Case Title: Thomas W. Reimann v. Circuit Court for Dane County

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP002361-W

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2361-W 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Thomas W. Reimann,  
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County and the Honorable 
Michael B. Torphy,  
 
Respondents-Petitioners.  
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(No Cite) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
December 16, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 8, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael B. Torphy, Jr. 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondents-petitioners the cause was 
argued by James H. McDermott, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, assistant attorney 
general. 
 
 
For the petitioner there was a brief by Peter 
DeWind and Legal Assistance to Institutionalized Persons, Madison 
and oral argument by Peter DeWind. 
 
No. 96-2361-W 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2361-W 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Thomas W.  
Reimann,  
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Circuit Court for Dane County and the  
Honorable Michael B. Torphy,  
 
          Respondents-Petitioners.  
FILED 
 
DEC 16, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Modified and 
as modified, affirmed. 
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.  There is one issue presented 
for review:  when a person complains to a circuit court judge 
that such person believes a crime has been committed within that 
judge's jurisdiction, does Wis. Stat. § 968.261 (1995-96)2 
                     
1 Wis. Stat. § 968.26 provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows:    
John Doe Proceeding.  If a person complains to a 
judge that he or she has reason to believe that a 
crime 
has 
been 
committed 
within 
his 
or 
her 
jurisdiction, the judge shall examine the complainant 
under oath and any witnesses produced by him or her 
and may, and at the request of the district attorney 
shall, 
subpoena 
and 
examine 
other 
witnesses 
to 
ascertain whether a crime has been committed and by 
whom committed.  The extent to which the judge may 
proceed in the examination is within the judge's 
discretion. . . . If it appears probable from the 
testimony given that a crime has been committed and 
who committed it, the complaint may be reduced to 
No. 96-2361-W 
 
2 
require the judge to examine under oath the complainant and any 
witnesses produced by him or her.  We conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.26 requires a circuit court judge to conduct such an 
examination 
only 
when 
the 
complainant 
has 
sufficiently 
established that he or she has "reason to believe" that a crime 
has been committed within that judge's jurisdiction. 
 
¶2 
This is a review of the decision of the court of 
appeals granting a supervisory writ sought by Thomas Reimann 
against the Circuit Court for Dane County and Judge Michael B. 
Torphy, Jr., State ex rel. Reimann v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, No. 96-2361-W (Wis. Ct. App. November 13, 1996).  We 
modify the decision of the court of appeals, and we affirm the 
decision, as modified, granting a supervisory writ directing 
Judge Torphy to conduct further proceedings, consistent with 
this opinion, under Wis. Stat. § 968.26.  
 
¶3 
Thomas 
Reimann 
filed 
a 
petition 
for 
John 
Doe 
proceedings under Wis. Stat. § 968.26 in the circuit court, 
alleging certain criminal conduct by a Wisconsin Department of 
Justice special agent and by an assistant district attorney of 
Dane County.  The petition was given under oath and was 
certified by a notary public.  Judge Torphy denied the petition 
without conducting a hearing or examining Reimann.  Upon review 
of Reimann's petition, the judge determined that some of the 
                                                                  
writing and signed and verified; and thereupon a 
warrant shall issue for the arrest of the accused. 
 
2 All future references to Wis. Stats. will be to the 1995-
96 version of the statutes unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 96-2361-W 
 
3 
allegations contained therein were not actionable since they 
fell outside the statute of limitations.  Judge Torphy also 
concluded that since Reimann presented his petition under oath 
and with supporting documents, "it [was] not necessary to again 
place Reimann under oath and take further evidence from him . . 
. ." 
 
¶4 
Reimann then petitioned the court of appeals for a 
supervisory writ under Wis. Stat. § 809.51(1)3 compelling Judge 
Torphy to conduct further proceedings on the John Doe petition. 
 The court of appeals granted a supervisory writ ordering that 
"Judge Torphy shall conduct an examination of the complainant 
and his witnesses, if any."  The court relied heavily on the 
mandatory portion of Wis. Stat. § 968.26, which states "the 
judge shall examine the complainant . . . ."  The court also 
concluded that Wis. Stat. § 968.26 does not require the 
complainant to satisfy any threshold test before an examination 
is required.  Based on the mandatory language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.26 and the absence of any threshold requirement, the court 
concluded that Judge Torphy was required to conduct a John Doe 
examination of Reimann.  We accepted Judge Torphy's petition for 
review.  
¶5 
The sole issue presented for review is whether Wis. 
Stat. § 968.26 requires a judge to examine under oath the 
                     
3  Wis. Stat. § 809.51(1) provides as follows:  "A person 
may request the court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction 
or its original jurisdiction to issue a prerogative writ over a 
court and the presiding judge, or other person or body, by 
filing a petition and supporting memorandum. . . ." 
No. 96-2361-W 
 
4 
complainant and any witnesses produced by him or her, whenever 
such person complains that he or she believes a crime has been 
committed within that judge's jurisdiction.  This is a question 
of statutory interpretation.   
¶6 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law.  See 
Stockbridge School Dist. v. DPI, 202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 
N.W.2d 96 (1996); Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 
327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996).  This court reviews questions of law 
de novo, without giving deference to the decisions of the lower 
courts. See Jungbluth 201 Wis. 2d at 327; Hughes v. Chrysler 
Motors Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 979, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996). 
¶7 
The ultimate goal of statutory interpretation is to 
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.  See 
Stockbridge School Dist., 202 Wis. 2d at 219; Hughes, 197 
Wis. 2d at 979; Rolo v. Goers, 174 Wis. 2d 709, 715, 497 N.W.2d 
724 (1993).  To achieve this goal, we first look to the plain 
language of the statute.  See Jungbluth, 201 Wis. 2d at 327; In 
re Interest of Kyle S.-G., 194 Wis. 2d 365, 371, 533 N.W.2d 794 
(1995).  If a statute is unambiguous, this court will apply the 
ordinary and accepted meaning of the language of the statute to 
the facts before it, see Swatek v. County of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 
47, 57, 531 N.W.2d 45 (1995), and we are prohibited from looking 
beyond such language to ascertain its meaning.  See Stockbridge 
School Dist., 202 Wis. 2d at 220 (quoting Jungbluth, 201 Wis. 2d 
at 327).  If a statute does not clearly set forth the 
legislative intent, we may look at the history, scope, context, 
No. 96-2361-W 
 
5 
subject matter, and object of the statute.  See id.; Interest of 
Kyle S.-G., 194 Wis. 2d at 371. 
¶8 
We therefore turn to the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.26 to determine whether it clearly sets forth the intent 
of the legislature.  Section 968.26 provides in pertinent part: 
"If a person complains to a judge that he or she has reason to 
believe that a crime has been committed within his or her 
jurisdiction, the judge shall examine the complainant under oath 
and any witnesses produced by him or her . . . ."   
¶9 
The obligation Wis. Stat. § 968.26 places on circuit 
court judges is clear and unambiguous.  The plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 968.26 requires a judge to examine a John Doe 
complainant and his or her witnesses, if any, when the 
complainant has reason to believe a crime has been committed 
within that judge's jurisdiction.  The legislature made this 
requirement mandatory by stating "the judge shall examine."  The 
general rule is that the word "shall," when used in a statute, 
is presumed to be mandatory unless another construction is 
necessary to carry out the clear intent of the legislature.  See 
Wagner v. State Medical Examining Bd., 181 Wis. 2d 633, 643, 511 
N.W.2d 874 (1994); C.A.K. v. State, 154 Wis. 2d 612, 621-22, 453 
N.W.2d 897 (1990).  There is no indication that this portion of 
the statute is meant to be read in any manner other than 
mandatory. 
¶10 The mandatory nature of this requirement is supported 
by the legislature's careful choice of language.  When the words 
"shall" and "may" are used in the same section of a statute, the 
No. 96-2361-W 
 
