Case Title: Nodak Mutual Ins. Co. v. Loeffler

Citation: 225 N.W.2d 286

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1974-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
225 N.W.2d 286 (1974) NODAK MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Richard LOEFFLER, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. No. 9049. Supreme Court of North Dakota. October 10, 1974. *287 Degnan, McElroy, Lamb, Camrud & Maddock, Grand Forks, for defendant and appellant. Letnes & Marshall, Grand Forks, for plaintiff and appellee. ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice. Richard Loeffler, defendant, has appealed to this court from a declaratory judgment ordered by the District Court for Pembina County declaring that Loeffler was not insured by an automobile insurance policy # 29454 issued by the plaintiff Nodak Mutual Insurance Company. This is a motion by Nodak to dismiss that appeal due to alleged noncompliance with certain of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure. A chronology of the pertinent procedural events of this case follows: The case came on for trial before the Honorable James H. O'Keefe, District Judge, sitting without a jury, and on the 31st of December 1973 Judge O'Keefe rendered a memorandum opinion declaring that no contractual obligation to Loeffler was incurred by Nodak because of the issuance of Automobile Liability Policy # 29454. On January 11, 1974, judgment was entered pursuant to the memorandum opinion. On March 8, 1974, Loeffler filed in the district court a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of January 11, 1974. On August 8, 1974, Nodak filed in this court the present motion to dismiss the appeal. Up to this point, Loeffler had not transmitted the record to this court nor had he filed an appellate brief. On August 21, 1974, the record of this case was transmitted to and filed in this court. On that date Loeffler also filed his return to the motion to dismiss, his brief, and a stipulation signed by counsel for Nodak waiving the necessity of a bond on appeal. Nodak listed the following as grounds upon which it based its motion to dismiss: 1. Noncompliance with Rules 11 and 12, N.D.R.App.P., in that Loeffler had not caused the timely transmission of the record within 40 days of the filing of his notice of appeal. 2. Noncompliance with Rule 31, N.D.R. App.P., apparently because of the late filing of Loeffler's appellate brief, although this was not expressly stated in the motion to dismiss. 3. Noncompliance with Rule 7, N.D.R. App.P., in that Loeffler had not filed a bond for costs on appeal. 4. The notice of appeal indicates an attempt to obtain a trial de novo of the declaratory action. *288 Grounds numbered 3 and 4 are insufficient cause for the granting of the motion. As to number 3, although a bond was not filed within the time required by Rule 7, N.D.R.App.P., since Nodak has now waived the requirement of a bond the issue has become moot. As to number 4, the notice of appeal does no more than follow the requirements of Rule 3(c), N.D.R.App.P. Rule 3(c) reads: Nodak has offered no support for its contention that this notice of appeal is actually a request for a trial de novo, and this court has found none. Accordingly, this contention is rejected. We now consider Nodak's contentions herein numbered 1 and 2. The pertinent parts of the applicable rules follow. The notice of appeal was filed on March 8, 1974. The deadline for transmission of the record, according to Rule 11(a), was April 17, 1974, computing the time pursuant to Rule 26(a). The record was filed on the 21st of August, 1974, and was therefore untimely. The same objection may be made as to the payment of the docket fee which, by Rule 12(a), is to be effected within the time allowed for transmitting the record. The receipt issued by the clerk of this court is dated August 28, 1974. The payment of the fee was therefore not timely. Rule 31(a) requires that briefs be filed within 40 days of the filing of the record. In this case this was done, since both the brief and the record were filed on August 21, 1974; but as the record was not timely filed, it being 136 days late, the brief was also filed late. Loeffler offers no excuse for these delays except that counsel was confused as to when the time for filing the record and brief began to run. Under Rule 3(a), N.D.R.App.P., we may take such action as we deem appropriate. Rule 3(a) reads: Recently we warned the bar that noncompliance by an appellant with our rules could result in a dismissal of an appeal. Naaden v. Hagen, 213 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 1973); Johanson v. Nash Finch Co., 212 N.W.2d 372 (N.D.1973). An appeal has been dismissed for failure to comply with Rules 10(b) and 12(a). Beckert v. Wallace, 219 N.W.2d 160 (N.D.1974). The question in this case seems to be whether the violations of the rules in this case merit such severe action as a dismissal. In Naaden, we refused to dismiss an appeal even though provisions of Rules 11 and 12 were not met. Although one reason for the denial of dismissal was the newness of the appellate rules, we also said that because of the "readiness of this appeal for calendaring at the next term, there being no showing of prejudice caused by delay, and a substantial question being involved, we deny the motion to dismiss, * * *" Naaden v. Hagen, supra, 213 N.W.2d 702 at 704. It should also be noted that in Beckert, where we dismissed the appeal, the case was not made ready for hearing in our court prior to the date set for hearing in our court of the motion to dismiss. In the instant case, the matter has been made ready for hearing, the record is here, and the appellant's brief has been filed. Furthermore, Nodak has made no showing whatsoever that it was prejudiced by the delay. Absent such a showing of prejudice on the part of the respondent, we are reluctant *290 to dismiss the appeal. Although stated prior to the enactment of our new appellate rules, what we said in Hogan, infra, remains pertinent: Additionally, the judgment appealed from in this case affects not only Nodak and Loeffler, but also Donald Keller, who is not a party to this action and who is in no way responsible for the delays. Keller has initiated a suit against Loeffler, and the nature of that suit is such that Keller's ability to recover, or his measure of recovery may well be affected by the determination of whether Loeffler is deemed to be insured by Nodak. In light of these facts, and in the absence of a showing of prejudice by Nodak, we are of the opinion that this is a case where the merits should be reached, notwithstanding the failure on the part of Loeffler to comply with the Appellate Rules. Accordingly, the motion for dismissal of the appeal is denied. KNUDSON, PAULSON, VOGEL and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.