Case Title: Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.

Citation: 2002-Ohio-2842

Docket Number: 20001984 and 20010493

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 512, 2002-Ohio-
2842.] 
 
 
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. AETNA 
CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 
512, 2002-Ohio-2842.] 
Insurance — Continuous occurrence of environmental pollution triggers claims 
under multiple insurance policies — Insured entitled to source coverage 
from a single policy of its choice that covers all sums incurred as damages 
during the policy period — Pollution exclusion clause in insurance 
contract that bars coverage for expected or intended “emission, 
discharge, seepage, release or escape” of contaminating materials is 
triggered, when. 
(Nos. 2000-1984 and 2001-0493 — Submitted November 28, 2001 — Decided 
June 26, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 19121. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  When a continuous occurrence of environmental pollution triggers claims 
under multiple primary insurance policies, the insured is entitled to secure 
coverage from a single policy of its choice that covers “all sums” incurred 
as damages “during the policy period,” subject to that policy’s limit of 
coverage. 
2.  A pollution exclusion clause in an insurance contract that bars coverage for 
expected or intended “emission, discharge, seepage, release or escape” of 
contaminating materials is triggered when the policyholder expects or 
intends that the contaminants will migrate from the location in which they 
were first deposited. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
__________________ 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J. 
{¶1} 
In 1993, appellants, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company and others 
(collectively “Goodyear”),1 filed this action against appellees Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Company and several other insurance companies (collectively the 
“insurers”)2 seeking declaratory judgments concerning insurance claims for 
pollution cleanup costs at twenty-two sites.  Numerous claims, defendants, and 
specific insurance policies were disposed of through pretrial motions.  The 
remaining parties agreed to limit the evidence in this case to claims relating to two 
waste disposal sites.  Those sites are the Motor Wheel Site in Lansing, Michigan, 
and the Army Creek Landfill in New Castle, Delaware. 
{¶2} 
After Goodyear had presented its case at trial, the insurers moved 
for directed verdicts on various grounds.  The trial court granted the directed 
verdicts to all defendants without providing a specific basis for its decision.  The 
court of appeals reversed the trial court on a number of the motions for directed 
verdicts.  No appeal has been taken from these reversals.  The appellate court 
affirmed the trial court on the remaining motions for directed verdict.  Goodyear 
asserts that this was error.  The consolidated cases are now before this court 
pursuant to the allowance of discretionary appeals. 
I.  Standard for Directed Verdicts 
{¶3} 
At the outset, we are mindful of the standard of review for a 
directed verdict.  According to Civ.R. 50(A)(4), a motion for directed verdict is 
granted if, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against 
whom the motion is directed, “reasonable minds could come to but one 
conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such 
party.”  The “reasonable minds” test mandated by Civ.R. 50(A)(4) requires the 
court to discern only whether there exists any evidence of substantive probative 
value that favors the position of the nonmoving party.  Civ.R. 50(A)(4); Ruta v. 
January Term, 2002 
3 
Breckenridge-Remy Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 66, 69, 23 O.O.3d 115, 430 N.E.2d 
935. 
{¶4} 
“A motion for directed verdict * * * does not present factual 
issues, but a question of law, even though in deciding such a motion, it is 
necessary to review and consider the evidence.”  O’Day v. Webb (1972), 29 Ohio 
St.2d 215, 58 O.O.2d 424, 280 N.E.2d 896, paragraph three of the syllabus.  See, 
also, Wagner v. Roche Laboratories (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 116, 119, 671 N.E.2d 
252.  Since we are presented with a question of law, we apply a de novo standard 
of review.  Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co.  v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 
521, 523, 668 N.E.2d 889, 891.  It is with these principles in mind that we 
consider Goodyear’s assertions of error. 
II.  Allocation 
{¶5} 
In determining whether the directed verdicts were properly 
granted, we must first decide whether the lower courts erred in the method used to 
allocate insurance coverage among the multiple insurers.  Allocation deals with 
the apportionment of a covered loss across multiple triggered insurance policies.  
Paar, Recovery is in the Details: Hot Issues in the Administration and Application 
of General Liability Insurance Policies (2000), 86 PLI/NY 199, 216.  The issue of 
allocation arises in situations involving long-term injury or damage, such as 
environmental cleanup claims where it is difficult to determine which insurer 
must bear the loss. 
{¶6} 
The parties are in agreement as to which primary insurance 
policies have been called into play, and there is no dispute that there was 
continuous pollution across multiple policy periods that gave rise to occurrences 
and claims to which these policies apply.  However, they disagree as to the 
appropriate method for distributing losses across the triggered policies.  There are 
two accepted methods for allocating coverage.  One approach, favored by 
Goodyear, permits the policyholder to seek coverage from any policy in effect 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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during the time period of injury or damage.  This “all sums” approach allows 
Goodyear to seek full coverage for its claims from any single policy, up to that 
policy’s coverage limits, out of the group of policies that has been triggered.  In 
contrast, the insurers urge us to apply the pro rata allocation scheme implicitly 
adopted by the court of appeals.  Under the pro rata approach, each insurer pays 
only a portion of a claim based on the duration of the occurrence during its policy 
period in relation to the entire duration of the occurrence.  It divides “a loss 
‘horizontally’ among all triggered policy periods, with each insurance company 
paying only a share of the policyholder’s total damages.”  Id. at 217.  For the 
reasons that follow, we agree with Goodyear’s position and adopt the “all sums” 
method of allocation. 
{¶7} 
The starting point for determining the scope of coverage is the 
language of the insurance policies.  The policies at issue require the insurer to 
“pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of * * * property damage to which this 
policy applies caused by an occurrence.” (Emphasis added.)  The policies define 
“property damage” as “injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs 
during the policy period * * *.”3  (Emphasis added.)  The italicized portions of 
this language provide the point of contention. 
{¶8} 
It is well settled that “insurance policies should be enforced in 
accordance with their terms as are other written contracts.  Where the provisions 
of the policy are clear and unambiguous, courts cannot enlarge the contract by 
implication so as to embrace an object distinct from that originally contemplated 
by the parties.”  Rhoades v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U.S. (1978), 54 Ohio 
St.2d 45, 47, 8 O.O.3d 39, 374 N.E.2d 643, citing Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Tomanski (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 222, 226, 56 O.O.2d 133, 271 N.E.2d 924. 
{¶9} 
There is no language in the triggered policies that would serve to 
reduce an insurer’s liability if an injury occurs only in part during a given policy 
January Term, 2002 
5 
period.  The policies covered Goodyear for “all sums” incurred as damages for an 
injury to property occurring during the policy period.  The plain language of this 
provision is inclusive of all damages resulting from a qualifying occurrence.  
Therefore, we find that the “all sums” allocation approach is the correct method to 
apply here. 
{¶10} Interpreting the policy language in this manner is a practice that 
has been frequently implemented in other jurisdictions.  Am. Natl. Fire Ins. Co. v. 
B & L Trucking & Constr. Co., Inc. (1998), 134 Wash.2d 413, 428, 951 P.2d 250 
(noting that the national majority rule forbids insurers from limiting their liability 
to a pro rata share unless the policy expressly allows it).  In particular, support for 
this approach can be found in the frequently cited case of Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. 
of N. Am. (C.A.D.C.1981), 667 F.2d 1034.  In Keene, an action for declaratory 
relief was brought to discern the rights and obligations of parties under 
comprehensive general liability policies issued to an insured that was liable for 
bodily injuries arising from asbestos-related diseases.  The asbestos was deemed 
to cause bodily injury in more than one policy period, and it was determined that 
multiple policies had been triggered.  Id. at 1040.  The court went on to rule that 
each insurer whose insurance policy had been triggered would be liable in full for 
the indemnification and defense costs of the insured relating to the asbestos 
claims.  Id. at 1048.  In reaching this conclusion, the Keene court noted that there 
was nothing in the triggered policies that “provides for a reduction of the insurer’s 
liability if an injury occurs only in part during a policy period.”  Id.  This being 
so, the court reasoned that the insured would have reasonably expected “complete 
security from each policy it purchased.”  Id. 
