Case Title: People v. Reese

Citation: 2017 IL 120011

Docket Number: 120011

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2017-10-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 IL 120011 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
(Docket No. 120011) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. 
WILLIS REESE, Appellee and Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
Opinion filed October 19, 2017. 
 
 
JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
 
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman, and Theis 
concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
Justice Burke concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion. 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the offense of aggravated vehicular 
hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(3) (West 2006)) requires proof that the defendant 
took actual physical possession of a vehicle from the driver. We hold that the 
offense encompasses taking actual physical possession of a vehicle but may also be 
 
 
 
 
 
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committed when a defendant exercises control of the vehicle by use of force or 
threat of force with the victim still present. Accordingly, we affirm in part and 
reverse in part the appellate court’s judgment. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
Defendant Willis Reese was charged with several offenses, including 
aggravated vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(3) (West 2006)), vehicular 
invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11.1 (West 2006)), attempted armed robbery (720 ILCS 
5/8-4, 18-2 (West 2006)), and escape (720 ILCS 5/31-6 (West 2006)). The public 
defender was appointed to represent defendant, but defendant subsequently 
informed the trial court that he wished to proceed pro se.  
¶ 4 
 
The Cook County trial court admonished defendant about his right to appointed 
counsel and the potential of nonextended and extended-term sentences for the 
charged offenses. The trial court also informed defendant that some of his 
sentences could run consecutively and that two of the charges alone carried a 
potential maximum term of 160 years. The court summarized, “Basically, you are 
looking at massive time if you are convicted.” The trial court did not admonish 
defendant that any potential sentences would also be served consecutively to his 
natural-life sentence for his unrelated first degree murder conviction. When asked 
if he understood the potential penalties, defendant stated, “Perfectly, Your Honor, 
perfectly.” After completing the admonishments, the trial court permitted 
appointed counsel to withdraw and defendant to represent himself. 
¶ 5 
 
Prior to jury selection, defendant asked to have his leg shackles removed before 
potential jurors entered the courtroom. The trial court told defendant that his hands 
would be free and both counsel tables would be covered with drapes to block any 
view of his leg shackles. Defendant expressed concern that the jurors would be able 
to hear the shackles if he moved. He also asserted that he was there “to do a 
thorough job” and he “[could] not work under these conditions.” The trial court told 
defendant the decision on removing the shackles was within the discretion of the 
Department of Corrections. When defendant continued to express concern, the trial 
court stated, “You are preaching to the choir. All you have to do is talk to the men in 
charge. If you can convince those three men that you don’t need leg shackles, you 
don’t have to have them on.”  
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 6 
 
Following a recess, defendant asked if he would be shackled “when trial 
officially starts.” The trial court responded, “That’s up to the Illinois Department of 
Corrections.” Defendant stated, “The only way they are going to come off is by 
court order” and reiterated that he “cannot work under these conditions.” The court 
asserted it would take the matter under advisement and make a decision the next 
day. 
¶ 7 
 
During jury selection, defendant asked the court to consider an issue without 
the jurors present. After the trial court removed the prospective jurors from the 
courtroom, defendant stated he believed two of them saw his leg shackles through 
an area of the counsel table left uncovered by the drapes. The trial court brought 
those potential jurors into the courtroom separately. The first one stated she could 
not see behind the drapes. Defendant, nevertheless, removed her with a peremptory 
challenge. The second potential juror stated he saw “a little belt on [defendant’s] 
strap between his feet,” but assured the court that what he saw would not affect his 
ability to be fair. After questioning the prospective juror, defendant decided not to 
challenge him for cause or exercise a peremptory challenge.  
¶ 8 
 
When the three remaining members of the panel were brought back into the 
courtroom, the court asked if anything about defendant’s appearance “with this 
drapery in front of him” would affect their ability to be fair. One of the potential 
jurors responded, “No I guess” and asked if there was “something we should know 
that we don’t know because now I am confused.” The trial court stated there was 
nothing the jurors should know. The other two potential jurors did not respond to 
the court’s inquiry. The parties then accepted the four-member panel. 
¶ 9 
 
After concluding voir dire, the trial court addressed the State’s motion to 
introduce defendant’s prior murder conviction as evidence of his motive to escape 
and for impeachment if defendant chose to testify. The State sought to present a 
certified copy of the charging instrument from defendant’s prior murder case to 
prove that he was found guilty three days before trying to escape and “to introduce 
evidence of the potential sentence he was facing insofar as it relates to motive.” The 
trial court ruled that evidence could not be presented in the State’s case-in-chief but 
a certified copy of defendant’s prior murder conviction could be used for 
impeachment if he chose to testify.  
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 10 
 
The next day, the trial court ordered removal of defendant’s shackles during 
trial. The State called Cook County sheriff’s Deputy Vito Zaccaro, who testified 
that he was working in the external operations unit at John H. Stroger, Jr., Hospital 
of Cook County (Stroger Hospital) when he met defendant at the front of the 
hospital to accompany him to an appointment. Defendant was wearing a 
Department of Corrections inmate uniform and was restrained with handcuffs and 
leg shackles. Zaccaro transported defendant to the dermatology clinic on the second 
floor. Defendant repeatedly asked to use the restroom during the appointment. 
After the appointment, Zaccaro took defendant to a single-occupancy restroom and 
allowed him to enter with his hands uncuffed but his legs still shackled. Zaccaro 
waited in the hallway outside with the restroom door “open about a crack.” 
¶ 11 
 
When defendant came out after about 10 minutes, Officer Zaccaro asked him to 
put his hands out, but defendant instead “jumped toward the one side with a silver 
metal weapon, placed it to [Zaccaro’s] neck and said ‘move or I’ll cut you.’ ” 
Zaccaro felt defendant’s hand going toward his handgun, and he threw up his arms 
to prevent defendant from taking the gun. Defendant responded by stabbing 
Zaccaro in the neck. Zaccaro struggled to detain defendant, but he tripped over 
defendant’s shackles, and they both fell to the floor. When defendant got up and 
began running, Zaccaro hit the “panic button” on his radio and chased defendant 
through the hallways and down an emergency stairwell, exiting at the front of 
Stroger Hospital. 
¶ 12 
 
Zaccaro followed defendant out of the hospital and saw him run onto a shuttle 
bus nearby. Zaccaro tried to enter the bus, but the door slammed on him and the bus 
began to travel around the circular driveway before it “just kind of stopped and 
went into a wall.” Defendant ran out of the bus, and hospital police officers tackled 
him. On cross-examination, Zaccaro acknowledged that defendant never made a 
verbal demand for Zaccaro’s handgun and he also had keys to the handcuffs and leg 
shackles on his belt. 
¶ 13 
 
James Rimmer testified that he was the driver of the shuttle bus and was making 
runs between the Cook County juvenile court parking lot and Stroger Hospital. The 
shuttle bus was parked near one of the main entrances to the hospital with the doors 
open when defendant, wearing a jail inmate uniform, ran through the front door. 
Rimmer testified that defendant “stood over me, left hand, I guess, behind my seat, 
 
 
 
 
 
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and right hand in front of my face. I seen an object in his hand, and he ordered me to 
drive. He said, ‘*** [D]rive. If you stop, I’m gonna stab you in the neck.’ ” Rimmer 
closed the door to the bus and began driving. After driving a short distance, 
Rimmer opened the door, causing the bus to stop suddenly. When defendant 
stumbled forward, Rimmer grabbed his arm and tried to hold him until police 
arrived. As they wrestled, defendant stabbed Rimmer twice in the face and once in 
the chest with a downward motion. Defendant then broke free, ran through the front 
door of the bus, and was tackled by police officers. On cross-examination, Rimmer 
testified that defendant never got behind the wheel of the bus or gave directions on 
where to drive. Rimmer nonetheless thought he was a hostage during the incident. 
¶ 14 
 
Sergeant Gregory Hardin of the Cook County hospital police testified that he 
received a radio call about an escaped prisoner and ran toward the main entrance 
with two or three other officers. Upon arriving at the entrance, they were directed to 
the shuttle bus. They ran to the bus as it stopped and observed defendant striking 
the driver with a downward motion. Sergeant Hardin entered the bus through the 
rear door and ordered defendant to stop and get down. Defendant turned toward the 
front door of the bus and was arrested by the other officers. 
¶ 15 
 
After denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, the trial court 
admonished defendant about his right to testify and reminded him that his prior 
murder conviction could be used to impeach his credibility if he chose to testify. 
Defendant asked, “How far does that play out?” The court responded that the State 
could not talk about the facts of that case but would be able to introduce evidence 
that defendant was convicted of first degree murder and the date of the conviction. 
The court also advised defendant that if he testified about a necessity defense, 
claiming he tried to escape because he had been beaten by jail guards, the State 
would be allowed to rebut that claim of motive with his murder conviction. 
¶ 16 
 
Defendant decided to testify. He first discussed his prior murder conviction and 
maintained he did not commit that offense. He stated that prior to his escape 
attempt he had spent 4½ years in the Cook County jail. Defendant described the 
conditions in the jail as “terrible” and “appalling” and asserted that he only tried to 
escape because he was suffering, his health was failing, and he had been beaten by 
jail guards about one year before his murder trial. Defendant stated he was 
hospitalized for three days following the attack, recovering from bruising, cuts, and 
 
 
 
 
 
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severe injuries to his eye. Defendant testified one of the guards threatened to beat 
him again. After he was found guilty of murder, defendant knew he had to escape to 
save himself and others who were also suffering in the jail. Defendant testified that 
he tried to escape because he felt his life was in danger and he also wanted to alert 
the authorities to help others suffering in the jail. Defendant realized he was “going 
to be one of these guys who sits in prison for 30 years, you know, on something that 
he didn’t do.” 
¶ 17 
 
Defendant denied trying to take Officer Zaccaro’s handgun, explaining that he 
was only trying to take the keys to unlock his leg shackles. Defendant testified he 
jumped on the bus and asked the driver for help. The bus driver agreed and began 
driving, but when defendant saw the officers approaching the bus he “knew the gig 
was up” and told the driver to open the door. As defendant turned to exit the bus, 
the driver attacked him, a “physical altercation” ensued, and “during the process 
*** [defendant] accidentally hit him with the knife.” Defendant then surrendered to 
the police officers and was arrested. 
¶ 18 
 
On cross-examination, the State asked if the alleged beating by the guards 
occurred while defendant was in jail “[o]n the charges, among other things of first 
degree murder.” Defendant agreed and also acknowledged that a jury had found 
him guilty of that offense. The State further asked whether the jury found defendant 
personally discharged a firearm that caused the victim’s death. Defendant 
responded, “Oh, yeah. And when they did that, when they did that, sir.” The State 
asked, “Is that what they found?” and defendant replied, “Not that I know of. *** I 
thought it was something different than that.” 
¶ 19 
 
The prosecutor then asked, “[A]fter being found guilty of first degree murder 
three days before your escape and with the additional finding that you shot your 
victim to death, you were looking at a potential sentence of 45 years to the rest of 
natural life in prison?” After the trial court overruled defendant’s objection, he 
responded that he was found guilty of a crime he did not commit. Defendant 
acknowledged that he knew the potential sentence but claimed it “didn’t mean 
anything” to him, and he intended to escape only to avoid being beaten again. The 
State subsequently asked defendant if he was “charged with a felony murder among 
other things,” and defendant responded that he was “charged with murder.” 
Defendant denied attempting to force the bus driver to drive away. Rather, he asked 
 
 
 
 
 
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the driver, and the driver agreed. Defendant stated he never threatened the bus 
driver with the knife but was only holding it because he had tried to remove his 
shackles with it. 
¶ 20 
 
In rebuttal, the trial court granted the State’s motion to admit into evidence a 
certified statement of conviction and disposition indicating that defendant was 
found guilty of first degree murder on March 19, 2007. In discussing the evidence 
to give to the jury, the prosecutor subsequently asserted, “I believe we were going 
to send back all our exhibits except for the grand jury transcript and the certified 
copy.” The trial court stated, “Right. The grand jury transcript doesn’t go back, 
everything else does.” 
¶ 21 
 
The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated vehicular hijacking, unlawful 
vehicular invasion, attempted armed robbery, and escape. Defendant was sentenced 
to concurrent extended-term sentences of 50 years for aggravated vehicular 
hijacking, 30 years for vehicular invasion, 30 years for attempted armed robbery, 
and 14 years for escape. The trial court ordered those sentences to run 
consecutively to defendant’s sentence for murder. 
¶ 22 
 
On appeal, defendant maintained, among other things, that his aggravated 
vehicular hijacking conviction must be reversed because he did not “take” the bus 
within the meaning of the aggravated vehicular hijacking statute. Defendant argued 
the statute requires proof that he actually dispossessed the shuttle bus from the 
driver. Defendant contended that merely forcing the driver to drive the bus was 
insufficient. 
¶ 23 
 
The appellate court agreed with defendant, holding that the taking element of 
aggravated vehicular hijacking is established only when a defendant “ ‘ “cause[s] 
the victim to part with possession or custody of [the vehicle] against his will.” ’ ” 
2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 58 (quoting People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489, 526 
(1992), quoting People v. Smith, 78 Ill. 2d 298, 303 (1980)). While defendant may 
have deprived the driver of a measure of control over the vehicle, there was no 
evidence that he took possession of the bus or removed it from the driver’s custody. 
2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 59. The appellate court, therefore, concluded that 
defendant’s aggravated vehicular hijacking conviction must be reversed because 
the State failed to prove the taking element of that offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 59. The appellate court also held that 
 
 
 
 
 
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defendant’s sentence for escape must be reduced to a nonextended term of seven 
years’ imprisonment but otherwise affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 2015 IL 
App (1st) 120654, ¶¶ 130, 132. 
¶ 24 
 
Justice Palmer dissented in part, asserting that a defendant can “take” a vehicle 
within the meaning of the aggravated vehicular hijacking statute without physically 
dispossessing the vehicle from the victim. 2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 156 
(Palmer, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). According to the 
partial dissent, the majority’s narrow construction of the statute produced an absurd 
result because it failed to include the circumstances of this case where defendant 
obtained control of the vehicle. 2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶¶ 156-57 (Palmer, J., 
specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). The partial dissent would have 
held the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant took the vehicle within 
the meaning of the aggravated vehicular hijacking statute. 2015 IL App (1st) 
120654, ¶ 157 (Palmer, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
¶ 25 
 
We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 
2015)). 
 
¶ 26 
 
 
 
 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
¶ 27 
 
 
 
A. Construction of the Aggravated Vehicular Hijacking Statute 
¶ 28 
 
On appeal to this court, the State contends that the appellate court construed the 
aggravated vehicular hijacking statute far too narrowly. The State maintains that 
the statutory language does not require an offender to remove a vehicle from the 
driver’s possession but may also be satisfied when, as here, the defendant exercises 
control over the vehicle by use of force. The State contends the appellate court 
ignored the plain meaning and purpose of the statute. Further, its decision excludes 
the most dangerous conduct from the statute’s scope because the greatest risk of 
harm occurs when a victim remains in the vehicle with the assailant during the 
offense. The State contends that defendant’s actions fall squarely within the 
conduct prohibited by the statute when construed properly. 
¶ 29 
 
Defendant responds that the phrase “takes from” in the vehicular hijacking 
statute plainly requires physical dispossession of the vehicle from the driver. In 
 
 
 
 
 
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Strickland, this court held that robbery of a vehicle occurred only when the 
defendant removed the vehicle from the victim’s actual possession. Strickland, 154 
Ill. 2d at 526. The legislature subsequently used the language from the robbery 
statute in enacting the vehicular hijacking statute. Defendant concludes that 
because the legislature used the language from the robbery statute in creating the 
vehicular hijacking offense, this court’s construction of that language in Strickland 
controls the interpretation of the vehicular hijacking statute. 
¶ 30 
 
This issue presents a question of statutory construction subject to de novo 
review. People v. Grant, 2016 IL 119162, ¶ 20. The fundamental objective of 
statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. 
People v. Pearse, 2017 IL 121072, ¶ 41. The most reliable indicator of legislative 
intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. 
Cherry, 2016 IL 118728, ¶ 13. In discerning legislative intent, we may consider the 
purpose of the statute, the problems to be remedied, and the consequences of 
interpreting the statute one way or another. People v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, 
¶ 15. A reviewing court may also consider the circumstances existing when the 
statute was enacted, contemporaneous conditions, and the goals sought to be 
achieved. People v. Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 15. We presume that the 
legislature did not intend absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. People v. 
Williams, 2016 IL 118375, ¶ 15. The rule of lenity requires that any ambiguity in a 
criminal statute must be resolved in a manner favoring the accused, but that rule 
must not be stretched to defeat the legislature’s intent. Pearse, 2017 IL 121072, 
¶ 39. 
¶ 31 
 
The offense of vehicular hijacking is committed when a person “takes a motor 
vehicle from the person or the immediate presence of another by the use of force or 
by threatening the imminent use of force.” 720 ILCS 5/18-3(a) (West 2006). 
Vehicular hijacking is a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 5/18-3(c) (West 2006)). The 
offense is enhanced to aggravated vehicular hijacking, a Class X felony with a 
minimum sentence of seven years’ imprisonment, if committed while the offender 
is armed with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(3), (b) 
(West 2006)). 
¶ 32 
 
As defendant points out, in Strickland this court addressed similar language in 
the robbery statute. In that case, the defendant and his brother encountered a man 
 
 
 
 
 
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parked in front of a house in Buffalo Grove and ordered him at gunpoint to drive 
them to California. The man drove instead to the downtown area of Chicago and 
stopped in front of a marked police car at an intersection. When the man got out of 
the car to alert the police officer, the defendant and his brother fled on foot and were 
later apprehended. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at 499-500. The defendant was charged 
with several offenses, including armed robbery of a vehicle. The robbery statute in 
effect at the time provided that “ ‘[a] person commits robbery when he takes 
property from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by 
threatening the imminent use of force.’ ” Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at 523 (quoting Ill. 
Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, ¶ 18-1(a)). The offense was enhanced to armed robbery 
when committed while armed with a dangerous weapon. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at 
523 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, ¶ 18-2(a)). 
¶ 33 
 
The defendant contended there was no evidence that he took the vehicle from 
the driver as required to sustain the offense of armed robbery because the driver 
operated the vehicle at all times during the incident. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at 525. 
This court agreed, asserting that “ ‘[t]he taking by force or the threat of force is the 
gist of the offense’ ” of armed robbery. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at 525-26 (quoting 
Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 18-1, Committee Comments, at 113 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 
1992)). “[T]he offense ‘is complete when force or threat of force causes the victim 
to part with possession or custody of property against his will [citation].’ ” 
Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at 526 (quoting Smith, 78 Ill. 2d at 303). Although the 
defendant deprived the driver of a large measure of control over his vehicle, there 
was no evidence that the vehicle was ever taken from the driver or removed from 
his actual possession. This court, therefore, reversed the defendant’s conviction of 
armed robbery because the evidence was insufficient to establish the taking 
element of that offense. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at 526. 
¶ 34 
 
The vehicular hijacking statute became effective in 1993 (Pub. Act 88-351, § 5 
(eff. Aug. 13, 1993)), less than one year after this court issued its decision in 
Strickland. At the same time, the legislature amended the robbery statute to exclude 
motor vehicles from its scope. The amended robbery statute provided that “[a] 
person commits robbery when he or she takes property, except a motor vehicle 
covered by Section 18-3 or 18-4, from the person or presence of another by the use 
of force or by threatening the imminent use of force.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 
5/18-1 (West 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 35 
 
Subsequently, in People v. McCarter, 2011 IL App (1st) 092864, the appellate 
court relied on Strickland in construing the vehicular hijacking statute. The 
appellate court observed that, under Strickland, taking a large measure of control 
over a vehicle is insufficient to establish the offense of armed robbery. McCarter, 
2011 IL App (1st) 092864, ¶ 77. The appellate court held that, as with armed 
robbery, the vehicular hijacking statute also requires a defendant to dispossess the 
vehicle from the victim. McCarter, 2011 IL App (1st) 092864, ¶¶ 77-78. Although 
the defendant forced the victim to drive his vehicle at gunpoint, the evidence did 
not establish that the victim was ever dispossessed of his car. McCarter, 2011 IL 
App (1st) 092864, ¶ 78. Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that the State 
failed to prove the offense of vehicular hijacking. McCarter, 2011 IL App (1st) 
092864, ¶ 79. 
¶ 36 
 
The McCarter court viewed Strickland as controlling the construction of the 
vehicular hijacking statute. We believe Strickland is distinguishable, however, for 
the simple reason that in Strickland we construed the armed robbery statute, not the 
vehicular hijacking statute. The vehicular hijacking statute was not even enacted 
until approximately one year after Strickland. 
¶ 37 
 
Our construction of the armed robbery statute in Strickland was based largely 
on the common-law understanding of that offense. This court discussed the use of 
force or threat of force in taking property as “the gist of the offense.” (Internal 
quotation marks omitted.) Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at 525. This court has previously 
stated that “[t]he gist of the offense of robbery, both at common law and under the 
statute of this State” is the force or intimidation used in taking property against a 
person’s will. People v. Casey, 399 Ill. 374, 377 (1948) (citing People v. Kubish, 
357 Ill. 531 (1934)); People v. Stathas, 356 Ill. 313 (1934)). The common-law 
understanding of the offense of robbery as requiring the defendant to remove 
property from the victim’s possession through the use of force or the threat of force 
is specific to that offense. The vehicular hijacking offense is not derived from the 
common law but was newly enacted in 1993. Accordingly, we find the analysis in 
Strickland is inapposite to the proper construction of the vehicular hijacking 
statute. 
¶ 38 
 
Ultimately, we must determine what the legislature intended in enacting the 
new, separate offense of vehicular hijacking. Defendant contends that by creating 
 
 
 
 
 
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the vehicular hijacking offense, the legislature intended to punish the taking of a 
motor vehicle more harshly than the taking of other property. Defendant observes 
that robbery is generally a Class 2 felony (720 ILCS 5/18-1(b) (West 2006)) while 
vehicular hijacking is a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 5/18-3(c) (West 2006)). 
Defendant therefore concludes that vehicular hijacking is simply robbery of a 
vehicle with a harsher penalty than for robbery of other property. We disagree. 
¶ 39 
 
If the legislature had intended only to punish robbery of a motor vehicle more 
harshly, it could have simply included an enhanced punishment for that offense 
within the robbery statute. The robbery statute in effect at the time of this offense 
enhanced the penalty to a Class 1 felony if the victim was 60 years of age or over or 
was physically handicapped or when the offense was committed in a school or a 
place of worship. 720 ILCS 5/18-1(b) (West 2006). The legislature could have 
added robbery of a motor vehicle to that list if its intention was to treat that offense 
more harshly. Instead, the legislature removed motor vehicles from the robbery 
statute and created an entirely new offense entitled “vehicular hijacking.” Because 
the legislature created a new offense, we necessarily reject defendant’s argument 
that it only intended to punish robbery of a motor vehicle more harshly. 
¶ 40 
 
Rather, in creating the new offense of vehicular hijacking, the legislature 
plainly intended to address criminal conduct distinct from robbery of a motor 
vehicle. We believe the legislature not only intended to encompass situations when 
a victim is actually dispossessed of a vehicle but also intended more broadly to 
include circumstances when the defendant takes a vehicle by exercising control. In 
the context of vehicular hijacking, exercising control over a vehicle by directing the 
driver through the use of force or the threat of force falls within the plain statutory 
language requiring the offender to “take[ ] a motor vehicle from the person or the 
immediate presence of another.” 720 ILCS 5/18-3(a) (West 2006). 
¶ 41 
 
The consequences of interpreting the statute one way or another also support 
our construction. See Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 15. Undoubtedly, a victim may 
be subject to greater risk of violence if he or she remains in the vehicle with the 
offender. See United States v. DeLaCorte, 113 F.3d 154, 156 (9th Cir. 1997) (a 
victim who is forced to stay in a car and is subjected to the assailant’s continuing 
threats and possible violence will often be placed in greater danger than a victim 
who is released immediately). Given the greater risk of harm, we do not believe the 
 
 
 
 
 
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legislature intended to exclude from the scope of the vehicular hijacking statute the 
forceful taking of a vehicle while the driver remains inside. 
¶ 42 
 
In sum, we conclude that the legislature did not intend merely to enact a 
separate statute for robbery of a motor vehicle. The legislature also intended to 
criminalize taking control of a vehicle by force or threat of force, including when 
the victim remains inside the vehicle. Accordingly, the appellate court’s decision to 
the contrary in McCarter must be overruled. 
¶ 43 
 
Defendant’s actions of threatening the shuttle bus driver with a knife and 
ordering him to drive fall squarely within the conduct prohibited by the vehicular 
hijacking statute. Defendant took control of the bus from the driver by the threat of 
force. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish the offense of 
aggravated vehicular hijacking. Accordingly, the appellate court’s judgment is 
reversed on that point. 
 
¶ 44 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Shackling During Jury Selection 
¶ 45 
 
In his cross-appeal, defendant renews several issues he raised in the appellate 
court. First, defendant argues he was deprived of due process by being shackled 
during jury selection. Defendant contends the appellate court erred in finding the 
violation of his right to due process harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because 
the shackles interfered with his self-representation and prejudiced him in the eyes 
of the jury. The State concedes that the trial court erred in allowing defendant to be 
shackled during jury selection without first making an express determination that 
restraints were necessary but contends that defendant was not prejudiced by the 
error. 
¶ 46 
 
This court has long held that the use of physical restraints in court is warranted 
only when there has been a showing of manifest need for the restraints. People v. 
Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340, 347 (2006) (citing People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 265-66 
(1977)). Physical restraints should be avoided whenever possible because they tend 
to prejudice the jury against the defendant, hinder the defendant’s ability to assist 
counsel, and offend the dignity of the judicial process. In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d 33, 36 
(1977) (citing Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 265-66). A defendant may be shackled when 
there is reason to believe that he or she may try to escape, that he or she may pose a 
 
 
 
 
 
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threat to the safety of people in the courtroom, or when necessary to maintain order 
during the trial. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266.  
¶ 47 
 
The decision on whether and how to restrain a defendant is left to the trial 
court’s discretion. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d at 348. The trial court should state on the record 
the reasons for allowing the defendant to remain shackled, and the defendant’s 
attorney should be given an opportunity to present reasons why the defendant 
should not be restrained. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266. A defendant may not be tried in 
shackles in either a bench trial or a jury trial absent a showing that restraints are 
necessary. In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 38. The showing of manifest need for restraints 
must be established clearly on the record. In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 38. 
¶ 48 
 
This court has codified the holdings in Boose and Allen in Illinois Supreme 
Court Rule 430 (eff. July 1, 2010). Rule 430 states that after becoming aware of 
restraints, the trial court must conduct a separate hearing to investigate whether 
they are necessary. The trial court must allow the defendant to be heard and must 
make specific findings on enumerated factors before permitting the use of 
restraints. 
¶ 49 
 
In this case, the trial court did not conduct a hearing or articulate any reason for 
shackling defendant during jury selection. Rather, the trial court deferred to the 
judgment of the Department of Corrections. When considering similar 
circumstances in Allen, this court stated, “this abdication of the trial court’s 
responsibility is not acceptable.” Allen, 222 Ill. 2d at 348-49. Here, the trial court 
clearly abused its discretion in allowing defendant to be shackled during jury 
selection without making a determination of manifest need for the restraints. The 
trial court’s failure to follow the procedure established in Boose and subsequently 
codified in Rule 430 resulted in a violation of defendant’s right to due process. 
Allen, 222 Ill. 2d at 349. 
¶ 50 
 
Citing Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635 (2005), defendant contends that the 
shackling error cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In Deck, 
the Supreme Court stated that shackling is inherently prejudicial and will often 
have negative effects that are not apparent from the trial transcript. Deck, 544 U.S. 
at 635. To establish that the due process violation was harmless, “[t]he State must 
prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not 
 
 
 
 
 
- 15 - 
contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Deck, 544 U.S. at 635 (quoting Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 
¶ 51 
 
We recognize that physical restraints affect several interests, including the 
defendant’s presumption of innocence, the ability to assist counsel, and the dignity 
of the court proceedings. Deck, 544 U.S. at 630-32; In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 36; 
Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 265. We believe the impact of the shackling error on those 
interests was mitigated, however, by the specific facts of this case. 
¶ 52 
 
First, we note that the trial court ordered removal of the shackles following jury 
selection and defendant represented himself without any physical restraints 
throughout the remainder of the trial. During jury selection, the trial court placed 
skirting around both counsel tables to block the view of the shackles. The record 
shows that one prospective juror saw the shackles under the table, but there is no 
showing that any of the remaining jurors were aware of the shackles. Upon 
questioning by the trial court and defendant, the prospective juror who saw the 
shackles stated it would not affect his ability to be fair. After questioning the juror, 
defendant did not challenge him for cause or exercise a peremptory challenge. 
Thus, defendant was apparently satisfied that the juror could remain impartial. In 
this case, we believe the limited use of the shackles and the effort to block them 
from view reduced the impact of the error on defendant’s presumption of 
innocence. 
¶ 53 
 
While defendant complained about the impact of the shackles on his ability to 
represent himself, stating he “[could] not work under these conditions,” the record 
shows he questioned the prospective jurors extensively during voir dire and made 
peremptory challenges. A review of the record indicates defendant was not 
hindered in protecting his rights during jury selection despite the presence of the 
shackles. 
¶ 54 
 
As for the dignity of the court proceedings, that interest includes respectful 
treatment of defendants, reflecting the importance of the determination of a 
defendant’s guilt or innocence. Deck, 544 U.S. at 631. The routine use of shackles 
in the presence of juries undermines those interests. Deck, 544 U.S. at 631. Here, 
however, the shackles were not generally visible to observers in the courtroom. We 
find that the trial court’s placement of skirting around both counsel tables at least 
reduced the impact of the shackling error on the dignity of the court proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 16 - 
¶ 55 
 
Finally, we consider the evidence presented against defendant. Defendant was 
caught in the act of trying to escape from custody by hijacking the shuttle bus. He 
injured several people during his escape attempt. Although a necessity defense may 
be available when an inmate escapes to avoid injury while in custody (People v. 
Unger, 66 Ill. 2d 333, 340-41 (1977)), defendant’s necessity defense depended on 
convincing the jury that he had to escape to avoid the jail conditions he had already 
endured for 4½ years. The alleged beating by jail guards that defendant claimed 
motivated his escape attempt occurred one year before he tried to escape. The State 
rebutted defendant’s necessity defense with proof that he was just convicted of first 
degree murder and was facing at least 45 years’ imprisonment, thus providing a 
more plausible motive for his escape attempt. We conclude that the State presented 
overwhelming evidence against defendant. 
¶ 56 
 
The shackling error in this case was unquestionably serious. The trial court’s 
failure to follow the procedure established in Boose and later codified in Illinois 
Supreme Court Rule 430 resulted in a due process violation. Given the specific 
facts of this case, however, we are convinced that the shackling error did not 
contribute to defendant’s convictions. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 635. Accordingly, we 
agree with the appellate court that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
 
¶ 57 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Defendant’s Waiver of Counsel 
¶ 58 
 
Next, defendant contends that his waiver of counsel was invalid because the 
trial court did not inform him that any sentence in this case would be served 
consecutively to his sentence for murder, as required by Illinois Supreme Court 
Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984). Defendant contends the failure to comply with Rule 
401(a) requires reversal of his convictions and remand for a new trial.  
¶ 59 
 
The State responds that defendant forfeited this claim by failing to include it in 
his motion for a new trial and he is not entitled to relief under the plain error rule. 
The State further contends that Rule 401(a) only requires substantial compliance 
and the trial court met that standard by adequately advising defendant of the 
consequences of waiving counsel. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 17 - 
¶ 60 
 
Defendant did not raise this issue in his motion for a new trial. To preserve an 
issue for review, a defendant must object at trial and raise the alleged error in a 
written posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). A reviewing 
court may, however, address a forfeited claim under the plain error doctrine when 
“(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced 
that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, 
regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error 
occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the 
defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless 
of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 
(2007) (citing People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005)). 
In applying the plain error doctrine, it is appropriate to first determine whether a 
clear or obvious error occurred. People v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659, ¶ 39. 
¶ 61 
 
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) governs the trial court’s acceptance of a 
defendant’s waiver of counsel. People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 235 (1996). Rule 
401(a) provides: 
 
“(a) Waiver of Counsel. Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The 
court shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense 
punishable by imprisonment without first, by addressing the defendant 
personally in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands 
the following: 
 
(1) the nature of the charge; 
 
(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, 
when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected 
because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences; and 
 
(3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel 
appointed for him by the court.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984). 
¶ 62 
 
The purpose of the rule is “ ‘to ensure that a waiver of counsel is knowingly and 
intelligently made.’ ” People v. Campbell, 224 Ill. 2d 80, 84 (2006) (quoting 
Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 241). Strict, technical compliance with the rule is not always 
 
 
 
 
 
- 18 - 
required, however. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 236. Substantial compliance is sufficient 
for a valid waiver of counsel if the record indicates the waiver was made knowingly 
and intelligently and the trial court’s admonishment did not prejudice the 
defendant’s rights. People v. Kidd, 178 Ill. 2d 92, 113 (1997) (citing Haynes, 174 
Ill. 2d at 236, People v. Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d 321, 333 (1989), and People v. 
Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119, 132 (1987)). Each waiver of counsel must be assessed on 
its own particular facts. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 242. 
¶ 63 
 
After defendant moved to discharge his appointed attorney, the trial court 
admonished him about his right to counsel and the potential nonextended and 
extended-term sentences for the charged offenses. Defendant was also informed 
that some of his sentences could run consecutively. The trial court told defendant 
that two of the charges alone carried a potential maximum penalty of 160 years. 
The court stated, “Basically, you are looking at massive time if you are convicted.” 
When asked if he understood the potential penalties, defendant stated, “Perfectly, 
Your Honor, perfectly.” 
¶ 64 
 
Defendant contends that the trial court failed to provide a sufficient admonition 
that his sentences would run consecutively to his existing natural-life sentence for 
murder, but there is no indication in the record that the trial court’s failure to 
admonish defendant on that point affected his decision to waive his right to 
counsel. Defendant was informed that he was facing “massive time” if convicted of 
even some of the charged offenses in this case. The trial court told defendant that 
the maximum sentence was 160 years’ imprisonment on two of the charges alone. 
The trial court’s admonition surely impressed upon defendant the gravity of the 
potential punishments. We fail to see how informing defendant that the potential 
160-year sentence in this case would also be served consecutively to his natural-life 
sentence for murder could have affected his decision on whether to waive counsel 
and proceed pro se. 
¶ 65 
 
The record here shows that defendant’s waiver of counsel was made knowingly 
and intelligently and the admonitions did not prejudice his rights. See Kidd, 178 Ill. 
2d at 113 (citing Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 236, Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d at 333, and 
Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d at 132). The trial court carefully admonished defendant about 
the charges, the possible punishments, and his right to counsel. We do not believe 
any error in the admonishment on consecutive sentencing could have misled 
 
 
 
 
 
- 19 - 
defendant or caused him to waive his right to counsel unknowingly. Based on the 
record, including the trial court’s detailed admonishments under Rule 401(a), we 
conclude that defendant’s waiver of counsel was valid. Defendant has not 
established a clear or obvious error required for relief under the plain error doctrine. 
Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to reversal of his convictions on this ground. 
 
¶ 66 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Details About Prior Murder Conviction 
¶ 67 
 
Defendant argues that the certified copy of conviction introduced by the State 
contains excessive and irrelevant details about his prior murder conviction. 
Defendant contends the jury was given the certified copy of conviction revealing 
that he faced additional charges, was ordered to complete fitness examinations, was 
found guilty on seven counts of murder even though there was only one victim, was 
sentenced to life in prison, and filed an unsuccessful appeal and postconviction 
petition. Defendant further contends that on cross-examination, the prosecutor 
elicited that he faced other charges in addition to murder and asked if he personally 
discharged a firearm causing the victim’s death. In closing argument, the 
prosecutor stated that defendant personally discharged the firearm. Defendant 
argues he is entitled to a new trial because he was prejudiced by this “irrelevant 
surplusage.” 
¶ 68 
 
As noted previously, to preserve an issue for appeal a defendant must make a 
contemporaneous objection at trial and raise the issue in a written posttrial motion. 
Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186. Defendant concedes that he did not object at trial to the 
challenged evidence, other than to one of the prosecutor’s questions about 
discharging the firearm. Defendant also acknowledges that he did not include any 
of these issues in his motion for a new trial. Defendant has, therefore, forfeited his 
claims. 
¶ 69 
 
A reviewing court may address a forfeited issue under the plain error rule when 
“(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced 
that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, 
regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error 
occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the 
defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless 
 
 
 
 
 
- 20 - 
of the closeness of the evidence.” Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565 (citing Herron, 
215 Ill. 2d at 186-87). 
The defendant bears the burden of persuasion under both prongs of the plain error 
doctrine. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010). The defendant must first 
establish that a clear or obvious error occurred. People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 
497-98 (2009). 
¶ 70 
 
Initially, we observe that the fact of defendant’s prior murder conviction and 
the potential sentence he faced for that offense were introduced to rebut 
defendant’s necessity defense. Defendant testified that he only tried to escape 
because he was suffering, had been beaten by jail guards, and believed his life was 
in danger. Before he testified, the trial court advised defendant that the prior murder 
conviction would be admissible to rebut his claim of motive if he testified to a 
necessity defense. The evidence that defendant was found guilty of murder just 
three days before the escape attempt and that he was facing a potential natural-life 
sentence was clearly relevant to defendant’s motive to escape. We conclude that 
evidence was properly offered to rebut defendant’s testimony. See People v. Hood, 
213 Ill. 2d 244, 259-61 (2004) (testimony tending to explain, contradict, or 
disprove the defendant’s evidence is generally admissible in rebuttal); People v. 
Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 434-35 (1989). 
¶ 71 
 
As for the additional details of the murder case contained in the certified copy 
of conviction, the appellate court held that the record failed to support defendant’s 
claim that the jury was given the certified copy. 2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 116. 
While discussing the evidence to give to the jury, the prosecutor stated, “ ‘I believe 
we were going to send back all our exhibits except for the grand jury transcript and 
the certified copy.’ ” The trial court responded, “ ‘Right. The grand jury transcript 
doesn’t go back, everything else does.’ ” The appellate court concluded that 
reading the trial court’s response with the prosecutor’s comment revealed “that the 
State did not give the jury the certified copy of conviction.” 2015 IL App (1st) 
120654, ¶ 116. The appellate court declined to speculate that the certified copy was 
actually brought to the jury room. 2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 116. 
¶ 72 
 
We agree with the appellate court that the record is ambiguous on whether the 
certified copy was actually given to the jury. The plain error doctrine is a narrow 
and limited exception to forfeiture. People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 65 (2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
- 21 - 
On plain error review, the defendant has the burden of establishing a clear or 
obvious error. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d at 497-98. “ ‘[T]he plain error exception will 
be invoked only where the record clearly shows that an alleged error affecting 
substantial rights was committed.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 
549 (quoting People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 102 (1992)). We cannot find a 
clear or obvious error occurred without a showing that the certified copy of 
conviction was actually submitted to the jury. 
¶ 73 
 
Defendant’s remaining claims are based on the State’s cross-examination and 
closing argument. The State elicited from defendant on cross-examination that he 
was facing charges of first degree murder, “among other things.” The State also 
asked defendant if the jury found he personally discharged a firearm causing death, 
and the prosecutor repeated that claim in closing argument. Defendant contends the 
complained-of statements are prejudicial and irrelevant to either impeachment or 
his motive to escape. 
¶ 74 
 
In response, the State argues that defendant presented detailed testimony about 
the murder and repeatedly asserted he did not commit that crime. Given 
defendant’s wide-ranging testimony about the murder, the State contends that it 
was entitled to ask about the details of that offense on cross-examination. 
¶ 75 
 
The trial court overruled one objection made by defendant to a question on 
whether the jury found he personally discharged the firearm. The trial court was not 
given an opportunity to rule on the other points because defendant failed to object. 
A trial court’s decisions on the admissibility of evidence and the scope of 
cross-examination on an appropriate subject of inquiry are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. People v. Chambers, 2016 IL 117911, ¶ 75. We agree with the appellate 
court that the additional information about defendant’s prior murder case may have 
been relevant to rebut his testimony about the details of that conviction, including 
his repeated claims that he did not commit that crime. Acting pro se, defendant 
offered wide-ranging testimony in narrative form on direct examination. The 
prosecutor’s questions about whether the jury found defendant personally 
discharged the firearm could have been relevant to rebut his repeated claims of 
innocence. See People v. Harris, 231 Ill. 2d 582, 588-89 (2008) (“[t]here is no 
question that a defendant can open the door to the admission of evidence that, under 
ordinary circumstances, would be inadmissible”). We cannot say the trial court 
 
 
 
 
 
- 22 - 
abused its discretion in overruling the objection to the State’s questioning on that 
point. 
¶ 76 
 
We also agree with the appellate court that the reference to defendant being 
charged with murder, “among other things,” was a brief, passing remark. Even if 
improper, the reference cannot be viewed as particularly prejudicial. In sum, we 
conclude that even if any of the complained-of evidence or closing argument was 
improper, defendant has not satisfied his burden of establishing plain error under 
either prong of the plain error doctrine. Accordingly, defendant’s forfeiture of these 
challenges cannot be excused. 
 
¶ 77 
 
 
 
 
 
E. Vehicular Invasion Conviction 
¶ 78 
 
Defendant raises two separate challenges to his vehicular invasion conviction. 
First, he claims the State failed to prove him guilty of that offense because there 
was no evidence that he entered the shuttle bus by force. Defendant also contends 
that if this court affirms his conviction of aggravated vehicular hijacking, the 
separate conviction of vehicular invasion must be vacated under the one-act, 
one-crime rule. The State concedes that, in the event the aggravated vehicular 
hijacking conviction is sustained, defendant’s conviction of vehicular invasion 
must be vacated under the one-act, one-crime rule. 
¶ 79 
 
Under the one-act, one-crime rule, a court must first determine whether the 
defendant’s conduct involved a single act or multiple acts. Multiple convictions are 
improper if they are based on the same physical act. People v. Miller, 238 Ill. 2d 
161, 165 (2010) (citing People v. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d 183, 186 (1996)). If the 
defendant’s conduct involved multiple acts, the court must decide whether any of 
the offenses are lesser-included offenses. Multiple convictions are also improper if 
an offense is a lesser-included offense. Miller, 238 Ill. 2d at 165 (citing Rodriguez, 
169 Ill. 2d at 186). 
¶ 80 
 
As explained above, we have affirmed defendant’s conviction of aggravated 
vehicular hijacking. The aggravated vehicular hijacking and vehicular invasion 
charges are based on the same physical act. The State concedes that defendant’s 
conduct was not apportioned into two separate acts either in the indictment or in the 
arguments at trial. See In re Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d 359, 377-78 (2009) (findings 
 
 
 
 
 
- 23 - 
of guilt for multiple offenses can only be sustained if the charging instrument 
reflects the State’s intent to apportion the defendant’s conduct and prosecute for 
multiple crimes). We therefore agree with the parties that defendant’s vehicular 
invasion conviction must be vacated under the one-act, one-crime rule. 
Accordingly, we need not address defendant’s alternative argument that the State 
failed to prove the “force” element of that offense. 
 
¶ 81 
 
 
 
 
 
F. Extended-Term Sentences 
¶ 82 
 
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in imposing extended-term 
sentences for offenses not included in the most serious class of felony. The State 
concedes error on this point. 
¶ 83 
 
Section 5-8-2(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections authorizes extended-term 
sentences based on certain aggravating factors. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a) (West 2006). 
The imposition of extended-term sentences is limited, however, to offenses within 
the most serious classification. People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192, 205-06 (1984). 
An exception to that rule applies when extended-term sentences are imposed “on 
separately charged, differing class offenses that arise from unrelated courses of 
conduct.” People v. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d 247, 257 (1995). 
¶ 84 
 
In this case, the parties agreed, and the appellate court found, that the offenses 
were committed in a single course of conduct. We agree and, therefore, conclude 
that an extended-term sentence may be imposed only on offenses within the most 
serious class of felony. Defendant was sentenced to an extended term of 50 years’ 
imprisonment for aggravated vehicular hijacking, a Class X felony. The trial court 
also imposed extended-term sentences on the remaining convictions for Class 1 and 
Class 2 felonies. The extended-term sentences for the Class 1 and Class 2 felonies 
were improper. 
¶ 85 
 
The parties further agree that the appropriate remedy in this case is to affirm the 
extended-term sentence on the most serious offense and reduce the sentences on the 
lesser class felonies to the maximum nonextended term. See People v. Ware, 2014 
IL App (1st) 120485, ¶ 32 (when a trial court imposes an extended-term sentence 
improperly, but the record establishes that the court intended to impose the 
maximum sentence available, a reviewing court may exercise its power under 
 
 
 
 
 
- 24 - 
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) and reduce the sentence to the maximum 
nonextended term). Here, the trial court imposed the maximum extended-term 
sentences for the Class 1 and Class 2 felonies. Thus, the trial court clearly intended 
to sentence defendant to the maximum term available for those offenses. 
Accordingly, we reduce defendant’s sentence for attempted armed robbery, a Class 
1 felony, to the maximum nonextended term of 15 years’ imprisonment (730 ILCS 
5/5-8-1(a)(4) (West 2006)), and we reduce defendant’s sentence for escape, a Class 
2 felony, to the maximum nonextended term of 7 years’ imprisonment (730 ILCS 
5/5-8-1(a)(5) (West 2006)). Defendant’s extended-term sentence for aggravated 
vehicular hijacking is affirmed. 
 
¶ 86 
 
 
 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶ 87 
 
For the above reasons, we reverse the appellate court’s judgment reversing 
defendant’s conviction of aggravated vehicular hijacking. Defendant’s conviction 
of vehicular invasion is vacated. Defendant’s extended-term sentence for 
aggravated vehicular hijacking is affirmed, and his sentences for attempted armed 
robbery and escape are reduced to the maximum nonextended terms. The appellate 
court’s judgment is otherwise affirmed. 
 
¶ 88 
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
 
¶ 89 
 
JUSTICE BURKE, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
¶ 90 
 
The majority reverses the appellate court judgment, which reversed defendant’s 
conviction for aggravated vehicular hijacking. 720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(3) (West 2006). 
Reinstating this conviction, the majority now holds that the offense of vehicular 
hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-3(a) (West 2006)) may be committed when a person 
commandeers or takes control over a vehicle by use of force or threat of force, even 
though the victim is not dispossessed of the vehicle. I disagree with the majority’s 
interpretation of the vehicular hijacking statute and, therefore, respectfully dissent. 
¶ 91 
 
Section 18-3(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 defines the offense of vehicular 
hijacking and provides that the offense is committed when a person “takes a motor 
 
 
 
 
 
- 25 - 
vehicle from the person or the immediate presence of another by the use of force or 
by threatening the imminent use of force.” 720 ILCS 5/18-3(a) (West 2006). 
Relying on our decision in People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489 (1992), the 
appellate court held that the “taking” element of the offense of vehicular hijacking 
is not satisfied where, as here, the defendant has not taken actual physical 
possession of the vehicle away from the person or presence of the owner or driver 
of the vehicle. 2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 67. I would affirm that holding. 
¶ 92 
 
In Strickland, the defendant and his brother approached a man who was sitting 
in a parked car. They got into the car and ordered the man, at gunpoint, to drive 
them to California. The man drove instead to Chicago, where the two defendants 
were subsequently arrested and charged with several offenses, including armed 
robbery. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at 499-500. The robbery statute, at that time, 
provided that “[a] person commits robbery when he takes property from the person 
or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of 
force.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, ¶ 18-1(a). The term “property” included motor 
vehicles, and absent certain special circumstances, the offense was designated a 
Class 2 felony. 
¶ 93 
 
The defendant was convicted, and on appeal, he argued that he was not guilty of 
armed robbery because the vehicle was never taken from the driver’s possession. 
We agreed and reversed the defendant’s conviction. Interpreting the phrase “takes 
*** from the person or presence of another,” we held that the offense required 
proof that the owner was dispossessed of his property. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at 
525-26. We acknowledged that “the Stricklands’ actions certainly denied [the 
vehicle owner] a large measure of control over his vehicle.” Id. at 526. 
Nevertheless, we held that this was insufficient to establish the “taking element” of 
the offense. Id. 
¶ 94 
 
In 1993, approximately one year after Strickland was decided, the legislature 
amended article 18 of the Criminal Code of 1961. Section 18-1, the general robbery 
statute, was amended to exclude motor vehicles from its scope, providing that “[a] 
person commits robbery when he or she takes property, except a motor vehicle 
covered by Section 18-3 or 18-4, from the person or presence of another by the use 
of force or by threatening the imminent use of force.” Pub. Act 88-351 (eff. Aug. 
13, 1993) (amending 720 ILCS 5/18-1). At the same time, sections 18-3 and 18-4 
 
 
 
 
 
- 26 - 
were added to Article 18, creating the new offenses of vehicular hijacking and 
aggravated vehicular hijacking (id. (adding 720 ILCS 5/18-3, 18-4)) and increasing 
the penalty for vehicular hijacking to a Class 1 felony (id. (amending 720 ILCS 
5/18-3(c)). Importantly, however, the legislature continued to use the exact same 
terminology in the vehicular hijacking statute as was contained in the general 
robbery statute. Section 18-3(a) provided that the offense of vehicular hijacking is 
committed “when [a person] takes a motor vehicle from the person or the 
immediate presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent 
use of force.” 720 ILCS 5/18-3(a) (West 1994).  
¶ 95 
 
The fact that the identical language was used is significant because the 
legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial decisions interpreting legislation. 
Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 48. Thus, if the legislature amends a statute or 
enacts new legislation after a judicial decision is published, it must be presumed 
that the legislature acted with knowledge of our interpretation. Morris v. William L. 
Dawson Nursing Center, Inc., 187 Ill. 2d 494, 499 (1999); People v. Hickman, 163 
Ill. 2d 250, 262 (1994). Moreover, if the legislature reenacts a statute without 
modification it is assumed that any construction of the statutory language by this 
court will continue to be in effect. Williams v. Crickman, 81 Ill. 2d 105, 111 (1980); 
People ex rel. Klaeren v. Village of Lisle, 316 Ill. App. 3d 770, 782 (2000). 
Furthermore, considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory 
construction, especially where the legislature is free to change court interpretations 
of its legislation. Williams, 81 Ill. 2d at 111. 
¶ 96 
 
Here, we must presume that the legislature was aware of our interpretation of 
the “taking” language in Strickland when it created the new offense of vehicular 
hijacking and used the identical language that was interpreted in Strickland. 
Applying the well-established principles of statutory construction set forth above, 
we must find the legislature’s choice to repeat the identical language used in the 
robbery statute, when it defined vehicular hijacking, signified its intention to give 
the vehicular hijacking statute the same meaning. For this reason, the meaning of 
the statutory language at issue here is unambiguous. It means exactly what we held 
in Strickland.  
¶ 97 
 
Today, however, the majority interprets the vehicular hijacking statute and 
holds that the statutory language “plainly” means something else. Supra ¶¶ 40-41. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 27 - 
The majority rejects our plain language interpretation of the statutory phrase “takes 
*** from the person or presence of another,” which we adopted 25 years ago in 
Strickland, and now expands the meaning of “takes” to include taking control over 
or commandeering a vehicle—the exact interpretation we rejected in Strickland. 
The majority’s only explanation for rejecting the settled meaning of the statutory 
language is that the legislature “removed motor vehicles from the [general] robbery 
statute and created an entirely new offense entitled ‘vehicular hijacking.’ ” Supra 
¶ 39. In other words, according to the majority, the title of the statute has changed 
the plain meaning of the substantive text. Because this conclusion is contrary to 
well-established principles of statutory construction, I cannot agree.  
¶ 98 
 
An offense is defined not by its title but by the substantive language of the 
statute that constitutes the elements of the offense. As the appellate court below 
recognized, the title or heading of a statute cannot alter the plain meaning of the 
text. 2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 79 (citing Michigan Avenue National Bank v. 
County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 505-06 (2000)). The title of a statute can only be 
used to shed light on an ambiguous word or phrase. Id. Here, there is no ambiguity. 
The meaning of the text within the vehicular hijacking statute was already settled 
when the statute was enacted. Giving the statute the name “vehicular hijacking” 
does not change the plain and established meaning of the text within. By reaching 
the conclusion it does, the majority calls into question the continued validity of 
established rules of construction. 
¶ 99 
 
I am well aware that the word “hijacking” has a certain connotation, and 
therefore, the temptation to attach an expanded meaning to the statute is 
understandable. However, it is this court’s obligation to interpret statutes in accord 
with legislative intent. It is not our job to rewrite statutes. Based on the analysis 
above, I believe we are bound by our rules of construction and stare decisis to 
interpret the vehicular hijacking statute in accord with the longstanding 
interpretation of the language contained therein. To interpret the vehicular 
hijacking statute as the majority does is not only to read into the statutory language 
a meaning that is not there but to affirmatively adopt a meaning that previously was 
expressly rejected. In short, we cannot conclude that the legislature “plainly 
intended” something different than what we said in Strickland simply because the 
statute is titled “vehicular hijacking.” 
 
 
 
 
 
- 28 - 
¶ 100 
 
Because I would affirm the appellate court’s reversal of defendant’s aggravated 
vehicular hijacking conviction, I would also find that defendant’s conviction for 
vehicular invasion may stand. Therefore, I also dissent from the majority’s decision 
to vacate that conviction. In all other respects, I agree with the majority and, 
therefore, would affirm the appellate court judgment on the remaining issues.