Case Title: Nye v. University of Delaware

Citation: 

Docket Number: 315, 2005

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GLORIA T. NYE,  
 
 
 
§ 
§ 
No. 315, 2005 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  
Court Below: Superior Court  
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and for  
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
§ 
 
UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE and § 
C.A. No. 02C-12-065  
MELVIN D. SCHIAVELLI 
 
§ 
§ 
Defendants Below, 
 
 
§ 
Appellees.  
 
 
§ 
 
 
Submitted:  December 21, 2005 
   Decided:  January 31, 2006 
   Revised:  April 4, 2006 
 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 4th day of April 2006, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties and 
their contentions at oral argument, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Appellant plaintiff Gloria T. Nye (“Mrs. Nye”), as widow and 
executrix of Dr. John C. Nye (“Dr. Nye”), appeals the Superior Court’s granting of 
summary judgment in favor of the University of Delaware (“the University”) and 
Dr. Melvin D. Schiavelli (“Dr. Schiavelli”) on five causes of action related to Dr. 
 
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Nye’s employment. 1  Mrs. Nye argues that summary judgment was inappropriate 
because there is a genuine dispute about material facts.  Two alleged agreements 
are at issue in this case.  We affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on all claims 
involving alleged breaches of Dr. Nye’s contract of employment as Dean of the 
College of Agriculture and Natural Resources.  We reverse and remand for further 
proceedings regarding the University’s alleged breach of a separate promise to pay 
Dr. Nye during a period of “administrative leave,” because material issues of fact 
preclude summary judgment on that claim. 
(2) 
Dr. Nye was Dean of the College of Agriculture and Natural 
Resources at the University of Delaware from 1991 to 2001, and served two full 
five-year terms.  A Dean at the University undergoes a review process near the end 
of each five-year term, but serves as Dean at the will of the administration.  During 
Dr. Nye’s first review, the review committee recommended he continue as Dean 
for another term, but only if he improved his communications with the staff and 
faculty of his college.  Near the end of his second term, almost half the tenured 
faculty in his college signed and submitted to the University administration a 
petition of no-confidence, stating their dissatisfaction with Dr. Nye because his 
                                          
 
1 Appellant voluntarily dismissed her claim against Dr. Thomas M. DiLorenzo after discovery, 
although his name remained on Appellant’s Notice of Appeal and briefs.  The five causes of 
action alleged against the remaining defendants are (1) The University breached its covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing; (2) Provost Schiavelli’s letter to Dr. Nye established a valid contract 
which was breached; (3) The University is estopped to deny administrative leave pay; (4) 
withholding of administrative leave pay violates Delaware’s Wage Payment and Collection Act; 
and (5) Dr. Schiavelli tortiously interfered with Dr. Nye’s contract.   
 
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communications within the college had not improved.  As Provost, Dr. Schiavelli 
initiated Dr. Nye’s second review near the end of his five-year term as Dean.  A 
review committee normally gives only an advisory written opinion to the Provost, 
who in turn advises the President, who makes the ultimate decision on a Dean’s 
reappointment.  Dr. Schiavelli appointed Dr. DiLorenzo as chair of the review 
committee. 
(3) 
There are disputes of fact as to how the committee reached its 
decision, but for the reasons we explain below, several of these disputed facts are 
immaterial.  Only material disputes are sufficient to deny summary judgment.2  
Mrs. Nye accuses Dr. Schiavelli of improperly influencing the committee’s 
decision to recommend Dr. Nye not serve a third term as Dean.  It is undisputed 
that after the review committee orally shared its decision with Dr. Schiavelli, he 
relayed that decision to Dr. Nye.  It is also undisputed that the review committee 
did not produce a written statement memorializing Dr. Nye’s poor communications 
within his college or his faculty’s unprecedented petition for his removal.  It is also 
undisputed that Dr. Nye was not reappointed as Dean of the College.  What is 
disputed is whether Dr. Nye voluntarily decided to not pursue a third term, whether 
the administration made that decision, or whether it was a shared or compromise 
                                          
 
2 Superior Court Civil Rule 56(c). 
 
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decision.  It is clear that Dr. Nye and Dr. Schiavelli wrote an e-mail to the faculty 
together announcing that Dr. Nye would not serve a third term as Dean. 
(4) 
It is undisputed that the final outcome was that Dr. Nye and Dr. 
Schiavelli agreed that Dr. Nye would finish his second term as Dean, then begin 
working for one year as Director of Cooperative Extension, and thereafter take one 
year of paid administrative leave.  Dr. Schiavelli knew that Dr. Nye was exploring 
other employment opportunities outside the University.  At oral argument, counsel 
for the University conceded an inference could be drawn that the arrangement was 
a “quiet plan to exit.”  Whether the purpose of one year’s paid administrative leave 
was for the purpose of preparing for Dr. Nye’s return to the faculty, or whether it 
was a severance arrangement in return for his agreement not to challenge the 
administration’s decision not to reappoint him as Dean, cannot be decided on the 
present record.  Dr. Nye finished his second term as Dean and began his position as 
Director.  As Dean, Dr. Nye regularly received annual pay increases of inconsistent 
amounts.  He did not receive an annual pay increase as Director.  While Dr. Nye 
was serving as Director he died – before beginning his administrative leave with 
pay.   
 
 
 
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(5) 
Mrs. Nye, as widow and as executrix, seeks: first, the difference 
between Dr. Nye’s salary as Director and the alleged increase in salary he would 
have received had he served a third term as Dean;3 and second, the compensation 
Dr. Nye would have received during his one year administrative leave: $162,500.  
After reviewing the admissible evidence, the Superior Court held that the plaintiff 
had not established a claim that was sufficient to survive summary judgment, and 
granted the Defendants’ motion.   
(6) 
“This Court reviews de novo the Superior Court’s grant of summary 
judgment both as to facts and law to determine whether or not the undisputed facts, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party, entitle the moving party 
to judgment as a matter of law.”4  However, if the record was curtailed by pre-trial 
rulings, this Court reviews evidentiary rulings of the trial judge for abuse of 
discretion.5  An abuse of discretion occurs when a court has exceeded the bounds 
of reason in view of the circumstances, so ignored recognized rules of law or 
practice so as to produce injustice.6  As a court reviewing for abuse of discretion, 
we may not substitute our own notions of what is right for those of the trial judge if 
                                          
 
3 The Court had not proceeded to a stage in the proceedings to calculate the exact damages, but 
the parties estimate the amount of Dr. Nye’s foregone pay increase at around $6,000. 
4 Motorola, Inc. v. Amkor Tech., 849 A.2d 931, 935 (Del. 2004) (citing Rhudy v. BottleCaps, 
Inc., 830 A.2d 402, 405 (Del. 2003)). 
5 See E.A.W. v. L.W., 280 A.2d 714 (Del. 1971).  See also Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1059 
(Del. 1994); ABB Flakt, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 731 A.2d 811, 815 (Del. 1999).   
6 Lilly, 649 A.2d at 1059. (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Adams, 541 A.2d 567, 570 
(1988)).   
 
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her judgment was based upon conscience and reason, as opposed to capriciousness 
or arbitrariness.7  We review de novo the Superior Court’s summary judgment 
ruling based on the facts before it.8 
(7) 
Mrs. Nye has not met her burden of showing that her allegations 
against Dr. Schiavello, even if true, support a claim for which relief can be granted.  
Mrs. Nye claims that (i) Dr. Schiavelli did not follow the University’s procedure 
when the administration did not reappoint Dr. Nye for a third term as Dean, and (ii) 
those procedural irregularities amounted to a breach of the University’s covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing.  Mrs. Nye has failed to show, however, that but for 
the deviation from procedure, the administration would have appointed Dr. Nye to 
a third term.  She has failed to adduce any admissible evidence that Dr. Schiavelli 
falsified or manipulated Dr. Nye’s record in order to deprive him of reappointment 
as Dean.  Although the University’s procedures did require both a written report 
and explicit decision from the President in order to reappoint a Dean, the 
undisputed evidence is that despite the absence of a report and explicit presidential 
decision, Dr. Nye and Dr. Schiavelli reached an agreement for Dr. Nye to take a 
different position at the University. 
(8) 
Mrs. Nye’s claim for Dr. Nye’s foregone salary increase fails for 
several reasons.  First, under the facts presented, there was no need for the 
                                          
 
7 Chavin v. Cope, 243 A.2d 694, 695 (Del. 1968). 
8  Matas v. Green, 171 A.2d 916 (Del. 1916). 
 
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committee to issue a written report or for President Roselle to make a decision, 
because Dr. Nye agreed to serve as Director of Cooperative Extension after he 
completed his second term.  Mrs. Nye claims that Dr. Nye did not make that 
agreement, but offers no evidence to support this contention.  Dr. Nye and Dr. 
Schiavelli jointly prepared an e-mail to the faculty stating that he would not serve a 
third term as Dean, and the record shows that Dr. Nye did, in fact, serve as 
Director of Cooperative Extension.  There is no evidence in the record that Dr. Nye 
attempted to seek reappointment as Dean for a third term.  Second, an employer’s 
alleged failure to follow written policy or procedure, by itself, will not support a 
viable claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, because 
Delaware adheres to the employment at-will doctrine, and has set a high threshold 
for an actionable breach of that covenant.9   
(9) 
Mrs. Nye must adduce some evidence of bad faith or ill will.10  Mrs. 
Nye has not.  We conclude that the Superior Court properly granted summary 
judgment on the claim of breach of good faith and fair dealing.     
(10) Mrs. Nye’s related contention is that Dr. Schiavelli tortiously 
interfered with Dr. Nye’s employment contract to remain as Dean.  Specifically, 
Mrs. Nye contends Dr. Schiavelli acted outside the scope of his authority when he 
told Dr. DiLorenzo not to prepare a report from the committee and when he told 
                                          
 
9 Merrill v. Crothall-Am., Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 103 (Del. 1992). 
10 See Geddiss v. University of Delaware, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9058 (D. Del. 2001). 
 
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President Roselle that Dr. Nye had decided not to pursue a third term as Dean.  
This claim also fails.  First, as a matter of law, a party cannot tortiously interfere 
with a contract to which it is also a party.11  Dr. Schiavelli, as Provost, was acting 
as an agent of the University, and therefore cannot be liable for tortious 
interference of a contract to which he was acting ( in that capacity) as a party.12  
The only exception to this rule would be if the Provost acted outside his authority, 
but Mrs. Nye offered no such evidence.  Second, Mrs. Nye has not had adduced 
evidence of the prima facie elements of a claim for tortious interference.13  Mrs. 
Nye offers vague out-of-court statements of Dr. Schiavelli which, she then 
suggests, a finder of fact could interpret to find Dr. Schiavelli intended to interfere 
with Dr. Nye’s contract.  Where a plaintiff opposing a motion for summary 
judgment has had fair opportunity to conduct discovery to explore the defendant’s 
subjective state of mind, yet cannot point to any evidence indicating that the 
defendant intended to deceive or to interfere, plaintiff cannot prevail.14  We find no 
evidence of an intent to deceive or interfere even when the record is viewed in a 
                                          
 
11 Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1058 (Del. Ch. 1984). 
12 Wallace ex rel. Cencom Cable Income Partners II, Inc., L.P. v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1182-83 
(Del. Ch. 1999). 
13 The elements of a claim for tortuous interference with contractual relations are: (1) contract, 
(2) defendant’s knowledge of the contract, (3) and intentional act that is a significant factor in 
causing the breach of the contract, (4) lack of justification and causing the breach, and (5) injury.  
See Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Cantor, 724 A.2d 571 (1998). 
14 Murphy v. Godwin, 303 A.2d 668, 673 (Del. Super. 1973); see also Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 
A.2d 1050, 1058 (Del. Ch. 1984). 
 
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light most favorable to Mrs. Nye.  We conclude that the Superior Court properly 
granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Schiavelli. 
(11) Mrs. Nye claims that the Defendants contracted for Dr. Nye to receive 
the amount of $162,500 (equal to one year’s salary), to be paid during his 
administrative leave.15  The parties dispute the nature of this bargain.  The 
University contends administrative leave always ends with an employee returning 
to work, and that employees are expected to prepare themselves for the work they 
plan on doing upon their return (i.e., teaching).  Mrs. Nye responds by making 
several alternative contentions: that the administrative leave was paid vacation, or 
Dr. Nye earned administrative leave over his prior ten years of service as Dean, or 
the administrative leave with pay was a severance arrangement in exchange for Dr. 
Nye not seeking a third term as Dean.  Mrs. Nye points out that the University’s 
communications to Dr. Nye regarding the administrative leave lacked any explicit 
enumeration of duties he would be required to perform during the administrative 
leave or afterwards.  Therefore, Mrs. Nye contends, the University did not expect 
Dr. Nye to perform any duties during administrative leave in return for the 
payment of $162,500.  The University responds that by custom there was an 
expectation of Dr. Nye to retool and prepare for a return to the faculty.   
                                          
 
15 In a related claim, the Plaintiff contends that under Delaware’s Wage Payment and Collection 
Act  (“WPCA”) 19 Del. C. Chapter 11, Dr. Nye earned administrative leave as compensation by 
completing two terms as Dean.   
 
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Nevertheless, the unique facts of the case permit and inference that the parties 
reached a compromise on a dispute arising from Dr. Nye’s continuation of his 
employment as Dean, but Dr. Nye died before the agreed compensation was 
scheduled to be paid.   
(12) On the record before us, we find disputes of material facts that 
preclude summary judgment on the claim for administrative leave pay.  Under the 
admissible evidence presented, an inference can be drawn that, in Dr. Nye’s 
particular case, the administrative leave was compensation due whether or not Dr. 
Nye performed further personal service or even lived to personally collect it.  
Although severance pay is not a “wage” subject to collection under the Wage 
Payment and Collection Act (“WPCA”),16 it is a benefit or wage supplement.17   
Mrs. Nye has presented sufficient evidence from which a breach of a contract to 
pay Dr. Nye $162,500 and a violation of the Wage Payment and Collection Act 
may be inferred.  Whether such a contract was agreed to is for the trier of fact in 
this case to decide.18  Accordingly, we hold that the Superior Court erred in 
                                          
 
16  See Commons v. Green Grant Co., 394 A.2d 753 (Del. Super. 1978) (Wages does not include 
severance pay.) 
17 See 19 Del. C. § 1109. 
18 The Superior Court granted summary judgment on the WPCA claim because Mrs. Nye’s claim 
is based upon a personal services contract that terminated upon Dr. Nye’s death.  We have 
concluded that this finding cannot be made by way of summary judgment.  The University 
further contends that Mrs. Nye cannot bring a private cause of action under § 1109 and that any 
claim under the Wage Payment and Collection Act is time-barred.  These defenses were not 
addressed by the Superior Court and we decline to consider them in the first instance in this 
appeal. 
 
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granting summary judgment in favor of the University depriving Mrs. Nye of a 
trial on her claim for her late husband’s “administrative leave” pay.  In all other 
respects, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED in part; and REVERSED in part.  This matter is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this Order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice