Case Title: Jackson Paint & Glass, Inc. v. Town of Jackson Bd. of Adjustment

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jackson Paint & Glass, Inc. v. Town of Jackson Bd. of Adjustment1991 WY 76811 P.2d 293Case Number: 91-31Decided: 05/17/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
JACKSON PAINT & 
GLASS, INC., Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

TOWN OF JACKSON BOARD OF 
ADJUSTMENT, Appellee (Respondent).

Appeal from The District 
Court, TetonCounty, D. Terry Rogers, 
J.

William P. 
Schwartz of Ranck & Schwartz, Jackson, for 
appellant.

David K. Larson 
of Mullikin, Larson & Swift, Jackson, for 
appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., THOMAS, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and RAPER, J. 
(Retired).

RAPER, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a final order of the district court dismissing the petition for review of agency 
action filed by appellant.

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant states the 
issues to be:

     A. Did the district 
court err in concluding that the Board lacked the authority to rehear its 
decision denying JP & G's requested variance?

1. Does a Wyoming municipality 
possess the power to pass an ordinance authorizing rehearings before a Board of 
Adjustment?

B. Did the district court 
err in concluding that JP & G's petition for review was 
untimely?

[¶4.]     Appellee restates the 
issue:

     Was the action of the 
district court in dismissing appellant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to 
petitioner's failure to file a timely petition for review pursuant to the 
requirements of Rule 12.04 Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure proper and 
sustainable in accordance with applicable law?

[¶5.]     By letter dated 
February 1, 1990, appellant, acting pro se, requested a variance from the 
setback requirements of Jackson Town Ordinances. The request was heard by the 
Board of Adjustment (Board) on March 7, 1990, and an entry of denial was shown 
in the minutes of the Board as of that date.

[¶6.]     On July 12, 1990, 
appellant requested in writing a rehearing of the Board's denial of the 
variance. On July 18, 1990, the Board heard appellant's request for rehearing 
and denied it, as shown by the Board's minutes as of that same 
date.

[¶7.]     Counsel entered the 
matter and on August 2, 1990, appealed to the district court to review the 
agency action. The district court heard and accordingly dismissed appellant's 
petition for review as untimely in that it failed to seek review of the March 7, 
1990 denial of a variance within 30 days thereafter. The decision of the Board 
may be reviewed by the district court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12. W.S. 
15-1-609.

[¶8.]     W.R.A.P. 12.04 
provides:

     In a contested case, 
or in a noncontested case where a statute places a time limit on appeal, the 
petition for review shall be filed within thirty (30) days after written, 
certified notice to all parties of the final decision of the agency or denial of 
the petition for a rehearing, or, if a rehearing is held, within thirty (30) 
days after written, certified notice to all parties of the decision thereon, 
except that upon a showing of excusable neglect based upon the failure of a 
party to learn of the decision or action, the district court may extend the time 
for filing the petition for review not exceeding thirty (30) days from the 
expiration of the original time herein prescribed. Concurrently with the filing 
of the petition, the appellant shall order and arrange for the payment of a 
transcript of the evidence necessary for the appeal, and written evidence of the 
compliance with this requirement shall be served upon the agency and all parties 
as provided in Rule 5, W.R.C.P.

[¶9.]     Rehearing was denied, 
though the city ordinances of Jackson provided for a rehearing if the terms 
of such ordinance were followed. The district court used the lead opinion in 
Hupp v. Employment Security Commission of Wyoming, 715 P.2d 223 (Wyo. 1986). However, 
examination of the concurring opinions indicates that the Supreme Court's 
majority opinion is really found in the opinion of Justice Urbigkit, concurring 
only in the result of what at first blush appears to be the majority opinion but 
really is not. The concurring majority disagrees that there must be express 
statutory authority granting the agency the right to allow a rehearing as stated 
in what purports to be the majority opinion.

[¶10.]  Since, under the provisions of the state 
zoning statutes W.R.A.P. 12 is applicable, we agree with the district judge that 
a petition for review of the agency action should have been taken within 30 days 
after the March 7, 1990 ruling denying the variance.

[¶11.]  We disagree with any ruling that the 
Zoning Board of Adjustment did not have authority to provide for rehearing. We 
follow the true majority in Hupp, 715 P.2d  at 229 where it 
said:

[T]he general power 
provisions of the normal agency statute, including the ability and obligation to 
adopt rules of procedure, afford the right through those provisions and the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act to adopt the additional rules as part of 
the hearing process which provide agency procedural flexibility by 
rehearing.

[¶12.]  An application for rehearing to the 
agency, however, must be taken in time to allow for a petition for review within 
30 days after final action by the agency denying the variance. Failure to grant 
a rehearing does not toll the 30 day limit.

[¶13.]  No more need be 
said.

[¶14.]  Affirmed.

THOMAS, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶15.]  I concur in the disposition of this case 
according to the majority opinion. I think it is important to note that, even 
though we recognize the authority of the zoning board of adjustment to grant a 
rehearing, the original decision becomes final unless that rehearing is sought 
before the last day to seek review of the original decision. In this instance, 
the last day to seek review had long passed before the rehearing was sought. For 
that reason also, the appellant's opportunity for review was lost.