Case Title: MARTIN LOUIS KRUCHECK v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARTIN LOUIS KRUCHECK v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 81702 P.2d 1267Case Number: 84-172Decided: 07/09/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARTIN LOUIS KRUCHECK, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, and Denise 
Nau, Asst. Appellate Counsel (orally), Wyoming Public Defender Program, 
Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John Renneisen and Mary B. 
Guthrie (orally), Sr. Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant was convicted 
of second degree murder in the death of John P. Welsh. In this appeal, in his 
words, he presents the following issues for our 
determination:

"1. Whether the Court 
failed to instruct on the applicable law regarding heat of passion in that it 
required the victim to be the provocateur of the passion.

"2. Whether expert 
testimony regarding the effect of stress and adrenalin on muscles and muscle 
reactions was admissible to aid the jury in determining Appellant's ability to 
control his reflex-reactions."

[¶2.]     This case is before us 
a second time following a second trial to a jury. In the first trial appellant 
was convicted of second degree murder. The conviction was reversed for reasons 
not involved in this appeal, Krucheck v. State, Wyo., 671 P.2d 1222 (1983), and the case 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Upon the second trial 
appellant was again convicted of second degree murder.

[¶3.]     John P. Welsh, the 
victim, married Dianne Welsh and a child was born of their marriage. They were 
divorced. Thereafter, Dianne Welsh at divers times lived with and was intimate 
with both her ex-husband, John P. Welsh, and appellant. John P. Welsh had moved 
to and was working and residing in Evanston, Wyoming. Three weeks prior to this 
incident Dianne moved from Casper to Evanston, Wyoming to reunite and live with John Welsh. 
Dianne testified that John Welsh was planning to transfer back to Casper, Wyoming; thus, one 
week prior to this incident, she returned to Casper to locate a place for them to live. 
While in Casper 
she stayed at the apartment of her brother-in-law, though she frequently saw 
appellant. On the day before this incident Dianne visited appellant at his home 
until late in the evening, returning to her brother-in-law's apartment prior to 
John Welsh's planned arrival that night. The next day appellant telephoned the 
apartment, learned that Dianne had spent the night with John Welsh, became 
angry, and went immediately to the apartment where he shot and killed John 
Welsh. Additional details concerning this homicide appear in the majority and 
dissenting opinions in Krucheck v. State, 
supra.

VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER 
INSTRUCTION

[¶4.]     Appellant, in the 
second trial, was charged with second degree murder as defined by § 6-4-104, 
W.S. 1977, which provided:

"Whoever purposely and 
maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being, is guilty of 
murder in the second degree, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for any 
term not less than twenty (20) years, or during life."

The trial court 
instructed the jury also upon manslaughter as provided by § 6-4-107, W.S. 
1977:

"Whoever unlawfully kills 
any human being without malice, expressed or implied, either voluntarily, upon a 
sudden heat of passion, or involuntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful 
act, or by any culpable neglect or criminal carelessness, is guilty of 
manslaughter, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than twenty 
(20) years."

Manslaughter is 
a lesser offense included in the charge of second degree murder. See Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 682 P.2d 991 (1984); State v. Sorrentino, 31 Wyo. 129, 224 P. 420, 34 
A.L.R. 1477 (1924). Had the jury found that appellant acted upon a sudden heat 
of passion in killing John Welsh, his conviction would have been for the 
lesser-included offense, manslaughter, rather than for second degree 
murder.

[¶5.]     Appellant agrees that a 
lesser-included-manslaughter instruction was proper. He complains, however, that 
the instruction given the jury was an incorrect statement of law in that it 
required that his heat of passion result from provocation by the victim. He 
states that his contact with the victim had been minimal and that he, therefore, 
harbored no ill feeling or anger aroused by the victim that might provoke him to 
act in a heat of passion. He states further that Dianne Welsh was the source of 
his heat of passion but that the instruction given did not inform the jury that 
this source of the heat of passion was sufficient, and thus the instruction 
precluded the finding of his crime to be voluntary manslaughter. The instruction 
complained of, Instruction No. 14, is as follows:

"`Heat of passion' means 
such passion as naturally would be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily 
reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances as those in question 
which would cause him to act rashly, without reflection and deliberation, and 
from passion rather than from judgment. Such passion must have been aroused by 
provocation of the Defendant by the person who was killed." (Emphasis 
added.)

The same 
instruction was given in the first trial and complained of as error in the first 
appeal. Appellant contended there, as he contends here, that it should make no 
difference how the heat of passion is aroused as long as it is present. The 
majority of the court did not reach nor decide this issue in the first appeal. 
Justice Raper, however, correctly stated in his dissenting opinion 
that

"[a]ppellant's position 
is not sound. The general rule is that in order to reduce murder to 
manslaughter, the victim must have been the source of the defendant's 
provocation generating heat of passion." Krucheck v. State, supra, at 
1231-1232.

[¶6.]     Appellant contends in 
this case that, while in a heat of passion caused by anger directed toward 
Dianne Welsh, he shot and killed John Welsh and the crime should be no greater 
than manslaughter. As we have said, the source of appellant's provocation 
causing his heat of passion must have been the victim, John Welsh, to satisfy 
this element of manslaughter. Appellant's provocation was not aroused by John 
Welsh here; and, in our view, the killing of John Welsh under this scenario is 
the result either of accident or mistake, or a deliberate, intentional killing 
without heat of passion directed toward the victim John Welsh. Neither accident 
nor mistake nor deliberate, intentional killing makes out 
manslaughter.

[¶7.]     In this case, appellant 
defended claiming the shooting and killing of John Welsh was an accident. If 
successful in this defense, he might have been acquitted. He testified that the 
anger which caused him to be in a heat of passion was directed toward Dianne 
Welsh; that John Welsh was not the cause of his anger or acting in a heat of 
passion. He stated that when John Welsh opened the door, he said, "Hi, Zit 
Face," and hit him in the head with a gun he was holding. He then saw Dianne 
Welsh, their eyes locked, and while looking at Dianne Welsh, the gun in his hand 
went off accidentally killing John Welsh. Only appellant knew his state of mind. 
According to his testimony, the killing was an accident. But other witnesses 
testified that when John Welsh opened the door, appellant said, "Hi, Zit Face, 
I'm going to kill you"; that he then hit Welsh on the head with a gun and Welsh 
sunk to the floor; as Welsh was on the floor or attempting to get up, appellant 
looking directly at him, pointed the gun at him, and shot and killed him. Thus, 
the jury was left in the position of having to find either that what occurred 
was an accident or that appellant, without passion aroused by provocation on the 
part of John Welsh, deliberately leveled the gun at his body and shot and killed 
him. The jury, after hearing all of the evidence, opted for the latter version 
and returned a verdict of guilty of second degree murder; this verdict is amply 
supported by the evidence.

[¶8.]     Upon this evidence, we 
question whether appellant was entitled to a manslaughter instruction at all. In 
People v. Wax, 75 Ill. App.2d 163, 220 N.E.2d 600 (1966), the adultery of defendant's wife and deceased occurred 
approximately three weeks before the killing. During the ensuing three weeks, 
defendant and his wife argued about the incident, defendant's resentment built 
against his wife, his anger grew and ultimately he shot deceased in the back, 
killing him. The court said:

"We do not believe that 
passion engendered by the conduct of persons other than the decedent can be made 
into provocation [within the statute], and we must conclude that examination of 
the record discloses no evidence which authorizes the giving of an instruction 
as to manslaughter." Id., 220 N.E.2d  at 610.

In State v. Fowler, Iowa, 268 N.W.2d 220 
(1978), an ex-husband, returning his children to his former wife, shot and 
killed her boyfriend. The question was whether the provocation necessary to 
reduce the charge to manslaughter must be caused by the slain person. The court 
said:

"`[T]he provocation must 
have been given by the person who was killed, except in those cases in which the 
wrong person was killed by accident or mistake, or deceased was present aiding 
and abetting the person causing the provocation.'" Id., at 224 (quoting from 
40 C.J.S. Homicide § 53).

The court then 
noted that the killing was not the result of accident or mistake and that 
defendant's wife was not aiding and abetting the provocation of the defendant by 
the person who was killed.

[¶9.]     We find the same to be 
true in this case. Appellant states John Welsh did not provoke him nor cause his 
anger or heat of passion. Neither did John Welsh aid and abet Dianne Welsh in 
provoking appellant for he was opposed to Dianne seeing or having anything to do 
with him. Whether the killing was the result of accident or mistake was fairly 
presented to the jury and resolved against appellant. He cannot now, under the 
theory he presented in his defense, complain that the jury found him guilty of 
second degree murder rather than manslaughter. As we have said, the instruction 
given was a correct statement of the law for the heat of passion, anger, rage, 
or hot blood "must have been entertained toward the person slain, and not toward 
another." 40 Am.Jur.2d Homicide § 57.

[¶10.]  We have discussed the giving of 
Instruction No. 14, supra, because of its importance with respect to future 
litigation. Were it not for the importance of this question, we would have 
disposed of this issue adversely to appellant because there was no objection by 
appellant's counsel to this instruction prior to the time it was given to the 
jury. Appellant offered instructions which were refused by the court, but these 
offered instructions did not concern the law stated in the manslaughter 
instruction and, therefore, did not preserve his objection. We have repeatedly 
held that, where no objection is made to an instruction, claimed error with 
respect to the instruction will not be considered on review unless it can be 
shown to be plain error. Harries v. 
State, Wyo., 650 P.2d 273 (1982); Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo, 636 P.2d 1107 
(1981). Plain error is not claimed in this appeal nor does it 
exist.

[¶11.]  Instruction No. 14, supra, was a correct 
statement of the law in providing that to reduce murder to manslaughter 
defendant's heat of passion must result from provocation by the victim. Although 
appellant may not have been entitled upon the facts of this case to a 
manslaughter instruction, the giving of such instruction could only have been to 
his advantage for the jury might have found him guilty of a lesser charge. If it 
was error to give the instruction, it was harmless. Finally, since there was no 
objection to the instruction in any event and giving it was not plain error, it 
cannot be the basis for reversal. For the reasons stated, the giving of 
Instruction No. 14 was not error.

REFUSAL OF EXPERT 
TESTIMONY

[¶12.]  In this case appellant sought to 
introduce the testimony of Dr. Kahn, a medical doctor, and Dr. Leggett, a 
psychiatrist. When appellant sought to call Dr. Kahn as a witness, the State of 
Wyoming 
interposed an objection to his testifying. A recess was called, arguments 
presented, and appellant's counsel stated:

"It is our position, 
Judge, that the testimony of either this doctor [Dr. Kahn] or in this case Dr. 
Leggett, because we are thinking of calling Dr. Leggett, a psychiatrist, is 
admissible regarding whether or not Mr. Krucheck intended to fire the revolver 
shot, which killed John Welsh."

The State's 
objection was sustained and the doctors were not permitted to 
testify.

[¶13.]  It is not claimed that either doctor was 
present or had first-hand knowledge of the defendant's state of mind, and in 
this circumstance we have held:

"A doctor who was not a 
witness to the crime and does not have first-hand knowledge of a defendant's 
state of mind at the time of the offense, may not give his opinion as to what 
such mental state - intention - was. The state of mind of the accused is the 
proper subject for expert testimony when the defense is based on insanity but 
not when not based on such a plea." Smith 
v. State, Wyo., 564 P.2d 1194, 1200 (1977).

The candid 
admission of counsel that the proffered testimony concerned the question, 
"whether or not Mr. Krucheck intended to fire the revolver," established that 
the proposed testimony was inadmissible.

[¶14.]  Appellant has suggested that the doctor 
would also testify to the effect of stress and excitement causing adrenalin to 
flow and resulting in a reaction or reflex causing the shooting. Reaction to 
stress and excitement is something experienced by all of mankind. It is a matter 
of common knowledge within the experience of lay persons and hardly a subject 
for expert testimony. We have said, to be admissible, the subject matter must be 
so distinctively related to some science, profession, business, or occupation as 
to be beyond the ken of the average layman. Buhrle v. State, Wyo., 627 P.2d 1374 
(1981). See also, Dyas v. United 
States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C.App. 1977), and McCormick on Evidence, Expert 
Testimony § 13 (3rd ed. 1984). The testimony was not admissible nor would it 
have been helpful to the jury in its consideration of this case. Rule 702, 
W.R.E., provides:

"If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."

This testimony 
would not have assisted the jury, Buhrle 
v. State, supra, and was properly refused.

[¶15.]  At the time the court sustained an 
objection to the receipt of testimony from the medical doctor and psychiatrist, 
there was no offer of proof as to what their testimony would have been if 
received. Where expert testimony is excluded, an offer of proof sufficient to 
apprise the court of the nature and substance of the excluded evidence is 
necessary to its consideration upon appeal. We have frequently 
stated:

"`In the context of 
evidentiary rulings at trial, this court has long adhered to the doctrine that a 
sufficient offer of proof is necessary so that this court may be adequately 
apprised of the nature of the excluded testimony. Padilla v. State, Wyo., 601 P.2d 189 
(1979); Elliott v. State, Wyo., 600 P.2d 1044 (1979); Montez v. State, 
Wyo., 573 P.2d 34 (1977); Pack v. 
State, Wyo., 571 P.2d 241 (1977); State v. Goettina, supra [61 Wyo. 420, 
158 P.2d 865 (1945)]; State v. Rouse, 
[58] Wyo. 468, 134 P.2d 1116 (1943); Jenkins v. State, 22 Wyo. 34, 134 P. 260, reh. denied [22 Wyo. 34], 135 P. 749 (1913); and McGinness v. State, 4 Wyo. 115, 31 P. 978, reh. denied [4 Wyo. 115], 53 P. 492 (1893). The dual purpose of this 
requirement is to enable the trial court to be fully advised in the exercise of 
its discretion regarding the admission of evidence, and to enable the reviewing 
court to determine if prejudicial error resulted from the exclusion of the 
proffered testimony.' Garcia v. State, 
Wyo., 667 P.2d 1148, 1155 (1983)." Jahnke v. State, supra, at 
1005.

[¶16.]  We hold that the proferred testimony was 
correctly excluded in the first instance; that thereafter, irrespective of our 
holding, in the absence of an offer of proof neither the trial court nor this 
court could judge whether such exclusion was prejudicial 
error.

[¶17.]  There being no error in the trial of this 
case, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.