Case Title: Belle v. Goldasich, Jr., et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1171001

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2019-09-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: September 13, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2019
____________________
1171001
____________________
Antoinette Belle, as personal representative of the Estate
of Edith Louise Mitchell, deceased
v.
Dennis E. Goldasich, Jr., et al.
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-18-42)
MITCHELL, Justice.
This is a legal-malpractice case that stems from a
medical-malpractice action.  Antoinette Belle, as personal
representative of the estate of Edith Louise Mitchell,
1171001
deceased, sued various health-care providers that treated
Mitchell while she was hospitalized in April 2009.  Belle
eventually reached settlements with all of those health-care
providers except two physicians.  The trial court entered a
summary judgment against Belle and in favor of the two
physicians, bringing the medical-malpractice action to a
close.
Belle then filed a legal-malpractice case against four
attorneys and three law firms that had represented her at
varying 
times 
in 
the 
medical-malpractice action, 
alleging 
that
they had been negligent in representing her.  Belle later
brought an additional claim of fraudulent concealment.  The
attorneys and law firms denied the allegations against them,
arguing that Belle's claims were untimely and that they had no
factual or legal basis.  The trial court agreed and entered
judgments in favor of the attorneys and law firms.  Belle
appeals.  We affirm the judgments.
Facts and Procedural History
On April 23, 2009, Mitchell was transported by ambulance
to a Mobile hospital after complaining of chest pain. 
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Mitchell was admitted to the hospital and was treated over the
next seven days.  On April 30, 2009, she passed away.
On April 29, 2011, Belle, the court-appointed personal
representative of Mitchell's estate, filed a complaint in the
Mobile Circuit Court alleging that the hospital, nurses, and
physicians that had treated Mitchell in the week before her
death had provided her with substandard care that proximately
caused her death.  Belle claimed that those health-care
providers had breached the applicable standards of care by
failing to ensure that Mitchell was given her corticosteroid
medication while she was hospitalized, even though they had
been given notice that Mitchell had been taking that
prescription medication for approximately 11 years.  The
complaint further alleged that the health-care providers
failed to timely recognize Mitchell's symptoms of withdrawal
from the corticosteroid and her dehydration and that those
failures hastened the organ failure that ultimately caused her
death. 
Belle's complaint was prepared and signed by Dennis E.
Goldasich, Jr., and Victoria Dye, attorneys who were at the
time affiliated with Fischer, Goldasich & Aughtman, LLC, a
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Birmingham law firm ("the Fischer firm").  Goldasich
subsequently left the Fischer firm and started Goldasich &
Associates, LLC ("the Goldasich firm"), taking Belle's case
with him.  Goldasich properly notified the trial court at the
time he separated from the Fischer firm that he and the
Goldasich firm would thereafter be Belle's counsel of record. 
Because Dye remained at the Fischer firm, she asked the trial
court to allow her to withdraw from the case.  In October
2011, Dye's motion to withdraw was granted, and it is
undisputed that Dye and the Fischer firm had no involvement in
Belle's case after that time.  In April 2012, J. Allan Brown
of J. Allan Brown, LLC, a Mobile law firm ("the Brown firm"),
filed a notice of appearance indicating that he would also be
representing Belle in the medical-malpractice action.  In May
2015, Brown's associate, Joseph F. McGowin IV, filed his own
notice of appearance on behalf of Belle. 
In January 2013, Belle reached a settlement with the
hospital and its nurses and agreed to dismiss them from the
case, leaving only her claims against two physicians to be
resolved.  Those claims proceeded toward trial, and in March
2015 Belle's expert witness, Dr. Ednan Bajwa, was deposed. 
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During his deposition, Dr. Bajwa testified that Mitchell's
death had been caused by the failure of the two physicians to
diagnose and treat a urinary-tract infection from which
Mitchell was suffering when she was hospitalized.  Dr. Bajwa
testified 
that 
the 
untreated 
urinary-tract 
infection
eventually became septic and caused Mitchell's death.  
The two physicians thereafter moved the trial court to
exclude Dr. Bajwa's testimony about Mitchell's alleged
urinary-tract infection because Belle's complaint did not
assert a claim based on the failure to diagnose and treat such
an infection.  On August 3, 2015, Belle filed an amended
complaint in which she asserted for the first time that the
two physicians had failed to diagnose and treat Mitchell's
urinary-tract 
infection 
and 
that 
this 
negligence 
had
proximately caused Mitchell's death.  On August 18, 2015, the
trial court denied the two physicians' motion to exclude Dr.
Bajwa's testimony.  
It is not entirely clear from the record what transpired
over the next 17 months, but on February 1, 2017, Belle's case
was transferred to a new judge.  That same day, Brown,
McGowin, and the Brown firm moved to withdraw from the case,
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and on February 6, 2017, the trial court granted their motion. 
On March 29, 2017, the two physicians moved the trial court
again to exclude Dr. Bajwa's testimony about a urinary-tract
infection.  The two physicians also moved the trial court to
enter a partial summary judgment in their favor on Belle's
claim asserting that Mitchell's death was caused by an
untreated urinary-tract infection.  
The 
physicians 
argued 
that
the claim was not brought until August 2015 –– after the
expiration of the two-year statute of limitations that governs
medical-malpractice actions –– and that the claim did not
relate back to the original complaint and was thus not
permissible under Rule 15(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.  While those
motions were pending, Edward Johnson and Donald Stewart with
Stewart & Stewart, P.C., filed notices of appearance on behalf
of Belle.  Goldasich and the Goldasich firm thereafter moved
to withdraw from the case, and on April 17, 2017, they were
permitted to do so, leaving only Johnson and Stewart as
Belle's attorneys of record.  At the time Goldasich and the
Goldasich firm were allowed to withdraw, the claim based on
allegations of an untreated urinary-tract infection had been
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successfully lodged and the physicians' motion for a partial
summary judgment was pending.
On July 19, 2017, three months after Goldasich and the
Goldasich firm had withdrawn, the trial court entered a
partial summary judgment in favor of the two physicians on
Belle's claim alleging that they had failed to diagnose and
treat Mitchell's urinary-tract infection.  The trial court
held that the claim did not relate back to the original
complaint and was therefore barred by the two-year statute of
limitations. 
 
Belle 
thereafter petitioned this 
Court, 
pursuant
to Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., for permission to file an
immediate appeal of the trial court's judgment.  In October
2017, this Court unanimously denied her petition.  The two
physicians subsequently moved the trial court to enter a
summary judgment in their favor on the remaining claims
asserted against them by Belle.  In February 2018, the trial
court granted the motion of the two physicians and entered a
final judgment in their favor.  Belle did not appeal that
judgment.
On December 5, 2017, Belle sued Goldasich and the
Goldasich firm, Dye and the Fischer firm, and Brown, McGowin,
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and the Brown firm (hereinafter referred to collectively as 
"the 
attorney 
defendants"), alleging 
that 
they 
had 
negligently
failed to assert a claim against the two physicians for
failing to diagnose and treat Mitchell's urinary-tract
infection before the statute of limitations for that claim
expired.  The attorney defendants thereafter moved the trial
court to enter judgments in their favor, arguing that Belle's
claims were untimely under the Alabama Legal Services
Liability Act, § 6-5-570 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the
ALSLA"), which by its terms governs all actions in Alabama in
which an attorney or law firm is alleged to have breached the
standard of care in the provision of legal services.1  See
Sessions v. Espy, 854 So. 2d 515, 522 (Ala. 2002) ("From these
Code sections [§§ 6–5–572 and 6–5–573, Ala. Code 1975], it is
clear that the ALSLA applies to all actions against 'legal
service providers' alleging a breach of their duties in
providing legal services.").  The attorney defendants
1The attorney defendants aligned themselves into three
groups before the trial court: 1) Goldasich and the Goldasich
firm; 2) Dye and the Fischer firm; and 3) Brown, McGowin, and
the Brown firm.  Each group was represented by its own counsel
and filed its own pleadings and motions.  These groupings have
continued on appeal, but 
because the groups' arguments largely
overlap, we refer to the groups collectively throughout this
opinion.
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specifically argued that Belle's claims were barred by § 6-5-
574(a), Ala. Code 1975, which provides:
"All legal service liability actions against a legal
service provider must be commenced within two years
after the act or omission or failure giving rise to
the claim, and not afterwards; provided, that if the
cause of action is not discovered and could not
reasonably have been discovered within such period,
then the action may be commenced within six months
from the date of such discovery or the date of
discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to
such discovery, whichever is earlier; provided,
further, that in no event may the action be
commenced more than four years after such act or
omission or failure ...."
See also Cockrell v. Pruitt, 214 So. 3d 324, 330 (Ala. 2016)
(explaining that § 6-5-574(a) "sets forth a two-year statute
of limitations and four-year statute of repose for legal-
malpractice claims").  The attorney defendants argued that
both the alleged negligent act that was the basis of Belle's
legal-malpractice claim (the filing of a deficient complaint)
and Belle's alleged injury (the running of the statute of
limitations applicable to her medical-malpractice claim)
occurred in April 2011.  Thus, they argued, Belle's December
2017 
complaint, 
which 
asserted 
a 
legal-malpractice claim 
based
on events occurring in April 2011, was outside the ALSLA's
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two-year statute of limitations and four-year statute of
repose.
In March 2018, Belle filed an amended complaint in which
she asserted two separate counts.  The first count alleged
that Goldasich and the Goldasich firm, and Dye and the Fischer
firm, had breached the standard of care by failing in the
April 2011 complaint "to allege facts sufficient to indicate
a transaction or occurrence upon which a subsequent amended
complaint could relate back to the filing of the original
complaint under Rule 15(c)."  Belle's second count alleged
that all the attorney defendants except Dye had breached the
standard of care by concealing or otherwise failing to inform
Belle that she had a potential legal-malpractice claim against
those of the attorney defendants who had prepared the April
2011 complaint because that complaint was so inartfully
drafted that a subsequently asserted claim based on Dr.
Bajwa's expert opinion could not relate back to it.
The 
attorney defendants thereafter renewed 
their 
motions,
reiterating that Belle's claims were untimely and therefore
barred by § 6-5-574(a).  They also argued that her second
count had no factual or legal basis because the trial court
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1171001
allowed Belle to amend her initial complaint to assert a claim
against the two physicians based on Dr. Bajwa's untreated-
urinary-tract-infection theory, and that claim was viable at
all times while they represented Belle.  Thus, the attorney
defendants argued, Belle had no potential legal-malpractice
claim based on the drafting of the April 2011 complaint while
they represented her and they could not have breached the
standard of care by failing to inform her of a potential claim
she did not actually have.  On June 11, 2018, the trial court
entered 
three 
orders 
granting 
the 
attorney 
defendants' 
motions
and entering judgments in their favor.  On July 23, 2018,
Belle filed her notice of appeal to this Court.
Standard of Review
The attorney defendants filed separate motions asking the
trial court to enter judgments in their favor.  Goldasich and
the Goldasich firm asked the trial court to enter a judgment
for them on the pleadings, while Dye and the Fischer firm, and
Brown, McGowin, and the Brown firm, asked the trial court to
dismiss Belle's claims.  All those motions, however, made
similar arguments, and some of those motions even expressly
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adopted and incorporated the arguments asserted by the other
attorney defendants in their motions.  
In ruling in favor of the attorney defendants, the trial
court entered a separate order on each motion.  Thus, one
order granted a motion for a judgment on the pleadings and two
of the orders granted motions to dismiss.  Regardless of the
distinction in the form of the judgments entered by the trial
court, the only questions before this Court are questions of
law.  Therefore, all the judgments are subject to the same de
novo standard of review.  See Walter Energy, Inc. v. Audley
Capital Advisors LLP, 176 So. 3d 821, 825 (Ala. 2015)
(explaining that "we review the sufficiency of [the
plaintiff's] complaint de novo" when reviewing a 
trial court's
order granting a motion to dismiss); Ex parte Capstone Bldg.
Corp., 96 So. 3d 77, 81 (Ala. 2012) ("The question presented
is a pure question of law subject to de novo review by this
Court."); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 776 So.
2d 81, 82 (Ala. 2000) ("A judgment on the pleadings is subject
to a de novo review.").
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Scope of the Appeal
Before undertaking a substantive legal analysis, it is
important to clarify what has been presented for appeal. 
Belle's notice of appeal did not expressly indicate that she
was appealing only the judgments entered against her on the
second count, but she has now effectively conceded that the
claim asserted in her first count –– based on the alleged
negligent drafting of the April 2011 medical-malpractice
complaint –– is time-barred by the statute of repose in § 6-5-
574(a).
The applicable statute of repose provides that "in no
event" may a legal-malpractice action "be commenced more than
four years after" the act, omission, or failure "giving rise
to the claim."  § 6-5-574(a).  See also Ex parte Seabol, 782
So. 2d 212, 214 (Ala. 2000) ("Section 6–5–574(a) further
provides that any action filed beyond the two-year limit 'must
be filed within four years of the wrongful act or omission,
regardless of whether the client has suffered damage.'" 
(quoting Ex parte Panell, 756 So. 2d 862, 867 (Ala. 1999))). 
The attorney defendants argued to the trial court, and now
argue to this Court, that the statute of repose bars the claim
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asserted by Belle in count one because she did not initiate
her legal-malpractice action until December 2017, more than
six years after the April 2011 complaint was drafted and
filed.  Their argument appears to be meritorious, but we
ultimately do not need to make that determination because
Belle has made no effort on appeal to explain why the statute
of repose should not apply to this claim.
In Fogarty v. Southworth, 953 So. 2d 1225 (Ala. 2006),
this Court explained:
"When an appellant confronts an issue below that the
appellee contends warrants a judgment in its favor
and the trial court's order does not specify a basis
for its ruling, the omission of any argument on
appeal as to that issue in the appellant's principal
brief constitutes a waiver with respect to the
issue."
Id. at 1232.  The attorney defendants asked the trial court to
enter judgments in their favor on count one of Belle's amended
complaint based on, among other things, the statute of repose. 
The trial court granted their motions without explaining its
rationale, and Belle has failed to address in her brief to
this Court what effect the statute of repose has on count one
of her amended complaint.  Accordingly, we conclude that she
has waived any arguments on this issue and has effectively
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abandoned count one.  See also Freeman v. Holyfield, 179 So.
3d 101, 105 (Ala. 2015) (holding that the appellant waived any
argument that the trial court erred by holding one of his
claims to be time-barred because he presented no argument on
that issue).
We thus focus our analysis on count two of Belle's
amended complaint, which alleges that the attorney defendants
fraudulently concealed Belle's potential legal-malpractice
claim against the drafters of the April 2011 complaint once
Dr. Bajwa gave his deposition.
Discussion
Count two of Belle's amended complaint is denominated as
a concealment claim and is in the nature of a fraudulent-
suppression claim.  In Coilplus–Alabama, Inc. v. Vann, 53 So.
3d 898 (Ala. 2010), this Court explained that for a plaintiff
to prevail in a legal-malpractice action based on a claim of
fraudulent suppression, the plaintiff must establish the
following elements:
"(1) [T]he defendant had a duty to disclose an
existing material fact; (2) the defendant concealed
or 
suppressed 
that 
material 
fact; 
(3) 
the
defendant's suppression induced the plaintiff to act
or refrain from acting; and (4) the plaintiff
suffered actual damage as a proximate result. 
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Freightliner, LLC v. Whatley Contract Carriers, LLC,
932 So. 2d 883, 891 (Ala. 2005).  "'[A]n action for
suppression will lie only if the defendant actually
knows the fact alleged to be suppressed.'"  Cook's
Pest Control, Inc. v. Rebar, 28 So. 3d 716, 726
(Ala. 2009) (quoting McGarry v. Flournoy, 624 So. 2d
1359, 1362 (Ala. 1993))."
Id. at 909 (emphasis added).  The attorney defendants argue
that Belle cannot prevail on her claim because it is
undisputed that they had no knowledge of the supposed fact
they allegedly suppressed –– that Belle had a potential legal-
malpractice claim against the attorneys who drafted the April
2011 complaint –– while they represented her because she did
not, in fact, have such a claim.  After reviewing the relevant
facts and the chronology of the medical-malpractice action, we
agree with the attorney defendants.  We examine below each of
the attorney-defendant groups, in the order in which they
withdrew from the medical-malpractice action.
A.  Dye and the Fischer firm
The first of the attorney defendants to withdraw from
Belle's case were Dye and the Fischer firm.  Their involvement
in the medical-malpractice action ended in October 2011 when
Goldasich left the Fischer firm, taking Belle's case with him. 
Notably, this was well before the alleged deficiencies in the
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April 2011 complaint came to light in Dr. Bajwa's March 2015
deposition.  Accordingly, it is undisputed that Dye and the
Fischer firm could not have had any knowledge that the April
2011 complaint was deficient or that Belle might have a legal-
malpractice claim against its drafters during the time they
represented Belle.  In the reply brief Belle has filed on
appeal, she acknowledges as much and concedes that Dye and the
Fischer firm have no liability for the claims she asserted
against them in count two of her amended complaint.
B.  Brown, McGowin, and the Brown firm
The next of the attorney defendants to withdraw from
Belle's case were Brown, McGowin, and the Brown firm in
February 2017.  They represented Belle after Dr. Bajwa's March
2015 testimony introduced a theory regarding the cause of
Mitchell's death that did not have an express basis in the
April 2011 complaint.  If Dr. Bajwa's deposition testimony did
not apprise them that there might be a deficiency in the April
2011 complaint, the two physicians' subsequent motion to
exclude Dr. Bajwa's testimony certainly would have done so. 
Based on that awareness, Belle amended her April 2011
complaint in August 2015 specifically to assert a medical-
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malpractice claim based on Dr. Bajwa's testimony.  That same
month, the trial court denied the physicians' motion to
exclude Dr. Bajwa's testimony.  
In April 2016, the trial court granted a motion filed by
Belle seeking leave to file a second amended complaint that
included the previously added claim against the 
two 
physicians
based on Dr. Bajwa's theory of causation.  Thus, for all that
appears, any deficiency that might have existed in the April
2011 complaint was cured no later than April 2016 when the
trial court allowed Belle to file an amended complaint
asserting a claim based on Dr. Bajwa's testimony about an
untreated urinary-tract infection.  Belle could not have
asserted a legal-malpractice claim based on deficiencies in
the April 2011 complaint after that time because there were no
longer any deficiencies in that complaint.2  It necessarily
follows that Brown, McGowin, and the Brown firm could not have
known that Belle had a potential legal-malpractice claim when
she did not, in fact, have such a claim.
2We further note that, even if Belle had immediately
asserted a legal-malpractice claim against the drafters of the
April 2011 complaint following Dr. Bajwa's deposition, and
even if that claim was held to be timely, it would
nevertheless have been rendered moot once the trial court
allowed the amended complaint.
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None of these facts had changed in February 2017 when
Brown, McGowin, and the Brown firm withdrew from Belle's case. 
At that time, Belle's amended complaint asserted a claim of
medical-malpractice based on the physicians' alleged failure
to diagnose and treat Mitchell's urinary-tract infection, and
the case was presumably moving toward a trial.  Brown,
McGowin, and the Brown firm could not have told Belle that she
had a legal-malpractice claim against the drafters of the
original April 2011 complaint while they represented her
because, in fact, she did not have such a claim.  To the best
of Brown, McGowin, and the Brown firm's knowledge, Belle had
not suffered any injury from the allegedly deficient April
2011 complaint because the trial court had allowed the
amendment.  The legal-malpractice claim asserted against
Brown, McGowin, and the Brown firm in count two of Belle's
complaint accordingly fails and was properly dismissed by the
trial court.
C.  Goldasich and the Goldasich firm
The remaining attorney defendants, Goldasich and the
Goldasich firm, did not withdraw from Belle's case until April
2017.  Like Brown, McGowin, and the Brown firm, they also
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represented Belle after Dr. Bajwa introduced a new theory of
causation in March 2015, and much of the analysis in the
immediately preceding section applies to them as well.  Most
significantly, when Goldasich and the Goldasich firm withdrew
in April 2017, Belle's medical-malpractice claim based on the
untreated urinary-tract infection was pending and viable, and
Goldasich and the Goldasich firm would have had no basis upon
which to inform Belle that she had a legal-malpractice claim
against the drafters of the April 2011 complaint. 
The circumstances of Goldasich and the Goldasich firm's
withdrawal were, however, different in one respect.  On March
29, 2017, while Goldasich and the Goldasich firm were still
representing Belle, the two physicians filed a motion
requesting a partial summary judgment on Belle's claim that
Mitchell's death was caused by an untreated urinary-tract
infection.  This motion was pending at the time of Goldasich
and the Goldasich firm's withdrawal from the case.  But the
mere possibility that the trial court might reverse its
previous decision and hold that the urinary-tract-infection
claim was untimely provides no basis upon which to conclude
that Goldasich and the Goldasich firm should have informed
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Belle that she had a potential legal-malpractice claim against
the drafters of the April 2011 complaint.  The critical fact
is that the trial court had allowed Belle to amend her
complaint to assert a claim based on Dr. Bajwa's urinary-
tract-infection theory, and that claim was pending at all
times until after Goldasich and the Goldasich firm withdrew
from the case.  Accordingly, Goldasich and the Goldasich firm
could not have informed Belle that she had a legal-malpractice
claim 
when 
the 
physicians 
filed 
their 
partial-summary-judgment
motion in March 2017 because there was, in fact, no basis on
which to assert such a claim at that time.  Goldasich and the
Goldasich firm, therefore, did not breach the standard of care
by not informing Belle that she had a potential legal-
malpractice claim against the drafters of the April 2011
complaint, and the judgment on the pleadings entered by the
trial court in their favor was proper.
Conclusion
Belle sued the attorney defendants alleging that they
breached the standard of care while they represented her in a
medical-malpractice action.  Belle specifically asserted that
some of the attorney defendants had been negligent in the
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drafting of her medical-malpractice complaint and that some of
the attorney defendants had breached the standard of care by
failing to apprise her of that negligence.  The trial court
concluded that all the attorney defendants were entitled to
judgments in their favor, and, for the reasons discussed
above, the judgments were proper.  Accordingly, those
judgments are hereby affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Wise, Sellers, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ.,
concur in the result.
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