Case Title: Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. State

Citation: 166 Vt. 337, 693 A.2d 1045

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1997-03-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co. v. State  (95-572); 166 Vt. 337; 693 A.2d 1045

[Filed 28-Mar-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 95-572

Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co., Inc.                 Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.                                           Chittenden Superior Court

State of Vermont                                  May Term, 1996

Linda Levitt, J.

       Robert F. O'Neill, Norman Williams, and Eric B. Fitzpatrick of Gravel
  & Shea, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and John K.
  Dunleavy, Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for defendant-appellee

PRESENT:  Allen, C.J.,(FN1) Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiff Hinesburg Sand and Gravel Company appeals a
  decision of the Chittenden Superior Court, which dismissed its civil rights
  action against defendants State of Vermont and Patrick Garahan, Secretary
  of the Agency of Transportation,(FN2) concluding that plaintiff lacked
  standing to bring the action.  We affirm.

       Plaintiff supplies crushed and uncrushed gravel for use as a sub-base
  material to builders of state and local roads who bid on road projects in
  accordance with state bid specifications. Gravel is the result of natural
  forces and consists of varying sizes of loose rock.  It is different from
  stone, which must be blasted out of the earth at quarries or from ledges
  cut along the path of a new highway.  Prior to 1989, the Vermont Agency of
  Transportation (Agency) considered stone and crushed gravel to be
  equivalent products and so treated them in its bid specifications. In 1989,
  it adopted a policy of not allowing crushed gravel to be used in areas
  where stone is

 

  available.

       The Agency enjoys broad discretion to award highway-construction
  contracts "on terms as it deems to be in the best interest of the state." 
  19 V.S.A. § 10(1).  It is authorized to award contracts on behalf of
  municipalities, and in such cases, "[a]ll work shall be done to the
  satisfaction of and in accordance with the requirements of the [A]gency." 
  Id. § 309(b).

       This case began as a dispute over the bid specifications on a project
  to widen Dorset Street in South Burlington.  Plaintiff alleges that the
  state's policy has cost it sales and profits because it sells only crushed
  gravel and has been prevented from seeking subcontracts on state highway
  projects in the Chittenden County area, where crushed stone is available. 
  The Agency asserts that crushed stone is stronger than crushed gravel, and
  is therefore a preferable sub-base material.  Claiming that the Agency's
  preference for stone over gravel "lacks any legitimate rational basis,"
  plaintiff sought relief under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,(FN3)
  asserting that defendant's policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of
  the Fourteenth Amendment.

       The superior court concluded that, because plaintiff was merely a
  potential supplier to prospective bidders, it had no standing under the
  Equal Protection Clause to challenge the Agency's policy.  The court also
  determined that plaintiff had no legally protected property or liberty
  interest under the Due Process Clause.  Plaintiff appeals the court's
  conclusion with respect to the Equal Protection Clause.

       We hold that Hinesburg Sand and Gravel lacks standing to assert an
  equal protection claim because its interest in competing on an equal basis
  with suppliers of crushed stone is neither a legally protected interest
  guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause nor is it within the "zone of
  interests" protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Furthermore, we hold that even
  if plaintiff

 

  had standing to bring this action, it has failed to state a cause of action
  under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

       In one of its most important decisions on standing, Perkins v. Lukens
  Steel Co.,