Case Title: Delgado v. Interinsurance Exchange etc.

Citation: 47 Cal. 4th 302

Docket Number: S155129

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2009-08-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 8/3/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
JONATHAN DELGADO, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S155129 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/3 B191272 
INTERINSURANCE EXCHANGE OF  
) 
THE AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF  
)  
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. VC045588 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
This case involves an insurance policy that covers injury resulting from “an 
accident.”  After an assault and battery by the insured, the injured party sued the 
insured, alleging that the insured had acted under the unreasonable belief of 
having to defend himself, an act that according to the injured party fell within the 
policy‟s coverage of “an accident.”  Does the insurance company have a duty to 
defend that action?  The answer is “no.”  We therefore reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal, which had reversed the trial court. 
I 
 
Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club of Southern California 
(ACSC) issued to Craig Reid a homeowner‟s insurance policy providing liability 
coverage for up to $100,000.  On November 7, 2003, while the policy was in 
effect, insured Reid hit and kicked 17-year-old Jonathan Delgado.   
 
2 
 
In March 2004, Delgado sued Reid.  The complaint alleged two causes of 
action.  The first alleged an intentional tort in that Reid “in an unprovoked fashion 
and without any justification physically struck, battered and kicked” Delgado.  
The second cause of action alleged that Reid “negligently and unreasonably 
believed” he was engaging in self-defense “and unreasonably acted in self defense 
when [Reid] negligently and unreasonably physically and violently struck and 
kicked minor Jonathan Delgado repeatedly causing serious and permanent 
injuries.”   
 
Reid tendered to ACSC the defense of Delgado‟s lawsuit.  ACSC denied 
coverage and refused to provide Reid a defense.  ACSC asserted that the assault 
was not covered because it was not an “occurrence,” which was defined in the 
policy as an “accident,” and that the complaint‟s allegations arose out of Reid‟s 
intentional acts, which came within the policy‟s intentional acts exclusion. 
 
In January 2005, the trial court, at Delgado‟s request, dismissed the 
intentional tort claim.  Delgado and Reid then settled the action by stipulating that 
Reid‟s use of force occurred because he negligently believed he was acting in self-
defense, and by stipulating to entry of a $150,000 judgment against Reid.  Later, 
Reid agreed to pay Delgado $25,000 and he assigned to Delgado Reid‟s claims 
against his insurer, ACSC; Delgado in turn agreed to give Reid a partial satisfaction 
of judgment and a covenant not to execute on the remainder of the judgment.   
 
Delgado then brought this action against ACSC.  The trial court sustained 
ACSC‟s demurrer on the ground that no facts were pled to establish coverage 
under the policy, but the court allowed Delgado leave to amend the complaint.  
Delgado then filed a first amended complaint alleging, on information and belief, 
that at the time of the incident the insured, Reid, acted “without intent to injure” 
Delgado “but with intent to defend himself and his family . . . from what [Reid] 
perceived was an imminent threat of harm . . . .”  It further alleged that Reid‟s 
 
3 
“reaction to what he perceived was an imminent threat of harm was an 
overreaction, [was] not willful or malicious, and was an accident . . . within the 
meaning of Reid‟s insurance policy.” 
 
The first amended complaint alleged two causes of action seeking 
declarations from the trial court that ACSC had a duty to defend and indemnify its 
insured, Reid, in the underlying lawsuit brought by Delgado; one cause of action 
brought under Insurance Code section 11580, subdivision (b)(2), in which 
Delgado sought to recover from ACSC as a judgment creditor of ACSC‟s insured, 
Reid; and three causes of action alleging bad faith — one for failure to defend, one 
for refusal to indemnify, and one for failure to pay medical benefits. 
 
ACSC demurred to the first amended complaint.  At the hearing on the 
demurrer, the trial court asked Delgado‟s counsel what facts were alleged 
regarding the events that led insured Reid to think he was acting in self-defense.  
Counsel responded:  “We can‟t allege facts leading up to what happened when my 
client was ultimately struck.  We can‟t allege those facts.”   
 
The trial court sustained ACSC‟s demurrer without leave to amend, finding 
that the settlement and stipulated judgment between Reid and Delgado were 
“contrived” to expose ACSC to liability, that it was “disingenuous at best” to 
characterize insured Reid‟s assault and battery as an “accident,” and that there 
were no facts alleged to support Delgado‟s claim that Reid believed he was acting 
in self-defense. 
 
The Court of Appeal reversed.  After stating that allegations of harmful acts 
done with an unreasonable belief in self-defense describe conduct that is “properly 
characterized as nonintentional tortious conduct,” the Court of Appeal concluded 
that Delgado‟s first amended complaint alleged acts by insured Reid that 
potentially were an “accident” covered by the policy. 
 
We granted ACSC‟s petition for review. 
 
4 
II 
 
As mentioned earlier, in this case the trial court sustained ACSC‟s demurrer 
to Delgado‟s complaint without leave to amend.  In reviewing the ensuing 
judgment of dismissal, “we treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts 
properly pleaded, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions or 
conclusions of law.”  (City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 
865.)   
 
At issue here is whether the insurer had a duty to defend its insured in an 
action brought by a third party.1  To prevail in an action seeking declaratory relief 
on the question of the duty to defend, “the insured must prove the existence of a 
potential for coverage, while the insurer must establish the absence of any such 
potential.  In other words, the insured need only show that the underlying claim 
may fall within policy coverage; the insurer must prove it cannot.”  (Montrose 
Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 300.)  The duty to defend 
exists if the insurer “becomes aware of, or if the third party lawsuit pleads, facts 
giving rise to the potential for coverage under the insuring agreement.”  (Waller v. 
Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 19.)  We look first to the terms of 
the policy.  (Ibid.)   
 
ACSC‟s policy provides liability coverage for bodily injury caused by an 
“occurrence,” which the policy defines as “an accident . . . which, during the 
                                              
1  
Because the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify (Montrose 
Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 299), a conclusion that 
here ACSC did not have a duty to defend will be dispositive of plaintiff Delgado‟s 
claim that ACSC had a duty to indemnify.  That conclusion is also dispositive of 
Delgado‟s claim that he is a judgment creditor under Insurance Code section 
11580, subdivision (b)(2).  Under that statute, an action by a judgment creditor of 
an insured against an insurance company is “on the policy and subject to its terms 
and limitations . . . .”   
 
5 
policy period, results in bodily injury . . . .”  In the context of liability insurance, 
an accident is “ „an unexpected, unforeseen, or undesigned happening or 
consequence from either a known or an unknown cause.‟ ”  (Geddes & Smith, Inc. 
v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 558, 563-564 (Geddes); 
accord, Hogan v. Midland National Ins. Co. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 553, 559.)  “This 
common law construction of the term „accident‟ becomes part of the policy and 
precludes any assertion that the term is ambiguous.”  (Collin v. American Empire 
Ins. Co. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 787, 810; see Bartlome v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1235, 1239.) 
 
Here, injured party Delgado contends that because insured Reid‟s assault 
and battery was motivated by an unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense, 
the act fell within the policy‟s definition of “an accident,” because from the 
perspective of the injured party the assault was “unexpected, unforeseen, and 
undesigned.”  We disagree that whether there was an “accident” within the policy 
language must be determined from the injured party‟s perspective. 
 
In support of his contention, Delgado points to certain language by this 
court in Geddes, supra, 51 Cal.2d at page 563.  This court there stated:  “No all-
inclusive definition of the word „accident‟ can be given.  It has been defined „as “a 
casualty — something out of the usual course of events and which happens 
suddenly and unexpectedly and without design of the person injured.” ‟ ”  Geddes 
went on to state that the term “accident” “ „ “includes any event which takes place 
without the foresight or expectation of the person acted upon or affected by the 
event.” ‟ ”  (Ibid.)  It is this italicized sentence on which Delgado relies.  But that 
language should be read in context, not in isolation, as Delgado does.  Geddes 
quoted several sources that had defined “accident.”  The italicized sentence on 
which Delgado relies is only one of those definitions.  Immediately after the 
sentence in question, Geddes quoted this definition of “accident”:  “ „Accident, as 
 
6 
a source and cause of damage to property, within the terms of an accident policy, 
is an unexpected, unforeseen, or undesigned happening or consequence from 
either a known or an unknown cause.‟ ”  (Id. at pp. 563-564.)  Notably, this quoted 
definition lacks any mention of the need to consider the perspective of the injured 
party.  And it was this definition of “accident” that this court in Geddes applied to 
the case before it.  As Geddes pointed out, it is the “unexpected, undesigned, and 
unforeseen” nature of the injury-causing event that determines whether there is an 
“accident” within the policy‟s coverage.  (Id. at p. 564.)   
 
Similarly misplaced is Delgado‟s reliance on this court‟s later decision in 
Hogan v. Midland National Ins. Co., supra, 3 Cal.3d 553.  Hogan held that to the 
extent the property damage that the injured party incurred there was the result of 
the injured party‟s deliberate acts, “no accident occurred within the Geddes [] 
definition.”  (Id. at p. 560.)  Hogan did not hold that whether an event is an 
“accident” is, as Delgado would have us conclude, to be determined from the 
perspective of the injured party independent of the insured‟s intention.  Indeed, 
Hogan concluded that a deliberate act causing an injury is not an accident.  (Ibid.) 
 
Delgado‟s contention does find support in some language from Maxon v. 
Security Ins. Co. (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 603 (Maxon).  The Court of Appeal there 
held that an insurance company was not obligated to defend its insured against a 
claim of malicious prosecution by a third party.  (Id. at p. 617.)  Although 
unnecessary to its decision, Maxon nevertheless discussed whether malicious 
prosecution was an “accident” within the coverage of the insurance policy there in 
issue.  In the course of that discussion, Maxon quoted the same language from this 
court‟s decision in Geddes, supra, 51 Cal.2d at page 563, on which Delgado relies:  
“ „ “[Accident] includes any event which takes place without the foresight or 
expectation of the person acted upon or affected by the event.” ‟ ”  Based on that 
language from Geddes, Maxon stated that the third party‟s claim against the 
 
7 
insured for malicious prosecution was based on an accident, reasoning that the 
arrest and prosecution of a person who is innocent and has no reason to expect an 
arrest “is, as to such person, an accident.”  (Maxon, supra, at p. 612.)  Maxon‟s 
reliance on the Geddes language was wrong.  As we explained earlier, that 
language played no role in the holding that Geddes ultimately reached:  that the 
injury there was caused by an accident because it was “unexpected, undesigned, 
and unforeseen” (Geddes, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 564), and not because the injury 
was unexpected by the injured party. 
 
Were we to accept Delgado‟s argument that any interpretation of the policy 
term “accident” should be based solely on whether the injury-causing event was 
expected, foreseen, or designed by the injured party, then intentional acts that by 
no stretch could be considered accidental nevertheless would fall within the 
policy‟s coverage of an “accident.”  Under Delgado‟s reasoning, even child 
molestation could be considered an “accident” within the policy‟s coverage, 
because presumably the child neither expected nor intended the molestation to 
occur.  (See J. C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. M. K. (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1009, 1028, 
fn. 17 [“[T]he very notion of „accidental‟ child molestation is implausible”].)  
Other examples that come to mind are arson, robbery, and premeditated murder, 
which are acts that do not fit the common understanding of the word “accident” 
because they involve acts intentionally done with the intent to cause harm.   
 
Delgado contends that ACSC could have included in the policy‟s coverage 
of an “accident” the phrase “from the standpoint of the insured,” if the insurer‟s 
intent was to have the word “accident” defined from the perspective of the insured 
as opposed to that of the injured party.  In support, he points out that earlier 
standard comprehensive general liability policies defined the word “occurrence” 
as “ „an accident . . . which results in bodily injury or property damage neither 
 
8 
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.‟ ”  (2 Croskey et al., Cal. 
Practice Guide:  Insurance Litigation (The Rutter Group 2008) ¶ 7:42.1, p. 7A-13.) 
 
We are not persuaded that because the coverage clause of ACSC‟s policy 
does not use the words “neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the 
insured,” the word “accident” as used in the policy means that whether an event is 
an accident must be determined from the injured party‟s viewpoint.  The phrase 
“neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured” in earlier 
comprehensive general liability policies has been construed as modifying the 
policy term “injury and damages,” not “accident.”  (See City of South El Monte v. 
Southern Cal. Joint Powers Ins. Authority (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1629, 1646; 
United Pacific Ins. Co. v. McGuire Co. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1560, 1566; 
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1205, 1209.)  
We note that in 1985 that phrase was deleted from the standard comprehensive 
general liability policy coverage clauses because of conflicting judicial 
interpretations of the phrase.  Some courts had conflated the concept of “an 
accident” with the phrase “neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of 
the insured.”  This led those courts to “conclud[e] that an „accident‟ refers to an 
unexpected or unintended injury.”  (3 New Appleman, Insurance Law:  Practice 
Guide (2008) ¶ 30.07[4], pp. 30-48.)  Other courts, however, “concluding that the 
terms are different and have their own meanings, held that the „occurrence‟ 
definition is limited to events that are accidental in nature, and the rest of the 
definition merely confirms that expected or intended injuries are not „accidental.‟ ”  
(Ibid.) 
 
Under California law, the word “accident” in the coverage clause of a 
liability policy refers to the conduct of the insured for which liability is sought to 
be imposed on the insured.  (Quan v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 
583, 596; Collin v. American Empire Ins. Co., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 804.)  
 
9 
This view is consistent with the purpose of liability insurance.  Generally, liability 
insurance is a contract between the insured and the insurance company to provide 
the insured, in return for the payment of premiums, protection against liability for 
risks that are within the scope of the policy‟s coverage.  Insurance policies are 
read in light of the parties‟ reasonable expectations and, when ambiguous, are 
interpreted to protect the reasonable expectations of the insured.  (State of 
California v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1008, 1018, 1026.)  Therefore, the 
appropriate inquiry here is not, as Delgado would have it, confined to viewing the 
pertinent event from the perspective of the injured party.   
 
Delgado insists that an insured‟s unreasonable, subjective belief in the need 
for self-defense converts into “an accident” an act that is purposeful and intended 
to inflict injury.  We disagree.   
 
We begin by noting that an injury-producing event is not an “accident” 
within the policy‟s coverage language when all of the acts, the manner in which 
they were done, and the objective accomplished occurred as intended by the actor.  
(Hogan v. Midland National Ins. Co., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 560; Stellar v. State 
Farm General Ins. Co. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1498, 1505; Merced Mutual Ins. 
Co. v. Mendez (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 41, 50.)  Here, insured Reid‟s assault and 
battery on Delgado were acts done with the intent to cause injury; there is no 
allegation in the complaint that the acts themselves were merely shielding or the 
result of a reflex action.  Therefore, the injuries were not as a matter of law 
accidental, and consequently there is no potential for coverage under the policy.  
(Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. MV Transportation (2005) 36 Cal.4th 643, 655.) 
 
We also note that in a number of contexts other than those involving claims 
pertaining to assault and battery, which is the conduct at issue here, courts have in 
insurance cases rejected the notion that an insured‟s mistake of fact or law 
transforms a knowingly and purposefully inflicted harm into an accidental injury.  
 
10 
(E.g., Merced Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mendez, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 41 [oral 
copulation and attempted oral copulation not an accident notwithstanding 
insured‟s mistaken belief that victim consented]; Collin v. American Empire Ins. 
Co., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th 787 [misunderstanding of legal rights did not turn 
conversion of property into an accident]; Quan v. Truck Ins. Exchange, supra, 67 
Cal.App.4th 583 [rape not transformed into an accident notwithstanding insured‟s 
mistaken belief that victim consented]; Swain v. California Casualty Ins. Co. 
(2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1 [mistaken belief that acts were lawful did not render 
wrongful eviction of tenant an accident]; Lyons v. Fire Ins. Exchange (2008) 161 
Cal.App.4th 880 [insured‟s subjective miscalculation of victim‟s state of mind did 
not make sexual attack an accident]; see J. C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. M. K., 
supra, 52 Cal.3d 1009 [homeowner‟s policy as a matter of law did not provide 
coverage for child molestation regardless of lack of intent to harm].)   
 
Here, injured party Delgado advances two different arguments to support 
his claim that, unlike the above-cited decisions pertaining to oral copulation, 
conversion, rape, wrongful eviction, and child molestation, an actor‟s 
unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense converts an assault and battery 
into an unintentional act and therefore is “an accident” within the policy‟s 
coverage.  We reject these contentions. 
 
Delgado‟s first argument relies on a statement by this court in Gray v. 
Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263 (Gray).  The issue there was whether 
an insurance company had a duty to defend an action alleging that the insured had 
“ „willfully, maliciously, brutally and intentionally assaulted‟ ” the plaintiff.  (Id. 
at p. 267.)  Unlike the case now before us, the policy‟s coverage clause in Gray 
did not define coverage in terms of injuries resulting from “an accident.”  It stated 
that the insurer would defend its insured against “ „any suit‟ ” alleging “ „bodily 
injury or property damage . . . even if any of the allegations are groundless, false 
 
11 
or fraudulent.‟ ”  (Ibid.)  In discussing the scope of the policy‟s exclusion for 
intentional injury and the rules allowing liberal amendments to pleadings, Gray 
remarked that the insured “might have been able to show that in physically 
defending himself, even if he exceeded the reasonable bounds of self-defense, he 
did not commit wilful and intended injury, but engaged only in nonintentional 
tortious conduct.”  (Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 277, italics added.)  Delgado 
relies on that statement from Gray and on several cases that have cited Gray for 
the proposition that acts done in self-defense are unintentional and therefore 
accidental.   
 
That reliance is misplaced.  Gray and the cases that have cited it pertained 
to the question of unreasonable use of force or unreasonable self-defense in the 
context of an insurance policy‟s exclusionary clauses, not as here in the context of 
a policy‟s coverage clause.  (Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 266; Quan v. Truck Ins. 
Exchange, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 595-596; David Kleis, Inc. v. Superior 
Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1048; Merced Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mendez, 
supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 47; Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Whitaker (1986) 181 
Cal.App.3d 532, 537; Mullen v. Glens Falls Ins. Co. (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 163, 
170.)  At issue here is whether unreasonable self-defense comes within the 
policy‟s coverage for “an accident,” not whether it falls within a particular policy 
exclusion. 
 
Moreover, Gray did not say that an unreasonable belief in self-defense will 
convert into unintentional acts any purposeful acts that were done with intent to 
harm.  The insurance company in Gray contended that it was not obligated to 
defend its insured against a claim of assault because the policy excluded coverage 
for “ „bodily injury or property damages caused intentionally by or at the direction 
of the insured.‟ ”  (Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 267.)  “ „[A]lthough exclusions are 
construed narrowly and must be proven by the insurer, the burden is on the insured 
 
12 
to bring the claim within the basic scope of coverage, and (unlike exclusions) 
courts will not indulge in a forced construction of the policy‟s insuring clause to 
bring a claim within the policy‟s coverage.‟ ”  (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 
Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 16, quoting Collin v. American Empire Ins. Co., supra, 
21 Cal.App.4th at p. 803.)  A policy clause excluding intentional injury, such as 
the one in Gray, is treated as having the same meaning as the language in 
Insurance Code section 533, which provides that an insurance company is not 
liable for a loss caused by a willful act of the insured.  (Allstate Ins. Co. v. Overton 
(1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 843.)   
 
Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at page 277, stated that an unreasonable belief in the 
need for self-defense could remove the resulting act from the reach of the policy‟s 
exclusion clause for intentional acts (that is, makes the act “nonintentional”).  
Gray did not say, however, that such a belief would convert an intentional act into 
an unintentional act, as Delgado here asserts.  Acceptance of Delgado‟s argument 
would render Gray‟s statement nonsensical, because a purposeful and intentional 
act remains purposeful and intentional regardless of the reason or motivation for 
the act.  (Hogan v. Midland National Ins. Co., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 560 [whatever 
the motivation, a deliberate and calculated act is not an accident]; Lyons v. Fire 
Ins. Exchange, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 889 [mental miscalculation of 
victim‟s state of mind does not transform intentional conduct done with 
knowledge of objective facts into an accident]; Swain v. California Casualty Ins. 
Co., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 10 [“We know of no case from this or any other 
jurisdiction where a harm knowingly and purposefully inflicted was held 
 
13 
„accidental‟ merely because the person inflicting it erroneously believed himself 
entitled to do so”].)2   
 
Delgado‟s second argument — that an insured‟s mistaken and unreasonable 
belief in the need for self-defense converts the assault into an accidental act — is 
based on the notion that a provocative act by the injured party turns the insured‟s 
physical response into an accidental act.  Under this view, the injured party‟s 
provocative acts are unforeseen and unexpected from the perspective of the 
insured, making the insured‟s responsive acts unplanned and therefore accidental, 
triggering the policy‟s coverage for “an accident.” 
 
The source of that argument is a statement by the Court of Appeal in 
Merced Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mendez, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 41.  There the court, in 
                                              
2  
Delgado‟s amicus curiae Steven W. Murray cites this court‟s decision in 
Lowell v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 298 as supporting Delgado‟s 
claim that acts done in self-defense are accidents.  Lowell, however, is readily 
distinguishable from this case.  There the policy provided coverage for injuries 
caused by an accident.  The third party sued the insured, alleging assault and 
battery; the insured tendered the defense of that action to the insurance company, 
asserting that the assault and battery never happened.  (Id. at p. 300.)  This court 
held that the insurance company had a duty to defend because the policy promised 
to defend the insured even against groundless claims, because language in the 
policy‟s exclusion clause stated that assault and battery “ „shall be deemed an 
accident unless committed by or at the direction of the insured,‟ ” and because the 
exclusionary language was not conspicuous, plain and clear.  This court, without 
further reference to the language in the policy‟s exclusion clause regarding 
assaultive conduct committed by the insured, stated that the policy there 
“categorically states that assault and battery is to be deemed an accident, covered 
by the policy.”  (Id. at p. 301.)  Lowell reasoned that there the insured could 
reasonably expect a defense, as the policy stated that the insurer would defend 
against groundless claims and that “ „[a]ssault and battery shall be deemed an 
accident . . . .‟ ”  (Ibid.)  There is nothing in the policy now before us that would 
support a conclusion that the insured reasonably expected a defense.  Here, unlike 
the situation in Lowell, nothing in the policy defines an assault and battery as 
accidental conduct.   
 
14 
rejecting the argument that an “accident” may have occurred because the insured 
mistakenly believed the victim consented to a sexual battery and assault, stated 
that “an „accident‟ exists when any aspect in the causal series of events leading to 
the injury or damage was unintended by the insured and a matter of fortuity.”  (Id. 
at p. 50, italics added.)  The premise of Delgado‟s argument is that whenever a 
provocative act by the injured person is part of the causal chain of events that 
ultimately led to the insured‟s injury-causing conduct — here an assault and 
battery — the insured‟s conduct should be considered accidental. 
 
Delgado overlooks the context in which the Court of Appeal in Merced 
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mendez, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at page 50, made the statement 
in question.  In the same paragraph, the court also observed:  “An accident, 
however, is never present when the insured performs a deliberate act unless some 
additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs that 
produces the damage.  [Citation.]  Clearly, where the insured acted deliberately 
with the intent to cause injury, the conduct would not be deemed an accident.”  
(Ibid.)  Thus, the statement upon which Delgado relies — that an accident exists 
whenever any part of the causal events leading to the injury was unintended — 
referred to events in the causal chain after the acts of the insured, not to events 
preceding the acts of the insured.   
 
Here, Delgado‟s complaint alleges acts of wrongdoing by the insured 
against him.  Those are the acts that must be considered the starting point of the 
causal series of events, not the injured party‟s acts that purportedly provoked the 
insured into committing assault and battery on Delgado.  The term “accident” in 
the policy‟s coverage clause refers to the injury-producing acts of the insured, not 
those of the injured party.  (Quan v. Truck Ins. Exchange, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 596; Collin v. American Empire Ins. Co., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 804.)  In 
determining whether the injury is a result of an accident, taking into consideration 
 
15 
acts or events before the insured‟s acts would be illogical and contrary to 
California case law.   
 
“Any given event, including an injury, is always the result of many causes.”  
(1 Dobbs, The Law of Torts (2001) § 171, p. 414.)  For that reason, the law looks 
for purposes of causation analysis “to those causes which are so closely connected 
with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing 
liability.”  (Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 41, p. 264.)  In a case of 
assault and battery, it is the use of force on another that is closely connected to the 
resulting injury.  To look to acts within the causal chain that are antecedent to and 
more remote from the assaultive conduct would render legal responsibilities too 
uncertain.  “When a driver intentionally speeds and, as a result, negligently hits 
another car, the speeding would be an intentional act.  However, the act directly 
responsible for the injury—hitting the other car—was not intended by the driver 
and was fortuitous.  Accordingly, the occurrence resulting in injury would be 
deemed an accident.”  (Merced Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mendez, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 50; see Quan v. Truck Ins. Exchange, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 600, fn. 16; 
see generally Maples v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 641, 647-
648 [“the term „accident‟ unambiguously refers to the event causing damage, not 
to the earlier event creating the potential for future injury”].)   
 
Delgado‟s argument that the insured‟s assault was an accidental act because 
a provocative act by the injured party was unforeseen and unexpected would also 
be inconsistent with California case law.  In Quan v. Truck Ins. Exchange, supra, 
67 Cal.App.4th 583, the insured was sued for assault and battery based upon the 
insured‟s act of forcibly raping the victim.  (Id. at pp. 587, 588, fn. 5.)  In his 
action against his insurance company for breach of the duty to defend, the insured 
argued that there was a potential for coverage under a policy insuring against 
bodily injury caused by an accident (id. at p. 592) because he could simply be 
 
16 
found negligent or “found to have mistakenly believed the claimant had 
„consented‟ ” (id. at p. 596).  Quan rejected the argument that the victim‟s 
antecedent act that induced the insured‟s mistaken belief in consent converted the 
forcible rape into an “accident.”  Quan first observed that to determine whether an 
injury resulted from an accident, and thus falls within the policy‟s coverage, one 
needs to consider the nature of the insured‟s act.  Quan then concluded that the 
insured‟s conduct could not have been accidental because it was intentional, and 
that an unreasonable belief in the victim‟s consent could not alter the nature of the 
act of forcible rape itself.  (Id. at pp. 596-598.)  Other courts have come to similar 
conclusions.  (E.g., Lyons v. Fire Ins. Exchange, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th 880 
[false imprisonment relating to alleged sexual attack not an accident even when 
insured may have acted under mistaken belief victim would not rebuff advances]; 
Modern Development Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 932, 942 
[“A mistake of fact in an employment termination does not transform the 
intentional act of terminating an employee into an accident”]; Swain v. California 
Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th 1 [insured‟s belief that he was entitled to 
inflict harm does not transform wrongful eviction into an accident]; Merced 
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mendez, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 41 [unreasonable belief in 
victim‟s consent did not make oral copulation and attempted oral copulation an 
accident].) 
 
We conclude here that an insured‟s unreasonable belief in the need for self-
defense does not turn the resulting purposeful and intentional act of assault and 
battery into “an accident” within the policy‟s coverage clause. Therefore, the 
insurance company had no duty to defend its insured in the lawsuit brought against 
him by the injured party. 
 
17 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Delgado v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 152 Cal.App.4th 671 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S155129 
Date Filed: August 3, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Raul A. Sahagun 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Glaser & Damone, Glaser, Damone & Schroeder and Robert P. Damone for Plaintiff and Appellant 
 
Dickstein Shapiro, Kirk A. Pasich, Cassandra S. Franklin and Stephanie A. Sullins for United Policyholders 
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Steven W. Murray as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Law Office of Daniel U. Smith, Daniel U. Smith; Law Office of Gary L. Simms and Gary L. Simms for 
Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Reed Smith, Margaret Grignon, Judith E. Posner; Ford, Walker, Haggerty & Behar, Timothy L. Walker, 
Donna Rogers Kirby, Maxine J. Lebowitz and K. Michele Williams for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, Paul E. B. Glad, Michael A. Barnes and David R. Simonton for 
Association of California Insurance Companies as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Summers & Shives, Robert V. Closson and Ian G. Williamson for Employers Mutual Casualty Company as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Robert P. Damone 
Glaser, Damone & Schroeder  
400 Oceangate, Suite 800 
Long Beach, CA  90802 
(562) 983-3130 
 
Kirk A. Pasich 
Dickstein Shapiro 
2049 Century Park East, Suite 700 
Los Angeles, CA  90067-3109 
(310) 772-8300 
 
Daniel U. Smith 
Law Office of Daniel U. Smith 
21 Rancheria Road 
Kentfield, CA  94904-2833 
(415) 461-5630 
 
Margaret Grignon 
Reed Smith 
355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2900 
Los Angeles, CA  90071-1514 
(213) 457-8000