Case Title: Commonwealth v. Morales

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-10917

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-10917 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ARIEL MORALES. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     October 7, 2019. - December 17, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Prior consistent statement.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 1, 2008. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Janet L. Sanders, J. 
 
 
 
Brian J. Kelly for the defendant. 
 
Tracey A. Cusick, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The defendant, Ariel Morales, was convicted by a 
jury of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, and of conspiracy 
to commit murder in connection with the shooting death of Carlos 
Gomez.  On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial judge 
abused her discretion by allowing a State police trooper to 
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testify to the prior statements of a key witness that were 
consistent with that witness's trial testimony.  This alleged 
error, the defendant argues, gave rise to a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Alternatively, the 
defendant requests that we exercise our authority pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict or order a new trial.  
Upon full review of the record, we affirm and decline to grant 
extraordinary relief under § 33E. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving certain details for discussion.  On the evening 
of October 14, 2007, the victim met with Luis Lopez, a drug 
dealer to whom the victim owed money; Jose Perez, who worked for 
Lopez selling drugs; and the defendant, Lopez's brother-in-law.  
The victim had a money order, payable to a third party, that the 
victim planned to use to repay the money owed to Lopez.  Lopez 
drove the men to several different convenience stores in order 
for the victim to try to cash the money order; however, the 
victim was unsuccessful. 
 
While the victim was inside the last convenience store 
visited, attempting to cash the money order for a final time, 
Lopez asked the defendant to kill the victim.  The victim 
returned to the vehicle, having been unable to obtain cash to 
repay Lopez, and Lopez resumed driving.  At some point the 
defendant asked him to stop so that the defendant could smoke a 
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cigarette.  Lopez stopped on a dark road, and both the defendant 
and the victim got out of the car to smoke.  The defendant then 
drew a firearm from his waistband, called the victim's name, and 
shot him in the forehead.  When the victim fell to the ground, 
the defendant stood over him and shot him several more times.  
The victim was discovered hours later lying on the side of the 
road in a pool of blood, holding the money order in his hand. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Prior consistent statements.  Perez, who 
gave a statement to police after his arrest, was a key witness 
for the Commonwealth.  Among other things, he testified as to 
events that took place before and after the killing, as well as 
to details of the shooting itself.  Although Perez originally 
was charged with murder in the first degree, months after 
providing his account of the events to the police, he reached an 
agreement with the Commonwealth in which he pleaded guilty to 
accessory to murder after the fact and received a sentence of 
from five to six years. 
 
The prosecutor also called as a witness the State police 
trooper who interviewed Perez.  Through the trooper's testimony, 
the jury learned that the statements Perez made regarding the 
killing during his interrogation were consistent with his 
testimony.  The defendant argues that the judge erred in 
admitting Perez's prior consistent statements through the 
trooper because they improperly bolstered Perez's credibility. 
4 
 
 
We note at the outset that, because trial counsel failed to 
object to any portion of the trooper's testimony, we review the 
matter to determine whether any error in admitting the testimony 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Commonwealth v. Rivera, 430 Mass. 91, 99 (1999).  For 
the reasons set forth infra, we find no error in the admission 
of the prior consistent statements. 
 
"A witness's prior statement that is consistent with that 
witness's trial testimony is usually 
inadmissible."  Commonwealth v. Novo, 449 Mass. 84, 93 (2007), 
quoting Rivera, 430 Mass. at 99.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 613(b)(1) 
(2019).  This is because "the testimony of a witness in court 
should not need -- and ought not -- to be 'pumped up' by 
evidence that the witness said the same thing on some prior 
occasion."  Commonwealth v. Kindell, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 202-
203 (1998), citing 4 J.H. Wigmore, Evidence § 1124, at 255 
(Chadbourne rev. ed. 1972). 
 
However, "the use of prior consistent statements to 
rehabilitate a witness is permissible when a court finds that a 
party has claimed that a witness's in-court testimony is the 
result of recent contrivance or bias, so long as the prior 
consistent statement was made before the witness had a motive to 
fabricate or the occurrence of an event indicating a 
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bias."  Commonwealth v. Caruso, 476 Mass. 275, 284 n.5 (2017), 
and cases cited.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 613(b)(2). 
 
Before admitting a prior consistent statement, the trial 
judge must determine that, in fact, the opposing party has 
claimed that a witness's in-court testimony is a recent 
fabrication, and that the prior consistent statement was made 
before the witness had a motive to fabricate his or her trial 
testimony.1  See Caruso, 476 Mass. at 284. 
 
Here, the defendant contends that Perez's prior consistent 
statements were admitted improperly because the defendant did 
not suggest that Perez's testimony was a recent contrivance.  We 
disagree.  At the outset, defense counsel specifically 
challenged Perez's credibility, contending during his opening 
statement that "[Perez] cut a deal to blame somebody else for 
what he did."  Later, on cross-examination, defense counsel 
asked Perez about the specific details of the agreement. 
 
The defendant argues that trial counsel's cross-examination 
of Perez "barely mentioned" Perez's plea agreement, and "never 
raised any claim of recent contrivance or motive to lie."  He 
further points out that, because the prosecutor already had 
established the existence of a plea agreement during the direct 
                     
 
1 These findings should be made on the record outside the 
presence of the jury.  Commonwealth v. Caruso, 476 Mass. 275, 
284 (2017). 
6 
 
examination, trial counsel's questions on the matter were 
cumulative and of little consequence.  Thus, the defendant 
reasons, the impeachment of Perez could not be considered as an 
assertion of recent contrivance that opened the door to the 
admission of prior consistent statements.  See Caruso, 476 Mass. 
at 284. 
 
This argument is unpersuasive.  Defense counsel's 
references to Perez's plea agreement during the opening 
statement and during cross-examination served no other purpose 
than to establish that Perez was motivated to fabricate his 
testimony in exchange for a lesser sentence.  We conclude that 
defense counsel indeed raised the issue of recent contrivance 
and that the judge unambiguously so found. 
 
With regard to whether Perez's prior consistent statements 
to the trooper preceded the plea agreement Perez reached with 
the Commonwealth, the judge did not make an explicit finding on 
the issue, and the defendant does not argue this point on 
appeal.2  At any rate, the failure to make the requisite findings 
explicitly is not reversible error, so long as the findings are 
both implied and supported by the record.  See Caruso, 476 Mass. 
                     
 
2 Nor was there any discussion as to the admissibility of 
the prior consistent statements because defense counsel made no 
objection. 
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at 284-285, citing Commonwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543, 547 
(1981), and Commonwealth v. Brady, 380 Mass. 44, 52 (1980). 
 
Here, it is undisputed that the statements that Perez made 
to the trooper preceded Perez's agreement to testify for the 
Commonwealth in exchange for a reduced sentence.  We thus 
conclude that the judge did not abuse her discretion in 
admitting the prior consistent statements.3  See Commonwealth 
v. Lessieur, 472 Mass. 317, 323, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 418 
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 485 
(1905) ("admission or exclusion of [prior consistent statements] 
rests largely in the discretion of the trial [judge]"). 
 
2.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant 
also requests that this court exercise its authority either to 
reduce his verdict or to order a new trial.  The defendant 
points to no reason why this court should do so, beyond the 
admission of Perez's prior consistent statements, which, as 
discussed supra, we have determined to be proper.  Pursuant to 
our duty under G. L. c. 211, § 3, we carefully have reviewed the 
entire record and discern no reason to grant a new trial or to 
reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
                     
 
3 We note that the judge properly gave the jury a limiting 
instruction explaining that Perez's prior consistent statement 
could only be considered to rebut the claim of recent 
contrivance.