Case Title: Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc.

Citation: 1996-Ohio-265

Docket Number: 19950301

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAUZY ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. KELLY SERVICES, INC. ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc. (1996), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Age discrimination — Phrase “Absent direct evidence of age 
discrimination” used in Kohmescher v. Kroger Co., construed — 
Plaintiff must show that she was “discharged” in order to establish a 
prima facia case of age discrimination under former R.C. 4101.17 — 
When plaintiff alleging unlawful age discrimination chooses 
termination in lieu of transfer, the decision cannot be construed as 
an actual discharge under former R.C. 4101.17 — Test for 
determining whether an employee was constructively discharged. 
1. 
The phrase “Absent direct evidence of age discrimination,” as used in 
Kohmescher v. Kroger Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 501, 575 N.E.2d 439, at 
the syllabus, refers to a method of proof, not a type of evidence.  It means 
that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of age discrimination 
directly by presenting evidence, of any nature, to show that an employer 
more likely than not was motivated by discriminatory intent. 
2. 
Irrespective of whether an inference of discriminatory intent is created 
directly or indirectly, the plaintiff must show that she was “discharged” in 
order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under former 
R.C. 4101.17. 
 
2
3. 
Where a plaintiff alleging unlawful age discrimination chooses 
termination in lieu of transfer, her decision cannot be construed as an 
actual discharge under former R.C. 4101.17.  However, she may establish 
by sufficient evidence that she was constructively discharged. 
4. 
The test for determining whether an employee was constructively 
discharged is whether the employer’s actions made working conditions so 
intolerable that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have 
felt compelled to resign. 
- - 
 
(No. 95-301 — Submitted March 5, 1996 — Decided June 12, 1996.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lake County, No. 94-L-029. 
 
Plaintiff-appellant, Phyllis Ruth Mauzy, began employment with 
defendant-appellant, Kelly Services, Inc. (“Kelly”) in April 1974 as Resident 
Branch Manger of Kelly’s Mentor, Ohio office.  Throughout her employment, 
Mauzy consistently received exceptional performance evaluations from her 
supervisors.  She was classified as a “Number 1 Manager” and, in 1987, 
received the “Manager of the Year Award.” 
 
3
 
In September 1987, defendant-appellee Patricia N. Hart became the Vice 
President and Regional Manager in charge of the Cleveland Region for Kelly, 
and thus Mauzy’s supervisor.  On August 6, 1992, Hart notified Mauzy that she 
was being reassigned to manage Kelly’s recently downsized Mayfield office 
and to fill the newly created position of workers’ compensation manager, and 
that her salary and benefits would remain the same.  Mauzy refused the 
reassignment and her employment ended on August 18, 1992.  Mauzy was 
sixty-one years of age at the time. 
 
Hart and Mauzy disagree sharply on the series of events leading to 
Mauzy’s reassignment.  According to Hart, she attended a meeting during the 
week of June 1, 1992, at Kelly’s corporate headquarters in Troy, Michigan, at 
which there was discussion concerning cost-cutting approaches that could be 
implemented by Kelly’s regional managers.  In particular, it was suggested that 
some of Kelly’s full-service offices could be downsized to “employment 
centers” and the downsized territory incorporated into other full-service centers 
in the same geographic area.  Also discussed was the creation of the position of 
regional workers’ compensation manager who would monitor claims filed by 
 
4
Kelly temporary employees and develop safety programs in conjunction with 
Kelly’s customers. 
 
Accordingly, Hart  made the decision to downsize the Mayfield office 
and incorporate its territory into the Mentor office.  She also determined that 
Mauzy was the most qualified person in the Cleveland region to fill the job of 
workers’ compensation manager.  In order to implement this regional 
reorganization, Hart decided to transfer the manager of the Mayfield branch, 
Pamela Vaughn, to serve as regional branch manager of the Mentor office, and 
transfer Mauzy to the Mayfield office to serve as both manager of the Mayfield 
employment center and workers’ compensation manager. 
 
When Hart informed Mauzy of her reassignment, Mauzy first expressed 
interest in the workers’ compensation position but, upon learning that she 
would be relocated to the Mayfield office, refused the job.  After several 
attempts to convince Mauzy to accept the transfer, Hart finally told Mauzy that 
if she did not report to Mayfield on August 17, 1992, Kelly would assume that 
she wished to terminate her employment.  When Mauzy failed to report to 
Mayfield on August 17, she was given one more chance to report on August 18.  
 
5
When she failed to report to Mayfield on August 18, it was concluded that she 
had decided to relinquish her employment. 
 
Patricia MacKinnon, Regional Manager, Major Market Division for 
Kelly, set forth a version of the facts similar to that of Hart’s, except to state that 
Mauzy “left us no alternative but to terminate her employment.” 
 
Mauzy’s version is markedly different from that of Hart’s.  According to 
Mauzy, when Hart took over as her supervisor, Hart “made it absolutely clear 
that she wanted younger people hired, and would only allow consideration of 
recent college graduates.”  Hart’s first question was, “What is the applicant’s 
age?”  Hart asked Mauzy when she planned to retire and told her that “[i]f I 
were you, I would take the money and run.”  Hart also wrote a note in Mauzy’s 
final performance evaluation that “you can’t teach an old dog new tricks.”1 
 
Between 1988 and 1992, Hart consistently gave Mauzy negative 
evaluations.  Hart berated Mauzy in front of coworkers for things Hart allowed 
younger employees to do.  Hart removed three of Mauzy’s four office staff; 
reduced Mauzy’s territory in half; and, in April 1992, had already introduced 
Vaughn to Mauzy’s key customers.  Mauzy further testified that Vaughn was 
 
6
rated a “No. 5 manager”; and that the workers’ compensation manager position 
was never filled and the Mayfield office was eventually “phased-out.” 
 
On September 24, 1992, Mauzy and her husband, appellants, instituted 
this action in the Lake County Court of Common Pleas against Kelly and Hart, 
alleging in part that Mauzy’s termination was the result of unlawful age 
discrimination in violation of former R.C. 4101.17.  The trial court entered 
summary judgment for Kelly and Hart, concluding that Mauzy “was not 
discharged from her employment within the meaning of the statute so as to 
maintain a claim for age discrimination but instead voluntarily relinquished her 
employment.” 
 
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.  In so doing, 
the court agreed with Mauzy that “the four elements [to establish a prima facie 
case of age discrimination] set forth in the syllabus of Kohmescher [v. Kroger 
Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 501, 575 N.E.2d 439] need not be proven where 
direct evidence of age discrimination is presented.”  The court found, however, 
that Mauzy failed to present such direct evidence of age discrimination.  In so 
finding, the court relied on the definition of “direct evidence” as set forth in 
Black’s Law Dictionary (5 Ed.1979) 414:  “Evidence that directly proves a fact, 
 
7
without an inference or presumption, and which in itself, if true, conclusively 
establishes that fact.”  The court of appeals then reasoned that “[a]s a result, 
appellants were required to present a prima facie case of discrimination by 
proving the four elements set forth in the syllabus of Kohmescher.”  Since 
Mauzy was offered a lateral transfer and voluntarily chose to reject it, “she was 
not terminated within the meaning of R.C. 4101.17.” 
 
The cause is now before the court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
___________________ 
 
Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A., Patrick J. Perotti  and Robert J. 
Hoffman, for appellants. 
 
Thompson, Hine & Flory, Michael J. Frantz and Daniel A. Ward, for 
appellees. 
 
Louis A. Jacobs; Spater, Gittes, Schulte & Kolman and Frederick M. 
Gittes, urging reversal for amici curiae, Ohio Employment Lawyers 
Association, Ohio Now Education and Legal Fund, National Conference of 
Black Lawyers, Columbus Chapter, Mid Ohio Board for an Independent Living 
Environment, Ada-Ohio, and Police Officers for Equal Rights. 
 
8
 
Cathy Ventrell-Monsees, urging reversal for amicus curiae, American 
Association of Retired Persons. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease and David A. Westrup, urging affirmance 
for amicus curiae, Ohio Chamber of Commerce. 
___________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  There are two issues presented for our 
determination — one involving the grant of summary judgment in favor of 
appellees on Mauzy’s claim of unlawful age discrimination under former R.C. 
4101.17, and the other involving the denial of two requests by Mauzy for 
additional discovery.  The facts pertaining to the second issue will be set forth 
infra.  We proceed first to the issue of summary judgment because this issue can 
be resolved without regard to the further issue of discovery. 
I 
 
The broad issue here is whether Mauzy presented sufficient evidence to 
withstand a motion for summary judgment.  Ultimately, this issue turns on 
whether the circumstances surrounding Mauzy’s separation from Kelly can 
properly be viewed as a “discharge” under former R.C. 4101.17.  However, in 
light of the opinions below and the arguments advanced by the parties, we find 
 
9
it necessary to clarify certain aspects of the requirements for establishing a 
prima facie case of age discrimination.   
 
Former R.C. 4101.17 (now renumbered R.C. 4112.14) provided in part as 
follows: 
 
“(A) No employer shall discriminate in any job opening against any 
applicant or discharge without just cause any employee aged forty or older who 
is physically able to perform the duties and otherwise meets the established 
requirements of the job and laws pertaining to the relationship between 
employer and employee.” 
In Barker v. Scovill, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 146, 6 OBR 202, 451 
N.E.2d 807, we adopted the analytic framework established by the United States 
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792, 93 
S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, for use in Title VII cases, and modified the 
elements of a prima facie case to fit the contours of former R.C. 4101.17.  Thus, 
we held that: 
“In order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, violative 
of R.C. 4101.17, in an employment discharge action, plaintiff-employee must 
demonstrate (1) that he was a member of the statutorily-protected class, (2) that 
 
10
he was discharged, (3) that he was qualified for the position, and (4) that he was 
replaced by, or that his discharge permitted the retention of,  a person not 
belonging to the protected class.  Defendant-employer may then overcome the 
presumption inherent in the prima facie case by propounding a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s discharge.  Finally, plaintiff must be 
allowed to show that the rationale set forth by defendant was only a pretext for 
unlawful discrimination.”2 
 
In Kohmescher v. Kroger Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 501, 575 N.E.2d 
439,  at the syllabus, we modified Barker, in relevant part, by prefacing the first 
paragraph of its syllabus with the phrase, “Absent direct evidence of age 
discrimination.”  In so doing, we explained as follows: 
 
“Research indicates that the McDonnell Douglas standards borrowed in 
Barker, supra, were never intended to be applied strictly. * * *  
 
“Moreover, as the high court stated in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Thurston (1985), 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S.Ct. 613, 621, 83 L.Ed.2d 523, 533,  
* * * ‘* * * the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff 
presents direct evidence of discrimination. * * *’  
 
11
 
“* * * As the court stated in Barnes v. GenCorp., Inc. (C.A.6, 1990), 896 
F.2d 1457, 1464:  ‘* * * the importance of the McDonnell Douglas “test” is its 
discussion of the elements a plaintiff must prove to establish a prima facie case 
of discrimination absent direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence of 
discrimination.’  (Emphasis added.) * * * 
 
“* * * 
 
“Therefore, based on all of the foregoing, we modify the first sentence of 
paragraph one of the syllabus in Barker, supra, * * *.  Under this modified 
standard, it should be abundantly clear that direct evidence of age 
discrimination will be sufficient to establish a prima facie case.”  Id., 61 Ohio 
St.3d at 504-506, 575 N.E.2d at 442-443. 
 
