Case Title: St. Marys v. Auglaize Cty. Bd. of Commrs.

Citation: 2007-Ohio-5026

Docket Number: 20061033

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as St. Marys v. Auglaize Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 115 Ohio St.3d 387 , 2007-Ohio-5026.] 
 
 
 
THE CITY OF ST. MARYS, APPELLEE, v. AUGLAIZE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as St. Marys v. Auglaize Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 
 115 Ohio St.3d 387, 2007-Ohio-5026.] 
Contracts — Solid-waste management — Agreement to pay for environmental 
monitoring of landfill — R.C. 5705.41 — Exemption from statutory 
requirement that county fiscal officer certify availability of public funds. 
(No. 2006-1033 — Submitted May 22, 2007 — Decided October 3, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Auglaize County,  
No. 2-05-17, 2006-Ohio-1773. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
I. Introduction 
{¶ 1} This case involves a dispute arising out of an agreement between a 
county and city for managing the disposal of solid waste.  We accepted the 
county’s three propositions that pertain to the interpretation of the agreement.  We 
also accepted the issue of whether a county’s fiscal officer had to comply with 
R.C. 5705.41(D)(1), which requires the county to certify the availability of public 
funds before the county could agree to pay for the environmental monitoring of 
the city’s landfill pursuant to the agreement. 
{¶ 2} For the reasons explained below, we find in favor of the city with 
regard to the contractual dispute.  We also hold that the county’s contractual 
obligation to pay for the environmental monitoring of the landfill was excepted 
from the certification requirements of R.C. 5705.41(D) by R.C. 5705.44.  
Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in favor of the city.  
 
 
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II. Facts and Procedure 
{¶ 3} Appellant is the Auglaize County Board of Commissioners 
(“county”).  Appellee is the city of St. Marys, Ohio.  The city owns and operates a 
landfill for disposing of solid waste. 
{¶ 4} Effective June 24, 1988, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 592, 142 Ohio Laws, 
Part III, 4418, established statewide policies for the management of solid and 
hazardous waste.  Danis Clarkco Landfill Co. v. Clark Cty. Solid Waste Mgt. Dist. 
(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 590, 596, 653 N.E.2d 646.  The bill enacted R.C. 3734.52, 
which requires each county in Ohio to either form a single-county solid-waste-
management district (“SWMD”) or participate in a joint solid-waste-management 
district for the purpose of “orderly development of the solid waste management 
planning.”  Section 6(C)(1), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 592, see also Fairfield Cty. Dist. 
Bd. of Health v. Shank (May 23, 1991), 10th Dist. No. 90AP-1176, 1991 WL 
96362.  In order to maintain a single-county SWMD, a county with a population 
under 120,000 was required to acquire an exemption from the Ohio 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) under R.C. 3734.52(C)(2).  In order to 
obtain this exemption, the county had to demonstrate that it had access to a solid-
waste-disposal facility with sufficient capacity to accept the county’s solid waste 
for at least ten years.  R.C. 3734.52(C)(2). 
 
{¶ 5} Auglaize County desired to form a single-county SWMD, and 
because it had a population of less than 120,000, it needed an R.C. 3734.52(C)(2) 
exemption.  On December 22, 1988, the county executed an agreement with the 
city that permitted the county to dispose of its solid waste in the city’s landfill.  In 
return, the county agreed to pay for the environmental monitoring of the city’s 
landfill.  The term of the agreement was 12 years. 
{¶ 6} On February 17, 1989, the EPA approved the county’s exemption, 
and the county formed the Auglaize County Solid Waste Management District.  
January Term, 2007 
3 
The county commissioners served as the board of directors for the district as 
required by R.C. 343.01. 
{¶ 7} The policy committee of the district completed its initial plan for 
solid-waste management in early 1992.  The plan set fees and proposed various 
plans and activities associated with the management and disposal of solid waste, 
such as the construction of a recycling center. 
{¶ 8} In the early to mid 1990s, it became apparent that the city either 
had to expand or close the landfill.  Ultimately, the city closed the landfill in June 
1998.  Nevertheless, the county continued to pay the costs of environmental 
monitoring of the landfill through December 2000. 
{¶ 9} The city, which claimed that the county was obligated to pay all 
environmental-monitoring expenses during the 12-year term of the agreement and 
for 30 years after the landfill closed, sued the county for breach of the agreement 
after the county stopped paying for the monitoring of the landfill.  The parties 
filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment.  The trial court granted partial 
summary judgment to the city, holding that the agreement obligated the county to 
pay for postclosure monitoring of the landfill for 30 years even though the 
agreement had terminated. 
{¶ 10} The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the 
remaining issues.  The county argued that it was not obligated to pay for the 
monitoring because the city had breached the agreement by failing to set aside a 
portion of its gate fees into a fund to pay in part for the monitoring costs.  (Gate 
fees were the fees charged by the city for the disposal of solid waste at the 
landfill.)  The court again recognized that the agreement required the county to 
pay for the monitoring, but it held that the city’s failure to set aside a portion of its 
gate fees resulted in a breach of the contract that relieved the county of its 
obligation to pay for monitoring.  Thus, the court granted summary judgment to 
the county and dismissed the city’s complaint. 
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{¶ 11} The city appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s 
holding that the county had a duty to pay for postclosure environmental 
monitoring for 30 years after expiration of the agreement but reversed the trial 
court’s finding that the city breached the agreement.  St. Marys v. Auglaize Cty. 
Bd. of Commrs., 3d Dist. No. 2-05-17, 2006-Ohio-1773, ¶ 16, 32.  The court of 
appeals found that the agreement was ambiguous regarding the city’s obligation 
to contribute to the cost of environmental monitoring but that the parties’ course 
of conduct gave meaning to the agreement.  Id. at ¶ 21, 29.  Accordingly, the 
court reversed and remanded the cause to the trial court to issue summary 
judgment in the city’s favor. 
{¶ 12} The cause is before this court pursuant to our acceptance of the 
county’s discretionary appeal. 
III. Analysis 
{¶ 13} We begin our analysis by examining the language of the parties’ 
agreement. 
A. The Agreement 
1. The County’s Obligation to Monitor the Landfill  
Survives Termination of the Agreement 
{¶ 14} The county argues that its contractual obligation to pay for the 
environmental monitoring of the landfill ended when the agreement terminated in 
2000.  The city counters that the agreement imposes an obligation on the county 
to pay for postclosure monitoring beyond the termination date of the agreement. 
{¶ 15} Paragraph 5 of the agreement requires the county to monitor the 
landfill: 
{¶ 16} “Pursuant to this agreement, the County shall: 
{¶ 17} “a. as soon as the monitoring program initiated by the City 
pursuant to paragraph 4(f) * * * is approved by the OEPA, undertake complete 
responsibility for all environmental monitoring required for the City Site by 
January Term, 2007 
5 
applicable statutes and regulations, including the operation of such environmental 
monitoring and any capital expenditures to accomplish the monitoring, both prior 
to and subsequent to closure of the site.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 18} The role of courts in examining contracts is to ascertain the intent 
of the parties.  Hamilton Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Cos. (1999), 86 Ohio 
St.3d 270, 714 N.E.2d 898.  Where the terms in a contract are not ambiguous, 
courts are constrained to apply the plain language of the contract.  Nationwide 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 107, 652 N.E.2d 
684. 
{¶ 19} The term of the agreement was 12 years.  But the plain language of 
the agreement provided that once the city initiated monitoring of the landfill as 
approved by the EPA, the county assumed “complete responsibility for all 
environmental monitoring required * * * by applicable statutes and regulations * 
* * both prior to and subsequent to closure of the site.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 20} We presume that the parties intended for the landfill to remain 
open for the entire 12-year term.  Thus, the language requiring the county to pay 
for monitoring “subsequent to closure of the site” clearly intended that the 
county’s obligation to monitor the landfill extended beyond the termination of the 
agreement. 
{¶ 21} Accordingly, we hold that the county’s obligation to pay for the 
environmental monitoring of the landfill survived the December 22, 2000 
termination date of the agreement and required the county to pay for postclosure 
monitoring for the entire period that monitoring was required by law. 
2.  The Parties’ Course of Conduct Controls 
{¶ 22} In its second and third propositions of law, the county essentially 
argues that the agreement was not ambiguous, and therefore the court of appeals 
erred in relying on the parties’ course of conduct to interpret the agreement.  More 
specifically, the county argues that the agreement required the city to establish a 
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“rate for the disposal of solid waste” and equates this rate with the city’s gate fees.  
The county further alleges that under the agreement, the city was required to set 
aside a portion of that rate into a fund, part of which was to be used to finance the 
monitoring of the landfill.  Finally, the county alleges that the city breached the 
agreement by failing to set aside any portion of its gate fees and therefore the 
county was discharged from its obligation to pay for monitoring the landfill. 
{¶ 23} Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the agreement address the city’s rate for the 
disposal of solid waste and the creation of a fund to be used to pay for 
environmental monitoring.   
{¶ 24} Paragraph 8 provides: 
{¶ 25} “Upon commencement of this agreement, the City shall establish a 
rate for the disposal of solid waste at the City Site as follows: 
{¶ 26} “a. [T]he rate shall be set by the City using an objective third party 
acceptable to the Parties hereto, who shall conduct a rate study that shall take into 
account operating costs, the potential need for expansion, the need to create a 
reasonable index (e.g., an index composed of the Consumer Price Index and other 
appropriate indicators) that can be used to calculate periodic adjustments to the 
rate, the requirements of the Fund established pursuant to Paragraph 9, infra, and 
other relevant factors deemed necessary by the objective third party conducting 
the rate study. 
{¶ 27} “b. [T]he rate may reflect that residents of the County who are not 
residents of the City may be charged a surcharge to reflect the investment made 
by the City in the City Site; 
{¶ 28} “c. [T]he rate shall be reviewed annually by the City and may be 
modified pursuant to the index established during the rate study referenced in 
Paragraph 8(a), supra.” 
{¶ 29} Paragraph 9 of the agreement provides: 
January Term, 2007 
7 
{¶ 30} “The Parties agree that a portion of the rate established pursuant to 
Paragraph 8(a), supra, shall be set aside for the creation and maintenance of a 
fund (“Fund”), which shall be used and administered as follows: 
{¶ 31} “a.  [A] portion of the Fund shall be allocated to pay the costs of 
environmental monitoring of the City Site, and other sites for the disposal of solid 
waste that may be established and operated by the Parties during the term of this 
Agreement, both prior to and subsequent to the closure of the City Site or 
additional sites established and operated by the Parties during the term of this 
agreement, to the extent that such environmental monitoring is required by 
applicable statutes and regulations; the portion of the Fund to be set aside and 
accumulated for such monitoring purposes shall be established by the rate study to 
be conducted pursuant to Paragraph 8, supra, and may be periodically adjusted in 
accordance with the index established by that study; provided, however, that to 
the extent that the costs of environmental monitoring subsequent to the closure of 
the City Site exceed the amounts set aside pursuant to this subparagraph, the 
County shall bear those costs pursuant to Paragraph 5(a) * * * ;  
{¶ 32} “b. [O]ne half of the remainder of the Fund, that is the portion that 
is not allocated pursuant to Paragraph 9(a), shall be set aside for contingent 
liabilities that the Parties may incur with respect to the past, present and future 
operation of the City Site, and other legitimate purposes with respect to the past, 
present and future operation of the City Site; 
{¶ 33} “c. [T]he remainder of the Fund, that is the portion remaining 
following the allocations described in Paragraph 9(a) and (b), shall be set aside for 
contingent liabilities that the Parties may incur with respect to the operation of 
any additional sites established and operated by the parties during the term of this 
Agreement, planning for additional sites, and other legitimate purposes with 
respect to the past, present, and future operation of any additional sites established 
and operated by the Parties during the term of this agreement; 
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{¶ 34} “d. [T]he Fund shall be administered by the Board of the SWMD 
established pursuant to the C-2 exemption referenced in Paragraph 1.” (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶ 35} The court of appeals held that paragraphs 8 and 9 did not clearly 
state how the rate would be charged or how much of the rate needed to be set 
aside in the fund.  2006-Ohio-1773, ¶ 20.  To resolve these ambiguities, the court 
of appeals looked to the practical construction given to the terms of the contract 
by the parties.  Id. at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 36} The court of appeals concluded that the “rate” referred to in the 
agreement was set pursuant to the recommendation of an agreed-upon third-party 
consultant, John Hull, and that Hull had also recommended that the district levy 
fees or increase fees to fund environmental monitoring.  From this, the court 
determined that the rate included the city’s gate fees and a separate surcharge 
imposed by the district. 
{¶ 37} The court of appeals further determined that the portion of the rate 
to be set aside was also to be determined by the rate study.  Because the county 
administered the fund, the obligation of establishing and maintaining the fund fell 
on the county.  The court of appeals determined that the city had remitted to the 
county the district’s surcharge fees, which were established in part to fund the 
postclosure environmental monitoring.  The court of appeals concluded that the 
parties operated in this fashion for over 12 years without any objection.  Thus, it 
concluded, the city had fulfilled its obligations under paragraphs 8 and 9 of the 
agreement. 
{¶ 38} Contract interpretation is a matter of law, and questions of law are 
subject to de novo review on appeal.  Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Guman 
Bros. Farm, 73 Ohio St.3d at 108, 652 N.E.2d 684. 
{¶ 39} Parties may implicitly modify an agreement by their actions. 
Automated Solutions Corp. v. Paragon Data Sys., Inc., 167 Ohio App.3d 685, 
January Term, 2007 
9 
2006-Ohio-3492, 856 N.E.2d 1008.  “ ‘A continued, different, “course of 
performance” between parties manifests a modification of the original 
agreement.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 29, quoting Schmidt v. Texas Meridian Resources (Dec. 30, 
1994), Washington App. No. 94CA12, 1994 WL 728059.  Finally, “ ‘the practical 
construction made by the parties may be considered by the court as an aid to its 
construction when the contract is ambiguous, uncertain, doubtful, or where the 
words thereof are susceptible to more than one meaning, or when a dispute has 
arisen between the parties after a period of operation under the contract.’ ” 
(Emphasis sic.)  Consol. Mgt., Inc. v. Handee Marts, Inc. (1996), 109 Ohio 
App.3d 185, 191, 671 N.E.2d 1304, quoting 18 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1980) 46, 
Contracts, Section 160; see, also, Natl. City Bank of Cleveland v. Citizens Bldg. 
Co. of Cleveland (1947), 48 Ohio Law Abs. 325, 335, 74 N.E.2d 273 (“Where a 
dispute arises relating to an agreement under which the parties have been 
operating for some considerable period of time, the conduct of the parties may be 
examined in order to determine the construction which they themselves have 
placed upon the contract * * *”). 
{¶ 40} Paragraph 8 of the agreement does provide that “the City shall 
establish a rate for the disposal of solid waste” and later states that “the rate shall 
be set by the City.”  However, according to the same paragraph, the rate was to be 
set by “an objective third party acceptable to the Parties” who was to conduct a 
rate study that took into account operating costs.  The city and the county agreed 
to use Hull as that third party.1 
{¶ 41} The rate study completed by Hull in 1989 proposed three 
alternative increases to the city’s gate fees.  The study also contemplated 
environmental-monitoring costs. 
                                                          
 
1.  The city initially hired Hull and later the county hired Hull as a consultant.   
 
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{¶ 42} After the city objected to the amount of the initial proposed 
increases, Hull then recommended that the city increase its gate fee to $7 per ton, 
which he thought “should be sufficient to generate the required funds necessary to 
install the groundwater monitoring wells and to perform initial monitoring.” 
{¶ 43} However, paragraph 8b of the agreement also allowed the district 
to levy a “surcharge,” and Hull recommended that the surcharge be set at $5.24 
per ton, which would cover the initial costs of environmental monitoring.2  On 
June 6, 1989, the district approved a surcharge of $5 per ton. 
{¶ 44} Thus, we find it reasonable to conclude that the rate referred to in 
paragraph 8 of the agreement included both the city’s gate fee and the county’s 
surcharge. 
{¶ 45} The agreement required that the fund be administered by the 
district’s board.  The district created, maintained, and administered an 
environmental-monitoring fund that was funded annually by the surcharges.  Yet, 
despite administering the fund, and therefore being aware of the sources of 
revenue for the funding, the county never objected to the method of funding 
during and even beyond the expiration of the agreement, until now.  In other 
words, the district levied and collected a fee, which in part financed the cost of the 
environmental monitoring that the county was obliged to perform, and paid 
monitoring costs during the term of the agreement without the county ever 
complaining that the city had not contributed to the fund. 
{¶ 46} We conclude that the conduct of the city and the county over a 
period of years demonstrates that they agreed to a rate that incorporated the need 
to pay for postclosure monitoring, that a portion of that rate was placed into a 
                                                          
 
2.  The letter noted that the city was currently considering an increase in its gate fee to $7 per ton 
to help pay for environmental monitoring, “but suggested that prior to the initial district surcharge 
implementation, the landfill should adjust its gate fee so that monitoring fees, etc., were not 
included in the gate fee and the surcharge.”  (Emphasis added.)  Arguably, this language suggests 
that the city was not obligated to use its gate fees to pay for monitoring costs.     
January Term, 2007 
11 
fund that was used to pay for the environmental monitoring of the city’s landfill, 
and therefore, that the city satisfied its obligations under paragraphs 8 and 9 of the 
agreement.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment in favor of the 
city regarding its obligations under paragraphs 8 and 9 of the agreement. 
B. Certification by the County Auditor 
{¶ 47} The county also argues that the county auditor never certified that 
the amount the county needed to meet its contractual obligation to pay for the 
environmental monitoring of the landfill agreement was available under R.C. 
5705.41(D) and therefore that the contract was void.  See Lancaster v. Miller 
(1898), 58 Ohio St. 558, 51 N.E. 52, paragraphs two and three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 48} The city argues that the county’s expenditure for environmental 
monitoring falls within any one of several exceptions to the certification 
requirement of R.C. 5705.41(D).  In particular, the city argues that the county’s 
expenditures for monitoring were excepted from the certification requirement by 
R.C. 5705.44 because the funds expended on the environmental monitoring were 
from the earnings of a public utility. 
{¶ 49} Generally a “subdivision” or “taxing authority” (which includes a 
county3) cannot enter into a contract that requires spending public money unless 
the fiscal officer of that subdivision certifies that the entire amount required to 
satisfy the obligation has been appropriated for that purpose and is available and 
unencumbered.  R.C. 5705.41(D)(1).  “The purpose in requiring such certificate to 
be made and in prohibiting public officials entering into any such contracts unless 
such certificate is first made is clearly to prevent fraud and the reckless 
expenditure of public funds, but particularly to preclude the creation of any valid 
obligation against the county above or beyond the fund previously provided and at 
hand for such purpose.”  State v. Kuhner (1923), 107 Ohio St. 406, 413, 140 N.E. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
3.  R.C. 5705.01(A) provides that “ ‘[s]ubdivision’ means any county * * * .” 
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344; see, also, Riverside Corp. v. Cincinnati (Feb. 27, 1980), 1st Dist. No. C-
780794, 1980 WL 352742, *6 (the certification requirement is a “means of 
protecting the public treasury”). 
1. Payments Made from Earnings of Public Utilities 
Are Excepted from Certification 
{¶ 50} There are several exceptions to the general rule requiring the fiscal 
officer of a subdivision to certify that funds are available.  One is located in R.C. 
5705.44, which provides: 
{¶ 51} “The certificate required by section 5705.41 of the Revised Code 
as to money in the treasury shall not be required for contracts on which payments 
are to be made from the earnings of a publicly operated water works or public 
utility, but in the case of any such contract made without such certification, no 
payment shall be made on account thereof, and no claim or demand thereon shall 
be recoverable, except out of such earnings.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 52} Thus, any payments made from the earnings of a public utility are 
excepted from the certification requirement of R.C. 5705.41(D).  The critical 
question in this case is whether an SWMD is a public utility, as that term is used 
in R.C. 5705.44. 
{¶ 53} R.C. 5705.44 does not define “public utility,” and there are no 
cases interpreting R.C. Chapter 5705 that define the term.  While “public utility” 
is defined in other titles of the Revised Code, we have held that “ ‘those 
definitions are relevant solely to the statutory chapters in which they are located’ 
” and thus are irrelevant in defining “public utility” in other contexts.  Castle 
Aviation, Inc. v. Wilkins, 109 Ohio St.3d 290, 2006-Ohio-2420, 847 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 
20, quoting Vernon v. Warner Amex Cable Communications, Inc. (1986), 25 Ohio 
St.3d 117, 119, 25 OBR 164, 495 N.E.2d 374.  Instead, we look to case law for a 
definition. 
January Term, 2007 
13 
{¶ 54} Determination of whether a particular entity is a public utility is a 
mixed question of law and fact.  Marano v. Gibbs (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 310, 311, 
544 N.E.2d 635.  Whether an entity “is operating as a public utility is determined 
by the character of the business in which it is engaged.”  Indus. Gas Co. v. Pub. 
Util. Comm. (1939), 135 Ohio St. 408, 14 O.O. 290, 21 N.E.2d 166, paragraph 
one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 55} Although case law defines numerous attributes common to public 
utilities, it is generally recognized that none are controlling.  Montville Bd. of 
Twp. Trustees v. WDBN, Inc. (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 284, 10 OBR 400, 461 
N.E.2d 1345.  Thus, each case must be determined on its own facts. Indus. Gas 
Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 135 Ohio St. at 413, 14 O.O. 290, 21 N.E.2d 166. 
{¶ 56} One of the most important attributes of a public utility is that it 
provides “an essential good or service to the general public which has a legal right 
to demand or receive this good or service.”  A & B Refuse Disposers, Inc. v. 
Ravenna Twp. Bd. of Trustees (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 385, 387, 596 N.E.2d 423; 
Freight, Inc. v. Northfield Ctr. Bd. of Twp. Trustees (1958), 107 Ohio App. 288, 
292-293, 8 O.O.2d 212, 158 N.E.2d 537;  Motor Cargo, Inc. v. Richfield Bd. of 
Twp. Trustees (C.P.1953), 67 Ohio Law Abs. 315, 52 O.O. 257, 117 N.E.2d 224. 
{¶ 57} Further, the good or service must be provided to the public 
“generally and indiscriminately.”  S. Ohio Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1924), 
110 Ohio St. 246, 143 N.E. 700, paragraph two of the syllabus; see, also, Marano, 
45 Ohio St.3d at 311, 544 N.E.2d 635. 
{¶ 58} Finally, a public utility must conduct “its operations in such a 
manner as to be a matter of public concern.”  A & B Refuse Disposers, 64 Ohio 
St.3d at 388, 596 N.E.2d 423.  In determining whether an entity conducts itself in 
such a way as to become a matter of public concern, courts look to the good or 
service provided, competition in the local marketplace, and regulation by a 
governmental authority.  Id. 
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a. The District Provides an Essential Service 
{¶ 59} An SWMD is responsible for preparing a plan for solid-waste 
management and providing for “the safe and sanitary management of solid 
wastes” within the district’s territory.  R.C. 3734.52.  One of the primary 
requirements of the plan is that the district must secure access to a solid-waste-
management facility with sufficient capacity to accept disposal of all of the 
district’s solid waste for ten years.  R.C. 3734.53(A). 
{¶ 60} This court has recognized that collecting and disposing of garbage 
is necessary to protect public health.  Broughton v. Cleveland (1957), 167 Ohio 
St. 29, 33, 4 O.O.2d 1, 146 N.E.2d 301; see, also, Weber v. Butler Cty. Bd. of 
Health (1947), 148 Ohio St. 389, 405, 35 O.O. 351, 74 N.E.2d 331 (Zimmerman, 
J., dissenting) (county health board has authority to enforce rules that require 
persons to prohibit persons from disposing of trash in a manner that may be 
unhealthy to others);  Portsmouth v. McGraw (1986), 21 Ohio St.3d 117, 21 OBR 
422, 488 N.E.2d 472, syllabus (municipality may enforce ordinance that requires 
all residents who accumulate trash to use a municipal garbage-collection service).  
We find that the implementation of an SWMD’s plan for the safe and efficient 
disposal of solid waste is consistent with, and falls within, the necessary service 
of collecting and disposing of garbage. 
{¶ 61} In the instant case, the district developed a plan for the 
management of solid waste that included programs aimed at collecting, 
processing, and marketing recyclable waste; educating the public about the 
disposal of household hazardous waste; and composting.  Most important, the 
district secured an agreement with the city for the city to accept all the county’s 
solid waste for at least ten years.  Accordingly, we hold that the district provided 
an essential service. 
b. The District Provides Its Service Indiscriminately and Reasonably 
January Term, 2007 
15 
{¶ 62} An SWMD has jurisdiction over “all of the incorporated and 
unincorporated territory of the county” for purposes of implementing its solid-
waste-management plan.  R.C. 3734.52(A).  Furthermore, the plan has to show 
that the district can provide access to a solid-waste-disposal facility with 
sufficient capacity to accept the county’s solid waste for at least ten years. 
{¶ 63} In the instant case, statutory law requires the district to prepare 
solid-waste-disposal plans for the foreseeable future.  Further, the district had 
jurisdiction over all of the territory within Auglaize County regarding disposal of 
its solid waste.  The district contracted with the city to dispose of the solid waste 
generated by the residents of Auglaize County in the city’s landfill for ten years.  
Thus, we hold that the district provides its services reasonably and 
indiscriminately to all the residents within Auglaize County. 
c. The District Qualifies as a Matter of Public Concern 
{¶ 64} In A & B Refuse Disposers, this court held that regulation of a 
landfill pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3734 did not qualify the landfill as a matter of 
public concern.  64 Ohio St.3d at 390, 596 N.E.2d 423.  We must determine what 
effect A & B Refuse Disposers has, if any, in determining whether an SWMD 
regulated under R.C. Chapter 3734 qualifies as a matter of public concern. 
{¶ 65} In A & B Refuse Disposers, the court addressed whether a privately 
owned sanitary landfill was a public utility that could be exempted from local 
zoning requirements.  The owner of the landfill argued that state regulation of a 
waste-disposal facility, under R.C. Chapter 3734, qualified a sanitary landfill as a 
matter of public concern.  This court determined that R.C. Chapter 3734 sought to 
protect the environment and human health but that public concern as it related to a 
public utility arose “from the monopolistic aspects of the entity and the nature of 
the business in which it [was] engaged.”  A & B Refuse Disposers, 64 Ohio St.3d 
at 389, 596 N.E.2d 423.  Thus, the court rejected the assertion that regulation of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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waste-disposal facilities under R.C. Chapter 3734 alone qualified this sanitary 
landfill as a matter of public concern. 
{¶ 66} We find that the instant case is distinguishable from A & B Refuse 
Disposers.  An SWMD is a unique government-run entity charged with the 
creation and implementation of a solid-waste-management plan applicable to the 
entire county that will provide for the disposal of all solid waste produced by the 
county for at least ten years.  Moreover, an SWMD has the authority to levy fees 
on the generation of all solid waste created in the district, as well as for the 
disposal of all solid waste at a facility located in the district.  R.C. 3734.573 and 
3734.57(B)(1) through (3).  These rates must be paid “by every person, municipal 
corporation, township, or other political subdivision that owns premises to which 
solid waste collection, storage, transfer, disposal, recycling, processing, or 
resource recovery service is provided by the district and may change the rates or 
charges whenever it considers it advisable.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 343.08(A).  
These rates are set considering the cost of service rather than based solely on 
market conditions.  Finally, an SWMD has authority to issue rules that govern the 
“maintenance, protection and use of solid waste collection, storage, disposal, 
transfer, recycling, processing, and resource recovery facilities within the district 
and requiring the submission of general plans and specifications for the 
construction, enlargement, or modification of any such facility.”  R.C. 
3734.53(C)(2). 
{¶ 67} Thus, the nature of the regulation by R.C. Chapter 3734 (i.e., to 
protect persons and the environment) does not qualify an SWMD as a matter of 
public concern.  Rather, it is the SWMD’s unique position of control over the 
management and disposal of a district’s solid waste and ability to set fees for the 
generation and disposal of solid waste within the district that qualify it as a matter 
of public concern.  Therefore, we find that the district qualifies as a matter of 
public concern. 
January Term, 2007 
17 
{¶ 68} In sum, where an entity “serves such a substantial part of the 
public that its rates, charges and methods of operation become a public concern, it 
can be characterized as a public utility.”  A & B Refuse Disposers, 64 Ohio St.3d 
at 388, 596 N.E.2d 423.  Because the district possesses these attributes, we hold 
that the district is a public utility as that term is used in R.C. 5705.44. 
2. Payment of Monitoring Expenses 
{¶ 69} Pursuant to R.C. 5705.44, only payments from the earnings of a 
public utility are excepted from the certification requirement of R.C. 5705.41(D).  
As we found earlier, the district levied and collected fees on the generation and 
the disposal of solid waste in the district that were used at least in part to finance 
the environmental monitoring.  The district maintained and administered a fund to 
pay monitoring costs that was financed at least in part by its surcharge.  
Accordingly, the agreement herein is not void for lack of certification under R.C. 
5705.41(D) because the money spent by the district to monitor the landfill came 
from revenue earned by a public utility. 
IV. Conclusion 
{¶ 70} We hold (1) that the agreement requires the county to pay for 
monitoring beyond the term of the agreement, (2) that the city did not breach the 
agreement, and (3) that the agreement is not void for lack of certification under 
R.C. 5705.41(D).  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
 
CUPP, J., dissents and would dismiss the appeal as having been 
improvidently accepted. 
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O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
{¶ 71} The matter before our court involves a breach-of-contract action 
between Auglaize County and the city of St. Marys in a dispute regarding an 
agreement for the disposal of solid waste.  Although interesting, the case involves 
neither a novel legal issue nor a substantial constitutional question or an issue of 
public or great general interest.  The issue in this case is whether the landfill 
agreement requires the county to pay for any postclosure costs despite the 
termination of the agreement. 
{¶ 72} In response to a motion for reconsideration, this court also 
accepted a fourth proposition of law concerning the county’s obligation to pay the 
municipality pursuant to the contract when the auditor never certified funds 
according to R.C. 5705.41(D), an issue never passed upon or mentioned by the 
court of appeals. 
{¶ 73} In my view, this case should be dismissed as having been 
improvidently accepted, as it fails to present a substantial constitutional issue or 
an issue of public or great general interest.  This court ought not rule on matters 
not ruled on by appellate courts. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Bruce Ingram, and Philip F. 
Downey; and Noble Montague & Moul and Kraig E. Noble, for appellee. 
 
Eastman & Smith Ltd., Henry N. Heuerman, and Albin Bauer III; and 
Edwin A. Pierce, Auglaize County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Byron & Byron Co., L.P.A., and Stephen L. Byron, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae, Ohio Municipal League. 
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