Case Title: Elliot v. Durrani

Citation: 2022-Ohio-4190

Docket Number: 2021-1352

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2022-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Elliot v. Durrani, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4190.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-4190 
ELLIOT, APPELLEE, v. DURRANI, APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Elliot v. Durrani, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4190.] 
Medical 
malpractice—Absconded 
defendant—R.C. 
2305.15(A)—R.C. 
2305.113(C)—R.C. 2305.15(A) tolls the medical-claim statute of repose, 
R.C. 2305.113(C), and therefore does not bar the filing of a medical-
malpractice claim against a defendant while that defendant is absconded 
from the state. 
(No. 2021-1352—Submitted August 2, 2022—Decided December 6, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-180555, 
2021-Ohio-3055. 
__________________ 
DONNELLY, J. 
{¶ 1} This discretionary appeal asks whether the four-year statute of repose 
cuts off a plaintiff’s time for filing a medical-malpractice claim when the defendant 
has fled the country before the statute of repose has expired.  We hold that by its 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2 
plain language, R.C. 2305.15(A) tolls the medical-claim statute of repose, R.C. 
2305.113(C), and therefore the statute of repose does not bar the filing of a claim 
during the defendant’s absence.  Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the First 
District Court of Appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} In March 2010, appellant, Abubakar Atiq Durrani, M.D., performed 
spinal surgery on appellee, Richard Elliot, at Good Samaritan Hospital of 
Cincinnati.  Within a week, Elliot suffered pain and infection.  Six weeks later, 
Elliot was unable to eat or drink and had lost 80 pounds.  Elliot believes that Dr. 
Durrani and his clinic, Center for Advanced Spine Technologies, Inc., were 
responsible for performing his surgery unnecessarily, negligently, and without his 
informed consent.  He also believes that Good Samaritan Hospital was negligent in 
credentialing Dr. Durrani, among other failings.  In August 2013, the United States 
government indicted Dr. Durrani for criminal fraud related to his medical practice.  
See United States v. Durrani, S.D.Ohio Case No. 1:13-cr-84 (Aug. 7, 2013).  Dr. 
Durrani fled to Pakistan in late 2013, and he has not returned. 
{¶ 3} In August 2015, Elliot filed a medical-malpractice complaint against 
Dr. Durrani, his clinic, and Good Samaritan Hospital in the Hamilton County Court 
of Common Pleas.1  Elliot is one of hundreds of plaintiffs who have filed similar 
malpractice and related claims against Dr. Durrani and his clinic.  See, e.g., In re 
Dr. Durrani Medical Malpractice Cases, S.D.Ohio No. 1:16-cv-004, 2016 WL 
8199122 (June 20, 2016) (227 civil actions were consolidated before being 
remanded to state courts for lack of jurisdiction).  Elliot’s complaint against Dr. 
Durrani and Dr. Durrani’s clinic was served in Pakistan in accord with the Hague 
Convention and Civ.R. 4.5(A).  All the defendants answered the complaint and filed 
 
1.  The complaint was a refiling.  Elliot’s first complaint was filed in June 2014 to “preserve the 
statute of limitation[s]” and was then dismissed.  See Elliot v. Durrani, Hamilton C.P. No. A1403492 
(Sept. 16, 2014). 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
3 
motions to dismiss, citing the four-year statute of repose as an absolute bar to the 
lawsuit. 
{¶ 4} In July 2018, the trial court granted the motions to dismiss based on 
Elliot’s having waited more than four years after the act or omission on which the 
claim was based to file his medical-malpractice complaint.  The court held that R.C. 
2305.15(A), which tolls certain limitations periods for filing lawsuits when a 
defendant absconds, does not toll the four-year statute of repose for medical claims.  
The court dismissed with prejudice Elliot’s complaint against Dr. Durrani, his 
clinic, and the hospital. 
{¶ 5} Elliot appealed.  During the pendency of that appeal, this court issued 
its decision in Wilson v. Durrani, 164 Ohio St.3d 419, 2020-Ohio-6827, 173 N.E.3d 
448.  In Wilson, the plaintiffs had filed medical-malpractice claims against Dr. 
Durrani within four years of their surgeries.  After the statute of repose had run, 
however, the plaintiffs dismissed their complaints pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a), 
id. at ¶ 2-3, which allows plaintiffs to dismiss their claims without prejudice under 
certain circumstances.  The plaintiffs then refiled their lawsuits in another county, 
believing that R.C. 2305.19, which protects a complaint from the statute of 
limitations if it is refiled within a year of dismissal, tolled the statute of repose.  
Wilson at ¶ 5.  This court held that the statute of repose in R.C. 2305.113(C) “clearly 
and unambiguously precludes the commencement of a medical claim more than 
four years after the occurrence of the alleged act or omission that forms the basis 
of the claim.”  Id. at ¶ 38. 
{¶ 6} The plaintiffs in Wilson filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting 
that the statute of repose had not run, because under R.C. 2305.15(A), Dr. Durrani’s 
flight to Pakistan tolled the limitation period during his absence from the country.  
We granted the motion in part and remanded the cause to the court of appeals 
“solely to consider whether the repose period was tolled under R.C. 2305.15(A).”  
Wilson v. Durrani, 161 Ohio St.3d 1453, 2021-Ohio-534, 163 N.E.3d 580. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4 
{¶ 7} Before issuing its decision on remand in Wilson, the First District 
rendered its decision in this case.  After considering the language of R.C. 
2305.15(A) and this court’s rulings in Wilson, the First District held that that statute 
does toll the repose period as to Dr. Durrani but does not toll the repose period as 
to the other defendants (Dr. Durrani’s clinic and Good Samaritan Hospital).  2021-
3055, 178 N.E.3d 977.  Dr. Durrani appealed, and we accepted jurisdiction over his 
lone proposition of law: “The absent defendant statute, R.C. 2305.15, does not toll 
the medical claim statute of repose in R.C. 2305.113(C), (D).”  See 166 Ohio St.3d 
1401, 2022-Ohio-445, 181 N.E.3d 1184. 
II.  LAW AND ANALYSIS 
A.  Standard of Review 
{¶ 8} We begin with the standard of review.  “[I]ssues of statutory 
construction constitute legal issues that we decide de novo on appeal.”  New York 
Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Bedford Hts. Income Tax Bd. of Rev., 150 Ohio St.3d 386, 
2016-Ohio-7582, 82 N.E.3d 1105, ¶ 8.  In any case concerning the meaning of a 
statute, our focus is the text.  “ ‘[O]ur inquiry begins with the statutory text, and 
ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.’ ”  State ex rel. Plain Dealer 
Publishing Co. v. Cleveland, 106 Ohio St.3d 70, 2005-Ohio-3807, 831 N.E.2d 987, 
¶ 38, quoting BedRoc Ltd., L.L.C. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183, 124 S.Ct. 
1587, 158 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004).  “Thus, when a statute is unambiguous in its terms, 
courts must apply it rather than interpret it.”  Id. 
B.  Relevant Statutes 
{¶ 9} This case involves several statutes.  First is R.C. 2305.113(A), which 
sets out the statute of limitations for medical claims.  R.C. 2305.113(A) provides: 
“Except as otherwise provided in this section, an action upon a medical, dental, 
optometric, or chiropractic claim shall be commenced within one year after the 
cause of action accrued.”  (Emphasis added.)  “Accrue” refers to when the injury 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
5 
giving rise to the claim is discovered.  See Ruther v. Kaiser, 134 Ohio St.3d 408, 
2012-Ohio-5686, 983 N.E.2d 291, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 10} R.C. 2305.113(C), the statute of repose for medical claims, provides: 
 
Except as to persons within the age of minority or of 
unsound mind as provided by section 2305.16 of the Revised Code, 
and except as provided in division (D) of this section, both of the 
following apply: 
(1) No action upon a medical, dental, optometric, or 
chiropractic claim shall be commenced more than four years after 
the occurrence of the act or omission constituting the alleged basis 
of the medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim. 
(2) If an action upon a medical, dental, optometric, or 
chiropractic claim is not commenced within four years after the 
occurrence of the act or omission constituting the alleged basis of 
the medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim, then, any 
action upon that claim is barred. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  In other words, R.C. 2305.113(C) starts the statute of repose 
running on the date the alleged malpractice was committed, not the date of its 
discovery.  The date of the alleged malpractice and the date when the injury from 
the alleged malpractice is or should have been discovered are fact-dependent and 
may be the same.  See Hershberger v. Akron City Hosp., 34 Ohio St.3d 1, 516 
N.E.2d 204 (1987), paragraph one of the syllabus.  On the other hand, the statute 
of repose may preclude the filing of a claim before it has even accrued.  Wilson, 
164 Ohio St.3d 419, 2020-Ohio-6827, 173 N.E.3d 448, at ¶ 16. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6 
{¶ 11} R.C. 2305.113(D)(1) carves out some exceptions to the four-year 
statute of repose as follows: 
 
If a person making a medical claim, dental claim, optometric 
claim, or chiropractic claim, in the exercise of reasonable care and 
diligence, could not have discovered the injury resulting from the 
act or omission constituting the alleged basis of the claim within 
three years after the occurrence of the act or omission, but, in the 
exercise of reasonable care and diligence, discovers the injury 
resulting from that act or omission before the expiration of the four-
year period specified in division (C)(1) of this section, the person 
may commence an action upon the claim not later than one year after 
the person discovers the injury resulting from that act or omission. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2305.113(D)(1) thus prescribes an exception to the four-
year statute of repose based on an accrual date. 
{¶ 12} R.C. 2305.113(D)(2) and (3) also use the date of accrual as a means 
of tempering the statute of repose: 
 
If the alleged basis of a medical claim, dental claim, 
optometric claim, or chiropractic claim is the occurrence of an act 
or omission that involves a foreign object that is left in the body of 
the person making the claim, the person may commence an action 
upon the claim not later than one year after the person discovered 
the foreign object or not later than one year after the person, with 
reasonable care and diligence, should have discovered the foreign 
object. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
7 
A person who commences an action upon a medical claim, 
dental claim, optometric claim, or chiropractic claim under the 
circumstances described in division (D)(1) or (2) of this section has 
the affirmative burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that the person, with reasonable care and diligence, could not have 
discovered the injury resulting from the act or omission constituting 
the alleged basis of the claim within the three-year period described 
in division (D)(1) of this section or within the one-year period 
described in division (D)(2) of this section, whichever is applicable. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Regarding a foreign object left in the body, R.C. 
2305.113(D)(2) introduces an accrual date that potentially expands the statute of 
repose indefinitely. 
{¶ 13} The next relevant statute is the tolling statute, R.C. 2305.15, which 
states: 
 
(A) When a cause of action accrues against a person, if the 
person is out of the state, has absconded, or conceals self, the period 
of limitation for the commencement of the action as provided in 
sections 2305.04 to 2305.14 * * * does not begin to run until the 
person comes into the state or while the person is so absconded or 
concealed.  After the cause of action accrues if the person departs 
from the state, absconds, or conceals self, the time of the person’s 
absence or concealment shall not be computed as any part of a 
period within which the action must be brought. 
(B) When a person is imprisoned for the commission of any 
offense, the time of the person’s imprisonment shall not be 
computed as any part of any period of limitation, as provided in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8 
section 2305.09, 2305.10, 2305.11, 2305.113 or 2305.14 of the 
Revised Code, within which any person must bring any action 
against the imprisoned person. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The language in the above statute clearly incorporates the 
exceptions to R.C. 2305.113, the statute of repose for medical claims, into both 
sections. 
{¶ 14} The final relevant statute is R.C. 2305.19(A), which provides: 
 
In any action that is commenced * * *, if * * * the plaintiff 
fails otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff * * * may 
commence a new action within one year after the date of the reversal 
of the judgment or the plaintiff’s failure otherwise than upon the 
merits or within the period of the original applicable statute of 
limitations, whichever occurs later. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
C.  Wilson v. Durrani 
{¶ 15} Both Elliot and Dr. Durrani find support for their positions in Wilson, 
164 Ohio St.3d 419, 2020-Ohio-6827, 173 N.E.3d 448.  Dr. Durrani cites our 
holding in Wilson in support of his assertion that no exceptions to the statute of 
repose outside of those contained in R.C. 2305.113(C) and (D) shall be recognized.  
Quoting from our decision in Wilson, Dr. Durrani asserts that “ ‘R.C. 2305.113(C) 
is a true statute of repose that, except as expressly stated in R.C. 2305.113(C) and 
(D), clearly and unambiguously precludes the commencement of a medical claim 
more than four years after the occurrence of the alleged act or omission that forms 
the basis of the claim,’ ” id. at ¶ 38.  But he fails to quote the rest of the paragraph, 
which puts the quotation in the context of the saving statute: “Expiration of the 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
9 
statute of repose precludes the commencement, pursuant to the saving statute, of a 
claim that has previously failed otherwise than on the merits in a prior action,” id.  
The holding in Wilson turned on there being no statute that allowed the plaintiffs’ 
causes of action in that case to overcome the statute of repose. 
{¶ 16} Elliot counters that Wilson examined whether the saving statute 
saves a cause of action from the statute of repose if it saves the action from the 
statute of limitations.  See id. at ¶ 23-27.  Concerning that discussion, this court 
cited California Pub. Emps.’ Retirement Sys. v. ANZ Securities, Inc., __ U.S. __, 
__, 137 S.Ct. 2042, 2050, 198 L.Ed. 2d 584 (2017), which held: “In light of the 
purpose of a statute of repose, the provision is in general not subject to tolling.  
Tolling is permissible only where there is a particular indication that the legislature 
did not intend the statute to provide complete repose but instead anticipated the 
extension of the statutory period under certain circumstances.” 
{¶ 17} This is exactly our situation here.  As in this case, our analysis in 
Wilson turned on the language of the statute.  In Wilson, we were asked to read into 
the saving statute an exception to the statute of repose.  But the court held that 
neither the statute of repose nor the saving statute afforded it an avenue to do so.  
The statute of repose delineates discrete exceptions, none of which incorporate the 
saving statute.  And the saving statute specifically mentions the circumstance that 
will stretch the statute of limitations, but it says nothing about the statute of repose.  
Accordingly, this court held in Wilson that R.C. 2305.113(C) “clearly and 
unambiguously” precludes refiling a claim beyond the limits of the statute of 
repose.  Wilson at ¶ 38. 
{¶ 18} Furthermore, the court emphasized that only explicit exceptions to 
the statute of repose are to be applied.  Id., 164 Ohio St.3d 419, 2020-Ohio-6827, 
173 N.E.3d 448, at ¶ 33.  What we make clear now is that the explicit directives in 
other statutes matter as much as the directives in the statute of repose and are not 
to be ignored.  The saving statute is not identified anywhere as an exception to the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
medical-claim statute of repose.  See id. at ¶ 37.  But R.C. 2305.15(A) and (B) 
explicitly make the tolling statute an exception to the statute of repose.  In other 
words, in Wilson, the court held that nothing in the saving statute rescued the cause 
of action in that case from the statute of repose.  But here, the tolling statute 
explicitly rescues Elliot’s cause of action from the statute of repose. 
{¶ 19} That the tolling statute and the statute of repose are complementary 
rather than conflicting can hardly be denied.  Certain language in Wilson may 
provide an avenue to attack them as incompatible, but only if we ignore the 
language in each statute.  However, we are not authorized to ignore statutory 
language.  “When statutory language is unambiguous, it must be applied as written, 
without resort to rules of statutory interpretation or considerations of public policy.”  
State ex rel. Paluch v. Zita, 141 Ohio St.3d 123, 2014-Ohio-4529, 22 N.E.3d 1050, 
¶ 13. 
{¶ 20} Dr. Durrani has two responses.  First, Dr. Durrani claims that the 
“period of limitation” in R.C. 2305.15 cannot refer to the medical-claim statute of 
repose, because “period of limitation” is the language of a statute of limitations, not 
a statute of repose.  He also identifies what he perceives to be practical problems 
with a statute that applies “accrual” to a statute of repose.  He asserts that because 
the tolling statute refers to when an action accrues, it cannot be applied to the statute 
of repose.  But exceptions to the statute of repose appear in R.C. 2305.113(C) and 
(D), and yet those statutory subsections toll the statute of repose. 
{¶ 21} Furthermore, this court in Wilson quoted with approval the meaning 
of the phrase “period of limitation” as interpreted by the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Hinkle v. Henderson, 85 F.3d 298 (7th Cir.1996); that court applied the 
phrase to both a statute of repose and a statute of limitations.  See Wilson, 146 Ohio 
St.3d 419, 2020-Ohio-6827, 173 N.E.3d 448, at ¶ 35.  The phrase “period of 
limitation,” which appears in R.C. 2305.113(A) and (B), is a broader term than 
“statute of limitations,” which appears in the saving statute.  Wilson at ¶ 35.  As for 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
11 
any perceived practical problems with applying R.C. 2305.15(A), such as a 
plaintiff’s having to count a defendant’s vacation days away from the state to 
determine whether a lawsuit can be filed within the statute of repose, our task is to 
apply unambiguous statutes as written.  Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc., 146 Ohio 
St.3d 281, 2016-Ohio-1567, 55 N.E.3d 1082, ¶ 9.  We do not second guess the 
legislature’s policy choices.  See Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 
2008-Ohio-883, 173 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 212. 
