Case Title: State v. Johnson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 111031115-22

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2014-10-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
State of Maryland v. Jonathan Johnson, No. 3, September Term 2014, Opinion by Greene,
J.
CRIMINAL LAW – PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
A threshold must be crossed before it is appropriate for a trial judge to review a victim’s
mental health records in camera.  The defendant must proffer or present sufficient facts to
show a reasonable likelihood that the records sought contain exculpatory evidence to warrant
an in camera review.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Case No. 111031115-22
Argued: September 3, 2014
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 3
September Term, 2014
    STATE OF MARYLAND
 v.
     JONATHAN JOHNSON
 
Barbera, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins 
McDonald
 
Watts,
JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
Filed:   October 22, 2014
Respondent, Jonathan Johnson, was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor and second-
degree sexual offense.  Leading up to trial, Respondent sought, by means of a trial subpoena,
access to the minor victim’s mental health records.  The trial court denied Respondent’s
request for an in camera review of those records, reasoning that his request amounted to a
“fishing expedition,” and concluding that Respondent did not show a reasonable likelihood
that the records contained exculpatory evidence as required by Goldsmith v. State, 337 Md.
112, 651 A.2d 866 (1995).  In Goldsmith, this Court rejected the argument that a criminal
defendant has the right to seek a victim’s privileged mental health records during pre-trial
discovery, but recognized that a criminal “defendant’s constitutional rights at trial may
outweigh the victim’s right to assert a privilege.”  337 Md. at 129, 651 A.2d at 874 (emphasis
added).  Thus, we pick up where Goldsmith left off; in this case, we consider whether a
criminal defendant’s constitutional rights at trial may trump a victim’s privilege in his or her
mental health records, and, further, what standard the defendant’s proffer must meet before
being entitled to an in camera review of the privileged records.  We shall hold that a criminal
defendant is entitled to an in camera review of a victim’s mental health records, even though
privileged, if the defendant can establish a reasonable likelihood that the privileged records
contain exculpatory evidence relevant to the defense. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts surrounding Respondent’s history with the minor victim, J.C.,  are set forth
1
 For purposes of anonymity, we shall refer to the minor victim by his initials.
1
in Petitioner’s brief, pursuant to the parties’ agreed Statement of Facts,  as follows:
2
Between April 2007 and April 2008, Respondent lived in an apartment in
Baltimore City with his girlfriend, who was also the mother of Respondent’s
infant children, and with J.C. (Respondent’s girlfriend’s nine/ten year old son),
and J.C.’s older sister (Respondent’s girlfriend’s oldest daughter).  Because
J.C.’s mother worked, Respondent oftentimes was the only adult home when
J.C. returned from school, which was about an hour earlier than his oldest
sister.
On one occasion, Respondent entered J.C.’s room after J.C. returned home
from school and was changing clothes.  Respondent, who was riled up at the
time, ordered J.C. to turn over in a mean tone.  He then pushed J.C. around
onto J.C.’s bed and, after pulling J.C.’s shorts down, Respondent put on a
condom and forced his penis “in and out” of J.C.’s “butt.”  J.C., who cried at
the time, threatened to kill Respondent when Respondent finished.  J.C. did not
tell his mother or another adult because he did not trust a lot of people and did
not feel comfortable talking to someone about the assault.
J.C. began to live with his maternal grandfather in March 2009 and ceased all
contact with Respondent at that time.  While J.C. was living with his
grandfather, one evening they dined at a Chinese restaurant.  During dinner,
J.C. and his grandfather spoke about the trouble that J.C. had been having at
school.  His grandfather encouraged him to talk about his problems with
“somebody,” or with his “therapist,” or with other “people.”  After learning
from his grandfather that his grandfather had been molested as a child, J.C.
reported Respondent’s sexual assault to his grandfather.  Upon returning home
from the restaurant, J.C.’s grandfather called the police.
At trial, Respondent stated that he was never alone with J.C. and denied that
he had ever sexually assaulted J.C.  According to Respondent, J.C.’s
grandfather and Respondent had a sexual encounter about twenty years earlier
and then, more recently, introduced Respondent to J.C.’s mother.  (Citations
to the record omitted.)
  Maryland Rule 8-501(g) provides that “[t]he parties may agree on a statement of
2
undisputed facts that may be included in a record extract or, if the parties agree, as all or part
of the statement of facts in the appellant’s brief. . . .”
2
Based on J.C.’s allegations, Respondent was charged, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City,
with sexual abuse of a minor and other related offenses.  According to the record, J.C.
became a patient at National Pike Health Center, Inc. (“National Pike”), a full service
medical facility with a staff that includes both psychiatrists and licensed clinical social
workers.  Prior to trial, Respondent filed a subpoena duces tecum to require National Pike
to produce records pertaining to J.C.  National Pike filed a Motion for Protective Order,
effectively seeking to quash the subpoena.
On November 9, 2011, the morning of trial, the trial judge held a hearing with regard
to National Pike’s Motion for Protective Order.  National Pike explained that the records
sought by Respondent are privileged and confidential because they contain communications
by J.C. to mental health providers, and include notes from psychiatrists and a licensed clinical
social worker.  The trial judge asked defense counsel to explain the reason for requesting the
records, to which defense counsel responded: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: . . . I’d like to see the records, one, to know what is
this young man’s mental health diagnosis.  Is he, is he bipolar?  Is he paranoid
schizophrenic?  Is he delusional?  Does he have hallucinations, Your Honor?
THE COURT: And the reason for that?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, if he, if he’s delusional, and if [he] has
hallucinations, I believe that’s, leads to exculpatory, that’s exculpatory for Mr.
Jonathan Johnson’s case. . . .
THE COURT: Well, I assume you’re, you’re saying you want to see these
records generally because these records may disclose information that could
affect his credibility or his ability to perceive; is that what you’re talking
about?
3
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.  So just, just like the – maybe they do.  I mean, maybe
there’s something in there or not.  But you don’t, you don’t know that for a
fact, correct?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any other reasons?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: No, Your Honor.  I’m just trying to get an idea of
anything exculpatory about this young man, why he’s in treatment.  If he’s in
treat – if there’s allegations that he’s in treatment for disciplinary issues, if he’s
in treatment for, if he’s seeing a counselor because he’s a habitual liar.
THE COURT: Okay.  Why isn’t this just a fishing expedition?  I mean, you
could say that – I assume, and I’m, and I, I – again, in these cases I’m
sympathetic to the defense because in a sense you obviously don’t have the
records, so you can’t tell me what exactly they contain.  But I guess part of my
concern is just merely a proffer that, in fact, it may affect his credibility or it
may [ ] provide you some information you can use for cross-examination.  Is
there anything more specific beyond that?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Not without even having a slightest idea of what may
be in the records, Your Honor, not without even knowing his diagnosis, no. 
So, it, it’s – if you wish to call it a fishing expedition, it may be because I have
no idea what these records may contain.
We have a State’s witness who has mental health issues, obviously has mental
health issues that may lead to his credibility, may affect his credibility, may
affect his ability to perceive, to understand. . . .
Relying on Goldsmith v. State, 337 Md. 112, 651 A.2d 866 (1995), and Fisher v. State, 128
Md. App. 79,  736 A.2d 1125 (1999), discussed infra, the trial court concluded that defense
counsel’s proffer to the court was insufficient to permit disclosure of the victim’s privileged
mental health records.  Therefore, the trial judge granted National Pike’s motion, but ordered
4
that the records sought by defendant be sealed.  On November 14, 2011, after a three day jury
trial, Respondent was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor and second-degree sexual
offense.  On February 10, 2012, Respondent was sentenced to fifteen years incarceration.
Respondent noted an appeal, arguing that the trial court committed reversible error
by granting National Pike’s motion.  In an unreported opinion, one judge dissenting,  the
3
Court of Special Appeals panel reversed, concluding that “[Respondent] sufficiently
established the likelihood that the records sought would provide exculpatory information.” 
Noting the need to “strike a balance between the competing interests of a witness’s privilege
and a defendant’s constitutional rights to obtain and present information necessary to his
defense,” the court stated further, “[w]hile we cannot expect counsel to have precise
information as to the content of the records, he did suggest that it would be appropriate to
know of [J.C.’s] propensity for veracity.”  In the court’s view, “[t]hose suggestions alone
were sufficient, at the very least, to call for an in camera review of the records to determine
their relevance, vis a vis [Respondent]’s constitutional rights, before ruling on [National
Pike’s motion].”  On the State’s petition, we granted certiorari, 435 Md. 501, 79 A.3d 947
(2013), to answer the following question:
Is a “suggestion” by the defendant that the victim’s mental health records may
contain information that is either exculpatory or relating to the victim’s
 The dissenting opinion advocated for an affirmance of Johnson’s convictions
3
because, based on our holding in Goldsmith, the mere speculation that the records contained
evidence relevant to impeachment is not sufficient to allow the defendant access to the
records via an in camera review.
5
“propensity for veracity” insufficient, under Goldsmith v. State, 337 Md. 112,
651 A.2d 866 (1995), to “call for an in camera review” of those records? 
For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner would have us create a bright line rule and hold that a victim’s mental
health records are subject to an absolute privilege; therefore, a defendant would not be
entitled to the disclosure of such records under any circumstances.  At the very least,
Petitioner argues, in order to access privileged records the defendant should be required to
demonstrate a sufficient factual basis supporting his or her proffer that the records sought
likely contain exculpatory information.  Specifically, Petitioner asserts that a defendant must
satisfy a high threshold test, and present credible evidence that would otherwise be
admissible under the Maryland Rules of Evidence.
Respondent argues that a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights at trial must trump
a victim’s privilege in mental health records, and an in camera review of the records is an
appropriate method to both protect the victim’s privacy interest in his or her records and
ensure a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights and access to exculpatory evidence. 
Respondent contends that the burden on the defendant to warrant an in camera review cannot
be as high as Petitioner suggests, however.  Instead, Respondent urges this Court to follow
the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480
U.S. 39, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987), that is, where the defendant cannot possibly
know exactly what the records contain, he or she need only “make some plausible showing”
6
that the information in the records would be “both material and favorable to his [or her]
defense.”  Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58 n.15, 107 S. Ct. at 1002 n.15, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 58 n.15
(quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 3446, 73
L. Ed. 2d 1193, 1202 (1982)).
In undertaking our review of Goldsmith and other relevant precedent, we shall first
discuss the threshold question of whether a criminal defendant’s trial rights may prevail over
a victim’s right to assert a privilege in his or her mental health records.  Because we answer
that question in the affirmative, we shall next address when a criminal defendant will be
entitled to an in camera review  of the privileged records.
