Case Title: State v. Stakes

Citation: 227 Kan. 711, 608 P.2d 997

Docket Number: 51,418

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1980-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
227 Kan. 711 (1980)
608 P.2d 997
STATE OF KANSAS, Petitioner,
v.
WILBUR S. STAKES, Respondent.
No. 51,418

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 5, 1980.
Roger N. Walter, disciplinary counsel, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for the petitioner.
Edwin P. Carpenter, of Hiatt, Crockett, Hiatt & Carpenter, Chartered, of Topeka, argued the cause, and E. Roger Horsky, of Leavenworth, was with him on the brief for the respondent.
Per Curiam:
On August 9, 1979, a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys held a hearing on a complaint against respondent Wilbur S. Stakes, Jr., a member of the bar of this state practicing in Leavenworth County. The panel filed its report, findings and recommendation on September 4, 1979. The action is before this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 212 (225 Kan. lxxxvi-lxxxvii).
The formal complaint encompassed two separate complaints filed with the Board. The first matter involved alleged conflict of interest arising from certain dealings between American Roofing & Heating Co., Inc., and the City of Lansing, Kansas. Respondent had been closely involved with the corporation as an attorney, officer, and named stockholder prior to being appointed as the Lansing city attorney. While respondent was serving as city attorney the corporation had certain dealings with the city. Further recitation of the involved factual situation relative to this aspect of the complaint is unnecessary, inasmuch as the panel dismissed this portion of the complaint on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence.
This brings us to the section of the complaint involving the respondent's charging of an allegedly excessive fee (DR 2-106, 225 Kan. xcix) to the City of Lansing. A rather unusual procedure was utilized by the panel in the hearing herein. This procedure resulted from the circumstance that both counsel had entered into written stipulations of fact with documentary attachments thereto. At the hearing neither counsel presented any additional evidence. The panel accepted the stipulations as the disciplinary administrator's presentation of evidence. Respondent's counsel, however, did make the respondent available to the panel to *712 answer any questions that members of the panel had relative to the stipulations. This arrangement was apparently in accord with the agreements made by counsel at the time the written stipulations of fact were entered into. As a result of this procedure, the transcript of the hearing consists wholly of questions propounded by the panel members and respondent's answers thereto.
The stipulation of facts, shorn of statements relative to the American Roofing complaint, is as follows:
....
The affidavit of John W. Jamison, referred to in paragraph 14 of the stipulation, is as follows:
*714 The affidavit of Charles B. Hall, referred to in paragraph 15 of the stipulation, is as follows:
The affidavit of W. Edward Nichols, referred to in paragraph 16 of the stipulation, is as follows:
$75,000 of the temporary note proceeds went into a special account captioned "Fawn Subdivision-Street Improvement City of Lansing, Kansas." From said account respondent received the following:
The other $75,000 of the temporary note proceeds went into a special account captioned "Fawn Subdivision-Sewer Improvement City of Lansing, Kansas." From said account respondent received the following:
The panel found and concluded as follows:
"Conclusions of Law
The panel then concluded that the respondent's testimony *719 clearly established an additional violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility "in connection with the acceptance of private employment in a matter where a public official has substantial public duties to perform and in a matter where the appearance of impropriety may exist."
The panel, however, took no action on this additional violation which surfaced in respondent's testimony.
The panel was unable to agree as to a recommendation concerning the discipline to be imposed. The record was then presented to the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys, two members not participating, which adopted the panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law, and recommended that the respondent be punished by indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
The respondent filed the following exceptions to the panel's report:
The court has carefully reviewed the record and concludes that the panel's findings and conclusions, above recited, are amply supported therein. From respondent's testimony we note that the $81,000 disbursements were made to respondent on his own request and were not subjected to the approval of the city council. All checks were signed by the city clerk and city treasurer, plus either the mayor or the president of the city council. We further note that the respondent gave inconsistent explanations as to precisely what services the $81,000 was in payment for. At various places in his testimony he states the $81,000 was a negotiated fee between himself and the initial developer, Jamison, *720 based on 11% of the total project cost ($700,000) for services respondent was to perform primarily in the future for the developer.
At another place in his testimony the respondent states that the $81,000, at least in part, was payment by the city for some 1,600 hours of promotional work performed for the city prior to the payment of the fee. Of the 1,600 hours so charged, respondent attributes 800 hours to the Fawn Valley Subdivision. However, respondent further states that at no time did the city agree to pay him for promotional work. Respondent states the agreement was that, whereas he would not be paid for his promotional work, he would be permitted to accept employment from any developers he was able to attract to Lansing. Presumably, such employment would encompass only the future performance of such work for the developer as might be agreed upon between respondent and the developer. Respondent does not contend that the $81,000 fee was a fair fee for work done solely in connection with the temporary notes. After it became apparent that Jamison would be withdrawing from the project, respondent neither returned any part of the fee to the city, nor offered to do so. When the smoke cleared away, respondent had the $81,000, plus 30% of the project (apparently having paid some $55,000 therefor). Respondent's uncle became the principal owner of the project after the Jamison involvement terminated.
The finding of the panel that "[t]here appears to be considerable confusion in Attorney Stakes' mind between his client, the City; his obligations to the taxpayers of the City of Lansing; and his relationship to the developer, legal services he intended to perform on behalf of the developer, and his present role as investor in the Fawn Valley Subdivision," is, in itself, a considerable understatement.
We do not hesitate to conclude that the $81,000 fee was paid by the City of Lansing from the proceeds of the temporary notes and that said fee was far in excess of a proper fee for services rendered in connection with the issuance of such notes. A violation of DR 2-106 by the respondent has clearly been established.
We turn now to the question of the appropriate discipline to be imposed. In making such determination we must consider the facts of the violation as well as any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Respondent contends that the Board's recommendation *721 of indefinite suspension from the practice of law is too harsh and would be inconsistent with discipline previously imposed by this court for allegedly comparable violations. In State v. Alvey, 215 Kan. 460, 466, 524 P.2d 747 (1974), a similar contention was made and this court stated:
By way of mitigation the respondent directs our attention to the fact this is the first time he has been involved in a disciplinary proceeding and that the City of Lansing will suffer no financial loss as a result of the violation. Respondent also notes that certain members of the city council knew the fees were being paid to him and that the developer, Jamison, was in agreement with the payment of the fees in this manner.
Conspicuously absent from the testimony of respondent, or from his brief, is any admission of violation of DR 2-106, any suggestion that he should have proceeded differently, or that in like circumstances he would proceed in a different manner in the future. The fact respondent was city attorney during the transactions in question must be considered as an aggravating factor. The violation herein can only be regarded as both willful and flagrant. Under the totality of the facts and circumstances herein, the majority concludes that the respondent's misconduct justifies the discipline recommended by the State Board for Discipline of Attorneys, although a minority of the court would disbar the respondent.
It is therefore by the court considered, ordered and adjudged *722 that Wilbur S. Stakes, Jr., be and he is hereby suspended from the practice of law for an indefinite period. Costs of this proceeding are taxed to the respondent.