Case Title: Cartwright v. Commonwealth Transportation Comm'r

Citation: 

Docket Number: 042240

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
RAYMOND D. CARTWRIGHT 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 042240             JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
June 9, 2005 
COMMONWEALTH TRANSPORTATION 
 COMMISSIONER OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE 
E. Preston Grissom, Judge 
 
In this appeal, the issue we consider is whether the 
circuit court erred in denying a petition for writ of mandamus 
brought pursuant to Code § 2.2-3713 on the ground that the 
petitioner had an adequate remedy at law and, thus, mandamus 
would not lie. 
BACKGROUND 
The pertinent facts are not disputed.  On January 19, 2004, 
Raymond D. Cartwright, a citizen of this Commonwealth, made a 
request to the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) 
under The Virginia Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Code 
§§ 2.2-3700 through 2.2-3714, seeking a photocopy of the “sales 
brochure” compiled by VDOT in connection with VDOT’s highway 
construction project on Route 17 in the City of Chesapeake.  
Cartwright was a joint owner of property located on Route 17 
that VDOT had determined was needed to complete the project.  A 
sales brochure, as used in this context, is a document prepared 
by VDOT for the purpose of preparing appraisals and offers for 
 
 
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property that is subject to condemnation for public use.  VDOT 
denied the request, expressly contending that the sales brochure 
was exempt from disclosure under the FOIA by Code § 2.2-3705(8), 
permitting a public body to withhold “[l]egal memoranda and 
other work product compiled specifically for use in litigation,” 
and Code § 2.2-3705(35), permitting a public body to withhold 
“[a]ppraisals and cost estimates of real property subject to a 
proposed purchase, sale or lease, prior to the completion of 
such purchase, sale or lease.”1  
At the time Cartwright filed the FOIA request, he was a 
party to a pending condemnation proceeding regarding his 
property on Route 17, which VDOT had initiated in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Chesapeake.  Cartwright had requested the 
same document from VDOT through discovery served on August 26, 
2003.  Although VDOT had not produced the document in response 
to the discovery request, Cartwright had not sought to compel 
compliance with his request at that time. 
On January 30, 2004, Cartwright filed a petition for writ 
of mandamus in the same circuit court pursuant to Code § 2.2-
3713 seeking an order directing the Commonwealth Transportation 
                     
1 Code § 2.2-3705 was repealed in 2004.  Acts 2004, c. 690.  
The exclusions relied upon by VDOT now appear at Code § 2.2-
3705.1(3) (legal memoranda) and Code § 2.2-3705.1(8) (appraisals 
and cost estimates). 
 
 
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Commissioner2 to provide a copy of the sales brochure to 
Cartwright.  In addition, Cartwright requested an award of 
“reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees” as permitted by Code 
§ 2.2-3713(D).  On March 2, 2004, VDOT filed a demurrer to the 
petition for writ of mandamus, asserting that the refusal of 
Cartwright’s request “was made in good faith and based upon a 
plainly correct interpretation of the wording of the statute.”  
VDOT further asserted that mandamus was not appropriate because 
Cartwright could seek to obtain the same information through a 
motion to compel discovery in the pending condemnation action 
and, therefore, he had an adequate remedy at law. 
Following a hearing, the circuit court entered a final 
order dated July 9, 2004, sustaining VDOT’s demurrer and denying 
Cartwright’s petition for writ of mandamus.  The circuit court 
found that Cartwright had “an adequate remedy at law.  
Consequently, mandamus does not lie, under [T]he Virginia 
Freedom of Information Act.”  The circuit court expressly 
withheld making a ruling on whether the sales brochure was 
exempt from disclosure under the FOIA.  We awarded Cartwright 
this appeal. 
                                                                  
 
2The Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner is the chief 
executive officer of VDOT.  Code § 33.1-3.  For clarity, we will 
 
 
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DISCUSSION 
Initially, we note that VDOT has filed a motion to dismiss 
this appeal, averring therein that on January 31, 2005, VDOT 
“mailed [Cartwright] a copy of the sales brochure that was the 
subject of Cartwright’s mandamus petition.”  VDOT contends that 
the appeal should be dismissed as moot because “there no longer 
is any dispute whether Cartwright will be furnished a copy of 
the sales brochure,” and because VDOT has offered assurance that 
it will honor future requests for sales brochures made under the 
FOIA. 
We hold that Cartwright’s appeal is not moot.  It is true 
that VDOT provided Cartwright with the requested sales brochure.  
However, this action does not resolve the issue joined in this 
appeal, that is, whether a mandamus action brought pursuant to 
Code § 2.2-3713 is barred by the petitioner having an adequate 
remedy at law.  This is so because, if Cartwright prevails, the 
issues whether his petition for mandamus should have been 
granted because VDOT violated the FOIA and, if so, his 
entitlement to recover his costs and fees would remain to be 
resolved in the circuit court.  Thus, the issue raised by this 
appeal “is not one in which there is no actual controversy or in 
                                                                  
refer to VDOT’s actions rather than to those of the Commissioner 
in his representative capacity. 
 
 
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which no relief can be afforded,” and, consequently, it is not 
moot.  RF&P Corp. v. Little, 247 Va. 309, 315, 440 S.E.2d 908, 
912 (1994); see also Hankins v. Town of Virginia Beach, 182 Va. 
642, 643-44, 29 S.E.2d 831, 832 (1944). 
We now turn our consideration to the merits of the issue 
raised in this appeal.  In doing so, we emphasize that the issue 
decided by the circuit court and now before us in this appeal is 
whether a petition for writ of mandamus brought pursuant to Code 
§ 2.2-3713 can be properly denied on the ground that the 
petitioner has an adequate remedy at law.  The circuit court 
expressly withheld making any ruling on whether the specific 
FOIA request in this case was properly denied by VDOT.  
Accordingly, that issue is not before us, and we express no 
opinion regarding it. 
Circuit courts have the jurisdiction to issue a writ of 
mandamus in any case where it is “necessary to prevent the 
failure of justice and in which mandamus may issue according to 
the principles of common law.”  Code § 17.1-513.  The common law 
issuance of a writ of mandamus is “an extraordinary remedy 
employed to compel a public official to perform a purely 
ministerial duty imposed upon [the official] by law.”  Richlands 
Medical Assoc. v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 384, 386, 337 S.E.2d 
737, 739 (1985). 
 
 
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We have consistently held that “[t]he writ of mandamus 
. . . only issues when there is a clear and specific legal right 
to be enforced, or a duty which ought to be and can be 
performed, and where there is no other specific and adequate 
legal remedy.”  Hertz v. Times-World Corp., 259 Va. 599, 608, 
528 S.E.2d 458, 463 (2000) (quoting Tyler v. Taylor, 70 Va. (29 
Gratt.) 765, 766-67 (1878)); accord Town of Front Royal v. Front 
Royal and Warren County Indus. Park Corp., 248 Va. 581, 584, 449 
S.E.2d 794, 796 (1994); Hall v. Stuart, 198 Va. 315, 323-24, 94 
S.E.2d 284, 290 (1956).  We have further noted that to be 
“adequate,” the legal remedy “must be equally as convenient, 
beneficial, and effective as the proceeding by mandamus.”  
Carolina, C & O Ry. v. Board of Supervisors, 109 Va. 34, 37, 63 
S.E. 412, 413 (1909). 
In developing this body of law with respect to the 
extraordinary relief afforded by the issuance of a writ of 
mandamus, we generally have considered petitions filed under the 
general jurisdiction of the circuit courts.  However, prior to 
this case we have not considered whether a petition for writ of 
mandamus filed in a circuit court and specifically authorized by 
the FOIA may be denied based on the availability of another 
adequate remedy at law. 
 
 
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The intent of the General Assembly in enacting the FOIA is 
clearly expressed in its provisions.  As pertinent here, the 
General Assembly’s intent is to “ensure[] the people of the 
Commonwealth ready access to records in the custody of a public 
body or its officers and employees” so as “to promote an 
increased awareness by all persons of governmental activities 
and afford every opportunity to citizens to witness the 
operations of government.”  Code § 2.2-3700(B).  To effectuate 
that intent, the General Assembly has expressly provided that 
the provisions of the FOIA are to be “liberally construed.”  
Id.; see also Beck v. Shelton, 267 Va. 482, 487, 593 S.E.2d 195, 
197 (2004); City of Danville v. Laird, 223 Va. 271, 276, 288 
S.E.2d 429, 431 (1982). 
Specific provisions of the FOIA foster its salutary 
statutory scheme to provide freedom of information consistent 
with open government.  Code § 2.2-3713(A) expressly authorizes 
“[a]ny person . . . denied the rights and privileges conferred 
by this chapter . . . to enforce such rights and privileges by 
filing a petition for mandamus.”  In addition, the statute 
further provides that the petition for mandamus may be filed in 
either the general district court or the circuit court of the 
jurisdiction in which the denial of the right or privilege under 
the FOIA is alleged to have occurred.  Id.  This is the only 
 
 
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instance in which the general district courts are given 
concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts to hear mandamus 
proceedings.  See Code § 16.1-77(6). 
The statute further provides that “[t]he petition for 
mandamus . . . shall be heard within seven days of the date when 
the same is made.”  Code § 2.2-3713(C).  “A single instance of 
denial of the rights and privileges conferred by this chapter 
shall be sufficient to invoke the remedies granted herein.”  
Code § 2.2-3713(D).  And if the court finds the denial to 
constitute a violation of the FOIA, “the petitioner shall be 
entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees from 
the public body if the petitioner substantially prevails on the 
merits of the case, unless special circumstances would make an 
award unjust.”  Id. 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the statute 
provides that in such proceedings “the public body shall bear 
the burden of proof to establish an exemption by a preponderance 
of the evidence.  Any failure by a public body to follow the 
procedures established by this chapter shall be presumed to be a 
violation of this chapter.”  Code § 2.2-3713(E).  This is 
contrary to the rule in common law mandamus proceedings which 
places the burden on the petitioner to prove the violation of a 
right or privilege and in which there is a presumption of 
 
 
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regularity in the conduct of government business.  See Legum v. 
Harris, 205 Va. 99, 103, 135 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1964). 
VDOT acknowledges that these statutory provisions have 
“modified” traditional principles and procedural requirements 
relating to mandamus proceedings in the context of the FOIA.  It 
nevertheless contends that a petitioner must prove lack of an 
adequate legal remedy to be entitled to mandamus for an alleged 
violation of the rights and privileges conferred by the FOIA.  
The thrust of this contention is that, in light of the above 
express modifications, the omission of any reference in Code 
§ 2.2-3713 to the common law requirement that the petitioner in 
a mandamus proceeding prove that an adequate remedy at law does 
not exist manifests the intent of the General Assembly not to 
eliminate that requirement in a proceeding involving a FOIA 
request. 
In support of its position, VDOT first argues that we would 
be required to add words to Code § 2.2-3713 “under the guise of 
interpretation” in order to conclude that the General Assembly 
intended to eliminate the traditional requirement of a 
petitioner in a mandamus proceeding to prove lack of an adequate 
legal remedy.  VDOT relies upon well-established principles that 
need not be recited at length here.  See, e.g. Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co. of Roanoke v. County of Botetourt, 259 Va. 559, 
 
 
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565, 526 S.E.2d 746, 750 (2000).  Our analysis of the issue 
presented in this case simply does not involve our careful and 
consistent refusal to add words to a statute even if such might 
clarify the statute. 
The provisions of Code § 2.2-3713 significantly distinguish 
the right to mandamus it provides from the common law right to 
mandamus.  By granting concurrent jurisdiction to the circuit 
and general district courts, expediting the proceedings, 
providing for an award of costs and attorneys’ fees, and 
shifting the burden of proof to the public body, the General 
Assembly has evinced an intent to provide mandamus relief under 
Code § 2.2-3713(A) different from that of common law mandamus.  
These distinctions are entirely consistent with the express 
purpose of the FOIA and manifestly facilitate access to 
appropriate governmental records.  Contrary to VDOT’s 
contention, we are of opinion that the lack of any reference in 
this statute to the common law requirement that the petition 
prove a lack of adequate remedy at law evinces the intent of the 
General Assembly to eliminate that common law prerequisite to 
the issuance of a writ of mandamus.  Such is clearly consistent 
with the salutary statutory scheme of the FOIA. 
VDOT principally relies upon our decision in Gannon v. 
State Corporation Commission, 243 Va. 480, 416 S.E.2d 446 
 
 
11
(1992), to support its position in this case.  This reliance is 
misplaced.  The petitioner in that case had filed a FOIA request 
for certain records in the possession and control of the State 
Corporation Commission, which was denied.  Rather than availing 
himself of the remedy provided by the pertinent Rules of the 
Commission to challenge the denial of his request, the 
petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court.  
Under those circumstances, we dismissed Gannon’s petition, 
holding that he was required to avail himself of his “‘specific 
and adequate remedy’ under the Commission’s Rules before seeking 
a writ of mandamus in this Court.”  Id. at 483, 416 S.E.2d at 
448.  Gannon did not involve a mandamus petition filed in a 
circuit court pursuant to Code § 2.2-3713(A), and does not 
address the issue presented in this appeal. 
We hold that a citizen alleging a violation of the rights 
and privileges afforded by the FOIA and seeking relief by 
mandamus pursuant to Code § 2.2-3713(A) is not required to prove 
a lack of an adequate remedy at law, nor can the mandamus 
proceeding be barred on the ground that there may be some other 
remedy at law available.  Accordingly, we hold that the circuit 
court erred in sustaining VDOT’s demurrer and denying 
Cartwright’s petition for writ of mandamus on the ground that he 
 
 
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had an adequate remedy at law by means of discovery in the 
pending condemnation proceeding. 
Although Cartwright has received the information he sought 
to compel VDOT to disclose, as we have noted above, a 
determination that he would have been entitled to disclosure of 
that information under the FOIA would further entitle him to 
receive an award of reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees in the 
absence of a finding by the circuit court of special 
circumstances that would make such an award unjust.  
Accordingly, because the circuit court did not reach the issue 
whether the sales brochure was subject to disclosure under the 
FOIA, we must remand the case for further consideration of that 
issue, and, if the court finds Cartwright’s request was 
improperly denied, for consideration of whether and in what 
amount he should be awarded his reasonable costs and attorneys’ 
fees. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.