Case Title: Matter of Paternity of TS

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-95-13

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Paternity of TS1996 WY 74917 P.2d 183Case Number: C-95-13Decided: 05/31/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of the PATERNITY OF TS. JCI,

 Appellant 
(Respondent),

v.

TL, 
by his guardians and conservators, TL and CL,

 Appellee (Petitioner). 

Appeal 
from the District Court, Sweetwater County, Jere

John 
M. Burman, Faculty Supervisor, and Scott Kolpitcke, Student Director, of the 
UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM, Laramie, for 
Appellant.

John 
M. Scorsine, Burns, for Appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant JCI 
appeals from the order in which the district court found that Appellee TL was 
the father of TS (the child) and granted a partial summary judgment in favor of 
the appellee on the paternity issue.

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand.

ISSUES

[¶3]      The appellant 
presents three issues for our review:

1. 
        
Whether the District Court erred when it concluded that Appellee was the 
presumed father because he held out T.S. as his own child, and based that 
conclusion on disputed material facts?

2. 
        
Whether the District Court erred when it ruled on summary judgment that a 
trier of fact could not find that the Appellant presented clear and convincing 
evidence to rebut the presumption in favor of the Appellee under Wyo. Stat. § 
14-2-102(a)(iv)?

3. 
        
Whether the District Court erred when it found that no presumption arose 
in favor of Appellant under Wyoming Statute § 14-2-109(e)(iv) because the 
Appellee is a "presumed natural father" rather than an "alleged parent," despite 
a blood test which shows the Appellant is probably the biological 
father?

FACTS

[¶4]      On October 18, 
1991, CS (the mother), who was not married, gave birth to the child. On January 
31, 1994, the appellee petitioned the district court to establish his paternity 
and the child's custody and support, alleging that he was the child's natural 
father. In May 1994, the appellant joined in the paternity action, stating that 
he was possibly the child's biological father. Pursuant to the district court's 
order, genetic tests were conducted to determine who was the child's father. The 
tests revealed that the appellee was not the child's biological father and that 
a 99.99+ percent probability existed that the appellant was the child's 
biological father.

[¶5]      The district 
court nevertheless ruled that the appellee was presumed to be the child's father 
because he had taken the child into his home and held the child out as being his 
natural child. The district court concluded that the appellant had not presented 
clear and convincing evidence to rebut that presumption and granted a summary 
judgment in favor of the appellee. The appellant subsequently perfected his 
appeal to this Court.

DISCUSSION

[¶6]      Our standard for 
reviewing summary judgments is well established. A summary judgment is 
appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and when the 
prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Roitz v. 
Kidman, 913 P.2d 431, 432 (Wyo. 1996); W.R.C.P. 56(c). We examine the record 
from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and 
we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be 
drawn from the record. Hiltz v. Robert W. Horn, P.C., 910 P.2d 566, 569 (Wyo. 
1996).

[¶7]      The appellant 
contends that the district court erred when it granted a summary judgment in 
favor of the appellee. The district court concluded that the appellee was the 
child's presumed father under WYO. STAT. § 14-2-102(a)(iv) (Supp. 
1995):

(a) 
A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:

. 
. .

(iv) 
While the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his 
home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.

When 
a man is presumed to be a child's father under § 14-2-102(a), only clear and 
convincing evidence can rebut that presumption. WYO. STAT. § 14-2-102(b) (Supp. 
1995). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as being "`"[t]hat kind of proof 
which would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the contention is highly 
probable." MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., Wyo., 612 P.2d 830, 839 
(1980).'" Story v. Wyoming State Board of Medical Examiners, 721 P.2d 1013, 1014 
(Wyo. 1986) (quoting LP v. Natrona County Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services (Parental Rights of GP), 679 P.2d 976, 982 (Wyo. 
1984)).

[¶8]      When the mother 
filled out the birth certificate form, she indicated that the child's father was 
unknown. She subsequently changed the birth certificate form to show that the 
appellee was the child's father, and the official birth certificate reflected 
this information. The mother later averred that the appellee had coerced her 
into making the change to the birth certificate form.

[¶9]      The appellee and 
his father filed affidavits in support of the appellee's contention that he took 
the child into his home and held the child out as being his natural child. Those 
affidavits indicated that the mother and the child lived with the appellee and 
his family intermittently from the time of the child's birth until December 1994 
and that the appellee and his family provided financial support during that time 
for the child. The mother filed an affidavit which contradicted the appellee's 
assertions. She claimed that, during the five to six months prior to June 1993, 
the appellee "never picked up" the child for visitation or personally gave her 
any money for the child's support.1

[¶10]   Although the evidence showed that 
the mother and the child lived with the appellee and his family on an 
intermittent basis, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether, 
under the statute, the appellee could be considered as being the child's 
presumptive father. The district court improperly weighed the evidence in 
deciding that the appellee took the child into his home and held him out as his 
natural child.

[¶11]   A genuine issue of material fact 
also existed as to whether the appellant's evidence was clear and convincing and 
would rebut any presumption which a trier of fact may determine exists in favor 
of the appellee.2 The genetic test results were 
strong evidence, and we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the results were 
not clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Vigil v. Tafoya, 600 P.2d 721, 722 
(Wyo. 1979) (concluding that clear and convincing evidence rebutted the 
husband's presumption of parentage); see also WYO. STAT. § 14-2-109 (1994); DLB 
v. DJB (Paternity of JRW), 814 P.2d 1256, 1261-62 (Wyo. 1991) (discussing the 
use of genetic testing in paternity cases).

[¶12]   Furthermore, on the basis of the 
genetic test results, the appellant is presumed to be the child's father under § 
14-2-109(e)(iv):

(e) 
The results of genetic tests shall have the following effect:

. 
. .

(iv) 
If the experts conclude that the genetic tests show that the alleged parent is 
not excluded and that the probability of the alleged parent's parentage is 
ninety-seven percent (97%) or higher, the alleged parent is presumed to be the 
parent and this evidence shall be admitted. This presumption may be rebutted 
only by clear and convincing evidence.

See 
Holtz v. State ex rel. Houston, 847 P.2d 972, 973 (Wyo. 1993). At the trial 
which will be held after this remand, the trier of fact may be required to 
determine whether any clear and convincing evidence rebuts that 
presumption.

[¶13]   The district court apparently 
considered a number of policy factors in reaching its decision that the appellee 
was the child's father. The district court stated: "Resolving the question of 
paternity between [the appellee] and [the appellant] will ultimately determine 
custody of the child. The child's welfare and best interests must, in such 
cases, be the court's primary concern." We do not agree with the district court. 
The only issue presented in this phase of the case was the child's paternity. 
This Court has stated that a best interests analysis is not relevant in an 
inquiry which relates solely to establishing paternity. JJ v. AFM (Matter of 
SAJ), 781 P.2d 528, 530 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶14]   The district court cited R.C.L. v. 
K.S.C. (Adoption of R.S.C.), 837 P.2d 1089 (Wyo. 1992), as being support for its 
decision to use a best interests analysis in determining the paternity issue in 
this case. In R.C.L., the mother was married to the husband when she gave birth 
to a child that she conceived with another man. 837 P.2d  at 1092. The husband 
was presumed to be the child's father because the child was born into the 
marriage. 837 P.2d  at 1092-94. The husband retained custody of the child after 
he and the mother divorced. 837 P.2d  at 1092. The mother's second husband 
subsequently sought to adopt the child, and the mother consented to the proposed 
adoption. Id.

[¶15]   In R.C.L., this Court looked at the 
child's best interests in the course of resolving the paternity issue and in 
determining which party should have custody of the child. 837 P.2d  at 1092-93. A 
primary objective of the Court's best interests analysis in that case, as it is 
in all cases where a child is born into a marriage, was to preserve the child's 
legitimacy. 837 P.2d  at 1093; see also LC, 870 P.2d  at 378-79. The R.C.L. Court, 
therefore, held that the presumption that the husband is the father of a child 
born into the marriage may be sufficiently strong in certain instances to 
override biological parenthood. 837 P.2d  at 1093; see also Mak-M v. SM, 854 P.2d 64, 66 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶16]   The case at bar is different from 
R.C.L. Since the child was not born into a marriage, we do not need to 
concentrate on preserving the child's legitimacy. We must, therefore, apply the 
paternity statutes as they are written without engaging in an analysis of what 
is in the child's best interests. After the paternity issue has been resolved in 
this case, the district court may, in an appropriate proceeding, engage in a 
best interests analysis to determine custody, visitation, et cetera as they 
relate to the child.

[¶17]   Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 
In June 1993, the appellee was involved in a serious automobile accident which 
left him paralyzed.

2 
The appellant is entitled to contest the appellee's paternity pursuant to WYO. 
STAT. § 14-2-104(b) (1994). See LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374, 378 (Wyo.), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 195, 130 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1994). Section 14-2-104(b) 
provides:

(b) 
Any interested party may bring an action at any time for the purpose of 
determining the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship 
presumed under W.S. 14-2-102(a)(iv).