Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF GEORGE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 03-16

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF GEORGE2003 WY 12977 P.3d 1219Case Number: 03-16Decided: 10/15/2003
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

EDWARD 
DALE GEORGE, deceased:

 

NELLIE 
LUE GEORGE; VIRGINIA MAY

HORTON-FERGUSON; 
BEVERLY ANN

STRAIGHT; 
and TAMMIE JO GEORGE,

 

Appellants(Respondents),

 

v.

                                                                                                

KAREN 
ALLEN, Personal Representative

of 
the Estate of  EDWARD DALE 
GEORGE,

deceased,

 

Appellee(Petitioner).

 

 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
James P. Castberg, Sheridan, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
William D. Omohundro, Buffalo, Wyoming.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      In 2001, the 
appellee, Karen Allen (Allen), replaced Beverly Ann Straight (Straight) as 
personal representative of the Estate of Edward Dale George (the decedent).  Shortly thereafter, Allen petitioned the 
district court to sell the decedent's undivided 1/10th interest in 
real property located in Sheridan County.  
The appellants objected to Allen's petition.  Following a hearing, the district court 
authorized Allen to sell the decedent's interest in the subject property.  The appellants appeal from that 
decision.  They argue that the 
district court should have reached the opposite conclusion based on their 
factual assertions and that the district court lacked jurisdiction.  We affirm.

 

 

[¶2]      The appellants 
present the following issues for our review:

 

1.         
Did the district court commit an error in granting appellee's petition to 
sell real property over the objection of appellants, and prior to appellees 
collecting all of the assets of the estate and prior to a determination of the 
unpaid debts and fees due the personal representative and attorney for the 
estate?

 

2.         
Did the district court lack jurisdiction in this matter in that the 
decedent was a resident of Sheridan County, Wyoming, at the time of his death, 
died in Sheridan County, Wyoming, and all of the real estate, or interest 
therein, owned by the decedent at the time of his death, was located in Sheridan 
County, Wyoming?

 

 

[¶3]      Edward Dale 
George died intestate April 17, 2000.  
On May 9, 2000, Straight, the decedent's sister, filed a verified 
Petition to Administer Estate in the District Court for Johnson County of the 
Fourth Judicial District.  In that 
petition, Straight identified the decedent's potential heirs as his six sisters 
(including the appellants), two brothers, and three nieces, and alleged that the 
decedent died in Johnson County and was a resident of Johnson County at the time 
of his death.  Based on the 
information contained in the petition, the district court (sitting in probate) 
found as follows:  (a) the decedent 
died in Johnson County and owned real and personal property in Johnson County 
and Sheridan County at the time of his death; (b) the district court had 
jurisdiction in the matter; and (c) the decedent's "resident status" was such 
that venue was proper in Johnson County.  
The district court appointed Straight to act as personal representative 
of the decedent's estate, issued her letters of administration, and ordered that 
she post a $25,000.00 bond.

 

[¶4]      Subsequent 
filings and pleadings contain conflicting information regarding where the 
decedent resided at the time of his death.  
A death certificate filed July 26, 2000, states that the decedent died in 
Sheridan County, and was a resident of Sheridan County at the time of his 
death.  In October 2000, Straight, 
as personal representative (at that time, counsel for the appellee represented 
Straight), petitioned the district court to sell some of the decedent's real and 
personal property not at issue in the instant appeal.  Straight averred in that petition that 
the decedent was a resident of Sheridan County at the time of his death.  In February 2001, Straight filed a 
verified report detailing the sale of this property, wherein she stated that the 
decedent was a resident of Johnson County at the time of his death.  In the resulting order approving these 
transactions, the district court again found that the decedent was a resident of 
Johnson County at the time of his death.

 

[¶5]      In September 
2001, Karen Allen, a potential creditor of the decedent's estate, petitioned the 
district court to remove Straight as the estate's personal representative.  The petition stated that the decedent 
died in Sheridan County and was a resident of Sheridan County at the time of his 
death.  It further alleged that 
Straight failed to act in the estate's "best interests" with respect to the 
estate's assets.1  Straight did not appear at a hearing set 
to consider the petition's merits.  
The district court subsequently removed Straight as the estate's personal 
representative, and appointed Allen to assume that position, accompanied by 
letters of administration.  On 
November 5, 2002, Allen petitioned the district court to order Straight to show 
cause for the alleged misappropriation of estate assets and to order the company 
that posted Straight's bond to reimburse the estate in an amount required to 
make the estate "whole."  The 
district court issued Straight an order to appear and show 
cause.

 

[¶6]      Allen had 
previously listed the decedent's undivided 1/10th interest in certain 
real property located in Sheridan County in an Amendment to Estate 
Inventory.  On November 5, 2002, 
Allen separately also petitioned the district court to allow her to sell the 
decedent's undivided 1/10th interest in the subject real property 
because the "estate currently has insufficient funds to pay costs of 
administration and the creditors claims that have been accepted" and that it was 
"in the best interest of this estate and for the benefit of the estate's 
creditors" that the property be sold.  
She attached an appraisal to the petition indicating that the value of 
the decedent's interest in the property was $2,448.00, and that Allen had 
entered an agreement to sell the decedent's interest for $16,000.00.  In an unverified responsive pleading 
objecting to Allen's petition, the appellants claimed the 
following:

 

1.         
The subject real property is "the family home," and is "sacred and 
hallowed" property because the decedent's brother's ashes were scattered on the 
property in 2001;

 

2.         
Allen's accounting included assets that Allen stated she could not 
locate, but the appellants "believe[d]" that the assets could be located with 
"due diligence";2

 

3.         
It "may not be necessary" for the estate to sell the decedent's interest 
in the subject property due to Allen's request that the company that posted 
Straight's personal representative bond reimburse the estate; 
and

 

4.         
The district court lacked "jurisdiction in this matter" because the 
decedent was a resident of Sheridan County when he died, his death occurred in 
Sheridan County, and the subject property is located in Sheridan 
County.

 

[¶7]      The district 
court held a hearing December 17, 2002, on Allen's petition to sell the 
decedent's interest in the subject property, during which hearing the district 
court heard testimony from Allen and three other witnesses.3  Based on that testimony and accompanying 
evidentiary exhibits, the district court made the following findings in its 
Order Authorizing Sale of Real Property filed December 24, 
2002:

 

1.         
At that time, the decedent's estate had at least $21,786.00 "of 
obligations payable" by the estate, and had $3,503.49 in the estate bank 
account;

 

2.         
Expenses and interest continued to accrue pursuant to these 
obligations;

 

3.         
The decedent's estate needed funds to pay the obligations and selling the 
decedent's interest in the subject property was in the "best interest of the 
Estate and its creditors;" and

 

4.         
The district court had "jurisdiction in this 
matter."

 

Accordingly, 
the district court authorized Allen to sell the decedent's interest in the 
property for $16,000.00 pursuant to the referenced agreement.  The appellants filed a Notice of Appeal 
regarding the Order Authorizing Sale of Real Property on December 30, 
2002.

 

 

 

[¶8]      The appellants 
contend that the district court erred in authorizing Allen to sell the 
decedent's interest in the subject property.  They assert that the property has 
"intrinsic value" to them in that it is the family home and a sibling's ashes 
were dispersed on the property in accordance with the sibling's final wish.  The appellants further argue that the 
district court's order "fails to take into consideration" that assets which 
Allen was unable to locate, "if" collected, "may well produce adequate funds" to 
satisfy the estate's obligations, and "fails to take into consideration" that on 
January 17, 2003, the district court ordered the company that posted Straight's 
personal representative bond to pay $25,000.00 to the estate due to Straight's 
actions as the estate's personal representative.

 

[¶9]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-7-612(a) (LexisNexis 2003) provides as follows:

 

Any 
real or personal property belonging to the decedent except exempt personal 
property and the homestead may be sold . . . by the personal representative for 
any of the following purposes:

 

(i)         
The payment of debts and charges against the 
estate;

 

. 
. .

 

(iii)       Any other 
purpose in the best interests of the estate.

 

See 
also 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-614 (LexisNexis 2003) (whenever "it is for the best 
interests of the estate, real and personal property of the estate may be sold . 
. ..").  "At the hearing and upon 
satisfactory proof the court may order the sale . . . of the property described 
or any part thereof at such price and upon such terms and conditions as the 
court may authorize."  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 2-7-615 (LexisNexis 2003).

 

[¶10]   The use of the verb "may" generally 
indicates that the authority found in the statute is "to be exercised at the 
discretion of the court."  
Hodgins v. State, 1 P.3d 1259, 1261 (Wyo. 2000).  See generally Nimmo v. State, 607 P.2d 344, 348 (Wyo. 1980).  We have said that

 

"[j]udicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.'  . . .  We must ask ourselves whether the 
district court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its 
ruling was arbitrary or capricious."

 

Young 
v. HAC, LLC, 
2001 WY 50, ¶ 6, 24 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Wyo. 2000) and Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998)).

 

[¶11]   We note at the outset that the 
appellants have provided neither a transcript of the hearing on the referenced 
petition pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.02 nor a statement of the evidence pursuant to 
W.R.A.P. 3.03, and it does not appear that they requested special findings of 
fact and conclusions of law under W.R.C.P. 52(a).

 

It 
is the appellant[s'] burden to bring a complete record to this Court.  Erhart v. Evans, 2001 WY 79, ¶ 
18, 30 P.3d 542, 547 (Wyo.2001); Wood v. Wood, 865 P.2d 616, 617 
(Wyo.1993).  Where a proper record 
is not provided, an appeal may be dismissed or review may be limited to those 
issues not requiring inspection of the record.  Stadtfeld v. Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo.1996) (quoting Matter of Manning's Estate, 646 P.2d 175, 
176 (Wyo.1982)); Wood, 865 P.2d  at 618.

 

Smith 
v. Smith, 
2003 WY 87, ¶ 11, 72 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Wyo. 2003).

 

Without 
a sufficient record, we must

 

"accept 
the trial court's findings as being the only basis for deciding the issues 
which pertain to the evidence.'  
Willowbrook Ranch, Inc. v. Nugget Exploration, Inc., 896 P.2d 769, 
771 (Wyo.1995).  In the absence of 
anything to refute them, we will sustain the trial court's findings, and we 
assume that the evidence presented was sufficient to support those 
findings.'  896 P.2d  at 
771-71."

 

Williams 
v. Dietz, 
999 P.2d 642, 645 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Weiss v. Pedersen, 933 P.2d 495, 498 (Wyo. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by White v. Allen, 
2003 WY 39, 65 P.3d 395 (Wyo. 2003)).

 

[¶12]   The appellants have not directed us 
to any evidence or pertinent legal authority that supports their argument 
regarding the subject property's claimed "intrinsic" value.  They did not cite to the record in 
advancing this argument and did not provide us a record of the hearing on 
Allen's petition to sell the decedent's interest in the subject property.  The bald assertions contained in the 
appellants' responsive pleading to Allen's petition and appellate brief are not 
sufficient.  "This Court cannot rely 
on the allegations and averments contained within pleadings and briefs as being 
accurate statements of facts."  
Small v. Convenience Plus Partners, Ltd., 6 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

[¶13]   The appellants' contention that the 
district court failed to consider that Allen was unable to locate some of the 
decedent's personal property is similarly deficient.  We cannot evaluate whether the district 
court erred in failing to consider this issue without a proper record, and the 
appellants do not cite to the record or pertinent legal authority in advancing 
this argument.  The appellants do 
cite some relevant information from the pleadings in another portion of their 
appellate brief.  Allen stated in a 
pleading that she "has never been able to locate or account for" certain 
personal property that Straight had previously listed in an estate 
inventory.  The appellants claimed 
in their responsive pleading to Allen's petition that with "due diligence" some 
of these assets could be located; they stated in their appellate brief merely 
that "if" some or all of these assets can be located, the assets "may well" 
produce sufficient funds to satisfy the estate's obligations.  We reiterate that we cannot rely on 
allegations and averments contained in the pleadings or briefs as accurate 
statements of fact.  Even so, this 
argument is literally speculative, and also speculative based on the state of 
the record before us.

 

[¶14]   Without citing to any pertinent 
legal authority, the appellants assert that the district court failed to 
consider the $25,000.00 it ordered a bonding company to pay the estate due to 
Straight's conduct while acting as the estate's personal representative.  In that order, filed January 17, 2003, 
the district court found that Straight had "depleted the assets of this estate 
by disregarding her duties as personal representative" and caused the estate to 
incur $26,580.86 in expenditures, interest, missing personal property, attorneys 
fees and costs, and personal representative fees and costs.  We cannot evaluate the merits of this 
argument, or what, if any, consideration the district court gave it, without a 
proper record.  We further note that 
the district court's order as to the bonding company was filed well after the 
December 17, 2002, hearing on Allen's petition, the district court's order 
pursuant to that hearing filed December 24, 2002, and the appellants' notice of 
appeal from that order filed December 30, 2002.  Indeed, in the appellants' response to 
Allen's petition, they merely state that "[d]epending upon how much" is 
recovered from the bonding company, it "may not be necessary" to sell the 
decedent's interest in the subject property.  It does not appear that the appellants 
ever requested that the district court reconsider its decision.4

 

[¶15]   The appellants' contentions on this 
issue all pertain to the evidence.  
In the absence of a sufficient record, we accept the district court's 
findings as being the only basis for deciding the issues pertaining to the 
evidence.  The district court's 
findings in the instant case included that the estate had at least $21,786.00 in 
obligations payable by the estate in addition to accruing expenses and interest, 
and had $3,503.49 in the estate bank account.  The district court concluded that at 
that time, the estate needed funds to satisfy the referenced obligations and 
selling the decedent's interest in the subject property was in the "best 
interest" of the estate and its creditors.  
The appellants have not directed us to any facts appropriate for our 
consideration that refute the district court's findings.  Accordingly, we sustain those findings 
and assume that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the 
findings.  We conclude that the 
district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in authorizing Allen to 
sell the decedent's interest in the subject property based on the existing 
circumstances.  The appellants have 
not cited any pertinent legal authority that would compel a contrary 
conclusion.

 

 

[¶16]   The appellants argue that the 
district court's Order Authorizing Sale of Real Property was "void ab initio" 
because the district court (sitting in probate) for Johnson County lacked 
"jurisdiction."  In their responsive 
pleading to Allen's petition to sell the decedent's interest in the subject 
property, the appellants advanced the following argument for the first time in 
the district court:

 

It 
appears from the death certificate of Edward Dale George that he was a resident 
of Sheridan County, Wyoming, at the time of his death; that his death occurred 
in Sheridan County, Wyoming; and that the real estate the 
Petitioner seeks to sell is located in Sheridan County, Wyoming, therefore this 
Court lacks jurisdiction in this matter.

 

(Emphasis 
in original.)  On appeal, the 
appellants assert, apparently for the first time, that the district court for 
Johnson County "was not the proper venue and 
therefore lacked jurisdiction in this matter."  (Emphasis added.)  They contend that we should reverse the 
district court's order and remand with instructions to transfer the venue of 
this matter to the district court (sitting in probate) for Sheridan 
County.

 

[¶17]   The district court concluded after 
the December 17, 2002, hearing that it had "jurisdiction in this matter."  Subject matter jurisdiction is "the 
power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings 
in question belong.'"  Lacey v. 
Lacey, 925 P.2d 237, 238 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Fuller v. State, 568 P.2d 900, 903 (Wyo. 1977)).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-2-101 (LexisNexis 
2003) provides, in pertinent part:

 

The 
district courts of the state have exclusive original jurisdiction of all matters 
relating to the probate and contest of wills and testaments, the granting of 
letters testamentary and of administration, and the settlement and distribution 
of decedents' estates.  The court 
granting the letters has exclusive jurisdiction of all matters touching the 
settlement and distribution of the estates for which letters have been 
granted.  The jurisdiction over 
subject matter of the district court sitting in probate, sometimes referred to 
in this Title 2 as the "probate court", is coextensive with the jurisdiction 
over subject matter of the district court in any civil 
action.

 

Allen's 
petition to sell the decedent's interest in the subject property clearly touched 
upon the settlement of an estate for which the district court had previously 
granted letters of administration.5

 

[¶18]   On appeal, the appellants argue 
that the district court lacked jurisdiction solely because "venue" was improper 
in the district court (sitting in probate) for Johnson County.  This argument seems to confuse the 
concepts of jurisdiction and venue.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-2-102 (LexisNexis 2003) provides, in pertinent part, 
as follows:

 

Venue 
generally.

 

(a)       Wills shall 
be proved and letters testamentary or of administration 
granted:

 

(i)         
In the county of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his 
death, regardless of where he may have died[.]

 

The 
following excerpt, although not specific to probate jurisdiction, generally 
illustrates the distinction between the two concepts:

 

The 
district courts in this state are courts of general jurisdiction.  Murrell v. Stock Growers' National 
Bank of Cheyenne, 74 F.2d 827, 831 (10th 
Cir.1934).  See Urbach v. 
Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 73 P.2d 953 (1937).  As such, they have inherent subject 
matter jurisdiction over any and all cases in which jurisdiction is not 
specifically vested in some court of limited jurisdiction.  Wyoming Constitution, Art. 5, § 10; 
Murrell, 74 F.2d  at 831.  . . 
.  Once jurisdiction is acquired, 
the district court has the power to hear and determine the matter and to render 
a binding judgment.  McGuire v. 
McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278 (Wyo.1980); State v. District Court of Eighth 
Judicial District in and for Natrona County, 33 Wyo. 281, 238 P. 545 
(1925).  We adopt the analysis found 
in Sil-Flo Corporation v. Bowen, 98 Ariz. 77, 402 P.2d 22 (1965), and 
recognize that the power to enter a binding judgment is equally present among 
all district courts in the state.  
In this context, venue is never a consideration.  See Myuskovich [v. State ex rel. 
Osborn, 59 Wyo. 406], 14[1] P.2d [540] at 543 [(1943)].  It follows that the authority to enter 
summary judgment or any other order in favor of or against Hall properly is 
vested in any, or all, of the district courts in the state.  That authority does not reside only in 
the court in which proper venue is found.  
In view of this widely vested authority, Hall's contention that the 
District Court of the Sixth Judicial District in and for Campbell County was 
without jurisdiction is without merit.

 

            
Since jurisdiction, with its inherent power to render judgment, is 
present despite any impropriety with respect to venue, it is unnecessary for us 
to consider whether the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District in and 
for Converse County properly followed § 27-12-601.  Subject matter jurisdiction would be 
present whether it did or did not.  
It is proper, however to remind our district courts and counsel that the 
remedy with respect to questions of venue is a request to change venue to the 
proper court.  Unless specifically 
mandated by statute, the absence of proper venue does not result in a dismissal, 
a reversal, or a new trial.  See 
Sil-Flo, 402 P.2d  at 27.  
Furthermore, we expect the aggrieved party to make a timely objection, or 
to request a change.  Otherwise, 
venue will be deemed proper.  Such a 
result is justified because venue normally is founded upon convenience to the 
parties to the litigation.  It does 
not reach the judicial power.

 

Matter 
of Larsen, 
770 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Wyo. 1989).  See also Hronek v. St. Joseph's 
Children's Home, 866 P.2d 1305, 1309-10 (Wyo. 1994).

 

[¶19]   The filings and pleadings in this 
case contain conflicting information as to where the decedent resided at the 
time of his death and Straight was the source of some of this conflicting 
information.  Interestingly, despite 
the conflicting information, the only formal findings the district court made in 
its prior orders appear to have been that the decedent was a resident of Johnson 
County at the time of his death.  
Because the appellants have not provided us a proper record, we do not 
know what, if any, evidence was presented at the December 17, 2002, hearing in 
order to evaluate this issue to the extent the appellants now claim it relates 
specifically to "venue."

 

[¶20]   We do know that, based on the state 
of the record on appeal, the appellants did not raise this issue in the district 
court precisely as one based on improper "venue."  We generally will not review issues 
raised for the first time on appeal except for jurisdictional issues and those 
so fundamental in nature that they must be considered.  In re Pohl, 980 P.2d 816, 819 
(Wyo. 1999).  Venue "does not reach the judicial 
power."  Matter of Larsen, 
770 P.2d  at 1092.  Without a record of the hearing, the 
above-quoted argument from the appellants' responsive pleading to Allen's 
petition is the only item indicating the manner in which the appellants raised 
the issue in the district court.  
That argument challenges the district court's "jurisdiction," not 
"venue," and the appellants did not request that the district court transfer 
"venue" to another court.  The 
resulting finding by the district court was that it had "jurisdiction."  Notably, on appeal (although the 
appellants appear to confuse the relationship between the two concepts) the 
appellants specifically discuss "venue" accompanied by citations to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 2-2-102 (probate court venue) and specifically discuss "jurisdiction" 
accompanied by citations to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-2-101 (probate court 
jurisdiction).  In the district 
court, the appellants only discussed the district court's "jurisdiction" without 
citing either statute.

 

[¶21]   Nevertheless, and notwithstanding 
other potential issues as to whether the appellants waived consideration of, or 
should be estopped from raising, this issue in terms of "venue," the appellants' 
remedy on appeal in the instant case is not a reversal of the district court's 
order authorizing Allen to sell the decedent's interest in the subject 
property.  Matter of Larsen, 
770 P.2d  at 1092.  It is worth noting that the district 
judge who decided the merits of Allen's petition is the sitting district judge 
in the District Court for Sheridan County of the Fourth Judicial District, which 
venue the appellants claim to be the proper venue for the instant 
case.

 

[¶22]   Allen asks that we sanction the 
appellants for lack of cogent argument or citation to pertinent authority.  The appellants, although minimally, did 
generally cite to the record and to some pertinent legal authority, and we 
conclude that this is not one of those rare circumstances where sanctions 
pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05 are appropriate.

 

[¶23]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1Allen later alleged that Straight 
used estate assets for inappropriate or unidentified expenditures, 
misappropriated estate assets, and failed to account for estate 
assets.

 

  2The appellants also stated that 
Allen had failed to account for three horses in Allen's possession "which she 
may or may not have sold."  Allen 
later supplemented her accounting with information regarding the three horses, 
as well as other horses.  Allen's 
supplementation seems to have resolved this issue.

 

  3The exhibits received at the hearing 
indicate that these three witnesses testified regarding horses they purchased 
during Straight's tenure as the estate's personal representative.  This testimony does not appear to be at 
issue in the instant appeal.

 

  4See, for example, In re Potter's 
Estate, 396 P.2d 438, 445 (Wyo. 1964).

 

  5Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-103 
(LexisNexis 2003) states that the personal representative "shall take possession 
of all of the estate of the decedent, real and personal," and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-7-402 (LexisNexis 2003) provides that all of the decedent's "property is 
subject to the possession of the personal representative and to the control of 
the court for the purposes of administration . . .."