Case Title: SANDRA MAHAFFEY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of DONALD DIAL, V.STATE OF WYOMING ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0091

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-03-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
SANDRA MAHAFFEY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of DONALD DIAL, V.STATE OF WYOMING ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2011 WY 45Case Number: S-09-0091Decided: 03/11/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
SANDRA 
MAHAFFEY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of DONALD 
DIAL,Appellant(Respondent),V.STATE OF WYOMING ex 
rel. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,Appellee(Petitioner).

          

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Donna 
D. Domonkos, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; James M. Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General

  

 
 
KITE, 
C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court; GOLDEN, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 

KITE, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After suffering a 
compensable work injury, Donald Dial applied for permanent partial disability 
(PPD) benefits in accordance with the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Act.  The Workers' Compensation 
Division (Division) denied the application and Mr. Dial requested a 
hearing.  Following the hearing, the 
Office of Administrative Hearing's (OAH) awarded him benefits, and the Division 
appealed the award to the district court.  
The district court reversed the OAH decision, and Mr. Dial appealed to 
this Court.  After the appeal was 
filed, Mr. Dial passed away and Sandra Mahaffey, the personal representative of 
his estate, was substituted as the party of record.  Finding that substantial evidence 
supported the OAH decision, we reverse the district court order.    

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The issues for 
our determination are whether the OAH's decision was supported by substantial 
evidence or whether the OAH abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily, 
capriciously or not in accordance with the law when it awarded benefits.  

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On June 10, 2004, 
Mr. Dial was working as a counter sales person for Howard Supply Company in 
Casper, Wyoming.  While assisting a 
customer, he picked up a 290 pound reel of wire rope and suffered a neck 
injury.  He consulted his doctor and 
began conservative treatment for the injury, consisting of medication, physical 
therapy and injections.  His 
condition did not improve and, on March 15, 2005, Dr. Thomas Kopitnik performed 
a two level anterior cervical discectomy and fusion to repair the injury.      

 
 
[¶4]  On September 27, 2005, Mr. Ken Rodeman, 
a physical therapist, performed a functional capacity evaluation of Mr. Dial to 
determine whether he could return to his employment at Howard Supply 
Company.  Based upon the evaluation, 
Mr. Rodeman assigned Mr. Dial a 25% permanent partial impairment rating.  He also advised that Mr. Dial could not 
return to the heavy physical work required of him at his job as a counter 
salesman, but could return to medium physical work.  

 
 
[¶5]  On September 29, 2005, Dr. Tuenis D. 
Zondag performed an independent medical evaluation of Mr. Dial.  Dr. Zondag reported that Mr. Dial would 
be at maximum medical improvement by October 28, 2005, and would have 
"disability to extend his head and disability to do repetitive work above his 
shoulder."  Dr. Zondag rated Mr. 
Dial at 26% whole person impairment and concluded he would be able to work 
within a medium work capacity.  

 
 
[¶6]      Based upon the 
functional capacity and independent medical evaluations, the Division awarded 
Mr. Dial a permanent partial impairment benefit of $18,574.33 on November 2, 
2005.  A year later, on November 29, 
2006, Mr. Dial submitted an application for a PPD award.  The Division arranged for him to meet 
with Ms. Kelly White, a vocational expert, to evaluate whether he could return 
to employment at a wage that was at least 95% of his monthly gross earnings at 
the time he was injured.  In her 
initial report, she identified no jobs at 95% or above of his pre-injury 
salary.  She did not include jobs 
that required driving because Mr. Dial had stated he was frightened of driving 
and worried he might cause an accident due to the limited range of motion in his 
neck. 

 
 
[¶7]  After Ms. White's initial report, the 
Division obtained an affidavit from Dr. Zondag in which he attested that Mr. 
Dial's work-related medical condition was not preventing him from driving.  As a result, Ms. White amended her 
evaluation to include jobs involving driving.  Three of the jobs identified paid 95% of 
Mr. Dial's pre-injury earnings.  On 
the basis of Ms. White's report, the Division denied Mr. Dial's application for 
a PPD award, stating that "the information indicates that you can return to an 
occupation at a comparable wage."   

 
 
[¶8]      Upon Mr. Dial's 
request the OAH convened a hearing on October 31, 2007.  The focus of the hearing was whether Mr. 
Dial could return to work making at least 95% of his gross pre-injury 
earnings.  Mr. Dial presented 
evidence that he was not able to drive due to his injury and could not, 
therefore, perform the jobs Ms. White had identified.  The Division attempted to show that Mr. 
Dial's inability to drive was not due to his injury but was instead because he 
had been stopped in 2006 for driving under the influence, had pled guilty to 
reckless driving, and his driver's license had not been reinstated.  On November 30, 2007, the OAH issued an 
order awarding PPD benefits, concluding from the evidence presented that as a 
result of his injury Mr. Dial was unable to obtain employment at a comparable 
wage.    

 
 
[¶9]      The Division 
filed a petition for judicial review in the district court.  The Division asserted the OAH's 
findings, conclusions and order were inadequate and substantial evidence showed 
Mr. Dial could have returned to work earning a wage comparable to what he was 
making before his injury.  On March 
18, 2009, the district court issued an order reversing the OAH's order.  The district court concluded Mr. Dial 
"failed to establish, by a preponderance of [the] evidence, that he was 
incapable of finding employment in Wyoming at a wage that was at least 95% of 
the pre-injury wage."  Mr. Dial 
timely appealed from the district court's order.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]  In considering an appeal from a district 
court's review of an administrative agency's decision, we give no special 
deference to the district court's decision.  Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 
84, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d 554, 557 (Wyo. 2008).  
Instead, we review the case as if it had come directly to us from the 
administrative agency.  Id.  Our review is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2009), which states:

 
 
(c) 
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

            
(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

            
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions 
found to be:

            
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

            
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

            
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or 
lacking statutory right;

            
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or

            
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record 
of an agency hearing provided by statute.

 
 
[¶11] 
 We review an agency's factual 
findings for substantial evidence.  
Dale, ¶ 10, 188 P.3d  at 
558.  Substantial evidence means 
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 
a conclusion."  Moss v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
and Comp. Div., 2010 WY 66, ¶ 10, 232 P.3d 1, 4 (Wyo. 2010).  Findings of fact are supported by 
substantial evidence if, from the evidence preserved in the record, we can 
discern a rational premise for those findings.  Id.

 
 
[¶12]  We review an agency's conclusions of law 
de novo, and will affirm an agency's 
legal conclusion only if it is in accordance with the law.  Dale, ¶ 26, 188 P.3d  at 561-62.  

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶13]  "Permanent partial disability" is 
defined as "the economic loss to an injured employee  resulting from a 
permanent physical impairment[.]"  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §  27-14-102(a)(xv) (LexisNexis 2009).  In order to be eligible for PPD 
benefits, a claimant must demonstrate he has suffered a loss of earning capacity 
due to a work-related injury.  Bonsell v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2006 WY 114, ¶ 10, 142 P.3d 686, 689 (Wyo. 2006) 
(citations omitted).  An injured 
worker has the burden to prove each of the elements of his claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Id.

 
 
[¶14]  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h) 
(LexisNexis 2009) incorporates the "loss of earnings" concept into the statutory 
requirements for PPD benefits:

 
 
(h) 
An injured employee awarded permanent partial impairment benefits may apply for 
a permanent disability award subject to the following terms and 
conditions:

            
(i) The injured employee is because of the injury, unable to return to 
employment at a wage that is at least ninety-five percent (95%) of the monthly 
gross earnings the employee was earning at the time of 
injury;

            
(ii) An application for permanent partial disability is filed not before 
three (3) months after the date of ascertainable loss or three (3) months before 
the last scheduled impairment payment, whichever occurs later, but in no event 
later than one (1) year following the later date;  and

            
(iii) The employee has actively sought suitable work, considering the 
employee's health, education, training and experience.

 
 
There 
was no dispute that Mr. Dial timely filed his application for PPD benefits and 
actively sought work as required by subsections (h)(ii) and (iii).  The only issue was whether he proved he 
was unable to return to work at a job paying at least 95% of what he was earning 
before the work injury as required in subsection (h)(i).  

 
 
[¶15]   Ms. Mahaffey asserts the OAH's 
determination that Mr. Dial met his burden of proving that he was unable to 
obtain employment at a comparable wage was supported by substantial evidence and 
the district court erred in reversing that determination.  She contends substantial evidence was 
presented showing that Mr. Dial was unable to drive due to his injury; the only 
available jobs paying a comparable wage identified by the vocational evaluator 
required driving; therefore, he was unable to return to work at a wage 
comparable to his pre-injury earnings.  
The Division asserts the district court correctly concluded Mr. Dial 
failed to prove that he was unable to return to work at a comparable wage.  It points to evidence that two jobs were 
available, both of which paid more than his pre-injury wage.  The Division asserts Mr. Dial's 
inability to drive resulted not from his work-related condition but from the 
suspension of his driver's license as a consequence of his arrest for driving 
while intoxicated.             

 
 
[¶16]  In determining whether an employee has 
suffered a loss of earning capacity both medical and non-medical evidence may be 
relevant.  Bonsell, ¶ 12, 142 P.3d  at 689.  The following considerations are relevant 
to the loss of earning capacity inquiry:  
"the employee's physical impairment, including the nature and extent of 
his injury; age; education; actual earnings, including pre-injury and 
post-injury earnings; ability to continue pre-injury employment; and post-injury 
employment prospects."  Id.  No one factor is determinative and the 
agency, as the fact finder, has the discretion to assign such weight to the 
individual factors as it deems appropriate.   Id.  

 
 
[¶17]  In concluding Mr. Dial had suffered a 
loss of earning capacity and was entitled to an award of PPD benefits, the OAH 
cited the testimony of Ms. Mahaffey, Mr. Dial's fiancée at the time, that Mr. 
Dial had limited range of motion, difficulty turning his head and poor 
concentration and she did not think it was safe for him to drive.  The OAH also cited Mr. Dial's testimony 
that he was released to return to work but was unable to return to jobs that he 
knew, and had worked in the past in the oil field, as a landscaper and as a 
truck driver, but no longer felt comfortable driving because of his slow range 
of motion.  Additionally, the OAH 
referenced Mr. Rodeman's testimony that he had concerns about whether Mr. Dial 
could safely perform the identified available jobs.  

 
 
[¶18]  It is clear from the OAH's conclusions 
of law that it considered the relevant factors, including Mr. Dial's physical 
impairment, age, education, actual earnings and post-injury employment 
prospects.  The OAH placed 
particular emphasis on this Court's statement in Bonsell, ¶ 25, 142 P.3d  at 692, that the 
focus of § 27-14-405(h) is "on the injured worker's true ability to earn a 
living."  The OAH found Mr. Dial to 
be a credible witness after having the opportunity to observe him and weigh his 
testimony, an opportunity neither the district court nor this Court had.  From all of the evidence, and "plac[ing] 
its primary focus . . . on Mr. Dial's true ability to earn a living after 
sustaining a significant, on-the-job injury to his neck and left shoulder which 
resulted in a two level fusion," the OAH concluded he was unable to obtain 
employment at a comparable wage and was entitled to PPD benefits.    

 
 
[¶19]  The Division claims Mr. Dial's 
application for benefits should have been denied because the evidence showed 
jobs were available at a comparable wage.  
The jobs the Division referencesas a county assessor and as a Schwann's 
delivery truck driverboth required driving on a regular basis.  The Division contends the affidavit of 
Dr. Zondag showed Mr. Dial's medical condition did not prevent him from driving; 
rather, the only factor preventing him from doing so was that he had lost his 
driver's license as a result of his arrest for DUI. 

 
 
[¶20]  In considering the evidence, the OAH 
gave greater weight to the testimony of Mr. Dial and Ms. Mahaffey than it did to 
Dr. Zondag's affidavit or Ms. White's testimony.  Determining the weight to be assigned to 
the evidence is the responsibility of the finder of fact.  Bonsell, ¶ 24, 142 P.3d  at 692.  Although the evidence in this case may be 
subject to different interpretations, substantial evidence was presented to 
support the OAH's determination that Mr. Dial was not able to drive on a regular 
basis because of his injury.  

 
 
[¶21]  In addition to Mr. Dial's and Ms. 
Mahaffey's testimony at the hearing, the OAH had before it the statements Mr. 
Dial made to Ms. White during the vocational evaluation to the effect that he 
was afraid to drive because the stiffness and slow range of motion in his neck 
potentially would cause him to run into someone or something and Ms. Mahaffey 
was willing to drive him to work.  
These statements, made in late 2006 or early 2007, were consistent with 
his testimony at the hearing in October of 2007.  The Division asserts Mr. Dial's 
inability to drive was due not to his injury but to his arrest for DUI and the 
suspension of his license.  Evidence 
was presented that in 2006, a year after the surgery in 2005, Mr. Dial was 
arrested for DUI, convicted of reckless driving, his license was suspended and 
it had not been reinstated at the time of the hearing.  The OAH was required to weigh this 
evidence against the evidence indicating Mr. Dial could not drive because of his 
injury.  Giving the evidence the 
weight to which it deemed it was entitled, the OAH apparently believed Mr. 
Dial's testimony.  In light of Mr. 
Dial's testimony, and that of Ms. Mahaffey, we are not willing to conclude there 
was no rational premise for the OAH's finding.  This is especially true given other 
evidence in the record corroborating Mr. Dial's testimony and credibility.  

