Case Title: Murray v. State Board of Regents

Citation: 194 Kan. 686, 401 P.2d 898

Docket Number: 43,836, 44,018

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1965-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
194 Kan. 686 (1965)
401 P.2d 898
EDWARD F. MURRAY, SR., and ESTHER M. MURRAY, his wife, Appellants,
v.
STATE BOARD OF REGENTS, of the State of Kansas, Appellee.
Nos. 43,836 and 44,018

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 15, 1965.
Robert K. Weary, of Junction City, argued the cause, and Ulysses S. Weary and E.S. Barnhill, both of Junction City, were with him on the briefs for the appellants.
Charles S. Arthur, Special Assistant Attorney General, of Manhattan, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
These appeals stem from a controversy over a condemnation proceeding brought by the State Board of Regents to acquire a tract of land on behalf of the Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, for engineering research.
Because of the rather complicated manner in which the appeals reached this court a chronological presentation of both the substantive and procedural facts will be helpful.
In the early spring of 1962, the Kansas State University was preparing to make application to the federal government for grants for the purpose of conducting radiation shielding and other nuclear *687 research programs. In order to qualify for the grants it was necessary that the university show control of a tract of land on which the nuclear research programs could be conducted.
On May 3, 1962, the Kansas State University Endowment Association entered into a lease agreement with Edward F. Murray and Esther, his wife. The lease covered one hundred seventy-five acres of land adjacent to the Fort Riley Military Reservation and was for a term of five years extending to April 30, 1967. The agreement also provided for an option to purchase which covered two hundred ninety acres of land, including the land under lease, for the sum of two hundred dollars per acre. The option to purchase extended to May 1, 1964.
The lease and option agreement provided:
The university subsequently received a grant from the federal government. It entered into possession of the leased land under a sub-lease from the Endowment Association and erected structures for the operation of certain phases of the radiation shielding program.
On June 5, 1963, the State Board of Regents filed a petition in the District Court of Riley County for the condemnation of the land covered by the lease. The petition stated in part:
The petition was approved by the court and appraisers were appointed. On September 11, 1963, the landowners filed a motion to dismiss the condemnation proceedings stating:
On September 18, 1963, the appraisers filed their report in which they appraised the value of the land taken, utilities and buildings, and severance damages at a total of $23,000. On September 30, 1963, the district court entered an order approving the appraisers' report and denying the landowners' motion to dismiss.
The landowners' motion for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss was also overruled on October 7, 1963, and they appealed to this court on October 11, 1963. This appeal was number 43,836.
On October 12, 1963, the landowners filed a petition for injunction seeking to have the State Board of Regents enjoined from "entering said premises, or attempting to appropriate, condemn or acquire said land in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of said option agreement...." The petition stated the same grounds for relief as were stated in its motion to dismiss, which have heretofore been presented.
The State Board of Regents filed a demurrer and a motion to dismiss. The district court, with the consent of counsel for both parties, then stayed all proceedings in both cases pending a decision of this court in the appeal, numbered 43,836, from the order overruling the motion to dismiss the condemnation proceedings.
Later the landowners filed a motion for a restraining order and temporary injunction stating that the defendant was making claims to the title of the property contrary to the trial court's stay order. On June 5, 1964, the district court overruled the motion finding it to be without merit as a matter of law and stating:
The plaintiffs, the landowners, have duly perfected their appeal to this court in the injunction proceedings which has been numbered 44,018.
Counsel for the parties agree that the facts and issues are the same and that determination of the issues raised in the appeal in the injunction case will also dispose of the issues presented in the appeal from the order refusing to dismiss the condemnation proceeding.
The controlling question to be determined is whether the appellee, the State Board of Regents, is estopped from condemning the land because of the lease and escrow agreement heretofore discussed.
The appellants contend that the Kansas State University Endowment Association was acting as agent for the State Board of Regents in making the lease and option agreement, and that the acquisition of appellants' land by condemnation is contrary to the provisions of the lease and option agreement entered into by its agent for its benefit. It follows that the basic foundation of the landowners' claim is agency, and if there is no agency there can be no claim of estoppel. Appellants do not dispute this basic conclusion.
We are forced to conclude that the Endowment Association was not, and could not have been, acting as agent for the State Board of Regents when it entered into the opinion agreement with the appellants.
The State Board of Regents had no authority to acquire land except by condemnation under the provisions of G.S. 1949 (now K.S.A.), 76-147 and the then existing condemnation statutes. The Board has only such authority as is granted to it by the legislature. Governmental agencies are creatures of the legislature, and can *690 exercise only such powers as are expressly conferred by law and those necessary to make effective the powers expressly conferred. (State, ex rel., v. City of Kansas City, 181 Kan. 870, 317 P.2d 806; State, ex rel., v. City of Overland Park, 192 Kan. 654, 391 P.2d 128). In State, ex rel., v. Regents of the University, 55 Kan. 389, 40 Pac. 656, this court in denying the Board of Regents the right to collect fees from students for use of the library because not authorized by the legislature held:
At a very early date this court stated in Kansas State Agricultural College v. Hamilton, 28 Kan. 376, p. 378:
In Hornaday v. State, 63 Kan. 499, 65 Pac. 656, we held that boards, such as the State Board of Regents, could acquire land only in the manner provided by the legislature. The opinion in the above case quoted with approval from Hornaday v. State, 62 Kan. 822, 62 Pac. 329, where it is stated at page 830 of the opinion:
The legislature has not seen fit to authorize the State Board of Regents to acquire land by negotiation and purchase, neither has the legislature seen fit to authorize the Board to negotiate options to purchase, and it had no authority to do so. No doubt the Endowment Association entered into the lease and option agreement for the purpose of assisting the Kansas State University in obtaining government grants for the purpose of conducting nuclear research programs, but its assistance could not go beyond the power of the University and the State Board of Regents to act. The Endowment Association could not by agreement, or under the claim of agency, *691 extend the power of the State Board of Regents beyond that granted by the legislature.
It necessarily results that the Endowment Association could not have legally acted as agent for the State Board of Regents in purchasing the land or in acquiring an option which it could neither legally ratify nor exercise. If the State Board of Regents is to acquire title to the land, it can be done only by condemnation.
Since no agency relationship could have existed between the Endowment Association and the State Board of Regents in the execution of the option agreement, there is no basis for applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the State Board of Regents in the proceedings to condemn the land in controversy.
It would appear that the lease and option agreement anticipated condemnation proceedings by the state or its agencies. The agreement specifically provided for the disposition of the proceeds under the following conditions:
What has been said renders unnecessary a determination of whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies to the State Board of Regents. It is also unnecessary to consider the right of appellants to appeal from the order overruling the motion to dismiss the petition for condemnation, since the issue involved in that appeal has been determined in the appeal from the order denying the temporary injunction.
The judgments of the district court are affirmed with instructions to dismiss the petition for injunction involved in appeal numbered 44,018, and to proceed, as provided by law, with the condemnation proceedings involved in appeal numbered 43,836.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.