Case Title: State v. Prine

Citation: 

Docket Number: 103242

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2013-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 103,242 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
 
JOHN PRINE, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
An issue raised for the first time on appeal may be considered when consideration 
of the claim is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of 
fundamental rights.  
 
2.  
 
Ordinary rules of evidence do not violate the federal Constitution's Ex Post Facto 
Clause. Application of the 2009 amendment to K.S.A. 60-455 to trial of this case after the 
amendment's effective date does not violate the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto 
laws.  
 
3.  
 
Under the plain language of K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 60-455(d), the legislature carved 
out an exception to the prohibition on admission of certain types of other crimes and civil 
wrongs evidence to prove propensity of a criminal defendant to commit the charged 
crime or crimes for sex crime prosecutions. As long as the evidence is of "another act or 
offense of sexual misconduct" and is relevant to propensity or "any matter," it is 
2 
 
 
 
admissible, as long as the district judge is satisfied that the probative value of the 
evidence outweighs its potential for undue prejudice. 
 
4.  
 
When evidence of another act or offense of sexual misconduct is admitted under 
K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 60-455(d) in a sex crime prosecution, the district judge need not give 
a limiting jury instruction.   
 
5. 
 
In this case, the district judge erred in admitting evidence of uncharged crimes 
committed by the defendant against two other victims for intent, absence of mistake or 
accident, and plan. However, because the applicable amended version of K.S.A. 60-455 
applied, and because it would permit admission of the same evidence on retrial to 
demonstrate the defendant's propensity to commit the charged crimes, his convictions are 
not reversible. There has been no error affecting his substantial rights under K.S.A. 60-
261.   
 
Appeal from Reno District Court; RICHARD J. ROME, judge. Opinion filed May 31, 2013. 
Affirmed.    
 
Matthew J. Edge, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant.   
 
Keith E. Schroeder, district attorney, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, was 
with him on the briefs for appellee.   
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
 
BEIER, J.:  This appeal returns to this court after retrial.  
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In 2009, we reversed defendant John Prine's 2004 convictions for rape, aggravated 
criminal sodomy, and aggravated indecent liberties because the district judge had erred 
by admitting evidence of Prine's sexual abuse of two victims other than the one making 
the allegations underlying this case. State v. Prine, 287 Kan. 713, 200 P.3d 1 (2009) 
("Prine I"). The legislature responded to our decision by amending K.S.A. 60-455, see L. 
2009, ch. 103, sec. 12. The district judge ostensibly applied the amended statute to admit 
the same evidence at Prine's retrial. Prine now challenges his new convictions and his 
sentence of 387 months' imprisonment. His primary argument is the same that entitled 
him to reversal in 2009; it does not carry the day this time around.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Crimes and Investigation 
 
 
J.C's babysitter fell through. J.C's then-fiancé (now husband), Anthony, had a best 
friend:  defendant John Prine. J.C. contacted Prine, who agreed to act as a backup 
babysitter. She left Prine with her two babies and her 6-year-old stepdaughter, A.M.C. 
Anthony, A.M.C.'s father, picked her up after lunch and took her to kindergarten. J.C's 
mother, A.M.C.'s future grandmother, picked A.M.C. up from school to take her back 
home, where Prine was still babysitting. On the way home, A.M.C. told her grandmother 
that she did not want to go home because Prine had touched her. The grandmother 
relayed this information to J.C., who immediately came home. J.C. told Prine he was free 
to go, which he did after taking a shower. Then J.C. and Anthony took A.M.C. to the 
doctor for a medical examination. The examination revealed no injury, but J.C. and 
Anthony filed a police report, as the doctor suggested.  
 
4 
 
 
 
 
Detective John Taylor interviewed A.M.C. at the police station. The interview was 
videotaped. They talked about truth and lies, and about good and bad touching. A.M.C. 
told Taylor that "John" had given her "bad touches." She told Taylor that Prine had 
touched her on her "front"—which she identified with "where she went pee from"—with 
his fingers, his tongue, and his tummy. She demonstrated how he licked his two fingers 
and touched her front, and she described how he "would pull my front open and lick 
inside."  
 
 
Taylor also interviewed Prine, who denied ever inappropriately touching A.M.C. 
Prine became annoyed and left the police station, but he returned later to make a report 
concerning illegal activity at a grocery warehouse where Anthony worked. Specifically, 
he reported that Anthony was stealing from the warehouse.  
 
Several weeks later, Taylor interviewed Prine again. At this time, Prine offered 
information about unintentional conduct that might have formed the basis for A.M.C.'s 
allegations. One time, he said, A.M.C. had a swimsuit on and slid down his arm and the 
side of her swimsuit moved, exposing her vagina; on other occasions, Prine had 
roughhoused with A.M.C. and his hand might have slipped; and one time A.M.C. got 
peanut butter on her face, and Prine had licked his thumb and wiped it off. Prine also 
suggested that A.M.C.'s father might have been the one who molested her. 
 
 
Between the time that A.M.C. made her initial allegations about Prine and the time 
that she was interviewed, J.C. called T.M. and informed her about A.M.C.'s accusations. 
T.M. was Prine's ex-wife and had two children with him. She and defendant had been 
involved in a bitter custody dispute. T.M.'s daughter, S.M., had previously made 
allegations that Prine molested her. Taylor interviewed S.M. The interview was recorded. 
At the time of her interview, S.M. was 9 years old. She stated that defendant—her 
father—had sex with her when she was little. When she was 4 or 5 years old, he would 
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place her on top of his bare body and she would be naked from the waist down and she 
could feel his penis on her vagina.  
 
