Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter

Citation: 2005-Ohio-5411

Docket Number: 20041770

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2005-10-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter, 106 Ohio St.3d 418, 2005-Ohio-5411.] 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. HUNTER. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter, 106 Ohio St.3d 418, 2005-Ohio-5411.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Disbarment is the appropriate sanction for converting 
client funds. 
(No. 2004-1770 — Submitted March 1, 2005 — Decided October 26, 2005.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 02-56. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Sandra K. Hunter of Solon, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0009526, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1977.  
On February 27, 2004, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent in a 
second amended two-count complaint with violations of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility.  A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline heard the cause and, based on stipulations and other evidence, made 
findings of misconduct and a recommendation, which the board adopted. 
Facts Underlying Counts I and II 
Count I 
{¶ 2} On April 6, 1999, respondent was appointed Evelyn Grundstein’s 
guardian and was charged with overseeing Grundstein’s welfare and assets, which 
exceeded $500,000.  As guardian, respondent agreed to account for all 
expenditures and income and had authority to expend estate assets only upon 
probate court approval. 
{¶ 3} From September 1999 through March 2001, while serving as 
Grundstein’s guardian, respondent misappropriated at least $180,000 from the 
guardianship estate.  Respondent withdrew this money for her own use through 
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several bank counter checks totaling over $83,000, ATM transactions totaling an 
estimated $27,000, and 38 other checks totaling over $80,000.  Respondent 
marked several of these checks as being compensation for “attorney fees” or a 
“business loan”; however, she had no probate court approval for these payments. 
{¶ 4} Respondent’s embezzlement scheme began on September 14, 
1999, when she withdrew without probate court approval over $84,000 from a 
$186,000 certificate of deposit belonging to her ward.  Respondent then deposited 
these funds, dividing them between two bank accounts that she maintained for 
Grundstein’s care.  Her withdrawal cost the guardianship estate interest on the 
certificate of deposit and a $2,000 early-withdrawal penalty.  Respondent later 
used these bank accounts as a source from which to misappropriate funds. 
{¶ 5} Among numerous other transactions, respondent wrote a check to 
herself from a Grundstein bank account on September 17, 1999, for $31,000.  On 
March 27, 2000, she wrote two bank counter checks also for her own use: one for 
$33,825.53 and another for $50,000.  Respondent conceded under oath that she 
spent these sums for her own benefit; however, she could not specifically recall 
where much of the money went, and her bank records were of no help in 
explaining how she used the stolen funds. 
{¶ 6} In November 2000, respondent began a solo law practice.  
Respondent used some of the stolen funds for her law firm startup and operation 
costs.  She also used part of the funds for personal expenses, including 
acupuncture treatment and monthly massages. 
{¶ 7} On Monday, April 2, 2001, Grundstein died.  On the Saturday 
before Grundstein’s death, as trustee of the Henry L. Wiech Trust, respondent 
moved $100,000 from the trust account to the Grundstein bank account to help 
conceal the prior theft. 
{¶ 8} Respondent was later removed as Grundstein’s guardian for failing 
to timely file a final account.  Grundstein’s next of kin hired attorney Kenneth 
January Term, 2005 
3 
Traeger to represent Grundstein’s estate.  Traeger reviewed guardianship 
paperwork 
and 
bank 
records 
and 
discovered 
respondent’s 
extensive 
misappropriation.  In May 2001, Traeger called respondent about his findings, but 
respondent failed to explain the reasons for the missing money.  Afterward, she 
refused to return his telephone calls. 
{¶ 9} When respondent did not reply to his inquiries, Traeger filed a 
motion to surcharge respondent for the missing funds.  At a hearing in August 
2001, respondent’s attorney delivered a check to Traeger for $55,021.79 and also 
presented him with an application for $32,000 in legal fees for respondent’s 
services as guardian.  The application was never filed with the probate court. 
{¶ 10} At a second hearing, respondent’s attorney delivered another check 
to Traeger, this time for $42,000.  Settlement discussions ensued and led to 
questions about the source of funds for the $100,000 deposit respondent made at 
the time of Grundstein’s death.  In response, respondent solicited a letter from 
Virginia R. Cook Lester, the primary beneficiary of the Wiech trust, in which 
Lester advised that she had lent respondent the $100,000 from the Wiech trust.  
The motion to surcharge was dismissed based on respondent’s reimbursement and 
Lester’s assurance that the $100,000 had come from a legitimate source. 
