Case Title: Ex parte James Soleyn. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Bishop State Community College v. James Soleyn)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1080179

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2009-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 05/29/09
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1080179
_________________________
Ex parte James Soleyn
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:  Bishop State Community College
v.
James Soleyn)
(Case No. FMCS: 08-1166;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2070670)
_________________________
1080195
_________________________
2
Ex parte Angelo Archible
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:  Bishop State Community College
v.
Angelo Archible)
(Case No. FMCS: 07-04797;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2070379)
WOODALL, Justice.
James Soleyn and Angelo Archible each sought certiorari
review of the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals in
appeals by Bishop State Community College ("Bishop State"),
which the Court of Civil Appeals consolidated.  Bishop State
Cmty. Coll. v. Archible, [Ms. 2070379, October 24, 2008] __
So. 3d __ (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).  We granted certiorari review
to consider two material questions of first impression for
this Court:  Whether the Court of Civil Appeals applied the
proper standard of review and whether, in reviewing a notice
of termination under the Fair Dismissal Act, it is appropriate
to consider the circumstances surrounding the notice.  See
Rule 39(a)(1)(C), Ala. R. App. P.  We consolidated the cases
for the purpose of writing one opinion.  We reverse and
remand.
1080179,1080195
3
The Court of Civil Appeals' opinion contains detailed
statements of the facts of each underlying case.  We will not
repeat all  those facts, many of which are not relevant to the
legal questions before us.  Instead, we will focus on the
relevant procedural history of these cases.
Soleyn and Archible are employees of Bishop State who,
because of their employment status, have certain rights under
the Fair Dismissal Act, § 36-26-100 et seq., Ala. Code 1975
("the Act").  Their employment may be terminated only for one
or more of the reasons listed in § 36-26-102.  In order to
terminate an employee who is subject to the Act, the employer,
here Bishop State, must first give the employee written notice
of its intent to terminate his or her employment.  In relevant
part, the notice of intent to terminate must "state the
reasons for the proposed termination [and must] contain a
short and plain statement of the facts showing that the
termination is taken for one or more of the reasons listed in
Section 36-26-102 ...."  § 36-26-103(a).  
On August 1, 2007, Bishop State issued notices of its
intent to terminate the employment and pay of Archible and
Soleyn.  Both employees contested the terminations, and each
1080179,1080195
4
requested a hearing pursuant to the Act.  Hearing officers
were selected to hear the contests.  See § 36-26-114.  In the
course of his contest, Archible challenged the sufficiency of
the notice of intent to terminate his employment, arguing that
it did not contain the requisite "short and plain statement of
the facts showing that the termination is taken for one or
more [lawful] reasons."  Soleyn made a similar challenge to
the sufficiency of Bishop State's notice of intent to
terminate his employment.
The hearing officer assigned to Archible's contest
concluded that the notice provided to Archible by Bishop State
did not comply with § 36-26-103(a).  The hearing officer
ordered Bishop State to reinstate Archible with backpay and
benefits until such time as the termination process was
reinstated 
with 
an 
appropriate 
notice 
to 
Archible.
Subsequently, the hearing officer assigned to Soleyn's contest
entered a similar order.  Bishop State appealed the decisions
of both hearing officers.  The Court of Civil Appeals agreed
to hear the appeals, and it consolidated these appeals and
issued one opinion.  See § 36-26-104(b). 
1080179,1080195
5
Section 36-26-104(b) provides, in pertinent part, that
"[t]he decision of the hearing officer shall be affirmed on
appeal unless the Court of Civil Appeals finds the decision
arbitrary and capricious, in which case the court may order
that the parties conduct another hearing consistent with the
procedures of this article."  (Emphasis added.)  In spite of
this statutory mandate for a narrow appellate review, the
Court of Civil Appeals conducted a de novo review of the
hearing officers' decisions in Archible's and Soleyn's
contests.
"The basic question before the court is whether
the hearing officers erred in rescinding the
employees' terminations on the ground that Bishop
State had failed to provide the employees proper
notice of the factual bases for the termination of
their employment and their pay.  In resolving that
question, we review only the hearing officers'
conclusions of law and their application of law to
the facts.  As such, our standard of review is de
novo.  Barngrover v. Medical Licensure Comm'n of
Alabama, 852 So. 2d 147, 152 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002)
(stating 
that 
the 
presumption 
of 
correctness
typically afforded a hearing officer's decision in
an administrative proceeding does not attach to the
hearing officer's conclusions of law or to his or
her improper application of the law to the facts)."
Bishop State, __ So. 3d at __.  We have agreed to address the
issue whether the Court of Civil Appeals applied the
appropriate standard of review to the hearing officers'
1080179,1080195
6
conclusions concerning the adequacy of the notices of proposed
terminations under the Act.
The Court of Civil Appeals concluded that each notice of
intent to terminate complied with § 36-26-103(a); thus, it
reversed the decisions of the hearing officers and remanded
the cases for further proceedings.  In reaching its
conclusions, the Court of Civil Appeals did not hold that the
notices, by their express terms, were sufficient.  Instead,
the court looked beyond the terms of the notices themselves to
what it described as the "surrounding circumstances."  "Based
on 
the 
content 
of 
the 
notice 
and 
the 
surrounding
circumstances, it is apparent that Bishop State provided
Archible sufficient information of the misconduct and moral
turpitude it intended to prove so as to enable Archible to
defend against those charges."  Bishop State, __ So. 3d at __
(emphasis added).  As to Soleyn, the Court of Civil Appeals
concluded: "The content of the notice, along with the
surrounding 
circumstances, 
provided 
Soleyn 
sufficient
information so that he could properly prepare his defense."
Bishop State, __ So. 3d at __ (emphasis added).  We have
agreed to address the issue whether, in determining the
1080179,1080195
7
adequacy of a notice of proposed termination under the Act, it
is appropriate to look beyond the terms of the notice itself
and consider any surrounding circumstances.
We turn first to the standard-of-review issue.  It is
true that the Act provides an arbitrary-and-capricious
standard that is "generally applicable to appeals from a
hearing officer's decision."  Archible's brief, at 55.  We
agree with Archible that § 36-26-104(b) "evinces legislative
intent that there be a presumption as to the correctness of
[a] hearing officer's rulings where factual determinations are
involved."  Archible's reply brief, at 21.  However, as Bishop
State points out, "no hearing was held and no facts were
adduced in [these] matter[s]."  Bishop State's brief, at 48-
49.  Under these circumstances, each hearing officer's
conclusions were, as Bishop State argues, "solely conclusions
of law, based on his review of the facts provided to [the
employee] in the notice of intent to terminate."  Bishop
State's brief, at 49.  
Neither Archible nor Soleyn has called to our attention
any case in which an Alabama appellate court has applied an
arbitrary-and-capricious standard to the review of a legal
1080179,1080195
8
conclusion or the application of the law to undisputed facts.
Indeed, it is well established that where the issues involve
only the application of law to undisputed facts appellate
review is de novo.  See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Motley, 909 So. 2d 806, 810 (Ala. 2005).  This has been
held to be true where a hearing officer's decision is
otherwise subject to more limited review.  Ex parte Wilbanks
Health Care Servs., 986 So. 2d 422, 425 (Ala. 2007) ("Review
of the hearing officer's conclusions of law or application of
the law to the facts is de novo."); Barngrover v. Medical
Licensure Comm'n of Alabama, 852 So. 2d 147, 152 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2002) ("The presumption of correctness does not attach to
the hearing officer's conclusions of law; further, no
presumption of correctness exists when a hearing officer
improperly applied the law to the facts.").  Thus, the Court
of Civil Appeals applied the appropriate standard of review to
the hearing officers' conclusions concerning the adequacy of
the notices of proposed terminations pursuant to the Act.  
In considering the propriety of looking to "surrounding
circumstances" in evaluating the sufficiency of a notice of
proposed termination of employment under the Act, "our inquiry
1080179,1080195
9
begins with the language of the statute, and if the meaning of
the statutory language is plain, our analysis ends there."  Ex
parte McCormick, 932 So. 2d 124, 132 (Ala. 2005).  Section 36-
26-103 provides the exclusive means by which an employer such
as Bishop State may terminate employees such as Archible and
Soleyn.  Under § 36-26-103(a), Bishop State was clearly
obligated to provide each employee with a notice of intent to
terminate his employment that "state[d] the reasons for the
proposed termination" and that "contain[ed] a short and plain
statement of the facts showing that the termination [was]
taken for one or more of the reasons listed in Section 36-26-
102."  This statutory requirement is, by its very terms,
unconditional, and this Court cannot, under the guise of
statutory construction, create any exception to it.  We agree
with Archible that the Court of Civil Appeals "[d]epart[ed]
from the clear language of the notice provisions of the ...
Act to embrace the ambiguous concept of 'surrounding
circumstances.'" Archible's brief, at 27. 
Bishop State's position concerning the consideration of
surrounding circumstances by the Court of Civil Appeals is, at
best, confusing.  First, for example, it argues that the
1080179,1080195
10
consideration of such circumstances is proper: "Even if the
[Act] require[d] more specifics in the initial notice of
intent to terminate, Mr. Archible had knowledge of the
specific facts involved in the decision to terminate his
employment."  Bishop State's brief, at 40-41.  However, Bishop
State goes on to argue that the hearing officer in Archible's
case did not consider any such circumstances: "The Hearing
Officer's decisions are solely conclusions of law, based on
his review of the facts provided to Mr. Archible in the notice
of intent to terminate."  Bishop State's brief, at 49.  We
agree with Archible that the ambiguous concept of "surrounding
circumstances" invites confusion. Archible's brief, at 27.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the Court of
Civil Appeals are reversed and the cases are remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
1080179 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1080195 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and
Shaw, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.