Case Title: Joseph v. Auto Club Insurance Ass'n (Opinion)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 142615

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED MAY 15, 2012 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
 
DOREEN JOSEPH, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 142615 
 
AUTO CLUB INSURANCE 
ASSOCIATION, a/k/a A.C.I.A, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
MARY BETH KELLY, J.  
We granted defendant Auto Club Insurance Association’s bypass application for 
leave to appeal in this case to determine whether the minority/insanity tolling provision 
of MCL 600.5851(1) applies to toll the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) of the 
no-fault act.  The one-year-back rule is designed to limit the amount of benefits 
recoverable under the no-fault act to those losses occurring no more than one year before 
an action is brought.  Plaintiff here is seeking to recover no-fault benefits for losses 
dating back 32 years before she brought her action.  In denying defendant’s motion for 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly 
Stephen J. Markman 
Diane M. Hathaway 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
 
 
2 
partial summary disposition, the circuit court relied on Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins 
Co1 to hold that the minority/insanity tolling provision tolls the one-year-back rule.  In 
Regents, this Court held that a saving provision that tolls a statute of limitations also 
prevents application of the one-year-back rule.  Regents overruled Cameron v Auto Club 
Ins Ass’n2 and Liptow v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co,3
We once again hold that the minority/insanity tolling provision, which addresses 
only when an action may be brought, does not preclude the application of the one-year-
back rule, which separately limits the amount of benefits that can be recovered.  These 
distinctions were recognized in Michigan law both in Cameron as well as several 
decisions of this Court that predate Cameron.  Yet this Court’s decision in Regents 
conflated these distinct concepts in order to effectuate what the Regents majority believed 
was a broader social good served by expanding the right to recover benefits beyond those 
allowed by law.  We recognize the necessity for, and value of, stability in the law and 
take no pleasure in overruling a precedent of recent vintage by this Court.  But Regents 
itself simply failed to apply our then recent decision in Cameron, resulting in a decision 
that patently failed to enforce the requirements of the statutes that it interpreted.  Because 
the holding in Regents contravened the Legislature’s clear and unambiguous language in 
MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1), Regents is overruled and we reinstate 
 which had held that the saving 
provisions at issue only tolled a statute of limitations, not statutes limiting damages.   
                                              
1 Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins Co, 487 Mich 289; 791 NW2d 897 (2010). 
2 Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 476 Mich 55; 718 NW2d 784 (2006). 
3 Liptow v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 272 Mich App 544; 726 NW2d 442 (2006). 
 
3 
Cameron.  Accordingly, we remand this case to the circuit court for entry of an order 
granting defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition on the basis of the one-year-
back rule. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In June 1977, then 17-year-old plaintiff, Doreen Joseph, was involved in an 
automobile accident in which she suffered traumatic brain injury and quadriplegia.  At 
the time of the accident, plaintiff had automobile insurance coverage through the Detroit 
Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, defendant’s predecessor.  Defendant later 
assumed responsibility for paying plaintiff’s personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits.  
Since the date of plaintiff’s injury, defendant has paid more than $4 million in PIP 
benefits for plaintiff’s care. 
On February 27, 2009, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking additional PIP benefits 
for allegedly unpaid case-management services provided by plaintiff’s family members.  
The period for which plaintiff seeks recovery dates back to the date of plaintiff’s accident 
in 1977.  Defendant moved for partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR 
2.116(C)(10), arguing that the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) barred plaintiff’s 
claim with respect to benefits sought for any period more than one year before the 
February 27, 2009, commencement date of plaintiff’s action.  Plaintiff responded that her 
“insanity” over the past 32 years had operated to toll the one-year-back rule pursuant to 
the minority/insanity tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1). 4
                                              
4 The circuit court held that there exists a question of fact regarding whether plaintiff is 
“insane” for purposes of MCL 600.5851(1).  That determination is not at issue in this 
appeal. 
 
 
4 
The circuit court denied defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition, citing 
Regents for the proposition that the minority/insanity tolling provision tolls the one-year-
back rule and, thus, if plaintiff is determined to be “insane,” her recovery will not be 
limited to the year immediately preceding the filing of her complaint.  Defendant filed an 
interlocutory application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals and then filed a 
bypass application for leave to appeal in this Court, arguing that the minority/insanity 
tolling provision does not apply to the one-year-back rule and that Regents was wrongly 
decided.  We entered orders staying the circuit court proceedings5 and granting 
defendant’s bypass application to consider whether Regents was correctly decided.6
 
This Court reviews de novo a circuit court’s decision whether to grant or deny 
summary disposition.
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
7  Similarly, we review de novo issues of statutory interpretation as 
questions of law.8  Our primary goal when interpreting statutes is to discern the intent of 
the Legislature.9  To do so, we focus on the best indicator of that intent, the language of 
the statute itself.10
                                              
5 Joseph v ACIA, 802 NW2d 351 (Mich, 2011).  
 
6 Joseph v ACIA, 489 Mich 924 (2011). 
7 Nastal v Henderson & Assoc Investigations, Inc, 471 Mich 712, 720; 691 NW2d 1 
(2005). 
8 Id. 
 
