Case Title: Sannerud v. Brantz

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-08-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sannerud v. Brantz1994 WY 76879 P.2d 341Case Number: 93-192Decided: 08/02/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Chrysanthe 
SANNERUD,

Appellant 
(Defendant & Third-Party Plaintiff),

v.

Paul 
E. BRANTZ,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff),

and 
Paul M. Brantz and Betty J. Brantz,

Appellees 
(Third-Party Defendants).

 

Rehearing 
Denied August 25, 1994.

Appeal 
from The District Court, Natrona County, Harry E. Leimback, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Stephen 
R. Winship, Donald R. Winship & Associates, P.C., 
Casper.

Representing 
Appellees:

Michael 
D. Zwickl, Casper.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., THOMAS, MACY and TAYLOR, JJ., and CARDINE, J. 
(RET.)

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant 
Chrysanthe Sannerud appeals from an order which quieted the title to real 
property owned by Appellee Paul E. Brantz (the son), from an order which denied 
Sannerud's motion for a summary judgment on her complaint and the third-party 
defendants' counterclaim, and from an order which entered a judgment against 
Sannerud for slandering the son's title to real property upon which a motel and 
cafe were located and which denied Sannerud's claim against Appellees Paul M. 
Brantz and Betty J. Brantz (the Brantzes) for payment of a promissory 
note.

[¶2]      We affirm in part 
and reverse in part.

[¶3]      Sannerud presents 
nine issues:

1. 
Whether humiliation, mental anguish and emotional distress constitute actual or 
special damages sufficient for judgment on slander of 
title.

2. 
Whether actual malice on the part of the Appellant was proven with convincing 
clarity.

3. 
Whether Appellant's foreclosure notice was sufficiently false to be adjudged 
slanderous.

4. 
Whether, in view of the manner and circumstances surrounding the transfer of 
title to the affected property to Appellee from his parents, Appellee possessed 
sufficient interest in the property affected to allow him standing to bring his 
slander of title action.

5. 
Whether the lower court erred in considering extrinsic evidence on the 
sufficiency of the consideration of the note to Appellant from 
Appellees.

6. 
Whether there was a failure of consideration underlying the Note to Appellant 
from Appellees.

7. 
Whether the transfer of the Red & White Motel and Cafe to Appellee from his 
parents is subject to Wyoming's fraudulent conveyance and "bulk transfer" 
statutes.

8. 
Whether the lower court erred in granting Appellee's "quiet title" motion for 
summary judgment.

9. 
Whether the lower court erred in denying Appellant's Motion to Dismiss at the 
close of Appellee's case.

[¶4]      The Brantzes 
signed a real estate broker's contract on April 8, 1982, which authorized 
Sannerud, a licensed real estate broker, to list for sale the J & E Motel, 
Restaurant, and Trailer Court which was located in Sheridan, Wyoming (the 
Sheridan property). Sannerud produced buyers who agreed to purchase the 
property. The Brantzes and the buyers entered into a purchase agreement, and 
they signed the sales contract which provided that the buyers would make a down 
payment and monthly payments thereafter. Sannerud gave the Brantzes a $25,000 
cashier's check to apply toward a debt which the Brantzes owed to the Small 
Business Administration so that the mortgage securing the debt would not be a 
cloud on the title to the property. The Brantzes agreed to give Sannerud a 
$25,000 bonus in addition to her regular commission for obtaining a sale price 
of $950,000 for the property. The Brantzes executed a $50,000 promissory note 
made payable to Sannerud, presumably for the $25,000 bonus and the $25,000 
cashier's check. The buyers delivered the down payment and made four monthly 
payments but failed to make the remainder of the monthly payments. The Brantzes 
regained possession of the Sheridan property.

[¶5]      On January 31, 
1986, Sannerud recorded a "Lien Statement" in the Natrona County clerk's office 
in an attempt to protect her interest in the promissory note, stating that the 
Brantzes failed to pay for the "services and cash" which she had provided to 
them. Because Sannerud understood that the Brantzes had lost the Sheridan 
property, she claimed a lien against real property located in Casper, Wyoming, 
which was owned by the Brantzes and which was known as the Red and White Motel 
and Cafe (the Casper property). In December 1989, the Brantzes deeded the Casper 
property to the son.

[¶6]      Sannerud 
purported to foreclose her lien on the Casper property by publishing notice in 
February 1991 of a foreclosure sale. On March 5, 1991, a foreclosure sale was 
held on the Natrona County courthouse steps, and Sannerud successfully bid 
$151,162.42 for the Casper property. The Natrona County sheriff issued a 
sheriff's deed on July 10, 1991, purporting to convey the Casper property to 
Sannerud. After she obtained the sheriff's deed, Sannerud went to the cafe 
located on the Casper property and asked the son to surrender his keys and 
leave. The son did not leave. She served a "Notice to Quit, Leave and Vacate" on 
the son on July 15, 1991, in the presence of customers at the Casper property. 
On July 19, 1991, Sannerud filed a civil complaint, claiming that the son was 
"not the lawful property owner." The Natrona County Court dismissed that 
complaint.

