Case Title: State v. White. Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba, with whom J. Duffy joins [pdf].

Citation: 110 Haw. 79

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
‘4+ FOR PUBLICATION *#*

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

00

  

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellee,

WAYDE K. WHITE, Defendant-Appellant.

 

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(Cr. No. 03-1-2198)

MARCH 10, 2006

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON AND NAKAYAMA, JJ.
AND ACOBA, J., DISSENTING, WITH WHOM DUFFY, J., JOINS

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEVINSON, J.
‘The defendant-appellant Wayde K. white appeals from the
judgment of the circuit court of the first circuit, the Honorable
Derrick Chan presiding, filed on March 1, 2008, convicting him of
and sentencing him for the following offenses: (1) two counts of
forgery in the second degree in violation of Hawai'i Revised
Statutes (HRS) 708-852 (Supp. 1997)' and (2) one count of theft

ps § 708

 

Forgery in the second degree, (1) A person conmite the
offense cf forgery in the second degree sf, with intent to
Getraud, the person falsely sakes, completes, endorses, oF alters
Svnritten instrument, of utters 2 forges instrument, oF
fraudulently encodes’ the magnetic ink character recognition
hunbers, which ss or purporte to be, of which is calculated to
becone cr to represent if completed, a deed, will, codicil,
contract, assignment, commercial instrument, or other instrument
Which does or may evidence, create, transfer, terminate, oF
(continued...)

 

 

 

oqns
‘** FOR PUBLICATION *#*
in the second degree in violation of HRS § 708-831(1) (b) (Supp.
1998) 7

on appeal, White contends that the circuit court erred
in sentencing him to extended terms of imprisonment as a
“multiple offender” pursuant to HRS § 706-662(4) (a) (Supp.
2003),? inasmuch as the jury did not decide that such

 

1(. seontinued
otherwise affect legal right, interest, obligation, or status.
(2) Forgery in the second degree is a class © felony

 

5 RS § 708-831 provides in relevant part:

Theft in the second degree. (1) A person commits the
offense of theft in the second degree if the person conmita theft.

i) Of property or services the value of which exceeds $300;

{2} Theft in the second degree is a class C felony. . . .

 

> BRS § 706-662 provides in relevant part

criteria for extended terns of imprisonment. A

convicted defendant may be subject to an extended term

of dnpelscnment uncer section 7106-661, if the

Convicted cefendant satisfies one oF more of the

following criteria:

(2) "Ihe defendant is # persistent offender whose inprisonsent
for an extended term is necessary for protection of the
fablic. the court shall not make this finding unless the
Sefendant har previously bean convicted of two felonies
Semmited at different tines unen the defendant was eighteen

years of age or older.

 

 

 

(3) ne defendant is 2 dangerous person whose imprisonment for
an extended term ia necessary for protection of the public.
The°coure shell not make thie finding onless the defendant
has been subjected to a psychiatric or psychological
evaluation that docusents 2 significant history of
Gangerousness to others resulting in criminally violent
Gonduct, and this history sakes the defendant a serious
Ganger to sthers, Nothing in this section preci
introduction of victin-reiated data in order to
Gangerousness in accord with the Hawasi rules of evidence.

(4) Te defendant 1s 2 multiple offender whose criminal actions
tere so extensive that a sentence of imprisonment for an
extended tern is necessary for protection of the public.
{he court shall not make this finding unless:

(a) “The defendant se being sentenced for two or more
felonies or is already under sentence of
inpriscnment for felony; oF
(©) The maximum terms of imprisonment authorized for
(Continued...)

 

 

     

 

 
+** FOR PUBLICATION ***

extended terms of imprisonment were necessary for the protection
of the public, and, therefore, the extended term sentences
imposed by the circuit court ran afoul of the sixth amendment to
the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court in Apprendi v, New Jersev, 530 U.S. 466
(2000), Blakely vs Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United

5(,, continues)
Jach of the defendant's crines, if made to run
fonecutively, would equal or exceed in length
the maxinun of the extended tern imposed or
would equal of exceed forty years if the
Gutended term inposed is for'a class h felony,
(5) The defendant 18 an offender against the elderly,
handicapped, or @ minor under the age of eight, whose
Imprisonment for an extended term ig necessary’ for the
protection of che public. ‘The court shall not make this
Finding unless:
fa). the defendant attempts or comits any of the
following crimes: sarder, nansiaughter, a
Sexual offense that constitutes a felony under
Ghepter 107, zobbery, felonious assault,
Durslery, of kignappingy and

(b) The defendant, in the course of committing or
attempting to\conmit the crine, inflicts serious
of substantial bodliy injury upon & person who

 

 

 

 

 

2 of age or older:
(34) Blingy a paraplegic, or a quadriplegic: or
(Sil) Bight yesre of age or younger? ana

tc) Such disebitity is known of Feasonably should be

 

 

 

(6 offender whose imprisonment
for an extended term is necessary for the protection of the

public, The court shall not make this finding unless

fs) dhe defendant ic convicted of a crime under chapter
707,708, or 711: and

(b) The defendant intentionally selected a victim, or in
the case of a property crine, the property that was
the object of # crime, because of hostility toward the
actual or perceived race, religion, disebility,
ethnicity, national origin, gender identity or
Supression, or sexual orientation of any person. For
purpones of this eubsection, "gender identity or
expression” includes a person's actual or perceived
Gender, as well se a person's gender identity,
Gender-related self-image, gender-related appe
or gender-related expression; regardless of whether
that gender identity, gender-related self-inag
gender-related appearance, oF gender-related
Gxprension is different from that traditionally
absociated with the person's sex at birth.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3
‘4% FOR PUBLICATION +#*

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

‘The State of Hawai'i (hereinafter, “the prosecution”)
counters that the circuit court properly exercised its broad
discretion to sentence White to extended terms of imprisonment as
a multiple offender because HRS § 706-662(4) (a), see supra
note 3, passes muster under Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker.
(Citing State v, Maugactesa, 107 Hawai'i 399, 114 P.34 905
(2005); State v. Rivera, 106 Hawai'i 146, 102 P.3d 1044 (2004),
cert, denied, 126 S. Ct. 45 (2005); State v, Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1,
72 P.3d 473 (2003).)

