Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Gorby

Citation: 2015-Ohio-476

Docket Number: 2014-0541

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-02-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Gorby, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-476.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-476 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. GORBY. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Gorby,  
Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-476.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Failure to inform clients of lack of malpractice 
insurance—Failure to hold clients’ funds in trust account—One-year 
suspension, stayed. 
(No. 2014-0541—Submitted July 8, 2014—Decided February 10, 2015.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 2013-043. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Jennifer Ann Gorby of Salem, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0073833, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2001. 
{¶ 2} On August 2, 2013, a probable-cause panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline1 certified a complaint filed by 
                                                 
1 Effective January 1, 2015, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has been 
renamed the Board of Professional Conduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(1)(A), 140 Ohio St.3d CII. 
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relator, disciplinary counsel, that charged Gorby with five violations of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct arising from her alleged misappropriation of funds 
belonging to her sister and brother-in-law, who were her clients. 
{¶ 3} The parties submitted joint stipulations of fact, misconduct, and 
aggravating and mitigating factors, and the panel heard Gorby’s testimony.  At the 
hearing, Gorby admitted the underlying facts and affirmed her stipulations, except 
that she withdrew her original stipulation of a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation). 
{¶ 4} The panel issued a report setting forth its findings of fact, finding 
that Gorby committed all of the alleged misconduct—except for an alleged 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law), which the panel 
unanimously dismissed by separate entry.  Finding that Gorby’s conduct resulted 
from a family matter gone bad and that she presented little, if any, risk to the 
public, the panel recommended that her license to practice law in Ohio be 
suspended for one year, all stayed on the conditions that she commit no further 
misconduct and submit to a one-year period of monitored probation focusing on 
law-office and trust-account management. 
{¶ 5} The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct and 
its recommended sanction.  Relator objects to the aggravating and mitigating 
factors found by the board and urges this court to impose a one-year actual 
suspension from the practice of law.  For the reasons that follow, we overrule 
relator’s objections, adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, and 
suspend Gorby from the practice of law for one year, all stayed on the 
recommended conditions. 
 
 
January Term, 2015 
3 
 
Misconduct 
{¶ 6} In 2010, Gorby reduced her workload to approximately 25 hours 
per week and limited her practice to court-appointed criminal defense and 
guardian ad litem work in Columbiana County. 
{¶ 7} In April 2011, Gorby’s sister, Donna Adams, contacted her 
regarding a foreclosure action filed against her and her husband, Troy Adams, in 
the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas.  Although she did not normally 
handle civil matters or practice outside of Columbiana County, Gorby agreed to 
represent them in the foreclosure action at no charge.  There was no written fee 
agreement, and Gorby failed to advise the Adamses that she did not carry 
professional liability insurance. 
{¶ 8} Gorby filed an answer and counterclaim against the lender in the 
foreclosure action on May 19, 2011, and continued to actively represent the 
Adamses in the matter until the court issued a judgment against them in May 
2012.  In connection with this representation, Gorby agreed to receive payments 
from the Adamses and hold the funds in trust until they saved enough money to 
stop the foreclosure.  Having limited her practice to court-appointed work, Gorby 
did not maintain a client trust account, so beginning in June 2011, she deposited 
the money she received from the Adamses into her business checking account. 
{¶ 9} From June 27, 2011, through March 7, 2012, Gorby deposited a 
total of $6,400 from the Adamses and $4,600.78 of her personal funds into her 
business checking account.  Although the Adamses did not authorize her to use 
their funds for any purpose other than payment of their mortgage, Gorby began 
writing checks from the account in July 2011 to cover personal and business 
expenses unrelated to their foreclosure.  Her account balance soon dipped below 
the amount that she was supposed to be holding in trust for the Adamses—
reaching a low of $96.49 when it should have contained $5,500 of the Adamses’ 
money—and remained inadequate in varying degrees to satisfy that obligation 
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until November 2, 2012, when she deposited $5,500 in personal funds from her 
husband’s retirement account.  Just days before making that deposit, she 
submitted a response to relator’s letter of inquiry in which she was less than 
forthcoming about the situation—advising relator that she was “presently holding 
$5,500” on the Adamses’ behalf. 
{¶ 10} By November 2012, the Adamses had divorced and Mr. Adams 
had filed for bankruptcy.  On or about November 28, 2012, Gorby received a 
letter from Mr. Adams’s bankruptcy trustee, requesting that one-half of the $5,550 
in entrusted funds be disbursed to him.  Because Gorby had withdrawn funds 
from the account to cover personal and business expenses even after depositing 
the funds from her husband’s retirement account, she deposited an additional 
$100 of personal funds on December 4, 2012, to bring the account balance to 
$5,584.49.  She issued a $2,775 check to Mr. Adams’s bankruptcy trustee on 
December 7, 2012, and another check for the same amount to her sister on 
December 13, 2012. 
{¶ 11} The board found that Gorby’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c) 
(requiring a lawyer to inform the client if the lawyer does not maintain 
professional liability insurance), 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to hold the property 
of clients in an interest-bearing client trust account, separate from the lawyer’s 
own property), and 8.4(c).  We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct. 
Sanction 
{¶ 12} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
January Term, 2015 
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determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).2   
{¶ 13} The board found that Gorby acted with a dishonest or selfish 
motive when she misappropriated funds belonging to her sister and brother-in-law 
for her own purposes and that her misappropriation involved a pattern of 
misconduct.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b) and (c). 
{¶ 14} The board balanced these aggravating factors against stipulated 
mitigating factors, including the absence of a prior disciplinary record, Gorby’s 
timely good-faith effort to make restitution, and her full and free disclosure to the 
disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings.  See BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (c), and (d).  The board also considered Gorby’s 
uncontroverted deposition and hearing testimony regarding her tumultuous and 
contentious relationship with her sister.  The board noted Gorby’s testimony that 
once she became a practicing attorney, her older sister expected her to provide 
legal services for whatever she wanted and whenever she wanted them.  Whether 
it was a speeding ticket or a foreclosure, her sister expected her to drop 
everything, no matter what was going on in her own life, and fix everything.  
Gorby felt that she could not refuse her sister’s demands because if she did, her 
sister would call and complain and harass her or their mother and “cause a big 
family fight and big family drama.” She reported that it had “always been this 
way” and that it was easier to give in to her sister’s demands than to fight.  Gorby 
also testified that while the foreclosure was pending, she also served as the 
attorney for her grandmother’s estate—which created intense disagreements 
between the sisters, who were both beneficiaries of the estate. 
{¶ 15} While acknowledging that the presumptive sanction for 
misappropriation is disbarment, see, e.g., Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Dixon, 95 Ohio 
                                                 
2 Effective January 1, 2015, the aggravating and mitigating factors previously set forth in BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1) and (2) are codified in Gov.Bar R. V(13).  140 Ohio St.3d CXXIV. 
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St.3d 490, 2002-Ohio-2490, 769 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 15, the board focused on the 
primary purpose of the disciplinary sanction, which is not to punish the offender 
but to protect the public.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoppel, 129 Ohio St.3d 53, 
2011-Ohio-2672, 950 N.E.2d 171, ¶ 21.  The board considered our decision in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Burchinal, 133 Ohio St.3d 38, 2012-Ohio-3882, 975 
N.E.2d 960, upon which relator relied to support his recommendation that we 
impose a one-year actual suspension for Gorby’s misconduct.  However, the 
board distinguished Burchinal on the grounds that it involved misappropriation in 
multiple cases, neglect of a client matter, and concealment, which warranted the 
imposition of a two-year suspension with 18 months stayed on conditions, 
whereas Gorby’s misconduct involved misappropriation in just one client matter.  
Burchinal at ¶ 7-11, 20.  The board also found that Gorby’s clients suffered no 
harm as a result of her misconduct and that she poses little, if any, threat to the 
public because her misconduct arose in the context of her very contentious family 
relationship. 
{¶ 16} Having considered Gorby’s conduct, the aggravating and 
mitigating factors, and this court’s precedent, the board recommends that we 
suspend Gorby for one year but that we stay the entire suspension on the 
conditions that she engage in no further misconduct and submit to a one-year 
period of monitored probation focusing on law-office and trust-account 
management. 
{¶ 17} Relator objects to the board’s findings with regard to the applicable 
aggravating and mitigating factors and argues that our precedent requires that we 
impose a sanction greater than a six-month actual suspension from the practice of 
law in this case. 
{¶ 18} First, relator suggests that there is clear and convincing evidence to 
establish two aggravating factors that were not found by the board—the failure to 
cooperate with relator’s investigation and the failure to acknowledge the wrongful 
January Term, 2015 
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nature of the conduct at issue.  Relator argues that Gorby’s early representation 
that she was “presently holding $5,500” entrusted to her by her sister and brother-
in-law, when she had actually misappropriated the money, establishes that she 
failed to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation.  However, relator was aware 
of this misstatement in Gorby’s response to his initial letter of inquiry when he 
stipulated that Gorby made full and free disclosure to the board and demonstrated 
a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings. 
{¶ 19} Moreover, it appears that Gorby cooperated in the investigation 
from that point forward, with the exception that at the hearing, she withdrew her 
stipulation that she had engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 
in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c).  Relator contends that because she withdrew 
that stipulation, she has refused to admit that her conduct was wrongful.  While 
relator is correct that Gorby stated that she did not feel that she had stolen money 
from her sister, she also fully acknowledged that she took the money and used it 
without authorization and apologized for her actions, and the board believed that 
she showed genuine remorse.  She explained that it was difficult for her to 
differentiate between her horrible familial relationship with her sister and her role 
as her sister’s attorney.  Moreover, Gorby testified that this conduct would never 
have happened with a client other than her sister and that it would not happen 
again. 
{¶ 20} We are not bound by the findings of fact or conclusions of law of 
the panel or board in attorney disciplinary proceedings.  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Firth, 93 Ohio St.3d 173, 181, 754 N.E.2d 219 (2001).  However, we generally 
defer to the credibility determinations of the panel unless the record weighs 
heavily against those findings, because the panel had the opportunity to observe 
the witnesses firsthand.  Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 14, 2003-
Ohio-6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 8.  Here, the record does not weigh heavily 
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against the findings of the panel, as adopted by the board, and therefore we defer 
to the panel’s credibility determinations. 
{¶ 21} Relator also argues that a familial relationship between the 
grievant and the respondent and the absence of harm to a client are not mitigating 
factors.  Relator is correct that BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B) does not specifically 
identify either of these factors as mitigating.  But the rule also expressly requires 
the board to consider “all relevant factors” in determining the appropriate sanction 
for attorney misconduct.  And these factors are most certainly relevant in this 
case. 
{¶ 22} Gorby testified, and the board found, that she and her sister have 
always had a contentious relationship and that since she obtained her law license, 
her sister—and her mother—have expected her to drop everything to handle her 
sister’s legal crises with no reimbursement for her time or the expenses she incurs 
on her sister’s behalf.  She indicated that it was easier to go along with her sister’s 
demands than to fight them and cause “a big family fight and big family drama.”  
However, she reports that she has learned her lesson about handling legal matters 
for her family and that it will never happen again. 
{¶ 23} In Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Ake, 111 Ohio St.3d 266, 2006-Ohio-
5704, 855 N.E.2d 1206, ¶ 4, 32, attorney Ake knowingly violated a temporary 
order in his personal divorce proceeding by writing a $94,000 check to his 
secretary.  He then used the funds to pay for a condominium that he had agreed to 
buy and used his one-half interest in a piece of marital real property to secure a 
$400,000 individual line of credit.  All told, he violated the court’s orders on five 
separate occasions—as a party, an attorney of record, and an officer of the 
court—because it suited his economic interest to do so.  Id. at ¶ 39.  While Ake’s 
misconduct did not involve the misappropriation of client funds, it did involve the 
misappropriation of more than $90,000 in marital funds in violation of a court 
January Term, 2015 
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order that was issued to preserve the funds pending an equitable distribution of 
marital assets by the court or by consent of the parties. 
{¶ 24} We found as aggravating factors in Ake that the respondent’s 
actions were dishonest and self-serving, that he repeatedly violated several of the 
same disciplinary rules, and that he refused to recognize that his conduct rose to 
the level of an ethical violation.  Id. at ¶ 41.  Mitigating factors included the 
absence of a prior disciplinary record, full and free disclosure during the 
disciplinary process, and evidence of Ake’s good character and reputation apart 
from the charged misconduct.  Id. at ¶ 42.  Citing testimony and evidence of his 
integrity and competence, we found that Ake “would not disobey a court order in 
any situation other than the charged atmosphere of ending his own marriage.”  Id. 
at ¶ 46.  Confident that he would never repeat his transgressions, we suspended 
him from the practice of law for six months, all stayed on the condition that he 
commit no further misconduct.  Id. at ¶ 47.  Thus, we recognized that an attorney 
whose only professional misconduct occurs in his own emotionally charged case 
may warrant a lesser sanction because the conduct is not likely to reoccur and 
does not pose a threat to the public. 
{¶ 25} We have also stated that because it is of the utmost importance that 
attorneys maintain their personal and office accounts separate from their clients’ 
accounts, a violation of the rules we have established to protect client funds 
warrants a substantial sanction whether or not the client has been harmed.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Vogtsberger, 119 Ohio St.3d 458, 2008-Ohio-4571, 895 
N.E.2d 158, ¶ 10.  The degree of harm caused by the conduct may, nonetheless, 
be relevant in determining the appropriate level of that sanction. 
{¶ 26} In this case, relator agreed at the hearing that the Adamses suffered 
no financial harm as a result of Gorby’s misconduct—although the bank obtained 
a judgment against them, they were ultimately able to keep their home.  While 
relator argued that they were denied timely access to their funds, the undisputed 
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evidence demonstrates that when Mrs. Adams first requested the return of those 
funds, the Adamses divorce was pending and Mr. Adams had filed for 
bankruptcy.  But relator agreed that if the money had been sitting in a trust 
account at that time, it would have been proper for Gorby to wait until she 
received direction from those courts to determine how the funds should be 
distributed.  And while relator now asserts that the Adamses suffered 
psychological harm as the result of Gorby’s breach of trust, there is no evidence 
to establish whether such harm occurred because neither of them was called to 
testify. 
{¶ 27} Relator’s argument that the absence of harm cannot obviate the 
need to sanction an attorney for misconduct is inapposite.  The board does not 
state that Gorby should not be sanctioned at all for her misconduct because there 
was no harm.  Rather, the board states that in light of all of the mitigating 
factors—including the absence of harm to the clients and the fact that Gorby’s 
sole misconduct in her nearly 13-year legal career arose out of a contentious 
family dispute—a lesser sanction will be sufficient both to protect the public and 
to deter future misconduct.  We agree. 
{¶ 28} Accordingly, we overrule relator’s objections and suspended 
Jennifer Ann Gorby from the practice of law in Ohio for one year, all stayed on 
the conditions that she engage in no further misconduct and submit to a one-year 
period of monitored probation focusing on law-office and trust-account 
management.  Costs are taxed to Gorby. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
_________________________ 
Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Bruce T. Davis, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
January Term, 2015 
11 
 
Jennifer Ann Gorby, pro se. 
_________________________