Case Title: State ex rel. Cartwright v. Ohio Adult Parole Bd.

Citation: 2023-Ohio-1717

Docket Number: 2022-1217

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2023-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Cartwright v. Ohio Adult Parole Bd., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-1717.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-1717 
THE STATE EX REL. CARTWRIGHT, APPELLANT, v. OHIO ADULT PAROLE 
BOARD, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Cartwright v. Ohio Adult Parole Bd., Slip Opinion 
No. 2023-Ohio-1717.] 
Mandamus—Notice of alleged parole violations provided to inmate served as 
effective written notice that meets requirements of due process—Evidence 
presented at parole-revocation hearing is sufficient to support Ohio Parole 
Board’s finding that Ohio Adult Parole Authority had proved by 
preponderance of the evidence that inmate committed alleged violation—
Court of appeals’ denial of writ affirmed. 
(No. 2022-1217—Submitted March 21, 2023—Decided May 24, 2023.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 20AP-62, 
2022-Ohio-2934. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellee, the Ohio Parole Board, revoked appellant Dana 
Cartwright’s parole after finding that he had engaged in sexual contact with a 
woman without her consent.  Cartwright filed an original action in the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals, seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the parole board to 
reinstate his parole and hold a new revocation hearing.  The Tenth District denied 
the writ.  We affirm. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} In April 2019, Cartwright was released on parole after serving time in 
prison for murder and other crimes.  As a condition of Cartwright’s parole, he 
agreed to “obey federal, state and local laws and ordinances.” 
{¶ 3} On June 6, 2019, Cartwright visited a hospital where his mother was 
a patient.  A lab technician, T.G., reported to police that an individual—later 
identified as Cartwright—made inappropriate sexual remarks to her and “groped 
her repeatedly,” including on her leg and “her side below her bra line.”  A nurse, 
S.O., reported that Cartwright made inappropriate remarks to her as well, including 
telling her she could “get [him] washed up” after S.O. asked Cartwright’s mother 
whether she could “get [her] washed up.”  A parole officer arrested Cartwright the 
next day. 
{¶ 4} The Ohio Adult Parole Authority (“APA”) provided Cartwright with 
a written “Notification of Release Violation Hearing.”  The notice specified two 
charged violations, both alleging violations of “Rule 1.”  The notice quoted Rule 1 
as stating, “I will obey federal, state and local laws and ordinances, including those 
related to illegal drug use and registration with authorities.”  The first count stated: 
“On or about 6/6/2019, in the vicinity of Dayton, OH you engaged or attempted to 
engage in sexual contact with [T.G.] without her consent.”  The second count 
stated: “On or about 6/6/2019, in the vicinity of Dayton, OH you engaged or 
attempted to engage in sexual contact with [S.O.] without her consent.”  The notice 
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included three boxes—one labeled “Admit,” one labeled “Admit with Mitigation,” 
and one labeled “Deny”—of which Cartwright was to initial the applicable box for 
each count; the notice offered no explanation of what those labels meant.  For the 
count regarding T.G., Cartwright initialed “Admit with Mitigation.”  For the count 
regarding S.O., Cartwright initialed “Deny.” 
{¶ 5} On July 8, 2019, the parole board held a hearing on Cartwright’s 
alleged violations.  Cartwright was represented by counsel at the hearing.  At the 
hearing, Cartwright denied both counts—including count one, the box for which he 
had initialed “Admitted with Mitigation” on the notice form.  The hearing officer 
did not refer to the fact that Cartwright had admitted with mitigation count one on 
the notice form. 
{¶ 6} T.G., S.O., Cartwright, and three police officers testified at the 
hearing.  T.G. testified that Cartwright repeatedly caressed her calf and ultimately 
grabbed her breast and that she told him multiple times not to touch her.  S.O. 
testified that she witnessed Cartwright touch T.G.’s breast but that he never touched 
S.O. 
{¶ 7} The parole board found that the APA had presented sufficient 
evidence to prove count one, regarding T.G., but insufficient evidence to prove 
count two, regarding S.O.  The parole board revoked Cartwright’s parole and 
ordered that he serve 48 months in prison before being eligible for another release 
hearing. 
{¶ 8} Cartwright filed a petition in the Tenth District requesting a writ of 
mandamus ordering the parole board to reinstate his parole and hold a new 
revocation hearing.  Cartwright claimed two grounds for relief: that his due-process 
rights were violated because he was not provided adequate notice of the charged 
violations and that the revocation of his parole was based on insufficient evidence.  
The Tenth District denied the writ. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 9} Cartwright appealed to this court, raising two issues.  First, Cartwright 
maintains that he was denied due process because he was not provided clear notice 
of the alleged parole violations.  Second, he maintains that there was insufficient 
evidence of the violation for which the parole board revoked his parole. 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A.  Mandamus requirements and standard of review 
{¶ 10} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Cartwright must establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that (1) he has a clear legal right to the requested 
relief, (2) the parole board has a clear legal duty to provide it, and (3) he lacks an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Love v. O’Donnell, 
150 Ohio St.3d 378, 2017-Ohio-5659, 81 N.E.3d 1250, ¶ 3.  This court reviews the 
court of appeals’ judgment de novo.  State ex rel. Mango v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. 
& Corr., 169 Ohio St.3d 32, 2022-Ohio-1559, 201 N.E.3d 846, ¶ 11. 
B.  Mandamus is not the proper vehicle by which to order Cartwright’s release 
{¶ 11} In his petition, Cartwright requests that the parole board be ordered 
to reinstate his parole.  To the extent that Cartwright is seeking his immediate 
release from prison, habeas corpus—not mandamus—is the proper vehicle, and the 
court of appeals could not order his release through a writ of mandamus.  State ex 
rel. Johnson v. Ohio Parole Bd., 80 Ohio St.3d 140, 141, 684 N.E.2d 1227 (1997).  
Mandamus is, however, the proper vehicle for obtaining the remedy of an order 
requiring a new parole-revocation hearing.  Mango at ¶ 11. 
C.  Notice of alleged violations 
{¶ 12} Cartwright argues that the parole board deprived him of due process 
because, in his view, he did not receive clear notice of the alleged violations that 
would form the basis of the revocation of his parole.  A parolee has certain due-
process protections at parole-revocation proceedings.  Mango at ¶ 14; see also 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-484, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).  
One of these protections is the right to receive “written notice of the claimed 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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violations of parole.”  Morrisey at 489; see also State ex rel. Atkins v. Denton, 63 
Ohio St.2d 192, 193, 406 N.E.2d 1390 (1980). 
{¶ 13} The APA notified Cartwright in writing of two alleged violations of 
“Rule 1,” which obligated Cartwright to “obey federal, state and local laws and 
ordinances.”  Regarding the violation that he was found to have committed, the 
notice stated, “On or about 6/6/2019, in the vicinity of Dayton, OH you engaged or 
attempted to engage in sexual contact with [T.G.] without her consent.” 
{¶ 14} Despite the specifics in the notice, Cartwright argues that due 
process required that the written notice specify the particular law he was alleged to 
have violated.  In his mandamus petition and at the Tenth District (although not in 
the briefs he filed in this court), Cartwright cited a federal case from the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, United States v. Havier, 155 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir.1998), in 
support of this proposition.  In Havier, which involved the revocation of federal 
supervised release, the Ninth Circuit held that “when a revocation petition alleges 
the commission of a new crime and the offense being charged is not evident from 
the condition of probation being violated, a defendant is entitled to receive notice 
of the specific statute he is charged with violating.”  Id.  Notably, in Havier, the 
description in the written notice of the alleged violation created confusion at the 
hearing as to what law the defendant was accused of violating, leading him to 
pursue a suboptimal defense strategy.  See id. at 1094. 
{¶ 15} Cartwright has pointed to no Ohio decision that has adopted the 
Havier standard.  In contrast, in Atkins, 63 Ohio St.2d 192, 406 N.E.2d 1390, this 
court implicitly declined to adopt a requirement that a statute be specified in the 
written notice of violation.  In Atkins, a parolee was provided written notice that he 
took “money by force” from a restaurant on a specified date.  Id. at 192.  At the 
revocation hearing, he was found to have committed conspiracy to commit robbery.  
He later sought a writ of mandamus, arguing that he did not receive written notice 
of a conspiracy-to-commit-robbery charge.  The court of appeals reviewed a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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summary of the parole-revocation hearing and determined that Atkins had not 
shown either prejudice or a lack of opportunity to defend relative to a conspiracy 
charge and that there was no element of surprise that restricted either the merit 
defense or mitigation.  This court affirmed the court of appeals’ denial of the writ.  
Id. at 194. 
{¶ 16} The circumstances of the revocation of Cartwright’s parole are 
similar to those in Atkins.  The APA provided Cartwright with written notice of 
allegations that he violated the law by engaging or attempting to engage in sexual 
contact with T.G. without her consent on a specified date.  The notice was clear 
about what Cartwright was alleged to have done.  Although the notice did not cite 
a statute, its language closely tracked that of R.C. 2907.06, which proscribes sexual 
imposition.  The statutory definition of “sexual imposition” does not explicitly use 
the words “without consent,” but it does refer to sexual contact when “[t]he 
offender knows that the sexual contact is offensive to the other person * * * or is 
reckless in that regard,” R.C. 2907.06(A).  Moreover, at the revocation hearing, 
Cartwright’s counsel had no difficulty raising a defense or understanding what 
Cartwright was accused of violating.  The parties made arguments about whether 
Cartwright’s actions met the legal definition of “sexual contact” and whether he 
intended to make T.G. uncomfortable. 
{¶ 17} The notice of violations provided to Cartwright served as effective 
written notice that meets the requirements of due process. 
D.  Sufficiency of the evidence 
{¶ 18} Cartwright also argues that the parole board’s decision to revoke his 
parole was not supported by sufficient evidence.  Sufficient evidence to sustain a 
revocation of parole exists when there is “substantial evidence” to support the 
decision; there is “ ‘substantial evidence’ ” when the evidence presented by the 
APA, if believed, is sufficient to satisfy its burden of proving that the parolee 
violated the terms of his parole.  Mango, 169 Ohio St.3d 32, 2022-Ohio-1559, 201 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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N.E.3d 846, at ¶ 18, quoting State v. Delaney, 11 Ohio St.3d 231, 236, 465 N.E.2d 
72 (1984).  The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies to parole-
revocation hearings.  Id. at ¶ 19. 
{¶ 19} Cartwright argues that although the record shows that he rubbed 
T.G.’s calf, rubbing a person’s calf does not constitute sexual contact.  R.C. 
2907.01(B) defines “sexual contact” as “any touching of an erogenous zone of 
another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, 
if the person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying 
either person.”  (Emphasis added.)  We need not decide whether a person’s calf can 
be considered an erogenous zone, however, because the record also contains 
evidence that Cartwright touched T.G.’s breast. 
{¶ 20} Cartwright also argues that he did not violate Rule 1, because he was 
never charged with any crime related to the incident at the hospital.  Parole may be 
revoked, however, without a parallel criminal indictment or conviction.  Duganitz 
v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 92 Ohio St.3d 556, 557, 751 N.E.2d 1058 (2001). 
{¶ 21} The remainder of Cartwright’s arguments attack the credibility of 
the victims and the officers who testified at his parole-revocation hearing.  The 
evidence presented by the APA—if believed—is sufficient to support the parole 
board’s finding that Cartwright violated a state law by engaging in sexual contact 
with another person without the person’s consent.  T.G. testified that Cartwright 
grabbed her breast, and S.O. testified that she witnessed this.  T.G. testified that she 
told Cartwright multiple times not to touch her.  The circumstances surrounding the 
touching—such as Cartwright’s asking T.G. out for drinks and his telling S.O., 
“You can get me washed up anytime”—support a finding that Cartwright intended 
to sexually arouse or gratify himself or T.G.  This evidence is sufficient to support 
the parole board’s finding that the APA had proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Cartwright committed the alleged violation. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 22} For the reasons stated above, Cartwright has not shown by clear and 
convincing evidence that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the parole 
board to reinstate his parole and hold a new revocation hearing.  We therefore 
affirm the court of appeals’ denial of the requested writ. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and DETERS, 
JJ., concur. 
BRUNNER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
_________________ 
Dana Cartwright, pro se. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and George Horváth, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
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