Case Title: Scott R. Jensen v. Wisconsin Elections Board

Citation: 2002 WI 13

Docket Number: 2002AP000057-OA

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 13 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-0057-OA 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Scott R. Jensen, personally and as Speaker of 
the Wisconsin Assembly and Mary E. Panzer, 
personally and as Minority Leader of the 
Wisconsin Senate,  
 
Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Elections Board, an independent agency 
of the State of Wisconsin, Jeralyn Wendelberger, 
its chairman, and each of its members in his or 
her official capacity, David Halbrooks, R.J. 
Johnson, John P. Savage, John C. Schober, Steven  
V. Ponto, Brenda Lewison, Christine Wiseman and 
Kevin J. Kennedy, its executive director,  
 
Respondents, 
State Senate Majority Leader Charles J. Chvala, 
State Assembly Minority Leader Spencer Black, 
 
Intervenors-Respondents 
 Wisconsin Education Association Council, a 
voluntary association, Stan Johnson, its elected 
president, and several of its members, Tommie 
Lee Glenn, Paul Hambleton and Dianne Catlin 
Lang,  
 
Intervenors-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 12, 2002 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 5, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
2
For the petitioners there was oral argument by James R. 
Troupis of Michael, Best & Friedrich, Madison. 
 
For intervenors-respondents, Charles J. Chvala and Spencer 
Black, there was oral argument by Michael P. May of Boardman, 
Suhr, Currey & Field, LLP, Madison. 
 
For intervenor-respondent, WEAC, there was oral argument by 
Brady C. Williamson, Jr., of LaFollette, Godfrey & Kahn, 
Madison. 
 
For the respondents the cause was argued by Thomas J. 
Balistreri, assistant attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 13 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-0057-OA  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Scott R. Jensen, personally and as  
Speaker of the Wisconsin Assembly and  
Mary E. Panzer, personally and as  
Minority Leader of the Wisconsin Senate,  
 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Elections Board, an independent  
agency of the State of Wisconsin, Jeralyn  
Wendelberger, its chairman, and each of  
its members in his or her official  
capacity, David Halbrooks, R.J. Johnson,  
John P. Savage, John C. Schober, Steven  
V. Ponto, Brenda Lewison, Christine  
Wiseman and Kevin J. Kennedy, its  
executive director,  
 
          Respondents, 
 
State Senate Majority Leader Charles J.  
Chvala, State Assembly Minority Leader  
Spencer Black,  
 
          Intervenors-Respondents, 
 
Wisconsin Education  
Association Council, a voluntary  
Association, Stan Johnson, its elected  
president, and several of its members,  
Tommie Lee Glenn, Paul Hambleton and  
Dianne Catlin Lang,  
 
          Intervenors-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 12, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
02-0057-OA   
 
2 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION for declaratory and injunctive relief. 
Petition for original action denied without prejudice. 
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   This 
matter 
involves 
the 
decennial 
problem of legislative redistricting. On January 7, 2002, 
Assembly Speaker Scott R. Jensen and Senate Minority Leader Mary 
E. 
Panzer, 
representing 
Assembly 
and 
Senate 
Republicans, 
petitioned this court for leave to commence an original action 
on the issue of state legislative redistricting.  Senate 
Majority Leader Charles J. Chvala and Assembly Minority Leader 
Spencer Black, representing Senate and Assembly Democrats, and 
the Wisconsin Education Association Council (WEAC), along with 
its president and several of its members, were each permitted to 
intervene on the initial jurisdictional question.  
¶2 The petitioners ask this court to declare the existing 
legislative districts constitutionally invalid due to population 
shifts now documented by the 2000 census.  They further ask that 
we enjoin the respondent Wisconsin Elections Board (Elections 
Board) from conducting the 2002 elections using the existing 
districts.  Finally, claiming a legislative impasse, they ask 
this court to remap the state's Senate and Assembly districts in 
time for the rapidly approaching 2002 election cycle. 
¶3 The intervenors argue against our assumption of original 
jurisdiction in this matter because a three-judge panel of the 
federal 
district 
court 
in 
Milwaukee 
has 
already 
taken 
jurisdiction over state legislative redistricting, has scheduled 
a 
trial, 
and 
is 
ready, 
willing, 
and, 
under 
present 
No. 
02-0057-OA   
 
3 
 
circumstances, better able to decide the state and federal 
questions presented by this case.  The Elections Board, by a 4-3 
margin, supports the petition for original jurisdiction (four 
Republican appointees in favor, two Democratic appointees and 
one court-appointee against). 
¶4 This case raises important state and federal legal and 
political issues that go to the heart of our system of 
representative democracy.1 In the absence of a timely legislative 
compromise, our participation in the resolution of these issues 
would ordinarily be highly appropriate.  For the reasons that 
follow, however, we decline to accept original jurisdiction in 
this matter, and therefore deny the petition without prejudice. 
 
 
 
 
 
I 
¶5 
It is an established constitutional principle in our 
federal system that congressional reapportionment and state 
legislative redistricting are primarily state, not federal, 
prerogatives.2  Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993); Chapman 
                                                 
1 Although not specifically pleaded in the petition, 
redistricting litigation typically presents Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection questions under Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 
(1962), Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) and their 
prodigious progeny; state constitutional questions under the 
applicable provisions of the state charter (here, Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 1; art. IV, §§  2-5); and questions under the Voting 
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq. (2001). 
 
 
No. 
02-0057-OA   
 
4 
 
v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975); Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 
409 (1965).  Although the federal and state courts have 
concurrent 
jurisdiction 
to 
decide 
the 
federal 
and 
state 
constitutional and statutory issues presented by redistricting 
litigation, the United States Constitution and principles of 
federalism and comity dictate that the states' role is primary:  
'[R]eapportionment 
is 
primarily 
the 
duty 
and 
responsibility of the State through its legislature or 
other body, rather than of a federal court.'  Chapman 
v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27, 95 S.Ct. 751 (1975).  Absent 
evidence that these state branches will fail timely to 
perform that duty, a federal court must neither 
affirmatively 
obstruct 
state 
reapportionment 
nor 
permit federal litigation to be used to impede it. 
Growe, 507 U.S. at 34. 
¶6 The Wisconsin Constitution sets forth standards for 
redistricting,3 
and 
commits 
to the 
state 
legislature the 
authority and responsibility of drawing State Senate and 
Assembly district boundaries:  "At its first session after each 
enumeration made by the authority of the United States, the 
legislature shall apportion and district anew the members of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 The cases and the parties sometimes use the terms 
"reapportionment" and "redistricting" interchangeably, although 
there is a distinction.  Reapportionment is the allocation of 
seats in a legislative body where the district boundaries do not 
change but the number of members per district does (e.g., 
allocation of congressional seats among established districts, 
that is, the states); redistricting is the drawing of new 
political boundaries.  This petition involves the latter. 
3 See generally Wis. Const. art. I, § 1 (equal protection), 
and art. IV, §§  2-5 (requiring compactness, contiguity and 
respect for municipal boundaries in the establishment of 
district lines; also prohibiting the division of an assembly 
district in the formation of a senate district). 
No. 
02-0057-OA   
 
5 
 
senate and assembly, according to the number of inhabitants."  
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3.   
¶7 However, in the four decades since Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the 
matter of redistricting in Wisconsin has been resolved by the 
legislature without court involvement exactly once, in 1972.  
The last time this court was involved in redistricting was 1964.  
See State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 126 
N.W.2d 551 (1964) ("Zimmerman I"); State ex rel. Reynolds v. 
Zimmerman, 23 Wis. 2d 606, 128 N.W.2d 16 (1964) ("Zimmerman 
II"). 
¶8 In Zimmerman I, this court followed the United States 
Supreme Court's Baker v. Carr lead and overruled prior cases 
that precluded judicial review of redistricting statutes valid 
when 
enacted 
but 
allegedly 
invalid 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution due to subsequent population shifts.  State ex rel. 
Reynolds, 22 Wis. 2d at 562-63 ("Zimmerman I").  Noting that the 
earlier 
cases 
were 
based 
upon 
the 
"political 
question" 
nonjusticiability rationale of Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 
(1946), distinguished by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 208-09, 234, 
this court held that: 
The citizens of this state can now obtain affirmative 
judicial relief from federal courts upon a showing 
that the voting power discriminations resulting from 
malapportionment deny them equal protection.  Since a 
denial of voting rights deemed to be a denial of the 
general standards of equal protection of the law under 
the Fourteenth amendment would also be a denial of the 
specific standard of representation in direct ratio to 
No. 
02-0057-OA   
 
6 
 
population in art. IV [of the Wisconsin Constitution], 
there is no reason for Wisconsin citizens to have to 
rely 
upon 
the 
federal 
courts 
for 
the 
indirect 
protection of their state constitutional rights. 
State ex rel. Reynolds, 22 Wis. 2d at 564 ("Zimmerman I") 
(emphasis added). 
 
¶9 Notwithstanding Zimmerman I's unequivocal assertion of 
this court's institutional interest in vindicating the state 
constitutional rights of Wisconsin citizens in redistricting 
matters, redistricting combatants have either sought or ended up 
in federal court following both the 1980 census and the 1990 
census.  See Wisconsin State AFL-CIO v. Elections Board, 543 F. 
Supp. 630 (E.D. Wis. 1982); Prosser v. Elections Board, 793 F. 
Supp. 859 (W.D. Wis. 1992).  In 1982, this court granted a 
petition for leave to commence an original action in the matter 
of legislative redistricting, but its jurisdiction was brief and 
inconsequential: the case was promptly removed to federal court 
in Milwaukee and consolidated with a redistricting lawsuit 
already pending there.  Wisconsin State AFL-CIO, 543 F. Supp. at 
632-33; State ex rel. Dreyfus v. Election Board, No. 82-480-OA 
(Wis. S. Ct. 1982) (petition for original action granted).   
¶10 Despite the reality that redistricting is now almost 
always resolved through litigation rather than legislation, we 
are moved to emphasize the obvious: redistricting remains an 
inherently 
political 
and 
legislative——not 
judicial——task.  
Courts called upon to perform redistricting are, of course, 
judicially legislating, that is, writing the law rather than 
interpreting it, which is not their usual——and usually not their 
No. 
02-0057-OA   
 
7 
 
proper——role.4  Redistricting determines the political landscape 
for the ensuing decade and thus public policy for years beyond.  
The framers in their wisdom entrusted this decennial exercise to 
the 
legislative 
branch 
because 
the 
give-and-take 
of 
the 
legislative process, involving as 
it 
does 
representatives 
elected by the people to make precisely these sorts of political 
and policy decisions, is preferable to any other. 
¶11 But the requirement of a remedy for constitutional or 
Voting Rights Act violations stipulated or adjudicated in 
redistricting litigation has impelled the federal courts to take 
up seemingly permanent residency in what Justice Frankfurter 
warned was a "political thicket" that judges "ought not to 
enter."  Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556 (plurality opinion).  It is 
not a comfortable place for any court, state or federal.  See 
Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 
75 Tex. L. Rev. 837, 841 (1997) ("[w]hile straightforward in 
principle, the redistricting process is complicated by the 
political arena in which it operates and the judiciary's 
attempts to police this political arena.").5  We read Growe as 
                                                 
4 James Madison, quoting Montesquieu in Federalist No. 47, 
warned that "where the whole power of one department is 
exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of 
another department, the fundamental principles of a free 
constitution are subverted . . . . 'Were the power of judging 
joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject 
would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then 
be the legislator.'"  The Federalist No. 47, at 245 (Alexander 
Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay) (Oxford Press ed. 1948).   
5 "[J]udicial management of a process that is necessarily 
political" is troubling.  La Porte County Republican Cent. Comm. 
v. Board of Comm'rs, 43 F.3d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 1994).   
No. 
02-0057-OA   
 
8 
 
the United States Supreme Court's effort to put the state 
supreme courts back into the equation.   
II 
¶12 We are at this moment well into the first legislative 
session following the 2000 census enumeration, and not far (just 
three and a half months) from the official commencement of the 
next election season (nomination paper circulation begins June 
1). Wis. Stat. § 10.72(2) (1999-2000). And yet, neither the 
Democratic-controlled State Senate nor the Republican-controlled 
State Assembly has submitted a legislative redistricting bill.  
Accordingly, were we to take this case, we would be in a 
position similar to that in which the three-judge federal panel 
in 1992 found itself: 
[W]e are not reviewing an enacted plan.  An enacted 
plan would have the virtue of political legitimacy.  
We are comparing submitted plans with a view to 
picking the one (or devising our own) most consistent 
with judicial neutrality.  Judges should not select a 
plan that seeks partisan advantage——that seeks to 
change the ground rules so that one party can do 
better than it would do under a plan drawn up by 
persons having no political agenda——even if they would 
not be entitled to invalidate an enacted plan that did 
so. 
Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 867. 
¶13 The situation this time around is complicated not just 
by the prospect of competing plans but competing courts.  
Apparently anticipating the gridlock that sometimes results 
where (as here) a politically split bicameral legislature 
approaches a politically sensitive task such as redistricting, 
or perhaps just making an early forum-choice decision, a group 
No. 
02-0057-OA   
 
9 
 
of Wisconsin citizens commenced a congressional reapportionment 
lawsuit in federal court over a year ago. Arrington v. Elections 
Board, No. 01-C-121 (E.D. Wis. filed 2001), now pending and well 
along in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Wisconsin, has since been amended to include the 
issue of state legislative redistricting.  The petitioners here 
are intervening parties in the federal litigation, as are the 
intervenors in this case, Senate Majority Leader Chvala and 
Assembly Minority Leader Black. 
¶14 A three-judge panel, established pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2284 (2000), has assumed jurisdiction over the federal case 
and established a schedule that contemplates discovery, pretrial 
submissions and separate trials on congressional reapportionment 
and state legislative redistricting.  On February 4, 2002, the 
Arrington panel issued an order adopting a pretrial and trial 
schedule proposed by the parties in that action.  The order 
establishes deadlines for depositions and written discovery, the 
filing of proposed maps and witness lists, trial briefs, 
pretrial motions and supporting briefs.  The federal court has 
set the state legislative redistricting matter for trial on 
April 11-12, 2002, indicating that the trial will not be stayed 
unless the Wisconsin "legislature or any other Wisconsin 
authority" has adopted and implemented "redistricting plans for 
congressional 
districts 
and 
state 
legislative 
districts."  
Arrington v. Elections Board, No. 01-C-121 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 29, 
2002) (Status Conference).  
No. 
02-0057-OA   
 
10 
 
¶15 Growe requires federal courts "to defer consideration 
of disputes involving redistricting where the State, through its 
legislative or judicial branch, has begun to address that highly 
political task itself." Growe, 507 U.S. at 33. Growe also 
specifies that any redistricting plan judicially "enacted" by a 
state court (just like one enacted by a state legislature) would 
be entitled to presumptive full-faith-and-credit legal effect in 
federal court.  Id. at 35-36. 
¶16 But the Growe rule is deference, not abstention.  Id. 
at 37.  A redistricting plan adopted by this court——like one 
adopted by the legislature——would be subject to collateral 
federal court review for compliance with federal law.  See e.g., 
Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993) (federal courts are 
bound to respect the states' apportionment choices unless those 
choices contravene federal requirements); Sexson v. Servaas, 33 
F.3d 799, 803 (7th Cir. 1994) (if state apportionment violates 
federal law, the federal interest trumps the state interest); 
see also Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994); Johnson v. De 
Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994); Thompson v. Smith, 52 F. Supp. 2d 
1364 (M.D. Ala. 1999).  Accepting original jurisdiction, then, 
would necessarily put this case and any redistricting map it 
would produce on a collision course with the case now pending 
before the federal three-judge panel.  At the very least, the 
outcome here would be subject to later review in federal court.  
At best, such a scenario would delay and disrupt the 2002 
election season, which is now almost upon us.  At worst, it 
would throw the whole process into considerable doubt. 
No. 
02-0057-OA   
 
11 
 
¶17 There is no question but that this matter warrants this 
court's 
original 
jurisdiction; 
any 
reapportionment 
or 
redistricting case is, by definition, publici juris, implicating 
the sovereign rights of the people of this state. See Petition 
of Heil, 230 Wis. 428, 443, 284 N.W. 42 (1939).  The people of 
this state have a strong interest in a redistricting map drawn 
by 
an 
institution 
of 
state 
government——ideally 
and 
most 
properly, the legislature, secondarily, this court.  Growe 
unequivocally reaffirmed that the principles of federalism and 
comity 
establish 
the 
institutions 
of 
state 
government——
legislative 
and 
judicial——as 
primary 
in 
matters 
of 
reapportionment and redistricting.  Had our jurisdiction been 
invoked earlier, the public interest might well have been served 
by our hearing and deciding this case.  As it stands, it is not.  
¶18 
Accepting 
original 
jurisdiction 
would 
undermine 
principles of cooperative federalism6 and federal-state comity 
and would result in an unjustifiable duplication of effort and 
expense, all incurred by the taxpayers of this state.  It would 
also have the substantial potential of creating uncertainty 
rather than resolution of the critical legal and political 
issues that surround redistricting.7   Under circumstances more 
                                                 
6 See generally G. Alan Tarr and Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter, 
State Supreme Courts in State and Nation, 13 (1988)("[a]lthough 
the legal principles governing the relationships between state 
supreme courts and federal courts emphasize hierarchy and——to a 
lesser extent——autonomy, in actuality these relationships are 
often characterized by reciprocity and interdependence.").  
7 We note that the intervenors have also raised the 
possibility of removal should this court accept this case.  See 
State ex rel. Dreyfus v. Elections Board, No. 82-480-OA (Wis. S. 
No. 
02-0057-OA   
 
12 
 
favorable to an orderly and efficient resolution of the case, we 
would readily accept original jurisdiction in this matter and 
decide the important issues that it raises.  Indeed, this court 
has taken original jurisdiction in cases concerning legislative 
redistricting on no fewer than five previous occasions.  See 
State ex rel. Dreyfus, No. 82-480-OA;  State ex rel. Reynolds, 
22 Wis. 2d 544 ("Zimmerman I"); State ex rel. Thompson v. 
Zimmerman, 264 Wis. 644, 60 N.W.2d 416 (1953); State ex rel. 
Bowman v. Dammann, 209 Wis. 21, 243 N.W. 481 (1932); State ex 
rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 
(1892).  
¶19 Simultaneous, separate 
efforts by 
the 
state and 
federal 
courts 
addressing 
the 
subject 
of 
legislative 
redistricting would engender conflict and uncertainty regarding 
the 
validity 
of 
the 
respective 
plans 
that 
the 
parallel 
litigation would produce.  The risk that this would leave the 
state with no clear, authoritative map of legislative districts 
going into the upcoming election season is significant. 
¶20 Even if the federal court were to stay its hand under 
Growe and wait for the outcome of this case, the likelihood of 
followup 
federal 
court 
review, 
and, 
therefore, 
continued 
uncertainty and delay remains.  We have no established protocol 
for the adjudication of redistricting litigation in accordance 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ct. 1982) (petition for original action granted).   While we do 
not speculate on either the likelihood or success of such a 
strategic maneuver, see, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2001), we note only 
that the prospect of removal increases the possibility for 
uncertainty and delay. 
No. 
02-0057-OA   
 
13 
 
with contemporary legal standards.  A procedure would have to be 
devised and implemented, encompassing, at a minimum, deadlines 
for the development and submission of proposed plans, some form 
of factfinding (if not a full-scale trial), legal briefing, 
public hearing, and decision.  We are obviously not a trial 
court; our current original jurisdiction procedures would have 
to be substantially modified in order to accommodate the 
requirements of this case.  See Wis. S. Ct. IOP § II.B.3 (May 
24, 1984). 
¶21 All this takes time, and there is precious little of 
that left——certainly not enough for back-to-back state and 
federal 
plenary 
proceedings 
on 
a 
matter 
as 
complex 
and 
consequential as this.  The Elections Board has established a 
deadline of May 14 by which it hopes to certify new Senate and 
Assembly districts.  If (as seems likely) our decision in this 
case were to be subsequently challenged in federal court on 
federal grounds, the legality of the new district boundaries 
would remain in doubt for an additional, unknown period of time.  
This, needless to say, would have serious practical and 
political ramifications for the people of this state and their 
elected officials. 
¶22 Accordingly, while we recognize and agree that the 
institutions of state government are primary in matters of 
redistricting, and federalism requires deference to state high 
courts for their resolution, the timing and circumstances here 
do not allow us to responsibly exercise original jurisdiction in 
a way that would do substantial justice in the case.  This is 
No. 
02-0057-OA   
 
14 
 
not to say that the legislature cannot now undertake to give the 
people of this state their due, and timely deliver a plan of 
legislative redistricting.  While this court must act as a 
court, and provide, in this as in any other case, all of the 
procedural protections that due process and the right to be 
heard require, the legislature, as a legislature, can act more 
rapidly and respond to the exigencies of the situation. 
¶23 The legislature has it within its power, if not its 
present will, to draft a redistricting plan; we urge it to 
summon the will and do so forthwith.  Other state legislatures 
are currently acting on redistricting.  Legislative action might 
not obviate federal court review, but it would have the virtue 
of putting in place a redistricting plan that carries political 
legitimacy.  See Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 867.  The people of 
this state deserve no less. 
III 
¶24 Consistent with Growe, and to assure the availability 
of a forum in this court for future redistricting disputes, we 
will initiate rulemaking proceedings regarding procedures for 
original jurisdiction in redistricting cases.  Components of a 
new procedure could include: provisions governing factfinding 
(by a commission or panel of special masters or otherwise); 
opportunity 
for 
public 
hearing 
and 
comment 
on 
proposed 
redistricting plans; established timetables for the factfinder, 
the public and the court to act; and if possible, measures by 
which to avoid the sort of federal-state court "forum shopping" 
conflict presented here.  See generally Growe, 507 U.S. 25; 
No. 
02-0057-OA   
 
15 
 
Wilson v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1306, 1307 (Cal. 1991);8 In re 
Reapportionment Plan for Pennsylvania General Assembly, 442 A.2d 
661 (Pa. 1981); Pa. Const. Art. 2 § 17 (2001); see also Teague 
v. Bad River Band of Chippewa Indians, 2000 WI 79, 236 Wis. 2d 
384, 612 N.W. 709.  Public and expert comment will be solicited, 
and a hearing on this issue shall be held on Monday, October 14, 
2002, at 9:30 a.m. in the Supreme Court Room in the State 
Capitol, Madison, Wisconsin. 
¶25 We emphasize in closing that this court is the final 
arbiter of questions arising under the Wisconsin Constitution, 
and as such, stands ready to carry out its responsibility to 
faithfully 
adjudicate 
any 
such 
questions 
in 
appropriate 
circumstances, should that become necessary.  See State ex rel. 
Reynolds, 22 Wis. 2d at 562-63 ("Zimmerman I").  For the 
                                                 
8 In California, for example, the following procedure has 
been followed: 
 •The supreme court appoints a panel of three special 
masters comprised of retired or reserve trial and appellate 
judges charged with the responsibility of holding a series of 
public hearings throughout the state to receive evidence and 
arguments on proposed redistricting plans. 
•The special masters must complete the public hearings 
within 30 days of their appointment and submit recommendations 
and a proposed plan within 30 days thereafter.  An additional 
30-day period for briefing and for filing of public comments 
with 
the 
court 
concerning 
the 
special 
masters' 
plan 
is 
permitted. 
•The court then reviews the special masters' plan and 
public comment. 
No. 
02-0057-OA   
 
16 
 
foregoing reasons, the petition for leave to commence an 
original action is denied without prejudice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
02-0057-OA   
 
 
 
1