Case Title: Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. State of Wisconsin Division of Hearings and Appeals

Citation: 2006 WI 86

Docket Number: 2003AP002628

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 86 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2628 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc., 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin Division of Hearings and 
Appeals, 
          Respondent, 
Harley-Davidson Motor Company, Inc., 
          Participant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2005 WI App 6 
Reported at:  278 Wis. 2d 508, 692 N.W.2d 670 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 8, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Charles H. Constantine   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and BUTLER, J.J., join the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Paul R. Norman, Sarah A. Zylstra and Boardman, Suhr, Curry & 
Field LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Sarah A. Zylstra. 
 
For the participant-appellant there were briefs by Peter J. 
Stone, Kelli A. Taffora and Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Peter J. Stone. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Brian E. Butler, 
Michelle Affatati and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison, on behalf 
of the Wisconsin Automobile and Truck Dealers Association, and 
there was oral argument by Brian E. Butler. 
 
 
2
 
2006 WI 86 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2628  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV821) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc.,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent- 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Division of Hearings  
and Appeals,  
 
          Respondent, 
 
Harley-Davidson Motor Company, Inc.,  
 
          Participant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   Racine Harley-Davidson, 
Inc. (Racine H-D) seeks review of a published decision of the 
court of appeals.1     
¶2 
The court of appeals reversed an order of the circuit 
court for Racine County, Charles H. Constantine, Judge, and 
                                                 
1 Racine Harley-Davidson v. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 2005 
WI App 6, 278 Wis. 2d 508, 692 N.W.2d 670.  
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
2
reinstated a ruling of the Department of Administration, 
Division of Hearings and Appeals, granting summary judgment to 
Harley-Davidson Motor Company (Harley-Davidson) against Racine 
H-D.   
¶3 
The court of appeals gave great weight deference to 
the decision of the Division of Hearings and Appeals that 
Harley-Davidson's assignment of territory to Racine H-D, namely 
a zip code list,2 is not part of the motor vehicle dealer 
agreement between the parties under Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8).3  
Accordingly, the court of appeals determined that Harley-
Davidson's 
unilateral 
modification 
of 
the 
assignment 
of 
territory did not trigger the requirement in Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0116(8) of an administrative determination of good cause 
for the modification of a motor vehicle dealer agreement. 
¶4 
In contrast, the circuit court had overturned the 
decision of the Division of Hearings and Appeals.  The circuit 
court concluded that Harley-Davidson's zip code assignment of 
territory to Racine H-D is part of the motor vehicle dealer 
agreement between the parties under Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8) and 
that the cause should be remanded to the Division of Hearings 
and Appeals to reinstate Racine H-D's amended complaint and to 
conduct 
further 
proceedings 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0116(8). 
                                                 
2 Assignment of territory is sometimes also referred to as 
"area of sales responsibility" or "primary market area." 
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
3
¶5 
The issue presented here is the same as that presented 
to the Division of Hearings and Appeals, the circuit court and 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
namely 
whether 
Harley-Davidson's 
assignment of territory to Racine H-D (a zip code list) is part 
of their motor vehicle dealer agreement under Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0116(8).  If the assignment is part of their motor vehicle 
dealer agreement, the cause should be remanded to the circuit 
court for remand to the Division to reinstate the amended 
complaint and to conduct further proceedings to determine 
whether Racine H-D should prevail on its claim under Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0116(8).  
¶6 
We 
conclude 
that 
read 
together, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0101(1) 
and 
(13); 
§ 218.0114(9) 
and 
(11); 
and 
§ 218.0116(1)(r), (7), and (8); and the purpose of §§ 218.0101 
to 218.0163, support the conclusion that a more reasonable 
reading of the statutes than that of the Division of Hearings 
and Appeals is that a manufacturer's assignment of territory is 
an essential aspect of the franchise relationship and therefore 
part of the motor vehicle dealer agreement. 
¶7 
Accordingly we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and hold (1) that Harley-Davidson's assignment of 
territory (the zip code list) to Racine H-D is part of the motor 
vehicle dealer agreement between Harley-Davidson and Racine H-D 
under Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8); and (2) that the cause should be 
remanded to the circuit court for remand to the Division of 
Hearings and Appeals to reinstate Racine H-D's complaint and to 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
4
conduct further proceedings under Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8) 
consistent with this opinion.  
I 
¶8 
To determine whether the assignment of territory (the 
zip code list) is part of the motor vehicle dealer agreement 
under § 218.0116(8), we must first address the threshold issue 
of the proper level of deference to be given to the decision of 
the Division of Hearings and Appeals.4  
¶9 
The court requested supplemental briefs from the 
parties on the level of deference to be accorded the decision of 
the Division of Hearings and Appeals, "considering Wis. Stat. 
§§ 227.43(1)(bg) and 227.46(3), and the following cases (and any 
other statute or case the parties consider applicable to the 
subject):  State ex rel. Kaminski v. Schwarz, 2001 WI 94, ¶¶16, 
21, 245 Wis. 2d 310, 630 N.W.2d 164; Buettner v. DHFS, 2003 WI 
App 90, ¶¶6-8, 264 Wis. 2d 700, 663 N.W.2d 282; Town of Barton 
                                                 
4 When this court reviews a decision of an administrative 
agency, it ordinarily reviews the agency decision, not the 
decision of the court of appeals or the circuit court.  West 
Bend Co. v. LIRC, 149 Wis. 2d 110, 117, 438 N.W.2d 823 (1989). 
The meaning of the word "agency" in ch. 227, and whether 
"agency" includes the Division of Hearings and Appeals for 
purposes of service, is discussed in All Star Rent a Car, Inc. 
v. DOT, 2006 WI 85, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  The 
definition of "agency" in ch. 227 is not relevant in the instant 
case because Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(9) provides that any person 
aggrieved by a decision of the Division may have review of the 
decision as provided in ch. 227.  Section 227.52 provides for 
judicial review of any "administrative decision" without linking 
that decision to an agency.  See also Wis. Stat. § 227.46(2m) 
(providing for judicial review of Division decisions made under 
Wis. Stat. § 227.43(1)(bg)). 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
5
v. Division of Hearings and Appeals, 2002 WI App 169, ¶10, 256 
Wis. 2d 628, 649 N.W.2d 293; Artac v. DHFS, 2000 WI App 88, ¶13, 
¶13 n.6, 234 Wis. 2d 480, 610 N.W.2d 115; Sea View v. DNR, 223 
Wis. 2d 138, 145-49, 588 N.W.2d 667 (Ct. App. 1998); Roehl 
Transport, Inc. v. Division of Hearings and Appeals, 213 
Wis. 2d 452, 460-61, 570 N.W.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1997)."   
¶10 The issue of deference to be accorded a decision 
involving the Division of Hearings and Appeals is also raised in 
Hilton v. DNR, 2006 WI 84, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 
mandated this date. 
¶11 Although statutory interpretation is ordinarily a 
question of law determined independently by a court, a court may 
accord an agency's interpretation of a statute great weight 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
6
deference or due weight deference.5  The standard of review of an 
agency interpretation and application of a statute (and the 
                                                 
5 Keup v. DHFS, 2004 WI 16, ¶12, 269 Wis. 2d 59, 675 N.W.2d 
755 ("This issue involves statutory interpretation, which is a 
question of law that this court reviews de novo.  Thus, we are 
not 
bound 
by 
an 
administrative 
agency's 
determination.  
Nevertheless, we have generally used one of three standards of 
review, with varying degrees of deference, to review an agency's 
conclusions of law or statutory interpretation." (citations 
omitted)); Brown v. LIRC, 2003 WI 142, ¶¶11-13, 267 Wis. 2d 31, 
671 N.W.2d 279 ("The interpretation of a statute presents a 
question of law.  The application of a statutory standard to a 
fact situation is ordinarily a question of law for the courts.  
 . . . Nevertheless, labeling an issue as a question of law does 
not mean that a court may disregard an agency's determination.  
 . . . The appropriate level of scrutiny a court should use in 
reviewing an agency's decision on questions of law depends on 
the comparative institutional capabilities and qualifications of 
the court and the agency to make a legal determination on a 
particular issue"); Dodgeland Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 2002 WI 22, 
¶22, 250 Wis. 2d 357, 639 N.W.2d 733 ("Whether WERC properly 
interpreted Wis. Stat. § 111.70 is a question of law and we are 
not bound by WERC's interpretation.  In certain circumstances, 
however, courts should defer to an administrative agency's 
interpretation of a statute." (citations omitted)); Ide v. LIRC, 
224 Wis. 2d 159, 166, 589 N.W.2d 363 (1999) ("Whether the facts, 
as found by LIRC, fulfill a particular legal standard is a 
question of law which we review de novo.   . . . When reviewing 
questions of law, we apply one of three levels of deference to 
the agency's interpretation . . . ."); LaCrosse Queen, Inc. v. 
DOR, 208 Wis. 2d 439, 445-46, 561 N.W.2d 686 (1997) (court 
"review[s] questions of law de novo" and "may substitute [its] 
judgment for that of the [Tax Appeals] Commission" but will 
accord deference when agency possesses particular expertise in 
an area of law); UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 284, 548 
N.W.2d 57 
(1996) 
("Although 
we 
are 
not 
bound 
by 
LIRC's 
interpretation, we do defer to agency interpretations in certain 
situations."); Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 
659, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995) ("The guiding principle is that 
statutory interpretation is a question of law which courts 
decide de novo.  Furthermore, a court is not bound by an 
agency's interpretation of a statute.  As important, however, is 
the principle that courts should defer to an administrative 
agency's interpretation of a statute in certain situations." 
(citations omitted)); State ex rel. Parker v. Sullivan, 184 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
7
deference to be accorded thereto) have been the subject of 
numerous cases, as this opinion demonstrates, and much law 
review commentary.6     
                                                                                                                                                             
Wis. 2d 668, 699, 517 N.W.2d 449 (1994) ("The interpretation of 
a statute presents a question of law, and the 'blackletter' rule 
is that a court is not bound by an agency's interpretation.  
Nevertheless courts frequently refrain from substituting their 
interpretation of a statute for that of the agency charged with 
the administration of a law. . . . [C]ourts frequently give 
deference to the interpretation of statutes by administrative 
agencies charged with their enforcement."); Marris v. City of 
Cedarburg, 176 Wis. 2d 14, 32, 498 N.W.2d 842 (1993) (same); 
Richland School Dist. v. DILHR, 174 Wis. 2d 878, 890-91, 498 
N.W.2d 826 (1993) (same); Lisney v. LIRC, 171 Wis. 2d 499, 505, 
493 N.W.2d 14 (1992) (same); West Bend Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 121 
Wis. 2d 1, 11-12, 357 N.W.2d 534 (1984) ("Generally questions 
relating to interpretation and application of statutes are 
labeled questions of law, and the blackletter rule is that a 
court is not bound by an agency's conclusions of law.  Courts, 
however, frequently refrain from exercising the power to 
substitute their interpretation or application of a statute for 
that of an agency charged with the administration of the law.").  
6 See Salvatore Massa, The Standards of Review for Agency 
Interpretations of Statutes in Wisconsin, 83 Marq. L. Rev. 597 
(2000); Patrick M. Zabrowski, Comment, The Standard of Review of 
Administrative Rules in Wisconsin, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 691, 
(1982); Paul B. Hewitt, Comment, The Scope of Judicial Review of 
Administrative Agency Decisions in Wisconsin, 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 
554 (1973).  
At the federal level too, "one of the most persistently 
intriguing puzzles has been to define the appropriate judicial 
and administrative roles in the interpretation of regulatory 
statutes. . . . To determine 'what the law is' in the context of 
an actual controversy that turns on a question of statutory 
meaning is the quintessential judicial function.  At the same 
time, however, such questions are so bound up with successful 
administration of the regulatory scheme that it may seem only 
sensible to give principle interpretive responsibility to the 
'expert' agency that lives with the statute constantly."  
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of 
Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 452-53 
(1989).   
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
8
¶12 In an attempt to clarify prior statements of the 
standard of review for agency interpretation and application of 
statutes, the court set forth three levels of deference of 
agency interpretations of statutes in adjudicative matters in 
Jicha v. DILHR, 169 Wis. 2d 284, 290-91, 485 N.W.2d 256 (1992) 
and Sauk County v. WERC, 165 Wis. 2d 406, 413-14, 477 N.W.2d 267 
(1991): great weight deference, due weight deference, and no 
deference.7   
¶13 These levels of deference take into account the 
comparative institutional qualifications and capabilities of the 
court and the administrative agency.8  The levels of deference 
are in accord with Wis. Stat. § 227.57(10), in which the 
legislature provides that upon review of an agency's decision, 
"due 
weight 
shall 
be 
accorded 
the 
experience, 
technical 
competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency involved, as 
                                                                                                                                                             
