Case Title: Trotter v. Litton Systems, Inc.

Citation: 370 So. 2d 244

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1979-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
370 So. 2d 244 (1979) Louis P. TROTTER v. LITTON SYSTEMS, INC. No. 51134. Supreme Court of Mississippi. April 25, 1979. Robert P. Krebs, Pascagoula, for appellant. Karl Wiesenburg, French Caldwell, Pascagoula, for appellee. Before ROBERTSON, WALKER and LEE, JJ. LEE, Justice, for the Court: Louis P. Trotter filed suit in the Circuit Court of Jackson County against Litton Systems, Inc. (Litton) seeking damages for a personal injury sustained while in its employ. Litton answered the declaration and pled, as an affirmative defense, that Litton is an employer within the provisions of the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Law and has secured payment of compensation as required by said law; that, at the time of the injury, Trotter was an employee of Litton, working in the scope of his employment, and that said injury arose out of such employment; that Trotter's sole and exclusive remedy is under the provisions of the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Law; and that Litton is not liable in a common law negligence action. The trial judge sustained the affirmative defense, which was heard preliminarily, and dismissed the declaration, from which order Trotter appeals here. The appellant received a cut on his left thumb June 6, 1975, while working in the appellee's West Bank Shipyard in Jackson County. He immediately went to the First Aid Station at said shipyard, and one Jerry Newman, an employee of the appellee, *245 working in the first aid station, sutured appellant's thumb. Newman was not a licensed physician and was not qualified to perform such function. The suturing resulted in an infection of appellant's thumb, which caused him to suffer acute cellulitis of the thumb and arm, resulting ultimately in the loss of use of his thumb. Appellant charged that the injury resulting from the infection was due to the negligence of appellee in placing an unqualified person in the first aid station and in not providing proper medical care and attention for appellant. This is a case of first impression in the State of Mississippi, and it deals with the dual capacity doctrine. 2A Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, 14-112, 14-117 (1976) discusses the doctrine as follows: Larson further discusses the doctor-employer relationship and opposing views. Appellant relies upon the cases of Szydlowski v. General Motors Corp., 59 Mich. App. 180, 229 N.W.2d 365 (1975); Vesel v. Jardine Mining Co., 110 Mont. 82, 100 P.2d 75 (1940); and Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952) in his brief. In Szydlowski his widow filed a wrongful death action to recover damages resulting from the death of Szydlowski due to a heart attack suffered while working for General Motors. She contended that her husband died as a result of treatment, drugs and medicine furnished (administered) him prior to his death. The Michigan court held that the treatment given Szydlowski was illegally furnished and that her action was well pled. (This case is absent a charge in the declaration that his death did not arise out of or in the course of his employment with General Motors). In Vesel, the employee was struck in the eye by a piece of steel. He received medical aid at the direction of his employer from a woman not qualified to treat him and, as a result, he lost the sight of his right eye and the sight in his left eye was impaired. A demurrer was sustained. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held that the employer was not bound to render care but that when it did, the employer was bound to exercise reasonable care; that the Workmen's Compensation Act was intended to apply only to injuries sustained by an employee in the course of his employment and as to such person, the act is exclusive unless falling under an exception provided by the act. The Court further held that the employer could not hide behind the compensation act and escape liability from his negligent or malicious acts toward an employee having no connection with the course of employment, and that the cause of action was well founded. In Duprey, a practical nurse was employed by the Shane Diagnostic Foundation. She received injuries while working there and was treated by Dr. Harrison, a fellow employee, and by Dr. Shane, her employer. As a result of the treatment, she incurred a new and further disability. The California Court held that the employer, Dr. Shane, *246 was responsible in a civil action for his negligent acts in treating her injuries. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 71-3-3(g) (1972) defines "injury" as "actual injury or accidental death arising out of and in the course of employment." Mississippi Code Annotated Section 71-3-15 (1972), a part of the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act, provides with reference to medical services and supplies, the following: Appellee relies upon Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 499, 125 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1976) where the Court, in restricting the Duprey principle and denying the suit, said: In Warwick v. Hudson Pulp & Paper Company, Inc., 303 So. 2d 701 (Fla.App. 1974), the Florida Court said: The Florida compensation statutes are practically identical with Mississippi's statutes. In Universal Manufacturing Company v. Barlow, 260 So. 2d 827 (Miss. 1972), the Court held that aggravation of a preexisting infirmity (which also means the aggravation of an existing injury) is compensable under the Act. The principle has been applied many times. Also, aggravation by a physician of an injury sustained by an employee in the scope of his employment is compensable. In McAlister v. Methodist Hospital of Memphis, 550 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1977), the Tennessee court said: We are of the opinion that, under Mississippi statutes, the principle announced in Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., supra, Warwick v. Hudson Pulp & Paper Co., Inc., supra, and McAlister v. Methodist Hospital of Memphis, supra, pronounces the better rule, and the dual capacity doctrine should not be applied, absent legislative enactment. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., and SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, BOWLING and COFER, JJ., concur.