Case Title: Hepp v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hepp v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.1999 WY 31977 P.2d 682Case Number: 98-198Decided: 03/25/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF:

KAREN HEPP, Appellant 
(Employee-Claimant),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND 
COMPENSATION DIVISION,

Appellee (Objector-Defendant).

 

                                

     Appeal from the 
District Court of Sheridan County: The Honorable John C. Brackley, 
Judge.

   

     Representing 
Appellant:

 Kathleen J. Doyle of Schwartz, Bon, 
Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

      Representing 
Appellee:

John W. Renneisen, Deputy 
Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Bernard P. 
Haggerty, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 

     Before LEHMAN, 
C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN & HILL, JJ.

 

     MACY, 
Justice.

    
[¶1]     Appellant Karen Hepp (the employee) 
appeals from the district court's order which affirmed the Office of 
Administrative Hearings' denial of her claim for worker's compensation 
benefits.

 

   [¶2]     We affirm.

 

                                
ISSUES

 

    [¶3]  The employee submits two issues for our 
review:

 

       1. Whether 
the Hearing Examiner applied an incorrect standard of law and burden of 
proof?

 

       2. Whether 
substantial evidence supports the Hearing Examiner's findings and 
conclusions?

 

                        
            FACTS

 

   [¶4]     Community Media, Inc. (the employer) 
hired the employee in early December of 1995 to work as a sales representative 
for its radio station. Peggy Anderson and Jerry Walker managed the radio 
station, and, because of the employee's good reputation in the sales industry, 
they had been trying for some time to get her to come to work for them. Although 
the employee could have been paid on a commission basis at any time, she and the 
employer decided that she would receive a salary for the first three months of 
her employment and that thereafter she would work on a commission 
basis.

 

   [¶5]     As a sales representative for the radio 
station, the employee was required to regularly visit with contacts for the 
purposes of developing new customers and maintaining and increasing the 
advertising frequency of existing clients. To meet these requirements, sales 
representatives were expected to travel on occasion to the contacts' places of business. The 
sales representatives were even given monthly $50 travel allowances for such 
purpose.

 

   [¶6]     The employee made it a practice to meet 
with her clients at their places of business to learn more about them so that 
she could develop effective advertising campaigns. This was often accomplished 
outside the usual Monday through Friday, 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. business 
hours.

 

   [¶7]     When the employee began working for the 
employer, she was assigned the Sheridan Livestock Sale Barn account. Gib Lloyd 
owned the sale barn. The employee claims that her managers instructed her to do 
what she needed to do in order to keep the account because Lloyd had threatened 
to discontinue advertising with the radio station. The employee remembers her 
managers being concerned that Lloyd would transfer his business to the station 
where the previous sales representative had gone to work and that they suggested 
she contact Lloyd as soon as possible.

 

   [¶8]     The employee contacted Lloyd, and they 
met for breakfast. They talked about his business, and the employee developed 
advertising ideas for the sale barn that pleased Lloyd. The employee testified 
that, a few days later, Lloyd invited her to come to his property to ride the 
horses that he was planning to sell at a horse sale following the regular livestock sale on 
December 19, 1995. The employee claims that Lloyd asked her to ride his horses 
in the horse sale. She remembers that she agreed to participate in the horse 
sale and that, because she was reluctant to ride an unfamiliar horse through the 
ring, Lloyd invited her to come to the sale barn on the Saturday before the sale 
to familiarize herself with the horses.

 

   [¶9]     The radio station managers testified 
that they thought the invitation extended to the employee to ride horses was a 
personal one and that they did not pressure or require the employee to go riding 
that Saturday. The employee claims that she had her own horse, which she could 
have ridden that day if she had wanted to, and that she expressed to her mother and some friends 
that she felt obligated to go riding with Lloyd so that Lloyd would continue 
advertising with the radio station.

 

   [¶10]  Lloyd testified that, even though he and 
the employee did not have anything more than a business relationship and the 
employee did not give him any reason to think the Saturday meeting was a date, 
he considered it to be a "boy/girl deal" and assumed that the employee agreed to 
ride the horses because she was interested in horses. Lloyd also testified that 
he appreciated the employee's interest in his business but claims that he did 
not intend to have her ride his horses in the upcoming sale. In fact, he stated 
that he did not plan to sell any horses at the Tuesday horse 
sale.

 

   [¶11]  The employee kept her plans to go riding 
with Lloyd and sustained a severe closed head injury while she was attempting to 
mount a horse at the sale barn. The employee is not able to recall anything 
which occurred on that Saturday due to the seriousness of her injuries, but 
Lloyd testified that, as the employee was mounting the horse, "the horse stepped forward and . 
. . she got off balance and her foot got behind the saddle and the horse spooked 
and went sideways and then she fell on the ground." He also stated that the only 
business they discussed that day was his satisfaction with the new promotional 
spots.

 

   [¶12]  The employee filed an injury report with 
the Division of Workers' Safety and Compensation, and the division denied her 
claim. The employee objected to the division's final determination and requested 
a contested case hearing. After a hearing on the matter, the hearing examiner 
denied her claim. The employee requested 
a review in the district court, and the district court affirmed the hearing 
examiner's order. The employee appeals to this Court.

 

                          
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

     [¶13]  When we review a decision in a worker's 
compensation case, we do not accord deference to the district court's decision. 
Shaffer v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 
960 P.2d 504, 506 (Wyo. 1998). Instead, 
we review the case as if it had come directly to this Court from the agency. Id. 
Judicial review of an agency's action is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c) (Michie 1997). W. R. A. P. 12.09(a). 

 

                              
DISCUSSION

 

  [¶14] 
   The employee contends 
that the hearing examiner applied the wrong burden of proof to this case. She 
maintains that he denied her claim for benefits because "the Claimant has not 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that there was any requirement for her 
to go horseback riding." She argues that she should have been required to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that her injury arose out of and in the course of her 
employment.

 

   [¶15]  To qualify for benefits, the employee 
must have sustained an injury pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) 
(Michie Supp. 1998), which provides:

 

            (xi) "Injury" means any 
harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and 
includes damage to or loss of any 
artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the course 
of employment while at work in or 
about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer 
and incurred while at work in 
places where the employer's business requires an employee's 
presence  and which subjects the employee to extra 
hazardous duties incident to the business.

 

An "injury" does not include 
injuries "sustained while engaged in recreational or social events under 
circumstances where an employee was under no duty to attend and where the injury 
did not result from the performance of tasks related to the employee's normal 
job duties or as specifically instructed to be performed by the employer." 
Section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(H).

 

   [¶16]  The employee carries the burden of 
establishing every essential element of a claim by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Everheart v. S & L Industrial, 957 P.2d 847, 852 (Wyo. 1998). As a 
part of her burden, she must show that 
her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. Id. To prove that 
the injury arose out of and in the course of her employment, the employee must 
show that a causal connection existed between the injury and the employment. 
Id.

 

   [¶17]  Whether or not an employee's injury 
occurred in the course of her employment is a question of fact. DeWall v. State 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 960 P.2d 502, 503 
(Wyo. 1998). We review an administrative agency's findings of fact by applying 
the substantial evidence standard. Id. Our task is to examine the entire record 
to determine whether substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner's 
findings. Id. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing 
examiner when substantial evidence 
supports his decision. Id. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a 
reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's conclusions. Id. If an 
agency's action "is supported by substantial evidence, its decision should be reversed 
only for errors of law. If the agency did not apply the correct rule of law, or 
applied it incorrectly, this Court does not defer to the agency's conclusion. 
The agency's errors of law are corrected by this Court." Butts v. Wyoming State 
Board of Architects, 911 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Wyo. 1996) (citations 
omitted).

 

   [¶18]  The part of the hearing examiner's order 
which the employee takes issue with states: "[T]he Claimant has not proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence that there was any requirement for her to go 
horseback riding." The employee focuses 
on this statement to argue that the hearing examiner applied the wrong burden of 
proof. We disagree that the hearing examiner's decision can be summed up by this 
isolated sentence.

 

   [¶19]  The relevant portion of the hearing 
examiner's order states:

 

                             
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

 

            1. The Claimant has the 
burden of proving that her injury arose out of and in the course of 
her employment. Hohnholt v. Basin 
Electric Power Coop., 784 P.2d 233, 235 (Wyo. 1989).

 

            2. W.S. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi) defines injury as follows:

 

"(xi) Any harmful change in the human organism other 
than normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement 
and death, arising out of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used 
or controlled by the employer incurred while at work in places where the 
employer's business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the 
employee to extra hazardous duties incident to the business. . . 
."

 

            Thus, an injury may 
arise out of and in the course of employment if the Claimant is at work or in 
or about the premises occupied, 
used or controlled by the employer. Or, an injury may be a harmful change 
arising out of, or in the course of 
employment incurred while at work in places where a[n] employer's business 
requires an employee's presence.  It 
is undisputed that the injury in this case, a severe injury resulting from a 
horseback riding incident, took place on premises not owned or controlled by the 
employer. Thus, it must be determined whether or not the Claimant was at work at 
the time of the horseback riding accident and whether or not her employer's 
business required her presence. For such a nexus to exist between the injury and 
the employment, there must be a causal connection between the injury and course 
of employment and such a causal connection is supplied when there is a nexus 
between the injury and some condition, activity, environment or requirement of 
the employment. Parker v. Energy Development Co., 691 P.2d 981 (Wyo. 
1984).

   

            The Claimant was not 
required by her employer to engage in after hour social activities with 
her customers. Although such 
activities may be conducive to improving the employer's business and 
thus Claimant's business, there was 
no objective requirement that she do so. Whether a nexus 
exists between an injury in the 
course of employment is a question of fact. Stuckey v. State ex rel. 
Workers'   Compensation Division, 890 P.2d 1097, 
1099 (Wyo. 1995). . . . In this particular case, the Claimant has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence 
that there was any requirement for her to go horseback riding.

 

In this case, the Claimant's interaction with 
clientele at any time or place which she might happen to meet them was 
undoubtably conducive to good business relations. However, even if such social 
interaction enhances the employee's performance and benefits her employer, the 
required             nexus has 
not been established. The Claimant was not in a place her employer required her 
to be and was not engaging in an 
activity which her employer required as a condition of her employment. Thus, 
the             Claimant 
was not injured in the course of employment. Cronk v. City of Cody, 897 P.2d 476, 478 (Wyo. 
1995).

 

   [¶20]  After reading the hearing examiner's 
order in its entirety, this Court concludes that the hearing examiner applied 
the correct burden of proof. He considered whether a sufficient causal 
connection existed between the employee's injury and her employment. He simply 
determined that such a connection was not present in this case. We agree that he 
used the fact that the employee was not required, as a condition of her 
employment, to go horseback riding as a 
deciding factor, but he did not transform this fact into the applicable burden 
of proof.

 

   [¶21]  We turn now to the employee's contention 
that the hearing examiner's decision was not supported by substantial 
evidence.  We have considered cases 
with similar fact patterns, which we find helpful in this 
case.

 

   [¶22]  In Cronk v. City of Cody, 897 P.2d 476 
(Wyo. 1995), a police officer was injured while he was lifting weights in a gym 
located in the Law Enforcement Center. 897 P.2d  at 477. Cronk claimed that 
staying in good physical condition made him a better police officer and that he 
was, therefore, injured in the course of his employment even though he was off duty at the time of 
his injury.  Id. This Court affirmed 
the district court's decision that a nexus did not exist between the injury and 
Cronk's employment because the officers were not required to use the gym or 
participate in any type of physical fitness program as a condition of their 
employment. 897 P.2d  at 478.

 

   [¶23]  This Court decided DeWall, 960 P.2d 502, 
just last year. In that case, DeWall was a ski instructor who was injured while 
he was skiing between line ups. 960 P.2d 502-03. He was scheduled to instruct on 
the day of his injury, but no one needed a lesson at the morning line up so he 
went skiing with a friend. 960 P.2d  at 503. He argued that skiing between lessons made him 
better at his job and, therefore, benefited his employer because it enabled him 
to maintain his skills, stay physically fit, and become familiar with the snow 
conditions in case he needed to take a student up on the mountain for a lesson. 
Id. We held that, because the employer did not require, as a condition of 
employment, its instructors to ski unless they were giving a lesson, DeWall 
was not acting within the scope of 
his employment at the time of his injury even though skiing might have made him 
better at his job.  960 P.2d  at 
504.

 

   [¶24]  Although the employee in this case makes 
a valiant attempt at distinguishing these cases, her arguments are ultimately 
unpersuasive. We recognize that the employee was attempting to retain Lloyd's 
advertising by showing an interest in his business. She simply went outside the 
course and scope of her employment in 
order to do a good job for her employer. Although her dedication to her job and 
her desire to please her client are commendable, we agree with the hearing 
examiner that a causal connection between the injury and the employment just did 
not exist. A logical end to compensation would not occur if we were to allow compensation for activities that are not 
required by employers or are not related to an employee's normal job duties.  This would be particularly true in a 
case such as this one where the 
employee, in her own discretion, decided to "ride an unfamiliar horse in a 
snowstorm," admittedly a somewhat dangerous activity. To compensate injuries 
that occur after an employee makes an individual decision to engage in some 
activity which is neither required by the employer nor related to 
her normal job duties would put an 
unbearable strain on the workers' compensation fund. The fund would, in effect, 
become a general health and accident insurance fund, a purpose for which it was 
not intended. See State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 377 (Wyo. 1997).  For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the hearing 
examiner properly denied the employee's request for 
benefits.

 

   [¶25]  The employee asserts various subissues 
in her brief. Our discussion, however, is dispositive of those issues. We, 
therefore,  will not address them 
individually in this opinion. State v. McDermott, 962 P.2d 136, 140-41 (Wyo. 
1998).

 

   [¶26]  Affirmed.