Case Title: State v. Lozier

Citation: 2004-Ohio-732

Docket Number: 20020900

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Lozier, 101 Ohio St.3d 161, 2004-Ohio-732.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. LOZIER, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Lozier, 101 Ohio St.3d 161, 2004-Ohio-732.] 
Criminal law — Drug Offenses — Trafficking in drugs — Culpable mental state 
of recklessness applies to the offense of trafficking in LSD “in the 
vicinity of a school” under R.C. 2925.03(C)(5)(b). 
(No. 2002-0900 — Submitted April 30, 2003, at the Ross County Session — 
Decided March 3, 2004.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Holmes County, No. 01CA21, 2002-Ohio-
1671. 
_________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The culpable mental state of recklessness applies to the offense of trafficking in 
LSD “in the vicinity of a school” under R.C. 2925.03(C)(5)(b). 
_________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶1} 
On February 14, 2001, the Holmes County Grand Jury indicted 
defendant-appellee, Chad A. Lozier, for trafficking in drugs in violation of 
2925.03(A).  All five counts against appellee contained a specification that 
appellee sold drugs within the vicinity of a school, which enhances the penalty 
under R.C. 2925.03(C)(5)(b).  Count 4 was eventually dismissed.  Appellee 
withdrew his initial plea of not guilty and entered pleas of no contest to the 
remaining counts. 
{¶2} 
The sales at issue occurred at appellee’s former home, which is 
located approximately 745 feet from the Holmes County Job and Family Services 
building.  That building housed, on its third floor, a remedial education program 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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known as “Project Stay.”  The state stipulated that it had no evidence that appellee 
knew of the existence of Project Stay and that there was nothing to mark it or to 
identify it as a school to the public. 
{¶3} 
The trial court ruled that Project Stay was, in fact, a school.  The 
court also ruled that whether appellee knew that he was selling drugs in the 
vicinity of the school was irrelevant, since the specification for trafficking within 
the vicinity of a school is written in terms of strict liability.  Appellee was 
convicted on four counts of trafficking with the sentence-enhancement 
specifications. 
{¶4} 
Appellee appealed from his convictions to the Fifth District Court 
of Appeals, arguing that the trial court had erred in finding that R.C. 
2925.03(C)(5)(b) imposes strict liability.  The appellate court agreed and reversed 
the judgment of the trial court, concluding that the culpable mental state 
associated with R.C. 2925.03(C)(5)(b) is “knowingly.” 
{¶5} 
Upon the state’s motion, the court of appeals certified a conflict 
between its holding and the holding of the Ninth District in State v. Rogers (Apr. 
14, 1999), Summit App. No. 19176, 1999 WL 239100.  In its motion to certify a 
conflict in the court of appeals, the state argued that “the issue proposed for 
certification is whether [R.C.] 2925.03(C)(5)(b) is a strict liability statute.”  
Despite its holding that “knowingly” is the culpable mental state for R.C. 
2925.03(C)(5)(b), the court of appeals phrased the certified question in terms of 
recklessness:  “Whether the culpable mental state of recklessness applies to R.C. 
2925.03(C)(5)(b)?” 
{¶6} 
Recognizing a conflict between appellate districts, this court 
granted jurisdiction and ordered briefing on that issue. 96 Ohio St.3d 1446, 2002-
Ohio-3512, 771 N.E.2d 260. 
Law and Analysis 
January Term, 2004 
 
