Case Title: WILLIAM C DESSART V LYNN MARIE BURAK

Citation: 

Docket Number: 122238

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court  
Lansing, Michigan 48909  
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 5, 2004 
WILLIAM C. DESSART, and
SHIELA A. DESSART, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v 
No. 122238 
LYNN MARIE BURAK, and
BRYAN R. BURAK, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Plaintiff argued that he was entitled to mediation 
sanctions under MCR 2.403 in his third-party negligence 
action. His claim for sanctions under MCR 2.403 requires a 
determination whether “assessable costs” include attorney 
fees and whether assessable costs are calculated from the 
filing of the complaint to the rendering of the verdict. 
The Court of Appeals answered both questions in the 
negative. We affirm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
I. Procedural Background 
Plaintiff William Dessart and defendant Lynn Burak 
were involved in an automobile collision. 
Plaintiff and 
his wife filed a third-party negligence action for injuries 
plaintiff sustained in that accident. 
Before trial, a 
mediation panel1 evaluated the case at $120,000. Plaintiffs 
accepted the evaluation, but defendants rejected it. 
Following a jury trial, plaintiff was awarded $100,000 in 
damages. 
The circuit court denied plaintiffs’ motion for 
mediation sanctions under MCR 2.403, concluding that the 
adjusted verdict was “more favorable” to the defendants as 
defined in MCR 2.403. 
The circuit court also rejected 
plaintiffs’ argument that “actual costs” under MCR 2.403 
includes attorney fees. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
decision of the circuit court. 252 Mich App 490; 652 NW2d 
669 (2002). 
II. Analysis 
The proper interpretation of a court rule is a 
question of law and is subject to review de novo.  CAM 
Constr v Lake Edgewood Condo Ass’n, 465 Mich 549, 553; 640 
NW2d 256 (2002). 
1 The procedure under MCR 2.403 formerly known as
"mediation" 
was 
renamed 
"case 
evaluation" 
effective 
August 1, 2000.  This change did not effect any substantive
change in the rule. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the time the parties mediated this case, MCR 2.403 
provided, in part: 
(O) Rejecting Party's Liability for Costs. 
(1) If a party has rejected an evaluation 
and the action proceeds to verdict, that party 
must pay the opposing party's actual costs unless 
the verdict is more favorable to the rejecting 
party than the mediation evaluation . . . . 
* * * 
(3) For the purpose of subrule (O)(1), a
verdict 
must 
be 
adjusted 
by 
adding 
to 
it 
assessable costs and interest on the amount of 
the verdict from the filing of the complaint to
the date of the case evaluation . . . . 
After 
this adjustment, the verdict is considered more
favorable to a defendant if it is more than 10 
percent below the evaluation, and is considered
more favorable to the plaintiff if it is more
than 10 percent above the evaluation. . . . 
* * * 
(6) For the purpose of this rule, actual 
costs are 
(a) those costs taxable in any civil action,
and 
(b) a reasonable attorney fee based on a
reasonable hourly or daily rate as determined by
the trial judge for services necessitated by the
rejection of the case evaluation. 
[Emphasis
added.] 
In their motion for mediation sanctions under this rule, 
plaintiffs argued that the adjusted verdict exceeded 
$108,000 (which is “more than 10 percent below the 
evaluation” of $120,000) and, accordingly, was not “more 
3  
 
 
favorable to defendants” under MCR 2.403(O)(3). 
As such, 
plaintiffs contended that they were entitled to mediation 
sanctions under MCR 2.403(O)(1). Defendants responded that 
plaintiffs miscalculated the adjusted verdict in two ways: 
first, by including “assessable costs” from the filing of 
the complaint to the verdict rather than from the filing of 
the complaint to the case evaluation and, second, by 
including attorney fees in “assessable costs.” The circuit 
court denied plaintiffs' motion for sanctions, agreeing 
with defendants that "assessable costs" are limited to 
taxable costs incurred from the date the complaint is filed 
until the date of case evaluation and do not include 
attorney fees. 
In affirming the decision of the circuit court, the 
Court of Appeals panel acknowledged that in Beach v State 
Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 216 Mich App 612; 550 NW2d 580 
(1996), and Grow v W A Thomas Co, 236 Mich App 696; 601 
NW2d 426 (1999), the term "assessable costs" in the court 
rule was interpreted broadly to include postmediation costs 
and attorney fees. 
The panel held, however, that those 
cases were not controlling because their discussions of 
assessable costs were obiter dicta. 
The panel also noted 
that Beach was distinguishable because it involved a 
statute that allows attorney fees as an element of damages 
under certain circumstances. 
The panel held that attorney 
4  
 
 
 
fees are included in the "actual costs" awarded as a 
mediation sanction, but not in "assessable costs" used to 
determine whether a sanction should be awarded. 
The Court also explained that the assessable costs 
that are added to a verdict under MCR 2.403(O)(3) are those 
incurred from the filing of the complaint to the date of 
the case evaluation. 
In so concluding, the Court of 
Appeals declined to follow the Grow Court in applying the 
“last antecedent” rule of construction in interpreting the 
mediation rule. 
This rule of construction provides that 
“'a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent 
unless something in the subject matter or dominant purpose 
[of the statute] requires a different interpretation.’” 
Haveman v Kent Co Rd Comm’rs, 356 Mich 11, 18; 96 NW2d 153 
(1959), quoting Kales v Oak Park, 315 Mich 266, 271; 23 
NW2d 658 (1946), quoting Hopkins v Hopkins, 287 Mass 542, 
547; 192 NE 145 (1934). 
The Court of Appeals concluded 
that the application of the last antecedent rule in this 
case would mean that the phrase "from the filing of the 
complaint to the date of the mediation evaluation" modified 
only "interest on the amount of the verdict" and not 
"assessable costs." 
MCR 2.403(0)(1). 
The panel concluded 
that such an interpretation of the rule "skews its dominant 
purpose." 
252 Mich App 497. 
Therefore, the panel held 
that the modifying phrase in MCR 2.403(O)(3) applied to 
5  
 
 
 
 
both “assessable costs” and “interest.” 
This construction 
of the court rule, the Court concluded, was more in keeping 
with the overall purposes of the mediation rule, which are 
“to encourage settlement, deter protracted litigation, and 
expedite and simplify the final settlement of cases.” 252 
Mich App 498. 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that attorney fees, 
whether incurred before or after the mediation evaluation, 
are not an element of "assessable costs" under MCR 
2.403(O)(3). The general “American rule” is that “attorney 
fees are not ordinarily recoverable unless a statute, court 
rule, or common-law exception provides the contrary.” 
Nemeth v Abonmarche Dev, Inc, 457 Mich 16, 37-38; 567 NW2d 
641 (1998). 
As such, the term “costs” ordinarily does not 
encompass attorney fees unless the statute or court rule 
specifically defines “costs” as including attorney fees. 
For example, MCR 2.403(O)(6) provides that “actual costs” 
include “(a) those costs taxable in any civil action, and 
(b) a reasonable attorney fee . . . .” 
MCR 2.403(O)(6), 
however, does not define “assessable costs” as including 
attorney fees. 
We conclude, therefore, that attorney fees 
are 
not 
included 
in 
“assessable 
costs” 
under 
MCR 
2.403(O)(3). 
We also agree that in adjusting a verdict under MCR 
2.043(O)(3), assessable costs are limited to those incurred 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
between the filing of the complaint and the date of the 
mediation evaluation or case evaluation. 
Plaintiffs have urged upon us the position that 
utilization of the “last antecedent” rule would support the 
conclusion that the modifying phrase applies only to 
“interest.” 
Here, however, the last antecedent rule 
provides little guidance because there are no textual clues 
indicating that “assessable costs” and “interest” are to be 
treated separately. 
To the contrary, the fact that “and” 
joins “assessable costs” and “interest on the amount of the 
verdict from the filing of the complaint to the date of the 
case evaluation” suggests that the phrase “assessable costs 
and interest” is to be thought of as a single term, and, as 
a unit, is modified by “from the filing of the complaint to 
the date of the case evaluation.” 
MCR 2.403(0)(3). 
Moreover, plaintiffs’ suggested reading produces conceptual 
difficulties because it would provide no temporal limit at 
all to “assessable costs” and would make it possible for a 
party, remorseful over its failure to accept the mediation 
award, to advantage itself between mediation and trial by 
accruing unnecessary costs. This is an outcome that surely 
could not have been intended by the Court in adopting these 
rules. 
Indeed, the plain meaning of the rule and its 
grammatical structure make it clear that the rule does set 
the temporal limit as the date of case evaluation. On the 
7  
 
 
 
 
basis of the foregoing application of the principles of 
construction, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. MCR 7.302(G)(1). 
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
WILLIAM C. DESSART, and
SHIELA A. DESSART, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
No. 122238 
LYNN MARIE BURAK, and
BRYAN R. BURAK, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
WEAVER, J. (concurring in result). 
I concur in the majority’s determination that the last 
antecedent rule does not control the interpretation of the 
court rule at issue in this case. 
I agree with and adopt the Court of Appeals reasoning 
that applying the last antecedent rule to MCR 2.403(O)(3) 
“skews [the court rule’s] dominant purpose,” which is to 
encourage settlement, deter protracted litigation, and 
expedite and simplify the final settlement of cases. 252 
Mich App 490, 497; 652 NW2d 669 (2002). 
I write separately because in its efforts to avoid 
applying 
the 
last 
antecedent 
rule, 
the 
majority 
unnecessarily creates a new rule of interpretation—that 
when two phrases are joined by “and,” they are to be 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
   
treated as one term for the purpose of the last antecedent 
rule unless there is some textual clue indicating that they 
are 
to 
be 
treated 
separately. 
This 
new 
rule 
of 
interpretation conflicts with the last antecedent rule, 
which provides that a limiting clause or phrase should 
ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase 
that 
it 
immediately 
follows, 
unless 
there 
is 
some 
indication to the contrary.1 
The majority’s creation of the new conflicting rule of 
interpretation is unnecessary because, although the last 
antecedent rule is a well-recognized rule of statutory 
construction, its use is optional, not mandatory. 
As 
Sutherland On Statutory Construction explains, the last 
antecedent rule is “another aid to discovery of intent or 
meaning and is not inflexible and uniformly binding. Where 
the sense of the entire act requires that a qualifying word 
or phrase apply to several preceding or even succeeding 
1 Barnhart v Thomas, 540 US ___; 124 S Ct 376, 380; 157
L Ed 2d 333 (2003), citing 2A Singer, Sutherland on 
Statutory Construction, § 47.33, p 369 (6th rev ed, 2000)
(“Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no 
contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last 
antecedent.”) 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
sections, the word or phrase will not be restricted to its 
immediate antecedent.”2 
I concur in the result of the memorandum opinion. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
2 2A Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, §
47.33, p 372 (6th rev ed 2000). 
3