Case Title: MARK DAVID KOENIG V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARK DAVID KOENIG V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 135121 P.3d 780Case Number: 04-164Decided: 09/17/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
MARK 
DAVID KOENIG,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. 
Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; Nathan Preuss, Student Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Preuss.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric Johnson, Director; 
Jenny L. Craig, Student Director; Scott M. Dutcher, Student Intern; and Jonathan 
Haidsiak, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Haidsiak.

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
Mark 
Koenig appeals the district court's ruling on his post-sentence motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas.  Koenig 
contends that his guilty pleas were not knowing or voluntary because he was 
suffering from a mental illness and, accordingly, incompetent at the time he 
entered the pleas.  We 
affirm.

 
 
 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]           
Koenig 
presents the following issue on appeal:

 
 
Whether 
the district court abused its discretion when it denied [Koenig's] motion to 
withdraw guilty pleas.

 
 
 
 

FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
On 
January 11 and January 19, 2003, Koenig entered the home of Tracy Archuleta 
without her permission and, in each instance, caused more than $500.00 in 
damages to its contents.  During the 
latter incident, Koenig had in his possession a .40 caliber semi-automatic 
handgun and a hunting knife.  As a 
result of his conduct on those occasions, the State charged Koenig with one 
count of burglary and one count of aggravated burglary, as proscribed by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301 (LexisNexis 2005).

 
 

[¶4]           
Koenig 
initially pled not guilty to the charges at his arraignment.  On August 8, 2003, Koenig changed his 
pleas to guilty on both counts pursuant to a plea agreement with the State.  Before accepting Koenig's pleas, the 
district court ensured Koenig understood his rights, the nature of the charges 
and their associated penalties, and that he was not suffering from any physical, 
mental or learning disability. After obtaining a factual basis for his pleas, 
the district court found Koenig was alert and not under the influence of 
anything that would adversely affect his understanding of the proceedings, he 
was competent to enter the pleas, and his pleas were knowing and voluntary.  

 
 

[¶5]           
Prior to 
sentencing, Koenig's attorney arranged for Dr. Anup Sidhu to perform a 
psychiatric evaluation on Koenig for use in mitigation of sentencing.  That evaluation was completed on October 
25, 2003, and Dr. Sidhu's report was submitted to, and reviewed by, the district 
court before sentencing. Based primarily on the information provided by Koenig, 
Dr. Sidhu diagnosed Koenig as bipolar.  
At the same time, however, Dr. Sidhu noted Koenig was alert, cooperative, 
and of average intellectual ability with good insight and judgment.  Dr. Sidhu also noted Koenig was oriented 
as to time, place and person and found no indication Koenig had been 
experiencing hallucinations or delusions. 

[¶6]           
Koenig's 
sentencing hearing was held on December 30, 2003.  During the hearing, the district court 
entertained the testimony of three witnesses for the State, an impact statement 
by the victim, counsels' arguments in mitigation and aggravation of sentencing, 
and Koenig's statement in allocution of sentencing.  Koenig's attorney mentioned Koenig's 
bipolar disorder but did not indicate that competency was at issue for either 
the crimes or at the time of Koenig's guilty pleas.  Koenig spoke directly to the district 
court and argued coherently and logically for leniency.  The district court was not swayed by 
Koenig's comments, defense counsel's argument, or Dr. Sidhu's report.  The district court noted that Dr. 
Sidhu's conclusions lacked factual support and did not mitigate Koenig's 
actions.  The court ultimately 
imposed a sentence of five to fifteen years on the aggravated burglary 
conviction and two to three years on the burglary conviction.  

 
 

[¶7]           
On March 
16, 2004, more than two months after sentencing, Koenig, through new counsel, 
moved to withdraw his guilty pleas.1  Relying on Dr. Sidhu's report, Koenig 
claimed, among other things, that his guilty pleas were not knowing and 
voluntary because he was mentally incompetent at the time of his pleas. 

 
 

[¶8]           
During a 
motion hearing held on April 21, 2004, defense counsel based his argument for 
plea withdrawal on three points gleaned from Dr. Sidhu's report of Koenig's 
bipolar disorder and counsel's own understanding of the nature of that disorder 
-- Koenig's lack of care of his reckless behavior, his lack of care regarding 
the consequences of his actions, and his impulsiveness.  In response, the State pointed out that 
nothing in Dr. Sidhu's report suggested Koenig was mentally incompetent during 
the crimes or when he entered his guilty pleas to warrant withdrawal of those 
pleas.  The district court agreed 
with the State and denied the motion, specifically 
finding:

 
 
I find 
that there is nothing in Dr. Sidhu's report that has even an implication that 
Mr. Koenig did not understand or did not have the capacity to understand the 
rightness of his decision; in other words, there is nothing in that report that 
suggests that at the time that a crime was committed he was incompetent or that 
he was incompetent to stand trial.  
The report was offered solely for purposes of mitigation; and there still 
is no evidence before me other than that report, which does not say he lacked 
proper capacity to indicate that, in fact, he did lack capacity either to go 
forward with trial or to understand the seriousness of his plea.  There have been implications and 
suggestions, but there is no evidence from which I can make that finding.  Dr. Sidhu's report was offered only for 
purposes of mitigation, as I indicated earlier.  And, largely, that report was based on 
self-reporting from Mr. Koenig.  And 
a number of things reported couldn't be verified and, in fact, are disputed by 
the other evidence, including his allegations of use of alcohol on the night in 
question.   

 
 
Koenig 
appeals the district court's denial of his motion.

 
 
 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶9]           
Withdrawal 
of a guilty plea after sentencing requires a defendant to show "manifest 
injustice."  Ingersoll v. State, 2004 WY 102, ¶ 12, 
96 P.3d 1046, 1050 (Wyo. 2004).  We 
review a trial court's denial of a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea for an abuse of discretion.  
Id.  In deciding whether or not a trial court 
abused its discretion, we must "determine whether the trial court could 
reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary 
or capricious."  Id. (citations 
omitted).

 
 
 
 

DISCUSSION  

 
 

[¶10]       
Koenig 
argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  Koenig contends, as he did below, that 
his pleas were involuntary because he was suffering from bipolar disorder, which 
rendered him incompetent to enter his pleas.  We have recognized that the standard for 
determining a defendant's competence to enter a guilty plea is the same as the 
standard for determining competence to stand trial.  Major v. State, 2004 WY 4, ¶ 19, 83 P.3d 468, 477 (Wyo. 2004) (citing Godinez v. 
Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 395 n.5, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 
125 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993)). A defendant is not competent to stand trial if, by 
reason of mental illness or deficiency, he lacks the capacity to: (1) comprehend 
his position; (2) understand the nature and object of the proceedings against 
him; (3) conduct his defense in a rational manner; and (4) cooperate with his 
counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-302(a) (LexisNexis 
2005).  

 
 

[¶11]       
Koenig 
presents no argument that he was ever incompetent as defined by § 
7-11-302(a).  Ignoring the statute, 
Koenig simply argues, as he did below, that a diagnosis of a recognized mental 
illness automatically renders a person incompetent to enter a guilty plea.  His broad claim that he suffers from 
bipolar disorder and is "mentally ill" is insufficient to establish he was 
incompetent to knowingly and voluntarily enter his guilty pleas.  Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459, 1472 
(10th Cir. 1995).  With no evidence supporting a claim of 
legal incompetency, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court in 
denying Koenig's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  It is Koenig's burden to demonstrate 
manifest injustice warranting withdrawal of his pleas.  Koenig clearly has failed to carry that 
burden.

[¶12]       
Moreover, 
our review of the record supports a finding that Koenig's guilty pleas were 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.  The transcript from the change of plea 
hearing reveals the district court very carefully complied with the mandates of 
W.R.Cr.P. 11.  If those criteria are 
satisfied, it is not an abuse of discretion to refuse to allow withdrawal of the 
pleas.  Johnson v. State, 922 P.2d 1384, 1386 
(Wyo. 
1996).  At the change of plea 
hearing, the district court thoroughly advised Koenig of his rights and the 
ramifications of his decision to plead guilty.  Koenig indicated his understanding of 
the charges and their attendant penalties, the consequences of his guilty pleas, 
and the rights he would relinquish if he entered those pleas.  We are satisfied Koenig was true to his 
word when he stated to the court he was entering his pleas voluntarily and of 
his own free will.  Even the 
psychiatric evaluation submitted by Koenig for purposes of sentencing does not 
contradict this conclusion.  It 
provides no indication that Koenig was not able to comprehend the nature and 
object of the criminal proceeding against him.  Indeed, it affirmatively indicated 
Koenig was college educated, oriented and alert and not suffering from delusions 
or hallucinations.2  

 
 
 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶13]       
The 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Koenig's post-sentence 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  
Koenig presented no evidence that he was legally incompetent at any time 
during the criminal proceedings.  
The record indicates Koenig's guilty pleas were entered intelligently, 
knowingly, and voluntarily.  
Affirmed. 

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The judgment 
and sentence was entered on March 3, 2004.  
Therefore, the rule articulated in Nixon v. State, 2002 WY 118, 51 P.3d 851 
(Wyo. 2002), is inapplicable in this case.

 
 

2We also 
reject Koenig's contention that the district court should have suspended, sua sponte, the proceedings pending a 
competency evaluation and hearing.  
This contention has not been properly raised as an issue before this 
Court.  In any event, we find no 
evidence in the record that would have given the district court reasonable cause 
to believe Koenig was legally incompetent at any stage of the proceedings.  Cf. deShazer v. State, 2003 WY 98, ¶¶ 14-29, 
74 P.3d 1240, 1245-52 (Wyo. 2003) (discussing evidence before the trial court 
meriting a sua sponte competency 
determination).