Case Title: Fama v. Smith

Citation: 303 Pa. Super. 414, 449 A.2d 755

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1982-05-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
303 Pa. Superior Ct. 414 (1982) 449 A.2d 755 Judy FAMA, Appellant, v. Irvin SMITH v. Judy FAMA. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued March 8, 1982. Filed May 28, 1982. Reargument Denied August 24, 1982. Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied October 15, 1982. *415 Gary T. Harris, Williamsport, for appellant. Ambrose R. Campana, Williamsport, for appellee. Before CAVANAUGH, WICKERSHAM and CIRILLO, JJ. CIRILLO, Judge: This action in trespass arises out of injuries that Judy Fama/appellant/minor plaintiff suffered when she was struck by a vehicle driven by Irvin Smith/appellee/defendant. The jury returned a verdict for appellee.[1] Appellant's motions for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict were denied. Appellant filed this appeal arguing solely that the court's charge to the jury was in error. We agree and order a new trial. *416 The relevant facts are as follows: The accident occurred on a four-lane, divided limited-access highway. Appellant lived with her family in a mobile home park near this highway. Appellant was six years of age at the time of the accident and her companion was a 9 or 10 year old girl. The two had passed under the highway through a conduit. They climbed the embankment, stepped over the guardrail and began to cross the highway. The appellee testified that as he rounded a slight curve on his motorcycle, he saw two girls climbing the embankment to his right about a quarter of a mile away. Appellee stated that the two girls seemed to be looking at him as they stepped over the guardrail. The girls began to cross the highway, entered the righthand lane and stopped in approximately the middle of that lane, at a point 500 feet away from the appellee. A pickup truck which was travelling about 200 feet in front of appellee, pulled into the passing lane and appellee followed. Appellee had been proceeding at about 55 miles per hour, upon seeing the girls he slowed to 40 or 45 miles per hour. He did not reduce his speed below 40 miles per hour. After the pickup truck passed the girls, and as the appellee approached, the younger girl ran into his path and impact occurred. Appellee testified that he did not consider stopping because the children were standing still and the eldest child was watching the traffic. Initially, we note that the denial of a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a palpable abuse of discretion or a plain error of controlling law. Benkovitz v. Urban Redevelopment Auth. of City of Pittsburgh, 56 Pa.Commw. 523, 425 A.2d 1178 (1981). Appellant's assignment of error is that the court erred in not applying the controlling law in its charge to the jury. It is settled that although the grant or refusal of a new trial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, reversal is required where the jury has been improperly instructed. National Products Co., Inc. v. Atlas Financial Corp., 238 Pa.Super. 152, 364 A.2d 730 (1975). *417 The lower court charged the jury generally upon negligence and ordinary care and then more specifically as follows: Appellant's assignment of error is that the trial court did not apply the controlling law in Pennsylvania, in its charge to the jury, concerning the striking of a child on a highway. Appellant asserts that the charge should have included the following instructions: The applicable law in Pennsylvania, concerning the striking of a child on a highway, was recently noted in Piccolo v. Weisenberger, 237 Pa.Super. 218, 352 A.2d 116 (1975) as follows: In Berk v. LeQuin, 412 Pa. 88, 194 A.2d 136 (1963), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated: The Berks court went on to cite the law as previously stated in Derr v. Rich, 331 Pa. 502, 505, 200 A. 599, 600 (1938): It is settled that when the jury charge requested is sufficiently or adequately covered by other instructions, the trial court commits no reversible error in declining to read to the jury a specific point for charge. Buchecker v. Reading Co., 271 Pa.Super. 35, 412 A.2d 147 (1979). Yet, where a charge is generally accurate, but misleads the jurors on a critical issue, a new trial should be granted. See Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978). When the accuracy of a jury charge is in issue, an appellate court must look to the charge in its entirety against the background of the evidence in order to determine whether error was committed and, if so, whether that error was prejudicial to the complaining party. Smith v. Chardak, 291 Pa.Super. 173, 435 A.2d 624 (1981); Slavish v. Ratajczak, 277 Pa.Super. 272, 419 A.2d 767 (1980). Applying the above law, we find that although the charge in the instant case was generally accurate, it is misleading. The instruction merely stated that if the driver reasonably apprehended that the child might run into a place of danger, then the driver was under a duty to exercise a higher degree of care than under ordinary circumstances. This charge did not adequately apprise the jury of what the higher degree of care would entail. The lower court should have directed the jury to first determine whether appellant was in a place of danger or whether she was in a place of safety where there was a reasonable apprehension that she might run into a place of danger.[2] The jury should have then been instructed that if *420 they found appellant was in either place, the next question to be resolved would be whether the evidence indicated that appellant was in that place for a sufficient amount of time for the driver to observe her and, in the exercise of due care, bring his vehicle under control, so as to avoid striking or injuring the child. In order to rectify the error committed, in the instructions given to the jury, we reverse the order of the lower court and remand for a new trial. Jurisdiction is not retained. [1] An additional defendant/Judy Fama, appellant's mother, also received a verdict in her favor. The propriety of this verdict was not raised in this appeal and therefore is not before this court. [2] The instruction only addressed whether the driver reasonably apprehended that appellant might run into a place of danger. Nothing was said about the appellant being in a place of danger at the time the driver observed her on the highway.