Case Title: MMG Insurance Company v. Estate of Greenlaw

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2024-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2024 ME 28 
Docket: 
Cum-23-228 
Argued: 
February 7, 2024 
Decided: 
 April 18, 2024 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ. 
 
 
MMG INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
v. 
 
ESTATE OF PHILIP J. GREENLAW et al. 
 
 
LAWRENCE, J. 
[¶1]  Jodi Greenlaw, individually and as personal representative of the 
estate of her late husband Philip J. Greenlaw (collectively, the Estate),1 appeals 
from a judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, O’Neil, J.) granting 
a motion for summary judgment filed by MMG Insurance Company (MMG) on 
MMG’s complaint.  MMG’s complaint sought a declaratory judgment that it had 
no duty to indemnify Joseph McNeely, a close friend of Greenlaw, in a separate 
wrongful death action that the Estate filed against McNeely after Greenlaw’s 
death.   
 
1  To match the language used in the judgment and in the parties’ filings and briefs, we refer to 
Philip J. Greenlaw as “Greenlaw.”  We refer to Jodi Greenlaw individually as “Jodi.” 
 
 
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[¶2]  In granting MMG’s motion for summary judgment, the court 
determined that McNeely was not covered as an insured under MMG’s 
businessowners insurance policy because McNeely’s actions while wrestling 
with Greenlaw were not “with respect to the conduct of” McNeely’s landscaping 
business.  On appeal, the Estate contends that there are triable issues of fact 
regarding “whether Greenlaw’s death occurred with respect to the conduct of 
McNeely’s business.”  We disagree and affirm the court’s judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. 
Facts 
[¶3]  “The following facts are drawn from the summary judgment record 
and . . . are not disputed by the parties.”  Atkins v. Adams, 2023 ME 59, ¶ 2, 301 
A.3d 802. 
 
[¶4]  In 2019, McNeely operated, as sole owner, a landscaping business 
called Cutter’s Edge Lawn Maintenance.  MMG issued a businessowners 
insurance policy providing both property and liability coverage to McNeely, 
effective from May 1, 2019, to May 1, 2020 (the MMG Policy).   The MMG Policy’s 
declarations designate “the form of McNeely’s business as ‘[I]ndividual.’”   
 
[¶5]  McNeely had discussed with Greenlaw, his close friend, measuring 
and providing a proposal to hydroseed Greenlaw’s backyard.  On May 20, 2019, 
 
 
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Greenlaw hosted “an informal social group” of men at his house.  The group 
“met year-round on Monday evenings to share their enthusiasm for 
motorcycles by eating, drinking, telling stories, and taking a ride together if the 
weather permitted.”  The group also “discussed business-related topics” and 
“engaged in frequent business dealings.”  McNeely attended these meetings 
when he could.  On May 20, McNeely arrived at Greenlaw’s house around 
6:00 p.m.  McNeely came in his work truck, wearing his work clothes, and 
brought his work equipment to prepare an estimate for Greenlaw.   
[¶6]  McNeely and Greenlaw went to the backyard, where McNeely 
measured and provided pricing for the project.  Greenlaw said he planned to 
think about the project and would get back to McNeely about it.   
[¶7]  After the measuring and discussion, McNeely joined the group.  
McNeely discussed his landscaping business with multiple people attending the 
gathering.  At around 8:00 p.m., Jodi returned home, and the men, including 
McNeely and Greenlaw, “were ‘inebriated.’”  After 10:00 p.m., Jodi asked how 
the measuring for the hydroseeding went, and either McNeely or Greenlaw told 
her about the project’s progress.  “Late in the evening,” while “sitting and 
gabbing,” Greenlaw initiated a wrestling match with McNeely.  During the 
 
 
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wrestling bout, McNeely put Greenlaw in a chokehold, and Greenlaw lost 
consciousness and died soon after, despite McNeely’s efforts to revive him.   
 
[¶8]  Pursuant to the MMG Policy, MMG “will pay those sums that the 
insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily 
injury’ . . . to which this insurance applies.”2  The MMG Policy defines an 
“insured” as anyone “designated in the Declarations” as an “individual . . . but 
only with respect to the conduct of a business of which [the named insured is] 
the sole owner.”  (Emphasis added.)   
B. 
Procedural History 
 
[¶9]  On May 6, 2022, MMG filed a complaint against the Estate.  MMG 
alleged, inter alia, that the Estate had filed a wrongful death action against 
McNeely and that McNeely had entered into a settlement agreement with the 
Estate.  Through its complaint, MMG sought a declaratory judgment that it had 
no duty to indemnify McNeely in the wrongful death action.  See 14 M.R.S. 
§ 5953 (2023).  MMG alleged that “[b]ecause the circumstances giving rise to 
Philip Greenlaw’s death did not occur with respect to the conduct of McNeely’s 
 
2  The “insurance applies . . . [t]o ‘bodily injury’ . . . only if . . . caused by an ‘occurrence,’” and the 
MMG Policy defines both “bodily injury” and “occurrence.”   
 
 
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business, McNeely is not an insured under the MMG Policy.”  On May 13, 2022, 
the Estate filed its answer.   
 
[¶10]  On February 2, 2023, MMG filed a motion for summary judgment, 
along with exhibits and a statement of material facts in support of its motion.  
MMG contended that its policy “unambiguously excludes coverage” because 
McNeely was not conducting business at the time of Greenlaw’s death.  The 
Estate filed its opposition on March 6, 2023, along with opposing and additional 
statements of material fact.  The Estate contended that summary judgment was 
inappropriate because “there are just as many facts” showing that McNeely’s 
conduct was covered under the MMG Policy’s language and the issue of whether 
McNeely was acting with respect to the conduct of his business was for a fact 
finder to determine.  On March 31, 2023, MMG filed its reply in support of its 
motion for summary judgment and its reply to the additional statements of 
material fact.3   
 
[¶11]  On June 8, 2023, the court entered a judgment granting MMG’s 
motion for summary judgment.  The court determined that the language 
“conduct of a business,” though undefined in the MMG Policy, was unambiguous 
 
3  MMG stated that it “admits all of [the Estate’s] responses to the other facts and all of [the Estate’s] 
additional statements of fact.”   
 
 
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and that the plain meaning “is that liability coverage is limited to times when 
the policy owner, McNeely, is acting with respect to the conduct of his 
landscaping business.”  The court concluded that there were “no genuine issues 
of material fact” regarding what happened on May 20, 2019, and that “[t]he 
question of whether those events are covered by an unambiguous insurance 
policy is a question of law.”  The court held that McNeely was not an insured 
because “[r]egardless of [his and Greenlaw’s] earlier business dealings, the 
wrestling itself was not business-related.”  The Estate timely appealed.  See M.R. 
App. P. 2B(c)(1). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶12]  The Estate contends that “whether Greenlaw’s death occurred 
with respect to the conduct of McNeely’s business” is a triable issue of fact and 
that the court “erred by discounting the ‘earlier business dealings’ and the 
litany of other facts . . . when summarily finding that the ‘wrestling itself was not 
business-related.’”  Specifically, the Estate argues that “this factual 
determination encompasses a wide variety of factors and circumstances”; that 
McNeely was, inter alia, in the process of negotiating a business deal with 
Greenlaw, wearing business clothes, and driving his work truck; and that MMG 
could have drafted a policy that “unambiguously exclude[d] coverage for 
 
 
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recreational activities that also further legitimate business interests and 
objectives.”   
[¶13]  “We review the entry of a summary judgment de novo” and “will 
uphold the summary judgment if, viewing the record in the light most 
favorable” to the nonmoving party “there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Travelers 
Indem. Co. v. Bryant, 2012 ME 38, ¶¶ 7-8, 38 A.3d 1267 (quotation marks 
omitted); Am. Prot. Ins. Co. v. Acadia Ins. Co., 2003 ME 6, ¶ 10, 814 A.2d 989; see 
M.R. Civ. P. 56(c).  “An issue is considered genuine if there is sufficient evidence 
supporting the claimed factual dispute to require a choice between the parties’ 
differing versions of the truth at trial,” and “[a] fact is considered to be material 
if it could potentially affect the outcome of the case.”  Am. Prot. Ins. Co., 2003 ME 
6, ¶ 10, 814 A.2d 989 (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶14]  We also “review de novo whether the trial court made any errors 
of law in interpreting coverage under [an] insurance policy.”  Travelers, 2012 
ME 38, ¶ 8, 38 A.3d 1267; see Kelley v. N. E. Ins. Co., 2017 ME 166, ¶¶ 4, 9, 168 
A.3d 779; City of South Portland v. Me. Mun. Ass’n, 2008 ME 128, ¶¶ 7, 11-12, 
953 A.2d 1128.  “A provision of an insurance contract is ambiguous if it is 
reasonably susceptible of different interpretations or if any ordinary person in 
 
 
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the shoes of the insured would not understand that the policy did not cover 
claims such as those brought.”  Travelers, 2012 ME 38, ¶ 9, 38 A.3d 1267 
(quotation marks omitted).  If an insurance contract contains an ambiguity, 
then that ambiguity “is construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in 
favor of the insured.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  “Unambiguous contract 
language,” however, “must be interpreted according to its plain meaning.”  Id.; 
see Kelley, 2017 ME 166, ¶¶ 5-9, 168 A.3d 779. 
 
[¶15]  The MMG Policy provision is unambiguous.  The MMG Policy 
designates McNeely as an individual, and McNeely is thus covered as an 
“insured[], but only with respect to the conduct of a business of which [he is] 
the sole owner.”  Though the MMG Policy does not define “conduct of a 
business,” the language is not ambiguous.  See Travelers, 2012 ME 38, ¶¶ 8, 10, 
13, 38 A.3d 1267 (determining that the insurance policy language was 
unambiguous when the policy provided coverage for partners “‘only with 
respect to the conduct of your business,’ and [for] employees . . . only . . . ‘while 
performing duties related to the conduct of your business’”); see also Am. 
Policyholders’ Ins. Co. v. Kyes, 483 A.2d 337, 340-41 (Me. 1984) (determining 
that the court correctly deemed unambiguous the language of a policy that 
 
 
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provided coverage for an “insured, ‘but only with respect to conduct of a 
business’”). 
[¶16]  Nor did the court err in determining that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact and that McNeely’s actions while he was wrestling with 
Greenlaw were not “with respect to the conduct” of McNeely’s landscaping 
business.  In an analogous case, Travelers, we determined that “[t]he court did 
not err in concluding, based on the plain language of the policy, that [an 
individual who was a co-owner and employee] was not insured either as a 
partner or as an employee . . . when he exited his truck at a traffic light and 
assaulted” another motorist.  2012 ME 38, ¶¶ 1-2, 10, 38 A.3d 1267.  The 
insurer filed a complaint “seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to 
indemnify [the individual] for claims arising from the altercation,” and it 
“moved for summary judgment on its complaint.”  Id. ¶ 5. 
[¶17]  The individual in Travelers was traveling in a truck that he owned 
and that bore decals advertising his business, Prime Cut Meat Market.  Id. ¶ 2.  
The parties disputed whether the individual was traveling “to Prime Cut to 
check on the store’s freezers and the extent to which [the individual] used his 
truck for work associated with Prime Cut.”  Id. ¶ 5.  Despite this dispute, we 
affirmed the court’s entry of summary judgment for the insurer because the 
 
 
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individual’s “actions in assaulting [the other motorist] were not taken ‘with 
respect to the conduct’ of the meat market’s business.”  Id. ¶¶ 7, 11, 13. 
[¶18]  In this case, although it is undisputed that earlier in the evening 
McNeely had, inter alia, measured Greenlaw’s backyard and discussed his 
landscaping business with several individuals, there is no contention, as the 
Estate’s counsel conceded at oral argument, that McNeely’s actions while 
wrestling with Greenlaw were to further McNeely’s business or taken with 
respect to the conduct of his business.  Further, “[a]n ordinary person would 
not think that the policy’s language would cover” McNeely’s actions while 
wrestling with Greenlaw.  Id. ¶ 12.  We affirm the court’s grant of summary 
judgment to MMG. 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Walter F. McKee, Esq., and Kurt C. Peterson, Esq. (orally), McKee Law, LLC, P.A., 
Augusta, for appellants Estate of Philip J. Greenlaw et al. 
 
John S. Whitman, Esq., and Carol I. Eisenberg, Esq. (orally), Richardson, 
Whitman, Large & Badger, Portland, for appellee MMG Insurance Company 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number CV-2022-168 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY