Case Title: LARIAT DIESEL CORPORATION v. WYOMING DEPARMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-272

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
LARIAT DIESEL CORPORATION v. WYOMING DEPARMENT OF TRANSPORTATION2004 WY 2586 P.3d 266Case Number: 02-272Decided: 03/17/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                
   

 

LARIAT 
DIESEL CORPORATION, a

Wyoming 
corporation, d/b/a LARIAT

INTERNATIONAL 
TRUCKS,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff) 
,

 

v.

 

WYOMING 
DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION; 
and JACK'S HEAVY

EQUIPMENT, 
INC., a Wyoming corporation,

 

Appellees(Defendants) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Thomas 
M. Hogan and Donald L. Painter, Casper, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Hogan.

 

Representing 
Appellees:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; and Mary Loos, Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Ms. Loos for 
Wyoming Department of Transportation.

James 
L. Edwards of Stevens, Edwards & Hallock, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming, for 
Jack's Heavy Equipment, Inc.

 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, Lariat 
Diesel Corporation (Lariat), disputes the authority of the Appellee, Wyoming 
Department of Transportation (WYDOT), to purchase motor vehicles from Appellee, 
Jack's Heavy Equipment, Inc, (Jack's).  
Lariat contends that the district court erred in failing to enjoin the 
award of the bid to Jack's, and in denying Lariat's demand that the vehicles be 
purchased from it.  Lariat asserts 
that Jack's was not a licensed motor vehicle dealer in Wyoming nor did Jack's 
have a dealer franchise which authorized it to sell the vehicles that were the 
subject of WYDOT's bid solicitation.  
Because of these circumstances, it is Lariat's further contention that 
Jack's did not qualify to compete in the bidding process and that WYDOT could 
not accept Jack's bid, even though Jack's eventually did become a licensed 
dealer in Wyoming, before the bid was awarded to it.  In addition, Lariat contends that the 
district court erred in setting aside the default entered in favor of Lariat and 
against the State.  Lariat also 
seeks to recover the costs it incurred in seeking to bid in these circumstances, 
lost profits associated with the bid, and attorney's fees incurred in 
prosecuting this matter as a "private attorney general."

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

 

[¶3]      Lariat raises 
these issues:

 

A.  Did 
the district court err in denying Lariat's request to enjoin the State from 
executing and/or performing the contract with Jack's and in denying Lariat's 
request to award the contract to Lariat in its October 11, 2001 "Order Granting 
in Part and Denying in Part Summary Judgment"?

 

B.  Did 
the district court err in granting Summary Judgment against Lariat on its claims 
for declaratory relief and for intentional interference with business expectancy 
in the court's February 25, 2002 "Second Order Granting in Part and Denying in 
Part Summary Judgment"?

 

C.  Did 
the district court err in granting Summary Judgment against Lariat on its claims 
for damages under the theories of promissory estoppel and breach of a duty to 
treat Lariat's bid honestly and fairly in the court's November 13, 2002 "Order 
Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendant"?

 

D.  Did 
the district court err in setting aside the clerk of court's Entry of Default 
against the State of Wyoming in its February 6, 2001 "Order Setting Aside Entry 
of Default"?

 

WYDOT 
reorders and restates the issues proposed by Lariat:

 

1.  Whether 
the District Court erred when it set aside the Clerk's Entry of Default against 
[WYDOT].

 

2.  Whether 
the District Court erred when it denied Lariat's prayer to enjoin [WYDOT] from 
performing the contract with Jack's and when it denied Lariat's prayer to award 
the contract to Lariat.

 

3.  Whether 
the District Court erred when it denied Lariat's claims for declaratory relief 
and intentional interference with business expectancy.

 

4.  Whether 
the District Court erred when it denied Lariat's claims for damages under the 
theories of promissory estoppel and breach of a duty to treat Lariat's bid 
honestly and fairly.

 

In 
addition, on August 19, 2003, two days before oral argument, the State submitted 
a letter to the Court (with copies to other counsel) giving notice of additional 
authority supporting its arguments.  
During oral argument, it was made clear by WYDOT's attorney that the 
additional authority did not support an argument already put forward by WYDOT, 
but rather, it supported an argument that this Court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the appeal and, hence, the appeal should be dismissed.  This theory was premised on the failure 
of Lariat to exhaust the remedy available to it under W.R.A.P. 12 (i.e., Lariat 
had failed to timely file a petition for review of WYDOT's administrative 
action).  The issue raised by WYDOT 
during oral argument was not addressed to the district court.  WYDOT did not file a motion to dismiss 
the appeal nor was this issue supported by a brief or other written argument 
addressed to this Court.

