Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF TLJ, minor child: CLH V. MMJ

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-05-7

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF TLJ, minor child: CLH V. MMJ2006 WY 28129 P.3d 874Case Number: C-05-7Decided: 03/15/2006
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
IN THE MATTER OF 
TLJ, minor child:

 
 
CLH,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
MMJ,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal from theDistrictCourtofUintaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Tammy A. 
Burt of Harris Law Firm, P.C., Evanston, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

E. Dean 
Stout, Evanston, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      CLH (Father) 
filed a petition for modification of a custody order which granted MMJ (Mother) 
primary physical custody of their daughter, TLJ.  The district court denied the 
petition.  We 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Father presents 
the following issues for our review:

 
 
I.   Did the district court err as a 
matter of law when it determined that a "substantial and material change of 
circumstances" had not occurred?

 
 
II.   Did the district court abuse its 
discretion in the manner in which it determined there was no substantial and 
material change of circumstances?

 
 

BACKGROUND 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3] 
     TLJ was born to 
Mother and Father on January 5, 2001.  
At the time of TLJ's birth, Mother was sixteen and Father was nineteen 
years of age.  Mother and Father 
never married, and TLJ has been in the custody of Mother since birth.  An action to establish paternity and 
child support was filed on April 18, 2001.  
Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the district court entered an order 
on August 24, 2001, establishing paternity, custody, visitation and child 
support.  The court awarded Mother 
primary physical custody of TLJ and granted Father visitation rights.  

 
 
[¶4]      Mother and Father 
lived together on and off in Wyoming and 
Utah until 
around July 2003, when Father moved out of the home after an argument with 
Mother.  On November 20, 2003, 
Father filed a petition to have the original custody order modified so that he 
would have primary physical custody of TLJ.  Father asserted that there had been a 
material change of circumstances and that it was in the best interest of TLJ to 
be in his physical custody.  

 
 
[¶5]      The district 
court held a hearing on March 15, 2005, during which it entertained testimony 
from the parties.  The district 
court denied Father's petition, concluding that a material change in 
circumstances had not been shown to warrant reopening the initial custody 
order.  This appeal followed. 

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      Decisions 
pertaining to child custody are within the sound discretion of the district 
court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent procedural error or a clear 
abuse of discretion.  Selvey v. Selvey, 2004 WY 166, ¶ 15, 102 P.3d 210, 214 (Wyo. 2004).  
"Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily and capriciously."  
Id. (quoting Fergusson v. Fergusson, 2002 WY 66, ¶ 9, 
45 P.3d 641, 644 (Wyo. 2002)).  In 
determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred, our core inquiry is the 
reasonableness of the district court's decision.  Selvey, ¶ 15, 102 P.3d  at 214 (citing Metz v. Metz, 2003 WY 3, ¶ 6, 61 P.3d 383, 385 (Wyo. 2003)).  We view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's determination, 
affording to the prevailing party every favorable inference and omitting from 
our consideration conflicting evidence.  
Selvey, ¶ 15, 102 P.3d  at 214 
(citing GGV v. JLR, 2002 WY 19, ¶ 14, 
39 P.3d 1066, 1074 (Wyo. 2002)).  

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      Father seeks 
review of the district court's order denying his petition to modify the custody 
provision of the order generated from the initial paternity action.  While Father presents two issues, the 
issues are interrelated.  Therefore, 
for ease of analysis, we will combine Father's issues.

 
 
[¶8]      Modification of a 
pre-existing custody order is controlled by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) 
(LexisNexis 2005), which provides in pertinent part:

 
 
A court 
having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care, custody and 
visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of a material 
change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question and that the 
modification would be in the best interests of the children pursuant to W.S. 
20-2-201(a).

 
 
This 
Court has construed this provision to require a two-step approach to custody 
modification actions.  See KES v. CAT, 2005 WY 29, ¶ 10, 107 P.3d 779, 782 (Wyo. 2005); Jackson v. Jackson, 2004 WY 99, ¶ 8, 96 P.3d 21, 24 (Wyo. 2004); JRS v. GMS, 2004 
WY 60, ¶ 10, 90 P.3d 718, 723 (Wyo. 2004); Cobb v. Cobb, 2 P.3d 578, 579-80 (Wyo. 
2000).  The first step requires a 
showing that there has been "a material change in circumstances since the entry 
of the order in question."  § 
20-2-204(c).  Because of the res 
judicata effect afforded custody orders, such a finding is a threshold 
requirement.  Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 
949-50 (Wyo. 
1995).  The district court does not 
properly acquire jurisdiction to reopen an existing custody order until there 
has been a showing of "a substantial or material change of circumstances which 
outweigh society's interest in applying the doctrine of res judicata" to a 
custody order.  Kreuter v. Kreuter, 728 P.2d 1129, 1130 
(Wyo. 
1986).  See generally Harshberger v. 
Harshberger, 2005 WY 99, ¶¶ 12-13, 117 P.3d 1244, 1250-51 (Wyo. 2005); Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 613 (Wyo. 
1999); Hertzler, 908 P.2d at 949-50; 
Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 54 
(Wyo. 1995).  In short, unless the 
district court finds a material change in circumstances, it cannot proceed to 
the second step  determining whether a modification would be in the best 
interests of the child.  In the 
instant case, the district court found that no material change in circumstances 
had been proven justifying reopening the prior custody determination and, as a 
matter of law, properly denied Father's petition without further 
consideration.

 
 
[¶9]      In reading 
Father's appellate brief, it is obvious that Father fails to recognize the 
separation between the two steps.  
Father declares that the district court, in determining whether a change 
in circumstances existed, was required to consider the best interests of 
TLJ.  Father specifically alleges 
that the district court was required to weigh the factors found in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-201(a) (LexisNexis 2005).  
That provision sets forth factors to be considered in determining the 
best interests of a child in an initial custody proceeding.  However, it is only during the second 
step that § 20-2-204(c) requires consideration of the best interests of the 
child pursuant to § 20-2-201(a).  A 
best interest analysis is not required, nor even necessarily appropriate, to the 
threshold determination as to whether a material change in circumstances has 
occurred.  A best interest analysis 
allows for far broader judicial discretion than is warranted for a material 
change in circumstances analysis.  
Under the principles of res judicata, a court does not have the 
discretion to reopen a custody order simply because, looking at the best 
interests of the child, it believes it can make a better decision than was made 
in the prior custody order.  If such 
were the case, then custody determinations would never have 
finality.

 
 
[¶10]   A determination that circumstances 
have materially changed is governed instead by an evaluation of the current 
circumstances of the parties in relation to their circumstances at the time the 
prior custody order was entered.  See Jackson, ¶¶ 8-12, 96 P.3d at 24-26; 
Thompson v. Thompson, 824 P.2d 557, 
559 (Wyo. 
1992).  While that evaluation may 
include certain factors that might also be relevant to an analysis of the best 
interests of the child, the ultimate determination is not driven by a child's 
best interests.  Father's appellate 
argument is pervaded with references to the best interests of TLJ.  Because Father's argument is premised on 
his failure to acknowledge the distinction between the analysis required under 
each step of the two-step process, we find it of minimal assistance in assessing 
the propriety of the district court's decision.1

[¶11]   Sifting out the irrelevant best 
interest portion of Father's argument, Father's claim that circumstances have 
materially changed boils down to allegations that his circumstances have 
materially improved over Mother's, and that Mother has demonstrated she is not a 
fit and proper person to have primary physical custody of TLJ.  As the party seeking to modify custody, 
Father had the burden of proving a material change in circumstances since the 
entry of the original custody order.  
A district court's finding concerning a material change in circumstances 
is principally a factual determination to which we accord great deference.  Yates v. Yates, 702 P.2d 1252, 1256-57 
(Wyo. 
1985).  Our task is to examine the 
record in the light most favorable to Mother to determine whether the district 
court could have reasonably concluded as it did.  Selvey, ¶ 15, 102 P.3d  at 
214.

 
 
[¶12]   On Father's side, the evidence 
shows that Father is currently living with his father and working full time as a 
health care worker at Mountain Regional Services in Evanston.  Father has completed a six-week 
parenting class, obtained certification as an EMT and a nursing assistant and is 
currently pursuing a nursing degree at WesternWyomingCommunity College. 

 
 
[¶13]   On Mother's side, the evidence 
shows that Mother has settled in Tooele, Utah, 
where she has maintained the same residence since July of 2003.  The evidence also shows that Mother has 
obtained a GED, a high school diploma, and has completed a computer class.  She is enrolled in a program known as 
YES that has provided her with job training, job opportunities and assistance in 
furthering her education.  Mother 
testified concerning her intentions to further her education by taking college 
classes and eventually obtaining a college degree.  Mother has done volunteer work at a 
health care center and worked as a teacher's assistant at an elementary 
school.  Mother loves TLJ and has a 
good relationship with her.  
Although Mother has refused Father visitation on a few isolated 
occasions, each motivated by concerns for the safety and well-being of TLJ, 
Father enjoys regular visitation as provided for in the original custody 
order.  

 
 
[¶14]   The district court concluded that 
"there has been a change in circumstances but it has been for the better for 
both of them."  In its order, the 
district court found that

 
 
both 
parties' positions have improved.  
The father has progressed further than the mother, but the mother has 
done well, especially when one considers her lack of education and the fact that 
she had to care for a young daughter.  
Both parents, commendably, have progressed beyond what existed at the 
time of the original decree, but not beyond what might reasonably have been 
contemplated.  The father's change 
of circumstances has not moved him so far ahead of the mother so as to 
constitute a material and substantial change of circumstances which would 
warrant a modification. 

 
 
After a 
thorough review of the argument presented on appeal and the record in this case, 
we find ample support for the district court's decision.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying Father's petition for change of custody.  Considering the facts and circumstances 
presented in this case, the district court's decision was reasonable.  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Besides 
confusing the issues, Father has also ignored our standard of review by arguing 
only the facts most favorable to him.  
In doing so, Father has gone so far as to ill-advisably misrepresent to 
this Court not only the facts but also the district court's ruling, thus further 
diminishing the value of his appellate brief.