Case Title: Killian v. State

Citation: 512 N.E.2d 411

Docket Number: 79S04-8709-CR-809

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1987-09-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
512 N.E.2d 411 (1987)
Timothy KILLIAN, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 79S04-8709-CR-809.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
September 2, 1987.
Rehearing Denied November 23, 1987.
*412 Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Hope Fey, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Amy Schaeffer Good, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
DeBRULER, Justice.
Appellant Killian was convicted of unlawful deviate conduct in November of 1982. He received the presumptive sentence of ten years to run consecutive to commitments for two other crimes. The conviction was affirmed in Killian v. State (1984), Ind. App., 467 N.E.2d 1265. Thereafter he filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, which was denied. On appeal the Fourth District of the Court of Appeals reversed in an unpublished opinion, 506 N.E.2d 1146, and ordered a new sentencing hearing, because of the lack of support for that part of the judgment requiring the sentence to be consecutive. On the petition of Killian, we now grant transfer.
At the outset we agree with the holding of the Fourth District that appellant's claim that his sentence was erroneous was not waived or foreclosed by his failure to raise it in an objection at the time of sentencing or to otherwise raise it in his motion to correct errors and his direct appeal. A sentence premised upon an incorrect interpretation of a statute setting criminal penalties, obvious on the face of the record, is fundamental error. Vawter v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 168, 279 N.E.2d 805. Kleinrichert v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 537, 297 N.E.2d 822.
The evidence upon which the conviction rests reveals that appellant was in jail awaiting trial upon burglary and theft charges when he participated in an assault upon another prisoner. Upon conviction for the assault, the trial court ordered that the sentence be served consecutively to the sentences meted out for the burglary and theft charges. The court concluded that this result was mandated by I.C. XX-XX-X-X which requires consecutive sentences when a crime is committed after an arrest for another crime and before discharge from penalties for that other crime. This conclusion was error, as in Hutchison v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 850, this court held that the statute applied only to persons on parole, probation or serving a term of imprisonment at the time the second offense was committed. The opinion of the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that the consecutive sentence order could not rest upon the mandatory provision in the statute and for such reason must be vacated.
Appellant now challenges the order of the Fourth District in so far as it remands the case to the sentencing court for a new sentencing hearing. This court has held in a like case, that when two elements *413 are present, the requirement of consecutiveness must be vacated, and a requirement of concurrent terms substituted therefor, without discretion by the sentencing court. Taylor v. State (1982), Ind., 442 N.E.2d 1087. First the decision must rest upon I.C. XX-XX-X-X(b) when that statute is not applicable. This element is present here as indicated above. Second, the sentencing court must make a specific statement that no aggravating circumstances are present. This statement is twice made by the trial court in its exchange with counsel at the time of reaching its conclusions regarding the sentence.
The second element is present in this exchange and therefore the legal criteria for an order of remand for correction of sentence without a hearing as set by Taylor, are met.
We therefore remand this case for correction in sentencing. The term of imprisonment is to run concurrently. It is so ordered.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, J., concur.
GIVAN, J., dissents with opinion in which PIVARNIK, J., concurs.
*414 GIVAN, Justice, dissenting.
I realize that Judge Conover, in his opinion in the Court of Appeals, followed ruling precedent in this case and that Justice DeBruler is correct as to the law at the present time. However, I believe we erred in interpreting Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2. The statute reads:
I do not believe the legislature intended to create what I perceive to be a ridiculous result of providing for concurrent time for one convicted, as in the case at bar, who assaults another prisoner after his arrest for the first crime and is tried for that assault before he is ever sentenced on the first crime, but a prisoner who would assault another prisoner after he had been sentenced for his first crime would receive a consecutive sentence.
In spite of the long-standing error in this regard, I think this is the time to correct the error.
PIVARNIK, J., concurs.