Case Title: State v. Kanekoa

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW LIBRARY

‘seen FOR PUBLICATION***

No. 26783
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T
a
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee

HUBERT KANEKOR, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant

er
el

 

 

oats

 

 

 

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEOIATE couRT oF APREAES gy
(CR. NO, 04=1-1122) ae oS
BE os
a8 S
weyORANoU m — 8
Moon, C-d-, Levinson, Nakayama, “} = &
‘eoba, and Duffy, 33.)
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Hubert Kanekca

(Petitioner) filed an application for writ of certiorari’

January 27, 2006, requesting that this court review the
December 28, 2005 Summary Disposition Order (SDO) of the

Intermediate Court of Appeals (the ICA),? affirming the

2 pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 602-59 (1993 & Supp.
2 the decision of the Intermediate Court of Appeals
‘Bee HRS

2008), a party may appe
iithy' onty by an application to thie court fora writ of certiorarl.
Tn determining whether £0 accept er reject the application for

5 602-5814).
crit of eetisorert, this court reviews the ICA decision for:

 

 

(2) grave errors of law of of fact, or (2) obvious
intossistencies in the decision of the intermediate
appellate court with thet of the supreme court, federal
aeEicigns, or its om decision, and the magnitude of such
Grrors or inconsistencies dictating the need for further

 

appeal.
ns § 602-59(b). The grant or denial of a petition for certiorari ss
Glsctetionary with this court. See HRS § 602-59(a)

2 the Sunmaty Disposition Order was issued by Chief Judge James 8.
burns and Associate Judges John §,#. Lim and Daniel R. Foley.

 
‘*+nor FOR PUBLICATION*#*
Auguat 17, 2004 judgment of the first circuit court (the court)”

convicting Petitioner of terroristic threatening in the second

degree, Hawai" Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 707-715(1) and -717(1)

(2993) .*
Pertinent facts from the answering brief of

Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai" (Respondent) are

as follows:

(Teddy chow (Chow)] and [Petitioner) were close
chitgnood fiends . .. « On April 27, 2004, Chow was
Sliving's forey-foot ‘tractor trailer to Kalua Longs to pick
Sp a “Boom section for a crane” for work... [Je saw
[Petstioner) driving in the opposite direction and waved to
Nines. [Petitioner] rolled den his window and said to
him, “oh, you think 1 scared of you? You think 1 scared of
your”

=. Chow... cbserved (Petitioner) execute “a U-
turn 4h the Siddle ¢"the intersection and begin to follow
hin towards Longe.” (Getitioner] drove erratically and
Sovertock cars to catch up to chow.” (aJe the entrance
of the Kailus Longs parking lot, (eetitioner) drove over =
Splanter box and pulled his vehicle along the left side of

 

 

> The Honorable Rhonda A. Nishimura presided.

4 agg  707-715(1) stetes in pertinent part that [a] person commits
the offense of terroristic threatening if the person threatens, by word or
EOheuct, te cause bodily injury to snother person... [w]ith the intent to

Of terrorizing, another

   

   

   

person(«)*

 

RS § 707-717 states as follow

(2) A person commits the offense of terroristic
threstening in the second degree if the person commits
ferroristic threatening other than as provided in section
yo7=316.

(2) Terroristic threatening in the second degree is a
misdemeanor:

ks § 707-716 entitled “rerroristic threatening in the first
degree," states that terroristic threstening in the first degree is committed,
inter alia, a= follows:
(a) By threatening another pereon on ore than one
edcasion for the sane or a similar purpose) oF
() Sy threats made in a common scheme against
aleferent persons; or

 

 

jai | faith the use of @ dangerous instrument.

 

2
sssNoT FOR PUBLICATION*#*

SSS

Chow's tratier about two feet away. . . . [Petitioner]
felled st Chow "at the top of his Lungs, ‘saying thet he's
Going to Kill Chom, and if not today, not tomorrow, within
She"next ten years Chow will be Gead-" (Petitioner!
Sppeared “very upset, very scary.” Chow felt threatened and
aitaids . « - [Petitioner] said, "You know what, call the
focking Cops; call the focking Cops if you Like.” Chow
Fesponded, why don’t you stick around, ‘they’ re probably on
Ehete way." “hen (Petitioner) “sured rubber ercund the
Corner and Leet.”

oe MGnow prepared] a written statement (for the
police.}”.,\. Chon testified thet he wrote in his statenent
Bhat [Petitioner] got cut of his truck and started yelling
ae {chow}. chow clarified that that part of his statenent
was not correct because (Petitioner) did not get out of his

 

 

 

 

Titi. os S"[respondent) rested. (Petitioner) moved for =
Sodgnent of acquittal ss.
[Petitioner]. -\. testified) in his own defense end

acknowledged that he came upon Chow at the Kailua Longs
parking let. (Petitioner) stated:

«ss Twas sn the middie of the intersection
when I'pulied in thinking that the rig was going to go
forward: He stopped and plant himself there and took
two sige of the Lane

wot Titeying for get ovt of the intersection,
0 1 don't’ make traffic of somebody hit my truck.

So] avosded that. T'wanted co know who was
driving the Fig. + + =

 

[Petitioner] claimed he did not realize that chow was the
Efiver ef the trailer until he pulled up to the side of it
Gnd saw Chow sitting in the trailer. [Petitioner] adnitted
that he Folled down his window with the intention of telling
Chon, “inst the fock you doing? No brains or something?”
Niowever, {Petitioner) claimed he did not say anything and
Gensed making any threats,

 

 

(Brackets omitted.)
Petitioner presents the following questions.

A. Did the Circuit Court err when it denied
[Petseicner's) ‘motion to dismiss at the close of
[Respondent's} case?

B.. Was (Respondent's) only witness impeached and
therefore unworthy of belief?

@. Did the Circuit Court err when it refused to give
the two Jury instructions which were requested by
[Petitioner]?

D. Was the jury's verdict was [sic] inconsistent with
any fair and impartial view of the evidence presented?

B. “Did [Respondent] fail to prove its case against
[Petitioner] beyond reasonable doubt?

F. Dig the Circuit Court err when it accepted the
jury's verdict and entered the final Judgment and sentence
SE the court?

 

 

(Capitalization omitted.)
‘see? FOR PUBLICATION***
1

There is merit in Petitioner’ s Question C.

With respect to Question C, Petitioner maintained that
instruction 17 given by the court, as opposed to his proposed
instructions 6 and 7 refused by the court, failed to convey the
“true threat” requirement. On appeal, “[wJhen jury instructions
or the omission thereof are at issue. . . , the standard of
review is whether, when read and considered as whole, the
instructions given are prejudicially insufficient, erroneous,
inconsistent, or misleading.” State v. French, 104 Hawai'i 89,
93, 85 F.3d 196, 200 (App. 2004).

Petitioner's proposed instruction no. 6 stated:

In @ terroristic threatening prosecution, the
prosecution aust prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
Fenark is a "true threat", as opposed to constitutionally
protected speech, such that the remark conveyed to the
Person to whom it was directed a gravity of purpose and
Uminent prospect of execution. In other words, (the)
prosecution must prove beyond a reascnable doubt that the
ELieSea threat wae ebjectively cepabie of insveing «|
Feasonable fear of bodily injury in the person at whom the
threst uss directed and who was aware of the circunstances
nder which the remarks were uttered. cate v, Valaivia, 95
Hawei't” 465, 476, 24 8.34 661, 672 12002)

 

 

 

Petitioner's proposed instruction no. 7 stated:

In a terroristic threatening prosecution, to
constitute a "true threat”, the alleged statenent must have
been objectively susceptible to inducing fear of bodily
ingury in a reasonable person at whom the threat was
directed and who was familiar with the circumstances under
Sich the throat was uttered in order to differentiate =
“true threat” from constitutionally protected free speech
state ve Valdivia, 98 Hawal'i 46s, 478, 26 P.3d 661, 673
Zo0ry

 

 

 

The court's instruction no. 17 stated:

Im the Complaint, [Petitioner] is charged with the
offense of Terroristic Threatening in the Second Degr

 
‘senor FOR PUBLICATION*#*
Sees

A person commits the offense of Terroristic
‘Threatening in the Second Degree if, with the intent to
Corrorize or in reckless disregard of the risk of
Eeerorseing another person, he threatens, by word or
Conduct, to cause bodily injury to thet person.

There aze two material elements to nis charge, each
of which the prosecution sust prove beyond a reasonable
Soube.

‘These two elenents are:

Te That on of about April 27, 200¢, in the City and

County of Honolulu, State of Hawail, that
TPetitioner] threatened, by word or’ conduct, to
Gouse bodily injury to [Chow] and
That [Petitioner] did so with the intent to
Torrorize or in feckless disregard of the risk
of terrorizing (Chow)

‘The threat on its face snd in the circumstances in
which It is'made suet be so unequivocal, unconditional,
“inediate, and specific as to the person threatened, 2s to
Srvey' gravity of purpose end an insinent prospect of

 

 

   

 

 

As to this issue, the ICA stated, “The [court] did not err when
it refused [Petitioner’s] proposed jury instruction . . . «
Valdivia, 95 Hawai'i at 475-76, 24 P.3d at 671-72." SDO at 2.
aA.

