Case Title: Renaud v. Renaud

Citation: 168 Vt. 306, 721 A.2d 463

Docket Number: 97-366

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1998-09-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Renaud v. Renaud  (97-366); 168 Vt. 306; 721 A.2d 463

[Filed 11-Sep-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 97-366

Daniel M. Renaud                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Franklin Family Court

Gail E. Renaud                                    March Term, 1998

Linda Levitt, J.

       Jan E. Bernasconi of Paul, Frank & Collins, Inc., Burlington, for
  Plaintiff-Appellant.

       Sandra M. Lee of Keiner & Dumont, P.C., Middlebury, for
  Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       JOHNSON, J.   Daniel Renaud (father) appeals from a divorce judgment
  of the Franklin Family Court.  He contends the court: (1) abused its
  discretion in awarding Gail Renaud (mother) sole legal and physical
  parental rights and responsibilities notwithstanding the court's finding
  that mother had interfered with the relationship between the child and
  father; and (2) erroneously divided the marital estate.  We affirm.

       The parties were married in October 1989.  They had one child, a son,
  born in January 1994. In May 1996, the parties separated following father's
  disclosure that he was having an affair with a co-worker and wanted a
  divorce.  At the time of trial in April and May of 1997, mother was living
  with the three-year-old child in the marital home, and father was living
  with the co-worker and her children.

       Both parties worked full time in supervisory positions for the federal
  government.  Before the separation, both shared in attending to the minor's
  childcare needs.  Mother arranged her work schedule to have Fridays off to
  spend with the child.  Father took the child to daycare in 

 

  the morning, visited him there during the day, and brought him home at
  night.  Mother generally took time off from work when the child was sick,
  purchased his clothes, and did his laundry.  The court found that both
  parents provided the child with love, discipline, structure, and guidance,
  and that either would be fit to serve as the custodial parent.
  
       Following the separation, father voluntarily moved out, and mother and
  child continued to reside in the family home.  Almost immediately, mother
  began to impede father's contact with the child, forcing father to file a
  number of motions to establish an emergency visitation schedule. Following
  a hearing in July 1996, the court established a temporary visitation
  schedule.  Thereafter, mother filed a succession of relief-from-abuse
  petitions, alleging that father had physically and sexually abused the
  minor.  The allegations ranged from evidence of diaper rash, to sunburn,
  cuts and bruises, and inappropriate touching.  These petitions further
  disrupted father's contact with the child, resulting in periods of
  non-contact and supervised visitation.

       None of the abuse allegations was substantiated, and all of the
  petitions were ultimately dismissed.  Indeed, the court found that father
  had never abused the minor, that the factual support for the "excessive
  number of motions and petitions" was "weak at best," and that mother had,
  in fact, "imagined abuse where there was no abuse."  The court further
  found that mother's actions were the result of a heightened distrust of
  father because of his marital unfaithfulness, and that her "baseless
  suspicions ha[d] adversely affected [the minor] in that he is no longer as
  loving towards [father] as he once was."  A team of psychiatric experts
  appointed by the court observed that the child interacted well with each
  parent, but noted that mother's repeated accusations had damaged the
  child's relationship with father, and warned that if such accusations
  continued they could seriously compromise the father-child relationship.

       The court awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities to mother,
  albeit "with some hesitation."  The court found that the child had an
  extremely close emotional relationship with mother and that "upsetting that
  relationship [was] likely to be detrimental to [the child]."  The court
  further observed that mother had sought counseling to overcome her
  emotional problems 

 

  resulting from the divorce, and concluded that she would be able "in a
  reasonable period of time .  .  . [to] help repair the damage she caused to
  the relationship between [father] and [the child]," and could "actively
  encourage frequent and open contact" between them.  To further ensure that
  this occurred, the court specifically ordered mother to encourage the child
  to develop a warm and loving relationship with father, forbade either
  parent from making disparaging remarks about the other in the minor's
  presence, and ordered extensive visitation with father totalling about
  fifty percent of the minor's time.  This appeal followed.
  
                                     I.

       In light of the court's express findings that mother had undermined
  the child's relationship with father by filing excessive and baseless abuse
  allegations, father contends that the court's decision to award mother sole
  parental rights and responsibilities was a patent abuse of discretion. Like
  the trial court here, we are reluctant to condone any conduct by a parent
  that tends to diminish the child's relationship with the other parent. 
  Indeed, in awarding parental rights and responsibilities, the court is
  statutorily required to consider "the ability and disposition of each
  parent to foster a positive relationship and frequent and continuing
  contact with the other parent, including physical contact, except where
  contact will result in harm to the child or to a parent."  15 V.S.A. §
  665(b)(5). Across the country, the great weight of authority holds that
  conduct by one parent that tends to alienate the child's affections from
  the other is so inimical to the child's welfare as to be grounds for a
  denial of custody to, or a change of custody from, the parent guilty of
  such conduct.  See generally Annotation, Alienation of Child's Affections
  as Affecting Custody Award, 32 A.L.R.2d 1005 (1953) (collecting cases).

       The paramount consideration in any custody decision, however, is the
  best interests of the child.  See Bissonette v. Gambrel, 152 Vt. 67, 70,
  564 A.2d 600, 602 (1989); Lafko v. Lafko, 127 Vt. 609, 618,