Case Title: Noetzelmann v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86-38

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Noetzelmann v. State1986 WY 148721 P.2d 579Case Number: 86-38Decided: 07/08/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Tyrone D. NOETZELMANN, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, FremontCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, and Martin J. McClain, Deputy State Public 
Defender, of the Public Defender Program for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Gerald P. Luckhaupt, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Tyrone D. 
Noetzelmann was convicted by a jury of delivery of a controlled substance under 
§ 35-7-1031(a)(ii), W.S. 1977, and sentenced to a term of two to four years in 
the Wyoming State Penitentiary.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     On June 29, 1984, two 
agents from the Wyoming division of criminal 
investigation (DCI) were conducting an undercover drug investigation in 
Riverton, Wyoming. The agents stopped by the Corner 
Pocket Billiard Lounge where an informant introduced them to appellant. At some 
point during their conversation, appellant indicated that he could obtain 
marijuana for the agents. He left the bar and returned approximately 30 minutes 
later. He and one of the agents then went outside to the agent's car where 
appellant gave the agent two plastic baggies of marijuana in exchange for $200. 
On the basis of these events, appellant was later arrested and charged with 
delivery of a controlled substance.

[¶4.]     Appellant raises the 
following five issues on appeal:

1. "Whether the trial 
court's refusal to instruct the jury upon Appellant's entrapment defense 
deprived Appellant of his constitutional right to have all questions of fact 
resolved by the jury."

2. "Whether this Court 
erred in failing to [grant] a mistrial when evidence of prior unrelated bad acts 
of Appellant [was] presented [to] the jury."

3. "Whether the trial 
court erred in permitting the State's expert to testify that the substance in 
question was marijuana when the expert was a chemist, not a [botanist], and his 
testing procedure was designed to determine the presence of 
tetrahydrocannabinol, a different controlled substance under the statute than 
that with which Appellant was charged."

4. "Whether the 
prosecutor improperly used closing argument to testify to the jury that he 
believed the State's witnesses were telling the truth."

5. "Whether the competent 
evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to sustain the conviction of 
delivery of marijuana."

I

[¶5.]     Appellant claims first 
that he was denied his constitutional right to have all questions of fact 
decided by a jury in that the trial court refused to instruct the jury on the 
defense theory of entrapment. That is, appellant complains that the reasons 
given by the trial court for refusing the entrapment instruction amounted to 
findings of fact properly left for a jury to decide.

[¶6.]     The law in Wyoming is well settled 
with respect to instructing the jury on the defendant's theory of the 
case.

"* * * [T]he defendant in 
a criminal case has the right to have his defense affirmatively presented to the 
jury. [Citation.] The right to an instruction on the defendant's theory of the 
case rests on two conditions precedent, namely, the offered instruction must be 
sufficient to inform the court of the defendant's theory and there must be competent evidence in the 
record to support the theory. * * *" (Emphasis added.) Sanchez v. State, 
Wyo., 694 P.2d 726, 727 (1985).

"If these two 
elements are present and prejudice 
results from the failure to instruct, * * * the error requires reversal." 
(Emphasis added.) Stapleman v. State, Wyo., 680 P.2d 73, 77 (1984). In determining 
whether an instruction in favor of an accused should be given, the evidence must 
be viewed in a light as favorable to him as is justifiable. Stapleman v. State, 
680 P.2d  at 75.

[¶7.]     In the present case, 
the evidence when viewed in a light favorable to appellant discloses that the 
agents went to the Corner Pocket for the express purpose of meeting and 
attempting to purchase drugs from appellant. A surveillance crew was already in 
position outside the bar. Upon being introduced to appellant by their informant, 
the agents asked appellant if he could get them some marijuana. Appellant left 
the bar and returned 30 minutes later with two baggies of 
marijuana.

[¶8.]     Even when viewed in 
this light, the evidence is not sufficient to support the theory of entrapment. 
Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct was the product of the creative 
activity of law enforcement officials. Dycus v. State, Wyo., 529 P.2d 979 
(1974). It does not arise if one is ready to commit the offense, given but the 
opportunity. Higby v. State, Wyo., 485 P.2d 380 (1971). The decisions in 
cases involving the illegal sale of drugs are practically unanimous in holding 
that the offense of entrapment is not available where the only solicitation is 
an offer to buy. Janski v. State, Wyo., 538 P.2d 271 (1975). Suspected persons 
can be tested by being offered an opportunity to transgress the law, although 
they may not be put under an extraordinary temptation or inducement. Higby v. 
State, supra.

[¶9.]     We fail to see how the 
actions of the agents in the present case placed appellant under extraordinary 
temptation or inducement. As in Janski v. State, the facts in the present case 
show only that the agents attempted to buy a controlled substance from appellant 
and that appellant managed to obtain it for them directly. The evidence is 
simply insufficient to support the defense of entrapment. There being no 
competent evidence in the record to support the theory, the trial court's 
failure to instruct the jury on entrapment does not constitute reversible 
error.

II

[¶10.]  Appellant's second contention is that the 
trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial when evidence was introduced 
that appellant had previously sold marijuana to children.

[¶11.]  On appeal, great deference is given to a 
trial court's determination concerning the admissibility of evidence. Bishop v. 
State, Wyo., 687 P.2d 242 (1984), cert. denied 
___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985). The trial court is in a far better position to evaluate the impact 
of the evidence, because it has the opportunity to observe the mannerisms and 
reactions of the witnesses, the defendant, the jurors, and counsel. We are, 
therefore, reluctant to overturn the court's evidentiary rulings unless they are 
arbitrary or irrational. Bohack Corporation v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 715 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1983). As long as there is a legitimate basis for a court's 
decision, we cannot say that there was an abuse of discretion. Bishop v. State, 
supra.

[¶12.]  At trial during the prosecutor's 
examination of one of the DCI agents, the following 
transpired:

"Q. * * * [D]id the 
[appellant] at any point make a representation to you as to what those bags 
contained?

"A. He 
did.

"Q. And what 
representation did he make to you?

"A. He indicated to me 
after he had handed the baggies to me that he normally [sells] the marijuana to 
-

"[APPELLANT'S COUNSEL]: 
Objection, Your Honor. That's nonresponsive to the question again. The question 
was, `What do the bags contain?'

"THE COURT: Well, the 
question was whether the [appellant] indicated what the bags contained to this 
witness. Please try to be responsive to this question, [witness]. Go ahead. You 
may answer. 

"A. It's difficult to be 
-

"Q. * * * Did he make a 
specific representation as to what those bags contained?

"A. Yes, he 
did.

"Q. Okay. What specific 
representation did he make?

"A. He stated to me that 
he normally sells the marijuana -

"[APPELLANT'S COUNSEL]: 
Your Honor, I'd object once again, this is a real simple question that the 
State's trying to ask. `Was there any reference to what it contained?' And the 
agent is insisting on throwing in as much as he can in his testimony. I'd 
object. He's being unresponsive to the question.

"THE COURT: The objection 
is overruled. I believe the witness is trying to be responsive. You may finish 
your answer.

"A. Thanks. Mr. 
Noetzelmann stated to me that the 
marijuana that he had given to me he normally sells to kids in the area for 
thirty dollars a quarter-ounce. However, he was selling it to me for a hundred 
dollars an entire ounce * * *." (Emphasis added.)

[¶13.]  At this point, appellant moved for a 
mistrial on the grounds that the testimony was unresponsive, irrelevant, highly 
prejudicial, and inadmissible as evidence of prior bad acts under Rule 404(b), 
W.R.E. Rule 404(b), W.R.E., provides as follows:

"Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident."

[¶14.]  Pursuant to that rule, we have held that 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is normally not admissible in the 
trial of a criminal case. Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d  at 245-246. However, as 
indicated by the rule, evidence of prior acts may be admitted by a trial court 
for a variety of purposes; the establishment of intent or a particular course of 
conduct is among those purposes. Evans v. State, Wyo., 655 P.2d 1214 (1982); Vasquez v. State, Wyo., 623 P.2d 1205 
(1981).

[¶15.]  Under provisions identical to Rule 
404(b), W.R.E., numerous courts have held that evidence of prior involvement in 
drug trafficking is admissible as proof of intent. In United States v. 
Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866 (1st Cir. 1983), for example, the defendant was 
charged with possession of drugs with intent to distribute. Over the defendant's 
objection that the government was seeking to prove criminal disposition in 
contravention of Rule 404(b), F.R.E., the court admitted evidence that the 
defendant had stated "that he had been smuggling drugs for years." 713 F.2d  at 
871. The court found that the evidence tended to show intent, which was 
particularly relevant since the defense sought to suggest that the defendant 
never intended to engage in a drug transaction. We are faced with a comparable 
situation here. Appellant relies on the theory that he was somehow induced to 
sell marijuana by agents of the DCI. Evidence of appellant's own statements that 
he had previously engaged in the sale of marijuana goes directly to refute that 
theory and shows that he intended to sell marijuana. It was, therefore, properly 
admitted under Rule 404(b), W.R.E.

[¶16.]  Appellant also contends that the 
testimony was inadmissible under Rule 403, W.R.E., which provides as 
follows:

"Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence."

[¶17.]  Relevant evidence is defined in Rule 401, 
W.R.E., as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." We have already stated that the 
evidence in question here tended to show that appellant intended to sell 
marijuana. In light of appellant's theory that he never intended to engage in a 
drug transaction, that evidence is particularly relevant. We are, therefore, not 
persuaded by appellant's claim that the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 
403, W.R.E.

[¶18.]  In any event, even if the evidence was 
wrongfully admitted, we find no cause for reversal.

"`* * * A 
nonconstitutional error, as in the case of erroneous admission of similar act 
evidence, is harmless if it is "highly probable" that the error did not 
contribute to the verdict. * * *'

* * * * * 
*

"For an error to be 
regarded as harmful, there must be a reasonable possibility that in the absence 
of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant. * * 
*" Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d  at 246-247.

[¶19.]  In the present case, in light of the 
other evidence presented by the State, we do not find a reasonable possibility 
that in absence of the claimed error the verdict might have been more favorable 
to appellant.

III

[¶20.]  In his third assignment of error, 
appellant claims that the trial court erred in permitting the State's expert to 
testify that the substance sold by appellant was marijuana. His claim is based 
on the fact that the expert was a chemist, not a botanist, and that the testing 
procedure was designed to determine the presence of tetrahydrocannabinol, not 
marijuana.

[¶21.]  As appellant recognizes, whether a 
witness qualifies as an expert rests largely with the trial court, and that 
court's determination will not be disturbed in a criminal trial except in 
extreme cases or when a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Chavez v. State, 
Wyo., 604 P.2d 1341 (1979), cert. denied 446 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 2967, 64 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1980). 
The burden of establishing an abuse of discretion lies with the party attacking 
the ruling of the trial court. Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 682 P.2d 991 (1984). A court does not 
abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of 
reason under the circumstances; the ultimate issue is whether the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did. Martinez v. State, 
Wyo., 611 P.2d 831 (1980). In the present case, the testimony demonstrated that the State's 
expert had been employed by the Wyoming state crime lab as a senior forensic 
scientist for three and one-half years. His education included a Bachelor of 
Science Degree in chemistry, extensive in-house training at the state crime lab 
and Extra Nuclear Incorporated Company, and a fellowship from NorthwesternUniversity. Among his duties as forensic 
scientist for the state crime lab is the training of in-coming chemists on 
laboratory techniques and identification and analysis of drugs and controlled 
substances. His primary responsibility is the chemical analysis of unknown 
substances and identification of controlled substances. He testified that he had 
performed thousands of tests for marijuana. In addition, he testified fully as 
to the methods used in testing for marijuana, including a microscopic 
examination and three separate chemical examinations. Finally, he testified that 
he personally performed each of the tests on the substance sold by appellant. On 
the basis of this testimony, the trial court's finding that the expert was 
qualified to testify as to the identity of the substance in question was 
reasonable.

IV

[¶22.]  In his closing argument, the prosecutor 
made the following statement:

"* * * [T]here can be no 
reasonable doubt about whether or not that plant substance is marijuana. You can 
only have a doubt if you disregard the evidence that was presented, or if you 
feel the State's witnesses lied to you. I 
don't believe that they did. * * *" (Emphasis added.)

[¶23.]  Appellant complains that the prosecutor 
improperly used his closing argument to testify to the jury that he believed the 
State's witnesses were telling the truth. He relies in part on the principle 
that "`[i]t is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his or her 
personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or 
evidence or the guilt of the defendant.'" United 
States v. Young, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1043, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985).

[¶24.]  While we recognize the validity of that 
principle, consideration must be given to other factors as well. In order to 
determine whether a prosecutor's expression of personal belief in testimony 
given at trial is so improper as to require reversal, we must examine the 
argument in its entirety. Freeze v. State, Wyo., 662 P.2d 415 
(1983).

[¶25.]  In the present case, the prosecutor began 
his closing argument by carefully informing the jury that one of its duties was 
to weigh and consider the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. He 
emphasized that it was the jury's function to decide whom to believe. He then 
asked the jury to keep in mind that nothing said by counsel was evidence. After 
appellant's objection to the prosecutor's statement that he did not think the 
State's witnesses lied, the court ruled that the remark was improper. However, 
in light of other remarks in both opening and closing arguments, the trial court 
did not find that the remark required a mistrial. The court, instead, cautioned 
the prosecutor that if any further expressions of personal belief were made 
during closing arguments, a directed verdict would be entered in favor of 
appellant. Thereafter, the prosecutor's comments were entirely 
proper.

[¶26.]  The scope of permissible argument, as 
well as the injury caused by improper argument, is best left to the trial court. 
Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982). We will not reverse the trial 
court's determination absent a showing that it was without legitimate basis. 
Hopkinson v. State, supra. Under the circumstances presented here, we find that 
the trial court's determination to not grant appellant's motion for a mistrial 
was legitimate, and we, therefore, find no abuse of 
discretion.

V

[¶27.]  In his final claim for relief, appellant 
contends that the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to sustain the 
conviction. More specifically, appellant contends that the evidence presented by 
the State established only that the baggies contained tetrahydrocannabinols, not 
that they contained marijuana.

[¶28.]  We have already sustained the trial 
court's ruling on the qualifications of the State's expert. During his 
testimony, the expert testified that the substance he examined was "consistent 
with the same microscopic characteristics as in marijuana" and that "[t]he 
active ingredient extracted from the marijuana plant is tetrahydro-cannabinol." 
This testimony, when combined with all the other evidence presented, was 
sufficient for the jury to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.

[¶29.]  Affirmed.