Winite responds that this court misconstrued Blakely’ s
pronouncements in Rivera and incorrectly held that “Hawaii's
extended term sentencing scheme is not incompatible with Blakely

-, inasmuch as . . . Blakely addresses only statutory
‘determinate’ sentencing ‘guideline’ schemes.” (Quoting Rivera,
106 Hawai't at 150, 102 P.3d at 1048.)

We note that our recent decisions in Rivera and
Maugactega -- which reaffirmed our holding in Kaua that Hawaii's
extended term sentencing scheme does not run afoul of Apprendi --
dispose of White's point of error. Nevertheless, inasmuch as
White disputes our analysis of Blakely and mounts a new challenge
to Rivera's interpretation of “indeterminate” sentencing schemes,
we explain Rivera's consonance with the mandate of Blakely.

 

 

«on ganuary 11, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit sffimmed the United states District Court for the District of
Howaii*s grant of Wayman Kaua'e petition for e writ of habeas corpus in Kaua
zErank, "550 f. supp. 2d 848 (0. Hav. 2004), thereby vacating Kaua’s extended
sentence. See Kauav. Frank, No. 05-15059 (Sth Cir. Jan. 12, 2006). 26
U:S.c. § 228¢td) (2000) teancerning federal habeas relief) provides in
relevant part:

 

 

  

An opplicetion for 2 weit of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of 2 State court shall
(continued...)
‘## FOR PUBLICATION *+#
As we discuss more fully infra in section ITI, white’s

arguments are unavailing. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit

court’s judgment of conviction and sentence of White to extended

terms of imprisonment.

1. BACKGROUND
on October 9, 2003, the prosecution charged White by
complaint with the following offenses: (1) forgery in the second
degree (Counts I ¢ IT) in violation of HRS § 708-852, see supra
note 1, and (2) theft in the second degree (Count III) in
violation of HRS § 708-831(1)(b), see supra note 2. On September

 

22, 2004, the circuit court commenced a jury trial that ended on
September 24, 2004. On September 24, 2004, the jury returned a
verdict of guilty as charged as to all three counts.

On Novenber 26, 2004, the prosecution filed a motion to

sentence White as a multiple offender to extended terms of

 

“(..scontinued)
not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on
the merits in State court proceedings unlese the adjudication of
the claim ~~

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, oF involved
‘an unreasonable application ef, clearly established Federal lew,
25 determines by the Supreme Court of the United Seates(-)

The district court neld that ovr conclusion in State v. Kaus, 102 Hawai'i 1,
727.34 473, “that Kaua"s extended sentence did net viclate Apprendi was
gontibey tor and involved 4p unzeasonable application Of, clearly established
federal law, a2 deternined by the United States supreme Court.”

Ezank, 350 f. Supp. 24 at 860." The Ninth circuit agreed that our effirmance
of Raua's extended term sentence contravened Apprengi and held that "[bJecsuse
the effect of the public protection finding was to increase Kaus’ s sentence
above that authorized by the Jury's guilty verdict, the sixth Asendnent
Fequired « jury to make that Tinding.” Kaua vs Frank, No. 0515059, slip op.
fatto (9th Cir: Jan. 11, 2006) «

The district court noted in its opinion that “(wJhile circuit law may be
‘persuasive authority’ for purposes of determining whether a state court
decision is an unreasonable application of Suprene Court ax, only the Suprene
Court's holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need
be reasonably applied.” ‘anks 350 f. Supp. 24 at es6 n-€ (quoting

331 F.3d 1062, T0E9 (Sth Cir. 2003)). Accordingly, we
Seetine to fellow the finth Circuit's holding

 

    

   

 

5
#4 FOR PUBLICATION ***
imprisonment of ten years, pursuant to HRS § 706-662(4) (a), soe
supra note 3, for each of the three class C felonies of which he
was simultaneously convicted. On that same day the prosecution
also filed a motion for sentencing of @ repeat offender to a

mandatory minimun term of imprisonment of one year and eight

months pursuant to HRS § 706-606.5(1) (a) (iv) (1993)
on Novenber 26, 2004, the prosecution filed a motion for

Finally,

 

consecutive term sentencing pursuant to HRS § 706-668.5 (1993).

‘The circuit court conducted a sentencing h

 

ring on
March 1, 2005, during which it sentenced White and considered the
prosecution’s motions for repeat offender, consecutive, and

extended term sentencing. The circuit court concluded that white
was 2 multiple offender under HRS § 706-662(4) (a), see supra note

3, and orally granted the prosecution’s motion for extended terms

+ RS § 706-606.5 provides in relevant part:

(2) Notwithstanding secticn 706-669 ang any other law to the
contrary, any person convicted of murder in the second degree, any
{ese a felony toe} any class B felony... and who has a prior
Conviction or prior convictions for the following felonies,
Sheluding an attenpt to commit the same: murder, murder in the
{iret or second degree, a class A felony, a class B felony, or any
felony conviction ef another Jurisdiction shall be sentenced toe

Indstory minimn perio’ of iaprisonsent without possibility of
parole during such period as follows:

(2) one price’ felony conviction:

 

 

 

 

iv)’ Where the instant conviction is for 2 class ¢
felony ~~ one year, eight months(.)

