Case Title: McAllister v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 645, 2009

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CURTIS E. McALLISTER,   
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 645, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 9703008409 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 16, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Decided:   August 30, 2010 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 30th day of August 2010, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Curtis E. McAllister, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s October 6, 2009 order adopting the Superior 
Court Commissioner’s September 16, 2009 report, which recommended that 
McAllister’s third postconviction motion pursuant to Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 61 be denied.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in February 2000, McAllister was 
found guilty by a Superior Court jury of Trafficking in Heroin, Possession 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §512(b); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62. 
 
2 
With Intent to Deliver Heroin, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, 
Maintaining a Dwelling for Keeping Controlled Substances and Conspiracy 
in the Second Degree.  He was sentenced as a habitual offender2 to life in 
prison.  McAllister’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.3  
McAllister subsequently filed two motions for postconviction relief, both of 
which were unsuccessful.   
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his third 
postconviction motion, McAllister claims that a) probation officers violated 
departmental regulations during the search that produced the illegal drugs 
upon which his conviction was based; and b) his trial attorney provided 
ineffective assistance when he failed to advance that argument at the 
suppression hearing.  McAllister contends that the procedural bars do not 
apply to these claims.   
 
(4) 
When considering a postconviction motion, the Superior Court 
must first apply the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing 
the substantive merits of the claims.4  In this case, McAllister’s claims are 
clearly time-barred.5  Moreover, because this was McAllister’s third 
                                                 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4214(b). 
3 McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119 (Del. 2002). 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 
 
3 
postconviction motion, it is barred as repetitive.6  Finally, because the issue 
raised by McAllister in his latest motion was previously addressed by this 
Court on direct appeal, it is barred as formerly adjudicated.7   
 
(5) 
In order to overcome the time and procedural bars, McAllister 
argues that this Court’s decision in Culver v. State, 956 A.2d 5 (Del. 2008) 
creates a new rule that must be applied retroactively.8  McAllister’s 
argument fails for two reasons.  First, Culver did not create a new rule, but 
merely applied the well-established doctrine that an uncorroborated 
anonymous tip does not provide “reasonable suspicion” to conduct a 
residential search.9  Second, the factual basis for the Culver decision is 
clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case.  While Culver dealt 
with an “anonymous” tip from a police officer to a probation officer, in this 
case the tip concerning McAllister, a probationer, came from a known 
informant directly to the probation officers without any action on the part of 
the police.  Moreover, unlike the situation in Culver, the tip contained details 
that were independently corroborated.  Finally, McAllister attempted to flee 
the scene once he realized that the police were about to conduct the search, 
                                                 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 
8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 
9 Culver v. State, 956 A.2d at 11-14. 
 
4 
further bolstering the probation officers’ suspicions that McAllister had 
violated his probation by engaging in illegal activity.      
 
(6) 
McAllister’s claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance is likewise unavailing.  Because the substantive claim made by 
McAllister is meritless, his attorney cannot be faulted for not having asserted 
it during the suppression proceedings.10       
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Justice 
 
                                                 
10 Rogers v. State, Del. Supr., No. 247, 2004, Berger, J. (Nov. 30, 2004); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).