Case Title: Kelsey v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC15-2079

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2016-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC15-2079 
____________ 
 
THOMAS KELSEY, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[December 8, 2016] 
 
PERRY, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District 
Court of Appeal in Kelsey v. State, 183 So. 3d 439 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).  In its 
decision, the district court expressed concern and certified a question of great 
public importance,1 which we rephrase as follows: 
                                          
 
1.  The following question was certified by the First District: 
Whether a defendant whose initial sentence for a 
nonhomicide crime violates Graham v. Florida, and who 
is resentenced to concurrent forty-five year terms, is 
entitled to a new resentencing under the framework 
established in chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida? 
Kelsey, 183 So. 3d at 442. 
 
 
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Is a defendant whose original sentence violated Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48 (2010), and who was subsequently resentenced prior to 
July 1, 2014, entitled to be resentenced pursuant to the provisions of 
chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida? 
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  We answer the rephrased 
question in the affirmative. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Thomas Kelsey was born on December 10, 1986.  The underlying offenses 
in this case occurred on November 6, 2002, when fifteen-year-old Kelsey 
burglarized an apartment and raped the pregnant victim at knifepoint in the 
presence of her two small children.  Kelsey was identified in 2008 based on a DNA 
match.  In 2009, Kelsey was charged with two counts of armed sexual battery, 
armed burglary, and armed robbery, and he pleaded guilty.  On March 26, 2010, a 
trial court sentenced Kelsey to two life sentences and two concurrent twenty-five-
year terms for four nonhomicide offenses.  After the United States Supreme Court 
decided Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Kelsey sought to withdraw his 
plea, which was denied.  At the resentencing held in January 2014, the trial court 
imposed concurrent sentences of forty-five years.2 
                                          
 
 
2.  The sentences also run concurrently to a twenty-year sentence that Kelsey 
is serving pursuant to a revocation of probation on an unrelated offense. 
 
 
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On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal originally issued an opinion in 
Kelsey v. State, 183 So. 3d 439, 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), comprised of one 
paragraph, holding: 
Even if Mr. Kelsey were entitled to resentencing under Henry [v. 
State, 175 So. 3d 675 (Fla. 2015)], which applied the new sentence 
review statute to a Graham-eligible defendant, he is not entitled to the 
benefit of the new sentence review statute because his previous 
convictions for another separate armed robbery and conspiracy to 
commit armed robbery disentitle him to relief.  See § 921.1402(2)(a), 
Fla. Stat. (2014) (“[A] juvenile offender is not entitled to review if he 
or she has previously been convicted of one of the following offenses, 
or conspiracy to commit one of the following offenses . . . armed 
robbery.”). 
On Kelsey’s motion for rehearing, the First District issued a revised opinion, 
reconsidering its legal analysis, and “concluding that [Kelsey] is not entitled to 
resentencing again.”  Id.  Under its revised analysis, the First District opined that it 
was precluded from providing Kelsey the same relief afforded to Henry because 
Kelsey’s forty-five-year prison term did not constitute a de facto life sentence in 
violation of Graham.  Id. at 441 (citing Abrakata v. State, 168 So. 3d 251, 252 (Fla. 
1st DCA 2015); Lambert v. State, 170 So. 3d 74, 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)).  
Specifically, the First District stated, “Because the concurrent resentences at issue 
in this case do not violate Graham, we are constrained to deny relief.”  Id. 
 
After recognizing our guidance in Thomas v. State, 135 So. 3d 590 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2014), quashed, 177 So. 3d 1275 (Fla. 2015) (table decision), the First 
District distinguished Kelsey, opining that the decision in Thomas was based on 
 
 
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Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012),3 and its progeny, and not Graham.  The 
First District recognized that, “the supreme court appears to require that any 
juvenile initially sentenced . . . in violation of Miller be sentenced under the new 
framework regardless of what resentence may have been imposed in the interim.”  
Kelsey, 183 So. 3d at 441.  However, the district court reasoned: 
Unlike Miller cases for which no valid remedy on resentencing was 
available until the recent legislation, a wide range of valid term of 
years sentences are available for [juveniles] whose original sentences 
were unconstitutional under Graham.  If those resentences themselves 
violate Graham by providing no meaningful opportunity for release 
(as in Henry and Gridine [v. State, 175 So. 3d 672 (Fla. 2015)]), the 
supreme court requires resort[ing] to the 2014 legislative remedies.  
But the supreme court has not yet held that all resentencings and re-
resentencings under Graham must also comply with the recent 
legislation.  Our precedents have not held that a forty-five year 
sentence for a nonhomicide is a de facto life term to which Graham 
applies; nor has our supreme court.  We are thereby constrained to 
affirm in this case, but recognizing the need for clarity on this 
category of Graham cases certify the following question . . . . 
Id. at 442. 
DISCUSSION 
Standard of Review 
 
Because the certified question of great public importance before this Court 
presents a purely legal question, the appropriate standard of review is de novo.  See 
                                          
 
 
3.  In Miller, the Supreme Court held that mandatory life sentences without 
parole for crimes committed by juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment. 
 
 
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Gridine, 175 So. 3d at 674 (citing Haygood v. State, 109 So. 3d 735, 739 (Fla. 
2013)). 
Graham 
 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Graham held that Florida’s 
practice of sentencing juvenile offenders to life in prison for nonhomicide crimes 
violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  For a period of 
nearly four years, the Florida Legislature left the trial courts and district courts of 
appeal to determine how to legally sentence juvenile nonhomicide offenders.  In 
2014, the Legislature passed chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, which provided 
judicial review for juvenile offenders who were tried as adults and received more 
than twenty years of incarceration, with exceptions.  Following that, this Court, in 
a unanimous decision, decided that juveniles who receive sentences that do not 
provide a meaningful opportunity for release are entitled to be resentenced 
pursuant to chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida.  As we discuss further below, we 
conclude that our decision in Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675 (Fla. 2015), requires 
that all juvenile offenders whose sentences meet the standard defined by the 
Legislature in chapter 2014-220, a sentence longer than twenty years, are entitled 
to judicial review.  We therefore hold that all juveniles who have sentences that 
violate Graham are entitled to resentencing pursuant to chapter 2014-220, Laws of 
 
 
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Florida, codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401 and 921.1402, Florida Statutes 
(2014). 
 
To answer the First District’s certified question, we first revisit the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Graham.  Terrance Jamar Graham received a withheld 
adjudication and was sentenced to probation for crimes he committed at the age of 
sixteen.  He subsequently received a life sentence after violating that probation 
before he turned eighteen years of age.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 53-57. 
 
The Supreme Court began its analysis with its Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  Id. at 58.  The Court noted that the core of the Eighth Amendment 
“is the ‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and 
proportioned to [the] offense.’ ”  Id. at 59 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 
U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).  The Court then noted that Graham presented a new 
categorical challenge to term-of-years sentences.  Id. at 61 (“The present case 
involves an issue the Court has not considered previously: a categorical challenge 
to a term-of-years sentence.”).  Accordingly, the Court reasoned, the correct 
approach to the analysis would be the one used in cases such as Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  Graham, 560 U.S. at 61-62. 
 
Opining that “Roper established that because juveniles have lessened 
culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punishments,” Graham, 560 
 
 
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U.S. at 68 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569), the Court pronounced a categorical rule.  
Id. at 75, 78, 79 (“Categorical rules tend to be imperfect, but one is necessary 
here.”  “A categorical rule avoids the risk that . . . a court or jury will erroneously 
conclude that a particular juvenile is sufficiently culpable to deserve life without 
parole for a nonhomicide.”  “[A] categorical rule gives all juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform.”).  The new categorical 
rule provided that: 
The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole 
sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.  A 
State need not guarantee the offender eventual release, but if it 
imposes a sentence of life it must provide him or her with some 
realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term. 
Id. at 82. 
 
In this Court’s discussions of Graham, we have underscored the Supreme 
Court’s emphasis on the status of the juvenile nonhomicide offender and the nature 
of the offense committed.  See Henry, 175 So. 3d at 675 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. 
at 69).  Accordingly, our focus has not been on the length of the sentence imposed 
but on the status of the offender and the possibility that he or she will be able to 
grow into a contributing member of society.  To understand this reading of 
Graham, we now turn to our decision in Henry. 
Henry 
 
 
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Leighdon Henry, a juvenile offender who was tried as an adult, was 
convicted of multiple nonhomicide crimes and sentenced to life in prison plus an 
additional sixty years.  Henry, 175 So. 3d at 676.  After Graham issued, Henry’s 
life sentence was vacated and he was resentenced to thirty years in prison, to run 
consecutively to the originally imposed sixty-year sentence.  Id. 
 
On appeal, we concluded “that Graham prohibits the state trial courts from 
sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to prison terms that ensure these 
offenders will be imprisoned without obtaining a meaningful opportunity to obtain 
future early release during their natural lives based on their demonstrated maturity 
and rehabilitation.”  Id. at 680.  We reasoned that the “Supreme Court’s long-held 
and consistent view that juveniles are different” supported the conclusion that “the 
specific sentence that a juvenile nonhomicide offender receives for committing a 
given offense is not dispositive as to whether the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment is implicated.”  Id.  Thus, we determined that Graham was not 
limited to certain sentences but rather was intended to insure that “juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders will not be sentenced to terms of imprisonment without 
affording them a meaningful opportunity for early release based on a 
demonstration of maturity and rehabilitation.”  Id.  In light of this reasoning, we 
concluded that the Eighth Amendment, as read through Graham, requires a review 
mechanism for evaluating this class of offenders because “any term of 
 
 
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imprisonment for a juvenile is qualitatively different than a comparable period of 
incarceration is for an adult.”  Id.  Therefore, our holding in Henry was not 
predicated on the term of the sentence but rather on the status of, and the 
opportunity afforded, the offender.  Indeed, the holding of Henry was unequivocal.  
Additionally, we determined that the remedy outlined in Horsley v. State, 160 So. 
3d 393, 395 (Fla. 2015), applied to cases like Henry’s.  See Henry, 175 So. 3d at 
680. 
Horsley 
 
In Horsley, a juvenile offender tried as an adult was convicted of first-degree 
felony murder, among other offenses, and received a mandatory life sentence 
without the possibility of parole.  After Miller, the trial court resentenced Horsley 
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  The Fifth District Court of 
Appeal vacated that sentence and certified a question of great public importance to 
this Court.4  In our decision, we reasoned that “presented with this unique situation 
in which a federal constitutional infirmity in a sentencing statute has now been 
                                          
 
 
4.  The Fifth District asked: “Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Miller v. Alabama, [132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)], which invalidated section 
775.082(1)’s mandatory imposition of life without parole sentences for juveniles 
convicted of first-degree murder, operates to revive the prior sentence of life with 
parole eligibility after 25 years previously contained in that statute?”  Horsley, 160 
So. 3d at 397 (quoting Horsley v. State, 121 So. 3d 1130, 1132-33 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2013)). 
 
 
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specifically remedied by our Legislature, we conclude that the proper remedy is to 
apply [that legislation] to all juvenile offenders whose sentences are 
unconstitutional in light of Miller.”  Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 395. 
Miller held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that 
mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders,” even 
for juveniles convicted of homicide crimes.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.  While the 
remedy articulated in Horsley initially only applied to those juvenile defendants 
whose sentences violated the Eighth Amendment pursuant to Miller, we extended 
the reasoning of Horsley to those juveniles whose sentences violated the Eighth 
Amendment pursuant to Graham in Henry.  See Henry, 175 So. 3d at 680.  We 
have since reaffirmed that application of the new statute is the appropriate remedy.  
See Thomas v. State, 177 So. 3d 1275 (Fla. 2015). 
Reading together our decisions in Henry, Horsley, and Thomas, it is clear 
that we intended for juvenile offenders, who are otherwise treated like adults for 
purposes of sentencing, to retain their status as juveniles in some sense.  In other 
words, we have determined through our reading of the Legislature’s intent in 
passing chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, that juveniles who are serving lengthy 
sentences are entitled to periodic judicial review to determine whether they can 
demonstrate maturation and rehabilitation.  It would be antithetical to the precept 
of Graham and chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, to interpret them so narrowly as 
 
 
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to exclude a juvenile offender who happens to have been resentenced before this 
Court issued Henry.  With these considerations in mind, we turn to the present 
case. 
This Case 
 
Kelsey represents a narrow class of juvenile offenders, those resentenced 
from life to term-of-years sentences after Graham, for crimes committed before 
chapter 2014-220’s July 1, 2014, effective date.  Kelsey argues that his sentence 
does not currently provide the relief specified in our previous decisions and seeks 
the judicial review granted to other defendants who, like him, were sentenced to 
terms that will not provide them a meaningful opportunity for relief in their 
respective lifetimes.  We agree. 
 
After we made clear that Graham does indeed apply to term-of-years 
sentences, we have declined to require that such sentences must be “de facto life” 
sentences for Graham to apply.  See, e.g., Guzman v. State, 183 So. 3d 1025, 1026 
(Fla. 2016).  By using chapter 2014-220 as a guide, we avoid second-guessing the 
legislative contemplation that resulted in the twenty-year cutoff for judicial review 
contained in the law.  However, in applying chapter 2014-220, we agree with the 
State that the new sentencing scheme contemplates the possibility of a life sentence 
for a juvenile nonhomicide offender.  See Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 404 (“Juveniles 
convicted of nonhomicide offenses, thereby implicating Graham rather than Miller, 
 
 
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also may be sentenced to life imprisonment if the trial court, after considering the 
specified factors during an individualized sentencing hearing, determines that a life 
sentence is appropriate.” (citing ch. 2014-220 §§ 1, 3, Laws of Fla.)).  Because we 
determine that resentencing is the appropriate remedy, the trial courts may embrace 
all of the provisions of chapter 2014-220 and are not required to limit themselves 
to only applying the judicial review provision.  This would mean that if the State 
seeks a life sentence, the trial court’s determination would have to be informed by 
individualized sentencing considerations. 
Kelsey further argues that he has a reasonable expectation of finality in his 
forty-five-year prison term because his term is lawful apart from its failure to 
provide judicial review.  We disagree. 
 
In Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 2003), we held that “[o]nce a 
sentence has been imposed and the person begins to serve the sentence, that 
sentence may not be increased without running afoul of double jeopardy 
principles.” (citing Lippman v. State, 633 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1994); Clark v. State, 
579 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1991)).  To do so, we articulated, was a clear violation of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.  Id. (citing State v. Wilson, 680 So. 2d 411, 413 (Fla. 
1996)).  In 2012, we clarified that jeopardy attaches only to a legal sentence.  
Dunbar v. State, 89 So. 3d 901, 905 (Fla. 2012) (citing Harris v. State, 645 So. 2d 
386 388 (Fla. 1994)). 
 
 
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Therefore, jeopardy has not attached to Kelsey’s illegal sentence, and when 
he is resentenced according to the provisions of chapter 2014-220, the State may 
again seek life imprisonment with judicial review.  Kelsey originally began serving 
his sentence as a life sentence, but that sentence became illegal when the Supreme 
Court issued Graham and Kelsey successfully sought relief.  However, his sentence 
was unconstitutional not because of the length of his sentence, but because it did 
not provide him a meaningful opportunity for early release based on maturation 
and rehabilitation.  Accordingly, Kelsey’s resentencing under the provisions of 
chapter 2014-220 would not place him in any worse position than he would have 
been had he initially faced post-Graham resentencing under the statute. 
 
For these reasons, there is no compelling reason that the State must be 
precluded from seeking a life sentence that complied with Graham: 
A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a 
juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime.  What the State 
must do, however, is give defendants like Graham some meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation.  It is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the 
means and mechanisms for compliance. 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.  In Henry, we determined that the Legislature’s remedy 
was the appropriate remedy in these cases, and the Legislature has determined that 
the “means and mechanisms for compliance” with Graham are to provide judicial 
review for juvenile offenders who are sentenced to terms longer than twenty years.  
Therefore Kelsey is entitled to resentencing under those provisions.  We therefore 
 
 
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answer the rephrased question in the affirmative and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion, in which LABARGA, C.J., and PERRY, 
J., concur. 
POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring. 
 
I concur with the majority that juvenile offenders like Kelsey, who were 
previously resentenced after the United States Supreme Court decided Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), but before the Legislature enacted chapter 2014-220, 
Laws of Florida, are entitled to resentencing under this sentencing scheme.  
Majority op. at 14.  Resentencing under this new juvenile sentencing scheme 
includes, in most instances, the benefit of judicial review of the sentence as set 
forth in section 921.1402(2), Florida Statutes (2014).  See majority op. at 11-12. 
I write to emphasize that, in this case, even though our precedent in Dunbar 
v. State, 89 So. 3d 901 (Fla. 2012), does not preclude the State from seeking a life 
sentence on remand because Kelsey’s previously imposed sentence was illegal, the 
individualized sentencing consideration required by Graham and our juvenile 
sentencing precedent will likely preclude such a sentence.  Indeed, as I explain 
 
 
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below, I would conclude that Kelsey is precluded from being resentenced to a term 
exceeding his current forty-five-year sentence when the sentencing court takes into 
account all of the sentencing factors set forth in section 921.1401(2).  
 
As we explained in Landrum v. State, chapter 2014-220 sets forth the 
individualized sentencing considerations that a sentencing court must consider 
“when determining if a juvenile offender should be sentenced to life 
imprisonment.”  192 So. 3d 459, 466 (Fla. 2016).  These considerations have since 
been codified in section 921.1401(2), Florida Statutes (2014), and include the 
following sentencing factors: 
 
(a)  The nature and circumstances of the offense committed by 
the defendant. 
 
 
(b)  The effect of the crime on the victim’s family and on the 
community. 
 
 
(c)  The defendant’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and 
mental and emotional health at the time of the offense. 
 
 
(d)  The defendant’s background, including his or her family, 
home, and community environment. 
 
 
(e)  The effect, if any, of immaturity, impetuosity, or failure to 
appreciate risks and consequences on the defendant’s participation in 
the offense. 
 
 
(f)  The extent of the defendant’s participation in the offense. 
 
 
(g)  The effect, if any, of familial pressure or peer pressure on 
the defendant’s actions. 
 
 
 
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(h)  The nature and extent of the defendant’s prior criminal 
history. 
 
 
(i)  The effect, if any, of characteristics attributable to the 
defendant’s youth on the defendant’s judgment. 
 
 
(j)  The possibility of rehabilitating the defendant. 
 
 
The record in this case demonstrates that, while the sentencing court did not 
consider all of the above factors, the sentencing court was aware that the 
Legislature was at the time considering legislation later enacted as chapter 2014-
220, Laws of Florida.  Indeed, the sentencing court considered some of the 
individualized sentencing considerations since codified in section 921.1401(1) 
when determining whether to again sentence Kelsey to life in prison or to some 
lesser term.  As the court explained: 
We have to make a decision based on what we know about a person’s 
history, taking into account their psychological condition, their mental 
health, their age, you know, disabilities, severity of the crime, and all 
of the factors that [the psychologist] went over and defense counsel 
has adequately covered. 
 
 
Further, the sentencing court heard testimony from a psychologist who had 
evaluated Kelsey, and whose testimony underscored “the special status of juvenile 
offenders for purposes of criminal punishment.”  Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675, 
677 (Fla. 2015).  As the psychologist explained:  
 
So, you have a 15 year old with a 80 IQ, borderline intellectual 
functioning, maybe even a lower achievement at that age, maybe, I 
don’t know.  And then you have an adolescent, young brain 
develop[ment], where they have low decision making ability, frontal 
 
 
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lobe not being developed, executive functioning not being developed, 
and that’s compounded by an IQ in the borderline range. 
  
Secondary, you have a kid whose, you know, in a marginal 
lifestyle, some trouble, maybe some special education, and he’s not 
functioning very high in terms of cognitive ability and he’s hanging 
out with what we call deviant peers.  And so—well, I don’t that, I 
didn’t see him when he was 15, I’m making some hypothesis from 
evaluating juveniles over the years, and often juveniles with this level 
of functioning start doing bad things, start doing delinquent type 
things because they’re faced with the choice of being called lots of 
names, retarded, dumb, dummy, and they don’t want to be called 
those things and the way to get around that is to start acting out, and 
so they can be called bad, and they get identified as bad, and that’s 
part of their personality, and it’s the way they get accepted, and 
knowledge of deviant peer groups, but they want to fight against being 
called dumb or any of those derogatory words that teenage boys are 
apt to use.  And so, they overcompensate and they get tough and street 
tough and start acting tough, and they start looking like the delinquent 
kid, and it’s really because of the way they are in their life, without 
enough positive adult mentoring peer, without enough appropriate 
prosocial peer groups.  So, it has, sorry to use this word, it has a 
waterfall effect, you know.    
 
 
These statements demonstrate that the sentencing court was cognizant of the 
United States Supreme Court’s command that the “status of juvenile offenders 
warrants different considerations by the states whenever such offenders face 
criminal punishments as if they are adults.”  Id. at 678.  Therefore, even though 
chapter 2014-220 “contemplates the possibility of a life sentence for a juvenile 
nonhomicide offender,” majority op. at 12, I would conclude that such a possibility 
is slim.  This is especially so in this case, where the sentencing court previously 
tried to comply with Graham during resentencing, expressly considered some of 
the sentencing factors now codified in section 921.141, and sentenced the juvenile 
 
 
- 18 - 
offender to concurrent sentences of forty-five years.  Put simply, upon 
resentencing, the sentencing court must consider whether Kelsey is the “rare 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,” and thereby 
warrants a life sentence.  Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 397 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 132 
S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012)).  In my view, imposing a lengthier sentence in this 
nonhomicide case upon consideration of additional individualized sentencing 
factors would violate the basic “precept of justice that punishment for crime should 
be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.”  Landrum, 192 So. 3d at 460-61 
(quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 59) (noting that upholding a juvenile offender’s life 
without parole sentence for second-degree murder “would violate this precept, as a 
juvenile convicted of the lesser offense of second-degree murder would receive a 
harsher sentence than a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder”).   
LABARGA, C.J., and PERRY, J., concur. 
POLSTON, J., dissenting. 
 
When Kelsey was fifteen years old, he committed burglary and raped a 
pregnant woman at knifepoint in front of her two small children.  Unlike the 
majority, I would approve the First District Court of Appeal’s decision affirming 
Kelsey’s resentencing for these crimes.  I also would answer the question as 
certified in the negative and hold that “a defendant whose initial sentence for a 
nonhomicide crime violate[d] Graham v. Florida, and who [was] resentenced to 
 
 
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concurrent forty-five year terms, is [not] entitled to a new resentencing under the 
framework established in chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida.”  Kelsey v. State, 
183 So. 3d 439, 442 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). 
 
In Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010), the United States Supreme 
Court held the following: 
The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without 
parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit 
homicide.  A State need not guarantee the offender eventual 
release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him 
or her with some realistic opportunity to obtain release before 
the end of that term. 
Subsequently, this Court in Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675, 676 (Fla. 2015), 
reviewed a district court decision holding that Graham “does not apply to term-of-
years prison sentences because such sentences do not constitute life 
imprisonment.”  This Court disagreed and held “that Graham does apply and that 
the sentence at issue will not provide a meaningful opportunity for release.”  Id.  
Specifically, this Court explained that “Graham requires a juvenile nonhomicide 
offender, such as Henry, to be afforded such an opportunity during his or her 
natural life.”  Id. at 679.  Then, this Court explained that, “[b]ecause Henry’s 
aggregate sentence, which totals ninety years and requires him to be imprisoned 
until he is at least nearly ninety-five years old, does not afford him this 
opportunity, that sentence is unconstitutional under Graham.”  Id. at 679-80. 
 
 
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In contrast to Henry, Kelsey was sentenced to an aggregate of forty five 
years for crimes he committed when he was fifteen years old.  Because Kelsey’s 
term-of-years aggregate sentence is not a de facto life sentence, Kelsey will have a 
meaningful opportunity for release during his natural life.  Therefore, Kelsey’s 
aggregate sentence does not violate Graham, and he is not entitled to resentencing.  
Cf. Henry, 175 So. 3d at 680 (“Because we have determined that Henry’s sentence 
is unconstitutional under Graham, we conclude that Henry should be resentenced 
in light of the new juvenile sentencing legislation enacted by the Florida 
Legislature in 2014, ch. 2014-220, Laws of Fla.”).   
 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D14-518 
 
 
(Duval County) 
 
Nancy Ann Daniels, Public Defender, and Glen Phillip Gifford, Assistant Public 
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and 
Virginia Chester Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,  
 
 
for Respondent 
 
 
 
- 21 - 
Julianne M. Holt, President, Tampa, Florida; and Jonathan Harris Greenberg, 
Assistant Public Defender, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Florida Public Defender Association, Inc. 
 
Paolo Giuseppe Annino of FSU College of Law Public Interest Law Center, 
Tallahassee, Florida; and Marsha L. Levick of the Juvenile Law Center, 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,  
 
for Amici Curiae FSU College of Law Public Interest Law Center, Juvenile 
Law Center, ACLU of Florida, CFFSY, The Center on Children and 
Families at UF, Children and Youth Law Clinic at UM, FACDL, FCF, 
FJRRP At FIU, FLS, National Association of Counsel for Children, 
NAFPD, NJDC, SJDC, and SPLC