Case Title: In the Matter of R.J.G.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 64S04-0809-JV-483

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2009-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
T. Edward Page  
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Merrillville, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ellen H. Meilaender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 64S04-0809-JV-483 
 
R.J.G.,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Respondent below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Petitioner below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Porter Circuit Court, Juvenile Division, No. 64C01-0708-JD-565  
The Honorable Mary R. Harper, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 64A04-0803-JV-130 
_________________________________ 
 
March 10, 2009 
 
Boehm, Justice. 
 
We hold that a juvenile court may order a commitment to the Department of Correction 
and, in the same order, provide for probation following release from the Department of 
Correction. 
Facts and Procedural History 
R.J.G. was fifteen years old in the spring of 2007.  On May 21, after selling marijuana to 
a friend, R.J.G. pointed a gun at his customer.  The gun accidentally discharged, shooting the 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Mar 10 2009, 9:08 am
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friend in the mouth and severely injuring him.  A search of R.J.G.‘s bedroom uncovered drug 
paraphernalia and a safe containing two guns, cash, a scale, and thirty-four grams of marijuana.   
The State filed a delinquency petition, alleging that R.J.G. committed acts that would, if 
committed by an adult, constitute class C felony criminal recklessness, class D felony pointing a 
firearm, class D felony dealing in marijuana, and class A misdemeanor marijuana possession.  
R.J.G. pleaded guilty to criminal recklessness and marijuana possession in exchange for 
dismissal of the other charges.   
The juvenile court concluded that the appropriate placement for R.J.G. was commitment 
to the Department of Correction (―DOC‖), specifically the Indiana Boys School, until the age of 
eighteen, followed by supervised probation until the age of twenty-one.  The juvenile court found 
that this disposition was ―proper and necessary for the safety of the community and in the best 
interests of the juvenile‖ because of  
the seriousness of the crime, the juvenile‘s reluctance to have mental health 
treatment prior to the incident, his lack of remorse, his ability to run a major drug 
enterprise out of his basement for at least a year, supplying drugs to his friends 
and neighbors, his lack of parental supervision, [and] his reckless behavior in 
owning and handling a hand gun which ended in the predictable outcome of 
serious injury . . . .  
The juvenile court also ordered that R.J.G. participate in individual counseling, and that after his 
release, R.J.G. and his family participate in the Community Transition Program and R.J.G. 
complete 200 hours of community service.  The juvenile court held the amount of restitution 
open until obtaining further documentation. 
R.J.G. appealed the dispositional order, arguing that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction 
to order both commitment to the DOC and probation in the same order, and also raising other 
issues that are now moot.1  The State responded that statutes provide the juvenile court with such 
                                                 
1 The trial court‘s order of commitment until age eighteen was a determinate commitment.  R.J.G. argued 
to the Court of Appeals that the juvenile court lacked authority to order a determinate commitment to the 
DOC because he did not have two unrelated prior adjudications of delinquency.  See Ind. Code § 31-37-
19-10 (2004).  The State agreed with R.J.G. on this point, and the Court of Appeals remanded for entry of 
a recommended term rather than a determinate one.  R.J.G. v. State, 888 N.E.2d 213, 217 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2008).  R.J.G. petitioned for transfer to this Court and concurrently moved for a limited remand under 
Indiana Appellate Rule 37 to reduce his commitment to a recommended disposition while his transfer 
petition was pending.  The Court of Appeals granted the limited remand and ordered the trial court to 
order an indeterminate commitment, which was done on July 15, 2008.  On July 17, 2008, the trial court 
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jurisdiction, and this flexibility permits courts to craft an appropriate disposition for each child.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court, holding that the juvenile court had jurisdiction 
to order probation following discharge from the DOC.  R.J.G. v. State, 888 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2008).  Because this holding conflicted with the holding in J.J.M. v. State, 779 N.E.2d 
602, 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), we granted transfer to resolve the conflict.  Ind. Appellate Rule 
57(H)(1). 
Standard of Review 
Whether a juvenile court may simultaneously order commitment to the Department of 
Correction and probation following release is a question of statutory interpretation that we 
review de novo.  Pinnacle Props. Dev. Group, LLC v. City of Jeffersonville, 893 N.E.2d 726, 
727 (Ind. 2008).   
Juvenile Dispositional Orders 
 
When a person under the age of eighteen commits an act that would be an offense if 
committed by an adult, the person is adjudicated a ―delinquent child.‖  Ind. Code §§ 31-37-1-1, -
2 (2004).  Upon finding that a child is delinquent, the juvenile court enters a dispositional decree 
providing for the placement of the child and other sanctions and treatment.  Dispositional decrees 
are intended to promote rehabilitation.  J.D. v. State, 853 N.E.2d 945, 947 (Ind. 2006) (―Our 
legislature has declared that it is the policy of this State and the purpose of our juvenile code to 
‗ensure that children within the juvenile justice system are treated as persons in need of care, 
protection, treatment, and rehabilitation.‘‖ (quoting I.C. § 31-10-2-1(5))). 
The legislature has given juvenile courts ―a myriad of dispositional alternatives to fit the 
unique and varying circumstances of each child‘s problems.‖  J.D., 853 N.E.2d at 947–48.  The 
menu of dispositional options is found in Indiana Code sections 31-37-19-5 and 31-37-19-6.2  
Section 5 provides that the juvenile court may, ―in addition to an order under section 6 of this 
chapter, enter at least one (1) of the following dispositional decrees.‖  The list that follows 
                                                                                                                                                             
released R.J.G. from the DOC to his father‘s custody.  R.J.G.‘s petition for transfer raising only the 
probation issue remained before this Court.   
2 Sections 5 and 6 were amended effective July 1, 2008, and January 1, 2009, respectively, pursuant to 
Public Law 146-2008.  The amendments are not relevant to the question here. 
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includes probation, outpatient treatment, surrender of driver‘s license, restitution, emancipation, 
attendance at an alcohol and drug program, community service, and, for certain acts, ―wardship‖ 
of the DOC for a fixed period.  Section 6 allows the juvenile court to ―enter any dispositional 
decree specified in section 5 of this chapter‖ and authorizes awarding ―wardship‖ to a juvenile 
detention facility, to the DOC for housing in a correctional facility for children, or to another 
person or facility. 
R.J.G. acknowledges that the plain language of Sections 5 and 6 clearly permits a 
dispositional order providing for both commitment to the DOC and subsequent probation.  
However, he contends that the options contained in Sections 5 and 6 are available only when a 
court has jurisdiction over the juvenile under Indiana Code section 31-30-2-1, which provides for 
jurisdiction over a delinquent child until: 
(1) the child becomes twenty-one (21) years of age, unless the court discharges 
the child and the child‘s parent, guardian, or custodian at an earlier time; or 
(2) the guardianship of the child is awarded to the department of correction. 
R.J.G. reasons that when the juvenile court ordered commitment to the DOC, it lost jurisdiction 
over him and could make no further dispositions until regaining jurisdiction. 
In support of this argument R.J.G. cites J.J.M. v. State, 779 N.E.2d 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2002).  In J.J.M., the juvenile court‘s dispositional decree was the same as the one here—the 
juvenile court ordered the delinquent child to the Indiana Boys School followed by probation.  
779 N.E.2d at 607.  J.J.M. held that upon ordering guardianship of the child to the Department of 
Correction, the juvenile court is divested of jurisdiction and cannot order probation.  Id.  We 
think J.J.M. was incorrect on this point.  Sections 5 and 6 allow a juvenile court to order ―at least 
one,‖ i.e., potentially multiple, dispositions.  Nothing prevents these from being accomplished in 
the same order.  And there is no jurisdictional bar to ordering more than one disposition in the 
same order.  The juvenile court has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter at the time 
it makes its dispositional decree and therefore has jurisdiction at that time to order both probation 
and commitment to the DOC.   
R.J.G. also points to Indiana Code section 31-30-2-3, which permits the juvenile court to 
reinstate jurisdiction upon the juvenile‘s release from the DOC.  R.J.G. argues that the legislature 
has provided this section as the exclusive means by which a juvenile court may order probation 
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upon release from the DOC.  However, entry of multiple dispositions in the initial order is not 
inconsistent with reinstatement of jurisdiction for additional dispositions upon release from the 
DOC.  Providing the juvenile court with the option to reinstate jurisdiction does not foreclose an 
initial order including probation.  It merely preserves flexibility in crafting a dispositional order 
and allows deferring decisions as to the need for additional dispositions.     
Conclusion 
 
We affirm the provision of the dispositional decree ordering probation following R.J.G.‘s 
release from the Department of Correction. 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, and Rucker, JJ., concur.