Case Title: The Wisconsin Conference Board of Trustees of the United Methodist Church, Inc. v. Ronald Culver

Citation: 2001 WI 55

Docket Number: 1999AP001522

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 55 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-1522 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
The Wisconsin Conference Board of Trustees of 
the United Methodist Church, Inc.,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Ronald Culver, Loretta Konrad, Lucille Krentz, 
Arthur Lamonska, Gordon Trapp, John Does 1 
through 20 and Jane Does 1 through 20,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 132 
Reported at:  237 Wis. 2d 343, 614 N.W.2d 523 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 31, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
January 31, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 
JUDGE: 
William H. Carver 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by Lan Waddell and Waddell & Pavia, Columbus, and 
oral argument by Lan Waddell. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by 
Jon G. Furlow, Mary C. Turke and Michael Best & Friedrich, LLP, 
Madison, and oral argument by Jon G. Furlow. 
 
2 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Kevin J. 
Sjostrom and Brusky & Sjostrom, S.C., Wauwatosa, on behalf of 
Katrine L. Anderson, Judy Bell, Ernest Cutting, Alyson Janke, 
Michael B. Lukens, and Clifton Kirkpatrick as stated clerks of 
the Presbytery of Northern Waters, the Milwaukee Presbytery, the 
Twin Cities Area Presbytery and the Synod of Lakes and Prairies, 
the John Knox Presbytery, the Winnebago Presbytery of the 
Presbyterian Church (USA), the Presbyterian Church (USA), and the 
United House of Prayer for all People of the Church on the Rock 
of the Apostolic Faith. 
 
 
2001 WI 55 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-1522 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
The Wisconsin Conference Board of  
Trustees of the United Methodist Church,  
Inc.,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Ronald Culver, Loretta Konrad, Lucille  
Krentz, Arthur Lamonska, Gordon Trapp,  
John Does 1 through 20 and Jane Does 1  
through 20,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case requires us to 
address the ownership of church property when a local Methodist 
church breaks away from the Methodist denomination.  The 
defendants, the trustees of a local church formerly known as the 
Elo United Methodist Church, seek review of a published decision 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversing 
the 
summary 
judgment 
FILED 
 
MAY 31, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
2 
determinations of the circuit court.1  The court of appeals 
concluded that the plaintiff, the Wisconsin Conference Board of 
Trustees of the United Methodist Church (Conference), was 
entitled to the property because the local church's withdrawal 
from the United Methodist Church (UMC) rendered it a "defunct" 
or 
"dissolved" 
local 
Methodist 
church 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 187.15(4) (1997-98).2  Because we agree with the court of 
appeals' interpretation of the statute and conclude that title 
to the property at issue vests in the Conference, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals.   
 
¶2 
We 
preface 
our 
discussion 
with 
the 
following 
undisputed facts that provide a brief history of the local 
church, its ties to the Methodist denomination, the local church 
property, and the events preceding our review. 
¶3 
In the 1840s, a congregation of Methodists formed in 
the town of Utica in Winnebago County.  The group began meeting 
in members' homes, and by the late 1840s was a recognized 
Methodist Episcopal church, known as the Elo church.  The Elo 
church was a member church of the Liberty Prairie Circuit, a 
group of local churches organized by the Wisconsin Conference of 
the Methodist Episcopal Church.  That statewide conference was 
                     
1 Wisconsin Conf. Bd. of Trs. of the United Methodist 
Church, Inc. v. Culver, 2000 WI App 132, 237 Wis. 2d 343, 614 
N.W.2d 523 (reversing judgment of the Circuit Court for 
Winnebago County, William H. Carver, Judge). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 volumes unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
3 
responsible for appointing a minister to serve the congregations 
within the circuit.   
¶4 
The property at issue today came to be used by the Elo 
congregation 
following 
an 
1860 
conveyance. 
An 
1860 
deed 
documents the transfer of ten acres of land in the town of Utica 
from Isaac and Abigal Corliss to the "Trustees of the Methodist 
Episcopal Church of the Liberty Circuit Wisconsin Conference."  
The trustees purchased the property for $400, and it was deeded 
to the trustees "in Trust for the Methodist Episcopal Church."3   
¶5 
Subsequent to the conveyance, the Elo congregation 
built a church upon the land.  The church was eventually called 
the Elo Methodist Church.  Sometime later, a parsonage was 
erected to house the acting minister.   
¶6 
The Elo Methodist Church continued as a Methodist 
Episcopal church well into the twentieth century.  It maintained 
its affiliation with organized Methodism through successive 
                     
3  The deed conveying the property and creating the trust 
also provided for the disposition of the property under certain 
conditions.  Under the deed, the trustees could dispose of the 
property upon the failure of the statewide conference to provide 
a minister, the cessation or extinction of the Methodist 
Episcopal Church of the Liberty Prairie Circuit, or a departure 
of a majority of the members as a result of "nonaction or 
unrightous [sic] action."  Should any of these occur, the deed 
provided that a two-thirds vote of those who donated the money 
to purchase the land would allow the trustees to sell the 
property and distribute the proceeds among the subscribers or to 
donate or hold in trust the property for another "Evangelical 
Church."   
As far as we know, none of the contingencies described in 
the deed was encountered, and the record contains no indication 
of a two-thirds vote of the original donors.  
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
4 
mergers between the Methodist Episcopal Church and other 
Methodist branches.  In 1939 the Methodist Episcopal Church 
merged 
with 
other 
Methodist 
denominations 
to 
become 
the 
Methodist Church.  Another merger in 1968 created the United 
Methodist Church.   
¶7 
The UMC is organized in a hierarchical fashion.  The 
Conference 
is 
its 
state-level 
organizational 
body. 
 
The 
relationship among the national, regional, and local levels of 
the denomination is governed by the Book of Discipline of the 
United Methodist Church, which sets forth the doctrinal law of 
the denomination.  
¶8 
In 1970 members of the Elo church filed a certificate 
of incorporation organizing itself as a "religious society of 
the Wisconsin Conference of the United Methodist Church."  Under 
its certificate of incorporation, the Elo church became the Elo 
United Methodist Church, a duly incorporated religious society 
under Wis. Stat. § 187.01. 
¶9 
The Elo church continued its affiliation with the UMC 
until 1997.  In that year, a dispute arose between the 
congregation and the UMC over certain doctrinal matters.  On 
June 25, 1997, the Elo church passed, by a near-unanimous vote 
of the congregation, the following resolution withdrawing from 
the UMC: 
 
1. 
Whereas: The United Methodist Conference has 
acted to create a major doctrinal change and, in 
spite of an attempt to change that position 
through existing procedures, has reaffirmed its 
position on those matters 
and 
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
5 
2. 
Whereas: 
We, 
as 
a 
"Christian 
Bible 
based" 
congregation cannot reconcile their actions with 
the "Scripture" as we understand it: 
Therefore 
We, 
as 
a 
Christian 
Church, 
hereby 
disavow 
ourselves from the United Methodist Conference 
and do rescind any and all relationships with 
said Conference, thereby declaring ourselves as a 
non-affiliated and independent Christian Church, 
effective as of this date, June 25, 1997. 
¶10 Thereafter, the Elo church changed its name to the Elo 
Evangelical Church.  The church continued to operate as an 
independent, nondenominational congregation.  The congregation 
removed all UMC insignia and signage on the church property and 
also refused to continue the financial arrangements it had 
previously maintained with the UMC, including its share of 
support for the minister appointed to serve the church and who 
was housed in the Elo parsonage.4   
¶11 After a period of fruitless attempts at reconciliation 
with the Elo congregation, the Conference responded to the Elo 
church's withdrawal from the UMC in December 1998.  It resolved 
that the property held by the Elo church had been "abandoned" 
under church rules by virtue of the Elo church's disaffiliation. 
 Under the provisions of the Book of Discipline, the Conference 
concluded that it was to assume control of the local church 
property.   
                     
4 We note that after this lawsuit was filed the congregation 
changed its name again to the Elo Evangelical Methodist Church. 
 They admittedly did this to avoid application of § 187.15(4) 
and have not reestablished an affiliation with the UMC.  Elo 
does not advance this fact in support of its position. 
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
6 
¶12 By authorization of the resolution, the Conference 
filed suit against the Elo trustees individually in February 
1999, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.  Its primary 
contention was that under Wis. Stat. § 187.15(4), the Elo church 
had become defunct or dissolved, thus entitling the Conference 
to all property held by the Elo church.5   
¶13 The Elo trustees responded by moving to dismiss the 
complaint.  In addition to claiming that the circuit court 
lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to resolve this internal 
church dispute, the Elo trustees claimed that the requirements 
of § 187.15(4) had not been met.  They maintained that because 
the Elo congregation continued to exist, it could not constitute 
a 
"defunct" 
or 
"dissolved" 
church 
within 
the 
dictionary 
definitions of those terms.  The Conference responded with a 
summary judgment motion claiming that it was entitled to a 
judgment in its favor because there was no disputed issue of 
fact that the Elo congregation's resolution to disaffiliate 
rendered it defunct or dissolved under § 187.15(4).  
                     
5  Although the Conference sued for a declaration of rights 
as to both the real and personal property held by the Elo 
trustees, this case has evolved into one solely about the real 
property in the local church's possession.  The court of appeals 
did not address any personal property.  Moreover, the Conference 
has shifted its focus to the real property to such a great 
extent that it opens its brief to this court by referencing only 
the real estate.  At no point does it request an award of 
personal property.  Our decision today is thus limited to the 
real property in question.  Additionally, the Conference pursued 
an action in trespass.  That claim is not before us. 
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
7 
¶14 The circuit court heard both motions together.  After 
examining numerous affidavits and documents submitted with the 
motion for summary judgment, including the 1860 deed, the 
circuit court concluded that title to the property was held by 
the Elo trustees and that § 187.15 is triggered only if the 
local 
congregation 
ceased 
functioning 
and 
abandoned 
the 
property.  Accordingly, the court entered a judgment dismissing 
the Conference's complaint.   
 
¶15 The Conference appealed and the court of appeals 
reversed.  After explaining that its resolution of an intra-
church property dispute is restricted by the First Amendment to 
a consideration of neutral principles of law, the court of 
appeals interpreted and applied § 187.15(4).  Wisconsin Conf. 
Bd. of Trs. of the United Methodist Church, Inc. vs. Culver, 
2000 WI App 132, ¶¶13-17, 237 Wis. 2d 343, 614 N.W.2d 523.  It 
concluded that Elo church's disavowal of all ties to the UMC 
rendered it defunct or dissolved under the statute.  Id. at ¶29. 
  The court explained: "We cannot imagine a clearer statement 
and demonstration of Elo's intent to dissolve its ties with the 
UMC. . . . While Elo continues to endure, the dissolution of its 
relationship with the UMC rendered it defunct as a local church 
of the UMC."  Id.  
I 
¶16 This case requires us to decide competing motions for 
summary judgment.  While the circuit court resolved this case by 
granting the Elo trustees' motion to dismiss and denying the 
Conference's motion for summary judgment, the circuit court 
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
8 
considered matters outside the pleadings in deciding the motion 
to dismiss.  We thus treat the motion as one for summary 
judgment and the circuit court's judgment as one entered upon 
the grant of that motion.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.06(3); Schwab v. 
Timmons, 224 Wis. 2d 27, 35, 589 N.W.2d 1 (1999).  
 
¶17 We review a motion for summary judgment using the same 
methodology as employed by the circuit court.  Stelpflug v. Town 
of Waukesha, 2000 WI 81, ¶17, 236 Wis. 2d 275, 612 N.W.2d 700.  
Summary judgment is granted where there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2); Stelpflug, 2000 WI 81 at 
¶17.   
 
¶18 Ultimately, 
we 
conclude 
that 
resolution 
of 
the 
competing 
motions 
for 
summary 
judgment 
is 
a 
matter 
of 
interpretation 
and 
application 
of 
§ 187.15(4). 
 
We 
must 
determine whether the local church's withdrawal from the UMC 
rendered it a defunct or dissolved local Methodist church under 
that statute.  Such a question of statutory interpretation is a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
independently 
of 
the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court of 
appeals.  Stockbridge Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Pub. Instruction 
Boundary Appeal Bd., 202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996). 
II 
 
¶19 We begin our discussion by addressing the appropriate 
constitutional framework for our analysis.  This court has not 
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
9 
been asked to resolve a church property dispute in many years.6  
However, in recent decades many courts have wrestled with the 
appropriate 
means 
of 
resolving 
property 
disputes 
between 
churches and among competing factions within a church under the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  The Establishment Clause, as applied to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits states from 
making any law "respecting [the] establishment of religion."  
U.S. Const. amend. I.7  The United States Supreme Court has 
visited the question on several occasions and has outlined 
constitutional means of judicial resolution of church property 
disputes.  
 
¶20 In exploring the Establishment Clause limitations on 
judicial resolution of disputes over church property, the 
Supreme Court has explained that civil courts may resolve such 
disputes, provided that they do not entangle themselves in the 
business of "establishing" churches by deciding matters of 
doctrine and practice.  Presbyterian Church in the United States 
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 
440, 449 (1969).  Thus, the foremost limitation imposed by the 
                     
6  The last occasion was in 1940.  See Kerler v. Evangelical 
Emmanuel's Church, 235 Wis. 209, 292 N.W. 887 (1940).   
7  The religion clauses of the First Amendment, the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, read in their entirety: 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."  U.S. 
Const. amend. I.  They were made applicable to the states in 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).   
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
10
First Amendment is that we refrain from resolving doctrinal 
disputes.  Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979).  Should we 
be faced with a dispute that hinges on an issue of religious 
doctrine or polity, we must defer to the resolution of the 
highest authority of a hierarchical church organization.  Id.  
 
¶21 We address church property disputes under the neutral 
principles of law approach outlined by the Supreme Court in 
Jones v. Wolf.  Under this approach, we may base our 
determination upon any number of neutral legal principles, 
including "the language of the deeds, the terms of the local 
church charters, the state statutes governing the holding of 
church property, and the provisions in the constitution of the 
general church concerning the ownership and control of church 
property."  443 U.S. at 603.  Adherence to neutral principles 
will avoid an entanglement with religion that would run afoul of 
the Establishment Clause.8   
                     
8  A recognized alternative to the neutral principles 
approach described in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), is 
deference to the highest church authority in a hierarchical 
church in resolving church property disputes.  See Maryland and 
Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at 
Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368-69 (1970) (Brennan, J., 
concurring); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1871).  However, 
rather than defer to the church hierarchy on secular and legal 
matters that we are fully capable of resolving under neutral 
principles of law, we choose, consistent with the constitutional 
directives of the Supreme Court, to defer to church hierarchy 
only when the question before us involves matters of doctrine or 
church polity.  See Jones, 443 U.S. at 602.  While the 
Conference suggests that some form of deference is due to its 
internal determinations in this case, we conclude that because 
resolution of this case does not require an inquiry into 
doctrine or polity, deference is unnecessary.   
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
11
 
¶22 In the case at hand we resolve the church property 
dispute by resort to a state statute governing the holding of 
church property.  In a concurrence often cited in church 
property dispute cases, Justice William Brennan set forth 
various constitutional approaches that states may employ to 
resolve church property disputes, including "special statutes 
governing 
church 
property 
arrangements 
in 
a 
manner 
that 
precludes state interference in doctrine."  Maryland and 
Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at 
Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Brennan, J., 
concurring).  The statute before us, Wis. Stat. § 187.15, is 
such a statute. 
 
¶23 In this case, we are not concerned with the intra-
church dispute that fueled the Elo congregation's departure.  
Moreover, we have not been invited to determine whether the Elo 
church has abandoned the UMC by a departure from doctrine.  Nor 
would we accept such an invitation, as such considerations are 
anathema under the Constitution.  Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 
at 
449-50. 
 
Rather 
than 
deal 
in 
such 
constitutionally 
impermissible shades of gray, today's case presents us with the 
                                                                  
The Elo trustees suggest that we should adopt an approach 
that would give effect to the will of the majority of the 
congregation.  While the Supreme Court has suggested that a rule 
of presumptive majority representation is compatible with a 
neutral principles approach, id. at 607-08, deference to the 
majority is a concept appropriate for a case involving a church 
with a congregational, rather than a hierarchical, polity.  See 
Maryland and Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God, 396 U.S. 
at 368-69 (Brennan, J., concurring); Watson, 80 U.S. at 724-25. 
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
12
Elo church's unequivocal resolution to withdraw from the 
Conference and the UMC.  
 
¶24 Because 
§ 187.15 
governs 
the 
church 
property 
arrangement in the dispute before us and because we need only 
interpret and apply the terms of the statute in wholly legal and 
secular terms, we do not wade into doctrinal waters with today's 
decision.  The question before us is whether the Elo church's 
disaffiliation renders it a defunct or dissolved local Methodist 
church within the meaning of § 187.15(4).  We now turn to that 
question.   
III 
 
¶25 This case began as an action under § 187.15(4) and was 
presented to the circuit court and court of appeals as a 
question of interpretation and application of that statute.9 
While the parties spent much of their briefs and oral argument 
addressing trust law principles, the terms of the UMC Book of 
Discipline, and the language of the 1860 deed, we believe the 
crux of the dispute between the parties and the determinative 
issue in resolving the parties' competing motions for summary 
judgment is the meaning of "defunct" and "dissolved" under 
§ 187.15(4).  
¶26 Our sole purpose when interpreting a statute is to 
discern the intent of the legislature.  Stockbridge Sch. Dist., 
                     
9  Although the Conference's complaint referenced the Book 
of Discipline in a manner suggesting that it was an alternative 
theory under which it was proceeding, its summary judgment 
motion was based on its claimed right to the property under the 
§ 187.15(4).   
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
13
202 Wis. 2d at 219.  When doing so, we begin with the statutory 
language.  Id.  If the language of the statute fails to clearly 
convey the legislature's intent, we will resort to extrinsic 
aids.  Id.  Courts should resolve statutory ambiguities so as to 
advance 
the 
legislature's 
basic 
purpose 
in 
enacting 
the 
legislation.  UFE, Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 288, 548 
N.W.2d 57 (1996).   
 
¶27 The 
statutory provision that we 
must 
interpret, 
§ 187.15(4), reads: 
 
Whenever any local Methodist church or society shall 
become defunct or be dissolved the rights, privileges 
and title to the property thereof, both real and 
personal, shall vest in the annual conference and be 
administered according to the rules and discipline of 
said church. 
This provision was created by the legislature in 1923.  § 3, ch. 
158, Laws of 1923.  While § 187.15 has been in existence for 
over three-quarters of a century, neither this court nor the 
court of appeals has been asked to interpret or apply the 
statute prior to the present case.10 
                     
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 187.15 had numerous predecessors 
controlling the incorporation of Methodist societies; however, 
none of them contained a provision similar to subsection (4) 
that provided for the passage of property from a defunct or 
dissolved local church to the statewide conference.  See Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 187.15(5) 
(listing 
prior 
Methodist 
incorporation 
statutes).  The first state law concerning the incorporation of 
Methodist churches and the trust relationship between the local 
church and the denomination was passed in 1849.  Ch. 89, Laws of 
1849.   
The provision at issue has been amended only once.  In 
1939, the language of the statute was changed to reflect the 
1939 denominational merger.  See ch. 403, Laws of 1939.   
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
14
 
¶28 Both parties contend that the plain language of the 
statute as applied to the facts of this case warrants a decision 
in their favor.  On the one hand, offering several dictionary 
definitions, the Elo trustees maintain that the words "defunct" 
and "dissolved" unambiguously require that the Elo church must 
"cease to exist" or be "dead" or "extinct" to trigger the 
statute.  They advance what they term an "empty church" 
definition and contend that as long as the church exists as a 
practicing congregation it cannot be considered defunct or 
dissolved, regardless of its denominational affiliation.   
 
¶29 The Conference, on the other hand, accepts the Elo 
trustees' plain language reading of defunct and dissolved but 
argues that we must read that phrase with reference to the 
phrase 
"local 
Methodist 
church 
or 
society." 
 
Under 
the 
Conference's plain language reading of the statute, because the 
Elo church ceases to exist as a local Methodist church or 
society, it is defunct or dissolved.  The court of appeals 
interpreted the statute in this manner.   
 
¶30 We are persuaded by the Conference's and the court of 
appeals' interpretation of the statute.  The words "defunct" or 
dissolved" cannot be read in isolation.  They are modified by 
the term "local Methodist church or society."  The existence of 
the local Methodist church or society is defined by its 
denominational affiliation, not solely by its continuation as an 
active congregation.  The cessation of ties to the UMC and the 
statewide conference renders a local Methodist church or society 
defunct or dissolved under the statute.  
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
15
 
¶31 This reading of the statute recognizes the overall 
purpose of the statute.  The statute is designed as a whole to  
accommodate the Methodist organizational structure and its 
system of property management.  The United Methodist Church is 
organized in a hierarchical fashion and manages its property 
through a system of trusts.  This organizational structure was 
explained by another court addressing a similar dispute over UMC 
property: 
 
In 
the 
hierarchical 
type 
of 
church 
the 
local 
congregation is an organic part of a larger church 
body and is subject to its laws, procedures, and 
organs according to an ascending order of authority.  
It does not enjoy local autonomy.  Its doctrine is 
defined by that of the parent body and its property, 
while peculiarly a matter of local enjoyment, is held 
for uses consistent with the written rules, doctrines 
and practices of the denominational parent church.   
Brady v. Reiner, 198 S.E.2d 812, 827 (W. Va. 1973).11    
 
¶32 Section 187.15 recognizes these features of organized 
Methodism and codifies the manner in which the UMC maintains 
control over local church property.  It does so by organizing 
the property arrangement among three levels of the church 
hierarchy: the denominational church (UMC), the Conference, and 
the local church.  Under the statute, the trust provisions 
                     
11 The West Virginia court also concisely explained the 
other common type of church polity, the congregational polity: 
"The congregational polity, by contrast to the hierarchical, 
features 
local 
congregational 
autonomy 
as 
its 
central 
characteristic.  It is premised on the idea that the local 
congregation is the highest authority in all matters of doctrine 
and usage."  Brady v. Reiner, 198 S.E.2d 812, 827 (W. Va. 1973). 
  
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
16
operate to protect the UMC's property interest in property held 
by a local Methodist church.  § 187.15(1) & (3).  In the absence 
of such a local Methodist church, however, the statute requires 
that the Conference take title and hold the property in trust 
for the UMC.  § 187.15(4).  Thus, the statute envisions that the 
Conference will fill the shoes of the local trustees to continue 
to hold the property in trust for the UMC.  Were we to read the 
statute to allow 
the 
property to 
be 
removed 
from 
this 
arrangement and be held by a group that has severed all ties to 
the UMC, we would frustrate the statute's purpose.   
¶33 The Elo trustees argue this reading of the statute 
ignores other provisions of chapter 187 employing "defunct" and 
"dissolved" and defining "defunct" in a manner consistent with 
its "empty church" interpretation.  They contend that we must 
read § 187.15(4) in pari materia with § 187.10(9) and § 187.11, 
which provide that a local church is deemed defunct when "it 
shall have ceased to maintain at least one regular service per 
month for a period of two years."  Wis. Stat. § 187.10(9) 
(Congregational church) & § 187.11 (Church of Christ); see also 
§ 187.08.  Such provisions lend credence to the trustees' 
interpretation.  However, we note that neither § 187.10(9) nor 
§ 187.11 
provide 
any 
guidance 
in 
defining 
"dissolved."  
Additionally, we do not believe the time limitations in those 
statutes require that the term "defunct" be exclusively defined 
as abandonment of the property for a lengthy period of time.  
 
¶34 Turning to the facts of this case, there is no 
disputed issue of fact as to whether the Elo church is a defunct 
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
17
or dissolved local Methodist church under our construction of 
the statute.  It is not disputed that the Elo church was 
formerly a local Methodist church.  It is also beyond question 
that the Elo congregation severed all ties to the UMC and the 
Conference.  Because these matters are beyond dispute, summary 
judgment should properly be granted in favor of the Conference. 
¶35 We reiterate that it is the Elo church's unequivocal 
withdrawal from the UMC that allows us to apply the statute to 
the facts of this case.  In the absence of such a clear 
severance of relations by the local church, we do not believe 
§ 187.15(4) would be the appropriate means of resolving the 
property dispute.  As the court of appeals explained, the 
statute is not "designed to resolve schisms between local 
churches and the UMC."  Wisconsin Conf. Bd. of Trs. of the 
United Methodist Church, Inc., 2000 WI App 132 at ¶30.  It is, 
however, designed to dictate the resolution of property rights 
where there has been a total dissolution of the relationship 
between the local church and the UMC by the local church as 
evidenced in the incontrovertible fashion presented in this 
case. 
IV 
 
¶36 We next briefly turn to the constitutional issues that 
the Elo trustees have interjected into the parties' debate.  In 
seeking the review of this court, the Elo trustees have for the 
first time raised questions of the constitutionality of the 
statute.  The arguments presented are not facial challenges to 
the statute.  Rather, they raise these arguments under the 
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
18
mantle of statutory construction, arguing that we must construe 
the statute to avoid the constitutional problems that they 
propose are created by our construction of the statute.  
 
