Case Title: TAYLOR v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

Citation: 2003 WY 83, 72 P.3d 799

Docket Number: 436750

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Cite as: 2003 WY 83, 72 P.3d 799

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKERS'

COMPENSATION 
CLAIM OF:

 

DARCY 
S. TAYLOR,

 

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

STATE 
OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING

WORKERS' 
SAFETY AND COMPENSATION

DIVISION,

 

Appellee(Respondent).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Kathleen J. Swanson of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Casper, 
Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; Steve Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and David L. 
Delicath, Assistant Attorney General.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

VOIGT, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Darcy S. 
Taylor (Taylor) seeks review of the Office of Administrative Hearings' (OAH) 
order stating the method for calculating his worker's compensation 
benefits.  The district court 
affirmed the decision of the OAH.  
In 1990, Taylor's feet were crushed in a work-related accident that 
resulted in partial amputation of his left foot.  Doctors assessed impairment in the left 
foot at 75%, for which Taylor received benefits.  In 2000, Taylor underwent additional 
surgery that increased his impairment rating to 83%.  Taylor disagrees with the OAH's method 
of calculating his additional benefits.   We affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Taylor presents 
the following issue on appeal:

 

Whether 
the Office of Administrative Hearings improperly calculated Darcy Taylor's award 
for Permanent Partial Impairment of 83%, based upon Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-405(g) in 
effect in April, 2000, by subtracting 75%.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      In 1990, after a 
serious work-related injury at a sawmill, doctors partially amputated Taylor's 
left foot near the arch.  As a 
result, Taylor has undergone treatment for several consequential progressive 
injuries stemming from the original accident.  The Wyoming Division of Workers' Safety 
and Compensation (the Division) has paid Taylor worker's compensation benefits 
for these injuries.

 

[¶4]      Doctors initially 
assessed Taylor's permanent partial impairment (PPI) in the left foot at 
75%.  In April 2000, after Taylor 
underwent surgery to release his left Achilles tendon, his doctor increased his 
impairment rating to 83%.  In 
September 2000, the Division advised Taylor that his temporary total disability 
had ended, and that he qualified to apply for a PPI award based on the 83% 
impairment to his left foot.   
The Division had previously awarded Taylor $20,176.92 for his 75% 
impairment, calculated pursuant to statutes in effect in 1990 when the original 
injury occurred.  In its Notice of 
Permanent Partial Impairment Rating to Taylor, the Division advised Taylor how 
the new award would be calculated:  
"Twenty four months x $1120.94 which is 2/3 of the states average [1990] 
wage x 83% = $22,329.12.  . . .  You received a seventy-five percent 
($20,176.92) permanent partial impairment award for your left foot July 
1991.  Therefore, you are 
entitled to receive the difference/additional impairment percentage which equals 
$2,152.20."  (Emphasis in 
original.)

 

[¶5]      Taylor disagreed 
that the calculation should be based on the 1990 average wage, and a hearing was 
held before the OAH.  At the 
hearing, Taylor argued that his surgery in 2000 constituted a second compensable 
injury, and that he should be awarded an 83% PPI award under the 2000 statute, 
using the average monthly wage in 2000 less the award he previously 
received.  The OAH agreed that the 
surgery was a second compensable injury, and eventually determined that the 
award would be calculated using the 8% increase in PPI and the statute in effect 
at the time of the second injury.  
The OAH determined the award would be calculated taking the 8% increased 
PPI rating and multiplying it by 44 months as found in Wyo. Stat Ann. § 
27-14-405(g) (LexisNexis 2003).  
This amount was then to be multiplied by the statewide monthly average 
wage in effect in the quarter preceding July 2000 to arrive at the new PPI 
award.

 

[¶6]      Taylor agreed 
with the last OAH method of calculating the award amount, but contended there 
should be no deduction for the prior 75% payment, and appealed to the district 
court.   The district court 
affirmed the OAH's calculation and its order in entirety, and this appeal 
followed.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶7]      "When reviewing 
an administrative order, we are not compelled to accept any of the conclusions 
reached by the district court, and will review the case as if it had come 
directly to this Court from the agency."  
Appleby v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Div., 2002 WY 84, ¶ 9, 47 P.3d 613, 616 (Wyo. 2002).  Taylor presents a pure question of law 
that requires interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(g).  Statutory interpretation and the 
application of law made by an administrative agency are reviewed by this Court 
de novo.  Bailey v. State 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 2002 WY 145, ¶ 10, 55 P.3d 23, 26 (Wyo. 2002); Gray 
v. Stratton Real Estate, 2001 WY 125, ¶ 5, 36 P.3d 1127, 1128 (Wyo. 
2001).

 

"The 
interpretation and correct application of the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act are questions of law over which our review authority is 
plenary.  Collicott [v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 2001 WY 35] ¶ 4 [20 P.3d 1077, ¶ 4 (Wyo.2001)].  Conclusions 
of law made by an administrative agency are affirmed only if they are in accord 
with the law.  Id.  We do not afford any deference to the 
agency's determination, and we will correct any error made by the agency in 
either interpreting or applying the law.  
Id."

