Case Title: Bigelow v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bigelow v. State1989 WY 25768 P.2d 558Case Number: 87-249Decided: 01/27/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
GARY 
BIGELOW, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, NatronaCounty, Daniel R. Spangler, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, WDAP, Daniel M. 
Hesse and Michael K. Cornia, Student Interns, WDAP, for appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Terry L. Armitage, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and BROWN, J., Retired.*

 
 
*Retired 
June 30, 1988.

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This case involves 
burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary convictions in violation of W.S. 
6-3-3011 and W.S. 6-1-303.2 Gary Bigelow (appellant) and other 
prisoners in the Natrona County Jail hatched and executed the generally 
unsuccessful effort with appellant's primary defense now being that the 
participants only conspired to rob other establishments and not burglarize the 
Wonder Bar which became the final target. Therefore, the "wrong" conspiracy was 
charged. After the jury found appellant guilty of both burglary and conspiracy 
to commit burglary, he was sentenced to consecutive terms of six to eight 
years.

 
 

[¶2.]     Appellant phrases the 
issues as whether:

 
 
[T]here was 
sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to allow conviction.

 
 
[T]he 
letters from Studer and statements made by Bonner and Studer were inadmissible 
hearsay.

 
 
[A]dmission 
of the hearsay statements was harmless error.

 
 

[¶3.]     We 
affirm.

 
 
I. 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant was 
incarcerated in the Natrona County Jail from November 6, 1986 to March 8, 1987. 
Starting with the second week in February 1987 until appellant's release, he was 
confined in a large cell with several individuals, including Russell Fleetwood, 
George Studer, and Herb Bonner. Christopher Dvorak also shared this confinement 
intermittently since he was only serving weekends. It was in this period from 
the second week in February 1987 until March 8, 1987 that the conspiracy between 
these people, Everett Gunnett, Gwendi Poledna and appellant, allegedly occurred. 
Fleetwood and Dvorak testified as to what occurred in the jail, although neither 
one was charged as a co-conspirator. Studer was the alleged hub of the 
conspiracy and had become acquainted with Gunnett from sharing correctional time 
at the State Boys' School in Worland. This friendship was renewed after a few 
years of divergence and Studer moved in with the Gunnett family. It was through 
Gunnett's sister, Evelyn, that Studer knew Poledna. As well, Studer was 
acquainted with Bonner because they both had a common acquaintance of Howard 
Hamlin, who was the manager of the Wonder Bar. Bonner, the only person named in 
the indictment as having conspired with appellant to burglarize the Wonder Bar, 
boasted of his employment as bartender of the Wonder Bar, where he had been 
working for a few years; however, he had been terminated prior to his 
incarceration. His "bragging" after recollecting after hour activities such as 
roof parties, progressed to explaining his knowledge of the building layout, 
security system, and even the safe combination.

 
 

[¶5.]     As the activities 
proceeded, it became known around the jail that Bonner and appellant did not get 
along. Studer, the scribe among the parties, wrote two letters which played a 
part in the plot. The first letter postmarked February 20, 1987 was sent from 
Studer to Gunnett and encouraged Gunnett to help appellant ease into the 
transitional period after his release from incarceration. The second letter 
postmarked February 25, 1987 was sent by Studer to Poledna and asked that 
Poledna pick up appellant when he was released. Moreover, in this 
correspondence, Studer asked that Poledna get a ski cap, a jump suit, and a BB 
gun from Gunnett. Although Studer's motivations for this last request were not 
apparent at the time, he testified at appellant's trial that it was made at the 
urging of Bonner so he could set him up. On Sunday, March 2, 1987, Poledna and 
Evelyn Gunnett started comparing the two3 letters; adding two and two and not 
coming up with four, they decided to share the contents of this correspondence 
with Al Gunnett, Evelyn Gunnett's stepfather.

 
 

[¶6.]     Al Gunnett delivered 
the letters to the police who instructed Poledna and Evelyn Gunnett to talk with 
appellant, Studer, and Bonner on the following Monday evening to acquire further 
information. Poledna complied with the visitation request and visited with 
Bonner, Studer and appellant, each in turn, to only learn from Studer that 
"they" were planning on robbing Kentucky Fried Chicken and Peaches and from 
Bonner that Studer could not be trusted. On the next Thursday, Bonner told 
Poledna to come by the jail about 8:30 p.m. that night. Bonner told her at that 
meeting "[t]hat Gary [appellant] was not going to trust Studer's judgment and 
that they were going to do another place, do a bar is what he said." When 
appellant was released from jail on that Thursday, Dvorak picked him up as 
arranged. Poledna was called twice the next evening by appellant; once he was 
told that Gunnett would be better for the job, and the second time, after 
apparently deciding to proceed with Gunnett's inclusion in the plot, appellant 
left a phone number where he could be reached. Gunnett, although not a present 
crony, was not unknown to the other cast of players since Studer and he had been 
old boys' school mates, and Fleetwood and Gunnett had socialized a lot and 
shared a common background. In a complex effort as initiated by the police, 
Gunnett contacted appellant for a meeting. Gunnett, wired, kept this appointment 
as was evidenced by the tapes which were produced of the resulting conversation. 
Appellant advised Gunnett of the layout and the combination to the safe of the 
Wonder Bar, which had been learned from Bonner.

 
 

[¶7.]     On March 7, 1987, as 
following the developed plan, appellant had Gunnett drive him to a place close 
to the Wonder Bar where he subsequently paid his cover charge and had a few 
drinks, portraying the role of a normal patron. Appellant, as had been planned, 
left the main serving area acting as though he were going to the restroom, but 
continued on and instead went through the hatch door in the roof. Appellant, 
while hiding in the crawl space, indicated he had "a change of heart."4 Delayed when the band and manager 
stayed until approximately 5:30 a.m. and then realizing how "bad" the situation 
looked, appellant waited to depart until after bar personnel had gone to be 
caught by the waiting police when he went out the bar's back door. The dollar 
bills from a shake-a-day jar were discovered missing as apparently picked up by 
him on attempted departure.

 
 

[¶8.]     Convicted of conspiracy 
to commit burglary as well as the substantive offense of burglary, appeal is 
only taken from the conspiracy count.5

 

II. 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

 
 

[¶9.]     Our standard of 
evidentiary review has been examined numerous times.

 
 
"`In 
reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case, this court makes a 
painstaking review of the record to determine if the evidence is sufficient to 
permit the jury to reach the conclusion that it did. [Citation.] The court will 
not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption 
of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, could reasonably conclude that a defendant was proved guilty of the 
offense charged. [Citation.] The court considers the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict and will assume that the jury disbelieved any testimony 
in conflict with the result it reached. [Citation.]' State v. Richardson, Minn., 393 N.W.2d 657, 661-662 
(1986)."

 
 
Scadden v. 
State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1052 (Wyo. 1987) (quoting 
DeSersa v. State, 729 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo. 1986)). See also for the sufficiency 
rule, Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478 (Wyo. 1988); 
Righter v. State, 752 P.2d 416 (Wyo. 1988); and 
Carson v. State, 751 P.2d 1315 (Wyo. 1988). Appellant 
narrows the sufficiency inquiry by only contending that there was not enough 
evidence to support the conspiracy conviction.

 
 

[¶10.]  This court in Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1332 (Wyo. 1977) defined conspiracy 
as:

 
 
     A conspiracy is an 
agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act. The crime of 
conspiracy is complete when an agreement has been made and overt acts performed 
to further the unlawful design. Goldsmith v. Cheney, 10 Cir. 1971, 447 F.2d 624.

 
 
The 
elements of the general conspiracy statute, W.S. 6-1-303, have been defined as: 
"(1) an agreement between one or more persons to commit a crime, and (2) an 
overt act to effect the objective of the agreement."6 Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852, 855 
(Wyo. 1987). 
The overt act is the manifestation of the conspiracy at work. Schultz v. State, 
751 P.2d 367, 371 (1988); 2 W. LaFave and A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 
6.5 at 94 (1986).

 
 

[¶11.]  The gravamen of appellant's attack is on 
the agreement7 aspect of the conspiracy charge. 
Appellant argues that there is no substantial evidence of an agreement between 
appellant and Bonner; therefore, without a meeting of the minds, a conspiracy 
could not occur. Appellant's misconception is twofold. First, the meeting of the 
minds theory relates to a bilateral approach to conspiracy which this court has 
expressly rejected.

 
 
"One might 
suppose that the agreement necessary for conspiracy is essentially like the 
agreement or `meeting of the minds' which is critical to a contract, but this is 
not the case. Although there continues to exist some uncertainty as to the 
precise meaning of word in the context of conspiracy, it is clear that the 
definition in this setting is somewhat more lax than elsewhere. A mere tacit 
understanding will suffice, and there need not be any written statement or even 
a speaking of words which expressly communicates agreement. * * 
*

 
 
"Because 
most conspiracies are clandestine in nature, the prosecution is seldom able to 
present direct evidence of the agreement. Courts have been sympathetic to this 
problem, and it is thus well established that the prosecution may `rely on 
inferences drawn from the course of conduct of the alleged conspirators.'"8

 
 
Burke, 746 P.2d  at 855 (quoting W. LaFave and A. Scott, 
Criminal Law, § 61 at 460-61 (1972) (emphasis added)).9

 

[¶12.]  Appellant's second misconception is that 
only evidence relating to the conspiracy between the charged individuals can be considered, 
essentially resting on the premise that if the individual is not charged, he 
cannot be a co-conspirator. While Bonner was the only other individual charged, 
the evidence from the other individuals is not precluded from consideration. A 
conspiracy need not be charged for a joint venturer to be considered a 
co-conspirator. See Burke, 746 P.2d  at 855; Jasch, 563 P.2d  at 1333 and cases 
cited therein.10 This court in Jasch, 563 P.2d  at 
1332, adopted Judge Learned Hand's phraseology from United States v. Olweiss, 138 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 
1943), cert. denied 321 U.S. 744, 64 S. Ct. 483, 88 L. Ed. 1047 
(1944) in this regard:

 
 
"[A]nd any 
evidence admissible against Olweiss was admissible against them, so far as it 
consisted of conduct in furtherance of the joint venture in which all three were 
engaged. The notion that the competency of the declarations of a confederate is 
confined to prosecutions for conspiracy has not the slightest basis; their 
admission does not depend upon the indictment, but is merely an incident of the 
general principle of agency that the acts of any agent, within the scope of his 
authority, are competent against his principal."

 
 

[¶13.]  Further circumstantial evidence can be 
relied on to prove the conspiracy because of the covert nature of the crime 
itself. Burke, 746 P.2d  at 855 (citing W. LaFave and A. Scott, Criminal Law, 
supra, at 460-61).11 In any event, there was 
substantial evidence supplied by appellant through the taped conversations 
between Gunnett and himself to find a conspiracy to rob the Wonder Bar.12 It is immaterial that the 
indictment lists the conspiracy participants as only Bonner and appellant. After 
reviewing this record, we find more than enough evidence to support the jury's 
finding that a conspiracy existed to burglarize the Wonder Bar.13

 

[¶14.]  Appellant's argument based on the 
charging of the "wrong" conspiracy is premised on the scope of the conspiracy 
and is basically that the statements made were not in furtherance of planning 
the Wonder Bar burglary. A proper foundational showing under W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) 
is for the State to show "(1) that a conspiracy exists, (2) membership of the 
declarant co-conspirator and the defendant in such conspiracy, and (3) that the 
declaration was uttered in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy." 
Burke, 746 P.2d  at 865.

 
 

[¶15.]  To determine if the situation exhibits 
one or several conspiracies, the totality of the circumstances must be 
considered. Some factors examined are: "(1) the number of alleged overt acts in 
common; (2) the overlap in personnel; (3) the time period during which the 
alleged acts took place; (4) the similarity in the methods of operation; (5) the 
locations in which the alleged acts took place; (6) the extent to which 
purported conspiracies share a common objective; and (7) the degree of 
interdependence needed for the overall operation to succeed." 2 W. LaFave and A. 
Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, supra, at 102 (footnotes 
omitted).

 
 
     An agreement to commit 
several crimes is but one conspiracy. Several persons may be parties to a single 
conspiracy even if they have never directly communicated with one another; the 
question is whether they are aware of each other's participation in a general 
way and have a community of interest.

 
 

Id. at 
86.

 
 

[¶16.]  For a person to be held responsible as a 
co-conspirator, a member need not be acquainted in a complex situation with the 
other members, D. Binder, Hearsay Handbook § 28.06 (2d ed. 1983), have direct 
dealings, 2 W. LaFave and A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, supra, at 71, know 
the identity of the others or all the details, W. LaFave and A. Scott, Criminal 
Law, supra, at 460-61.14 The record amply demonstrates that 
appellant knew of the others' participation in the burglary scheme. "To prove 
that a statement has been made in furtherance of a conspiracy, it need be shown 
only that the statement was intended to advance the objectives of the 
conspiracy." Comment, Testing the Reliability of Coconspirators' Statements 
Admitted Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E): Putting the Claws Back in 
the Confrontation Clause, 30 Vill.L.Rev. 1565, 1590-91 (1985). While mere 
bragging does not satisfy the in furtherance requirement, Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 
673 F.2d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 466 U.S. 931, 104 S. Ct. 1718, 80 L. Ed. 2d 190 (1984), the boasts can be admissible under F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) when 
the declarant uses the information to obtain confidence of the co-conspirator. 
United States v. McGuire, 608 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Rivera v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 1092, 100 S. Ct. 1060, 62 L. Ed. 2d 782, reh'g denied 613 F.2d 315 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 446 U.S. 910, 100 S. Ct. 1838, 64 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1980). See United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 905 (9th 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Werner v. United States, 455 U.S. 1027, 102 S. Ct. 1731, 72 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1982), description of robbery was in furtherance 
because of necessity to facilitate the escape; and United States v. Pool, 660 F.2d 547, 562 (5th Cir. 1981), statements were admissible when found "necessary 
to keep them abreast of the conspiracy's current status." Ultimately, the fact 
that the other participants were not charged or that another conspiracy or two 
may have also occurred, is not material to the present issue if the information 
is found to have been made in furtherance of the Wonder Bar conspiracy when the 
totality of the circumstances are considered.

 
 
III. 
HEARSAY

 
 

[¶17.]  Appellant argues that the two letters - 
the one from Studer to Poledna and the one from Studer to Gunnett - should not 
have been admitted over his hearsay objections. The same rationale is used to 
try to exclude Poledna's testimony concerning discussion of restaurant robberies 
or that Bonner had informed her that he and appellant were planning on 
burglarizing the Wonder Bar. Consequently, the trial court's application of 
W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E)15 is at the center of this 
turmoil.16

 
 

[¶18.]  The United States Supreme Court recently 
had occasion to reexamine the co-conspirator aspect of F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E)17 in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1987).18 Appellant essentially advocates 
that this court must adopt a standard of independent evidence19 concerning the existence, 
membership, and scope of the conspiracy to avoid the bootstrapping problems of 
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680, reh'g denied 
sub nom. Kretske v. United 
States, 315 U.S. 827, 62 S. Ct. 629, 86 L. Ed. 1222, reh'g denied sub nom. Roth v. United 
States, 315 U.S. 827, 62 S. Ct. 637, 86 L. Ed. 1222 
(1942).

 
 

[¶19.]  Appellant additionally advances the 
thesis that this court's majority holding in Burke, 746 P.2d 852, which required 
a prima facie showing of the conspiracy, is now inconsistent with the holding in 
Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct.  at 2779, that the standard of proof of the conspiracy 
before admission is by a preponderance of the evidence. Bourjaily, however, did 
not decide if the conspiracy determination can rest solely upon the 
co-conspirator's statement since that was not the presented factual scenario. 
Fortunately, this court like the United States Supreme Court in Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct.  at 2781, is not left with a bare assertion of the hearsay statement to 
support a pyramided conspiracy since other independent evidence was present to 
establish the existence of the conspiracy. D. Binder, supra, at 152 (2d. ed. 
1983 & Supp. 1988). Thus, any claim of error in the standard utilized to 
establish the existence of the conspiracy must be evaluated in relation to 
whether it was harmless error. See United States v. James, 609 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 
1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 905, 100 S. Ct. 1082, 63 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1980), where 
the error was not substantial when viewed with the other evidence, so no 
substantial rights of the defendant were jeopardized and United States v. Lyles, 
593 F.2d 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 440 U.S. 972, 99 S. Ct. 1537, 59 L. Ed. 2d 789, cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. United States, 440 U.S. 975, 99 S. Ct. 1545, 59 L. Ed. 2d 794, cert. denied sub nom. Holder v. United States, 444 U.S. 847, 100 S. Ct. 94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 61 (1979). Cf. Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(2)(E) and the Confrontation Clause: Closing the Window of Admissibility 
for Coconspirator Hearsay, 53 Fordham L.Rev. 1291, 1320 (1985) advocating that 
harmless error not be utilized in "close" cases.

 
 

[¶20.]  In this case, the impact of the letters 
and Poledna's statements were minimal. The most critical and damaging testimony 
came from appellant himself through the taped conversations with Gunnett where 
appellant implicated himself. Clearly, these statements could be admitted 
independent of W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E).

 
 
     It should be noted 
that a party's participation in a conspiracy may be established by his own statement, which qualifies as an 
admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) when offered against him, and which may be 
received without invoking the coconspirator exception.

 
 
4 D. 
Louisell and C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 427 at 332-33 (1980) (emphasis in 
original). Factually, this case is similar to United States v. Hernandez, 829 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 1486, 99 L. Ed. 2d 714, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 2029, 100 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1988), where 
the defendant's taped statements were strong independent proof of the conspiracy 
and thus admissible. We do not need to confine admissibility within a prima 
facie evidence premise as we consider this well developed factual foundation of 
conspiracy. Consequently, the Bourjaily standard of preponderance is no 
impedance to affirmed conviction.

 
 

[¶21.]  Lastly, appellant challenges the order of 
proof. The four step order of proof was outlined in Burke, 746 P.2d  at 866. Here 
again, we find no error that affected substantial rights when all the evidence 
is properly considered.

 
 

[¶22.]  AFFIRMED.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 W.S. 6-3-301(a) 
provides:

 
 
     (a) A person is guilty 
of burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a building, occupied 
structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with 
intent to commit larceny or a felony therein.

 
 

2 W.S. 6-1-303 
provides:

 
 
     (a) A person is guilty 
of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or more persons that 
they or one (1) or more of them will commit a crime and one (1) or more of them 
does an overt act to effect the objective of the 
agreement.

 
 
     (b) A person is not 
liable under this section if after conspiring he withdraws from the conspiracy 
and thwarts its success under circumstances manifesting voluntary and complete 
renunciation of his criminal intention.

 
 
     (c) A conspiracy may 
be prosecuted in the county where the agreement was entered into, or in any 
county where any act evidencing the conspiracy or furthering the purpose took 
place.

 
 

3 Actually, three 
letters were introduced into evidence. Two were addressed to Poledna from Studer 
and appellant respectively; the other one was addressed to Gunnett sent by 
Studer. Only the admission of the letter to Poledna from Studer and the letter 
to Gunnett from Studer are being questioned. However, the pertinence even at 
trial of the letter to Poledna from appellant is not clear, since it innocuously 
discussed her taking him to Denver to buy a car when he was 
released.

 
 

4 Appellant 
appropriately does not argue that this constituted a withdrawal from the 
conspiracy because there was not affirmative evidence in addition to the 
withdrawal of the thwarting of the conspiracy's success "under circumstances 
manifesting voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal intention." W.S. 
6-1-303(b). See also United 
States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied 464 U.S. 993, 104 S. Ct. 486, 78 L. Ed. 2d 682 (1983); Project, White-Collar 
Crime: Survey of Law-1983 Update, 21 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 179, 216 (1983); 2 W. LaFave 
and A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §§ 6.4 and 6.5(f) (1986); and 4 D. 
Louisell and C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 427 at 338-39 
(1980).

 
 

5 Although appellant in 
context barely got peanuts, the analogy to cheese and a baited trap is not 
inapposite. An entrapment defense was not made. At the same time, the 
conspiratorial activities were indeed a poorly kept secret. His oppressive luck 
was not to end, since a plea bargain at preliminary hearing, which was 
singularly better than the final sentence, went awry to result in his proceeding 
to trial and convictions. A comprehensive inculpatory statement given in pursuit 
of the plea negotiations was suppressed following a pretrial motion in limine, 
but the information contained was obviously of no detriment to prosecution and 
of no benefit to appellant in trial planning and 
presentation.

 
 

6 An overt act is not a 
requirement under Wyoming's controlled substances conspiracy 
statute. See W.S. 35-7-1042; Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852, 855 n. 1 (Wyo. 1987); and Apodaca v. State, 627 P.2d 1023 
(Wyo. 
1981).

 
 

7 This agreement 
requirement has a long history.

 
 
     The first significant 
expansion of conspiracy occurred with the decision by the Court of Star Chamber 
in 1611 of Poulterers' Case. The defendants had confederated to bring a false 
accusation against one Stone, but Stone was so clearly innocent that the grand 
jury refused to indict him. This being so, it was the contention of the 
defendants that no conspiracy had occurred, but the court decided to the 
contrary. Thus, Poulterers' Case gave rise to a doctrine which survives to this 
day: the gist of conspiracy is the agreement, and thus the agreement is 
punishable even if its purpose was not achieved.

 
 
W. LaFave and A. Scott, 
Criminal Law § 61 at 453-54 (1972).

 
 

8 This leniency view has 
been criticized as unfair to criminal defendants with Judge Learned Hand 
describing conspiracy as the "darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery." 
Harrison v. United 
States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925). Justice 
Jackson, in a concurring opinion in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 69 S. Ct. 716, 93 L. Ed. 790 (1949), analogized conspiracy to an "`elastic, sprawling 
and pervasive offense, * * * so vague that it almost defies definition [and 
also] chameleonlike [because it] takes on a special coloration from each of the 
many independent offenses on which it may be overlaid.'" W. LaFave and A. Scott, 
Criminal Law, supra n. 7, at 456. Some commentators have summed up the problem 
and suggested that "`it is hard to find an antidote for the poison you cannot 
identify.'" W. LaFave and A. Scott, Criminal Law, supra n. 7, at 456 (quoting 
Mitford, The Trial of Dr. Spock at 61 (1969)).

 
 
     The 
United States Supreme Court 
in Blumenthal v. United 
States, 332 U.S. 539, 68 S. Ct. 248, 92 L. Ed. 154 
(1947), reh'g denied sub nom. Goldsmith v. United 
States, 332 U.S. 856, 68 S. Ct. 385, 92 L. Ed. 425, 
reh'g denied sub nom. Weiss v. United 
States, 332 U.S. 856, 68 S. Ct. 385, 92 L. Ed. 425, 
reh'g denied sub nom. Feigenbaum v. United 
States, 332 U.S. 856, 68 S. Ct. 385, 92 L. Ed. 425 
(1948) has explained this wide latitude:

 
 
     "Secrecy and 
concealment are essential features of successful conspiracy. The more completely 
they are achieved, the more successful the crime. Hence the law rightly gives 
room for allowing the conviction of those discovered upon showing sufficiently 
the essential nature of the plan and their connections with it, without 
requiring evidence of knowledge of all its details or of the participation of 
others. Otherwise the difficulties, not only of discovery, but of certainty in 
proof and of correlating proof with pleading would become insuperable, and 
conspirators would go free by their very ingenuity."

 
 
2. W. LaFave and A. 
Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, supra, at 66.

 
 

9 For further discussion 
of the bilateral versus unilateral approach to conspiracy, see 2 W. LaFave and 
A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, supra, at 73 n. 107 (that Wyoming 
statutorily takes the unilateral approach); and Note, Conditional Objectives of 
Conspiracies, 94 Yale L.J. 895, 906-07 n. 64 (1985).

 
 

10 The extensive amount 
of literature on this subject is in agreement that a conspiracy need not be 
charged. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039 (1974); United States v. Kendricks, 623 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1980); 
United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Lyles, 593 F.2d 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 440 U.S. 972, 99 S. Ct. 1537, 59 L. Ed. 2d 789, 
cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. United States, 440 U.S. 975, 99 S. Ct. 1545, 59 L. Ed. 2d 794, cert. denied sub nom. Holder v. United States, 444 U.S. 847, 100 S. Ct. 94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 61 (1979); United States v. Talbot, 470 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 
1972); United States v. Rinaldi, 393 F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 393 U.S. 913, 89 S. Ct. 233, 21 L. Ed. 2d 198 (1968); Report of Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, Comments to F.R.E. 801; E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 267 at 794 
(3d ed. 1984); M. Dombroff, Trial Hearsay: Objections & Exceptions at 48 
(1988); 11 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 801.50[6](E) (2d ed. 1988); and 
4 D. Louisell and C. Mueller, supra n. 4, at 333-34.

 
 

11 See also Dorador v. 
State, 711 P.2d 417, 419 (Wyo. 1985); Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663, 677 (Wyo. 
1982); McLaughlin v. State, 626 P.2d 63, 65, 66 (Wyo. 1981); Jasch, 563 P.2d  at 
1334; State v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 139 N.W.2d 490, cert. denied 385 U.S. 817, 
87 S. Ct. 39, 17 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1966); Project, supra n. 4, 21 Am. Crim.L.Rev. at 
211; and Note, Inconsistencies in the Federal Circuit Courts' Application of the 
Coconspirator Exception, 39 Wn. & Lee L.Rev. 125, 126 n. 12 
(1982).

 
 

12 Part of the exchange 
exhibited from Gunnett's testimony during this drive succinctly stated the 
involvement:

 
 
Q. What did he say 
about Herb Bonner?

 
 
A. He told me that when 
he was in jail with Herb, had told him the way to get in, the way to get to the 
safe, how to get in the safe, the combination and that Herb had been doing this 
because he was pretty angry with the Wonder Bar.

 
 

13 The officer testified 
from monitoring the conversations:

 
 
     Q. From your 
monitoring the conversations did the defendant Gary Bigelow ever mention Herb 
Bonner by name?

 
 
     A. Yes, he 
did.

 
 
     Q. In what 
context?

 
 
     A. Talking about Herb 
being sincere and being, giving him the combination to the safe of the Wonder 
Bar, that he had been an ex-employee, that he was sending his sister $2,000. and 
that was pretty much the contents of that portion, when mentioned Herb Bonner by 
name.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
     A. He was explaining 
that Herb had told him not to worry about the sign that says there is an alarm 
or about setting the alarm system because the Wonder Bar can never afford to 
have it hooked up.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
     A. When first out in 
front of 1711 Custer had a short conversation there, and Mr. Bigelow told 
Everett that he had gotten the combination of the safe from Herb, which Everett 
responded, Herb who? And then Mr. Bigelow explained that Herb was an ex-employee 
of the Wonder Bar. And again at 15th and Poplar was turning northbound again, 
talking about the combination at that time, I have got the combination supplied 
by Herb. When he mentioned him by name, Herb Bonner, and also that he was going to send Herb's sister 
$2,000. out of the money he was going to get. [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 

14 For views on the 
complications of determining the "in furtherance" requirement, see: Comment, 
Testing The Reliability of Coconspirators' Statements Admitted Under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E): Putting The Claws Back In The Confrontation 
Clause, 30 Vill.L.Rev. 1565 (1985); Note, supra n. 9, 94 Yale L.J. at 899, 908 
(advocating a limitation to objects that were "objectively likely to occur or 
were believed by a conspirator to be likely to occur"); and Note, supra, n. 11, 
39 Wn. & Lee L.Rev. at 127 n. 14 (and cases cited 
therein).

 
 

15 W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) is 
identical to F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) and provides:

 
 
     (2) Admission by 
Party-Opponent. - The statement is offered against a party and is * * * (E) a 
statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of 
the conspiracy.

 
 

16 This exception, which 
some call a "vicarious admission," accidentally arose. IV J. Wigmore, Wigmore on 
Evidence §§ 1079 and 1080a (1972); Mueller, The Federal Coconspirator Exception: 
Action, Assertion, and Hearsay, 12 Hofstra L.Rev. 323 (1984). The first 
manifestation of this exception was in the "English treason trials in the late 
eighteenth century, where defendants were charged with trying to import the 
French Revolution to English soil." Mueller, supra, 12 Hofstra L.Rev. at 325. 
The first adoption of this exception by the United States Supreme Court appeared 
in United 
States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460, 25 U.S. 460, 461, 6 L. Ed. 693 (1827). 
Mueller, supra, 12 Hofstra L.Rev. at 329. The scope of the American exception 
has been defined as:

 
 
     The American 
coconspirator exception came to consist of three elements. Coconspirator 
statements were to be admissible over a hearsay objection if it could be shown 
(1) that declarant and defendant were coconspirators (the "co-venturer" 
requirement), and that the statement had been made (2) during the course of the 
venture (the "pendency" requirement), and (3) in furtherance thereof (the 
"furtherance" requirement). The framers of rule 801(d)(2)(E) elected not to 
alter the received American tradition, and instead carried it forward 
intact.

 
 
Mueller, supra, 12 
Hofstra L.Rev. at 331 (footnotes omitted). Of further interest on the history 
aspect of this rule, see Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy: A Reexamination of the 
Co-Conspirators' Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 52 Mich.L. Rev. 1159 (1954); 
Note, supra n. 11, 39 Wn. & Lee L.Rev. at 125; and W. 
LaFave and A. Scott, Criminal Law, supra at § 
61.

 
 

17 See Annotation, 
Admissibility Of Statement By Coconspirator Under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) Of Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 44 A.L.R. Fed. 627 (1979) for a general 
analysis.

 
 
      This popular 
issue has been reflected as: "Of all the subdivisions of Rule 801(d)(2), the 
coconspirator subdivision has attracted the most attention from litigants and 
the courts. The extra attention is due to the constitutional issues of the 
criminal arena, where safeguards are more scrupulously observed." M. Dombroff, 
supra n. 10, at 46. Some of the constitutional issues faced, for example, 
concern the confrontation clause, Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1987); Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: 
Exemptions from the Constitutional Unavailability Requirement, 70 Minn.L.Rev. 
665 (1986); Comment, supra, 30 Vill.L.Rev. at 1592, and equal protection. See 
also Imwinkelried, Of Evidence and Equal Protection: The Unconstitutionality of 
Excluding Government Agents' Statements Offered as Vicarious Admissions Against 
the Prosecution, 71 Minn.L.Rev. 269, 272 (1986).

 
 

18 A provocative analysis 
of this decision can be found at Note, Sixth Amendment - The Co-Conspirator 
Exemption to the Hearsay Rule: The Confrontation Clause and Preliminary Factual 
Determinations Relevant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), 78 J. of 
Crim.L. & Criminology 915 (1988).

 
 

19 Many authorities 
discuss the differences between the standards of "proper proof" for the 
independent assessment required before admission. See Burke, 746 P.2d  at 863 n. 
2 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Annotation, Comment 
Note. - Necessity and Sufficiency of Independent Evidence of Conspiracy To Allow 
Admission of Extrajudicial Statements Of Coconspirators, 46 A.L.R.3d 1148 
(1972); and 2 W. LaFave and A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, supra, at 
66.