Case Title: Napert v. Napert

Citation: 

Docket Number: 000562

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
GERALD PAUL NAPERT 
 
v.  Record No. 000562     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
January 12, 2001 
THERESA MARIE NAPERT 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we review a determination made on a bill 
of review that a decree of a trial court was entered in 
violation of Rule 1:13. 
In December 1997, Gerald Paul Napert (husband) filed a 
proceeding seeking a divorce a vinculo matrimonii from Theresa 
Marie Napert (wife).  The wife filed a response, pro se, 
denying certain allegations of the bill of complaint.  On 
October 9, 1998, the husband mailed a copy of a "Motion to 
Establish Permanent Child Support and For Entry of Final 
Decree of Divorce" to the wife.  The motion designated the 
date and time he would seek entry of the decree.  A hearing 
was held on November 13, 1998, but the wife did not appear.  A 
decree of divorce was subsequently entered on November 16, 
1998.  The decree was silent as to child support. 
The wife filed a bill of review pursuant to Code § 8.01-
623, asserting that the divorce decree was void because it was 
entered in violation of Rule 1:13.  The Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County agreed, holding that the decree did not comply 
with either the endorsement or notice requirements of Rule 
1:13 and that there was no indication on the decree that the 
trial court dispensed with those requirements.  The trial 
court granted the relief sought in the bill of review, vacated 
the November 16, 1998 divorce decree declaring it void, and 
denied the husband's motion for reconsideration.  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in an 
unpublished memorandum opinion (Napert v. Napert, Record No. 
1173-99-4, February 8, 2000), holding that because the 
November 16, 1998 decree contained neither the endorsement of 
the wife or her counsel nor a dispensation of the endorsement 
by the court, the decree was "facially erroneous and void."  
We granted the husband an appeal. 
 
In his first assignment of error, the husband asserts 
that the Court of Appeals erred in construing and applying 
Rule 1:13.  Rule 1:13 states: 
Drafts of orders and decrees shall be endorsed 
by counsel of record, or reasonable notice of 
the time and place of presenting such drafts 
together with copies thereof shall be served 
. . . to all counsel of record who have not 
endorsed them.  Compliance with this rule . . . 
may be modified or dispensed with by the court 
in its discretion. 
 
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not 
dispense with the Rule's requirements because the decree did 
not specifically recite such dispensation.  The husband 
 
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asserts that this holding is in conflict with previous 
decisions of this Court.  We agree with the husband. 
This Court has never held that, in order to modify or 
dispense with the requirements of Rule 1:13, a court must 
affirmatively state in its order that it is exercising its 
discretion to take such action.  For example, in Smith v. 
Stanaway, 242 Va. 286, 410 S.E.2d 610 (1991), the trial court 
entered an order without endorsement of or notice to counsel 
and the order did not include any statement that the court had 
dispensed with such requirements as allowed by Rule 1:13.  
Nevertheless, this Court evaluated the validity of the order 
by considering whether the trial court abused its discretion 
in dispensing with the requirements of the Rule.  Id. at 288-
89, 410 S.E.2d at 612.  The concurrence in Smith specifically 
contended that the trial court should be required to recite 
its reasons for exercising its discretion to dispense with 
Rule 1:13, a requirement implicitly rejected by the majority.  
Id. at 290-91, 410 S.E.2d at 613; see also Rosillo v. Winters, 
235 Va. 268, 272-73, 367 S.E.2d 717, 719 (1988). 
Although a better practice would be for a trial court to 
include a statement reflecting its decision to exercise its 
discretion, in the absence of such a statement, we presume 
that a trial court exercised its discretion to dispense with 
the Rule's requirements.  Courts are presumed to act in 
 
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accordance with the law and orders of the court are entitled 
to a presumption of regularity.  Beck v. Semones' Adm'r, 145 
Va. 429, 442, 134 S.E. 677, 681 (1926). 
Likewise in this case, the divorce decree is entitled to 
a presumption that the trial court dispensed with the Rule's 
requirements.  Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Appeals 
erred in approving the trial court's decision that the 
November 16, 1998 divorce decree was entered in violation of 
Rule 1:13. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals and dismiss the bill of review. 
Reversed and dismissed. 
 
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