In his appeal, Petitioner maintained, inter alia, that
(2) “the court's . . . instruction no. 17 does not contain or
explain the words ‘true threat,’” (footnote and capitalization
omitted), and (2) “the words testified to by Chow, namely, “I'm
going to fucking kill you, okay. If not today, if not tomorrow,
within the next ten vears vou're going to be fucking dead{,]”
were “words of future intention, not of @ ‘true threat’ which
carried with it an ‘imminent prospect of execution.’ (Emphasis
in original.)

In response to this argument, Respondent maintained
simply that “(t]he jury was . . . properly instructed regarding

the requirement that the words attributed to (Petitioner)
‘*sNOT FOR PUBLICATION***

 

amounted to a ‘true threat,’ pursuant to Valdivia” and “Valdivia
does not require the additional ‘guidance’ . . . as proposed by
[Petitsoner.]” Respondent did not argue that any error with
respect to the court’s instruction was harmless error.

‘The court gave no further instructions as to a “true
threat” other than as set forth in instruction no. 17. However,
it was required to do so.

B.
In Valdivia, the circuit court gave essentially the

same instruction.

‘The circuit court, partially in accord with [state wv.
hung, 175 Haw. 398, 8€2 P.26 10€3 (1993),] instructed the
jury that, "eo constitute 4 threst punishable by law, the
Enreat on’ its face ana in the ciroumetances in which st is
‘must be so unequivocal, unconditional, smmediate(,) and
Specific as to the person threatened ae to convey a gravity

oF purpose.

 

 

 

95 Hawai'i at 478, 24 P.3d at 674 (brackets omitted). This court
said that such an instruction was insufficient and further advice

as to the nature of a “true threat” was mandated.

ihe tury thet Torus threat,”

directed x ar

Sous gostooriste lahausae recording “amminency. a
SAMS _sav that the tury as sufficiently instructed wish
(Tesbect to aif verentiating a “true threat” from

Taasmich as
Erroneous instructions afe_presusptively harmful, and st
Goes not affirmatively appear from the record ae\2 whole
that the error was not prejudicial~-in that there Le 2
Feasonable possibility that the error may have contributed
to Valdivia’s conviction of firet degree terroristic

 

 

 

 

 

+n Sts instruction as to the reckless state of mind, the circuit
court indicated it was not necessary that the complainant “actually
experience such an alarm for persenal safety, but that the person could have
‘experienced such an alarm.'* “Yaldivia, 95 Hawai's at 476, 24 P.3d at 674

6

  

 
‘s*aNOT FOR PUBLICATION*#*

threatening--, we must renand this matter for a new trial
with respect to" that offense.

‘Id. (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted) .
It should be noted that this court previously granted
certiorari and reversed the ICA’s decision in circumstances like

those presented in this case.

in his application, Martins’s sole contention is as
follows: "the ICA gravely erred in holding that the circuit
Court dig not plainly err in failing to instruct the jury on
the definition of a ‘true threat’ because the evidence of
Eetroristic threatening waz Neztins’ conduct of ‘eischaraing
his shotgun’ * oe

‘On Novesber 2, 2008, we granted certiorari in order
to clarify that, purcvant to (Valdivia) and [Chunal, the

 

Stas Sees SPs tae theese the tan
Sipe etre Muse tae ¢ 0e-s0(6) (15951 -Aecordingiy, we

Ti} reverse the Tech's opinion ae to sectich TIZ.B.,
{2} vacate the circuit court's March 1, 2002 judgnent of
Sonviction ae to the offense of terroristic threatening in
Efe’ second degree, and (3) remand this cage to the circuit
Court for retrisl on hat count

State vi Martins, 106 Hawai'i 136, 137-38, 102 P.3d 1034, 1035-36
(2004) (emphases added). Here the evidence of threats were as to
“remarks,” and the “necessity of a jury instruction defining a
‘true threat’ applie{d.]” Id, Accordingly, the ICA's
Decenber 28, 2005 SPO must be reversed, and the court's
August 17, 2004 judgment is vacated and the case remanded to the
court in accordance with this opinion.
1.
Because we remand the case for retrial, we observe the

following as to the other questions raised.
‘++¢NOT FOR PUBLICATION®**

As to his Question A, Petitioner rests on two grounds,
(1) “Lt]here was nothing imminent about the words which Chow
attributed to [Petitioner]; Chow said he only wanted to make a
record for the future,” and (2) “[t]he sole witness (for
Respondent], Chow, had been impeached . . . on a vitally
important matter[.]” However, as Respondent noted, the imminency
requirement may be proved by demonstrating that the defendant had

the apparent ability to carry out the threat. In Valdivia, this

 

court sail

Clhe “inminency” reouireiment| can be established by means
‘Sober than nroof that a threatening remark willbe executed
Sibeiiately at once. and without delay, Rather, os

General satter, the prosecution mast prove that the chrest
See objectively susceptible to inducing fear of bodily
Unjury in # reasonable person at whom the threat w
directed and who was familiar with the circunstances under
“nich the threat wee uttered. “OF course, one means of
Proving the foregoing wosid be to establien . «thst the
Ehrest wos uteered under circumstances that rendered it "so
Gneguivocal, unconditional, smmeciate(,] and specific a¢ to

person threatened, as to convey « gravity of purpose and
Emninent prospect of executicn.”

 

   

 

 

2 tthe threat,” such thet “she

95 Hawai'i at 477, 24 P.3d at 673 (citations omitted) (emphases
added) .

As to the second ground regarding impeachment,
Petitioner's brief indicates he is referring to the following
cross-examination of Chow:

Q. All right. Now, in your staterent, may 1 have you
read, after the words Longs Kailua there, you see where that
Is in the sixth line? You then wrote something else
Harting, it’ looks Tike the word when.” Would you read that.
‘when [pet ttionee) “aot oi of his

r iil me
Hid-not et cut of his truck. That is a false statenent
ane there

 
‘**sNOT FOR PUBLICATION***
eee

2. Okay. 0 that part of your statement is not
correct?

he Yeah.

&. Okay! ten't it @ fact that [Petitioner] never got
out of hie truck during the entire incident on the 27th of

peril
Trus_he did not cet out of his truck
(Emphases added.) This is partially a restatement of Question B

 

which is addressed below. The balance of Petitioner's argument
rests on the ground that the mere use of words and the lack of
threatening action invokes constitutional safeguards. Petitioner
again refers to his contention that “[t]here was nothing imminent
about the words [sic] which Chow attributed to [Petitioner]”
which has already been addressed above. However, as between
words and actions, as Respondent notes, “HRS [§] 707-715(1)

defines ‘terroristic threatening’” . . . as “thri

 

ten{ing], by

word or conduct,” and that “[Respondent] 1

 

@ only prove one” of
the two “occurred . . . to establish . . . the offensel.1”
mt.

With respect to Question B, the fact that Chow was
impeached on an “important matter” based on the cross-examination
reproduced above, does not vitiate the jury’s verdict. Although,
as Petitioner argued, “Chow admitted on the witness stand that he
had falsified his report to the police, by adding a statenent
which he adnitted was false,” it was within the province of the
Jury, as the court instructed, to “determine whether and to what
extent @ witness should be believed and to give weight to his or
testimony accordingly(,]” and to “reject the testimony of that

witness except for those parts which [the jury] nevertheless
‘++NOT FOR PUBLICATION*#*
believe to be true.” It is established that “jurors are presumed

to follow the court's instructions.” State v 1 94 Hawas'd
405, 415, 16 P.3d 246, 256 (2001). By their verdict the jury
apparently determined that the fact that Petitioner did not leave
his truck did not obviate the evidence that Petitioner otherwise
stated he was going to kill Chow.

wv.

With respect to Questions D and B,* as Respondent
argues, there was substantial evidence to support the jury's
verdict. See Bremer v. Weeks, 104 Hawai'i 43, Si, 85 F.3d 150,
158 (2004) (defining substantial evidence as “credible evidence
which is of sufficient quality and probative value as to enable a
person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion”).

Respondent contends that

[t)he evidence established that (Petitioner) threatened to
Cause bodily injury to Chow with the intent to terrorize o
Un feckless disregard of the rick of terrorising. After
following Chow's erailer in-an erratic nann

rolled down his window and threatened Chow
hie lunge, eaying that he's going te kill (Chow). 8/11/04
TR et 15-16. (Petitioner) appeared “very upset, very
scary,” while Chow felt threatened and afraid. 8/11/04 7®
se uelan, st

  
    

Also, Respondent argues that “[Petitioner] . . . was stopped only
two feet aay from Chow's trailer. Therefore, [Petitioner]
possessed the apparent ability to carry out his threat and that
the threat would reasonably tend to induce fear of bodily injury
in Chow." Accordingly, there was evidence from which the jury

could determine terroristic threatening had been committed.

 

«questions D and £ were combined into one point on appeal.

10
‘+**NOT FOR PUBLICATION®**

v
With respect to Question F, Petitioner complains about
the probationary sentence, including the three months’
incarceration imposed, but only contends with respect to this
matter, that Petitioner’s “words which, even if they were said,

were words of future intention which carried constitutional

protection, and which did not create any‘. . . imminent
prospect of execution.’” (Emphasis in original.) (Footnote
omitted.) That argunent has been resolved supra.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, February 16, 2006.

 

James M, Sattler, on
the application for
petitioner /defendant-

appellant

 

n