For discussions of the deference given to federal agency 
interpretation of statutes, see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218 (2001); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); 6 Jacob A. Stein et 
al., Administrative Law § 51.01 (Rel. 75-8/02 Pub. 301). 
7 For prior case law explaining the standard of review of an 
agency interpretation and application of a statute, including a 
comparison of the court's "analytical" approach to agency 
deference and "practical" or "policy" approach, see, e.g., DOR 
v. Exxon Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 700, 712-14, 281 N.W.2d 94 (1979); 
DOR v. Milwaukee Ref. Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 44, 48, 257 N.W.2d 855 
(1977); Pabst v. Dep't of Taxation, 19 Wis. 2d 313, 322-23, 120 
N.W.2d 77 (1963). 
8 Brown v. LIRC, 2003 WI 142, ¶13, 267 Wis. 2d 31, 671 
N.W.2d 279 (citing State ex rel. Parker v. Sullivan, 184 
Wis. 2d 668, 699, 517 N.W.2d 449 (1994)). 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
9
well as discretionary authority conferred upon it."  The 
legislature has thus entrusted responsibility to the agencies.   
¶14  By granting deference to agency interpretations, the 
court has not abdicated, and should not abdicate, its authority 
and responsibility to interpret statutes and decide questions of 
law.  Some cases, however, mistakenly fail to state, before 
launching into a discussion of the levels of deference, that the 
interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law 
to be determined by a court.9  In any event, it is the court's 
responsibility to decide questions of law and determine whether 
deference is due and what level of deference is due to an agency 
interpretation and application of a statute.  The court 
determines the appropriate level of deference by comparing the 
institutional qualifications and capabilities of the court and 
the agency by considering, for example, whether the legislature 
has charged the agency with administration of the statute, 
whether 
the 
agency 
has 
expertise, 
whether 
the 
agency 
interpretation is one of long standing, and whether the agency 
interpretation will provide uniformity and consistency.  
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Pinczkowski v. Milwaukee County, 2005 WI 161, 
¶¶62-65, 286 Wis. 2d 339, 706 N.W.2d 642 (discussing levels of 
deference, but not stating the court's ultimate authority to 
decide questions of law); Clean Wisconsin, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n, 2005 WI 93, ¶¶37-43, 282 Wis. 2d 250, 700 N.W.2d 768 
(same); Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. LIRC, 2003 WI 106, ¶¶23-
25, 28-30, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 664 N.W.2d 651 (same); Kitten v. 
DWD, 2002 WI 54, ¶¶26-29, 252 Wis. 2d 561, 644 N.W.2d 649 
(same).  
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
10
¶15 Furthermore, 
giving 
deference 
to 
the 
agency 
interpretation does not mean that the court accepts the agency 
interpretation without a critical eye.  The court itself must 
always interpret the statute to determine the reasonableness of 
the 
agency 
interpretation. 
 
Only 
reasonable 
agency 
interpretations are given any deference.   
¶16 A reviewing court 
accords 
an agency's 
statutory 
interpretation great weight deference when each of the following 
requirements are met: (1) the agency is charged by the 
legislature with the duty of administering the statute; (2) the 
agency interpretation is one of long standing; (3) the agency 
employed its expertise or specialized knowledge in forming its 
interpretation; and (4) the agency's interpretation will provide 
uniformity and consistency in the application of the statute.10   
¶17 When a reviewing court applies great weight deference, 
it sustains an agency's reasonable statutory interpretation, 
even if the court concludes that another interpretation is 
equally reasonable, or even more reasonable, than that of the 
agency.11  An agency's conclusion of law is unreasonable and may 
                                                 
10 UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 284, 548 N.W.2d 57 
(1996) (citing Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 
660, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995)). 
11 UFE Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 287. 
"[W]hen the expertise of the . . . agency is significant to 
the value judgment (to the determination of a legal question)," 
if the agency's decision is reasonable it will be accepted by 
courts "irrespective of whether there may have been some other 
reasonable interpretation or application [of the statute]."  
Nottelson v. DIHLR, 94 Wis. 2d 106, 117 & n.10, 287 N.W.2d 763 
(1980).  
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
11
be reversed by a reviewing court if it directly contravenes the 
statute or the federal or state constitution, if it is clearly 
contrary to the legislative intent, history, or purpose of the 
statute, or if it is without a rational basis.12 
¶18 A reviewing court 
accords 
an agency's 
statutory 
interpretation due weight deference when the agency has some 
experience in an area but has not developed the expertise that 
necessarily places it in a better position than a court to make 
judgments regarding the interpretation of the statute.13  Due 
weight deference is based on the fact that the legislature has 
charged the agency with the enforcement of the statute in 
question, not on the expertise of the agency.  When a reviewing 
court applies due weight deference, it sustains an agency's 
statutory interpretation if it is not contrary to the clear 
meaning of the statute, unless the reviewing court determines 
that a more reasonable interpretation exists.14 
¶19 A reviewing court 
accords 
an agency's 
statutory 
interpretation no deference when any of the following conditions 
is met:  (1) the issue is one of first impression; (2) the 
agency has no experience or expertise in deciding the legal 
issue presented; or (3) the agency's position on the issue has 
                                                 
12 Brown, 267 Wis. 2d 31, ¶19 (citing Harnischfeger Corp. v. 
LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 662, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995); Barron Elec. 
Co-op. 
v. 
Pub. 
Serv. 
Comm'n, 
212 
Wis. 2d 752, 
766, 
569 
N.W.2d 726 (Ct. App. 1997)). 
13 UFE Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 286. 
14 Id. at 287. 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
12
been so inconsistent as to provide no real guidance.15  When a 
reviewing court accords an agency's statutory interpretation no 
deference, the court interprets the statute independently of the 
agency's interpretation and in effect adopts an interpretation 
that 
the 
court 
determines 
is 
the 
most 
reasonable 
interpretation.16   
¶20 Thus, due weight deference and no deference to an 
agency's interpretation of a statute are similar.  Under both 
due weight deference and no deference, the reviewing court may 
adopt, without regard for the agency's interpretation, what it 
views as the most reasonable interpretation of the statute.  
When due weight deference is accorded an agency, however, a 
reviewing 
court 
will 
not 
reverse 
the 
agency's 
statutory 
interpretation when an alternative interpretation is equally 
reasonable.17  In contrast, in a no deference review of an 
agency's statutory interpretation, the reviewing court merely 
benefits from the agency's determination and may reverse the 
agency's interpretation even when an alternative statutory 
interpretation is equally reasonable to the interpretation of 
the agency.18   
                                                 
15 Id. at 285. 
16 Harnischfeger Corp., 196 Wis. 2d at 660 n.4 (citing 
Village of Whitefish Bay v. Employment Relations Bd., 34 
Wis. 2d 432, 445, 149 N.W.2d 662 (1967)). 
17 UFE Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 287 n.3. 
18 Id. 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
13
¶21 In the present 
case 
two 
administrative entities 
implement the licensing system.  The parties agree that although 
the Department of Transportation licenses both Harley-Davidson 
and Racine H-D under Wis. Stat. §§ 218.101 to 218.0163 and 
supervises both Harley-Davidson's and Racine H-D's licenses,19 
the Division of Hearings and Appeals, not the Department of 
Transportation, is charged by the legislature with hearing 
disputes under Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8).      
¶22  A dealer seeking to challenge a proposed modification 
of 
its 
motor 
vehicle 
dealer 
agreement 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0116(8) must file a complaint with the Department of 
Transportation and the Division of Hearings and Appeals, and the 
Division must schedule a hearing and decide the matter.20  
¶23 The administrator of the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals is directed by statute, Wis. Stat. § 227.43(1)(bg), to 
assign a hearing examiner to preside over any hearing or review 
under Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8)(a), the statute at issue in the 
                                                 
19 Wis. Stat. § 218.0111. 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 218.0116(8)(a) provides in relevant 
part: 
[T]he 
motor 
vehicle 
dealer 
may 
file 
with 
the 
department of transportation and the division of 
hearings and appeals and serve upon the respondent a 
complaint for a determination of whether there is good 
cause for permitting the proposed modification.  The 
division 
of hearings 
and 
appeals 
shall 
promptly 
schedule a hearing and decide the matter. 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
14
instant case.21  Although the statute governing the Division 
requires 
that 
the 
system 
shall 
ensure, 
to 
the 
extent 
practicable, that hearing examiners are assigned to different 
subjects on a rotating basis, the statute also allows the system 
to include the establishment of pools of examiners responsible 
for certain subjects.22  It appears that the administrator of the 
Division 
has 
established 
a 
system 
for 
assigning 
hearing 
examiners that designates a particular examiner or pool of 
examiners to be responsible for cases arising under §§ 218.0110 
to 218.0163 to enable these examiners to develop expertise. 
                                                 
21 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.43(1)(bg) also grants the Division 
jurisdiction to appoint a hearing examiner to hear and preside 
over hearings: 
(1) The administrator of the division of hearings and 
appeals in the department of administration shall: 
. . . . 
(bg) Assign a hearing examiner to preside over any 
hearing 
or 
review 
under 
ss. . . .  
86.16(5) . . . 218.0116 . . . (8)(a) . . . .   
See also Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8)(a).   
The statutes refer to a "hearing examiner."  The Division 
refers to the hearing examiner as an "administrative law judge." 
22 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.43(1g) states: 
The administrator of the division of hearings and 
appeals shall establish a system for assigning hearing 
examiners to preside over any hearing under this 
section.  The system shall ensure, to the extent 
practicable, that hearing examiners are assigned to 
different subjects on a rotating basis.  The system 
may include the establishment of pools of examiners 
responsible for certain subjects. 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
15
¶24 Each party adversely affected by a proposed decision 
of a hearing examiner under Wis. Stat. § 227.43(1)(bg) may seek 
review by the administrator of the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals.23  The decision of the administrator of the Division "is 
a final decision of the agency subject to judicial review under 
s. 227.52."24  Thus the administrator of the Division helps 
achieve uniformity and consistency in adjudicative proceedings.  
In the instant case the administrator did modify the decision of 
the hearing examiner. 
¶25 The decision of the Division of Hearings and Appeals 
in a dispute under § 218.0116(8) is final25 (not subject to 
adoption, approval, or modification by the Department of 
                                                 
23 Wis. Stat. § 227.46(2m). 
24 Id. 
25 Wisconsin Stat. § 218.0116(8)(c) provides: 
The decision of the division of hearings and appeals 
shall be in writing and shall contain findings of fact 
and a determination of whether there is good cause for 
permitting the proposed modification.  The division of 
hearings and appeals shall deliver copies of the 
decision to the parties personally or by registered 
mail.  The decision is final upon its delivery or 
mailing and no reconsideration or rehearing by the 
division of hearings and appeals is permitted. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 227.46(2m) provides, in relevant part: 
In any hearing or review assigned to a hearing 
examiner under s. 227.43 (1)(bg) [which includes a 
hearing under s. 218.0116(8)(a)] . . . [t]he decision 
of the administrator of the division of hearings and 
appeals is a final decision of the agency subject to 
judicial review under s. 227.52. 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
16
Transportation)26 and an aggrieved party may seek judicial review 
as provided in chapter 227 of the statutes.27  The Department of 
Transportation may petition for judicial review.28     
¶26 In debating whether this court should give any 
deference to the statutory interpretation of the Division of 
Hearings and Appeals, the parties agree that the Division, 
including the hearing examiner in the present case, handles many 
Department of Transportation cases involving the motor vehicle 
statutes, but that neither the Division nor a hearing examiner 
has specifically addressed whether a manufacturer's modification 
of a dealer's territory is a modification of the parties' 
agreement under Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8).  Nor has the Division 
                                                 
26 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.46(3) states, in relevant part: 
With respect to contested cases except a hearing or 
review assigned to a hearing examiner under s. 
227.43(1)(bg) 
[which 
includes 
a 
hearing 
under 
§ 218.0116(8)(a)], an agency may by rule or in a 
particular case may by order: 
(a) Direct that the hearing examiner's decision be the 
final decision of the agency . . . . 
Thus, because the Division of Hearings and Appeals assigns 
the 
hearing 
examiner 
for 
§ 218.0116(8) 
cases 
under 
§ 227.043(1)(bg), the Department of 
Transportation is not 
permitted to adopt the decision of the Division. 
27 Wisconsin Stat. § 218.0116(9) states: 
Any person in interest aggrieved by a decision of the 
division of hearings and appeals or an order of the 
division of banking may have a review of the decision 
as provided in ch. 227. 
28 Wis. Stat. § 227.46(2m). 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
17
addressed the definitions of "agreement" and "franchise" under 
§§ 218.0101(1) and 218.0101(13).  The parties disagree, however, 
about what deference, if any, is due to the Division's decision 
in the present case.   
¶27 Harley-Davidson argues that the Division's decision 
interpreting the motor vehicle dealer statutes should be 
afforded great weight deference or, at a minimum, due weight 
deference.  Harley-Davidson urges great weight or due weight 
deference because the Division of Hearings and Appeals is 
charged with enforcing the statutory scheme and uses its motor 
vehicle distribution expertise to interpret and apply the phrase 
"motor vehicle dealer agreement."       
¶28 Racine H-D and amicus Wisconsin Automobile and Truck 
Dealers Association contend that this court should not accord 
any deference to the statutory interpretation of the Division 
and should interpret and apply the statute independently of the 
Division.  They argue that the Division has never before 
addressed whether a manufacturer's modification of a dealer's 
territory is a modification of the parties' agreement under Wis. 
Stat. § 218.0116(8) and that accordingly the Division has no 
expertise 
or 
specialized 
knowledge 
in 
forming 
the 
interpretation. 
¶29 In the instant case the final decision in the dispute 
is not that of the Department of Transportation but rather is 
that of the Department of Administration, Division of Hearings 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
18
and Appeals.29  Under the statutes, we review the decision of the 
Division 
of 
Hearings 
and 
Appeals. 
 
The 
Department 
of 
Transportation, which has statutory licensing authority, is at 
odds with the Division of Hearings and Appeals, which has 
statutory 
authority 
to 
decide 
disputes 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0116(8) relating to modification of a motor vehicle dealer 
agreement.  
¶30 The question presented in the present case is whether 
the statutory interpretation of an administrative entity charged 
solely with an adjudicative function in certain disputes should 
be accorded any deference by the courts.  Prior cases have 
answered this question in the affirmative.30  
¶31 The concept of deference to statutory interpretations 
by agencies has been developed and applied in case law involving 
numerous 
administrative 
agencies, 
including 
agencies 
that 
                                                 
29 See Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8)(c).  
30 The court has reviewed and accorded deference to the 
statutory interpretation of the adjudicative agency without 
deference to the other agency.  See, e.g., DILHR v. LIRC, 161 
Wis. 2d 231, 241-45, 467 
N.W.2d 545 
(1991) 
(court accords 
deference to LIRC's statutory interpretation, not DILHR's, even 
though DILHR 
is primary 
agency administering 
unemployment 
compensation law; court unpersuaded by DILHR's argument to the 
contrary); 
Dep't 
of 
Transp. 
v. 
Comm'r 
of 
Transp., 
159 
Wis. 2d 271, 463 N.W.2d 870 (Ct. App. 1990) (court reviews 
decision of Commissioner of Transportation, the adjudicative 
predecessor to the Division of Hearings and Appeals for 
Department of Transportation cases (with adjudicative authority 
to grant or deny an application for a motor vehicle dealer's 
license), 
according 
no 
deference 
to 
the 
Department 
of 
Transportation, the agency charged with other duties under the 
motor vehicle dealer code; Wis. Stat. § 218.01(3)(b) (1989-90)).   
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
19
perform purely adjudicative functions.  Some agencies, like the 
Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC), to which deference 
has been accorded, have solely final adjudicative functions.31  
Other agencies are charged by statute with primary substantive 
administration and rule-making powers and also with interpreting 
statutes to resolve disputes.32  These agencies likewise have 
been accorded deference.  
¶32 Because many of the cases according deference to 
statutory interpretations involved decisions of LIRC,33 it is 
useful to compare the Division of Hearings and Appeals to LIRC.  
LIRC is part of the Department of Workforce Development.34  The 
                                                 
31 See, 
e.g., 
UFE, 
Inc., 
201 
Wis. 2d at 
281-88; 
Harnischfeger Corp., 196 Wis. 2d at 659-63; Lisney v. LIRC, 171 
Wis. 2d 499, 505-07, 493 N.W.2d 499 (1992); DILHR v. LIRC, 161 
Wis. 2d 231, 241-47, 467 N.W.2d 545 (1991) (deference was due to 
LIRC, not DILHR, reasoning that the legislature intended LIRC to 
have final review authority over disputed DILHR decisions; Wis. 
Stat. §§ 108.09(6)-(7), 108.10(3) (1989-90)).  
32 See, e.g., Clean Wisconsin, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 
2005 WI 93, ¶¶35-44, 282 Wis. 2d 250, 700 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Stat. 
§ 196.02 (2001-02)); West Bend Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 121 
Wis. 2d 1, 12-14, 357 N.W.2d 534 (1984) (Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4) 
(1979-80)). 
33 See, e.g., Brown, 267 Wis. 2d 31, ¶17 (great weight 
deference); UFE, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 286-87 (due weight 
deference); Harnischfeger Corp., 196 Wis. 2d at 660 (great 
weight deference); Lisney, 171 Wis. 2d at 522 (no deference 
because 
statutory 
language 
abides 
only 
one 
reasonable 
interpretation); DILHR v. LIRC, 161 Wis. 2d 231, 241-47, 467 
N.W.2d 545 (1991) (LIRC, not DILHR, is the appropriate body to 
which deference is accorded).  
34 Wis. Stat. § 15.225(1). 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
20
Division is part of the Department of Administration.35  Each has 
independent authority to make rules within the context of its 
authority.36  Each exercises its powers, duties, and functions 
independently of the head of the department to which it is 
connected.37     
                                                 
35 Wis. Stat. § 15.103(1). 
36 Wisconsin Stat. § 103.04(2) provides: 
(2) Notwithstanding s. 227.11, the commission [LIRC] 
may not promulgate rules except that it may promulgate 
its rules of procedure. 
(Wisconsin Stat. § 227.11 provides for the general rule-making 
authority of administrative agencies.) 
Under Wis. Stat. § 227.43(1)(d), "The administrator of the 
division 
of 
hearings 
and 
appeals 
in 
the 
department 
of 
administration shall . . . (d) Promulgate rules relating to the 
exercise of the administrator's and the division's powers and 
duties under this section." 
37 Wisconsin Stat. § 15.03, applying to the Division of 
Hearings and Appeals and LIRC, provides in relevant part: 
Any division, office, commission, council or board 
attached under this section to a department or 
independent agency or a specified division thereof 
shall 
be 
a 
distinct 
unit 
of 
that 
department, 
independent 
agency 
or 
specified 
division. 
Any 
division, office, commission, council or board so 
attached 
shall 
exercise 
its 
powers, 
duties 
and 
functions prescribed by law, including rule making, 
licensing and regulation, and operational planning 
within the area of program responsibility of the 
division, 
office, 
commission, 
council 
or 
board, 
independently of the head of the department or 
independent 
agency, 
but 
budgeting, 
program 
coordination and related management functions shall be 
performed under the direction and supervision of the 
head of the department or independent agency . . . . 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
21
¶33 LIRC handles appeals addressing a variety of subject 
matters.38  In 2005, LIRC issued a total of 3,473 decisions.39  
The Division of Hearings and Appeals handles appeals addressing 
a variety of subject matters.40  In 1998-99, the last year for 
which complete statistics are available, the Division conducted 
a total of 4,942 hearings.41  Hearings are ordinarily conducted 
by hearing examiners. 
¶34 The three LIRC commissioners are appointed by the 
governor with the advice and consent of the Senate and they 
serve six-year terms.42  The administrator of the Division of 
                                                 
38 The subjects include unemployment insurance, worker's 
compensation, equal rights, and employer tax status. 
39 Statistics 
available 
at 
LIRC 
website, 
http://www.dwd.state.wi.us/lirc/lrc_05st.htm/ (last visited June 
27, 2006). 
LIRC 
decided 
2,845 
unemployment 
insurance 
cases, 455 
worker's compensation cases, 144 equal rights cases, and 29 
employer tax status cases.  
40 The subjects include medical assistance, food stamps, 
nursing home and medical facility licensing, crime victim 
compensation, special education cases, and parole and probation 
review.  Hearing information available at Division of Hearings 
and Appeals website, http://dha.state.wi.us/home/ (last visited 
June 27, 2006).  A complete list of the agencies for which the 
Division conducts hearings, and the subject matters those 
hearings cover, is available on the Division website. 
41 Statistics available in portable document format at the 
website 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
State 
Legislature, 
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lab/reports/00-7full.pdf 
(last 
visited June 27, 2006). 
42 Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 15.01(2), 15.06(1)(a). 
 
The 
LIRC 
chairperson is elected by the commissioners from among their own 
members for two-year terms.  Wis. Stat. § 15.06(2)(a).  
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
22
Hearings and Appeals is appointed by the Secretary of the 
Department of Administration,43 who is appointed by the governor 
with the advice and consent of the Senate.44  The administrator 
is in the classified service.45 
¶35 Thus, both LIRC and the Division are adjudicative 
bodies charged only with resolving certain disputes.  Neither 
entity makes rules, except regarding the procedure by which the 
adjudications proceed.  Both address a wide variety of subject 
matters in handling appeals.46  LIRC's relationship with the 
Department 
of 
Workforce 
Development 
is 
not 
substantively 
different from the Division's relationship with the Department 
of Administration and the entities for which it conducts 
adjudicative proceedings. 
¶36 The Division of Hearings and Appeals is not the only 
adjudicative body that is attached to the Department of 
Administration.  The Tax Appeals Commission is attached to the 
                                                 
43 Wis. Stat. § 15.103. 
44 Wis. Stat. § 15.05(1)(a). 
45 Wis. Stat. § 15.103(1). 
46 There are, of course, differences between LIRC and the 
Division.  For example, the hearing examiners who conduct the 
initial hearings reviewed on appeal by LIRC are not employed by 
LIRC; 
they 
are 
employed 
by 
the 
Department 
of 
Workforce 
Development.  The hearing examiners in Division of Hearings and 
Appeals cases, on the other hand, are employees of the Division. 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
23
Department of Administration as well.47  The Tax Appeals 
Commission handles all appeals in a wide variety of tax matters, 
subject to judicial review under ch. 227.48  The agency with 
primary authority over non-adjudicated tax matters is the 
                                                 
47 Wis. Stat. § 15.105(1) ("There is created a tax appeals 
commission which is attached to the department of administration 
under s. 15.03."); see also 2001-2003 Biennial Report of the 
Wisconsin 
Tax 
Appeals 
Commission, 
at 
1, 
available 
at 
http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs_view2.asp?docid=1680 
(last 
visited June 27, 2006) ("The Tax Appeals Commission is an 
independent state agency. Its organization, powers, duties, and 
functions are governed by Chapter 73 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 15.03, budgeting, program coordination, 
and 
related 
management 
functions 
are 
performed 
by 
the 
Commission, under the general direction and supervision of the 
Secretary of the Department of Administration."). 
48 Wis. Stat. § 73.01. 
See 2001-2003 Biennial Report of the Wisconsin Tax Appeals 
Commission, 
at 
1, 
available 
at 
http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs_view2.asp?docid=1680 
(last 
visited June 27, 2006), for a list of the types of tax appeals 
handled by the Tax Appeals Commission. 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
24
Department of Revenue.49  This court has accorded deference to 
decisions of the Tax Appeals Commission.50   
¶37 If deference is accorded to statutory interpretation 
decisions by LIRC and the Tax Appeals Commission, both totally 
adjudicative agencies, the question remains whether deference 
should be denied to statutory interpretation decisions of the 
Division of Hearings and Appeals for the sole reason that the 
Division is a totally adjudicative entity.  
¶38 The court of appeals has had several opportunities to 
determine whether to apply levels of deference to statutory 
interpretations rendered by the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals.    
                                                 
49 Wis. Stat. § 73.03. 
50 See, e.g., Lincoln Savings Bank, S.A. v. DOR, 215 
Wis. 2d 430, 443, 573 N.W.2d 522 (1998) (citing UFE, Inc., 201 
Wis. 2d at 282 n.2, granting no deference to interpretation and 
application 
of 
statute 
by 
Tax 
Appeals 
Commission 
when 
interpretation contravened plain language of statute); LaCrosse 
Queen, Inc. v. DOR, 208 Wis. 2d 439, 445-46, 561 N.W.2d 686 
(1997) (granting no deference to interpretation and application 
of statute by Tax Appeals Commission when Commission had no 
expertise on the meaning of the term "interstate commerce"); 
William Wrigley, Jr., Co. v. DOR, 176 Wis. 2d 795, 801, 500 
N.W.2d 667 (1993) (granting deference to interpretation and 
application of a statute by Tax Appeals Commission because 
Commission is "the final administrative authority" for review of 
Department of Revenue decisions and is experienced in applying 
particular tax statute in issue); DOR v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 
208 Wis. 2d 582, 589, 561 N.W.2d 344 (Ct. App. 1997) (granting 
deference to interpretation and application of statute by Tax 
Appeals 
Commission 
because 
Commission 
"has 
primary 
responsibility 
for 
[tax] 
policy 
determinations" 
and 
has 
"expertise and experience in construing the tax laws generally, 
and the interrelationship between the federal and state tax laws 
specifically."). 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
25
¶39 In Roehl Transport, Inc. v. Division of Hearings & 
Appeals, 213 Wis. 2d 452, 570 N.W.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1997), a 
trucking company challenged the imposition of a tax by the 
Department of Transportation based on a fuel taxation system 
under Wis. Stat. § 341.45(1g)(a), which the Department was 
charged with administering.51  The trucking firm's challenge was 
heard by a hearing examiner for the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals, which rejected the challenge.52  On appeal, the court of 
appeals reversed the decision of the Division, giving no 
deference to the Division's interpretation of the statute.53 
¶40 The Division's adjudicative responsibilities under 
Wis. Stat. § 341.45 are set forth in § 227.43(1)(br).54  That 
section (in contrast to § 227.43(1)(bg), the section applicable 
in the present case) authorizes the administrator of the 
Division of Hearings and Appeals to assign a hearing examiner to 
                                                 
51 Roehl Transport, Inc. v. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 213 
Wis. 2d 452, 460, 465-66, 570 N.W.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1997). 
52 Id. at 455, 457. 
53 Id. at 455-56. 
54 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.43 states, in relevant parts: 
(1) The administrator of the division of hearings and 
appeals in the department of administration shall: 
. . . . 
(br) Assign a hearing examiner to preside over any 
hearing of a contested case which is required to be 
conducted by the department of transportation and 
which 
is 
not 
conducted 
by 
the 
secretary 
of 
transportation. 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
26
render 
decisions 
in 
disputes 
before 
the 
Department 
of 
Transportation in hearings not conducted by the Secretary of 
Transportation, including disputes such as the one in Roehl 
Transport. 
 
The 
Department 
of 
Transportation 
could 
have 
directed, but did not direct, that the hearing examiner's 
decision in Roehl Transport was the final decision of the 
Department under Wis. Stat. § 227.46(3)(a).  Thus, the court of 
appeals reviewed the Division's decision as a final decision of 
the Division, not of the Department. 
¶41 In determining the level of deference to be accorded 
the statutory interpretation of the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals, the court of appeals distinguished between an agency 
charged with the administration and enforcement of the statutes 
being interpreted and other administrative entities such as the 
Division of Hearings and Appeals that merely "provide management 
services and assistance to state agencies and departments."55   
¶42 The court of appeals emphasized two elements in 
deciding whether to grant deference to the Division's decision 
in Roehl Transport:  (1) Did the Division have experience, 
expertise, or expert knowledge? and (2) Did the legislature 
impose on the Division the duty to enforce or administer the 
statute?56   
¶43 The court of appeals held in Roehl Transport that the 
Division of Hearings and Appeals had not shown that it possessed 
                                                 
55 Roehl Transport, 213 Wis. 2d at 460. 
56 Id. at 460-61. 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
27
any experience, expertise, or specialized knowledge in the area 
of fuel or excise taxation.57     
¶44 The court of appeals also concluded in Roehl Transport 
that the legislature had not imposed on the Division of Hearings 
and Appeals the duty to enforce or administer the statute 
because the Department of Transportation could have directed 
(although it did not direct) that the hearing examiner's 
decision in Roehl Transport was the final decision of the 
Department under Wis. Stat. § 227.46(3)(a).58  
                                                 
57 Id. at 461 (emphasis added).  A review of the Division of 
Hearings and Appeals website indicates that Roehl Transport was 
the first case the Division ever heard regarding Wis. Stat. 
§ 341.45. 
 
See 
Decisions 
Issued 
by 
DHA 
for 
Dep't 
of 
Transportation, 
available 
at 
http://dha.state.wi.us 
(last 
visited June 27, 2006). 
In Commissioner of Insurance v. Fiber Recovery, Inc., 2004 
WI App 183, ¶15, 276 Wis. 2d 495, 687 N.W.2d 755, the court of 
appeals, following Roehl Transport, concluded that the court 
"may give deference to an agency decision on a question of law 
where the agency has expertise" but that the Division of 
Hearings and Appeals lacked expertise regarding ch. 605 and the 
construction of insurance contracts.   The Division apparently 
heard the Fiber Recovery case under its authority under Wis. 
Stat. § 227.43(1m), which states: 
(1m) Upon the request of an agency that is not 
prohibited from contracting with a 3rd party for 
contested case hearing services, the administrator of 
the division of hearings and appeals in the department 
of administration may contract with the agency to 
provide the contested case hearing services and may 
assign a hearing examiner to preside over any hearing 
performed under such a contract.  
58 The court of appeals thus distinguished the Division of 
Hearings and Appeals from the Tax Appeals Commission, explaining 
that the Division is not "an independent agency——such as the Tax 
Appeals Commission——created for the express purpose of reviewing 
decisions of a line agency." 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
28
¶45 The 
principles of 
deference 
enunciated 
in 
Roehl 
Transport regarding decisions of the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals under Wis. Stat. § 227.43(1)(br) were applied and 
explained in Sea View Estates Beach Club, Inc. v. DNR, 223 
Wis. 2d 138, 588 N.W.2d 667 (Ct. App. 1998), a case arising 
under § 227.43(1)(b).59  As with Wis. Stat. § 227.43(1)(br) 
(applied in Roehl Transport), § 227.43(1)(b) authorizes the 
administrator of the Division of Hearings and Appeals to assign 
a hearing examiner to render a decision in disputes such as the 
one in Sea View when the secretary of the Department of Natural 
Resources does not hear the matter.   
¶46 In Sea View, a beach club had operated a 215-foot pier 
without a permit.  Upon a complaint by Sea View's neighbor, the 
DNR conducted a site inspection and determined that a 190-foot 
pier would be more appropriate for the site and recommended 
granting a permit for a 190-foot pier.  Sea View applied for 
this permit.  Several neighbors objected to the permit and a 
contested hearing regarding the pier was held before the 
Division of Hearings and Appeals, as provided by Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
59 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.43 states in relevant parts: 
(1) The administrator of the division of hearings and 
appeals in the department of administration shall: 
. . . . 
(b) Assign a hearing examiner to preside over any 
hearing of a contested case which is required to be 
conducted by the department of natural resources and 
which is not conducted by the secretary of natural 
resources. 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
29
§ 227.43(1)(b).  The hearing examiner concluded that a 110-foot 
pier would be more appropriate for the location.  
¶47 In accordance with Wis. Admin. Code § NR 2.155(1),60 
the Department of Natural Resources adopted the decision of the 
                                                 
60 Wisconsin Admin. Code § NR 2.155(1) (Sept., 2002) 
provides in relevant part: 
Unless the department petitions for judicial review as 
provided in s. 227.46(8), Stats., the decision [of the 
Division of Hearings and Appeals hearing officer] 
shall be the final decision of the department, but may 
be reviewed in the manner described in s. NR 2.20. 
Wisconsin Admin Code § NR 2.20 (Aug., 1997) provides: 
  (1) FILING. Any party to a contested case who is 
adversely affected by a final decision rendered after 
a contested case hearing on the matter may, within 20 
days after issuance of the decision, file a written 
petition 
for 
review 
by 
the 
secretary 
or 
the 
secretary's designee. The petition shall specify in 
detail the grounds for the review, the relief which 
petitioner 
seeks 
and 
citation 
to 
supporting 
authorities 
which 
petitioner 
believes 
aids 
petitioner's case. The secretary may not delegate the 
review to anyone who has had prior involvement in 
either the hearing or decision-making process. 
  (2) SERVICE. The petition for review under this 
section shall be served on the secretary as provided 
for in s. NR 2.03. Copies of the petition for review 
shall 
be 
served 
by 
regular 
mail 
upon 
the 
administrative law judge and upon all parties to the 
action. 
  (3) DECISION. Within 14 days of the receipt of the 
petition, the secretary shall decide whether or not to 
grant the requested review. If the secretary decides 
to grant the review, the secretary may order the 
filing of briefs, presentation of oral argument, or a 
rehearing of all or part of the evidence presented at 
the 
original 
public 
hearing, or 
any 
combination 
thereof. 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
30
Division of Hearings and Appeals.  The Department of Natural 
Resources had adopted Wis. Admin. Code § NR 2.155(1) pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 227.46(3),61 which authorizes an agency to direct by 
                                                                                                                                                             
  (4) APPEAL. A petition for review pursuant to this 
section is not a prerequisite for appeal or review 
under ss. 227.52 to 227.53, Stats. 
  (5) SUSPENSION OF DECISIONS. The filing of a 
petition for review under this section does not 
suspend or delay the effective date of a decision, and 
the decision shall take effect on the date of the 
decision unless another date is set by the department 
or the administrative law judge, and shall continue in 
effect 
unless 
provisions 
of 
the 
decision 
are 
specifically suspended or delayed by the secretary in 
writing. Petition for suspension of the effective date 
of a decision shall be clearly specified in the 
petition for review under this section. 
  (6) EFFECT ON JUDICIAL REVIEW. An action pending 
under this section does not in any manner affect or 
extend the time limits for filing actions in circuit 
court for review under ss. 227.52 and 227.53, Stats. 
See Sea View Estates Beach Club, Inc. v. DNR, 223 Wis. 2d 138, 
144-45, 588 N.W.2d 667 (Ct. App. 1998). 
61 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.46(3) states: 
With respect to contested cases except a hearing or 
review assigned to a hearing examiner under s. 
227.43(1)(bg), 
an 
agency 
may 
by 
rule 
or 
in 
a 
particular case may by order: 
(a) Direct that the hearing examiner's decision be the 
final decision of the agency;  
(b) Except as provided in sub. (2) or (4), direct that 
the record be certified to it without an intervening 
proposed decision; or 
(c) Direct that the procedure in sub. (2) be followed, 
except that in a class 1 proceeding both written and 
oral argument may be limited. 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
31
rule or in a particular case that the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals decision be the final decision of the agency.  The beach 
club appealed and argued that under Roehl Transport, the 
reviewing 
court 
owed 
no 
deference 
to 
the 
Division's 
interpretation of the statute in question.62   
¶48 On appeal, the court of appeals distinguished Sea View 
from Roehl Transport, reasoning that the Department of Natural 
Resources had adopted the decision of the Division of Hearings 
and Appeals.  Accordingly, in Sea View the court of appeals 
reviewed the decision of the Division of Hearings and Appeals as 
a final decision of the Department of Natural Resources63 and 
determined that the Department of Natural Resources decision 
adopting the decision of the Division was entitled to great 
weight deference.64  The Department of Natural Resources, 
according to the court of appeals, is the administrative agency 
charged by the legislature with general administrative duties 
and rule-making authority and had expertise regarding the 
relevant statutory provisions.65    
                                                 
62 Sea View, 223 Wis. 2d at 144-46. 
63 Sea 
View 
Estates 
Beach 
Club, 
Inc. 
v. 
DNR, 
223 
Wis. 2d 138, 149, 588 N.W.2d 667 (Ct. App. 1998). 
64 Id. at 147, 149. 
65 Id. at 149. 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
32
¶49 Adhering to the distinction between Roehl Transport 
and Sea View, the court of appeals has granted no deference to 
decisions of the Division of Hearings and Appeals on behalf of 
the Department of Health and Family Services (DHFS).  Although 
permitted by Wis. Stat. § 227.46(3), DHFS has not adopted 
decisions of the Division of Hearings and Appeals as final.66   
                                                                                                                                                             
Similarly, in Borsellino v. DNR, 2000 WI App 27, ¶¶5-6, 232 
Wis. 2d 430, 606 N.W.2d 255, the court of appeals reviewed a 
Division of Hearings and Appeals decision regarding pier size 
that was adopted by the Department of Natural Resources under 
Wis. Admin. Code § NR 2.155(1).  Relying on Sea View, the court 
of appeals reviewed the decision as the final decision of the 
Department of Natural Resources and gave the decision great 
weight deference. 
66 In Artac v. DHFS, 2000 WI App 88, 234 Wis. 2d 480, 610 
N.W.2d 115 (a case arising under Wis. Stat. § 227.43(1)(bu), 
which is parallel to Wis. Stat. § 227.43(1)(b) and (br)), the 
court of appeals, citing Roehl Transport and Sea View, gave no 
deference to a decision of the Division of Hearings and Appeals 
denying a medical assistance application.  The court of appeals 
pointed out that, unlike the Department of Natural Resources in 
Sea View, the Department of Health and Family Services had not 
adopted the decision of the Division.  Thus the court of appeals 
granted the Division's decision no deference.  The court of 
appeals commented that "[I]t appears unusual to grant different 
levels of deference to what are effectively all [Division] 
decisions based on whether a particular agency has a rule by 
which it automatically adopts those decisions.  However under 
Roehl and Sea View, it appears that we are bound to do so."  234 
Wis. 2d 480, ¶13 n.6. 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
33
¶50 A more recent case, Town of Barton v. Division of 
Hearings & Appeals, 2002 WI App 169, 256 Wis. 2d 628, 649 
N.W.2d 293, is similar to the instant case.  Town of Barton, 
like the present case, arose under Wis. Stat. § 227.43(1)(bg).67   
¶51 The City of West Bend had requested permission from 
the Town of Barton to build a sanitary sewer interceptor through 
the Town.  The Town denied the request, and the City appealed to 
the 
Division 
of 
Hearings 
and 
Appeals 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 86.16(5).68 
 
The 
Division 
ordered 
the 
Town 
to 
permit 
installation of the interceptor.   
                                                                                                                                                             
The court of appeals followed Artac in Buettner v. DHFS, 
2003 WI App 90, 264 Wis. 2d 700, 663 N.W.2d 282.  In Buettner, 
the 
Department 
of 
Health 
and 
Family 
Services 
terminated 
Buettner's medical assistance benefits.  Buettner appealed to 
the Division of Hearings and Appeals, which, after a hearing, 
affirmed.  As in Artac, the Division's authority to hear 
Buettner's challenge came from Wis. Stat. § 227.43(1)(bu).  The 
circuit court granted summary judgment for the Department.  On 
appeal, the court of appeals determined that the Division of 
Hearings and Appeals decision had not been adopted by DHFS, the 
statutes were complex, and the Division's decision was entitled 
to no deference under Sea View and Artac.   
67 Town of Barton addressed Wis. Stat. § 86.16(5), which is 
included in the list of statutes covered by Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.43(1)(bg).  See supra note 21.  
68 Wisconsin Stat. § 86.16(5) states: 
Any 
person, 
firm 
or 
corporation 
whose 
written 
application for permission to construct such lines 
within the limits of a highway has been refused, or 
has been on file with the department or local 
authority for 20 days and no action has been taken 
thereon, may file with the department or local 
authority a notice of appeal to the division of 
hearings and appeals.  The department or local 
authority shall thereupon return all of the papers and 
action of the department or local authority to the 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
34
¶52 On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that due 
weight deference was appropriate to the decision of the Division 
of Hearings and Appeals permitting the City to install sewer 
equipment in the Town under Wis. Stat. § 86.16(5),69 because (1) 
the Division of Hearings and Appeals "has been charged with 
administering Wis. Stat. § 86.16(5)" and (2) the Division has 
"some experience, even though its experience is not of long 
standing."70  The court of appeals decision did not explain why 
it viewed the Division of Hearings and Appeals as charged with 
administering § 86.16(5) and did not refer to either Roehl 
Transport or Sea View or any other case in its discussion of the 
standard of review.71 
¶53 These court of appeals cases can be explained as 
follows: When the Division of Hearings and Appeals hears 
disputes under Wis. Stat. §§ 227.43(1)(b), (br), (bu), and (by), 
it appears to have jurisdiction concurrent with the Department 
of Natural Resources, the Department of Transportation, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
division of hearings and appeals, and the division of 
hearings and appeals shall hear and try and determine 
the appeal on 10 days' notice to the department or 
local authority, and the applicant. The order entered 
by the division of hearings and appeals shall be 
final. 
See also Wis. Stat. § 227.43(1)(bg). 
69 Town of Barton v. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 2002 WI App 
169, ¶¶10, 15, 256 Wis. 2d 628, 649 N.W.2d 293. 
70 Id., ¶10. 
71 The briefs in Town of Barton made no reference to Roehl 
Transport or Sea View. 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
35
Department of Health and Family Services, and the Department of 
Workforce 
Development, 
respectively. 
 
Furthermore, 
each 
department may by rule or in a particular case may by order 
direct that the hearing examiner's decision be the final 
decision of the agency.72  Roehl Transport and Sea View fall 
within these statutory provisions.  The level of deference 
depends on whether the department adopts the decision of the 
Division and whether the department has the requisite expertise 
in the issue before it.  The court of appeals thus gave 
deference in Sea View but not in Roehl Transport. 
¶54 In contrast, when the Division of Hearings and Appeals 
hears disputes under Wis. Stat. § 227.43(1)(bg), the statute 
involved in the present case and in Town of Barton, the Division 
is the only administrative entity with authority to conduct the 
hearing, and the Division's decision is final subject to 
judicial review.73  Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 227.46(3) does not 
permit the Department of Transportation to promulgate a rule 
adopting, as a final decision of the Department, decisions of 
the Division rendered under § 86.16(5) (Town of Barton) or 
§ 218.0116(8)(a) (the instant case).       
                                                 
72 Wis. Stat. § 227.46(3)(a). 
73 Wis. Stat. §§ 227.43(1)(bg), 227.46(2m), (3).  See also 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8)(c), (9).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 227.46(2m) permits the Department of 
Transportation to seek judicial review of a Division decision 
made under § 227.43(1)(bg). 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
36
¶55 After reviewing Roehl Transport, Sea View, Town of 
Barton, and other cases such as those involving LIRC and the Tax 
Appeals Commission, we conclude that the legislature imposed the 
adjudicative responsibilities under Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8)(a) 
on the Division of Hearings and Appeals and thus, for the 
purposes 
of 
adjudication, 
charged 
the 
Division 
with 
administration and enforcement of that statute.  Therefore, our 
cases recognize that although statutory interpretation is 
ordinarily a question of law determined independently by a 
court, 
a 
court 
may 
accord 
deference 
to 
the 
Division's 
interpretation 
of 
§ 218.0116(8)(a) 
under 
appropriate 
circumstances set forth in the case law.  
¶56 Applying these cases, we conclude that in the present 
case the Division of Hearings and Appeals is not entitled to 
great weight deference because it has no experience or expertise 
in the issue presented.  At most, the Division is entitled to 
due weight deference.  The Division has heard numerous cases 
under Wis. Stat. § 218.0116 and its predecessor statutes.  
However, besides the present case, only two of those cases have 
considered a subsection of § 218.0116 addressing a motor vehicle 
dealer agreement, and neither of those disputes addressed the 
definition of "motor vehicle dealer agreement" or § 218.0116(8) 
or its predecessor statute.74  Nor did these disputes address the 
                                                 
74 See Decisions Issued by DHA for Dept. of Transportation, 
available at http://dha.state.wi.us (last visited June 27, 
2005). 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
37
definition of "agreement" or "franchise" under § 218.0101(1) and 
(13).   
¶57 The other disputes before the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals relating to Wis. Stat. § 218.0116 addressed provisions 
of that section that impose licensing requirements on motor 
vehicle dealers and manufacturers or regulate the sale of motor 
vehicles.  While the Division may have expertise regarding these 
issues, we conclude that interpretation of a motor vehicle 
dealer agreement under § 218.0116(8)(a) is a matter of first 
impression and that the Division lacks the requisite expertise 
and experience for its statutory interpretation to be accorded 
great weight deference.75 
¶58 Even if we were to grant due weight deference to the 
statutory interpretation of the Division of Hearings and Appeals 
of § 218.0116(8)(a) in the present case, we do not adopt the 
Division's statutory interpretation of § 218.0116(8)(a) because, 
as we explain below, another interpretation is more reasonable.   
II 
¶59 The substantive dispute in the present case centers on 
what documents constitute the motor vehicle dealer agreement 
under Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8).  More specifically, the dispute 
focuses on whether the document assigning territory to Racine H-
D (the zip code list) is part of the motor vehicle dealer 
agreement under § 218.0116(8).  We first set forth the facts, 
                                                 
75 See UFE Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 284 (citing Harnischfeger 
Corp., 196 Wis. 2d at 660). 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
38
then determine the meaning of "motor vehicle dealer agreement" 
under § 218.0116(8) and apply the statutory interpretation to 
the present case.  
A 
¶60 The following are the undisputed facts.  The Division 
of Hearings and Appeals granted summary judgment to Harley- 
Davidson, concluding as a matter of law on the basis of 
undisputed facts that the zip code list assigning territory to 
Racine H-D was not part of the motor vehicle dealer agreement.   
¶61 Harley-Davidson manufactures and sells motorcycles, 
parts, and accessories through a nationwide network of retail 
dealers.  Harley-Davidson is licensed as a "manufacturer" under 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0101(20)(a) and Racine H-D is licensed as a 
"motor vehicle dealer" under Wis. Stat. § 218.0101(23).  Racine 
H-D became a Harley-Davidson dealer in 1992 and entered into a 
series of contracts with Harley-Davidson, all granting Racine H-
D a non-exclusive right to purchase and sell Harley-Davidson 
products at retail from an approved location in Racine. 
¶62 When Racine H-D became a Harley-Davidson dealer in 
1992, the parties signed a contract that granted Racine H-D the 
right to sell Harley-Davidson products in a "territory" defined 
as "Racine County in the State of Wisconsin."  Racine County 
includes the zip code 53105, which encompasses the City of 
Burlington, an area of very high sales. 
¶63 On expiration of the 1992 contract, in late 1993 or 
early 1994, Harley-Davidson presented Racine H-D with a new 
contract that made reference to and expressly incorporated 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
39
Harley-Davidson's General Conditions of Sales and Service.  
Instead of assigning a territory, these documents stated that 
Harley-Davidson would assign Racine H-D a territory from "time 
to time" that could be modified based on Harley-Davidson's "good 
faith business judgment."       
¶64 Before signing the 1994 contract, Racine H-D learned 
that Harley-Davidson intended to remove the Burlington zip code 
from Racine H-D's assigned territory and that the Burlington zip 
code would be reassigned to Uke's Harley-Davidson, a dealer 
located in Kenosha. 
¶65 In response to 
Harley-Davidson's 
removal of the 
Burlington zip code, Racine H-D filed a complaint under Wis. 
Stat. § 218.0116(8) with the Division of Hearings and Appeals 
and the Department of Transportation, contesting the removal of 
the Burlington zip code.  Racine H-D asserted that under the new 
method of assigning territory, which based assignment on a 
dealer's distance from the center of a zip code, Racine H-D was 
closer to Burlington than was Uke's Harley-Davidson. 
¶66 Harley-Davidson then reevaluated its calculations and 
transferred the Burlington zip code back to Racine H-D.  Racine 
H-D then withdrew its complaint and signed the 1994 dealer 
contract, dated May 25, 1994 and set to expire in 1998.   
¶67 Racine H-D first received a list of zip codes to be 
included in its territory in 1994 in a meeting with its district 
manager.  The list was on a sheet of paper, separate from any 
other documents. 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
40
¶68 In 1998, Harley-Davidson and Racine H-D entered into 
the contract at issue in the present case.  Like the contract 
entered into by the parties in 1994, the 1998 contract includes 
both a signed document entitled "Harley-Davidson Motor Company 
Motorcycle Dealer Contract" and a second document entitled 
"General Conditions of Sales and Service," which the Dealer 
Contract expressly incorporates.  Neither document includes the 
zip code list but the word "territory" is used in both 
documents.  
¶69 The 
Dealer 
Contract 
mentions 
the 
assignment 
of 
territory in relevant parts as follows:   
 
1. GRANT OF RIGHTS.  Seller hereby grants to 
Dealer, and Dealer hereby accepts from Seller, the 
following rights: 
 
A. To purchase and resell at retail, primarily to 
persons residing or doing business in the Territory 
assigned under this Contract the motorcycles, parts, 
accessories, clothing, and other items (collectively 
referred to in this Contract as the "Harley-Davidson 
Products") identified in the Products Addendum to the 
Harley-Davidson 
Motor 
Company 
Motorcycle 
Dealer 
Contract 
(referred 
to 
in 
this 
Contract 
as 
the 
"Products Addendum"); 
. . . . 
Each of the foregoing rights granted to Dealer shall 
be non-exclusive. 
. . . . 
6. SPECIAL MARKET RIGHTS. . . . Dealer's special 
market rights only limit the location at which an 
additional Harley-Davidson motorcycle dealership may 
be established and are not in any way related to, and 
have no impact upon, Dealer's Territory, which remains 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
41
non-exclusive and subject to change by Harley-Davidson 
from time-to-time. 
¶70 The document entitled "General Conditions of Sales and 
Service," expressly incorporated in the Dealer Contract,76 
provides that Harley-Davidson can modify, alter, or adjust the 
territory at any time based on its good faith business judgment 
and that territory changes may result from the relocation of an 
existing dealership.  The document provides, in relevant part, 
for the assignment of territory as follows: 
Seller will assign Dealer a geographic area from time 
to time as Dealer's Territory, in which Dealer is 
responsible 
for 
effectively 
selling 
at 
retail, 
servicing and otherwise representing Harley-Davidson 
Products.  It is understood and agreed that (a) Seller 
may modify, alter or adjust Dealer's Territory at any 
time, based on Seller's good faith business judgment; 
and (b) Dealer's Territory is non-exclusive.  Without 
limitation, Dealer recognizes that Seller may change 
its 
Territory 
if 
the 
change 
results 
from 
the 
establishment 
of 
an 
additional 
Harley-Davidson 
dealership 
or 
the 
relocation 
of 
an 
existing 
dealership.   
                                                 