9 Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). 
 
10 Id. 
  The words used by the Legislature are given their common and 
 
 
5 
ordinary meaning.11  If the statutory language is unambiguous, we presume that the 
Legislature intended the meaning that it clearly expressed, and further construction is 
neither required nor permitted.12
Defendant moved for partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).  
Because a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint, 
the circuit court must consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and 
other evidence submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion.
 
13  If the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine 
issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.14
                                              
 
11 MCL 8.3a; Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 160; 645 NW2d 643 
(2002). 
 
12 Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999). 
 
13 Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). 
14 MCR 2.116(C)(10) and (G)(4); Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 
NW2d 314 (1996). 
 
 
6 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  THE ONE-YEAR-BACK RULE AND THE MINORITY/INSANITY 
TOLLING PROVISION 
This case requires that we again interpret the limitations on recovery of PIP 
benefits set forth in the no-fault act.  The relevant statutory provision of the no-fault act, 
MCL 500.3145(1), provides in pertinent part: 
 
An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits 
payable under this chapter for accidental bodily injury may not be 
commenced later than 1 year after the date of the accident causing the 
injury unless written notice of injury as provided herein has been given to 
the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless the insurer has 
previously made a payment of personal protection insurance benefits for the 
injury. If the notice has been given or a payment has been made, the action 
may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent 
allowable expense, work loss or survivor’s loss has been incurred. 
However, the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss 
incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was 
commenced.[15
As early as 1984, this Court explained that this statutory provision contains 
separate and distinct limitations periods that relate both to the timing in which an action 
may be brought and the damages that may be recovered.
] 
16
contains two limitations on the time for filing suit and one limitation on the 
period for which benefits may be recovered: 
 
  Specifically, we have noted 
that MCL 500.3145(1)  
“(1) An action for personal protection insurance [PIP] benefits must 
be commenced not later than one year after the date of accident, unless the 
                                              
15 Emphasis added. 
16 Welton v Carriers Ins Co, 421 Mich 571, 576; 365 NW2d 170 (1984). 
 
7 
insured gives written notice of injury or the insurer previously paid [PIP] 
benefits for the injury. 
 
“(2) If notice has been given or payment has been made, the action 
may be commenced at any time within one year after the most recent loss 
was incurred. 
 
“(3) Recovery is limited to losses incurred during the one year 
preceding commencement of the action.”[17
although a no-fault action to recover PIP benefits may be filed more than 
one year after the accident and more than one year after a particular loss has 
been incurred (provided that notice of injury has been given to the insurer 
or the insurer has previously paid PIP benefits for the injury), § 3145(1) 
nevertheless limits recovery in that action to those losses incurred within 
the one year preceding the filing of the action.[
] 
Accordingly, a person filing a claim for PIP benefits must do so within a year of the 
accident unless the insured gives written notice of injury or previously received PIP 
benefits from the insurer.  If notice was given or payment was made, the action can be 
commenced within one year of the most recent loss.  In any case, though, recovery is 
limited only to losses that have been incurred during the year before the filing of the 
action. 
The final limitation provided in MCL 500.3145(1) is the limitation on damages 
known as the one-year-back rule.  In Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, we discussed the 
significance of the legislative distinction between statutes of limitations and provisions 
that limit damages, noting that 
18
                                              
17 Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 574; 702 NW2d 539 (2005), quoting 
Welton, 421 Mich at 576. 
18 Devillers, 473 Mich at 574; see also Howard v Gen Motors Corp, 427 Mich 358, 385-
387; 399 NW2d 10 (1986) (opinion by BRICKLEY, J.). 
] 
 
8 
Our Legislature has also independently established, in the Revised Judicature Act 
(RJA),19 a general tolling provision in order to aid those who are minors or legally 
insane.  The minority/insanity tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1) extends the time for 
filing suit by tolling an otherwise applicable statute of limitations.20
Notably, by its unambiguous terms, this provision concerns when a minor or person 
suffering from insanity may “make the entry or bring the action,” and the provision is 
entirely silent with regard to the amount of damages recoverable once an action has been 
brought.
  MCL 600.5851(1) 
provides in relevant part: 
[I]f the person first entitled to make an entry or bring an action under 
this act is under 18 years of age or insane at the time the claim accrues, the 
person or those claiming under the person shall have 1 year after the 
disability is removed through death or otherwise, to make the entry or bring 
the action although the period of limitations has run. 
21
 
We first considered the interplay between the one-year-back rule and the 
minority/insanity tolling provision in Cameron.
 
B.  CAMERON AND ITS PROGENY 
22
                                              
19 MCL 600.101 et seq. 
20 See Lambert v Calhoun, 394 Mich 179, 181, 192; 229 NW2d 332 (1975). 
21 This is a point that is only relevant to statutes like the no-fault act that contain a unique 
one-year-back rule, which limits the right of recovery to damages incurred during the 
year before commencement of the action. 
22 Cameron, 476 Mich 55. 
  In Cameron, the plaintiffs’ minor son 
sustained a closed head injury when an automobile struck his bicycle in 1996.  Six years 
 
9 
later, in 2002, the plaintiffs filed suit against their no-fault insurer to recover PIP benefits 
for attendant-care services rendered from 1996 to 1999.  The plaintiffs argued that the 
minority/insanity tolling provision applied to toll the one-year-back rule, rendering 
recoverable the losses incurred between 1996 and 1999.  We disagreed, holding that the 
minority/insanity tolling provision does not operate to toll the one-year-back rule.  We 
explained in Cameron: 
By its unambiguous terms, MCL 600.5851(1) concerns when a 
minor or person suffering from insanity may “make the entry or bring the 
action.”  It does not pertain to the damages recoverable once an action has 
been brought.  MCL 600.5851(1) then is irrelevant to the damages-limiting 
one-year-back provision of MCL 500.3145(1).[23
the minority/insanity tolling provision in MCL 600.5851(1), by its plain 
terms, only addresses when an action may be brought.  Therefore, it does 
not apply to toll the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) because that 
provision does not concern when an action may be brought but, instead, 
limits the amount of PIP benefits a person injured in an automobile accident 
may recover.[
] 
That is, 
24
 
In reaching this conclusion, we overruled the Court of Appeals’ decision in Geiger 
v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch,
] 
25 which held that MCL 600.5851(1) applies to toll the one-
year-back rule.26
                                              
23 Id. at 62. 
24 Id. at 72. 
25 Geiger v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch,114 Mich App 283; 318 NW2d 833 (1982). 
  The Geiger panel reasoned that reading the statute in a contrary fashion 
26 By overruling Geiger, the dissent contends that “the Cameron majority upended 25 
years of settled law . . . .”  Post at 2.  Aside from the fact that such “settled law” was a 
Court of Appeals decision and thus not binding on this Court, the dissent disregards the 
fundamental principle that not all precedents are deserving of equal respect. Geiger 
 
 
10 
would “severely limit the utility” of the minority/insanity tolling provision “and could 
deprive a person of benefits to which he would otherwise be rightfully entitled.”27
[W]e must assume that the thing the Legislature wants is best 
understood by reading what it said. Because what was said in MCL 
500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1) is clear, no less clear is the policy. 
Damages are only allowed for one year back from the date the lawsuit is 
filed. We are enforcing the statutes as written.  While some may question 
the wisdom of the Legislature’s capping damages in this fashion, it is 
unquestionably a power that the Legislature has under our Constitution.[
  This 
Court held that Geiger’s conclusion was not supported by the statutory texts and 
contravened the Legislature’s unambiguous directives, compelling its overruling.  As 
Cameron explained: 
28
                                              
ignored the clear and unambiguous language of MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1) 
and was, instead, grounded on its own speculative policy considerations.  Because 
Cameron closely analyzed the actual statutory language and did not allow policy 
considerations to dictate the result, it is simply deserving of more regard.  Thus, Cameron 
did not “upend 25 years of settled law”; stated in more accurate terms, the Cameron 
majority was compelled to overrule nonbinding precedent premised on a faulty legal 
analysis. 
Contrary to the dissent, our conclusion that Cameron is “better reasoned” is not an 
altogether subjective determination.  Instead, it is based on a straightforward reading of 
both Cameron and Geiger, which, even the dissent can hardly deny, would lead almost 
any reader to conclude that Cameron is focused principally on the statutory language in 
dispute, while Geiger is focused principally on policy considerations.  Because such 
statutory language constitutes the best indicator of legislative intent, we believe that 
Cameron is “better reasoned.”  Although we appreciate that our dissenting colleagues are 
free to disagree with this assessment, judgments nonetheless must be made.  And we have 
sought to exercise our own best judgment in assessing the precedents before us.   
27 Geiger, 114 Mich App at 291. 
28 Cameron, 476 Mich at 63 (citation omitted). 
] 
 
11 
 
After our decision in Cameron, the Court of Appeals in Liptow29 applied 
Cameron’s reasoning to hold that separate tolling provisions for state political 
subdivisions30 do not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule.  The panel 
reasoned that the plain statutory text of MCL 600.5821(4) indicates that the Legislature 
intended to exempt the state from statutes of limitations when bringing an action to 
recover public funds.  As in Cameron, the Court recognized that the one-year-back rule is 
not a statute of limitations, but a damages-limiting provision.  Accordingly, because 
MCL 600.5821(4) does not address damages limitations, the Court of Appeals 
determined that it has no effect on the one-year-back rule.31
Four years after Cameron and Liptow, in Regents, this Court again considered 
whether a saving provision tolling a statute of limitations similarly tolls the one-year-
  Thus, Liptow held that while 
a political subdivision may bring an action at any time pursuant to MCL 600.5821(4), it 
cannot recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than one year before the 
date on which the action was commenced. 
C.  REGENTS 
                                              
29 Liptow, 272 Mich App 544. 
30 See MCL 600.5821(4), which provides in pertinent part: 
Actions brought in the name of . . . any political subdivision of the 
state of Michigan . . . for the recovery of the cost of maintenance, care, and 
treatment of persons in hospitals . . . are not subject to the statute of 
limitations and may be brought at any time without limitation, the 
provisions of any statute notwithstanding.  [Emphasis added.] 
31 Liptow, 272 Mich App at 555-556. 
 
12 
back rule.32  In Regents, the plaintiffs brought an action seeking payment from the 
defendant insurer for the full cost of medical treatment provided to the defendant’s 
insured who had been treated at the university’s hospital following an automobile 
accident.  The circuit court held that the one-year-back rule barred the plaintiffs from 
recovering any portion of the loss incurred more than one year before commencement of 
the action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  In a narrowly divided decision, this Court 
reversed the decisions of the lower courts and overruled the recent decisions in Cameron 
and Liptow, holding, in part, that the minority/insanity tolling provision does, in fact, toll 
the one-year-back rule.  The Regents Court, essentially adopting the dissenting position 
from Cameron, held that “the ‘action’ and ‘claim’ preserved by [the minority/insanity 
tolling provision] include the right to collect damages” because “the right to bring an 
action would be a hollow one indeed if a plaintiff could not recover damages.”33
Three justices strongly dissented from the decision to overrule Cameron and erase 
the long-recognized distinction between statutes of limitations and the damages-limiting 
  
According to Regents, the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) is inapplicable to a 
statute that preserves a plaintiff’s right to bring an action.  That is, because MCL 
600.5851(1) preserves the rights of minors and insane persons by granting them one year 
after their disabilities have been removed to bring their civil actions, MCL 600.5851(1) 
precludes application of the one-year-back rule. 
                                              
32 Regents, 487 Mich 289. 
33 Id. at 299. 
 
13 
provision of the no-fault statute.  The dissenting justices explained that because the one-
year-back rule “serves only as a limitation on the recovery of benefits” and “does not 
define a period within which a claimant may file a cause of action,” the one-year-back 
rule “lies outside the scope of what is affected by the RJA’s minority/insanity tolling 
provision.”34  By holding to the contrary, the dissenting justices concluded that the 
majority had failed to enforce as written the unambiguous language of the one-year-back 
rule, and had attempted instead to “discern the purpose of the statute from something 
other than its actual language.”35
We believe that the ruling in Regents was erroneous for the simple reason that the 
statutory texts of MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1) plainly do not support it.  
MCL 600.5851(1) gives minors and insane persons one year after the removal of their 
disabilities “to make the entry or bring the action.”  By its very terms, the 
minority/insanity tolling provision is a timing mechanism specifying when a minor or 
insane person may bring his or her claim; it places no limitation on, and makes no 
reference to, the amount of damages that can be recovered after the action has been 
brought.  The one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1), on the other hand, forecloses a 
claimant from recovering “benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year 
before the date on which the action was commenced.”  By its very terms, then, the one-
 
D.  REGENTS WAS WRONGLY DECIDED 
                                              
34 Id. at 333 (MARKMAN, J., dissenting). 
35 Id. at 336. 
 
14 
year-back rule is a damages-limiting provision because it limits a claimant’s recovery to 
those losses incurred during the year before the filing of the action.   
By concluding that the minority/insanity tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1) 
operates to toll the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1), Regents failed to recognize 
the critical distinction between having the general right to commence an action and the 
limitation on the right to recover no-fault benefits for losses occurring more than one year 
before the filing of the action.  Indeed, Regents impermissibly interpreted the phrase 
“bring the action” in MCL 600.5851(1) as conferring on a claimant the right to “bring the 
action and recover an unlimited amount of damages,” an interpretation which cannot be 
extracted from the plain and unambiguous statutory text.  The dissenting justices in 
Regents recognized this distinction, contrasting the one-year-back rule, which provides 
that the claimant “may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 
1 year before the date on which the action was commenced,” with MCL 600.5821(4), 
which provides that an action by the state or one of its political subdivisions “may be 
brought at any time without limitation.”  The dissenting justices in Regents properly 
observed: 
[W]hen these two provisions are read together, it is clear that while a 
political subdivision may bring an action at any time, it cannot recover 
benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the 
date on which the action was commenced. In other words, MCL 
600.5821(4), which pertains only to when an action may be commenced, 
does not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule, which only 
limits how much can be recovered after the action has been commenced.[36
                                              