{¶11} Like the insured in Keene, we are persuaded that Goodyear 
expected complete security from each policy that it purchased.4  This approach 
promotes economy for the insured while still permitting insurers to seek 
contribution from other responsible parties when possible.  Therefore, we find 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
that when a continuous occurrence of environmental pollution triggers claims 
under multiple primary insurance policies, the insured is entitled to secure 
coverage from a single policy of its choice that covers “all sums” incurred as 
damages “during the policy period,” subject to that policy’s limit of coverage.  In 
such an instance, the insurers bear the burden of obtaining contribution from other 
applicable primary insurance policies as they deem necessary. 
{¶12} For each site, Goodyear should be permitted to choose, from the 
pool of triggered primary policies, a single primary policy against which it desires 
to make a claim.  In the event that this policy does not cover Goodyear’s entire 
claim, then Goodyear may pursue coverage under other primary or excess 
insurance policies.  The answer to the question of what insurance may be tapped 
next is dependent upon the terms of the particular policy that is put into effect by 
Goodyear.  At this juncture, we are unable to determine which policy Goodyear 
will invoke, and thus we are also unable to determine whether the primary policy 
limits will be exhausted.  Since Goodyear may find it necessary to seek excess 
insurance coverage, we find that the lower court erred in granting directed 
verdicts in favor of the excess insurers.  The excess insurers should be included in 
the proceedings so that their rights and obligations can be considered in the event 
that their policies become a factor.  We reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals on this question. 
III.  Timely Notice 
{¶13} The second issue concerns whether Goodyear gave timely notice to 
its insurers so as to trigger coverage for occurrences of pollution at the Motor 
Wheel Site.  The insurance policies at issue required Goodyear to notify its 
insurers of an occurrence “as soon as practicable.”5  Additionally, they required 
Goodyear to give the insurers notice of a claim “immediately.”  The court of 
appeals affirmed the grant of directed verdicts on this issue, finding that the notice 
provided by Goodyear to its primary insurers was untimely and unreasonable as a 
January Term, 2002 
7 
matter of law.  However, it did not reach the issue with respect to the excess 
insurers, since it had already granted them directed verdicts on the allocation 
issue. 
{¶14} Notice provisions in insurance contracts are conditions precedent 
to coverage, so an insured’s failure to give its insurer notice in a timely fashion 
bars coverage.  Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co. 
(C.P.1995), 74 Ohio Misc.2d 183, 203, 660 N.E.2d 770.  In Ormet Primary 
Aluminum Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 292, 725 
N.E.2d 646, syllabus, we stated, “A provision in an insurance policy requiring 
notice to the insurer ‘as soon as practicable’ requires notice within a reasonable 
time in light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances.”  A similar 
requirement is applied to a provision that compels notice “immediately.”  Id. at 
303, 725 N.E.2d 646.  Generally, the question of timeliness calls into play matters 
to be discerned by the finder of fact; however, it is also true that “an unexcused 
significant delay may be unreasonable as a matter of law.”  Id. at 300, 725 N.E.2d 
646. 
{¶15} The court of appeals relied upon Ormet to find that the notice 
provided by Goodyear in the instant case was unreasonable as a matter of law.  
We disagree because Ormet is distinguishable on its facts.  In that case, by 1966, 
the insured had knowledge of actual pollution caused by its actions.  In 1986, the 
EPA formally identified the insured as a potentially responsible party.  By 1987, 
the insured had signed a settlement agreement with federal and state government 
agencies that outlined its financial responsibilities for cleaning up contamination.  
Despite these events, the insured did not notify its insurers about potential claims 
until March 1992.  Based on these facts, this court found that the timing of notice 
resulted in actual prejudice to the insurers and thus barred coverage. 
{¶16} Here, however, the facts do not present such a clear manifestation 
of unreasonableness.  In 1970, Goodyear received information from Michigan 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
authorities indicating the potential for groundwater pollution at the Motor Wheel 
site.  At two other times during the ensuing decade, it was asked to cease and 
desist some or all of its dumping activities at the site, and by 1981 Goodyear had 
notified the United States Environmental Protection Agency that contamination at 
the site was likely.  However, when correspondence from the local health 
department to the Michigan Department of Natural Resources dated December 
1982 indicated that a single water well in the area should be monitored due to the 
presence of a chemical, nothing therein indicated that Goodyear was responsible.  
Goodyear nonetheless conducted an investigation into the pollution problem 
during a ten-year span beginning in 1982.  It gave notice of the possibility of an 
occurrence to many of its insurers sometime between 1983 and August or October 
1984, but testimony indicated that no cleanup was undertaken by Goodyear until 
at least 1992. 
{¶17} Based on this evidence, we are not inclined to bypass the factfinder 
on the question of whether Goodyear’s notice was unreasonably late.  In Ormet, 
notice was provided to affected insurers some six years after the insured was 
identified by the EPA as a responsible party for pollution and some five years 
after the insured had entered into a settlement agreement dictating the terms of 
cleanup.  In the instant case, no similar lapse in time occurred between an event 
so blatantly indicating an occurrence and the time of notice by Goodyear.  
Nothing in any of the relevant documents informed Goodyear that it would be 
responsible for cleanup costs, and Goodyear did not admit liability for such costs.  
Information and events were unfolding over time with such complexity that only 
the factfinder may resolve the issue of whether Goodyear’s notice was 
unreasonable. 
{¶18} After construing the evidence most strongly in favor of Goodyear, 
we find that reasonable minds could come to more than one conclusion as to 
whether Goodyear’s primary and excess insurers received unreasonable notice.  
January Term, 2002 
9 
Directed verdicts in favor of the insurers on this question were therefore 
improper, and the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
IV.  Pollution Exclusion Provision 
{¶19} The final issue concerns the meaning of pollution exclusion 
clauses in certain insurance policies issued to Goodyear covering occurrences at 
the Army Creek Landfill.  Each of these policies contained a provision that 
excluded coverage for property damage “arising out of any emission, discharge, 
seepage, release or escape of any liquid, solid, gaseous or thermal waste or 
pollutant * * * if such emission, discharge, seepage, release or escape is either 
expected or intended from the standpoint of any insured * * *.” 
{¶20} The insurers argue that this provision should be construed to mean 
that if the policyholder intentionally placed contaminants into a landfill, that act is 
enough to forfeit coverage.  Goodyear counters that the exclusion applies only to 
the migration of contaminants from the place of deposit and not to the initial 
placement.  It argues that since it did not expect or intend for harmful chemicals 
to migrate from the landfill, the pollution exclusion clause cannot bar coverage.  
The court of appeals adopted the insurers’ reasoning. 
{¶21} We construe insurance provisions in accordance with the rule that 
“an exclusion in an insurance policy will be interpreted as applying only to that 
which is clearly intended to be excluded.”  (Emphasis in original.)  Hybud Equip. 
Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., Ltd. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 657, 665, 597 N.E.2d 
1096.  While looking at the plain meaning of similar language, the court in Nestle 
Foods Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (D.N.J.1993), 842 F.Supp. 125, noted that 
the terms “discharge, dispersal, release or escape” all were undefined terms in the 
subject policy.  However, it found that “[a]ll of these terms intrinsically evoke a 
transition from a state of confinement to movement.”  Id. at 131.  A number of the 
highest courts from other states have construed these terms in a similar fashion.  
Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Cent. Natl. Ins. Co. of Omaha (1994), 126 Wash.2d 50, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
882 P.2d 703; Compass Ins. Co. v. Littleton (Colo.1999), 984 P.2d 606; Alabama 
Plating Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. (Ala.1996), 690 So.2d 331. 
{¶22} Just as in those cases, here the insurers included language in the 
pollution exclusion provisions that they failed to define but which has a plain 
meaning.  The terms “emission, discharge, seepage, release or escape” require 
some sort of movement by a contaminant from one location to another.  For 
instance, one definition of the word “escape” is “flight from confinement.”  
Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1984) 424.  “Disperse” means “to 
spread or distribute from a fixed or constant source.”  Id. at 365.  These terms 
incorporate the concept of a leakage or discharge, such as through cracks or other 
outlets.  They indicate that the relevant event invoking the pollution exclusion 
clause is the intentional movement of contaminants from the Army Creek Landfill 
rather than the act of initially placing pollutants there.  If the insurers had meant 
their pollution exclusions to apply to acts such as depositing or placing chemicals 
in the ground, they could have used language that more perfectly described those 
actions. 
{¶23} A pollution exclusion clause in an insurance contract that bars 
coverage for expected or intended “emission, discharge, seepage, release or 
escape” of contaminating materials is triggered when the policyholder expects or 
intends that the contaminants will migrate from the location in which they were 
first deposited.  Based on the record before us, we find evidence indicating that 
any migration of pollutants from the Army Creek Landfill was unexpected and 
unintended.  When Goodyear was depositing the wastes, it did not believe that 
they were pollutants.  Also, at the time, the widespread belief was that chemicals 
deposited in a landfill would be contained and would remain where they were 
initially placed.  Representative cases recognizing this school of thought include 
Compass Ins. Co., supra, and Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Great Cent. Ins. Co. 
(Minn.App.1992), 480 N.W.2d 368.  Testimony shows that Goodyear believed 
January Term, 2002 
11 
disposal of the wastes at a landfill was safe.  Thus, the directed verdicts on this 
issue were erroneous, since factual questions exist as to whether Goodyear 
expected or intended pollutants to migrate to surrounding groundwater. 
{¶24} Accordingly, for the above reasons, the judgment of the court of 
appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS and F.N. YOUNG, JJ., dissent. 
 
FREDERICK N. YOUNG, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for 
COOK, J. 
__________________ 
 
FREDERICK N. YOUNG, J., dissenting. 
{¶25} I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority regarding 
the issue of allocation, although I agree with the majority in all other regards. 
{¶26} The majority adopts an “all sums” approach to the allocation of 
insurance coverage among multiple insurers.  This method allows an insured to 
choose one of its multiple carriers to reimburse it for all costs incurred—even 
though covered by other insurance carriers—when the injury is continuous and 
cannot be attributed to one period covered by only one insurance carrier.  As the 
majority points out, this leaves “the insurers [to] bear the burden of obtaining 
contribution from other applicable primary insurance policies as they deem 
necessary.”  I find that this approach ignores the plain language of the insurance 
contract, flies in the face of the majority rule, and contravenes plain common 
sense. 
{¶27} As the majority correctly notes, the starting point for determining 
the scope of coverage is the language of the insurance policies, and the policies at 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
issue require the insurer to “pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the 
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of * * * 
property damage to which this policy applies caused by an occurrence.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶28} “Property damage” is defined in the insurance policy as “injury to 
or destruction of tangible property which occurs during the policy period * * *.”  
(Emphasis added.)  The majority focuses on only the “all sums” language and 
virtually ignores the requirement that the injury must occur during the policy 
period.  In the case before us, as in most cases involving continuous injury 
occurring under many different policy periods, it is impossible for the insured to 
prove the extent of the injury that occurred during the policy period of the 
insurance carrier being targeted.  The majority accepts the fact that the injury 
occurred here only in part during the given policy period.  It falls to logical 
interpretation of the contract that the phrase “all sums” is limited by the insurance 
contract to all sums arising during the policy period.  The insured and the carrier 
here bargained for only a limited period of time of coverage for an injury that 
arose before the coverage and continued to exist after it, and the premium was 
therefore based upon that bargained-for coverage.  Each insurance carrier’s 
liability is therefore limited to only that part of the total injury that occurred 
within a particular carrier’s coverage dates.  Since that portion of the injury 
cannot be proven by direct evidence in dollar terms, the only way to allocate 
coverage is to attribute the losses to the various insurance carriers that provided 
coverage throughout the policy periods.  That approach, which was adopted by 
the court of appeals, gives effect to all the language of the insurance contract and 
not just to the two isolated words “all sums.” 
{¶29} If this court were to affirm the court of appeals on the allocation 
issue, it would be in line with the majority of jurisdictions that, in the context of 
continuing environmental damage from pollution, have adopted rules allocating 
January Term, 2002 
13 
damages among multiple periods of coverage.  As noted by William P. Shelley, 
Fundamentals of Insurance Coverage Allocation (Jan. 5, 2000), Mealey’s 
Litigation Reports (Insurance) 25, 30, “[t]he vast majority of courts have rejected 
the joint and several (or ‘pick and choose’) approach to allocation.” 
{¶30} Finally, I note that under the “all sums” approach, the insurance 
carrier chosen by the insured would bear the burden of obtaining contribution 
from other applicable primary insurance carriers as it deems necessary.  This is a 
fundamentally flawed conclusion because the insured, not the targeted insurance 
carrier, is the one that chose the other insurance carriers.  Some carriers may not 
be liable to the targeted carrier for such contribution or may in fact lack the 
financial resources to contribute.  Why should the targeted carrier bear that 
financial burden when it did not choose the other carriers?  The insured, since it 
did choose the other carriers, should logically and in all fairness bear that burden 
of obtaining the proper share of coverage from each of the other carriers.  Indeed, 
for some periods of time during the continuous pollution, the insured may have 
acted as self-insured and should therefore bear its portion of the allocation of the 
total damages.  It should not be able to seek complete reimbursement from a 
carrier that did not provide coverage through any of those other periods of time. 
{¶31} The court of appeals here properly allocated coverage among all 
the insurance carriers who covered separate portions of the time periods of the 
continuous pollution.  I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals on this 
issue. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and DOUGLAS, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
Brouse McDowell, Paul A. Rose, Frank E. Quirk and Keven D. Eiber, for 
appellants Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, Motor Wheel Corporation, 
Kelly-Springfield Tire Company, Hose Couplings Manufacturing, Inc., Divested 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
Aerospace Corporation, as successor in interest to Goodyear Aerospace 
Corporation, Goodyear Farms, Inc., and Brad Ragan, Inc. 
Choate, Hall & Stewart, Kathleen A. Burdette and A. Hugh Scott; Baker 
& Hostetler, L.L.P., Daniel P. Mascaro, Susan E. Thomas and Jordan Berns, for 
appellees Aetna Casualty & Surety Company and Travelers Indemnity Company. 
Hermann, Cahn & Schneider, Anthony J. Hartman and Hugh D. Berkson; 
Joseph B. Royster; Bollinger, Ruberry & Garvey and Clay Phillips, for appellee 
Stonewall Insurance Company. 
Lord, Bissell & Brook, Daniel I. Schlessinger, Hugh Griffin and Michael 
P. Comiskey; and Dennis Bartek, for appellees Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, 
London, and the London Market Company. 
Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews and James F. Mathews, for 
appellee Atlanta International Insurance Company. 
Buckley King & Bluso and James W. Barnhouse; Cohn & Baughman and 
Michael J. Baughman, for appellees Century Indemnity Company (individually 
and as successor to policies issued by Insurance Company of North America), 
California Union Insurance Company, and U.S. Fire Insurance Company. 
Clausen, Miller, Gorman, Caffrey & Witous, P.C., Margaret J. Orbon, 
Edward M. Kay and Amy R. Paulus; Janik & Dorman, Steven J. Danik and 
Andrew J. Dorman, for appellees AIU Insurance Company, Birmingham Fire 
Insurance Company, Granite State Insurance Company, Insurance Company of 
the State of Pennsylvania, Lexington Insurance Company, and National Union 
Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom and Michael J. Balch; Roderick, 
Linton, L.L.P., Howard C. Walker, Jr. and Lawrence R. Bach, for appellees 
General Reinsurance Corporation, Old Republic Insurance Company, and 
Northstar Reinsurance Corporation, n.k.a. Signet Star Reinsurance Company. 
January Term, 2002 
15 
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, L.L.P., and Lourdes Slater; Kimball 
Ann Lane and Craig Brown; Rodgers & Co., L.P.A., and Walter A. Rodgers, for 
appellee Westport Insurance Company (f.k.a. Puritan Insurance Company). 
Rodgers & Co., L.P.A., and Walter A. Rodgers, for appellee Government 
Employees Insurance Company. 
Bates & Carey, Robert J. Bates, Maria G. Enriquez and Monica Sullivan; 
Ulmer & Berne and David L. Lester, for appellees Executive Risk Indemnity, Inc. 
(f.k.a. American Excess Insurance Company) and American Re-insurance 
Company. 
Traub, Eglin, Lieberman & Straus, Robert P. Siegel, Meryl R. Lieberman 
and Stephen D. Straus; Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley, L.L.P., Gary 
Johnson and Joseph M. Saponaro, for appellees Evanston Insurance Company and 
Northwestern National Insurance Company. 
McNeal, Schick, Archibald & Biro Co., L.P.A., Robert D. Archibald and 
Brian T. Winchester; Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Priess, Michael W. 
Morrison and Dale Kurth, for appellee Allstate Insurance Company, successor in 
interest to Northbrook Excess and Surplus Lines Insurance Company. 
Merlo, Kanofsky & Brinkmeier, Ltd., Ross D. Roloff and Michael R. 
Gregg; Roderick, Linton, L.L.P., and Lawrence R. Bach, for appellees Everest 
Reinsurance Company (f.k.a. Prudential Reinsurance Company) and Gibraltar 
Casualty Company (n.k.a. Mt. McKinley Insurance Company). 
Bollinger, Ruberry & Garvey, Clay Phillips and Dennis Dolan; McMahon 
DeGulis Hoffmann & Blumenthal and Gregory DeGulis, for appellees 
International Insurance Company and International Surplus Lines Insurance 
Company. 
Chadbourne & Parke, L.L.P., and Francisco Vazquez, for appellee 
Bermuda Fire & Marine Insurance Company. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
Connelly, Jackson, & Collier, L.L.P., and Steven R. Smith; Covington & 
Burling and Mitchell F. Dolin, urging reversal for amici curiae Babcox & Wilcox 
Company, B.F. Goodrich Company, Lincoln Electric Company, Millenium 
Chemicals, Inc., Norfolk Southern Railway Company, Oglebay Norton Company, 
Ohio Chemistry Technology Council, Owens Corning, PPG Industries, Inc., and 
Sherwin-Williams Company. 
Goodman Weiss Miller, L.L.P., and Drew A. Carson; Anderson Kill & 
Olick, P.C., Eugene R. Anderson and Richard P. Lewis; Law Office of Amy Bach 
and Amy Bach, urging reversal for amicus curiae United Policyholders. 
Keener, Doucher, Curley & Patterson and Thomas Joseph Keener, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Insurance Environmental Litigation Association. 
                                          
 
1. 
The other named appellants in this action are Motor Wheel Corporation, Kelly-
Springfield Tire Company, Hose Couplings Manufacturing, Inc., Divested Aerospace Corporation, 
as successor in interest to Goodyear Aerospace Corporation, Goodyear Farms, Inc., and Brad 
Ragan, Inc. 
2. 
The other appellees in this action are Travelers Indemnity Company, Stonewall Insurance 
Company, Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, London Market Company, Atlanta 
International Insurance Company, Insurance Company of North America, Century Indemnity 
Company, Central National Insurance Company of Omaha, California Union Insurance Company, 
U.S Fire Insurance Company, AIU Insurance Company, Birmingham Fire Insurance Company, 
Granite State Insurance Company, Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, Lexington 
Insurance Company, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA, General 
Reinsurance Corporation, Northstar Reinsurance Corporation (n.k.a. Signet Star Reinsurance 
Company), Westport Insurance Company (f.k.a. Puritan Insurance Company), Government 
Employees Insurance Company, Executive Risk Indemnity, Inc. (f.k.a. American Excess 
Insurance Company), American Reinsurance Company, Evanston Insurance Company, 
Northwestern National Insurance Company, Allstate Insurance Company, as successor in interest 
to Northbrook Excess and Surplus Lines Insurance Company, Everest Reinsurance Company 
(f.k.a. Prudential Reinsurance Company), Gibraltar Casualty Company (n.k.a. Mt. McKinley 
Insurance Company), International Insurance Company, International Surplus Lines Insurance 
Company, Bermuda Fire & Marine Insurance Company, and Old Republic Insurance Company. 
3. 
The quoted language is taken from a policy issued by Travelers Indemnity Company and 
is representative of the language used in each of the insurance policies at issue. 
4. 
See, also, J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1993), 534 Pa. 29, 626 A.2d 
502. 
5. 
The policies at issue used this or similar language.