Case Title: State ex rel. Blue v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 1997-Ohio-164

Docket Number: 19950541

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. BLUE, APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, 
APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Blue v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 466.] 
Workers’ compensation — Industrial Commission’s denial of claimant’s 
application for permanent total disability compensation supported by 
“some evidence,” when — Commission’s nonmedical analysis satisfies the 
mandate of Noll, when — Court of appeals errs in returning cause to 
commission for consideration of claimant’s memory loss, when. 
(No. 95-541 — Submitted July 7, 1997 — Decided September 24, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 93APD12-1731. 
 
Appellee-claimant, John Blue, Sr., sustained five industrial injuries during 
his employment career from 1980 through 1988.  They have been collectively 
allowed for: 
 
“(1) Hips and back, aggravation of pre-existing degenerative arthritis of the 
thoracic spine.  (2) Acute traumatic sprain and strain lumbosacral muscles, fracture 
distal and mid phalanx, right great toe, acute traumatic contusion and sprain right 
ankle, fracture lateral distal tip right fibula, lumbosacral degenerative arthritis.  (3) 
Sprain and strain of the right shoulder.  (4) Twisted left knee, internal 
derangement left knee.  (5) Right knee strain and sprain, synovitis and internal 
derangement, right ankle strain and sprain with synovitis, major depression.” 
 
In 1990, claimant moved appellant, Industrial Commission of Ohio, for 
permanent total disability compensation.  Commission specialist Dr. W. Jerry 
McCloud, an orthopedist, examined claimant and reported: 
 
“In summary, Mr. Blue does have a variety of sources of loss of function as 
described.  I feel that he would have restrictions against activities that required 
prolonged ambulating or going up or down steps or stairs or incline planes or 
2 
doing much in the way of kneeling or bending.  He also had restrictions against 
repetitive lifting of objects whose weight would exceed 20 pounds.  I do not think 
specific restrictions would be necessary in regard to his neck or either of his upper 
extremities nor to his thoracic area, although he does have some loss of function in 
that regard.  I do feel that these restrictions would preclude his work activities as 
an electrician.  However, he is only 56 and is a pleasant and bright and cooperative 
individual and possibly could get some benefit from rehabilitation.  
 
“It is my opinion that this claimant does not present with medical evidence 
consistent with considering him permanently and totally impaired.  The changes 
are permanent, and he has reached a level of maximum medical improvement and 
in claim 80-40261 [No. 1], demonstrates a permanent partial impairment of 10 
percent of the body as a whole.  There is a permanent partial impairment of 30 
percent in claim 81-25764 [No. 2], 10 percent in claim 85-49982 [No. 3], 10 
percent in claim 85-24665 [No. 4], and 10 percent in claim 88-43819 [No. 5].  
Again, he relates to me that he has begun to receive his social security benefits and 
therefore rehabilitation may not be a realistic consideration.” 
 
Dr. Thomas O. Hoover, a psychologist, opined that claimant’s allowed 
depression was not work-prohibitive.  He assigned a thirty percent permanent 
partial impairment to the condition. 
 
Dr. Paul H. Dillahunt performed a combined-effects review on the 
commission’s behalf.  He assessed a sixty-five percent combined permanent 
partial impairment and felt that claimant could engage in some other gainful 
employment that required occasional lifting of up to ten pounds. 
 
The commission denied permanent total disability compensation as follows: 
 
“The medical evidence found persuasive are the reports of Commission 
specialists Drs. McCloud, Hoover and Dillahunt.  Dr. McCloud, a Commission 
3 
orthopedist, opined that as a result of his physical injuries the claimant would have 
restrictions against repetitive lifting of objects over twenty pounds, excessive 
kneeling and bending, or prolonged ambulating or stair climbing.  Dr. Hoover, a 
Commission psychologist, opines the claimant’s mental condition represents a 
thirty percent permanent partial impairment which would not preclude his 
returning to his previous occupation.  The combined effects review of Dr. 
Dillahunt finds a sixty-five percent whole body permanent partial impairment and 
opines the claimant is capable of lifting up to ten pounds occasionally.  It is noted 
that none of the claimant’s five industrial injuries [has] required more than 
conservative treatment.  Based on the consideration of the above, the Commission 
finds the medical evidence does not support a finding of permanent total 
impairment.  Rather, the claimant demonstrates a moderate impairment which, at 
most, only permits him to engage in sedentary employment.  It is noted the 
claimant is fifty-seven years old, has a twelfth grade education and a work history 
as a certified electrician.  Given the claimant’s twelfth grade educational level and 
the specialized nature of his former electrician job, the Commission determines 
that the claimant presents [as] a candidate with the intellectual capacity and 
sufficient qualifications for successful training and eventual employment in the 
sedentary workforce.  Accordingly, the claimant’s application for permanent total 
disability is denied.” 
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in denying 
him permanent total disability compensation.  The court of appeals found that 
while the commission’s medical analysis was supported by “some evidence,” the 
commission’s nonmedical analysis was incomplete.  The court cited a passage 
from Dr. Dillahunt’s report and wrote: 
4 
 
“Although we have overruled relator’s specific objections to the referee’s 
report, this court believes that the commission completely overlooked a relevant 
Stephenson [State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 
31 OBR 369, 509 N.E.2d 946] factor contained in the evidence.  In the report of 
Dr. Dillahunt, upon which the commission expressly relied, it is noted:  
 
“‘In addition to the orthopedic impairments it must be noted that claimant’s 
mental 
impairment 
would 
further 
compromise 
claimant’s 
occupational 
opportunities.  Claimant is irritable, anxious, restless and depressed.  Claimant’s 
memory is impaired for recent and remote events as claimant forgets many simple 
things which would compromise claimant’s ability to remember locations and 
work like procedures or to understand and remember detailed instruction. * * *.’  
[Emphasis added.] 
 
“Although relator’s claim is allowed for ‘major depression’ there is no 
evidence in the record indicating that the memory loss observed by Dr. Dillahunt 
is related to [the] allowed condition of ‘major depression.’  While numerous 
medical professionals had examined relator prior to Dr. Dillahunt’s examination, 
none noted relator’s memory loss.  
 
“Stephenson and Noll [State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio 
St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245], supra, require the commission to identify and 
consider psychological factors contained in the record, and explain how those 
factors, in combination with the allowed conditions in relator’s claim either permit 
or foreclose sustained remunerative employment.  The commission’s order 
contains no discussion of relator’s memory loss, a factor which unquestionably 
affects relator’s ability to be reemployed in the sedentary work force.  
Consequently, the commission’s order violates both Stephenson and Noll, supra. 
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“Upon an examination of the referee’s report and an independent review of 
the file, this court adopts the findings of fact of the referee, but rejects the referee’s 
conclusions of law.  Accordingly, this court will issue a writ of mandamus 
ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order denying permanent 
total disability benefits and to issue a new order, either granting or denying said 
benefits, which complies with Stephenson and Noll, supra.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
The commission now appeals to this court as of right. 
___________________ 
 
Schiavoni, Schiavoni & Bush Co., L.P.A., Joseph J. Bush III and Thomas 
Tootle, for appellee. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Diane M. Meftah, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellant Industrial Commission. 
___________________ 
 
COOK, J.  Three questions are presented for our review:  (1) Is there some 
evidence supporting the commission’s determination that claimant is medically 
capable of sedentary work?  (2) Does the commission’s nonmedical analysis 
satisfy the mandates of Noll?  and (3) Did the court below err in returning the 
cause for consideration of claimant’s memory loss?  For the following reasons, we 
answer each question affirmatively.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
 
Claimant does not — and cannot credibly — dispute his medical ability to 
do sedentary work.  The commission relied on Drs. Hoover, McCloud, and 
Dillahunt, all of whom certified a capacity for such employment.  
 
The commission’s order also satisfies Noll.  Claimant’s high school 
education and specialized electronics training present a favorable nonmedical 
profile.  These two factors prompted the commission’s conclusion that claimant 
had “the intellectual capacity and sufficient qualifications for successful training 
6 
and eventual employment in the sedentary workforce.”  This is a reasonable 
conclusion; it is not an abuse of discretion and meets the Noll requirements. 
 
As another Noll flaw, claimant assails the commission’s cursory mention of 
his age.  While the commission did not “discuss” this factor, that flaw, in this 
instance, should not be deemed fatal.  Claimant was fifty-seven when permanent 
total disability compensation was denied.  While not a vocational asset, claimant’s 
age is also not an insurmountable barrier to re-employment.  If claimant’s other 
vocational factors were all negative, further consideration of his age would be 
appropriate, since age could be outcome-determinative — the last straw that could 
compel a different result.  All of claimant’s other vocational factors are, however, 
positive.  A claimant may not be granted permanent total disability compensation 
due solely to his age.  Therefore, even in the absence of detailed discussion on the 
effects of claimant’s age, the commission’s explanation satisfies Noll. 
 
Although the court of appeals’ opinion seems to correspond with the above 
analysis, the court returned the case, citing the commission’s failure to discuss 
claimant’s alleged memory loss.  This decision is erroneous and is reversed for the 
following reason. 
 
Dr. Dillahunt was a reviewing physician, not an examining physician, and a 
nonexamining physician must accept the findings of those who personally 
examined the claimant.  State ex rel. Wallace v. Indus. Comm. (1979), 57 Ohio 
St.2d 55, 59, 11 O.O.3d 216, 219, 386 N.E.2d 1109, 1112; State ex. rel. Hughes v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 71, 73-74, 26 OBR 61, 63, 
498 N.E.2d 459, 461-462.  Our review of the record reveals that no examining 
physician found claimant to have any memory loss.  In fact, Dr. Dillahunt 
expressly accepted the factual findings of examining physicians Drs. DeRosa and 
Hoover, both of whom found claimant’s memory and recall to be adequate.  This 
7 
inconsistency affects the credibility of the various reports.  Since the commission 
weighs and evaluates the evidence, State ex rel. Teece v. Indus. Comm. (1981), 68 
Ohio St.2d 165, 169, 22 O.O.3d 400, 403, 429 N.E.2d 433, 436, a reviewing court 
may not disturb the commission’s decision either to disregard Dr. Dillahunt’s 
unfounded statement or to credit instead the findings of Drs. DeRosa and Hoover.  
Dr. Dillahunt’s opinion regarding memory loss constitutes a rejection of the 
essentially contrary findings of claimant’s examiners, which disqualifies the 
opinion from evidentiary consideration.  It cannot, therefore, be a basis for return. 
 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate 
the commission’s decision denying permanent total disability compensation. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent and would affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals.