Case Title: STATE V. YOUNG

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 13–0983 
 
Filed April 3, 2015 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
ARCHALETTA LATRICE YOUNG, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carol L. 
Coppola, Judge. 
 
 
The defendant in a criminal proceeding appeals from an enhanced 
sentence imposed on her present conviction for third-degree theft by the 
use of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction.  REVERSED AND 
REMANDED. 
 
 
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Rachel C. Regenold, 
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant. 
 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant 
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Kevin D. 
Hathaway, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
 
 
2 
APPEL, Justice. 
 
In this case, we consider whether a misdemeanor conviction 
pursuant to a guilty plea by an incarcerated poor person who did not 
have the assistance of counsel, may later be used by the State as a 
predicate offense for application of a theft statute in which the crime is 
enhanced if the defendant has two prior theft offenses.  The district court 
concluded the prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could be used 
as an offense to trigger enhanced punishment when the facts 
surrounding the prior conviction were that the defendant failed to 
appear; she was arrested and held in jail for one day prior to her initial 
appearance; and at the initial appearance, upon pleading guilty, she was 
sentenced to one day in jail, with credit for time served.   
For the reasons expressed below, we conclude that under the right 
to counsel provision of article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution, a 
misdemeanor defendant has a right to the assistance of counsel when 
the defendant faces the possibility of imprisonment.  Because the poor 
defendant in this case was not provided the assistance of counsel and 
the State stipulated there was not a valid waiver, the prior misdemeanor 
conviction cannot be used as a predicate offense to enhance a later 
punishment consistent with fundamental fairness demanded by the due 
process clause of article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution.  As a 
result, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand for 
further proceedings.  
I.  Factual and Procedural Background. 
In June 2003, Archaletta Young was issued a citation for theft in 
the fifth degree for stealing $104.28 worth of merchandise from Walmart.  
See Iowa Code § 714.2(5) (2003).  She failed to appear at her initial 
appearance, however, and the court issued a warrant for her arrest.  At 
3 
her initial appearance, without counsel, Young pled guilty to theft in the 
fifth degree, a simple misdemeanor, and was sentenced to one day in jail 
with credit for time served and received a fine.     
 
About nine-and-one-half years later, Walmart store security 
observed Young stealing $94.87 worth of clothing.  The State filed a trial 
information alleging theft in the third degree under Iowa Code section 
714.2(3) (2011).1  This Code section provides: “the theft of any property 
not exceeding five hundred dollars in value by one who has before been 
twice convicted of theft, is theft in the third degree.”  Id.  “Theft in the 
third degree is an aggravated misdemeanor.”  Id. 
 
The State claimed Young was guilty of theft in the third degree 
based on her current crime and two prior theft convictions.  One of the 
prior theft convictions that the State alleged supported theft in the third 
degree was Young’s 2003 conviction of theft in the fifth degree.  Young 
does not challenge the propriety of using the other prior fifth-degree-theft 
conviction as an enhancement predicate and thus no issues in this 
appeal are raised in connection with that conviction.  However, under the 
statute, two prior fifth-degree-theft offenses are required to trigger the 
elevation of a subsequent fifth-degree-theft conviction to theft in the third 
degree.    
 
Prior to trial, Young filed a motion to strike the 2003 prior theft 
conviction as a basis to support the charge of third-degree theft.  In her 
motion, Young asserted that because she was not represented by counsel 
when she pled guilty and served a term of incarceration, the conviction 
was infirm under article I, sections 9 and 10 of the Iowa Constitution.  As 
a result, Young argued the conviction could not be used to enhance her 
1The second count of the two-count trial information charged Young with 
possession of a controlled substance in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5). 
                                      
 
4 
later crime.  The State resisted, asserting that under applicable 
precedent, the uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could be used to 
enhance the later offense.    
 
The trial court held a hearing on the issue.  Young asked the court 
to judicially notice the content of the 2003 misdemeanor file, which the 
court agreed to do.  The State recognized State v. Allen, 690 N.W.2d 684, 
687 (Iowa 2005), stands for the proposition that a conviction cannot be 
used to enhance a later crime if the defendant was denied his or her 
constitutional right to counsel in the prior proceeding.  The State 
contended, however, that Young had no right to counsel in the 2003 
simple 
misdemeanor 
proceedings 
because 
realistically 
in 
these 
proceedings the defendant is given either a fine or credit for time served.  
The State further argued that in cases like Young’s 2003 misdemeanor, a 
defendant would not benefit from counsel because no additional term of 
incarceration normally results after the entry of a guilty plea.  
 
In rebuttal, Young noted that a client facing a simple misdemeanor 
conviction should be advised that the conviction could be used later to 
enhance a subsequent crime.  She also asserted Iowa Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 2.19(9) supported her assertion that the uncounseled 
misdemeanor conviction could not be used to enhance her later crime.   
 
The State responded that sentence enhancements are collateral 
matters that do not give rise to ineffective-assistance claims.  The State 
further asserted that rule 2.19 does not create an independent right to 
counsel.       
 
Upon the conclusion of oral argument, the court asked the parties 
to file briefs in support of their respective positions.  Young repeated her 
assertion that in order for a conviction to serve as a basis for 
enhancement it must be constitutionally valid.  Young claimed the 2003 
5 
simple misdemeanor could not be a predicate to enhancement because 
she did not have an attorney; did not waive her right to an attorney; was 
ultimately sentenced to a term of imprisonment, namely one day with 
credit for time served; and received a fine.  As a result, Young claimed 
her 2003 conviction was constitutionally infirm and could not be used to 
support an enhanced charge in the case. 
 
In response, the State conceded Young did not have an attorney 
and did not waive the right to have one.  Citing Allen, 690 N.W.2d at 693, 
the State argued an uncounseled simple misdemeanor conviction may be 
used to enhance a later charge when the defendant was not actually 
sentenced to a term of incarceration.  While the State recognized Young 
was incarcerated for one day for her failure to appear in court, the State 
argued that the incarceration for one day was not punishment for the 
underlying offense, but was designed to ensure the defendant’s presence 
for the criminal proceedings.  Thus, according to the State, the 2003 
uncounseled simple misdemeanor conviction was not constitutionally 
defective.   
 
The district court rejected Young’s argument and found the one 
day of incarceration was not additional incarceration resulting from her 
guilty plea.  Although Young cited the wrong rule of criminal procedure, 
the court cited Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.61(2) and concluded 
Young’s situation was not one in which “the defendant face[d] the 
possibility of imprisonment” requiring the appointment of counsel under 
the rule.    
 
Young waived a jury trial and stipulated to a trial on the minutes.  
The district court found Young guilty of theft in the third degree and 
possession of a controlled substance and sentenced Young to 
6 
consecutive suspended sentences of two years and two years of 
probation.  Young appealed. 
 
II.  Standard of Review. 
 
Constitutional issues are reviewed de novo, but when there is no 
factual dispute, review is for correction of errors at law.  State v. Majeres, 
722 N.W.2d 179, 181 (Iowa 2006).  In interpreting the Iowa Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, our review is for correction of errors at law.  State v. 
Jones, 817 N.W.2d 11, 15 (Iowa 2012).   
 
III.  Discussion. 
 
A.  Preliminary Issues.  Several preliminary aspects of this case 
deserve attention.  First, the State concedes that if the 2003 conviction 
was obtained in violation of Young’s right to counsel, then the 2003 
conviction cannot be used to enhance Young’s 2012 offense.  Second, the 
State concedes Young did not waive her right to counsel during the 2003 
proceeding.  Thus, if Young’s 2003 conviction was obtained in violation of 
Young’s right to counsel under the State or Federal Constitution, it 
cannot be used to enhance the 2012 offense.    
There is also a potential preservation issue in this case.  In the 
written motion to strike the enhancement, the defendant relied on Allen, 
690 N.W.2d at 263, and the right-to-counsel and due process provisions 
of the Iowa Constitution.  At oral argument and in postargument 
submissions, the defendant also cited the right-to-counsel and due 
process provisions of the United States Constitution.  The district court 
order explicitly considered Allen and the Iowa Constitution, but did not 
address the question under the United States Constitution.    
Even if there was a failure to preserve issues under the United 
States Constitution, such claims, and any other claim inartfully made or 
not preserved, could be resurrected under the aegis of an ineffective-
7 
assistance-of-counsel claim.  See State v. Brubaker, 805 N.W.2d 164, 170 
(Iowa 2011) (“Failure of trial counsel to preserve error at trial can support 
an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.”).  Because we conclude that 
under the Iowa Constitution, a defendant facing the possibility of 
imprisonment in a misdemeanor proceeding has a constitutional right to 
counsel, Young’s uncounseled 2003 misdemeanor conviction cannot be 
used to enhance her 2012 crime.  As a result, any failure to preserve the 
issue under the Federal Constitution or any other claim is of no 
consequence.  
B.  Setting the Contextual Stage: Do Misdemeanor Convictions 
Matter?  Misdemeanors are by definition crimes less serious than 
felonies.  Compare Black’s Law Dictionary 736 (10th ed. 2014), with id. at 
1150.  An appeal involving an uncounseled misdemeanor may seem 
inconsequential, but there is more under the surface.  Because of high 
volumes, the treatment of misdemeanors in the court system naturally 
tends to emphasize efficiency over accuracy of fact-finding.  See John D. 
King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 Harv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 20 & n.124 (2013) [hereinafter King].  The notion that 
efficiency may trump individualized determinations in a busy courtroom 
is cause for concern, particularly when our legal system relies upon the 
accuracy of those determinations to support dramatically enhanced 
sentences for later crimes.  Given the pressures of docket management, 
there is a risk that the ability of the system to function efficiently and at 
low cost, rather than the reliability of fact-finding, will shape judicial 
outcomes.   
It is not only the need to process large volumes of cases that puts 
pressure on the system provided misdemeanor defendants, but the fact 
that misdemeanor defendants are often poor persons.  See Erica J. 
8 
Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 461, 482–83 (2007).  Being poor has two important consequences 
for those accused of misdemeanors.  While many misdemeanor 
defendants do not face pretrial incarceration, those that do face 
significant obstacles to the assertion of innocence.  As Caleb Foote 
demonstrated decades ago, pretrial detention significantly and adversely 
impacts the truth-finding process by preventing effective assertion of 
defenses and increasing pressures to plead guilty as a matter of 
convenience. 
 
See 
Caleb 
Foote, 
Vagrancy-Type 
Law 
and 
Its 
Administration, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 603, 643–47 & n.162 (1956) (noting 
the lack of pretrial procedures and the speed of the judicial process as 
particularly problematic in the adjudication of misdemeanor-type cases); 
see also Candace McCoy, Caleb was Right: Pretrial Decisions Determine 
Mostly Everything, 12 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 135, 137–38 (2007). 
In addition, poor people cannot afford lawyers.  And lawyers can be 
important, even in misdemeanor cases.  At least one often-cited study 
has shown that the odds of escaping criminal liability for misdemeanor 
defendants increase five-fold when the accused is represented by 
counsel.  See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 
2011, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 538 (1972) (citing American Civil Liberties 
Union, Legal Counsel for Misdemeanants Preliminary Report 1 (1970)).  
The combination of administrative pressures, pretrial detention in some 
cases, and the lack of the guiding hand of counsel, are powerful factors 
that may distort the lens of the fact-finding process in our misdemeanor 
courts.  See Lawrence Herman, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor 
Court 16–30 (1974) [hereinafter Herman].     
For these reasons, the risk of an inaccurate verdict in uncounseled 
misdemeanor cases is higher than in most felony prosecutions.  See 
9 
Herman at 27 & n.61.  Noting that every student of the misdemeanor 
process has observed that the risk of convictions in misdemeanor court 
is much higher than in felony court, a leading scholar decades ago found 
it no accident that the first case reversed by the United States Supreme 
Court for insufficient evidence was a misdemeanor case, Thompson v. 
City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206, 80 S. Ct. 624, 629, 4 L. Ed. 2d 654, 
659 (1960).  See Herman at 27. 
These distortions alone are reason for concern, but such concerns 
about the accuracy of individual determinations of guilt in cases 
involving misdemeanors are magnified by the fact that the so-called 
“collateral consequences” of misdemeanor convictions are dramatically 
increasing.  Conviction of misdemeanors, as discussed below, may 
impose a significant moral stigma and can substantially affect 
employment opportunities.  According to a 2010 survey performed by the 
Society for Human Resource Management, seventy-three percent of 
employers conducted criminal background checks on all of their 
employees, with another nineteen percent performing background checks 
on selected employees.  See John P. Gross, What Matters More: A Day in 
Jail or a Criminal Conviction, 22 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 55, 86 (2013) 
[hereinafter Gross] (citing Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., Background 
Checking: Conducting Criminal Background Checks 3 (2010) [hereinafter 
Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt.], available at http://www.shrm.org/ 
research/surveyfindings/articles/pages/backgroundcheckcriminalcheck
s.aspx).  Fifty-one percent of respondent employers indicated that a 
nonviolent 
misdemeanor 
would 
be 
“ ‘somewhat 
influential’ ” 
in 
determining employment, while twenty-two percent indicated that it 
would be “ ‘very influential.’ ”  See id. (quoting Soc’y for Human Res. 
Mgmt. at 5).  The “Common Application” being completed by thousands 
10 
of high school seniors applying to colleges now requires disclosure of 
misdemeanor and felony convictions.  See Paul Marcus, Why the United 
States Supreme Court Got Some (But Not a Lot) of the Sixth Amendment 
Right to Counsel Analysis Right, 21 St. Thomas L. Rev. 142, 176–77 
(2009) [hereinafter Marcus].  By way of further example, a misdemeanor 
battery conviction can lead to deportation, Hernandez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
513 F.3d 1336, 1339–40 (11th Cir. 2008), a marijuana conviction can 
lead to loss of student loan assistance for at least a year, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1091(r)(1) (2012), a low-level drug crime may lead to eviction from 
public housing for the individual and the entire family, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437d(l)(6), a conviction of the misdemeanor of indecent conduct can 
lead to sex registration requirements, Iowa Code § 692A.103(1) (2015), 
and a misdemeanor conviction of eluding an officer may lead to 
suspension of a driver’s license, Iowa Code § 321.209(7).  A misdemeanor 
conviction can also affect professional licensure, child custody, the right 
to possess a firearm, and eligibility for government assistance.  See King, 
48 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 23–34 (describing the “panoply of severe 
consequences” 
misdemeanants 
may 
suffer 
in 
relation 
to 
their 
misdemeanor convictions); see also Gross, 22 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. at 
80–87 (detailing collateral consequences of misdemeanor convictions); 
Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in 
the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 277, 298–303 (2011) 
(same).  Collateral consequences have proliferated to the point that the 
American 
Bar 
Association 
Standards 
for 
Criminal 
Justice 
now 
recommends that each jurisdiction collect all the collateral consequences 
within one section of the criminal code for ease of access for lawyers and 
clients.  See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Collateral Sanctions 
11 
and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons 19–2.1, at 21 (3d 
ed. 2004).   
Further, in the electronic age, a remote misdemeanor conviction is 
no longer practically obscure.  A tech-savvy functionary or a decision-
maker who hires investigative firms who specialize in unearthing such 
information can easily discover a misdemeanor conviction.  See King, 48 
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 31.  Such convictions can have great capacity 
to further close opportunities for poor persons who, because of their 
social-economic status, already have limited opportunities.  See id. (For 
example, “[t]he uncounseled misdemeanor defendant who pleads guilty 
to shoplifting in Oregon in exchange for a small fine may be surprised 
years later when that conviction prevents her from getting a job in New 
York.”). 
The bottom line is that while the treatment of misdemeanor cases 
by our judicial system is not likely to generate a media frenzy or rivet the 
attention of the public, it does raise important issues for our criminal 
justice system and those directly affected by it.  Although lacking dazzle 
and glitz, this case thrusts us into an inquiry as close to the heart of the 
legal system as that actually experienced by thousands of Iowans.   
C.  Impact of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.61(2).  Young 
suggests the use of her uncounseled conviction violates her due process 
rights because she has a rule-based right to counsel under Iowa Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 2.61(2).  The United States Supreme Court has 
allowed a due process collateral attack on a conviction in an 
enhancement context based only on the denial of the constitutional right 
to counsel established in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 
S. Ct. 792, 796, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 805 (1963).  See Custis v. United States, 
511 U.S. 485, 496, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1738, 128 L. Ed. 2d 517, 528 
12 
(1994).  As emphasized in Custis, the failure to appoint counsel for an 
indigent defendant amounted to “a unique constitutional defect.”  Id.  
Thus, there is no federally cognizable due process attack based upon a 
mere rule violation.      
Of course, we could come to a different conclusion applying state 
law.  The question of whether a rule violation provides a foundation 
preventing a conviction from triggering an enhanced sentence was 
considered in State v. Johnson, 38 A.3d 1270, 1276 (Me. 2012).  In 
Johnson, a defendant sought to collaterally attack a prior conviction in a 
sentence-enhancement context on the ground that although he was 
represented in the prior proceeding, he was not properly informed of his 
rights under a state rule of criminal procedure.  See id. (citing Me. R. 
Crim. P. 5(b)–(c)).  In that case, the Maine Supreme Court summarized 
the authorities as standing for the proposition that  
the right to collaterally attack a conviction that will enhance 
a new charge or sentence should be, for solid constitutional 
and policy reasons, limited to a claim that the defendant was 
deprived of the fundamental Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. 
Id. at 1275.  The Johnson court emphasized that expanding the basis for 
collaterally attacking sentences in the enhancement context beyond the 
Custis rule requiring a deprivation of the constitutional right to counsel 
would introduce chronic uncertainty and undermine the finality of 
criminal judgments.  Id. at 1278.  In a footnote, the Johnson court noted 
that at least eleven jurisdictions had adopted the Custis framework.  See 
id. at 1275 n.7 (citing Camp v. State, 221 S.W.3d 365, 369–70 (Ark. 
2006); People v. Padilla, 907 P.2d 601, 606 (Colo. 1995) (en banc); State 
v. Veikoso, 74 P.3d 575, 580, 582 (Haw. 2003); State v. Weber, 90 P.3d 
314, 318–20 (Idaho 2004); State v. Delacruz, 899 P.2d 1042, 1049 (Kan. 
13 
1995); McGuire v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 931, 937 (Ky. 1994); 
People v. Carpentier, 521 N.W.2d 195, 199–200 (Mich. 1994); State v. 
Weeks, 681 A.2d 86, 89–90 (N.H. 1996); State v. Mund, 593 N.W.2d 760, 
761 (N.D. 1999); State v. Boskind, 807 A.2d 358, 360, 362–64 (Vt. 2002); 
State v. Hahn, 618 N.W.2d 528, 532, 535 (Wis. 2000)). 
Some state cases go somewhat beyond the Custis approach in their 
application of state law.  For example, in State v. Maine, 255 P.3d 64, 69 
(Mont. 2011), the Montana Supreme Court was asked by the state to 
adopt the Custis rule, namely, that prior convictions used for 
enhancement may not be challenged under any constitutional theory 
except a Gideon violation, under Montana law.  The Montana court, 
however, noted that “[w]e have long recognized, however, that Montana 
law may be more protective of individual rights than the floor established 
by federal law.”  Id. at 72.  Ultimately, the Montana court, under the due 
process clause of the Montana Constitution, held that a defendant could 
attack a prior conviction in the context of a sentence enhancement not 
only when there was a Gideon violation, but also when there was 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 73.  While the Montana court 
thus announced a rule beyond the federal caselaw, the court emphasized 
that the expansion of collateral challenges extended only to cases that 
were “constitutionally infirm.”  Id.   
In another case, Paschall v. State, 8 P.3d 851, 913 n.2 (Nev. 2000) 
(per curiam), the Nevada Supreme Court likewise departed from Custis.  
The Paschall court noted that Custis “merely established the floor for 
federal constitutional purposes.”  Id.  The Paschall court declined to 
apply the Custis limitations under Nevada law.  Id.  Paschall, however, 
involved a constitutional claim, namely, whether under the Nevada 
Constitution, a justice of the peace had authority to suspend certain 
14 
sentences.  Id. at 913–15.  Thus, the claim entertained in Paschall, like 
that in Johnson, was of constitutional dimension.  
New Jersey has taken a different approach.  In State v. Hrycak, 
877 A.2d 1209, 1211 (N.J. 2005), the New Jersey Supreme Court 
considered whether a prior uncounseled conviction could count in a 
sentencing enhancement proceeding.  The Hrycak court relied on prior 
precedent providing counsel for indigent misdemeanor defendants in 
“ ‘the sound administration of justice.’ ”  Id. at 1215 (quoting Rodriguez v. 
Rosenblatt, 277 A.2d 216, 223 (N.J. 1971)).  The court held that “a prior 
uncounseled DWI conviction of an indigent is not sufficiently reliable to 
permit increased jail sanctions under the enhancement statute.”  Id. at 
1216.   
For reasons similar to those outlined in Johnson, however, we 
decline to announce a rule today that prevents application of a prior 
conviction in an enhancement proceeding based upon a mere rule 
violation.  While we are, of course, free to depart from Custis under the 
Iowa Constitution, we do not think the expansion of collateral attacks on 
prior convictions based upon nonconstitutional flaws makes sense.  Nor 
do we think expansion of the right to counsel by this court in “the sound 
administration of justice” is the appropriate approach.  See id. at 1215.  
We have considerable discretion in supervising the operation of the 
judicial branch, but we do not believe it extends so far as to allow us to 
collaterally attack convictions arising from guilty pleas not on direct 
appeal or in an action for postconviction relief, but in the context of the 
enhancement of a subsequent crime in which there is no error of 
constitutional dimension.   
As a result, we are required to proceed to consider whether the use 
of an uncounseled conviction in a misdemeanor proceeding to enhance 
15 
punishment involves a violation of constitutional dimension, namely, the 
violation of the right to counsel. 
D.  Textual Provisions of State and Federal Constitutional 
Provisions Regarding the Right to Counsel.  Two separate Iowa 
constitutional provisions are implicated in this case, the right to counsel 
under Iowa Constitution article I, section 10, and the due process clause 
under Iowa Constitution article I, section 9.  As will be seen below, 
although two separate Iowa constitutional provisions are implicated, the 
issues tend to merge.  If the failure to provide appointed counsel to a 
poor person in a misdemeanor case violates the right to counsel in article 
I, section 10, it would be fundamentally unfair under the due process 
clause of article I, section 9 to use that conviction to enhance a later 
crime.  Cf. State v. Becker, 818 N.W.2d 135, 148 (Iowa 2012) (due 
process protects fundamental fairness in judicial proceedings); State v. 
Nail, 743 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Iowa 2007) (same). 
We begin our substantive review of the right to counsel with a 
review of the language of the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and what has previously been characterized as the “unique” 
language of article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution.  See McNabb v. 
Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 13 (Iowa 1982).  Although we decide this 
case based upon the Iowa Constitution, analysis of federal law provides 
context for our consideration and shows the important interplay between 
state and federal constitutional law in right-to-counsel and due process 
questions.   
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel 
for his defence.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  Article I, section 10 uses 
similar 
language 
but 
adds 
an 
important 
additional 
provision.  
16 
Specifically, article I, section 10 provides that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, and in cases involving the life, or liberty of an individual, 
the accused shall have a right . . . to have the assistance of counsel.”  
Iowa Const. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added).  Unlike its federal counterpart, 
the Iowa provision is double-breasted.  It has an “all criminal 
prosecutions” clause and a “cases” clause involving the life or liberty of 
an individual.    
The language of the Sixth Amendment and article I, section 10 
raise interpretive issues.  Under both the United States Constitution and 
the Iowa Constitution, the question that arises in the context of this case 
is the meaning of the term “all criminal prosecutions.”  Does the phrase 
“all criminal prosecutions” literally mean every criminal prosecution, or 
does it mean something else?  Is the term “all criminal prosecutions” 
broad enough to cover all misdemeanor cases, some misdemeanor cases, 
or none at all?  Even if “all criminal prosecutions” includes 
misdemeanors, does it mean only that there is a right to retained 
counsel, or if you are poor, does it mean there is a right to appointed 
counsel?  
In considering these questions under article I, section 10, it is 
important to note that the mere fact the phrase “all criminal 
prosecutions” is used in both the Federal and Iowa Constitutions does 
not bind us to follow the prevailing federal constitutional interpretation.  
We are free to follow or reject federal authority in interpreting our state 
constitution depending upon our view of the strength of the reasoning in 
the federal precedent.  See, e.g., State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 481 
(Iowa 2014) (“We may, of course, consider the persuasiveness of federal 
precedent, but we are by no means bound by it.”).   
17 
In addition, under the Iowa Constitution but not the Federal 
Constitution, there are additional interpretive issues posed by the “cases” 
clause.  What are we to make of the additional language in article I, 
section 10 of the Iowa Constitution, not found in the Sixth Amendment, 
which provides that the right to counsel extends not only to all criminal 
prosecutions but also to “cases involving the . . . liberty of an individual?”  
To what extent does the phrase help inform the meaning of the prior 
term, “all criminal prosecutions?”  And, to what extent does the “cases” 
language expand the scope of the right to counsel in Iowa beyond the 
right to counsel found in the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by the 
United States Supreme Court? 
Finally, 
there 
is 
a 
question 
of whether 
an 
uncounseled 
misdemeanor conviction that could not validly support incarceration can 
be used to increase imprisonment when the defendant commits a later 
crime.  If the first conviction without a lawyer cannot be used to support 
a day in jail, how can that same conviction later be used to impose an 
additional term of incarceration when the defendant commits another 
crime?  
E.  Scope of the Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases Under 
State and Federal Constitutions. 
1.  Introduction.  We now turn to consider the scope of the right to 
counsel in misdemeanor cases.  As indicated above, the question of the 
scope of the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases is critical in this case 
because of the relationship between the right to counsel in the 2003 
proceeding and the use of the 2003 conviction to enhance the 2012 
crime.  
We begin with a discussion of the English common law precedent, 
the adoption of state constitutions with right-to-counsel provisions more 
18 
expansive than the English tradition, and early state court cases dealing 
with the right to counsel.  Next, we examine the convoluted course of 
federal constitutional law regarding the right to counsel embraced in the 
Sixth Amendment.  We then return to state court cases in examining the 
extent to which the serpentine federal precedent has influenced state 
constitutional law.  Finally, we examine Iowa law regarding the right to 
appointed counsel under article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution.   
As will be seen below, we conclude article I, section 10 should not 
be interpreted in a fashion similar to United States Supreme Court 
precedent that requires a poor person suffer “actual imprisonment” 
before being entitled to the appointment of counsel in misdemeanor 
cases.  Under the Iowa Constitution, we conclude that a poor person has 
a right to appointed counsel when a statute authorizes imprisonment 
unless the defendant validly waives that right.  Because Young was 
prosecuted under a statute that authorized imprisonment, was not 
provided appointed counsel, and did not validly waive that right, it would 
be fundamentally unfair under the due process clause of the Iowa 
Constitution to use that prior conviction to enhance her later crime.     
2.  Early English traditions, the development of state constitutional 
provisions, and early state court right-to-counsel precedents.  English 
common law recognized a limited right to counsel.  Interestingly, 
however, the English common law right to counsel extended to all 
misdemeanor cases, but not to felonies.  See William M. Beaney, The 
Right to Counsel in American Courts 8–9 (1955) [hereinafter Beaney]; 
James J. Tomkovicz, The Right to the Assistance of Counsel 3 (2002) 
[hereinafter Tomkovicz].  At least one theory posits that the Crown’s 
interest in felony prosecution was just too great to allow all felony 
defendants the right to assistance of counsel to gum up the Crown’s 
19 
prosecutorial efforts.  See Tomkovicz at 3–6 (describing competing 
theories regarding why misdemeanants were allowed counsel while felons 
were not).  Indeed, it seems to have been thought that serious crimes 
threatened the existence of the monarchy itself.  See id. at 3–4.  It is also 
true that at common law, private individuals, not professional 
prosecutors, brought felony cases, so arguably denial of the right to 
counsel did not cause a substantial imbalance in the trial of the case.  
See id. at 2–3.  As noted by Professor Tomkovicz, there was no likelihood 
that a highly skilled prosecutor would take advantage of a less skilled 
defendant.  Id. at 5.   
Over time, some common law judges adopted a more relaxed 
attitude to the ban.  See Beaney at 10; Tomkovicz at 6–8.  By 1747, 
Parliament enacted a provision providing for legal counsel to those 
impeached by the House of Commons for high treason.  Tomkovicz at 8.  
Not until 1836 did Parliament eventually extend the right to counsel to 
all felonies.  Id. 
The colonial practice with respect to the right to counsel is not well 
understood.  Often times, it appears trials were informal affairs 
prosecuted by private parties.  See id. at 9.  However by the beginning of 
the American Revolution, all of the colonies employed public prosecutors 
to pursue criminal charges.  See id.  
The advent of public prosecutors seemed to have increased interest 
in providing defendants with the right to assistance of counsel.  See id. at 
9–10.  For instance, the Delaware Charter of 1701 granted “ ‘all 
Criminals . . . the same Privileges of Witnesses and Council as their 
Prosecutors.’ ”  Id. at 10 (quoting Del. Charter of 1701, § V).  The 
Pennsylvania Charter of Privileges of 1701 had a similar provision.  Id. 
(citing Pa. Charter of Privileges of 1701, § V).  Connecticut as a matter of 
20 
common law seems to have rejected the English limitations on the right 
to counsel.  Beaney at 16; Tomkovicz at 13.  A number of the colonies 
provided for statutory rights to counsel of varying shapes and sizes.  
Some of the statutes not only allowed for representation by retained 
counsel, but also provided lawyers to the accused who wanted legal 
representation.  See Beaney at 16, 21.    
Seven of the early state constitutions provided a right to counsel.  
See Tomkovicz at 11.  See generally Beaney at 19–21 (describing the 
right to counsel in early state constitutions).  The Maryland Constitution 
of 1776 provided that “in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a 
right . . . to be allowed counsel . . . .”  Md. Const. of 1776, Declaration of 
Rights, art. XIX.  The New Jersey Constitution of 1776 provided that “all 
criminals shall be admitted to the same privileges of witnesses and 
counsel, as their prosecutors are or shall be entitled to.”  N.J. Const. of 
1776, art. XVI.  The New York Constitution of 1777 stated that “in every 
trial on impeachment, or indictment for crimes or misdemeanors, the 
party impeached or indicted shall be allowed counsel, as in civil actions.”  
N.Y. Const. of 1777, art. XXXIV.  The Vermont Constitution of 1777 
declared that “in all prosecutions for criminal offenses, a man hath a 
right to be heard, by himself and his counsel . . . .”  Vt. Const. of 1777, 
ch. I, § X.  The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided that “every 
subject shall have a right to . . . be fully heard in his defence by himself, 
or his counsel at his election.”  Mass. Const. of 1780, pt. I, art. XII.  The 
New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 provided that “[e]very subject shall 
have a right . . . to be fully heard in his defence, by himself, and 
counsel.”  N.H. Const. of 1784, pt. I, art. XV.  The Delaware Constitution 
of 1792 provided that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a 
right to be heard by himself and his counsel.”  Del. Const. of 1792, art. I, 
21 
§ 7.  Eventually, all state constitutions except Virginia had a right-to-
counsel provision of some kind, and the Virginia courts eventually held 
that the right to counsel was incorporated by other state constitutional 
provisions.  See David Fellman, The Right to Counsel Under State Law, 
1955 Wis. L. Rev. 281, 281 & n.2 (1955).   
The language of these early state constitutional provisions was 
plainly more expansive than the prevailing English practice.  The use of 
the term “all criminal prosecutions” was obviously designed to address 
the gap in English law refusing to allow the right to counsel for felonies.  
See Tomkovicz at 14 (“[T]he states had dramatically departed from the 
restrictive English common law rule regarding retention of counsel in 
serious criminal prosecutions.”).  Beyond this conclusion, scholars have 
not uncovered much evidence of what state constitutional framers meant 
when adopting the broadly worded right to counsel language in the early 
state constitutions.   
The state constitutional cases regarding the right to counsel are 
few and far between each other and do not represent the development of 
a coherent, organized body of law.  Significantly, the Iowa Territorial 
Supreme Court and other state supreme courts decided in early cases 
that if a person was entitled to representation by counsel but could not 
pay for it, representation should be provided at state expense.  See Hall 
v. Washington County, 2 Greene 473, 476 (Iowa 1850) (holding a county 
is liable for compensation to an attorney appointed by the court to 
conduct the defense of an indigent prisoner); see also People v. 
Goldenson, 19 P. 161, 168 (Cal. 1888); Cutts v. State, 45 So. 491, 491 
(Fla. 1907); Delk v. State, 26 S.E. 752, 753 (Ga. 1896); Hendryx v. State, 
29 N.E. 1131, 1132 (Ind. 1882); Carpenter v. County of Dane, 9 Wis. 274, 
277 (1859).  Further, well prior to the development of the United States 
22 
Supreme Court’s doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel, state 
courts were instrumental in chipping away at the theory that because an 
attorney was an agent of the client, the client could not bring an 
ineffectiveness claim.  See generally Sara Mayeux, Ineffective Assistance 
of Counsel Before Powell v. Alabama: Lessons from History for the Future 
of the Right to Counsel, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 2161, 2162–84 (2014) (describing 
state caselaw from the 1880s through the 1920s regarding the 
foundations of current ineffective-assistance claims).  Against this state 
court backdrop, the United States Supreme Court decided Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932), and Gideon, 
372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799.  
3.  The Sixth Amendment and early federal constitutional law.  The 
United States Constitution originally, of course, did not contain a bill of 
rights, which was added to the document in 1791.  When James 
Madison introduced language regarding the right to counsel as part of 
his proposed bill of rights, there seems to have been no substantive 
debate.  See Beaney at 23–24.  Like the earlier state constitutional 
provisions, it seems clear, however, the use of the term “all criminal 
prosecutions” was designed to fill the gaps in English common law and 
thus should generally be considered an expansive term.   
Beyond that, according to one leading commentator, the founders 
seem to have left the matter of scope of the right to counsel to the courts.  
See id. at 25.  Maybe so, but the Supreme Court did not consider any 
substantial case involving the right to counsel until the twentieth 
century.  Part of the reason seems to be that states enacted statutes 
providing for the appointment of counsel in capital cases if not in all 
felony cases generally.  Further, conscientious courts may have often 
found volunteer lawyers to assist the poor.  See id. at 32.    
23 
4.  The evolution of federal constitutional law: Powell, Gideon, and 
beyond.  We begin our discussion of the modern right to counsel and its 
due process implications with a discussion of the infamous Scottsboro 
case, in which nine African-American youth were accused of raping two 
white girls, a capital offense.  See Powell, 287 U.S. at 49, 53 S. Ct. at 57, 
77 L. Ed. at 160.  The accused were tried and convicted in state court 
and therefore, although the Sixth Amendment did not apply directly to 
the proceedings, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was fully applicable.  Id. at 60, 53 S. Ct. at 60, 77 L. Ed. at 166.  The 
United States Supreme Court reversed the convictions on the ground 
that poor defendants in a capital case were entitled, as a matter of due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment, to effective assistance of 
counsel at state expense.  Id. at 71–72, 53 S. Ct. at 65, 77 L. Ed. at 172.  
In Powell, Justice Sutherland eloquently spoke of the role of counsel in 
defending poor defendants facing prosecution for capital crimes.  He 
memorably wrote: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail 
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.  
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and 
sometimes no skill in the science of law.  If charged with 
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself 
whether the indictment is good or bad.  He is unfamiliar with 
the rules of evidence.  Left without the aid of counsel he may 
be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon 
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or 
otherwise inadmissible.  He lacks both the skill and 
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense even though he 
have a perfect one.  He requires the guiding hand of counsel 
at every step in the proceedings against him.  Without it, 
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction 
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.   
24 
Id. at 68–69, 53 S. Ct. at 64, 77 L. Ed. at 170.  The central theme of 
Justice Sutherland’s opinion was the lack of reliability of convictions 
obtained without the assistance of counsel.  
Justice Sutherland further noted that “[i]n a case such as this . . . 
the right to have counsel appointed, when necessary, is a logical 
corollary from the constitutional right to be heard by counsel.”  Id. at 72, 
53 S. Ct. at 65, 77 L. Ed. at 172.  In other words, if there is a due 
process right to retained counsel, there is also a due process right to 
appointed counsel when a defendant cannot pay for retained counsel.    
The fresh and clean rhetoric of Justice Sutherland inspired judges 
and lawyers then, just as it inspires judges and lawyers today.  What is 
not generally recognized, however, is that Justice Sutherland in Powell 
built his opinion largely on state court precedents, relying extensively on 
such precedents for the central propositions of the case, namely that 
pro forma participation of counsel does not satisfy the right to counsel, 
id. at 58–59, 53 S. Ct. at 60, 77 L. Ed. at 165 (citing thirteen state court 
precedents), that the right to counsel is fundamental in character, id. at 
70–71, 53 S. Ct. at 64–65, 77 L. Ed. at 171 (citing eight state court 
cases), and that the right to have counsel appointed when necessary is a 
logical corollary from the constitutional right to be heard by counsel, id. 
at 72, 53 S. Ct. at 65, 77 L. Ed. at 172.  Although they are less well 
known than United States Supreme Court precedents like Powell, state 
court right-to-counsel decisions did much of the ice-breaking that 
allowed Powell to sail into the law books.    
Six years after Powell, the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458, 459, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1020, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 1464 (1938), considered 
whether the Sixth Amendment required counsel be appointed for 
indigents in federal felony cases.  In Zerbst, the defendants were accused 
25 
with feloniously possessing and uttering counterfeit money.  Id. at 459–
60, 58 S. Ct. at 1021, 82 L. Ed. at 1464.  They had no lawyer and were 
tried and convicted without the assistance of counsel.  Id. at 460, 58 
S. Ct. at 1021, 82 L. Ed. at 1464.  Because Zerbst was tried in federal 
court, the Sixth Amendment applied directly to the proceeding.  See id. at 
463, 58 S. Ct. at 1022–23, 82 L. Ed. at 1466. 
In Zerbst, the Supreme Court firmly declared that a criminal 
defendant in federal court has a right to counsel and that if the 
defendant could not afford counsel, counsel would be provided.  Id.  The 
Zerbst Court underscored the point by characterizing the question in 
jurisdictional terms.  Id. at 467–68, 58 S. Ct. at 1024, 82 L. Ed. at 1468.  
Representation by counsel was “an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to 
a federal court’s authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty.”  Id.  
The Zerbst Court declared that “[t]he Sixth Amendment withholds from 
federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to 
deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the 
assistance of counsel.”  Id. at 463, 58 S. Ct. at 1022–23, 82 L. Ed. at 
1466 (footnote omitted).  The Zerbst Court emphatically characterized the 
failure to provide counsel as a “jurisdictional bar” to a valid conviction 
depriving the defendant of his life or liberty.  Id. at 468, 58 S. Ct. at 
1024, 82 L. Ed. at 1468.   
The Zerbst Court further emphasized that the Sixth Amendment 
embodies 
a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average 
defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect 
himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take 
his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by 
experienced and learned counsel.  That which is simple, 
orderly, and necessary to the lawyer—to the untrained 
laymen—may appear intricate, complex, and mysterious.    
26 
Id. at 462–63, 58 S. Ct. at 1022, 82 L. Ed. at 1465–66.  As in Powell, the 
central theme of Zerbst was the lack of reliability of verdicts obtained 
without the assistance of counsel.  
The Supreme Court next returned to considering a right-to-counsel 
issue in a state court proceeding in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 456–
57, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 1253, 86 L. Ed. 1595, 1599 (1942), overruled by 
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339, 83 S. Ct. at 794, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 802.  In Betts, a 
defendant accused of robbery in a Maryland court was denied 
appointment of counsel.  Id.  The defendant subsequently pled not guilty 
and elected to be tried to the court.  Id. at 457, 62 S. Ct. at 1253–54, 86 
L. Ed. at 1599.  The defendant summoned witnesses on his behalf, cross-
examined the State’s witnesses, and examined his own.  Id. at 457, 62 S. 
Ct. at 1254, 86 L. Ed. at 1599.  He did not take the stand on his own 
behalf and was convicted by the trial court.  Id.  The conviction was 
upheld upon filing a writ of habeas corpus.  Id.  The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed.  Id. at 473, 62 S. Ct. at 
1262, 86 L. Ed. at 1607.   
The Betts Court emphasized that while the Sixth Amendment 
applies to trials in federal courts, it is only through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that a defendant may make a 
claim from a state court conviction.  Id. at 461–62, 62 S. Ct. at 1256, 86 
L. Ed. at 1601.  According to Betts, the Due Process Clause does not 
incorporate lock, stock, and barrel the entirety of the Sixth Amendment.  
Id.  Instead, due process is much more flexible and fact specific.  Id.  
According to the Betts Court, only “in certain circumstances” would the 
denial of right to counsel by a state court amount to a due process 
violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id.  The Betts Court noted 
“states should not be straight-jacketed . . . by a construction of the 
27 
Fourteenth Amendment” advanced by the appellants.  Id. at 472, 62 S. 
Ct. at 1261, 86 L. Ed. at 1607.  Thus, federalism concerns were an 
important factor in achieving a different result than in Zerbst.  With 
regard to whether a poor defendant was entitled to appointed counsel for 
felony cases in state court, the Betts Court declared that no definite 
criteria could be developed, but that the totality of circumstances needed 
to be evaluated, which included the nature of the crime, the age and 
education of the defendant, the conduct of the court and prosecuting 
officials, and the complicated nature of the offense charged and possible 
defenses related to the charge.  Id. at 472–73, 62 S. Ct. at 1261–62, 86 
L. Ed. at 1607.  The powerful and unequivocal emphasis in Powell and 
Zerbst on the lack of reliability of uncounseled convictions gave way to a 
diluted view of the right to counsel powered by federalism concerns.   
Justice Black called out the majority for its departure from the 
emphasis on the lack of reliability of uncounseled convictions.  Id. at 
474–77, 62 S. Ct. at 1262–63, 86 L. Ed. at 1607–09 (Black, J., 
dissenting).  According to Justice Black, “[a] practice cannot be 
reconciled with common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right, 
which subjects innocent men to increased dangers of conviction merely 
because of their poverty.”  Id. at 476, 62 S. Ct. at 1263, 86 L. Ed. at 1609 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Justice Black cited the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin, which in the case of Carpenter declared that it would 
make a “ ‘mockery to secure to a pauper . . . solemn constitutional 
guaranties for a full and fair trial [and then state] he must employ his 
own counsel.’ ”  Id. (quoting Carpenter, 9 Wis. at 276).  In support of his 
dissent, he attached a lengthy appendix showing that many states were 
providing counsel to indigents on a categorical basis.  Id. at 477–80, 62 
S. Ct. at 1264–65, 86 L. Ed. at 1609–11.  Although not expressed in 
28 
these terms, Justice Black essentially argued that the majority 
approached the application of Sixth Amendment right to counsel in state 
courts in lowest-common-denominator terms.    
Aside from Justice Black’s protest regarding the abandonment of 
the underlying rational of the right to counsel, the multifactored special-
circumstances test in Betts was unstable and encountered some 
resistance in the lower courts as judges routinely found special 
circumstances.  See Christine S. May, Uncounseled Misdemeanor 
Convictions and Their Unreliability for Sentence Enhancement Under the 
United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Nichols v. United States, 
114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994), 18 Hamline L. Rev. 231, 238 & n.86 (1994) 
[hereinafter May] (citing cases).  An everything-is-relevant and nothing-
is-determinative test produces wide fluctuations in results.  Twenty years 
later, in Gideon, Betts was overruled, the principle of Powell was 
extended to noncapital felony prosecutions, and parity between the Sixth 
Amendment right to appointed counsel in federal and state courts was 
restored.  Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345, 83 S. Ct. at 797, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 805–
06.   
The facts of Gideon are well known.  Gideon was charged with 
breaking and entering a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor, 
a felony under Florida law.  Id. at 336, 83 S. Ct. at 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 
800–01.  He sought appointed counsel, but the trial court advised him 
that counsel could be appointed only in capital cases.  Id. at 337, 83 S. 
Ct. at 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 801.  He attempted to defend himself, giving an 
opening statement, cross-examining witnesses, and making a closing 
statement.  Id. at 337, 83 S. Ct. at 792–93, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 801.  He was 
found guilty and received a five-year sentence.  Id.  The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that the right to counsel in criminal proceedings such 
29 
as that faced by Gideon was fundamental to a fair trial.  Id. at 344, 83 S. 
Ct. at 796, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 805.   
As in Powell and Zerbst, the animating principle behind Gideon 
was that the “ ‘guiding hand of counsel’ ” was essential in fairly 
determining the outcomes of cases in the criminal justice system.  Id. at 
344, 83 S. Ct. at 797, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 805 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–
69, 53 S. Ct. at 64, 77 L. Ed. at 170).  As noted by Justice Black, 
“[r]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary 
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor 
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided 
for him.”  Id. at 344, 83 S. Ct. at 796, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 805.  The Court in 
Gideon characterized Betts as an “abrupt break” from previous precedent 
and Gideon “restore[d] constitutional principles established to achieve a 
fair system of justice.”  Id.  
While the underlying rationale of Powell and Gideon applied to all 
criminal prosecutions, the holding in Powell applied only to capital 
offenses and in Gideon to felonies.  Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342, 345, 83 S. 
Ct. at 795, 797, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 801, 805–06; Powell, 287 U.S. at 71, 53 S. 
Ct. at 65, 77 L. Ed. at 171–72.  Yet, Gideon made short work of the claim 
that capital offenses should be distinguished from felonies, focusing not 
on the severity of the crime but the need for fundamental fairness in the 
underlying proceeding.  372 U.S. at 344, 83 S. Ct. at 796, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 
805.  Further, although state attorneys’ general in their amicus brief 
urged the court to limit the right to appointed counsel to felonies, the 
court declined to do so.  Id. at 344–45, 83 S. Ct. at 796–97, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 
805 (holding only that refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent accused 
of a noncapital felony violated the Due Process Clause); see Brief for the 
State Government Amici Curiae, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
30 
(1963) (No. 155), 1962 WL 115122, at *3, *21 (“We repeat that we are 
limiting our claim to the constitutional right to representation for 
felonies.”); Henry Clay Moore, Comment, The Right to Counsel for 
Misdemeanants in State Courts, 20 Ark. L. Rev. 156, 158 (1966).  Yet, 
under Gideon, the question of whether the Sixth Amendment required 
the appointment of counsel to assist the poor in misdemeanor 
prosecutions remained an open question.  Plainly, however, in Gideon 
the dilution of Sixth Amendment rights in state court as evidenced in 
Betts was abandoned in favor of the traditional rationale of the lack of 
reliability of uncounseled convictions.  
 
The United States Supreme Court in Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 
109, 88 S. Ct. 258, 19 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1967), considered the question of 
whether an uncounseled conviction in state court could be used to 
enhance the penalties of a later criminal conviction.  Burgett was 
convicted of assault with malice aforethought with intent to murder.  Id. 
at 110, 88 S. Ct. at 259, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 322.  Pursuant to a Texas 
recidivist statute, however, he faced life in prison if he had incurred four 
previous felony convictions.  Id. at 111, 88 S. Ct. at 260, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 
322.  Three of the convictions were for forgery in Tennessee.  Id.  During 
trial, the state offered into evidence a certified copy of one of the 
Tennessee convictions, which indicated that the defendant proceeded 
“without Counsel.”  Id. at 112, 88 S. Ct. at 260, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 323 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The State then offered a second 
version indicating there was “argument of counsel.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The question posed was whether an 
uncounseled felony conviction could be used to enhance the punishment 
for a later crime.  Id. at 115–16, 88 S. Ct. at 262, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 324–25.   
31 
 
In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court held that the 
prior Tennessee conviction could not be used to support the 
enhancement.  Id.  The Burgett Court announced that 
[t]o permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. 
Wainwright to be used against a person either to support 
guilt or enhance punishment for another offense is to erode 
the principle of that case.  Worse yet, since the defense in 
the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the 
accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that 
Sixth Amendment right. 
Id. at 115, 88 S. Ct. at 262, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 324–25 (citation omitted).  
Justice Warren returned to the theme of lack of reliability of uncounseled 
convictions, noting the case presented “a classic example of how a rule 
eroding the procedural rights of a criminal defendant on trial for his life 
or liberty can assume avalanche proportions, burying beneath it the 
integrity of the fact-finding process.”  Id. at 117, 88 S. Ct. at 263, 19 
L. Ed. 2d at 326 (Warren, C.J., concurring).  As with the other right-to-
counsel cases except for the overturned Betts, the focus was on the lack 
of reliability of the fact-finding process when a defendant is convicted 
without the assistance of counsel.  
In reaching its decision, the Court seemed to put the burden on 
the state to show that the defendant either received the assistance of 
counsel or validly waived his or her right to counsel in the prior 
proceeding.  See id. at 114–15, 88 S. Ct. at 262, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 324 
(majority opinion).  According to the Burgett Court, presuming waiver of 
counsel from a silent record was impermissible.  Id.  
 
The high court considered a similar question in United States v. 
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446, 92 S. Ct. 589, 591, 30 L. Ed. 2d 592, 595–96 
(1972).  In Tucker, a federal court imposed a sentence relying in part 
upon uncounseled felony convictions.  Id. at 444–45, 92 S. Ct. at 590, 30 
32 
L. Ed. 2d at 594–95.  The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial 
court with instructions to reconsider the sentence.  Id. at 448–49, 92 S. 
Ct. at 592–93, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 597.  Citing Burgett, the Court emphasized 
that the use of an unconstitutionally obtained felony conviction would 
erode the principle of Gideon.  Id. (citing Burgett, 389 U.S. at 115–16, 88 
S. Ct. at 262, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 324–25).  The Tucker Court emphasized 
that the trial court acted upon “misinformation of constitutional 
magnitude.”  Id. at 447, 92 S. Ct. at 592, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 596.  In a 
footnote, the Tucker Court further cited Gideon for the proposition that a 
lawyer’s help is necessary to ensure that the poor receive a fair trial.  Id. 
at 447 n.5, 92 S. Ct. at 592 n.5, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 596–97 n.5 (citing 
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344, 83 S. Ct. at 796, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 805).  Tucker 
therefore remained consistent with the underlying reliability theme of 
Powell, Zerbst, Gideon, and Burgett.   
 
In Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483–84, 92 S. Ct. 1014, 1019–20, 
31 L. Ed. 2d 374, 381–82 (1972) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court 
for a third time refused to allow an uncounseled conviction, invalid 
under Gideon, to have collateral consequences.  In Loper, the Supreme 
Court considered a habeas corpus claim in which a state court defendant 
argued it was improper for Texas prosecutors to attempt to impeach him 
using an uncounseled state court felony conviction.  Id. at 476–78, 92 S. 
Ct. at 1016–17, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 378–79.  The Supreme Court refused to 
allow such impeachment.  Id. at 483–84, 92 S. Ct. at 1019–20, 31 L. Ed. 
2d at 381–82.  According to Justice Stewart’s plurality opinion, “ ‘the 
absence of counsel impairs the reliability of [uncounseled] convictions 
just as much when used to impeach as when used as direct proof of 
guilt.’ ”  Id. at 483, 92 S. Ct. at 1019, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 382 (quoting Gilday 
v. Scafati, 428 F.2d 1027, 1029 (1st Cir. 1970)).  The reliability rationale 
33 
of Powell, Zerbst, Gideon, Burgett, and Tucker was at the heart of the 
opinion.  
After Gideon, the question remained whether the right to counsel 
extended to misdemeanor prosecutions.  Several federal appellate courts 
who considered the question after Gideon held that under the Sixth 
Amendment, a poor defendant was entitled to the appointment of counsel 
in misdemeanor cases.  See, e.g., Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263, 
269 (5th Cir. 1965); Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1942).  
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Harvey noted that while the 
key right to counsel cases involved felonies, “their rationale does not 
seem to depend on the often purely formal distinction between felonies 
and misdemeanors.”  340 F.2d at 269.  The Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit in Evans emphasized that no differentiation is made in the term 
“all criminal prosecutions” in the Sixth Amendment.  126 F.2d at 638.    
The Supreme Court first took up the issue of the application of 
Powell and Gideon principles to misdemeanor cases in Argersinger, 407 
U.S. at 26–27, 92 S. Ct. at 2007–08, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 532–33.  In 
Argersinger, a divided Florida Supreme Court ruled that the notion that a 
poor person was entitled to appointed counsel did not extend to cases in 
which punishment did not exceed six months’ imprisonment.  Id. at 26–
27, 92 S. Ct. at 2007, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 532–33.  Because the defendant in 
Argersinger was sentenced to only ninety days in jail, the Florida 
Supreme Court majority concluded that Gideon and Powell did not apply.  
Id.  
The Supreme Court reversed.  Id. at 27, 92 S. Ct. at 2008, 32 
L. Ed. 2d at 533.  In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court rejected 
the proposition that principles of Powell and Gideon did not extend to 
crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than six months.  Id. at 32–
34 
33, 92 S. Ct. at 2010, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 535–36.  Although the right to a 
jury trial might be restricted to cases involving six months or more of 
incarceration, Justice Douglas wrote that nothing in the history of the 
right to counsel suggested a similar limitation.  Id. at 29–34, 92 S. Ct. at 
2009–11, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 534–37.  Justice Douglas noted that cases 
involving short-term imprisonment may bristle with thorny constitutional 
questions that require the defendant receive the assistance of counsel in 
order to receive a fair trial.  Id. at 33, 92 S. Ct. at 2010, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 
536.  Justice Douglas further noted that counsel is needed in 
misdemeanor as well as felony cases “so that the accused may know 
precisely what he is doing, so that he is fully aware of the prospect of 
going to jail or prison, and so that he is treated fairly by the prosecution.”  
Id. at 34, 92 S. Ct. at 2011, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 536–37.  While recognizing 
the volume of misdemeanor cases, Justice Douglas cautioned against “an 
obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the 
result,” id. at 34, 92 S. Ct. at 2011, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 537, and noted there 
was evidence in empirical studies that misdemeanant defendants are 
prejudiced from “assembly-line justice” when appointed counsel is not 
provided, id. at 36, 92 S. Ct. at 2012, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 538 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Although Justice Douglas thus extended the 
fundamental fairness reasoning of Powell and Gideon to misdemeanors 
when a defendant was subsequently incarcerated, he expressly stated 
that the court “need not consider” whether the right to counsel applied 
when the “loss of liberty” is not involved.  Id. at 37, 92 S. Ct. at 2012, 32 
L. Ed. 2d at 538.  Yet, plainly, in terms of its underlying rationale, 
Argersinger adopted the reliability rationale of Powell and its long list of 
progeny. 
35 
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, filed a concurring 
opinion in Argersinger.  Id. at 44–66, 92 S. Ct. at 2016–27, 32 L. Ed. 2d 
at 542–55 (Powell, J., concurring in the result).  Justice Powell urged a 
more flexible, Betts-like, case-by-case approach to the question of the 
entitlement of a poor person to appointed counsel when facing a crime 
that was not a felony.  See id. at 62–63, 92 S. Ct. at 2025, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 
553.  Thus, in some respects, Justice Powell thought the Argersinger 
majority went too far in extending the right to appointed counsel.  See id.  
However, Justice Powell thought the majority opinion fell too short 
as well.  For instance, Justice Powell noted that the impact of a 
misdemeanor conviction on employment could present a serious 
consequence justifying the appointment of counsel.  Id. at 47–48, 92 S. 
Ct. at 2017–18, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 544–45.  Further, he noted that stigma 
may attach to a drunken-driving conviction and that losing a driver’s 
license may be more serious for some individuals than a brief stay in jail.  
Id. at 48, 92 S. Ct. at 2018, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 544.  In footnote 11, Justice 
Powell cited a wide range of potential collateral consequences, as well as 
academic literature related to them.  Id. at 48 n.11, 92 S. Ct. at 2018 
n.11, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 545 n.11.  In short, in Justice Powell’s view in 
1972, the collateral effects of a misdemeanor conviction “are frequently of 
sufficient magnitude not to be casually described by the label ‘petty.’ ”  
Id. at 48, 92 S. Ct. at 2018, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 544.   
Whether the right to counsel extended to cases in which 
imprisonment was authorized by the underlying criminal statute, but did 
not actually occur, was considered by the United States Supreme Court 
in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 368, 99 S. Ct. 1158, 1159, 59 L. Ed. 2d 
383, 385–86 (1979).  In Scott, the Illinois Supreme Court declined to 
extend Argersinger to cases in which no imprisonment was actually 
36 
imposed upon the defendant.  Id. at 369, 99 S. Ct. at 1160, 59 L. Ed. 2d 
at 386. 
The short 5–4 majority opinion in Scott was written by Justice 
Rehnquist.  Id. at 368, 99 S. Ct. at 1159, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 385.  Harkening 
back to the aberrant and overruled Betts, Justice Rehnquist stressed 
federalism concerns about extending the right to counsel further than 
the narrow holding of Argersinger.  Id. at 372, 99 S. Ct. at 1161, 59 
L. Ed. 2d at 388.  He noted that because the Sixth Amendment was now 
incorporated against the states, “special difficulties” arose because “state 
and federal contexts are often different.”  Id.  He further stated that the 
Supreme Court’s cases had departed from the literal meaning of the 
Sixth Amendment, thereby implying that the “all criminal prosecutions” 
language of the Sixth Amendment did not pose an obstacle to limiting the 
right to counsel to cases involving actual imprisonment.  Id.  While 
finding that the intentions of the Argersinger Court were not entirely 
clear, the rule enunciated in that case had proved “reasonably workable” 
whereas an extension of the rule would impose unpredictable but 
necessarily substantial costs on the “quite diverse States.”  Id. at 373, 99 
S. Ct. at 1162, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 389.  Thus, in the name of federalism and 
practicality, the approach of Powell, Zerbst, Gideon, Burgett, Tucker, and 
Argersinger was not extended to misdemeanor cases in which 
imprisonment was authorized but not actually imposed in state court.   
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, 
dissented.  Id. at 375–89, 99 S. Ct. at 1163–70, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 390–99 
(Brennan, J., dissenting).  He emphasized the language of the Sixth 
Amendment, namely, that in “all criminal prosecutions,” the accused 
shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel.  Id. at 375–76, 99 
S. Ct. at 1163, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 390–91.  While recognizing that 
37 
Argersinger took a “cautious” approach, he noted the question raised in 
Scott was expressly reserved in the case.  Id. at 378–79, 99 S. Ct. at 
1164–65, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 392–93.  According to Justice Brennan, the 
Court’s precedents showed the right to counsel is more fundamental to a 
fair trial than the right to a jury trial.  Id. at 380, 99 S. Ct. at 1165, 59 L. 
Ed. 2d at 393.  Justice Brennan emphasized that unlike many traffic or 
other regulatory offenses, the misdemeanor crime of theft carries with it 
a “moral stigma associated with common-law crimes traditionally 
recognized as indicative or moral depravity.”  Id. at 380, 99 S. Ct. at 
1165–66, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 393–94. 
According to Justice Brennan, the constitutionally required test for 
whether an accused should be afforded counsel was not an “actual 
imprisonment” test but instead an “authorized imprisonment” test.  Id. at 
382, 99 S. Ct. at 1166, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 394.  Justice Brennan saw the 
“authorized imprisonment” test as more faithful to Gideon, presenting no 
practical problems, and consistent with legislative judgments of the 
seriousness of crime.  Id. at 382–83, 99 S. Ct. at 1166–67, 59 L. Ed. 2d 
at 394–95.  In short, Justice Brennan called out the majority for jumping 
the rails of the track plainly laid down by the Court’s prior Sixth 
Amendment precedents.  
The next turn of the caselaw occurred in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 
U.S. 222, 100 S. Ct. 1585, 64 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1980) (per curiam), 
overruled by Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 
1928, 128 L. Ed. 2d 745, 755 (1994).  In Baldasar, the Supreme Court 
considered a slightly different but important question not decided in 
Scott, namely, whether an uncounseled conviction that did not result in 
actual imprisonment under Scott could be used as a predicate for 
enhancing a later offense that carried a prison term.  Id. at 222, 100 S. 
38 
Ct. at 1585, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 171–72.  A divided Illinois appellate court 
concluded such an uncounseled conviction could be used as a predicate 
to enhance the later crime.  Id. at 223–24, 100 S. Ct. at 1586, 64 L. Ed. 
2d at 172.  
The judgment of the Court was announced in a per curiam opinion 
and was supported by three separate concurring opinions that garnered 
the support of five justices.  Id. at 224–30, 100 S. Ct. at 1586–89, 64 L. 
Ed. 2d at 172–76.  In an opinion for himself and joined by Justices 
Brennan and Stevens, Justice Stewart briefly wrote that under the 
specific facts presented, the conviction violated the principles outlined in 
Scott.  Id. at 224, 100 S. Ct. at 1586, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 172–73 (Stewart, J., 
concurring).  Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, 
wrote more broadly.  Id. at 224–29, 100 S. Ct. at 1586–88, 64 L. Ed. 2d 
at 173–76 (Marshall, J., concurring).  He reinforced the proposition that 
the petitioner had been deprived of his liberty “as a result of [the first] 
criminal trial could not be clearer.”  Id. at 226, 100 S. Ct. at 1587, 64 L. 
Ed. 2d at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Justice Marshall 
emphasized a conviction that could not support a one day jail sentence 
could not support a subsequent conviction under a repeat offender 
statute imposing lengthy incarceration.  Id. at 226–27, 100 S. Ct. at 
1587, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 173–74.  In a third brief opinion, Justice Blackmun 
concurred, noting Baldasar was entitled to counsel under his dissent in 
Scott because in the underlying proceeding he faced the possibility of 
incarceration for more than six months.  Id. at 229–30, 100 S. Ct. at 
1589, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 176 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice White, and 
Justice Rehnquist dissented.  Id. at 230–35, 100 S. Ct. at 1589–92, 64 L. 
Ed. 2d at 176–80 (Powell, J., dissenting).  He argued the subsequent 
39 
enhanced conviction was valid under Scott because the defendant had 
the assistance of counsel during his prosecution for the enhanced 
offense.  Id. at 231, 100 S. Ct. at 1589, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 177.    
The multiple opinions in Baldasar caused confusion in the lower 
courts.  The result of the case was clear, but which opinion was the 
narrowest opinion that, under the traditional approach to fractured 
opinions, formed the holding of the case was less so.  The courts 
splintered.  Many, but not all, saw the core holding of Baldasar, that an 
uncounseled conviction was invalid for the purpose of collaterally 
enhancing a sentence, as the precise result, relying upon Justice 
Marshall’s opinion.  See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 854 
(9th Cir. 1991), abrogated by Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748, 114 S. Ct. at 
1928, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 755; Lovell v. State, 678 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Ark. 
1984), abrogated by Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748, 114 S. Ct. at 1928, 128 
L. Ed. 2d at 755; State v. Laurick, 575 A.2d 1340, 1347 (N.J. 1990), 
abrogated by Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748, 114 S. Ct. at 1928, 128 L. Ed. 2d 
at 755.  Other courts relied primarily on the opinion of Justice 
Blackmun.  See, e.g., Hlad v. State, 565 So. 2d 762, 764–67 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1990) (en banc); State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 175–76 (N.D. 
1985).  Still others seem to have regarded the opinion as hopelessly 
splintered and without much precedential value.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1990); May, 18 Hamline L. Rev. at 
253–55 (citing various theories employed by courts in interpreting 
Baldasar); Kirsten M. Nelson, Nichols v. United States and the Collateral 
Use of Uncounseled Misdemeanors in Sentence Enhancement, 37 B.C. L. 
Rev. 557, 570–72 (1996) (same).   
The opaqueness of Baldasar was resolved for federal constitutional 
purposes in Nichols, 511 U.S. 738, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 128 L. Ed. 2d 745.  
40 
In Nichols, a federal criminal defendant received additional points under 
United States Sentencing Guidelines as the result of a state 
misdemeanor conviction for driving while under the influence for which 
he was fined but not incarcerated.  Id. at 740, 114 S. Ct. at 1924, 128 L. 
Ed. 2d at 750.  Because of the increase in points, the maximum sentence 
of imprisonment increased from 210 to 235 months.  Id.  The defendant 
claimed the increase in points was not allowed under Baldasar.  Id. at 
741, 114 S. Ct. at 1924, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 750.  The district court 
disagreed and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed.  Id. at 741–42, 114 S. Ct. at 1924–25, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 
750–51. 
A divided United States Supreme Court affirmed.  Id. at 742, 114 
S. Ct. at 1925, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 751.  In a majority opinion by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that a sentencing court may consider 
a 
defendant’s 
previous 
uncounseled 
misdemeanor 
conviction 
in 
sentencing a defendant for a subsequent offense so long as the 
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction did not result in a sentence of 
imprisonment.  Id. at 748–49, 114 S. Ct. at 1928, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 755.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that enhancement statutes do not 
change the penalty for the original uncounseled misdemeanor, but 
impose penalties only for the last offense committed by the defendant.  
Id. at 746–47, 114 S. Ct. at 1927, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 753–54.     
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, 
dissented.  Id. at 754–65, 114 S. Ct. at 1931–37, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 758–65 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Reminiscent of Justice Brennan’s dissent in 
Scott, Justice Blackmun’s opinion stressed the right to counsel applied to 
“all criminal prosecutions.”  Id. at 754–55, 114 S. Ct. at 1931, 128 L. Ed. 
2d at 758–59.  He argued the animating principle of the cases was “that 
41 
no indigent [should be] deprived of his liberty as a result of a proceeding 
in which he lacked the guiding hand of counsel.”  Id. at 757, 114 S. Ct. 
at 1932, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 760.  Justice Blackmun wrote that while the 
subsequently enhanced conviction did not increase the penalties for the 
original offense for purposes of double jeopardy, it was still undeniable 
that Nichols’s uncounseled conviction resulted in more than two years’ 
imprisonment.  Id. at 757, 114 S. Ct. at 1933, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 761.  
Justice Blackmun argued that a conviction that is invalid for purposes of 
the offense itself remains invalid for purposes of increasing the term of 
imprisonment imposed for a subsequent offense.  Id.  He further argued 
the majority opinion was inconsistent with Burgett and Tucker, decided 
only a few years earlier.  Id. at 762–63, 114 S. Ct. at 1935, 128 L. Ed. 2d 
at 763–64.   
Further, Justice Blackmun questioned the reliability of an 
uncounseled conviction.  He emphasized that a rule that an uncounseled 
misdemeanor conviction can never form the basis for a term of 
imprisonment is faithful to Gideon’s admonition that “ ‘any person haled 
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial 
unless counsel is provided.’ ”  Id. at 762, 114 S. Ct. at 1935, 128 L. Ed. 
2d at 764 (quoting Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344, 83 S. Ct. at 796, 9 L. Ed. 2d 
at 805).  He noted a study, cited by Justice Douglas in Argersinger, 
showing misdemeanants represented by counsel were five times more 
likely to emerge from police court with all charges dismissed as those 
who have no representation.  Id. at 763, 114 S. Ct. at 1936, 128 L. Ed. 
2d at 764 (citing Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 36, 92 S. Ct. at 2012, 32 L. Ed. 
2d at 538).  According to Justice Blackmun: 
Given the utility of counsel [in misdemeanor cases], the 
inherent risk of unreliability in the absence of counsel, and 
42 
the severe sanction of incarceration that can result directly 
or indirectly from an uncounseled misdemeanor, there is no 
reason in law or policy to construe the Sixth Amendment to 
exclude the guarantee of counsel where the conviction 
subsequently results in an increased term of incarceration. 
Id.  In any event, both Scott and Nichols departed from the traditional 
Sixth Amendment reliability rationale driven by federalism and 
practicality concerns.  
Most recently, the Supreme Court decided Alabama v. Shelton, 535 
U.S. 654, 122 S. Ct. 1764, 152 L. Ed. 2d 888 (2002).  In Shelton, the 
Supreme Court considered whether a misdemeanor assault conviction in 
which a sentence of thirty-days’ imprisonment was suspended with 
probation imposed was the kind of criminal proceeding entitling the 
accused to a lawyer.  Id. at 657–58, 122 S. Ct. at 1767, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 
895.  In Shelton, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that a 
suspended sentence constitutes “a term of imprisonment” under 
Argersinger and Scott even though incarceration was not immediate or 
inevitable.  Id. at 659, 122 S. Ct. at 1768, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 896.  The 
Supreme Court affirmed.  Id. at 674, 122 S. Ct. at 1776, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 
905–06.  In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the majority first recognized 
the “actual imprisonment” test of Argersinger and Scott.  Id. at 662, 122 
S. Ct. at 1769–70, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 898.  Applying an “actual 
imprisonment” test, the Court concluded “[a] suspended sentence is a 
prison term imposed for the offense of conviction.”  Id. at 662, 122 S. Ct. 
at 1770, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 898.  The majority rejected the view that 
counsel 
could 
be 
appointed 
when 
probation 
revocation 
was 
contemplated, noting that under applicable state law, the issue at that 
point was narrow and did not provide for the relitigation of the 
underlying offense.  Id. at 667, 122 S. Ct. at 1772, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 901.  
Addressing the argument that requiring counsel in such cases would be 
43 
unduly burdensome, the majority noted “most jurisdictions already 
provide a state-law right to appointed counsel more generous than that 
afforded by the Federal Constitution.”  Id. at 668, 122 S. Ct. at 1773, 152 
L. Ed. 2d at 902 (citing Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748 n.12, 114 S. Ct. 1928 
n.12, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 755 n.12).   
Four members of the Supreme Court dissented in Shelton.  Id. at 
674–81, 122 S. Ct. at 1776–80, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 906–10 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  Writing for the dissenters, Justice Scalia emphasized that 
actual imprisonment was the touchstone triggering the right to counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at 675, 122 S. Ct. at 1776, 152 L. Ed. 
2d at 906.  The dissenters emphasized that actual imprisonment in 
Shelton was only a contingency and would occur only if a future 
probation violation occurred and if the state court remedy for the 
probation violation was actual imprisonment.  Id. at 675–76, 122 S. Ct. 
at 1777, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 906–07.  In other words, imposition of a 
suspended sentence did not result in actual imprisonment triggering the 
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.  See id.  
Finally, there is one additional case which, though not dealing with 
the right of a poor person to appointed counsel in misdemeanor 
prosecutions, has some bearing on the analysis.  In Padilla v. Kentucky, 
559 U.S. 356, 359–60, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284, 289–90 
(2010), the United States Supreme Court held that a lawyer who does not 
advise a client of the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction 
may provide ineffective assistance of counsel.  The immigration 
consequences of a criminal conviction have, of course, been considered 
“collateral consequences” and ordinarily counsel have not been held to 
have an obligation to explain them to a client.  See id. at 375–76, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1487–88, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 300 (Alito, J., concurring).  However, in 
44 
Padilla, the Supreme Court recognized that the collateral consequences—
namely deportation—may be more significant than the sanctions 
available in the underlying proceeding.  Id. at 368, 130 S. Ct. at 1483, 
176 L. Ed. 2d 284, 295 (majority opinion).  Padilla’s recognition that the 
collateral consequence of deportation may be more powerful than 
criminal sanctions including “actual imprisonment” tends to undermine 
the categorical rule of Scott that “actual imprisonment” is a special 
sanction and is meaningfully more severe than the other consequences of 
criminal convictions.  If Justice Scalia is right, who wrote in dissent that 
the principle in Padilla could not be contained but would expand to other 
collateral consequences, then the theoretical underpinning of Scott may 
be unraveling.  See id. at 388–92, 130 S. Ct. at 1494–97, 176 L. Ed. 2d 
284, 307–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
In summary, the extent to which poor people are entitled to the 
assistance of counsel in misdemeanor cases has been hotly contested in 
the United States Supreme Court.  While the animating rationale of 
Powell, Zerbst, Gideon, Burgett, Tucker, and Argersinger stressed the role 
of counsel in producing fair results, the majority in Scott and Nichols 
dramatically changed the emphasis to practicality considerations and 
notions of federalism.  
But even the “actual imprisonment” test of Scott and Nichols has 
not proved satisfactory to the majority of the Court, and in Shelton, the 
right to counsel was triggered by a sentence that could eventually lead to 
actual incarceration.  In addition, it is at least arguable that Padilla 
suggests the bright-line distinction between “actual imprisonment” and 
other consequences of criminal conviction may no longer be valid.  
Padilla may indicate a renewed receptivity to Justice Powell’s concurring 
opinion in Argersinger, which asserted that important collateral impacts 
45 
such as loss of employment or loss of a driver’s license might be far more 
important to a poor person than a short stint in jail.  See Argersinger, 
407 U.S. at 48, 92 S. Ct. at 2018, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 544–45 (Powell, J., 
concurring in the result).     
Until modified by the United States Supreme Court, however, Scott 
stands for the proposition that under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, a poor misdemeanant defendant does not have a 
right to counsel unless “actual imprisonment” actually occurs regardless 
of the collateral consequences or the fairness of the underlying 
proceeding.  440 U.S. at 369, 99 S. Ct. at 1160, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 386.  
Nichols stands for the proposition that a valid misdemeanor conviction, 
which includes an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction when no 
imprisonment was imposed, may be used in a sentence enhancement 
scheme without running afoul of the Sixth Amendment.  511 U.S. at 
748–49, 114 S. Ct. at 1928, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 755.  The question is: do we 
reach the same results under the Iowa Constitution?  
5.  State law regarding the right to counsel for misdemeanants.  In 
order to determine whether we should follow the reasoning of United 
States Supreme Court precedent in interpreting our state constitution, 
the precedents of other states can be instructive.  See Baldon, 829 
N.W.2d at 818 (Appel, J., specially concurring) (noting other states’ 
constitutional analysis “can serve as a springboard for [our own] 
analysis”).   
As pointed out in Nichols and Shelton, state law generally provides 
counsel for poor people more generously than the caselaw of the United 
States Supreme Court under the Sixth Amendment.  See Shelton, 535 
U.S. at 668, 122 S. Ct. at 1773, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 902; Nichols, 511 U.S. 
at 748 n.12, 114 S. Ct. at 1928 n.12, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 755 n.12.  These 
46 
more generous provisions are often based in statute, rule, or the exercise 
of supervisory powers by the judiciary.  According to a 2009 survey, nine 
states by statute provided counsel in all, or virtually all criminal 
proceedings; fifteen states provided counsel for any offenses punishable 
by imprisonment; eight states provided counsel for offenses punishable 
by incarceration or a fine of more than a specified amount, or for any 
offense with a minimal incarceration period or fine; fourteen states 
provided counsel for any criminal offense except when imprisonment is 
not authorized; and five states required a sentence of actual 
imprisonment for a defendant to be entitled to court-appointed counsel.  
See Marcus, 21 St. Thomas L. Rev. at 164–65 & nn. 141–46 (citing state 
statutes).   
We begin our substantive discussion of state constitutional law by 
noting that prior to Scott, a number of state supreme courts held that the 
“all criminal prosecutions” type language in their state constitutions was 
broad enough to cover misdemeanors.  See, e.g., In re Johnson, 398 P.2d 
420, 422 (Cal. 1965) (noting California Constitution provides right to 
counsel “in criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever,” which 
includes misdemeanors); Bolkovac v. State, 98 N.E.2d 250, 252–53 (Ind. 
1951) (observing Indiana Constitution provides for the right to counsel in 
“all criminal prosecutions” and makes no distinction between felonies 
and misdemeanors); Decker v. State, 150 N.E. 74, 76 (Ohio 1925) (noting 
Ohio Constitution providing for counsel to appear “in any trial, in any 
court” includes misdemeanor prosecutions); Hunter v. State, 288 P.2d 
425, 428 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955) (noting the “all criminal prosecutions” 
language under the Oklahoma Constitution and finding that “[n]o 
distinction is drawn between a felony or misdemeanor”); Brown v. Dist. 
Ct., 570 P.2d 52, 55 (Or. 1977) (en banc) (observing that “all criminal 
47 
prosecutions” in Oregon Constitution includes all conduct that the 
legislature has defined as a criminal offense).  These cases often involved 
the right to retained counsel rather than appointed counsel, but if the 
right to have the assistance of retained counsel in one’s defense is 
fundamental to the fairness of the proceeding, how can a proceeding be 
fair if a poor person is required to proceed without counsel? 
With respect to the Nichols question of whether a valid but 
uncounseled 
misdemeanor 
conviction 
can 
be 
used 
to 
enhance 
incarceration in a subsequent offense, a number of state courts after 
Baldasar held under their state constitutions that a poor person’s 
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be used to enhance a 
subsequent criminal offense.  See, e.g., State v. Dowd, 478 A.2d 671, 678 
(Me. 1984), overruled by State v. Cook, 706 A.2d 603, 605 (Me. 1998).    
After Nichols, however, a number of states changed course and 
followed the new United States Supreme Court precedent.  For example, 
the Maine Supreme Court overruled its prior precedent under its state 
constitution to conform with the new federal precedent.  Cook, 706 A.2d 
at 605.  The West Virginia Supreme Court overruled its cases to follow 
the new federal precedent.  See State ex rel. Webb v. McCarty, 542 S.E.2d 
63, 66–67 (W. Va. 2000) (citing State v. Hopkins, 453 S.E.2d 317, 324 
(W. Va. 1994)).  At the time of their decisions, these state supreme courts 
generally followed a highly deferential approach to federal precedents 
and, as such, their opinions are conclusory in nature.  See State v. 
Weeks, 681 A.2d 86, 88 (N.H. 1996); State v. Porter, 671 A.2d 1280, 
1282–84 (Vt. 1996).   
Several states have pursued their own path under their state 
constitutions or statutes.  For example, in Brisson v. State, 955 P.2d 888, 
891 (Wyo. 1998), the Wyoming Supreme Court held the requirement 
48 
under a Wyoming statute that counsel “shall be appointed” for “serious 
crimes” included cases in which incarceration was a practical possibility.  
Brisson noted the clear invitation in Nichols that states were free to 
implement stricter standards.  Id. (citing Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748 n.12, 
114 S. Ct at 1129 n.12, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 755 n.12).  Although the case 
involved 
statutory 
grounds, 
the 
Wyoming 
Supreme 
Court 
also 
announced that it would “decline to follow the United States Supreme 
Court’s actual incarceration approach” and cited State v. Sinagoga, 918 
P.2d 228, 241 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996), overruled in part on other grounds by 
State v. Veikoso, 74 P.3d 575, 583 n.8 (Haw. 2003), a case under the 
Hawaii Constitution.  Brisson, 955 P.2d at 891.  The Brisson court 
further emphasized that its concern arose from “the reliability of 
uncounseled convictions.”  Id. (“In order to allow a sentencing court to 
consider previous convictions, we must be convinced that such 
convictions are reliable.”).   
Similarly, in Sinagoga, the Hawaii appellate court adopted 
reasoning independent from Nichols under the Hawaii Constitution.  918 
P.2d at 242 (choosing “not to follow the rationale in Nichols” in the 
context of consecutive term sentencing).  The Sinagoga court relied 
heavily on the language of Burgett and Tucker, reasoning that the 
reliability of the underlying prior convictions is the “linchpin” for due 
process consideration.  Id. at 238, 241.  Although the Hawaii right-to-
counsel provision has distinctive language, the Sinagoga court utilized a 
functional rather than textual analysis.  See Haw. Const. art. I, § 14; 
Sinagoga, 918 P.2d at 240 n.12, 241. 
In State v. Henes, the North Dakota Supreme Court, citing state 
caselaw precedent from 1985, noted that “ ‘absent a valid waiver of the 
right to counsel the resulting [uncounseled misdemeanor] conviction 
49 
cannot, under art. I, § 12, [of the North Dakota Constitution] be used to 
enhance a term of imprisonment for a subsequent offense.’ ”  763 N.W.2d 
502, 505 (N.D. 2009) (quoting Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 178–79 (recognizing 
“the right to counsel under [the North Dakota] Constitution is 
fundamental because it enables an accused to procure a fair trial”)); see 
also City of Grand Forks v. Mata, 517 N.W.2d 626, 630 (N.D. 1994) (“Orr’s 
practical consequence is that, regardless of the penalty to be imposed, a 
court must afford a nonindigent defendant the opportunity to retain 
counsel, appoint counsel for an indigent defendant, or obtain a valid 
waiver of counsel on the record if that conviction is to be used as a basis 
for enhancing the penalty for a subsequent conviction.”). 
In short, the North Dakota Supreme Court has followed the 
fundamental fairness rationale of Powell, Zerbst, Gideon, Burgett, Tucker, 
and Argersinger, and not the federalism and practicality rationales of 
Scott and Nichols. 
The Florida Supreme Court also recently refused to follow federal 
precedent.  The Florida Supreme Court has employed similar analysis 
under article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution, which declares 
that in “all criminal prosecutions,” the accused has “the right . . . to be 
heard in person, by counsel or both.”  Fla. Const. art. I, § 16(a).  The 
Florida trail begins with Hlad, 585 So. 2d at 930 and State v. Beach, 592 
So. 2d 237, 238 (Fla. 1992).  After the Supreme Court decided Nichols, in 
State v. Kelly, 999 So. 2d 1029, 1032–33 (Fla. 2008), the State of Florida 
urged the Florida Supreme Court to abandon Hlad and Beach and adopt 
the Nichols approach.  The Florida Supreme Court declined to do so.  Id. 
at 1039.  The court, like many of the other state supreme courts rejecting 
the Nichols approach, focused on the reliability of the uncounseled 
convictions.  Id. at 1048–49.  The Kelly court noted that the unreliability 
50 
of prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions “does not turn on the 
length of the prospective term of imprisonment,” but rather “on the fact 
that even an uncounseled innocent gains little by contesting a ‘petty’ 
misdemeanor where the prosecuting attorney is offering a low fine and 
community service in exchange for a guilty or no-contest plea.”  Id. at 
1051.  
In summary, state courts too have wrestled with the questions 
inherent in Scott and Nichols, with varying results.  Some, but not all, 
rely on state constitutional language different from the Sixth Amendment 
in departing from federal precedent.  Aside from linguistic differences, 
those courts that emphasize the fundamental fairness principle as the 
bedrock principle, rather than the federalism and practicality concerns of 
Scott and Nichols, tend to follow Powell and its progeny.  Jurisdictions 
that are inclined to follow the federal model through a lockstep approach 
even if it requires overturning recent state constitutional precedent have 
tended to follow the Supreme Court’s lead. 
6.  Post-Gideon legislation, rulemaking, and caselaw developments 
regarding the right to counsel in Iowa.  We begin our discussion with 
legislative and rulemaking developments.  As early as 1860, the Iowa 
Code provided that if a defendant “appear[s] for arraignment without 
counsel, he must be informed by the court, that it is his right to have 
counsel . . . and [if he] is unable to employ any, [the court must] assign 
him counsel.”  See Iowa Code § 4685 (1860).  This right to counsel 
extended not only to felons, but also to misdemeanants when the penalty 
might exceed a fine of $100 or imprisonment for more than thirty days, 
i.e. in the case of indictable misdemeanors (which today include serious 
and aggravated misdemeanors).  Id. § 4499(3); see Wright v. Denato, 178 
N.W.2d 339, 342 (Iowa 1970) (holding “an indigent defendant charged 
51 
with an indictable misdemeanor is entitled to appointment of counsel 
upon request”); Op. Iowa Att’y Gen. 160–62 (1964) (“[C]ounsel must be 
appointed for indigent defendants accused of felonies and indictable 
misdemeanors at the preliminary hearing.”); see also Op. Iowa Att’y Gen. 
179–82 (1966) (same).  Thus, long before Gideon, the statutory policy in 
Iowa provided counsel for most misdemeanants.    
In 1976, the Iowa legislature enacted statutory provisions 
completely revising criminal procedure laws.  See 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 
1245, ch. 2, div. XIII (effective beginning Jan. 1, 1978) (currently found 
at Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.1–.76).  At that time, the legislature passed a vague 
provision in a new section relating to the trial of simple misdemeanors 
which stated that “[i]n appropriate cases” Iowa courts shall appoint 
counsel to assist in the defense of indigent defendants.  Id. § 1302, r. 42.  
The following year, in 1977, the legislature changed the language to 
require the appointment of counsel for indigents when the defendant 
faced the “possibility of imprisonment.”  1977 Iowa Acts ch. 153, § 85.  
This statutory provision was in place at the time Scott was decided.  We 
subsequently incorporated the “possibility of imprisonment” language 
into what is now Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.61(2).    
Thus, under Iowa legislative enactment and court rule, the right to 
counsel in Iowa has been extended to all criminal proceedings in which 
there is “a possibility of imprisonment” since before Scott was decided.  
Although the Supreme Court in Scott later adopted a more restrictive 
approach, the Iowa statute, replaced by the subsequent verbatim court 
rule, was not altered and remains on the books today.  See Iowa R. Crim. 
P. 2.61(2).  
We now turn to Iowa caselaw developments related to the right to 
counsel.  Our early cases deal with the entitlement of counsel to payment 
52 
pursuant to statutory provisions providing for the appointment of 
counsel.  See, e.g., Ferguson v. Pottawattamie County, 224 Iowa 516, 
518, 278 N.W. 223, 224 (1938); Hall, 2 Greene at 476.  Although these 
cases evince some solicitude to the role of counsel, they have no 
particular relevance to the constitutional question presented in this case.   
We have considered numerous right-to-counsel cases in which the 
defendant only invoked the Sixth Amendment.  See, e.g., State v. Wilkins, 
687 N.W.2d 263, 264–65 (Iowa 2004) (per curiam); State v. Cooper, 343 
N.W.2d 485, 486 (Iowa 1984), overruled by Wilkens, 687 N.W.2d at 265; 
Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d at 10.  Particularly instructive is Osmundson. 
In Osmundson, an indigent was facing a jail sentence for contempt of 
court.  315 N.W.2d at 10.  The indigent claimed he was entitled to 
appointment of counsel at public expense.  Id. at 11.  We agreed.  Id. at 
14.  In coming to our conclusion, we noted that “we . . . make no attempt 
to arrive at our own independent interpretation of the United States 
Constitution, but follow the federal decisions as we understand them.”  
Id. at 13.  Citing the “unique language” of article I, section 10 of the Iowa 
Constitution (“In all criminal prosecutions, and in cases involving the . . . 
liberty of an individual the accused shall have a right . . . to have the 
assistance of counsel.”), we observed the petition did not raise the 
question of whether a poor person could claim entitlement to counsel in 
a contempt proceeding under it.  Id.  Nor were we required to examine 
the Iowa rules of criminal procedure because the case was not a criminal 
prosecution.  Id. at 13–14. 
We considered two cases after Gideon that dealt with the federal 
right to counsel in misdemeanor cases.  In Cooper, 343 N.W.2d at 486, 
we considered whether two prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions 
could be used to enhance a theft conviction to theft in the third degree, 
53 
the very issue posed in this case.  We concluded that they could not.  Id.  
In support of our holding, we cited “the reasoning in Baldasar,” “our own 
view of the importance of counsel,” and “[t]he lack of reliability [of] an 
uncounseled conviction.”  Id.  We noted the collateral consequences of 
conviction on the enhanced charge could include fines, social stigma, 
loss of a job, and decreased employment prospects.  Id.  While we cited 
Sixth Amendment caselaw, we also cited two state law cases, State v. 
Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 903–05 (Minn. 1983), and State v. Grenvik, 
628 P.2d 1195, 1196–97 (Or. 1981) (en banc), abrogated by State v. 
Probst, 124 P.3d 1237, 1245 (Or. 2005), which precluded use of 
uncounseled misdemeanors to enhance a subsequent crime under state 
law.  Cooper, 343 N.W.2d at 486.  Among the various interpretations 
swirling around the courts after Baldasar, our decision in Cooper is most 
consistent with Justice Marshall’s opinion.  Cf. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 
224–29, 100 S. Ct. at 1186–88, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 173–75 (Marshall, J., 
concurring).   
After the Supreme Court decided Nichols, we backtracked from 
Cooper and sought to follow the new federal precedent in a per curiam 
opinion in Wilkins, 687 N.W.2d at 265.  In Wilkins, the sole claim was 
whether the use of uncounseled convictions to enhance a later crime 
violated the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at 264–65.  No issues were raised in 
Wilkins under the Iowa Constitution.  See id.  We stated that once the 
Supreme Court ruled in Nichols, “our own view of the importance of 
counsel,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), and our concerns about 
the reliability of prior convictions were now irrelevant on the federal 
constitutional issue subsequently teed up and squarely decided in 
Nichols.  Id. (citing Cooper, 343 N.W.2d at 486).  There was no 
recognition of the nuance in Justice Souter’s Nichols opinion, which 
54 
stressed that the misdemeanor convictions were used as part of a 
sentencing structure that preserved at least some discretion for the trial 
court.  Compare id., with Nichols, 511 U.S. at 749–54, 114 S. Ct. at 
1929–31, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 755–58 (Souter, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  In Wilkins, there was no follow-up on the tantalizing 
suggestion in Osmundson regarding the “unique language” of article I, 
section 10 of the Iowa Constitution or of the Iowa Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.  Compare Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d at 13, with Wilkens, 687 
N.W.2d at 265. 
Finally, in Allen, 690 N.W.2d at 686, an indigent defendant claimed 
that under the Iowa Constitution, prior uncounseled misdemeanor 
convictions could not be used to enhance a subsequent crime even when 
actual incarceration did not occur as required in Scott and Nichols.  The 
defendant did not cite a specific provision of the Iowa Constitution, but 
did cite Cooper, 243 N.W.2d at 485, and generally argued the 
unreliability of uncounseled convictions precluded their use in the 
enhancement of the subsequent charge.  Allen, 690 N.W.2d at 686–87.  
In Allen, we briefly recognized the “ebb and flow” of United States 
Supreme Court decisions beginning with Argersinger and ending in 
Nichols.  Id. at 687–89.  We then proceeded to consider the Iowa 
constitutional claims.  Id. at 689–92.  Remarkably, we did not cite the 
“unique language” of article I, section 10 as in Osmundson, but instead 
inaccurately declared that the language was “textually similar” to the 
federal counterpart.  Id. at 690.  Although Allen states that other state 
courts who declined to follow Nichols did so with distinctive language in 
their state constitutions “authoriz[ing] the possibility of incarceration,” 
id. at 690–91 (emphasis omitted), the Iowa language stating that the 
55 
right to counsel exists in “cases involving liberty” seems to do just that, 
Iowa Const. art. I, § 10.    
We declared in Allen that there must be some principled basis for 
distinguishing Nichols.  Allen, 690 N.W.2d at 690.  But, as is apparent, 
particularly in our recent cases, there is no presumption of the 
correctness of federal law.   See Short, 851 N.W.2d at 486–87 (noting 
there is no presumption that federal construction of similar language is 
correct); Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 821 (Appel, J., specially concurring) 
(“[T]here is no presumption that . . . federal law is the correct 
approach.”); State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Iowa 2010) (same).  
Instead, federal precedent has a bearing on our interpretation of state 
law only to the extent its reasoning persuades us.  See Ochoa, 792 
N.W.2d at 267. 
There are substantial reasons to question the reasoning of Nichols.  
The Allen court failed to recognize that Scott, upon which Nichols 
critically relied, was based upon federalism and pragmatic concerns that 
had no application in Iowa.  The strong emphasis in Scott on its 
federalism concern about a one-size-fits-all rule for the diverse states has 
no bearing on determining questions of state constitutional law that 
impact only one state.  In addition, although the Allen court mimicked 
the speculative fiscal concerns in Scott by stating that a decision to 
require counsel for poor misdemeanor defendants would impose 
“significant additional burdens on the criminal justice system,” 690 
N.W.2d at 692, the Allen court was apparently not familiar with Iowa’s 
long standing legislative policy, now embraced in Iowa Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 2.61(2), that poor persons are entitled to appointment of 
counsel in misdemeanor cases when there is a “possibility of 
imprisonment,” a standard consistent with Justice Brennan’s dissent in 
56 
Scott.  See Scott, 440 U.S. at 375–89, 99 S. Ct. at 1163–70, 59 L. Ed. 2d 
at 390–99 (Brennan, J., dissenting).     
The Allen court also failed to recognize that in Cooper, we 
emphasized our “own view of the importance of counsel,” the “lack of 
reliability of uncounseled convictions,” and cited cases relying on state 
law to prohibit sentencing enhancements arising from uncounseled 
misdemeanor convictions.  Cooper, 343 N.W.2d at 486.  The powerful 
language in Powell, Zerbst, Gideon, Burgett, Tucker, and Argersinger 
regarding the role of counsel in promoting the reliability of the fact-
finding process in criminal proceedings regardless of the severity of 
punishment is entirely ignored.  The Allen opinion contains no 
discussion at all about the realities of the management of the 
misdemeanor docket or the Argersinger concern about “assembly-line 
justice.”  Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 36, 92 S. Ct. at 2012, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 
538 (internal quotation marks omitted).  And, the Allen court did not 
evince awareness of the dramatic increase and rapid expansion of 
collateral consequences for even minor offenses such as shoplifting, 
theft, or vagrancy. 
Finally, and understandably, the Allen court was not in a position 
to consider developments that occurred after the case was decided.  
Although the Allen court declared it did not “detect a trend in our sister 
state courts to abandon the federal analysis,” 690 N.W.2d at 690, the 
Allen court did not have the benefit of the Florida case declining to follow 
Nichols, see Kelly, 999 So. 2d at 1039.  It also was not aware of Padilla 
and its potential undermining of the Nichols rationale.  See Padilla, 559 
U.S. at 368, 130 S. Ct. at 1483, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 294. 
For the above reasons, we conclude Allen is fundamentally flawed 
and the issue presented, namely, whether the uncounseled misdemeanor 
57 
conviction of a poor person facing the possibility of incarceration may be 
used to enhance a subsequent crime, should be considered anew. 
F.  Analysis of Scope of Article I, Section 10 for Misdemeanor 
Cases. 
1.  Textual analysis.  We begin our discussion by noting the force 
of the plain language of the Iowa Constitution, article I, section 10.  The 
language provides that the right to counsel applies “in all criminal 
prosecutions.”  Iowa Const. art. I, § 10.  It does not say some criminal 
prosecutions.  It does not say felonies only.  And, of course, the text says 
nothing at all about “actual incarceration.”   
A plain reading of the constitutional text causes us to question the 
reasoning of Scott and Nichols.  We are not dealing with an open-textured 
phrase such as “privileges and immunities” or “due process of law” which 
are inherently, if not deliberately, ambiguous and require a process of 
constant reinterpretation and reappraisal.  We do not deny there can be 
important line-interpretive questions regarding the meaning of the 
phrase.  There is, for instance, a substantial question as to when a 
criminal prosecution begins.  But the language of the “all criminal 
prosecutions” provision of article I, section 10 is directed toward 
providing counsel in order to avoid the risk of conviction, not the risk of 
incarceration.  And if this choice of language means anything, it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the phrase “all criminal 
prosecutions” was expressly designed to avoid judicially imposed slicing 
and dicing of criminal prosecutions into two or more categories.  See, 
e.g., In re Johnson, 398 P.2d at 422; Bolkovac, 98 N.E.2d at 255; Decker, 
150 N.E. at 76; Hunter, 288 P.2d at 428; Brown, 570 P.2d at 55.  The bill 
of rights of the Iowa Constitution embraces the notion of “inalienable 
58 
rights,” not rights that shrink and disappear based upon currently 
fashionable transient pragmatic assessments.  See Iowa Const. art. I, § 1.    
Our linguistic concerns are exacerbated by the double-breasted 
nature of the Iowa Constitution’s right-to-counsel provision.  Not only 
does the Iowa Constitution expressly apply in “all criminal prosecutions,” 
it also applies in “cases involving the life, or liberty of an individual.”  Id. 
art. I, § 10.  Unlike the “all criminal prosecutions” language, the liberty 
language of the “cases” clause is directed toward a limited category of 
cases involving a person’s interest in physical liberty.  See id.   
We believe that liberty is “involved” in a misdemeanor prosecution 
when an accused is charged under a statute that authorizes 
incarceration.  The founders of the Iowa Constitution intended a bill of 
rights in which article I, section 10 is a part to be read in a generous 
fashion, not in a cramped, stingy, or fearful fashion.  According to George 
Ells, Chairman of the Committee on the Preamble and Bill of Rights, the 
committee wanted provisions in the Iowa Bill of Rights that “ ‘would 
enlarge, and not curtail the rights of the people’ ” and would “ ‘put upon 
record every guarantee that could be legitimately placed there in order 
that Iowa . . . might . . . have the best and most clearly defined Bill of 
Rights.’ ”  Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 810 (Appel, J., specially concurring) 
(quoting 1 The Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of 
Iowa 100 (W. Blair Lord rep., 1857) [hereinafter The Debates], available 
at www.statelibraryofiowa.org/services/collections/law-library/iaconst.).   
As a matter of constitutional history, it is clear the “cases” 
language in the Iowa Constitution arose, at least in part, in order to 
provide protections to persons subject to return to slavery under the 
Federal Fugitive Slave Act.  See 2 The Debates at 736–41.  The inclusion 
of the “cases” language was hotly debated by the drafters, as apparent 
59 
from spirited exchanges namely between Mr. Clark and Mr. Harris.  Id.  
Mr. Harris had recommended an amendment to strike such language 
from section 10, which was rejected.  Id. at 741.  Mr. Clark contended 
that  
unless we have the right to make a constitution which will 
secure to me the right of jury trial, if I am claimed as a 
fugitive slave, without that right we are not a sovereign 
people.  Without that right we cannot protect every 
individual member of society. 
Id. at 737.  What is apparent, therefore, is that one of the purposes of the 
“cases” language was to guarantee the protections of article I, section 10 
to those whom no formal criminal prosecution was or could be instituted, 
thereby 
providing 
broader 
protections 
than 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution.  See id. at 736–41. 
In this respect, the Iowa judiciary, the writers of the Iowa 
Constitution of 1857, and the contemporary political branches of 
government embraced a view of law that was not only independent from, 
but fundamentally at odds with, federal law on the slavery issue.  See 
Short, 851 N.W.2d at 483; 2 The Debates at 738–39 (“I believe [the 
fugitive slave law] to be unconstitutional.”) (remarks by Mr. Wilson). 
But the “cases” language of article I, section 10 has broader 
application than the immediate problem it was designed to ameliorate.  
While it may be that the “cases” language amounts to constitutional 
support for a right to counsel in qualifying civil contexts, it also strongly 
suggests that if a right to counsel exists in civil cases in which “liberty” is 
involved, it also must exist in criminal prosecutions in which “liberty” is 
also at stake.          
2.  Functional or structural analysis.  Aside from textual analysis, 
we also find a functional analysis supports the view that a right to 
60 
counsel exists under the Iowa Constitution at least when imprisonment 
is authorized.  We note the observations of Justice Powell in his 
concurring opinion in Argersinger.  See 407 U.S. at 44–66, 92 S. Ct. at 
2016–27, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 542–55 (Powell, J., concurring in result).  While 
some statutory offenses that merely impose fines may be considered 
regulatory in nature and have little if any consequence, statutes that 
authorize 
the 
imposition 
of 
imprisonment 
invariably 
contain 
a 
reputational sting far beyond mere law violation.  A person convicted of a 
misdemeanor arising from shoplifting may have difficulty holding or 
obtaining a job, particularly in the era of electronic access to information.  
A driver’s license or professional license may be adversely affected.  A 
simple misdemeanor conviction may have other collateral impacts, such 
as impairing the ability of persons to obtain educational, housing, or 
other important benefits.  A simple misdemeanor conviction involving 
drugs could adversely impact immigration status.  See generally Gabriel 
J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the 
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 699–700 (2002) 
(observing the “imposition of collateral consequences has become an 
increasingly central purpose of the modern criminal process”); Gross, 22 
Wm & Mary Bill Rts. J. at 80–87 (describing the rise of collateral 
consequences over the last several decades); Jenny Roberts, Why 
Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal 
Courts, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 277, 297–303 (2011) (noting the “most 
pervasive collateral effect of a misdemeanor conviction is the ability to 
find and keep work”).  While the prospect of these impacts were 
recognized by Justice Powell in his Argersinger concurrence, they are 
even greater today.  See 407 at 44–66, 92 S. Ct. at 2016–27, 92 L. Ed. 2d 
at 542–55.  These adverse effects must be evaluated not from the 
61 
perspective of comfortable middle-class judges, but from the viewpoint of 
the poor with their attendant life challenges.     
We also do not believe a lawyer’s help is irrelevant in misdemeanor 
convictions when imprisonment is authorized.  The breathtaking and 
inspiring language of Justice Sutherland in Powell emphasized that “[t]he 
right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”  287 U.S. at 68–69, 53 S. 
Ct. at 64, 77 L. Ed. at 170.  Simply put, a person does not get his “day in 
court” without a lawyer.  Although the narrow issue in Gideon was 
whether the right to counsel extended to noncapital felony cases, Justice 
Clark’s reasoning emphasized “there cannot constitutionally be a 
difference in the quality of process based merely upon a supposed 
difference in the sanction involved.”  372 U.S. at 349, 83 S. Ct. at 799, 9 
L. Ed. 2d at 808 (Clark, J., concurring in the result).  Similarly, much of 
the rationale in Argersinger was based not on the offense charged, but 
instead on the undeniable fact that in any criminal prosecution, whether 
a capital offense, a felony, or a misdemeanor, complicated legal problems 
may arise that the average person cannot satisfactorily navigate without 
the assistance of counsel.  Indeed, as pointed out by Justice Douglas in 
Argersinger, the history of our jurisprudence is rife with very complicated 
and important legal questions arising in the context of misdemeanor 
prosecutions.  See 407 U.S. at 32–34, 92 S. Ct. at 2010–11, 32 L. Ed. 2d 
at 535–36 (majority opinion); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
578, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508, 525–26 (2003) (nolo 
contendere plea to misdemeanor raises fundamental issues regarding 
sodomy statutes); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323, 121 
S. Ct. 1536, 1541, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549, 558 (2001) (case involving seat-belt 
violation raises important search and seizure issues).   
62 
Scott and Nichols are inconsistent with the traditionally close 
relationship between the due process right to a fair trial and the right to 
counsel.  The heart of Gideon is concern over the fairness and reliability 
of the criminal justice process.  As noted in Justice Blackmun’s dissent 
in Nichols, it is difficult to understand why an uncounseled misdemeanor 
conviction that could not be used to support one day of incarceration can 
later be used in an enhancement statute to significantly lengthen the 
period of incarceration for the later crime.  511 U.S. at 757, 114 S. Ct. at 
1933, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  If ensuring 
fairness and reliability of criminal justice outcomes are the constitutional 
forces underlying the right to counsel, an uncounseled misdemeanor 
conviction cannot support incarceration directly or in subsequent cases.  
See Cooper, 343 N.W.2d at 486 (citing “our own view of the importance of 
counsel” and declaring “[t]he lack of reliability in an uncounseled 
conviction that prevents the imposition of incarceration also prevents 
enhancement of the charge”).  We conclude the reasoning of Cooper and 
the state court cases declining to follow Nichols is more persuasive.  See 
id.; Kelly, 999 So. 2d at 1048–49; Brisson, 955 P.2d at 891. 
3.  Iowa tradition regarding the right to counsel.  Finally, we note 
that statutory enactments and court rules are consistent with an 
interpretation that the right to counsel extends to cases in which 
imprisonment is authorized.  The right to counsel established by the 
Iowa legislature going back almost forty years provided for counsel when 
there is a “possibility of imprisonment.”  See 1977 Iowa Acts ch. 153, 
§ 85.  We subsequently adopted this legislative formulation as part of our 
court rules.  See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.61(2).  Our tradition of the right to 
counsel is simply broader than that represented by Scott and Nichols.  
63 
The Scott fear of exposing state’s to unspecified expense simply does not 
apply in Iowa.    
4.  Overruling Allen.  In order to reach the conclusion that under 
article I, section 10, a person charged with a misdemeanor offense that 
authorizes imprisonment has the right to the assistance of counsel, we 
must consider Allen.  We see no basis for distinguishing Allen from the 
present case, and we must therefore squarely address the question of 
whether Allen should be overruled.   
We answer that question in the affirmative for a number of 
reasons.  The Allen court did not consider the sweeping language of the 
“all criminal prosecutions” clause or the more limited “cases” clause of 
article I, section 10.  Allen did not recognize that Scott was an outlier 
from the prior right-to-counsel cases that emphasized the role of counsel 
in ensuring fairness and reliability in criminal prosecutions and that the 
federalism and pragmatic concerns cited in Scott are wholly irrelevant to 
the interpretation of the Iowa Constitution.  In particular, the Allen court 
did not recognize the fact that forty years ago, no doubt in response to 
Gideon, the Iowa legislature had provided for appointed counsel in all 
cases involving the “possibility of imprisonment” and this standard was 
incorporated into this court’s rules.  The Allen court also did not 
recognize 
that 
the 
fairness 
and 
reliability 
concerns 
regarding 
uncounseled misdemeanor convictions are particularly acute given the 
pressures inherent in the misdemeanor docket.  Finally, the Allen court 
did not see the inconsistency of an approach that refused to allow an 
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to support one day in jail because 
of concerns about the fairness and reliability of the process, but then 
allowed the same conviction to be used to substantially increase 
incarceration through later application of an enhancement statute.   
64 
In sum, we overrule Allen.  We conclude that under article I, 
section 10 of the Iowa Constitution, an accused in a misdemeanor 
criminal prosecution who faces the possibility of imprisonment under the 
applicable criminal statute has a right to counsel.  When a right to 
counsel has not been afforded, any subsequent conviction cannot be 
used as a predicate to increase the length of incarceration for a later 
crime.   
IV.  Conclusion. 
For the above reasons, the decision of the district court is reversed 
and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
Cady, C.J., and Wiggins and Hecht, JJ., join this opinion.  
Mansfield, J., files a separate concurring opinion in which Waterman and 
Zager, JJ., join.  Zager, J., files a separate concurring opinion in which 
Waterman and Mansfield, JJ., join. 
 
 
65 
#13–0983, State v. Young 
MANSFIELD, Justice (concurring specially). 
I too would vacate Young’s enhanced sentence, but I cannot join 
the court’s opinion.  Following a lengthy discussion, the court concludes 
as a matter of Iowa constitutional law that “an accused in a 
misdemeanor criminal prosecution who faces the possibility of 
imprisonment under the applicable criminal statute has a right to 
counsel.”  This discussion and conclusion are unnecessary.  The Iowa 
Rules of Criminal Procedure already grant such a right.  Rule 2.61(2) 
provides, “In cases where the defendant faces the possibility of 
imprisonment, the court shall appoint counsel for an indigent defendant 
. . . .”  Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.61(2).  Why are we not deciding this case based 
on the text of the rule? 
Rule 2.61(2) is the defendant’s first line of argument.  Young 
devoted four and a half pages to this argument, making it her initial brief 
point.  She also wrote, “This Court will avoid unnecessary constitutional 
questions by addressing those issues that are not of a constitutional 
nature first.”  I believe Young’s statement is correct. 
Time and again, in recent years, we have proclaimed our 
adherence to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.  See Hawkeye 
Land Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 847 N.W.2d 199, 219 (Iowa 2014); State v. 
Iowa Dist. Ct., 843 N.W.2d 76, 85 (Iowa 2014); Mall Real Estate, L.L.C. v. 
City of Hamburg, 818 N.W.2d 190, 200 (Iowa 2012); L.F. Noll Inc. v. 
Eviglo, 816 N.W.2d 391, 398 (Iowa 2012); Simmons v. State Pub. 
Defender, 791 N.W.2d 69, 73–74 (Iowa 2010). 
But the principle is hardly a new one.  See Hines v. Ill. Cent. Gulf 
R.R., 330 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Iowa 1983) (“As previously indicated, we do 
not reach the merits of these constitutional claims.  We consider 
66 
constitutional issues on appeal only when another question is not 
decisive.”); Cmty. Lutheran Sch. v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 326 N.W.2d 
286, 291–92 (Iowa 1982) (“We avoid constitutional issues except when 
necessary for disposition of a controversy.”); Ehlinger v. Mardorf, 285 
N.W.2d 27, 28 (Iowa 1979) (“Although plaintiff asserts the trial court 
erred on both statutory and constitutional grounds, we consider only the 
statutory ground because we find it is determinative of the case.  We 
have long held we will not consider a constitutional question on appeal 
when another question is decisive.”).  One of our decisions makes this 
point rather elegantly: 
However, we are constrained by our principles of self-
restraint, including the longstanding rule that we will not 
decide constitutional questions when a case can be resolved 
on other grounds.  See, e.g., Dubuque & D.R. Co. v. Diehl, 64 
Iowa 635, 640, 21 N.W. 117, 120 (1884) (“We will not decide 
a constitutional question, unless it be necessarily involved in 
the case, which cannot be disposed of without the decision of 
such question.  If the record shows other questions which 
are decisive of the case, they alone will be considered.  
Courts are slow in approaching, and hesitate to decide, 
constitutional questions.”)[, overruled on other grounds by 
Vandewater v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 170 Iowa 687, 
695, 153 N.W. 190, 194 (1915)]; accord State v. Button, 622 
N.W.2d 480, 485 (Iowa 2001); State v. Quintero, 480 N.W.2d 
50, 51 (Iowa 1992).  Such judicial restraint is an essential 
component of our system of federalism and separation of 
powers. See generally 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law 
§§ 115–128 
(1998); 
Lisa 
A. 
Kloppenberg, 
Avoiding 
Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 1003 (1994).  
Moreover, we recognize the law to be an evolving process that 
often makes the resolution of legal questions a composite of 
several cases, from which appellate courts can gain a better 
view of the puzzle before arranging all the pieces.  The 
wisdom of this process has been revealed time and again, 
and we continue to subscribe to it today. 
State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 30 (Iowa 2005). 
I fail to understand why we are ignoring that doctrine here and 
reaching out to decide a state constitutional question unnecessarily.  The 
67 
majority contends that prior deprivation of the right to counsel contrary 
to a rule cannot serve as the ground for attacking an enhancement.  
There are several problems with the majority’s position. 
In the first place, the State has not made this argument.  The 
State’s only response to Young’s rule 2.61(2) argument has been to 
disagree with Young’s interpretation of the rule.  The State does not 
maintain that a prior violation of the right to counsel afforded by rule 
2.61(2) is an insufficient basis for challenging an enhancement.  Thus, 
the majority is making its own argument for the State (although one I 
doubt the State wants made). 
Second, the cases cited by the majority do not support its position.  
They do not address whether denial of the right to counsel in violation of 
a rule can serve as the basis for an attack on a later enhancement—the 
issue presented here.  Rather, they address whether the enhancement 
can be attacked based on violations other than denial of the right to 
counsel.  See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 38 A.3d 1270, 1272, 1276 (Me. 
2012) (refusing to invalidate enhancement based on earlier allegedly 
faulty guilty plea colloquy where the defendant had been represented). 
In fact, the only out-of-state decisions that are on point go the 
other way.  See State v. Hrycak, 877 A.2d 1209, 1218 (N.J. 2005); 
Brisson v. State, 955 P.2d 888, 891–92 (Wyo. 1998).  In Hrycak, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court decided that it would invalidate enhancements 
based on prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions under principles of 
“the sound administration of justice” and “our [the New Jersey] Court 
Rules.”  See Hrycak, 877 A.2d at 1214–16 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The plain language of our rule 2.61(2) supports the same 
approach here. 
68 
Likewise, in Brisson, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that an 
uncounseled conviction in violation of a Wyoming statute could not serve 
as the basis for a later enhancement.  See Brisson, 955 P.2d at 891.  
Thus, Brisson—like Hrycak—follows an approach similar to the one I 
would follow here. 
Third, the majority’s invocation of judicial restraint is curious—and 
just plain backwards.  The majority maintains it would go too “far” to 
remedy a rule-based denial of counsel, so the court is “required to 
proceed” under the Iowa Constitution.  This inverts traditional notions of 
judicial restraint.  Suppose we adopted Young’s primary argument based 
on the plain language of rule 2.61(2).  Then the legislature could 
potentially modify or reverse our ruling if it disagreed with it.  But 
because the majority has decided to fly solo under the Iowa Constitution, 
and overrule our 2005 precedent without the benefit of meaningful 
adversarial briefing, the legislature is stuck with our ruling absent a 
constitutional amendment (or a change of heart from this court).   
Another very good reason to exercise restraint here is that Young 
has provided only a minimal, bare-bones state constitutional argument.  
The gist of Young’s position is that we should interpret the Iowa 
Constitution “more stringently.”  I quote her article I, section 10 
argument in its entirety: 
More stringent analysis under the Iowa Constitution.  
“Even where a party has not advanced a different standard 
for interpreting a state constitutional provision,” our 
Supreme Court “may apply the [federal] standard more 
stringently than federal case law.”  State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 
767, 771–72 (Iowa 2011).  See also State v. Bruegger, 773 
N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009).  Our Supreme Court has 
previously rejected the argument that the Iowa Constitution 
should be interpreted more stringently than the federal 
constitution in the right-to-counsel context.  State v. Allen, 
690 N.W.2d 684, 690 (Iowa 2005). 
69 
Since the Allen decision, our supreme court has 
applied a more stringent analysis in the context of search 
and seizure and cruel and unusual punishment.  See e.g., 
State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 791 (Iowa 2013) (noting 
that the federal constitution “makes for an admirable floor, 
but it is certainly not a ceiling”); State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 
636, 650 (Iowa 2012) (reiterating that Iowa courts utilized a 
more stringent review than federal courts in the context of 
cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 
260, 291 (Iowa 2010) (rejecting the federal approach to 
warrantless searches of parolees).  The court should consider 
doing the same under the right-to-counsel analysis. 
Arguing that we can interpret the Iowa Constitution differently is not the 
same as presenting an independent constitutional argument.  While 
today’s opinion displays considerable workmanship, it would not be fair 
to characterize it as the outcome of an adversarial litigation process. 
Even if we have to reach the constitutional issue, which we do not, 
then I wonder why we are overruling State v. Allen, 690 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 
2005).  We decided Allen unanimously less than a decade ago.  There we 
discussed (albeit in a shorter opinion) a number of the same federal and 
out-of-state precedents the court discusses today.  Id. at 687–88, 690–
91.  We also relied on several state constitutional precedents the court 
does not mention today.  Id. at 690; see People v. Reichenbach, 587 
N.W.2d 1, 4–7 (Mich. 1998) (finding no right to counsel for misdemeanor 
defendants 
under 
the 
Michigan 
Constitution 
absent 
actual 
imprisonment); State v. Woodruff, 951 P.2d 605, 616 (N.M. 1997) (finding 
no right to counsel for misdemeanor defendants under the New Mexico 
Constitution absent actual imprisonment).  Reading Allen today, I think 
that ten-year-old decision stands the test of time. 
 
My colleagues’ rhetoric about Allen is harsh: “Remarkably, we did 
not cite,” “mimicked,” “apparently not familiar,” “contains no discussion 
at all,” “fundamentally flawed.”  This harshness in describing a 
unanimous decision of this court is unwarranted.  I believe this court in 
70 
2005 understood how the criminal justice system operates in the real 
world.2 
The majority also asserts that “the Allen court did not have the 
benefit of the Florida case declining to follow Nichols.”  See State v. Kelly, 
999 So. 2d 1029, 1048–49 (Fla. 2008).  Interested readers can peruse 
Kelly for themselves and decide whether it is a game-changer.  I think 
not.  Kelly was decided under the Florida Constitution, whose right to 
counsel guarantee is framed somewhat differently than the right to 
counsel in the Sixth Amendment or article I, section 10 of the Iowa 
Constitution.  See id. at 1050.  Regardless, the reliability consideration 
that propelled the Florida Supreme Court’s Kelly decision is one we 
expressly considered, and rejected, in Allen.  See Allen, 690 N.W.2d at 
691–92.3 
2The majority also maintains that the Allen court erred in observing that the 
Sixth Amendment and article I, section 10 are “textually similar.”  See Allen, 690 
N.W.2d at 690.  In fact, they are.  Both provisions apply to “all criminal prosecutions.”  
Compare Iowa Const. art. I, § 10, with U.S. Const. amend. VI.  Article I, section 6 also 
covers another category of cases, namely, “cases involving the life, or liberty of an 
individual.”  Iowa Const. art. I, § 10.  As noted by the majority, the contemporary 
debates indicate this provision was meant to protect persons claimed to be subject to 
return as fugitive slaves.  See 2 The Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State 
of 
Iowa 
736–41 
(W. 
Blair 
Lord 
rep., 
1857), 
available 
at 
www.statelibraryofiowa.org/services/collections/law-library/iaconst. 
3In addition, the majority mentions Hawaii and North Dakota constitutional 
precedent that preceded Allen.  See State v. Sinagoga, 918 P.2d 228, 242 (Haw. Ct. App. 
1996), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Veikoso, 74 P.3d 575, 582 n.8 
(Haw. 2003); State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 177–79 (N.D. 1985).  However, Hawaii’s 
Constitution expressly provides, “The State shall provide counsel for an indigent 
defendant charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment.”  Hawaii Const. art. I, 
§ 14 (emphasis added).  Therefore, Sinagoga is hardly a relevant precedent here.  As the 
North Dakota Supreme Court noted in Orr, the wording of North Dakota’s constitution 
also differs from that of the Sixth Amendment.  See 375 N.W.2d at 177.  Regardless, 
Allen’s observation remains true that “[a] strong majority of the states that have 
analyzed uncounseled misdemeanor convictions under their state constitutional rights 
to counsel and due process have declined to forge new and different ground.”  690 
N.W.2d at 690. 
                                      
 
71 
 
Finally, let me address one other matter.  We have previously held 
the right to counsel can be waived in a written plea that includes a 
waiver of counsel.  See State v. Majeres, 722 N.W.2d 179, 182–83 (Iowa 
2006).  That did not occur here.  Nothing the court has said today affects 
the Majeres holding. 
 
For the reasons indicated, I would vacate Young’s enhancement 
because the prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction did not comply 
with rule 2.61(2) and Young did not waive the rule’s requirements. 
 
Waterman and Zager, JJ., join this special concurrence. 
 
 
72 
 
#13–0983, State v. Young 
ZAGER, Justice (concurring specially). 
I too would vacate Young’s enhanced sentence predicated on her 
prior, uncounseled plea to a simple misdemeanor.  Further, I would 
follow Justice Mansfield’s special concurrence’s reasoning and vacate the 
sentence based on Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.61(2), which by its 
plain language answers the question: “In cases where the defendant 
faces the possibility of imprisonment, the court shall appoint counsel for 
an indigent defendant . . . .”  I write separately to emphasize the need for 
district courts to adequately inquire into and document both the State’s 
intentions of requesting imprisonment and a defendant’s intention to 
waive counsel. 
 
In this case, the record is devoid of any record of the initial 
appearance for the prior misdemeanor.  Correspondingly, it is devoid of 
any record of the State’s intentions of requesting imprisonment or 
whether the right to counsel was communicated to the defendant.4  As 
our rules properly note, an important inquiry at this stage of the criminal 
proceedings is whether the State will be requesting imprisonment 
because of the charge.  See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.61(2); accord State v. 
Majeres, 722 N.W.2d 179, 182 (Iowa 2006) (“At all critical stages of the 
criminal process, the Sixth Amendment affords an accused facing 
incarceration the right to counsel.”  (Emphasis added.)).  If the State will 
4Here, we deal with the right to counsel in the context of a simple misdemeanor.  
Of course, attachment of the right to counsel is different when a defendant is charged 
with an indictable offense.  See State v. Nelsen, 390 N.W.2d 589, 591 (Iowa 1986) 
(holding when the right to counsel attaches depends on when adversary proceedings are 
“commenced” by reference to state law).  In either case, however, a defendant may waive 
his or her right to counsel.  See State v. Marjeres, 722 N.W.2d 179, 182 (Iowa 2006) 
(“Although a defendant has such a right to counsel, a defendant can choose to waive 
the right to counsel.”). 
                                      
 
73 
be requesting imprisonment, the right to counsel attaches.  If not, it 
doesn’t.  This fact is readily determined through judicial inquiry of the 
State and should be noted in the initial appearance record. 
Likewise, even if the right to counsel attaches, a defendant may 
waive his or her right to be represented by counsel.  Majeres, 722 N.W.2d 
at 182 (“Although a defendant has such a right to counsel, a defendant 
can choose to waive the right to counsel.”).  As with the State’s intention 
to pursue imprisonment, a defendant’s intention to waive the right to 
counsel can be readily determined by the district court communicating 
that right to the defendant and asking: “Do you want to waive your right 
to counsel?”  This fact should also be noted in the initial appearance 
record. 
While I am confident the district court made these inquiries when 
the defendant appeared for her initial appearance, we have no record of 
this.  Consequently, this case highlights the need for district courts to 
inquire into and document both the State’s intention to request 
imprisonment and a defendant’s intention to waive counsel.  As this case 
illuminates, failure to do so can significantly affect future prosecutions.  
On the other hand, the simple step of inquiring into and documenting 
these matters ensures that enhanced sentences are upheld on appeal 
when otherwise appropriate. 
 
Waterman and Mansfield, JJ., join this special concurrence.