76  Regarding the General Conditions of Sales and Service, 
the Dealer Contract provides:   
2. General Conditions.  The Harley-Davidson Motor 
Company General Conditions of Sales and 
Service 
(January 1999) (referred to in this Contract as the 
"General Conditions"), a copy of which has been 
provided to Dealer and has been read and agreed to by 
Seller and Dealer, and such General Conditions and any 
duly executed and delivered supplement or amendment 
thereto are hereby expressly made a part of this 
Contract and incorporated herein.  Unless the context 
otherwise requires, any term defined in any part of 
this Contract shall have the same meaning in all parts 
of this Contract. (Emphasis added.) 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
42
¶71 The General Conditions of Sales and Service document 
expressly provides that Racine H-D has rights and obligations 
related to a "Territory assigned under this Contract . . . ."  
The document also requires Racine H-D to "devote its best 
efforts to promote aggressively the sale at retail of Harley-
Davidson products to customers within the Territory assigned to 
Dealer . . . ."  In addition, the document requires Racine H-D 
to "develop, utilize and participate in various advertising and 
sales 
promotional 
programs . . . in 
fulfilling 
its 
responsibilities for selling, promoting and advertising Harley-
Davidson products in the Territory" and obligates Racine H-D to 
maintain an inventory based on the "proper share of current and 
anticipated demand 
for 
Harley-Davidson 
Motorcycles in the 
Territory." 
¶72 The parties agree that both the 1998 Dealer Contract 
and the General Conditions of Sales and Service are included in 
the 
agreement 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0116(8)(a). 
Neither 
document spells out the territory assigned to Racine H-D, 
although both documents refer to Harley-Davidson assigning 
territory to Racine H-D.  The dispute centers on whether other 
documents relating to the assignment of territory, in particular 
the zip code lists Harley-Davidson provided to Racine H-D, are 
part of the 1998 agreement.     
¶73 As demonstrated by various documents and the parties' 
course of dealings, Racine H-D's territory continued to include 
the Burlington zip code from 1994 through 2001.  For example, 
almost every year the parties sent direct mail promotional items 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
43
to residents of Racine H-D's territory, which was described as 
including the Burlington zip code.  
¶74 The dispute between the parties arose when Harley-
Davidson decided in 2001 to remove the Burlington zip code from 
Racine H-D's assigned territory.  In 2001, Harley-Davidson 
informed Racine H-D that the Burlington zip code would be 
reassigned to Uke's Harley-Davidson once Uke's moved its Kenosha 
facility to a new location along Interstate 94.  Using its 
standard distance calculations, Harley-Davidson determined that 
the new Uke's location was closer to the center of the 
Burlington zip code than was Racine H-D's location.  
¶75 In 2002, in response to the reassignment of the 
Burlington zip code, Racine H-D filed a complaint with the 
Division 
of 
Hearings 
and 
Appeals 
and 
the 
Department 
of 
Transportation.77  Racine H-D argued before the Division that the 
                                                 
77 See Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8)(a): 
A manufacturer or distributor may not modify a motor 
vehicle dealer agreement during the term of the 
agreement or upon its renewal if the modification 
substantially and adversely affects the motor vehicle 
dealer's rights, obligations, investment or return on 
investment without giving 60 days written notice of 
the proposed modification to the motor vehicle dealer 
unless the modification is required by law, court 
order or the licensor.  Within the 60-day notice 
period the motor vehicle dealer may file with the 
department of transportation and the division of 
hearings and appeals and serve upon the respondent a 
complaint for a determination of whether there is good 
cause for permitting the proposed modification.  The 
division 
of hearings 
and 
appeals 
shall 
promptly 
schedule a hearing and decide the matter.  Multiple 
complaints 
pertaining 
to 
the 
same 
proposed 
modification shall be consolidated for hearing. The 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
44
removal of the Burlington zip code constitutes a modification of 
the motor vehicle dealer agreement between the parties.  Harley-
Davidson moved for summary judgment, and the hearing examiner 
granted the motion.   
¶76 The decision of the hearing examiner was for the most 
part approved by the administrator of the Division of Hearings 
and Appeals.  The final ruling stated that "[t]he assignment of 
a territory by Harley-Davidson for [Racine H-D] is not part of 
the motor vehicle dealer agreement" between the parties and that 
"the 'Harley-Davidson Motor Company Motorcycle Dealer Contract' 
and the 'Harley-Davidson Motor Company General Conditions of 
Sales and Service' together comprise the 'motor vehicle dealer 
agreement.'"  The Division of Hearings and Appeals further ruled 
that "[a]lthough the assignment of a territory to a motor 
vehicle dealer is an important component of the agreement 
between a manufacturer and a dealer, the description of the 
specific territory assigned is not a necessary component."  
Finally, the Division concluded that Harley-Davidson's policy of 
not including specific zip codes in motor vehicle dealer 
agreements is sensible because the legislature did not intend 
that each modification of a dealer's assigned territory, when 
made under a uniform policy, should become the potential subject 
of a complaint.    
                                                                                                                                                             
proposed modification may not take effect pending the 
determination of the matter.   
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
45
¶77 On review the circuit court concluded that the zip 
codes list provided to Racine H-D in 1994 was part of the motor 
vehicle dealer agreement because the motor vehicle dealer 
agreement "only makes sense if there is reference" to the zip 
code list.  The court of appeals reversed the order of the 
circuit court.  The court of appeals applied great weight 
deference to the decision of the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals, concluding that the legislature had charged the 
Division with administration of § 218.0116(8) and that the 
Division had substantial experience interpreting the motor 
vehicle code.78  The court of appeals thus reinstated the 
Division's decision and summary judgment order, holding that it 
was a reasonable interpretation of the meaning of the phrase 
"motor 
vehicle 
dealer 
agreement" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0116(8).79     
B 
¶78 We turn now to the question whether the assignment of 
territory is part of a motor vehicle agreement under Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0116(8).  We conclude that a manufacturer's assignment of 
territory is an essential aspect of the franchise relationship 
and therefore part of a motor vehicle dealer agreement under 
§ 218.0116(8). 
¶79 We begin our analysis of the meaning of "motor vehicle 
dealer 
agreement" 
as 
used 
in 
§ 218.0116(8) 
by 
examining 
                                                 
78 Racine Harley-Davidson, 278 Wis. 2d 508, ¶¶22, 24. 
79 Id., ¶¶26-30. 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
46
§§ 218.0101(1) and (13), which define the words "agreement" and 
"franchise" respectively for the purposes of §§ 218.0101 to 
218.0163 governing motor vehicle dealers.     
¶80 Wisconsin Stat. § 218.0101(1) defines "agreement" to 
mean "a contract that describes the franchise relationship 
between manufacturers, distributors, importers and dealers."  
The statute does not define "agreement" as a written instrument 
and does not require that all terms of the agreement be included 
in a single instrument designated as the agreement and executed 
by both parties.   
¶81 Section 218.0101(13) defines "franchise" to mean "the 
right to buy, sell, distribute or service a line make of motor 
vehicles 
that 
is 
granted 
to a motor 
vehicle 
dealer or 
distributor 
by 
a 
manufacturer, 
importer 
or 
distributor."  
Nothing in Wis. Stat. §§ 218.0101 to 218.0163 further defines 
the words "agreement," "contract" (as used in § 218.0101(1)) or 
"franchise" 
for 
purposes 
of 
§ 218.0116(8). 
The 
statutory 
definition of agreement is broad, encompassing the parties' 
description of their franchise relationship.80    
                                                 
80 The original definition of "agreement" adopted in 1961 is 
substantially the same as the present definition.  The original 
definition stated, "'Agreement' means contract or franchise or 
any 
other 
terminology 
used 
to 
describe 
the 
contractual 
relationship between manufacturers, distributors, importers and 
dealers."  Wis. Stat. § 218.01(1)(u) (1961).  
A worksheet for a draft of the 1961 session law, ch. 560, 
Laws of 1961, states that "'[a]greement' is intended to include 
and be synonymous with contract or franchise, or any other 
terminology used to describe the 
contractual 
relationship 
between 
manufacturers, 
distributors, 
importers 
and 
their 
appointed dealers."   
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
47
¶82 Several other provisions in Wis. Stat. §§ 218.0101 to 
218.0163 demonstrate that the assignment of territory is an 
essential aspect of the franchise relationship and therefore 
part of the motor vehicle dealer agreement. 
¶83 The 
first 
sentence 
of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0114(11) 
provides that "[a] manufacturer . . . shall designate in writing 
the area of sales responsibility assigned to a motor vehicle 
dealer."  Thus a manufacturer's written assignment of territory 
is a statutory condition for licensing.   
¶84 While this language does not explicitly require that 
the written territory assignment be part of the motor vehicle 
dealer agreement, the implication is that the assignment of 
territory is an essential aspect of the franchise relationship 
and therefore part of the motor vehicle dealer agreement. 
¶85 The second sentence of Wis. Stat. § 218.0114(11) 
prohibits a manufacturer from modifying the area of sales 
responsibility to avoid the requirements of § 218.0116(7), which 
governs a manufacturer who seeks to enter into a franchise 
agreement establishing or relocating a motor vehicle dealership.  
If a manufacturer seeks to establish or relocate a dealership, 
an existing dealer franchise may file a protest with the 
Department of Transportation and the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals.  Thus territory plays a role when a manufacturer 
proposes establishing another dealership within the "relevant 
                                                                                                                                                             
The legislative history of the definition of "agreement" 
adopted in 1993 demonstrates no intent to change the substance 
of the prior definition.  
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
48
market area" of an existing dealership.  The implication in 
§ 218.0116(7) and (11) is that the manufacturer's assignment of 
territory is an essential aspect of the franchise relationship 
and therefore part of the motor vehicle dealer agreement.     
¶86 Section 
218.0116(1)(r) 
(part 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0116(1) governing the denial, suspension or revocation of 
licenses) provides that a manufacturer's license may be denied, 
suspended, or revoked if, among other matters, the manufacturer 
"fails to designate in writing the area of sales responsibility 
assigned to a motor vehicle dealer."  Although subsection (1)(r) 
does not explicitly require that the assignment of territory be 
part of the motor vehicle agreement, it reaffirms the notion 
that the assignment of territory is an essential aspect of the 
franchise relationship and therefore part of the motor vehicle 
dealer agreement between the parties. 
¶87 Another significant provision for our purposes is Wis. 
Stat. § 218.0114(9)(a)1. prohibiting and rendering void any 
provisions in an agreement that "waive a remedy or defense 
available to . . . a dealer or other provision protecting the 
interests 
of . . . a 
dealer 
under 
ss. 
218.0101 
to 
218.0163 . . . ."  If we were to hold that a manufacturer may 
exclude an assignment of territory from a motor vehicle dealer 
agreement and reserve for itself the power to change the 
territory according to its good faith business judgment, we 
would in effect be allowing a manufacturer to enter into a motor 
vehicle dealer agreement forcing the dealer to waive the remedy 
and protections available to it under Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8).   
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
49
¶88 Unless an assignment of territory is treated as part 
of the motor vehicle dealer agreement, Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8) 
will not provide an effective administrative remedy to motor 
vehicle dealers for a manufacturer's modification of territory.  
This result seems contrary to the purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 218.0114(9)(a)1. and 218.0116(8). 
¶89 Thus Wis. Stat. § 218.0101(1) and (13); § 218.0114(9) 
and (11); and § 218.0116(1)(r), (7), and (8) support the view 
that an assignment of territory is an essential aspect of the 
franchise relationship and therefore part of a motor vehicle 
dealer agreement.  Failing to include an assignment of territory 
as a part of the motor vehicle dealer agreement not only would 
make it difficult to "effectively work under the terms of the 
contract[,]" as the circuit court stated, but also would permit 
manufacturers and dealers to circumvent by contract essential 
and non-waivable provisions of §§ 218.0101 to 218.0163. 
¶90 The Division of Hearings and Appeals concluded that 
the assignment of territory is an important component of the 
franchise relationship between a manufacturer and dealer but 
that "the precise description of the assigned territory is not 
essential to the relationship."  It concluded that the express 
language in Wis. Stat. § 218.0114(11) prohibiting a manufacturer 
from modifying "the area of sales responsibility to avoid the 
requirements of s. 218.0116(7) . . . implies that manufacturers 
may modify a dealer's area of sales responsibility in other 
instances."   
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
50
¶91 The reasoning of the Division of Hearings and Appeals 
is not persuasive and gives no consideration to Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0114(9)(a)1. prohibiting and rendering void any provisions 
in an agreement that "waive a remedy or defense available 
to . . . a dealer or other provision protecting the interests 
of . . . a dealer under ss. 218.0101 to 218.0163."  The 
Division's interpretation of § 218.0116(8) is not the more 
reasonable interpretation because it allows a manufacturer to 
circumvent the protections afforded a dealer under Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0116(8) 
by 
allowing 
the 
manufacturer 
to 
place 
the 
assignment of territory in a document separate from other 
documents.  
¶92 Furthermore, 
the 
statutory 
interpretation 
of 
the 
Division of Hearings and Appeals fails to serve the remedial 
purpose underlying the statute.  The dealership law is designed 
to protect motor vehicle dealers from unfair treatment by 
manufacturers who are in a stronger bargaining position than 
dealers and to give dealers remedies against the manufacturer.  
In Forest Home Dodge, Inc. v. Karns, 29 Wis. 2d 78, 138 N.W. 2d 
214 (1965), we explained that the legislature recognized this 
disparity of bargaining positions in adopting the motor vehicle 
dealership law: 
Implicit in this law is the recognition of the gross 
disparity of bargaining power between the manufacturer 
of automobiles and the local retailer.  It was enacted 
in recognition of the long history of the abuse of 
dealers by manufacturers. . . . The purpose of the law 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
51
is to furnish the dealer with some protection against 
unfair treatment by the manufacturer.81 
¶93 The court has often stated that remedial legislation 
should be broadly construed to effectuate its purpose.82  We thus 
construe the relevant sections of ch. 218 broadly to effectuate 
the statute's remedial purpose.  In so doing, we conclude that a 
more reasonable interpretation of these remedial statutes than 
that of the Division of Hearings and Appeals is that a 
manufacturer's assignment of territory is an essential aspect of 
the franchise relationship and therefore part of the motor 
vehicle dealer agreement. 
¶94 We 
conclude 
that 
read 
together, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0101(1) and (13); § 218.0114(9) and (11); and § 218.0116 
(1)(r), (7), and (8); and the purpose of §§ 218.0101 to 
218.0163, 
support 
the 
conclusion 
that 
a 
more 
reasonable 
interpretation of the statutes than that of the Division of 
                                                 
81 Forest Home Dodge, Inc. v. Karns, 29 Wis. 2d 78, 85, 138 
N.W. 2d 214 (1965); see also Kuhl Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 
270 Wis. 488, 494, 71 N.W.2d 420 (1955) ("[T]he legislature 
recognized the inequality in bargaining power between an 
automobile dealer and an economically powerful manufacturer such 
as the defendant and that it desired to furnish him some 
protection by deterring unfair cancellation."). 
82 See, e.g., Garcia v. Mazda Motors of America, Inc., 2004 
WI 93, ¶8, 273 Wis. 2d 612, 682 N.W.2d 365 ("[W]e will liberally 
construe remedial statutes to suppress the mischief and advance 
the remedy that the legislature intended to afford."); City of 
Madison v. Hyland, Hall, & Co., 73 Wis. 2d 364, 373, 243 
N.W.2d 422 (1976) (quoting Stone v. Inter-State Exchange, 200 
Wis. 585, 589, 229 N.W. 26 (1930) ("Under the accepted law of 
Wisconsin and of other jurisdictions, remedial statutes should 
be liberally construed 'to suppress the mischief and advance the 
remedy which (the statute) intended to afford.'")). 
No.  2003AP2628 
 
 
52
Hearings and Appeals is that a manufacturer's assignment of 
territory is an essential aspect of the franchise relationship 
and therefore part of the motor vehicle dealer agreement.  
¶95 Applying our interpretation of the statutes to the 
present case, we agree with the circuit court that the zip code 
list is part of the motor vehicle dealer agreement under Wis. 
Stat. § 218.0116(8) between the parties.  The circuit court 
astutely observed: "It is disingenuous to argue the [zip code] 
list is not part of the dealership agreement. . . . Neither 
[Racine H-D nor Harley-Davidson] can effectively work under the 
terms of the contract without reference to the territorial 
restrictions as set forth in the list." 
¶96 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and hold (1) that Harley-Davidson's assignment of 
territory to Racine H-D was part of the motor vehicle dealer 
agreement between Harley-Davidson and Racine H-D under Wis. 
Stat. § 218.0116(8); and (2) that the cause should be remanded 
to the circuit court for remand to the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals to reinstate Racine H-D's complaint and to conduct 
further proceedings under Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8) consistent 
with this opinion. 
¶97 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
remand to the Division of Hearings and Appeals. 
 
No.  2003AP2628.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶98 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  The majority 
opinion provides a valuable analysis of our standard of review 
for various administrative decisions.  It includes a discussion 
of when we afford great weight deference to an agency's 
interpretation of law.  I join the opinion and write separately 
only to reference my concurring opinion in Hilton v. DNR, 2006 
WI 84, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, which was written with 
the hope of generating discussion. 
 
 
No.  2003AP2628.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶99 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J. 
(concurring).   The 
majority opinion concludes that the sales territory serviced by 
Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. (Racine H-D) is part of its "motor 
vehicle dealer agreement" under Wis. Stat. § 218.0166(8)(a) 
(2003-04).1  Majority op., ¶78.  I agree with this conclusion.  I 
also applaud the majority opinion's thorough discussion of the 
common law standards of deference to agency decisions that have 
been applied in the past.  However, the majority opinion also 
concludes that the Department of Hearings & Appeals' (DHA) 
interpretation of § 218.0166(8)(a), a question of law, may be 
accorded the same levels of deference that we have accorded the 
decisions of a line agency that is charged with administering a 
specific statutory scheme.  Majority op., ¶¶55-58.  I write 
separately for two reasons:  (1) I disagree with the majority 
opinion's conclusion that common law levels of deference may be 
accorded to decisions of the DHA administrator when the 
administrator's decision has not been adopted by the line 
agency, 
and 
(2) 
the 
majority 
opinion 
overlooks 
contract 
interpretation that is central to deciding the issue presented 
for review. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶100 Racine H-D has been a franchised Harley-Davidson Motor 
Company (Harley-Davidson) dealer since 1992.  As part of its 
relationship with Harley-Davidson, Racine H-D has agreed to 
service specific geographic areas that are referred to as Racine 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2003AP2628.pdr 
 
2 
 
H-D's "Territory."  Initially, Racine H-D's Territory was all of 
Racine County, which included the Burlington zip code, 53105.  
Subsequently, its Territory was described by a list of zip 
codes.   
¶101 However, in 2001 when Harley-Davidson provided a new 
franchise agreement, the Burlington zip code was not included in 
Racine H-D's Territory.  Racine H-D claimed that removing 
Burlington from its Territory was a modification of its 
franchise agreement that substantially and adversely affected 
its rights as a Harley-Davidson motor vehicle dealer and that 
the modification was made without good cause. It filed a 
complaint 
with 
DOT, 
alleging 
a 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0116(8).2   
¶102 The complaint was referred to the DHA to adjudicate, 
as authorized by statute, Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8)(a), and a DHA 
hearing examiner was assigned to adjudicate it, Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.43(1)(bg).  The DHA hearing examiners are assigned to hear 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 218.0116(8) provides in relevant part: 
(a) A manufacturer or distributor may not modify 
a motor vehicle dealer agreement during the term of 
the agreement or upon its renewal if the modification 
substantially and adversely affects the motor vehicle 
dealer's rights, obligations, investment or return on 
investment without giving 60 days written notice of 
the proposed modification to the motor vehicle dealer 
unless the modification is required by law, court 
order or the licensor.   
No.  2003AP2628.pdr 
 
3 
 
contested case proceedings from many different line agencies.3  
The legislature has required the DHA administrator to establish 
a system for their assignments that "shall ensure, to the extent 
practicable, that hearing examiners are assigned to different 
subjects on a rotating basis."  Section 227.43(1g).4   
¶103 Harley-Davidson moved for summary judgment to dismiss 
the complaint.  It contended that Racine H-D's Territory was not 
a part of its "motor vehicle dealer agreement," as those terms 
are used in Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8); and therefore, assigning 
the Burlington zip code to another dealer did not contravene 
§ 218.0116(8).  The hearing examiner agreed with Harley-Davidson 
because the description of Racine H-D's Territory was not 
contained within the Harley-Davidson Motor Company Motorcycle 
Dealer Contract (Dealer Contract) or the Harley-Davidson Motor 
Company General Conditions of Sales and Service (Conditions of 
Sales 
and 
Service) 
that 
the 
parties 
signed. 
 
The 
DHA 
administrator affirmed the decision of the hearing examiner.  It 
is the decision of the DHA administrator, granting summary 
                                                 
3 The 
DHA 
conducts 
hearings 
for 
the 
Department 
of 
Corrections, the Department of Health & Family Services, the 
Department 
of 
Workforce 
Development, 
the 
Department 
of 
Administration, 
the 
Department 
of 
Natural 
Resources, 
the 
Department of Justice, the Department of Transportation, the 
Department of Public Instruction, and the Department of Employee 
Trust Funds.  The DHA website, http://dha.state.wi.us/home (last 
visited June 14, 2006). 
4 Even though the administrator may establish "pools of 
examiners 
responsible 
for 
certain 
subjects," 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.43(1g), the record contains nothing in regard to the 
qualifications or experience of the hearing examiner who heard 
this case. 
No.  2003AP2628.pdr 
 
4 
 
judgment dismissing Racine H-D's complaint, that is before us 
for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standards of Review 
 
1. 
Statutes 
¶104 Statutory construction is a question of law.  Buettner 
v. DHFS, 2003 WI App 90, ¶6, 264 Wis. 2d 700, 663 N.W.2d 282.  
We have applied three levels of common law deference to an 
administrative agency's interpretation of a statute:  (1) no 
deference, often referred to as de novo review; (2) due weight 
deference, where we affirm an agency's interpretation if it is 
reasonable and we conclude that another interpretation is not 
more reasonable; and (3) great weight deference, where we affirm 
an agency's interpretation if it is reasonable, even when we 
conclude that another interpretation is more reasonable.  UFE 
Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 285-87, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996).   
¶105 Due weight deference requires that the legislature has 
charged the agency with the administration of the statute in 
question and that the agency has had at least some experience 
interpreting the statute in a consistent fashion.  Id. at 286-
87.  In according due weight deference, we defer to an agency's 
statutory interpretation only when we conclude that another 
interpretation of the statute is not more reasonable than that 
chosen by the agency.  Id. at 287.  In order to decide that 
question, 
we 
make 
a 
comparison 
between 
the 
agency's 
interpretation and alternate interpretations.  This comparison 
requires us to construe the statute ourselves.  In so doing, we 
No.  2003AP2628.pdr 
 
5 
 
employ judicial expertise in statutory construction, and we 
embrace a major responsibility of the judicial branch of 
government, deciding what statutes mean.  Therefore, this level 
of deference is of a lesser concern than is great weight 
deference.    
¶106 Great 
weight 
deference 
also 
requires 
that 
the 
legislature has charged the agency with the administration of 
the statute in question.  Id. at 284.  Additionally, in order to 
accord great weight deference, the agency must have long 
standing expertise in administering the statute; it must have 
used its expertise and specialized knowledge in forming its 
interpretation of the statute; and the agency's interpretation 
must provide more uniformity and consistency in the application 
of the statute than would a court's decision.  Id. (citing 
Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 660, 539 N.W.2d 98 
(1995)).  
¶107 Our basis for giving even due weight deference to an 
agency's statutory interpretation is bottomed on two required 
assumptions:  the statute is one that the agency was charged 
with administering and the agency has at least some expertise in 
the interpretation of the statute in question.  UFE, 201 Wis. 2d 
at 284-86.   
¶108 The majority opinion concludes the first assumption, 
that 
the 
DHA 
was 
charged 
with 
administering 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0116(8), applies.  Majority op., ¶55.  It also concludes 
that the DHA is charged with enforcing § 218.0116(8).  Id.  I 
conclude that neither conclusion pertains here.  First, the type 
No.  2003AP2628.pdr 
 
6 
 
of legislatively assigned responsibility of a deciding authority 
for a line agency to which we previously have accorded 
deference, e.g., LIRC, has been limited to the discrete 
statutory context that the line agency, itself, administered.  
See, e.g., West Bend Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 121 Wis. 2d 1, 11-13, 
357 N.W.2d 534 (1984) (concluding that the agency (WERC) can 
provide 
uniformity 
and 
consistency 
in 
the 
field 
of 
its 
specialized knowledge); Jicha v. DILHR, 169 Wis. 2d 284, 290-91, 
485 N.W.2d 256 (1992) (concluding that deference to an agency's 
statutory 
interpretation 
is 
appropriate 
only 
where 
the 
interpretation is based on the specialized knowledge, technical 
competence and experience particular to the agency (LIRC)).   
¶109 Second, in cases brought to the DHA for a hearing, the 
DHA administrator makes the final agency decision that is then 
subject to judicial review under Wis. Stat. § 227.52.  Wis. 
Stat. § 227.46(2m).  However, the DHA administrator does not 
have the type of specialized knowledge and technical competence 
of other deciding authorities, such as LIRC and WERC, to which 
we have accorded deference in the past.  This is so because the 
DHA administrator is the final decision maker for many types of 
DHA adjudications, e.g.:  (1) the Department of Corrections 
(DOC) parole and probation revocations, Wis. Admin. Code § HA 
2.05(8); (2) the DOC good time forfeitures, Wis. Admin. Code 
§ HA 2.06(8); (3) all decisions of the DOT for which a hearing 
No.  2003AP2628.pdr 
 
7 
 
examiner is appointed under Wis. Stat. § 227.43(1)(bg);5 (4) 
decisions by the Department of Commerce in regard to permitting, 
suspending or revoking a permit for a manufactured home park, 
§ 227.43(1)(bg); (5) decisions by the Department of Commerce in 
regard to licensing or suspending and revoking a license to be a 
manufactured home dealer, § 227.43(1)(bg); and (6) decisions by 
highway commissioners of municipalities to close a highway for 
safe 
transportation 
of 
certain 
hazardous 
materials, 
§ 227.43(1)(bg).  And finally, the DOT cannot by rule or by 
order in an individual case adopt the DHA administrator's 
decision.  Section 227.46(3).  Therefore, there is not even the 
assurance that the administrator's decision comports with the 
line agency's interpretation of the law.  
¶110 Under current statutory provisions, the administrator 
of the DHA has become a general adjudicator of broadly ranging 
disputes arising under numerous statutes and administrative 
rules.  This is the natural result of the 1977 creation of Wis. 
Stat. § 227.43, which began the process of bringing to the DHA 
the adjudication of claims arising under statutes administered 
                                                 
5 The decisions of the DOT involve regulation of outdoor 
advertising, regulation of junkyards, permits to construct 
entrances to state highways, placement of utility lines along 
highways, removal of highway signage, rescinding designations of 
marked highway routes within a municipality, certificates of 
approval to construct airports, regulations of structures that 
could affect airport operation, annual registration fees for 
aircraft, closing of highways for the safe transportation of 
hazardous materials, granting or suspending or revoking motor 
vehicle dealer or manufacturer or importer licenses, allegations 
of misuse of temporary operation permits and plates, the DOT 
acts or omissions under ch. 342, licenses for driver instructors 
and permits for oversized vehicles and loads. 
No.  2003AP2628.pdr 
 
8 
 
by 
many 
different 
line 
agencies. 
 
This 
separated 
the 
"administrative and prosecutorial functions of the department[s] 
from 
[their] 
adjudicative 
functions," 
and 
established the 
potential for general adjudicative authority in the DHA.  See 
DOT v. Office of the Comm'r of Transp., 159 Wis. 2d 271, 277-78, 
463 N.W.2d 870 (Ct. App. 1990); see also 1995 Wis. Act 370, § 14 
(transferring to the Department of Administration, personnel and 
financial resources formerly used by agencies to adjudicate 
disputes relating to agencies' interpretation and administration 
of sections of the statutes assigned to them). 
¶111 In my view, these legislative changes have shifted the 
factual underpinnings that we employed in our decisions to 
accord deference to an agency's statutory interpretation.6  This 
shift causes the DHA administrator to function more like a court 
system that hears disputes on widely divergent topics, than like 
a final 
adjudicator for 
a 
line 
agency, 
which 
has 
more 
specialized adjudicative authority.  We do not apply common law 
levels of deference to a court's interpretation of Wisconsin 
                                                 
6 The majority opinion relies in part on Town of Barton v. 
Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 2002 WI App 169, 256 Wis. 2d 628, 
649 N.W.2d 293, for concluding that the legislature assigned the 
DHA the responsibility for enforcing Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8).  
Majority op., ¶¶50-55.  The author of this concurrence was also 
the author of Town of Barton; however, the question of whether 
common law deference should be accorded to the DHA was not 
presented to the court of appeals as it has been presented to 
the supreme court.  Rather, the question in Town of Barton was 
whether Wis. Stat. § 86.16(1) applied to waste water pipelines 
as well as to fresh water pipelines because if it did not, then 
§ 86.16(5) did not permit the DHA to decide the controversy.  
Town of Barton, 256 Wis. 2d 628, ¶¶11, 15.  The parties did not 
dispute 
whether 
the 
DHA 
was 
charged 
with 
administering 
§ 86.16(5) when § 86.16(1) did apply. 
No.  2003AP2628.pdr 
 
9 
 
statutes.  Therefore, in my view, decisions of the DHA 
administrator, 
who 
is 
by 
contract 
performing 
general 
adjudicative functions and has no special expertise in the areas 
of law decided by multitudes of line agencies for which the DHA 
administrator has become the "deciding authority," should be 
treated similarly to decisions of circuit courts.  That is, no 
deference should be accorded the DHA administrator's decision. 
¶112 The majority opinion also concludes that the common 
law levels of deference "are in accord with Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.57(10)," majority op., ¶13, and that this shows the 
"legislature has thus entrusted responsibility to the agencies."  
Id.  I disagree with both assertions.  As an initial matter, 
there is no indication in § 227.577 that great weight deference8 
should ever be accorded.  In addition, we have never interpreted 
§ 227.57(10) as being consistent, or inconsistent, with the 
common law standards of deference.   
¶113 I also am concerned that by setting up a system of 
hearing examiners, often referred to as administrative law 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.57(10) states in relevant part: 
Upon such review due weight shall be accorded the 
experience, 
technical 
competence, 
and 
specialized 
knowledge 
of 
the 
agency 
involved, 
as 
well 
as 
discretionary authority conferred upon it. 
I do not contrast or compare the common law doctrine of due 
weight deference with the phrase "due weight" in § 227.57(10) 
because that issue has not been briefed for the court. 
8 When we apply great weight deference, we affirm an 
agency's interpretation of a statute even though we conclude 
that another interpretation is more reasonable.  UFE, 201 
Wis. 2d at 287. 
No.  2003AP2628.pdr 
 
10 
 
judges,9 to whom the DHA administrator and the courts may defer, 
the legislature may have inadvertently established a system of 
judges who are not accountable to the voters and whose 
decisions, if great weight deference is accorded, will never 
receive a meaningful review.  This arrangement may thereby deny 
access to justice that the judicial branch of our tripartite 
system of government was meant to provide.  Accordingly, I 
conclude that decisions of the DHA administrator should be 
accorded no deference.10   
2. 
Contracts 
¶114 This case also presents a question of contract 
interpretation.  Therefore, I address the standard of review to 
be 
accorded 
an 
agency 
decision 
that 
turns 
on 
contract 
construction.  Construction of a contract is a question of law 
to 
which 
we 
give 
no 
deference 
to 
the 
decision 
of 
an 
administrative agency.  See Wisconsin End-User Gas Ass'n v. PSC, 
218 Wis. 2d 558, 565, 581 N.W.2d 556 (Ct. App. 1998) (concluding 
that the courts are more experienced in contract construction 
than are administrative agencies).   
                                                 
9 See majority op., ¶23 n.21. 
10 See Patience Drake Roggensack, Elected to Decide:  Is the 
Decision-Avoidance 
Doctrine 
of 
Great 
Weight 
Deference 
Appropriate in this Court of Last Resort?, 89 Marq. L. Rev. 541 
(Spring 2006).  
No.  2003AP2628.pdr 
 
11 
 
B. 
Interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8)  
¶115 The DHA administrator affirmed the decision of the DHA 
hearing examiner who interpreted the terms "motor vehicle dealer 
agreement" in Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(8)(a) as not including 
Racine H-D's Territory.  The validity of this determination is 
affected by whether the description of Racine H-D's Territory 
was an "agreement" between Harley-Davidson and Racine H-D, as 
agreement is defined in Wis. Stat. § 218.0101(1).  Section 
218.0101(1) provides that an "agreement" is "a contract that 
describes the franchise relationship between manufacturers, 
distributors, importers and dealers."  Therefore, the agreement 
of § 218.0116(8) is a contract that covers a particular 
relationship.   
¶116 "Contract" is not defined in ch. 218; however, 
"contract" is a legal term of art to which courts apply an 
accepted meaning.  Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. 
DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶6, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612; see also 
Wis. Stat. § 990.01 (explaining that legal terms of art are to 
be given their accepted legal meanings).  A "contract" has been 
defined generally as an agreed set of "obligations that are 
enforceable or otherwise recognizable at law."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 341 (8th ed. 2004).   
¶117 The terms that make up a contract can be ascertained 
by 
employing 
well-settled 
legal 
principles 
of 
contract 
construction.  Therefore, I would give no common law deference 
to the DHA administrator's statutory interpretation, as an 
initial matter because I conclude it is not the type of decision 
No.  2003AP2628.pdr 
 
12 
 
to which common law deference has been accorded, as I explained 
above, and also because, simply stated, the question to be 
answered is:  What are the terms of the parties' contract?  
Neither the DHA hearing examiner nor the DHA administrator is 
more skilled than is a court in deciding this question.  End-
User Gas Ass'n, 218 Wis. 2d at 565.   
C. 
Contract Interpretation 
¶118 Racine H-D's Territory is described in a document 
separate from the Dealer Contract and the Conditions of Sales 
and Service.  Therefore, common law principles of contract 
construction require that in order to ascertain whether this 
separate writing is part of Racine H-D's contract with Harley-
Davidson, we must determine whether the parties intended it to 
be part of their contract.  Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis. v. Hills, 209 
Wis. 2d 167, 175, 561 N.W.2d 718 (1997).  When we attempt to 
ascertain the terms of a contract, we begin with all writings of 
the parties that relate to the subject matter because all the 
components of a contract are not required to be set forth in one 
document.  Appleton Papers, Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co., 2000 WI 
App 
104, 
¶34, 
235 
Wis. 2d 
39, 
612 
N.W.2d 
760. 
 
All 
contemporaneous writings that relate to the same contractual 
relationship are construed together.  Wipfli v. Bever, 37 
Wis. 2d 324, 326-27, 155 N.W.2d 71 (1967).   
¶119 The zip code description of Racine H-D's Territory is 
a writing contemporaneous to the two signed writings, the Dealer 
Contract and the Conditions of Sales and Service.  However, the 
No.  2003AP2628.pdr 
 
13 
 
Conditions of Sales and Service has an integration clause11 that 
provides:  "Except as explicitly agreed in this Contract, 
[Harley-Davidson] has made no promises to [Racine H-D] and there 
are no other agreements or understandings, either written or 
oral, between the parties affecting this Contract . . . ."12  
Harley-Davidson contends this integration clause prevents the 
written description of Racine H-D's Territory from becoming part 
of the contract between the parties.  I disagree because, even 
though it is generally true that contracts that are fully 
integrated cannot be supplemented with additional terms, see 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 216(1) (1981), a contract is 
not completely integrated if it omits an agreed upon term that 
is necessary to carrying out the intent of the parties.  Thomsen 
v. Olson, 219 Wis. 145, 151, 262 N.W. 601 (1935) (concluding 
that the agreement to buy stock with corporate funds and 
distribute the shares to achieve equality of ownership for the 
two remaining shareholders also included the unstated terms that 
neither shareholder could use company funds to purchase stock 
that he would refuse to divide with the other shareholder).   
¶120 Here, the parties' rights and obligations under the 
Dealer Contract and the Conditions of Sales and Service, to 
which both parties agree they are bound, cannot be fully 
ascertained without reference to Racine H-D's Territory.  For 
example, Racine H-D is granted the right to "purchase and resell 
at retail, primarily to persons residing or doing business in 
                                                 
11 The Dealer Contract makes no attempt at integration. 
12 Conditions of Sales and Service at 20. 
No.  2003AP2628.pdr 
 
14 
 
the Territory assigned."13  Racine H-D had the authority to 
operate a retail store only within its Territory and only at the 
specific location approved by Harley-Davidson.14  The dealer's 
Territory is also the geographic area where Racine H-D was 
required to "effectively" sell, service and represent Harley-
Davidson products.15  Racine H-D was required to actively solicit 
sales of Harley-Davidson merchandise "to customers within the 
Territory"16 and to maintain an inventory of motorcycles, parts, 
accessories and clothing sufficient to meet the anticipated 
demand "in the Territory."17  Racine H-D was obligated to 
advertise 
in 
newspapers, 
Yellow 
Pages, 
and 
other 
places 
appropriate to "the Territory."18  One of the ways that Harley-
Davidson could evaluate Racine H-D's performance was to review 
Racine H-D's activities in its Territory.  For example, Harley-
Davidson could determine whether Racine H-D was advertising 
Harley-Davidson products in the Burlington zip code, as it 
contracted to do, by reviewing all advertisements Racine H-D 
placed.  Accordingly, I conclude that the contract between 
Racine H-D and Harley-Davidson included the written description 
of Racine H-D's Territory because it is a component necessary to 
completely describing the rights and obligations of the parties. 
                                                 
13 Dealer Contract at 1.  
14 Id. at 3. 
15 Conditions of Sales and Service at 2. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. at 2-3. 
18 Id. at 9. 
No.  2003AP2628.pdr 
 
15 
 
¶121 In conclusion, even though I agree with the mandate of 
the majority opinion, because I disagree with its conclusion 
that common law standards of deference may be accorded to 
decisions of the DHA administrator when the administrator's 
decision has not been adopted by the line agency and that 
contract interpretation is central to the issue presented for 
review, I respectfully concur.  
¶122 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2003AP2628.pdr 
 
1