Case Title: Exxon Co. v. Alexis

Citation: 370 So. 2d 1128

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1978-12-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
370 So. 2d 1128 (1978)
EXXON COMPANY, U.S.A., Petitioner,
v.
Paul ALEXIS and Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents.
No. 52556.

Supreme Court of Florida.
December 7, 1978.
Barry A. Pemsler, of Jabara & Richard, Coral Gables, for petitioner.
John G. Tomlinson, Jr., of Williams, Tomlinson & duFresne, Coral Gables, for respondents.
SUNDBERG, Justice.
By petition for writ of certiorari we are asked to review an order of the Industrial Relations Commission affirming an order of the Judge of Industrial Claims which found, inter alia, that respondent/claimant sustained a forty percent loss of wage-earning capacity, despite claimant's failure to attempt to obtain employment after having reached maximum medical improvement. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, and Section 440.27, Florida Statutes (1975). In accordance with Florida Appellate Rule 3.10 e. we have dispensed with oral argument.
The claimant, Paul Alexis, was employed by petitioner, Exxon Company, U.S.A., as *1129 an automobile mechanic. On May 8, 1974, during the course and in the scope of his employment, claimant suffered injuries when a tire rack collapsed. Petitioner accepted the accident as compensable, furnishing medical treatment and temporary total disability compensation benefits for the period from May 9, 1974, through November 13, 1974.
The claimant was initially treated by Dr. Sarnow on May 10, 1974, for a lumbo sacral sprain and aggravation and acceleration of a preexisting degenerative spondylosis and dextroscoliosis. Dr. Sarnow admitted claimant to the hospital where he remained from May 11, 1974 to May 15, 1974. Following his discharge from this initial hospitalization, claimant was reemployed by petitioner in a supervisory position. After a short period, however, petitioner terminated claimant's employment. Claimant continued under the sole care of Dr. Sarnow until July 9, 1974, approximately two months after the accident. On that date, Dr. Sarnow diagnosed a right inguinal hernia which, he opined, was causally related to the accident. Dr. Sarnow immediately referred claimant to Drs. Cantwell and Grovestein for treatment of the hernia. On August 28, 1974, Dr. Sarnow concluded that claimant had reached maximum medical improvement with regard to the lumbo sacral sprain and aggravation of the preexisting injuries, and discharged the patient from treatment. However, from October 3, 1974, to October 9, 1974, claimant was again hospitalized and surgery was performed for repair of the right inguinal hernia by the referral physician, Dr. Cantwell.
Claimant thereafter filed a claim for, inter alia: (1) temporary total benefits from May 8, 1974, the date of the accident, to the date of maximum medical improvement; (2) six weeks statutory hernia benefits pursuant to Section 440.15(6), Florida Statutes (1973); (3) a permanent partial disability of the body as a whole rating, based upon a permanent physical impairment and/or diminution in wage-earning capacity; and (4) payment of outstanding medical and hospital bills incurred for surgical repair of his right inguinal hernia. In response to this claim petitioner posited, in relevant part, that: (1) claimant had reached maximum medical improvement on August 28, 1974, and, therefore, an overpayment of temporary total disability compensation benefits, which were paid until November 13, 1974, had occurred; (2) claimant's hernia was not causally related to the accident of May 8, 1974; (3) claimant had not sustained permanent physical impairment or a loss of wage-earning capacity as a result of the accident; (4) the outstanding medical bills were not authorized pursuant to Section 440.13, Florida Statutes (1973).
Pertinent to our review are the following portions of the order of the Judge of Industrial Claims:
On review by the Industrial Relations Commission, the following relevant points were raised by petitioner:
The Industrial Relations Commission dispensed with oral argument on review and, finding no reversible error to have been demonstrated, affirmed the order of the Judge of Industrial Claims.
With respect to point (1), it is apparent that there is competent, substantial evidence in the record, which comports with logic and reason, to support the finding of the Judge of Industrial Claims. See Brown v. S.S. Kresge Company, Inc., 305 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1974); Dillow v. Florida Portland Cement Plant, 258 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1972); United States Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 55 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1951). Further, we find that the Judge of Industrial Claims did not depart from the essential requirements of law in permitting claimant to reopen his case and present additional testimony after he and petitioner had rested their respective cases. It is well established that the decision of a trial judge to allow a party to reopen his case will not be reversed unless the opposing party was prejudiced thereby. Considerable latitude and discretion is afforded the trial judge in these matters. See Eli Witt Cigar & Tobacco Co. v. Matatics, 55 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1951); Akins v. Taylor, 314 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); King v. State, 272 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Similar discretion reposes with the Judge of Industrial Claims. In the case before us, we are not persuaded that the Industrial Relations Commission erred in failing to find that petitioner was prejudiced by the reopening of claimant's case. This is so because petitioner was permitted to present evidence in rebuttal of any additional testimony presented by claimant. Accordingly, we find petitioner's second point to be without merit.
As to petitioner's third point, however, we conclude that the record is devoid of competent, substantial evidence to support the determination of the Judge of Industrial Claims that claimant suffered a forty percent loss of wage-earning capacity as result of the lumbo sacral sprain and aggravation of his preexisting injuries. This is so because claimant failed to establish that he sought employment after August 28, 1974, the date when he reached maximum medical improvement with respect to these injuries. The only evidence contained in the record reflects that claimant was reemployed by petitioner shortly after his first hospitalization of May 11, *1132 1974 through May 15, 1974. However, claimant was terminated shortly thereafter and made no further efforts to seek employment. It is well established that in order to justify an award of compensation based upon a diminution of wage-earning capacity, a claimant must show that he has made an effort to test his employability in the open labor market after having reached maximum medical improvement. See Clark v. Western Knapp Engineering Company, 190 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1966); Montgomery Ward and Company, Inc. v. Hayes, 172 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1965); Trieste v. Anchell, 143 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1962). Because claimant in the case before us failed to make such a showing, the Judge of Industrial Claims improperly concluded that he suffered a forty percent loss of wage-earning capacity.
Based upon our finding of error with respect to petitioner's third point on review, the petition for writ of certiorari is granted and that part of the order of the Industrial Relations Commission affirming the finding that claimant suffered a forty percent diminution of wage-earning capacity is quashed. The cause is remanded to the Industrial Relations Commission with directions to vacate the relevant portion of the order of the Judge of Industrial Claims and to remand the cause to that Judge for proceedings not inconsistent with this decision. The remainder of the order of the Industrial Relations Commission is hereby approved.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C.J., and OVERTON and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, BOYD and HATCHETT, JJ., dissent.