Case Title: Sullivan v. Cheatham

Citation: 84 So. 2d 374

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1955-11-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
84 So. 2d 374 (1955)
L. B. SULLIVAN, as Director, Department of Public Safety,
v.
Frank CHEATHAM.
8 Div. 791.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 28, 1955.
Rehearing Denied January 12, 1956.
*375 John Patterson, Atty. Gen., and Robt. P. Bradley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
Britnell & McEntire, Decatur, for appellee.
MAYFIELD, Justice.
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Morgan County, brought under the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act, Act No. 704, appvd. Sept. 5, 1951, Gen. Acts of Alabama 1951, pp. 1224-1244, Code 1940, Tit. 36, § 74(42) et seq.
The threshold question for our consideration is whether or not the controversy between these parties, which resulted in this appeal, is now moot. Without specifically so deciding, it would appear from the whole record in this cause, that it is now beyond the power of the Director of Public Safety to take further action against the appellee, Frank Cheatham, under the provisions of Act No. 704, supra.
While there is doubt that there remains a justiciable controversy between the parties; the question presented is one of broad public interest, and one which deserves a decision by this Court. We are cited to no case, nor does our research reveal the existence of a case, construing the particular section of the Act in question. In the cases of Willis v. Buchman, 240 Ala. 386, 199 So. 892, 132 A.L.R. 1179, and Jones v. Crawford, 258 Ala. 278, 62 So. 2d 221, we find authority for the proposition that where a broad public interest is involved it is within the power of this Court to write to the issue even though such decision may not be determinative of any existing rights between the appealing parties.
In the case at bar, the appellee was the driver-owner of an automobile involved in a collision with one Stinson on 2 January 1954. Both parties filed accident reports with the appellant Director of Public Safety, within ten days after the accident. Stinson filed an affidavit claiming damage to his automobile in the amount of $568.50. On 11 February 1954, the Director of Public Safety commanded the appellee Cheatham to post with his Department the prescribed form showing that he had the requisite liability insurance policy, or in the alternative *376 to post bond in the amount of $568.50. The appellee was advised that unless he complied with this directive he was to turn over to the Department his driver's license, his registration certificates and license plates on or before 7 March 1954; such plates and licenses were subject to suspension under the terms of the Alabama Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act.
The appellee failed to post bond or give evidence of liability insurance and challenged the order of suspension. On 11 February 1954, the appellee took an appeal from the Director's order to the Circuit Court of Morgan County. The Circuit Court, without a jury, set aside the order of the Director. Appellant's motion for a new trial was overruled and the instant appeal was perfected.
The position of the appellee, both in the Court below and here, is that he was guilty of no fault or negligence in connection with the accident and, therefore, did not have to comply with the terms of the Act requiring the posting of security. The evidence of the appellee in the Trial Court tended to support his freedom from culpability in connection with the accident. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the appellee's contention. The most pertinent portion of such ruling is as follows:
The Court further held that it was its opinion from the evidence that the appellee was not liable to anyone for damages from this accident, and that accordingly the order of the Director should be set aside.
The question for our decision is whether or not the possible or probable existence of civil liability for an automobile accident, is a consideration in determining whether or not a particular owner or driver of an automobile is required to comply with the applicable provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act. The language of the Act is as follows:
Section 2(b) of the Act provides that an appeal to the circuit court from any order or decision of the Director may be taken. This subsection further provides:
While this Court has not previously construed these sections, similar acts in other jurisdictions have been considered by appellate courts of some of our sister states.
Sections 2, 4, and 5 of the Texas Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 6701h, are substantially identical to those same numbered sections of the Alabama Act. In Gillaspie v. Department of Public Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 259 S.W.2d 177, 181, the Supreme Court of Texas held:
In construing a section of the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, KRS 187.330, which is markedly similar to section 5 of the Alabama Act, the Court of Appeals of that state succinctly stated:
In the leading case of Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 197 A. 701, 703, 115 A.L.R. 1367, it was stated by the New Hampshire Supreme Court:
See, also, Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52; State v. Stehlek, 262 Wis. 642, 56 N.W.2d 514; Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d 620, 35 A.L.R.2d 1003.
As we view it, the Act does not invest the Director with a discretion to determine who shall be required to post security for a given accident. The purpose of the Act is clearly to require and establish financial responsibility for every owner or operator of a motor vehicle "in any manner involved in an accident." To allow the Director, through his officers and agents, to decide the civil responsibility for accidents occurring on the highways would be a usurpation of the judicial function. The Act is designed to protect all persons having claims arising out of highway accidents.
While learned counsel argues with much force that it would be harsh to require an innocent accident victim to comply with the requirements of the Act, nevertheless it is clear that the Act was designed for the benefit of the public generally, and such public benefit would be seriously compromised if compliance was made dependant on a preliminary non-judicial determination of the existence of liability.
Some jurisdictions have, within their police power, required the operators of motor *379 vehicles to furnish evidence of financial responsibility before the issuance of a driver's license or certificate of registration. Our statute has oft been criticized as "allowing one free accident". Needless to say, the terms and application of the Act were a matter for the legislature; so long as they violate no constitutional guarantees.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Circuit Court was in error in setting aside the Director's order on the grounds that the appellee was free from fault in the particular accident. The judgment is due to be reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to dispose of any justiciable controversy that may still exist between the parties.
Reversed and remanded.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.