Case Title: Campbell v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 297, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2003-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JAMAR L. CAMPBELL, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 297, 2003 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN99-12-1779  
§                   IN99-12-1780 
§ 
 
Submitted: July 3, 2003 
Decided:  August 21, 2003 
 
Before HOLLAND, STEELE and JACOBS, Justices 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 21st day of August 2003, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it 
appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Jamar L. Campbell, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s May 30, 2003 order denying his motion for postconviction relief 
pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The State of Delaware has moved to 
affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face 
of Campbell’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and 
AFFIRM. 
 
2
 
(2) 
In March 2001, a Superior Court jury found Campbell guilty of 
Possession With Intent to Deliver Cocaine and Possession of Cocaine Within 300 
Feet of a Park.  Campbell was sentenced to a total of 18 years incarceration at 
Level V, to be suspended after 15 years for decreasing levels of probation.  
Campbell filed a direct appeal of the Superior Court’s judgment, which was 
affirmed by this Court.1 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Campbell claims that: a) the prosecutor made improper 
remarks at trial that were prejudicial to his case; b) the amendment to his 
indictment was prejudicial and deprived him of a fair trial; c) evidence of his 
criminal history was improperly admitted into evidence; d) there was insufficient 
evidence presented at trial to prove the State’s case; and e) his trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance by failing to conduct an adequate investigation, 
subpoena trial witnesses, make appropriate objections at trial, conduct a proper 
cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, move to suppress evidence, challenge 
the arrest warrant, object to improper jury instructions, and move for a mistrial. 
 
(4) 
Campbell’s first four claims are procedurally barred either because 
they were not raised on direct appeal and there is no evidence of cause or 
                                                                 
1Campbell v. State, Del. Supr., No. 388, 2001, Walsh, J. (June 27, 2002). 
 
3
prejudice,2 or because they were previously adjudicated in his direct appeal and 
there is no evidence that reconsideration of the claims is warranted in the interest 
of justice. 3  There is, moreover, no evidence of a miscarriage of justice occasioned 
by a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, integrity or 
fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction. 4 
 
(5) 
In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Campbell must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s professional errors, there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been 
different. 5  Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly 
demanding and leads to a “strong presumption that the representation was 
professionally reasonable.”6 
 
(6) 
Campbell’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are unavailing.  
Campbell has presented no evidence that any claimed error on the part of his 
counsel resulted in prejudice to him. 
                                                                 
2SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (3). 
3SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (4). 
4SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (5). 
5Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
6Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
 
4
 
(7) 
It is manifest on the face of Campbell’s opening brief that this appeal 
is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled 
Delaware law and, to the extent that judi
cial discretion is implicated, clearly there 
was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment 
of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
7After the State filed its motion to affirm, Campbell filed a motion for leave to respond in which 
he argues that the State’s motion to affirm “mischaracterizes” his claims.  We have reviewed 
Campbell’s motion and it neither supports that argument nor presents any matter that is different 
from what is contained in his opening brief.  For these reasons, Campbell’s motion for leave to 
respond is denied.