3 
{¶7} 
The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether R.C. 
2925.03(C)(5)(b), which elevates trafficking in LSD to a fourth degree felony if 
the offense is committed “in the vicinity of a school,” imposes strict criminal 
liability on a defendant.  We make our determination against the backdrop of R.C. 
2901.04(A), which states that “sections of the Revised Code defining offenses or 
penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, and liberally construed in 
favor of the accused.” 
{¶8} 
The case against appellee begins with his violation of R.C. 
2925.03(A), which itself requires a mental state of “knowingly”: 
{¶9} 
“No person shall knowingly do any of the following: 
{¶10} “(1) Sell or offer to sell a controlled substance; 
{¶11} “(2) Prepare for shipment, ship, transport, deliver, prepare for 
distribution, or distribute a controlled substance, when the offender knows or has 
reasonable cause to believe that the controlled substance is intended for sale or 
resale by the offender or another person.” 
{¶12} R.C. 2925.03(C)(5)(b) is in play because appellee was selling 
LSD, and because he was selling that substance in the vicinity of a school.  The 
relevant statutory language is as follows: 
{¶13} “(C) Whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of one 
of the following: 
{¶14} “* * *  
{¶15} “(5) If the drug involved in the violation is L.S.D. or a compound, 
mixture, preparation, or substance containing L.S.D., whoever violates division 
(A) of this section is guilty of trafficking in L.S.D.  The penalty for the offense 
shall be determined as follows: 
{¶16} “* * *  
{¶17} “(b) * * * [I]f the offense was committed in the vicinity of a school 
or in the vicinity of a juvenile, trafficking in L.S.D. is a felony of the fourth 
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degree, and division (C) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code applies in 
determining whether to impose a prison term on the offender.” 
{¶18} The mental state of the offender is a part of every criminal offense 
in Ohio except for those plainly imposing strict liability.  R.C. 2901.21(A)(2) 
requires that, in order to be found guilty of a criminal offense, a person must have 
“the requisite degree of culpability for each element as to which a culpable mental 
state is specified by the section defining the offense.” 
{¶19} R.C. 2901.21(B) addresses strict liability statutes and those statutes 
that do not address a culpable mental state.  That statute reads: 
{¶20} “When the section defining an offense does not specify any degree 
of culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal liability 
for the conduct described in the section, then culpability is not required for a 
person to be guilty of the offense.  When the section neither specifies culpability 
nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, recklessness is sufficient 
culpability to commit the offense.” 
{¶21} Thus, recklessness is the catchall culpable mental state for criminal 
statutes that fail to mention any degree of culpability, except for strict liability 
statutes, where the accused’s mental state is irrelevant.  However, for strict 
liability to be the mental standard, the statute must plainly indicate a purpose to 
impose it. 
{¶22} In State v. Maxwell, 95 Ohio St.3d 254, 2002-Ohio-2121, 767 
N.E.2d 242, the majority decided that the language of R.C. 2907.321(A)(6) 
plainly indicated a purpose to impose strict liability.  That statute provides: 
{¶23} “(A) No person, with knowledge of the character of the material or 
performance involved, shall do any of the following: 
{¶24} “* * * 
{¶25} “(6) Bring or cause to be brought into this state any obscene 
material that has a minor as one of its participants or portrayed observers.” 
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5 
{¶26} Maxwell involved a defendant who had downloaded onto his 
computer obscene images; although he knew that the images were obscene, he 
argued that he did not know that he was downloading them from a computer 
system in another state, thereby importing the images into Ohio.  The majority in 
Maxwell found that, as to importing images, the statute imposed strict liability.  
The Maxwell majority relied on State v. Wac (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 84, 86, 22 
O.O.3d 299, 428 N.E.2d 428, in holding that where the General Assembly 
indicates a mental state in one part of a statute, and does not indicate any mental 
state in another part of that statute, that indicates an intent to impose strict liability 
in that other part. Maxwell at ¶ 27-29. 
{¶27} In Maxwell, the court found that the knowledge element of R.C. 
2907.321(A) was separated out in order to apply only to “the character of the 
material or performance involved,” noting that “knowledge is a requirement only 
for the discrete clause within which it resides.” Id., 95 Ohio St.3d 254, 2002-
Ohio-2121, 767 N.E.2d 242, at ¶ 29.  The court held that the knowledge element 
did not apply to the “[n]o person * * * shall do any of the following” portion of 
the statute.  Since knowledge was required in one part of the statute and not in the 
other, the Maxwell majority determined that the General Assembly therefore 
intended to impose strict liability in the subsection of the statute without the 
knowledge requirement. Id. at ¶ 30. 
{¶28} The statute in the present case is structurally more similar to the 
statute analyzed in Wac.  In Wac, this court considered the mental element in R.C. 
2915.02(A)(1).  That statute provides: 
{¶29} “(A) No person shall do any of the following: 
{¶30} “(1) Engage in bookmaking, or knowingly engage in conduct that 
facilitates bookmaking.” 
{¶31} This court found that the inclusion of the element of “knowingly” 
for “conduct that facilitates bookmaking” but not in regard to “bookmaking” 
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operated to “ ‘plainly indicate[ ] a purpose to impose strict liability’ ” on 
bookmaking per se.  Wac, 68 Ohio St.2d at 86, 22 O.O.3d 299, 428 N.E.2d 428.  
The court in Wac “recognized that the clause ‘or knowingly engage in conduct 
that facilitates bookmaking’ was a discrete clause and that the knowledge required 
by that clause could not be inserted into the previous clause, ‘engage in 
bookmaking.’ ”  Maxwell, 95 Ohio St.3d 254, 2002-Ohio-2121, 767 N.E.2d 242, 
¶ 28. 
{¶32} Here, we are dealing with another pair of discrete clauses separated 
by “or.”  The phrase at issue in R.C. 2925.03(C)(5)(b) reads: 
{¶33} “[I]f the offense was committed in the vicinity of a school or in the 
vicinity of a juvenile, trafficking in L.S.D. is a felony of the fourth degree, and 
division (C) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code applies in determining 
whether to impose a prison term on the offender.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶34} Standing alone, “in the vicinity of a school or in the vicinity of a 
juvenile” does not indicate any required degree of mental culpability.  However, 
each clause, “in the vicinity of a school” and “in the vicinity of a juvenile,” is 
separately defined in the chapter’s definitional section.  “In the vicinity of a 
juvenile,” as defined in R.C. 2925.01(BB), employs strict liability terms: 
{¶35} “(BB) An offense is ‘committed in the vicinity of a juvenile’ if the 
offender commits the offense within one hundred feet of a juvenile or within the 
view of a juvenile, regardless of whether the offender knows the age of the 
juvenile, whether the offender knows the offense is being committed within one 
hundred feet of or within view of the juvenile, or whether the juvenile actually 
views the commission of the offense.” 
{¶36} R.C. 2925.01(BB) makes it abundantly clear that the offender’s 
mental state is irrelevant in determining whether the offender has committed an 
offense “in the vicinity of a juvenile.”  An offender is liable whether or not he 
January Term, 2004 
 
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knows the age of the juvenile, or whether he realizes that a juvenile is in the 
vicinity. 
{¶37} By contrast, the definition of “in the vicinity of a school,” 
contained in R.C. 2925.01(P), lacks the express strict liability language of R.C. 
2925.01(BB).  That definition reads: 
{¶38} “(P) An offense is ‘committed in the vicinity of a school’ if the 
offender commits the offense on school premises, in a school building, or within 
one thousand feet of the boundaries of any school premises.” 
{¶39} The General Assembly, in imposing the strict liability requirement 
for drug sales “in the vicinity of a juvenile,” perfectly illustrates what R.C. 
2901.21(B) calls a “purpose to impose strict liability.”  Additionally, the stark 
contrast between the definition of “committed in the vicinity of a school” and the 
definition of “committed within the vicinity of a juvenile” indicates that the 
General Assembly did not intend to impose strict liability for selling LSD in the 
“vicinity of a school” section. 
{¶40} Applying the reasoning of Wac, if one part of a clause explicitly 
sets forth a mental state, that mental state does not apply to another discrete clause 
within that subsection.  In fact, it is an indication that the General Assembly is 
attaching differing mental states as to the two distinct clauses.  As the majority 
wrote in Maxwell, “the decision in Wac demonstrates that a crime may have 
different degrees of mental culpability for different elements.” Maxwell, 95 Ohio 
St.3d 254, 2002-Ohio-2121, 767 N.E.2d 242, ¶ 30.  We find that the language 
employed by the General Assembly in the R.C. 2925.01(P) and (BB) definitions 
establishes differing levels of culpability for offenses committed “in the vicinity 
of a juvenile” and “in the vicinity of a school,” plainly indicating that the General 
Assembly’s purpose was to impose strict liability for acts committed “in the 
vicinity of a juvenile” but not for acts committed “in the vicinity of a school.” 
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{¶41} Moreover, we find that the differing degrees of mental culpability 
for offenses committed near a school as opposed to near a juvenile are consistent 
with a coherent legislative policy. 
{¶42} The distance requirement for an act to be committed within “the 
vicinity of a juvenile” is only 100 feet or “within view of the juvenile.”  Drug 
trafficking is a dangerous activity.  Beyond the psychic danger of seeing drugs 
being sold, there is a very real physical danger surrounding a drug transaction, 
even for nonparticipants.  Thus, a child, whether in view or not, could become a 
part of the collateral damage of a failed transaction.  The threat to a child is real 
and imminent. 
{¶43} On the other hand, to be “in the vicinity of a school,” an offender 
could, by definition, be 1,000 feet away from a school.  A child may not 
necessarily be nearby, or even in the school.  The transaction could occur in the 
late evening hours, or in summer, or during any other period of the year that the 
school is closed. 
{¶44} The difference between the potential peril of a transaction that 
occurs “in the vicinity of a school” and “in the vicinity of a juvenile” is 
significant.  “In the vicinity of a school” addresses danger that can be theoretical; 
“in the vicinity of a juvenile” addresses a real, present danger.  Because the 
“vicinity of a juvenile” offense is so much more dangerous, the General Assembly 
has determined that the offender’s knowledge that a juvenile is nearby is 
irrelevant.  Also, since “in the vicinity of a juvenile” includes being in view of a 
juvenile, its parameters can expand well beyond 100 feet.  Thus, if an offense 
occurs within 1,000 feet of a school, the offender still can be subject to strict 
criminal liability if there is a juvenile within view.  As the danger to children 
becomes more real, the culpable mental state gets stricter. 
{¶45} Having determined that the General Assembly’s purpose was to 
impose differing culpable mental states for acts committed “in the vicinity of a 
January Term, 2004 
 
9 
juvenile” and “in the vicinity of a school,” we must determine what culpable 
mental state applies to offenses that occur “in the vicinity of a school.”  Since the 
definition of “in the vicinity of a school” includes no culpable mental state, we 
employ R.C. 2901.21(B) to provide the requisite culpability for the offense in 
question.  We therefore hold that the culpable mental state of recklessness applies 
to the offense of trafficking in LSD “in the vicinity of a school” under R.C. 
2925.03(C)(5)(b). 
{¶46} Although the court of appeals found that the requisite mental state 
is “knowingly,” and we conclude that recklessness is the appropriate standard, we 
nevertheless affirm.  A reviewing court is not authorized to reverse a correct 
judgment merely because it was reached for the wrong reason.  State ex rel. 
McGinty v. Cleveland City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 283, 
290, 690 N.E.2d 1273. 
{¶47} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Judgment affirmed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, HARSHA and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., dissents. 
 
O’CONNOR, J., dissents. 
 
WILLIAM H. HARSHA III, J., of the Fourth Appellate District, sitting for 
COOK, J. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J., dissenting. 
{¶48} Because I determine that R.C. 2925.03 imposes strict liability for 
trafficking in a controlled substance in the vicinity of schools, I respectfully 
dissent from the majority’s opinion. 
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{¶49} I agree with the majority that the issue before us demands analysis 
of discrete language and that “in the vicinity of a school” is, in fact, a discrete part 
of R.C. 2925.03.  I disagree, however, as to the applicability of R.C. 2901.21(B) 
and the relevance of the statutory language analyzed by the majority.  Further, by 
applying State v. Wac (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 84, 22 O.O.3d 299, 428 N.E.2d 428, 
and State v. Maxwell, 95 Ohio St.3d 254, 2002-Ohio-2121, 767 N.E.2d 242, I 
determine that R.C. 2925.03(C)(5)(b) imposes strict liability. 
{¶50} R.C. 2901.21(B) states: “When the section defining an offense 
does not specify any degree of culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to 
impose strict criminal liability for the conduct described in the section, then 
culpability is not required * * *.  When the section [defining an offense] neither 
specifies culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, 
recklessness is sufficient * * *.” 
{¶51} In Maxwell, we determined that R.C. 2907.321(A)(6) imposes 
strict liability for bringing obscene material into the state.  In reaching this 
conclusion, we noted the irrelevance of R.C. 2901.21(B) when a statutory section 
identifies a standard of culpability.  In part because R.C. 2907.321(A) specifies 
“knowledge” as the mens rea for the offense, we reasoned that R.C. 2901.21(B) 
cannot “operate to supply the mental element of recklessness to R.C. 
2907.321(A)(6).”  Maxwell at ¶ 22. 
{¶52} In light of Maxwell, R.C. 2901.21(B) cannot operate to supply the 
mental element of recklessness to R.C. 2925.03(C)(5)(b) because R.C. 2925.03 
includes a mental element in defining Lozier’s offense.  R.C. 2925.03(A) requires 
the mens rea of knowingly selling or offering to sell a controlled substance.  R.C. 
2925.03(C)(5)(b) then provides a sentencing enhancement “if the offense [of 
knowingly selling or offering to sell LSD] was committed in the vicinity of a 
school * * *.”  Although the statute’s enhancement provision does not specify a 
degree of culpability, the section defining Lozier’s offense does.  Thus, R.C. 
January Term, 2004 
 
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2925.03(A)’s knowledge requirement precludes imputing recklessness to R.C. 
2925.03(C)(5)(b) via R.C.2901.21(B).  See Maxwell at ¶ 21. 
{¶53} Having resolved that R.C. 2901.21(B) is inapplicable here, we still 
must determine the degree of culpability required for a sentencing enhancement 
under R.C. 2925.03(C)(5)(b).  In Wac, the statute in question stated that no person 
shall “[e]ngage in bookmaking, or knowingly engage in conduct that facilitates 
bookmaking.”  R.C. 2915.02(A)(1).  The defendant in Wac had wanted the 
knowledge requirement for engaging in conduct that facilitates bookmaking 
imputed to the discrete prohibition against engaging in bookmaking.  We 
reasoned that the exclusion of a mental element from the proscription against 
bookmaking juxtaposed with the inclusion of a mental element pertaining to 
facilitating bookmaking indicates the General Assembly’s intent to impose strict 
liability for the offense of bookmaking. 
{¶54} In Maxwell, we applied Wac in determining that R.C. 
2907.321(A)(6) imposes strict liability for bringing “into this state any obscene 
material that has a minor as one of its participants * * *.”  R.C. 2907.321(A) 
states that to be convicted of pandering obscenity involving a minor, the offender 
must have known the material to be obscene.  We held that the knowledge 
requirement applied to the offender’s understanding of the nature of the material 
but not to the act of bringing such material into the state because subsections (A) 
and (A)(6) are discrete from each other.  Following Wac, we decided that in light 
of subsection (A)’s knowledge requirement, the omission of a mental element 
from subsection (A)(6) subjects conduct under that provision to strict liability. 
{¶55} Both Wac and Maxwell stand for the propositions that a mental 
element cannot be imputed from one discrete clause to another and that the 
exclusion of a mental element from a discrete clause indicates the applicability of 
strict liability where the section defining the offense includes a mental element.  I 
would follow Wac and Maxwell and hold that the knowledge requirement of R.C. 
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2925.03(A) cannot be imputed to R.C. 2925.03(C)(5)(b), and that the exclusion of 
a mental element from R.C. 2925.03(C)(5)(b), in light of R.C. 2925.03(A)’s 
knowledge requirement, subjects the described conduct to strict liability. 
{¶56} Rather than following Wac and Maxwell, today’s majority errs by 
analyzing a definitional section that does not bear on the issue before us.  In Wac 
and Maxwell, we confined our analysis to the section that defines the offense, 
whereas today’s majority departs to a wholly other section.  The discrete language 
at issue here is found in R.C. 2925.03, the section that defines Lozier’s offense, 
not in the definitional section. 
{¶57} After choosing discrete provisions in an irrelevant section, the 
majority posits that the General Assembly has defined those provisions in a 
manner that imposes divergent degrees of culpability.  This position is wholly 
unfounded because, for the reason provided below, the recklessness standard of 
R.C. 2901.21(B) cannot apply to a definitional section such as R.C. 2925.01. 
{¶58} By its own terms, R.C. 2901.21(B) applies only to sections that 
define offenses.  R.C. 2925.01, the section to which the majority applies R.C. 
2901.21(B), does not define an offense; it simply defines terms used in R.C. 
Chapter 2925.  As a corollary, R.C. 2901.21(B) cannot apply to R.C. 2925.01, and 
the linchpin that supposedly connects recklessness to R.C. 2925.03(C)(5)(B) is 
dissolved. 
{¶59} I find further support for my position that R.C. 2925.03(C)(5)(b) 
describes a strict liability offense in United States v. Falu (C.A.2, 1985), 776 F.2d 
46, which resolved the same issue presented herein within the context of former 
Section 845(a), Title 21, U.S.Code, a federal statute that was analogous to R.C. 
2925.03.1  In Falu, the district court resolved that Section 845(a) imposed strict 
                                                          
 
1.  Section 845(a) has been somewhat revised and has been moved to Section 860(a), Title 21, 
U.S.Code.  It now provides: “Any person who violates section 841(a)(1) of this title * * *  by 
distributing * * * a controlled substance in or on, or within one thousand feet of, the real property 
January Term, 2004 
 
13 
liability.  Although I would not subjugate my independent judicial analysis to that 
of my learned colleagues on the federal bench, I recognize that the universal 
purpose of enhancing penalties for trafficking in drugs in the vicinity of schools is 
to protect children from the pariahs that are drug dealers.  Thus, the Falu court 
found, “[A] requirement that the dealer know that a sale is geographically within 
the prohibited area would undercut this unambiguous legislative design.”  Falu at 
50.  I wholeheartedly agree, and I believe that the same rationale applies to 
requiring recklessness. 
{¶60} For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
__________________ 
Robert D. Rinfret, Holmes County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jeffrey A. 
Mullen, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
J. Dean Carro, for appellee. 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, and 
Rebecca L. Thomas, Assistant Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio 
Attorney General. 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 
Assistant Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Public 
Defender. 
__________________ 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
comprising a public or private elementary, vocational, or secondary school * * * is * * * subject to 
(1) twice the maximum punishment authorized by section 841(b).”