[¶7]      The son filed a 
complaint in the district court on July 24, 1991, to quiet his title in the 
Casper property and prayed for damages, including punitive damages, for slander 
of title. Sannerud filed a counterclaim, seeking to set aside the conveyance of 
the Casper property from the Brantzes to the son, alleging that the conveyance 
had been made to hinder, delay, and defraud her as a creditor. She also filed a 
third-party complaint against the Brantzes, seeking a judgment against them in 
the amount of $50,000 plus interest for nonpayment of the promissory note which 
had been executed as a part of the Sheridan property sale. Sannerud later 
amended her counterclaim to include a count in which she alleged that the 
Brantzes had violated the "`Bulk Sales' Act then in 
force."

[¶8]      The district 
court granted a partial summary judgment in favor of the son which declared that 
the sheriff's deed for the Casper property was void and which quieted the son's 
title in that property. The district court denied Sannerud's motion for a 
summary judgment on her complaint and on the third-party defendants' 
counterclaim. After a bench trial, the district court ruled that Sannerud was 
answerable in damages for slander of title and entered a judgment against her 
and in favor of the son in the amount of $5,000 to compensate him for his 
emotional distress, mental anguish, and humiliation resulting from Sannerud's 
unwarranted actions. The district court also ruled that the $50,000 promissory 
note was unenforceable and that Sannerud's fraudulent conveyance and bulk 
transfer claims were moot.

[¶9]      Sannerud claims 
that she was entitled to receive payment on the $50,000 promissory note because 
she had fulfilled her obligations relating to the sale of the Sheridan property. 
The Brantzes contend, however, that Sannerud did not provide "qualified buyers," 
which was a condition precedent to their promise to pay the $50,000 promissory 
note.

A 
condition precedent is defined as "`an act or event, other than a lapse of time, 
which must exist or occur before a duty of immediate performance of a promise 
arises.'" Robert W. Anderson Housewrecking and Excavating, Inc. v. Board of 
Trustees, School District No. 25, Fremont County, Wyoming, 681 P.2d 1326, 
1331 (Wyo. 1984) (quoting Calamari & Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 
11-3 (1977)).

Mad 
River Boat Trips, Inc. v. Jackson Hole Whitewater, Inc., 
803 P.2d 366, 368 (Wyo. 1990), after remand, 818 P.2d 1137 (Wyo. 
1991).

[¶10]   The promissory note in this case 
stated in part:

For 
value received I/we promise to pay to the order of Chrysanthe Sannerud . . . the 
sum of Fifty Thousand no/100 Dollars with interest at the rate of 10% per annum 
until paid. The said amount to be paid in 84 consecutive installments of $830.00 
each . . . beginning June 1, 1982. . . .

The 
escrow instructions provided in pertinent part:

Funds 
paid . . . by Buyers are to be applied by the Escrow Agent as 
follows:

. 
. . .

(c) 
Of funds received monthly, the sum of $830.00 is to be paid to the credit of 
Chrysanthe Sannerud. . . . The payments are to be made until a promissory note 
payable to the order of Chrysanthe Sannerud for the sum of $50,000.00 with 
interest at the rate of 10% per annum is paid in full.

[¶11]   Sannerud argues that the promissory 
note was clear and unambiguous and that the escrow instructions should not have 
been considered in determining the parties' intent when they executed the 
promissory note. The Brantzes assert that the consideration of parol evidence by 
the trial court was proper because the evidence did not vary the terms of the 
promissory note. We agree.

"[P]arol 
evidence is admissible to show that a contract fully executed and delivered is 
not to be effective, unless and until[] some condition, extraneous to the terms 
of the contract, has been complied with . . . the rule is equally well 
established that the parol condition may not be shown if it is contrary to the 
terms of the written executed contract."

North 
American Uranium, Inc. v. Johnston, 
77 Wyo. 332, 354, 316 P.2d 325 (1957) (quoting L.B. Williams Organization v. 
Winter, 106 Cal. App. 2d 604, 235 P.2d 407, 408 (1951)). "`"The question 
usually is as to whether the parol evidence sought to be introduced contradicts 
or alters the written contract, or leaves it to stand unchanged and simply tends 
to establish an additional collateral agreement."'" 77 Wyo. at 352-53, 316 P.2d 325 (quoting Denman v. Hall, 144 Tex. 633, 193 S.W.2d 515, 516 
(1946)).

[¶12]   Here, the promissory note did not 
describe how the payments were to be made to Sannerud. By declaring that the 
payments to Sannerud would be made through the escrow agent, the escrow 
instructions supplied a term which was extraneous to the promissory note terms. 
The promissory note did not expressly provide that all the agreements intended 
by the parties were included. Cf. Hollabaugh v. Kolbet, 604 P.2d 1359, 
1362 (Wyo. 1980) (parol evidence inadmissible when contract for sale "provide[d] 
that it include[d] all agreements intended by the parties"). The escrow 
instructions were not inconsistent with the promissory note terms. They 
described the same payments, principal amount, interest rate, and payee as were 
described by the promissory note. The promissory note and the escrow 
instructions, when they are considered together, are clear and unambiguous. 
See Kilmer v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 860 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Wyo. 1993) 
(language of various agreements involved in a transaction was clear and 
unambiguous). The district court correctly considered the language contained in 
the escrow instructions together with the language contained in the promissory 
note.

[¶13]   The district court stated in its 
decision letter:

This 
provision [in the escrow instructions] would suggest that Sannerud would be paid 
from the proceeds of the payments by buyers, and that if the buyers were 
incapable of completing sufficient payments to cover the promissory note taken 
in consideration of the sale [it] would not have to be paid. That interpretation 
is the only one that makes any sense in the whole 
transaction.

We 
agree with the district court. We hold that the buyers were not "qualified 
buyers" because they were incapable of making sufficient payments and that the 
Brantzes did not have a duty to pay the promissory note.

[¶14]   Because we hold that the Brantzes 
did not have a duty to pay the $50,000 promissory note, we do not need to 
consider Sannerud's remaining claims concerning the promissory 
note.

[¶15]   Sannerud contends that there was 
insufficient evidence on the slander of title claim to prove that the son 
incurred any pecuniary loss.

The 
standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is well established. On 
review, this court assumes that the evidence in favor of the successful party is 
true. We leave out of consideration entirely the evidence presented by the 
unsuccessful party that conflicts with the evidence of the successful party, and 
we afford to the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference that 
may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it.

Kadrmas 
v. Valley West Homeowner's Association, 
848 P.2d 826, 828 (Wyo. 1993) (citation omitted).

[¶16]   "`Slander of title' is defined as a 
false and malicious statement made in disparagement of a person's title to real 
or personal property, or of some right of his causing him special damage." 
Bennett v. Pace, 731 P.2d 33, 34 (Wyo. 1987).

In 
order to sustain an action for disparagement of another's property or title, it 
is necessary to show damages. Diefenderfer v. Totman, 73 Wyo. 409, 280 P.2d 284 (1955), followed in Brennan v. Laramie Newspapers, Inc., Wyo., 
493 P.2d 1044 (1972). See also, Restatement, Torts 2d §§ 624-632, comment 
b; § 632 explicitly requires p[]ecuniary loss in order to complete the 
cause of action.

Cates 
v. Barb, 
650 P.2d 1159, 1161 (Wyo. 1982) (emphasis added).

[¶17]   The son claimed that he lost 
approximately $12,000 in revenue because of Sannerud's actions. His testimony 
was the only evidence which was presented concerning his financial 
losses:

Q. 
Have you identified any financial loss that you suffered that you can identify 
with this lien foreclosure action, and you said, yes; and then how did you make 
this determination?

A. 
Well, there is the lawyer's fees I have had to pay all along since this has 
began. I figured that I have lost about 12,000 in 
business.

Q. 
How do you figure that?

A. 
Based on my tax returns. The first year I was here I improved business by 6,000 
and then when this began, that year I only improved business by about 2,000, so 
I figure this litigation has cost me 4,000 for that year. And then I am assuming 
that this year I'll lose another 4,000 based on what I figured I lost the year 
before.

[¶18]   No evidence was presented which 
indicated that the business would have improved more than it did in the year of 
the foreclosure sale if a foreclosure sale had not occurred. The pecuniary loss 
evidence was, therefore, speculative. "Damages must be proven with a reasonable 
degree of certainty, and a court may not resort to speculation or conjecture in 
determining the proper amount to award." Cottonwood Valley Ranch, Inc. v. 
Roberts, 874 P.2d 897 (Wyo. 1994). "A claim for lost future profits must be 
based on `the best proof available as to the amount of loss.'" State Surety 
Company v. Lamb Construction Company, 625 P.2d 184, 193 (Wyo. 1981) (quoting 
Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 563 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Wyo. 
1977)).

[¶19]   The son claimed that he incurred 
attorney's fees in the approximate amount of $4,000. The district court 
concluded that the son had failed to prove his attorney's fees "in a manner 
permitting judgment in that respect." But cf. Barquin v. Hall Oil Co., 28 
Wyo. 164, 171, 201 P. 352 (1921) (suggesting that attorney's fees are not 
recoverable in an action for defamation of title). The son also claimed that he 
had suffered emotional distress, but he did not present evidence of any 
pecuniary loss which was associated with his emotional distress. See 
Cates, 650 P.2d  at 1161.

[¶20]   When we afford the son's evidence 
every favorable inference which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it, we 
conclude that the son failed to produce sufficient evidence of pecuniary loss, 
which is an essential element of a slander of title cause of action. We, 
therefore, reverse the trial court's slander of title judgment.1

[¶21]   Because we hold that the son did 
not prove damages to support his slander of title claim, we do not need to 
consider Sannerud's remaining claims concerning slander of 
title.

[¶22]   Affirmed in part and reversed in 
part.

Footnote

1 The district court did not award punitive damages. See Cates, 650 P.2d  at 1161 ("If a plaintiff is not entitled to actual damages, he is not 
entitled to punitive damages").