Case Title: Estate of Bean v. City of Bangor

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2022 ME 30

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2022-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2022 ME 30 
Docket: 
Pen-21-348 
Argued: 
May 9, 2022 
Decided: 
May 31, 2022 
 
Panel: 
STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, CONNORS, and 
LAWRENCE, JJ. 
 
 
ESTATE OF ALBERT L. BEAN SR. 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF BANGOR et al. 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
[¶1]  The City of Bangor appeals from a decision of the Superior Court 
(Penobscot County, Anderson, J.) denying its motion for summary judgment in 
a personal injury suit brought by the estate of Albert L. Bean Sr. (the Estate).  
The City contends that it is immune from liability pursuant to the Maine Tort 
Claims Act (MTCA), 14 M.R.S. §§ 8101-8118 (2022).1  Because an issue of fact 
remains as to the City’s insurance coverage, we dismiss the appeal as 
interlocutory. 
 
1  The City’s additional contentions are not addressed in this opinion as we do not reach the merits 
of the appeal. 
 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  Viewed in the light most favorable to the Estate as the nonmoving 
party, the summary judgment record establishes the following facts.  Searle v. 
Town of Bucksport, 2010 ME 89, ¶ 2, 3 A.3d 390.  A small tree surrounded by a 
tree grate was cut and removed by the City of Bangor Forestry Department on 
an unknown date prior to September 26, 2017.  The tree grate hole that housed 
the small tree was located near a Bangor restaurant and had a diameter of 
twenty-four inches.  The City planned to replant the small tree in the spring of 
2018.  After the tree was removed and before it was replanted, Bean was 
walking in proximity to the restaurant and fell.2  The City was not planting a 
tree or performing any work related to the small tree when Bean fell.   
[¶3]  Following his death approximately one year later, Bean’s widow and 
the Estate jointly filed a three-count complaint against the City3 alleging 
negligence, wrongful death, and loss of consortium.  On February 22, 2021, the 
City moved for summary judgment claiming immunity pursuant to the MTCA.  
 
2  The summary judgment record reflects only that Bean fell near the restaurant and does not 
include any indication of when Bean fell or the supposed cause of his fall.  The complaint alleges that 
on September 26, 2017, Bean was on the Bangor sidewalk directing his wife toward an available 
parking spot when he stepped backwards into the tree grate hole at issue, fell, and impacted the 
sidewalk. 
 
3  All claims against the co-defendants named in the complaint have been dismissed and they are 
not involved in the present appeal.   
 
 
3 
On October 13, 2021, the court denied the City’s motion, finding that factual 
issues concerning the waiver of the City’s immunity existed.  The City timely 
appealed.  See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2022); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶4]  Although an appeal from the denial of a motion for summary 
judgment is generally interlocutory and barred by the final judgment rule, 
“appeals based on a denial of a dispositive motion asserting immunity from suit 
are immediately reviewable.”  Rodriguez v. Town of Moose River, 2007 ME 68, 
¶ 16, 922 A.2d 484; see also Perry v. Dean, 2017 ME 35, ¶ 10, 156 A.3d 742.  
However, an interlocutory appeal under the immunity exception to the final 
judgment rule is not available “[w]hen immunity issues have underlying fact 
questions that must be decided before the trial court can determine the 
applicability of immunities as a matter of law.”  Wilcox v. City of Portland, 
2009 ME 53, ¶ 14, 970 A.2d 295. 
 
[¶5]  “The MTCA provides as a general rule that ‘all governmental entities 
shall be immune from suit on any and all tort claims seeking recovery of 
damages.’”  McDonald v. City of Portland, 2020 ME 119, ¶ 12, 239 A.3d 662 
(citing 14 M.R.S. § 8103(1)).  This general immunity has limitations, including 
a waiver of immunity found within 14 M.R.S. § 8116.  “[Section] 8116 specifies 
 
 
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that the immunity provisions and protections of the [MTCA] are inapplicable if 
the claims against the governmental entity are covered by an insurance policy 
indemnifying the governmental entity for such claims.”  Wilcox, 2009 ME 53, 
¶ 12, 970 A.2d 295. 
[¶6]  Although not a fact set forth in the summary judgment record, see 
Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, ¶¶ 4-6, 770 A.2d 653, the Estate asserted 
in its complaint that “Defendant City of Bangor is not immune from suit as it 
maintains insurance which will cover the Plaintiff’s claims.”  See 14 M.R.S. 
§ 8116.  As a general rule, “the party opposing a claim, usually a defendant, has 
the burden of proof on an issue characterized as an affirmative defense or other 
issues to avoid or reduce liability.”  Hansen v. Sunday River Skiway Corp., 
1999 ME 45, ¶ 11 n.2, 726 A.2d 220.  In MTCA cases involving the sovereign 
immunity defense, we have said that the governmental entity, as the party 
asserting the affirmative defense, has the burden of demonstrating the basis for 
the defense, including that the entity does not have insurance to cover the event 
in question.  See Perry, 2017 ME 35, ¶ 24, 156 A.3d 742; Hilderbrand v. 
Washington Cnty. Comm’rs, 2011 ME 132, ¶ 7, 33 A.3d 425; King v. Town of 
Monmouth, 1997 ME 151, ¶ 7, 697 A.2d 837.  Because the City asserted the 
affirmative defense of immunity to the Estate’s suit, the City “had the burden of 
 
 
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proof on this issue, including the burden to establish that there is no insurance 
coverage.”  Perry, 2017 ME 35, ¶ 24, 156 A.3d 742.  The summary judgment 
record is devoid of any mention of insurance; notably absent from the trial 
court record is any denial by the City that such coverage exists. 
[¶7]  Although it failed to address the Estate’s allegation of insurance 
coverage in its summary judgment submissions, the City stated in its brief, 
“Cities do have insurance, and, therefore, an exception to immunity requires the 
City to demonstrate the lack of coverage for the event to support the immunity 
defense.  The City may or may not have such coverage in its policy.”  (Emphasis 
added).  Because the summary judgment record has “left unresolved the 
question of the applicability of insurance to indemnify the City for the claims 
presented in this case,” Wilcox, 2009 ME 53, ¶ 12, 970 A.2d 295, and the City 
admits that it “may or may not have such coverage in its policy,” it would be 
premature for us to consider the MTCA immunity issues presented in this 
appeal. 
The entry is: 
 
Appeal dismissed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
Frederick F. Costlow, Esq. (orally), Richardson, Whitman, Large & Badger, 
Bangor, for appellant City of Bangor 
 
Kirk D. Bloomer, Esq., and William J. Johnson, Esq. (orally), Bloomer Russell 
Beaupain, Bangor, for appellee Estate of Albert Bean, Sr. 
 
 
Penobscot County Superior Court docket number CV-2019-126 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY