Case Title: MAHER v. MAHER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAHER v. MAHER2004 WY 6290 P.3d 739Case Number: 03-181Decided: 05/27/2004
April 
Term, A.D. 2004

 

 

HENRY 
EARL MAHER,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

MARLENE 
LOUISE MAHER, n/k/a

MARLENE 
LOUISE LAWSON,

 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, District Judge by 
assignment

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Deborah 
Ford Mincer of The Mincer Law Firm, Cheyenne, WY.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Carol 
A. Serelson, Cheyenne, WY.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant Henry 
Maher (Maher) appeals the denial of his petition to terminate the alimony 
payments he is required to make to his former wife, appellee Marlene Lawson 
(Lawson).  The alimony payments are 
required pursuant to an agreement entered into between the parties and 
incorporated into their divorce decree.  
Maher sought to terminate the alimony payments upon his former wife's 
remarriage.  We 
affirm.  

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Maher sets forth 
the following issues:

 

I.  Whether 
the trial judge erred under Swetich 
v. [Smith, 802 P.2d 869 (Wyo. 1990),] when the 
recipient of alimony, upon her remarriage, was required to bear no burden of 
proof as to a continuing need for alimony?

 

II.  Whether 
the trial judge erred when he decided a settlement agreement required that he 
deny a motion to terminate alimony?

 

III.  In 
the alternative, whether the trial judge abused his discretion in ruling that 
the motion to terminate alimony should be denied?

 

Lawson 
phrases the issues on appeal as:

 

A.  Whether 
the trial court properly required Appellant to prove a substantial change of 
circumstances to justify a modification or termination of 
alimony?

 

B.  Whether 
the trial court properly weighed the written agreement of the parties in denying 
the motion to terminate alimony?

 

C.  Whether 
the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to terminate alimony is warranted 
by the facts of this case and is not an abuse of 
discretion?

 

D.  Whether 
this Court will certify that there is no reasonable cause for this appeal and 
award sanctions against Appellant?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On May 7, 1998, 
after almost twenty-five years of marriage, Maher filed for divorce from 
Lawson.  The parties entered into a 
Property Settlement Agreement prepared by Maher's attorney on May 22, 1998.  The agreement provided, in applicable 
part:

 

            
9.  The Husband [Maher] shall pay spousal maintenance/alimony 
to the Wife [Lawson] in the amount of $1,739.00 per month, beginning on the 
fifteenth (15th) day of June, 1998, and 
continuing until September of the year 2008 when the parties' current mortgage 
is paid off.

 

            
At the time the parties' mortgage is paid in full, Husband's spousal 
maintenance/alimony payments shall be reduced by Nine Hundred Nineteen Dollars 
and Ninety Two Cents ($919.02), which equals the amount of the parties' current 
principal and interest mortgage payment.  
Said amount shall then be paid until September of the year of 
2012.

 

            
At such time as child support ceases, Husband's spousal 
maintenance/alimony payment shall increase by the amount of child support, 
$661.00, in the month after the last child support payment was 
paid.

 

            
In the event that Wife obtains better paying employment, or receives a 
pay increase of any sort, Husband's alimony payment will be reduced by fifty 
percent (50%) of Wife's pay increase.  
In the event Husband receives pay raises, his spousal maintenance/alimony 
payment shall be increased to, and calculated at, fifty percent (50%) of his net 
monthly income.

 

            
In the event Husband serves on Active Duty for the United States Marine 
Corps Reserve, he shall pay fifty percent (50%) of any net amount earned, for 
that service, over and above the net amount earned for his civilian employment, 
to Wife as additional spousal maintenance/alimony.  Any travel expenses and perdiem [sic] 
payments associated with said Active Duty will be retained exclusively by the 
Husband. 

 

The 
agreement also included an acknowledgment that the parties had the opportunity 
to retain separate counsel prior to execution of the agreement.  Although the parties considered 
including a clause within the agreement that would end alimony upon remarriage, 
the parties could not agree on that clause and it was left out of the 
agreement.  Further, Maher signed 
and filed a statement under oath indicating that the form of decree of divorce 
was fair and equitable to both parties.  
The agreement was then filed with the district court, and the district 
court entered a decree of divorce on July 7, 1998, incorporating the 
agreement.  

 

[¶4]      Maher remarried 
in November 1999, and Lawson remarried in March 2000.  On July 18, 2000, Maher filed his 
Petition for Termination of Alimony, which was initially heard before a district 
court commissioner.  Upon the 
recommendation of the district court commissioner, the district court formally 
denied Maher's petition.  
Thereafter, the district court granted Maher's Motion for Relief from 
Judgment filed pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b).1 

 

[¶5]      A trial was then 
held before the district court on Maher's original Petition for Termination of 
Alimony.  Ultimately, the district 
court denied the petition on June 9, 2003, finding that Maher had failed to show 
a material and substantial change of circumstances. 

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶6]      A trial court's 
conclusions of law are not binding on this court and are reviewed de 
novo.  Pagel v. 
Franscell, 2002 WY 169, ¶7, 57 P.3d 1226, ¶7 (Wyo. 2002); Maycock v. 
Maycock, 2001 WY 103, ¶12, 33 P.3d 1114, ¶11 (Wyo. 2001).  The standard we apply in reviewing cases 
asserting an abuse of discretion by the trial court is whether the trial court 
reasonably could have concluded as it did.  
Ready v. Ready, 2003 WY 121, ¶11, 76 P.3d 836, ¶11 (Wyo. 2003); 
Rude v. State, 851 P.2d 20, 23 (Wyo. 1993); Parry v. Parry, 766 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Wyo. 1989).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Questions 
of Law

 

[¶7]      In his first two 
issues on appeal Maher, in essence, claims that the district court erred as a 
matter of law when it denied his petition to terminate alimony.  According to Maher, the case of 
Swetich 
v. 
Smith, 
802 P.2d 869 (Wyo. 1990), citing the cases of Marquardt 
v. Marquardt by 
Rempfer, 
396 N.W.2d 753 (S.D. 1986) and In 
re Marriage of Shima, 
360 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1985), stands for the proposition that upon the filing of a 
motion to terminate alimony based on remarriage, the 
spouse receiving alimony has the burden of showing that extraordinary 
circumstances exist which justify the payment of continued alimony.  We do not agree.

 

[¶8]      While it is true 
that the Marquardt 
and 
In 
re Marriage of Shima cases 
may support the argument espoused by Maher, this court cited those cases only as 
authority showing that remarriage could 
be 
considered a sufficient change of circumstances to terminate alimony, but that 
it did not automatically terminate alimony payments without amendatory court 
action.  As stated in Swetich, 
at 870-71:

 

            
Daniel asks that we construe the agreement to provide for automatic 
termination of alimony upon remarriage in the absence of any agreed termination 
provision in the agreement.  His 
basic argument is that, traditionally, alimony ends upon remarriage as a matter 
of law.  Daniel cites several cases 
which tend to support that proposition.  
Only recently, we indicated "[a]limony payments terminate on the death of 
either party or on the remarriage of the payee." Sellers 
v. Sellers, 
775 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Wyo. 1989) (accord Warren 
v. Warren, 
361 P.2d 525 (Wyo. 1961)).  There 
was also language in Neagle 
v. Neagle, 
481 P.2d 661, 663 (Wyo. 1971)  
(Neagle 
I), 
which indicates "alimony payments . . . cease upon the remarriage or 
death of [the payee]."

 

            
While Daniel argues with some force for that proposition, another factor 
must be considered that the argument advanced and the cases cited by Daniel do 
not accommodate. Daniel's argument does not weigh the continuing jurisdiction of 
the district court to modify decrees, Sellers, 
775 P.2d 1029, and the cited cases do not involve decree incorporated term 
payment separation agreements and do not provide any express termination on 
remarriage proviso.

 

            
In Hendrickson 
v. Hendrickson, 
583 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Wyo. 1978), we said "an award always remains open; and upon 
application, where conditions and circumstances have changed, the trial court 
can provide relief and modify the allowance." Necessarily, modification of the 
award for the payment of alimony is to be made by the district judge, not by a 
unilateral decision by the payor.

 

            
This approach is similar to that used in other jurisdictions.  In Marquardt 
v. Marquardt 
by 
Rempfer, 
396 N.W.2d 753 (S.D. 1986), a separation agreement incorporated by reference 
into the divorce decree provided for alimony payments but did not provide for 
the termination of alimony upon remarriage of the payee.  The ex-husband moved to have alimony 
support terminated after his ex-wife remarried.  In that case, the court held that 
remarriage is prima facie evidence that alimony should be terminated and shifts 
to the payee the burden of showing extraordinary circumstances which might 
require continued payments of alimony.  
The Supreme Court of South Dakota relied upon In 
re Marriage of Shima, 
360 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1985) for its rationale.

 

            
In In 
re Marriage of Shima, 
the Iowa Supreme Court indicated that while alimony did not terminate 
automatically upon remarriage, the burden was upon the payee to demonstrate 
extraordinary circumstances which could justify continued alimony payments.  The Supreme Court of Iowa had relied 
upon Wolter 
v. Wolter, 
183 Neb. 160, 158 N.W.2d 616, 619 (1968) for its rationale.  In Wolter, 
the Nebraska Supreme Court held that remarriage does not automatically terminate 
a right to alimony but makes a prima facie case which can only be overcome by a 
showing by the payee of extraordinary circumstances justifying a continuation of 
alimony.

 

            
There is also a substantial body of cases and accommodating statutes 
determining that termination of alimony is automatic upon remarriage.  See Voyles 
v. Voyles, 
644 P.2d 847 (Alaska 1982); Myers 
v. Myers, 
62 Utah 90, 218 P. 123 (1923); Ala.Code § 30-2-55 (1989); Cal.Civ.Code 
§ 4801(b) (West 1983 & Cum.Supp. 1990); Colo.Rev.Stat. 
§ 14-10-122(2) (1987 & Cum.Supp. 1990);  Del.Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1519(b) 
(1981);  Nev.Rev.Stat. § 125.150.5 
(Cum.Supp. 1989); and N.Y.Dom.Rel.Law § 248 (McKinney 1986).  See also Kuhns' 
Estate v. Kuhns, 
550 P.2d 816 (Alaska 1976) (death case) and Cecil 
v. Cecil, 
11 Utah 2d 155, 356 P.2d 279 (1960).  
See the conflict within reported cases detailed in Annotation, Alimony as 
Affected by Wife's Remarriage, In Absence of Controlling Specific Statute, 48 
A.L.R.2d 270 (1956) and later case service.

 

However, 
this court further noted at 871-72:

 

            
Resolution of this case will be confined to its factual 
content.  It presents an agreement for periodic 
alimony payments with a stated term and no remarriage termination 
condition.  We need not write an all 
inclusive rule for nonagreement cases to decide this case where the agreement of 
the parties initially created the obligation. Dorr v. Newman, 785 P.2d 1172 (Wyo. 1990). Since the agreement and the decree into which it was 
incorporated made no provision for automatic termination where each document 
contained a term period for alimony payment, the remedy available to the alimony 
obligor is reserved to a petition to modify the decree. Sellers, 
775 P.2d 1029;  Buchler v. 
Buchler, 65 Wyo. 452, 202 P.2d 670 (1949).  Remarriage could be a change of 
circumstance, but it does not automatically cancel the obligation provided in 
the decree without amendatory court action.  Beck v. Beck, 208 Kan. 148, 490 P.2d 628 (1971).

 

. 
. .

 

            
We hold that modification of the alimony decree in this case was not 
automatically accomplished without district court petition upon remarriage of 
the spouse.

 

(Emphasis 
added and footnotes omitted.)

 

[¶9]      Furthermore, it 
is critical to note that Wyoming's statutory scheme is different than the 
statutory schemes of the jurisdictions cited within the Swetich 
opinion.  Specifically, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-116 
(LexisNexis 2003) provides that after a decree for alimony is entered, the court 
may from time to time, on the petition of either of the parties, revise and 
alter the decree respecting the amount of alimony.  This statute does not specify that 
termination 
of alimony is automatic upon remarriage. 
Moreover, both prior to and following the issuance of the Swetich 
opinion, 
this court has clarified that a party seeking modification of alimony must 
establish that there has been a material and substantial change of circumstances 
which outweighs the interest of society in applying the doctrine of res 
judicata.  Ready 
v. Ready, 
at ¶11; 
Pasenelli 
v. Pasenelli, 
2002 WY 159, ¶9, 57 P.3d 324, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002); Crawford 
v. Crawford, 
828 P.2d 1192, 1194 (Wyo. 1992); Mentock 
v. Mentock, 
638 P.2d 156, 158 (Wyo. 1981).  
Likewise, we recognized in Ready 
v. Ready, 
at ¶21 
(citing Dorr 
v. Newman, 
785 P.2d 1172, 1178 (Wyo. 1990)), that the party seeking the termination of 
alimony must demonstrate that there has been a substantial change of 
circumstances from the time of the divorce to the time of the petition to 
modify.  Thus, 
we hold that the district court did not err as a matter of law by requiring 
Maher to bear the burden of proving that there 
had been a material and substantial change of circumstances.  

 

[¶10]   In addition, Maher asserts that the 
district court erred when it found that the Property Settlement Agreement, in 
and of itself, required that the district court deny his petition to terminate 
alimony.  In support of this 
argument, Maher cites Pauling 
v. Pauling, 
837 P.2d 1073, 1078 (Wyo. 1992), which details that when, in the absence of 
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the agreement is presumed to 
merge into the decree and will no longer be given effect. 

 

[¶11]   Upon review of the record, it is 
clear that the district court used the language within the agreement, which was 
incorporated into the divorce decree, as one of many factors in making its 
determination.  Indeed, the district 
court properly recognized that alimony can be modified even if it is established 
by agreement, citing Dorr 
v. Newman.  This court has further established that 
although not separately dispositive, there must be significance attached to the 
separation agreement when modification is considered as contrasted with a 
court-imposed payment responsibility which was not voluntarily assumed by the 
prior marital partner.  Johnson 
v. Johnson, 717 P.2d 335, 340 (Wyo. 1986).  Accordingly, we do not find Maher's 
argument to be persuasive.  

 

Abuse 
of Discretion

 

[¶12]   In the alternative, Maher submits 
that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his petition to 
terminate alimony.  Review of the 
district court's detailed decision letter indicates that the district court's 
determination was based on a number of criteria.  Specifically, the district court 
considered the remarriage and Maher's changed financial circumstances, including 
the fact that Maher had incurred additional debt since the divorce.  Nevertheless, the district court noted 
that Maher had incurred much, if not all, of that debt voluntarily.  In particular, the district court 
stated:

 

            
The other principal change urged by [Maher] involves his current earning 
and spending capacity.  He 
specifically argues that his current home involves a huge mortgage payment and 
that in addition he is also helping an adult son to the degree that he probably 
spends $200 or perhaps more in a given month.  The evidence was that after settlement 
of the divorce, Mr. Maher took a job in the area of Chicago, Illinois for the 
same company and for somewhat more money.  
However, more money didn't go as far as he anticipated it would in 
Chicago, though he was able to buy a home and eventually remarried there.  It was uncontroverted, however, that 
while he had a home, he built a larger one, obtaining a commensurately larger 
loan with his new wife which doubled the amount of his existing mortgage, 
clearly a voluntary choice.  In 
addition, his monthly obligation is dramatically higher because he sought, for 
financial planning reasons, a 15-year mortgage.  Again, smart financial planning on his 
part, but not something that this Court could consider as anything other than 
the voluntary acquisition or assumption of significant debt which cannot be 
considered a change of circumstances.  
Goody v. Goody, 939 P.2d 731 (Wyo. 1997).  See also, Johnson v. 
Johnson, 717 P.2d 335 (Wyo. 1986).

 

            
The evidence of financial assistance to an adult stepson was also 
appropriate from [Maher's] point of view and something the Court notes as 
admirable, but not of the kind and nature of expense that this Court can 
consider as a change of circumstances.

 

[¶13]   The district court further 
recognized that the settlement agreement included provisions for adjustment of 
alimony based on 1) changes in Maher's and Lawson's income, 2) when child 
support ceased, 3) the parties' mortgage was paid in full, and 4) the event that 
Mr. Maher became activated in the military.  Additionally, the district court pointed 
out that the settlement agreement even specified that any travel expenses and 
per diem regarding Maher's military service would be exclusively retained by 
Maher and that alimony, in any event, would terminate on a date certain 
apparently simultaneous with Maher's anticipated military retirement.  Thus, the district court concluded the 
parties' settlement agreement spoke to long-term planning over a period of years 
and to what money would flow post-divorce from Maher to Lawson.  Hence, the district court gave the 
agreement significant weight in making its determination.  Moreover, the district court considered 
that the parties had contemplated a remarriage clause in the settlement 
agreement, but the parties did not ultimately include it.  

 

[¶14]   The district court, after balancing 
each of these elements, concluded that:

 

Here the 
specific details in the agreement and resulting decree convince the Court that 
[Lawson's] remarriage is not a substantial change of circumstances that 
outweighs the interests of the law in the principal of res judicata.  In addition, even considering the 
financial burden of [Maher's] unanticipated financial situation, to a large 
degree most if not all of that additional burden has been voluntarily 
acquired.  His income simply not 
going as far in Illinois as it did here was not, under the evidence presented, a 
substantial change all by itself, and in fact it was an anticipated move on or 
about the time of the settlement agreement. 

 

[¶15]   Upon our review of the record and 
the district court's reasoning, we cannot conclude that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying Maher's petition to terminate alimony.  To the contrary, the district court's 
decision appears to be well reasoned and within Wyoming's established law on 
this issue.

 

[¶16]   Furthermore, we find no merit in 
Maher's effort to convince this court that under our holding in Jones v. 
Jones, 858 P.2d 289 (Wyo. 1993), his unrealized belief that he would receive 
sufficient earnings to cover both his living expenses and the alimony payments 
upon moving to Illinois constitutes a failed expectation that supports his claim 
that a substantial change in circumstances occurred.   Maher knew at the time he entered 
into the settlement agreement what his income would be when he moved to 
Illinois.  Maher also testified that 
his income increased every year since the divorce.  Moreover, Maher voluntarily chose to 
assume a nearly $300,000 debt after filing his petition to terminate alimony, 
assuming that he would be successful in his attempt to terminate his alimony 
obligation which would then enable him to afford his new higher mortgage 
payment.  In Jones, Mr. Jones 
anticipated that his back injury would heal enough that he would be able to 
pursue higher paying employment and pay his obligations.  However, Mr. Jones was precluded from 
doing so because through no fault of his own, his back did not 
heal as anticipated.  Under these 
facts, we held there was sufficient basis for modifying Mr. Jones' 
obligation.  Maher's situation is 
obviously far different from the circumstances that existed in Jones as 
Maher's alleged predicament was self-induced and knowingly assumed.  

 

[¶17]   Additionally we are not persuaded 
by Maher's last-ditch effort arguing that the settlement agreement should be set 
aside as unfair.  As noted earlier, 
the parties entered into the settlement agreement on May 22, 1998.  Detailed negotiations took place in the 
development of the language that was ultimately contained in the agreement.  Although the parties considered 
including within the agreement a clause that would end alimony upon remarriage, 
the parties could never agree on the form of that clause and it was left out of 
the agreement.  Further, the 
agreement contained an acknowledgment that the parties had the opportunity to 
retain separate counsel prior to its execution.  Thus, Maher cannot now infer that 
counsel who prepared the settlement agreement did not look out for his best 
interests. The settlement agreement was eventually incorporated into the divorce 
decree.  Maher signed and filed a 
statement under oath indicating that the decree was fair and equitable to both 
parties.  Apparently Maher abided 
with the terms of the decree of divorce thereafter.  Consequently we find Maher's argument 
unconvincing.     

 

Imposition 
of Sanctions

 

[¶18]   Lawson asks that we impose 
sanctions against Maher in this case pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05.  Although we affirm the actions of the 
district court, we decline to impose sanctions.  Maher's brief was not so lacking in 
cogent argument or pertinent authority that it constituted that rare 
circumstance where sanctions are appropriate.  See Estate of McLean ex rel. Hall v. 
Benson, 2003 WY 78, ¶12, 71 P.3d 750, ¶12 (Wyo. 2003).

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶19]   We affirm the district court's 
denial of Maher's petition to terminate alimony for those reasons stated.  In addition, we deny Lawson's request 
that we levy sanctions against Maher on appeal.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1This 
motion also included a Motion to Terminate Alimony and Motion to Rescind the 
Property Settlement Agreement.