Case Title: Bergeron v. Boyle

Citation: 176 Vt. 78, 2003 VT 89, 838 A.2d 918

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bergeron v. Boyle (2002-410); 176 Vt. 78; 838 A.2d 918

2003 VT 89

[Filed 24-Oct-2003]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2003 VT 89

                                No. 2002-410

  Robert and Cecile Bergeron	                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Chittenden Superior Court 

  Sidney Boyle	                                 March Term, 2003

  Mary Miles Teachout, J.

  Heather Rider Hammond and Robert F. O'Neill of Gravel and Shea, Burlington,
    for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

  Michael S. Gawne of Brown, Cahill, Gawne & Miller and Michael Rose (On the
    Brief), St. Albans, for Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Allen, C.J.
            (Ret.), Specially Assigned

        
       ¶  1.  SKOGLUND, J.   This case concerns a contract for the sale of
  real estate.  Plaintiffs Robert and Cecile Bergeron petitioned the
  Chittenden Superior Court for specific performance of their agreement with
  defendant Sidney Boyle to purchase 100 acres of his farm.  Following an
  evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that the parties entered
  into a valid, enforceable contract for the purchase and sale of defendant's
  farm, and granted plaintiffs' petition.  The court, however, denied
  plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees.  On appeal, defendant argues that
  Chittenden County was the improper venue for plaintiffs' action; that he
  properly revoked his offer to sell the farm prior to plaintiffs'
  acceptance; and that plaintiffs' consideration was illusory.  Plaintiffs
  cross-appeal, claiming that attorney's fees were available pursuant to the
  terms of their written agreement.  We affirm.  

       ¶  2.  The trial court found the following facts.  On July 11, 1999,
  plaintiffs, in response to a For Sale sign posted on defendant's property,
  met with defendant at defendant's home and inquired about the available
  realty.  Defendant indicated that he was selling 100 acres of his 150 acre
  farm in South Hero, Vermont, including a farmhouse and attendant
  outbuildings, at a price of $180,000.  With defendant's guidance,
  plaintiffs examined the acreage, farmhouse, and outbuildings.  During this
  examination, the parties discussed the subdivision configuration of the
  lot, as well as defendant's desire to use the farm's outbuildings for one
  year to enable sufficient time to move machinery, hay, and other equipment.  
  Plaintiffs also inquired about the zoning regulations affecting the
  property, and indicated that "in order to close [plaintiffs] wanted to be
  satisfied through investigation . . . at the Town Clerk's office that there
  were no problems with the title, encumbrances and liens, and any other
  legal defects of the property."

       ¶  3.  After inspecting the property, the parties discussed the price
  of the farm.  Plaintiffs requested a price reduction, but defendant
  maintained his asking price of $180,000.  Plaintiffs agreed to defendant's
  price and to provide a $5000 deposit, which defendant accepted.  Desiring
  to reduce the terms of their agreement to writing, defendant produced a
  blank, preprinted form provided to him earlier by a realtor entitled
  "Purchase and Sale Contract."  The Purchase and Sale Contract contains the
  following pre-printed language in clause two: "Purchaser hereby offers and
  agrees to buy the Property described herein at the price and on the terms
  and conditions stated herein."
   
       ¶  4.  Defendant proceeded to add the necessary information to the
  preprinted Purchase and Sale Contract.  In clause one, defendant handwrote
  both the plaintiff-purchasers' and defendant-seller's  names and addresses;
  in clause three, defendant identified the time agreed upon by the parties
  for acceptance as August 11; in clause four, defendant described the real
  property as "100 acres +/- . . . 493 RT 2 South Hero Grand Isle VT;" in
  clause five, the total purchase price was set at $180,000; and the contract
  deposit amount of $5000 was noted in clause six.  Under clause ten of the
  agreement, labeled "Special Conditions of Contract," defendant included two
  specific provisions: first, that "Purchaser will give seller 1 year from
  closing to move machinery, hay and other personal property off farm," and
  second, in response to plaintiffs' concern they would forfeit their deposit
  if defendant was unable to convey marketable title, defendant wrote that
  "[i]f purchaser revokes offer the $5000.00 deposit will be refunded." 
  Defendant then signed and dated the agreement under the section labeled
  Acceptance of Offer and Agreement to Sell, which states "Seller hereby
  accepts Purchaser's offer and agrees to sell the property at the price and
  upon the terms set forth in this contract and any addenda thereto." 
  Although willing, plaintiffs did not sign the agreement after defendant
  suggested that their signatures were unnecessary, but did provide defendant
  with a personal check in the amount of the agreed upon deposit.  The
  parties each kept a copy of the agreement.                

       ¶  5.  On the morning of July 21, defendant told plaintiffs' daughter
  that he no longer wanted to sell his farm.  The next day, defendant met
  with an attorney, who drafted a letter to plaintiffs, stating in part that
  "[d]ue to physical and emotional difficulties at this time [defendant] is
  withdrawing his offer to sell the property.  We are, therefore, enclosing
  your deposit check and apologize for any inconvenience."  The trial court
  determined that defendant's attorney mailed this letter after 4:00 p.m. on
  July 22.  Plaintiffs received this letter on July 23.

       ¶  6.  In the interim, plaintiffs' daughter had informed her parents
  of defendant's statement.  In response, plaintiffs signed their copy of the
  Purchase and Sale Contract.  Plaintiffs' daughter delivered the signed
  agreement to defendant on July 22.  On July 26, plaintiffs recorded a copy
  of the signed agreement in the Town Clerk's office.  On July 27,
  plaintiffs' attorney returned the deposit check to defendant's attorney,
  stating that plaintiffs "had accepted [defendant's] offer at 10:05 a.m. on
  July 22nd and had delivered a signed copy to [defendant] at 1:22 p.m.,
  before the offer to sell was withdrawn."  The attorney also noted that
  plaintiffs could close on the property within four or five days after
  receiving notice.  

       ¶  7.  The parties continued to communicate through their attorneys,
  and unsuccessfully attempted to resolve their dispute through mediation. 
  On August 26, 1999, plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory relief,
  specific performance, and attorney's fees in Chittenden Superior Court. 
  Defendant moved to dismiss based on improper venue, asserting that pursuant
  to 12 V.S.A. § 402(a), the case should be heard in Grand Isle County, the
  situs of the property at issue.  The court denied this motion, as well as
  the parties' subsequent cross-motions for summary judgment, finding that
  the contract at issue was ambiguous as a matter of law.  After additional
  pleadings and discovery, a merits hearing was held in April 2002.  The
  trial court found that the parties had formed a valid, enforceable contract
  and granted plaintiffs' request for  specific performance.  The court,
  however, denied plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees.
   
       ¶  8.  Defendant appealed to this Court on September 9, 2002. 
  Plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal on October 15, alleging that they are
  entitled to attorney's fees under the terms of the  Purchase and Sale
  Contract.  Defendant objected to plaintiffs' cross-appeal as untimely.  The
  trial court deemed plaintiffs' failure to timely file their cross-appeal
  excusable neglect, and allowed the cross-appeal to proceed to this Court. 
  Defendant now asks this Court to determine whether the trial court erred in
  concluding (1) that venue was proper, (2) that the parties entered into a
  valid, enforceable contract, and (3) whether plaintiffs are entitled to
  appeal the trial court's denial of attorney's fees.  We find no error in
  the trial court's ultimate conclusions. 

                                  I.  Venue

       ¶  9.  The threshold question in this appeal is whether Chittenden
  Superior Court was the proper venue in which to hear this action. 
  Defendant claims that plaintiffs' contract action seeking specific
  performance is one "concerning real estate" pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 402(a),
  thereby placing proper venue in Grand Isle County, where the property is
  located.  Plaintiffs argue, however, that this is a dispute over contract
  rights, not real estate.  The trial court agreed concluding that "[t]his is
  a suit about $5,000, not land," and denied defendant's motion to dismiss
  for improper venue.  While we disagree with the court's assessment of the
  nature of this action, we find that venue was proper in Chittenden County. 
  See Gochey v. Bombardier, Inc., 153 Vt. 607, 613, 572 A.2d 921, 925 (1990)
  (Court may affirm correct judgment on grounds other than those stated by
  trial court).

       ¶  10.  Section 402(a) of Title 12 establishes venue for actions in
  superior court:

    An action before a superior court shall be brought in the county
    in which one of the parties resides, if either resides in the
    state; otherwise, on motion, the complaint shall be dismissed.  If
    neither party resides in the state, the action may be brought in
    any county.  Actions concerning real estate shall be brought in
    the county in which the lands, or some part thereof, lie.

  In creating distinct trial venues based on the subject matter of the claim
  filed, this statute mirrors the common law distinction between local and
  transitory actions.  At common law, "[i]f the cause of action could have
  arisen in any place whatsoever, it was said to be transitory, and an action
  thereon might be brought in any county wherein the defendant was found." 
  Page v. Newbury, 113 Vt. 336, 338, 34 A.2d 218, 219 (1943).  If, on the
  other hand, "the cause of action could have arisen in one place only, it
  was local and suit could be brought only where the cause arose."  Id.  This
  dichotomy parallels that which exists between in personam and in rem
  jurisdiction.  Raphael J. Musicus, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 743 F.2d 503, 506 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 98
  Eng.Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1744)).  "The reason for this parallel is simply that,
  in order to provide in rem relief, the court must have jurisdiction over
  the real property at issue, and a local action must therefore be brought in
  the jurisdiction in which that real property is located."  Id.; see also
  Gerdel v. Gerdel, 132 Vt. 58, 62,