Case Title: Scannell v. City of Saint Paul

Citation: 163 N.W.2d 872

Docket Number: 40205

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1969-01-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
163 N.W.2d 872 (1969) Howard J. SCANNELL et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF SAINT PAUL et al., Respondents. No. 40205. Supreme Court of Minnesota. January 3, 1969. *873 Terrance S. O'Toole, St. Paul, for appellants. Joseph P. Summers, City Atty., Robert E. O'Connell, Daniel A. Klas, Spec. Asst. City Attys., St. Paul, for respondents. KNUTSON, Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted by the district court in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs are employees of the city of St. Paul, a city of the first class. They have been on the payroll of the fire and police departments of said city since prior to January 1, 1939. They reached their 65th birthdays prior to January 1, 1964, and are employees in good standing in the St. Paul Police Relief Association or the St. Paul Fire Department Relief Association and future beneficiaries of said pension and retirement funds. They are honorably discharged veterans of the armed services of the United States and entitled to the benefits and protection afforded under the Veterans Preference Act, Minn.St. §§ 197.45, 197.46, and 197.47. They bring this action against the city of St. Paul seeking a declaratory judgment holding invalid and unconstitutional that part of L.1963, c. 802, (Minn.St. § 423.075, subd. 2) which purports to remove them from the protection of the Veterans Preference Act. (Minn.St. § 423.075, subd. 1, so far as material, reads: The constitutionality of this portion of the act as it relates to nonveterans has been upheld by two prior cases: Burns v. City of St. Paul, 210 Minn. 217, 297 N.W. 638, and Fabio v. City of St. Paul, 267 Minn. 273, 126 N.W.2d 259. In 1963, however, the legislature added subd. 2 (L.1963, c. 802, § 1), which provides: The only question now before us is whether subd. 2 is constitutional. It is the argument of plaintiffs that it is not, for the reason that it discriminates against certain veterans in a class by compelling them to retire at 65 when others in the same class are not required to do so. It must be conceded that if there is a rational basis for the classification to be found in the statutory enactment the arguments of plaintiffs are untenable. The rules with respect to determining whether a classification sufficiently meets the tests required by our Constitution are adequately stated in State v. Pehrson, 205 Minn. 573, 287 N.W. 313, 123 A.L.R. 1045, and in Williams v. Rolfe, 262 Minn. 284, 114 N.W.2d 671. We see no need to repeat them here. The rationale of Fabio was that the basic objective of § 423.075 is to remove from active duty police officers (and the same applies to firemen) who have reached an age where the hazards of their occupation and the physical demands necessary to perform their duties make it desirable that they be replaced by younger employees. If that rationale was sound in Fabio as to nonveterans, it is equally sound here when applied to veterans. Advancing age takes its toll of both veterans and nonveterans alike, and if hazards of occupation make it undesirable to retain men beyond the age of 65 in this type of work, it is as true of veterans as of nonveterans. The only real argument advanced by plaintiffs is that the legislature, having created preference rights for veterans, could not take them away. This also has been answered by a former decision. In State ex rel. Stubben v. Board of County Commrs., 273 Minn. 361, 370, 141 N.W.2d 499, 505, we said: The same is true here. The legislature, having created the rights, could take them away, which it did by amending § 423.075 in 1963. As a result, the trial court's decision must be and is affirmed. Affirmed.