   

. RS § 706-668.5 provide:

 

(2) Tf maltiple tems of izprisonnent are imposed on a
defendant at the sane tine, oF if a term of impriconnent is
Gnposed ons defendant wha’ 42 already subject te an unexpired tem
of inprisonnent, the terms may run concurrently or consecutively.
Murtiple terms of nprisonment imposed at the sane tine run
Concurrently unless the court orders or the statute mandates that
the terms run consecutively. Multiple terms of imprisonment
Unposed at cifferent tines run consecutively unless the court
orders that the terms run concurrently.

(2) Ine court, An determining whether the terms imposed are
to be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively, shall consider
the factors set forth in section 706-606.

6

 

 
4** FOR PUBLICATION ***

of imprisonment. The circuit court also granted the
prosecution’s motion for repeat offender sentencing. The circuit
court denied the prosecution's motion for consecutive term
sentencing. With respect to all three counts, the circuit court
sentenced White to an extended ten-year indeterminate maximum
‘term of imprisonment, subject to @ mandatory minimum term of
Amprisonment of one year and eight months. The cireuit court
ordered all sentences to run concurrently with one another.

on March 23, 2005, the circuit court entered orders
granting the prosecution's motions for repeat offender and
extended term sentencing.

on March 30, 2005, white timely filed a notice of

appeal to this court.

TI. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

®. Sentencing

IA) sentencing judge generally has broag
giscretion in imposing a sentence. State 2, Gavierd,
Je Hawai 121, 1aa-44, 890 P.2a 1267, 2183-84 (199517
ates. Valera, 74 How, 424, 435, 848 P.2d 376,
SES MHEES} . “ihe applicable’ standard of review
for dentencing oF resentencing matters is whether the
CSurt committed plain and manifest abuse of discretion
faite Gecision.” Gaviorg, 78 Hawai'i at 146, 690 2.28
ot 1164; State vs Kumukau, 71 Maw. 218, 227-28, 787
Pia 682, 607-00 [1990]; State v. Murcav[,) 63! Haw.
{iy 25, 621 Poaa 334, 342-43 (1980); Shate v. fry, 62
au, 286, 231, 602 P24 13, 16 (1973)

Keave vy, State, 79 Hawai'i 282, 284, 901 P.2d 483, 494
(iss5)- *iFlactors which indicate 's plain and manifest
abuse of discretion are arbitrary or capricious action by
the Judge and a rigid refusal te consider the defendant's
Eonteneione.” Eey, 6l Haw. at 231, 602 P.2d at 17. And,
SSigleneretiy, fo -constétute an abuse it must appear that
the court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or
Glsregerded rules or principles of law or practice to the

Sheiel detrinent of @ party Litigent.’* Keawe, 78
Howaiii at, 264,, 902 P-za ot 48¢ (quoting Gaylord, 78 Hawai's
de lea, 890 P24 at 116s (quoting Kumukau, 71 Haw. ot
2b7-28, 767 Pi2d at 68E)).

State v. Rauch, 94 Hawai'i 315, 322, 13 P.3d 324, 331 (2000)

 

 

 

 

 

 
‘** FOR PUBLICATION ++

(brackets and ellipsi
5, Questions of Constitutional Law

We answer questions of constitutional lew ‘by
exercising our own independent judgment based on the facts
of the case,” and, thes, questions of constitutional law.
re reviewed on appeel “unger the ‘right /wrong" standard.”

7 53 Hawai's 87, 100, 987 P.2d 13, 26 (2000)
(ertations omitted).

State v. Aplaca, 96 Hawai'i 17, 22, 25 P.34 792, 797 (2001).

 

points in original).

  

 

Statutorv Inte

 

“[tUhe interpretation of @ statute -
is a question of law reviewable de novo.

‘84 Kawai't 2, 10, 928 Pa2d €43, 892
(298€) (quoting State 'v. Camara, 61 Hawai'i 324,
329,916 F.2d 1225, 1230. (1996) (citations
cnitted)).” See alse State v. Tovenurs, £0
Rawasi 6,, 18, 904 P-2d €93, 903 (1998)? State
Silage, "79 awa's i, 3, 897 P.28.926, 950
(7995) ;" State v. Naksta, 76 Hawai'i 360, 365,
O16 F.2d eo, 70 89M).

 

 

 

 

Savy. Adeint 1 Dirl of she Court, 64 Hawai'i 138, 144,
S5t-T.2a se0, S96 (1957) {some Brackets added and some in
criginal) (; glee gleo State v Soto, 64 Hawai'i 229, 236,
S53 P.2a 66, 75 (1997) Furthernore, our statutory

Constiuetion is guided ey establiened rales!

 

 

ben construing 6 statute, our foremost obligation Ls

fo ascertain and give effect to the intention of the

Jegisiature, which is to be obtained primarily from
ute itself. And we

  

is doubt, doubleness of meaning, oF
indistinctivencss or uncertainty of en expression used
ina statute, an ambiguity existe, «

Tn construing an ambiguous statute, “[t)he
eaning of the anbiguos words may be sought by
Skamining the context, with whieh the ambaquost words,
Phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to
Escertain thelr true meaning.” HAS § 1-15(1)

{(1885)}. Moreover, the courts may resort to
extrinaic aids in determining Legislative intent. One
Svenue is the use of legislative history as en
Interpretive tool.

Gray, 64 Hawai'i at 148, 931 P.2d at $90 hate wt.
‘Tevenura, £0 Hawas's 8, "18-19, 904 P.24 898, 903-08 (1995))
(brackets and ellipsis points in original) ‘(footnote
omitted). This court may also consider “[t]he reason and
spirit of the law, and the cause which induced ¢h

 

 

 

 

legisleture to enact It... te discover its true meaning.”
BRS § 1-15(2) . wihets'4e pari pateria, or upon the

ane subject matter, shall Be construed with reference to
‘#8 FOR PUBLICATION *##
gach other. ni
fn aig to expla
(1983)

Rauch, 94 Hawai'i at 322-23, 13 P.3d at 331-32 (quoting State ve

Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999)).

As clear in one statute my be called upon
hat is doubtful in another.” HRS § 1-16

  

IIT. DIscusston

White argues in his reply brief that, “[bJased upon a
careful review of Blakely,” our decision in Rivera “misconstrued
Blakely’ s pronouncements regarding the applicability of Apprendi”
to Hawaii's extended term sentencing system. white urges us to
reconsider Rivera, submitting that we erred in analyzing the
“indeterminate” sentencing scheme discussed in Blakely because we
presumed Washington’s indeterminate sentencing scheme to be the
same as Hawaii's, White posits that Blakely “used the terms
‘determinate’ and ‘indeterminate’ to distinguish between
Washington’ s pre- and post-1981 sentencing schemes without
explaining or defining what its use of those terms meant.”

White claims that Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Blakely, $42 U.S. at 314-17 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), reveals
that “the ‘indeterminate’ sentencing scheme previously used in
Washington . . . differed significantly from Hawaii's
Mindeterminate’ sentencing scheme in that Washington judges
actually had ‘unfettered discretion’ in choosing an amount of
prison time within the statutory range set for an offense.”
White quotes Justice 0’Connor’s dissent in an effort to
illustrate how “Havaii’s sentencing scheme is more akin to the

scheme that Blakely labeled ‘determinate,’” thus undermining our
‘#** FOR PUBLICATION

 

reasoning in Rivera. Citing HRS § 706-660 (1993),” White argues
that, “[iJn contrast with Washington's former ‘indeterminate’
scheme, Hawaii's indeterminate sentencing schene affords judges
no discretion with regard to the nunber of years (of
imprisonment thet a defendant must serve.” (Emphasis in
original.) White maintains that, in his case, “the judge was
constrained to impose prison terns of exactly five years, whereas
under Washington's ‘indeterminate’ scheme, a judge could have
Smposed anywhere between zero and five years,” making Hawaii's
sentencing schene “nore akin to the scheme that Blakely labeled
\determinate’” and that the Supreme Court struck down. White
concludes that “the Blakely court's reasoning must be considered
within the context of the Washington schemes,” both pre-1981 and
after the Washington state legislature passed the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1961 (codified as Wash. Rev. Code chap. 9.94A).
(Emphasis in original.) We believe that, notwithstanding Justice
o’Connor’s dissent in Blakely and Washington’s pre- and post-1981
sentencing schenes, White's arguments are without merit.

‘The rule declared by the United States Supreme Court in
Apprendi was that “(o)ther than the fact of a prior conviction,

any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the

HRS § 706-660 provides:

A person who has been convicted of 2 class 8 or class C
felony may be sentenced to en indeterminate term of inprisonnent
Except af provided for in section 706-6601 relating to the use of
firearms in certain felony offenses and section 706-606.5 relating
fo repeat offenders. When ordering such a sentence, the court,
shall impose the maximum length of imprisonment which shall be as

   

follows
(1) For a clase 8 felony -- 10 years: and
(2) For @ class C felony -- 5 year

‘The sinisun of the

 

(Eupaasis acaeds

10
‘** FOR PUBLICATION *#*

prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and

proved beyond @ reasonable doubt.” $30 U.S. at 490. The
Blakely Court extended the Apprendi rule, explaining that “the
relevant ‘statutory maximun’ is not the maximum sentence a judge
may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he mey
impose without any additional findings.” $42 U.S. at 302
(emphasis in original).

In State v. Kaua, the first case to address the effects
of Apprendi on Hawaii's extended term sentencing scheme, we

reaffirmed the “intrinsic-extrinsic™ analysis first
Grticulsted by this court in State vw. Schresder, 76 Hawai'i
515, B60. P.24 292 (1994), and reatfimmea an.

51 fawas's 261, 982 P.20 890 (1999), and rejected the
Sefendant’s argument thot Boorendi ‘mandated chat a “multiple
Offender" Geteraination, for purposes of HES

$'706-662(4) (a), (ees supra note 3,] must be made by the
Eeier of fact, holding (1) that HRS § 706-662(, gee supra
ote 3] pessed constitutional muster under the Hawaii and
United’ Seetes Constitutions and (2) that "(tlhe facts
foundational te. , extended terms of imprisonment...
Pursuant to HRS § i08-662(4) (a), fell outside the

Pole, and, thus, the ultimate finding that [a defencant] was
a tnultipie offender’ whore extensive criminal actions
warranted extended prison terms was properly within the
frovinee of the sentencing court.” (State 2.) Haus, 102
Kawai at 13, 72 Bead at 485. tn go holding, enie court
noted

 

  

    

 

 

 

 

the fundamental distinction between
predicate facts Sescribed in HRS $5
Ehd (a), - ss om the one hand, and thoae described in
BRS £5 208-662(5) ana (6), . - . on the other
Specifically, the facts at issue in rendering an
extended term sentencing determination under HRS

55 T0e-662{1), (2), and (4) implicate considerations
Completely “extrinsic” to the elenents of the offense
ith which the defendant was charged and of which he
as convicted; accordingly, they should be found by
the sentencing Judge in aczoraance with [State v.]
Huslanan(, 60 Haw. 71, 568 P.2d 394 (1973),] and ite
Progeny. The face a¢ issue for purposes of HRS

5S Foerée2(s) ano (6), however, are, by their very
Rature, “intrinsic” to the offense with which the
Gefendant wae charged and of which he has been
Convicted: accordingly, they must be found beyond a
Feasonable doubt by the trier of fact in order to
Siford the defendant bis constitutional rights to
fiscedure! due process ang a trial sy jury. zafova,

nature of the
862 (1) (3),

  

 

 

 

 

ua
**4 FOR PUBLICATION ***

91 Mawai's at 273-72, 982 P.24 at 900-01) Schroeder
76 Hawai'i St 528, 860 P.2d at 203

Eo, at 12-13, 72 P.3d at 484-85 (emphases added).
Hauge, 103 Hawai'i at 59-60, 79 P.3d at 152-53 (emphases deleted)
(brackets in original).
Subsequently, in Rivera, we analyzed the effect of
Blakely on Hawaii’s sentencing scheme:
focused on the perceived defects of Washington
stators determinate sentencing schese, applying the tule the
Gourt had previously crafted in Apprendi, iie., that
‘the fact of 8 prior conviccion, any fact that

penalty for a rine beyond the prescribed
statutory saxinon rest be tubmiteed cos jury, and proved

  
 

sentencing of # defendant to more than thres
Sounontn statutory mavimom of the prescribes “standard
Fange” for his offense, on the basis of the sentencing
jusge’s finding that the defendent had acted with deliberate
Grueity, violated his sixth smendment right to trial by
jury. “in our view, the Blakely analysis vis-a-vis Aoprends
is continea to the meaning of the construct “statutory
aximun” within the context of datesminate or “guideline”
Sentencing schenes. Inaemich as Havaii's extended term
Sentencing structure is indeterminate, we believe that
Blakely docs not aftect the Mntrinstc-extrinsic” analysis
thet this court articulates in (State ve JKaua(, 102 Hawai'i
1y"52'p.3d 473. (2003)1-

The Blakely majority explained that “the ‘statutory

 

  

 

 

 

naximun’ for Auprendl purposes is the maximum sentence a
Suage may impose gelelv on the basis of the tacts reflected

nthe iucy verdict or admitted by the defendant.” [542
Olgese 303] lenphasis in original]. Tin other vords, the
Felovant ‘statutory maximun’ 1s not the maximum sentence 3
judge nay inpose after finding additional facts, but the
jnaximum he ay impose xithout eny additional facts." Id.
(enphasis in originsl)-Aecoraingly, the essential manaace
of Apprendi ~~ ize, that any fact other than a prior
Conviction must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
Fessonable doubt =~ is unaffected by the Court’ s decision in
Blakely. can reasonably be construed, then, as a
Gloss co Assrendl, clarifying (1) that the upward Limit of
any given presumptive sentencing range prescribed ina
Statutory scheme utilizing s "eeterminate” sentencing
“guideline” system constitutes the "statutory maxinun” end
(2) that a defendant upon whom a sentence exceeding this
Sstatutory maximum” 1s imposed is entitied to all of the
procedural protections that Apbrends articulates.

106 Hawai'i at 156, 102 P.3d at 1054 (emphases in original).
Recently, in Booker, the United States Supreme

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Court addressed the constitutionality of the statutory federal

2
‘** FOR PUBLICATION ###

sentencing guidelines in the context of Apprendi and Blakely.
The majority held (1) that the federal sentencing guidelines are
subject to Apprendi constraints and (2) that the provisions of
the Federal Sentencing Act making the sentencing guidelines
mandatory Were incompatible with Apprendi, thereby requiring
severance of those provisions and rendering the guidelines

advisory only:

If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as
merely advisery provisions that recommended, rather than
Fequited, the selection of particular sentences in response
to differing sets of facts, their use woulé not implicate
the Sixth Anendsent.

2 Sudoe to-exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence
nithin 2 statutory canoe,

543 U.S. at 226, 232, 246 (citations omitted) (emphases added).
Further to the foregoing, the Court explained why it was
necessary to excise the provisions of the Federal Sentencing Act
that made the guidelines mandatory:

Ae the Court today recognizes in ite first opinion dn
these cases, the existence of § 3553(b/(1) is a necessary
Conaition of the constitutional violation. That is 0 #
Without this provision =~ namely the provision that makes,
“the relevant! sentencing rules - . . mandatory and impose(s)
binding requirenents on ail sentencing judges” -~ the
statute falls outside the scope of upiendi"s requirement.

‘The remainder of the Act “function{s) independently.
Without the snandatory” provision, the Act nonetheless
Fequires judges to take account of che Guidelines. together
ith other sentencing goals. See 18 U.8.C.A. § 3583 (a)
(Supp. 2004). The Act nonetheless requires judges co,
Consider the Guidelines “sentencing range established for

The applicable category of offense committed by the
appiicable category of defendant,” § 3853(a) (4), the
pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements, the need
Eo'avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, an the need to
provide restitution to victins, $6 8553(a) (i), (3), (5)-(7)
{main es. and Sopp. 2008)

ee to i Eeflect the seriousness of

the offense, proncte respect for the law, provide just
punishnent, afford adequate deterrence, protect che eublic,
Sng eftectively provide the defendant mith needea
Sducstsonal or vocational training and medical care
$3583 (a1 (2). (main ed, and Supp. 2004).

543 U.S. at 259-60 (some citations omitted) (emphases added).

  

   

 

 

33
 

‘#8 FOR PUBLICATION +*

We determined in Maugaoteaa that Booker did not alter

the essential holdings of Apprendi and Blakely:

[t]he declaration in Booker (1) that rendering the federal
sentencing guidelines. advisory rather than sandatery
Fenedies their unconstitutionality and (2) that the Federal
Sentencing Act continues to require judges to inpost
Sentences that, among cther things, “protect the public”
eseentially eras ‘ektendes term sentencing
Schemes such ae Hawaii's from the Gecision’s purview.

107 Hawai'i at 408, 114 P.3d at 914,
Furthermore, in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545,
565 (2002), the Supreme Court explained:

 

Whether chosen by the judge or the legislature, the facts
Quiding Judielal discretion below the statutory

hot be alleged in the indictment, submitted to t
Proved Beyond a reasonable doubt, When a Judge sentences
Ehe defendant tos mandatory minima, no less than when the
judge chooses 2 sentence within the range, the grand and
petit Juries already have found all the facts necessary to
Suthorize the Government to impose the sentence

   

 

 

added.)
To respond to White’s contention that “the

(mph:

‘indeterminate’ sentencing scheme previously used in Washington
. . differed significantly from Hawaii’s ‘indeterminate’
sentencing schene in that Washington judges actually had
‘unfettered discretion’ in choosing an amount of prison time
within the statutory range set for an offense,” we must further
distinguish Hawaii's sentencing scheme from the post~1981
Washington sentencing scheme at issue in Blakely.

utilizes 9 mandatory indeterminate
‘Seat es, 71 Maw. (485,) 486, 795
P24 (842/] 844 [{1390)1. An indeterminate sentence is ™[2]
Sentence to imprisonment for the maximum period defined by
ign, subject to termination by the parol board or other
[authorized] agency at any tine after service of the minimum
period” orsinavily set by the parcling authority. Black's.
Sil [ath ea. 1968). In thie jurisdiction, ©
Convicted defendant’ s individual characteristics and
Gulpabslity are considered By the Hawai's Paroling
Rushority, which sets the minimum term of imprisonment,

 

ntencing

 

4
** FOR PUBLICATION *#*

pursuant to HRS § 706-669 (1993). Beznades, 71 Haw. at 488,
595 b.2d at 644.

Rivera, 106 Hawai'i at 158, 102 P.3d at 1056. A “determinate
sentence” is defined as “[a] sentence for a fixed length of time
rather than for an unspecified duration.” Black's Law Dictionary
1367 (7th ed. 1999). Nevertheless, rather than look specifically
to the terms “determinate” and “indeterminate” in order to
interpret the impact of Blakely, it is more appropriate to look
at the effect of the system that the Court discusses.

“in contrast to Hawaii's indeterminate sentencing
scheme, at issue in Blakely was Washington's determinate
sentencing structure and, particularly, the sentencing court's
imposition of a sentence thirty-seven months in excess of the
fifty-three-month upward Limit of the statutorily enumerated
‘standard renge.’” Rivera, 106 Hawas"i at 159, 102 P.3d at 1087
(quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 302) (emphases in original).

In Washington, second-degree kicnaping is a class 8 felony.
State law provides that *(nJo person convicted of &
[clase 8] felony shall be punished by confinement
exceeding --. a term of ten years.” Other provisions of
State low, ‘however, further Limit the range of sentences a
Susye may inposes. ashington’s Sentencing Reform Act
apecifies, for petitioner's offense of second-aegree
kisnaping with 9 firears, @ “standard range” of #9 to 53
onth, "A judge may inpoee a sentence above the standard
Tange if he finds "substontial ana compelling reasons
Justifying an exceptional sentence.” The Act lists
aggravating factors that justify such @ departure, which it
Fecites to be silustrative rather than exhaustiv
Nevertheless, *(a} reason offered to justify an excepticnal
gentence cen be considered only if it tekes into account
factors other than those which are used in computing the
Standard range sentence for tne offense.” State v, Gore,
143 Wash.2d 268, 315-316, 22 Pe3d 262, 277 (2001). when a
judge inposes an exceptional sentence, he must set forth
Hpdinge of fact and conclusions of law supporting it. A
Eeviewing coure will reverse the sentence 1f it finds that
Sunder a clearly erronecus stancard there is insufficient
evidence in the record to support the reasons for imposing
Sn exceptional sentence.” Gore, gupta, at 215, 21 F.3d,
ae at

Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State recommended
fa sentence within the standard range of 49 to 53 months.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4s
**4 FOR PUBLICATION +#*

After hearing Yolanda's description of the kidnaping,
however, the Judge rejected the State's reconmendaticn and
imposed’ an exceptional sentence of 90 sonths -- 37 nonths
beyona the standerd maximum. Se justified the sentence on
the ground that petitioner had acted with “deliberate
cruelty,” a statutorily enumerated ground for departure in
Senestic-violence cases.

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299-300 (footnotes and citations omitted).

Therein Lies the distinction between Hawaii's enhanced
sentencing structure, set forth in HRS § 706-662, [ga
ote 3;] and Washington’ s determinate sentencing’ gusdeline
Scheme! (2) In Hawai't, the sentencing scheme s¢
indeterminate, and there is no presunptive guideline range
‘and (2) ‘the sentencing court could not have subjected th
Gefendant to an extended term of imprisonment based on the
Sane facts in Blakely without submitting those facts to the
trier of fact, because the aggravating factor of “deliberate
Erusity” entailed an ‘intrinaie” fact s0 “inextricably,
Srneshed in the defendant's actions in conmstting the

Sffense charges, . that the Hawai Constitution requires
that these findings be nade by the trier of fact(.)" (State
yalKaug, 102 Wawai's at 11, 72 P.3g at 483 (quoting
(Gaeva}, 81 Hawai's ae 271-72, 982 P24 at 900-01)

Rivera, 106 Hawai'i at 159-60, 102 P.3d at 1057-58,
As the Supreme Court further explained in Blakely,

(bly reversing the judgment below, we are not, as the State
would have it, “findling] determinate sentencing schemes
Uneonstitueionel.”"., . This case de not about whether
Seterminate sentencing is constitutional, cnly about how st
con be inplenented in a way that respects the sixth
Amendment. Several policies prompted Washington’ s adoption
of determinate sentencing, including proportionality to the
Gravity of the offense and parity anon defendants... .
Nothing we have said inpugns those salutary objectives
‘Sustice O*Connor argues that, because determinate
sentencing schenes involving judicial factfinding entail
Lees judicial aiseretion than indeterminate schemes, the
constitutionality of the Latter implies the
Constitutionality of the former. Tale argument is flawed on
a nunber cf levels. First, the Sixth Anenanent by ite cexme
fernot a Linitation of judicial power, but a reservation of
jury poner. Jt lines judicial power’ only to the extent
that the cleined judicial power infringes on the province of
the jury. Indeterminate cenvencing does ne do 26. Te
inereases judicial discretion, to be sure, but not at the
expense of the jury"s traditional funetion of funding the
Facts ecsentiai to lawful imposition of the penslty. Of
course indeterminate schenes involve Judicial factfinding,
in that 2 judge (like s perole boars) ray implicitly rele’ on
‘those facts he dens important to the exercise of hit
Sentencing discretion. But the facts So net pertain to
whether the defendant has 2 legal ight to a lesser sentence
“wand that makes ail the difference insofer ee juciclal
Anpingenent upon the traditional role of the jury i=

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

16
‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION *#*
concerned. In a system that says the judge may punish

Bargiary with 10 to 40 years, every burglar knows he is

Flexing 40 years in jail. in a system that punishes

Burglary with 2 10-year sentence, with another 30 added for

Use of 8 gun, the burglar who enters a hone unarmed is

bilities to no more than a'10-yesr sentence -~ and by reason

Et the einth amendment che facts bearing upon that

Gntitienent must be found by a Jury.

542 U.S, at 308-09 (emphases in original) (citations omitted) .

Simply put, Washington's system codified a standard
range -- in Blakely that range was 49 to 53 months within the
120-month total maximum sentence statutorily prescribed for
class 8 felonies. Therefore, the statutory maximum of the
standard range was 53 months, and Blakely instructs that any
finding increasing the defendant’s sentence beyond that standard
range was required to be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, in accordance with Apprendi.

By contrast, Havai'i does not employ a standard range
for any of its felonies. The circuit court has no discretion to
determine the length of a defendant's sentence. “The court's
discretion is limited to choosing between imprisonment and other
modes of sentencing. Once the court has decided to sentence @
felon to imprisonment, the actual time of release is determined
by pazole authorities.” Rivera, 106 Hawai‘ at 159, 102 P.34 at
1057 (quoting the commentary to HRS § 706-660, see supra note 7).

White argues that

the “indeterminate” sentencing schese previcusly used in

Washington state (1.e,, before the “determinate” sentencing

System under which defendant Blakely was sentenced) differed

Slgnifscantiy from Hawaii's “indeterminate” sentencing

Schene in that Kachsngton Judges actually had “unfettered

Giscretion in choosing an angunt of prison time within the

Statutory range set for an offense

Winite interprets Blakely's statement that “[i]n a system that

 

says the judge may punish burglary with 10 to 40 years, every

burglar knows he is risking 40 years in jail” to describe

u
 

#8 FOR PUBLICATION
Washington's pre~1981 “indeterminate” sentencing scheme.

(Quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. 308-09.) Conversely, White interprets

 

the statement that

[iIn a system that punishes burglary with a 10:
sentence, with another 30 added ter use of a gun, the
Burglar who Snarsed is gatitied to’no more
than a 10-ye ‘and by reason of the Sixth
jzendzent the facts bearing upon that entitlement must be
found by jury

 

 

     

to describe Washington's post-1981 “determinate” sentencing
schene at issue in Blakely. (Quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. 308-09.)
We agree with White’s interpretation that the Blakely Court’s
characterization of the first sentencing system described
Washington's pre-1981 indeterminate sentencing scheme.
Nevertheless, we disagree with White’s contention that Hawaii's
sentencing system does not resenble Washington’ s pre-1981
sentencing scheme.

White insists that Hawaii's sentencing scheme has no
range and that, as such, it is “more akin to the scheme that
Blakely labeled ‘deterninate’” and in violation of a defendant's
sixth amendnent rights. To the contrary, Hawaii's sentencing
system most closely resembles the Washington sentencing system
that was in place prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1961 and
thus, as we stated in Rivera, is excised from Blakely’s analysis.
See Eivera, 106 Hawai'i at 156-57, 102 P.3d at 1054-55, The range
inherent in Hawaii's indeterminate sentencing scheme lies between
probation and the statutory maximum prison term, but, rather than
the sentencing judge setting the specific term that 2 defendant
is to serve, the minimum time served is set by the parole board.
Therefore, Hawaii's system more closely resenbles the pre-19¢1
Washington system that was not at issue in Blakely. As Justice
O'Connor noted in her dissent in Blakely,

18
‘** FOR PUBLICATION **

Iplsior to 1962, Washington, Like most other States and the
Federal Government, employed an inceterminate sentencing
Scheme, Washington's criminal code separated all felonies
{nto theee broad categories: “class 8," carrying a sentence
of 20 yeare to life) “cises B,” carrying a sentence of 0 to
20 years: and “class C," carrying a sentence of 0 £05
years. Sentencing judges,

Eosrdi, hed vireuaily unfetteres discretion co sentence
Sefendants to prison terms falling anywhere within the
Statutory range, including probeticn =~ t.e., no jail
sentence #t all.

$42 U.S, at 315 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)

(citations omitted). Similarly, sentencing judges in Hawai'i, in

 

 

 

conjunction with parole boards, have “virtually unfettered
discretion to sentence defendants to prison terms falling
anywhere within the statutory range, including probation,” ids.

In Blakely, the judge was not authorized to impose the
90-month sentence based sclely on the facts adnitted in Blakely’s
plea. ‘The aggravating fact in Blakely was that Blakely acted
with what the sentencing judge deemed was “deliberate cruelty,”
whereas the fact that extended White’s sentence was his
concurrent conviction for two or more felonies. “the factor that
justifies the enhancement of the sentence to extended prison
terms, therefore, is the fact of prior or multiple felony
convictions.” Rivera, 106 Hawai'i at 162, 102 P.3d at 1060.

In the present matter, but for White's multiple
convictions there would be no basis for extended prison terms.
HRS § 706-662 (4) (a), see supra note 3, authorizes a judge to
Ampose an extended prison term upon finding that the defendant
conmitted a previous felony: without the foregoing finding,
notwithstanding that such a sentence may be considered “necessary
for protection of the public,” a judge would not be authorized to
impose it. It is erroneous to think that the “necessary for

protection of the public” requirement has any greater effect at

13
FOR PUBLICATION *#*

 

extended term sentencing than it does at ordinary sentencing.
The circuit court was first required to consider the factors set

forth in HRS § 706-606 (1993)' “in determining the particular

sentence to be imposed.” Among the traditional sentencing
considerations set forth in HRS § 706-606, see supra note 8, is
the “need for the sentence imposed . . . [t]o protect the public

from further crimes of the defendant,” HRS § 706-606(2) (c).

[z)nssnuch as both HRS $6 706-6061, ges suera note 8,) and
706-662(, age supra note 3,] require the determination of
hether the sentence imposed is needed to protect the
fublic, the sole factor, beyond those already
Gnomerated Ln HRS §" 706-606 and already considered by the
Sentencing ceurt, whicn extends an indeterminete prison term
Pursuant to HRS § 706-662 (4) (a), i the fect that a
Sefencant is 2 multiple offender. The ablviple offender
Setermination, pursuant to HRS § 706-662(4) (al, mirrors. the
prior conviction exception in Apprendi because’ the defendant
has either already plesdes guilty, and thereby adnittes
geile, of the trier of fact has found beyond & reasonable
Goubt' that the defendant has committed two or nore felonies
for which he ss currently Being sentenced, gee Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 488... (reasoning that both the “certainey
that procedural safeguards attached to any ‘fact’ of prior
Gonvietion, afd the reality that [ehe defendant] aid not

 

 

 

+ Rs § 706-606 provides:

Factors to be considered in isposing a sentence. he court,
in devermining the particular sentence tebe insosed. shal

‘sonsider:
TZ) The nature and clroumstances of the offense
history and characteristics of the defensant,

 

(2) The-need for the sentence imposed:

fal Te reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for law, and to provide Just
Bunlshaent for the offense;

fb) To atford adequate deterrence to criminal
Eenduces

(e) Fecprstece en
defendants and

(a) Telprovide the defendant with needed educational

of vocational training, medical care, or other
Correctional treatment’ in the nost effective
(3) The kinds of sentences available and
(3) The need to avoia unwar ‘sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been,
found guilty of similar conduct.

   

(emphases addea)
20
‘** FOR PUBLICATION

 

challenge that Mfacti,]/ . . . mitigated the due
process and Giith anensnent’ concerns otherwise implicated in

Sllowing « Judge to determine a *fact" increasing panishnent

beyond the aaxisun of the statutory range")-
Rivera, 106 Hawai" at 163, 102 P.3d at 1061.

Because we disagree with White that “[t]he Rivera.
court's acceptance of Blakely’s labels (particularly the term
Mindeterminate’), absent confirmation that Washington’ s
definition of ‘indeterminate’ was the same or nearly the same as
Hawaii's,” was erroneous and that the “necessary for protection
of the public” consideration is qualitatively different as
between ordinary and extended-term sentencing, we affirm white’s

extended-term sentence

IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm White's

sentence to extended terms of imprisonment.

on the briefs: 7
Phyllis Hironaka,

Deputy Public defender, :

for the defendant-appeilant lela mer

Wayde K. Waite

Destin clint OAT

Daniel shimizu,

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,

for the plaintiff appellee
State of Hawai'l