Case Title: Steven T. Robinson v. City of West Allis

Citation: 2000 WI 126

Docket Number: 1998AP001211

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-12-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 126 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-1211 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Steven T. Robinson  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
and Primecare Health Plan, Inc.,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
City of West Allis, Officer Anthony R. Ball and 
Officer James Schumitsch,  
 
Defendants-Appellants.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  231 Wis. 2d 719, 605 N.W.2d 663 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
December 13, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
October 5, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Christopher R. Foley 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by Phillip J. Ramthun, Patrick A. Callahan and Stern 
& Ramthun, LLP, Milwaukee, with oral argument by Phillip J. 
Ramthun. 
 
 
For the defendants-appellants there was a brief 
by Michael J. Sachen, city attorney, and Scott E. Post, assistant 
 
2 
city attorney, and oral argument by Scott E. Post. 
 
2000 WI 126 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-1211 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Steven T. Robinson  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
and Primecare Health Plan, Inc.,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
City of West Allis, Officer Anthony R.  
Ball and Officer James Schumitsch,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Petitioner, Steven T. Robinson 
(Robinson), seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court 
of appeals reversing the circuit court's denial of summary 
judgment as to Robinson's claims that the police used excessive 
force during his arrest and that the police failed to provide 
FILED 
 
DEC 13, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
2 
him with medical attention.1  The court of appeals held that 
Robinson was unable to sustain his excessive use of force claim 
against defendants, the City of West Allis (City) and West Allis 
police officers Anthony T. Ball (Ball) and James Schumitsch 
(Schumitsch), because he did not proffer an affidavit of an 
expert countering that offered by the defendants.  The court 
also held that Robinson's claim of failure to provide medical 
attention against the defendant-officers failed because the 
officers were not required to obtain medical treatment under the 
facts of this case.  
¶2 
We agree that under the facts of this case it is 
proper to grant summary judgment dismissing Robinson's claim of 
failure to provide medical attention.  However, because we 
determine that Robinson was not required to submit an affidavit 
of an expert to avoid summary judgment on his excessive use of 
force claim and because we reject the several defenses to that 
claim raised by the defendants, we reverse the court of appeals 
and remand for further proceedings.   
I. 
¶3 
This case arises from an altercation between the 
defendant-officers and Robinson at approximately 1:00 a.m. on 
June 10, 1995.  The deposition testimony of the parties, 
                     
1  Robinson v. City of West Allis, No. 98-1211, unpublished 
slip opinion (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1999) (reversing and 
remanding order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 
Christopher R. Foley, Judge). 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
3 
incorporated into the summary judgment motion, reveals that the 
facts surrounding this altercation are in dispute.   
¶4 
Robinson, with Judy Schneider (Schneider) as his 
passenger, 
parked 
his 
motorcycle 
outside 
a 
West 
Allis 
establishment.  After Robinson alighted from his motorcycle, he 
claims Officer Ball, who had stopped his squad car behind the 
motorcycle, approached Robinson and told him he was under arrest 
for eluding an officer and speeding.2  Robinson asserts that he 
then put his hands on the car, while Ball patted him down.  
Ball, on the other hand, explains that Robinson refused to 
remove his hands from his pockets and that Ball forcibly removed 
them and placed them on the hood of the car.  Meanwhile, at 
about this time, another squad car driven by Officer Schumitsch 
arrived at the scene.   
¶5 
Robinson states that after the pat-down he removed a 
folding knife he carried on his belt from its sheath and handed 
it to Schneider.  Officer Schumitsch describes, however, that he 
saw Robinson with the closed knife and grabbed Robinson's hand 
ordering him to release the weapon.  At this point, Schumitsch 
maintains that Robinson tossed the knife to Schneider who caught 
it, and Ball then retrieved it from Schneider.   
¶6 
The officers explain that they attempted to control 
Robinson by maneuvering him towards the hood of the vehicle.  
Both officers recount how during the struggle to control 
Robinson, he began stomping, striking Schumitsch in the foot.  
                     
2 No subsequent charges were issued for those offenses.  
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
4 
They indicate that they were unable to apply handcuffs to 
Robinson while he was standing and therefore moved him to the 
ground.  Robinson, however, asserts that Schumitsch threw him 
onto the hood of the car and stated that he was under arrest for 
carrying a concealed weapon. 
¶7 
According to Robinson, while he was still bent over 
the hood of the squad car, Schumitsch conducted another pat-down 
and then ordered Robinson to place his hands behind his back.  
Robinson testified that, in response to what he perceived as the 
officer's aggressiveness, he refused to cooperate.  He claims 
that the officers then managed to maneuver one of his hands 
behind his back and clasp a handcuff to that hand.  Robinson 
maintains that the officers then pepper sprayed his face. 
¶8 
The officers admit pepper spraying Robinson, but claim 
it was done after Robinson was maneuvered to the ground, before 
either hand was cuffed.  Under Robinson's version of events he 
was not maneuvered to the ground, but rather he states that 
after being sprayed, he turned around, and in a dazed and 
confused fashion staggered, until he was tackled to the ground. 
¶9 
Robinson alleges that one of the officers punched him 
in the side of the head and then grabbed him by the hair and 
smashed his face into the ground.  However, at another point in 
the deposition, Robinson seems to state that he was punched in 
the face while bent over the hood of the squad car.   
¶10 It is unclear when the officers affixed the handcuffs 
to both of Robinson's wrists.  After being handcuffed, Robinson 
asserts that the officers picked him up by the belt at the back 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
5 
of his pants and carried him to the curb where he was dropped to 
the ground from a height of two and a half or three feet, 
landing on his chest on the curb.  The officers deny striking 
Robinson with their fists or feet during the entire encounter 
and deny smashing Robinson's face into the ground.  Both 
officers also deny picking Robinson up by the belt and dropping 
him. 
¶11 Robinson states that while he lay across the curb with 
his face on the street, Schumitsch stood with his foot in the 
middle of Robinson's back.  In response, Robinson testified that 
he told Schumitsch that he had high blood pressure and 
polycystic kidneys and asked that Schumitsch remove his foot 
from Robinson's back.  Robinson told Schumitsch that because of 
his kidney condition, he ran the risk of bursting a cyst if 
punched in the back.  Both officers deny that either of them 
stood upon Robinson or that he told either of them of a 
preexisting condition.   
¶12 Robinson maintains that he was unconscious for an 
indefinite period of time.  When he regained consciousness, 
rescue personnel from the fire department were present.  The 
rescue squad flushed Robinson's eyes of the pepper spray.  
Robinson does not recall the rescue squad inquiring about any 
further medical attention and states that he did not volunteer 
any information regarding his kidney condition to the personnel 
treating his eyes.   
¶13 Several minutes later, the police placed Robinson in a 
paddy wagon to be escorted to the police station.  Robinson 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
6 
claims that at that point, he requested to go to the hospital 
because his face felt like it was "on fire" and because he could 
not "breathe good."  The officers both recount Robinson 
complaining of the effects of the pepper spray.  Once at the 
police station, he explains that he did not seek any further 
attention for the burning sensation to his face, because he had 
asked once and had been denied and because he did not believe 
the police would allow him any medical attention.  Robinson 
eventually arrived at the Milwaukee County jail, by which point 
he acknowledges that he no longer needed medical attention.  
¶14 During his deposition, Robinson describes the injuries 
he suffered as consisting of cuts, bruises, and abrasions to his 
head, and a large boot-print shaped bruise on his back.  He also 
makes reference to treatment for a thumb injury and a shoulder 
injury apparently suffered during the altercation.  Robinson's 
deposition contains no mention of any problems or pain caused by 
or associated with his kidney condition or reported high blood 
pressure. 
¶15 Following his arrest, the Milwaukee County District 
Attorney's office issued charges against Robinson for the 
following 
violations: 
(1) 
operating 
a 
vehicle 
following 
revocation (4th offense); (2) carrying a concealed weapon; (3) 
resisting an officer; (4) battery to a law enforcement officer; 
and (5) disorderly conduct.  
¶16 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Robinson agreed to plead 
guilty to the charge of carrying a concealed weapon and to plead 
no contest to the charge of battery to a law enforcement 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
7 
officer.  The prosecution agreed to dismiss the three remaining 
charges in the complaint and allow them to be read in for 
sentencing purposes.3  
¶17 A Milwaukee County circuit court accepted Robinson's 
pleas following a plea colloquy and entered a judgment of 
conviction for the two offenses.  At the close of that colloquy, 
Robinson agreed to the use of the facts in the criminal 
complaint as the factual basis for the two charges to which he 
pled.   
¶18 Robinson 
then 
began 
this 
civil 
action 
alleging 
violations of his constitutional rights.4  Relevant to this 
                     
3  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.20(1g)(b) (1995-96) explains: 
"Read-in crime" means any crime that is uncharged or 
that is dismissed as part of a plea agreement, that 
the defendant agrees to be considered by the court at 
the time of sentencing and that the court considers at 
the time of sentencing the defendant for the crime for 
which the defendant was convicted.   
 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 volumes unless otherwise indicated.  
4  Robinson did not reference 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in his 
complaint.  However, he did plead all of the essential elements 
of the claim, and both parties, the circuit court, and the court 
of appeals accept that this action was brought under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) reads, in pertinent part: 
Every 
person 
who, 
under 
color 
of 
any 
statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
8 
appeal, Robinson alleged that Ball and Schumitsch were liable 
for violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights through their 
use of "unjustified and excessive force."  In addition, the 
complaint alleged that the officers had denied him requested 
medical assistance for his injuries.  He further alleged that 
the City of West Allis was liable for these violations on the 
grounds 
that 
it 
"authorized, 
tolerated 
as 
institutional 
practices, and ratified" Ball's and Schumitsch's actions. 
¶19 The defendants moved for summary judgment.  Despite 
the many disputes between the parties as to the facts, the 
defendants argued on various grounds that they were entitled to 
summary judgment because Robinson could not proceed with his 
causes of action as a matter of law.   
¶20 In addressing the claimed excessive use of force, the 
City and officers argued that Robinson was foreclosed by the 
doctrine of issue preclusion from taking a position inconsistent 
with the facts as presented in the criminal complaint.  In 
addition, they argued that because this civil rights action 
would imply the invalidity of his criminal convictions it could 
not be maintained under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).  
The defendants also contended that Officers Ball and Schumitsch 
were entitled to qualified immunity.  With regard to the 
allegation 
of 
failure 
to 
provide 
medical 
attention, 
the 
defendants argued that it failed as a claim because Robinson 
                                                                  
