Case Title: Bains v. Jameson

Citation: 507 So. 2d 504

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1987-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
507 So. 2d 504 (1987)
Jack Martin BAINS, Sr., et al.
v.
Richard JAMESON, As Executor of the Estate of Jessie Katheryn Howard, Deceased.
No. 85-1126.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 1, 1987.
B.J. McPherson, Jack Martin Bains, and Thomas Prickett II, Oneonta, for appellants.
Henry E. Simpson and Barbara F. Olschner of Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, Birmingham, for appellee.
BEATTY, Justice.
This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Jack Martin Bains, Sr., and Peggy H. Bains, suing individually and as parents and next friends of Jack Martin Bains, Jr., from a judgment for the defendant, Richard Jameson, executor, based upon a jury verdict in plaintiffs' action to recover damages. We affirm.
The action arose out of a collision between a vehicle driven by Jack Martin Bains, Jr., and another vehicle driven by Jessie K. Howard. The accident occurred on Highway 75 within the city limits of Oneonta. Highway 75 is a five-lane highway, with two lanes running east, two lanes running west, and a turn lane between the east and west lanes. Jack, Jr., was travelling west, driving his father's 1983 Chevrolet Blazer vehicle, with his father's permission. He was operating the vehicle with the cruise control set at about 45 m.p.h., and, with the windows down, *505 was listening to a tape of a musical selection, "Blizzard of Oz."
Mrs. Howard was driving south in her two-door vehicle on Ingle Street, a perpendicular street which intersected Highway 75. A stop sign was located on the corner of Ingle Street and Highway 75 for traffic approaching Highway 75.
The collision occurred in the inside westbound lane on Highway 75, the lane that Jack, Jr., occupied. Both drivers sustained personal injuries. Mrs. Howard died on the day of the accident. Jack, Jr., was treated for injuries but not hospitalized.
Plaintiffs brought this action against Mrs. Howard's estate, alleging negligence and wanton conduct, to recover damages for the damage to the vehicle of Jack, Sr., for loss of service to the parents of Jack, Jr., and for injuries sustained by Jack, Jr. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, as subrogee, was made a party plaintiff. Defendant answered by charging Jack, Jr., with contributory negligence. Following further pleading and discovery, trial by jury ensued, with a verdict being rendered for the defendant on all counts. State Farm and the Bainses moved for a new trial, which was overruled. The Bainses appeal. State Farm did not appeal.
Plaintiffs contend on appeal that there was no evidence of contributory negligence on the part of Jack, Jr., and thus, that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred in improperly charging the jury.
Regarding plaintiffs' attack upon the sufficiency of the evidence, we conclude that, upon the record, this Court cannot review that issue. It is well settled that a motion for a directed verdict must be made at the close of all the evidence and that a timely post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict must be subsequently made before an appellate court may consider on appeal the insufficiency-of-evidence issue directed to the jury's verdict. A full discussion of this requirement is found in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Sealy, 374 So. 2d 877, 880-82 (Ala. 1979), in which the Court, after discussing Rule 50, A.R.Civ.P., concluded:
See also Black v. Black, 469 So. 2d 1288 (Ala.1985), and Housing Authority of the City of Prichard v. Malloy, 341 So. 2d 708 (Ala.1977).
The plaintiffs in this case did not move for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. Nor did plaintiffs move for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Accordingly, plaintiffs have waived their right to question the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.
Plaintiffs also maintain that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury that Jack, Jr., was not, under the evidence, the agent, servant, or employee of his father.
The record discloses that the trial court gave an extensive oral instruction to the jury dealing with the law of agency as applied to Jack, Sr., and his son, Jack, Jr. Part, but not all, of that oral charge is reproduced here:
*507 After the trial court had completed the oral charge and given certain requested charges, counsel for plaintiff made the following request and exception:
(Emphasis added.) Thereafter, plaintiffs' counsel proceeded to except to the trial court's refusal to instruct on certain of plaintiffs' requested charges. None of the refused requested charges contained in the record before us pertains to the issue of agency.
Moreover, it does not appear, from a reading of counsel's address to the court, that plaintiff was objecting to the court's instructions on the agency issue. But if we are mistaken in that interpretation, nevertheless, plaintiff has failed to comply with Rule 51, supra. If the objection was that the trial court erred in giving defendants' requested charge, it has not been pointed out to us, and our own study of the entire jury charge does not disclose, which portion of that charge was complained about. In any case, no grounds for such an objection were proffered as required by Rule 51. If, on the other hand, the objection, if it was an objection, was to the giving of "an erroneous, misleading, incomplete, or otherwise improper oral charge," then, again, no grounds for objection were stated. Marshall Durbin Farms, Inc. v. Landers, 470 So. 2d 1098 (Ala.1985).
Finally, if by raising this issue on appeal plaintiffs are attacking the sufficiency of the evidence on the issue of agency, then we respectfully refer them to our discussion under Part I.
The final issue presented by plaintiffs concerns the trial court's response to a question from the jury. According to plaintiffs, the trial court erred in its response. The record discloses that the following exchanges occurred after the jury had been excused to begin their deliberations but returned to the courtroom with a question:
We have quoted the entire transaction so that the issue of the trial court's response is clearly and completely aired. *509 The record amply demonstrates the efforts of the trial court to fully respond to the jury's question while at the same time being careful not to emphasize any portion of his instruction. Contrary to the plaintiffs' position on appeal that the trial judge erred when he stated that "[t]he law would leave them the way they found them," the trial court diligently went further to assure that the jury would not overlook the effect of negligence on the agency issue.
Moreover, plaintiffs themselves, though objecting presently, made no objection to this charge. It was the defendant who objected. Plaintiffs cannot for the first time object to a jury instruction after they failed to make any objection and thus failed to preserve any supposed error for review. Record Data International, Inc. v. Nichols, 381 So. 2d 1 (Ala.1979).
Let the judgment be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.