 
 
[¶22]  Mr. Rodeman's report confirmed that Mr. 
Dial's coordination and timing were slow.  
Mr. Rodeman also concluded that Mr. Dial's subjective reports of pain and 
associated disability were reasonable and reliable and that he put forth maximum 
physical effort during the testing even though he was in the unusual position of 
being sent for a functional capacity evaluation only six months post-operative. 
 While Mr. Rodeman indicated in his 
2005 report that Mr. Dial could drive occasionally, the available jobs 
identified by Ms. White required extensive driving on a daily basis.  Mr. Rodeman also expressed disagreement 
with some of the conclusions reached by Dr. Zondag and Ms. White.  Having considered the record as a whole, 
the OAH's determination that Mr. Dial met his burden of proving that he was 
entitled to PPD benefits is supported by substantial evidence and is not, in any 
other fashion, arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23] 
The district court improperly substituted its judgment for the fact finder's 
when it reversed the OAH decision awarding Mr. Dial benefits.  The OAH decision was supported by 
substantial evidence and was not otherwise arbitrary, capricious or contrary to 
law.  Consequently, we reverse and 
remand to the district court with directions the case be returned to the OAH for 
reinstatement of the order awarding benefits to Mr. Dial.

 
 
  
 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice, dissenting.

 
 
[¶24]   In this appeal, Donald Dial (Dial) 
challenged the district court's reversal of the Office of Administrative 
Hearings (OAH) order awarding him permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h) (LexisNexis 2009).  After reviewing the OAH order in light 
of the entire record, I conclude the OAH order awarding PPD benefits was 
insufficient to permit judicial review.  
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div. v. Madeley, 2006 WY 63, ¶¶ 9-10, 134 P.3d 281, 284-85 (Wyo. 
2006); Olivas v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2006 WY 29, ¶¶ 15-18, 130 P.3d 476, 484-86 
(Wyo. 2006).  I would therefore 
reverse the district court's order and remand with directions to vacate the OAH 
order awarding benefits.   I 
would direct the district court to remand the case to OAH for supplemental 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶25]   In Mahaffey's principal brief, she 
presents these issues:

 
 
I.          
Whether the Office of Administrative Hearing's decision awarding benefits 
was supported by substantial evidence.

 
 
II.         
Whether the Office of Administrative Hearings abused its discretion, 
acted arbitrarily, capriciously or otherwise not in accordance with law when it 
reversed the Division's denial of permanent partial disability 
benefits.

 
 
The 
Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (Division) responds with these 
issues:

 
 
I.          
Was the hearing officer's decision granting permanent partial disability 
benefits to appellant  who failed to prove that he was unable to return to 
employment at a wage comparable to his wage at the time of his injury  
supported by substantial evidence?

 
 
II.         
Was the hearing officer's decision granting permanent partial disability 
benefits to appellant  who failed to prove that he was unable to return to 
employment at a wage comparable to his wage at the time of his injury  
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the 
law?

 
 
 
 
In 
her reply brief, Mahaffey stated this issue:

 
 
Whether 
the Office of Administrative Hearing's decision awarding benefits is complete 
and supported by substantial evidence.

 
 

BACKGROUND 
FACTS

 
 
[¶26]   On June 10, 2004, Mr. Dial, a 
counter salesman for Howard Supply Company in Casper, Wyoming, suffered a neck 
injury while helping a customer pick up a 290 pound reel of wire rope.  Following the injury, Mr. Dial received 
physical therapy, and when he did not improve, he discussed his condition with 
Dr. Thomas Kopitnik and elected surgery.  
On March 15, 2005, Dr. Kopitnik performed a two level anterior cervical 
discectomy and fusion to repair the neck injury.  On September 27, 2005, Mr. Ken Rodeman, 
a physical therapist, performed a functional capacity evaluation of Mr. Dial to 
determine whether he could return to his employment at Howard Supply 
Company.  Based upon that 
evaluation, Mr. Rodeman reported that Mr. Dial could not return to the heavy 
physical work required of a counter salesman, but could return to medium 
physical work.  On September 29, 
2005, Dr. Tuenis D. Zondag performed an independent medical evaluation of Mr. 
Dial and reported that he would be at maximum medical improvement by October 28, 
2005; he would have disability to extend his head and to do repetitive work 
above his shoulder; he was rated at 26% whole person impairment; and he would be 
able to work within a medium work capacity.

 
 
[¶27]   Based upon Mr. Rodeman's functional 
capacity evaluation and Dr. Zondag's medical evaluation, the Division awarded 
Mr. Dial a permanent partial impairment benefit of $18,574.33 on November 2, 
2005.  A year later, on November 29, 
2006, Mr. Dial submitted to the Division his application for a PPD award.  Sometime in December 2006, Mr. Dial met 
with Ms. Kelly White, a vocational counselor and evaluator whom the Division had 
employed to interview Mr. Dial, perform labor market surveys, and evaluate 
whether Mr. Dial could return to employment at a wage that was at least 95% of 
the monthly gross earning that Mr. Dial was earning when he suffered his neck 
injury.  On January 8, 2007, the 
Division received Ms. White's vocational evaluation report.  On January 17, 2007, the Division issued 
its final determination that Mr. Dial was not eligible for a PPD award, stating 
that "the information indicates that you can return to an occupation at a 
comparable wage. Wyoming Statute § 27-14-405(h)(i)." This determination was 
apparently based upon the above-mentioned reports of Mr. Rodeman, Dr. Zondag, 
and Ms. White.  Ms. White's report 
included labor market surveys and an addendum showing several jobs as a field 
appraiser in county assessors offices in Cheyenne, Casper, Rock Springs, and 
Sheridan, and a job as a sales route driver for Schwan's in Billings, 
Montana.  

 
 
[¶28]   On January 29, 2007, Mr. Dial 
requested a hearing on the Division's final determination.  On October 31, 2007, an OAH hearing 
examiner conducted a contested case hearing. Mr. Dial, as the claimant, had the 
burden of proof.  Block v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2009 WY 34, 
¶ 12, 202 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Wyo. 2009).  
Testifying in person on Mr. Dial's behalf were Mr. Dial, Mr. Dial's 
finance Sandra Mahaffey, and Mr. Rodeman.  
Testifying by deposition on the Division's behalf were Dr. Zondag and Ms. 
White.  The Division also submitted 
an affidavit executed by Dr. Zondag.  
Both Mr. Dial and the Division submitted documentary evidence.  The contested case hearing transcript 
runs 123 pages and the transmitted record on appeal contains 471 
pages.

 
 
[¶29]   On November 30, 2007, the OAH 
hearing examiner issued her order awarding PPD benefits to Mr. Dial.  In that order, the hearing examiner's 
findings of fact that are pertinent to the main issues of the hearing were as 
follows:

 
 
8.         
Susan Mahaffey (Mahaffey) testified that she is the fiancée of Dial.  Mahaffey testified that she has known 
Dial for about four and [one] half years.  
Mahaffey testified that Dial was active[ly] involved in sports, hunting, 
fishing and performed mechanical activities prior to his work injury.  Mahaffey testified that Dial was a 
working thriving adult.  Mahaffey 
testified that she was not aware that Dial had any physical impairment prior to 
June 10, 2004.  Mahaffey testified 
that Dial enjoyed being outdoors a lot.  
Mahaffey testified that on June 10, 2004, Dial came home from work at 
Howard, she noticed his neck and back were red and swollen.  Mahaffey testified that as the weekend 
went on Dial got progressively worse.  
Mahaffey testified that on Monday, he could not go into work.  Mahaffey testified that Dial could not 
walk.  Mahaffey testified that she 
went to Howard and got an injury report which she filled out.  Mahaffey testified that Dial signed the 
report.  Mahaffey testified that 
Dial did not get better [and] his condition continued to deteriorate.  Mahaffey testified that the therapy was 
sometimes making Dial's condition worse.  
Mahaffey testified that Dial's primary doctor referred them to Dr. 
Kopitnik.  Mahaffey testified that 
on March 15, 2005, Dial had double neck fusion.  Mahaffey testified that after the 
operation for the next day or so Dial felt pretty positive.  Mahaffey testified that Dial got an 
infection and took antibiotic[s] for weeks.  Mahaffey testified that Dial started 
therapy and has never recovered.  
Mahaffey testified that Dr. Kopitnik finally told Dial to stop the 
therapy and allow himself time to heal.  
Mahaffey testified that Dial's condition has gotten worse.  Mahaffey testified that Dial still had 
headaches and spasms in his mid-back.  
Mahaffey testified that when Dial is under emotional stress his neck 
swells.  Mahaffey testified that 
Dial has low concentration.  
Mahaffey testified that she does not think Dial is safe enough to drive 
because of his range of motion.  
Mahaffey testified that Dial has lost the drive for 
thriving.

 
 
9.         
Mahaffey testified that Dial has not had a drivers' license since he had 
his surgery.  Mahaffey testified 
that Dial does not have a Colorado drivers' license.  Mahaffey testified that they have lived 
in the state of Colorado since January 2007.  Mahaffey testified that Dial has stopped 
drinking.  Mahaffey testified that 
the amount of beer that Dial drank depended upon his pain.

 
 
10.       Ken Rodeman 
(Rodeman) testified that he is a physical therapist and has practiced for over 
20 years.  Rodeman testified that he 
performs functional capacity evaluations for work injuries and ergonomic 
analysis.  Rodeman testified that a 
functional capacity evaluation can last from six to eight hours.  Rodeman testified that he saw Dial at 
the request of Dr. Zondag on September 27, 2005.  Rodeman testified that he performed a 
functional capacity evaluation.  
Rodeman testified he was asked to evaluate whether Dial could return to 
his old job and if not what were his current work tolerances.  Rodeman testified that he reviewed the 
medical notes of Drs. Kopitnik and Zondag.  
Rodeman testified that the evaluation usually begins at 8 a.m.  Rodemen testified the injured worker is 
asked to fill out a series of questionnaires which requires an extensive amount 
of sitting time.  Rodeman testified 
that the worker is observed and timed during the filling out of 
questionnaires.  Rodeman testified 
body posture is observed.  Rodeman 
testified that the questionnaires are not only general questions for his files, 
but pain questionnaires of the injured worker's perception of their functional 
capabilities and symptoms.  Rodeman 
testified there is a particular way of grading the questionnaires.  Rodemen testified that he takes a 
history of the injury and medical intervention and when they were released or 
are still in treatment, as well as, pending surgeries.  Rodeman testified that he starts the 
range of motion testing, muscle strength and grip strength.  Rodeman testified that he then 
proceed[s] to fine dexterity testing, hand manipulation test and various body 
part positioning.  Rodeman testified 
that toward the end of the testing he actually gets into the lifting capacity of 
the individual.  Rodeman testified 
that there is also a cardio vascular test. Rodeman testified that Dial performed 
extremely well on the functional capacity testing.  Rodeman testified that Dial did more on 
the lifting but he downgraded him to the 50 pound lifting safety range.  Rodeman testified that Dial changed his 
body mechanics in the over head lift to perform better.  Rodeman testified that Dial['s] lifting 
capacity from floor to knuckle was 50 pounds on an occasional basis and 23 
pounds over head.  Rodeman testified 
that Dial perform[ed] well on all the lifts, however he downgraded Dial because 
the maximum lifts were deemed to be too much to be safe.  Rodeman testified that in reference to 
his neck, Dial was limited with forward and backward bending, limited side 
bending right and left, limited with rotation to the right and had normal range 
of motion on the left.  Rodeman 
testified that Dial's hand grips were within the norm.  Rodeman testified that [he] concluded 
that Dial was able to work in the medium category according [to] the Dictionary 
of Occupational Title (DOT).  
Rodeman [testified] that Dial was not able to return to his previous job 
which was in the heavy category.  
Rodeman [testified] that Dial had some limitations with overhead work and 
decreased range of motion.

