Case Title: Kim v. Multnomah County

Citation: 

Docket Number: S43031

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  December 17, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

DO MUN KIM and KWI OK KIM,
husband and wife,

Petitioners on Review,

	v.

MULTNOMAH COUNTY, by and
through its MULTNOMAH COUNTY
COMMUNITY DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, and its
MULTNOMAH COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS,

Respondents on Review.

(CC 9302-01079; CA A84073; SC S43031)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted January 8, 1997; reassigned September
16, 1998.

	Patricia Ferrell-French, West Linn, argued the cause and
filed the briefs for petitioners on review.

	J. Michael Doyle, Assistant County Counsel, Portland, argued
the cause for respondents on review.  With him on the brief was
Laurence Kressel, County Counsel.

	Charles Robinowitz, Portland, filed briefs for amicus curiae
Oregon Trial Lawyers' Association.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.**

	GILLETTE, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.  

	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court,

	Lee Johnson, Judge.

	138 Or App 417, 909 P2d 886 (1996). 

    **Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision.		

		GILLETTE, J.

		This is a negligence action brought against a county
corrections department by plaintiffs who are the victims of a
probationer's criminal conduct.  There are two issues before the
court:  First, whether a probation officer exercises sufficient
control over a probationer to warrant imposing liability on the
corrections department for the probationer's criminal conduct. 
Second, whether the statute providing for a probation officer's
authority and duties establishes a standard of care for probation
officers that would allow plaintiffs to recover damages for a
violation of the statute.  The trial court granted the
corrections department's motion for summary judgment and
dismissed the action.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Kim v.
Multnomah County, 138 Or App 417, 909 P2d 886 (1996).  We allowed
plaintiffs' petition for review and now affirm the decision of
the Court of Appeals. 

		The facts are undisputed.  The probationer, Lawrence,
was convicted on a misdemeanor assault charge in late 1991 and
placed on probation under the supervision of a probation officer,
Kirkpatrick.  Lawrence failed to report to Kirkpatrick, and she
caused a probation violation warrant to be issued in December
1991.  Lawrence was arrested on that warrant in February 1992,
but he was released from jail on his own recognizance pending a
probation revocation hearing.  He did not appear at the hearing,
and Kirkpatrick caused another warrant to be issued.  The second
warrant specified that, when Lawrence was apprehended, no bail
should be set and Lawrence should not be released on his own
recognizance.  

		Lawrence was arrested again on April 20, 1992, on four
charges of robbery in the first degree, arising out of his
alleged robbery at knife-point of two convenience stores, and on
the outstanding probation violation warrant.  He was arraigned
the next day and detained in the Multnomah County Department of
Corrections jail pending a probation revocation hearing, which
was scheduled for April 29, 1992.  

		While Lawrence was still in custody, the prosecutor
dismissed the robbery charges.  At the same time, however,
Lawrence also was arrested and indicted for unauthorized use of a
motor vehicle (UUMV), arising out of his alleged use of a stolen
vehicle during the commission of the convenience store robberies. 
Lawrence's arraignment on the UUMV charge was scheduled for April
30, 1992.  

		Meanwhile, on April 28, Kirkpatrick learned for the
first time that Lawrence was in jail and that his probation
revocation hearing was set for the next morning.  Kirkpatrick
could have learned before then that Lawrence was in custody
through various means.  For example, each time a police officer
checks for outstanding warrants for a person, a computerized
tracking mechanism is triggered in the Law Enforcement Data
System (LEDS) by which a notice is to be sent to probation
officers, among others, to inform them of the person's criminal
activities.  The notice is known as an "EPR hit," for "Enter
Probation Record."  However, Kirkpatrick never received an "EPR
hit" notifying her of Lawrence's arrest on the robbery charges.

		In addition, probation offices, including
Kirkpatrick's, daily receive a booking register, which is an
alphabetical list of all persons booked in the previous 24 hours,
with their charges.  Each day they also receive an "Alpha List,"
which is an alphabetical list of all persons in custody as of
4:00 a.m. that day, with their charges.  Had Kirkpatrick checked
the booking register on April 21 or the Alpha List at any time
between April 21 and April 28, she would have learned of the
robbery charges against Lawrence.  If Kirkpatrick had checked the
Alpha List on the morning of the probation revocation hearing,
she would have learned of the additional UUMV charge against
Lawrence, and she would have learned that the robbery charges had
been dismissed.  

		Kirkpatrick did nothing to prepare for the probation
revocation hearing other than to retrieve Lawrence's "Abscond
Status" file.  At the hearing, the judge asked both Kirkpatrick
and the district attorney whether any new charges had been
brought against Lawrence.  Both informed the court that they were
not aware of any.  Lawrence excused his failure to report to
Kirkpatrick by claiming that he suffered from a head injury that
prevented him from keeping his appointments.  The court ordered
that Lawrence's probation be continued, on the condition that he
provide Kirkpatrick with medical confirmation of his injury.  

		Lawrence was not released at that time, however; he
continued to be detained, because his arraignment on the UUMV
charge was scheduled for the next day.  Kirkpatrick was made
aware of Lawrence's continued detention later that day through a
telephone call from Lawrence's attorney.  Still, she did not
undertake any further investigation into other charges, and she
did not know of or attend the arraignment the next day.  At the
conclusion of that arraignment, the presiding judge ordered that
Lawrence be released on his own recognizance.  Lawrence was
released that day.  

		On May 1, 1992, Lawrence was indicted on the two
convenience store robberies, and the court issued an arrest
warrant.  Three days later, police arrested Lawrence at
plaintiffs' convenience store, where Lawrence had stabbed
plaintiffs while attempting to rob them. 

		Plaintiffs subsequently brought the present action for
negligence and negligence per se against Multnomah County, acting
by and through its agency, the Multnomah County Department of
Community Corrections (collectively, the County).  The agency
provides probation services in Multnomah County.  The complaint
alleged that the County was negligent in failing to inform the
court at the probation revocation hearing "that Lawrence had been
in custody for two counts of Robbery I and was still in custody
awaiting arraignment for one count of Unauthorized Use of
Vehicle" and in failing to inform the court at the hearing for
Lawrence's arraignment for UUMV "of Lawrence's custody on the two
counts of Robbery I and his Assault IV probation violation
warrant, arrest and custody."  In a second "claim for relief,"
the complaint alleged that those acts violated ORS 137.610, ORS
137.630(1)(a) and (e), and ORS 137.630(2), set out and discussed
post.(1)

  Additionally, in the summary judgment proceedings also
discussed post, plaintiffs alleged that the County was negligent
in failing to prevent Lawrence's release by issuing a detention
warrant pursuant to which he allegedly would have been detained
for up to 15 days pending an investigation into his conduct.  		
The County moved for summary judgment on the ground
that, as a matter of law, "neither the relationship between
plaintiffs and Multnomah County nor the relationship between
Lawrence and Multnomah County supports liability against the
county for the injuries suffered by plaintiffs as a result of
Lawrence's independent criminal acts."  In support of that
proposition, the County relied on Buchler v. Oregon Corrections
Division, 316 Or 499, 853 P2d 798 (1993), in which, according to
the County, this court held that there is no duty to control the
conduct of another so as to prevent him from causing harm, unless
a statute creates such a duty or the duty exists because of a
special relationship between the one accused of negligence and
either the injured party or the one who committed the harm. 
Plaintiffs argued that, under Buchler, the County was liable for
Lawrence's criminal acts, because it negligently failed to
control Lawrence even though it had taken charge of him when he
came under the County's supervision as a probationer and even
though the County knew or should have known that Lawrence was
likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled. 
Moreover, plaintiffs argued, relevant statutes impose a duty on
the County to protect the public and establish a standard of care
against which the County's conduct should be measured.  It
follows, they argued, that a question of fact existed as to
whether the County breached that standard of care.  

		As noted, the trial court granted summary judgment to
the County and dismissed the action.  Plaintiffs appealed to the
Court of Appeals, essentially repeating and refining the
arguments that they had made to the trial court.  They argued
that section 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965),
which defines a custodian's duty to prevent harm, controls the
present case and states an exception to the general rule of non-liability 
for the conduct of others.  Section 319 provides as
follows:

"One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows
or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to
others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to control the third person to prevent
him from doing such harm."

Plaintiffs argued that Kirkpatrick "took charge" of Lawrence and
knew or had reason to know that he was likely to cause bodily
harm if not controlled, and yet failed to exercise reasonable
care to control him.  Additionally, in support of their
negligence per se count, they argued that a question of fact
exists as to whether the County violated ORS 137.540(1)(a), ORS
137.550(2), ORS 137.630, ORS 423.505(2), (3) and (4), OAR 291-31-005 
et seq., OAR 291-65-007, and the County's internal policy and
procedure manual and, therefore, whether the County was negligent
per se.

		The Court of Appeals rejected both of plaintiffs'
arguments, holding that section 319, which this court followed in
Buchler, would apply only if Lawrence was in the County's custody
or under its control at the time of Kirkpatrick's alleged
negligent acts.  Kim, 138 Or App at 424.  The Court of Appeals
concluded that only the trial court had the ability to control
Lawrence's detention or release, and the County's supervisory
authority over Lawrence did not constitute "taking charge" of
Lawrence for purposes of liability under section 319.  Id. 
Turning to plaintiffs' negligence per se argument, the court
reviewed all the statutes and regulations cited by plaintiffs. 
The court concluded that none of them identified a particular
danger or class of persons at risk because of a probation
officer's failure to carry out the officer's duties and,
accordingly, none provided a basis for a negligence per se claim. 
Id. at 426-27.  

		For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of
the Court of Appeals.(2)

  We first address plaintiffs' section 319
argument.  As has been discussed, that section provides an
exception to the general rule of nonliability for the conduct of
others.  In Buchler, this court first held that the common-law
rule restated in section 319 is the law in Oregon.  316 Or at
506.  That decision arose out of an action brought by the estate
of a victim killed by a state prisoner who was a member of a work
crew assigned to a forest camp in a remote rural area.  The
prisoner escaped from custody by driving away in a state van in
which the crew supervisor negligently had left the keys in the
ignition.  In Buchler, there was no dispute that the defendant
"took charge" of the prisoner; the only real issue concerning the
applicability of section 319 was whether the defendant knew or
should have known that the prisoner was "likely to cause bodily
harm to others if not controlled."  Id. at 506-07.  

		Here, by contrast, the issue is whether, as a threshold
matter, the County "takes charge" of a probationer to the extent
that it could be liable under section 319 for the probationer's
later criminal activity.  The Court of Appeals held that that
standard requires a custodial relationship between the County and
the probationer at the time of the allegedly negligent acts; a
merely supervisory relationship, that court held, is
insufficient.  Kim, 138 Or App at 424.  For the reasons that
follow, we agree.  

		Implicit in the proposition in section 319 that one has
a "duty to exercise reasonable care to control" a third person he
has "taken charge of" "to prevent him from doing * * * harm" is
the notion that one has the legal ability to take charge of that
person.  In a probation officer-probationer relationship, the
probation officer does not have that ability.  Within the limits
of the conditions of his probation, the probationer is free to
come and go as he pleases, when and where he pleases.  It is no
part of a probation officer's work to follow each probationer to
prevent him from harming others.  In short, a probation officer
does not -- indeed, given caseloads, could not -- exercise a
degree of supervision that permits the conclusion that the
relationship between the parties is a form of custody.(3)

		Plaintiffs also argue that, even if a probation officer
ordinarily does not exercise the requisite degree of control over
a probationer, Kirkpatrick actually had the ability to control
 Lawrence under the facts of this case.  They argue that Lawrence
was in jail at the time of the County's alleged negligent acts
and that Kirkpatrick had the actual ability to keep him there,
thereby preventing the harm that Lawrence caused to plaintiffs
after his release.  Plaintiffs assert that, during the entire
time that Lawrence was in jail, he was in the County's actual
custody.  The basis for that assertion is that Lawrence was
incarcerated because of his arrest on Kirkpatrick's probation
violation warrant.  From that fact, plaintiffs argue that
Kirkpatrick had the actual ability to control Lawrence's conduct
in two ways, either of which would have prevented him from
harming plaintiffs, but that she negligently failed to do so.

		Plaintiffs first argue that Kirkpatrick negligently
failed to learn of the additional charges against Lawrence and
therefore failed to inform the court of them at the probation
revocation hearing.  Plaintiffs do not contend specifically that,
but for Kirkpatrick's alleged negligence in this regard, the
court would not have released Lawrence, but that is the clear
implication and necessary corollary to their theory that the
County had the actual ability to control Lawrence's conduct so as
to prevent harm.  Second, plaintiffs argue that, if Kirkpatrick
had known of the additional charges against Lawrence, she could
have had him arrested and detained for up to 15 days under a
detention warrant issued pursuant to her authority under ORS
137.550(2), ORS 137.620, ORS 137.630(2), and the County's policy
manual, with the result that Lawrence would have been in custody
at the time of the crimes against plaintiffs.(4)

		As a preliminary matter, we disagree that Lawrence was
in the County's custody when he was in jail following his arrest
on Kirkpatrick's probation violation warrant.  Probation officers
do have the authority to arrest a probationer, if they have
reason to believe that the person has committed a probation
violation.  ORS 137.550(2); ORS 137.620.  However, their
authority to hold a probationer in custody stops when the person
is delivered to the jail.  Thereafter, the custodian is the
jailer, not the probation officer.  There is no allegation here
of any negligent act by the jailer.

		We also do not agree that, under either of plaintiffs'
theories, the County had the ability to control Lawrence's
conduct while he was in jail, by preventing his release, so as to
prevent him from harming plaintiffs.  First, if Kirkpatrick had
obtained all the information available to her at the probation
revocation hearing, she presumably would have told the judge that
there was a UUMV charge pending against Lawrence and that robbery
charges had been brought but had been dismissed (subject to later
indictment).  The judge, not Kirkpatrick, then would have had to
decide whether to release Lawrence.  It was not within
Kirkpatrick's power to revoke Lawrence's probation and,
therefore, she did not have the ability to control his conduct by
preventing his release.  

		Additionally, even if the judge had been provided with
the relevant information, it is not clear that he would have
ruled differently, because the robbery charges were not pending
against Lawrence at the time of the hearing, and the only current
charge was UUMV.  In light of the fact that the judge at the UUMV
arraignment hearing the next day also released Lawrence on his
own recognizance, it is unlikely that Kirkpatrick's disclosure of
the existence of the UUMV charge would have affected the outcome
of the probation revocation hearing.  Moreover, plaintiffs
suggest that the judge actually was made aware by defense counsel
at the probation revocation hearing that additional charges were
pending against Lawrence, but released him anyway.(5)

  Under those
circumstances, it is clear that Kirkpatrick did not have the
ability to control Lawrence's release in any legally significant
manner.  

		Second, plaintiffs' assertion that Kirkpatrick had the
authority, under ORS 137.550(2), ORS 137.620, and ORS 137.630(2)
and the County's manual, to arrest Lawrence while he was in jail
and detain him for up to 15 days is incorrect.  ORS 137.620
simply provides that probation officers have the powers of peace
officers in the execution of their duties.  ORS 137.630(2)
provides that probation officers shall have the duties provided
by County rules, and the manual does not confer any authority
different than that provided by the relevant statutes.  

		ORS 137.550(2) is more specific, but does not grant to
probation officers the powers that plaintiffs suggest such
officers have.(6)

  That section provides:

"Any probation officer, police officer or other officer
with power of arrest may arrest a probationer without a
warrant for violating any condition of probation, and a
statement by the probation officer setting forth that
the probationer has, in the judgment of the probation
officer, violated the conditions of probation is
sufficient warrant for the detention of the probationer
in the county jail until the probationer can be brought
before the court[.] * * * [T]he probation officer, as
soon as practicable, but within one judicial day, shall
report such arrest and detention to the court that
imposed the probation."

(Emphasis added.)  Any authority of a probation officer to detain
a probationer suspected of violating a condition of probation
thus is limited to "one judicial day."  Thereafter, pursuant to
ORS 137.550(3), it is up to a judge to determine, within the
first 36 hours of custody, whether the probationer should be held
pending a probation revocation hearing or released on condition
that the probationer later appear at such a hearing.  The statute
further provides that the probationer shall be released from
custody if the probation revocation hearing is not held within 14
days of the arrest or detention.  ORS 137.550(5).  

		It follows from the foregoing that it is true that, had
Kirkpatrick been more vigilant on April 21, 1992, she possessed
the statutory authority to arrest Lawrence for violating a
condition of his parole.  However, that power was preempted,
essentially, when the police officer who arrested Lawrence for
the convenience store robberies also arrested him for the
probation violation.  Lawrence was brought before a court
immediately, in compliance with ORS 137.550(3), a probation
revocation hearing was set for April 29, 1992, and Lawrence was
detained in the interim.  Kirkpatrick did not have any authority
under ORS 137.550 to detain Lawrence beyond the date of the
probation hearing.  

		Moreover, even if it were within Kirkpatrick's power to
rearrest Lawrence while he was in detention and to set the
hearing scheduling procedure in motion again pending an
investigation into the other charges, it would have remained up
to the judge, not Kirkpatrick, to determine whether Lawrence
should have been released in the interim.  Neither Kirkpatrick
nor the County had the ultimate power to control Lawrence's
release through the issuance of a detention warrant.  It follows
that they were not in a position to prevent the harm that befell
plaintiffs.   

		On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that neither
Kirkpatrick nor the County "took charge" of Lawrence in such a
way that either had the ability to control him so as to prevent
him from doing the harm about which plaintiffs complain. 
Accordingly, section 319 of the Restatement is inapplicable in
this case to confer liability on the County for Lawrence's
independent criminal acts.  The decision of the Court of Appeals
upholding the trial court's order granting summary judgment on
that point was correct.  

		We turn to plaintiffs' negligence per se theory. 
Plaintiffs correctly state that, if a statute prescribes a
particular standard of care, then it may be appropriate for a
court to adopt that statute as the standard to be applied in a
common-law tort action.  See Bellikka v. Green, 306 Or 630, 650,
762 P2d 997 (1988) (a statute can be used to establish a proper
standard of care and to show that the defendant met or failed to
meet that standard).  However, to this point, all parties (and
the Court of Appeals) appear simply to have assumed that the
pertinent statutes do, in fact, establish a standard of care and
that the only issue before the court is whether that standard was
violated.(7)

  We do not believe that such an assumption is
warranted in this case.  Rather, it is appropriate to begin our
analysis by considering, instead, whether any of the statutes
relied on by plaintiffs establish a standard of care for
probation officers.  Only if such a standard is established would
we proceed to the next level of analysis, viz., consideration
whether plaintiffs are within a class of persons that the
legislature intended to be protected and whether the harm that
befell them is of the kind that the statute was intended to
prevent.  See Bob Godfrey Pontiac v. Roloff, 291 Or 318, 326, 630
P2d 840 (1981) (stating foregoing as the test for determining
whether a violation of a standard of conduct imposed by a statute
constitutes negligence per se); see also Scovill v. City of
Astoria, 324 Or 159, 173, 921 P2d 1312 (1996) (to the same
effect).    

		As noted, the only statutes that plaintiffs identified
in the trial court as possible sources for a standard of care are
ORS 137.610, ORS 137.630(1)(a) and (e), and ORS 137.630(2).  The
question before us, then, is whether ORS 137.610, ORS
137.630(1)(a), ORS 137.630(1)(e), or ORS 137.630(2) provides a
foundation for plaintiffs' negligence per se claim.  In Shahtout
v. Emco Garbage, Co., 298 Or 598, 601, 695 P2d 897 (1985), we
held that a statute establishes the standard of care if it "so
fixes the legal standard of conduct that there is no question of
due care left for a factfinder to determine."  In such a case,
"noncompliance with the [statute] is negligence as a matter of
law."  

		The first statute that plaintiffs referenced, ORS
137.610, is disposed of easily.  That statute provides that a
"judge * * * may request at any time the staff of the Department
of Corrections to perform any of the duties which might be
required of a probation officer."  A statute that authorizes a
judge to request a probation officer to do something cannot
establish a standard of care for probation officers.  

		The pertinent portions of ORS 137.630 provide as
follows:  

	"(1) The duties of probation officers * * * shall
be: 

	"(a) To make such investigations and reports under
ORS 137.530 as are required by the judge of any court 
* * * [in] which the officer is appointed to serve.  

		"* * * * * 

	"(e) To keep detailed records of the work done and
to make such reports to the courts and to the
Department of Corrections as such courts require.

		"* * * * *

	"(2) Probation officers of the Department of
Corrections shall have the duties as specified by rule
adopted by the Director of the Department of
Corrections."

		ORS 137.630(2), which merely provides that probation
officers have such duties as may be provided by regulation, does
not establish a standard of care.  Neither is the statutory duty
set out in ORS 137.630(1)(a) and (e) to make investigations and
reports as a judge may from time-to-time require sufficiently
specific to "so fix the legal standard."  Even plaintiffs
themselves characterize the relevant statutes as requiring
Kirkpatrick only "to exercise reasonable care in supervising and
controlling Lawrence in order to protect the public."  Under the
circumstances, then, those statutes do not provide a foundation
for plaintiffs' negligence per se claim.  It follows that the
trial court did not err in granting, and the Court of Appeals did
not err in affirming, the award of summary judgment to the County
on that issue.

		The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.  

1. 	Plaintiffs' complaint alleges negligence and negligence per
se, which are simply alternative legal theories of liability for
negligence.  See Shahtout v. Emco Garbage Co., 298 Or 598, 601,
695 P2d 897 (1985) (phrase "negligence per se" can apply only to
cases brought on theory of liability for negligence).  The
complaint, therefore, properly is viewed as stating two counts
but not, as plaintiffs sometimes erroneously state, as stating
two separate claims for relief.  

2. 	In so doing, we do not consider one argument that plaintiffs
raise in their briefs before this court, viz., that, based on
this court's holding in Fazzolari v. Portland School Dist. No.
1J, 303 Or 1, 734 P2d 1326 (1987), the County unreasonably
created a foreseeable risk of harm through its allegedly
negligent conduct.  Notwithstanding plaintiffs' arguments to the
contrary, we conclude that plaintiffs failed to raise that issue
before either the trial court or the Court of Appeals.  We have
reviewed those portions of the pleadings and briefs to which
plaintiffs direct us, and it is clear that, in each instance,
plaintiffs confined their arguments to the proper applicability
of section 319.  Section 319 is an example of a theory of
liability based on a "special relationship."  By contrast, the
general foreseeability theory of liability, outlined in
Fazzolari, speaks to circumstances in which a special
relationship is not present.  See, e.g., Buchler, 316 Or at 504
(explaining distinction).

3. 	As evidence that a probation officer exercises a degree of
control over a probationer such that the officer effectively
"takes charge" of the probationer, plaintiffs point to the fact
that a probation officer can, among other things, impose
sanctions on a probationer, search his home or his person without
a warrant, and cause warrants to be issued for the probationer's
arrest if the probationer violates a condition of his probation. 
Although the existence of those powers demonstrates that
probation officers have the ability to compel a probationer's
compliance with the conditions of his probation, they do not
permit the inference that a probation officer can control a
probationer's conduct in such a way as to prevent him from
harming others.  By contrast, in a custodial relationship, a
custodian is responsible for controlling the person's activities
and is required to, and actually has the legal ability to, take
precautions to prevent the person from doing harm.

4. 	Plaintiffs state several times in their brief to this court
that the County was negligent in failing to know that it had the
ability to control Lawrence's conduct during the ten days he was
in jail.  Of course, Lawrence was controlled adequately while in
jail; his crimes that are the basis for this action occurred
after he was released.  Therefore, we understand plaintiffs
statements in that regard to relate to their argument that
Kirkpatrick should have exercised her authority during the period
of Lawrence's incarceration to arrest and detain him, as
discussed in the text. 

5. 	Plaintiffs state that Kirkpatrick admitted that she did not
investigate whether other charges were pending against Lawrence
despite the fact that, at the probation revocation hearing, she
overheard part of a conversation between the judge and Lawrence's
defense counsel alluding to additional charges against Lawrence.  

6. 	ORS 137.550(2) has been amended since the time of the events
at issue in this case, but the amendments are not pertinent to
the resolution of the issues before the court.

7. 1	For example, in evaluating plaintiffs' assertion of
negligence per se, the Court of Appeals began and ended by
considering whether the legislature intended the statutes and
rules upon which plaintiffs rely to protect persons like
plaintiffs from the type of injuries they in fact suffered.  Kim,
138 Or App at 424-27.  That analysis appears to take as a given
that the statutes that the court reviewed prescribe a standard of
care for probation officers.