Case Title: League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker

Citation: 2014 WI 97

Docket Number: 2012AP000584-AC

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 97 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP584  
COMPLETE TITLE: 
League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Education 
Network,  
Inc. and Melanie G. Ramey, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Scott Walker, Thomas Barland, Gerald C. Nichol, 
Michael  
Brennan, Thomas Cane, David G. Deininger and 
Timothy Vocke, 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
Dorothy Janis, James Janis, Matthew Augustine, 
          Intervenors-Co-Appellants.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
348 Wis. 2d 714, 834 N.W.2d 393 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No: 2013 WI App 77 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 31, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 24, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard G. Niess 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (Opinion filed.) 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissents. 
(Opinion filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by Lester A. Pines, Tamara B. Packard, Susan Crawford, 
and Cullen Weston Pines & Bach LLP, Madison, and oral argument 
by Lester A. Pines. 
 
 
 
 
2 
For the defendants-appellants, the cause was argued by 
Clayton P. Kawski, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general, and Maria S. Lazar, 
assistant attorney general.  
 
For the intervenors-co-appellants, there was a brief by 
James R. Troupis, Sarah E. Troupis, and Troupis Law Office LLC, 
Cross Plains; Michael T. Morley, Cranford, N.J.; and Dan Backer 
and Coolidge-Reagan Foundation, Washington, D.C, and oral 
argument by Michael T. Morley. 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 97
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP584 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV4669) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Education 
Network, Inc. and Melanie G. Ramey, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Scott Walker, Thomas Barland, Gerald C. Nichol, 
Michael Brennan, Thomas Cane, David G. 
Deininger and Timothy Vocke, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
Dorothy Janis, James Janis, Matthew Augustine, 
 
          Intervenors-Co-Appellants. 
FILED 
 
JUL 31, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Modified and 
as modified, affirmed; injunction vacated; cause remanded to 
circuit court to dismiss the complaint.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 reversing an order of the circuit court2 
                                                 
1 League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. 
Walker, 2013 WI App 77, 348 Wis. 2d 714, 834 N.W.2d 393. 
2 The Honorable Richard G. Niess of Dane County presided. 
No. 
2012AP584   
 
2 
 
that declared portions of Wisconsin's voter identification law, 
2011 Wis. Act 23, unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its 
enforcement.   
¶2 
Plaintiffs, the League of Women Voters of Wisconsin 
Education Network, Inc., and its president, Melanie G. Ramey,3  
bring a facial challenge to the law under the Wisconsin 
Constitution.4  The League asserts that the legislature lacked 
authority to require an elector to present Act 23-acceptable 
photo identification.  It makes the following three arguments:  
(1) the requirement is an additional elector qualification not 
listed in Article III, Section 1; (2) the requirement is not one 
of the five types of election-related laws in Article III, 
Section 2; and (3) the requirement is not reasonable. 
¶3 
Defendants5 counter that Act 23 does not create an 
additional elector qualification, but rather, requiring voters 
to present Act 23-acceptable photo identification is a means to 
identify qualified voters.  They also say that Act 23 comes 
within the parameters of Article III, Section 2 of the Wisconsin 
                                                 
3 We refer to plaintiffs collectively hereinafter as "the 
League." 
4 Plaintiffs' challenge is based entirely on the requirement 
to present Act 23-acceptable photo identification to vote. It 
does not include any allegation that obtaining such photo 
identification places an unconstitutional burden on the right to 
vote. 
5 The defendants are Governor Walker and six members of the 
Government Accountability Board, all of whom are sued in their 
official capacities, and three individual voters who joined the 
suit at the court of appeals.   
No. 
2012AP584   
 
3 
 
Constitution as a law providing for registration of voters.  
Defendants 
further 
contend 
that 
Act 
23 
is 
a 
reasonable 
regulation that serves the State's significant interests in 
promoting voter confidence in the integrity of elections, in 
deterring voter fraud and in orderly election administration.  
¶4 
We conclude that the legislature did not exceed its 
authority under Article III of the Wisconsin Constitution when 
it 
required 
electors 
to 
present 
Act 
23-acceptable 
photo 
identification.  Since 1859, we have held that "it is clearly 
within [the legislature's] province to require any person 
offering to vote[] to furnish such proof as it deems requisite[] 
that he is a qualif[i]ed elector."  Cothren v. Lean, 9 Wis. 254 
(*279), 258 (*283-84) (1859).  Requiring a potential voter to 
identify himself or herself as a qualified elector through the 
use of Act 23-acceptable photo identification does not impose an 
elector qualification in addition to those set out in Article 
III, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶5 
We also conclude that the requirement to present Act 
23-acceptable 
photo 
identification 
comes 
within 
the 
legislature's 
authority 
to 
enact 
laws 
providing 
for 
the 
registration of electors under Article III, Section 2 because 
Act 23-acceptable photo identification is the mode by which 
election officials verify that a potential voter is the elector 
listed on the registration list.   
¶6 
Finally, we conclude that plaintiff's facial challenge 
fails 
because 
Act 
23's 
requirement 
to 
present 
photo 
identification is a reasonable regulation that could improve and 
No. 
2012AP584   
 
4 
 
modernize election procedures, safeguard voter confidence in the 
outcome of elections and deter voter fraud.  See Crawford v. 
Marion 
Cnty. 
Election 
Bd., 
553 
U.S. 
181, 
191 
(2008).  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.6  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶7 
We begin with a description of the portions of Act 23 
that bear on our analysis.  Act 23 requires an elector to 
present one of nine acceptable forms of photo identification in 
order to vote.  Wis. Stat. § 5.02(6m) (2011-12).7  Generally 
stated, these include:  Wisconsin Department of Transportation 
(DOT) issued driver's license; DOT issued photo identification 
card; United States uniformed service identification card; 
United States passport; United States naturalization certificate 
issued within two years preceding the election; federally 
recognized Wisconsin Native American tribe's identification 
card; Wisconsin university or college student identification 
card; and a citation or notice of driver's license suspension.   
¶8 
Act 23's presentation requirement applies to in-person 
as well as absentee voting, with some exceptions for, among 
others, electors who automatically receive absentee ballots 
                                                 
6 The court of appeals remanded the case to the circuit 
court "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion as 
may be necessary."  Because we conclude that plaintiffs' facial 
challenge to Act 23 fails as a matter of law, we modify the 
remand of the court of appeals, vacate the circuit court 
injunction and remand the matter to the circuit court to dismiss 
the lawsuit. 
7 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2012AP584   
 
5 
 
under Wis. Stat. § 6.86(2)(a), residents of qualified facilities 
described in Wis. Stat. § 6.875(1) and military and overseas 
electors under Wis. Stat. § 6.865(1).  § 6.87(4)(b)2., 3., and 
5.   
¶9 
If an elector does not present Act 23-acceptable 
identification on the day of the election in which he or she 
offers to vote, the elector may cast a provisional ballot.  
However, the provisional ballot will be counted only if the 
elector presents Act 23-acceptable identification at the polling 
location before 4:00 p.m. on the day of the election or at the 
office of the municipal clerk or board of election commissioners 
by the following Friday.  Wis. Stat. § 6.97(3).   
¶10 Four months after Governor Walker signed Act 23 into 
law, the League filed this lawsuit seeking a declaration that 
the photo identification requirement violated Article III of the 
Wisconsin Constitution and asking for injunctive relief.  After 
denying defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the 
circuit court granted the League's motion for summary judgment.  
The circuit court concluded that the challenged portions of Act 
23 were "unconstitutional to the extent they serve[d] as a 
condition for voting at the polls" and permanently enjoined 
defendants "from any further implementation or enforcement of 
those provisions."   
¶11 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court, 
concluding that:  (1) the League had "not shown that the photo 
identification requirement is on its face an 'additional 
qualification' for voting"; (2) Act 23 was validly enacted 
No. 
2012AP584   
 
6 
 
pursuant to the legislature's "implicit but broad constitutional 
authority to establish a voting registration system under which 
election officials may require potential voters to identify 
themselves as registered voters"; and (3) that there were no 
factual findings in the record to support the League's implied 
argument that the photo identification requirement was so 
burdensome that it effectively denied people the right to vote.8  
The League petitioned for review, which we granted.  
II.  DISCUSSION  
¶12 The League brings a facial constitutional challenge 
against Act 23, asserting that the requirement to present an Act 
23-acceptable 
photo 
identification 
creates 
an 
elector 
qualification in addition to those set out in Article III, 
Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which the legislature 
has no power to do; that Act 23 exceeds the scope of legislative 
authority authorized by Article III, Section 2 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution; and Act 23 is not a reasonable regulation of the 
elective franchise.  
A.  Standard of Review 
¶13 There 
are 
two 
general 
types 
of 
constitutional 
challenges:  facial and as-applied.  As we explained in State v. 
Wood, 2010 WI 17, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63: 
A party may challenge a law . . . as being 
unconstitutional on its face.  Under such a challenge, 
                                                 
8 The League no longer asserts that Act 23 is so burdensome 
that it effectively denies the right to vote, noting that this 
issue is now before us in Milwaukee Branch of NAACP v. Walker, 
2014 WI 98, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __.   
No. 
2012AP584   
 
7 
 
the challenger must show that the law cannot be 
enforced "under any circumstances." . . . In contrast, 
in an as-applied challenge, we assess the merits of 
the 
challenge 
by 
considering 
the 
facts 
of 
the 
particular case in front of us, "not hypothetical 
facts in other situations."  Under such a challenge, 
the 
challenger 
must 
show 
that 
his 
or 
her 
constitutional rights were actually violated.  
Id., ¶13 (internal citations omitted).   
¶14 The League presents only a facial challenge to Act 23, 
asserting that the photo identification requirement is void from 
its inception.  The constitutionality of a statute is a question 
of law that we independently review, while benefitting from the 
analyses of the circuit court and court of appeals.  State v. 
Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶8, 323 Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90.   
B.  Constitutional Challenge 
1.  Foundational principles 
¶15 Because the League brings a facial challenge to Act 
23, it "must show that the law cannot be enforced 'under any 
circumstances.'"  Wood, 323 Wis. 2d 321, ¶13 (citing Olson v. 
Town of Cottage Grove, 2008 WI 51, ¶44 n.9, 309 Wis. 2d 365, 749 
N.W.2d 211); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 
745 (1987) (explaining that a facial challenge to a legislative 
act is the most difficult of constitutional challenges because 
the challenger must prove that "no set of circumstances exists 
under which the Act would be valid").   
¶16 We generally presume that statutes are constitutional.  
Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, ¶46, 333 Wis. 2d 273, 797 
N.W.2d 854.  However, the way in which we address this 
presumption 
may 
vary 
depending 
on 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
No. 
2012AP584   
 
8 
 
constitutional claim at issue.  See e.g., Milwaukee Branch of 
NAACP v. Walker, 2014 WI 98, ¶¶27-41, __ Wis.2d __, __ N.W.2d 
__, also released today.  The presumption of constitutionality 
is based on respect for a co-equal branch of government, and it 
promotes due deference to legislative acts.  Dane Cnty. Dep't of 
Human Servs. v. Ponn P., 2005 WI 32, ¶16, 279 Wis. 2d 169, 694 
N.W.2d 344.  This presumption applies even when a statute 
implicates a fundamental right, subject to limited exceptions 
that do not apply here.  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶¶14, 20, 
264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328 (presuming that a concealed 
weapons law implicating the fundamental right to bear arms was 
constitutional).  "[I]f any doubt exists about a statute's 
constitutionality, we must resolve that doubt in favor of 
constitutionality."  Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 
98, ¶18, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849.  
¶17 The challenger has a very heavy burden in overcoming 
the presumption of constitutionality.  Dowhower v. W. Bend Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2000 WI 73, ¶10, 236 Wis. 2d 113, 613 N.W.2d 557.  To 
succeed, 
plaintiffs 
must 
prove 
that 
the 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 
520, ¶11.  While this burden of proof is often associated with 
the requisite proof of guilt in a criminal case, in the context 
of a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the phrase 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" expresses the "force or conviction 
with which a court must conclude, as a matter of law, that a 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional 
before 
the 
statute 
or 
its 
application can be set aside."  Ponn P., 279 Wis. 2d 169, ¶18.   
No. 
2012AP584   
 
9 
 
2.  Suffrage 
¶18 The qualifications of an elector entitled to vote are 
set out in Article III, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Article III, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution addresses 
implementation of voting rights through legislation.  Those two 
sections are the focus of our review and they provide in their 
entirety:  
Electors.  Section 1.  Every United States 
citizen age 18 or older who is a resident of an 
election district in this state is a qualified elector 
of that district. 
Implementation.  Section 2.  Laws may be enacted: 
(1) Defining residency. 
(2) Providing for registration of electors. 
(3) Providing for absentee voting. 
(4) Excluding from the right of suffrage persons: 
(a) Convicted of a felony, unless restored to 
civil rights. 
(b) Adjudged by a court to be incompetent or 
partially incompetent, unless the judgment specifies 
that the person is capable of understanding the 
objective of the elective process or the judgment is 
set aside. 
(5) Subject to ratification by the people at a 
general election, extending the right of suffrage to 
additional classes.  
3.  Prior Article III challenges 
¶19 The League's Article III challenge stands with many 
significant cases that have brought constitutional challenges to 
legislation that bears on voting.  Accordingly, we now review 
No. 
2012AP584   
 
10 
 
some of those challenges.  For example, in McGrael v. Phelps, 
144 Wis. 1, 128 N.W. 1041 (1910), we concluded that voting was a 
right, not a privilege, which was guaranteed by Article III, 
Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Id. at 14-15.  
However, we also concluded that "there is a legitimate field of 
legislative activity in the nature of regulation."  Id. at 2.  
In that regard, we explained: 
It has become elementary that constitutional 
inhibitions of legislative interference with a right, 
including the right to vote and rights incidental 
thereto, leaves, yet, a field of legislative activity 
in respect thereto circumscribed by the police power.  
That activity appertains to conservation, prevention 
of abuse, and promotion of efficiency.  Therefore, as 
in all other fields of police [power] regulation, it 
does not extend beyond what is reasonable. . . . 
However, what is and what is not reasonable, is 
primarily 
for 
legislative 
judgment, 
subject 
to 
judicial review. 
Id. 
at 
17-18. 
 
We 
noted 
that 
judicial 
review 
of 
the 
legislature's exercise of its police power addresses "whether 
the interference, from the standpoint of a legitimate purpose, 
can stand the test of reasonableness."  Id. at 18.   
¶20 In State ex rel. Small v. Bosacki, 154 Wis. 475, 143 
N.W. 175 (1913), we examined a statute that established voter 
residency requirements upon a claim that they limited the right 
to vote of those who worked in a district different from that in 
which they lived.  Id. at 476.  In upholding the law we said: 
[T]he right as well as the duty is vested in the 
legislature 
to 
prescribe 
reasonable 
rules 
and 
regulations 
under 
which 
[the 
franchise] 
may 
be 
exercised.  Such rules and regulations tend to 
certainty and stability in government and render it 
No. 
2012AP584   
 
11 
 
possible to guard against corrupt and unlawful means 
being employed to thwart the will of those lawfully 
entitled to determine governmental policies.  Their 
aim is to protect lawful government, not to needlessly 
harass or disfranchise any one.  
Id. at 478-79.   
¶21 More recently in Gradinjan v. Boho, 29 Wis. 2d 674, 
139 N.W.2d 557 (1966), we examined a statute that prohibited 
counting 
absentee 
ballots 
if 
they 
were 
not 
properly 
authenticated 
by 
a 
municipal 
clerk. 
 
We 
upheld 
the 
constitutionality of the statute, while explaining that, "the 
right of a qualified elector to cast his ballot for the person 
of his choice cannot be destroyed or substantially impaired.  
However, the legislature has the constitutional power to say 
how, when, and where his ballot shall be cast."  Id. at 684-85 
(quoting State ex rel. Frederick v. Zimmerman, 254 Wis. 600, 
613, 37 N.W.2d 473 (1949)).   
4.  The League's Article III challenges 
i.  additional elector qualification 
¶22 The League's major argument is that Act 23 is 
unconstitutional because being required to present Act 23-
acceptable 
photo 
identification 
is 
an 
additional 
elector 
qualification beyond what is listed in Article III, Section 1 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  As provided in full above, 
Section 1 requires that an elector be a United States citizen, 
at least 18 years of age, a resident of Wisconsin and a resident 
of the district in which the elector offers to vote.   
¶23 We agree with the League that the legislature cannot 
add to these qualifications for electors.  As we explained in 
No. 
2012AP584   
 
12 
 
State ex rel. La Follette v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 228 N.W. 895 
(1930), "[t]he persons who may exercise the right of suffrage 
and the day of election are fixed by the constitution."  Id. at 
548.  However, we also noted that "[t]hese provisions are not 
and were never intended to be self-executing or exclusive of 
regulation in other respects. . . . [T]he power to prescribe the 
manner of conducting elections is clearly within the province of 
the legislature."  Id.  
¶24 As we have explained, "the legislature has the 
constitutional power to say how, when, and where" elections 
shall be conducted.  Frederick, 254 Wis. at 613.  The mode and 
manner of conducting an election includes the legislature's 
ability "to require any person offering to vote, to furnish such 
proof as it deems requisite, that he is a qualified elector."  
Cothren, 9 Wis. at 258 (*283-84).   
¶25 Although requiring any person offering to vote to 
identify 
that 
he 
or 
she 
is 
a 
qualified 
elector 
is 
a 
straightforward and longstanding proposition to which we have 
uniformly adhered, we briefly discuss two cases decided shortly 
after the ratification of the state constitution to illustrate 
the principle.  The first is State ex rel. Knowlton v. Williams, 
5 Wis. 308 (1856).  The plaintiff in Knowlton challenged a vote 
to move the La Fayette County seat from Shullsburg to Avon.  Id. 
at 309.  Part of that act provided that "no person shall be 
deemed qualified to vote upon the question of the removal of the 
county seat provided for in this act, unless he shall have 
No. 
2012AP584   
 
13 
 
resided in the town where he offers to vote at least thirty 
days."  Id. at 309-10.   
¶26 At that time, Article III provided that "[e]very male 
person of the age of twenty-one years or upwards, of the 
following classes, who shall have resided in this State for one 
year next preceding any election, shall be deemed a qualified 
elector."  Wis. Const. Art. III, § 1 (1848).  None of the 
subsequent 
classes 
added 
further 
residency 
requirements.  
Futhermore, unlike the present version of Article III, the 
original state constitution did not grant the legislature the 
authority to define residency.  As such, we concluded that the 
law's 30-day residency requirement constituted an additional 
elector qualification that the legislature was not empowered to 
impose.  Knowlton, 5 Wis. at 311.9   
¶27 The second case, Cothren, involved another challenge 
to a vote to move a county seat.  Cothren, 9 Wis. 254 (*279).  
Plaintiffs disputed the results of the vote based on a challenge 
to a law that permitted election officials to question a voter 
whose qualifications to vote were challenged.  Id. at 257-58 
(*283).  Specifically, the law allowed election officials to ask 
an elector "a series of questions . . . calculated to draw out 
from such person the truth as to whether such cause of challenge 
existed against him or not."  Id. at 258 (*283).  
                                                 
9 See also State ex rel. Cornish v. Tuttle, 53 Wis. 45, 50, 
9 N.W. 791 (1881) (invalidating a village charter provision 
establishing a 20-day residency requirement in order to vote for 
municipal officers).   
No. 
2012AP584   
 
14 
 
¶28 Article III made (and still makes) no mention of the 
requirement that an elector answer questions or identify himself 
or herself.  Nonetheless, we upheld the law with reasoning 
similar to Knowlton, concluding that "instead of prescribing any 
qualifications for electors different from those provided for in 
the constitution, [the law] contain[ed] only new provisions to 
enable the inspectors to ascertain whether the person offering 
to 
vote 
possessed 
the 
qualifications 
required 
by 
[the 
constitution]."  Id.  Stated otherwise, requiring an elector to 
demonstrate his or her constitutional qualifications to vote 
does not constitute an additional elector qualification.   
¶29 The League agrees that the legislature has the 
authority to pass laws that allow election officials to 
ascertain whether a potential voter possesses the constitutional 
qualifications 
required 
of 
an 
elector. 
 
As 
the 
League 
acknowledges, this includes the ability to require a potential 
voter to identify himself or herself in some fashion, thereby 
answering the question, "Are you who you say you are, a 
constitutionally qualified elector?" 
¶30 The focus of the League's argument is that Act 23's 
presentation requirement goes beyond such authority because it 
"bars constitutionally qualified voters from voting."  This 
argument fails for several reasons. 
¶31 First, as the court of appeals noted, under the 
League's proposed logic, "virtually any requirement placed on 
voters would be an unconstitutional and impermissible additional 
'qualification.'"  League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, 
No. 
2012AP584   
 
15 
 
Inc. v. Walker, 2013 WI App 77, ¶66, 348 Wis. 2d 714, 834 N.W.2d 
393.  Stated otherwise, if the League were correct, mode and 
manner requirements for voting would not be permissible because 
the State could not enforce them.   
¶32 Second, and more important, the League's argument 
fails 
under 
Cothren, 
which 
similarly 
prohibited 
a 
constitutionally qualified 
elector from voting because he 
refused to identify himself by answering a series of questions.  
Notwithstanding Cothren, the League now makes the same argument 
we flatly rejected in that case: 
It is true that § 14 provides that if any person 
challenged refused to answer, his vote should be 
rejected.  But does that make the answering of the 
questions a new qualification for a voter?  Certainly 
not.  Under the law, as it before existed, any one 
whose vote was challenged had to take an oath that he 
possessed 
the 
qualifications 
required 
by 
the 
constitution.  If he refused, his vote was rejected.  
But this did not make the taking of the oath a new 
qualification, so as to invalidate the law.  It was 
rejected only because he failed to furnish the proof 
required by law, showing his right to vote. 
Cothren, 9 Wis. at 258-59 (*284).10  As such, that an elector 
must comply with Act 23 in order to vote cannot reasonably be 
said to impose an additional elector qualification. 
                                                 
10 See also Gradinjan v. Boho, 29 Wis. 2d 674, 682-83, 139 
N.W.2d 557 (1966) (quoting Anderson v. Budzien, 12 Wis. 2d 530, 
533-34, 
107 
N.W.2d 
496 
(1961)) 
("To 
prevent 
fraud, 
the 
legislature in some instances has specifically stated that there 
must be strict compliance with a statute or a ballot cannot be 
counted. . . . 
[C]ompliance 
with 
those 
provisions 
is 
mandatory."). 
No. 
2012AP584   
 
16 
 
¶33 This conclusion is bolstered by other ways in which an 
elector who fails to comply with indisputably valid election 
laws can lose the opportunity to vote.  For example, an elector 
who fails to arrive at a polling location on time can lose his 
right to vote in that election.  Therefore, although the elector 
is a United States citizen, over the age of 18, and a resident 
of the election district in which he or she offers to vote, if 
the elector does not arrive at a polling place between the hours 
of 7 a.m. and 8 p.m., and is not voting absentee, the elector 
may lose his right to vote in that election.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.78(4).  The same holds true for an elector who fails to 
arrive at the correct polling place.  Wis. Stat. § 6.77(1).  Yet 
none of these laws that affect the manner of voting can be 
seriously characterized as additional elector qualifications.  
¶34 Moreover, we note that Act 23 has a safeguard for 
electors who do not present an acceptable form of identification 
when offering to vote.  In that instance, an elector may cast a 
provisional ballot.  Wis. Stat. § 6.97.  If the elector presents 
an acceptable form of identification by 4 p.m. on the Friday 
after 
the 
election, 
his 
or 
her 
vote 
will 
be 
counted.  
§ 6.97(3)(b). 
¶35 For these reasons, we conclude that being required to 
present Act 23-acceptable photo identification prior to voting 
is not an elector qualification in addition to those set out in 
Article III, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution; but 
rather, it is a mode of identifying those who possess 
constitutionally required qualifications.   
No. 
2012AP584   
 
17 
 
¶36 Our decision is this regard is supported by the 
decisions of courts in other jurisdictions that have considered 
whether the requirement of presenting photo identification prior 
to voting is an additional elector qualification.  For example, 
in City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. 2013), the 
Tennessee Supreme Court considered the same constitutional 
challenge the League presents to us.  Id. at 108.  The court 
began by reviewing the Tennessee Constitution, which required 
that "one must be at least eighteen years of age, a United 
States citizen, a Tennessee resident . . . and registered to 
vote."  Id.  
¶37 In 
rejecting 
the 
contention 
that 
the 
photo 
identification requirement imposed by the Tennessee law was an 
additional voter qualification, the court concluded that "the 
photo ID requirement is more properly classified as a regulation 
pertaining to an existing voting qualification."  Id. at 109.  
The court explained that photo identification was merely a "mode 
of ascertaining" whether the potential voter possessed the 
necessary constitutional qualifications to vote.  Id. (quoting 
Trotter v. City of Maryville, 235 S.W.2d 13, 19 (Tenn. 1950)) 
(further citation omitted). 
¶38 In Democratic Party of Ga., Inc. v. Perdue, 707 S.E.2d 
67 (Ga. 2011), the Georgia Supreme Court addressed whether 
requiring 
the 
presentation 
of 
government-issued 
photo 
identification to identify qualified voters was an additional 
voter qualification.  The court explained that the right to vote 
is guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution, and it cannot be 
No. 
2012AP584   
 
18 
 
denied or taken away by legislative enactment.  Id. at 72.  
However, the legislature may prescribe "reasonable regulations 
as to how these qualifications shall be determined."  Id.  
Thereafter, the court concluded that photo identification was "a 
reasonable procedure for verifying that the individual appearing 
to vote in person is actually the same person who registered to 
vote."  Id.  
¶39 In League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 
N.E.2d 758 (Ind. 2010), the Indiana Supreme Court rejected the 
additional qualification contention that is made by the League 
before us.  The court first explained that the legislature could 
"not by statutory enactment add a substantive qualification to 
the right to vote."  Id. at 767.  However, the court further 
explained that "[r]equiring qualified voters to present a 
specified form of identification is not in the nature of such a 
personal, individual characteristic or attribute but rather 
functions merely as an election regulation to verify the voter's 
identity."  Id.   
¶40 Although none of the state constitutions is word for 
word identical with Article III, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, the reasoning of all three supreme courts is 
consistent with our own set out above.  Accordingly, we now turn 
to 
Article 
III, 
Section 2, 
which 
expressly 
permits 
the 
legislature to provide for registration of voters.  
ii.  registration 
¶41 In addition to the authority to "require any person 
offering to vote[] to furnish such proof as it deems requisite[] 
No. 
2012AP584   
 
