Case Title: Angerhofer v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 10032

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-08-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Angerhofer v. State1988 WY 97758 P.2d 1041Case Number: 88-45Decided: 08/05/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
RICKY L. ANGERHOFER, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Ricky L. 
Angerhofer, pro 
se.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Paul S. Rehurek, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and BROWN,* J., 
Retired.

* Retired June 30, 
1988.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The main question 
raised by this appeal is whether Angerhofer was entitled to withdraw a plea of 
guilty because of the failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions 
of Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P. A collateral claim is urged to the effect that Angerhofer 
should have been allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty in order to correct a 
manifest injustice. The trial court effectively denied Angerhofer's Motion to 
Withdraw Plea by not considering it within sixty days.1 We are in accord with the result of 
the automatic denial since Angerhofer has failed to demonstrate any valid basis 
for the withdrawal of his plea of guilty. The denial of the Motion to Withdraw 
Plea is affirmed.

[¶2.]     As the appellant, 
Angerhofer states the issue in this way:

"Whether the trial court 
abused its discretion and violated appellant's right to the due process of law 
by accepting appellant's plea."

In its Brief of 
Appellee, the State of Wyoming restates the issue as 
follows:

"I. Whether the State 
complied with its plea bargain commitment and whether appellant has established 
a manifest injustice requiring withdrawal of the plea?"

[¶3.]     After appropriate 
proceedings had been conducted in the County Court for Natrona County, 
Angerhofer was charged with escape from official detention in violation of § 
7-18-112(a)(i), W.S. 1977, June 1987 Repl.,2 and § 6-5-206(a)(i), W.S. 1977, 
June 1983 Repl.3 The court file reflects that 
Angerhofer had been assigned or transferred to Community Alternatives of Casper 
after a conviction for burglary, a felony, and had been permitted to leave 
Community Alternatives of Casper to visit his wife in Riverton, Wyoming. The 
file further reflects that prescribed time limits were set for his return and 
that he had not returned within those time limits. In a separate information, 
Angerhofer also was charged with the offense of receiving stolen property in 
violation of § 6-3-402, W.S. 1977, 1987 Cum.Supp. Angerhofer was presented for 
arraignment on the charges in both cases on March 5, 1987. Upon inquiry by the 
court as to whether the State intended to proceed on both counts, the 
prosecuting attorney replied that, in accordance with a negotiated disposition, 
which did not encompass any agreement as to a sentence, the State would move to 
dismiss the charge of receiving stolen property upon acceptance of the plea of 
guilty to the escape charge. The court then stated that it would take the motion 
to dismiss the receiving stolen property charge under consideration pending 
further proceedings. After so advising Angerhofer, the court proceeded with his 
arraignment on the charge of escape from detention. On the same day, the 
prosecuting attorney presented a motion to dismiss the information charging 
Angerhofer with receiving stolen property, and on March 6, the court signed an 
order, which was entered on March 11, 1987, dismissing that 
case.

[¶4.]     On May 28, 1987, 
Angerhofer appeared for sentencing, and the court imposed a sentence of not less 
than two years nor more than three years in the state penitentiary, with credit 
for 184 days served in the county jail to be deducted from both the minimum and 
maximum terms. The Judgment and Sentence also provided that this sentence was to 
be served concurrently with the sentence imposed in the parole revocation 
proceeding relating to the earlier conviction. Angerhofer did not appeal from 
this Judgment and Sentence.

[¶5.]     Angerhofer, however, 
did pursue relief diligently in the district court. In July, following the 
Judgment and Sentence, he sent a letter to the trial judge requesting a 
reduction of his sentence. The court treated that as a motion to reduce his 
sentence and denied it. In August, Angerhofer filed a formal Motion for 
Reduction of Sentence, and that was followed by a Motion by Defendant to Dismiss 
the Information, which was filed in September. Next, Angerhofer filed a Motion 
in Arrest of Judgment and, still later in the month of September, he filed a 
Motion to Withdraw Plea. His final, formal effort to obtain relief in the 
district court was another Motion to Withdraw Plea, which was filed on October 
26, 1987. Subsequently, he sent a letter to the district judge requesting that 
his sentence be reduced. The district court addressed only this last effort by 
an order denying the defendant's "Motion for Reduction of Sentence." None of the 
other motions were ruled upon by the district court.

[¶6.]     Initially, Angerhofer 
urges that his Motion to Withdraw Plea should have been granted because the 
district court did not comply with subsections (e)(3) and (e)(4) of Rule 15, 
W.R.Cr.P. His contention is premised upon the failure of the district judge to 
tell him, during the course of the arraignment, whether the plea agreement had 
been accepted or rejected. The pertinent provisions of Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P., 
are:

"(e) Plea agreement 
procedure.

* * * * * 
*

"(2) Notice of Such 
Agreement. - If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the court 
shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, 
on a showing of good cause, in 
camera, at the time the plea is offered. Thereupon the court may accept or 
reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or 
rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence 
report.

"(3) Acceptance of a Plea 
Agreement. - If the court accepts the plea agreement, the court shall inform the 
defendant that it will embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition 
provided for in the plea agreement.

"(4) Rejection of a Plea 
Agreement. - If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court shall, on the 
record, inform the parties of this fact, advise the defendant personally in open 
court or, on a showing of good cause, in 
camera, that the court is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the 
defendant the opportunity to then withdraw his plea, and advise the defendant 
that if he persists in his guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere the 
disposition of the case may be less favorable to the defendant than that 
contemplated by the plea agreement."

[¶7.]     It is clear from the 
record that the trial court complied with Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P. We quote the 
following:

"THE COURT: The purpose 
of this arraignment is to explain to you the nature of the charges against you 
and to determine whether you are ready to enter a plea to those charges. Does 
the State intend to proceed on both counts at this time?

"[ASSISTANT DISTRICT 
ATTORNEY]:

Your Honor, at this time 
it is my understanding pursuant to negotiated disposition with the defendant, in 
return for a plea of guilty to the escape from official detention, contained in 
10019, the State would move to dismiss 10032, receiving stolen property. There 
would be no agreement as to sentencing, and at this time conditioned upon the 
acceptance of that plea, the State would move to dismiss 
10032.

* * * * * 
*

"THE COURT: I will take 
under consideration the motion to dismiss Case No. 10032, pending further 
proceedings."

Rule 15(e)(2), W.R.Cr.P., 
specifically provides that "* * * the court may accept or reject the agreement, 
or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been 
an opportunity to consider the presentence report." In light of the specific 
authorization for the court to defer its decision as to acceptance or rejection, 
we discern no violation of the rule in this instance.

[¶8.]     The trial court 
accepted Angerhofer's guilty plea to the escape charge after determining that 
Angerhofer understood the charge, the rights he would waive by entry of the plea 
of guilty and the maximum sentence. The court further determined that there had 
been no promise of a lighter sentence or probation made, and the court 
established the factual basis for the charge. All of this occurred on the record 
and complied with the analysis of Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P. found in Hoggatt v. State, 
Wyo., 606 P.2d 718 (1980). When the court entered the order dismissing the 
charge of receiving stolen property, the plea agreement was accepted and fully 
complied with at that time.

[¶9.]     The plea agreement in 
this instance was silent with respect to any sentence, and the assistant 
district attorney specifically advised the court that there was no agreement as 
to sentencing. Consequently, the judge was free to exercise his full discretion 
within the statutory limits, which in this instance provided for imprisonment 
for not more than ten years. Section 6-5-206(a)(i), W.S. 1977, June 1983 Repl. 
The trial court sentenced Angerhofer to a term of not less than two nor more 
than three years in the state penitentiary, giving him credit on both the 
minimum and maximum terms for 184 days served in the county jail. It is readily 
perceptible that Angerhofer is unhappy about the length of this sentence, but 
"when a sentence is within the limits as set by the legislature, and since the 
determination of the penalty is exclusively within the discretion of the trial 
court, it must stand." Hicklin v. State, Wyo., 
535 P.2d 743, 754 (1975), quoting Bentley v. State, Wyo., 502 P.2d 203 
(1972). 

[¶10.]  Angerhofer's alternative argument is that 
he was "tricked into pleading guilty" because the charge of receiving stolen 
property never was dismissed. This contention obviously is without merit because 
the record shows that the charge was dismissed. The State of Wyoming complied with the 
plea agreement. We assume that Angerhofer simply is mistaken and has not 
deliberately attempted to mislead the court.

[¶11.]  As a final position, Angerhofer urges the 
court to correct the manifest injustice by reversing the denial of his Motion to 
Withdraw Plea.4 When relief is sought pursuant to 
Rule 33, W.R.Cr.P., the burden of proving manifest injustice is on the defendant 
who seeks to withdraw his plea of guilty. McGiff v. State, Wyo., 514 P.2d 199 (1973), cert. den., 415 U.S. 992, 94 S. Ct. 1592, 39 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1974); Hicklin v. State, supra. There is nothing in the record to indicate 
any manifest injustice in this instance. Angerhofer clearly did not meet the 
burden.

[¶12.]  The denial of relief in the form of 
permitting Angerhofer to withdraw his plea of guilty is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Rule 301, Uniform Rules 
for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming, provides, in pertinent 
part:

"* * * All motions not 
called up or set for hearing within 60 days after filing will automatically be 
denied, * * *."

2 Section 7-18-112(a)(i), 
W.S. 1977, June 1987 Repl., provides:

"(a) An offender or an 
inmate is deemed guilty of escape from official detention and shall be punished 
as provided by W.S. 6-5-206(a)(i) if, without proper authorization, 
he:

"(i) Fails to remain 
within the extended limits of his confinement or to return within the time 
prescribed to a community correctional facility to which he was assigned or 
transferred; or * * *."

3 Section 6-5-206(a)(i), 
W.S. 1977, June 1983 Repl., provides:

"(a) A person commits a 
crime if he escapes from official detention. Escape is:

"(i) A felony punishable 
by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, if the detention is the result 
of a conviction for a felony; * * *."

4 Rule 33, W.R.Cr.P., 
provides, in pertinent part:

"(d) Withdrawal of plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere. - A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty * * * may be made only 
before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to 
correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment 
or conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his 
plea."