Case Title: Wymer v. Dedman

Citation: 350 S.W.2d 169

Docket Number: 5-2411

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1961-09-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
350 S.W.2d 169 (1961) Joe WYMER and Kaneaster Hodges, Appellants, v. Ray DEDMAN and Myrtle Dedman, Appellees. No. 5-2411. Supreme Court of Arkansas. September 25, 1961. Rehearing Denied November 6, 1961. *170 C. M. Erwin and Marvin D. Thaxton, Newport, for appellant. Pickens, Pickens & Boyce, Newport, for appellee. HARRIS, Chief Justice. On February 18, 1958, appellee, Ray Dedman, operating an automobile belonging to his wife, Myrtle Dedman, collided with the rear of an unlighted trailer, loaded with cotton seed hulls, which was being pulled by a tractor driven by Ernest Brooks. Brooks was a farm laborer employed by Joe Wymer. The Dedmans instituted suit against Wymer, appellee Myrtle Dedman seeking judgment for damage to her automobile in the amount of $825.37, and appellee Ray Dedman, seeking damages for injuries sustained in the amount of $5,000. Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include Kaneaster Hodges as a defendant, appellees alleging that Wymer and Hodges were partners in the raising and marketing of cattle; that Brooks was an employee of the partnership, and that at the time of the collision, Brooks was performing his duties and acting on the instructions of appellants herein in that he was specifically hauling cattle feed from the Southern Cotton Oil Mill for appellants. Separate answers were filed by Wymer and Hodges, alleging, inter alia, that Ray Dedman was operating the automobile in a negligent and careless manner; that he was operating the car as an agent for his wife, Myrtle Dedman, and in pursuance of a mission for both himself and wife; that the two were engaged in a joint venture at *171 the time of the collision. As a third party complaint against Dedman, appellants individually prayed that if they "be held liable in any amount to the plaintiff Myrtle Dedman for the reason that the negligence of the plaintiff Ray Dedman is not imputable to her," then they asked "to recover over the full amount of such judgment against the plaintiff Ray Dedman" because of his negligence in excess of that of the appellants. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court submitted the case to the jury on five special interrogatories. In response to Interrogatory No. 1, the jury found that Joe Wymer and Kaneaster Hodges were engaged in a partnership cattle business. In response to Interrogatory No. 2, relating to the percentage of total negligence which was the proximate cause of the collision, the jury found that the partnership of Wymer and Hodges should be charged with 55%', and Ray Dedman, 45%. Myrtle Dedman's damage (to automobile) was fixed at $825, and Ray Dedman was awarded $662 for personal injuries. In accordance therewith, judgment was entered against appellants in favor of Mrs. Dedman in the amount of $825, and judgment entered for Ray Dedman in the amount of $364.10, the amount of his damages, reduced by the percentage of his negligence. From such judgment, Wymer and Hodges bring this appeal. For reversal, appellants rely upon four points, which we list in the order for discussion, rather than in the order listed by appellants. We cannot agree that, as a matter of law, the written agreement between Wymer and Hodges created the status only of landlord and tenant, though it terms appellant Hodges as lessor and appellant Wymer as lessee. That contention may be correct as far as the farm acreage and crops are concerned, but we are here only interested in that portion of the agreement relating to the raising of cattle. Such portion reads as follows: It is asserted that in the cattle enterprise, the two men had wholly different expenses and duties, and that no right of control was reserved to Hodges. Mr. Hodges testified that Mr. Brooks did not work for him, and that he did not send Brooks after cattle feed. He stated that he and Wymer owned the entire herd, but that there was no agreement on profits or losses. According to Hodges, at one time, three cows died, and the two men shared the loss equally. Wymer testified that he sent Brooks into town for feed for the cattle; that he had a one-half interest in same; that when it was necessary to buy additional feed for the cattle, the cost was split "50-50" at the end of a year; when the proceeds from sales exceeded the debt, such proceeds were divided "50-50". Under our statute, cited as Uniform Partnership Act, Ark.Stats. § 65-101 et seq, a partnership is defined as "an association of two [2] or more persons to carry on as coowners a business for profit." Blacks Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 1957, defines a partnership as "a voluntary contract between two or more competent persons to place their money, effects, labor, and skill, or some or all of them,[2] in lawful commerce or business, with the understanding that there shall be a proportional sharing of the profits and losses between them." There are, of course, many types of partnership agreement, containing multiple provisions, and so diverse as to make difficult any attempt at a definition that will cover all cases. However, the definitions heretofore cited are somewhat standard, and rather concisely cover the relationship as it is generally understood. In the litigation before us, there was evidence that the cattle were jointly owned by appellants; that proceeds from the sale of the cattle, and profits, if any, were shared equally; that losses were shared equally, and that costs of maintaining the herd (when it became necessary to purchase supplemental feed) were likewise equally borne. This evidence was pertinent to the issue of whether appellants had associated themselves together in the business of raising cattle for profit. The fact that their obligations, or duties, under the agreement were not identical, is of no moment. See 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 9, p. 413. Likewise, the fact that appellant Hodges did not send Brooks after the cattle feed, does not, in itself, constitute a defense, for, if the *173 parties were partners, the one is liable for the acts of the other, if committed in the course of business. In addition, irrespective of the actual relationship between the two, there is the matter of legal liability where the rights of third parties are concerned. In Turnage v. Ritchie Grocer Company, 204 Ark. 935, 165 S.W.2d 604, 605, this Court, quoting from an earlier case,[3] said: We hold there was substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that Wymer and Hodges were partners in the enterprise of raising cattle for profit. Three requested instructions, submitting the issue of whether appellees were engaged in a joint venture,[4] were refused by the court. We cannot agree with appellants that this issue should properly have been submitted to the jury. The proof reflected that the automobile, involved in the wreck, was owned by Mrs. Dedman, but at the time of the collision, was being operated by Mr. Dedman, who used the car to travel to and from work. On that occasion, Dedman was also transporting to work a man named Porter, and had been transporting the latter since August, 1955. For this service, Porter paid Mrs. Dedman the sum of $5 per week. In 4 Blashfield, Chapter 65, § 2373, pp. 493-95, we find: Further, on pages 500 and 501: Whether an instruction, placing in issue the question of whether Dedman was acting as agent for his wife, would have been proper, is not before us, for no such instruction was requested. Appellants call attention to the case of Callaway v. Cherry, 229 Ark. 297, 314 S.W.2d 506, 508, wherein we said: That case is of no aid to appellants, for Mrs. Cherry was riding in the car at the time of the collision. Accordingly, the distinction here is one of substance, rather than nomenclature. The Court told the jury: Appellants contend this was error, in that a finding that each party was guilty of 50% negligence would not have ended the lawsuit; both appellants and Ray Dedman would have still been equally responsible to Myrtle Dedman for the damage to her automobile. Appellants state that, in effect, the court told the jury that Mrs. Dedman could not recover unless the jury tipped the scale of fault in favor of her husband, and against appellants. It is pointed out that the jury did this by the bare margin of 55% to 45%. Under our holdings, we cannot consider this contention, for no objection was made by appellants to the form of the interrogatory, nor was any instruction requested covering this point. Appellants, as heretofore noted, included third party complaints against Ray Dedman, praying that if Myrtle Dedman obtained judgment against them, they recover over the amount of such judgment against the husband. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Sections 34-1001 through 34-1009, Ark.Stats. (1947) Anno., defines joint tortfeasors as: 52 American Jurisprudence, Section 112, p. 451, under the chapter heading, "Torts", states: See also Applegate v. Riggall, 229 Ark. 733, 318 S.W.2d 596. We agree that, relative to the damage done Myrtle Dedman's car, appellants and Ray Dedman were joint tortfeasors. However, Section 34-1002 provides: We are of the opinion that appellants, upon discharging the judgment obtained against them by Myrtle Dedman, will be entitled to file their motion for judgment for contribution from Ray Dedman. The situation before us is a bit unusual, in that actions wherein relief is sought against an alleged joint tortfeasor usually involve bringing in a third person who is not already a party to the proceedings. Of course, in the present instance, the "third party" defendant was one of the persons who instituted the complaint, and Hodges is in the position of being liable to both appellees, while no liability was incurred by appellee Dedman to his wife because she did not sue him. However, we think, in the spirit of the Act, that Hodges is entitled to contribution without further litigation. Uniform Laws Annotated, Vol. 9, which contains the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, and discussion thereto, gives an interesting example relative to Section 7 (§ 34-1007, Ark.Stats.), under the heading "Third party practice, amended complaints, counterclaims and cross-complaints, and motion practice."[5] Subsection (b) of subdivision 3, § 34-1007, provides that "a pleader may either * * move for judgment for contribution against any other joint judgment debtor, where in a single action a judgment has been entered against joint tortfeasors one of whom has discharged the judgment by payment or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof. relief can be obtained as provided in this subsection no independent action shall be maintained to enforce the claim for contribution."[6]. It is true that Mrs. Dedman obtained no judgment against her husband, but as pointed outshe filed no action against him. The jury found 45% negligence on the part of Dedman; thus, this amount of negligence has been definitely determined, and there is no occasion nor reason for a separate suit. Again, from Uniform Laws Annotated, Vol. 9, page 249, comment as to the meaning of this subsection is made as follows: Here, of course, Hodges actually did file a cross-action against Dedman seeking contribution. Accordingly, when appellants have discharged the judgment obtained against them by Myrtle Dedman, they may file their motion for judgment for contribution from Ray Dedman, and the court shall enter such judgment against Dedman for 45% of the amount paid by appellants to Myrtle Dedman in satisfaction of her judgment. With such modification, the judgment is affirmed. [1-a] Emphasis supplied. [1-b] Emphasis supplied. [2] Emphasis supplied. [3] Buford v. Lewis, 87 Ark. 412, 112 S.W. 963. [4] According to Prosser on Torts, 2nd Edition, paragraph 65, p. 363, in a discussion of joint enterprise, "whore the enterprise is for some commercial or business purpose, and particularly where the parties have agreed to share profits and losses, it usually is called a joint adventure." [5] "Suppose P is hurt by the concurrent negligence of A and B, and sues A for damages. Without this Subsection, P's action against A would proceed to judgment which A would pay. Then A would bring a separate action against B for contribution, in which the issues litigated would be substantially identical with those raised in P's action against A as far as evidence is concerned. Under this Subsection, A could make B a third-party defendant and proceed to prove that if he. A, is liable, to P, B is also. The upshot would be that if he were successful in his claim against B, which would be litigated at the same time as P's against A, then A, on payment of P's judgment, could move in the same action for contribution against B, all of the germane issues having been settled in P's action. This practice is already well-established in Wisconsin and in several British jurisdictions." This illustration can be better understood by substituting Myrtle Dedman for "P", Wymer and Hodges for "A", and Ray Dedman for "B". [6] Emphasis supplied.