Case Title: Legue v. City of Racine

Citation: 2014 WI 92

Docket Number: 2012AP002499

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 92 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2499   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Eileen W. Legue, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Department of Health and Human Services and 
Farmers  
Insurance Exchange, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
     v. 
City of Racine and Amy L. Matsen, 
          Defendants-Respondents.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 25, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 14, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Charles H. Constantine 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ZIEGLER, BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, JJJ., dissent. 
(Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there were briefs by Timothy 
S. Knurr and Gruber Law Offices, LLC, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Timothy S. Knurr. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents, there was a brief by Thomas 
M. Devine, Anthony P. Hahn, Jennifer O. Hemmer, and Hostak, 
Henzl & Bichler, S.C., Racine, and oral argument by Thomas M. 
Devine. 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by J. Michael Riley and 
Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Association for Justice. 
 
 
 
2014 WI 92
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP2499 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV2090) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Eileen W. Legue, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
Department of Health and Human Services and 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Racine and Amy L. Matsen, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 25, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Racine 
County, Charles H. Constantine, Judge.  Reversed and remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is an appeal from a 
judgment of the circuit court for Racine County, Charles H. 
Constantine, Judge, dismissing the action of Eileen W. Legue, 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
2 
 
the plaintiff,1 against the City of Racine and Amy L. Matsen, a 
Racine police officer.2  The court of appeals certified the 
appeal to this court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61. 
¶2 
This 
appeal 
originates 
from 
a 
collision 
at 
an 
intersection in the City of Racine between the plaintiff's car 
and a Racine police car driven by Officer Matsen, the defendant.  
The police car was responding to an emergency dispatch calling 
the officer to the scene of an accident.   
¶3 
The collision of the automobiles presents an issue of 
law at the juncture of Wis. Stat. § 893.80 (2011-12),3 governing 
the immunity of municipal government and its officers and 
employees, and Wis. Stat. § 346.03, governing the rules of the 
road for emergency vehicles.   
¶4 
The immunity statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), declares 
that no suit may be brought against any governmental actor for 
acts done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.  "These functions are 
synonymous with discretionary acts."4  The law of our state is 
                                                 
1 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and 
Farmers Insurance Exchange are involuntary plaintiffs.  We refer 
only to Eileen W. Legue as the plaintiff for the sake of 
simplicity. 
2 For the sake of simplicity we refer only to Amy L. Matsen, 
the police officer, as a defendant. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 Willow Creek Ranch, LLC v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, 
¶25, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693. 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
3 
 
clear that for municipal government actors "the rule is 
liability——the exception is immunity."5    
¶5 
The statute governing the rules of the road applicable 
to emergency vehicles, Wis. Stat. § 346.03, sets forth statutory 
privileges of authorized emergency vehicles to exempt their 
operators from certain rules of the road, but also explicitly 
states that an operator of an emergency vehicle is not relieved 
of the "duty to drive or ride with due regard under the 
circumstances for the safety of all persons . . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.03(5).   
¶6 
The appeal raises two issues of law.  The more 
difficult one implicates the interplay between Wis. Stat. 
§§ 893.80(4) and 346.03(5).  The appeal raises the question of 
how to reconcile the statutory dichotomy of discretionary 
immunity and ministerial liability in § 893.80(4) with the 
statutory imposition of a duty on officers to operate an 
authorized 
emergency 
vehicle 
"with 
due 
regard 
under 
the 
circumstances for the safety of all persons" in § 346.03(5).  
                                                                                                                                                             
"When analyzing and applying Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), we 
often have used the term 'discretionary' as a shorthand to refer 
to decisions of a governmental entity that are legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial." 
Showers 
Appraisals, 
LLC 
v. 
Musson 
Bros, 
2013 
WI 
79, 
¶26, 
350 
Wis. 2d 509, 835 N.W.2d 226 (citing, inter alia, Willow Creek 
Ranch). 
5 Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 39, 115 
N.W.2d 618 (1962).  See also Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 
2002 WI 71, ¶22, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314. 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
4 
 
¶7 
The issue is phrased by the court of appeals in its 
certification memorandum as a question the case law has left 
open:  
Does governmental immunity apply when someone is 
injured because an officer proceeds against a traffic 
signal as authorized by Wis. Stat. § 346.03(2)(b) 
(2011-12), if the officer slowed the vehicle and 
activated lights and sirens as required by § 346.03(3) 
but nonetheless arguably violated the duty to operate 
the vehicle "with due regard under the circumstances" 
as 
required 
by 
§ 346.03(5)? . . . More 
specifically, . . . when, if ever, the "due regard" 
requirement 
imposed 
by 
§ 346.03(5) 
becomes 
a 
"ministerial" obligation, violation of which will 
create an exception to governmental immunity.6   
¶8 
The second issue of law is whether, assuming liability 
for the police officer's alleged negligence, there was credible 
                                                 
6 The court of appeals' certification memorandum viewed the 
following question as left open by Brown v. Acuity, 2013 WI 60, 
¶42, 348 Wis. 2d 603, 833 N.W.2d 96:  
[D]oes immunity apply if an officer's manner of 
proceeding against a traffic signal fulfills the 
ministerial duties of Wis. Stat. § 346.03(2)(b) and 
(3) (that is, the officer slows the vehicle and 
activates lights and sirens) but arguably violates the 
duty to operate the vehicle "with due regard under the 
circumstances" as required by § 346.03(5)?  
The City of Racine and Amy L. Matsen raised the issue of 
their governmental immunity by a post-verdict motion seeking 
judgment 
notwithstanding 
the 
verdict. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.14(5)(b).  A circuit court's order granting a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is a ruling on an issue of law.  The 
circuit court in effect granted the motion by dismissing the 
action on the ground of governmental immunity. 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
5 
 
evidence to support the jury's verdict that the police officer's 
negligence caused the plaintiff's injuries.7 
¶9 
The first issue requires that we interpret the 
immunity statute and the rules of the road statute and apply 
them to the facts presented.       
¶10 The plaintiff asserts that the immunity statute does 
not apply to the alleged negligent acts of the police officer in 
failing to keep a proper lookout and failing to maintain a speed 
that allowed for a proper lookout.  In contrast, the defendant 
asserts that the police officer's decisions regarding lookout 
and speed, which the plaintiff alleges are part of the duty of 
"due regard under the circumstances," are instead part of the 
officer's discretionary decision to enter the intersection 
against the red light.  In sum, the officer contends that her 
decisions regarding lookout and speed, when she proceeded 
through the red light after slowing down with the squad car's 
lights 
and 
siren 
engaged 
in 
compliance 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.03(2)(b) and (3), were immune discretionary acts.      
¶11 Both parties rely on Estate of Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 
202 Wis. 2d 290, 319, 550 N.W.2d 103 (1996), to support their 
respective positions.   
¶12 The plaintiff relies on the following sentence in 
Cavanaugh:  
                                                 
7 The City of Racine and Amy L. Matsen challenged the jury 
verdict by a motion for directed verdict.  The circuit court in 
effect granted the motion. 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
6 
 
In sum, despite the general discretionary act immunity 
set forth in § 893.80(4), a negligence action may be 
sustained against an officer involved in a high-speed 
pursuit on the grounds that he or she breached the 
duty to operate the vehicle with "due regard under the 
circumstances" under § 346.03(5). 
Cavanaugh, 202 Wis. 2d at 319.     
¶13 The defendant relies on the very next sentence in 
Cavanaugh:  
However, the negligent operation under § 346.03(5) 
does not include the discretionary decisions to 
initiate or continue a pursuit; such discretionary 
decisions continue to be afforded immunity under 
§ 893.80(4).   
Id. 
¶14 In its certification memorandum, the court of appeals 
pointed out that Cavanaugh instructs that "an officer can be 
liable for negligent driving during an emergency response if 
damages were caused by the officer's negligent operation of the 
vehicle beyond the context of the discretionary decision 
itself."  Yet this leaves us to puzzle:  Which decisions go to 
negligent operation, and which go to the discretionary decision? 
¶15 The court of appeals explains this gray area left by 
Cavanaugh as follows:  
When, if ever, does a public officer's obligation to 
operate an emergency vehicle with "due regard under 
the circumstances" under Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) create 
an exception to the governmental immunity provided by 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80?   
When, if ever, does a public officer's decision to 
violate rules of the road during an emergency trigger 
potential liability for arguable failure to operate 
with "due regard under the circumstances" by making 
that decision?      
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
7 
 
¶16 We conclude that the immunity statute does not apply 
in the present case to the police officer's violation of the 
duty to operate the vehicle "with due regard under the 
circumstances."  A contrary outcome would contravene Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) and 346.03(5), public policy, the rules of statutory 
interpretation, and case law. 
¶17 We further conclude that there was credible evidence 
to support the jury verdict of causal negligence on the part of 
the police officer. 
¶18 For the reasons set forth, we reverse the judgment of 
the circuit court dismissing the action and remand the matter to 
the circuit court to reinstate the jury verdict. 
¶19 We reach this conclusion by reasoning as follows:  
I. We state the facts and procedural posture of the 
appeal. 
II. We survey the current state of the doctrine of 
governmental 
immunity 
governed 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) to give context for our decision in the 
instant case.  
III. 
We 
state 
and 
apply 
the 
rules 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) 
and 
§ 346.03(5). 
IV. We scrutinize our case law, especially Estate of 
Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 202 Wis. 2d 290, 550 N.W.2d 103 
(1996), for principles guiding our understanding of 
the 
interplay 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 893.80(4) 
and 
346.03(5), 
the 
distinction 
between 
immune 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
8 
 
discretionary and non-immune ministerial acts under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), and the nature of the duty of 
"due regard" in Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5). 
V. Upon holding that immunity does not apply in the 
instant case, we search the record for credible 
evidence to support the jury verdict that the police 
officer's 
alleged 
negligent 
acts 
caused 
the 
plaintiff's injury. 
¶20 For the reasons set forth, we reverse the judgment of 
the circuit court dismissing the action and remand the matter to 
the circuit court to reinstate the jury verdict. 
I 
 
¶21 The facts and procedural history of this case are 
undisputed for purposes of this appeal.   
 
¶22 On July 27, 2009, Police Officer Amy Matsen responded 
to a dispatch calling her to the scene of a motor vehicle 
accident with unknown injuries.  She engaged in a full emergency 
response, activating her lights and siren in the squad car and 
exceeded the speed limit.   
 
¶23 At around noon, she was proceeding northbound on 
Douglas Avenue in the City of Racine at a high rate of speed, 
occasionally using the car's bullhorn.   
¶24 As she approached the intersection of Douglas Avenue 
and South Street, she observed the red light and slowed her car 
to 27 miles per hour.  The posted speed limit was 30 miles per 
hour.  Northbound traffic was stopped at the light.  The officer 
maneuvered her car around the traffic stopped at the light and 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
9 
 
into the southbound lanes of Douglas Avenue to enter the 
intersection. 
¶25 Before impact, the officer saw another vehicle turn 
from the eastbound lane of South Street onto the southbound lane 
of Douglas Avenue.  The officer testified that she had to 
maneuver her car to avoid the turning car. 
 
¶26 When the officer's car entered the intersection, the 
plaintiff's car was eastbound on South Street at 30 miles per 
hour.  Eastbound traffic, including the plaintiff, had a green 
light.  The plaintiff did not slow down when she entered the 
intersection.  The plaintiff's radio was on; the car's air 
conditioning was on; and the car windows were closed.  The 
plaintiff did not see the officer's vehicle or hear the 
officer's siren or horn.   
¶27 A KFC store sits on the southwest corner of the 
intersection.  Both parties stipulated that the store blocked 
the view of cars entering the intersection.  The plaintiff's car 
would not have been visible to the officer and the officer's car 
would not have been visible to the plaintiff until about two 
seconds before the collision occurred. 
 
¶28 When 
both 
cars 
entered 
the 
intersection, 
the 
plaintiff's vehicle struck the driver's side of the officer's 
vehicle.  The collision was recorded by a dash-mounted camera in 
the squad car.   
¶29 Both the plaintiff and the officer were injured.  The 
plaintiff brought suit against the police officer and the City 
of Racine for injuries sustained.     
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
10 
 
 
¶30 At trial, the police officer conceded that she 
considered it necessary to check for pedestrians and other 
vehicles and travel at a reasonable speed to make observations 
about traffic, in order to properly exercise her duty of care. 
 
¶31 Additionally, the parties stipulated that City of 
Racine Police Department Policy and Procedure Number 812 
dictates the requirements of an officer in responding to an 
emergency request.  The policy reads in relevant part: 
POLICY:   
The operator of an emergency vehicle shall insure that 
he or she has due regard for the safety of all 
occupants of his or her vehicle as well as the safety 
of pedestrians and occupants of other vehicles. 
PROCEDURE:  
When responding to an emergency call or actively 
involved in a pursuit, the following requirements must 
be complied with: 
1. Use emergency lights and siren simultaneously 
and continuously. 
2. At all times, comply with the requirements of 
Wisconsin State Statute [Section] 346.03 relative 
to the giving of audible and visual signals (sub. 
3). 
 
a. The emergency vehicle operator may exceed 
the speed limit without giving audible and 
visual 
signals 
under 
the 
following 
circumstances (sub. 4): 
1) While obtaining evidence of a speed 
violation 
2) When responding to a call which 
he/she reasonably believes involves a 
felony 
in 
progress 
and 
reasonably 
believes any of the following: 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
11 
 
a) Knowledge of his/her presence 
may 
endanger 
the 
safety 
of 
a 
victim or other person. 
b) Knowledge of his/her presence 
may cause the suspected violator 
to evade apprehension. 
c) Knowledge of his/her presence 
may cause the suspected violator 
to destroy evidence of a suspected 
felony or may otherwise result in 
the 
loss 
of 
evidence 
of 
a 
suspected felony. 
d) Knowledge of his/her presence 
may cause the suspected violator 
to 
cease 
the 
commission 
of 
a 
suspected 
felony 
before 
he/she 
obtains 
sufficient 
evidence 
to 
establish grounds for arrest. 
 . . . . 
5. Keep in mind that the exemptions granted above 
do not relieve department members from the duty 
to drive with due regard under the circumstances 
for the safety of all persons, taking into 
consideration: 
a. The type, actions and speed of the 
vehicle being pursued; 
b. The geographic area of pursuit and its 
population density; 
 
 
c. The time of day and day of week; 
d. The vehicular and pedestrian traffic 
present in area; 
 
 
e. The road and weather conditions; 
f. The officer's familiarity with the area 
of pursuit. 
6. 
Although 
the 
conditions 
are 
identified 
individually, each can have an impact on another; 
therefore, the totality of the circumstances 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
12 
 
should be considered.  Their value for decision-
making purposes is enhanced when considered in 
combination. 
¶32 The jury returned a special verdict, finding that, 
inter alia:  (1) the defendant was causally negligent with 
regard to the operation of her motor vehicle; (2) the plaintiff 
was causally negligent with regard to the operation of her motor 
vehicle; and (3) the defendant and the plaintiff were each fifty 
percent causally negligent.  The jury awarded damages to the 
plaintiff in the amount of $129,799.72.  The police officer did 
not seek damages in the present case. 
 
¶33 After the verdict was returned, the officer brought a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict asserting the 
officer's 
immunity 
and 
a 
motion 
for 
a 
directed 
verdict 
challenging, inter alia, the jury's finding of the defendant's 
causal negligence.   
¶34 On 
the 
motion 
for 
judgment 
notwithstanding 
the 
verdict, the circuit court ruled as a matter of law that because 
the police officer's decision to enter the intersection was 
discretionary, all her other allegedly negligent decisions were 
part of her discretionary decision and immune from suit.  On the 
motion for a directed verdict, the circuit court ruled that the 
police officer had a duty to exercise due regard but that in the 
instant case the police officer's negligence was not causal.   
II 
¶35 The instant case requires us to survey the current 
state of the doctrine of governmental immunity governed by Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80 to give context for our decision.   
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
13 
 
 
¶36 Prior to 1961, the common law doctrine of governmental 
immunity generally barred tort suits against a governmental 
entity.  In Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 
N.W.2d 618 (1962), the court rejected the immunity doctrine 
outright 
for 
municipalities 
and 
stated 
a 
new 
rule: 
"[H]enceforward, so far as governmental responsibility for torts 
is concerned, the rule is liability——the exception is immunity."  
Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 39.  Nevertheless, Holytz declared that a 
municipality is not liable for acts done "in the exercise of its 
legislative or judicial or quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial 
functions."  Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 40. 
 
¶37 The Holytz court noted that if the legislature deemed 
it better public policy, the legislature was of course free to 
reinstate immunity.   
¶38 After Holytz, the legislature created Wis. Stat. 
§ 331.43, now numbered § 893.80, setting forth the circumstances 
under which the general rule of governmental liability does not 
apply.8  The statute codified Holytz's exception to municipal 
governmental liability:  Government is immune for acts done in 
the exercise of "legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative, and 
quasi-judicial functions."9   
                                                 
8 Ch. 198, Laws of 1963. 
9 See Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. City of Milwaukee, 
2005 WI 8, ¶53, 277 Wis. 2d 635, 691 N.W.2d 658 (recognizing 
that § 893.80 "codified the holding in Holytz regarding immunity 
for legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial 
acts") (citing Lange v. Town of Norway, 77 Wis. 2d 313, 314-18, 
253 N.W.2d 240 (1977)). 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
14 
 
¶39 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(4) (which is substantially 
the same as the provision adopted in 1963) presently reads as 
follows: 
No suit may be brought against any volunteer fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employees nor may any suit be 
brought 
against 
such 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
agency or volunteer fire company or against its 
officers, officials, agents or employees for acts done 
in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions (emphasis added). 
 
¶40 The court has explicated the purpose of the government 
immunity statute as protecting separation of powers and avoiding 
judicial intrusion into the policy decisions of the other 
branches.  The court explained:  
The purpose of [governmental] immunity is to ensure 
that 
courts 
refuse 
to 
pass 
judgment 
on 
policy 
decisions in the province of coordinate branches of 
government, if such a policy decision, consciously 
balancing risks and advantages, took place.10 
¶41 The exceptions to municipal and employee immunity 
represent "a judicial balance struck between 'the need of public 
officers to perform their functions freely [and] the right of an 
aggrieved party to seek redress.'"11  The threat of liability and 
a lawsuit against governmental actors creates public policy 
                                                 
10 Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d 663, 687, 292 
N.W.2d 816, 827 (1980) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
11 Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶24 (quoting C.L. v. Olson, 143 
Wis. 2d 701, 710, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988)). 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
15 
 
concerns, which governmental immunity seeks to reduce.  The 
public policy concerns include: 
(1) The danger of influencing public officers in the 
performance of their functions by the threat of a 
lawsuit; (2) the deterrent effect which the threat of 
personal liability might have on those who are 
considering entering public service; (3) the drain on 
valuable 
time 
caused 
by 
such 
actions; 
(4) 
the 
unfairness 
of 
subjecting 
officials 
to 
personal 
liability for the acts of their subordinates; and (5) 
the feeling that the ballot and removal procedures are 
more appropriate methods of dealing with misconduct in 
public office.12  
These public policy considerations have to be balanced against 
the need to protect the public against the misfortune of being 
injured by a government actor.13    
 
¶42 The court has interpreted the words "legislative, 
quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions" in Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) 
to 
be 
synonymous 
with 
the 
word 
                                                 
12 Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶23 (quoting Lister v. Board of 
Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 299, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976)). 
13 C.L., 143 Wis. 2d at 708-09.  
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
16 
 
"discretionary."14  If an act is discretionary, then governmental 
immunity provided by Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) applies.  There is 
no immunity, however, for liability associated with "the 
performance of ministerial duties imposed by law."15   
                                                 
14 The rule was first announced in Lister v. Board of 
Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976), which stated 
that "the most generally favored principle is that public 
officers are immune from liability for damages resulting from 
their negligence or unintentional fault in the performance of 
discretionary functions."  Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301.  The court 
has echoed this notion multiple times.  See, e.g., Lodl, 253 
Wis. 2d 323, ¶21 ("The statute immunizes against liability for 
legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, and quasi-judicial 
acts, which have been collectively interpreted to include any 
act that involves the exercise of discretion and judgment."); 
Willow Creek Ranch, 235 Wis. 2d 409, ¶25 ("Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4), a municipality is immune from 'any suit' for 'acts 
done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial 
or quasi-judicial functions.'  These functions are synonymous 
with discretionary acts.").  
15 Brown, 
348 
Wis. 2d 603, 
¶42 
(quoting 
Lodl, 
253 
Wis. 2d 323, ¶24). 
The ministerial duty, according to some case law, is not so 
much 
an 
exception 
as 
a 
recognition 
that 
immunity 
law 
distinguishes 
between 
discretionary 
and 
ministerial 
acts, 
immunizing the performance of the former but not the latter.  
See Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶25. 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
17 
 
¶43 The 
court's 
explication 
and 
application 
of 
the 
doctrine of governmental immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) 
has come under increasing criticism by members of the court.16 
¶44 The criticism came clearly and forcefully to the fore 
in Scott v. Savers Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 2003 WI 
60, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715.   
¶45 In Scott, a school guidance counselor gave incorrect 
information to a student regarding appropriate classes.  As a 
result the student was ineligible for an athletic scholarship.17  
A majority of the court held that the counselor was immune, 
performing a discretionary act.   
¶46 The 
separate 
writings 
in 
Scott 
explore 
the 
dissatisfaction surrounding the existing governmental immunity-
governmental liability doctrines.  See Scott, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 
¶58 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (noting the "jurisprudential 
chaos surrounding the phrase 'legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions' in § 893.80(4)"); id., ¶62 
(Bablitch, J., concurring, joined by Crooks, J.) (decrying the 
                                                 
16 Commentators have also noted the court's recent criticism 
of the doctrine and have themselves criticized the existing case 
law.  See, e.g., Linda M. Annoye, Comment, Revising Wisconsin's 
Government Immunity Doctrine, 88 Marq. L. Rev. 971 (2005) 
(advocating for an additional requirement that a discretionary 
decision be a policy decision to receive immunity); Andrea 
Dudding, Comment, Reining in Municipalities: How To Tame the 
Municipal Immunity Monster in Wisconsin, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 1741 
(criticizing the application of governmental immunity to low 
level municipal actors and advocating immunity only for high 
level policy and decision making actors).   
17 See Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, 
262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715. 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
18 
 
existing doctrine as producing "an unjust result" and creating 
"injustice and inequity," and predicting that the doctrine of 
governmental immunity "will not[ ] stand much longer"); id., ¶82 
(Prosser, J., dissenting) (criticizing the governmental immunity 
doctrine as "wrong and unjust" and "contrary to legislative 
intent").  See also Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage 
Dist., 2013 WI 78, ¶¶108-109, 350 Wis. 2d 554, 835 N.W.2d 160 
(Gableman, J., concurring) (discretionary immunity has been used 
"to stretch governmental immunity beyond both the text of the 
statute and the Holytz decision" and has "essentially restored 
governmental 
immunity"); 
id., 
¶¶182-83 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting, joined by Bradley, J.) (criticizing the majority 
opinion 
for 
ruling 
that 
the 
continuation 
of 
a 
nuisance 
constituted a ministerial act, even though the nuisance was 
created by a design defect, the design being a discretionary 
immune act).  
¶47 Some of the criticism has centered on the court's 
alleged rewriting of the statute by substituting the word 
"discretionary" for the text of § 893.80(4), which immunizes 
acts 
in 
the 
exercise 
of 
"legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions."18  These critics reason 
that an act may involve an exercise of judgment and discretion 
but is not an exercise of a "legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial, or quasi-judicial function."  
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Scott, 262 Wis. 2d 127, ¶¶75-79 (Prosser, J., 
dissenting). 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
19 
 
¶48 Other criticism has been directed at the case law for 
not 
consistently 
explaining 
the 
distinction 
between 
discretionary and ministerial acts.  The test distinguishing 
between ministerial and discretionary acts has been disparaged 
as too malleable and not consistently applied.   
 
¶49 Some cases have defined a discretionary act broadly as 
follows:  "A discretionary act involves the exercise of judgment 
in the application of a rule to specific facts."  Willow Creek 
Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶25, 235 
Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693.  Consequently, one would assume 
that a ministerial act, in contrast to a discretionary act, is 
one that does not involve the exercise of judgment in the 
application of a rule to specific facts.   
¶50 Other cases appear to set forth a more specific, more 
difficult test to be met for an act to be characterized as 
ministerial:   An act is ministerial if it "is absolute, certain 
and imperative, involving the performance of a specific task 
that the law imposes and defines the time, mode and occasion for 
its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for 
judgment or discretion."19  The court has also stated that a 
"duty imposed by the statute, regulation, or procedure must 
conform to all elements of a ministerial duty."20   
                                                 
19 Brown, 348 Wis. 2d 603, ¶43 (quoting Lister, 72 Wis. 2d 
at 301).  See also Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 10-11, 546 
N.W.2d 151 (1996) (quoting Olson, 143 Wis. 2d at 711-12 (quoting 
Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301)). 
20 Brown, 348 Wis. 2d 603, ¶44 (quoting Yao v. Chapman, 2005 
WI App 200, ¶31, 287 Wis. 2d 445, 705 N.W.2d 272). 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
20 
 
 
¶51 This "absolute, certain and imperative" and "time, 
mode and occasion" test for a ministerial act has engendered 
disagreement among members of the court regarding its meaning 
and its application.   
 
¶52 For example, in Pries v. McMillon, 2010 WI 63, ¶¶33-
37, 326 Wis. 2d 37, 784 N.W.2d 648, the company's instructions 
for dismantling a horse stall at State Fair Park admonished, 
"[A]lways have someone holding up the piece that you are taking 
down."  The instructions do not state where the piece is to be 
held or how high it is to be held.  Nevertheless, the court 
ruled that the company's language satisfied the requirements of 
a ministerial duty.  
¶53 The three-justice dissent asserted that the written 
instructions suffer from "a critical lack of particularity as to 
time, mode and occasion for performance."21       
¶54 In Cavanaugh, the court noted that although Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.03(6) requires law enforcement agencies to provide written 
guidelines, the statute does not specify the time, mode, or 
occasion for the agency to provide the written guidelines.  
Nevertheless, Cavanaugh held that the law enforcement agency's 
duty 
to 
promulgate 
guidelines 
under 
§ 346.03(6) 
was 
a 
ministerial function and that the agency's failure to promulgate 
written guidelines conforming to the statute rendered the agency 
liable. 
                                                 
21 Pries v. McMillon, 2010 WI 63, ¶77, 326 Wis. 2d 37, 784 
N.W.2d 648 (Bradley, J., dissenting, joined by Roggensack, J. & 
Gableman, J.). 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
21 
 
¶55 The 
following 
functions 
have 
been 
held 
to 
be 
discretionary and thus immune:  A school district benefit 
specialist 
giving 
information 
to 
an 
employee 
regarding 
employment benefits;22 a University faculty member constructing a 
volleyball net base for a physical education class;23 and a 
police officer directing traffic at an intersection when the 
traffic light was not functioning despite mandatory police 
department protocols for directing traffic.24   
¶56 Conversely, the following functions have been held to 
be ministerial and not immune:  A sewer authority's maintenance 
of a sewer system;25 a University of Wisconsin department chair's 
offer of employment to a faculty member;26 a director of 
facilities' construction and maintenance of a platform at Camp 
Randall according to safety regulations.27 
¶57 In the face of the criticisms of and inconsistencies 
in the law of governmental immunity, our state nevertheless 
continues to operate under the doctrine of immunity for 
discretionary acts and liability for ministerial acts.   
                                                 
22 See 
Kierstyn 
v. 
Racine 
Unified 
School 
Dist., 
228 
Wis. 2d 81, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999). 
23 Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d 1. 
24 See Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323. 
25 Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 277 Wis. 2d 635. 
26 Bicknese v. Sutula, 2003 WI 31, 260 Wis. 2d 713, 660 
N.W.2d 289. 
27 Umansky v. ABC Ins. Co., 2009 WI 82, 319 Wis. 2d 622, 769 
N.W.2d 1. 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
22 
 
 
¶58 The 
parties 
frame 
their 
positions 
within 
the 
discretionary-ministerial dichotomy.  The plaintiff contends 
that the duty of the police officer to act with "due regard 
under the circumstances," under Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) is a 
ministerial function that is not immune under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4).  As might be expected, the police officer asserts 
that she was acting in the exercise of a discretionary function 
and is therefore immune from suit.     
 
¶59 With this general overview of the current state of the 
doctrine of governmental immunity governed by Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4), we look to the applicable statutes, regulations, 
and procedures to determine how to characterize the police 
officer's conduct in the intersection in the present case.   
III 
 
¶60 We 
turn 
to 
the 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) and § 346.03(5) and their application to the facts 
of the present case.  Interpretation and application of a 
statute is ordinarily a question of law that this court 
determines independently but benefiting from the analyses of the 
circuit court and court of appeals.28  
¶61 We interpret a statute by looking at the text of the 
statute.29  The statutory language is examined within the context 
                                                 
28 DOR v. River City Refuse Removal, Inc., 2007 WI 27, ¶26, 
299 Wis. 2d 561, 729 N.W.2d 396. 
29 Klemm v. Am. Transmission Co., LLC, 2011 WI 37, ¶18, 333 
Wis. 2d 580, 798 N.W.2d 223.   
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
23 
 
in which it is used.30  Words are ordinarily interpreted 
according to their common and approved usage; technical words 
and phrases and others are ordinarily interpreted according to 
their technical meaning.31  Statutes are interpreted to give 
effect to each word and to avoid surplusage.32  We interpret a 
statute by examining the purpose of a statute33 and the 
consequences of alternative interpretations.34  We also examine 
                                                 
30 Alberte v. Anew Health Care Servs., Inc., 2000 WI 7, ¶10, 
232 Wis. 2d 587, 592, 605 N.W.2d 515 ("While it is true that 
statutory interpretation begins with the language of the 
statute, it is also well established that courts must not look 
at a single, isolated sentence or portion of a sentence, but at 
the role of the relevant language in the entire statute."); 
Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 
N.W.2d 659 
(contextual 
approach 
is 
not 
new); 
Klemm, 
333 
Wis. 2d 580, ¶18 ("The statutory language is examined within the 
context in which it is used."). 
31 Klemm, 
333 
Wis. 2d 580, 
¶18; 
see 
also 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 990.01. 
32 See, e.g., Klemm, 333 Wis. 2d 580, ¶18; Pawlowski v. Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 105, ¶22 n.14, 322 Wis. 2d 21, 777 
N.W.2d 67 (citing Donaldson v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 306, 315, 286 
N.W.2d 817 (1980)). 
33 State v. Hanson, 2012 WI 4, ¶16, 338 Wis. 2d 243, 808 
N.W.2d 390; Klemm, 333 Wis. 2d 580, ¶18; Lagerstrom v. Myrtle 
Werth Hosp.-Mayo Health Sys., 2005 WI 124, ¶51, 285 Wis. 2d 1, 
700 N.W.2d 201. 
34 State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶16, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 
N.W.2d 203; Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, 
¶30, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258 (considering "alternative 
interpretation" to evaluate potential absurd results); State v. 
Cole, 
2003 
WI 
59, 
¶66, 
262 
Wis. 2d 167, 
663 
N.W.2d 700 
(considering 
consequences 
of 
a 
party's 
alternative 
interpretation). 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
24 
 
our case law interpreting the statute35 and the statutory history 
of the statute to determine its meaning.36   
¶62 We look first to the text of the two relevant 
statutes.  The most noticeable fact is that the texts of the two 
statutes do not refer to each other.  At first blush, they seem 
to have no relationship to each other at all.   
¶63 As we noted previously, immunity is granted in 
§ 893.80(4) to governmental actors for acts in the exercise of 
"legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions," which the court has deciphered as synonymous with a 
wide range of functions which are described as "discretionary." 
¶64 The 
words 
"liability," 
"immunity," 
"no 
suit," 
"discretionary," 
"ministerial," 
"legislative," 
"quasi-
legislative," "judicial" or "quasi judicial" do not appear in 
Wis. Stat. § 346.03.       
                                                 
35 Nowell v. City of Wausau, 2013 WI 88, ¶21, 351 Wis. 2d 1, 
838 N.W.2d 852; Juneau County Star-Times v. Juneau County, 2013 
WI 4, ¶66, 345 Wis. 2d 122, 824 N.W.2d 457; State v. Davison, 
2003 WI 89, ¶61, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 666 N.W.2d 1.   
36 "Statutory history encompasses the previously enacted and 
repealed provisions of a statute. By analyzing the changes the 
legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be 
assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute. Therefore, 
statutory history is part of the context in which we interpret 
the words used in a statute."  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 
2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (citations 
omitted).  See, e.g., LaCount v. Gen. Cas. Co., 2006 WI 14, ¶31, 
288 Wis. 2d 358, 709 N.W.2d 418; VanCleve v. City of Marinette, 
2003 WI 2, ¶6, 258 Wis. 2d 80, 655 N.W.2d 113; State v. Byers, 
2003 WI 86, ¶¶22-27, 263 Wis. 2d 113, 665 N.W.2d 729; Hughes v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 980-84, 542 N.W.2d 148 
(1996).  
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
25 
 
¶65 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 346.03 
lays 
out 
various 
circumstances under which an operator of an authorized emergency 
vehicle may exercise a "privilege" set forth in the section.  
The "privileges" exempt an operator of an authorized emergency 
vehicle 
from 
complying 
with 
certain 
rules 
of 
the 
road, 
including:  stopping, standing, or parking; proceeding past a 
red or stop signal or stop sign; exceeding the speed limit; and 
leaving doors of a parked vehicle open.  Exercising these 
privileges is, however, subject to the conditions stated in 
§ 346.03 (2) to (5m). 
¶66 Section 346.03 reads in full as follows: 
(1) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, 
when responding to an emergency call or when in the 
pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, 
when responding to but not upon returning from a fire 
alarm, 
when 
transporting 
an 
organ 
for 
human 
transplantation, 
or 
when 
transporting 
medical 
personnel for the purpose of performing human organ 
harvesting or transplantation immediately after the 
transportation, may exercise the privileges set forth 
in this section, but subject to the conditions stated 
in subs. (2) to (5m). 
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle 
may: 
(a) 
Stop, 
stand 
or 
park, 
irrespective 
of 
the 
provisions of this chapter; 
(b) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, 
but only after slowing down as may be necessary for 
safe operation; 
(c) Exceed the speed limit; 
(d) 
Disregard 
regulations 
governing 
direction 
of 
movement or turning in specified directions. 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
26 
 
(2m) Notwithstanding s. 346.94(20), a law enforcement 
officer, 
a 
fire 
fighter, 
or 
emergency 
medical 
personnel may open and leave open any door of an 
authorized emergency vehicle when the vehicle is 
stopped, standing, or parked and the person is 
performing official duties. 
(3) 
The 
exemption 
granted 
the 
operator 
of 
an 
authorized emergency vehicle by sub. (2)(a) applies 
only when the operator of the vehicle is giving visual 
signal by means of at least one flashing, oscillating 
or rotating red light except that the visual signal 
given by a police vehicle may be by means of a blue 
light and a red light which are flashing, oscillating 
or rotating, except as otherwise provided in sub. 
(4m).  The exemptions granted by sub. (2)(b), (c) and 
(d) apply only when the operator of the emergency 
vehicle is giving both such visual signal and also an 
audible signal by means of a siren or exhaust whistle, 
except as otherwise provided in sub. (4) or (4m). 
(4) Except as provided in sub. (4m), a law enforcement 
officer operating a police vehicle shall otherwise 
comply with the requirements of sub. (3) relative to 
the giving of audible and visual signals but may 
exceed the speed limit without giving audible and 
visual signal under the following circumstances: 
(a) If the officer is obtaining evidence of a speed 
violation. 
(b) If the officer is responding to a call which the 
officer reasonably believes involves a felony in 
progress and the officer reasonably believes any of 
the following: 
1. Knowledge of the officer's presence may endanger 
the safety of a victim or other person. 
2. Knowledge of the officer's presence may cause the 
suspected violator to evade apprehension. 
3. Knowledge of the officer's presence may cause the 
suspected violator to destroy evidence of a suspected 
felony or may otherwise result in the loss of evidence 
of a suspected felony. 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
27 
 
4. Knowledge of the officer's presence may cause the 
suspected violator to cease the commission of a 
suspected felony before the officer obtains sufficient 
evidence to establish grounds for arrest. 
(4m) A law enforcement officer operating a police 
vehicle that is a bicycle is not required to comply 
with the requirements of sub. (3) relative to the 
giving of audible and visual signals. 
(5) 
The 
exemptions 
granted 
the 
operator 
of 
an 
authorized emergency vehicle by this section do not 
relieve such operator from the duty to drive or ride 
with due regard under the circumstances for the safety 
of all persons nor do they protect such operator from 
the consequences of his or her reckless disregard for 
the safety of others. 
(5m) The privileges granted under this section apply 
to the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle 
under s. 340.01(3)(dg) or (dh) only if the operator 
has successfully completed a safety and training 
course in emergency vehicle operation that is taken at 
a technical college under ch. 38 or that is approved 
by the department and only if the vehicle being 
operated is plainly marked, in a manner prescribed by 
the department, to identify it as an authorized 
emergency vehicle under s. 340.01(3)(dg) or (dh). 
(6) Every law enforcement agency that uses authorized 
emergency vehicles shall provide written guidelines 
for its officers and employees regarding exceeding 
speed limits under the circumstances specified in sub. 
(4) and when otherwise in pursuit of actual or 
suspected violators.  The guidelines shall consider, 
among other factors, road conditions, density of 
population, severity of crime and necessity of pursuit 
by vehicle.  The guidelines are not subject to 
requirements for rules under ch. 227.  Each law 
enforcement agency shall review its written guidelines 
by June 30 of each even-numbered year and, if 
considered appropriate by the law enforcement agency, 
shall revise those guidelines. 
¶67 In contrast to the other subsections' exemption of 
emergency vehicle operators from compliance with certain rules 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
28 
 
of the road, subsection (5) of Wis. Stat. § 346.03 imposes a 
duty on an operator of an authorized emergency vehicle.  
Subsection (5) states that the exemptions from the rules of the 
road granted an operator of an authorized emergency vehicle "do 
not relieve the operator from the duty to drive or ride with due 
regard under the circumstances for the safety of all persons and 
do not protect the operator from the consequences of his or her 
reckless disregard for the safety of others." 
¶68 Thus, 
§ 346.03(5), as 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
has 
explained, "qualifies the privileges granted by secs. 346.03(1) 
to (4)."37  Subsection (5) does not, however, explicitly impose 
liability on a governmental actor. 
¶69 That Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) is to be interpreted as 
imposing liability on a governmental actor is supported by the 
text of Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) imposing a duty of due regard, in 
the context of the exemption/privilege language of the other 
provisions of § 346.03.  This language leads us to conclude that 
an exemption or privilege begets immunity and a duty begets 
liability.  Why would the legislature exempt an operator of an 
authorized emergency vehicle from complying with certain rules 
                                                 
37 City of Madison v. Polenska, 143 Wis. 2d 525, 527, 421 
N.W.2d 862, 863 (Ct. App. 1988). 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
29 
 
of the road and impose a duty of due regard unless a violation 
of the duty can result in liability?38   
¶70 Our case law has interpreted Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) as 
providing a cause of action arising out of a breach of an 
emergency vehicle operator's duty created by the statute.  See, 
e.g., Brown v. Acuity, 2013 WI 60, 348 Wis. 2d 603, 833 
N.W.2d 96; Cavanaugh, 202 Wis. 2d 290; see also Montalto v. Fond 
du Lac Cnty., 272 Wis. 552, 76 N.W.2d 279 (1956) (holding that a 
negligence action could be sustained based on an ambulance 
operator's failure to exercise due regard for the safety of 
others).  
¶71 The statutory history of Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) also 
supports this interpretation. 
¶72 In 1915, the legislature exempted police officers from 
automobile regulations and rules of the road when the police 
officers were pursuing violators of the automobile code, but did 
not explicitly provide for the police officer's liability.39    
¶73 In Suren v. Zuege, 186 Wis. 264, 201 N.W. 722 (1925), 
the court interpreted the statute as rendering a police officer 
                                                 
38 See Candee v. Egan, 84 Wis. 2d 348, 357, 267 N.W.2d 890 
(1978) ("Even though a statute does not expressly provide a 
civil remedy for those injured by its violation, this court will 
imply such a remedy if it concludes that the legislature 
intended such a remedy to exist."). 
39 Section 1, ch. 511, Laws of 1915 provided:  "Any police 
officer of any city, county, town or village shall be exempt 
from [the sections of the code regarding auto regulation], while 
actually in pursuit of and attempting to apprehend a person who 
is violating any of the provisions of these sections."   
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
30 
 
liable for breach of the duty of ordinary care for the safety of 
others and himself, stating: 
This statutory exemption . . . while rendering [the 
officer] immune from prosecution or preventing the 
application of the rule that such excess of speed may 
establish a prima facie presumption of negligence, 
does not absolve [the officer] from the duty to 
exercise that which, under those circumstances and 
conditions, is reasonable and ordinary care for the 
safety of others and himself. 
Suren, 186 Wis. at 267 (emphasis added). 
 
¶74 In its revision of the automobile code in 1929, the 
legislature adopted an explicit provision that the emergency 
vehicle operator is not protected from the consequences of a 
reckless disregard for the safety of others.40 
¶75 In the same 1929 legislation, the legislature exempted 
operators of emergency vehicles from speed restrictions.41  In 
1947, the legislature amended the speed limit statute to state 
that the exemption from speed limits does not relieve an 
                                                 
40 Section 3, ch. 454, Laws of 1929, codified at Wis. Stat. 
§ 85.12(5) (1929), provides in relevant part: 
(5) EXEMPTIONS TO AUTHORIZED EMERGENCY VEHICLES.  The 
provisions of said sections regulating the movement, 
parking and standing of vehicles shall not apply to 
authorized emergency vehicles while the operator of 
such vehicle is operating the same in an emergency in 
the necessary performance of public duties.  This 
exemption shall not, however, protect the operator of 
any such vehicle from the consequence of a reckless 
disregard for the safety of others (emphasis added). 
41 "The speed limitations set forth in section 85.40 shall 
not apply to authorized emergency vehicles when operating in 
emergencies."  § 3, ch. 454, Laws of 1929, codified as Wis. 
Stat. § 85.42 (1929). 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
31 
 
operator of an authorized emergency vehicle from either the duty 
to operate with "due regard" for the safety of all persons using 
the highway, nor shall it protect the operator from the 
consequence of a reckless disregard of the safety of others.42 
¶76 Thus, even in the pre-Holytz era, authorized emergency 
vehicle operators who were exempt from obeying certain traffic 
laws were nonetheless "bound to exercise reasonable precautions 
against the extraordinary dangers of the situation which duty 
compels them to create."  Montalto, 272 Wis. at 558.   
¶77 In Montalto, the court concluded that Wis. Stat. 
§§ 85.12(5) and 85.40(5) (1953) could be the basis of an action 
against the operator of an emergency vehicle: 
The right of way given to public service vehicles and 
their exemption from traffic regulations, however, do 
not 
relieve 
their 
operators 
from 
the 
duty 
of 
exercising due care to prevent injury to themselves 
and others lawfully upon the ways.  Although it is 
generally recognized that firemen driving to a fire, 
                                                 
42 Section 1, ch. 407, Laws of 1947, codified as Wis. Stat. 
§ 85.40(5) (1947), provides as follows: 
(5) The speed limitations set forth in this section 
shall not apply to authorized emergency vehicles when 
responding to emergency calls and the operators 
thereof sound audible signal by siren or exhaust 
whistle, and when such emergency vehicle is equipped 
with at least one lighted lamp exhibiting red light 
visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a 
distance of 500 feet to the front of such vehicle.  
This provision shall not relieve the operator of an 
authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to operate 
with due regard for the safety of all persons using 
the highway, nor shall it protect the operator of any 
such vehicle from the consequence of a reckless 
disregard of the safety of others (emphasis added). 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
32 
 
when the safety of lives and property are at stake, 
are in many instances duty bound to proceed at a rate 
of speed greater than that which any ordinary driver 
could justify and cannot be required to stop for red 
lights or other traffic signals, they must include in 
the care they are bound to exercise reasonable 
precautions against the extraordinary dangers of the 
situation which duty compels them to create.  They 
must keep in mind the speed at which their vehicle is 
traveling and the probable consequences of their 
disregard of traffic signals . . . . 
Montalto, 272 Wis. at 558 (quoting Russell v. Nadeau, 29 A.2d 
916, 917 (Me. 1943)). 
¶78 In 1957, the legislature enacted a new vehicle code, 
codifying the new rules of the road in Wis. Stat. Chapter 346 
(1957) and adopting a provision substantially the same as the 
present § 346.03(5).   
¶79 Section 1, ch. 260, Laws of 1957, codified at Wis. 
Stat. § 346.03(5) (1957), provides in relevant part: 
(5) 
The 
exemptions 
granted 
the 
operator 
of 
an 
authorized emergency vehicle by this section do not 
relieve such operator from the duty to drive with due 
regard under the circumstances for the safety of all 
persons nor do they protect such operator from the 
consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety 
of others. 
¶80 The 1957 Legislative Council note to ch. 260, Laws of 
1957, also supports our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) 
as creating liability:  
Subsection (5) makes clear that the operator of an 
authorized emergency vehicle is not relieved of the 
duty to drive with due care. This is the rule 
applicable under the present law with respect to 
violation of the speed law . . . but § 85.12(5) seems 
to make the operator of an authorized emergency 
vehicle liable for his negligence in the case of 
disregard of other rules of the road only if such 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
33 
 
negligence amounts to a reckless disregard of the 
safety of others.  The Supreme Court so held in 
Montalto v. Fond du Lac County, 272 Wis. 2d 442, 76 
N.W.2d 279 (1956).  There is no logical basis for this 
distinction and it has been eliminated. 
Wisconsin Annotations 1804 (1960). 
¶81 In Cavanaugh, 202 Wis. 2d 290, the court held that the 
standard for operating an authorized emergency vehicle "with due 
regard under the circumstances for the safety of all persons" is 
a negligence standard.  Cavanaugh, 202 Wis. 2d at 316. 
¶82 Thus, the statutory history of Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) 
supports our interpretation that it is a liability statute. 
¶83 Our interpretation of the language and statutory 
history of Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) as a liability statute 
dovetails with § 893.80(5), a subsection of the immunity statute 
that we have not previously discussed.    
¶84 The legislature affirmed in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(5) 
that statutes other than § 893.80 might govern liability of 
governmental actors.  The legislature declared in subsection (5) 
of § 893.80 that "[w]hen rights or remedies are provided by any 
other statute against any [governmental actor] for injury, 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
34 
 
damage or death, such statute shall apply and the limitations in 
sub. (3) [referring to caps on damages] shall be inapplicable."43   
¶85 Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 893.80(5) provides in full as 
follows:  
Except as provided in this subsection, the provisions 
and limitations of this section shall be exclusive and 
shall apply to all claims against a volunteer fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or agency or 
against any officer, official, agent or employee 
thereof for acts done in an official capacity or the 
course of his or her agency or employment.  When 
rights or remedies are provided by any other statute 
against 
any 
political 
corporation, 
governmental 
subdivision or agency or any officer, official, agent 
or employee thereof for injury, damage or death, such 
statute shall apply and the limitations in sub. (3) 
shall be inapplicable (emphasis added). 
¶86 This 
language 
makes 
clear 
that 
the 
legislature 
envisioned the possibility that other statutes might create 
rights 
or 
remedies 
that 
plaintiffs 
can 
pursue 
against 
governmental 
actors 
despite 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4)'s 
codification of immunity for legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial, or quasi-judicial acts.     
                                                 
43 The court has interpreted the last sentence to refer 
specifically to the applicability of damage caps and not to 
other subsections of § 893.80.  "[Section] 893.80(5), Stats., 
only directs that when a claim is based on another statute, the 
damage limitations of sec. 893.80(3) do not apply.  Section 
893.80(5) does not say that the notice provisions of sec. 
893.80(1) do not apply."  DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 
Wis. 2d 178, 192-93, 515 N.W.2d 888, 893-94 (1994), abrogated on 
other grounds by State ex rel. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 
200 Wis. 2d 585, 547 N.W.2d 587 (1996).   
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
35 
 
¶87 Our 
rules 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
regarding 
surplusage 
militate 
in 
favor 
of 
interpreting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.03(5) as imposing liability on the officer in the instant 
case for failure to exercise due regard. 
¶88 The defendant police officer in the present case 
invites us to view Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) and its "due regard" 
requirement as a "vague suggestion."44  Yet the statute is not 
vague in its imposition of duty:  The section "does not relieve 
[the] operator from the duty" of due regard.  The defendant is 
asking us to read the mandate of § 346.03(5) out of the statute 
entirely.     
¶89 The defendant police officer further avers that 
because she met the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 346.03(2)(b) 
and § 346.03(3), that is, she slowed her vehicle and activated 
her lights and siren, the duty of "due regard" was already met.45     
¶90 Reading compliance with Wis. Stat. § 346.03(2)(b) and 
§ 346.03(3) 
as 
meeting 
the 
due 
regard 
standard, 
as 
the 
defendants 
urge, 
ignores 
the 
language 
of 
§ 346.03(5).  
Subsection (5) explicitly states that the duty of due regard 
exists notwithstanding the other exemptions or privileges in 
§ 346.03: "The exemptions granted . . . by [§ 346.03] do not 
relieve such operator from the duty to drive or ride with due 
                                                 
44 Brief of Defendants-Respondents at 18. 
45 The court of appeals asks in its certification memorandum 
whether compliance with the slow-down and lights-and-sirens 
requirements are sufficient to demonstrate "due regard" in the 
instant case. 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
36 
 
regard 
under 
the 
circumstances 
for 
the 
safety 
of 
all 
persons . . . ."  The text of § 346.03(5) envisions "due regard" 
as a standard of care existing independently of the exemptions 
granted by § 346.03. 
¶91 A holding adopting the police officer’s interpretation 
that compliance with the exemptions or privileges authorized in 
§ 346.03 meets the duty of "due regard" under § 346.03(5) would 
treat the language of (5) as surplusage.  Such a holding would 
do exactly what the statute forbids, namely it would relieve the 
operator of this duty.  We decline to do so.  
¶92 To be true to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) and (5) and 
§ 346.03(5), and the rules of statutory interpretation, we 
conclude that the police officer in the instant case who is 
alleged to have breached the duty of "due regard" under 
§ 346.03(5) is not immune from suit under § 893.80(4). 
IV 
¶93 We 
turn 
now 
from 
applying 
rules 
of 
statutory 
interpretation to scrutinizing our case law, especially Estate 
of Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 202 Wis. 2d 290, 550 N.W.2d 103 (1996), 
for principles guiding our understanding of the interplay of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) and § 346.03(5), the distinction between 
immune discretionary and non-immune ministerial acts under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4), 
and 
the 
nature 
of 
"due 
regard" 
in 
§ 346.03(5).   
¶94 At first glance, the question whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4), the immunity statute, bars claims brought for 
breach of an emergency vehicle operator's duty of "due regard 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
37 
 
under the circumstances" appears to be resolved by Cavanaugh.  A 
closer inspection reveals that it is not. 
¶95 The Cavanaugh court declared, as we noted previously, 
that "despite the general discretionary act immunity set forth 
in § 893.80(4), a negligence action may be sustained against an 
officer involved in a high-speed pursuit on the grounds that he 
or she breached the duty to operate the vehicle with 'due regard 
under the circumstances' under § 346.03(5)."  Cavanaugh, 202 
Wis. 2d at 319.   
¶96 The dilemma presented by the Cavanaugh opinion is that 
it distinguishes the discretionary decision to pursue (entitled 
to immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4)) from the physical 
operation of the vehicle (not entitled to immunity under 
§ 893.80(4)) without clarifying which acts are included in the 
decision to pursue and which acts are included within the 
physical operation of the vehicle. 
¶97 The police officer contends that her lookout and speed 
were part and parcel of her decision to proceed through the red 
light, after slowing down with the police car's lights and siren 
engaged pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 346.03(2)(b) and (3).  The 
decision to proceed, the officer reasons, was a discretionary 
act and thus her lookout and speed were subject to immunity akin 
to the decision to engage and persist in pursuit in the 
Cavanaugh case. 
¶98 In contrast, the plaintiff argues that the police 
officer's negligence, such as the officer's failure to keep a 
lookout, goes to the "physical operation of the vehicle."    
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
38 
 
¶99 We first examine Cavanaugh more closely to distill its 
teachings.  We then turn to a closer examination of the 
discretionary-ministerial dichotomy in Cavanaugh.   
A 
¶100 First, the facts and reasoning of Cavanaugh.  In 
Cavanaugh, a driver pursued by a police officer in a high-speed 
pursuit collided with another car, killing the victim.  The 
victim's estate brought an action against the officer, the city, 
and the other driver for their negligence.  The estate alleged 
that the officer was negligent in failing to terminate the 
pursuit and negligent with respect to the operation of the 
vehicle, contrary to the "due regard" standard under Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.03(5).  The estate also alleged that the city was 
negligent in failing to provide adequate guidelines for high-
speed chases, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.03(6).  The jury 
found the officer and the city each partially negligent and 
awarded damages to the victim.46   
¶101 In motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
the officer and the city each raised claims of immunity.  The 
circuit court denied both claims, holding that the officer and 
the city were not immune.  The court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court, holding that the city was immune but the officer 
was not.   
                                                 
46 The jury found the other driver 75 percent negligent, the 
officer 2 percent negligent, and the city 23 percent negligent.  
Cavanaugh, 202 Wis. 2d at 297. 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
39 
 
¶102 This court reversed the court of appeals, holding, 
inter alia:  
1) The city had a ministerial duty to create guidelines 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 346.03(6) and was not immune 
from suit for its negligence in failing to adopt such 
guidelines;  
2) The officer's decision to initiate and continue the 
high-speed pursuit was discretionary and the officer 
was immune from liability for his alleged negligent 
speed; and   
3) A suit for negligence may be maintained against an 
officer 
engaged 
in 
a 
high-speed 
pursuit 
notwithstanding the immunity statute if the officer's 
operation of the vehicle breaches the statutory duty 
of "due regard."47  
¶103 With regard to the first holding, the Cavanaugh 
majority declared that Wis. Stat. § 346.03(6), which requires 
law enforcement agencies to create guidelines, established a 
ministerial duty.  The Cavanaugh court reasoned that the 
statutory mandate that the law enforcement agency "shall provide 
written guidelines" and "shall consider" specific factors 
dictates actions that "are absolute, certain and imperative, 
                                                 
47 The Cavanaugh court also held that the officer was not 
liable "because there [was] no credible evidence . . . that any 
alleged negligence . . . with respect to physical operation of 
[the] vehicle was a substantial factor in causing the accident."  
Cavanaugh, 202 Wis. 2d at 322. 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
40 
 
involving 
merely 
the 
performance 
of 
a 
specific 
task."  
Cavanaugh, 202 Wis. 2d at 301. 
¶104 With regard to the second and third holdings, the 
Cavanaugh court distinguished between two separate functions of 
the police officer——"an officer's discretionary decision to 
initiate and continue a high-speed chase" and the officer's 
"physical operation of the vehicle."  Cavanaugh, 202 Wis. 2d at 
317.   
¶105 The 
Cavanaugh 
court 
considered 
the 
decision 
to 
initiate and continue a high-speed chase to be inherently 
discretionary. 
 
It 
further 
concluded 
that 
the 
officer's 
allegedly negligent acts (e.g., speeding) were "[i]nherent in 
the decision to pursue."  Cavanaugh, 202 Wis. 2d at 316 (citing 
City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 655 (Tex. 1994)). 
¶106 Nevertheless, the Cavanaugh court did not create a 
"blanket immunity from all liability by virtue of [a public 
officer's] involvement in a pursuit." Cavanaugh, 202 Wis. 2d at 
317.  The Cavanaugh court drew a distinction between acts 
relating to the decision to pursue and acts relating to 
negligent physical operation of the vehicle, with the former 
being immune and the latter being subject to liability.  The 
Cavanaugh court explained: 
Our holding that 893.80(4) provides immunity for an 
officer's decision to initiate or continue a pursuit 
does not mean, as suggested by the dissent to this 
section, that officers are afforded blanket immunity 
from all liability by virtue of their involvement in a 
pursuit.  We agree with the court of appeals that an 
officer may be negligent pursuant to 346.04(5) for 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
41 
 
failing to physically operate his or her vehicle with 
due regard for the safety of others.   
This distinction between an officer's discretionary 
decision to initiate and continue a pursuit and the 
physical operation of the vehicle has been recognized 
by other jurisdictions . . . .  
Cavanaugh, 202 Wis. 2d at 317.  Cavanaugh thus attempted to 
segregate an officer's decision to initiate or continue a 
pursuit from that officer's physical operation of the vehicle 
with due regard under the circumstances for the safety of all 
persons.     
¶107 To support its distinction between the decision to 
pursue, which is immune, and the physical operation of the 
vehicle, which is not immune, the Cavanaugh court relied on two 
sister-state cases, Thornton v. Shore, 666 P.2d 655 (Kan. 1983), 
and Kelly v. City of Tulsa, 791 P.2d 826 (Okla. Civ. App. 1990), 
interpreting 
statutory 
language 
similar 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.03(5).   
¶108 These cases declare that under statutes similar to 
Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) requiring "due care" during emergency 
vehicle responses, the "duty of due care" applies "only to the 
operation 
of 
the 
emergency 
vehicle 
itself," 
not 
to 
the 
initiation or continuation of the pursuit.  Kelly, 791 P.2d at 
828; Thornton, 666 P.2d at 667-68 (quoted by Cavanaugh, 202 
Wis. 2d at 318). 
¶109 The theoretical and practical difficulties of making 
this distinction has been acknowledged in the years since 
Cavanaugh, Thornton, and Kelly.   
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
42 
 
¶110 The Kansas Supreme Court overruled Thornton in Robbins 
v. City of Wichita, 172 P.3d 1187, 1195 (Kan. 2007), "refusing 
to distinguish between the decision to pursue and continue the 
pursuit from the method of pursuing."   
¶111 In Robbins, officers engaged in a high-speed chase 
that resulted in a fatal collision.  The officers argued that 
their decision to pursue the suspect at high speed was immune 
because their decision on their speed was derived from their 
discretionary decision to pursue, not from their negligent 
operation of the vehicle.   
¶112 The Robbins court reasoned that it was not feasible to 
distinguish between which actions derived from the decision to 
pursue and which actions derived from the operation of the 
vehicle, because "the act of driving involves both mental and 
physical components."  Robbins, 172 P.3d at 1195.   
¶113 Thus, the Robbins court concluded that officers could 
be liable for breaches of the duty of due care for decisions to 
pursue or continue pursuit of a fleeing driver. 
¶114 Similarly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court overruled Kelly 
in State ex rel. Oklahoma Dep't of Public Safety v. Gurich, 238 
P.3d 1 (Okla. 2010), citing Robbins for the proposition that "a 
decision 
to 
begin 
or 
discontinue 
a 
police 
pursuit 
is 
indistinguishable from the method of pursuing."  The Gurich 
court similarly concluded that officers are liable for breaches 
of the duty of due care for both physical operation of a vehicle 
and the decision to pursue or continue pursuit. 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
43 
 
¶115 Cavanaugh's 
distinction 
between 
the 
decision 
to 
pursue, which is immune, and the physical operation of the 
vehicle, which is not immune, has thus been rebuffed by other 
jurisdictions as unworkable.     
¶116 Cavanaugh 
nevertheless 
retains 
vitality 
and 
is 
instructive in the instant case, as is the mandatory language of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.03(5) 
declaring 
that 
the 
exemptions 
or 
privileges "do not relieve such operator from the duty to drive 
or ride with due regard . . . ."   
¶117 Cavanaugh teaches that an officer must still treat all 
persons and vehicles with "due regard under the circumstances," 
notwithstanding the discretionary decision of the officer to 
engage in a high-speed pursuit or respond to an emergency call.  
Cavanaugh instructs that the duties of the officer to operate 
the vehicle are not subsumed by an initial discretionary 
decision.  
¶118 Even though the officer "may . . . proceed past a red 
or stop signal or stop sign," Wis. Stat. § 346.03(2)(b), that 
officer must still "slow[] down as may be necessary for safe 
operation," § 346.03(2)(b), "giv[e] both such visual signal and 
also an audible signal by means of a siren or exhaust whistle," 
§ 346.03(3),48 and maintain "the duty to drive or ride with due 
regard under the circumstances  . . . ."  § 346.03(5).  
B 
                                                 
48 See discussion infra, ¶¶125-130, on this requirement in 
Brown, 348 Wis. 2d 603.   
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
44 
 
¶119 We turn from Cavanaugh's pursuit/physical operation 
distinction to the discretionary-ministerial distinction to 
determine whether the police officer's breach of the duty of due 
regard under Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) subjects the officer in the 
present case to immunity or liability.   
¶120 A 
key 
step 
in 
inquiring 
whether 
an 
act 
is 
discretionary or ministerial is to identify the law creating the 
duty to act.  "Where there is a written law or policy defining a 
duty, we naturally look to the language of the writing to 
evaluate whether the duty and its parameters are expressed so 
clearly and precisely, so as to eliminate the official's 
exercise of discretion."49 
 
¶121 In the instant case, the plaintiff points to two 
sources of law that allegedly create the ministerial duty 
requiring the police officer to act with "due regard under the 
circumstances":  First, the statute governing the rules of the 
road applicable to an authorized emergency vehicle, Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.03(5); and second, the internal procedures of the Racine 
Police Department.   
 
¶122 The text of Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) declares that 
operators of authorized emergency vehicles, despite their 
privilege or exemption from other requirements of the rules of 
the road, must continue to operate their vehicles with due 
regard under the circumstances for the safety of others.   
                                                 
49 See Pries, 326 Wis. 2d 37, ¶26. 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
45 
 
¶123 The 
internal 
procedures 
for 
the 
Racine 
Police 
Department echo the language of Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5), stating 
that "the exemptions granted above do not relieve department 
members from the duty to drive with due regard under the 
circumstances for the safety of all persons."   The internal 
police procedures list the considerations that a police officer 
must take into account to drive with "due regard": 
a. The type, actions and speed of the vehicle being 
pursued; 
b. The geographic area of pursuit and its population 
density; 
c. The time of day and day of week; 
d. The vehicular and pedestrian traffic present in 
area; 
e. The road and weather conditions; 
f. 
The 
officer's 
familiarity 
with 
the 
area 
of 
pursuit.50 
¶124 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.03 and the internal Racine 
Police Department procedures create a ministerial duty.51   
¶125 Our 
conclusion 
that 
the 
statute 
sets 
forth 
a 
ministerial duty is supported by our case law.  See Brown, 348 
Wis. 2d 603; Cavanaugh 202 Wis. 2d 290. 
¶126 In Brown, the court held that an officer breached a 
ministerial duty regarding the method by which an officer 
                                                 
50 City of Racine Police Department, Policy and Procedure 
No. 812 (2006). 
51 See the discussion of a governmental entity's ministerial 
duty to create guidelines, ¶¶102-103, supra. 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
46 
 
operated an emergency vehicle and consequently subjected himself 
to liability, even if the officer's operation of the vehicle 
occurred as part of his performance of some discretionary act 
that is otherwise immune.  
 
¶127 In Brown, a volunteer fire truck driver was responding 
to an emergency and entered an intersection against a red light. 
An exemption to the general rules of the road granted by Wis. 
Stat. § 346.03(2)(b) states that an operator of an authorized 
emergency vehicle may "proceed past a red or stop signal or stop 
sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe 
operation."   
¶128 The fire truck driver had his vehicle's lights on but 
no siren was activated.  Under Wis. Stat. § 346.03(3), the 
exception allowing an operator of an authorized emergency 
vehicle to enter an intersection against a red stop signal 
applies only if both the visual signal and audible signal by 
means of a siren or exhaust whistle are engaged.52   
                                                 
52 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.03(3) reads in full: 
The exemption granted the operator of an authorized 
emergency vehicle by sub. (2)(a) applies only when the 
operator of the vehicle is giving visual signal by 
means of at least one flashing, oscillating or 
rotating red light except that the visual signal given 
by a police vehicle may be by means of a blue light 
and a red light which are flashing, oscillating or 
rotating, except as otherwise provided in sub. (4m).  
The exemptions granted by sub. (2)(b), (c) and (d) 
apply only when the operator of the emergency vehicle 
is giving both such visual signal and also an audible 
signal by means of a siren or exhaust whistle, except 
as otherwise provided in sub. (4) or (4m). 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
47 
 
¶129 The Brown court held that the driver's failure to use 
a siren was a failure to perform a ministerial duty.  Although 
the initial decision to initiate the emergency response and 
proceed through the red light was discretionary under Cavanaugh, 
the driver's activation of the siren was "directly govern[ed]" 
by the statute and was a nondiscretionary ministerial function 
on the part of the driver.  Brown, 348 Wis. 2d 603, ¶53.  
Failure to perform a nondiscretionary ministerial function set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 346.03(3) resulted in liability in Brown.   
¶130 The Brown court did not address whether the "due 
regard" obligation imposed by Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) could also 
support liability in that case. 
¶131 The ministerial duty in the instant case is a duty to 
maintain a particular standard of care——namely a duty of "due 
regard under the circumstances."  This duty is given additional 
clarification, but not precision, through the Racine internal 
police procedures detailing what due regard entails.  As our 
case law has demonstrated, although not consistently, a duty 
need not dictate each precise undertaking that the government 
actor must implement in order to be ministerial.53 
¶132 In Cavanaugh, for example, the statute established a 
duty on the part of the governmental entity to create guidelines 
but did not explain the exact method or means by which to enact 
those guidelines, i.e., it left them to the discretion of the 
                                                 
53 See ¶¶48-59, supra. 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
48 
 
entity.54  Nevertheless, in Cavanaugh, the court held that when 
the governmental entity fails to comply with the requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.03, the immunity statute does not protect the 
governmental entity from liability.  Cavanaugh, 202 Wis. 2d at 
300-01.  
¶133 Using 
the 
discretionary-ministerial 
dichotomy 
to 
determine immunity and liability, we hold that the officer's 
acts in the instant case are outside the scope of the immunity 
statute and the officer is liable for negligence. 
¶134 Today's holding is in keeping with sister state 
jurisdictions with statutes similar to Wisconsin's that view the 
operation of a vehicle as a paradigmatic ministerial act.55  
                                                 
54 Wis. Stat. § 346.03(6). 
55 As Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975) 
notes, in interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act, operating an 
automobile is the archetypal nondiscretionary act, even though 
it still involves judgment on the part of the operator: 
It is not the mere exercise of judgment, however, 
which immunizes the United States from liability for 
the torts of its employees.  Driving an automobile was 
frequently cited in the congressional reports leading 
to the Act as an example of "non-discretionary" 
activity which would be outside the discretionary 
function exception. Driving an automobile involves 
judgment.  The failure to signal a turn, for example, 
may be said to represent an exercise of judgment, 
albeit a poor one.  Yet, the automobile accident 
caused by a federal employee while on the job is an 
archetypal claim which Congress sought to place in the 
courts. 
Downs, 522 F.2d at 995 (citations omitted).  See also Schmitz v. 
City of Dubuque, 682 N.W.2d 70, 73 (Iowa 2004) (quoting Downs); 
Pile v. City of Brandenburg, 215 S.W.3d 36, 40 (Ky. 2006) ("The 
act 
of 
safely 
controlling 
a 
police 
cruiser 
is 
not 
a 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
49 
 
These jurisdictions tend to hold that immunity does not attach 
to negligent operation on the part of an emergency vehicle 
operator.56 
 
¶135 Consequently, we view our discretionary-ministerial 
jurisprudence as directing us to hold that immunity does not 
apply to the police officer's conduct in the instant case  
simply because she made the discretionary decision to respond to 
an emergency call. 
V 
 
¶136 Because we hold that no immunity exists for the 
officer in the instant case, we review the circuit court's 
decision to direct a verdict in favor of the officer. 
¶137 A motion for a directed verdict challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  A circuit court may grant the 
                                                                                                                                                             
discretionary act, but rather a ministerial function."); Mumm v. 
Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 491-92 (Minn. 2006) (officers were not 
entitled to immunity for decision to continue pursuit, because 
the officers' duty to discontinue pursuit was ministerial in 
compliance with department policies). 
56 See, e.g., Patrick v. Miresso, 848 N.E.2d 1083 (Ind. 
2006) (holding that a claim that an emergency vehicle operator 
breached a similar "due regard" statute was not barred by 
immunity); Robbins, 172 P.3d 1187 (Kan. 2007); Mason v. Bitton, 
534 P.2d 1360, 1365 (Wash. 1975) (holding that immunity cannot 
bar liability in a case alleging breach of due regard by an 
emergency vehicle because "[i]f this type of conduct were immune 
from liability, the exception would surely engulf the rule, if 
not totally destroy it"); Biscoe v. Arlington County, 734 F.2d 
1352 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying District of Columbia law using 
similar "due regard" language to allow a suit for negligence 
against an emergency vehicle operator and governmental actor for 
failing to exercise "due regard" and holding that pursuit was a 
ministerial duty). 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
50 
 
motion if the circuit "court is satisfied that, considering all 
credible evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is 
made, there is no credible evidence to sustain a finding in 
favor of such party."  Wis. Stat. § 805.14(1).   When there is 
any credible evidence to support a jury's verdict, even though 
it is contradicted and the contradictory evidence appears 
stronger and more convincing, nevertheless the verdict must 
stand.57  
¶138 Like the circuit court, an appellate court conducts a 
search of the record for facts to uphold the jury verdict.58  An 
appellate court should not overturn a circuit court's decision 
to dismiss for insufficient evidence unless the record reveals 
that the circuit court was "clearly wrong."59   A circuit court's 
decision to change the jury's answer is clearly wrong if the 
jury's verdict is supported by any credible evidence.60   
                                                 
57 Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2012 WI 57, ¶47, 341 
Wis. 2d 119, 143, 815 N.W.2d 314, 326, decision clarified on 
denial of reconsideration, 2012 WI 74, 342 Wis. 2d 254, 823 
N.W.2d 266, 
reconsideration 
denied, 
2012 
WI 
106, 
343 
Wis. 2d 558, 820 N.W.2d 432. 
58 Marquez, 341 Wis. 2d 119, ¶48. 
59 Id., ¶49. 
60 Marquez, 341 Wis. 2d 119, ¶49.  
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
51 
 
 
¶139 The circuit court determined that a directed verdict 
in the present case was justified.  The circuit court adhered to 
the negligence standard as set forth in Cavanaugh and concluded 
that "[the officer's] negligence could not have been causal, and 
on that basis, she should not be liable as determined by the 
jury."   
 
¶140 The jury had before it evidence that there was an 
obstruction to the police officer's vision; that the police 
officer 
was 
familiar 
with 
the 
intersection; 
that 
the 
intersection was busy; that the police officer entered the 
intersection at 27 miles per hour; that the police officer was a 
block from her destination; that the officer saw another car 
turning right into the southbound lanes and had to avoid the 
car; that the officer never saw the plaintiff's car; and that 
the police officer could not have avoided the accident after 
entering the intersection. 
 
¶141 The circuit court reasoned that any breach of duty of 
due regard after initiating the entry into the intersection 
could not have caused the accident, because any failure to keep 
a lookout after entering would not have prevented the accident.   
                                                                                                                                                             
"If there is any credible evidence . . . from which the 
jury could conclude that the . . . driver was negligent with 
respect to any of the items of negligence in regard to which 
they were instructed——lookout, management and control, or speed—
—the motion for directed verdict [is] properly denied and the 
jury's verdict must be sustained."  Crowder v. Milwaukee & 
Suburban Transp. Corp., 39 Wis. 2d 499, 159 N.W.2d 723 (1968). 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
52 
 
¶142 Yet the police officer's duty of due regard did not 
simply emerge once the police officer entered the intersection. 
The duty to keep a lookout existed before entry into the 
intersection.61 
¶143 A jury could find that the police officer's conduct 
demonstrated a failure of lookout, a failure to reduce speed, 
and a failure of management and control.  Viewing the credible 
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we 
conclude that there is credible evidence to support a jury's 
finding 
that 
the 
officer's 
conduct 
constituted 
causal 
negligence.    
¶144 The police officer argues that because she had the 
right of way under Wis. Stat. § 346.03(2), which authorizes the 
officer to enter the intersection against a red stop signal, the 
plaintiff 
could 
not 
have 
been 
only 
50 
percent 
causally 
negligent.   
¶145 The police officer cites to Sabinasz v. Milwaukee & 
Suburban Transport Co., 71 Wis. 2d 218, 238 N.W.2d 99 (1976), 
for the proposition that the plaintiff's failure to yield to the 
officer's right of way bars a jury finding that the plaintiff is 
only 50 percent responsible.  Yet the Sabinasz court noted that 
even when a driver has the right of way and can assume that 
drivers without the right of way will yield, "[T]his does not 
excuse the driver [with the right of way] from maintaining a 
                                                 
61 Leckwee v. Gibson, 90 Wis. 2d 275, 290-91, 280 N.W.2d 186 
(1979). 
No. 
2012AP2499   
 
53 
 
proper lookout or relieve him of liability if the jury finds 
that he failed to do so."  Sabinasz, 71 Wis. 2d at 223.  This 
principle holds true even when the vehicle with the right of way 
is an authorized emergency vehicle and the other driver was also 
negligent and failed to yield.  See Montalto, 272 Wis. 552. 
¶146 The standard of review dictates our result. There was 
"credible evidence" that the officer was negligent and caused 
the injury.  Therefore, the circuit court erred in directing a 
verdict in the instant case.  
* * * * 
¶147 We conclude that the immunity statute does not apply 
in the present case to the police officer's violation of the 
duty to operate the vehicle "with due regard under the 
circumstances."  A contrary outcome would contravene Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) and § 346.03(5), public policy, rules of statutory 
interpretation, and case law. 
¶148 We further conclude that there was credible evidence 
to support the jury verdict of causal negligence on the part of 
the police officer. 
¶149 For the reasons set forth, we reverse the judgment of 
the circuit court dismissing the action and remand the matter to 
the circuit court to reinstate the jury verdict. 
By the Court.——The judgment of the circuit court is 
reversed and the cause is remanded. 
No.  2012AP2499.akz 
 
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¶150 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   (dissenting).  
Emergency responders are permitted, to some extent, to violate 
the rules of the road when responding to an emergency, and for 
good reason.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.03(2).1  I recognize that this 
privilege is not limitless, see Wis. Stat. § 346.03(3),2 and I 
further recognize that an emergency responder must exercise "due 
regard under the circumstances for the safety of all persons."  
See § 346.03(5).3  Under the facts of this case, however, the 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.03(2) provides: 
The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may: 
(a) Stop, stand or park, irrespective of the 
provisions of this chapter; 
(b) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop 
sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary 
for safe operation; 
(c) Exceed the speed limit; 
(d) Disregard regulations governing direction of 
movement or turning in specified directions. 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.03(3) provides: 
The 
exemption 
granted 
the 
operator 
of 
an 
authorized emergency vehicle by sub. (2) (a) applies 
only when the operator of the vehicle is giving visual 
signal by means of at least one flashing, oscillating 
or rotating red light except that the visual signal 
given by a police vehicle may be by means of a blue 
light and a red light which are flashing, oscillating 
or rotating, except as otherwise provided in sub. 
(4m).  The exemptions granted by sub. (2) (b), (c) and 
(d) apply only when the operator of the emergency 
vehicle is giving both such visual signal and also an 
audible signal by means of a siren or exhaust whistle, 
except as otherwise provided in sub. (4) or (4m). 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.03(5) provides: 
No.  2012AP2499.akz 
 
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circuit court correctly concluded that Officer Matsen, as an 
emergency responder, complied with her statutory obligations and 
is entitled to immunity.  
¶151 The majority opinion's reasoning leads it to err 
because it disregards the standard set by the legislature in 
Wis. Stat. § 346.03; departs from our jurisprudence in regard to 
ministerial duty and discretionary act; disregards the standard 
we set in Estate of Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 202 Wis. 2d 290, 550 
N.W.2d 103 (1996); and ignores the circumstances under which 
Officer Matsen was acting.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶152 In the case at issue, Officer Matsen, acting as an 
emergency responder, had activated her lights and siren, thus 
complying with Wis. Stat. § 346.03(3).  As she approached the 
intersection, Officer Matsen slowed her vehicle to 27 miles per 
hour, below the 30 miles per hour posted speed limit, thus 
complying with § 346.03(2)(b).  While it is true that Legue and 
Officer Matsen were not visible to one another because a KFC 
blocked their view of each other, Officer Matsen had engaged 
full emergency response with her squad lights on and emergency 
siren sounding.   
¶153 Legue was under an absolute obligation to give Officer 
Matsen the right of way.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.19(1).4  Legue had 
                                                                                                                                                             
The 
exemptions 
granted 
the 
operator 
of 
an 
authorized emergency vehicle by this section do not 
relieve such operator from the duty to drive or ride 
with due regard under the circumstances for the safety 
of all persons nor do they protect such operator from 
the consequences of his or her reckless disregard for 
the safety of others. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.19(1) provides in relevant part:  
No.  2012AP2499.akz 
 
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her radio on, her air conditioning on, and her windows closed.  
Legue did not see or hear Officer Matsen's vehicle.  Legue 
entered the intersection traveling at 30 miles per hour and 
broadsided Officer Matsen's squad car.  The jury found Legue and 
Officer Matsen equally negligent.  The circuit court, however, 
concluded that Officer Matsen, as an emergency responder, was 
entitled to immunity as she was acting in a discretionary 
capacity with due regard under the circumstances.  I agree.  
¶154 The majority opinion fails to interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.03(5) and concludes that Officer Matsen, as an emergency 
responder, is not entitled to immunity because she was not 
acting with discretionary authority, but instead failed in her 
"ministerial 
duty" 
to 
act 
with 
"due 
regard 
under 
the 
circumstances."  Majority op., ¶¶131-33.  In so doing, the 
majority opinion ignores the plain meaning of § 346.03(5) by 
affording virtually no consideration to the legislature's 
coupling of "due regard" with "under the circumstances."  The 
majority opinion confuses discretionary decision-making that the 
legislature afforded to emergency responders with common law 
negligence principles.   
¶155 I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 346.03 sets the test we 
are to apply.  The statute illuminates what is meant by "due 
regard" 
when 
an 
authorized 
emergency 
vehicle 
enters 
an 
intersection against a red light.  It provides that an operator 
of an emergency vehicle can proceed past a red light if it 
                                                                                                                                                             
Upon the approach of any authorized emergency 
vehicle giving audible signal by siren the operator of 
a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way . . . .  
No.  2012AP2499.akz 
 
4 
 
"slow[s] down as may be necessary for safe operation" and if it 
gives a "visual signal by means of at least one flashing, 
oscillating or rotating red light except that the visual signal 
given by a police vehicle may be by means of a blue light and a 
red light which are flashing, oscillating or rotating, . . . and 
also an audible signal by means of a siren or exhaust whistle."  
Wis. Stat. § 346.03(2)(b) and (3).  These requirements inform 
what regard is due. 
¶156 Although the case at issue involved an officer 
traveling below the speed limit with her lights and siren 
engaged, entering an intersection against a red signal, the 
circumstances that can attend responding to an emergency are 
incredibly diverse.  For example the area through which the 
emergency responder passes and the time of day are part of the 
circumstances of an emergency response, e.g., is the emergency 
responder proceeding through a school district with children 
present or is he or she proceeding through a rural area at two 
o'clock in the morning?  The type of emergency is also part of 
the circumstances, e.g., is the call for help a request for help 
for a feared heart attack or a call to stop a vehicle involved 
in a traffic violation?   
¶157 "Due regard under the circumstances for the safety of 
all persons" is not fully described with particularity, nor 
could it be, because the circumstances will generally require 
the exercise of judgment by the emergency responder in ways that 
are particular to the circumstance with which the emergency 
responder is confronted.  When the circumstances  require such 
No.  2012AP2499.akz 
 
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an exercise of judgment, it is the sine qua non of a 
discretionary decision. 
¶158 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.03(6) also shows that exercising 
"due regard under the circumstances" often will require a 
judgment call.  This section requires law enforcement agencies 
to provide written guidelines for officers to assist in their 
response to an emergency.  Those guidelines are to consider, 
"road conditions, density of population, severity of crime and 
necessity of pursuit by vehicle."  § 346.03(6).   
¶159 Of course, we expect emergency responders to use 
discretion under the circumstances to permit them to respond 
safely and promptly.  Of course, we contemplate that they may 
not follow the rules of the road when so responding.  In the 
mind of the responder and in the legislature's own language, the 
response will be balanced and measured in that the responder 
must use "due regard under the circumstances."  This balancing 
generally requires judgment calls that vary circumstance by 
circumstance.  Such a balancing of continuingly changing factors 
in an emergency response then is not "absolute, certain and 
imperative" decision-making as the legislature would have set 
out if a ministerial duty were fully described.  
¶160 To explain further, under our precedent, discretionary 
and ministerial duties are very different.  Ministerial duties 
are 
"'absolute, 
certain 
and 
imperative,' 
involving 
the 
'performance of a specific task' that the law imposes and 
defines the 'time, mode and occasion for its performance with 
such 
certainty 
that 
nothing 
remains 
for 
judgment 
or 
No.  2012AP2499.akz 
 
6 
 
discretion.'" 
 
Brown 
v. 
Acuity, 
2013 
WI 
60, 
¶43, 
348 
Wis. 2d 603, 833 N.W.2d 96 (quoting Lister v. Board of Regents 
of University Wisconsin System, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 
N.W.2d 610 (1976)).   
¶161 A public officer, such as an emergency responder, is 
immune from suit for acts done in the exercise of legislative, 
quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions.  Brown, 
348 Wis. 2d 603, ¶41 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4)).  Acts 
that require the exercise of judgment are "discretionary" under 
the law.  Lister, 72 Wis. 2d 282.  A public officer discharging 
a "ministerial duty," by contrast, is not entitled to immunity.  
Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 546 N.W.2d 151 (1996).5 
¶162 As this court has consistently stated, "[a] public 
officer's duty is ministerial only when it is 'absolute, certain 
and imperative,' involving the 'performance of a specific task' 
that the law imposes and defines the 'time, mode and occasion 
for its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for 
                                                 
5 While the majority opinion criticizes the distinction 
between "discretionary" acts, and "ministerial" duties, see 
majority op. ¶¶48-56, it nonetheless remains the law in 
Wisconsin.  See Brown v. Acuity, 2013 WI 60, ¶¶42-43, 348 Wis. 
2d 603, 833 N.W.2d 96. 
No.  2012AP2499.akz 
 
7 
 
judgment or discretion.'"  Brown, 348 Wis. 2d 603, ¶43 (quoting 
Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301).6 
¶163 The majority opinion, however, departs from these 
longstanding principles.  The majority fails to address how 
Officer Matsen's duty of due regard under the circumstances was 
"'absolute, certain and imperative,'" such that she needed to 
perform only a "'a specific task'" in order to meet her 
obligation.  Id. (quoting Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301).  Further, 
the majority does not explain how Officer Matsen's duty to 
exercise "due regard under the circumstances" in the case at 
issue imposed or defined the "'time, mode and occasion'" for the 
performance of any such task "'with such certainty that nothing 
remains for judgment or discretion.'"  Id. (quoting Lister, 72 
Wis. 2d at 301).  Instead, the majority opinion concludes that 
an emergency responder is under a ministerial duty not to be 
involved in an accident.  See majority op., ¶¶142-43.  If an 
accident occurs, under the majority's standard, immunity is 
seemingly precluded. 
                                                 
6 The majority opinion claims that some cases, specifically 
Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, 235 
Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693, have used a less stringent 
statement of the ministerial duty standard.  See majority op., 
¶49.  This assertion, however, is incorrect.  See Willow Creek, 
235 Wis. 2d 409, ¶27 (stating that "[a] ministerial act, in 
contrast to an immune discretionary act, involves a duty that 
'is absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the 
performance of a specific task when the law imposes, prescribes 
and defines the time, mode and occasion for its performance with 
such 
certainty 
that 
nothing 
remains 
for 
judgment 
or 
discretion'"). 
No.  2012AP2499.akz 
 
8 
 
¶164 Additionally, 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
analysis 
is 
inconsistent with this court's prior decision in Estate of 
Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 202 Wis. 2d 290, 550 N.W.2d 103 (1996).  
In Cavanaugh we concluded that Wis. Stat. "§ 346.03(5) does not 
preclude the defense of immunity for the discretionary acts of 
initiating or continuing a high-speed pursuit."  Id. at 317.  In 
so doing, we distinguished between a discretionary decision to 
pursue a suspect, and a ministerial obligation to "physically 
operate" a vehicle with "due regard under the circumstances for 
the safety of all persons."  Id. at 316-17.  We also pointed out 
that a determination that the officer was negligent did not 
preclude the conclusion that he or she had acted with "due 
regard under the circumstances" and thereby was immune from 
liability.  Id. at 319.7   
¶165 In Cavanaugh the officer initiated and continued a 
high speed pursuit through a residential neighborhood.  Id. at 
296.  The pursuit proceeded through solid red traffic signals at 
between 60 and 80 miles per hour, despite the fact that the 
suspect's illegal conduct merely involved a moving violation.  
Id.  We nonetheless concluded that the officer was entitled to 
immunity, because the decision to engage in such a pursuit was 
discretionary and not ministerial.  Id. at 316.  We noted that 
"[i]nherent in the decision to pursue is the decision to speed."  
                                                 
7 In Estate of Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 202 Wis. 2d 290, 550 
N.W.2d 103 (1996), the jury found that the officer failed to 
maintain a proper lookout and this failure was causal in regard 
to Cavanaugh's injuries.  Id. at 319.  In the case before us, 
Officer Matsen was found by the jury to have failed to maintain 
a proper lookout. 
No.  2012AP2499.akz 
 
9 
 
Id.  The court applied the "due regard under the circumstances" 
standard and stated that "an officer may be negligent pursuant 
to [Wis. Stat.] § 346.03(5) for failing to physically operate 
his or her vehicle with due regard for the safety of others."  
Id. at 317.  The court, however, concluded that the officer's 
running of red lights, at 60 to 80 mile per hour, did not 
violate the "due regard under the circumstances" standard, and 
concluded that the officer was immune from liability. 
¶166 It 
is 
difficult 
to 
reconcile 
the 
precedent 
of 
Cavanaugh with the majority opinion today.  As in Cavanaugh, 
Officer Matsen was operating her vehicle in an emergency 
response.  In Cavanaugh, the officer ran several red lights at 
between 60 and 80 miles per hour.  By contrast, Officer Matsen 
entered an intersection against a red traffic signal, but did so 
at only 27 miles per hour.  In Cavanaugh, the officer was acting 
in an effort to issue a traffic ticket.  In the case at issue, 
Officer Matsen was responding to an emergency dispatch calling 
her to the scene of an accident.   
¶167 As with Cavanaugh and that officer's decision to 
pursue, Officer Matsen exercised her judgment in deciding to 
proceed through the intersection, in response to an emergency.  
As with Cavanaugh, inherent in Officer Matsen's judgment is the 
exercise of discretion in deciding whether to proceed through 
the intersection with its risk of danger from cross-traffic.  As 
with Cavanaugh, Officer Matsen did not maintain proper lookout.  
¶168 Stated differently, the case at issue is controlled by 
Cavanaugh.  If the officer in Cavanaugh was immune for his 
No.  2012AP2499.akz 
 
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discretionary decision to run red lights at 60 to 80 miles per 
hour in order to chase a traffic offender, Officer Matsen also 
is 
immune 
for 
her 
discretionary 
decision 
to 
enter 
an 
intersection against a red signal at 27 miles per hour in order 
to respond to an emergency dispatch calling her to the scene of 
an accident.   
¶169 The majority opinion dutifully recites the standard 
articulated in Cavanaugh but does not apply it, and instead 
opines that Cavanaugh is merely "instructive."  Majority op., 
¶¶100-16. 
 
The 
majority 
neither 
overrules 
nor 
reverses 
Cavanaugh, but it seriously undermines its value as precedent.8   
¶170 Under the majority's analysis, I am concerned whether 
a plaintiff who is involved in an automobile accident with an 
emergency responder need plead only that the responder failed to 
exercise "due regard" in order to automatically defeat a claim 
of immunity.  Such a principle is clearly at odds with one of 
the primary justifications for governmental immunity: "[t]he 
danger of influencing public officers in the performance of 
their functions by the threat of lawsuit."  Kimps, 200 
Wis. 2d 1, 9.  It is also at odds with the plain meaning of Wis. 
Stat. § 346.03.   
¶171 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
                                                 
8 The only real difference between the two cases is that, in 
the case at issue, the officer himself was involved in the 
accident, while in Cavanaugh it was the suspect who struck 
another vehicle.  This difference aptly illustrates how the 
majority's holding really works: officers are now under a 
ministerial duty not to be involved in traffic accidents. 
No.  2012AP2499.akz 
 
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¶172 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this dissent. 
 
No.  2012AP2499.akz 
 
1