Case Title: Gray v. Virginia Secretary of Transportation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 071220

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
PATRICK R. GRAY, ET AL. 
v.  Record No. 071220  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 June 6, 2008 
VIRGINIA SECRETARY OF 
TRANSPORTATION, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Margaret P. Spencer, Judge 
 
This appeal involves a constitutional challenge to 
certain contractual agreements between the Commonwealth of 
Virginia and the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority 
concerning the Dulles Toll Road.  The sole issue is whether 
the circuit court erred in sustaining demurrers and pleas in 
bar asserting sovereign immunity.  Because we conclude that 
certain constitutional provisions are self-executing and 
thus waive the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity, we will 
reverse in part the circuit court’s judgment. 
A. Standard of Review 
“ ‘Where no evidence is taken in support of a plea in 
bar, the trial court, and the appellate court upon review, 
consider solely the pleadings in resolving the issue 
presented.’ ”  Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230, 
233, 564 S.E.2d 127, 129 (2002) (quoting Lostrangio v. 
Laingford, 261 Va. 495, 497, 544 S.E.2d 357, 358 (2001)).  
“The facts as stated in the pleadings by the plaintiff are 
taken as true for the purpose of resolving the special 
plea.”  Id. (citing Lostrangio, 261 Va. at 497, 544 S.E.2d 
at 358).  “The existence of sovereign immunity is a question 
of law that is reviewed de novo.”  City of Chesapeake v. 
Cunningham, 268 Va. 624, 633, 604 S.E.2d 420, 426 (2004). 
B. The Parties1 
The appellants, Patrick R. Gray and James W. Nagle, are 
both residents of Fairfax County and allege that they are 
frequent users of the Dulles Toll Road.  The appellees 
include several entities and officials of the Commonwealth: 
the Commonwealth Transportation Board, the Virginia 
Department of Transportation (VDOT), the Virginia Secretary 
of Transportation, and the Virginia Commissioner of 
Transportation.  For purposes of this opinion, we will refer 
to these appellees as “the Commonwealth Defendants.” 
The Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA) 
is also an appellee.  The MWAA is a regional public entity 
established by an interstate compact, which was approved by 
the United States Congress in 1986.  See 49 U.S.C. § 49101 
et seq.  The General Assembly and the City Council of the 
                     
1  Because the circuit court decided this case upon 
demurrers and special pleas in bar of sovereign 
immunity without an evidentiary hearing, we will recite 
the facts as alleged in the pleadings.  McMillion v. 
Dryvit Systems, Inc., 262 Va. 463, 465, 552 S.E.2d 364, 
365 (2001). 
 
2
District of Columbia enacted legislation to establish the 
MWAA.  Code § 5.1-152 et seq.; D.C. Code § 9-901 et seq.  
According to Code § 5.1-153, the MWAA is “a public body 
corporate and politic and independent of all other bodies,” 
see also 42 U.S.C. § 49106(a)(2); D.C. Code § 9-902, created 
for the purpose of “acquiring, operating, maintaining, 
developing, promoting and protecting Ronald Reagan 
Washington National Airport and Washington Dulles 
International Airport.”  Code § 5.1-156. 
C. Historical Background 
 
On September 7, 1950, the United States Congress 
enacted legislation authorizing “the construction, 
protection, operation, and maintenance of a public airport 
in or in the vicinity of the District of Columbia.”  Pub. L. 
81-762, 64 Stat. 770.  Construction for the airport 
commenced in 1958, and the airport was dedicated on November 
17, 1962, as Dulles International Airport.  In 1984, it was 
renamed Washington Dulles International Airport (Dulles 
Airport).  As part of the overall project, the Dulles 
Airport Access Highway (DAAH) was constructed to connect the 
airport to Interstate 495 (the Beltway) and Interstate 66.  
The entire road is limited to airport traffic only and has 
no exits west of the Beltway, other than direct access to 
the airport.  Due to public demand for local access routes 
 
3
off of the DAAH, the United States Department of 
Transportation and the Director of the then existing 
Metropolitan Washington Airports entered into an agreement 
with the Commonwealth, dated July 6, 1981 (“the 1981 
Agreement”), to construct a new road in the existing right-
of-way for the DAAH.  This new road, which has access for 
local traffic, is known as the Dulles Toll Road.  VDOT 
constructed the Dulles Toll Road in the early 1980’s and has 
maintained and operated the highway since it was opened to 
public use.  By deed of easement dated January 9, 1990, the 
MWAA conveyed to the Commonwealth the right to use 
additional land within the DAAH right-of-way to widen the 
Dulles Toll Road. 
On March 24, 2006, the Secretary of Transportation 
executed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the 
Commonwealth of Virginia and the MWAA concerning the Dulles 
Corridor Metrorail Project2 (Metrorail Project) and the 
Dulles Toll Road.  The MOU recites that the Dulles Toll Road 
was “constructed upon property owned by the federal 
government and leased to [the MWAA], pursuant to several 
deeds of easement to the Commonwealth of Virginia for the 
construction of the Dulles Toll Road.”  In the MOU, the 
                     
2  The Metrorail Project is for the purpose of expanding 
the existing metrorail system to Dulles Airport. 
 
4
parties agreed that the Commonwealth, acting through VDOT 
and the Commonwealth Transportation Board, “will transfer 
possession and control over the Dulles Toll Road right-of-
way and all improvements thereto to the [MWAA],” that the 
MWAA will assume all operational, maintenance, toll-setting, 
toll-collection, debt, and financial responsibility for the 
Dulles Toll Road, and that the MWAA will construct certain 
phases of the Metrorail Project.  Pursuant to the MOU, the 
Commonwealth agreed to transfer to the MWAA funds dedicated 
for the design and construction of the Metrorail Project and 
revenues collected from operation of the Dulles Toll Road.  
Finally, the MOU provides that “[r]evenues collected from 
the Dulles Toll Road shall be used for any and all costs 
related to the operation, maintenance and debt service of 
the Dulles Toll Road, and the design, construction and 
financing of the Dulles Corridor Metrorail Project.” 
On December 29, 2006, the VDOT and the MWAA entered 
into the first of several agreements contemplated by the 
MOU.  Among other things, the agreement transferred to the 
MWAA the authority to set toll rates for the Dulles Toll 
Road. 
D. The Controversy 
 
On January 11, 2007, Gray and Nagle (the Plaintiffs) 
filed a complaint against the Commonwealth Defendants and 
 
5
the MWAA seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.  The 
Plaintiffs asserted that, without prior authorization from 
the General Assembly, the Commonwealth Defendants lacked the 
authority “to convey or transfer valuable Dulles Toll Road 
assets . . . to MWAA[; and] to delegate or assign to MWAA 
the responsibility and authority to direct and supervise the 
operation and maintenance of the Dulles Toll Road,” and to 
“fix[] and collect[] tolls on the Dulles Toll Road.”  The 
Plaintiffs further alleged that “[t]he contracting away, 
transfer, delegation or assignment . . . of taxing power to 
MWAA pursuant to the December 29, 2006, Agreement [was] an 
ultra vires act and violates the Constitution of Virginia.”  
They asserted that the power to tax, or in this case, 
collect tolls, is vested in the General Assembly and that 
this power may only be delegated “to the governing bodies of 
counties, cities, towns and regional governments.”  In 
support of their position, the Plaintiffs cited Article IV, 
Section 1 and Article VII, Sections 2, 3, and 7 of the 
Constitution of Virginia.  The Plaintiffs requested that the 
circuit court declare the MOU and the December 29, 2006 
Agreement “illegal and invalid” and enjoin the 
implementation of both agreements. 
The Commonwealth Defendants and the MWAA responded by 
filing demurrers and pleas in bar asserting, among other 
 
6
things, that the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity and that the circuit court, 
therefore, lacked jurisdiction to hear the action.  In their 
memorandum opposing the demurrers and pleas in bar, the 
Plaintiffs argued that their complaint alleged not only 
“violations of the separation of powers clauses of the 
Virginia Constitution (Article I, [Section] 5 and Article 
III, [Section] 1)” but also a violation of Article IV, 
Section 1 pertaining to the delegation of the General 
Assembly’s taxing power.  The Plaintiffs claimed that these 
provisions of the Virginia Constitution are self-executing 
and thus constitute a waiver of the Commonwealth’s sovereign 
immunity. 
 
The circuit court sustained the demurrers and pleas in 
bar and dismissed the complaint.  In a letter opinion, which 
the circuit court incorporated into its final order, the 
court characterized the Plaintiffs’ claims as being rooted 
in Article IV, Section 1, and Article VII, Sections 2, 3, 
and 7 of the Virginia Constitution.  The circuit court also 
referenced “the separation of powers clauses of the Virginia 
Constitution” cited in the Plaintiffs’ memorandum in 
opposition to the pleas in bar, i.e., Article I, Section 5 
and Article III, Section 1.  The circuit court concluded 
 
7
that these provisions are not self-executing and thus do not 
constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity.3 
On appeal to this Court, the Plaintiffs assert 
essentially the same argument as they presented in the 
circuit court.  They contend that the “doctrine [of 
sovereign immunity] does not bar claims grounded in self-
executing provisions of the Constitution.”  Contrary to the 
circuit court’s holding, the Plaintiffs assert that Article 
I, Section 5, Article III, Section I, and Article IV, 
Section 1 of the Virginia Constitution are self-executing 
provisions and that their claims alleging violations of 
these constitutional provisions are therefore not barred by 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.4 
E. Analysis 
                     
3  The circuit court also concluded that the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity applies to the MWAA.  The court found 
that the MWAA should be treated like a municipality and was 
performing a governmental function for which it is immune.  
Alternatively, the court concluded that because the MWAA was 
in privity of contract with the Commonwealth under the 
December 29, 2006 Agreement, it shared in the Commonwealth’s 
immunity.  On appeal to this Court, the Plaintiffs do not 
assign error to these rulings; therefore, they will not be 
reviewed on appeal.  Rule 5:17(c). 
 
4  The Plaintiffs do not discuss Article VII, Sections 
2, 3, and 7.  Thus, we will not consider those 
constitutional provisions in our analysis.  See Rule 5:27; 
Elliott v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 396, 422, 593 S.E.2d 270, 
286 (2004) (failure to brief an assignment of error 
constitutes a waiver of the argument). 
 
8
 
“[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is ‘alive and 
well’ in Virginia.”  Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 307, 
321 S.E.2d 657, 660 (1984).  “It is an established principle 
of sovereignty, in all civilized nations, that a sovereign 
State cannot be sued in its own courts . . . without its 
consent and permission.”  Board of Public Works v. Gannt, 76 
Va. 455, 461 (1882).  “One of the most often repeated 
explanations for the rule of state immunity from suits in 
tort is the necessity to protect the public purse.”  
Messina, 228 Va. at 307, 321 S.E.2d at 660.  “[W]hile 
maintenance of public funds is important, another equally 
important purpose of the rule is the orderly administration 
of government.”  Id. at 308, 321 S.E.2d at 660.  Sovereign 
immunity is “a rule of social policy, which protects the 
state from burdensome interference with the performance of 
its governmental functions and preserves its control over 
state funds, property, and instrumentalities.”  Hinchey v. 
Ogden, 226 Va. 234, 240, 307 S.E.2d 891, 894 (1983).  The 
doctrine also serves in “preventing citizens from improperly 
influencing the conduct of governmental affairs through the 
threat or use of vexatious litigation.”  Messina, 228 Va. at 
308, 321 S.E.2d at 660; accord Afzall v. Commonwealth, 273 
Va. 226, 231, 639 S.E.2d 279, 282 (2007). 
 
9
Thus, “as a general rule, the sovereign is immune not 
only from actions at law for damages but also from suits in 
equity to restrain the government from acting or to compel 
it to act.”  Hinchey, 226 Va. at 239-40, 307 S.E.2d at 894 
(citing Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682 
(1949)).  “Sovereign immunity may also bar a declaratory 
judgment proceeding against the Commonwealth.”  Afzall, 273 
Va. at 231, 639 S.E.2d at 282.  And because the Commonwealth 
can act only through individuals, the doctrine applies not 
only to the state, but also to certain government officials.  
Messina, 228 Va. at 308, 321 S.E.2d at 661.  “[H]igh level 
governmental officials have generally been accorded absolute 
immunity.”  Id. at 309, 321 S.E.2d at 661, accord Alliance 
to Save the Mattaponi v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 423, 455, 621 
S.E.2d 78, 96 (2005). 
 
The Commonwealth, however, can waive sovereign immunity 
and consent to being sued in its own courts.  See, e.g., 
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va. v. Carter, 267 Va. 
242, 244, 591 S.E.2d 76, 78 (2004).  “Only the General 
Assembly, acting in its capacity of making social policy, 
can abrogate the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity.”  
Alliance, 270 Va. at 455, 621 S.E.2d at 96 (citing 
Commonwealth v. Luzik, 259 Va. 198, 206, 524 S.E.2d 871, 876 
(2000)).  “The Commonwealth and its agencies are immune from 
 
10
liability . . . in the absence of an express constitutional 
or statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.”  Billups v. 
Carter, 268 Va. 701, 707, 604 S.E.2d 414, 418 (2004).  “A 
waiver of sovereign immunity will not be implied from 
general statutory language but must be explicitly and 
expressly stated in the statute.”  Alliance, 270 Va. at 455, 
524 S.E.2d at 871 (citing Hinchey, 226 Va. at 241, 307 
S.E.2d at 895). 
The Plaintiffs acknowledged during oral argument before 
this Court that if the constitutional provisions upon which 
they rely, Article I, Section 5; Article III, Section 1; and 
Article IV, Section 1, are not self-executing, then their 
claims alleged in this action are barred by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity.  Thus, the dispositive issue before us 
is whether these constitutional provisions are self-
executing.5 
                     
5  The Plaintiffs’ standing to bring this action was not 
challenged in the circuit court and thus is not a question 
before this Court.  See Martin v. Ziherl, 269 Va. 35, 39, 
607 S.E.2d 367, 368 (2005) (failure to raise challenge to 
standing at trial level precludes this Court from 
considering the issue on appeal).  We reiterate, however, 
that “[t]he point of standing is to ensure that the person 
who asserts a position has a substantial legal right to do 
so and that his rights will be affected by the disposition 
of the case.”  Cupp v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax 
County, 227 Va. 580, 589, 318 S.E.2d 407, 411 (1984). 
“Thus, it is not sufficient that the sole interest of [a] 
petitioner is to advance some perceived public right or to 
redress some anticipated public injury when the only wrong 
 
11
We begin our analysis by examining the constitutional 
provisions at issue.  Article I, Section 5 provides in 
relevant part: “That the legislative, executive, and 
judicial departments of the Commonwealth should be separate 
and distinct.”  Va. Const. art. I, § 5.  Article III, 
Section 1 states in relevant part: “The legislative, 
executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and 
distinct, so that none exercise the powers properly 
belonging to the others, nor any person exercise the power 
of more than one of them at the same time.”  Va. Const. art. 
III, § 1.  And, Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution of 
Virginia provides, in its entirety: “The legislative power 
of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, 
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Delegates.”  
Va. Const. art. IV, § 1. 
If a constitutional provision is self-executing, no 
further legislation is required to make it operative.  Gill 
v. Nickels, 197 Va. 123, 129, 87 S.E.2d 806, 810 (1955); 
City of Newport News v. Woodward, 104 Va. 58, 60, 51 S.E. 
193, 193 (1905); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1391 (8th 
ed. 2004) (defining the term “self-executing” as “effective 
                                                              
he has suffered is in common with other persons similarly 
situated.  Virginia Beach Beautification Comm’n v. Board of 
Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 415, 419, 344 S.E.2d 899, 902 
(1986). 
 
12
immediately without the need of any type of implementing 
action”).  In Robb v. Shockoe Slip Foundation, 228 Va. 678, 
324 S.E.2d 674 (1985), we explained how to determine whether 
a constitutional provision is self-executing: 
 
A constitutional provision is self-executing 
when it expressly so declares.  See, e.g., Va. 
Const. art. I, § 8.  Even without benefit of such 
a declaration, constitutional provisions in bills 
of rights and those merely declaratory of common 
law are usually considered self-executing.  The 
same is true of provisions which specifically 
prohibit particular conduct.  Provisions of a 
Constitution of a negative character are 
generally, if not universally, construed to be 
self-executing. . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
 
A constitutional provision may be said to be 
self-executing if it supplies a sufficient rule by 
means of which the right given may be employed and 
protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced; 
and it is not self-executing when it merely 
indicates principles, without laying down rules by 
means of which those principles may be given the 
force of law. 
 
Id. at 681-82, 324 S.E.2d at 676 (citations and quotations 
omitted). 
As the Plaintiffs point out, this Court has held in a 
long line of cases that the Virginia constitutional 
provision prohibiting the General Assembly from enacting any 
law whereby private property is taken or damaged for public 
uses without just compensation (currently found in Article 
I, Section 11) is self-executing and that a landowner may 
 
13
enforce the constitutional right to just compensation in a 
common law action.  Kitchen v. City of Newport News, 275 Va. 
378, 393, 657 S.E.2d 132, 140 (2008); Burns v. Board of 
Supervisors of Fairfax County, 218 Va. 625, 627, 238 S.E.2d 
823, 825 (1977) (citing Heldt v. Elizabeth River Tunnel 
Dist., 196 Va. 477, 482, 84 S.E.2d 511, 515 (1954) and Swift 
& Co. v. City of Newport News, 105 Va. 108, 114-15, 52 S.E. 
821, 824 (1906)).  As we explained, “such an action is not a 
tort action; rather, it is a contract action and, therefore, 
is not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”  Bell 
Atlantic-Virginia, Inc. v. Arlington County, 254 Va. 60, 62, 
486 S.E.2d 297, 298 (1997) (citing Jenkins v. County of 
Shenandoah, 246 Va. 467, 470, 436 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1993) and 
Burns, 218 Va. at 627, 238 S.E.2d at 825); see also Wiecking 
v. Allied Medical Supply Corp., 239 Va. 548, 553, 391 S.E.2d 
258, 261 (1990) (“The sovereign is as liable for its 
contractual debts as any citizen would be, and that 
liability may be enforced by suit in the appropriate circuit 
court.”). 
In contrast, we held in Robb that Article XI, Section 1 
of the Virginia Constitution is not self-executing.  228 Va. 
at 683, 324 S.E.2d at 677.  That constitutional provision 
states:  
 
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§ 1.  Natural resources and historical sites of 
the Commonwealth  
 
To the end that the people have clean air, pure 
water, and the use and enjoyment for recreation 
of adequate public lands, waters, and other 
natural resources, it shall be the policy of the 
Commonwealth to conserve, develop, and utilize 
its natural resources, its public lands, and its 
historical sites and buildings. Further, it shall 
be the Commonwealth's policy to protect its 
atmosphere, lands, and waters from pollution, 
impairment, or destruction, for the benefit, 
enjoyment, and general welfare of the people of 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Va. Const. art. XI, § 1.  There, the plaintiff sought to 
enjoin the Governor of Virginia and the Virginia Department 
of General Services from demolishing certain state-owned 
buildings.  Id. at 680, 324 S.E.2d at 675.  In reaching the 
conclusion that Article XI, Section 1 is not self-executing, 
the Court pointed out that the provision’s language “invites 
crucial questions of both substance and procedure,” such as 
whether “the policy appl[ies] only to the State and to state-
owned sites, or does it extend to private developers and to 
privately-owned sites[; w]ho has standing to enforce the 
policy[; and whether] the remedy [is] solely administrative, 
solely judicial, or a mixture of the two?”  Id. at 682, 324 
S.E.2d at 676-77.  Because that constitutional provision is 
not self-executing, the Court reversed the decree of the 
trial court enjoining the defendants from taking certain 
 
15
actions and dismissed the bill of complaint.  Id. at 683, 324 
S.E.2d at 677. 
None of the constitutional provisions at issue in this 
case invite such questions of substance and procedure. 
Article I, Section 5 and Article III, Section 1 are the 
separation of powers provisions cited by the Plaintiffs.  
Article I, Section 5 is contained in the Bill of Rights, and 
such constitutional provisions are generally considered to 
be self-executing.  Robb, 228 Va. at 681, 324 S.E.2d at 676.  
Furthermore, no additional legislation is needed to carry 
into effect the clear mandate contained in Article I, 
Section 5.  See Woodward, 104 Va. at 61, 51 S.E. at 194.  
Article III, Section 1, which provides that the 
“legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be 
separate and distinct,” not only reiterates the mandate 
found in Article 1, Section 5, but also expressly adds the 
prohibition “that none [of the departments can] exercise the 
powers properly belonging to the others, nor any person 
exercise the power of more than one of them at the same 
time.”  Va. Const. art. III, § 1.  While Article III, 
Section 1 is not found in the Bill of Rights, it is of a 
negative character and specifically prohibits certain 
conduct.  See Robb, 228 Va. at 681-82, 324 S.E.2d at 676.  
 
16
Thus, we conclude that Article I, Section 5 and Article III, 
Section 1 are self-executing. 
Article IV, Section 1, unlike the previous provisions 
discussed, is neither contained in the Bill of Rights nor 
cast in a negative character.  However, it does provide a 
clear rule that the General Assembly, consisting of a House 
of Delegates and a Senate, shall be vested with the 
legislative power of the Commonwealth.  This constitutional 
provision needs no further legislation to make it operative.  
Gill, 197 Va. at 129, 87 S.E.2d at 810.  It provides a 
sufficient rule by which the duty imposed may be enforced.  
Robb, 228 Va. at 682, 324 S.E.2d at 676.  It would be an 
anomaly to say that a constitutional provision vesting the 
legislative power in the General Assembly is not self-
executing and thus requires further legislation to make it 
operative.  Therefore, we also conclude that Article IV, 
Section 1 is self-executing.  See Marshall v. Northern Va. 
Transp. Auth., 275 Va. 419, 435-36, 657 S.E.2d 71, 80 (2008) 
(applying provisions of Article IV, Section 1). 
 
“The characterization of a constitutional provision as 
‘self-executing’ or not, is generally only a conclusion as to 
whether the constitutional intent is to provide a presently 
effective rule, by means of which the right given may be 
enjoyed and protected and the duties imposed may be enforced 
 
17
without supplementary legislation.”  Jacobs v. City of 
Bunkie, 737 So.2d 14, 18 (La. 1999) (quoting Student Gov’t 
Ass’n v. Board of Supervisors, 264 So.2d 916, 919 (La. 
1972)).  The fact that a self-executing constitutional 
provision is operative without the need for supplemental 
legislation means that the provision is enforceable in a 
common law action.  Compare Kitchen, 275 Va. at 392, 657 
S.E.2d at 140 (holding that a self-executing provision 
“permits a property owner to enforce his constitutional right 
to just compensation in a common law action”), with Robb, 228 
Va. at 683, 324 S.E.2d at 677 (dismissing a bill of complaint 
because a constitutional provision was not self-executing).  
The constitutional provisions at issue in this case place 
duties and restrictions upon the Commonwealth itself and its 
departments.  To give full force and effect to the provisions 
as self-executing, a person with standing must be able to 
enforce them through actions against the Commonwealth.  Thus, 
we further hold that the self-executing constitutional 
provisions before us waive the Commonwealth’s sovereign 
immunity. 
F. Conclusion 
 
We hold that Article I, Section 5; Article III, Section 
1; and Article IV, Section 1 are self-executing 
constitutional provisions and thereby waive the 
 
18
 
19
Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity.  Because the Plaintiffs 
do not challenge the circuit court’s finding that the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to the MWAA, our 
conclusion applies only to the Commonwealth Defendants.  
Thus, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit court with 
regard to the Commonwealth Defendants and remand this case 
for further proceedings. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
    and remanded.