Case Title: State ex rel. Hayes v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 1997-Ohio-180

Docket Number: 19950153

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State ex rel. Hayes, Appellant, v. Industrial Commission of Ohio et al., 
Appellees. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Hayes v. Indus. Comm. (1997), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Workers’ compensation -- Application for permanent total disability 
compensation -- Denial of application by Industrial Commission 
an abuse of discretion, when -- Commission’s order vacated and 
cause remanded for further proceedings, when. 
 
(No. 95-153 -- Submitted March 18, 1997 -- Decided June 11, 1997.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APD01-
20. 
 
Claimant-appellant, Johny Hayes, received five separate injuries during 
the course of and arising out of her employment as a nurse’s aide with appellee, 
Youngstown Hospital Association (“employer”), which were allowed by 
appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio (“commission”), as follows: 
 
1.  February 14, 1977:  “Fracture distal tibia right leg into ankle joint 
with effusion of right ankle strain substernal.”  Additional allowance for 
“Baker’s cyst right knee,” which was surgically removed on August 14, 1978. 
 
2.  August 18, 1980:  “Contusion of the abdomen (lower left quadrant).” 
 
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3.  May 28, 1981:  “Lumbosacral sprain, left knee sprain and abdominal 
muscle strain.” 
 
4.  July 26, 1982:  “Left foot and ankle” injury. 
 
5.  May 22, 1984:  “Low back strain and left ankle strain.” 
 
On April 11, 1989, claimant filed an application for permanent total 
disability (“PTD”) compensation, which the commission granted by order dated 
August 28, 1990.  However, on May 12, 1992, the commission reconsidered 
and denied claimant’s application.  On August 24, 1992, claimant filed a 
complaint in mandamus, which resulted in the issuance of a writ by the 
appellate court pursuant to State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio 
St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245.   
 
On March 4, 1993, the commission again denied claimant’s application 
for PTD.  In its order, the commission noted that claimant was sixty-two years 
of age, had a tenth grade education, a previous work history as a nurse’s aide 
and bar attendant, and possessed no special training or vocational skills.  The 
order explains further: 
 
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“The medical report(s) of Dr.(s) Masternick, Boening, Vamvas, 
McCloud, and Dillahunt and Messrs. Ruth and Kontosh were reviewed and 
evaluated.  The findings and order are based particularly on the medical 
report(s) of Dr.(s) Dillahunt and Mr. Kontosh, the evidence in the file and the 
evidence adduced at hearing. 
 
“*** 
 
“Dr. Dillahunt’s synthesis of all the medical reports on file is found to be 
the most persuasive for the reason that he included all the allowed conditions 
and related the physical restrictions resulting from them.  It is found that such 
physical restrictions would not prevent the claimant from performing the types 
of jobs noted by Mr. Kontosh in his second report; specifically, those of a 
clerk, check cashier, answering service operator, credit authorizer or telephone 
solicitor.  In accordance with the assessment of Mr. Kontosh, it is found that 
the claimant’s age of 62 would not prevent her from performing such sedentary 
jobs, nor would her tenth grade education pose as a barrier to her being 
retrained to do them.  Certainly, her past work history as a nurse’s aide would 
 
4
be an asset in obtaining a job as either an Outpatient Admitting Clerk or 
Hospital Admitting Clerk. 
 
“Based upon the foregoing, it is found that the claimant’s industrial 
injuries do not prevent her from performing some sustained remunerative 
employment on a sedentary level; therefore, her Application for Permanent and 
Total Disability Benefits is denied.” 
 
Dr. Paul Dillahunt’s report, dated September 18, 1990, states that 
“claimant suffers a 51% permanent partial impairment arising from the 
combined effects of all allowed conditions of all five industrial accidents *** 
[and] retains the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work.” 
 
Larry G. Kontosh, the employer’s vocational expert, evaluated claimant 
on November 6, 1991.  In his report, dated November 14, 1991, Kontosh 
reviewed the various medical reports in claimant’s file and concluded that such 
“medical documentation suggests that claimant might be able to do sedentary 
work.”  He listed claimant’s prior work history as including nurse’s aide, 
kitchen helper and bartender, and noted the exertional level of each to be in the 
 
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light or medium range.  During his evaluation, Kontosh administered a number 
of vocational tests, making accommodations in the testing procedure for a 
flare-up of a nonallowed neck and shoulder injury which caused pain in 
claimant’s right dominant shoulder, arm and hand. 
 
Kontosh outlined the results of the tests as follows: 
 
“*** Her [claimant’s] score on the Reading subtest was at the below 
third grade level. * * * Mrs. Hayes was given the Career Ability Placement 
Survey (CAPS).  This is a package of eight subtests which measure 
occupational aptitudes. * * * All of Mrs. Hayes’ timed scores on the eight 
subtests are below average.  Mrs. Hayes demonstrated she has difficulty with 
cognitive reasoning.  Her Mechanical Reasoning score is in the 8 percentile.  
Her Spatial Relations score is in the 17 percentile.  Her Verbal Reasoning score 
is in the 2 percentile, and her Numerical Ability is in the 2 percentile. 
 
“However, considering her untimed scores, there are two which are at the 
average range.  Her untimed Verbal Reasoning is at the 50 percentile and her 
Language Usage is also at the 50 percentile.  These higher, untimed scores 
 
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suggest Mrs. Hayes has verbal and language ability, but does not reason at 
competitive levels. 
 
“Mrs. Hayes demonstrates the ability to follow verbal instructions.  
However, she showed problems with the understanding of written instructions.  
This issue suggests reading comprehension problems and is consistent with the 
above reasoning speed problems.” 
 
Kontosh summarized that claimant’s “aptitudes would suggest jobs 
which deal primarily with things and people and not so much with data.”  
However, he concluded that “[t]he absence of the use of her dominant hand 
presents a vocational disability which is significant and not adequately 
overcome by [her] vocational aptitudes.”  Thus, he opined, claimant “may not 
be medically stable and *** her apparent present condition precludes totally 
her ability to work.” 
 
Since the condition involving claimant’s right upper extremities was not 
work-related, the employer asked Kontosh to clarify his report.  On February 
25, 1993, Kontosh issued a “Supplemental Report” that listed the sedentary 
 
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occupational titles mentioned in the commission’s March 4, 1993 order, and 
concluded that “based on the allowed conditions, and [claimant’s] age, 
education, and past work experience it is reasonable to accept that this claimant 
can do any of the jobs suggested in this report.”  However, no additional testing 
or retesting was performed prior to Kontosh’s supplemental report. 
 
Claimant filed a motion for reconsideration of the commission’s March 
4, 1993 order, which the commission denied, and then instituted an action in 
mandamus, alleging that some evidence does not exist to support the 
commission’s order.  She sought a writ ordering the commission to amend its 
order and enter a finding of PTD.  The court of appeals, adopting the referee’s 
report, denied the writ. 
 
This cause is before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
_______________ 
 
Schiavoni, Schiavoni & Bush and Thomas Tootle, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Steven P. Fixler, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio. 
 
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Manos, Pappas, Stefanski & DeFoy Co., L.P.A., Leonard J. Pappas and 
James A. Neff, for appellee Youngstown Hospital Association. 
_______________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  It is well settled that the determination of disputed factual 
situations, including that of PTD and whether the claimant could return to any 
other employment, is totally within the province and final jurisdiction of the 
commission, subject to correction by action in mandamus only upon a showing 
of abuse of discretion.  See State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 31 
Ohio St.3d 167, 172-173, 31 OBR 369, 374, 509 N.E.2d 946, 951; State ex rel. 
Kokocinski v. Indus. Comm. (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 186, 188, 11 OBR 499, 500, 
464 N.E.2d 564, 566. 
 
However, in determining PTD, the commission is required to consider all 
medical and nonmedical disability factors contained in the record and, in its 
order, must specifically state what evidence has been relied upon, and briefly 
explain the reasoning for its decision.  Stephenson; Noll.  “Noll quite clearly 
stands for the proposition that the commission must explain, in its orders, how 
 
9
the Stephenson factors, if pertinent, support the commission’s determination 
granting or denying the requested benefits.”  State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm (1994), 
68 Ohio St.3d 315, 321, 626 N.E.2d 666, 671.  “The issuance of a writ of 
mandamus is appropriate where the court finds non-compliance with Noll, as 
such non-compliance is equivalent to an abuse of discretion.”  State ex rel. 
Ranomer v. Indus. Comm. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 134, 137, 642 N.E.2d 373, 
376. 
 
Dr. Dillahunt’s report constitutes some evidence to support the 
commission’s finding that claimant is medically capable of returning to some 
sustained remunerative employment of a strictly sedentary nature.  However, a 
medically based capacity for certain employment is immaterial if claimant’s 
nonmedical disability factors operate to foreclose such employment.  State ex 
rel. Lawrence v. Am. Lubricants Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 321, 322, 533 
N.E.2d 344, 346.  As in almost all PTD decisions that are appealed to this 
court, this case “involve[s] a claimant who retains some medical capacity for 
work, making the role of nonmedical factors even more critical.”  State ex rel. 
 
10
Waddle v. Indus. Comm. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 452, 458, 619 N.E.2d 1018, 
1022. 
 
Thus, to adequately justify its decision denying claimant’s application 
for PTD compensation, the commission, in its order, would need to explain 
how it is that a sixty-two-year-old, fifty-one percent medically impaired 
claimant with a tenth grade education, who has worked only as a nurse’s aide, 
kitchen helper and bartender, who has no special training or vocational skills, 
and who has a severely limited vocational aptitude, including reading at below 
a third grade level, mechanical reasoning ability in the eight percentile, verbal 
reasoning and numerical ability in the two percentile, and noncompetitive 
verbal and language abilities, can realistically return to the job market to do 
work of a strictly sedentary nature.  State ex rel. Gay, 68 Ohio St.3d at 321, 626 
N.E.2d at 671. 
 
The commission’s order of March 4, 1993, explains: 
 
“In accordance with the assessment of Mr. Kontosh, it is found that the 
claimant’s age of 62 would not prevent her from performing such sedentary 
 
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jobs, nor would her tenth grade education pose as a barrier to her being 
retrained to do them.  Certainly, her past work history as a nurse’s aide would 
be an asset in obtaining a job as either an Outpatient Admitting Clerk or 
Hospital Admitting Clerk.” 
 
This order provides no insight into how the various nonmedical 
disability factors in this case support the denial of PTD compensation.  It does 
not disclose whether the commission considered claimant’s age and education 
to be vocationally favorable or unfavorable.  To the contrary, the phraseology 
of the order is elusive in this regard, and reveals little more than that claimant 
is sixty-two years of age, has a tenth grade education, is capable of sedentary 
work and, therefore, is not permanently and totally disabled.  “If, for example, 
the commission views these factors as assets to retraining, it should say so.”  
State ex rel. Waddle, 67 Ohio St.3d at 458, 619 N.E.2d at 1022. 
 
Also, regardless of whether the commission views these factors as assets 
or as a hindrance to retraining, it should, in this case, explain how the claimant, 
in light of all nonmedical disability factors, is capable of retraining and 
 
12
entering the job market.  At the very least, this would require that the 
commission give consideration to whether the combination of claimant’s age, 
education, lack of special training and vocational skills, and severely limited 
vocational aptitude present “a barrier to her being retrained.” 
 
However, the commission’s order is grammatically constructed in a way 
that avoids correlating the various nonmedical disability factors.  The order 
states only that claimant’s “tenth grade education” would not preclude her from 
being retrained, and mentions claimant’s “age of 62” only with reference to her 
“performing such sedentary jobs.”  There is no indication that the commission 
gave any consideration to whether claimant’s age, let alone the other disability 
factors, would combine with her tenth grade education to make retraining 
unrealistic.  Such an inquiry is particularly pertinent in this case because, as the 
commission noted in its order, “[d]ue to her age, the claimant was not referred 
to the Rehabilitation Division.” 
 
The commission’s explanation that claimant’s work history as a nurse’s 
aide would be an asset in obtaining a job as an outpatient or hospital admitting 
 
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clerk provides no additional insight into why claimant should be denied PTD 
compensation.  Even if we were to accept that claimant’s prior work history as 
a nurse’s aide is an asset, there is no indication in the commission’s order that 
such fact would offset her other vocational disabilities.  Moreover, we would 
be remiss not to question how the skills acquired as a nurse’s aide are 
transferable to the job of admitting clerk, or how the claimant in this case is 
suited to work as an admitting clerk when her vocational aptitudes would 
suggest jobs that do not, in Kontosh’s words, deal “so much with data.”  While 
such matters are generally within the province of the commission, certain 
findings, albeit factual, cry out for explanation. 
 
The commission’s order is also flawed because it purports to relieve the 
commission of its responsibilities under Stephenson and Noll, by entering 
findings “[i]n accordance with the assessment of Mr. Kontosh.”  The 
commission remains the ultimate authority to determine the totality and 
permanency of the allowed injury.  “The commission is not required to accept 
the factual findings stated in a medical report at face value and, without 
 
14
questioning such, adopt the conclusions as those of the commission.  * * * [T]o 
do so would be tantamount to allowing a physician to determine disability 
rather than the commission.”  (Citations omitted.)  State ex rel. Stephenson, 31 
Ohio St.3d at 171, 31 OBR at 373, 509 N.E.2d at 950. 
 
The same holds true with regard to specialized vocational or 
rehabilitation reports.  State ex rel. Ellis v. McGraw Edison Co. (1993), 66 
Ohio St.3d 92, 94, 609 N.E.2d 164, 166.  Thus, as aptly explained in Fulton, 
Ohio Workers’ Compensation Law (1991) 219, Section 9.14: 
 
“Whether it is a medical doctor or a vocational expert who submits an 
opinion, it is the Industrial Commission and not the outside expert that has the 
responsibility of determining whether the claimant is disabled.  The Industrial 
Commission must consider the factors that informed the experts’ opinions, but 
the experts cannot usurp the role of the Commission in determining disability.”  
See, also, State ex rel. Huntley v. Interlake Steel Corp. (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 
168, 538 N.E.2d 103; State ex rel. Basham v. Consolidation Coal Co. (1989), 
43 Ohio St.3d 151, 152, 541 N.E.2d 47, 48; State ex rel. Adkins v. Indus. 
 
15
Comm. (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 180, 182, 24 OBR 410, 412-413, 494 N.E.2d 
1105, 1108 (Locher, J., concurring). 
 
The remaining question is whether to remand the cause pursuant to Noll, 
allowing the commission to reconsider and properly explain its decision, or to 
direct the commission to enter an order finding claimant permanently and 
totally disabled, pursuant to Gay. 
 
The commission argues that relief under Gay should be rejected because 
this case does not present the required profile, i.e., where the commission’s 
order has “combined unfavorable vocational evidence with medical evidence 
that assessed a relatively high degree of physical impairment.”  We reject this 
argument because that is exactly the situation in the present case.  There is very 
little about the vocational evidence in this case, other than Kontosh’s 
supplemental opinion, that can be characterized as vocationally favorable.  In 
addition, we have specifically stated that a particular physician, in his reports, 
“assessed a high (fifty percent) degree of impairment.”  State ex rel. Lopez v. 
Indus. Comm. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 445, 449, 633 N.E.2d 528, 531; State ex 
 
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rel. Taylor v. Indus. Comm. (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 582, 585, 645 N.E.2d 1249, 
1252. 
 
Nevertheless, we find relief under Gay to be inappropriate in this case.  
In Gay, we observed that “the commission cited no evidence to support its 
apparent  conclusion that [claimant’s] nonmedical disability factors are work-
amenable, and all the evidence which appears in the record indicates that the 
factors are not vocationally favorable.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id., 68 Ohio St.3d at 
322, 626 N.E.2d at 672.  In the present case, unlike in Gay, the record contains 
the report of Kontosh, a vocational expert, opining that “based on the allowed 
conditions, and [claimant’s] age, education, and past work experience it is 
reasonable to accept that this claimant can do any of the jobs suggested in this 
report.”  It remains the commission’s task, although not an easy one in this 
case, to correlate Kontosh’s findings with claimant’s ability to engage in 
sustained remunerative employment.  Of course, the commission may 
reconsider its conclusion that claimant is not permanently and totally disabled. 
 
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For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals.  A limited writ is granted ordering the commission to vacate its order 
and to proceed in accordance with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and limited writ allowed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and F.E. SWEENEY, J., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., concur in judgment. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring in judgment.     The majority has recited the 
status of this “* * * sixty-two year old, fifty-one percent medically impaired 
claimant with a tenth grade education, who has worked only as a nurse’s aide, 
kitchen helper and bartender, who has [absolutely] no special training or 
vocational skills, and who has a severely limited vocational aptitude, including 
reading at below a third grade level, mechanical reasoning ability in the eight 
percentile, verbal reasoning and numerical ability in the two percentile, and 
noncompetitive verbal and language abilities * * *.”  What else needs to be 
 
18
said to afford relief pursuant to State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 
315, 626 N.E.2d 666?  I would grant Gay relief. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  Because the commission’s order is 
clearly supported by “some evidence,” which, as the majority points out, is the 
legal standard of review, I would affirm the court of appeals. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.