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress. . . . 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
9 
alleged neither a resulting injury nor the requisite standard of 
"deliberate indifference."5  
¶21 An affidavit of Captain Gerald Amerpohl of the West 
Allis Police Department was included in the defendants' summary 
judgment materials.  In the affidavit Captain Amerpohl states 
his credentials as a trainer of police officers.  He then 
renders his opinion that the force used by Officers Ball and 
Schumitsch to gain control of the knife in Robinson's possession 
and to handcuff him was reasonable and proper under accepted 
standards for the use of force.   
¶22 The circuit court denied the motion for summary 
judgment as to the excessive use of force claim on the grounds 
that there was a material issue of fact as to whether or not 
excessive force was used.  The court also denied the motion 
concerning the claim against the officers for failure to provide 
medical attention because it found there to be material issues 
of fact.   
¶23 The defendants sought interlocutory review of the 
denial of summary judgment, and over Robinson's objection, the 
                     
5  The City also argued that Robinson's failure to allege a 
municipal policy of deliberate indifference to medical needs was 
fatal.  The circuit court agreed and dismissed this claim 
against the City.  Robinson has not appealed this dismissal.   
Likewise, the defendants successfully contested Robinson's 
claim that the initial stop and arrest were in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment because he was never charged with a traffic 
violation and because Officer Ball did not use his lights or 
sirens.  The circuit court dismissed this claim as it related to 
both the City and the individual defendants.  Robinson has not 
appealed this dismissal. 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
10
court of appeals granted review.  The court of appeals reversed 
the 
circuit 
court, 
stating 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
inappropriately failed to consider the consequences of Captain 
Amerpohl's affidavit in the summary judgment context.  In the 
court of appeals' view, because the defendants presented an 
affidavit by an expert witness addressing the reasonableness of 
the officers' conduct, Robinson was required to counter this 
affidavit 
with 
that 
of 
an 
expert 
opining 
as 
to 
the 
unreasonableness of the officers' conduct.  Thus, the court 
concluded Robinson could not sustain his claim for use of 
excessive force without a countering affidavit.   
¶24 The court of appeals also reversed the circuit court's 
denial of summary judgment on Robinson's claim of failure to 
provide medical assistance.  The court of appeals held that the 
claim failed for two reasons.  Officers Ball and Schumitsch were 
not required to obtain medical assistance for Robinson's 
preexisting conditions, because there was nothing to suggest 
that he was ill as a result of those conditions.  Also, 
Robinson's alleged request for treatment for the burning 
sensation on his face did not relate to a "serious injury" and 
therefore did not amount to a constitutional violation.   
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
11
II. 
¶25 We are asked by Robinson to review the bases of the 
court of appeals' decision.  In addition, the defendants present 
us with several arguments they claim provide alternative grounds 
for upholding the outcome reached by the court of appeals 
regarding the excessive use of force claim.  As they argued 
before the circuit court and court of appeals, the defendants 
contend that summary judgment is necessitated by the doctrine of 
issue preclusion, the rule of Heck v. Humphrey, and qualified 
immunity.  The defendants newly allege that Robinson has waived 
a portion of his claims through his arguments to the court of 
appeals.6   
¶26 We review a grant or denial of summary judgment 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  State ex rel. Auchinleck v. 
Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 591-92, 547 N.W.2d 587 
(1996). However, we apply the same methodology as that used by 
the circuit court.  Id.  A motion for summary judgment shall be 
granted when the pleadings and supporting papers show no genuine 
issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
                     
6 In addition, although not fully developed in their brief, 
at oral argument defendants sought to individually attack the 
allegation that the officers picked Robinson up by his belt and 
dropped him.  They argue that it does not constitute an 
actionable claim because Robinson has not alleged any particular 
resultant injury.  In response, we simply note that, construing 
the inferences drawn from the evidence most favorably to 
Robinson, he has alleged numerous injuries suffered in the 
altercation. 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
12
judgment as a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  Where 
there is a dispute, even as to material facts, "'those facts 
become irrelevant if, in giving full benefit to the party 
against 
whom 
summary 
judgment 
is 
sought, 
the 
claim 
is 
nevertheless barred as a matter of law.'"  Torgerson v. 
Journal/Sentinel, Inc., 210 Wis. 2d 524, 537, 563 N.W.2d 472 
(1997) (quoting Byrne v. Bercker, 176 Wis. 2d 1037, 1045, 501 
N.W.2d 402 (1993)).  
III. EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE CLAIM 
¶27 We initially examine the challenges to Robinson's 
claim that defendants used excessive force during his arrest.  A 
claim of excessive use of force arising during arrest is 
grounded in the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
seizures as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989); Felder v. Casey, 150 
Wis. 2d 458, 471, 441 N.W.2d 725 (1989).7  The standard for 
determining whether a police officer's exercise of force is 
excessive is whether the officer's actions are objectively 
reasonable.  Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.  Wisconsin JI—Civil 2155 
provides that to sustain a claim for excessive use of force 
                     