19 
 
that he is a qualif[i]ed elector," Cothren, 9 Wis. at 258 (*283-
84), the legislature may pass five types of election-related 
laws 
pursuant 
Article 
III, 
Section 2 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  One of those enumerated types are laws that 
"[p]rovid[e] for registration of electors."  Wis. Const. Art. 
III, § 2(2).  
¶42 The court of appeals succinctly summarized the current 
registration system as follows:  
Election 
officials 
compile 
registration 
information into "poll lists" for use at polling 
places, containing "the full name and address of each 
registered elector."  Wis. Stat. § 6.36(2) (2009-10); 
Wis. Stat. § 6.36(2).  Thus, poll lists memorialize 
who is registered to vote in a given election in a 
given voting district and they play a critical role in 
the voting process both pre- and post-Act 23.  When a 
potential voter arrives at the polling place for his 
or her residence in a given election, he or she "shall 
state his or her full name and address" to election 
officials, who "shall verify that the name and 
address" provided match the name and address on the 
poll list.  Wis. Stat. § 6.79(2)(a) (2009-10); Wis. 
Stat. § 6.79(2)(a). 
League of Women Voters, 348 Wis. 2d 714, ¶15 (footnote omitted).   
¶43 Requiring an elector to identify himself or herself by 
stating his or her full name and address is unquestionably part 
of the registration process.  After all, there would be no point 
to compiling a list of registered electors if there were no 
means by which to ascertain if the person offering to vote was 
an elector appearing on the list.  Identification of registered 
voters by a government-issued photo identification is the mode 
of identification that the legislature has chosen.  
No. 
2012AP584   
 
20 
 
¶44 Based on the League's arguments before us, we can see 
no meaningful grounds on which to distinguish the photo 
identification requirement from the requirement that an elector 
state his or her full name and address in order to verify that 
it matches the registration list.  Both requirements permit use 
of registration lists to verify at the polling place that the 
potential voter is registered.  An elector who fails to comply 
with either procedure cannot vote.  Furthermore, the League does 
not rely on the difficulty and inconvenience of procuring an Act 
23-acceptable form of identification.11  Therefore, the ease with 
which most electors will be able to state their names and 
addresses is not relevant to our decision in this case.   
¶45 We now address the League's remaining argument, that 
Act 23 fails an independent reasonableness requirement.  
iii.  reasonableness 
¶46 According to the League, even laws that do not 
constitute an additional qualification under Article III, 
Section 1 or that come within one of the five types of election-
related laws under Article III, Section 2 must be "reasonable" 
to pass constitutional muster.  Act 23 fails this requirement, 
                                                 
11 In NAACP, Act 23 was subjected to a very different 
challenge than that brought by the League.  There, plaintiffs 
submitted evidence to develop their allegation that obtaining 
Act 23-acceptable photo identification imposed unconstitutional 
burdens of time, inconvenience and cost on the right to vote and 
that Act 23 was not reasonably necessary to effect a significant 
government interest.  NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶2, __ Wis.2d __.  
Accordingly, we employed a more nuanced test, under which the 
severity of the burden on the right to vote dictates the level 
of scrutiny that is applied.    
No. 
2012AP584   
 
21 
 
according to the League, because "it destroys the right of a 
qualified elector to cast a ballot" and "it does nothing to 
preserve and promote the constitutional right to vote."   
¶47 We acknowledge that in upholding various election 
regulations we have couched some of our decisions in terms of 
"reasonableness."  E.g., McGrael, 144 Wis. at 17-18 (explaining 
that laws regulating voting methods are enacted through the 
legislature's use of police power, and accordingly, they must be 
reasonable exercises of that power).  Therefore, in order to 
meet the League's argument, we assume without deciding, that 
reasonableness functions as an independent limit on election 
regulation.   
¶48 In State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, 142 Wis. 320, 
125 N.W. 961 (1910), we considered a challenge to statutorily 
established primary elections.  Id. at 322-23.  In addressing 
the claim that the election regulation bore unconstitutionally 
on the right to assemble, we explained that "[s]uch rights have 
always been held to be subject to reasonable regulation."  Id. 
at 337 (citing Freund, Police Power, § 480; further citations 
omitted).  We noted that "[s]uch regulations, within reasonable 
limits, 
strengthen 
and 
make 
effective 
the 
constitutional 
guaranties instead of impairing or destroying them."  Id. 
(quoting State ex rel. Runge v. Anderson, 100 Wis. 523, 533-34, 
76 N.W. 482 (1898)).  
¶49 Accordingly, given our discussions of the use of 
police power when enacting laws bearing on elections, we 
understand the League's argument to be that when the legislature 
No. 
2012AP584   
 
22 
 
regulates elections, its use of police power is limited to 
legislation that does not destroy or impair, but rather, 
preserves and promotes the right to vote.  Stated otherwise, if 
the legislation does not do so, it is "unreasonable."   
¶50 While we agree with the League that election laws must 
not destroy or impair the right to vote, Act 23's presentation 
requirement does not do so.  As we explained in part above, 
requiring a potential voter to identify himself or herself with 
government-issued photo identification does not destroy or 
impair the right to vote.  Identification by the use of Act 23-
acceptable photo identification is the mode of ascertaining that 
the potential voter is a constitutionally qualified elector.  
Because the legislature has the power to regulate in ways that 
affect the mode and manner of conducting elections and Act 23-
acceptable photo identification is a mode of ascertaining the 
identity of electors, it is reasonable.  See Kohler, 200 Wis. at 
548; Frederick, 254 Wis. at 613; Cothren, 9 Wis. at 258 (*283-
84).  
¶51 Furthermore, we have little trouble concluding that 
Act 
23's 
presentation 
requirement 
is 
a 
law 
that 
could 
"strengthen and make effective the constitutional guarant[y]" of 
suffrage.  See Runge, 100 Wis. at 534.  In a more recent 
context, in Crawford, the United States Supreme Court concluded 
that voter identification laws serve unquestionably legitimate 
purposes:  (1) "safeguarding voter confidence"; (2) "improv[ing] 
and moderniz[ing] election procedures"; and (3) "deterring and 
detecting voter fraud."  Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191.  Each of 
No. 
2012AP584   
 
23 
 
these purposes is reasonable precisely because it could preserve 
and promote the right to vote.   
¶52 For instance, photo identification could enhance the 
integrity of elections because "[t]he electoral system cannot 
inspire public confidence if no safeguards exist . . . to 
confirm the identity of voters."  Id. at 194 (quoting Report of 
the Commission on Federal Election Reform, Building Confidence 
in U. S. Elections § 2.5 (Sept. 2005)).  Increased confidence in 
the elector system, in turn, "encourages citizen participation 
in the democratic process."  Id. at 197.   
¶53 Also, the presentation of photo identification "is to 
some extent, a condition of our times.  Many important personal 
interactions are being modernized to require proof of identity 
with photo identification."  NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶44, __ Wis. 2d 
__. 
 
Crawford 
also 
noted 
that 
the 
modern 
approach 
to 
identification is moving toward photo identification.  Crawford, 
553 U.S. at 192.  
¶54 Additionally, voter identification laws could detect 
and deter fraud thereby ensuring that a constitutionally 
qualified elector's vote is not diluted by fraudulent votes.12  
This could preserve and promote the right to vote by assuring 
                                                 
12 A recent filing in Milwaukee County demonstrates that 
voter fraud is a concern.  See State v. Monroe, 2014CF2625 
(June 20, 
2014), 
wherein 
the 
Milwaukee 
County 
District 
Attorney's office filed a criminal complaint against Robert 
Monroe that alleged 13 counts of voter fraud, including multiple 
voting in elections and providing false information to election 
officials in order to vote.   
No. 
2012AP584   
 
24 
 
that a constitutionally qualified elector's vote counts with 
full force and is not offset by illegal ballots.  See Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).    
¶55 In areas such as election regulation, "[w]here a 
legislature has significantly greater institutional expertise," 
courts generally defer to legislative judgments.  Nixon v. 
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., 
concurring).  Therefore, rather than "asking whether the statute 
burdens any one such interest in a manner out of proportion to 
the statute's salutary effects upon the others," courts employ a 
presumption of constitutionality.  Id.  In so doing, we decline 
to evaluate whether Act 23 is the best way to preserve and 
promote the right to vote, such "policy determinations . . . are 
not properly addressed to the members of the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin."  MTI v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, ¶181, __ Wis.2d __, __ 
N.W.2d __ (Crooks, J., concurring).  Instead, we conclude that 
Act 23 is a reasonable way to do so.  
¶56 And 
finally, 
employing 
the 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality in the present case, we conclude that the 
League has failed to prove that presenting an Act 23-acceptable 
photo identification is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Furthermore, Act 23's presentation requirement is a 
reasonable voter regulation that is supportive of the State's 
significant interests in promoting voter confidence in the 
outcome 
of 
elections, 
improving 
and 
modernizing 
election 
procedures and deterring voter fraud.   
No. 
2012AP584   
 
25 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶57 We conclude that the League has failed to prove Act 23 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  The legislature did 
not exceed its authority under Article III of the Wisconsin 
Constitution when it required electors to present Act 23-
acceptable photo identification.  Since 1859, we have held that 
"it is clearly within [the legislature's] province to require 
any person offering to vote[] to furnish such proof as it deems 
requisite[] that he is a qualif[i]ed elector."  Cothren, 9 Wis. 
at 258 (*283-84).  Requiring a potential voter to identify 
himself or herself as a qualified elector through the use of Act 
23-acceptable photo identification does not impose an elector 
qualification in addition to those set out in Article III, 
Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶58 We also conclude that the requirement to present Act 
23-acceptable 
photo 
identification 
comes 
within 
the 
legislature's 
authority 
to 
enact 
laws 
providing 
for 
the 
registration of electors under Article III, Section 2 because 
Act 23-acceptable photo identification is the mode by which 
election officials verify that a potential voter is the elector 
listed on the registration list.   
¶59 Finally, we conclude that plaintiffs' facial challenge 
fails 
because 
Act 
23's 
requirement 
to 
present 
photo 
identification is a reasonable regulation that could improve and 
modernize election procedures, safeguard voter confidence in the 
outcome of elections and deter voter fraud.  See Crawford, 553 
No. 
2012AP584   
 
26 
 
U.S. at 191.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified and as modified, affirmed; injunction vacated; cause 
remanded to circuit court to dismiss the complaint.   
 
 
 
No. 
2012AP584.npc 
 
1 
 
¶60 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (concurring)  In bringing a 
purely facial challenge to Act 23, Wisconsin's voter photo 
identification law, the plaintiffs have undertaken what is, 
according to the United States Supreme Court, "of course, the 
most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the 
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists 
under which the Act would be valid."1  Because the majority 
applies the presumption of constitutionality and requires that 
the plaintiffs prove that the statute is unconstitutional beyond 
a reasonable doubt, I join that holding and the mandate.   I 
write separately to emphasize that the result in this case is 
compelled by the framework of law that we are bound to apply.  
As has been recognized in other cases, it is often true that the 
standard of review and the applicable analysis dictate the 
outcome.2  That is the case here. 
 
¶61 The question we must answer is not whether the voter 
photo identification law is good policy, but whether we can say 
                                                 
1 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). 
2 See Gibson v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 810, 819-20, 177 N.W.2d 
912, 917 (1970) (holding that presumption that counsel has 
fulfilled his duty of proper representation "is dispositive of 
the defendant's claim" where there was no evidence to the 
contrary) and Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. Menasha Corp., 2008 
WI 88, ¶109, 311 Wis. 2d 579, 754 N.W.2d 95 (Crooks, J., 
concurring) (stating that "resolving the issue of deference is 
key to a correct decision in this case"), and David R. Dow, The 
Equal Protection Clause and the Legislative Redistricting Cases-
Some Notes Concerning the Standing of White Plaintiffs, 81 Minn. 
L. Rev. 1123, 1130 (1997) (stating that in redistricting cases, 
for example, "The issue of which standard of review to use is 
pivotal because the choice of standard typically dictates the 
outcome.") 
No. 
2012AP584.npc 
 
2 
 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Act 23 violates the Wisconsin 
Constitution on any of the grounds claimed by these plaintiffs.   
As a purely facial challenge, this challenge is distinct from 
the challenge raised by plaintiffs in Milwaukee NAACP v. Walker, 
2014 WI 98, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d. ___ (raising a 
challenge similar to that raised in Crawford v. Marion County 
Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008), and providing a record with 
evidence of the Act's burden on individual Wisconsin residents).  
Given the framework within which the question must be answered, 
I agree with the holding of the majority that the plaintiffs 
have not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is 
unconstitutional and I join that holding and the mandate.  I can 
reach no other conclusion than to uphold Act 23 based on the 
purely facial challenge here.  I therefore respectfully concur. 
I. 
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
   
¶62 With this type of facial challenge, the odds are 
against the plaintiffs at every turn.  A court is bound to 
recognize the presumption that the statute is constitutional.3  
Here, the plaintiffs must prove otherwise beyond a reasonable 
doubt.4  In considering such a challenge, a court must "resolve 
any doubt about the constitutionality of a statute in favor of 
upholding the statute."5 
                                                 
3 Tammy W. G. v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, ¶46, 333 Wis. 2d 273, 
797 N.W.2d 854. 
4 State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶11, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 
N.W.2d 328. 
5 Monroe Cnty. Dep't  of Human Servs. v. Kelli B., 2004 WI 
48, ¶16, 271 Wis. 2d 51, 2 678 N.W.2d 831. 
No. 
2012AP584.npc 
 
3 
 
¶63 In short, the question before us in this case is not 
whether the Act is good policy, not whether it accomplishes what 
it sets out to do, and not whether it is unfair under some 
circumstances to some individuals.  The question before us in 
this case is solely this: starting with a presumption of 
constitutionality in its favor, are we are persuaded beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the statute violates the Wisconsin 
Constitution in every circumstance? 
II. 
EVALUATING PLAINTIFFS' CHALLENGE 
¶64 The plaintiffs argue that requiring a voter to show 
photo identification is flatly outside the legislature's power 
because it impermissibly adds a qualification to the three 
elector qualifications listed in the Wisconsin Constitution: a 
United States citizen, aged 18 or older, and a resident of an 
election district in Wisconsin.6   
¶65 The plaintiffs argue that case law explicitly states 
that "an act of the legislature which deprives a person of the 
right to vote, although he has every qualification which the 
constitution makes necessary, cannot be sustained"7  and "it is 
incompetent for the legislature to add any new qualifications 
for an elector."8  Furthermore, the plaintiffs contend that 
"[t]he 
elector 
possessing 
the 
qualifications 
prescribed by the constitution is invested with the 
                                                 
6 Wis. Const. art. III, § 1, states "Every United States 
citizen age 18 or older who is a resident of an election 
district in this state is a qualified elector of that district." 
7 Knowlton v. Williams, 5 Wis. 308, 316 (1856). 
8 Cothren v. Lean, 9 Wis. 279, 283 (1859). 
No. 
2012AP584.npc 
 
4 
 
constitutional right to vote at any election in this 
state.  These qualifications are explicit, exclusive, 
and 
unqualified 
by 
any 
exceptions, 
provisos 
or 
conditions, and the constitution, either directly or 
by 
implication, 
confers 
no 
authority 
upon 
the 
legislature to change, impair, add to or abridge them 
in any respect."9   
The plaintiffs cite Dells v. Kennedy10 for the proposition that 
even permitted regulation of elections must be reasonable; they 
contend that this photo identification requirement is, on its 
face, unreasonable and must be struck down.  The plaintiffs also 
contend that the Act does not fall into any of the categories of 
laws that the legislature is permitted to pass under its 
constitutional authority to regulate elections.11  
¶66 However, as the court of appeals correctly and 
concisely 
stated, 
each 
of 
these 
arguments 
is 
ultimately 
unpersuasive in the context of this particular type of facial 
challenge: 
 
First, we conclude that the League's "additional 
qualification" argument is defeated by concessions the 
League makes and by Wisconsin Supreme Court precedent 
                                                 
9 Dells v. Kennedy, 49 Wis. 555, 556, 6 N.W. 246 (1880). 
10 Dells, 49 Wis. 555, 558 (stating that "a registry law can 
be sustained only, if at all, as providing a reasonable mode or 
method by which the constitutional qualifications of an elector 
may be ascertained and determined, or as regulating reasonably 
the exercise of the constitutional right to vote at an election" 
(emphasis added)). 
11 Article III, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states, "Laws may be enacted:  (1) Defining residency. (2) 
Providing for registration of electors. (3) Providing for 
absentee voting. . . . " 
No. 
2012AP584.npc 
 
5 
 
addressing the authority of the legislature to enact 
laws allowing officials to ascertain at the polls 
which potential voters are qualified to vote.  The 
League has not shown that the photo identification 
requirement 
is 
on 
its 
face 
an 
"additional 
qualification" for voting, as opposed to a voter 
registration regulation that allows election officials 
"to ascertain whether the person offering to vote 
possessed the qualifications required."  See State ex 
rel. Cothren v. Lean, 9 Wis. 254, [*279], 258, [*283] 
(1859).   
 
Second, we reject the League's additional, implied 
argument that the requirement is unconstitutional 
under the Article III right to suffrage because it 
imposes a restriction that is, on its face, so 
burdensome that it effectively denies potential voters 
their right to vote, and is therefore constitutionally 
"unreasonable."  We express no opinion as to whether 
such an argument might have merit if supported by fact 
finding regarding the burdens imposed.  However, in 
this facial challenge in which the League does not 
rely on any fact finding or evidentiary material, the 
implied argument falls short.  
 
Finally, as to the argument that, even if the 
requirement is not an "additional qualification" or 
constitutionally 
"unreasonable," 
the 
legislature 
exceeded its authority in enacting it, we conclude 
that this argument collapses with a concession by the 
League, which we believe is a warranted concession.  
The concession is that the legislature has implicit 
but broad constitutional authority to establish a 
voting 
registration 
system 
under 
which 
election 
officials may require potential voters to identify 
themselves 
as 
registered 
voters, 
including 
by 
requesting photo identification.   
League of Women Voters v. Walker, 2013 WI App 77, ¶¶3-5, 348 
Wis. 2d 714, 834 N.W.2d 393. 
¶67 The problem for the plaintiffs is that implicit in and 
essential to the registration process is the necessity of 
confirming the identity of the voter at the polling place.  A 
facial challenge to a more onerous identification requirement, 
No. 
2012AP584.npc 
 
6 
 
such as a requirement for every voter to show a current passport 
or a group of documents, might conceivably be successful, but a 
facial challenge to a requirement of the kind of photo 
identification requirements at issue here cannot prevail.  The 
test for a purely facial challenge, as noted before, is not 
whether the law is ever unconstitutional but whether it is 
always and in every application unconstitutional. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
¶68 The question here is not whether the photo voter 
identification law is good policy, but whether the plaintiffs 
have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the Act violates the 
Wisconsin Constitution on any of the grounds claimed by these 
plaintiffs.  Given the framework within which the question must 
be answered, I agree with the holding of the majority that the 
plaintiffs have not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
statute is unconstitutional, and I join that holding and the 
mandate.  I can reach no other conclusion than to uphold Act 23 
based on the purely facial challenge here.  I therefore 
respectfully concur. 
 
 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶69 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).   
Who are to be the electors . . . ?  Not the rich, more 
than the poor; not the learned, more than the 
ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished 
names, more than the humble sons of obscurity and 
unpropitious fortune.  The electors are to be the 
great body of the people of the United States. 
The Federalist No. 57 (1788) (James Madison).   
¶70 Today the court follows not James Madison——for whom 
Wisconsin's capital city is named——but rather Jim Crow——the name 
typically used to refer to repressive laws used to restrict 
rights, including the right to vote, of African-Americans.   
¶71 Indeed the majority opinion in NAACP v. Walker1 brings 
the specter of Jim Crow front and center.  It invalidates costs 
incurred by a qualified Wisconsin voter to obtain an Act 23 
photo ID as an illegal de facto poll tax.2  
¶72 The right to vote is "a sacred right of the highest 
character."3  The Wisconsin Constitution explicitly confers the 
right to vote upon all qualified individuals as specified in 
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution: 
                                                 
1 NAACP v. Walker, 2014 WI 98, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___, mandated of even date. 
2 State and federal courts in the Jim Crow era rejected 
challenges to literacy tests, Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. 
of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), and poll taxes, Breedlove v. 
Suttles, 
302 
U.S. 
277 
(1937), 
and 
onerous 
registration 
requirements that functionally deprived millions of the right to 
vote.  Asserting that the legislature had broad powers to 
determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may 
be exercised, the courts turned a blind eye to the effects of 
these tests on the electorate, especially African-Americans. 
3 State v. Phelps, 144 Wis. 1, 15, 128 N.W. 1041 (1910). 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
2 
 
Every United States citizen age 18 or older who is a 
resident of an election district in this state is a 
qualified elector of that district. 
So fundamental and sacred is the right to vote, the Wisconsin 
Constitution allows legislative regulation of voting in only a 
few enunciated areas.  Wis. Const. art. III, § 2.4 
¶73 The right to vote is "a fundamental political right, 
because [it is] preservative of all rights."5  Accordingly, the 
right to vote is the most protected of rights: 
The right of a qualified elector to cast a ballot for 
the election of a public officer, which shall be free 
and equal, is one of the most important of the rights 
                                                 
4 Article III, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  
Laws may be enacted: 
(1) Defining residency. 
(2) Providing for registration of electors. 
(3) Providing for absentee voting. 
(4) Excluding from the right of suffrage persons: 
(a) Convicted of a felony, unless restored to 
civil rights. 
(b) Adjudged by a court to be incompetent or 
partially incompetent, unless the judgment specifies 
that the person is capable of understanding the 
objective of the elective process or the judgment is 
set aside. 
(5) Subject to ratification by the people at a general 
election, 
extending 
the 
right 
of 
suffrage 
to 
additional classes. 
5 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).  See also 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (right to vote is "a 
fundamental political right . . . preservative of all rights.") 
(quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370).  
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
3 
 
guaranteed to him [or her] by the constitution.  If 
citizens are deprived of that right, which lies at the 
very basis of our Democracy, we will soon cease to be 
a Democracy.  For that reason, no right is more 
jealously guarded and protected by the departments of 
government under our constitutions, federal and state, 
than is the right of suffrage.  It is a right which 
was enjoyed by the people before the adoption of the 
constitution and is one of the inherent rights which 
can be surrendered only by the people and subjected to 
limitation only by the fundamental law. 
State ex rel. Frederick v. Zimmerman, 254 Wis. 600, 613, 37 
N.W.2d 473 (1949) (emphasis added). 
¶74 When 
an 
individual 
who 
is 
qualified 
under 
the 
Wisconsin Constitution goes to the polls to vote, no legislative 
action may prevent that person from casting a ballot: 
[A]n act of the legislature which deprives a person of 
the right to vote, although he has every qualification 
which the constitution makes necessary, cannot be 
sustained. 
State ex rel. Knowlton v. Williams, 5 Wis. 308, 316 (1856). 
¶75 Yet under the majority opinion, an individual who has 
fulfilled every requirement to vote——he or she is a citizen of 
the United States, is a resident of Wisconsin, is over the age 
of 18, and is registered——can nonetheless be denied the right to 
vote 
for 
failing 
to 
produce 
a 
government-issued 
photo 
identification enumerated in Act 23,6 such as a driver's license 
or receipt therefore, a State identification card or receipt 
therefore, a military identification card, a United States 
passport, certain certificates of United States naturalization, 
                                                 
6 I refer to these enumerated photo identifications as "Act 
23 photo ID." 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
4 
 
an identification by a federally recognized tribe, or certain 
university and college identification cards.7  
                                                 
7 Section 1 of 2011 Wis. Act 23 reads as follows: 
5.02(6m) of the statutes is created to read: 
5.02(6m) "Identification" means any of the following 
documents issued to an individual: 
(a) One of the following documents that is unexpired 
or if expired has expired after the date of the most 
recent general election: 
1. An operator's license issued under ch. 343. 
2. An identification card issued under s. 343.50. 
3. An identification card issued by a U.S. 
uniformed service. 
4. A U.S. passport. 
(b) A certificate of U.S. naturalization that was 
issued not earlier than 2 years before the date of 
an election at which it is presented. 
(c) An unexpired driving receipt under s. 343.11. 
(d) An unexpired identification card receipt issued 
under s. 343.50. 
(e) An identification card issued by a federally 
recognized Indian tribe in this state. 
(f) An unexpired identification card issued by a 
university 
or 
college 
in 
this 
state 
that 
is 
accredited, as defined in s. 39.30(1)(d), that 
contains the date of issuance and signature of the 
individual to whom it is issued and that contains an 
expiration date indicating that the card expires no 
later than 2 years after the date of issuance if the 
individual establishes that he or she is enrolled as 
a student at the university or college on the date 
that the card is presented. 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶76 These Act 23 photo IDs are not mandated in the 
Wisconsin Constitution as a qualification to vote.8   
¶77 The State may require verification of the identity of 
the voter, but Act 23 severely restricts and limits the form of 
identification that enables a qualified voter to cast a ballot.  
Rather than merely verify identity, Act 23's requirement 
conditions the right to vote on possession of a restricted list 
of identifying documents; no other form of proof of identity 
than an Act 23 photo ID allows a qualified voter to verify 
identity and cast a ballot.  By restricting verification of 
identity to only certain government-issued photo IDs, Act 23 
does not condition the right to vote on verification of 
identity.  Instead, Act 23 conditions the right to vote on 
production of a particular identity card.  Requiring a specific 
photo ID is an additional qualification on the right to vote, 
and is therefore impermissible under the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶78 Without 
any 
evidence 
that 
in-person 
voter 
impersonation is a problem in Wisconsin,9 the voting restrictions 
that the majority opinion approves today give Wisconsin the most 
restrictive voting laws in America,10 laws that systematically 
                                                 
8 Not every government-issued photo ID satisfies Act 23.  
Act 23 does not allow an individual to use a Veteran's ID card, 
the photo ID that the United States Department of Veterans 
Affairs issues when veterans leave the military, or an ID from 
one of Wisconsin's two-year technical colleges. 
9 NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶¶134-136 (Crooks, J., dissenting). 
10 For 
a 
helpful 
list 
of 
voter 
registration 
and 
identification 
requirements 
from 
across 
the 
country, 
see 
National Conference of State Legislatures, Voter Identification 
Requirements, tbl. 2, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-
and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx (last visited July 14, 2014). 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
6 
 
disenfranchise entire classes of individuals who are without the 
required Act 23 photo ID.  For example, an estimated 23 percent 
of persons aged 65 and over do not have a Wisconsin driver's 
license or other Act 23 photo ID.11   
¶79 Qualified and registered Wisconsin individuals who 
voted in the last election may be barred from voting in the next 
election under today's majority opinions in NAACP and the 
instant case unless they obtain an Act 23 photo ID.  Their vote 
is now contingent upon possession of a specific ID, not their 
constitutional qualifications to vote or their identity.  The 
possession of an Act 23 photo ID may be further contingent on 
the discretion of an agency administrator who determines whether 
an individual can obtain an Act 23 photo ID.12  "These 
disenfranchised citizens would certainly include some of our 
friends, neighbors, and relatives."13   
                                                                                                                                                             
No other state requires the production of one of a list of 
permissible government-issued photo identifications as in Act 
23, and no other state forbids other methods of voter identity 
verification such as affidavit, as does Act 23. 
11 In contrast, 99% of Indiana's voting age population 
possessed photo IDs that complied with the new Indiana law.  
Crawford v. Marion County Elections Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 188 n.6 
(2008).   
12 See NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶67. 
13 Circuit court op. at 9. 
We would ignore reality were we not to recognize that the 
requirements of Act 23 fall with unequal weight on voters 
according to economic status.  See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 
134, 144 (1972); see also NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶¶123-129 (Crooks, 
J., dissenting). 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶80 I write in dissent to discuss both the instant case 
and the NAACP case.   
¶81 First, the two cases address the constitutionality of 
the same Act 23 but are inconsistent.    
¶82 According to NAACP, the fees imposed to obtain an Act 
23 photo ID constitute an impermissible de facto poll tax.14  
Thus Act 23 creates an unconstitutional precondition on the 
right to vote, according to NAACP.  A charge to comply with Act 
23 creates a severe and unconstitutional burden on the right to 
vote, according to NAACP.15   
¶83 In the instant case, the court, addressing the same 
Act 23, concludes that no precondition to voting has been 
created. 
 
This 
inconsistency 
between 
the 
two 
cases 
is 
unexplained.  
¶84 How can the de facto poll tax be unconstitutional in 
the NAACP case, while the court declares all of Act 23 
constitutional 
in 
the 
instant 
case 
as 
not 
imposing 
any 
additional qualifications for voters?  Isn't NAACP precedential 
in the instant case?  
¶85 Additionally, the NAACP majority opinion is internally 
inconsistent in failing to invalidate various fees and costs 
associated with obtaining documentation necessary to obtain an 
Act 23 photo ID.  Fees and costs imposed on a person 
constitutionally qualified to vote are an integral part of the 
Act 23 photo ID requirement. 
                                                 
14 See NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶83 n.9 (Crooks, J., dissenting). 
15 NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶¶61-65. 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶86 Second, I articulate the key principles from our case 
law that guide the high and exacting standard of judicial 
scrutiny required for review of legislation regulating the right 
to vote.   
¶87 Neither NAACP nor the instant case applies Wisconsin's 
voting 
rights 
jurisprudence 
to 
interpret 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution in the present case.   
¶88 Indeed, the two opinions apply different standards of 
review to gauge the constitutionality of Act 23 under Article 
III of the Wisconsin Constitution.  How can that be?  The same 
Act 23 is challenged in both cases as unconstitutional under 
Article III of the state constitution.  Both cases present a 
facial challenge.  The plaintiffs in both cases assert that Act 
23 imposes a burden on qualified voters.  No persuasive reason 
is given for the different standards of review in the two cases.  
¶89 Our state's case law outlines key principles that 
protect the right to vote in the face of legislative election 
regulations.  The "presumption of constitutionality"16 applied by 
the majority opinion in the instant case is wholly inappropriate 
under 
longstanding 
state 
law 
for 
the 
protection 
of 
the 
fundamental, sacred right to vote.   
¶90 Third, I apply the principles of the Wisconsin voting 
rights cases to the instant case and conclude that the League of 
Women Voters and the circuit court are correct: Act 23 
unconstitutionally adds a qualification to the right to vote.   
                                                 
16 Majority op., ¶¶16-17; concurrence, ¶¶62-63. 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶91 If a qualified voter fails to produce an Act 23 photo 
ID, Act 23 bars that person from voting even though that voter 
meets all the qualifications enumerated in the Wisconsin 
Constitution and meets all the statutory voter registration 
requirements.  Thus Act 23 deprives qualified, registered 
Wisconsin voters of the right to vote, based solely on their 
failure to meet a legislatively established precondition to 
voting. 
 
Such 
deprivation 
amounts 
to 
an 
impermissible 
legislative amendment of the Wisconsin Constitution to add a 
voter qualification. 
¶92 Today's holding, along with the holding in NAACP, 
undermines the very foundation of our democracy and deprives 
individuals of the most sacred of constitutional rights through 
no fault of their own.17    
¶93 Act 23 is facially unconstitutional and void.  This 
court cannot rewrite Act 23 to make it constitutional.  That 
task is for the legislature.   
¶94 Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
¶95 The opinions in the instant case and NAACP are 
inconsistent.  If Act 23 imposes a de facto poll tax in NAACP, 
does it not impose a de facto poll tax in the instant case?  The 
majority opinion and Justice Crooks' dissent in NAACP recognize 
that Act 23 in effect creates, in whole or in part, facially 
                                                 
17 Dells v. Kennedy, 49 Wis. 555, 557, 6 N.W. 246 (1880). 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
10 
 
unconstitutional restrictions on the right to vote.18  The 
holding of NAACP is precedential and governs the instant case.   
¶96 The NAACP majority opinion follows the lead of the 
United States Supreme Court in Harper v. Virginia State Board of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), which finally struck down poll 
tax laws that were created to burden African-American voters.19  
¶97 In Harper, the Court struck down a $1.50 poll tax on 
the ground that "payment of any fee" to a Virginia governmental 
entity could not be required as a precondition of voting.  
Although the Harper Court discussed the uneven impact such a fee 
may have on those with limited financial resources, the Court 
struck down the fee for all voters.  The Harper Court declared 
that payment of a fee to vote is invidious discrimination and 
has no relation to voter qualifications:      
[W]e must remember that the interest of the State, 
when it comes to voting, is limited to the power to 
fix qualifications. Wealth, like race, creed, or 
color, is not germane to one's ability to participate 
intelligently 
in 
the 
electoral 
process. . . . To 
introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a 
voter's qualifications is to introduce a capricious or 
irrelevant factor.  The degree of the discrimination 
is irrelevant. . . . [T]he requirement of fee paying 
causes an 'invidious' discrimination. . . .  
 
 . . . . 
                                                 
18 NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶¶60-65; id., ¶¶86-97 (Crooks, J., 
dissenting).   
19 The court overruled Breedlove, 302 U.S. 277, which had 
upheld poll taxes as constitutional just 30 years prior.  By the 
time Harper was mandated, only four states still imposed poll 
taxes: Texas, Alabama, Virginia, and Mississippi. 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
11 
 
For to repeat, wealth or fee paying has, in our view, 
no relation to voting qualifications; the right to 
vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so 
burdened or conditioned.20 
¶98 The 
NAACP 
majority 
opinion 
asserts 
that 
"to 
constitutionally administer Act 23, the [Department of Motor 
Vehicles] may not require documents in order to issue a 
[Department of Transportation] photo identification card for 
voting that require payment of a fee to any government agency."  
NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶7 n.5.   
¶99 Despite apparently invalidating some fees and costs 
for obtaining Act 23 photo IDs, the NAACP majority opinion does 
not resolve the de facto poll tax issue for other fees and 
costs.   
¶100 For example: 
• An individual may need to obtain a court order in the 
case of a name change, gender change, adoption, or 
divorce, which will require additional filing and 
court costs.21 
• An 
individual 
may 
need 
to 
provide 
a 
marriage 
certificate or certified copy of a judgment of 
divorce,22 which will require court costs, filing fees, 
and other costs associated with a court order.  
                                                 
20 Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 
668, 670 (1966) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
21 Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 102.15(3)(a)17 (Feb. 2013). 
22 Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 102.15(4)(a)11. (Feb. 2013). 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
12 
 
• An individual must provide citizenship documentation 
to obtain Act 23 photo ID,23 such as a passport, a 
certificate 
of 
United 
States 
citizenship, 
a 
certificate of naturalization, etc., each of which 
have 
associated 
costs 
imposed 
by 
the 
federal 
government.  The fee for applying is $165 for a 
passport for first-time adult applicants,24 and $600 
for a certificate of naturalization.25 
¶101 Exactly which costs and severe burdens the NAACP 
majority opinion invalidates is anyone's guess.   
¶102 The NAACP majority opinion avers that it cures the 
unconstitutional imposition of these costs and fees through its 
"saving construction" of Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 102.15(3)(b)-
(c).26 
                                                 
23 Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 102.15(3m) (Feb. 2013). 
24 See United States Passports & International Travel, 
United 
States 
Department 
of 
State, 
Passport 
Fees, 
http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/passports/info
rmation/costs.html (last visited July 14, 2014). 
25 See 
Instructions 
for 
Form 
N-600, 
Application 
for 
Certificate of Citizenship, OMB No. 1615-0057 at 7 (2014), 
available 
at 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/n-
600instr.pdf (last visited July 14, 2014). 
26 Wisconsin 
Admin. 
Code 
§ Trans 102.15(3)(b)-(c) 
(Feb. 
2013) states as follows: 
(b) If a person is unable to provide documentation 
under par. (a), and the documents are unavailable to 
the person, the person may make a written petition to 
the administrator of the division of motor vehicles 
for an exception to the requirements of par. (a). The 
application shall include supporting documentation 
required by sub. (4) and: 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
13 
 
 
¶103 The NAACP majority opinion reads this Department of 
Transportation regulation to provide that if a qualified voter 
asserts that he or she is obtaining a photo ID for the purposes 
of 
voting, 
the 
administrator 
shall 
exercise 
his 
or 
her 
discretion 
in 
deciding 
whether 
to 
issue 
a 
DOT 
photo 
identification card without the documents referenced in § Trans 
102.15(3)(a) "in a constitutionally sufficient manner."  NAACP 
majority op., ¶71.  The NAACP majority opinion leaves the 
administrator and the public to guess what a "constitutionally 
sufficient manner" is. 
 
¶104 The NAACP majority opinion regarding Department of 
Transportation regulations is not, however, a cure for the 
constitutional defect. 
 
¶105 First, the NAACP majority opinion provides no process 
for 
an 
individual 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
he 
or 
she 
is 
"constitutionally 
'unable'" 
to 
obtain 
the 
necessary 
documentation 
required 
by 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
                                                                                                                                                             
1. A certification of the person's name, date of birth 
and 
current 
residence 
street 
address 
on 
the 
department's form; 
2. An explanation of the circumstances by which the 
person is unable to provide any of the documents 
described in par. (a); and 
3. Whatever documentation is available which states 
the person's name and date of birth. 
(c) 
The 
administrator 
may 
delegate 
to 
the 
administrator's subordinates the authority to accept 
or reject such extraordinary proof of name and date of 
birth. 
 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
14 
 
§ Trans 102.15(3)(a).27  What procedures must be followed by the 
Department of Transportation administrator and his or her 
designees when reviewing a petition or request?  What is the 
timeline for petitioning the Department of Transportation or the 
Department of Motor Vehicles and the timeline for the agencies 
to process the petition or request?  What proof may the 
administrator require?  Can a Department of Transportation 
administrator and his or her designees apply his or her 
discretion to deny Act 23 photo ID because he or she does not 
find the petition credible?  How may the administrator's ruling 
be challenged?   
¶106 The NAACP majority opinion appears to leave discretion 
in the hands of the Department of Transportation administrator 
and his or her designees but provides no guidance to the 
Department of Transportation or to the public about proper 
procedures and the rights of qualified voters. 
 
¶107 Second, the section of administrative regulations that 
the NAACP majority opinion "construes" to cure Act 23's 
constitutional defects appears to apply only to documents 
regarding proof of name and date of birth, not to other 
documentation required to obtain an Act 23 photo ID.  A 
naturalization certificate required to prove citizenship or a 
marriage certificate required to prove identity may require 
payments to a government agency; these documents are not covered 
by the NAACP majority opinion's "saving" regulation. 
                                                 
27 NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶69. 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
15 
 
 
¶108 Third, as Justice Crooks' dissent notes, fees and 
costs other than fees paid directly to government agencies may 
be required to obtain an Act 23 photo ID.28  These costs are 
similarly unaddressed and unresolved and may be invidious 
discrimination. 
¶109 Thus, although the NAACP majority opinion appears to 
deem invalid any fees and costs paid to any government agency 
necessary for documentation to obtain an Act 23 photo ID, its 
supposed "saving construction" of the administrative regulations 
fails to cure the myriad variety of costs that Act 23 imposes on 
individuals attempting to obtain the photo ID necessary to 
exercise the right to vote. 
 
