Case Title: Kelso v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 101866

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette and Mims, JJ., 
and Lacy and Koontz, S.JJ. 
 
HARRY MURPHY KELSO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
v.  Record No. 101866 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      JUNE 9, 2011 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether venue in 
Hanover County was proper for the prosecution and conviction of 
Harry Murphy Kelso for three counts of causing a juvenile to 
assist in the distribution of marijuana to a third party in 
violation of Code § 18.2-255(A)(ii). 
BACKGROUND 
 
The facts are not in dispute.  On three occasions in the 
spring of 2007, Hanover County Sheriff’s deputies provided a 
confidential informant $500 for the purchase of marijuana.  On 
each occasion the confidential informant purchased marijuana 
from M.B. with the money provided by the deputies.  M.B. was 
seventeen years of age at the time the confidential informant 
made these purchases. 
On the first occasion, the confidential informant met M.B. 
in Hanover County.  M.B. got into the informant’s car and they 
traveled to Kelso’s apartment in Henrico County.  The informant 
waited in his vehicle while M.B. entered Kelso’s apartment and 
returned with the marijuana.  M.B. and the confidential 
informant then traveled back to Hanover County where the 
transaction was consummated.  On the two subsequent occasions, 
the informant met M.B. in Hanover County, M.B. traveled alone to 
Henrico County to meet Kelso and obtain the marijuana, and then 
returned to Hanover County to complete the sale of marijuana to 
the confidential informant.  Hanover County Sheriff’s deputies 
conducted surveillance of each transaction which included 
installing a camera and an audio listening device in the 
informant’s vehicle and following M.B. and the informant during 
the transactions. 
The evidence further established that Kelso also sold M.B. 
a quarter-pound of marijuana each week since April of 2007 and 
that he knew M.B. was seventeen or eighteen years of age.  M.B. 
testified that he began selling marijuana to friends and people 
he knew at Atlee High School in Hanover County, that he had 
smoked marijuana with Kelso and that between August 2006 and 
August 2007 he had purchased approximately fifteen pounds of 
marijuana from Kelso.  Occasionally, friends from high school 
would accompany M.B. to Kelso’s apartment, however, Kelso would 
sell marijuana only to M.B., who in turn sold it to his friends. 
 
Kelso was indicted by a multijurisdictional grand jury for 
three counts of violating Code § 18.2-255(A)(ii) and tried in 
2 
 
the Circuit Court of Hanover County.1  At the close of the 
Commonwealth’s evidence, Kelso argued that venue in Hanover 
County was improper and the indictments should be dismissed 
because there was no evidence that he was in Hanover County or 
conducted any transaction involving the distribution of drugs in 
that county.  The trial court disagreed, denied the motion to 
dismiss and entered judgments of conviction on each of the three 
counts.  The Court of Appeals affirmed Kelso’s convictions, 
Kelso v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 30, 41, 698 S.E.2d 263, 268 
(2010). 
DISCUSSION 
 
Kelso argues here, as he did in the Court of Appeals and 
the trial court, that his indictments for violation of Code 
§ 18.2-255(A)(ii) should be dismissed because the evidence 
established that he did not undertake any action relating to the 
sale of marijuana in Hanover County.  His distribution of 
marijuana to M.B. occurred solely in Henrico County.  Because 
the prosecution of a crime must be conducted “in the county or 
city in which the offense was committed,” Code § 19.2-244, Kelso 
asserts that the indictments should have been dismissed and 
subsequent convictions should be vacated. 
                                                 
1 Kelso also was indicted and convicted of conspiracy to 
distribute more than five pounds of marijuana in violation of 
Code §§ 18.2-256 and 18.2-248.1.  That conviction is not the 
subject of this appeal. 
3 
 
Kelso correctly recites the general venue statute providing 
for prosecution of a crime in the county or city in which the 
crime was committed, except as otherwise provided by law.  Code 
§ 19.2-244.  Application of this statute requires a 
determination of where a specific crime was “committed.”  This 
determination is straightforward when the crime is a discrete 
act.  For example, the distribution of marijuana to a juvenile 
in violation of Code § 18.2-255(A)(i) is a discrete act which 
when completed constitutes the commission of the crime.2  Moreno 
v. Baskerville, 249 Va. 16, 18-19, 452 S.E.2d 653, 655 (1995). 
The crime at issue here is a violation of subsection 
(A)(ii) of Code § 18.2-255.  That subsection makes it a crime 
for any person over the age of 18 to knowingly or intentionally 
cause a person under the age of 18 to assist in the distribution 
of marijuana.  This crime involves a number of actions which 
must be taken by more than one person.  To secure a conviction, 
the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant not only 
knowingly or intentionally performed an act which caused the 
juvenile to assist in the distribution of the contraband, but 
also that the juvenile assisted in the actual distribution of 
                                                 
2 Code § 18.2-255(A) provides in relevant part that 
 
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person who is at least 18 
years of age to knowingly or intentionally (i) distribute 
any drug classified in Schedule I, II, III or IV or 
marijuana to any person under 18 years of age who is at 
least three years his junior. 
4 
 
the contraband to a third party.  If there is no distribution to 
a third party, there is no violation of Code § 18.2-255(A)(ii).  
Furthermore, the actions of the defendant and those of the 
juvenile who assists in the distribution of the contraband may 
not always be in the same jurisdiction.  
We have addressed the issue of venue for prosecution of 
other crimes in which actions involving the commission of the 
crime occur in different places, in the absence of a special 
venue statute.3  In doing so, we have looked to the nature of the 
crime charged and the location of the acts constituting the 
crime.  For example, in considering the proper venue for the 
crime of embezzlement, we acknowledged that, although venue was 
generally appropriate in the jurisdiction in which the 
conversion was consummated, such venue was not exclusive and the 
crime also could be prosecuted in the jurisdiction in which the 
perpetrator formed the intent to appropriate the goods to his 
own use.  Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 893, 895, 134 S.E. 
                                                 
3 Although the General Assembly has enacted a number of 
statutes providing special venue provisions for crimes which may 
involve acts performed in more than one jurisdiction, no such 
statute exists for a violation of Code § 18.2-255(A)(ii).  See 
e.g., Code § 18.2-198.1 (offenses relating to credit cards, such 
as theft, forgery, fraud, and unauthorized possession); Code 
§ 18.2-186.3(D) (identity theft); Code § 18.2-178(B) (obtaining 
money or signatures by false pretenses); Code § 18.2-46.8 
(terrorism offenses); Code § 18.2-46 (crimes by mobs); and Code 
§ 18.2-212(B) (summoning ambulance or fire-fighting apparatus 
without just cause). 
5 
 
723, 724 (1926).4  Similarly, we held that venue is proper in the 
jurisdiction where the direct and immediate result of an illegal 
act occurred, even if the illegal act causing the injury 
occurred in another jurisdiction.  Gregory v. Commonwealth, 237 
Va. 354, 355, 377 S.E.2d 405, 406 (1989).  See also United 
States v. Blecker, 657 F.2d 629, 632 (4th Cir. 1981) (when 
statute defining substantive offense does not indicate where the 
place of committing the crime is to be, the locus delicti must 
be determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the 
location of the act or acts constituting it.) 
The nature of the crime at issue here is not that of a 
“continuing crime” as in the case of a larceny.  A larceny is 
deemed to be repeated every time the object of the theft is 
transported to another jurisdiction; thus the crime is 
“continuing” in nature and subject to prosecution in each venue.  
Gheorghiu v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 678, 685, 701 S.E.2d 407, 411 
(2010).  In this case we are addressing a crime in which 
different elements of a single crime occur in different 
jurisdictions.  As discussed above, the crime consists of more 
than one act which must be performed by more than one person.  
One of the acts which must occur for conviction of a violation 
of subsection (A)(ii) of Code § 18.2-255 is the juvenile’s 
                                                 
4 The General Assembly codified this holding in 1960 when it 
amended the predecessor to Code § 19.2-245, former Code § 19.2-
220. 
6 
 
assistance in the distribution of the contraband to a third 
party.  Under these circumstances, we hold that the place where 
that act occurred is an appropriate venue for prosecution.  The 
record in this case is clear that the juvenile distributed the 
marijuana he received from Kelso to a third party in Hanover 
County.  Therefore venue in Hanover County was proper in this 
case. 
 
Kelso also assigned error to the Court of Appeals’ holding 
that he had waived his challenge to the “territorial 
jurisdiction” of the trial court.  We need not address this 
issue in light of our holding on venue; however, we note that 
“territorial jurisdiction” and venue are synonymous and were 
used interchangeably in Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 
229-30, 661 S.E.2d 415, 427-28 (2008), when contrasting venue 
jurisdiction with subject matter jurisdiction. 
Finally, Kelso argues that Code § 18.2-255(A)(ii) prohibits 
causing a person under 18 years of age to assist in the 
distribution of drugs to another juvenile.  Relying on this 
construction of the statute, Kelso argues that the record is 
silent with regard to the age of the confidential informant to 
whom M.B. sold the marijuana and, therefore, the evidence was 
insufficient to establish venue in Hanover County and to convict 
him of the substantive offenses.  The Court of Appeals declined 
to address this argument either as it relates to venue or 
7 
 
sufficiency of the evidence, finding that Kelso failed to make 
the argument in the trial court and therefore he did not 
preserve the issue for appeal.  Rule 5A:18.  Kelso asserts here 
that this holding was error.5  We disagree with Kelso. 
The record demonstrates that at no point in the trial did 
Kelso move to strike the evidence because it was insufficient to 
support the convictions.  Similarly, Kelso’s arguments at trial 
in support of his motion to dismiss for improper venue were 
based on his assertion that he did nothing in Hanover County.  
Thus, Kelso has not preserved this issue for appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
In summary, for the reasons stated above, we will affirm 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
                                                 
 
5 Kelso did not assign error to the Court of Appeals’ 
refusal to consider the issue through the application of the 
ends of justice provision of Rule 5A:18. 
8