7 The defendants argue that a portion of Robinson's 
excessive force claims were subject to a different standard 
under the Eighth Amendment.  We disagree.  The Eighth Amendment 
protection 
from 
excessive 
use 
of 
force 
arises 
following 
conviction.  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989); 
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1986).  Because 
Robinson's allegations occur during an arrest, we believe that 
the entirety of Robinson's excessive force claim is grounded in 
the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures. 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
13
during arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must 
establish that an officer was acting under color of law and that 
the officer's use of force was unreasonable.   
Expert Affidavit 
¶28 We first address whether the court of appeals was 
correct in concluding that as a matter of law expert testimony 
is necessary to establish "[w]hat constitutes reasonable force 
during an arrest and what are accepted practices for police when 
confronted with an uncooperative and armed person."  In reaching 
this conclusion the court determined that the matter was beyond 
"the realm of ordinary experience and lay comprehension."  
Because we conclude that determinations of excessive use of 
force are not, in general, beyond the realm of ordinary 
experience and lay comprehension, we reject a categorical 
requirement of expert testimony in excessive use of force cases. 
¶29 The question before the court is not whether certain 
expert testimony is admissible, but rather whether it is 
mandatory in a certain class of cases.  This court has stated 
that "requiring expert testimony rather than simply permitting 
it represents an extraordinary step, one to be taken only when 
'unusually complex or esoteric issues are before the jury.'"  
Weiss v. United Fire & Casualty Co., 197 Wis. 2d 365, 379, 541 
N.W.2d 753 (1995) (quoting White v. Leeder, 149 Wis. 2d 948, 
960, 440 N.W.2d 557 (1989)).  Expert testimony is mandatory only 
where the matter is "not within the realm of ordinary experience 
and lay comprehension."  White, 149 Wis. 2d at 960.   
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
14
¶30 Although this court has not often addressed excessive 
use of force as a constitutional violation pursued under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, we have addressed it as a common law cause of 
action.  Johnson v. Ray, 99 Wis. 2d 777, 299 N.W.2d 849 (1981); 
McCluskey v. Steinhorst, 45 Wis. 2d 350, 173 N.W.2d 148 (1970). 
 The touchstone of both causes of action is the objective 
reasonableness of the use of force.  Compare Graham, 490 U.S. at 
397, with Johnson, 99 Wis. 2d at 781-83.   
¶31 A point of emphasis in our past excessive use of force 
cases is that the issue is one properly entrusted to the jury.  
We believe the approach of our prior case law belies any 
contention that the matter is necessarily beyond the jury's 
comprehension.  In our cases discussing the common law cause of 
action, we have repeated the following explanation of the 
reasonableness test: 
 
"What amounts to reasonable force on the part of an 
officer making an arrest usually depends on the facts 
in the particular case, and hence the question is for 
the jury.  The reasonableness of the force used must 
be judged in the light of the circumstances as they 
appeared to the officer at the time he acted, and the 
measure is generally considered to be that which an 
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, with the 
knowledge and in the situation of the arresting 
officer, 
would 
have 
deemed 
necessary 
under 
the 
circumstances."   
McCluskey, 45 Wis. 2d at 354 (quoting 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Arrest, 
§ 81 (1962)); Johnson, 99 Wis. 2d at 782-83; see also Wirsing v. 
Krzeminski, 61 Wis. 2d 513, 524, 213 N.W.2d 37 (1973).   
¶32 We cannot at once emphasize the jury's responsibility 
for applying the standard of reasonableness and also claim that 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
15
the issue is beyond the jury's comprehension.  Requiring an 
expert as a prerequisite to a finding of use of excessive force 
would essentially remove from the jury the task of applying 
standards of reasonableness and replace it with the task of 
evaluating the testimony of the parties' experts.  
¶33 Moreover, a per se rule that expert testimony is 
necessary to enlighten a jury as to what is reasonable when 
police confront an "uncooperative and armed person" conflicts 
with our recognition of the fact-intensive nature of excessive 
force cases.  We have repeated throughout our discussions that 
"[t]he reasonableness of the force depends upon the facts of 
each case."  Johnson, 99 Wis. 2d at 782.  Just as the facts of 
each case dictate the reasonableness inquiry, so too should they 
dictate whether expert testimony is needed in a given case.  We 
continue to believe that "[w]hether expert testimony is required 
in a given situation must be answered on a case-by-case basis." 
 Netzel v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 51 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 186 N.W.2d 
258 (1971). 
¶34 Having rejected a per se requirement of expert 
testimony, we must decide whether expert testimony is needed in 
this case.  While there may be cases in which the subtleties of 
police procedure and practice justifying a particular use of 
force are so far removed from the comprehension of a lay jury as 
to necessitate an expert, this is not one of them.  We have 
reviewed the summary judgment materials presented by the parties 
and conclude that the facts of this case are not so complex and 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
16
esoteric as to require an expert to determine whether the force 
used by Ball and Schumitsch was reasonable.  
¶35 Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 
we must accept Robinson's version of the disputed facts.  Under 
these facts there is no indication that the reasonableness of 
the officers' actions involves matters so complex as to 
necessitate an expert.  One need not be an expert to determine 
whether a reasonable use of force in effectuating an arrest 
includes smashing an arrestee's face to the ground or landing a 
punch to the side of his head.  Similarly, a jury does not need 
the opinion of an expert to determine whether a police officer 
acted reasonably in picking up a handcuffed individual by the 
belt and dropping him to the ground and then standing upon him. 
 The difficulty a jury will have with this case lies not in 
applying the reasonableness standard to the facts as it finds 
them but in untangling the disputed facts presented by the 
parties.  
¶36 In addition, regardless of the necessity of expert 
testimony in this case, no effect should have been given to 
Captain Amerpohl's affidavit at the summary judgment stage given 
the disputed factual basis underlying his opinion.  It fails to 
address Robinson's allegations that he was punched, stood upon, 
and dropped to the curb or that the officers smashed his face on 
the ground.   
¶37 We conclude that Robinson was not required to submit 
an affidavit of an expert and therefore that his failure to do 
so was not a proper basis for granting summary judgment.  
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
17
Accordingly, we must address the arguments that the defendants 
offer as alternative grounds for upholding the court of appeals' 
decision.   
Issue Preclusion 
¶38 The defendants assert that the doctrine of issue 
preclusion bars Robinson's excessive use of force claim.  They 
contend that Robinson is barred from claiming facts different 
from those in the criminal complaint, and that this eliminates 
any issues of material fact.  The defendants believe that this 
would clear the way for dismissal of the case as a matter of 
law, because the facts in the complaint do not include the 
conduct that serves as the basis for Robinson's excessive use of 
force claim. 
¶39 Issue preclusion limits the relitigation of issues 
that have been contested in a previous action between the same 
or different parties.  Michelle T. v. Crozier, 173 Wis. 2d 681, 
687, 495 N.W.2d 327 (1993).  The doctrine is intended to prevent 
parties from revisiting issues "actually litigated in a previous 
action."  Paige K.B. v. Steven G.B., 226 Wis. 2d 210, 219, 594 
N.W.2d 370 (1999).  The preclusive effect of prior litigation 
arises where "'an issue is actually and necessarily determined 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
18
by a court of competent jurisdiction.'"  Id. (quoting Montana v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)).8 
¶40 The defendants' issue preclusion argument essentially 
entails three distinct issues; namely, the preclusive effect on 
this subsequent civil action of the read-in charges, the no 
contest plea, and the guilty plea, respectively.  We examine 
each in turn, and conclude that none of the aspects of the prior 
criminal proceeding has a preclusive effect on Robinson's 
excessive use of force claim.   
¶41 We first examine the effect of the read-in charges.  
As a consequence of the plea agreement, Robinson agreed to have 
the charges of resisting an officer, disorderly conduct, and 
operating a vehicle after revocation read-in for consideration 
at sentencing.  The defendants quite correctly quote State v. 
Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d 740, 753, 460 N.W.2d 819 (Ct. App. 
1990), for the proposition that "when a defendant agrees to 
crimes being read in at the time of sentencing, he makes an 
admission that he committed those crimes."  However, it is a 
                     
8 
Normally, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
issue 
preclusion 
determination will stand unless it constitutes an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  Paige K.B. v. Steven G.B., 226 Wis. 2d 
210, 225, 594 N.W.2d 370 (1999).  In the case at hand, the 
record reflects no exercise of discretion in the denial of 
summary judgment with respect to the issue preclusion challenge 
to Robinson's excessive force claim.  The circuit court failed 
to address that issue.  Where the circuit court fails to set 
forth the reasoning behind an exercise of discretion, we need 
not reverse if our independent review of the record reveals a 
basis for sustaining the circuit court's action.  State v. 
Pittman, 174 Wis. 2d 255, 268, 496 N.W.2d 74 (1993).  We thus 
independently inquire into whether issue preclusion bars this 
claim. 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
19
significant step to argue the admission of crimes for sentencing 
purposes as part of a plea agreement necessarily will have a 
preclusive effect in a subsequent civil action.   
¶42 Read-in charges have historically served a limited 
function.  We explained in Austin v. State that 
 
[u]nder our read-in procedure, the defendant does not 
plead to any charges and therefore is not sentenced on 
any of the read-in charges but such admitted uncharged 
offenses are considered in sentencing him on the 
charged offense.   
49 Wis. 2d 727, 732, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971).  Beyond their effect 
on 
sentencing, 
read-ins 
also 
serve 
a 
role 
in 
setting 
restitution.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g) & (1r).  While they do 
have a preclusive effect in the criminal context in that the 
state is prohibited from future prosecution of the read-in 
charges, State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, ¶25, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 778, 
606 N.W.2d 155, they are not otherwise treated as adjudications 
of guilt.  See Austin, 49 Wis. 2d at 732 ("Read-in offenses are 
not prior convictions and cannot be used under sec. 973.12, the 
repeater statute."). 
¶43 Consideration of read-in charges during sentencing is 
not tantamount to actual litigation of the underlying issues.  
The sentencing court performs no adjudication of the read-in 
charges, and it cannot be said that any issues are actually and 
necessarily determined.  Because issue preclusion applies only 
where issues have been actually litigated in a previous action, 
the read-in charges cannot serve as a bar here. 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
20
¶44 Next we consider the effect of Robinson's plea of no 
contest to the charge of battery to a law enforcement officer.  
The benefit of a no contest plea has to this point been limited 
to the evidentiary bar of the use of the plea as an admission of 
the crime charged.  See Wis. Stat. § 904.10.  "The essential 
characteristic of a plea of nolo contendere is that it cannot be 
used collaterally as an admission."  Lee v. State Bd. of Dental 
Exam'rs, 29 Wis. 2d 330, 334, 139 N.W.2d 61 (1966). 
¶45 This court has never been asked to decide the issue of 
whether a no contest plea has a preclusive effect in subsequent 
civil litigation.  However, we have commented on the subject.  
In Michelle T., we quoted the Restatement (Second) of Judgments: 
 
