Case Title: Lyon v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co.

Citation: 176 Kan. 411, 271 P.2d 291

Docket Number: 39,311

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1954-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
176 Kan. 411 (1954)
271 P.2d 291
OSCAR LYON and DALE LYON, Individually and as Partners doing business as SALINA COFFEE HOUSE, Appellants,
v.
KANSAS CITY FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee.
No. 39,311

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 12, 1954.
John I. Young, of Salina, argued the cause, and Horace A. Santry, of Salina, was with him on the briefs for the appellants.
John Q. Royce, of Salina, argued the cause, and LaRue Royce, E.S. Hampton, H.H. Dunham, Jr., H.G. Engleman, and C. Stanley Nelson, all of Salina, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WEDELL, J.:
Plaintiffs, Oscar Lyon and Dale Lyon, doing business as the Salina Coffee House, instituted an action on an insurance *412 policy to recover for the loss of an automobile on the theory it was lost by theft. Judgment was for the defendant insurer and plaintiffs appeal.
In view of this court's conclusions it is deemed unnecessary to narrate the testimony of the various witnesses. The district court made conclusions of fact and law, including pertinent terms of the policy. Exclusive of terms of the policy the pertinent facts as found are:
The court, in substance, concluded: Proof of loss as required by the policy was a condition precedent to the right of recovery; appellants did not make proof of loss; there was no intention on the part of appellee to deny liability and there was no such denial within the time provided for filing proof of loss; appellee did not waive proof of loss and this was not the type of loss contemplated by the terms of the policy but was excluded thereby.
Other conclusions of law relative to who presently had title to the car and whether appellants were barred from recovery by reason of abandoning the car after locating it in Massachusetts need not, in our opinion, be considered.
Appellants assert the first question is whether the policy covers the loss as a theft or larceny under the facts of this case. Appellants argue it does and rely on Motor Co. v. Insurance Co., 111 Kan. 225, 207 Pac. 205, in which it was held,
and on later cases to the same effect.
Appellants assert the other question is whether appellee waived the terms of the policy which required sworn proof of loss within sixty days. Those undoubtedly were the two principal questions involved in the trial and the court ruled thereon.
Assuming, without deciding, the cases relied on by appellants are determinative of insurance liability in a case of loss occasioned entirely by misrepresentations and fraud for the reason they constitute a species of theft, larceny, robbery or pilferage, we find other elements involved here among which is appellants' participation in an unlawful act by the acceptance of a check for the car with knowledge the maker did not have the funds in the bank at the time the check was delivered. There is also the further question whether appellants abandoned the car in Massachusetts and, if so, what the legal effect of abandonment was upon their right of recovery on the policy. Some other legal questions intrude.
However, further assuming appellee's liability under all these circumstances insofar as the policy coverage is concerned, appellants nevertheless are confronted with the duty to make proof of loss as a condition precedent to recovery. We, therefore, shall direct our initial attention to that question.
It is conceded the required proof of loss was not made. Appellants argue such proof was waived by appellee and it is estopped to claim otherwise. The correctness of that contention depends upon the facts by which this court is bound on appellate review and not on whether there is evidence to support appellants' contention.
In order to establish the waiver of a legal right there must be a clear, unequivocal and decisive act of the party showing such a purpose or acts amounting to an estoppel on his part. (Green v. Insurance Co., 106 Kan. 90, 92-93, 186 Pac. 970; Cure v. Insurance Co., 109 Kan. 259, 261-262, 198 Pac. 940; Leach v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 124 Kan. 584, 589, 261 Pac. 603; Musgrave v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 124 Kan. 804, 808, 262 Pac. 571; Brown v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 166 Kan. 616, 623, 203 P.2d 150.)
It is the trier of the facts, in this case the court since a jury was *415 waived, who was required to be convinced appellee waived proof of loss. Proof of loss is a condition precedent to recovery under the terms of the policy. The burden of proving waiver of proof of loss was on appellants, the parties asserting it. (Brown v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra, p. 622; Brown v. Great American Ins. Co., 170 Kan. 281, 224 P.2d 989.)
Upon the entire record consisting of oral and written testimony the court concluded appellants did not establish waiver of proof of loss and that appellee was not estopped to deny liability by reason of failure to make the required proof. There was ample testimony from which the court properly could conclude appellants did not claim and did not believe appellee was liable under the policy and so advised appellee's local agent. In fact there was no contrary evidence. Thereafter the local agent notified appellee of appellants' position and that appellants desired only to obtain appellee's assistance in locating the party who had obtained possession of the car. As previously stated, no proof of loss had been filed and no liability of appellee had been claimed by appellants. In view of those circumstances the main office of appellee advised its local agent that it could not obtain the assistance of the National Bureau, an investigating agency, to assist in apprehending the culprit.
That information was conveyed to appellants by the local agent. It was not until many months after the loss that appellee learned for the first time appellants believed the loss was covered by the policy. It was then that the company first denied liability. We have not overlooked giving careful attention to testimony cited by appellants. The trial court did not interpret such testimony as appellants do or did not place great weight thereon or it may have disbelieved it entirely. A court, as a jury, may disbelieve testimony which it deems unworthy of belief although there is no contrary testimony. (Kallail v. Solomon, 146 Kan. 599, 72 P.2d 966; Duran v. Mission Mortuary, 174 Kan. 565, 258 P.2d 241.) Conflict on material portions of the testimony was resolved against appellants. That was the court's privilege. There was substantial testimony from which the court could, and did, find appellee did not intend to, and did not, deny liability until long after the time for making proof of loss had expired and that it did not otherwise waive proof of loss. The findings made by the court, in preference to those requested by appellants, support the conclusions of law. Under these circumstances the judgment must be affirmed. It is so ordered.