Case Title: Caldwell v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 118, 1999

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
COREY CALDWELL,
)
)  No.  118, 1999
Defendant Below,
)
Appellant,
)  Court Below:  Superior Court
)  of the State of Delaware in
v.
)  and for Kent County
)
STATE OF DELAWARE,
)  Cr. A. No. 98060606
)
Plaintiff Below,
)
Appellee.
)
Submitted:  November 28, 2000
Decided:     April 26, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE,
Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED.
Leo John Ramunno, Wilmington, Delaware.  Attorney for Appellant.
John Williams, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware.  Attorney for
Appellee.
STEELE, Justice:
2
On December 10, 1998, a jury convicted Corey Caldwell of Possession
with Intent to Deliver Cocaine, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia and Resisting
Arrest.  Caldwell filed a timely notice of appeal.
On this appeal, Caldwell raises six issues in support of an argument that he
was denied a fair trial.  Caldwell contends that:  1) the Superior Court abused its
discretion by denying Caldwell’s request for a continuance after he had retained
private counsel on the first day of trial; 2) the Superior Court abused its discretion
by denying a motion for a mistrial made after the prosecutor related in his opening
an out-of-court statement by a witness who did not testify; 3) the Superior Court
abused its discretion by admitting over defense objection the same out-of-court
statement as interpreted and embellished by police officers who did testify at trial;
4) the Superior Court erred as a matter of law by not suppressing cocaine seized by
police after they conducted a pat down search of Caldwell without a reasonable
and articulable suspicion to conduct the pat down search; 5) the State presented
insufficient evidence to show that Caldwell possessed cocaine with the intent to
deliver; and 6) the Superior Court abused its discretion by denying a motion for a
mistrial after the prosecutor expressed his “opinion” by vouching for the
credibility of two police officers and by denigrating the credibility of the sole
defense witness with no basis in fact for doing so.
3
The State denies that any error or abuse of discretion occurred, but if so, any
errors were harmless and did not so prejudice Caldwell that a new trial would be
required.
We conclude that the Superior Court abused its discretion when it denied
the motion for a mistrial at the conclusion of the State’s case based upon the
prosecutor’s improper representation of an out-of-court statement made by a
witness who did not testify.  Moreover, allowing that statement and further
embellishment of that statement to justify a confrontation with Caldwell and a pat-
down search of his person which resulted in admitting drugs into evidence
constituted plain error.
Therefore, we REVERSE the judgment of the Superior Court and
REMAND for a new trial.
I
On June 19, 1998, Dover Police Officers Anthony DiGirolomo and Todd
Case received information from Detective Humphrey1 of the Dover Police
Department that they interpreted to mean that Caldwell “probably had been
involved in some type of drug dealing” in the vicinity of 456 East Water Street, an
area known for drug activity.  DiGirolomo and Case arrived at 456 East Water
                                                
1 As will be discussed, infra, the prosecutor led the jury to infer that the actual words related
were that “Corey Caldwell, was in front of 456 E. Water Street and he had in possession what
4
Street, a residence, and approached Caldwell sitting alone on the front steps.  They
ordered him to stand up.  Case told Caldwell that they had information that he
probably had been involved in some type of drug dealing.  Caldwell replied that he
had not been.  Case then asked Caldwell to turn around, face a wall and place his
hands on top of his head.  DiGirolomo began a pat down search of Caldwell.  He
asked Caldwell if he had anything hidden in his groin area.  Caldwell replied no.
DiGirolomo testified that as he moved up Caldwell’s legs, he detected what felt
like hard objects in a plastic bag in Caldwell’s groin area.
At trial, DiGirolomo testified that:
[b]ased on the information that we received, we decided to do a
pat-down on Mr. Caldwell who was seated there.  We told Mr.
Caldwell to stand up.  At that time, he was ordered by Officer Case to
interlock his hands over top of his head. … I asked him if he had
anything hidden in his groin area before I patted him down.  He stated
no.  I started from the ankles up.  When I got to his groin area with
my right hand – Case was directly behind him, I was to his side,
approximately, basically right on top of him.  I started to pat him
down.  I felt hard objects which appeared to be in a plastic bag that
was located in his groin.  I felt that.  I indicated to Officer Case, I
said, “I think I got it.” 2
After DiGirolomo felt the object in Caldwell’s pants, Caldwell attempted to
break away from the officers and flee.  Both DiGirolomo and Case testified that
Caldwell pulled a plastic bag from his pants and threw it on the ground.  The
                                                                                                                                                            
was reported to be a fairly large amount of cocaine.”
2 Appx. to Appellant’s Op. Br. at A-8 – A-9.
5
officers retrieved the bag, which contained a yellow-white, rocklike substance that
resembled crack-cocaine broken up into several small pieces.  A field test
identified the substance as crack-cocaine and a later laboratory test confirmed that
the substance was 4.39 grams of crack-cocaine.  During the search, the officers
also discovered a pager and $290 in cash in Caldwell’s pants’ pocket.  The
Officers found no paraphernalia that Caldwell could use to smoke, inject or ingest
the cocaine.
Caldwell’s aunt was the only defense witness to testify at trial.  She testified
that she was inside 456 East Water Street when DiGirolomo and Case arrived.
She stated that she heard a group of men who had been outside of the house scatter
when the two officers arrived.  She remained in the house until she heard a
banging outside against the house.  She testified that she went outside and saw
DiGirolomo and Case holding Caldwell against the house searching him.  She
testified that the officers did not take anything from Caldwell but rather picked up
a bag lying on the ground nearby.
II
Caldwell argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying a
motion for a mistrial that the defense made immediately after the State’s case-in-
chief.  The prosecutor had referred in his opening to a statement made by
Humphrey to DiGirolomo and Case that Caldwell possessed a “fairly large amount
6
of cocaine.”  After observing that the prosecutor did not call Humphrey during the
State’s case-in-chief, Caldwell argued that the State’s maneuver denied him the
opportunity to cross-examine Humphrey on “facts” that were relevant to an
important element of the most serious offense with which he stood charged –
possession with intent to deliver.  The prosecutor clearly referred to Humphrey’s
information in a way that both implicated Caldwell individually and implied that
he possessed cocaine, in “a fairly large amount,” at a location that would later be
described as a “drug vicinity.”  The decision not to call Humphrey prevented
Caldwell from examining him about his source of information or the basis for
anyone to believe that the information might be true.
During his opening statement, the prosecutor stated:
On June 19th, this year, two officers of the Dover City Police
Department… received information from another officer…, that was
Detective Humphrey, that the defendant, Corey Caldwell, was in front
of 456 East Water Street and he had in possession what was reported
to be a fairly large amount of cocaine.
The two officers reported to East Water Street, and the
description they had been given is there would be a black man
wearing dark pants, black T-Shirt and a white hat.  When they got
there, they saw a man fitting this description, and also said it would
be Corey Caldwell….3
The State concedes in its brief that the prosecutor’s statement related
hearsay but argues that the comment was not “testimony of a witness” but merely
                                                
3 Appx. to Appellant’s Op. Br. at A-3.
7
the statement of an attorney.  The State argues that a curative instruction given by
the Superior Court, one which instructed the jury that attorney comments are not
to be considered as evidence, eliminated any unfair prejudice that the suggestion
in the statement may have caused.  The State further argues that because Caldwell
waited to object to the Humphrey statement in the opening until the State
completed its case-in-chief rather than when it was made, Caldwell must show
actual prejudice.
This Court uses a two-step analysis to review the argument that the
prosecutor made improper statements during argument.  The first step is to
determine whether the prosecutor’s remarks were improper.  The second step is to
determine whether any improper remarks prejudiced the rights of the defendant.
This second step requires an inquiry into “the closeness of the case, the centrality
of the issue affected by the (alleged) error, and the steps taken to mitigate the
effects of the error.”4  In addition, in order to constitute plain error, the State’s
improper comments must “be so clear and defense counsel’s failure to object so
inexcusable that a trial judge … has no reasonable alternative other than to
intervene sua sponte and declare a mistrial or issue a curative instruction.”5
                                                
