Case Title: State v. Taylor

Citation: 1997-Ohio-243

Docket Number: 19960119

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Taylor, Appellant. 
[Cite as State v. Taylor (1997), ____ Ohio St.3d _____.] 
Criminal law -- Aggravated murder -- Death penalty upheld -- 
Evidence sufficient for jury to have found prior calculation and design, 
when. 
 
(No. 96-119 -- Submitted September 25, 1996 -- Decided March 19, 
1997.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 65711. 
 
On November 24, 1992, defendant-appellant, Michael N. Taylor, shot 
and killed Marion “Donny” Alexander in a bar.  Despite appellant’s self-
defense claims, the jury found prior calculation and design, convicted 
appellant of aggravated murder, and recommended the death penalty. 
 
Between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m. on November 24, 1992, appellant, his 
girlfriend Sandra Paul, and David Roseborough arrived at the Club Seville, a 
bar in Garfield Heights.  Shortly thereafter, Marion “Donny” Alexander came 
in.  Alexander, a regular in the bar, greeted Darlene Youngblood and Debra 
Lymore, who both worked at the bar, as well as Denise Shephard, another 
 
2
regular.  They all sat around the main bar, but Alexander later took a seat 
alone at the nearby piano bar.  Alexander did not talk with Paul, whom he had 
formerly dated, nor to appellant, whom he had previously met. 
 
According to Shephard, Alexander acted quietly, and did not complain 
to or argue with appellant that night.  However, appellant, Paul, and 
Roseborough described Alexander as loud and boisterous.  Appellant and 
Paul claimed Alexander stared at them when they were dancing that night 
soon after they arrived at the club.  According to Roseborough, Alexander 
flashed a large roll of bills and said, “If a nig*** ain’t getting it like this, he 
ain’t suppose[d] to be in here.”  Paul recalled Alexander saying, “Any nig*** 
[who] did not have any money, wasn’t shit.”  Appellant believed Alexander 
was trying to humiliate him. 
 
Later, some twenty to thirty minutes after appellant, Paul, and 
Roseborough had arrived, Paul went to the jukebox to play music.  Alexander 
asked her to play a song for him.  Appellant, still seated at the main bar, 
objected to Alexander’s request.  Youngblood testified that appellant told 
 
3
Alexander, “Put your own goddamn dollar in the box.  My woman is not 
playing you no music.”  Roseborough recalled appellant said, “Man, I give her 
the money so she could play the music that we want to hear. *** If you want 
to hear some music, put your money in there like I did ***.” 
 
According to Youngblood, Alexander replied, “It ain’t no problem.  I 
have got a dollar here. *** I just asked her to play ***.”  According to 
Lymore, Alexander replied, “What’s the problem?  I have been knowing her.  
I talk to her when you are not around.”  Appellant again told Alexander, “Put 
your own goddamn dollar in there.”  Alexander and appellant glared at each 
other for a “couple of seconds,” but did not approach each other.  Then Paul 
walked back to where appellant was sitting. 
 
According to appellant’s friends, Alexander told appellant after the 
jukebox incident that “this is his bar, and he do[es] what *** he wants to do, 
[and] says what *** he wants,” and if appellant had “a problem with anything, 
I’m saying you can see me today, tomorrow.”  Alexander also allegedly 
cursed appellant as a “punk, hip mother fucker.”  It was asserted by the 
 
4
defense that when Paul was leaving the bar, Alexander said, “Bitch *** [I 
told] you not to bring this mother fucker up here to my bar.”  
 
When Paul got back to her seat, appellant told her, “Get your goddamn 
coat.  We’re getting out of here.”  Paul asked, “Can I drink my drink first *** 
[and] hear my music.”  Appellant told her he did not “have time for this ‘Kid’s 
shit,’ Let’s go.”  Within a minute, Paul had put her coat on and left the bar.  
Roseborough and appellant started to follow her, but Roseborough changed 
direction and walked over behind Alexander to the jukebox.  Appellant 
stopped a little past Alexander.  Roseborough said to appellant, “Look out,” 
and Alexander stood up and raised his hands.  Alexander told appellant, 
“Don’t start no shit and it won’t be no shit.”  
 
Appellant replied, “What did you say, mother fucker,” pulled out a 
semiautomatic 9 mm pistol, and shot Alexander several times.  After being 
shot three times, Alexander fell face down and tried to crawl away.  Then 
appellant walked closer to Alexander and fired three or four more shots into 
his back.  
 
5
 
Appellant testified that Alexander had blocked his way and pulled a 
gun on him as appellant walked out of the bar.  Appellant claimed he “thought 
[Alexander] was going to shoot *** [or] kill me.”  Roseborough testified that 
Alexander was reaching into his coat when appellant shot him. 
 
However, of those present, only appellant claimed that he saw 
Alexander with a gun.  Paul testified that Alexander always carried a gun, but 
she did not claim that she saw one that night.  Testimony from police officers 
suggested that they did not find any gun on the premises.   
 
Appellant and Roseborough left after appellant shot Alexander.  As 
appellant left, he leaned out of Paul’s car window and yelled to Youngblood, 
“It was self-defense.”  Youngblood called 911, and police and paramedics 
quickly arrived.  
 
At 11:26 p.m., patrolman Michael Naso received a radio call, and he 
arrived at the bar within two minutes.  Naso found Alexander on the floor 
bleeding, and Shephard was “straddling his back [in] near hysteria.”  Naso 
 
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found seven 9 mm shell cartridges in the club and a spent bullet inside the 
men’s room. 
 
Although appellant and his friends claimed that Alexander had a wad of 
money, “two grand or close,” police found only thirteen dollars on him.  
Shephard testified she had given Alexander fifty dollars earlier that day, and 
that he usually did not have a lot of money on him.  
 
Deputy Coroner Dr. Robert Challener found that Alexander had been 
shot seven times, the bullets perforating the body, including once in each 
thigh, twice in the abdomen, and twice in the back.  Alexander died as a result 
of these wounds.  At least three bullets entered from the back, and the path of 
one or more bullets was consistent with the victim’s lying on the ground with 
the assailant standing. 
 
Rejecting appellant’s self-defense claim, the jury convicted him of 
aggravated murder with a death penalty specification for a prior murder 
conviction.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).  The jury also found appellant guilty of a 
firearms specification and a prior aggravated-felony specification.  After 
 
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considering mitigation evidence, the jury recommended the death penalty, and 
the trial court sentenced appellant to death.  The court of appeals affirmed.  
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, 
George J. Sadd and Winston Grays, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
appellee. 
 
David L. Doughten and John P. Parker, for appellant. 
 
Alice Robie Resnick, J.  In his appeal to this court, appellant raises 
eighteen propositions of law for our review.  We have thoroughly reviewed 
each, and find that none warrants a reversal of appellant’s conviction or of his 
death sentence.  In addition, we have conducted an independent review of the 
record, have weighed the aggravating circumstance against the mitigating 
factors, and have examined the proportionality of the death sentence to the 
penalty imposed in similar cases.  For the reasons which follow, we affirm 
appellant’s conviction and sentence of death. 
I 
 
8
Sufficiency of Evidence 
 
In proposition of law I, appellant argues that “prior calculation” 
and “design” are separate elements of “aggravated murder” as defined 
in R.C. 2903.01(A).  Appellant claims the evidence is insufficient to 
prove those separate elements; hence, he contends he is not guilty of 
aggravated murder. 
 
However, appellant cites no case holding that “prior calculation 
and design” are two separate elements, and we reject such a view.  
Rather, the phrase “prior calculation and design” is a single indivisible 
term, describing the mens rea element of proof necessary to find a 
violation of R.C. 2903.01(A).  Having rejected that claim, we now 
consider whether the trial evidence was sufficient to prove that 
appellant murdered Alexander “with prior calculation and design.” 
 
In reviewing a record for sufficiency, “[t]he relevant inquiry is 
whether, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
 
9
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. 
Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the 
syllabus (in part), following Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 
99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560. 
A. The Meaning of “Prior Calculation and Design” 
 
Under former R.C. 2901.01, “murder in the first degree,” aside from 
murder by poison or felony-murder, required proof of “deliberate and 
premeditated malice.”  See State v. Stewart (1964), 176 Ohio St. 156, 27 
O.O.2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 439.  Effective January 1, 1974, the General Assembly 
reclassified first-degree murder as “aggravated murder” and substituted a 
requirement of “prior calculation and design” to replace the more traditional 
“deliberate and premeditated malice.”  (134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1866, 1900, 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511.)  See State v. Jenkins (1976), 48 Ohio App.2d 99, 2 
O.O.3d 73, 355 N.E.2d 825.  R.C. 2903.01(A), amended in 1981, retained the 
term “prior calculation and design” as a necessary element of aggravated 
murder.  (139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1, 3.) 
 
10
 
According to the 1973 Technical Committee Comment to 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, a Legislative Service Commission summary, R.C. 
2903.01 “restates the former crime of premeditated murder so as to embody 
the classic concept of the planned, cold-blooded killing while discarding the 
notion that only an instant’s prior deliberation is necessary.  By judicial 
interpretation of the former Ohio law, murder could be premeditated even 
though the fatal plan was conceived and executed on the spur of the 
moment.”  See, e.g., State v. Stewart; State v. Schaffer (1960), 113 Ohio App. 
125, 17 O.O.2d 114, 177 N.E.2d 534. 
 
According to the committee comment, “the phrase ‘prior calculation 
and design’ [was employed] to indicate studied care in planning or analyzing 
the means of the crime as well as a scheme encompassing the death of the 
victim.  Neither the degree of care nor the length of time *** are critical 
factors in themselves, but they must amount to more than momentary 
deliberation.”  
 
11
 
In State v. Cotton (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 10 O.O.3d 4, 381 N.E.2d 
190, at paragraph one of the syllabus, we agreed that “‘prior calculation and 
design’ is a more stringent element than the ‘deliberate and premeditated 
malice’ which was required under prior law.”  The General Assembly’s 
apparent intention “was to require more than the few moments of deliberation 
permitted in common law interpretations of the former murder statute, and to 
require a scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to kill.”  Id., 
56 Ohio St.2d at 11, 10 O.O.3d at 6, 381 N.E.2d at 193.  Also, in Cotton, at 
paragraph two of the syllabus, we held that “[i]nstantaneous deliberation is 
not sufficient to constitute ‘prior calculation and design.’”  However, under 
the particular facts of Cotton, we found prior calculation and design when, 
after a botched forgery attempt, the accused wrestled a gun from a police 
officer, fired shots at pursuing police, and then returned to the scene to kill an 
officer he had wounded as the officer was attempting to crawl away. 
 
In State v. Jenkins, 48 Ohio App.2d at 102, 2 O.O.3d at 75, 355 N.E.2d 
at 828, the court of appeals found three factors important in determining 
 
12
whether prior calculation and design exists: (1) Did the accused and victim 
know each other, and if so, was that relationship strained? (2) Did the accused 
give thought or preparation to choosing the murder weapon or murder site? 
and (3) Was the act drawn out or “an almost instantaneous eruption of 
events”?  The court in Jenkins found no prior calculation in the following 
“almost spontaneous” eruption of events:  A motorist told the accused, 
standing in the road, to get out of his way, and the accused went to his own 
car, retrieved a shotgun, and killed the motorist. 
 
This court has upheld findings of prior calculation and design in some 
short-lived emotional situations other than the Technical Committee’s 
“classic” concept of the “planned, cold-blooded killing.”  Committee 
Comment to Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, R.C. 2903.01.  See, e.g., State v. Claytor 
(1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 234, 574 N.E.2d 472 (encounter with unarmed Veterans 
Administration guards and pursuit of wounded guard); State v. Robbins 
(1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 12 O.O.3d 84, 388 N.E.2d 755 (after argument and 
assault, defendant retrieved weapon and stabbed neighbor); State v. Toth 
 
13
(1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 206, 6 O.O.3d 461, 371 N.E.2d 831 (accused and 
victim encountered each other in several bars in one evening). 
 
At other times, Ohio courts (including this court) have declined to 
uphold findings of “prior calculation and design” in explosive, short-duration 
situations. See, e.g.,  State v. Reed (1981), 65 Ohio St.2d 117, 19 O.O.3d 311, 
418 N.E.2d 1359 (after a botched theft, accused shot pursuing civilian and 
police officer); State v. Mulkey (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 773, 649 N.E.2d 897 
(street-gang attack on victim); State v. Davis (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 205, 8 
OBR 276, 456 N.E.2d 1256 (excluded patron shot bar owner and doorman). 
 
Our review of the preceding cited cases convinces us that it is not 
possible to formulate a bright-line test that emphatically distinguishes 
between the presence or absence of “prior calculation and design.”  Instead, 
each case turns on the particular facts and evidence presented at trial. 
B. Evidence of Prior Calculation and Design 
 
At trial, appellant argued the insufficiency of evidence of prior 
calculation and design and moved to dismiss under Crim.R. 29 after the state 
 
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rested, and again at the close of all the evidence.  In proposition of law I, 
appellant reasserts his claim that the evidence is insufficient to permit a 
finding of prior calculation and design. 
 
In analyzing the jury’s determination that appellant acted with prior 
calculation and design, State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, at 
paragraph two of the syllabus, establishes that we must review the evidence 
“in a light most favorable to the prosecution.” 
 
In light of that standard, we find that the evidence presented at 
appellant’s trial sufficiently supports the jury’s determination of prior 
calculation and design.  The evidence was conflicting as to the events which 
took place in the bar prior to the shooting.  The observations made by the 
court of appeals as it reviewed the evidence are a reasonable interpretation of 
the way the jury may have viewed that evidence.  The court of appeals dealt 
with this issue as follows: 
 
“The evidence reveals Taylor and Alexander did have an exchange of 
words and intimidating glances prior to the shooting, but the shooting did not 
 
15
occur immediately thereafter.  Both men went back to their seats.  Taylor 
ordered his girlfriend to go outside to the car.  Meanwhile, his companion, 
Roseborough, headed for the door but positioned himself near the door behind 
where Alexander was seated.  When Taylor stood up from his chair to leave, 
Alexander stood up, put his hands up in the air, and the two men exchanged 
words again.  Taylor immediately pulled out his gun and shot Alexander 
several times.  Alexander fell to the ground and attempted to crawl away, but 
Taylor walked over to where Alexander had fallen and shot Alexander in the 
back several times. 
 
“It is reasonable to infer that Taylor ordered his girlfriend to leave and 
waited for Roseborough to strategically position himself behind Alexander 
because he planned to shoot Alexander.  Moreover, Taylor clearly had a 
choice not to shoot Alexander after Alexander fell down; Alexander was still 
alive but injured.  Taylor made a conscious decision to walk over to where 
Alexander was crawling face down on the floor and shot him four more times. 
 
16
 
“Construing this evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to prove the element of prior 
calculation and design.  Taylor’s conscious decisions to get his girlfriend out 
of the way, to strategically position Roseborough, and to continue to shoot 
Alexander after he was down, more than any other evidence proved he acted 
with prior calculation and design.” 
 
To underscore the observations of the court of appeals, the evidence 
showed that Sandra Paul had introduced appellant to the victim, Alexander, in 
the same bar prior to the night of the murder.  When Alexander met appellant 
at that time, Alexander warned Paul not to “be bringing him [appellant] in my 
bar.”  Although Paul claimed she told appellant about the warning sometime 
later, the jury could have inferred from the circumstances that appellant may 
have learned earlier of Alexander’s statement.  According to appellant, 
Alexander had a “nasty attitude” and elbowed him when they previously met.  
Clearly, Alexander and appellant had met before, and their relationship was 
not a cordial one. 
 
17
 
On the night of the shooting, their relationship became more strained 
even before the jukebox incident.  Testimony was conflicting as to 
Alexander’s behavior on the night in question.  There was some testimony 
that Alexander acted like a gentleman that night, but some defense witnesses 
testified to Alexander’s boisterousness.  Appellant testified he thought 
Alexander tried to humiliate him by flashing a big roll of money and saying, 
“If a  nig*** ain’t got no money, he ain’t shit.”  It was also contended by the 
defense that Alexander “stared” at Paul and appellant when they were dancing 
earlier that night.  Roseborough claimed that Alexander called appellant a 
“bitch” and a “punk, hip mother fucker,” and invited him several times to 
fight after the jukebox incident.  Alexander also purportedly told appellant, 
“Mother fucker, these are my friends up here *** [in this bar].  I say and do 
what I want to do in here.”  As Paul left the bar, Alexander reportedly told 
her, “Bitch, I told you not to bring this mother fucker up here to my bar.”  
 
The strained relationship between appellant and Alexander occurred 
because Alexander had previously dated Paul.  Furthermore, Alexander had 
 
18
warned Paul not to bring appellant into “his” bar.  The night of the shooting, 
Alexander reportedly was rude and obnoxious, deliberately flashed money in 
a possible attempt to humiliate appellant, and stared at appellant and Paul as 
they danced. 
 
Two other specific factors, in addition to the previous relationship of 
the appellant and the victim, allowed the jury to find that appellant engaged in 
more than “instantaneous deliberation.”  Appellant took a gun into a bar 
where he knew Alexander frequently drank.  The jury could reasonably have 
inferred that appellant may have carried the gun with an intention to use it.  
The jury could have drawn that inference from all the circumstances 
surrounding the shooting even though the prosecution did not specifically 
claim that appellant went to the bar with the intention of killing Alexander. 
 
Moreover, several of appellant’s shots were fired after Alexander, 
already wounded, was lying on the floor.  As Alexander tried to crawl away, 
appellant walked closer and fired three or four shots into his back.  These 
circumstances also support the jury’s finding of prior calculation and design, 
 
19
since they are inconsistent with an “instantaneous eruption of events.”  State 
v. Jenkins, 48 Ohio App.2d at 102, 2 O.O.3d at 75, 355 N.E.2d at 828. 
 
Even though most of the evidence indicates that the time between the 
jukebox incident and the shooting was only two or three minutes, there was 
more than sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably have found that 
appellant, with prior calculation and design, decided to shoot Alexander in 
that space of time.  “Neither the degree of care nor the length of time the 
offender takes to ponder the crime beforehand are critical factors in 
themselves,” but “momentary deliberation” is insufficient.  Committee 
Comment to Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, R.C. 2903.01.  In light of the strained 
relationship between appellant and the victim, and the other factors mentioned 
above, two or three minutes is more than instantaneous or momentary under 
these circumstances, and is more than sufficient for prior calculation and 
design. 
 
The situation in this case resembles previous cases in which this court 
upheld jury findings of prior calculation and design.  See, e.g., State v. 
 
20
Claytor; State v. Robbins; State v. Toth.  In particular, Toth involved a 
defendant who apparently was unacquainted with the victim until the evening 
of the killing, and a murder which occurred after brief encounters in several 
bars.  The facts in Toth are similar to those in this case, and Toth did not 
involve any more evidence of studied deliberation than was present here.  
This court upheld the jury finding of prior calculation and design and 
remarked that “[t]he appellant’s method of shooting *** as well as his 
apparent determination to follow through on a specific course of action, 
sufficiently supports the finding that the appellant had adopted a plan to kill.”  
Toth, 52 Ohio St.2d at 213, 6 O.O.3d at 465, 371 N.E.2d at 836. 
 
When all the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, as required in Jenks, the jury could reasonably have found the 
required element of prior calculation and design.  Accordingly, we reject 
proposition of law I. 
II 
Procedural Deficiencies 
 
21
 
In proposition of law II, appellant argues that the prosecution tried the 
case on different facts as to the capital specification (a prior murder 
conviction) than were presented to the grand jury (a prior attempted murder 
conviction).  Appellant assumes the prosecutor presented an inaccurate April 
1974 journal entry to the grand jury showing that appellant had been 
convicted of only attempted murder.  On April 23, 1993, well after this trial 
started, the prosecutor secured a nunc pro tunc entry correcting the April 1974 
journal entry to reflect that appellant had pled guilty and was at that time 
convicted of two murders. 
 
Appellant did not raise this argument at trial or before the court of 
appeals, and hence waived this issue.  State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 
112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364.  However, even if he had raised it, 
appellant’s claim lacks merit.  The prosecution tried the case on the same 
basis as that presented to the grand jury, since a death-penalty specification 
under R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) covers prior convictions for either murder or 
attempted murder.  In addition, appellant’s indictment charged in specification 
 
22
two that he “was convicted *** of Murder, R.C. 2903.02[,] on April 8, 1974, 
of which an essential element was the purposeful killing or purposeful attempt 
to kill another.” 
 
Appellant implicitly challenges the trial court’s authority to make such 
a nunc pro tunc entry.  However, the trial court clearly had authority to correct 
factual errors in the 1974 journal entry to reflect that appellant had been 
convicted of two counts of murder, and not of attempted murder.  See Crim.R. 
36; State ex rel. Hill v. Niehaus (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 507, 628 N.E.2d 1376; 
Benedict v. State (1887), 44 Ohio St. 679, 11 N.E. 125.  Appellant’s 1974 
conviction was affirmed in State v. Taylor (July 10, 1975), Cuyahoga App. 
No. 33701, unreported.  An examination of that court of appeals opinion 
reflects that appellant’s 1974 conviction was for two murders.  Appellant also 
admitted on cross-examination at this trial that he had been convicted of two 
murders in 1974.  Appellant has failed to establish any error or prejudice.  We 
reject proposition of law II. 
 
