Case Title: In re MM

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1992-09-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-068


 In re M.M., Juvenile                         Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
                                              Orange Family Court

                                              September Term, 1992



 Alan W. Cheever, J.

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Martha Csala,
    Assistant Attorney General, and Keith Aten, Law clerk (On the Brief),
    Waterbury for plaintiff-appellee

 Charles Martin and Gerald Tallman, Law Clerk (On the Brief), of Martin &
    Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Johnson, JJ.


   JOHNSON, J.  Appellant, mother of the juvenile, M.M., appeals an order of
 the Vermont Family Court of Orange County granting the petition of the
 Commissioner of Social and Rehabilitative Services (SRS) to terminate
 residual parental rights.  Appellant claims that the trial court erred in
 finding there was a substantial change in material circumstances and in
 finding that the best interests of M.M. required termination of all parental
 rights.  She argues that her parental rights were prematurely terminated in
 response to a false sense of "perceived urgency" created by SRS.  We affirm.
      M.M. was born on August 5, 1988, when appellant was fourteen years old.
 M.M. was first brought to the attention of SRS on April 2, 1990 when
 appellant's grandmother gave the police photographs showing M.M. with two
 black eyes.  On April 5, 1990, M.M. was placed in SRS custody pursuant to a
 temporary detention order.  Appellant claimed that the injuries were caused
 by a fall and denied that her husband, who was not M.M.'s biological father,
 had abused M.M.  On May 3, 1990, the court found M.M. to be a child in need
 of care and supervision.  The court based its conclusion upon findings that
 M.M.'s stepfather had physically abused her, thereby causing the black eyes;
 that appellant failed to protect M.M. from abuse; and that appellant did not
 seek medical care for M.M.  The court also found that appellant was a poor
 caretaker of M.M. and that M.M.'s legal guardian, appellant's father, also
 failed to protect her and was uncooperative with authorities seeking to
 protect her.
      At a disposition hearing, held July 9, 1990, legal guardianship and
 custody of M.M. was transferred to SRS, with residual parental rights and
 responsibilities remaining with appellant.  The court further ordered that
 M.M.'s stepfather have no further contact with M.M. after finding that in
 addition to physically abusing M.M., he had previously abused his own
 eighteen-month-old daughter, M.G., and that an outstanding court order
 barred him from any contact with her.  The court also approved SRS's plan of
 services for the family, which had as its goal reunification of appellant
 and M.M.  SRS's plan enumerated several steps and programs that appellant
 would have to complete before custody could be restored, including
 counselling programs, stabilization of her economic and living situation,
 and regular visits with M.M.
      SRS's case goal remained reunification until the July 1991 eighteen-
 month review when the goal was changed to termination of parental rights
 (TPR) and adoption of M.M. by her foster family.  SRS providers determined
 in the eighteen-month evaluation that appellant required at least twelve to
 eighteen months more of continued counselling before reunification could
 even be considered.  That determination was based on many factors,
 including the following: basic parenting skills had not been learned and
 safety and protection concerns had not been adequately addressed; appellant
 had separated from and reconciled numerous times with her husband, who had
 spent time in prison, abused his own infant daughter, abused M.M., and was
 physically abusive to appellant herself; appellant continued to support her
 husband's denial of having abused M.M., which greatly put in doubt her
 ability to protect M.M. in the future; the risk of potential substance abuse
 was considered high and a major risk factor for future abuse of M.M.
      At the same time, Dr. Racusin, who performed psychiatric evaluations of
 both M.M. and appellant, determined that if reunification could not safely
 occur within one to two months, M.M.'s foster placement should become
 permanent "if she is to be spared from unacceptable psychological trauma."
 SRS providers were all in agreement that M.M.'s situation needed to be
 stabilized within the next one to two months and that appellant would not be
 able to adequately care for and protect M.M. at any time in the near future.
 Thus, they unanimously recommended TPR.  Despite appellant's "demonstrated
 investment in the reunification plan," SRS service providers were all in
 agreement that she was still unable to provide for M.M.'s safety, care and
 nurture.
      The family court made further findings of fact regarding appellant's
 situation after the eighteen month evaluation up until the date of the
 court's order, December 31, 1991.   By December 1991, appellant had moved
 more than eighteen times, and, during parts of that time, her moves were so
 erratic and frequent that it was difficult, and at times impossible, to
 locate her.  Appellant was not currently employed nor was she seeking
 employment or employment-related training, and she had resisted such
 training in the past.  Appellant was dependent on others for transportation
 and had not attempted to obtain a driver's license.  Even though SRS
 provided bus vouchers to use to visit M.M., appellant was unable to remember
 on several occasions to call SRS the Friday before a Monday visit to confirm
 that she would be arriving at the bus station, and therefore missed the
 meetings.  Although appellant and her husband were living apart, they had
 not filed for divorce.  She was then living with a man who also had a
 criminal record, who was known to be physically abusive, and who was an
 untreated alcoholic.  They did not have a steady home.
      On December 31, 1991, the family court granted SRS's petition, thereby
 terminating appellant's residual parental rights and transferring legal
 custody and guardianship, without limitation as to adoption, to SRS.  The
 present appeal ensued.
      Vermont law requires that courts employ a two-step analysis in
 determining whether to terminate residual parental rights.  See In re J.H.,
 156 Vt. 66, 68-69, 587 A.2d. 1009, 1011 (1991); In re H.A., 153 Vt. 504,
 514, 572 A.2d 884, 890 (1990) (interpreting the former 33 V.S.A. {{ 659,
 667, currently found at {{ 5531(a), 5540).  First, to modify an existing
 disposition order, the court must find "that changed circumstances so
 require in the best interest of the child."  33 V.S.A. { 5531(a).  The
 proponent of the modification must show the change to be a "substantial
 change in material circumstances" so as to warrant modification.  In re
 J.H., 156 Vt. at 71, 572 A.2d  at 1012.  Second, the court must determine
 whether the best interests of the child, as set out by 33 V.S.A. { 5540,
 require that all parental rights and responsibilities be terminated. Id. at
 68-69, 587 A.2d  at 1011.  Appellant claims the trial court failed to
 properly evaluate M.M.'s case under either step of the required analysis.
 We disagree.
      A substantial change in material circumstances is "most often found
 when the parent's ability to care properly for the child has either
 stagnated or deteriorated."  In re H.A., 153 Vt. at 515, 572 A.2d  at 890.
 "Stagnation" can be shown by "the passage of time with no improvement in
 parental capacity to care properly for the child."  In re J.R., 153 Vt. 85,
 99, 570 A.2d 154, 161 (1989).  The court's finding that a parent will be
 unlikely to resume his or her parental duties within a reasonable time must
 be supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re H.A., 153 Vt. at 513,
 572 A.2d  at 889.  An explicit finding of changed circumstances is not
 required to uphold a modification order; "[r]ather, the changed
 circumstances test is met when the findings in the case are 'replete with
 facts sufficient to meet the required standard.'"  Id. at 515, 572 A.2d  at
 890 (quoting In re C.L., 151 Vt. 480, 483, 563 A.2d 241, 243-44 (1989)).
 The court's findings will be upheld unless clearly erroneous, and its
 conclusions will be affirmed if supported by the findings.  In re H.A., 153
 Vt. at 515, 572 A.2d  at 890.
      Here, the trial court made numerous findings regarding appellant's
 participation in the programs required by the reunification plan and
 regarding her inability to resume care for M.M. within a reasonable time.
 The court based its findings on testimony of several SRS service providers
 and psychologists, who all believed appellant would be unable to resume
 full-time parental duties within a reasonable time, and who all believed it
 to be in M.M.'s best interest to pursue termination of parental rights.  The
 court found this testimony to be credible, and evaluated all testimony and
 evidence using the clear and convincing evidence standard.
      Appellant claims that she had been making improvements in her ability
 to adequately care for M.M.  The court did find that during the first
 eighteen months M.M. was in SRS custody, appellant showed some improvement
 at points and tried to comply with the reunification plan.  The court found
 that although appellant did not show much effort in visiting with M.M. or
 in attending recommended counselling programs during the spring and summer
 of 1990, she regularly attended all recommended programs beginning in the
 fall of 1990, and had weekly visits with M.M. for increasingly longer time
 intervals.  She and M.M. were clearly bonded, and appellant acted
 appropriately with M.M. during her visits.  The court further found that
 appellant's participation once again slacked off, understandably so, after
 SRS's decision to pursue TPR, and she missed most visits with M.M. after
 that time, causing M.M. great distress on at least one occasion.
      Although the trial court recognized brief periods of progress in
 learning to parent M.M., the court concluded that appellant's ability to
 provide for, care, and protect M.M. either stagnated or deteriorated
 following any such gains.  The court concluded that appellant was unable to
 provide the necessary environment for M.M.'s well-being, nor did she show
 promise of being able to do so within a reasonable time.  Because these
 conclusions are amply supported by the record, they must be affirmed.
      The second step of the analysis requires consideration of the four
 factors, as set forth in 33 V.S.A. { 5540, to be used in determining whether
 M.M.'s best interests mandate termination of all of appellant's parental
 rights and responsibilities.  Section 5540 reads:
            At the time of . . . a modification hearing under
         section 5532 of this title . . . the court shall
         consider the best interests of the child in accordance
         with the following:

           (1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child
         with his natural parents, his foster parents if any, his
         siblings, and any other person who may significantly
         affect the child's best interests;

           (2) The child's adjustment to his home, school, and
         community;

           (3) The likelihood that the natural parent will be
         able to resume his parental duties within a reasonable
         period of time; and

           (4) Whether the natural parent has played and
         continues to play a constructive role, including
         personal contact and demonstrated love and affection, in
         the child's welfare.
 The most critical factor in determining a child's best interests is whether
 the parent will be able to resume her parental duties within a reasonable
 time.  In re R.W., 154 Vt. 649, 650, 577 A.2d 253, 253 (1990)(mem.); In re
 L.A., 154 Vt. 147, 158, 574 A.2d 782, 788 (1990) (interpreting identical
 provision of prior statute).  The parent's inability to resume parental
 duties within a reasonable time must be shown by clear and convincing
 evidence.  See In re L.A., 154 Vt. at 158-59, 574 A.2d  at 788.
      Appellant argues that SRS created a "perceived urgency" by placing M.M.
 with a foster family seeking to adopt, and that this false urgency caused
 the court to misinterpret the requirement of "reasonable time" under { 5540,
 and to improperly consider M.M.'s relations with her foster family.  We
 disagree.  The court specifically found that a reasonable time had passed
 and appellant was still at least twelve to eighteen months of counselling
 away from even being in a position to be considered for reunification.
 While the court found that appellant had made some progress, each gain was
 followed by subsequent stagnation or deterioration.  Furthermore, the court
 found that further prolonging the process, especially in light of
 appellant's lack of a present inclination to participate in the program,
 would only be to the detriment of M.M., who needs "a caring, safe, and
 stable environment in which to thrive."  These findings were based on ample
 evidence that the court found to be "clear and convincing."
      The court did not err in considering M.M.'s positive relationship with
 her foster family.  The court's findings under { 5540(3) were based upon the
 testimony of SRS providers regarding appellant's progress and potential
 ability to care and protect M.M., and not upon an improper weighing of
 appellant's ability to care for M.M. versus that of the foster family.  A
 consideration of M.M.'s interactions and interrelations with her foster
 family was properly considered, however, in evaluating her best interests
 under subsections (1) and (2) of { 5540, as required by the statute.
      Although we uphold the trial court's findings under { 5540 based on
 these facts and circumstances, we are not unmindful that once a child is
 placed in SRS custody, SRS "has the power to shape the historical events
 that form the basis for termination" of parental rights.  Santosky v.
 Kramer,