Case Title: Ex parte Laura Wilson. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Madison County Board of Education v. Laura Wilson)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1071683

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2009-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:1/16/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1071683
____________________
Ex parte Laura Wilson
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Madison County Board of Education
v.
Laura Wilson)
(No. FMCS 05-03316;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2050222)
PER CURIAM.
WRIT DENIED. NO OPINION.
See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Bolin, and Parker, JJ.,
concur.
Smith, J., concurs specially.
Cobb, C.J., and Murdock, J., dissent.
1071683
2
SMITH, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur to deny the petition.  The underlying facts of
this case are explained in the earlier decision of the Court
of Civil Appeals, Madison County Board of Education v. Wilson,
984 So. 2d 1153 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006), and this Court's
opinion affirming that court's judgment, Ex parte Wilson, 984
So. 2d 1161 (Ala. 2007).  The current procedural posture of
this case is explained in part in Chief Justice Cobb's
dissent.
Chief Justice Cobb, in her dissenting opinion, asserts
that the petitioner, Laura Wilson, "has sought redress in
every reasonable manner in seeking an answer to the question
whether a new hearing officer is required on remand."  ___ So.
2d at ___.  However, instead of filing a "motion for
clarification," Wilson could have sought mandamus relief
directing that a hearing be commenced before the original
hearing officer after the Madison County Board of Education
refused to proceed if the matter was not heard before a new
hearing officer.  
Additionally, the Court of Civil Appeals' most recent
action in this case merely withdraws an order that placed the
1071683
3
case on rehearing ex mero motu.  It is unclear how this Court
could review such a decision on certiorari review.  In any
event, the Court of Civil Appeals' prior decision in this
case, which this Court affirmed, remanded the case "for the
parties to conduct another hearing consistent with the
provisions of the Teacher Tenure Act."  Madison County Bd. of
Educ., 984 So. 2d at 1160.  The parties have not yet conducted
such a hearing.  I see no reason why our denial of this
petition will prevent the fulfillment of that remand order.
Therefore, I concur to deny the petition.
1071683
The Board terminated its contract with Wilson pursuant
1
to which she also served as the cheerleading coach at Buckhorn
High School.  Wilson conceded that she possessed no right to
contest the cancellation of that contract.
4
COBB, Chief Justice (dissenting).
Laura Wilson had the misfortune of being one of the first
teachers whose termination under the Teacher Tenure Act, § 16-
24-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, was scrutinized by the appellate
courts of Alabama since the Teacher Tenure Act was drastically
amended by the legislature in 2004.  See Act No. 566, Ala.
Acts 2004.  In April 2005, the Madison County Board of
Education ("the Board") terminated Wilson's employment as a
tenured physical-education teacher at Buckhorn High School.
Pursuant to § 16-24-10 Wilson appealed her termination, and
after receiving ore tenus and documentary evidence, the
hearing officer ordered that Wilson be returned to her
teaching position and that no discipline be imposed.   The
1
Board appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals pursuant to § 16-
24-10(b), Ala. Code 1975, and Court of Civil Appeals
"reverse[d] the hearing officer's decision and remand[ed] the
cause for the parties to conduct another hearing consistent
with the provisions of the Teacher Tenure Act."  Madison
County Bd. of Educ. v. Wilson, 984 So. 2d 1153, 1160 (Ala.
1071683
5
Civ. App. 2006).  Wilson then petitioned this Court for a writ
of certiorari.  Wilson's petition was granted, and this Court
affirmed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.  See Ex
parte Wilson, 984 So. 2d 1161 (Ala. 2007).  I dissented from
this Court's judgment in that matter, and I dissent now.
This case, unfortunately, has become a procedural
quagmire.  In affirming the judgment of the Court of Civil
Appeals, this Court stated: "The new hearing shall be
conducted pursuant to the provisions of the new [Teacher
Tenure] Act[, § 16-24-1 et seq.]."  Ex parte Wilson, 984 So.
