Case Title: RICHARD LYNN WRIGHT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84-225

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
RICHARD LYNN WRIGHT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 102703 P.2d 1102Case Number: 84-225Decided: 08/01/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
RICHARD LYNN WRIGHT, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty, Robert A. Hill, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, and James 
A. Horner, Jr., Student Intern, Wyoming Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, and 
Zane Moseley, Defender Aid Program, Laramie, for appellant; oral argument by 
James A. Horner, Cheyenne.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Roger Fransen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee; oral argument by 
Roger Fransen.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant was charged 
with burglary in violation of § 6-3-301(a), W.S. 1977, and pled guilty. At the 
time of sentencing, appellant asked to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court 
denied his request and proceeded to sentence appellant. We 
affirm.

[¶2.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues:

"1. Whether the district 
court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea prior to sentencing.

"2. Whether the sentence 
imposed was an abuse of the sentencing court's 
discretion."

[¶3.]     Appellant was going 
fishing with his fourteen-year-old son. They stopped at a Seven-Eleven store. An 
owner of a car which had broken down across the freeway asked appellant if he 
could fix the car. Appellant checked it out and told him that he could not take 
care of the mechanical problem. Appellant then asked for a $15.00 fee as a 
service charge. The owner refused to pay because the car had not been fixed. 
Appellant drove the owner to the Seven-Eleven store, went back to the vehicle, 
broke a window and took a briefcase containing papers and a Colt .38 Special 
revolver. He was drunk, and he was angry at the owner of the vehicle for not 
paying the service charge.

[¶4.]     This incident occurred 
May 12, 1984. A criminal complaint and a criminal warrant were filed May 15, 
1984. A public defender was appointed to represent appellant on May 16. A waiver 
of preliminary hearing was filed with the court on May 17. The prosecutor had 
told appellant that it would be ten days from the initial hearing to the 
preliminary hearing. Because of the waiver, the preliminary hearing was not 
held. At the arraignment, on June 6, 1984, appellant told the judge that he felt 
there had been delay in bringing him before the court because he had not gone to 
a preliminary hearing. His attorney informed the court that the preliminary 
hearing had been waived. Appellant pled guilty.

[¶5.]     At the sentencing 
hearing, appellant sought to withdraw his plea of guilty because a preliminary 
hearing had not been held, contending that the hearing had been waived without 
his permission. The judge ordered a transcript prepared of the arraignment 
stating that if appellant was lying about what occurred, he would get four or 
five extra years. The sentencing hearing resumed on July 24, 1984. At that time 
appellant contended that the only reason he had pled guilty was that the 
prosecutor had told him that, if he did not plead guilty, his fourteen-year-old 
son would be tried as an adult and put in prison as an accessory. He stated that 
during the arraignment he had asked his wife if his son was still in town, and 
when she said yes, he then pled guilty.

[¶6.]     The trial court found 
that appellant did not satisfy his burden of establishing his claims concerning 
waiver of his preliminary hearing and his plea of guilty. With respect to the 
waiver of the preliminary hearing without his permission, the court questioned 
the parties and counsel involved; and it appeared that appellant had told the 
deputy sheriff he wanted to "get this over" and would waive his preliminary 
hearing in order to do so, and that appellant requested his attorney waive the 
preliminary hearing to expedite his appearance in court. The State informed the 
court that it had contemplated bringing charges against appellant's son but 
determined not to do so, that no threats had ever been made, and that there was 
very little discussion of the son. Appellant had never been denied opportunities 
to contact the court. The court conceded it should not have threatened appellant 
with a longer sentence and affirmed that it would not sentence out of "spite." 
Appellant's request to withdraw his guilty plea was refused, and he was then 
sentenced to a period of not less than three nor more than ten 
years.

WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY 
PLEA

[¶7.]     There is no absolute 
right to withdraw a plea of guilty before sentencing.

"Denial by the district 
court is within its sound discretion and there must be a plausible reason for 
withdrawal." Ecker v. State, 
Wyo., 545 P.2d 641, 642 (1976).

See also, Hanson v. State, Wyo., 590 P.2d 832 
(1979). We have equated "a plausible reason for withdrawal" with the federal 
standard of a fair and just reason for withdrawing the plea. Schmidt v. State, Wyo., 668 P.2d 656 
(1983). The defendant has the burden to establish good grounds for a withdrawal. 
Osborn v. State, Wyo., 672 P.2d 777 
(1983).

[¶8.]     At the sentencing 
hearing, appellant sought to withdraw his guilty plea because a preliminary 
hearing had not been held and because his guilty plea was based on his desire to 
protect his son from harassment. He contends that this conduct constituted a 
"plausible" reason for withdrawing his plea. There is no contention that the 
arraignment did not meet the standards of Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P. The trial judge 
made a comprehensive showing that appellant understood the consequences of his 
plea and the constitutional rights available to him at trial. The court 
established that the plea was not being made as a result of coercion, threats, 
fear or a promise of favorable treatment; it was voluntary and of appellant's 
own free will without any underlying bargain. After the plea of guilty was 
entered, the court established a factual basis for the guilt. Thereafter the 
court asked the defendant about his children. Appellant did not respond, but an 
unidentified observer related that the child was still present in Rawlins. Thus, 
appellant had entered his guilty plea before knowing the whereabouts of his 
son.

[¶9.]     Appellant did not 
satisfy his burden of establishing good grounds or a valid reason for withdrawal 
of the plea. He does not contend that he was innocent nor that he has a 
meritorious defense. He contends that he entered the plea because of a desire to 
protect his son from prosecution. This contention is not supported by the record 
or the actual proceedings before the court. The court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to allow appellant to withdraw his plea of guilty. 

ABUSE IN 
SENTENCING

[¶10.]  Appellant contends that the sentence 
imposed was an abuse of the sentencing court's discretion. At the first 
sentencing hearing appellant stated that the preliminary hearing had been waived 
without his permission. The court continued the hearing in order to have a 
transcript prepared of the arraignment. At that time he 
stated:

"I'll tell you what I'm 
going to do. I'm going to have that transcript prepared, and if you're lying, 
you're going to get about four or five extra years,"

and:

"But I think I'll test 
the veracity of your statements, and if the record - the transcript of the 
arraignment proceedings does not bear out what you're telling me, I'm going to 
just fix a little time for you for coming into Court and playing this 
game."

When the 
sentencing hearing resumed, defendant asked:

"[D]oes this mean that 
now that you'll sentence me to that extra years that you told me you were going 
to give me?

"THE COURT: No, I don't 
think I can do that. I think I made a threat I shouldn't have made. Because if I 
do, the Supreme Court will construe it as vindictive measure on my part. And 
certainly it's not my purpose to sentence out of spite."

Appellant was 
sentenced to not less than three nor more than ten years. Section 6-3-301(b), 
W.S. 1977, provides that "burglary is a felony punishable by imprisonment for 
not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than fourteen thousand dollars 
($14,000.00), or both."

[¶11.]  The standard concerning sentencing review 
is well established.

"[W]e are reluctant to 
review the length of a sentence imposed by a trial court if it is within the 
limits set by statute and * * * we will not disturb a sentence absent a clear 
abuse of discretion." Ventling v. 
State, Wyo., 676 P.2d 573, 574 
(1984).

[¶12.]  The determination of a sentence involves 
two considerations: the nature of the crime and its circumstances as well as the 
character of the criminal. Id. at 575. Appellant was drunk and outraged 
over a $15.00 debt which may or may not have actually been owed. In the company 
of his fourteen-year-old son he smashed the window of a vehicle and stole a 
briefcase. He did not know what was in the briefcase nor did he care; the act 
was one of vindictive destruction. Appellant had a fairly extensive prior 
criminal record with a felony conviction. Appellant's sentence was within the 
statutory limits. He claims that the judge's statement that he would not carry 
out his threat should not be allowed to work as a disclaimer of the prior 
threats. Appellant contends that the judge sentenced him out of spite because he 
gave the maximum sentence.

[¶13.]  Appellant was not sentenced to a maximum 
term under the statute. He was given a sentence of three to ten years; he could 
have received a sentence of nine to ten years as well as a fine. We do not find 
an abuse of discretion in appellant's sentence. The judgment is, therefore, 
affirmed.