Case Title: Redding v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 641, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2003-09-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
       
 HENRY J. ANDERSON,
§
No. 710, 2002
§
     Defendant Below,
§
     Appellant,
§        Court Below: Superior Court
§
of the State of Delaware
v.
          
§
in and for New Castle County
§
Cr.A. Nos. IN95-01-0853 thru 0854
 ,
STATE OF DELAWARE
§
§
     Plaintiff Below, 
§
     Appellee.
§
§
    *****
§
,
ISAAC REDDING
§
No. 641, 2002
§
     Defendant Below,
§
     Appellant,
§        Court Below: Superior Court
§
of the State of Delaware
v.
§
in and for New Castle County
§
Cr.A. Nos. IN 88-09-0550R3 thru
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
0551R3, N88-09-0552 thru 0553
§
IN88-09-0554R3, N88-09-0555 and 
     Plaintiff Below,
§
IN88-11-0209R3 thru 0212R3
     Appellee.
§
§
    *****
§
JOHN A. WOODS,
§
No. 19, 2003
§
     Defendant Below,
§
     Appellant,
§
Court Below: Superior Court 
§
of the State of Delaware
v.
§
in and for Kent County
§
Cr.A. Nos. K95-12-0314I thru 0373I
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
K95-12-0374R1 thru 0374R1
§
K95-12-0376I thru 0377I
     Plaintiff Below,
§
K95-12-0378R1 thru 0385R1
     Appellee.
§
§
2
Submitted:  June 16, 2003
Decided: September 4, 2003
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, STEELE, and
JACOBS, Justices, constituting the Court en banc.  
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  Anderson v. State, AFFIRMED;
Redding v. State, REVERSED and REMANDED; Woods v. State,
REVERSED and REMANDED.
As to Anderson: 
Dean C. Delcollo, Esquire (argued) and Lisa M. Schwind, Esquire, Office of the
Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant.
Paul Wallace, Esquire (argued), Office of the Attorney General, Wilmington,
Delaware, and Kim Ayvazian, Esquire, Office of the Attorney General,
Georgetown, Delaware, for Appellee.
As to Redding:
William T. Deely, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington,
Delaware, for Appellant.
Loren C. Meyers, Esquire, Office of the Attorney General, Wilmington,
Delaware, for Appellee.
As to Woods:
Sandra W. Dean, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Dover, Delaware, and
and Lisa M. Schwind, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington,
Delaware, for Appellant.
John Williams, Esquire, Office of the Attorney General, Dover, Delaware, for
Appellee.
11989 WL 167430 (Del. Super.)  Pennell appears to be the first case in which the admissibility of DNA
testing was disputed and a trial court decided the issue by written opinion.  DNA test results were used in
some earlier trials without objection.
2 See, e.g., Warrington v. State, 2003 WL 21100667 (Del. Supr.) (DNA used by the State to show that
blood sample matched the murder victim’s blood); Vanlier v. State, 2002 WL 31883016, *2 (Del.Supr.)
(DNA testing led to a stipulation by the State that the defendant was not the source of biological material
collected by investigators.)
3 See, Holly Schaffter, Note, Postconviction DNA Evidence: A 500 Pound Gorilla In State Courts,
50 Drake L. Rev. 695, 709 (2002); http://www.innocenceproject.org. (listing relevant state legislation).
3
Berger, J.:
I.  INTRODUCTION
Over the past 15 years, scientific evidence from deoxyribonucleic acid
(“DNA”) testing has become an increasingly important feature of many criminal
cases.  First found admissible in Delaware in State v. Pennell,1 DNA testing
may be dispositive in determining whether or not a particular individual was the
source of a particular sample of biological material. 2  But some criminal
defendants were tried and convicted before DNA testing was available, or
before DNA testing techniques were sufficiently advanced to allow analysis of
a small or somewhat degraded biological sample.  To address the possibility
that DNA testing could help establish a convicted defendant’s innocence, more
than half the states in the nation, including Delaware, have enacted statutes
providing prisoners the right to post-conviction DNA testing under certain
circumstances.3  To date, such post-conviction testing has led to the
4 Kathy Swedlow, Don’t Believe Everything You Read: A Review Of Modern “Post-Conviction”
DNA Testing Statutes, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 355, 355 (2002); Schaffter, supra at 697.
4
exoneration of over one hundred convicted defendants in other jurisdictions.4
Delaware’s statute, enacted in 2000, sets forth six criteria governing
inmates’ entitlement to post-conviction DNA testing.  For those who were
convicted before the statute was enacted, there was a two-year window during
which motions for DNA testing could be timely filed.  That window expired on
September 1, 2002, and appears to have precipitated numerous motions.  The
three cases that have been consolidated in this opinion are the first to reach this
Court for review.  We consider them together in order to address several
substantive and procedural issues associated with this new statute.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.   Anderson v. State
On January 7, 1995, Robert Kyelberg was sitting in his truck on the
corner of 7th and Washington Streets in Wilmington, Delaware, when a stranger
suddenly climbed into the vehicle and put his hand on Kyelberg’s right vest
pocket.  During the  struggle that followed, Kyelberg’s eyeglasses were
knocked off, and the two men fell out through the truck door.  While fighting,
5
Kyelberg noticed a screwdriver and glove fall to the ground.  Eventually,
Kyelberg managed  to  climb back into his truck and lock the door.  Once the
assailant realized that the doors were locked, he left.  
Kyelberg drove to a gas station, and the attendant called the police.
When the police arrived, Kyelberg described his assailant as a black male
wearing blue jeans and a dark jacket, and carrying a screwdriver and a pair of
work gloves.  Kyelberg warned that he would be unable to provide a positive
identification, however, because his glasses had been knocked off.  
The police went to the area of the assault, and saw a man, later identified
as Henry J. Anderson, who matched Kyelberg’s description.  When the police
detained Anderson, he threw a pair of work gloves to the ground.  The police
seized the gloves, as well as a screwdriver that Anderson was carrying.  As the
police were arresting Anderson, they noticed blood on Anderson’s face and on
his boots.    
Anderson’s boots, work gloves, and screwdriver were sent to an F.B.I.
laboratory in Washington, D.C., where they were subjected to a form of DNA
testing known as restriction fragment length polymorphism (“RFLP”) testing.
The results were inconclusive.  Special Agent Michael Vick, of the F.B.I.,
testified that the likely reason for the inconclusive results was either that there
6
was not a large enough sample, or that the blood was degraded.  Before
Anderson’s first trial, in 1996, he was given the opportunity to obtain  further
testing of the blood samples, but that opportunity also included a risk.  As his
lawyer explained:
 [P]erhaps if further testing would result in exculpatory evidence,
then that would be the only reason why the defense would perhaps
wish to have further testing done.
And that is Mr. Anderson’s call.
Perhaps, it could turn around and bite him as well ... so that’s a
decision Mr. Anderson would have to make....  
Anderson decided to forego further testing, and was  convicted of attempted
robbery in the first degree.  
In August  2002, Anderson filed a motion for post-conviction DNA
testing.  Anderson claimed that short tandem repeat (“STR”) DNA testing was
not “widely available” at the time of his initial trial, and that STR testing is
capable of returning reliable results even from blood samples that are small or
degraded.  The trial court denied Anderson’s motion, finding that he failed to
show: (1) that the technology was unavailable at the time of the trial; (2) that the
samples had been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that they
were not substituted, degraded, or altered in any material aspect; or (3) that the
5A pseudonym assigned by this Court pursuant to Rule 7(d).
7
requested testing had the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative
evidence materially relevant to his assertion of actual innocence. 
B. Redding v. State
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 18, 1988, an intruder forced his way
into Diana Wendell’s5 apartment building and raped her.  After the attack, the
assailant warned Wendell not to contact the police and then left the apartment.
Wendell immediately went to her bathroom to clean herself up.  In that process,
she threw away the underwear she had been wearing.  Later that morning,
Wendell went to the police station.  Because the rape took place in dim lighting,
however, Wendell was unable to describe her assailant beyond noting that he
had a scar across his face.  Approximately three months later, a man again
forced his way into Wendell’s apartment.  The two struggled, and Wendell
managed to call for help through an open window before the intruder pulled her
away from the window.  He identified himself as the assailant from the previous
assault by telling her that he would “fuck [her] like he did the first time.”  