¶37 The 
Elo 
trustees 
generally 
argue 
that 
the 
interpretation of § 187.15(4) we adopt today renders the statute 
"coercive," "confiscatory," and "preferential."  They identify, 
but 
do 
not 
develop, 
numerous 
constitutional 
challenges, 
concluding the statutory interpretation results in a deprivation 
of property without due process because of the statute's alleged 
retroactivity12 and that it constitutes an unconstitutional 
taking and an impermissible "preference by law" to the UMC in 
violation 
of 
Article 
I, 
Section 
18 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  They also propose that the construction raises 
"substantial objections" under the First Amendment.  
 
¶38 None of these constitutional arguments is presented in 
depth.  They are referenced in a few paragraphs and are 
conclusory in nature.  The arguments do little more than allege 
that the construction of the statute violates the provisions at 
issue.  We need not address arguments presented in this fashion. 
 See Block v. Gomez, 201 Wis. 2d 795, 811, 549 N.W.2d 783 (Ct. 
                     
12 The trustees essentially contend that a law enacted in 
1923 cannot be retroactively applied to property deeded in 1860. 
 This argument ignores both the 1970 incorporation, by which the 
Elo church voluntarily became subject to chapter 187, and Wis. 
Stat. § 187.02, under which churches are "grandfathered" under 
the law in existence at the time of their creation, unless they 
affirmatively choose, by the act of incorporation, to become 
subject to chapter 187.   
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
19
App. 1996) (refusing to address amorphous and insufficiently 
developed arguments).  As our court of appeals has explained: 
 
Constitutional claims are very complicated from an 
analytic perspective, both to brief and to decide.  A 
one or two paragraph statement that raises the specter 
of such claims is insufficient to constitute a valid 
appeal of these constitutional issues to this court.  
For us to address undeveloped constitutional claims, 
we would have to analyze them, develop them, and then 
decide them.  We cannot serve as both advocate and 
court.  For this reason, we generally choose not to 
decide issues that are not adequately developed by the 
parties in their briefs. 
Cemetery Servs., Inc. v. Dep't of Reg. & Licens., 221 Wis. 2d 
817, 831, 586 N.W.2d 191 (Ct. App. 1998).  Similarly, we cannot 
allow parties to simply raise the specter of a constitutional 
violation through insufficiently developed arguments in order to 
garner an interpretation of a statute in their favor.   
V 
 
¶39 Even 
if 
we 
were 
to 
address 
these 
undeveloped 
constitutional 
arguments 
as 
applied 
to 
our 
statutory 
construction and interpret the statute as advanced by the Elo 
trustees, the trustees still would not be entitled to the 
property under other neutral principles of law recognized in 
Jones v. Wolf.  While this case was presented below as solely a 
matter of statutory law, the parties have gone to some lengths 
to address their rights under the neutral principles of trust 
law and the 1860 deed.  The record is sufficiently developed to 
allow us to address the parties' rights to the property under 
the principles they debate.  We agree with the conclusion of the 
court of appeals that the UMC has a beneficial interest in the 
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
20
property.  Wisconsin Conf. Bd. of Trs. of the United Methodist 
Church, Inc., 2000 WI App 132 at ¶23 n.7.  Thus, even in the 
absence of § 187.15(4), the trustees are not entitled to retain 
the property for whatever purposes they see fit without regard 
to the interests of the Conference and the UMC.   
 
¶40 The 1860 deed created an express trust for the benefit 
of the UMC, and the property at issue in this case has been held 
in trust for the Methodist denomination since its original 
conveyance.  The deed provides that the property was conveyed to 
the original local trustees "in Trust for the Methodist 
Episcopal Church."13  While the Elo trustees maintain that this 
created a trust for the local church, we find such a reading 
unreasonable.  The local church is not mentioned in the deed.  
The property was deeded to the trustees of the Liberty Prairie 
Circuit and the property was to be held in trust for the 
denomination, the Methodist Episcopal Church.  As a result of 
the successive denominational mergers, the United Methodist 
Church is the successor in interest to the Methodist Episcopal 
Church's beneficial interest in the trust.14   
                     
13  The language creating the trust is consistent with the 
language of the law controlling Methodist Episcopal corporations 
at the time of the conveyance.  See ch. 89, Laws of 1849.  That 
legislation addressed property held "in trust for the Methodist 
Episcopal Church," referring to the denominational church.  Id.  
14  See, e.g., Book of Discipline of the United Methodist 
Church ¶1 (1996) ("The united Church, as thus constituted, is, 
and shall be, the successor of the two uniting churches."). 
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
21
 
¶41 The Elo trustees rely on a provision of the Book of 
Discipline that establishes that local Methodist churches were 
not required to "alienate or change the title to property 
contained in its deed or deeds" as a result of the 1968 merger 
that created the UMC.15  They assert that this "deed-saving" 
language prevents the conversion of their local church property 
to trust property.  The trustees' argument presupposes that the 
original deed conveyed to them an interest in the property 
greater than that of a trusteeship for the benefit of the 
denomination.  As we have explained, however, a beneficial 
interest for the denomination was created by the deed when the 
property was originally conveyed.  There was no change in the 
Elo trustees' property interest as a result of the 1968 merger. 
 The local church trustees continued to hold the entrusted 
property for the benefit of the denomination.16   
 
¶42 Because the property is burdened with this trust, 
under which the property at issue is held for the benefit of the 
UMC, it is beyond the powers of the Elo trustees to disassociate 
the property from the UMC.  We explained long ago in a similar 
church dispute that ordinary trust principles prevent the 
                     
15 Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church ¶6 
(1996). 
16  At oral argument, the Elo trustees emphasized their 
refusal to honor the request for a trust deed made by the UMC in 
the late 1960s.  Because we conclude that the property was held 
in trust since its original conveyance in 1860 and thus already 
held in trust for the UMC at the time of this request for a 
trust deed, we find no significance in the local church's 
refusal to proffer a new trust deed.   
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
22
diversion of property in the manner attempted by the Elo 
trustees: 
 
A religious corporation holding property charged with 
a trust for certain purposes can no more divert it to 
other and inconsistent uses, even by due corporate 
actions, than can any other trustee.  
Cape v. Plymouth Congregational Church, 130 Wis. 174, 179-80, 
109 N.W. 928 (1906).   
¶43 This is in accord with the rule of other states that 
have addressed the attempted removal of entrusted property by a 
local congregation that secedes from a hierarchical church.  The 
general rule in this regard has been expressed as follows: 
 
[A]lthough the members of a local church may secede 
from a hierarchical system, they cannot secede and 
take the church property with them. 
New York Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church v. Fisher, 
438 A.2d 62, 70 (Conn. 1980) (citing cases). 
 
¶44 In sum, we conclude that as a consequence of the Elo 
congregation's unequivocal withdrawal from the UMC and the 
Conference, the Elo church was rendered a defunct or dissolved 
local Methodist church within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 187.15(4).  By operation of that statutory provision title to 
the property at issue vests in the Conference, and summary 
judgment must be granted in its favor.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals, reversing and remanding 
this matter to the circuit court.   
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
99-1522 
 
 
23
 
 
No. 99-1522.ssa 
 
1 
¶45 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  
Today's decision rests upon a reasonable interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 187.15, governing the disposal of Methodist church 
property. 
 I 
agree with 
the majority opinion 
that the 
application 
of 
the 
statute 
represents 
neither 
an 
unconstitutional taking nor an impermissible preference for 
church hierarchy, the bases on which the Elo trustees ground 
their appeal.  Nevertheless, I would remand the case for 
resolution of this property dispute on non-statutory grounds. 
 
I 
 
¶46 As the majority opinion concludes, the 1860 deed 
creates a trust in favor of the Methodist Episcopal Church.17  
Whether the United Methodist Church (UMC) is the successor in 
interest to the trust in favor of the Methodist Episcopal Church 
appears to be a disputed question of fact at this summary 
judgment stage, contrary to the majority's conclusion.18 
¶47 The Elo trustees rely on the Book of Discipline of the 
United Methodist Church, which states as follows: 
 
Nothing in the Plan of Union at any time after the 
union is to be construed so as to require any local 
church or any other property owner of the former The 
Evangelical United Brethren Church or the former The 
Methodist Church to alienate or in any way to change 
                     
17 See majority op. at ¶40. 
18 See majority op. at ¶40. 
No. 99-1522.ssa 
 
2 
the title to property contained in its deed or deeds 
at the time of union.19 
They further allege that the UMC requested, and was denied, a 
new deed following the 1968 merger.  According to the Elo 
trustees, the UMC's conduct indicates that it did not have a 
beneficial interest in the property. 
¶48 Because this case comes to us on review of the UMC's 
motion for summary judgment, this court must draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the Elo trustees.20 
 I conclude that the Elo trustees have succeeded in raising a 
reasonable inference that the UMC did not automatically become 
the successor in interest to the Methodist Episcopal Church 
under the 1860 deed.  The majority's reliance on the first 
paragraph of the Book of Discipline, the meaning and relevance 
of which have not been briefed, does not convince me otherwise. 
¶49 Because a disputed issue of material fact exists 
regarding the UMC's right to property held in trust for the 
Methodist Episcopal Church, I would remand the case to the 
circuit court for resolution of this issue.  If the case for 
resolution on trust principles is as strong as the majority 
contends, remand would impose but a small burden on the parties 
and the circuit court.  Moreover, a resolution of this property 
dispute on the basis of trust principles involves no risk of 
entanglement in church doctrine. 
                     
19 Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church, ¶6 
(1996). 
20 See Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Serv., Inc., 2000 
WI 87, ¶56, 236 Wis. 2d 435, 613 N.W.2d 142. 
No. 99-1522.ssa 
 
3 
 
II 
 
¶50 I am concerned that Wis. Stat. § 187.15 may be 
unconstitutional.  Admittedly, the Elo trustees never raised 
this argument, and their failure to challenge the existence (as 
opposed to the UMC's interpretation) of Wis. Stat. § 187.15 can 
be construed as waiver.  Because the issue was not briefed, I do 
not write to decide this issue.  I do, however, express a 
question about the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 187.15. 
¶51 Chapter 187 is a patchwork of statutes governing 
religious property, some directed toward specific religious 
denominations, 
others 
directed 
toward 
religious 
societies 
generally.  While Methodist church property is governed by Wis. 
Stat. § 187.15, the church property of religious societies that 
do not have the benefit of a specific statute is governed by 
other provisions of Chapter 187, including Wis. Stat. § 187.08. 
¶52 The differences between Wis. Stat. §§ 187.15 and 
187.08 should give this court pause about resolving this dispute 
by using a statute that applies specifically to Methodist church 
property, when other religious societies cannot avail themselves 
of a similar statutory remedy.  I wonder whether Justice 
Brennan's call for "special statutes governing church property 
arrangements" envisioned a statutory scheme that singles out 
No. 99-1522.ssa 
 
4 
individual religions and leads to varied results in church 
property disputes.21 
¶53 The majority opinion further suggests that Wis. Stat. 
§ 187.15 "codifies the manner in which the UMC maintains control 
over local church property."22  This proposition may well be 
correct, but if the statute merely codifies the church's system 
of property management, this case can be resolved without resort 
to the statute. 
¶54 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
 
                     
21 See majority op. at ¶22. 
22 See majority op. at ¶32. 
No. 99-1522.jpw 
 
1 
¶55 JON P. WILCOX, J. (dissenting).  I concur with Chief 
Justice Abrahamson's dissent; I agree that Wis. Stat. § 187.15 
(1997-98) is problematic.  I write separately only to emphasize 
that this dispute should be remanded to be resolved on the terms 
of the deed. 
¶56 Although the majority characterizes the record as 
"sufficiently developed to allow us to address the parties' 
rights to the property," I disagree.  Majority op. at ¶39.  
While the United Methodist Church (UMC) may or may not have a 
"beneficial interest" in the property, if such an interest does 
exist, it is unclear as to its nature and extent.23  Id.  The 
deed states that the property is to be held: 
 
in Trust for the Methodist Episcopal Church . . . upon 
the express condition and understanding that should 
the Wisconsin Conference of the Methodist-Episcopal 
Church neglect to send a minister to said Liberty-
Prairie Circuit or should the Methodist Episcopal 
Church of the Liberty-Prairie Circuit become extinct 
or cease to exist from any cause or should a majority 
of the members of said church in said Circuit leave in 
consequence of nonaction or unrightous [sic] action on 
the subject if having by the general conference of the 
Methodist Episcopal Church then by a vote of two-
thirds of the subscribers to a certain subscription 
paper bearing date the first day of March, Eighteen 
hundred Sixty . . . . 
                     
23 It is undisputed that the UMC requested a trust deed for 
the property in 1968 when The Methodist Church merged with the 
Evangelical United Brethren to create the UMC and Elo refused 
the UMC's request.  Wisconsin Conf. Bd. Of Trs. of the United 
Methodist Church, Inc. v. Culver, 2000 WI App 132, ¶5, 237 
Wis. 2d 343, 614 N.W.2d 523.  Such a request is inconsistent 
with unequivocal ownership of a beneficial interest as the 
majority portrays.  Majority op. at ¶39.  
No. 99-1522.jpw 
 
2 
In my view, this language qualifies any beneficial interest that 
the UMC may have.  It indicates that the grantor envisioned that 
a dispute could arise between the local church [Elo] and the 
hierarchical church [UMC] and created a contingency for such a 
scenario.  Nevertheless, the language of the deed may very well 
be deemed ambiguous, requiring extrinsic evidence to discern the 
intent of the grantor.  See Edlin v. Soderstrom, 83 Wis. 2d 58, 
69, 264 N.W.2d 275 (1978) ("The construction of the deed is a 
matter of law unless there is an ambiguity requiring words or 
terms to be construed by extrinsic evidence, in which event the 
question becomes one of fact.").  If the language of the deed is 
judged ambiguous, the record is clearly incomplete to resolve 
this dispute.  The majority opinion implies as much by stating 
"[a]s far as we know, none of the contingencies described in the 
deed was encountered, and the record contains no indication of a 
two-thirds vote of the original donors."  Majority op. at ¶4 
n.3.  The record is insufficiently developed to determine if any 
of the contingencies in the deed are met and there is no 
indication of a two-thirds vote of possible successors to the 
"subscribers" because the circuit court ruled in favor of the 
UMC on summary judgment. 
 
¶57 Accordingly, this case should be remanded to determine 
whether the UMC has a beneficial interest and the nature and 
extent of any such beneficial interest in accordance with the 
neutral principles doctrine espoused in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 
595, 603 (1979).  The circuit court can determine whether the 
UMC is entitled to the property by first looking to the deed.  
No. 99-1522.jpw 
 
3 
If the circuit deems the language in the deed is ambiguous, it 
can then look to extrinsic evidence.  Thus, I agree with Chief 
Justice Abrahamson that this case can be resolved without 
resorting to § 187.15.   
¶58 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
No. 99-1522.ssa 
 
1