Case Title: Commonwealth v. Lawson

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11996

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-10-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11996 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RICHARD LAWSON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 7, 2016. - October 28, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
 
Insanity.  Mental Health.  Evidence, Sanity, Inference, 
Presumptions and burden of proof, Argument by prosecutor.  
Practice, Criminal, Presumptions and burden of proof, 
Required finding, Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Central Division of 
the Boston Municipal Court Department on March 12, 2014. 
 
 
The case was heard by Michael J. Coyne, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Christopher DeMayo for the defendant. 
 
John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The defendant, after being told by Boston 
police officers that he had an outstanding warrant, resisted 
arrest and assaulted the officers.  At a jury-waived trial in 
the Boston Municipal Court, the defendant offered a defense of 
lack of criminal responsibility, and called a forensic 
psychologist who described the defendant's lengthy mental health 
history and opined that the defendant was not criminally 
responsible at the time of the offense.  The Commonwealth did 
not present expert evidence on the issue of criminal 
responsibility in rebuttal but rather relied on the 
circumstances surrounding the offense and cross-examination of 
the defendant's expert to establish criminal responsibility.  
The judge denied the defendant's motion for required findings of 
not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility and 
found the defendant guilty on all charges. 
 
On appeal, the defendant contends that the judge must have 
relied on the so-called "presumption of sanity" because, without 
this presumption, the evidence did not support a finding of 
criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt.  We conclude 
that the "presumption of sanity" is not truly a presumption but 
rather an inference that the defendant is probably criminally 
responsible because most people are criminally responsible for 
their acts.  Where a defendant proffers a defense of lack of 
criminal responsibility and there is some evidence that supports 
3 
 
 
it, this inference, standing alone, cannot support a finding 
that a defendant is criminally responsible beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Although the Commonwealth may not rely on "the 
presumption of sanity" to establish criminal responsibility, the 
Commonwealth need not offer expert testimony in every case and 
may rely instead on the circumstances of the offense and all 
that the defendant did and said before, during, and after the 
offense to prove the defendant's criminal responsibility.  
Applying the proper test, we hold that the evidence here was 
sufficient to allow a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that 
the defendant was criminally responsible at the time of the 
offenses and, therefore, affirm the convictions. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts that could have been found 
by the judge from the evidence at trial.  On March 11, 2014, 
Boston police Officers Paul Hayward and John Mullen were on 
routine patrol in full uniform in downtown Boston when Officer 
Hayward spotted the defendant, whom the officer knew to have 
outstanding warrants.  The officers got out of their vehicle and 
approached the defendant, who was walking, talking, and laughing 
with two other men.  As the officers approached, the defendant's 
eyes widened, and he looked over his shoulder.  When Officer 
Hayward blocked the defendant's path and told the defendant that 
the officer needed to speak with him, the defendant asked the 
officer to light his cigarette.  The officer declined, told the 
4 
 
 
defendant that he had an outstanding warrant, and asked for 
identification.  The defendant stepped back and reached his hand 
down towards his pants pocket.  Officer Hayward put his hand on 
the defendant's hand to prevent the defendant from reaching into 
the pocket.  The defendant pushed Officer Hayward away.  Officer 
Hayward then "took [the defendant] to the ground," and a 
struggle ensued during which both officers attempted to restrain 
the defendant and apply handcuffs.  During the struggle, Officer 
Mullen inadvertently placed both cuffs on the same hand of the 
defendant.  The defendant kicked Officer Mullen in the head 
several times and flailed his handcuffed hand.  Eventually, they 
were able to restrain the defendant.  Officer Hayward described 
the defendant as being coherent but "absolutely manic" during 
the struggle. 
 
The defendant was arrested and taken to the police station, 
where he struggled with several other officers.  Later that day, 
the defendant was taken to the Massachusetts General Hospital 
for a mental status evaluation.  At the hospital, he was 
described as paranoid, disheveled, and having "flight of ideas."  
He was so agitated that he was given emergency antipsychotic 
medication. 
 
After his arrest, the defendant appeared in the Quincy 
Division of the District Court Department on an unrelated 
matter.  A judge of that court ordered the defendant to be 
5 
 
 
evaluated for his competency to stand trial, and the defendant 
was sent to Bridgewater State Hospital (Bridgewater) for that 
evaluation. 
 
At trial, in support of his defense of lack of criminal 
responsibility, the defendant called a forensic psychologist at 
Bridgewater to testify regarding the defendant's mental health 
history and her opinion as to his criminal responsibility on the 
day in question.  The doctor reported that the defendant has an 
"extensive" mental health history, which has involved ten 
admissions to Bridgewater, the first in 2000.  Some of those 
admissions were the result of civil commitments; others resulted 
from referrals from correctional institutions.  He was civilly 
committed at Bridgewater at the time of trial.  The defendant 
has received mental health diagnoses of a psychotic disorder not 
otherwise specified, bipolar disorder, manic episodes with 
psychotic features, a mood disorder not otherwise specified, and 
schizoaffective disorder.  His current diagnosis is 
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type.  In the past, he has 
been prescribed a combination of antipsychotic and mood-
stabilizing medications.  The defendant also has a history of 
substance abuse. 
 
A month before the incident, the defendant had been in 
custody at the Nashua Street jail, where he was taking 
medications prescribed to manage his mental health symptoms.  
6 
 
 
But on February 21, 2014, the defendant was transferred to the 
Norfolk County Correctional Center, where his antipsychotic and 
mood-stabilizing medications were discontinued.  The mood-
stabilizing medication was later prescribed, but the defendant 
did not take it.  The defendant was then transferred to the 
Middlesex County house of correction, where he was not 
prescribed any medication, and from there he apparently was 
released from custody.  Consequently, there was no record 
indicating that the defendant had taken any medication from 
February 21 until the incident on March 11. 
 
The doctor testified that when the defendant discontinues 
medications, he decompensates quickly, and he would likely 
become agitated, aggressive, impulsive, paranoid, and 
delusional.  He also would likely hear voices, exhibit poor 
insight, and exercise poor judgment. 
 
The doctor also described what the defendant had told her 
about the incident.  He said that he was walking down the street 
when someone wearing a yellow suit with a reflective emblem 
approached him and asked, "What the fuck is your name?"2  He 
thought the person could have been a street cleaner or a 
security guard but did not think that the person was a police 
                                                          
 
 
2 The defendant recalled only one person approaching him; he 
did not recall a second person being involved in the 
altercation. 
7 
 
 
officer.  He thought that the person was trying to torment him 
and was going to take him back to jail.3 
 
The doctor opined that the defendant was likely manifesting 
symptoms of schizoaffective disorder on the day of the incident, 
including paranoid delusions.  She also opined that his actions 
were driven by a distorted sense of reality caused by the 
symptoms of his mental illness and that he could not conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law on the day of the 
offense. 
 
On cross-examination, the doctor stated that her 
conversations with the defendant occurred after she provided him 
with a Lamb warning, see Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass. 265, 
270 (1974), informing him that his statements would not be 
confidential and could be used in court.4  She testified that she 
                                                          
 
 
3 The defendant's statements to the forensic psychologist 
were hearsay and therefore admissible only for the limited 
purpose of assessing the credibility of the doctor's opinion 
regarding the defendant's criminal responsibility; they were not 
admissible for the truth of the matters asserted.  See 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 449 Mass. 747, 768-769 (2007).  See 
generally Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2) (2016) (party's out-of-
court statement is hearsay unless offered in evidence by 
opposing party).  However, neither party sought to limit the 
admissibility of these statements, and the judge did not declare 
that he would do so.  Where otherwise inadmissible hearsay is 
admitted without objection or request for a limiting 
instruction, it may be considered by the finder of fact for all 
purposes.  See Commonwealth v. Washington, 449 Mass. 476, 487 
(2007). 
 
 
4 In Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass. 265, 270 (1974), we 
held that communications between an individual and a mental 
8 
 
 
first encountered the defendant three weeks after his arrest; 
she did not examine the defendant on the day of the offense.  
The doctor reviewed the defendant's records from the 
Massachusetts General Hospital regarding his examination there 
on March 11 and 12, but did not review any subsequent medical 
records before March 31, when the defendant was sent to 
Bridgewater.  She acknowledged the defendant's history of 
substance abuse and testified that he admitted to using cocaine 
on the day of the incident.  The doctor concluded that the 
defendant was not malingering, but she initially did not rule 
out that possibility.  She also testified that the defendant has 
been noncompliant with taking his medication in the past and has 
been violent while hospitalized at Bridgewater even when he was 
taking his medication. 
 
The prosecution did not offer any expert testimony in 
rebuttal.  At the close of all the evidence, the defendant moved 
for required findings of not guilty by reason of lack of 
criminal responsibility, arguing that the evidence was 
insufficient as a matter of law to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was criminally responsible at the time 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
health professional made during a court-ordered examination are 
privileged pursuant to G. L. c. 233, § 20B, unless the 
individual is informed that the communications would not be 
privileged. 
9 
 
 
of the offenses.5   The judge denied the motion and found the 
defendant guilty on all counts:  two counts of assault and 
battery on a public employee, in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13D; one count of assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon (shod foot), in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A; one 
count of assault by means of a dangerous weapon (handcuffs), in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15B;6 and one count of resisting 
arrest, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 32B.  The defendant 
appealed, and we allowed his motion for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  The defendant argues that the judge erred in 
denying his motion for required findings of not guilty by reason 
of lack of criminal responsibility.  He also contends that the 
prosecutor made improper comments to the judge in arguing 
against that motion. 
 
1.  Criminal responsibility.  Where a defendant asserts a 
defense of lack of criminal responsibility and there is evidence 
at trial that, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
                                                          
 
 
5 Although counsel moved for required findings of not 
guilty, and did not specify that she was moving for required 
findings of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal 
responsibility, it is clear from the evidence at trial and the 
content of her argument that her motion sought the latter 
finding. 
 
 
6 The complaint charged the defendant with assault and 
battery with the handcuffs, but after the prosecution rested, 
the judge ordered the complaint amended to allege the lesser 
included offense of assault with the handcuffs because the 
evidence showed that the defendant "flailed" the handcuffs but 
never struck anyone with them. 
10 
 
 
defendant, would permit a reasonable finder of fact to have a 
reasonable doubt whether the defendant was criminally 
responsible at the time of the offense, the Commonwealth bears 
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was criminally responsible.  Commonwealth v. Keita, 
429 Mass. 843, 849-850 (1999).  "In this process, we require the 
Commonwealth to prove negatives beyond a reasonable doubt:  that 
the defendant did not have a mental disease or defect at the 
time of the crime and, if that is not disproved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that no mental disease or defect caused the 
defendant to lack substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law."  Id., citing Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 
Mass. 544, 546-547 (1967). 
 
The defendant contends that, where the Commonwealth offered 
no expert evidence that the defendant was criminally responsible 
and where there was nothing about the circumstances of the 
commission of the crimes or the defendant's conduct after their 
commission that would suggest that he was criminally 
responsible, it must be inferred that the judge denied the 
motion for required findings of not guilty based solely on the 
"presumption of sanity," even though the judge made no reference 
to such a presumption.  The defendant further claims that the 
inference arising from this "presumption" alone cannot support a 
11 
 
 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
criminally responsible. 
 
The Commonwealth contends that a judge may not allow a 
motion for a required finding of not guilty based on the 
Commonwealth's failure to prove criminal responsibility because 
criminal responsibility is not an "element" of any of the 
offenses charged.  We agree that criminal responsibility is not 
an "element" of any crime.  Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 
516, 532 (1976).  If it were, the United States Supreme Court 
would not have upheld the constitutionality of Federal and State 
laws that place the burden on a defendant to prove that he or 
she was not criminally responsible at the time of the offense, 
because the Supreme Court has declared that due process requires 
that the prosecution bear the burden of proving every element of 
a crime.  Id. at 531-532.  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 
(1970).  See also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798-799 (1952) 
(due process does not mandate that prosecution bear burden of 
proof of criminal responsibility).  However, even though 
criminal responsibility is not an "element" of a crime, once the 
defense of lack of criminal responsibility is proffered and some 
evidence is offered in support, a jury must be instructed that 
they must find the defendant not guilty by reason of lack of 
criminal responsibility if the Commonwealth has failed to meet 
its burden of proving criminal responsibility.  See Commonwealth 
12 
 
 
v. Goudreau, 422 Mass. 731, 735-737 (1996); id. at 737-739 
(Appendix).  See also Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 1-2 
(2013).  Regardless of whether criminal responsibility is an 
"element" of a crime or a required "fact" to be proved, a 
conviction may not stand where no rational finder of fact could 
find the defendant criminally responsible.  See Keita, 429 Mass. 
at 844 ("if the evidence did not permit a finding of criminal 
responsibility, [the defendant's] conviction would create a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice").  Therefore, a 
required finding of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal 
responsibility may rest on the failure of proof of criminal 
responsibility.  The absence of self-defense also is not an 
element of any offense, but where self-defense is claimed, we 
have considered whether the evidence of its absence is 
sufficient to support the denial of a motion for a required 
finding of not guilty.  See Commonwealth v. McAfee, 430 Mass. 
483, 495-496 (1999); Koonce v. Commonwealth, 412 Mass. 71, 73-74 
(1992), S.C., 418 Mass. 367 (1994). 
 
The Commonwealth also contends that, if criminal 
responsibility is a suitable ground for a defendant to move for 
a required finding of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal 
responsibility, the inference arising from the "presumption of 
sanity" alone is sufficient to defeat such a motion.  We agree 
that, under current case law, the Commonwealth is correct.  In 
13 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 357 Mass. 168, 178-180 (1970), S.C., 427 
Mass. 245 (1998), we declared: 
"[A] court cannot direct a jury to return a verdict of not 
guilty by reason of insanity even though the only evidence 
on the issue is that the defendant was insane at the time 
of the alleged crime, and the evidence is uncontroverted.  
[One] reason, as stated in Commonwealth v. Clark, 292 Mass. 
409, 415 [1935], is that 'although the burden of proof is 
on the Commonwealth to prove the defendant mentally 
responsible for crime . . . the fact that a great majority 
of men are sane, and the probability that any particular 
man is sane, may be deemed by a jury to outweigh, in 
evidential value, testimony that he is insane.' . . .  It 
is for the jury to decide in each case whether they draw 
that inference. . . .  If they draw that inference, it is 
for them to decide what weight they will give to it in the 
light of all of the evidence introduced on the issue.  They 
may deem it to outweigh, in evidential value, psychiatric 
or other evidence that the defendant is insane.  These are 
decisions to be made by the jury, and the court cannot 
direct the jury how they shall decide thereon." 
 
See Keita, 429 Mass. at 847.  We now revisit the doctrine 
arising from that case law. 
 
A presumption in the classic sense is a rule of law where 
proof of fact A is sufficient to satisfy a party's burden to 
prove fact B, leaving the opposing party with the burden of 
production or persuasion to prove the nonexistence of fact B.  
2 McCormick on Evidence § 342, at 675-677 (K.S. Broun ed., 7th 
ed. 2013).  In criminal cases, presumptions have been considered 
to be either mandatory or permissive:  mandatory presumptions 
require the finder of fact to "find the presumed fact upon proof 
of the basic fact, 'at least unless the defendant has come 
forward with some evidence to rebut the presumed connection 
14 
 
 
between the two facts,'" whereas permissive presumptions 
"allow[], but do[] not require, the trier of fact to infer the 
presumed fact from proof of the basic facts."  Id. at § 346, at 
716, quoting County Court of Ulster County, N.Y. v. Allen, 442 
U.S. 140, 157 (1979).  We have recognized that what has been 
called the "presumption of sanity" is "merely an expression we 
have used to describe both 'the fact that a great majority of 
men are sane,' . . . and 'the probability that any particular 
man is sane,' . . . , from which the jury may conclude that the 
defendant is sane" (citations omitted).  Kostka, 370 Mass. at 
530.  The "presumption of sanity" is thus not a presumption 
under any meaning of the word.  It is not premised on the 
admission in evidence of any basic fact to prove a presumed 
fact, but rather relies on a commonsense understanding regarding 
the sanity of the majority of the populace that need not be 
admitted in evidence.  It is more accurately characterized as an 
inference; characterizing it as a presumption is a recipe for 
confusion.7 
                                                          
 
 
7 We have declared that the "presumption of sanity" has a 
procedural characteristic in that it relieves the Commonwealth 
of the burden of proving criminal responsibility unless and 
until the defendant proffers the lack of criminal responsibility 
as a defense and some evidence is admitted in support of that 
defense.  Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 530 (1976).  
But this suggests that criminal responsibility is an element of 
an offense, which it is not, and that the presumption satisfies 
the prosecution's burden of proving that element where no 
evidence to the contrary is admitted.  Lack of criminal 
15 
 
 
 
The inference that a defendant is probably sane because 
most people are sane is not strong enough alone to permit a 
rational finder of fact to conclude that a defendant is 
criminally responsible beyond a reasonable doubt.  Although it 
is probable that an individual selected randomly would be 
criminally responsible for his or her acts, that same 
probability would not attach to the tiny subset of the 
population who are criminal defendants with a long history of 
mental illness who proffer a defense of lack of criminal 
responsibility.  As Justice O'Connor wrote in a dissent in 
Commonwealth v. Kappler, 416 Mass. 574, 599-600 (1993) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting): 
"The fact that a great majority of people are sane says 
little, if anything, about whether a particular defendant 
was sane when he or she engaged in a type of conduct in 
which the great majority of people do not engage.  The fact 
that a great majority of people are sane says absolutely 
nothing about whether the defendant in this case, . . . who 
had a long history of 'mental illness and auditory 
hallucinations,' . . . was sane on the morning that, 
staring straight ahead, he drove his automobile through a 
red traffic light on the Alewife Brook Parkway and then 
onto an adjacent footpath where he intentionally struck two 
people he had no reasonable or understandable motive to 
harm, and drove away" (citation omitted). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
responsibility is a defense, like self-defense or defense of 
another, and, where the defense is not raised, the Commonwealth 
has no burden to rebut it.  See id. at 532.  In this procedural 
sense, a "presumption of sanity" is as nonsensical as a 
presumption that a person does not kill in self-defense or in 
defense of another. 
16 
 
 
See Commonwealth v. Ricard, 355 Mass. 509, 515 (1969) ("The 
probability that any particular man is sane may be of slight if 
any weight in the face of unanimous psychiatric opinion to the 
contrary, where it is plainly apparent from the evidence that 
the act committed is not one that a sane person would have 
committed, there being no circumstances [anger, revenge, 
rejection, jealousy, hatred, insult, intoxication, or the like] 
to account for the murderous act by a sane person"). 
 
To permit an inference based on the probability that a 
person in the general population is criminally responsible, 
standing alone, to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt 
of criminal responsibility also diminishes the standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, especially where there is strong 
evidence of the defendant's mental health history and bizarre 
behavior.  See Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 506, 523 
(2000) (Spina, J., concurring) (noting "the obvious analytic 
problem of reconciling the reasonable doubt standard with a 
'presumption' that permits jurors to 'infer' a particular 
defendant's sanity from general probabilities"); Commonwealth v. 
Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 815 n.2 (1975) ("it may be questionable 
whether the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard and the 
'presumption of sanity' can logically coexist in a case where 
there has been extensive evidence of insanity with no medical 
evidence to the contrary"). 
17 
 
 
 
We therefore conclude that the inference that the defendant 
is criminally responsible because the great majority of persons 
are criminally responsible is not sufficient alone to warrant a 
rational finder of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that a defendant is criminally responsible.8  But this does not 
mean that the Commonwealth must offer expert evidence to meet 
its burden of proving criminal responsibility in every case 
where the issue is raised.  See Keita, 429 Mass. at 846 ("The 
Commonwealth . . . may prove sanity without presenting expert 
testimony").  See also Kostka, 370 Mass. at 535-536.  The 
Commonwealth may prove criminal responsibility through the 
inferences arising from the circumstances of the offense, 
including evidence that the defendant planned the offense, acted 
                                                          
 
 
8 We also recognize that we earlier declared that "[a] jury 
instruction concerning the presumption of sanity should be given 
in every case in which the question of the defendant's criminal 
responsibility is raised."  Commonwealth v. Keita, 429 Mass. 
843, 846 (1999).  The District Court followed this guidance by 
including in its model jury instruction 9.200 the sentence, "In 
considering whether or not the defendant was sane, if you feel 
it appropriate you may take into account that the great majority 
of people are sane, and that there is a resulting likelihood 
that any particular person is sane."  See Criminal Model Jury 
Instructions for Use in the District Court (1999).  An earlier 
version of the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide contained a 
substantially identical instruction.  See Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 51 (1999).  We now conclude that, given 
the meager weight of this inference and the risk of juror 
confusion regarding the burden of proof, judges should not 
instruct juries regarding this inference.  We note that the 
current Model Jury Instructions on Homicide make no reference to 
this inference in the instructions regarding criminal 
responsibility.  See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 1-12 
(2013). 
18 
 
 
on a rational motive, made rational decisions in committing the 
offense and in avoiding capture, and attempted to conceal the 
offense or his or her role in the offense.  See Commonwealth v. 
Cullen, 395 Mass. 225, 229 (1985) ("the judge was entitled to 
infer sanity from the facts underlying the crime"); Ricard, 355 
Mass. at 515 (absence of motive for killing supports claim of 
lack of criminal responsibility).  The Commonwealth also may 
prove criminal responsibility through admissible evidence of the 
defendant's words and conduct before, during, and after the 
offense, including evidence of malingering.  See Cullen, supra 
at 229-230; Commonwealth v. Lunde, 390 Mass. 42, 47-49 (1983). 
 
In deciding a motion for a required finding of not guilty 
by reason of lack of criminal responsibility, the judge must 
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth and determine whether "the evidence and the 
inferences that reasonably could be drawn from it were 'of 
sufficient force'" to permit a rational finder of fact to 
conclude that the defendant was criminally responsible beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 472 Mass. 815, 820 
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676–677 
(1979).  A motion for a required finding of not guilty may be 
brought at the close of the Commonwealth's case and again at the 
close of all the evidence, see Commonwealth v. Sheline, 391 
Mass. 279, 283 (1984), but we conclude that a motion for a 
19 
 
 
required finding of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal 
responsibility may be brought only at the close of all the 
evidence.  The reason for the difference is that the 
Commonwealth need prove criminal responsibility beyond a 
reasonable doubt only after there is evidence presented of lack 
of criminal responsibility that is sufficient to warrant a 
reasonable doubt, see Commonwealth v. Berry, 457 Mass. 602, 612 
& n.5 (2010), S.C., 466 Mass. 763 (2014), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Mills, 400 Mass. 626, 627 (1987), and such evidence is often 
presented only during the defendant's case.  By limiting such 
motions for a required finding of not guilty by reason of lack 
of criminal responsibility to the close of all the evidence, we 
ensure that the Commonwealth has a full opportunity to offer 
evidence in rebuttal of any such defense claim. 
 
In deciding such a motion at the close of all the evidence, 
a judge must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth and must disregard contrary evidence presented 
by the defendant, including the testimony of a defense expert, 
unless the contrary evidence demonstrates that the 
Commonwealth's evidence, or any inference drawn from such 
evidence, is "conclusively incorrect."  See Commonwealth v. 
O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 204 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Pike, 430 Mass. 317, 323 (1999).  See also O'Laughlin, supra 
("the fact that the defendant has presented evidence that he did 
20 
 
 
not [commit the crime] does not affect the sufficiency of the 
evidence unless the contrary evidence is so overwhelming that no 
rational jury could conclude that the defendant was guilty"); 
Kater v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 17, 20, S.C., 421 Mass. 1008 
(1995), and 432 Mass. 404 (2000). 
 
It will be the rare case where the totality of the evidence 
regarding the defendant's conduct and the circumstances 
surrounding the offense will not be sufficient to defeat a 
defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty by 
reason of lack of criminal responsibility.  Where, however, this 
evidence provides only weak support for a finding of criminal 
responsibility, the Commonwealth proceeds at its peril if it 
chooses to offer no expert testimony to rebut a defense expert's 
opinion of lack of criminal responsibility.  Cf. Kostka, 370 
Mass. at 540 (Hennessey, C.J., dissenting in part) ("the 
Commonwealth runs the very real risk of reversal and the 
granting of a new trial if it chooses to rely on the presumption 
and the circumstantial evidence of sanity . . . , rather than to 
introduce medical evidence of sanity"). 
 
Applying the legal standard to the facts of this case, we 
conclude that this is not one of those rare cases, and that the 
evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to support a finding 
that the defendant was criminally responsible beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Viewed in the light most favorable to the 
21 
 
 
Commonwealth, the evidence would allow a reasonable fact finder 
to infer that the defendant (1) told the doctor that he 
struggled with the officer because he feared he would be taken 
back to jail and therefore understood that the man was a police 
officer, with the power to arrest him; (2) attempted to divert 
the officers' attention by asking one of the officers to light 
his cigarette, because he feared that the officers were going to 
arrest him on an outstanding warrant and became violent once he 
realized that his ruse had failed; (3) fought the officers 
because he wanted to escape rather than be arrested and return 
to jail; and (4) was fabricating his claims that the person he 
assaulted was wearing a yellow suit with a reflective emblem and 
that he did not believe the person to be a police officer. 
 
Although the testimony and opinion of the doctor 
"contradicted, and tended to undermine, the potency of the 
Commonwealth's case, it falls well short of demonstrating that 
the Commonwealth's evidence was 'conclusively incorrect.'"  
Pike, 430 Mass. at 323, quoting Kater, 421 Mass. at 20.  See 
Kater, supra ("Deterioration would occur not because the 
defendant contradicted the Commonwealth's evidence . . . , but 
because evidence for the Commonwealth necessary to warrant 
submission of the case to the jury is later shown to be 
incredible or conclusively incorrect" [citation omitted]). 
22 
 
 
 
2.  Argument by prosecutor.  The defendant also argues that 
the prosecutor made improper assertions to the judge in arguing 
against the defendant's motion for required findings of not 
guilty.  Specifically, the defendant claims that the 
prosecutor's argument that the defendant had the capacity to 
understand his actions at the time of the offenses and that he 
deliberately chose not to take medications were not supported by 
the evidence adduced at trial.  As to the argument that the 
defendant had the substantial capacity to understand the legal 
and moral significance of his actions on the day of the 
offenses, our conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to 
support a finding of criminal responsibility also means that the 
prosecutor's argument was a "fair inference[] that might be 
drawn from the evidence."  See Commonwealth v. Ridge, 455 Mass. 
307, 330 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Murchison, 418 Mass. 
58, 59–60 (1994). 
 
As to the argument that the defendant was deliberately 
refusing to take medication, the defendant cannot establish that 
he was prejudiced by any misstatement because, shortly after the 
prosecutor made that statement, defense counsel brought to the 
judge's attention the fact that the defendant was not prescribed 
medication at the Middlesex County house of correction before 
the incident.  Thus, it is unlikely that any misstatement 
23 
 
 
affected the trial judge's findings.  See Commonwealth v. 
Beaudry, 445 Mass. 577, 584-585 (2005). 
 
Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion for 
required findings of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal 
responsibility is affirmed, and the defendant's convictions are 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.