Case Title: State v. Brad E. Forbush

Citation: 2011 WI 25

Docket Number: 2008AP003007-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 WI 25 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
08AP3007-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Brad E. Forbush, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2010 WI App 11 
Reported at: 323 Wis. 2d. 258, 779 N.W.2d 476 
(Ct. App. 2010-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 29, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 14, 2010 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit Court 
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan 
 
JUDGE: 
Terence T. Bourke 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BRADLEY, J., concur 
(Opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., concurs (Opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, ZIEGLER, and GABLEMAN, JJ., dissent 
(Opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER and GABLEMAN, JJ., dissent (Opinion 
filed).    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Craig Mastantuono, Rebecca M. Coffee, and Mastantuono 
Law 
Office, 
S.C., 
Milwaukee, 
and 
oral 
argument 
by 
Mr. 
Mastantuono. 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a cause argued by 
Aaron R. O’Neil, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Nicholas L. Chiarkas, 
state public defender and Colleen D. Ball, assistant state 
public defender.
 
 
2011 WI 25
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2008AP3007-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2008CF292) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Brad E. Forbush, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 29, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded to the circuit court.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a published 
decision of the court of appeals1 reversing the circuit court's2 
order granting Brad Forbush's (Forbush) motion to suppress 
statements he made during a police interrogation.  The central 
issue presented is whether the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2079 
                                                 
1 State v. Forbush, 2010 WI App 11, 323 Wis. 2d 258, 779 
N.W.2d 476. 
2 The Honorable Terence T. Bourke of Sheboygan County 
presided. 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
2 
 
(2009), requires us to overrule Wisconsin precedent that 
established the parameters of a charged defendant's right to 
counsel in Wisconsin when a defendant, who has affirmatively 
invoked his constitutional right to counsel by retaining and 
receiving the services of counsel on pending charges, is 
subjected to questioning by law enforcement.   
¶2 
Forbush contends that his right to counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution was violated by police 
interrogation because he had affirmatively invoked his right to 
counsel and counsel was not present when he was asked to waive 
the right he previously invoked.  I agree.  For the reasons 
discussed below, I conclude that in the factual context herein 
presented, Montejo does not sanction the interrogation that 
occurred.  We so conclude because Forbush's right to counsel 
under the federal or state constitution had attached and was 
invoked affirmatively by Forbush before the investigator's 
questioning was initiated.  I also conclude that the circuit 
court's finding that the investigator knew Forbush had secured 
legal counsel for the pending charges is not clearly erroneous.  
Furthermore, Forbush was not required to "re-invoke" his right 
to 
counsel when the investigator initiated interrogation.  
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
3 
 
Accordingly, Forbush's statements must be suppressed, and we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals.3   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On May 8, 2008, the State of Wisconsin filed a 
criminal complaint against Forbush charging him with attempted 
second-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment.  A warrant 
was issued for his arrest.  Forbush was arrested in Michigan and 
made a court appearance there with an attorney he retained for 
these charges.  His brother, Scott Forbush, a licensed Michigan 
attorney (Attorney Forbush), provided legal representation to 
Forbush.  With the advice of counsel, Forbush waived extradition 
proceedings.  He was transported to Wisconsin in the early 
morning hours of May 16, 2008.  The State stipulated that the 
district attorney's office was notified that Forbush was 
represented by counsel prior to Detective Cory Norlander's 
(Norlander) interrogation of Forbush.  Attorney Forbush, as 
Forbush's lawyer for the pending charges, had contact with 
Detective Ethan Weber, of the Sheboygan County Sheriff's 
Department. 
                                                 
3 Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, joined by Justice Ann 
Walsh Bradley in an opinion based on reasoning that differs from 
that employed herein, concurs in concluding that Forbush's 
Article I, Section 7 right to counsel was violated and that his 
statements to Norlander must be suppressed; Justice David T. 
Prosser, in a separate opinion based on reasoning that differs 
from that employed herein and that employed by Chief Justice 
Abrahamson, concurs in concluding that Forbush's statements to 
Norlander must be suppressed; Justice N. Patrick Crooks, Justice 
Annette Kingsland Ziegler and Justice Michael J. Gableman 
dissent and have filed dissenting opinions. 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
4 
 
¶4 
On the morning of May 16, Forbush was questioned by 
Norlander, also of the Sheboygan County Sheriff's Department.  
Norlander had reviewed Detective Weber's reports prior to his 
interrogation of Forbush.  The interrogation was videotaped.  
Norlander read Forbush the Miranda4 warnings.  After 28 minutes 
of inquiry regarding whether Forbush was willing to waive his 
right to have counsel present, Norlander repeatedly told Forbush 
that he would like to hear his side of the story; that it was 
usually better if law enforcement knew both sides of the story; 
that Norlander knew only one side of the story, but that he 
could not hear Forbush's side unless Forbush signed the waiver 
of rights form.  Forbush subsequently gave a verbal waiver and 
completed a waiver of rights form.  Throughout the reminder of 
the 
interrogation, 
Forbush 
made 
potentially 
incriminating 
statements.  
¶5 
Immediately following the interrogation, Forbush was 
taken to his initial appearance.  Attorney Rebecca Coffee, an 
attorney with the Mastantuono Law Office, who together with 
Attorney Forbush has represented Forbush on these charges 
throughout this case, was present at the initial hearing.   
¶6 
Before trial, Forbush moved to suppress his statements 
to Norlander on the grounds that his right to counsel was 
violated5 because he was represented by counsel on these charges 
                                                 
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
5 Forbush also argued that there was a Fifth Amendment 
violation, but the circuit court's Fifth Amendment holding is 
not on appeal.  
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
5 
 
at the time of the interrogation.  Specifically, Forbush 
asserted that he was represented both by Attorney Forbush, a 
Michigan 
attorney, 
and 
by 
Attorney 
Craig 
Mastantuono, 
a 
Wisconsin attorney, at the time of his interrogation.6  Because 
of his representation by counsel on these charges and because he 
had been formally charged, Forbush argued that any statements 
elicited by Norlander violated his Sixth Amendment and Article 
I, Section 7 right to counsel.   
¶7 
The circuit court found that law enforcement knew 
Forbush was represented by counsel on the pending charges and 
concluded that the State had violated Forbush's Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.  The circuit court granted Forbush's motion, 
barring the State from introducing Forbush's statements to 
Norlander.  
¶8 
The State appealed and the court of appeals reversed 
the suppression order.  State v. Forbush, 2010 WI App 11, ¶2, 
323 Wis. 2d 258, 779 N.W.2d 476.  The court of appeals concluded 
that sometime after the circuit court's decision, the United 
States Supreme Court in Montejo overruled Michigan v. Jackson, 
475 U.S. 625 (1986), and held that the Sixth Amendment does not 
prevent 
police 
from 
questioning 
charged 
and 
represented 
defendants.  Forbush, 323 Wis. 2d 258, ¶2.  Because the court of 
appeals concluded that the circuit court's holding was based 
entirely on this court's conclusions in State v. Dagnall, 2000 
                                                 
6 Attorney Mastantuono has continued to represent Forbush 
throughout this appeal. 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
6 
 
WI 82, 236 Wis. 2d 339, 612 N.W.2d 680, and that Dagnall was 
effectively overruled by Montejo, the court of appeals reversed 
the circuit court's suppression order.  Forbush, 323 Wis. 2d 
258, ¶¶2, 13. 
¶9 
We granted review and now reverse the court of 
appeals. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶10 At issue is whether the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Montejo requires us to overrule Wisconsin law that 
established the parameters of a defendant's right to counsel 
after he has affirmatively invoked his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel by retaining and receiving the services of counsel on 
the pending charges.  This issue "involves the application of 
constitutional principles to historical facts."  State v. Hoppe, 
2003 WI 43, ¶34, 261 Wis. 2d 294, 661 N.W.2d 407.  We have 
adopted 
a 
two-part 
standard 
of 
review 
for 
questions 
of 
constitutional fact.  Id.  We uphold the circuit court's 
findings of historical or evidentiary fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶12, 311 Wis. 2d 
358, 752 N.W.2d 748.  We review independently the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts found.  State v. Ward, 
2009 WI 60, ¶17, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236. 
B.  Right to Counsel 
¶11 On appeal, Forbush argues that the interrogation by 
Norlander violated his right to counsel.  Forbush contends that 
he invoked his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
7 
 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution when he affirmatively requested and 
received representation of counsel, Attorney Forbush and the 
Mastantuono Law Office, for these charges.  Accordingly, Forbush 
argues that he was represented by counsel when Norlander 
questioned 
him 
and 
that 
the 
State 
was 
aware 
of 
this 
representation.  The State contends that Montejo has removed the 
restrictions on questioning a represented defendant unless he 
requests counsel at the time of questioning.   
¶12 I begin my discussion with the framework for the right 
to counsel that has been employed during interpretations of the 
United States and Wisconsin Constitutions, in order to show the 
contours of the right when Forbush was interrogated.  I then 
examine the rule of law established by the Supreme Court's 
decision in Montejo.  Finally, I discuss the current viability 
of the pre-Montejo standards in Wisconsin and apply the 
applicable law to Forbush.  
a.  General framework 
¶13 The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "the accused shall 
enjoy . . . the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."7  
                                                 
7 In full, the Sixth Amendment reads:  
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
8 
 
Similarly, Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel."8  The 
right to counsel is a fundamental right guaranteed to criminal 
defendants in this country.  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 
462 (1938).  The United States Supreme Court has declared that 
the right to counsel:  
is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed 
necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life 
and 
liberty. . . . 
 
It 
embodies 
a 
realistic 
recognition of the obvious truth that the average 
defendant does not have the professional legal skill 
to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with 
power to take his life or liberty, wherein the 
                                                                                                                                                             
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.  
U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
The Supreme Court applied the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel to the states through incorporation by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963). 
8 In full, Article I, Section 7, "Rights of accused," reads:  
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have 
compulsory 
process 
to 
compel 
the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by 
indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial 
by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein 
the offense shall have been committed; which county or 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law. 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 7. 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
9 
 
prosecution is presented by experienced and learned 
counsel. 
Id. at 462-63.  The Sixth Amendment "guarantees the accused 
. . . the right to rely on counsel as a 'medium' between him and 
the State."  Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985).  "The 
right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments 
is 
indispensable 
to 
the 
fair 
administration of our adversarial system of criminal justice."  
Id. at 168-69.   
¶14 It is important to note that "[o]nce the right to 
counsel has attached and been asserted, the State must of course 
honor it."  Id. at 170.  "[T]he prosecutor and police have an 
affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents 
and thereby dilutes the protection afforded by the right to 
counsel."  Id. at 171.  In Moulton, the right to counsel was 
invoked by the appearance of Moulton and his attorney before the 
Maine Superior Court for Waldo County, where a plea of not 
guilty to the crimes charged was entered.  Id. at 162.   
¶15 Generally, the right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment and Article I, Section 7 "'attaches only at or after 
the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated 
against [a defendant].'"9  United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 
180, 187 (1984) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 
(1972)); State v. Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d 219, 226, 548 N.W.2d 69 
(1996) (concluding that the Article I, Section 7 right to 
                                                 
9 Cf., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
10 
 
counsel does not create a right different from the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel).   
¶16 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to all 
"critical stages" of the criminal proceedings, including the 
period prior to trial.  United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 
227-28 (1967).  This is particularly important because pretrial 
proceedings "'might well settle the accused's fate and reduce 
the trial itself to a mere formality.'"  Moulton, 474 U.S. at 
170 (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 224).  As a general rule, "[t]he 
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment arises after 
adversary 
judicial 
proceedings 
have 
been 
initiated——in 
Wisconsin, by the filing of a criminal complaint or the issuance 
of an arrest warrant."  Dagnall, 236 Wis. 2d 339, ¶30.  Once a 
criminal complaint or an arrest warrant has been issued, the 
right to counsel attaches.  Id., ¶32.   
¶17 Prior to charging, the right to counsel during in-
custody police questioning is afforded under the Fifth Amendment 
and Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Both 
the Supreme Court and this court have held that under the Fifth 
Amendment, 
a 
suspect must unequivocally and unambiguously 
request counsel before police are required to cease questioning.  
See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994); State v. 
Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶44, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142.10   
                                                 
10 Jennings also addressed Article I, Section 8 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution and chose to interpret it consistent with 
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.  State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶40 
& n.8, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142. 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
11 
 
¶18 As with the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel that has attached with the 
filing of a criminal complaint or the issuance of an arrest 
warrant is not automatically invoked when such a defendant is 
questioned by the police.  Consequently, police questioning of a 
charged defendant is not automatically prohibited.  Rather, to 
have a valid claim that one's constitutional rights have been 
violated, a charged defendant must show that he invoked his 
right to counsel.  McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175-79 
(1991).   
¶19 Dagnall described some circumstances under which a 
charged defendant may invoke his right to counsel.11  In Dagnall, 
the Dane County District Attorney's office issued a criminal 
complaint charging Dagnall with homicide.  Dagnall, 236 Wis. 2d 
339, ¶5.  Shortly thereafter, Dagnall was arrested in Florida.  
Id.   
¶20 On the same day that Dagnall was arrested, Attorney 
James H. Conners delivered a letter to the Dane County Sheriff's 
Department informing them that he had been retained to represent 
Dagnall on the pending charges, and that he did not want Dagnall 
questioned by anyone about the homicide.  Id., ¶6.  The next day 
                                                 
11 In Dagnall, the issue of whether Dagnall had invoked his 
right to counsel under the Wisconsin Constitution was not raised 
and therefore, this court did not directly address it.  But 
rather, Dagnall interpreted the law relative to a charged 
defendant 
through 
reference 
to 
past 
Sixth 
Amendment 
interpretations.  State v. Dagnall, 2000 WI 82, ¶28 n.7, 236 
Wis. 2d 339, 612 N.W.2d 680. 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
12 
 
two detectives from Dane County went to Florida and questioned 
Dagnall.  Id., ¶7.  They questioned him on three separate 
occasions in which Dagnall made incriminating statements.12  Id., 
¶¶10-13.  While talking with the detectives, Dagnall mentioned 
his attorney more than once.  First, prior to questioning, he 
told the detectives, "My lawyer told me that I shouldn't talk to 
you guys."  Id., ¶9.  While being transported to the Dane County 
jail, he also told the detectives that his lawyer "would be mad 
at him for speaking" to them.  Id., ¶13.  Finally, when the 
detectives approached Dagnall at the Dane County jail, Dagnall 
asked whether Attorney Conners knew Dagnall was back in town and 
when the detectives said that they did not know, the officers 
recalled that Dagnall said that "it would probably be best to 
have his attorney present."  Id., ¶14.  The detectives ceased 
all questioning at that point.  Id.   
¶21 As part of our discussion in Dagnall, we reviewed the 
modes by which an accused may invoke his right to counsel, 
thereby mandating the cessation of questioning by the police.  
After thorough consideration of Supreme Court precedent, we 
concluded "that a charged defendant in custody who does not have 
counsel must invoke, assert, or exercise the right to counsel to 
prevent interrogation."  Id., ¶48.  We went on, however, to 
distinguish a criminal defendant who has an attorney:  "We do 
not, however, . . . require an accused defendant who has an 
                                                 
