Case Title: Barksdale v. Wilkowsky

Citation: 419 Md. 649

Docket Number: 66/10

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2011-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
HEADNOTE:
Janay Barksdale v. Leon Wilkowsky, et al., No. 66, September Term, 2010.
CIVIL PROCEDURE—JURY INSTRUCTIONS—HARMLESS ERROR—In a lawsuit by
a tenant against her former landlord for negligence resulting in injuries from lead paint
poisoning, the trial court gave an instruction regarding the joint responsibilities of landlords
and tenants in keeping the property in good condition.  This inclusion of this instruction was
error, because neither the plaintiff’s contributory negligence nor negligence of her family
members were at issue in the case.  This error was prejudicial, because it introduced into the
jury deliberations the idea that the plaintiff, or her family, could have also been to blame for
the injuries.  This argument was not only irrelevant to the case, but prohibited by law and
policy.  When the defendant introduces an impermissible argument through jury instructions,
it is not “harmless” merely because it was introduced indirectly, or because it was
contradicted by other, correct, jury instructions.  The inclusion of the argument may have
permitted the jury to speculate or precluded a finding of liability where it was otherwise
appropriate.  
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-06-010732
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 66
September Term, 2010
                                                                             
JANAY BARKSDALE
v.
LEON WILKOWSKY, et al.
                                                                             
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Adkins, J.
Battaglia, J., joins in the judgment only.
                                                                             
Filed:    May 23, 2011
1In the petition for writ of certiorari, Barksdale presented two separate issues
regarding (1) the Court of Special Appeals’s interpretation of the standard and (2) the Court
of Special Appeals’s application of that standard.  We have combined them here for the sake
of brevity.  
In this lead paint case, we revisit the standard for determining “harmless error” in a
civil case involving a faulty jury instruction.  The Petitioner, Janay Barksdale, sued the
owners of her childhood home (the “Owners”), alleging injuries from lead paint on the
premises.  At trial, the Owners questioned Barksdale’s grandmother whether she had ever
notified them of flaking and peeling paint in Barksdale’s home.  The Owners then requested
a jury instruction indicating that a person’s failure to report flaking paint to the landlord is
evidence of negligence.  The trial court gave the instruction, even though the grandmother’s
negligence was not attributable to Barksdale, and Barksdale herself was too young to have
any duty to report.  The jury issued a verdict in favor of the Owners. 
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals upheld the jury verdict.  It held that the jury
instruction was erroneous, but also harmless.  Barksdale sought review from this Court on
a number of issues.  We granted certiorari to review the following questions, all involving
the issue of “harmless error” from an erroneous jury instruction:
1) 
Whether the Court of Special Appeals correctly
interpreted [and applied1] the harmless error standard for a
substantive jury instruction as enunciated by the Court of
Appeals?
2) 
Whether the Court of Special Appeals’ interpretation of
the harmless error standard for a substantive jury instruction is
incorrect for a statutorily protected class such as lead poisoned
children?
3) 
Whether the Court of Special Appeals’ interpretation and
2The property was owned by G&S Real Estate, whose two partners, Stewart Sachs and
Ronald Greenwald, were also named as defendants.  The original complaint included Leon
Wilkowsky as a defendant, but he was dismissed from the case prior to trial.
2
application of the harmless error standard for a substantive jury
instruction is constitutional?
We shall hold that the inclusion of the erroneous jury instruction was not harmless
error, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.  
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
Janay Barksdale lived with her grandmother at 2440 West Baltimore Street (the
“Property”) for eleven years, from her birth in 1988 until her grandmother moved in 1999.
Later, as a teenager, Barksdale was diagnosed with “mild mental retardation,” with a low IQ
score and impaired senses.  These impairments have limited her ability to read, her verbal
language abilities, and her mathematical reasoning.  Barksdale attended school through the
sixth grade, later working briefly at a fast food restaurant.  She has expressed an interest in
becoming a medical assistant, security guard, or computer technician.  According to expert
testimony, however, it would be extremely difficult for Barksdale to “obtain and maintain
competitive employment” due to these impairments.
Seeking redress for these injuries, Barksdale initiated the current suit, naming the
Owners as defendants.2  Barksdale alleged that, during her residence in the Property, she was
exposed to chipping and peeling lead paint that caused her permanent mental injury.  She
alleged that the Owners never inspected the property or notified their tenants of the potential
dangers of lead-based paint.  Barksdale introduced medical records demonstrating that she
3Blood lead levels are generally measured in micrograms of lead per deciliters of
blood.  See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Lead,” available at:
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/ (last visited May 3, 2011).  Barksdale’s levels measured
between 11 and 18, and an expert witness at trial testified that “[i]n 1976 the average blood
lead level in the United States was 14.6.”
3
had elevated blood levels as a child, and expert testimony linking those blood levels to her
current impairments.
Yet, Barksdale was able to present only limited evidence of lead paint in the Property.
After she and her grandmother moved out of the house, the Property sat vacant, until being
purchased and “gut rehab[bed]” by a new owner in 2005.  This owner replaced all interior
walls and old window frames, and did not test for lead paint.  Thus, there was no scientific
record of the paint that existed during Barksdale’s residency.  Instead, Barksdale
commissioned a test of the property on August 8, 2008, which revealed lead-based paint at
one location – the staircase newel post.  Barksdale relied on this test, her observations of
chipping and flaking paint, and her elevated blood lead levels to claim that the source of her
exposure to lead was the Property.
The Owners contested this allegation on a number of levels.  They introduced
evidence of Barksdale’s mother’s behavior during pregnancy, which included drinking and
smoking.  They also called an expert witness who testified that Barksdale’s impairments
were likely caused by something other than lead paint poisoning.  They argued that
Barksdale’s lead levels were close to the average lead level in children during the 1970's.3
They introduced an expert witness who testified that Barksdale could find employment, and
4
who reported that Barksdale herself stated that she left her previous job to take care of her
children, and that she “didn’t see herself as working” in her adult life.
Furthermore, over  the objection of Barksdale, the Owners implicitly introduced the
issue of whether Barksdale’s grandmother was somehow at fault.  Although the Owners did
not explicitly argue that Barksdale’s grandmother was contributorily negligent or a
superseding cause, the Owners questioned Barksdale’s grandmother as to whether she had
ever reported the chipping and flaking paint to them.  She admitted that she had not done so.
At the close of the trial, the Owners requested the jury instruction at issue in this appeal,
relating to a tenant’s obligation, under Baltimore City Housing Code Article 13, Section 902,
to report certain conditions to the landlord.  The trial court included the instruction in the
middle of its longer instruction regarding the Baltimore City Housing code, stating as
follows:
The violation of a statute which is a cause of [Barksdale’s]
injuries or damages is evidence of negligence. The Baltimore
City Housing Code states as follows; Section 103; purpose. The
purpose of this code is to prevent all conditions in and about
dwellings which are now or which may in the future become so
unsafe, dangerous, unhygienic or insanitary as to constitute a
menace to the health and safety of the people.
Section 702; good repair and safe conditions. Every building
and all parts thereof used or occupied as a dwelling shall be kept
in good repair in safe condition. Section 703; standards for good
repair and safe condition. Good repair and safe condition shall
include, but is not limited to the following standards; interior
walls and floors shall be maintained free of loose materials.
Section 706; painting.  All interior loose or peeling wall
covering or paint shall be removed and the exposed surface shall
5
be placed in a smooth and sanitary condition. Section 1001;
prohibited occupancies. No owner shall lease or permit the
subletting to another for occupancy and vacant or vacated
dwelling or dwelling unit which does not comply with the
provision of this code.
Section 902A; every occupant of a dwelling or a dwelling
unit shall keep in a clean and sanitary condition that part of
the dwelling unit and the premises thereof which he occupies
and controls. A clean and sanitary condition[ ] shall include,
but is not limited to the following standards; walls and
windows.
The Baltimore City Code of public local laws provides as
follows . . . in any written or oral lease or agreement for rental
of a dwelling intended for human habitation, the landlord shall
be deemed to covenant and warrant that a dwelling is fit for
human habitation.
The Baltimore City Housing Code places a continuous duty on
the landlord to maintain the property and keep it free of
chipping, peeling and flaking paint at all times. It is not a
violation of the law for lead paint to be present in a property.
You are instructed that as a matter of law there is no evidence
that the house where [Barksdale] lived was painted with
lead-based paint by the Defendants.
(Emphasis added).
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals held that the facts of this case did not justify
the instruction: 
Here, the requested instruction regarding the occupant’s
duties to maintain the Property in a clean and sanitary condition,
the obligation pursuant to § 902A, was not relevant to the issues
before the jury, i.e., whether the landlord was negligent or
engaged in deceptive trade practices in renting the Property.
Whether Ms. Barksdale’s grandmother kept the Property clean
had no bearing on the jury’s assessment of those issues.
4Although requested by the Owners, we did not grant certiorari on the correctness of
giving the instruction.  For the purposes of this appeal, therefore, we proceed with the
assumption that the Court of Special Appeals was correct and that this instruction was
erroneous.  
6
In Bartholomee v. Casey, 103 Md. App. 34, 66, 651 A.2d
908 (1994), cert. denied, 338 Md. 557, 659 A.2d 1293 (1995),
a lead paint case, this Court stated that it “would have been error
for the trial court to instruct the jury to find in favor of [the
defendants] based on the parents’ actions.”  The Court explained
that “[t]he law in Maryland is clear that the negligent acts of a
parent cannot be imputed to the minor child, and that negligent
acts of the parent that merely contribute to the injury do not
necessarily rise to the level of superseding causation.” Id. n.16
(citing Caroline v. Reicher, 269 Md. 125, 304 A.2d 831 (1973)).
There was no argument here that the grandmother’s
actions or inactions were a superseding cause of Ms.
Barksdale’s injuries. Accordingly, the instruction regarding §
902 was irrelevant under the facts of this case, and the court
erred in instructing the jury on § 902 of the Housing Code.
Barksdale v. Wilkowsky, 192 Md. App. 366, 384-85,  994 A.2d 996, 1007 (2010).4
Recognizing the second step of an error analysis, the intermediate appellate court
examined whether the error was harmless, by considering whether “the error was likely to
have affected the verdict below”: 
Ms. Barksdale has not met her burden of showing
prejudice.  The court’s instructions made clear that the relevant
issue for the jury was the conduct of appellees, not anything
done by the occupants.  The court instructed that a “minor
cannot be held responsible for the negligence of the minor’s
parent, guardian or custodian.” It also instructed that it was [the
Owners] who had the duty to “maintain the property and keep
it free of chipping, peeling and flaking paint at all times.” Thus,
the jury clearly was advised that appellees had a duty to keep the
Property free of chipping paint and that Ms. Barksdale could not
5Although “harmless error” is now universally recognized, in some form, this was not
true at common law.  For over a century, English courts operated under a rule, originating
in Crease v. Barrett, 1 C.M. & R. 919, 149 Eng. Rep. 1353, 1359 (Ex. 1835), in which an
erroneous exclusion or admission of evidence required automatic reversal.  See 1 Wigmore,
Evidence § 21 (1983) (explaining the invention and development of the “harmless error” rule
in the context of evidentiary rulings); see also 1 Steven Alan Childress & Martha S. Davis,
Federal Standards of Review § 6.05 (4th ed. 2010) (describing U.S. federal courts departure
from “the old rule of presumed reversal” towards the harmless error rule).
7
be held responsible for any negligence on the part of her
grandmother. Moreover, there was no suggestion during closing
argument that [the Owners] were relieved in any way of their
statutory obligations to keep the premises free of chipped or
flaking paint or that [the grandmother] was contributorily
negligent for failing to clean up any chipped paint. Thus,
although the court erred in giving the instruction, it was
harmless error that does not require a new trial.
Barksdale, 192 Md. App. at 385-86,  994 A.2d at 1007 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Court of Special Appeals thus affirmed the jury verdict despite the erroneous instruction.
DISCUSSION
The ultimate issue before this Court, presented as three different sub-issues, is whether
the inclusion of the erroneous jury instruction in this case requires reversal of the jury
verdict. “It has long been the policy in this State that this Court will not reverse a lower court
judgment if the error is harmless.”  Flores v. Bell, 398 Md. 27, 33, 919 A.2d 716, 719 (2007).
See also Greenbriar v. Brooks, 387 Md. 683, 740, 878 A.2d 528, 563 (2005); Crane v. Dunn,
382 Md. 83, 91, 854 A.2d 1180, 1185 (2004).5  The harmless error rule “embod[ies] the
principle that courts should exercise judgment in preference to the automatic reversal for
‘error’ and ignore errors that do not affect the essential fairness of the trial.”  Williams v.
8
State, 394 Md. 98, 120, 904 A.2d 534, 547 (2006) (Raker, J., dissenting) (quoting
McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553, 104 S.Ct. 845, 848-49
(1984)). 
 We will examine, in turn, the two issues which often comprise the harmless error
analysis:   (1) whether the complaining party is entitled to any presumption of prejudice, and
(2) how a party can satisfy its burden of showing prejudice.  We will then apply these
standards to the facts in this case.  
 I. “Harmless Error” Analysis and Presumptions of Prejudice
The question of whether a complaining party is entitled to a presumption of prejudice
is an important, and often dispositive, question.  The test that courts have employed varies
by the context of the case – civil or criminal – and by the type of error alleged.  As the
Second Federal Circuit has described, courts analyzing prejudice have looked to the degree
to which the conduct of the trial has violated basic concepts of fair play.  See Kyle v. United
States, 297 F.2d 507, 514 (2nd Cir. 1961).  The Kyle court explained: 
The reason why the showing of prejudice required to
bring down the balance in favor of a new trial will vary from
case to case is that the pans contain weights and counterweights
other than the interest in a perfect trial. Sometimes only a small
showing of prejudice, or none, is demanded because that interest
is reinforced by the necessity that ‘The administration of justice
must not only be above reproach, it must also [be] beyond the
suspicion of reproach,’ and by the teaching of experience that
mere admonitions are insufficient to prevent repetition of abuse.
In other cases, where the conduct of the trial has been less
censurable, or not censurable at all, a greater showing of
prejudice is demanded, because the interest in obtaining an ideal
trial, with the trier of the facts considering all admissible
6Although Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507 (2nd Cir. 1961), was a criminal case,
and much of its discussion is unique to that context, we find that the above discussion
regarding the “spectrum” of errors is useful in civil cases as well. 
7In a Kentucky case, the state Supreme Court justified a civil presumption of prejudice
when the jury was erroneously constituted as follows:  
The requirement of a showing of actual prejudice effectively
nullifies the requirements of the rule on allocation of peremptory
challenges. To show actual prejudice, the complaining litigant
would be required to discover the unknowable and to reconstruct
(continued...)
9
evidence that has ever become available, and nothing else, is not
thus supplemented and may be outweighed by the interest in
avoiding a retrial unlikely to have a different outcome[.]
See Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514 (2nd Cir. 1961).6 
In civil cases, Maryland courts have varied the tests based on the relative gravity of
the error.  For the more egregious civil errors, Maryland employs a presumption of prejudice.
See Murrell v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 376 Md. 170, 197, 829 A.2d 548, 564
(2003) (prejudice presumed where written agency decision was issued by someone other than
hearing officer, in violation of city procedural statute); Wyatt v. Johnson, 103 Md. App. 250,
653 A.2d 496 (1995) (prejudice presumed when the court refused to provide jury with a
verdict sheet itemizing damages in a personal injury case); King v. State Roads Comm’n, 284
Md. 368, 396 A.2d 267 (1979) (when trial court erroneously struck five extra jurors to obtain
panel of 12 after both parties exercised peremptory challenges, prejudice would be presumed,
provided that, on remand, the record reflected that appellant objected to trial court’s
procedure).7  But see St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Smith, 318 Md. 337, 568 A.2d
7(...continued)
what might have been and never was, a jury properly constituted
after running the gauntlet of challenge performed in accordance
with the prescribed rule of the game. Add to this the further
obstacle that it is the policy of the law to look with disfavor on
attempts to invade the jury’s internal process of decision to
impeach verdicts except in relatively rare instances.
Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cook, 590 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Ky. 1979) (footnote
omitted).
10
35 (1990) (When trial court gave defendant extra four strikes, but also increased plaintiff’s
strikes by four, no prejudice presumed because the parties were left in effectively the same
position as before court’s action).
We have previously justified this presumption of prejudice in the civil context on the
need to provide for hearty review of trial errors.  See Harris v. Harris, 310 Md. 310, 319-20,
529 A.2d 356, 360-61(1987).  In Harris, we considered the erroneous disqualification of one
of the party’s attorneys.  In addressing whether that error was harmless, we relied on a
presumption of prejudice due to the practical impossibility of proving prejudice: 
If it is established on appeal that the disqualification was in
error, we shall presume that the disqualified attorney's former
client has been prejudiced and the burden will be on the party
advantaged by the erroneous disqualification to prove that the
disqualification did not influence the outcome of the litigation.
As we see it, the presumption of prejudice, by relieving the
complaining party of the burden of establishing prejudice,
renders a disqualification order subject to effective
postjudgment review. 
Id.  
Other than these limited circumstances, the burden to show error in civil cases is on
11
the appealing party to show that an error caused prejudice.  See Flores, 398 Md. at 33, 919
A.2d at 719; Greenbriar, 387 Md. at 740, 878 A.2d at 563; Crane, 382 Md. at 91, 854 A.2d
at 1185; Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 330, 368 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1977); Klingensmith,
Inc. v. Snell Landscape Contractor, Inc., 265 Md. 654, 662, 291 A.2d 56, 60 (1972); M.A.
Realty Co. v. State Roads Comm’n, 247 Md. 522, 527, 233 A.2d 793, 797 (1967); State
Roads Comm’n v. Kuenne, 240 Md. 232, 235, 213 A.2d 567, 568 (1965).   
Although most of the harmless error analyses in civil law cases involve erroneous
exclusion or admission of evidence, it is also clear that a party complaining of an erroneous
jury instruction in a civil case must show prejudice.  See Fry v. Carter, 375 Md. 341, 355,
825 A.2d 1042, 1050 (2003) (“A judgment [regarding jury instructions] will not be reversed
unless the complaining party can show both error and prejudice.”); Bowser v. Resh, 170 Md.
App. 614, 648, 907 A.2d 910, 930 (2006) (in civil case involving “inadvertent” error in jury
instructions, “the appellant must show not only error but prejudicial error” to succeed on
appeal).
Here, Barksdale has suggested, in novel arguments, that she should be entitled to a
presumption of prejudice.  First, Barksdale argues that a presumption should be afforded to
“a statutorily protected class such as lead poisoned children[.]”  Second, she contends that
a defective jury instruction jeopardizes the constitutional guarantees of relief for injury, trial
by jury, and due process, and therefore warrants a presumption of prejudice.
We have never recognized a presumption of prejudice from error based on the
personal characteristics of the complaining party, and Barksdale has provided no meaningful
8In addition to these alleged constitutional violations, Barksdale argues that the
harmless error standard applied by the trial court violated the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, Art. 46, which protects against sex discrimination.  She states:
Ms. Barksdale is the mother of several pre-school age
children; as a woman, her earnings expectations and her
worklife expectancy are less than a man of similar age,
intelligence, and background.  Accordingly, any denial of
compensation for a woman disproportionately impacts her vis-a-
vis a similarly situated man.  Thus, a jury instruction which
potentially leads to the denial of compensation should be subject
to a strict scrutiny test when the victim is a woman.  
In a civil tort case, application of any rule of civil procedure potentially leads to the denial
of compensation.  Thus, under Barksdale’s theory, in which any denial of compensation
disproportionately impacts a woman, a female tort plaintiff would be entitled to an entirely
different set of rules than a male plaintiff.  This result is clearly unsustainable under the very
constitutional provisions invoked by Barksdale.  
12
support for her arguments for such a presumption.8  We decline to undermine decades of case
law supporting our harmless error analysis in order to create a special rule in this case. 
II. Satisfying the Burden of Showing Prejudice
Our determination that the complainant has the burden to prove prejudice does not
resolve this dispute.  Our inquiry then becomes: what is sufficient to show prejudice in a civil
jury instruction error?  The harmless error test is one for which Maryland courts, like many
other jurisdictions, have declined to establish “precise standards.”  See Flores, 398 Md. at
33, 919 A.2d at 720; Beahm, 279 Md. at 331, 368 A.2d at 1011 (“Precise standards for the
degree of prejudice required for reversal, have not been, and perhaps cannot be,
established.”).  Instead, we have determined prejudice based on the facts of each individual
case.  See id.; State Deposit Ins. Fund Corp. v. Billman, 321 Md. 3, 17, 580 .2d 1044, 1051
9The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals described a similar, burden-less test as follows:
While this standard of review is less stringent than review for
harmless error in a criminal case, it is more stringent than review
for sufficiency of the evidence in which we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. In reviewing
a civil jury instruction for harmless error, the prevailing party is
(continued...)
13
(1990) (“In determining whether [the error] prejudicially affected the outcome of a civil case,
the appellate court balances the probability of prejudice from the face of the extraneous
matter with the circumstances of the particular case[.]”).  Although a certain amount of
generality is needed to retain flexibility in application of the rule, we will examine how
Maryland courts, and other courts, have made determinations on prejudice, in order to flesh
out the analytical framework.  
