Case Title: Elston v. Howland Local Schools

Citation: 2007-Ohio-2070

Docket Number: 20051993 and 20052032

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Elston v. Howland Local Schools, 113 Ohio St.3d 314, 2007-Ohio-2070.] 
 
 
ELSTON ET AL., APPELLEES, v. HOWLAND LOCAL SCHOOLS, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Elston v. Howland Local Schools,  
 113 Ohio St.3d 314, 2007-Ohio-2070.] 
Political subdivision — Immunity — The immunity from liability referenced in 
R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) applies to the political subdivision itself and to the 
individual employees of the political subdivision who exercise “judgment 
or discretion in determining whether to acquire, or how to use, equipment, 
supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and other resources unless the 
judgment or discretion was exercised with malicious purpose, in bad faith, 
or in a wanton or reckless manner.” 
(Nos. 2005-1993 and 2005-2032 – Submitted September 19, 2006 – Decided 
May 16, 2007.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County, 
No. 2004-T-0092, 2005-Ohio-4765. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  Pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(5), a political subdivision is immune from 
liability if the injury complained of resulted from an individual 
employee’s exercise of judgment or discretion in determining how to use 
equipment or facilities unless that judgment or discretion was exercised 
with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner, 
because a political subdivision can act only through its employees. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} This case is presented to us as a certified conflict between 
appellate jurisdictions divided over resolution of the following legal issue:  
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“Whether a political subdivision’s immunity from liability under R.C. 
2744.03(A)(5) applies only to the acts of the political subdivision, and not to the 
acts of the employees of the political subdivision.” 
{¶ 2} The Howland Local School District appeals from a decision of the 
Trumbull County Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the school district and determined that R.C. 
2744.03(A)(5) extends immunity only to the acts of a political subdivision, and 
not to the acts of its employees.  The appellate court in this case also determined 
that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether a freshman 
baseball coach acted with a malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton and 
reckless manner despite the fact that no such allegations had been presented in the 
pleadings. 
{¶ 3} We reverse this erroneous decision of the court of appeals and 
answer the certified question by stating that in accordance with R.C. 
2744.03(A)(5), a political subdivision is immune from liability if the injury 
complained of resulted from an individual employee’s exercise of judgment or 
discretion in determining how to use equipment or facilities unless that judgment 
or discretion was exercised with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or 
reckless manner, because a political subdivision can act only through its 
employees. 
{¶ 4} On April 29, 2002, while preparing for an away baseball game in 
Girard, 15-year-old Jeffrey Elston pitched short-toss batting practice to Joe Ross 
in a batting cage located in the gymnasium at Howland High School.  On the 
fourth or fifth pitch, a batted ball ricocheted off the screen protecting Elston and 
struck him in the head.  At that point, Elston went to the locker room and obtained 
an ice pack, which he applied to his head, and then accompanied the team on the 
bus to its game at Girard.  Although Elston told the coach he could play, Coach 
Thomas Eschman noticed his slurred speech and impaired balance and advised his 
January Term, 2007 
3 
parents that he should be taken to an emergency room for medical attention.  
According to the appellate court, the Elstons transported their son to Trumbull 
Memorial Hospital, and from there he was taken by helicopter to the Rainbow 
Children’s Hospital in Cleveland, Ohio, where doctors surgically implanted four 
titanium plates and screws into his head.  Elston v. Howland Local Schools, 
Trumbull App. No. 2004-T-0092, 2005-Ohio-4765, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 5} Elston, by and through his mother, Pamela, thereafter filed a 
negligence complaint against the school district claiming that it had, through the 
actions of Coach Eschman, breached its duties to instruct on the proper use of an 
L-screen, a portable protective netted shield used during batting practice to protect 
pitchers from being struck by batted baseballs, failed to supervise the use of the 
batting cage, and also failed to furnish protective helmets for use by pitchers 
during batting practice.  Notably, the amended complaint filed in this case did not 
allege any conduct involving malicious purpose, bad faith, or wanton or reckless 
conduct, nor did it present any claim against Eschman individually.  In response 
to the complaint, the school district moved for summary judgment, relying on the 
immunity defense in R.C. 2744.03(A)(5), and contended that Elston’s injury 
resulted from the exercise of discretion with respect to the use of equipment or 
facilities, or alternatively pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(3), that it fell within the 
discretion of the baseball coach with respect to policy-making, planning, or 
enforcement powers by virtue of the responsibilities of his position as coach of 
the team.  Elston opposed that motion, claiming that Eschman’s position as a 
freshman baseball coach did not involve the exercise of any discretion with regard 
to those matters. 
{¶ 6} The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and held 
that both R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) and (A)(5) provided the school district with 
immunity from liability.  Elston appealed that judgment, asserting that neither 
R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) nor (A)(5) applied to the school district as a matter of law.  In 
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a split decision reversing the grant of summary judgment, the appellate court 
stated that “[a] plain reading of R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) establishes that immunity is 
extended only to the acts of a political subdivision, not to the acts of its 
employees.”  Elston, Trumbull App. No. 2004-T-0092, 2005-Ohio-4765, ¶ 32.  It 
further held R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) inapplicable because the school district “failed to 
show that Eschman’s position as baseball coach involved policy-making, 
planning, or enforcement powers.”  Elston, 2005-Ohio-4765, ¶ 31.  And the 
appellate court concluded that genuine issues of material fact also existed 
regarding whether Coach Eschman acted with a malicious purpose, in bad faith, 
or in a wanton and reckless manner despite the fact that Elston had not included 
any such allegations of malice, bad faith, or reckless conduct in the amended 
complaint.  Id. at ¶ 33. 
{¶ 7} The court of appeals recognized its decision as being in conflict 
with decisions from the Second District Court of Appeals in Pope v. Trotwood-
Madison City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., Montgomery App. No. 20072, 2004-Ohio-
1314 (injury to a student during an after-school “open gym” session), Moore v. 
Southeastern Local School Dist. (Mar. 29, 1996), Montgomery App. No. 95-CA-
23, 1996 WL 139779 (injury to a student during a physical education class), and 
Mosely v. Dayton City School Dist. (July 6, 1989), Montgomery App. No. 11336, 
1989 WL 73988 (injury during a physical education class), as well as decisions 
from the Ninth District Court of Appeals in Hughes v. Wadsworth City School 
Dist. (Mar. 29, 2000), Medina App. No. C.A. 2961-M, 2000 WL 327240 (injury 
while rollerskating during a physical education class), and from the Twelfth 
District Court of Appeals in Thompson v. New Miami Local School Dist. (Sept. 8, 
1998), Warren App. No. CA98-03-051, 1998 WL 568691 (injury to a student in a 
school gymnasium while unsupervised), and Harland v. W. Clermont Local 
School Dist. (August 1, 1994), Clermont App. No. CA94-01-006, 1994 WL 
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394958 (injury to student while playing floor hockey in a physical education 
class). 
{¶ 8} As a result, the appellate court certified the following question to 
us:  “Whether a political subdivision’s immunity from liability under R.C. 
2744.03(A)(5) applies only to the acts of the political subdivision, and not to the 
acts of the employees of the political subdivision.”  Though it was poorly worded, 
we accepted the certified question, as well as a discretionary appeal, to determine 
whether a school district may assert the defenses found in R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) and 
(A)(5) to establish nonliability in a case in which a political subdivision would 
otherwise be liable according to R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) for negligence caused by its 
employees occurring in connection with the performance of a governmental 
function. 
{¶ 9} At the outset, we recognize that the dissenting opinion here takes 
issue with the General Assembly concerning the concept of immunity.  We 
further recognize that the concept is part of the jurisprudence of our state and that 
the judicial role is to interpret legislative enactments.  
{¶ 10} The process of determining whether a political subdivision is 
immune from liability involves a three-tiered analysis.  See Greene Cty. 
Agricultural Soc. v. Liming (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 551, 556, 733 N.E.2d 1141.  
The first tier provides a general grant of immunity, stating that “a political 
subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to 
person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political 
subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in connection with a 
governmental or proprietary function.”  R.C. 2744.02(A)(1).  In this case, it is 
undisputed that Howland Local Schools is a political subdivision as defined in 
R.C. 2744.01(F), that Eschman is a teacher and baseball coach employed by the 
school district, who acted within the scope of his employment, and that “[t]he 
provision of a system of public education” as well as the “operation of any school 
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athletic facility, school auditorium, or gymnasium” are governmental functions 
pursuant to R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(c) and (u).  Therefore, the general grant of 
immunity contained in R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) applies in this case. 
{¶ 11} The second tier in an immunity analysis focuses on the exceptions 
to immunity located in R.C. 2744.02(B).  Applicable here is the exception found 
in former R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), Sub.S.B. No. 108, 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 462, 
providing that “political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person 
or property that is caused by the negligence of their employees and that occurs 
within or on the grounds of buildings that are used in connection with the 
performance of a governmental function.”  The allegations contained in Elston’s 
amended complaint match this provision because a claim sounding in negligence 
is asserted against Howland Local Schools, arising from an injury that occurred at 
a school gymnasium used in connection with the performance of a governmental 
function. 
{¶ 12} Finally, in the third tier of the analysis, immunity may be 
reinstated if a political subdivision can successfully assert one of the defenses to 
liability listed in R.C. 2744.03.  See Cater v. Cleveland (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 24, 
28, 697 N.E.2d 610.  This case concerns the application of the specific defenses 
listed in former R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) and (A)(5), Sub.S.B. No. 108, 149 Ohio 
Laws, Part I, 463, 464, which state: 
{¶ 13} “(A) In a civil action brought against a political subdivision or an 
employee of a political subdivision to recover damages for injury, death, or loss to 
persons or property allegedly caused by any act or omission in connection with a 
governmental or proprietary function, the following defenses or immunities may 
be asserted to establish nonliability: 
{¶ 14} “ * * *  
{¶ 15} “(3) The political subdivision is immune from liability if the action 
or failure to act by the employee involved that gave rise to the claim of liability 
January Term, 2007 
7 
was within the discretion of the employee with respect to policy-making, 
planning, or enforcement powers by virtue of the duties and responsibilities of the 
office or position of the employee. 
{¶ 16} “ * * *  
{¶ 17} “(5) The political subdivision is immune from liability if the 
injury, death, or loss to persons or property resulted from the exercise of judgment 
or discretion in determining whether to acquire, or how to use, equipment, 
supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and other resources unless the judgment 
or discretion was exercised with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or 
reckless manner.” 
R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) 
{¶ 18} The school district asserts that Coach Eschman exercised his 
judgment and discretion as a baseball coach by instructing his players on how to 
use the batting cage, the protective L-screen, and other facilities, and maintains 
that the statute provides it with immunity.  Elston, echoing the appellate court 
decision, contends that R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) extends only to the discretionary 
actions of a political subdivision – as opposed to actions of the subdivision’s 
employees – because the statute does not contain any reference to the term 
“employees.” 
{¶ 19} We have held and it is well recognized that a political subdivision 
acts through its employees.  In Spires v. Lancaster (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 76, 28 
OBR 173 502 N.E.2d 614, we stated, “ ‘It is undeniable that the state can only act 
through its employees and officers.’ ”  Id. at 79, 28 OBR 173, 502 N.E.2d 614, 
quoting Drain v. Kosydar (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 49, 56, 8 O.O.3d 65, 374 N.E.2d 
1253. 
{¶ 20} Furthermore, teachers and coaches, as employees of a political 
subdivision, have “wide discretion under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) to determine what 
level of supervision is necessary to ensure the safety of the children in” their care.  
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See Marcum v. Talawanda City Schools (1996), 108 Ohio App.3d 412, 416, 670 
N.E.2d 1067; see, also, Frederick v. Vinton Cty. Bd. of Edn., Vinton App. No. 
03CA579, 2004-Ohio-550, ¶ 43.  In Marcum, a student suffered injury at the 
hands of other students when a teacher left a student council meeting of students 
in her classroom unsupervised to attend a faculty meeting.  108 Ohio App.3d at 
414, 670 N.E.2d 1067.  The court of appeals held that the Talawanda City School 
District was immune from liability and determined that the teacher’s decision to 
leave the students unattended was within the scope of her discretionary authority 
pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).  Marcum at 416, 670 N.E.2d 1067. 
{¶ 21} Here, Eschman’s coaching decisions reflect the same type of 
discretion that was exercised in Marcum.  Eschman provided instruction to 
pitchers regarding the use of the L-screen as well as general guidance regarding 
game-day preparations.  His direction represents the exercise of his judgment and 
discretion in the use of equipment or facilities in connection with his position as 
coach of the baseball team and as an employee of the school district. 
Cases in Conflict 
{¶ 22} The cases certified as in conflict support this analysis and fortify 
this conclusion.  In Pope v. Trotwood-Madison City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 
Montgomery App. No. 20072, 2004-Ohio-1314, the Second District Court of 
Appeals held the school board immune from liability pursuant to R.C. 
2744.03(A)(5) in a case involving the death of a student who had hit his head 
against a wall while playing basketball during an after-school “open gym” 
session.  The court determined that the architects of the gym, acting on behalf of 
the school district, designed the facility to be used in the manner in which the 
school had utilized it.  Id. at ¶ 15.  Moreover, the school’s employees exercised 
discretion in selecting and installing the protective matting on the walls of the 
gymnasium.  Id. at ¶ 19.  Thus, the court held the school district immune from 
liability based upon the discretion exercised through the actions of its employees. 
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{¶ 23} In another conflict case, Hughes v. Wadsworth City School Dist. 
(Mar. 29, 2000), Medina App. No. 2961-M, 2000 WL 327240, where a student 
sustained an injury while rollerskating, the Ninth District Court of Appeals held 
the school district immune and stated that a physical education teacher had not 
acted recklessly “while preparing for and conducting his physical education 
class.”  As in Pope, the court applied the provisions of R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) to the 
actions of the employees of the political subdivision in determining that the 
school district had immunity.  Id. 
{¶ 24} Harland v. W. Clermont Local School Dist. (August 1, 1994), 
Clermont App. No. CA94-01-006, 1994 WL 394958, involved an injury to a 
student sustained while playing floor hockey during a physical education class.  
There, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals held the school district immune and 
stated that “the record is devoid of evidence that [the school district] or its 
employees knew or should have known that they were creating an unreasonable 
risk of harm to the students.”  (Emphasis added.) Id.  Thus, the appellate court 
there did not limit the immunity provided by R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) to the political 
subdivision itself, but rather determined that it applied it to the acts of employees 
of the political subdivision. 
{¶ 25} In contrast with these decisions, the appellate court in this case 
determined that R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) did not afford immunity to the Howland 
Local School District, because the language of the statute affords immunity “only 
to the acts of a political subdivision,” and “not to the acts of its employees.”  See 
Elston, 2005-Ohio-4765, ¶ 32. Our purpose in construing statutes is to “ ‘ascertain 
and give effect to the legislative intent.’ ”  Sarmiento v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 
106 Ohio St.3d 403, 2005-Ohio-5410, 835 N.E.2d 692, ¶ 25, quoting Carter v. 
Youngstown Div. of Water (1946), 146 Ohio St. 203, 32 O.O. 184, 65 N.E.2d 63, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  Furthermore, “[i]t is a cardinal rule of statutory 
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construction that a statute should not be interpreted to yield an absurd result.”  
Mishr v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 238, 240, 667 N.E.2d 365. 
{¶ 26} The appellate court here has added its own phrases to this statute 
and unnecessarily manipulated and confused it.  Because a school district can act 
only through its employees, R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) affords a defense to liability.  In 
this instance, Elston’s injury resulted from the judgment or discretion of the coach 
in determining how to use equipment or facilities.  No claim is presented 
suggesting reckless conduct.  Thus, the school district successfully asserted this 
defense in this instance. 
R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) 
{¶ 27} Pursuant to the R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) defense, a court must 
determine whether there are any policy-making, planning, or enforcement powers 
involved, and then look to see whether the political subdivision’s employee had 
discretion with respect to those powers by virtue of that employee’s office or 
position.  Although both R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) and 2744.03(A)(3) concern an 
employee’s discretionary acts, the focus of subsection (A)(3) is that the employee 
be engaged in policy-making, planning, or enforcement.  Also unlike R.C. 
2744.03(A)(5), R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) does not have language limiting its grant of 
immunity.  In other words, a political subdivision may assert the immunity 
defense when an employee who has the duty and responsibility for policy-making, 
planning, or enforcement by virtue of office or position actually exercises 
discretion with respect to that power.  This immunity exists even if the 
discretionary actions were done recklessly or with bad faith or malice. 
{¶ 28} It makes sense to distinguish legally the two types of immunity.  
As we explained in discussing R.C. 2943.02, a part of the Court of Claims Act in 
which the state waived its immunity with respect to certain torts, “the state cannot 
be sued for its legislative or judicial functions or the exercise of an executive or 
planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is 
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characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.  
However, once the decision has been made to engage in a certain activity or 
function, the state may be held liable, in the same manner as private parties, for 
the negligence of the actions of its employees and agents in the performance of 
such activities.”  Reynolds v. State, Div. of Parole & Community Servs. (1984), 14 
Ohio St.3d 68, 14 OBR 506, 471 N.E.2d 776, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 29} Before recognizing the immunity of a political subdivision such as 
a school district, a court must consider carefully the duties and responsibilities of 
the employees whose actions are at issue.  The Court of Appeals for Butler 
County, for example, reviewed from several perspectives a case involving an 
assault on a sixth-grade student by his classmates. Marcum v. Talawanda City 
Schools (1996), 108 Ohio App.3d 412, 670 N.E.2d 1067.  In that case, the court 
held that the teacher’s decision to leave the students unattended for a period of 
time was within the scope of her discretionary authority to determine the level of 
supervision necessary for the safety of children in her care.  Id. at 416-417, 670 
N.E.2d 1067.  The school district was held to be immune from liability, pursuant 
to R.C. 2744.03(A)(5), because there was no evidence that the teacher had acted 
with malice or bad faith.  The school district was also immune pursuant to R.C. 
2744.03(A)(3) for the actions of the school principal and superintendent who had 
investigated the incident because both were acting well within the scope of the 
policy-making, planning, and enforcement powers attendant to their offices when 
determining how to deal with the assault.  Id. at 418, 670 N.E.2d 1067.  Finally, 
the individual employees who were personally sued successfully invoked 
immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6), as the court found no evidence that the 
employees had acted or had failed to act with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or 
in a reckless manner. Id. 
{¶ 30} In this case, there is no showing that Coach Eschman’s position as 
baseball coach involved policy-making, planning, or enforcement powers.  His 
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position as a baseball coach, without more, does not involve “the exercise of a 
high degree of official judgment or discretion.”  Reynolds, 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 14 
OBR 506, 471 N.E.2d 776, paragraph one of the syllabus.  We therefore hold that 
R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) does not apply to Coach Eschman’s actions and does not 
provide the school district with a defense. 
{¶ 31} Finally, we recognize that because the amended complaint filed 
here presented no claims against Coach Eschman, we need not consider any 
defense he may have been able to assert pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(6).  
Furthermore, because the amended complaint failed to allege malice, bad faith, or 
wanton or reckless conduct, the appellate court strayed well beyond the pleadings 
and erred in reversing the judgment of the trial court in that regard, and we need 
not further address that issue. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 32} Accordingly, we conclude that pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(5), a 
political subdivision is immune from liability if the injury complained of resulted 
from an individual employee’s exercise of judgment or discretion in determining 
whether to acquire or how to use equipment or facilities unless the judgment or 
discretion was exercised with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or 
reckless manner, because a political subdivision can act only through its 
employees. 
{¶ 33} Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is reversed and 
the judgment of the trial court is reinstated. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., WOLFF, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and LANZINGER, 
JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
 
WILLIAM H. WOLFF JR., J., of the Second Appellate District, was assigned 
to sit for RESNICK, J., whose term ended on January 1, 2007. 
January Term, 2007 
13 
 
CUPP, J., whose term began on January 2, 2007, did not participate in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 34} “The archaic monarchical notion upon which sovereign immunity 
is based — ‘The King can do no wrong’ — has been absurdly revised” again.  
Haynes v. Franklin, 95 Ohio St.3d 344, 2002-Ohio-2334, 767 N.E.2d 1146, ¶ 31 
(Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  See Garrett v. Sandusky (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 139, 144, 
624 N.E.2d 704 (Pfeifer, J., concurring).  This time, the new rule is “Nobody 
when exercising judgment or discretion while working for the King can do 
wrong.” 
{¶ 35} “Sovereign immunity—the more they explain it, the more I don’t 
understand it.”  Fahnbulleh v. Strahan (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 666, 670, 653 
N.E.2d 1186 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  Why should the state be different from 
every other entity or person in the state?  Especially when our state constitution 
guarantees that “every person * * * shall have remedy by due course of law.”  
Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  Especially when our state 
constitution guarantees that “[s]uits may be brought against the state, in such 
courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law.”  Section 16, Article I of 
the Ohio Constitution.  See Garrett, 68 Ohio St.3d at 144, 624 N.E.2d 704.  When 
sued for negligence, every other entity or person in the state has to defend itself 
when a plaintiff can show a duty, a breach of that duty, that the breach was the 
proximate cause of harm, and damages.  See Fed. Steel & Wire Corp. v. Ruhlin 
Constr. Co. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 171, 173, 543 N.E.2d 769; Jeffers v. Olexo 
(1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 140, 142, 539 N.E.2d 614.  Why shouldn’t the state or any 
of its political subdivisions have to defend themselves?   
{¶ 36} In this case, it would be exceedingly difficult to prove that a duty 
was breached.  Alas, we will never know because, with its decision today, the 
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court has stated:  “The Constitution be damned, we will not allow the King or any 
person exercising discretion on behalf of the King to be sued.”  Even though 
Ohio’s citizens have been part of a representative democracy for over 200 years, 
the King still lives.  I dissent. 
__________________ 
Betras, Maruca & Kopp, L.L.C., and Brian P. Kish, for appellees. 
Tomino & Latchney, L.L.C., L.P.A., and Nick C. Tomino, for appellant. 
Subashi, Wildermuth & Ballato, and Nicholas E. Subashi, urging reversal 
for amici curiae Ohio School Boards Association, Buckeye Association of School 
Administrators, Ohio Association of School Business Officials, Ohio Education 
Association, and Ohio Federation of Teachers. 
Thomas C. Drabick, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association of 
Public School Employees/AFSCME Local 4, AFL-CIO. 
______________________