6 
court can infer that the legislature was aware of the different 
denotations and intended the words to have their precise 
meanings.  See Karow v. Milwaukee County Civil Serv. Comm., 82 
Wis. 2d 565, 571, 263 N.W.2d 214, 217 (1978).  The relevant, 
first sentence of Wis. Stat. § 968.26 contains the word "shall" 
twice and the word "may" once.  In total, Wis. Stat. § 968.26 
employs the words "shall" and "may" alternatively 12 different 
times.  We can therefore infer that the legislature intended 
"shall" to have its precise, mandatory meaning.  Applying the 
precise meaning of the statutory text, we conclude that once a 
John Doe complainant has shown that he or she has reason to 
believe that a crime has been committed, the judge has no 
discretion to refuse to examine the complainant.  With this 
conclusion of the court of appeals, we agree. 
¶11 We disagree, however, with the court of appeals' 
conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 968.26 does not impose a threshold 
requirement on the John Doe complainant.  The operative clause 
of Wis. Stat. § 968.26 provides: "If a person complains to a 
judge that he or she has reason to believe that a crime has been 
committed . . ." (emphasis added).  As we view this language, 
there is one prerequisite to triggering the judge's duty to 
examine the complainant—that the complainant first establish 
that he or she has "reason to believe" that a crime has been 
committed.  See Wolke v. Fleming, 24 Wis. 2d 606, 612-13, 129 
N.W.2d 841 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 917 (1965) (stating 
that Wis. Stat. § 968.26 requires that the complainant have 
reason to believe a crime has been committed within the 
No. 96-2361-W 
 
7 
magistrate's jurisdiction); see also State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 
161, 165, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977) (stating that a John Doe 
proceeding can be commenced only if a person complains to a 
judge that he or she has reason to believe that a crime has been 
committed within the jurisdiction).  Absent a showing in the 
petition that the complainant has reason to believe that a crime 
has 
been 
committed 
within 
the 
circuit 
court 
judge's 
jurisdiction, 
the 
judge 
is 
not 
required 
to 
examine 
the 
complainant.  
¶12 The language of Wis. Stat. § 968.26 is ambiguous as to 
what threshold showing is sufficient to establish that the 
complainant has "reason to believe" that a crime has been 
committed.  The term "reason to believe" is not defined in the 
statute, and its meaning is "capable of being understood by 
reasonably well-informed persons in either two or more senses." 
 Parental Rights to SueAnn A.M., 176 Wis. 2d 673, 678, 500 
N.W.2d 649 (1993)(quoting In Interest of P.A.K., 119 Wis. 2d 
871, 878-79, 350 N.W.2d 677 (1984)). Compare State v. Flanagan, 
251 Wis. 517, 520, 29 N.W.2d 771 (1947)(applying objective 
standard to determine whether "reason to believe" existed under 
Wis. Stat. § 29.05(6) (1947))4 with Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42 
                     
4 In State v. Flanagan, 251 Wis. 517, 29 N.W.2d 771 (1947), 
the court determined whether an officer lawfully searched a 
vehicle under Wis. Stat. § 29.05(6) (1947), which provided that 
"an officer may, with or without warrant, open, enter and 
examine all . . . vehicles . . . where he has reason to believe 
that wild animals, taken or held in violation of this chapter 
are to be found . . ." (emphasis added).  Based on observable 
acts and inferences drawn therefrom, the court concluded that 
the search was lawful.  See id. at 520. 
No. 96-2361-W 
 
8 
Wis. 2d 368, 381, 166 N.W.2d 255 (1969)(applying subjective 
standard to determine whether "any reason to believe" existed 
under Wis. Stat. § 966.01).5 
¶13 When faced with an ambiguous statute, courts should 
use the established rules of statutory construction to help 
determine the intent of the legislature.6  See SueAnn A.M., 176 
Wis. 2d at 679; State v. Charles, 180 Wis. 2d 155, 158, 509 
N.W.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1993).  Applying accepted rules of statutory 
construction, we conclude that the legislature intended to adopt 
an objective, threshold requirement in Wis. Stat. § 968.26. 
¶14 First, we must attempt "to find the common sense 
meaning and purpose of the words employed in the statute."  
SueAnn A.M., 176 Wis. 2d at 679.  Wisconsin Statutes § 968.26 
does not define the term "reason to believe."  In the absence of 
statutory definitions, this court construes all words according 
to their common and approved usage, which may be established by 
                     
5 In Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42 Wis. 2d 368, 166 N.W.2d 255 
(1969), the court determined whether a district attorney was 
required to order a coroner's inquest under Wis. Stat. § 966.01, 
which provided that a district attorney, having notice of death, 
"shall order an inquest if, from the surrounding circumstances, 
there is any reason to believe that death was caused by criminal 
conduct, suicide, or unexplained and suspicious circumstances." 
(emphasis added).  The court concluded that the legislature 
selected the district attorney to make this determination 
because, with his experience and training, he could make the 
subjective judgment required by the statute.  See id. at 381. 
6 Courts may also look to the legislative history of the 
statute to determine the legislature's intent.  Although there 
is some legislative history concerning Wis. Stat. § 968.26, it 
is not helpful in answering the specific question before this 
court.    
No. 96-2361-W 
 
9 
dictionary definitions.  See Swatek, 192 Wis. 2d at 61 (quoting 
State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d 371, 377-78, 340 N.W.2d 511 
(1983)).7  The word "reason" is commonly defined as "an 
underlying fact or cause that provides logical sense for a 
premise or an occurrence: There is reason to believe that the 
accused 
did 
not 
commit 
this 
crime." 
 
American 
Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 1506 (3rd ed. 1992)(emphasis 
original).  The word "believe" is commonly defined as meaning 
"to accept as true or real" or "to credit with veracity."  See 
id. at 169. 
¶15 Employing the common definitions of the words "reason" 
and "believe," we conclude that the precise language of Wis. 
Stat. § 968.26 requires a John Doe complainant to do more than 
merely allege in conclusory terms that a crime has been 
committed.  The allegation must be supported by objective, 
factual assertions before a circuit court judge is required to 
conduct an examination of the complainant.  Accordingly, if a 
John Doe complainant, in his or her petition, presents only 
conclusory allegations, or fails to allege facts sufficient to 
raise a reasonable belief that a punishable crime has been 
committed, the circuit court judge may, in the exercise of his 
or 
her 
legal 
discretion, 
deny 
the 
petition 
without 
an 
examination.  Cf. Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 497-98, 195 
                     
7 However, this general rule of statutory construction does 
not apply to technical words and phrases that have a peculiar 
meaning.  See State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 904, 470 N.W.2d 
900 (1991).  
No. 96-2361-W 
 
10
N.W.2d 629 (1972)(finding denial of motion to vacate a guilty 
plea without conducting an evidentiary hearing was not an abuse 
of 
discretion 
where 
defendant 
presented 
only 
conclusory 
allegations); State v Smith, 60 Wis. 2d 373, 383, 210 N.W.2d 678 
(1973)(affirming decision to deny, without evidentiary hearing, 
motion 
for 
postconviction 
relief 
where 
allegations 
were 
conclusory and failed to raise question of fact); State v. 
Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 319, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996)(holding 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
denying, without evidentiary hearing, defendant's postconviction 
motion).8 
¶16 Second, it is a basic rule of statutory construction 
that courts are to give effect to every word of a statute, if 
possible, so that no portion of the statute is rendered 
superfluous.  See Lake City v. Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 156, 163, 558 
N.W.2d 100 (1997); State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 355, 548 
N.W.2d 817 (1996).  Reimann argues that Wis. Stat. § 968.26 does 
not impose a threshold requirement on John Doe complainants.  In 
essence, Reimann asks us to adopt a subjective test of "reason 
to believe," that a judge is required to examine every 
complainant who complains that he or she subjectively believes a 
                     
8 Although the purpose of conducting an examination of a 
John Doe complainant under Wis. Stat. § 968.26 is substantively 
different than holding an evidentiary hearing under Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06 (postconviction procedure), the discretion conferred 
upon the circuit court judge in each situation is similar as to 
whether the movant has alleged sufficient facts to entitle him 
or her to an examination or evidentiary hearing.   
No. 96-2361-W 
 
11
crime has been committed.  This reading of Wis. Stat. § 968.26 
would render the "reason to believe" language superfluous.  The 
only logical purpose for including this language would be to 
require the complainant to establish something more than mere 
subjective belief.  Had the legislature intended to employ a 
subjective test, it could have done so by requiring an 
examination if a person simply complains to a judge "that he or 
she believes that a crime has been committed."  The legislature 
chose not to use such language. 
¶17 To the contrary, the legislature specifically added 
the "reason to believe" language in the 1949 revision of the 
criminal code.  See § 33, ch. 631, Laws of 1949.  Prior to the 
1949 revision, the John Doe statute required a magistrate to 
examine 
a 
complainant 
merely 
"[u]pon 
complaint 
to 
such 
magistrate that a criminal offense had been committed . . ." 
Wis. Stat. § 361.02 (1947).9  Noticeably absent from the 1947 
statute is any language requiring the complainant to show 
"reason to believe" that a crime has been committed.  The pre-
revision language of the John Doe statute may have supported 
Reimann's subjective-test interpretation; the current language 
                     
9 Wis. Stat. § 361.02 (1947) provided in pertinent part: 
361.02 
Complaint 
and 
warrant; 
John 
Doe 
Proceeding. (1) Upon complaint made to any such 
magistrate that a criminal offense has been committed, 
he shall examine, on oath, the complainant and any 
witness 
produced 
by 
him, 
and 
shall 
reduce 
the 
complaint to writing and shall cause the same to be 
subscribed by the complainant; . . . .  
 
No. 96-2361-W 
 
12
does not.  The current language of Wis. Stat. § 968.26 retains 
the additional "reason to believe" requirement added in 1949.  
The legislature has chosen not to remove this threshold 
requirement from the John Doe statute.  We refuse to do so here. 
¶18 Third, statutes should be interpreted in a manner that 
supports their underlying purpose.  See Lukaszewicz v. Concrete 
Research, Inc., 43 Wis. 2d 335, 342, 168 N.W.2d 581, 585 (1969). 
 The procedure required by Wis. Stat. § 968.26 must, of course, 
be consistent with the purpose of the statute. 
¶19 The purpose of Wis. Stat. § 968.26 is two-fold.  
First, and most obvious, a John Doe proceeding is intended as an 
investigatory tool used to ascertain whether a crime has been 
committed and if so, by whom.  See State v. Cummings, 199 
Wis. 2d 721, 736, 546 N.W.2d 406 (1996) (citing State v. 
Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 822, 266 N.W.2d 597 (1978)); see 
also Wis. Stat. § 968.26.  Second, the John Doe proceeding is 
designed to protect innocent citizens from frivolous and 
groundless prosecutions.  As we explained in State ex rel. Long 
v. Keyes, 75 Wis. 288, 294-95, 124 N.W.  (1889):  
 
When [the John Doe] statute was first enacted the 
common-law practice was for the magistrate to issue 
the warrant on a complaint of mere suspicion, and he 
was protected in doing so.  This was found to be a 
very unsafe practice.  Many arrests were made on 
groundless suspicion, when the accused were innocent 
of the crime and there was no testimony whatever 
against them.  This statute was made to protect 
citizens from arrest and imprisonment on frivolous and 
groundless suspicion. 
 
No. 96-2361-W 
 
13
A John Doe proceeding under Wis. Stat. § 968.26, therefore, 
serves both as an inquest into the discovery of crime and as a 
screen to prevent "reckless and ill-advised" prosecutions.  See 
Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 822. 
¶20 Applying an objective test to determine whether a 
complainant has established "reason to believe" a crime has been 
committed is consistent with both purposes of the statute.  The 
objective test permits complainants to initiate reasonable, 
fact-based John Doe proceedings to determine whether a crime has 
been committed and if so, by whom.  At the same time, it also 
allows the judge to screen for and weed out groundless and 
frivolous petitions without requiring further proceedings that 
may be injurious to the accused.  
¶21 Although we recognize that crime victims and other 
complainants should have recourse to the judicial branch when 
the executive branch fails to respond to their complaints, we 
reject the argument that Wis. Stat. § 968.26 was designed to 
give all John Doe complainants their day in court.  As we 
explained in Washington, the John Doe judge has no authority to 
ferret out crime.  See Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 822.  Rather, 
the John Doe investigation is essentially limited to the subject 
matter of the petition filed under Wis. Stat. § 968.26.  See id. 
¶22 Finally, it is a fundamental rule of statutory 
construction that any result that is absurd or unreasonable must 
be avoided.  See State v. Peete, 185 Wis. 2d 4, 17, 517 N.W.2d 
149 (1994); State v. Pham, 137 Wis. 2d 31, 34, 403 N.W.2d 35 
(1987).  Adopting Reimann's interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
No. 96-2361-W 
 
14
§ 968.26 would lead to absurd results.  We specifically held in 
Washington that a John Doe proceeding cannot be used to obtain 
evidence against a defendant for a crime with which the 
defendant has already been charged.  See Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 
at 824.  Under the interpretation Reimann suggests, a circuit 
court judge would have no choice but to examine under oath a 
complainant, and his or her witnesses, even if that judge were 
precluded by our decision in Washington from conducting further 
proceedings.  The legislature surely did not intend this absurd 
result. 
¶23 In addition, under Reimann's interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 968.26, a circuit court judge would be required to 
conduct an examination of the complainant and his or her 
witnesses even if: (1) the facts alleged in the John Doe 
petition could not possibly constitute a crime; (2) prosecution 
of the crime alleged in the petition is barred by the statute of 
limitations; or (3) the petition is patently meritless or is 
filed merely as an abuse of process.  Requiring a circuit court 
judge 
to 
conduct 
examinations 
in 
such 
cases 
would 
be 
unreasonable and would result in a waste of limited judicial 
resources. 
¶24 Applying 
these 
established 
rules 
of 
statutory 
construction, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 968.26 imposes a 
threshold requirement on persons filing petitions for John Doe 
proceedings.  Before a circuit court judge's obligation to 
conduct an examination under Wis. Stat. § 968.26 is triggered, 
the John Doe complainant must establish that he or she has 
No. 96-2361-W 
 
15
"reason to believe" a crime has been committed within that 
judge's jurisdiction.  Under the interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.26 we apply today, a John Doe complainant must do more 
than merely allege that a crime has been committed.  Before a 
circuit court judge is required to conduct an examination of a 
complainant, that complainant, in his or her petition, must 
allege objective, factual assertions sufficient to support a 
reasonable belief that a crime has been committed.   
¶25 We do not equate this "reason to believe" standard of 
Wis. Stat. § 968.26 with the probable cause required to support 
a criminal complaint.10  There is no requirement that a finding 
of probable cause be made before a John Doe proceeding is 
commenced.  To the contrary, the statute prescribes that a 
determination of probable cause is to be made after subpoena and 
examination of the witnesses.  We reaffirm our statement in 
Washington: 
 
The John Doe complaint . . . need not name a 
particular accused; nor need it set forth facts 
sufficient to show that a crime has probably been 
committed.  The John Doe is, at its inception, not so 
much a procedure for the determination of probable 
cause as it is an inquest for the discovery of crime . 
. . . 
 
                     
10 Unlike a petition for John Doe proceedings, a criminal 
complaint must set forth certain facts which would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude that a crime had probably been 
committed and that the defendant named in the complaint was 
probably the culpable party.  See State v. Haugen, 52 Wis. 2d 
791, 793, 191 N.W.2d 12 (1971); State v. White, 97 Wis. 2d 193, 
203, 295 N.W.2d 346 (1980). 
No. 96-2361-W 
 
16
Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 822.  Although the line dividing 
"reason to believe" from probable cause may appear slight, its 
position in Wis. Stat. § 968.26 must remain secure. 
 
¶26 The John Doe procedure we adopt today gives citizens 
access to an impartial and neutral jurist for review of their 
criminal complaints.  It does not, however, require the judge to 
conduct a time-consuming hearing of petitions that are spurious, 
frivolous, or groundless.  The circuit court judge to whom a 
John Doe petition has been presented, therefore, must first 
determine from the face of the petition whether the complainant 
has shown that he or she has reason to believe that a crime has 
been committed.  If the judge finds that the complainant has 
made such a showing, the judge has no choice but to examine the 
complainant under oath.  If, however, the judge finds that the 
complainant has failed to establish "reason to believe," that 
judge may deny the John Doe petition without conducting an 
examination. 
¶27 This, of course, is not to say that the judge's 
decision may rest upon prejudice or caprice.  In determining 
whether the petition is worthy of further treatment, a circuit 
court judge must act as a neutral and detached magistrate.  In 
making this decision, the judge should not weigh the credibility 
of the complainant or choose between conflicting facts and 
inferences.  See State v. Schober, 167 Wis. 2d 371, 381, 481 
N.W.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1992).  For some complainants, the John Doe 
procedures available under Wis. Stat. § 968.26 provide their 
only entrance to the state courts.  Although we believe that 
No. 96-2361-W 
 
17
circuit court judges must perform some gate-keeping functions 
under Wis. Stat. § 968.26, we do not here intend to close the 
doors of the courtroom to those persons who may have reason to 
believe a crime has been committed.  In addition, the judge must 
recognize that many John Doe petitions are filed pro se by 
complainants not trained in the complexities of criminal law and 
procedure.  Where a mere technical error on the face of the 
petition, or an inadequacy in the facts alleged therein, can be 
cured by a simple request for additional information, justice 
may be best served under Wis. Stat. § 968.26 by the judge simply 
making such request or examining the complainant. 
¶28 Discretion of a limited nature is conferred upon the 
judge by Wis. Stat. § 968.26, and there must be evidence that 
discretion was in fact exercised.  If a circuit court judge 
denies a petition for further proceedings without examining the 
complainant, that decision is subject to review under the 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 809.51, by which a writ of mandamus 
may be sought to compel the judge to conduct under oath an 
examination of the complainant and any witnesses he or she might 
produce. 
 
¶29 Based on the foregoing, we modify the decision of the 
court of appeals.  The court of appeals erred in concluding that 
Judge Torphy was required to examine Reimann without considering 
whether Reimann satisfied the threshold requirement Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.26 places on John Doe complainants.  Since we also 
conclude that Judge Torphy applied the wrong rule of law, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals granting a 
No. 96-2361-W 
 
18
supervisory writ.  We direct Judge Torphy to conduct further 
proceedings, consistent with this opinion, to determine whether 
Reimann, in his John Doe petition, has established that he has 
reason to believe that a punishable crime has been committed 
within Judge Torphy's jurisdiction.  If Judge Torphy determines 
that the crimes alleged in Reimann's petition are beyond the 
applicable statute of limitations,11 he may deny the petition 
without conducting an examination of Reimann.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified and as modified, affirmed.   
 
                     
11 In determining whether the crimes alleged by Reimann are 
beyond the appropriate statute of limitations, Judge Torphy, 
like any judge applying a statute of limitations, must consider 
not only the time having passed since the alleged crime 
occurred, but also the occurrence of events and the existence of 
factors that may have tolled the running of the statute of 
limitations.  
 
 
1