Case Title: Koprivec v. Rails-to-Trails of Wayne County

Citation: 2018-Ohio-465

Docket Number: 2016-0704

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2018-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Koprivec v. Rails-to-Trails of Wayne Cty., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-465.] 
 
*Reporter’s Note: This cause was decided on January 24, 2018, but was released to the public on 
February 7, 2018, subsequent to the resignation of Justice William M. O’Neill, who participated in 
the decision. 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-465 
KOPRIVEC ET AL., APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS, v. RAILS-TO-TRAILS 
OF WAYNE COUNTY, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Koprivec v. Rails-to-Trails of Wayne Cty., Slip Opinion No. 
2018-Ohio-465.] 
Real property—Deeds—Adverse possession—Court of appeals’ determination that 
1882 deed created a fee simple absolute affirmed—In re Petition of Copps 
Chapel Methodist Episcopal Church disapproved to extent it suggested that 
a deed can create a determinable fee only by including language explicitly 
saying that property would revert to grantor upon occurrence of stated 
event—A title holder’s licensee may defeat exclusivity element of an 
adverse-possession claim if licensee performs acts on the land that would 
ordinarily require owner’s permission—Licenses granted by railroad 
company that previously owned abandoned rail corridor to two 
telecommunications companies and associated corridor-maintenance 
activities failed to defeat exclusivity element of adverse-possession claims 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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of neighboring landowners—Railroad companies’ activities on corridor 
were insufficient to defeat exclusivity element of two adverse-possession 
claims but sufficient as to third—Court of appeals’ determination that 
genuine issues of material fact exist and preclude summary judgment as to 
two adverse-possession claims affirmed, and cause remanded—Court of 
appeals’ determination that genuine issues of material fact exist and 
preclude summary judgment as to third adverse-possession claim reversed. 
(No. 2016-0704—Submitted May 16, 2017—Decided January 24, 2018.*) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Wayne County, 
No. 15AP0006, 2016-Ohio-1141. 
_________________ 
 
DEWINE, J. 
{¶ 1} This case involves a dispute about ownership of an abandoned rail 
corridor.  It pits a nonprofit organization, Rails-to-Trails of Wayne County (“Rails-
to-Trails”), which seeks to develop the corridor into a bike trail, against three 
landowners, who claim ownership of the sections of the corridor adjacent to their 
properties.  We have before us issues of deed construction and adverse possession. 
{¶ 2} The first issue involves construction of an 1882 deed by which part of 
the corridor was conveyed to a railroad company.  Two of the landowners contend 
that the deed created a fee simple determinable and that when the property stopped 
being used for railroad purposes, it reverted to them as successors of the original 
grantors.  Relying on an oft-criticized decision of this court, In re Petition of Copps 
Chapel Methodist Episcopal Church, 120 Ohio St. 309, 166 N.E. 218 (1929), the 
court of appeals held that the deed did not create a fee simple determinable because 
it did not contain reverter language.  We decline to rely on Copps Chapel, but based 
on the plain language within the four corners of the deed, we nonetheless affirm the 
decision below that the deed created a fee simple absolute. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 3} The second set of issues involves the court of appeals’ determination 
that there exist genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment in 
favor of Rails-to-Trails on the three landowners’ adverse-possession claims.  To 
prove adverse possession, claimants must show that they had open, notorious, and 
exclusive possession for 21 years.  Grace v. Koch, 81 Ohio St.3d 577, 692 N.E.2d 
1009 (1998), syllabus.  Our focus here, as it was in the courts below, is on the 
exclusivity of the landowners’ possession.  We are asked to determine whether 
licenses that the railroad company that previously owned the corridor granted to 
two telecommunications companies for fiber-optic cables, and associated corridor-
maintenance activities by the companies, are sufficient to defeat the landowners’ 
claims that for 21 years, they exclusively possessed the land.  We hold that the 
licenses alone fail to demonstrate that the landowners’ possession was not 
exclusive.  We further hold that while activities undertaken on the corridor pursuant 
to licenses could be sufficient to interrupt exclusivity, here genuine issues of 
material fact about the activities preclude summary judgment. 
{¶ 4} We also must determine whether activities undertaken by the railroad 
company were sufficient to negate the exclusivity element of the landowners’ 
adverse-possession claims.  We hold that for two of the three landowners issues of 
fact exist that preclude summary judgment in favor of Rails-to-Trails but not for 
the third.  So we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in part and reverse it 
in part. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
{¶ 5} In 2009, Rails-to-Trails purchased an old railroad corridor with the 
intention of converting the land into a public multipurpose trail.  Three owners of 
adjacent properties challenge Rails-to-Trails’ ownership of parts of the corridor.  
They are the Koprivecs, the Bilinoviches, and the Koontzes (collectively, “the 
landowners”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 6} In 2011, the landowners filed suit to establish their ownership of the 
sections of the corridor next to their respective properties.  All three landowners 
asserted that they had adversely possessed those sections of the corridor.  As the 
case developed, the Koontzes and the Bilinoviches also claimed that under an 1882 
deed, the sections of the corridor adjacent to their properties reverted to them when 
the corridor stopped being used as a railroad. 
A.  The 1882 Deed 
{¶ 7} The Bilinoviches and the Koontzes trace ownership of the sections of 
the corridor next to their properties back to an 1882 conveyance to the Akron 
Branch Rail Road Company.  The deed granted the property to the railroad 
company “and to its assigns forever.”  In its habendum clause, the deed provided 
that the grant was “forever for the purpose of constructing and using thereon a Rail 
Road.”  The Bilinoviches and the Koontzes construe the deed as creating a fee 
simple determinable.  In other words, they argue, when the land stopped being used 
as a railroad, the sections adjacent to the properties they now own reverted back to 
them as the successors-in-interest of the original grantors. 
B.  The Adverse-Possession Claims 
{¶ 8} All three landowners assert that they adversely possessed their 
portions of the rail corridor.  While there is some question about when the 21-year 
period began to run—the landowners maintain that the period commenced in 1987 
when, they claim, the corridor’s then owner, Consolidated Rail Corporation 
(“Conrail”), completed removal of its rails and wooden ties from the corridor; 
Rails-to-Trails counters that removal of the rails and ties from the property was not 
completed until 1989—the question here is whether the landowners can prove 
exclusive possession. 
{¶ 9} Rails-to-Trails denies that the landowners had exclusive possession 
of their portions of the corridor.  It points to the license agreements between Conrail 
and the telecommunications companies and to various maintenance activities 
January Term, 2018 
 
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undertaken pursuant to those licenses by employees of the telecommunications 
companies on the corridor after 1987.  Rails-to-Trails also claims that railroad-
company employees walked along the corridor and did work to maintain the 
corridor after 1987. 
C.  The Proceedings Below 
{¶ 10} In response to the landowners’ lawsuit, Rails-to-Trails filed 
counterclaims seeking to establish its own claim of title.  On cross-motions for 
summary judgment, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Rails-to-
Trails on all the landowners’ claims and on Rails-to-Trails’ declaratory-judgment 
and quiet-title claims. 
{¶ 11} The trial court found that under Copps Chapel, the 1882 deed did 
not create a determinable fee because it did not contain reversionary language; that 
is, it did not explicitly say that the property would revert to the grantors when it 
ceased being used as a railroad.  As for the adverse-possession claims, the trial court 
found that the landowners could not meet the exclusivity element because their 
possession had been interrupted by (1) the license agreements with the 
telecommunications companies, (2) the activities of the telecommunications 
companies on the land, and (3) the inspection of the corridor by a railroad-company 
employee. 
{¶ 12} The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in 
part.  The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the deed issue raised by the 
Bilinoviches and the Koontzes.  Relying on Copps Chapel, the court held that the 
1882 deed created a fee simple absolute because the deed did not contain a 
provision stating that the land would revert to the grantors if it was no longer used 
for railroad purposes.  2016-Ohio-1141, 61 N.E.3d 676, ¶ 38 (lead opinion). 
{¶ 13} The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s summary judgment in 
favor of Rails-to-Trails on the adverse-possession claims.  The appellate court held 
that the license agreements and the activities of the telecommunications companies 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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conducted pursuant to those agreements were insufficient as a matter of law to 
defeat the exclusivity element of the landowners’ adverse-possession claims. Id. at 
¶ 15 (lead opinion).  The court further determined that there were genuine issues of 
material fact about the activities of the railroad-company employee that made 
summary judgment inappropriate.  Id. at ¶ 17 (lead opinion).1 
{¶ 14} We accepted Rails-to-Trails’ discretionary appeal challenging the 
reversal of the trial court’s summary judgment on the adverse-possession issues.  
We also accepted jurisdiction over the cross-appeal of the Bilinoviches and the 
Koontzes challenging the court of appeals’ decision on the deed issue. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 15} First, we consider the deed-construction issue raised by the 
Bilinoviches and the Koontzes in the cross-appeal.  Second, we consider the 
adverse-possession issues raised in Rails-to-Trails’ appeal. 
A.  The Deed Issue 
{¶ 16} In rejecting the Bilinoviches’ and the Koontzes’ argument that the 
corridor sections adjacent to their properties reverted to them when the corridor 
stopped being used as a railroad, the court of appeals relied on the Copps Chapel 
decision.  Thus, we must start with a discussion of that case. 
1.  The Copps Chapel Decision 
{¶ 17} In Copps Chapel, this court considered a deed conveying property 
to a church.  The habendum clause contained the phrase, “To have and to hold  
* * * unto the said grantees and their successors * * * so long as said lot is held and 
used for church purposes.”  120 Ohio St. at 311, 166 N.E. 218.  Under longstanding 
                                                          
 
1 Two opinions were issued at the court of appeals—the lead opinion and an opinion concurring in 
judgment only—and the third judge concurred in judgment only without opinion.  The judge who 
authored the opinion concurring in judgment only agreed “with the majority’s disposition of the 
case” but wrote separately to clarify why she believed the telecommunications companies’ activities 
did not defeat the adverse-possession claims.  2016-Ohio-1141, 61 N.E.3d 676, at ¶ 42 (Hensal, P.J., 
concurring). 
January Term, 2018 
 
7
principles of deed interpretation, such language—“so long as”—had been 
understood to create a fee simple determinable; that is, if the property ceased to be 
“held and used for church purposes,” it would revert to the grantor.  But in Copps 
Chapel, the court held that “without any provision for forfeiture or reversion, such 
statement is not a condition or limitation of the grant.”  Id. at syllabus.  Thus, Copps 
Chapel seemed to announce a rule that the only way that a determinable fee could 
be created was by including language explicitly saying that the property would 
revert to the grantor upon the occurrence of a stated event. 
{¶ 18} The court of appeals below held that the 1882 deed in this case did 
not create a fee simple determinable because “[l]ike the deed[] in Copps Chapel,” 
it “does not contain a provision stating that upon the grantee’s failure to use the 
corridor for railroad purposes, ownership of the corridor reverts to the grantor.”  
2016-Ohio-1141, 61 N.E.3d 676, at ¶ 38 (lead opinion).  The court concluded that 
the “lack of this provision is critical and it precludes both the Bilinoviches and the 
Koontzes from claiming a possibility of reverter in the portions of the railroad 
corridor abutting their properties.”  Id. 
{¶ 19} In relying on Copps Chapel, the court of appeals alluded to its 
questionable underpinnings: the court cited an opinion from the Tenth District 
Court of Appeals “noting that ‘[w]hile the decision in Copps Chapel has been 
frequently criticized by scholars, it is still the rule of law of Ohio.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 36 
(lead opinion), quoting Kauble v. Cooley, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 86AP-822, 1988 
WL 4673, *1 (Jan. 19, 1988).  The court of appeals’ reliance on Copps Chapel is 
understandable.  Before today, we had not explicitly addressed the continuing 
import of the case.  But as we explain, going forward, there is no longer reason to 
rely on Copps Chapel. 
{¶ 20} Copps Chapel made Ohio an outlier.  Critics “were quick to point 
out that the * * * court failed to recognize that under orthodox doctrines the church 
had only a determinable fee, and that upon abandonment of the use for church 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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purposes a possibility of reverter reserved by implication in the grantor became 
possessory.”  Lynn and Ramser, Applying the Rule Against Perpetuities to 
Functional Equivalents: Copps Chapel and the Woburn Church Revisited, 43 Iowa 
L.Rev. 36, 37 (1957).  Indeed, “the phrase so long or as long as ha[d] been 
recognized as sufficient” to create a determinable interest “since before the days of 
[the 16th-century legal commentator Edmund] Plowden.”  (Italics sic.)  O’Meara, 
Determinable Fees, 3 U.Cin.L.Rev. 491, 493 (1929); see also Recent Case Notes, 
39 Yale L.J. 123, 135 (1929).  The dean of the Ohio State University College of 
Law was said to have scoffed: “[T]he decision did two things.  It decided the case 
before it and it introduced a mischief into the land law of Ohio which will plague 
the bench and bar for years.”  Clark v. Smith, 89 Ohio Law Abs. 229, 243, 184 
N.E.2d 695 (C.P.1962).  Copps Chapel was described as “unique in the 
misconception of the defeasible fee exhibited by court and counsel.”  Agnor, 
Defeasible Fees 282 (1955). 
2.  Moving Away from Copps Chapel 
{¶ 21} In the years since Copps Chapel, our jurisprudence has moved in a 
different direction.  Soon after the case was decided, lower courts began to limit its 
reach.  Most frequently, courts have distinguished Copps Chapel based on a fact 
not relied on in the decision—that the “so long as” language appeared in the 
habendum clause of the deed rather than its granting clause.  Thus, when limiting 
language is found in the granting clause of a deed, Ohio courts have found that a 
fee simple determinable was created even without the express reservation of a 
reversionary interest.  See, e.g., Schurch v. Harraman, 47 Ohio App. 383, 389, 191 
N.E. 907 (3d Dist.1933); Walker v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 73 Ohio App.3d 
617, 624, 598 N.E.2d 101 (6th Dist.1991).  Courts have used other ways to get 
around Copps Chapel as well.  For example, in one case, a court found the words 
“so long as the same shall be occupied as a site for a school house and no longer” 
enough to create a determinable fee, even without explicit reversionary language.  
January Term, 2018 
 
9
Lebanon Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hollingsworth, 56 Ohio App. 95, 97, 
10 N.E.2d 25 (1st Dist.1936). 
{¶ 22} This court has not mentioned Copps Chapel in an opinion in over 
half a century.  See Ohio Soc. for Crippled Children & Adults v. McElroy, 175 Ohio 
St. 49, 54, 191 N.E.2d 543 (1963).  While lower courts have taken bites out of its 
holding, our opportunities to overrule the decision or further distance ourselves 
from it have been few and far between.  Nonetheless, a careful reading of our 
caselaw of the past seven decades makes clear that the principles of deed 
construction that we have developed in that time make continued reliance on Copps 
Chapel inappropriate. 
{¶ 23} The animating principle in our deed jurisprudence has been to look 
to the language of the four corners of the deed and to construe the deed based on its 
plain terms.  Thus, in Hinman v. Barnes, 146 Ohio St. 497, 66 N.E.2d 911 (1946), 
we announced our adherence to the “ ‘modern and prevalent rule for determining 
the estate conveyed by a deed,’ which rule is ‘that if the intention of the parties is 
apparent from an examination of the deed “from its four corners,” it will be given 
effect regardless of technical rules of construction.’ ”  Id. at 508, quoting Sherman 
v. Petroleum Exploration, 280 Ky. 105, 110, 132 S.W.2d 768 (1939).  The court 
did not overrule Copps Chapel in Hinman, but it did attempt to place it within its 
framework of construing a deed based on the plain language of the four corners of 
the deed.  The court noted that “the real basis” for the Copps Chapel decision was 
that in “ ‘taking the deed by its four corners, it shows that the grantor intended to 
convey, and did convey, to the grantees all of his estate in the land.’ ”  Hinman at 
507-508, quoting Copps Chapel, 120 Ohio St. at 315, 166 N.E. 218.  One can 
certainly question whether the four corners of the deed in Copps Chapel showed 
any such thing, but Hinman nonetheless stands for the principle that it is the plain 
language of the deed that matters. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 24} In the years since Hinman, we have followed its core holding and 
looked first to the plain language of the deed to determine questions of 
interpretation.  See Jolliff v. Hardin Cable Television Co., 26 Ohio St.2d 103, 106, 
269 N.E.2d 588 (1971); Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 106, 
2006-Ohio-954, 846 N.E.2d 478, ¶ 58.  Lower courts in Ohio have followed suit.  
See, e.g., Cartwright v. Allen, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2011-10-025, 2012-Ohio-
3631, ¶ 12; Snyder v. Monroe Twp. Trustees, 110 Ohio App.3d 443, 448, 674 
N.E.2d 741 (2d Dist.1996). 
{¶ 25} Copps Chapel runs contrary to this central tenet: that courts should 
give effect to the intention of the grantor as expressed within the four corners of the 
deed.  Presumably, when a grantor conveys a property to another “for so long as it 
is used for X,” she means exactly that—that she intends for the property to be held 
by the grantee for so long as it is used for X.  When the property stops being used 
for X, it reverts to the grantor.  That would have been the result at common law, 
and that is the result that one gets from the “modern” rule set forth in Hinman.  But 
Copps Chapel says something different—it is not the grantor’s intention as 
evidenced by the four corners of the deed that matters but, rather, whether there 
was an explicit reservation of a right of reverter. 
{¶ 26} Imagine a nature lover who conveys the idyllic woodland adjacent 
to his house to a municipality for “so long as the property is used for park purposes.”  
If the town decides to convert the woods into a municipal dump, the follow-the-
grantor’s-intention principle would mandate that the property be returned to the 
grantor.  But the rule in Copps Chapel says that absent reverter language, we must 
disregard the grantor’s intent and the plain language of the deed.  To put it another 
way, the rule in Copps Chapel is incompatible with our caselaw that says look to 
the plain language of the deed so as to honor the grantor’s intent. 
{¶ 27} It is true that for the last 90 years or so, astute conveyors of real estate 
would have been aware of Copps Chapel and been able to include appropriate 
January Term, 2018 
 
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reversionary language.  But as this case demonstrates, from time to time, issues still 
arise from deeds that predate Copps Chapel.  Moreover, even for deeds drafted 
since Copps Chapel, it would seem only fair that we honor the intent of the grantor. 
{¶ 28} Thus, while we realize that Copps Chapel has survived almost 90 
years without being explicitly overturned, we conclude that its underpinnings, our 
subsequent caselaw, its diminishment by Ohio courts, and its unnecessariness in 
determining the intent of the parties to a deed make it an unsuitable precedent on 
which to decide the issue before us.  Thus, we will analyze the deed-construction 
issue in front of us without reliance on Copps Chapel. 
3.  The Four Corners of the Deed Evince an Intent to Convey a Fee Simple 
Absolute 
{¶ 29} The first rule of deed construction in Ohio is that when the parties’ 
intentions are clear from the four corners of the deed, we will give effect to that 
intention.  Hinman, 146 Ohio St. at 508-509, 66 N.E.2d 911; accord 9 Thompson 
on Real Property, Section 82.13, at 722-723 (Thomas Ed.2017).  Here, both the 
granting clause—“[t]he words that transfer an interest in a deed,” Black’s Law 
Dictionary 816 (10th Ed.2014)—and the habendum clause—“the part of a * * * 
deed * * * that defines the extent of the interest being granted and any conditions 
affecting the grant,” id. at 825—convey the property to the railroad company 
without limitation.  The granting clause provides that the grantors “freely Grant 
bargain sell and convey unto the said Akron Branch of the Cleveland and Pittsburgh 
Rail Road Company and to its assigns forever” the property in question.  The 
habendum clause again represents that the grant is “forever”: 
 
To Have and to Hold said premises unto the said Akron Branch of 
the Cleveland and Pittsburgh Rail Road Company and to its assigns 
forever for the purpose of constructing and using thereon a Rail 
Road and other works connected therewith under and by virtue of 
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the several acts of the Legislature of the state of Ohio incorporating 
and regulating said Akron Branch Rail Road Company. 
 
The “forever” language is a strong indication of an intent to convey a fee simple 
absolute; in a fee-simple conveyance to a corporation, the words “heirs” or 
“successors” are not necessary, 1 Tiffany, Law of Real Property, Section 29, at 41 
(3d Ed.1939).  “An estate in fee simple absolute is created in a corporation * * * by 
an otherwise effective conveyance * * * of land without the use of words of 
succession, unless an intent is expressed in the conveyance to create an estate other 
than an estate in fee simple absolute.”  Restatement of the Law 1st, Property, 
Section 34, at 96 (1936). 
{¶ 30} Despite the unequivocal conveyance to the railroad company and its 
assigns forever, the Bilinoviches and the Koontzes argue that the deed created only 
a fee simple determinable.  They base this argument on the fact that the habendum 
clause states that the conveyance is “for the purpose of constructing and using 
thereon a Rail Road.” 
{¶ 31} “A ‘determinable fee’ has been defined as a fee-simple estate to a 
person and his heirs, with a qualification annexed providing that it must terminate 
whenever the qualification is at an end.”  2 Thompson on Real Property, Section 
20.02, at 107.  The estate ends automatically upon the happening of the 
contingency, without any further act of the grantor or the grantor’s heirs.  Id. at 108.  
To create such an estate, deeds use words such as “until,” “during,” “so long as,” 
and the like.  Id. at 145. 
{¶ 32} Here, the conveyance does not contain any language that limits the 
conveyance, no words that suggest termination.  True, the habendum clause says 
“for the purpose of constructing and using thereon a Rail Road.”  But by its plain 
terms, this kind of language simply describes the reason for the conveyance.  See, 
e.g., Ohio Soc. for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc., 175 Ohio St. at 51, 191 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2018 
 
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543.  Significantly, the language does not condition the railroad company’s right to 
hold the estate on its use as a railroad.  “Unless a conditional estate is created by 
the express language of a deed or will, the grantor or testator will be conclusively 
presumed to have intended a fee simple.”  2 Thompson on Real Property, Section 
17.07, at 398. 
{¶ 33} The Bilinoviches and the Koontzes argue that the 1882 deed’s 
inclusion of the phrase “under and by virtue of the several acts of the Legislature 
of the state of Ohio incorporating and regulating said Akron Branch Rail Road 
Company” limits the extent of the interest granted and incorporates language from 
the 1835 act passed by the General Assembly to incorporate the Akron Branch Rail 
Road Company.  The language that they claim the deed incorporates is found in 
Section 3 of the 1835 act, which sets forth laws regarding railroad operation: “[The 
Akron Branch Rail Road Company] shall be capable in law of purchasing, holding, 
selling, leasing and conveying estates, real personal and mixed, so far as the same 
shall be necessary for the purposes hereinafter mentioned, and no further.”  34 Ohio 
Laws 576, 577. 
{¶ 34} Although the 1882 deed does reference “the several acts of the 
Legislature of the state of Ohio incorporating and regulating said Akron Branch 
Rail Road Company,” that language appears in the “for the purpose of” section of 
the habendum clause.  Read in the context of the entire habendum clause, the 
“several acts” language does not function to incorporate the language of those acts 
but, rather, indicates that the property has been transferred for the purpose of 
constructing and maintaining both a railroad and other facilities that Ohio law 
allows to be operated in connection with the railroad.  Furthermore, and most 
significantly, no language from any act of the legislature appears within the four 
corners of the deed. 
{¶ 35} Thus, within the four corners of the deed, the parties made clear their 
intention to create a fee simple absolute.  We therefore affirm the portion of the 
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Ninth District’s judgment affirming the trial court’s denial of the Bilinoviches’ and 
the Koontzes’ motion for summary judgment on Rails-to-Trails’ counterclaims. 
B.  The Adverse-Possession Issues 
{¶ 36} Rails-to-Trails argues that the landowners all failed to exclusively 
possess their claimed individual sections of the abandoned railroad corridor.  It 
contends that the court of appeals was wrong in concluding as a matter of law that 
the licenses held by the telecommunications companies and their associated 
activities could not defeat the exclusivity of the landowners’ possession.  It 
maintains further that the court of appeals erred in concluding that there are 
questions of fact as to whether activities taken by railroad-company employees 
interrupted the landowners’ exclusive possession. 
{¶ 37} Because the landowners assert separate claims to the sections of the 
abandoned railroad corridor abutting their own properties, we must consider each 
claim of exclusive possession individually.  We conclude that genuine issues of 
material fact remain regarding whether the activities of the telecommunications 
companies interrupted the exclusivity of the landowners’ possession.  But we 
conclude that undisputed acts of a railroad-company employee were sufficient to 
interrupt the exclusive possession of the owners of one of the adjacent properties—
the Bilinoviches. 
1.  The Requirement of Exclusive Possession 
{¶ 38} The trial court’s summary judgment was based on the exclusivity 
element of the landowners’ adverse-possession claims, and both propositions of 
law raised by Rails-to-Trail focus on this element.  “Adverse possession in law 
means exclusive possession, where some one else is excluded who claims the right 
to possess.” Herrick v. Cleveland, 4 Ohio C.D. 684, 7 Ohio C.C. 470, 481-482 
(1893). 
{¶ 39} The general rule is that “exclusive possession can be shown by acts 
that would ordinarily be exercised by an owner in appropriating land to the owner’s 
January Term, 2018 
 