 
 
11.       Rodeman 
testified that he reviewed the vocational evaluation done by Kelly White, as 
well as, her deposition and the deposition of Dr. Zondag.  Rodeman testified that he performed a 
job analysis of cement truck driver in Casper at two different facilities.  Rodeman testified that [he] analyzed the 
position of cement truck driver at JTL Concrete and Mobile Concrete.  Rodeman testified that the job involved 
more frequency than the DOT reveals.  
Rodeman testified that the lifting capacity [is] probabl[y] comparable 
because with the job analysis that he performed the chutes actually weigh 40 to 
50 pounds, not 75 pounds as mentioned in the depositions.  Rodeman testified that his job analysis 
found that there is buildup in the chutes which increases the weight as opposed 
to the testimony in the depositions of White and Zondag.  Rodeman testified that the positioning 
of the chutes was correlated between the two facilities.  Rodeman testified that JTL's chutes are 
hanging type off the back of the truck which requires an over head lift to 
brought done [sic] to waist height to added [sic] onto the main chute on the 
back of the truck.  Rodeman 
testified that the frequency of lifts were six.  Rodeman testified that Mobile Concrete 
had hanging chute[s] up above at seven feet.  Rodeman testified that some chutes were 
placed on the fenders of the truck and strapped down and some attached to the 
front of the truck toward the cab.  
Rodeman testified that cement truck drivers are required to 
pre-maintenance check of the vehicle, and at the batch plant the driver is 
required to climb up to the top of the cylinder and look inside for the 
consistency of the cement.  Rodeman 
testified that quite a bit of climbing is involved.  Rodeman testified that each driver is 
required to perform maintenance on the truck which means cleaning inside the 
cylinder.  Rodeman testified if 
there is concrete inside the cylinder the driver has to use a small electric 
jack hammer.  Rodeman testified that 
he had trouble with the overhead lifting in reference to Dial, going under the 
truck and going up [and] down the ladder with one hand.  Rodeman testified that each of the 
driver[s] do about seven loads a day on an average.  Rodeman testified that Dial is not 
capable of performing the job of cement truck driver due to the frequency of 
lifts, over head lifting and amount of weight with the frequency of lifts.  Rodeman testified that White's general 
description of driver, sales route does not allow him to determine whether it 
meets Dial's limitation.  Exhibit 
EC-30.  Rodeman testified that the 
county assessor jobs described in EC-28, and EC-29 do not give much of physical 
capabilities, for him to determine that Dial could perform the 
job.

 
 
12.       Rodeman 
testified on cross-examination that he has not tested Dial since September 27, 
2005.  Rodeman testified that he did 
his functional capacity evaluation of Dial six months after the two level 
cervical fusion.  Rodeman testified 
that in his opinion, a more accurate evaluation of Dial would have been after 
one year.  Rodeman testified that he 
did not know what Dial['s] ultimate physical capacity was going to be relative 
to his neck fusion when [he] did his evaluation.  Rodeman testified that he did a job 
analysis of JTL which was shown in White['s] report.  Rodeman testified that Dial was an 
appropriate candidate for [the] work hardening program. Rodeman testified that 
Dial can lift 10 pounds constantly.

 
 
13.       Dial 
testified that he was injured when [he] helped a customer pick up a spool of 
wire rope.  Dial testified that [he] 
felt a snap from his neck to the middle of his back.  Dial testified that he was active prior 
to his injury.  Dial testified that 
he lifted weights.  Dial testified 
that he played baseball.  Dial 
testified that he played darts and fished.  
Dial testified that he worked at counter sales at Howard.  Dial testified he came home from work on 
June 10, 2005 and by Monday he was stiff.  
Dial testified that he was seen by Dr. Clifford.   Dial testified that Clifford asked 
him if [he] wanted to see a specialist.  
Dial testified that he was referred to Dr. Kopitnik.  Dial testified that Kopitnik told him 
that there were problems with his neck but he did not do surgery right 
away.  Dial testified that therapy 
did not help him.  Dial testified 
that first physical therapy had some lying on my back [sic].  Dial testified that the second physical 
therapy did not help.  Dial 
testified that he had surgery and returned to physical therapy which created 
more problems.  Dial testified that 
his shoulders and neck started bulging.  
Dial testified that he was told to lay off physical therapy.  Dial testified that he did therapy on 
his own.  Dial testified that his 
neck scares him.  Dial testified 
that his neck and shoulder swells.  
Dial testified that [he] has numbness in his fingers.  Dial testified that his range of motion 
is slow.  Dial testified that he has 
been given facet injection in his neck.  
Dial testified that he was released to return to work.  Dial testified that he has been unable 
to return [to] the jobs he knows.  
Dial testified that he has done oil field and landscaping.  Dial testified that he has driven a 
truck before.  Dial testified that 
he would not feel comfortable driving truck with his slow range of motion.  Dial testified that he was turned down 
for rental car service job.  Dial 
testified that he does not have a drivers' license.

 
 
14.       Dr. Zondag 
performed an Independent Medical Evaluation (IME) on Dial on September 29, 
2005.  Zondag found that Dial would 
be at maximum medical improvement by October 28, 2005 and gave Dial a 26 percent 
impairment of the whole person.  
Zondag found Dial would be able to work within the medium work 
capacity.  Zondag indicated the Dial 
would have a disability to extend his head and disability to repetitive work 
above his shoulder.  Exhibit 
EC-C-10.

 
 
15.       In a 
vocational evaluation performed by Kelly White (White) indicated that Dial was 
paid $2,288.76 per month as shown on the report of injury.  White noted there were no jobs 
identified that had a beginning salary of 95% or above what Dial was earning at 
the time of his injury.  White noted 
further, in her evaluation that she researched the job of a delivery sales 
driver but was not used as Dial did not drive.  Exhibit EC-H-13.  White did addendum to her evaluation 
with a labor market survey on jobs involving driving.  White's addendum listed jobs that paid a 
beginning salary of 95% or above what Dial was earning at the time of his 
injury.  Exhibit EC-1.  White testified on cross-examination in 
her deposition "I was not told they would have to be lifting bags of cement or 
anything like that, no.  I don't go 
 I'm not going to go through every single thing with these employers.  I'm not going to sit there and say are 
you going to have them lift this and that and are you going to have them lift 
that?  I ask for a general job 
description.  I also have the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles which gives me a job description and so I have 
something in general that I can go off of."  Exhibit EC-S-15.

 
 
16.       Based upon 
all the evidence presented, this Office finds Dial has met his burden of proof 
in this case that he is entitled to PPD benefits.  Dial has shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that because of his injury and is unable to return to employment at a 
wage that is at least ninety-five percent (95%) of the monthly gross earnings he 
was earning at the time of the injury, a wage and is entitled to a loss of 
earnings award.

 
 
[¶30]   The hearing examiner's conclusions 
of law pertinent to the pivotal issues of the hearing were the 
following:

 
 

B. 
Application of Law

 
 
23.       Dial 
received a PPI award and subsequently timely filed for benefits.  The parties do not dispute that Dial 
timely filed his disability application and that he has actively sought suitable 
work considering his health, education, training, and experience.  The Division denied Dial's application 
asserting that Dial could return to an occupation at a comparable 
wage.

 
 
24.       This case 
requires consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
application for PPD benefits and the efforts made by Dial to comply with the 
provisions of the act and the rules.  
Dial testified that he did his best to perform on the functional capacity 
evaluation done by Ken Rodeman.  
Rodeman testified that Dial perform[ed] well and in some instances 
performed above a level that was safe considering his restrictions.  Rodeman indicated that Dial could 
perform jobs in the medium category.  
Dr. Zondag found that Dial could perform jobs in the medium job 
category.  Kelly White performed an 
initial vocational evaluation and found that there were no jobs that paid 95% of 
Dial's pre-injury wage.  White 
submitted addendum which found driving jobs that paid 95% of Dial's pre-injury 
wage.  White testified further that 
when she did her labor market survey she got a general job description.  Rodeman testified that he did a job 
analysis of the cement truck driver and the frequency of lifting and over head 
lifting and determined the Dial could not perform this job because of his work 
injury.  Rodeman indicated that he 
could not determine if the driver sales was within Dial's restrictions because 
the job description was too general.

 
 
25.       This Office 
places its primary focus in this case on Dial's true ability to earn a living 
after sustaining a significant, on-the-job injury to his neck and left shoulder 
which resulted in a two level fusion.  
Considering all the evidence in this case, including Dial's physical 
limitations, and the functional capacity evaluation and job analysis support his 
inability to obtain employment at a comparable wage.

 
 
[¶31]   The Division timely petitioned for 
judicial review to the district court, and that court on March 18, 2009, issued 
its order reversing the OAH hearing examiner's order because "substantial 
evidence did not exist to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
Respondent [Dial] could not return to a job at a wage at least 95% of the 
monthly gross earnings he was making at the time of his injury."  The district court explained its 
decision as follows:

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
            
The Division argues that the Hearing Examiner's finding that Respondent 
carried his burden of proof is stated in a "summary fashion" without making 
basic findings of fact on the issue. (Appellant's Brief, p. 12.) The Division 
further argues that "A review of the entire record does not support the OAH 
decision to award Mr. Dial PPD benefits."  
(Appellant's Brief, p. 13.)  
For the reasons set forth below, this Court concludes, after a complete 
review of the record, that substantial evidence does not exist in the record to 
support the OAH Decision reversing the Division's denial of Respondent's 
application for PPD benefits.  
Specifically, a complete review of the record reveals that substantial 
evidence did not exist to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
Respondent could not return to a job at a wage at least 95% of the monthly gross 
earnings he was making at the time of his injury.

 
 
            
Under Wyoming law, the burden is on the claimant to demonstrate, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he is "unable to return to employment at a 
wage that is at least nine-five percent (95%) of the monthly gross earnings the 
employee was earning at the time of injury."  Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-405(h)(i); see In the Matter of the Worker's Compensation 
Claim of David Block, 2009 WY 34, ¶ 12 (Wyo. 2009); Yother v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Div., 173 P.3d 356 (Wyo. 2007).  Respondent maintains that "There is 
substantial evidence to support the findings and conclusions of the hearing 
examiner and the decision should be upheld."  (Respondent's Brief, page 9.)  The primary issue in this case is 
whether Respondent could or could not perform the county assessor jobs.  If he could, then he was ineligible for 
PPD benefits. If it was not determinable, then he still was ineligible, because 
he bore the burden of establishing that he could not.  Equivocation is insufficient.  See In re Matter of Worker's Compensation Claim 
of Thornberg, 913 P.2d 863, 869 (Wyo. 1996) (where treating doctor hedged 
his opinion by stating that causation was certainly a possibility, but that he 
would not make an authoritative statement petitioner failed to carry the burden 
of proof to establish entitlement to benefits); see also Casper Iron & Metal, Inc. v. 
Unemployment Ins. Com'n of Dept. of Employment, 845 P.2d 387, 393 (Wyo. 
1993) (party with burden of persuasion cannot satisfy that burden if the 
evidence is in equipoise or the opposing party's preponderates the party with 
the burden must fail.)  This Court 
finds the evidence before the hearing examiner was in equipoise.  In such a situation, under Wyoming law 
the party with the burden of proof must fail.  See Campbell County School Dist. v. State, 
907 P.2d 1238, 1266 (Wyo. 1995) (where evidence at trial found to be in 
equipoise, the party with the burden of proof must necessarily 
lose.)

 
 
            
Mr. Rodeman could not testify or opine that the Respondent could not 
perform the county assessor position.  
In fact, he conceded that Respondent could perform the job, but that he 
needed more information to determine whether he could do so safely.  Yet, the Hearing Examiner found that 
"Rodeman testified that the county assessor jobs described in EC-28, and EC-29 
do not give much of physical capabilities, for him to determine that Dial could 
perform the job."  (ROA, Vol. I, p. 
6.)  However, Rodeman's testimony 
was actually the opposite:

 
 
A. 
. . . Last part of that page is Sheridan, Wyoming extending to the next page on 
E-29, again stating about fences, measuring structures and so it's another 
general description of that.  So out 
of these three pages, the description of the Rock Springs county assessor's job 
is probably the best, but it still lacks information on whether I could safely 
say that Mr. Dial could perform the job or not.

 
 
. 
. .

 
 
Q.  So are you able to ascertain from any of 
those descriptions whether or not Mr. Dial is able to assume any of those 
positions based on these descriptions?

 
 
A.        The 
Rock Springs job has the best description of the job, but I still have a couple 
of questions before I could say safely.  
He could probably perform the 
job, but is it safe or not.  So 
I had need to know the frequency of the lifts and the 
carries.

 
 
(ROA, 
Vol. III, pp. 58-60.) (emphasis added.)  
Thus, at best Mr. Rodeman needed more information to determine whether 
the Respondent could not perform the county assessor jobs.  Absent that additional information any 
opinion or finding that he could not would be pure speculation.  See Langberg v. State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2009 WY 39, ¶ 16 (Wyo. 2009) 
(where expert could not necessarily say that claimant's condition started from 
original injury such a claim would be pure speculation which does not rise to 
level of proof necessary to support award).  Speculation does not satisfy 
Respondent's burden in this case.  
Thus, the Hearing Examiner's finding was erroneous.  Even given the benefit of doubt, the 
burden and question remained whether Respondent was capable of performing the 
county assessor job.  Based upon the 
testimony of Mr. Rodeman, the Respondent's ability to perform the job was 
equivocal at best, which fails to sustain the Respondent's burden of 
proof.

