Case Title: Pokorny v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n

Citation: 382 So. 2d 678

Docket Number: 53023

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1980-04-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
382 So. 2d 678 (1980)
Robert John POKORNY, Howard E. Shuping, and Mary Shuping, His Wife, Plaintiffs,
v.
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION OF LARGO, Florida et al., Defendants.
No. 53023.

Supreme Court of Florida.
April 3, 1980.
*679 John L. McFadyen of Lloyd & Henniger, St. Petersburg, for plaintiffs.
Thomas T. Steele of Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, Tampa, for defendants.
ADKINS, Justice.
We have for consideration questions of law certified to us by the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, in accordance with the provision of Rule 9.510, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, formerly Rule 4.61, Florida Appellate Rules (1962).
Pokorny, Shuping, and Shuping's wife, as plaintiffs, brought an action against the Federal Savings & Loan Association as defendant for causing an arrest. There was a verdict for the defense in the United States District Court and plaintiffs appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the case involved a question or proposition of the law of the state of Florida which was determinative of the cause and that there appeared to be no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the appellate courts of the state of Florida. The statement of facts and the questions certified to us for consideration read as follows:
QUESTIONS FOR THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
Pokorny v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Largo, 563 F.2d 763, 765-66 (5th Cir.1977).
Plaintiffs argue that the defendant proximately caused the false imprisonment and unlawful detention of the plaintiffs and that the defendant is therefore liable. Defendant argues that the mere fact that a person's communication to an officer may have caused the victims' arrest did not make him liable when he did not in fact request any detention.
Plaintiffs rely primarily upon the case of Johnson v. Weiner, 155 Fla. 169, 172, 19 So. 2d 699, 701 (Fla. 1944), where the Court said:
In Johnson v. Weiner, supra, the defendant had sworn out a warrant for the arrest of Jack Johnson and had subsequently erroneously pointed out the plaintiff as the perpetrator named in the warrant. The defendant in Johnson not only requested a warrant but also identified the plaintiff. This amounted to a "request" for an arrest and constituted more than merely supplying information to law enforcement officers or accusing another of a crime.
Washington County Kennel Club, Inc., v. Edge, 216 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968), relied upon by plaintiffs, involved a situation where the plaintiffs were initially detained in the defendant's office against their will and were subsequently arrested by a deputy sheriff at the request and instigation of the defendant's agent. Applying the test of Johnson v. Weiner, supra, the Court held that the defendant was guilty of false imprisonment in two instances: By itself unlawfully detaining the plaintiffs and by requesting the unlawful arrest by the deputy sheriff. The action of the private citizen constituted far more than merely supplying information to law enforcement officers or accusing plaintiffs of a crime.
Plaintiff also cites Jackson v. Biscayne Medical Center, Inc., 347 So. 2d 721 (Fla.3d DCA 1977). In this case the Court held that a complaint stated a cause of action for false arrest where it alleged that the defendant hospital's employees detained plaintiff against his will and procured his arrest by law enforcement officers.
In the case sub judice, the defendant, First Federal Savings & Loan Association, did not detain the defendant. The agent of the defendant represented to the F.B.I. that an attempted robbery had occurred. Plaintiffs say that there was no attempted robbery, but based on the conclusion of the defendant's employees, the arrest was made. Plaintiffs urge that this clearly constitutes direct procurement of an arrest.
*682 Defendant relies upon a general rule that a private citizen may not be held liable in tort where he neither actually detained another nor instigated the other's arrest by law enforcement officers. See generally Annot. 21 ALR2d 643 (1952).
Some courts have consistently upheld the privilege of private citizens to provide, without fear of subsequent tort liability, information about suspected criminal activities to law enforcement officials, even where the information was mistaken, and the providing of such information constituted the principal cause of imprisonment. See Charles Stores Co. v. O'Quinn, 178 F.2d 372 (4th Cir.1949); Harris v. Barham, 35 N.C. App. 13, 239 S.E.2d 717 (1978).
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 45A, Comment (c) (1965) contains the following:
In Manis v. Miller, 327 So. 2d 117 (Fla.2d DCA 1976), the defendant, a private citizen, erroneously identified the plaintiff as the perpetrator of an armed robbery, leading to his arrest and imprisonment. In a subsequent tort suit brought by the mistakenly arrested suspect against the witness, the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff despite the defendant's good faith. On appeal the district court of appeal reversed and held:
327 So. 2d  at 118. In Manis the Court rested its decision upon the policy of encouraging private citizens to become involved in law enforcement:
Id. at 117.
We hold that under Florida law a private citizen may not be held liable in tort where he neither actually detained another nor instigated the other's arrest by law enforcement officers. If the private citizen makes an honest, good faith mistake in reporting an incident, the mere fact that his communication to an officer may have caused the victim's arrest does not make him liable when he did not in fact request any detention. See 14 Fla.Jur. False Imprisonment § 5 (1957).
In the case sub judice, the evidence does not show that defendant's employees at any time detained either of the plaintiffs. Nor does the record show that the employees of defendant ever requested the F.B.I. to arrest either of the plaintiffs. The defendant's employees reported a possible attempted robbery and identified plaintiffs as the suspects. As long as the employees acted reasonably, their action did not constitute "direct procurement of an arrest" as set forth in Johnson v. Weiner, supra.
Defendant relies upon the cases of Camp v. Silas, 113 Fla. 323, 151 So. 706 (Fla. 1933), and Dodson v. Solomon, 134 Fla. 284, 183 So. 825 (Fla. 1938). The facts of these cases are distinguishable. However, these decisions are in conformity with the general principle that a private citizen, making an honest, good faith effort in reporting an incident, cannot be held liable in a case based upon false imprisonment or malicious prosecution unless it further appears that the defendant was personally involved in detaining the victim.
*683 Florida courts have never recognized a separate tort for "negligently" swearing out a warrant for arrest. Such cases may be brought only in the form of civil suits for malicious prosecution. See, e.g., City of Miami Springs v. Carr, 319 So. 2d 184 (Fla.3d DCA 1975); Wilson v. O'Neal, 118 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960), appeal dismissed 123 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1960), cert. den. 365 U.S. 850, 81 S. Ct. 813, 5 L. Ed. 2d 814 (1961). A plaintiff contending that he had been improperly arrested as the result of negligence in swearing out a warrant must bear the burden of establishing malice and want of probable cause. Mere negligence alone is insufficient. Accordingly, if defendant's employees in the case sub judice had sworn out a warrant for the arrest of plaintiffs Pokorny and Shuping, and if an arrest had been effected pursuant to that warrant, the plaintiffs would have been unable to recover for mere negligence and would have been required to shoulder the elements of an action for malicious prosecution. The jury's decision that defendant's teller acted reasonably in believing Pokorny was guilty of the felony of attempting bank robbery would have been final on the elements of malice and probable cause.
We therefore hold that the actions of the employees of the defendant, First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Largo, Florida, did not constitute "direct procurement" of an arrest under the teachings of Johnson v. Weiner, supra. The first question is therefore answered in the negative.
Since the actions of the employees of defendant did not constitute "direct procurement" of the arrest of Pokorny and Shuping, and since they were arrested by law enforcement officers, the rules governing arrest and imprisonment by private citizens do not apply in this case. The second question is also answered in the negative.
Our answers to certified questions # 1 and # 2 obviously dispose of the case. Therefore we decline to reach answers to certified questions # 3, # 4, and # 5.
ENGLAND, C.J., and BOYD, OVERTON, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.