Case Title: D. A. R. v. R.E.L., D.H., and R.H.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1151080

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2018-09-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: September 7, 2018
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2018
____________________
1151080
____________________
D.A.R.
v.
R.E.L., D.H., and R.H.
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-15-901410)
PER CURIAM.
D.A.R. appeals from a judgment by the Baldwin Circuit
Court dismissing his complaint against R.E.L., D.H., and R.H. 
We affirm.
1151080
I. Facts and Procedural History
On November 20, 2015, D.A.R., a licensed attorney
practicing in Alabama, filed a complaint in the Baldwin
Circuit Court against R.E.L., D.H., and R.H.  R.E.L. is also
a licensed attorney, who, at all times material to the
allegations in the complaint, was employed as an assistant
general counsel for the Alabama State Bar ("the ASB").  D.H.
and R.H. are brothers; they are not attorneys.  
According to the complaint, at some point before December
2007, R.E.L. and D.H. began "a personal, professional and/or
sexual relationship," and R.E.L. and R.H. began "a personal
and/or professional relationship."  D.A.R. alleged that in
December 2007, at R.E.L.'s recommendation and with his
assistance, D.H. and R.H. "filed a baseless complaint against
[D.A.R.] with the ASB."  D.A.R. alleged that the motivation
for the complaint was to use it "as a means to protect [D.H.
and R.H.] from liability for a debt owed by [them] to a client
represented by [D.A.R.] and/or as retaliation for his role in
representing that client."  
According to D.A.R., R.E.L. knew when it was filed that
the complaint against D.A.R. was baseless in fact and in law. 
2
1151080
D.A.R. also alleged that R.E.L. did not reveal his
relationships with D.H. and R.H. to the Disciplinary
Commission of the ASB or to D.A.R., and R.E.L. did not recuse
himself from the ASB proceedings against D.A.R., despite his
relationships with D.H. and R.H.  Instead, R.E.L. persisted in
prosecuting 
the 
complaint 
allegedly 
because 
of 
his
relationships with D.H. and R.H.  D.A.R. alleged that, after
he had spent almost two years defending himself against the
groundless charges, the ASB dismissed the charges with a
letter of caution that D.A.R. reluctantly accepted.  
 D.A.R. alleged that on November 24, 2013, he first
became aware that "[R.E.L.] and [D.H.] had an inappropriate
sexual relationship which preexisted the December 2007
complaint" and that that relationship "continued throughout
the pendency of the ASB proceedings against [D.A.R.]."  In
2014, D.A.R. informed the ASB of the relationship between
R.E.L. and D.H. and the alleged connection between that
relationship and the December 2007 complaint.  D.A.R. further
alleged that, at some later time, 
"[the] 
ASB, 
through 
its 
elected 
leadership
representatives, ... admitted to [D.A.R.] that the
complaint filed against him by [D.H. and R.H.] was
baseless, that the ASB proceedings against him were
3
1151080
inappropriate, tainted and wrongful from their
inception and at all times thereafter, and that, on
behalf of the ASB, [R.E.L.] improperly prosecuted
[D.A.R.] and deceived and suppressed information
from [D.A.R.] relating to the baseless complaint and
prosecution against him."
As noted above, on November 20, 2015, D.A.R. filed his
complaint against R.E.L., D.H., and R.H.1  D.A.R. asserted
claims 
of 
abuse 
of 
process, 
malicious prosecution, 
negligence,
wantonness, 
tort 
of 
outrage/intentional 
infliction 
of
emotional distress, slander, libel, breach of fiduciary duty,
fraudulent 
suppression/concealment, 
fraudulent
misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy. 
On January 6, 2016, D.H. and R.H. filed a motion to
dismiss the claims against them and a brief in support of
their motion.  D.H. and R.H. argued that they were entitled to
"absolute immunity based 
upon the nature of the quasi-judicial
function of the disciplinary process" and based on Rule 15(a),
Ala. R. Disc. P.  On the same date, R.E.L. filed a motion to
dismiss the claims against him on the ground that he was
entitled to immunity based on Rule 15(a) and (b), Ala. R.
Disc. P., because at all relevant times he was acting in his
capacity as an assistant general counsel for the ASB, and on
1The ASB is not a defendant in this action.
4
1151080
the grounds of State immunity, State-agent immunity, judicial
immunity, and quasi-judicial immunity.  On March 14, 2016,
D.A.R. filed responses in opposition to the motions to
dismiss.
The trial court held a hearing on the motions to dismiss,
and, on April 5, 2016, the trial court entered an order
granting the motion to dismiss filed by R.E.L. and an order
granting the motion to dismiss filed by D.H. and R.H.  The
trial court did not state a rationale in either order for its
decision.  
On April 25, 2016, D.H. and R.H. filed a motion to seal
the record on the ground "'that disclosure will result in
undue harm or embarrassment to an individual,'" quoting
Holland v. Eads, 614 So. 2d 1012, 1015 (Ala. 1993).  The
motion to seal further alleged that the "allegations could
further pose a serious threat of harassment, exploitation, or
other particularized harm to the parties in this action."  The
trial court granted the motion on April 27, 2016.2
On May 5, 2016, D.A.R. filed a "Motion to Vacate the
Order[s] of Dismissal."  See Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P.  In
2D.H. and R.H. also filed a motion in this Court to seal
the record.
5
1151080
the motion, D.A.R. conceded that R.E.L., D.H., and R.H. were
entitled to an absolute privilege against his slander and
libel claims, but he contended that the defendants were not
entitled to immunity for the other claims he asserted against
them.  Additionally, D.A.R. alleged that he had obtained new
information, specifically information that the initial
grievance against him had been referred to and denied by the 
County Bar Grievance Committee of the county in which D.A.R.
practiced law; that R.E.L., D.H., and R.H. had fabricated
false evidence to submit to the ASB Disciplinary Commission;
that an independent investigator engaged by the ASB to
investigate the matter had issued an independent report to the
ASB but that the ASB had subsequently refused to provide a
copy of that report to D.A.R., despite the ASB's assurance
that the report would be provided to him; and that the ASB's
then president admitted to D.A.R. that the prosecution of
D.A.R. by the ASB was wrongful and baseless from its
inception.  
Along with his motion to vacate, D.A.R. filed a first
amended complaint, omitting his claims alleging slander and
libel and realleging the other claims.  The first amended
6
1151080
complaint also changed certain allegations to assert that
R.E.L.'s misconduct was not within the scope of his authority
as an assistant general counsel for the ASB.3 
On May 8, 2016, D.H. and R.H. filed a motion to dismiss
the first amended complaint on the ground that the trial
3In D.A.R.'s motion to vacate, he explained the reason for
the changes as follows:
"At the oral argument of the motion to dismiss,
there was an exchange during which the parties
debated the impact of the claims in the Complaint
that [R.E.L.] was acting in the line and scope of
his employment by the Alabama State Bar.  The
argument of [R.E.L.'s] counsel seemed to imply that
this allegation alone somehow entitled [R.E.L.] to
absolute and unqualified immunity. [D.A.R.] submits
that such an argument is completely misplaced. 
Every defendant in civil cases in Alabama whose
conduct fell into an exception created by qualified
immunity was acting within the line and scope of
their respective employment with a state or
quasi-state agency.  As expressed in the legal
authorities presented by the parties in their
briefs, it is their actions that are nominally
within the line and scope of their employment, but
not authorized by law, that subject them to civil
liability.  The allegations of the Complaint clearly
allege conduct by [R.E.L.] that was not authorized
by law, and [D.A.R.] has filed an Amended Complaint
adding the factual allegations recited above, and
adding specific allegations that the conduct of
[R.E.L.] was outside the scope of his jurisdiction
as an Assistant General Counsel, was not authorized
by law and was in direct violation of applicable
law."
(Emphasis omitted.)
7
1151080
court's orders dismissing the original complaint were final
judgments 
that 
deprived 
the 
trial 
court 
of 
further
jurisdiction to consider the amended complaint.  On May 10,
2016, R.E.L. filed a response to the first amended complaint
in which he adopted and incorporated the arguments made by the
D.H. and R.H. in their motion to dismiss the first amended
complaint.  
On May 13, 2016, D.A.R. filed a motion requesting that
the trial court unseal the record and requesting that the
trial court "set aside the April 25 order, conduct a hearing,
... take evidence as necessary, and enter an order denying
[D.H.] and [R.H.'s] motion to seal."
On June 7, 2016, the trial court entered an order denying
D.A.R.'s motion to vacate the April 2016 orders dismissing the
original complaint.  On the same date, the trial court entered
an order denying D.A.R.'s motion to unseal the record, and it
entered respective orders declaring moot D.H. and R.H.'s
motion to dismiss the first amended complaint and R.E.L.'s
response to the first amended complaint.
D.A.R. appeals.  We note that, on appeal, D.H. and R.H.
filed a motion to seal the record.  D.A.R. did not respond to
8
1151080
that motion, and the motion was granted.  D.A.R. has presented
no argument that the trial court erred as to the sealing of
the record or that the record should be unsealed on appeal. 
See Muhammad v. Ford, 986 So. 2d 1158, 1165 (Ala. 2007) ("An
argument not made on appeal is abandoned or waived." (quoting
Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Heilman, 876 So. 2d 1111, 1124
n. 8 (Ala. 2003))).  We therefore do not consider that issue
in our analysis.
II.  Standard of Review
As this Court has noted, 
"immunity issues should be decided as early as
possible once raised.  See, e.g., Siegert v. Gilley,
500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 114 L. Ed. 2d
277 (1991)('One of the purposes of immunity,
absolute or qualified, is to spare a defendant not
only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands
customarily imposed upon those defending a long
drawn out lawsuit.')."
Vandenberg v. Aramark Educ. Servs., Inc., 81 So. 3d 326,
338–39 (Ala. 2011).  
"The standard of 
review 
applicable to 
motions to
dismiss is set forth in Ex parte City of Birmingham,
624 So. 2d 1018, 1020 (Ala. 1993), quoting Seals v.
City of Columbia, 575 So. 2d 1061, 1063 (Ala. 1991):
"'It is a well-established principle of law
in this state that a complaint, like all
other 
pleadings, 
should 
be 
liberally
construed, Rule 8(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., and
9
1151080
that a dismissal for failure to state a
claim is properly granted only when it
appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts entitling him to
relief.  Winn–Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v.
Henderson, 371 So. 2d 899 (Ala. 1979). 
Stated another way, if under a provable set
of facts, upon any cognizable theory of
law, a complaint states a claim upon which
relief could be granted, the complaint
should not be dismissed.  Childs v.
Mississippi 
Valley 
Title 
Insurance 
Co., 
359
So. 2d 1146 (Ala. 1978).
"'Where a [Rule] 12(b)(6) motion has
been granted and this Court is called upon
to review the dismissal of the complaint,
we must examine the allegations contained
therein and construe them so as to resolve
all doubts concerning the sufficiency of
the complaint in favor of the plaintiff. 
First National Bank v. Gilbert Imported
Hardwoods, Inc., 398 So. 2d 258 (Ala.
1981).  In so doing, this Court does not
consider 
whether 
the 
plaintiff 
will
ultimately prevail, only whether he has
stated a claim under which he may possibly
prevail.  Karagan v. City of Mobile, 420
So. 2d 57 (Ala. 1982).'"
Patton v. Black, 646 So. 2d 8, 9–10 (Ala. 1994) (emphasis
omitted). 
III. Analysis
D.A.R. argues that the trial court erred in dismissing
his complaint because, he says, R.E.L., D.H., and R.H. have
not established that they are entitled to immunity for the
10
1151080
actions he alleges they committed in connection with the Bar
complaint filed against him.4  
Rule 15(a), Ala. R. Disc. P., states:  "Complaints and
petitions submitted pursuant to these Rules or testimony with
respect thereto shall be absolutely privileged, and 
no 
lawsuit
predicated thereon may be instituted."  This Court has not
decided a case applying Rule 15(a).  A number of other states,
however, have statutes or disciplinary rules that contain
nearly identical language to Rule 15(a) -- "no lawsuit
predicated [on a Bar complaint and a petition] may be
instituted."5  One probable reason for this broad uniformity
4In their appellate briefs, the parties engage in a
preliminary dispute concerning whether the trial court
correctly refused to entertain D.A.R.'s first amended
complaint filed after the trial court had entered its orders
dismissing D.A.R.'s original complaint.  The difference
between the allegations in 
D.A.R.'s original complaint and his
first amended complaint are discussed above.  See note 3 and
accompanying text.  Based on the rationale for our decision
affirming the trial court's April 2015 orders dismissing
D.A.R.'s complaint, see discussion infra, we do not address
the issue whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow
D.A.R. to amend his complaint after the dismissal orders had
been entered.  
5States with identical or nearly identical language in
their disciplinary rules include:  California (Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code § 6094); Hawaii (Hawaii R. Sup. Ct., Disc. Rule
2.8); Iowa (I.C.A. Rule 38.9); (Louisiana (La. Sup. Ct. R.
Disc. 19, § 12); Mississippi (§ 73-3-345, Miss. Code Ann.);
North Dakota Rule 6, N.D. R. Lawyer Disc.); Rhode Island
11
1151080
is that the American Bar Association Model Rules of
Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 12, titled "Immunity," states,
in part:
"A.  From Civil Suits.  Communications to the board,
hearing committees, or disciplinary counsel relating
to lawyer misconduct or disability and testimony
given in the proceedings shall be absolutely
privileged, and no lawsuit predicated thereon may be
instituted against any complainant or witness."
In its commentary to this rule, the American Bar Association
states:
"The Rule recommends absolute privilege rather
than qualified privilege; qualified privilege may
not protect against harassment made possible by
simply alleging malice in a lawsuit. ...
"A 
policy 
of 
conferring absolute immunity on 
the
complainant encourages those who have some doubt
about a lawyer's conduct to submit the matter to the
proper agency, where it may be examined and
determined.  Without immunity, some valid complaints
will not be filed.  The individual lawyer may suffer
some hardship as the result of the occasional filing
of a malicious complaint, but a profession that
wants to retain the power to police its own members
(Art. III, Disc. Rule 7, R.I. R. Sup. Ct.); Texas (Tex. R.
Prof. Conduct 15.11); Wyoming (Rule 26, Wy. R. Disc. P.).  In
addition, conducting its own survey on this subject, the
Kentucky Supreme Court found that, as far as prohibitions on
lawsuits based on complaints or petitions against lawyers
(Rule 15(a)), "[a]t least twenty-eight states have evinced a
policy decision to bar such civil suits through enactment of
a court rule or statute."  Morgan & Pottinger, Attorneys,
P.S.C. v. Botts, 348 S.W.3d 599, 603 & n.2 (Ky. 2011)
(footnote lists applicable state provisions).
12
1151080
must be prepared to make some sacrifice to that
cause."
American 
Bar Association 
Model 
Rules 
of 
Disciplinary
Enforcement, Rule 12 Commentary. 
 
 Courts throughout the nation that have applied language
similar to Rule 15(a) have concluded that a Bar complainant is
entitled to absolute immunity from an action predicated upon
such a complaint.  See, e.g., Field v. Kearns, 43 Conn. App.
265, 275, 682 A.2d 148, 153 (1996) ("A rule establishing
absolute immunity for bar grievants protects the public
confidence and the integrity of our judicial system."); 
Tobkin v. Jarboe, 710 So. 2d 975, 977 (Fla. 1998) ("We
acknowledge the possibility that groundless or baseless
complaints against attorneys may sometimes be filed by
individuals.  However, Bar complainants must be encouraged to
step forward with legitimate complaints, which will further
the 
important 
public 
policy 
of 
disciplining 
attorney
misconduct."); Kamaka v. 
Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 117
Haw. 92, 105-06, 176 P.3d 91, 104-05 (2008);  Netterville v.
Lear Siegler, Inc., 397 So. 2d 1109, 1113 (Miss. 1981); see
also Caffey v. Alabama Supreme Court, 469 F. App'x 748, 752
(11th Cir. 2012) (not selected for publication in the Federal
13
1151080
Reporter) (discussing Rule 15, Ala. R. Disc. P., and affirming
the district court's conclusion "that Defendant Jones, the
state prosecutor, enjoyed [absolute] immunity for filing a
state bar complaint against Caffey").  See generally Mark E.
Hopkins, Open Attorney Discipline: New Jersey Supreme Court's
Decision 
to 
Make 
Attorney 
Disciplinary 
Procedures 
Public--What
It Means to Attorneys and to the Public, 27 Rutgers L.J. 757,
780 
(1996) 
(stating 
that 
"[a]bsolute 
immunity 
for 
complainants
against 
civil 
litigation 
is 
the 
rule 
in 
thirty-one
jurisdictions" 
and 
listing 
Alabama 
as 
one 
of 
those
jurisdictions6).
D.A.R. concedes that the claims in his original complaint
alleging slander and libel are barred by Rule 15(a), but he
contends that his other claims are not foreclosed by that
rule.  But the language of Rule 15(a) is unequivocal.  As the
Louisiana Supreme Court has explained:
"The key words ... are 'absolutely privileged.' 
A 'privilege' as it relates to the law of libel and
6The 
31 
jurisdictions 
Hopkins 
lists 
are: 
Alabama, 
Arizona,
Arkansas, 
California, 
Colorado, 
Delaware, 
District 
of
Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, 
Louisiana, 
Michigan, 
Minnesota, 
Montana, 
Nebraska, 
New
York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South
Dakota, 
Tennessee, 
Texas, 
Utah, 
Washington, 
West 
Virginia, and
Wyoming. See Hopkins, 27 Rutgers L.J. at 780 n.162.
14
1151080
slander is defined as an 'exemption from liability
for the speaking or publishing of defamatory words
concerning another, based on the fact that the
statement was made in the performance of a duty,
political, judicial, social, or personal.'  Black's
Law Dictionary, 1360 (4th ed. 1968).  An 'absolute
privilege' is defined as a 'privilege that immunizes
an actor from suit, no matter how wrongful the
action might be, and even though it is done with an
improper motive.'  Black's Law Dictionary, 1215 (7th
ed. 1999).  Louisiana jurisprudence has consistently
held that communications made in judicial or
quasi-judicial 
proceedings 
carry 
an 
absolute
privilege so that witnesses, bound by their oaths to
tell the truth, may speak freely without fear of
civil suits for damages.  Knapper v. Connick, ...
681 So. 2d 944, 946, citing Bienvenu v. Angelle, 254
La. 182, 223 So. 2d 140 (1969), overruled on other
grounds, Gonzales v. Xerox Corporation, 254 La. 182,
320 So. 2d 163 (1975).  This court has recognized
the difference between absolute immunity, which
defeats a suit at the outset, and qualified
immunity, 
which 
depends 
on 
circumstances 
and
motivations and often must be established by
evidence at trial.  Knapper, ... 681 So. 2d at 948.
"The key words in the additional sentence of
Rule XIX, § 12(A) -- and no lawsuit predicated
thereon may be instituted against any complainant or
witness -- are 'instituted' and 'no lawsuit.'  In
the 
context 
of 
this 
legal 
rule, 
the 
word
'instituted' is defined as 'to begin or start;
commence.'  Black's Law Dictionary, 801 (7th ed.
1999).  The words 'no lawsuit' clearly foreclose the
institution of any lawsuit whatsoever, regardless of
the cause or causes of action pled therein.  Thus,
Respondent's argument in the instant matter that
Rule XIX, § 12(A), as applied by this court, leaves
the door open for suits for malicious prosecution
and/or abuse of process is untenable.  It is
absolutely clear that Rule XIX, § 12(A)[,] prohibits
all lawsuits predicated on the complaint or the
15
1151080
testimony, and, thus, provides additional protection
to complainants and witnesses that the former rule
did not provide.  The policy decision by this court
to protect those who file complaints against lawyers
from retaliatory lawsuits avoids a chilling effect
upon the proper function of the lawyer regulatory
system.  This provision is consistent with the
overall purpose of Rule XIX to engender confidence
by the public in Louisiana's lawyer regulatory
system."
In re Raspanti, 8 So. 3d 526, 533-34 (La. 2009); see also
Morgan & Pottinger, Attorneys, P.S.C. v. Botts, 348 S.W.3d
599, 603-04 (Ky. 2011) ("Though few cases exist interpreting
the typically broad language of these rules, at least four
courts have specifically concluded that the privilege would
bar even claims relating to the act of filing the complaint,
such as malicious prosecution or abuse of process.  See
Wallace v. Jarvis, 119 N.C. App. 582, 459 S.E.2d 44 (1995);
Jarvis v. Drake, 250 Kan. 645, 830 P.2d 23 (1992)
(interpreting rule which affords judicial immunity to
participants in the 
attorney discipline process); In re Smith,
989 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1999) (interpreting former rule); Kamaka
v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 117 Hawai'i 92, 176 P.3d
91 (2008)."); see also Kamaka v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn &
Stifel, 117 Haw. at 107, 176 P.3d at 106 ("Here, the language
of RSCH Rule 2.8 clearly and unambiguously states that 'no
16
1151080
lawsuit predicated upon [complaints or testimony given with
respect thereto] may be instituted.' Thus, we hold that
malicious prosecution suits are barred."); State v. 
Baker, 293
N.W.2d 568, 576 (Iowa 1980) ("In the interest of protecting
the public from unethical practices, persons should not be
dissuaded from filing complaints by threats of defamation
suits or other litigation.").   
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that any claims
against D.H. and R.H. -- regardless of their potentially false
and malicious nature -- are barred by Rule 15(a).  
As to D.A.R.'s claims against R.E.L., D.A.R. alleged in
his complaint that "[i]n December 2007, at the recommendation
of [R.E.L.] and with the assistance of [R.E.L.] acting under
the authority of the ASB, [D.H.] and [R.H.] filed a baseless
complaint against [D.A.R.] with the ASB.  [R.E.L.] was aware
that the complaint against [D.A.R.] was baseless in fact and
in law."7  Based on the foregoing allegations and other
7D.A.R.'s first amended complaint alleged:
"9.  In December 2007, at the recommendation of
[R.E.L.] and with the assistance of [R.E.L.] acting
outside the scope of his jurisdiction as Assistant
General 
Counsel 
for 
the 
ASB 
and 
without
authorization of law, [D.H.] and [R.H.] prepared a
baseless 
grievance 
... 
against 
[D.A.R.] 
and
17
1151080
language in the complaint, we assume, without deciding, that
the actions R.E.L. took before the filing of the Bar complaint
against D.A.R., coupled with the filing of the complaint
itself, are sufficient to state a cause of action against
R.E.L.8
 
As noted above, R.E.L asserted the following grounds for
immunity from D.A.R.'s action in his motion to dismiss:
Rule 15(a) and (b), Ala. R. Disc. P.,9 State immunity, State-
agent 
immunity, 
judicial 
immunity, 
and 
quasi-judicial
subsequently sent it to the ASB.  [R.E.L., D.H., and
R.H.] were aware that the grievance against [D.A.R.]
was baseless in fact and in law.  The grievance was
sent by the ASB to [D.A.R.], and [D.A.R.] promptly
responded with ample and irrefutable evidence
proving the baseless nature of the complaint."
8We 
note 
that 
D.A.R.'s 
complaint 
also 
includes 
allegations
that R.E.L. violated the Alabama Rules of Professional
Conduct.  Such violations do not "give rise to an independent
cause of action."  Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-578(b) ("[T]he fact
that a legal service provider violated any provision of the
rules of professional conduct shall not give rise to an
independent cause of action ...."); see also Scope, Ala. R.
Prof. Cond.; Terry Cove N., Inc. v. Marr & Friedlander, P.C.,
521 So. 2d 22, 23 (Ala. 1988)("The Code of Professional
Responsibility is designed not to create a private cause of
action for infractions of 
disciplinary rules, but to establish
a remedy solely disciplinary in nature.").  
9Rule 15(b) states:  "The following shall be immune from
suit for any conduct in the course of their official duties: 
... (4) The General Counsel and the staff of the Office of
General Counsel ...." 
18
1151080
immunity.  As to quasi-judicial immunity, R.E.L. discussed
Mooneyham v. State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 802 So. 2d
200 (Ala. 2001). 
In 
Mooneyham, 
E. 
Lamar 
Mooneyham, 
a 
licensed
chiropractor, filed a civil action against the State Board of
Chiropractic Examiners and certain members of that Board as a
result of the Board's disciplinary action against him.  In
addressing Mooneyham's appeal from the dismissal of his
complaint against the Board and the Board members, we noted: 
"According to his complaint, Mooneyham has been
licensed to practice chiropractic in Alabama since
1990.  During that time, he alleges, he has formed
business 
relationships 
with 
certain 
insurance
companies.  He alleges that those relationships
involve performing 'utilization reviews' of other
Alabama chiropractors.  Mooneyham also claims that
he has frequently testified as an expert witness in
civil 
proceedings 
against 
other 
Alabama
chiropractors.  According to Mooneyham's complaint,
much of his work has been adverse to the interests
of certain Board members or their families and
associates.
"On February 8, 1995, the Board, by way of an
administrative complaint, charged Mooneyham with six
violations of various laws, rules, or regulations
applicable to the chiropractic profession.  The
Board ultimately found Mooneyham guilty of four
violations and imposed punishment that included a
$14,600 fine and a revocation of his license to
practice chiropractic in Alabama.  The adjudication
and judgment passed upon votes by the [Board
members].  Mooneyham's complaint alleges that the
19
1151080
sanctions imposed on him were among the most severe
sanctions ever imposed by the Board for any
misconduct, including that seen in the most serious
cases.  Mooneyham further alleged that after August
6, 1997, [certain of the Board members] maliciously,
willfully, wantonly, and in bad faith authorized the
communication of the Board's findings to specific
third parties, including the State of Florida and
the Federation of Chiropractic Licensing Boards, and
made those findings a matter of public record."
802 So. 2d at 202 (emphasis added).  
Mooneyham's 
complaint 
"include[d] 
allegations 
of
defamation; tortious interference with business relations;
malicious prosecution; conspiracy; and a violation of his
federal constitutional rights (brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983)."  Id. at 202. 
"The Board and the individual defendants timely
moved to dismiss Mooneyham's claims, pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., for failing to state
claims 
for 
which 
relief 
could 
be 
granted. 
Specifically, the defendants argued that they were
all entitled to various forms of immunity.  The
circuit court granted the motions."
802 So. 2d at 201.  Mooneyham appealed, and this Court
affirmed the order dismissing Mooneyham's complaint.  
In deciding to affirm the dismissal of Mooneyham's
claims, this Court first noted as to the underlying
disciplinary proceedings against Mooneyham:
20
1151080
"Mooneyham appealed the Board's findings and its
punishment order to the Montgomery Circuit Court. 
After hearing evidence, that court found that
Mooneyham's disciplinary action had been taken, and
the punishment imposed, in retaliation for his
performing 
utilization 
reviews 
for 
insurance
companies and for the adverse testimony he had given
in 
civil 
proceedings 
against 
certain 
Alabama
chiropractors.  The court concluded that the Board's
conduct had been arbitrary and capricious, and it
ordered the reinstatement of Mooneyham's license, a
reversal of the fine, and a dismissal of all other
proceedings against Mooneyham.  The Court of Civil
Appeals, on February 26, 1999, affirmed the circuit
court's order, without an opinion.  State Bd. of
Chiropractic Exam'rs v. Mooneyham (No. 2980001), 776
So. 2d 223 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (table)." 
802 So. 2d at 202 (emphasis added). 
As to Mooneyham's appeal, this Court first concluded that
the Board was entitled to State immunity as to Mooneyham's
state-law claims.  802 So. 2d at 203-04; see also Ala. Const.
1901, § 14.  The Court then affirmed the dismissal of
Mooneyham's claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
because "[t]he Supreme Court's refusal in Siegert [v. Gilley,
500 U.S. 226 (1991),] to recognize an injury to one's
reputation as a deprivation of a constitutionally protected
liberty interest forecloses Mooneyham's ability to defeat the
individual defendants' immunity defenses."  802 So. 2d at 205. 
Finally, the Court addressed the immunity of the individual
21
1151080
Board members as to Mooneyham's state-law claims, and a
plurality of the Court, sitting in a five-member division,
concluded that the dismissal of Mooneyham's complaint was
proper on the ground of quasi-judicial immunity.10
  
"Mooneyham's malicious-prosecution and
tortious-interference claims both originate from
Mooneyham's allegation that the Board's action
against him was wrongful.  Mooneyham essentially
claims that the Board wrongly proceeded against him.
He also alleges that the Board later defamed him by
making its subsequent adjudication a matter of
public record.  The Board members contend, however,
that their actions are protected by quasi-judicial
immunity.
"Quasi-judicial immunity is akin to judicial
immunity, although it is somewhat narrower in scope. 
See Ex parte Phelps, 612 So. 2d 1177, 1181 (Ala.
1992) ('"Quasi-judicial immunity is more limited
than the immunity afforded to judges and extends
only to those acts committed within the scope of the
actor's jurisdiction and with the authorization of
law."') (quoting Carden v. Hand, 407 F. Supp. 451,
10Justice See concluded that members of the Board were
entitled to State-agent immunity, and he therefore did not
"reach the question of the scope of quasi-judicial immunity."
802 So. 2d at 207 (See, J., concurring in the judgment and
concurring in part and concurring in the result in part as to
the opinion).  Justice See's position is interesting in that
he was willing to dispose of the case on what is arguably a
more difficult immunity to establish for purposes of a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  See, e.g., Ex parte
Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 177 (Ala. 2000) ("'[I]t is the rare
case involving the defense of [State-agent] immunity that
would be properly disposed of by a dismissal pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), [Ala. R. Civ. P.].'" (quoting Patton v. Black, 646
So. 2d 8, 10 (Ala. 1994))).    
22
1151080
482 (S.D. Ala. 1975)).  With respect to judicial
immunity, this Court has said:
"'"Whenever the state confers judicial
powers upon an individual, it confers
therewith 
full 
immunity 
from 
private 
suits.
In effect, the State says to the officer,
that these duties are confided to his
judgment; that he is to exercise his
judgment fully, freely, and without favor,
and he may exercise it without fear; that
the duties concern individuals, but they
concern more especially the welfare of the
State, and the peace and happiness of
society; that if he shall fail in a
faithful discharge of them, he shall be
called to account as a criminal; but that
in order that he may not be annoyed,
disturbed, and impeded in the performance
of these high functions, a dissatisfied
individual shall not be suffered to call in
question his official action in a suit for
damages." -- Cooley on Torts, 408.'
"Coleman v. Roberts, 113 Ala. 323, 329, 21 So. 449,
450 (1896).  The policy supporting quasi-judicial
immunity is the same.  As the United States Supreme
Court said in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.
Ct. 2894, 57 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1978), 'Judges have
absolute immunity not because of their particular
location within the Government but because of the
special nature of their responsibilities.'  438 U.S.
at 511, 98 S.Ct. 2894.  Quasi-judicial immunity,
when applicable, is absolute.  Ex parte Colagross,
674 So. 2d 1315, 1316 (Ala. 1996); accord Butz, 438
U.S. 
at 
514, 
98 
S.Ct. 
2894 
(holding 
that
administrative officials performing adjudicatory
functions are entitled to absolute immunity for
official acts).
"Mooneyham contends that the members of the
Board are entitled to the same immunity to which
23
1151080
most 
administrative 
officials 
are 
generally
entitled, that is, 'discretionary immunity' of the
character discussed in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d
392 (Ala. 2000), and not quasi-judicial immunity. We
disagree.
"The Supreme Court, in Butz v. Economou, supra,
addressed 
this 
issue 
with 
respect 
to 
an
administrative tribunal within the United States
Department of Agriculture.  The tribunal had issued
an administrative complaint alleging that Arthur
Economou, a registered merchant, had intentionally
failed to maintain minimal financial requirements
prescribed by Department of Agriculture regulations. 
The chief hearing examiner of the Department
sustained the complaint.  The examiner's decision
was then affirmed by the judicial officer of the
Department, who was entrusted by the Secretary of
Agriculture with decisional authority in enforcement
proceedings.  Economou tried unsuccessfully in a
federal district court to enjoin the administrative
proceedings.  After the Department had issued its
decision, Economou sued the chief hearing examiner,
the 
judicial 
officer, 
and 
several 
officials
associated with the prosecution of the complaint
against him, seeking damages.  He alleged that the
defendants had made the administrative complaint
available to third parties, without providing them
his answer, and that the defendants had issued a
press release reporting that he had committed a
violation of Department regulations.  The defendants
responded to these allegations with claims of
quasi-judicial 
immunity. 
 
The 
district 
court
dismissed the case.  See 438 U.S. at 480, 98 S. Ct.
2894.  The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed as to the district court's
holding that the defendants were entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity; the Court of Appeals held
that the Department officials were entitled only to
discretionary immunity.  See 438 U.S. at 480, 98
S.Ct. 2894.  The Supreme Court reversed, stating
that administrative officials performing duties that
24
1151080
are characteristic of the judicial process are
entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.  Butz, 438 U.S.
at 512-13, 98 S. Ct. 2894.
"We conclude that the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Butz v. Economou applies in the present case,
where Board members serving as administrative
officials performed a judicial function -- the
adjudication of a complaint.  Therefore, any claims
against the Board members arising out of that
proceeding are barred by quasi-judicial immunity."
Mooneyham, 802 So. 2d at 205-06 (emphasis added).  
In relying on Mooneyham, R.E.L. presented the trial court
with authority that quasi-judicial immunity protects even
retaliatory, arbitrary, and capricious actions by officials
when those actions are related to the filing and adjudication
of disciplinary complaints those officials are charged with
administering.  And, it is important to note that the
Mooneyham plurality rejected Mooneyham's argument that the
Board members were not entitled to absolute immunity, but to
discretionary immunity, i.e. "the same immunity to which most
administrative officials are generally entitled."  802 So. 2d
at 206.  Further, in affirming the trial court's dismissal of
Mooneyham's claims on the ground of quasi-judicial immunity,
the Mooneyham Court was 
"mindful that '[m]otions to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] should be granted
25
1151080
sparingly, and [that] such a dismissal is proper
only when it appears beyond a doubt that the ...
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
the claim which would entitle the ... plaintiff to
relief.'  Quality Homes Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
496 So. 2d 1, 2 (Ala. 1986)." 
802 So. 2d at 203.  
D.A.R. discussed Mooneyham in his response to R.E.L.'s
motion to dismiss, but D.A.R. did not argue to the trial court
that the Mooneyham plurality's discussion of the law of quasi-
judicial immunity was inaccurate.  Instead, D.A.R. emphasized
the Mooneyham Court's statement that quasi-judicial immunity
is "narrower in scope" than judicial immunity, and he urged
that "[t]he defense of quasi-immunity of a prosecutor
recognizes a clear exception that applies to the facts stated
in the complaint."  Specifically,  D.A.R. emphasized that
Mooneyham cited Ex parte Phelps, 612 So. 2d 1177 (Ala. 1992),
quoting Carden v. Hand, 407 F. Supp. 451 (S.D. Ala. 1975)
(reported sub nom. Turner v. American Bar Ass'n).  D.A.R.
stated in his response to R.E.L.'s motion to dismiss:
"Ex parte Phelps, cited by Mooneyham in the
preceding paragraph, also discusses this exception:
"'Quasi-judicial immunity is not absolute,
however, as illustrated by the following
language in Carden v. Hand, 407 F. Supp.
451, 482 (S.D. Ala. l975), where the court
26
1151080
stated:  "Quasi-judicial immunity is more
limited than the immunity afforded to
judges and extends only to those acts
committed within the scope of the actor's
jurisdiction and with the authorization of
law."  Here, a plaintiff bringing an action
against 
the 
Board 
for 
negligent 
supervision
would have at least a tenable argument that
the 
Board 
was 
acting 
outside 
its
jurisdiction 
in 
supervising 
pretrial
detainees.  Hence, potential liability for
the Board is not absolutely precluded.
[Emphasis supplied by D.A.R.]'
"[612 So. 2d at 1181.]
"Ex parte Phelps in turn cites Carden v. Hand,
407 F. Supp. 451, 482 (S.D. Ala. l975), cited as
Turner v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 482 (N.D.
Tex. 1975) aff'd sub nom. Taylor v. Montgomery, 539
F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976) and aff'd sub nom. Pilla v.
Am. Bar Ass'n, 542 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976):
"'From 
the 
Doctrine 
of 
Judicial
Immunity 
has 
come 
the 
Doctrine 
of
Quasi-Judicial Immunity. 
 
Alzua 
v. 
Johnson,
231 U.S. 106, 34 S. Ct. 27, 58 L. Ed. 142
(1913); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581
(C.A.3,1966) and cases cited therein at
footnote 7.  Quasi-Judicial Immunity is
more limited than the immunity afforded
Judges and extends only to those acts
committed within the scope of the actor's
jurisdiction and with the authorization of
law.  Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124
(C.A.5, 1955).'
"The Lewis case cited by Cardin states:
"'"... a quasi-judicial officer, such as a
prosecuting attorney, who acts outside the
scope of his jurisdiction and without
27
1151080
authorization 
of 
law, 
cannot 
shelter
himself from liability by the plea that he
is acting under color of office."  Cooper
v. O'Connor, 69 App. D.C. 100, 99 F.2d 135,
138, 118 A.L.R. 1440 [(1938)]; 43 Am. Jur.,
Public Officers, 
§ 277.'  (Emphasis
supplied [by D.A.R.]).
"Mooneyham, Phelps, Carden and Lewis all
recognize an exception applicable to prosecutorial
immunity.  In his motion [R.E.L.] incorrectly offers
Mooneyham as authority for the position that he
acted with full judicial immunity.  Under the facts
pled in the Complaint, [R.E.L.] has at most an
argument that he acted with limited quasi-judicial
immunity.  Assuming that he acted with limited
quasi-judicial immunity, there is a broad spectrum
of conduct for which a prosecutor like [R.E.L.]
would not act with any immunity. [D.A.R.] submits
that [R.E.L.'s] conduct was such that it was outside
of the scope of any quasi-judicial immunity." 
In his brief on appeal, D.A.R. does not cite or discuss
Mooneyham, Phelps, Carden, or Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124
(5th Cir. 1955).11  Instead, D.A.R. first discusses principles 
11D.A.R. cites Mooneyham in his reply brief, but he does
not cite  Phelps, Carden, or Lewis in that brief.  Also,
D.A.R. again fails to argue in his reply brief that the
Mooneyham plurality's understanding and application of quasi-
judicial immunity was erroneous.  Instead, D.A.R. purports to
distinguish Mooneyham by 
arguing that the Mooneyham Court held
that quasi-judicial immunity applied only to the Board's
actions in adjudicating the disciplinary complaint.  But, as
noted above, the Board's allegedly wrongful actions described
in Mooneyham were not 
limited to adjudicating the disciplinary
complaint.    
Further, D.A.R. argues, for the first time in his reply
brief, that Mooneyham is "distinguishable from the present
28
1151080
of State-agent immunity, citing Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d
392, 405 (Ala. 2000), and Ex parte Alabama Department of
Transportation, 
764 
So. 
2d 
1263 
(Ala. 
2000); 
the
case because the trial court in that case had a record of the
underlying disciplinary procedures at the motion to dismiss
stage."  D.A.R.'s reply brief, at p. 13.  Mooneyham contains
no reference to the Baldwin Circuit Court's (the trial court
in Mooneyham's civil action) having received such a record
from the Montgomery Circuit Court (the court that reviewed
Mooneyham's appeal from the Board's disciplinary action
against him) or the parties.  Mooneyham merely states,
apparently based on the allegations of Mooneyham's complaint,
that 
certain 
Board 
member 
defendants 
"authorized 
the
communication of the Board's findings to specific third
parties ... and made those findings a matter of public
record."  802 So. 2d at 202.  Further, the Mooneyham Court
clearly stated:
"We 
are 
mindful that '[m]otions to 
dismiss 
under
Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] should be granted
sparingly, and [that] such a dismissal is proper
only when it appears beyond a doubt that the ...
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
the claim which would entitle the ... plaintiff to
relief.'  Quality Homes Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
496 So. 2d 1, 2 (Ala. 1986).  We also recognize the
well-established principle that '[m]atters outside
the pleadings should never be considered in deciding
whether to grant a [Rule] 12(b)(6) motion.'  Hales
v. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 380 So. 2d 797, 800
(Ala. 1980)."
802 So. 2d at 203. 
In any event, it is well settled that arguments made for
the first time in a reply brief are "waived, and will not be
considered by this Court."  Perkins v. Dean, 570 So. 2d 1217,
1220 (Ala. 1990).     
29
1151080
burden-shifting process 
applicable to 
motions 
to 
dismiss 
based
on the ground of State-agent immunity; and this Court's
recognition that the issue of State-agent immunity generally
should be resolved through a motion for a summary judgment
rather than a motion to dismiss, citing Johnson v. Reddoch,
198 So. 3d 497 (Ala. 2015).     
D.A.R. argues that 
"prosecutors have only qualified immunity for torts
occurring in the investigative phase of a case. 
Their acts in making a pre-complaint investigation
have no quasi-judicial protection from immunity, and
are measured by the state-agent standard. Like
state-agent 
immunity, 
a 
defendant 
asserting
prosecutorial immunity has the initial burden of
showing that such immunity is justified for the
function in question.  That order of proof is
inconsistent with the procedure for a motion to
dismiss; so this remedy is typically inappropriate
where the defendant claims prosecutorial immunity."
D.A.R.'s brief, at p. 11 (emphasis added).  D.A.R. continues: 
"The defendant must bear the initial burden of proof
that the acts for which he is sued are discretionary
and, therefore, afford him the shield of immunity. 
Only then does the burden shift to the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant's acts were fraudulent,
willful, malicious, or in bad faith.  See Ex parte
Alabama Department of Transportation, 764 So. 2d
1263 (Ala. 2000)."
D.A.R.'s brief, at p. 15.  D.A.R. then argues:
"Unlike purely State agents, prosecutors also have
absolute immunity from liability for some acts that
30
1151080
are intimately connected with the judicial process. 
However, prosecutors have only qualified immunity
for torts occurring in the investigative phase of a
case.  Their acts in making a pre-complaint
investigation have no quasi-judicial protection or
immunity, and are measured by the state-agent
standard of Cranman and Ex parte Alabama Department
of Transportation.  See McConico v. Patterson, [204
So. 3d 409] (Ala. Civ. App. ... 2016)."
D.A.R.'s brief, at 17 (emphasis added).  
D.A.R. then proceeds to discuss the Court of Civil
Appeals' decision in McConico v. Patterson, 204 So. 3d 409
(Ala. Civ. App. 2016), purportedly as addressing "the
interplay among the general rules [established by Ex parte
Cranman and Ex parte Alabama Department of Transportation],
Rule 12(b) dismissal law, and the absolute immunity afforded
prosecutors engaged in the judicial process,"  
D.A.R.'s brief,
at pp. 17-18, and the burden-shifting process as to a
defendant who claims quasi-judicial immunity.  D.A.R. argues
that McConico supports the conclusion that a defendant who
claims absolute immunity has the initial burden of proving
that such immunity applies to the function in question. 
D.A.R. continues:
"The McConico Court held that '[b]ecause [the
district attorney] has not yet presented the issue
of prosecutorial immunity to the trial court, he has
clearly 
not 
met 
that 
burden. 
 
Thus, 
any
31
1151080
consideration of the issue of prosecutorial immunity
is premature, and this court will not affirm that
portion of the trial court's judgment dismissing the
malicious prosecution claim on that ground at this
point in the proceedings.' [204 So. 2d at 418]
(emphasis added)."
D.A.R.'s brief, at p. 21. 
D.A.R.'s discussion of the holding in McConico, however,
is inexact.  Fernessa McConico filed an action against Brandon
Falls, the Jefferson County District Attorney, alleging
malicious prosecution.  In the trial court, Falls asserted in
his motion to dismiss that McConico's claim should be
dismissed because a Jefferson County grand jury had indicted
McConico.  Falls did not raise or argue in the trial court
that he was entitled to prosecutorial immunity.  The trial
court dismissed McConico's malicious-prosecution claim based
on the fact of the indictment.  
On appeal, the Court of Civil appeals concluded that the
trial court erred in dismissing McConico's claim on that basis
because an indictment merely creates a presumption as to the
existence of probable cause.  The Court of Civil Appeals noted
that that presumption can be overcome by the plaintiff, and
McConico was not afforded an opportunity to rebut the
presumption.  
32
1151080
In Falls's application for rehearing, he asserted, for
the first time, that he was entitled to prosecutorial
immunity.  The Court of Civil Appeals chose to address this
contention on the merits and concluded that "[b]ecause Falls
has not yet presented the issue of prosecutorial immunity to
the trial court, he has clearly not met th[e] burden" "'of
showing that [absolute] immunity is justified for 
the 
function
in question.'"  204 So. 3d at 418 (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500
U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (emphasis omitted)). 
Unlike the defendant in McConico, R.E.L. asserted the
defense of absolute immunity from the outset in the trial
court, and R.E.L. presented arguments to the trial court
establishing why quasi-judicial immunity should apply to the
facts presented in D.A.R.'s complaint.  D.A.R. thus had the
burden of establishing that R.E.L.'s argument was incorrect. 
McConico does not support D.A.R.'s contention that his
complaint should not have been dismissed.
More importantly, we note that D.A.R. has effectively
abandoned the argument he made in the trial court addressing
the merits of the application of quasi-judicial immunity based
on the rationale of Mooneyham.  His argument on appeal instead 
33
1151080
conflates the analysis of State-agent immunity and its
exceptions with the functional analysis used for purposes of
quasi-judicial immunity and then focuses on the procedural
propriety of dismissal.  And, to the extent D.A.R. discusses
the merits of quasi-judicial immunity, he does not discuss
Alabama precedents establishing the limits of the state-law
defense of quasi-judicial immunity; instead, he discusses
precedents 
addressing 
 
federal-law 
quasi-judicial 
immunity 
for
purposes of actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, particularly as to
how such immunity applies to prosecutors.12   Our state law as
to quasi-judicial immunity, however, is not limited to the
parameters of federal law.  See, e.g., Bogle v. Galanos, 503
So. 2d 1217, 1219 (Ala. 1987) (noting that prosecutorial
immunity "under state law ... is at least as broad as immunity
12D.A.R. also makes no attempt to discuss why, under state
law, a functional analysis of the duties of a district
attorney or other prosecutor for purposes of prosecuting
criminal 
cases 
-- 
which 
includes 
unique 
risks 
to
constitutionally protected rights –- allows an easy parallel
to be drawn to the duties of an assistant general counsel for
the ASB as to Bar disciplinary procedures.  See Preamble, Ala.
R. Disc. P. ("The purpose of lawyer discipline and disability
proceedings 
is 
to 
maintain 
appropriate 
standards 
of
professional 
conduct 
to 
protect 
the 
public 
and 
the
administration of justice from lawyers who have demonstrated
by their conduct that they are unable or are likely to be
unable to properly discharge their professional duties."). 
34
1151080
under § 1983").  And, even as to federal law, this Court has
noted, after "review[ing] a considerable number of federal
cases which have grappled with the difficult questions of
prosecutorial immunity," that "[t]he federal circuit courts
are not always uniform in deciding whether absolute or
qualified immunity applies."  Bogle, 503 So. 2d at 1218.  In
other words, D.A.R. has shifted his argument as to quasi-
judicial immunity from the argument he presented to the trial
court, and he has failed to demonstrate that the trial court
erred by dismissing his complaint on the grounds he presented
to it.  See, e.g., Snider v. Morgan, 113 So. 3d 643, 655 (Ala.
2012)(arguments made to the trial court but not made on appeal
are waived); see also Campbell v. Taylor, 159 So. 3d 4, 13
(Ala. 2014) ("Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., requires that
the parties present in their brief the legal authorities that
support their position.  'If they do not, the arguments are
waived.'  White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 998 So. 2d
1042, 1058 (Ala. 2008)."); and Boshell v. Keith, 418 So. 2d
89, 92 (Ala. 1982) ("When an appellant fails to argue an issue
in its brief, that issue is waived.").  Accordingly, the trial
court's judgment must be affirmed.
35
1151080
III.  Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that that D.H. and
R.H. are entitled to immunity from suit pursuant to Rule 15(a) 
and that D.A.R. has failed to establish that the trial court
erred in dismissing his claims against R.E.L. on the ground of
quasi-judicial immunity.  The trial court's judgment is
affirmed. 
AFFIRMED.
Parker, Main, Wise, Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.
Shaw and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result.
Bolin, J., recuses himself.
36
1151080
SHAW, Justice (concurring in the result).  
I agree that Alabama law bars D.A.R.'s claims against
D.H. and R.H.  Rule 15(a), Ala. R. Disc. P.  As to R.E.L., I
also agree that Alabama law concerning quasi-judicial
immunity, as discussed in Mooneyham v. State Board of
Chiropractic Examiners, 802 So. 2d 200 (Ala. 2001), applies
generally to officials of the Alabama State Bar and that such
immunity applies here with respect to R.E.L.  That said, I
note that there are exceptions to quasi-judicial immunity that
appear to me to be applicable in this case.  However, because
those exceptions are not invoked and argued on appeal, this
Court is bound under our well established principles of
judicial review to affirm the judgment in favor of R.E.L.
Bryan, J., concurs.
37