Case Title: State v. Swift

Citation: 176 Vt. 299, 2004 VT 8A, 844 A.2d 802

Docket Number: 2002-414

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2004-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Swift (2002-414); 176 Vt. 299; 844 A.2d 802

2004 VT 8A

[Filed 27-Feb-2004]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2004 VT 8A

                                No. 2002-414

  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 3, Washington Circuit

  Kent Swift	                                 September Term, 2003

  Edward J. Cashman, J.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and John Treadwell, Assistant
    Attorney General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Allison Fulcher of Martin and Associates, Barre, and Kent Swift, Pro Se,
    Jarratt, Virginia, for Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Allen, C.J.
            (Ret.), Specially Assigned

        
       ¶  1.  JOHNSON, J.   Defendant appeals his conviction for one count
  of second-degree aggravated domestic assault in violation of 13 V.S.A. §
  1044, and two counts of obstruction of justice  for threatening a witness
  in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3015.  Defendant claims that the trial court
  erred by refusing to instruct the jury on simple assault, which is a
  lesser-included offense of second-degree aggravated domestic assault. 
  Alternatively, defendant asserts that the jury instruction impermissibly
  limited the jury's ability to doubt the complaining witness's credibility,
  and thereby violated his constitutional right of confrontation.  We affirm
  the trial court's decision not to instruct the jury on simple assault. We
  reverse and remand for a new trial because the court's instruction
  prejudicially impinged upon the jury's duty to weigh the evidence.

       ¶  2.  On July 26, 2000, defendant assaulted Cindy Lawrence, his then
  girlfriend.  The following day, defendant was arraigned on domestic assault
  charges.  At arraignment, the court imposed conditions of release that,
  among other things, prohibited defendant from contacting or harassing
  complainant Cindy Lawrence, and from being within 1000 feet of her, her
  home, or her place of employment.  Despite those conditions, defendant went
  to complainant's home on August 10, 2000 where he allegedly threatened her. 
  On August 24, 2000 defendant allegedly threatened  plaintiff again, and
  punched her in the head.  Defendant was subsequently arraigned and tried on
  one count of second-degree aggravated domestic assault and two counts of
  obstructing justice in the matter of his earlier assault on complainant.  

       ¶  3.  At trial, complainant testified that she "dated the defendant"
  and lived together with him in a Barre apartment from January 2000 to July
  2000.  When asked on direct if she had a sexual relationship with
  defendant, she responded affirmatively.  She was not cross examined on any
  of this testimony.  Defendant did not introduce any evidence on the issue.
   
       ¶  4.  After the close of the State's case, defendant moved for
  judgment of acquittal.  The motion challenged the sufficiency of the
  State's evidence that complainant was a "household member" of defendant for
  purposes of the domestic assault statute, 13 V.S.A. § 10449(a)(1).  In the
  context of the motion, defendant conceded that the evidence showed that he
  had a sexual relationship with complainant and that he had lived with her
  for approximately six months in 2000.  Defendant argued that complainant's
  admittedly uncontroverted assertion that she had a sexual relationship with
  defendant and had lived with him for six months - without more - was 
  insufficient to meet the State's burden of proof on the "household member"
  issue.  The judge denied the motion, specifically stating that he believed
  the State had enough evidence on the issue.

       ¶  5.  The following day, defendant objected to the judge's decision
  not to give the jury an instruction on simple assault, a lesser included
  offense of domestic assault.  Defendant argued that the jury should have
  had the option to convict on the simple assault offense in the event that
  it decided that the State had not established the "household member"
  element of domestic assault beyond a reasonable doubt.  The judge found
  this argument unpersuasive, and stated that "the evidence about domestic
  partner [household member] just seems totally uncontested and
  uncontroverted." 

       ¶  6.  On appeal, defendant renews his argument that the judge should
  have instructed the jury on simple assault as well as domestic assault. 
  The State correctly concedes that the elements of simple assault are
  incorporated within the elements of second-degree aggravated domestic
  assault, and thus simple assault is a lesser included offense. 
  Nonetheless, the State maintains that defendant failed to present evidence
  or contradict the State's evidence on the "household member" element that
  distinguishes the two offenses, and thus defendant was not entitled to a
  simple assault instruction.  The record provides ample support for the
  State's position.
   
       ¶  7.  As a general rule, a defendant is entitled to an instruction
  on a lesser offense than the offense charged if the elements of the lesser
  offense are necessarily included in the greater offense, and if the facts
  in evidence reasonably support such an instruction.  State v.  Delisle, 162
  Vt.  293, 301,