 

Bailey, 
2002 
WY 145, ¶ 9, 55 P.3d at 26 (quoting State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. v. Garl, 2001 WY 59, ¶ 9, 26 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Wyo. 2001)).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      Taylor argues 
that the hearing examiner improperly calculated his PPI award with respect to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(g).  
Taylor claims that because the statutory language in effect at the time 
of his second compensable injury is different from the language in effect at the 
time of the original injury in 1990, the worker's compensation benefits he 
previously received should not be deducted from the present calculation.  Taylor claims that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-405(b)1 applicable in 1990 contained 
language providing for the subtraction of previous awards, whereas the statute 
in effect in 2000 contained no such language.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(b) 
applicable in 1990 stated:

 

For 
any permanent partial disability described in this section, the employee shall 
receive for the number of months indicated a monthly payment as provided by W.S. 
27-14-403(c), less any 
previous awards for the same body part[.]

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-405(g) applicable in 2000 provided:

 

An 
injured employee's impairment shall be rated by a licensed physician using the 
most recent edition of the American Medical Association's guide to the 
evaluation of permanent impairment.  
The award shall be paid as provided by W.S. 27-14-403 for the number of 
months determined by multiplying the percentage of impairment by forty-four (44) 
months.

 

[¶9]      Taylor's claim 
requires us to interpret Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(g).  Statutory interpretation involves a 
reasoned search for the intention of the legislature.  Petroleum Inc. v. State ex rel. State 
Bd. of Equalization, 983 P.2d 1237, 1240 (Wyo. 1999).  We interpret statutory language in light 
of the purpose and policy behind the enactment.  In seeking to ascertain the intent of 
the legislature regarding the proper construction, we are guided by the fact 
that the legislature is presumed to have intended a reasonable, just, and 
constitutional result.  82 C.J.S. 
Statutes §§ 307-310 (1999); 
Petroleum Inc., 983 P.2d  at 1240.

 

[¶10]   The rules of statutory 
interpretation are well recognized.

 

"We 
first decide whether the statute is clear or ambiguous.  This Court makes that determination as a 
matter of law.  A statute is 
unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as 
to its meaning with consistency and predictability.'  Allied-Signal, Inc. [v. Wyoming State 
Board of Equalization], 813 P.2d [214,] 220 [ (Wyo.1991) ].  A statute is ambiguous only if it is 
found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.'  813 P.2d  at 
219-20."

 

Powder 
River Coal Co. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 2002 WY 5, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 423, 426 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting State v. Bannon Energy Corp., 999 P.2d 1306, 
1308-09 (Wyo. 2000)).

 

"When 
the words used are clear and unambiguous, a court risks an impermissible 
substitution of its own views, or those of others, for the intent of the 
legislature if any effort is made to interpret or construe statutes on any basis 
other than the language invoked by the legislature.  . . .  If the language selected by the 
legislature is sufficiently definitive, that language establishes the rule of 
law.  . . .  This inhibition upon statutory 
construction offers assurance that the legislative efforts and determinations of 
elected representatives will be made effective without judicial adjustment or 
gloss."

 

State ex 
rel. Dept. of Revenue v. Buggy Bath Unlimited, Inc., 2001 
WY 27, ¶ 16, 18 P.3d 1182, 1187 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Allied-Signal, Inc. v. 
Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d  214, 219 (Wyo. 1991)).

 

[¶11]   We find the language in the 1990 
and 2000 statutes to be clear and unambiguous, and we conclude that the 
subtraction language in the 1990 statute was superfluous because  the law does not allow one to receive 
double compensation for the same injury.  
In State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. v. 
Colvin, 681 P.2d 269, 273 (Wyo. 1984), we 
held that double recovery was prohibited (claimant could not be compensated for 
the partial loss of his entire arm and also be compensated for the individual 
injuries to the same member).

 

[¶12]   It is true that this Court has 
recognized the second compensable injury rule, under which an employee who has 
incurred a compensable injury and received benefits for that injury, may receive 
more benefits for a compensable injury caused by the first injury, regardless of 
the passage of time.  Yenne-Tully 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 2002 WY 90, 
¶ 10, 48 P.3d 1057, 1062 (Wyo. 2002).  In order for a second injury to be 
compensable, the original compensable injury must be the direct cause of the 
subsequent injury.  
Id.

 

[¶13]   In the instant case, there is no 
dispute that Taylor had a second compensable injury for which he could receive 
compensation benefits.  There also 
is no dispute that the PPI rating is now 83%, an additional 8% over his original 
assessment.  Therefore, the hearing 
examiner concluded that the calculation, based on the 2000 version of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-405(g), would be 8% times 44 months times the wage rate in 
effect in the quarter preceding July 2000.  
We conclude that the hearing examiner's calculation of Taylor's increased 
impairment is correct according to the statute.  To do as Taylor suggests would allow him 
a "double recovery" of 158% (75% + 83%), which is contrary to the intent of the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶14]   The OAH properly applied Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-405(g) in calculating Taylor's PPI award.  The order of the district court 
affirming the OAH is affirmed.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

  
1Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-14-405(a) and (b) were repealed in 1994.