 

Jack's 
statement of the issues is more limited:

 

I.          
Did the District Court properly grant summary judgment in favor of [WYDOT 
and Jack's]?

 

II.          
Should Jack's Heavy Equipment, Inc. be awarded its attorney fees and 
costs as a result of the violation of Rule 11 [W.R.C.P.] by [Lariat] in pursuing 
this frivolous litigation?

 

 

[¶4]      The essential 
facts are not disputed.  WYDOT 
solicited bids to supply dump truck chassis and a tractor.  Lariat and Jack's submitted bids.  The bids were due on January 6, 
2000.  Jack's was the lowest bid, 
and Lariat's was the second lowest bid.  
Lariat contends that Jack's was not a qualified or responsive bidder 
because Jack's was not licensed to sell vehicles in Wyoming, as well as because 
it was not yet a franchised dealer for the products it proposed to sell.  WYDOT knew of these factors at the time 
the bids were opened.  Jack's got 
its dealer's license on January 10, 2000.  
The issuance of that license is at the heart of this dispute.  The State concedes that Jack's did not 
submit its application for a license until January 12, 2000.  Nonetheless, the license in question was 
issued with an effective date of January 10, 2000.  At oral argument, counsel for WYDOT 
explained that the license is issued as effective on the date WYDOT receives the 
dealer's bond, rather than the date of the application itself.1  Lariat indicated at oral argument that 
it had not heard such an explanation before.  The record does show that Jack's 
franchise agreement was effective on January 1, 2000.  Jack's bid was accepted by WYDOT on 
January 20, 2000.  Jack's completed 
delivery on the contract on July 28, 2000.

 

[¶5]      Immediately 
following the award of the bid to Jack's, Lariat sent several letters to WYDOT 
protesting the award.  By letter 
dated February 3, 2000, WYDOT informed Lariat that WYDOT's decision to award the 
contract to Jack's was final.  By 
letter dated March 15, 2000, Lariat submitted a claim under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-101 through 1-39-121 
(LexisNexis 2003). Lariat demanded the sum of $64,318.81 as lost profits and the 
expense of preparing its bid.  The 
claim was denied by letter dated April 21, 2000.

 

[¶6]      After Jack's had 
already completed delivery on the contract, Lariat filed its complaint in the 
district court on August 11, 2000, alleging that WYDOT could not accept the 
"nonresponsive" bid made by Jack's.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-16-102 and 31-16-103 (LexisNexis 2003) provide that 
no person may solicit sales of vehicles without a vehicle dealer's license, and 
that if such sales are to be solicited, then the license must be obtained before 
soliciting sales.  An attorney 
representing WYDOT entered an appearance on August 25, 2000, and also filed a 
motion to dismiss on that same date.  
Jack's filed a similar motion to dismiss on August 28, 2000.  By order entered on January 4, 2001, 
both motions were denied.

 

[¶7]      On January 17, 
2001, Jack's answered Lariat's complaint.  
WYDOT's answer was filed on January 26, 2001.  On January 26, 2001, Lariat filed a 
motion for entry of default, asserting that WYDOT's time to answer had 
expired.  See W.R.C.P. 
12(a)(1).  The clerk's entry of 
default occurred on January 26, 2001.  
On January 31, 2001, WYDOT filed a motion to set aside entry of 
default.  The district court set 
aside the entry of default by order entered on February 6, 
2001.

 

[¶8]      Lariat, Jack's, 
and WYDOT filed motions for summary judgment in early July of 2001.  By order entered on October 11, 2001, 
the district court determined that neither an order enjoining WYDOT from 
awarding the bid to Jack's, nor an order directing WYDOT to award the bid to 
Lariat, were feasible remedies because the contract had already been awarded to 
Jack's, and Jack's had made delivery of the vehicles.  Thus, two of the remedies sought by 
Lariat were moot.  However, the 
district court also held that Lariat would be permitted to file an amended 
complaint to assert a claim for damages.

 

[¶9]      Such a complaint 
was filed on October 2, 2001.2  Lariat filed a second motion for summary 
judgment, which WYDOT opposed, as did Jack's.  The district court's order on these 
motions for summary judgment was entered on February 25, 2002.  In that order, the district court 
granted WYDOT's motion for summary judgment with respect to declaratory relief, 
largely because such relief would have been moot in these circumstances.  Concerning Lariat's claim called "breach 
of a duty to treat Lariat's bid honestly and fairly," the district court found 
that there were genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary 
judgment.  With respect to Lariat's 
claim of promissory estoppel, the district court allowed Lariat additional time 
to file another amended complaint.  
The district court granted Jack's motion for summary judgment on Lariat's 
claim of intentional interference with a business expectancy and awarded Jack's 
its costs.  The district court 
denied Jack's motion for sanctions pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
11.

 

[¶10]   On March 7, 2002, Lariat filed its 
second amended complaint iterating its claim that WYDOT breached a duty to treat 
its bid honestly and fairly, and fleshing out its promissory estoppel 
claim.  Lariat asserted damages of 
$64,300.00 for loss of profit and the cost of submitting its bid.  Summary judgment motions were again 
filed by Lariat and WYDOT.3  By order entered on November 13, 2002, 
the district court entered summary judgment in favor of WYDOT, bringing this 
litigation to a conclusion.  The 
district court determined that Lariat's claim was a tort action and was 
precluded by the Governmental Claims Act.  
It further recognized that WYDOT was not governed by Wyoming's general 
competitive bidding statute.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 9-2-1016(b) (LexisNexis 2003) (excepting entirely the University of 
Wyoming, community college districts, and school districts; and the department 
of transportation except as to paragraphs (xi), (xii) and (xiii) of that 
subsection).  The district court 
also relied upon our decision in State v. Weisz & Sons, Inc., 713 P.2d 176 (Wyo. 1986), wherein we concluded that where the bidding procedures 
followed by an executive branch agency are not "other than lawful, reasonable, 
and in the exercise of honest judgment, good faith, and accepted competitive bid 
practices,  the judiciary of this state cannot interfere and substitute its 
judgment for that of the responsible agency[.]"  Id. at 185.  Furthermore, the district court 
concluded that promissory estoppel did not apply in the circumstances of this 
case because WYDOT made no promise by soliciting bids and because WYDOT reserved 
the right to reject any and all bids.

 

 

[¶11]   We can find no basis on which to 
disagree with the district court's orders in this matter.  We will enlarge only briefly on the 
district court's conclusions.  The 
competitive bidding process is designed primarily to protect the public's 
interest in ensuring that the government will not pay too high a price for goods 
and services, and irregularities in that process will seldom provide a basis for 
a claim for damages.  See 
generally, James L. Isham, Annotation, Public Contracts:  Low Bidder's Monetary Relief Against 
State or Local Agency for Nonaward of Contract, 65 A.L.R.4th 93, 
esp. § 2 at 99-102 (1988 and Supp. 2002); Noralyn O. Harlow, Annotation, 
Public Contracts:  Authority of 
State or Its Subdivisions to Reject All Bids, 52 A.L.R.4th 186, 
esp. § 2 at 192-95 (1987 and Supp. 2002); and Robert M. Ey, Annotation, 
Authority of State, Municipality, or Other Governmental Entity to Accept Late 
Bids for Public Works Contracts, 49 A.L.R.5th 747, esp. § 2 at 754-55 (1997 and 
Supp.2002).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
31-16-102, 31-16-103, and 31-16-112 address an entirely separate and distinct 
interest, and a violation of those statutes is punishable as a 
misdemeanor.

 

[¶12]   With respect to the district 
court's decision to grant WYDOT relief from the entry of default, we note that 
decisions resolving motions for setting aside the entry of default or a default 
judgment are made in the sound discretion of the trial court.  Fluor Daniel (NPOSR), Inc. v. 
Seward, 956 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Wyo. 1998).  We perceive no abuse of discretion 
here.

 

[¶13]   WYDOT contends that this Court 
lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal and that it must be dismissed.  WYDOT is correct that a question of 
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even on the Court's own 
motion.  See Exotex Corporation 
v. Rinehart, 3 P.3d 826, 828 n.2 (Wyo. 2000); and Mutual of Omaha 
Insurance Company v. Blury-Losolla, 952 P.2d 1117, 1119-20 (Wyo. 1998).  Under the peculiar circumstance of this 
case, we decline to address WYDOT's jurisdictional issue as that matter is not 
entirely clear from the record, and the briefing and argument on this question 
are inadequate.  

 

[¶14]   We have carefully considered Jack's 
demand that fees and costs be awarded to it, and we decline to do 
so.

 

 

[¶15]   The orders of the district court 
are affirmed.  Each party is to bear 
its own costs in this appeal.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

   1The record also 
reflects that WYDOT changed its policy after this occurrence to require a 
vehicle dealer to have a license when a bid is 
submitted.

   2The district 
court issued a decision letter on September 6, 2001, permitting the filing of an 
amended complaint, but counsel for WYDOT neglected to submit an order 
memorializing that decision letter, as directed in the decision letter, until 
after the amended complaint was filed.

  

   3At this point, 
there were no remaining issues pertaining to 
Jack's.