23
 
In proposition of law III, appellant argues that the trial court erred by 
issuing the April 23, 1993 nunc pro tunc entry as to the 1974 conviction 
without giving appellant or his counsel notice of the proposed change or an 
opportunity to be heard.  The judge who signed the nunc pro tunc entry, Judge 
Norman A. Fuerst, was not the judge who presided over appellant’s 1993 
murder trial.  At trial in the instant case, the prosecutor did not explain why he 
secured that April 23, 1993 nunc pro tunc entry after trial testimony had 
begun on April 22, 1993.  The prosecutor also did not explain why no notice 
was given to opposing counsel regarding the intent to secure the entry.  When 
the prosecutor offered the entry into evidence, appellant’s counsel objected. 
 
The state argues that appellant was not wrongfully excluded from a 
crucial hearing because no hearing was held prior to Judge Fuerst’s decision 
to issue the nunc pro tunc entry.  However, since the 1993 trial had already 
started, the prosecutor arguably should have given prior notice to opposing 
counsel before securing the 1993 entry correcting the 1974 judgment entry. 
 
24
 
Nevertheless, the prosecutor did not per se violate appellant’s right to 
be present at proceedings to correct the 1974 journal entry.  An accused has a 
fundamental right to be present at all stages of his criminal trial.  Section 10, 
Article I, Ohio Constitution; Crim.R. 43(A); State v. Williams (1983), 6 Ohio 
St.3d 281, 286, 6 OBR 345, 349, 425 N.E.2d 1323, 1330.  However, Judge 
Fuerst’s decision to sign that entry relating to the 1974 conviction was not a 
critical stage of appellant’s 1993 trial, provided appellant had an opportunity 
to contest the accuracy of the corrected entry during the course of the 1993 
trial.  The relevant crucial stage of appellant’s 1993 trial occurred when the 
prosecution offered the nunc pro tunc entry into evidence at the 1993 trial.  
Appellant was present at that point in his trial, appellant and his counsel had 
notice and an opportunity to challenge the corrected entry’s admission into 
evidence, and they did so, albeit unsuccessfully.  See In re Petition for Inquiry 
into Certain Practices (1948), 150 Ohio St. 393, 38 O.O. 258, 83 N.E.2d 58, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  Nor can appellant contest the accuracy of the 
nunc pro tunc entry; he admitted his 1974 conviction was for two counts of 
 
25
murder.  In these circumstances, any irregularities concerning the nunc pro 
tunc entry did not affect appellant’s fundamental rights.  See State v. Clark 
(1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 258, 527 N.E.2d 844, 851. 
 
In 1982, Governor Rhodes commuted appellant’s 1974 prison sentence.  
Despite appellant’s attempt to base arguments on the commutation, the 
existence of appellant’s 1974 murder conviction was not affected by the 
commutation; only the length of appellant’s sentence was affected.  See R.C. 
2967.01(C).  Even though the commutation mistakenly referred to appellant’s 
1974 conviction as one for “attempted murder,” appellant’s argument that that 
mistake could change the substance of his 1974 conviction is baseless.  We 
reject appellant’s proposition of law III. 
 
In proposition of law IV, appellant argues that he was prejudiced 
because the indictment included an irrelevant prior aggravated-felony 
specification.  Appellant further contends that the trial judge incorrectly 
described to the jury the prior murder conviction as an aggravated felony. 
 
26
 
We agree that the prior aggravated-felony specification was irrelevant.  
Such a specification operates to increase the minimum and maximum sentence 
for an aggravated felony.  See R.C. 2929.11(B)(1)(b), (B)(2)(b), (B)(3)(b), 
and (F).  As appellant points out, neither murder nor aggravated murder is 
classified as an aggravated felony.  See R.C. 2901.02(A). 
 
However, appellant was not prejudiced by the inclusion of this 
irrelevant prior-aggravated-felony specification or by the trial judge’s 
misdescription of murder as an aggravated felony.  The inclusion of the 
irrelevant specification did not cause the jury to become aware of appellant’s 
prior murder conviction.  The jury knew about that conviction because the 
prosecution properly introduced evidence of that prior murder conviction to 
prove the death-penalty specification.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).  Moreover, 
appellant deliberately chose to have that death-penalty specification tried to 
the jury.  The record shows that he did so because he planned to testify and 
knew his conviction would inevitably be disclosed to attack his credibility as 
a witness.  Thus, we reject appellant’s proposition of law IV. 
 
27
 
In proposition of law IX, appellant argues his rights were violated 
because he was absent from a brief meeting in chambers when the trial court 
recorded the preliminary excusal of various jurors for reasons such as medical 
problems and financial hardships.  However, appellant was absent with his 
counsel’s approval, and both counsel were present and agreed with the 
excusals. 
 
Crim.R. 43(A) preserves an accused’s right to be present “at every stage 
of the trial.”  An accused’s absence, however, does not necessarily result in 
prejudicial or constitutional error.  Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934), 291 U.S. 
97, 107-108, 54 S.Ct. 330, 333, 78 L.Ed. 674, 679, held that “the presence of 
the defendant [in a prosecution for felony] is a condition of due process to the 
extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to 
that extent only.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Appellant relies upon Rogers v. United States (1975), 422 U.S. 35, 95 
S.Ct. 2091, 45 L.Ed.2d 1, and United States v. Brown (C.A.9, 1987), 832 F.2d 
128.  Yet, those cases involved federal, not state, trials, and counsel did not 
 
28
know in either of those cases about the court’s unilateral jury contacts taken in 
the accused(s)’ absence.  United States v. Gagnon (1985), 470 U.S. 522, 105 
S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486, reaffirmed the Snyder principle that an accused’s 
absence from a hearing at which counsel were present does not necessarily 
offend due process.  State v. Williams, 6 Ohio St.3d at 285-287, 6 OBR at 
348-350, 452 N.E.2d at 1329-1331, recognized that an accused’s absence can 
be harmless error. 
 
In this case, appellant’s absence did not thwart a fair and just hearing.  
Snyder.  The proceeding was not a “hearing” at which the judge received 
evidence.  It was no more than the routine noting of excuses from jury duty.  
The accused’s absence, with counsel’s consent, was harmless error.  See State 
v. Williams, 6 Ohio St.3d at 287, 6 OBR at 350, 452 N.E. 2d at 1331; State v. 
Roe (1989), 41 Ohio St.3d 18, 27, 535 N.E.2d 1351, 1362. 
 