36 Id. at 339. 
] 
 
15 
This interpretation is merely an extension of the same legal rationale applied in Cameron, 
in which the Court distinguished the plain language of the one-year-back rule from the 
plain language of the minority/insanity tolling provision. 
Again, the rules of statutory interpretation mandate that we give effect to the 
Legislature’s intent, relying on the plain language of the no-fault statute itself.  If the 
statutory language is unambiguous, we must presume that the Legislature intended the 
meaning it clearly expressed and further construction is neither required nor permitted.37
Application of the Regents Court’s interpretation of the one-year-back rule to this 
case illustrates how that decision defeats the very purpose of the rule.  Under Regents, 
plaintiff would be permitted to recover PIP benefits for those losses incurred during the 
32 years predating the filing of her action on February 27, 2009, in addition to those 
  
As is evident from its holding, the interpretation advanced by Regents superseded the 
Legislature’s explicit intent that recovery of PIP benefits be limited to losses incurred 
within one year before the date on which an action is filed.  The statutory provision 
containing the one-year-back rule employs plain, clear, and simple language.  The 
minority/insanity tolling provision sets forth an equally simple concept, tolling the time 
in which an action may be commenced after a person’s disability is removed.  This 
tolling provision, however, is silent regarding the amount of damages a claimant may 
recover and, accordingly, there is no support for the conclusion that that minority/insanity 
tolling statute precludes application of the no-fault act’s one-year-back rule.  Because 
Regents reached such a conclusion, it was wrongly decided. 
                                              
37 Sun Valley Foods, 460 Mich at 236. 
 
16 
losses incurred after that date and continuing for the remainder of her life.  Permitting 
recovery in that manner ignores the plain language of the one-year-back rule, which 
limits plaintiff’s recovery to those losses incurred within one year before February 27, 
2009, while still allowing additional recovery for all losses incurred after that date.  
Although the minority/insanity tolling provision may certainly toll myriad statutory 
provisions that contain a statute of limitations, it cannot toll the one-year-back rule of 
MCL 500.3145(1) because the one-year-back rule is not a statute of limitations in that it 
does not limit the period of time within which a claimant may file an action; rather, the 
one-year-back rule places a limitation on the amount of damages a claimant is entitled to 
recover.  Furthermore, the one-year-back rule does not serve those purposes typically 
associated with a statute of limitations because it does not operate to cut off a claim or 
bar the action or the recovery; it simply limits the compensation available to the 
claimant.38
                                              
38 The dissent characterizes our interpretation of MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 
600.5851(1) as “tend[ing] toward the absurd.”  Post at 4. 
There is no need for this Court to address the “absurd results” doctrine in this case 
because there is simply no result here that is absurd.  Indeed, the dissent’s argument that 
this construction produces an absurd result was fully considered and rejected in Cameron.  
As reiterated by the dissenting justices in Regents, “‘[i]n choosing to make no-fault 
insurance compulsory for all motorists, the Legislature has made the registration and 
operation of a motor vehicle inexorably dependent on whether no-fault insurance is 
available at fair and equitable rates.’”  Regents, 487 Mich 346-347, (MARKMAN, J., 
dissenting), quoting Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 599; 267 NW2d 72 
(1978) (alteration in original).  It therefore bears repeating that it is certainly quite 
possible that in a system that provides mandatory unlimited lifetime benefits, the 
Legislature intended to impose a limitation on recovery of no-fault benefits in order to 
make no-fault insurance affordable.  This limitation is not only sensible, but necessary for 
the survival of no-fault system. 
  Because the no-fault act’s one-year-back rule and the RJA’s 
 
 
17 
minority/insanity tolling provision serve manifestly different purposes and function 
independently of each other, the one-year-back rule is not the subject of tolling under the 
minority/insanity tolling provision.  And this proper interpretation comports both with the 
plain language of the statute and the legislative purpose of keeping insurance premiums 
at affordable rates while providing victims of motor vehicle accidents assured, adequate, 
and prompt reparation for certain economic losses.39
Having concluded that Regents was wrongly decided, we must decide whether 
stare decisis nevertheless compels our adherence to its holding.  The test for determining 
whether stare decisis compels the continued adherence to a precedent is set forth in 
Robinson v Detroit
  
E.  STARE DECISIS 
40
                                              
Insofar as the dissent asserts that it “defies common sense” to think “[t]hat the 
Legislature wanted to grant a minor or insane person the right to prove his or her 
damages in a court of law while lacking any opportunity to be awarded them,” post at 4, 
we note that the statutory language plainly does not confer on a claimant a right to prove 
and recover an unlimited amount of damages.  Instead, the plain language merely confers 
a right, under certain circumstances, to bring an action despite the period of limitations 
having expired.  The dissent utterly fails to recognize that the one-year-back rule does not 
operate to preclude a claimant from recovering any damages; rather, a claimant will find 
himself or herself without any recovery as a result of the one-year-back rule’s operation 
only if the claimant has not suffered any losses within the one year immediately 
preceding the filing of the action.  Contrary to the dissent, “that this result will occur 
‘only’ in some circumstances,” post at 4 n 11, hardly constitutes our only response to its 
claim of “absurdity.”  As previously explained, it is possible that the Legislature chose to 
impose a limitation on the recovery of no-fault benefits to ensure the financial integrity of 
the no-fault system.  See also Regents, 487 Mich at 346-347 (MARKMAN, J. dissenting). 
39 See, e.g., Tebo v Havlik, 418 Mich 350, 366; 343 NW2d 181 (1984); Celina Mut Ins 
Co v Lake States Ins Co, 452 Mich 84, 89; 549 NW2d 834 (1996); O’Donnell v State 
Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 404 Mich 524, 547; 273 NW2d 829 (1979). 
 and calls for us to examine, among other factors, “(a) whether the 
40 Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 464-468; 613 NW2d 307 (2000). 
 
18 
earlier decision was wrongly decided, and (b) whether overruling such decision would 
work an undue hardship because of reliance interests or expectations that have arisen.”41
With regard to reliance interests, “the Court must ask whether the previous 
decision has become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone’s 
expectations that to change it would produce not just readjustments, but practical real-
world dislocations.”
 
 
First, as discussed previously, Regents was wrongly decided for the simple reason 
that it ignored the Legislature’s clear and unambiguous directives in MCL 500.3145(1) 
and MCL 600.5851(1) by failing to enforce these statutory provisions as written.  Rather 
than grounding its analysis on the proper and historically accepted interpretation of the 
one-year-back rule, the Regents decision appears to have focused on the majority’s 
concern that a plaintiff allowed to bring a suit under the minor/insanity tolling provision 
would be precluded by the one-year-back rule from recovering all the damages that might 
otherwise be permitted outside the no-fault context.  However, it is the Legislature’s 
enactment of the no-fault act’s one-year-back rule that operates to limit the recovery of 
damages incurred more than one year before an action is commenced, not our 
interpretation of the minority/insanity tolling provision.     
42
                                              
41 Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732, 757; 641 NW2d 567 (2002), citing 
Robinson, 462 Mich at 464-468; see also Mitchell v W T Grant Co, 416 US 600, 627-628; 
94 S Ct 1895; 40 L Ed 2d 406 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 
42 Robinson, 462 Mich at 466. 
  In discussing this factor, the Regents Court explained: “Cameron 
is of recent vintage, having been decided a mere four years ago.  Hence, reliance on its 
 
19 
holding has been of limited duration.”43  Regents is of even more recent vintage than was 
Cameron, having been decided a mere 21 months ago.  Certainly, Regents has not 
“become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone’s expectations that to 
change it would produce . . . practical real-world dislocations”44 such that reliance 
interests will be disrupted.  While we view the duration of a decision from this Court as 
important, we believe the foremost indicator that reliance interests weigh in favor of 
overruling Regents is the plain language of the statutes because it is the unambiguous 
statutory text that guides the citizenry and their behavior.  “This is the essence of the rule 
of law: to know in advance what the rules of society are.”45
[I]f the words of the statute are clear, the actor should be able to 
expect, that is, rely, that they will be carried out by all in society, including 
the courts.  In fact, should a court confound those legitimate citizen 
expectations by misreading or misconstruing a statute, it is that court itself 
that has disrupted the reliance interest.  When that happens, a subsequent 
court, rather than holding to the distorted reading because of the doctrine of 
stare decisis, should overrule the earlier court’s misconstruction.  The 
reason for this is that the court in distorting the statute was engaged in a 
form of judicial usurpation that runs counter to the bedrock principle of 
American constitutionalism, i.e., that the lawmaking power is reposed in 
the people as reflected in the work of the Legislature, and, absent a 
constitutional violation, the courts have no legitimacy in overruling or 
nullifying the people’s representatives.[
  As we have explained: 
46
                                              
43 Regents, 487 Mich at 305. 
44 Robinson, 462 Mich at 466. 
45 Id. at 467. 
46 Id. 
] 
 
20 
 
Because Regents strayed considerably from the statutory language, it undermined 
the reliance interest that the people of this state have with regard to that language and 
with regard to a Court that is committed to upholding such language.  As a result, it is this 
Court’s duty to restore such reliance interests by restoring the law to mean what its 
language plainly states—a no-fault “claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of 
the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was 
commenced.”47
 
The one-year-back rule codifies an integral part of the legislative compromise that 
is the no-fault act, and invalidating that compromise will threaten the continued fiscal 
soundness of our no-fault system.  Given that Michigan is the only state with a no-fault 
automobile-injury reparations scheme with mandatory, unlimited, lifetime medical 
benefits, the Legislature adopted a unique approach to defining the temporal limitations 
for filing suit without allowing open-ended liability or time-barring claims before they 
accrue.  The Legislature addressed this problem by enacting the one-year-back rule, 
which limits recovery to losses incurred within one year before suit was filed.  Thus, the 
creation of MCL 500.3145(1) was the Legislature’s reasonable and simple approach to 
resolving the problem of allowing a reasonable amount of time for pursuing a claim while 
protecting the fiscal integrity of the no-fault system.  However, under the Regents 
interpretation of the one-year-back rule, not only is a claimant permitted to recover those 
losses incurred after the date on which the action was filed, but recovery also extends to 
those losses incurred any number of years before the filing date.  Permitting a claimant to 
 
                                              
47 MCL 500.3145(1). 
 
21 
recover all losses incurred both before and after an action is filed, without any limitation, 
would nullify this legislative compromise and render the no-fault system unsustainable. 
 
For these reasons, we overrule Regents and “return the law, as is our duty, to what 
we believe the citizens of this state reading these statutes at the time of enactment would 
have understood [them] to mean.”48
In this case, plaintiff filed her complaint on February 27, 2009, seeking recovery 
of PIP benefits for losses dating back 32 years.  While plaintiff contends that, in light of 
her alleged insanity, the minority/insanity tolling provision tolls the one-year-back rule, 
rendering any losses incurred from the date of plaintiff’s 1977 accident recoverable, we 
conclude otherwise.  The minority/insanity tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1), which 
concerns when an action may be commenced, does not render inoperable the one-year-
back rule, which only limits how much can be recovered after the action has been 
  We are mindful of the importance of stability and 
continuity in the law and approach with great caution a decision to overrule precedent, 
but to allow the interpretation of MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1) set forth in 
Regents to stand would result in the endorsement of a decision that utterly failed to 
enforce the requirements of the very statutes it purported to interpret. 
Because the plain and unambiguous language of MCL 500.3145(1) can only be 
interpreted as limiting the amount of PIP benefits recoverable to those losses incurred 
within one year before the date the lawsuit is filed, which was the same interpretation 
advanced by the Cameron majority, we reinstate our previous decision in Cameron. 
F.  APPLICATION 
                                              
48 Robinson, 462 Mich at 468. 
 
22 
commenced.  Consequently, the one-year-back rule does not fall within the purview of 
what is intended to be tolled by the minority/insanity tolling provision.  Accordingly, 
plaintiff’s recovery is limited to losses incurred on or after February 27, 2008. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The minority/insanity tolling provision in MCL 600.5851(1) does not apply to toll 
the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) because the one-year-back rule is a damages-
limiting provision and does not concern when an action may be brought.  These two, 
distinct statutory provisions serve different purposes and by their express language 
operate separately.  Because the decision in Regents ignored the plain statutory directive, 
it is hereby overruled and Cameron is reinstated.49
                                              
49 The Regents Court overruled Liptow on the sole basis that it relied on Cameron.  
Because Cameron has now been reinstated, the justification for overruling Liptow is no 
longer controlling law. 
  Accordingly, we reverse the decision 
of the circuit court denying defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition and 
remand this case to that court for entry of partial summary disposition in defendant’s 
favor. 
 
 
Mary Beth Kelly 
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
 
DOREEN JOSEPH, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 142615 
 
AUTO CLUB INSURANCE 
ASSOCIATION, a/k/a A.C.I.A., 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
MARILYN KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
 
Today’s decision is this Court’s third ruling on the same issue in six years.  Yet 
nothing accounts for its going back and forth on the issue—no new or revised legislation 
or social upheaval—except changes in the composition of the Court itself.   
 
The majority overrules Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins Co1 and reinstates the 
rule from Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass’n.2  Cameron changed 25 years of settled law3
                                              
1 Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins Co, 487 Mich 289; 791 NW2d 897 (2010). 
2 Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 476 Mich 55; 718 NW2d 784 (2006). 
 
and held that the saving provision in MCL 600.5851(1) for minors and insane persons 
does not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1).  I 
authored the majority opinion in Regents and continue to believe that it correctly decided 
this issue.  Thus, I would reaffirm our decision in Regents and respectfully deplore its 
demise. 
3 See Geiger v DAIIE, 114 Mich App 283; 318 NW2d 833 (1982). 
 
2 
 
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, MCL 600.5851(1) is not “entirely silent 
with regard to the amount of damages recoverable once an action has been brought.”4
 
MCL 600.5851(1) does not create its own independent cause of 
action.  It must be read together with the statute under which the plaintiff 
seeks to recover.  In no-fault cases, for example, MCL 600.5851(1) must be 
read together with MCL 500.3145(1).  Doing so, the statutes grant infants 
and incompetent persons one year after their disability is removed to “bring 
the action” “for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits . . . for 
accidental bodily injury . . . .”  On the basis of its language, MCL 
600.5851(1) supersedes all limitations in MCL 500.3145(1), including the 
one-year-back rule’s limitation on the period of recovery.[
  
Rather, as I stated in Regents: 
5
 
The majority correctly asserts that our decisions predating Cameron recognized 
that MCL 500.3145(1) contains two limitations on the time for filing suit and one 
limitation on the period of recovery.
]    
6
 
The significant point is that Cameron was the first decision in which this Court 
recognized the distinction between the limitations in MCL 500.3145(1) and applied them 
differently.  In so doing, the Cameron majority upended 25 years of settled law and drew 
a distinction that even the defendant did not initially ask it to draw.
  It attempts to use that uncontroversial point, 
however, to characterize Cameron as an uncontroversial, predetermined, and 
straightforward application of our precedent.  The characterization is inaccurate.   
7
                                              
4 Ante at 8. 
5 Regents, 487 Mich at 298. 
6 See ante at 6-7, citing Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 574; 702 NW2d 
539 (2005), and Welton v Carrier Ins Co, 421 Mich 571, 576; 365 NW2d 170 (1984). 
  These simple facts 
7 See Cameron, 476 Mich at 88-90 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting) (noting that the defendant 
initially argued that MCL 600.5851(1) should not apply to any of the limitations in MCL 
 
 
3 
call into doubt the majority’s contentions that Cameron was “compelled to overrule 
nonbinding precedent”8 and that Regents “ignored the Legislature’s clear and 
unambiguous directive[] in MCL 500.3145(1) . . . .”9
                                              
500.3145(1), but that the defendant eventually devised the alternative argument that, even 
though MCL 600.5851(1) saved the plaintiff’s right to file suit, the one-year-back rule 
nevertheless prevented the plaintiff from recovering any damages that were incurred 
more than a year before the date of filing suit). 
8 Ante at 10 n 26.  The majority also repeats a theme originating from Justice 
MARKMAN’s concurrence in Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197, 226; 
731 NW2d 41 (2007) (MARKMAN, J., concurring), that “not all precedents are built alike” 
because some are “better reasoned.”  See ante at 9 n 26.  I have no doubt the majority 
believes that all of its decisions overruling previous cases are better reasoned than its 
predecessors’; otherwise, overruling those cases would seem foolish indeed.  But any 
establishment of a hierarchy of precedents is inherently flawed because whether one 
decision is better reasoned than another is “undoubtedly in the eye of the beholder.”  
Regents, 487 Mich at 303 n 28.  Given the subjective nature of this “better reasoned” 
inquiry, such an approach would serve no purpose other than to shield the majority’s 
allegedly better-reasoned precedents from scrutiny.   
 
The majority claims that this inquiry is not subjective because, given that 
Cameron focused principally on the statute’s language, not “policy considerations,” it is 
objectively “better reasoned” than Geiger.  Even accepting the majority’s 
characterization, this assertion is flawed.  An objective person reading an absurd decision 
that is based on a seriously strained reading of statutory language (Cameron) might 
reasonably find a contrary decision primarily focused on “policy considerations” (Geiger) 
to be “better reasoned.”  The majority’s disdain for policy considerations in favor of a 
focus on statutory language that it inevitably determines is “clear and unambiguous”—
even when it is not—does not an objective determination make. 
Finally, it appears that, unlike the majority, the Legislature did not consider 
Geiger to be “premised on a faulty legal analysis.”  Ante at 10 n 26.  It did not supersede 
Geiger by amending the applicable statutes from 1982 to 2006. 
9 Ante at 18. 
  If the Legislature’s directive were 
truly so clear and unambiguous, why did the prevailing interpretation of MCL 
500.3145(1) go unchallenged for nearly 25 years?   
 
4 
 
As observed by the dissenting opinions in Cameron, the majority’s interpretation 
of MCL 600.5851(1) and MCL 500.3145(1) in Cameron and this case tends toward the 
absurd.10  That the Legislature wanted to grant a minor or insane person the right to prove 
his or her damages in a court of law while lacking any opportunity to be awarded them 
defies common sense.  Yet under the Cameron regime restored today, many claims 
supposedly “saved” by MCL 600.5851(1) will be disposed of in precisely that fashion.11
                                              
10 Cameron, 476 Mich at 103 n 12 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting); id. at 109-130 (KELLY, J., 
dissenting). 
11 The majority’s response to this obvious absurdity is that it will “only” occur if the 
injured person has suffered no losses in the year preceding the filing of the action.  The 
majority’s speculation that this result will occur “only” in some circumstances does 
nothing to undercut its absurdity.  And it will provide cold comfort for those caught in 
this judicially created trap. 
  
This result creates a false promise.  I cannot conclude that the Legislature intended such a 
promise. 
 
I dissent from the majority’s decision to overrule Regents and reinstate the rule 
from Cameron that MCL 600.5851(1) does not preclude application of the one-year-back 
rule in MCL 500.3145(1).  I would hold that MCL 600.5851(1) saves a minor or insane 
person’s “claim,” which includes the right to recover all of his or her personal protection 
insurance benefits.  
 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
 
Diane M. Hathaway