12 The detectives read Dagnall his Miranda warnings on each 
occasion before they questioned him.  Id., ¶¶10, 12.  
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
13 
 
attorney for the crime charged to show the same diligence as a 
defendant without an attorney."  Id., ¶49.  We summarized the 
rule as follows: 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach 
until the initiation of criminal charges.  It then 
attaches for those specific charges.  The right must 
be "invoked" by the accused to terminate police 
questioning before an attorney has been retained 
. . . .  
After an attorney represents the defendant on 
particular charges, the accused may not be questioned 
about the crimes charged in the absence of an 
attorney.  The authorities must assume that the 
accused does not intend to waive the constitutionally 
guaranteed right to the assistance of counsel.   
Id., ¶¶52-53.   
¶22 We clarified that the right to counsel was not 
violated when a represented defendant makes an "unguarded 
outburst" or himself initiates the contact with the police.  
Id., ¶54.  Moreover, we pointed out that an additional 
consideration in this analysis is whether the police have 
knowledge that the accused has obtained representation.  Id., 
¶51.  We explained that "[t]o require an accused person to 
assert the right to counsel after the accused has counsel would 
invite the government to embark on a persistent campaign of 
overtures and blandishments to induce the accused into giving up 
his rights."  Id., ¶59.   
¶23 The question of whether an accused defendant actually 
invoked his right to counsel was addressed in Smith v. Illinois, 
469 U.S. 91 (1984).  There, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
defendant's statement "I'd like to do that[,]" upon being told 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
14 
 
that he had the right have an attorney present, was sufficient 
to invoke the right to counsel.  Id. at 96.  The Court explained 
that nothing in Smith's invocation "reasonably would have 
suggested equivocation."  Id. at 97.  The Court also concluded 
that statements made after Smith's invocation of his right to 
counsel could not be used to defeat that right once it was 
invoked.  Id.   
¶24 As the Court explained by quoting the trial court, "a 
statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel or 
it is not."  Id. at 97-98 (brackets omitted).  In Davis, the 
Court relied on the reasoning of Smith to "determine whether 
[an] accused actually invoked his right to counsel."  Davis, 512 
U.S. at 458 (quoting Smith, 469 U.S. at 95).  The Supreme Court 
explained that whether a defendant has invoked his right to 
counsel is an "objective inquiry."  Id. at 458-59.  The Court 
noted that such an objective inquiry "'requires, at a minimum, 
some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an 
expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.'"  Id. 
(quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178).  
¶25 The Court in Smith also discussed the difference 
between invoking the right to counsel and the waiver of that 
right, concluding that "a valid waiver 'cannot be established by 
showing only that [the accused] responded to further police-
initiated custodial interrogation.'"  Smith, 469 U.S. at 98 
(quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981)).   
¶26 A charged defendant may invoke his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel at an extradition proceeding, even though it is 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
15 
 
a separate proceeding from the criminal action for which 
extradition is sought.  See People v. Maust, 576 N.E.2d 965, 971 
(Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1991) (concluding that Maust invoked his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel for pending charges when he 
requested counsel during a hearing where he waived formal 
extradition); see also State v. March, 2011 WL 332327, at *25 
(Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2011) (concluding that March invoked 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by retaining counsel before 
he was returned from California to Tennessee).   
b.  The effect of Montejo 
¶27 The State now urges that we overrule Dagnall's 
conclusion that the waiver of the right to counsel by a charged 
defendant who has affirmatively invoked his right to counsel by 
securing the services of an attorney for the crimes charged is 
invalid unless the defendant initiates the contact with the 
police.  The State's argument is based on the 2009 Supreme Court 
decision in Montejo; however, Montejo does not require the 
result that the State seeks.  Montejo decided only that courts 
need not "presume that such a waiver is invalid under certain 
circumstances."  Montejo, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S. Ct. at 2085.  
The "certain circumstances" of Montejo were a charged defendant 
for whom the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached and 
who was represented.  However, the Court concluded that it 
should not presume that Montejo had actually invoked his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, simply from the fact that he was 
represented.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case 
to the trial court to determine whether Montejo had actually 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
16 
 
invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel such that the 
protections of Edwards would apply.  Id. at 2091-92. 
¶28 Montejo was charged with first-degree murder and at 
his 72-hour hearing, the Louisiana trial court ordered the 
Office of Indigent Defender to represent him.  Id. at 2082.  
Montejo did not affirmatively request and retain counsel for the 
crimes charged.  That same day, two police detectives took 
Montejo on an "excursion" to help them locate the murder weapon.  
Id.   
¶29 While the exact details were disputed, at some point 
during the excursion, the police convinced Montejo to write an 
inculpatory letter of apology to the widow of the victim.  Id.  
Prior to writing the letter, Montejo was read his Miranda 
warnings.  Id.  At trial, the letter was introduced over 
Montejo's objection.  Id.   
¶30 On appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, Montejo 
argued that admission of the letter into evidence was a 
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the 
Office of Indigent Defender had been ordered to represent him; 
therefore, he was represented when the police initiated contact 
with him.  Id. at 2082-83.  He based his argument on the rule of 
Jackson.  Jackson held that "if police initiate interrogation 
after a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar 
proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
17 
 
defendant's 
right 
to 
counsel 
for 
that 
police-initiated 
interrogation is invalid."  Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636.13  
¶31 The 
Louisiana 
Supreme 
Court 
rejected 
Montejo's 
argument, reasoning that the Jackson rule is not triggered 
"unless and until the defendant has actually requested a lawyer 
or has otherwise asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel."  
Montejo, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S. Ct. at 2083.  Since the 
Louisiana trial court ordered that the Office of Indigent 
Defender represent Montejo at the 72-hour hearing, and Montejo 
did not request counsel himself, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
held that Montejo never "actually requested a lawyer."  Id.  
¶32 Montejo appealed to the United States Supreme Court.  
The 
Supreme 
Court 
first 
rejected 
the 
Louisiana 
court's 
interpretation of the Jackson rule.  Id. at 2083-84.  The Court 
pointed out the varying practices throughout the states, noting 
that "[i]n some two dozen [states], the appointment of counsel 
is automatic upon a finding of indigency; and in a number of 
others, appointment can be made either upon the defendant's 
request or sua sponte by the court."  Id. at 2083 (citations 
                                                 
13 The Jackson case consolidated the cases of two separate 
defendants 
in 
two 
separate 
crimes, 
defendant 
Bladel 
and 
defendant Jackson.  Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986).  
Both defendants expressly requested appointment of counsel at 
their arraignments because they were indigent.  Id. at 627-28.  
Detectives 
involved 
in each respective investigation were 
present at the arraignments and aware of the requests.  Id.  
Nonetheless, in each instance, before the defendant was provided 
an opportunity to consult with counsel, police initiated further 
interrogations in which they obtained incriminating statements. 
Id.  Both defendants were read Miranda warnings before they made 
any statements.  Id. 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
18 
 
omitted).  The Court noted that nothing in Jackson indicated 
that the Court was aware that some states do not require 
indigent defendants to assert their right to counsel prior to 
appointment, and, therefore, nothing in Jackson indicated how 
the Jackson rule would apply to such states.  Id. at 2083-84.  
The Court explained: 
The Louisiana Supreme Court's answer to that 
unresolved question is troublesome.  The central 
distinction it draws——between defendants who "assert" 
their right to counsel and those who do not——is 
exceedingly hazy when applied to States that appoint 
counsel absent request from the defendant. . . .  How 
does one affirmatively accept counsel appointed by 
court order?  An indigent defendant has no right to 
choose his counsel, so it is hard to imagine what his 
"acceptance" would look like, beyond the passive 
silence that Montejo exhibited. 
Id. at 2084 (internal citation omitted).   
¶33 After rejecting the Louisiana court's interpretation 
of Jackson, the Court in Montejo discussed the viability of the 
Jackson rule with regard to appointed counsel by reaffirming 
those principles that it sought not to disturb.  First, the 
Court noted that "once the adversary judicial process has been 
initiated, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right 
to have counsel present at all 'critical' stages of the criminal 
proceedings."  Id. at 2085 (citing Wade, 388 U.S. at 227-28).  
Second, the Court confirmed that "[i]nterrogation by the State 
is such a stage."  Id. (citing Massiah v. United States, 377 
U.S. 201, 204-05 (1964)).  Third, the Court pointed out that the 
"Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be waived by a defendant, 
so long as relinquishment of the right is voluntary, knowing, 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
19 
 
and intelligent."  Id. (citing Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 
285, 292 n.4 (1988)).  Fourth, the Court reaffirmed the anti-
badgering protections afforded by Edwards.  
¶34 The court then noted that the "only question raised by 
this case, and the only one addressed by the Jackson rule, is 
whether courts must presume that such a waiver is invalid under 
certain circumstances."  Id.  The "certain circumstances" 
referenced in the Court's framing of the issue in Montejo were a 
charged defendant for whom counsel had been appointed by the 
court, but for whom the Supreme Court could not determine 
whether he had actually invoked his right to counsel and the 
protections that would then flow from Edwards.  Accordingly, the 
Court remanded the case to determine whether the "protections 
already provided by Edwards" apply.  Id. at 2091-92.   
¶35 The Montejo decision did not conclude that a charged 
defendant who has affirmatively invoked his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel by retaining and receiving the services of a 
lawyer for the offenses charged must "re-invoke" his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel every time law enforcement attempts 
to interrogate him.  To the contrary, the Court cited Massiah 
with approval, wherein the Court concluded that eliciting 
testimony of a defendant who has appeared in court with counsel 
retained 
for 
the 
pending 
charges 
was 
violative 
of 
the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.  Id. at 2085; Massiah, 377 
U.S. at 206-07. 
¶36 The Court in Montejo examined the origins of the 
Jackson rule.  It highlighted that the Jackson rule was created 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
20 
 
by analogy to the Fifth Amendment presumptive rule created in 
Edwards.  The presumptive rule in Edwards mandates that under 
the Fifth Amendment,  
when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel 
present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver 
of that right cannot be established by showing only 
that 
he 
responded 
to 
further 
police-initiated 
custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of 
his rights.  We further hold that an accused . . .  
having expressed his desire to deal with the police 
only through counsel, is not subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has 
been made available to him, unless the accused himself 
initiates 
further 
communication, 
exchanges, 
or 
conversations with the police.   
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.  Montejo explained that the purpose 
of the Edwards rule was to "'prevent police from badgering a 
defendant into waiving his previously asserted [] rights.'"  
Montejo, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S. Ct. at 2085 (quoting Michigan 
v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)).  Accordingly, it reasoned 
that the same rationale drives the Jackson rule in the Sixth 
Amendment context.14  Id. at 2086.  "Edwards and Jackson are 
meant to prevent police from badgering defendants into changing 
their minds about their rights, but a defendant who never asked 
for counsel has not yet made up his mind in the first instance."  
Id. at 2087.  
                                                 
14 The dissent disagreed, arguing that the purpose of the 
Jackson rule was to preserve the "unique protections afforded to 
the 
attorney-client 
relationship by the Sixth Amendment."  
Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2096 (2009) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).    
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
21 
 
¶37 The Court first concluded that not requiring the 
invocation of the right to counsel by a defendant in order to 
trigger the Jackson presumption, while consistent with the 
holding in Jackson, was unworkable in the many states that 
appoint counsel to indigent defendants without requiring an 
express request.  Id. at 2088.  Based in part on its 
determination 
that 
Jackson 
was 
unworkable, 
and 
that 
the 
protections the Court believed that Jackson provided were 
already afforded by Edwards for defendants who personally had 
retained and received the services of a lawyer for the crimes 
charged, the Court eliminated the presumptive rule of Jackson.  
Id. at 2091.   
¶38 The Court did not change the rule of law set out in 
Massiah that holds that a charged defendant who has secured and 
received representation of counsel for the pending charges has 
invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, thereby preventing 
the subsequent eliciting of statements by the defendant without 
the presence of counsel.  Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206 (concluding 
that Massiah was denied the "basic protections of [the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel] when there was used against him at 
his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal 
agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been 
indicted and in the absence of his counsel.")  The Court also 
reaffirmed the proscription of police badgering a defendant to 
change his mind about his invocation of the right to counsel 
made before police questioning began.  Montejo, 556 U.S. at ___, 
129 S. Ct. at 2085-87.  
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
22 
 
¶39 Here, Forbush invoked his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel while in custody in Michigan.  He contacted Attorney 
Forbush and requested that Attorney Forbush represent him with 
regard to pending charges, and Attorney Forbush did so.  The 
Sixth Amendment's objective standard for determining whether the 
right to counsel was invoked is fully satisfied by Forbush 
appearing in Michigan with the attorney that he retained.  See 
Davis, 512 U.S. at 459.  There is nothing in the record to show 
that his invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was 
equivocal or that he did not request that Attorney Forbush 
assist him with the pending charges.  That Forbush's first 
appearance with counsel was at an extradition hearing where he 
waived formal extradition proceedings does not diminish the fact 
that he was then a charged defendant and that the attorney who 
represented him was his brother, an attorney whom he retained.  
Id.; Maust, 576 N.E.2d at 971.   
¶40 In some respects, Forbush's circumstances are similar 
to those in Massiah, in that Massiah had appeared on pending 
charges with a lawyer and pleaded not guilty.  Massiah, 377 U.S. 
at 
201. 
 
When 
law 
enforcement 
succeeded 
in 
obtaining 
incriminating 
statements from him through an intermediary 
outside the presence of counsel, the Supreme Court held 
Massiah's statements inadmissible as violative of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  Id. at 205-06.  Here, Forbush's 
statements were made after he had invoked his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel by his appearance in Michigan with an attorney 
when 
these 
charges 
were 
pending. 
 
The 
Sixth 
Amendment 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
23 
 
circumstances presented by the facts of this case are not the 
"certain circumstances" addressed in Montejo where there was no 
determination that Montejo had invoked his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel.15   
c.  Wisconsin law 
¶41 In regard to the protections afforded defendants in 
criminal proceedings, one interpretation of Forbush's argument 
is that he is not asking us to create a new interpretation of 
Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution in order to 
expand its protections beyond those afforded by the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Rather, Forbush 
may be asking us to maintain our past interpretations of Article 
I, Section 7.  In order to address this argument, I review past 
interpretations of Article I, Section 7 that we have applied in 
cases where an accused's right to counsel is at issue. 
                                                 
15 Justice Crooks' dissent is based on the unstated, but 
faulty, premise that Forbush did not invoke his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel by his appearance in Michigan with an attorney 
when these charges were pending.  However, there is no 
reasonable view of the record before us under which one could 
conclude that Forbush by his unequivocal conduct did not then 
invoke his Sixth Amendment right to counsel for these charges.  
See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 201-02 (1964); Davis 
v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1994); Smith v. 
Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1984).  He appeared in Michigan 
after he had been charged and he appeared with an attorney who 
is his brother.  Scott Forbush was not an attorney selected by 
someone else.  If the dissent were to admit that Forbush invoked 
his right to counsel, all of the dissent's arguments fall away.  
Accordingly, I understand why the dissent has not applied the 
objective test to the record before us, as is required by the 
Supreme Court; however, it is important for the reader to 
understand the tactic the dissent has chosen, as well.   
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
24 
 
¶42 Prior to Montejo, we held that "[t]he right to the 
assistance of counsel is necessary to ensure that a criminal 
defendant receives a fair trial. . . .  A criminal defendant in 
Wisconsin is guaranteed this fundamental right to the assistance 
of counsel for his defense by both Article I, § 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution."  State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 201-
02, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997) (footnotes omitted).  In State v. 
Polak, 2002 WI App 120, 254 Wis. 2d 585, 646 N.W.2d 845, the 
court of appeals explained that "[t]he scope, extent and 
interpretation of the right to assistance of counsel is 
identical under both the Wisconsin and the United States 
Constitutions."  Id., ¶8.  Both Klessig and Polak arose after 
the defendants had asked for and were given the right of self-
representation.  However, the language that the courts used in 
reasoning through to their conclusions broadly described the 
parallel between the rights then guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment and those guaranteed by Article I, Section 7.  
¶43 In the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, we also have concluded that Article I, Section 7's right 
to counsel is the same as what we then understood to have been 
provided by the Sixth Amendment.  Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d at 226.  
Furthermore, our previous interpretations of the right to 
counsel in Wisconsin are consistent with the constitutional 
history of Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Although, records from the Wisconsin constitutional conventions 
do not contain informative debate about the right to counsel in 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
25 
 
Article I, Section 7,16 cases decided near the time the 
Constitution was enacted are instructive.  In 1859, in Carpenter 
v. County of Dane, we concluded that a prosecuting county was 
responsible for the cost of attorneys court-appointed to defend 
indigent defendants.  Carpenter v. Cnty. of Dane, 9 Wis. 249, 
250 (1859).  We relied on Article I, Section 7, when we 
reasoned:  
It is true, we find no express provision of law 
declaring that the county shall pay for services 
rendered by an attorney appointed by the court, in 
defending a person on trial for a criminal offense; 
and 
yet, 
it 
would 
be 
a 
reproach 
upon 
the 
administration of justice, if a person, thus upon 
trial, could not have the assistance of legal counsel 
because he was too poor to secure it. 
Id. at 250-51.  We highlighted the significance of the right to 
counsel in Wisconsin: 
Now, is the right to meet the witnesses face to face, 
and 
to 
have 
compulsory 
process 
to 
compel 
the 
attendance of unwilling witnesses, more important, or 
more valuable to a person in [jeopardy] of life or 
liberty, than the privilege of having the benefit of 
the talents and assistance of counsel in examining the 
witnesses, or making his defense before the jury? And 
would it not be a little like mockery to secure to a 
pauper these solemn constitutional guaranties for a 
                                                 
16 The Wisconsin Constitution was adopted in 1848.  There 
were two constitutional conventions, one in 1846 and 1847-48.  
State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 235 n.11, 580 N.W.2d 171 
(1998).  Review of the debates indicates that on January 22, 
1848, 
the 
committee 
on 
revision 
and 
arrangement 
of 
the 
Declaration of Rights changed the Article I, Section 7 right to 
counsel from "the accused hath a right to be heard by himself 
and counsel" to "the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard 
by himself and counsel."  Milo M. Quaife, The Attainment of 
Statehood 714 (1928).  This is not instructive for our 
construction of Article I, Section 7. 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
26 
 
fair and full trial of the matters with which he was 
charged, and yet say to him when on trial, that he 
must employ his own counsel, who could alone render 
these guaranties of any real permanent value to him. 
Id. at 251.  We recognized the importance of having a robust 
right to counsel under Article I, Section 7, and that to be 
effective, this right must include the right to have the expense 
of counsel for indigent defendants covered by the State.  
¶44 The import of the discussion of the right to counsel 
under Article I, Section 7 in Carpenter increases given that the 
opinion was authored by Justice Orsamus Cole.  Justice Cole was 
the 
Grant 
County 
delegate 
to 
the 
1848 
constitutional 
convention.17  Justice Cole, consequently, had considerable 
insight into the intent of the framers.  Cf. State v. Hansford, 
219 Wis. 2d 226, 238-39 (1998) (explaining that an 1852 case 
that held a right to a 12-person jury under the Wisconsin 
Constitution was "particularly significant" given that one of 
the justices on the unanimous court, although not the author of 
the opinion, was a delegate to the 1847-48 convention).  
¶45 In addition to this early history of the right to 
counsel under Article I, Section 7, careful consideration of 
underlying constitutional policy supportive of this provision 
has led us to vigorously protect an accused's right to counsel.  
The above-cited language from early cases such as Carpenter 
demonstrates that the long-standing principles relating to the 
                                                 
17 Supreme 
Court 
Justices, 
Wisconsin 
Court 
System, 
http://wicourts.gov/about/judges/supreme/retired/cole.htm 
(last 
visited Apr. 18, 2011). 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
27 
 
right to counsel are among the most important in protecting an 
accused.  For example, Carpenter pointed out how it would be 
nothing short of "mockery" to afford the accused the right to 
compel and confront witnesses, while not providing counsel to 
assist him.  Carpenter, 9 Wis. at 251.  Moreover, in County of 
Dane v. Smith, 13 Wis. 654 (1861), we explained that the 
defendant and the prosecution are inherently adverse, and stated 
that it would be "unsafe and hazardous" for the accused to 
proceed without counsel.  Id. at 656-57. 
¶46 We repeatedly have expressed similar constitutional 
rationales relating to the issues presented today.  First, 
regarding a defendant's right to the cessation of questioning 
once he has been formally charged and is represented by counsel, 
we explained, by comparing the differences in the wording of the 
Sixth Amendment and Fifth Amendment right to counsel, that:  
[t]he Sixth Amendment right to "Assistance of Counsel" 
is provided explicitly in the text of the Amendment 
and is designed to assist the "accused" with his or 
her "defence."  The Fifth Amendment right to counsel 
is not expressly provided.  It is a right that exists 
by implication, a prophylactic devised by courts to 
protect a person's right, in a criminal case, not to 
incriminate himself or herself involuntarily.  
Dagnall, 236 Wis. 2d 339, ¶31.  We explained that once the 
accused has requested and retained counsel, "'a distinct set of 
constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of 
the attorney-client relationship takes effect.'"  Id., ¶49 
(quoting Patterson, 487 U.S. at 290 n.3).   
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
28 
 
¶47 The 
constitutional 
policy 
underlying 
the 
Dagnall 
holding emphasizes that once a defendant moves from a "suspect" 
to an "accused," i.e., once a person has been formally charged, 
his or her right to counsel attaches.  And in Dagnall, the 
defendant had affirmatively invoked his right to counsel by 
retaining and receiving the services of counsel.  The strong 
constitutional protections under both the federal and state 
constitutions for an accused in the circumstances attendant to 
our Dagnall decision are logical given the competing interests 
at stake at that point in a prosecution.  That is, the State 
seeks to obtain a confession from the accused while the accused 
has an interest in guarding against the powers of the State that 
are focused on convicting him.  Moreover, much of the State's 
investigation will be completed by the time the State formally 
charges a defendant, and therefore, protections for an accused 
do not unduly hinder the State's ability to investigate crimes. 
¶48 In Dagnall, we also relied on the important policy 
rationale behind preserving the attorney-client relationship.  
This is a consideration separate and apart from other reasons 
for the principles we explained.  Indeed, "the confidence and 
trust 
underlying 
the 
attorney-client 
relationship 
are 
foundational to the practice of law and deeply rooted in our law 
and Professional Rules."  Sands v. Menard, Inc., 2010 WI 96, 
¶53, 328 Wis. 2d 647, 787 N.W.2d 384.   
¶49 In Sparkman v. State, 27 Wis. 2d 92, 133 N.W.2d 776 
(1965), we addressed whether a defendant had a right to 
appointed counsel at or prior to a preliminary hearing, as a 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
29 
 
matter of public policy.  Sparkman claimed a violation of his 
right to counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Id. at 97.  For a variety of reasons, we did not 
reach the constitutional questions presented.  However, we 
concluded that counsel was required to be appointed for 
"compelling reasons," such as assisting in preserving the 
constitutional 
right 
to 
a 
fair 
trial, 
avoiding 
adverse 
psychological 
factors 
for 
the 
defendant, 
preparing 
and 
conducting the cross-examination of government witnesses and 
preserving testimony.  Id. at 99-100.  In so concluding, we said 
that the court's "power and duty were based on common law and 
supported by arguments from the various provisions of sec. 7, 
art. I."  Id. at 98.  
¶50 In Dagnall and many other cases cited above, we 
affirmed the rights that we concluded charged defendants require 
for 
fair 
trials. 
 I now conclude that the fundamental 
constitutional principles underlying those decisions are just as 
compelling today as we held them to be in the past.  Therefore, 
they continue to be sound policy for Wisconsin that assures 
defendants fair trials.  
¶51 In 
sum, 
I 
affirm 
the 
reasoning 
of 
Dagnall 
as 
controlling on the issue of the right to counsel for a defendant 
who has affirmatively invoked his right to counsel by requesting 
and receiving the services of counsel for pending charges.  I 
agree with the State that Montejo did modify Dagnall such that 
there is no presumption of a Sixth Amendment violation due to 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
30 
 
police interrogation of a represented defendant when the 
"certain circumstances" of defendant match those of defendant-
Montejo.  I now apply these standards to the case at hand.   
C.  Application 
¶52 At the September 8, 2008 motion hearing, the parties 
stipulated that Forbush was represented by counsel at the time 
Norlander initiated questioning.  This stipulation is consistent 
with Massiah, Davis and Smith.  Stated otherwise, applying an 
objective standard to determine whether Forbush actually invoked 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by this representation to 
which 
the 
State 
has 
stipulated, 
requires 
the 
reasonable 
conclusion that he did invoke his right to counsel.18   
¶53 The parties did not stipulate to whether Norlander 
knew Forbush was represented.  However, the circuit court made a 
finding of fact that authorities knew Forbush had retained 
counsel.  This finding is not clearly erroneous.19 
¶54 In this regard, I reaffirm that authorities must not 
avoid discovering whether an accused has invoked his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  Dagnall, 236 Wis. 2d 339, ¶51.  The 
                                                 
18 Justice Crooks' dissent asserts that the stipulation 
gives no support to the conclusion that Forbush invoked his 
right to counsel.  Justice Crooks' dissent, ¶130.  However, I 
conclude that the continuation of legal representation in 
Wisconsin that Forbush began by personally retaining an attorney 
in Michigan, leads to the reasonable conclusion that Forbush 
invoked his Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 7 rights to 
counsel. 
19 Norlander testified that he had reviewed Detective 
Weber's report prior to questioning Forbush and Detective Weber 
had been in contact with Scott Forbush, Forbush's attorney. 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
31 
 
circuit court concluded that, "In those circumstances where it's 
known that there has been an attorney and when it's been advised 
to the DA's Office that there is an attorney, I think it's 
incumbent on the officers doing the interview to at least ask if 
there is an attorney representing that defendant.  And that 
wasn't done."   
¶55 I agree with the circuit court's reasoning.  Under the 
undisputed facts herein presented, Forbush affirmatively invoked 
his Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 7 rights to counsel 
by retaining and receiving the services of counsel for the 
crimes 
charged, 
and 
law 
enforcement 
was 
aware 
of 
that 
representation 
when 
Norlander 
began 
to 
question 
Forbush.  
Accordingly, Norlander's questioning violated Forbush's right to 
counsel afforded by the Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 7 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, from its inception; the circuit 
court's suppression of Forbush's statements to Norlander was 
required due to the violation of Forbush's constitutional 
rights.  Nothing in Montejo disturbs Edwards absolute bar to 
questioning a defendant who has invoked his right to counsel.  
Accordingly, Montejo is not applicable to the constitutional 
analysis applicable after Forbush affirmatively invoked the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel by retaining and receiving the 
services of an attorney.20  
                                                 
20 The reader should note that this is not a waiver case, 
i.e., the question presented is not whether Forbush waived his 
right to counsel during Norlander's interrogation.  This is an 
invocation case, i.e., the question presented is whether Forbush 
invoked his Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 7 rights to 
counsel. 
No. 
2008AP3007-CR   
 
32 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶56 I 
conclude 
that 
in 
the 
factual 
context 
herein 
presented, Montejo does not sanction the interrogation that 
occurred.  We so conclude because Forbush's right to counsel 
under the federal or state constitution had attached and was 
invoked affirmatively by Forbush before the investigator's 
questioning was initiated.  I also conclude that the circuit 
court's finding that the investigator knew Forbush had secured 
legal counsel for the pending charges is not clearly erroneous.  
Furthermore, Forbush was not required to "re-invoke" his right 
to 
counsel when the investigator initiated interrogation.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
affirm the suppression order of the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶57 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  Because 
Justice Roggensack's opinion appears as the first opinion in 
print and electronic publications and inconsistently employs the 
words "we" and "us" (incorrectly in many instances, inasmuch as 
no justice is joining her opinion), it is important to clarify 
the precedential value of Justice Roggensack's opinion.  It has 
none.  See Justice Roggensack's op., ¶2, n.3 (explaining that 
four justices agree to reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals, although they do not agree on the rationale). 
¶58 I agree to some extent with the writings of both 
Justice Roggensack and Justice Crooks.  I agree with Justice 
Roggensack's bottom line that Forbush's right to counsel was 
violated and that Forbush's statements must be suppressed.  I 
agree with Justice Crooks's criticism of Justice Roggensack's 
reasoning regarding Wisconsin law and Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 
U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).1  Justice Roggensack does not 
                                                 
1 Justice Roggensack, in an obfuscated attempt to avoid 
interpreting 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
rests 
on 
an 
interpretation of Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 
2079 
(2009). 
 
I 
agree 
with 
Justice 
Crooks 
that 
her 
interpretation lacks foundation in the text of the decision.  
I further agree with Justice Crooks's dissent that a 
determination of an accused's constitutional rights is tethered 
to 
the 
text 
of 
a 
constitution, 
not 
to 
"fundamental 
constitutional 
principles" 
or 
"sound 
policy" 
as 
Justice 
Roggensack asserts in ¶¶44-49.  There is neither support for, 
nor a need for, the concoction of constitutional principles and 
policy unmoored from the solemn constitutional guaranties the 
people of Wisconsin ensured for themselves.  See Justice 
Roggensack's opinion, ¶¶44-49. 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
forthrightly rest her decision on the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Instead, Justice Roggensack vacillates between resting on the 
Wisconsin Constitution, on constitutional interpretation in the 
case law, and nebulous concepts of "fundamental constitutional 
principles" and "sound policy" derived from the Wisconsin 
Constitution and our case law.2   
¶59 I 
conclude 
that 
Forbush's 
right 
to 
counsel 
is 
appropriately tethered to the Wisconsin Constitution.     
¶60 I 
conclude 
that 
Forbush's 
right 
to 
counsel 
is 
protected 
under 
Article 
I, 
Section 
7 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, which provides:  "In all criminal prosecutions the 
                                                                                                                                                             
In 
avoiding 
interpreting 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
Justice Roggensack rests on unmoored principles of public 
policy.  It has been observed that public policy "is a very 
unruly horse, and once you get astride it you never know where 
it will carry you.  It may lead you from sound law."  Richardson 
v. Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824).  I heed that warning 
and avoid riding that unruly horse.  Instead I base this 
concurrence on the Wisconsin Constitution and this Court's long-
standing and cherished tradition of interpreting the Wisconsin 
Constitution to protect an accused's meaningful right to counsel 
to ensure the integrity of our system of justice. 
Justice Roggensack's view that our court's interpretation 
of the federal Constitution in State v. Dagnall, 2000 WI 82, 236 
Wis. 2d 339, 612 N.W.2d 680, is in reality an interpretation of 
the state constitution is erroneous, see Justice Crooks's 
dissent, ¶¶136-137, and contravenes the United States Supreme 
Court's doctrine of "adequate and independent state ground[s]."  
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1035, 1040 (1983).  
2 The interpretation of an accused's right to counsel under 
the Wisconsin Constitution is not based on sound policy or the 
common law unmoored from the constitutional guaranties the 
people of Wisconsin ensured for themselves through the Wisconsin 
constitution. 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and 
counsel . . . ."  
¶61 This case must be understood in the light of two 
decisions——our decision in State v. Dagnall, 2000 WI 82, 236 
Wis. 2d 339, 612 N.W.2d 680, and the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. 
Ct. 2079 (2009)——and in light of Wisconsin constitutional law 
and constitutional history. 
¶62 In Dagnall, this court interpreted the Sixth Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, 
not 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The Dagnall court suppressed a defendant's 
incriminating statements under the Sixth Amendment, concluding 
that a presumption existed that the defendant had invoked his 
right to counsel when (1) the defendant had been charged; (2) 
the defendant had counsel; and (3) law enforcement officers were 
aware that the defendant had counsel.3  Both Forbush and the 
State agree that the well-established law enforcement practice 
in Wisconsin has been to refrain from interrogating charged and 
represented defendants.    
¶63 In Montejo, the United States Supreme Court overruled 
its prior decisions to conclude that the protections of the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
right 
to 
counsel 
are 
equivalent 
to 
the 
protections of an accused's Fifth Amendment right to counsel.  
The Court ruled in Montejo that a defendant who has been charged 
with a crime may waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel so 
                                                 
3 State v. Dagnall, 2000 WI 82, ¶¶52-53, 236 Wis. 2d 339, 
612 N.W.2d 680. 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
long as the relinquishment of the right is voluntary, knowing, 
and intelligent;4 an equivocal request for counsel does not 
constitute a request for counsel under the Sixth Amendment.5   
¶64 The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the Sixth Amendment in Montejo supersedes our interpretation of 
the Sixth Amendment in Dagnall and our previous interpretations 
of the Sixth Amendment.6  "[T]he Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution compels adherence to United States Supreme 
                                                 
4 "The defendant may waive the right whether or not he is 
already represented by counsel; the decision to waive need not 
itself be counseled."  Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085. 
5 Id. 
6 Montejo also effectively overruled State v. Hornung, 229 
Wis. 2d 469, 600 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1999), in which the court 
of appeals determined that strict requirements of "unequivocally 
and unambiguously" asserting the right to counsel, as determined 
under the Fifth Amendment, were not the appropriate requirements 
under the Sixth Amendment.  The Hornung court, relying upon 
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 631-32 (1986), determined 
that greater leeway was afforded a charged defendant in 
asserting the right to counsel. 
This court referred to the Hornung decision in State v. 
Ward, 2009 WI 60, ¶43 n.5, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236, in 
summing up Wisconsin precedent regarding a charged defendant's 
invocation of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.  
In Ward, Justice Crooks, in dissent, lamented the artificial 
line-drawing between the protections of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.  I agree with Justice Crooks that the protections 
for the right of counsel should be same for the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.  Unlike Justice Crooks, I would keep the stronger 
protections rather than drop down to the weaker protections.  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has interpreted the United 
States 
Constitution, 
and 
this 
court 
is 
bound 
by 
that 
determination. 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
Court precedent on matters of federal law, although it means 
deviating from a conflicting decision of this court."7    
¶65 Thus, Forbush concludes that he is foreclosed by the 
Sixth Amendment.  He focuses on the Wisconsin Constitution.  I 
too focus my analysis on the Wisconsin Constitution.  The core 
issue Forbush presents in the instant case is whether Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution requires the suppression 
of the statements he made to Detective Norlander.8  
¶66 Forbush calls our attention to Justice Scalia's 
majority opinion in Montejo, inviting state courts to look to 
their own constitutions.9  Justice Scalia wrote:  "If a State 
wishes to abstain from requesting interviews with represented 
defendants when counsel is not present, it obviously may 
continue to do so."10 
¶67 No invitation from the United States Supreme Court is 
necessary for a state court to abide by its own constitution.  
Wisconsin 
judges 
take 
an 
oath 
to 
support 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The long-standing tradition in this State is to 
protect the rights provided by the fundamental charter between 
Wisconsin and the people of this state.    
                                                 
7 See State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶3, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 
647 N.W.2d 142. 
8 Forbush's Petition for Review at 2; Brief and Appendix of 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner at 1.  
9 Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner at 
23-24. 
10 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089 (emphasis in original). 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶68 State courts have, without question, the power to 
interpret their state constitutions differently than the United 
States Supreme Court has interpreted even parallel, analogous 
federal constitutional provisions.11     
                                                 
11 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
explicitly 
acknowledged this authority on numerous occasions, even going so 
far as offering invitations to state courts to do so on many 
occasions, just as Justice Scalia has in Montejo.  See, e.g., 
Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089 ("If a State wishes to abstain from 
requesting interviews with represented defendants when counsel 
is not present, it obviously may continue to do so" (emphasis in 
original).); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) ("[A] 
State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater 
restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to 
be necessary upon federal constitutional standards" (emphasis in 
original).); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 499 (1977) ("It 
is therefore important to note that the state courts remain 
free, in interpreting state constitutions, to guard against the 
evil 
clearly 
identified 
by 
this 
case.") 
(Marshall, 
J., 
dissenting); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) ("Of 
course, the States are free, pursuant to their own law, to adopt 
a higher standard.").  For other authority stating the same 
proposition of law, see State v. Knapp (Knapp II), 2005 WI 127, 
¶57, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899; id., ¶¶85-86, (Crooks, J., 
concurring). 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has "a long history of 
recognizing the vitality of the Declaration of Rights of the 
Wisconsin Constitution . . . ."  State v. Pallone, 2000 WI 77, 
¶92, 
236 
Wis. 2d 162, 
613 
N.W.2d 568 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting).  See, e.g., Jokosh v. State, 181 Wis. 160, 193 
N.W. 976 (1923); Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 
(1923); State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 
N.W.2d 899; see also John Sundquist, Construction of the 
Wisconsin Constitution——Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 62 
Marq. L. Rev. 531 (1979); Eric Klumb, Comment, The Independent 
Application of State Constitutional Provisions to Questions of 
Criminal Procedure, 62 Marq. L. Rev. 596 (1979); Junaid H. 
Chida, 
Comment, 
Rediscovering 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution:  
Presentation of Constitutional Questions to State Courts, 1983 
Wis. L. Rev. 483.   
No.  2008AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶69 It is axiomatic that a state's highest court is the 
final arbiter of the meaning of the state constitution, subject 
to the rule that a state may not infringe upon protections 
afforded by the federal constitution.  Nearly fifty years ago 
our court explained that when interpreting our Constitution, 
decisions from the United States Supreme Court interpreting 
analogous provisions in the federal Constitution "are eminent 
and highly persuasive, but not controlling, authority . . . ."12   
¶70 This court has explained that it "will not be bound by 
the minimums which are imposed by the Supreme Court of the 
United States if it is the judgment of this court that the 
Constitution of Wisconsin and the laws of this state require 
that greater protection of citizens' liberties ought to be 
afforded."13  Article I, Section 22 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
admonishes:  "The blessings of a free government can only be 
maintained 
by 
a 
firm 
adherence 
to 
justice, 
moderation, 
temperance, frugality and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to 
fundamental principles."   
¶71 Based on our long tradition, I accept Justice Scalia's 
invitation to interpret the protections afforded Forbush under 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  I conclude that under the Wisconsin 
                                                                                                                                                             
For a discussion of other state courts interpreting their 
own constitutions rather than viewing the state constitution as 
a restatement of the federal Constitution, see Knapp II, 285 
Wis. 2d 86, ¶¶87-91 (Crooks, J., concurring). 
12 McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 139, 121 
N.W.2d 545 (1963). 
13 State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 172, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977). 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
Constitution, an accused is afforded the protections this court 
previously described in Dagnall,14 Hornung,15 and Ward16 to be 
attached to the Sixth Amendment.  Applying the holding of 
Dagnall to the Wisconsin Constitution, I conclude that Forbush 
"was not required to invoke the right to counsel in this case 
because he had been formally charged with a crime and counsel 
had been retained to represent him on that charge."17  My 
conclusion is grounded in Wisconsin's long history of protecting 
an accused's meaningful right to counsel, a history dating back 
well before the protections under the Sixth Amendment were 
extended to the people of this State.18         
¶72 In reaching this conclusion I am following the course 
this court took in our recent decision in State v. Knapp, 2005 
WI 127, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899.  The history of Knapp is 
analogous to the history of the present case.  Knapp provides an 
example of this court's interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution 
to afford greater protection to our citizens' liberties than 
that provided under the federal constitution.     
¶73 In State v. Knapp (Knapp I), 2003 WI 121, 265 
Wis. 2d 278, 666 N.W.2d 881, the court interpreted the Fifth 
                                                 
14 State v. Dagnall, 2000 WI 82, 236 Wis. 2d 339, 612 
N.W.2d 680.   
15 Hornung 
v. 
Hornung, 
229 
Wis. 2d 469, 
477-80, 
600 
N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1999).  
16 State v. Ward, 2009 WI 60, ¶43 n.5, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 
N.W.2d 236. 
17 Dagnall, 236 Wis. 2d 339, ¶4. 
18 Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 274 (1859). 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
Amendment of the federal Constitution.  (In Dagnall, this court 
interpreted the Sixth Amendment.)  The Knapp I court concluded 
that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine extended to 
derivative evidence discovered as a result of defendant's 
voluntary statements obtained without Miranda warnings.   
¶74 Thereafter, in United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 
(2004), the United States Supreme Court disagreed with our 
court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment and concluded in a 
plurality opinion that the admission of such derivative evidence 
did not violate the Fifth Amendment.19  The United States Supreme 
Court vacated the Knapp I decision and remanded the case to this 
court.20  (In Montejo the Supreme Court disagreed with our 
court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment in Dagnall.) 
¶75 On remand of Knapp I, this court had to decide in 
Knapp II21 whether to follow the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Patane or stay with Knapp I and hold that the 
physical 
evidence 
obtained 
as 
the 
direct 
result 
of 
an 
intentional 
Miranda 
violation 
should 
be 
suppressed 
as 
a 
violation of Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
                                                 
19 Justices Kennedy and O'Connor concurred in the judgment, 
agreeing with the plurality that admission of nontestimonial 
physical fruits does not run the risk of admitting into trial an 
accused's coerced incriminating statements against himself.  
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 645 (2004). 
20 Wisconsin v. Knapp, 542 U.S. 952 (2004) (vacating this 
court's decision on Fifth Amendment grounds in State v. Knapp 
(Knapp I), 2003 WI 121, 265 Wis. 2d 278, 666 N.W.2d 881). 
21 State v. Knapp (Knapp II), 2005 WI 127, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 
700 N.W.2d 899. 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
(the Fifth Amendment analogue).22  (In the instant case, this 
court has to decide whether to follow the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Montejo or adhere to Dagnall as a matter of 
state constitutional law.)   
¶76 The 
State 
argued 
in 
Knapp 
II 
that 
Patane 
was 
dispositive because neither did Knapp raise violations of, nor 
did this court base its decision in Knapp II on, our state 
constitution's analogue of the Fifth Amendment.  Moreover, the 
State argued that this court had declined in previous cases to 
interpret the Wisconsin Constitution's right against self-
incrimination 
in 
Article 
I, 
Section 
8 
(textually 
almost 
identical to that right in the Fifth Amendment) more broadly 
than the federal constitutional right.23  (The State makes a 
similar argument in the instant case.) 
¶77 On remand in Knapp II, relying upon Wisconsin's long 
and cherished history of providing robust protection for 
individual rights to preserve the integrity of our criminal 
justice system, this court held that the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides greater protections under Article I, Section 8 than are 
afforded under the analogous Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.24  In the present case, I would follow the 
                                                 
22 Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  "No person . . . may be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself or herself."   
23 State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶6, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 
N.W.2d 142. 
24 Knapp II, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶¶79-83. 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
precedent 
set 
forth 
in 
Knapp 
II 
and 
apply 
the 
state 
constitution.  
¶78 Protecting an accused's right to counsel in pre-trial 
interrogation is imperative to protect the trial rights of an 
accused and to enhance the integrity of the fact-finding 
process.  As the United States Supreme Court recognized in 
Miranda:  "Without the protections flowing from adequate warning 
and the rights of counsel, 'all the careful safeguards erected 
around the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or any 
other witness, would become empty formalities in a procedure 
where the most compelling possible evidence of guilt, a 
confession, would have already been obtained at the unsupervised 
pleasure of the police.'  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting).  Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 
(1965)."25 
¶79 I would interpret Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution following the reasoning and conclusions 
set forth in Dagnall and other Wisconsin cases interpreting a 
charged defendant's right to counsel.  In doing so I carry 
forward 
our 
1859 
Carpenter 
decision26 
and 
this 
court's 
longstanding state constitutional law jurisprudence to protect 
an accused's meaningful right to counsel.  
                                                                                                                                                             
See Knapp II, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶2 (reinstating all portions 
of the prior Knapp I decision, 265 Wis. 2d 278, not implicated 
by the United States Supreme Court's order vacating the decision 
in light of United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004)). 
25 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966) (parallel 
citations omitted). 
26 Carpenter v. Doe, 9 Wis. 274 (1859). 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶80 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that the State 
violated Forbush's constitutional right to counsel under Article 
I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The circuit court 
properly suppressed his statements. 
¶81 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion.         
 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.dtp 
1 
 
 
¶82 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  In 2000 the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel in the following circumstances: (1) the defendant had 
been charged with a crime; (2) counsel had been retained to 
represent the accused on that charge; (3) counsel informed law 
enforcement authorities about the representation and admonished 
them not to question the accused about the charge; and (4) both 
the law enforcement officers involved and the accused knew of 
the representation and discussed it.  In these circumstances, 
the law enforcement officers continued to question the accused, 
administering Miranda warnings1 three times, then interrogating 
the accused about the charge.  Each time they elicited 
incriminating information.  The accused later attempted to 
suppress this information.  See State v. Dagnall, 2000 WI 82, 
236 Wis. 2d 339, 612 N.W.2d 680.   
¶83 The Dagnall court did not determine whether the 
accused's statement to the officers——"My lawyer told me that I 
shouldn't talk to you guys"——was sufficient to "invoke" his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel after he received a Miranda 
warning.  Id., ¶¶56-57.  Rather, the court determined that the 
defendant was not required to "invoke" the right of counsel in 
the circumstances presented:   
We hold that Dagnall was not required to invoke 
the right to counsel in this case because he had been 
formally charged with a crime and counsel had been 
retained to represent him on that charge.  Because 
Dagnall 
was 
an 
accused 
person 
under 
the 
Sixth 
                                                 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.dtp 
2 
 
Amendment who had an attorney to represent him on the 
specific crime charged, and because the attorney had 
informed the police of his representation of Dagnall 
and admonished them not to question his client about 
that crime, any subsequent questioning about that 
crime was improper. 
Dagnall, 236 Wis. 2d 339, ¶4. 
¶84 The court added in its conclusion: 
We hold that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
protected Dagnall from police interrogation about the 
homicide once Dagnall was formally charged and once an 
attorney represented him on that charge.  Because the 
detectives went to Florida knowing that counsel had 
been retained on the charge and because Attorney 
Connors had notified authorities that he represented 
Dagnall and did not want Dagnall questioned about the 
homicide, the detectives had no authority to question 
Dagnall about that crime. 
Id., ¶67. 
¶85 The Dagnall decision was this court's attempt to 
synthesize and explain United States Supreme Court decisions on 
the right to counsel, under the Sixth Amendment, as of mid-2000.  
The decision affirmed a unanimous decision of the court of 
appeals, State v. Dagnall, 228 Wis. 2d 495, 596 N.W.2d 482 (Ct. 
App. 
1999), 
that 
concluded 
that 
Dagnall's 
"[m]y 
lawyer" 
statement to the officers——in the wake of Attorney James 
Connors' retention, notice of retention, and admonition to law 
enforcement——effectively invoked Dagnall's right to counsel.  
The court of appeals stated that right-to-counsel invocations by 
accused persons under the Sixth Amendment appeared to be 
afforded "greater leeway" than that given to "uncharged suspects 
(under the Fifth Amendment) during custodial questioning."  Id. 
at 504-05. 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.dtp 
3 
 
¶86 The Dagnall decision did not eliminate the need to 
invoke the right to counsel for "a charged defendant in custody 
who does not have counsel."  Dagnall, 236 Wis. 2d 339, ¶48 
(emphasis added).  The court said that the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel "must be 'invoked' by the accused to terminate police 
questioning before an attorney has been retained or appointed 
for those specific charges," provided that the accused has been 
properly informed of his right to have an attorney and his right 
not to answer questions.  Id., ¶52 (emphasis added). 
¶87 But once a person has been charged and an attorney has 
been retained or appointed for that charge, "an accused who has 
[ ] counsel . . . need not make a 'real request' [an unambiguous 
invocation of the right to counsel] as required by the Fifth 
Amendment."  Id., ¶50. 
¶88 These statements constitute the law of Wisconsin on 
and after July 6, 2000.  They were the law of Wisconsin on May 
16, 2008, when a detective for the Sheboygan County Sheriff's 
Department questioned Brad E. Forbush about the attempted sexual 
assault and false imprisonment charges filed against him eight 
days earlier.  
¶89 On 
May 
8, 
2008, 
the 
Sheboygan 
County 
District 
Attorney's office had charged Forbush with two felonies and 
secured a warrant for his arrest.  On that day, Forbush was 
arrested on the warrant in Michigan.  He thereafter appeared at 
an extradition hearing in a Michigan court where he was 
represented by his brother, Scott Forbush, a Michigan attorney. 
¶90 Forbush waived extradition and was transported to 
Wisconsin on May 15, 2008.  The following morning he was 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.dtp 
4 
 
questioned——after receiving a Miranda warning——by Detective Cory 
Norlander before his scheduled appearance in Sheboygan County 
Circuit Court.   
¶91 There is no dispute that during the week between 
Forbush's arrest in Michigan and his return to Wisconsin, 
someone close to Forbush retained the Mastantuono Law Office to 
represent Forbush on his Wisconsin charges and the Mastantuono 
Law Office immediately notified the Sheboygan County District 
Attorney's office of this representation.  Attorney Rebecca 
Coffee of the Mastantuono Law Office was present for Forbush's 
11 a.m. initial appearance in court on May 16. 
¶92 In short, Forbush's Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
was triggered by the filing of a criminal complaint.  Counsel 
was present for Forbush in Michigan, and counsel was retained 
for Forbush in Wisconsin.  The District Attorney's office was 
promptly notified of Forbush's Wisconsin representation, and 
counsel for Forbush appeared timely for the first court hearing.  
There is simply no basis for disconnecting the facts of this 
case from the clear law established in Dagnall because under the 
law in Dagnall, Forbush was not required to personally, 
unambiguously, and unequivocally "invoke" his right to counsel 
when he spoke to Detective Norlander.   
¶93 Accordingly, 
the 
detective's 
questioning 
was 
not 
proper.  Any incriminating statements obtained from Forbush on 
the morning of May 16 should have been suppressed under then 
controlling Wisconsin law.  The circuit court was correct when 
it applied this law and suppressed Forbush's statements on 
September 19, 2008.   
No.  2008AP3007-CR.dtp 
5 
 
MONTEJO AND GANT 
¶94 In 2009, while the State's appeal was pending in the 
court of appeals, the United States Supreme Court handed down 
two important criminal law decisions: Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 
U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009), and Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 
__, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).   
¶95 In Montejo, the Supreme Court overruled its holding in 
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986), that once the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is asserted, an accused may not 
validly waive that right in a police-initiated custodial 
interrogation.  Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091.  The Court, in an 
opinion by Justice Scalia, conducted a cost-benefit analysis, 
ultimately concluding that the "three layers of prophylaxis" 
outlined by the Court's decisions in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966), Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and 
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990), were sufficient to 
protect the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.  
Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090. 
¶96 In overruling Jackson, the Court undercut many of the 
major 
underpinnings 
of 
Dagnall, 
which 
relied 
heavily 
on 
Jackson's reasoning.  See Dagnall, 236 Wis. 2d 339, ¶¶42, 48.  
The Montejo Court held that where a defendant has been read his 
Miranda rights, is represented by counsel, and waives his 
rights, no presumption of invalidity attaches to the waiver.  
Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085.  As a practical matter, the Court's 
holding in Montejo constricted the rights of criminal defendants 
who have been charged with an offense and are represented on 
that offense. 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.dtp 
6 
 
¶97 The Court implicitly recognized, however, that its 
changed interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
is not the only constitutionally acceptable approach.  "If a 
State 
wishes 
to 
abstain 
from 
requesting 
interviews 
with 
represented defendants when counsel is not present, it obviously 
may continue to do so."  Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089.  In making 
this statement, the Court not only acknowledged the viability of 
other, more protective, procedures in the Sixth Amendment 
context but also belied any interpretation that its Montejo 
ruling must be applied retroactively.   
¶98  The second important criminal case in 2009 was 
Arizona v. Gant.  In Gant, the Court narrowed the search-
incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
requirement.  By clarifying and narrowing the holding in New 
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the Court limited police 
searches of the passenger compartments of motor vehicles to 
situations in which the persons arrested are unsecured and 
within reaching distance of the compartments at the time of the 
search.  Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.   
¶99  Many courts, including courts in Wisconsin, had 
interpreted Belton expansively, see, e.g., State v. Fry, 131 
Wis. 2d 153, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986), and law enforcement officers 
had relied on these rulings in conducting certain automobile 
searches incident to arrest. 
¶100 When this court was confronted with the holding in 
Gant, we immediately accepted the Gant interpretation as 
controlling for future searches but declined to apply the remedy 
of exclusion retroactively to searches conducted prior to Gant.  
No.  2008AP3007-CR.dtp 
7 
 
See State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶¶3-4, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 
N.W.2d 97; State v. Littlejohn, 2010 WI 85, ¶5, 327 Wis. 2d 107, 
786 N.W.2d 123.  We recognized that the search conducted by the 
officers in Dearborn was clearly lawful at the time,2 and 
occurred in reasonable reliance on existing Wisconsin precedent.  
Id., ¶28. 
¶101 Because there was no question that the officers were 
acting in good faith, we applied the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule and declined to apply the remedy of exclusion.  
Id., ¶49.  We noted that in this context, where officers act in 
objectively reasonable reliance on settled precedent later 
deemed unconstitutional, the deterrent benefit of excluding the 
evidence seized would be nonexistent.  Id.   
¶102 In many ways, the Forbush case presents the opposite 
of the good faith reliance exemplified in Dearborn.  When 
Forbush was questioned on the morning of May 16, 2008, he had 
been charged with two crimes and was represented by counsel.  
The law of Wisconsin did not require Forbush to "invoke" his 
right to counsel under these circumstances.  Rather, it 
precluded law enforcement officers from initiating questions to 
the accused about these crimes.  The law in Wisconsin was not 
ambiguous.  The Department of Justice's own training materials 
clearly stated that, under Dagnall, a represented defendant 
charged with a crime need not invoke his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel to prevent police questioning.  Wisconsin Department 
                                                 
2 The search in question occurred on April 9, 2006.  State 
v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶5, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97.  
Arizona v. Gant was argued on October 7, 2008, and decided on 
April 21, 2009. 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.dtp 
8 
 
of Justice, Training and Standards Bureau, The Miranda Primer: A 
Handbook for Law Enforcement (2004).  In a publication written 
specifically for law enforcement, the Department of Justice 
instructed:  
[I]f a suspect who has been charged responds to the 
Miranda warning by making references to an attorney 
even though she does not clearly express a wish for 
counsel, this would likely be considered an assertion 
of the 6th amendment right. . . .  The court jealously 
protects the 6th amendment right to counsel. 
The Miranda Primer, 9 (citing Dagnall, 236 Wis. 2d 339). 
¶103 At the time of Forbush's interrogation, the advent of 
the Montejo ruling was barely a glimmer in Justice Scalia's eye.  
The Supreme Court would not grant certiorari in Montejo until 
almost 
five 
months 
later 
(October 
1, 
2008), 
Montejo 
v. 
Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 30 (2008), and it would not render a 
decision until May 26, 2009.  It is therefore impossible to 
contend, as did the officers in Dearborn, that they acted in 
good faith reliance on existing law. 
¶104  Law enforcement should not be disadvantaged for its 
"objectively reasonable reliance" on settled law.  Dearborn, 327 
Wis. 2d 252, ¶44.  When officers follow "the clear and settled 
precedent of this court," they are doing what officers should 
do.  Id.  Applying the exclusionary rule to these officers 
simply because the "settled" law is subsequently changed would 
not deter misconduct.  Conversely, law enforcement should not be 
rewarded for disregarding settled law in anticipation that 
someday it may be overruled.  Evidence obtained in clear 
violation of the constitutional principles announced by this 
court should be suppressed. 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.dtp 
9 
 
¶105 The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
evolved from a recognition that where law enforcement acts in 
good faith, the purpose of deterrence is not served by 
suppressing reliable evidence.  Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 
349-50 (1987).  The corollary to rewarding good faith is 
sanctioning bad faith.  Applying the exclusionary rule and 
suppressing evidence where law enforcement has not complied with 
constitutional law promotes deterrence.  While this court 
concluded that deterrence was not served by the retroactive 
application of Gant, it is served here.  Ordinarily, law 
enforcement must comply with existing law, even though that law 
is later changed. 
FUTURE CASES 
¶106 The principles stated above should determine the 
outcome of this case and may affect other cases where law 
enforcement officers conducted inappropriate questioning of 
accused defendants before Montejo was decided.  The principles 
stated above do not address the future.  It is, however, 
important to note that the Supreme Court invited the states to 
preserve existing law that police-initiated questioning of 
accused persons charged with crimes and represented by counsel 
is presumed invalid and will lead to exclusion of incriminating 
evidence. 
¶107 The Wisconsin Department of Justice was correct when 
it stated that this court "jealously protects the 6th amendment 
right to counsel."  The Miranda Primer, 9.  As we indicated in 
Dagnall, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel arises after 
adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated by the filing 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.dtp 
10 
 
of a criminal complaint or the issuance of an arrest warrant, 
Dagnall, 
236 
Wis. 2d 339, 
¶30, 
and 
it 
includes 
pretrial 
interrogations after either of these events has occurred, id. 
¶108 Interpreting the cases in 2000, this court said that 
"a charged defendant in custody who does not have counsel must 
invoke, assert, or exercise the right to counsel to prevent 
interrogation."  Id., ¶48. 
¶109 The upshot of Montejo is that a charged defendant in 
custody must invoke, assert, or exercise the right to counsel, 
clearly, to prevent interrogation, even after counsel has been 
hired or appointed, so long as a proper Miranda warning has been 
provided. 
¶110 Justice Scalia acknowledged in Montejo that a "bright-
line rule like that adopted in Jackson ensures that no fruits of 
interrogations made possible by badgering-induced involuntary 
waivers are ever erroneously admitted at trial."  Montejo, 129 
S. Ct. at 2089.  But he discounted the value of such a rule, 
writing: 
[T]he Court has already taken substantial other, 
overlapping measures toward the same end. Under 
Miranda's prophylactic protection of the right against 
compelled self-incrimination, any suspect subject to 
custodial interrogation has the right to have a lawyer 
present if he so requests, and to be advised of that 
right. Under Edwards' prophylactic protection of the 
Miranda right, once such a defendant "has invoked his 
right to have counsel present," interrogation must 
stop. And under Minnick's prophylactic protection of 
the Edwards right, no subsequent interrogation may 
take place until counsel is present, "whether or not 
the accused has consulted with his attorney."  
Id. at 2089-90 (citations omitted). 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.dtp 
11 
 
¶111 According to Justice Scalia, "a defendant who does not 
want to speak to the police without counsel present need only 
say as much when he is first approached and given the Miranda 
warnings."  Id. at 2090. 
¶112 This blueprint for interrogation will inevitably raise 
questions about whether a particular accused's statements "say 
as much" as necessary to terminate interrogation in the absence 
of counsel.  It raises questions about whether an attorney 
present at the jail and demanding to see her client will be 
permitted to confer with the accused unless the accused 
personally asks to confer with his attorney.   
¶113 An accused's waiver of counsel must be knowing and 
intelligent and voluntary, and the state will have the burden of 
showing all three in every case.  This is significant when we 
acknowledge that not all defendants are equal in their capacity 
to understand and appreciate their rights, and not all post-
Miranda admissions will automatically pass muster. 
¶114 Whether rights afforded by the Sixth Amendment will 
require additional protection in this state remains to be 
determined. 
¶115 The law is ever changing.  At first glance, Montejo 
presents a dramatic shift in direction for Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  If there is anything to be learned from a study 
of constitutional law, however, it is that even the most 
momentous decisions rarely escape some refinement over time.  
The Court's holding in Belton was perceived to be very broad 
when it was issued, but the decision was not clarified and 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.dtp 
12 
 
narrowed until almost 30 years later.  Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718-
19. 
¶116 Montejo is unquestionably the current controlling law 
on the subject of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  But 
neither this court nor law enforcement currently has the benefit 
of the inevitable explanation, application, and modification of 
the principles that Montejo so recently announced.  It is 
unnecessary here to expound on what additional protections, if 
any, may be needed in the future.  It is enough now to uphold 
the protections that were in place when Brad Forbush was 
questioned in violation of settled law. 
¶117 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶118 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.    (dissenting).  I lament the 
fact that three justices, each in a separate written opinion, 
take three divergent avenues in a futile effort to uphold the 
Dagnall rule and suppress statements Forbush voluntarily made to 
police.  These varying approaches leave more questions than 
answers.  Justice Roggensack, in her effort to save the Dagnall 
rule, employs an extremely narrow reading of Montejo, ignoring 
an entire section of that decision, in order to extract only the 
language and principles that support her position.  Her attempt 
to minimize the effect of a United States Supreme Court decision 
rings hollow because Montejo clarified that the focus on 
retained versus appointed counsel is a distinction without a 
difference.  After Montejo, retaining or appointing counsel does 
not, by itself, serve to invoke the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel prohibiting a subsequent police-initiated interrogation.  
Both Justice Prosser and Chief Justice Abrahamson note as much 
in their writings.  Justice Prosser, in his effort to save the 
Dagnall rule, invents an anomalous bad faith corollary to the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.  Chief Justice 
Abrahamson, in her effort to save the Dagnall rule, relies on 
the Wisconsin Constitution but pays scant attention to the fact 
that 
Dagnall 
was 
based 
entirely 
on 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution.  I would follow the clear mandate in Montejo and 
overrule Dagnall.  This result follows the letter and the spirit 
of Montejo, protecting a defendant's right to counsel while 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
ensuring that justice will be done by the admission of voluntary 
statements of a defendant such as Forbush.     
¶119 I disagree with the decisions of these justices to 
depart from well-reasoned federal constitutional law, and thus I 
respectfully dissent.  Part I analyzes the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. 
Ct. 2079 (2009).  Part II explains the effect of Montejo on the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the law in Wisconsin.  In 
Part III, I note, as I did in my dissent in State v. Dagnall, 
2000 WI 82, 236 Wis. 2d 339, 612 N.W.2d 680, that the concerns 
echoed by the United States Supreme Court in Montejo and the 
lack of legal support for distinguishing between the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment rights to counsel strongly support following the 
United States Supreme Court's approach in Montejo.  Part IV 
briefly concludes my dissent. 
I. 
¶120 I begin by clarifying the effect of Montejo to 
demonstrate that Justice Roggensack's interpretation lacks any 
foundation in the language of that decision.  Her opinion gives 
far too little credence to the United States Supreme Court’s 
careful examination of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and 
the rationale underlying the Jackson rule.  Montejo's clear and 
emphatic rejection of the Jackson rule effectively overrules 
Dagnall, as the court of appeals appropriately concluded.  State 
v. 
Forbush, 2010 
WI App 11, ¶13, 323 Wis. 2d 258, 779 
N.W.2d 476. 
 
Montejo 
also 
clarified 
that 
only 
a 
clear, 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
3 
 
unequivocal request for counsel will invoke the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.1   
¶121 Under Jackson, a waiver of the right to counsel was 
presumed invalid where it was obtained during police-initiated 
questioning after the State was notified that a charged 
defendant had secured representation by counsel.  Montejo, 129 
S. Ct. at 2083.  In Jackson, the defendant affirmatively 
requested the appointment of counsel.  Michigan v. Jackson, 475 
U.S. 625, 627 (1986).  The Montejo Court explicitly overruled 
Jackson, concluding that it produced an unworkable, “fact-
intensive and burdensome” rule for law enforcement and courts.  
Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2084.   
¶122 The Montejo Court's holding encompassed two distinct 
but related Sixth Amendment right to counsel issues.  The Court 
first rejected Montejo's attempt to expand Jackson to allow the 
mere appointment of counsel, without any request by the 
defendant, to serve as an invocation of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.  Id. at 2083-88.  Going a step further, the 
Court overruled Jackson outright.  Id. at 2088-91. 
¶123 In rejecting the expansion of Jackson to the facts in 
Montejo, the United States Supreme Court noted that the only 
rationale for the Jackson rule was protection from police 
                                                 
1 The central focus of Montejo was “the scope and continued 
viability of the rule announced by [the United States Supreme 
Court] in Michigan v. Jackson.  Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 
__, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2082 (2009).  After overruling Jackson, the 
Court also clarified that upon remand, Montejo could establish a 
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel only if he 
proved that he clearly and unequivocally requested counsel when 
the officers approached him.  Id. at 2091-92.      
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
4 
 
badgering.  Id. at 2085-86.  When a defendant has not actually 
requested the assistance of an attorney during custodial 
interrogation, the Court concluded that it was and is wholly 
unnecessary to place these constraints on law enforcement.  The 
Court explained: 
No reason exists to assume that a defendant like 
Montejo, who has done nothing at all to express his 
intentions with respect to his Sixth Amendment rights, 
would not be perfectly amenable to speaking with the 
police without having counsel present.  And no reason 
exists to prohibit the police from inquiring.  Edwards 
and Jackson are meant to prevent police from badgering 
defendants into changing their minds about their 
rights, but a defendant who never asked for counsel 
has not yet made up his mind in the first instance. 
Id. at 2086-87. 
¶124 The United States Supreme Court then put the entire 
Jackson rule in its sights.  After weighing the costs and 
benefits of the Jackson rule, the Court concluded that Jackson 
lacked compelling reasoning.  Id. at 2089-91.  The Court 
highlighted the absurdity of protecting a defendant from his own 
election to talk to law enforcement without counsel when other 
safeguards ensure that such a decision is knowing and voluntary.  
Id. at 2089-90.  Little additional protection is gained from the 
Jackson rule considering the many prophylactic layers that exist 
to 
prevent 
police 
from 
obtaining 
involuntary 
or 
coerced 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
5 
 
statements.2  Id.  The cost of the Jackson rule, on the other 
hand, is substantial, given that it could often be used to 
invalidate an entirely voluntary confession and may deter law 
enforcement from even trying to obtain confessions.  Id. at 
2090-91.  Ultimately, the Court overruled Jackson, holding that 
its limited benefit to constitutional protections came at too 
great a cost.  Id. at 2091. 
 
¶125 Montejo also clarified that an unequivocal request for 
counsel is required to invoke both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.3  The United States Supreme Court has long 
required an unequivocal and unambiguous request to invoke the 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel.  Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452, 
                                                 
2 The Montejo Court elaborated that there are three key 
layers of protection which adequately shield a defendant from an 
involuntary confession.  129 S. Ct. at 2089-90.  Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966), prevents compelled self-
incrimination by providing defendants with a number of rights in 
custodial interrogations, including the right to have an 
attorney present and the right to be notified of that right.  
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981), ensures that 
law enforcement respects the Miranda right by prohibiting 
further interrogation after a defendant invokes the right to 
counsel.  In a similar vein, Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 
146, 153 (1990), adds to the protection provided by Edwards by 
prohibiting any interrogation outside the presence of counsel 
once a defendant has invoked the right to counsel. 
3 Justice Roggensack's failure to address Forbush's argument 
that he equivocally requested counsel and that such a request is 
sufficient to invoke the right to counsel implicitly recognizes 
that this argument lacks merit after Montejo.  Chief Justice 
Abrahamson's opinion recognizes that Montejo clarified that a 
clear, unequivocal request for counsel is required to invoke 
both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to counsel, though she 
concludes that equivocal requests are sufficient to invoke the 
right to counsel under the Wisconsin Constitution.  Chief 
Justice Abrahamson's op., ¶¶64 n.6, 71.  
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
6 
 
459 (1994).  Prior to Montejo, the Court had not directly 
addressed the clarity with which a defendant was required to 
request counsel to invoke the Sixth Amendment right.  However, 
the Court did not state that any different standard applied to 
post-charging interrogations either.  While only the Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel was implicated in Davis, nothing in 
that case indicated that the standard was applicable only to 
pre-charging interrogations, and its reasoning is equally 
applicable to interrogations after a defendant has been charged.  
Id. at 458-62. 
¶126 In Montejo, after rejecting his argument under the 
now-defunct Jackson decision, the United States Supreme Court 
ordered a remand to allow Montejo to argue that he “made a clear 
assertion of the right to counsel,” which under Edwards would 
invalidate any statements obtained after such an invocation if 
police initiated the subsequent interrogation.  Montejo, 129 S. 
Ct. at 2091-92 (citing Davis, 512 U.S. at 459).  The Court noted 
that “[e]ven if Montejo subsequently agreed to waive his rights, 
that waiver would have been invalid had it followed an 
‘unequivocal election of the right.’”  Id. at 2091 (quoting 
Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 176 (2001)).     
¶127 At one time, the Wisconsin court of appeals had 
suggested “that the strict requirements for ‘unequivocally and 
unambiguously’ asserting one’s right to counsel under the Fifth 
Amendment 
are 
somewhat 
less 
stringent 
under 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment.”  State v. Hornung, 229 Wis. 2d 469, 478-80, 600 
N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1999) (relying on distinctions between the 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
7 
 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to counsel in Jackson).  This 
court extended that statement in a footnote in State v. Ward, 
even though the Sixth Amendment was not at issue in that case, 
by noting that “in contrast to the Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel, an equivocal request for counsel in a Sixth Amendment 
context is sufficient to invoke that right.”  State v. Ward, 
2009 WI 60, ¶43 n.5, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236 (citing 
Hornung, 229 Wis. 2d at 477-78 and Patterson v. Illinois, 487 
U.S. 
285, 
290-91 
(1988), 
and 
similarly 
relying 
on 
such 
distinctions).  The United States Supreme Court has now erased 
the distinctions between pre- and post-charging interrogations 
in Montejo and clarified that an unequivocal request is required 
to invoke the right to counsel under both Amendments.  The Ward 
footnote is now clearly in error.      
¶128 Significantly, in its decision overruling Jackson and 
clarifying that only an unequivocal request can invoke the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, the United States Supreme Court 
disposed of the distinctions between the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in Montejo.  In support of its 
abrogation of the Jackson rule, the Court explained that 
“[s]ince the right under both sources is waived using the same 
procedure, 
doctrines 
ensuring 
voluntariness 
of 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment waiver simultaneously ensure the voluntariness of the 
Sixth Amendment waiver.”  Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090 (internal 
citations omitted).  Even more directly, the Court explicitly 
provided that “there is no reason categorically to distinguish 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
8 
 
an unrepresented defendant (Fifth Amendment) from a represented 
one (Sixth Amendment).”  Id. at 2092 (parentheticals added).  
II. 
¶129 I emphasize these tenets of Montejo because the United 
States Supreme Court’s definitive interpretation of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in Montejo clearly invalidates 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
reasoning 
for 
upholding 
Dagnall 
and 
provides the appropriate outcome in this case.  The heart of 
Justice Roggensack's rationale is based on three erroneous legal 
arguments: (1) requesting counsel in out-of-state extradition 
proceedings invokes the right to counsel for a subsequent 
interrogation in Wisconsin, (2) Montejo is limited to its facts, 
and (3) Dagnall interpreted the Wisconsin Constitution or 
created 
constitutional 
principles 
severed 
from 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment.  These assertions lack any legal support.   
¶130 There is also a fourth and quite critical factual flaw 
in Justice Roggensack's reasoning.  Even if Montejo and Dagnall 
could be reconciled into a rule prohibiting the police-initiated 
interrogation of a charged defendant "who has affirmatively 
invoked his right to counsel by securing the services of an 
attorney for the crimes charged," Justice Roggensack's op., ¶27, 
there is no evidence that Forbush in fact did so in this case.  
While Forbush secured a Michigan attorney as counsel for his 
extradition hearing, there is no evidence that he secured 
counsel in Wisconsin or even knew that he was represented by 
counsel when the interrogation took place in Wisconsin.  Justice 
Roggensack makes much of the parties' stipulation that Forbush 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
9 
 
was represented by counsel when interrogated by Detective 
Norlander and the circuit court's finding that Norlander knew of 
that 
representation. 
 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
op., 
¶¶52-53.  
Montejo rejected the idea that retaining counsel was sufficient 
to invoke the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Justice 
Roggensack asserts that the Dagnall rule that survives Montejo 
applies to a defendant who affirmatively requests counsel, but 
the record does not support a conclusion that Forbush did so.  
More than conflicting with Montejo, allowing the retention of 
counsel by a family member or other person to invoke a 
defendant's right to counsel is contrary to this court's 
statement in Ward that only the defendant can invoke his right 
to counsel.  Ward, 318 Wis. 2d 301, ¶38.  There is nothing in 
the record to show that Forbush, himself, "affirmatively invoked 
his right to counsel by securing the services of an attorney for 
the crimes charged" in Wisconsin.  Thus, Justice Roggensack's 
opinion is unveiled as nothing more than an endeavor to salvage 
Dagnall. 
¶131 Despite the lack of evidence in the record that 
Forbush affirmatively requested counsel in Wisconsin, Justice 
Roggensack makes the novel assertion that Forbush's retention of 
counsel for his extradition hearing in Michigan invoked his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel for these Wisconsin charges.  
Justice Roggensack's op., ¶¶26, 39-40.  Justice Roggensack 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
10 
 
provides no relevant support for this claim.4  Indeed, as was 
recently reaffirmed in Montejo, the United States Supreme Court 
has "in fact never held that a person can invoke his Miranda 
rights anticipatorily, in a context other than 'custodial 
interrogation.'"  Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091 (quoting McNeil v. 
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3 (1991)).  No decision by this 
or any court provides that Forbush's assistance from Michigan 
counsel in a procedural, not substantive, extradition hearing in 
                                                 
4 Justice Roggensack primarily relies on two decisions from 
other states, neither of which lend her any support.  The 
Appellate Court of Illinois, relying on Jackson, since overruled 
in Montejo, held that police could not question a defendant who 
had requested counsel at an extradition hearing related to the 
crimes charged.  People v. Maust, 576 N.E.2d 965, 971 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1991).  In a very different factual scenario in State v. 
March, No. M2007-53-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 332327 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
Jan. 27, 2011), the defendant retained Tennessee counsel for the 
purposes of the pending criminal charges in Tennessee while 
still in California.  However, this was not during or for the 
purposes of his extradition hearing.  Id. at 19, 25.  The court 
did, in passing, suggest that this invoked his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel for the Tennessee charges, id. at 25; however, 
this conclusion was completely irrelevant to the court's 
ultimate decision that the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights 
were not violated because he initiated the conversation with 
police, id. at 27.  
Justice Roggensack's reliance on several United States 
Supreme Court cases is similarly misplaced.  Both Davis and 
Smith v. Illinois deal with the sufficiency of a request for 
counsel made during a custodial interrogation after being 
notified of the right to have an attorney present.  Davis, 512 
U.S. at 454-55, 459; Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 94-97 
(1984).  Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 202-03, 206 
(1964), did not involve a waiver at all, but rather the 
propriety of a clandestine interrogation by a third party 
without notice that the defendant was entitled to have an 
attorney present. 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
11 
 
Michigan could serve to invoke his right to counsel for the 
purposes of an interrogation on criminal charges in Wisconsin.5             
¶132 Additionally, it simply is not possible to read 
Montejo as narrowly as Justice Roggensack desires.  Justice 
Roggensack insists that Montejo is limited to the "certain 
circumstances" presented in Montejo, which she vaguely asserts 
as "a charged defendant for whom counsel had been appointed by 
the court, but for whom the Supreme Court could not determine 
                                                 
5 The extradition hearing in an asylum state, in this case, 
Michigan, is distinct from any criminal proceedings that flow 
from the charges in the demanding state, in this case, 
Wisconsin.  An extradition hearing, codified in the Michigan 
statutes at Mich. Comp. Laws § 780.14 (2009), follows the 
issuance of a fugitive compliant under § 780.12.  See also Wis. 
Stat. § 976.03(13), (15) (2009-10).  Pursuant to Mich. Comp. 
Laws § 780.12, the fugitive complaint must be on the oath of a 
credible person, must assert that the defendant committed a 
crime in another state, and must charge that the defendant has 
fled from justice.  Then, at the extradition hearing, a judge in 
the asylum state determines whether "it appears that the person 
held is the person charged with having committed the crime 
alleged" and whether it appears "that he has fled from justice."  
§ 780.14.  At the extradition hearing, the defendant may 
exercise his right to waive further extradition proceedings and 
be willingly transported back to the demanding state. 
In this case, Forbush secured his brother as counsel for 
his extradition hearing, waived extradition, and was willingly 
transported back to Wisconsin.  As a practical matter, it is 
often the case that for purposes of representation at the 
extradition hearing, the court will have a public defender 
present or may appoint counsel, or, as was the case here, the 
defendant might wish to retain his own counsel.  However, as the 
above statutory procedures make clear, a fugitive complaint and 
an extradition hearing are by no means a trial on the underlying 
charges in the demanding state.  Accordingly, contrary to 
Justice Roggensack's suggestion, the fact that Forbush secured 
his brother as counsel for his extradition hearing in Michigan 
does not mean that Forbush affirmatively invoked his right to 
counsel for the crimes charged in Wisconsin. 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
12 
 
whether he had actually invoked his right to counsel and the 
protections that would then flow from Edwards."6  Justice 
Roggensack's op., ¶34 (citing Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091-92).  
Justice Roggensack does not provide a single case from any court 
that has interpreted or limited Montejo in this way.  I also 
found none.  To the extent Justice Roggensack attempts to limit 
Montejo based on the Court's decision to remand to allow Montejo 
to make an argument that he "made a clear assertion of the right 
to counsel when the officers approached him," that is merely a 
reference to the legal standard after Montejo: a defendant 
cannot "invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context 
other than 'custodial interrogation.'"7  Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 
2091 (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n.3) (emphasis added).     
¶133 Federal and state courts around the country have 
recognized that after Montejo, neither requesting nor being 
                                                 
6 Justice Roggensack's opinion asserts that, as a result of 
Montejo, Dagnall no longer requires courts to presume that a 
waiver by a charged and represented defendant is invalid.  This 
begs the question: What then is left of the Dagnall rule that 
Justice Roggensack strives so mightily to hold onto?  Justice 
Roggensack suggests that the Dagnall rule now means a defendant 
may invoke the Sixth Amendment right to counsel by "retaining 
and receiving the services of a lawyer" and need not "re-invoke" 
the right to counsel during custodial interrogation.  Justice 
Roggensack's op., ¶35.  Without the presumption, is there really 
anything meaningful left of the Dagnall holding?  
7 Justice Roggensack's reliance, in part, on Montejo's 
approval of the Edwards rule, which protects defendants from 
police "badgering," is misguided.  Justice Roggensack's op., 
¶33.  The Court addressed the anti-badgering rationale in the 
section overruling Jackson, concluding that it did not justify 
the Jackson rule because other prophylactic rules adequately 
protect against so-called police badgering.  Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 
at 2089-90. 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
13 
 
appointed nor receiving the services of counsel serves to invoke 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  United States v. Johnson, 
No. 09-752, 2010 WL 4910889, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2010); 
United States v. Veals, No. 08-2235, at 6, 2010 WL 145110, (7th 
Cir. Jan. 15, 2010); People v. Vickery, 229 P.3d 278, 281 (Colo. 
2010); Hughen v. State, 297 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2009); Williams v. State, 38 So. 3d 188, 190-92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 
2010). 
 
Commentators 
have 
also 
noted 
that 
Montejo 
foreclosed any rule allowing representation by or the retention 
of an attorney to serve as an invocation of the Sixth Amendment 
right 
to 
counsel. 
 
Sixth 
Amendment—Right 
to 
Counsel—
Interrogation Without Counsel Present, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 182, 
183 (2009) ("Justice Scalia held that neither of the two 
proposed approaches to Jackson—applying it only when the 
defendant affirmatively requests counsel or applying it as soon 
as the defendant is granted counsel even if there is no 
affirmative request—is workable.").  The writings of Justice 
Prosser and Chief Justice Abrahamson both recognize that Montejo 
repudiated this court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel in Dagnall.  Justice Prosser's op., ¶¶96, 109; 
Chief Justice Abrahamson's op., ¶64. 
¶134 A closer look at the context of the Court's language 
in Montejo illuminates the fact that the "certain circumstances" 
are much broader, including both the facts of this case and the 
Dagnall rule.  In summarizing the issue presented, the Court 
stated, "The only question raised by this case, and the only one 
addressed by the Jackson rule, is whether courts must presume 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
14 
 
that such a waiver is invalid under certain circumstances."  
Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085.  Thus, "certain circumstances" 
refers 
to 
those 
in 
Jackson, 
where 
the 
defendant 
had 
affirmatively requested counsel.  Jackson, 475 U.S. at 627.  It 
could not be more clear that the Jackson rule——upon the 
attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a waiver is 
presumed invalid if obtained in a police-initiated interrogation 
by a defendant who has previously secured counsel for those 
charges——was what the Court categorically rejected in Montejo.  
Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091. 
¶135 The decision did not conclude upon the United States 
Supreme Court's explanation that the Jackson rule did not 
include a charged defendant who had "previously been appointed a 
lawyer."  Id. at 2088.  The Court proceeded to vitiate the 
Jackson rule and explained that it had "never held that a person 
can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other 
than 'custodial interrogation.'"  Id. at 2091 (quoting McNeil, 
501 U.S. at 182 n.3).  The Court could not have provided a more 
complete 
rejection 
of 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
interpretation 
espoused in Jackson, adopted by this court in Dagnall, and 
advanced in Justice Roggensack's opinion.8 
                                                 
8 Justice Roggensack's reliance on Massiah, 377 U.S. 201, is 
misplaced.  Justice Roggensack's op., ¶¶38, 40.  Massiah was not 
a waiver case; indeed, Massiah was never advised of his right to 
counsel at all.  377 U.S. at 202-03.  In Montejo, after citing 
Massiah and several other tangentially related Sixth Amendment 
cases, the Court noted, "Since everyone agrees that absent a 
valid waiver, Montejo was entitled to a lawyer during the 
interrogation, those cases do not advance his argument."  
Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2088.  Massiah is similarly unavailing on 
the precise issue here.      
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
15 
 
¶136 Dagnall’s holding “that the Sixth amendment right to 
counsel protected Dagnall from police interrogation . . . once 
Dagnall was formally charged and once an attorney represented 
him on that charge,” directly conflicts with Montejo and thus 
should no longer be the law in Wisconsin.  Dagnall, 236 
Wis. 2d 339, ¶67; see State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶3, 252 
Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142 (“[T]he Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution compels adherence to United States 
Supreme Court precedent on matters of federal law, although it 
means deviating from a conflicting decision of this court.”).9  
¶137 On a deeper level, Montejo rejected not only this 
court’s holding in Dagnall, but also our reasoning in that case.  
Dagnall's10 departure from the more defined Fifth Amendment right 
                                                 
9 I would also highlight that our decision in Jennings dealt 
with a conflict similar to the one presented in this case.  That 
led us in Jennings to overrule conflicting Wisconsin precedent.     
Our decision in Walkowiak was tethered to the Fifth 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments 
and 
Miranda/Edwards 
jurisprudence up to that point.  Davis was decided a 
month later.  The following year, we acknowledged the 
conflict between Walkowiak and Davis, but did not 
explicitly overrule Walkowiak.  We now do so. 
 
Jennings, 252 Wis. 2d 228, ¶35 (internal citations omitted). 
We should similarly overrule Dagnall, and clarify the 
conflicting footnote in Ward, as both were "tethered" to now 
overruled United States Supreme Court precedent. 
10 We should not lose sight of the fact that our decisions 
have real consequences.  As a result of the majority's decision 
in Dagnall, his "statements detailing his involvement, with co-
defendant Christopher E. Murray, in beating a man to death with 
baseball bats [was not] allowed in evidence.  His conviction of 
first degree intentional homicide by use of a dangerous weapon, 
party to a crime, [was] set aside."  Dagnall, 236 Wis. 2d 339, 
¶70 (Crooks, J., dissenting).       
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
16 
 
to 
counsel 
standards 
was 
based, 
in 
part, 
on 
purported 
distinctions between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to 
counsel.  I dissented in Dagnall because there is no basis for 
deriving different standards from the Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights to counsel.  236 Wis. 2d 339, ¶¶74-76 (Crooks, J., 
dissenting).  As explained above, the United States Supreme 
Court has now expressly rejected the premise that it is more 
difficult to waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel than it 
is to waive the Fifth Amendment right.  Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 
2090, 2092.   
¶138 Montejo rejected this court's interpretation of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in Dagnall, and it cannot 
survive without those Sixth Amendment underpinnings.  We 
explicitly stated in Dagnall that our decision was based solely 
on the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel and not on any interpretation of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  In fact, the Dagnall majority referred 
to the Sixth Amendment 69 times and referred to the Wisconsin 
Constitution only in a footnote, which was added to make 
absolutely clear that our decision was not based on Article I, 
Section 7.  236 Wis. 2d 339, ¶28 n.7 (“The State does not raise 
the issue whether Dagnall properly invoked his right to counsel 
under the state constitutional provision.  Therefore, we do not 
address it.”) (emphasis added).     
¶139 While 
Justice 
Roggensack 
insists 
that 
Montejo's 
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment does not conflict with 
Dagnall, she nevertheless suggests that Dagnall created a 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
17 
 
"fundamental constitutional principle[]" underlying Article I, 
Section 7 that is unencumbered by Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.  
Justice Roggensack's op., ¶¶41-51.  As noted in Justice 
Roggensack's opinion, ¶42, we have generally interpreted the 
right to counsel under Article I, Section 7 consistent with that 
in the Sixth Amendment.  See State v. Polak, 2002 WI App 120, 
¶8, 254 Wis. 2d 585, 646 N.W.2d 845; State v. Sanchez, 201 
Wis. 2d 219, 226-27, 548 N.W.2d 69 (1996); State v. Klessig, 211 
Wis. 2d 194, 202-03, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997).  In a convoluted 
inversion 
of 
that 
premise, Justice Roggensack essentially 
concludes that when we interpreted and applied the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in Dagnall, we created "fundamental 
constitutional principles" separate and independent from the 
federal constitution on which they were based.11  Justice 
Roggensack's op., ¶¶42, 50.  This is a novel and unsupported 
interpretation.  In both Sanchez and Klessig, our conclusion 
equating the right to counsel in Article I, Section 7 with that 
in the Sixth Amendment led us to adopt the United States Supreme 
Court’s definitive interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel as the rule in Wisconsin.  Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d at 
226-36; Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 201-03.  Applying that rationale 
                                                 
11 To the extent that Justice Roggensack's citation to 
Sparkman v. State, 27 Wis. 2d 92, 133 N.W.2d 776 (1965), and 
characterization 
of 
the 
Dagnall 
rule 
as 
a 
"fundamental 
constitutional principle[]" suggests that the rule she applies 
rests upon a constitutional common law, I note that there is no 
support 
for 
such 
a 
claim. 
 
Sparkman——a 
procedural, 
not 
constitutional 
right-to-counsel 
case——does 
not 
support 
the 
development of a constitutional common law rule detached from 
the constitution.  Id. at 97-101. 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
18 
 
here should similarly lead Justices Roggensack and Prosser and 
Chief Justice Abrahamson to accept and follow the Court’s 
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment in Montejo.   
¶140 Justice 
Roggensack's 
reference 
to 
Wisconsin’s 
historically vigorous protection of the right to counsel does 
not require a different result.  Her writing correctly notes 
that Wisconsin has long protected a robust right to counsel but 
fails to provide a single case interpreting the right to counsel 
in Article I, Section 7 to provide the specific embellishments 
at issue in this case.  Nor is there an explanation as to how 
the right to counsel, as interpreted by the United States 
Supreme Court in Montejo, is inconsistent with Wisconsin’s 
commitment to protecting the right to counsel.  Instead, Justice 
Roggensack rewrites our previous interpretations of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in Dagnall into a constitutional rule 
that 
is, 
inexplicably, 
independent 
of 
the 
constitutional 
provision from which it was derived.   
¶141 Using another unique tactic to uphold the exclusion of 
Forbush's statements, Justice Prosser invents a bad faith 
corollary to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 
We recently discussed the good faith exception in State v. 
Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97.  We noted 
in Dearborn that the good faith exception was adopted from 
United States Supreme Court decisions and has been extensively 
developed through Fourth Amendment precedent.  Id., ¶¶33-43.  
Conversely, to my knowledge, this bad faith corollary has never 
been recognized by any other court, nor has the good faith 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
19 
 
exception ever before been applied in the Sixth amendment 
context.     
¶142 Most importantly, Justice Prosser fails to heed our 
warning in Dearborn upon which our decision not to exclude 
critical evidence was based: deterrence should not be put ahead 
of the interest of justice.  Id., ¶36 ("To trigger the 
exclusionary 
rule, 
police 
conduct 
must 
be 
sufficiently 
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and 
sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price 
paid by the justice system.") (quoting Herring v. United States, 
555 U.S. 135, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009)).  It simply cannot be 
said in this case that Detective Norlander's conduct was so 
deliberate and culpable that exclusion is warranted when, in 
light of Montejo, there was no Sixth Amendment violation.  
¶143 Taking further liberties with United States Supreme 
Court precedent, Justice Prosser suggests that because it is 
unclear how Montejo, "the current controlling law on the subject 
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel," will be refined in the 
future, this court can wait and see how the law develops before 
we decide whether to follow it.  Justice Prosser's op., ¶¶115-
16.  This ignores the maxim that "this court is bound by the 
interpretations which the United States Supreme Court has given" 
to provisions of the federal constitution.  State v. Pitsch, 124 
Wis. 2d 628, 632, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985).  We may not elect 
whether to follow current constitutional law when applying the 
Sixth Amendment or defer until it develops into a rule we find 
more palatable. 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
20 
 
¶144 Two 
of 
our 
previous 
decisions 
illustrate 
the 
consequences of misinterpreting and misapplying United States 
Supreme Court precedent.  In State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 564 
N.W.2d 328 (1997), I dissented, in part, because the majority 
misread Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), to accord with its 
result.  We noted as much in State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, 245 
Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223, overruling Ramos because it was 
neither practically nor legally sound in light of the Court's 
decision in United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 
(2000), explicitly rejecting this court's reading of Ross in 
Ramos.  Lindell, 245 Wis. 2d 689, ¶¶87-90, 131. Rather than 
waiting for the Court to explicitly reject Justice Roggensack's 
reading of Montejo, it would be wise to employ the only 
interpretation consistent with Montejo's reasoning: neither 
equivocally requesting, nor having appointed, nor receiving the 
services of an attorney invokes the right to counsel for the 
purposes of a custodial interrogation.  It takes an unequivocal 
invocation of such right.  
¶145 To reach their desired result, Justices Roggensack and 
Prosser need not misapply our precedent and that of the United 
States Supreme Court, as they have done here, because, as we 
have done in certain unique circumstances, there are established 
methods through which we may depart from federal constitutional 
rulings.  For example, we may examine a parallel provision of 
the Wisconsin Constitution to determine whether it provides 
protections not afforded under the United States Constitution.  
See e.g., State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 241-43, 580 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
21 
 
N.W.2d 171 (1998) (holding that Article I, section 7 required a 
12-person jury trial despite the United States Supreme Court's 
decision that the Sixth Amendment jury trial right did not) 
(citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)).  However, I 
would note that there are limitations on this avenue, as there 
should be on any attempt to depart from federal constitutional 
standards. 
 
Any 
"upward 
departure 
from 
the 
federal 
constitutional standards adopted by the United States Supreme 
Court for purposes of our own state constitutional law must 
itself 
be 
grounded 
in 
requirements 
found 
in 
the 
state 
constitution or laws."  Jennings, 252 Wis. 2d 228, ¶39 (citing 
State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 180-181, 593 N.W.2d 427 
(1999)); see also State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 172, 254 
N.W.2d 210 (1977).  Unfortunately, Justice Roggensack's and 
Justice 
Prosser's 
departures 
from 
the 
Court's 
definitive 
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in 
Montejo does not rest on any solid ground. 
¶146 Chief Justice Abrahamson's opinion follows the well-
established 
method 
of 
examining 
whether 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution provides greater protections than the federal 
constitution.  While I do not quibble with her approach, for the 
reasons set forth in this dissent, I strongly disagree with her 
result.  I do not believe that there are any requirements in our 
Wisconsin Constitution or laws upon which an attempt to salvage 
the Dagnall rule may be founded. 
¶147 The Dagnall rule is without any legal footing after 
Montejo.  This rule should not survive for several practical 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
22 
 
reasons as well.  In its decision rejecting the Jackson rule, 
based in part on a cost-benefit analysis of its practical 
application, the United States Supreme Court explained that it 
“deters law enforcement officers from even trying to obtain 
voluntary confessions.”  Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091.  Allowing 
equivocal requests for counsel to serve as an invocation of the 
right to counsel is similarly imprudent.  As I noted previously, 
in Davis, when proclaiming the standard that only an unequivocal 
and unambiguous request can invoke the right to counsel, the 
Court noted that anything less “would transform the Miranda 
safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police 
investigative activity.”  Davis, 512 U.S. at 460 (quoting 
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975)).  The amorphous 
concept of what constitutes an equivocal request for counsel 
provides almost no guidance to law enforcement officers and 
courts and thus is not a wise standard to impose.  
¶148 As a result of the opinions of the three justices, 
statements Forbush made to police voluntarily after carefully 
considering whether to waive his right to counsel and tell his 
side 
of 
the 
story 
are 
held 
to 
be 
inadmissible. 
 
The 
justification for this result is unclear in light of the fact 
that, consistent with established Fifth Amendment law, had 
police questioned Forbush before charges were formally filed, 
his 
waiver would 
be valid and his statements would be 
admissible.  However, since charges had been filed, they find 
his waiver invalid, even though if they followed the decision in 
Montejo, the waiver would be valid.  Based on the clear holding 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
23 
 
of the United States Supreme Court in Montejo, I believe that 
there is no basis whatsoever for the rule set forth today.   
¶149 Any interpretation of the right to counsel must strike 
a balance between protecting a defendant’s rights and allowing 
law enforcement to seek justice.  See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 
2089.  The other opinions clearly fail to strike such a balance.   
¶150 For the above reasons, we should follow the United 
States Supreme Court and make it clear that Dagnall is no longer 
the law in Wisconsin.  Dagnall relied solely on the Sixth 
Amendment to the federal constitution, and given the Court’s 
clear decision in Montejo, I believe that the Supremacy Clause 
dictates this outcome.  See Jennings, 252 Wis. 2d 228, ¶3.  
Justice Roggensack strives to salvage Dagnall’s holding by 
restricting Montejo and attempting to convince the reader to 
believe that Dagnall created a rule unmoored to the Sixth 
Amendment.  Despite this unsupported rationale, Dagnall cannot 
survive 
Montejo. 
 
Since 
Montejo 
also 
clarified 
that 
an 
unequivocal request for counsel is required to invoke both the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to counsel, we should recognize 
that as the law in Wisconsin. 
III. 
¶151 I believe it is also important to highlight that, in 
my dissent in Dagnall, I raised many of the same concerns 
addressed by the United States Supreme Court in its rejection of 
the Jackson rule in Montejo.  One such concern is the limited 
support for applying different standards to the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights to counsel.  I dissented in Dagnall because 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
24 
 
“[i]n most significant respects, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
have been accorded similar treatment in regard to the right to 
counsel.”  236 Wis. 2d 339, ¶74 (Crooks, J., dissenting).  I 
further explained that the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Patterson, 487 U.S. 285, “made it clear that while 
different policies are involved in the Fifth Amendment and Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, one right is not superior to the 
other, and it is not more difficult to waive the Sixth Amendment 
right 
than 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment 
right.” 
 
Dagnall, 
236 
Wis. 2d 339, ¶76.  I also noted problems with such distinctions 
in practice.  The “bright-line rule . . . prohibiting police 
interrogation where there has been an ambiguous or equivocal 
Sixth Amendment invocation, or no invocation at all by the 
accused, could be disastrous for law enforcement officials in 
Wisconsin.”  Id., ¶84 (Crooks, J., dissenting).  As discussed 
above, the United States Supreme Court agreed, noting that 
deterring law enforcement officers from trying to obtain 
confessions 
would 
seriously 
interfere 
with 
investigations.  
Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090-91.   
IV. 
¶152 Therefore, I would affirm the court of appeals’ 
decision and remand this case for trial.  In so doing I would 
make it clear that Dagnall is no longer the law in Wisconsin and 
hold that the Sixth Amendment does not prohibit law enforcement 
from questioning a charged and represented defendant, assuming 
Miranda warnings and a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 
waiver.  I would also hold that a defendant may invoke the Sixth 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.npc 
 
25 
 
Amendment right to counsel only through an unambiguous and 
unequivocal request for the assistance of counsel.   
¶153 I have emphasized in previous dissents and continue to 
emphasize here that when different rules apply to charged and 
uncharged defendants there may be a temptation to manipulate the 
timing of charging in a manner inconsistent with the interests 
of justice.  Additionally, a bright-line rule prohibiting law 
enforcement from initiating questioning with a charged and 
represented defendant will unduly restrict law enforcement’s 
ability to obtain voluntary confessions.  The result in this 
case comes at a serious cost.  When law enforcement is prevented 
from obtaining voluntary confessions, “crimes go unsolved and 
criminals unpunished.”  Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091.   
¶154 For the reasons set forth herein, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶155 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this dissent.    
 
 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶156 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (dissenting).  I join 
Justice Crooks' dissent, but I write separately to emphasize my 
reason for joining his dissent.   
¶157 For the past decade, the law in this state regarding 
custodial interrogation of represented defendants has been 
governed by State v. Dagnall, 2000 WI 82, 236 Wis. 2d 339, 612 
N.W.2d 680.  In Dagnall, this court concluded that the right to 
counsel 
under 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution protects a defendant from police interrogation once 
the defendant is formally charged and once the defendant is 
represented by counsel on that charge.  Id., ¶67.  Nowhere in 
Dagnall did the court base its decision on Article I, Section 7 
of the Wisconsin Constitution.  See id., ¶28 n.7.  Had the 
Dagnall 
court 
so 
based 
its 
decision 
on 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution instead of relying solely on the United States 
Constitution, my analysis might be different.  This court is not 
"bound by the minimums which are imposed by the Supreme Court of 
the United States if it is the judgment of this court that the 
Constitution of Wisconsin and the laws of this state require 
that greater protection of citizens' liberties ought to be 
afforded."  State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 172, 254 N.W.2d 210 
(1977).  For a time, Dagnall set forth a workable standard for 
those 
in 
the 
criminal justice system and, in my view, 
articulated a sound and fair rule.   
¶158 However, in the wake of Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 
___, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009), Dagnall, which relied solely on the 
No.  2008AP3007-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
federal constitution, can no longer be viewed as the law in this 
state——unless this court was to now rely on the Wisconsin 
Constitution to uphold Dagnall and the principles stated 
therein.  Absent that reliance on the state constitution, that 
is, without applying "new federalism," Dagnall is no longer good 
law.  Because I would adhere to the long-standing principle that 
we follow the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the Sixth Amendment when interpreting the parallel provision, 
Article I, Section 7, of our state constitution, see State v. 
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 202-03, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), it is 
my view that this court is required to follow the Supreme 
Court's clear decision in Montejo.1    
¶159 For that reason, I join Justice Crooks' writing and 
respectfully dissent.   
¶160 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this dissent. 
 
 
                                                 
1 In 
this 
case, 
law 
enforcement 
acted 
in 
direct 
contravention of clear, then-existing law under State v. 
Dagnall, 2000 WI 82, 236 Wis. 2d 339, 612 N.W.2d 680.  I do not 
condone that action.  However, given the Supreme Court's 
subsequent decision in Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. ___, 129 
S. Ct. 2079 (2009), there is no recourse for law enforcement's 
violation of Dagnall.   
No.  2008AP3007-CR.akz 
 
 
 
1