence in the outcome is not 
undermined.  Thus, Anderson is not entitled to relief.   
Jury Instruction on Merging Aggravating Factors 
Anderson argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to request the 
aggravating factor merging instruction, and he maintains that the trial court 
improperly doubled the CCP and pecuniary gain aggravating factors by using the 
same facts to find both CCP and pecuniary gain.  The merging instruction, 
contained in Florida Standard Jury Instruction 7.11, states as follows: 
The State may not rely upon a single aspect of the offense to establish 
more than one aggravating circumstance.  Therefore, if you find that 
two or more of the aggravating circumstances are proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt by a single aspect of the offense, you are to consider 
that as supporting only one aggravating circumstance. 
 
Where the jury is instructed as to duplicative aggravating factors, the jury should 
receive the aforementioned limiting instruction.  See Castro v. State, 597 So. 2d 
259 (Fla. 1992) (concluding that the jury should have received the merging 
instruction where it was permitted to consider as aggravating circumstances that 
the murder was committed for pecuniary gain and that the murder was committed 
during the commission of a robbery).  On the facts of this case, however, we 
conclude that CCP and pecuniary gain were not duplicative aggravating factors.  
Therefore, Anderson‘s trial counsel was not deficient in failing to request the 
merging instruction.  As a result, counsel‘s failure to seek the merging instruction 
 
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did not constitute deficient performance.  Because counsel‘s performance was not 
deficient, we need not address whether Anderson suffered prejudice.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
We also conclude that the trial court did not improperly double the CCP and 
pecuniary gain aggravating factors by using the same facts to find both CCP and 
pecuniary gain.  The trial court made extensive findings as to the existence of CCP.  
These findings illustrated premeditation of murder and highlighted the manner in 
which Anderson carried out his crimes and sought to eliminate the witnesses.  
Anderson obtained two revolvers in advance of the robbery.  On the day of the 
robbery, Anderson took the loaded revolvers into the bank.  He forced Young and 
Scott, the only people remaining in the bank, into the vault to fill a trash liner with 
money.  After doing as they were told, Anderson asked the women who wanted to 
die first.  He shot Young and Scott multiple times using both revolvers and at point 
blank range.  One of the revolvers required that Anderson cock the hammer first 
and then pull the trigger in order to fire—Anderson fired this particular weapon six 
times.  Bullets from both revolvers were found in Young‘s body.  Anderson was 
caught trying to remove the other evidence of his presence in the bank that day—
the VCR which he studied the day before.  The trial court‘s finding of the 
pecuniary gain aggravating factor was based on evidence that Anderson‘s motive 
 
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for the murder was to obtain money to pay his outstanding restitution.  Each 
aggravating factor is based on a separate set of facts.      
We have rejected previous claims that the trial court improperly doubled the 
CCP and pecuniary gain aggravating factors.  See Larzelere v. State, 676 So. 2d 
394, 406 (Fla. 1996) (concluding that CCP and pecuniary gain were not improperly 
doubled where the trial court‘s finding of ―CCP was based on evidence that she 
[appellant] meticulously staged her husband‘s murder to look as though it were 
committed during a robbery,‖ and the court‘s finding of pecuniary gain was based 
on ―evidence that appellant killed her husband to collect life insurance‖); 
Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So. 2d 784, 793 (Fla. 1992) (concluding that CCP and 
pecuniary gain were not improperly doubled where the trial court‘s finding of CCP 
was based on evidence that the murder was ―carefully choreographed,‖ and the 
court‘s finding of pecuniary gain was based on evidence that the appellant killed 
the victim ―in furtherance of his plan to receive life insurance proceeds upon his 
wife‘s death‖).  Because the trial court relied on distinct aspects of the crime to 
find CCP and pecuniary gain, Anderson is not entitled to relief on this claim.  
Victim Photographs 
Anderson asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
introduction of five medical examiner photographs of victim Heather Young.  We 
 
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disagree and conclude that counsel was not deficient and Anderson was not 
prejudiced.   
At trial, the State offered the testimony of Dr. Susan Rendon, who 
performed Young‘s autopsy.  Rendon testified about the types of wounds that 
Young suffered, the wound locations, the places from where bullets were retrieved, 
and the physical damage caused by the gunshots.  Rendon‘s testimony provided the 
foundation for five autopsy photographs of Young, and the photographs supporting 
that testimony were admitted into evidence.  The photographs illustrate numerous 
injuries: blunt force trauma from a flat surface, a bullet wound to the neck, a bullet 
wound to the chin with an exit wound from Young‘s eye, an abrasion on Young‘s 
arm that was indicative of blunt force trauma or a defensive wound, and a gunshot 
wound above Young‘s cheek that occurred at close range.   
We have previously observed that a victim‘s photographs are admissible to 
―explain a medical examiner‘s testimony, to show the manner of death, the 
location of the wounds, and the identity of the victim.‖  Larkins v. State, 655 So. 
2d 95, 98 (Fla. 1995).  In Anderson‘s case, the photographs of victim Young were 
relevant to explain the medical examiner‘s testimony, demonstrate the location and 
the nature of the injuries that Young sustained, and illustrate the cause of her death.  
The photographs were also relevant to proving premeditation.  Therefore, trial 
counsel was not deficient for failing to object to the admission of the photographs.    
 
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Moreover, Anderson was not prejudiced by the introduction of the 
photographs.  First, we conclude that the admission of five photographs was not 
excessive in this case.  Further, even though the photographs depicted a deceased 
person, they were not so gruesome as to be unduly prejudicial.  The photograph of 
―the victim after she had been turned over lying in a pool of blood wearing her 
bloody smock‖ presented to the jury in Larkins was far more gruesome than the 
five photographs admitted during Anderson‘s trial.  We nevertheless agreed with 
the trial court‘s admission of the photograph into evidence because it was relevant 
―to assist the medical examiner in explaining the cause of death to the jury, as well 
as how and where the victim died.‖  Id. at 98-99.   
Anderson also appears to claim ineffective assistance of counsel as to the 
introduction of three photographs of the surviving victim, Marisha Scott.  We 
reject this claim.  On direct appeal, this Court concluded that Scott‘s photographs 
were relevant to show Scott‘s identity as well as the location of Scott‘s wounds.    
Because all of the photographs challenged by Anderson were relevant for a 
variety of purposes and were properly admitted, counsel‘s performance was not 
deficient.  Moreover, as to the photographs of victim Scott, given the 
overwhelming evidence of Anderson‘s guilt, he cannot demonstrate prejudice such 
that our confidence in the outcome is undermined.  Therefore, Anderson is not 
entitled to relief on this issue.  
 
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Improper Testimony 
Anderson also claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to or 
seek to limit the testimony of the following witnesses: Deputy Michael Thomas 
(arresting officer), Kirk Lewis (fire department first responder), Mark O‘Keefe 
(paramedic),  Dr. Susan Rendon (medical examiner), Marisha Scott (surviving 
victim), and Detective James Jicha (conducted hospital interview of Marisha 
Scott).   
 
Anderson makes only vague assertions with respect to each witness, except 
for Deputy Thomas.  While the deputy was being cross-examined by defense 
counsel, the following exchange took place:  
DEFENSE COUNSEL: You said you looked in the vault after the 
suspect was under control out there in the lobby, correct? 
 
THOMAS: Yes, sir.  And I saw blood splatter and the two victims 
lying on the ground as well as, once again, I saw Heather Young, who 
was still convulsing. 
 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Excuse me, did you know Miss Young? 
 
THOMAS:  No, this was after the fact.  I didn‘t know the suspect‘s 
name, but I learned of it after the fact.  Immediately after I arrested 
him and got his I.D.  Miss Young was deceased, later found out who 
she was, and Marisha Scott as well, who they were.  And as I saw 
Heather Young on the ground and Marisha Scott was pretty much 
choking on her blood, pretty much trying to grasp for air.  I held 
Heather Young in my arms and she pretty much was just trying to say 
―help me.‖  She went.   
 
 
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Anderson argues that the deputy‘s testimony about Young dying in his arms and 
Scott‘s struggle to breathe was improper because it was unresponsive to the 
question and was prejudicial.  We disagree.  
 
In his postconviction order, the judge concluded that, although the answer 
Thomas gave went beyond the scope of the question, the answer was relevant 
because it related the extent of the victims‘ injuries and proved Anderson‘s intent 
to kill.  The court also concluded that the testimony was relevant to other testimony 
presented regarding blood spatter and DNA evidence.  We will not disturb the 
circuit court‘s conclusions here.  However, even if counsel‘s failure to object or 
move to strike this testimony was deficient, given the overwhelming evidence of 
guilt presented, Anderson cannot demonstrate prejudice sufficient to undermine 
our confidence in the outcome.      
As to the other witnesses, Anderson merely states that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to or seek to limit the gruesome and detailed 
testimony of these witnesses.  While he provides the witnesses‘ names and the 
page numbers of their testimony, he does not cite to any specific statements or 
portions of the witnesses‘ testimony that should have been objected to by counsel.   
Anderson also challenges the testimony of both Dr. Rendon, the medical 
examiner, and Marisha Scott, the surviving victim.  However, we agree with the 
circuit court‘s observation as to ―the obvious need for that testimony.‖  The court 
 
- 25 - 
also addressed the remaining witnesses and concluded that the testimony of Kirk 
Lewis and Mark O‘Keefe as first responders was relevant as evidence of 
premeditation, as well as to illustrate the victims‘ condition and the nature of their 
injuries.  The court also concluded that the testimony of Detective Jicha was 
relevant because he led the interview during which victim Scott identified 
Anderson from a photo lineup.  Because the admission of the testimony of these 
witnesses does not undermine our confidence in the verdict in light of the 
overwhelming evidence of Anderson‘s guilt, we also conclude that this claim does 
not merit relief.  
Blood Spatter Testimony 
Anderson further contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to make a 
specific objection to the expert testimony regarding blood spatter at the crime 
scene.  At trial, Senior Crime Technician Farley ―Jake‖ Caudill provided expert 
testimony on blood spatter evidence found at the scene; and he drew conclusions 
about the nature of the trauma that caused the spatter.  Trial counsel objected to 
Caudill‘s testimony based on his qualifications, but following an extensive voir 
dire by both the State and the defense, the trial court overruled the objection and 
permitted the expert to testify.  At the conclusion of his testimony, defense counsel 
asked the court to reconsider its acceptance of Caudill‘s testimony as expert 
testimony, but the court denied the motion.   
 
- 26 - 
On direct appeal, Anderson asserted that the admission of Caudill‘s 
testimony was improper because it was of dubious probative value, completely 
speculative, and highly inflammatory.  This Court concluded that the claim was 
procedurally barred because that specific objection was not raised at trial.  Now, 
Anderson asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to make that specific 
objection.  We disagree.  Even though we determined that the claim was 
procedurally barred on direct appeal, we examined the claim‘s merits and 
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Caudill‘s 
testimony.  Anderson, 863 So. 2d at 179.  We said:  
 
Even if Anderson‘s argument had been preserved, we would 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing 
Caudill to testify.  Caudill‘s testimony was relevant with regard to the 
State‘s theory on blunt force trauma.  Moreover, Anderson‘s counsel 
rigorously cross-examined Caudill, and this cross-examination would 
have let the trier of fact assess the weight and credibility that should 
be attached to Caudill‘s opinion.    
 
Id. at 181 (footnote omitted). 
 
Additionally, even if counsel‘s failure to object constituted deficient 
performance, Anderson did not suffer prejudice, and our confidence in the outcome 
is not undermined.  At best, Caudill‘s testimony provided some support to the 
State‘s theory that Anderson hit the victims with a blunt object after shooting them.  
This testimony provided some corroboration to the medical examiner‘s testimony 
that both victims sustained head injuries that were consistent with blunt trauma.   
 
- 27 - 
 
In the absence of Caudill‘s testimony, the jury would still have been exposed 
to the overwhelming evidence of Anderson‘s guilt, including that before the 
victims suffered blunt trauma, Anderson fired ten shots from two revolvers, six of 
which required deliberate effort to fire.  For these reasons, Anderson is not entitled 
to relief on this claim. 
Prosecutor’s Statements 
Anderson contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
certain misstatements of law by the prosecutor regarding the balance of 
aggravating and mitigating factors.  Florida law provides that a penalty phase jury, 
after deliberating, shall render an advisory sentence to the court.  That sentence is 
to be based on:  
 
(a)   Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist  
. . . 
 
(b)   Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist  
which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist;  
and  
 
(c)   Based on these considerations, whether the 
defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.  
 
§ 921.141(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008).  ―[A] jury is neither compelled nor required to 
recommend death where aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors.‖  Cox v. 
State, 819 So. 2d 705, 717 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239, 
249-50 (Fla. 1996)).    
 
- 28 - 
Anderson argues that certain prosecutorial statements were worthy of 
objection because they eliminated the threshold analysis of whether the 
aggravating circumstances, by themselves, justified the death penalty.  For 
example, Anderson cites the following statement made by the prosecutor during 
voir dire: ―You weigh the aggravating evidence versus the mitigating evidence, 
and which ever way your personal scale tips, that, under the law, is supposed to be 
the recommendation you make.‖   
 
We agree that this statement does not reflect the proper considerations that 
the jury must employ when determining whether a defendant should be sentenced 
to life or death, and we have previously concluded that similar statements were 
indeed misstatements of law.  See Cox, 819 So. 2d at 717 (concluding that the 
prosecutor misstated the law where the prosecutor told the jury during voir dire 
that ―if the evidence in aggravation outweighs the evidence in mitigation, the law 
says that you must recommend that Mr. Cox die‖ ); Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 
239, 249 (Fla. 1996) (concluding that the prosecutor misstated the law by telling 
prospective jurors that under the law, they must recommend death ―[i]f the 
evidence of the aggravators outweighs the mitigators‖).  Because we conclude that 
the statements in Anderson‘s case were misstatements of law, we also conclude 
that counsel‘s failure to object to those statements was deficient performance.   
 
- 29 - 
 
However, our analysis does not end there.  We must also determine whether 
the Strickland prejudice prong was satisfied.  We conclude that it was not.  In both 
Cox and Henyard, we determined that the defendants were not prejudiced by the 
improper statements of the prosecutors because the juries were given the proper 
instructions for analyzing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  In 
Anderson‘s case, the trial court properly instructed the jury that it must first 
determine whether there were aggravating circumstances sufficient to justify the 
death penalty and, if so, then proceed to determine whether sufficient mitigating 
circumstances exist that outweigh the aggravating circumstances.  Because 
Anderson has not demonstrated prejudice, we conclude that he is not entitled to 
relief on this claim.    
State’s Closing Argument 
During the guilt phase closing argument, the prosecutor referred to 
Anderson‘s defense as the ―National Enquirer Defense‖ and suggested that after 
the trial, the jurors could come to him and learn additional facts about the case.  
Trial counsel objected to the argument.  The trial court overruled the objection and 
warned the State that the comments were improper.  Anderson contends, however, 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a curative instruction and a 
mistrial.  We agree that these comments were improper, but we also conclude that 
 
- 30 - 
counsel‘s failure to ask for a curative instruction or move for mistrial did not 
prejudice Anderson.  
When Anderson challenged these comments on direct appeal, this Court 
concluded that while the comments were improper—because they commented on 
the quality of the defense and also mentioned the existence of evidence that was 
not presented at trial—Anderson was not entitled to relief.  Anderson, 863 So. 2d 
at 187.  Regarding challenges to prosecutorial comments, we have explained:    
In order for the prosecutor‘s comments to merit a new trial, the 
comments must either deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial 
trial, materially contribute to the conviction, be so harmful or 
fundamentally tainted as to require a new trial, or be so inflammatory 
that they might have influenced the jury to reach a more severe verdict 
than that it would have otherwise.   
 
Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377, 383 (Fla. 1994). 
Ultimately, we decided that although improper, the comments in Anderson‘s 
case did ―not approach the level of improper comments in cases where we have 
granted relief.‖  Anderson, 863 So. 2d at 187; cf. Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 
905 (Fla. 2000) (vacating death sentence and remanding for new penalty phase in 
light of the ―cumulative effect of the numerous, overlapping improprieties in the 
prosecutor‘s penalty phase closing argument‖).  Because Anderson is unable to 
demonstrate prejudice, he is not entitled to relief.     
 
- 31 - 
Shackling 
 
Anderson also contends that he was denied due process when he was 
shackled during trial.  We agree with the circuit court‘s conclusion that Anderson 
has not proven a due process violation, and further, we conclude that he has not 
shown that counsel was ineffective.      
 
This Court has said that ―[s]hackling is an inherently prejudicial practice.‖  
Bryant v. State, 785 So. 2d 422, 429 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Bello v. State, 547 So. 2d 
914, 918 (Fla. 1989)).  Because of the danger of prejudice, if a defendant objects 
and requests an inquiry into whether shackling is necessary, a defendant is entitled 
to an evidentiary hearing.  Bryant, 785 So. 2d at 429.  Furthermore, when this type 
of claim is raised on collateral attack, it should not be summarily denied where the 
defendant has properly pled both deficient performance and prejudice.  See Jones 
v. State, 998 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2008).  The circuit court granted an evidentiary 
hearing on this issue. 
 
Anderson failed to show that the jury saw or was otherwise aware of 
Anderson‘s shackles.  The primary courtroom bailiff, Karen Nelson, testified that 
the shackles placed on Anderson‘s legs were never visible or audible to the jury.  
Any time that Anderson was moved from one place to another, he was moved 
outside of the jury‘s presence; and objects were strategically placed to block the 
jury‘s view of the shackles.  The court also found that Anderson was not 
 
- 32 - 
handcuffed at trial, despite Anderson‘s allegations to the contrary.  Accordingly, 
the trial court concluded that Anderson did not suffer a due process violation.  We 
agree with the court‘s conclusion.     
Although Anderson did not raise the shackling claim as an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, we also conclude that counsel was not ineffective here.  
Even if trial counsel was deficient for not objecting to Anderson‘s shackles, we 
conclude that Anderson did not suffer prejudice.  The record does not suggest that 
the jury was aware of Anderson‘s shackles, and competent, substantial evidence 
supports the circuit court‘s conclusion that significant efforts were made to prevent 
the jury from seeing or hearing them.   
Because adequate precautions were taken and there is no indication that the 
jury was aware of Anderson‘s shackles, we conclude that Anderson did not suffer 
prejudice and is not entitled to relief. 
Motion to Interview Jurors 
Five years after the trial, Anderson filed a motion to interview jurors on the 
grounds that he was shackled at trial in view of the jury.  Following a hearing, the 
trial court denied Anderson‘s motion because there was no evidence that the jurors 
observed the shackles and there was no showing of juror misconduct.  A trial 
court‘s decision on a motion to interview jurors is reviewed pursuant to an abuse of 
discretion standard.  Marshall v. State, 976 So. 2d 1071, 1077 (Fla. 2007).   
 
- 33 - 
 
Because there is no indication in the record that any of the shackles were 
perceptible to any members of the jury, we agree with the circuit court‘s decision 
and conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.  To 
have granted the motion would have allowed Anderson to conduct a ―fishing 
expedition‖ interview of the jurors, a practice which we have previously rejected.  
See Arbelaez v. State, 775 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2000).  Thus, we deny relief on this 
claim.  
Mental Health Evaluation 
Anderson argues that he was denied due process because he did not receive a 
competent mental health evaluation.  A defendant whose sanity at the time of the 
offense is to be an issue at trial must have access to a ―competent psychiatrist [or 
other mental health professional] who will conduct an appropriate examination and 
assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.‖  Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).  Because this claim was not raised on direct 
appeal, it is procedurally barred.  This Court has previously rejected postconviction 
claims of incompetent mental health evaluations as procedurally barred.  See, e.g., 
Ponticelli v. State, 941 So. 2d 1073, 1105-06 (Fla. 2006) (concluding that even if 
the claim was a valid Ake claim, it was procedurally barred because it was not 
raised on direct appeal); Whitfield v. State, 923 So. 2d 375, 379 (Fla. 2005) 
 
- 34 - 
(rejecting Ake claim as procedurally barred because it should have been raised on 
direct appeal).    
Moreover, Anderson‘s claim lacks merit.  The fact that Anderson‘s 
postconviction experts concluded that he suffered from various mental health 
disorders does not discount Dr. McMahon‘s evaluation, which did not detect any 
mental disorder or evidence of statutory or nonstatutory mitigation.  Specifically, 
she did not identify any indicators of psychosis at the time of the evaluation or at 
the time of the offense, nor did she see indicators of PTSD, brain damage or 
borderline personality disorder.  See Peede v. State, 955 So. 2d 480, 495 (Fla. 
2007) (―We have consistently held that a mental health investigation is not 
rendered inadequate ‗merely because the defendant has now secured the testimony 
of a more favorable mental health expert.‘ ‖ (quoting Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 
974, 986 (Fla. 2000))).   
Moreover, Anderson‘s assertions that the evaluation was not comprehensive 
are without merit.  The circuit court found that Anderson received an extensive 
mental health evaluation, conducted by an experienced forensic psychologist with 
significant exposure to death penalty cases.  We agree with the circuit court‘s 
conclusions on this issue and will not disturb them.  Consequently, we affirm the 
circuit court‘s denial of relief.  
 
- 35 - 
Cumulative Error 
Because Anderson‘s claims, addressed individually, do not give rise to 
conclusions of ineffective assistance of counsel or that Anderson‘s constitutional 
rights were violated, we reject Anderson‘s claim of cumulative error.  See Israel v. 
State, 985 So. 2d 510, 520 (Fla. 2008) (―Because the alleged individual errors are 
without merit, the contention of cumulative error is similarly without merit.‖).  
Anderson‘s claim for relief based on cumulative error is denied.   
ANDERSON’S HABEAS CLAIMS 
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
Anderson contends that certain omissions by his appellate counsel 
constituted ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  Specifically, Anderson 
contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to raise the trial 
court‘s denial of Anderson‘s motion to change venue; (2) failing to ensure a 
complete record on appeal; (3) failing to raise a claim regarding the presence of 
Anderson and the trial judge when the jury was sworn; and (4) failing to raise as an 
issue the absence of the jury instruction regarding merging aggravating factors.  
Additionally, although he concedes that the claim is not yet ripe, Anderson asserts 
that he is incompetent to be executed.  We address each claim in turn and conclude 
that none of Anderson‘s claims merits relief. 
 
- 36 - 
Appellate counsel‘s ineffectiveness is properly raised in a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000).  In order 
to grant habeas relief on the basis of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, this 
Court must determine 
whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to constitute a 
serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably outside the 
range of professionally acceptable performance and, second, whether 
the deficiency in performance compromised the appellate process to 
such a degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of the 
result. 
 
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986).  ―The defendant has the 
burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.‖  Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1069. 
Change of Venue 
Anderson contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
as an issue the trial court‘s denial of Anderson‘s motion to change venue.  
However, we conclude that appellate counsel was not deficient because the claim 
has no merit.  This Court has articulated the standard for a change of venue as 
follows: 
 
Knowledge of the incident because of its notoriety is not, in and 
of itself, grounds for a change of venue.  The test for determining a 
change of venue is whether the general state of mind of the inhabitants 
of a community is so infected by knowledge of the incident and 
accompanying prejudice, bias, and preconceived opinions that jurors 
could not possibly put these matters out of their minds and try the case 
solely upon the evidence presented in the courtroom. 
 
- 37 - 
 
McCaskill v. State, 344 So. 2d 1276, 1278 (Fla. 1977) (quoting Kelley v. State, 
212 So. 2d 27, 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)).  Furthermore, ―absent an extreme or 
unusual situation, the need to change venue should not be determined until an 
attempt is made to select a jury.‖  Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239, 245 (Fla. 
1996).      
 
Anderson‘s jury selection process was extensive.  His jury selection began 
on a Monday and the guilt phase did not begin until the following Wednesday 
afternoon.  The record reflects that a significant amount of time was devoted to 
determining the extent of potential jurors‘ pretrial exposure.  The State and the 
defense were able to select a panel of fifteen jurors, including three alternates.  
Given this extensive and meticulous jury selection process, there was no 
meritorious claim that appellate counsel could have raised.  Appellate counsel 
cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise meritless issues.  See Brown v. 
State, 846 So. 2d 1114, 1128 (Fla. 2003).  Thus, Anderson is not entitled to habeas 
relief on this claim.      
Record on Appeal 
Anderson also argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
ensure a proper record on appeal.  He specifically refers to the omission of jury 
questionnaires from the record, which he contends reflect significant juror bias and 
lend credence to his argument that the motion for change of venue should have 
 
- 38 - 
been granted.  We note that the questionnaires are not a part of the record before 
this Court and thus consideration of their content is improper.   
 
Even if appellate counsel was deficient in failing to preserve the 
questionnaires as a part of the appellate record, Anderson did not suffer prejudice.  
A review of the trial transcript shows that prospective jurors were questioned 
extensively about their exposure to the case and whether that exposure would 
compromise their ability to sit as fair and impartial jurors.  Because the trial court 
did not err in denying the motion to change venue, Anderson did not suffer 
prejudice by not having the questionnaires as a part of the record on appeal, and he 
is not entitled to relief. 
Defendant’s Presence During Jurors’ Oath 
Anderson contends that appellate counsel was ineffective because appellate 
counsel did not challenge his and the judge‘s absence when the prospective jurors 
were sworn for voir dire.  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.180(a)(4) requires 
that the defendant be present ―at the beginning of trial during the examination, 
challenging, impaneling, and swearing of the jury.‖  Anderson asserts that his right 
to be present at the beginning of trial included when the jury was sworn for voir 
dire.  However, we have previously rejected this argument and have held that the 
prior general qualification process does not require the defendant‘s presence.  See 
 
- 39 - 
Robinson v. State, 520 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1988) (―[W]e do not find that process to be 
a critical stage of the proceedings requiring the defendant‘s presence.‖).  
Immediately before opening statements, with Anderson present, the jury was 
sworn.  This satisfies the requirement that the defendant be present when the jury is 
sworn, and therefore Anderson‘s claim is not well taken.  ―Appellate counsel is 
expected to raise those claims which are deemed to have the most merit, and is not 
ineffective for failing to raise meritless issues.‖  Brown, 846 So. 2d at 1128 (citing 
Downs v. Moore, 801 So. 2d 906, 910 (Fla. 2001)).  Therefore, Anderson‘s request 
for habeas relief on this issue is denied.    
Jury Instruction on Merging Aggravating Factors 
Anderson contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
challenge the absence of the merging instruction during the penalty phase jury 
instructions.  Appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a 
claim that has no merit.  See Brown, 846 So. 2d at 1128.  As we discussed, the 
merging instruction is appropriate where there are duplicative aggravating factors.  
See Castro v. State, 597 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1992).  On the facts of Anderson‘s case, 
CCP and pecuniary gain were not duplicative aggravating factors, and Anderson 
was not entitled to the merging instruction.  That being the case, appellate counsel 
cannot be deemed ineffective for not raising this issue on appeal.  Therefore, 
Anderson is denied relief on this claim. 
 
- 40 - 
Incompetency to be Executed 
Anderson asserts that he may be incompetent at the time of execution.  
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.811(a) provides that ―[a] person under 
sentence of death shall not be executed while insane to be executed.‖  Subdivision 
(c) of the same rule provides that ―[n]o motion for a stay of execution pending 
hearing, based on grounds of the prisoner‘s insanity to be executed, shall be 
entertained by any court until such time as the Governor of Florida shall have held 
appropriate proceedings for determining the issue pursuant to the appropriate 
Florida Statutes.‖ 
Anderson concedes that this claim is not ripe for review as he has not yet 
been found incompetent and a death warrant has not yet been signed.  He states 
that he is only raising this issue for preservation purposes.  This Court has 
repeatedly found that no relief is warranted on similar claims.  See State v. Coney, 
845 So. 2d 120, 137 n.19 (Fla. 2003) (rejecting Coney‘s claim that he was insane 
to be executed where he acknowledged that claim was not yet ripe and was being 
raised only for preservation purposes); Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 2003) 
(finding claim that defendant may be insane to be executed ―not ripe for review‖ 
where defendant was not yet found incompetent and death warrant had not yet 
been signed and noting that defendant made the claim ―simply to preserve it for 
 
- 41 - 
review in the federal court system‖).  Thus, Anderson is not entitled to habeas 
relief on this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court‘s denial of 
postconviction relief, and we also deny Anderson‘s petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Lake County,  
G. Richard Singeltary, Judge – Case No. 99-572-CF-DS 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Maria D. Chamberlin, Marie-
Louise Samuels Parmer, and Nathaniel E. Pucker, Assistant CCR Counsel, Middle 
Region, Tampa, Florida 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Kenneth S. Nunnelley, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent