Case Title: Gunning v. Doe

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 78

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 78 
Docket: 
Cum-15-558 
Argued: 
October 26, 2016 
Decided: 
May 4, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Majority: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Dissent: 
JABAR, J. 
 
 
 
MARIE GUNNING 
 
v. 
 
JOHN DOE 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
 
[¶1]  In August 2013, Marie Gunning brought suit in the Superior Court 
(Cumberland County) against the anonymous publisher and writer(s) 
(collectively John Doe) of News as Viewed From a Crow’s Nest (Crow’s Nest), 
a publication distributed locally in Freeport, Maine, and accessible on the 
Internet,1 which Gunning claimed had published defamatory statements about 
her in several of its issues.  After a California court quashed a subpoena that 
Gunning served on the Crow’s Nest’s website host seeking to identify Doe, the 
Superior Court (Warren, J.) dismissed her complaint without prejudice for 
                                         
1  Doe’s brief states that the Crow’s Nest is no longer available on the Internet. 
 
2 
failure to effect service on the defendants.  Gunning appeals from that 
judgment.  The publisher of the Crow’s Nest (Doe #1) cross-appeals, agreeing 
with the court that Gunning is estopped by the California judgment from 
continuing to seek the Does’ identities, and additionally contending that 
Gunning cannot force the Does to reveal their identities because the Crow’s 
Nest is both nonactionable constitutionally protected parody and protected 
anonymous speech.  We conclude that Gunning is estopped by the prior 
California judgment, and we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court without 
reaching Doe’s alternative arguments. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
 
[¶2]  In 2011, Gunning ran for the Freeport Town Council and was 
defeated.  One week later, the Crow’s Nest, which declares under its masthead 
that it is “a parody look at the news,” published an “Election Special” issue, 
which included a photograph of the “Wicked Witch of the West” character from 
the classic movie The Wizard of Oz next to Gunning’s name, along with the 
caption “Aka: ‘Gunner Gunning’ ‘Miss Prozac 2003,’” and several purported 
quotes from Gunning.  Several other people with apparent ties to Freeport were 
treated similarly.  Gunning’s complaint against Doe alleged three counts of libel 
and one count each of false light and intentional infliction of emotional distress 
 
3 
based on the statements concerning her in the “Election Special” issue, as well 
as those appearing in fifteen subsequent issues of the Crow’s Nest. 
 
[¶3]  Gunning served a California subpoena on the Crow’s Nest’s website 
host, seeking the names, email addresses, and IP addresses of anyone 
associated with the publication’s website.  Does #1 and #2, who filed written 
declarations in the California Superior Court stating that they were the owner 
and writer, respectively, of the Crow’s Nest website, moved to quash the 
subpoena in that court, asserting that the Crow’s Nest was constitutionally 
protected parody and that they had a constitutional right to speak 
anonymously.  In a decision issued on January 24, 2014, the court granted the 
motion to quash, ruling that  
[Gunning] must make a prima facie showing of libel. . . . [She] failed 
to make this prima facie showing.  The Court finds that while the 
content of the Crow’s Nest could be seen as rude and distasteful, 
taking into consideration the context and contents of the 
statements at issue, it is a parody.  The speech at issue in the Crow’s 
Nest is protected under the First Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution.  The statements are not actionable speech such 
that the identities of the website owner and persons who comment 
or otherwise publish material printed in or posted online at the 
Crow’s Nest must be revealed pursuant to the subpoena. 
 
Doe v. Gunning, No. CPF-13-513271 (Cal. Super. Ct. S.F. County Jan. 24, 2014). 
 
[¶4]  Gunning did not appeal the California judgment.  Three months after 
that judgment issued, Gunning served a Maine subpoena on a Town of Freeport 
 
4 
employee in order to depose him to learn whether he was the writer for the 
Crow’s Nest.  The employee objected to the subpoena and provided an affidavit 
averring that he had never had anything to do with the Crow’s Nest and had no 
knowledge of anyone who did.  Fourteen months later, the employee, stating 
that Gunning again sought to depose him, moved to quash the subpoena on the 
grounds that Gunning was collaterally estopped by the California judgment 
from further discovery seeking to learn the identities of Does #1 and #2, and 
that her complaint failed to state a claim that could survive First Amendment 
scrutiny.2  Doe #1 separately moved to quash the employee’s subpoena and “to 
bar Gunning from issuing any other process to compel the disclosure of the 
anonymous speakers named in her Complaint, and to enter an order dismissing 
the Complaint.” 
 
[¶5]  On October 22, 2015, the Superior Court issued an order granting 
the motion to quash and dismissing Gunning’s complaint without prejudice for 
failure to effectuate service pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 3.3  The court said that “[l]eft 
to its own devices” it would “conclude that [G]unning has set forth a prima facie 
                                         
2  The court ruled that the employee’s standing to make those arguments was not at issue because 
Doe #1 also moved to quash the subpoena. 
 
3  Although the Rule ordinarily requires service “within 90 days after the filing of the complaint,” 
M.R. Civ. P. 3, the court explained that an extension of that deadline was implicit in its discovery 
orders in the case. 
 
5 
case and that she has submitted evidence sufficient to support the elements of 
her libel claim.”  The court found, however, that although it “would be inclined 
to find that there is at least a factual dispute as to whether [one specific] 
description of Gunning . . . would reasonably be understood to constitute a 
parody” and therefore be entitled to First Amendment protection, 
the court is not writing on a clean slate on that issue. . . . [W]hether 
or not this court agrees with the California ruling, the issue of 
whether Gunning has made the necessary prima facie showing [of 
an actionable claim] was actually litigated in California, was 
decided adversely to Gunning, and was essential to the outcome of 
the California action. . . . No appeal was sought.  Accordingly, the 
California decision is entitled to collateral estoppel effect and 
precludes Gunning from relitigating the same issue here in Maine. 
 
 
[¶6]  Accordingly, the court quashed the subpoena and dismissed the 
complaint for lack of service on the Does.  Gunning appealed and Doe #1 
cross-appealed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶7]  We first address the question of whether Gunning is precluded from 
relitigating in Maine the issue of the constitutional protection afforded to the 
statements made about her in the Crow’s Nest.  If she is, then the California 
court’s determination that the statements are parody protected by the 
First Amendment controls, and Gunning’s libel complaint fails to state an 
 
6 
actionable claim.4  In that event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
quashing the Freeport employee’s subpoena, and we need not reach the Does’ 
contention that the statements in the Crow’s Nest, if reviewed de novo, are 
entitled to protection either as constitutionally protected parody or as 
anonymous speech.  See State v. Marroquin-Aldana, 2014 ME 47, ¶ 33, 
89 A.3d 519 (“We review a court’s decision on a motion to quash for an abuse 
of discretion.”). 
 
[¶8]  The California judgment is conclusive to the extent that it quashed 
the subpoena issued to the Crow’s Nest’s website host, a result concerning a 
discrete collateral issue related to Gunning’s suit that she does not challenge.  
See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (holding that pursuant 
to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, “the judgment of the rendering State gains 
                                         
4  The elements of a libel claim are “a false and defamatory statement concerning another; an 
unprivileged publication to a third party; fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the 
publisher; and either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of 
special harm caused by the publication.”  Cole v. Chandler, 2000 ME 104, ¶ 5, 752 A.2d 1189 
(list headings omitted). Gunning’s false light claim is similar, except that it involves propagating 
defamatory information through “publicity” rather than by “publication.”  Id. ¶ 17.  If the statements 
in the Crow’s Nest are constitutionally protected, then they are not “unprivileged,” and Gunning 
cannot satisfy the second element of a libel claim.  See Simmons, Zillman & Gregory, Maine Tort Law 
§ 13-11 at 13-19 (2004 ed.) (“[A defamation] action that meets all state common law requirements 
for recovery may fail because a recovery for the plaintiff would unconstitutionally abridge the 
freedom of speech and press.”).  If Gunning’s libel claim fails for that reason, her claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress fails as well.  See Shay v. Walters, 702 F.3d 76, 83 (1st Cir. 2012) (“The 
Supreme Court has made it pellucid that a failed defamation claim cannot be recycled as a tort claim 
for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress.”); Ault v. Hustler Magazine, 860 F.2d 877, 
880 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) (“There is no independent cause of action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress based on the very same acts which are insufficient to support an action for 
defamation.”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1080 (1989). 
 
7 
nationwide force”).  Maine law, however, determines whether the judgment 
acts to foreclose Gunning’s claims in this State.  See Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws § 95 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. Supp. 1989 revisions) (“[L]ocal law 
of the State where the judgment was rendered . . . will be consulted to determine 
whether the judgment affects the claim or only some incidental issue.  If under 
this law the judgment was not on the merits and settled only some incidental 
issue . . . the judgment will be held conclusive in other States only as to the issue 
decided and the plaintiff will remain free to maintain an action on the original 
claim.”). 
 
[¶9]  In beginning that analysis, we have explained, applying 
well-established law, that 
[c]ollateral estoppel is the issue preclusion component of the 
principle of res judicata.  It prevents the relitigation of factual 
issues already decided if the identical issue was determined by a 
prior final judgment, and the party estopped had a fair opportunity 
and incentive to litigate the issue in a prior proceeding. . . . The 
court’s conclusion that collateral estoppel applies is a legal 
determination; our review of that conclusion is therefore de novo. 
 
Gray v. TD Bank, N.A., 2012 ME 83, ¶ 10, 45 A.3d 735 (alteration and quotation 
marks omitted) (emphases added); see Macomber v. MacQuinn-Tweedie, 
2003 ME 121, ¶ 22, 834 A.2d 131 (stating that “[w]e have long recognized that 
 
8 
the doctrine of res judicata has two prongs,” including “[i]ssue preclusion, also 
referred to as collateral estoppel,” and claim preclusion). 
A. 
Identical Issue 
 
 
[¶10]  Concerning the first element, the issue decided by the California 
court and that to be decided by Maine courts if Gunning is not estopped from 
relitigating it is the same—did Gunning make out a prima facie showing of libel, 
or were the statements made about her in the Crow’s Nest shielded by the 
First Amendment from being the basis for a libel claim.  The trial court correctly 
found that “Gunning previously litigated that issue in California[.]” 
B. 
Final Judgment 
 
 
[¶11]  Gunning vigorously contests the court’s determination that “[t]he 
decision of the California Superior Court constituted a final decision on 
Gunning’s application for interstate discovery.”  Nonetheless, the only issue that 
the California court was asked to decide was whether the subpoena directed to 
the Crow’s Nest’s website host should be quashed.  Once it did so, there was 
nothing left for the California court to consider.  See Fitzgerald v. Bilodeau, 
2006 ME 122, ¶ 4, 908 A.2d 1212 (“[A] judgment is final, and not interlocutory, 
when: (1) the trial court’s action fully decides and disposes of the whole matter 
leaving nothing further for the consideration and judgment of the trial court; 
 
9 
and (2) no subsequent proceedings in the case will render the appellate court’s 
decision immaterial.” (quotation marks omitted)).  The final provision in the 
California court’s order and the final notation in the docket entries concern the 
resolution of costs and attorney fees involved in adjudicating the motion—
indicative of a finished case. 
 
[¶12]  Gunning’s argument that she is not estopped because appellate 
review of the California judgment was effectively unavailable to her is not 
persuasive.  She points to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 
(Am. Law Inst. 1982), which provides that “relitigation of [an] issue in a 
subsequent action between the parties is not precluded . . .  [when] [t]he party 
against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of law, have obtained 
review of the judgment in the initial action.”  The first comment to section 28 
elaborates: “There is a[n] . . . exception to the rule of preclusion when . . . appeal 
does not lie[] by . . . extraordinary writ[.]”  Id. cmt. a. 
 
[¶13]  The Restatement limits the exception, however, in saying that 
“[t]he [section 28] exception . . . applies only when review is precluded as a 
matter of law.  It does not apply in cases where review is available but is not 
sought.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Here, review of the order quashing the 
subpoena was available by extraordinary writ pursuant to the California Code 
 
10 
of Civil Procedure,5 but Gunning opted not to seek such review.  Accordingly, 
the Restatement exception to the collateral estoppel doctrine that is invoked 
when no appellate review is available does not apply. 
 
[¶14]  Although Gunning argues that she would have been required to 
show “immediate harm” in order to obtain an extraordinary writ and chose not 
to file a petition because she believed she would have been unsuccessful, it was 
for the California courts, and not Gunning, to say that the likely termination of 
her Maine lawsuit was not a qualifying “immediate harm,” or that some other 
ground for granting a writ under California law did not apply. 
 
[¶15]  Like Gunning, the dissent goes to great lengths to predict an 
adverse ruling by California’s appellate courts had Gunning pursued 
an extraordinary writ.  Dissenting Opinion ¶¶ 23-26.  That would be an 
unnecessary exercise if Gunning had requested a writ, as was her right.  
See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2029.650(a) (Deering, LEXIS through ch. 4 of the 
2017 Reg. Sess.).  In any event, we are not a California court, and it is 
                                         
5  The California Code of Civil Procedure provides: “If a dispute arises relating to discovery . . . any 
request . . . to enforce, quash, or modify a subpoena, or for other relief may be filed in the superior 
court in the county in which discovery is to be conducted . . . .”  Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2029.600(a) 
(Deering, LEXIS through ch. 4 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.).  Thereafter, “[i]f a superior court issues an order 
. . . resolving a petition under Section 2029.600 . . . a person aggrieved by the order may petition the 
appropriate court of appeal for an extraordinary writ.”  Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2029.650(a) 
(Deering, LEXIS through ch. 4 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
 
11 
indisputably true that Gunning did not pursue the avenue of appellate review 
available to her under California law—the venue that she chose.  Had she done 
so, in addition to having a stronger argument in this appeal, that state’s 
appellate courts would have had an opportunity to address what Gunning and 
the dissent contend are serious errors of law in the California Superior Court’s 
decision.  See Dissenting Opinion ¶ 35. 
C. 
Fair Opportunity and Incentive 
 
[¶16]  Gunning asserts that although in furtherance of her Maine lawsuit 
she caused a subpoena to be served in California and then fully litigated the 
Does’ motion to quash it, she “did not have a full and fair incentive to litigate 
the issue in the California court” because “she had another avenue available to 
her from which to seek disclosure of the Crow’s Nest authors: the depositions 
that were being sought in Maine.”  That position is counterintuitive at best.  
A plaintiff in Gunning’s situation would be very motivated to litigate a motion 
that (1) presumably involved considerable time and expense to pursue; 
(2) would have potentially yielded all of what she continues to seek had it 
succeeded, namely the identities and contact information of the website’s host 
and contributors; and (3) would predictably lead, if the motion to quash were 
granted, to precisely what occurred—an effort to collaterally estop Gunning 
 
12 
from relitigating in Maine the central issue of whether the Crow’s Nest 
statements were actionable at all. 
 
[¶17]  The Restatement provides, in a comment captioned “[l]ack of fair 
opportunity to litigate in the initial action,” that  
the court in [a] second proceeding may conclude that issue 
preclusion should not apply because the party sought to be bound 
did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full 
and fair adjudication in the first proceeding.  Such a refusal to give 
the first judgment preclusive effect should not occur without a 
compelling showing of unfairness, nor should it be based simply on 
a conclusion that the first determination was patently erroneous. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 cmt. j.  Gunning does not make any 
“compelling showing of unfairness” sufficient for us to conclude that she lacked 
opportunity or incentive to fully litigate this matter in California. 
 
[¶18]  Furthermore, in charging that our decision is unfair to Gunning 
because “we are allowing the California law to prevent [her] from pursuing her 
defamation case in this state,” Dissenting Opinion ¶ 37, the dissent ignores the 
fact that Gunning had a full opportunity to litigate the issue at hand in the venue 
of her choosing.  Had Gunning chosen to prosecute this Maine action by 
pursuing discovery in Maine’s courts—for example if she had sought to depose 
 
13 
the Freeport employee before serving a subpoena in California,6 or if she had 
withdrawn the subpoena when the Does’ California motion to quash raised a 
potentially dispositive issue—then the Superior Court would have decided the 
Freeport employee’s motion to quash based on Maine law, and either party 
could have appealed an adverse ruling to this Court.  Instead, Gunning opted, of 
her own volition, to litigate a substantive issue in the California courts, 
presumably hoping for a favorable result.  After receiving an unfavorable ruling, 
and choosing not to pursue an appeal of that ruling, she cannot simply elect to 
relitigate the very same issue involving the same parties in another jurisdiction, 
hopeful of obtaining a more favorable result.  Such is the long-standing, 
well-established doctrine of collateral estoppel.  See Gray, 2012 ME 83, ¶ 10, 
45 A.3d 735. 
D. 
Conclusion 
 
[¶19]  Because the issue decided by the California court in a final 
judgment was the same issue that Gunning seeks to have a Maine court revisit, 
namely whether the Crow’s Nest enjoys constitutional protection sufficient to 
foreclose her libel claim, and because Gunning had both opportunity and 
                                         
6  In that event, if the Does had intervened and the Maine court ruled that Gunning had made out 
a prima facie case of libel, that judgment would have had preclusive effect in California. 
 
 
14 
incentive to litigate that issue in California, she is estopped from relitigating it 
in the Maine action.  See id.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in quashing the subpoena served on the Freeport employee, or in 
dismissing Gunning’s complaint for lack of service on the defendants as a 
result.7  See Marroquin-Aldana, 2014 ME 47, ¶ 33, 89 A.3d 519; M.R. Civ. P. 3.  
Having concluded that the court did not err in finding that Gunning is precluded 
from relitigating the dispositive issue, we do not address the question raised in 
the cross-appeal of whether on de novo review we would reach the same 
conclusion as did the California court, and we offer no opinion as to whether 
the trial court correctly articulated Maine law concerning the extent to which 
anonymous speech is protected.8 
                                         
7  Gunning does not challenge the court’s statement that, by agreement, if the subpoena were 
quashed then she “had no further avenues to pursue disclosure of the identities of John Does #1 
and #2.” 
 
8  Although the trial court went to considerable lengths to set out the analysis that it would have 
applied had it been “writing on a clean slate” on the issue of whether the Crow’s Nest’s statements 
concerning Gunning constituted actionable defamation, including citing a test articulated in 
Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), that 
discussion was dicta given the court’s ultimate conclusion that Gunning was estopped by the 
California decision.  We have previously made mention of Dendrite but have not adopted it, and we 
do not do so today.  See Fitch v. Doe, 2005 ME 39, ¶¶ 26-27, 869 A.2d 722 (“Because Doe failed to 
raise the issue in the trial court, we decline at this time to consider the extent to which the First 
Amendment affects the consideration of motions to disclose information about anonymous ISP 
subscribers.”).  Thus, the dissent’s discussion of the trial court’s Dendrite analysis, and its declaration 
that “we have not addressed whether the Dendrite ‘heightened burden’ or some other procedural 
hurdle at the commencement of the suit will be the law of our state,” Dissenting Opinion ¶ 34, simply 
create and then attack a straw man.  See supra ¶ 7.  We take no issue with the dissent’s appeal to 
sovereignty when it says that “[t]he law in this area is evolving and we should be making our own 
decision as to what is the best policy for Maine,” Dissenting Opinion ¶ 39, but today’s opinion does 
 
15 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JABAR, J., dissenting. 
 
[¶20]  I respectfully dissent because I do not believe that a California 
court’s order concerning a discovery dispute should be given preclusive effect 
on a defamation claim in Maine.  The law addressing defamation claims in 
California and Maine is not identical, and because of significant differences we 
should not give deference to the California court’s order.  For the reasons 
discussed below, I would vacate the trial court’s decision and remand for 
further proceedings. 
I.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Restatement of Judgments 
 
[¶21]  The Court refers to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 
(Am. Law Inst. 1982) to support its decision.  Court’s Opinion ¶ 13.  The 
Restatement in fact supports vacation of the trial court’s judgment.  It reads: 
                                         
not have the effect that the dissent fears.  The California decision is controlling only in this case, and 
then only because that is where Gunning chose to litigate.  In the future, the Legislature is free to 
make any policy judgment in this area that it deems fit within constitutional constraints, and, 
contrary to the dissent’s accusation, see Dissenting Opinion ¶¶ 28, 37, 39, our jurisprudence remains 
very much our own. 
 
16 
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid 
and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the 
judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between 
the parties is not precluded in the following circumstances: 
 
(1)  The party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a 
matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment in the initial 
action; or 
 
. . . 
 
(3)  A new determination of the issue is warranted by differences 
in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the 
two courts or by factors relating to the allocation of jurisdiction 
between them; or 
 
(4)  The party against whom preclusion is sought had a significantly 
heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial 
action than in the subsequent action; the burden has shifted to his 
adversary; or the adversary has a significantly heavier burden than 
he had in the first action; or 
 
(5)  There is a clear and convincing need for a new determination 
of the issue (a) because of the potential adverse impact of the 
determination on the public interest or the interests of persons not 
themselves parties in the initial action, (b) because it was not 
sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial action that the issue 
would arise in the context of a subsequent action, or (c) because 
the party sought to be precluded, as a result of the conduct of his 
adversary or other special circumstances, did not have an adequate 
opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the 
initial action. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28. 
[¶22]  The California discovery order against Gunning meets several of 
these exceptions to the general rule of issue preclusion.  First, pursuant to 
 
17 
section 28(1) Gunning could not have obtained review of the judgment of the 
California Superior Court.  Next, pursuant to sections 28(3) and (4), because 
California applies a different burden at the threshold of a case to litigants 
making defamation claims than the burden applied in Maine, a new 
determination of the issue is warranted.  Finally, pursuant to section 28(5), 
there is a clear and convincing need for a determination in Maine of the scope 
of First Amendment protection when it conflicts with a plaintiff’s right to seek 
recovery for defamation because this conflict involves important public 
interests.  
B. 
Inability to Seek Review 
 
[¶23]  The Restatement provides that relitigation is not precluded where 
“[t]he party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of law, 
have obtained review of the judgment in the initial action.”  Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments § 28(1).  Though the Court asserts that Gunning should 
have sought review in California of the order granting Doe’s motion to quash, 
Court’s Opinion ¶¶ 13-15, I disagree that as a matter of law review was 
available to Gunning. 
 
[¶24]  The California Code of Civil Procedure provides that when a 
California superior court issues an order resolving a motion to quash, “a person 
 
18 
aggrieved by the order may petition the appropriate court of appeal for an 
extraordinary writ.”  Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2029.650(a) (Deering, LEXIS through 
ch. 4 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2029.600(a) (Deering, LEXIS 
through ch. 4 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.).  The case law in California indicates that 
an extraordinary writ is difficult to obtain: “[discovery] rulings are typically 
vested in the trial court’s discretion, and even if an abuse can be shown it is 
often impossible for the aggrieved party to establish grounds for interlocutory 
intervention.”  O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 82 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006).  Only when an immediate harm is threatened by failure to 
grant review, “such as loss of a privilege against disclosure, for which there is 
no other adequate remedy,” will review be granted.  Id. at 83 (emphasis added); 
see also Raytheon Co. v. Superior Court, 256 Cal. Rptr. 425, 427 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“[W]rit review is appropriate when [a] petitioner seeks 
relief from an order which may undermine a privilege.”). 
 
[¶25]  The extraordinary writ required for Gunning’s discovery appeal to 
move forward in California is not available to her because such a writ would 
only be granted if the facts were flipped—to achieve the writ, the order would 
need to have breached some privilege, rather than maintained it.  For example, 
review by extraordinary writ has been granted when a court’s order denying 
 
19 
motions to quash resulted “in the production of privileged materials and 
threaten[ed] the confidential relationship” between a client and an attorney.  
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 526, 546 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) 
(quotation marks omitted).  Nor was Gunning subject to the immediate harm 
that is required to be granted an extraordinary writ.  The only review permitted 
for the discovery order was by extraordinary writ, and it was, as a matter of 
California law, unavailable to Gunning. 
 
[¶26]  It is unrealistic for the Court to assume otherwise.  See Court’s 
Opinion ¶ 13.  A litigant need not go through a lengthy and expensive process 
to demonstrate something that is legally evident on its face.  Where we can 
plainly see that review of the discovery order was not available in California, 
pursuant to section 28(1) of the Restatement, we should not allow collateral 
estoppel to prevent Gunning from litigating her defamation claim in Maine. 
C. 
Differing Burdens 
 
[¶27]  The Restatement also provides that relitigation is not precluded if 
the issue is one of law and a “new determination of the issue is warranted by 
differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the 
two courts,” or where “[t]he party against whom preclusion is sought had a 
significantly heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial 
 
20 
action.”  Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(3)-(4).  Here, both of these 
exceptions are implicated for essentially the same reason: the law addressing 
the issue of whether or not the litigant has a “heightened burden” when 
asserting a defamation action against an anonymous speaker has not 
previously been decided by this Court.  California, in contrast to Maine, has 
adopted a “heightened burden” standard requiring a prima facie showing of the 
elements of the plaintiff’s claim in order to overcome a motion to quash a 
subpoena 
seeking 
the 
speaker’s 
identity. 
 
See 
Krinsky 
v. 
Doe, 
72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 245 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).  Applying the California law here 
imposes California’s “significantly heavier burden of persuasion” upon 
Gunning.  See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(4). 
 
[¶28]  The drafters of the comments to the Restatement assert that in 
subsequent cases such as this, “the more flexible principle of stare decisis is 
sufficient to protect the parties and the court from unnecessary burdens.”  Id. 
cmt. b.  “A rule of law declared in an action between two parties should not be 
binding on them for all time, especially . . . when other litigants are free to urge 
that the rule should be rejected.  Such preclusion might unduly delay needed 
changes in the law and might deprive a litigant of a right that the court was 
prepared to recognize for other litigants in the same position.”  Id.  Allowing the 
 
21 
California order to determine the outcome of Maine defamation claims by 
collaterally estopping litigation in Maine on the basis of discovery orders delays 
needed review of Maine law and deprives litigants of rights that would 
otherwise be recognized. 
 
[¶29]  Additionally, “reexamination [of a legal principle] is particularly 
appropriate when the application of the rule of issue preclusion would impose 
on one of the parties a significant disadvantage.”  Id. cmt. c.  This conflict 
between a litigant’s right to access the courts and a defendant’s First 
Amendment rights is analogous to Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, which imposes 
a statutory burden upon those bringing claims that implicate a party’s 
constitutionally protected First Amendment rights.  See 14 M.R.S. § 556 (2016).  
In an anti-SLAPP case, upon a showing by the speaker “that the claims against 
it are based on the exercise of that party’s constitutional right to petition,” the 
burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate prima facie evidence 
through pleadings and affidavits that “at least one of the moving party’s 
petitioning activities was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any 
arguable basis in law and caused actual injury to the [non-moving party].”  
Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 2013 ME 51, ¶¶ 13-14, 66 A.3d 571; see also 
14 M.R.S. § 556.  This procedural hurdle placed before litigants in Maine is 
 
22 
similar to the “heightened burden” hurdle imposed by California on litigants 
pursuing a defamation action against a defendant claiming protected speech 
under the First Amendment. 
 
[¶30]  Like our jurisprudence addressing the anti-SLAPP statute, we are 
faced with a clash between Gunning’s right to access the courts for redress of 
grievances, and Doe’s First Amendment rights.  However, unlike the anti-SLAPP 
protections, there is no Maine legislation nor any Maine case law imposing a 
“heightened burden” upon litigants who bring defamation claims against 
individuals claiming that First Amendment protection.  Instead, there is only 
case law in a few scattered states that have placed this type of threshold hurdle 
against plaintiffs.  To date, we have not established such a hurdle, nor has the 
United States Supreme Court.  There are serious policy concerns that this Court 
should consider prior to placing this type of obstacle in front of litigants, not the 
least of which is whether such an obstacle should be imposed by us or by the 
Maine Legislature. 
 
[¶31]  The policy concerns are significant.  The California court relied 
upon Krinsky to require that Gunning show a prima facie case of defamation.  
Krinsky, in turn, relied upon Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); and 
 
23 
Highfields Capital Management L.P. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2004), 
among other cases, to hold, after a thorough analysis of methods by which 
courts in several jurisdictions balance the competing rights of access to the 
courts and First Amendment protection, that California will require a 
prima facie showing before allowing discovery to proceed in defamation cases 
against anonymous speakers.  Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 241-46.  The Krinsky 
court undertook a California-specific assessment of the case law, noting that it 
was addressing “California subpoenas” and that “specific Dendrite criteria to 
defeat a protective order or motion to quash may likewise be dependent on the 
different pleading and motion procedures across states.”9  Id. at 244.  The court 
even pointed out that in certain states the second Dendrite criterion would be 
“essential,” whereas in other states, it would be “superfluous.”  Id. 
                                         
9  It is worth noting that the Dendrite court’s analysis emphasized that “New Jersey’s State 
Constitution affords even greater protection to persons’ rights to free speech than does [the] federal 
Constitution . . . .”  Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 765 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).  Other 
courts have therefore applied a “heightened burden” to plaintiffs in defamation cases based on state 
constitutional protections that may or may not be coextensive with the constitutional protections 
guaranteed by the Maine Constitution, see id. at 766—protections that the Court here does not 
address. 
 
 
24 
[¶32]  We should engage in our own assessment of whether to impose a 
“heightened burden” in defamation claims against anonymous speakers 
asserting First Amendment protection.10 
D. 
Public Interests 
 
[¶33]  Finally, the Restatement provides that relitigation is not precluded 
when “[t]here is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of the 
issue . . . because of the potential adverse impact of the determination on the 
public interest or the interests of persons not themselves parties in the initial 
action.”  Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(5)(a). 
                                         
10  In this case, the Maine Superior Court mistakenly concluded that Maine and California law are 
identical, imposing a “heightened burden” on litigants pursuing a defamation claim against an 
anonymous defendant.  The court attempted to define the issue before it by stating that “[t]he 
motions to quash before the court turn on whether Gunning has met her burden of demonstrating 
entitlement to proceed with discovery when her rights are weighed against what the Law Court has 
stated as ‘the recognized right to anonymous speech,’” citing to our decision in Fitch v. Doe, 
2005 ME 39, ¶ 26, 869 A.2d 722. 
 
In Fitch, however, Doe and amici urged the Court to adopt the “heightened burden” test enunciated 
in Dendrite, and the Court declined to address the question because Doe failed to raise a First 
Amendment issue in the trial court.  Id. ¶ 27.  As the Court today acknowledges, Court’s Opinion ¶ 18 
n.8, we have never held that Dendrite is the law in our state, or otherwise indicated that Dendrite or 
any similar “heightened burden” would control cases in which a plaintiff seeks to bring a defamation 
case. 
 
It is therefore inapposite that, relying upon the elements from Dendrite, which the California court 
did not even cite, the Maine Superior Court would conclude that because “one of the essential 
Dendrite requirements”—whether Gunning established a prima facie case sufficient to support her 
libel claim—was fully litigated in California and decided adversely to Gunning, collateral estoppel 
precludes Gunning from relitigating her claim in Maine. 
 
 
25 
 
[¶34]  In Maine, we have not addressed whether the Dendrite “heightened 
burden” or some other procedural hurdle at the commencement of the suit will 
be the law of our state.11  Even though the Maine Superior Court in this case 
indicated that Gunning had presented a prima facie case, the Court today is 
preventing Gunning from proceeding with her defamation claims because a 
California court interpreting California state law concluded that pursuant to an 
analysis applied uniquely in California—which the Krinsky court found 
“unnecessary and potentially confusing,” Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244—
Gunning had not presented a prima facie case.  This is not the approach that we 
should take. 
 
[¶35]  Also concerning is the California court’s conclusion that the speech 
at issue was parody and therefore protected by the First Amendment, 
rendering the speech not actionable.12  What constitutes parody includes factual 
determinations best left to a jury.  See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 
                                         
11  The Court states in its opinion that if Gunning had litigated the motion to quash in Maine and 
the Maine court had ruled that Gunning had made out a prima facie case, that judgment would have 
preclusive effect in California.  Court’s Opinion ¶ 18 & n.6.  This argument is misplaced because 
presently, under Maine law, Gunning would not be required to establish a prima facie case before 
proceeding with discovery. 
 
12  The Court states that the claim for defamation was for Doe’s comparison in newsprint of 
Gunning with the “Wicked Witch of the West” from The Wizard of Oz, as well as a caption stating 
“Miss Prozac 2003.”  Court’s Opinion ¶ 2.  The article concerning Gunning also contains a more 
blatantly defamatory statement: “Rumors continue that, Marie is suffering from a bipolar disorder 
with acute depression and paranoia, amplified by substance abuse.” 
 
26 
501 U.S. 496, 522 (1991) (stating that when “[a] reasonable jury could find a 
material difference between the meaning of [a published, written] passage and 
[a] tape-recorded statement,” the falsity of the published passage is a jury 
question); Nike, Inc. v. “Just Did It” Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(discussing several trademark parody cases in which summary judgment was 
vacated because “[t]oo many disputed facts require[d] a trial for resolution”); 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L&L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 317-18, 320 
(4th Cir. 1992) (holding that a federal district court judge “improperly assumed 
the jury’s role of determining” whether a t-shirt depicting a beer can was 
parody when the district court granted entry of judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, because “the jury was uniquely positioned to make the critical 
determination in that regard”); San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v. Superior 
Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (“It is not for the court to 
evaluate the parody as to whether it went ‘too far.’”); Kiesau v. Bantz, 
686 N.W.2d 164, 177 (Iowa 2004) (“To be a parody, the jury must find the 
altered photograph could not reasonably be understood as describing actual 
facts . . . or actual events . . . .”), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott 
Int’l Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 708 & n.3 (Iowa 2016).  Because the California court 
entered into its own assessment, based on review of the parties’ moving papers, 
 
27 
of whether the speech constituted a parody, thereby reducing a mixed question 
of fact and law into a question of law, the California court’s discovery order 
should not have preclusive effect on the litigation of the issue in Maine. 
[¶36]  Furthermore, the Maine Superior Court stated that it believed 
Gunning had established a prima facie case of defamation and that there was a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether Doe’s speech constituted parody, but it felt 
compelled to collaterally estop Gunning from litigating the issue because of the 
California court’s discovery decision.  Unless and until we impose a “heightened 
burden” on litigants claiming defamation, a jury, rather than a court, should 
determine whether Doe’s speech was parody.  Because of the status of the law 
in Maine, the issues in the California court are not identical to those before the 
court in Maine and do not warrant preclusive application of collateral estoppel. 
[¶37]  Despite the Maine trial court’s indication that Gunning may have 
satisfied the “heightened burden” standard, we are allowing the California law 
to prevent Gunning from pursuing her defamation case in this state.  Maine has 
never ruled that there is a “heightened burden” for a plaintiff to make a prima 
facie showing of defamation before proceeding with a claim.  A decision of this 
magnitude should not be decided by simply deferring to a California trial 
court’s imposition of a “heightened burden” on a discovery order.  See 
 
28 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29(7) (Am. Law Inst. 1982) (stating that 
a party should not be precluded from relitigating an issue when “[t]he issue is 
one of law and treating it as conclusively determined would inappropriately 
foreclose opportunity for obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule upon 
which it was based”). 
[¶38]  “Decisions of this sort demonstrate that res judicata, as the 
embodiment of a public policy, must, at times, be weighed against competing 
interests, and must, on occasion, yield to other policies.”  Spilker v. Hankin, 
188 F.2d 35, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1951).  “[W]hen as here private litigation has 
extensive implications of public import, the rule of res judicata or estoppel is 
not allowed to stultify reassessment of the prior decision.  The public interest 
supersedes the private interest.”  Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 1178, 
1182 (E.D. Va. 1969).  Because the public interest in Maine courts establishing 
our own framework for balancing the rights at stake in this case outweighs 
Doe’s interest in not relitigating the issue of whether Doe’s speech constitutes 
defamation, I cannot join the Court’s decision. 
II.  CONCLUSION 
[¶39]  There are significant issues in today’s society surrounding social 
media, blogs, and claims of “fake news.”  The law in this area is evolving, and we 
 
29 
should be making our own decision as to what is the best policy for Maine.  
Furthermore, as was done by the Maine Legislature with our anti-SLAPP 
statute, the Legislature should determine whether any “heightened burden” 
should be imposed upon litigants at the filing stage.  This important policy 
decision should not be resolved by a discovery order in California. 
[¶40]  I would vacate the Maine Superior Court’s decision and remand 
the case so that it may proceed as any other defamation case filed in a Maine 
court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gene R. Libby, Esq., Tara A. Rich, Esq., and Tyler Smith, Esq. (orally), Libby 
O’Brien Kingsley & Champion LLC, Kennebunk, for appellant Marie Gunning 
 
Sigmund D. Schutz, Esq. (orally), Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLP, 
Portland, for appellee John Doe 
 
Zachary L. Heiden, Esq., American Civil Liberties Union of Maine Foundation, 
Portland, Paul Alan Levy, Esq., Public Citizens Litigation Group, Washington, DC, 
and George J. Marcus, Esq., Marcus, Clegg & Mistretta, P.A., Portland, for amici 
curiae Public Citizen, Inc., and American Civil Liberties Union of Maine 
Foundation 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number CV-2013-359 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY