Case Title: Cloutier v. Turner

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2012-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2012 ME 4 
Docket: 
And-11-7 
Argued: 
December 12, 2011 
Decided: 
January 19, 2012 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, 
JJ. 
 
 
RAYMOND R. CLOUTIER 
 
v. 
 
ROBIN M. (CLOUTIER) TURNER 
 
 
SILVER, J. 
[¶1]  Raymond R. Cloutier appeals from a judgment entered in the District 
Court (Lewiston, Lawrence, J.) granting Robin M. (Cloutier) Turner’s motion to 
enforce the child support provisions of a 1992 amended divorce judgment.  
Cloutier argues that (1) Turner lacks standing to bring the motion to enforce 
because she filed it after the children became adults; (2) the limitations period on a 
claim of overdue child support is six years; (3) the court’s failure to apply the 
six-year statute of limitations deprived Cloutier of his constitutional right of equal 
protection; and (4) laches should apply due to Turner’s delay in bringing the 
motion to enforce.  We affirm the judgment. 
 
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I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
 
 
[¶2]  Cloutier and Turner were married in 1983 and divorced in 1987.  
An amended divorce judgment was entered in 1992.  The amended judgment gave 
Turner primary residence of their two daughters and required Cloutier to pay 
$40.00 per week, effective October 2, 1992, as the total child support for both 
children.   The 1992 order also required Cloutier to provide health insurance for the 
children, and to pay thirty-seven percent of any uninsured medical expenses.       
[¶3]  On September 1, 2010, Turner filed a motion to enforce the judgment, 
seeking unpaid child support and Cloutier’s portion of the uninsured medical 
expenses she had paid for the children.  The court held a hearing on 
December 10, 2010, and entered an order on December 13, 2010.   
[¶4]  At the time Turner filed the motion to enforce the judgment their two 
children were ages twenty-five and twenty-seven.  Cloutier testified that he has 
five other children, and for a period he had child support obligations to both Turner 
and the mother of his other children.   
[¶5]  Turner testified that she did not file the motion sooner because Cloutier 
was intimidating; he gave excuses for not paying; and she preferred to avoid 
confrontation for the sake of the children.  She testified that she spoke with 
Cloutier repeatedly over the years about the children’s medical bills.   
 
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[¶6]  The court found that between 1992 and 2003, when the younger 
daughter turned eighteen, Cloutier accrued a total child support obligation of 
$20,200.00 for both children.  The court found that of this amount Cloutier had 
paid $4346.03 leaving a balance of $15,853.97 unpaid.  The court rejected as 
lacking credibility Cloutier’s testimony and his other evidence that he made 
additional payments.  The court found that Turner had paid $10,481.00 of 
uninsured medical expenses for the children and awarded her Cloutier’s unpaid 
thirty-seven percent obligation which was $3877.97.  Turner dropped her claim 
that Cloutier reimburse her for a portion of the health insurance premiums she 
incurred to cover the children.  The court ordered Cloutier to pay $3798.00 toward 
Turner’s attorney fees.  The total judgment was for $23,529.94 which included 
child support, uninsured medical expenses, and attorney fees.  The court also 
awarded post-judgment interest and costs to Turner.  Cloutier filed a timely appeal.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶7]  Cloutier makes four arguments on appeal.  First, he argues that 
pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(12) (2011)1 Turner lost her standing to bring the 
                                         
1  Title 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(12) (2011) states: 
 
Termination of order.  A court order requiring the payment of child support remains in 
force as to each child until the order is altered by the court or until that child: 
  
A. Attains 18 years of age. For orders issued after January 1, 1990, if the child 
attains 18 years of age while attending secondary school as defined in Title 20-A, 
section 1, the order remains in force until the child graduates, withdraws or is 
 
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motion to enforce once the children reached the age of eighteen. He argues that the 
children are the beneficiaries of a child support order, and now that they are adults 
Turner would only have standing if they assigned their interests to her.   
[¶8]  “Standing relates to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and may be 
raised at any time, including during an appeal.”  Matteson v. Batchelder, 
2011 ME 134, ¶ 14, --- A.3d --- (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  
We have held that “the right to installments of alimony or for support becomes 
absolute and vested as they become due,” and “[t]his right is vested in the custodial 
parent, since any award of arrearages is in effect a reimbursement for support owed 
by the noncustodial parent and paid by the custodial parent.”  Tapman v. Tapman, 
544 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me. 1988) (quotation marks omitted).  Although the 
obligation to provide future support ends when the child reaches majority pursuant 
to 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(12), liability for arrearages does not terminate then, and 
therefore Turner has standing to bring a motion to enforce.   
                                                                                                                                   
expelled from secondary school or attains 19 years of age, whichever occurs first; 
 
B. Becomes married; or 
 
C. Becomes a member of the armed services.  
 
 
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[¶9]  Second, Cloutier argues that the limitations period on a claim of 
overdue child support is six years pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 752 (2011).2  He argues 
that recognition of a limitations period longer than six years is beyond the power of 
the courts.  We review de novo issues of statutory interpretation.  Peters v. 
O’Leary, 2011 ME 106, ¶ 13, 30 A.3d 825.  Pursuant to both 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 2602(2) (2011)3 and our precedent, see Carter v. Carter, 611 A.2d 86, 88 & n.2 
(Me. 1992), child-support arrearages are considered money judgments.  There is no 
statute of limitations for money judgments; rather, there is a statutory presumption 
of payment after the lapse of twenty years pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 864 (2011).  
See Carter, 611 A.2d at 88 n.2.   
 [¶10]  Third, Cloutier argues that the limitations period that applies to 
fathers in paternity actions, which is six years pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 1554 (2011), also applies to him.  The six-year limitations period in paternity 
                                         
2  Title 14 M.R.S. § 752 (2011) states:  
 
   
All civil actions shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues and 
not afterwards, except actions on a judgment or decree of any court of record of the 
United States, or of any state, or of a justice of the peace in this State, and except as 
otherwise specially provided. 
 
3  Title 19-A M.R.S. § 2602(2) (2011) states: 
The court may order installment payments for future obligations under the decree. 
The court may enforce its decree ordering installment payments as provided under 
[14 M.R.S. §§ 3126-A to 3136 (2011)  (concerning enforcement of money judgments)]. 
In enforcement actions under those sections, the person ordered to pay is deemed a 
judgment debtor and the person entitled to receive the payments a judgment creditor. 
 
 
 
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actions on which he relies, however, limits “[t]he father’s liabilities for past 
education and support . . . to the 6-year period preceding the commencement of an 
action.”  19-A M.R.S. § 1554 (emphasis added).  The arrearages ordered here 
accrued after judgment in the divorce action, not prior to the commencement of the 
action.  In fact, the enforcement of all child support orders entered as part of a 
judgment in any action⎯including both paternity actions and divorce actions⎯is 
governed by the same statutes: 19-A M.R.S. §§ 2101-2675 (2011).  
See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1553, 2101(13) (2011).  Therefore, Cloutier has not been 
treated any differently than fathers who are subject to child support enforcement 
stemming from a paternity action.  See Friends of Lincoln Lakes v. Bd. of Envtl. 
Prot., 2010 ME 18, ¶ 26, 989 A.2d 1128 (explaining the test for equal protection).  
 [¶11]  Fourth, Cloutier argues that Turner’s claim should be barred by 
laches, and that he suffered prejudice from the delay because his records of 
payments were missing.  The standard of review is de novo as to whether the 
doctrine of laches bars a claim.  Hawksley v. Gerow, 2011 ME 3, ¶ 4, 10 A.3d 715.  
Assuming that laches may in some circumstances bar a claim for past due child 
support, Cloutier has failed to make the showing necessary to establish the defense.  
See Glew v. Glew, 1999 ME 114, ¶¶ 13-14, 734 A.2d 676; Carter, 611 A.2d at 87.   
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
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On the briefs and at oral argument: 
 
Andrews Bruce Campbell, Esq., Andrews Bruce Campbell, P.A., 
Bowdoinham, for appellant Raymond R. Cloutier 
 
Henry W. Griffin, Esq., Lewiston, for appellee Robin (Cloutier) Turner 
 
 
 
 
Lewiston District Court docket number DV-1987-422 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY