Case Title: Williams v. State

Citation: 339 Md. 560

Docket Number: 89/95

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Scotland Eugene Williams v. State of Maryland - No. 89, 1995 Term
CRIMINAL LAW - Death Penalty -- Evidence insufficient to sustain
burglary conviction -- improper to impeach defense witness with
delinquency adjudication -- cross examination of DNA expert unduly
restricted.  Error not harmless, judgment reversed.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 89
  September Term, 1995
___________________________________
SCOTLAND EUGENE WILLIAMS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
___________________________________
Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Chasanow, J.
      Rodowsky and Bell, JJ.,      
 concur.
___________________________________
      Filed:  July 30, 1996        
        
This direct appeal in a capital murder case raises several
issues concerning the trial of and death sentence imposed upon the
Appellant, Scotland Eugene Williams.  Williams was convicted by a
jury in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County of two counts of
first degree murder, multiple counts of robbery with a deadly
weapon, theft, burglary, and use of a handgun in the commission of
a crime of violence.  After a capital sentencing hearing conducted
before Judge Eugene M. Lerner, Williams received the death penalty.
This appeal is before us pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1992
Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.), Article 27, § 414.  For reasons which we
shall explain, we must reverse Williams's convictions and sentence
and remand the case for a new trial.
I.  FACTS
The victims in this case, Jose Trias and his wife, Julie
Gilbert, were successful attorneys who owned a weekend home in
Annapolis, Maryland.  On Monday, May 16, 1994, when Trias and
Gilbert failed to arrive at work, their secretaries became
concerned and tried to locate them.  Gilbert's secretary contacted
Ricky Cole, a carpenter who frequently worked on the couple's
Annapolis home and had a key to the residence, and asked him to go
to the house to check on the couple.  Upon arriving at the house,
Cole noticed that Gilbert's Acura Legend automobile was missing,
and he found a note taped to the door that said "ON VACATION!!  BE
BACK 20 MAY."  Cole went into the bedroom, where he found Gilbert
-2-
and Trias lying prone on their bed.  Each had been fatally shot in
the back of the head at close range.  Both victims had been dead
approximately 24 to 48 hours prior to discovery. 
Among various items missing from the residence were automatic
teller machine (ATM) cards belonging to Trias and Gilbert.  During
the period of May 15 to 17, 1994, several withdrawals and attempted
withdrawals were made with the bank cards at various ATM locations.
Security cameras at the ATM machines photographed Williams making
some of these transactions, and photographed Williams in a car that
appeared similar to Gilbert's Acura Legend.  Two witnesses also
testified that they saw Williams ahead of them in line at ATM
machines on May 17, 1994.  
Police arrested Williams on May 19, 1994, as he was leaving
his mother's home in Arnold, Maryland.  When arrested, Williams was
carrying $2,160.85 in cash, most of it in $20 bills.  He also had
in his possession a brown bag containing, among other things, a
canister of mace, a crow bar, a blue bandanna, and a gold watch.
The watch was later identified as belonging to Gilbert.  After the
arrest, police searched the home of Williams's mother, where
Williams had been living for about a month.  During the search,
police seized three small flashlights, two pair of handcuffs and a
pair of binoculars.  
Various items of clothing seized from the Williams residence,
as well as the clothing Williams was wearing when arrested, tested
positive for blood, although the source of the blood could not be
-3-
determined.  Additionally, fibers from a pair of brown cotton
gloves found in Williams's bedroom were consistent with fibers
found on the tape securing the "on vacation" sign found at the
murder scene.  A handwriting expert testified that there were
similarities between the handwriting on the note and Williams
handwriting, but he could not reach an opinion on whether Williams
wrote the note.      
At the Gilbert/Trias home, police found a drinking glass on
the kitchen counter.  Epithelial cells from a mucosal membrane,
such as that on the inside of a person's mouth, were found on the
glass.  The cells were submitted to Cellmark Diagnostics, Inc. of
Germantown, Maryland, for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing.  At
trial, a senior molecular biologist for Cellmark testified that
test results obtained using a method called "polymerase chain
reaction" showed that the types of DNA obtained from the epithelial
cells on the glass were the same types as those found in the blood
sample obtained from Williams.  The biologist also testified that
Gilbert and Trias were excluded by the tests as sources of the DNA.
Hairs discovered in the Gilbert/Trias home were found to be
consistent with hair samples taken from Williams, but the State's
expert testified that the hair comparison could not provide a
positive identification.  Additionally, a shoe print discovered in
the kitchen was consistent with a photocopy of the soles of shoes
-4-
     The photocopy of the soles of the shoes previously worn by
1
Williams apparently was obtained by police as part of an unrelated
investigation several months before the murders. 
stipulated to have been worn by Williams several months earlier.1
At trial, a critical State's witness was Carl Spoone, who
became acquainted with Williams when the two were incarcerated
together at the Anne Arundel County Detention Center following
Williams's arrest.  Spoone testified that Williams made statements
at the jail incriminating himself in the murders of Gilbert and
Trias.  Spoone testified that he and another inmate were discussing
God, when Williams became defensive and told them "`how were them
two ... them two [l]awyers prepared for God when I took the gun ...
to the back of their head and blew their brains out?'"  Spoone
further stated that later on in the conversation, Williams said
that "the only thing that he had done it for was the red
Legend...."  According to Spoone, Williams also said that "the only
thing that they could get on him was stealing the car and using the
ATM card."
Additional facts relevant to the disposition of this appeal
will be provided as necessary throughout this opinion. 
II.  SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN BURGLARY CONVICTION
First, we consider Williams's contention that the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction for
burglary.  The test for evidentiary sufficiency in a criminal case
-5-
is "`"whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt."'"  Wiggins v. State, 324 Md. 551, 567, 597 A.2d 1359, 1366
(1991)(citations omitted), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1007, 112 S.Ct.
1765, 118 L.Ed.2d 427 (1992).  
The essential elements of burglary are the breaking and
entering of the dwelling of another at night with the intent to
commit a felony.  E.g. Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 662, 612 A.2d
258, 274 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 931, 113 S.Ct. 1312, 122
L.Ed.2d 700 (1993).  The breaking element of burglary may be
satisfied by evidence showing either an actual breaking, or a
breaking 
accomplished 
constructively 
via 
artifice, 
fraud,
conspiracy or threats.  Id.  Williams argues that there was no
evidence of a breaking, either actual or constructive.  Hence,
Williams asserts that the trial court erred in not granting his
motion for judgment of acquittal on the burglary charge.  We agree.
In Oken, this Court reversed a burglary conviction because we
found insufficient evidence of a breaking.  327 Md. at 663, 612
A.2d at 275.  In that case, we noted that the only evidence of an
actual or constructive breaking was testimony from several
witnesses who stated that on prior occasions the defendant had
attempted to gain entry to homes by fraudulently representing that
he needed to use the telephone, and on one occasion he attempted to
-6-
stop a woman in her car by posing as a police officer.  Based on
this evidence, the State argued that the jury could have reasonably
inferred that the defendant used a similar tactic to gain entry to
the victim's home, where he committed murder.  We reversed Oken's
burglary conviction, explaining:
"While it is true that ... a conviction
may rest on circumstantial evidence alone, we
have also explained:
`to ensure that the trier of fact
bases a finding of guilt on the
appropriate degree of certainty, ...
a 
conviction 
[based] 
upon
circumstantial evidence alone is not
to 
be 
sustained 
unless 
the
circumstances, taken together, are
inconsistent with any reasonable
hypothesis of innocence.'
Here, aside from the evidence of ruses
employed by Oken in connection with the entry
or attempted entry of other residences in the
neighborhood of the victim's apartment, the
record is completely devoid of any evidence
showing 
a 
breaking, 
either 
actual 
or
constructive, of [the victim's] apartment.
Consequently, we are not convinced that a jury
could 
find 
such 
circumstantial 
evidence
inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis
that the victim's apartment was entered by
Oken 
without 
a 
constructive 
breaking.
Therefore, we hold that Oken's conviction for
burglary must be reversed."  (Citations
omitted).
Oken, 327 Md. at 662-63, 612 A.2d at 275.
In the instant case, the State concedes that there was no
evidence of a forced entry into the Gilbert/Trias home.  As
evidence of a breaking, the State points to testimony indicating
-7-
that Trias was security conscious and that the home was equipped
with a security system.  The State contends that the "jury could
infer that this type of person would not leave his door open for a
stranger to walk in off the street," and that entry into the home
"was made by Williams's opening a door, threatening the victims, or
obtaining entry by deceit."  We hold that any such inference,
without more, is insufficient to prove a breaking beyond a
reasonable doubt.  We agree with Williams that the evidence adduced
at his trial to prove a breaking was even weaker than the evidence
we found to be insufficient in Oken.  Hence, we reverse Williams's
burglary conviction.  Because our reversal is based on a finding of
insufficient evidence, Williams cannot be retried for burglary.
See Oken, 327 Md. at 663, 612 A.2d at 275. 
III.  ADMISSION OF "BURGLARS' TOOLS" INTO EVIDENCE
Next, we consider Williams's contention that the trial judge
erred by admitting into evidence, over objection, several items
taken from a bag that was in Williams's possession at the time of
his arrest and from a briefcase seized from his residence.  The
items, some of which were characterized as "burglars' tools" by the
State during closing arguments, included handcuffs, a pry bar, and
a can of mace.  Williams contends that these items lacked probative
value because there was no evidence linking the tools to the
murders or the other crimes with which he was charged.  Further, he
-8-
     
The general principles governing relevancy and the
2
admissibility of evidence are now contained in Maryland Rules 5-
401, 5-402, 5-403.  The offenses for which Williams was charged
occurred prior to July 1, 1994, the day the Maryland Rules of
Evidence took effect.  Although the rules do not apply in this
case, we note that our holding would be the same under the rules in
any event. 
asserts that the admission of the pry bar, handcuffs, and mace was
highly prejudicial because the items gave the jury a basis from
which to infer that Williams had a propensity to commit crimes, and
that he may have used the items to commit unrelated crimes.  
In order for evidence to be admissible in a criminal case,
that evidence must be relevant.   State v. Joynes, 314 Md. 113,
2
119, 549 A.2d 380, 383 (1988); Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 643,
350 A.2d 665, 669 (1976).  Evidence is relevant when it tends to
establish or disprove a fact at issue in the case.  Joynes, 314 Md.
at 119, 549 A.2d at 383.  As we explained in Joynes:
"There are two important components to
relevant evidence: materiality and probative
value.  Materiality looks to the relation
between 
the 
propositions 
for 
which 
the
evidence is offered and the issues in the
case.  The second aspect of relevance is
probative value, which is the tendency of
evidence to establish the proposition that it
is offered to prove. *** Evidence which is
thus not probative of the proposition at which
it is directed is deemed `irrelevant.'  The
trial judge is usually in the best position to
evaluate the probative value of the proffered
evidence.  Where evidence is utterly lacking
in probative value, it may be condemned as
`remote' 
or 
`speculative.'" 
 
(Citations
omitted).
314 Md. at 119-20, 549 A.2d at 383.  A trial judge's determination
-9-
on relevance will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
White v. State, 324 Md. 626, 637, 598 A.2d 187, 192 (1991).
A finding by the trial judge that a particular piece of
evidence is relevant, however, does not mean that evidence is
automatically admissible.  Even relevant evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.  Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 425, 583 A.2d 218,
236 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835, 112 S.Ct. 117, 116 L.Ed.2d
86 (1991); 5 LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 403.1, at 297 (1987).  As
with the trial court's relevancy determination, a decision to admit
relevant evidence over an objection that the evidence is unfairly
prejudicial will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
Hunt, 321 Md. at 425, 583 A.2d at 236. 
Applying these principals to the instant case, we conclude
that the judge abused his discretion in admitting the crow bar and
can of mace found in Williams's possession at the time of his
arrest.  The State contends that the crow bar and mace were offered
to prove "that Williams had the ability to burglarize the victims'
home and subdue its occupants."  According to the State, the crow
bar and mace were relevant to connect Williams to the burglary of
the Gilbert/Trias home because the "items were found in his
possession soon after the crime was committed," and "the jury could
infer that Williams was attempting to flee, with evidence of the
-10-
crimes, after seeing" news broadcasts indicating he was a suspect.
We find these connections to the charged crimes to be highly remote
and speculative.
There is simply no evidence in the record establishing any
connection between the crow bar and mace and the crimes with which
Williams was charged.  As we discussed, in section II, supra, there
was insufficient evidence adduced at trial to support a finding
that Williams broke into the house.  There was no indication that
the crow bar was used to gain entry into the house, and the State
conceded in its brief and during oral argument that there were no
signs of forced entry into the home.  There is no indication that
Williams even had the crow bar and/or mace in his possession at the
time he allegedly committed the murders and other crimes.  Contrary
to the State's contention that the items were seized "soon after"
the crimes, the crow bar and mace were not taken from Williams
until the day of his arrest, approximately four days after the
murder and robbery of Gilbert and Trias.  Since there is no
evidence establishing a connection between the crow bar and mace
and the crimes, the probative value of the items was virtually nil.
  
Furthermore, the danger of unfair prejudice in admitting the
crow bar and mace substantially outweighed any minimal probative
value.  The admission of the items gave the jury a basis from which
to conclude that Williams had a propensity to commit crimes,
especially burglary.  This danger was acute given the State's
-11-
     There are several important exceptions to this rule, see Ross
3
v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669-70, 350 A.2d 680, 684. (1976), but none
are applicable in the instant case.  See also Md. Rule 5-404(b).
Attorney's reference to the items as "burglars' tools" during
closing arguments.  This Court has made clear that evidence tending
to link a defendant to uncharged, unrelated criminal conduct is
generally inadmissible.   See, e.g, Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664,
3
669, 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976).  The purpose of this rule is to
prevent the jury from convicting a defendant on the basis that the
defendant is a person of general criminal character, rather than a
finding that the defendant committed the specific crimes charged.
See id.; 5 MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 404.5, at 352.  See also Ayers v.
State, 335 Md. 602, 631 n.8, 645 A.2d 22, 36 n.8 (1994)(other
crimes evidence is excluded because "it is generally too
prejudicial"), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 942, 130
L.Ed.2d 886 (1995).  
Since there was no evidence linking the crow bar or mace to
the crimes with which Williams was charged, there is a strong
probability that the jury may have inferred from the evidence that
Williams was a person of general criminal character.  The danger of
this kind of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any minimal
probative value of the crow bar and the mace.  See State v. Acklin,
368 A.2d 212, 216-17 (Conn. 1976)(holding that admission of masks
and ropes seized from defendants at time of arrest was error
because there was no evidence linking the articles to the robbery
-12-
with which the defendants were charged).  We hold that the trial
judge erred in admitting the crow bar and mace.  
Williams also objects to the admission of the two pair of
handcuffs seized from a briefcase found during a search of his
room.  Williams contends that "only speculation" connected the
handcuffs to the murders.  We disagree.  The evidence established
that the bodies of Gilbert and Trias were found face down on their
bed with their hands behind their backs in an unnatural position.
Hence, it would be logical for the jury to infer that the victims'
hands were bound behind their backs before they were shot.
Further, there was no evidence of ligature marks on the victims'
hands or wrists which might have indicated that rope was used.
Thus, it might also be reasonable to infer that handcuffs were used
in the murders.  Therefore, the probative value of the handcuffs
outweighed any prejudicial effect.  We agree with the State that
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the
handcuffs.
IV.  IMPEACHMENT OF DEFENSE WITNESS WITH JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATIONS
The next issue raised by Williams concerns the ruling of the
trial judge allowing the State to impeach a key defense witness
using several of the witness's juvenile delinquency adjudications.
The defense witness was another fellow inmate of Williams who
testified that a vital State's witness, inmate Carl Spoone, was
-13-
     The court did allow the State to impeach Wheelton with the
4
fact that he had confessed to the murder, apparently on the theory
that the killing was a prior bad act within the meaning of Md. Rule
5-608(b).  Williams did not object to the impeachment of Wheelton
with his confession to murder.  Hence, we need not decide whether
Wheelton's statement was a prior bad act that is "probative of a
character trait of untruthfulness."  See Maryland Rule 5-608(b).
We in no way express approval, however, for the ruling of the trial
judge.
lying when he testified that Williams had confessed to the murders
during a jailhouse conversation about God.   The second inmate,
Mark Wheelton, stated that he remembered being present during the
conversation, and that Williams had not joined in the discussion.
Wheelton further testified that he knew Williams for approximately
three months while the two were incarcerated together, and that
Williams never discussed the charges against him. 
Before Wheelton took the stand, defense counsel asked the
court to rule on the question of whether the State would be allowed
to impeach Wheelton with his recent murder conviction and with
several juvenile delinquency adjudications.  After discussion with
lawyers for both sides, the court ruled that the State could not
use Wheelton's murder conviction as impeachment evidence because
the deadline for Wheelton to file an appeal from the conviction had
not expired.   As to Wheelton's juvenile delinquency adjudications,
4
the court ruled that under the holding of Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), the State could use the
juvenile records to impeach Wheelton.  As a result, the following
-14-
cross-examination occurred:  
"[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  [P]rior to ... being in
the detention center you had in 1991 been
found delinquent on three counts of breaking
and entry, hadn't you?
[WHEELTON]:  Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, may I have a
continuing objection?
THE COURT:  You have a continuing objection.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Thank you, Your Honor.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  And also in 1991 you were
found to have been delinquent in regard to
larceny and breaking and entry?
[WHEELTON]:  Yes.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  And in 1992 you were
found delinquent regarding breaking and entry
and theft?
[WHEELTON]:  Yes.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  And again, in 1992 you
were found, uh, delinquent regarding daytime
housebreaking?
[WHEELTON]:  Yes.
Williams contends that the trial judge erred in allowing the
State to impeach Wheelton with the juvenile adjudications.  We
agree.  A juvenile delinquency adjudication is not a criminal
conviction.  Md. Code (1974, 1995 Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial
Proceedings Art., § 3-824(a)(1).  Hence, the rule is clear in
Maryland that it is impermissible for the State to attack the
credibility of a defense witness by directly asking him about his
-15-
     We point out that our holding would be the same under
5
Maryland Rule 5-609, which does not provide for impeachment of
witnesses using juvenile adjudications.  See LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND
RULES OF EVIDENCE § 2.609.3(5), at 155 (1994)("The federal rule
provides for the admissibility of juvenile adjudications ... in
certain circumstances.  The Maryland Rule does not.").  See also
Committee Note to Md. Rule 5-609 (noting that evidence of juvenile
adjudications is restricted, but that a defendant may have a right
to impeach a State's witness under the Confrontation Clause
pursuant to Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39
L.Ed.2d 347 (1974)).  
past record of juvenile offenses.   See Westfall v. State, 243 Md.
5
413, 423, 221 A.2d 646, 652 (1966).  In Lancaster v. State, 86 Md.
App. 74, 585 A.2d 274 (1991), aff'd on other grounds, 332 Md. 385,
631 A.2d 453 (1993), the Court of Special Appeals stated:
"The law is perfectly clear that it is
`impermissible to attack the credibility of a
witness by asking him about his past record of
juvenile offenses, directly, or indirectly.'
Indeed, any inquiry, `whether by record or by
cross-examination, of determinations of prior
juvenile delinquency is impermissible in any
adjudicatory hearing.'"  (Citations omitted).
86 Md. App. at 86, 585 A.2d at 280.  This rule is designed to
protect the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings.  See Md. Code
(1974, 1995 Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., §§ 3-
824(b) and (c).  See also 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 42, at 147 (John
W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)("In statutes relating to proceedings
in juvenile courts it is frequently provided that an adjudication
of delinquency shall not be used in evidence against the child in
any other court and shall not be deemed a `conviction.'  These
statutes are usually construed as precluding the finding from being
-16-
used as a conviction to impeach credibility.").     
The trial judge's reliance upon Davis, supra, was plainly
misplaced.  Davis involved a defendant's constitutional right under
the Sixth Amendment to confront a State's witness with his prior
juvenile record to show bias on the part of the witness.  Davis,
415 U.S. at 318-19, 94 S.Ct at 1111-12, 39 L.Ed.2d at 355.  Davis
is not authority for allowing the State to violate the
confidentiality of juvenile records through its cross-examination
of a defense witness.  Davis was based on a defendant's right to
effective cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution.  The State has no
constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment.  Hence, Davis is
inapposite. 
Furthermore, even if we were to interpret Davis as applying to
both State and defense witnesses, it would still be inapplicable in
the instant case.  Davis involved particular narrow factual
circumstances in which the defendant was attempting to demonstrate
that a State's witness's status as a juvenile offender on probation
may have biased his testimony against the defendant.  Under such
circumstances, the Supreme Court found that the State's interest in
protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders was outweighed by a
defendant's right to effective cross-examination directed at
possible bias of the witness related to the witness's status as a
juvenile delinquent.  Davis, 415 U.S. at 319-20, 94 S.Ct. at 1111-
-17-
12, 39 L.Ed.2d at 355-56.  Davis does not stand for the proposition
that a witness's general credibility may be impeached with juvenile
adjudications.  See Davis, 415 U.S. at 321, 94 S.Ct. at 1112-13, 39
L.Ed.2d at 356 (Stewart, J., concurring).
In the instant case, there was no allegation that Wheelton may
have been biased in favor of Williams and against the State, or any
indication that Wheelton's juvenile delinquency adjudications may
have somehow motivated his testimony.  In fact, the record makes
clear that the trial judge's ruling was based on his belief that
the juvenile adjudications were relevant to Wheelton's credibility,
not bias:
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, may I -- may
I just say that -- that this is really not an
issue of bias, it's an issue of credibility.
***
THE COURT:  Well, isn't bias credibility?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  No, I think they're very
different.  ***  Credibility is, one, the
ability to tell the truth.  Bias is having an
interest in the outcome.
They can certainly question him on
whether or not he had an interest in the
outcome....
THE COURT:  Well, but the problem is -- the
problem comes down, here's a man that has been
convicted of -- of things that would tend to
show he's not -- he wouldn't tell the truth.
It seems to me that's absolutely pertinent.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Again, I would call the
court's 
attention 
that 
these 
are 
not
convictions.
-18-
THE COURT:  Oh, I understand it clearly says
that, it clearly says that.  ***  But I do
think it tends to show his credibility.  And
I'm -- I'm inclined to allow him to ask about
that."
The cross-examination of Wheelton was not directed at possible
bias, but rather his general credibility.  Hence, Davis is
inapposite.  See Committee Note to Md. Rule 5-609 (noting that
evidence of juvenile adjudications is restricted, but that they may
be used by a defendant to show bias pursuant to Davis).  We agree
with Williams that the trial judge erred in allowing the State to
impeach 
Wheelton's 
general 
credibility 
with 
the 
juvenile
delinquency adjudications. 
V.  OBJECTIONS RELATED TO DNA EVIDENCE
A.  Restriction of cross-examination of State's expert witness 
We next consider Williams's contention that the trial judge
improperly restricted his cross-examination of an expert witness
who testified for the State regarding the DNA testing that linked
Williams to the crime scene.  The DNA evidence, produced by
Cellmark Diagnostics, Inc. of Germantown, Maryland, consisted of
test results comparing the DNA from a sample of Williams's blood to
that in epithelial cells found on a drinking glass in the kitchen
of the Gilbert/Trias home.  Melissa Weber, the senior molecular
biologist at Cellmark who performed the tests, testified that the
test results showed that the types of DNA obtained from the glass
-19-
     The "polymerase chain reaction" (PCR) process, like the
6
"restriction fragment length polymorphism" (RFLP) process, is
designed to identify which forms of a particular gene are contained
in a given sample.  As we explained in Armstead v. State, 342 Md.
38, 673 A.2d 221 (1996): 
"For each genetic characteristic, there
may be two or more variations or forms of the
controlling gene, which are called alleles.
Each parent contributes one copy of each gene,
so every individual has two copies or alleles
of each gene.  For two-allele genes, i.e.,
genes with only a `form A' and a `form B,' an
individual may end up with one of three
possible combinations:  AA, AB, or BB.  Each
combination 
of 
alleles 
is 
known 
as 
a
genotype."  (Citations omitted).
342 Md. at 67, 673 A.2d at 235.  For forensic identification, PCR
is used to identify the alleles contained in a crime scene sample
and to compare this information with a sample taken from the
suspect. 
were the same types as those found in the blood sample obtained
from Williams.  Weber also testified that Gilbert and Trias were
excluded by the tests as sources of the DNA.
Weber testified that the DNA evidence was obtained using a DNA
testing procedure called "polymerase chain reaction" (PCR).  PCR
testing differs from a more established form of DNA testing, known
as "restriction fragment length polymorphism" (RFLP).  Weber stated
that while RFLP testing can provide a "very specific match between
two samples," PCR testing can only "narrow down a potential number
of donors to a certain group."  She explained that while RFLP
testing requires a large sample of material, PCR testing can be
done on much smaller samples because it isolates and then
replicates the DNA before typing it.  
6
-20-
PCR involves three basic steps.  See COMMITTEE ON DNA TECHNOLOGY
IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC
SCIENCE, at 40-44 (1992)(NRC REPORT).  First, the DNA must be
extracted from the crime scene sample and purified.  In some
instances, suspect and victim DNA are identified and separated;
however, separation is only possible with sperm samples, and can
not be used in the case of saliva or blood.  NRC REPORT, at 65-66.
Next, the DNA sample is heated so that the two intertwined strands
that make up the DNA helix are "unraveled," and separated.  NRC
REPORT, at 40.  Chemical substances known as "primers" are then
attached to the DNA strands to "block off" the segments of the
strand that contain the specific alleles to be identified.  NRC
REPORT, at 40-41 (Fig. 1-6).
The second step in the process is amplification.  Using a
process similar to the cell's own mechanism for producing DNA, the
small DNA sample retrieved from the crime scene is copied a number
of times to generate a larger sample for further testing.   
Finally, the third step in the process is identification.
This may be accomplished in several ways, but the most common
method is known as "reverse dot blotting."  NRC REPORT, at 42.  In
this procedure, the amplified DNA sample is washed over a membrane
or a test strip embedded with chemical probes designed to bond with
particular alleles.  If the sample of DNA taken from the crime
scene includes an allele that matches the probe embedded at a
particular location on the test strip, a colored dot will appear at
that location on the strip.  When the DNA sample is washed over a
test strip embedded with probes for every possible allele of a
given gene, a pattern of blue dots will appear.  
Because each person possesses two alleles for each gene, only
one or two dots, indicating a match, should appear on the strip.
If only one dot appears, that indicates that the sample contains
two copies of the same allele (i.e., "AA" or "BB").  Samples with
two copies of the same allele are termed "homozygous."  If two dots
appear, then the sample likely contains two different alleles
(i.e., "AB"), although this result may also indicate contamination
of a homozygous sample.  NRC REPORT, at 68.  Samples with two
different alleles are termed "heterozygous."  Furthermore, if more
than two dots appear, this may indicate a contamination problem.
Id. 
To illustrate this process, one commercial PCR test kit
identifies the alleles of the HLA gene (the HLA-DQ alpha test).
See Henry C. Lee et al., DNA Typing in Forensic Science, 15 AM. J.
-21-
MED. & PATHOLOGY 269, 277-78 (1994).  There are six alleles or forms
of this gene, which are denoted 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2, 3, and 4.  There
are twenty-one possible combinations of these six alleles.  Because
some alleles are more common than others, the likelihood of
possessing a particular combination of alleles is not simply 1/21.
Instead, the likelihood of possessing a particular combination of
alleles of the HLA gene is determined by evaluating the frequency
of occurrence of that combination in the population.  See 15 AM. J.
MED. & PATHOLOGY, at 278.
In addition to the HLA-DQ alpha test, there are now a number
of other recently introduced commercial kits.  Id.  Some of these
new kits test more than one gene.  For example, the Polymarker kit
tests five additional genes.  Id.  Using both the HLA-DQ alpha test
and the Polymarker test substantially increases the discriminating
power of PCR testing for forensic identification.  Id.  Both the
HLA-DQ alpha and the Polymarker tests were used in this case.
Before trial, Williams moved to exclude the PCR test results.
A two-day hearing was held during which the court heard expert
testimony concerning PCR testing and whether it had attained
general acceptance in the scientific community.  See Reed v. State,
283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (1978).  After the hearing, the
trial judge denied Williams's motion to exclude the DNA evidence,
concluding "there is a general acceptance in the relevant
scientific community as to the reliability of PCR...."  Before
addressing Williams's challenge to the admissibility of the PCR
evidence, see Section V(B), infra, we shall consider his contention
that the trial judge improperly restricted his attempts to cross-
examine Weber concerning the frequency of errors and contamination
occurring during PCR testing at Cellmark.
On direct-examination, Weber was asked by the State to
describe the procedures for PCR testing, and the steps taken to
-22-
ensure that technicians at Cellmark properly perform the tests.
Weber 
explained 
that 
Cellmark 
technicians 
undergo 
blind
"proficiency tests" given by independent forensic associations to
determine if the lab's procedures are working properly.  Weber
testified that Cellmark had no errors in any of the PCR proficiency
tests the laboratory performed.  
During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Weber about
testing errors and incidents of contamination that occurred apart
from the proficiency tests.  Specifically, defense counsel queried
whether any tests at Cellmark ever had been contaminated from
testing solution accidentally spilling over onto a sample and
polluting it.  Weber acknowledged that she could think of at least
one occasion where such spill-over contamination of a sample had
occurred while she was performing a test.  Defense counsel then
sought to ask Weber how often such errors occurred at Cellmark
generally, and the State objected on the ground that the question
was irrelevant.  At a bench conference, the following colloquy
ensued:
"COURT:  Okay.  What's your proffer?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, it's the same
issue that I dealt with earlier.  I think that
in order to make an assessment about the
effect of contamination in the laboratory, I
am entitled to find out how often it happened,
if 
it 
happened 
very 
often 
with 
this
technician, if it was discussed in the lab, if
the lab took steps to deal appropriately with
it. 
* * * 
-23-
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  It does not matter if
fifty 
percent 
of 
their 
cases 
were
contaminated.  What matters is this one.
* * * 
COURT:  Okay.  I thought you were going to ask
her, because you had some contamination in one
instance, does it carry over to all the rest
of them.  That's what I thought you were going
to ask her.  Now, you're going back and
rehashing the whole thing over again.  I mean,
I don't mind you asking her ... if the fact
that she had a contamination before, does it
carry over to everything they do. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  [We] also want[] to ask
her about incidents of contamination in the
lab by other technicians.  She was allowed to
testify about proficiency tests by other
technicians. *** So she ought to be able to be
allowed ... to testify to other incidents of
contamination.  
* * * 
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Your honor, what is the
relevance of other cases?
COURT:  Yeah, I --
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  It's just not relevant.
* * * 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, there's a more
general issue here.  When a witness says, I've
never made an error, certainly I can ... I
don't think I'm confined to simply saying
well, what proficiency tests have you done.
Obviously, I have to -- I have to be able to
cross-examine on the basis --
COURT:  Well, what do you want to ask her
about the proficiency test?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  About how many times these
errors have occurred.
-24-
COURT:  To her.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  About how many times
contaminations occurred, yes.
COURT:  To her.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Only to her.
COURT:  She's -- that's what she answered.
She's the one that answered.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  She can't speak for other
technicians anyway.
COURT:  Yeah.
* * *
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, with all due
respect, she already has testified as to the
proficiency 
testing 
of 
all 
the 
other
technicians at Cellmark.  So why shouldn't she
be able to be asked about contaminations by
other -- 
COURT:  Well, maybe she doesn't know.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Maybe she does though.
Let us ask the question.
* * * 
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Nobody else touched this
case, so what difference does it make?"
At that point, the trial judge asked Weber whether she knew when
other technicians in the lab made mistakes, and Weber responded
that she did not.  Because the question occurred at the bench
conference, the jury did not hear the question or Weber's response.
After Weber answered the question, the judge ended the line of
inquiry, and defense counsel objected to not being allowed to
further pursue the line of questioning. 
-25-
Our review of the trial transcript convinces us that the trial
judge erred in restricting defense counsel from cross-examining
Weber concerning the frequency of contamination during PCR testing
at Cellmark.  Williams should have been allowed to fully pursue
questions regarding testing errors and possible spill-over
contamination in the lab.  
As a general rule, great latitude should be allowed in the
cross-examination of expert witnesses.  3 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 601, at 160 (13th ed. 1973).  See also 2 SPENCER A.
GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 14:30, at 665-67 (6th ed. 1972).  Thus, as
a general matter, when DNA evidence is admitted against an accused
in a criminal trial, questions on cross-examination regarding how
that specific DNA evidence was obtained, and the laboratory
conditions under which the DNA tests in that case were conducted,
should be allowed.  See United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 563
(6th Cir. 1993)(noting that "`vigorous cross-examination of the
government's experts'" assists the jury in determining how much
weight to give DNA evidence)(citation omitted); State v. Cauthron,
846 P.2d 502, 512 (Wash. 1993)(noting that thorough cross-
examination of State's experts on the possibility of error in the
laboratory and errors in the proficiency test allowed the jury to
get "a balanced picture" of the DNA evidence).  
Furthermore, cross-examination about incidents of spill-over
errors and other contamination was especially pertinent in the
-26-
instant case given that the test results were obtained using PCR
testing.  Possible contamination of samples is a major concern with
the reliability of forensic use of PCR testing:
"[T]he extraordinary sensitivity of PCR is
known to make it susceptible to contamination
and may, therefore, be its Achilles heel.
Contamination of the PCR reaction in a
forensic laboratory with even the smallest
trace amounts of DNA from another individual
could produce a misidentification.  Although
this is likely to be rare, there is no way to
demonstrate whether cross-contamination has or
has 
not 
occurred. 
 
Cross-contamination
occasionally occurs in molecular biology
laboratories, and has been a concern with
respect to the use of PCR in medical research.
Hence, PCR requires extraordinarily tight
quality control assurances."  (Footnotes
omitted).
William C. Thompson and Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and
Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. LAW REV. 45,
77-78 (1989).  See also Note, Janet C. Hoeffel, The Dark Side of
DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal
Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465, 482 (1990)("The PCR technique ...
is particularly susceptible to contamination....").  A 1992 report
on DNA testing produced by a committee of leading forensic
scientists stressed the importance of preventing contamination
problems in laboratories where PCR testing is performed:
"One 
of 
the 
most 
serious 
concerns
regarding PCR-based typing is contamination of
evidence samples with other human DNA.  PCR is
not discriminating as to the source of the DNA
it amplifies, and it can be exceedingly
sensitive.  Potentially, amplification of
contaminant DNA could lead to spurious typing
-27-
     The NCR REPORT suggested three possible types of contamination
7
that could affect PCR results:
1. mixed samples (i.e., of suspect and victim DNA, or of
multiple suspects);
2. contamination from handling in the field and in the
laboratory; and
3. "carryover contamination" from one PCR test to
another.
NCR REPORT, at 65-66.
Although 
laboratories 
have 
implemented 
a 
variety 
of
experimental controls to identify potential contamination in the
PCR laboratory, these controls may not identify pre-existing
contamination that occurs at the crime scene or in handling prior
to arrival at the testing laboratory.  As the NRC REPORT indicates,
"[e]ven the simple act of flipping the top of a plastic tube might
aerosolize enough DNA to pose a problem."  NCR REPORT, at 66.
Furthermore, even if there is no indication of contamination
of the suspect's PCR test, it is important to consider both
systemic contamination problems in the laboratory, as well as
isolated, unrelated instances of contamination that occurred close
in time to testing of the suspect's DNA, because:
"it should be remembered that the controls are
useful for monitoring general contamination in
the 
laboratory, 
not 
the 
accuracy 
of a
particular experiment.  If a blank control is
positive in one experiment, it indicates a
potential 
problem 
not 
just 
for 
that
experiment, but for any experiment performed
at about the same time--even in a laboratory
contaminated 
with 
PCR 
carryover, 
blank
controls 
do 
not 
necessarily 
become
contaminated on every occasion."  (Emphasis
added).
results."
COMMITTEE ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA
TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, at 65 (1992).  
7
-28-
NCR REPORT, at 67.
While we concluded in Armstead that "the better approach is
generally to treat individualized errors in application of the DNA
technique as matters of weight" rather than admissibility, we
observed that some errors, including contamination or degradation
of the DNA sample, might warrant exclusion.  342 Md. at 64 & n.18,
673 A.2d at 234 & n.18.  Evidence of contamination of the suspect's
test or of a systemic contamination problem in the laboratory may
justify exclusion of the PCR results. Therefore, the trial judge
should permit full exploration of any potential contamination to
determine whether the DNA evidence is admissible.
In addition, we reject the State's contention that "[i]t does
not matter if fifty percent of their cases were contaminated.  What
matters is this one."  Although a scientific test need not be
infallible to satisfy the due process requirement of "fundamental
fairness," due process precludes the use of scientific test results
that are grossly inaccurate.  Armstead, 342 Md. at 84-85, 673 A.2d
at 244.
In the instant case, Williams sought through the proffered
line of questioning to cast doubts on the reliability of the
testing procedures used by Cellmark.  This was a legitimate method
of responding to the DNA evidence, especially considering the well-
recognized effects of contamination on PCR test results.  Cross-
examination of Weber regarding the frequency of spill-over errors
and contamination in the laboratory could have been vital to the
jury's determination of how much weight to give to the PCR test
results.  See Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 66, 673 A.2d 221, 235
(1996)(noting that "case-specific challenges to the manner in which
a particular [DNA] test was conducted" ordinarily go to the weight
of the evidence).  Therefore, we hold that the trial judge erred in
restricting Williams from fully cross-examining Weber concerning
-29-
the prevalence of testing errors and contamination during PCR
testing at Cellmark.    
B.  Objection to admissibility of DNA evidence obtained
via the PCR testing method 
Williams also contends that the PCR test results themselves
should not have been admitted at trial.  In Armstead, our most
recent case dealing with the admissibility of DNA evidence, we
delineated the general principles governing the admissibility of
scientific evidence in Maryland courts:
"[N]ovel 
scientific 
evidence 
may 
become
admissible in one of several ways.  First, the
evidence may be admitted by statute, if a
relevant statute exists.  See 5 MCLAIN, MARYLAND
EVIDENCE § 401.4(c), at 277-78 (1987).  Second,
the proponent can prove that the evidence
meets 
the 
Reed 
standard 
of 
"general
acceptance" 
in 
the 
relevant 
scientific
community.  Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381,
391 A.2d 364, 368 (1978)(quoting Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1923))."
342 Md. at 54, 673 A.2d at 228-29.  DNA evidence obtained using
RFLP testing is admissible in Maryland pursuant to statute.  See
Md. Code (1974, 1995 Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings
Art., § 10-915.  The statute does not apply to DNA evidence
obtained using PCR testing, and this Court has not passed on the
question of whether the PCR method meets the Frye-Reed test.
Because we reverse Williams's convictions on other grounds, we
need not decide whether the PCR method of DNA testing is admissible
-30-
under the Frye-Reed standard.  Further, given the rapidly
developing scientific data on the reliability of the PCR method of
DNA testing, we believe it might be premature to pass on the
question based on the record from the initial Frye-Reed hearing in
the instant case, which is more than a year old.  Therefore, should
the State seek to admit the PCR evidence at Williams's second
trial, the trial court should consider conducting a new Frye-Reed
hearing on the question of whether PCR testing results are
admissible.
     
VI.  HARMLESS ERROR
The State contends that even if errors were made during
Williams's trial, reversal is not required because the errors were
harmless.  The State argues that the impact of the errors we have
outlined was "insignificant" in the face of the "overwhelming
evidence against Williams."  The State points to the various
circumstantial and forensic evidence linking Williams to the crime
scene, including the hair comparison, the shoeprint evidence and
the similarity of his handwriting to that on the "on vacation"
sign, and to the evidence showing that Williams used the victims'
ATM bank cards in the days after the murders. 
In Dorsey, supra, this Court laid down the standard for
determining whether an error in a criminal case can be deemed
"harmless:"
-31-
"[W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case,
establishes error, unless a reviewing court,
upon its own independent review of the record,
is able to declare a belief, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the error in no way
influenced the verdict, such error cannot be
deemed `harmless' and reversal is mandated."
276 Md. at 659, 350 A.2d at 678.  In the instant case, we are
unable to conclude that the several errors committed in the trial
court were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Initially, we point out that much of the evidence linking
Williams to the crime was not conclusive.  For example, although
fibers from the brown cotton gloves found in Williams's bedroom
were consistent with those found on the tape securing the "on
vacation" sign at the murder scene, the State's expert witness
could not rule out the possibility that the fibers on the tape
could have come from another pair of cotton gloves.  Further, the
handwriting expert called by the State testified that he could not
give an opinion on whether the "on vacation" sign was in Williams's
handwriting.  Hairs discovered in the home were found to be
consistent with hair samples taken from Williams, but again the
State's expert testified that the hair comparison was "not a basis
for positive personal identification."  In addition, although some
items of clothing seized from Williams's room and his person tested
positive for blood, the source of the blood could not be
determined.  Finally, while the shoe print discovered in the
kitchen was consistent with a photocopy of shoes worn by Williams
months earlier, an expert witness acknowledged that he could not
-32-
make a positive identification.       
At the same time, several of the errors committed at trial
were highly prejudicial.  For example, the improper use of juvenile
delinquency adjudications to impeach defense witness Mark Wheelton
impacted the credibility of a critical defense witness.  While
substantial circumstantial evidence was produced at trial linking
Williams to the crimes, the only direct evidence establishing
Williams's guilt was Carl Spoone's testimony that Williams had
confessed to the murders during a jailhouse conversation about God.
Wheelton's testimony directly rebutted Spoone's version of events.
Hence, Wheelton's credibility as a witness was vital to Williams's
defense.  
  
Additionally, as we have explained, the trial court's
restriction of Williams's cross-examination of the State's DNA
expert, Melissa Weber, was prejudicial.  Refusing to allow Williams
to question Weber about general problems of contamination of PCR
samples at Cellmark deprived Williams of the full opportunity to
cast doubt on the reliability of the DNA evidence.  Further, as we
discussed in section III, supra, the trial judge erred in admitting
into evidence a crow bar and mace seized from Williams at the time
of his arrest.  There was no evidence linking either item to the
crimes with which Williams was charged, and the admission of the
items was unduly prejudicial.  The significance of this error was
compounded by the trial judge's ruling denying Williams's motion
-33-
for a judgment of acquittal on the burglary charge, because it
would have been fair for the jury to infer that the burglar and
murderer were the same person.  As we explained in section II,
supra, the charge of burglary against Williams should never have
been sent to the jury because there was no evidence of a breaking.
Given the cumulative effect of these errors, we cannot
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's verdict was not
influenced.  Thus, we must reverse Williams's convictions and
remand this case for a new trial.  
VII.  OTHER ALLEGATIONS OF ERROR
 Because the State will undoubtedly seek to retry Williams for
the murders of Gilbert and Trias, we will take this opportunity to
provide guidance on several other issues raised on appeal that will
very likely arise again in a second trial.
A.  Motion to suppress physical evidence
First, we will consider Williams's motion to suppress physical
evidence on the ground that it was seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures.  Williams moved before trial to suppress several items
seized during searches of his room and of the brown bag in his
possession at the time of his arrest.  Both the bag and the room
-34-
     Police obtained a search warrant after arresting Williams
8
that provided for a search of Williams's mother's house and "[o]ne
brown bag...."
were searched pursuant to a warrant.   Several items, including the
8
crow bar, mace, handcuffs and Gilbert's gold watch, were seized.
After a pre-trial suppression hearing, the trial judge denied
Williams's motion to suppress the physical evidence.  
1.  Probable cause underlying the search warrant   
First, Williams attacks the magistrate's determination that
probable cause existed to issue the warrant.  The Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and Article 26 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights require that no search warrant shall issue
without probable cause.  State v. Lee, 330 Md. 320, 326, 624 A.2d
492, 494-95 (1993).  Probable cause means a "`fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.'"  Lee, 330 Md. at 326, 624 A.2d at 495 (citation omitted).
Appellate review of a magistrate's probable cause determination is
limited to whether the magistrate had "`a "substantial basis for
... conclud[ing]" that a search would uncover evidence of
wrongdoing....'"  Potts v. State, 300 Md. 567, 571, 479 A.2d 1335,
1337 (1984)(citation omitted).      
Williams argues that the probable cause determination for the
search warrants was invalid because the warrants authorized the
police to seize clothing, including "boots and or shoes" and
-35-
"hooded jackets, sweat shirts and coats," even though the clothing
worn by the perpetrator of the crime was unknown at the time.  We
find no merit in this contention.  The full description of the
items to be seized under the warrants authorized the police to
seize "[a]ny and all boots and or shoes, eyeglasses, bandannas,
hooded jackets, sweat shirts and coats."  There was a more than
adequate basis in the affidavit for the magistrate to include these
items in the warrant.  The affidavit described photographs taken by
bank security cameras at the time cash was withdrawn from ATM
machines using the bank cards belonging to Gilbert and Trias.  One
photograph, which was attached to the affidavit as an exhibit,
showed a man wearing a bandanna, glasses and some type of jacket or
coat making the ATM withdrawal.  We conclude that the magistrate
had a substantial basis from which to find that the items of
clothing listed could have linked Williams to the crimes.
2.  Items from brown bag
Williams also contends that certain items seized from the
brown bag should have been suppressed because they did not fit
within the description in the warrant of items to be seized.  The
Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants particularly
describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  Williams argues that the several items
seized from the brown bag were outside the scope of the warrant,
and therefore should have been suppressed.  Specifically, Williams
-36-
     Williams does not argue that other items seized from the bag,
9
including the gold watch and mace, should have been suppressed.  
points to the following items seized from the brown bag: (1) the
crow bar; (2) a pair of shorts; (3) two store receipts; (4)
cigarettes; and (5) a jar of Vaseline.  Although only the crow bar
and the receipts were actually admitted as evidence at trial, we
cannot anticipate whether the State will seek to admit other items
seized from the bag at a second trial.  Hence, we will briefly
consider Williams's objections to all five items.  
9
Even assuming Williams is correct that none of the five items
fits within the description of items to be seized in the warrant,
several of the items were clearly within the scope of the plain
view doctrine, and thus not subject to suppression.  As we
explained in Livingston v. State, 317 Md. 408, 564 A.2d 414 (1989):
"The plain view doctrine `serves to
supplement a previously justified intrusion,
... and permits a warrantless seizure.'  State
v. Wilson, 279 Md. 189, 194, 367 A.2d 1223,
1227 (1977).  Therefore, when the police (1)
have 
a 
prior 
justification 
for 
their
intrusion; (2) inadvertently discover evidence
which is in plain view; and (3) immediately
perceive that what they have discovered is
evidence, they are permitted to seize that
evidence."
317 Md. at 412, 564 A.2d at 416-17.  Here, there is no question
that police were justified in searching the brown bag pursuant to
a valid warrant, and that the items were discovered inadvertently
during the search.  The only question is whether the police had
-37-
probable cause to believe the items were incriminating.  See
Livingston, 317 Md. at 412 n.5, 564 A.2d at 417 n.5. 
We believe the police had probable cause to seize the store
receipts, which provided police with vital evidence of Williams's
location and activity after the murders.  The receipts also
provided police with evidence that Williams had spent money, which
was significant because police had evidence that Williams had
withdrawn money using the victims' ATM cards.  Further, one of the
receipts had a Baltimore address, and police knew that Gilbert's
Acura Legend had been discovered in Baltimore.  The fact that the
officer who seized the receipts may have had to peruse them to some
extent before ascertaining that they potentially linked Williams to
the crimes does not take the seizure outside the scope of the plain
view exception.  The warrant authorized police to seize various
documents and receipts from the bag, including "[a]ny and all
documents, papers, [or] writings" belonging to Gilbert or Trias, or
any documents tending to show a connection between Williams and
Gilbert and Trias.  Thus, the police were entitled to peruse the
receipts to determine whether they were within the scope of the
warrant.  See U.S. v. Menon, 24 F.3d 550, 563 (3rd Cir.
1994)(recognizing that when a search warrant authorizes the seizure
of documents, police are entitled to glance at each document to
determine whether it is within the scope of the warrant); see also
United States v. Slocum, 708 F.2d 587, 604 (11th Cir. 1983).  In
-38-
     
Although we held in section III, supra, that the crow bar
10
should not have been admissible at trial on relevancy grounds, we
merely note here that the trial judge did not err in refusing to
suppress it because of a Fourth Amendment violation. 
the course of lawfully examining these receipts, the police
obtained probable cause to seize them under the plain view
exception.
Police also had probable cause to seize the cigarettes,
because officers had observed a cigarette butt at the crime scene.
Police had probable cause to seize the crow bar, which they could
have believed at that time may have been used to gain entry to the
house.   There was no testimony at the suppression hearing as to
10
the evidentiary significance of the jar of Vaseline or the shorts,
both of which Williams now complains were improperly seized.
Hence, we cannot conclude they were within the plain view
exception.  
B.  Motion to suppress statements to police
Williams also contends that the trial judge erred in denying
his motion to suppress statements he made to police following his
arrest.  According to testimony from the suppression hearing,
Williams was taken to the police station after his arrest and
placed in an interview room, where he waited for approximately 15
minutes.  When police Detectives Tim Zywiolek and Keith Williams
entered the room and identified themselves, Williams asked why he
-39-
was being detained.  The officers informed Williams that he was
under arrest for a double murder.  One of the officers then showed
Williams a photograph portraying Williams using one of the victims'
ATM cards.  According to Detective Zywiolek, Williams stated
"`[y]eah, that's me'" upon seeing the photograph.  Following that
statement, Williams was given his rights pursuant to Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d. 694 (1966).
After receiving his Miranda warning, Williams indicated to
police that he did not want to answer further questions and
indicated he wanted an attorney.  As the officers began to gather
their papers, one of the officers told Williams to remove his
earring and Williams mumbled under his breath, "you can't get me.
I'll just say a girl gave me the card."  After this second
statement, Detective Zywiolek testified that he commented that
"[t]his is going to work" and reiterated to Williams that he was
being charged with the murders of Gilbert and Trias.  At that
point, Williams made a third statement: "`I know I'm never getting
out.'"  Detective Zywiolek testified that Williams was not looking
at police when he made the second and third statements, but rather
seemed to be "in his own little world." 
The trial judge suppressed the first statement by Williams
"[y]eah that's me," because it was made before Williams had
received his Miranda warning.  The judge denied Williams's motion
to suppress the second and third statements to the detectives.
-40-
     
The question of whether the trial judge was correct in
11
suppressing Williams's first statement to police, made before the
Miranda warning, is not before us on this appeal.  Hence, we must
assume, for purposes of our analysis of the subsequent statements,
that the trial judge's ruling was correct.
Williams contends that the second and third statements, made after
the Miranda warning and after Williams requested an attorney, also
should have been suppressed.   We disagree.
11
It is established law that once a defendant, "detained in a
custodial setting, has asserted his right to counsel, all
interrogation must cease until an attorney has been furnished to
consult with him or he initiates further communication, exchange or
conversations."  State v. Conover, 312 Md. 33, 38, 537 A.2d 1167,
1169 (1988)(citing, inter alia, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386-87 (1981)).
Hence, the question before us is whether the police continued to
interrogate Williams after he invoked his right to remain silent
and requested an attorney.  The Supreme Court has made clear that,
after a suspect has requested an attorney, "interrogation" includes
more than direct questioning:
"`[I]nterrogation' under Miranda refers not
only to express questioning, but also to any
words or actions on the part of the police
(other than those normally attendant to arrest
and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response 
from 
the 
suspect." 
(Footnote
omitted).
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-90,
-41-
64 L.Ed.2d 297, 308 (1980).  See also Conover, 312 Md. at 38-39,
537 A.2d at 1169-70.  
Thus, we must decide whether the words and actions of the
detectives were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses
from Williams.  We conclude that they were not.  The testimony from
the suppression hearing reveals that Williams made the second
statement, "you can't get me.  I'll just say a girl gave me the
card," as the police officers began to gather their papers and told
Williams to remove his earring.  These were routine procedures that
the officers could hardly be expected to anticipate would prompt an
incriminating statement.  Williams made the third statement, "I
know I'm never getting out," after one of the officers commented
that "[t]his is going to work" and reiterated to Williams that he
was being charged with two murders.  These comments simply advised
Williams that police had evidence they believed established
Williams's guilt in a double homicide, and as a result he was being
charged with murder.  We cannot conclude that the trial judge erred
in finding that these innocuous comments were not reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response from Williams.  See U.S. v.
Payne, 954 F.2d 199, 202 (4th Cir.)("[T]he Innis definition of
interrogation is not so broad as to capture within Miranda's reach
all declaratory statements by police officers concerning the nature
of the charges against the suspect and the evidence relating to
those charges."), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 988, 112 S.Ct. 1680, 118
-42-
L.Ed.2d 396 (1992); Conover, 312 Md. at 42-45, 537 A.2d at 1171-72
(finding no interrogation where police provided defendant with
statement of charges explaining evidence against him).  Thus, we
find that Williams's statements were not the result of police
interrogation.
We also reject Williams's contention that the "illegality" of
the first, pre-Miranda statement "tainted" the second and third
statements.  Assuming the first statement was obtained in violation
of Miranda, it was not coerced or involuntarily made.  Since the
second and third statements were made voluntarily after Williams
received a Miranda warning, any "illegality" did not taint those
subsequent statements.  See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318,
105 S.Ct. 1285, 1298, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 237-38 (1985).  We find no
error in the trial judge's ruling that the second and third
statements by Williams were not subject to suppression.          
C.  Objection to victim impact statements  
The final issue we shall consider is whether the trial judge
erred in admitting certain victim impact statements at the
sentencing hearing.  At the hearing, the judge admitted, over
objection, two "victim impact" statements written by a friend of
Gilbert and a colleague of Trias.  Williams contends the admission
of the written statements was improper.  We agree. 
The admissibility of victim impact statements in cases in
-43-
     
Unless otherwise provided, all statutory references
12
hereinafter are to Maryland Code (1957, 1993 Repl. Vol.), Article
41.
which the State seeks the death penalty or imprisonment for life
without parole is governed by Md. Code (1957, 1993 Repl. Vol.),
Art. 41, § 4-609(d),  which provides:
12
"In any case in which the death penalty
or 
imprisonment 
for 
life 
without 
the
possibility of parole is requested under
Article 
27, 
§ 
412, 
a 
presentence
investigation, including a victim impact
statement, shall be completed by the Division
of 
Parole 
and 
Probation, 
and 
shall 
be
considered by the court or jury before whom
the 
separate 
sentencing 
proceeding 
is
conducted under Article 27, § 412 or § 413."
The plain language of the statute makes the preparation of a
presentence investigation (PSI) report by the Division of Parole
and Probation mandatory in a death penalty case, and requires that
a victim impact statement be included in or incorporated as part of
the PSI.  The PSI in the instant case was completed before trial
and apparently did not include any victim impact statement as
required by the statute.  As a result, the State's Attorney
independently offered two written statements from friends of
Gilbert and Trias, arguing that they were admissible as "victim
impact" statements.  The judge agreed and admitted the statements.
  
The State contends that the written statements were admissible
under Art. 41, § 4-609(c)(2)(ii), which authorizes the State's
Attorney to prepare and submit a victim impact statement for
consideration in cases where the court does not order a PSI.  We
-44-
disagree with the State's contention.  Section 4-609(c) is a
general provision that applies prior to the circuit court
sentencing a defendant to the jurisdiction of the Division of
Correction.  It provides the court with the discretion to order a
PSI in felony and certain misdemeanor cases "if the court is
satisfied that the investigation would help the sentencing
process."  Art. 41, § 4-609(c)(1).  Section 4-609(c) does not apply
in death penalty cases, which are specifically governed by § 4-
609(d), and in which a PSI and victim impact statement are
mandatory rather than discretionary.  See Passnault v. Board of
Admin. Appeals, 309 Md. 466, 475, 525 A.2d 222, 226 (1987)(noting
that an applicable specific statute controls over a general
statute).  See also State v. Kennedy, 320 Md. 749, 755, 580 A.2d
193, 196 (1990).  Hence, the State has no right in a death penalty
case to admit its own written victim impact statements under § 4-
609(c)(2)(ii).  The only written victim impact statement admissible
in a death penalty case is that contained in the PSI prepared by
the Division of Parole and Probation and specifically authorized as
well as required by § 4-609(d).  Because the statements written by
friends of Gilbert and Trias were not included in or incorporated
as part of a PSI prepared pursuant to § 4-609(d), they should not
have been admitted.       
We stress, however, that we do not mean to rule out the
possibility that information from friends or colleagues of a victim
-45-
     
In the instant case, Williams's objection was to the
13
admissibility of the "victim impact" statements offered by the
State's Attorney, rather than to the absence of the PSI required by
Art. 41, § 4-609(d).  We note that the unobjected to failure to
prepare the PSI and victim impact statement may not be grounds for
reversal.
might be considered in the sentencing phase of a death penalty
case.  Such information may well be admissible if it is included in
or incorporated as part of the PSI report prepared by the Division
of Parole and Probation, which has wide latitude in preparing such
reports.  Our interpretation of the statute is simply that the only
written victim impact statements that are admissible in death
penalty cases are those made part of a PSI prepared by the Division
of Parole and Probation as authorized by Art. 41, § 4-609(d).   
13
The State also argues that despite the unambiguous language of
the PSI statute, the statements from the friends of Gilbert and
Trias were admissible at sentencing under the holding of Reid v.
State, 302 Md. 811, 490 A.2d 1289 (1985).  In Reid, we held that
the State could admit, in addition to the victim impact statement
prepared by the Division of Parole and Probation and included in
the PSI, a separate, additional victim impact statement prepared by
the State's Attorney.  302 Md. at 821, 490 A.2d at 1294.  We
interpreted a prior version of the PSI statute, then codified as
Md. Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 41, § 124, as setting "a
minimum standard for what the sentencing judge ... must
consider...."  Reid, 302 Md. at 821, 490 A.2d at 1294.  We stated
-1-
that the statute "does not prevent additional statements or
comments from being offered by the victim, his family or the
State's Attorney," and we left it to the discretion of the
sentencing judge whether to receive and consider such supplemental
statements.  Id. 
 This reasoning, however, does not apply in the instant case.
Reid was not a death penalty case.  As we have explained, the
admissibility of victim impact statements in death penalty cases is
specifically governed by Art. 41, § 4-609(d), which requires that
the Division of Parole and Probation prepare a PSI and victim
impact statement in every death penalty case.  Our decision in Reid
was based on a prior version of the PSI statute which did not
include the provision mandating the preparation of a presentence
investigation and victim impact statement by the Division of Parole
and Probation in all capital cases.  The legislature added that
provision in 1983.  See Chapter 297 of the Acts of 1983.  
We believe that the specific provision requiring a PSI and
victim impact statement, now codified as Md. Code (1957, 1993 Repl.
Vol.), Art. 41, § 4-609(d), controls the admissibility of victim
impact statements in death penalty cases.  In adopting this
specific provision requiring the preparation of a victim impact
statement by the Division of Parole and Probation in all death
penalty cases, we believe that the legislature intended to limit
the use of written victim impact statements in death penalty cases
-2-
to those included in or incorporated as part of a PSI prepared by
the Division of Parole and Probation.  See Scott v. State, 297 Md.
235, 246-52, 465 A.2d 1126, 1132-35 (1983)(recognizing that the
type of evidence admissible pursuant to the sentencing statutory
scheme in a death penalty case is generally more restricted than
evidence admissible at sentencing in a non-death penalty case).
The State also argues that the statements are admissible under
a provision of the general statute governing the admissibility of
evidence at a capital sentencing proceeding.  Md. Code (1957, 1992
Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.), Art. 27, § 413(c)(v) allows the court to
admit "[a]ny other evidence that [it] deems of probative value and
relevant to sentence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair
opportunity to rebut any statements."  As with § 4-609(c), this
general provision does not apply in the instant case, however,
because the legislature has enacted a specific statute dealing with
admissibility of written victim impact statements.  See Passnault,
309 Md. at 475, 525 A.2d at 226.  See also Kennedy, 320 Md. at 755,
580 A.2d at 196.
VIII.
    Williams also raises several other allegations of error,
which, given our reversal, we need not address.  
-3-
JUDGMENTS REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY FOR NEW
TRIAL.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY.
Concurring Opinion follows next page:
Judge Bell concurs in the judgment and in the opinion except
for Part VII.
Rodowsky, J., concurring.
I join in the judgment of the Court and in its opinion, with
the exceptions of Part V.A. and so much of Part VI as is predicated
on the holding in Part V.A.  The line of cross-examination which
the defense sought to pursue dealt with instances of actual
contamination of samples in the control of others than the witness,
who had no personal knowledge concerning what others had done.
Thus, the majority opinionUs interesting discussion of the
theoretical ways in which a DNA sample can be contaminated is not
an issue presented by the record.