Case Title: Polakoff v. Turner

Citation: 385 Md. 467

Docket Number: 20/04

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Civil No. 14-C-01-5025
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 20
September Term, 2004
______________________________________
LAWRENCE POLAKOFF, ET AL.
v.
JASMINE TURNER
____________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Greene, J.
Raker and Wilner, JJ., Dissent
______________________________________
Filed:     March 11, 2005
1   Five different groups, including the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, the
Housing Authority for Baltimore City, the Greater Baltimore Property Owners Association,
the Maryland Multi-Housing Association, and the National Association of Industrial and
Office Properties, filed amici curiae briefs in the Court of Special Appeals in support of
Polakoff and Chase.  The Public Justice Center, the Coalition to End Childhood Lead
Poisoning, and Advocates for Children and Youth filed an amicus curiae brief in support of
Jasmine.  Only the latter group filed an amicus brief in this Court. 
On October 30, 2002, a jury in Baltimore City found Lawrence Polakoff
(“Polakoff”) and Chase Management (“Chase”) negligent in the lead-paint poisoning of
Jasmine Turner (“Jasmine”), a minor who resided in a home owned by Polakoff and
managed by Chase.  The jury awarded Jasmine $500,000 that was later reduced by the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City to $350,000, pursuant to the cap on non-economic
damages.  Both parties appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.1
While the matter was pending in the Court of Special Appeals, we decided Brooks
v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 835 A.2d 616 (2003), in which we held that “in
order to make out a prima facie case in a negligence action, all that a plaintiff must show
is: (a) the violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a specific class of persons
which includes the plaintiff, and (b) that the violation proximately caused the injury
complained of.”  Brooks, 378 Md. at 79, 835 A.2d at 621.  Brooks overruled Richwind
Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 645 A.2d 1147 (1994), which held that “a
landlord is not liable for a defective condition on the property unless the landlord knows
or has reason to know of the condition and had a reasonable opportunity to correct it.”
Richwind, 335 Md. at 673, 645 A.2d at 1153 (internal citations omitted).  
Polakoff and Chase argued to the Court of Special Appeals, as they do here, that
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Brooks should apply prospectively only.  They claim that they relied on the notice
standard enunciated in Richwind regarding lead paint and that it would be unfair to hold
them to the “new” notice standard of Brooks.   The intermediate appellate court applied
the general rule that a new holding applies to all pending cases and concluded that the
Brooks decision and the notice requirement enunciated therein applied to the present case. 
Polakoff v. Turner, 155 Md. App. 60, 69-70, 841 A.2d 406, 412 (2004).  
By petition for writ of certiorari to this Court, Polakoff and Chase challenge the
ruling of the Court of Special Appeals asserting that Brooks should apply prospectively,
that the intermediate appellate court erred in applying Brooks to the case at bar, that
Brooks was wrongly decided, and that the trial court erred in denying their motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict because there was insufficient evidence to prove
that they had reason to know of the flaking, loose, or peeling paint.  We granted certiorari
on May 14, 2004.  Polakoff v. Turner, 381 Md. 324, 849 A.2d 473 (2004).
We reaffirm our holding in Brooks and hold that the standard for establishing a
prima facie case based on a violation of the Baltimore City Housing Code (“Code”) as
enunciated therein applies to all cases not final at the time Brooks was filed.
I.
In March of 1985, Lelia Whittington (“Lelia”) and her daughter, Crystal
Whittington (“Crystal”), moved into a residential rental property located at 17 North
Bentalou Street.  17 North Bentalou is a row house located in Baltimore City.  It was built
2   Polakoff is a limited partner in CFAS and he serves as its president.
3  Polakoff is the president of Chase Management, Inc.
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prior to 1950 and was later determined to contain lead-based paint.  While residing at the
property, Crystal gave birth to Jasmine on April 3, 1990.  The women lived in the home
for nine years until August of 1994 when Polakoff asked them to move out.
Polakoff was the owner of 17 North Bentalou from 1975 until June 30, 1992, when
he transferred the property to C.F.A.S. Limited Partnership(“CFAS”).2  While under his
ownership, Polakoff hired a property manager to handle day-to-day management and
maintenance.  After the sale to CFAS on June 30, 1992, Chase Management (“Chase”)
took over the day-to-day operation of managing the property.3  
Lelia and Crystal testified that prior to moving into the Bentalou property they
conducted a walk-through to inspect it.  Both women testified that the windowsills, and
baseboards had been freshly painted before they moved.  The paint on the windowsills,
however, was “bumpy” from having been applied on top of old chipping paint.  Crystal
testified that the majority of the walls had wallpaper on them but those that were painted
had been freshly painted and were “smooth.”  The women testified that during their
tenancy they noticed that the paint around the windows had begun to chip and flake. 
Crystal testified that she noticed chipping and flaking paint about 1½ years into the
tenancy, while Lelia testified that she noticed the chipping “about two to three years” into
the tenancy.  Crystal also testified that around the same period of time, 1½ years into the
4 Jasmine’s blood lead level was 22 ug/dl.  A child is considered to have “elevated”
blood lead levels at 10 ug/dl.  Ug/dl is an abbreviation for micrograms per deciliter.  It
indicates that the child has 22 micrograms of lead per every deciliter of blood.  See Jones v.
Mid-Atlantic Funding, 362 Md. 661, 668 n.12, 766 A.2d 617, 621 n.12 (citing Preventing
Lead Poisoning in Young Children, A Statement by the Center for Disease Control (1991)).
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tenancy, the wallpaper began to peel away from some of the walls, revealing painted
walls with disintegrating plaster behind the wallpaper.
Prior to Jasmine’s birth, a workman painted the two windowsills in the living
room.  The paint was applied again over top of the chipping and flaking paint without
removing the old paint.  According to testimony, the paint continued to chip.  Other than
the one time the windowsills were painted, no other painting or repairs to the chipping
and flaking paint were made during the nine-year tenancy.  There was testimony,
however, that other repairs were made to the house, including work on the windows
themselves.
In early 1993, when Jasmine was almost three years old, a routine physical
revealed that she had elevated levels of lead in her blood.4  Doctors placed Jasmine on a
special diet and gave her iron to treat the poisoning.  Crystal was also instructed to
remove anything from the home that could contribute to Jasmine’s lead levels, e.g., lead
containing dust. 
Polakoff testified that at the time of the trial he had been in the real estate business
for approximately thirty (30) years.  He testified that at the time he leased the premises to
the Whittingtons, he was aware of the following: that most housing in Baltimore City
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built before 1950 would probably contain some sort of lead-based paint; that deteriorating
lead paint can be a potential danger to young children; that it was a violation of the
Baltimore City Housing Code for a property to have peeling, chipping, or flaking paint;
and that the Code requires flaking and chipping paint to be made smooth before
repainting the surface.  He also testified that he did not inspect 17 North Bentalou to see
if it was “fit for habitation” before the Whittingtons moved in because “I have a painter
working for me who had probably 30 years experience painting Baltimore City houses,
mostly row houses.  He knew the process. He was experienced.  He had a level of
expertise and he knew how to prepare a home for painting and that’s what he did on all
the houses he painted for me including 17 North Bentalou Street.” Polakoff further
testified that he did not inform Ms. Whittington of the dangers of lead paint prior to her
moving in; however, he did inform her of the procedure for reporting needed repair work.
II.
A. Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc.
At the core of Polakoff and Chases’s argument is the question of notice and
whether we correctly decided Brooks.  If we reaffirm Brooks, which we do, then the only
remaining question is whether it applies to the case at bar.  We therefore begin with a
review of the Brooks opinion.
In Brooks we stated that, 
under the common law and in the absence of a statute, a
landlord ordinarily has no duty to keep rental premises in
5  The standard for establishing a prima facie case of negligence in a statutory-based
negligence action is different from the general standard for establishing a prima facie case
of negligence in cases that are not governed by a statute.  See Rosenblatt v. Exxon, 335 Md.
58, 76, 642 A.2d 180, 188 (1994) (listing the elements for a negligence suit as “(1) that the
defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant
breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) that the loss or
injury proximately resulted from the defendant’s breach of the duty”).
-6-
repair, or to inspect the rental premises either at the inception
of the lease or during the lease term.  There are, however,
exceptions to this general rule.
Moreover, where there is an applicable statutory scheme
designed to protect a class of persons which includes the
plaintiff, another well-settled Maryland common law rule has
long been applied by this Court in negligence actions.  That
rule states that the defendant’s duty ordinarily “is prescribed
by the statute” or ordinance and that the violation of the
statute or ordinance is itself evidence of negligence.
Brooks, 378 Md. at 78, 835 A.2d at 620.  We then cited an extensive list of cases that
apply the “statute or ordinance” rule.  See Brooks, 378 Md. at 78-9, 835 A.2d at 621 for
cases cited therein.  We explained:
Under this principle, in order to make out a prima facie case
in a negligence action, all that a plaintiff must show is: (a) the
violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a
specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff, and (b)
that the violation proximately caused the injury complained
of.  Proximate cause is established by determining whether
the plaintiff is within the class of persons sought to be
protected, and the harm suffered is of a kind which the
drafters intended the statute to prevent.  It is the existence of
this cause and effect relationship that makes the violation of a
statute prima facie evidence of negligence.[5]
Where there is evidence that the violation of the statute
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proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury, evidence of such
violation is sufficient evidence to warrant the court in
submitting the case to the jury on the question of the
[defendant’s] negligence.  The trier of fact must then evaluate
whether the actions taken by the defendant were reasonable
under all the circumstances.
* * * *
Nevertheless, once it is established that there was a statutory
violation, the tort defendant’s knowledge that he or she
violated the statute is not part of the tort plaintiff’s burden of
proof.  It is the violation of the statute or ordinance alone
which is evidence of negligence.
 Brooks, 378 Md. at 79-80, 835 A.2d at 621-22 (internal citations omitted).
Having determined the applicable rule, we turned to the Code itself.  We began by
noting that the Code “contains a comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at ‘establish[ing]
minimum standards governing the condition, use, operation, occupancy, and maintenance
of dwellings . . . in order to make dwellings safe, sanitary, and fit for human habitation.’”
Brooks, 378 Md. at 81, 835 A.2d at 622 (quoting Baltimore City Code (2000 Repl.Vol.),
Art. 13, § 103(a)(2)).  It imposes “numerous duties and obligations upon landlords who
rent residential property.”  Brooks, 378 Md. at 81, 835 A.2d at 622.  Section 702 of the
Code imposes a duty on property owners to keep a dwelling in “good repair and safe
condition.”  Section 702(a) provides that “[e]very building and all parts thereof used or
occupied as a dwelling shall, while in use or at any time when the lack of maintenance
affects neighboring property, be kept in good repair, in safe condition, and fit for human
habitation.”  Section 703(b)(3) provides that “good repair and safe condition” includes a
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requirement that “[a]ll walls, ceilings, woodwork, doors, and windows shall be kept clean
and free of any flaking, loose, or peeling paint and paper.”  The Code places the duty on
the owner or operator of the property to keep it in compliance with all provisions of the
Code.  § 310(a)(1).  It further provides the owner with access to the property during a
tenancy “for the purpose of making such inspection and such repairs or alterations as are
necessary to effect compliance with the provisions of this Code . . . .” § 909.  
Based on the language of the Code, we concluded that the landlord’s duty to keep
the property in compliance is continuous.  “The landlord must take whatever measures are
necessary during the pendency of the lease to ensure the dwelling’s continued compliance
with the Code.”  Brooks, 378 Md. at 84, 835 A.2d at 624.  Consequently, because the
Code prescribes the property owner’s duty to keep the property continuously free of any
flaking, loose, or peeling paint, the failure to keep the property in such a condition is itself
evidence of negligence.  
Brooks does not hold that a landlord will be held strictly liable for violations of the
Code; rather it reaffirmed the long-standing common law rule that a violation of a statute
or ordinance is evidence of negligence.  As we repeatedly stated in Brooks, proof of a
statutory violation, plaintiff’s membership in the class of people designed to be protected
by the statute, and causation, amount to prima facie evidence of negligence, not
negligence per se.  See Brooks, 378 Md. at 78-81, 84-5, 85 n.5, 89, 835 A.2d at 620-25,
625 n.5, 627; see also, Absolon v. Dollahite, 376 Md. 547, 831 A.2d 6 (2003) (stating that
6 Absolon involved a personal injury suit brought by a pedestrian who was injured
when she was struck by a car in the crosswalk but while the crosswalk signal indicated a
flashing “red hand.”  The defendant argued that the pedestrian’s alleged violation of a statute
which required the pedestrian to remain on a safety island when the “red hand” crosswalk
signal was displayed established contributory negligence as a matter of law and that he was
entitled to summary judgment.  Absolon, 367 Md. at 550, 831 A.2d at 8. The trial court
granted the motion.  Absolon, 367 Md. at 551, 831 A.2d at 8. We reversed, holding that the
trial court erred in finding that the statute established an absolute duty and amounted to
negligence as a matter of law.  Absolon, 367 Md. at 553, 831 A.2d at 9-10.  We reasoned:
Section 21-203(e) [of the Transportation Article] arguably
establishes a duty for pedestrians to remain on or proceed to the
nearest safety island.  Sue Ann Absolon was standing in the
median strip, which may or may not fall within the statutory
definition of a “safety island.”  When she stepped off the
median, she may have been in violation of her statutory duty of
care.  If so, the evidence of the violation should be submitted to
the jury, along with any other evidence tending to show
contributory negligence or the lack thereof.  A violation of the
statute alone is not sufficient to establish an absolute duty so as
to satisfy the requirement of Maryland Rule 2-501(e) for a grant
of summary judgment, “that the party in whose favor judgment
is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Absolon, 367 Md. at 557, 831 A.2d at 11-12 (internal citations omitted).
-9-
it is a “long established general rule in Maryland that the violation of a statutory duty is
only evidence of negligence, but does not establish negligence per se” (internal citations
omitted));6 Bentley v. Carrol, 355 Md. 312, 325, 734 A.2d 697, 704-05 (1999) (“Not long
ago we reaffirmed that [t]his Court has consistently held that the violation of a statutory
duty may furnish evidence of negligence.  The positive evidentiary value of the statutory
violation, however, is subject to the condition that ‘the person alleging the negligence is
within the class of persons sought to be protected, and the harm suffered is of a kind
7 Bentley involved a medical malpractice suit alleging negligence on the part of family
healthcare practitioners who treated a sexually abused child, named Bentley, but failed to
report the abuse.  Bentley contended that a statute then in effect, § 35A of the Child Abuse
Act, Md. Code (1957, 1976 Repl.Vol., 1978 Cum.Sup.) Article 27, § 35A (relevant language
recodified in Md. Code (1984) § 5-903 of the Family Law Article by Ch. 296 § 2 and
currently found in Md. Code (2002) § 5-704 of the Family Law Article), imposed a statutory
duty upon doctors to report the possibility of child abuse in certain circumstances, that the
defendant doctors violated that duty in their treatment of her, and that their violation of the
statute amounted to evidence of malpractice.  Bentley, 355 Md. at 318, 735 A.2d at 701.  We
held that,
the trial court was obligated in the instant case to instruct the
jury in some manner as to the legal propositions that (1)
Maryland statutory law, during the relevant period, required
every physician who treated a child and believed or had reason
to believe that the child had been abused was required to make
a report as to the existence of such suspected abuse to the local
department of social services or to the appropriate law
enforcement agency, which would then investigate and intervene
to the extent necessary to redress prior abuse and prevent future
occurrences and (2) the violation of such a statute by a physician
constitutes evidence of negligence.
Bentley, 355 Md. at 328, 735 A.2d at 706.
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which the statute was intended, in general, to prevent.’”) (quoting County Commissioners
v. Bell Atlantic-Maryland, 346 Md. 160, 179, 695 A.2d 171, 181 (1997)). 7
Contrary to
the view expressed in Polakoff and Chase’s brief, evidence of negligence does not ipso
facto equate to liability.  Before a landlord can be found liable, the trier of fact must
determine whether the defendant acted reasonably given the circumstances.  As we stated
in Brooks, “our holding in the instant case does not impose a strict liability regime upon
landlords.  Whether [the landlord] is held liable for any injury to a child, based on lead-
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paint poisoning, will depend on the jury’s evaluation of the reasonableness of the
[landlord’s] actions under all the circumstances.”  Brooks, 378 Md. at 84-5, 835 A.2d
624.  Thus, liability will depend on the fact-finder’s determination regarding whether the
landlord acted reasonably under all the circumstances.  Brooks, 378 Md. at 85 n.5, 835
A.2d at 624 n.5.
The issue of what qualifies as “reasonable” will, as it does in all negligence cases,
depend on the facts and circumstances of the case.  As we noted in Brooks, the fact-
finder’s determination of reasonableness “is the essence of a negligence action.”  Brooks,
378 Md. at 85 n.5, 835 A.2d at 625 n.5 (“negligence is a failure to do what the reasonable
[person] would do ‘under the same or similar circumstances’” (internal citation omitted)). 
“[I]t will be the duty of the trier of fact to determine whether the steps taken by the
landlord to ensure continued compliance with the Code, i.e. the frequency and
thoroughness of inspections, and the maintenance of the interior surfaces of the dwelling,
were reasonable under all the circumstances.  The test is what a reasonable and prudent
landlord would have done under the same circumstances.”  Brooks, 378 Md. at 86, 835
A.2d at 625.  See also, Juarez v. Wavecrest Management Team LTD, 672 N.E.2d 135,
141 (N.Y. 1996) (interpreting a New York City Code similar to the Baltimore City Code
and concluding that “[w]here, however, a landlord establishes that it exercised due care, it
will not be held liable.  To avoid liability, a landlord must prove that, even though it
violated [the local lead-paint statute], it was acting reasonably under the circumstances.”).
8 In 1994, the General Assembly enacted the “Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing,”
Md. Code (1996 Repl. Vol.), §6-801 et seq. of the Environment Article, which impacts a
landlord’s liability in lead paint cases.  The stated purpose of subtitle 8 is to “reduce the
incidence of childhood lead poisoning, while maintaining the stock of affordable rental
housing.” § 6-802.  It contains means of limiting landlord lead paint liability, provided the
landlord complies with certain preventive measures.  See §§ 6-815 through 6-819.  
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Liability will depend on the reasonableness of the landlord’s efforts to remain in
compliance with the statute; therefore, it is incumbent upon the landlord to take such
reasonable steps as may be necessary.  One surefire way of avoiding lead-paint poisoning
liability is to remove lead paint from the rental property.  We recognize, however, that the
current law does not require this action.  Less extreme options may include: notifying the
tenant in writing and orally of the possible presence of lead paint in the property and its
potential danger; asking the tenant to notify the landlord or property manager immediately
if flaking, loose, or peeling paint occurs; and inspecting the property at the inception and
at regular intervals throughout the tenancy to ensure that there is no flaking, loose, or
peeling paint.   This list is by no means exhaustive nor is it a guarantee that a jury will
find the landlord’s actions reasonable.  Our point is simply to show that there are
reasonable ways of attempting to satisfy one’s duty pursuant to the Code.  See also, Md.
Code (1996 Repl. Vol.), §6-801 et seq. of the Environment Article (entitled “Reduction of
Lead Risk in Housing”).8
We expressly recognized in Brooks that our holding was in conflict with parts of
our opinion in Richwind, 335 Md. 661, 645 A.2d 1147.  Brooks, 378 Md. at 86, 835 A.2d
9Sections 301 through 303 govern the procedure for pursuing violations of the Code
by the Department of Housing and Community Development.  They do not purport to address
any notice requirements for tenants.  Section 301 provides in relevant part that,
[w]henever the Commissioner of Housing and Community
Development determines that there has been a violation of any
provision of this Code or of any rule or regulation adopted
pursuant hereto, he shall give notice of such alleged violation to
(continued...)
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at 625.  Richwind held that “a landlord is not liable for a defective condition on the
property unless the landlord knows or has reason to know of the condition and had a
reasonable opportunity to correct it.” Richwind, 335 Md. at 673, 645 A.2d at 1153. 
Richwind argued to the Court that, despite the numerous statutory enactments that impact
upon the relationship between the landlord and tenant, the statute does not “supercede the
common law requirement that a landlord’s liability for negligence depends upon notice of
a particular defect and a reasonable opportunity to correct it.”  Richwind, 335 Md. at 670,
645 A.2d at 1151.  We recognized that certain statutory enactments may alter the common
law.  We concluded, however, that based on §§ 301 through 303, the Code and the
common law notice requirement were consistent with each other and therefore the Code
did not do away with the notice requirement.  Richwind, 335 Md. at 672-674, 645 A.2d at
1152-53.  
In Brooks, we specifically disapproved of this reasoning.  Brooks, 378 Md. at 87,
835 A.2d at 626.  We noted that “[t]he flaw in the Richwind opinion’s analysis is its
extension of §§ 301 and 303's notice requirement to occupants.”9  Id.  We concluded that
9(...continued)
the person or persons responsible therefor as hereinafter
provided.
Section 301(b) then details the form and content of the required notice.
10 Much of Polakoff and Chase’s brief is dedicated to statutory construction arguments
as to why our interpretation of the Housing Code in Brooks is incorrect.  At the core of their
argument are two rules of statutory construction which state that legislative bodies are aware
of “the interpretations that this Court has placed upon its enactments,” (Blevins v. Baltimore
County, 352 Md. 620, 642, 724 A.2d 22, 33 (1999)), and that when a legislative body
reenacts a statute without altering its language following an opinion of this Court interpreting
the statute, we presume the legislative body acquiesced in our interpretation. Stack v.
Marney, 252 Md. 43, 49, 248 A.2d 880, 884 (1969).  Although it is true that we may interpret
silence as acquiescence, we find action more compelling.  Following our opinion in Brooks,
City Council Bill 04-1276, entitled “Building, Fire and Related Codes – Landlord’s Tort
Liability” was introduced as an addition to the Code.  It stated “[t]his code is not intended
to alter the common law principle of tort liability that a landlord may be found liable for
personal injury to a tenant caused by a defective condition on the leased premises only if the
landlord had knowledge or reason to know of the condition and a reasonable opportunity to
correct it.” The bill was a direct result of our holding in Brooks.  Its trip through the
legislative process, however, was short lived as it did not make it out of the Judiciary
Committee. 
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“[t]he Housing Code provisions relied on in the Richwind opinion do not alter the
requirements set forth by this Court for a plaintiff to make out a prima facie case based on
[statutory] negligence.  The Housing Code does not make the landlord’s notice of a
defective condition a factor with regard to the landlord’s duty to the tenant.”  Brooks, 378
Md. at 88-89, 835 A.2d at 627.10
We remain committed to the analysis in Brooks.  The law in this State regarding
the breach of a statutory duty remains the same today as it has for over ninety years.  To
make out a prima facie case in a negligence action based on the breach of a statutory duty,
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a plaintiff must show “(a) the violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a
specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff, and (b) that the violation
proximately caused the injury complained of.”  Brooks, 378 Md. at 79, 835 A.2d at 621. 
“Proximate cause is established by determining whether the plaintiff is within the class of
persons sought to be protected, and the harm suffered is of a kind which the drafters
intended the statute to prevent.”  Id. 
We conclude, as we did in Brooks, that the Code places a continuous duty on
landlords to maintain their properties in “good repair and safe condition,” including
keeping the premises free of flaking, loose, or peeling paint.  If a landlord of property
located in Baltimore City fails to maintain the premises in a safe condition and someone
whom the Code was designed to protect, i.e., a resident child, is injured as a result of the
landlord’s failure to maintain the premises, the plaintiff will have successfully established
a prima facie case of negligence.  It will then be incumbent upon the finder of fact to
determine whether the landlord’s actions were reasonable under all of the circumstances. 
Pursuant to the established principles of Maryland tort law cited in Brooks, if Jasmine
could establish a violation of the Code which proximately caused her injuries, she would
be entitled to have the negligence count of her complaint submitted to the trier of fact for
a determination of whether Polakoff and Chase acted reasonably under all of the
circumstances.  
As previously discussed, the Code requires that occupied dwellings continuously
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be kept in good repair and safe condition, which includes keeping windows free of
flaking, loose, or peeling paint.  §§ 702(a) and 703(b)(3).   Jasmine produced testimony
that flaking, loose, or peeling paint existed as early as 1½ years into the tenancy and that
the paint on the windowsills was “bumpy” from the inception of the tenancy as a result of
new paint being applied on top of old chipping paint.  There was testimony that prior to
Jasmine’s birth, a workman repainted the windowsills in the living room but, again, the
new paint was applied on top of the old chipping paint.  There was also testimony that
Jasmine spent much of her time at the “bumpy” windowsills looking out the window. 
Based on this testimony, Jasmine met her burden of production regarding the presence of
flaking, loose, or peeling paint in violation of the Code.  She established proximate cause
by presenting evidence that she is a member of the class of people sought to be protected
by the Code, and that her injury, lead-paint poisoning, is the type of injury the drafters of
the Code sought to prevent.  These two things taken together, a violation of the Code and
proximate cause, establish a prima facie case of negligence.  Consequently, Jasmine was
entitled to have her case presented to the trier of fact for a determination of whether
Polakoff and Chase acted reasonably given the circumstances.  
With regard to the issue of reasonableness, the jury heard testimony that Polakoff
was aware of the following at the inception of the lease: that most housing in Baltimore
City built before 1950 would probably contain some sort of lead-based paint; that
deteriorating lead paint can be a potential danger to young children; that it was a violation
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of the Code for a property to have peeling, chipping, or flaking paint; and that the Code
requires that flaking and chipping paint to be made smooth before repainting the surface. 
Polakoff testified that he did not inspect the premises at the inception of the lease but
instead relied on the experience of a painter with whom he had worked for many years. 
He further testified that at no time during the nine-year tenancy did he or anyone working
for him inspect the interior of the house to ensure its compliance with the Code.  Polakoff
instead relied on tenants to notify him of needed maintenance.  He further testified that he
did not inform Ms. Whittington of the dangers of lead paint prior to her moving into the
property.  Based on this information, a jury could reasonably conclude that, despite being
aware of the danger and likely presence of lead paint in the house, as well as the Code’s
requirement that the house be kept free of flaking, chipping, or peeling paint, Polakoff did
not inspect the inside of the residence at any point during the nine-year tenancy.  The jury
could reasonably conclude that Polakoff did not act as a reasonable landlord would have
acted, given the circumstances. 
III. Application of Brooks
 The final issue before the Court is whether the holding of Brooks applies to the
present case.  Polakoff and Chase argue that Brooks should apply to Brooks and to cases
arising from facts that postdate our decision but not to all others which arise on facts
11 Polakoff and Chase cite the Court of Special Appeals case, Stover v. Stover, 60 Md.
App. 470, 483 A.2d 783 (1984) in support of their proposition that “even when a change in
law is given prospective application, that change will still apply to the case where the new
rule was first decided.” The Court of Special Appeals in Stover explained this application by
noting that “[i]f the litigant who successfully contests a standing rule of law is denied relief
because the new rule applies purely prospectively, there would be little motivation to attack
settled rules of law.”  Stover, 60 Md. App. at 476, 483 A.2d at 786.
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predating the opinion.11  Although they do not use the term, what they seek is “selective
prospectivity.”
The U.S. Supreme Court identifies three types of application categories,
retroactive, purely prospective, and modified or selective prospectivity.  James B. Beam
Distilling Company v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535-37, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 2443-44, 115
L.Ed.2d 481, 488-89 (1991) (plurality opinion).  Retroactive application applies to “the
parties before the court and to all others by and against whom claims may be pressed,
consistent with res judicata and procedural barriers such as statute of limitations.”  Beam,
501 U.S. at 535, 111S.Ct. at 2443, 115 L.Ed.2d at 488.  The Supreme Court noted that
retroactivity is “overwhelmingly the norm, and is in keeping with the traditional function
of the courts to decide cases before them based upon their best current understanding of
the law.”  Id.  (Internal citations omitted.)  Pure prospectivity is the “method of
overruling, under which a new rule is applied neither to the parties in the law-making
decision nor to those others against or by whom it might be applied to conduct or events
occurring before that decision.  The case is decided under the old law but becomes a
vehicle for announcing the new, effective with respect to all conduct occurring after the
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date of that decision.”  Beam, 501 U.S. at 536, 111S.Ct. at 2443, 115 L.Ed.2d at 488
(internal citations omitted).
Modified or selective prospectivity is the method by which “a court may apply a
new rule in the case in which it is pronounced, then return to the old one with respect to
all others arising on facts predating the pronouncement.”  Beam, 501 U.S. at 537,
111S.Ct. at 2444, 115 L.Ed.2d at 489.  It is distinguishable from pure prospectivity in that
the new pronouncement applies to the case in which it is made and not solely to cases
arising after the pronouncement.  This is the form of application sought by Polakoff and
Chase in the current matter.
With regard to selective prospectivity, the Supreme Court has noted that “this
method . . .  enjoyed its temporary ascendancy in the criminal law during a period in
which the Court formulated new rules, prophylactic or otherwise, to insure protection of
the rights of the accused.”  Id.  (Internal citations omitted.)  The Supreme Court, however,
has abandoned the use of selective prospectivity.  See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,
107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (overruling Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85
S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965) on the grounds that “the integrity of judicial review
requires that [the Court] apply [the new] rule to all similar cases pending on direct
review” and “selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly
situated [parties] the same”); Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94-95,
113 S.Ct. 2510, 2516-517, 125 L.Ed.2d 74, 85 (1993); Beam, 501 U.S. 529, 111 S.Ct.
12   In Harper, the Supreme Court adopted the opinion of the majority of Justices in
Beam and stated that the rule in civil cases is:
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties
before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law
and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on
direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such
events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.  This
rule extends Griffith’s ban against “selective application of new
rules.”  Mindful of the “basic norms of constitutional
adjudication” that animated our view of retroactivity in the
criminal context, we now prohibit the erection of selective
temporal barriers to the application of federal law in noncriminal
cases.  In both civil and criminal cases, we can scarcely permit
“the substantive law [to] shift and spring” according to “the
particular equities of [individual parties’] claims of actual
reliance on an old rule and of harm from retroactive application
of a new rule.
Harper, 509 U.S. at 97, 113 S.Ct. at 2517, 125 L.Ed.2d at 86 (internal citations omitted).
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2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481.12
Our own cases have “essentially followed the teaching of Linkletter v. Walker in
deciding whether a new interpretation of a Maryland constitutional provision, statute, or
rule, should receive retrospective effect.”  American Trucking Association, Inc. v.
Goldstein, 312 Md. 583, 591, 541 A.2d 955, 959 (1988) (citing Hicks v. State, 285 Md.
310, 336-38, 403 A.2d 356, 370-71 (1979); see also, Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325
Md. 420, 471, 601 A.2d 633, 658 (1991) (“When a prior case in this Court is overruled on
the ground that it was erroneously decided, the question whether our holding is
retrospective or only prospective is governed by the principles set forth in such opinions
13 Pursuant to Linkletter, “prospective application rested on the purpose of the new
rule, the reliance placed upon the previous view of the law, and the ‘effect on the
administration of justice of a retrospective application’ of the new rule.”  Harper, 508 U.S.
at 94, 113 S.Ct. at 2517, 125 L.Ed.2d at 84 (citing Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636, 85 S.Ct. at
1741, 14 L.Ed.2d at 608).
14 In the case where this Court announces a change in the common law, however, we
continue to apply selective prospectivity as defined by the Supreme Court.  See American
Trucking, 312 Md. at 592 n.7, 541 A.2d at 959 n.7, (distinguishing cases involving new
interpretations of statutes from cases that change the common law and noting that changes
in common law “[o]rdinarily, except as to the parties before the court, such decisions are
fully prospective”); Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 275, 462 A.2d 506, 522 (1983).
15 The Court of Special Appeals aptly noted in its opinion in the present case that our
cases have not always been consistent regarding what is meant by the terms retroactive and
(continued...)
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such as American Trucking . . . Linkletter v. Walker . . . .”).13  The general rule in these
cases is that even when a “prospective” application applies because of the Linkletter
factors, “a new interpretation of a constitutional provision, statute, or rule has included
the case before us and all other pending cases where the relevant question has been
preserved for appellate review.”  American Trucking, 312 Md. at 592, 541 A.2d at 959
(citing Potts v. State, 300 Md. 567, 576-83, 479 A.2d 1335, 1340-43 (1984); McClain v.
State, 288 Md. 456, 470, 419 A.2d 368, 374 (1980); State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 338,
403 A.2d 356, 371 (1979)).14
It appears that what we have referred to as “prospective” application in American
Trucking, to wit, application of a new interpretation of a statute to the case before us and
all other cases pending where the issue has been preserved for appellate review, the
Supreme Court classifies as “retroactive” application.15  For purposes of clarity, we
15(...continued)
prospective, as “they are not always used in the same sense.”  Polakoff, 155 Md. App. at 66,
841 A.2d at 410.  The court noted that “the term prospective is sometimes used in the same
manner as retroactive, i.e., to indicate that the new holding applies to the case which
produced the new holding and to all pending cases in which the issue has been preserved for
appellate review.”  Id. 
16Contrary to the position taken by the dissent, Brooks did not involve a change
in the common law.  Judge Eldridge, writing for the Court, explained that the Court in
Richwind misread the Housing Code in reaching its decision.  Brooks, however, involved
this Court’s subsequent correction of that misinterpretation.  Although, in the case at bar, 
(continued...)
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hereby adopt the Supreme Court’s classification of “retroactive” for application of new
interpretations of constitutional provisions, statutes or rules that include the case before us
and all other pending cases where the relevant question has been preserved for appellate
review.    Regardless of how the application is classified, however, both the federal rule
and the general rule in Maryland is that a new interpretation of a statute applies to the
case before the court and to all cases pending where the issue has been preserved for
appellate review.  See McClain v. State, 288 Md. 456, 463-64, 419 A.2d 369, 372 (1980)
(applying the exclusionary rule of Johnson v. State retroactively).  Both rules are
consistent with the view that the law can “scarcely permit ‘the substantive law to shift and
spring’ according to the particular equities of individual parties’ claims of actual reliance
on an old rule and of harm from retroactive application of a new rule.”  Harper, 509 U.S.
at 97, 113 S.Ct. at 2517, 125 L.Ed.2d at 86 (internal citations omitted).
As discussed, supra, in Brooks we held that our prior interpretation of the Code in
Richwind was erroneous.16  In doing so we applied the well-settled Maryland common
16(...continued)
we address the parties contentions with regard to the retrospective application of the
Brooks decision, our application of the common law rule that violation of a statute is
evidence of negligence does not necessarily give rise to a retroactive versus a prospective
analysis.  The real question is which law is applicable on direct appellate review. 
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law rule that when there is an applicable statute designed to protect a certain class of
people, the defendant’s duty ordinarily is prescribed by the statute.  Brooks represented a
different interpretation of a statute and the question of its application is governed by the
standard discussed in American Trucking.  Consequently, our decision in Brooks applies
retroactively, and includes the case at bar.  
Moreover, our per curiam decision in Gentry v. Ebersole, 378 Md. 612, 837 A.2d
924 (2003), makes it clear that Brooks applies retroactively.  Gentry involved a lead paint
case in which the defendant property owner was granted summary judgment on the issue
of notice.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court and the plaintiff
petitioned this Court for certiorari while Brooks was pending.  Following the publication
of our Brooks opinion, we issued the per curiam opinion which mandated that the case be
remanded for further proceedings consistent with Brooks.
We further note that in the present case, the jury was instructed that it had to find
that Polakoff and Chase had reason to know of the existence of flaking, loose, or peeling
paint in order to find defendants liable.  Presumably, because the jury found in favor of
Jasmine, they concluded that Polakoff and Chase did have knowledge.  Even assuming
Brooks did not apply to the present case, there is no prejudice to Polakoff and Chase in
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that the Circuit Court required Jasmine to prove more than was necessary to establish
liability, to wit, notice of the defect.  In Maryland we give great deference to a jury’s
determination of a disputed fact, consequently the trial court properly denied Polakoff and
Chase’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  See Houston v. Safeway Stores
Inc., 346 Md. 503, 521, 697 A.2d 851, 859 (“‘As with respect to a judgment n.o.v. . . . [i]f
there is any legally relevant and competent evidence, however slight, from which a
rational mind could infer a fact in issue, then the trial court would be invading the
province of the jury by declaring a directed verdict.’” (Internal citation omitted.)).  Here,
there was testimony that repairs were made to the inside of the house during the tenancy,
including work on the windows alleged to have been the source of the paint which
poisoned Jasmine.  From this testimony, a rational jury could conclude that Polakoff,
through his agent, should have been on notice of the chipping paint on the windowsills. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY
PETITIONERS.
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Civil No. 14-C-01-5025
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 20
September Term, 2004
______________________________________
LAWRENCE POLAKOFF, ET AL.
v.
JASMINE TURNER
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
______________________________________
Dissenting Opinion by Raker, J.,
which Wilner, J., joins.
______________________________________
Filed:   March 11, 2005
Raker, J., dissenting, in which Wilner, J., joins:
The question in this case is whether the holding in Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc.,
378 Md. 70, 835 A.2d 616 (2003), applies to this case.  I would hold that it does not and that
Brooks applies prospectively only.  See, e.g., Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 275, 462 A.2d
506, 522 (1983) (abrogating the interspousal immunity rule in Maryland as to cases sounding
in negligence, applying the abrogation to the instant case and prospectively to all such causes
of action accruing after the date of the filing of the opinion in that case).  Accordingly, I
would reverse the judgement of the Court of Special Appeals.
Writing for the Court on the issue of the prospective effect of a decision of this Court,
in Julian v. Christopher, 320 Md. 1, 575 A.2d 735 (1990), Judge Chasanow wrote:
“In appropriate cases, courts may ‘in the interest of justice’ give
their decisions only prospective effect.  Contracts are drafted
based on what the law is; to upset such transactions even for the
purpose of improving the law could be grossly unfair.
Overruling prospectively is particularly appropriate when we are
dealing with decisions involving contract law.  The courts must
protect an individual’s right to rely on existing law when
contracting.
“Ordinarily decisions which change the common law apply
prospectively, as well as to the litigants before the court.
Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 217, 438 A.2d 1301, 1309
(1981).  What is meant by ‘prospectively’ may depend on the
fairness of applying the decision to cases or events occurring
after the effective date of the decision.  See, e.g., Boblitz v.
Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 275, 462 A.2d 506, 522 (1983)
(abrogating interspousal immunity in negligence cases—
decision applicable to the case before the court and causes of
action accruing or discovered after the date of the decision);
Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 304 Md. 124, 162, 497 A.2d
1143, 1162 (1985) (imposing strict liability on manufacturer of
‘Saturday Night Specials’—decision applicable to the case
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before the court as well as retail sales after the date of the
mandate).  It is reasonable to assume that landlords may have
relied on the Klawans interpretation when entering into leases
with ‘silent consent’ clauses.  This reliance should be protected.
Contracts should be interpreted based on the law as it existed
when they were entered into.  Therefore, whether the Klawans
case or the instant case governs the interpretation of a “silent
consent” clause depends on whether the lease being interpreted
was executed before or after the mandate in this case.”
Id. at 10-11, 575 A.2d at 739-40.  
Landlords in the City of Baltimore had a right to rely on the common law in this State
and the law as set out in Richwind.  The landlords in the City had no reason to anticipate that
they had an affirmative duty to inspect properties for peeling or flaking paint after the
inception of the tenancy.  Out of fairness to the landlords in the City, Brooks should be
applied prospectively only.  To declare that plaintiffs need not show notice and to apply the
rule retroactively is unjust and unfair.
I adhere to my view expressed in my dissent in Brooks that the case was wrongfully
decided.  I reiterate:
“. . . that absent notice, actual or constructive, the landlord has
no duty, even under the Housing Code, to inspect the demised
premises during the tenancy.  The tenant is in a superior position
to detect chipping or peeling paint and should therefore notify
the landlord of the hazard.  Nor does the landlord have a duty to
continuously inspect premises under the tenant's control to see
if there is chipping or peeling paint; that duty to inspect arises at
the inception of the tenancy.  This is so under the common law,
and under the City Code.”
378 Md. at 97, 835 A.2d at 632.
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I respectfully dissent.  Judge Wilner has authorized me to state that he joins in this
dissenting opinion.