Case Title: New Jersey v. Sutherland

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2018-01-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

                                   State v. Ryan Sutherland (A-14-16) (077807)

Argued October 10, 2017 -- Decided January 11, 2018

LaVECCHIA, J., writing for the Court.

         The Court considers the constitutionality of an officer’s stop of a motor vehicle under the belief that the
vehicle was in violation of 
N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) and -66 because one of the vehicle’s taillights was not operational.

         A Toyota Camry that appeared to have a malfunctioning taillight passed Officer Carletta. Although the
vehicle had four taillights in total, two on each side, and although only one light on the rear passenger side was not
illuminated, Officer Carletta believed that the vehicle was in violation of the motor vehicle code. He executed a
motor vehicle stop. Officer Carletta asked the driver, defendant Ryan Sutherland, for his driver’s license, motor
vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. Officer Carletta returned to his vehicle to check defendant’s
information. Upon confirming that defendant’s license was suspended, Officer Carletta issued two summonses:
driving with a suspended license, and failure to maintain the vehicle’s “lamps” in violation of 
N.J.S.A. 39:3-66. A
Morris County Grand Jury later indicted defendant and charged him with fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle
during a period of license suspension for a second or subsequent driving-while-intoxicated conviction.

          Defendant filed a motion to suppress the traffic stop and to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the traffic
stop constituted an unreasonable seizure because his vehicle had three operable taillights, in compliance with the
requirements of 
N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) and -66. The State countered that the stop was lawful because the
malfunctioning taillight provided Officer Carletta with reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and because the stop
was lawful under the “community caretaking” function by which police officers engage in protecting public safety.
Officer Carletta testified at the hearing that he had stopped the vehicle both because he believed that any
malfunctioning taillight constituted a violation of the statute and because he was engaging in community caretaking
by letting defendant know that his vehicle was not in proper working order.

         The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence resulting from the motor vehicle stop, but
the court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment. On the motor vehicle stop, the trial court agreed with
defendant that Officer Carletta’s understanding of the maintenance-of-lamps statute had been “incorrect” and that
defendant had not violated the statute because he had at least one functioning taillight on each side of the vehicle.
The court concluded that Officer Carletta’s erroneous interpretation of the law could not pass constitutional scrutiny.

          The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal and reversed the trial court. 
445 N.J. Super. 358 (2016).
Relying extensively on Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. ___, 
135 S. Ct. 530 (2014), the panel determined that
“even if the officer was mistaken that the inoperable tail light constituted a Title 39 violation, he had an objectively
reasonable basis for stopping defendant’s vehicle.” Id. at 360. In reaching that conclusion, the panel questioned the
continuing vitality of State v. Puzio, which had held “that where an officer mistakenly believes that driving conduct
constitutes a violation of the law, but in actuality it does not, no objectively reasonable basis exists upon which to
justify a vehicle stop.” 
379 N.J. Super. 378, 383 (App. Div. 2005). The panel went on to conclude that the statute at
issue here was ambiguous and that even if Officer Carletta’s interpretation of the statute was an objectively
reasonable mistake of law, the stop was permissible pursuant to Heien. 
445 N.J. Super. at 368–70. The panel’s
reasoning made it unnecessary to reach the State’s argument about the applicability of the community caretaking
doctrine. Id. at 371.

         The Court granted defendant leave to appeal. 
228 N.J. 246 (2016).

HELD: The Appellate Division erred in concluding that the holding in Heien is applicable here. The motor vehicle
statutes pertinent here are not ambiguous. The officer’s stop of defendant’s motor vehicle was not an objectively
reasonable mistake of law that gave rise to constitutional reasonable suspicion; the stop was therefore unconstitutional.

                                                           1
1. Under previous case law in this state, a police officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of fact does not render a
search or arrest unconstitutional. Consistent with federal jurisprudence, the Court has held that Article I, Paragraph
7 of the New Jersey Constitution provides room for some mistakes by police. However, that principle applies only
when the police behave reasonably. (pp. 10-11)

2. Until the Appellate Division decision in this case, the jurisprudence of New Jersey appellate courts had not held
that reasonable mistakes of law would pass constitutional muster. In fact, courts had reached the opposite
conclusion. See Puzio, 
379 N.J. Super. at 382-83. The Puzio decision noted “a clear distinction between the present
situation and those presented in cases where the officer correctly understands the statute but arguably misinterprets
the facts concerning whether a vehicle, or operator, has violated the statute.” Id. at 382. In explaining its reasoning,
the panel stated that “[i]f officers were permitted to stop vehicles where it is objectively determined that there is no
legal basis for their action, 'the potential for abuse of traffic infractions as pretext for effecting stops seems
boundless and the costs to privacy rights excessive.’” Id. at 384. The panel also viewed the creation of an exception
for a mistake of law as inconsistent with the exclusionary rule because “it would remove the incentive for police to
make certain that they properly understand the law that they are entrusted to enforce and obey.” Ibid. (pp. 11-14)

3. In Heien, the United States Supreme Court considered a police officer’s reasonable but erroneous interpretation
of a motor vehicle statute. Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion noted that “the ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness.’” 
135 S. Ct.  at 536. After explaining that “[t]o be reasonable is not to be
perfect,” and that the Fourth Amendment allows for reasonable mistakes of fact, the Chief Justice went on to explain
that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry applies to mistakes of law just as it applies to mistakes of fact.
Ibid. Based on the language of the North Carolina statute involved in Heien, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that
the officer’s error of law was reasonable and thus provided the officer with reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic
stop. Id. at 540. Importantly, Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a concurrence that has garnered
support with states that have chosen to follow the Heien approach in their own search and seizure analyses. Critical
to her agreement with the majority was her belief that erroneous interpretations of the law will pass Fourth
Amendment scrutiny only when the law at issue is “'so doubtful in construction’ that a reasonable judge could agree
with the officer’s view.” Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring). Such cases must necessarily involve a “really difficult”
or “very hard question of statutory interpretation” and will thus be “exceedingly rare.” Ibid. (pp. 14-16)

4. A number of states have subsequently adopted Heien’s holding. Importantly, however, a number of states have
either followed or acknowledged Justice Kagan’s narrow interpretation of an objectively reasonable mistake of law.
In State v. Scriven, 
226 N.J. 20 (2016), the Court did not reach the question of whether to adopt Heien. The
officer’s mistake of law in that case was not objectively reasonable and thus did not qualify as the type of “rare”
case that involves an objectively reasonable mistake of law. (pp. 17-19)

5. Defendant’s traffic stop was premised on perceived violations of two statutes. The statutes read together require
that a motor vehicle only have two working rear lamps, with at least one working lamp on each side. See 
N.J.S.A.
39:3-61(a); 
N.J.S.A. 39:3-66. 
N.J.S.A. 39:3-66 mandates that the lamps “required by this article” must be kept in
good working order. The statutes require one working taillight on each side of a vehicle. Thus, if a vehicle has two
taillights on each side of the vehicle—more than the law requires—and one of those multiple taillights on one side is
not working, a violation of 
N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) and -66, as was assumed and charged here, has not occurred. The
officer’s erroneous application of the functioning taillight requirement was not an objectively reasonable mistake of
law. This case does not present a basis for considering the application of Heien. Simply put, this was not a good
stop. The judgment of the Appellate Division, premised on an application of Heien to the stop in this matter, is
reversed. (pp. 19-23)

6. The State also asserted community caretaking as an alternative basis to support the stop. The Appellate Division
did not reach the argument in light of the manner in which it resolved the case. Accordingly, a remand is
appropriate to allow the Appellate Division to address the unresolved argument advanced by the State. (p. 23)

         The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. The matter is REMANDED to the Appellate
Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, AND
TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.

                                                           2
                                     SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       A-
14 September Term 2016
                                                077807

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

    Plaintiff-Respondent,

         v.

RYAN SUTHERLAND,

    Defendant-Appellant.

         Argued October 10, 2017 – Decided January 11, 2018

         On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate
         Division, whose opinion is reported at 445
         N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2016).

         Joseph P. Rem, Jr., argued the cause for
         appellant (Rem Law Group, attorneys; Joseph
         P. Rem, Jr., of counsel, and Tamra Katcher,
         of counsel and on the brief).

         Claudia Joy Demitro, Deputy Attorney
         General, argued the cause for respondent
         (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
         attorney; Claudia Joy Demitro, of counsel
         and on the brief, and Paula C. Jordao,
         Assistant Morris County Prosecutor, on the
         brief).

         Alexander R. Shalom argued the cause for
         amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union
         of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal
         Director, attorney; Alexander R. Shalom,
         Edward L. Barocas and Jeanne M. LoCicero, on
         the brief).

         Paula C. Jordao, Assistant Prosecutor,
         submitted a letter brief on behalf of
         respondent (Fredric M. Knapp, Morris County
         Prosecutor, attorney).

                               1
    JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

    This Court has acknowledged that a reasonable mistake of

fact on the part of a police officer will not render a search or

arrest predicated on that mistake unconstitutional.     See State

v. Handy, 
206 N.J. 39, 53-54 (2011).   In this matter, a police

officer pulled over a car under the belief that the vehicle was

in violation of 
N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) and -66 because one of the

vehicle’s taillights was not operational.   The trial court

determined that the officer was mistaken about the law and

granted defendant’s motion to suppress the fruits of the motor

vehicle stop.   The Appellate Division reversed.   The panel

determined that the relevant motor vehicle statutes were

ambiguous and that, applying the reasoning of the United States

Supreme Court in Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. ___, 
135 S. Ct. 530 (2014), the officer’s stop of defendant’s car

constituted at most an objectively reasonable mistake of law

that should be treated in the same manner as a mistake of fact.

Accordingly, the panel held that the officer’s mistake of law

did not require suppression of the motor vehicle stop.

    We now reverse.   The Appellate Division erred in concluding

that the holding in Heien is applicable here.   Because the motor

vehicle statutes pertinent here are not ambiguous, we need not

consider importing Heien into the determination of this matter.

                                 2
Thus, we do not address the arguments raised herein that Heien’s

mistake-of-law analysis is not reconcilable with our state

constitutional jurisprudence.     The officer’s stop of defendant’s

motor vehicle was not an objectively reasonable mistake of law

that gave rise to constitutional reasonable suspicion; the stop

was therefore unconstitutional.     We remand to the Appellate

Division for its consideration of the State’s alternative

argument, which the panel did not reach, that the stop should be

sustained based on the community caretaking doctrine.

                                  I.

                                  A.

    At the suppression hearing in this matter, the following

facts were adduced.     Officer Michael Carletta of the Mount Olive

Police Department was the sole witness.

    At about 9:00 p.m. on the evening of February 3, 2014,

Officer Carletta was on motor vehicle patrol traveling

southbound on Route 206.     A Toyota Camry passed him traveling

northbound.     Looking in his rearview mirror, the officer

observed that the northbound vehicle appeared to have a

malfunctioning taillight.     Although the vehicle had four

taillights in total, two on each side, and although only one

light on the rear passenger side was not illuminated, Officer

Carletta believed that the vehicle was in violation of the motor

vehicle code.    He made a U-turn and began to follow the vehicle.

                                   3
After confirming that one of the vehicle’s taillights was not

illuminated, he executed a motor vehicle stop.     Officer Carletta

testified that, in such situations, it is typical police

practice to give the driver a warning rather than a summons.

    After stopping and approaching the vehicle, Officer

Carletta asked the driver, defendant Ryan Sutherland, for his

driver’s license, motor vehicle registration, and proof of

insurance.   Defendant initially stated that he did not have his

driver’s license with him but then quickly admitted that he did

not have a valid driver’s license.     After obtaining defendant’s

name and date of birth, Officer Carletta returned to his vehicle

to check defendant’s information with police dispatch.

    Upon confirming that defendant’s license was in fact

suspended, Officer Carletta issued defendant two summonses:

driving with a suspended license in violation of 
N.J.S.A. 39:3-

40, and failure to maintain the vehicle’s “lamps” in violation

of 
N.J.S.A. 39:3-66.   Officer Carletta explained to defendant

that he had been stopped because one of his taillights was not

working and that he could no longer drive the vehicle because he

had a suspended driver’s license.      The officer allowed defendant

to leave the scene on the condition that his passenger drive the

car to its intended destination.

                                B.

                                   4
     On June 2, 2014, defendant was charged in municipal court

with fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of

license suspension in violation of 
N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26.       A Morris

County Grand Jury later indicted defendant and charged him with

fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of

license suspension for a second or subsequent driving-while-

intoxicated conviction in violation of 
N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b).

     Defendant filed a motion to suppress the traffic stop and

to dismiss the indictment,1 arguing that the traffic stop

constituted an unreasonable seizure because his vehicle had

three operable taillights, in compliance with the requirements

of 
N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) and -66.       The State countered that the

stop was lawful because the malfunctioning taillight provided

Officer Carletta with reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle

and because the stop was lawful under the “community caretaking”

function by which police officers engage in protecting public

safety.   Officer Carletta testified at the hearing that he had

stopped the vehicle both because he believed that any

malfunctioning taillight constituted a violation of the statute

1  The Appellate Division opinion treats defendant as having
filed two separate motions: a motion to suppress the stop and a
motion to dismiss the indictment. However, it appears from the
record that defendant filed one motion to dismiss the indictment
for two discrete reasons: (1) because the charge resulted from
an unconstitutional stop; and (2) because the prosecutor gave
improper instructions to the grand jury.
                                  5
and because he was engaging in community caretaking by letting

defendant know that his vehicle was not in proper working order.

    The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress

evidence resulting from the motor vehicle stop, but the court

denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of

faulty instructions provided to the grand jury.   On the motor

vehicle stop, the trial court agreed with defendant that Officer

Carletta’s understanding of the maintenance-of-lamps statute had

been “incorrect” and that defendant had not violated the statute

because he had at least one functioning taillight on each side

of the vehicle.   Relying heavily on State v. Puzio, 
379 N.J.

Super. 378 (App. Div. 2005), as well as an unpublished 2009

Appellate Division decision, the trial court concluded that

Officer Carletta’s erroneous interpretation of the law -- even

though it was a “common sense” and “practical” approach to

interpreting the statute -- could not pass constitutional

scrutiny.

    The State sought leave to appeal on the grounds that

(1) Officer Carletta had reasonable suspicion to conduct a

traffic stop; (2) Puzio’s continuing vitality was put into

question by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Heien,

in which the Supreme Court held that objectively reasonable

mistakes of law can provide the reasonable suspicion necessary

for a constitutional stop; and (3) the stop was lawful under the

                                 6
community caretaking doctrine.   The Appellate Division granted

leave to appeal and reversed the trial court in a published

opinion.   State v. Sutherland, 
445 N.J. Super. 358 (2016).

     Relying extensively on Heien, the panel determined that

“even if the officer was mistaken that the inoperable tail light

constituted a Title 39 violation, he had an objectively

reasonable basis for stopping defendant’s vehicle.”    Id. at 360.

In reaching that conclusion, the panel questioned the continuing

vitality of Puzio, which had held “that where an officer

mistakenly believes that driving conduct constitutes a violation

of the law, but in actuality it does not, no objectively

reasonable basis exists upon which to justify a vehicle stop.”

Puzio, 
379 N.J. Super. at 383 (collecting cases).2    The panel

reasoned that Puzio had been decided before Heien and that

Heien’s “well-reasoned” holding had cast doubt on Puzio’s

continuing validity.   Sutherland, 
445 N.J. Super. at 366-67.

The panel went on to conclude that the statute at issue here was

ambiguous and that even if Officer Carletta’s interpretation of

the statute was an objectively reasonable mistake of law, the

stop was permissible pursuant to Heien “[b]ecause the Fourth

Amendment tolerates objectively reasonable mistakes of law.”

2  The panel below also disagreed with the holding in the
unpublished decision referenced by the trial court, which, the
panel noted, is unpublished and thus does not constitute
precedential authority. Sutherland, 
445 N.J. Super. at 365.
                                 
7 Id. at 368–70.   The panel’s reasoning made it unnecessary to

reach the State’s argument about the applicability of the

community caretaking doctrine.    Id. at 371.

    Defendant sought leave to appeal from this Court, which we

granted.   
228 N.J. 246 (2016).   We also granted the motion of

the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU-NJ) to

appear as amicus curiae.

                                  II.

    The parties’ arguments are largely those advanced in the

proceedings before the trial and appellate courts.

    Defendant argues that the Appellate Division’s adoption of

Heien is at odds with prior New Jersey precedent, which has

traditionally provided greater protections under our state

analogue to the Fourth Amendment than those provided by the

Federal Constitution.   Specifically, he argues that Puzio, 
379 N.J. Super. at 383, correctly held that a traffic stop based on

an incorrect interpretation of law can never be objectively

reasonable.   That holding, defendant argues, is a natural

extension of this Court’s decision in State v. Novembrino, 
105 N.J. 95 (1987), which held that our State Constitution does not

contemplate good faith mistakes by law enforcement as an

exception to the exclusionary rule.     Defendant also contends

that the statutory provisions at issue here were plain and

unambiguous and did not apply to his vehicle, undermining any

                                  8
basis for reasonable suspicion.   In essence, defendant’s

argument challenges Officer Carletta’s interpretation of those

provisions as not reasonable.

    The State argues that the Appellate Division correctly held

that Officer Carletta’s belief that defendant was in violation

of the motor vehicle code was objectively reasonable and

provided him with reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s

vehicle.   Relying on Heien, the State posits that just as we

have held that reasonable mistakes of fact can pass

constitutional scrutiny, so too should we hold that reasonable

mistakes of law do not run afoul of our constitution.   Such a

result is not inconsistent with Puzio, the State argues, because

Puzio involved an objectively unreasonable mistake of law,

whereas here, Officer Carletta was forced to interpret a

confusing and outdated set of statutes ambiguous enough to be

open to differing and equally reasonable interpretations.

Additionally, the State maintains that it preserved its argument

that Officer Carletta had lawful authority to stop defendant’s

vehicle based on the community caretaking doctrine, which

provides police with the power to ensure the safety and welfare

of the public independent of their law enforcement objectives.

    Amicus curiae ACLU-NJ argues that the statutes at issue

here are not ambiguous and that the rule of lenity requires

strict construction of those statutes in defendant’s favor.

                                  9
ACLU-NJ further argues that a stop based on a police officer’s

misunderstanding or ignorance of the law can and should be

differentiated from mistakes of fact, and that such ignorance or

misunderstanding of the law must always be unreasonable and thus

unconstitutional under our Article I, Paragraph 7 jurisprudence.

Like defendant, ACLU-NJ maintains that that conclusion flows

naturally from state constitutional case law, most specifically

from Novembrino.   Heien, the ACLU-NJ argues, is inconsistent

with that jurisprudence and thus should not be adopted by this

Court.

                               III.

                                A.

    Under previous case law in this state, a police officer’s

objectively reasonable mistake of fact does not render a search

or arrest unconstitutional.   Consistent with federal

jurisprudence, we have held that Article I, Paragraph 7 of the

New Jersey Constitution provides “room . . . for some mistakes

[by police].”   Handy, 
206 N.J. at 54 (second alteration in

original) (quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez,