Case Title: Ostrowski v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5781

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ostrowski v. State1983 WY 66665 P.2d 471Case Number: 5781, 5782Case Number: 5781, 5782Decided: 06/10/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
Phillip OSTROWSKI, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff). Nos. 5781, 5782

Appeal from District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

James R. 
McCarty, Casper, 
for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Allen C. Johnson, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Michael L. Hubbard, and Randall T. Cox (argued), Asst. Attys. Gen., 
for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and 
BROWN, JJ.

RAPER, Justice.

[¶1.]     Phillip Ostrowski 
(appellant) was tried and found guilty by a jury in the district court of 
NatronaCounty on seven criminal 
counts. The seven counts were contained in two separate criminal actions1 brought by indictment against him 
by the State. Both actions were joined for trial over appellant's objection. 
After judgment and sentence in the combined criminal actions was entered, 
appellant appealed separately from each action. On appeal, we have consolidated 
the cases. In his briefs, appellant raises a veritable barrage of issues. We 
consolidate and summarize them to be:

1. Whether evidence used 
against him at trial was legally seized either pursuant to a valid arrest or 
pursuant to properly issued and executed search warrants; 

2. Whether the trial 
court erred in permitting the State to amend one count of an indictment at the 
close of evidence;

3. Whether the evidence 
supports a conviction for concealing stolen property;

4. Whether the trial 
court erred in denying appellant's motion to dismiss one count - Count V in No. 
8513 - of concealing stolen goods made upon the ground that it did not specify 
the property appellant was charged with concealing;

5. Whether the trial 
court erred in joining both indictments brought against appellant for 
trial;

6. Whether the trial 
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as requested by 
appellant;

7. Whether appellant was 
denied his right to a fair trial as a result of remarks made by the prosecutor 
at trial;

8. Whether the trial 
court erred in admitting several exhibits over appellant's objection that a 
chain of custody had not been established; and

9. Whether the trial 
court erred in permitting the hearsay testimony of Rhonda Thenes over 
appellant's objection.

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     From November 1980 
through June 1981 the Casper Police Department had investigated a number of 
burglaries and robberies that had occurred in Casper, Wyoming. During the course of their 
investigations, the police began to piece together information that implicated 
appellant in one way or another in a number of those crimes. Investigation of 
appellant continued through the first ten months of 1981. By November 10, 1981, 
the police had obtained enough incriminating information against appellant that 
provided, in their opinion, sufficient probable cause to arrest him for certain 
of his criminal activities - namely, concealing stolen property. On November 10, 
1981, a "pick up and hold order" for the arrest of appellant was issued and 
disseminated throughout the Casper Police Department. Patrolman Anderson of the Casper 
Police Department, acting on that order, stopped and arrested appellant in the 
evening of November 10.

[¶4.]     After placing appellant 
under arrest, Patrolman Anderson searched appellant and a portion of the 
interior of his car. Those searches produced drugs and other evidence that were 
used at the trial to convict appellant. Immediately following appellant's arrest 
the police obtained a warrant to more thoroughly search appellant's car. Their 
search of the car turned up more incriminating evidence that was also used 
against him. Some time later, police obtained search warrants for various 
residences and appellant's safety deposit box. Searches conducted pursuant to 
those warrants also produced incriminating evidence used against appellant at 
trial.

[¶5.]     Additional facts will 
be discussed where pertinent to our discussion of the various issues 
presented.

I

[¶6.]     Appellant questions 
whether the police had probable cause to arrest him without an arrest warrant, 
and secondly, whether the several search warrants issued after his arrest had 
been issued on sufficient probable cause. We answer those questions in the 
affirmative.

[¶7.]     On the question of 
whether the police had probable cause to arrest appellant without a warrant, he 
argues that Patrolman Anderson did not have sufficient personal knowledge as 
probable cause to arrest without a warrant; therefore, the arrest was 
constitutionally invalid. He also urges, in the alternative, that those 
investigating appellant's criminal activities were without sufficient knowledge 
to give them probable cause to issue the pick-up-and-hold order upon which 
appellant was arrested. Appellant cites Whiteley v. Warden of Wyoming 
Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971), in support of his position.

[¶8.]     At the outset, we take 
note that at the time appellant was arrested, there was no outstanding warrant 
for his arrest. We, therefore, deal with the body of law surrounding warrantless 
arrests. Section 7-2-103, W.S. 1977, provides statutory authority for a peace 
officer to arrest a suspected felon without a warrant so long as he does so with 
probable cause to believe a felony has been committed and the suspect committed 
it. We have upheld that view by applying it on numerous occasions. Lopez v. State, Wyo., 643 P.2d 682 (1982); Neilson v. State, Wyo., 599 P.2d 1326 (1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1980); DeHerrera v. 
State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 845 (1979).

[¶9.]     The Fourth Amendment to 
the United 
States Constitution2 permits an officer to arrest a 
suspect without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that a crime was 
committed and it was committed by the suspect. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979). This court has said that in deciding whether 
probable cause is sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest, it must be 
determined that "the facts and circumstances within the peace officer's 
knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient 
to warrant a reasonably cautious or prudent man to believe that the person 
arrested has committed * * * an offense." Neilson v. State, supra at 1333 (citing 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)). That view continues to reflect the United States Supreme Court's 
view of what is probable cause sufficient to justify an arrest. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 
supra.

[¶10.]  In Lopez v. State, supra at 684, we stated 
that in deciding whether there was probable cause to make a warrantless arrest, 
the test is as stringent as that applied to magistrates in cases where an arrest 
warrant has issued. The facts and circumstances considered in determining 
probable cause for arrest need not amount to proof of guilt or even prima facie 
evidence of guilt but must be more than mere suspicion. Raigosa v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 1009 
(1977) (citing Brinegar v. United 
States, supra). Since the constitutional standard governing probable cause 
is grounded upon reasonableness, our inquiry requires an objective consideration 
of the evidence in the record. Neilson v. State, supra, 599 P.2d  at 1333. The 
standard of reasonableness must be viewed with practicality and good sense. Vrooman v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 782 
(1982).

[¶11.]  With that general review, we go to 
appellant's first argument. He argues that since the arresting officer, 
Patrolman Anderson, did not have personal knowledge of appellant's suspected 
involvement in criminal activity, he lacked probable cause to arrest. Patrolman 
Anderson acted 
solely on the basis of the pick-up-and-hold order issued by investigators from 
the Casper Police Department. Appellant relies on Whiteley v. Warden of Wyoming 
Penitentiary, supra, in that since Patrolman Anderson lacked personal knowledge, 
he lacked probable cause to arrest. He argues that Whiteley precludes probable 
cause being determined on the basis of the collective knowledge of law 
enforcement personnel. It is his position that the arresting officer must have 
sufficient personal knowledge of the facts to have probable cause to make a 
warrantless arrest. To so hold would be unrealistic as well as contrary to 
law.

[¶12.]  The Whiteley decision stands for the 
proposition that, where there was no probable cause to issue an arrest warrant 
in the first instance, an arrest made by police solely on the knowledge that a 
warrant had been issued was constitutionally invalid when the arresting officer 
himself lacked independent probable cause to make a warrantless arrest. The 
Court's decision did not condemn the arresting officers for acting solely on the 
pick-up-and-hold order. The Court said:

"We do not, of course, 
question that the Laramie police were entitled to act on the 
strength of the radio bulletin. Certainly police officers called upon to aid 
other officers in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume that the 
officers requesting aid offered the magistrate the information requisite to 
support an independent judicial assessment of probable cause. Where, however, 
the contrary turns out to be true, an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be 
insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on 
fellow officers to make the arrest." Whiteley v. Warden of Wyoming Penitentiary, 401 U.S.  at 568, 91 S. Ct.  at 1037.

[¶13.]  Arresting officers can rely on the 
knowledge of investigating officers and their determination of probable cause in 
making an arrest. Williams v. State, 
Wyo., 557 P.2d 135 (1976). In United States v. Bernard, 607 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1979), the 
court held an arresting officer need not, at the time he makes a warrantless 
arrest, possess sufficient personal knowledge of the facts to give him probable 
cause to make the arrest; probable cause may be determined upon the knowledge of 
all agencies or officers participating in the arrest. In Bernard, the court 
quoted from United States v. 
Stratton, 453 F.2d 36 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 405 U.S. 1069, 92 S. Ct. 1515, 31 L. Ed. 2d 800 (1972), where it was said:

"We think the knowledge 
of one officer is the knowledge of all and that in the operation of an 
investigative or police agency the collective knowledge and the available 
objective facts are the criteria to be used in assessing probable cause. The 
arresting officer himself need not possess all of the available information. * * 
*" 453 F.2d  at 37.

[¶14.]  We hold, therefore, that simply because 
Patrolman Anderson was possessed of only the knowledge that a pick-up-and-hold 
order had been issued when he arrested appellant does not invalidate the arrest 
if collectively the police had probable cause to arrest appellant. Our next stop 
is to determine if the officers investigating appellant had probable cause to 
arrest him.

[¶15.]  At the hearing on a motion to suppress 
evidence seized incident to appellant's arrest, the State produced testimony of 
police investigators which demonstrated that they had probable cause to have 
appellant arrested on the charge of concealing stolen property. There was 
testimony that police investigators had been told by one of the known 
participants in a residential burglary that property stolen in the burglary had 
been delivered to appellant in return for a quantity of methamphetamine. That 
information was corroborated when some of the property stolen in the 
aforementioned burglary was recovered from an individual that claimed he was 
keeping it for appellant together with, what turned out to be, property stolen 
in other thefts. With that information, officers of the Casper Police Department 
did have facts from which a reasonable man could believe that, in all 
probability, appellant had committed the crime of receiving stolen property; 
they did have the necessary probable cause to arrest appellant for that crime. 
Appellant's arrest was constitutionally valid and the trial court quite properly 
refused to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to that arrest.

[¶16.]  We next review appellant's argument that 
evidence obtained during four searches conducted pursuant to search warrants and 
used at trial should have been suppressed. Appellant argues that for various 
reasons the search warrants were improper and the fruits of those searches 
should have been suppressed. Again, the Fourth Amendment, together with Article 
1, § 4, Wyoming Constitution, are at issue. The search warrants questioned were: 
(1) a search warrant issued to search appellant's car which was issued 
immediately after appellant's arrest; (2) a search warrant issued to search two 
boxes and two footlockers belonging to appellant and located in a residence of 
Kevin Gregory; (3) a search warrant issued to search appellant's residence on 
Sandpiper Lane one-half mile east of Mystery Bridge Road; and (4) a search 
warrant issued to search appellant's safety deposit box.

[¶17.]  Before discussing each search warrant we 
will look at the applicable law. We have recently held that warrantless searches 
and seizures are per se unreasonable except in a few, specifically established 
and well-delineated exceptions. Kish v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 453 
(1982). None of those exceptions are relied upon here to justify any of the 
searches since warrants were obtained in all cases. It is elementary 
constitutional law that where a search warrant is required, it can only be 
issued on probable cause. Probable cause under the Wyoming Constitution must be 
supported by affidavit; in that regard, it differs slightly in language from the 
Fourth Amendment.3 Smith v. State, Wyo., 557 P.2d 130 
(1976). Before either a search warrant or arrest warrant can issue, the judicial 
officer issuing such a warrant must be supplied with sufficient information to 
support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant. Whiteley v. Warden of Wyoming Penitentiary, supra. This 
court's decisions require that the affidavit in support of a warrant recite more 
than conclusions on the part of those seeking the warrant. It must include facts 
sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent and cautious man to believe that a 
crime has been committed and further that there is evidence of the crime at the 
place to be searched. Smith v. State, 
supra. As with probable cause to arrest, mere suspicion is not sufficient ground 
to issue a search warrant. Id. at 133. Certainty is, of course, not required, 
and the evidence justifying the search need not be necessarily admissible at 
trial. Croker v. State, Wyo., 477 P.2d 122 (1970).

[¶18.]  Because probable cause must exist at the 
time a warrant is issued, we must confine ourselves to that which was before the 
issuing magistrate at the time the warrants issued. Here we will examine the 
various affidavits presented in support.

[¶19.]  With respect to the search of appellant's 
automobile, we note that we are not dealing with the automobile exception to the 
search warrant requirement since a warrant was obtained. Further, although at 
the time appellant was arrested certain items were seized from the passenger 
compartment of the car, those items were seized incident to a lawful arrest and 
are not at issue. See, Lopez v. 
State, supra, 643 P.2d  at 685 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981)). We concern ourselves with the affidavit 
presented in support of the police request for a search warrant to make a more 
thorough search of appellant's car.

[¶20.]  That affidavit showed that when appellant 
was arrested quantities of marijuana and methamphetamine were found on his 
person. Field tests indicated the substances found were indeed marijuana and 
methamphetamine. Also, a pipe containing what officers, based upon their 
experience, believed to be marijuana residue was found on the floorboard of the 
car. Even though a police officer may not qualify to testify at trial as an 
expert, his professional training and expertise can be taken into account in 
determining probable cause to issue a search warrant. 1 LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 3.2(c) at 462. The affidavit, based on the foregoing, stated his 
belief that additional controlled substances were concealed in appellant's car. 
He requested the warrant to search for "controlled substances including but not 
limited to methamphetamine and marihuana * * *." On this basis the warrant was 
issued. We hold that there were sufficient facts presented to provide probable 
cause to issue a warrant to search appellant's car. To suppress the fruits of 
that search made on the basis of insufficient probable cause would have been 
error against the State.

[¶21.]  Next, appellant questions the validity of 
the search warrant issued to search two boxes and two footlockers belonging to 
him but located at the residence of Kevin Gregory. The police sought to search 
the four containers for certain stolen property, drugs, drug-related items, etc. 
A lengthy affidavit supporting the request for a warrant contained sufficient 
facts to allow a probable cause determination to be made. Appellant does not 
question that there was probable cause to issue the warrant; his complaint goes 
to the description contained in the warrant.

[¶22.]  Both Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment demand specificity in describing both the 
place to be searched and the items to be seized. If the warrant merely referred 
to the items sought as "stolen goods" as appellant implies, it would have been 
constitutionally inadequate as being too general. 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
4.6(c) at 102. However, we note a general description will suffice which 
includes a reference to the circumstances under which the goods were stolen, 
when that added fact discloses something about the condition or appearance of 
the goods. Id. In this case our evaluation of the record reveals appellant 
incorrectly represents the facts and the warrant was sufficiently specific in 
describing what was sought in the search. The warrant recited exactly what 
police had sought to search for in their affidavit. The warrant described both 
what was to be searched and what was sought:

"2 12" X 12" white 
cardboard boxes turned over to the Casper Police Dept. by Kevin Gregory along 
with one silver colored footlocker + 1 dark colored footlocker. 1. Drugs 
including but not limited to methamphetamines, cocaine, marijuana, and hashish. 
2. Papers, letters, and documents showing ownership of the boxes and footlocker. 
3. Silver collector spoons from Wisconsin taken in the Holman 
burglary."

[¶23.]  The warrant did not amount to simply a 
"general warrant to snoop" for "stolen goods" as appellant claims. It was 
sufficiently specific to pass constitutional muster. Further, the affidavit in 
support of the warrant recited more than an ample amount of facts from which an 
issuing magistrate could believe that a crime was being or had been committed 
and evidence of that crime could be found in the four containers. This warrant 
was constitutionally unassailable; denial of the motion to suppress the fruits 
of that search was proper.

[¶24.]  Appellant questions the search of his 
Mystery Bridge Road residence by arguing that the affidavit in support of the 
search warrant issued failed to specify facts showing that the items sought were 
in the residence on the day the search was to be conducted. The search was 
conducted three days after appellant's arrest, on November 13, 1981, for, among 
other things, ".30 cal. M-1 carbine ammunition" stolen from a residence in 
Casper. The affidavit stated numerous facts which would lead a reasonable and 
prudent person to believe that such items had been in the residence since the 
burglary and were still there. There were facts presented that from October 
until November 6, 1981, the items sought had remained at the house. The issuing 
magistrate certainly had before him probable cause to believe that the items 
sought were still there. It must be remembered that certainty that the items 
will be found is not required - only a reasonable belief. Whether or not the 
search will turn up what was sought can only be determined by the search itself. 
Since the record reflects that the warrant to search appellant's residence on 
Mystery Bridge Road was valid, the motion to suppress the fruits of the search 
was properly denied.

[¶25.]  Appellant next raises a question 
concerning the search and seizure of appellant's safety deposit box at the 
Hilltop National Bank of Casper. His specific argument is that: "Taken on its 
face, the warrant permits the seizure of the box but not an examination of its 
contents." That argument is, on its face, without merit. The search warrant 
provides:

"* * * on the premises 
known as Hilltop National Bank of Casper, 300 Country Club Rd., Casper, Wyoming 
82602 * * * in the City of Casper, County of Natrona, State of Wyoming, there is 
now being concealed, certain property, to-wit:

"Safety deposit box 
Number 495[;] Bank records pertaining to rental of said Safety Deposit Box[;] 
Money, firearms, jewelry or other items taken in the robbery of a Mr. Rousalis 
[Roussalis] or the burglary of the residence of a Mr. Holman, both of 
Casper[.]"

It provides for 
more than just the seizure of the safety deposit box; it allows officers to 
examine the pertinent bank records and then to search the box for the items 
listed. There were enough facts for the magistrate to make a probable cause 
determination and the items sought were sufficiently described to avoid 
constitutional challenge of the warrant. The trial court, again, quite properly 
denied appellant's motion to suppress the fruits of the search.

II

[¶26.]  Appellant claims that the trial court 
erred in permitting the State to amend Count I of the indictment in Criminal 
Action No. 8512 at trial. Count I originally charged appellant with unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to deliver in 
violation of § 35-7-1031(a)(i), W.S. 1977. As amended, appellant was charged 
with the same crime; however, the statutory reference was changed to § 
35-7-1031(a)(ii). Section 35-7-1031(a), supra, provides in pertinent 
part:

"(a) Except as authorized 
by this act [§§ 35-7-1001 to 35-7-1055], it is unlawful for any person to 
manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a 
controlled substance. Any person who violates this subsection with respect 
to:

"(i) A controlled 
substance classified in Schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, is guilty of 
a crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than twenty (20) 
years, or fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00), or 
both;

"(ii) Any other 
controlled substance classified in Schedule I, II or III, is guilty of a crime 
and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, fined 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both."

[¶27.]  Methamphetamine is a controlled substance 
listed on Schedule II, § 35-7-1016(d)(ii), W.S. 1977. It is not a narcotic as 
defined in § 35-7-1002(a)(xv), W.S. 1977, which limits narcotics to include 
opiates and coca derivatives. Therefore, § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) was the proper 
statutory reference.

[¶28.]  The State moved at trial to amend Count I 
prior to instruction of the jury. The record reflects the jury was unaware of 
any change and was instructed on only the amended charge. Rule 9, W.R.Cr.P. is 
particularly applicable to this issue. It provides in pertinent 
part:

"(a) Nature and contents. - All prosecutions 
shall be by indictment or information * * *. The indictment or information shall 
state for each count the official or customary citation of the statute, rule, 
regulation or other provision of law which the defendant is alleged therein to 
have violated. Error in the citation or 
its omission or any other defect or imperfection which does not tend to 
prejudice any substantial right of the defendant upon the merits or to mislead 
the defendant to his prejudice shall not be grounds for dismissal of the 
indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction. * *" (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶29.]  The record reflects that Count I of the 
indictment remained unchanged from when it was handed down by the grand jury 
with the exception that the citation to § 35-7-1031(a)(i) was changed to 
(a)(ii). The indictment charged in Count I:

"PHILLIP OSTROWSKI, did 
on or about the 10th day of November, 1981, in the County of Natrona, State of 
Wyoming, unlawfully possess a controlled substance, with the intent to deliver, 
to-wit: methamphetamine, in violation of W.S. 1977, §§ 35-7-1016(d)(ii) and 
35-7-1031(a)(i) * * *." (Emphasis added.)

[¶30.]  Appellant was always aware of the charges 
brought against him. He realized that the indictment was in error and he 
admitted as much in his brief and at trial. He knew that methamphetamine was not 
a narcotic contemplated in § 35-7-1031(a)(i), and, therefore, that the charge 
was internally inconsistent. His knowledge belies any claim that he was 
prejudiced by the change.

[¶31.]  Rule 9(a), W.R.Cr.P., implements the 
constitutional right of a criminal defendant to be informed of the nature of the 
charge(s) against him. This court has said: "[i]n a criminal indictment, it is 
only necessary to allege sufficiently to allow the accused to understand the 
charge and prepare his defense." Gonzales 
v. State, Wyo., 551 P.2d 929 (1976). Since appellant, by his own admissions, 
knew the nature of the charges against him and the technical imperfections 
therein, he could not have been misled.

[¶32.]  As to substantive changes, the historic 
rule followed by courts is that an indictment may not be amended. 1 Wright, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 127 at 415 (1982). Rule 9 does not 
address substantive changes. Here the amendment was not substantive; it simply 
corrected an imperfection that was well known to appellant - an error in 
citation. Appellant was not prejudiced by the change; therefore, there was no 
error.

III

[¶33.]  Appellant next asserts that the evidence 
presented at trial was not sufficient to support a conviction in one of the 
several counts of concealing stolen property. Appellant refers us to Count II in 
Criminal Action No. 8512, see fn. 1, which charges:

"* * * That on or about 
the dates of June 21, 1981, to June 23, 1981, in the County of Natrona, State of 
Wyoming, the said PHILLIP OSTROWSKI did unlawfully conceal a thing of value 
which had been stolen, to-wit: jewelry, silverware, rifle, and a Samarai sword 
belonging to one John Holman, knowing the same to have been stolen and said 
property having the value of $100.00, and upwards, to-wit: $5,000.00, in 
violation of W.S. 1977, § 6-7-304 * * *."

Section 6-7-304, 
W.S. 1977, which appellant is charged with violating provides:

"Whoever buys, receives, 
conceals or aids in the concealment of anything of value, which has been stolen, 
embezzled or obtained by false pretense, knowing the same to have been stolen, 
embezzled or obtained by false pretense, shall, if the goods are of the value of 
one hundred dollars ($100.00) or upwards, suffer the punishment prescribed for 
grand larceny, and if the goods are worth less than one hundred dollars 
($100.00), shall suffer the punishment prescribed for petit 
larceny."

[¶34.]  Appellant argues that the State failed to 
prove that appellant knew the items in question were stolen and, therefore, his 
conviction on that count must be overturned. We disagree.

[¶35.]  The State's burden on this charge was to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements: (1) the receipt (2) of a 
thing of value which was stolen (3) knowing it to have been stolen. Russell v. State, Wyo., 583 P.2d 690 
(1978). Our task in reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence question such as 
this is to determine if the State met its burden. In so doing we employ a 
standard of review of long standing most recently set out in Brown v. State, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1024 
(1983). We there quoted from our decision in Harries v. State, Wyo., 650 P.2d 273, 
274 (1982):

"`"The oft-repeated rule 
by which we test the sufficiency of evidence on appeal of a criminal matter is 
that we examine and accept as true the evidence of the prosecution, leaving out 
of consideration entirely the evidence of the defendant in conflict therewith, 
and we give to the evidence of the prosecution every favorable inference which 
may reasonably and fairly be drawn therefrom. Stated another way - it is not 
whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for us, but 
rather whether it is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the jury when the evidence is 
viewed in the light most favorable to the State. [Citations.]" * *'"

[¶36.]  The transcript in this case reveals that 
appellant received property that had been stolen in the burglary of the Holman 
residence. Appellant does not contest the State's proof of those two elements of 
the crime. Nor does he contest the value requirement since it was proved at 
trial that the property was valued at over $100. He only argues that the State 
failed to prove that he knew the property was stolen.

[¶37.]  At trial the State presented the 
testimony of one of the Holman burglars that appellant had received the property 
stolen from the Holmans in return for a quantity of methamphetamine. 
Additionally, the State presented Kevin Gregory's testimony that appellant had 
indeed been in possession of the property stolen in the Holman burglary. 
Finally, the State presented Kevin Gregory's testimony that appellant considered 
himself to be a fence and that he had a "significant fence operation * * * going 
on." A fence, as used here and defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979) 
is "[a] colloquial characterization of a receiver of stolen 
property."

[¶38.]  Keeping in mind that each element of a 
crime may be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence, Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79, 
148 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982) (Hopkinson I), we hold against appellant 
on this issue. The evidence presented by the State was sufficient for the jury 
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had received stolen 
property with knowledge it was stolen. We so find after applying the standard 
set by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, reh. denied 444 U.S. 890, 100 S. Ct. 195, 62 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1979), applied in Hopkinson 
v. State, Wyo., 664 P.2d 43 (1983) (Hopkinson II). We do not decide whether 
we believe the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but we view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine if any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.

IV

[¶39.]  Appellant next would have us assign as 
error the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss made on the ground that 
Count V in Criminal Action No. 8513 failed to specify the property he was 
charged with concealing. Count V charged:

"* * * That on or about 
the 17th day of June, 1981, in the County of Natrona, State of Wyoming, the said 
PHILLIP OSTROWSKI, did unlawfully conceal things of value, to-wit: property 
belonging to and having been stolen from John Roussalis, and having the value of 
$100.00 or upwards, and knowing the same to have been stolen, in violation of 
W.S. 1977, § 6-7-304 * * *."

Appellant would 
have us declare that an itemized list of property involved is required in a 
criminal charge. That is unnecessary. A bill of particulars is available to 
elicit that information if an accused needs it.

[¶40.]  As noted in our discussion of appellant's 
second issue, Rule 9(a), W.R.Cr.P., governs the nature and contents of criminal 
indictments. Again, that rule implements the constitutional right of a criminal 
defendant to be informed of the nature of the charge(s) against him.4 Rule 9, W.R.Cr.P., in pertinent 
part, provides:

"(a) Nature and contents. - All prosecutions 
shall be by indictment or information and carried on in the name and by the 
authority of the state of Wyoming, and shall conclude `against the peace and 
dignity of the state of Wyoming'. The indictment or information shall be a 
plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts 
constituting the offense charged and it shall be signed by the prosecuting 
attorney. Allegations made in one count may be incorporated by reference in 
another count. It may be alleged in a single count that the means by which the 
defendant committed the offense are unknown, or that he committed it by one (1) 
or more specified means. The indictment or information shall state for each 
count the official or customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation or 
other provision of law which the defendant is alleged therein to have violated. 
* * *

* * * * * *

"(d) Bill of particulars. - The court for 
cause may direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A motion for bill of 
particulars may be made only within ten (10) days after arraignment or at such 
other time before or after arraignment as may be prescribed by rule or order. 
The bill of particulars may be amended at any time subject to such conditions as 
justice requires."

[¶41.]  Appellant cites this court's decision in 
Crouse v. State, Wyo., 384 P.2d 321 (1963) in support of his argument. That 
case, of course, does not support appellant's contention that an itemized list 
of property is required in the indictment to comport with Rule 9's requirements. 
The decision in Crouse dealt with an information described in § 7-122, W.S. 
1957; it was decided prior to the adoption of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Nonetheless, in dicta, the court set out the view that an indictment 
must be sufficiently specific to identify the offense with which the accused is 
charged. The indictment need only provide an accused with enough information to 
understand the charges against him and prepare his defense. Id. at 
325.

[¶42.]  In Hovee v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1127, 
1131 (1979), this court, citing Hamling 
v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S. Ct. 2887, 41 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1974) said: 
"an indictment is sufficient if it contains the elements of the offense charged 
and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend and 
enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions 
for the same offense * * *." Here the indictment was sufficient in that it 
fairly apprised appellant of the charge being brought against him.

[¶43.]  If, as appellant claims, he needed more 
information to prepare his defense, a bill of particulars would have gone a long 
way in satisfying that need. Rule 9(d), W.R.Cr.P., supra, provides for the means 
for obtaining a bill of particulars. As this court stated in Booth v. State, Wyo., 517 P.2d 1034 
(1974), a bill of particulars is designed to supply a criminal defendant with 
information about the details of the charge against him if necessary to further 
prepare his defense.

[¶44.]  The record reveals that appellant did, in 
fact, make a motion for a bill of particulars on this charge. He, however, 
failed to pursue the motion even when confronted by the trial court with his 
failure to do so. The State argues that appellant's failure to pursue his 
request for a bill of particulars disposes of this issue. That view is not quite 
correct. If an indictment is insufficient, it must be dismissed; an insufficient 
indictment cannot be saved by a bill of particulars. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 
82 S. Ct. 1038, 8 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1962); see also, 1 Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure 2d § 125 at 387 and § 129 at 434. The issue is whether the indictment 
is sufficient. We have determined it was. There is no error on that 
score.

V

[¶45.]  Appellant next argues that the trial 
court erred in consolidating the two criminal actions brought against him - Nos. 
8512 and 8513, fn. 1 supra - for trial. At the heart of this issue are Rules 11, 
12, and 13, W.R. Cr.P. Rule 11, W.R.Cr.P., provides in pertinent 
part:

"(a) Joinder of offenses. - Two (2) or more 
offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate 
count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors 
or both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or 
transaction, or on two (2) or more acts or transactions connected together or 
constituting part of a common scheme or plan."

Rule 12, 
W.R.Cr.P., provides:

"The court may order two 
(2) or more indictments or informations or both to be tried together if the 
offenses, and the defendants, if there is more than one (1), could have been 
joined in a single indictment or information. The procedure shall be the same as 
if the prosecution were under such single indictment or 
information."

Rule 13, 
W.R.Cr.P., provides:

"If it appears that a 
defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants 
in an indictment or information, or by such joinder for trial together, the 
court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of 
defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. In ruling on a 
motion by a defendant for severance, the court may order the prosecuting 
attorney to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or confessions 
made by the defendant which the state intends to introduce in evidence at the 
trial."

[¶46.]  In this issue appellant raises two 
questions: (1) whether the charges in each separate indictment should have been 
joined under Rule 11, W.R.Cr.P., and, if so (2) whether the two indictments 
should have been tried together. Appellant properly preserved both issues for 
review. He seeks relief from the trial court's denial of his motion for relief 
from prejudicial joinder and for separate trial made pursuant to Rule 13, 
W.R.Cr.P. Appellant argues that as a result of both the joinder of offenses and 
the consolidation for trial of the two indictments he was prejudiced. We are 
constrained to take a different view.

[¶47.]  Before proceeding we notice the law 
applicable to the resolution of this issue. Rules 11 and 12, W.R.Cr.P., permit 
both joinder of offenses and trial together of separate indictments. The 
language in both rules is permissive; thus a trial court's refusal to grant 
relief under either is discretionary, Dycus v. State, Wyo., 529 P.2d 979 
(1974), and will be reviewed under our traditional abuse-of-discretion 
standards. The trial court has no discretion, however, to include in a single 
indictment offenses or defendants not permitted by Rule 11 to be joined. Such an 
act would be termed "misjoinder." Trial courts have no discretion to deny 
severance on timely motion where misjoinder has occurred. United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184 
(7th Cir. 1980). See also, 1 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 2d § 145 at 
527.

[¶48.]  If joinder was proper under Rule 11, then 
Rule 13 is activated to provide a means for relief to avoid prejudice. The grant 
or denial of severance under Rule 13 being within the sound discretion of the 
trial court, upon review, absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not 
disturb the trial court's decision. Tabor 
v. State, Wyo., 616 P.2d 1282 (1980).

[¶49.]  Since Rule 12 conditions when more than 
one indictment against a defendant may be tried together on the circumstances in 
Rule 11, discussion of Rule 11 is pertinent to both questions raised by 
appellant. Rule 11 allows joinder of offenses on any one of three separate 
bases: (1) if the offenses charged are based on the same act or transaction; (2) 
if the offenses charged are based on two or more acts that are connected 
together or constituting a common scheme or plan; and (3) if the offenses 
charged are of the same or similar character. Rule 11, W.R.Cr.P., and see, 1 
Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 2d § 143 (discussing an identical Rule 
8(a), F.R.Cr.P.).

[¶50.]  Referring to the various charges brought 
against appellant, fn. 1, it is obvious that we are not dealing with offenses 
arising from the same act or transaction. Arguably, too, the offenses charged do 
not satisfy the second basis for joinder because they are not closely connected 
nor of such a nature to constitute a common scheme or plan. We, therefore, turn, 
as did the trial court, to a consideration of the third basis to determine if 
joinder was permissible. Did the trial court properly hold that the offenses 
were of the same or similar character?

[¶51.]  In making such a determination the most 
important consideration seems to be whether evidence relating to the similar 
offenses charged would be admissible in the separate trial of each offense. Dobbins v. State, Wyo., 483 P.2d 255 
(1971). If evidence admissible in a joint trial could be admissible in separate 
trials on each charge, a defendant could not be prejudiced by the joinder. Hopkinson v. State, supra, 632 P.2d  at 
101.

[¶52.]  Our review of the record leads us to the 
conclusion that the evidence presented in this consolidated case could have been 
presented at separate trials on each charge. Although we realize that trial 
courts have a great deal of discretion in ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence, Weathers v. State, Wyo., 
652 P.2d 970, 972 (1982), Rules 104 and 403, W.R.E., we must look to determine 
what the trial court could have done acting within the scope of its discretion. 
At the very least, the trial court could have properly admitted the evidence 
presented at separate trials on each charge using Rule 404(b), W.R.E.5, and Tabor v. State, supra at 1284, 
1285. Joinder of the offenses in one indictment would thus have been proper, and 
it was also proper to try both indictments together.

[¶53.]  With that in mind we must determine 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant appellant's 
Rule 13 motions alleging prejudice. The only allegation appellant raises worthy 
of consideration is that he was prejudiced by being denied the ability to 
testify on his own behalf on some charges without being subject to 
cross-examination on all. This court dealt somewhat inconclusively with this 
issue in Dobbins v. State, supra. 
There the court indicated that defendant had failed to raise the issue before 
the trial court and then on appeal failed to identify the charges he chose to 
testify on. On those facts, this court declared that more than the mere 
assertion of such a claim was necessary for the court to act upon the 
defendant's claims.

[¶54.]  In the case before us, appellant raised 
the issue in the trial court. In an affidavit accompanying his Rule 13 motion, 
he indicated his desire to testify on his own behalf concerning some but not all 
of the charges. No explanation was given for the request other than the bare 
assertion that he would, without obtaining the relief he sought, be prejudiced 
at trial.

[¶55.]  Again we note that on this issue our 
review is founded on an abuse-of-discretion standard. To hold that the trial 
court abused its discretion, more than a bare assertion that prejudice will 
occur as a result of the trial court's failure to grant relief is required. At 
the very least, appellant should have presented sufficient information 
concerning the nature of the testimony he wished to give on some counts and his 
reasons for remaining silent on the others to satisfy the court that his claim 
of prejudice is genuine. To have done so would have allowed the trial court to 
independently evaluate the possible prejudice and then weigh any such prejudice 
against the interests favoring joinder. United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922 
(2d Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Bronco, 597 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Jamar, 561 F.2d 1103, 
n. 9 (4th Cir. 1977); Baker v. United 
States, 401 F.2d 958, 976-977 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

[¶56.]  To hold that the trial court erred in 
failing to grant appellant relief under Rule 13 on his bare assertion of 
possible prejudice would greatly weaken, if not destroy, the effective and 
beneficial remedies provided for in Rules 11 and 12. Trial courts, when 
presented with sufficient information on an in camera examination, are quite 
capable of exercising sound discretion through the mechanism of Rule 13, W.R. 
Cr.P., and relieving either party in a criminal action of the burden of 
prejudicial joinder. The State and the judicial system are entitled to 
consideration as well as the accused. A trial judge must be given a fair chance 
to exercise discretion before we can consider possible error on the basis 
claimed by appellant. 

VI

[¶57.]  In this issue we have combined several 
specific questions concerning the trial court's instructions to the jury; they 
are: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to give appellant's offered 
instructions; (2) whether the trial court erred in presenting its cautionary 
instruction concerning accomplice testimony rather than appellant's; and (3) 
whether the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury with regard to the 
offense charged in Count I of Action No. 8513, fn. 1 supra.

[¶58.]  A preliminary view of the law will help. 
It is a well-settled rule that the jury must be instructed on the law in 
language it can understand. Britton v. 
State, Wyo., 643 P.2d 935 (1982); Heinrich v. State, Wyo., 638 P.2d 641 
(1981). The general rule in reviewing questions involving instructions is that 
the trial court may refuse to give proposed instructions which are correct so 
long as the principles embodied in the requested instructions are covered by 
other instructions given. Britton v. 
State, supra; Jeschke v. State, 
Wyo., 642 P.2d 1298 (1982).

[¶59.]  Appellant represents that the court erred 
in refusing to give, as a group, appellant's sixteen offered instructions. We 
have reviewed both the instructions given by the court and those offered by 
appellant. Without setting out both sets of instructions, we find no error 
occurred in instructing the jury. The jury was adequately instructed on the 
applicable law. As to the specific allegations of error raised by appellant, we 
will proceed to discuss them in more detail. We refuse to go further in 
discussing a general allegation that it was error to refuse appellant's sixteen 
tendered instructions. Alcala v. 
State, Wyo., 487 P.2d 448, cert. denied 405 U.S. 997, 92 S. Ct. 1259, 31 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1971).

[¶60.]  Appellant argues that the trial court 
erred in refusing his instruction concerning the testimony of three alleged 
accomplices to some of his criminal undertakings. His proposed instruction 
stated:

"YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that 
the testimony of Terry Lawson, Rhonda Thenes and Viola Jean Burd should be 
received by you with great caution and you should not convict the Defendant of 
any crimes connected with their testimony upon the basis of their testimony 
alone, unless it is corroborated by other credible evidence tending to show that 
the Defendant is guilty of the crime charged."

The pertinent 
paragraphs of the instructions given by the trial court are as 
follows:

"The jury is the sole 
judge of the credibility of the witnesses, and of the weight to be given their 
testimony. You should take into consideration their demeanor upon the witness 
stand, their apparent intelligence or lack of intelligence, their means of 
knowlege [sic] of the facts testified to, the interest, if any, which any 
witness may have in the outcome of this trial, the prejudice or motives, or 
feelings of revenge, if any, which have been shown by the evidence. In so doing, 
you may take into consideration all of the facts and circumstances in the case 
and give such weight as you think the same are entitled to, in the light of your 
experience and knowledge of human affairs." "If you believe from the evidence in 
this case that any witness willfully and corruptly swore falsely to any material 
fact in this case, then you are at liberty to disregard all or any part of that 
testimony, except insofar as the same has been corroborated by other and 
credible evidence, and the facts and circumstances proven during the 
trial."

"YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that 
the fact that a witness has been convicted of a felony, if such be a fact, may 
be considered by you for only one purpose, namely, in judging the credibility of 
that witness. The fact of such a conviction does not necessarily destroy or 
impair the witness' credibility, and it does not raise a presumption that the 
witness has testified falsely. It is simply one of the circumstances that you 
are to take into consideration in weighing the testimony of such a 
witness."

"An accomplice is one who 
unites with another person in the commission of a crime, voluntarily and with 
common intent (and who could be charged with the same offense as the defendant, 
either as principal or as accessory before the fact). An accomplice does not 
become incompetent as a witness because of participation in the crime charged. 
On the contrary, the testimony of an accomplice alone, if believed by the jury, 
may be of sufficient weight to sustain a verdict of guilty, even though not 
corroborated or supported by other evidence. However, the jury should keep in 
mind that such testimony is always to be received with caution and weighed with 
great care.

"You should never convict 
a defendant upon the unsupported testimony of an alleged accomplice, unless you 
believe that unsupported testimony beyond a reasonable doubt."

[¶61.]  We find that no error can be assigned on 
this point. The trial court's instructions sufficiently cautioned the jury with 
regard to the credibility of the witnesses without singling out appellant's 
accomplices as such. Further, as this court noted in Phillips v. State, Wyo., 553 P.2d 1037 
(1976), the law in Wyoming is that a conviction may be had upon the 
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Therefore, appellant's proposed 
instruction incorrectly states the law. The trial court's instructions correctly 
stated the law on the subject of the credibility of alleged 
accomplices.

[¶62.]  Appellant also complains that the trial 
court incorrectly instructed the jury concerning Count I in Criminal Action No. 
8513, fn. 1 supra. In that count, appellant was charged with acting as an 
accessory before the fact, § 6-1-114, W.S. 1977, in the commission of aggravated 
robbery in violation of § 6-4-402, W.S. 1977. It was not necessary to charge 
appellant with more than the violation of the principal offense where the State 
proceeded with appellant's knowledge on an accessory-before-the-fact theory. Hawkes v. State, Wyo., 626 P.2d 1041 
(1981).

[¶63.]  In instructing the jury on this crime, 
the trial court set out the elements of the crime of aggravated robbery. 
Appellant does not contend that the elements of the crime were incorrectly 
instructed. He takes exception to the following language in that 
instruction:

"YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that 
concerning the charge pertaining to armed robbery the State must prove each of 
the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

"1. That someone took property of value belonging 
to My Brother's Place from Frank Schulte, Jr." (Emphasis added.)

Appellant argues 
that the instruction, by its use of the word "someone," would allow anyone to be 
found guilty of the crime.

[¶64.]  Appellant's argument is mere sophistry. 
In reviewing instructions we are reminded that the instructions given by the 
trial court must be examined in their entirety. Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 (1981). Here, in addition to the instruction on aggravated robbery, 
the trial court instructed the jury as to what an accessory before the fact was. 
The trial court then proceeded to instruct on the elements of the crime 
appellant was charged with as follows:

"The necessary elements 
of the crime of accessory before the fact to the felony charged are:

"1. The crime occurred 
within the County of Natrona, State of Wyoming, on or about the date of November 
2, 1980.

"2. That armed robbery 
was committed by someone as a principal; and

"3. The defendant 
knowingly and willfully counseled, encouraged, hired, commanded, or otherwise 
procured the commission of the felony, the elements of which were set forth in 
another instruction.

"If you find from your 
consideration of all of the evidence that each of these elements has not been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not 
guilty.

"If, on the other hand, 
you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that each of these 
elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the 
defendant guilty."

[¶65.]  Appellant was not charged with actually 
committing the robbery, he was charged as an accessory before the fact in the 
commission of the robbery. Appellant was well aware of that fact and does not 
question the State's theory of the case here. Appellant merely raises a 
meritless issue that even a cursory review of the record discounts. Needless to 
say, there was no error.

VII

[¶66.]  Appellant questions the propriety of 
certain comments made by the prosecutor during voir dire and in his opening 
statement. Specifically, appellant complains of the State's use of the words 
"fence" and "narcotics" in referring to his criminal activities. He also 
complains that the State, during voir dire, referred to him as a criminal. He 
therefore would have us rule that the trial court committed reversible error in 
overruling his objection to the prosecutor's use of the aforementioned words and 
denying his motions for mistrial. He cites as authority for his proposition this 
court's decision in Dorador v. State, 
Wyo., 520 P.2d 230 (1974), and Kwallek v. 
State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1372 (1979).

[¶67.]  Neither of those cases is on point 
because, in both, the complained of misconduct dealt with the prosecution's 
introduction of the defendant's past conduct into evidence. In neither case was 
the complained of evidence relevant to the case being tried. This court's 
decision in both cases was founded on the principles announced in Rule 404(a), 
W.R.E. That rule prohibits the use of evidence of an accused's character or 
trait of his character for the purpose of proving he acted in conformity 
therewith on the occasion in question except where the accused has first placed 
his character in issue. Kwallek v. 
State, supra, 596 P.2d  at 1377.

[¶68.]  In this case we must deal with the 
prosecutor's comments before the presentation of evidence had begun. No question 
is raised on the admissibility of evidence. We will review the comments made by 
the prosecutor during voir dire and his opening statement and then apply the 
applicable law.

[¶69.]  Rule 25(a), W.R.Cr.P., deals with voir 
dire. It states in pertinent part:

"(a) Examination of jurors. - The parties, or 
their attorneys, may conduct the examination of prospective jurors, but such 
examination shall be under the supervision and control of the court. * * 
*"

The purpose of 
voir dire is to inquire of jurors to determine whether they have prejudices and 
biases which would interfere with their ability to decide the case fairly and 
impartially. Hopkinson v. State, 
supra, 632 P.2d  at 111.

"* * * While it is not 
possible, or at least not practical, to enunciate rigid rules concerning the 
latitude which should be allowed counsel when interrogating prospective jurors, 
there is universal agreement that the matter is within the sound discretion of 
the trial court. * * *" Gerard v. State, Wyo., 511 P.2d 99, 100 
(1973).

[¶70.]  This court recently, in Hopkinson I, had occasion to review a 
question concerning a prosecutor's opening statement. There, quoting from Chief 
Justice Burger's concurring opinion in United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 
612, 96 S. Ct. 1075, 1082, 47 L. Ed. 2d 267, 276-277 (1976), it was said concerning 
the purpose and scope of an opening statement:

"`An opening statement 
has a narrow purpose and scope. It is to state what evidence will be presented, 
to make it easier for the jurors to understand what is to follow, and to relate 
parts of the evidence and testimony to the whole; it is not an occasion for 
argument. To make statements which will not or cannot be supported by proof is, 
if it relates to significant elements of the case, professional misconduct. 
Moreover, it is fundamentally unfair to an opposing party to allow an attorney, 
with the standing and prestige inherent in being an officer of the court, to 
present to the jury statements not susceptible of proof but intended to 
influence the jury in reaching a verdict.' * * *" 632 P.2d  at 112.

[¶71.]  In Hopkinson I it was held that ruling on 
objections made to comments in opening statements was left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. In Hopkinson I the misstatements made in 
the prosecutor's opening statement were held not to be intentional, malicious or 
prejudicial; therefore, the trial court's actions were upheld. As explained 
there, this court puts great stock in the trial court's decisions on such 
matters because the trial court is in the best position to guage the prejudice, 
if any, that may result from improper statements. Id. at 119. That logic is 
equally applicable to comments made during voir dire.

[¶72.]  Before trial appellant had sought to 
limit the prosecution's use of the term complained of, and the court refused 
saying he would rule on objections when they arose. Here the prosecutor, during 
voir dire, used the term "fence" when he asked the jury if they knew what a 
"fence" was. The plain and simple fact of the matter is that the State's case, 
in a large part, was aimed at proving that appellant was indeed a "fence." There 
was ample evidence that appellant, in his own words, considered himself to be a 
fence. We refuse to assign error for the prosecutor's use of the word "fence" 
during voir dire. It would be unthinkable to say reversible error resulted from 
the use of a term which the proof established that it accurately described the 
activities appellant was alleged to have been criminally involved 
with.

[¶73.]  During voir dire, the prosecutor in 
effect asked if anyone on the jury could honestly find fault with the State for 
giving lenient treatment to a witness "in exchange for his testimony against 
another criminal." Appellant objected to his being, in essence, characterized as 
a criminal and moved for a mistrial. The trial court sustained the objection to 
the comment and denied the motion for a mistrial. We are unable to find fault 
with the trial court's actions where it was in the best position to guage the 
prejudicial effect, if any, of the comment. The prosecutor's ill-considered 
characterization of appellant was improper as the trial court pointedly 
indicated; but as a single isolated occurrence we will, without a clear showing 
of prejudice, let the trial court's decision stand.

[¶74.]  In his opening statement, the prosecutor 
stated:

"The evidence will show * 
* * that the defendant in the street language was, as he admitted himself, a 
fence. In fact he bragged about being a significant fence, and as a fence, the 
defendant was also a dealer of narcotics, the evidence will show that in return 
for the stolen merchandise * * * the defendant delivered to the burglars and 
robbers narcotics."

During the 
presentation of its case the State then proceeded to present the evidence as 
advertised in its opening statement, with one exception. The State in the 
technical sense did not prove appellant dealt in narcotics as defined in § 
35-7-1002(a)(xv), W.S. 1977. The State did prove that controlled substances, 
incorrectly alluded to as narcotics, were distributed by appellant. As we 
pointed out earlier in this opinion, appellant was well aware of the technical 
defect, thus was not prejudiced, and the jury was instructed on the proper 
drug-related offense. In common parlance a narcotic is a drug. 
Webster.

[¶75.]  We hold that the prosecutor's statements 
were, in general, completely proper as briefly detailing the evidence he 
intended to present. The technical defect in the incorrect reference to 
narcotics was not of such nature to create reversible error. The trial court 
obviously felt that appellant was not prejudiced by the technical defect, and we 
are unable to conclude that it abused its discretion in reaching that 
conclusion.

VIII

[¶76.]  Appellant next urges us to reverse his 
conviction on the ground that a number of items were improperly received in 
evidence. His only cogent argument to which he cites supporting authority deals 
with the admission into evidence of several of the numerous controlled substance 
exhibits. We refuse to deal with appellant's remaining claims with regard to the 
admissibility of evidence because, with respect to those, he fails to make a 
cogent argument supported by pertinent authority. This court need not consider 
claimed error unsupported by cogent argument and authority. Britton v. State, 
supra, 643 P.2d  at 940.

[¶77.]  Appellant claims that the State failed to 
adequately demonstrate a continuous chain of custody necessary to establish 
proper foundation for the admission of several small bags of marijuana seized 
from a footlocker belonging to appellant. He correctly cites Jackson v. State, Wyo., 522 P.2d 1356 
(1974) as authority for such a foundation requirement. Since then, in LeBeau v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1292 
(1979), and Escobedo v. State, Wyo., 
580 P.2d 655 (1978), we have recognized the requirement that proper foundation 
for the admission into evidence of controlled substances requires that a chain 
of custody be established. In both LeBeau 
and Escobedo, this court also 
recognized that more than conjecture or speculation that the evidence was 
altered or tampered with is required before exclusion is dictated.

[¶78.]  Here no evidence was presented nor even 
an allegation made which would indicate even a suspicion on the part of 
appellant that the evidence was tampered with or altered. Beyond that, however, 
and contrary to appellant's representations, the record abundantly reveals that 
the State established a chain of custody with regard to these few bags of 
marijuana. Appellant's argument is without merit. There is no error 
here.

IX

[¶79.]  In his final issue, appellant complains 
that the only evidence connecting him with the Roussalis theft and the charges 
contained in Count V in Criminal Action No. 8513, fn. 1 supra, was contained in 
improperly received hearsay testimony. Appellant claims that: (1) the pertinent 
testimony of Rhonda Thenes implicating him in the Roussalis theft was all 
hearsay; (2) the trial court erred in receiving the alleged hearsay testimony 
over his timely objection; and (3) that he was thereby prejudiced because no 
other evidence connecting him with the crime was produced.

[¶80.]  The record speaks to the contrary. In it 
we find that there was evidence produced at trial connecting appellant with the 
Roussalis theft other than that complained of by appellant. Items stolen from 
the Roussalis home, including coin collections, guns and ammunition, were found 
in appellant's possession. There was the testimony, mentioned earlier, that 
appellant considered himself to be a fence who ran a substantial fencing 
operation. Well over $200,000 in money and goods was stolen from the Roussalis 
home. Appellant, though unemployed and without visible means of support, was 
shown to have large quantities of cash immediately after the theft.

[¶81.]  Further, Rhonda Thenes, an accomplice in 
stealing the property, testified that appellant was a known associate of the 
thieves and was in their company both immediately before and immediately after 
the crime. She knew that appellant was present when the heist was planned. She 
testified also that she had watched as some of the property stolen from the 
Roussalis home was delivered to appellant. None of the foregoing was objected 
to.

[¶82.]  In short, there was more than adequate 
evidence presented which implicated appellant. The record revealed evidence 
which was more than sufficient to convict appellant on the charge contained in 
Count V. We have laid bare appellant's first and third contentions. There was 
far more evidence presented than what he claims with which he could be found 
guilty on Count V in Action No. 8513. The record and appellant's assertions are 
in conflict. We accept the record.

[¶83.]  Where no actual prejudice is claimed or 
can be shown, we will not reverse even where it is shown that evidence was 
improperly received. Murdock v. 
State, Wyo., 351 P.2d 674 (1960). See also, Harvey v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1386 
(1979); Rule 49(a), W.R.Cr.P. Appellant's assertions are unbuttressed by fact, 
so we need go no further. A review of the hearsay claim would be of no value in 
the absence of prejudice.

[¶84.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Criminal Action No. 
8512:

"COUNT I

"PHILLIP OSTROWSKI, did 
on or about the 10th day of November, 1981, in the County of Natrona, State of 
Wyoming, unlawfully possess a controlled substance, with the intent to deliver, 
to-wit: methamphetamine, in violation of W.S. 1977, §§ 35-7-1016(d)(ii) and 
35-7-1031(a)(ii) [as amended] * * *.

"COUNT II

"That on or about the 
dates of June 21, 1981, to June 23, 1981, in the County of Natrona, State of 
Wyoming, the said PHILLIP OSTROWSKI did unlawfully conceal a thing of value 
which had been stolen, to-wit: jewelry, silverware, rifle, and a Samarai sword 
belonging to one John Holman, knowing the same to have been stolen and said 
property having the value of $100.00, and upwards, to-wit: $5,000.00, in 
violation of W.S. 1977, § 6-7-304 * * *."

Criminal Action No. 
8513:

"COUNT I

"PHILLIP OSTROWSKI, did, 
on or about the 2nd day of November, 1980, in the County of Natrona, State of 
Wyoming, unlawfully forcibly and feloniously take from the possession of 
another, namely, Frank Schulte, Jr., property of value belonging to My Brother's 
Place, when a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a pistol, was used and exhibited in the 
commission of the offense, by violence and putting in fear, in violation of W.S. 
1977, § 6-4-402 * *.

"COUNT II

"That on or about the 9th 
day of May, 1981, in the County of Natrona, State of Wyoming, the said PHILLIP 
OSTROWSKI, did unlawfully conceal things of value, to-wit: rings, silverware, 
and buckles stolen from Merback Awards, knowing the same to have been stolen and 
having the value of $100.00 or upwards, to-wit: $1,500.00, in violation of W.S. 
1977, § 6-7-304 * * *.

"COUNT III

"That on or about the 
16th day of December, 1980, in the County of Natrona, State of Wyoming, the said 
PHILLIP OSTROWSKI, did unlawfully conceal things of value, to-wit: jewelry 
stolen from Molly Habernicht and John Major, knowing the same to have been 
stolen, and having the value of $100.00 or upwards, to-wit: $1,500.00, in 
violation of W.S. 1977, § 6-7-304 * * *.

"COUNT IV

"That on or about the 
10th day of November, 1981, in the County of Natrona, State of Wyoming, the said 
PHILLIP OSTROWSKI, did unlawfully possess, with the intent to deliver, a 
controlled substance, to-wit: marihuana, in violation of W.S. 1977, §§ 
35-7-1031(a)(ii) and 35-7-1014(d)(x) * * *.

"COUNT V

"That on or about the 
17th day of June, 1981, in the County of Natrona, State of Wyoming, the said 
PHILLIP OSTROWSKI, did unlawfully conceal things of value, to-wit: property 
belonging to and having been stolen from John Roussalis, and having the value of 
$100.00 or upwards, and knowing the same to have been stolen, in violation of 
W.S. 1977, § 6-7-304 * * *."

2 Article 1, § 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution is nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment and has been 
treated similarly in our decisions. See, Kish v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 453 
(1982).

3 The Fourth Amendment 
requires that:

"* * * [N]o Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized."

Article 1, § 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution says basically the same thing with the exception that 
"affidavit" is substituted for "Oath or affirmation."

4 The Sixth Amendment is 
the relevant constitutional provision. It provides in part:

"In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation * *."

5 Rule 404(b), W.R.E., 
provides:

"Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." (Emphasis 
added.)