We have described the required showing of prejudice in multiple ways, alternatively
stating that the complainant must show that prejudice was “likely” or “substantial.” Crane,
382 Md. at 91, 854 A.2d at 1185 (using likely and substantial interchangeably); Beahm, 279
Md. at 331, 368 A.2d at 1011 (substantial); Fry, 375 Md. at 356, 825 A.2d at 1050
(substantial).  We have been consistent, though, in stating that the “focus of our inquiry is
on the probability, not the possibility, of prejudice.”  Flores, 398 Md. at 33, 919 A.2d at 720;
Harford Sands, Inc. v. Groft, 320 Md. 136, 148, 577 A.2d 7, 12-13 (1990) (same); Hance v.
State Roads Comm’n, 221 Md. 164, 176, 156 A. 2d 644, 651 (1959) (“substantial prejudice
[must] be shown”).  Thus, the general rule is that a complainant who has proved error must
show more than that prejudice was possible; she must show instead that it was probable.9 
9(...continued)
not entitled to have disputed factual questions resolved in his
favor because the jury’s verdict may have resulted from a
misapprehension of law rather than from factual determinations
in favor of the prevailing party.  
Gambini v. Total Renal Care, Inc., 486 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2007).  See also Haddad
v. Lockheed Cal. Corp., 720 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Just as the verdict in a civil
case need only be more probably than not true, so an error in a civil trial need only be more
probably than not harmless.”).
14
In some cases, the harmlessness of the error is readily apparent.  For example, an error
in evidence is harmless if identical evidence is properly admitted.  See, e.g., Beahm, 279 Md.
at 332, 368 A.2d at 1012 (erroneous admission, as substantive evidence, of non-treating
physician’s testimony was harmless error because same testimony was properly admitted
from treating physician); Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. Connor, 136 Md. App. 91, 134-35,
764 A.2d 318, 341-42 (2000) (error of admitting one expert’s testimony was harmless
because another expert’s testimony, which was properly admitted, was substantially similar).
Moreover, erroneous instructions can be harmless if the Court takes appropriate steps to cure
that error.  See, e.g., Kruszewski v. Holz, 265 Md. 434, 290 A.2d 534 (1972) (erroneous jury
instruction was not prejudicial because trial judge gave clarifying instruction which was not
objected to by either party).
Other cases have required a more flexible inquiry, involving factors that sometimes
resemble the factors that justify a presumption in other contexts.  In Safeway Stores v.
Watson, 317 Md. 178, 183-84, 562 A.2d 1242, 1245 (1989), for example, we considered
whether the wrongful sequestration of a civil corporate defendant’s designated representative
10 Rule 2-513(a) provided as follows:
On motion of any party made before testimony begins the court
shall order that witnesses other than parties be excluded from
the courtroom before testifying, and it may do so on its own
initiative or on motion of any party made after testimony begins.
The court may continue the exclusion of a witness following the
testimony of that witness if a party indicates that the witness
may be recalled to give further testimony. A party that is not a
natural person may designate a representative to remain in the
courtroom, even though the representative may be a witness. An
expert witness who is to render an opinion based on testimony
given at the trial  shall be permitted to remain during that
testimony.
15
under former Md. Rule 2-51310 was a harmless error.  We analyzed multiple extrinsic factors,
including the rights of the disadvantaged party, and the purpose that having a representative
at trial serves.  In a dual holding, we applied a presumption of prejudice and held that the
appellant had demonstrated prejudice:   
We conclude that it is appropriate to presume prejudice from the
wrongful exclusion of a party, or its representative, from a trial.
Experienced trial attorneys and judges understand the
importance of “humanizing” a corporate defendant in a jury
trial. Moreover, a party is entitled to be present to have a
firsthand view of the proceedings for purposes of evaluating the
constantly changing prospects or exigencies for settlement, and
to participate in tactical decisions that must be made, sometimes
quickly, in the course of a trial. Finally, the attorney for Safeway
was deprived of the presence at his side of the principal
investigator in the case. Whether we consider these facts as
mounting up to the necessary proof of prejudice by Safeway, or
simply consider them in determining that a presumption of
prejudice is appropriate in this case, the result is the same. The
claimant has not overcome the proof or presumption, and the
result must be a new trial.
11Cf. Blaney v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 87 P.3d 757, 761
(Wash. 2004) (providing a presumption of prejudice in erroneous civil jury instructions, but
affirming the reviewing court’s duty to “ scrutinize the entire record in each particular case,
and determine whether or not the error was harmless or prejudicial.”).
12Md. Rule 5-606 applies to civil and criminal cases, and provides, in pertinent part:
 
(1) In any inquiry into the validity of a verdict, a sworn juror
may not testify as to (A) any matter or statement occurring
during the course of the jury’s deliberations, (B) the effect of
anything upon that or any other sworn juror’s mind or emotions
as influencing the sworn juror to assent or dissent from the
verdict, or (C) the sworn juror's mental processes in connection
with the verdict.
(2)  A sworn juror’s affidavit or evidence of any statement by
the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be
precluded from testifying may not be received for these
purposes.
13The court, of course, can acquire additional insight when the jury is asked to give
a special verdict.  See Flores v. Bell, 398 Md. 27, 36, 919 A.2d 716, 721 (2007) (although
(continued...)
16
Id. at 184, 562 A.2d at 1245-46.  Examination of Safeway Stores and other cases suggests
that there is a fine line between presuming prejudice due to the magnitude and importance
of the error, and declaring that the burden has been met due to the materiality of the error and
its relation to the issues in the case.11  
When prejudice is not readily apparent, a reviewing court must focus on the context
and magnitude of the error.  Maryland Rule 5-606 strictly limits a  court’s ability to inquire,
post-verdict, into “the sworn juror’s mental processes in connection with the verdict.”12
Thus, a court cannot “unbake” the jury verdict and examine the impact of any one
ingredient.13   In the criminal context, this difficulty has led Maryland to adopt a presumption
13(...continued)
question was erroneously submitted to the jury, the jury returned a special verdict favorable
to disadvantaged party on that issue); K&K Mgmt. v. Lee, 316 Md. 137, 149-50, 557 A.2d
965, 971 (1989) (although court erroneously denied request to submit an issue to the jury,
the jury’s special verdict demonstrated that jury would not have reached the issue); see also
Moore v. Preventive Med. Medical Group, Inc., 223 Cal. Rptr. 859, 870-71 (1986)
(erroneous submission of “proximate cause” instructions to the jury, as opposed to “legal
cause,” was harmless because the jury was instructed on “legal cause” and returned a verdict
using the language of legal, and not proximate, cause).    
14See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 316, 825 A.2d 1008, 1027 (2003) (“The
harm done is patent due to the difficulty of proving such contentions post-verdict[.]
Therefore, a presumption of prejudice is appropriate in such cases.”); Hayes v. State, 355 Md.
615, 636, 735 A.2d 1109, 1120 (1999) (substitution of an alternate juror is prejudicial if done
after the jury “closes the door” to deliberate; this standard is practical because “it can be
established through objective and extrinsic evidence, without the need to question jurors as
to what went on in the jury room after the door was closed[.]”).
17
of prejudice for errors, which may be rebutted by the State.14  Although, in the civil context,
this same difficulty does not give rise to a universal presumption of prejudice, it does shape
the applicable harmless error test. 
Fry v. Carter, 375 Md. 341, 825 A.2d 1042 (2003), demonstrates this point.  In Fry,
a highway construction worker was killed when a trucker, carrying roof trusses which
protruded off the side of his vehicle, struck the construction worker on his head when driving
by the construction site.  The deceased workers’ family brought suit against the truck driver
for negligence.  After the close of evidence, the judge gave an “unavoidable accident”
instruction to the jury, over the objection of the plaintiff, stating as follows:
An unavoidable accident is an inevitable occurrence which is
not to be foreseen or prevented by vigilance, care, and attention
and not occasioned by or contributed to in any manner by an act
or omission of the party claiming the accident was unavoidable.
18
And in this case, the defendant claims that the accident was
unavoidable.
Id. at 346-47, 825 A.2d at 1045.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, and
the case reached this court on the allegedly erroneous jury instruction.
On appeal, we analyzed a number of cases involving “unavoidable accident”
instructions, we held that there was significant evidence of negligence in that case, and that
“[g]iven evidence that the accident was not unavoidable, the trial court erred in instructing
the jury on unavoidable accident.”  Id. at 355, 825 A.2d at 1050.  The Fry Court then
considered whether the error required reversal of the jury verdict, analyzing the injection of
the “unavoidable accident” concept in the context of the case and concluding:
The unavoidable accident instruction was prejudicial because it
permitted the jury to speculate as to whether [the defendant]
could have avoided the accident at the last minute. . . .
Suggesting to the jury that it could decide the case on the
grounds that the event was unavoidable was misleading because
it diverted juror attention from the pivotal issue in the case–
negligence. The verdict in this case was a general verdict; thus
it is unclear how the jury reached its verdict. The jury might
have relied upon the unavoidable accident instruction as a basis
for its verdict.
Id. at 356, 825 A.2d at 1050.
Our decision in Fry did not set forth a specific standard, nor did it create an automatic
presumption of prejudice.  Instead, Fry declares prejudicial those jury instructions which are
“misleading” and “distracting,” and “permit[] the jury to speculate as to [improper issues
which may be dispositive].” Fry, 375 Md. at 356, 825 A.2d at 1050.  More generally, Fry
holds that a complainant must satisfy her burden regarding prejudice by showing the nature
19
of the erroneous jury instruction and its relation to the issues in the case.  A reviewing court
can then weigh the materiality of the error and the potential that it poisoned the jury
deliberations. 
In some cases, when it is practically impossible for the court to separate the erroneous
instruction from the issues in the case, the mere uncertainty as to prejudice may be grounds
for holding an error is reversible.  See Flores, 398 Md. at 35, 919 A.2d at 721 (describing the
holding in Fry as follows: “Because we were unable to determine the conclusions utilized
by the jury in making its decision, it was possible and probable that the jury relied on the
improper instruction as a basis for its verdict.”); Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless
Error 64 (1970) (observing that an error “can be declared prejudicial for the simple reason
that the court is unable to declare a belief one way or the other as to the probable effect of
the error on a particular judgment. There is also the preeminent reason that such errors are
so subversive of the judicial process as to make reversal necessary.”).  
Reviewing the approaches of other federal and state courts, we see a similar focus on
how the instruction interacted with the evidence in reviewing whether erroneous jury
instructions were prejudicial.  In Lindstrom v. Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis, 214 N.W.2d
672 (Minn. 1974), a suit for damages brought by injured passengers in a taxi cab, the trial
court used  jury instructions containing a mix of the “reasonable care” standard, which was
wrong, and the correct, higher standard of care required under Minnesota law for common
15In another case, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that the elevated standard of
care required a taxicab company to exercise “foresight for the safety of its passengers[,]” “to
take every reasonable precaution to protect them from injury[,]” and “to have skilled and
careful drivers who were alert at all times to discover and avoid danger.”  Ford v. Stevens,
157 N.W. 2d 510, 513 (Minn. 1968) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
20
carriers.15  After the jury returned a verdict for the taxi company, the trial court granted a
motion for a new trial.  On appeal, Minnesota’s Supreme Court analyzed the extent to which
the erroneous instructions had “permeated” the instructions as a whole, and the “material”
nature of the mistake:  
 The crux of this issue is how many of the original instructions
were permeated by the error of failing to instruct on the highest
degree of care. Defendant views the error on the standard of care
as limited to the single instruction on the ordinary-care standard
(Instruction 101), which was cured by the trial court’s
withdrawal and corrective instructions. Plaintiffs submit that the
fundamental error was not limited to the court’s giving of
Instruction 101 but involved repeated references to the
ordinary-care standard in related instructions in the charge on
common-law rules of the road and proximate cause. It was
apparent to the trial court, as it is to this court, that the error was
not limited to the giving of Instruction 101 but included repeated
references to the ordinary-care standard. The corrective
instructions failed to convey clearly to the jury the single
standard of care applicable to a common carrier.
Id. at 677.  See also LNC Invs. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 173 F.3d 454, 463 (2nd Cir. 1999)
(finding prejudice when the error was “integral to the standard of liability because it
precluded a finding of causation[,] [and created] an erroneous impression regarding the
standard of liability[.]”); Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 554 (2nd Cir. 1996) (in
medical malpractice claim, erroneous instruction that finding of malpractice precluded
16In addition, the Nat’l Medical court listed the “closeness of the jury verdict” as a
factor to consider.  72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 720, 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).  In California, only three-
fourths of a civil jury must agree to render a verdict.  See Cal. Const. Art. I, § 16 (2011); Cal.
Civ. Pro. § 618 (2011).  As Maryland requires a unanimous jury verdict in civil cases, see
Maryland Rule 2-522, we have excluded this factor as irrelevant.  
21
finding of “deliberate indifference” was not harmless because it “[went] to the very heart of
the plaintiff's claim, and effectively preclude[d] a finding of liability where one may be
warranted.”); Hendricks v. Coughlin, 942 F.2d 109, 113-14 (2nd Cir. 1991) (failure to
instruct jury that defendants could be liable if they recklessly disregarded plaintiff’s rights
was not harmless error because it went directly to plaintiff’s claim).
At least one California court has undertaken the hard task of outlining the objective
factors that a court can consider.  See Nat’l Med. Transp. Network v. Deloitte & Touche, 72
Cal. Rptr. 2d 720 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).  In considering whether an erroneous jury instruction
was prejudicial, the court listed the following factors:  
(1) the degree of conflict in the evidence on critical issues; (2)
whether respondent’s argument to the jury may have contributed
to the instruction's misleading effect; (3) whether the jury
requested a rereading of the erroneous instruction or of related
evidence; . . . and [4] the effect of other instructions in
remedying the error.
Id. at 731.16  Although we are hesitant to ascribe to any exclusive list of factors, given the
patchwork of harmless error cases, we believe this four factor list is helpful.
Summary
We summarize the above discussion as follows: a party challenging an erroneous jury
instruction in a civil case must demonstrate to the court why the error was prejudicial.  An
22
erroneous instruction may be prejudicial if it is misleading or distracting for the jury, and
permits the jury members to speculate about inapplicable legal principles.  See Fry, 375 Md.
at 355, 825 A.2d at 1050.  An error may also be prejudicial if the error, by itself, could have
precluded a finding of liability where one was warranted.  See LNC Invs., 173 F.3d 454.  We
have also recommended a non-exclusive, four-factor list for the reviewing court to consider.
See Nat'l Medical Transp. Network, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731.  Moreover, in certain cases, the
mere inability of a reviewing court to rule out prejudice, given the facts of the case, may be
enough to declare an error reversible.  See Traynor, supra at 64.  The reviewing court, in
considering these issues, should engage in a comprehensive review of the record, and base
its determination on the nature of the instruction and its relation to the issues in the case. 
III.  The Erroneous Instruction in This Case
We turn now to apply the above analysis and determine whether the error in this case
was prejudicial or harmless.  The trial court’s error was the inclusion, in its jury instructions,
of Section 902A of the Baltimore City Code, stated as follows: 
Section 902A; every occupant of a dwelling or a dwelling unit
shall keep in a clean and sanitary condition that part of the
dwelling unit and the premises thereof which he occupies and
controls. A clean and sanitary condition[ ] shall include, but is
not limited to the following standards; walls and windows.
At trial, the Owners requested Section 902A, describing it as “the provision[] of the code that
talk[s] about tenant obligations as well.”  The Owners’ counsel justified his request as such:
I’m simply suggesting that that’s the problem with taking just a
part of the Housing Code.  As you get into issues that, you
know, these statutes are typically designed in a way that they’re
23
not – you know, they impose obligations upon the landlord, but
they also recognize some obligations by the tenant.  And I feel
like what’s been proposed is sort of one sided there.
* * * 
[C]hipping and flaking paint, I mean, that’s sort of an issue[]
that periodically comes up in these – or that’s the issue that is
not explored in great depth in these cases, but the question
always is, if you saw chipping and flaking paint existing in the
house why didn’t you clean it up?  It’s a tough issue to present
to Plaintiffs and it’s a – you know, sounding callous issue to
present to Plaintiffs, but it’s an issue.  If there was chipping
paint in you[r] property I would argue that that constitutes dirt
and filth and that’s not clean and sanitary.  And you don’t wait
for the landlord to come in and clean it up.  
The Owner’s counsel concluded that “it’s only fair in the interest of completeness that all
potentially applicable sections of the Housing Code be read.”  Barksdale’s counsel disagreed,
stating that the Owners were “trying to throw in a contributory negligence argument even
though my client can’t be contrib[utorily negligent].”  
On review of this record, the Owners’ request for the Section 902A instruction seems
to be an outgrowth of their frustration with Maryland’s regulatory scheme.  It is undisputed
that the issues in this case include neither contributory negligence by Barksdale nor a
superseding cause of negligence by Barksdale’s grandmother.  Maryland law has determined
that the responsibility of a landlord to protect children from lead paint poisoning is an
important one, and thus does not allow the landlord to escape liability by blaming the child
or her family. See, e.g., Caroline v. Reicher, 269 Md. 125, 304 A.2d 831 (1973) (parent’s
negligence in failing to prevent child from eating paint chips cannot be a superseding cause
24
to landlord’s negligence).  In a case like this one, the correct jury instructions, as the Owners’
counsel argued at trial, may fail to explore the tenant’s failure to clean up chipping paint. 
In that sense, fairly or unfairly, Maryland has weighted the scale.
The Owners’ request for a Section 902A instruction, however, is an impermissible
counterweight.  Although not explicitly a “superseding cause” or “contributory negligence”
argument, it may have served the same purpose and had the same impermissible effect, i.e.,
to deflect liability to a third party.  As the Owners’ argument in favor of the instruction
demonstrates, the reason for including the Section 902A instruction was to raise the
following question with the jury: “if you saw chipping and flaking paint existing in the
house[,] why didn’t you clean it up?”  The Section 902A instruction, sought by and argued
for by the Owners, served no other purpose than to raise this impermissible insinuation. 
The Section 902A instruction, therefore, touched on the heart of the
case—determining who was responsible for Barksdale’s injury—and may have had an
insidious impact on the jury’s thinking.  Jury deliberations, which often address the technical
application of law to established facts, are ultimately about apportioning blame, a process
which involves the reactions, opinions, emotions, intuition, and reasoning of the jury
members.  In this process, jury instructions serve the vital purpose of enabling the jurors to
sift and sort these varying and conflicting forces, and channel them into a deliberative
pathway that leads to a verdict  permitted by law.   As we described above, the jury was
prohibited by law from blaming Barksdale or her grandmother for contributory or
superseding negligence, but inclusion of the Section 902A instruction may well have enticed
17The Owners suggest, in their brief, that the verdict was a “special verdict,” and thus
distinguishable from an impenetrable general verdict such as that in  Fry v. Carter, 375 Md.
341, 825 A.2d 1042 (2003).  Here, the verdict did distinguish between the negligence count
and the Consumer Protection Act count, yet the verdict was “general” in that it did not break
down the negligence count in such a way that this Court can determine whether the jury
inappropriately blamed Barksdale’s grandmother for her failure to report or clean up the
flaking paint.  
18For example, the trial court instructed the jury that “[a] minor cannot be held
responsible for the negligence of the minor’s parent, guardian or custodian[,]” and that the
law “places a continuous duty on the landlord to maintain the property and keep it free of
chipping, peeling and flaking paint at all times.”
25
them down that road.  At the very least, we are unable to determine if the jury relied on
Barksdale’s grandmother’s conduct in reaching a verdict in favor of the Owners.17
The Owners argue instead that, even if the jury were to have found that Barksdale or
her grandmother violated Section 902A, the jury instructions as a whole “did not direct or
even suggest to the jury that any such finding was attributable to [Barksdale]” or that “the
obligations of the landlord were relieved in any way by any action or inaction by
[Barksdale’s] grandmother with respect to keeping the premises clean, or that [Barksdale’s]
claim otherwise failed against the [Owners] due to her grandmother’s actions or inactions.”
To be sure, the jury instructions contained other, appropriate, instructions, which, if
understood correctly, could have negated any potentially preclusive implications of the
Section 902A instruction.18  
We are not persuaded, however, by the theory of the Owners, who, having sought and
argued in favor of such an instruction, now claim that their disputed instruction, once given,
was meaningless and necessarily disregarded by the jury.   We do not view the potential for
26
prejudice as impermissible speculation or conjecture, as the Owners contend, nor will we
assume that the jury followed the correct and contradictory instructions.  With an error
touching the heart of the litigation, we cannot be sure that the erroneous instructions were
“cured” by the correct instructions when both were presented to the jury as equals.   
Nor is “tangible evidence” required to show prejudice in this context, as the Owners
assert.  As we explained, there is no “tangible” proof of prejudice because we cannot read
the minds of the jurors.  This lack of knowledge was caused not by the failure of Barksdale
to present evidence or make an argument regarding prejudice, but by the reality that the
Court cannot determine whether the jury actually relied on the impermissible jury instruction.
We  conclude, therefore, that, Barksdale has carried her burden of showing prejudice.  
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  REMANDED TO THAT
COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THE
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE CITY AND REMAND TO THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL.  COSTS
TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENTS.
Judge Battaglia joins in the judgment only.