4 Hughes v. State, Del. Supr., 437 A.2d 559, 571 (1981) (quoting Dyson v. U.S., D.C. App., 418
A.2d 127, 132 (1980)).
5 Trump v. State, Del. Supr., 753 A.2d 963, 964-965 (2000).
8
Since the objection, however understandably so, came long after the alleged
improper statement was made, we examine whether this prosecutor’s statement
actually prejudiced Caldwell.  In this case, the outcome of the case was close
because of the factual dispute about whether Caldwell actually possessed cocaine;
and, more importantly, any intent to deliver it.  The conflict on this central issue in
the case began when the prosecutor introduced the suggestion that Humphrey had
informed DiGirolomo and Case that Caldwell possessed a “fairly large amount of
cocaine.”  The prosecutor could not fairly state in his opening that Humphrey’s
out-of-court statement related information that Caldwell possessed a fairly large
amount of cocaine when that fact is central to the case, disputed and the source
quoted in the opening statement will not be called and subjected to cross-
examination.  The import the jury may place upon the out-of-court statement can
not be minimized when it has been reputed to be a fact known to a police officer
and vouched for as such by a Deputy Attorney General at the opening of the trial.
This is particularly true when the declarant is under the control of the State and the
State does not call him at trial.  A generalized “curative” instruction that says little
more than that an attorney’s statement is not evidence fails to focus on the specific
prejudice created by the prosecutor’s introduction of Humphrey’s out-of-court
statement in his opening.  The disarmingly misleading effect upon the jury was
later compounded by the officers on the scene testifying that they interpreted the
9
statement by Humphrey, even if related accurately by the prosecutor, to mean that
Caldwell “had been involved in some type of drug dealing.”  This opening
scenario denied Caldwell’s Sixth Amendment right to be confronted by and to
cross-examine his accuser.  This Sixth Amendment violation prejudiced Caldwell
when considered in conjunction with later events because it denied him the
opportunity to test the source and accuracy of critical information that led to his
confrontation with the police and the credibility of the person relating it on issues
of fact and law touching upon elements of the major offense for which he stood
charged.  The following events which occurred during the State’s case in chief
underscore the unfair prejudice to Caldwell.
III
Caldwell argues that the Superior Court compounded the earlier error by
improperly allowing the State to question DiGirolomo and Case about the
information they received from Humphrey.  On direct examination, DiGirolomo
testified that “[b]ased on the information that we received, we decided to do a pat-
down on Mr. Caldwell….”6  Case testified that “I indicated to Mr. Caldwell that I
had received information that he probably had been involved in some type of drug
dealing.”7  This statement elevates Humphrey’s professed statement that Caldwell
                                                
6 Appx. to Appellant’s Op. Br. at A-8.
7 Appx. to Appellant’s Op. Br. at A-17.
10
possessed “a fairly large amount of cocaine” to the very inferences the State
wished the jury to draw from that hearsay:  (a) he in fact possessed cocaine and
with the intent to deliver it, though he, by his plea and through his aunt in her
testimony denied even simple possession; and, (b) that the amount seized was
consistent with dealing.
Caldwell objected to these officers’ testimony as a violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to cross-examination and later moved for a mistrial.  The
Superior Court denied the motion after concluding that DiGirolomo and Case did
nothing more than substantially corroborate Humphrey’s out-of-court statement
related by the prosecutor.  The State now argues that the prosecutor did not elicit
hearsay evidence from DiGirolomo and Case because the prosecutor offered
neither his comment nor the officers’ testimony to show the truth of either the
inference that Caldwell “had been involved in some type of drug dealing” or that
he “possessed a fairly large amount of cocaine” but simply to show why the
officers went to 456 East Water Street.  The State also argues that neither officer
related what Humphrey actually said to them nor purported to repeat the substance
of their conversation with him.
The Humphrey statement advanced by the prosecutor in the opening and the
DiGirolomo/Case statements on the stand, presumably relating its meaning to
them, could under other circumstances be considered insignificant because they
11
might simply serve to explain why police officers arrive at a particular location.  In
this case, however, these statements serve more than just to explain why
DiGirolomo and Case went to 456 East Water Street.  They are the only evidence
that create the inference that the police had a reasonable belief or articulable
suspicion that Caldwell was or had been engaged in criminal activity.  The State’s
contention that the statements were not offered for their truth is an argument made
out of whole cloth.  Without the out-of-court statement of Humphrey introduced
by the prosecutor in his opening and its transformation into something even more
telling by the officers’ testimony about its meaning to them, the State’s argument
that Caldwell possessed cocaine with the intent to deliver turns on whether the
jury would believe Caldwell’s aunt or the officers’ observations at the scene.
Further, even if the jury were to be more likely to believe the officers at the scene
about the details of the confrontation, Humphrey’s untested out-of-court
statement’s reference to quantity, vouched for by the prosecutor and embellished
by the officers at the scene into being consistent with “drug dealing,” could not be
fairly segregated by the jury from their consideration of whether he possessed
cocaine with the intent to deliver it.  We are convinced that the prejudice caused
by admitting Humphrey’s out-of-court statement through the opening statement
and again through the repetition and embellishment of the statement at trial
through the testimony of the officers at the scene denied Caldwell a fair trial.
12
IV
Caldwell’s argued trail of prejudicial errors continues with the Superior
Court’s failure to declare a mistrial after the prosecutor expressed his personal
opinion during closing argument by vouching for the credibility of DiGirolomo
and Case and by improperly undermining the credibility of Caldwell’s aunt, the
sole defense witness.8  Because Caldwell made no objection at trial to the
prosecutor’s statements, we review for plain error.9
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated: 
You have heard from two officers of the Dover City Police
Department in the State’s case-in-chief.  Both of them are
experienced officers.  They really have no motive to lie here.  They
are just doing their job.  They show up, they find this and come in and
tell you about it.
On the other hand, you heard from the defendant’s aunt.  Now,
you know, she’s known this guy since he was a baby.  She told you
that she watched him, that she tried to keep him out of trouble when
he was a kid.  She told you she doesn’t want to see anybody get in
trouble.  Certainly, the State suggests, her heart is in the right place,
but her feelings for the defendant certainly cloud her memory and her
perception of what went on.10
                                                
8 Caldwell also contends that the prosecutor impermissibly used the term “I” during closing
argument.  For example, the prosecutor stated, “as I told you in the opening” and “I’m just going
to go through the charges briefly.”  Appx. to Appellee’s Op. Br. at B-16.  Although this court
strongly discourages the use of the term “I” in closing arguments, see Brokenbrough v. State,
Del. Supr., 522 A.2d 851, 859 (1987), there is no rule that the use of the term “I” is per se
improper.  See Trump v. State, Del. Supr., 753 A.2d 963, 968 (2000).  In this case, because the
prosecutor’s use of the term “I” came only in introductory phrases and did not indicate a personal
endorsement of particular testimony, the statements were not improper.
9 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8; see McDade v. State, Del. Supr., 693 A.2d 1062, 1064 (1997).
10 Appx. to Appellant’s Op. Br. at A-25.
13
Caldwell argues that these statements are improper because they reflect the
prosecutor’s personal opinion about the credibility of witnesses.  The State argues
that the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument were not improper and
denies that the prosecutor attempted to vouch for the credibility of DiGirolomo
and Case.  Moreover, the State argues that Caldwell has not shown unfair
prejudice.
Prosecutors may not comment on the truth of testimony or credibility of
witnesses.11  This general rule includes a specific prohibition against vouching for
the credibility of the State’s witnesses such as stating or implying personal
knowledge of the truth of their testimony “beyond that logically inferred from the
evidence presented at trial.”12  In this case, the prosecutor told the jury that
DiGirolomo and Case “are experienced officers” and that “[t]hey really have no
motive to lie here.  They are just doing their job.  They show up, they find this and
come in and tell you about it.”13  Although these statements are arguably improper
because they imply that the officers’ testimony is accurate, they do not contain a
personal endorsement of the officers and they do not imply that police officers
always testify truthfully.14
                                                
11 See Brokenbrough v. State, Del. Supr., 522 A.2d 851, 855 (1987).
12 Saunders v. State, Del. Supr., 602 A.2d 623, 624 (1984).
13 Appx. to Appellant’s Op. Br. at A-25.
14 But cf. Miller v. State, Del. Supr., No. 434, 1998 Hartnett, J. (Feb. 16, 2000) (reversing in part
because the State improperly asked the jury whether “[a] man who has dedicated his life to
14
Prosecutors must also refrain from implying that a defense witness is lying
unless (1) the jury may legitimately infer from the evidence that the witness lied
and (2) the “prosecutor relates his argument to specific evidence which tends to
show that the testimony or statement is a lie.”15  In this case, the prosecutor argued
that Caldwell’s aunt “doesn’t want to see anybody get into trouble” and that “her
feelings for the defendant certainly cloud her memory and her perception of what
went on.”16  The prosecutor in this case certainly could argue that Caldwell’s aunt
was biased provided there was evidence to support that inference.  To suggest that
bias would “cloud her memory and her perception of what went on” and to imply
that she “tried to keep him out of trouble,” does not alone constitute an
impermissible suggestion that she lied under oath.
Assuming arguendo that even if all or some of the prosecutor’s statements
above were improper, the next step is to determine whether the State’s improper
statements prejudiced Caldwell and constituted plain error.  Applying the
prejudice analysis in Hughes, the outcome of the case was close and the jury had
to resolve the central credibility issue involved in the conflicting testimony of
DiGirolomo, Case and Caldwell’s aunt.  In addition, the Superior Court did not
immediately issue a curative instruction.  This analysis raises a serious question
                                                                                                                                                            
enforcing the law would come in here and lie to you in some effort to point the finger at the
wrong person”).
15
that the prosecutor’s statements may have affected the jury, the outcome of the
case and therefore unfairly prejudiced Caldwell.
While we must caution a prosecutor against any predilection to overreach in
an endorsement of police credibility and to exercise care in decrying the credibility
of a defendant’s witness, the prosecutor’s actions in this case can not be said to
have unfairly prejudiced Caldwell and therefore do not constitute plain error.
V
Caldwell argues that the Superior Court erred by not suppressing the
cocaine DiGirolomo and Case seized during the pat down search.  He contends
that the officers used the pat down search as a pretense to search for drugs, which
violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.
The State argues that there was no error in admitting the cocaine because
DiGirolomo and Case, in fact, retrieved the cocaine from the ground after
Caldwell threw it down and abandoned it, placing the cocaine in plain view.  The
State acknowledges, however, that the search may have exceeded the scope of a
permissible pat down search had the officers seized the cocaine from Caldwell’s
person.  The State insists, nevertheless, that DiGirolomo and Case had a
reasonable and articulable suspicion to confront Caldwell and conduct a pat down
                                                                                                                                                            
15 Hughes, at 571.
16 Appx. to Appellant’s Op. Br. at A-25.
16
search based on the information they received from Humphrey.
The State contends that Caldwell should have filed a motion to suppress and
demanded a hearing if there were a question about the admissibility of the cocaine
seized during the search.  Caldwell’s defense that he never possessed cocaine
drove the tactical decision not to pursue a motion to suppress.  Because Caldwell
neither filed a pre-trial motion to suppress nor objected at trial to the admission of
the cocaine, we review for plain error.17
Our analysis begins by determining whether DiGirolomo and Case
conducted a lawful pat down search of Caldwell.  Generally, warrantless searches
are presumed invalid.  There are few exceptions.18  One exception is the pat down
search permitted under Terry v. Ohio.19  This exception permits a police officer,
after observing “unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot,” to stop and briefly detain
the person in order to make “reasonable inquiries” aimed at confirming or
dispelling any suspicions.20  Furthermore, when circumstances give the officer
justification to believe that the individual is armed and presently dangerous, the
officer may conduct a pat down search of that person for weapons.21  The test for
                                                
17 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8; see McDade v. State, Del. Supr., 693 A.2d 1062, 1064 (1997).
18 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993).
19 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
20 Id. at 30.
21 Id. at 24.
17
the justification of the search is “whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was
in danger.”22  In this case no one contends that possession of a weapon is in issue.
A pat down search may not rest on a “generalized suspicion” alone.23  The
search must be founded upon a “reasonable suspicion,” which is defined as “the
officer’s ability to point to specific and articulable facts, which, taken together
with all rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.”24
And “[a]lthough we give due deference to an officer’s experience and knowledge,
the facts which form the basis of the reasonable suspicion must ‘be capable of
measurement against an objective standard.’”25  It is important that police have an
articulable suspicion appropriate to the circumstances.26  In Jones v. State27 this
Court found that the State incorrectly distinguished the officers’ safety exception
from the need for an articulable suspicion.28  “‘[O]fficer safety,’ at least on this
record, does not obviate the court’s obligation to assess independently the legality
of the officer’s action.”29  This Court in Jones agreed with the Seventh Circuit that
                                                
22 Id. at 27.
23 Id. at 10.
24 Id. at 9 (emphasis in original).
25 Robertson v. State, Del. Supr., 596 A.2d 1345, 1350-1351 (1991) (quoting Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
26 See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119 (1998).
27 Del. Supr., 745 A.2d 856 (1999).
28 Id. at n. 78.
29 Id.
18
“while officer safety is ‘both legitimate and weighty,’ it cannot in all
circumstances justify a search or seizure.  Otherwise nearly any invasion of a
person’s privacy could be justified by arguing that the police needed to protect
themselves from harm.”30
In this case, the record shows no evidence that the officers on the scene
actually observed Caldwell engage in any unusual conduct that led them to
reasonably conclude in light of their experience that criminal activity was afoot.
The officers testified that they saw Caldwell sitting alone on the front steps of 456
East Water Street, a residence, when they approached him.  He was not “abroad”
as that term has come to be interpreted.  There is no evidence that the officers
asked Caldwell whether he possessed a weapon.  There is no evidence that
Caldwell was hostile31 or that the officers faced a large number of people.32  The
record reflects no circumstance that would give the officers justification for
believing that Caldwell was armed and presently dangerous.  In fact, the officers’
testimony resolves any question that the officers conducted the pat down search
for drugs alone.  Indeed, while conducting the pat down search, DiGirolomo stated
“I think I got it” after he felt what he thought to be a package of drugs.  He did not
state that he thought the object he felt was a weapon.  In sum, DiGirolomo and
                                                
30 Id. (citing U.S. v. Johnson, 7th Cir., 170 F.3d 708, 718 (1999) (citations omitted) (quoting
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119 (1998)).
19
Case pointed to no specific and articulable facts, which, taken together with all
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the intrusion.
If DiGirolomo and Case lacked justification to conduct a pat down search of
Caldwell, the search was invalid and the seized cocaine is inadmissible.
Assuming, however, that the officers had justification to conduct a pat down
search, they must have first detained Caldwell pursuant to the requirements of 11
Del. C. §§ 190233 – 1903.34  Although Caldwell does not argue that his detention
was illegal or that he was even simply detained, it is nonetheless important to
examine whether the officers possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion to
seize Caldwell and detain him in accordance with §§ 1902 – 1903.  Only after
satisfying the requirements of §§ 1902 – 1903 could DiGirolomo and Case
conduct a pat down search of Caldwell.
Under 11 Del. C. § 1902(a), an officer “may stop any person abroad, or in a
public place, who he has a reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has
committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of him his name,
                                                                                                                                                            
31 See Hicks v. State, Del. Supr., 631 A.2d 6, 10 (1993).
32 See Robertson v. State, Del. Supr., 596 A.2d 1345, 1352 (1991).
33 11 Del. C. § 1902 states in pertinent part: “(a) A peace officer may stop any person abroad, or
in a public place, who the officer has reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed
or is about to commit a crime, and may demand the person’s name, address, business abroad and
destination.”
34 11 Del. C. § 1903 states in pertinent part: “A peace officer may search for a dangerous weapon
any person whom he has stopped or detained to question as provided in § 1902 of this title,
whenever he has a reasonable ground to believe that he is in danger if the person possesses a
20
address, business abroad and where he is going.”  In Hicks v. State,35 this Court
stated that “[t]he purpose of § 1902 was to legalize the questioning and detention
of persons without probable cause where the express criteria of the section were
met.  Where, however, there is no reasonable basis to suspect the detainee had
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, any detention of that
defendant is unlawful.”36
In Jones v. State, this Court held that in order to stop and detain an
individual pursuant to the Delaware detention statute and the Delaware
Constitution, a peace officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of
criminal activity.  In Jones, this Court reversed the judgment of the Superior
Court, finding that evidence had been invalidly seized from the defendant, Jones.
The seizure resulted from an encounter with a police officer in which the officer,
based only on an anonymous 911 call that there was a “suspicious black male
wearing a blue coat” in a particular area, ordered Jones, who fit the description, to
stop and remove his hands from his pockets.  Jones did not comply with this
command; instead, Jones turned and walked away.  The officer once again
commanded Jones to remove his hands from his pockets.  When Jones again did
not comply, the officer attempted to remove Jones’ hands from his pockets.  The
                                                                                                                                                            
dangerous weapon.”
35 Del. Supr., 631 A.2d 6 (1993).
21
officer and Jones began to struggle during which Jones threw over his head a
small bag of cocaine that the officer later retrieved.
In Jones, this Court focused on when Jones’ detention occurred under 11
Del. C. 1902.  The Court concluded that Jones had been detained when the officer
ordered him to stop and remove his hands from his pockets because a reasonable
person would believe that he would not be free to go and to ignore the police
presence.  “The reasonableness of [the officer’s] suspicion must rest on the facts
known to him at the time he ordered Jones to stop.”37  This Court concluded that
“Jones’ actions in walking away from police and his refusal to obey  … the
officer’s commands … did not furnish grounds for reasonable and articulable
suspicion to effect the seizure.”38
In this case, the question is whether the officers had a reasonable and
articulable suspicion to detain or seize Caldwell and conduct a pat down search
based on the facts known to them at the time they approached Caldwell as he sat
alone on the front steps of the residence at 456 East Water Street.  The officers
seized Caldwell when they ordered him to stand up, turn around, place his hands
on top of his head and face the wall.  Given these commands, no reasonable person
would think that he could ignore them and walk away.
                                                                                                                                                            
36 Id. at 9 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
37 Jones, at 863.
22
The State contends the officers possessed a reasonable and articulable
suspicion based on the information provided by Humphrey.  A troubling aspect of
this case, however, is that Humphrey did not testify.  No evidence indicated the
source, reliability or accuracy of Humphrey’s purported information.  What is
plain is that Humphrey himself had no personal knowledge of the facts he
purportedly related to Case and DiGirolomo.  The prosecutor’s statement to the
jury of what the prosecutor believed Humphrey told DiGirolomo and Case differs
from the officers’ trial testimony about what they understood Humphrey to have
said.  Without Humphrey’s out-of-court statement, there is no indication in the
record that Caldwell had committed or was about to commit any criminal activity.
The officers’ own observations “added nothing to” Humphrey’s statements and
“did not corroborate or particularize” Humphrey’s statements except to find
Caldwell present, alone and on residential steps.39  In fact, the only testimony
about the information Humphrey relayed to the officers, the State contends, was
not offered for its truth.40  The flawed nexus between DiGirolomo and Case’s
information and a reasonable belief that Caldwell possessed cocaine has its
genesis in the out-of-court statement by Humphrey.  Despite the State’s contention
that the officers seized the cocaine in plain view there can be no question even
                                                                                                                                                            
38 Id. at 869.
39 See Jones, at 870.
23
under the State’s theory that the initial confrontation with Caldwell directly caused
the disgorgement of the cocaine later retrieved.  Based on the record, we conclude
that the State failed to show that DiGirolomo and Case had a reasonable and
articulable suspicion to seize Caldwell and conduct a pat down search pursuant to
the requirements of §§ 1902 - 1903.
Because DiGirolomo and Case had no reasonable and articulable suspicion
to confront Caldwell and conduct a pat down search pursuant to the Delaware
detention statute, Caldwell suffered actual prejudice when the cocaine was
admitted into evidence and we, therefore, hold that the Superior Court committed
plain error by admitting the cocaine.
VI
Caldwell argues that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to deliver cocaine.  At best, he
suggests that the State proved simple possession.  The State, of course, argues that
not only was there sufficient evidence to support a conviction for intent to deliver
but also that because Caldwell failed to present this argument to the trial court, we
must review this contention for plain error.
At trial, the State’s evidence relevant to Caldwell’s intent to deliver cocaine
was the quantity of the cocaine, the out-of-court statement made by Humphrey
                                                                                                                                                            
40 See Appellee’s Op. Br. at 18.
24
about quantity that was reinterpreted by the officers at the scene to mean that
Caldwell was “involved in drug dealing,” the expert testimony presented by
DiGirolomo regarding the typical characteristics of drug dealers and the testimony
of Case regarding the street value of the cocaine seized.
During the trial, the jury heard from the prosecutor that Humphrey informed
DiGirolomo and Case that Caldwell possessed “a fairly large amount of drugs.”
Humphrey did not testify, however, nor did the State introduce evidence to show
the source, reliability or accuracy of Humphrey’s information.  DiGirolomo
testified about the manner in which drug dealers carry narcotics, and he also
testified about paraphernalia that would be carried by those who possess drugs for
use alone.  DiGirolomo testified that the quantity of drugs found was typical of
that carried by a drug dealer and that the lack of paraphernalia for consumption
indicated that Caldwell did not carry the drugs for personal use.  Case testified, in
effect, that the information Humphrey told him, along with the location where they
found Caldwell led him to conclude that Caldwell was involved “in some type of
drug dealing.”  Case further testified that the street value of the crack cocaine was
approximately $400 and that Caldwell already possessed $290 at the time of the
arrest.  The State presented no other evidence to show that Caldwell possessed
cocaine with the intent to deliver.
25
The State argues that the totality of the evidence was sufficient to permit a
jury to infer that Caldwell intended to sell drugs.  The State argues that the (now)
“large” quantity of cocaine, the $290 in cash found on Caldwell’s person and the
absence of any paraphernalia used to smoke or ingest the cocaine support
conviction for intent to deliver beyond a reasonable doubt.  Moreover, the State
argues that because Caldwell’s only defense was that the drugs were not his, once
a jury determined that the drugs were his, he had no defense against the charge of
intent to deliver.
The State cannot establish intent to deliver merely by proving possession of
a particular quantity of cocaine,41 but the State may establish intent to sell
“exclusively through circumstantial evidence.”42  The State argues that it presented
enough circumstantial evidence to permit the jury to infer that Caldwell intended
to deliver drugs.  But an important piece of evidence from which to draw that
inference comes from the out-of-court statement of Humphrey, a hearsay statement
that reflected no personal knowledge on his part.  Since this hearsay statement is
buttressed by the dubious interpretation supplied by Case, we conclude that it is
more likely than not that the jury placed considerable weight on these
inappropriately admitted statements.  Considered with the prosecutor’s arguable
                                                
41 See Malloy v. State, Del. Supr., 462 A.2d 1088, 1091 (1983).
42 Davis v. State, Del. Supr., 706 A.2d 523, 525 (1998) (citing 11 Del. C. § 307(a)).
26
vouching for the testimony in closing, this raises considerable doubt about the
fairness of the outcome of Caldwell’s trial.  Because it is unclear how much
weight the jury actually placed on the out-of-court statement by Humphrey as
related by the prosecutor and then embellished by later testimony and the fact that
Caldwell could not cross-examine Humphrey, we lack confidence in the fairness
of Caldwell’s trial.  Accordingly, his sentence must be reversed.
27
VII
Caldwell sought private counsel on the day of the trial.  Caldwell claims that
he requested a continuance to allow time for his counsel to prepare, but the
Superior Court denied his request.  The docket does not indicate that a request was
made.  Because we have determined that Caldwell should receive a new trial in
any event, we need not address Caldwell’s argument that the Superior Court
abused its discretion by denying his request for a continuance.
Conclusion
The Superior Court abused its discretion by denying Caldwell’s motion for
a mistrial at the conclusion of the State’s case and by allowing the out-of-court
statement by Humphrey to be buttressed at trial by the officers at the scene.
Admission of the drugs after a confrontation with and pat-down of the defendant
by the police in the absence of a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Caldwell
possessed drugs prejudiced Caldwell, raises doubt about the fairness of the
outcome and constitutes plain error.  Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND
for a new trial.
oc:
Clerk
c:
Hon. James T. Vaughn, Jr.
John Williams
Leo John Ramunno
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