Case Title: MAY v FIGGINS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 14958 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 ROBERT MAY,' Deputy Administrator, Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, Plaintiff, Respondent and Cross-Appellant, WILLIE FIGGINS, individually and d/b/a FIGGINS & SONS, Defendants, Appellants and Cross-Respondents. 1 from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, County of Gallatin, Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Berg, Morgan, Coil & Stokes, Bozeman, Montana Michael C. Morgan argued, Bozeman, Montana For -Respondents : Bolinger, Higgins and Andes, Bozeman, Montana Gerry M. Higgins argued, Bozeman, Montana Submitted: February 25, 1980 Decided : HA!? 1': @@ H ~ R I - I?;;, Filed: -1- Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. Plaintiff sued a state District Court in Montana to enforce a Colorado default judgment against defendant. Defendant moved for summary judgment based on Colorado's lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the Colorado action. Summary judgment was denied. After trial, the Court, sitting without a jury, found for plaintiff. Defendant appeals from that judgment. The material facts are undisputed. Defendant Willie Figgins is a Montana road contractor who does most of his work in the Gallatin Valley. Including family members, Figgins has only seven employees at any one time. He does no road contracting in Colorado, does not advertise or solicit business in Colorado, and does not have a Colorado bank account. On December 17, 1971, Willie Figgins signed a "Collec- tive Bargaining Compliance Agreement" which was also signed by representatives of the Montana Joint Council of Teamsters No. 2 3 , which has no connection with the State of Colorado. The compliance agreement was accepted by the Montana A.G.C. Teamsters Trust Fund and by the trustees of the Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund at Seattle, Washington. Under this agreement, Figgins agreed to be bound by the articles of trust contained in the pension trust fund. He agreed "to be bound by, become a party thereto, comply with and execute all forms necessary to be bound to the various Articles of Trust contained in the health and welfare plan and pension plan or any other trust established under the terms and conditions of said extent agreement." The Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund is one of the trusts so established. The administrative office of the Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund is in Seattle, Washington, the situs of the trust is the State of Washington, and the articles of the trust state that ". . . all questions pertaining to its validity, construction, and administration shall be determined in accordance with the laws of that State." The trust provides that "Employer Con- tributions shall be paid to the depository bank designated by the Administrator of the Trust Fund for the particular Pension Agreement," and that "The County in which the parti- cular Employer Contribution is payable shall be a proper county in which to institute legal proceedings to collect delinquent Employer Contributions." Neither the collective bargaining compliance agreement nor the trust agreement specify where the contributions are to be made. In the compliance agreement, however, defendant also agreed to execute all necessary forms, one of which is the employer's monthly report which designates the United Bank of Denver in Denver, Colorado as the depository bank. Willie Figgins' bookkeeper sent thirty-five (35) checks, ap- proximately one per month, to Colorado following the Trust Administrator's instructions, beginning on March 10, 1972. The checks were defendant's only contact with the State of Colorado. Figgins was later audited by a Seattle, Washington firm for the trust. Plaintiff-respondent, Robert May, Deputy Administrator of the trust, brought an action in Colorado to collect delinquent employer contributions from Figgins. A summons was served on Figgins in Montana, but he did not defend the Colorado lawsuit, and plaintiff took a default judgment i n Colorado. P l a i n t i f f brought s u i t i n t h e Montana D i s t r i c t Court t o enforce t h e Colorado judgment. Figgins moved f o r summary judgment on t h e b a s i s of Colorado's lack of personal j u r i s d i c t i o n over him i n t h e Colorado s u i t , b u t t h e Montana D i s t r i c t Court denied summary judgment and found f o r p l a i n t i f f . Defendant appeals from t h a t judgment. The following i s s u e s have been presented t o t h i s Court f o r review: 1. Did t h e defendant's a c t of sending t h i r t y - f i v e checks t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s t r u s t account i n a Colorado bank e s t a b l i s h s u f f i c i e n t "minimum contacts" t o g i v e t h e Colorado c o u r t - i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e nonresident Montana defendant? 2. Did t h e Montana defendant knowingly consent t o Colorado j u r i s d i c t i o n ? On cross-appeal p l a i n t i f f p r e s e n t s t h e following i s s u e : Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n by l i m i t i n g p l a i n t i f f ' s a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s t o $1200? "As a r e s u l t of t h e decisions of t h e Supreme Court expanding t h e l i m i t s of due process t o permit t h e a s s e r t i o n of j u r i s d i c t i o n over non- r e s i d e n t s where t h e r e has been only minimal c o n t a c t s with t h e forum state, s t a t e s have re- sponded by enacting long-arm s t a t u t e s and c o u r t r u l e s enlarging t h e scope of permissible j u r i s - d i c t i o n i n t h e s t a t e courts." 2 Moore's Federal P r a c t i c e 714.41-1 [3] a t 4-437. "Under t h e s e s t a t e long-arm s t a t u t e s , t h e deter- mination of whether t h e c o u r t has i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n i s a two-step process. The c o u r t f i r s t must look t o t h e s t a t e s t a t u t e t o deter- mine whether t h e s t a t u t e provides f o r the exer- c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n under t h e p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s of t h e case, and second, t h e c o u r t must d e t e r - mine whether it would offend due process t o assert j u r i s d i c t i o n . " 2 Moore's Federal Prac- t i c e 114.41-1111 a t 4-421. The Montana Supreme Court has followed t h e two-step approach i n Haker v. Southwestern Ry. Co. (1978), - Mont. , 578 P.2d 724, 729, 35 St.Rep. 523, and it is t h e proper frame of a n a l y s i s i n which t o consider t h i s case. A Colorado s t a t u t e g r a n t s j u r i s d i c t i o n over nonresi- d e n t s i f t h e cause of a c t i o n a r i s e s from ". . . t h e t r a n s - a c t i o n of any business within t h i s s t a t e . " Colo. Rev. S t a t . § 13-1-124. The Colorado Supreme Court has i n t e r p r e t e d t h e s t a t u t e t o mean t h a t Colorado has - i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n over any nonresident who meets t h e "minimum c o n t a c t s " t e s t o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe Co. v. S t a t e of Washington (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95. "By enacting t h e latter s t a t u t e s , our l e g i s - l a t u r e intended t o extend t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of our c o u r t s t o t h e f u l l e s t e x t e n t permitted by t h e due process c l a u s e of t h e f o u r t e e n t h amend- ment of t h e United S t a t e s Constitution." S a f a r i O u t f i t t e r s , Inc. v. Superior Court (1968), 167 Colo. 456, 448 P.2d 783, 784. Accordingly, t h e only question t o be decided i s whether o r n o t t h e Montana defendant's r i g h t t o due process was vio- l a t e d by Colorado's a s s e r t i o n of j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h i s case. The leading case addressing t h e question of when a s t a t e may e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e person of a non- r e s i d e n t defendant i s I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe Co. v. S t a t e of Washington, supra. The S t a t e of Washington brought s u i t t o recover unpaid c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e s t a t e unemployment compensation fund from a f o r e i g n corporation which had no o f f i c e i n Washington and made no c o n t r a c t s t h e r e , b u t which employed salesmen within t h e s t a t e t o s o l i c i t orders. The defendant corporation maintained t h a t t h e a c t i v i t i e s of its salesmen d i d n o t render it "present" within t h e s t a t e f o r purposes of personal j u r i s d i c t i o n c o n s i s t e n t with due pro- cess. I n r e j e c t i n g t h e s e contentions, t h e Supreme Court announced: ". . .due process r e q u i r e s only t h a t i n order t o s u b j e c t a defendant t o a judgment i n per- sonam, i f he be n o t p r e s e n t within t h e t e r r i t o r y of t h e forum, he have c e r t a i n minimum c o n t a c t s with it such t h a t t h e maintenance of t h e s u i t does n o t offend ' t r a d i t i o n a l notions of f a i r play and s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e . ' " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe, 326 U.S. a t 316. The Supreme Court elaborated on t h e requirements of t h e "minimum contacts" test: "Whether due process i s s a t i s f i e d must depend r a t h e r upon t h e q u a l i t y and n a t u r e of t h e ac- t i v i t y i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e f a i r and o r d e r l y administration of t h e laws which it w a s t h e purpose of t h e due process c l a u s e t o insure. That c l a u s e does n o t contemplate t h a t a s t a t e may make binding a judgment i n personam a g a i n s t an i n d i v i d u a l o r corporate defendant with which t h e s t a t e has no c o n t a c t s , ties, o r r e l a t i o n s "But t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t a corporation e x e r c i s e s t h e p r i v i l e g e of conducting a c t i v i t i e s within a s t a t e , it enjoys t h e b e n e f i t s and p r o t e c t i o n of t h e laws of t h a t state. The e x e r c i s e of t h a t p r i v i l e g e may g i v e r i s e t o o b l i g a t i o n s ; and, so f a r as those o b l i g a t i o n s arise o u t of o r a r e connected with t h e a c t i v i t i e s within t h e state, a procedure which r e q u i r e s t h e cor- poration t o respond t o a s u i t brought t o enforce them can, i n most instances, hardly be s a i d t o be undue." I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe, 326 U.S. a t 319. ( C i t a t i o n s omitted.) Applying t h e s e standards t o t h e f a c t s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe, t h e Supreme Court held: " I t i s evident t h a t t h e s e operations e s t a b l i s h s u f f i c i e n t c o n t a c t s o r t i e s with t h e s t a t e of t h e forum t o make it reasonable and j u s t ac- cording t o our t r a d i t i o n a l conception of f a i r play and s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e t o permit t h e s t a t e t o enforce t h e o b l i g a t i o n s which appel- l a n t has incurred there." 326 U.S. a t 320. McGee v. I n t e r n a t i o n a l L i f e I n s . Co. (1957), 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223, r e p r e s e n t s t h e f a r t h e s t extension thus f a r of j u r i s d i c t i o n over a nonresident under t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe doctrine. 2 Moore's Federal P r a c t i c e 114.25[4] a t 4-253 and g4.41-l[l] a t 4-413. I n M c G e e t h e b e n e f i c i a r y under a l i f e insurance p o l i c y brought s u i t i n California against a nonresident insurance corporation. The foreign corporation was served by registered mail pursuant to California statutes. The policy upon which the suit was based had been purchased by the decedent from an Arizona company which was subsequently, absored by defendant, a Texas corporation. Defendant's only connection with Cali- fornia was that it had mailed a reinsurance certificate to the decedent in California offering to insure him under the terms of the original policy and later delivered the insur- ance contract there. Also, the insured had sent his pre- miums by mail to defendant in Texas. The plaintiff obtained a default judgment in a California state court against the nonresident insurance company and brought an action to enforce the judgment in Texas, where the Texas courts re- fused to give full faith and credit to the California decree on the grounds that the California court had not secured jurisdiction over defendant consistent with due process. The Supreme Court reversed holding that the California judgment did not violate due process under the rationale of International Shoe. The Court said: "It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that State . . . The contract was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there and the insured was a resident of that state when he died. It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims. These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable. When claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum--thus in effect making the company judgment proof. Often the crucial wit- nesses--as here on the company's defense of sui- cide--will be found in the insured's locality." McGee. 355 U.S. at 223. Thus, - i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n w a s upheld i n McGee where t h e only c o n t a c t t h e nonresident had with t h e forum s t a t e w a s t h e insurance c o n t r a c t sued upon, and where no evidence w a s presented t h a t any agent o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e defendant was ever i n t h e S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a . "However, where defen- d a n t ' s c o n t a c t s with t h e state a r e n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f y t r a d i t i o n a l notions of f a i r play and s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e , - i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n may n o t be secured over him through long-arm service." 2 Moore's Federal P r a c t i c e 114.41-1[1] a t 4-414, c i t i n g Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283. Hanson, decided a year a f t e r M c G e e , r e p r e s e n t s a l i m i t a t i o n t o t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s e a r l i e r holdings i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe and M c G e e . I n Hanson, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court denied a F l o r i d a c o u r t ' s a s s e r t i o n of j u r i s d i c t i o n over a Delaware t r u s t and s t a t e d : ". . .it i s e s s e n t i a l i n each case t h a t t h e r e be some a c t by which t h e defendant purposefully a v a i l s i t s e l f of t h e p r i v i l e g e of conducting a c t i v i t i e s within t h e forum S t a t e , thus invoking t h e b e n e f i t s and p r o t e c t i o n of i t s laws." 357 U.S. a t 253. I n Hanson a r e s i d e n t of Penn- sylvania c r e a t e d a t r u s t , naming a Delaware t r u s t company a s t r u s t e e . The s e t t l o r r e t a i n e d a l i f e e s t a t e and reserved a power of appointment over t h e remainder. She subsequently became a r e s i d e n t of F l o r i d a , where she executed an i n t e r vivos power of appointment over a p o r t i o n of t h e remainder and made o u t a w i l l appointing t h e balance of t h e t r u s t corpus t o her executrix. When t h e s e t t l o r d i e d i n F l o r i d a , t h e question arose a s t o whether t h e a s s e t s appointed i n t e r vivos should have passed under decedent's w i l l , s i n c e the i n t e r vivos appointment would have been i n v a l i d under F l o r i d a law a s an attempted testamentary d i s p o s i t i o n . A declaratory judgment a c t i o n was brought i n Florida t o resolve t h i s i s s u e . The Delaware t r u s t company w a s given n o t i c e a s required by the Florida s t a t u t e s dealing with constructive service. The Supreme Court reversed t h e Florida c o u r t ' s adjudication of t h e m a t t e r , holding t h a t under Florida l a w the Delaware t r u s t company was an indispensable p a r t y over which the Florida c o u r t s had n o t obtained - i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n . The Supreme Court concluded t h e r e were i n s u f f i c i e n t contacts linking t h e t r u s t company t o the forum s t a t e . The majority opinion i n Hanson s t a t e d : "In McGee t h e Court noted t h e trend of expanding personal j u r i s d i c t i o n over nonresidents . . . - - But it i s a mistake t o assume t h a t t h i s trend heralds t h e eventual demise of a l l r e s t r i c t i o n s on the personal j u r i s d i c t i o n of s t a t e courts. . . Those r e s t r i c t i o n s are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient o r d i s t a n t l i t i g a t i o n . They a r e a consequence of t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e power of t h e respective S t a t e s . However minimal t h e burden of defending i n a foreign t r i b u n a l , a defendant may n o t be c a l l e d upon t o do so unless he has had the 'minimal contacts' with t h a t S t a t e t h a t a r e a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o i t s e x e r c i s e of power over him. . . "We f a i l t o f i n d such contacts i n t h e circum- stances of t h i s case. The defendant t r u s t company has no o f f i c e i n Florida, and t r a n s a c t s no bus- i n e s s there. None of t h e t r u s t a s s e t s has ever been held o r administered i n Florida, and the re- cord d i s c l o s e s no s o l i c i t a t i o n of business i n t h a t S t a t e e i t h e r i n person o r by m a i l . . . "The cause of a c t i o n i n t h i s case i s n o t one t h a t a r i s e s o u t of an act done o r t r a n s a c t i o n consum- mated i n t h e forum S t a t e . I n t h a t r e s p e c t , it d i f f e r s from McGee v. I n t e r n a t i o n a l L i f e Ins. Co., 355 U . S . 220, 78 S . C t . 1 9 9 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223, and t h e cases t h e r e c i t e d . . . "In c o n t r a s t , t h i s a c t i o n involves t h e v a l i d i t y of an agreement t h a t was entered without any connection with t h e forum S t a t e . The agreement w a s executed i n Delaware by a t r u s t company incor- porated i n t h a t S t a t e and a s e t t l o r domiciled i n Pennsylvania. The f i r s t r e l a t i o n s h i p Florida had t o the agreement w a s years l a t e r when the s e t t l o r became domiciled t h e r e , and t h e t r u s t e e remitted t h e t r u s t income t o her i n t h a t S t a t e . From F l o r i d a M r s . Donner c a r r i e d on s e v e r a l b i t s of t r u s t administration t h a t may be compared t o t h e mailing of premiums i n NcGee. But t h e record d i s c l o s e s no i n s t a n c e i n which t h e t r u s t e e per- formed any acts i n F l o r i d a t h a t bear t h e same re- l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e agreement a s t h e s o l i c i t a t i o n i n McGee. Consequently, t h i s s u i t cannot be s a i d t o be one t o enforce an o b l i g a t i o n t h a t a r o s e from a p r i v i l e g e t h e defendant exercised i n Florida. . . "The execution i n F l o r i d a of t h e powers of appoint- ment under which t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s and appointees claim does n o t give Florida a s u b s t a n t i a l connection with t h e c o n t r a c t on which t h i s s u i t i s based . . . The u n i l a t e r a l a c t i v i t y of those who claim some r e l a t i o n s h i p with a nonresident defendant cannot s a t i s f y t h e requirement of c o n t a c t with t h e forum S t a t e . The a p p l i c a t i o n of t h a t r u l e w i l l vary with t h e q u a l i t y and nature of t h e defendant's a c t i v i t y , b u t it i s e s s e n t i a l i n each case t h a t t h e r e be some act by which t h e defendant pur- posefully a v a i l s i t s e l f of t h e p r i v i l e g e of con- ducting a c t i v i t i e s within t h e forum S t a t e , thus invoking t h e b e n e f i t s and p r o t e c t i o n s of its laws. I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe Co. v. S t a t e of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S.Ct. 154, 159, 90 L.Ed. 95." 357 U.S. a t 250-253. Defendant advocates t h a t Hanson i s d i s p o s i t i v e of t h i s appeal, apparently on t h e grounds t h a t a l l of h i s i n i t i a l c o n t a c t s concerning t h e Western Conference of Teamsters Pension T r u s t Fund w e r e n o t with Colorado, b u t were e i t h e r with Montana o r with t h e S t a t e of Washington, t h e s i t u s of t h e t r u s t . It i s t r u e t h a t a l l of the i n i t i a l c o n t a c t s con- cerning t h e t r u s t e s t a b l i s h e d i n Hanson were e i t h e r i n Penn- sylvania, where t h e s e t t l o r resided a t t h e t i m e t h e t r u s t w a s c r e a t e d , o r i n Delaware, t h e s i t u s of t h e t r u s t , r a t h e r than i n F l o r i d a , where t h e s e t t l o r resided a t the t i m e she exercised her power of appointment and a t t h e time of her death. That f a c t , however, w a s n o t d i s p o s i t i v e i n Hanson, where t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court held t h a t t h e F l o r i d a c o u r t had no personal j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e t r u s t e e and no j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e t r u s t based on a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e r e w e r e no "minimum c o n t a c t s " between t h e Delaware t r u s t e e and t h e forum s t a t e of F l o r i d a , e i t h e r i n i t i a l l y o r a t any subsequent time. Nevertheless, Hanson has a bearing on t h e outcome of t h i s appeal. I n both cases, t h e nonresident defendant ( W i l l i e Figgins i n t h i s case, t h e Delaware t r u s t e e i n Hanson) has no o f f i c e i n t h e forum s t a t e (Colorado i n t h i s case, F l o r i d a i n Hanson), has no a s s e t s t h e r e , t r a n s a c t s no business t h e r e , and has n o t s o l i c i t e d business i n t h e forum s t a t e . I t i s t r u e t h a t t h e cause of a c t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t appeal a r i s e s o u t of W i l l i e Figgins' f a i l u r e t o make em- ployer c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e Colorado bank, while i n Hanson t h e Court s t a t e d t h a t t h e c a u s e . o f a c t i o n was not one t h a t a r o s e o u t of an a c t done o r a t r a n s a c t i o n consummated i n t h e forum s t a t e , s i n c e t h e Delaware t r u s t w a s n o t e s t a b l i s h e d i n F l o r i d a and had no connection with F l o r i d a , d e s p i t e t h e u n i l a t e r a l a c t i v i t y of t h e s e t t l o r i n F l o r i d a and t h e t r u s t e e ' s remittance of t r u s t income t o her i n t h a t s t a t e . "The c o n t a c t s required upon which t o base j u r i s d i c t i o n , c o n s i s t e n t with due process, would be g r e a t e r where t h e a c t i o n i s brought upon a claim n o t a r i s i n g from t h e s e con- t a c t s with t h e s t a t e , than where t h e a c t i o n does a r i s e from t h e s t a t e contacts." 2 Moore's Federal P r a c t i c e 114.41-1[1] a t 4-414. See I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe, supra, and Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. (1952), 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485. S t i l l , defendant's act of sending checks t o Colorado can be compared with t h e a c t i v i t y of t h e Hanson t r u s t e e i n r e m i t t i n g t r u s t income t o t h e s e t t l o r i n F l o r i d a , and it must be remembered t h a t i n Hanson t h e Court held t h a t t h e r e was no act by which t h e defendant t r u s t e e "purposely a v a i l s i t s e l f of t h e p r i v i l e g e of conducting a c t i v i t i e s within t h e forum s t a t e , thus invoking t h e bene- f i t s and p r o t e c t i o n s of i t s laws." 357 U.S. a t 253. Applying the rules enunciated in International Shoe, McGee and Hanson to the present case, it does not appear that defendant Willie Figgins had sufficient "minimum contacts" to subject him to the jurisdiction of the Colorado court. It would be unfair to this defendant and unreason- able to require him to defend in Colorado where his only contact with that forum was to mail thirty-five checks to a Denver Bank. Willie Figgins has no offices in Colorado, does no contracting work in Colorado, solicits no business there, and does not have a Colorado bank account. By his act of merely sending checks to plaintiff's bank in Colorado, he has not purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business within that forum, and he has not there- by invoked the benefits and protections of its laws. Conse- quently, there is no rationale to justify subjecting him to Colorado ' s jurisdiction. In support of this conclusion are holdings from the courts of other states which state that merely making pay- ments in a state does not establish the requisite minimum contacts to satisfy due process. U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt (Tex. 1977), 553 S.W.2d 760, 763, cert. denied 434 U.S. 1063; Freedom Finance Co. v. Berry (N.J.Super. 1972), 62 N.J. 256, 290 A.2d 298, affVd/300 A.2d 341; "Automatic" Sprinkler Corp. v. Seneca Foods Corp. (1972), 361 Mass. 441, 280 N.E.2d 423. Compare Tucker v. Vista Financial Corp. (1977), Colo. , 560 P.2d 453, holding that California could properly exercise jurisdiction over a resident of Colorado whose sole contact with California was that in Colorado she co-signed a promissory note payable in Cali- fornia to a California bank and authorized funds to be disbursed in California. The Montana contractor did not knowingly consent to Colorado - in personam jurisdiction. In the collective bar- gaining compliance agreement which he signed with the Western Conference of Teamsters, located in Seattle, Washing- ton, defendant agreed to be bound by the articles of trust contained in the pension trust fund. One provision of the articles of trust stated that the county in which the employer contribution is payable as designated by the Administrator of the trust fund "shall be a proper county in which to institute legal proceedings to collect delinquent Employer Contributions." Neither the collective bargaining compliance agreement nor the articles of trust specified where the employer contributions were to be paid. They were paid to the Colorado bank by defendant upon receipt of subsequent instructions from the Trust Administrator. In the collec- tive bargaining compliance agreement, however, defendant also agreed to execute all necessary forms, one of which is the employer's monthly report which designates the deposi- tory bank. The general rule is that "parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court . . ." National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent (1964), 375 U.S. 311, 316, 84 S.Ct. 411, 11 L.Ed.2d 354. In this case, however, the courts of Colorado could not exercise - in personam jurisdiction over the defendant consistent with due process, so that any purported consent to Colorado's juris- diction would amount to a waiver of the constitutional right to due process and would have to be evaluated in that light and by the tests applicable to a waiver of constitutional rights. The defendant contractor in this case could not have known that the agreement which he signed would subject him to the jurisdiction of Colorado courts because there was nothing in the collective bargaining compliance agreement or in the articles of trust that specified the jurisdiction as to which he waived his constitutional due process rights. Hence, there was no clear waiver of his due process rights as required by Fuentes v . Shevin (1972), 407 U.S. 67, 95, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556. Compare Clinic Masters v. District Court (1976), Colo. I 556 P.2d 473. As stated in Telephonic, Inc. v. Rosenblum (1975), 88 N.M. 532, 543 P.2d 825, 830: "An agreement to waive this constitu- tional right must be deliberately and understandingly made, and language relied upon to constitute such a waiver must clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously express a waiver of this right." To accept the respondent's argument that the defendant here contractually consented to be sued in Colorado would be to give the respondent carte blanche to use contracts of adhesion to establish a right to sue defendants wherever would be most convenient to respondents, and least con- venient to defendants. The contractual provisions purport- ing to waive - in personam jurisdiction are unreasonable and unenforceable. Furthermore, defendant did not waive his rights as to Colorado jurisdiction. The Compliance Agreement, which Willie Figgins signed, and Trust Agreement, to which he was bound, do not state specifically the county and state where legal proceedings are to be instituted. By subsequently re- ceiving a notice to send payments to Colorado and by accom- modating the Trust Administrator by mailing payments to Colorado, defendant did not deliberately, understandingly, clearly, unequivocally, and unambiguously consent to the jurisdiction of the State of Colorado. The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause is dismissed. The matter is remanded to the District Court so that proceedings may be had to determine costs and reasonable attorney fees for the services of defendant's attorneys and assessment of the same against plaintiff. I I Justice I We concur: a&-8 w a 4 . Chief Justice % A : Justices