Case Title: State v. Daniels

Citation: 

Docket Number: S057832

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: July 9, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent
on Review,
v.
DEVIN JACOB DANIELS,
Petitioner
on Review.
(CC
200621759; CA A136901; SC S057832)
En Banc
On review from the
Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted
May 19, 2010, at Ashland High School, Ashland, Oregon.
Bronson D. James,
Chief Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, Salem, argued
the cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the brief was Peter Gartlan,
Chief Defender.
Gregory A. Rios,
Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. 
With him on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and Jerome Lidz, Solicitor
General.
WALTERS, J.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Lane
County Circuit Court, Pierre L. Van Rysselberghe, Senior Judge. 230 Or App 430,
215 P3d 127 (2009).
WALTERS, J.
The issue in this criminal case is
whether the state adduced evidence from which a jury could find that defendant
was in actual or constructive possession of a small quantity of methamphetamine
located in defendant's girlfriend's bag.  The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's
conviction without issuing a written opinion.  State v. Daniels, 230 Or
App 430, 215 P3d 127 (2009).  We allowed review and now reverse.
At trial, the following evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the state, see State v. Casey, 346
Or 54, 56, 203 P3d 202 (2009) (stating standard), was presented.  On September
21, 2006, police obtained a warrant to search the house that defendant shared
with a roommate.  Defendant's girlfriend, Perdune, did not live there.  The
week before the police obtained the warrant, they had noticed a high volume of
visitors to defendant's house.  One officer had observed four vehicles and five
pedestrians within a 20-minute period, suggesting to him that someone at the
house was selling illegal drugs.  Using a confidential informant, police made a
controlled purchase of narcotics.  
On September 21, the police knocked on
the front door of defendant's house and, when they received no response, made a
forced entry.  In a safe in defendant's roommate's bedroom, police found a small
pistol, a list of transactions, a larger plastic baggie(1)
containing smaller plastic baggies, and a plastic container holding a substance
commonly used to dilute methamphetamine.  In defendant's bedroom, police found
a set of digital scales, small plastic baggies, a loaded magazine of .223
caliber rounds for an assault rifle (but no corresponding rifle), and a pink bag.(2) 
Inside the pink bag was a small baggie identical to the small plastic baggies found
in the bedrooms of both defendant and his roommate.  The baggie in the pink bag
contained a small quantity of methamphetamine sufficient for personal use.  
Defendant was present during the
search, as was Perdune.(3) 
Defendant's roommate was not.  On questioning, defendant confessed to having
sold methamphetamine from the residence "about a month ago" and to
using methamphetamine regularly, smoking it three to four times per week.  Perdune
acknowledged ownership of the pink bag.
The
state charged defendant with one count of possession of methamphetamine, ORS
475.894,(4)
and one count of distribution of methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a school,
ORS 475.892.  At trial, defendant twice moved for a judgment of acquittal.  In
one motion, defendant contended that the state had not proved that defendant's
distribution occurred in proximity to a school.  The court granted that motion,
reducing the distribution charge to the lesser-included charge of delivery of
methamphetamine under ORS 475.890.  In the other motion, defendant contended
that the state had not adduced sufficient evidence to permit a conviction for
possession.  The trial court denied that motion, and the jury returned a
verdict of guilty on both charges, viz., the possession charge and the
delivery charge.  Defendant appealed the possession conviction, asserting that
the trial court had erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal.(5) 
As noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
As a preliminary matter, it is
important to clarify that defendant's conviction for delivery of
methamphetamine did not reflect a jury finding that defendant had delivered
methamphetamine to Perdune on or about September 21, 2006.  The delivery that
the jury was instructed to consider, and that formed the basis for its
conviction, occurred 30 days earlier.
In the indictment, the state alleged two
separate counts -- first that, on or about September 21, 2006, defendant
possessed methamphetamine; and second, that, on or between August 1 and
September 21, 2006, defendant delivered methamphetamine.  During trial, the
judge asked the state's attorney to clarify the facts on which they based the delivery
charge.  The court explained that the jury should be told whether that charge
was based on the delivery that defendant told the officer he had made a month
before the search, a delivery that may have occurred when the informant bought
methamphetamine, or a delivery that may have occurred on the date of the
search.(6) 
The state apparently answered that the delivery charge was based on defendant's
statement to the officer because the court instructed the jury accordingly:
"But that * * * the incident alleged in [the delivery]
charge is not the incident when the search warrant was served, or it's not the
incident, I think Counsel made this clear when the informant went into the
house under the officer's supervision with the money, and so forth.
"The incident which is that * * * alleges
the basis of this charge is the one based on the officer's testimony about the
Defendant telling him when [he] last sold methamphetamine.  That's the incident
that you're dealing with on that charge, and the issue is did the State prove
that beyond a reasonable doubt within the rules of the laws, and [the]
instructions that I'm giving you."  
(Ellipses in transcript.)
The court also instructed the jury
that the possession charge depended solely on whether defendant possessed
methamphetamine on the date that the search warrant was served -- September 21,
2006:
"First charge alleges that the Defendant on
or about September 21, 2006 in Lane County, Oregon did unlawfully and knowingly
possess a substance containing the Schedule II controlled substance,
methamphetamine.  
"And the incident that's alleged to be the
basis of that charge, is the incident time when the search warrant is served,
and that's your question.  Was the Defendant at that time, and that was September
21, 2006 is alleged [to have been] when the offense [occurred], unlawfully possessing
methamphetamine[?]"
Thus, in light of the trial court's instructions, the issue
before this court is whether there was evidence from which the jury could have
found that defendant possessed, on September 21, 2006,(7)
the methamphetamine that the police found in Perdune's bag when they conducted
their search.  
In ruling on the sufficiency of the
evidence of possession of methamphetamine, the question is whether there was
sufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Rader, 348 Or 81, 91, 228 P3d 552 (2010). 
"In making that determination, a court must resolve all conflicts of evidence
in favor of the state and give the state the benefit of all reasonable
inferences."  Id.
The state advances two alternative
arguments for the conclusion that it presented sufficient evidence to support the
jury's verdict of guilty.  The state first argues that defendant actually
possessed the methamphetamine found in Perdune's bag.  A person has actual
possession of property when the person has physical control over it.  See
ORS 161.015(9) ("'Possess' means to have physical possession or otherwise
to exercise dominion or control over property."); State v. Fries,
344 Or 541, 546, 185 P3d 453 (2008) ("As a general rule, 'to have physical
possession' of property means to have bodily or physical control of
it.").  
The state contends that, although
defendant was not in physical control of the methamphetamine when the police
discovered it on September 21, there was evidence that defendant had had that methamphetamine
in his physical control "just before" the police discovered it.  The state
points to defendant's admission that he had sold methamphetamine previously, the
paraphernalia that the police discovered indicating that a high volume
methamphetamine sales operation was ongoing, Perdune's status as defendant's
girlfriend, the fact that the methamphetamine was discovered in her bag, and
the fact that the methamphetamine was inside a small plastic baggie that was identical
to the small plastic baggies found elsewhere in the house.  The state argues
that the jury could have inferred from that evidence that defendant was the
source of the methamphetamine in Perdune's bag and that he therefore had had the
methamphetamine in his physical possession on the day of the search before
either supplying it to Perdune for her use or placing it in her bag to avoid
its discovery by the police.
Although those scenarios are possible,
they rely on speculation rather than reasonable inferences.  The evidence
disclosed that defendant had supplied methamphetamine to others about a month before
and that Perdune was in possession of methamphetamine, but not other facts from
which a reasonable jury could infer that defendant was the source of that
methamphetamine.  Defendant had no methamphetamine in his own possession and
there was no methamphetamine anywhere else in the house.
Even if we were to assume that there
was evidence from which a jury could find that defendant supplied Perdune with the
methamphetamine or placed it in her bag, there was not sufficient evidence that
defendant did so -- and therefore was in possession of the drugs -- on
September 21, 2006.  To establish actual, as opposed to constructive,
possession, the state had to prove that defendant had physical control of the
methamphetamine on September 21, i.e., that he possessed the
methamphetamine on that day.  The state argues that the amount of
methamphetamine in the bag was small and that the jury could infer from that
fact that Perdune had not had it in her possession for long.  If defendant had transferred
the methamphetamine to Perdune before September 21, the state contends, she already
would have consumed it.  What the state overlooks, however, is that the
evidence did not disclose the extent or frequency of Perdune's use.  The fact
that the methamphetamine was in Perdune's bag on September 21 was insufficient to
permit a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant also had that
methamphetamine in his physical possession on that date.
In the alternative, the state contends
that defendant had constructive possession of the methamphetamine in Perdune's
bag.  The concept of constructive possession broadens the scope of the crime of
possession beyond physical control.  State v. Casey, 346 Or 54, 60, 203 P3d 202 (2009).  In accordance with that concept, under ORS 161.015(9), "possess" means not
only physical possession, but "otherwise exercis[ing] dominion or control
over property."
The state contends that the jury
could have found that defendant exercised dominion or control of the
methamphetamine on September 21, 2006, because he shared control of it with
Perdune.  The state relies on the same circumstances outlined above:  defendant
was a drug dealer and user; defendant and Perdune were in a romantic
relationship; and Perdune's bag was located in defendant's bedroom. 
Accordingly, the state contends that "it is likely that the drugs were available
for defendant's use, and that he, therefore, constructively possessed
them."  (Emphasis added.)
We reject the state's argument for
two reasons.  First, proximity to property owned by a social guest does not
establish that the host exercises dominion or control over that property. 
Second, the facts did not permit a reasonable inference that Perdune was more
than defendant's social guest. 
In Casey, the court considered
four factual circumstances on which the state based an argument of constructive
possession of a gun owned by a social guest, three of which are relevant here. 
First, the court considered the fact that the guest brought a gun, concealed on
his person, into the defendant's residence.  The court held that no reasonable
trier of fact could find that the defendant exercised dominion or control over
the gun without some evidence that the defendant knew that the guest was
carrying a gun.  346 Or at 60-61.  Second, as the defendant and his guest were
leaving the residence, the guest placed the gun on a counter in the defendant's
residence.  The fact that the guest did so with defendant's knowledge was also
insufficient to establish constructive possession.  The court stated, 
"As a general matter, guests retain dominion and
control over their own property when they visit another person's home.  See
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 US 91, 99-100, 110 S Ct 1684, 109 L Ed 2d 85
(1990) ('[H]osts will more likely than not respect the privacy interests of
their guests, who are entitled to a legitimate expectation of privacy despite
the fact that they have no legal interest in the premises.').  A guest who
hangs his or her hat on the host's hat rack for the duration of a visit does
not, by that act alone, give the host dominion or control over the guest's
hat.  Something more is required to permit an inference that the guest intended
to cede or share control of the guest's property with the host."
Id. at 61.  Third, the court concluded that when the
defendant in Casey reentered the residence and was again in proximity to
the gun for a short period of time, his proximity to the gun, without more, was
not sufficient to establish constructive possession.  Id. at 62-63.
Like Casey, the facts in this
case do not create an inference of constructive possession sufficient for a
reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had
constructive possession of the methamphetamine.  The evidence neither established
nor permitted a reasonable inference that defendant knew that the pink bag was
in his bedroom or that it contained methamphetamine. There was no evidence that
defendant had looked in the bag, that the bag was transparent, or that the
methamphetamine was otherwise discernable.  The state contends that a jury
could infer defendant's awareness of the methamphetamine from the likelihood
that he had sold it to Perdune.  But, as we have previously explained, the record
does not contain facts that would justify that inferential leap.  Without some
evidence that defendant knew that the methamphetamine was in Perdune's bag, the
evidence, like that in Casey, is insufficient to permit a reasonable
jury to find that defendant constructively possessed it.
Second, as Casey informs us, guests
retain dominion and control over their own property when they visit the home of
another.  The evidence did not permit a reasonable jury to find that Perdune
was any more than a social guest at defendant's residence.  The evidence did
not disclose anything about the relationship between defendant and Perdune
other than that it was romantic.  There was no evidence, for example, about
whether defendant and Perdune had formed a partnership in their personal
property, or even how long they had been acquainted.  There was no evidence
about whether Perdune had permitted defendant to exercise dominion or control
over her personal property, or even that he had opened her bag or purse.  A romantic
relationship and bedroom access does not give rise to an inference of a partnership
relationship and purse access.  
Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the state, we conclude that a rational juror could not have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed, on September 21,
2006, the methamphetamine that the police discovered that day.  We therefore
conclude that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a
judgment of acquittal on that charge.
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. At
trial, the witness referred to this larger plastic item and the smaller plastic
items within it as "baggies."  To be consistent with that testimony,
we also use the term "baggies."
2. At
trial, some of the participants referred to the container as a "pink
bag," "purse," and "backpack," but the only witness,
the police officer, used the term "bag" or "pink bag."  The
container was not introduced into evidence.  We also will use the words
"bag" or "pink bag."
3. Viewing
the record in the light most favorable to the state, there was some evidence
that Perdune was present when the search warrant was executed.  The police officer
who conducted the search testified that "she claimed the bag as being
hers."  In addition, the officer was not certain whether he interviewed
defendant first or last.  Because defendant's roommate was not present during
the search, it appears that the officer interviewed someone in addition to
defendant and that that person was present when the search was conducted.  A
trier of fact reasonably could infer that Perdune was present and acknowledged
ownership of the bag at the time of the search.
4. ORS
475.894(1) provides: 
"It is unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally to possess methamphetamine unless the substance was obtained
directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner
while acting in the course of professional practice, or except as otherwise
authorized by ORS 475.005 to 475.285 and 475.840 to 475.980."
5. Defendant
also sought appellate review of the issue of whether a unanimous jury verdict
was constitutionally required.  We decline to consider that issue on review.  See
ORAP 9.20(2) (court may limit questions on review).
6. In
a conference on jury instructions, the trial court told the attorneys that he
needed to clarify the charge for the jury because "my concern is * * * so
that we've got three possible bas[i]s for a charge, three possible dates, I
mean they could say well, it was when the informant went in the house, or they
could say, you know, they could look at [the] date the search warrant was
served, or they could look at the date 30 days before when the Defendant
alleges that he sold the substance, so I want to make sure they know the charge
that's before them."  (Ellipsis in transcript.)
7. As
noted, the indictment alleged that defendant possessed the methamphetamine
"on or about" September 21, 2006, but the court instructed the jury
that it was required to find that defendant's possession occurred on that
specific date.  The state did not object to the instruction, nor does it argue
in this court that there was evidence that defendant possessed the
methamphetamine on a date "on or about" September 21, 2006, other
than on that specific date -- September 21, 2006.  As we understand the state's
argument, it does not dispute that, for the purposes of resolving defendant's
motion for judgment of acquittal, the question is whether there was evidence
from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that, on September 21,
defendant actually or constructively possessed the methamphetamine found in the
pink bag.  We limit our discussion to that issue.