Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Williams

Citation: 2016-Ohio-827

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-03-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Williams, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-827.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-827 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. WILLIAMS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Williams, Slip Opinion No.  
2016-Ohio-827.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, including engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation—Two-year suspension with 
18 months stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2015-0293—Submitted September 2, 2015—Decided March 8, 2016.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the  
Supreme Court, No. 2014-043. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Orlando Joseph Williams of Cincinnati, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0033558, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1986.  On 
June 9, 2014, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Williams with professional 
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misconduct arising from his sexual relationship with a party in an eviction action 
over which he presided as a magistrate, his falsification of a loan application for 
the purchase of a motor vehicle, and his misappropriation of wrongful-death 
proceeds that were intended to finance an annuity for the benefit of the decedent’s 
minor children. 
{¶ 2} Relator and Williams subsequently submitted joint stipulations of 
fact, violations, aggravating and mitigating factors, and exhibits and jointly 
recommended that Williams be suspended from the practice of law for two years 
with one year stayed on conditions. 
{¶ 3} A panel of the Board of Professional Conduct adopted all but one of 
the parties’ stipulations but recommended that Williams be suspended from the 
practice of law for two years with no stay.  The board adopted the panel’s findings 
of fact and conclusions of law but recommended that Williams be indefinitely 
suspended from the practice of law. 
{¶ 4} Williams objects and argues that his conduct does not warrant an 
indefinite suspension from the practice of law and urges us to adopt the parties’ 
stipulated sanction of a two-year suspension with one year stayed on conditions.  
Relator joins Williams in requesting that we reject the board’s recommendation 
and, at a minimum, suspend him for two years with one year stayed on conditions. 
{¶ 5} We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct.  But we sustain 
Williams’s objection and suspend him from the practice of law in Ohio for two 
years with the final 18 months stayed on conditions. 
Misconduct 
Count One—Failure to Recuse 
{¶ 6} Williams was appointed to the Akron Municipal Court in March 2009.  
After he lost his bid to retain that position in the November 2009 general election, 
he accepted a position as a magistrate in the same court and as part of his duties, 
presided over eviction cases.  In May 2012, while assigned to a case in which a 
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landlord sought to evict tenant A.B., Williams entered into a sexual relationship 
with A.B. and failed to immediately recuse himself from the case.  Several weeks 
later, after learning that A.B. had been pulled over for operating a vehicle while 
under the influence and had repeatedly referred to Williams as her boyfriend, four 
Akron Municipal Court judges met with Williams, at which time he admitted to his 
relationship with A.B.  Thereafter, he signed a recusal entry and resigned from his 
employment as a magistrate. 
{¶ 7} On these facts, the parties agreed and the board found that Williams 
violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 (requiring a judge or magistrate to avoid impropriety and 
the appearance of impropriety and to act at all times in a manner that promotes 
public confidence in the integrity, impartiality, and independence of the judiciary) 
and Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A) (requiring a judge or magistrate to disqualify himself or 
herself from any proceeding in which the impartiality of the judge or magistrate 
might be reasonably questioned).  Consistent with the parties’ stipulations, the 
panel dismissed two additional alleged violations. 
Count Two—Fraudulent Loan Application 
{¶ 8} After Williams resigned from his employment, he worked as an 
associate attorney at a Columbus law firm.  But that employment was terminated 
on May 3, 2013.  Several days later, Williams and A.B. purchased a used car from 
an Akron car dealer.  On his credit application, Williams listed a residential address 
that he had not leased for over a year, falsely stated that he was still employed by 
the Columbus firm, and falsely stated that he was earning $7,500 per month.  He 
signed the application, certifying that this false information was true.  With 
Williams’s knowledge and consent, A.B. altered one of his paystubs to increase his 
income and withholdings and submitted it with his loan application.  Williams later 
defaulted on the loan and the vehicle was repossessed. 
{¶ 9} The board adopted the parties’ stipulation that this conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving 
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dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and dismissed one other alleged 
violation with respect to this count. 
Count Three—Misappropriation of Wrongful-Death Benefits 
{¶ 10} In November 2007, Williams filed an application seeking the 
appointment of Pamela Schaffer as fiduciary for the estate of decedent Anthony 
Criss in the Summit County Probate Court.  The court approved a $25,000 
wrongful-death settlement, and Williams deposited the proceeds into his client trust 
account.  Williams made several distributions pursuant to the probate court’s order, 
but he was unable to apply $10,798.50 toward the purchase of an annuity for the 
benefit of Criss’s three minor children within 30 days of the settlement as ordered 
by the court.  This failure was reportedly due to the fact that the settlement funds 
had been deposited into Williams’s client trust account instead of being remitted 
directly to the annuity company by the insured. 
{¶ 11} In April 2011, the probate court magistrate wrote to Williams to 
request that he take action to close the estate, but Williams did not receive the letter.  
After the probate judge issued a show-cause order, Williams appeared and informed 
the court that the funds remained in his client trust account.  He stated that he would 
invest them in a money-market account for the benefit of the Criss children. 
{¶ 12} As of November 1, 2012, all of the funds belonging to the Criss 
children remained in Williams’s client trust account.  But over the next two months, 
Williams misappropriated nearly all of those funds.  In May 2013, he liquidated his 
retirement account and deposited $10,000 into his client trust account to replace 
most of the funds he had misappropriated.  However, he misappropriated the money 
a second time, leaving only $6.31 in the account.  In October 2013, he again 
replaced the misappropriated funds by depositing $10,810 of his personal funds 
into the client trust account. 
{¶ 13} The parties stipulated and the board found that Williams’s conduct 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in 
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representing a client), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
Sanction 
{¶ 14} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final determination, 
we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B).1  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-
Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 15} Williams testified that he had no intention of continuing to serve as 
the magistrate in A.B.’s eviction case after their relationship had begun but that he 
did not know the proper procedure for recusing himself.  He further testified that 
A.B. abused him throughout their relationship and that her abuse contributed to his 
stipulated misconduct.  Williams entered into a five-year contract with the Ohio 
Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) on July 16, 2013, and reported that he was 
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of A.B.’s abuse.2  
But he offered no medical records to document that diagnosis or its causal 
relationship to his misconduct.  Consequently, the board did not afford any 
mitigating effect to his PTSD.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g) (setting forth 
requirements for consideration of a mental disability as a mitigating factor). 
{¶ 16} The parties stipulated that relevant mitigating factors include the 
absence of a prior disciplinary record, a timely, good-faith effort to make 
restitution, full and free disclosure to the board, and positive character evidence in 
                                                 
1 Effective January 1, 2015, the aggravating and mitigating factors previously set forth in BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1) and (2) are codified in Gov.Bar R. V(13), 140 Ohio St.3d CXXIV. 
2 Relator received an e-mail from OLAP director Scott Mote regarding Williams’s PTSD and does 
not dispute the diagnosis. 
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the form of two character letters.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (c), (d), and 
(e).  The board accepted the stipulated mitigating factors with one exception.  
Because Williams had endeavored to make only partial restitution by issuing a 
$10,800 check to his attorney’s trust account just one day before his disciplinary 
hearing—but had not yet made the Criss children whole—the board rejected the 
parties’ stipulation that Williams made a timely, good-faith effort to pay restitution.  
The record does not establish how much the children’s $10,800 investment would 
have been worth had Williams purchased the annuity as ordered by the court.  At 
oral argument Williams’s counsel stated, and relator agreed, that the children lost 
approximately $9,000 as a result of Williams’s misconduct. 
{¶ 17} As aggravating factors, the parties stipulated and the board found 
that Williams acted with a dishonest or selfish motive and engaged in multiple 
offenses.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b) and (d). 
{¶ 18} The parties jointly recommended that Williams be suspended from 
the practice of law for two years with one year stayed on the conditions that he 
commit no further misconduct and remain in compliance with his OLAP contract.  
The panel, however, believed that Williams’s misconduct warranted a two-year 
suspension with no stay and recommended that his reinstatement be conditioned 
upon the commission of no further misconduct, compliance with his OLAP 
contract, and payment of full restitution to the Criss children—$10,798.50 plus the 
interest they would have earned if he had timely purchased an annuity for their 
benefit as ordered by the probate court on February 6, 2009.  The board 
recommended that Williams be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law and, 
in addition to the panel’s recommended conditions for reinstatement, would require 
Williams to make full restitution within six months of the date of our order. 
Williams’s Objections 
{¶ 19} Williams first challenges the board’s failure to accord any mitigating 
effect to the abuse he suffered at the hands of A.B., which included threats of 
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physical harm and emotional pain.  Williams testified that A.B. stabbed him on four 
separate occasions, that he twice sought medical care for knife wounds, and that 
their arguments were related to A.B.’s demands that he withdraw funds from his 
client trust account and use them for her personal benefit.  He contends that the 
abuse he suffered clouded his judgment and emphasizes that he not only moved 
across the state to extricate himself from the unhealthy relationship but also sought 
assistance from OLAP—including mental-health counseling—in an effort to save 
his once successful legal career. 
{¶ 20} Williams also argues that his misconduct does not warrant an 
indefinite suspension.  He cites several cases in which we have imposed two-year 
suspensions (some partially stayed) for comparable misconduct involving 
misappropriation and making false statements.  Relator agrees that Williams’s 
misconduct does not warrant an indefinite suspension and urges us to impose a 
suspension of at least two years with one year stayed on conditions. 
{¶ 21} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Simon-Seymour, 131 Ohio St.3d 161, 
2012-Ohio-114, 962 N.E.2d 309, we suspended an attorney for two years, with the 
final six months stayed on conditions, for misappropriating more than $17,000 from 
a decedent’s estate over a period of years and submitting false documents to conceal 
that misappropriation from the court.  Although Simon-Seymour engaged in a 
pattern of misconduct, we also found that she had no prior disciplinary record, made 
full and free disclosure during the disciplinary investigation, displayed a 
cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, and made full restitution.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
{¶ 22} In Columbus Bar Assn. v. King, 132 Ohio St.3d 501, 2012-Ohio-873, 
974 N.E.2d 1180, we imposed a two-year suspension on an attorney who failed to 
maintain adequate records of the client funds in his possession, misappropriated 
more than $100,000 from his client trust account to cover his own personal and 
business expenses, and fabricated a fee dispute in an attempt to justify his delay in 
returning those funds.  We also required King to complete one year of monitored 
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probation and at least 12 hours of continuing legal education (“CLE”) in accounting 
and law-office management.  Id. at ¶ 16. 
{¶ 23} And in Disciplinary Counsel v. Blair, 128 Ohio St.3d 384, 2011-
Ohio-767, 944 N.E.2d 1161, the attorney misappropriated nearly $17,000 
belonging to an incompetent ward, failed to maintain required client-trust-account 
records, and  obtained eight separate 30-day extensions to file her guardianship 
accounting.  Id. at ¶ 4, 7.  She also failed to properly supervise her employees who 
prepared false documents, signed the attorney’s name and notarized the forged 
signature, and then filed the documents in the probate court.  Id. at ¶ 11-12.  
Although Blair acted with a selfish motive, she had no prior disciplinary record, 
made a timely, good-faith effort to provide restitution, made full and free disclosure 
to the board, demonstrated a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary 
proceedings, and established that her alcohol dependence and recurrent major 
depressive disorder were mitigating factors pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(g).  Id. at ¶ 15-16.  We suspended her from the practice of law for two 
years with 18 months stayed on the conditions that she serve a period of monitored 
probation, remain in compliance with her OLAP contract, continue to receive 
alcohol and mental-health counseling, and complete a CLE course in law-office 
management.  Id. at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 24} We conclude that the misappropriation and false statements at issue 
in this case are most comparable to the conduct at issue in Blair and that Williams’s 
additional misconduct in failing to promptly recuse himself from A.B.’s eviction 
case does not significantly increase the magnitude of his misconduct.  See, e.g., 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Oldfield, 140 Ohio St.3d 123, 2014-Ohio-2963, 16 N.E.3d 
581 (publicly reprimanding a judge who actually presided over 53 cases in which a 
public defender appeared as counsel while she was living in the judge’s home and 
riding to the courthouse with the judge each day); Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Vukelic, 
102 Ohio St.3d 421, 2004-Ohio-3651, 811 N.E.2d 1127 (publicly reprimanding a 
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part-time magistrate who failed to immediately recuse himself when one of his 
domestic-relations clients appeared before him on two misdemeanor charges). 
{¶ 25} And although Williams did not establish that his PTSD was a 
mitigating factor pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g), we acknowledge that 
he practiced law without incident for more than 20 years before he commenced his 
improper relationship with A.B., and we conclude that the abuse he endured during 
their relationship contributed significantly to his stipulated misconduct.  Therefore, 
we sustain Williams’s objections to the board’s recommended sanction and 
conclude that a two-year suspension, with 18 months stayed on stringent 
conditions, is the appropriate sanction for Williams’s misconduct. 
{¶ 26} Accordingly, Orlando Joseph Williams is suspended from the 
practice of law in Ohio for two years with 18 months stayed on the conditions that 
he remain in full compliance with his OLAP contract, continue to participate in 
mental-health counseling for his PTSD, engage in no further misconduct, make full 
restitution to the Criss children—$10,798.50 plus the interest they would have 
earned if he had timely purchased an annuity for their benefit as ordered by the 
probate court on February 6, 2009—within two years of the date of our order, and 
satisfactorily complete an 18-month period of monitored probation in accordance 
with Gov.Bar R. V(21).  If he fails to comply with the conditions of the stay, the 
stay will be lifted, and he will serve the full two-year suspension.  Costs are taxed 
to Williams. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent and would adopt the position of 
the panel and impose a suspension of two years without stay. 
_________________ 
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Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Joseph M. Caligiuri, Chief 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, L.P.A., and George D. Jonson, for 
respondent. 
_________________