Case Title: People v. Rodas

Citation: 

Docket Number: S237379

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2018-11-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
DOMINGO RODAS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S237379 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Three 
B255598 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BA360125 
 
 
November 26, 2018 
 
Justice Kruger filed the opinion of the court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, and Kline concurred. 
 
 
 
 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
S237379 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
Defendant Domingo Rodas was found incompetent to stand 
trial and ordered confined at a state hospital.  After several 
months of treatment with antipsychotic medication, hospital 
physicians reported that defendant had regained trial 
competence, but cautioned that it was important for defendant 
to continue taking his medication.  At the start of his jury trial 
some months later, however, the trial court learned that 
defendant had stopped taking his medication and that he had 
begun communicating incoherently with counsel about defense 
strategy, exhibiting some of the same symptoms he had 
displayed during earlier episodes of incompetence.  Defense 
counsel declared a doubt about defendant’s competence, but the 
trial court ruled that the trial could proceed after conducting a 
brief colloquy with defendant in which defendant was able to 
identify the charges against him and stated a willingness to go 
to trial and work with counsel.  Later, against counsel’s advice, 
defendant testified in his own defense.  The testimony was 
incoherent and the court struck it as irrelevant.  Defendant was 
ultimately convicted on several counts and sentenced to 
multiple life terms.   
We conclude the trial court erred in failing to suspend the 
criminal trial and initiate competency proceedings at the time 
counsel declared a doubt as to her client’s competence.  As a 
general rule, once a defendant has been found competent to 
stand trial, a trial court may rely on that finding absent a 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
 
substantial change of circumstances.  But when a formerly 
incompetent defendant has been restored to competence solely 
or primarily through administration of medication, evidence 
that the defendant is no longer taking his medication and is 
again exhibiting signs of incompetence will generally establish 
such a change in circumstances and will call for additional, 
formal investigation before trial may proceed.  In the face of such 
evidence, a trial court’s failure to suspend proceedings violates 
the constitutional guarantee of due process in criminal trials.  
(People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 847.)    
I. 
Rodas, also known by his birth name, Doudley Brown, was 
charged with murdering Frederick Lombardo, Keith Fallin and 
Roger Cota, and attempting to murder Kenneth McFetridge and 
Ronald Vaughn.  The victims were homeless men living on the 
street in Los Angeles.  All of the victims were stabbed over the 
course of July and August 2009; four of the stabbings occurred 
within a few hours in the same area of Hollywood.  Defendant 
was apprehended in the area carrying a knife.  DNA from three 
of the victims was found on the knife, its sheath, or defendant’s 
shirt.  A surviving victim later identified defendant from a 
photographic lineup, and one of the fatal stabbings was captured 
by surveillance cameras. 
In February 2012, before trial began, the parties raised the 
question of whether defendant was competent to stand trial.  
The parties agreed to submit the question on the reports of two 
experts, psychiatrist Kory J. Knapke and psychologist Sara 
Arroyo, without any live testimony or argument.  After 
reviewing the reports, the trial court found defendant 
incompetent to stand trial. 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
 
Only Dr. Knapke’s report is in the appellate record.  The 
report begins by recounting defendant’s psychiatric history.  In 
1974, when he was 19 years old and still known as Doudley 
Brown, defendant was hospitalized in a military hospital for a 
psychiatric disorder.  He received a medical discharge from the 
United States Army and a 30 percent disability rating for 
psychiatric reasons.  In 1984, he was found incompetent to stand 
trial and was committed to Patton State Hospital (Patton) for 
several months.  In 1986, defendant returned to Patton when he 
was found incompetent to stand trial on burglary charges.  He 
was later found competent and was convicted of those charges.   
In 1988, at the end of his state prison sentence for burglary, 
defendant was 
confined 
at 
Atascadero 
State 
Hospital 
(Atascadero) 
and 
Patton 
under 
a 
mental 
health 
conservatorship.1  He was diagnosed with schizophrenia, 
paranoid type, and schizoaffective disorder with substance 
abuse.  At the hospitals, defendant refused to eat or drink, 
explaining that “ ‘Lucifer would get him out of the hospital 
sooner if he starved himself.’ ”  On his admission to Atascadero, 
he showed symptoms of “ ‘florid psychosis,’ ” with marked 
disorganization to his thinking, and “ ‘speaking in nonsensical 
terms or word salad with legalistic flavor.’ ”  For example, he 
kept repeating the statement, “ ‘I will have to have my mother 
review, for I need a legal recourse for my faculties, recourse of 
legal testament for legal statements of my personage.  I don’t 
commit to answer any tests for legal recourse of degree of 
                                        
1  
Under Penal Code section 2974, an inmate who has been 
released from prison may be placed in a state hospital if a 
danger to himself, herself, or others, or gravely disabled as a 
result of a mental disorder, and if he or she does not come within 
the provisions of the Mentally Disordered Offender Act.   
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
 
recourse of trial.  I did not answer questions.  I do not recognize 
you as being a doctor by personage testimony witness offers.’ ”   
Dr. Knapke’s report noted that defendant had been 
examined by Dr. Arroyo in 2011.  According to Knapke, Arroyo 
found that “defendant’s thought processes were fragmented,” 
that he could not rationally cooperate with his attorney, and 
that he was therefore incompetent to stand trial.  Dr. Knapke 
reached a similar conclusion after examining defendant in 
January 2012.  At the start of the examination, defendant 
immediately began “rambling in a nonsensical manner” about 
needing photographs and fingerprints from Patton to prove he 
had never been there.  Dr. Knapke asked about defendant’s 
current charges but defendant did not answer on that subject, 
instead becoming increasingly agitated.  Defendant insisted he 
was not the person Knapke was talking about and yelled, 
“ ‘You’re accusing me of being at a hospital.’ ”  When asked 
whether he believed he suffers from a mental illness, defendant 
responded, “ ‘You’re basing it on wrong identification.  The court 
should verify that I’ve never been [at] Patton State Hospital.’ ”   
Dr. Knapke’s report summarized defendant’s condition 
succinctly, describing defendant as “psychotic and paranoid . . . 
and does not make any sense.”  Because defendant could not 
rationally cooperate with his attorney or participate in court 
proceedings, Dr. Knapke concluded, he was incompetent to 
stand trial.  With “zero insight into his mental illness and need 
for medications,” Dr. Knapke wrote, defendant “will require 
involuntary medications.”  On a face sheet addendum to his 
report, Knapke indicated that if untreated with medication, 
defendant “probably will suffer serious harm to his . . . physical 
or mental health,” but “[p]sychotropic medication will likely 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
 
restore this person to a state of mental [c]ompetency to stand 
trial.”   
Clinical staff at Patton submitted a progress report to the 
court in May 2012.  Staff noted that when defendant was 
admitted the previous month, he presented with psychotic 
symptoms including disorganized speech and thought and 
paranoia.  He had been prescribed psychotropic medication to 
control those symptoms and stabilize his mood.  Although he 
was compliant with the medication regimen, he had not yet been 
restored to competence. 
In a second report, dated October 2012, staff noted that 
defendant continued to show symptoms of schizophrenia, 
including “tangential and circumstantial thought processes, and 
disorganized 
non-sensical 
speech.” 
 
With 
psychotropic 
medications, defendant had “demonstrated some symptom 
stabilization,” though not to the point of restored trial 
competence.  Due to his confused thought and speech patterns, 
defendant was still unable to “logically and meaningfully assist 
his attorney” or to “appreciate his legal situation in a 
meaningful way.”  He showed some progress toward “gaining 
knowledge of the legal procedures,” but while he sometimes 
began answering a question about court proceedings correctly, 
he would “become derailed by irrelevant and odd ideas, and 
ultimately spoil his partially correct response.”  Clinical staff 
believed that with continued psychiatric treatment there was a 
substantial likelihood defendant would achieve trial competence 
in the foreseeable future, but that without it he was not expected 
to improve.  Staff concluded:  “There are no effective alternatives 
to treatment with antipsychotic medication.” 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
 
Defendant was transferred from Patton to Atascadero in 
February 2013.  In May, the Atascadero medical director filed 
with the court a certification of mental competency under Penal 
Code section 1372.  The certification was supported by a clinical 
report dated April 18, 2013.  According to the report, defendant 
suffered from schizophrenia, but since his transfer he had 
“presented with organized thought processes and ha[d] not 
expressed any delusional or paranoid ideation,” “appear[ed] to 
have an adequate factual understanding of his charges and the 
different court procedures and did not express any delusional 
thought content about his charges” and was “able to logically 
discuss his legal options and has the capacity to return to court 
and cooperate with his attorney.”  The report noted, however, 
that defendant “has limited insight into his history of mental 
illness and continues to deny he was involved in the charges and 
insists it was somebody else.”  The report cautioned:  “He should 
remain on his current medication regimen once he is returned 
to custody to prevent mental decompensation and maintain 
competency related abilities while he waits to return to court.” 
Further opining on defendant’s discharge readiness, the 
Atascadero report explained that while defendant wished to 
plead not guilty and go to trial, he understood his plea choices 
and was willing to listen to his attorney’s advice.  In a 
recommendation for continuing care in defendant’s next facility, 
the report stated:  “It is recommended that Mr. Rodas continue 
to take the medication he is being prescribed to prevent mental 
decompensation and maintain competency related abilities once 
he returns to custody and is waiting to return to court.”  The 
Atascadero medical director reiterated this point in a letter to 
the trial judge accompanying the report and certification:  “It is 
important that the individual remain on this medication for his 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
 
own personal benefit and to enable him to be certified under 
Section 1372 of the Penal Code.” 
In May 2013, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, 
the court ruled that defendant was competent to stand trial and 
reinstituted criminal proceedings.  In so ruling, the court stated 
it was proceeding with no case file before it, only a “docket 
sheet,” and with the understanding that “he was found 
competent.”  In later proceedings to settle the record, the 
superior court judge who presided on that date stated that she 
had before her only a “dummy file” containing the Atascadero 
medical director’s certification of competence.  There being no 
defense request for a hearing on competence and no objection 
from either party, the judge explained that she had 
“inferentially found him competent based upon the doctor’s 
letter.”2  At the hearing, the court and defense counsel discussed 
the possible need for a court order to ensure defendant received 
his antipsychotic medication at the jail, but the court made no 
order at the time or, so far as the record indicates, at a later 
time. 
In March 2014, after jury selection was completed and 
before opening statements were given, defense attorney Carole 
Telfer told the court that after recent communications with 
defendant, she had developed a doubt as to defendant’s trial 
                                        
2  
On appeal, defendant contended the trial court could not 
properly proceed in this manner without a stipulation 
submitting the matter on the medical report.  The Court of 
Appeal, relying on People v. Mixon (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1471, 
1480, held that absent a request for a hearing, the trial court 
could summarily approve the state hospital certification of 
competency.  We did not grant review on that issue, and we do 
not decide it here. 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
 
competence.  Counsel explained her concerns in an in camera 
hearing.  The previous day, defendant told her he wished to 
testify on his own behalf, which they had previously agreed he 
would not do.  When she tried to find out what he intended to 
say in testimony, he sent her a note that said:  “Playing record 
Hollywood department Westside Honor Ranch L.A. County.  
Two police officers visiting.  Four records.  Call to testify in 
court.  Statement you are the one that murdered a series of 
persons in a tunnel.”  On another page, the note continued (in 
counsel’s reading):  “Transcriptures of acquittal of execution, 
transcriptures of the advance of the court date from May 2nd, 
2012 from April 6th, 2012, and transcriptures of the name plake, 
P-L-A-K-E, Rodas, Domingo to Doudley Brown.” 
According to counsel, defendant’s reference to two police 
officers visiting him in jail was not accurate.  Counsel asked 
defendant what he meant about “playing record,” and from his 
response she gathered that “he was indicating something about 
the video, but was asserting that the video they had, all three of 
them were assimilations and were not the correct video.”  
According to counsel, defendant said that what he had been 
shown were all “assimilations,” though she did not know what 
he meant by that term.  When counsel asked defendant what he 
meant by “transcriptures of acquittal of execution,” he 
responded in a “word salad”—that is, by “using a lot of 
polysyllabic words that go around in a circle and don’t really 
make sense.” 
When counsel tried to talk to defendant about his name 
change (from Doudley Brown to Domingo Rodas), she reported:  
“[H]e got very angry at me and again started doing this word 
salad, talking about—something about forgery and . . . how 
could they say he was Doudley Brown.”  Counsel was unsure 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
 
whether defendant meant that he should be charged with 
forgery for using the wrong name or that law enforcement 
authorities were committing forgery by referring to him as 
Doudley Brown.  Counsel was concerned because on previous 
occasions when defendant had been incompetent to stand trial 
he had used the same “word salad,” though sometimes in the 
past he had spoken in Spanish instead of English.  Defendant 
had also told defense counsel he was not taking his medication, 
and unlike earlier interactions since defendant’s return to court, 
counsel was now having difficulty understanding her client:  “I 
don’t know what he’s saying, I don’t know what he wants, and 
he wants—apparently wants to testify and I’m afraid to put him 
on the stand because I don’t know what’s going to come out of 
his mouth.” 
After hearing from counsel, the court addressed defendant 
in the following colloquy: 
“The court:  . . . Mr. Rodas how you doing? 
“The defendant:  I’m fine, thank you, your Honor.  Since I 
have returned from Atascadero Hospital, that I’ve been proved 
mentally competent to stand trial, it is the first time that I made 
those notes and I had a conversation with Carole Telfer just 
yesterday.  And I really didn’t mean to be obstructive to the 
person’s attention.  I didn’t know that that was the person 
means.  I was being belligerent as how the—antagonistic as how 
the person said, and I didn’t know that I was being obstructive 
or confrontive, or con – 
 “The court:  Confrontational. 
 “The defendant:  Yeah, confrontational.  And I didn’t know 
that I was being by anyone—being obstructive against the 
person. 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
 
 “The court:  Well, how are you feeling today? 
 “The defendant:  I feel perfectly fine, your Honor.  I don’t—
I don’t consider—I only wanted to ask the person’s pardon if I 
possibility was being obstructive that I made up those notes, and 
I really don’t mind how the person to continue defending my case 
for me and I do mean to keep quiet.  I didn’t know, at least the 
first time I spoke to the person admittedly, and I didn’t know 
that I was being—that the person was considering me to be 
confrontative or obstructive. 
 “The court:  Well, let’s slow down here.  [¶]  You know what 
we have a jury now? 
 “The defendant:  Yes, your Honor. 
 “The court:  And we’re set to start the trial? 
 “The defendant:  Yes, your Honor. 
 “The court:  And do you understand that you’ve been 
charged with some serious crimes? 
 “The defendant:  Yes, your Honor. 
 “The court:  You’ve been—can you tell me what you’ve 
been charged with? 
 “The defendant:  Yes, I understood yesterday the 
proceedings were going over and that I was being charged with 
three counts of murder and two counts of attempted murder. 
 “The court:  And you know Ms. Telfer is here to defend you 
on those charges? 
 “The defendant:  Yes, your Honor. 
 “The court:  And are you willing to help her to the best of 
your ability? 
 “The defendant:  Yes, your Honor.” 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
 
Addressing defense counsel, the court said it was 
“impressed with his clarity of speech and apparent clarity of 
reasoning in addressing the court.  He understands the charges.  
He says he’s willing to help you.”  The court then asked 
defendant if he thought it was “okay to go ahead and have the 
trial,” to which Rodas said, “Yes, your Honor.  That will be 
properly fine, yes, your Honor.”  The court confirmed that was 
Rodas’s “request.”  When the court asked Rodas if he was taking 
his medication, Rodas replied, “No, your Honor, I’ve been doing 
without the medication.  I’ve been doing fine.  I’ve been getting 
along well.  I’ve been there about a year already.  I returned from 
Atascadero Hospital since May of last year and I’ve been doing 
fine.  I have been doing without my medications.  It was just the 
notes that I made to Ms. Telfer and she thought I was being 
obstructive or confrontative.”  Answering the court’s leading 
questions, defendant affirmed he understood what was going on 
and would try to help his counsel with his defense.  The court 
said, “I think we should go forward.”  Counsel replied, “Fine.  I 
just wanted to make a record.” 
The trial proceeded.  Against counsel’s advice, defendant 
testified in his own defense.  In his testimony, defendant asked 
the court to “order the three video record exhibition and report 
for video filming in the nature exhibited, the copy from the 
Hollywood Police Department, the copy that Carole Telfer 
showed me at Wayside Honor Ranch, and the copy in the nature 
that is being exhibited here at the courtroom . . . .”  Defendant 
maintained “that the three copies are disassimilated copies, that 
they’re not perfectly alike copies, and that they have divulginary 
and arbitrary information of casting of images.”  He also asked 
that the police officers who he said had visited him in jail and 
who had “committed” him “the statements to the four video 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
 
record copies that you are the one that committed a serious of 
murders in a tunnel” be called to testify regarding the “four 
record copies on their video copy of record of filming in their 
possession . . . .”  The court granted the prosecution’s motion to 
strike the testimony as irrelevant.   
The jury convicted defendant of the murder of Fallin, with 
a special circumstance of murder by lying in wait, and of both 
attempted murders, but acquitted him on two of the charged 
murders.  He was sentenced to life without possibility of parole, 
plus two additional life terms. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed.  The appellate court rejected 
defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in failing to 
suspend proceedings when counsel raised a doubt about his 
competence in March 2014.  While counsel’s description of 
defendant’s behavior “certainly suggested mental illness,” the 
court reasoned, it “did not necessarily constitute substantial 
evidence of defendant’s incompetence.”  Rather, the court 
continued, defendant’s responses to the trial court’s questions 
suggested competence:  “[Defendant] knew he was in a jury trial; 
he recited the charges against him with precision; he knew that 
Ms. Telfer was defending him; he was willing to help her; he 
wanted to go forward with trial; and he apologized for his 
‘obstructive’ and ‘belligerent’ behavior.  The record therefore 
shows that Rodas understood the nature of the criminal 
proceedings and could assist counsel in the conduct of a defense 
in a rational manner.”  The Court of Appeal acknowledged that 
defendant’s 
2013 
psychiatric 
report 
“connected 
taking 
medication to maintaining competence,” but reasoned that the 
report did not condition its competence finding on continued 
medication, and the trial court had “no current medical report 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
 
from 2014 describing the effect, if any, of Rodas’s failure to take 
his medication.” 
We granted defendant’s petition for review, limited to the 
question of whether the trial court erred in failing to suspend 
the criminal proceedings after defense counsel expressed her 
doubts as to defendant’s competence to stand trial. 
II. 
A. 
The constitutional guarantee of due process forbids a court 
from trying or convicting a criminal defendant who is mentally 
incompetent to stand trial.  (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 
181, 194; U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15.)  
Section 1367 of the Penal Code, incorporating the applicable 
constitutional standard, specifies that a person is incompetent 
to stand trial “if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental 
disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of 
the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a 
defense in a rational manner.”  (Id., subd. (a); see Dusky v. 
U.S. (1960) 362 U.S. 402 [competence requires “ ‘sufficient 
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding’ ” and “ ‘a rational as well as 
factual understanding of the proceedings against him’ ”].) 
Penal Code section 1368 requires that criminal proceedings 
be suspended and competency proceedings be commenced if “a 
doubt arises in the mind of the judge” regarding the defendant’s 
competence (id., subd. (a)) and defense counsel concurs (id., 
subd. (b)).  This court has construed that provision, in 
conformity with the requirements of federal constitutional law, 
as meaning that an accused has the right “to a hearing on 
present sanity if he comes forward with substantial evidence 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
 
that he is incapable, because of mental illness, of understanding 
the nature of the proceedings against him or of assisting in his 
defense.”  (People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 518, 
discussing Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 385–386.)  
“Once such substantial evidence appears, a doubt as to the 
sanity of the accused exists, no matter how persuasive other 
evidence—testimony of prosecution witnesses or the court’s own 
observations of the accused—may be to the contrary.”  
(Pennington, at p. 518.)  As we have explained in more recent 
cases, substantial evidence for this purpose is evidence “that 
raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt” as to competence, and 
the duty to conduct a competency hearing “may arise at any time 
prior to judgment.”  (People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 
p. 847; accord, People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 464.) 
When a doubt exists as to the defendant’s mental 
competence, the court must appoint an expert or experts to 
examine the defendant.  The issue is then tried to the court or a 
jury under the procedures set out in Penal Code section 1369.  
Except as provided in Penal Code section 1368.1 (allowing for 
probable cause and motion hearings in certain circumstances), 
all criminal proceedings are to be suspended until the 
competence question has been determined.  (Pen. Code, § 1368, 
subd. (c).) 
If, after a competency hearing, the defendant is found 
competent to stand trial, a trial court may rely on that finding 
unless the court “ ‘is presented with a substantial change of 
circumstances or with new evidence’ casting a serious doubt on 
the validity of that finding.”  (People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 
1115, 1153 (Jones); accord, People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 
856, 884.)   
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
 
 
B. 
Defendant contends that the trial court was presented with 
substantial evidence of his mental incompetence at the March 
2014 hearing and that the circumstances at that time had 
substantially changed from those prevailing in May 2013, when 
defendant was found competent to stand trial.  We agree.   Given 
the circumstances, the trial court erred by proceeding with trial 
without undertaking the required formal inquiry into 
defendant’s competence.   
First, a brief review of the facts.  As the trial court was 
aware, defendant had a history of mental illness dating at least 
to 1974, and he was found incompetent to stand trial on criminal 
charges in 1984 and 1986.  In 1988, he was again confined at 
Atascadero and Patton and diagnosed with schizophrenia.  
Besides 
delusional 
thinking, 
his 
communication 
was 
disorganized:  he spoke in “word salad,” using nonsensical terms 
with no connection to one another. 
In 2011 and 2012, experts found him incompetent to stand 
trial based on his “fragmented” thought processes, “rambling” 
and “nonsensical” speech and his delusional belief he was 
misidentified as the person who previously had been confined at 
Patton.  But with psychotropic medication, Dr. Knapke noted in 
2012, defendant could probably be returned to a state of mental 
competence to stand trial.  After several months of treatment, a 
report from Patton found that with medication defendant had 
shown some progress in reducing symptoms of psychosis.  With 
continued treatment, he likely would regain competence, but 
without it he likely would not:  “There are no effective 
alternatives to treatment with antipsychotic medication.”  
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
 
When, several months later, the Atascadero medical director 
ultimately certified defendant as competent, the report twice 
cautioned that he should remain on his medication regimen “to 
prevent mental decompensation and maintain competency 
related abilities.”  In a cover letter to the court on filing the 
certificate of competence, the Atascadero medical director 
repeated the warning:  “It is important that [defendant] remain 
on this medication . . . to enable him to be certified under Section 
1372 of the Penal Code.” 
In sum, the psychiatric reports and letters in the record 
established two critical facts.  First, defendant’s schizophrenia 
causes him to suffer paranoid ideation and severe difficulties in 
organizing his thoughts and speech, periodically rendering him 
incompetent to stand trial.  Second, while consistent 
administration 
of 
antipsychotic 
and 
mood-stabilizing 
medication can control these symptoms, maintenance of 
competence depends on continued medication. 
It was against this backdrop that defense counsel informed 
the trial court in March 2014 that she had formed a new doubt 
about defendant’s competence.  At that time, the trial court 
learned that defendant had stopped taking his medication and 
his condition had severely deteriorated.  Defendant was now 
focused on a paranoid theory that the videotapes the prosecution 
was using against him were “assimilations” and that 
identifications of him as Doudley Brown (his original name, 
under which he had been previously confined in state hospitals) 
were somehow “forge[d].”  Beyond that, his communications to 
his attorney were incoherent, consisting of a “word salad” like 
that reported during his earlier bouts of mental incompetence.  
Defendant had told counsel he now wanted to testify, contrary 
to their earlier agreement, but counsel did not understand what 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
 
defendant was saying to her and hence did not know “what’s 
going to come out of his mouth” if he took the stand.  Taken as a 
whole, this information constituted substantial evidence of 
mental incompetence.  The facts made known to the court raised 
a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant was able to 
communicate rationally with his attorney and thus “to assist 
counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.”  (Pen. 
Code, § 1367, subd. (a).)3 
In concluding that the trial could proceed, the trial court 
relied on a brief colloquy with defendant, in which defendant 
displayed a general understanding of the nature of the 
proceedings and the charges against him.  But nothing in the 
colloquy dispelled the specific concerns that counsel had raised 
                                        
3  
The record does not support the Attorney General’s 
speculative 
suggestion 
that 
defendant’s 
incoherent 
communication with counsel was attributable to his use of 
English rather than Spanish.  Defendant’s sister testified at 
trial that he was fluent in both English and Spanish.  Defendant 
was born in Puerto Rico but, according to Dr. Knapke’s report, 
his father was “British from Honduras.”  On one occasion, 
defendant insisted to an interviewer that he spoke only Spanish, 
but he nevertheless “spontaneously began speaking English in 
the middle of an interview about any problem.”  The record 
reflects, moreover, that the problems counsel described arose 
when defendant was speaking Spanish as well as when he was 
speaking English.  Dr. Knapke also noted that when he 
interviewed 
defendant 
through 
a 
Spanish 
interpreter, 
defendant began “rambling in a nonsensical manner,” and the 
interpreter told Knapke he was having difficulty understanding 
defendant because of defendant’s “bizarre use of words and 
syntax.”  Even to the interpreter, defendant “was using words 
out of context” and “was not making any sense.”  In declaring 
her doubts as to competence, defense counsel explained to the 
trial court that defendant had previously used a “word salad” in 
Spanish and was now doing so in English. 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
 
about defendant’s ability to rationally assist her in conducting 
his defense.  Indeed, the transcript of the colloquy is suggestive 
of some of the very communication difficulties counsel had 
described:  In response to the court’s opening question about 
how he was doing, defendant responded that he was fine, but 
then continued:  “[I]t is the first time that I made those notes 
and I had a conversation with Carole Telfer just yesterday.  And 
I really didn’t mean to be obstructive to the person’s attention.  
I didn’t know that that was the person means.  I was being 
belligerent as how the—antagonistic as how the person said, 
and I didn’t know that I was being obstructive or confrontive.” 
And critically, while aspects of defendant’s performance in 
this colloquy could be seen as weighing to some degree against 
counsel’s evidence of incompetence, the colloquy did not provide 
an adequate basis for resolving any conflict in the evidence 
concerning defendant’s competence.  In Pate v. Robinson, supra, 
383 U.S. 375 (Pate), the high court made clear that when 
substantial evidence of incompetence otherwise exists, a 
competency hearing is required even though the defendant may 
display “mental alertness and understanding” in his colloquies 
with the trial judge.  (Id. at p. 385.)  The court explained that 
while the defendant’s in-court behavior “might be relevant to the 
ultimate decision as to his sanity, it cannot be relied upon to 
dispense with a hearing on that very issue.”  (Id. at p. 386.) 
This court has followed the same principle:  When faced 
with conflicting evidence regarding competence, the trial court’s 
role under Penal Code section 1368 is only to decide whether the 
evidence of incompetence is substantial, not to resolve the 
conflict.  Resolution must await expert examination and the 
opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing.  (People v. Lightsey 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 703–704; People v. Pennington, supra, 66 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
 
Cal.2d at p. 518.)  Had the issue of defendant’s competence been 
tried to the court under Penal Code section 1369, the trial court 
might legitimately have weighed defendant’s demeanor and the 
nature of his responses to the court’s questioning against the 
experts’ reports and other available evidence relating to his 
condition.  But in the face of substantial evidence raising a doubt 
about defendant’s competence, defendant’s demeanor and 
responses supplied no basis for dispensing with further inquiry. 
It is true that, generally speaking, when a defendant has 
already been found competent to stand trial, “a trial court need 
not suspend proceedings to conduct a second competency 
hearing unless it ‘is presented with a substantial change of 
circumstances or with new evidence’ casting a serious doubt on 
the validity of that finding.”  (Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1153.)  
We have also said that when a competency hearing has already 
been held, “the trial court may appropriately take its personal 
observations into account in determining whether there has 
been some significant change in the defendant’s mental state,” 
particularly if the defendant has “actively participated in the 
trial” and the trial court has had the opportunity to observe and 
converse with the defendant.  (Ibid.) 
This rule does not, however, alter or displace the basic 
constitutional requirement of Pate, supra, 383 U.S. at pages 385 
to 386, and People v. Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at page 518, 
which require the court to suspend criminal proceedings and 
conduct a competence hearing upon receipt of substantial 
evidence of incompetence even if other information points 
toward competence.  The effect of the Jones rule is simply to 
make clear that the duty to suspend is not triggered by 
information that substantially duplicates evidence already 
considered at an earlier, formal inquiry into the defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
 
competence; when faced with evidence of relatively minor 
changes in the defendant’s mental state, the court may rely on 
a prior competency finding rather than convening a new hearing 
to cover largely the same ground. 
Whether there has been a change in circumstances 
sufficient to call for a new competency hearing is necessarily a 
fact-specific inquiry.  Under the facts of this case, however, it is 
plain that the standard was met; the evidence before the trial 
court made it unreasonable to continue to rely on the prior 
competence finding in allowing the trial to proceed.  The May 
2013 competence finding had followed a finding of incompetence 
in February 2012; in the interim, defendant had been confined 
in state hospitals and treated with antipsychotic medication.  
When the competence finding was made, it was based solely on 
the certification of the medical director, who stated clearly that 
it was “important that [defendant] remain on this medication 
. . . to enable him to be certified.”4 
Considering this context, the information presented to the 
court at the March 2014 in camera hearing showed a substantial 
change in circumstances since May 2013.  At that hearing, the 
court learned that defendant had stopped taking his 
antipsychotic medication—on which his prior competence 
                                        
4  
Not only was no evidentiary hearing held at that time, but 
the court had before it no case file; it made its determination 
based solely on the “docket sheet,” as the judge presiding at the 
hearing said at the time, or at most on a “dummy file” containing 
only “the letter from the doctor, finding the defendant 
competent,” as the judge stated in settling the record.  
Ms. Telfer, 
who 
had 
represented 
defendant 
in 
earlier 
proceedings and who later represented him at trial, was not 
present for the May 2013 hearing; two other deputy public 
defenders stood in for her. 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
 
finding was effectively conditioned—and was again displaying 
symptoms similar to those he exhibited during prior bouts of 
incompetence.  Far from duplicating the evidence considered in 
the course of making the prior competency finding, this new 
information painted a starkly different picture from that 
contained in the medical director’s certification.  Nothing the 
trial court heard in its colloquy with defendant negated the 
showing of changed circumstances—nor, for that matter, did the 
trial court justify its decision not to declare a doubt after the in 
camera hearing by any determination that the circumstances 
had not significantly changed since defendant was found 
competent in May 2013.  This change in circumstances required 
additional, formal inquiry under Penal Code section 1368.5 
This conclusion is consistent with that of another published 
decision of the Court of Appeal, in which the court held that a 
competency hearing was required under circumstances strongly 
                                        
5  
Even if the information the court received at the March 
2014 in camera hearing were not deemed to show substantially 
changed circumstances from the May 2013 competence finding, 
defendant’s nonsensical and irrelevant testimony during trial, 
together with counsel’s earlier presentation, clearly did so.  
When the court tried to clarify defendant’s testimony that the 
tape copies were “divulginary and arbitrary information of 
casting of images” by asking whether defendant was saying the 
jury had been shown a different tape than he had seen in jail, 
defendant responded:  “No, your Honor, not explicitly that 
nature.  I am just saying that the physical material copies in the 
fact of knowledge identified consistency, a prototype of the 
nature of the assimilated nature.”  Although defense counsel did 
not at that point renew her caution that defendant appeared 
incompetent to stand trial, the court’s duty to assess competence 
is a continuing one.  (People v. Sattiewhite, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 
p. 464.) 
 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
 
resembling those presented in this case.  In People v. Murdoch 
(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 230 (Murdoch), the court held that the 
trial court was required to suspend criminal proceedings under 
Penal Code section 1368 when confronted with evidence that the 
defendant had stopped taking his medication and was pursuing 
a delusional theory of defense.  The defendant there, charged 
with assault, was found competent to stand trial based on expert 
reports stating that he was competent so long as he remained 
medicated.  But the same reports noted that defendant had 
either completely or mostly stopped taking his medication and 
could “decompensate and become incompetent if he continued to 
refuse medication.”  (Murdoch, at p. 233.)  At trial a few months 
later, the defendant, now representing himself, told the court 
that he wanted to introduce parts of the Bible and other books 
to prove that the alleged victim was not a human being because 
he did not have shoulder blades, which “ ‘are symbolic of angelic 
beings,’ ” and instead had a single bone that prevented him from 
shrugging his shoulders.  (Id. at p. 234.)  When the victim 
testified, the defendant asked him on cross-examination if he 
could shrug his shoulders.  The victim did so, and the defendant 
stated, “ ‘That’s all I have.  This isn’t the man that I believe 
attacked me.’ ”  (Id. at p. 235.)  The Murdoch court held that in 
light of the experts’ reports, which described the defendant’s 
“fragile competence and its evident dependence upon continued 
medication,” and evidence that the defendant had stopped 
taking that medication, the defendant’s bizarre explanation of 
his defense required new proceedings to determine competence.  
(Id. at p. 237.) 
Although the Court of Appeal in this case attempted to 
distinguish Murdoch, the cases are similar in relevant respects.  
Like the defendant in Murdoch, defendant here had been 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
 
diagnosed with a mental illness that threatened his trial 
competence if untreated; as in Murdoch, the trial court was 
faced with evidence defendant had stopped taking his 
medication and was now insisting on presenting a defense that 
threatened to be nonsensical or delusional.  In this case, the 
evidence before the court also showed that defendant could no 
longer communicate rationally with his attorney about his 
defense.  In both cases, the defendants’ behavior, in combination 
with the warnings of the health professionals about the 
likelihood that they would become incompetent if they did not 
take antipsychotic medication, was substantial evidence giving 
rise to a doubt as to their competence.  Here, as in Murdoch, the 
trial court was required to suspend proceedings and launch a 
formal inquiry to resolve the matter. 
C. 
The Attorney General raises two main arguments in 
defense of the trial court’s ruling, but neither is persuasive.  The 
Attorney General first attempts to minimize the concerns 
defense counsel raised at the March 2014 hearing, arguing that 
defendant’s note and remarks to counsel do not reflect 
delusional thinking on par with that of the Murdoch defendant.  
We grant there are differences between the Murdoch 
defendant’s mental state and the mental state of defendant in 
this case.  But the differences do not render defendant’s 
condition less concerning from the standpoint of due process.  
Defendant’s insistence that the prosecution’s videotapes were 
“assimilations” and that the accusation against him involved 
some type of “forgery” of his identity reflected paranoid thinking 
like that he had displayed in previous episodes of mental 
incompetence.  And defendant’s descent into speaking in “word 
salad” in response to questions about his desire to change trial 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
 
strategy—which had also characterized his previous episodes of 
incompetence—showed him unable to coherently discuss his 
defense with counsel, which meant he could not rationally assist 
his attorney with his defense. 
Second, echoing the Court of Appeal’s rationale, the 
Attorney General also argues that the record does not clearly 
establish the connection between the administration of 
medication and defendant’s competence.  The medical reports in 
the record, the Attorney General contends, did not “necessarily 
condition” his mental competence on continued medication.  And 
the record contains no contemporaneous medical report 
indicating that defendant’s symptoms had returned after he 
stopped taking his medication. 
For reasons already stated, we disagree with the Attorney 
General’s characterization of the medical reports in the record.  
While the reports did not state in so many words that defendant 
would decompensate and become incompetent if he stopped 
taking his medication, the reports did make several points clear:  
that defendant had been incompetent while unmedicated; that 
defendant had required involuntary medication to be restored to 
a state of competency to stand trial; that for defendant “[t]here 
are no effective alternatives to treatment with antipsychotic 
medication”; that “to prevent mental decompensation and 
maintain competency related abilities,” defendant should 
continue his medication; and that it was “important” for 
defendant to remain on medication “to enable him to be 
certified” as competent to stand trial.  Given that human 
psychology rarely involves absolutes, a closer link between 
continued medication and defendant’s mental competence could 
hardly be demanded. 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
25 
 
The Attorney General is correct that the court did not have 
the benefit of expert reports or testimony evaluating defendant’s 
condition after he stopped taking his medication in 2013 or 
2014.6  But under the circumstances, substantial evidence of 
incompetence existed without such a report.  The court already 
had the benefit of the medical reports described above, which 
related 
to 
defendant’s 
history 
of 
incompetence 
while 
unmedicated and which made clear that medication should be 
continued to ensure that defendant’s competence continued.  At 
the March 2014 hearing, the trial court learned not only that 
defendant had ceased taking his medication, but also that he 
had begun displaying some of the same symptoms he had 
displayed during earlier periods of incompetence and, as a 
consequence, was unable to communicate rationally or 
coherently with his attorney.  As in Murdoch, supra, 194 
Cal.App.4th at pages 236 to 238, the evidence before the court 
went beyond a simple report that defendant was speaking or 
acting bizarrely; against the background of medical reports 
detailing defendant’s history of schizophrenia and the 
importance of medication in controlling his symptoms, counsel’s 
report raised a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s continued 
competence.  To the extent a new expert examination and report 
were needed to resolve that doubt, the procedures are contained 
in Penal Code section 1369, subdivision (a).  The court could not 
properly proceed with the criminal trial without first invoking 
those procedures to determine whether defendant was 
competent. 
                                        
6  
A psychiatrist testified for the defense at trial, but did not 
examine defendant or prepare any written report.   
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
26 
 
III. 
A question remains as to the appropriate remedy.  The 
Attorney General asks that if we determine the trial court was 
required to suspend criminal proceedings and hold a competency 
hearing following the March 2014 hearing, we order the case 
remanded to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether 
defendant was in fact competent at the time of his trial. 
This court has never decided whether remand for such a 
retrospective competency hearing is an appropriate remedy for 
what we have sometimes referred to as Pate error—that is, a 
court’s due process error in failing to suspend criminal 
proceedings and determine the defendant’s competence.  In Pate 
itself, the high court rejected a proposal to remand for a 
retrospective competency hearing, citing the difficulty of 
determining the defendant’s competence some six years after 
the fact.  (Pate, supra, 383 U.S. at p. 387.)  The court did the 
same in Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 183 (Drope), 
emphasizing “the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc 
determination under the most favorable circumstances.”   
For many years, these decisions were generally understood 
to mean automatic reversal was the only remedy for Pate error.  
(People v. Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 704 (Lightsey).)  But 
at some point, some courts began to take a different view, 
concluding that retrospective competency hearings might in 
some instances be feasible and appropriate.  This  included the 
Court of Appeal in People v. Ary (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1016, 
1029 (Ary I), which remanded to the trial court to determine 
whether a retrospective hearing was feasible where the record 
contained “extensive expert testimony and evidence . . . 
regarding defendant’s mental retardation and his ability to 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
27 
 
function in the legal arena” at the time of his disputed 
competence.  When the same case later arrived at this court for 
review, we assumed, without deciding, that this remedy was 
permissible.  (People v. Ary (2011) 51 Cal.4th 510, 516–517 (Ary 
II).)  We emphasized, however, that if the remand procedure is 
in fact permissible, it requires the trial court to “first decide 
whether a retrospective determination is indeed feasible.  
Feasibility in this context means the availability of sufficient 
evidence to reliably determine the defendant’s mental 
competence when tried earlier.”  (Id. at p. 520.)  
In Lightsey, we again declined to answer the question 
whether a retrospective competency hearing is ever an available 
remedy for Pate error, deeming the question “complex and 
subject to debate.”  (Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 704.)  We 
instead concluded that such a hearing might be an appropriate 
remedy for a different sort of error—namely, a trial court’s error 
in failing to appoint counsel to represent a defendant in a 
competency hearing.  (Id. at pp. 702, 706–710.)  In so holding, 
we distinguished cases of Pate error, explaining:  “[D]espite the 
error in the manner in which the competency proceedings were 
conducted, the subject of defendant’s mental competence 
actually was reviewed at the time of the trial and 
contemporaneous evidence specifically addressing that issue 
presumably still exists.”  (Id. at p. 707.)  “In contrast, in the 
circumstances of Pate error, where there was substantial 
evidence of incompetence but no proceedings to develop the 
record further, there is by definition a shortcoming in the 
evidence, and the trier of fact at a retrospective competency 
hearing would have to rely on after-the-fact opinions and 
evidence in the record (such as the defendant’s courtroom 
behavior) that might only circumstantially assist in determining 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
28 
 
the defendant’s mental state at the time of trial.”  (Id. at 
pp. 707–708.) 
Assuming that in some circumstances a retrospective 
hearing may be proper when the trial court has erred in failing 
to hold a competency hearing, we conclude that here, much as 
in Pate and Drope, “the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro 
tunc determination” (Drope, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 183) cannot be 
overcome under the circumstances of the case.  As we have 
previously explained, the critical question in determining 
whether a retrospective competency hearing is feasible is 
whether there is “sufficient evidence to reliably determine the 
defendant’s mental competence when tried earlier.”  (Ary II, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 520, italics added.)  The burden of proof 
in a retrospective hearing is on the defendant, and feasibility 
requires finding that such a hearing “will provide defendant 
a fair opportunity to prove incompetence, not merely [that] some 
evidence exists by which the trier of fact might reach a decision 
on the subject.”  (Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 710.)   
Several factors might bear on this inquiry.  (See Ary II, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 516–517 [suggesting various factors 
that might be relevant to the feasibility of retrospective 
competency hearings].)7  Here, however, the dominant 
                                        
7  
In Ary II, supra, 51 Cal.4th 510, we declined to address 
the theoretical question whether Pate error may ever be cured 
by a retrospective competence hearing.  (Ary II, at pp. 516–517.)  
In dicta, however, we discussed the feasibility of such hearings, 
citing with approval an appellate decision identifying four 
factors bearing on feasibility:  the passage of time, the 
availability 
of 
contemporaneous 
medical 
evidence, 
any 
statements by defendant in the trial record, and the availability 
of individuals who interacted with defendant before and during 
trial.  (Id. at p. 520, fn. 3.) 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
29 
 
considerations are the fluctuating nature of defendant’s 
symptoms, the passage of time, and the lack of contemporaneous 
expert evaluations.  To saddle defendant with the burden of 
proving his incompetence in March 2014, around five years after 
the fact, without the benefit of any contemporaneous 
psychiatric, psychological, or neurological evaluation, would 
neither be fair nor produce a reliable result.  Without any 
significant prospect of evidence showing competence being 
produced, moreover, a retrospective hearing could not feasibly 
cure the Pate error.8  Defense counsel already put her negative 
view of defendant’s competence on the record at the trial’s 
outset, and defendant’s testimony at trial only served to 
reinforce counsel’s showing that his mental condition made it 
impossible for him to rationally assist in his defense.   
                                        
8 
Here, as in all cases of Pate error, the trial record itself 
supplies substantial evidence of defendant’s incompetence.  The 
critical question is not whether the trial court could reliably 
find, on the basis of this evidence, that defendant was in fact 
incompetent.  The critical question, rather, is whether the trial 
court could reliably find competence:  whether evidence exists 
both to show defendant’s competence at the time of trial and to 
permit defendant to respond fully to that showing, such that a 
fair and reliable determination that defendant was competent 
to stand trial could be made. 
 
We recognize that a retrospective hearing might be 
thought technically “feasible” as long as the court had 
information sufficient to make a determination either way.  But 
it would serve no purpose to remand for a hearing that could do 
no more than confirm that defendant was incompetent at the 
time of trial; our analysis therefore focuses on the feasibility of 
holding a hearing that could fairly and reliably show that 
defendant was in fact competent at the time of trial. 
 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
30 
 
Had the trial court declared a doubt about competence in 
March 2014, the court would have appointed two experts to 
examine defendant and report on aspects of his mental condition 
relevant to competence, as well as the appropriateness of 
medical treatment for any condition found.  (Pen. Code, § 1369, 
subd. (a).)  Such evaluations would have been crucial in 
determining whether defendant’s failure to adhere to his drug 
regimen had resulted in a return of his schizophrenic symptoms 
to such a degree as to render him once more incompetent.  A 
retrospective hearing, in contrast, would presumably require an 
attempt by psychologists or psychiatrists to reconstruct 
defendant’s mental condition at trial based on the prior medical 
reports and defendant’s behavior at the time of trial.  But the 
most recent expert evaluation, dating from April 2013, tied 
defendant’s competence to continuation of his medication.  
Given the showing that by March 2014 defendant had long since 
stopped taking his medication and had suffered a significant 
relapse into a more florid psychotic condition, it is difficult to see 
how a psychologist or psychiatrist appointed to make a 
retrospective evaluation could reliably find defendant was 
nonetheless competent at the time of trial.  Under the particular 
circumstances of this case, at a distance of around five years and 
without any expert evaluations from the time of trial, we do not 
believe the trial court could fairly come to a reliable conclusion 
that defendant was competent at that time. 
By contrast, when courts have permitted retrospective 
hearings, they have generally done so in cases involving unusual 
circumstances where reliable evidence of the defendant’s mental 
condition at the time of trial would be available at the hearing.  
(See Ary I, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1028; Tate v. State 
(Okla.Crim.App. 1995) 896 P.2d 1182, 1188 ; cf. Lightsey, supra, 
PEOPLE v. RODAS 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
31 
 
54 Cal.4th at pp. 707-708 [retrospective hearing might be 
feasible to cure the error of failing to appoint counsel for the 
defendant at the original competence hearing].)  Absent such 
contemporaneous evidence here, and given the fluctuating 
nature of defendant’s symptoms and the considerable passage of 
time, we conclude no retrospective competency hearing could 
“ ‘place[] [defendant] in a position comparable to the one he 
would have been placed in prior to the original trial.’ ”  (Ary II, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 520.)  
Without either approving or foreclosing the possibility that 
a retrospective hearing might be found feasible in other cases of 
Pate error, we hold that under the circumstances of this case 
such a hearing would not supply an adequate remedy. 
IV. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand 
the matter to that court with directions to reverse the judgment 
of conviction.  Defendant may be retried on the charges for which 
he was convicted if he is not presently incompetent to stand 
trial. 
  
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KLINE, J.*
                                        
* 
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 
District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Rodas 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 8/15/16 – 2d Dist., Div. 3 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S237379 
Date Filed: November 26, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Robert J. Perry 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer, Susan Sullivan Pithey and Zee 
Rodriguez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Joanna McKim 
P.O. Box 19493 
San Diego, CA  92159 
(619) 303-6897 
 
Zee Rodriguez 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1700 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 576-1342