Case Title: In re Jones

Citation: 2003-Ohio-3182

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as In re Jones, 99 Ohio St.3d 203, 2003-Ohio-3182.] 
 
 
IN RE JONES; THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE; NYE, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as In re Jones, 99 Ohio St.3d 203, 2003-Ohio-3182.] 
Evidence — Privileged communications — Psychologists — Statements made by 
an individual to a licensed psychologist or licensed independent social 
worker in the course of an examination ordered by a court for forensic 
purposes are not protected as privileged communications pursuant to 
R.C. 4732.19 and former R.C. 2317.02 — Psychological examination is 
considered to be for forensic purposes, when. 
(No. 2002-0176 — Submitted February 26, 2003 — Decided July 2, 2003.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 01AP-376, 
2001-Ohio-3937. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  Statements made by an individual to a licensed psychologist or licensed 
independent social worker in the course of an examination ordered by a 
court for forensic purposes are not communications received “from a client 
in that relation,”  R.C. 2317.02(G)(1), and are not protected as privileged 
communications pursuant to R.C. 4732.19 and former R.C. 2317.02, 147 
Ohio Laws, Part III, 4686, 4702, as in effect prior to April 10, 2001, the 
effective date of 2000 Sub.H.B. No. 506. 
2.  A psychological examination is considered to be for forensic purposes when it 
is ordered to assist the court in determining facts or making conclusions of 
law. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶1} 
Zachary Jones is the minor son of appellant, Karen Nye.  Karen is 
also the mother of three daughters, two of whom live with their father, Zachary’s 
stepfather, Robert Nye.  In January 2001, Franklin County Children Services 
(“FCCS”) filed a complaint in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 
Domestic Relations and Juvenile Division, alleging that Zachary, who at that time 
was living with his mother, was a dependent child in need of services.  FCCS 
sought custody, as did Zachary’s stepfather. 
{¶2} 
FCCS had become involved with the Nyes during earlier 
dependency adjudications concerning the daughters.  Robert was eventually 
granted temporary legal custody of the girls. 
{¶3} 
As part of the earlier proceedings, in February, 2000, a licensed 
independent social worker, Sharon Pickel, had begun counseling sessions with the 
Nye sisters.  Ultimately Robert, Karen, and Zachary joined the counseling 
sessions. Pickel conducted an individual therapy session with Karen on 
September 25, 2000.  Pickel met with Karen, Robert, and two FCCS employees 
on October 3, 2000, to “talk about the ground rules for family therapy.”  Karen 
attended ten counseling sessions conducted by Pickel, eight of which were family 
sessions. 
{¶4} 
Karen’s participation in counseling was part of a case plan 
approved by the court in the dependency proceedings concerning the daughters.  
The case plan required Karen to undergo counseling, one goal of which was to 
improve her parenting skills. 
{¶5} 
After FCCS filed its complaint concerning Zachary, the court 
awarded temporary custody of him to Robert and ordered a mental health 
assessment of Karen, who was restricted to supervised visitation.  Accordingly, 
George Pfaff, a licensed independent social worker, thereafter interviewed Karen. 
{¶6} 
On February 2, 2001, the court held a hearing to consider  Karen’s 
request for broader visitation, and Pickel was the sole witness.  Over Karen’s 
January Term, 2003 
3 
objection, Pickel divulged some of the contents of her conversations with Karen 
during counseling.  The trial court overruled Karen’s motion that Pickel’s 
testimony be stricken as violating “client/clinician privilege.”  In denying Karen’s  
objection to Pickel’s testimony, the court found that “Mrs. Nye was engaged with 
Miss Pickel pursuant to court order and only to the extent to be involved with 
family counseling as it was instant to the children’s counseling.”  The court found 
that a therapist-client relationship had not existed between Karen and Pickel 
because Karen’s counseling sessions with Pickel were not  for purposes of 
treatment.  Based on Pickel’s testimony, the court ordered that visits between 
Zachary and his mother continue to be supervised. 
{¶7} 
At the conclusion of the February 2 hearing, the guardian ad litem 
noted that the court had ordered psychological testing on Karen and Robert in the 
case involving the Nye sisters and asked the court to take judicial notice of 
“everything in the court file from the other case and incorporate it in this case so 
that Court [sic] doesn’t have to spend money on a psychological for these 
people.” 
{¶8} 
On February 22, 2001, Pfaff was called as a witness at Zachary’s 
dependency hearing.  He immediately asked the court to consider whether the 
privilege provided by R.C. 2317.02(G) applied to limit his testimony.  Karen, 
through counsel, refused to waive any privilege.  The court ruled that Karen’s 
mental health assessment occurred pursuant to a court order and was not for 
purposes of treatment.  Therefore, a privileged, therapeutic relationship had not 
been established between Karen and Pfaff.  Pfaff then testified that Karen suffered 
from adjustment disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder and showed symptoms 
of borderline personality disorder and histrionic personality disorder.  His 
assessment was based on a two-and-one-half-hour interview at which Nye 
provided him a history and responded to his questions. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
{¶9} 
Dr. John H. Mason, a psychologist, also appeared as a witness at 
Zachary’s dependency hearing.  He testified that in early 2000, pursuant to the 
court’s referral, he had evaluated both Karen and Robert in connection with the 
court proceedings concerning their two daughters.  He recounted that he had 
performed his standard evaluative process, including a clinical interview and the 
administration of standardized psychological tests.  He testified that the results of 
his testing suggested that Karen might possess a personality disorder and that she 
should not be the custodial parent.  Dr. Mason further testified that his only 
professional contact with either Nye was his conducting the psychological 
evaluations ordered by the court. 
{¶10} During the last day of the dependency hearings, Pickel’s testimony 
from the visitation hearing was incorporated into the record by agreement.  
Mason’s reports were admitted into evidence.  The court declared Zachary a 
dependent minor pursuant to R.C. 2151.04(C) and granted custody to FCCS. 
{¶11} Karen appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the 
therapists’ testimony and report in the absence of any waiver of the testimonial 
privilege. 
{¶12} The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, 
holding that a therapist-client privilege applies only to communications “made in 
the course of treatment.”   It thereafter certified the cause to this court, finding 
that its judgment conflicted with the decisions of the Stark County Court of 
Appeals in In re Daywalt (Mar. 19, 2001), Stark App. Nos. 2000CA332 and 
2000CA355, and In re Layne (June 25, 2001), Stark App. No. 2001CA00104, 
2001 WL 1773763; and the Portage County Court of Appeals in In re Kyle (Dec. 
1, 2000), Portage App. No. 2000-P-0014, 2000 WL 1774155.  It certified this 
question to us for resolution:  “In dependency/neglect cases, do the statutory 
privileges set forth in former R.C. 4732.19 and R.C. 2317.02(G) apply to the 
reports and/or testimony of a psychologist and a licensed independent social 
January Term, 2003 
5 
worker when such testimony and report were generated for forensic purposes only 
and do not concern communications made in the course of treatment?”  
{¶13} We answer the certified question in the negative, and hold that 
statements made by an individual to a licensed psychologist or licensed 
independent social worker in the course of an examination ordered by a court for 
forensic purposes are not communications received “from a client in that relation,” 
R.C. 2317.02(G)(1), and are not protected as privileged communications pursuant 
to R.C. 4732.19 and former R.C. 2317.02, 147 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4686, 4702, as 
in effect prior to April 10, 2001, the effective date of 2000 Sub.H.B. No. 506.  A 
psychological examination is considered to be for forensic purposes when it is 
ordered to assist the court in determining facts or making conclusions of law.  
Individuals interacting with a professional in such an examination are not clients 
of the professional for purposes of the privilege statutes. 
{¶14} At the time of the hearings, former R.C. 2317.021 provided:  
{¶15} “The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:  
{¶16} “* * * 
{¶17} “(B)(1) A physician * * * concerning a communication made to 
the physician * * * by a patient in that relation or the physician’s * * * advice to 
a patient * * *. 
{¶18} “* * *  
{¶19} “(G)(1) * * * [A] person licensed under Chapter 4757. of the 
Revised Code as a professional clinical counselor, professional counselor, social 
worker, or independent social worker, or registered under Chapter 4757. of the 
                                                 
1. 
Since April 10, 2001, the effective date of 2000 Sub.H.B. No. 506, the relevant statutes 
provide that  licensed independent social workers and licensed psychologists may testify in a civil 
action concerning court-ordered treatment or services received by a patient if the court-ordered 
treatment or services were ordered as part of a case plan journalized under R.C. 2151.412 or the 
court-ordered treatment or services are necessary or relevant to dependency, neglect, or abuse of 
temporary or permanent custody proceedings under R.C. Chapter 2151.  See  R.C.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
Revised Code as a social work assistant concerning a confidential communication 
received from a client in that relation or the person’s advice to a client * * *.” 
(Emphasis added.)  147 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4686, 4702 and 4707-4705. 
{¶20} R.C. 4732.19 states:  
{¶21} “The confidential relations and communications between a 
licensed psychologist * * * and client are placed upon the same basis as those 
between physician and patient under division (B) of section 2317.02 of the 
Revised Code.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶22} Accordingly, these statutes provide a privilege only for 
communications made to a professional incident to a counselor-client or doctor-
patient relationship. 
{¶23} In In re Wieland (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 535, 733 N.E.2d 1127, 
syllabus, we held that in the “absence of a specific statutory waiver or exception, 
the testimonial privileges established under R.C. 2317.02(B)(1) (concerning 
communications between a physician and patient), R.C. 4732.19 (concerning 
communications between a licensed psychologist and client), and R.C. 
2317.02(G) (concerning communications between a licensed counselor or 
licensed social worker and client) are applicable to communications made by a 
parent in the course of treatment ordered as part of a reunification plan in an 
action for dependency and neglect.” 
{¶24} In Wieland, the mother of alleged dependent children was ordered 
to submit to a substance abuse and domestic violence assessment and to attend 
parenting classes.  We observed that “ ‘the purpose of the [physician-patient 
privilege] statute is to create an atmosphere of confidentiality, encouraging the 
patient to be completely candid and open with his or her physician, thereby 
enabling more complete treatment.’ ”  Id. at 538-539, 733 N.E.2d 1127, quoting 
                                                                                                                                     
2317.02(G)(1)(g) and 2317.02(B)(1)(b) as applied to licensed psychologists pursuant to R.C. 
4732.19. 
January Term, 2003 
7 
In re Miller (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 99, 107, 585 N.E.2d 396.  Similarly, we noted 
that the “same concerns are prevalent where a parent is required, under the terms 
of a reunification plan, to utilize medical, psychological, or other social and 
rehabilitative services in an effort to remedy the problems that initially caused the 
child to be placed outside the home so that the child can return home.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Id. at  539, 733 N.E.2d 1127. 
{¶25} In Wieland this court affirmed the judgment of the court of 
appeals.  In its opinion in that case, the court of appeals cogently wrote as 
follows: 
{¶26} “Whenever a court orders a parent to undergo a psychiatric 
examination or substance abuse evaluation and treatment for purposes of a child 
custody case, the parent is required to submit involuntarily to the examination, 
evaluation and treatment. The mere fact of involuntariness, however, should not 
end the inquiry. Instead, an examination of the purpose and the nature of the 
professional help sought is also necessary. 
{¶27} “In regard to a court-ordered examination or evaluation, the parent 
is being required to consult the expert for forensic purposes. The physician is not 
examining or treating the patient to alleviate medical complaints or substance 
addictions. Instead, the physician is performing a forensic evaluation for the 
purpose of helping the court to determine the best course of action. In this case, 
no privilege attaches.  * * *  Likewise, we conclude that when a psychiatric 
examination or substance evaluation is ordered by a court in a child custody case 
for forensic purposes, the privilege is inapplicable.  However, when the parent is 
also required to undergo treatment, the reason underlying the psychologist-patient 
privilege applies. As previously stated, the purpose of the privilege statutes is to 
‘create an atmosphere of confidentiality, encouraging the patient to be completely 
candid and open with his or her physician, thereby enabling more complete 
treatment.’  In re Miller (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 99, 107, 585 N.E.2d 396.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
Furthermore, the purpose of reunification case-plans is to reunify the parent and 
child by remedying the reason for the removal of the child from the home. See 
R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). In order to meet the goal of the reunification plan, the 
purpose underlying the statutory privilege—effective treatment—is material and 
significant. In other words, if a parent is fearful that any communications with her 
provider will not be privileged, she may not be open and truthful during 
treatment, thereby undermining the effectiveness of treatment and ultimately 
defeating the goal of remedying the reason for the removal of the child.  On the 
other hand, matters that do not involve communications between the provider and 
the patient-client, e.g., a summary of attendance, will not be protected by the 
privilege. 
{¶28} “We find this type of situation closely akin to that addressed by the 
Ohio Supreme Court in In re Miller, supra. Although Miller involved an 
involuntary commitment in which the action was commenced for the benefit of 
the patient, the court found that the privilege afforded by R.C. 2317.02 covered 
any treatment provided to the individual being committed.  Id., 108-109, 585 
N.E.2d 396.  Similarly, an order for substance abuse and psychological treatment 
for a parent in a custody determination is intended to benefit the parent, directly, 
by helping to resolve the problems requiring removal of the child from the home. 
The parent’s treatment may, of course, ultimately benefit the child by permitting 
reunification, but that is an indirect benefit of the treatment, and is equally 
dependent upon the treatment’s effectiveness, which the statutory privilege is 
intended to promote.”  In re Wieland (July 9, 1999), Montgomery App. No. 
17646, 1999 WL 961154. 
{¶29} We find this analysis compelling and fully consistent with our 
judgment in Wieland.  We follow it and specifically distinguish between court-
ordered psychological assessments for forensic purposes and psychological 
January Term, 2003 
9 
treatment or counseling ordered for the purpose of assisting an individual in 
recognizing, addressing, and changing detrimental behaviors. 
{¶30} In applying this distinction to the case at bar, we conclude that the 
privilege statutes asserted here did not apply to bar the testimony of Pfaff and 
Mason.  Both of these professionals conducted psychological examinations of 
Karen pursuant to court order for the forensic purpose of evaluating Karen’s 
existing psychological status to assist the court in its decision-making.  The 
examinations were not ordered for the purpose of improving Karen’s suitability 
for reunification with her children.  Karen was not the client of either Mason or 
Pfaff and, hence, not within the scope of the applicable privilege statutes. 
{¶31} Regarding the testimony of Sharon Pickel, we conclude that the 
trial court erred in finding that a therapist-client relationship did not exist between 
Nye and Pickel.  It is true that Pickel considered her primary clients to be the Nye 
daughters, not Karen, although Pickel did acknowledge that she had a 
“therapeutic relationship” with the entire family.  Ultimately, though, the goal of 
Karen’s participation in therapy sessions with Pickel as ordered in the court-
approved reunification plan was to receive treatment in order to change her own 
behavior and to develop a healthy and constructive relationship with her children.  
Those sessions were not merely evaluative or confined to the forensic purpose of 
providing the court with information to assist it in reaching decisions pending 
before it.  The relevant testimony of the FCCS caseworker follows:  
{¶32} “Q:  Specifically what on the case plan [relative to the Nye sisters] 
hasn’t mother done? 
{¶33} “A:  The counseling is the biggest issue. It’s—the case plan asked 
for her to follow all recommendations with regards to the counseling.  And she 
had not done that.  It—her attendance has been sporadic.  Sharon Pickel has gone 
out of her way to include mom.  Mom was concerned at first that the girls were 
going to counseling with Robert and not involving her.  Sharon accommodated 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
that request.  In fact made it on—the sessions on the same day that mom would be 
in town so she could be incorporated in the counseling.  She hasn’t been to 
counseling since this whole court thing has started again.  I don’t know why that 
the therapeutic relationship between her and Sharon has been severed.  I’m not 
sure as to what her reason is for that.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶34} Because Karen’s sessions with Pickel were treatment-focused, she 
is properly deemed a client of Pickel for purposes of former  R.C. 2317.02(G)(1), 
and any confidential communications made by Karen to Pickel in the family 
counseling sessions fell within the scope of  the statutory privilege.  A contrary 
holding would directly contradict the law established in Wieland. 
{¶35} Pickel’s testimony was, however, wholly consistent with testimony 
provided by Mason and Pfaff, whose testimony was not subject to statutory 
privilege, and of Karen herself.  Accordingly, no reversible error is demonstrated 
in the record before us, and the court of appeals did not err in affirming the trial 
court’s judgment finding that Zachary was a dependent child and granting 
temporary custody to FCCS. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, VUKOVICH, LUNDBERG STRATTON and 
O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
JOSEPH J. VUKOVICH, J., of the Seventh Appellate District, sitting for 
COOK, J. 
__________________ 
 
Yeura R. Venters, Franklin County Public Defender, David L. Strait and 
Heather D. Lang, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
 
Ronald J. O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Katherine 
Press, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Michael N. Oser, guardian ad litem for Zachary Jones. 
__________________