Taylor also interviewed Prine's younger sister, J.S., who had previously reported 
being molested by defendant. At the time of her interview, J.S. was 27 years old. She 
indicated that, from the time she was about 4 years old until she was 10 or 11, defendant 
sexually abused her. He would lick two fingers and touch her vagina; touch his penis to 
her vagina; put his mouth and lips on her vagina; and/or wipe saliva on her vagina. She 
also described him forcing her to have oral sex with him by placing his penis in her 
mouth. She stated that two of her brothers had, at least on one occasion, witnessed this 
abuse. When J.S. was 15 years old, she filed a police report in her hometown in Montana, 
detailing Prine's sexual abuse of her.  
 
First Trial and Appeal 
 
After Prine was tried and convicted by a jury on the evidence described above, 
including the video of Taylor's interview of A.M.C., he appealed. He argued, among 
other things, that the district judge erred in admitting evidence of his prior sexual abuse 
of S.M. and J.S. A divided Court of Appeals panel affirmed the admission and his 
convictions. See State v. Prine, No. 93,345, 2006 WL 3479017 (Kan. App. 2006) 
(unpublished opinion).    
 
On the K.S.A. 60-455 evidence, the majority stated that, despite a general rule that 
evidence of prior crimes is inadmissible to show intent when it is obvious from the mere 
doing of the charged act, such evidence should be admissible when a defendant has 
created "an inference of innocent motive." 2006 WL 3479017, at *4. The majority also 
relied on its view that, "[d]espite some difference . . . the defendant's conduct [with 
A.M.C.] was sufficiently similar [to evidence of sexual activity with S.M. and J.S.] to 
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demonstrate a plan or common approach." 2006 WL 3479017, at *5. It also held that, 
even though the probative value of Prine's intent was slight because of his general denial 
of the charged crimes, "the combined value of the prior bad acts evidence to prove intent, 
an absence of mistake or accident, and plan outweighed the potential prejudice to the 
defendant." 2006 WL 3479017, at *5.   
 
Judge Richard D. Greene dissented on the issue. He would have held that the 
K.S.A. 60-455 evidence was not admissible to prove intent, absence of mistake or 
accident, or plan, and that the erroneous admission of the evidence to show propensity 
denied Prine a fair trial. Specifically, Judge Greene wrote that "there was no room for any 
inference of innocent conduct." 2006 WL 3479017, at *6 (Greene, J., dissenting). In his 
view, intent and absence of mistake or accident were not in issue, as Prine had not offered 
an innocent explanation for the charged conduct. Judge Greene also wrote that the 
allegations made by S.M. and J.S. were not sufficiently similar to those made by A.M.C. 
for the uncharged crimes to prove plan or modus operandi. 2006 WL 3479017, at *6.   
 
On Prine's petition for review, this court reversed the convictions and remanded 
the case for retrial. In our opinion, we discussed the history of K.S.A. 60-455's 
inconsistent application to child sexual abuse cases. We concluded that, here, although 
potentially probative, the evidence of prior sexual abuse of S.M. and J.S. was not material 
because intent was not in issue; the acts alleged were obviously criminal and not 
innocent. We also concluded that the evidence was not relevant to prove absence of 
mistake or accident; defendant's pretrial interview hypotheses for how the allegations 
arose did not create a basis for the admission of the evidence because the theory of his 
trial defense was categorical denial. Furthermore, after reviewing the inconsistent 
application of a similarity standard for admission of other crimes and civil wrongs 
evidence to prove "plan," we held that such evidence must be "so 'strikingly similar' in 
pattern or so distinct in method of operation as to be a 'signature.'" Prine I, 287 Kan. at 
7 
 
 
 
735 (quoting State v. Jones, 277 Kan. 413, 423, 85 P.3d 1226 [2004]). Here, although 
S.M. and J.S. were the same gender as A.M.C. and were abused at approximately the 
same age, and although some of the activities defendant engaged in with each victim bore 
some likeness, the behaviors were not so unusual or identical as to constitute a signature. 
Having held that none of the bases for admission under K.S.A. 60-455 were sound, we 
addressed harmlessness of the error. Ultimately, we concluded that, because the State's 
entire case hinged on A.M.C.'s credibility, the error required reversal of Prine's 
convictions. Prine I, 287 Kan. at 739-40.  
 
In Prine I, we also noted that "evidence of prior sexual abuse of children is 
peculiarly susceptible to characterization as propensity evidence forbidden under K.S.A. 
60-455 and, thus, convictions of such crimes are especially vulnerable to successful 
attack on appeal." However, the "modern psychology of pedophilia" suggests that 
propensity evidence may possess probative value for juries, because "sexual attraction to 
children and a propensity to act upon it are defining symptoms of this recognized mental 
illness." We suggested that the legislature could "examine the advisability of amend[ing] 
K.S.A. 60-455." Prine I, 287 Kan. at 737.  
 
K.S.A. 60-455 Amendment 
 
Amend the legislature did, just 3 months after our decision was issued. K.S.A. 
2009 Supp. 60-455 became effective April 30, 2009. L. 2009, ch. 103, sec. 12. The 
amended statute's subsection (a) contains the original prohibition on admission of other 
crimes or wrongs evidence. Its subsection (b) contains the earlier version's non-
exhaustive list of material facts that other crimes and civil wrongs evidence is admissible 
to prove. The new subsection (c) states that, in any criminal action other than certain 
listed sexual-offense prosecutions, such evidence is admissible "to show the modus 
operandi or general method used by a defendant to perpetrate similar but totally unrelated 
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crimes when the method of committing the prior acts is so similar to that utilized in the 
current case before the court that it is reasonable to conclude the same individual 
committed both acts." K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 60-455(c). K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 60-455(d) reads 
in pertinent part: 
 
 
"(d) Except as provided in K.S.A. 60-445, and amendments thereto, in a criminal 
action in which the defendant is accused of a sex offense under articles 34, 35 or 36 of 
chapter 21 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated and amendments thereto, evidence of the 
defendant's commission of another act or offense of sexual misconduct is admissible, and 
may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant and probative." 
 
The statute requires the State to disclose such evidence and its intent to introduce it at 
least 10 days before trial, K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 60-455(e), and instructs that the statute 
"shall not be construed to limit the admission . . . of evidence under any other rule or to 
limit the admissibility" of other crimes or civil wrongs evidence in actions other than 
sexual offense criminal actions. K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 60-455(f). Subsection (g) lists the 
included acts or offense(s) of sexual misconduct referenced in subsection (d). Finally, the 
amended statute contains a severability provision. K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 60-455(h).  
 
Retrial 
 
At Prine's August 2009 retrial, A.M.C. again testified. She told the jury that Prine 
touched her "private," on the inside and the outside, and with his fingers, his tongue, and 
his stomach. She also said that he would lick his two fingers and touch her private parts.  
 
Steve Edwards, a clinical social worker who had performed a sexual abuse 
evaluation on A.M.C., testified that he interviewed her about good touching and bad 
touching, and about body parts. She told Edwards that "John," her dad's friend, was 
"doing it to her," and that it happened more than one or two times and in "lots of places" 
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in her house. A.M.C. told Edwards that Prine had touched her front part with his fingers, 
his tongue, and his tummy. 
 
In addition, on retrial, on the State's motion and over defendant's continuing 
objection, the district judge allowed S.M. and J.S. to testify about Prine's uncharged 
abuse of them. The judge apparently relied upon the freshly amended K.S.A. 60-455, but 
the record before us contains neither a written ruling on the State's motion nor a transcript 
of a proceeding in which the motion was heard and granted. The State's motion to admit 
the evidence had argued it was admissible under the newly amended statute because 
subsection (d) required it to be only "relevant and probative," not "strikingly similar"; and 
the evidence was relevant and probative to prove intent, lack of mistake or accident, 
and/or plan.  
 
 
S.M., 14 at the time of retrial, testified that Prine would "tak[e] me into the 
bedroom and tak[e] his clothes off, tak[e] mine off, and then [sit] me on the bed and then 
hav[e] sex, basically." Edwards, the social worker, testified that he had counseled S.M. 
and around February 2003 performed a sexual abuse evaluation on her. S.M. had told him 
that "John," who was her biological father, would force her to come into a bedroom, 
would put honey on his private part, and would force her to "get on his private." When 
S.M. testified during the retrial, she said that she remembered telling Edwards about 
honey but she did not remember "where it [fit] in."  
 
 
S.M.'s mother testified about how she learned that S.M. had been molested, and 
how it was that J.C. eventually contacted her.  
 
 
J.S. testified that from about the time she was 4 years old until she was about 10, 
Prine, who was her half-brother, would sexually abuse her. He would force her to 
perform oral sex on him; he would perform oral sex on her; he would lick his fingers and 
10 
 
 
 
touch her between the legs; and he would rub his penis between her legs. She testified 
that later, when she was 15, she made a report about this abuse to the police in Montana 
where she lived. She testified that two of her brothers had witnessed at least one incident. 
 
 
J.S.'s half-brother, M.S., testified that in 1983, when he was about 12 years old and 
J.S. was about 6, he remembered looking through a bedroom door and seeing her 
performing oral sex on defendant.  
  
 
N.P., the other brother who had allegedly witnessed the 1983 incident, testified for 
the defense. He denied witnessing Prine abuse J.S. and said M.S. had told him that no 
abuse happened.   
 
 
Prine also testified during his retrial. He described his family relationships and his 
friendship with Anthony. He testified about his relationship with J.C., and how she began 
making advances toward him, which he rebuffed. He testified about the events of 
December 11, 2003, when he babysat J.C.'s and Anthony's children, and he denied 
licking or inserting his fingers into A.M.C.'s vagina. He testified about having offered 
possible explanations to the police about "where [such] an idea could end up coming 
from"; again, a swimsuit malfunction, roughhousing, and a "spit bath." He testified that, 
after these allegations arose, he reported that Anthony was stealing from the warehouse 
where he worked, and that he did so because he was angry. He denied suggesting that 
Anthony had molested A.M.C. He also denied sexually molesting either his daughter, 
S.M., or his half-sister, J.S.   
 
 
The jury was instructed that it could consider evidence of uncharged sexual 
offenses "solely for the purpose of proving John Prine's intent, plan, absence of mistake 
or accident." Prine did not object to the language of this instruction. Prine was again 
convicted, and he was sentenced to 387 months' imprisonment. 
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Appeal 
 
 
This appeal was transferred to this court from our Court of Appeals on our own 
motion. Prine raises four claims of error. First, Prine argues that the district judge erred in 
admitting evidence of his prior sexual abuse of J.S. and S.M. Second, he argues that 
application of the amended version of K.S.A. 60-455 at his retrial violated the federal 
constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws. Prine's third and fourth claims challenge 
his sentence. The arguments on both sentencing challenges have previously been 
rejected, and we decline to depart here from our precedents. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 
286 Kan. 824, 851, 190 P.3d 207 (2008) (imposition of aggravated sentence in grid box 
without factors proved beyond reasonable doubt to jury not constitutional violation); 
State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 46, 41 P.3d 781 (2002) (imposition of increased sentence 
based on criminal history not proved to jury beyond reasonable doubt not constitutional 
violation).  
 
 
We will not further discuss Prine's third and fourth claims of error in the remainder 
of this opinion. We address Prine's first and second claims of error in reverse order for 
the sake of analytical clarity.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Ex Post Facto   
 
 
Prine acknowledges that this issue was not raised before the district court. Issues 
not raised below generally are precluded on appeal. See State v. Warledo, 286 Kan. 927, 
938, 190 P.3d 937 (2008). This rule includes constitutional grounds for reversal. See 
State v. Gomez, 290 Kan. 858, 862, 235 P.3d 1203 (2010). 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
But this preservation rule is not without exceptions. A constitutional question 
raised for the first time on appeal may be considered when:  (1) the newly asserted theory 
involves only a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and is determinative 
of the case; (2) consideration of the question is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to 
prevent the denial of fundamental rights; or (3) the district court is right for the wrong 
reason. See State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, Syl. ¶ 5, 299 P.3d 292 (2013).   
 
Prine urges us to address his ex post facto claim because the first and second 
exceptions apply. We agree that this is an appropriate case for invocation of the second 
exception. In Prine I, we concluded that the admission of evidence concerning prior 
sexual abuse of S.M. and J.S. violated the pre-2009 statute, and the erroneous admission 
of that evidence was not harmless. If retroactive application of the amended statute 
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the federal Constitution, then Prine insists that his 
convictions must again be reversed and the case remanded for a third trial because of 
Prine I's analysis of the old version of K.S.A. 60-455. In short, the contours of our earlier 
decision set up the possibility that today's ruling on the ex post facto issue claim could 
lead to a violation of Prine's fundamental right to a fair trial. We therefore choose to 
address this constitutional question under the second exception to our preservation rule. 
See State v. Garcia, 285 Kan. 1, 10, 169 P.3d 1069 (2007) (argument that application of 
amended statute of limitations violated ex post facto considered despite failure to raise 
statute of limitations defense, ex post facto argument in district court). 
 
The United States Supreme Court has set forth four categories of ex post facto 
violations: 
 
"'1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was 
innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a 
13 
 
 
 
crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the 
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when 
committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or 
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, 
in order to convict the offender. All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and 
oppressive.'" Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 612, 123 S. Ct. 2446, 156 L. Ed. 2d 
544 (2003) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. [3 Dall.] 386, 390-91, 1 L. Ed. 648 [1798]; 
law enacted after expiration of previously applicable statute of limitations period violated 
Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to revive a time-barred prosecution).   
 
Kansas decisions have restated the prohibition on ex post facto laws to require two 
elements to be present:  "(1) The law must be retrospective, applying to events occurring 
before its enactment, and (2) it must alter the definition of criminal conduct or increase 
the penalty by which a crime is punishable." Anderson v. Bruce, 274 Kan. 37, 43, 50 P.3d 
1 (2002). In other words, the law must be retrospective and it must disadvantage the 
offender affected by it. State v. Chamberlain, 280 Kan. 241, 247, 120 P.3d 319 (2005) 
(citing, e.g., Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 412, 960 P.2d 227, cert. denied 525 
U.S. 1060 [1998]). The critical question in evaluating an ex post facto claim is whether 
the law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date. 
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 31, 101 S. Ct. 960, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1981); State v. 
Armbrust, 274 Kan. 1089, 1093, 59 P.3d 1000 (2002). 
 
Impermissible under the fourth Stogner category, implicated here, are laws that 
reduce the burden of persuasion the prosecution must satisfy to win a conviction. Carmell 
v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 530, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 146 L. Ed. 2d 577 (2000) (amendment to 
Texas statute authorizing conviction of certain sex offenses on victim's testimony alone 
altered rules of evidence, required less evidence to convict; previous statute required 
victim's testimony plus corroborating evidence); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590, 4 S. 
Ct. 202, 28 L. Ed. 262 (1884) ("Any statutory alteration of the legal rules of evidence 
14 
 
 
 
which would authorize conviction upon less proof, in amount or degree, than was 
required when the offence was committed" may run afoul of ex post facto prohibition.).   
 
But ordinary rules of evidence generally do not violate the Clause. Carmell v. 
Texas, 529 U.S. at 533 n.23 ("[S]uch rules, by simply permitting evidence to be admitted 
at trial, do not at all subvert the presumption of innocence . . . [and] to the extent one may 
consider changes to such laws as 'unfair' or 'unjust,' they do not implicate the same kind 
of unfairness implicated by changes in rules setting forth a sufficiency of the evidence 
standard.").   
 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that 
 
"'[s]tatutes which simply enlarge the class of persons who may be competent to testify in 
criminal cases are not ex post facto in their application to prosecutions for crimes 
committed prior to their passage; for they do not attach criminality to any act previously 
done, and which was innocent when done; nor aggravate any crime theretofore 
committed; nor provide a greater punishment therefor than was prescribed at the time of 
its commission; nor do they alter the degree, or lessen the amount or measure, of the 
proof which was made necessary to conviction when the crime was committed.'" 
Carmell, 529 U.S. at 543 (quoting Hopt, 110 U.S. at 589).  
 
Such a change does not qualify as ex post facto, "[e]ven though it may work to the 
disadvantage of a defendant." Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293, 97 S. Ct. 2290, 53 
L. Ed. 2d 344 (1977).  
 
We find the case of Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S. Ct. 922, 43 L. Ed. 
204 (1898), to be virtually indistinguishable from the one before us today. In that case, 
George Thompson was tried and convicted for poisoning the sexton of a St. Louis church. 
The evidence was entirely circumstantial. Key questions of fact included the authorship 
15 
 
 
 
of a prescription for strychnine and a certain letter addressed to the church organist that 
contained threatening language about the sexton. Thompson denied writing either the 
prescription or the letter. At trial, several personal letters written by Thompson to his wife 
were admitted for purposes of handwriting comparison. The Supreme Court of Missouri 
held this was error and reversed and ordered a new trial. Before the new trial was held, 
the Missouri Legislature enacted a statute providing that "'comparison of a disputed 
writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine shall be 
permitted to be made by witnesses, and such writings and . . . evidence . . . may, be 
submitted to the court and jury as evidence of the genuineness or otherwise of the writing 
in dispute.'" 171 U.S. at 381 (quoting Laws Mo. 1895 p. 284). At Thompson's retrial, the 
letters were again admitted—this time pursuant to the new statute—for purposes of 
comparing them with the strychnine prescription and letter to the organist. On appeal, the 
Missouri Supreme Court rejected Thompson's ex post facto argument and affirmed his 
conviction. The United States Supreme Court affirmed.  
 
The Court's holding in that case is applicable here:  
 
"[T]he statute of Missouri relating to the comparison of writings is not ex post facto when 
applied to prosecutions for crimes committed prior to its passage. If persons excluded 
upon grounds of public policy at the time of the commission of an offense, from 
testifying as witnesses for or against the accused, may, in virtue of a statute, become 
competent to testify, we cannot perceive any ground upon which to hold a statute to be ex 
post facto which does nothing more than admit evidence of a particular kind in a criminal 
case upon an issue of fact which was not admissible under the rules of evidence as 
enforced by judicial decisions at the time the offense was committed. The Missouri 
statute, when applied to this case, did not enlarge the punishment to which the accused 
was liable when his crime was committed, nor make any act involved in his offense 
criminal that was not criminal at the time he committed the murder of which he was 
found guilty. It did not change the quality or degree of his offense. Nor can the new rule 
introduced by it[] be characterized as unreasonable [so as to affect the accused's] 
16 
 
 
 
substantial rights . . . . The statute did not require 'less proof, in amount or degree,' than 
was required at the time of the commission of the crime charged upon him." Thompson, 
171 U.S. at 386-87. 
 
Following the lead of Thompson, we hold that application of the amended version of 
K.S.A. 60-455 at Prine's retrial did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.  
 
Admission of Evidence 
 
Before April 30, 2009, K.S.A. 60-455 provided:  
 
"Subject to K.S.A. 60-447, evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a 
specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his or her disposition to commit crime or 
civil wrong as the basis for an inference that the person committed another crime or civil 
wrong on another specified occasion but, subject to K.S.A. 60-445 and 60-448 such 
evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact including motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or 
accident." 
 
The amended version of K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 60-455 states:   
 
 
 
"(a) Subject to K.S.A. 60-447, and amendments thereto, evidence that a person 
committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is in-admissible to prove his or 
her such person's disposition to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference 
that the person committed another crime or civil wrong on another specified occasion but,  
 
 
"(b) Subject to K.S.A. 60-445 and 60-448, and amendments thereto, such 
evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact including motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
"(c) Subject to K.S.A. 60-445 and 60-448, and amendments thereto, in any 
criminal action other than a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sex 
offense under articles 34, 35 or 36 of chapter 21 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, and 
amendments thereto, such evidence is admissible to show the modus operandi or general 
method used by a defendant to perpetrate similar but totally unrelated crimes when the 
method of committing the prior acts is so similar to that utilized in the current case before 
the court that it is reasonable to conclude the same individual committed both acts. 
 
 
"(d) Except as provided in K.S.A. 60-445, and amendments thereto, in a criminal 
action in which the defendant is accused of a sex offense under articles 34, 35 or 36 of 
chapter 21 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, and amendments thereto, evidence of the 
defendant's commission of another act or offense of sexual misconduct is admissible, and 
may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant and probative.  
 
 
"(e) In a criminal action in which the prosecution intends to offer evidence under 
this rule, the prosecuting attorney shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, including 
statements of witnesses, at least 10 days before the scheduled date of trial or at such later 
time as the court may allow for good cause. 
 
 
"(f) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of 
evidence under any other rule or to limit the admissibility of the evidence of other crimes 
or civil wrongs in a criminal action under a criminal statute other than in articles 34, 35 or 
36 of chapter 21 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, and amendments thereto. 
 
 
"(g) As used in this section, an "act or offense of sexual misconduct" includes: 
 
 
(1) Any conduct proscribed by article 35 of chapter 21 of the Kansas Statutes 
Annotated, and amendments thereto; 
 
 
(2) the sexual gratification component of aggravated trafficking, as described in 
subsection (a)(1)(B) and (a)(2) of K.S.A. 21-3447, and amendments thereto; 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
(3) exposing another to a life threatening communicable disease, as described in 
subsection (a)(1) of K.S.A. 21-3435, and amendments thereto; 
 
 
(4) incest, as described in K.S.A. 21-3602, and amendments thereto; 
 
 
(5) aggravated incest, as described in K.S.A. 21-3603, and amendments thereto; 
 
 
(6) contact, without consent, between any part of the defendant's body or an 
object and the genitals, mouth or anus of the victim; 
 
 
(7) contact, without consent, between the genitals, mouth or anus of the 
defendant and any part of the victim's body; 
 
 
(8) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of death, bodily 
injury or physical pain to the victim; 
 
 
(9) an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to engage in conduct described in 
paragraphs (1) through (8); or 
 
 
(10) any federal or other state conviction of an offense, or any violation of a city 
ordinance or county resolution, that would constitute an offense under article 35 of 
chapter 21 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, and amendments thereto, the sexual 
gratification component of aggravated trafficking, as described in subsection (a)(1)(B) 
and (a)(2) of K.S.A. 21-3447, and amendments thereto; incest, as described in K.S.A. 21-
3602, and amendments thereto; or aggravated incest, as described in K.S.A. 21-3603, and 
amendments thereto, or involved conduct described in paragraphs (6) through (9). 
 
 
"(h) If any provisions of this section or the application thereof to any person or 
circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or 
applications of this section which can be given effect without the invalid provisions or 
application. To this end the provisions of this section are severable." 
 
19 
 
 
 
Even though both sides seem to agree that the district judge applied the amended 
statute to admit the evidence about Prine's abuse of S.M. and J.S. on retrial, the parties' 
merits arguments on the propriety of that admission—and, to the extent we can tell from 
the incomplete record, the district judge's ruling—seem to have focused nearly 
exclusively on language carried from the old version into subsections (a) and (b) of the 
amended statute. In other words, this case continued to concentrate on whether the 
evidence was admissible to prove intent, absence of mistake or accident, and plan. The 
defense now argues that the district judge's ruling was just as erroneous at retrial as it was 
at Prine's first trial. For its part, the State vociferously denounces Prine I's decision that 
intent was not in issue and its requirement that 60-455 plan evidence requires a similarity 
amounting to a "signature." The State also repeats its argument that Prine advanced 
innocent explanations during the investigation of A.M.C.'s allegations, making absence 
of mistake or accident relevant at trial. The State's only express reliance on subsection (d) 
of the new statute comes in its brief's conclusory statement that the disputed evidence 
meets the subsection's requirement that it be relevant and probative.  
 
These circumstances demand that we examine both what could and should have 
occurred under the amended statute compared to what did occur, and that we then 
determine whether any variation from the new normal had a negative impact on Prine's 
substantial rights or the reliability of his convictions.  
 
The interpretation and, if necessary, construction of statutes raise questions of law 
reviewable de novo on appeal. See State v. Arnett, 290 Kan. 41, 47, 223 P.3d 780 (2010). 
A logically necessary corollary of this rule is that this court is in as good a position as the 
district judge to analyze the meaning and applicability of the language added to K.S.A. 
60-455 in 2009.  
 
20 
 
 
 
The most fundamental rule of statutory interpretation and construction is that the 
intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. Arnett, 290 Kan. at 47. 
We first attempt to ascertain legislative intent through the statutory language enacted, 
giving common words their ordinary meanings. State v. Raschke, 289 Kan. 911, 914, 219 
P.3d 481 (2009). When a statute is plain and unambiguous, we do not speculate as to the 
legislative intent behind it and will not read into the statute something not readily found 
in it. Where there is no ambiguity, we need not resort to statutory construction. Only if 
the statute's language or text is unclear or ambiguous do we use canons of construction or 
legislative history or other background considerations to construe the legislature's intent. 
State v. Trautloff, 289 Kan. 793, 796, 217 P.3d 15 (2009). In doing so, we may look to 
the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the 
purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under the various 
constructions suggested. See In re Tax Exemption Application of Lietz Constr. Co., 273 
Kan. 890, 898, 47 P.3d 1275 (2002). We cannot delete provisions or supply omissions in 
a statute. No matter what the legislature may have really intended to do, if it did not in 
fact do it, under any reasonable interpretation of the language used, the defect is one that 
the legislature alone can correct. See State v. Johnson, 289 Kan. 870, 879, 218 P.3d 46 
(2009). 
 
 
The plain language of the amended statute retains the old version's general 
prohibition on the use of propensity evidence in subsection (a). Subsection (b) contains 
the old version's nonexclusive list of material facts other than propensity that may be 
proved by other crimes and civil wrongs evidence. Meanwhile, the amended statute's new 
language in subsection (c) responds to our Prine I ruling that other crimes or civil wrongs 
admitted to show a nonpreparation type of plan must be so "strikingly similar" or so 
similar as to constitute a "signature" when compared with the charged crime. This 
subsection explicitly does not apply to the sex offense prosecutions such as this. New 
subsection (d) does cover sex crime prosecutions; it permits evidence of other acts or 
21 
 
 
 
offenses of sexual misconduct to be admitted in such a prosecution "for its bearing on any 
matter to which it is relevant and probative."   
 
The basic prohibition contained in the original statute, now subsection (a), is 
straightforward:  Evidence that a defendant committed a crime or civil wrong on a 
specified occasion is generally inadmissible to prove that person's disposition or 
propensity to commit the charged crime. As a rule of exclusion, the prohibition on 
propensity evidence is based on the principle that such evidence is irrelevant and unduly 
prejudicial; and, historically, the rule has been strictly enforced. See State v. Gunby, 282 
Kan. 39, 50, 144 P.3d 647 (2006) (citing cases).  
 
But the legislature's intention to relax the prohibition on evidence of other acts or 
offenses of sexual misconduct to show propensity, indeed, and "any matter to which it is 
relevant and probative" in sex crime cases is explicit in the statute's new subsection (d). 
This plain language could and should have governed the K.S.A. 60-455 issue on retrial of 
this case.  
 
We note that our interpretation of the plain language of subsection (d) is 
reinforced by contemporaneous legislative committee minutes and testimony showing 
that the proposed amendment was patterned after Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414. 
See H.B. 2250; S.B. 44; Minutes from the House Judiciary Committee, February 9, 2009; 
Minutes from the Senate Judiciary Committee, March 9, 2009, March 10, 2009; see also 
Comment, How Similar is Similar? Confusing the Similarity Standard for the Admission 
of Prior Crimes Evidence under the Plan Exception in Child Molestation Cases, 44 
Washburn L.J. 157, 159-60 (2004) (urging legislature to "adopt a statute that codifies the 
Federal Rules of Evidence 413 to 415, along with Kansas' common law practice of 
liberally admitting prior crimes evidence in sex abuse cases . . . [to] permit the inference 
22 
 
 
 
that the defendant has a propensity to molest children, and thus is more likely to have 
committed the charged crime in accord with this character trait").    
 
Rule 413 states that, "[i]n a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of a 
sexual assault, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other 
sexual assault. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant." 
Fed. R. Evid. 413(a). Rule 414 permits the same use for similar prior crimes evidence in 
child molestation cases, stating "[i]n a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of 
child molestation, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other 
child molestation. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant." 
Fed. R. Evid. 414(a). These federal rules have been interpreted to allow propensity 
evidence in sexual assault and child molestation cases. See, e.g., Seeley v. Chase, 443 
F.3d 1290, 1294 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 903 (10th 
Cir. 1999); United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998); United States 
v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431 (10th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Dillon, 532 
F.3d 379, 387 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Julian, 427 F.3d 471, 486 (7th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Sioux, 362 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2004); Johnson, 283 F.3d at 151; 
United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 534 U.S. 1166 
(2002); United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 800-01 (8th Cir. 1998). Subsequent 
subsections in both Rule 413 and 414 set out pretrial disclosure requirements, as well as 
pertinent directives and definitions similar to those contained in the amended K.S.A. 60-
455(e), (f), and (g). Federal Rule of Evidence 415 permits the same types of evidence in 
civil cases involving sexual assault or child molestation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Elk Lake 
School Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 150-52 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 
Subsection (d) of the amended K.S.A. 60-455 still requires, as the State admits, a 
district judge to perform a gatekeeping function. Under the language of the amended 
statute, the evidence of the other act or offense of sexual misconduct the State desires to 
23 
 
 
 
admit must be "relevant and probative." This court's definition of those two terms makes 
the "and probative" portion of that phrase redundant; the concept of relevance 
encompasses both materiality and probative value. See K.S.A. 60-401(b); Prine I, 287 
Kan. at 725. Materiality requires that whatever fact sought to be proved be in dispute or 
in issue between the parties to the case. See Garcia, 285 Kan. at 14. The requirement of 
probative value demands that the evidence have a logical tendency to prove the material 
fact. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 505, 186 P.3d 713 (2008).  
 
Under our cases construing and applying K.S.A. 60-455 as it existed before the 
2009 amendment, district judges were required to evaluate these concepts. See Prine I, 
287 Kan. at 724-25 (under traditional rubric, admissibility of K.S.A. 60-455 evidence 
depends on three factors:  [1] evidence must be relevant to prove material fact; [2] 
material fact must be disputed; [3] probative value of evidence must not be substantially 
outweighed by risk of unfair prejudice); see also K.S.A. 60-403 (exclusionary rules 
inapplicable to undisputed material facts, except district court may weigh probative 
value, elect to exclude); State v. Leitner, 272 Kan. 398, 415, 34 P.3d 42 (2001) (although 
K.S.A. 60-445 requires district judge to balance probative value, prejudice only when 
opposing party claims surprise, balance may require exclusion "as a rule of necessity" 
when probative value substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, regardless 
of existence of surprise). Thus these concepts will be familiar as district judges apply the 
amended statute.  
 
Under the prior version of K.S.A. 60-455, we also required district judges to 
balance the probative value of other crimes or civil wrongs evidence against the threat of 
undue prejudice. See, e.g., State v. Vasquez, 287 Kan. 40, 49, 194 P.3d 563 (2008). 
Neither side in this appeal has suggested that we abandon this judicially created 
safeguard. We thus leave the question of whether the necessity of this weighing persists 
under new subsection (d) to another day. Assuming that it does persist, federal cases 
24 
 
 
 
interpreting Rules 413, 414, and 415 on which subsection (d) was modeled provide 
helpful guidance on how the weighing is to be conducted. See United States v. Meacham, 
115 F.3d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir.1997) (Rule 403 applies to Rule 414 evidence); see also 
United States v. Sturm, 673 F.3d 1274, 1284-85 (10th Cir. 2012) (four-factor analysis 
under Rule 403 applies to prior crimes evidence:  [1] how clearly prior act has been 
proved; [2] how probative evidence is of material fact it is admitted to prove; [3] how 
seriously disputed material fact is; and [4] whether government can avail itself of any less 
prejudicial evidence); Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433 (setting forth Rule 403 test for Rule 413 
evidence; noting exclusion of relevant evidence under test should be infrequent, 
reflecting Congress' legislative judgment that evidence of similar crimes should 
"normally" be admitted in child molestation cases); Benally, 500 F.3d at 1090-91 
(extending Enjady to Rule 414 evidence).    
 
In addition, when evidence was admitted under the unamended statute, in order to 
avoid the jury's consideration of the evidence for prohibited propensity, we required a 
limiting instruction listing the material facts in issue for which the evidence could be 
considered. See Prine I, 287 Kan. at 724-25. Although neither party challenges the 
continuation of this judicially created safeguard, its obsolescence under the amended 
statute is clear. In a sex crime prosecution governed by new subsection (d), there remains 
no reason to tell jurors to ignore the bearing prior sexual misconduct may have on the 
defendant's propensity to commit the charged crime or crimes. If other sex crimes or civil 
wrongs are relevant, i.e., material and probative of propensity, the jury may consider 
them for that. We no longer need the workaround the limiting instruction hoped to 
ensure.  
 
In this case then, on retrial, the State could and should have sought to admit the 
evidence of Prine's abuse of S.M. and J.S. under new subsection (d) of K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 
60-455. It could have avoided analysis of intent, absence of mistake or accident, and plan 
25 
 
 
 
completely, focusing only on whether Prine's other sexual misconduct was relevant and 
probative of his propensity to abuse A.M.C. Had the State done so, the district judge 
would still have been called upon to determine relevance, i.e., materiality and probative 
value for propensity; and, as of today at least, he would still have needed to conduct a 
weighing of probative value and undue prejudice. If the judge then ruled admission was 
proper, he would not have needed to give a K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 60-455 limiting 
instruction.    
 
Having set out what could and should have been, we turn to what actually was.   
 
As in the first trial, the State sought on retrial to admit evidence of Prine's abuse of 
S.M. and J.S. to show intent, absence of mistake or accident, and plan. Prine is correct 
that the evidence was no more relevant to intent or to absence of mistake or accident the 
second time around than it was on the first. The State points us to no improvement or 
other alteration in its case that would change our analysis of these two bases for 
admission, and we will not repeat what we said in Prine I.  
 
Admission for plan, however, merits a slightly more extended evaluation.  
 
The State would like us to rule that subsection (c) of the amended K.S.A. 60-455 
should have been applied to permit admission of the evidence to prove nonpreparation 
plan. But this is contrary to the plain language of the subsection, which expressly 
excludes its application in a sex crime prosecution such as this. See K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 
60-455(c). The meaning and efficacy of the legislature's apparent effort to modify the 
"strikingly similar" or "signature" standard enunciated in Prine I is simply not at issue 
here. See K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 60-445(c).   
 
26 
 
 
 
The defense, recognizing subsection (c)'s inapplicability in this sex crime 
prosecution, urges us to hold that Prine I sets the default similarity requirement for 
subsection (d) relevance of this type of plan evidence. We agree. Subsection (d) did 
nothing to change the "strikingly similar" or "signature" ruling of Prine I. The fact of 
Prine's plan, or, really, his identity as A.M.C.'s abuser, was put in issue by Prine's general 
denial. It thus was material, a quality whose existence we review de novo. See Vasquez, 
287 Kan. at 50. Without a "strikingly similar" pattern or "signature" between that abuse 
and the abuse of S.M. and J.S., however, the evidence of the other crimes was not 
probative of the material fact; and we repeat our holding of Prine I that the district 
judge's contrary ruling was an abuse of discretion. See Prine I, 287 Kan. at 725-28; see 
also Vasquez, 287 Kan. at 50 (existence of probative value reviewed under abuse of 
discretion standard). Admission of the evidence to prove plan was still error on retrial 
under the amended version of K.S.A. 60-455.  
 
The last question we must answer is:  Did this error make any difference? We 
ruled that it did in Prine's first trial and reversed. We make the opposite ruling now.  
 
The problem for the defense is that subsection (d) necessarily changed our 
calculus on reversibility of this error. As we have already observed, K.S.A. 60-455 
evidence relevant to propensity—leaving aside any constitutionality question not argued 
in this case—is admissible under new subsection (d). Because we have no doubt that, on 
any third trial of Prine, the evidence of his abuse of S.M. and J.S. would again come 
before the jury as propensity evidence, see Prine I, 287 Kan. at 737, and that its probative 
value would be deemed more weighty than its threat of undue prejudice, no reversal is 
required. Although the State's and the district judge's grasp of the import and workings of 
the amended statute at retrial was tenuous, their efforts to protect Prine's rights at retrial 
went beyond anything to which he would be entitled after a second reversal. This means 
that we see no error that affects Prine's substantial rights under K.S.A. 60-261.    
27 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Although the district judge erred at defendant John Prine's retrial by admitting 
evidence of Prine's uncharged sexual abuse of two victims, the certainty that the evidence 
would come in as relevant to Prine's propensity to abuse the victim in this case under 
K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 60-455(d) means reversal is not required. The judgment of the district 
court is therefore affirmed as right for the wrong reasons.