Later, in responding to a jury question, the court incorrectly told the 
jury during deliberations on guilt that murder is an aggravated felony.  The 
judge’s brief written answer to the jury question was also harmless.  From the 
 
29
record, we do not know if the court consulted counsel before answering the 
question or, if so, whether counsel objected to the answer or appellant’s 
absence.  Although the answer was incorrect, i.e., that murder was an 
aggravated felony, the question and answer were innocuous.  See, also, State 
v. Allen (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 626, 630, 653 N.E.2d 675, 682; State v. Jenkins 
(1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 236-237, 15 OBR 311, 373-374, 473 N.E.2d 264, 
324, and paragraph thirteen of the syllabus; State v. Abrams (1974), 39 Ohio 
St.2d 53, 68 O.O.2d 30, 313 N.E.2d 823.  We reject proposition of law IX. 
III 
Evidence Issues 
 
In proposition of law VI, appellant argues the trial court erred by 
admitting gruesome photographs that prejudiced both the guilt-determination 
and penalty phases.  However, appellant did not object to these photographs at 
trial and waived all but plain error.  State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 
O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364.  We find no plain error and reject proposition of 
 
30
law VI.  Cf. State v. Lundgren (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 653 N.E.2d 304; 
State v. Morales (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 252, 257, 513 N.E.2d 267, 273. 
 
In proposition of law VII, appellant argues that the state improperly 
cross-examined him about details of his prior murder conviction.  However, 
the trial court “has broad discretion in determining the extent to which 
testimony will be admitted under Evid.R. 609.”  State v. Wright (1990), 48 
Ohio St.3d 5, 548 N.E.2d 923, syllabus; see Evid.R. 609(A).  Accord State v. 
Amburgey (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 115, 515 N.E.2d 925.  
 
In this case, appellant failed to disclose on direct examination that his 
1974 murder conviction was for two murders; thus, the prosecutor’s brief 
inquiry on cross was proper.  See State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 
528 N.E.2d 542, paragraph three of the syllabus.  Additionally, the prosecutor 
needed to use the prior murder conviction to prove the death-penalty 
specification. 
 
Appellant’s claim that the Governor’s 1982 commutation of his 
previous sentence erased the murder conviction lacks any merit.  A 
 
31
commutation is not a pardon.  State ex rel. Maurer v. Sheward (1994), 71 
Ohio St.3d 513, 520, 644 N.E.2d 369, 375; In re Victor (1877), 31 Ohio St. 
206, 207.  See Evid.R. 609(C); R.C. 2967.01(B) and (C).  We reject 
proposition of law VII. 
 
In proposition of law X, appellant argues that Denise Shephard 
disclosed improper victim-impact evidence when she briefly mentioned in the 
guilt phase that she had attended counseling for two months to deal with the 
shooting’s psychological impact on her.  If error, that brief testimony was 
harmless.  Cf. State v. Allard (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 482, 499-500, 663 N.E.2d 
1277, 1292; State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 414, 420-421, 613 
N.E.2d 212, 218-219.  Any impact on the sentence did not violate appellant’s 
fundamental rights.  Payne v. Tennessee (1991), 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 
2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720. 
IV 
Guilt Instruction Issues 
 
32
 
In propositions of law V, VIII, and XIII, appellant alleges deficiencies 
in the court’s jury instructions.  However, appellant failed to request specific 
instructions or object at trial on issues he now raises, except as to proposition 
of law VIII, and thus waived all but plain error.  Crim.R. 30(A); State v. 
Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus.  
We find that no alleged deficiency would cause a different trial result or 
create a manifest miscarriage of justice.  State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 
91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraphs two and three of the syllabus.  
We therefore reject propositions of law V and XIII. 
 
In proposition of law VIII, appellant argues the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury, over objection, that “flight, in and of itself, does not raise 
a presumption of guilt, but unless satisfactorily explained, it tends to show 
consciousness of guilt or a guilty connection with the crime.”   
 
Despite appellant’s claims, this instruction on flight was neither 
arbitrary nor unreasonable, and did not create an improper mandatory 
presumption.  “Flight from justice *** may be indicative of a consciousness 
 
33
of guilt.” State v. Eaton (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 145, 48 O.O.2d 188, 249 
N.E.2d 897, paragraph six of the syllabus.  Accord State v. Wilson (1988), 47 
Ohio App.3d 136, 140-141, 547 N.E.2d 1185, 1188-1189; cf. State v. Strub 
(1975), 48 Ohio App.2d 57, 63, 2 O.O.3d 40, 43, 355 N.E.2d 819, 824.  Nor 
did the instruction improperly comment on appellant’s silence, since he 
testified.  See State v. Fields (1973), 35 Ohio App.2d 140, 64 O.O.2d 248, 
300 N.E.2d 207.  We reject proposition of law VIII. 
V 
Sentencing Issues 
 
In proposition of law XI, appellant urges that the prosecutor made 
improper and prejudicial comments in his closing arguments to the jury at the 
sentencing phase.  Appellant claims the prosecutor’s remark that the victim 
did not have an opportunity to plead for his life before he was killed was an 
improper appeal to the jury’s emotions.  The trial court sustained appellant’s 
objection to this and related remarks, and appellant did not ask for a curative 
 
34
instruction.  Appellant also complains because the prosecutor asked the jury, 
over objection, to show sympathy towards the victim. 
 
None of these remarks constituted prejudicial error.  “The test regarding 
prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments is whether the remarks were 
improper and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected substantial rights of 
the defendant.”  State v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 14 OBR 317, 
318, 470 N.E.2d 883, 885.  Evidence or comments about crime victims, 
including the impact of a crime on victims, do not offend the United States or 
Ohio Constitutions, and did not harm appellant.  See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 
U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720; State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio 
St.3d 195, 199, 661 N.E.2d 1068, 1075.  “The victims cannot be separated 
from the crime.”  State v. Lorraine, 66 Ohio St.3d at 420, 613 N.E.2d at 218-
219.  Accord State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 611-612, 605 N.E.2d 
916, 929-930. 
 
Appellant also asserts in proposition of law XI that the prosecutor 
improperly commented on nonstatutory aggravating factors by referring to 
 
35
appellant’s prior conviction for two murders.  Appellant’s claim lacks merit.  
The charged death-penalty specification alleged appellant had previously been 
convicted of murder.  See R.C. 2929.04(A)(5); State v. Evans (1992), 63 Ohio 
St.3d 231, 238, 586 N.E.2d 1042, 1050; State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 
413, 653 N.E.2d 253, syllabus. 
 
In propositions of law XII, XIV and XVII, appellant argues 
instructional errors during the sentencing phase.  However, appellant waived 
these issues when he did not raise them in the court of appeals.  See State v. 
Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, at paragraph two 
of the syllabus. 
 
Moreover, except as noted below, appellant at trial did not propose 
instructions on issues he now raises or object to the instructions given.  
Appellant’s failure to propose instructions and to object to those given waives 
any error “unless, but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have 
been otherwise.”  State v. Underwood, 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 
N.E.2d 1332, at the syllabus.  See State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 
 
36
178, 372 N.E.2d 804, at paragraph two of the syllabus.  See, also, State v. 
Wolons (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 64, 541 N.E.2d 443, paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
 
In proposition of law XII, appellant argues the trial court gave the 
equivalent of an improper “acquittal first” jury instruction during the penalty 
phase.  Appellant argues the trial court should have specifically instructed 
“that if the jury was unable to agree on whether the aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigation evidence, it could consider a lesser sentence.”  See 
State v. Brooks (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 159-160, 661 N.E.2d 1030, 1040-
1041; cf. State v. Thomas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 219-220, 533 N.E.2d 
286, 292-293. 
 
The trial court instructed the jury: “If all 12 members of the jury find 
*** that the aggravating circumstance *** outweighs the mitigating factors, 
then *** you *** must *** recommend *** the sentence of death ***.  [But] 
if *** you find that the State of Ohio failed to prove *** that the aggravating 
circumstance *** outweighs the mitigating factors, then you will return your 
 
37
verdict reflecting your decision.  In this event, you will then proceed to 
determine which of the two possible life imprisonment sentences to 
recommend to the Court.” 
 
Our review of the trial court’s instructions reveals that the trial court 
simply told the jury it must decide between the life sentence options if it found 
the state had failed to prove that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the 
mitigating factors.  The trial court did not give an improper “acquittal first” 
instruction and did not tell the jury how to proceed if jurors did not all agree 
on a life or death sentence.  The jury was free to consider a life sentence even 
if jurors had not unanimously rejected the death penalty. 
 
Appellant did not preserve this issue.  He failed to ask the trial judge to 
instruct the jury that “[y]ou are not required to determine unanimously that the 
death sentence is inappropriate before you consider the life sentences.”  
Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d at 160, 661 N.E.2d at 1041.  Although the instruction 
appellant now seeks may be a desirable one, its absence was not plain error.  
See State v. Davis (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 107, 116-118, 666 N.E.2d 1099, 
 
38
1108-1109; State v. Williams (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 153, 168, 652 N.E.2d 
721, 733-734; State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d at 213, 15 OBR at 353, 473 
N.E.2d at 307.  We reject proposition of law XII. 
 
In proposition of law XIV, appellant takes issue with trial court 
instructions to the jury during the penalty phase.  Appellant claims the trial 
court erred in instructing the jury, “Reasonable doubt is present when, you, 
the jurors, *** cannot say that you are firmly convinced of the truth of the 
charge.”  Appellant had requested that the jury be instructed that “[r]easonable 
doubt is present when you are not firmly convinced that death is the 
appropriate punishment.”  See State v. Wolons, 44 Ohio St.3d 64, 541 N.E.2d 
443, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
Although appellant’s proposed instruction may be preferred, the flaw, if 
any, is harmless.  An instruction identical to that given by the trial court in 
this case was upheld in State v. Woodard (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 70, 76-77, 
623 N.E.2d 75, 80, and in State v. Spirko (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 1, 17, 570 
N.E.2d 229, 248.  Also, a “single instruction *** must be viewed in the 
 
39
context of the overall charge.”  State v. Price (1970), 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 14 
O.O.3d 379, 398 N.E.2d 772, paragraph four of the syllabus.  Overall, the trial 
court clearly instructed the jury that, before recommending death, it must be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance 
outweighed the mitigating factors, and that the prosecution had the burden of 
proof on the issue. 
 
Appellant also complains because the trial court referred to the charged 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) aggravating circumstance as “repeat murder.”  However, 
the trial court’s use of that short, convenient term to refer to the aggravating 
circumstance was not improper nor did it inject a nonstatutory aggravating 
circumstance into the trial.  The indictment as well as the trial court used the 
term “repeat murder” to refer to the specification, and appellant did not object.  
It is not unusual to use the term “repeat murder” in this context.  See, e.g., 
Committee Comment to Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, R.C. 2929.04; State v. Benner 
(1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 301, 304, 533 N.E.2d 701, 707; State v. Bayless (1976), 
48 Ohio St.2d 73, 80, 2 O.O.3d 249, 253, 357 N.E.2d 1035, 1043. 
 
40
 
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in defining a “mitigating 
factor” as one “extenuating or reducing the degree of the defendant’s blame or 
punishment.”  Appellant requested a more comprehensive definition of 
“mitigating factors.”  See State v. Holloway (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 242, 
527 N.E.2d 831, 835.  Any instructional error on this point was harmless.  
State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 101-102, 656 N.E.2d 643, 669; 
State v. Woodard, 68 Ohio St.3d at 77, 623 N.E.2d at 80. 
 
Appellant further contends under proposition of law XIV that the trial 
court erred by instructing the jury not to be “influenced by any consideration 
of sympathy,” as opposed to the term “mere sympathy.”1  Yet, appellant asked 
that sympathy be excluded in considering the sentence, and, in any event, 
sympathy is not a relevant sentencing criterion.  There is no practical 
difference between “mere sympathy” and “any sympathy” in this context.  See 
California v. Brown (1987), 479 U.S. 538, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934; 
State v. Allen, 73 Ohio St.3d at 638, 653 N.E.2d at 687; State v. Combs 
 
41
(1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 278, 288-289, 581 N.E.2d 1071, 1080.  In sum, 
proposition of law XIV lacks merit. 
 
In proposition of law XVII, appellant argues that the trial court violated 
his rights by instructing the jury, over his objection, that its decision in the 
penalty phase was a “recommendation.”  However, the trial court’s use of that 
term accurately stated the law and did not constitute error.  See, e.g., State v. 
Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d at 101, 656 N.E.2d at 669; State v. Grant (1993), 67 
Ohio St.3d 465, 472, 620 N.E.2d 50, 61. 
 
In proposition of law XV, appellant argues that he was denied his right 
to the effective assistance of counsel at trial.  Reversal of convictions on 
grounds of ineffective assistance requires that the defendant show, first, “that 
counsel’s performance was deficient” and, second, “that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense *** so as to deprive the defendant of a 
fair trial.”  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693.  Accord State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio 
St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373. 
 
42
 
However, the performance of appellant’s counsel never fell “below an 
objective standard of reasonable representation.”  State v. Bradley, at 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  Appellant complains that his counsel did not 
introduce evidence as to the Governor’s 1982 sentence commutation.  Yet, 
counsel could reasonably hold back this utterly irrelevant evidence.  Counsel 
also reasonably chose against bifurcation on the death-penalty specification.  
Since appellant claimed self-defense and testified, his prior murder conviction 
would have been admissible as to his credibility regardless of bifurcation.  See 
discussion on proposition of law IV. 
 
Counsel reasonably chose not to offer evidence of appellant’s paranoid 
personality disorder at the guilt phase in view of the doubtful value and 
admissibility of such evidence at that stage.  See State v. Cooey (1989), 46 
Ohio St.3d 20, 26, 544 N.E.2d 895, 906; State v. Wilcox (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 
182, 24 O.O.3d 284, 436 N.E.2d 523 (psychiatric testimony unrelated to 
insanity is inadmissible to show defendant’s incapacity to form intent).  
Moreover, appellant has not demonstrated that these tactical choices caused 
 
43
him prejudice, i.e., that “were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial 
would have been different.”  State v. Bradley, at paragraph three of the 
syllabus. 
 
Appellant also argues that his counsel should have objected further at 
trial to the jury instructions.  However, appellant did not make that argument 
to the court of appeals.  Thus, he waived that claim save for plain error. State 
v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364.  Moreover, 
counsel made some objections.  Counsel need not raise meritless issues or 
even all arguably meritorious issues.  Counsel’s performance never fell below 
“an objective standard of reasonable representation,” nor was the result of the 
trial affected by counsel’s alleged errors.  See State v. Bradley, at paragraphs 
two and three of the syllabus.  We find that proposition of law XV lacks merit. 
 
In proposition of law XVI, appellant argues the trial judge did not give 
appropriate weight to mitigating evidence.  However, “[a] decisionmaker need 
not weigh mitigating factors in a particular manner.  The process ***, as well 
as the weight, if any, to assign a given factor is a matter for the discretion of 
 
44
the individual decisionmaker.”  State v. Fox (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 193, 
631 N.E.2d 124, 132.  Accord State v. Stumpf (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 512 
N.E.2d 598, paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio 
St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, paragraph two of the syllabus.  
Appellant further argues that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating 
circumstance so that the death penalty is inappropriate.  This court’s 
independent sentence determination will resolve that issue.  We reject 
proposition of law XVI. 
VI 
Constitutionality 
 
In proposition of law XVIII, appellant challenges the constitutionality 
of Ohio’s death penalty statute.  We summarily reject this challenge.  State v. 
Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus.  Ohio’s death 
penalty statute is constitutional.  See, e.g., State v. Davis (1992), 63 Ohio 
St.3d 44, 50, 584 N.E.2d 1192, 1197; State v. Scott (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 92, 
109, 26 OBR 79, 93-94, 497 N.E.2d 55, 69. 
 
45
VII 
Independent Review and Proportionality Analysis 
 
At the penalty phase of his trial, appellant presented several witnesses.  
Psychologist Dr. Rita J. Politzer concluded that appellant suffered from a 
“paranoid personality disorder” that made him overly excitable and 
suspicious.  Appellant had a tendency to react violently to perceived affronts.  
Although the condition was amenable to treatment, appellant had never been 
treated for it.  Politzer felt appellant could adjust to life in an institutional 
setting and had so adjusted during his prior prison term. 
 
Suette B. Steiner, who supervised appellant when he worked as a 
warehouseman, described appellant as intelligent and a very hard worker.  
Reverend Robert L. Doss testified that appellant, a member of Doss’s 
congregation, was a man of God and a God-fearing man.  Doss believed 
appellant’s life should be spared because the Lord said, “Vengeance is mine.” 
 
Constance M. Turner, the mother of appellant’s seven-year-old son, felt 
sorrow and pity for the family of Marion Alexander, but did not believe 
 
46
appellant should be sentenced to death.  Sharon Levett, appellant’s older 
sister, described appellant as a quiet and peaceable man who did not bother or 
bully people.  She believed her brother acted in self-defense. 
 
In an unsworn statement, appellant expressed regret, but said he “didn’t 
do anything that I wouldn’t expect anyone else to do under the 
circumstances.”  Appellant could not believe the jury convicted him.  Further, 
he stated, “I am a man, not a coward *** and, yes, I have been to Vietnam.  I 
fought for this country *** and killed people that haven’t done anything to 
me.”  Yet, he also felt that “when someone tries to do something to me, I 
cannot stand up and defend myself.  *** I might as well let myself be shot.”  
As to the 1974 murder conviction, appellant stated he pled guilty because he 
felt responsible and wanted others, who he felt were not responsible, to go 
free. 
 
After independent assessment, we find the evidence proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance charged against appellant, i.e., 
a prior murder conviction.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).  As to possible mitigating 
 
47
factors, the nature and circumstances of the offense provide some slight 
mitigating features.  Alexander was the ex-lover of appellant’s girlfriend.  
Appellant crossed paths with Alexander in the Club Seville, and both were 
drinking.  It appears that jealousy may have played a part in the violence that 
ended the encounter.  However, appellant’s self-defense claims lacked 
credibility, as other witnesses did not support his account of events.  
Furthermore, appellant brutally shot Alexander, already wounded, as 
Alexander was lying on the floor. 
 
Appellant’s history and background provide very few mitigating 
features.  Little evidence was introduced on those points beyond that 
summarized above.  Nothing in appellant’s character appears to be mitigating. 
 
The evidence does not support finding that the victim “induced or 
facilitated” the offense.  See R.C. 2929.04(B)(1).  The jury rejected 
appellant’s claims of self-defense, and Alexander’s rude and obnoxious 
behavior, even if it occurred, did not establish that Alexander “induced” the 
offense. 
 
48
 
Defense testimony from appellant, Paul, and Roseborough could be 
interpreted to support an argument that appellant acted under “duress, 
coercion, or strong provocation” within the meaning of R.C. 2929.04(B)(2), 
and so provides at least some mitigation.  Defense witnesses testified to a 
strained relationship between appellant and Alexander, and testified that 
Alexander attempted to humiliate appellant, and threatened and cursed 
appellant. 
 
Dr. Politzer’s description of appellant’s “paranoid personality disorder” 
does not establish the R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) mitigating factor, although the 
personality disorder is entitled to some mitigating weight as an “other factor” 
under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).  The mitigating factors in R.C. 2929.04(B)(4), (5) 
and (6) are not relevant to this case.  Appellant was forty-four at the time of 
the offense, his criminal record was apparent, and he was the principal 
offender. 
 
As to the R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) “other factors,” this court normally has 
accorded little weight to “personality disorders” as a mitigating “other factor.”  
 
49
See State v. Wilson (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 381, 401, 659 N.E.2d 292, 310; 
State v. Hill (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 447-448, 653 N.E.2d 271, 284.  
However, under the specific facts of this case, appellant’s “paranoid 
personality disorder” may have caused him to feel especially threatened by 
Alexander’s behavior, and to have overreacted to it.  Nevertheless, while we 
accord some mitigating weight to this factor, its mitigation value is not great.  
We give no weight to residual doubt.  No “other factors” are mitigating.  
There is little evidence that appellant expressed remorse at trial, and no other 
possible mitigating features are apparent. 
 
We find that the aggravating circumstance outweighs the combined 
mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  Having previously been 
convicted of the murder of two persons, appellant was incarcerated.  Yet, ten 
years after his release, he murdered again.  A prior murder conviction can be 
even more grave than other aggravating circumstances.  See State v. Carter 
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 218, 228, 594 N.E.2d 595, 602. 
 
50
 
The very strong aggravating circumstance here, appellant’s prior 
conviction for the murder of two persons, outweighs beyond a reasonable 
doubt all of his mitigation evidence.  Appellant has murdered three persons; 
he committed his third murder after he had been tried, convicted, and served 
eight years in prison for the first two murders.  In view of these 
circumstances, the death penalty is appropriate. 
 
The death penalty is both appropriate and proportionate when 
appellant’s case is compared with similar capital cases.  See State v. Carter, 
64 Ohio St.3d 218, 594 N.E.2d 595; State v. Davis, 63 Ohio St.3d 44, 584 
N.E.2d 1192; State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373; State v. 
Mapes (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 108, 19 OBR 318, 484 N.E.2d 140. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., dissent. 
FOOTNOTE: 
 
51
1. 
The trial court’s instruction to the jury regarding sympathy appears in 
the record as, “You must be influenced by any consideration of sympathy 
***.”  The word “not” is missing from this sentence in the record.  If the trial 
court did indeed omit the word “not,” any prejudice would have been in 
appellant’s favor.  Hence, any possible error in the trial court’s instruction on 
this narrow point did not prejudice appellant. 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  Because the evidence in this case is 
insufficient to permit a finding of “prior calculation and design,” a necessary 
element for the offense of aggravated murder in R.C. 2903.01(A), I would set 
aside Taylor’s conviction for aggravated murder and the resulting death 
sentence.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
 
As the majority observes, in 1974 the General Assembly reclassified 
first-degree murder as “aggravated murder” and substituted a requirement of 
“prior calculation and design” to replace the more traditional requirement of 
“deliberate and premeditated malice.”  (134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1866, 1900, 
Am.Sub.  H.B. No. 511.)  See State v. Jenkins (1976), 48 Ohio App.2d 99, 2 
 
52
O.O.3d 73, 355 N.E.2d 825.  R.C. 2903.01(A), amended in 1981, retained the 
term “prior calculation and design” as a necessary element of aggravated 
murder.  (139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1, 3.) 
 
According to the 1973 Technical Committee Comment to Am. Sub. 
H.B. No. 511, R.C. 2903.01 “restates the former crime of premeditated 
murder so as to embody the classic concept of the planned, cold-blooded 
killing while discarding the notion that only an instant’s prior deliberation is 
necessary.” 
 
In State v. Cotton (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 10 O.O.3d 4, 381 N.E.2d 
190, at paragraph one of the syllabus, we agreed that “‘prior calculation and 
design’ is a more stringent element than the ‘deliberate and premeditated 
malice’ which was required under prior law.”  The General Assembly’s 
apparent intention “was to require more than the few moments of deliberation 
permitted in common law interpretations of the former murder statute, and to 
require a scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to kill.”  
Cotton at 11, 10 O.O.3d at 6, 381 N.E.2d at 193.  Also, in Cotton, we held that 
 
53
“[i]nstantaneous deliberation is not sufficient to constitute ‘prior calculation 
and design.’”  Cotton, at paragraph two of the syllabus.  I would reiterate that 
holding today. 
 
Taylor asserts in this case that the evidence is insufficient to permit a 
finding of prior calculation and design.  I agree.  When the evidence is viewed 
in a light most favorable to the prosecution, as required by State v. Jenks 
(1991),  61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus, I 
believe the jury could not have reasonably found the required element of prior 
calculation and design.   
 
In State v. Jenkins, 48 Ohio App.2d at 102, 2 O.O.3d at 75, 355 N.E.2d 
at 828, the court of appeals set out three factors to be considered in 
determining the existence of prior calculation and design:  (1) Did the accused 
and victim know each other, and if so, was that relationship strained? (2) Did 
the accused give thought or preparation to choosing the murder weapon or 
murder site? and (3) Was the act drawn out or “an almost instantaneous 
eruption of events”? 
 
54
 
The evidence here showed only two or three minutes had passed 
between the jukebox confrontation and the time when Taylor shot Marion 
“Donny” Alexander.  According to a barmaid, Donny and Taylor glared at 
each other “for a couple of seconds” when Taylor told Donny to “[p]ut your 
own dollar in there.”  The men glared at each other a “couple of more 
seconds” before Sandra Paul (“Sandra”) walked back to where Taylor was 
sitting.  According to Darlene Youngblood, there “wasn’t a minute” between 
when Taylor last told Donny to “[p]ut your own *** dollar in the box,” and 
when Taylor told Sandra, “Let’s go.”  Shortly thereafter, Sandra got up to 
leave, Taylor followed her, and then shot Donny on the way out in “maybe 
about a minute.” 
 
Admittedly, Sandra had introduced Taylor to Donny in the same bar 
some time before the night of the murder.  When Donny had met Taylor then, 
Donny privately warned Sandra not to “be bringing him [Taylor] in my bar.”  
Sandra claimed she only told Taylor about the warning later.  According to 
Taylor, Donny had a “nasty attitude” and elbowed him when they previously 
 
55
met.  Thus, Donny and Taylor had met before, and their relationship was 
strained.  
 
On the night of the murder, defense witnesses claimed Donny was loud 
and boisterous.  Taylor testified he thought Donny tried to humiliate him by 
flashing around a big roll of money and saying, “If a  nig *** ain’t got no 
money, he ain’t shit.”  Donny also “stared” at Sandra and Taylor when they 
were dancing earlier that night.  
 
While this evidence indicates a strained relationship between Taylor 
and Donny, the evidence does not establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Taylor had planned to kill Donny.  It is equally plausible that their encounter 
at the bar that night was totally coincidental.  Significantly, Donny was not 
even at the bar when Taylor arrived.  No evidence was introduced that Taylor 
chose that bar as a murder site, or that he lay in ambush for Donny, or that he 
even knew Donny would be there that particular evening.  See State v. 
Jenkins, supra. 
 
56
 
After the jukebox incident, David Roseborough claimed that Donny 
called Taylor a “bitch” and a “punk, hip mother fucker” and invited him 
several times to fight.  Donny also told Taylor, “Mother fucker, these are my 
friends up here *** [in this bar].  I say and do what I want to do in here.”  As 
Sandra left the bar, Donny reportedly told her, “Bitch, I told you not to bring 
this mother fucker up here to my bar.”  
 
Despite these circumstances, I would hold the evidence insufficient to 
permit a finding that Taylor engaged in more than “instantaneous 
deliberation” in planning to kill Donny, as Cotton requires.  Evidence of bad 
blood or a strained relationship between persons is simply not, by itself, 
sufficient to show that one planned to kill another.  While Taylor did take a 
gun to Club Seville, the prosecution never claimed at trial that when he did so, 
he planned or intended to kill Donny.  See State v. Jenkins.  Up to the very 
moment of the jukebox incident, Donny and Taylor had not confronted each 
other.  The time between the jukebox incident and the shooting was very 
short, two or three minutes at most.  No evidence exists that Taylor planned 
 
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and deliberated to kill Donny in that brief space of time.  In fact, Taylor had 
expressed his intention to leave the bar, and actually began to leave, after the 
jukebox incident.  This case simply falls short of the degree of calculation 
envisioned by the General Assembly when it adopted the term “prior 
calculation and design” effective in 1974 as part of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511. 
 
Taylor did shoot Donny seven times, including several times as Donny 
was lying on the floor.  That fact demonstrates Taylor’s anger at the moment 
and proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally killed Donny.  
Such intent, however, is not the equivalent of prior calculation and design. 
 
When the General Assembly adopted the more stringent “prior 
calculation and design” requirement, its precise purpose was to distinguish 
short-lived eruptions of violence from the more traditional first-degree 
premeditated and planned killings.  The evidence adduced at trial indicates the 
altercation that resulted in Donny Alexander’s death was “an almost 
instantaneous eruption of events.”  State v. Jenkins.  Established Ohio law 
 
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requires more than instantaneous deliberation to support a finding of prior 
calculation and design.  Cotton.  
 
Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeals’ judgment affirming 
Taylor’s guilt of the offense of aggravated murder and vacate his sentence of 
death. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.