Case Title: Guy Riccitelli, M.D. v. Fredrik Broekhuizen, M.D.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1998AP000329-FT

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0329-FT 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Guy Riccitelli, M.D.,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Fredrik Broekhuizen, M.D. and Carole Hagarty, 
R. N., Ph.D.,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners, 
Aurora Health Care, Inc., Sinai Samaritan  
Medical Center, Inc. and Alan M. Wagner,  
M.D.,  
 
Defendants.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  221 Wis. 2d 533, 585 N.W.2d 709 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 24, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
June 2, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Franke 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: Abrahamson, C.J., did not participate. 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners the 
cause was argued by David T. Flanagan, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney 
general. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by 
Mark J. Goldstein, and Padway & Padway, Ltd., Milwaukee and oral 
argument by Mark J. Goldstein. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Edward E. Robinson and 
Warshafsky, Rotter, Tarnoff, Reinhardt & Bloch, S.C., Milwaukee 
for the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-0329-FT 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Guy Riccitelli, M.D.,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Fredrik Broekhuizen, M.D. and Carole  
Hagarty, R. N., PH.D.,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Aurora Health Care, Inc., Sinai Samaritan  
Medical Center, Inc. and Alan M. Wagner,  
M.D.,  
 
          Defendants.  
FILED 
 
JUN 24, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
JON 
P. 
WILCOX, 
J.   The 
defendants, 
Fredrik 
Broekhuizen, M.D., and Carole Hagarty, R.N., Ph.D, seek review 
of a decision of the court of appeals1 subjecting them to tort 
liability under the “dual persona” doctrine for actions arising 
out of their affiliation with Sinai Samaritan Medical Center.  
Even though the plaintiff, Dr. Riccitelli, failed to file a 
timely notice of claim under Wis. Stat. § 893.82(3), the court 
of appeals held that Drs. Broekhuizen and Hagarty, faculty 
                     
1 Riccitelli v. Broekhuizen, 221 Wis. 2d 533, 585 N.W.2d 709 
(Ct. App. 1998)(rev’g an order for the Circuit Court of 
Milwaukee County, John A. Franke, Judge).   
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
2 
members of the University of Wisconsin-Madison Medical School 
who were assigned to Sinai Samaritan Medical Center pursuant to 
an affiliation agreement, could be sued for their work as 
director and associate director, respectively, of a residency 
program at Sinai Samaritan Medical Center because they possessed 
“dual personas,” a doctrine borrowed from worker’s compensation 
law.  We do not agree.  We further reject Dr. Riccitelli’s 
estoppel claims, as well as his assertion that the notice of 
claim statute violates his equal protection and due process 
rights.  The decision of the court of appeals is reversed.  
I. 
¶2 
For purposes of this appeal, the facts are not in 
dispute.  In June 1991, Dr. Riccitelli was accepted in a four-
year obstetrics and gynecology (OB-GYN) residency training 
program operated by Sinai Samaritan Medical Center (Sinai 
Samaritan) in Milwaukee.  Dr. Broekhuizen, a member of the 
University of Wisconsin Medical School (U.W. Medical School) 
faculty, was the program director.  Dr. Hagarty, an assistant 
professor at the U.W. Medical School, was the assistant 
director.  
¶3 
The residency program existed under an “Affiliation 
Agreement” between the Board of Regents of the University of 
Wisconsin and Aurora Health Care, Inc. (Aurora), which operates 
Sinai Samaritan.  Under the agreement, members of the U.W. 
Medical 
School 
faculty 
were 
to 
provide 
clinical 
and 
administrative services, teaching services for graduate medical 
education, 
continuing medical 
education, and 
other 
health 
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
3 
science education.  The U.W. Medical School was responsible for 
the recruitment and maintenance of quality faculty.  Decisions 
on full-time faculty appointments, with either the Center for 
Health Sciences faculty, the clinical faculty or the tenured or 
tenure-track faculty, were to be made by the U.W. Medical 
School, with consultation from the President of Aurora; clinical 
and administrative assignments of the full-time faculty were to 
be jointly approved by the Dean of the U.W. Medical School and 
the President of Aurora; faculty members assigned to Sinai 
Samaritan were required to be qualified members of the medical 
staff where assigned; and faculty appointments were to be 
governed 
by 
University 
policy 
and 
procedures 
concerning 
appointments to the U.W. Medical School.   
¶4 
Also under the agreement, the State of Wisconsin was 
to 
provide 
liability 
protection, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 895.46 and 893.82 (1989-90), for faculty participating in the 
U.W. Medical School educational programs at Aurora institutions 
on a full-time basis for acts within the scope of their 
employment (activities contemplated by the Agreement).  The 
agreement explicitly directed that the statutory notification 
and claim procedures of § 893.82 (1989-90) be utilized for 
claims against the Board of Regents, or any of its employees or 
students. 
¶5 
Dr. 
Riccitelli’s 
four-year 
residency 
was 
renewed 
annually.  During Dr. Riccitelli’s fourth year, he was notified 
by the Resident Evaluation Committee (Committee) that it would 
not certify his completion of the residency program.  One month 
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
4 
later, in April 1995, Dr. Riccitelli was notified that “in order 
to complete his residency, [he] must participate in a three 
month 
probationary 
period 
followed 
by 
a 
six 
(6) 
month 
remediation program.”  Despite his participation, in September 
1995, the Committee voted to terminate Dr. Riccitelli from the 
residency program.   
¶6 
Dr. 
Riccitelli 
immediately 
sought 
an 
injunction 
barring his termination, as well as compensatory and punitive 
damages.2  The complaint stated that Dr. Broekhuizen was a 
professor and the chairman and program director for OB-GYN 
Department at the U.W. Medical School Milwaukee clinical campus, 
and in that capacity, he was head of the residency program for 
the U.W. Medical School Milwaukee clinical campus operated in 
conjunction with Aurora and Sinai Samaritan.  Dr. Riccitelli 
alleged that as a resident physician in the OB-GYN Department at 
the U.W. Medical School Milwaukee clinical campus, he held an 
academic/professional staff appointment and was, therefore, 
entitled to the procedural guarantees provided state employees 
under Wis. Stat. § 36.15(3)(1993-94).  
¶7 
In the course of the injunction hearing on Dr. 
Riccitelli’s employment status, Dr. Broekhuizen testified that 
the residency program was Sinai Samaritan’s medical program, and 
that as program director he acted on behalf of Sinai Samaritan 
and not in his role as a U.W. faculty member.  When asked by Dr. 
                     
2 The attorney general appeared for and represented Dr. 
Broekhuizen, the U.W. Medical School, and the Board of Regents 
in Dr. Riccitelli’s request for an injunction.  
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
5 
Riccitelli’s counsel whether the affiliation with the University 
was an essential component of the residency program, Dr. 
Broekhuizen 
replied 
“it’s 
essential 
for 
me, 
since 
[the 
affiliation 
with 
the 
University 
is] 
the 
reason 
I’m 
there. . . . but it’s not essential for the residency program to 
have a U.W. affiliation.”  Dr. Broekhuizen further explained 
that he wears three, sometime overlapping, hats as a practicing 
physician, as an OB-GYN residency program director, and as a 
U.W. Medical School faculty member.   
¶8 
Following 
the 
evidentiary 
hearing, 
the 
Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court, the Honorable John DiMotto, found that 
residents, such as Dr. Riccitelli, in the OB-GYN residency 
program were solely employees of Sinai Samaritan, and were not 
granted appointments as academic staff with the U.W. Medical 
School.  Because the residency program was run by Sinai 
Samaritan, and because Dr. Riccitelli was not a University 
employee, the circuit court denied Dr. Riccitelli injunctive 
relief.  Following the dismissal of Dr. Riccitelli’s request for 
an injunction, the Committee terminated him from the residency 
program.   
¶9 
In August 1997, Dr. Riccitelli filed the current 
action, alleging, among other claims, intentional interference 
with contract/hindrance of contract on the part of Drs. 
Broekhuizen and Hagarty.  Drs. Broekhuizen and Hagarty moved to 
dismiss, arguing that they were employees of the University, and 
that Dr. Riccitelli’s failure to comply with the notice of claim 
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
6 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.82 (1995-96),3 required dismissal.4  
The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the Honorable John A. 
Franke, treating the motion as one for summary judgment, agreed 
that § 893.82 was applicable, and that it was not complied with; 
the court thereby dismissed Drs. Broekhuizen and Hagarty as 
defendants in the action.  Dr. Riccitelli appealed.   
¶10 A majority of the court of appeals reversed.  The 
court concluded that Drs. Broekhuizen and Hagarty were employees 
and/or agents of both the U.W. Medical School and Aurora/Sinai; 
therefore, they each had a “dual persona” which obviated the 
need for Dr. Riccitelli to comply with the notice requirements 
of Wis. Stat. § 893.82.  Riccitelli, 221 Wis. 2d at 546, 556.  
We accepted Drs. Broekhuizen and Hagarty’s petition for review. 
II. 
¶11 On review of a summary judgment order, we employ the 
same methodology, set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), as do the 
circuit courts and the court of appeals.  Green Spring Farms v. 
Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).  Under 
§ 802.08(2), summary judgment shall be granted only if the 
                     
3 All references are to the 1995-96 version of the statutes 
unless otherwise noted. 
4 Drs. Broekhuizen and Hagarty submitted affidavits in 
support of their motion to dismiss.  Both averred that they are 
currently, and were throughout the period during which Dr. 
Riccitelli was a resident physician, employees of the State of 
Wisconsin as members of the U.W. Medical School faculty.  In the 
course of their duties as State of Wisconsin employees, both 
were assigned by the University to supervise, instruct, and 
evaluate resident physicians in the obstetrics and gynecology 
residency training program at Sinai Samaritan.  
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
7 
“pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, 
and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 
  
III. 
¶12 The issue in this case is whether Dr. Riccitelli’s 
failure to timely file a notice of claim with the state, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.82, mandates dismissal of Drs. 
Broekhuizen and Hagarty from this action.  Section 893.82(3) 
provides in part: 
[N]o civil action or civil proceeding may be brought 
against any state officer, employe or agent for or on 
account of any act growing out of or committed in the 
course of the discharge of the officer’s, employe’s or 
agent’s duties . . . unless within 120 days of the 
event causing the injury, damage or death giving rise 
to the civil action or civil proceeding, the claimant 
in the action or proceeding serves upon the attorney 
general written notice of a claim . . . . 
¶13 It is undisputed that Dr. Riccitelli failed to comply 
with the notice statute.  Regarding Dr. Hagarty, both Dr. 
Riccitelli and the court of appeals insist that she is similarly 
situated with Dr. Broekhuizen regarding her employment status.  
Riccitelli, 221 Wis. 2d at 536 n.1, 555-56.  We do not agree.  
Dr. Hagarty, who was the associate director of the Sinai 
Samaritan OB-GYN residency program, was not a party in the 1995 
case, and did not offer testimony regarding her associate 
director position.  Dr. Hagarty’s affidavit in which she averred 
to be an employee of the State of Wisconsin who was assigned by 
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
8 
the U.W. Medical School to assist physicians involved in the 
residency program, is the only evidence in the record regarding 
her employment status.  We conclude that without any evidence to 
the contrary, Dr. Hagarty is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).   
¶14 We will now address Dr. Riccitelli’s arguments as to 
the remaining defendant, Dr. Broekhuizen.  Dr. Riccitelli first 
argues that Dr. Broekhuizen’s 1995 testimony precludes him, 
under the doctrines of judicial estoppel and equitable estoppel, 
from claiming that he is a state employee in this suit; 
therefore, the notice statute is inapplicable. 
¶15 The equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes 
a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding and then 
subsequently asserting an inconsistent position.  State v. 
Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 347, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996).  The 
doctrine may be invoked if:  (1) the later position is clearly 
inconsistent with the earlier position; (2) the facts at issue 
are the same in both cases; and (3) the party to be estopped 
convinced the first court to adopt its position.  Id. at 348.  
Determining the elements and considerations involved before 
invoking the doctrine of judicial estoppel are questions of law 
which we decide independently of the circuit court or court of 
appeals.  Id. at 347.   
¶16 We conclude that the principles for applying judicial 
estoppel are not present in this case.  Two of the requirements 
for the application of the doctrine are absent here.  First, the 
record does not support Dr. Riccitelli’s contention that Dr. 
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
9 
Broekhuizen 
has 
consistently 
asserted 
irreconcilably 
inconsistent positions as to his status.  See id. at 349.  Dr. 
Broekhuizen testified that he wore three, sometimes overlapping, 
hats, and that as the program director for the residency 
program—Sinai Samaritan’s program—he acted on behalf of Sinai 
Samaritan and not in his role as a U.W. Medical School faculty 
member.  However, Dr. Broekhuizen was not testifying as to his 
employment or his employer.  Rather, he was explaining the 
difference between two training programs—medical student and 
residency programs—one in the province of the U.W. Medical 
School and the other guided by Sinai Samaritan.   
¶17 His affidavit corroborates that from 1991 through 
1995, while serving as the director of the residency program, he 
was on the U.W. Medical School facility and that all acts he 
undertook in the OB-GYN residency program “were done in the 
course of [his] duty as an employee of the State of Wisconsin.” 
 We do not view Dr. Broekhuizen’s statements as irreconcilably 
inconsistent. 
¶18 Similarly, Dr. Riccitelli’s claim that the facts at 
issue in the two cases are the same is unfounded.  In the first 
case, the circuit court determined the status of the OB-GYN 
residency program and the status of Dr. Riccitelli, not the 
status of Dr. Broekhuizen.  For these reasons, we conclude that 
equity does not require estopping Dr. Broekhuizen from claiming 
he was, and continues to be, a state employee.  We reject Dr. 
Riccitelli’s judicial estoppel argument. 
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
10
¶19 Dr. Riccitelli further argues that Dr. Broekhuizen 
should be equitably estopped from claiming that he was a state 
employee because Dr. Broekhuizen testified to the contrary in 
the prior case and because Dr. Riccitelli reasonably relied on 
Dr. Broekhuizen’s sworn testimony.   
¶20 Equitable estoppel, which focuses on the conduct of 
the parties, requires: 
(1) action or non-action, (2) on the part of the one 
against whom estoppel is asserted, (3) which induces 
reasonable reliance thereon by the other, either in 
action or non-action, and (4) which is to his or her 
detriment. 
Milas v. Labor Ass’n of Wisconsin, 214 Wis. 2d 1, 11-12, 571 
N.W.2d 656 (1997).   
¶21 We do not agree that the elements of equitable 
estoppel are present in this case.  Dr. Riccitelli’s premise 
that the focus is upon the testimony (action) of Dr. Broekhuizen 
(the party against whom estoppel is asserted) regarding Dr. 
Broekhuizen’s employment status is incorrect.  Dr. Broekhuizen 
did not testify to, nor did the first case involve Dr. 
Broekhuizen’s 
employment 
status. 
 
Rather, 
Dr. 
Riccitelli 
characterized Dr. Broekhuizen’s employment as a U.W. Medical 
School faculty member as the basis for Dr. Riccitelli’s claim 
that as an OB-GYN resident, he too was a state employee subject 
to the procedural protections afforded state employees. 
¶22 If Dr. Riccitelli in fact relied on Dr. Broekhuizen’s 
1995 testimony to conclude, as a matter of law, that Dr. 
Broekhuizen was not a state employee, then such reliance was 
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
11
unreasonable.  As the court of appeals noted, “Dr. Riccitelli’s 
first action was premised, in part, on his theory that Dr. 
Broekhuizen was a state employee.”  Riccitelli, 221 Wis. 2d at 
548.  Even if Dr. Broekhuizen’s testimony in the injunction suit 
left Dr. Riccitelli with the impression or belief that Dr. 
Broekhuizen was not a state employee, “the statutory mandates 
provide no ‘exception for plaintiffs who have an honest but 
mistaken belief about the status of the defendant as a state 
employee.’”  Id. at 549 (quoting Mannino v. Davenport, 99 Wis. 
2d 602, 608, 299 N.W.2d 823 (1981)(discussing Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.45 (1977), now Wis. Stat. § 893.82).  Because the elements 
of equitable estoppel and judicial estoppel have not been met, 
these doctrines do not preclude summary judgment in this second 
action.   
IV. 
¶23 Dr. Riccitelli next contends that he may maintain his 
suit against Dr. Broekhuizen, based on the “dual persona” 
doctrine, a concept taken from worker’s compensation law.  He 
insists that if Dr. Broekhuizen has but one persona, it is that 
of a Sinai Simaritan employee.   
¶24 The “dual persona” doctrine is an exception to the 
exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Compensation Act.  
Henning v. General Motors Assembly Div., 143 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 419 
N.W.2d 551 (1988).  Under this doctrine, “‘[a]n employer may 
become a third person, vulnerable to tort suit by an employee, 
if—and only if—he possesses a second persona so completely 
independent from and unrelated to his status as employer that by 
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
12
established standards the law recognizes it as a separate legal 
person.’” 
 Id. at 15 
(quoting 2A 
A. Larson, 
Workmen’s 
Compensation Law, § 72.81 at 14-229 (1987)); Rauch v. Officine 
Curioni, S.P.A., 179 Wis. 2d 539, 543, 508 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App. 
1993); Schweiner v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 120 Wis. 2d 
344, 352, 354 N.W.2d 767 (Ct. App. 1984).  The dual persona 
exists where the duality is “firmly entrenched in common law or 
equity” or where the duality is one created by modern statute.  
Henning, 143 Wis. 2d at 19 (quoting 2A A. Larson, supra, § 72.81 
at 14-232).   
¶25 The court of appeals found the dual persona doctrine 
to be an exception to the notice requirement based on its 
determination 
that 
under 
the 
affiliation 
agreement, 
Dr. 
Broekhuizen had apparent dual employment/agency status as U.W. 
Medical 
School 
faculty 
and 
administration 
assigned 
to 
Aurora/Sinai.  Riccitelli, 221 Wis. 2d at 553-54.  The court 
relied on Rauch, 179 Wis. 2d 539, and Kashishian v, Port, 167 
Wis. 2d 24, 481 N.W.2d 277 (1992) for the application of the 
doctrine. 
¶26 We are not convinced that the dual persona doctrine 
should be applied to circumvent a party’s failure to file a 
timely notice of claim under Wis. Stat. § 893.82(3). The notice 
statute provides that no action shall be brought unless the 
required notice is given.  Id.  No time exception is permitted. 
 Renner v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 151 Wis. 2d 885, 889, 447 N.W.2d 
97 (Ct. App. 1989); Yotvat v. Roth. 95 Wis. 2d 357, 361, 290 
N.W.2d 
524 
(Ct. 
App. 
1980)(interpreting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
13
§ 895.45(1)(1977), 
now 
§ 893.82); 
§ 893.82(3). 
As 
a 
jurisdictional statute, § 893.82(3) requires strict compliance. 
 Oney v. Schrauth, 197 Wis. 2d 891, 904, 541 N.W.2d 229 (Ct. 
App. 1995).   
¶27 The purpose of the notice of claim statute is to 
enable the governmental unit to investigate a claim against an 
employee, to avoid needless litigation, and to settle all 
reasonable claims.  Ibrahim v. Samore, 118 Wis. 2d 720, 726-27, 
348 N.W.2d 554 (1984); Mannino v. Davenport, 99 Wis. 2d 602, 
609, 299 N.W.2d 823 (1981); see also Wis. Stat. § 893.82(1)(a)1-
3.  The dual persona doctrine, on the other hand, serves as part 
of the delicate balancing of interests represented in the 
worker’s compensation laws.  Henning, 143 Wis. 2d at 11.  
Importing the dual persona doctrine to allow a party to vitiate 
the notice of claim provision, does not fit well with the 
purposes of either § 893.82(3) or the dual persona doctrine.  
“To the extent that the present law may be disparate, unequal or 
uneven in its application, it is a question for the legislature 
to address.”  Henning, 143 Wis. 2d at 26-27 (quoting Jenkins v. 
Sabourin, 104 Wis. 2d 309, 323, 311 N.W.2d 600 (1981)).   
¶28 Moreover, for the dual persona doctrine to apply, the 
two persona must be completely independent from and unrelated to 
one another such that the law recognizes them as separate legal 
persons.  Henning, 143 Wis. 2d at 15.  Even if we were to 
conclude that the dual persona doctrine could be applied in this 
case, we agree with the dissent in Riccitelli that the elements 
have not been met.  Dr. Broekhuizen’s participation in the 
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
14
decision to release Dr. Riccitelli grew out of and was related 
to his employment with the U.W. Medical School.  Riccitelli, 221 
Wis. 2d at 562 (Fine, J., dissenting). 
¶29  The record supports this conclusion.  Dr. Broekhuizen 
was, and continues to be a full-time member of the U.W. Medical 
School faculty.  This fact is not controverted.   
¶30 Moreover, Dr. Broekhuizen explained in 1995 why he was 
practicing academic medicine in Milwaukee—he was assigned there 
because of the U.W. Medical School’s affiliation with Sinai 
Samaritan.  The affiliation agreement confirmed that the U.W. 
Medical School was to assign its faculty to provide teaching 
services 
for 
graduate 
medical 
education, 
i.e., 
residency 
programs, at Sinai Samaritan.  The agreement also stated that 
the State of Wisconsin was to provide liability protection for 
its faculty (and students) participating in the U.W. Medical 
School education programs at Aurora institutions.   
¶31 Dr. Broekhuizen reaffirmed in his affidavit, without 
contradiction, that he was a full-time faculty member of the 
U.W. Medical School.  As a faculty member, the U.W. Medical 
School assigned Dr. Broekhuizen to the OB-GYN Department at 
Sinai Samaritan in accordance with the affiliation agreement the 
U.W. Medical School had entered into with Aurora.  
¶32 As the State points out, there is no evidence to 
suggest that what Dr. Broekhuizen did in supervising a resident 
physician is in any way different from that which he did in 
supervising 
a 
medical 
student. 
 
The 
evidence 
does 
not 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
clinical 
supervision 
of 
a 
resident 
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
15
physician or director of the residency program is so unrelated 
and independent of the supervision of a medical student to 
create what the law recognizes as separate persons or legal 
entities.5  See Henning, 143 Wis. 2d at 15. 
¶33 We conclude that Dr. Broekhuizen’s work at Sinai 
Samaritan as director of the OB-GYN residency program grew out 
of and was entirely dependent upon his employment as a faculty 
member with the U.W. Medical School.  Accordingly, we reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals.   
IV. 
¶34 Dr. 
Riccitelli’s 
remaining 
claims 
are 
that 
the 
application of the notice of claim provision, Wis. Stat. 
                     
5 The court of appeals summarily concluded that Dr. 
Broekhuizen 
was 
an 
employee/agent 
of 
Sinai 
Samaritan.  
Riccitelli, 221 Wis. 2d at 553-54.  We do not believe that the 
record supports a conclusion that he was the servant of Sinai 
Samaritan subject to its right of control, and not the U.W. 
Medical School.  Cf. Kashishian v. Port, 167 Wis. 2d 24, 33-34, 
481 N.W.2d 277 (1992).  It is also clear from the record that 
the doctor’s roles as director of the residency program and as 
U.W. Medical School faculty member were not separate legal 
entities like the owner/lessor in Rauch v. Officine Curioni, 
S.P.A., 179 Wis. 2d 539, 546, 508 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App. 1993)(dual 
persona doctrine applied to Anderson, a majority stockholder who 
personally purchased and then leased a machine to the corporate 
employer).  And this court has previously held that a medical 
malpractice suit could not be maintained against a state 
employee absent compliance with the notice requirement, even if 
the employee was acting as an apparent agent of the private 
hospital.  Kashishian, 167 Wis. 2d at 50-51.  Even if Dr. 
Broekhuizen was acting as an apparent agent for Sinai Samaritan, 
that does not change the fact that in directing the resident 
physicians he was acting in accordance with the affiliation 
agreement (thus, within the scope of state employment), and such 
“apparent agency” does not negate the notice requirements.  Id. 
at 50. 
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
16
§ 893.82(3), violates the due process and equal protection 
clauses of both the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  
See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Wis. Const. art. I, § 1.  The 
constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  Castellani v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 260, 578 
N.W.2d 
166 
(1998). 
 
All 
legislative 
acts 
are 
presumed 
constitutional.  Yotvat, 95 Wis. 2d at 363.  A party challenging 
a statute has a heavy burden proving it is unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 849, 
863, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1051 
(1999). 
¶35 Dr. Riccitelli’s equal protection claim seems to be 
that the U.W. Medical School through its affiliation agreements 
has created a “class,” of which Dr. Broekhuizen is a member, of 
otherwise private citizens who are now protected by Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.82(3).  According to Dr. Riccitelli, this classification 
was neither created nor intended by the Wisconsin legislature 
and has no rational basis.  
¶36 In an equal protection claim, unless government action 
involves classifications based on a suspect class, such as race 
or alienage, or invidious classifications that arbitrarily 
deprive a class of persons of a fundamental right, the rational 
basis test applies.  State v. Post, 197 Wis.2d 279, 319, 541 
N.W.2d 115 (1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2507 (1997).  Dr. 
Riccitelli concedes the rational basis test is applicable.  In a 
rational basis analysis, “[t]he basic test is not whether some 
inequality 
results 
from 
the 
classification, 
but 
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
17
whether . . . any reasonable basis [exists] to justify the 
classification.”  Omernik v. State, 64 Wis.2d 6, 19, 218 N.W.2d 
734 (1974) (footnotes omitted); State v. McManus, 152 Wis.2d 
113, 131, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989).   
¶37 As we explained in section III, the purpose of the 
notice of claim statute is to enable the governmental unit to 
investigate a claim against an employee, to avoid needless 
litigation, and to settle all reasonable claims.  Ibrahim, 118 
Wis. 2d at 726-27; Mannino, 99 Wis. 2d at 609.  
Investigation may disclose facts substantiating a 
defense to a claim or show that the employee is not 
entitled to immunity because the employee did not act 
within 
the 
scope 
of 
his 
or 
her 
employment.  
Classifications 
made 
between 
victims 
of 
public 
employee tortfeasors to protect public funds from 
unwarranted disbursements have a rational basis. 
Yotvat, 95 Wis. 2d at 368-69. 
 
¶38 Dr. Riccitelli seems to suggest, however, that the 
affiliation agreement between the Board of Regents of the 
University and Aurora is not sanctioned by the legislature, and 
should therefore eliminate the state’s need for timely notice.  
We do not agree.   
¶39 One of the missions of the University of Wisconsin 
system, which is governed by the Board of Regents, is to 
“develop human resources, to discover and disseminate knowledge, 
to extend knowledge and its application beyond the boundaries of 
its campuses.”  Wis. Stat. § 36.01(2).  The Board of Regents is 
also directed to maintain, control and supervise the use of the 
University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics for the purpose of 
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
18
“[a]ssisting health programs and personnel throughout the state 
and region in the delivery of health care.”  Wis. Stat. 
§ 36.25(13g)(b)4. 
 
The 
affiliation 
agreement 
with 
Sinai 
Samaritan effectuates these goals.  We believe it is reasonable 
that faculty assigned under such an agreement are still 
protected as state employees.6 
 
¶40 Dr. Riccitelli insists, however, that there is no 
rational basis for an absolute bar against claims.  Especially 
in a case such as this, where “the Attorney General not only had 
‘actual notice’ of the claim, Assistant Attorney General 
Flanagan participated in the proceedings in the prior case 
between the parties.”  Presumably the attorney general had 
“actual notice” and participated in Dr. Riccitelli’s attempt to 
enjoin his termination because a notice of claim was timely 
filed.  This second action is different from the first—it was 
filed two years later, after his termination, and it involved 
allegations of interference with a contract.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 893.82(3) requires a notice be filed with the attorney general 
within 120-days of the event causing the injury.  Because the 
two cases involve two different alleged injuries, we believe it 
is clear that two separate notice of claims were necessary as 
well.   
                     
6 The liability portion of the affiliation agreements 
directs that the State of Wisconsin will provide liability 
protection for faculty participating in the U.W. Medical School 
education programs at Aurora institutions for acts within the 
scope of their employment.   
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
19
¶41 Based on the purposes of the notice of claim statute, 
and under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that there 
is a reasonable basis to require a party to file a notice of 
claim within 120 days of the event causing injury.  We therefore 
conclude that Dr. Riccitelli’s rights guaranteed under the equal 
protection 
clauses 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
and 
United 
States 
Constitutions have not been violated.   
¶42 Lastly, Dr. Riccitelli claims that the application of 
the notice of claim statute violates his right to due process.  
Due process requires that the means the legislature chooses 
bears a reasonable and rational relationship to the purpose or 
objective of the enactment.  State v. Jackman, 60 Wis.2d 700, 
705, 211 N.W.2d 480 (1973). The clear policy of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.82(3) is to provide notice to the governmental unit in 
advance of any civil actions for damages based upon acts 
committed by a state employee.  Ibrahim, 118 Wis. 2d at 726-27. 
 The statute requires a notice of claim be filed within 120 days 
of the event causing injury.  We conclude that § 893.82(3) is a 
rational method to further the legislative goal allowing 
investigation, and/or settlement of claims brought against state 
employees. 
¶43 Dr. Riccitelli more specifically argues that he was 
denied substantive and procedural due process because he relied 
on Dr. Broekhuizen’s sworn testimony regarding Dr. Broekhuizen’s 
employment status.  We have concluded in part III of this 
opinion that Dr. Broekhuizen was not testifying, in 1995, about 
his employment status or his employer; rather, the issue in the 
No. 
98-0329-FT 
 
20
1995 suit was the status of the OB-GYN residency program, and 
Dr. Riccitelli’s status in that program.  We also determined 
that any reliance by Dr. Riccitelli on Dr. Broekhuizen’s 
testimony in concluding that Dr. Broekhuizen was not a state 
employee was unreasonable.   
¶44 We also note that Dr. Riccitelli’s first action was 
premised on his theory that Dr. Broekhuizen was a state 
employee.  It is reasonable to presume that a timely notice of 
claim was filed in the first case since the attorney general 
represented Dr. Broekhuizen, the U.W. Medical School, and the 
Board of Regents.  Clearly if Dr. Broekhuizen was not a state 
employee, he would not have been represented by the attorney 
general, he would have had his own personal counsel.  It is 
rather ironic that Dr. Riccitelli has alleged in one action that 
Dr. Broekhuizen was a state employee (subject to the notice of 
claim statute), but has  claimed in this subsequent action that 
he was unaware that Dr. Broekhuizen was a state employee such 
that he needed to file a second notice of claim.   
¶45 We 
conclude 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.82(3) 
is 
constitutionally valid and applies to the present case to bar 
Dr. Riccitelli’s cause of action against Dr. Broekhuizen. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
¶46 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate.
 
 
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