Count II 
{¶ 11} Lester was the stepdaughter of Henry L. Wiech, who died February 
12, 2001.  Wiech’s estate contained approximately $33,000 in assets, and the 
Wiech trust was valued at an estimated $1,369,658.  Wiech had chosen 
respondent to be executor of his will and successor trustee upon his death. 
{¶ 12} In addition to being the primary beneficiary, Lester was also 
advisor to respondent as trustee of the Wiech trust, and the declaration of trust 
required that respondent consult with Lester prior to making any distributions.  
Notwithstanding this restriction, respondent withdrew $100,000 from the Wiech 
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trust on March 31, 2001, without Lester’s knowledge and deposited it into the 
Grundstein bank account. 
{¶ 13} Respondent did not report her $100,000 withdrawal to Lester until 
late September or early October 2001.  At that time, respondent recited a series of 
hardships and confessed to Lester that she had withdrawn $100,000 from the trust 
for her personal use.  Respondent then assisted Lester in writing the letter 
designating as a loan the misappropriated $100,000. 
{¶ 14} Respondent promised to repay the $100,000 by December 2001 
with interest and to provide a signed promissory note documenting the loan.  She 
did not also tell Lester that she had already used the money to partially repay 
funds that she had stolen from the Grundstein estate or that she hoped to exculpate 
herself for that theft with Lester’s letter.  Moreover, despite her promise, 
respondent neither repaid the $100,000 nor forwarded a promissory note by 
December 2001. 
{¶ 15} The Ohio estate taxes for the Wiech estate were due in November 
2001.  Respondent, however, did not have the money to pay the taxes from either 
the trust or the estate until October 2003.  The Wiech estate was assessed over 
$5,000 in interest by the Ohio Department of Taxation for respondent’s delay. 
{¶ 16} Lester asked respondent repeatedly to send the promissory note for 
the $100,000 debt, but respondent did not do so until February 2003.  Respondent 
also did not return many of Lester’s telephone calls or respond to her letters 
asking for regular billing statements.  And contrary to Lester’s wishes, respondent 
did not provide bills for her time or account records from November 2002 through 
September 2003. 
{¶ 17} For serving as executor and attorney for the Wiech estate and 
trustee and attorney for the Wiech trust for the three years after February 2001, 
respondent was paid over $98,000.  She did not, however, tailor her billing 
practices to the particular service provided.  Respondent’s records indicate that 
January Term, 2005 
5 
she charged attorney rates for completing nonlegal administrative tasks, including 
picking up mail, depositing checks, paying bills, and arranging for lawn care, 
house cleaning, and the delivery of necessities. 
{¶ 18} At a January 2003 deposition during the Grundstein investigation, 
respondent was asked whether she had misappropriated funds from any other 
sources.  Respondent did not mention the $100,000 she took from the Wiech trust.  
Respondent has since claimed that after Lester’s letter, which she argues ratified 
the $100,000 withdrawal, she considered the withdrawal a loan.  At the panel 
hearing, however, respondent admitted that she viewed her withdrawal of 
$100,000 from the Wiech trust as a misappropriation.  Because of respondent’s 
silence on this issue, more than one year passed before relator discovered the 
Wiech trust embezzlement. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 19} We find, consistent with the board’s report, that by embezzling 
during a three-year period nearly $300,000 from two separate estates in her 
charge, respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (barring illegal conduct involving 
moral turpitude), 1-102(A)(4) (barring conduct involving fraud, deceit, 
dishonesty, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) (barring conduct that is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (barring conduct that adversely 
reflects on the fitness to practice law), 2-106(A) (barring the charge or collection 
of an illegal or excessive legal fee), 9-102(B)(3) (requiring a lawyer to maintain 
complete records of and protect all client funds upon receipt), and 9-102(B)(4) 
(requiring a lawyer to promptly pay requested funds that a client is entitled to 
receive). 
{¶ 20} In finding this misconduct, we reject respondent’s argument that 
she did not commit a crime of moral turpitude.  Respondent’s embezzlement in 
the Grundstein case recently resulted in her conviction of felony theft in violation 
of R.C. 2913.02, for which we suspended her license to practice law for an 
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interim period pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(5)(A)(1)(a).  See In re Hunter, 105 Ohio 
St.3d 1554, 2005-Ohio-2424, 828 N.E.2d 110.  Moreover, stealing from a 
guardianship, trust, or decedent’s estate is illegal and immoral and violates DR 1-
102(A)(3).  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Muhlbach, 104 Ohio St.3d 340, 
2004-Ohio-6563, 819 N.E.2d 698, and Columbus Bar Assn. v. Hamilton (2000), 
88 Ohio St.3d 330, 725 N.E.2d 1116. 
{¶ 21} Respondent argues, however, that her mental disability weighs 
heavily against a finding of moral turpitude because, according to the medical 
evidence, her depression “inhibited” her judgment during the periods that she 
repeatedly stole large sums of money.  Respondent insists that her depression 
clouded her understanding of right and wrong and thus diminished the quality of 
her judgment. 
{¶ 22} We disagree.  In explaining the severity of respondent’s mental 
illness in 1999 and 2000, respondent’s treating psychiatrist described her as 
“clearly impaired in her ability to think clearly,” but he also said that she had “the 
capacity to recognize reality” and that her condition did not prohibit her from 
knowing right from wrong.  Seizing on this testimony, relator’s counsel urged the 
panel to account in its report for the difference between doing wrong while 
depressed and doing wrong because of depression.  Although it is not clear that 
the panel or the board subscribed to this distinction, we do. 
{¶ 23} No evidence established that respondent was so debilitated by her 
depression that she could not appreciate the gravity of her wrongdoing.  Her own 
actions, in fact, dispel that notion.  At the time of Grundstein’s death, respondent 
realized that her theft would likely be discovered by whoever Grundstein’s family 
selected to administer the estate.  So immediately, respondent stole more money 
from another entrusted source to conceal her embezzlement.  And months later, 
obviously still realizing the impropriety of her crime, respondent persuaded the 
unsuspecting Lester to “ratify” her theft as a loan. 
January Term, 2005 
7 
{¶ 24} Where moral turpitude is disputed, an independent review of the 
circumstances underlying the illegal conduct is necessary to determine whether 
the conduct manifests the requisite lack of social conscience and depravity 
beyond any established criminal intent.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Burkhart 
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 188, 191, 661 N.E.2d 1062.  We have conducted that 
review in this case and agree with the board that respondent’s theft was motivated 
by an unmitigated interest in personal financial gain at others’ expense.  Our 
conclusion warrants a finding that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(3). 
{¶ 25} We also reject respondent’s challenge to the board’s finding that 
she charged an excessive fee.  As discussed, the evidence establishes that 
respondent charged Lester legal fees for a variety of nonlegal services.  This 
practice of overcharging violates DR 2-106(A).  Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Alsfelder, 
103 Ohio St.3d 375, 2004-Ohio-5216, 816 N.E.2d 218, ¶ 22-23. 
Sanction 
{¶ 26} In determining the sanction for this misconduct, we review the 
aggravating and mitigating features of respondent’s case.  See Section 10 of the 
Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before 
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  
We adopt the board’s findings in aggravation that respondent committed her 
misconduct out of greed and deceit.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b).  And because 
respondent stole so much for so long, we also agree with the board that 
respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct and committed multiple offenses.  
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c) and (d).  Moreover, we share the board’s and 
panel’s skepticism as to respondent’s candor and find it implausible that she could 
have withdrawn sums as large as $83,000 but could not remember how she spent 
them.  Consistent with the board’s report, we find that respondent took advantage 
of Lester’s kindness and trust to conceal the misappropriation of money from the 
Wiech trust and to give the appearance of repayment in the Grundstein case. 
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{¶ 27} In mitigation, we find that respondent has no prior record of 
professional discipline.  BCGD Prog.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a).  She also claims to have 
repaid the clients the misappropriated sums.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(c).  
We hold, however, that the restitution was not mitigating because it was neither 
timely nor in good faith. 
{¶ 28} Respondent, who suffers from post-polio syndrome and other 
physical ailments, also presented two character witnesses and numerous letters of 
recommendation that described her integrity and competence apart from the 
committed misconduct.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(e).  The most extenuating 
circumstance of her case, however, is the mental disability from which she 
suffered during the underlying events.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g). 
{¶ 29} To have significant mitigating effect under BCGD Proc.Reg. 
(10)(B)(2)(g), a mental disability must be supported by all of the following:  (1) a 
qualified health-care professional, (2) a determination that the mental disability 
contributed to the misconduct, (3) a sustained period of successful treatment, and 
(4) a prognosis from a qualified health-care professional that the attorney will be 
able to return, under specified conditions if necessary, to the competent, ethical, 
and professional practice of law.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(i), (ii), (iii), and 
(iv). 
{¶ 30} Psychiatrist Dr. Jeffrey C. Hutzler testified that he diagnosed 
respondent with major depression in 2001 and that in his medical opinion, she had 
shown symptoms consistent with that condition for at least the two previous 
years.  According to Dr. Hutzler, respondent’s mental disability also partially 
caused the misconduct she committed.  Respondent has responded successfully to 
treatment, Dr. Hutzler reported, and has recovered to the extent that her diagnosis 
is now major depressive disorder, recurrent type, mild.  Dr. Hutzler considers 
respondent’s prognosis to be good and, providing she continues to adhere to her 
January Term, 2005 
9 
treatment regimen, he is confident that she will have no debilitating recurrence of 
her former symptoms and can return to the competent and ethical practice of law. 
{¶ 31} Relator advocated respondent’s disbarment before the panel.  
Respondent requested a two-year suspension, with the entire suspension period 
stayed upon conditions, including a monitored probation period of respondent’s 
law practice.  The board acknowledged that disbarment is the presumptive 
sanction for a lawyer’s misappropriation of client assets.  Adopting the panel’s 
recommendation, however, the board credited respondent’s mitigating evidence, 
particularly her mental disability, and recommended an indefinite suspension.  
The board further recommended conditions for respondent’s reinstatement, 
including a candid accounting of the embezzled funds, proof of full restitution, 
and continued treatment for her mental illness. 
{¶ 32} Upon review, we find the recommendation to indefinitely suspend 
inappropriate.  To protect clients and the public, to ensure the administration of 
justice, and to maintain the integrity of the legal profession, see American Bar 
Association Center for Professional Responsibility, Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions (1991 & Amend.1992), Standard 1.1., we instead order that 
respondent be permanently disbarred. 
{¶ 33} Respondent raises three objections to the board’s report.  First, she 
contends that imposing an indefinite suspension is unfair and violates equal 
protection.  In the second, she maintains that no evidence justifies an indefinite 
suspension.  In the third, she asserts that the mitigation warrants a lesser sanction.  
As relator argues, the substance of all of her objections is that her case warrants a 
less onerous sanction than an indefinite suspension.  We consider all the 
objections together. 
{¶ 34} The appropriate sanction in a case of professional misconduct 
depends on “the duties violated, the actual injury caused, the attorney's mental 
state, the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and sanctions 
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imposed in similar cases.”  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 
424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16; Disciplinary Counsel v. King, 103 
Ohio St.3d 438, 2004-Ohio-5470, 816 N.E.2d 1040, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 35} Here, respondent knowingly breached her duty to her clients.  As 
evidenced by her violations of DR 1-102(A)(4) and 9-102, respondent treated 
Grundstein and Wiech, to whom she owed a fiduciary duty, with deceit and 
dishonesty.  In violating DR 1-102(A)(3), (4), and (5), respondent also 
compromised her duty to the public in general, ignoring the community’s 
expectation that lawyers will protect their clients’ property and perform with 
integrity.  Respondent’s violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6) and 2-106 similarly 
compromised her duty to her clients, the legal system, and the legal profession. 
{¶ 36} The injuries suffered due to respondent’s transgressions were 
immense.  Respondent misappropriated nearly $300,000 from an incompetent 
ward and a trust that she had promised to protect.  She also engaged in conduct 
that was misleading and designed to hide her embezzlement from Lester, Traeger, 
the probate court, and relator. 
{¶ 37} Although relator no longer advocates disbarment, relator observes 
that “[t]he starting point for determining the appropriate sanction for 
misappropriation is disbarment.”  Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Churilla (1997), 78 
Ohio St.3d 348, 350, 678 N.E.2d 515.  “The continuing public confidence in the 
judicial system and the bar requires that the strictest discipline be imposed in 
misappropriation cases.”  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Belock (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 98, 
100, 694 N.E.2d 897.  Disbarment is the presumptive sanction for 
misappropriation.  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Dixon, 95 Ohio St.3d 490, 2002-Ohio-
2490, 769 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 38} Respondent urges us to impose a sanction even more lenient than 
an indefinite suspension, mainly because of her mental disability.  She relies on 
Dayton Bar Assn. v. Gerren, 103 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-4110, 812 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2005 
11 
1280, in which after taking into account mitigating features not including mental 
disability, we suspended a lawyer’s license to practice for six months because he 
misappropriated over $12,000 that he was obligated to pay on a client’s behalf to 
a medical provider.  Respondent suggested that a similar sanction is appropriate 
here because in finding the theft of client funds in Gerren intolerable, we said that 
“it is immaterial whether the [misappropriated] amount at stake is large or small.”  
Id. at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 39} Our statement in Gerren was not intended to establish a rule that 
all lawyers who steal from their clients will receive a six-month suspension.  It 
was intended to advise lawyers that if they misappropriate even a relatively small 
amount of a client’s funds, their license to practice law will be suspended.  For 
theft and dishonesty of the magnitude committed in this case, the appropriate 
sanction is disbarment, even considering respondent’s mental condition.  “The 
appropriate sanction when a lawyer knowingly converts funds for the lawyer’s 
benefit is disbarment.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Wherry (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 
584, 587, 722 N.E.2d 515.  Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Madden (2000), 89 
Ohio St.3d 238, 730 N.E.2d 379; Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Bernardic (1995), 
74 Ohio St.3d 26, 656 N.E.2d 326. 
{¶ 40} Respondent is therefore disbarred.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
RESNICK, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 41} I respectfully dissent from the sanction imposed on respondent by 
the majority.  I believe that the record reveals the existence of mitigating factors 
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sufficient to preclude imposition of the irrevocable sanction of permanent 
disbarment. 
{¶ 42} It is fully appropriate for disbarment to be the presumptive 
disposition in a disciplinary case when an attorney has stolen from clients.  
Respondent without question egregiously violated the trust of her clients and her 
responsibilities to them, as well as to the profession.  However, by definition, a 
presumptive sanction of disbarment does not preclude the application of 
mitigation.  That is, the presumption in favor of disbarment in the case of theft 
from clients is a rebuttable one. 
{¶ 43} This court has rightly acknowledged that the mental illness of an 
attorney, where proven, should be considered in mitigation when the relationship 
between that illness and the attorney’s conduct meets certain criteria.  Section 
10(B)(2)(g) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints 
and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
(“BCGD Proc.Reg.”) instructs the board that it may consider mental disability as 
mitigating when all of the following are present: 
{¶ 44} “(i)  A diagnosis of a * * * mental disability by a qualified health 
care professional * * *;  
{¶ 45} “(ii)  A determination that the * * * mental disability contributed to 
cause the misconduct;  
{¶ 46} “(iii)  * * * [A] sustained period of successful treatment;  
{¶ 47} “(iv)  A prognosis from a qualified health care professional  * * * 
that the attorney will be able to return to competent, ethical professional practice 
under specified conditions.” 
{¶ 48} In adopting BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g), the court  established as 
policy that, while attorney misconduct caused, in part, by an illness of the brain 
should not be excused, the fact of mental disability or illness should be 
meaningfully considered in determining a sanction.  I am not persuaded that 
January Term, 2005 
13 
imposition of disbarment in this case is consistent with recognition of 
respondent’s mental disability. 
{¶ 49} In the case at bar, two competent and highly credentialed medical 
doctors—one a published author of medical texts and a professor of psychiatry at 
the Cleveland Clinic and the other a psychiatrist retained by the board itself—
evaluated respondent’s mental health at the time of her misconduct and following 
treatment.  Both came to professional opinions that respondent suffered from a 
major depressive disorder.  Their testimony clearly establishes the presence of 
each of the factors set forth in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g). 
{¶ 50} Jeffrey C. Hutzler, M.D., a psychiatrist, testified regarding 
respondent’s mental health.  Hutzler has served on the faculty of the medical 
schools of the Ohio State University and the Cleveland Clinic and first saw 
respondent as a patient in June 2001.  He testified that respondent met the 
diagnosis of mental illness set forth in R.C. 5122.01(A)1 and described her as 
having “a substantial disorder of mood, * * * of memory, and * * * impaired 
judgment.  * * * [S]he was clearly depressed, which was a problem of mood 
which was significant.”  Dr. Hutzler believed that respondent had first 
experienced depression in 1998 or 1999 and had not fully recovered by the time 
of their initial appointment. 
{¶ 51} Dr. Hutzler testified that her mental-health problems impaired her 
ability to distinguish right from wrong. When asked by a panel member whether 
respondent’s major depression contributed to cause her acts of dishonesty, Dr. 
Hutzler responded: “I don’t think there is any question that it certainly interfered 
with her judgment and certainly had an effect on her acts of dishonesty.”  In April 
2004, his diagnosis of respondent was major depressive disorder, recurrent type, 
                                                 
1.  
R.C. 5122.01(A) defines mental illness as “a substantial disorder of thought, mood, 
perception, orientation, or memory that grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize 
reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life.” 
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mild, and in remission.  He recommended ongoing psychotherapy and testified 
that his prognosis for respondent was good and that she was likely to recover 
fully. 
{¶ 52} At the request of the board, Dr. Peter Geier conducted an 
independent psychiatric evaluation of respondent in April 2003.  He concluded 
that respondent had suffered from major depressive disorder from January 2000 
through June 2001, but did not suffer from any mental illness at the time of the 
evaluation 
{¶ 53} These unrebutted opinions, expressed with reasonable medical 
certainty, demonstrated each of the criteria set forth in BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(g).  In imposing the sanction of permanent disbarment despite this 
medical evidence, the majority has not given adequate credit in mitigation to 
respondent’s diagnosed mental illness. 
{¶ 54} In addition, the board received more than 30 letters of endorsement 
from individuals representing a wide spectrum of the community, including 
attorneys, judges, clients, and community activists.  Despite the egregious 
misconduct found by the board during the years surrounding the active phase of 
her depression, those who have known respondent over many years repeatedly 
described her as trustworthy, honest, and unusually caring towards her primarily 
elderly clients.  Although such communications are often not relevant to the 
conduct for which a respondent is sanctioned, they are helpful here in placing 
respondent’s conduct in perspective.  One writer observed, “[C]linical depression 
* * * must have been a significant factor in Sandra’s recent problems as I cannot 
imagine Sandra engaging in such conduct under any other circumstance.”  The 
letters describe respondent as “trustworthy, altruistic, easy to work with and 
reliable”; “one of the most knowledgeable, caring and honest attorneys in the 
office”; “professional in her conduct, very honest and forthcoming”; “honest, fair 
and completely within the parameters of her legal expertise professionally”; 
January Term, 2005 
15 
“concern[ed] for the feelings and welfare of her clients”; “a person of the highest 
degree of integrity and trustworthiness” who has always adhered to the “highest 
ethical standards” and “has [the colleague’s] complete trust and respect”; and “an 
excellent attorney — trustworthy, honest, accurate, and punctual with complete 
knowledge of the laws of Ohio.”  One client expressed her hope that respondent 
“will still be here when [she dies] to help [her] children in a difficult time as she 
has helped” the client. 
{¶ 55} The majority imposes the most severe sanction available for 
attorney misconduct, even though that sanction was not recommended by the 
panel that heard the witnesses or the board; nor is it now sought by relator.  While 
this court is responsible for imposing attorney discipline in order to protect the 
public from a recurrence of similar conduct, we have adopted rules and programs 
that enable us to achieve this goal without ordering disbarment.  Should 
respondent seek reinstatement from an indefinite suspension after the expiration 
of the two-year period established by Gov.Bar R. V(10)(B), she would be 
required to establish “by clear and convincing evidence” that she “possesses all of 
the mental, educational, and moral qualifications that were required of an 
applicant for admission to the practice of law in Ohio at the time of * * * her 
original admission” and that she “is now a proper person to be readmitted to the 
practice of law in Ohio, notwithstanding the previous disciplinary action.” 
(Emphasis added.)  Gov.Bar R. V(10)(E)(2) and (4).  An application for 
reinstatement would trigger a hearing by the board to “take and report evidence 
relevant to the rehabilitation of the petitioner and his or her possession of all the 
mental, educational, and moral qualifications” required of an applicant to the bar. 
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(Emphasis added.) Gov.Bar R. V(10)(F).  Even then, this court has the authority 
to order a conditional reinstatement.  Gov.Bar R. V(10)(E)(4).2 
{¶ 56} This record does not support disbarment.  The public would be 
adequately protected by imposition of an indefinite suspension with the conditions 
recommended by the board and with the expectation that a full mental-health 
review would be conducted if and when respondent applied for reinstatement.   
 
{¶ 57} The panel concluded that the matters offered in mitigation, 
particularly respondent’s “resolved mental disability which contributed to cause 
the misconduct she is charged with,” justified a sanction less than disbarment.  It 
concluded that “the interests of the profession and society would be better served 
by permitting her to return to the practice of law upon demonstrating restitution 
and continued mental health—and candidly admitting where the funds went 
which she stole.”  I agree. 
{¶ 58} I would accept the recommendation of the board and would 
indefinitely suspend respondent from the practice of law in Ohio with the 
conditions proposed by the board. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Robert R. Berger, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Mary L. Cibella, for respondent. 
_______________________ 
                                                 
2. 
Gov.Bar. R. V(10)(E)(4) provides, “The order of reinstatement may be subject to 
conditions the Supreme Court considers appropriate including, but not limited to, requiring the 
petitioner to serve a period of probation on conditions the Supreme Court determines * * *.”