Case Title: Town of Ellettsville, Indiana Plan Commission v. DeSpirito

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2018-11-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 53S01-1709-PL-612 
Town of Ellettsville, Indiana Plan Commission and 
Richland Convenience Store Partners, LLC, 
Appellants,  
–v– 
Joseph V. DeSpirito, 
Appellee.  
Argued: November 30, 2017 | Decided: November 29, 2018 
Appeal from the Monroe Circuit Court 
No. 53C01-1509-PL-1714 
The Honorable E. Michael Hoff, Judge  
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 53A01-1611-PL-2559 
Opinion by Justice Slaughter 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Massa, and Goff concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Nov 29 2018, 11:01 am
 
 
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Slaughter, Justice. 
We adhere to Indiana’s longstanding common-law rule that relocating 
a fixed easement requires the consent of all affected estate-holders. And 
we reject the minority approach, reflected in the Third Restatement of 
Property (Servitudes), which permits the unilateral relocation of 
easements if a court finds the proposed relocation is “reasonable”, 
consistent with the “normal” use and development of the servient estate, 
and does not adversely affect the dominant estate. Property rights in 
Indiana are not so flimsy that they may be modified or eliminated if their 
exercise impedes what is thought to be a more productive or worthwhile 
use of land. Under Indiana law, such rights may be abridged only with the 
bargained-for consent of the property owner or through the lawful 
exercise of eminent domain. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 History of the Affected Properties 
At issue here are two adjoining lots in Ellettsville, Indiana, that were 
once a single parcel of land owned by Swifty Oil Company. In 1996, 
Swifty subdivided the parcel and recorded the subdivision by a plat filed 
with the Monroe County Plan Commission. The plat delineates a utility 
easement across Lot 1. Swifty conveyed Lot 2 by warranty deed to Martin 
Hukill, the predecessor in interest to appellee, Joseph V. DeSpirito. 
In 2011, DeSpirito obtained Lot 2 by a special limited warranty deed 
executed and recorded in the Monroe County Recorder’s Office. This deed 
conveyed Lot 2 “as shown on the recorded plat thereof” and “[s]ubject to 
covenants, easements and restrictions, if any, appearing in the public 
records.” DeSpirito’s deed does not explicitly mention a utility easement 
running through Lot 1. But one of the public records to which it is 
subject—namely, the subdivision plat—does show the easement.  
 
 
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In 2014, Swifty conveyed the other lot—Lot 1—to appellant Richland 
Convenience Store Partners, LLC, by a limited warranty deed executed 
and recorded in April 2014. Richland’s title was explicitly subject to 
“encroachments, easements, rights of way, covenants, reservations, and 
restrictions in the chain of title to the Real Estate or otherwise existing 
thereon”. Richland’s deed made clear Lot 1 was subject to various 
covenants, conditions, restrictions and, relevant here, “Utility and 
Drainage easements and setback lines”, along with any amendments 
disclosed on the subdivision’s recorded plat.  
 Town of Ellettsville Plan Commission Proceedings 
In 2015, Richland asked the Town of Ellettsville Plan Commission, also 
an appellant here, for permission to relocate the utility easement on Lot 1. 
Richland wanted to move the easement, along with the private sewer line 
running beneath it, fifteen to twenty feet south—all at Richland’s own 
expense. Richland sought to relocate the easement to increase the 
buildable area of Lot 1. DeSpirito, who owned Lot 2, opposed the 
relocation and testified against it at the hearing.  
Despite DeSpirito’s opposition, the Plan Commission approved 
Richland’s request. It found that Richland’s “application [met] all of the 
requirements as set forth by the Town of Ellettsville Zoning Ordinance”; 
and it granted the proposed amendment to the plat. The Commission 
specifically found that relocating the sewer line would cause only minimal 
disruption to DeSpirito, and that Richland had agreed to incur the cost of 
replacement. It also found that relocation would increase the buildable 
area on Lot 1 and represented “the best location to allow for future 
development of the site and maintain the functionality of the sewer line.”  
 Trial Court Proceedings 
DeSpirito petitioned for judicial review of the Commission’s decision in 
the Monroe Circuit Court. He also sought a declaration that the 
Commission’s ruling was null and void, along with injunctive relief 
 
 
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preventing construction or other development on Lot 1 inconsistent with 
the utility easement’s existing location as described in the plat. The parties 
agreed to the preliminary injunction. On summary judgment the trial 
court found that DeSpirito, as owner of Lot 2, had a fixed utility easement 
through Lot 1, the location of which was specified in the subdivision plat. 
Citing Indiana appellate caselaw, the court held that the easement’s fixed 
location meant it “cannot be changed by either party without consent of 
the other.” The court thus granted DeSpirito’s motion for summary 
judgment and remanded to the Commission with instructions to dismiss 
Richland’s petition unless DeSpirito agreed to it. The court also ordered 
the preliminary injunction to remain in effect.  
 Court of Appeals Proceedings 
Richland and the Commission appealed the trial court’s entry of a 
purported final judgment, though the entry did not resolve all claims as to 
all parties. Town of Ellettsville v. DeSpirito, 78 N.E.3d 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2017). Ignoring any jurisdictional infirmity, the court of appeals agreed 
with the trial court that there were no disputed material facts. Id. at 668. 
But the court distinguished the caselaw the trial court had relied upon, 
finding it involved “an easement by necessity” and thus did not apply. Id. 
at 676-77. The court of appeals concluded that the “more modern” and 
“more equitable approach to easement relocation” is stated in Section 4.8 
of the Third Restatement of Property (Servitudes). Id. at 677. This 
provision entitles the holder of the servient estate—Richland—to “make 
reasonable changes in the location or dimensions of an easement” at its 
own expense, but only if they do not “(a) significantly lessen the utility of 
the easement, (b) increase the burdens on the owner of the easement in its 
use and enjoyment, or (c) frustrate the purpose for which the easement 
was created.” Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.8(3) (2000). 
In adopting the Restatement, the court of appeals cited an opinion from 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, M.P.M. Builders, LLC v. 
Dwyer, 809 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 2004). The Massachusetts court rejected the 
common-law approach because it “permits an easement holder to prevent 
 
 
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any reasonable changes in the location of an easement” and thus renders 
“an access easement virtually a possessory interest rather than what it is, 
merely a right of way.” Id. at 1058. Our court of appeals found that 
rationale convincing and predicted we would, too. “We find these 
observations persuasive and believe that our supreme court would also 
recognize the utility of adopting the Restatement’s approach to easement 
relocation.” 78 N.E.3d at 679. 
 Supreme Court Proceedings 
DeSpirito sought transfer, which we granted, thus vacating the court of 
appeals’ opinion. After oral argument, we found appellate jurisdiction 
lacking because the trial court never issued a final judgment—one that 
“disposed of all claims as to all parties”. Ind. Appellate Rule 2(H)(1). Town 
of Ellettsville v. DeSpirito, 87 N.E.3d 9, 11 (Ind. 2017). In the interest of 
judicial economy, we did not dismiss the case outright; rather, we stayed 
the appeal and remanded to the trial court to determine whether it could 
enter a final judgment. Id. at 11-12. In response to our opinion, the trial 
court expressly determined that there was no just reason for delay and 
expressly directed entry of judgment for DeSpirito on his claim for judicial 
review and against Richland and the Commission. This entry is sufficient 
to secure appellate jurisdiction. 
Standard of Review 
We review the entry of summary judgment de novo, and that is no less 
true when the trial court sits as a reviewing court on judicial review from 
an administrative ruling. Under our settled standard, summary judgment 
is proper if the designated evidence shows there is no genuine issue as to 
any fact material to a claim or issue, and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Ryan v. TCI Architects/Engineers/Contractors, 
Inc., 72 N.E.3d 908, 912-13 (Ind. 2017). Here, the parties agree there are no 
disputed issues of material fact. The only dispute is one of law, which we 
also review de novo: Should we adhere to Indiana’s longstanding 
 
 
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common-law rule, which requires all affected estate-holders to consent to 
the relocation of a fixed easement; or adopt the Restatement position, 
which does not always require such consent? We continue to follow the 
common-law rule as the law of Indiana and thus affirm the trial court. 
Discussion and Decision 
I. Lot 2’s utility easement through Lot 1 is fixed. 
An easement is the right to use another’s land for a specified purpose. 
An easement appurtenant benefits adjoining land; an easement in gross 
benefits a specific individual. The land benefited by an easement is the 
dominant estate; the land burdened by an easement is the servient estate. 
At issue here is an easement appurtenant because the easement benefits 
land. The parties agree that Lot 2 has a utility easement running through 
Lot 1. DeSpirito owns Lot 2, the dominant estate. Richland owns Lot 1, the 
servient estate. The easement originated in 1996 when the parcel was 
subdivided, and the easement was delineated in the plat recording the 
subdivision. The easement runs with the land and thus survived the 
changed ownership of both lots. DeSpirito obtained Lot 2 “as shown on 
the recorded plat thereof”. Likewise, Richland obtained Lot 1 subject to 
(among other things) “Utility and Drainage easements and setback lines 
and any amendments thereto as disclosed on the recorded plat of 
subdivision.”  
Richland argues the easement’s location is not fixed, which is a mixed 
question of law and fact. An easement is fixed if the instrument creating it 
specifies its location or if the law requires it to be maintained in a specific 
position. In contrast, a “floating easement” is not limited to any specific 
part of the servient estate. Easement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). Richland argues that the plat describes only the easement’s width, 
not its location in relation to the lot’s boundaries. Thus, Richland says, the 
easement is not fixed.  
 
 
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We disagree. Richland is correct that the plat does not expressly 
indicate the relative distance of the easement to the boundaries. But the 
plat is drawn to scale: One inch equals sixty feet. The plat describes the 
width of the easement and indicates its path through the lot with two 
dashed lines. With a ruler, one can determine the distance of the easement 
to the lot boundaries. These distances are determinable, and the 
easement’s width is explicitly indicated. The easement is fixed.  
Moreover, even if the plat were not drawn to scale, the disputed 
easement is fixed by practice. “Where the right to an easement is granted 
without giving definite location and description to it, the exercise of the 
easement in a particular course or manner, with the consent of both 
parties, renders it fixed and certain”. Dudgeon v. Bronson, 159 Ind. 562, 565, 
64 N.E. 910, 910 (1902). (citation omitted)  
In sum, Lot 2 has a utility easement through Lot 1, and its location in 
the subdivision plat is fixed. 
II. Indiana’s common law follows a bright-line rule 
that is easy to apply, in contrast to the 
Restatement’s multifactor test, which leads to 
uncertain results. 
 Indiana common-law precedent requires all affected 
parties to consent to the modification of various 
servitudes.  
We next consider whether, under Indiana law, a servient estate-holder 
can unilaterally move a fixed utility easement or whether he must obtain 
the dominant estate-holder’s consent. 
Our starting point is a well-settled principle concerning easements by 
necessity and restrictive covenants. An easement by necessity arises when 
the easement is essential to the reasonable use of nearby property, such as 
 
 
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an easement connecting a landlocked parcel of land to a road. Easement, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY. Once two landowners agree on an easement by 
necessity, one cannot alter it without the other’s consent. Ritchey v. Welsh, 
149 Ind. 214, 221, 48 N.E. 1031, 1033 (1898) (finding a way once selected 
cannot be changed by either party without the consent of the other). The 
same goes for restrictive covenants, which are private agreements that 
restrict the use or occupancy of real property. Covenant, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY. “If any lot, or part of a lot, located in such plat shall have 
been sold and conveyed, no modification thereof can be made unless the 
owners of all the lots and parts therein join in the execution of such 
writing.” Wischmeyer v. Finch, 231 Ind. 282, 288, 107 N.E.2d 661, 664 (1952) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, we deal with a servitude that is similar to both an easement by 
necessity and a restrictive covenant—specifically, an express fixed 
easement appurtenant. Such an easement is a permitted use of land 
granted by the servient estate-holder for the benefit of the dominant 
estate-holder and runs with the dominant estate. See Sanxay v. Hunger, 42 
Ind. 44, 48 (1873); accord William C. Haak Trust v. Wilusz, 949 N.E.2d 833, 
835 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 
Our court of appeals considered this type of easement in Shedd v. 
American Maize Products Company, 60 Ind. App. 146, 108 N.E. 610 (1915). 
There, the court found that our default rule for easements by necessity—
that, once established, they cannot be changed without the consent of both 
parties—also applies to fixed easements appurtenant. “When such a way 
is once selected and located it cannot be changed by either party without 
the consent of the other.” 60 Ind. App. at 155, 108 N.E. at 614 (citing 
Thomas v. McCoy, 30 Ind. App. 555, 66 N.E. 700 (1903); Ritchey, 149 Ind. 
214, 48 N.E. 1031). Cf. Daviess-Martin County REMC v. Meadows, 179 Ind. 
App. 622, 625, 386 N.E.2d 1000, 1002 (1979) (affirming trial court’s 
determination that government’s unilateral relocation of electrical-line 
easement was taking for public use even when easement was 
prescriptive).  
 
 
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Although we have never previously adopted this rule expressly, we see 
no reason to depart from Shedd’s holding. The same considerations 
regarding relocation rights that apply to easements by necessity also apply 
to easements appurtenant. The Shedd court was correct in concluding that 
once an easement appurtenant’s location is fixed, it cannot be relocated 
unilaterally. 
 The Restatement approach to relocation agreements is 
unclear and appears internally inconsistent.  
The Restatement advances a different rule—one that only a few state 
courts have adopted and that our court of appeals describes as “more 
modern” and “more equitable” than our common-law approach. 
DeSpirito, 78 N.E.3d at 677. The Restatement “rejects the rule espoused by 
the weight of authority in the United States” in favor of a new rule its 
drafters believe will  
• “permit development of the servient estate to the extent it can be 
accomplished without unduly interfering with the legitimate 
interests of the easement holder”;  
• “increase overall utility”; and  
• “encourage the use of easements” by decreasing the cost to the 
servient landowner to grant them.  
Restatement § 4.8 cmt. f. 
To date, six state courts of last resort have adopted the Restatement’s 
approach. See Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 
2001); Dwyer, 809 N.E.2d 1053; St. James Village, Inc. v. Cunningham, 210 
P.3d 190 (Nev. 2009); Lewis v. Young, 705 N.E.2d 649 (N.Y. 1998); Stanga v. 
Husman, 694 N.W.2d 716 (S.D. 2005); Roy v. Woodstock Cmty. Trust, Inc., 94 
A.3d 530, 539 (Vt. 2014) (adopting § 4.8 for underground easements only). 
But see AKG Real Estate, LLC v. Kosterman, 717 N.W.2d 835 (Wis. 2006); 
Herren v. Pettengill, 538 S.E.2d 735 (Ga. 2000); Stowell v. Andrews, 194 A.3d 
953 (N.H. 2018). These adopting courts rely primarily on the rationale that 
 
 
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the Restatement “strikes an appropriate balance between the interests of 
the respective estate owners by permitting the servient owner to develop 
his land without unreasonably interfering with the easement holder’s 
rights.” Dwyer, 809 N.E.2d at 1057. 
1. Under a plain-meaning interpretation of Section 
4.8, the Restatement does not apply to fixed 
easements. 
The Restatement’s operative provision, Section 4.8, opens with an 
introductory clause that suggests the rule does not apply to fixed 
easements: 
Except where the location and dimensions are determined by 
the instrument or circumstances surrounding creation of a 
servitude, they are determined as follows: 
(1) The owner of the servient estate has the right within a 
reasonable time to specify a location that is reasonably suited to 
carry out the purpose of the servitude. 
(2) The dimensions are those reasonably necessary for 
enjoyment of the servitude. 
(3) Unless expressly denied by the terms of an easement, as 
defined in § 1.2, the owner of the servient estate is entitled to 
make reasonable changes in the location or dimensions of an 
easement, at the servient owner’s expense, to permit normal 
use or development of the servient estate, but only if the 
changes do not 
 (a) significantly lessen the utility of the easement, 
 
 
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 (b) increase the burdens on the owner of the easement in its 
use and enjoyment, or 
 (c) frustrate the purpose for which the easement was created. 
Restatement § 4.8 (emphasis added). 
In light of Section 4.8’s introductory provision—“Except where the 
location and dimensions are determined by the instrument or 
circumstances surrounding creation of a servitude, they are determined as 
follows”—its plain meaning would seem to make the rest of Section 4.8 
inapplicable when the “instrument” creating the servitude or the 
“circumstances surrounding” its creation “determined” the location. This 
provision, in other words, would appear to limit Section 4.8 to servitudes 
that are not “determined” or fixed. 
2. The Restatement’s drafters believe Section 4.8 
applies even to fixed easements. 
But a plain-meaning interpretation of Section 4.8 leads to a result at 
odds with what the Restatement’s drafters say they were doing in 
adopting Section 4.8—namely, rejecting “the rule espoused by the weight 
of authority in the United States”. Restatement § 4.8 cmt. f. Stated 
differently, the Restatement announced a new rule that would 
purportedly modernize outdated common-law restraints, like Indiana’s, 
and thereby “increase overall utility” and “encourage the use of 
easements”. Id. But if the new rule applies only to the unliteral relocation 
of non-fixed easements, then Section 4.8 amounts to no more than a 
rephrasing—a restatement, if you will—of the longstanding common-law 
rule already in place. Read this way, Section 4.8 is not rejecting anything. 
The Supreme Court of Nevada faced this very question in St. James 
Village, 210 P.3d 190. There, the court considered whether Section 4.8 
applies to an easement recorded by deed with a metes-and-bounds 
description. The court adopted the Restatement but held “that the plain 
 
 
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meaning of the rule’s introductory language prohibits application of the 
rule when the creating instrument provides for an express location or 
dimensions of the easement.” Id. at 193. The court continued: “Thus, when 
the easement at issue has a location certain, the Restatement rule is not 
applicable and the easement cannot be unilaterally relocated.” Id. See also 
Offshore Systems-Kenai v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Public Facilities, 282 P.3d 
348, 357 (Alaska 2012) (adding in dicta that Restatement applies only 
when easement is not fixed); Lewis, 705 N.E.2d 649, 653–54 (applying draft 
version of § 4.8 to non-fixed easement); Stanga, 694 N.W.2d 718-19 
(applying § 4.8 because right-of-way easement was not described in deed 
and had changed course and form over time). 
The Nevada court’s plain-meaning interpretation, however, may not be 
what the Restatement’s drafters had in mind. Their comments state that 
subsection 4.8(3) applies unless “expressly negated by the easement 
instrument.” Restatement § 4.8 cmt. f. And if the purchasers of an 
easement wish “to retain control over any change in location, the 
instrument should be drafted to accomplish that result.” Id. The drafters 
also state, under the section “Effects of Specifying Location or 
Dimensions”, that specified locations or dimensions of an easement in the 
creating instrument “may indicate the parties’ intent that no deviation be 
permitted”. Restatement § 4.8, Reporter Note p.570 (emphasis added).  
These statements cast doubt on a plain-reading construction of Section 
4.8. The term “expressly negated” in comment f could mean, as the 
Nevada court found, that specific locational measurements strictly forbid 
unilateral relocation. But this reading is at odds with the “may” language 
following it in the Reporter notes: Specific locations or dimensions in the 
creating instrument “may indicate the parties’ intent that no deviation is 
permitted.” Restatement § 4.8, Reporter Note p.570 (emphasis added). 
Comment f also indicates that when parties wish to contract around the 
Restatement rule permitting unilateral relocation, the “instrument should 
be drafted to accomplish that result.” In other words, the instrument 
creating the easement should expressly prohibit unilateral relocation of 
the easement, or else such one-sided action will be deemed permitted. 
 
 
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Further evidence that the Restatement was intended to apply to 
traditionally fixed easements can be found in Section 4.8’s expository 
examples. In one example, Whiteacre has an easement through Blackacre 
to use the “existing roadway for a private way”. Restatement § 4.8 illus. 4. 
This easement was granted in 1910. The existing roadway meanders 
through Blackacre and passes within ten feet of the house located on 
Blackacre. Blackacre, the servient estate, wants to re-route the road to a 
better location. The deed describes the easement. The road is located when 
the easement is created and is determinable. The road has existed for over 
a century and so is determined by practice. Under the common law, this 
easement would be fixed, thus requiring all parties to consent to a 
relocation. Yet the drafters use this as an example of an easement that can 
be relocated unilaterally. Id. 
3. Some courts conclude that Section 4.8 does not 
mean what it says. 
Unlike Nevada’s high court, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts in Dwyer, 809 N.E.2d 1053, declined to adopt the plain-
meaning construction and instead read Section 4.8 as being a true new 
path. Because the “deed describes the location of the easement” and 
“contains no language concerning its relocation”, id. at 1055, Dwyer held 
the fixed easement could be unilaterally relocated under Section 4.8. In 
contrast, and consistent with Section 4.8’s plain meaning, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court found Dwyer to be an outlier in applying Section 4.8 to 
fixed easements. See AKG Real Estate, 717 N.W.2d at 845. 
These conflicting state-court opinions persuade us that our court of 
appeals erred in relying on Dwyer for its conclusion that Richland could 
relocate the disputed easement without DeSpirito’s consent. Given the 
plain meaning of Section 4.8, we reject Dwyer’s holding that the 
Restatement applies to fixed easements. Thus, even if we were to adopt 
the Restatement, we would interpret it based on the section’s actual text 
and not the drafters’ apparent intent. But, as discussed next, we decline to 
adopt Restatement Section 4.8 at all—not as intended or written. 
 
 
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III. Indiana’s common-law approach has long been 
settled, and we see no reason to modify it. 
We decline to adopt the Restatement and opt instead to reaffirm 
Indiana’s common law concerning the relocation of easements: Once an 
easement’s location is fixed, neither the servient nor dominant estate-
holder can relocate or modify the easement without the other’s consent. 
This rule applies to easements by necessity, restrictive covenants, and, 
relevant here, express easements appurtenant.  
For four reasons, we continue to embrace the common-law rule. First, 
the common-law approach settles the expectations of property owners 
and honors their bargained-for holdings, ensuring stability in land 
ownership and property valuation. Second, it avoids the likely flood of 
litigation that would occur were we to abandon the common law’s bright-
line rule and thus inject uncertainty into whether and when the 
Restatement applies to various scenarios. Third, it avoids having to 
address whether modifying the common-law rule would effect a judicial 
taking of private property, triggering an entitlement to just compensation. 
And, fourth, it likely leads to more efficient economic outcomes than the 
Restatement.  
 Settling expectations 
Our first concern with the Restatement’s approach is that it may 
unsettle property values by frustrating the contracting parties’ 
expectations. Parties often bargain over an easement’s type and location 
when first creating an easement. Allowing one party to thwart that 
bargain may result in a windfall for one party and a corresponding 
shortfall for the other, thus depriving it of its bargain. 
As the Supreme Court of Maine explained in Davis v. Bruk, 411 A.2d 
660 (Me. 1980), the Restatement approach would “introduce considerable 
uncertainty into land ownership” by depriving the dominant estate-
holder “of his property rights in the servient estate”. Id. at 665. And, the 
court continued, following the Restatement could 
 
 
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confer an economic windfall on the servient owner, who 
presumably purchased the land at a price which reflected the 
restraints existing on the property. Such a rule would relieve 
him of such restraints to the detriment of the owner of the 
dominant estate whose settled expectations would be derailed 
with impunity.  
Id. Reaffirming Indiana’s common-law approach signals to landowners 
that we are holding the parties to the agreement they—or their 
predecessors in interest—made when they negotiated their easement or 
acquired their property concerning the easement. A key virtue of the 
common-law rule is that it promotes certainty and encourages 
investments in dominant estates and the easements serving them by 
ensuring their property interests and corresponding property values 
remain stable and predictable. 
 Minimizing litigation  
As Indiana’s dearth of caselaw on this topic underscores, our common-
law approach has not generated much litigation over the years. The 
common-law approach is a clear, bright-line rule requiring parties to 
consent to the modification or relocation of a fixed easement. Were we to 
adopt the Restatement approach, it would fall to courts to determine, 
among other things: 
• what is a reasonable change to an easement; 
• would a reasonable change permit normal use or development 
of the servient estate;  
• would relocation significantly lessen the utility of the easement; 
and 
• would the relocation frustrate the easement’s purpose? 
Property owners are better suited than courts to answer these 
questions. We leave the determination of such questions to the parties 
themselves and the market. Under such circumstances, the governing 
legal principles should be clear, black-letter rules that leave no room for 
 
 
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judicial discretion. Our longstanding common-law rule fills that bill. See 
Herren, 538 S.E.2d at 736 (allowing unilateral relocation by servient estate-
holder would be “opening the door for increased litigation over 
‘reasonableness’ issues based on today’s conditions rather than those 
considered in the original bargain”). 
 Avoiding judicial takings  
Another reason for retaining the common-law rule is that the Supreme 
Court, in a plurality opinion by Justice Scalia, has observed that a judicial 
taking may arise if a court modifies the common law to eliminate a settled 
property right. 
In sum, the Takings Clause bars the State from taking private 
property without paying for it, no matter which branch is the 
instrument of the taking. . . . If a legislature or a court declares 
that what was once an established right of private property no 
longer exists, it has taken that property, no less than if the State 
had physically appropriated it or destroyed its value by 
regulation. 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Envt’l Protection, 560 
U.S. 702, 715 (2010) (emphasis in original). By retaining the common-law 
rule, we avoid having to consider whether the Restatement so 
fundamentally alters a property right in the easement that abandoning the 
rule amounts to a taking of that right requiring the payment of just 
compensation. 
 Securing economically efficient outcomes 
A final reason for adhering to the common-law rule is the economic 
reality that property owners with easement disputes often will bargain 
extralegally—meaning they will contract around existing rules. Both the 
common-law and Restatement approaches are alternative rules that 
presumptively govern a legal relationship unless the parties agree to other 
 
 
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Page 17 of 19 
 
terms. But parties are more likely to contract around clear rules that 
address whether and when the law applies. The Restatement often leaves 
such questions unanswered. In contrast, the common law provides a 
straightforward answer and encourages interdependence between parties 
by requiring them to work cooperatively any time one of them wishes to 
move an easement.  
A potential problem with extralegal bargaining is that if transaction 
costs are more than de minimis, the parties may be deterred from 
bargaining to the optimal, so-called “Pareto-efficient” outcome—where it 
is impossible to enhance the welfare of one party without making another 
worse off. This is the Coase Theorem in its simplest form. As Professor 
Coase acknowledged, transaction costs often prevent extralegal 
bargaining and frustrate optimal outcomes. R. H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). Because transactions costs are 
usually more than negligible, we seek the rule that minimizes bargaining 
costs and encourages parties to attain a more efficient outcome. 
The Restatement approach threatens to make bargaining costlier and 
deter the most efficient use of resources. Under the Restatement, the 
servient estate-holder may take initial steps to relocate the easement 
unilaterally because he does not need the dominant estate-holder’s prior 
consent. Especially if those initial steps include investing significant 
resources, those sunk costs might make the owner of the servient estate 
“reluctant to accept an offer from the owner of the dominant estate to 
cease the relocation, even if doing so would be the most efficient 
outcome.” Note, The Right of Owners of Servient Estates to Relocate Easements 
Unilaterally, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1693, 1701 (1996). The common-law rule, in 
contrast, forces parties to cooperate from the outset. The servient estate-
holder, aware he must obtain the dominant estate-holder’s consent before 
relocating the easement, will likely engage in dialogue before incurring 
significant costs that would deter a mutually beneficial outcome. Thus, in 
such instances, the common-law rule encourages bargaining at a lower 
cost than the Restatement approach. 
 
 
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Richland worries about the bad actor—the dominant estate-holder who 
uses the common-law rule as a shield and refuses to consent to an 
easement’s relocation despite an economic motive to do so. That is a fair 
concern, and we acknowledge the prevailing rule may enable dominant 
estate-holders to use their utility easements to block economically 
beneficial development of an adjacent plot. But the Restatement presents 
its own bad-actor problems. As described by the Maine Supreme Court, 
the dominant estate-holder “could be subjected to harassment by the 
servient owner’s attempts at relocation to serve his own conveniences.” 
Davis, 411 A.2d at 665. Adopting the Restatement would not solve the 
bad-actor problem. It would simply empower a different party—the 
servient estate-holder—to act badly. There is no reason to believe servient 
estate-holders will pursue their own self-interest with any less gusto 
under the Restatement than dominant estate-holders under the common 
law. Thus, adopting the Restatement to thwart the dominant estate-holder 
that uses the easement as a shield would merely reassign property values 
to the servient estate-holder, and we see no point in that. 
Conclusion 
For these reasons, we retain Indiana’s common-law rule prohibiting the 
unilateral relocation of fixed easements and thus affirm the trial court’s 
entry of judgment for DeSpirito on his petition for judicial review and 
against Richland and the Commission.  
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
 
 
 
 
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A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L A N TS 
TOWN OF ELLETTSVILLE PLAN COMMISSION 
Darla S. Brown 
Sturgeon & Brown, P.C. 
Bloomington, Indiana 
RICHLAND CONVENIENCE STORE PARTNERS, LLC 
Andrew P. Sheff 
Sheff Law Office 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Carina M. de la Torre 
The de la Torre Law Office LLC 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L E E 
Michael Rabinowitch 
Maureen E. Ward 
Wooden McLaughlin LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana