Case Title: State v. Thomas

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020AP000032-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2023-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
2023 WI 9 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP32-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Oscar C. Thomas, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 399 Wis. 2d 277, 963 N.W.2d 887 
PDC No: 2021 WI App 55 - Published  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 21, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 28, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Bruce E. Schroeder   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
ROGGENSACK, J., announced the mandate of the Court, and 
delivered an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined, and the 
majority opinion of the Court with respect to ¶2 and ¶¶12-24, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined, and in which HAGEDORN, J., joined with 
respect to ¶¶12-24.  DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion, 
which constitutes the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion.   
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by John T. Wasielewski and Wasielewski & Erickson, 
Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by John T. Wasielewski.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Sonya K. Bice, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
 
 
2 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Sonya K. Bice, assistant attorney general.  
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 9 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2020AP32-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2007CF1) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Oscar C. Thomas, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 21, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., announced the mandate of the Court, and 
delivered an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined, and the 
majority opinion of the Court with respect to ¶2 and ¶¶12-24, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined, and in which HAGEDORN, J., joined with 
respect to ¶¶12-24.  DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion, 
which constitutes the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion.   
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a published 
decision of the court of appeals1 that affirmed the circuit 
                                                 
1 State v. Thomas, 2021 WI App 55, 399 Wis. 2d 277, 963 
N.W.2d 887.  
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
2 
 
court's2 judgment of conviction and its denial of Oscar C. 
Thomas's postconviction motion.   
¶2 
We accepted two issues for review.  First, whether 
Thomas's confession of sexual assault was corroborated by a 
significant fact, and we conclude it was.  This opinion is the 
majority opinion for the discussion of corroboration.  Second, 
whether the cross-examination of Thomas's expert witness by use 
of a Wisconsin Crime Lab Report ("the Report") that was not in 
evidence and whose author did not testify violated Thomas's 
confrontation right.  Four justices conclude the Report's 
contents were used for their truth during cross-examination, 
thereby violating Thomas's right of confrontation.  Justice 
Dallet's concurrence is the decision of the court for the 
confrontation issue.3  Six justices conclude Hemphill precludes 
admission of evidence to correct an allegedly misleading 
impression created by the defendant, and seven justices conclude 
that any error related to the Report was harmless.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the court of appeals.  
¶3 
The court of appeals concluded that the State met its 
evidentiary 
burden 
to 
sufficiently 
corroborate 
Thomas's 
confession of sexual assault.  We agree with this conclusion.  
We also conclude that the State's use of the Report4 that a 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Bruce E. Schroeder of Kenosha County Circuit 
Court presided.  
3 Justice Dallet's concurrence is joined by Justices Ann 
Walsh Bradley, Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Jill J. Karofsky.   
4 The Report, a three-page document, was marked as Exhibit 
36 during the prosecutor's cross-examination of Thomas's expert, 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
3 
 
defense expert reviewed, but which was not admitted into 
evidence, did not violate Thomas's confrontation right under the 
United States' Constitution or the Wisconsin Constitution when 
used for impeachment purposes.5  However, we reject the State's 
argument that it properly used the Report's contents during 
closing argument.  Furthermore, following Hemphill,6 a criminal 
defendant does not "open the door" to the introduction of 
testimonial 
out-of–court 
statements 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
"correct[ing]" a "misleading impression."  Although we conclude 
that the State did not use the content of the Report for its 
truth on cross-examination, the State did improperly use the 
Report's content for its truth during closing argument, which 
the circuit court erroneously permitted.  However, we conclude 
the error was harmless because it is "clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a rational jury would have found [Thomas] guilty 
absent the error."  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶46, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).   
                                                                                                                                                             
Dr. Williams.  The prosecutor did not attempt to have Exhibit 36 
admitted.   
5 U.S. Const. amend VI; Wis. Const. art. I, § 7.   
6 Hemphill v. New York, 595 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 681, 686 
(2022).  We acknowledge that Hemphill was published while this 
case was pending on appeal.  
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
4 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
In the early hours of December 27, 2006, officers 
responded to a 911 call and found Ms. Joyce Oliver-Thomas 
unresponsive 
on 
the 
floor 
of 
her 
apartment. 
 
Emergency 
responders employed CPR and attempted to resuscitate Ms. Oliver-
Thomas as they transported her to the hospital, where she was 
pronounced dead.  An autopsy concluded that Joyce died from 
"Strangulation due to Physical Assault."  Ms. Oliver-Thomas's 
husband, the defendant Oscar C. Thomas,7 was subsequently charged 
with first-degree intentional homicide, first-degree sexual 
assault, 
and 
false 
imprisonment. 
 
Thomas 
provided 
three 
statements to police over the course of the investigation, which 
we address below.   
¶5 
At his 2007 trial, the jury convicted Thomas of all 
three charges against him.  Thomas appealed, and the court of 
appeals affirmed.  We denied review.8  Thomas then pursued 
federal habeas corpus relief, and the Seventh Circuit granted 
him a new trial.  Thomas v. Clements, 789 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 
                                                 
7 The record indicates that Thomas and Ms. Oliver-Thomas had 
been married, divorced, and then reconciled without remarrying.  
Accordingly, Thomas refers to Ms. Oliver-Thomas as his wife.  
Striving for consistency with the record, we too, refer to 
Ms. Oliver-Thomas and Thomas as spouses, though we recognize 
this was not technically the case at the time of Ms. Oliver-
Thomas's death. 
8 State v. Thomas, No. 2010AP1606-CR, unpublished slip op., 
¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2011), review denied, 2012 WI 45, 340 
Wis. 2d 542, 811 N.W.2d 818.  
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
5 
 
2015).9  Thomas was retried to a jury in 2018, convicted of all 
charges again, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.  
¶6 
Thomas appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed 
Thomas's convictions and the circuit court's denial of his 
postconviction motions.  Specifically, the court of appeals 
concluded there was sufficient corroborating evidence of the 
sexual assault confession, and denial of the postconviction 
motion was appropriate.  State v. Thomas, 2021 WI App 55, ¶14, 
399 Wis. 2d 277, 963 N.W.2d 887.  The court of appeals also 
concluded the Report's DNA evidence was "inadmissible hearsay," 
causing a Confrontation Clause violation when it was used 
erroneously 
during 
trial 
and 
during 
the 
State's 
closing 
argument.  Id., ¶35.  However, the court of appeals concluded 
that the error was harmless.  Id., ¶¶35, 37.10   
¶7 
In its briefing to us, the State did not argue that 
the Report could be used for the truth of its contents.  Rather, 
                                                 
9 Thomas argued his 2007 trial counsel was ineffective 
because he failed to call a forensic pathologist or other 
similar expert to refute the State's forensic pathologist's 
testimony.  Thomas v. Clements, 789 F.3d 760, 762-63 (7th Cir. 
2015).  The court of appeals agreed that failure to call a 
forensic expert demonstrated the deficiency of Thomas's counsel 
and prejudiced his defense.  Id. at 763.  The Seventh Circuit 
concluded "that a reasonable counsel would have consider[ed]  
and/or consulted with a forensic expert," and "[g]iven the 
weakness of the state's case . . . there is a reasonable 
probability the outcome of the trial would have turned out 
differently."  Id. 
10 Thomas presented a third issue to the court of appeals 
regarding an allegedly-biased juror, which he has not petitioned 
for us to review. 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
6 
 
it set the issue up as:  "[W]hen Thomas's expert gave testimony 
directly contradicting the lab report on which he relied, it was 
an implied waiver of Thomas's right to confront the author of 
the lab report."  However, Dr. Williams did not say he "relied" 
on the Report, but rather, that he "reviewed" the Report along 
with hundreds of other pages of material relative to this case.11  
Nevertheless, the State veered from the argument it raised 
consistently below that the prosecutor used the Report to 
impeach Thomas's defense expert.  Instead, at oral argument the 
State argued that we should analyze the Report based on the 
contention that its contents were properly used during cross-
examination and during closing argument for the truth of the 
matters asserted therein.  
¶8 
Thomas petitioned us for review, which we granted on 
two matters:  first, to review whether the State sufficiently 
satisfied its burden to corroborate Thomas's confession with any 
significant fact; second, to review whether the State's cross-
examination of Thomas's expert witness through the use of the 
Report violated Thomas's right under the Sixth Amendment to 
confront the author of the Report.  We also review the State's 
use of the DNA findings of the Report in the prosecutor's 
closing argument.  We conclude that error occurred in the 
                                                 
11 Prosecutor:  "Now, you also reviewed Wisconsin crime lab 
reports, correct?" 
Answer:  "Correct."   
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
7 
 
prosecutor's use of the contents of the Report in closing 
argument; however, the error was harmless as we explain below.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶9 
Whether evidence corroborates a criminal defendant's 
confession(s) or statement(s) presents a question of evidentiary 
sufficiency, which is ultimately a question of law subject to 
our independent review.  State v. Bannister, 2007 WI 86, ¶¶22, 
33, 302 Wis. 2d 158, 734 N.W.2d 892.  
¶10 We 
review 
constitutional 
issues 
independently, 
although we benefit from the discussions of the court of appeals 
and circuit court.  State v. Smith, 2012 WI 91, ¶25, 342 Wis. 2d 
710, 817 N.W.2d 410.   
¶11 Lastly, we review whether an error was harmless by 
placing the burden on the party that benefitted from the error 
to establish it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have found [Thomas] guilty absent the 
error."  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶46 (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 
18).  
B.  Corroboration 
¶12 Thomas first argues that the State did not present 
evidence to corroborate the statements he made to police in 
which he confessed to the crime of sexual assault.  Accordingly, 
Thomas argues the jury convicted him based solely on the two 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
8 
 
relevant statements he made to police following Ms. Oliver-
Thomas's death.12   
¶13 In Thomas's first statement to officers, he reported 
that Ms. Oliver-Thomas had complained of chest and ear pain in 
the early evening.  Throughout the evening, Thomas and a friend 
were smoking crack in the basement of the four-plex apartment, 
and Thomas checked on his wife frequently.  Each time he left 
the basement to check on Ms. Oliver-Thomas, she was "in bed 
dozing off."  Thomas began watching a pornographic video in the 
apartment sometime after midnight, during which he became 
aroused and approached his wife, who agreed to consensual sex.  
During sex, the couple fell off of the bed and onto the floor.  
Following their encounter, Thomas noted that Ms. Oliver-Thomas 
complained her "chest was still hurting."  Thomas checked on his 
wife a few more times, left the building and, upon returning to 
the apartment, he found Ms. Oliver-Thomas on the floor in the 
bedroom.  Thomas then called 911 and administered CPR until 
officers arrived. 
¶14 In Thomas's second statement to police,13 he and a 
friend were smoking crack in the apartment building's basement.  
                                                 
12 Thomas's third statement was made while he was in 
custody.  The third statement implicated a drug dealer, who 
Thomas believes entered the apartment while Thomas was with his 
friend and killed Ms. Oliver-Thomas over an outstanding debt 
Thomas owed.  As this statement is not relevant to the sexual 
assault conviction at issue, we do not address it further.  See 
Thomas, 399 Wis. 2d 277, ¶6 n.3.    
13 Though not initially under arrest, Thomas was placed 
under arrest while providing his second statement to police.  
Officers read Thomas his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
9 
 
Thomas repeatedly returned to the apartment.  On one trip to the 
apartment, Thomas noticed Ms. Oliver-Thomas was lying down 
because "her chest was hurting."  On a subsequent trip upstairs, 
Ms. Oliver-Thomas said "she was feeling better."  Thomas began 
watching a pornographic video and approached his wife to 
initiate sex.  Even though she initially told him to stop, 
Thomas persisted, and, according to Thomas, the pair engaged in 
consensual sex, during which they fell to the floor.  While 
engaged in sex, Thomas stated he had his left arm up around his 
wife's neck.   
¶15 After Ms. Oliver-Thomas returned to the bed, Thomas 
said he began "humping" Ms. Oliver-Thomas's hip area.  Thomas 
and Ms. Oliver-Thomas again fell to the floor, where Thomas had 
his left arm around Ms. Oliver-Thomas's neck a second time.  
Thomas stated:  
I didn't think I was squeezing hard, but Joyce was 
struggling and was yelling for me to stop and to quit 
it.  Joyce's feet were kicking the floor while she was 
telling me to stop.  Joyce was telling me she loved me 
and for me to quit playing.  I kept squeezing for a 
little while . . . Joyce's breathing started to slow 
down, so I turned her loose.  After I turned her 
loose, Joyce was breathing funny and looking at me.  I 
got up and left [the apartment]. 
When Thomas returned, he found Ms. Oliver-Thomas laying face 
down on the floor.  Thomas tried to lift her, but lost his grip 
twice.  Each time, Ms. Oliver-Thomas's face hit the bed or the 
                                                                                                                                                             
U.S. 436 (1966)), which Thomas then waived to continue speaking 
with police.   
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
10 
 
floor.  Thomas called 911, and the dispatcher instructed Thomas 
to begin CPR, which he performed until officers arrived.  
¶16 The State charged Thomas with sexual assault pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(1)(a) (2021-22),14 the conviction of 
which requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
defendant 
had:  (1) sexual 
contact 
with 
another 
person 
(2) without consent and (3) caused great bodily harm to that 
person.  "Sexual contact" is statutorily defined to include 
intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, for 
the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant.15  
The Jury Instructions at Thomas's trial adhered to the statutory 
language, and the jury convicted Thomas of first-degree sexual 
assault of Ms. Oliver-Thomas.16 
¶17 Thomas asserts there was insufficient evidence to 
support his conviction for sexual assault independent of the 
statements he made to police.  Namely, Thomas points to the 
results from Joyce's autopsy and forensic examination, which 
included the use of a sexual assault kit.  The exam's results 
                                                 
14 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated. 
15 See Wis. Stat. § 940.225(5)(b)1. 
16 The Jury Instructions at Thomas's trial adhered to the 
statutory language, stating, "Sexual contact includes the 
intentional touching of any part of the body of Joyce Oliver-
Thomas by the defendant's penis.  The touching may have been by 
the penis directly, or it may have been through the clothing.  
Sexual contact also requires that the defendant acted with 
intent to become sexually aroused or gratified."  
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
11 
 
did not reveal any evidence of sexual intercourse.17  The State, 
however, alleged first-degree sexual assault consistent with 
Thomas's second statement to police.  In that statement, Thomas 
confessed to "humping" Joyce's hip area, during which he had his 
left arm around Joyce's neck and he was squeezing.  Joyce 
struggled and yelled at Thomas to stop, but Thomas "kept 
squeezing for a little while," until "Joyce's breathing started 
to slow down."  Thomas let her go and noted "Joyce was breathing 
funny."  Accordingly, evidentiary results of sexual intercourse 
from a forensic exam were not necessary to support the State's 
theory of sexual assault in this case.   
¶18 One of the many tenets upon which our criminal justice 
system rests is that "conviction of a crime may not be grounded 
on the admission or confessions of the accused alone."  State v. 
Verhasselt, 83 Wis. 2d 647, 661, 266 N.W.2d 342 (1978).  
Instead, 
Wisconsin 
law 
requires 
corroboration 
of 
any 
"'significant fact' in order to sustain a conviction."  State v. 
Hauk, 2002 WI App 226, ¶20, 257 Wis. 2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393.  
While at times we have upheld a jury's verdict of criminal 
conviction 
based 
on 
"considerable 
corroborative 
evidence," 
Verhasselt, 83 Wis. 2d at 662, Wisconsin's corroboration rule 
requires less than that.  We have said:  
All the elements of the crime do not have to be 
proved 
independently 
of 
an 
accused's 
confession; 
however, there must be some corroboration of the 
confession in order to support a conviction . . . .  
                                                 
17 R. 319 at 122-23.  
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
12 
 
If there is corroboration of any significant fact, 
that is sufficient under the Wisconsin test. 
Holt v. State, 17 Wis. 2d 468, 480, 117 N.W.2d 626 (1962).  A 
significant fact is corroborated when "there is confidence in [] 
the fact that the crime the defendant has confessed to indeed 
occurred."  Bannister, 302 Wis. 2d 158, ¶26.  The primary 
purpose of the corroboration rule is to ensure the reliability 
of an accused's confession, requiring "evidence that the crime 
actually occurred."  Id., ¶24; Hauk, 257 Wis. 2d 579, ¶24.  
¶19 The State points to two pieces of evidence that, in 
its 
view, 
corroborate 
a 
"significant 
fact" 
of 
Thomas's 
confession 
of 
sexual 
assault:  (1) a 
downstairs 
neighbor's 
testimony that she was woken by a loud argument upstairs, during 
which she heard a woman scream, "Stop, stop, I love you, I love 
you;" and (2) a pornographic video recovered at the apartment. 
¶20 While the State does not, and need not, offer 
corroborating evidence of every element of the crime of sexual 
assault, the State has offered corroborating evidence for a 
"significant fact" of Thomas's statements given to police.  
Holt, 17 Wis. 2d at 480.  Thomas's downstairs neighbor testified 
she heard an argument between a man and woman, and the woman 
screamed, "Stop, stop, I love you, I love you."  The neighbor 
also testified she heard something big hit the floor, the sound 
of furniture moving, and silence.  She then heard the apartment 
door open, and a person she identified as Thomas walked out.   
¶21 We conclude the neighbor's testimony corroborates a 
"significant fact" of Thomas's statements to the police in which 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
13 
 
he confessed to sexually assaulting his wife.  The neighbor 
heard a female voice scream "Stop, stop, I love you, I love 
you."  This phrase corroborates what Thomas told officers; 
namely, that while Thomas "humped" the victim's hip area, "Joyce 
was struggling and was yelling for me to stop . . . Joyce was 
telling me she loved me and for me to quit playing."18   
¶22 The neighbor's testimony "permits confidence" that the 
crime of sexual assault that Thomas confessed to "indeed 
occurred."  Bannister, 302 Wis. 2d 158, ¶30.  Wisconsin's 
corroboration 
rule 
does 
not 
demand 
more 
to 
support 
a 
factfinder's determination of guilt when the only other evidence 
of a particular crime is the defendant's statements to officers.  
Holt, 17 Wis. 2d at 480.   
¶23 We 
also 
conclude 
that 
the 
neighbor's 
testimony 
regarding 
Ms. Oliver-Thomas's 
statement 
establishes 
a 
"significant fact" consistent with our case law.  See Bannister, 
302 Wis. 2d 158, ¶2 (presence of morphine in an alleged buyer's 
body at time of death constituted a significant fact to 
corroborate confession); see also Holt, 17 Wis. 2d at 480-82 
(charred infant torso found in furnace constituted sufficient 
independent corroboration of defendant's confession that baby 
was alive when placed in the furnace); Verhasselt, 83 Wis. 2d at 
                                                 
18 While the State need not corroborate a confession with 
elements of a crime, we recognize, without deciding, Ms. Oliver-
Thomas's statement may do just that because we conclude that it 
is difficult to determine that the phrase "stop, stop" could not 
show a lack of consent.  Holt v. State, 17 Wis. 2d 468, 480, 117 
N.W.2d 626 (1962).   
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
14 
 
693 (defendant's confession to fellow prison inmate, gun found 
in defendant's car identified as the one from which the bullets 
came, and defendant's confession to friend while showing two 
bullets corroborated significant facts of confession); State v. 
DeHart, 242 Wis. 562, 566, 8 N.W.2d 360 (1943) (location and 
condition of victim's body and expert testimony regarding 
consistency 
of 
bone 
condition 
with 
damage 
from 
buckshot 
consistent with defendant's confession).  Having concluded that 
the 
neighbor's 
testimony 
sufficiently 
corroborates 
the 
statements Thomas made to police, we need not further analyze 
the importance of the pornographic video found in Thomas's 
apartment. 
¶24 We conclude the State satisfied its burden to present 
"some evidence" that the sexual assault charged, and to which 
Thomas confessed, actually occurred.  Bannister, 302 Wis. 2d 
158, ¶¶24, 25. 
C.  The Report at Trial 
¶25 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution prevents the admission of testimonial 
hearsay when the declarant is absent from trial unless the 
witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior 
opportunity 
to 
cross-examine 
the 
witness. 
 
Crawford 
v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).  The Sixth Amendment right 
of confrontation is a "fundamental right, as made applicable to 
and obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment."  
State v. Griep, 2015 WI 40, ¶18, 361 Wis. 2d 657, 863 N.W.2d 567 
(citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)). 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
15 
 
¶26 Thomas asks us to consider whether his right to 
confront his accuser, guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause, 
was violated at his trial.  Specifically, Thomas argues his 
confrontation right was violated during the State's cross-
examination of his expert witness, Dr. Karl Williams.  Thomas 
also asks us to consider the impact of the State's use of 
testimony, elicited from Dr. Williams himself, for the truth of 
the matter asserted at closing argument.   
1.  The Cross-Examination 
¶27 Thomas called just one witness at trial——Dr. Williams, 
a medical examiner.  On direct examination, Dr. Williams 
testified that "in allegations of violence resulting in death," 
he looks for "an exchange of trauma, an exchange of evidence" 
between the victim and accused.  When asked specifically, 
Dr. Williams replied that he did not see signs of a struggle or 
of defensive wounds.  In his opinion, abrasions on Ms. Oliver-
Thomas's face could have resulted from emergency CPR or from 
engaging in face-down sex on the floor, consistent with Thomas's 
statements.   
¶28 On 
cross-examination, 
the 
State 
challenged 
Dr. Williams's characterization that there were no signs of an 
exchange of trauma through the following cross-examination:  
[Prosecutor]:  Now, you also reviewed Wisconsin crime 
lab reports, correct? 
[Dr. Williams]:  Correct. 
. . . . 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
16 
 
[Prosecutor]:  Okay.  But in those crime lab reports, 
you are aware that there was some analysis done? 
[Defense counsel]:  Objection. 
[Prosecutor]:  It's what he relied on in his 
opinion.[19] 
[Defense counsel]:  I'm objecting to going into 
the details of reports that haven't been introduced 
into evidence, though.  It's a back door.  
THE 
COURT:  If 
he 
examined 
it, 
then 
it's 
presumably something he discounted or relied upon.  
The objection is overruled. 
[Prosecutor]:  And you are aware in those crime lab 
reports that Oscar Thomas's DNA was found under Joyce 
Oliver-Thomas's 
fingernail 
clippings, 
which 
were 
clipped from her body at the time of the autopsy, 
correct? 
 . . . [The State hands the [R]eport to Dr. Williams 
at his request] . . . . 
[Dr. Williams]:  Yes, this appears to be an analysis 
that shows that the DNA found under the [fingernails] 
was obviously a mixture.  You are going to have her 
DNA, but also evidence of DNA from Oscar Thomas. 
[Prosecutor]:  And similarly the fingernails from the 
defendant were also swabbed, and her DNA was found 
under that as well; is that correct? 
[Dr. Williams]:  Yes. 
[Prosecutor]:  Okay. 
[Dr. Williams]:  They 
are 
living 
in 
a 
consensual 
marriage.  A finding of the DNA, they could be 
scratching each other's back.  I mean, there is no 
                                                 
19 Dr. Williams "reviewed" the Report.  That he did not 
"rely" on it also is clear from his testimony that diminishes 
the importance of the DNA evidence found under the fingernails 
of Thomas and Joyce, saying there "is no evidence of trauma on 
him to support the fact that she was struggling sufficiently." 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
17 
 
evidence of trauma on him to support the fact that she 
was struggling sufficiently. 
Documents 
submitted 
prior 
to 
trial 
indicate 
Dr. Williams 
reviewed the Report, among other things, in preparing his 
testimony.  Thomas urges us to conclude that the details 
elicited on cross-examination of Dr. Williams violated his 
confrontation right. 
a.  Confrontation or Impeachment 
¶29 "The 
Confrontation 
Clause 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
and 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
guarantee 
criminal 
defendants the right to confront witnesses against them."  
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42; State v. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, ¶36, 281 
Wis. 2d 554, 697 N.W.2d 811.  The right to confrontation applies 
to statements that are testimonial.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; 
State v. Deadwiller, 2012 WI App 89, ¶7, 343 Wis. 2d 703, 820 
N.W.2d 149 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 
(2006)). 
 
Testimonial 
statements 
are 
those 
made 
"under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably 
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial."  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.  Forensic or scientific 
reports "prepared in connection with a criminal investigation or 
prosecution" are testimonial and, therefore, within the ambit of 
the Confrontation Clause.  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 
647, 658 (2011).   
¶30 When forensic or scientific reports are offered for 
their truth, an accused must be able to confront the witness 
against 
him 
by 
subjecting 
the 
report's 
author, 
as 
the 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
18 
 
statement's declarant, to the "crucible of cross-examination."  
Id. at 661 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62).  In the event of 
witness 
unavailability, 
a 
testimonial 
statement 
may 
be 
introduced at trial only if an accused has had a "prior 
opportunity for cross-examination."  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  
It is not enough for a report's author to testify by other 
means.  See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310-11 
(2009) (ex parte affidavits cannot circumvent the right to 
confront the declarant by cross-examination); Bullcoming, 564 
U.S. 
at 
652 
(surrogate 
testimony 
does 
not 
meet 
the 
constitutional requirement and, an "accused's right is to be 
confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless 
that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused [has] had 
an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular 
scientist.").  In sum, a forensic report cannot be used as 
substantive evidence against an accused unless an accused may 
confront the report's author through cross-examination in court 
or has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the author.  
Melendez-Diaz, 577 U.S. at 309.   
¶31 Although a criminal defendant must be able to confront 
a 
forensic 
report's 
author, 
expert 
witnesses 
may 
review 
inadmissible reports in preparing their testimony.  In Williams, 
the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of "allowing 
an expert witness to discuss others' testimonial statements if 
the testimonial statements were not themselves admitted as 
evidence."  Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 67 (2012) 
(quoting 
Bullcoming, 
564 
U.S. 
at 
673 
(Sotomayor, 
J., 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
19 
 
concurring)).  There, the Court concluded an expert may qualify 
the assumptions upon which she bases her conclusions so long as 
the bases themselves are not offered for their truth.  Williams, 
567 U.S. at 57-58.  The Court reasoned that allowing an expert 
to 
make 
such 
disclosures 
aids 
the 
factfinder 
in 
making 
credibility and weight determinations about the validity of the 
expert's opinions.  Id. at 77-78.20  Stated otherwise, eliciting 
information from an expert for the purpose of undermining the 
bases of the expert's opinion, serves to impeach an expert; and 
impeachment evidence is not hearsay because it is not offered to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted.  Id. at 79 (explaining 
that the Confrontation Clause applies only to out-of-court 
statements that are "use[d]" to "establis[h] the truth of the 
matter asserted.").  
¶32 Although we acknowledge that Williams does not provide 
a majority rationale,21 Wis. Stat. § 907.03 reflects this concept 
                                                 
20 "The purpose for allowing this disclosure is that it may 
'assis[t] the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion.'  [Citation 
omitted.] . . . [The approach is] based on the idea that the 
disclosure of basis evidence can help the factfinder understand 
the expert's thought process and determine what weight to give 
to the expert's opinion . . . .  The purpose of disclosing the 
facts on which the expert relied is to allay these fears——to 
show that the expert's reasoning was not illogical, and that the 
weight of the expert's opinion does not depend on factual 
premises unsupported by other evidence in the record——not to 
prove the truth of the underlying facts."  Williams v. Illinois, 
567 U.S. 50, 78 (2012).  
21 Williams resulted in a 4-1-4 split.  Four justices joined 
the lead opinion, and Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring 
in the judgment. 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
20 
 
and permits an expert to review inadmissible reports in forming 
her conclusions.22  Despite a report's inadmissibility, or a 
proponent's failure to obtain admission of the report into 
evidence, a cross-examiner may use the contents of a report for 
the "distinctive and limited purpose" of attacking an expert's 
credibility so a jury may determine the weight to give an 
expert's testimony.  Id.; see Seifert v. Balink, 2017 WI 2, 
¶¶124-127, 372 Wis. 2d 525, 888 N.W.2d 816.   
¶33 This method of attack may serve to impeach a witness 
even though cross-examination of an expert witness's bases for 
her opinion is not a hearsay exception.  This is so because 
substance of reports and data that an expert reviewed are not 
automatically admitted as evidence for the truth of the matter 
asserted when they come up in cross-examination for another 
purpose.  See State v. Watson, 227 Wis. 2d 167, ¶78, 595 N.W.2d 
403 (1999) ("[Wisconsin Stat. §] 907.03 does not transform 
inadmissible hearsay into admissible hearsay.  It does not 
permit hearsay evidence to come in through the front door of 
direct examination."); Staskal v. Symons Corp., 2005 WI App 216, 
¶22, 287 Wis. 2d 511, 706 N.W.2d 311 ("[Section] 907.03 is not a 
hearsay exception and does not make inadmissible hearsay 
                                                 
22 "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an 
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by 
or made known to the expert . . . before the hearing . . . . 
[T]he facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order 
for the opinion or inference to be admitted.  Facts or data that 
are 
otherwise 
inadmissible 
may 
not 
be 
disclosed 
to 
the 
jury . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 907.03. 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
21 
 
admissible.").  Instead, parties may strategically determine 
whether to request cautioning or limiting instructions for the 
use of a report that is not eligible to be admitted for the 
truth of the matters asserted therein.  Limiting instructions 
aid a factfinder's understanding of how to evaluate, constrain, 
or disregard an expert's opinion "if it is not based on evidence 
of record."  Watson, 227 Wis. 2d 167, ¶82.   
¶34 Turning to the case at hand, the State's use of the 
Report to impeach Dr. Williams on cross-examination did not 
violate Thomas's confrontation right.  The State challenged 
Dr. Williams's conclusion that there was "no exchange of 
evidence" by referencing the Report that Dr. Williams had 
reviewed, which showed DNA exchanges under the fingernails of 
Thomas and Ms. Oliver-Thomas.  Stated otherwise, by drawing 
attention 
to 
the 
"exchange" 
of 
DNA 
between 
Thomas 
and 
Ms. Oliver-Thomas, 
the 
State 
attempted 
to 
undermine 
Dr. Williams's opinion that Ms. Oliver-Thomas's cause of death 
could have been accidental.  The degree to which the State 
succeeded in limiting the usefulness of Dr. Williams's testimony 
was then considered by the jury together with all of the 
evidence in deciding Thomas's guilt.  Although we recognize 
Thomas could have asked for limiting instructions that the jury 
not consider the Report's contents for their truth because 
testimony about the contents of the Report was not admitted for 
substantive purposes, he made no such request.  We conclude the 
State's questioning on cross-examination relevant to the Report 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
22 
 
did not violate Thomas's right to confront the Report's author 
when used to impeach Dr. Williams's opinion.   
b.  Truth of the Report 
¶35 The State summarily asserted at oral argument that it 
wanted the Report's discussion of DNA evidence found under 
fingernails employed "for the truth of the matter asserted."  
The portions of the State's brief relevant to the Report, its 
contents, and the confrontation right rely extensively on 
Justice Alito's concurrence in Hemphill v. New York, 595 U.S. 
___, 142 S. Ct. 681 (2022).  However, at oral argument the State 
relied on cases not mentioned in its brief, such as, State v. 
Mattox, 2017 WI 9, 373 Wis. 2d 122, 890 N.W.2d 256, Griep, 361 
Wis. 2d 657, and Vinicky v. Midland Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 35 
Wis. 2d 246, 151 N.W.2d 77 (1967).  
¶36 As we begin, we review Hemphill and Justice Alito's 
concurrence and conclude that the State could not use the Report 
for its truth at Thomas's trial under Crawford or Hemphill.  
¶37 In Hemphill, the Supreme Court heard arguments that 
the State violated defendant Hemphill's confrontation right 
during the course of its prosecution of him for murdering a 
young girl who was hit by a stray 9-millimeter bullet.  
Hemphill, 142 S. Ct. at 686.  Hemphill maintained his innocence 
throughout trial and premised his defense on the theory another 
man, Morris, was the shooter.  Id. at 688.  The State had 
initially charged Morris with the murder but offered Morris a 
plea 
deal 
mid-trial, 
which 
required 
Morris 
to 
admit 
to 
possession of a .357-magnum revolver, rather than a 9-millimeter 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
23 
 
handgun.  Id. at 686.  At Hemphill's trial for the same murder, 
Hemphill presented "undisputed testimony" that police had 
recovered a 9-millimeter handgun from Morris's nightstand.  Id.  
Over objection, the trial court permitted the State to enter 
parts of the transcript from Morris's plea allocution to rebut 
Hemphill's defense theory, despite Morris's unavailability to 
testify.  Id.  The trial court based its decision to allow use 
of the transcript on a binding New York case,23 which held that 
"a criminal defendant could 'open the door' to evidence that 
would otherwise be inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause 
if 
the 
evidence 
was 
'reasonably 
necessary 
to 
correct 
a 
misleading impression.'"  Id. at 688.  New York's highest court 
affirmed the trial and appellate courts, reasoning that at trial 
"[the] defendant created a misleading impression that Morris 
possessed a 9-millimeter handgun [and so the] introduction of 
the plea allocution was reasonably necessary to correct that 
misleading impression."  Id. at 688-89.  
¶38 The United States Supreme Court rejected New York's 
corrective ideations, asserting there is "no exception [to the 
Confrontation Clause] for cases in which the trial judge 
believes unconfronted testimonial hearsay might be reasonably 
necessary to correct a misleading impression."  Id. at 693.  The 
Supreme Court concluded that New York's rule resulted in a judge 
impermissibly making a reliability assessment.  Id. at 691-92.  
Under the Confrontation Clause, reliability must be assessed in 
                                                 
23 People v. Reid, 971 N.E.2d 353 (N.Y. 2012). 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
24 
 
a particular manner:  "by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination."  Id. at 691 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61).  In 
summing up the opinion, the majority stated, "[T]he Court does 
not decide today the validity of the common-law rule of 
completeness as applied to testimonial hearsay.  Under that 
rule, a party 'against whom a part of an utterance has been put 
in, may in his turn complement it by putting in the remainder.'"  
Id. at 693 (citations omitted). 
¶39 Justice Alito concurred in Hemphill.  He addressed 
"conditions under which [he said that] a defendant can be deemed 
to have validly waived the right to confront adverse witnesses," 
while using the rule of completeness to get there in some 
circumstances.  Id. at 694 (Alito, J., concurring).  Justice 
Alito said that a defendant may "waive the Sixth Amendment right 
to confront adverse witnesses through conduct."  Id.  This was 
not a case under New York's opening-the-door-to-correct-a-
misleading-statement rule 
because its application 
was not 
predicated on "conduct evincing intent to relinquish the right 
of confrontation," nor was it predicated on "action inconsistent 
with the assertion of that right."  Id. at 694-95.  While 
acknowledging the reasons under which the New York rule fails 
constitutional muster as related to the confrontation right, 
Justice Alito stated "[t]here are other circumstances, however, 
under which a defendant's introduction of evidence may be 
regarded as an implicit waiver of the right to object to the 
prosecution's use of evidence that might otherwise be barred by 
the Confrontation Clause."  Id. at 695.  The concurrence then 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
25 
 
suggested the rule of completeness may invoke one of those 
circumstances.  There, "if a party introduces all or part of a 
declarant's statement, the opposing party is entitled to 
introduce the remainder of that statement . . . regardless of 
whether the statement is testimonial or there was a prior 
opportunity to confront the declarant."  Id.  
¶40 Justice Alito asserted "the rule of completeness fits 
comfortably within the concept of implied waiver [of the 
confrontation right]."  Id.  By introducing statements of an 
unavailable declarant, "a defendant has made a knowing and 
voluntary decision to permit that declarant to appear as an 
unconfronted witness."  Id.  Under this theory, a criminal 
defendant may waive his confrontation right by introducing an 
incomplete statement of an unavailable declarant; completing an 
incomplete or misleading statement, the argument goes, demands 
that the entire statement is "fair game."  Id.  
¶41 In its brief, the State urges us to accept that the 
"rationales for the holdings in [Crawford and Hemphill] simply 
do not apply here."24  The State characterizes Crawford and 
Hemphill as rejecting "open-ended, reliability-based exceptions 
that applied to any kind of evidence."25  Instead, the State 
views the Report at issue in Thomas's conviction as belonging to 
a "narrow category of evidence that a defense expert relied on 
                                                 
24 Resp't. Br. at 28.   
25 Id. (emphasis in original). 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
26 
 
and 
gave 
factually 
inaccurate 
testimony 
about."26 
 
While 
acknowledging the Hemphill concurrence is not binding, the State 
asserts 
the 
concurrence 
is 
the 
guidance 
courts 
have 
in 
evaluating situations like Thomas's where, in the State's view, 
Thomas elicited testimony that "flatly contradicted" the Report.  
Because "he made 'a tactical choice' to put the [R]eport in 
play," he "waived his confrontation right as to that [R]eport."27  
¶42 The State is incorrect on several bases.  First, it 
was the State who introduced the Report in its cross-examination 
of Thomas's expert, not the defendant.  Second, to the extent 
the State views Justice Alito's concurrence as "contemplate[ing] 
fact patterns like [the one in the instant case]," we fail to 
see how.  Justice Alito plainly states, "The introduction of 
evidence that is misleading as to the real facts does not, in 
itself, indicate a [defendant's] decision regarding whether any 
given declarant should be subjected to cross-examination."  
Hemphill, 142 S. Ct. at 695 (Alito, J., concurring).  In other 
words, a defendant's introduction of misleading evidence cannot 
be 
interpreted 
to 
infer 
a 
defendant's 
waiver 
of 
his 
confrontation right.  Accordingly, we conclude the State's 
complaint that Thomas's expert testified in a way it found 
"misleading as to the real facts," does not amount to an implied 
waiver of the right of confrontation even under Justice Alito's 
concurrence.   
                                                 
26 Id. (emphasis in original).   
27 Id. at 30.   
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
27 
 
¶43 The fault in the State's rationale is apparent when 
applied to Thomas:  Dr. Williams reviewed 219 pages of reports 
and statements in preparing his testimony.  Dr. Williams may 
very well have concluded the Report's contents regarding DNA 
evidence did not show signs of "an exchange of evidence."  As 
Dr. Williams testified, the existence of another's DNA under a 
cohabitating couple's fingernails may have innocent origins and 
is not necessarily indicative of a struggle.  If the State 
disagreed with his conclusion and sought to challenge it, the 
appropriate method is through impeachment, as occurred here.  
Otherwise, we fail to differentiate the State's argument from 
the reliability determinations that the Supreme Court rejected 
in Crawford and Hemphill.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62-68, 
rejecting the reliability-based approach of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56 (1980); Hemphill, 142 S. Ct. at 690-92, reaffirming that 
rejection while overruling People v. Reid, 971 N.E.2d 353 (N.Y. 
2012).  
¶44 There is little doubt the Report was testimonial when 
used for its truth.  After all, Ms. Oliver-Thomas's fingernails 
were clipped during her autopsy and sent to a crime lab to 
determine whose, if anyone's, DNA could be found there.  The 
same could be said for Thomas's fingernails.  Under these 
circumstances an objective witness would certainly believe the 
resulting statement in a report would be "available for use at a 
later trial" for its truth.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.  However, 
if the State wanted to use the Report for its truth, the State 
was required to introduce and authenticate the Report and then 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
28 
 
subject its author to cross-examination by Thomas in accordance 
with the Sixth Amendment and Melendez-Diaz.  Melendez-Diaz, 557 
U.S. at 305.  The information the State elicited from 
Dr. Williams on cross-examination for impeachment purposes did 
not transform the Report into admissible hearsay.  We conclude 
that the State's questioning of Dr. Williams served to impeach 
his testimony, and that the State's use of the Report for 
impeachment did not employ the Report's contents for their 
truth.  
2.  Closing Arguments 
¶45 The second instance in which the Report surfaces is 
during closing arguments, where the State used evidence elicited 
on Dr. Williams's cross-examination for the truth of the 
contents of the Report.  The prosecution asserted its theory of 
the case in closing:    
[Prosecutor]:  You would have to be high on crack to 
think that there is any other explanation for Joyce 
Oliver-Thomas's death than that Oscar Thomas killed 
her, but it was more than just killing.  It was 
brutal, vicious, violent, choking the life out of her 
for minutes . . . while he is scratching up her face 
with his free hand, with his right hand, trying to 
cover her mouth. 
[Defense counsel]:  I'm going to object to that.  
I'm objecting to this demonstrative.  There is no 
evidence of that, Judge. 
[Prosecutor]:  Closing argument, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  Well, no, no, no.  Confined to the 
evidence. 
[Prosecutor]:  And the evidence supports this 
theory, Your Honor.  We have testimony of the 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
29 
 
scratches on her face. . . .  Her DNA is found under 
his fingernails.  We have testimony from the neighbor 
downstairs. 
THE COURT:  All right, as long as you are clear 
this is your theory, and that -- 
[Prosecutor]:  Absolutely.  It is my closing 
argument, Your Honor.  I'm presenting to the jury my 
theory of how Joyce Oliver-Thomas died, and I think 
the evidence supports that.  This is exactly what I 
think happened.  Oscar Thomas placed his left arm 
around her throat and squeezed, compressing her neck 
while using his other hand to muzzle her nose and her 
mouth to keep her quiet and speed up her death, and 
that's how she got the scratches on her face. 
Over defense counsel's objection, the State assured the judge 
that 
"the 
evidence 
supports 
this 
theory." 
 
The 
State's 
representation was not correct.  There had been no evidence 
admitted for the truth of the DNA found in the fingernail 
clippings.  The State presented no independent DNA evidence, did 
not enter the Report into evidence, and it did not otherwise 
present evidence as to the scratches' origin.   
¶46 We conclude the State's reliance on hearsay evidence 
that was used to impeach Thomas's expert's opinion was improper 
during closing arguments because the Report then was used for 
the truth of the statements therein.  See State v. Marinez, 2011 
WI 12, ¶44, 331 Wis. 2d 568, 797 N.W.2d 399 (limiting the use of 
evidence that had been admitted because of its high potential 
for unfair prejudice); State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 663, 676, 
298 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1980) (concluding that reference to 
confiscated weapons was improper given its potential for unfair 
prejudice).  As stated earlier, the facts or data upon which an 
expert bases her opinion may be introduced under Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
30 
 
§ 907.03, but only for the limited purpose of assisting the 
factfinder in determining an expert's credibility.  Watson, 227 
Wis. 2d 167, ¶82.  Evidence brought in for that purpose does not 
transform into admissible hearsay for subsequent use at trial.  
Id., ¶78.   
¶47 Furthermore, 
after 
defense 
counsel 
objected, 
the 
prosecutor incorrectly assured the judge that, "[T]he evidence 
supports this theory, Your Honor.  We have testimony of the 
scratches on her face. . . .  Her DNA is found under his 
fingernails."  It was therefore erroneous to permit the 
prosecutor's statement in closing argument because the DNA 
evidence in the Report was not properly admitted as evidence for 
its substantive content.   
D.  Harmless Error 
¶48 Our test for harmless error has varied over the years.  
Despite variations, we have consistently noted that there has 
been "little practical difference between the formulations of 
harmless error which the court has used from time to time."  
State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985).  
Harmless error analyses have been applied to errors claimed to 
have occurred during closing argument.  State v. Johnson, 60 
Wis. 2d 334, 344-45, 210 N.W.2d 735 (1973).  Over time, we have 
moved toward implementing a uniform harmless error standard 
regardless of whether the complained-of error is constitutional, 
statutory, or other.  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶40.  The 
beneficiary of the error, here the State, has the burden of 
proving the error was harmless.  Id., ¶41.    
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
31 
 
¶49 In addition, "[Wis. Stat.] § 805.18, made applicable 
to criminal cases by Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1), prohibits reversal 
for error not affecting a party's substantial rights."  Id., 
¶39.  The harmless-error inquiry considers whether it is "clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found 
the defendant guilty absent the error."  Id., ¶46 (citing Neder, 
527 U.S. at 18).    
¶50 In reviewing a contention that the error was harmless, 
we consider evidence that was not affected by the error that 
occurred during the State's closing argument.  In so doing, we 
examine whether the State has met its evidentiary burden.   
¶51 In regard to the sexual assault, the State offered the 
following 
evidence 
at 
trial:  the 
downstairs 
neighbor's 
testimony asking that Thomas "stop, stop" and the large bump due 
to something falling on the floor above; and the medical 
examiner's testimony, discussed below.   
¶52 Thomas's friend told the jury the pair had smoked 
crack together in the apartment basement in the early morning 
hours on the day Ms. Oliver-Thomas died.  The friend stated at 
one point he waited about "an hour" for Thomas to return from 
checking on his wife.  The jury heard that, after Thomas 
returned to the basement, Thomas "seemed nervous and kind of 
edgy . . . it was a whole different person from what I [had] 
seen him like."  
¶53 The medical examiner testified regarding the results 
she found during the forensic examination of Ms. Oliver-Thomas.  
The medical examiner provided testimony as to her autopsy 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
32 
 
report, which was received into evidence.  The jury heard the 
medical examiner's testimony that "the decedent had injuries to 
her face and her neck consistent with strangulation," such as 
hemorrhage and bruising along the front of the victim's neck and 
throughout the neck muscles.  The examiner further testified to 
bruises and bites on the victim's tongue, which she stated may 
have been caused "by a force against the neck pushing the back 
of the neck into the spine."  She also testified that she found 
injuries on the victim's lips in addition to scratches on her 
face.  She continued by describing petechiae, small burst 
vessels that she observed in the victim's eyes and which are 
commonly seen in strangulation cases.  The examiner further 
testified that the victim had approximately 70ccs of bloody 
fluid in her stomach, which the victim swallowed.  The State 
also entered nine photographs from Ms. Oliver-Thomas's autopsy 
into evidence. 
¶54 None of this evidence was affected by the State's 
substantive use of the hearsay Report in closing argument.  
While Thomas presented a medical expert in his defense, we make 
no determination as to the jurors' assessment of credibility and 
weight.   
¶55 The harmless error query does not reduce to a mere 
quantum 
of 
evidence, 
but 
instead, 
whether 
absent 
the 
hearsay/Report it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have found Thomas guilty.  Here, we conclude 
that the State offered sufficient evidence for a rational jury 
to determine Thomas sexually assaulted and intentionally took 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
33 
 
the life of his wife.  All of the observations of physical 
injury to Ms. Oliver-Thomas are consistent with the jury's 
conclusion 
that 
Thomas's 
interactions 
with 
her 
were 
not 
consensual and were intentional.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the State has met its burden to show that the error was 
harmless. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶56 We affirm the court of appeals and conclude that the 
State met its evidentiary burden to sufficiently corroborate 
Oscar C. Thomas's confession of sexual assault.  We also 
conclude that the State's use of the Report that a defense 
expert reviewed, but which was not admitted into evidence, did 
not violate Thomas's confrontation right under the United 
States' Constitution or the Wisconsin Constitution when used for 
impeachment purposes.28  However, we reject the State's argument 
that it properly used the Report's contents, during closing 
argument.  Furthermore, following Hemphill, a criminal defendant 
does not "open the door" to the introduction of testimonial out-
of–court 
statements 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
"correcting" 
a 
"misleading impression."  Although we conclude that the State 
did not use the content of the Report for its truth on cross-
examination, the State improperly used the Report's content for 
its truth during closing arguments, which the circuit court 
                                                 
28 We note that Justice Dallet's concurrence concludes the 
opposite, and is the decision of the court in regard to use of 
the Report during cross-examination of Thomas's expert witness.  
See ¶2, supra. 
No. 
2020AP32-CR   
 
34 
 
erroneously permitted.  However, we conclude the error was 
harmless because it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have found [Thomas] guilty absent the 
error."  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶46 (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 
18).   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2020AP32-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶57 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
portion of the majority/lead opinion holding that Thomas's 
confession was sufficiently corroborated to be admissible.  See 
majority/lead op., ¶¶12-24.  As noted in the majority/lead 
opinion,1 because this concurrence is joined by Justices Ann 
Walsh Bradley, Rebecca Grassl Bradley, and Jill J. Karofsky, it 
represents the decision of the court with respect to the second 
issue raised in this case:  Whether the State violated Thomas's 
rights under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause when it 
elicited testimony about DNA evidence contained in a Crime Lab 
report not in evidence without affording Thomas the opportunity 
to cross-examine the report's author.   
¶58 I conclude that the State violated Thomas's Sixth 
Amendment rights.  The State sought the DNA evidence described 
in the Crime Lab report for its truth at trial.  That much is 
clear from the prosecutor's closing argument to the jury.  And 
the State confirmed that the DNA evidence was offered for its 
truth throughout briefing and during oral argument in this 
court.2  For that reason, the DNA evidence in the Crime Lab 
report was testimonial hearsay; it was an out of court 
                                                 
1 See majority/lead op., ¶2.   
2 The majority/lead opinion is right that the State's 
position has changed over time.  See majority/lead op., ¶7.  In 
the post-conviction proceedings, at the court of appeals, and in 
its response to Thomas's petition for review, the State argued 
that the DNA evidence was used for impeachment at trial.  But 
that does not change what happened at trial or in briefing and 
oral argument before us, where the State took the consistent 
position that the DNA evidence was elicited and used for its 
truth.   
No.  2020AP32-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
statement, prepared "under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would 
be available for use at a later trial," and offered by someone 
other than the declarant for the truth of the matters asserted.  
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009) 
(quotation omitted).  Because the author of that report was not 
available for cross-examination, admitting testimony about it 
therefore violated the Confrontation Clause.  Nevertheless, 
because that Confrontation Clause violation was harmless, I 
conclude that Thomas's convictions should stand.   
I 
¶59 Thomas's forensic expert, the sole defense witness at 
trial, testified on direct examination that he did not see any 
defensive wounds or "signs of a struggle" on the victim.  This 
was important because Thomas argued that he killed the victim 
accidentally. 
 
During 
cross-examination, 
the 
State 
asked 
Thomas's expert if he reviewed reports from the Wisconsin Crime 
Lab in reaching his conclusions.  This was the first time the 
Crime Lab report and the DNA evidence contained in it came up at 
trial, and defense counsel objected to any questioning about the 
contents of the report.  The circuit court overruled the 
objection, however, and allowed the State to ask Thomas's expert 
about the report because he reviewed it before reaching his 
opinion.  The prosecutor then asked the expert about the 
report's finding that Thomas's DNA was under the victim's 
fingernails at the time of the autopsy.  After looking at the 
report, Thomas's expert said "[y]es, this appears to be an 
No.  2020AP32-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
analysis that shows that the DNA found under the fingerprints 
[sic] was obviously a mixture.  You are going to have [the 
victim's] DNA, but also evidence of DNA from Oscar Thomas."  He 
also confirmed that the victim's DNA was found under Thomas's 
fingernails.  Thomas's expert dismissed those conclusions, 
however, explaining that Thomas and the victim were married, and 
"[a] finding of the DNA, they could be scratching each other's 
back.  I mean, there is no evidence of trauma on him to support 
the fact that she was struggling."  The report was never 
admitted into evidence. 
¶60 The State's actions would have been permissible if, as 
the majority/lead opinion hypothesizes, it was done only to 
impeach 
Thomas's 
expert 
during 
cross-examination.3 
 
See 
majority/lead op., ¶¶29-34.  But the record, and the State's 
briefing and presentation at oral argument, all establish that 
the evidence was offered for the truth of matters contained in 
the report——that the victim's DNA was under Thomas's fingernails 
and Thomas's DNA was under her fingernails.  That was why, when 
the circuit court told the prosecutor to confine his closing 
arguments to the evidence, he responded——in front of the jury——
that "[w]e have testimony of the scratches on [the victim's] 
face.  We have testimony that it could have been caused by DNA.  
                                                 
3 After all, experts may rely on inadmissible evidence, 
including hearsay, in forming their opinions.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.03.  And if an expert does so, that inadmissible evidence 
can be used to impeach the expert's credibility on cross-
examination, but not for the truth of the matters asserted.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 907.05; see also State v. Heine, 2014 WI App 32, 
¶10, 354 Wis. 2d 1, 844 N.W.2d 409.  Nevertheless, as explained 
below, that is not what happened at Thomas's trial.   
No.  2020AP32-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
Her DNA is found under his fingernails."  The only "testimony" 
about DNA was Thomas's expert's answers about the Crime Lab 
report's findings during cross-examination.  And if there was 
any remaining question about the purpose of eliciting that 
testimony, it was answered in briefing and at oral argument in 
this court,4 where the State consistently asserted that Thomas 
impliedly waived his right to confront the author of the Crime 
Lab report when his expert's testimony contradicted the report's 
contents.   
¶61 Nevertheless, the majority/lead opinion insists that 
the State used the evidence during cross-examination not for its 
truth, but only to impeach Thomas's expert's credibility.  See 
majority/lead op., ¶34.  That is correct, in the majority/lead 
opinion's view, since the State's briefing "did not argue that 
the Report could be used for the truth of its contents."  Id., 
¶7.  But the majority/lead opinion misunderstands the State's 
position.  Its argument that Thomas impliedly waived his 
confrontation right only matters if the report was used for its 
truth.  After all, the Confrontation Clause only prohibits the 
introduction 
of 
testimonial 
hearsay, 
and 
hearsay 
is, 
by 
definition, an out of court statement that is "offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."  See Wis. 
Stat. § 908.01(3) (emphasis added); see also Crawford v. 
                                                 
4 For example, when speaking about why the evidence was 
admitted, the State's counsel stated that "we want it for the 
truth of the matter asserted," "[t]he State is not asking [for] 
it as impeachment," and "I don't want to go down the path of 
just calling it impeachment . . . ."       
No.  2020AP32-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004).  Thus, the State's 
consistent position before us is that it did not violate the 
Confrontation Clause when it sought to establish the truth of 
the Crime Lab report's findings through Thomas's expert's 
testimony on cross-examination.    
¶62 The 
problem 
with 
that 
position 
is 
that 
the 
Confrontation Clause "prohibits the introduction of testimonial 
statements by a nontestifying witness, unless the witness is 
'unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.'" Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 
237, 243 (2015) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54).  Crime lab 
reports are testimonial statements because they are "made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably 
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial."  Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310 (quotation 
omitted); see also Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 658-
59 (2011).  And for that reason, the conclusions reached by such 
reports may be admitted for their truth at trial only if the 
person who prepared the report is subject to cross-examination.  
See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 663.   
¶63 That wasn't the case at Thomas's trial.  Instead, 
through its questioning of Thomas's expert, the State was able 
to elicit DNA evidence from the Crime Lab report without 
affording Thomas the opportunity to confront the analyst who 
prepared that report——a straightforward Confrontation Clause 
violation.  See id. at 662 ("[T]he [Confrontation] Clause does 
not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the 
No.  2020AP32-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
court believes that questioning one witness about another's 
testimonial statements provides a fair enough opportunity for 
cross-examination.").   
¶64 The State tries to sidestep that violation by arguing 
that Thomas impliedly waived his right to confront the analyst 
who prepared the Crime Lab report when his expert witness 
"relied on" the DNA evidence in that report and then "gave 
factually inaccurate testimony about" it.  This argument is 
based on the direct testimony of Thomas's expert that he did not 
see any defensive wounds or "signs of a struggle" on the victim.  
The State claims that was inaccurate because the DNA evidence 
showed that Thomas's DNA was under the victim's fingernails (and 
her DNA under his).5  And for that reason, the State did not 
violate the Sixth Amendment by establishing the facts contained 
in the report through cross-examining Thomas's expert.   
¶65 This argument, however, mirrors an evidentiary rule 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
recently 
held 
was 
unconstitutional in Hemphill v. New York, 142 S. Ct. 681 (2022).  
That rule allowed evidence that would otherwise violate the 
Confrontation Clause to be admitted when the defendant "opened 
the door;" that is, when the defendant created "a misleading 
impression that requires correction with additional materials 
from the other side."  Id. at 691 (quotation omitted).  The 
                                                 
5 This argument is questionable even on its own terms since, 
as Thomas's expert explained, the DNA evidence does not 
necessarily indicate that a struggle occurred.  Indeed, the 
expert stated that because Thomas and the victim lived together, 
he 
would 
expect 
to 
find 
their 
DNA 
under 
each 
others' 
fingernails.   
No.  2020AP32-CR.rfd 
 
7 
 
Court rejected that rule because the Sixth Amendment's text 
"'does 
not 
suggest 
any 
open-ended 
exceptions 
from 
the 
confrontation requirement to be developed by courts.'"  Id. at 
690 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54).  As the Court explained, 
"[f]or Confrontation Clause purposes, it was not for the judge 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
[defendant's] 
theory . . . 
was 
unreliable, incredible, or otherwise misleading in light of the 
State's proffered . . . evidence," or whether that proffered 
evidence was "reasonably necessary to correct that misleading 
impression."  Id. at 692.   
¶66 The State attempts to distinguish Hemphill by arguing 
that Thomas impliedly waived his confrontation right.  As the 
State notes, Hemphill left open the possibility that one type of 
implied waiver, the common-law rule of completeness, might allow 
testimonial hearsay to be admitted under certain circumstances.  
See id. at 693.  And Justice Alito's concurrence in Hemphill 
suggested 
that 
defendants 
can 
impliedly 
waive 
their 
confrontation right in other ways, by engaging in "conduct 
evincing intent to relinquish the right of confrontation" or by 
taking an "action inconsistent with the assertion of that 
right."  Id. at 694-95 (Alito, J., concurring).   
¶67 Drawing on that framework, the State argues for a 
"narrow solution" that applies to the "narrow category of 
evidence that a defense expert relied on and gave factually 
inaccurate testimony about."  The problem with this argument is 
that it rests on the same flawed approach the U.S. Supreme Court 
rejected in Hemphill.  See Hemphill, 142 S. Ct. at 691.  As 
No.  2020AP32-CR.rfd 
 
8 
 
Justice Alito acknowledged in his concurrence, a defendant's 
introduction of evidence that is allegedly misleading as to the 
real facts is not, by itself, the kind of act that signals an 
intent to relinquish the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.  
See id. at 695 (Alito, J., concurring).  Yet that is what the 
State asks us to conclude: that the DNA evidence contained in 
the Crime Lab report "was reasonably necessary to correct [the] 
misleading impression" created by Thomas's expert's testimony 
that he did not see any defensive wounds or "signs of a 
struggle" on the victim.  See Hemphill, 142 S. Ct. at 692.  But 
adopting the State's position would defy Hemphill——something we 
cannot do.  Accordingly, Thomas did not impliedly waive his 
Confrontation Clause right, and admitting testimony about the 
contents of the Crime Lab report without affording him the 
opportunity to confront its author violated the Sixth Amendment.   
II 
¶68 Nevertheless, I conclude that the Confrontation Clause 
violation that occurred here was harmless.  An error is harmless 
if the State proves "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."  
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).  Thus, we look 
"not [to] what effect the constitutional error might generally 
be expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but rather what 
effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand."  
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (citing Chapman, 
386 U.S. at 24); see also id. ("The inquiry, in other words, is 
not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a 
No.  2020AP32-CR.rfd 
 
9 
 
guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the 
guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely 
unattributable to the error." (emphasis in original)).   
¶69 Here, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
admission of the DNA evidence did not contribute to the guilty 
verdict.  To be sure, the DNA evidence was used as support for 
the State's theory that Thomas intended to kill the victim and, 
conversely, to rebut Thomas's theory that the death was 
accidental.  And admittedly, the DNA evidence was somewhat 
useful in that regard as it bolstered the State's narrative that 
Thomas scratched the victim's face with his free hand while 
choking her to death.  But the evidence wasn't necessary to 
support that theory since the State's case was already strong 
without it.  The jury heard testimony from the medical examiner 
about injuries to the victim's face, neck, tongue, and lips, all 
of which were consistent with Thomas violently and intentionally 
strangling the victim.  Additionally, the jury also heard from 
Thomas's neighbor, who awoke to a loud argument in the middle of 
the night and a woman screaming "[s]top, stop, I love you, I 
love you."  She then heard a loud noise, furniture moving, and 
silence.   
¶70 Finally, even though the jury heard evidence that the 
victim's DNA was found under Thomas's fingernails, the rest of 
Thomas's expert's testimony undercut the importance of that 
fact.  When the prosecutor asked Thomas's expert about the DNA 
evidence, he said the presence of the DNA was unsurprising given 
that Thomas and the victim were a couple that lived together.  
No.  2020AP32-CR.rfd 
 
10 
 
Thus, even though it was erroneous to admit the DNA evidence in 
violation of Thomas's Confrontation Clause rights, it is clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to 
the jury's guilty verdict.  See id.     
¶71 
I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this opinion.   
 
 
No.  2020AP32-CR.bh 
 
1 
 
¶72 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  A majority of this 
court holds that the testimony of Oscar Thomas's neighbor 
corroborates a significant fact underlying his conviction for 
first-degree sexual assault.  I agree and join ¶¶12-24 of 
Justice Roggensack's majority/lead opinion.  A majority of the 
court also rejects Thomas's plea for a new trial on the grounds 
that his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights were 
violated.  This alleged error arose when, during cross-
examination, the State elicited testimony from a defense expert 
about certain DNA evidence in a crime lab report that was not 
admitted into evidence.  During its closing argument, the State 
urged conviction in partial reliance on that DNA evidence.  I 
agree with my colleagues that any alleged Confrontation Clause 
violation was harmless.  But I do not join their analysis of the 
Confrontation Clause issues for two reasons. 
¶73 First, it is unclear how to analyze and categorize the 
State's 
use 
of 
the 
report. 
 
In 
response 
to 
Thomas's 
postconviction motion and his appeal, the State argued the DNA 
evidence was used for impeachment purposes.  However, in 
briefing and at argument before us, the State asserts, and 
Thomas agrees, that the DNA evidence was admitted for its truth 
during 
cross-examination. 
 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
opinion 
concludes that the DNA evidence was properly used to impeach the 
defense expert——relying on the parties' prior arguments.  By 
contrast, Justice Dallet's opinion relies on the State's current 
representation, despite the fact that is not how this issue was 
litigated or represented below.  This is unusual, to say the 
No.  2020AP32-CR.bh 
 
2 
 
least, and forms a questionable foundation upon which to opine 
on these matters. 
¶74 Second, the confrontation issues in this case are 
novel and factually complicated.  They center on how to treat a 
report not admitted into evidence that is nonetheless reviewed 
by a testifying defense expert.  May the contents of such a 
report be explored on cross-examination by the State?  To what 
end?  The United States Supreme Court, whose decisions we are 
principally applying in this area of law, has not addressed this 
question.  With little guidance from the Supreme Court in this 
still 
emerging 
area 
of 
law, 
and 
because 
this 
case 
is 
sufficiently resolved on harmless error, I would not wade into 
these uncharted waters at this time. 
¶75 Rather than forge our own path on the State's use of 
the evidence, or analyze a novel area of federal constitutional 
law where the United States Supreme Court has left much 
unaddressed, I would simply conclude the Confrontation Clause 
errors Thomas alleges, if they are errors at all, were harmless.  
Thomas is not entitled to a new trial and his convictions should 
be affirmed.  I respectfully concur. 
 
No.  2020AP32-CR.bh 
 
1