Eric Lloyd was passing by Wendell’s apartment and happened to hear
her scream.  He called the police and remained on the scene.  The intruder had
forced Wendell to perform various sexual acts, and was attempting vaginal
8
intercourse when the police burst through the back door of Wendell’s
apartment.  The intruder ran out through the front door, but the responding
officers gave chase and captured the fleeing man, later identified as Isaac
Redding, on the street outside.  
One of the pursuing officers, Officer Strawbridge, testified that he never
lost sight of Redding from the time he first saw Redding in Wendell’s apartment
to the time he apprehended Redding outside the building.  In addition, the
passerby, who was watching from the street, testified that he saw a man run out
the front door of  Wendell’s building, and then saw a police officer follow and
apprehend him.  Wendell also identified Redding, when shown photographs
shortly after the second attack. She stated that the person she identified from
the photograph was the same person who had attacked her in May. 
At trial, Redding testified that he had known Wendell’s husband for
approximately fifteen years, and that he had met Wendell –  thus explaining why
she was drawn to his picture in the photo lineup.  His alibi for the first attack
was that he was babysitting the daughter of Lana Hickman at the time.
Hickman,  Redding’s girlfriend, corroborated his testimony.  With respect to
the second attack, Redding testified that he had been drinking alcohol with
friends approximately seven blocks from Wendell’s apartment.  When he
6A pseudonym assigned by this Court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
9
noticed how late it was, he decided to run home along a path that brought him
near Wendell’s apartment.  As he was running, a police officer jumped him.
The jury convicted Redding on all charges and he was sentenced to four
life terms.  In June 2002, Redding filed a motion seeking DNA testing of two
slides containing vaginal material taken from Wendell during the investigation of
the two attacks.  The trial court denied his motion, finding that the requested
testing did not have the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative
evidence materially relevant to Redding's assertion of actual innocence.
C. Woods v. State
On November 5, 1995, Laura Woods called the police to report that her
daughter, Rebecca6, had been sexually molested by her husband, Rebecca’s
father, John Woods.  The same day, a police officer interviewed Rebecca and
she recounted multiple molestations.  As a result, John Woods was arrested and
charged with 37 counts of unlawful sexual intercourse in the first degree, 32
counts of unlawful sexual contact in the second degree, and 3 counts of
unlawful sexual penetration in the third degree.  
At trial, Rebecca testified to numerous instances of sexual abuse by her
father.  In her testimony, she stated that he occasionally would have intercourse
10
with her in her bed, and occasionally would ejaculate outside her vagina and
onto her stomach.  Rebecca testified that, during the period of abuse, Woods
prohibited her from having boyfriends, or even speaking to boys on the phone.
The State introduced into evidence Rebecca’s bedspread, and an expert
testified that white stains on the bedspread contained a number of human sperm
cells.  In addition, Dr. Allan DeJong testified that he had examined Rebecca and
found an enlargement of her vaginal opening, and damage to her hymen, both
apparently the result of repeated sexual intercourse, and consistent with
Rebecca being sexually active.
At a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Woods elicited testimony
from Kim Milnick, a friend of Rebecca’s.  Milnick testified that, during the
period of alleged abuse, she had at least one conversation with Rebecca in
which Rebecca stated that she had had sexual intercourse with a boyfriend.
Rebecca testified and denied having had sex with a boyfriend during the time
in question.  Although Milnick’s testimony, if believed, could explain the semen
stain on Rebecca’s bedspread and Dr. DeJong’s medical findings, the trial court
excluded the testimony under the rape shield statute because the evidence of
Rebecca’s prior sexual activity was not sufficiently strong.
11
On February 27, 1998,  Woods was convicted of six counts of unlawful
sexual intercourse in the first degree, one count of unlawful sexual contact in the
second degree, and three counts of unlawful sexual penetration in the third
degree.  He was acquitted of the remaining 62 charges against him.  In June
2002, Woods filed a motion for post-conviction DNA testing of the semen stain
from Rebecca’s bedspread.  The Superior Court denied the motion on the
grounds that Woods failed to demonstrate that the requested testing was not
available at the time of trial; failed to show that identity was an issue; and failed
to establish that the testing would be materially relevant to his claim of actual
innocence. 
III. DISCUSSION
A.  Statutory Analysis
The statute governing prisoners’ entitlement to post-conviction DNA
testing, §4504(a), provides that:
[A] motion ... may be granted if:
(1) The testing is to be performed on evidence
secured in relation to the trial which resulted in the
conviction;
(2) The evidence was not previously subject to
testing because the technology for testing was not
available at the time of the trial;
(3) The movant presents a prima facie case that
identity was an issue in the trial;
7Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4504(a).
8 S. Bill 329 (Del. 1999) (synopsis); see also 72 Del Laws, Vol. II, Ch. 320 (1999) (enacting the
current §4504(a), and stating that the genesis of the law was Senate Bill 329).  
9See State v. Cephas, 637 A.2d 20, 25 (Del. 1994); Stop & Shop Cos., Inc. v. Gonzales, 619 A.2d
896, 898 (Del. 1993).
10See Walton v. State, 821 A.2d 871, 876 (Del. 2003).
12
(4) The movant presents a prima facie case that the
evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of
custody sufficient to establish that the evidence has
not been substituted, tampered with, degraded,
contaminated, altered or replaced in any material
aspect;
(5) The requested testing has the scientific potential
to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially
relevant to the person’s assertion of actual
innocence; and
(6) The requested testing employs a scientific method
which is generally accepted within the relevant
scientific community, and which satisfies the
pertinent Delaware Rules of Evidence concerning the
admission of scientific testimony or evidence.7
Section 4504(a) was intended to “allow [for] overturning convictions if forensic
DNA testing not available at the time of trial establishes the innocence of the
convicted person.”8  Because of its remedial purpose, §4504(a) should be
liberally construed to allow post-conviction DNA testing whenever the petitioner
has complied with a reasonable reading of its requirements.9  But a liberal
construction does not mean that relief should be awarded at the cost of twisting
or misreading the statutory language.10  
11§4504(a)(1).
12§4504(a)(3).
13
A petitioner seeking relief has the burden of making some showing to
satisfy each of the six statutory requirements.  The first requirement seems
unlikely to generate a dispute.  Petitioner must identify the evidence for which
testing is sought, and the evidence must have been secured in relation to the
trial.11  The third requirement, likewise, is relatively straightforward – identity
must have been an issue at trial.12  Identity is always an issue in a criminal trial
unless the defendant admits having engaged in the alleged criminal conduct and
relies on a defense such as consent or justification.  Thus, the trial record
should provide the necessary support for this requirement, if it is contested.
The remaining four requirements raise more difficult questions of proof and/or
interpretation, and will be considered in turn.
The New Technology Requirement
Section 4504(a)(2) requires a finding that the evidence was not previously
tested because the technology for that testing was not available at the time of
trial.  But DNA testing has changed somewhat and improved over the years.
Thus, the question is not simply whether DNA testing was available at the time
of trial, but whether there existed a form of DNA testing that could provide
13Fawcett v. State, 697 A.2d 385, 388 (Del. 1997).
14
conclusive results, given the size and condition of the sample.   The major
difficulty presented by this “new technology” requirement is the issue of proof.
To establish the form of  DNA testing (if any) that was available at trial,
and the testing now available, petitioner will have to submit evidence to the trial
court.  If the information can be obtained from reliable scientific literature,
petitioner should be able to meet his or her burden by presenting the source
materials and asking the trial court to take judicial notice of the relevant facts.13
If there is any dispute as to those facts, however, petitioner will have to present
expert evidence, and a hearing may be required.  We recognize that this process
may be costly and time consuming, and, to that extent, somewhat inconsistent
with the remedial purpose of the statute.  The scientific facts must be
determined, however.  We encourage the trial courts to devise an effective way
to make a comprehensive record that will resolve the new technology issue in
one or two early cases.  That process would eliminate, or at least markedly
reduce, the need to hold future hearings on this “new technology” requirement.
The Chain of Custody Requirement
14Black’s Law Dictionary 1209 (7th Ed. 1999).
15
Section 4504(a)(4) requires that petitioner make a prima facie showing
that the sample to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to
establish that it was not materially altered, replaced or degraded.  It is normally
the State, however, that has custody of the sample and the ability to determine
its current condition.  Apparently aware of this dilemma, the General Assembly
has required only that petitioner make a prima facie showing in support of the
chain of custody requirement.  A prima facie showing merely requires “enough
evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party’s
favor.”14  We find that, to satisfy §4504(a)(4), petitioner need only execute or
otherwise produce an affidavit stating that the sample was gathered by and
remains in the custody of a state agency, hospital, or other institution capable
of identifying and securing the sample.  If the State contests either the chain of
custody or the condition of the sample, the State must provide petitioner
sufficient information, including access to the sample, to permit petitioner to
develop a factual record for the trial court.  This approach allows petitioner to
meet the initial burden of making a prima facie showing and, if more evidence
is needed, to obtain the relevant facts that often will be in the State’s exclusive
control.
   
15Del. Code Ann. tit 11, § 4504(a)(2000).
16 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §440.30 (2003); see also People v. Tookes, 639 N.Y.S.2d 913, 915 (N.Y.
1996) (interpreting the NY statute and favoring a reading “that DNA testing [should] be ordered only upon
a court's threshold determination, in the context of the trial evidence, that testing results carry a reasonable
potential for exculpation.”).
17 See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. §22-4133(d) (2003) ( DNA testing authorized if “ there is a reasonable
probability that testing will produce non-cumulative evidence that would help establish that the applicant
was actually innocent....”); Wis. Stat. §974.07(7)(a),(b) (2003); Idaho Code §19-4902(d) (2003); Ariz.
16
The Materially Relevant Requirement
Section 4504(a)(5) is the heart of the statute.  It requires that the test have
the potential to produce “new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the
person’s assertion of actual innocence.”15  Although all DNA testing statutes are
intended to remedy situations in which an innocent person has been wrongly
convicted, they differ on how significant or persuasive a favorable test result
must be to justify the testing.  The New York and Illinois post-conviction DNA
testing statutes exemplify two different approaches.  The New York statute, the
first in the country, provides that post-conviction DNA testing will not be
granted unless a court determines that, “if a DNA test had been conducted on
[the] evidence, and ... the results had been admitted in the trial..., there exists a
reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to the
defendant.”16  Numerous jurisdictions  followed New York’s lead and enacted
statutes with a similar standard for the persuasiveness of exculpatory DNA test
results.17  Even among those states that favor the New York model, however,
Rev. Stat. §13-4240(b) (2003); Cal. Penal. Code §1405(c)(1)(b) (2003); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§925.11(2)(f)(3) (2003); Mo. Rev. Stat. §547.035(2)(5) (2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. '15A-269(b)(2) (2003);
Tenn. Code. Ann. '40-30-404 (2003); see also Va. Code. Ann. §19.2-327.1(a)(iii) (2003) (post-
conviction DNA testing may be granted if “materially relevant, noncumulative, and necessary and may
prove the convicted person's actual innocence;...”; c.f. Swedlow, supra at 367 n. 54, 369 n. 59 (listing
post-conviction DNA testing statutes).
18 Wisconsin follows New York, but appears to favor lenient application of the model.  See Keith A.
Findley, New Laws Reflect the Power and Potential of DNA, 75 Wis. Lawyer 20 (May 2002).  At
least two jurisdictions are stricter than New York, and require that the DNA test have the potential to
be clearly exonerating.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §9543.1(c), (d)(2) (2003);  Utah Code Ann. §78-
35a-301(e) (2003).
19 Schaffter, supra at 732. 
20 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/116-3(c)(1) (2003).
21 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4504(a) (2003); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §16-112-202(c)(1) (2003); Minn. Stat.
§590.01(1a)(c) (2003); Neb. Rev. Stat. §29-4120(5) (2003).
17
there is some disagreement over how dispositive an exculpatory test must be.18
Illinois was the second state in the nation to enact a post-conviction DNA
testing statute.19  A major difference between the Illinois and New York statutes
is that, instead of following New York’s reasonable-probability-of-a-different-
result rule, the Illinois statute requires only that “the result of the [requested]
testing ha[ve] the scientific potential to produce new, non-cumulative evidence
materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence;....”20
Delaware, along with several other jurisdictions,  followed the Illinois
framework.21
22 People v. Savory, 756 N.E. 2d 804, 809 (Ill. 2001).
23 Id. at 810-11.
24 Id. at 811.
18
Because the Delaware statute was modeled after the Illinois statute, that
state’s case law is highly persuasive in determining the meaning of §4504(a)(5).
In  People v. Savory, the Illinois Supreme Court overturned a lower court’s
determination that post-conviction DNA testing “is available only in cases where
the proposed scientific testing will, by itself, completely vindicate a
defendant.”22  The Savory court decided the meaning of  “materially relevant”
by reference to dictionary definitions and held that, “evidence which is
‘materially relevant’ to a defendant's claim of actual innocence is simply
evidence which tends to significantly advance that claim.”23  We adopt that
definition in construing the identical language in Delaware’s statute.
When deciding whether evidence is materially relevant, the trial court must
consider not only the exculpatory potential of a favorable DNA test result, but
also the other evidence presented at trial. 24  Thus, if the State presented a strong
case, and a favorable DNA test would discredit only an ancillary fact, the testing
should be refused.  At the opposite end of the spectrum, where the DNA test
could exonerate the defendant, it does not matter how strong the other evidence
might have been; §4504(a)(5) is satisfied.  Finally, since §4504(a)(5) demands
25Del. Code Ann. tit 11, §4504(a)(6)(2000).
26Armstead v. State, 673, A.2d 221, 233 (Md. 1996) (“The question of the reliability of a scientific
technique or process is unlike the question, for example, of the helpfulness of particular expert testimony
to the trier of facts in a specific case.  The answer to the question about the reliability of a scientific
technique or process does not vary according to the circumstances of each case.  It is therefore
inappropriate to view the threshold question of reliability as a matter within each trial judge’s individual
discretion.” (quoting Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 381 (Md. 1978)).
19
only that the proposed DNA testing have the “scientific potential” to return
favorable evidence, it is irrelevant whether the test is likely to be favorable or
not.  If testing is otherwise warranted, it should be authorized, no matter how
slight the chance that it will, in fact, yield a favorable result.
The Admissibility of the DNA Test
The last requirement is that the requested form of testing be “generally
accepted within the ... scientific community” and admissible under the Delaware
Rules of Evidence.25 Like the new technology requirement, this provision
burdens petitioner with the difficulty and expense of obtaining a scientific
expert, unless the admissibility of the test can be established in another way.
We encourage the trial courts to rely on other judicial findings and to take
judicial notice of appropriate treatises, where possible, to satisfy this
requirement.  Moreover, since facts relating to the reliability and progress of
DNA technology do not vary from case to case, they need not be decided de
novo by each individual trial court.26
27 As noted above, Anderson’s lawyer consulted with his client and then advised the court that Anderson
did not want additional tests because he was concerned that they “could turn around and bite him.”
20
B.  Case Analysis
We now consider the three cases that were combined for this decision.
Anderson v. State
Anderson’s case presents an example where the failure to pursue DNA
testing at the time of trial forecloses relief under §4504(a).  At a hearing held
before his 1996 trial, Anderson was asked to take a position on whether to seek
additional DNA testing of the blood samples found on his gloves, boots, and
screwdriver.  Anderson made the strategic decision not to pursue  additional
testing for fear that the test results would be incriminating.27  By adopting that
strategy, Anderson lost the opportunity to seek post-conviction DNA testing
under the statute.  
The consequences of Anderson’s trial tactic flow not from a general
theory of waiver, but from the statute’s requirements.  Under §4504(a)(2), a
petitioner is eligible to seek post-conviction DNA testing only if “[t]he evidence
was not previously subject to testing because the technology for testing was not
available at the time of the trial....”  If the reason that DNA testing was not
undertaken at trial was not because the testing was unavailable, but because the
28C.f. State v. Gisege, 582 N.W.2d 229, 230 (Minn. 1998) (affirming the denial of post-conviction
DNA testing on the basis that “the issue of testing was known [to defense counsel] at the time of trial
but was not raised then.”).
29 State v. Redding, 2002 WL 31411021, *3  (Del. Super. 2002) (footnotes omitted).
21
petitioner did not want to risk an unfavorable result, the petitioner cannot satisfy
§4504(a)(2).28
Redding v. State
In Redding, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that the
testing could not demonstrate Redding’s innocence, because of insufficient
evidence that the samples might contain any of the rapist’s DNA:
     There is no evidence to suggest that Defendant ejaculated at
any time during the first [rape], much less that he ejaculated in [the
victim’s] vagina. Furthermore, the victim testified that she
immediately washed herself and changed clothes after Defendant
left her home. She did not report to the police or seek any medical
attention until the next day. Thus, requested testing would be
meaningless. The Court finds nothing to suggest that DNA testing
of the vaginal material taken after the first incident could show
Defendant's innocence.
     In regard to the second incident, the victim testified that
Defendant had just pulled down his pants and was trying to put his
penis in her vagina when the police broke into the apartment and
Defendant ran away.  Thus there is no evidence of either vaginal
penetration or ejaculation, although there is evidence of oral
penetration....  As the Court sees it, this review of the evidence
ends the inquiry. Based on the facts, performance of forensic
DNA testing on either or both slides could not demonstrate
Defendant's "actual innocence," as required by §4504(a).29  
30Supr. Ct. Rule 8.
22
Because Section 4504(a)(5) requires only that the requested test have the
“scientific potential” to produce materially relevant evidence, doubts as to
whether DNA will be found in a given sample should be resolved in favor of
testing.  In this case, however, it appears that Redding gave the trial court no
evidence to establish the “scientific potential” that the samples would contain
DNA.  On appeal, Redding attached to his brief several publications and one
affidavit suggesting that the samples likely would contain the rapist’s DNA, even
though the victim washed after the first attack and the rapist did not ejaculate in
the victim’s vagina during the second attack.
Normally, and hereafter, a petitioner who fails to present scientific
evidence necessary to support his or her claim in the trial court will be denied
relief in this Court.  Litigants who wait until they are appealing an adverse ruling
before mustering all the support they can find for their position, run a substantial
risk that their claims will be rejected as not “fairly presented” to the trial court.30
Because this is a new statute, however, the interests of justice compel us to
remand this matter to the trial court for consideration on an appropriately
supported record.
31We note that the article is copyrighted in 1998, which is the year of Woods’ trial.  Thus, it is not clear
that mtDNA testing was not available.  But this is one of the questions the trial court will consider on
remand.
23
Woods v. State
The trial court denied Woods’ motion on the basis that it did not satisfy
§§4504(a)(2), 4504(a)(3), or 4504(a)(5).  On the first point, the trial court was
hampered by the same failure of proof as the court in Redding.  Woods
provided nothing more to the trial court than a conclusory averment that DNA
testing is now successful in many situations where, in the past, the test results
were inconclusive.  On appeal, Woods argues that mitochondrial DNA
(mtDNA) testing is the new type of testing he seeks.  In this Court, Woods
attached to his brief an article explaining the mtDNA testing process and its
usefulness in examining small or degraded samples.31  As with Redding, we are
constrained to remand this issue for consideration by the trial court, on an
appropriate record.
The Woods court, however, also rested its decision on two other bases.
We conclude that the petition should not have been rejected on either of those
alternative grounds.  First, the record establishes that identity was an issue at
trial. Rebecca identified her father as the person who was abusing her, but
24
Woods denied the charges.  Woods maintained that he was not the person who
was having sexual contact with his daughter.  Given the evidence that Rebecca
had sexual contact with someone, the identity of that person – whether it was
Woods or someone else – was an issue at trial.
Second, applying the standard outlined above, we hold that a favorable
DNA test would tend to significantly advance Woods’ claim of actual
innocence.  The most significant physical evidence introduced against Woods
was a bedspread from Rebecca’s bed that had semen stains.  The jury never
heard anything about Rebecca allegedly having sex with her boyfriend, because
the trial court excluded a friend’s testimony to that effect.  If DNA testing were
to establish that the semen stain on Rebecca’s bed came from someone other
than Woods, the whole complexion of the trial would be different.  The friend’s
testimony might be admitted, and even if not, Rebecca’s credibility could be
severely eroded.  In addition, if there were evidence of Rebecca’s sexual
activity, Woods could argue that Rebecca fabricated the abuse charges to
retaliate for his strictness in not allowing her to have boyfriends.  In sum, the
requested DNA testing, if found to satisfy §4504(a)(2), should be allowed.
25
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM the trial court’s decision in
Anderson v. State, and REVERSE and REMAND both Redding v. State and
Woods v. State for further action in accordance with this decision.