Case Title: Caesar Robinson v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC93-210

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2000-10-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
____________
No. SC93210
____________
CEASAR ROBINSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[October 5, 2000]
WELLS, C.J.
We have for review State v. Robinson, 711 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). 
We accepted this case based on express and direct conflict with the opinions in
Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1981), Johnson v. State, 442 So. 2d 185 (Fla.
1983), Evans v. State, 692 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), and Borgess v. State,
455 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3),
Fla. Const.  Although we approve the Second District’s reversal of the trial court’s
order granting postconviction relief in this case, we reach our conclusion through
1The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence in Robinson v. State,
436 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
-2-
reasoning that differs from that of the district court, and we remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The facts in this case, as set forth in the decision of the Second District
below, are as follows:
In the early morning hours of December 5, 1981, Avil Francis
was shot to death while sleeping at a residence in Winter Haven,
Florida.  His newlywed wife, Bernadette Francis, was shot in the head,
but survived the shooting.  The residence was the former marital
abode of Ms. Francis and Robinson, who were divorced five months
prior to the shootings.  At a trial in August 1982, the jury found
Robinson guilty of the first-degree murder of Mr. Francis and the
attempted first-degree murder of Ms. Francis.  The trial court
sentenced Robinson to life in prison with a minimum of twenty-five
years, plus a consecutive prison term of twenty years with a three-year
minimum.[1]
Approximately fourteen years later, in July 1996, Robinson filed
a motion for postconviction relief asserting newly discovered
evidence.  Robinson alleged that Ms. Francis and her daughter lied at
his trial concerning their eyewitness accounts of the shooting.  In
support of his motion, he filed the affidavit of a fellow inmate, Wilbert
Hollins, who purportedly obtained such information during a
conversation with Ms. Francis in New York, in 1989.  Robinson
claimed that he learned of this information only a few months prior to
filing his 1996 motion for postconviction relief.
In response to Robinson's motion, the State agreed to an
evidentiary hearing.  Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court
granted postconviction relief by written order in May 1997.
711 So. 2d at 620 (footnote omitted).  The State appealed, and the Second District
-3-
reversed, finding that the trial court had abused its discretion in that the court had
not recognized that the circumstantial evidence presented at trial, coupled with
direct evidence in the form of testimony of Ms. Francis and her daughter Shantel,
"so clearly outweighs the newly discovered, impeachment evidence that no
reasonable person would have reached the conclusion that the trial court did."  Id.
at 623.
In analyzing Robinson’s alleged newly discovered evidence, the district court
applied the two-prong test this Court provided in Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911
(Fla. 1991) (Jones I), and further explained in Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512 (Fla.
1998) (Jones II).  Id. at 622.  As to the first prong, the court found that Hollins’
testimony constituted newly discovered evidence in that it was unknown at the time
of the trial and that neither Robinson nor his counsel could have known of it by the
use of diligence.  See id.
Concerning the second prong of the Jones test, which assesses the probable
effect of the newly discovered evidence at retrial, the court noted that Hollins’
testimony would be admissible on retrial as impeachment evidence under section
90.608, Florida Statutes (1997).  See id.  After recognizing recent case law holding
that impeachment evidence alone may in some circumstances warrant a new trial,
the district court found that the trial court erred in failing to balance the weight of
-4-
Hollins’ impeachment testimony “against all of the other evidence stacked against
Robinson.”  Id. at 623.  The district court concluded that the trial court abused its
discretion in determining that Hollins’ testimony “would probably produce an
acquittal on retrial” and reversed the trial court’s grant of postconviction relief.  Id.
In this Court, Robinson contends that the Second District erred in that it
assumed the trial court’s role and erroneously reweighed the evidence rather than
finding the “palpable” abuse of discretion which is required to overturn a trial
court’s granting of a new trial.  Robinson contends that the trial court correctly
weighed the credibility of the newly discovered evidence alongside the direct
testimony and circumstantial evidence presented at trial.  Robinson further argues
that the testimony of Hollins seriously undermined the only direct evidence of guilt
the State presented at trial, which was the testimony of Ms. Francis and her
daughter.
As to our jurisdiction in this case, we find upon further consideration that
there is no conflict with the alleged conflict cases, which concern the proper role of
appellate courts in evaluating weight and sufficiency of evidence in various factually
distinguishable contexts.  However, we do find conflict between this case and our
decisions in Jones I and Jones II as to the analysis for determining whether alleged
newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial.
-5-
As to the merits of this case, we approve the Second District’s conclusion
that the trial court erred in granting postconviction relief.  However, the basis for
our holding as to trial court error is not that the trial court abused its discretion, as
held by the district court.  Rather, we find in the trial court’s order a misapplication
of law as set forth in the Jones cases.
In its decision below, the Second District did not deal with the trial court’s
legal error in the application of an incorrect test for determining whether newly
discovered evidence warrants a new trial.  In Jones I, we explained the test for
determining whether to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence as
first requiring a finding that the evidence was unknown and could not have been
known at the time of trial through due diligence.  See 591 So. 2d at 916.  Once past
this threshold finding, a court must apply the second prong which requires a finding
that the newly discovered evidence “would probably produce an acquittal on
retrial.”  Id. at 915.
Here, the trial court properly analyzed the threshold step in the Jones test but
then stated as to the second prong, “The Court finds that the newly discovered
evidence could probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”  State v. Robinson, No.
CF81-3683A1-XX, Order Granting Motion for Postconviction Relief at 6 (Fla. 10th
Cir. Ct. order filed May 28, 1997) (emphasis added).  The uncertainty of this
-6-
statement is compounded by the trial court’s earlier statement, “The Court finds the
new evidence would have probably affected the outcome of the case.”  See
Robinson order at 5.  These statements are in conflict with the definitive standard
we set forth in Jones II, in which we held, as stated, that newly discovered evidence
must be of such nature that it “would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.” 
709 So. 2d at 521 (emphasis added).
In Jones II, we further explained that to reach the conclusion as to the
probable acquittal on retrial,
[T]he trial court is required to “consider all newly discovered evidence
which would be admissible” at trial and then evaluate the “weight of
both the newly discovered evidence and the evidence which was
introduced at the trial.”  [Jones I, 591 So. 2d at 916.]
In considering the second prong, the trial court should initially
consider whether the evidence would have been admissible at trial or
whether there would have been any evidentiary bars to its admissibility. 
Once this is determined, an evaluation of the weight to be accorded
the evidence includes whether the evidence goes to the merits of the
case or whether it constitutes impeachment evidence.  The trial court
should also determine whether the evidence is cumulative to other
evidence in the case.  The trial court should further consider the
materiality and relevance of the evidence and any inconsistencies in the
newly discovered evidence.
709 So. 2d at 521 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  We also required in Jones
II that the trial court undertake a cumulative analysis by evaluating the newly
discovered evidence in conjunction with evidence presented at all prior evidentiary
-7-
hearings and evidence presented at trial.  See id. at 522.  We agree with the district
court that impeachment evidence could be part of this cumulative analysis, as this
Court stated in Jones I, Jones II, and Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 89 (Fla.
1994).
Therefore, we determine that this case should be remanded to the trial court
for the trial court to reconsider its ruling.  Accordingly, we remand to the Second
District Court of Appeal with directions for the trial court to conduct a reweighing
of the newly discovered impeachment evidence and a cumulative analysis by taking
into consideration all the evidence presented at trial and in the evidentiary hearing
below.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J.,
concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
ANSTEAD, J., specially concurring.
While I concur in the remand required by the majority, I write separately to
address the difficulty trial courts (and the trial court in this case in particular), have
encountered trying to cope with the confusing standards that have been articulated
-8-
by appellate courts for various postconviction proceedings.  It is critically
important, of course, that the correct standard be understood and applied, since it
will usually determine the outcome of the proceedings.
Perhaps the three most common grounds the courts see alleged for
postconviction relief are claims of newly discovered evidence, ineffective
assistance of counsel and the government’s failure to disclose evidence.  The
United States Supreme Court and, in turn, this Court, have articulated separate
standards of proof that a defendant must meet in order to prevail on these three
distinct legal claims.
For example, we have held that in order to prevail on a claim of newly
discovered evidence a defendant must show first that he has discovered evidence
that was “unknown and could not have been known at the time of trial through due
diligence.”  Majority op. at 5.  Secondly, it must be shown that the evidence
“would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”  Id.  Of course, if the newly
discovered evidence is asserted as grounds for a new penalty phase proceeding in a
capital case, the second prong would require a showing that the evidence would
probably produce a life sentence in a new penalty phase.
Importantly, this relatively high standard of proof and prejudice for newly
discovered evidence claims has been explicitly rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court
-9-
as a standard for demonstrating prejudice in claims based upon the ineffective
assistance of counsel:
     On the other hand, we believe that a defendant need
not show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely
than not altered the outcome in the case. . . .
     Even when the specified attorney error results in the
omission of certain evidence, the newly discovered
evidence standard is not an apt source from which to
draw a prejudice standard for ineffectiveness claims.  The
high standard for newly discovered evidence claims
presupposes that all the essential elements of a
presumptively accurate and fair proceeding were present
in the proceeding whose result is challenged.  Cf. United
States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 112 (1946).  An
ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence of one of
the crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding is
reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker and the
appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat
lower.  The result of a proceeding can be rendered
unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if
the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence to have determined the
outcome.
Strickland v. United States, 466 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984) (emphasis supplied).  In
Strickland, the U.S. Supreme Court formulated a two-part test for ineffectiveness
claims: “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. 
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.”  Id. at 687.  
In explaining the prejudice prong of the test the Strickland court explained:
-10-
     Accordingly, the appropriate test for prejudice finds
its roots in the test for materiality of exculpatory
information not disclosed to the defense by the
prosecution, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S., at 104,
112-113, and in the test for materiality of testimony made
unavailable to the defense by Government deportation of
a witness, United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, supra, [458
U.S.,] at 872-874.  The defendant must show that there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.  A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.
      . . . .
     The governing legal standard plays a critical role in
defining the question to be asked in assessing the
prejudice from counsel’s errors.  When a defendant
challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the
factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting
guilt.  When a defendant challenges a death sentence such
as the one at issue in this case, the question is whether
there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors,
the sentencer–including an appellate court, to the extent it
independently reweighs the evidence–would have
concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances did not warrant death.
Id. at 694-95 (emphasis supplied).  In applying Strickland, it is extremely important
to note that the Court expressly rejected utilizing the newly discovered evidence
standard for demonstrating prejudice.  Hence, in ineffective assistance of counsel
claims a defendant is not required to demonstrate that but for counsel’s deficient
conduct the outcome of the trial would have been different.  See id. at 693 (“[A]
2Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
-11-
defendant need not show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not
altered the outcome in the case”).  Rather, the Court ultimately focused on whether
counsel’s ineffectiveness was such as to “undermine confidence in the outcome.” 
Id. at 694.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained the application of
the Strickland standard:
     With respect to the prejudice requirement, the
petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 
The level of certainty is something less than a
preponderance; it need not be proved that counsel’s
performance more likely than not affected the outcome. 
Instead, the petitioner need only demonstrate “a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.”  
Young v. Catoe, 205 F.3d 750, 759 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).  
As noted in the Strickland quotes set out above, the prejudice prong of
Strickland is derived from the same legal test for materiality developed in cases
considering claims that the government withheld evidence from a defendant.  These
claims have come to be known as Brady claims after a Supreme Court case that
recognized a constitutional violation in the government’s improper withholding of
evidence.2  Because of the U.S. Supreme Court’s express reliance on the
3See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 410 (1995).
-12-
preexisting standard set out in cases like United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104
(1976), we can see that the prejudice standard for withheld evidence claims is
closely related to the prejudice standard for ineffectiveness claims.  In fact, in two
recent cases the U.S. Supreme Court has reiterated this materiality standard when
discussing the three-prong test for Brady claims.3  In essence the Supreme Court
has told us that the prejudice prong of a Brady claim is virtually identical to the
prejudice prong of an ineffectiveness claim.
Unfortunately, our opinions have not been careful in preserving the bright-line
distinction set out in Strickland between the prejudice standard in newly discovered
evidence claims and the prejudice standard in ineffectiveness and Brady claims.  In
much of our case law involving Strickland claims, we restate the prejudice prong to
require a showing of a probability of a different outcome as if the ineffectiveness
standard is identical to the newly discovered evidence standard.  Hence, we have
contributed to the misunderstandings and confusion that exist as to the proper
standards to be applied in postconviction proceedings.  Of course, the Strickland
opinion itself is somewhat confusing in its choice of words.  In fact, Justice Souter
has suggested that the Court use other language in describing the Strickland and
Brady standards so as to avoid the very confusion discussed herein:
-13-
The Court speaks in terms of the familiar, and perhaps
familiarly deceptive, formulation: whether there is a
“reasonable probability” of a different outcome if the
evidence withheld had been disclosed.  The Court rightly
cautions that the standard intended by these words does
not require defendants to show that a different outcome
would have been more likely than not with the suppressed
evidence, let alone that without the materials withheld the
evidence would have been insufficient to support the
result reached.  See ante, at 289-290; Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419, 434-435 (1995).  Instead, the Court
restates the question (as I have done elsewhere) as
whether “‘the favorable evidence could reasonably be
taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence’” in the outcome.  Ante, at 290
(quoting Kyles, supra, at 435).
     Despite our repeated explanation of the shorthand
formulation in these words, the continued use of the term
“probability” raises an unjustifiable risk of misleading
courts into treating it as akin to the more demanding
standard, “more likely than not.”  While any short
phrases for what the cases are getting at will be
“inevitably imprecise,” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97, 108 (1976), I think “significant possibility” would do
better at capturing the degree to which the undisclosed
evidence would place the actual result in question,
sufficient to warrant overturning a conviction or sentence.
See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 297-98 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).  For all these reasons, it should not be surprising that a trial
court might not always get it exactly right in restating the appropriate standard.  The
trial court here obviously did a thorough and conscientious job in evaluating the
claims presented and its work is to be commended.
-14-
PARIENTE, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Second District - Case No. 2D97-02619 
(Polk County)
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Kevin Briggs, Assistant Public
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Robert J. Krauss, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Chief of Criminal Law, and Patricia A. McCarthy, Assistant
Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Respondent