Case Title: Paul Rhoades v. State of Idaho Appeal from dismissal of petition for post-conviction relief

Citation: 

Docket Number: 35021

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2009-10-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 35021 
 
PAUL RHOADES,                                      
                                                   
          Petitioner-Appellant,                    
                                                   
v.                                                 
                                                   
STATE OF IDAHO, and TOM  
BEAUCLAIR, Director, Idaho Department  
of Correction, and GREG FISHER, Warden, 
Idaho Maximum Security Institution,                
                                                   
          Respondents.                                                    
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Boise, September 2009 Term 
 
2009 Opinion No.  134  
 
Filed:  October 26, 2009 
 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of  
Idaho, Bonneville County.  Hon. Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Federal Defender Services of Idaho, Boise, and Nevin, Benjamin, McKay &  
Bartlett, LLP, Boise, for appellant.  Oliver Loewy argued.  Dennis Benjamin  
appeared. 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondents.  Lamont  
Anderson argued. 
 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
HORTON, Justice 
 
Petitioner Paul Ezra Rhoades appeals the district court‟s summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief.  He argues that the district court erred in finding that his 
claims are time-barred under I.C. § 19-4902.   
 
In 1987, Rhoades entered a conditional plea of guilty for the murder and robbery of 
Nolan Haddon.  In 2005, Rhoades petitioned the district court for post-conviction relief alleging 
prosecutorial misconduct, actual innocence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and seeking to test 
biological evidence for DNA.  The district court found that these claims were not raised in a 
timely manner and summarily dismissed the petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906.   
 
Three main issues are presented on appeal:  First, whether the grounds raised by Rhoades 
allow for equitable tolling of the limitation provided by I.C. § 19-4902; second, for grounds that 
 
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would entitle him to equitable tolling, whether Rhoades has met his burden of pleading facts that 
would entitle him to that equitable tolling; and finally, whether this appeal was frivolous and 
whether, as a result, the state is entitled to an award of attorney fees.  We affirm and award costs 
to the state. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 1987, Paul Ezra Rhoades was charged with the rape and murder of Susan 
Michelbacher as well as the murder and robbery of Nolan Haddon.  Rhoades pleaded not guilty 
to all charges and filed a motion to sever the charges, which was subsequently granted.  Rhoades 
was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death on the charges relating to the Michelbacher rape and 
murder.  The parties subsequently entered into a plea agreement relating to the Haddon 
murder/robbery wherein Rhoades entered an “Alford”1 plea, maintaining his innocence in the 
case but conceding that “a conviction may be had on the charges as presently filed.”  Rhoades 
was sentenced to serve concurrent indeterminate life sentences for the Haddon murder and 
robbery. 
The evidence that would have been introduced at a trial for the Haddon murder included 
the gun used to kill Haddon found in the vicinity of a green car abandoned by Rhoades, 
statements made by Rhoades at the time of his arrest, and statements allegedly made to a 
jailhouse informer.  State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 600-604, 809 P.2d 455, 461-465 (1991).  
Further evidence would have included witness testimony placing a car matching the description 
of the car in which Rhoades was found at the scene of the Haddon murder, law enforcement 
officers‟ testimony that items found in Rhoades‟ possession were similar to the items taken at the 
time of the Haddon robbery, and testimony regarding Rhoades‟ purchase of bullets matching the 
caliber of those used in Haddon‟s murder.  The gun is notable in the present case as the same gun 
was presented as the murder weapon in the case relating to the rape and murder of Susan 
Michelbacher.  Based upon an affidavit of Dr. Greg Hampikian, Rhoades now claims that PGM 
(phosphoglucomutase enzyme) testing conducted by the FBI prior to the trial exonerates him of 
the Michelbacher murder and, by virtue of that exoneration, the Haddon murder as well.   
In 2005, Rhoades filed the present petition for post-conviction relief, alleging 
prosecutorial misconduct, actual innocence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and requesting 
                                                 
1  
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
 
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DNA testing.  These were similar to the 2002 petition and 2005 amendments to the petition for 
post-conviction relief made in connection with the Michelbacher case.   
The state moved for summary dismissal of Rhoades‟ claims on August 24, 2007, 
claiming that Rhoades‟ claims were time-barred by I.C. § 19-4902.  On November 26, 2007, the 
district court granted the motion to dismiss.  Rhoades appeals that decision. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by I.C. § 19-4901 et seq. (the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act).  A petition for post-conviction relief is a civil proceeding, governed 
by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 
(2008).  However, “[t]he „application must contain much more than a short and plain statement 
of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1).‟” State v. Payne, 146 
Idaho 548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008) (quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 
P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)).  Instead, the application must be supported by a statement that 
“specifically set[s] forth the grounds upon which the application is based.”  Payne, 146 Idaho at 
561, 199 P.3d at 136 (citing I.C. § 19-4903).  “The application must present or be accompanied 
by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal.” 
Id.  
 
This Court has free review of questions of law.  Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 626, 
167 P.3d 761, 763 (2007).  On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application 
without an evidentiary hearing, this Court determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will 
liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.  
Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. 
State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).   However, “while the underlying facts must 
be regarded as true, the petitioner‟s conclusions need not be so accepted.”  Phillips v. State, 108 
Idaho 405, 407, 700 P.2d 27, 29 (1985).  “[W]here the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the 
trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite 
the possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving 
the conflict between those inferences.” State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443, 180 P.3d 476, 482 
(2008).  These standards apply equally to questions regarding the accrual of actions and the 
 
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passage of the statute of limitations.  Harris v. State, ex rel. Kempthorne, 147 Idaho 401, 405, 
210 P.3d 86, 90 (2009). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
1. 
Rhoades did not plead facts sufficient to trigger equitable tolling and avoid 
summary dismissal. 
 
 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides three separate limitations periods.  
The first, contained in I.C. § 19-4902(a), states that “[a]n application may be filed at any time 
within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an 
appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later.”  The 
second, addressing only DNA testing, is contained in I.C. § 19-4902(b).  It states that a “petition 
must be filed by July 1, 2002, or within one (1) year after the filing of the judgment of 
conviction, whichever is later.”  I.C. § 19-4902(b).    Finally, I.C. § 19-4908 states that a court 
may grant a supplemental or additional petition where the “court finds a ground for relief 
asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, 
supplemental, or amended application.” 
 
The state, the trial judge and Rhoades all agree that the standards required for I.C. § 19-
4902 have not been met.  Remittitur in Rhoades‟ case was issued March 8, 1991.   In 1993, the 
period designated in I.C. § 19-4902, previously a five-year period, was amended to a one-year 
limitation period.  1993 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 265, § 1, p. 898.   Dating the one-year period from 
the July 1, 1993 amendment to I.C. § 19-4902, the petition was untimely under I.C. § 19-4902, as 
the present motion was filed on July 29, 2005.  Esquivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390, 392, 913 P.2d 
1160, 1162 (1996).  Rhoades does not dispute this but argues that he is entitled to equitable 
tolling by operation of I.C. §§ 19-4901 and 19-4908.2 
 
In Charboneau v. State, we considered the relationship of I.C § 19-4902 and I.C. § 19-
4908.  144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 (2007).  In Charboneau, this Court recognized that rigid 
application of I.C. § 19-4902 would preclude courts from considering “claims which simply are 
                                                 
2  
Rhoades cites I.C. § 19-4901(b) for the proposition that “a successive postconviction petition is timely if 
(1) it was not reasonable to expect the petitioner to have known of its underlying facts at the time of his first petition 
and (2) if the successor petition was filed within a reasonable amount of time of his discovering the underlying 
facts.”  I.C. § 19-4901(b), however, does not address when or whether specific facts may overcome the one-year 
statute of limitations for post-conviction petitions.  Rather, I.C. § 19-4901 merely addresses the relation between 
issues that might have been raised on direct appeal and issues raised in a petition for post-conviction relief.   
 
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not known to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise important due process issues.” Id. at 
904, 174 P.3d at 874.  According to this Court‟s decision in State v. Rhoades, 
[p]rocedural due process issues are raised whenever a person risks being deprived 
of life, liberty, or property interests because of governmental action. The 
requirement is that there must be some process to ensure that the individual is not 
arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions. 
This requirement is met when the defendant is provided with notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. 
120 Idaho 795, 806, 820 P.2d 665, 676 (1991).  The Court then used the three-part balancing test 
enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), to 
determine whether due process had been afforded, balancing (1) the interest at stake; (2) the risk 
of erroneous deprivation of the interest and the probable value of additional or substitute 
safeguards; and (3) the government‟s interest.  Rhoades, 120 Idaho at 806-07, 820 P.2d at 676-
77.   
 
In Charboneau, we noted that, in instances of a Brady violation,3  “there may be a tolling 
of the one year statute of limitations until discovery of the Brady violation.”  Charboneau, 144 
Idaho at 904, 174 P.3d at 874.  The Court applied the same “reasonable time” standard that 
governs its examination of post-conviction petitions in capital cases.  Id. at 905, 174 P.3d at 875.  
For claims that do not meet the required timeliness standard, a petitioner “shall be deemed to 
have waived such claims for relief as were known or reasonably should have been known.”  I.C. 
§ 19-2719.  “In determining what a reasonable time is for filing a successive petition, we will 
simply consider it on a case-by-case basis, as has been done in capital cases.”  Charboneau, 144 
Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875. 
 
The district court, in finding that Rhoades was not entitled to equitable tolling, cited the 
court of appeals‟ decision in Chico-Rodriguez v. State for the proposition that “the bar for 
equitable tolling in post-conviction actions is high.”  141 Idaho 579, 582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. 
App. 2005).   The Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized instances of equitable tolling 
“(1) where the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state facility on an in-state conviction 
without legal representation or access to Idaho legal materials; (2) and where mental disease 
and/or psychotropic medication renders a petitioner incompetent and prevents petitioner from 
earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction.”  Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 960, 88 P.3d 776, 
779 (Ct. App. 2003).  This Court has never explicitly addressed when a case would raise an 
                                                 
3  
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
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important due process issue.  However, the serious due process concerns enunciated in 
Charboneau  encompass cases involving access to courts claims.  Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 
530, 535-36, 944 P.2d 127, 132-33 (Ct. App. 1997).  It would similarly cover claims of 
incompetency.  Chico-Rodriguez, 141 Idaho at 582-83, 114 P.3d at 140-41.  We therefore 
reaffirm the standard expressed in Charboneau in order to determine whether equitable tolling is 
appropriate. 
 
Applying this structure, the first question is whether Rhoades‟ asserted claims 
(prosecutorial misconduct, actual innocence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and a request for 
DNA testing) “raise important due process issues” sufficient to trigger equitable tolling.  The 
second question is whether any claims that would be entitled to equitable tolling have been 
adequately supported by the facts and claims in the pleadings. 
 
a. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
With regard to the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, Charboneau answers the first 
question in the affirmative, citing claims of “state misconduct” involved in a Brady violation.  
Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904, 174 P.3d at 874.  While it must still be pursued in a timely 
fashion, state misconduct implicates core due process considerations that may trigger equitable 
tolling.  The district court acknowledged this, stating that “there is no doubt but that deliberate 
deception in a criminal prosecution would likely entitle a petitioner to equitable tolling for I.C. § 
19-4902 purposes.” The court then rejected the prosecutorial misconduct argument as 
unsupported by the facts alleged.   
 
Rhoades identifies four pieces of evidence in support of his claim that prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred.  First, Rhoades refers to the existence of the FBI document recounting the 
results of PGM testing upon which Dr. Hampikian relied.  Second, Rhoades relies on Dr. 
Hampikian‟s affidavit stating that the FBI tests excluded Rhoades as a contributor of the semen 
that was the subject of the FBI‟s PGM testing.  Third, Rhoades cites testimony at the 
Michelbacher trial by Don Wyckoff, the state‟s expert witness, that he could not address the 
results of the FBI tests because he did not do the analysis.   Finally, Rhoades refers to statements 
by the prosecutor in the closing arguments of the Michelbacher trial that Rhoades “alone of the 
persons who had access, matches” the semen samples found. 
 
While facts supported by admissible evidence must be accepted, the judge reviewing 
those facts need not draw inferences drawn from those facts that are not supported by the 
 
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evidence.  Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007).  Rhoades is 
correct in asserting that Mr. Wyckoff, the state‟s expert, would be considered an agent of the 
prosecution for purposes of Brady disclosures.  State v. Avelar, 132 Idaho 775, 781, 979 P.2d 
648, 654 (1999) (“The duty of disclosure enunciated in Brady is an obligation of not just the 
individual prosecutor assigned to the case, but of all the government agents having a significant 
role in investigating and prosecuting the offense.”) (internal quotations omitted).  Rhoades‟ 
argument relies on Wyckoff‟s role as state agent, combined with the apparently obvious import 
of the PGM testing and the fact that the PGM report had been made available to the state.   
 
Nevertheless, even assuming these facts, Rhoades effectively asked the district court to 
make, not one, but four inferences in his favor.  One must first infer from the mailing of the FBI 
report to the state investigatory office that Wyckoff received the report.4  Second, one must infer 
that Wyckoff actually reviewed the report.  Third, one must further infer that Wyckoff 
interpreted the report and reached the same conclusion as Rhoades‟ expert.  Finally, in order to 
show that the prosecutor suborned perjury, one must further infer that Wyckoff shared the 
exculpatory interpretation of the FBI report with the prosecutor.  Although the district court is 
required to draw inferences in favor of the non-moving party, those inferences must be 
reasonable.  The required series of inferences here simply does not meet the reasonableness 
standard.  Whether by virtue of oversight, misunderstanding the data, or, as the district court 
suggested, simply a different interpretation, there are a variety of explanations which are equally, 
if not more plausible than one of deliberate concealment.5   
 
Nor does Banks v. Dretke, upon which Rhoades relies, suggest a different result.  540 
U.S. 668 (2004).  Banks involved a case in which the prosecution had asserted that it had turned 
over all material required by Brady but had, in fact, failed to disclose information known to the 
state.  Although Rhoades argues that “concealment and misrepresentation” has occurred here, he 
acknowledges that “the prosecution did provide defense counsel with a copy of the FBI‟s PGM 
test results.”  We conclude that the district court did not err in finding that Rhoades failed to 
plead facts adequate to support his claim of prosecutorial misconduct and dismissing this claim.   
 
b. 
Actual Innocence 
                                                 
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The FBI report was directed to “Ms. Pamela J. Marcum, Senior Criminalist.” 
5  
The FBI report was disclosed to Rhoades‟ attorney who had the assistance of a court-appointed expert.  
Rhoades‟ claims of a Brady violation and subornation of perjury are based upon the facially exculpatory value of the 
report.  Rhoades does not explain why the state would suborn perjury when evidence of such exculpatory import had 
been disclosed to the defense. 
 
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 Rhoades argues that Sivak v. State supports his argument that a claim of actual innocence 
provides a basis for equitable tolling.  134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000).  However, Sivak, 
unlike Rhoades, was making a claim of actual innocence to support overriding a time-bar and 
reach the merits of an otherwise-barred constitutional claim.  Id. at 644, 8 P.3d at 639 (“[Sivak] 
asserted that the state denied his due process rights by withholding evidence of an agreement 
between Leytham and the prosecution.”).  We need not and do not decide today whether due 
process requires a free-standing actual innocence exception to the application of I.C. § 19-4902. 
Even if actual innocence provides a basis for equitable tolling, the facts alleged by 
Rhoades do not establish a prima facie case of actual innocence.  Under the standard for “actual 
innocence” as enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Schlup v. Delo, “the petitioner must 
show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the 
light of the new evidence.”  513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).  As the state correctly observes, even if 
the results of the FBI‟s PGM tests were accepted as unambiguously exculpating Rhoades of 
responsibility for the rape and murder of Michelbacher, that does not mean that Rhoades did not 
murder Haddon.  Rhoades alleges facts only related to the Michelbacher case, not the Haddon 
charges.  In light of the facts set forth in Part I of this opinion supra, that link Rhoades to the 
murder of Mr. Haddon, and given that there is no suggestion that the PGM tests would have been 
part of the Haddon prosecution, we conclude that Rhoades has failed to establish a prima facie 
case of actual innocence and this claim was properly dismissed as untimely. 
 
c. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
We have repeatedly held that ineffective assistance of counsel claims can or should be 
known after trial.  In addressing one of Rhoades‟ previous appeals, we squarely addressed this 
issue.  “Ineffective assistance of counsel is one of those claims that should be reasonably known 
immediately upon the completion of the trial and can be raised in a post-conviction petition.” 
Rhoades, 120 Idaho at 807, 820 P.2d at 677.  The facts of the case, being particularly within the 
knowledge of the defendant should be sufficient to alert a defendant to the presence of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  In this case, Rhoades had access to the material related to his 
case, including the PGM testing results.  Rhoades has further alleged that he is innocent.  
Assuming his claim of innocence to be true, even if Rhoades did not know that the PGM testing 
exculpated him, he would have been on notice that it may have done so.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the district court properly dismissed this claim as untimely.   
 
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d. 
Requests for DNA Testing under I.C. § 19-4902(b) 
 
Rhoades has not argued that the district court‟s finding that his claim was brought outside 
of the July 1, 2002 limit created by I.C. § 19-4902(b) was incorrect.  Rather, Rhoades simply 
argues that “he should be allowed to conduct deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) testing on any and 
all biological evidence collected by the state in the investigation of the murder which gave rise to 
the instant case.”  The U.S. Supreme Court recently rejected the argument that the due process 
clause provides a freestanding right to DNA testing.  Dist. Att’y’s Office for Third Jud. Dist. v. 
Osborne, 557 U.S. ___ , 129 S.Ct. 2308 (2009).  “In due process cases involving the deprivation 
of a liberty interest, this Court has applied the United States Supreme Court's standard for 
interpreting the due process clause of the United States Constitution, to art. I, § 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution.”  Smith v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 128 Idaho 768, 771, 918 P.2d 1213, 1216 (1996).  
Therefore, we conclude that the denial of DNA testing does not implicate a specific due process 
concern.  Accordingly, we affirm the district court‟s conclusion that Rhoades‟ claim for DNA 
testing was time-barred. 
2. 
We will not award the state attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121; however, we award 
costs to the state under I.A.R. 40. 
 
 
The state requests an award of costs and attorney fees incurred in connection with this 
appeal.  The request for attorney fees is based upon I.C. § 12-121.  “Reasonable attorney‟s fees 
will only be awarded to the prevailing party under I.C. § 12-121 when the court is left with the 
abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably and 
without foundation.”  Balderson v. Balderson, 127 Idaho 48, 54, 896 P.2d 956, 962 (1995) 
(internal quotation omitted).  We conclude that Rhoades‟ arguments, although unsuccessful, are 
not so wholly without merit as to warrant an award of fees.  As discussed above, the standard for 
equitable tolling has never been clearly spelled out and its application to many of the issues 
raised by Rhoades is a matter of first impression for this Court.   
 
Idaho Appellate Rule 40 provides that “[c]osts shall be allowed as a matter of course to 
the prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court.”  As a petition for 
post-conviction relief is a civil matter and because the state is the prevailing party on appeal, we 
award costs to the state.   
 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the district court‟s dismissal of Rhoades‟ petition for post-conviction relief as 
Rhoades‟ prosecutorial misconduct claims are unsupported by the facts presented and Rhoades‟ 
alternative grounds are time-barred under I.C. § 19-4202(a) and (b).  Costs to the state. 
 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICK, W. JONES and Justice Pro Tem  
 WALTERS CONCUR.