Case Title: Barfield v. Marron

Citation: 222 La. 210, 62 So. 2d 276

Docket Number: 

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1952-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
62 So. 2d 276 (1952) 222 La. 210 BARFIELD v. MARRON et al. No. 37579. Supreme Court of Louisiana. December 15, 1952. *277 Anders & Anders, Winnsboro, for plaintiff-appellant. Snyder & Sevier, Tallulah, for defendants-appellees. MOISE, Justice. Plaintiff filed this suit against Walter Marron, Carl Gipson and Alvin F. Moore for damages in the sum of $5,065, for an alleged malicious arrest and false imprisonment. The suit was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff against Carl Gipson. The remaining two defendants filed an exception of no cause of right of action, and this exception was referred to the merits. The suit is more than nine years old. The facts of record elicited from the trial on the merits are distinctly and clearly set out by the learned district judge, as follows: "We must now consider the status of Mr. Marron, the Conservation Agent, who actually did make the investigation, the arrest, and who placed Barfield in prison. It was shown that Mr. Marron acted in his capacity as a Game Warden on Lake Bruen, and *279 that he was an employee of the Conservation Commission of the State of Louisiana. He admitted that on the night of July 29, he did arrest Henry Barfield, plaintiff herein. Acting on the information, that he had received, and which has been previously mentioned in this judgment, Marron proceeded along Lake Bruen, and down to Brushy Lake. That he and Mr. Gipson made this trip together. Mr. Marron testified that he saw an object moving in the bushes; that he flashed his light in that direction, and ordered whoever was in said bushes to come out, that he had him covered. That Mr. Barfield did disclose his presence, and came toward Mr. Marron. *280 The foregoing recitation of the facts gives the entire background of what transpired among the parties involved, and it now becomes our duty to apply the law. The law to be applied, it would seem, is that pertaining to false arrest and imprisonment. From our examination of the authorities an arrest can be made where there is probable cause or surrounding suspicious circumstances. O'Malley v. Whitaker, 118 La. 906, 43 So. 545; Dunson v. Baker, 144 La. 167, 80 So. 238. The distinction between actions for false imprisonment and those for a malicious prosecution are far apart. In a false imprisonment, the arrest is made either without any legal process or warrant, or under a warrant null upon its face. In a malicious prosecution, the proceedings are had in pursuance of legal process, maliciously and wrongfully obtained. DeBouchel v. Koss Const. Co., Inc., 177 La. 841, 149 So. 496. Lord Mansfield says, in noting the difference between false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, that: "`* * * The wrongdoer in making the unlawful arrest or causing it to be made, takes the law in his own hands and acts without a warrant from a court or magistrate while the man who instigates a malicious prosecution puts the machinery of criminal law into operation, causing a warrant to issue and the arrest under the warrant.'" Johnstone v. Sutton, 1 Term Reports 544 (Eng.), 1 English Ruling Cases 765; DeBouchel v. Koss Const. Co., Inc. supra. The grounds or basis for malicious prosecution do not relate to the facts of this case and therefore the law pertaining thereto cannot be applied here. It is urged in the instant case that there was a false arrest. In Dunson v. Baker, 144 La. 167, 80 So. 238, it is declared that where a citizen is arrested on reasonable suspicion of a felony, the officer may detain the party until inquiry may be made, and damages will not be allowed where the prosecuting officer acted in good faith and with probable cause. In Pellifigue v. Judice, 154 La. 782, 98 So. 244, the court held that there must be some positive evidence to show that the prosecution was groundless and an acquittal or even subsequent proof of complete innocence, is not sufficient evidence of want of probable cause. Sundmaker v. Gaudet, 113 La. 887, 37 So. 865. In the case before us, the circumstances were highly suspiciousat the scene of the arrest there was a truck loaded with ice to preserve fish, scales for weighing, and two sets of clothing. Plaintiff's refusal to give his name when first questioned by the officer, his hiding in an obscure place and his occupation were sufficient circumstances to indicate that the officer arresting the plaintiff was not only free of malice but acted in good faith and with probable cause. It has been well said in Lyons v. Carroll, 107 La. 471, 31 So. 760, 761, that "Those who honestly seek the enforcement of law and the administration of justice, and who are supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the party suspected may be guilty of the offense charged, should not be unduly apprehensive that they will be held answerable in damages." That there was no malice on the part of the defendant is apparent from the evidence. That defendant was performing a duty is clear. He did not detain the plaintiff until after making an investigation and telephoning the president of the Police Jury. It is manifest from the record that he acted in good faith and with probable cause. The ideal here may be expediency, the moral lawthe Eleventh commandmentDon't get caught. The demand for damages was properly rejected. For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is affirmed at plaintiff-appellant's cost.