Case Title: Sierra Club v. Stanek

Citation: 

Docket Number: 123023

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2023-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 123,023 
 
SIERRA CLUB, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JANET STANEK, in her Official Capacity as Secretary of the Kansas Department of  
Health and Environment, and the DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT,  
an Agency of the State of Kansas,  
Respondents/Appellees, 
 
and 
 
HUSKY HOGS, L.L.C., PRAIRIE DOG PORK L.L.C.,  
ROLLING HILLS PORK, L.L.C., and STILLWATER SWINE, L.L.C., 
Intervenors/Appellants. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
A case is moot when the actual controversy has ended and the only judgment that 
could be entered would be ineffectual for any purpose and would not impact any of the 
parties' rights. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed April 1, 2022. 
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; RICHARD D. ANDERSON, judge. Opinion filed June 2, 2023. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed, and the appeal is dismissed. 
 
Clayton J. Kaiser, of Foulston Siefkin LLP, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Gary L. Ayers and 
David M. Traster, of the same firm, were with him on the briefs for intervenors/appellants.  
 
Timothy J. Laughlin, of Schoonover & Moriarty, LLC, of Olathe, argued the cause, and Robert V. 
Eye, of Robert V. Eye Law Office, LLC, of Lawrence, was with him on the briefs for petitioner/appellee. 
 
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Arthur S. Chalmers, assistant attorney general, argued the cause, and M.J. Willoughby, assistant 
attorney general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for respondents/ 
appellees. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
STEGALL, J.:  Sierra Club challenges permits issued by the Kansas Department of 
Health and Environment in 2017 and 2018 to four different swine confined animal 
feeding operations, sometimes referred to as CAFOs. Because current circumstances have 
rendered Sierra Club's legal challenges moot, we dismiss the case.  
 
Husky Hogs, L.L.C. owned a swine facility in Phillips County, Kansas, which 
burned down in June of 2017. Soon after, Husky Hogs formulated a plan to rebuild and 
expand the swine operation. An important limit on any CAFO is found in K.S.A.  
65-1,180—which establishes minimum setbacks from surface water:   
 
"(a) The department shall not approve a permit for construction of a new swine 
facility or expansion of an existing swine facility unless the swine waste management 
system for the facility: 
 
. . . .  
 
(3) . . . is located:  (A) Not less than 500 feet from any surface water if the 
facility has an animal unit capacity of 3,725 or more; (B) not less than 250 feet from any 
surface water if the facility has an animal unit capacity of 1,000 to 3,724; or (C) not less 
than 100 feet from any surface water if the facility has an animal unit capacity of under 
1,000." 
 
 
Because the Husky Hogs' facility, in its pre-fire configuration, was located 250 
feet from Prairie Dog Creek, it was limited to a maximum of 3,724 animal units. Given 
this reality and their desire to carry more animal units, the rebuild planners formed a new 
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limited liability corporation named Prairie Dog Pork, L.L.C. Husky Hogs and other 
landowners then executed a quitclaim deed granting Prairie Dog Pork a portion of the 
Husky Hogs' property. Then, in 2017, each L.L.C., separately and independently, applied 
for and was ultimately granted a permit from KDHE. These 2017 permits were valid 
through December 10, 2022.  
 
Sierra Club protested, publicly commented on, and opposed KDHE's decision at 
every opportunity, arguing that Husky Hogs and Prairie Dog Pork were not legally 
"separate facilities" and therefore any permits allowing the two facilities to carry an 
aggregate of more than 3,724 animal units would violate the statutory setback 
requirements.  
 
 
At about that time, the same group of landowners had also created two additional 
L.L.C.s in order to further grow their carrying capacities. They formed C & J Swine 
L.L.C. (doing business as Rolling Hills Pork, L.L.C.) and Stillwater Swine, L.L.C. These 
L.L.C.s were created to operate CAFOs in Norton County and—similar to Husky Hogs 
and Prairie Dog Pork—they were located on adjoining land within 250 feet of surface 
water. Rolling Hills Pork and Stillwater Swine also applied for and were ultimately given 
permits from KDHE. These 2018 Permits were valid through April 26, 2023, and May 
24, 2023. Sierra Club again protested, publicly commented on, and opposed KDHE's 
decision at every appropriate administrative step, arguing that the CAFOs were not 
legally "separate facilities," and therefore the permits would violate the setback 
requirements for land carrying more than 3,724 animal units. 
 
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After the issuance of the 2017 and 2018 permits, Sierra Club filed this lawsuit. 
Relevant to today's decision, Sierra Club alleged the permits issued by KDHE to the four 
CAFOs violated the surface water setback requirements of K.S.A. 65-1,180. In 2019, 
Sierra Club prevailed in the district court. Noticing the obvious gamesmanship the 
CAFOs had undertaken to avoid the setback requirements, the district court held that 
because the CAFOs were self-contained in two geographic areas (one in Phillips County 
and one in Norton County) with contiguous borders, the 2017 and 2018 permits were 
unlawful. Which is to say that even though the CAFOs were distinct legal entities, they 
were effectively only one CAFO on each geographic footprint. The district court's ruling 
was bolstered considerably by one of KDHE's then-existing regulations which stated that 
CAFO facilities would not be considered separate facilities if they shared a common 
property line. See K.A.R. 28-18a-4(d) (2008 Supp.). The district court remanded the 
matter to KDHE and the CAFOs appealed.  
 
While the appeal from the district court's decision was pending, three critical 
changes occurred. First, the CAFOs deeded small strips of land across each geographic 
footprint to third-party L.L.C.s. In other words, they removed the shared property line to 
avoid the legal impact of K.A.R. 28-18a-4(d) (2008 Supp.). In 2021, KDHE also 
amended K.A.R. 28-18a-4(d) to remove any reference to a "contiguous ownership 
boundary." Following the amendment, the regulation only required separate CAFOs to 
have separate waste management systems. And finally, in light of the district court's 
ruling and the work-arounds described above, the CAFOs sought new permits in lieu of 
the 2017 and 2018 permits. So, in 2021, KDHE issued to the CAFOs four brand new 
permits which reflected both the new legal descriptions of the four facilities at issue as 
well as describing the newly required separate waste management systems. 
 
Nonetheless, Sierra Club continued to defend the appeal on the grounds that the 
2017 and 2018 permits were unlawful—while at the same time the CAFOs were arguing 
that Sierra Club lacked standing to bring its claims in the first place. In this factual and 
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procedural posture, the case reached the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals panel 
ended up agreeing with the CAFOs on the question of associational standing. As such, 
the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court with directions to dismiss 
the KJRA petition and "reinstate" the 2017 and 2018 permits (which were no longer 
operational). Sierra Club v. Stanek, No. 123,023, 2022 WL 983563, at *1 (Kan. App. 
2022) (unpublished opinion). 
 
Critically, along the way to its standing determination, the Court of Appeals ruled 
the case was not moot: 
 
"KDHE has failed to clearly and convincingly show '"the actual controversy has 
ended, the only judgment that could be entered would be ineffectual for any purpose, and 
it would not impact any of the parties' rights."' [State v. Roat,] 311 Kan. at 592. For these 
reasons, we find the issues on this appeal are not moot." 2022 WL 983563, at *13. 
 
This was error.  
 
The Kansas case-or-controversy requirement insists that Kansas courts do not 
consider moot questions. See Baker v. Hayden, 313 Kan. 667, 672, 490 P.3d 1164 (2021). 
A case is considered moot when a court determines that "'it is clearly and convincingly 
shown the actual controversy has ended, the only judgment that could be entered would 
be ineffectual for any purpose, and it would not impact any of the parties' rights.'" State v. 
Roat, 311 Kan. 581, 584, 466 P.3d 439 (2020). Mootness can occur when, over the 
course of litigation, something changes that renders any judicial decision ineffectual to 
impact the rights and interests of the parties before it. 311 Kan. at 596. Kansas courts do 
not render advisory opinions. State v. Cheever, 306 Kan. 760, 786, 402 P.3d 1126 (2017) 
("Because the Kansas Constitution's framework 'limit[s] the judicial power to actual cases 
and controversies,' Kansas courts do not have the power to give advisory opinions."), 
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Boothby, 310 Kan. 619, 448 P.3d 416 (2019); 
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NEA-Topeka, Inc. v. U.S.D. No. 501, 227 Kan. 529, 532, 608 P.2d 920 (1980) (A "court 
is without constitutional authority to render advisory opinions," because "[s]uch an 
opinion would go beyond the limits of determining an actual case or controversy and 
would violate the doctrine of separation of powers."). 
 
Here, no party has challenged or disputed the ongoing validity of the 2021 
permits. All parties agree that the CAFOs currently operate under the 2021 permits and 
that the 2017 and 2018 permits are inoperative. And yet, the only issues on appeal 
concern the 2017 and 2018 permits. Further, at oral argument before this court, the 
CAFOs clearly took the position that they are not asking us for the symbolic 
reinstatement of the 2017 and 2018 permits to allow them the option of removing the 
strips of land inserted between the facilities. The Court of Appeals improperly clouded 
the doctrine of mootness with its own notions of fundamental fairness when it observed 
that not addressing the merits of the dispute over the 2017 and 2018 permits would   
 
"deprive Permittees of their opportunity to seek reinstatement of their original permits. 
While it is true that Permittees managed to avoid the consequences of the district court's 
unfavorable interpretation of K.A.R. 28-18a-4(d) by inserting a buffer between their 
facilities, that solution should not cost Permittees the right to appeal their permits for 
adjacent facilities. And while Permittees could avoid the district court's interpretation of 
K.A.R. 28-18a-4(d) by reapplying for a permit now that the new regulation is in effect, 
they should not have to apply for a new or modified permit if they are already entitled to 
the permits as originally issued." Sierra Club, 2022 WL 983563, at *12. 
 
There may be limited exceptions to our mootness doctrines. For example, we have 
discussed the possibility of considering the merits of issues capable of repetition or 
presenting concerns of public importance. Roat, 311 Kan. at 585-90. But see Roat, 311 
Kan. at 603-04 (Stegall, J., concurring) (endorsing a jurisdictional approach to mootness, 
suggesting that when a case or controversy has ended, a court's jurisdiction and a party's 
standing, must also end); State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 285 Kan. 875, 888-98, 179 
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P.3d 366 (2008) (there is no live case or controversy when an issue is moot); Miller v. 
Insurance Management Assocs., Inc., 249 Kan. 102, 109-10, 815 P.2d 89 (1991) 
(mootness is a jurisdictional consideration); Graves v. State Board of Pharmacy, 188 
Kan. 194, 197, 362 P.2d 66 (1961) (A trial court "had no authority to enter any judgment 
other than a dismissal of the action" when an issue was moot.).  
 
But setting aside thornier questions of jurisdiction and allowing that certain 
exceptions to the mootness doctrine may exist, we are confident that a sense of unfairness 
to the prevailing party is not one of them. The CAFOs do not get to have their valid 2021 
permits and their advisory opinion too. Courts in Kansas do not have the power to correct 
abstract or theoretical wrongs, only real ones. And any wrongs Sierra Club may have 
suffered due to the 2017 and 2018 permits, it will continue to suffer under the 2021 
permits regardless of anything we might say in this case.   
 
Instead, the parties may litigate their actual dispute in other cases and 
administrative forums involving the operational 2021 permits (and potential successor 
permits). These venues are where the live controversy now resides. Any suggestion to the 
contrary merely encourages walking-dead arguments which "try to put flesh onto the 
skeleton of a hypothetical . . . claim." Roat, 311 Kan. at 597.  
 
In sum, the only question pending before both the district court and the Court of 
Appeals was the validity of the 2017 and 2018 permits. But the CAFOs are no longer 
operating under the 2017 and 2018 permits—and they were not when the case was before 
the Court of Appeals. By then, the legal boundaries of the CAFOs were not even the 
same as the boundaries described in the 2017 and 2018 permits. On top of that, the legal 
grounding of the district court ruling under review had substantively changed. Simply 
put, there was no longer any actual controversy concerning the 2017 and 2018 permits. 
There may have been an abstract argument about them, but that is not sufficient to 
establish an actual controversy affecting the parties' rights. Indeed, regardless of what any 
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court might say about the 2017 and 2018 permits, the CAFOs would be legally entitled to 
continue operations under the current status quo pursuant to their legally obtained and, at 
least in this case, unchallenged 2021 permits. 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the appeal is dismissed as 
moot.