Case Title: Taylor v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 167, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2011-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
EMMETT TAYLOR, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 153 & 167, 2010 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0708020057 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
Submitted:  July 27, 2011 
Decided:  September 12, 2011 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices constituting the Court en banc.
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.
 
Nicole M. Walker (argued) and Santino Ceccotti of the Office of the Public 
Defender, Wilmington, Delaware for appellant. 
 
Paul R. Wallace (argued), Abby Adams and Maria Knoll of the Department 
of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for appellee. 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
2
 
Police arrested Emmett Taylor on August 17, 2007, and charged him with 
several crimes arising from the death of his fiancée, Stephanie Mumford.  The trial 
judge, pursuant to Cooke v. State,1 barred Taylor’s trial counsel from seeking a 
guilty but mentally ill verdict.  The jury convicted Taylor of all offenses and the 
trial judge sentenced him to death.  Taylor appeals his convictions and death 
sentence.  We affirm. 
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Emmett Taylor and Stephanie Mumford, set to wed on August 18, 2007, 
scheduled a rehearsal in Georgetown for August 14, 2007.  When they failed to 
arrive at the rehearsal, Mumford’s family drove to the townhouse the couple shared 
in Millsboro.  When the family arrived at the townhouse, they found Mumford’s 
body behind the door of the second floor bathroom.  The family noticed a warped 
frying pan on the kitchen island, along with damage to the drywall and blood all 
over the kitchen and bathroom.  Taylor and the couple’s car were missing.  The 
family later found a butcher knife on top of the refrigerator and gave it to police. 
Based on an autopsy, the medical examiner opined that the cause of 
Mumford’s death was blunt force trauma to the head and that the manner of death 
was homicide.  Doctors officially pronounced Mumford dead at 9:36 p.m. on 
                                          
1 977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009). 
3
August 14.  The medical examiner did not provide an opinion regarding the actual 
time of Mumford’s death. 
On August 17, 2007, police located Taylor in Washington DC and took him 
into custody in connection with Mumford’s death.  When police seized Taylor, 
they also seized two cell phones from his car—one was his and the other was 
Mumford’s.  Police forensically examined the phones and obtained call histories, 
videos, and photos from them.  Some of the photos they retrieved from Taylor’s 
phone showed Mumford lying on the floor of their townhouse with cucumbers 
inserted in her mouth, vagina, and anus.  The time stamps on the images ranged 
from 12:23 a.m. to 12:35 a.m. on August 14, 2007. 
Detective William Porter interrogated Taylor in Washington D.C.  Taylor 
told Porter that on the night of Mumford’s death—the night of August 13th into 
August 14th—Taylor told Mumford that he was having second thoughts about 
their wedding.  According to Taylor, Mumford stood next to the kitchen sink 
cutting food for dinner while the two argued.  Taylor explained that he headed 
toward Mumford to get something from the cupboard when she turned toward him 
with the knife she was using to cut food. Taylor said that he grabbed her wrist and 
went into what he called a “self defense mechanism.”  He then explained that he 
struck her with a frying pan several times before she gave up the knife. 
4
Mi Jung, the couple’s next door neighbor, testified at trial that she heard 
loud banging noises coming from the couple’s townhouse between 10:00 and 
10:30 p.m. on August 13, along with Taylor screaming at Stephanie.  Jung testified 
that she never heard Mumford’s voice in response.  Jung also testified that this was 
unusual because she generally had heard Mumford’s voice along with Taylor’s 
voice when the couple had argued in the past. 
Taylor told Porter that he did not believe Mumford pointed the knife at him 
intentionally and she never threatened him with it.  Taylor claimed he was in a rage 
because she had a knife pointed at him despite everything he had done for her.  
This account conflicts with what Taylor later told Dr. Zingaro, a licensed 
psychologist that Taylor’s attorneys retained.2
According to Taylor, the argument ended and he told Mumford that he 
wanted to leave for a while to clear his mind.  He said that Mumford became angry 
because she thought he was going to see another woman.  He explained that she 
threw the car keys at him, and then, when he was heading down the steps toward 
the garage, she jumped on his back.  He explained that the two of them fell 
together down the stairs and rammed into the wall at the bottom of the steps.  The 
                                          
2 In fact, Taylor told Zingaro that Mumford grabbed the collar of his shirt and attempted to lunge 
her body towards him with the knife in her other hand. 
5
weight of their bodies, according to him, caused a hole in the drywall, and 
Mumford absorbed most of the impact from the fall. 
Taylor told Zingaro that he was not trying to kill Mumford—only trying to 
get away from her—but he also told and showed Porter that he had no defensive 
wounds, injuries, or scratches.  He also agreed with Porter’s characterization of the 
incident as a one-sided fight.  Taylor told both Zingaro and the trial judge that after 
they fell down the stairs, he and Mumford had sex using cucumbers at her request. 
According to Taylor, after the couple had sex, Mumford’s head began to 
swell from their fall down the stairs.  While Taylor says he insisted that she go to 
the hospital, Mumford refused.  Instead, Taylor explained, he helped Mumford to 
the bathroom so she could clean up.  He said that he went to the living room and 
fell asleep on the sofa while she remained in the bathroom, only to awake later to 
find her dead on the bathroom floor.  He explained that he then changed his clothes 
and left for Washington D.C., where police arrested him. 
Zingaro met with Taylor multiple times over a two year period.  He noted 
that Taylor displayed characteristics of Dissociative Identity Disorder.  Defense 
counsel concluded that evidence of Taylor’s mental illness would support a GBMI 
verdict with respect to either the intentional murder charge or a lesser included 
offense.
6
In preparation for Taylor’s jury trial, however, Taylor and his attorneys 
reached a fundamental disagreement about trial strategy.  Specifically, he faced 
charges of capital murder, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission 
of a Felony, and Abuse of a Corpse.  With respect to the capital murder charge, 
Taylor preferred a not guilty verdict by virtue of a theory of accident or self-
defense, while his attorneys wanted to seek a GBMI verdict.  His attorneys did not 
believe that the evidence supported a plausible theory of accident or self defense.  
They believed that if Taylor pursued self defense or accident, he risked not only a 
conviction, but also a death sentence.  They also knew that when a jury returns a 
GBMI verdict, the jury must consider that verdict as a mitigating factor in the 
penalty phase of a capital murder trial. 
Taylor sought to fire his attorneys.  His attorneys filed a Motion to 
Withdraw, citing their fundamental disagreement with Taylor regarding trial 
strategy.  The trial judge held a series of ex parte hearings with Taylor and his 
attorneys to assess the disagreement, but postponed the ultimate resolution until 
after this court decided Cooke v. State.  Ultimately, the trial judge refused to 
dismiss defense counsel and ruled that, under Cooke, they could not seek a GBMI 
verdict or introduce GBMI evidence. 
At his jury trial, Taylor moved for judgment of acquittal on the Abuse of a 
Corpse charge, claiming that the State had failed to establish Mumford’s time of 
7
death.  The trial judge denied this motion and the jury found Taylor guilty of all 
charges.  At the penalty phase, the jury recommended death by an eleven to one 
vote.  The trial judge, at sentencing, determined that the State had established one 
statutory aggravating factor and all nine of its alleged non-statutory aggravating 
factors.  The judge also found fourteen of the sixteen proposed mitigating 
circumstances.  After weighing these various factors, the judge sentenced Taylor to 
death.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review the alleged denial of a constitutional right de novo.3  We also 
review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction in order to 
determine whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, could have found the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.4  The Delaware Criminal Code requires that we review Taylor’s 
death sentence to determine whether (1) the evidence supports, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the jury’s finding of the particular aggravating circumstances, 
(2) the judge arbitrarily or capriciously imposed the death sentence or the jury 
                                          
3 Hartman v. State, 918 A.2d 1138, 1140 (Del. 2007). 
4 Maddrey v. State, 975 A.2d 772, 774–75 (Del. 2009) (citing Davis v. State, 706 A.2d 523, 525 
(Del. 1998)). 
8
arbitrarily or capriciously recommended it, and (3) the sentence is disproportionate 
to the penalty imposed in similar cases.5
III.
ANALYSIS
Taylor’s appellate counsel makes four primary arguments in this appeal.  
First, counsel contend that the trial judge denied Taylor his Sixth Amendment right 
to the effective assistance of counsel.  Specifically, counsel contend it was error for 
the judge to prevent defense counsel from pursuing a GBMI verdict over Taylor’s 
objection after failing to engage in the inquiry they contend Cooke requires.  
Essentially, counsel contend that Cooke does not establish a bright line rule against 
arguing GBMI over a defendant’s objection, but rather requires the trial judge to 
determine the propriety of counsel’s representation under the individual 
circumstances of a particular case.  Second, they contend that our opinion in 
Cooke, if read to support the trial judge’s ruling in this case, violates the Sixth 
Amendment.  Third, they assert that the trial judge erred when he denied Taylor’s 
Motion for Acquittal on the Abuse of a Corpse charge because the State failed to 
present sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Mumford was, in fact, dead at the time of the alleged abuse.  Finally, 
they contend that the trial judge arbitrarily and capriciously imposed the death 
                                          
5 11 Del. C. § 4209(g)(2); Starling v. State, 903 A.2d 758, 762 (Del. 2006). 
9
sentence by not individually addressing each mitigating circumstance.  We reject 
each argument. 
A.
The trial judge correctly prevented Taylor’s attorneys from arguing for 
GBMI over Taylor’s objection.
 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”6  The United States Supreme Court has 
clarified that the right to counsel means “the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel.”7  The purpose of this right is to “ensure a fair trial” and “ensure that a 
defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the 
proceeding.”8  Accordingly, counsel may not “so undermine[] the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 
produced a just result.”9
                                          
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (holding that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal proceedings applies to the states under the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
7 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 691–92 (1984). See also United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). 
9 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 
10
 
When an attorney represents a defendant, the authority to manage the day-
to-day conduct of the trial generally rests with the attorney.10  An attorney who 
represents a criminal defendant has an “overarching duty to advocate the 
defendant’s cause and more particular duties to consult with the defendant on 
important decisions.”11  To be sure, the attorney’s duty to consult with the 
defendant regarding “important decisions”—including questions of overarching 
defense strategy—does not require counsel to obtain the defendant’s consent to 
“every tactical decision.”12  Certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of 
basic rights are so personal to the defendant, however, that “they cannot be made 
for the defendant by a surrogate.”13
 
A criminal defendant has “ultimate authority to make certain fundamental 
decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in 
his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.”14  This Court has recognized that these 
choices “implicate inherently personal rights which would call into question the 
                                          
10 New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114–15 (2000); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988). 
11 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
12 Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 
13 Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187. 
14 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). 
11
fundamental fairness of the trial if made by anyone other than the defendant.”15  In 
fact, we have explicitly acknowledged that this principle may sometimes make the 
defendant worse off than if defense counsel had the final say in a disputed matter: 
“Although these fundamental decisions are indeed strategic choices that counsel 
might be better able to make, because the consequences of them are the 
defendant’s alone, they are too important to be made by anyone else.”16
 
Therefore, with regard to basic decisions about the objectives of 
representation, a lawyer must “both consult with the defendant and obtain consent 
to the recommended course of action.”17  As an important corollary, “counsel 
cannot undermine the defendant’s right to make these personal and fundamental 
decisions by ignoring the defendant’s choice and arguing affirmatively against the 
defendant’s chosen objective.”18  As we explained in Cooke, this principle is 
consistent with the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct.19
                                          
15 Cooke, 977 A.2d at 841 (quoting Arko v. People, 183 P.3d 555, 558 (Colo. 2008)). See also 
Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 250 (2008) (“[S]ome basic trial choices are so 
important that an attorney must seek the client’s consent in order to waive the right.”) (citing 
Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187). 
16 Cooke, 977 A.2d at 842 
17 Id. (quoting Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187). 
18 Id.
19 See id. (citing Del. Lawyers’ Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2, which states that “a lawyer shall 
abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . shall consult 
with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. . . . In a criminal case, the lawyer 
12
 
One of the fundamental decisions a defendant alone is empowered to make 
is his plea.20  In Delaware, “[a] defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, nolo 
contendere, or guilty but mentally ill.”21  A Delaware defendant may also “raise the 
‘defense’ of ‘guilty but mentally ill’ at trial.”22  In Cooke, the defendant was 
competent to stand trial and decided, against the advice of counsel, to plead not 
guilty instead of pleading guilty but mentally ill.23  Nevertheless, his attorneys 
advised the trial judge that they planned to ask the jury, over Cooke’s “vociferous 
and repeated protestations” that he was innocent, to find him guilty but mentally 
ill.24
This Court found Cooke’s attorneys’ conduct violated the United States 
Constitution for two reasons.  First, Cooke completely lacked the “assistance” of 
counsel in pursuing his chosen trial objective—a not guilty verdict.25  Because we 
                                                                                                                                       
shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, 
whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify”). 
20 See Gonzalez, 553 U.S. at 247 (explaining that the right to plead not guilty is a fundamental 
right that the defendant must waive personally and the attorney cannot waive). 
21 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(a). 
22 Cooke, 977 A.2d at 842 (quoting 11 Del. C. § 408). 
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 843. 
13
presume prejudice in cases of the total failure of counsel, Cooke’s attorneys’ 
strategy violated his Sixth Amendment rights and warranted automatic reversal 
under United States v. Cronic.26  Second, Cooke’s attorneys’ conduct denied him 
the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard and meaningful adversarial testing of 
the State’s case against him.27  Consequently, we concluded that Cooke’s attorneys 
effectively negated his fundamental due process right to enter a plea of not guilty 
by pursuing their conflicting objective to have the jury find him guilty but mentally 
ill.28  In the opinion, however, this Court acknowledged that the United States 
Supreme Court’s holding in Florida v. Nixon instructed that we should not 
presume prejudice when defense counsel concedes guilt “after consultation with 
the defendant yields no response.”29
In this appeal, Taylor’s attorneys assert that Cooke does not establish a per
se rule against arguing GBMI over a competent defendant’s objection.  We 
disagree.  Specifically, his attorneys argue here that our opinion in Cooke requires 
                                          
26 Id. at 848–53. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 (holding that prejudice is presumed “where counsel 
entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing”); see also
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (holding that in order to show unconstitutionally ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a defendant typically must demonstrate prejudice from counsel’s alleged 
error). 
27 Cooke, 977 A.2d at 843 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656). 
28 Id.
29 Id. at 846 (quoting Nixon, 543 U.S. at 178). 
14
a trial judge to “inquire into the propriety of counsel’s representation” in each 
particular case and then decide who should make the ultimate decision whether to 
argue GBMI—the attorney or the client.  This assertion misinterprets Cooke.
Indeed, in Cooke, we stated plainly:  “The trial court [has] a duty to inquire into the 
propriety of the representation.”30  This statement means that the trial judge has a 
duty to determine whether there is indeed a conflict between attorney and client; it 
does not mean the judge has a duty—or the authority—to determine under specific 
factual circumstances whose views should prevail.  If there is a conflict, under 
Cooke, the judge must protect the defendant’s right to “raise [or not raise] the 
‘defense’ of ‘guilty but mentally ill’ at trial.”31
At oral argument, Taylor’s appellate counsel argued that this case is wholly 
different from Cooke.  She asserted that in Cooke the attorneys argued GBMI to 
the jury in direct contravention of the defendant’s clearly stated intent, amounting 
to ineffective assistance of counsel.  But, in this case, she asserted the attorneys 
wanted the same outcome as Taylor, but they wanted to “keep GBMI as an arrow 
in the quiver” as a sort of alternative argument.32  According to Taylor’s appellate 
                                          
30 Id. at 850. 
31 Id. at 842 (quoting 11 Del. C. § 408). 
32 At oral argument, Taylor’s attorney explained that Taylor’s trial counsel wanted to argue 
innocence to the jury, but also wanted to be able to tell the jury that if it was going to find him 
guilty, then it should find him guilty but mentally ill. 
15
counsel, the trial judge wrongfully denied them the ability to do this, thereby 
resulting in Taylor’s counsel being constitutionally ineffective.  Taylor’s appellate 
counsel even directed this Court to citations in the appellate record that would 
prove that Taylor’s attorneys wanted the same outcome that Taylor wanted.  After 
examining the record, we disagree with appellate counsel and find this case is 
factually similar to Cooke.
On the record before us, Taylor opposed his attorneys’ attempt to argue to 
the jury that he was guilty but mentally ill of any offense.  Taylor’s trial counsel 
acknowledged as much in their Motion for Continuance.  Even if Taylor’s 
appellate attorneys are correct that Taylor’s not guilty plea for the murder charge is 
logically consistent with arguing that GBMI should apply to one or more lesser 
included offenses—a proposition that we do not decide here—Taylor opposed this 
strategy.  At various points in time, to the judge and his attorneys, Taylor privately 
acknowledged that he may, indeed, be guilty of some offense other than murder.  
These private acknowledgements, however, are different from consenting to argue 
guilt or guilty but mentally ill to a jury. 
Therefore, an irreconcilable conflict existed between Taylor’s desired result, 
a not guilty verdict, and his counsel’s proposed strategy of “rais[ing] the ‘defense’ 
                                                                                                                                       
16
of ‘guilty but mentally ill’ at trial.”33  The trial judge, after several ex parte
hearings with Taylor and his counsel, concluded “[t]he defense, throughout the 
trial, cannot admit guilt if the defendant wants to plead not guilty.  Again, the 
defense counsel cannot undermine the defendant’s testimony or his chosen theory 
of the case.”  In other words, the trial judge denied Taylor’s attorneys the 
opportunity to present GBMI to the jury, thereby overriding Taylor’s plain intent to 
seek a not guilty verdict.  This ruling protected Taylor’s individual right to 
determine whether or not to present a defense of GBMI to the jury, was appropriate 
under our law, and did not deprive Taylor of the effective assistance of counsel.34
In deciding this case and applying our analysis from Cooke, we reaffirm 
Cooke.  We do not agree, as Taylor’s attorneys assert, that Cooke runs afoul of the 
Sixth Amendment standing alone or in its application here. 
B.
There was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to convict Taylor of 
Abuse of a Corpse.
 
In order to establish Taylor’s guilt for Abuse of a Corpse, the State must 
establish that he “treat[ed] a corpse in a way that a reasonable person knows would 
                                          
33 Cooke, 977 A.2d at 843 (quoting 11 Del. C. § 408). 
34 We note that while we do not generally consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on 
direct appeal, the Superior Court proceedings and actions of Taylor’s trial counsel are clearly 
reflected in the record.  Cooke, 977 A.2d at 848.  The record is sufficient here for our review of 
Taylor’s claim that the trial judge’s conduct denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel.  See id.
17
outrage ordinary family sensibilities.”35  The statute does not define the term 
“corpse.”  Taylor argues that the State presented insufficient evidence for a jury to 
find him guilty of Abuse of a Corpse because there is no evidence that Mumford 
was actually dead when he took photos of her with cucumbers inserted into her 
mouth, anus, and vagina.  To reiterate, we review de novo the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting Taylor’s conviction to determine whether any rational trier of 
fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have 
found Taylor guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.36
 
In this case, there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find Taylor 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Abuse of a Corpse.  Between 12:23 a.m. and 
12:35 a.m. on the night in question, Taylor took ten pictures on his cell phone of 
Mumford in the condition described above.  Although doctors did not officially 
declare Mumford dead until 9:36 p.m. the following night, nothing in the Delaware 
Criminal Code requires an official pronouncement of death in order to convict 
someone of Abuse of a Corpse.  Furthermore, while the medical examiner could 
not opine to a degree of medical certainty whether the pictures depict Mumford 
dead, unconscious, or otherwise, Taylor admitted that she was dead by 3 or 4 a.m.  
                                          
35 11 Del. C. § 1332. 
36 See Maddrey, 975 A.2d at 774–75. 
18
The condition of the apartment—with a lot of blood, the warped frying pan, and 
the hole in the drywall, among other factors—indicated a serious struggle.  Mi 
Jung, the couple’s neighbor, testified that she heard loud banging noises and 
Taylor’s screams between 10 and 10:30 p.m.  Notably, she testified that she did not 
hear Mumford’s voice, even though she had heard it during previous altercations 
between the couple.  On the basis of all these facts, construed in the light most 
favorable to the State, a rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable 
doubt, as the jury in this case did, that Mumford was dead at the time when Taylor 
took the cell phone pictures of her body. 
C.
The trial judge properly sentenced Taylor to death after carefully 
considering relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.
 
Taylor asserts that the trial judge erred when he improperly weighed the 
aggravating and mitigating factors by failing to discuss individually and in detail 
each mitigating circumstance.  According to Taylor, this failure resulted in the trial 
judge’s imposition of his death sentence being arbitrary and capricious.  
Specifically, Taylor argues that the judge erred by failing to discuss five of 
fourteen established mitigating factors and by minimizing the degree of physical 
and emotional trauma and the exposure to domestic violence that Taylor suffered 
during his life. 
19
 
So long as a death sentence is “the product of a deliberate, rational and 
logical deductive process,” it is not arbitrary or capricious.37  The analysis in which 
a trial judge must engage “is not a mere counting process of X number of 
aggravating circumstances and Y number of mitigating circumstances but rather a 
reasoned judgment as to what factual situations require the imposition of death and 
which can be satisfied by life imprisonment in light of the totality of the 
circumstances present.”38  Accordingly, a trial judge must engage a carefully 
reasoned analysis—not a mechanistic formula—when considering a death 
sentence.
 
Taylor’s argument is inconsistent with this principle because it would 
require the sentencing judge in every case, on the record, to inscribe some arbitrary 
minimum amount of discussion for each mitigating factor individually, regardless 
of its nature, significance, or weight.   Requiring this approach would reflect a 
preference for form over substance—an arrangement that would run somewhat 
contrary to the “deliberate, rational and logical deductive process” that the law 
requires.39  Certainly length and detail of consideration given the mitigating factors 
                                          
37 Starling v. State, 903 A.2d 758, 765 (Del. 2006) (quoting Red Dog v. State, 616 A.2d 298, 310 
(Del. 1992)). 
38 Id. (quoting State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846, 849 (Del. 1992)). 
39 Id.
20
by a trial judge are factors relevant to our review of the “totality of evidence” 
insofar as they indicate that the judge engaged in a thoughtful process.  But, we 
cannot agree that a judge’s failure to discuss each mitigating factor for some 
arbitrary page length makes imposition of a death sentence automatically arbitrary 
or capricious. 
 
Here, the judge’s analysis of the aggravating and mitigating factors was 
sufficiently careful and deliberate.  On March 12, 2010, the judge issued a nineteen 
page opinion.  In it, he concluded that the State had established all nine of the non-
statutory aggravating circumstances it had alleged and that Taylor had established 
fourteen of the sixteen mitigating circumstances he had alleged.  Taylor even 
admits that the judge explicitly considered nine of the fourteen established 
mitigators.40  Ultimately, the judge concluded that despite a difficult childhood, 
Taylor had a number of positive influences in his life.  These included loving 
grandparents, the opportunity for a college education, military service, and skills as 
a carpenter.  The judge also observed that at the time of the murder, Taylor had a 
nice home, a job, and Mumford’s love.  In light of these circumstances, the judge 
found that the mitigating factors deserved little weight because Taylor neither had 
                                          
40 Taylor claims the judge failed to discuss mitigating factors 2 (involving Taylor’s family 
history of mental disease), 7 (involving his attempts to identify his “longstanding mental and 
emotional issues”), 8 (involving his attempts to resume treatment for his mental and emotional 
issues), 15 (involving the rape of his mother), and 16 (involving the aid he has given his 
grandmother and her community). 
21
a bad life nor a future without the hope of an even better life.  This discussion of 
Taylor’s life evidences an appropriately careful and reasoned analysis by the trial 
judge.
 
Finally, Taylor argues that because the judge failed to address several 
mitigating factors, it is impossible for this Court to adequately review whether 
imposition of the death penalty in this case was proportionate to the penalty 
recommended in similar cases, as the law requires.41  We review capital 
punishment cases for proportionality to ensure that the death sentence imposed in a 
specific case is not an aberration.  But, we need not find an identical case where we 
affirmed a death sentence in order to find that Taylor’s sentence is proportionate to 
his crime.42  We consider the factual background of first degree murder cases to 
determine the proportionality of a particular sentence.43  Relevant factors include 
the gravity of the offense and the circumstances of the crime.44
                                          
41 See 11 Del. C. § 4209(g)(2); Starling, 903 A.2d at 762. 
42 See Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 144 (Del. 1983) (affirming a death sentence on the basis of 
other “similar”—not identical—cases). 
43 Zebroski v. State, 715 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1998). 
44 See Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 677 (Del. 2001) (“An exact comparison of these cases is 
not practicable, ‘but a review of some objective factors, including the gravity of the offense, the 
circumstances surrounding the crime, and the harshness of the penalty is helpful in reaching a 
determination of whether or not this case fits within a pattern of Delaware death sentence 
precedent.” (citing Zebroski, 715 A.2d at 84)). 
22
Taylor’s sentence here is similar to the result in other cases where the 
murder victim was a current or former lover.45  Like the defendant in Weeks v. 
State, Taylor seems to have shown no remorse for his actions, considering how he 
abused Mumford’s lifeless, battered body.46  Cases in which we have affirmed 
death sentences also often feature defendants with records of violent crime whose 
earlier violent felony convictions operated as aggravating circumstances.47  Here, 
as in those cases, Taylor has a prior conviction for Aggravated Assault of an ex-
girlfriend.  When examining Taylor’s case against the universe of first degree 
murder cases, his death sentence seems consistent—proportionate—with penalties 
upheld in similar cases.48  Therefore, the judge’s imposition of a death sentence in 
this case was not unlawfully disproportionate. 
                                          
45 See, e.g., Weeks v. State, 653 A.2d 266 (Del. 1995) (shooting of wife and her companion); 
Gattis v. State, 637 A.2d 808 (Del. 1994) (shooting death of girlfriend); Lawrie v. State, 643 
A.2d 1336 (Del. 1994) (arson killing of estranged wife and children). 
46 Weeks, 653 A.2d at 274 (“Immediately following the killing, Weeks showed no remorse.”). 
47 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 983 A.2d 904, 937 (Del. 2009) (previous conviction for fourth 
degree rape); Starling, 903 A.2d at 763–64 (previous convictions for reckless endangering and 
robbery); Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285, 306–07 (Del. 2005) (previous conviction for felony 
assault and unlawful sexual contact); Clark, 672 A.2d at 1008 (previous conviction for assault 
with intent to murder); Ferguson v. State, 642 A.2d 722, 784–85 (Del. 1994) (previous 
Pennsylvania convictions for homicide and aggravated assault); Red Dog, 616 A.2d at 302–03 
(previous convictions for robbery and homicide).  
48 This case fits within the pattern of cases where the imposition of the death penalty is 
appropriate, as reflected in the applicable universe of cases that is attached as Exhibit A to this 
opinion.
23
IV.
CONCLUSION
The trial judge properly applied this Court’s holding in Cooke to the 
circumstances of this case and did not deprive Taylor of his Sixth Amendment 
right to the effective assistance of counsel.  Cooke does not violate Sixth 
Amendment principles.  Also, there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to 
find Taylor guilty of Abuse of a Corpse beyond a reasonable doubt.  Finally, the 
judge in this case imposed the death sentence after adequately careful and 
deliberate consideration.  Taylor’s death sentence, on the facts of this case, is not 
unlawfully disproportionate compared to the sentences imposed in similar cases.  
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. 
 
A-1 
APPENDIX A*
Name: 
 
 
Robert Ashley 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9605003410 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment (following retrial and second penalty 
 
 
 
 
hearing) 
Decision on appeal: 
2006 WL 797894 (Del. Mar. 27, 2006) 
Name: 
 
 
Meri-Ya C. Baker 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
90011925DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment 
Decision on appeal: 
1993 WL 557951 (Del. Dec. 30, 1993) 
Name: 
 
 
Jermaine Barnett 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9506017682 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment (following second penalty hearing) 
Decision on appeal: 
749 A.2d 1230 (Del. 2000) (remanding for new sentencing) 
Name: 
 
 
Hector S. Barrow 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9506017661 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment (following second penalty hearing) 
Decision on appeal: 
749 A.2d 1230 (Del. 2000) (remanding for new sentencing) 
Name: 
 
 
Tyreek D. Brown 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9705011492 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1999 WL 485174 (Del. Mar. 1, 1999) 
                                                            
*The universe of cases prior to 1991 is set forth in appendices to prior opinions by this Court, 
and those appendices are incorporated herein by reference. See, e.g., Lawrie v. State, 643 A.2d 1336, 
1352-56 (Del. 1994). 
 
A-2 
Name: 
 
 
Justin L. Burrell 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9805012046 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
766 A.2d 19 (Del. 2000) 
Name: 
 
 
Luis G. Cabrera 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9703012700 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
747 A.2d 543 (Del. 2000) 
Name: 
 
 
Luis G. Cabrera 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9904019326 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
840 A.2d 1256 (Del. 2004) 
Name: 
 
 
James B. Clark, Jr. 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9406003237 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death (judge only) 
Decision on appeal: 
672 A.2d 1004 (Del. 1996) 
Name: 
 
 
Charles M. Cohen 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
90001577DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
No direct appeal taken 
Name: 
 
 
Donald Cole 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0309013358 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
922 A.2d 364 (Del. 2007)
 
A-3 
Name: 
 
 
James T. Crowe, Jr. 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9508008979 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1998 WL 736389 (Del. Oct. 8, 1998) 
Name: 
 
 
David F. Dawson 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
88K00413DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle (venue changed) 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death 
Decision on appeal: 
637 A.2d 57 (Del. 1994) 
Name: 
 
 
Byron S. Dickerson 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
90011926DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1993 WL 541913 (Del. Dec. 21, 1993) 
Name: 
 
 
Cornelius E. Ferguson 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
91009926DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
642 A.2d 772 (Del. 1994) 
Name: 
 
 
Donald Flagg 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9804019233 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
No direct appeal taken 
Name: 
 
 
Freddy Flonnory 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9707012190 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment (following second penalty hearing) 
Decision on appeal: 
893 A.2d 507 (Del. 2006) 
 
A-4 
Name: 
 
 
Sadiki J. Garden 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9912015068 
County: 
 
 
New Castle  
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment ordered on appeal  
Decision on appeal: 
844 A.2d 311 (Del. 2004) 
Name: 
 
 
Robert J. Garvey 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0107010230 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Appeal: 
 
 
873 A.2d 291 (Del. 2005) 
Name: 
 
 
Robert A. Gattis 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
90004576DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
637 A.2d 808 (Del. 1994) 
Name: 
 
 
Arthur Govan 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
92010166DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1995 WL 48359 (Del. Jan. 30, 1995) 
Name: 
 
 
Tyrone N. Guy 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0107017041 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
913 A.2d 558 (Del. 2006) 
Name: 
 
 
Jason Anthony Hainey 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0306015699 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Appeal: 
 
 
878 A.2d 430 (Del. 2005) 
 
A-5 
Name: 
 
 
Ronald T. Hankins 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0603026103A 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
976 A.2d 839 (Del. 2009) 
Name: 
 
 
Akbar Hassan-El 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
010701704 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
911 A.2d 385 (Del. 2006) 
Name: 
 
 
Robert W. Jackson, III 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
92003717 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
684 A.2d 745 (Del. 1996) 
Name: 
 
 
Larry Johnson 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0309013375 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
878 A.2d 422 (Del. 2005) 
Name: 
 
 
Shannon Johnson 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0609017045 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
983 A.2d 904 (Del. 2009) 
Name: 
 
 
David Jones 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9807016504 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
798 A.2d 1013 (Del. 2002) 
 
A-6 
Name: 
 
 
Michael Jones 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9911016309 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
940 A.2d 1 (Del. 2007). 
Name: 
 
 
Michael Keyser 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0310021647 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
893 A.2d 956 (Del. 2006) 
Name: 
 
 
David J. Lawrie 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
92K03617DI 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
643 A.2d 1336 (Del. 1994) 
Name: 
 
 
Thomas M. Magner 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9509007746 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1998 WL 666726 (Del. July 29, 1998) 
Name: 
 
 
Michael R. Manley 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9511007022 
County: 
 
 
New Castle  
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
918 A.2d 321 (Del. 2007) 
Name: 
 
 
Frank W. Moore, Jr. 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
92S03679DI 
County: 
 
 
Sussex 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1994 WL 202289 (Del. May 9, 1994) 
 
A-7 
Name: 
 
 
Adam Norcross 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0002006278A 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
816 A.2d 757 (Del. 2003) 
Name: 
 
 
Juan Ortiz 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0104013797 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
869 A.2d 285 (Del. 2005) 
Name: 
 
 
Darrel Page 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9911016961 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
934 A.2d 891 (Del. 2007) 
Name: 
 
 
James W. Perez 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
93001659 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
No. 207, 1993, Moore, J. (Del. Feb. 3, 1994) 
Name: 
 
 
Gary W. Ploof 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0111003002 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
856 A.2d 539 (Del. 2004) 
Name: 
 
 
James Allen Red Dog 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
91001754DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death (judge only) 
Decision on appeal: 
616 A.2d 298 (Del. 1992) 
 
A-8 
Name: 
 
 
Luis Reyes 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9904019329 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
819 A.2d 305 (Del. 2003) 
Name: 
 
 
James W. Riley 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0004014504 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment (following retrial)  
Decision on appeal: 
2004 WL 2085525 (Del. Oct. 20, 2004) 
Name: 
 
 
Jose Rodriguez 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
93001668DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment 
Decision on appeal: 
1994 WL 679731 (Del. Nov. 29, 1994) 
Name: 
 
 
Richard Roth, Jr. 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9901000330 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment 
Decision on appeal: 
788 A.2d 101 (Del. 2001) 
Name: 
 
 
Reginald N. Sanders 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
91010161DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle (venue changed) 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment (following 1992 resentencing)  
Decision on appeal: 
585 A.2d 117 (Del. 1990) (remanding for new sentencing) 
Name: 
 
 
Nelson W. Shelton   
Criminal ID: 
 
 
92000788DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
652 A.2d 1 (Del. 1995) 
 
A-9 
Name: 
 
 
Donald J. Simmons 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
92000305DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
No direct appeal taken 
Name: 
 
 
Chauncey Starling 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0104015882 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death (on two counts) 
Decision on appeal: 
903 A.2d 758 (Del. 2006) 
Name: 
 
 
Brian David Steckel 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9409002147 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
711 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998) 
Name: 
 
 
David D. Stevenson 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9511006992 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
918 A.2d 321 (Del. 2007) 
Name: 
 
 
Willie G. Sullivan 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
92K00055 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
636 A.2d 931 (Del. 1994) 
Name: 
 
 
Ralph Swan 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0002004767A 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
820 A.2d 342 (Del. 2003) 
 
A-10 
Name: 
 
 
Ambrose L. Sykes 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
04011008300 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
953 A.2d 261 (Del. 2008) 
Name: 
 
 
Antonio L. Taylor 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9404018838 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment 
Decision on appeal: 
685 A.2d 349 (Del. 1996) 
Name: 
 
 
Milton Taylor 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0003016874 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
822 A.2d 1052 (Del. 2003) 
Name: 
 
 
Desmond Torrence 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0205014445 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
2005 WL 2923501 (Del. Nov. 2, 2005) 
Name: 
 
 
Charles H. Trowbridge 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
91K03044DI 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1996 WL 145788 (Del. Mar. 4, 1996) 
Name: 
 
 
James W. Virdin 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9809015552 
County: 
 
 
Kent  
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
780 A.2d 1024 (Del. 2001) 
 
A-11 
Name: 
 
 
John E. Watson 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
91008490DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
No direct appeal taken 
Name: 
 
 
Dwayne Weeks 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
92010167 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
653 A.2d 266 (Del. 1995) 
Name: 
 
 
Joseph Williams 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9809018249 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
2003 WL 1740469 (Del. Apr. 1, 2003) 
Name: 
 
 
Roy R. Williamson 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
93S02210DI 
County: 
 
 
Sussex 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
669 A.2d 95 (Del. 1995) 
Name: 
 
 
Jermaine M. Wright 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
91004136 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
671 A.2d 1353 (Del. 1996) 
Name: 
 
 
Craig A. Zebroski 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9604017809 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
715 A.2d 75 (Del. 1998)