4
I.  May the defendant’s trial rights trump the victim’s privilege?
A patient’s privilege to preclude the disclosure of his or her communications to a
licensed psychiatrist and communications to a licensed clinical social worker, respectively,
are governed by Md. Code (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol., 2014 Supp.), §§ 9-109 and 9-121 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (hereinafter all references to the Maryland Code are
to the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, unless otherwise noted).  Specifically, § 9-109
(“Communications between patient and psychiatrist or psychologist”) provides in relevant
part: 
 We shall explain, infra, that an in camera review is the appropriate method to obtain
4
access to a victim’s privileged mental health records.  To allow a criminal defendant to
directly review all of the privileged records, even upon a sufficient showing of need, would
provide inadequate protection to the victim/patient’s privacy rights to prevent disclosure of
mental health records.
7
(b) Unless otherwise provided, in all judicial, legislative, or administrative
proceedings, a patient or the patient’s authorized representative has a privilege
to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness from disclosing:
(1) Communications relating to diagnosis or treatment of the patient; or
(2) Any information that by its nature would show the existence of a medical
record of the diagnosis or treatment.
Similarly, § 9-121 (“Communications between licensed social worker and client”) provides
in relevant part: 
(b) Unless otherwise provided, in all judicial or administrative proceedings, a
client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness from
disclosing, communications made while the client was receiving counseling
or any information that by its nature would show that such counseling
occurred.
Nothing in the relevant statutes purports to make the privileges absolute.  Indeed, the statutes
provide for certain exceptions, not relevant here, and, like other evidentiary privileges, the
privilege holder may waive the privilege.  See §§ 9-109(d); 9-121(d) and (e).  
5
In this case, Respondent sought the minor victim’s records held by a private
counseling center.  There is no dispute that the records sought are privileged mental health
records  and that the victim at no time waived the privilege.  As phrased by Petitioner, this
6
case involves a “tug of war” between the right of the victim to assert his or her privilege to
 For a detailed discussion of the psychotherapist-patient and social worker-client
5
privileges in Maryland, see generally Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence State and Federal
§§ 504, 512 (3d ed. 2013).
 Although the records at issue in this case apparently include communications to
6
psychiatrists as well as to clinical social workers, and therefore may be covered by both § 9-
109 and § 9-121, for purposes of this opinion, we shall simply refer to the privilege covering
these records collectively as the “psychotherapist-patient privilege.”  
8
prevent disclosure of confidential mental health records and the right of a criminal defendant
to present a fair defense at trial.  See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Md. Decl. of Rts. Art. 21. 
Specifically, a criminal defendant has a “right to put before a jury evidence that might
influence the determination of guilt,” or, in other words, a right to obtain and present
exculpatory evidence.  Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56, 107 S. Ct. at 1000, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 56.  In
addition, the Sixth Amendment provides the criminal defendant with the right to confront
witnesses, which is achieved through cross-examination.  See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,
315, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1974).  We addressed this conflict of rights,
albeit in dicta, in Goldsmith v. State, 337 Md. 112, 651 A.2d 866 (1995).
Goldsmith v. State
In Goldsmith, the defendant was charged with and convicted of sexual child abuse,
and other related offenses, of his stepdaughter.  337 Md. at 115, 651 A.2d at 868.  During
pre-trial discovery, the defendant sought access to the minor victim’s psychotherapy records,
asserting “(1) that the complainant [had] been in treatment with [her] psychologist[] for over
four years, and (2) that a police detective related that it took years of counseling for the
complainant to summon the courage to bring these charges against her stepfather.”  337 Md.
at 116, 651 A.2d at 868.  The trial judge denied Goldsmith’s motion on the basis of the
victim’s asserted privilege.  337 Md. at 119, 651 A.2d at 869.  Notably, “the motions judge
precluded the pre-trial discovery review of [the therapist’s] records[, but] [t]he defense was
not precluded from calling [the therapist] when the case actually went to trial.”  Id. (emphasis
9
in original).  The therapist, however, was never called to testify at trial.  Id.  
On appeal, this Court affirmed the denial of pre-trial discovery of the victim’s
privileged mental health records under Md. Rule 4-264.   Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 123, 651
7
A.2d at 871 (“Md. Rule 4-264 means what it says and precludes pre-trial discovery of a
victim’s privileged psychotherapist-patient records.”).  Noting that “an accused has limited
pre-trial discovery rights,” we further held that there is no state or federal constitutional right
that “establishes a pre-trial right of a defendant to discovery review of a potential witness’s
privileged psychotherapy records.”  Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 121, 127, 651 A.2d at 870, 873. 
In other words, the rule announced in Goldsmith is that a criminal defendant is never entitled
to pre-trial discovery of a victim’s privileged mental health records (absent waiver by the
privilege holder).  See id.; see also Thomas v. State, 372 Md. 342, 358-59, 812 A.2d 1050,
1060 (2002) (affirming the trial court’s holding that a witness’s psychotherapy records “are
privileged and therefore not discoverable” where the defendant sought to obtain those records
during pre-trial discovery); Fisher v. State, 128 Md. App. 79, 126, 736 A.2d 1125, 1150
(1999) (“With respect to a defendant’s entitlement to review [privileged psychotherapy
records] pretrial, the privilege is an absolute bar and there is no such entitlement under any
circumstance[.]”).
 Maryland Rule 4-264 governs pre-trial subpoenas for tangible evidence in criminal
7
cases.  As we stated in Goldsmith, “[p]re-trial production of ‘documents’ or ‘other tangible
things’ under Md. Rule 4-264 is discretionary, requiring a motion and a court order.  As such,
it does not guarantee a criminal defendant the absolute right to subpoena and examine the
private records of every private individual or entity that may conceivably possess exculpatory
records.”  337 Md. at 122, 651 A.2d at 871.
10
The Court’s discussion in Goldsmith did not end there, however.  We distinguished
between three scenarios: (1) pre-trial discovery of privileged information; (2) disclosure of
merely confidential (rather than privileged) information; and (3) disclosure of privileged
information for use at trial.  As we have seen, a victim’s privilege is an absolute bar to
disclosure of privileged mental health records during pre-trial discovery.  The other two
categories, the Court said, are not barred absolutely, but may be available to the criminal
defendant, if the defendant makes the requisite showing of need.   
8
With regard to the disclosure of privileged information at trial, although the issue was
not presented by the facts in Goldsmith, we “distinguish[ed] between a defendant’s right of
access to information during pre-trial discovery as opposed to the defendant’s
constitutionally based right at trial to fairly present a defense” and “recognize[d] that the
defendant’s constitutional rights at trial may outweigh the victim’s right to assert a privilege.” 
337 Md. at 129, 651 A.2d at 874 (emphasis in original).  Without further analysis, we noted
that the particular constitutional rights at issue are the rights to confrontation and compulsory
process.  
9
 We discuss in Section II, infra, the standard for determining when the defendant has
8
made a sufficient showing of need.  As we shall explain, the burden on the defendant is
higher for privileged information as compared to merely confidential information.
 For a discussion on these and other constitutional rights potentially implicated in this
9
context, as well as a thorough discussion of the conflict between a criminal defendant’s trial
rights and a victim/witness’s right to assert a privilege, see generally Clifford S. Fishman,
Defense Access to a Prosecution Witness’s Psychotherapy or Counseling Records, 86 Or. L.
Rev. 1 (2007).
11
In distinguishing a defendant’s limited right to pre-trial discovery from the
defendant’s use of privileged information at trial, we also reasoned that the trial judge would
be in a better position to protect the interests of both parties (the defendant and the
victim/witness) when evaluating a trial subpoena as opposed to a pre-trial discovery request. 
“The balancing of the defendant’s need for exculpatory information against the need to
protect the victim’s psychotherapist-patient privilege will be a much more informed decision
at trial.”  Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 131, 651 A.2d at 875.  Similarly, because at that point the
trial judge knows that the case is actually going to trial, “the trial judge will be in a better
position to determine what the contested issues are and evaluate the relevancy of the
information the defense is seeking.”  Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 131-32, 651 A.2d at 876.  We
also noted that in contrast to a pre-trial subpoena under Md. Rule 4-264, which is only for
documents or other tangible evidence, “a trial subpoena duces tecum under Md. Rule 4-265
covers the witness as well as documents or tangible evidence.  Therefore, when conducting
an in camera review . . . , the trial judge may be able to enlist the psychotherapist’s assistance
in locating relevant portions of the notes, as well as interpreting the notes.”  Goldsmith, 337
Md. at 131, 651 A.2d at 875.  Accordingly, we concluded that under some circumstances a
criminal defendant’s constitutional rights will trump a victim’s right to assert a privilege
during the defendant’s trial.  See Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 133-34, 651 A.2d at 876-77.
Jaffee v. Redmond 
Petitioner contends that Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 135 L. Ed.
12
2d 337 (1996), decided one year after Goldsmith, casts doubt on this Court’s analysis in
Goldsmith.   Jaffee involved a civil lawsuit against a police officer by the survivors of a man
10
shot and killed by the police officer.  518 U.S. at 4, 116 S. Ct. at 1925, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 341. 
Upon learning that the officer had participated in numerous counseling sessions with a
licensed clinical social worker, the family members sought access to the social worker’s
records of those sessions for use in cross-examination.  Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 5, 116 S. Ct. at
1926, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 342.  The police officer and the social worker refused to produce
those documents, or answer questions about them in depositions and trial, on the basis that
they were protected by a psychotherapist-patient privilege.  Id.  The trial judge rejected the
notion that the counseling records were privileged, and therefore instructed the jury that they
could “presume that the contents of the notes would have been favorable to [the family
members].”  Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 5-6, 116 S. Ct. at 1926, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 342.  The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that a psychotherapist-
patient privilege protected the confidential communications between the police officer and
the social worker, unless, in the interests of justice, the need for disclosure “outweighs that
patient’s privacy interests.”  Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 6-7, 116 S. Ct. at 1926, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 342-
43. 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, recognizing for the first time a
 We note that, to date, the Supreme Court has not considered the precise issue of this
10
case, i.e., whether a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights can outweigh a victim’s right
to assert a privilege.
13
“psychotherapist-patient privilege” that extends to a patient’s confidential communications
made to both licensed psychiatrists/psychologists and licensed social workers “in the course
of psychotherapy.”  Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15, 116 S. Ct. at 1931, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 348.   The
11
Supreme Court rejected, however, the application of a balancing test, which, as proposed by
the Seventh Circuit, would weigh the need for the evidence against the protection of the
privilege.  Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17-18, 116 S. Ct. at 1932, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 349-50 (“Making
the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of the relative
importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure would
eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege.”).  Thus, explaining and relying on the societal
benefits of the privilege,  the Supreme Court held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege
12
 In determining whether to recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege under the
11
federal rules of evidence, the question before the Supreme Court in Jaffee was “whether a
privilege protecting confidential communications between a psychotherapist and her patient
‘promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence[.]’” 
The Supreme Court concluded that “[b]oth ‘reason and experience’ persuade us that it does.” 
518 U.S. at 9-10, 116 S. Ct. at 1928, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 344 (citations omitted).
 The Supreme Court explained that: 
12
Like the spousal and attorney-client privileges, the psychotherapist-patient
privilege is ‘rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust.’ Ibid.
Treatment by a physician for physical ailments can often proceed successfully
on the basis of a physical examination, objective information supplied by the
patient, and the results of diagnostic tests.  Effective psychotherapy, by
contrast, depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the
patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions,
memories, and fears.  Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for
which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential
communications made during counseling sessions may cause embarrassment
(continued...)
14
was an absolute bar to disclosure in that case.  Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17, 116 S. Ct. at 1932, 135
L. Ed. 2d at 349.  Importantly, however, the majority opinion noted in closing that “we do
not doubt that there are situations in which the privilege must give way, for example, if a
serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure
by the therapist.”  Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19, 116 S. Ct. at 1932 n.19, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 349
n.19.
We disagree with Petitioner that Jaffee is inconsistent with Goldsmith.  First, Jaffee
is a civil case; the Supreme Court was not faced with the significant constitutional rights at
play in a criminal trial.   Second, we find Footnote 19 instructive, as it specifically leaves
13
the door open for situations where the privilege could yield to some greater interest.  In
arguing that Jaffee is inconsistent with Goldsmith, Petitioner asserts that “[n]otably, the
[Supreme] Court did not include the circumstance present here—it did not suggest that a
criminal defendant’s constitutional rights of confrontation or compulsory process would
merit abrogation of the privilege.”  The exclusion of this situation in the Court’s analysis
(...continued)
or disgrace.  For this reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may impede
development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful
treatment. 
518 U.S. at 10, 116 S. Ct. at 1928, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 344-45 (footnote omitted).  As we shall
explain, we do not disagree with this explanation of the societal benefits of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.
 Indeed, since Jaffee several federal district courts have reached this very conclusion. 
13
See, e.g., Bassine v. Hill, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1185 (D. Or. 2006) (distinguishing Jaffee
as “a civil case with no confrontation clause or due process considerations implicated”).
15
does not suggest that the Supreme Court meant to foreclose that possibility (or any other
possible scenario where a privilege might yield to some greater interest).  Certainly, the issue
of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights was not relevant to or at issue in that civil case
and, therefore, the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider it.  For the same reason, we
also conclude that the fact that the Supreme Court rejected the use of a balancing test in the
context of that case does not mean that a balancing test may never be appropriate.  Moreover,
the Supreme Court made it very clear that “[a] rule that authorizes the recognition of new
privileges on a case-by-case basis makes it appropriate to define the details of new privileges
in a like manner.”  Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18, 116 S. Ct. at 1932, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 349.  The
Jaffee majority further explained, “[b]ecause this is the first case in which we have
recognized a psychotherapist privilege, it is neither necessary nor feasible to delineate its full
contours in a way that would ‘govern all conceivable future questions in this area.’” Id.
(citation omitted).
Although in the dissenting opinion Justice Scalia cautioned that “[f]or the rule
proposed [by the Jaffee majority], the victim is more likely to be some individual who is
prevented from proving a valid claim–or (worse still) prevented from establishing a valid
defense[,]”  Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 19, 116 S. Ct. at 1932-33, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 350 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), it appears that the lower federal courts are split as to whether a criminal
defendant’s right to present a “valid defense” under the Sixth Amendment will trump the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.  See, e.g., United States v. Shrader, 716 F. Supp. 2d 464,
16
471-72 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (noting that “[s]ince Jaffee, courts have differed on whether the
Sixth Amendment can trump the psychotherapist-patient privilege” but “find[ing] that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is not subordinate to the Sixth Amendment rights of
[d]efendant” in that case); United States v. Mazzola, 217 F.R.D. 84, 88 (D. Mass. 2003)
(“Unlike the circumstance at issue in Jaffee, this case is a criminal prosecution involving the
medical records of a key government witness.  The evidentiary benefit of allowing access to
such medical records to defense counsel in order to effectively prepare and cross examine
[the witness] is great.”); United States v. Hansen, 955 F. Supp. 1225, 1226 (D. Mont. 1997)
(holding that in the context of a criminal case, the defendant’s demonstrated need for the
records outweighed the witness’s privilege, and noting that this was “consistent with the
Jaffee Court’s intent that the precise contours of the privilege be developed in specific
cases”). 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s holding in Jaffee established a testimonial privilege
under the federal rules of evidence based on “reason and experience.”  Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10,
116 S. Ct. at 1928, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 344.  By contrast, as the Supreme Court noted, all of our
sister states have codified “some form of psychotherapist privilege” by statute.  Jaffee, 518
U.S. at 12, 116 S. Ct. at 1929, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 346.  Of those that have reached the issue, the
majority of state courts (and at least one legislature)  agree that a victim’s privilege may be
14
 See State v. Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d 180, 194 (Iowa 2013) (discussing Iowa Code
14
Ann. § 622.10, amended in 2011, providing for an in camera review of privileged
information in a criminal trial “[u]pon a showing of a reasonable probability that the
(continued...)
17
subordinate to a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights at trial.   See State v. Slimskey,
15
779 A.2d 723 (Conn. 2001); Burns v. State, 968 A.2d 1012 (Del. 2009); State v. Peseti, 65
P.3d 119 (Hawai’i 2003); State v. Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 2013); Com. v. Dwyer,
448 Mass. 122 (2006); Com. v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554 (Ky. 2003); People v. Stanaway,
521 N.W.2d 557 (Mich. 1994); State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 1992); State v. King,
34 A.3d 655 (N.H. 2011); State v. L.J.P., 637 A.2d 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994);
State v. Blake, 63 P.3d 56 (Utah 2002); State v. Green, 646 N.W.2d 298 (Wisc. 2002).  But
see People v. Turner, 109 P.3d 639 (Colo. 2005); State v. Famiglietti, 817 So.2d 901 (Fla.
App. 2002); In re Subpoena to Crisis Connection, Inc., 949 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. 2011); Com.
v. Wilson, 602 A.2d 1290 (Pa. 1992).
Although we disagree with Petitioner that Jaffee obligates this Court to hold that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is an absolute bar to disclosure, we certainly do not disagree
with the Supreme Court’s evaluation of the societal value of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.  See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10-11, 116 S. Ct. at 1928-29, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 344-45
(...continued)
privileged records sought may likely contain exculpatory information that is not available
from any other source”). 
 We do not suggest that all states approach this conflict of rights the same way.  As
15
we noted in Goldsmith, some states require the privilege holder to waive the privilege once
the defendant makes the requisite showing; if he or she fails to waive the privilege for the
purpose of conducting an in camera review, then the witness’s testimony is stricken at trial. 
See Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 134 n.9, 651 A.2d at 877 n.9 (citing cases in Connecticut,
Nebraska, and Michigan).  In addition, some states also allow for pre-trial discovery of the
privileged records once a criminal defendant has made the requisite preliminary showing of
need.  See, e.g., Com. v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 561-62 (Ky. 2003).
18
(“The psychotherapist privilege serves the public interest by facilitating the provision of
appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem. 
The mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of
transcendent importance.”).  Indeed, it is because of the importance of the privilege that we
iterated a balancing test in Goldsmith, and held that defendant must meet a heavy burden to
access privileged information, which we discuss next.  Accordingly, we hold that a victim’s
right to assert a privilege in his or her mental health records may yield to the criminal
defendant’s constitutional rights at trial. 
II. When is the defendant entitled to a review of the privileged records?
Just as the victim does not have an absolute privilege against disclosure of
psychotherapy records, nor does a defendant have an absolute right to obtain those records
for use at trial.  Our stated purpose in Goldsmith was “to strike a balance between the
competing interests of a witness’s privilege and a defendant’s federal and state constitutional
rights to obtain and present evidence necessary to the defense.”  337 Md. at 121, 651 A.2d
at 870.  To achieve this goal, we held that a defendant must meet a minimum threshold to be
entitled to an in camera review of the evidence.  See Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 132, 651 A.2d
at 876.  We reiterate that a balancing test followed by an in camera review is the appropriate
method to protect both the defendant’s constitutional rights and the victim’s privacy rights
in his or her mental health records.
19
Preliminary Showing (“Proffer”)
Before a victim’s privilege will bend to the defendant’s need, a defendant must make
a preliminary showing, which in turn must meet the threshold established in Goldsmith.  If
the defendant is able to make a sufficient proffer, then the trial judge is required to conduct
an in camera review of the privileged records to determine whether the records actually
contain exculpatory material.
As previously discussed, the Goldsmith court outlined three scenarios:  (1) pre-trial
discovery of privileged information; (2) pre-trial discovery of merely confidential (rather than
privileged) information; and (3) disclosure of privileged information at trial.  Goldsmith dealt
conclusively with the first scenario–holding that a victim’s privilege in psychotherapy
records is an absolute bar to a criminal defendant’s pre-trial discovery request for those
documents.  With regard to the other two scenarios, Goldsmith set out a standard for
obtaining review of the requested information.  Although the information sought in this case
was privileged, we point out for purposes of clarity that to obtain access to confidential
information, not subject to a statutory or common law privilege, Goldsmith provides that a
defendant must “show a likelihood of obtaining relevant information.”  337 Md. at 128, 651
A.2d at 874.  This test has its genesis in Zaal v. State, 326 Md. 54, 602 A.2d 1247 (1992),
which dealt with a criminal defendant’s subpoena to obtain a minor victim’s educational
records (which are confidential but not privileged).
With regard to the disclosure of privileged records at trial, however, the Goldsmith
20
court stated in no uncertain terms that “in order to abrogate a privilege such as to require
disclosure at trial of privileged records, a defendant must establish a reasonable likelihood
that the privileged records contain exculpatory information necessary for a proper defense.” 
337 Md. at 133-34, 651 A.2d at 877 (footnote omitted).  Moreover, “the required showing
must be more than the fact that the records ‘may contain evidence useful for impeachment
on cross-examination.’”  Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 133, 651 A.2d at 876 (citing People v.
Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 576 (Mich. 1994)).  At the hearing on Goldsmith’s request for
the privileged mental health records, defense counsel proffered that “[w]here the facts are
that you have an adult bringing charges that go back over ten years . . . there [was] a question
about the complainant’s emotional state, and I think that’s tied into the credibility.  I mean,
I simply don’t know what her emotional state is.”  Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 118, 651 A.2d at
869.  That proffer, which we dubbed a “speculative assertion that the records might be
relevant for impeachment[,]” did not cut it.  Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 135, 651 A.2d at 877.
The Court of Special Appeals addressed this issue in a subsequent case, Fisher v.
State, 128 Md. App. 79, 736 A.2d 1125 (1999).  In Fisher, three defendants were convicted
of second-degree murder, child abuse, and conspiracy to commit child abuse related to
defendants’ treatment of two minor children, one of whom had died as a result of abuse and
neglect.  128 Md. App. at 87-88, 736 A.2d at 1129-30.  Leading up to trial, the defendants
sought access to the psychotherapy records of the still living child, which the trial court
denied.  Fisher, 128 Md. App. at 114-17, 736 A.2d at 1148-50.  On appeal, the Court of
21
Special Appeals affirmed, concluding that defense counsel’s proffer, namely the assertion
that “[w]e have no way of knowing, without having access to those records, whether there
is exculpatory material or not,” “does not do it.”  Fisher, 128 Md. App. at 128, 736 A.2d at
1151.  Relying on this Court’s opinion in Goldsmith and its own earlier opinion in Reynolds
v. State, 98 Md. App. 348, 633 A.2d 455 (1993), the intermediate appellate court explained,
“there is a threshold that must be crossed before it is even appropriate for the trial judge to
review such records in camera[,] . . . [and] it is the defendant who bears that burden of
showing the necessity for a review. . . .  Absent such a showing, not even the judge himself
should review the privileged material[.]” Fisher, 128 Md. App. at 124-25, 736 A.2d at 1149
(citations and quotations to Reynolds omitted).
In Reynolds, which was decided prior to Goldsmith, the Court of Special Appeals
considered precisely when a trial judge should conduct an in camera review of privileged
records.   There, the court stated “[t]he trial judge . . . should not make an in camera review
16
of each and every document that contains privileged information.  The patient’s claim of
privilege shall be honored unless the need for inspection has been established.”  Reynolds,
98 Md. App. at 369, 633A.2d at 464.  To show the “need for inspection” (i.e., to cross the
 In that case, the defendant was charged and convicted of sexual abuse of his minor
16
daughter.  The defendant made a pretrial request to review the daughter’s mental health
records, which the trial judge denied.  Reynolds, 98 Md. App. at 361, 633 A.2d at 461. 
Although the appellate court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on a separate
issue, the court offered guidance to the parties and the trial court should the privileged mental
health records issue arise during the new trial.  Reynolds, 98 Md. App. at 364, 633 A.2d at
461. 
22
threshold), the intermediate appellate court continued, “[t]he burden is on the defendant to
persuade the trial judge that there is a substantial possibility that . . . although privileged, the
records contain information that might influence the determination of guilt.”  Id.  We note
that the Court of Special Appeals in Fisher cited both the Reynolds iteration of the threshold
as well as the standard we enunciated in Goldsmith, holding that defense counsel’s proffer
failed either way.  See Fisher, 128 Md. App. at 128, 736 A.2d at 1151.  Although a
reasonable mind would conclude that “information that might influence the determination
of guilt” (Reynolds) is practically equivalent to “exculpatory information necessary for a
proper defense” (Goldsmith), we take this opportunity to clarify that Maryland courts should
utilize the Goldsmith standard in analyzing a defendant’s proffer for access to privileged
mental health records.   
17
 For a list of the various standards used by our sister states, see Fishman, supra note
17
9, at 39-41, stating: 
[C]ourts have used a variety of terms to articulate the appropriate standard.
These formulations vary in what the defendant must seek to show, and how
persuasively the defendant must show it, in order to trigger the in camera
review by the court. 
How is one to rank, in difficulty of proof, “a reasonable ground to believe,” “a
reasonable probability,” “a reasonable belief,” “a reasonable likelihood,” “a
good-faith belief, grounded on some demonstrable fact,” and “reasonable
certainty”? How is one to compare “would likely impair his right to impeach
the witness,” “material information necessary to [the] defense,” “information
. . . relevant and  material to the issue before the court,” “evidence favorable
to the accused and material to guilt or punishment, including impeachment
evidence,” “exculpatory information necessary for a proper defense,”
“exculpatory evidence which is relevant and material to the issue of the
(continued...)
23
In neither Goldsmith nor Fisher did the defendant present a sufficient proffer.  In
Goldsmith, defense counsel asserted that “there [was] a question about the complainant’s
emotional state, and I think that’s tied into the credibility.  I mean, I simply don’t know what
her emotional state is.”  Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 118, 651 A.2d at 869.  Similarly, in Fisher,
defense counsel stated “[w]e have no way of knowing, without having access to those
records, whether there is exculpatory material or not.”  Fisher, 128 Md. App. at 128, 736
A.2d at 1151.  In the words of the Court of Special Appeals, these proffers “do[] not do it.” 
Id.
In the instant case, defense counsel proffered that: “I’d like to see the records, one,
to know what is this young man’s mental health diagnosis.  Is he, is he bipolar?  Is he
paranoid schizophrenic?  Is he delusional?  Does he have hallucinations . . . . if he’s
delusional, and if [he] has hallucinations, I believe . . . that’s exculpatory for [Respondent’s]
case.”  The trial judge concluded that this “fishing expedition”  was not enough to pierce
18
the victim’s privilege.  In reversing, the Court of Special Appeals held that the suggestion
regarding the apparent need to know the victim’s propensity for veracity was enough to at
(...continued)
defendant’s guilt,” i.e., “material information necessary to the defense,”
“exculpatory evidence . . . which would be favorable to [the] defense” (is there
any other kind of “exculpatory evidence”?), and “necessary to a determination
of guilt or innocence”?  (Footnotes omitted.)
 Defense counsel even conceded that this was a fishing expedition, stating to the trial
18
judge: “if you wish to call it a fishing expedition, it may be because I have no idea what these
records may contain.”
24
least warrant an in camera review.
We disagree.  A “fishing expedition,” without more, does not satisfy the Goldsmith
standard.  The mere generalized suggestion “that it would be appropriate to know of [J.C.’s]
propensity for veracity” is not enough to overcome the victim’s privilege in his mental health
records.  As stated in Goldsmith, a “speculative assertion that the records might be relevant
for impeachment” will not cut it.  337 Md. at 135, 651 A.2d at 877.  Moreover, under the
intermediate appellate court’s rationale in this case, it is arguable that any defendant would
be able to pierce the victim’s privilege, because it would always be “appropriate to know [the
victim’s] propensity for veracity.”  We stated as much in Goldsmith: “We cannot permit a
privilege to be abrogated even at the trial stage by the mere assertion that privileged records
may contain information relevant to credibility.  To do so would virtually destroy the
psychotherapist-patient privilege of crime victims.”  337 Md. at 133, 651 A.2d at 876
(emphasis in original). 
We recognize how unlikely it may be that a defendant or defense counsel will know
in advance what information is in a patient’s privileged mental health or psychotherapy
records.  Nonetheless, in order to gain access to any information in those records, the
defendant may (and must) be able to point to some fact outside those records that makes it
reasonably likely that the records contain exculpatory information.   We look to our sister
19
 Petitioner urges this Court to require a more formal hearing, including the
19
application of the Rules of Evidence, where the defendant must present “credible evidence”
to show a likelihood that the records sought contain exculpatory evidence.  We decline the
(continued...)
25
states for examples of facts that could  reveal a likelihood that the privileged records contain
20
exculpatory evidence.  One such example is evidence of prior inconsistent statements.  In
State v. Peseti, the victim’s sister testified that the victim had on one occasion “admitted that
the incident ‘didn’t happen.’” 65 P.3d 119, 129.  Similarly, in Brooks v. State, 33 So. 3d
1262, 1269 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007), other records produced by the State during discovery
included an inconsistent statement by the victim.  Another example is strange behavior by
the victim surrounding the counseling sessions, such as Burns v. State, 968 A.2d 1012 (Del.
2009), where the victim destroyed notes about alleged abuses after an interview with her
psychiatrist.  People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557 (Mich. 1994), a case cited by this Court
in Goldsmith, also provides a useful example of a defendant pointing to actual facts to
support a proffer that the mental health records likely contained exculpatory evidence.  In
that case, the defense’s theory was “that the claimant is a troubled, maladjusted child whose
past trauma has caused her to make a false accusation.”  In support of a request to review the
claimant’s mental health records, the defendant pointed to prior abuse of claimant by her
biological father and factual support for sexually aggressive behavior by the victim. 
(...continued)
invitation.  In our view, the Goldsmith standard is enough to protect the victim’s privacy
interests and right to assert a privilege, and creates a sufficient burden on defendant, such that
we see no reason to require the defendant’s proffer to adhere to the Rules of Evidence. 
 We purposefully use the conditional here because the nature of this situation
20
necessarily requires a fact-specific inquiry.  For that reason, moreover, the evaluation of the
sufficiency of a defendant’s proffer is a matter left, in the first instance, to the sound
discretion of the trial judge.
26
Although the trial court denied the defendant’s request, the Supreme Court of Michigan held,
based on defendant’s proffer, that in camera review “may have been proper” and remanded
for further proceedings, including to further develop the record.  521 N.W.2d at 576-77.
Respondent in this case offered no such factual predicate to show a likelihood that the
victim’s psychotherapy records contained exculpatory information.  On the contrary, defense
counsel merely proffered that “if he’s delusional, and if [he] has hallucinations, I believe .
. . that’s exculpatory for [Respondent’s] case.”  In effect, all defense counsel proposed were
hypotheticals–in other words, too many “if’s.”  The Court of Special Appeals concluded that
the “suggest[ion] that it would be appropriate to know of [J.C.’s] propensity for veracity. .
. . [was] sufficient, at the very least, to call for an in camera review of the records to
determine their relevance, vis a vis [Respondent’s] constitutional rights, before ruling on
[National Pike’s motion].”  Although we do not disagree that it would be “appropriate to
know of [J.C.’s] propensity for veracity,” that alone is not enough to outweigh a victim’s
right to assert the privilege in the victim’s mental health records.  See Goldsmith, 337 Md.
at 128 n.5, 651 A.2d at 874 n.5 (“Merely stating ‘suppose’ the victim did this or said that is
not a proffer sufficient to establish a need for the records.”).  As we have repeated, we must
weigh the defendant’s need for the evidence with the victim’s privacy right in privileged
records.   Based on this record, Respondent’s proffer did not meet the required threshold and
21
 We cannot emphasize enough that this determination must be made on a case-by-
21
case basis.  Moreover, there may be other factors that are appropriate for the trial judge to
consider, such as whether the requested information is available from another source.
27
he is therefore not entitled to review J.C.’s counseling records for evidence regarding J.C.’s
propensity for veracity.  Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals’s conclusion was in error
and there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to conduct an
in camera review of the records. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED.  
CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT
OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
WITH
DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY.
RESPONDENT TO PAY COSTS IN
THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS.  
28