Case Title: Thompson v. People

Citation: 399 P.2d 776

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1965-03-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
399 P.2d 776 (1965) Robert THOMPSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. No. 20399. Supreme Court of Colorado. En Banc. March 8, 1965. Arthur S. Bowman, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error. MOORE, Justice. Plaintiff in error, to whom we will refer as the defendant, was found guilty of the crime of first-degree rape. The cause originated in the district court of Gunnison county upon the filing of an information in which it was alleged that the defendant: Upon the entry of pleas of not guilty by Thompson and his co-defendant Keller, a motion for severance was filed by each defendant, each of which was denied. Alfred Keller was found not guilty of the crime charged against him. The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty as charged and the trial court entered judgment that he serve a term of not less than seven nor more than fourteen years in the state penitentiary. The argument of counsel for plaintiff is presented to this court under eight separate captions as follows: The only arguments warranting discussion are presented to this court under Sections "B" and "D". A careful study of the record clearly reveals that the other assignments of error are without merit. We consider first the argument of counsel that the trial court erred "in closing trial to the public." In this connection the record discloses the following: At the outset of the trial, and before a jury was impaneled, the prosecuting attorney (Mr. Knous) addressed the court as hereinafter set forth, and the following proceedings occurred: "THE COURT: By the same token, do you agree with me that under certain circumstances insofar as the delicacies of certain testimony is concerned, especially by the victim, that she might be inclined to give a little more *779 truthful story of some of the sordid details that she might unravel if the general public was excluded. The court reserved a ruling until after a jury had been selected and sworn, thereupon it ruled as follows: "THE COURT: Let the record show that with respect to the motion made by the district attorney yesterday concerning the exclusion of all spectators in the courtroom, that I have given this matter considerable thought and consideration. I was quite interested all day yesterday as to the type of people who attended the sessions. Most of the spectators were those who were on the jury panel. However, I observed numerous younger people in the audience, one of whom *780 at least I recognized as a college student. This student was with others, other young people, and not knowing whether or not they were from the college, of course, I am not in a position to state what their business or occupation might be, or whether they were students. However, I feel that in this type of case and the type of testimony that is going to be introduced and elicited from the witnesses, particularly the prosecuting witness or the accuser, that it would serve no good purpose to permit the public generally to be in the courtroom during the course of trial. I realize that the trial should be public. I have no thought of excluding the press. I have no thought of excluding the relatives or others who are primarily interested in the actual case, relatives of the parties themselves, or the prosecuting witness. Therefore, I am granting the motion under these conditions. Number one, that all near relatives within at least the third degree of both the defendants and the prosecuting witness be permitted to remain in the courtroom, and that all members of the press be permitted to remain in the courtroom and, of course, all court officials, necessary police officers, bailiff, and attorneys at law. All others shall be excluded during the course of the trial. The attorney general relies on Benedict v. People, 23 Colo. 126, 46 P. 637, as supporting his contention that the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to a "public trial." In that case it was said, inter alia, that: However the Benedict case presented a far different factual situation than is shown in the instant case. In that case, the only showing in support of the claim that the accused was denied a public trial appeared in the form of "affidavits of some of the court officials which the clerk certifies were filed in the case, in which it is stated that the court made an order excluding from the court room during the progress of the trial all persons except members of the bar, officers of the court, students at law, and witnesses in the case." It is axiomatic that an order of the court which forms the basis of an assignment of error is not properly before an appellate court for consideration when it is presented in the form of an affidavit of some person who claims to have heard the order made. Court orders are a matter of record and the record as made must be certified to the appellate court. Moreover in Benedict there is no showing of any kind that the defendant made any objection to the claimed order of exclusion. With reference to this point the opinion states: Article II, Section 16, of the Constitution of Colorado provides, inter alia, that: Substantially the same provision is to be found in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. We hold that under the facts disclosed by the record in this case the defendant was denied the constitutional right to a public trial. Many authorities might be cited in support of our conclusion. We think it sufficient to make reference to United States v. Kobli, 3 Cir., 172 F.2d 919, in which will be found annotations to numerous decisions of courts of last resort throughout the nation, most of which we have read. We approve the opinion in the Kobli case, from which we quote as follows: It is argued that the court erred in refusing to give an instruction tendered by the defendant, as follows: Whether such an instruction should be given in a case of this kind is a matter which rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial court. Slocum v. People, 120 Colo. 86, 207 P.2d 970. In the instant case we cannot say that there was an abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to give the instruction. The case of the People did not rest wholly upon the unsupported word of the prosecuting witness. In several relevant particulars her testimony was corroborated by admitted circumstances and evidence from other witnesses. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. McWILLIAMS, J., dissents. SCHAUER, J., not participating. FRANTZ, Justice (concurring). I am in accord with everything that is said in the opinion of Mr. Justice Moore. However, I would make some observations which I believe give perspective to my concurrence. I am so motivated by the fact that a number of state appellate courts have, in my opinion, inverted the meaning of the constitutional right to a public trial. Article II of the Constitution of Colorado is our Bill of Rights. Section 16 of the Bill of Rights provides: This is a substantial constitutional right guaranteed to one charged with crime and only to be waived by the accused. There has been a tendency on the part of appellate courts to order exclusion of the public and to admit only certain persons to hear the trial of criminal cases where unsavory details may be brought out in the evidence. This is clearly an inversion of this important constitutional provision. I am firmly convinced that a public trial means that the trial shall be open to the public and that exclusion, if necessary because of circumstances (such as the tender years of one who would like to hear a sensational case), should apply only to individuals properly excludable; that the converse should not be the case, i. e., the exclusion of the public and the admission of only certain persons to hear the trial. McWILLIAMS, Justice (dissenting.) I must respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that Thompson was denied his right to a "public trial" as guaranteed by Article II, § 16 of the Colorado Constitution. In this connection Thompson makes no claim that *783 he was denied any right guaranteed him by the United States Constitution, his only contention being that he was denied the "public trial" required by the Colorado Constitution. There is a lack of judicial uniformity as to just what constitutes a "public trial." In 14 Am.Jur. p. 866, et seq. appears the following: Hence, the issue as to what constitutes a "public trial" and whether a trial is any less a "public trial" because a trial judge excludes spectators from the courtroom during a sex trial, for example, is one upon which there is diversity of judicial thinking. Accordingly, if this were a matter of first impression in Colorado, we would be free to adopt the construction which appeals to us as being more reasonable and logical. But this is not a matter of first impression in Colorado, as this Court has already spoken on this matter in Benedict v. People, 23 Colo. 126, 46 P. 637. In that case this Court said: In that same case we also held that there was no showing of any prejudice done the defendant by the order excluding all spectators from the courtroom, and that the burden of showing such prejudice "rests upon the one assigning it." As I see it, the majority of this Court have this day overruled the Benedict case, not only as to just what constitutes a "public trial," but have also overruled that part of the Benedict case declaring that a defendant must show actual prejudice resulting from the exclusion order. I recognize that the majority of this Court have attempted to distinguish the Benedict case from the one at hand, but in my view these distinctions are inconsequential in nature and in nowise detract from the fundamental rule enunciated in that case. In this regard it is of interest to note that the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit in United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, the authority primarily relied upon by a majority of this Court, cites the Benedict case in support of the following: I am in substantial agreement with this appraisal of the Benedict case as made in United States v. Kobli, supra. My general thinking on this subject is found in Reagan v. United States, 202 F. *784 488, where the Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit stated: Applying the result and the rationale of the Benedict case to the instant controversy, I am of the definite view that Thompson received a "public trial" and further that he has totally failed to show any prejudice resulting from the exclusion order as entered by the trial judge. Most certainly this was not a "secret trial." The exclusion order permitted all to attend who had any real or legitimate interest to be present, including relatives to the third degree of both the victim and the defendant, as well as the press, of course, The order for all practical purposes excluded only those who were mere spectators, which apparently included some college students. I would hold that a trial is a "public trial" even though a trial judge on sufficient showing and by appropriate order excludes from the courtroom during a "sex trial" those who are mere spectators or only gaping sight-seers. In the instant case I find no error in excluding from the courtroom all those persons who fall into this category, including the young college students, whose only interest in hearing a 20 year old girl tell just how the defendant forcibly raped her would be to satisfy their morbid curiosity or prurient longings. I would affirm this judgment.