Case Title: Arturo v. Gold

Citation: 

Docket Number: 186, 2020

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2021-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
NORRIS P. ARTURO,1 
 
   §        No. 186, 2020 
  
 
 
 
 
   § 
 
Respondent Below, 
 
   § 
Appellant, 
 
 
 
   §        Court Below—Family Court 
  
 
 
 
 
   §        of the State of Delaware 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
   § 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   §        File No. CS16-01729 
BETHANY E. GOLD,  
 
   §        Petition No. 19-09154 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   § 
 
Petitioner Below,  
 
   § 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
   § 
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted: December 18, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:  February 17, 2021 
 
 
 
 
   Corrected:  February 19, 2021 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, 
Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
 
 Upon consideration of the opening brief and the record on appeal, it appears 
to the Court that:  
(1) 
In April 2016, the appellee (the “Mother”) and the appellant (the 
“Guardian”) executed a consent agreement that awarded guardianship of the 
Mother’s son (the “Child”) to the Guardian.  The Family Court entered that 
agreement as an order of the court in May 2016.  In March 2019, the Mother filed a 
petition to rescind guardianship.  After further proceedings, including an evidentiary 
 
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
2 
 
hearing and an interview with the Child, the Family Court entered an order 
rescinding the guardianship and granting sole custody and residential placement of 
the Child to the Mother.  The Guardian has appealed.  For the reasons discussed 
below, we affirm. 
(2) 
The record reflects that the Mother and the Guardian began a 
relationship in late 2013, when the Child was an infant.  In approximately March or 
April of 2014, they began living in the home of the Guardian’s parents.  The Mother 
and the Guardian had a child together, who was born in September 2014; that child 
is not a subject of these proceedings.   
(3) 
The Mother and the Guardian separated in early 2016, and the Mother 
moved into her great grandmother’s home.  The Mother testified that she did not 
bring the children to live with her at that time because her great grandmother had 
dementia and the home was not suitable for children.  Instead, the children lived with 
the Guardian, and the Mother visited with and provided care for them at the 
Guardian’s parents’ home.  The parties agreed to the guardianship order because the 
Guardian was a father figure to the Child and so that the Guardian could make 
educational and medical decisions on the Child’s behalf while the Child was living 
with him and his parents.  The guardianship order provided that the Mother would 
have visitation with the Child “as the parties mutually agree.” 
3 
 
(4) 
In 2017, the Mother moved into her grandfather’s home, where the 
children had their own bedroom and beds.  The Child had overnight visits with the 
Mother every Tuesday and every other weekend.  The Mother and her fiancé, who 
have a child together, moved into a home in November 2017, where they continued 
to reside at the time of the guardianship rescission hearing.  The Tuesday night and 
weekend visitations continued. 
(5) 
The Child has been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder and a reactive attachment disorder and has been evaluated for other possible 
behavioral or mental health diagnoses.  The Guardian has arranged extensive 
counseling and treatment for the Child and ensures that he takes his prescribed 
medication.  Several mental or behavioral health professionals who have worked 
with or are familiar with the Child testified at the hearing.  Their testimony suggested 
that the Mother had had minimal involvement in the Child’s mental and behavioral 
health care at the time of the hearing.  The professional who had most recently been 
working with the Child indicated that it would not be detrimental to the Child to live 
with the Mother if she provided the same structure and stability that the Guardian 
had provided. 
(6) 
The guardianship statute establishes the standard by which the Family 
Court determines whether a guardianship will be rescinded.  Title 13, Section 
2332(c) of the Delaware Code provides: 
4 
 
[A]n order of guardianship may be rescinded upon a judicial 
determination that petitioner has made a preliminary showing the 
guardianship is no longer necessary for the reason(s) it was established, 
unless: 
 
(1) 
The Court finds that the guardian has established, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the child will be 
dependent, neglected, and/or abused in the care of the 
parent or parents seeking rescission; or 
 
(2) 
The Court finds that the guardian has established, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that the child will suffer physical 
or emotional harm if the guardianship is terminated.2 
 
(7) 
Applying the statutory standard, the Family Court found that the 
Mother made the preliminary showing that the guardianship was no longer necessary 
by establishing the following:  (i) she has obtained suitable housing; (ii) the Child 
has been spending every other weekend and every Tuesday night with the Mother at 
her home; (iii) the Mother is able and willing to care for the Child full-time and to 
make medical decisions on the Child’s behalf; and (iv) although the Mother may not 
have been as involved in the Child’s schooling and therapy as the Guardian, she did 
 
2 13 Del. C. § 2332(c).  That statute was enacted after this Court’s decision in Tourison v. 
Pepper, 51 A.3d 470 (Del. 2012), which held that: 
Parental rights are fundamental liberties, protected by the State and Federal 
Constitutions.  Fit parents, therefore, are entitled to a presumption that 
returning their children to their care and custody is in the children’s best 
interests.  We hold that the guardianship must be terminated at the request of 
a fit parent unless the guardian proves, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that the children will suffer physical or emotional harm if the guardianship is 
terminated.  The Family Court found that appellant’s child would not be 
dependent or neglected if returned to her custody.  Thus, appellant is a fit 
parent. 
Id. at 471-72. 
5 
 
not abandon the Child.3  The court also found that the Guardian had not established 
that the Child would be dependent, neglected, or abused in the Mother’s care, as 
those terms are defined in 10 Del. C. § 901, or that he would suffer physical or 
emotional harm if the guardianship were rescinded.  The court acknowledged the 
care that the Guardian had provided for the Child and the relationship that had 
formed between them, but also recognized that the Mother, as the Child’s biological 
parent, has a fundamental right to care for the Child if she is able to do so.4  The 
court therefore granted the Mother’s petition to rescind the guardianship and 
awarded sole custody to the Mother. 
 
3 The Guardian suggested that the guardianship order was necessary because the Mother 
abandoned the Child.  The Family Court rejected that conclusion, and we find that there 
was sufficient evidence in the record to support the Family Court’s determination.  The 
record reflects that the Mother remained involved in the Child’s life and care, and the 
Mother is entitled to a presumption that she consented to the guardianship with the Child’s 
best interests in mind.  Cf. In re D.I.S., 249 P.3d 775, 783 (Colo. 2011) (“An important 
characteristic of a guardianship by parental consent is that parents have exercised their 
fundamental right to place their child in the custody of another for purposes of furthering 
the child’s best interests.  Failure to accord fit parents a presumption in favor of their 
decision to terminate a guardianship established by parental consent would penalize their 
initial decision to establish the guardianship and deter parents from invoking the 
guardianship laws as a means to care for the child while they address significant problems 
that could impair the parent-child relationship or the child’s development.” (quoted in 
Tourison, 51 A.3d at 473) (citation omitted)). 
4 See Tourison, 51 A.3d at 473 (“This Court has noted that parental rights are fundamental 
liberties which the law has traditionally recognized and afforded constitutional protections.  
In Troxel v. Granville, [530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)], the United States Supreme Court, likewise, 
affirmed that parents have a fundamental right, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
‘to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.’” (internal 
quotation and alteration omitted)). 
6 
 
(8) 
On appeal, this Court reviews the Family Court’s factual and legal 
determinations as well as its inferences and deductions.5  We will not disturb the 
Family Court’s rulings on appeal if the court’s findings of fact are sufficiently 
supported by the record and its explanations, deductions, and inferences are the 
product of an orderly and logical reasoning process.6  We review legal rulings de 
novo.7  If the Family Court correctly applied the law, then our standard of review is 
abuse of discretion.8  On issues of witness credibility, we will not substitute our 
judgment for that of the trier of fact.9 
(9) 
After careful consideration of the Guardian’s position and the record on 
appeal, we conclude that the judgment of the Family Court should be affirmed on 
the basis of the Family Court’s order dated May 26, 2020.  The Family Court applied 
the correct legal standard for rescission of a guardianship, and its findings of fact are 
sufficiently supported by the record.   
(10) The Guardian argues that the Family Court erred by finding that “[the 
Guardian] failed to make a preliminary showing that the minor child will be 
dependent, neglected or abused in Mother’s care.”10  That argument misstates the 
 
5 Long v. Div. of Family Servs., 41 A.3d 367, 370 (Del. 2012). 
6 In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995). 
7 Id. 
8 CASA v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth and Their Families, 834 A.2d 63, 66 (Del. 
2003). 
9 Dawson v. Dawson, 2020 WL 236636, at *2 (Del. Jan. 14, 2020). 
10 Opening Brief at 15. 
7 
 
Family Court’s findings and the applicable legal standard.  As the Family Court 
correctly stated, the Guardian was required to establish, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the Child would be dependent, neglected, or abused in the Mother’s 
care.  Similarly, the Guardian argues that the Family Court erred by “improperly 
shifting the burden of proof and persuasion to [the Guardian].”11  But the Family 
Court correctly determined that, after the Mother made a preliminary showing that 
the guardianship was no longer necessary for the reason it was established—namely, 
by showing that she had established suitable, stable housing, had successfully had 
the Child in her care during overnight visits, and could assume full-time care of the 
Child—it was the Guardian’s burden to establish either dependency, neglect, or 
abuse or that the Child would suffer physical or emotional harm.   
(11) The Guardian presented evidence that he provided high-quality care for 
the Child and that the Mother had less involvement than he did during some periods.  
If the best-interests standard applied in this case, the Guardian’s comparison of his 
involvement with that of another potential caregiver might yield a different result.12  
In this case, however, the Guardian was required to prove either dependency or 
neglect or that the Child would suffer physical or emotional harm in the Mother’s 
 
11 Id. at 5. 
12 See generally Dawson, 2020 WL 236636, at *2 (“The Family Court . . . appropriately 
applied the best-interests standard when deciding between competing petitions for 
guardianship.”). 
8 
 
care.  We conclude that the Family Court’s determination that the evidence did not 
rise to that level was sufficiently supported by the evidence in the record.  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Tamika R. Montgomery-Reeves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice