Case Title: Ferrer-Vasquez v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 351, 2022

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2022-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CARLOS FERRER-VASQUEZ, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§    No. 351, 2022 
§ 
§    Court Below—Superior Court 
§    of the State of Delaware 
§   
§    Cr. ID No. 1904016280 (N) 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted:  October 19, 2022 
Decided:  December 21, 2022 
 
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and TRAYNOR, Justices.  
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the opening brief, the motion to affirm, the motion to 
strike, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:   
(1) 
The appellant, Carlos Ferrer-Vasquez, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s order denying his first motion for postconviction relief under 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm 
the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Ferrer-Vasquez’s 
opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  Even if the motion to affirm was 
untimely as Ferrer-Vasquez contends in his motion to strike,1 the Court concludes 
 
1 A motion to affirm is due within ten days of the service of the opening brief.  Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
“Whenever a participant has the right to or is required to do some act or take some proceeding 
within a prescribed period after being served and service is made by mail or by eFiling, 3 days 
 
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that affirmance sua sponte is appropriate under Supreme Court Rule 25(c).   
(2) 
In April 2019, a grand jury indicted Ferrer-Vasquez for first-degree 
murder and related offenses.  The charges arose from Ferrer-Vasquez stabbing his 
wife to death.  On March 2, 2020, Ferrer-Vasquez pleaded guilty to second-degree 
murder as a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder, possession of a deadly 
weapon during the commission of a felony (“PDWDCF”), and criminal contempt of 
a domestic violence protective order.  The parties agreed to open sentencing and 
requested a presentencing investigation.   
(3) 
Following a presentence investigation, the Superior Court sentenced 
Ferrer-Vasquez on October 30, 2020 as follows: (i) for second-degree murder, life 
imprisonment; (ii) for PDWDCF, ten years of Level V incarceration, suspended after 
two years; and (iii) for criminal contempt of a domestic violence protective order, 
one year of Level V incarceration, suspended for probation.  Ferrer-Vasquez did not 
appeal.   
(4) 
On February 22, 2022, Ferrer-Vasquez filed a motion for 
postconviction relief and a motion for appointment of counsel under Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 61.  He also requested transcripts.  He alleged that his trial counsel 
 
shall be added to the prescribed period.”  Supr. Ct. R. 11(c).  According to the certificate of service, 
Ferrer-Vasquez placed his opening brief in the mail on October 4, 2022.  This Court received, and 
electronically docketed, the opening brief on October 10, 2022.  The State filed the motion to 
affirm on October 19, 2022. 
 
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was ineffective for misinforming him of the maximum penalty for second-degree 
murder, failing to advise him of his right to appeal, and failing to present mitigation 
evidence at sentencing.  In addition, he alleged that the interpreter mistranslated the 
maximum sentence for second-degree murder.  The Superior Court asked trial 
counsel to submit an affidavit responding to Ferrer-Vasquez’s allegations of 
ineffective assistance.  Ferrer-Vasquez’s counsel submitted an affidavit.   
(5) 
On September 7, 2022, the Superior Court issued an order denying 
Ferrer-Vasquez’s motion for postconviction relief.  The Superior Court held that the 
motion was time-barred under Rule 61(i)(1).  The court also found that Ferrer-
Vasquez failed to identify any grounds for appeal, waived his right to appeal as part 
of his guilty plea, and was advised that he faced a potential life sentence.  The court 
denied Ferrer-Vasquez’s motions for appointment of counsel and transcripts as 
moot.  This appeal followed.   
(6) 
In his opening brief, Ferrer-Vasquez argues that the Superior Court 
abused its discretion in denying the motion because the interpreter mistranslated the 
sentence for second-degree murder and counsel failed to inform him of his right to 
appeal, misinformed him of the maximum penalty for second-degree murder, and 
failed to present mitigation evidence during the penalty phase. 
(7) 
  This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction 
 
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relief for abuse of discretion.2  We review legal or constitutional questions, including 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, de novo.3  The Court must consider the 
procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any substantive issues.4    
(8) 
The Superior Court did not err in finding Ferrer-Vasquez’s 
postconviction motion time-barred.  A postconviction motion is time-barred if “filed 
more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final or, if it asserts a 
retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of 
conviction is final, more than one year after the right is first recognized by the 
Supreme Court of Delaware or by the United States Supreme Court.”5  Ferrer-
Vasquez’s conviction became final thirty days after the Superior Court’s imposition 
of sentence on October 30, 2020;6 he filed his motion for postconviction relief more 
than a year and two months later on February 22, 2022.  Ferrer-Vasquez did not try 
to overcome the procedural bar by pleading a retroactively applicable right under 
Rule 61(i)(1), a lack of jurisdiction under Rule 61(i)(5), new evidence of actual 
innocence under Rule 61(i)(5) and 61(d)(2)(i), or a new rule of retroactive, 
constitutional law under Rule 61(i)(5) and 61(d)(ii). 
(9) 
As the Superior Court also recognized, the record did not support 
 
2 Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013). 
3 Id. 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
5 Super. Ct. R. 61(i)(1). 
6 Id. 61(m)(1). 
 
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Ferrer-Vasquez’s ineffective assistance claims.  A successful claim of ineffective 
assistance requires a claimant to show that: (i) his counsel’s conduct fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness; and (ii) there was a reasonable probability that, 
but for his counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted 
on going to trial.7  Although not insurmountable, there is a strong presumption that 
counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.8  
(10) In the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea form, the box indicating that the 
defendant understands that by pleading guilty he is waiving his right to appeal with 
the assistance of counsel is checked yes.  The form also includes the sentencing 
range of “15 – life” for second-degree murder.9  In his affidavit, Ferrer-Vasquez’s 
counsel stated that he advised Ferrer-Vasquez, through an interpreter, that he would 
give up or waive his right to appeal by pleading guilty.   Counsel also explained to 
Ferrer-Vasquez that second-degree murder carried a potential sentence of fifteen 
years to life imprisonment.   
(11) During the guilty plea colloquy,  the Superior Court advised Ferrer-
Vasquez, through an interpreter, that by pleading guilty he would waive certain 
constitutional rights, including the right to appeal with the assistance of counsel.  The 
court also advised Ferrer-Vasquez, more than once, that he faced a potential life 
 
7 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 
8 Albury, 551 A.2d at 59 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1988)). 
9 Motion to Affirm, Exhibit C. 
 
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sentence.  Ferrer-Vasquez claims that during his meeting with trial counsel and his 
guilty plea colloquy the interpreter mistranslated the sentence he faced for second-
degree murder as fifteen to twenty-five years of imprisonment instead of fifteen 
years to life imprisonment, but the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea form shows a 
sentence of “15 – life” for second-degree murder, not “15 – 25.”10  Ferrer-Vasquez 
states that he does not read, write, or speak English, but does not claim that he cannot 
read or understand numbers.  The letter trial counsel sent to Ferrer-Vasquez 
accurately reflects that his plea to second-degree murder meant he avoided the 
mandatory life sentence a first-degree murder conviction would carry.     
(12) As to Ferrer-Vasquez’s contention that his trial counsel failed to present 
mitigation evidence during the penalty phase, he is mistaken.  Ferrer-Vasquez’s 
counsel obtained a psychiatric evaluation of Ferrer-Vasquez that he provided to the 
Superior Court and discussed at sentencing.  Counsel argued that the circumstances 
of Ferrer-Vasquez’s upbringing, his inability to obtain mental health treatment that 
could have helped him and his family, and his lack of criminal history supported less 
than the life imprisonment sentence sought by the State.   
(13) In imposing a life sentence, the Superior Court acknowledged the 
mitigation efforts of Ferrer-Vasquez’s counsel, but ultimately found those efforts 
unpersuasive.  The court noted during the hearing that Ferrer-Vasquez had stabbed 
 
10 Id. 
 
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the victim seventeen times and confirmed that Ferrer-Vasquez had been served with 
the protective order the victim had obtained before he killed her.  Ferrer-Vasquez 
has not shown that his counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness or that there was a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s 
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial.  
The Superior Court did not err in denying Ferrer-Vasquez’s motion for 
postconviction relief. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.   
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/  James T. Vaughn, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice