Case Title: Babick v. Oregon Arena Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S46518

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  February 22, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

KENNETH BABICK,
GARY MOORE,
and JACK K. MINZEY, JR.,
and others similarly situated,
	Petitioners on Review/Respondents on Review,
	v.
OREGON ARENA CORPORATION,
an Oregon Corporation,
	Respondent on Review/Petitioner on Review.
(CC 9704-02797; CA A99542; SC S46518, S46578)
(Consolidated for Argument and Opinion)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted September 11, 2000.
	William B. Aitchison, of Aitchison & Vick Inc., Portland,
argued the cause for petitioners on review/respondents on review. 
Megan E. Glor, of Swanson, Thomas & Coon, Portland, filed the
brief.
	John R. Faust, Jr., Portland, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review/petitioner on review.  With him on
the brief were Karen O'Kasey, Thomas M. Triplett, and Schwabe,
Williamson & Wyatt, P.C.
	Stephen L. Brischetto, Portland, filed a brief for amicus
curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
	GILLETTE, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed
in part and reversed in part.  The case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Nely L. Johnson, Judge (Motion to Dismiss), Joseph F. Ceniceros, Judge (Judgment of Dismissal). 160 Or App 140, 980 P2d 1147 (1999).
    **Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case; De Muniz and Balmer, JJ., did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case.
		GILLETTE, J. 
		The issue in this civil action is whether plaintiffs,
at-will employees who worked for defendant as security guards at
a concert arena, stated claims for relief for wrongful discharge
and intentional infliction of severe emotional distress.  The
Court of Appeals ruled that certain of the plaintiffs had stated
claims for relief with respect to both torts.  Babick v. Oregon
Arena Corp., 160 Or App 140, 980 P2d 1147 (1999).  For the
reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals with respect to those plaintiffs' wrongful discharge
claim, but otherwise affirm.
		We take the following statement of facts from the lead
opinion in the Court of Appeals:
		"Defendant owns the Memorial Coliseum, a large
entertainment forum in Portland.  Defendant hired
plaintiffs to provide security and medical assistance
at music concerts and other entertainment events held
there.  As part of their employment, plaintiffs
received training from defendant to carry out their
functions as security officers.  That training included
instruction on 'radio procedures, * * * defensive
tactics, the use of force, action to be taken in cases
of suspected drug possession and the possession of
alcohol by minors, [and] arrest protocol * * *.'  One
night, some of those security officers were working at
a music concert performed by the group known as Phish. 
At that concert, certain security officers arrested, or
attempted to arrest, some members of the audience for
engaging in assaultive behavior and illegal drug and
alcohol possession.  The arrests were consistent with
the training they had received from defendant and were
otherwise lawful under Oregon law.  About a week later,
defendant discharged the entire group of security
officers, including those who were at the concert but
did not make any arrests and those who were employed as
security officers at the time but did not work at that
concert.  Defendant fired all the security officers in
retaliation for the lawful law enforcement actions of
some security officers at the Phish concert." 
160 Or App at 142-43. 
	After they were fired, plaintiffs brought the present
action against defendant, alleging wrongful discharge (on the
theory that they had been discharged for fulfilling an important
societal duty, i.e., arresting lawbreakers) and intentional
infliction of severe emotional distress (on the theory that, in
terminating their employment, defendant intended to and did cause
them severe emotional distress).  Defendant moved to dismiss
under ORCP 21 A(8), and the trial court granted that motion. 
With the court's leave, plaintiffs then submitted an amended
complaint that supplemented the factual allegations that
pertained to the intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress claim.  Specifically, plaintiffs alleged:
"11.

     "Defendant, through its agents and employees, did
the following during and after the November 24 Phish
concert:
     "a. publicly berated plaintiffs for taking or
attempting to take law enforcement action at the
November 24 Phish concert consistent with Oregon law
and defendant's prior instruction;
     "b. interfered with plaintiffs' efforts to take
law enforcement action at the November 24 Phish concert
by releasing intoxicated and violent concertgoers who
had been detained by plaintiffs, thereby undermining
plaintiffs in the performance of their security duties
and presenting a threat of imminent physical harm to
plaintiffs;
     "d.[ (1)] berated plaintiffs for taking law
enforcement action and for defending themselves against
Phish employees and agents and employees and agents of
the concert promot[e]r who physically attacked
plaintiffs and interfered with plaintiffs' performance
of their security activities during and immediately
after the November 24 Phish concert;
     "e. "humiliated plaintiffs by publicly announcing
after the November 24 Phish concert that plaintiffs'
law enforcement actions would be a 'marketing disaster'
for defendant; and
     "f. after learning plaintiffs had to defend
themselves from physical injury against Phish and
promot[e]r representatives during the November 24 Phish
concert, condoned the actions of Phish employees and
agents and employees and agents of the concert
promot[e]r by threatening to terminate and actually
terminating plaintiffs' employment.
"12.
	
     "The aforementioned acts by defendants constitute
an extraordinary transgression of the bounds of
socially tolerable conduct.  In so acting, defendant
OAC intended to and did inflict severe emotional
distress on plaintiffs.  As plaintiffs' employer,
defendant had a duty to refrain from subjecting
plaintiff to severe emotional distress."
The trial court concluded that the amended complaint also failed
to state a claim and again dismissed, this time without leave to
replead. 
	Plaintiffs appealed, and a divided panel of the Court
of Appeals reversed in part.  The Court of Appeals held that,
with respect to the plaintiffs who participated in the arrests at
the Phish concert, the complaint stated a claim for wrongful
discharge, on a theory that those plaintiffs were terminated for
fulfilling a public duty.  160 Or App at 149.  However, the court
affirmed the dismissal of the wrongful discharge claims with
respect to those plaintiffs who did not participate in the
arrests, concluding that the complaint alleged that those
plaintiffs had been discharged because of their association with
the other plaintiffs, a reason that cannot support a wrongful
discharge claim.  Id.  The Court of Appeals also held that the
complaint stated a claim for intentional infliction of severe
emotional distress because plaintiffs' allegation in the amended
complaint that defendant had subjected them to a threat of
imminent danger (by releasing detainees) qualified as an
allegation of "socially intolerable" conduct.  Id. at 150. 
	Defendant petitioned for review of the Court of
Appeals' decision insofar as it holds that, with respect to the
plaintiffs who did participate in the arrests, the complaint
states viable claims for wrongful discharge and intentional
infliction of severe emotional distress.  Plaintiffs also
petitioned for review, challenging the Court of Appeals' decision
to uphold the dismissal with respect to those plaintiffs who did
not participate in the arrests.  We allowed both petitions.
	In reviewing a dismissal under ORCP 21 A(8), we accept
all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and give
plaintiffs the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be
drawn from the facts alleged.  Scovill v. City of Astoria, 324 Or
159, 164, 921 P2d 1312 (1996).  Our task is to determine only
whether those allegations, so construed, are sufficient to
constitute a claim.  Id. 
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE

	Although this court repeatedly has affirmed the general
validity of the at-will employment rule, (2) it has acknowledged
that a discharge of an at-will employee nonetheless may be deemed
"wrongful" (and, therefore, actionable) under certain
circumstances.  Examples of such circumstances include:  (1) when
the discharge is for exercising a job-related right that reflects
an important public policy, see, e.g., Brown v. Transcon Lines,
284 Or 597, 588 P2d 1087 (1978) (employee unlawfully discharged
for filing workers' compensation claim); or (2) when the
discharge is for fulfilling some important public duty, see,
e.g., Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, 297 Or 10, 681 P2d 114 (1984)
(employee discharged for refusing to defame another employee);
Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or 210, 536 P2d 512 (1975) (employee
discharged for serving on jury).
	Plaintiffs have pleaded this case as a "public duty,"
not a "job-related right," case.  The Court of Appeals accepted
plaintiffs' argument that the "public duty" exception to the at-will rule is implicated by plaintiffs' allegation that they were
discharged for making lawful arrests.  The court first noted
(correctly) that it must "find a public duty, not create one,"
using constitutional and statutory provisions and case law. 
Babick, 160 Or App at 144.  The Court of Appeals then held that,
for purposes of the "public duty" theory of wrongful discharge,
"it is not necessary that a statute specifically
obligate an employee to act in the way that
precipitated the discharge. * * * Rather, a public duty
may arise from evidence of a 'substantial public policy
that would * * * be "thwarted" if an employer were
allowed to discharge its employee without liability.'"
Id. (quoting Banaitis v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 129 Or App 371,
376, 879 P2d 1288 (1994)).
	Applying that standard to the present case, the Court
of Appeals examined the statutes that plaintiffs had identified
as relevant:  ORS chapters 131 to 170 (the Oregon Penal Code);
ORS 181.870 et seq. (regulating licensing and training of private
security personnel); ORS 133.220(3) (permitting private citizens
to make arrests); and ORS 133.225(2) (permitting persons to use
physical force in making an arrest).  The Court of Appeals found
evidence in those statutes that Oregonians "value" a safe and
orderly community, and share a "common concern" with reliable and
effective law enforcement by citizen officers, particularly at
large public events where there is little or no police presence. 
The court concluded that plaintiffs had stated a claim for
wrongful discharge because the aforementioned "policies" would be
thwarted if employers could discharge employees with impunity for
arresting lawbreakers at a large concert venue.  Id. at 145-49.
	Defendant acknowledges that some of the cited statutes
(i.e., ORS chapters 131-170) evince a general public policy in
favor of an "orderly and safe community."  Defendant argues,
however, that those statutes do not impose or even suggest that
private citizens have a public duty to take law enforcement
action against lawbreakers.  Defendant further argues that,
although ORS 133.220(3) permits citizen arrests and ORS 181.870
et seq. regulates the licensing and training of private security
personnel, neither statute requires private citizens or private
security guards to arrest lawbreakers whom they encounter.  
	Implicit in defendant's argument is the proposition
that, for purposes of the "public duty" theory of wrongful
discharge, such a duty exists only if some statute or other
source of law imposes a specific legal obligation on the employee
to act in the way that precipitates the discharge.  That view of
the public duty theory is antagonistic to, and far narrower than,
the Court of Appeals' formulation quoted above.  However, we need
not decide, in this case, whether the "public duty" construct is
as narrow as defendant's argument suggests.  That is so because,
as we shall explain, the statutes on which plaintiffs rely do not
establish any public duty that is relevant in this case.  
	As noted, the Court of Appeals correctly acknowledged
that it is necessary to "'find' a public duty, not create one,
using 'constitutional and statutory provisions, or the case law
of this or other jurisdictions.'"  Babick, 160 Or App at 144.  In
purporting to "find" a public policy on the matter, the Court of
Appeals relied, first, on ORS chapters 131-170.  In that court's
view, those statutes reflect a public policy against crime, and
in favor of community safety and order.  However, such
expressions of a public desire for law and order are far too
general to support plaintiffs' "public duty" theory.  We are
concerned here with a duty to perform a specific act (the arrest
of lawbreakers by private citizens or private security
personnel), and the statutes cited have nothing to say about that
kind of act. 
	The Court of Appeals also relied on ORS 133.220(3) and
ORS 133.225(2), which entitle private citizens to arrest
lawbreakers and which, in the Court of Appeals' view, demonstrate
that the public is "concerned" about law enforcement in
circumstances in which police officers are not present.  However,
whether the allusion to common "concern" is accurate, those
statutes, on their face, are neutral on the essential issue,
which is whether the law encourages law enforcement action by
private individuals or security personnel or otherwise
demonstrates that such acts enjoy high social value.
	The third observation on which the Court of Appeals'
relied, viz., that ORS 181.870 et seq. (which regulates the
licensing and training of private security personnel)
demonstrates "common concern for reliable and effective private
law enforcement," Babick, 160 Or App at 146, suffers from a
similar lack of focus.  That statutory scheme shows that the
public is concerned about the manner in which private law
enforcement is carried out; it does not suggest that the
activities of private security personnel enjoy any higher social
value than the activities of employees in other professions to
which the at-will rule applies.  Neither do the statutes impose
an affirmative duty on private security personnel to arrest
lawbreakers.
	In short, we find no support in the statutes that have
been brought to our attention (and upon which the Court of
Appeals relied) for a conclusion that some substantial public
duty requires the kinds of acts that allegedly triggered
plaintiffs' discharge.  The Court of Appeals erred in purporting
to "find" such a policy.  Thus, even accepting the view of the
Court of Appeals that a "public duty" may arise out of some
expression of a "substantial public policy" that would be
thwarted by the discharge at issue (as opposed to a law that
specifically obligates an employee to act in a certain way),
plaintiffs have failed to establish that predicate here. 
Plaintiffs' argument that they were fired for acting in
accordance with a public duty is not well taken.  The trial court
did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' wrongful discharge claim. 
The contrary conclusion of the Court of Appeals was error. (3)
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
SEVERE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

	To state a claim for intentional infliction of severe
emotional distress, a plaintiff must plead that 
"(1) the defendant intended to inflict severe emotional
distress on the plaintiff, (2) the defendant's acts
were the cause of the plaintiff's severe emotional
distress, and (3) the defendant's acts constituted an
extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially
tolerable conduct."
McGanty v. Staudenraus, 321 Or 532, 543, 901 P2d 841 (1995)
(quoting Sheets v. Knight, 308 Or 220, 236, 779 P2d 1000 (1989). 
Defendant contends that plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a
claim for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress on
two grounds:  (1) plaintiffs failed to allege the requisite level
of intent; and (2) none of the acts alleged in the complaint
constitutes an "extraordinary transgression of the bounds of
socially tolerable conduct.  
	We first consider defendant's argument with respect to
the allegation of intent.  Defendant argues that the complaint is
deficient because it fails to allege that defendant knew that its
conduct was substantially certain to cause plaintiffs to suffer
severe emotional distress.  Defendant relies on McGanty which, in
defendant's view, stands for the proposition that a claim for
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress must allege
both that the defendant desired to inflict severe emotional
distress and that the defendant knew that such distress was
substantially certain to result from defendant's conduct. 
	Defendant misreads McGanty.  In McGanty, this court
considered whether a plaintiff adequately had alleged intent when
he alleged that the defendant's acts were intentional and that
the defendant knew or should have known that those acts would
cause severe emotional distress.  McGanty, 321 Or at 544.  Before
McGanty, this court had indicated that a plaintiff must allege
that the defendant acted with the purpose of inflicting severe
emotional distress to sustain a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.  See, e.g., Patton v. J. C. Penney Co.,
301 Or 117, 122-23, 719 P2d 854 (1986) (so holding).  However, in
McGanty, this court concluded that those previous statements with
respect to the intent requirement were incorrect and that the
correct formulation was expressed in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, § 8A (1965), including Comments a and b (defining "intent"
for purposes of intentional torts to pertain to consequences that
actor desires, but also to circumstances where actor "knows that
the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result
from his act, and still goes ahead") and section 46 (describing
elements of tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress).  McGanty, 321 Or at 549-50.  This court quoted with
approval the following portion of the commentary to section 46,
which explains the element of intent in the specific context of
the tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress:
"The rule stated in this Section applies where the
actor desires to inflict severe emotional distress, and
also where he knows that such distress is certain, or
substantially certain, to result from his conduct."
Id. at 550.  Applying that standard to the allegation in the
McGanty complaint, the court concluded that the plaintiff's
allegation that the defendant acted volitionally with knowledge
that the acts would cause severe emotional distress was
sufficient.  Id. at 550-51.
	Thus, McGanty does not indicate, as defendant suggests,
that a plaintiff must allege both that the defendant desired to
inflict severe emotional distress and that the defendant knew
that such distress was substantially certain to result from a
volitional act.  Rather, it holds that either allegation is
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.
	Plaintiffs in the present case specifically alleged
that defendant acted with a purpose of causing plaintiffs severe
emotional distress:  "In so acting, defendant * * * intended to * * * inflict severe emotional distress on plaintiffs."  Such an
allegation is sufficient at this stage of the proceedings to
survive a motion to dismiss.  Plaintiffs also need not allege
that defendant acted with knowledge that severe emotional
distress was substantially certain to result from its conduct.
	Defendant also has suggested that plaintiffs'
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress claim fails
because the conduct alleged is not sufficiently outrageous, i.e.,
it does not qualify as an "extraordinary transgression of the
bounds of socially tolerable conduct."  McGanty, 321 Or at 543. 
In that regard, plaintiffs allege that defendant:  (1) publicly
and privately berated them for taking the law enforcement actions
that they did; (2) humiliated them by announcing that plaintiffs'
actions would create a marketing disaster; (3) terminated their
employment upon learning that plaintiffs had been threatened by
Phish employees and had defended themselves; and (4) released
"intoxicated and violent" concertgoers who had been detained by
plaintiffs, thereby presenting a threat of imminent physical harm
to them.
	We need to discuss only one of those allegations, viz.,
the allegation that defendant exposed plaintiffs to a "threat of
imminent physical harm" by releasing "intoxicated and violent
concertgoers who [previously] had been detained by plaintiffs." 
Intentionally causing another person severe emotional distress by
exposing that person to a threat of imminent physical harm is, or
may be, outside the bounds of socially tolerable behavior.  See,
e.g., Brewer v. Erwin, 287 Or 435, 458-60, 600 P2d 398 (1979)
(landlord's attempt to frighten tenant out of apartment by
disconnecting utilities, acting in threatening manner, and
demolishing part of building while tenant was residing in it
could constitute intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress).
	As we already have noted, we give plaintiffs the
benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the
pleadings.  We assume, therefore, that the threat to plaintiffs
was a grave one, i.e., that, under the circumstances, there was a
significant probability that the "intoxicated and violent"
detainees physically would attack and harm those who had detained
them.  We also assume, given plaintiffs' other allegations about
defendant's conduct during the concert, that defendant not only
released a vengeful mob against plaintiffs, but in some sense
added to the threatening atmosphere by interfering with
plaintiffs' work and publicly rebuking them on the scene.  
	We agree with the Court of Appeals that plaintiffs have
alleged conduct that a jury could conclude was socially
intolerable.  Those plaintiffs who were exposed directly to a
threat of physical attack have stated a claim for intentional
infliction of severe emotional distress.  Those plaintiffs who
were not present at the concert or who were not involved in
arresting concertgoers were not exposed to a threat of imminent
harm by defendant's conduct.  We therefore also agree with the
Court of Appeals that the trial court properly dismissed those
plaintiffs' claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.  
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in
part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The case is remanded to
the circuit court for further proceedings.





1. 	No paragraph "c" appears in the original amended
complaint.

2. 	Specifically, this court has stated that "[g]enerally
an employer may discharge an employe[e] at any time and for any
reason, absent a contractual, statutory or constitutional
requirement [to the contrary]."  Patton v. J. C. Penney Co., 301
Or 117, 120, 719 P2d 854 (1986).  See also Madani v. Kendall
Ford, Inc., 312 Or 198, 202, 818 P2d 930 (1991) (quoting Patton
to that effect); Sheets v. Knight, 308 Or 220, 230-31, 779 P2d
1000 (1989) (same).

3. 	The foregoing conclusion resolves the issue raised in
plaintiffs' petition for review, viz., whether those plaintiffs
who were not present at the Phish concert or did not make
arrests, but who were discharged because of their coworker's law
enforcement actions, stated a claim for wrongful discharge.  We
have concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in reinstating the
wrongful discharge claims of plaintiffs who were involved in
arresting lawbreakers at the Phish concert.  Given that
disposition, the plaintiffs who were not involved in the arrests
gain nothing by arguing, as they do in their petition, that
defendant fired them for the same retaliatory reason that it
fired their coworkers who were present at the Phish concert.