Case Title: WILLIAM ODELL MABE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-289

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILLIAM ODELL MABE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 172169 P.3d 870Case Number: 06-289Decided: 10/31/2007Modified: 11/05/2007
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
WILLIAM ODELL 
MABE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. Lozano, State Public 
Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Donna D. Domonkos, Senior Assistant 
Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; 
Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; Ursula P. Schultz, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

                                    

Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, 
HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
William 
Mabe appeals his conviction on a felony charge of larceny by bailee.  He asserts that the trial court abused 
its discretion when it admitted into evidence certain documents that contained 
handwriting from an unidentified person.  
We conclude that the trial court committed no reversible error, and we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]           
Mr. 
Mabe's single issue, slightly rephrased, is whether the trial court erred when 
it admitted exhibits that contained unidentified 
handwriting.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
In August 
2005, Mr. Mabe went to work for Kosma Heating and Air Conditioning as a 
fabricator and installer of ductwork, furnaces, and air conditioners.  In February 2006, Mr. Mabe gave Kosma 
two weeks' notice that he was moving back east and would leave his job at the 
end of the month.  Apparently his 
plans were delayed, because he later asked to continue working for Kosma until 
the time he actually made the move.  
He stayed on with Kosma until March 6, 2006, when he was fired, for 
reasons discussed below.

 
 

[¶4]           
Kosma 
maintained charge accounts with various local vendors.  Employees were allowed to use those 
accounts to charge work-related supplies and tools.  They could also use the charge accounts 
to purchase tools for their own personal use, repaying Kosma through paycheck 
deductions.  For both work-related 
and personal charges, employees were required to obtain prior 
approval.

 
 

[¶5]           
Near the 
beginning of March 2006, Kosma received several invoices from two local vendors 
indicating that Mr. Mabe had charged a substantial number of tools, 
supplies, and other items on Kosma's accounts.  Kosma's office manager and co-owner, 
Christina Thompson, brought the invoices to the attention of Joseph Kosma, the 
other owner of the business.  They 
agreed that Mr.  Mabe had not been authorized to make the charges.  It also appeared to them that the tools 
and supplies were not work-related.  
For example, one invoice included a ball-peen hammer and a wrecking bar, 
tools that Kosma employees would be unlikely to use in their work.  Many of the charges were made after 
working hours or on weekends, times when Mr. Mabe was not at work.  Also, knowing that Mr. Mabe planned 
to quit his job and move away at the end of February, Ms. Thompson and Mr. 
Kosma came to the conclusion that Mr. Mabe intended to leave without paying 
for the charged items, leaving Kosma "held up high and 
dry."

 
 

[¶6]           
Mr. Kosma 
told Mr. Mabe's supervisor to fire Mr. Mabe.  That same day, after he was fired, Mr. 
Mabe telephoned Mr. Kosma to apologize.  
When asked, Mr. Mabe admitted that he had planned to leave without 
paying for the charged items. 

 
 

[¶7]           
Later 
that day, Mr. Mabe was arrested and charged with larceny by bailee under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(b) (LexisNexis 2007), which provides that: 

 
 
A bailee . . . or any person 
entrusted with the control, care or custody of any money or other property who, 
with intent to steal or to deprive the owner of the property, converts the 
property to his own or another's use is guilty of larceny.

  

Larceny by bailee is a felony if the 
property is valued at one thousand dollars or more.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(c)(i).  After Mr. Mabe's arrest, the police 
searched his home and found several of the items that had been charged to Kosma's 
account.  

 
 

[¶8]           
At trial, 
the prosecution placed into evidence seventeen invoices from two local vendors, 
dating from January 26, 2006, to March 6, 2006, all reflecting charges to 
Kosma's account, and all indicating that the charged items had been "Received 
by" Mr. Mabe.  
Ms. Thompson testified that Mr. Mabe had not received prior approval 
for any of these charges, and that with a very few possible exceptions, none of 
the charged items were work-related.  
The trial court admitted the invoices into evidence over Mr. Mabe's 
objections.

 
 

[¶9]           
On 
appeal, Mr. Mabe does not dispute that the invoices themselves were properly 
admitted under W.R.E. 803(6), commonly known as the business records exception 
to the rule excluding hearsay evidence.  
However, he asserts that it was error for the trial court to admit nine 
of the seventeen invoices into evidence because they contained the notation 
"Willie Personal" in handwriting from an unidentified person.  Mr. Mabe's nickname was Willie.  According to Mr. Mabe, these notations 
were inadmissible hearsay, and should not have been admitted into 
evidence.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 

[¶10]       
The 
parties disagree on the appropriate standard of review.  Mr. Mabe asserts that defense 
counsel objected to the admission of the invoices at trial, and so urges us to 
review for abuse of discretion, citing Lopez v. State, 2006 WY 97, ¶ 24, 
139 P.3d 445, 454 (Wyo. 2006).  The 
State disagrees, contending that defense counsel's objections were on different 
grounds from the issue presented on appeal.  The State therefore urges us to review 
for plain error, citing Cazier v. 
State, 2006 WY 153, ¶ 10, 148 P.3d 23, 28 (Wyo. 2006).  We would affirm this particular case 
under either standard.  However, as 
explained below, the appropriate standard in this case is plain 
error.

 
 

[¶11]       
During 
trial, the prosecution asked Ms. Thompson to establish that all seventeen 
invoices, as a group, were business records.  It then offered all seventeen invoices 
into evidence.  The defense objected 
on the bases of "foundation and hearsay."  
The trial court suggested that the prosecution "lay some more foundation 
for these particular exhibits, and identify them for your record."  The prosecution did so, asking Ms. 
Thompson to review each exhibit, one by one.  She provided additional information 
establishing each as a business record.  
The prosecution again offered the seventeen invoices into evidence.  The defense said it "would still object 
to foundation, as well as to the signature."  The trial court ruled that the invoices 
were admissible.  

 
 

[¶12]       
The 
defense initially objected on the basis of hearsay, but after the prosecution 
elicited additional information from Ms. Thompson, hearsay was not 
mentioned as a basis for its objection.  
The objections that were made the second time were "foundation" and "the 
signature."  Foundation, in this 
context, related to whether the invoices qualified as business records, but did 
not raise any issue regarding the "Willie Personal" notations.  Review of the record shows that the 
objection to "the signature" also did not relate to the "Willie Personal" 
notations.  Ms. Thompson 
testified that she was familiar with Mr. Mabe's signature, and she 
initially identified it on each of the seventeen invoices.  On cross-examination, however, she 
agreed that the signature on one of the invoices, Exhibit 12, did not look like 
the other signatures, and said she could not be certain that signature was 
Mr. Mabe's.1  In this context, the defense's objection 
to "the signature" was aimed at the signature on Exhibit 12, not at the 
notations to which Mr. Mabe now objects.

 
 

[¶13]       
Because 
the defense did not maintain its hearsay objection at trial, the hearsay issue 
it raises on appeal must be considered under the plain error standard.  In fact, this case provides a good 
illustration of why the plain error standard should apply.  If the defense had objected to the 
"Willie Personal" notations, then the trial court would have had an opportunity 
to address the issue.  It might have 
redacted the notations from the invoices.  
It might have said the prosecution needed to identify who wrote the 
notations.  But because defense 
counsel did not "lay his finger on the particular point" at issue, the trial 
court had no "opportunity to cure the alleged error."   Sanderson v. State, 2007 WY 127, 
¶ 13, 165 P.3d 83, 88 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting Valerio v. State, 429 P.2d 317, 319 
(Wyo. 1967), and Murdock v. State, 351 P.2d 674, 679 
(Wyo. 
1960)).  Accordingly, when we apply 
the plain error standard of review, we will reverse only if Mr. Mabe 
shows "in the record an error that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law in a clear and obvious manner resulting in material prejudice to a 
substantial right."  Cureton v. State, 2007 WY 168, ¶ 9, 
___ P.3d ___, ___ (Wyo. 2007); Lessard v. 
State, 2007 WY 89, ¶ 14, 158 P.3d 698, 702 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶14]       
Mr. 
Mabe's contention is that the unidentified handwriting on nine of the invoices 
was impermissible hearsay.  Hearsay, 
of course, is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted."  W.R.E. 
801(c).  Such a statement may be 
oral or written, W.R.E. 801(a), and in this case it was written.  The declarant was not identified, and 
the record does not reflect when the notations were made, so the statements were 
not made by the declarant while testifying.  The question of whether the charges were 
personal or work-related was one of the main issues at trial,2 and to the extent the "Willie 
Personal" notations suggested that the charges were personal, they may have been 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  In sum, they were 
hearsay.

 
 

[¶15]       
Again, 
Mr. Mabe does not dispute that the invoices themselves were properly admitted 
under the business records exception to the hearsay exclusion.  He contests only the "Willie Personal" 
notations as hearsay-within-hearsay, because the declarant was never 
identified.  However, it is not 
necessary to identify who authored each piece of information contained in a 
business record.  For example, a 
medical record containing the notation that the patient had suffered eye damage 
and the opinion that such damage was consistent with non-accidental trauma was 
properly admitted under the business records hearsay exception, even though the 
witness presenting the medical record did not know who had written the notation 
and opinion.  Hodgins v. State, 962 P.2d 153, 155-56 
(Wyo. 
1998).  Similarly, a freight bill 
was admissible under the business records hearsay exception, even though it 
contained handwritten notations from an unknown source.  United 
States v. Carranco, 551 F.2d 1197, 1199 (10th Cir. 1977).3

 
 

[¶16]       
The 
principal case on which Mr. Mabe relies, Fondedile, S.A. v. C.E. Maquire, Inc., 
610 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1992), does not compel the result he seeks.  In that case, the business records at 
issue were a secretary's notes of a meeting, indicating that someone had made a 
certain statement, but not who had made it.  The person to whom the statement was 
attributed did not testify.  
Significantly, although the secretary was made available at trial, 
neither side asked questions about the meeting notes.  They were business records, and were 
therefore admissible 
unless "the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation 
indicate a lack of trustworthiness."  
Id. at 94 
(quoting R.I.R.E. 803(6), which contains language also found in W.R.E. 
803(6)).  But unlike the Rhode Island court, which 
sustained an objection to the admissibility of the secretary's notes, the trial 
court in Mr. Mabe's case heard no objection to the "Willie Personal" 
notations.  The party objecting to 
the admission of a business record has the burden of establishing that a lack of 
trustworthiness should keep the document out of evidence.  4 Christopher B. Mueller & 
Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal 
Evidence § 8:83, at 752-53 (3d ed. 2007).  This is indicated by the structure of 
the rule, which states that a business record is admissible "unless" there are 
indications that it lacks trustworthiness.  
The prosecution in Mr. Mabe's case established that the invoices 
were business records, and therefore admissible.  The defense did not meet its burden of 
presenting facts or arguments to the trial court that the "Willie Personal" 
notations were untrustworthy.  The 
trial court's admission of the evidence, in the absence of any indication that 
it was not trustworthy, cannot be considered plain error.

 
 

[¶17]       
Further, 
we cannot conclude that the admission of the invoices with the "Willie Personal" 
notations resulted in material prejudice.  
To demonstrate prejudice, Mr. Mabe must show a reasonable probability 
that the jury would have reached a different verdict if the evidence had not 
been admitted.  See Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 28, 
¶ 34, 86 P.3d 851, 861 (Wyo. 2004).  
He has not made that showing.

 
 

[¶18]       
At 
trial, both Ms. Thompson and Mr. Kosma testified to and explained 
their conclusions that the items Mr. Mabe charged were not work-related, 
but for personal use.  Because the 
information suggested by the "Willie Personal" notations "was already before the 
court by virtue of testimony of the witnesses," it did not create material 
prejudice.  Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. Morris, 756 P.2d 774, 
779 (Wyo. 
1988).  When a witness testifies 
"extensively" to the contents of a document, the admission of the document, even 
if it is hearsay, does "nothing more than corroborate [the witness's] 
testimony," and consequently works no prejudice.  Rudy v. Bossard, 997 P.2d 480, 484 (Wyo. 
2000).  Further, a careful review of 
the record indicates that neither the witnesses nor the 
prosecuting attorney ever once mentioned, referred to, or even hinted at the 
"Willie Personal" notations.  Mr. 
Mabe cannot demonstrate on this record that the jury even noticed the notations, 
much less that the jurors relied on them in reaching a verdict.  Under plain error analysis, it is the 
appellant's burden to show prejudice.  
Mr. Mabe has not done so.  We 
affirm the decision of the trial court.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Apparently 
to overcome the question about the signature on Exhibit 12, the prosecution 
introduced testimony from the store clerk that Mr. Mabe had been involved in 
that particular transaction, and testimony from the police officer that an item 
listed on Exhibit 12 was found in Mr. Mabe's home. 

2Indeed, 
in his brief, Mr. Mabe asserts that this was the "ultimate" question at trial, 
and that the "Willie 
Personal" notations were particularly objectionable because they invaded the 
province of the jury.  However, 
under W.R.E. 704, evidence is not objectionable simply because it "embraces an 
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."

3Because the Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence we consider in this opinion are identical to their federal 
counterparts, or very nearly so, authority interpreting the federal rules is 
useful in our application of the Wyoming rules.  In re Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 998 
(Wyo. 1984); Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743, 748 
( 
Wyo. 
1975).