Case Title: COSCO v. UPHOFF

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
COSCO v. UPHOFF2003 WY 3066 P.3d 702Case Number: 02-107Decided: 03/04/2003
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                
   

LOUIS 
D. COSCO,

Appellant(Plaintiff) ,

 
 

v.

 

JUDITH 
UPHOFF, DIRECTOR, WYOMING

DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTIONS; BRUCE

DANIELS, 
WARDEN, WYOMING STATE

PENITENTIARY 
(WSP); VANCE EVERETT,

WARDEN, 
WSP; GARY STARBUCK, WARDEN,

WSP; 
BILL HETTGAR, WARDEN, WSP; JERRY

STEELE, 
WARDEN, WSP; all named in their

official 
and individual capacities,

Appellees(Defendants) .

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The Honorable Kenneth Stebner, Judge

 
 
   

Representing 
Appellant:

Pro Se

 

Representing 
Appellees:

Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy 
Attorney General; and Jay Jerde, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
           
    

Before HILL, C.J., and LEHMAN and VOIGT, JJ.; and HARTMAN, 
DJ; and PATRICK, DJ.

 
 
            

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 
  

[¶1]      Appellant Louis 
D. Cosco (Cosco) appeals the dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) of his declaratory 
judgment action against various officials of the Wyoming State Penitentiary 
(WSP) alleging that they wrongfully confiscated his personal property.  We will not address 
the propriety of the district court's ruling because Cosco failed to timely file 
his notice of appeal.

 
        
            

[¶2]      Cosco is a 
long-term resident of WSP.  Since 
his incarceration, which began in 1969, he had acquired a considerable amount of 
personal property.  In 1997, WSP 
amended the Inmate Rules Handbook, including the rules specifying the personal 
property an inmate may possess.  
Pursuant to the revised rules, WSP removed a significant portion of 
Cosco's personal property.  
Initially, Cosco brought suit in federal court, but that action was 
dismissed.  See Cosco v. 
Uphoff, 195 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 
1999).  In 
September of 2001, Cosco signed a release under which WSP agreed to pay for 
certain specified items in exchange for his agreement to release "all claims  
in any way arising out of the alleged loss of the following described property 
and any other matters relating to the Wyoming State Penitentiary's disposition 
of any and all of his property prior to the date of his signature 
below."

 
     
              
               
            
             
        

[¶3]      On September 25, 
2001, Cosco filed this action seeking declaratory relief pursuant to the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA).  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-37-101 to -115 (LexisNexis 2001).  The defendants, various employees of 
WSP, countered with a motion to dismiss pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for a 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  After a hearing, the district court 
issued a decision letter on March 22, 2002 granting the defendants' motion.  The district court based its decision 
upon four grounds:  (1) Cosco waived 
all of his claims when he signed the release; (2) the UDJA does not provide for 
the recovery of monetary damages; (3) the defendants were immune from suit under 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA); and (4) Cosco did not comply with 
the requirements of the WGCA by failing to file a notice of claim.  The final paragraph in the district 
court's decision letter stated: "This DECISION LETTER will serve as the Court's 
final determination and order of this matter."  Cosco filed his notice of appeal on April 25, 
2002, 34 days after the issuance of the decision letter.

 
       
           

[¶4]      Rule 2.01 of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "[a]n appeal from a trial court to an 
appellate court shall be taken by filing the notice of appeal with the clerk of 
the trial court within 30 days from entry of the appealable order  ."  The timely filing of a notice of appeal 
is jurisdictional, in the absence of which, we must dismiss.  Wiens v. American Motors 
Corporation, 717 P.2d 322, 323 (Wyo. 1986); Jackson v. State, 547 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Wyo. 1976).  
Without a timely notice of appeal, the jurisdiction of this Court is not 
invoked.  Wiens, 717 P.2d  at 322.

 
    

[¶5]      Ideally, the 
district court should have issued a final order separate from its decision 
letter.1  The order could have been attached to 
the decision letter or issued concurrently therewith.  Nonetheless, the decision letter clearly 
stated that it was to constitute the district court's final, appealable order in 
this proceeding.  Cosco's notice of 
appeal was filed 34 days thereafter and was clearly untimely under our 
rules.  Cosco did not attempt to 
make a showing of excusable neglect in support of a request for an extension of 
time to file his notice of appeal pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 
2.01(a)(1).  Accordingly, this 
Court's jurisdiction was never invoked, and Cosco's appeal must be 
dismissed.

 
  
          

[¶6]      
Dismissed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1Cosco does not 
raise the question of whether it is appropriate for a decision letter to 
constitute a final order.  We note, 
however, for the benefit of the district courts that any decision letter 
intended to operate as a final order must comply with the requirements of 
W.R.C.P. 58.