Case Title: Tracer Lane II Realty, LLC v. City of Waltham

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13195

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13195 
 
TRACER LANE II REALTY, LLC  vs.  CITY OF WALTHAM & another.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 7, 2022. - June 2, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Renewable Energy.  Zoning, By-law, Validity of by-law or 
ordinance, Accessory building or use, Permitted use. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on June 
12, 2019. 
 
 
The case was heard by Howard P. Speicher, J., on motions 
for summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Bernadette D. Sewell, Assistant City Solicitor, for the 
defendants. 
 
David C. Fixler (John J. Griffin, Jr., & John F. Farraher, 
Jr., also present) for the plaintiff. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Thomas Melone for Allco Renewable Energy Limited. 
 
Ben Robbins & Daniel B. Winslow for New England Legal 
Foundation. 
 
Sander A. Rikleen, David A. Michel, & Stella T. Oyalabu for 
First Parish in Bedford, Unitarian Universalist. 
 
1 Inspector of buildings for Waltham. 
2 
 
 
Michael Pill, pro se. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & David S. Frankel & Megan 
M. Herzog, Special Assistant Attorneys General, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Margaret E. Sheehan & Jonathan Polloni for Save the Pine 
Barrens, Inc., & others. 
 
David K. McCay, Lauren E. Sparks, & Tatiana Tway for town 
of Charlton & another. 
 
Kate Moran Carter, Charles N. Le Ray, & Nicholas P. Shapiro 
for Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc., & 
another. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  Tracer Lane II Realty, LLC (developer), seeks to 
build a solar energy system centered in Lexington and an access 
road to the facility through Waltham.  Although the solar energy 
system would be centered on property zoned for commercial use, 
the access road would be on property zoned for residential use.  
Waltham officials indicated to the developer that the developer 
could not construct the access road because the road would 
constitute a commercial use in a residential zone.  However, a 
Land Court judge determined on cross motions for summary 
judgment that this prohibition was improper because G. L. 
c. 40A, § 3, ninth par., which protects solar energy systems 
from local regulation that is not "necessary to protect the 
public health, safety or welfare," allowed the developer to lay 
the access road.  We affirm.2 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Allco 
Renewable Energy Limited; New England Legal Foundation; First 
Parish in Bedford, Unitarian Universalist; Michael Pill; the 
Commonwealth; Save the Pine Barrens, Inc., select board of 
 
3 
 
 
Background.  1.  Facts and procedural history.  The 
following facts are undisputed.  The developer owns land in 
Lexington and in Waltham.  The Lexington property is in an area 
zoned for commercial and manufacturing use, whereas the Waltham 
property is in an area zoned for residential use.  The developer 
intends to construct a one-megawatt solar energy system centered 
on the Lexington property that will cover an area of 
approximately 413,600 square feet and contribute solar energy to 
the electrical grid.  To access the part of the solar energy 
system that is on the Lexington property, the developer intends 
to build an access road over its Waltham property.  Construction 
vehicles would use the access road while the solar energy system 
was being built, and maintenance trucks would periodically use 
the access road thereafter.  The access road would include 
overhead wires and utility poles connecting the structure in 
Lexington to the electrical grid. 
 
Pelham, select board of Wendell, planning board of Buckland, 
planning board of Pelham, planning board of Shutesbury, planning 
board of Wendell, conservation commission of Wendell, Save 
Massachusetts Forests, Wareham Land Trust, Jones River Watershed 
Association, Concerned Citizens of Franklin County, and RESTORE: 
The North Woods; town of Charlton and town of Warren; and the 
Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc., and the 
Abstract Club. 
 
We do not address in this opinion arguments made by amici 
that are not "sufficiently related" to the arguments raised by 
the parties.  Police Dep't of Salem v. Sullivan, 460 Mass. 637, 
640 n.6 (2011). 
4 
 
 
Waltham officials indicated informally to the developer 
that the developer could not lay the access road because, 
according to Waltham, the road was not permitted in a 
residential zone.  The developer then brought a complaint 
against Waltham and its building inspector in the Land Court 
pursuant to G. L. c. 240, § 14A, seeking a declaration that 
Waltham could not prohibit the developer from building the 
access road.3  The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. 
A Land Court judge allowed the developer's motion and 
declared that any prohibition on constructing the access road 
was improper pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 3, portions of which 
are often referred to as the Dover Amendment.  That section 
states, in relevant part:  "No zoning ordinance or by-law shall 
prohibit or unreasonably regulate the installation of solar 
energy systems or the building of structures that facilitate the 
collection of solar energy, except where necessary to protect 
the public health, safety or welfare."  G. L. c. 40A, § 3, ninth 
par. 
 
3 General Laws c. 240, § 14A, states, in pertinent part:  
"The owner of a freehold estate in possession in land may bring 
a petition in the land court against a city or town wherein such 
land is situated . . . for determination as to the validity of a 
municipal ordinance, by-law or regulation . . . which purports 
to restrict or limit the present or future use, enjoyment, 
improvement or development of such land . . . ." 
5 
 
Waltham and its building inspector appealed, and we 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
2.  Waltham's zoning code.  The parties dispute the extent 
to which Waltham's zoning code permits solar energy systems.  
According to the developer, the zoning code does not permit 
solar energy systems at all because, according to the code, "Any 
use of any building, structure or premises, not expressly 
permitted . . . , is hereby prohibited."  Because the zoning 
code does not mention solar energy systems, the developer 
argues, it prohibits them. 
Waltham asserts that the zoning code expressly permits 
solar energy systems in industrial zones, which encompass 
approximately one to two percent of Waltham's total area.4  
According to the zoning code, industrial zones may include 
"[e]stablishments for the generation of power for public or 
private consumption purposes that are further regulated by 
Massachusetts General Laws." 
 
4 The Waltham zoning map is in the record.  To determine the 
percentage of Waltham that is in an industrial zone, we, like 
the Land Court judge, used the geographic information system 
version of the zoning map, available at https://web-
gis.city.waltham.ma.us/GPV51/Viewer.aspx [https://perma.cc/WDX3-
4CS4?type=image].  See Bask, Inc. vs. Borges, Mass. Land Ct., 
No. 19 MISC 000529, 28 LCR 568, 575 n.48 (Dec. 23, 2020) (where 
zoning map was in record, court took judicial notice of 
geographic information system version of map). 
6 
 
Waltham also argues that the zoning code permits 
"accessory" solar energy systems in residential and commercial 
zones.  The zoning code defines "accessory use" as the "[u]se of 
land, building or part of building that is customarily 
incidental and clearly subordinate to the principal use of the 
premises."  The zoning code also defines accessory use as 
applied to residential and commercial zones.5 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review and legal background.  
"Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law."  Boelter v. Selectmen of Wayland, 
479 Mass. 233, 237 (2018), quoting Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 
462 Mass. 346, 350 (2012).  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as 
amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002).  "We review a decision on a 
motion for summary judgment de novo and, thus, 'accord no 
deference to the decision of the motion judge.'"  Boelter, 
 
5 According to the zoning code, an accessory use in a 
residential zone is an "[a]ccessory use[] customarily incidental 
to any residential use permitted herein, provided that such use 
shall not include any activity conducted for gain, or any 
private walk or way giving access to such activity or any 
activity prohibited under this chapter."  An accessory use in a 
commercial zone is an "[a]ccessory use[] customarily incidental 
to commercial uses allowed by this chapter, including but not 
limited to day care, cafeteria and health club facilities for 
employees only, and further including satellite dish antennas 
and similar transmission devices used for private business 
purposes of businesses located on the lot." 
7 
 
supra, quoting Drakopoulos v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 465 Mass. 
775, 777 (2013). 
The statute at issue here, G. L. c. 40A, § 3, "was 
originally enacted to prevent municipalities from restricting 
educational and religious uses of land, but the Legislature has 
expanded [the statute] over time to ensure that other land uses 
would be free from local interference" (citation omitted).  
Crossing Over, Inc. v. Fitchburg, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 822, 829 
(2020).  The Legislature demonstrated its intent to protect 
solar energy systems from local regulation when it passed "An 
Act promoting solar energy and protecting access to sunlight for 
solar energy systems."  St. 1985, c. 637.  See Berriault v. 
Wareham Fire Dist., 365 Mass. 96, 97 (1974) (statute's title 
evidence of legislative intent).  That statute added a paragraph 
to G. L. c. 40A, § 3, that states:  "No zoning ordinance or by-
law shall prohibit or unreasonably regulate the installation of 
solar energy systems or the building of structures that 
facilitate the collection of solar energy, except where 
necessary to protect the public health, safety or welfare."  
G. L. c. 40A, § 3, ninth par., inserted by St. 1985, c. 637, 
§ 2.  When interpreting this paragraph, we keep in mind that it 
was enacted to help promote solar energy generation throughout 
the Commonwealth.  Cf. Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health & 
Retardation Assoc., 421 Mass. 106, 113-114 (1995) (interpreting 
8 
 
G. L. c. 40A, § 3, second par., in light of Legislature's "over-
all intent . . . to prevent local interference with the use of 
real property for educational purposes"). 
2.  Whether the access road is governed by G. L. c. 40A, 
§ 3, ninth par.  The solar energy provision applies to "solar 
energy systems" and "structures that facilitate the collection 
of solar energy."  G. L. c. 40A, § 3, ninth par.6  Waltham 
acknowledges that the structure proposed to be built on the 
Lexington property is a "solar energy system."  It argues, 
however, that the access road proposed to be built on the 
Waltham property is not governed directly by G. L. c. 40A, § 3, 
ninth par.  We disagree. 
Because we have not yet analyzed the ninth paragraph of 
G. L. c. 40A, § 3, we turn to the abundant case law interpreting 
that section's other paragraphs.  See Rogers v. Norfolk, 432 
Mass. 374, 377-378 (2000) (looking to other paragraphs of G. L. 
c. 40A, § 3, for guidance when interpreting third paragraph for 
first time).  In those cases, we have considered ancillary 
structures to be part of the protected use at issue.  See Martin 
v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus 
 
6 For purposes of G. L. c. 40A, § 3, ninth par., a "solar 
energy system" is "a device or structural design feature, a 
substantial purpose of which is to provide daylight for interior 
lighting or provide for the collection, storage and distribution 
of solar energy for space heating or cooling, electricity 
generating, or water heating."  G. L. c. 40A, § 1A. 
9 
 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 434 Mass. 141, 149 (2001) (church 
steeple need not have independent religious function to be 
considered part of religious use); Watros, 421 Mass. at 113-114 
("No distinction is made by the statute regarding its 
applicability to 'principal' or 'accessory' buildings, and it is 
clear that the over-all intent of the Legislature was to prevent 
local interference with the use of real property for educational 
purposes"); Trustees of Tufts College v. Medford, 415 Mass. 753, 
754-755, 763-764 (1993) (applying statute to college's parking 
garage).  See also Henry v. Board of Appeals of Dunstable, 418 
Mass. 841, 844 (1994) ("the scope of the agricultural or 
horticultural use exemption encompasses related activities").  
We reach the same conclusion here.  Given the access road's 
importance to the primary solar energy collection system in 
Lexington -- it will facilitate the primary system's 
construction, maintenance, and connection to the electrical grid 
-- we conclude that the access road is part of the solar energy 
system.  Cf. Beale v. Planning Bd. of Rockland, 423 Mass. 690, 
694 (1996) (access road in one zoning district leading to 
another zoning district "is considered to be in the same use as 
the parcel to which the access leads").  Therefore, G. L. 
c. 40A, § 3, ninth par., applies to the access road. 
3.  Whether G. L. c. 40A, § 3, ninth par., prohibits 
Waltham's decision.  The solar energy provision provides that a 
10 
 
municipality shall not "prohibit or unreasonably regulate the 
installation of solar energy systems . . . except where 
necessary to protect the public health, safety or welfare."  
G. L. c. 40A, § 3, ninth par.  That statutory language provides 
municipalities with more flexibility than statutory protections 
for land use for education, religion, and child care, which 
allow only for reasonable regulations on such matters as bulk 
and height.  See G. L. c. 40A, § 3, second par. ("No zoning 
ordinance or by-law shall . . . prohibit, regulate or restrict 
the use of land or structures for religious purposes or for 
educational purposes . . . ; provided, however, that such land 
or structures may be subject to reasonable regulations 
concerning the bulk and height of structures and determining 
yard sizes, lot area, setbacks, open space, parking and building 
coverage requirements"), third par. ("No zoning ordinance or 
bylaw . . . shall prohibit, or require a special permit for, the 
use of land or structures . . . for the primary, accessory or 
incidental purpose of operating a child care facility; provided, 
however, that such land or structures may be subject to 
reasonable regulations concerning the bulk and height of 
structures and determining yard sizes, lot area, setbacks, open 
space, parking and building coverage requirements"). 
The case law addressing these other protected uses is 
nevertheless helpful in deciding whether a prohibition or 
11 
 
regulation of solar energy systems is valid.  When evaluating an 
ordinance or by-law's facial validity under other sections of 
G. L. c. 40A, § 3, we have balanced the interest that the 
ordinance or by-law advances and the impact on the protected 
use.  See Rogers, 432 Mass. at 379 ("The proper test for 
determining whether the provision in issue contradicts the 
purpose of G. L. c. 40A, § 3, third par., is to ask whether the 
footprint restriction furthers a legitimate municipal interest, 
and its application rationally relates to that interest, or 
whether it acts impermissibly to restrict the establishment of 
child care facilities in the town, and so is unreasonable"). 
The interest that Waltham's zoning code presumably advances 
-- preservation of each zone's unique characteristics -- is 
legitimate.  See Rogers, 432 Mass. at 380 ("preservation of the 
residential character of neighborhoods is a legitimate municipal 
purpose to be achieved by local zoning control").  And, as just 
discussed, municipalities have more flexibility in restricting 
solar energy systems than they do, for instance, in the context 
of education, religion, or child care.  Nevertheless, Waltham's 
zoning code unduly restricts solar energy systems. 
Assuming Waltham is correct that the zoning code permits 
solar energy systems at all, it allows large-scale systems like 
the one at issue here in at most one to two percent of its land 
area.  These standalone, large-scale systems, not ancillary to 
12 
 
any residential or commercial use, are key to promoting solar 
energy in the Commonwealth.  See Executive Office of Energy and 
Environmental Affairs, Massachusetts 2050 Decarbonization 
Roadmap, at 4, 59 n.43 (Dec. 2020) ("the amount of solar power 
needed by 2050 exceeds the full technical potential in the 
Commonwealth for rooftop solar, indicating that substantial 
deployment of ground-mounted solar is needed under any 
circumstance in order to achieve [n]et [z]ero [greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2050]").7  Nothing in the record suggests that this 
stringent limitation is "necessary to protect the public health, 
safety or welfare."  G. L. c. 40A, § 3, ninth par.  Where 
Waltham has prohibited solar energy systems like the one here in 
all but one to two percent of its land area, its zoning code 
violates the solar energy provision. 
Like all municipalities, Waltham maintains the discretion 
to reasonably restrict the magnitude and placement of solar 
energy systems.  An outright ban of large-scale solar energy 
systems in all but one to two percent of a municipality's land 
area, however, restricts rather than promotes the legislative 
goal of promoting solar energy.  In the absence of a reasonable 
basis grounded in public health, safety, or welfare, such a 
prohibition is impermissible under the provision. 
 
7 Available at https://www.mass.gov/doc/ma-2050-
decarbonization-roadmap/download [https://perma.cc/J593-CVNM]. 
13 
 
Conclusion.  Because G. L. c. 40A, § 3, ninth par., 
prohibits Waltham from banning the solar energy system here, 
including its access road, from all but one to two percent of 
Waltham's land area, we affirm the judgment below. 
Judgment affirmed.