Case Title: In re Contested Election of November 2, 1993

Citation: 1995-Ohio-16

Docket Number: 19941662

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1995-07-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Thomas J. Moyer.                                                                 
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In re Contested Election of November 2, 1993 Concerning Issue                    
No. 9, Referendum of Ordinance No. 137-92, City of Avon.                         
Cite as In re Contested Election of November 2, 1993                             
(1995),       Ohio St.3d         .]                                              
Elections -- Contest of election -- Court lacks jurisdiction to                  
     proceed when R.C. 3515.10 not complied with.                                
     (No. 94-1662 -- Submitted May 9, 1995 -- Decided July 5,                    
1995.)                                                                           
     Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Lorain County,                     
No. 93 CV 111527.                                                                
     On January 25, 1993, appellee, Avon City Council, the                       
legislative authority for appellee, city of Avon, passed                         
Ordinance No. 137-92, which reduced the resident income-tax                      
credit for income taxes paid to another municipality from one                    
hundred percent to fifty percent, effective April 1, 1993.                       
Following the receipt of a referendum petition which proposed                    
repealing Ordinance No. 137-92, council passed Ordinance No.                     
58-93 on June 14, 1993, submitting the referendum issue to the                   
Lorain County Board of Elections for placement on the November                   
2, 1993 ballot.  The referendum issue, known as Issue 9 on the                   
ballot, was posted in five locations throughout Avon and was                     
publicized in local newspapers.                                                  
     Issue 9, taken from Ordinance No. 58-93, provided:                          
     "Shall Ordinance No. 137-92, which amends Ordinance 53-82,                  
as codified in Section 880.9(A) of the Avon Codified                             
Ordinances, which provides for an amendment of the municipal                     
income tax credit of a resident of the City having income                        
taxable in another municipality from 100% to 50% of  the amount                  
obtained by multiplying the lower of the tax rate of such other                  
municipality or of the City by the taxable income  earned or                     
attributable to the municipality or of the City by the taxable                   
income earned or attributable to the municipality of employment                  
or business activity be repealed?"                                               
     On November 17, 1993, the board of elections certified                      
that Issue 9 had failed by a margin of 1,449 to 1,288.  From                     
the date the ordinance enabling Issue 9 to be placed on the                      
November 2, 1993 ballot was passed until after the election,                     
appellees received no comment or complaint regarding the ballot                  
language.                                                                        
     On December 2, 1993, appellants, several electors who had                   
voted on Issue 9 at the November 2, 1993 election, filed a                       
complaint in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas contesting                  
the Issue 9 election result.  Appellants claimed that (1) the                    
ballot language of Issue 9 had misled and confused electors,                     
(2) the full text of Issue 9 was not posted at each polling                      
place, (3) absentee ballots were not properly counted, (4)                       
ballots were wrongfully excluded from being counted, and (5)                     
other unspecified irregularities in the conduct of the election                  
occurred.  Appellants further claimed that the defective ballot                  
language, improper posting, and other election irregularities                    
resulted in the rejection of Issue 9.  Appellants requested                      
that the election as to Issue 9 be set aside and that Issue 9                    
be declared to have passed.                                                      
     On December 15, 1993, appellees filed an answer, which                      
raised the affirmative defenses of laches and estoppel.  On the                  
same date, appellees filed a motion to dismiss, or                               
alternatively, a motion for summary judgment based on their                      
contention that appellants were estopped from bringing an                        
election contest.  On January 20, 1994, appellants filed a                       
motion for summary judgment on their claim that the ballot                       
language of Issue 9 was defective.                                               
     A hearing on the motions was continued from February 17,                    
1994 to March 11, 1994, on agreement of the parties.  On March                   
8 and 9, 1994, appellants filed motions for summary judgment on                  
the defective posting and ballot language issues, and further                    
moved to continue the scheduled hearing to allow appellees time                  
to respond to their new motions.  The court rescheduled the                      
case for hearing on all the motions for sometime after May 3,                    
1994.                                                                            
     On March 31, 1994, appellees filed a motion to dismiss the                  
matter on the basis that the procedure specified in R.C.                         
3515.10 had not been followed.  On May 6, 1994, appellants                       
requested that the court set a final hearing date once all                       
outstanding motions had been ruled upon.  On July 14, 1994, the                  
court determined that there was no genuine issue of material                     
fact and granted appellees' December 15, 1993 motion to                          
dismiss, or alternatively, motion for summary judgment, thereby                  
dismissing the case with prejudice.                                              
     Appellants filed a notice of appeal from the common pleas                   
court to this court pursuant to R.C. 3515.15, which provides:                    
     "The person against whom judgment is rendered in a contest                  
of election may appeal on questions of law, within twenty days,                  
to the supreme court ***.  *** The laws and rules of the court                   
governing appeals apply in the appeal of contested election                      
cases.  ***"                                                                     
     This court previously held that R.C. 3515.15 does not                       
authorize election contest appeals as a matter of right to this                  
court.  Moradelli v. Carney (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 67, 10 O.O.3d                  
142, 381 N.E.2d 1128; Foraker v. Perry Twp. Rural School Dist.                   
Bd. of Edn. (1935), 130 Ohio St. 243, 4 O.O. 264, 199 N.E.2d                     
1128.  These cases were premised on G.C. 12251 and, later, R.C.                  
2505.29, which provided appeals to this court by leave.  R.C.                    
2505.29 was repealed in 1987.  In Portis v. Summit Cty. Bd. of                   
Elections (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 590, 621 N.E.2d 1202, the court                  
treated an appeal of an election contest from a common pleas                     
court as an appeal as of right.  The Supreme Court Rules of                      
Practice do not expressly address this type of appeal.  On                       
November 23, 1994, this court ordered the transmission of the                    
common pleas court record and the filing of briefs, effectively                  
treating the instant appeal as one of right.                                     
                                                                                 
     Phillips & Co., L.P.A., and Gerald W. Phillips, for                         
appellants.                                                                      
     Russell T. McLaughlin, for appellees.                                       
                                                                                 
Per Curiam.  As a preliminary matter, appellants have moved to                   
strike appellees' brief because it contains matters in its                       
appendix which are not part of the record.  Appellees concede                    
that their brief contains documents which are not in the                         
record.  It is axiomatic that a reviewing court cannot add                       
matter to the record before it, which was not part of the trial                  
court's proceedings.  State v. Ishmail (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d                     
402, 8 O.O.3d 405, 377 N.E.2d 500, paragraph one of the                          
syllabus; State v. Davis (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 44, 46, 584                       
N.E.2d 1192, 1195, fn. 2.  Therefore, appellants' motion is                      
granted in part, and those portions of the appendix in                           
appellees' brief which constitute new matter are stricken and                    
are not  considered in the resolution of this appeal.                            
     In considering the merits of this appeal, in Ohio a                         
contestor of an election must establish by clear and convincing                  
evidence (1) that one or more election irregularities occurred,                  
and (2) that the irregularity or irregularities affected enough                  
votes to change or make uncertain the result of the election.                    
McMillan v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Elections (1993), 68 Ohio                      
St.3d 31, 34, 623 N.E.2d 43, 46.  The common pleas court's                       
dismissal was premised on appellees' December 15, 1993 motion                    
to dismiss, or alternatively, motion for summary judgment.                       
Appellees' motion was based solely on their contention that                      
appellants were estopped from asserting an election contest                      
because they were or should have been fully aware of the                         
proposed Issue 9 ballot language when the enabling ordinance                     
was passed on June 14, 1993.                                                     
     Extreme diligence and promptness are required in                            
election-related matters.  State ex rel. White v. Franklin Cty.                  
Bd. of Elections (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 45, 49, 600 N.E.2d 656,                   
659.  Equitable estoppel precludes recovery when "one party                      
induces another to believe certain facts exist and the other                     
party changes his position in reasonable reliance on those                       
facts to his detriment."  State ex rel. Chavis v. Sycamore City                  
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 26, 34, 641                       
N.E.2d 188, 196.  Generally, actual or constructive fraud is                     
required.  State ex rel. Richard v. Bd. of Trustees of Police &                  
Firemen's Disability & Pension Fund (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 409,                   
414, 632 N.E.2d 1292, 1296.                                                      
     In cases in which we have found equitable estoppel in an                    
election contest, irregularities were plain on the face of the                   
ballot, and the contestors were aware of the alleged defects                     
prior to the election.  See In re Election of November 6, 1990                   
for the Office of Attorney General of Ohio (1991), 58 Ohio                       
St.3d 103, 113-114, 569 N.E.2d 447, 457.  Appellants in this                     
case arguably were either aware of or should have been aware of                  
the ballot language prior to the November 2, 1993 election, yet                  
they failed to raise this issue prior to learning of the                         
adverse election results.  Cf. Beck v. Cincinnati (1955), 162                    
Ohio St. 473, 476, 55 O.O. 373, 374, 124 N.E.2d 120, 122, where                  
we rejected an estoppel claim based on the failure to object to                  
ballot language because we found the defect to be so                             
substantial as to void the election results.  However, assuming                  
arguendo that the common pleas court properly determined that                    
appellants were estopped from raising a                                          
defective-ballot-language claim, estoppel would not preclude                     
their other claims, e.g., improper posting and inaccurate                        
ballot counting.  Therefore, the common pleas court erroneously                  
relied on estoppel in order to dismiss all of appellants'                        
claims.                                                                          
     Nevertheless, a reviewing court cannot reverse a proper                     
judgment merely because erroneous reasons were assigned as a                     
basis thereof.  State ex rel. Carter v. Schotten (1994), 70                      
Ohio St.3d 89, 92, 637 N.E.2d 306, 309.  R.C. 3515.10 provides:                  
     "The court with which a petition to contest an election is                  
filed shall fix a suitable time for hearing such contest, which                  
shall not be less than fifteen nor more than thirty days after                   
the filing of the petition.  *** [T]he hearing shall proceed at                  
the time fixed, unless postponed by the judge hearing the case                   
for good cause shown by either party by affidavit or unless the                  
judge adjourns to another time, not more than thirty days                        
thereafter ***."  (Emphasis added.)                                              
     The procedures prescribed for election contests are                         
specific and exclusive, and must be strictly construed.  In re                   
Election of November 6, 1990 for the Office of Attorney General                  
of Ohio (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 1, 5, 577 N.E.2d 343, 344, 346.                    
The courts have no jurisdiction to conduct an election contest                   
in the absence of statutory authority, and "where a contestor,                   
before expiration of the time within which an election contest                   
under a statute must be tried, obtains a postponement or                         
acquiesces in a postponement which carries the case beyond the                   
time limit, he thereby discontinues his contest."  Jenkins v.                    
Hughes (1952), 157 Ohio St. 186, 190, 47 O.O. 127, 129, 105                      
N.E.2d 58, 60.  Compliance with the R.C. 3515.10 hearing                         
scheduling requirement is jurisdictional, and where the trial                    
date of the election contest is not set within thirty days                       
after the filing of the petition and no request is made for the                  
scheduling of a hearing within that period, the court lacks                      
jurisdiction to proceed.  McCall v. Eastern Local School Dist.                   
Bd. of Edn. (1959), 169 Ohio St 50, 52; 8 O.O.2d 11, 12-13, 157                  
N.E.2d 351, 352-353; cf. State ex rel. Daoust v. Smith (1977),                   
52 Ohio St.2d 199, 201, 6 O.O.3d 457, 458, 371 N.E.2d 536, 537,                  
and State ex rel. Byrd v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections (1981),                   
65 Ohio St.2d 40, 43, 19 O.O.3d 230, 232, 417 N.E.2d 1375,                       
1378, citing McCall and Jenkins for the proposition that in                      
election cases, compliance with statutory limitations is a                       
jurisdictional requirement; see, also, Sekas v. Wohl (Apr. 30,                   
1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 52927, unreported ("Jenkins, supra,                     
and McCall, supra, *** reveal a contest[o]r must demonstrate                     
some effort to have a hearing commenced or completed within the                  
thirty-day period set forth in R.C. 3515.10 in order to satisfy                  
such condition precedent.").                                                     
     Here, appellants filed their election contest on December                   
2, 1993, and no hearing on the petition was scheduled or                         
requested within the thirty-day period following that date.                      
Instead, appellants filed motions for summary judgment,                          
acquiesced in continuing a consideration of the merits of the                    
petition, and did not request that the court schedule a final                    
hearing date until May 6, 1994, over six months after the                        
filing of the election-contest action and after appellees had                    
moved to dismiss the election contest based on lack of                           
jurisdiction because of the failure to comply with R.C.                          
3515.10.  Based on Jenkins and McCall, the court lacked                          
jurisdiction to act.  Consequently, the court's dismissal of                     
the entire action, while not supported by its stated basis of                    
estoppel, was proper.  The issues raised by appellants are moot                  
and need not be considered in light of the foregoing                             
disposition.   Accordingly, the judgment of the court of common                  
pleas dismissing the case is affirmed.                                           
                                 Judgment affirmed.                              
     Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Wright, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney,                        
Pfeifer and Cook, JJ., concur.