"The rule of [§ 85 Effect of a Criminal Judgment in 
Subsequent Civil Action] presupposes that the issue in 
question 
was 
actually 
litigated 
in the 
criminal 
prosecution. . . . Accordingly the rule of this 
Section does not apply where the criminal judgment was 
based on a plea of nolo contendere . . . .  A plea of 
nolo 
contendere 
by 
definition 
obviates 
actual 
adjudication and under prevailing interpretation is 
not an admission." 
173 Wis. 2d at 687 n.7 (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 85 cmt. b (1982)).  Similarly, the court of appeals 
has commented on the issue, stating that a plea of "nolo 
contendere in the criminal suit does not draw any issues into 
controversy 
and 
does 
not 
support 
the 
use 
of 
collateral 
estoppel."  Crowall v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 120, 
122 n.2, 346 N.W.2d 327 (Ct. App. 1984); Amber J.F. v. Richard 
B., 205 Wis. 2d 510, 517-18, 557 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(citing Crowall). 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
21
¶46 We embrace today the rule suggested in these prior 
cases.  The essential characteristic of the no contest plea, 
which is that it cannot be used collaterally as an admission in 
future civil litigation, dictates that the defendants may not 
use the plea to prevent litigation in this subsequent civil 
action.   
¶47 The remaining aspect of the prior criminal action to 
be examined is Robinson's plea of guilty for carrying a 
concealed weapon in contravention of Wis. Stat. § 941.23.9  We 
need not address whether a guilty plea may have a preclusive 
effect, because we find that no issues related to the conviction 
for carrying a concealed weapon are being relitigated in this 
action.  Robinson freely admits that he was knowingly in 
possession of the knife.  Indeed, this is one of the few 
historical facts agreed upon by the parties.  We fail to see how 
Robinson's claim of excessive use of force will implicate any of 
the issues underlying his guilty plea and conviction for 
carrying a concealed weapon. 
¶48 In sum, we conclude that neither the read-in charges 
nor the no contest plea has a preclusive effect.  We also 
conclude that Robinson's excessive force claim does not require 
relitigation of the issues underlying his guilty plea.  Thus, 
issue preclusion does not prevent him from presenting facts that 
differ from those set forth in the criminal complaint.   
                     
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 941.23 reads: "Any person except a peace 
officer who goes armed with a concealed and dangerous weapon is 
guilty of a Class A misdemeanor." 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
22
Heck v. Humphrey 
¶49 The defendants additionally argue that Robinson's 
excessive use of force claim is in part barred by the doctrine 
of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).  Under Heck, when a 
plaintiff seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court must 
consider "whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would 
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence." 
 Id. at 487.  If the action would imply the invalidity of the 
prior conviction or sentence, it must be dismissed unless the 
plaintiff can show that the conviction or sentence has already 
been invalidated.  Id.   
¶50 Similar to their 
issue 
preclusion 
argument, the 
defendants contend that Heck supports dismissal of petitioner's 
"claims [of excessive force] prior to being in custody," because 
these pre-custody claims imply the invalidity of Robinson's 
convictions and the read-in charges.  We need not decipher which 
of Robinson's allegations the defendants believe arose prior to 
"custody," 
because 
we 
conclude 
that 
none 
of 
Robinson's 
allegations implicates the prior criminal action in a manner 
requiring dismissal under Heck.   
¶51 The defendants present us with no authority to support 
the proposition that the Heck doctrine is meant to protect the 
integrity of read-in charges.  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
explained that the doctrine prevents a § 1983 claim only if it 
will imply the invalidity of an "outstanding criminal judgment 
against the plaintiff."  Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
23
 Because read-in charges are not criminal judgments, we conclude 
they do not implicate the rule of Heck v. Humphrey.   
¶52 Turning our attention to Robinson's two convictions, 
which clearly are criminal judgments, we must determine whether 
his excessive force claim "necessarily impl[ies] the invalidity" 
of these convictions.  Id.  In determining whether a § 1983 
claim so invalidates a prior conviction, the Supreme Court 
suggested that the proper inquiry is whether the § 1983 claim 
requires negation of an element of the offense for which the 
plaintiff was convicted.  Id. at 486 n.6.   
¶53 Robinson was convicted of the offense of battery to a 
law 
enforcement 
officer, 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.20(2).10  We find no element of that offense that will 
necessarily be negated through proof of Robinson's excessive use 
of force claim.  Similarly, as we explained in regard to 
defendants' issue preclusion argument, Robinson's § 1983 claim 
does not implicate his conviction for carrying a concealed 
weapon in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.23.  We therefore find 
                     
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.20(2) reads: 
Battery to Law Enforcement Officers and Fire Fighters. 
 Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to a law 
enforcement officer or fire fighter, as those terms 
are defined in s. 102.475(8)(b) and (c), acting in an 
official capacity and the person knows or has reason 
to know that the victim is a law enforcement officer 
or fire fighter, by an act done without the consent of 
the person so injured, is guilty of a Class D felony. 
  
 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
24
no reason under Heck to grant summary judgment dismissing 
Robinson's claim or any portion of that claim.   
Waiver 
¶54 The defendants contend that, as a result of a 
statement made by Robinson in his brief to the court of appeals, 
he has waived any claims arising from conduct prior to his being 
"restrained and subdued."  In that brief, Robinson made the 
following statement: "Here, because the plaintiff does not 
contest the authority of the officers to arrest him and only 
complains of conduct arising after he had been restrained and 
subdued, the excessive use of force claim has no effect on the 
validity of the plaintiff's arrest or on his subsequent 
confinement."  Robinson repeated this statement in a brief to 
this court as well.  
¶55 We decline to give this statement the effect desired 
by defendants.  Read in context, the sentence was part of an 
argument by which Robinson was attempting to explain that his 
§ 1983 claim did not attack the validity of his arrest and was 
not intended as a statement of waiver.  Moreover, the statement 
is rather unspecific and is even less definite when considered 
in light of the disputed factual record.  
Qualified Immunity 
¶56 The last issue we address with respect to Robinson's 
claim of excessive use of force is whether the defendant-
officers are entitled to qualified immunity.  Qualified immunity 
protects governmental officials from § 1983 claims when carrying 
out a discretionary function.  Henes v. Morrissey, 194 Wis. 2d 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
25
338, 346, 533 N.W.2d 802 (1995).  When faced with the defense of 
qualified 
immunity 
the 
plaintiff 
bears 
the 
burden 
of 
establishing that a defendant's conduct violated "'clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.'"  Id. (quoting Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).   
¶57 While it is clearly established that an individual has 
a right to be free from excessive force, our qualified immunity 
inquiry must be much more particularized as to the facts of each 
case.  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987).  Both 
parties in this case advocate the approach adopted by the 
Seventh Circuit to determine whether the facts of a particular 
case demonstrate violation of a clearly established right.  In 
the excessive force context that approach requires that the 
plaintiff "(1) point[] to a closely analogous case that 
established a right to be free from the type of force the police 
officers used on him, or (2) show[] that the force was so 
plainly excessive that, as an objective matter, the police 
officers would have been on notice that they were violating the 
Fourth Amendment."  Clash v. Beatty, 77 F.3d 1045, 1048 (7th 
Cir. 1996). 
¶58 In their briefs and at oral argument the parties 
engage in a debate over arguably analogous case law.  As 
Robinson notes, qualified immunity does not require him to 
identify cases that contain the exact facts he is alleging.  See 
McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 1992).  
Furthermore, Robinson's version of events presents facts that 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
26
arguably could "thrust this case into the 'plainly excessive' 
category."  Rice v. Burks, 999 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir. 1993). 
However, in order for us to engage in either inquiry and 
ultimately to determine the matter of qualified immunity, the 
factual record must be deciphered.   
¶59 We are unable to say that the defendants' use of force 
in this case was reasonable as a matter of law given the 
nebulous set of facts presented in the summary judgment 
materials.  We have only a tenuous grasp on the timing of events 
as they unfolded during the altercation and believe it would be 
impossible for us to rule on the issue of qualified immunity 
given the disputed and confused factual record before us. Burkes 
v. Klauser, 185 Wis. 2d 308, 328, 517 N.W.2d 503 (1994) ("[I]f 
there 
are 
issues 
of 
disputed 
fact 
upon 
which 
immunity 
turns, . . .  the case should proceed to trial."); Baxter v. 
DNR, 165 Wis. 2d 298, 303-04, 477 N.W.2d 648 (Ct. App. 1991); 
Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1051 (6th Cir. 1999).   
¶60 Our decision does not mean that this claim cannot 
ultimately be disposed of on the grounds of qualified immunity. 
A denial of summary judgment does not preclude a party from 
raising the issue at trial.  Burkes, 185 Wis. 2d at 329.   
IV.  FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEDICAL ATTENTION 
¶61 The defendant-officers also moved for summary judgment 
on Robinson's claim that they denied him medical assistance.  
Robinson's claim in this regard exists only as to the individual 
officers.  The circuit court granted summary judgment on 
Robinson's claim against the City, and Robinson did not appeal 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
27
this ruling.  Robinson claims that given what the officers knew 
at the time of his arrest and subsequent confinement, they 
should have transported him to a hospital.   
¶62 The 
defendants' 
summary 
judgment 
challenge 
to 
Robinson's claim requires us to identify the right allegedly 
violated.  Both parties suggest that our focus should be on the 
Eighth Amendment and the deliberate indifference standard.  
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).11  However, the Eighth 
Amendment protection applies to convicted prisoners.  Ingraham 
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n.40 (1977).   Because Robinson 
had not yet been convicted at the time he was allegedly denied 
medical assistance, he should be properly considered a pretrial 
detainee.  
¶63 In City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 
463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983), the Supreme Court established that a 
pretrial detainee who has been injured is entitled to receive 
medical attention.  While the scope of this due process 
protection was not defined with specificity in City of Revere, 
                     
11 In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Court 
established the standard for a constitutional violation arising 
from inadequate medical treatment of prisoners.  A prisoner in 
such actions has a valid claim for violation of the Eighth 
Amendment 
where 
the 
prisoner 
alleges 
"acts 
or 
omissions 
sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs."  Id. at 106. 
 
The court of appeals and the defendants also rely to some 
degree on Brownelli v. McCaughtry, 182 Wis. 2d 367, 514 N.W.2d 
48 (Ct. App. 1994).  However, we find Brownelli inapposite 
because it concerns the duty owed to prisoners and is grounded 
in negligence principles rather than constitutional principles.  
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
28
the Court did state that such a pretrial detainee's rights "are 
as least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available 
to a convicted prisoner."  Id. (citations omitted).  The Supreme 
Court has not further explored the issue of the due process 
right of a pretrial detainee to receive medical care,12 and no 
Wisconsin court has yet addressed the issue.   
¶64 We do not attempt to define the scope of that right in 
its entirety today, but we do follow many of the courts that 
have addressed the issue and require that for there to be a 
constitutional violation the officers must have been inattentive 
to an injury or the signs of an injury that was more than merely 
a minor injury.  See, e.g., Brownell v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285, 
1291 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he due process clause does not require 
                     
12 Since City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 
463 U.S. 239 (1983), the Court has twice, without further 
defining a pretrial detainee's rights, reiterated its position 
that a pretrial detainee's rights are at least as great as a 
prisoner's.  County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849-50 
(1998); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 n.7 (1989). 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
29
hospital care for minor injuries.").13  Viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to Robinson, he is not entitled to 
proceed past summary judgment with this claim because he 
presents no evidence that the officers were inattentive to an 
injury or the signs thereof that is anything more than a minor 
injury. 
                     
13 See also Barrie v. Grand County, Utah, 119 F.3d 862, 868 
(10th Cir. 1997); Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 
1995) ("A pretrial detainee must be provided with medical 
treatment if a reasonable officer would have considered the 
injury serious."); Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 185 (3d Cir. 
1993); McNally v. Prison Health Servs., 46 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D. 
Me. 1999) (describing First Circuit rule).  These cases require 
that there be deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 
to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.  This 
describes the scope of the protection provided to a convicted 
prisoner under the Eighth Amendment.  Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. 
 The parties, relying to a great extent on Brownell v. Figel, 
950 F.2d 1285 (7th Cir. 1991), assert that this is the 
controlling standard.  While the several circuits listed above 
have adopted the Eighth Amendment standard in the Fourteenth 
Amendment context, the Supreme Court has specifically left open 
the possibility that the rights of a pretrial detainee in this 
regard are broader than those of convicted prisoners.  City of 
Revere, 463 U.S. at 244.   
Because we can decide this case on the narrow grounds of 
Robinson's failure to sustain a claim based on more than minor 
injuries, we cite Brownell and the other federal court of 
appeals cases for the much narrower proposition that inattention 
to a minor injury or the signs thereof does not amount to a 
constitutional violation.  We leave for another day the matter 
of defining further the degree of injury needed for there to be 
a constitutional violation and the question of whether the 
inattention must rise to the level of deliberate indifference.  
See Boswell v. Sherburne County, 849 F.2d 1117, 1121 (8th Cir. 
1988) (declining to define scope of pretrial detainee's rights 
in comparison to rights of convicted prisoners in light of 
Supreme 
Court's 
statements 
City 
of 
Revere 
when 
it 
was 
unnecessary to resolution of case).   
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
30
¶65 The only injuries of which the officers knew or had 
reason to know were the effects of the pepper spray and the cuts 
or scrapes to Robinson's face.  Robinson does not deny that the 
rescue squad provided medical attention for the effects of the 
pepper spray.  Minutes later Robinson claims to have requested 
to go the hospital because of the effects of the pepper spray.  
However, despite Robinson's claims, the effects of the pepper 
spray proved to be nothing more than minor and temporary.  
Robinson remained ambulatory and did not complain further of the 
injury in the initial few hours of confinement before the 
effects of the spray subsided.   
¶66 Robinson has presented no facts that suggest the 
injuries to his face were causing him pain or were the source of 
the complaints to the officers.  Indeed, he recalls that several 
hours after the incident only the pepper spray was causing him 
pain.  As such, we can find no evidence that suggests these 
injuries were anything other than minor. 
¶67 The focus of Robinson's argument is his contention 
that upon informing the officers of his kidney condition and 
high blood pressure, the officers should have sought medical 
attention.  However, the summary judgment materials do not 
demonstrate that Robinson was suffering from or complaining of 
the effects of these conditions at any point during the arrest 
or his subsequent confinement.  In his deposition he describes 
no pain or problems caused by or associated with either 
condition.  Robinson's statement merely informed the officers of 
a preexisting condition.  There was no injury related to these 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
31
conditions.  Merely stating that one has a preexisting medical 
condition does not warrant medical care absent some indication 
that those conditions require treatment at that time.   
¶68 Robinson alleges that a boot-print shaped bruise 
developed on his back from the placement of Schumitsch's foot.  
Yet, nothing in the summary judgment materials demonstrates that 
the officers had reason to know of this injury, and therefore 
they cannot be said to have been inattentive to it.  Similarly, 
Robinson 
has 
neither 
argued 
nor 
presented 
any 
evidence 
suggesting 
that 
the 
officers 
were 
aware 
of 
his 
alleged 
unconsciousness.   
¶69 Finally, Robinson contends in his brief that he 
requested that he be transported to a hospital due to a shoulder 
injury.  There is no mention of any such request in Robinson's 
deposition or elsewhere in the summary judgment materials.  Nor 
can we find any indication that Robinson complained of a 
shoulder injury or exhibited the signs of such an injury at the 
time when the defendant-officers would have been required to 
obtain medical assistance.  Again, Robinson testified that by 
the time he was at the police station, only the effects of the 
pepper spray were causing him pain.  
¶70 In sum, we have construed the inferences drawn from 
the evidence in Robinson's favor and conclude that he has 
presented 
no 
evidence 
suggesting 
that 
the 
officers 
were 
inattentive to an injury or the signs of an injury, other than 
minor injuries.  His claim, therefore, cannot survive the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment.   
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
32
V. 
¶71 In conclusion, we determine that under the facts of 
this case it is proper to grant summary judgment dismissing 
Robinson's claim of failure to provide medical attention.  
However, the circuit court correctly denied summary judgment on 
the claim of excessive use of force.  Robinson was not required 
to submit an affidavit of an expert witness to avoid summary 
judgment on his excessive use of force claim.  In addressing the 
defendants' defenses to that claim, we conclude that neither 
issue preclusion nor the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey presents a 
bar to that claim, and we determine that Robinson has not waived 
any portion of that claim.  We also conclude that the defendant-
officers are not entitled to dismissal of the claim on the basis 
of qualified immunity.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.   
 
No. 
98-1211 
 
 
1