Case Title: Steckel v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 109, 2005

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
BRIAN STECKEL, 
§
§
No.  109, 2005
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§
Court Below: Superior Court
§
of the State of Delaware
v.
§
in and for New Castle County
§
STATE OF DELAWARE,
 
§
No. 9409002147
§
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Submitted: August 11, 2005
Decided: September 7 , 2005
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY,
Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED
Joseph M. Bernstein, Esquire, (argued) and John P. Deckers, Esquire,
Wilmington, Delaware for Appellant.
Loren C. Meyers, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for
Appellee.
RIDGELY, Justice:
2
The defendant-appellant, Brian Steckel (“Steckel”), appeals from the Superior
Court’s denial of his second motion for post-conviction relief from his convictions and
death sentences in a capital murder case.  Steckel challenges the constitutionality of
11 Del. C. § 4209 (“Delaware’s Death Penalty Statute”), and argues that the doctrine
of severability requires the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without the
benefit of probation or parole.  He also claims other constitutional defects in the guilt
and penalty phases of his trial.  For the reasons discussed below, we agree with the
Superior Court that Steckel’s motion is procedurally barred.  Accordingly, we affirm
the Superior Court’s denial of Steckel’s motion for post-conviction relief.
I.  Background
Steckel was convicted by a Superior Court jury of three counts of murder in the
first degree, two counts of burglary in the second degree, unlawful sexual penetration
first degree, unlawful sexual intercourse first degree, arson first degree and aggravated
harassment.  After a separate penalty hearing pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4209(b)(1), the
same jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances by a vote of 11 to 1.  The sentencing judge concurred with the jury’s
recommendation and sentenced Steckel to death on each of the three murder in the
first degree convictions.  This Court affirmed those convictions and death sentences
  See Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
1
  See State v. Steckel, 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 429.
2
  See Steckel v. State, 795 A.2d 651 (Del. 2002).
3
 See Steckel v. Carroll, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 6558 (D. Del.).
4
 See State v. Steckel, 2005 Del. Super. LEXIS 66.  
5
3
in Steckel’s automatic and direct appeal.   
1
Steckel subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction relief under Superior
Court Criminal Rule 61, in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.  The
Superior Court denied the motion  and this Court affirmed that decision.
2
3
Steckel then filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.  His  petition, which
alleged ineffective counsel, was denied.   Steckel then filed a motion to grant a
4
certificate of appealability, which was denied by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit.
Steckel next filed a second Rule 61 motion for post-conviction relief in the
Superior Court.  The Superior Court denied his motion, because it was procedurally
barred,  and this appeal followed. 
5
II.  Discussion
Steckel claims that Delaware’s Death Penalty Statute violates Article 1,
Sections 4 and 7 of Delaware’s Constitution; and the Sixth Amendment and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  He
 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
6
 472 U.S. 320 (1985).  In Caldwell, the United States Supreme Court held that “it is
7
constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who
has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s
death rests elsewhere.”  Id. at 329-30.  
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(j) (2005).  
8
 442 U.S. 510 (1979).  In Sandstrom, the United States Supreme Court provided that
9
“verdicts may not be directed against defendants in criminal cases.”  Id. at 516 n.5.    
4
relies upon the United States Supreme Court decision in Ring v. Arizona.   In Ring the
6
U.S. Supreme Court held that capital defendants are entitled to a jury determination
of any fact upon which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum
punishment. 
Steckel’s argument has two parts.  He argues that the sentencing judge’s
instructions misled the jury into believing that their decision on the existence of a
statutory aggravating factor at the penalty phase, would be treated as a
recommendation rather than as a final determination.  That, he contends, was contrary
to Caldwell v. Mississippi.   Steckel further argues that the sentencing judge
7
improperly directed the jury to find, in the penalty phase, the statutory aggravating
factor that he committed the murder while engaged in the commission of unlawful
sexual intercourse and/or arson,   because the jury had already found him guilty on
8
two counts of felony murder.  Steckel contends that directed finding was contrary to
Sandstrom v. Montana.   Steckel claims that these instructions make Delaware’s Death
9
Penalty Statute unconstitutional, and that the doctrine of severability requires that his
 Wilson v. State, 834 A.2d 68, 72 (Del. 2003) (citing MacDonald v. State, 778 A.2d 1064,
10
1070 (Del. 2001); Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996)).  
 Thomas v. State, 725 A.2d 424, 427 (Del. 1999) (citing Abrams v. State, 689 A.2d 1185,
11
1187 (Del. 1997)).  
 Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991).  
12
 DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(1).
13
 Id. at 61(m)(2).  
14
5
death sentence be vacated and that a life sentence be imposed.  All of these arguments
were raised for the first time in Steckel’s second motion for post-conviction relief.  
We generally review the denial of a Rule 61 motion for post-conviction relief
for abuse of discretion.   We review claims challenging the constitutionality of a
10
statute de novo,  however.   A threshold issue for this Court, which also was decided
11
by the Superior Court, is whether Steckel’s motion for post-conviction relief satisfies
the procedural requirements of Rule 61.  
12
We begin by addressing Rule 61(i)(1), which requires that a motion for post-
conviction relief be filed within three years of final judgment.   Because there was an
13
automatic and direct appeal in this case, Steckel’s convictions became final when the
mandate was issued at the conclusion of his direct appeal.   Because this Court’s
14
mandate was filed on June 10, 1998, the three year time limit expired on June 10,
2001.  Steckel’s second Rule 61 motion for post-conviction relief was not filed until
May 10, 2004.  Therefore, it was untimely.  There is an exception in Rule 61(i)(1) for
motions that assert “a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the
 Id. at 61(i)(1).  
15
 Schiro v. Summerlin, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2526-27 (2004).  
16
 822 A.2d 1038 (Del. 2003).
17
 Id. at 1051.
18
6
judgment of conviction becomes final [if filed] within three years after the right is first
recognized by this Court or the United States Supreme Court.”   Steckel argues that
15
this exception applies to his motion.
None of Steckel’s claims fit within this exception.  Steckel’s Caldwell and
Sandstrom claims do not, because the rights explicated in those cases were recognized
long before Steckel’s judgment of conviction became final.  Steckel’s claim under
Ring does not fall under this exception because the United States Supreme Court held
in Shiro v. Summerlin that Ring “does not apply retroactively to cases already final on
direct review.”   Steckel’s case was “already final on direct review” before Ring was
16
decided.  Therefore, his motion does not assert a retroactive right.    
Steckel contends that the issue of retroactivity is, nevertheless, moot because
in Zebroski v. State,  this Court addressed the merits of a defendant’s Ring claim,
17
even though the defendant’s conviction had become final before Ring.   Steckel’s
18
argument is not persuasive.  Zebroski does not support the position that the merits of
a Ring claim must be addressed.  At the time Zebroski was decided the issue of the
retroactivity of Ring was unsettled and, therefore, this Court chose to address the
issue.  In  Summerlin, the U.S. Supreme Court settled the issue definitively, and it now
 DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(2).  
19
 Id. at 61(i)(5).
20
 State v. Trump, 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 285, at *5.  
21
7
is clear that Ring does not apply retroactively.  The procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(1)
applies to Steckel’s motion, and the exception for a retroactively applicable right does
not.  
A second procedural bar also applies to Steckel’s motion.  Steckel concedes that
his Ring, Caldwell and Sandstrom arguments were not raised at his penalty hearing,
in his direct appeal or in his first motion for post-conviction relief.  Steckel’s claims
are subject to the procedural bar set forth in Rule 61(i)(2), which precludes
consideration of “[a]ny ground for relief that was not asserted in a prior post-
conviction proceeding, ... unless consideration of the claim is warranted in the interest
of justice.”    Steckel has not shown that consideration of these claims is warranted
19
in the interest of justice.
Steckel argues that these procedural bars are inapplicable under Rule 61(i)(5)
for the reason that he has raised “a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of
justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality,
reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of
conviction.”   Steckel bears the burden of establishing “a colorable claim that there
20
was a miscarriage of justice.”   He has not done so.  As previously explained,  Ring
21
 585 A.2d 736, 749 (Del. 1990).
22
 Although we find that the procedural bars of Rule 61 preclude consideration of Steckel’s
23
motion on the merits, we note that this Court has held that “Delaware’s hybrid form of sentencing,
allowing the jury to find the defendant death eligible and then allowing a judge to impose the death
penalty once the defendant is found to be death eligible, is not contrary to the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution as construed in Apprendi and Ring.”  See Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285,
302 (Del. 2005).
 840 A.2d 1256 (Del. 2004).
24
 See id. at 1272-74 (rejecting an argument that there was a Caldwell violation because the
25
jury was allegedly misled about its role and was allegedly not informed that a guilty verdict during
the guilt phase of the proceeding would bind its finding of the existence of a statutory aggravating
circumstance during the penalty phase of the proceeding).
8
does not apply retroactively to cases, such as Steckel’s, that were already final on
direct review.  In Flamer v. State, this Court stated that “[a] postconviction relief court
need apply only the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original
proceedings took place.”   Steckel has not shown a violation of any then-applicable
22
constitutional standards.23
Nor was the Superior Court required to consider Steckel’s Caldwell claim under
Rule 61(i)(5).  Contrary to Steckel’s position, the jury was not misinformed about its
responsibility in sentencing.  The jury instruction at issue here was substantially
similar to the instruction given in Cabrera v. State,  where this Court rejected the
24
same argument now raised by Steckel.   Likewise, the Superior Court was not
25
required to consider Steckel’s Sandstrom claim under Rule 61(i)(5).  Under 11 Del.
C. § 4209(e)(2), “where the defendant has been convicted of murder in the first degree
in violation of any provision of § 636(a)(2)-(7) of this title, that conviction shall
establish the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance and the jury, or judge
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(2) (2005).  
26
 815 A.2d 314 (Del. 2003).  
27
 See id. at 322-23 (holding that “an instruction given by a sentencing judge pursuant to 11
28
Del. C. § 4209(e)(2) did not unconstitutionally establish a conclusive presumption or obviate the
requirement that the State prove the aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt ... [and this] reasoning
... is unchanged by the holding in Ring.”).  
9
where appropriate, shall be so instructed.”   Steckel complains that an instruction
26
made pursuant to this provision is unconstitutional.  He argues that because Ring
requires the jury to determine the facts that make a defendant death eligible, the
sentencing judge’s instruction to the jury to return a verdict in favor of the State
violated the rule announced in Sandstrom.  That claim is not colorable.  The jury
instruction at issue here was substantially similar to the instruction given in Brice v.
State,  where this Court rejected the same argument now raised by Steckel.   
27
28
For all of these reasons, the Superior Court correctly decided that Steckel’s
second motion for postconviction relief is procedurally barred.  Steckel has not shown
that the procedural bars of Rule 61 are inapplicable. 
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the judgement of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.