 
 
            
It should also be noted that the Hearing Examiner's findings never 
ultimately addressed whether Respondent could or could not perform the county 
assessor jobs.  Given the foregoing 
discussion, the Hearing Examiner could not have made such a finding, because no 
evidence was ever presented to demonstrate his inability to perform those 
jobs.  Hence, Respondent did not 
meet his burden, and the Hearing Examiner's decision must be 
reversed.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
            
The Hearing Examiner's decision awarding PPD benefits to Respondent must 
be reversed.  Based upon a review of 
the entire record which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the 
agency's conclusion, this Court concludes that Respondent failed to establish, 
by a preponderance of evidence, that he was incapable of finding employment in 
Wyoming at a wage that was at least 95% of his pre-injury wage.  The evidence as a whole failed to 
establish he was incapable of performing the county assessor 
jobs.

 
 
Dial 
timely appealed the district court's order.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶32]   In this appeal of the district 
court's appellate review of the OAH hearing examiner's administrative decision, 
we review the case as if it came to this Court directly from the hearing 
examiner.  Although we do not afford 
deference to the district court's appellate decision, Ball v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 128, ¶ 19, 239 P.3d 621, 627 (Wyo. 2010), 
the district court's decision is of help to this Court as an aid to our analysis 
and may reveal some factor not apparent to the parties but a subject of judicial 
discernment.  Id., ¶ 19 n.1, 239 P.3d  at 627 n.1.  In the instant case, our judicial review 
is limited to those considerations specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c)(ii)(A) and (E) (LexisNexis 2009):

 
 
(c) 
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

            
. . . .

 
 
            
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions 
found to be:

            

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

            
            
. . . .

 
 
            
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record 
of an agency hearing provided by statute. 

 
 
[¶33]   In regard to these considerations, 

 
 
[w]e 
affirm an agency's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial 
evidence.  Dale [v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84], 
¶ 22, 188 P.3d [554] at 561 [(Wyo. 2008)].  
"Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might 
accept in support of the agency's conclusions."  Id., ¶ 11, 188 P.3d  at 558, quoting Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 12, 49 P.3d 163, 168 (Wyo. 2002), quoting State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. 
Div. v. Jensen, 2001 WY 51, ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 1133, 1136 (Wyo. 2001).  We review an agency's conclusions of law 
de novo.  Dale, ¶ 26, 188 P.3d  at 561.  We employ the arbitrary and capricious 
standard as a "safety net" against agency action that is contrary to law but not 
readily correctible under the other applicable standards of review.  See id., ¶¶ 23-24, 188 P.3d  at 
561.

 
 

Shelest 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 
2010 WY 3, ¶ 7, 222 P.3d 167, 170 (Wyo. 2010).  One of the circumstances included in the 
arbitrary and capricious "safety net" concerns the hearing examiner's failure to 
provide appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law in the 
administrative decision.  Alphin v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 39, ¶ 13, 228 P.3d 61, 66 (Wyo. 2010).   When we identify such a 
circumstance, we emphasize that:

 
 
A 
hearing officer is required to support his conclusions with adequate findings of 
fact.  Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 16-3-110 (LexisNexis 2005).  A hearing officer has "the duty to make 
findings of basic facts upon all of the material issues in the proceeding and 
upon which its ultimate findings of fact or conclusions are based.  Unless that is done there is no rational 
basis for judicial review."  Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and 
Gas Conservation Comm'n, 446 P.2d 550, 555 (Wyo. 1968).  In order for this Court to have a 
rational basis upon which to conduct a review:

 
 
All 
of the material evidence offered by the parties must be carefully weighed by the 
agency as the trier of the facts;  
conflicts in the evidence must be resolved, and the underlying or basic 
facts which prompt the ultimate conclusion on issues of fact drawn by the agency 
in sustaining the prima facie case made, or in rejecting it for the reason it 
has been satisfactorily met or rebutted by countervailing evidence, must be 
sufficiently set forth in the decision rendered.  

 
 

Id. 
at 557.  

 
 

Bush 
[v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. 
Div., 2005 WY 120], ¶ 9, 120 P.3d [176] at 180 [(Wyo. 2005)]; see also Decker v. State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming 
Medical Commission, 2005 WY 160, ¶ 27, 124 P.3d 686, 695 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 

Olivas 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 
2006 WY 29, ¶ 13, 130 P.3d 476, 482-83 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶34]   We have also cautioned that such 
failures at the administrative contested case hearing level cannot be cured by 
the parties' appellate briefing in this Court.  Rodgers v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2006 WY 65, ¶ 29, 135 P.3d 568, 579 (Wyo. 
2006).  Indeed, in their appellate 
briefing, the parties' citations of evidence presented to the hearing examiner, 
but not included in the administrative decision, highlight that decision's 
deficiencies.  Id.  "If the evidence were material, it 
should have been included in the findings of facts" made by the hearing 
examiner.  Id.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶35]   My thorough review of the record on 
appeal reveals that the key material issues of the contested case hearing were 
(1) the availability of medium work capacity employment at a wage that was 95% 
of the monthly gross earnings that Mr. Dial was earning when injured and (2) Mr. 
Dial's ability to perform that employment if available.  It is obvious that the parties' evidence 
on these key material issues was in conflict.  Without going into considerable detail, 
I can summarize the parties' respective evidentiary positions on these two 
issues.

 
 
[¶36]   With respect to the issue of 
availability of employment, the Division's evidence consisted of Ms. White's 
vocational report and addendum and her deposition testimony.  She testified that employment was 
available as a cement truck driver, Schwan's sales route driver, and county 
assessor field appraiser in several Wyoming cities.  The only direct finding of fact made by 
the hearing examiner concerning Ms. White's evidence is the scant statement in 
Finding of Fact #15.  There, the 
hearing examiner makes no finding about the several county assessor field 
appraiser jobs, states that Ms. White did not consider the Schwan's sales route 
driver job because Mr. Dial did not drive, but fails to make any finding of fact 
concerning the reason why Mr. Dial did not drive.  Considerable evidence in this record 
explained that Mr. Dial's driver's license had been suspended because of a 
violation of the law which occurred when he was driving on April 3, 2006, after 
his neck injury and surgery.  The 
hearing examiner's findings of fact fail to report that evidence; the only 
reference made being found in Finding of Fact #13:  "Dial testified that he does not have a 
drivers' license."

 
 
[¶37]  In conflict with the Division's evidence 
on this issue of the availability of employment, Mr. Dial's evidence consisted 
of Mr. Rodeman's testimony criticizing Ms. White's evidence presented by the 
Division.  In stark contrast to the 
hearing examiner's scant statement in Finding of Fact #15 about Ms. White's 
evidence, the hearing examiner recounts at some length in Finding of Fact #11 
Mr. Rodeman's criticisms of Ms. White's evidence about the cement truck driver 
job.  However, with respect to the 
Schwan's sales route driver job and the several county assessor field appraiser 
jobs identified by Ms. White, the hearing examiner's statement in Finding of 
Fact #11 is simply that Mr. Rodeman testified that Ms. White's general 
description of the sales route driver job "does not allow him to determine 
whether it meets Dial's limitation" and that "the county assessor jobs . . . do 
not give much of physical capabilities, for him to determine that Dial could 
perform the jobs."

 
 
[¶38]   The hearing examiner's findings of 
fact on the issue of the availability of employment are insufficient.  In particular, the hearing examiner must 
evaluate the parties' evidence on the Schwan's sales route driver job and the 
several county assessor field appraiser jobs and make basic findings of fact and 
explain why those findings are supported by the evidence.  In this case, these insufficient 
findings of fact have resulted in an insufficient conclusion of law in 
Conclusion of Law #24.  There, the 
hearing examiner's conclusion simply states Mr. Rodeman's testimony that Mr. 
Dial could not perform the cement truck job and that Mr. Rodeman could not 
determine if the sales route driver job was within Mr. Dial's restrictions.  The hearing examiner states no 
conclusion of law concerning the county assessor field appraiser jobs.  Moreover, as the district court noted in 
its earlier review, the hearing examiner's conclusion misstates Mr. Rodeman's 
testimony about the county assessor field appraiser job in Rock Springs.  His testimony was:

 
 
The 
Rock Springs job has the best description of the job, but I still have a couple 
of questions before I could say safely.  
He could probably perform the job, but is it safe or not.  So I had need to know the frequency of 
the lifts and the carries.  

 
 
[¶39]   With respect to the issue of Mr. 
Dial's ability to perform the employment if available, the Division's evidence 
consisted of Ms. White's deposition testimony and vocational report; Dr. 
Zondag's independent medical evaluation, numerous medical reports documenting 
his physical examinations of Mr. Dial between September 2005 and June 2007; his 
affidavit dated June 18, 2007, and his deposition testimony; and Mr. Dial's 
testimony about his having driven a motor vehicle after his injury and surgery 
and having his driver's license suspended for a driving violation that had 
occurred on April 3, 2006, about eleven months after his neck surgery.  I note that in Ms. White's interview of 
Mr. Dial in December 2006, he told her that he was frightened of driving and 
worried about not being able to see someone when driving because of the 
stiffness in his neck.  Yet, at the 
hearing, Mr. Dial testified that his neck range of motion "is still the 
same.  It's just slower," and he 
expressed the opinion that it would be unsafe for him to drive a truck for that 
reason.  In conflict with that 
testimony, Dr. Zondag's affidavit dated June 18, 2007, attested that he had "not 
indicated to Mr. Dial that he cannot drive," and "Mr. Dial's work-related 
medical condition is not preventing him from operating a motor vehicle at this 
time."  In addition, Dr. Zondag's 
deposition testimony indicates that Mr. Dial could perform the jobs 
available.

 
 
[¶40]   I find it noteworthy that the 
Division submitted a large body of evidence about Mr. Dial's medical condition 
and ability to perform available jobs which had been developed by Dr. 
Zondag.  This large body of evidence 
included Dr. Zondag's independent medical evaluation in September 2005, his 
medical records of his later examinations of Mr. Dial after that early date, his 
affidavit dated June 18, 2007, and his testimony in his deposition taken on 
October 11, 2007, about three weeks before the contested case hearing.  And yet despite this large body of 
evidence, the hearing examiner's decision, in Finding of Fact #14, devotes only 
a very brief paragraph about Dr. Zondag's independent medical evaluation on 
September 29, 2005, and devotes nothing to the other substantial evidence of Dr. 
Zondag's.  When I contrast the 
hearing examiner's lengthy treatment of Mr. Rodeman's testimony with the hearing 
examiner's quite brief treatment of Dr. Zondag's evidence, I can only conclude 
that the hearing examiner failed to consider most of Dr. Zondag's evidence. 

 
 
[¶41]   In conflict with the Division's 
evidence on the issue of Mr. Dial's ability to perform the jobs available, Mr. 
Dial's evidence consisted of Ms. Mahaffey's testimony, Mr. Dial's testimony, and 
Mr. Rodeman's testimony.  In her 
testimony, Ms. Mahaffey expressed opinions that Mr. Dial's range of motion in 
his neck "seems to be guarded" and it was unsafe for him to drive.   I recounted above Mr. Dial's 
testimony about the range of motion in his neck and his fear of driving.  Mr. Rodeman testified about his concern 
whether Mr. Dial could safely perform the available jobs.  It is noteworthy that Mr. Rodeman had 
not examined or evaluated Mr. Dial's condition since his evaluation on September 
27, 2005, whereas Dr. Zondag had examined Mr. Dial on numerous occasions after 
that time, and most recently in June 2007, just four months before the 
hearing.  My review of the hearing 
examiner's order reveals that the hearing examiner failed to resolve the 
conflicting evidence on this issue.  
Moreover, the hearing examiner failed to consider the significance, if 
any, of Mr. Dial's driver's license suspension as it related to the requirements 
of the available jobs of Schwan's sales route driver and county assessor field 
appraiser.

 
 
[¶42]   Having carefully reviewed the 
hearing examiner's order in light of my review of the material evidence offered 
by the parties, I can only conclude that the hearing examiner has not carefully 
weighed all of the material evidence and has not resolved the conflicts in that 
evidence.  Consequently, the hearing 
examiner has failed to sufficiently set forth in the decision rendered the 
underlying or basic facts which prompt the ultimate conclusions on the key 
material issue of fact presented at the contested case hearing.  Until that careful weighing of the 
conflicting evidence is done, conflicts in the evidence are resolved, findings 
of basic facts are made, and ultimate conclusions upon those basic facts are 
made, this Court has no rational basis upon which to conduct its appellate 
review of the hearing examiner's decision.  
I would reverse the order of the district court and remand this case to 
that court with directions to vacate the order denying benefits.  Further, I would direct the district 
court to remand the case to the OAH for supplemental findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.