Case Title: Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision

Citation: 2002-Ohio-4032

Docket Number: 20011352

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 96 Ohio St.3d 170, 
2002-Ohio-4032.] 
 
 
SPECIALTY RESTAURANTS CORPORATION ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. CUYAHOGA 
COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 170, 2002-Ohio-4032.] 
Taxation — Real property valuation — Complaint dismissed, when — “Filing” 
for purposes of the prohibition of R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) against a second 
filing in the same interim period, construed and applied. 
(No. 2001-1352 — Submitted July 24, 2002 — Decided August 21, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 00-A-1588. 
__________________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
{¶1} 
The city of Cleveland and Specialty Restaurants Corporation, as 
the owner and lessee respectively (collectively, “Specialty”), filed a complaint 
against the valuation of real property with the Cuyahoga County Board of 
Revision (“BOR”) for tax year 1998.  Shortly after Specialty filed its complaint, it 
requested the BOR to allow it to withdraw the complaint, and the BOR granted 
the request. 
{¶2} 
Specialty filed another valuation complaint for the same property 
for tax year 1999.  Specialty did not give notice of any of the four circumstances 
set forth in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) and listed on the complaint form, which permit 
the filing of a second complaint in the same interim period. 
{¶3} 
The Board of Education for the Cleveland Municipal School 
District (“BOE”) filed a countercomplaint and a motion to dismiss Specialty’s 
1999 complaint.  In its motion the BOE alleged that R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) 
prohibited Specialty’s 1999 complaint as a second filing in the same interim 
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period, which covered the tax years 1997, 1998, and 1999.  The BOR granted the 
BOE’s motion and dismissed Specialty’s 1999 complaint. 
{¶4} 
Specialty appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”), which 
affirmed the BOR’s dismissal. 
{¶5} 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
{¶6} 
Specialty contends that it may file a second complaint in the same 
interim period because it voluntarily withdrew the 1998 complaint before the 
BOR considered it.  We disagree. 
{¶7} 
R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) limits the number of complaints that can be 
filed in a three-year interim period.  It states: 
{¶8} 
“No person * * * shall file a complaint against the valuation or 
assessment of any parcel that appears on the tax list if it filed a complaint against 
the valuation or assessment of that parcel for any prior tax year in the same 
interim period.” 
{¶9} 
In support of its contention, Specialty relies on Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (Apr. 9, 1999), Hamilton App. No. C-971012, 1999 
WL 193346.  General Electric filed a property valuation complaint for tax year 
1993 and then withdrew it before the hearing.  General Electric filed another 
complaint for tax year 1994.  The Hamilton County Board of Revision dismissed 
the complaint for tax year 1994, finding that it was the second filing in the interim 
period.  General Electric appealed to the Hamilton County Court of Appeals, 
which concluded that the board of revision must act on the complaint in some way 
before it is dismissed for the complaint to be considered filed.  The Hamilton 
County Court of Appeals misinterpreted our opinion in Elkem Metals Co., L.P. v. 
Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 683, 693 N.E.2d 276. 
{¶10} Elkem’s first filed complaint was dismissed for jurisdictional 
reasons.  Elkem filed another complaint the following year and argued that the 
first complaint was a nullity to be ignored because it had been dismissed for 
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jurisdictional reasons.  We disagreed.  Our decision turned on the word “filed” 
contained in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2).  We ruled that “ ‘[a] paper is filed when it is 
delivered to the proper official and by him received and filed.’ ”  Id. at 687, 693 
N.E.2d 276, quoting United States v. Lombardo (1916), 241 U.S. 73, 76, 36 S.Ct. 
508, 60 L.Ed. 897. 
{¶11} R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) states, “No person * * * shall file a complaint 
* * * if it filed a complaint * * * for any prior tax year in the same interim 
period.”  When a statute is clear and unambiguous in its terms, we apply it, not 
interpret it.  Soltesiz v. Tracy (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 477, 479, 663 N.E.2d 1273.  
This statute is clear and does not need interpretation.  We ruled as we did in 
Elkem because the property owner had delivered a prior complaint to the proper 
official, who received and filed it in the interim period.  Whatever happens to a 
complaint after it is filed is irrelevant for the purposes of R.C. 5715.19(A)(2).  If 
“a person, board, or officer” files a complaint in an interim period it may not file 
another complaint in the same interim period, unless one or more of the four 
statutory circumstances listed in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) is alleged.  Specialty’s 1999 
complaint was the second complaint it filed in the same interim period, and it did 
not establish any of the four circumstances that would permit it to file a second 
complaint in the same interim period. 
{¶12} Accordingly, we hold that the decision of the BTA affirming the 
BOR’s dismissal of  Specialty’s 1999 complaint was reasonable and lawful, and 
we affirm it. 
Decision affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., 
concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. dissenting. 
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{¶13} I dissent from the majority’s opinion.  I do not believe that the 
legislature intended R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) to apply to withdrawn complaints that 
were never acted upon.  The intent of R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) was to prohibit 
successive challenges to evaluations.  When a complaint against the valuation of 
real property is withdrawn before any other action is taken, it is analogous to a 
complaint in a trial court that is voluntarily dismissed before service is perfected.  
Pursuant to Civ.R. 3(A), an action is not even commenced until service is 
perfected.  No opposing party is harmed or even inconvenienced in either 
situation. 
{¶14} I would follow the court of appeals’ reasoning in Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (Apr. 9, 1999), Hamilton App. No. C-971012, 1999 
WL 193346, which reversed a similar dismissal and allowed the refiled action to 
proceed.  Applying that reasoning, I would reverse this case and allow the refiled 
action to proceed.  We should interpret ambiguous statutes to allow access to the 
legal system, not impose technical roadblocks. 
{¶15} Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A., and Annrita S. Johnson, for appellants. 
 
Britton, McGown, Smith, Peters, Kalail Co., L.P.A., Karrie M. Kalail, 
David H. Seed and David A. Rose, for appellee Cleveland Municipal School 
District Board of Education. 
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