¶110 The 
NAACP 
majority 
opinion 
invalidates 
the 
unconstitutional imposition of some de facto poll taxes as part 
of Act 23, but leaves other de facto poll taxes, fees, and costs 
intact.   
¶111 Yet the majority opinion in the present case declares 
that Act 23 is facially constitutional.  Neither the majority 
opinion nor I can explain the inconsistency.   
II 
¶112 The majority opinion erroneously uses the "presumption 
of 
constitutionality" 
standard 
of 
review 
to 
support 
its 
conclusions that Act 23 is constitutional.  Majority op., ¶¶16-
17.  This standard is particularly inappropriate in the instant 
case, because:  
                                                 
28 NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶¶102-103, 117-132 (Crooks, J., 
dissenting). 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
16 
 
A. The majority opinion in NAACP has already declared a 
fee imposed by Act 23 an unconstitutional prerequisite 
for a qualified voter to exercise the right to vote;  
B. The majority opinion in NAACP apparently uses several 
different standards of review; and  
C. The presumption of constitutionality standard does not 
comport with longstanding state case law in which 
legislative regulation of voting rights has been 
challenged.  
A 
¶113 The court has already declared in NAACP that, as a 
matter of law, the fees imposed by Act 23 for a Department of 
Transportation photo identification card are in effect a de 
facto poll tax.  The NAACP court has declared that the fees are 
severe, are so burdensome that they effectively deny qualified 
persons 
their 
right 
to 
vote, 
and 
are 
constitutionally 
impermissible.   
¶114 The NAACP case is precedential in the instant case.  
When the court itself has in effect invalidated an integral part 
of Act 23 as unconstitutional, how can a presumption of 
constitutionality apply in the instant case?  How can the court 
declare Act 23 constitutional in the instant case?   
B 
¶115 How can two opinions, League of Women Voters and 
NAACP, mandated the same day, use a different standard of review 
in gauging the constitutionality of Act 23?  The same Act 23 is 
challenged in both cases as unconstitutional under Article III 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
17 
 
of the state Constitution.  A facial challenge is made in both 
cases.29  Indeed, the plaintiffs in NAACP expressly disclaim that 
that they are making an as-applied challenge.30  The majority 
opinion in NAACP concedes that the challenge is a facial 
challenge.31   
¶116 In the instant case, the majority opinion employs the 
"presumption of constitutionality" standard, mucking it up 
somewhat.  See ¶61, infra. 
¶117 In NAACP, it is unclear what standard of review, if 
any, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
employs 
to 
reach 
its 
result.  
Depending on the section, the majority opinion in NAACP asserts 
several different standards of review. 
¶118 In the section labeled "Standard of Review," the NAACP 
majority opinion asserts that "[i]f we conclude that a voter 
regulation creates a severe burden on electors' right to vote, 
we will apply strict scrutiny to the statute, and conclude that 
it is constitutional only if it is narrowly drawn to satisfy a 
compelling state interest."  NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶22.  This 
appears to be some variation on the Anderson/Burdick federal 
test for Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment facial 
challenges to statutes that impair the right to vote.  See 
NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶¶26-39.   
                                                 
29 See NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶¶19, 21; majority op., ¶14; 
Justice Crooks' concurrence, ¶¶61-63. 
30 Brief of the Plaintiffs-Respondents at 30. 
31 NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶¶19, 21. 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
18 
 
¶119 In a strict-scrutiny analysis, the State has the 
burden to show that the regulation is necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end."  State v. Baron, 2009 WI 58, ¶45, 318 
Wis. 2d 60, 769 N.W.2d 34. 
¶120 Yet in the section titled "Foundational Principles," 
the 
NAACP 
majority 
opinion 
asserts 
the 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality is the proper standard, stating that "statutes 
are presumed to be constitutional."  NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶24.  
The NAACP majority opinion further asserts that it is the 
plaintiffs challenging the statute who "must prove that the 
statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id., 
¶25.   
¶121 The majority opinion also asserts that the presumption 
of constitutionality "may vary depending on the nature of the 
constitutional claim at issue."  NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶24 (citing 
League of Women Voters).  An identical statement appears in the 
majority opinion in the instant case, citing NAACP.  Majority 
op., ¶16.   This statement is an unexplained cipher, with no 
meaning or guidance for the analysis in either case or in future 
cases. 
¶122 In its section titled "Saving construction," the NAACP 
majority opinion applies yet another standard of review, 
asserting that Act 23 is not unconstitutional, averring that "we 
do not initially weigh the burden identified . . . because a 
saving 
construction 
of 
the 
administrative 
rule 
must 
be 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
19 
 
considered first."32  Yet a court typically applies a "saving 
construction" 
by 
first 
assessing 
whether 
the 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional and only then assessing whether a saving 
construction can be applied.33 
¶123 The NAACP majority opinion usurps the legislative 
role:  "[A]lthough this Court will often strain to construe 
legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack, it 
must 
not 
and 
will 
not 
carry 
this 
to 
the 
point 
of . . . judicially rewriting it.  Otherwise there would be no 
such thing as an unconstitutional statute."  State v. Zarnke, 
224 Wis. 2d 116, 139-40, 589 N.W.2d 370 (1999) (quoting United 
States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 86 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 
¶124 Finally, 
after 
its 
various 
machinations 
on 
the 
standard of review, the NAACP majority opinion claims to apply 
rational-basis review.  NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶71. 
¶125 Only by applying multiple contradicting standards of 
review can the NAACP majority opinion reach its multiple and 
                                                 
32 NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶65.   
33 See State v. Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 116, 124-25, 139-40, 589 
N.W.2d 370 (1999) (determining whether to apply a saving 
construction after State conceded that statute would be invalid 
otherwise); State v. Hall, 207 Wis. 2d 54, 67, 557 N.W.2d 778 
(1997) (presenting three issues, and first determining that 
statute is unconstitutional, followed by saving construction 
analysis). 
The NAACP majority opinion cites a variety of cases that 
deal with the jurisprudential doctrine of interpreting statutes 
to avoid a constitutional conflict.  See NAACP, ¶64.  None of 
these cases addresses the "savings construction" doctrine.   
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
20 
 
contradictory holdings: in one breath invalidating fees required 
for documentation to obtain an Act 23 photo ID as an 
unconstitutional de facto poll tax and severe burden, and in the 
next breath asserting that Act 23 is nonetheless constitutional 
and that "the burdens of time, inconvenience and cost upon 
electors' right to vote are not severe under our interpretation 
of § Trans 102.15 . . . ."34   
¶126 The NAACP majority opinion's shifting standards of 
review throughout the opinion make it impossible to evaluate how 
or why the court reaches its decision. 
¶127 The majority opinions in NAACP and in the instant case 
fail to rely on Wisconsin cases that have over the years 
interpreted and applied the voting provisions of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.35   
¶128 The 
majority 
opinions 
ignore 
the 
uniqueness 
of 
Wisconsin's constitutional provision on voting rights and 
Wisconsin's unique jurisprudence protecting the right to vote 
under its own constitution.  The United States Constitution does 
not protect voting rights in the same way as does the Wisconsin 
Constitution,36 and the federal challenges to state voter ID 
legislation are based on the Equal Protection Clause.   
                                                 
34 NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶72. 
35 See Crawford, 553 U.S. 181; Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 
428 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
36 Compare San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 132 n.78 (1973) ("[T]he right to vote, per se, is not a 
[federal] constitutionally protected right.") with Phelps, 144 
Wis. at 14-15 ("[T]he right to vote is one . . . guaranteed by 
the declaration of rights and by section 1, art. 3 of the 
[Wisconsin] Constitution."). 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
21 
 
 
¶129 The majority opinion in the present case attempts to 
distinguish the League of Women Voters and NAACP cases to 
justify its different approaches to the standard of review.  See 
majority op., ¶11 n.8.   
¶130 The majority opinion claims that the two cases are 
different because the League of Women Voters does not assert 
that Act 23 is so burdensome that it effectively denies the 
right to vote.  Majority op., ¶11, n.8.  The majority opinion 
ventures that, in contrast, in NAACP the burdens on the right to 
vote are at issue.  Majority op., ¶44 n.11.37   
 
¶131 This distinction is not borne out in the cases.  
Burdens on the right to vote of constitutionally qualified 
voters are at issue in both cases.       
¶132 The League of Women Voters complains that Act 23 
adopts and adds qualifications for voting that are not in the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
namely 
requiring 
production 
of 
a 
specified photo ID, and thus on its face Act 23 impairs or 
destroys the voting right of persons constitutionally qualified 
to vote and creates an impermissible burden on the right to 
vote.38  Act 23 destroys or burdens the right to vote by 
excluding from voting any registered, qualified voter who fails 
to display the mandated form of photo ID. 
                                                 
37 See also Justice Crooks' concurrence, ¶61 (determining 
that the claims in the instant case are "distinct from the 
challenge raised" in NAACP because the plaintiffs in NAACP 
"provid[ed] a record with evidence of the Act's burden on 
individual Wisconsin residents"). 
38 See Brief of Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners at 38-39. 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
22 
 
¶133 In contrast, the NAACP asserts that Act 23 imposes 
burdens 
of 
time, 
inconvenience, 
and 
costs 
on 
the 
constitutionally qualified voter to obtain an Act 23 photo ID.39   
 
¶134 In both the instant case and NAACP, the challenges are 
plainly facial challenges asserting a burden on Wisconsin 
citizens 
who 
are 
qualified 
to 
vote 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.40  The precise nature of the burden complained of 
                                                 
39 The record in League of Women Voters also reflects 
financial and other costs that burden qualified electors' right 
to vote.  See, e.g., Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, R22:7-9, 
¶¶18-26; Affidavit of Michael McCabe, President of Wisconsin 
Democracy Coalition (alleging that various members of his 
organization will have their right to vote burdened by the photo 
identification requirements); Affidavit of Analiese Eicher, 
Government Relations Director, United Council of UW Students, 
(alleging that many universities and colleges do not have photo 
identification cards that comply with Act 23 and do not plan to 
produce such cards, and that this will prevent many students for 
whom student identification cards are primary identification 
from voting); Affidavit of Ingrid Thompson (alleging that 
individuals in the senior living facility that she directs will 
be unable to vote); Affidavit of Amy Mendel-Clemens in Support 
of Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of Dane County (alleging that 
replacement birth certificates are difficult or impossible to 
obtain from certain states, and that California and Pennsylvania 
have not responded or do not respond to the forms used by Dane 
County). 
40 The distinction between a facial and an as-applied 
challenge is not always clear.  Justice Crooks states the 
standard of review as follows: "The appropriate framework to 
analyze the plaintiffs' challenge to Act 23 is the modified 
facial challenge approach, which the United States Supreme Court 
has applied in comparable cases."  NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶85 
(Crooks, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
There is also confusion about the application of the 
"presumption of constitutionality" standard of review to a 
facial challenge or an as-applied challenge. 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
23 
 
in each case is different, but in both cases the plaintiffs urge 
that Act 23 imposes a burden on qualified voters impairing or 
depriving them of their Wisconsin constitutionally guaranteed 
right to vote.   
¶135 If a more stringent standard of review than the 
"presumption of constitutionality" applies in NAACP, it must, in 
my opinion, also apply in the instant case.     
¶136 Neither the majority opinion in the instant case, nor 
the concurrence in the instant case, nor the majority opinion in 
NAACP advances satisfactory reasons for applying different 
standards in the two cases.  I conclude that this court must 
apply an identical standard of review in both cases and that the 
standard of review is not the "presumption of constitutionality" 
standard.     
C 
¶137 Finally, 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
"presumption 
of 
constitutionality" standard of review does not apply because our 
case law in voting rights cases contravenes this standard.  No 
Wisconsin court has ever applied this presumption to legislative 
regulations on voting.  None of the cases cited by the majority 
opinion supporting this standard of review relates to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
The majority opinion, ¶13, distinguishes between standards 
of review for facial and as-applied cases, quoting State v. 
Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶13, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63).  Compare 
Wood, 323 Wis. 2d 321, ¶15 (applying identical presumption of 
constitutionality to both facial and as-applied challenges) with 
Tammy W.-G. v Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, ¶¶46-48, 333 Wis. 2d 273, 
797 N.W.2d 854 (citing Wood for the proposition that the 
presumption applies in as-applied challenges but that "we do not 
presume that the State applies statutes in a constitutional 
manner"). 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
24 
 
fundamental right to vote, except for NAACP, whose standard of 
review is, to be charitable, confusing.41 
¶138 Our cases addressing voting rights often do not state 
a standard of review as such (as was judicial practice at the 
time the cases were decided), and they predate the federal 
adoption of strict scrutiny as a judicial standard for reviewing 
constitutional claims under the federal Constitution.42 
¶139 Nevertheless, key principles can be drawn from our 
jurisprudence to guide our review of laws governing the right to 
vote.  The essence of the cases is that courts must apply the 
highest levels of scrutiny to laws regulating the right to 
vote.43  
                                                 
41 Majority op., ¶¶15-17.  See ¶¶115-136, supra. 
42 The first case invoking the "strict scrutiny" standard in 
evaluating Wisconsin constitutional rights that I can find is 
Town of Vanden Broek, Outagamie Cnty. v. Reitz, 53 Wis. 2d 87, 
191 N.W.2d 913 (1971).  No reported Wisconsin appellate case 
since that date other than the instant case and NAACP has raised 
a facial challenge to a state statute or regulation alleging 
that it violates Article III of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
43 The United States Supreme Court has similarly stated that 
before the right to vote "can be restricted, the purpose of the 
restriction and the assertedly overriding interests served by it 
must meet close constitutional scrutiny."  Dunn v. Blumstein, 
405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (citing Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 
422 (1970)). 
The NAACP majority opinion at ¶22 describes its test as 
applying strict scrutiny if a "severe burden" exists on the 
right to vote, while the dissent in NAACP follows the language 
of the Anderson/Burdick test requiring balance between any 
burden on the right to vote and the state interests.  NAACP, 
2014 WI 98, ¶¶100-102 (Crooks, J., dissenting).   
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
25 
 
¶140 Because of the fundamental nature of the right to 
vote, the court has recognized that the right to vote is unlike 
other rights guaranteed by the Wisconsin Constitution and is 
specially protected from legislative interference: 
Thus is given the right to vote a dignity not less 
than any other of many fundamental rights. So it has 
been rightly said by judicial writers: "It is a right 
which the law protects and enforces as jealously as it 
does property in chattels or lands. . . . The law 
maintains and vindicates" it "as vigorously as it does 
any right of any kind which men may have or enjoy." 
State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. 233, 241 [(1869)]. It is 
commonly referred to as a sacred right of the highest 
character and then again, at times, as a mere 
privilege, a something of such inferior nature that it 
may be made "the foot–ball of party politics." We 
subscribe to the former view, placing the right of 
suffrage upon the high plane of removal from the field 
of mere legislative material impairment.  
State ex rel. McGrael v. Phelps, 144 Wis. 1, 15, 128 N.W. 1041, 
1046 (1910) (emphasis added). 
 
¶141 One key principle in the case law is that the 
legislature 
cannot 
impose 
a 
restriction 
on 
voting 
that 
constitutes an additional "qualification" on the right to vote.  
Only 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
can 
impose 
additional 
qualifications on the right to vote.   
¶142 The case law has drawn a line between those laws that 
create an "additional qualification" on the right to vote, 
thereby impairing an otherwise qualified voter from casting a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Furthermore, Wisconsin applies a strict scrutiny standard 
of review for First Amendment challenges.  Courts have located 
the federal right to vote in the First Amendment right to 
freedom of speech.  See Harper, 383 U.S. at 665 ("[T]he right to 
vote in state elections is implicit, particularly by reason of 
the First Amendment . . . ."). 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
26 
 
vote, 
and 
those 
that 
merely 
verify 
a 
voter's 
existing 
constitutional qualifications without restricting his or her 
existing rights. 
¶143 This 
distinction 
between 
impermissibly 
adding 
qualifications and verifying existing qualifications appears, 
for example, in two early cases, also cited by the majority 
opinion,44 State ex rel. Knowlton v. Williams, 5 Wis. 308 (1856), 
and State ex rel. Cothren v. Lean, 9 Wis. 254 [*279] (1859).   
¶144 In Knowlton, an elector challenged a 30-day residency 
requirement 
that 
restricted 
the 
right 
to 
vote 
to 
those 
individuals who had resided in the district for 30 days prior to 
election. 
 
The 
court 
in 
Knowlton 
voided 
the 
residency 
requirement as an additional qualification on the right to vote 
beyond what the constitution required: 
We have no doubt that the qualifications of the voters 
as fixed by the act are, in respect to residence in 
the state, quite different from those prescribed in 
the constitution. The latter instrument is explicit; 
it provides in express terms that a person who 
possesses the other qualifications mentioned, and who 
has resided in the state one year next preceding any 
election, shall be deemed a qualified elector at such 
election. 
. . . . 
The constitution provides, that if a person possesses 
certain qualifications, and has resided in the state 
one year next preceding any election, he shall be 
deemed a qualified elector at such election; while the 
act of the legislature in question provides, in 
effect, that this shall not be sufficient, but that he 
shall, in addition, have resided for thirty days 
                                                 
44 Majority op., ¶¶25-32. 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
27 
 
previous to the time when the election is holden in 
the town where he offers his vote. 
We have no doubt that the legislature have the power 
to provide that a person who has a right to vote under 
the constitution shall be allowed to exercise this 
right only in the town where he resides, because this 
would be only to prescribe the place where a right 
which he possessed under the constitution shall be 
exercised, and fixes upon the most convenient place 
for its exercise.  Such a provision does not add to 
the qualifications which the constitution requires; 
but an act of the legislature which deprives a person 
of 
the 
right 
to 
vote, 
although 
he 
has 
every 
qualification which the constitution makes necessary, 
cannot be sustained.45 
 
¶145 Thus, the law fixing the location where an elector can 
vote regulated merely how, where, and when to vote, but by 
adding that the elector had to reside in the district for the 
previous 30 days, the law in question restricted the rights of 
those voters who would otherwise be qualified under the 
Wisconsin Constitution to vote. 
¶146 The prohibited law in Knowlton must be compared with 
the law upheld in Cothren.  In Cothren, an elector challenged a 
law that allowed elections officials to "challenge for cause" a 
voter's qualifications.  An election official could challenge 
the voter's qualifications for cause at the polls; if the voter 
refused to answer the election official's questions, the vote 
would not be counted.46   
¶147 The court in Cothren approved of the "challenge for 
cause" requirement as mere proof that the qualified voter indeed 
possessed 
the 
constitutional 
qualifications 
to 
vote, 
                                                 
45 Knowlton, 5 Wis. at 316 (emphasis added). 
46 Cothren v. Lean, 9 Wis. 254, 258-59 [*284] (1859). 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
28 
 
distinguishing 
Knowlton 
because 
the 
challenge-for-cause 
procedure 
in 
Cothren 
did 
not 
prescribe 
additional 
qualifications.   The Cothren court reasoned that the law tested 
whether the constitutional qualifications for electors were met, 
rather than creating new requirements.  The voter in Cothren 
"failed to furnish the proof required by law, showing his right 
to vote," that is, he failed to prove that he had met the 
existing constitutional qualifications: 
[T]he grounds of challenge to which the sets of 
questions are adapted, imply only the qualifications 
required by the constitution; nothing further or 
different. 
 
This 
act, 
therefore, 
instead 
of 
prescribing any qualifications for electors different 
from those provided for in the constitution, contains 
only new provisions to enable the inspectors to 
ascertain 
whether 
the 
person 
offering 
to 
vote 
possessed 
the 
qualifications 
required 
by 
that 
instrument, and certainly it is competent for the 
legislature 
to 
enact 
such. 
 
The 
necessity 
of 
preserving the purity of the ballot box, is too 
obvious for comment, and the danger of its invasion 
too familiar to need suggestion.  While, therefore, it 
is incompetent for the legislature to add any new 
qualifications for an elector, it is clearly within 
its province to require any person offering to vote, 
to furnish such proof as it deems requisite, that he 
is a qualified elector. 
Cothren, 9 Wis. at 258-59 (1859) (emphasis added).   
¶148 In 
sum, 
the 
Cothren 
law 
targeted 
only 
the 
qualifications required by the constitution.  The questions the 
voters were asked were those questions necessary to ascertain 
whether the voter satisfied the qualifications enumerated in the 
Wisconsin Constitution: "the grounds of challenge to which the 
sets of questions are adapted, imply only the qualifications 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
29 
 
required by the constitution; nothing further or different."  
Cothren, 9 Wis. at 258. 
¶149 The 
guiding 
distinction 
between 
an 
impermissible 
additional 
qualification 
and 
proof 
of 
qualification 
as 
elucidated by Knowlton and Cothren continued in later cases. 
¶150 In State ex rel. Wood v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71 (1875), the 
court further clarified the reasoning of Knowlton and Cothren 
regarding boundaries on regulating the right to vote.  In Baker, 
the law required a voter's name be verified against an election 
registry before the voter would be allowed to vote.  The 
registry erroneously omitted a voter.   
¶151 The Baker court upheld the registry law, but it put a 
finer point on the distinction between prohibited "additional 
legislative 
qualifications" 
and 
permissible 
legislative 
requirements of "proof of the right" by asserting that the 
requirement of proof could be only "proof consistent with the 
right 
itself," 
i.e., 
the 
proof 
could 
verify 
only 
the 
constitutional qualifications of electors.   The Baker court, 38 
Wis. at 86, declared that the legislature may require reasonable 
proof of the right to vote but cannot impose "a condition 
precedent to the right" to vote.  Being on the registry was not 
a precondition to vote because the law "left other proof open to 
the voter at the election consistent with his present right to 
vote."  The Baker court explained: 
And such we understand to be the theory of the 
registry law . . . not to abridge or impair the right, 
but to require reasonable proof of the right.  It was 
undoubtedly competent for the legislature to provide 
for a previous registry of voters, as one mode of 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
30 
 
proof of the right; so that it should not be a 
condition precedent to the right itself at the 
election, but, failing the proof of registry, left 
other proof open to the voter at the election, 
consistent with his present right (emphasis added). 
¶152 A second key principle emerges from the case law:  "No 
constitutional qualification of an elector can in the least be 
abridged, added to, or altered, by legislation or the preten[s]e 
of legislation.  Any such action would be necessarily absolutely 
void and of no effect."47  If a law requires of a voter what is 
impracticable or impossible, and makes the voter's right to vote 
depend upon a condition he or she is unable to perform, the law 
impermissibly abridges the constitutional right to vote and is 
void:   
No registry law can be sustained which prescribes 
qualifications of an elector additional to those named 
in the constitution, and a registry law can be 
sustained only, if at all, as providing a reasonable 
mode 
or 
method 
by 
which 
the 
constitutional 
qualifications of an elector may be ascertained and 
determined, or as regulating reasonably the exercise 
of the constitutional right to vote at an election. If 
the mode or method, or regulations, prescribed by law 
for such purpose, and to such end, deprive a fully 
qualified elector of his right to vote at an election, 
without his fault and against his will, and require of 
him what is impracticable or impossible, and make his 
right to vote depend upon a condition which he is 
unable to perform, they are as destructive of his 
constitutional right, and make the law itself as void, 
as if it directly and arbitrarily disfranchised him 
without any pretended cause or reason, or required of 
an elector qualifications additional to those named in 
the constitution. 
Dells v. Kennedy, 49 Wis. 555, 558, 6 N.W. 246 (1880) (second 
emphasis added).    
                                                 
47 Dells, 49 Wis. at 557. 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
31 
 
¶153 As the Baker court emphasized, "[E]very one having the 
constitutional qualifications then, may go to the polls, vested 
with the franchise, of which no statutory condition precedent 
can deprive him."48  If voters "went to the election clothed with 
a constitutional right of which no statute could strip them, 
without some voluntarily failure on their own part to furnish 
statutory proof of right," regulations that modified the 
qualifications to deprive these qualified voters of the right to 
vote in those circumstances would "be monstrous."49 
¶154 A third key principle in the case law distinguishes 
between cases involving laws that impair or destroy the right to 
vote, which require the most stringent judicial review, and laws 
that enhance or expand the right to vote, which receive 
deference to the legislature as long as the regulation is 
reasonable.   
¶155 If a legislative regulation enhances, protects, or 
expands the right to vote, the inquiry into the regulation need 
address only whether the regulation was "reasonable," and our 
review gives deference to "legislative discretion."50  If, 
however, a legislative regulation restricts or impairs the right 
to vote, then the regulation is void on its face, regardless of 
state interest. 
                                                 
48 Baker, 38 Wis. at 86. 
49 Id. at 89. 
50 See Phelps, 144 Wis. at 18; see also State ex rel. Wood 
v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71, 86 (1875) (holding that requiring some 
proof of identity prior to voting existed "not to abridge or 
impair the right, but to require reasonable proof of the right" 
and therefore holding proof of identity as constitutional). 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
32 
 
 
¶156 This principle was stated in Dells v. Kennedy, 49 Wis. 
555, 6 N.W. 246 (1880).  The Dells court noted that the 
legislature could enact reasonable and necessary regulations to 
protect 
the 
right 
to 
vote, 
but 
that 
the 
legislature's 
regulations were afforded no deference if they impaired the 
right to vote: 
For 
the 
orderly 
exercise 
of 
the 
right 
[to 
vote] . . . it is admitted that the legislature must 
prescribe necessary regulations as to the places, mode 
and manner, and whatever else may be required to 
insure its full and free exercise.  But this duty and 
right inherently imply that such regulations are to be 
subordinate to the enjoyment of the right, the 
exercise of which is regulated.  The right must not be 
impaired by the regulation.  It must be regulation 
purely, not destruction.  If this were not an 
immutable principle, elements essential to the right 
itself might be invaded, frittered away, or entirely 
exscinded, under the name or preten[s]e of regulation, 
and thus would the natural order of things be 
subverted by making the principle subordinate to the 
accessory.  To state is to prove this position.  As a 
corollary of this, no constitutional qualification of 
an elector can in the least be abridged, added to, or 
altered, 
by 
legislation 
or 
the 
preten[s]e 
of 
legislation.  Any such action would be necessarily 
absolutely void and of no effect.   
Dells, 49 Wis. at 557. 
¶157 This principle was further elucidated in State ex rel. 
McGrael v. Phelps, 144 Wis. 1, 128 N.W. 1041 (1910).  The Phelps 
court recognized that the legislature is afforded a certain 
amount of deference by the judiciary when the legislature uses 
the police power to enact reasonable regulations upon voting.  
If, however, the regulation impairs the exercise of the right to 
vote rather than improves it, the regulation is no longer 
subject to deference and is instead unconstitutional: 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
33 
 
Regulation which impairs or destroys rather than 
preserves and promotes, is within condemnation of 
constitutional guarantees.  So it follows that, if the 
law in question trespasses upon the forbidden field, 
it is only law in form. 
State v. Phelps, 144 Wis. 1, 18 (1910). 
 
¶158 A final principle from our case law recognizes that 
because, as a practical matter, government must regulate 
elections so that they are orderly, fair, and honest, and that 
such regulations will invariably impose some burdens upon 
individual voters, the legislature has the power to say how, 
when, and where a qualified elector may vote, but may not 
regulate who may vote.  The who is governed by the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
¶159 In State ex rel. Frederick v. Zimmerman, 254 Wis. 600, 
37 N.W.2d 472 (1949), the court explained the legislature's 
power as follows: 
It is true that the right of a qualified elector to 
cast his ballot for the person of his choice cannot be 
destroyed or substantially impaired. However, the 
legislature has the constitutional power to say how, 
when and where his ballot shall be cast for a justice 
of the supreme court. 
Frederick, 254 Wis. at 613-14 (emphasis added).   
¶160 The legislature cannot, however, under the guise of 
regulating how, when, and where a ballot may be cast, destroy or 
substantially impair the right to vote.51  No matter how 
reasonable the law and how much deference the legislature 
receives, "[a]ll these laws were subject to the rule of law that 
                                                 
51 State ex rel. Frederick v. Zimmerman, 254 Wis. 600, 613, 
37 N.W.2d 472 (1949). 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
34 
 
an elector has the right to cast his [or her] ballot for 
whomsoever he [or she] chooses and cannot constitutionally be 
deprived of it."52 
¶161 The 
essence 
of 
the 
voting 
rights 
jurisprudence 
interpreting and applying the Wisconsin Constitution is that 
courts must apply the highest level of scrutiny to laws 
regulating the right to vote.   
III 
¶162 Applying the highest level of scrutiny and applying 
the key principles derived from our voting rights case law, I 
conclude that Act 23 is unconstitutional. 
¶163 The force of the Wisconsin Constitution is clear: 
"[E]very one having the constitutional qualifications [at the 
time of election] may go to the polls, vested with the 
franchise, of which no statutory condition precedent can deprive 
him [or her][, b]ecause the constitution makes him [or her], by 
force of his [or her] present qualifications, 'a qualified voter 
at such election.'"  Baker, 38 Wis. at 86. 
¶164 Under Act 23, a voter qualified under the Wisconsin 
Constitution——that is, a person who is over the age of 18, is a 
United States citizen, and is a resident of Wisconsin——and who 
has met the registration requirements under the Wisconsin 
statutes cannot vote even if he or she comes to the polls with 
extensive personal photo identification information.  Only an 
Act 23 photo ID suffices.  This requirement strips a qualified 
registered voter of the right to vote.   
                                                 
52 Id. at 618. 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
35 
 
¶165 The legislature does not have the power under the 
guise of an election regulation to strip a qualified, registered 
voter of the right to vote.53  Act 23 deprives a person of the 
right to vote even though that person meets the constitutional 
qualifications to vote and is therefore unconstitutional.  
¶166 I agree with the League of Women Voters and the 
circuit 
court 
that 
Act 
23 
impermissibly 
adds 
a 
fourth 
qualification for voting in addition to the three specified in 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  The fourth qualification is a 
legislatively 
specified 
photo 
ID. 
 
Act 
23 
deprives 
all 
qualified, registered voters who do not possess an Act 23 photo 
ID from exercising the right to vote.  The legislature has thus 
rendered an Act 23 photo ID in and of itself a qualification for 
voting.54        
¶167 The State may seek verification of a voter's identity, 
but the verification must be limited to "proof consistent with 
the right itself."55  Act 23 does not merely verify a voter's 
identity.  Rather, Act 23 creates a precondition to vote.  In 
order to cast a ballot, a voter must obtain a specified 
government photo ID.   
                                                 
53 Baker, 38 Wis. at 89. 
54 Act 23 does not fall into any of the five areas of law in 
which Article III, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
authorizes the legislature to enact laws.  It does not define 
residency.  It does not  provide for registration of voters.  It 
does not provide for absentee voting.  It does not exclude from 
suffrage persons convicted of a felony or adjudged incompetent.  
It does not extend the right of suffrage to additional classes.   
55 See Baker, 38 Wis. at 86. 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
36 
 
¶168 To obtain an Act 23 photo ID, the voter must verify 
his or her identity with additional documentation.56  These 
                                                 
56 Wisconsin Admin. Code § Trans 102.15(4)(a) (Feb. 2013) 
allows one of the following as satisfactory proof of identity to 
obtain a photo ID: 
(a) A supporting document identifying the person by 
name 
and 
bearing 
the 
person's 
signature, 
a 
reproduction 
of 
the 
person's 
signature, 
or 
a 
photograph 
of 
the 
person. 
Acceptable 
supporting 
documents include: 
2. A valid operator's license, including a license 
from another jurisdiction, except a province of the 
Dominion of Canada, bearing a photograph of the 
person; 
Note: 
Temporary 
driving 
receipts 
from 
other 
jurisdictions 
are 
not 
acceptable. 
"Another 
jurisdiction" is defined at s. 340.01 (41m), Stats. 
3. Military discharge papers (including certified copy 
of federal form DD-214); 
4. 
A 
U.S. 
government 
and 
military 
dependent 
identification card; 
5. A valid photo identification card issued by 
Wisconsin or another jurisdiction, except a province 
of the Dominion of Canada, bearing a photograph of the 
person; 
11. A marriage certificate or certified copy of 
judgment of divorce; 
Note: A testament to the marriage document does not 
satisfy this requirement. 
13. A social security card issued by the social 
security administration; 
Note: Metal or other duplicate Social Security Cards 
are not acceptable. 
23. Any document permitted under sub. (3)(a), if it 
bears a photograph of the person and was not used as 
proof of name and date of birth. 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
37 
 
documents sufficiently provide proof of identity to receive an 
Act 23 photo ID. 
¶169 Yet these documents, all of which verify one's 
identity for the purposes of obtaining an Act 23 photo ID, are 
not acceptable under Act 23 to prove identity for the purposes 
of voting.  By restricting verification of identity to specified 
government-issued photo IDs, Act 23 does not condition the right 
to vote on verification of identity.  Instead, Act 23 conditions 
the right to vote on production of a particular identity card.  
Requiring 
a 
specific 
identity 
card 
is 
an 
additional 
qualification on the right to vote, and it is therefore 
impermissible under the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶170 The mandatory precondition to voting of presenting an 
Act 23 photo ID is imposed on all voters who have already 
established 
their 
qualifications 
to 
vote 
through 
the 
registration process.  No connection exists between the Act 23 
voter ID requirement and a voter's constitutional qualifications 
to vote.  
¶171 Unlike constitutionally permissible verifications of 
voter identity, which enable a fully qualified voter to vote by 
providing various forms of proof of identity, Act 23 has no such 
                                                                                                                                                             
Note: This permits a person to use two separate 
documents 
under 
sub. 
(3)(a) 
to 
satisfy 
the 
requirements of subs. (3) and (4). 
24. Department of homeland security/transportation 
security 
administration 
transportation 
worker 
identification credential. 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
38 
 
fail-safe provision.57  The only way a voter can exercise the 
right to vote under Act 23 is to display the requisite ID.   
¶172 If the qualified voter cannot obtain, loses, or 
forgets to bring an Act 23 voter ID, Act 23 strips a qualified 
voter of the right to vote, even though the ID required by Act 
23 is mentioned nowhere in the Constitution.  "[A]n act of the 
legislature which deprives a person of the right to vote, 
although he has every qualification which the constitution makes 
necessary, cannot be sustained."58       
¶173 Act 23 in effect amends the Wisconsin Constitution to 
add a fourth voter qualification, an Act 23 photo ID card, 
without complying with the constitutional provisions governing 
amendment of the Wisconsin Constitution.59  This the legislature 
cannot do.   
                                                 
57 In State ex rel. Wood v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71, 86-87 (1875), 
the legislation provided for a fail-safe mechanism.  A qualified 
voter who failed to appear on the election registry could 
nonetheless furnish proof of his right to vote.  "[P]roof of the 
right [to vote] . . . should not be a condition precedent to the 
right itself at the election, but failing the proof of registry 
[the legislature] left other proof open to the voter at the 
election, consistent with his present right."    
In contrast with Act 23, in Michigan, a voter who does not 
have adequate photo identification is not required to incur the 
costs of obtaining photo identification as a condition of 
voting.  The Michigan voter may simply sign an affidavit in the 
presence of an election inspector and does not incur any costs 
in the execution of an affidavit.  In re Request for Advisory 
Opinion 
Regarding 
Constitutionality 
of 
2005 
AP 
71, 
740 
N.W.2d 444 (Mich. 2007). 
58 Knowlton, 5 Wis. at 316. 
59 Wis. Const. art. XII, §§ 1-2. 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
39 
 
¶174 Furthermore, 
Act 
23 
violates 
key 
principles 
established in Wisconsin case law for review of a law regulating 
voting. 
¶175 Act 23 does not preserve, promote or enhance a 
qualified voter's right to vote; it impairs or destroys a 
qualified voter's constitutional right to vote by requiring a 
specific form of voter photo identification.60  It imposes 
significant 
burdens 
of 
direct 
and 
indirect 
costs 
on 
a 
constitutionally qualified voter to acquire the photo ID, as 
Justice Crooks explains in his dissent in NAACP, thus severely 
and significantly impairing the right of a qualified voter to 
cast a ballot.61  "The right must not be impaired by the 
regulation.  It must be regulation purely, not destruction."62     
¶176 Act 23 abridges, adds to, or alters the constitutional 
qualifications of electors.  As a result of Act 23, qualified 
voters are barred from voting through no fault of their own.63  
It is clear on the face of Act 23 that some voters will be asked 
to 
perform 
"impracticable 
or 
impossible 
conditions."64  
"[L]egislation on the subject of elections is within the 
constitutional power of the Legislature so long as it merely 
                                                 
60 See Phelps, 144 Wis. at 18. 
61 NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶¶117-132 (Crooks, J., dissenting). 
62 See Dells, 49 Wis. at 557. 
63 "It would be a fraud on the constitution to hold 
[qualified electors] disenfranchised without notice or fault."  
Baker, 38 Wis. at 89. 
64 See Dells, 49 Wis. at 557. 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
40 
 
regulates the exercise of the elective franchise, and does not 
deny the franchise itself either directly or by rendering its 
exercise so difficult and inconvenient as to amount to a 
denial."65    
¶177 Act 23 does not regulate how, when, and where a voter 
casts his or vote.66  By creating the strict requirement that 
voters without an Act 23 photo ID "shall not be permitted to 
vote," the legislature has restricted the franchise to a limited 
group of individuals——those individuals who can present an Act 
23 photo ID.  Thus Act 23 regulates who is qualified to vote, 
adding a fourth qualification for voters to meet.   
¶178 For 
these 
reasons, 
I 
conclude 
that 
Act 
23 
is 
unconstitutional on its face. 
* * * * 
¶179 Our State has long recognized that the right to vote 
is the highest of rights and has enshrined the right in our own 
constitution.  It is the right upon which all other rights 
depend in a democratic society, and our court has consistently 
defended and protected that right above all others. 
¶180 As a result of Act 23, a qualified registered voter, 
with all the proof of his or her qualifications and identity, 
can no longer be assured of the right to vote.  Act 23 adds a 
new qualification for voters, repugnant to our constitution and 
                                                 
65 State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, 142 Wis. 320, 341, 
125 N.W. 961 (1910) (allowing legislative enactment of primary 
election ballot procedures).   
66 See Frederick, 254 Wis. at 613. 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
41 
 
"monstrous" to those qualified voters denied the right to vote 
through no fault of their own.67 
¶181 For many, including our friends, neighbors, and 
relatives, Act 23 imposes a precondition to voting that deprives 
qualified voters of the right to vote.  Such a precondition is 
unconstitutional.  "[E]very one having the constitutional 
qualifications then, may go to the polls, vested with the 
franchise, of which no statutory condition precedent can deprive 
him."68 
¶182 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
 
¶183 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 See Baker, 38 Wis. at 89:  "It would be a fraud on the 
constitution to hold [a voter whose name was not in the 
registry] disfranchised without notice or fault. . . . And it 
would be monstrous in us to give such an effect to the registry 
law, against its own spirit and in violation of the letter and 
spirit of the constitution." 
68 Baker, 38 Wis. at 86 
No.  2012AP584.ssa 
 
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