{¶ 22} Dr. Durrani argues that we should not apply the express exemption 
to the statute of repose found in R.C. 2305.15(A), because that exemption is in the 
tolling statute rather than in the statute of repose.  He quotes from Wilson in support 
of his argument that any exceptions to the medical-claim statute of repose are in the 
statute of repose: “ ‘Because the statute of repose now expressly incorporates only 
one statutory exception, other statutes that extend the time in which to bring an 
action must necessarily be excluded,’ ” id. at ¶ 33. 
{¶ 23} But we have no authority to read an explicit statutory provision out 
of the Revised Code.  R.C. 2305.15(A) states that the period of limitation as 
provided in R.C. 2305.04 to 2305.14 “does not begin to run * * * while the person 
is so absconded.”  We must “ ‘giv[e] such interpretation as will give effect to every 
word and clause in [a statute],’ ” treating no part “ ‘as superfluous unless that is 
manifestly required, and * * * avoid[ing] that construction which renders a 
provision meaningless or inoperative.’ ”  (First brackets sic.)  Boley v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 510, 2010-Ohio-2550, 929 N.E.2d 448, ¶ 21, 
quoting State ex rel. Myers v. Spencer Twp. Rural School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 95 Ohio 
St. 367, 373, 116 N.E. 516 (1917). 
{¶ 24} Because R.C. 2305.15(A) is clear and unambiguous, no principles of 
statutory construction are needed to interpret it.  Moreover, the legislature directs 
us that the “entire statute is intended to be effective.”  R.C. 1.47(B).  The legislature 
has not authorized us to apply the tolling statute only in part.  The statutory language 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
is unambiguous.  Therefore, the statute must be applied as written and no further 
interpretation is necessary.  Stolz, 146 Ohio St.3d 281, 2016-Ohio-1567, 55 N.E.3d 
1082, at ¶ 9. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 25} The legislature has presented us with an unambiguous tolling statute 
in R.C. 2305.15.  We have no authority to apply only part of the statute, and our 
holding in Wilson, 164 Ohio St.3d 419, 2020-Ohio-6827, 173 N.E.3d 448, does not 
require us to do so.  Furthermore, our holding today is consistent with the purpose 
of the statute of repose for medical claims, which identifies when a defendant is 
entitled to be free from liability.  See id. at ¶ 10.  The legislature has made clear in 
R.C. 2305.15 that an absconding defendant is not entitled to a four-year statute of 
repose that is not tolled.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the First District 
Court of Appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
GWIN, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissents. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KLATT, J. 
W. SCOTT GWIN, J., of the Fifth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
FISCHER, J. 
WILLIAM A. KLATT, J., of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
DEWINE, J. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 26} In this discretionary appeal from the First District Court of Appeals, 
we are asked to decide whether the medical-claim statute of repose, R.C. 
2305.113(C), is tolled under R.C. 2305.15(A) when the defendant in a medical-
malpractice action has left the state of Ohio.  R.C. 2305.15(A) does not create an 
express exception to the operation of the statute of repose.  But the statute of repose 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
13 
itself contains three express exceptions to its application.  See R.C. 2305.113(C).  
However, the absconding of a defendant from Ohio is not one of those exceptions.  
Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the First District and hold that the statute 
of repose is not tolled while the defendant is absconded from the state.  Because the 
majority does not, I dissent. 
Law and Analysis 
Statutory Interpretation 
{¶ 27} This case brings two statutory provisions into consideration: R.C. 
2305.15(A) and 2305.113(C).  “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
that we review de novo.”  Stewart v. Vivian, 151 Ohio St.3d 574, 2017-Ohio-7526, 
91 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 23.  “The question is not what did the general assembly intend to 
enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact.”  Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 
Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus.  In answering this 
question, “we must examine the statutory scheme as a whole as well as the specific 
code sections immediately at issue.”  Holben v. Interstate Motor Freight Sys., 31 
Ohio St.3d 152, 156, 509 N.E.2d 938 (1987).  “When the statutory language is plain 
and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what 
the General Assembly has said.”  Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 Ohio 
St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-1099, 784 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 28} R.C. 2305.15(A) and 2305.113(C) are not in conflict.  The 
absconding-defendant statute, R.C. 2305.15(A), establishes when an action must 
be commenced.  The medical-claim statute of repose, R.C. 2305.113(C), establishes 
the point at which a person is completely barred from ever pursuing a medical-
malpractice claim. 
The Absconding-Defendant Statute 
{¶ 29} R.C. 2305.15(A) states: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
When a cause of action accrues against a person, if the 
person is out of the state, has absconded, or conceals self, the period 
of limitation for the commencement of the action as provided in 
sections 2305.04 to 2305.14, 1302.98, and 1304.35 of the Revised 
Code does not begin to run until the person comes into the state or 
while the person is so absconded or concealed.  After the cause of 
action accrues[,] if the person departs from the state, absconds, or 
conceals self, the time of the person’s absence or concealment shall 
not be computed as any part of a period within which the action must 
be brought. 
 
{¶ 30} R.C. 2305.15(A) does not create an exception to the medical-claim 
statute of repose.  It uses the phrase “period of limitation,” which is synonymous 
with “statute of limitations.”  See Black’s Law Dictionary 1707 (11th Ed.2019) 
(“statute of limitations” also termed “limitations period”).  R.C. 2305.15(A) does 
refer to the period of limitation in R.C. 2305.113, because R.C. 2305.113(A) creates 
the one-year statute of limitations for medical-malpractice claims.  R.C. 2305.15(A) 
therefore may expand the statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.113(A).  But 
it does not expand the specific provisions of R.C. 2305.113 that establish the 
complete bar to commencing a medical-malpractice action. 
{¶ 31} The General Assembly enacted legislation in 1831 tolling the period 
of limitations for pursuing a legal action against a defendant who had left the state.  
See 29 Ohio Laws 41, 214, 216.  This absconded-defendant legislation was later 
revised and included in Ohio’s first Code of Civil Procedure enacted in 1852, see 
51 Ohio Laws 57, 60 (effective July 1, 1853), and through subsequent legislative 
revisions came to be what is now R.C. 2305.15(A).  For almost 172 years, there 
was no statute of repose to which the absconded-defendant legislation could apply, 
see 2002 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 281, Section 1, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3791, 3799-
January Term, 2022 
 
 
15 
3804 (enacting R.C. 2305.113, effective Apr. 11, 2003)—it tolled only statutes of 
limitations.  That remains true today: a plain reading of R.C. 2305.15(A) and its 
cross-references to the affected periods of limitations reveals that the absconding-
defendant statute does not create an express exception to the medical-claim statute 
of repose while the defendant is absconded. 
The Medical-Claim Statute of Repose 
{¶ 32} This reading of the absconding-defendant statute is supported by the 
plain, unambiguous language of the medical-claim statute of repose, which 
establishes the point at which a person is completely barred from pursuing a 
medical-malpractice claim.  R.C. 2305.113(C) provides: 
 
Except as to persons within the age of minority or of unsound 
mind as provided by section 2305.16 of the Revised Code, and 
except as provided in division (D) of this section, both of the 
following apply: 
(1) No action upon a medical * * * claim shall be 
commenced more than four years after the occurrence of the act or 
omission constituting the alleged basis of the medical * * * claim. 
(2) If an action upon a medical * * * claim is not commenced 
within four years after the occurrence of the act or omission 
constituting the alleged basis of the medical * * * claim, then, any 
action upon that claim is barred. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 33} The statute of repose is therefore subject to three express exceptions.  
First, it does not run while a claimant lacks legal capacity.  See R.C. 2305.16.  
Second, the statute of repose is subject to a modified discovery rule: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
If a person making a medical claim, * * * in the exercise of 
reasonable care and diligence, could not have discovered the injury 
resulting from the act or omission constituting the alleged basis of 
the claim within three years after the occurrence of the act or 
omission, but, in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, 
discovers the injury resulting from that act or omission before the 
expiration of the four-year period specified in division (C)(1) of this 
section, the person may commence an action upon the claim not later 
than one year after the person discovers the injury resulting from 
that act or omission. 
 
R.C. 2305.113(D)(1).  Third, when the claim is based on a foreign object left in the 
body of a person, “the person may commence an action upon the claim not later 
than one year after the person discovered the foreign object or not later than one 
year after the person, with reasonable care and diligence, should have discovered 
the foreign object.”  R.C. 2305.113(D)(2). 
{¶ 34} The language of R.C. 2305.113(C) is plain and unambiguous; 
therefore, it must be applied as written.  Except for these three things—legal 
incapacity, the accrual of the claim during the last year of the statute of repose, and 
the discovery of a foreign object left in the body—“[n]o action upon a medical  
* * * claim shall be commenced more than four years after the occurrence of the 
act or omission constituting the alleged basis of the medical * * * claim.”  R.C. 
2305.113(C)(1).  Had the General Assembly intended to provide other exceptions 
to the statute of repose, it would have included them in R.C. 2305.113(C).  The 
inclusion of these three exceptions to the statute of repose is necessarily the 
exclusion of all other exceptions to it.  See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 107-111 (2012). 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
17 
{¶ 35} We said as much in Wilson v. Durrani, 164 Ohio St.3d 419, 2020-
Ohio-6827, 173 N.E.3d 448.  The question in that case was whether the saving 
statute, R.C. 2305.19, allowed a medical claim that was filed within the statute of 
limitations but later dismissed to be refiled after the four-year period in the medical-
claim statute of repose had expired.  Id. at ¶ 1.  We noted that R.C. 2305.113(C) 
creates express exceptions to the statute of repose but the General Assembly did 
not “incorporate the saving statute as an express exception to the medical statute of 
repose.”  Id. at ¶ 30.  We further explained that “other statutes that extend the time 
in which to bring an action must necessarily be excluded.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. 
at ¶ 33.  We concluded that “R.C. 2305.113(C) is a true statute of repose that, except 
as expressly stated in R.C. 2305.113(C) and (D), clearly and unambiguously 
precludes the commencement of a medical claim more than four years after the 
occurrence of the alleged act or omission that forms the basis of the claim.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at ¶ 38. 
{¶ 36} In Wilson, we noted that a statute of repose is akin to “a discharge in 
bankruptcy * * * providing ‘a fresh start’ and ‘embod[ying] the idea that at some 
point a defendant should be able to put past events behind him.’ ”  (Brackets added 
in Wilson.)  Id. at ¶ 9, quoting CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 9, 134 S.Ct. 
2175, 189 L.Ed.2d 62 (2014).  In light of this purpose, we explained, “exceptions 
to a statute of repose require ‘a particular indication that the legislature did not 
intend the statute to provide complete repose but instead anticipated the extension 
of the statutory period under certain circumstances.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at  
¶ 29, quoting California Pub. Emps.’ Retirement Sys. v. ANZ Securities, Inc., ___ 
U.S. ___, ___, 137 S.Ct. 2042, 2050, 198 L.Ed.2d 584 (2017).  And since the 
General Assembly has created three express exceptions to the medical-claim statute 
of repose in R.C. 2305.113(C), no other exceptions should be recognized unless 
there is a statute that creates those exceptions clearly and unambiguously. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
{¶ 37} R.C. 2305.15(A) does not contain a “particular indication” that the 
absconding of the defendant is an exception to the running of the medical-claim 
statute of repose.  Again, it uses language that typically refers to a statute of 
limitations.  It cross-references R.C. 2305.113 because the medical-claim statute of 
limitations is found in R.C. 2305.113(A).  And as noted above, R.C. 2305.15(A) 
existed in some form well before the medical-claim statute of repose was enacted 
in 2002.  The statute of repose came about as part of tort reform, in response to the 
rising costs of medical-malpractice litigation.  2002 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 281, Section 
3, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3791, 3848-3851.  As this court recognized in Wilson, 
R.C. 2305.113(C) is a true statute of repose that establishes the point at which a 
person is completely barred from pursuing a medical-malpractice action, and other 
statutes that extend the time for filing suit do not limit its operation.  Wilson at ¶ 38.  
The plain language of R.C. 2305.15(A) therefore does not create an exception to 
the medical-claim statute of repose. 
{¶ 38} A comparison of R.C. 2305.15(A) with R.C. 2305.16 proves this 
point.  Both statutes cross-reference the periods of limitation enacted in the same 
range of statutes: R.C. 2305.04 to 2305.14, 1302.98, and 1304.35.  R.C. 2305.15(A) 
and 2305.16 therefore toll the exact same periods of limitation.  One would 
therefore expect both statutes to apply the same way to the medical-claim statute of 
repose, yet they do not.  R.C. 2305.113(C) makes the tolling provisions of R.C. 
2305.16 an express exception to the medical-claim statute of repose, but it does not 
create an express exception for an absconding defendant under R.C. 2305.15(A).  
Why?  Because the General Assembly understood that the language of R.C. 
2305.15(A) and 2305.16 does not limit the statute of repose.  The General 
Assembly then made R.C. 2305.16 an express limitation because it intended that 
tolling provision to apply to the statute of repose.  It did not do the same thing for 
R.C. 2305.15(A), because it did not mean for the time that a defendant is absconded 
to toll the statute of repose. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
19 
The Implications of Today’s Decision 
{¶ 39} “The statute of repose exists to give medical providers certainty with 
respect to the time within which a claim can be brought and a time after which they 
may be free from the fear of litigation.”  Ruther v. Kaiser, 134 Ohio St.3d 408, 
2012-Ohio-5686, 983 N.E.2d 291, ¶ 19.  The majority today overrides that statutory 
purpose and tolls the running of the statute of repose whenever the medical provider 
simply leaves the state—even if he or she departs Ohio without the intention to 
evade a malpractice action.  Under the majority’s holding today, when a medical 
provider leaves Ohio to practice in another state or to retire, he or she potentially 
has unending exposure to suit for injuries that occurred years or even decades 
earlier.  That result is contrary to the legislative intent of R.C. 2305.113(C).  The 
General Assembly provided a statute of repose to address the problems caused by 
stale litigation, including the loss of evidence and witnesses, changes in standards 
of care over long periods, and the “unacceptable burden to hospitals and health care 
practitioners” of maintaining records “for a period of time in excess of the time 
period presented in the statute of repose.”  2002 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 281, Section 3, 
149 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 3850.  And it acted to provide complete repose to medical 
providers after four years, subject only to three express exceptions. 
{¶ 40} This court does not have the final word regarding the interpretation 
of a statute.  We have observed that “ ‘the General Assembly has shown no 
hesitation in acting promptly when it disagrees with appellate rulings involving 
statutory construction and interpretation.’ ”  In re Bruce S., 134 Ohio St.3d 477, 
2012-Ohio-5696, 983 N.E.2d 350, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 
7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110, ¶ 23, superseded by statute on other grounds 
as stated in State v. Jarvis, 167 Ohio St.3d 118, 2021-Ohio-3712, 189 N.E.3d 754.  
If the majority today has misinterpreted R.C. 2305.113 and 2305.15, as I believe it 
has, the General Assembly has the prerogative to correct the court’s mistake by 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
amending those statutes to preclude the tolling of the medical-claim statute of 
repose while the defendant is absconded. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 41} The period given for a claimant to bring a cause of action is a matter 
of public policy reserved to the General Assembly.  See Erwin v. Bryan, 125 Ohio 
St.3d 519, 2010-Ohio-2202, 929 N.E.2d 1019, ¶ 29.  “[I]t is not the role of the 
courts to establish their own legislative policies or to second-guess the policy 
choices made by the General Assembly.”  Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., 
125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066, ¶ 61.  Rather, “[o]ur role, 
in exercise of the judicial power granted to us by the Constitution, is to interpret 
and apply the law enacted by the General Assembly.”  Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp 
Materials N.A., Inc., 134 Ohio St.3d 491, 2012-Ohio-5685, 983 N.E.2d 1253, ¶ 29. 
{¶ 42} Here, R.C. 2305.15(A) does not limit the medical-claim statute of 
repose.  And although R.C. 2305.113(C) creates express exceptions to the operation 
of the medical-claim statute of repose, it does not create an exception for when the 
defendant has absconded from the jurisdiction.  Consequently, the statute of repose 
has not been tolled while appellant, Abubakar Atiq Durrani, M.D., is absconded 
from the state.  I therefore would reverse the judgment of the First District Court of 
Appeals.  Because the majority does not, I dissent. 
KLATT, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Robert A. Winter Jr.; James F. Maus; and Statman Harris, L.L.C., and Alan 
Statman, for appellee. 
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Aaron M. Herzig, Russell S. Sayre, 
Philip D. Williamson, and Anna M. Greve, for appellant. 
Squire Patton Boggs (U.S.), L.L.P., Lauren S. Kuley, and Jeffrey W. 
DeBeer, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Hospital Association, Ohio State 
Medical Association, and Ohio Osteopathic Association. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
21 
Sean McGlone, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Hospital 
Association. 
Flowers & Grube, Paul W. Flowers, Melissa A. Ghrist, and Louis E. Grube, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice. 
_________________