2d at 1171.  Wilson did not sleep on her rights.  She
attempted to secure the new hearing that this Court ordered.
Upon receipt of this Court's judgment, the hearing officer
contacted Wilson and the Board and suggested dates for a new
hearing.  The Board, however, notified Wilson that, because
the matter had been remanded for a new hearing pursuant to the
provisions of the Teacher Tenure Act, it was arguing that a
new hearing officer must be selected for the new hearing.  The
Board premised its contention on § 16-24-10(a), Ala. Code
1975, which states that "the hearing officer shall be selected
as provided in subsection (b) of Section 16-24-20."  Wilson
1071683
6
disagreed and asserted that the matter had been remanded to be
heard by the original hearing officer.  Because Wilson refused
to consent to a new hearing officer, the Board deemed that she
had waived her rights to a new hearing and ceased paying her
salary.  Wilson appealed to the chief administrative law judge
of the office of administrative hearings in the office of the
Alabama Attorney General pursuant to § 16-24-21, Ala. Code
1975.  The administrative law judge determined that he lacked
jurisdiction over the dispute and dismissed Wilson's appeal.
On March 25, 2008, Wilson filed a motion for clarification
with the Court of Civil Appeals, asking that court to clarify
whether a new hearing officer is required on remand.  The
Court of Civil Appeals placed the case on rehearing ex mero
motu on April 22, 2008; however, on August 29, 2008, that
court withdrew its order.  Wilson now petitions this Court to
issue a writ of certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals or,
in the alternative, for a writ of mandamus.
The language used by the Court of Civil Appeals in
originally remanding the case and by this Court in affirming
the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals doing so could have
led to two reasonable interpretations: the new hearing was to
1071683
7
be held before the original hearing officer or the new hearing
was to be held before a new hearing officer.  It was the
responsibility of the Court of Civil Appeals to clarify its
remand order, even though the posture of this case was
complicated, to say the least.  This posture, however, was not
created by the parties but instead by the Court of Civil
Appeals and this Court.
Consequently, I agree wholeheartedly with Judge Bryan in
his writing dissenting from the Court of Civil Appeals'
withdrawal of its order placing this case on rehearing ex mero
motu.  I, too, believe that the Court of Civil Appeals erred
when it failed to retain this matter on rehearing ex mero motu
to respond to Wilson's motion for clarification.  As Judge
Bryan stated: 
"'The cardinal 
rule 
in 
statutory 
construction 
is
to give effect to the legislative intent as clearly
expressed in the statute or as may be inferred from
the language used as well as from the reason for the
act.'  Ex parte Berryhill, 801 So. 2d 7, 11 (Ala.
2001) 
(emphasis 
omitted). 
 
I 
note 
that 
the
legislature, in amending the [Teacher Tenure] Act in
2004, intended 'to streamline the contest and appeal
processes for teachers.'  Title to Act No. 2004-566,
Ala. Acts 2004.  Remanding the case for a new
hearing before the original hearing officer would be
consistent 
with 
this 
intention 
and 
would 
be
judicially efficient, whereas holding a hearing
before a new hearing officer unfamiliar with the
1071683
8
case would undermine this intention.  Further, §
16-24-10(b) permits this court to remand the case
for 'another hearing,' but that section does not
mention 'another hearing officer.'  Accordingly, I
interpret that portion of the Act calling for
'another hearing' as requiring remand to the
original hearing officer for a new hearing.
"Because I would place the appeal on rehearing
ex mero motu in order to clarify this court's
intention that the original officer should conduct
the hearing on remand, I respectfully dissent."
Madison County Bd. of Educ. v. Wilson, [Ms. 2050222, August
29, 2008] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (Bryan,
J., dissenting).  
Wilson has sought redress in every reasonable manner in
seeking an answer to the question whether a new hearing
officer is required on remand, and I believe she and the Board
are entitled to an answer. 
I agree with Justice Smith that the parties have not
conducted the "'hearing consistent with the provisions of the
Teacher Tenure Act'" on remand as ordered by the Court of
Civil Appeals. ___ So. 2d at ___ (Smith, J., concurring
specially).  This is a hearing to which Wilson is entitled,
and that right should not be thwarted by the Board's
alternative interpretation of our judgment and the judgment of
the Court of Civil Appeals.  I believe that Wilson should
1071683
9
demand a hearing before the original hearing officer.  Should
the hearing officer refuse to conduct such a hearing, she
should petition the Court of Civil Appeals for a writ of
mandamus.  If, however, the original hearing officer schedules
the hearing and the Board is still of the opinion that a new
hearing officer is required, the Board then may petition the
Court of Civil Appeals for a writ of mandamus.  In either
situation, the issue would be squarely before the appellate
courts.
However, I remain convinced that the Court of Civil
Appeals should have provided the relief Wilson sought.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
1071683
10
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
I agree in the main with the dissenting opinion of Chief
Justice Cobb.  She and Justice Smith disagree, however, over
whether, before coming to this Court, Wilson "sought redress
in every reasonable manner," ___ So. 2d at ___ (Cobb, C.J.,
dissenting), in an effort to determine whether a new hearing
officer was required on remand.  Under the unusual procedural
history of this case –- and what may be considered a novel and
unexpected position on the part of the Madison County Board of
Education ("the Board") in relation to a new legislative
enactment –- I believe Wilson has done enough. 
Although Wilson did not file an application for rehearing
seeking clarification of the mandate of this Court's 2007
decision, I do not fault her for this.  Any ambiguity in what
appeared to be routine remand language in this Court's
judgment was latent, at best. (It appears that routine
language was used both by this Court and by the Court of Civil
Appeals without any thought as to the issue now presented.)
It is true that, when the dispute arose between Wilson and the
Board as to whether the remand in this case required the
parties to begin anew the process of selecting a hearing
1071683
As a preliminary observation as to the merits of the
2
issue presented: If we construe the new teacher-tenure law as
requiring the selection of a new hearing officer, will we not
be forcing new evidentiary hearings in all remanded cases and
foreclosing the option of having the original "judge" simply
apply the correct law to the evidence with which he or she is
11
officer for Wilson's case, Wilson did not file a petition for
a writ of mandamus with either the Court of Civil Appeals or
this Court.  Instead, because this case had been remanded for
handling by the hearing officer, Wilson sought a resolution of
this dispute from the chief administrative law judge of the
office of administrative hearings in the office of the Alabama
Attorney General.  When that effort did not produce a
resolution, she promptly filed a motion for clarification with
the Court of Civil Appeals, asking it to clarify whether a new
hearing officer was required on remand.  When that court
refused to do so, she then filed a petition for an
extraordinary writ with this Court.  
An 
injustice 
may 
be 
occurring 
merely 
because 
of
uncertainty and disagreement by the parties as to what it
means for a case to be remanded under the new teacher-tenure
law.  The teacher's taking a different view from the Board,
and declining to submit her case to a new hearing officer, has
now resulted in her being fired.2
1071683
already familiar?   The latter course obviously is the nature
of most remands to "trial court" "judges."  I question the
Board's reliance on § 16-24-10(a), Ala. Code 1975, which
merely describes the general manner of selecting a hearing
officer.  Procedures, if not statutes, also are in place for
the assignment of cases among the trial judges of any given
circuit.  That does not mean that when an appellate court
remands a case for application of its legal holding to the
evidence of record that those procedures are re-implemented as
if the case were reaching the trial court for the first time.
12
Under the unusual circumstances presented, I am not
persuaded that we should not treat Wilson's petition to this
court as a timely request for a writ of mandamus, a common-law
writ of certiorari, or other extraordinary relief, bearing in
mind our general superintendence powers, see, e.g., Ex parte
Bracken, 263 Ala. 402, 406, 82 So. 2d 629, 631 (1955), and
authority to interpret and protect our mandates.