Case Title: State ex rel. Stevens v. Indus. Comm’n

Citation: 2015-Ohio-1352

Docket Number: 2013-1035

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Stevens v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-1352, 2015-Ohio-
1352.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-1352 
THE STATE EX REL. STEVENS, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT; 
FOUNTAIN PARK NURSING HOME, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Stevens v. Indus. Comm.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-1352.] 
Workers’ compensation—Continuing jurisdiction of Industrial Commission—
Mistake of law—Failure to address legal issue—Burden of proof. 
(No. 2013-1035—Submitted January 13, 2015—Decided April 8, 2015.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 10AP-1147, 2013-Ohio-2448. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant and cross-appellee, Sophia Stevens, slipped and fell while 
working as a nursing assistant in 1979.  Thirty years later, in 2009, she filed a 
motion for permanent-total-disability compensation.  Appellee and cross-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
appellant, Industrial Commission, through a staff hearing officer, initially granted 
her request.  The full commission subsequently reconsidered the staff hearing 
officer’s order and denied Stevens’s request for benefits. 
{¶ 2} Stevens filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals, alleging that the commission abused its discretion when 
it denied her application for permanent-total-disability benefits. 
{¶ 3} The court of appeals concluded that Stevens had not met her burden 
of proof in mandamus on the issue of continuing jurisdiction but that she had been 
deprived of due process of law when one of the three voting commissioners did 
not attend the hearing but relied on a summary of the proceeding from a hearing 
officer who was present at the hearing.  The court issued a writ commanding the 
commission to rehear the application for permanent-total-disability compensation 
with all three commissioners present. 
{¶ 4} For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and deny the writ. 
{¶ 5} On May 20, 1979, the claimant, Sophia Stevens, was injured while 
employed as a nursing assistant.  Through the years, her workers’ compensation 
claim related to this incident was allowed for the following medical conditions:  
cervical and lumbar strain, phlebitis in the right arm and hand, dyspepsia, 
gastritis, esophagitis and aggravation of hiatal hernia, strain/sprain of right 
shoulder, elbow, and forearm, closed fracture of right middle finger, impingement 
syndrome in the right shoulder, and degenerative spondylosis of the lumbar spine. 
{¶ 6} Stevens was referred to the commission’s rehabilitation division on 
several occasions, the division having closed her file in 1983, 1989, and 1991.  
She last worked in 1994 for one month as a sales associate at a department store.  
On October 8, 2009, she applied for permanent-total-disability benefits.  
Following a hearing, a staff hearing officer awarded her compensation. 
January Term, 2015 
 
3
{¶ 7} The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, by then-administrator 
Marsha Ryan, requested that the commission reconsider its decision on the basis 
that the staff hearing officer had failed to consider evidence that Stevens had 
voluntarily abandoned the workforce and was therefore ineligible for permanent-
total-disability benefits.  Stevens opposed the request, stating that the staff hearing 
officer had questioned her for almost an hour at the hearing and was satisfied that 
she had not voluntarily left the workforce. 
{¶ 8} The commission concluded that the issue of voluntary abandonment 
had been raised by the bureau administrator but not addressed in the staff hearing 
officer’s order.  The commission determined that this was a mistake of law that 
authorized it to invoke its continuing jurisdiction and reconsider the matter.  In 
doing so, the commission vacated the order of the staff hearing officer, and it then 
conducted a new hearing. 
{¶ 9} After reviewing all the evidence, the commission voted two to one 
to deny permanent-total-disability benefits.  The commission relied on the 
medical reports of James Hoover, M.D., and Ronald Bloomfield, M.D., as 
evidence that Stevens retained the ability to do unskilled sedentary work.  The 
commission also analyzed Stevens’s nonmedical disability factors, noting that her 
age of 67 was a “neutral to negative factor,” that she was able to read, write, and 
do basic math, and that she had made no attempt at rehabilitation since 1994. 
{¶ 10} The commission further noted that Stevens’s lack of an extensive 
employment history—her total employment history amounted to less than one 
year of work, the last being in 1994, at age 51—was a lifestyle choice and not due 
to the industrial injury.  Nevertheless, the commission concluded that Stevens had 
not voluntarily abandoned all employment at that time.  In support of its decision, 
the commission relied on Stevens’s testimony that she had been unable to perform 
her job as a sales associate because she could not stand for long periods of time 
and had anxiety using the cash register. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
{¶ 11} Stevens filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that the 
commission abused its discretion when it exercised continuing jurisdiction and 
denied compensation for permanent total disability after finding that she had not 
abandoned all employment. 
{¶ 12} On September 27, 2012, the court of appeals issued the first of two 
decisions in this case.  In Stevens I, the appellate court concluded that Stevens had 
not met her burden of proof for mandamus relief on the question of continuing 
jurisdiction.  The court denied the writ on that issue and returned the matter to the 
magistrate to consider whether the commission had abused its discretion when it 
denied permanent-total-disability compensation.  10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-
1147, 2012-Ohio-4408. 
{¶ 13} Instead, the magistrate determined that Stevens was deprived of 
due process of law when one of the three voting commissioners did not attend the 
hearing.  Citing State ex rel. Sigler v. Lubrizol Corp., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-255, 
2011-Ohio-4917, the magistrate concluded that the commission should be ordered 
to conduct another hearing with all three commissioners present.  In Stevens II, 
the appellate court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to do so.  
2013-Ohio-2448, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 14} Stevens appealed as of right to this court.  We referred the case to 
mediation and stayed briefing.  After mediation was unsuccessful, the case was 
returned to the regular docket and briefing commenced. 
{¶ 15} Stevens’s appeal focuses on the following issues:  the 
commission’s exercise of continuing jurisdiction over her application for 
permanent-total-disability benefits and the extent of the appellate court’s order for 
due-process reasons.  In its cross-appeal, the commission disputes the order to 
conduct a new hearing. 
A.  
Stevens I Properly Focused on Stevens’s Burden of Proof for Mandamus 
Relief 
January Term, 2015 
 
5
{¶ 16} Stevens argues that the commission should not have invoked its 
continuing jurisdiction to reconsider her application and that the court of appeals 
abused its discretion when it determined in Stevens I that she did not meet her 
burden of proof in mandamus. 
{¶ 17} A party may request that the commission exercise continuing 
jurisdiction and reconsider an order issued by a staff hearing officer if there is a 
clear mistake of law in the order from which reconsideration is sought.  R.C. 
4123.52; Industrial Commission Resolution No. R08-1-01.  Because voluntary 
abandonment of all employment is an affirmative defense and an issue critical to 
eligibility for compensation for permanent total disability, if evidence of 
voluntary abandonment has been brought into issue, a hearing officer’s failure to 
address the issue constitutes a mistake of law.  Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-
34(D)(1)(d);  State ex rel. Mackey v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 130 Ohio St.3d 108, 
2011-Ohio-4910, 955 N.E.2d 1005, ¶ 5. 
{¶ 18} The record supports the appellate court’s conclusion that Stevens 
did not have a clear legal right to the relief she sought.  First, Stevens presented 
no evidence in support of her claim but rather relied on the absence of a record.  
Although the record did not indicate exactly what occurred at the hearing, the 
commission made the express finding of fact that the administrator had raised the 
issue of voluntary abandonment at the hearing. 
{¶ 19} Next, the bureau’s brief in support of reconsideration identified 
facts in the record that would have supported the argument that Stevens 
voluntarily abandoned the workforce after 1994.  Finally, Stevens acknowledged 
that the staff hearing officer thoroughly questioned her on these issues, stating, 
“Obviously he was satisfied that claimant did not voluntarily leave the workforce 
* * *.” 
{¶ 20} There is a presumption of regularity that attaches to commission 
hearings.  State ex rel. Druggan v. Indus. Comm., 85 Ohio St.3d 680, 710 N.E.2d 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
1133 (1999).  Therefore, the burden was on Stevens to prove that the commission 
improperly exercised continuing jurisdiction.  Stevens I presumed that the 
proceedings were conducted properly and denied the request for a writ regarding 
the exercise of continuing jurisdiction. 
B. 
No Due-Process Violation 
{¶ 21} While this case was pending, we reversed Sigler, holding that a 
claimant is not deprived of due process when a voting commissioner does not 
attend the hearing so long as the commissioner conducts a meaningful review of 
the evidence prior to casting a vote.  State ex rel. Sigler v. Lubrizol Corp., 136 
Ohio St.3d 298, 2013-Ohio-3686, 995 N.E.2d 204.  “A commissioner is not 
required to attend a permanent-total-disability hearing in order to participate in 
the decision.”  Id. at ¶ 14.  So long as the decisionmaker, in some meaningful 
manner, considers and appraises all the evidence to justify the decision made, 
there is no due process violation.  Id. at ¶ 15, citing State ex rel. Ormet Corp. v. 
Indus. Comm., 54 Ohio St.3d 102, 107, 561 N.E.2d 920 (1990). 
{¶ 22} As in Sigler, the absent commissioner here stated that he had 
familiarized himself with the case: “I discussed this matter with Regina Miller 
who was present at the 07/15/2010 hearing.  Staff Hearing Officer Regina Miller 
summarized the testimony, evidence and arguments presented at hearing.”  The 
commissioner then reviewed all of the evidence in the claim file before voting. 
{¶ 23} In her reply brief, Stevens concedes that this court’s decision 
reversing Sigler requires reversal of the judgment in Steven II.  We agree. 
C. 
The Commission’s Order Denying Permanent-Total-Disability Benefits Is 
Supported by Evidence. 
{¶ 24} Finally, we hold that the commission did not abuse its discretion 
when it denied Stevens’s application for permanent-total-disability benefits.  
Here, the commission relied on the medical evidence that Stevens had both the 
physical and intellectual capacity to work, based on the medical reports of James 
January Term, 2015 
 
7
Hoover, M.D., and Ronald Bloomfield, M.D.  The commission also analyzed 
Stevens’s nonmedical disability factors as required by State ex rel. Stephenson v. 
Indus. Comm., 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 509 N.E.2d 946 (1987).  Thus, the 
commission’s order, supported by evidence in the record, was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
{¶ 25} The court below never reached this ultimate issue.  Nevertheless, 
because the evidence supports the commission’s decision, a remand to the court 
of appeals that would allow that court to validate the commission’s decision 
further is unnecessary.  State ex rel. Paraskevopoulos v. Indus. Comm., 83 Ohio 
St.3d 189, 699 N.E.2d 72 (1998); State ex rel. Shields v. Indus. Comm., 74 Ohio 
St.3d 264, 266, 658 N.E.2d 296 (1996). 
{¶ 26} Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
deny the writ. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
FRENCH, J., not participating. 
___________________ 
Portman & Foley, L.L.P., and Frederic A. Portman, for appellant and 
cross-appellee. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and John Smart, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee and cross-appellant. 
___________________