Case Title: In re Cullins

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2021-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 122,565 
 
In the Matter of F. WILLIAM CULLINS, District Judge, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING RELATING TO JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed February 26, 2021. One-year suspension, with 
conditions for reducing term of suspension.  
 
Todd N. Thompson, Examiner, Commission on Judicial Conduct, of Thompson-Hall P.A., of 
Lawrence, argued the cause and was on the brief for the petitioner. 
 
Christopher M. Joseph, of Joseph, Hollander & Craft LLC, of Topeka, argued the cause, and 
Carrie E. Parker, of the same firm, was with him on the briefs for the respondent, and F. William Cullins, 
respondent, argued the cause pro se.   
 
PER CURIAM:  This is a contested proceeding against F. William Cullins 
(Respondent) relating to his judicial conduct. Respondent is a district judge in the 
Fourteenth Judicial District, consisting of Montgomery and Chautauqua counties.  
 
Panel A of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications (Commission) held a four-
day formal, public hearing, beginning December 9, 2019. After taking the matter under 
advisement, the panel found Respondent had engaged in conduct which violated the 
Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct (the Code) as follows:  Canon 1—A judge shall uphold 
and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and shall avoid 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety—by violating Canon 1, Rule 1.2 
(Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary) (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 446); and Canon 2—A 
judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially, competently, and diligently—
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by violating Canon 2, Rule 2.3 (Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment) and Canon 2, Rule 2.8 
(Decorum, Demeanor, and Communication with Jurors) (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 448). The 
panel also found there were areas of great concern, specifically that it was not the "best 
practice" to take his concerns about procedures in the county attorney's office to the 
public arena and that it was not appropriate for him to exercise his authority as a judge 
over nonjudicial officers to perform work on behalf of the court. 
 
The parties had stipulated to certain facts before the formal hearing. Those facts 
are not in dispute, but Cullins challenges their significance insofar as they apply to the 
Code. 
 
After the hearing and arguments, the panel made the following findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and recommendations: 
 
"FINDINGS OF FACT 
 
"Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 619(b), the Panel finds that the Examiner has 
proved the following facts by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
"1. 
Respondent frequently used the word 'fuck' and its derivatives when 
speaking to or near employees and/or others at the courthouse. 
 
"2. 
Lance Carter served as a district court clerk in Independence for nearly 
12 years. Mr. Carter regularly overheard Respondent's use of obscenities. He created a 
swear journal documenting multiple instances of Respondent's profanity. Mr. Carter did 
not intend the swear journal to document all of Respondent's profanity. 
 
 
 
"3.  
Mr. Carter received an unsatisfactory performance evaluation from a 
supervisor in August 2015. When Mr. Carter asked Respondent to discuss the 
evaluation, Respondent called Mr. Carter into Respondent's office and said, 'Carter, go 
sit down in that fucking chair and don't you say a fucking word.' Respondent proceeded 
to yell and scream at Mr. Carter, using profanity. 
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"4.  
Respondent did not give Mr. Carter an opportunity to address Mr. 
Carter's concerns about the evaluation. When Mr. Carter tried to speak, Respondent told 
him, 'Keep your fucking mouth shut. You don't have the right to defend yourself here. 
Don't say another fucking word. Go see Joni Pratt. Get the fuck out of my sight and shut 
the fucking door on your way out.' Mr. Carter left the room. 
 
"5.  
Joni Pratt started as Chief Clerk of the District Court of Montgomery 
County in 2015. Ms. Pratt oversaw a remodeling project in the Coffeyville Clerk's 
Office in October 2016. Part of the remodeling project included new carpeting. One day, 
Travis Brock and Andre Ysusi were laying carpet in the law library. Ms. Pratt asked the 
Respondent whether these carpet layers could install some of the extra carpet in the 
elevators.  
 
"6.  
In response to Ms. Pratt's question, Respondent became 'very angry' and 
told Ms. Pratt that 'he didn't give a fuck about the carpeting and that that wasn't our 
fucking building' and that she should call the city manager. Ms. Pratt described 
Respondent's tone as frightening, loud, aggressive and scary. 
 
"7.  
After her lunch break, Ms. Pratt approached Respondent and told him 
she was embarrassed about the incident. Respondent told her, 'If you think I'm going to 
fucking apologize to you, I'm not.' Three days later Respondent called Ms. Pratt into his 
office and told her 'I got to thinking about what you said to me, and there's no fucking 
way that those fucking inmates heard me.' Ms. Pratt told Respondent it was the carpet 
layers who heard him, not inmates.  
 
"8.  
Travis Brock heard Respondent yell at Joni Pratt about laying carpet in 
the elevator. Mr. Brock heard Respondent say something along the lines of 'F' that, we're 
not doing that.' Respondent's reaction was 'extreme' under the circumstances. Mr. Brock 
was so uncomfortable that he put his head down and 'literally crawled back into the 
room I was working in.' 
 
"9.  
In June 2018, Joni Pratt resigned from the clerk's office. She asked Judge 
Gettler to accompany her to Respondent's office as she tendered her resignation. After 
she told Respondent that she was giving two weeks' notice of her resignation, she left 
the office and started walking down the hall. Ms. Pratt heard Respondent yell 'Yahoo.' 
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Judge Gettler heard the outburst. The Panel finds that Respondent knew or should have 
known that his comment would be overheard by Ms. Pratt and others.  
 
"10. 
Former Attorney General Curt Schneider, now a lawyer practicing in 
Coffeyville, heard Respondent use the terms '"bitch", "cunt", et cetera' in referring to 
females. 
 
"11. 
Mr. Schneider's legal assistant, Ann Rooks, overheard Respondent use 
profanity. Mr. Schneider had asked Ms. Rooks to call Respondent to enter Mr. 
Schneider's appearance and request a hearing in a court matter pending before 
Respondent. Mr. Schneider's testimony about Ms. Rooks' statements was admitted 
without objection.  
 
"12. 
Ms. Rooks memorialized her conversation with Respondent as follows:  
'When I called Judge Cullins to set the hearing and told him the names of the parties, he 
said, "Oh fuck. Them again?" Then he asked if Mr. Schneider represents "the dude or the 
chick." When I told him Mr. Schneider represents [client], he said, "Oh, fuck . . . really? 
She's fucking crazy." He then went on to say, "I used to think the guy was ok, but the 
longer this goes on, I'm starting to think he may be fucking crazy too."' Ms. Rooks' 
memorandum was admitted without objection. 
 
"13.  
Tim Emert, a lawyer from Independence, heard Respondent's use of 
obscenities so regularly that it was 'just routine.' Mr. Emert heard Respondent use the 
words 'bitch' and 'cunt' in describing females. Mr. Emert also heard Respondent use both 
of these words in the same sentence in talking about the same women.  
 
"14.  
The Panel is cognizant of a potential discrepancy between the testimony 
of Mr. Emert and the testimony of attorney Dan Reynolds, of the same firm, on the 
subject of Respondent's use of the words 'bitch' and 'cunt' in reference to specific 
women. On the one hand, Mr. Emert testified that Respondent used those terms in a 
conversation directly with Mr. Emert. On the other hand, Mr. Reynolds testified that Mr. 
Emert told Mr. Reynolds that Mr. Emert 'heard from another person' that Respondent 
had used those terms. The panel finds the testimony of both Mr. Emert and Mr. Reynolds 
highly credible. Based on the evidence presented, including witness demeanor, the panel 
believes that Respondent in fact used these derogatory terms in a conversation with Mr. 
Emert, and that either (a) Mr. Reynolds misunderstood what Mr. Emert had told him, or 
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(b) Mr. Emert elected for whatever reason not to reveal to Mr. Reynolds that Mr. Emert 
was the person who heard Respondent use the words. Mr. Emert's testimony before the 
Panel was under oath, and accordingly, Mr. Emert was obligated to tell the Panel the 
whole truth. The Panel is convinced that he did.  
 
"15.  
Respondent stipulated that he wrote 'Larry said so doesn't fucking cut it' 
on a document. The document was an arrest warrant packet prepared by the Office of 
Montgomery County Attorney Larry Markle. Assistant County Attorney Lisa 
Montgomery prepared the warrant packet. Montgomery County has two dockets, one in 
Independence and the other in Coffeyville. Certain traffic cases were assigned to the 
magistrate judge in Coffeyville. 
 
"16.  
Ms. Montgomery sent the arrest warrant packet to the district court 
clerk's office. Respondent sent the packet back to the Montgomery District Attorney's 
Office with the following language printed in large print on the front page of the arrest 
warrant:  'This is a traffic case that needs to be filed in c-ville or I need a better 
explanation. [signed] Cullins. Larry said so doesn't fucking cut it. [signed] Cullins.' The 
document has an arrow pointing to Larry with language that says, 'It used too [sic]'." 
 
"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
 
"1. RULE 1.2 
 
"Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary  
 
'A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and 
the appearance of impropriety.' 
 
"Under Rule 1.2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct a judge shall act at all times in a 
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Public 
confidence is eroded by a judge's improper conduct. This principle applies to both the 
professional and personal conduct of a judge. Rule 1.2, Cmt 1 (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 441.) 
'Integrity' under the Judicial Code includes the qualities of fairness and soundness of 
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character. Conduct that compromises or appears to compromise the integrity of a judge 
undermines public confidence in the judiciary. Rule 1.2, Cmt 3 (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 441.)  
 
"Of great concern to the Panel, Respondent used derogatory words to describe 
women, such as 'bitch' and 'cunt.'  
 
"In a conversation with Ann Rooks, secretary to attorney Curt Schneider, 
Respondent stated:  'Oh fuck. Them again.' When advised that Schneider represented the 
female in the situation, Respondent stated:  'Oh, fuck, really? She's fucking crazy. I used 
to think the guy was ok, but the longer this goes on, I'm starting to think he may be 
fucking crazy too.'  
 
"Respondent used expletives and derided Joni Pratt when she asked him 
questions regarding installing carpet in the elevator. Respondent's conduct was so out of 
line with appropriate decorum that carpet installer Travis Brock put his head down and 
attempted to avoid the situation. Respondent yelled 'Yippee' after Ms. Pratt resigned from 
the county clerk's office. 
 
"Respondent used expletives with anger when speaking with Lance Carter about 
his employment review. Respondent frequently used the word 'fuck' and its derivatives 
when speaking to or near employees and others at the courthouse. Respondent's unkind 
and abusive language to courthouse staff has resulted in unnecessary staff turnover.  
 
 
"Respondent's violations of Rule 1.2 as described above are established by clear 
and convincing evidence. The above-described conduct harms public confidence in the 
integrity of the judiciary. The conduct exhibits unfairness and unsound character. Public 
confidence has been undermined because of the above-described incidents of 
Respondent's conduct.  
 
 
"The Panel has not found, and makes no determination, that a judge's use of 
ubiquitous profanity will always constitute a violation of Rule 1.2. That is a question for 
another day. The Panel has simply found that Respondent's conduct described in this 
section violates Rule 1.2 based on the evidence presented in this proceeding. 
 
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"2. RULE 2.3  
 
"Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment 
 
"(B)  
'A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct 
manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment, including but not limited to bias, 
prejudice, or harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, 
disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political 
affiliation and shall not permit court staff, court officials or other subject to the judge's 
direction and control to do so.' 
 
"A. Gender Bias.  
 
"The Panel concludes that Respondent's use of derogatory words directed at 
women, in particular the words 'bitch' and 'cunt,' manifested a bias and/or prejudice and 
was hostile toward the individuals about whom he was speaking.  
 
"Respondent's violation of Rule 2.3 is established by clear and convincing 
evidence. His conduct manifested clear bias based upon sex. Intentionally gender-based 
derogatory references toward women have no place in the administration of justice, and 
have no place in a judge's vernacular.  
 
"B. Race Bias.  
 
"At a hearing involving an African-American athlete attending Independence 
Community College, the Respondent stated, 'Can I assume you're not even a Kansas 
boy?' At another hearing that same day involving a different African-American athlete, 
Respondent again inquired where the defendant came from before attending College. 
When the defendant replied Topeka, Respondent stated, 'At least you're a Kansas fellow, 
anyway.' Later in the second hearing, Respondent referred to the second defendant as a 
'Kansas boy.'  
 
"The Examiner alleged that Respondent's use of the term 'Kansas boy' violated 
Rule 2.3. Respondent testified that he did not intend the term 'boy' to have any racial 
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connotation. Respondent explained that he considers himself as a 'Chautauqua County 
boy' and that his reference to the young man as 'a Kansas boy' was in the same vein. This 
is consistent with the Examiner's allegations, because the Examiner expressly disclaimed 
any attempt to prove that Respondent's 'boy' reference was driven by race-based animus. 
Even though the Panel has implicitly found the Respondent's testimony on several other 
issues to be less worthy of credence than the testimony of other witnesses, the Panel finds 
Respondent's testimony that he did not intend the term 'boy' to have any racial 
connotation credible. Based on all of the evidence, the Panel concludes that Respondent 
intended to use the term 'boy' as term of geographic origin, and not as a term of racial 
derision. Geographic origin was relevant for proper administration of the bond hearing, 
and the men were teenagers.  
 
"Despite the Panel's finding that Respondent did not intend any racial derision in 
his use of the term 'boy,' however, there is clear and convincing evidence that the 
prosecutor in these criminal cases was concerned that Respondent's use of the term could 
be interpreted as a term of bias. The prosecutor felt it appropriate to (and did) apologize 
for Respondent's conduct to the father of one of the defendants.  
 
"The Panel believes that the Supreme Court's sua sponte analysis of Rule 2.3 in 
State v. Smith, 308 Kan. 778, 423 P.3d 530 (2018), compels a finding that Respondent 
violated Rule 2.3 in his use of the term 'boy' on these facts. The Smith case explains that 
the focus of the Rule 2.3 inquiry must be on the 'appearance of bias . . . to an informed, 
objective observer, 'even if that bias does not exist. Id. at 788 (quoting Meija v. United 
States, 916 A.2d 900 (D.C. Ct. App. 2007); see also id. (quoting Wang v. Attorney 
General of the United States, 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005) ('the assurance that the 
arbiter is not predisposed to find against a person "is absent—and judicial conduct 
improper—whenever a judge appears biased, even if she is not actually biased.'''); Rule 
2.3 Comment [1] ('A judge must avoid conduct that may reasonably be perceived as 
biased.'). The Panel concludes that Respondent's use of the term 'boy' on these facts may 
reasonably have been perceived as biased—especially to these defendants and their 
family member(s) in attendance. Indeed, the prosecutor on these matters 
contemporaneously believed that Respondent's comments may have been perceived as 
biased and apologized for them. Accordingly, the Panel finds that Respondent's use of the 
term boy in these hearings violated Rule 2.3. 
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"3. RULE 2.8  
 
"Decorum, Demeanor, and Communication with Jurors  
 
"'(B) A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants, jurors, 
witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court officials and others with whom the judge deals in an 
official capacity. . . . ' 
 
"Under Rule 2.8, a judge shall be dignified and courteous to lawyers, court staff, 
court officials and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Respondent 
uses obscenities, criticizes staff, and tells staff 'don't talk.'  
 
"In sending back the packet of information to the district attorney's office, 
Respondent used the language, 'This is a traffic case that needs to be filed in c-ville or I 
need a better explanation. [signed] Cullins. Larry said so doesn't fucking cut it. [signed] 
Cullins.' Respondent's demeanor contributed to the decisions of Joni Pratt, Lance Carter, 
and Lynette Phillips to leave their employment with the court.  
 
"Respondent used expletives and derided Joni Pratt when she asked him 
questions regarding installing carpet in the elevator. Respondent was undignified when he 
yelled 'Yippee' after Ms. Pratt resigned from the county clerk's office. Respondent used 
undignified language in discussing the litigants with Ann Rooks on the phone when she 
was attempting to enter an appearance for Curt Schneider.  
 
"Respondent stipulated to the fact that he used the quoted phrases:  'Sit down. I 
want you to listen and don't say a word,' and 'No, don't talk,' or something comparable 
during a meeting when Joni Pratt requested Respondent's assistance with court employees 
she supervised.  
 
"Respondent acknowledged that he needed a more effective management style. 
 
"Respondent's violations of Rule 2.8 as described above are established by clear 
and convincing evidence. His conduct was not patient, dignified, or courteous.  
 
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"4. OTHER ALLEGATIONS. All other violations of the Judicial Canons alleged by the 
Examiner in the Notice of Formal Proceedings and the Final Prehearing Order were not 
established by clear and convincing evidence or did not rise to the level of a violation of 
the Judicial Code. 
 
 
"Notwithstanding this, two of the allegations included in the Final Pretrial Order 
were areas of great concern for the Panel, and the Panel will now discuss these two areas.  
 
 
 
"A. Letter to Law Enforcement.  
 
"First, the Panel criticizes Respondent for his actions in a letter he sent to the 
sheriff's office or police departments in Montgomery County and the cities of 
Independence, Coffeyville, Caney and Cherryvale. Respondent's letter indicated correctly 
that the Court was having difficulty in getting the County Attorney's Office to file 
charges on probable cause arrests in a timely manner. The Panel does not believe 
Respondent's action amounts to a violation of the Judicial Code, but believes it was not 
the best practice in this situation to take the Respondent's concerns, as justifiably 
frustrated as he may have been, to the public arena. Respondent should have known his 
letter would become public. His letter was ultimately read at a Cherryvale City Council 
meeting and caused media coverage of a situation that could have been handled without 
incident through the adoption of local court rules. 
 
"B. Bonding Practices and Research.  
 
"Second, the Panel criticizes Respondent for directing attorneys outside the 
judicial branch to perform work on behalf of the court. On different occasions, 
Respondent directed both Larry Markle and Heath Lampson to look into the conduct of 
bondsmen in the district, as well as relevant statutes, regulations, and judicial authority. 
As chief judge, Respondent was vested with authority over bondsmen under K.S.A. 22-
2806 and 22-2809b. But the exercise of this authority is a judicial function. The Panel 
believes the authority does not include the power to direct attorneys appearing before the 
court to conduct research and investigations on behalf of the court. 
 
 
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"RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 
 
"The Panel concluded that an admonishment or cease and desist disposition was 
not a sufficient discipline for Respondent's actions in this case. However, the Panel also 
concluded that removal of Respondent from the Bench is not warranted on these facts. 
The Panel heard supporting recommendations from attorneys and judicial colleagues 
regarding Respondent's abilities as a district court judge. Christina Stapp, Court Services 
Officer in Montgomery County, testified that Respondent ran a 'very efficient' docket and 
that he was firm and held attorneys appropriately accountable. Daniel Reynolds, an 
attorney in Independence, testified that Respondent is 'a very good judge' and 'makes a 
fair determination.'  
 
"Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 620 (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 487), based on the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and based on a unanimous vote of 
all five members participating in the Formal Hearing, the Panel recommends to the 
Supreme Court of the State of Kansas that Respondent be disciplined for the violations by 
public censure and that the Supreme Court refrain from making any future appointment 
of Respondent as a chief judge.  
 
"The Panel also agrees with the recommendations set forth by Acumen 
Assessments, LLC. After Respondent completed a Multidisciplinary Forensic Fitness to 
Practice Evaluation administered by Acumen, the assessment professionals set forth in 
part the following recommendations: 
 
'1. Judge Cullins would benefit from a process of professional coaching 
in order to build on the insights he came to over the course of the 
evaluation, and improve his ability to attune to others in interpersonal 
interactions. He would also benefit from a continued focus on applying 
the skills he internalized during his participation in a professionalism 
workshop.  
 
'2. The symptoms of anxiety noted during the present evaluation are 
likely to return to baseline following the resolution of the current 
administrative process. It does not appear necessary at this point, but 
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Judge Cullins could seek out a process of individual counseling or 
psychotherapy in order to manage the acute symptoms that come to his 
awareness. . . .  
 
'4. We recommend that Judge Cullins focus his professional aspirations 
on continuing in his current position within the court, and that he not 
seek out any new leadership or management positions. If he is interested 
in pursuing such positions, he will need to learn to internalize new skills 
that would enable him to be a more effective team leader.'  
 
"The Panel recommends that Respondent complete professional coaching of a 
minimum of 1-2 years as recommended by Acumen and that if he fails to complete the 
recommended coaching then the Supreme Court should suspend Respondent from his 
judicial duties." 
 
Respondent filed exceptions to the panel's final hearing report. See Supreme Court 
Rule 620(e) (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 497). Respondent recommends admonishment or cease-
and-desist order. The Examiner endorses the panel's findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations for discipline. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A formal complaint against a judge for violations of the Code must specify the 
charges against the judge and the alleged facts that are the basis for the charges. Supreme 
Court Rule 615(c) (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 492). If no exceptions are filed by a respondent 
judge to the hearing panel's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, those Findings and 
Conclusions are conclusive and cannot be challenged by the respondent. Rule 620(d). See 
In re Pilshaw, 286 Kan. 574, 579, 186 P.3d 708 (2008); In re Robertson, 280 Kan. 266, 
269, 120 P.3d 790 (2005). In such event, only the discipline is at issue. 
 
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If exceptions to the Findings and Conclusions are filed, those exceptions are 
reviewed by this court. To sustain the charges in a disciplinary proceeding against a 
judge, the charges must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Supreme Court 
Rule 619(b) (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 495). Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that 
causes the factfinder to believe that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable. In re 
Henderson, 301 Kan. 412, 422, 343 P.3d 518 (2015) (Henderson I); see also In re Kurth, 
309 Kan. 224, 247-48, 433 P.3d 679 (2019) (in attorney discipline case, clear and 
convincing evidence causes the factfinder to believe that the truth of the facts asserted is 
highly probable). In determining whether the charges are supported by clear and 
convincing evidence, appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or make credibility 
determinations; the courts merely examine whether the record supports the panel's 
findings. In re Comfort, 284 Kan. 183, 190, 159 P.3d 1011 (2007). 
 
RESPONDENT'S EXCEPTIONS 
 
In this case, the panel received and accepted Stipulated Findings of Fact 
("Stipulations") Nos. 1-16. They are not challenged and are conclusively established. 
Supreme Court Rule 620(d). The panel also made Findings of Fact ("Findings") Nos. 1-
16. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 620, Respondent takes exception in part to the 
Findings. Those Findings and exceptions will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
Respondent also takes exception in part to the hearing panel's Conclusions of Law. 
Specifically, he takes exception to the panel's conclusions concerning his violation of 
Canon 2, Rule 2.3 (gender bias, reasonable perception of racial bias). He also asserts the 
panel's analysis of Canon 1, Rule 1.2 (confidence in the judiciary) and Canon 2, Rule 2.8 
(decorum, demeanor) "should not be accepted in full." Respondent accepts the panel's 
conclusions regarding his phone call to Ann Rooks, found to be a violation of Rule 1.2 
(promoting confidence in the judiciary), and his written note on a proposed warrant, 
which was found to be a violation of Rule 2.8. Respondent accepts that the demeanor and 
14 
 
decorum he exhibited around the courthouse and in certain interactions with court staff 
"fell short" of Rule 2.8(B) (patience, dignity, and courtesy) but asserts that it did not 
implicate Rule 1.2.  
 
Finally, with regard to the subject of the appropriate discipline, the Respondent 
took exception to the hearing panel's recommendation of discipline and costs. 
 
Respondent's arguments supporting his Exceptions were dispersed throughout his 
brief and reply brief. For example, in his brief's Table of Contents, he alleged the panel's 
finding that Cullins used derogatory words when referring to women was not supported 
by clear and convincing evidence. He also alleged the panel's factual findings regarding a 
carpet incident were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent then 
set forth his own asserted "Statement of Facts." 
 
This is not a re-trial. Unless specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
specifically challenged, this court accepts them as conclusively established. See Rule 
620(d); Pilshaw, 286 Kan. at 579. Though arguably the requirement for such specificity 
is clearer when applied to attorney discipline, the application of the "specific exception 
rule" is the same for both attorneys and judges. Cf. Rule 212(c) (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 259) 
(for attorneys, any part of the hearing report not "specifically excepted to" shall be 
deemed admitted).  
 
The discipline in this case, if any, will be based on this court's determination after 
considering: 
 
(A) Stipulations submitted by the parties, accepted by the panel, and presented to 
this court without exceptions; 
 
15 
 
(B) The panel's Findings presented to this court without exception, and thus 
conclusively established; 
 
(C) The panel's Findings presented to this court with exception and found by this 
court after review of the record to be supported by clear and convincing evidence;  
 
(D) The panel's Conclusions of Law presented to this court without exception;  
 
(E) The panel's Conclusions of Law presented to this court with exception and 
found by this court after review of the record to be supported by clear and 
convincing evidence; and 
 
(F) Arguments of the parties.  
 
THE PANEL'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
 
Regarding the status of each Finding, the following is ascertained after painstaking 
analysis of Respondent's briefs and the record: 
 
"1. Respondent frequently used the word 'fuck' and its derivatives when speaking 
to or near employees and/or others at the courthouse."  
 
Respondent stipulated to this fact and does not challenge it.  
 
This Finding is conclusively established. 
 
"2. Lance Carter served as a district court clerk in Independence for nearly 12 
years. Mr. Carter regularly overheard Respondent's use of obscenities. He 
created a swear journal documenting multiple instances of Respondent's 
16 
 
profanity. Mr. Carter did not intend the swear journal to document all of 
Respondent's profanity."  
 
No exception. 
 
This Finding is conclusively established. 
 
"3. Mr. Carter received an unsatisfactory performance evaluation from a 
supervisor in August 2015. When Mr. Carter asked Respondent to discuss the 
evaluation, Respondent called Mr. Carter into Respondent's office and said, 
'Carter, go sit down in that fucking chair and don't you say a fucking word.' 
Respondent proceeded to yell and scream at Mr. Carter, using profanity."  
 
 
Regarding the interactions between Carter and Respondent, Respondent offers that 
he considered Carter a friend and that while he was "too stern" with him during their 
meeting, he did not initiate the meeting or curse at Carter. He also submits that he was so 
stern because he wanted Carter to realize it was a very serious meeting and that Carter 
indeed had issues he needed to improve on. Respondent testified that he thought he could 
be "gruff" with Carter because Carter himself was also "gruff" but recognizes he made a 
mistake and overdid it.  
 
A review of the record shows that this Finding required the panel to decide 
whether Carter's testimony that Respondent cursed was more credible than Respondent's 
testimony that he did not curse. In light of Respondent's apparent ubiquitous cursing, to 
which Respondent admitted, we conclude the panel's finding that Respondent cursed 
during his meeting with Carter is supported by clear and convincing evidence.  
 
The meeting was attended by only Respondent and Carter. Both individuals 
testified about the tone of Respondent's statements to Carter. After reviewing the record, 
17 
 
and considering the panel's ability to review the demeanor of the witnesses, we conclude 
the panel's finding that Respondent "yelled and screamed" during the meeting, despite 
Respondent's description of his tone as "stern" or "gruff" during the "closed-door 
discussion," is supported by clear and convincing evidence.  
 
This Finding is affirmed. 
 
"4. Respondent did not give Mr. Carter an opportunity to address Mr. Carter's 
concerns about the evaluation. When Mr. Carter tried to speak, Respondent 
told him, 'Keep your fucking mouth shut. You don't have the right to defend 
yourself here. Don't say another fucking word. Go see Joni Pratt. Get the fuck 
out of my sight and shut the fucking door on your way out.' Mr. Carter left the 
room." 
 
Respondent's exceptions to this Finding are generally set forth with his exceptions 
concerning the previous finding. Respondent asserts he did not curse but concedes he was 
"too stern" with Carter during this meeting. Respondent testified that he thought he could 
be gruff with Carter because Carter himself was also gruff but recognizes he made a 
mistake and overdid it.  
 
A review of the record shows that this Finding required the panel to decide 
whether Carter's testimony describing the meeting was more credible than Respondent's 
testimony about the meeting. The panel heard testimony from the only two people present 
at the time and decided Carter's testimony was credible, reliable, clear, and convincing. 
Our review of the record shows this determination is supported by clear and convincing 
evidence.  
 
This Finding is affirmed. 
 
18 
 
"5. Joni Pratt started as Chief Clerk of the District Court of Montgomery County 
in 2015. Ms. Pratt oversaw a remodeling project in the Coffeyville Clerk's 
Office in October 2016. Part of the remodeling project included new carpeting. 
One day, Travis Brock and Andre Ysusi were laying carpet in the law library. 
Ms. Pratt asked the Respondent whether these carpet layers could install some 
of the extra carpet in the elevators."  
 
No exception.  
 
This Finding is conclusively established. 
 
"6. In response to Ms. Pratt's question, Respondent became 'very angry' and told 
Ms. Pratt that 'he didn't give a fuck about the carpeting and that that wasn't our 
fucking building' and that she should call the city manager. Ms. Pratt described 
Respondent's tone as frightening, loud, aggressive and scary."  
 
Respondent admits that he cussed in the initial interaction with Pratt but denies 
that he cursed her, that his tone was aggressive, or that he yelled at Pratt. He argues that 
he was irritated with Pratt because she would not let the issue go.  
 
A review of the record shows that this Finding required the panel to decide 
whether Pratt's testimony describing the encounter was more credible than Respondent's 
testimony about it. The panel heard testimony from both, was able to ascertain both 
witnesses' demeanors, and decided Pratt's testimony was more credible and reliable. Our 
review of the record shows this finding is supported by clear and convincing evidence.  
 
This Finding is affirmed. 
 
19 
 
"7. After her lunch break, Ms. Pratt approached Respondent and told him she was 
embarrassed about the incident. Respondent told her, 'If you think I'm going to 
fucking apologize to you, I'm not.' Three days later Respondent called Ms. 
Pratt into his office and told her 'I got to thinking about what you said to me, 
and there's no fucking way that those fucking inmates heard me.' Ms. Pratt told 
Respondent it was the carpet layers who heard him, not inmates."  
 
Respondent denies cussing when Pratt came to his office and claims she did most 
of the talking. Respondent also points out that Pratt claimed Michelle Stewart (Judge 
Cullins' former court reporter) could corroborate that he yelled and cussed, while 
Stewart's testimony was that she did not remember hearing anything other than 
conversation. Respondent also points out that he did not mean to upset or hurt Pratt with 
these interactions and while he understood how Pratt was embarrassed, she was also a 
"uniquely sensitive person."  
 
Initially, we note the Finding does not mention yelling. Stewart's memory of the 
"conversation" is not inconsistent with Pratt's memory of cursing, given Respondent's 
admittedly common practice of cursing during conversations. Respondent's denial of 
cursing while in his chambers would have been considered by the panel.  
 
The panel was able to ascertain both witnesses' demeanors and decided Pratt's 
testimony was more credible and reliable. Our review of the record shows this finding is 
supported by clear and convincing evidence.  
 
This Finding is affirmed. 
 
"8. Travis Brock heard Respondent yell at Joni Pratt about laying carpet in the 
elevator. Mr. Brock heard Respondent say something along the lines of '"F" 
that, we're not doing that.' Respondent's reaction was 'extreme' under the 
20 
 
circumstances. Mr. Brock was so uncomfortable that he put his head down and 
'literally crawled back into the room I was working in.'"  
 
Respondent's exception to this Finding references some apparent inconsistencies 
between Pratt's testimony and Brock's testimony. (Brock was one of the carpet layers.)   
 
The panel appears to rely on Brock's testimony for this finding, so Pratt's 
testimony is not at issue. Our review of Brock's testimony shows this finding is supported 
by clear and convincing evidence.  
 
This Finding is affirmed. 
  
"9. In June 2018, Joni Pratt resigned from the clerk's office. She asked Judge 
Gettler to accompany her to Respondent's office as she tendered her 
resignation. After she told Respondent that she was giving two weeks' notice of 
her resignation, she left the office and started walking down the hall. Ms. Pratt 
heard Respondent yell 'Yahoo.' Judge Gettler heard the outburst. The panel 
finds that Respondent knew or should have known that his comment would be 
overheard by Ms. Pratt and others."  
 
Respondent acknowledges that he was not courteous or professional when he 
yelled "Yahoo" after Pratt resigned but maintains that he did not mean to hurt her 
feelings, he did not realize she was around or that she heard it, and he regrets it. 
 
 
The Finding does not address Respondent's intent or regret. Our record review 
shows that the outburst was loud enough that Judge Gettler was certain Pratt had 
probably heard it. Our review of the record shows this finding is supported by clear and 
convincing evidence.  
 
21 
 
This Finding is affirmed. 
 
"10. Former Attorney General Curt Schneider, now a lawyer practicing in 
Coffeyville, heard Respondent use the terms '"bitch", "cunt", et cetera' in 
referring to females."  
 
Respondent takes exception to this Finding for multiple reasons. Our analysis of 
this Finding will be discussed later in this opinion. 
 
This Finding is affirmed. 
 
"11. Mr. Schneider's legal assistant, Ann Rooks, overheard Respondent use 
profanity. Mr. Schneider had asked Ms. Rooks to call Respondent to enter Mr. 
Schneider's appearance and request a hearing in a court matter pending before 
Respondent. Mr. Schneider's testimony about Ms. Rooks' statements was 
admitted without objection."  
 
No exception.  
 
This Finding is conclusively established. 
 
"12. Ms. Rooks memorialized her conversation with Respondent as follows:   
'When I called Judge Cullins to set the hearing and told him the names of the 
parties, he said, "Oh fuck. Them again?" Then he asked if Mr. Schneider 
represents "the dude or the chick." When I told him Mr. Schneider represents 
[client], he said, "Oh, fuck . . . really? She's fucking crazy." He then went on to 
say, "I used to think the guy was ok, but the longer this goes on, I'm starting to 
think he may be fucking crazy too."' Ms. Rooks' memorandum was admitted 
without objection." 
 
22 
 
Respondent takes exception only to the extent necessary to allow him to provide 
record evidence in mitigation but does not dispute that the evidence supports this finding. 
 
This Finding is conclusively established. 
 
"13. Tim Emert, a lawyer from Independence, heard Respondent's use of 
obscenities so regularly that it was 'just routine.' Mr. Emert heard Respondent 
use the words 'bitch' and 'cunt' in describing females. Mr. Emert also heard 
Respondent use both of these words in the same sentence in talking about the 
same women." 
 
Respondent takes exception to the Finding for multiple reasons. Our analysis of 
this Finding will be discussed later in this opinion. 
 
 
This Finding is affirmed. 
 
"14. The Panel is cognizant of a potential discrepancy between the testimony of 
Mr. Emert and the testimony of attorney Dan Reynolds, of the same firm, on 
the subject of Respondent's use of the words 'bitch' and 'cunt' in reference to 
specific women. On the one hand, Mr. Emert testified that Respondent used 
those terms in a conversation directly with Mr. Emert. On the other hand, Mr. 
Reynolds testified that Mr. Emert told Mr. Reynolds that Mr. Emert 'heard 
from another person' that Respondent had used those terms. The panel finds the 
testimony of both Mr. Emert and Mr. Reynolds highly credible. Based on the 
evidence presented, including witness demeanor, the panel believes that 
Respondent in fact used these derogatory terms in a conversation with Mr. 
Emert, and that either (a) Mr. Reynolds misunderstood what Mr. Emert had 
told him, or (b) Mr. Emert elected for whatever reason not to reveal to Mr. 
Reynolds that Mr. Emert was the person who heard Respondent use the words. 
23 
 
Mr. Emert's testimony before the panel was under oath, and accordingly, Mr. 
Emert was obligated to tell the panel the whole truth. The panel is convinced 
that he did."  
 
Respondent takes exception to this Finding for multiple reasons. Our analysis of 
this Finding will be discussed later in this opinion. 
 
This Finding is affirmed. 
 
"15. Respondent stipulated that he wrote 'Larry said so doesn't fucking cut it' on a 
document. The document was an arrest warrant packet prepared by the Office 
of Montgomery County Attorney Larry Markle. Assistant County Attorney 
Lisa Montgomery prepared the warrant packet. Montgomery County has two 
dockets, one in Independence and the other in Coffeyville. Certain traffic cases 
were assigned to the magistrate judge in Coffeyville."  
 
Respondent takes exception only to the extent necessary to allow him to provide 
record evidence in mitigation but does not dispute that the evidence supports this finding. 
 
This Finding is conclusively established. 
 
"16. Ms. Montgomery sent the arrest warrant packet to the district court clerk's 
office. Respondent sent the packet back to the Montgomery District Attorney's 
Office with the following language printed in large print on the front page of 
the arrest warrant:  'This is a traffic case that needs to be filed in c-ville or I 
need a better explanation. [signed] Cullins. Larry said so doesn't fucking cut it. 
[signed] Cullins.' The document has an arrow pointing to Larry with language 
that says, 'It used too [sic].'"  
 
24 
 
Respondent suggests this Finding must be considered within the context of his 
justifiable frustration with Larry Markle's practices as county attorney. While such 
context is appropriate in determining what, if any, discipline is appropriate, it does not 
constitute an exception to the Finding. 
 
This Finding is conclusively established. 
 
To summarize, our review of the record confirms each excepted Finding of Fact is 
supported by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, each excepted Finding is 
conclusively established. As needed for further explanation and clarification, the facts 
will be expanded and explained later. 
 
THE PANEL'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
 
CANON 2, RULE 2.3—GENDER BIAS 
 
The panel concluded that Respondent manifested gender bias in violation of 
Canon 2, Rule 2.3. This conclusion was based on Findings Nos. 10, 13, and 14.  
 
Respondent points out that Schneider did not specify a time period or context for 
his statement that Respondent used the terms "'bitch', 'cunt', et cetera" in referring to 
females. Yet, there was no objection as to relevancy, so this court infers the statements 
were allegedly made at some time after the Code applied to Respondent. Respondent also 
pivots to the testimony of other witnesses who did not hear such slurs, arguing the 
"weight" of such testimony. The Examiner responds that none were able to refute that 
Schneider and Emert heard Respondent make the statements, and we will not reweigh the 
panel's credibility determinations. 
 
25 
 
Respondent also asserts that Schneider's statements during the hearing were less 
than convincing because Schneider did not "complain" during his previous deposition 
that statements were "about" women, as opposed to being made "in front of" women. As 
Schneider aptly responded, witnesses do not ask deposition questions and the pertinent 
question apparently was not posed to him. 
 
Respondent claims it is improbable he would have made these derogatory 
statements to Emert about two court employees known to be close to Emert, when 
Respondent was not close to Emert. We find that the panel's findings are supported by 
clear and convincing evidence, especially in light of the panel's reference to witness 
demeanor, and we will not reweigh the evidence or re-determine witness credibility.   
 
Finally, Respondent asserts that Emert's testimony is refuted by Dan Reynolds, 
and argues that Emert was confusing his memory of Respondent's statements with his 
memories of Joni Pratt's statements. We are aware that a witness can be credible and yet 
provide unreliable information, as suggested in Respondent's reply brief. The quality and 
quantity of the evidence was presented to the panel and duly considered by it. Upon 
review of the entire record, the panel's findings are supported by clear and convincing 
evidence. The court will not set aside the panel's Findings Nos. 10, 13, and 14. They are 
affirmed. 
 
Turning to his second point on gender bias, Respondent asserts that the statements, 
even if made, did not violate the Code because they were not made during the 
performance of judicial duties. He submits this is correct because there is no indication 
the terms were used "during or in relation to any matter he was adjudicating" nor "made 
in the performance of [Respondent's] administrative duties."  
 
Respondent interprets "judicial duties," including his administrative duties, too 
narrowly. While in the courthouse—when court business of every kind was being 
26 
 
addressed—Respondent was present in his official capacity as a district judge, and 
sometimes also as chief judge. A judge does not lose his mantle of authority when he 
steps out of his chambers into a hallway. A judge's performance of "judicial duties" 
occurs constantly in the courthouse during the course of any given day. See Canon 1, 
Rule 1.2 Comments [1] (public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by improper conduct 
and the appearance of impropriety), [2] (a judge should expect to be under greater 
scrutiny than other citizens), and [3] (rule is general because it is impossible to list all 
possible improper conduct). Those duties include the times a judge presides over 
hearings, completes administrative reports, and evaluates employees, but they also 
include those occasions when a judge discusses employee performance with attorneys 
and other staff; admonishes persons waiting in the hall to be quieter so as not to disrupt 
court proceedings; offers to assist a wandering law enforcement officer who needs an 
application for search warrant reviewed; directs a member of the public to the right 
courtroom; addresses a complaint; and deals with innumerable other things that require a 
judge's professional attention, judgment, and decision throughout the day. The fact that 
some people did not see bias, or understand it to be such, is insufficient to overrule the 
panel's conclusion that it did occur—and occurred often enough—to show bias as 
represented on those occasions. 
 
A minority of the court would find that the Findings of the panel are insufficient to 
show more than bias against certain females and are not sufficient to show bias against 
females generally. 
 
CANON 2, RULE 2.3—APPEARANCE OF RACIAL BIAS 
 
In Stipulation No. 11, the parties agreed, "A transcript reflects that Respondent 
used the phrase 'Kansas boy' to describe two young black men charged with crimes." The 
panel also added:  
 
27 
 
"Respondent testified [at the hearing] that he did not intend the term 'boy' to have any 
racial connotation. Respondent explained that he considers himself as a 'Chautauqua 
County boy' and that his reference to the young man as 'a Kansas boy' was in the same 
vein. This is consistent with the Examiner's allegations, because the Examiner expressly 
disclaimed any attempt to prove that Respondent's 'boy' reference was driven by race-
based animus. Even though the Panel has implicitly found the Respondent's testimony on 
several other issues to be less worthy of credence than the testimony of other witnesses, 
the Panel finds Respondent's testimony that he did not intend the term 'boy' to have any 
racial connotation credible. Based on all the evidence, the Panel concludes that 
Respondent intended to use the term 'boy' as [a] term of geographic origin, and not as a 
term of racial derision. Geographic origin was relevant for proper administration of the 
bond hearing, and the men were teenagers. 
 
"Despite the Panel's finding that Respondent did not intend any racial derision in 
his use of the term 'boy,' however, there is clear and convincing evidence that the 
prosecutor in these criminal cases was concerned that Respondent's use of the term could 
be interpreted as a term of bias. The prosecutor felt it appropriate to (and did) apologize 
for Respondent's conduct to the father of one of the defendants." 
 
The panel then concluded that Respondent violated Canon 2, Rule 2.3 because his 
statements during those two defendants' bond hearings may reasonably have been 
perceived as racially biased.  
 
Rule 2.3 states:  
 
 
"(A) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, including administrative 
duties, without bias or prejudice. 
 
 
"(B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct 
manifest bias or prejudice, . . . based upon race . . . ." (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 449.) 
 
The Comments to Canon 2, Rule 2.3 state: 
 
28 
 
 
"[2] Examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice include but are not limited 
to . . . negative stereotyping; . . . [and] suggestions of connections between race . . . and 
crime, . . . A judge must avoid conduct that may reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or 
biased." (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 449-50.) 
 
 
Respondent asserts the panel erred in its conclusion that his words could 
"reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased" based on race. In support, he cites the 
hearing testimony of the prosecutor, who did not "speak of inflection, tone of voice, 
historical usage of the term, or local custom." Nor did this witness "claim that anything 
about [respondent's] use of the term specifically suggested racial animus. [The witness] 
also did not differentiate between asking if someone was a 'Kansas boy' and calling 
someone 'boy'." Finally, Respondent claims the word ["boy"] "simply violated the rule by 
which [the witness] abides, which is 'don't use that word with young, black, adult men.'" 
 
Everyone agrees that words and phrases in this context are important. 
Respondent's assertions to the panel that he meant no racial bias were accepted by the 
panel and are not contested by either party. Respondent contests only the panel's findings 
that his words created a reasonable perception of bias, which would also violate Canon 2, 
Rule 2.3. 
 
Respondent's words are not at issue. They are shown, verbatim, in the transcripts 
of the bond hearings for two defendants. Those words were: 
 
 
"THE COURT:  All right. Are you employed anywhere?  
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  No, sir.  
 
"THE COURT:  You going to school? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
 
29 
 
"THE COURT:  Where do you go to school at?  
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Independence Community College. 
 
"THE COURT:  You an athlete? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
 
"THE COURT:  Of course. I get so tired of seeing you Independence Community 
College athletes before me—that goes for Coffeyville Community College, too, though 
ICC is something that I see more regularly than not.  
 
 
"Can I assume you're not even a Kansas boy?  
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.  
 
"THE COURT:  That's right. We pay for this community college and they don't 
even have Kansas boys play their football or their baseball. They invite these people from 
out of state.  
 
 
"Where are you from?  
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  North Carolina.  
 
"THE COURT:  From North Carolina to—can I take a wild guess? Did you have 
a felony record before ICC gave you a scholarship?  
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  No, sir.  
 
"THE COURT:  Juvenile trouble?  
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  (Shaking head.) 
 
"THE COURT:  Really? 
30 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  (Shaking head.) 
 
"THE COURT:  You just started out this big?" 
 
And later, during the hearing for the second man: 
 
 
"THE COURT: Based on the information I found in the probable cause affidavit, 
I'm continuing to hold you. The only purpose of this hearing is to set a bond for you.  
 
 
"You're not from here, are you?  
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  No. 
 
 
"THE COURT:  Well, [Defendant], it only seems fair that you get the same 
lecture that [the prior defendant] got. This Court is exceedingly tired of seeing 
Independence Community College athletes standing in front of the Court for alleged 
violations of the law, and those alleged violations of the law are always serious.  
 
"Maybe I could stomach it a little bit more—keeping in mind you're only accused 
of doing this, but it—I see these all the time—might be a little bit easier for me to 
stomach seeing these cases if I didn't know the mill levy that that college imposes upon 
everybody in this area, and they use that money to invite athletes from—where are you 
from?  
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Topeka, Kansas. 
 
"THE COURT:  Oh, you're from Kansas. I'll take that different. At least you're a 
Kansas fellow, anyway. It bothers me more if you are out of state and they invite you 
here to commit crimes.  
 
"So you're a little bit lucky. You have ties to the community given you're a 
Topeka fellow." 
 
31 
 
Regardless of inflection, tone, or local custom, this court has little trouble finding 
there was clear and convincing evidence to support the panel's conclusion that the 
statements made by Respondent during these bond hearings created a reasonable 
perception of racial bias, in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.3. Specifically, two adult Black 
men appeared before the judge during a bond hearing, both presumed innocent of their 
criminal charges. A reasonable individual might perceive that the following may have 
shown racial bias: 
 
• Something about the defendants' appearance caused the judge to believe they 
were athletes; 
 
• Something about their appearance caused the judge to assume they were not 
from the area; 
 
• Something about their appearance caused the judge to question—even 
disbelieve—one defendant's assertion that he had no felony record; and 
 
• During the judge's comments he used a term—"boy"— that has been used at 
times in the past as a common and well-known slur against Black men.  
 
When taken altogether and in context, a reasonable perception of bias cannot be 
denied. As the panel pointed out, even the prosecutor in these cases felt the need to reach 
out to one defendant's father, assuring him with words along the lines of: "[D]on't think 
that the use of that language is going to affect the administration of justice in your son's 
case." This statement by the prosecutor demonstrates exactly why Canon 2, Rule 2.3 is 
imperative to our judicial system.  
 
Put plainly, our judicial system requires that every person be allowed to present 
his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him. "That 
32 
 
assurance is absent—and judicial conduct improper—whenever a judge appears biased, 
even if she actually is not biased." Wang v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
 
"An insistence on the appearance of neutrality is not some artificial attempt to mask 
imperfection in the judicial process, but rather an essential means of ensuring the reality 
of a fair adjudication. Both the appearance and reality of impartial justice are necessary to 
the public legitimacy of judicial pronouncements and thus to the rule of law itself." 
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S.     , 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1909, 195 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2016).   
 
The Findings and Conclusions of the panel on this issue are affirmed. 
 
CANON 2, RULE 2.8—DECORUM, DEMEANOR  
 
Respondent concedes there is clear and convincing evidence for the panel's 
conclusion that he violated this rule in certain interactions with lawyers and court staff. 
He admits his "language and conduct" violated Canon 2, Rule 2.8(B) which states:  "A 
judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to . . . lawyers, court staff, court officials, 
and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity . . . ." (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 
452.) 
 
CANON 1, RULE 1.2—CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY 
 
The panel found by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated this 
rule. Respondent takes exception to this conclusion. He argues Canon 1, Rule 1.2 is not 
implicated by Respondent's behavior. 
 
Canon 1, Rule 1.2 demands a judge to act at all times—meaning 24 hours a day, 7 
days a week, 365 days a year—"in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and 
33 
 
the appearance of impropriety." (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 447.) The panel found that the 
Respondent's conduct harms public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary; that it 
exhibits unfairness and unsound character; and finally that public confidence has been 
undermined because of his conduct. 
  
Respondent first argues that Respondent's use of the word "fuck" does not 
implicate this rule. He asserts the word is used so commonly in the current culture's 
vernacular that it is now ubiquitous and has nothing to do with character. Citing one of 
his witnesses and even a dissent in a Kansas Supreme Court case, he claims cussing is so 
common in Southeast Kansas that the entire region would take offense at the suggestion 
that the use of the word connotes a negative reflection on an individual's character. He 
goes so far as to suggest that the very idea reflects only the stereotypical bias of the panel. 
(He does concede that cursing may be unprofessional and, at times, undignified, but 
maintains it is error to hold that it means a judge lacks character.) 
 
We agree the use of the word is unprofessional and—almost always—undignified 
for a judge. But the Respondent misses the panel's point. The panel specifically stated it 
"has not found, and makes no determination, that a judge's use of ubiquitous profanity 
will always constitute a violation of Rule 1.2." Rather, the panel "simply found that 
Respondent's conduct described in [the 'Rooks,'  'carpet,' and 'Carter' incidents, now 
conclusively established,] violates Canon 1, Rule 1.2 based on the evidence presented in 
this proceeding." That offensive conduct goes far beyond any undignified and 
unprofessional use of the word "fuck." Respondent's aggressiveness; his reference to a 
female litigant as "crazy"; his overt and public humiliation of Pratt; and his loud, angry, 
and expletive-filled reprimand of Carter all collectively provided the basis for the panel's 
conclusion concerning Respondent's violation of this rule. 
 
Next, Respondent asserts the evidence indicated he was often fair to court staff. 
While that may be true, good behavior on some—even most—occasions does not 
34 
 
disprove misbehavior on other occasions. Good behavior may be relevant as mitigation 
for discipline, but it will not override the panel's conclusions concerning the alleged 
incidents of Code violations. Frankly, good behavior, while commendable in a judge, is 
also expected. In many ways, the Code is intended to be aspirational, advisory, or even 
cautionary, but when the "Code uses 'shall' or 'shall not,' binding obligations are imposed, 
the violation of which can result in disciplinary action." Supreme Court Rule 601B, 
Scope [5] (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 441). This court must first ascertain whether the Code was 
violated. Mitigating factors will be considered within the context of discipline only if it 
has been. 
 
Respondent also asserts that his conduct on some occasions do not show "unsound 
character," as found by the panel. He asserts character is overarching, and general 
character cannot be found to be unsound because of what could be considered as only 
temporary lapses in judgment.  
 
Respondent is correct in one sense. He has his own perception of his overall 
character, and he is entitled to that perception. But he is not the only judge of his 
character. The panel also must judge it, and that judgment must be based on the evidence 
presented at the hearing. Both parties had their opportunity to present what they believed 
to be relevant evidence in this case during the course of a four-day hearing. Based on 
that, there was enough clear and convincing evidence to conclude that Respondent 
demonstrated unfairness and "unsound character" for a judge.  
 
Finally, Respondent asserts that Canon 1, Rule 1.2 is not implicated because the 
incidents at issue did not occur in a public forum, so "public confidence" in the judiciary 
could not be implicated. On the contrary, the "carpet incident" occurred in a hallway near 
carpet layers and the "yahoo" was heard in a hallway. Even more obvious, it defies logic 
to imply that Respondent's conduct has not been discussed in the community by the 
people who witnessed it.  
35 
 
DISCIPLINE 
 
The only remaining issue before us is the appropriate discipline for Respondent's 
violations. During the hearing before this court, the Examiner recommended that 
Respondent at least be publicly censured and ordered to follow the conditions 
recommended by the panel. The hearing panel unanimously recommended that 
Respondent be disciplined by public censure and that our court refrain from making any 
future appointment of Respondent as chief judge. Further, the panel recommended 
Respondent be ordered to comply with recommendations set forth in an evaluation report 
prepared by Respondent's expert witness, that he be ordered to obtain professional 
coaching for one to two years, and that failure to fully comply should result in 
suspension. Respondent recommends private admonition or a letter to cease and desist 
the behavior demonstrated to be Code violations. 
 
This court views the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations of 
a disciplinary panel as advisory only, but it gives the final hearing report the same dignity 
as a special verdict by a jury or the findings of a trial court. In re Henderson, 306 Kan. 
62, 72, 392 P.3d 56 (2017) (Henderson II). The panel's recommendations do not prevent 
us from imposing greater or lesser sanctions, as the court may enter any of the 
dispositions available to us. See Rule 620(f).   
 
Respondent's behavior, as established by the Stipulations, Findings, and 
Conclusions, has been quite troubling. He has intimidated and publicly humiliated court 
employees. He has shown bias and the appearance of bias by his insulting and careless 
remarks, even while on the bench and presiding over hearings. By his coarse language in 
the courthouse, he has sullied the dignity and propriety of the judiciary. 
 
In mitigation, Respondent offers that he is efficient and fair in his hearings. He 
does not mean to hurt or harm. He is just "salty." 
36 
 
 
We conclude an appropriate discipline in this case is Respondent's suspension 
from sitting as a judge for one year. If Respondent wants us to consider a shorter 
suspension, he must formulate a plan that will address appropriate counseling and 
training for Respondent. Counseling must be more frequent than quarterly and should 
address more than "professional coaching." Training should include instruction on best 
practices for working with fellow employees, especially those one supervises, and also 
include workplace issues of harassment, retaliation, and hostile environment. The 
completed plan must be approved by the Office of Judicial Administration's Director of 
Personnel, currently Allyson Christman, before it may be presented to this court for 
consideration. If, after consideration, we approve the plan, then part or all of 
Respondent's suspension beyond 60 days will be stayed during compliance with the plan. 
Successful completion of the plan must be certified by the OJA Director of Personnel. If 
that certification occurs, Respondent's successful completion of the plan, along with the 
days of suspension served, will be considered by us for possible waiver of Respondent's 
remaining suspension. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that F. William Cullins be and he is hereby suspended 
from his judicial duties in the state of Kansas in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 
620(f) (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 499) for one year, effective on the date of this opinion.  
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above suspension will be stayed after 60 days 
provided Respondent enters into a plan for training and counseling approved by the OJA 
Director of Personnel. Approval of a plan by that office is required before the stay of 
Respondent's suspension can commence. If successful completion of the plan is certified 
by the OJA Director of Personnel, we will consider waiver of any remaining suspension 
ordered herein. 
 
37 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to 
Respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports. 
 
CHRISTINA DUNN GYLLENBORG, District Judge, assigned.1 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  District Judge Gyllenborg was appointed to hear case No. 
122,565 under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by art. 3, § 6(f) of the Kansas 
Constitution to fill the vacancy on the court by the retirement of Justice Carol A. Beier.