Case Title: Koopman By and Through Koopman v. Fremont County School Dist. No. 1

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Koopman By and Through Koopman v. Fremont County School Dist. No. 11996 WY 23911 P.2d 1049Case Number: 95-176Decided: 02/21/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

CHRISTOPHER KOOPMAN, a minor child, By and Through 
his next friends, MIKE and LINDA KOOPMAN,  

Appellant (Plaintiff), 

 

v. 

 

FREMONT COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 1, Fremont County 
School District No. 1 Board of Trustees, CRAIG LOPER, MARK McCLANAHAN, LARRY 
THOMPSON and HARRY RUSHING,  

Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County; 

Nancy J. 
Guthrie, Judge.

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

John T. Pappas of Western Law Associates, P.C., 
Lander.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

Paul K. Knight of Mullikin, Larson & Swift 
L.L.C., Jackson.

 

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant 
Christopher Koopman, by and through his next friends, Mike and Linda Koopman, 
appeals from the summary judgment which was granted in favor of Appellees 
Fremont County School District # 1, Fremont County School District # 1 Board of 
Trustees, Craig Loper, Mark McClanahan, Larry Thompson, and Harry Rushing. The 
district court found that Koopman had not exhausted the administrative remedies 
which were available to him.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Koopman presents 
the following issues for our review:

 

1. Did the district court [err] in granting the 
defendant[s'] motion for summary judgment by holding, as a matter of law, that 
the plaintiff's claims and relief sought in this matter could have been brought 
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400-1485 
("IDEA") and therefore the plaintiff[] should have exhausted [his] 
administrative remedies prior to pursuing [his] claims in a court of 
law?

 

2. Even if, for any reason, this Court finds that the 
claims of the plaintiff[] could have been appropriately raised under the 
provisions of IDEA, based upon the undisputed facts of this case, would the 
requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies [have] been excused under 
the exception of futility or other applicable exception?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      In January 1992, 
Koopman, who was a special education student at Lander Valley High School, 
enrolled in the Naval Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps program which was 
offered at the high school. A Training Corps field trip was scheduled to be 
taken during the spring of 1992. The local Training Corps instructors informed 
Koopman that he would not be allowed to go on the field trip because of his 
medical problems. Koopman suffered from a seizure disorder, chronic back pain, 
and asthma. The instructors were concerned that Koopman's medical condition 
would pose a risk to Koopman and others who were on the field trip. Koopman's 
mother offered to accompany Koopman on the trip, but the instructors still 
refused to allow him to go.

 

[¶5]      A second field 
trip was scheduled to be taken in the fall of 1992. The instructors again 
refused to allow Koopman to take part in the trip because of his medical 
condition. The instructors also refused to allow Koopman to participate on the 
Training Corps rifle team. Koopman's parents met with the instructors to discuss 
the decision to restrict Koopman's Training Corps activities; however, the 
instructors still refused to allow Koopman to participate.

 

[¶6]      After the 
instructors denied Koopman permission to participate in a third field trip which 
was scheduled to be taken in the spring of 1993, Koopman's parents contacted the 
high school principal. The principal spoke with the instructors about the 
parents' concerns, but the decision to restrict Koopman's Training Corps 
activities was not altered. Although Koopman could have contested the 
instructors' decisions under the administrative procedures which were available 
to him, he did not seek any additional relief from the school district at that 
time. Koopman elected not to enroll in the Training Corps program in the fall of 
1993.

 

[¶7]      Koopman filed 
this lawsuit in May 1994 after the appellees denied his governmental claim. 
Koopman's complaint included claims under the "Rehabilitation Act of 1973," 29 
U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1990 & Supp. 1995), and the "Americans With 
Disabilities Act of 1990," 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1990). He also stated 
claims for negligent supervision of employees and negligent instruction. The 
appellees moved for a summary judgment, and the district court granted their 
motion, reasoning that, because Koopman had failed to exhaust the administrative 
remedies which were available to him under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (Supp. 1995) (the IDEA), he was barred 
from asserting his claims in the district court. Koopman appealed to this 
Court.

 

DISCUSSION

 

A. Standard of Review

 

[¶8]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and when the 
prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Kahrs v. Board of Trustees for Platte 
County School District No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 406 (Wyo. 1995); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). We examine the 
record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the 
motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may 
fairly be drawn from the record. Jack v. 
Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Los Angeles, 899 P.2d 891, 893 (Wyo. 1995). We 
do not accord any deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law. 
Kahrs, 901 P.2d  at 
406.

 

B. Exhaustion of Administrative 
Remedies

 

[¶9]      Congress passed 
the IDEA in an effort to help state and local agencies meet the burden of 
providing disabled children with a suitable education.1 20 U.S.C. § 1400; see also Natrona County School District No. 
1 v. Ryan, 764 P.2d 1019, 1025 (Wyo. 1988). In order for the states to 
qualify for federal funding under the IDEA, they had to have a policy in effect 
which guaranteed that all disabled children would receive a "free appropriate 
public education." Hayes Through Hayes v. 
Unified School District No. 377, 877 F.2d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1989). See also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 
310, 108 S. Ct. 592, 597, 98 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1988). The State of Wyoming 
specifically guarantees that all disabled children receive a free appropriate 
public education, and it receives funding under the IDEA. Ryan, 764 P.2d at 1024-27; see also Wyo. Stat. §§ 21-2-501 (1992) 
and 21-2-502 (1994).

 

[¶10]   Congress imposed explicit 
procedural safeguards and requirements in the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415. The 
procedural provisions encouraged maximum parental involvement in the children's 
education. Hayes Through Hayes, 877 F.2d  at 811; Learning Disabilities 
Association of Maryland, Inc. v. Board of Education of Baltimore County, 837 F. Supp. 717, 721 (D.Md. 1993).

 

Primary among the procedural safeguards employed by 
IDEA is the requirement that states provide parents of disabled students the 
right to seek review of any decision concerning their children's 
education.

 

Hope v. Cortines, 872 F. Supp. 14, 16 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). The procedural 
specifications also placed some responsibility with the parents for protecting 
their children's education rights. See 
Hayes Through Hayes, 877 F.2d  at 812. These responsibilities in many cases 
included an express requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted. Id.

 

[¶11]   20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) 
states:

 

Nothing in this title shall be construed to restrict 
or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, 
title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal statutes protecting 
the rights of children and youth with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under 
such laws seeking relief that is also available under this part, the procedures 
under subsections (b)(2) and (c) shall be exhausted to the same extent as would 
be required had the action been brought under this 
part.

 

(Emphasis added.) The 
exhaustion requirement serves a number of important purposes which 
include:

 

"(1) permitting the exercise of agency discretion and 
expertise on issues requiring these characteristics; (2) allowing the full 
development of technical issues and a factual record prior to court review; (3) 
preventing deliberate disregard and circumvention of agency procedures 
established by Congress; and (4) avoiding unnecessary judicial decisions by 
giving the agency the first opportunity to correct any 
error."

 

Hayes Through Hayes, 877 F.2d  at 814 (quoting Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. 
Teague, 830 F.2d 158, 160 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations 
omitted)).

 

[¶12]   Koopman did not follow the 
administrative procedures which were available to him in this case. He contends, 
however, that he was not required to exhaust the IDEA's administrative remedies 
because he was seeking compensatory damages and the IDEA provided only 
injunctive or other prospective relief. Section 1415(f) requires that, if the 
relief sought is available under the IDEA, the parties must exhaust the IDEA's 
administrative remedies even when they do not actually pursue a claim under that 
act. Hayes Through Hayes, 877 F.2d  at 
812. In other words, parties cannot circumvent the IDEA's exhaustion 
requirements by asserting claims under other laws while they deliberately avoid 
asserting a cognizable claim under the IDEA. Hope, 872 F. Supp.  at 17. In this case, 
we must, therefore, decide whether the relief which Koopman sought in his 
lawsuit was available under the IDEA.

 

[¶13]   The courts which have considered 
whether monetary damages are available under the IDEA have not reached 
consistent results. Compare Board of 
Education of East Windsor Regional School District v. Diamond ex rel. 
Diamond, 808 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1986) (monetary damages available under the 
IDEA) with Valerie J. v. Derry Cooperative School District, 771 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.H. 1991) (monetary damages not generally available under the IDEA). 
However, in determining whether a claimant should have exhausted his 
administrative remedies under the IDEA, some courts have considered more than 
the type of remedy requested in the complaint when they were defining the term 
"relief." See, e.g., Hayes Through 
Hayes, 877 F.2d 809; Hope, 872 F. Supp. 14. They have looked at the policies which were behind the IDEA and the 
statutory provisions which defined what types of complaints could be pursued 
under the IDEA's administrative appeals process to determine whether the relief 
sought by the claimant was obtainable under the IDEA. Hayes Through Hayes, 877 F.2d at 
813-14; see also Carey ex rel. Carey v. 
Maine School Administrative District # 17, 754 F. Supp. 906 (D.Maine 
1990).

 

[¶14]   Section 1415(b)(1)(E) broadly 
defines the matters which may be contested under the IDEA. Under that provision, 
parents may file complaints for

 

any matter relating to the identification, 
evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free 
appropriate public education to such child.

 

20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E). 
The courts, taking into consideration the liberal language of this statutory 
section, have ruled that the IDEA's exhaustion requirements reach a wide variety 
of claims which have to do with the public education of disabled children. See, e.g., M.R. v. Milwaukee Public 
Schools, 584 F. Supp. 767 (E.D.Wis. 1984). For example, claims made by 
handicapped students under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act are often also cognizable under the IDEA. See Hope, 872 F. Supp.  at 
20-21.

 

[¶15]   At the heart of Koopman's complaint 
is his contention that, when the appellees refused to allow him to join in the 
Training Corps activities because of his medical condition, they deprived him of 
the educational benefits which he could have derived from participating in the 
field trips and on the rifle team. The courts have recognized that 
extracurricular activities may be considered as being a part of the free 
appropriate public education which is guaranteed by the IDEA. See Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary School 
Athletic Association, 873 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1989); Rettig v. Kent City School District, 788 F.2d 328 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
478 U.S. 1005, 106 S. Ct. 3297, 92 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1986); Hollenbeck v. Board of Education of 
Rochelle Township, 699 F. Supp. 658 (N.D.Ill. 1988). The Training Corps 
rifle team and the field trips were examples of such extracurricular activities. 
Koopman could have claimed that, under the IDEA, he was entitled to participate 
in these activities as a part of his free appropriate public education. We 
conclude, therefore, that Koopman was required to exhaust his administrative 
remedies under the IDEA before he could pursue his claims in a court of law. 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(f).2

 

[¶16]   Koopman also argues that, even if 
he could have pursued his claims under the IDEA, he should be excused from 
having to exhaust his administrative remedies in this case because it would have 
been futile for him to comply with the administrative appeals process. Some 
courts have recognized various exceptions to the IDEA's exhaustion requirement. 
A party may be excused from having to exhaust his administrative remedies if (1) 
it would be futile for him to follow the administrative procedures, (2) the 
agency has adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general applicability which 
is contrary to the law, or (3) it is improbable that appropriate relief could be 
obtained through the administrative appeals process. Hope, 872 F. Supp.  at 22. Other courts 
have determined that a party may be pardoned from exhausting his administrative 
remedies when severe or irreparable harm will result from the exhaustion 
requirement being enforced. See Komninos 
By Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Board of Education, 13 F.3d 775, 778-79 
(3d Cir. 1994); see also New Mexico 
Association for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 
1982).

 

[¶17]   Koopman argues that it would have 
been futile for him to exhaust his administrative remedies because he had 
already been deprived of the educational benefits which he would have derived 
from participating in the field trips and on the rifle team and because he did 
not enroll in the Training Corps program in the fall of 1993. He maintains that 
the school could not replace the lost educational experiences through the 
administrative appeals process and that monetary damages were his only possible 
form of relief.

 

[¶18]   We conclude that it would not have 
been futile for Koopman to exhaust his administrative remedies and that, 
therefore, he was not excused from having to comply with the exhaustion 
requirement. If Koopman had made a timely effort to pursue his administrative 
remedies, the controversy could well have been resolved before he lost all the 
educational benefits from the various activities. The IDEA's procedural scheme 
contemplates exactly this type of situation by emphasizing the necessity of 
seeking the expertise of the education professionals through the administrative 
appeals process at the first hint of a controversy between the parents and the 
educational entity. Carey ex rel. 
Carey, 754 F. Supp.  at 923.

 

[¶19]   Even if, as Koopman suggests, the 
school could no longer replace the educational experiences which he missed as a 
result of the appellees' actions, we would still need the record from the 
administrative proceeding in order to decide whether Koopman was entitled to be 
compensated under the facts of this case. This type of case should be decided by 
the courts "only after a serious and thorough examination of the records of the 
proceedings undertaken by education professionals and the insights of those 
experts into the problems of the subject child." Id.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶20]   We hold that no genuine issue of 
material fact existed in this case and that the appellees were entitled to have 
a judgment as a matter of law.

 

[¶21]   Affirmed.

 

Footnotes

1 IDEA was formerly known as the 
Education of the Handicapped Act. See 
Hope v. Cortines, 872 F. Supp. 14, 16 n. 4 (E.D.N Y 1995), and Natrona County School District No. 1 v. 
Ryan, 764 P.2d 1019, 1025 n. 6 (Wyo. 1988), for summaries of the history of 
this act.

2 Koopman maintains that he was not 
required to exhaust his administrative remedies because the administrative 
appeals procedures provided by the high school did not comply with the IDEA 
requirements. We refuse to consider this issue on appeal because Koopman did not 
present it to the district court. Vigil 
v. Ruettgers, 887 P.2d 521, 526 (Wyo. 
1994).