Case Title: Commonwealth v. Mauricio

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12254

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12254 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KEVIN A. MAURICIO. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     April 4, 2017. - August 14, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & 
Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Receiving Stolen Goods.  Constitutional Law, Search 
and seizure.  Search and Seizure, Search incident to lawful 
arrest, Inventory, Fruits of illegal search. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Taunton Division of 
the District Court Department on July 10, 2014. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Thomas 
L. Finigan, J., and the case was tried before him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Mathew B. Zindroski for the defendant. 
 
Stephen C. Nadeau, Jr., Assistant District Attorney (Shawn 
Guilderson, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  After a jury trial in the Taunton Division of 
the District Court Department, the defendant, Kevin A. Mauricio, 
was convicted of carrying a firearm without a license, in 
2 
 
 
violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); and receiving stolen 
property with a value in excess of $250, in violation of G. L. 
c. 266, § 60.  The charges stem from a search of the defendant's 
backpack after he was arrested for possession of a controlled 
substance and breaking and entering a residence in Taunton.  
During the course of the search, the police discovered a digital 
camera, a ring, and other items.  The firearm conviction was 
based on images retrieved after a warrantless search of the 
digital camera.  The images depicted the defendant next to 
firearms later determined to have been stolen.  The receiving 
stolen property conviction was based on the ring discovered in 
the defendant's backpack. 
The defendant appealed from the convictions, arguing that 
the judge erred in denying the motion to suppress the images 
discovered as the result of the warrantless search of the 
digital camera, and that the evidence offered at trial was 
insufficient to sustain the conviction of receiving stolen 
property with a value in excess of $250.  We granted the 
defendant's application for direct appellate review, and 
conclude that the warrantless search of the digital camera 
constituted neither a valid search incident to arrest nor a 
valid inventory search.  Accordingly, the images discovered in 
the unlawful search should have been suppressed.  We conclude 
further that, although the evidence was insufficient to sustain 
3 
 
 
the conviction of receiving stolen property with a value in 
excess of $250, a conviction of the lesser included offense must 
stand. 
 
Background.  We summarize the judge's findings of fact on 
the motion to suppress the images, supplementing where 
appropriate with uncontroverted testimony from the suppression 
hearing.  Commonwealth v. Melo, 472 Mass. 278, 286 (2015).  We 
reserve for later the recitation of the facts germane to the 
defendant's argument that the evidence presented at trial was 
insufficient to sustain the conviction of receiving stolen 
property. 
On May 28, 2014, Taunton police Officer Brett Collins 
received a report that two "suspicious parties" were seen 
running out of the side door of a residence on Downing Drive in 
Taunton.  According to the neighbor who called in the report, 
one of the individuals was a man wearing a dark hooded 
sweatshirt and red gloves and carrying a backpack.  The second 
person, a female, was wearing a gray sweatshirt. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Collins located two individuals nearby 
largely matching the neighbor's descriptions.  The man was 
identified as the defendant.  Following a brief conversation, 
Collins pat frisked the defendant and searched his backpack.  
Inside the backpack, Collins found various items, including the 
digital camera at issue, jewelry, hypodermic needles, 
4 
 
 
prescription medications, and coins.  Collins then drove the 
defendant back to Downing Drive, where the neighbor who made the 
report identified the defendant as the man he saw running from 
another residence on the street.  The police arrested the 
defendant. 
 
At the police station, Detective Dora Treacy, the evidence 
officer for the Taunton police department, conducted an 
inventory search of the defendant's backpack.  Believing the 
camera to have been stolen, Treacy, in the course of her 
inventory search, turned the camera on and viewed the digital 
images it contained in the hope of identifying its "true" owner.  
In doing so, Treacy came across an image of a man with firearms.  
Because Treacy knew a fellow detective, Michael Bonenfant, had 
been investigating a housebreak on Plain Street in Taunton where 
two firearms and jewelry had been reported stolen, Treacy showed 
Bonenfant the digital images. 
 
Bonenfant, suspecting that the firearms in the digital 
images matched the firearms stolen from the Plain Street 
residence, contacted the homeowner and showed him a printed 
photograph of one of the digital images.  After viewing the 
photograph, the homeowner confirmed that the firearms and the 
other items in the photograph were taken from his home during 
the break-in. 
5 
 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Motion to suppress.  The defendant filed 
two motions to suppress, both of which were ultimately denied.  
In his first motion, the defendant sought to suppress "all 
physical evidence and any alleged statements obtained by law 
enforcement authorities as a result of a search and seizure by 
the Taunton [p]olice [d]epartment."  Initially, the motion 
judge, who also decided the defendant's subsequent motion to 
suppress, granted the defendant's motion, concluding that the 
backpack search constituted neither a valid search incident to 
arrest nor a valid patfrisk for weapons.  The judge explained 
that, at the time of the search, the defendant was "detained 
upon specific articulable facts that he might be responsible for 
a housebreak," but that the defendant was not under arrest and, 
therefore, the search of the backpack by Collins could not be 
justified as a search incident to arrest.  Nor could it be 
justified as part of a patfrisk for weapons, because Collins 
lacked specific facts warranting a reasonable person to believe 
that he was in danger.  Based on these conclusions, the judge 
granted the defendant's first motion to suppress. 
 
Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a motion for 
reconsideration of the judge's ruling on this first motion to 
suppress, arguing that because the contents of the backpack 
would have been discovered during a later search incident to 
arrest, they are admissible under the "inevitable discovery" 
6 
 
 
exception to the exclusionary rule.  Persuaded by the 
Commonwealth's argument, the motion judge granted the motion for 
reconsideration and denied the motion to suppress.  Accordingly, 
the Commonwealth could introduce all the items in the backpack 
at trial.  Because this ruling did not specifically address the 
search of the digital camera, the defendant filed a second 
motion to suppress focusing exclusively on that issue.  The 
judge denied the motion on the ground that the viewing of the 
digital images was part of a valid inventory search. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge wrongly 
denied the motion to suppress the images recovered from the 
warrantless search of the digital camera because the search did 
not fall within the purview of the search incident to arrest 
exception to the warrant requirement and exceeded the scope of a 
valid inventory search.  We agree. 
 
a.  Standard of review.  In evaluating the grant or denial 
of a motion to suppress, "we accept the judge's subsidiary 
findings of fact absent clear error and leave to the judge the 
responsibility of determining the weight and credibility to be 
given oral testimony presented at the motion hearing."  
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 441 Mass. 390, 393 (2004).  However, 
"[w]e review independently the application of constitutional 
principles to the facts found."  Id.  Our inquiry, therefore, is 
whether the search of the digital camera was proper on either of 
7 
 
 
the grounds on which the judge relied in denying the motion to 
suppress. 
b.  Search incident to arrest.  The judge denied the 
defendant's first motion to suppress the search of his backpack, 
agreeing with the Commonwealth's position on the motion for 
reconsideration that the items in the backpack inevitably would 
have been discovered as part of a search incident to a lawful 
arrest for breaking and entering.  On appeal, the defendant does 
not challenge the search of the backpack.  Instead, he argues 
that the search of the digital camera cannot be justified on 
this ground.  Specifically, the defendant argues that the 
principles underlying Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 
(2014), which foreclosed the application of the search incident 
to arrest exception to cellular telephones (cell phones), also 
forecloses the application of this exception to warrantless 
searches of digital cameras under both the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  The Commonwealth counters that Riley 
does not apply because digital cameras, lacking the ability to 
function as computers, are not analogous to cell phones for 
Fourth Amendment purposes.  We decline to address the 
constitutionality of the search of the digital camera on Fourth 
Amendment grounds, but we apply the reasoning in Riley in 
holding that the search of the camera violated art. 14. 
8 
 
 
A search incident to a custodial arrest is well established 
as an exception to the warrant requirement under both the Fourth 
Amendment and art. 14.  See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 
800, 802 (1974), and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Santiago, 410 
Mass. 737, 742-743 (1991), and cases cited.  Under both Fourth 
Amendment and art. 14 jurisprudence, the purpose of the search 
incident to arrest exception is twofold: (1) to prevent the 
destruction or concealing of evidence of the crime for which the 
police have probable cause to arrest; and (2) to strip the 
arrestee of weapons that could be used to resist arrest or 
facilitate escape.  See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-
763 (1969); Santiago, supra at 743. 
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has 
grappled with defining the contours of the search incident to 
arrest exception in our increasingly digital world.  In Riley, 
134 S. Ct. at 2494, the Supreme Court addressed whether the 
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement 
applies to cell phones, and concluded that it does not.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that applying the 
search incident to arrest doctrine to the search of digital data 
serves neither of the two justifications announced in Chimel, 
395 U.S. at 762-763: "harm to officers and destruction of 
evidence."  Riley, supra at 2484-2485. 
9 
 
 
This reasoning presents a compelling basis to exclude 
digital cameras from the reach of the search incident to a 
lawful arrest exception to the warrant requirement.  Like the 
cell phone, the twin threats of "harm to officers and 
destruction of evidence" are not present with regard to the data 
on a digital camera.  See id.  Once the camera has been secured 
and potential threats eliminated, "data on the [camera] can 
endanger no one."  Id. at 2485 (officers free to "examine the 
physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be used 
as a weapon" [emphasis supplied]).  Likewise, the risk of 
destruction of incriminating data is also mitigated once the 
camera has been secured.  Although the concern regarding the 
destruction of cell phone data via remote wiping and data 
encryption was considered and rejected by the Supreme Court, see 
id. at 2486, this issue poses even less of a risk with respect 
to digital cameras, which, like the camera at issue here, may 
lack Internet or network connectivity. 
Also, like cell phones, digital cameras "place vast 
quantities of personal information literally in the hands of 
individuals."  Id. at 2485.  See Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. 
Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Or. 2012) (noting that "[e]lectronic 
devices such as . . . digital camera[s] hold large amounts of 
private information, entitling them to a higher standard of 
privacy").  But see United States v. Miller, 34 F. Supp. 3d 695, 
10 
 
 
699-700 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (suggesting cameras do not implicate 
same privacy concerns as cell phones because cameras do not 
"boast the extensive amount of personal information commonly 
present in cell phones").  Although digital cameras do not allow 
storage of information as diverse and far ranging as a cell 
phone, they nevertheless possess the capacity to store enormous 
quantities of photograph and often video recordings, dating over 
periods of months and even years, which can reveal intimate 
details of an individual's life.  As the United States Supreme 
Court aptly recognized, "an individual's private life can be 
reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, 
locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a 
photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet," Riley, 
134 S. Ct. at 2489, and "the fact that a search in the pre-
digital era could have turned up a photograph or two in a wallet 
does not justify a search of thousands of photos in a digital 
gallery."  Id. at 2493. 
While this logic supports the applicability of Riley to 
digital cameras, the Supreme Court has not yet determined 
whether the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless searches of 
digital cameras as a search incident to a lawful arrest.1  Thus, 
                     
 
1 Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), no Federal Courts 
of Appeals and only three Federal District Courts have decided 
the issue.  See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 34 F. Supp. 3d 
11 
 
 
we hesitate to extend the holding in Riley under the Fourth 
Amendment to digital cameras when the Supreme Court has not yet 
done so.  Instead, we decide the issue based on our State 
Constitution, bearing in mind that "art. 14 . . . does, or may, 
afford more substantive protection to individuals than that 
which prevails under the Constitution of the United States."  
Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 68 n.9 (1987).  We hold, 
for the same reasons articulated by the Supreme Court in Riley 
and as set forth above, that digital cameras may be seized 
incident to arrest, but that the search of data contained in 
digital cameras falls outside the scope of the search incident 
to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.  See 
Commonwealth v. Madera, 402 Mass. 156, 160 (1988) ("We have 
excluded evidence under art. 14 without regard to whether the 
                                                                  
695, 700 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (noting, without deciding whether 
Riley extends to digital cameras, that cameras do not implicate 
same privacy concerns as cell phones because cameras "contain a 
limited type of data . . . that do not touch the breadth or 
depth of information that a cell phone's data offers"); United 
States vs. Whiteside, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 13 Cr. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 29, 2015) (concluding that "Supreme Court's grant of 
protection to a device with the capacity to store a vast number 
of images directly applies to search of [defendant's] digital 
camera"); American News & Info. Servs., Inc. vs. Gore, U.S. 
Dist. Ct., No. 12-CV-2186 BEN (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2014) 
(dismissing plaintiff's Fourth Amendment unlawful search claim 
on qualified immunity grounds, where it is open question whether 
Riley applies to video cameras, but acknowledging that "[t]here 
are qualities associated with cell phones, significant in the 
court's analysis, that are both similar to and different from 
cameras"). 
12 
 
 
evidence was inadmissible under [the] Fourth Amendment . . .").2  
Indeed, with the twin threats justifying the search incident to 
arrest exception mitigated here because the camera was secure in 
the custody of the police, the officers had ample opportunity to 
obtain a search warrant. 
The Commonwealth argues that because the defendant failed 
to establish that he owned, and thus had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in, the digital camera, he has no 
standing to challenge the search.  The Commonwealth, however, 
failed to raise this issue in the proceedings below.  As a 
result, the merits of the issue were never meaningfully 
addressed during the motion to suppress hearing, and the motion 
judge made only the single factual finding that the camera "may 
or may not have been owned by the defendant."  Because the 
Commonwealth failed to raise the issue below, it is waived.  
Therefore, we decline to address the merits of the issue here.  
See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 209 (1981) 
(government may forfeit argument that defendant lacks reasonable 
expectation of privacy in area searched where issue not raised 
"in a timely fashion during the litigation").  See also 
                     
 
2 General Laws c. 276, § 1, which codifies the search 
incident to arrest exception, and which we have recognized, "is 
more restrictive than the Fourth Amendment," Commonwealth v. 
Blevines, 438 Mass. 604, 607 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Blevines, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 89, 93 (2002).  Where we suppress 
the search of the digital camera under art. 14, we need not 
address whether suppression would also be required under § 1. 
13 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Lawson, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 322, 327 (2011), 
overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Campbell, 475 
Mass. 611 (2016) ("Whether a defendant has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy may not be challenged for the first time 
on appeal by the Commonwealth . . ."); Commonwealth v. Martinez, 
74 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 249-250 (2009) (same). 
 
Furthermore, we decline the Commonwealth's invitation to 
apply the doctrine that allows an appellate court "to affirm a 
ruling on grounds different from those relied on by the motion 
judge if the correct or preferred basis for affirmance is 
supported by the record and the findings."  Commonwealth v. Va 
Meng Joe, 425 Mass. 99, 102 (1997).  Aside from the motion 
judge's single finding that the camera "may or may not have been 
owned by the defendant," the record is devoid of factual 
findings supporting the Commonwealth's argument.  Although we 
have determined that "if the facts found by the judge support an 
alternative legal theory, a reviewing court is free to rely on 
an alternative legal theory," id., no such facts were found 
here. 
c.  Inventory search.  The motion judge ruled, on the 
defendant's second motion to suppress the warrantless search of 
the digital camera, that the search constituted a valid 
inventory search.  The defendant claims error in this ruling, 
arguing that the search was investigatory in nature and, 
14 
 
 
therefore, outside the scope of the inventory search exception 
to the warrant requirement. 
Our cases have determined that "the police, without a 
warrant, but pursuant to standard written procedures, may 
inventory and retain in custody all items on [a] person [to be 
placed in a cell], including even those within a container."  
Commonwealth v. Vuthy Seng, 436 Mass. 537, 550, cert. denied, 
537 U.S. 942 (2002), and cases cited.  The exception is 
predicated on the need to "safeguard the defendant's property, 
protect the police against later claims of theft or lost 
property, and keep weapons and contraband from the prison 
population."  Id. at 550-551.  Thus, an inventory search is not 
intended to be investigatory or an occasion for police to "hunt 
for information by sifting and reading materials taken from an 
arrestee which do not so declare themselves."  Id. at 553, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Sullo, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 766, 770 
(1989). 
 
Applying these principles, we conclude that the search of 
the digital camera exceeded the bounds of the inventory search 
exception to the warrant requirement because it was 
investigatory in nature.  The investigative purpose is 
established by the judge's finding that Treacy, suspecting that 
the camera was stolen, took steps to investigate its ownership 
by activating the camera and viewing the stored images.  The 
15 
 
 
Commonwealth argues that Treacy's "sole objective was to 
identify its true owner."  But this objective confirms rather 
than refutes the conclusion that the examination of the digital 
camera was an investigatory search rather a benign inventory of 
the contents of the backpack.  Treacy's objective is founded on 
the assumption that the camera was stolen.  Indeed, during the 
motion hearing, before explaining that she viewed the camera's 
stored images, Treacy pointed out that the camera "came in as -- 
with a bunch of stolen property."  Treacy also explained that 
while she does not usually go through an individual's electronic 
property, the camera "was stolen property." 
 
Given these facts, we cannot conclude that Treacy's conduct 
was "noninvestigatory."  See Vuthy Seng, 436 Mass. at 552-554.  
See also Commonwealth v. White, 469 Mass. 96, 101-102 (2014) 
(officer's examination of pills seized from unlabeled pill 
container found during inventory of defendant's vehicle exceeded 
parameters of inventory search exception where officer examined 
pills "solely for an investigative rather than an inventory 
purpose").  Therefore, the search exceeded the scope of and was 
inconsistent with the purposes underlying the inventory search 
exception to the warrant requirement, and is thus at odds with 
our law.  See Vuthy Seng, supra at 554, quoting Sullo, 26 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 772 ("In making an inventory . . . the police are to 
act more or less mechanically, according to a set routine, for 
16 
 
 
to allow then a range of discretion in going about a warrantless 
search would be to invite conduct which by design or otherwise 
would subvert constitutional requirements"). 
Because the Commonwealth has failed to show that the 
warrantless search of the digital camera fell within one of the 
"'permissible exceptions' to the warrant requirement," 
Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 588 (2016), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Craan, 469 Mass. 24, 28 (2014), the search was 
unreasonable and, thus, art. 14 requires the exclusion of 
evidence seized during the search.  Accordingly, the denial of 
the defendant's motion to suppress the images found on the 
digital camera was error. 
 
d.  Suppression of the ring.  The defendant contends that 
the ring should also be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous 
tree.  "The 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine . . . has 
been applied to evidence derived from violations of both the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Damiano, 444 Mass. 444, 453 
(2005).  Unlike in the cases relied on by the defendant, here 
the police did not discover the ring as either a direct or 
indirect result of unlawful conduct.  Compare Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 487-488 (1963) (excluding narcotics 
seized from another individual where they were discovered only 
as result of statements made by defendant following police 
17 
 
 
officers' unlawful entry into defendant's home and unlawful 
arrest of defendant). 
 
Nevertheless, the defendant argues that the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine should be applied because, but for the 
investigation stemming from the unlawful search of the camera, 
the police never would have learned the significance of the ring 
-- that it was stolen.  We disagree.  Where the connection 
between the ring and the illegality -- the unlawful search of 
the camera -- is so tenuous, the application of the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine would risk untethering it from its 
underlying principles.  See Damiano, 444 Mass. at 453-454 
("[I]nfection will be held to have occurred when the illegality 
of the police behavior is sufficiently grave and the connection 
between the illegality and [the evidence discovered] is 
sufficiently intimate"). 
 
2.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant last argues 
that the judge erred in denying his motion for a required 
finding of not guilty of receiving stolen property with a value 
in excess of $250, where the Commonwealth failed to present 
sufficient evidence of the value of the ring.  To review a claim 
of sufficiency of the evidence we ask whether, "after viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" (emphasis in original).  
18 
 
 
Commonwealth v. St. Hilaire, 470 Mass. 338, 343 (2015), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979).  In 
determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider "the 
evidence in its entirety, including, not excluding, that 
admitted [at] trial but found inadmissible on appeal."  
Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 414 Mass. 37, 46 (1992), quoting 
Glisson v. Georgia, 192 Ga. App. 409, 410 (1989). 
 
To obtain a conviction of receiving stolen property, the 
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant (1) bought, received, or aided in the concealment of 
property that was stolen or embezzled; and (2) knew the property 
had been stolen.  Commonwealth v. Yourawski, 384 Mass. 386, 387 
(1981).  Under G. L. c. 266, § 60, the "value of the property 
stolen determines the punishable offense."  Commonwealth v. 
Tracy, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 455, 467 (1989).  Because a finding 
that the value of the stolen property received is in excess of 
$250 triggers an increased sentencing range, the value must be 
treated as an element of the crime, and thus proved by the 
Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. 
Beale, 434 Mass. 1024, 1025 (2001). 
 
Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the evidence at trial was insufficient to 
establish that the value of the ring exceeded $250.  The 
Commonwealth presented testimony that the mesh ring was of the 
19 
 
 
Tiffany brand and submitted to the jury a photograph of the 
ring.  However, there was no evidence of the ring's value.  Nor 
was the jury presented with the ring itself.  It is true, as the 
Commonwealth points out, that the trier of fact may employ 
"common sense" and common experience to determine the valuation 
issue.  See Commonwealth v. Muckle, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 631, 643 
(2003), citing Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 385-386 
(1926).  Here, however, equipped only with the brand and 
photograph of the ring, we cannot conclude that the application 
of common sense and experience is sufficient to fill the 
evidentiary gap.  Compare Muckle, supra (noting jury may apply 
"common sense" to conclude that value of vehicle exceeded $250), 
with Tracy, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 467 (concluding common 
experience of jurors insufficient to establish that value of 
firearm exceeded one hundred dollars).  Although the evidence of 
the ring's value was insufficient as a matter of law to prove 
the value of the property, it is undisputed that the 
Commonwealth proved all the other elements of the offense 
charged.  Thus, we conclude that a finding of guilty of the 
lesser included misdemeanor offense of receiving stolen property 
with a value of $250 or less, in violation of G. L. c. 266, 
§ 60, shall enter against the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. 
Deberry, 441 Mass. 211, 224 (2004). 
20 
 
 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, the order 
denying the motion to suppress the images from the digital 
camera is reversed.  Accordingly, the judgment of conviction of 
carrying a firearm without a license, in violation of G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (a), is vacated, and the matter is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  With respect 
to the defendant's conviction of receiving stolen property 
valued over $250, the judgment is vacated, and the case is 
remanded to the District Court, where a finding of guilty of the 
lesser included offense of receiving stolen property with a 
value of $250 or less shall enter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.