Case Title: State v. Aronson

Citation: 314 P.2d 849

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1957-08-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
314 P.2d 849 (1957) STATE of Montana, ex rel., David F. JAMES, Relator, v. J. Hugo ARONSON, Forrest H. Anderson and Frank Murray, being and constituting the State Board of Examiners, et al., Respondents. No. 9805. Supreme Court of Montana. August 20, 1957. *850 Ralph J. Anderson, Helena, and Ben E. Berg, Jr. Livingston, for relator. Ralph J. Anderson, Helena, and Ben E. Berg, Jr., Livingston, argued orally for relator. Forrest H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., William F. Crowley and James A. Robischon, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondents. Willaim F. Crowley and James A. Robischon, Asst. Attys. Gen., argued orally for respondents. CASTLES, Justice. This is an original proceeding in this court. The relator is seeking a writ of mandate to compel the State Board of Examiners to allow his claim for actual expenses in attending the organizational meeting of the Legislative Council created pursuant to the provisions of House Bill 46, chapter 34, Laws of 1957. The application for a writ of mandamus alleges the enactment of the act, the appointment of the relator as a member of the Interim Committee known as the Legislative Council, the attendance at a meeting for organization, the filing of his claim for actual expenses pursuant to the provisions of the act and the rejection of the claim by the State Board of Examiners upon the ground that the act is unconstitutional under the authority of the case of State ex rel. Mitchell v. Holmes, 128 Mont. 275, 274 P.2d 611. An alternative writ of mandamus was issued directed to the respondent Board. To the alternative writ, the respondents filed three separate pleadings; a general demurrer, a motion to quash, and an answer. The motion to quash challenged the sufficiency of the alternative writ of mandate and the affidavit upon which it was based. The motion to quash also alleged that the act under which the relator seeks relief is unconstitutional and pointed out the specific provisions of the Constitution which are alleged to be violated by the statute. As previously stated, a general demurrer was also filed. The answer of the respondents places in issue the validity of the appointments to the Legislative council. House Bill 46, now designated as chapter 34, Laws of 1957, became law when the governor signed it on February 21, 1957. The relator, State Senator David F. James, of Liberty County, was a member of the 1957 legislative body, and it is conceded by the respondents that he did attend the organizational meeting, and should be entitled to payment of his claim for actual expenses, if (1) his appointment was properly made under the terms of the act in question, and (2) if the act iself is constitutional. Two cases have heretofore been before this court involving similar enactments. In the first case, State ex rel. Mitchell v. Holmes, supra, chapter 143, Laws of 1953, was declared unconstitutional by a three to two decision of this court. The present act omits some of the provisions which were condemned by the court in that case, first, a provision extending the term of membership on the Council beyond the legislative term to which he was elected, and second, the right to accept donation of funds. Other provisions of the present act were condemned in that case. The second case, that of State ex rel. Schara v. Holmes, 130 Mont. 108, 1956, 295 P.2d 1045, turned upon the question of the validity of the appointment of the members of the Council. The 1957 Act being questioned is, in part, as follows: The respondents' motion to quash challenged this statute as being in contravention of the Montana State Constitution on several grounds that will appear hereinafter. There are several differences between the statute above set forth, and chapter 143, Session Laws of 1953, which was condemned by this court in Mitchell v. Holmes, supra. In the 1953 Act, membership on the Council continued on throughout the legislative session, which the court held extended the term of office of a member of the House of Representatives beyond the constitutional limitation of two years in violation of section 2, article V of the Constitution. The 1957 Act specifically provides that membership on the Council expires upon termination of the member's legislative term, and in no event may continue beyond December 31 of the year following appointment to the Council. Also, the 1953 Act permitted the Council to receive grants of money which the court, in Mitchell v. Holmes, held violated section 1, article XIX of the Constitution. No such provision is found here. The similarities between the 1953 Act and the 1957 Act are as follows: (1) Both acts create a Legislative Council to serve in the interim, with the power to investigate, report and recommend; (2) Membership on the Council is composed exclusively of legislators; (3) The Council is given the right to compel the attendance of witnesses at its investigative hearings; (4) Members on the Council are entitled to their actual travel expenses. We will discuss the constitutional features of the 1957 Act, first disposing of the general demurrer and the motion to quash, and will then discuss the appointment of the members of the Council. Before discussing constitutional objections to the 1957 Act, certain basic principles should be recalled. They are: (1) That a statute must always be given a construction consistent with its validity if at all possible, School Dist. No. 12 v. Pondera County, 89 Mont. 342, 297 Pac. 498; (2) That all presumptions are resolved in favor of the validity and constitutionality of legislative acts, Tipton v. Sands, 103 Mont. 1, 60 P.2d 662, 106 A.L.R. 474; and (3) That the State Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislature and not a grant of power to that body, State ex rel. Dufresne v. Leslie, 100 Mont. 449, 50 Pac.2d 959, 101 A.L.R. 1329. Turning now to the first three grounds of attack brought by respondents' motion to quash: (1) That it contravenes *853 section 5, article V of the Constitution, which provides per diem and mileage allowed each member of the legislative assembly and then states, "* * * shall receive no other compensation, perquisite, or allowance whatsoever"; (2) That the statute contravenes section 8, article V of the Constitution, which provides: "No member of either house shall, during the term for which he shall have been elected, receive any increase of salary or mileage under any law passed during such term"; and (3) That it contravenes section 26, article V of the Constitution, which provides: "The legislative assembly shall not pass local or special laws * * * creating, increasing or decreasing fees, percentages or allowances of public officers * * *." The act in question provides only for reimbursement of actual travel expenses, and our courts have held that reimbursement of actual cash outlays does not amount to additional compensation. In Mitchell v. Holmes, supra, this court held that the 1953 Act similar to the 1957 Act, in these regards, was in violation of section 5, article V, and section 8, article V of the Constitution. With this we do not agree. This court in Mitchell v. Holmes, gave no reason for their holding nor did they cite any case authority. The supreme court of Arizona in Earhart v. Frohmiller, 65 Ariz., 221, 178 P.2d 436, 438, in discussing the question whether expenses should be included within the term compensation as used in their constitution said: "When the State repays the legislators and their employees for their personal expenses, this does not constitute additional compensation but is merely a reimbursement for actual cash outlays necessarily incurred for subsistence while away from home and in performance of duty." The act in question, in concert with the constitution, specifically prohibits its Council members from receiving any compensation. In Collins v. Riley, 24 Cal. 2d 912, 152 P.2d 169, 171, the supreme court of California said: In Christopherson v. Reeves, 44 S.D. 634, 184 N.W. 1015, 1017, the South Dakota court said: It might be noted also, although we do not think it necessary for the purpose of this opinion, that service on the Council is a new duty, and as this court said in State ex rel. Donyes v. Board of Com'rs of Granite County, 23 Mont. 250, 253, 58 Pac. 439, 440: We hold then that the act in question does not violate either section 5 or section 8 of article V of the Constitution. Nor does it violate section 26 of article V. Next it is charged that the act contravenes section 7 of article V, which provides: "No senator or representative shall, during the term for which he shall have been elected, be appointed to any civil office under the state * * *." Again in Mitchell v. Holmes, supra, it was held that the 1953 Act, similar to this act in this respect, was in contravention of this section of the constitution. Then, Mr. Justice Anderson in his dissenting opinion stated as follows [128 Mont. 275, 274 P.2d 616]: With this statement from Mr. Justice Anderson's dissent in Mitchell v. Holmes, we agree. The Supreme Court of California was asked to determine whether service by a legislator on the California Commission on Interstate Cooperation was prohibited by the California Constitution. The California court, first noting the significant change in the California Constitution, art. 4, section 19, which enlarged the restriction from "any civil office" to "any office, trust or employment," held that service on the Interim Commission did not violate even the more stringent prohibition of the amendment to the California Constitution. The court in Parker v. Riley, 18 Cal. 2d 83, 113 P.2d 873, 875, 134 A.L.R. 1405, said in this regard: It will be seen at once that the California Constitution as [5] regards this particular phase is more stringent than the Montana Constitution. A civil office requires the vesting in an individual of a portion of the sovereign powers of the state. We find that the act in question does not violate or contravene section 7 of article V. It is also contended by the respondents that the act contravenes section 1 of article IV which provides, in general, for the separation of powers. Again, this court in Mitchell v. Holmes, held that the 1953 Act, similar to the 1957 Act in this respect, violated section 1 of article IV. We do not agree with the reasoning of the majority of the court in Mitchell v. Holmes. Referring again to the California court in Parker v. Riley, that court said: With the reasoning of the California court heretofore quoted, we agree. We hold that the statute in question does not violate section 1 of article IV. See, also, State ex rel. Hamblen v. Yelle, 29 Wash. 2d 68, 185 P.2d 723; Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 497; Tipton v. Parker, 71 Ark. 193, 74 S.W. 298, State ex rel. Robinson v. Fluent, 30 Wash. 2d 194, 191 Pac.2d 241. The next contention made by the respondents is that the act contravenes section 5 of article V, which provides in part: "No session of the legislative assembly, * * * shall exceed sixty days." The respondent raises the question involved in his brief in this manner, "* * * how can the legislative assembly of Montana, specifically limited in the exercise of its legislative powers to sixty days by section 5, article V of the State Constitution, by enacting a statute project its life beyond the date the constitution says it must die? How, if the power to exercise the legislative function ceases upon adjournment, sine die, can a subsidiary power continue to live? How can `the limb exist after the body has perished', or the `agent act after his principal is extinct?'" The answers suggested by the respondents to these questions would indicate that no possible function of a legislature can occur after its adjournment. Their answers would indicate that even the assembly of the journals, the production and publication of the statutes as passed, the storage of furniture, the final payment of staff of the legislature, the return trip home, and even the thought processes of the individual legislators should cease. This we do not believe was the intent of the framers of the Constitution. In State ex rel. Bennett v. State Board of Examiners, 40 Mont. 59, 104 Pac. 1055, 1057, this court said: With the possible exception of Mitchell v. Holmes, supra, there is to our knowledge no decision of any court denying to the legislature the power to create by statute a committee to serve in the interim between sessions of the assembly. On the contrary, *859 all courts have uniformly held that investigative power exists in the legislative branch which may be exercised after final adjournment as well as during the session. It is true that in many of the state court decisions concerning this subject, the state involved did not have a constitutional limitation as to time for the legislature to act. However, in the State of Washington, a similar constitutional restriction on the length of legislative sessions is had. The Washington court has been called upon twice to consider the validity of the Interim Committees, first in State ex rel. Hamblen v. Yelle, supra, and again in State ex rel. Robinson v. Fluent, 30 Wash. 2d 194, 191 P.2d 241, 245. In this latter case the Washington supreme court, in an original proceeding for a writ of mandamus to compel the state treasurer to pay a warrant drawn in payment of expenses of the relator for services rendered as a member of the Joint Legislative Council on Un-American Activities, held: Concerning legislative functions carried on during the interim period between sessions, a somewhat analogous situation occurs in the field of rate making. In Billings Utility Co. v. Public Service Comm., 62 Mont. 21, 203 P. 366, 368, this court in the year 1921 had this to say: The rate-making functions of the public service commission in Montana and various regulatory commissions throughout the nation has long been recognized by the courts. This rate-making function goes on throughout the year and during the interim periods between regular sessions of the Legislature. The function in rate-making is expressed in the above quotation by this court as a legislative one. To say that this violates the constitutional provision against the legislative functions after the sixty day period would seem to be a strange situation to be posed at this time. It might be suggested that the legislature in this particular situation, that is, the Legislative Council to investigate, study and recommend legislative proposals, might accomplish the same purpose by the establishment of a legislative bureau, an administrative office. See Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 91 Mont. 194, 213, 7 P.2d 919. Apparently under the rate-making processes prescribed above, such an administrative function could be accomplished. It would seem strange that a legislative function could be carried on through an administrative body and not by members of the legislature themselves. Another situation suggested is that various administrative boards, commissions, and *860 bodies in this state and throughout the nation, both state and federal, have been delegated authority by law to establish rules and regulations for the conduct of their functions. These rules and regulations have the force of law, and it would be a strange situation indeed to say that in Montana a rule and regulation passed by an administrative board having the force of law is the exercise of the legislative function, and therefore not valid because done in the interim period between legislative meetings. Historically Interim Committees have been resorted to as early as the pre-Civil war era for the purpose of conducting studies in preparing legislation for consideration at the next session of the legislature. Today, so far as this court's examination goes, such councils exist in thirty-four states where, whenever the question of their constitutionality has arisen, they have been uniformly held to be constitutional in all respects. For sample cases see: In re Opinion of the Justices, 248 Ala. 590, 29 So. 2d 10; Dickinson v. Johnson, 117 Ark. 582, 176 S.W. 116, L.R.A. 1915E, 496; Goffin v. Donelly, 6 Q.B.D. 307, 50 L.J.Q.B. 303; Application of Withrow, 176 Misc. 597, 28 N.Y.S.2d 223; State ex rel. Herbert v. Ferguson, 142 Ohio St. 496, 52 N.E.2d 980; Blakeslee v. Carroll, 64 Conn. 223, 29 A. 473, 25 L.R.A. 106; Greenfield v. Russel, 292 Ill. 392, 127 N.E. 102, 9 A.L.R. 1334; Bank v. Worth, 117 N.C. 146, 23 S.E. 160; Caldwell v. Carfer, 61 W. Va. 49, 55 S.E. 910, 10 L.R.A., N.S., 172; and People ex rel. Hastings v. Hofstadter, 258 N.Y. 425, 180 N.E. 106, 79 A.L.R. 1208. The respondents urge that the rule of stare decisis should be applied in order to uphold the decision of this court in State ex rel. Mitchell v. Holmes. The rule of stare decisis is not so imperative or inflexible as to preclude a re-examination of that case. One reason to blindly follow an erroneous decision is when property rights may be affected by its change. Even then, this court has reversed decisions making the new decision applicable only to the future. Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 91 Mont. 194, 7 P.2d 919; Continental Supply Co. v. Abell, 95 Mont. 148, 24 P.2d 133, and other Montana cases. No such reasons appear here. Therefore, we expressly overrule all that is said in Mitchell v. Holmes contrary to that said here. The demurrer filed herein is overruled and the motion to quash denied. By the answer of the respondents, the issue of the validity of the appointment of the relator is made. The respondents contend that the appointment of the relator to the Legislative Council was invalid. The relator's affidavit and application for writ of mandamus has alleged that the relator, Ben E. Berg, Jr., Earl Moritz, Lloyd Barnard, James Wood, Jr., George D. Howard, Bertha E. Streeter, Hugh Cumming, William R. Mackay and Robert A. Durkee, had been duly appointed, qualified and acting members of the Legislative Council. The respondents by their answer denied that the relator and the others named were duly appointed, qualified and acting members of the Council. The facts concerning the appointment of the senate members of the Council were stipulated to for the purpose of this action. There is no contention made but that the appointment of the house members of the Council was properly made and recorded by the speaker of the house. The act in question, as heretofore previously set out, gave the power of appointment in section 1 thereof. So far as applies here, the pertinent part of that section is as follows: "* * * and six (6) members of the State Senate who shall be appointed by the committee on committees of the State Senate * * *." The language of the bill is clear that the six members of the Senate would be appointed by the Committee on Committees of the Senate. It is also apparent that no particular formality with respect to the appointment of the members of the Council was required, and it is also apparent that the appointing power is reposed solely in the Committee on Committees. No concurring action by any other officer or body is required. The fact situations stipulated to, which brings the problem before the court, is that *861 the Committee on Committees made its report to the Senate in the following language: Thus here presented is the question: Was an appointment of the relator and the other members named from the Senate made as provided by the statute, or were the appointments not made because it was not ratified by the Senate? The respondents' position is that the failure of the Senate body as a whole to adopt the Committee on Committees' report resulted in a complete failure of the appointment. With this contention we cannot agree. The Senate's rule 8, which was attempted to be applied, does not control over a statutory enactment of both bodies of the legislature as approved by the governor. The statute in clear and unambiguous language gave the power of appointment to the Committee on Committees. The Committee on Committees, while it did not make its appointment of the members in language saying, "We hereby appoint the following," it did say, "The Committee on Committees pursuant to authority granted * * *, respectfully report and recommend that the following Senators be appointed to said Legislative Council * * *." While the language of the Committee on Committees' report leaves much to be desired in clarity on the making of appointments, under the only authority given for the power of appointment of senate members on the Legislative Council, we hold that appointments were made. The Committee *862 on Committees had its duty to perform and when it filed its report to the senate body for the purpose of making a record, its function was completed. It did not need nor could the senate body give, either its approval or disapproval of the appointments. To hold otherwise would be to say that the senate body could change the intent of a bill passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate and approved by the governor. If the senate body had wished to express its intent otherwise, it could very easily have amended the bill during its consideration, to state that the appointment of the members of the Legislative Council was subject to confirmation by the Senate. This it did not do. It is elementary that the authority of the legislature to delegate power of appointment is present. 42 Am. Jur., Public Officers, section 95, page 953; 67 C.J.S., Officers, section 29, page 158. In 67 C.J.S., Officers, section 30, pages 158, 159, the general rule is stated as follows: "The power to appoint to office carries with it discretion in the exercise of the power, and a valid appointment requires a choice by the appointing power of the person appointed. While the appointing power may listen to the recommendation or advice of others, the selection must finally be the act of the appointing power; and an appointment made by lot is invalid. There must be an intention on the part of the appointing officer to place the person of his choice in the position to be filled, but an intention to appoint may be implied." Thus, in the instant case, however clumsily or with whatever thought in mind the Committee on Committees may have had, the choice of members for membership on the Legislative Council was made. Compare Hubert v. Mendheim, 64 Cal. 213, 30 P. 633; People ex rel. Kresser v. Fitzsimmons, 68 N.Y. 514; People v. Gulvin, 164 App. Div. 768, 149 N.Y.S. 117. It is not necessary to examine the Senate Journal to determine intent, and we do not rule on whether such an examination would be proper. The plain meaning of the words used is sufficient. State v. Cudahy Packing Co., 33 Mont. 179, 82 Pac. 833. Another question urged is whether Senator Mackay is a member of the Legislative Council in view of his withdrawal from the Council with the unanimous consent of the senate body. The answer to this question is not of moment to this opinion. The Council exists. The act provides for the method of filling vacancies under another delegated power. The Council's administration can take care of that situation or of any possible future vacancy, should one occur. Additionally it is stipulated that Senator Mackay attended and participated in the organizational meeting of the Legislative Council and assumed and presumed to act as a member of the Council, and that the members of the Council assumed and presumed that he is a member thereof. Whether or not any formality attended this seating of Senator Mackay does not appear, but as heretofore stated, it is unimportant to this decision. In view of the foregoing discussion, we must next consider the question of attorney fees. The relator has by his petition pleaded damages by way of attorney fees. Attorney fees are allowable in such cases, R.C.M. 1947, section 93-9112; State ex rel. O'Connor v. McCarthy, 86 Mont. 100, 282 P. 1045; State ex rel Lynch v. Batani, 103 Mont. 353, 62 P.2d 565; State ex rel. McCarten v. Corwin, 119 Mont. 520, 177 P.2d 189. Attorney fees in the amount of $500 are hereby allowed. Let the peremptory writ issue. It is so ordered. HARRISON C. J., and ANGSTMAN, J., concur. BOTTOMLY and ADAIR, JJ., do not concur in this opinion, and reserve the right to later file a dissenting opinion stating their views herein.