15 
own use and to the exclusion of others.”  16 Powell on Real Property, Section 91.06 
(2017).  “[T]he possessor must use and occupy the land as his own and ‘exclude all 
others from similar rights.’ ” Richardson v. Blersch, 5th Dist. Hamilton No.  
C-930042, *3 (Apr. 6, 1994), quoting Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Donovan, 111 Ohio 
St. 341, 351, 145 N.E. 479 (1924).  Thus, to satisfy the exclusivity requirement, 
“the claimant’s possession need not be absolutely exclusive; it need only be a type 
of possession that would characterize an owner’s use.”  16 Powell on Real Property, 
Section 91.06. 
2.  Activities of the Telecommunications Companies 
{¶ 40} The Ninth District concluded that Conrail’s license agreements with 
the telecommunications companies and the activities of the companies under the 
agreements were insufficient “as a matter of law” to defeat the landowners’ 
adverse-possession claims.  In analyzing Rails-to-Trails’ challenge to this 
conclusion, we start with the settled proposition that the adverse possessor’s 
possession must be exclusive not only of the true owner but also “third persons 
entering the land * * * claiming to have permission to be on the premises from the 
true title holder.”  2016-Ohio-1141, 61 N.E.3d 676, at ¶ 12 (lead opinion); accord 
Walls v. Billingsley, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-92-100, 1993 WL 135808, *2 (Apr. 28, 
1993), citing 4 Tiffany, Law of Real Property, Section 1141, at 736 (3d Ed.1975); 
Reagan v. Sturges, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2016-P-0001, 2016-Ohio-8226, ¶ 15, 
citing Walls at *2; Welch v. Marlow, 5th Dist. Morgan No. 08 CA 8, 2009-Ohio-
6145, ¶ 28, citing Walls at *2.  A licensee fits squarely within this classification of 
third persons.  By definition, a licensee is “a person who enters the premises of 
another by permission or acquiescence.”  Light v. Ohio Univ., 28 Ohio St.3d 66, 68, 
502 N.E.2d 611 (1986); see also Black’s Law Dictionary at 1061 (defining 
“licensee” as “[s]omeone who has permission to enter or use another’s premises”).  
Thus, we have little difficulty concluding that a licensee of an owner may defeat 
the exclusivity of an adverse possessor’s claim if the licensee performs actions on 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
the land that are inconsistent with the claimant’s exclusive possession.  The court 
of appeals erred in holding otherwise. 
{¶ 41} That is not to say that a license—without more—is sufficient to 
defeat an adverse-possession claim.  The mere existence of a license (or an 
underground utility that exists pursuant to a license) does not by itself interfere with 
the exclusivity of the adverse possessor’s control of the land.  And while caselaw 
on the topic is limited, other jurisdictions have held that the existence of a license 
or easement for utilities on the land does not by itself interrupt the exclusivity of a 
claimant’s adverse possession.  For instance, in Jacobs v. Bay Dev. Co., Mich.App. 
Nos. 183964 and 183965, 1997 WL 33350554, *2-3 (Apr. 15, 1997), the court held 
that a railroad company’s license to a power company to erect and maintain a pole 
line along an abandoned right-of-way did not affect the exclusivity of the claimants’ 
possession.  Similarly, in Rieddle v. Buckner, 629 N.E.2d 860, 862 (Ind.App.1994), 
the presence of a utility easement did not defeat an adverse-possession claim. 
{¶ 42} Although a license in and of itself is insufficient to interrupt a 
claimant’s possession, the claimant’s possession must be exclusive as to a person 
on the property with the permission of the title holder.  If a licensee is on the 
property of the title holder performing acts that would ordinarily require the 
permission of the owner, the exclusivity of the adverse-possession claimant would 
be interrupted.  This is consistent with the overriding idea behind exclusivity—that 
claimants “must show that their possession of the [property] was the kind of 
possession that would characterize an owner’s use,” Schoeller v. Kulawiak, 118 
Or.App. 524, 528, 848 P.2d 619 (1993).  The presence on the land claimed by the 
adverse possessor of someone performing activities with the permission of the title 
holder belies the kind of possession that would characterize an owner’s use. 
{¶ 43} Having established that the activities of a licensee pursuant to its 
license may interrupt the exclusive possession of an adverse-possession claimant, 
January Term, 2018 
 
17 
we analyze below the particular activities of the telecommunications companies in 
relation to the exclusivity of the landowners’ possession. 
a.  The licensees’ activities on the Bilinovich section 
{¶ 44} Rails-to-Trails argues that the activities of Conrail’s licensees as a 
matter of law interrupted the exclusivity of the Bilinoviches’ possession and points 
to a number of interactions between Brian Bilinovich and the telecommunications 
companies.  Bilinovich testified that on two occasions, employees of the 
telecommunications companies came onto the railroad corridor at his request to 
mark the location of the utility lines so that he could do work on the Bilinoviches’ 
property.  Bilinovich also testified that he gave an employee of one of the 
telecommunications companies permission to enter the section of the corridor 
adjacent to the Bilinoviches’ property in order to trim trees. 
{¶ 45} A claim of exclusive possession is not defeated by one who uses the 
land with the permission of the adverse-possession claimant and without “asserting, 
by word or act, any right of ownership or possession.”  4 Tiffany, Law of Real 
Property, Section 1141, at 736 (3d Ed.1975).  Thus, if Bilinovich’s testimony is 
credited, none of the aforementioned activities of the telecommunications 
companies interrupted his exclusive possession because they were all done with his 
permission and without any assertion of ownership by the companies. 
{¶ 46} In addition to the interactions between the licensees and Bilinovich, 
Rails-to-Trails asserts that a large right-of-way clearing project by one of the 
telecommunications companies in 2007 interrupted the Bilinoviches’ exclusive 
possession.  The right-of-way clearing project purportedly encompassed the entire 
eight-mile length of the abandoned rail corridor.  This maintenance project that 
affected the railroad company’s real estate and not just the licensees’ license was 
the type of possessory activity that one would expect to be taken by an owner or 
someone acting with the owner’s permission.  Here, however, there is an issue of 
fact whether the clearing activity occurred on the Bilinovich section.  In an 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
affidavit, Bilinovich stated that he did not see anyone performing clearing activity 
on the section and did not see any indication that such clearing had been performed.  
He also averred to keeping the corridor free from brush himself after 1996.  The 
project manager of the company hired to perform the clearing testified that if the 
right-of-way was already clear, his crew would continue on to the next obstructed 
point along the corridor.  If Bilinovich had already cleared his section of the 
corridor, then, the clearing project would have skipped that section. 
{¶ 47} Thus, we conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact as 
to whether the activities of the telecommunications companies interfered with the 
Bilinoviches’ exclusive possession. 
b.  The licensees’ activity on the Koontz and Koprivec sections 
{¶ 48} Rails-to-Trails relies on the 2007 clearing project to defeat the 
Koontzes’ and the Koprivecs’ claims of exclusive possession.  Joseph Koontz and 
Don Koprivec both swore in affidavits to not having seen anyone else (besides 
Brian Bilinovich) doing clearing activity in 2007 or having seen any indication of 
such clearing having been done.  Like Bilinovich, they each claimed that they 
attended to the brush in their own sections over time.  If true, then as with the 
Bilinoviches’ section, the property manager would have skipped performing the 
clearing on their sections.  Although the 2007 clearing project is the type of activity 
that could interrupt the exclusivity of a claimant’s possession, there is a question of 
fact as to whether the telecommunications companies performed that activity on the 
sections of the corridor claimed by the Koontzes and the Koprivecs.  Thus, we 
cannot say as a matter of law that the telecommunications companies performed 
any acts sufficient to interfere with the exclusivity of the Koontzes’ and the 
Koprivecs’ possession. 
 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
19 
3.  Activities of the Prior Title Holder 
{¶ 49} Rails-to-Trails also asserts that the Ninth District failed to take into 
account the actions of Conrail employees on the disputed property before Rails-to-
Trails took title to the property. 
a.  Railroad-company activities on the Koontz section 
{¶ 50} In arguing that the activities of the railroad company were sufficient 
to defeat the exclusivity of the Koontzes’ possession, Rails-to-Trails relies on a 
statement in an affidavit submitted by Judith Wiley, the Koontzes’ predecessor-in-
interest.  Wiley averred that in the early to mid-1990s, she encountered a person on 
the right-of-way who identified himself as a railroad-company employee and that 
he advised her “not to trespass on the Railroad Right-of-Way.” 
{¶ 51} Wiley’s statement is not directly contradicted, and, if that was all 
there was to it, the railroad company’s activity in defending its corridor would seem 
a sufficient act of ownership to defeat summary judgment.  But there is more.  In 
her affidavit, Wiley also claimed that after the corridor was abandoned in 1989, the 
only activity she ever performed on the corridor was to remove snow from her 
driveway and, further, that none of her family members ever conducted activity on 
the corridor.  But as the court of appeals noted, the landowners introduced 
substantial evidence contradicting Wiley’s testimony, including affidavits from her 
real-estate agent, several of the landowners, and another neighbor.  According to 
this evidence, the Wiley family was vigilant about ejecting trespassers from the 
railroad corridor and used the corridor for a variety of purposes. 
{¶ 52} Thus, the credibility of Wiley is at issue.  We agree with the court of 
appeals that because the landowners’ “evidence directly contradicts Ms. Wiley’s 
averments in her affidavit,” 2016-Ohio-1141, 61 N.E.3d 676, at ¶ 22 (lead opinion), 
there remain genuine issues of material fact.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
court of appeals did not err in reversing the grant of summary judgment as to the 
Koontzes’ adverse-possession claim. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
b.  Railroad-company activities on the Bilinovich section 
{¶ 53} In regard to the Bilinovich section, Rails-to-Trails relies on Wiley’s 
statement referenced above as well as interactions between Solomon Jackson, a 
railroad-company employee, and Brian Bilinovich.  It is undisputed that on behalf 
of the railroad company, Jackson had extensive discussions with Bilinovich about 
a sale or lease of the corridor to Bilinovich.  They exchanged letters and, according 
to Jackson, had approximately six conversations about a possible sale.  In early 
2002, after receiving an offer letter from Bilinovich to purchase the entire corridor, 
Jackson went to the Bilinovich section of the corridor to discuss a possible sale.  
They walked the corridor together for one to two hours.  Ultimately, they were not 
able to reach a deal because at the time, the railroad company was in the middle of 
a complex corporate organization and was willing to offer Bilinovich only a lease.  
After the site visit, according to Jackson, the two continued to discuss a possible 
deal, engaging in another half dozen or so conversations. 
{¶ 54} It is hard to imagine a more direct assertion of ownership over a 
piece of property than a title holder standing on his property, inspecting it with 
another, and offering to lease it to that person.  Nevertheless, the court of appeals 
disregarded these activities.  In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on 
McAllister v. Hartzell, 60 Ohio St. 69, 53 N.E. 715 (1899). 
{¶ 55} In McAllister, a trial court had refused to provide a jury instruction 
that said that an adverse-possession claimant’s offer to purchase property would 
stop the running of the 21-year period.  Instead, the court had instructed the jury 
that an offer “would be evidence bearing upon the question whether or not she held 
the property adversely” and should be considered by the jury.  Id. at 82. 
{¶ 56} We find nothing in McAllister that impacts the question before us.  
The issue in McAllister dealt with the adverse possessor’s conduct—whether the 
purchase offer affected the adversity of possession.  The issue here deals with the 
title holder’s conduct—whether the title holder asserted ownership of the property, 
January Term, 2018 
 
21 
thereby destroying the exclusivity of the claimant’s possession.  Furthermore, this 
is not a case in which someone in possession of the property made an offer to a title 
holder who had had no contact with the property; here, the title holder came onto 
the property and walked it with the adverse-possession claimant with the express 
purpose of entering into a transaction involving the property. 
{¶ 57} Through Jackson’s entering onto the property and offering to lease 
it to Bilinovich, the railroad company was “asserting, by word or act, [a] right of 
ownership or possession,” 4 Tiffany, Law of Real Property, Section 1141, at 736 
(3d Ed.1975).  The railroad company unequivocally took action on the property of 
the type that would be taken by an owner, interrupting the exclusive possession of 
the Bilinoviches.  The court of appeals therefore erred in reversing the trial court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Rails-to-Trails on the Bilinoviches’ claim. 
c.  Railroad-company activities on the Koprivec section 
{¶ 58} Rails-to-Trails has not made any argument before this court about 
actions of railroad-company employees on the section of the corridor adjacent to 
the Koprivecs’ property that it contends are a sufficient basis for summary 
judgment.  (In regard to the Koprivecs, its arguments focus solely on the actions of 
the telecommunications companies.)  Accordingly, the court of appeals did not err 
in reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to the Koprivecs. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 59} We conclude that the 1882 deed granted an interest in fee simple to 
the railroad company, the grantee, and that there was thus no reversion of the 
property to the successors-in-interest of the grantors as was alleged by the 
Bilinoviches and the Koontzes.  In regard to adverse possession by the landowners, 
we conclude that the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of 
Rails-to-Trails on the Bilinoviches’ claim but not on the claims of the Koontzes and 
the Koprivecs.  Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
the Ninth District Court of Appeals, and we remand the cause for further 
proceedings. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
 and reversed in part, 
and cause remanded. 
KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion. 
O’NEILL, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
FISCHER, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 60} I agree with the majority opinion’s conclusions that the 1882 deed 
granted an interest in fee simple to the railroad company and that the trial court 
correctly entered summary judgment in favor of appellant, Rails-to-Trails of 
Wayne County, on the adverse-possession claims of appellees Brian and Laura 
Bilinovich but not on the adverse-possession claims of appellees Joseph and 
Michelle Koontz and Don and Carolyn Koprivec.  I write separately because I 
would not use this appeal as a vehicle for effectively overruling In re Petition of 
Copps Chapel Methodist Episcopal Church, 120 Ohio St. 309, 166 N.E. 218 
(1929). 
{¶ 61} The majority opinion states that “going forward, there is no longer 
reason to rely on Copps Chapel.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 19.  However, Copps 
Chapel has been a part of our jurisprudence for nearly 90 years and has become 
entrenched in Ohio law, and no party has challenged the validity of that decision in 
this case.  We should be particularly mindful of the principles underlying stare 
decisis in the context of real-estate law, for “adherence to precedent is necessary to 
the stability of land titles and commercial transactions entered into in reliance on 
January Term, 2018 
 
23 
the settled nature of the law.”  Bogle Farms, Inc. v. Baca, 122 N.M. 422, 1996-
NMSC-051, 925 P.2d 1184, ¶ 29, citing Giles v. Adobe Royalty, Inc., 235 Kan. 758, 
767, 684 P.2d 406 (1984). 
{¶ 62} These principles are overlooked in the majority opinion, which 
concludes that Copps Chapel is no longer good law without conducting the analysis 
required to overrule a decision that this court established in Westfield Ins. Co. v. 
Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, paragraph one of 
the syllabus.  As the majority opinion notes, the court of appeals’ lead opinion, in 
relying on Copps Chapel, reached the same conclusion on the deed issue that this 
court reaches today.  Because the validity of Copps Chapel is not directly at issue 
in this case, we should avoid disturbing any reliance Ohioans have placed on that 
decision.  I accordingly concur in judgment only. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 63} Respectfully, I concur in part and dissent in part. 
{¶ 64} I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals as to the issues 
of adverse possession and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. 
_________________ 
O’NEILL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 65} I join the majority’s holding concerning the deed issue.  I also join 
the majority’s holding that the exclusivity required to prove an adverse-possession 
claim is interrupted by a title holder’s licensee acting on the property in ways that 
would normally require the permission of the owner.  And I join the majority’s 
holding that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of 
appellant, Rails-to-Trails of Wayne County (“RTT”), on the adverse-possession 
claim of appellees Brian and Laura Bilinovich.  Yet, I must dissent from the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
remainder of the majority opinion, because I would hold that the trial court also 
correctly granted summary judgment to RTT on the claims of appellees Don and 
Carolyn Koprivec and Joseph and Michelle Koontz.  My view of the record is that 
there are no genuine disputes of material fact remaining for a jury to consider on 
those claims. 
{¶ 66} The present saga started in either 1987, 1988, or 1989.  During that 
time frame, Consolidated Rail Corporation (“Conrail”) owned a railroad corridor 
that abutted two properties and divided a third.  Two of the three properties were 
owned by Judith Wiley and her family, and one was owned by the Koprivecs.  The 
Wileys ultimately sold their two properties—to the Bilinoviches in 1996 and to the 
Koontzes in 1998. 
{¶ 67} Depending on whom a jury would believe, Conrail removed the train 
tracks from the rail corridor either by the end of 1987 or in two phases in 1988 and 
1989.  And depending on whom a jury would believe, the Wileys either “did 
nothing on the Railroad Right-of-Way” (other than remove snow from the portion 
of their driveway that crossed it) or frequently traveled on the rail corridor, 
threatened trespassers on the corridor with guns, allowed people to park on it, and 
listed it as part of the property sold to the Bilinoviches. 
{¶ 68} Regardless, in October 2009, RTT purchased the rail corridor by 
quitclaim deed.  On two occasions in November 2009, officers of RTT rode ATVs 
along the entire length of the rail corridor.  Each time, Donald Noble, the president 
of RTT, observed gates across the trail, but none of them were shut or locked.  
During one of these instances, Noble was approached by Brian Bilinovich, who 
claimed in his affidavit that he treated Noble’s entry as a trespass.  There is no 
testimony that the officers of RTT were told or forced to leave, and they continued 
to ride the entire corridor twice that day.  The other affidavits upon which the 
Koprivecs, the Bilinoviches, and the Koontzes (collectively, “the landowners”) rely 
January Term, 2018 
 
25 
claim a lack of knowledge regarding these actions of the RTT officers in November 
2009. 
{¶ 69} If that had been the only evidence presented on summary judgment, 
then this lawsuit would turn on two genuine issues of material fact that the 
landowners would have been entitled to present to a jury to resolve: (1) whether 21 
years elapsed between the time that Conrail removed the tracks and the time that 
the RTT officers surveyed the rail corridor shortly after taking title to it and (2) if 
so, whether the Wileys adversely possessed the land for a sufficient period that the 
Bilinoviches and the Koontzes could tack on their own periods of alleged 
possession to make a total of 21 years of uninterrupted possession. 
{¶ 70} But that was not the full scope of the case presented to the trial court 
on summary judgment.  Wiley offered unrebutted testimony that a railroad-
company employee walking along the rail corridor in the “early to mid 1990s” told 
her not to trespass on the land.  Viewing that testimony with all due deference to 
the Koontzes, it is simply impossible to reconcile that fact with their claim of 21 
years of continuous possession of the section of the rail corridor bordering their 
property.  That is no less true even if Wiley and her family chased trespassers off 
the rail corridor with guns or walked and parked cars on it or purported to sell it to 
the Bilinoviches. 
{¶ 71} It may be that the Wiley family did exclusively possess the land for 
many years by parking on the property and threatening other trespassers with a 
weapon.  But by offering testimony that an employee of the title holder told her to 
stay off the land while he stood on it, she has offered evidence that her own 
possession was interrupted in a meaningful way.  The affidavit upon which the 
Koontzes rely professes only a lack of knowledge regarding a railroad-company 
employee’s presence or actions on the rail corridor in the 1990s.  Wiley’s affidavit 
is clear and unequivocal.  There is no genuine dispute that her possession was 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
interrupted, and that is the only material question of fact for the Koontzes because 
it defeats their claim without any further inquiry regarding the other elements of 
adverse possession.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 
S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (“Only disputes over facts that might affect the 
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of 
summary judgment.  Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be 
counted”).  Though there are genuine issues of fact regarding Wiley’s possession 
of the land before and after her possession was interrupted, those questions are 
immaterial in light of the fact that there is unrebutted testimony that her possession 
was interrupted. 
{¶ 72} The Koontzes simply cannot claim continuous possession of their 
section of the rail corridor and leave Wiley’s testimony on this point unanswered.  
The majority casts the dispute over Wiley’s other actions and interactions on the 
land as a credibility issue.  Fair enough; she denied doing anything but clearing 
snow from the land.  But absent rebuttal testimony that no railroad-company 
employee told Wiley to stay off the rail corridor in the 1990s, there is no credibility 
issue with Wiley’s testimony on that point. 
{¶ 73} There is also substantial unrebutted evidence establishing entries by 
employees of a contractor hired by a third-party licensee during any 21-year period 
of exclusive possession that the landowners could conceivably claim.  In late 2006 
or early 2007, AT&T Communications, Inc., hired HLG Consulting to clear trees, 
brush, and other obstructions from the rail corridor.  AT&T operated a fiber-optic 
cable running along the rail corridor pursuant to a 1984 license agreement with 
Conrail.  According to a “Memorandum of Agreement” recorded in the land records 
in 1995 by Conrail, AT&T purchased a right to “construct, install, operate, 
maintain, and repair” a fiber-optic cable along the rail corridor.  Edward Hughes 
worked as a project manager for HLG Consulting in 2007, and he personally 
January Term, 2018 
 
27 
oversaw the clearing project, kept track of where his crews worked, and visited the 
rail corridor to “make sure that work was being completed.”  The project required 
“making sure that there [was] access” along the rail corridor “in its entirety,” 
including “the disputed trail property.”  The affidavits upon which the landowners 
rely admit to a lack of knowledge regarding any such activity by HLG Consulting. 
{¶ 74} Stating a lack of knowledge is not a rebuttal.  An affiant or deponent 
claiming “I have no knowledge” or “I never saw” an event or “Wiley never told me 
about the railroad employee” has not met the Civ.R. 56(E) requirement that 
affidavits “shall be made on personal knowledge” and “shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence.”  As a purely logical matter, someone cannot 
rebut testimony that an event occurred by claiming that he or she never saw it 
happen.  If a railroad company’s licensee hires a crew of workers to chop a tree 
down in the rail corridor and Don Koprivec swears that he “did not observe” it, 
does the tree make a sound when it falls?  An expression of knowledge beats an 
expression of a lack of knowledge without having to ask a jury to sort things out. 
{¶ 75} The majority engages in conjecture unsupported by the record when 
it claims that HLG Consulting “would have skipped” the well-maintained Koontz 
and Koprivec sections, majority opinion at ¶ 46.  This is an unreasonable inference 
from testimony that the landowners were aware only of their own work clearing 
brush on the land.  Even if the majority is right that HLG Consulting merely 
inspected these sections and moved on whenever it found that the disputed sections 
were well-groomed, I cannot agree that the act of entering and inspecting the land 
to assure access to the fiber-optic cable falls outside of the category of conduct that 
“would ordinarily require the permission of the owner,” id. at ¶ 42. 
{¶ 76} The trial court in this matter granted summary judgment in favor of 
RTT because the undisputed testimony showed that the landowners could not have 
exclusively possessed the land at issue for any uninterrupted 21-year period.  As 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
shown above, the record shows undisputed instances of the title holder and of the 
work crews hired by the title holder’s licensee using—or in other words, 
possessing—the land.  The only remaining question was a legal one: whether any 
party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  The trial court resolved that 
question in favor of RTT: “[RTT’s] use of [its] land, and permitted use by a third 
party, clearly interrupts any exclusive use of the land by the [landowners].”  This 
was a textbook example of an order correctly granting summary judgment. 
{¶ 77} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), a court may terminate litigation in favor 
of a party when that party can show that there is no genuine dispute of material fact 
and that construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, 
reasonable minds can conclude only that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.  Byrd v. Smith, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 2006-Ohio-3455, 850 N.E.2d 
47, ¶ 10.  If a party moving for summary judgment supports the motion with 
evidence sufficient to show that the movant is entitled to judgment in its favor, then 
Civ.R. 56(E) requires that the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” by “affidavit or as otherwise provided 
in this rule.”  To show a genuine issue of material fact, the landowners had to submit 
rebuttal evidence calling into question the truth of RTT’s evidence showing the 
entries made by the title holder and the work crews hired by its licensee.  Savransky 
v. Cleveland, 4 Ohio St.3d 118, 118-119, 447 N.E.2d 98 (1983).  But the 
landowners denied knowledge and thereby “rested upon the mere allegations of 
[their] pleadings, instead of setting forth specific facts showing that there was a 
genuine issue for trial,” id. at 119. 
{¶ 78} I would reinstate the trial court’s entire order granting summary 
judgment.  Therefore, I dissent in part from the majority’s judgment. 
_________________ 
 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
29 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, L.L.P., Thomas H. Fusonie, and Daniel 
E. Shuey, for appellees Don and Carolyn Koprivec and for appellees and cross-
appellants Brian and Laura Bilinovich and Joseph D. and Michelle K. Koontz. 
 
Walter Haverfield, L.L.P., Ralph E. Cascarilla, and Bonnie S. Finley, for 
appellant and cross-appellee.  
 
Chad A. Endsley, Leah Curtis, and Amy Milam, urging reversal for amici 
curiae Ohio Farm Bureau Federation and Wayne County Farm Bureau. 
_________________