The court of appeals interpreted the words “direct evidence” to mean 
“‘[e]vidence that directly proves a fact, without an inference or presumption.’”  
Both parties agree that this interpretation, as stated and applied by the court of 
appeals, amounts to a rendition of a dichotomy between “direct” and 
“circumstantial” evidence.  Mauzy argues, however, that the term “direct 
evidence,” as used in Kohmescher, “refers to the method of proof and not the 
type of evidence.”  (Emphasis sic.)  We agree. 
 
12
 
In order to prevail in an employment discrimination case, the plaintiff 
must prove discriminatory intent.  “‘The state of a man’s mind is as much a fact 
as the state of his digestion.  It is true that it is very difficult to prove what the 
state of a man’s mind at a particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as 
much a fact as anything else.’”  United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. 
Aikens (1983), 460 U.S. 711, 716-717, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d 403, 
411, quoting Eddington v. Fitzmaurice (1885), 29 Ch.Div. 459, 483. 
 
The function of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test is to allow the  
plaintiff to raise an inference of discriminatory intent indirectly.  It serves to 
eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the employer’s 
action:  lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy.  Texas Dept. of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 253-254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 
1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 215-216; Internatl. Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States 
(1977), 431 U.S. 324, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866, 52 L.Ed.2d 396, 429, fn. 44. 
 
As the Supreme Court explained in Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters  
(1978), 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949-2950, 57 L.Ed. 2d 957, 967: 
 
“A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of 
discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, 
 
13
are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors. 
See Teamsters v. United States, supra, at 358 [97 S. Ct. at 1866, 52 L.Ed.2d at 
429] n. 44.  And we are willing to presume this largely because we know from 
our experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary 
manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus, 
when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as 
possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the 
employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his 
decision on an impermissible consideration such as race.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
Thus, McDonnell Douglas is one method, an indirect method involving 
the process of elimination, whereby the plaintiff may create an inference that an 
employment decision was more likely than not based on illegal discriminatory 
criteria.  The process of elimination, however, is not the only method by which 
such an inference may be created.  As the high court explained in Teamsters, 
supra, 431 U.S. at 358, 97 S.Ct. at 1866, 52 L.Ed.2d at 429: 
 
“[T]he McDonnell Douglas pattern [is not] the only means of establishing 
a prima facie case of individual discrimination.  Our decision in that case * * * 
did not purport to create an inflexible formulation.  We expressly noted that 
 
14
‘(t)he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification * * * of 
the prima facie proof required from (a plaintiff) is not necessarily applicable in 
every respect to differing factual situations.’  The importance of McDonnell 
Douglas lies, not in its specification of the discrete elements of proof there 
required, but in its recognition of the general principle that any Title VII 
plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to create an 
inference that an employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion 
illegal under the Act.”  (Emphasis sic.)  (Citation omitted.)  Thus, “[a]s in any 
lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence.”  
Aikens, supra, 460 U.S. at 714, 103 S.Ct. at 1481, 75 L.Ed.2d at 409, fn. 3. 
 
This is clearly what we had in mind in Kohmescher, supra, 61 Ohio St.3d 
at 505, 575 N.E.2d at 442, when we emphasized the notion that the four-
element McDonnell Douglas prima facie test comes into play “‘absent direct, 
circumstantial, or statistical evidence of discrimination.’”  In fact, the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes, albeit lamenting this conclusion, 
interpreted the majority opinion in a similar vein.  Id., 61 Ohio St.3d at 507, 575 
N.E.2d at 443. 
 
15
 
Appellees argue, however, “[t]hat a plaintiff attempting to produce direct 
evidence to avoid application of the McDonnell Douglas test cannot rely upon 
the presentation of merely circumstantial evidence.” In support, appellees cite a 
litany of federal cases which do, indeed, draw a similar conclusion.  In reaching 
such a conclusion, these cases invariably rely upon certain language concerning 
“direct evidence” used by the United States Supreme Court in Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston (1985), 469 U.S. 111, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523, 
and by Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
(1989), 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268.  The cases, however, 
attempt to apply the term “direct evidence” in a context different from that of its 
origin. 
 
In Thurston, supra, 469 U.S. at 121, 105 S.Ct. at 621, 83 L.Ed.2d at 533, 
the Supreme Court stated that “the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable 
where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination.”  The “direct 
evidence” in Thurston was a transfer policy under which airline captains 
disqualified from serving because of their age were not afforded the same 
privilege as captains disqualified for reasons other than their age to displace less 
senior flight engineers.  The court found this policy to be discriminatory on its 
 
16
face, thus placing the burden of persuasion on the employer to prove an 
affirmative defense.  Id., 469 U.S. at 121-122, 105 S.Ct. at 621-622, 83 L.Ed.2d 
at 533.  The opinion in Thurston, however, does not disclose whether the term 
“direct evidence” was being used to refer to the type of evidence required in 
order to “shift” the burden of persuasion to the employer, or merely to indicate 
the fact that plaintiff had proven discrimination. 
 
In Price Waterhouse, the plurality opinion concluded that when a 
plaintiff proves that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, 
the burden of persuasion is then upon the employer to prove that it would have 
made the same decision even if it had not taken plaintiff’s gender into account.  
In concluding that plaintiff proved discrimination, the plurality focused its 
attention on certain negative gender-related comments made by Price 
Waterhouse partners in evaluating Hopkins for partnership.  In its opinion, the 
plurality specifically stated that: 
 
“By focusing on Hopkins’ specific proof, however, we do not suggest a 
limitation on the possible ways of proving that stereotyping played a motivating 
role in an employment decision, and we refrain from deciding here which 
specific facts, ‘standing alone,’ would or would not establish a plaintiff’s case, 
 
17
since such a decision is unnecessary in this case.”  Id., 490 U.S. at 251-252, 109 
S.Ct. at 1791, 104 L.Ed.2d at 288-289. 
On the other hand, in her concurring opinion Justice O’Connor indicated that 
she would require “direct evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial 
negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision.”  Id., 
490 U.S. at 277, 109 S.Ct. at 1805, 104 L.Ed.2d at 305, O’Connor, J., 
concurring.3 
 
The federal circuits, therefore, were left to grapple with the issue of 
whether, in light of Thurston and Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff is required to 
present “direct evidence” of discrimination as a precondition to “shifting” the 
burden of persuasion and, if so, what constitutes “direct evidence.”  Not 
surprisingly, the various federal courts have about as many solutions to this 
problem as they do employment discrimination cases.  See, e.g., Manzer v. 
Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co. (C.A.6, 1994), 29 F.3d 1078; Davis v. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (C.A.5, 1994), 14 F.3d 1082; Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. 
Ins. Cos. (C.A.2, 1992), 968 F.2d 171; Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (C.A.2, 
1992), 958 F.2d 1176; Jackson v. Harvard Univ. (C.A.1, 1990), 900 F.2d 464; 
Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc. (C.A.3, 1987), 814 F.2d 893. 
 
18
 
In this context, however, the term “direct evidence,” whatever it means 
and to the extent it is even required, is used to distinguish a Thurston or Price 
Waterhouse case from a McDonnell Douglas case.  See Sullivan, Accounting 
for Price Waterhouse:  Proving Disparate Treatment Under Title VII (1991), 56 
Brook.L.Rev. 1107, 1137.  In other words, the term is inserted as a precondition 
to “shifting” the burden of persuasion; it was not fashioned by its proponents to 
create a dichotomy between two opposing methods of establishing a McDonnell 
Douglas prima facie case.  The caliber of evidence as “direct” does, indeed, 
eschew reliance on the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, not because it is the sole 
alternative method by which to create an inference of discrimination, but 
because it rises to the level of actually proving discrimination.  The issue of 
what is required to “shift” the burden of persuasion, however, is an issue 
separate and apart from the issue of what is required to raise an inference of 
discrimination. 
 
Clearly, in Kohmescher we were not concerned with the issue of when 
the burden of persuasion should be placed on the employer.  We were only 
concerned “that direct evidence of discrimination will be sufficient to establish 
a prima facie case.”  Id., 61 Ohio St.3d at 506,  575 N.E.2d at 443.  In this 
 
19
context, the phrase “direct evidence of age discrimination” is indicative of a 
method of proof, not a type of evidence.  It is, in a sense, a misnomer.  It means 
that the plaintiff may establish a prima face case directly by presenting 
evidence, of any nature, to show that the employer more likely than not was 
motivated by discriminatory animus.  Barnes v. GenCorp., Inc. (C.A. 6, 1990),  
896 F.2d 1457, 1464; Perry v. Kunz (C.A.8, 1989), 878 F.2d 1056, 1058-1059; 
Oxman v. WLS-TV (C.A.7, 1988), 846 F.2d 448, 454-455; Wilhelm v. Blue Bell, 
Inc. (C.A.4, 1985), 773 F.2d 1429, 1432; Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm. v. 
Electrolux Corp. (D.C.Va. 1985), 611 F.Supp. 926, 927-928; Blackwell v. Sun 
Elec. Corp. (C.A.6, 1983), 696 F.2d 1176, 1180; Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams 
Co. (C.A.4, 1982), 681 F.2d 230, 239; Stanojev v. Ebasco Services, Inc. (C.A. 2, 
1981), 643 F.2d 914, 920-921; Smith v. Univ. of North Carolina (C.A.4, 1980), 
632 F.2d 316, 335; Loeb v. Texton, Inc. (C.A. 1, 1979), 600 F.2d 1003, 1017. 
 
Accordingly, we now clarify that the phrase “Absent direct evidence of 
age discrimination,” as used in Kohmescher, supra, at the syllabus, refers to a 
method of proof, not a type of evidence.  It means that a plaintiff may establish 
a prima facie case of age discrimination directly by presenting evidence, of any 
 
20
nature, to show that the employer more likely than not was motivated by 
discriminatory intent. 
 
Mauzy further argues that pursuant to Kohmescher, where there is direct 
evidence of discriminatory animus, “summary judgment is inappropriate, 
regardless whether the separation from employment is styled a termination, a 
resignation or a constructive discharge.”  Indeed, Justice Holmes similarly 
characterized the holding of Kohmescher:  “This newly adopted test is that even 
the slightest bit of evidence of age discrimination adduced by the plaintiff 
obviates the necessity to prove that the plaintiff was discharged * * *.” 
Kohmescher, supra, 61 Ohio St.3d at 507,  575 N.E.2d at 443 (Holmes, J., 
dissenting).  We, however, disagree. 
 
Evidence of discriminatory intent is nothing more than proof of 
discriminatory thought.  Former R.C. 4101.17, like Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, Section 2000e et seq., Title 42, U.S. 
Code, is not a thought control law.  As Justice O’Connor explained: 
 
“[Title VII was meant] to eradicate discriminatory actions in the 
employment setting, not mere discriminatory thoughts.  Critics of the bill that 
became Title VII labeled it a ‘thought control bill,’ and argued that it created a 
 
21
‘punishable crime that does not require an illegal external act as a basis for 
judgment.’  100 Cong.Rec. 7254 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Ervin).  Senator Case 
* * * responded: 
 
“‘The man must do or fail to do something in regard to employment.  
There must be some specific external act, more than a mental act.  Only if he 
does the act because of the grounds stated in the bill would there be any legal 
consequences.’”  Price Waterhouse, supra, 490 U.S. at 262, 109 S.Ct. at 1797, 
104 L.Ed.2d at 295-296. 
 
Thus, while proof of discriminatory thought is necessary to the 
establishment of a discrimination claim, it is not sufficient.  There must be a 
consequential prohibited act.  The prohibited act under former R.C. 4101.17, as 
relevant here, is a “discharge.”  Other actions, such as transfers or promotions, 
are not prohibited unless they amount to a “discharge.”  This is a legislative 
choice that we cannot disturb. 
 
It is true, as Mauzy urges, that direct evidence of discriminatory animus 
eschews reliance on the prima facie four-element test of Barker and 
Kohmescher, supra.  This does not mean, however, that a mandate of the statute 
may be ignored simply because it happens to be one of the elements of a prima 
 
22
facie case set forth in those cases.  Direct evidence of discriminatory thought no 
more obviates the statutory requirement that plaintiff be discharged than it does 
the statutory requirement that the plaintiff fall within the protected age group.  
To hold as Mauzy suggests would result in rewriting the statute or, worse, 
prohibiting mere thought. 
 
Thus, irrespective of which method is utilized to establish discriminatory 
intent, plaintiff must show that she was “discharged on account of age.”  
(Emphasis added.) Kohmescher, supra, 61 Ohio St.3d at 505, 575 N.E.2d at 
442. 
 
Mauzy also contends that her burden to show that she was discharged is 
satisfied by MacKinnon’s statement that Mauzy “left us no alternative but to 
terminate her [Mauzy’s] employment.”  According to Mauzy, “[i]t is the 
termination, not the reason for it, that allows the prima facie case.” 
 
In a general sense, Mauzy is correct; disputing the employer’s alleged 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging a plaintiff is not a 
requirement of the prima facie case.  However, when a plaintiff chooses 
termination in lieu of transfer, her decision is not construed as an actual 
discharge.  Instead, she is required to show as a part of her prima facie case that 
 
23
her choice to be terminated was involuntary or coerced. Kohmescher, supra, 61 
Ohio St.3d at 506, 575 N.E.2d at 443; Barker, supra, 6 Ohio St.3d at 148, 6 
OBR at 204, 451 N.E.2d at 810.  Mauzy can stand on no better footing by 
refusing her transfer assignment in the face of termination, than do employees 
who elect termination in lieu of transfer.  Former R.C. 4101.17 proscribes 
discriminatory discharges, not transfers.  It cannot be transformed into a 
palliative for every unattractive workplace transfer by the simple expedient of 
refusing the assignment.  See Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc. (C.A.4, 1985), 770 
F.2d 1251, 1255. 
 
Since Mauzy in effect chose termination over transfer, she must show that 
her decision was involuntary or, as the doctrine is more familiarly known, that 
she was constructively discharged.  See Clowes v. Allegheny Valley Hosp. 
(C.A.3, 1993), 991 F.2d 1159, 1160-1161.  Courts generally apply an objective 
test in determining when an employee was constructively discharged, viz., 
whether the employer’s actions made working conditions so intolerable that a 
reasonable person under the circumstances would have felt compelled to 
resign.4  Id., 991 F.2d at 1161; McCann v. Litton Systems, Inc. (C.A.5, 1993), 
986 F.2d 946, 951; Stephens v. C.I.T. Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. (C.A.5, 
 
24
1992), 955 F.2d 1023, 1027; Spulak v. K Mart Corp. (C.A.10, 1990), 894 F.2d 
1150, 1154; Levendos v. Stern Entertainment, Inc. (C.A.3, 1988), 860 F.2d 
1227, 1230-1231. 
 
In applying this test, courts seek to determine whether the cumulative 
effect of the employer’s actions would make a reasonable person believe that 
termination was imminent.  They recognize that there is no sound reason to 
compel an employee to struggle with the inevitable simply to attain the 
“discharge” label.  No single factor is determinative.  Instead, a myriad of 
factors are considered, including reductions in sales territory, poor performance 
evaluations, criticism in front of coemployees, inquiries about retirement 
intentions, and expressions of a preference for employees outside the protected 
group.  Nor does the inquiry change solely because an option to transfer is 
thrown into the mix, lateral though it may be.  A transfer accompanied by 
measurable compensation at a comparable level does not necessarily preclude a 
finding of constructive discharge.  Our review is not so narrowly circumscribed 
by the quality and attributes of the transfer option itself.  A sophisticated 
discriminating employer should not be permitted to circumvent the statute by 
transferring an older employee to a sham position as a prelude to discharge.  See 
 
25
Stephens, supra; Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc. (C.A.5, 1986), 803 F.2d 202; 
Crawford v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp. (D.C.Ohio 1986), 653 F.Supp. 
1184; Schneider v. Jax Shack, Inc. (C.A.8, 1986), 794 F.2d 383; Goss v. Exxon 
Office Systems Co. (C.A.3, 1984), 747 F.2d 885; Jacobson v. Am. Home 
Products Corp. (D.C.Ill. 1982), 36 FEP Cases 559; Annotation, Circumstances 
Which Warrant Finding of Constructive Discharge Under Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act (29 USCS §§ 621 et seq.) (1989), 93 A.L.R.Fed. 10, 
Sections 9-16. 
 
Applying the law as set forth above to the facts of this case, we conclude 
that summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of Hart and Kelly 
because of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact over whether Mauzy 
was constructively discharged on account of her age.  Under the record 
developed in the trial court, there is evidence showing that Mauzy met with 
great success over the years in her position as resident branch manager at 
Kelly’s Mentor branch.  When Hart took over as Mauzy’s supervisor, she 
expressed her preference for younger employees, inquired into Mauzy’s plans to 
retire, and told her to “take the money and run.”  She berated Mauzy in front of 
her coworkers, gave her negative evaluations, reduced her staff and territory, 
 
26
introduced a younger employee to Mauzy’s key customers, and noted in 
Mauzy’s final evaluation that “you can’t teach an old dog new tricks.”  
Subsequently, she sought to transfer Mauzy to a position that was newly 
created, and which was never filled following Mauzy’s separation from 
employment, while replacing Mauzy with a younger employee with a lower 
rating.  Although appellees’ version of the events is markedly different, in our 
view reasonable minds could conclude from the evidence that appellees were 
motivated by discriminatory animus and that Mauzy was constructively 
discharged from her employment.  Thus, Mauzy has presented sufficient 
evidence to raise an inference of age discrimination under former R.C. 4101.17.   
 
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is reversed as to this 
issue. 
II 
 
The second issue presented for determination involves the trial court’s 
denial of Mauzy’s requests for further discovery.  The facts relevant to this 
issue are as follows.  On February 23, 1993, the trial court entered a pretrial 
order indicating that discovery had been completed.  Following several 
continuances, appellees filed their motion for summary judgment on April 6, 
 
27
1993.  On April 29, 1993, Mauzy’s previous counsel filed a motion to extend 
the time to respond to appellees’ motion for summary judgment and to withdraw 
as Mauzy’s counsel of record, which the trial court granted on May 4, 1993. 
 
On May 13, 1993, Mauzy’s present counsel filed a motion for a stay of 
proceedings, stating that “[i]n order to properly undertake represent[ation] * * * 
[he] would require a * * * period of time to become completely familiar with 
the file and perform certain discovery which is necessary to properly respond to 
the summary judgment motion.”  On June 22, 1993, the trial court granted a stay 
of sixty days and scheduled a pretrial conference for August 23. 
 
During July and August 1993, Mauzy’s new counsel attempted to 
schedule depositions pursuant to Civ.R. 30(B)(4) and (5), seeking a number of 
documents and to depose Pamela Vaughn.  Appellees responded by filing a 
motion for a protective order.  On August 23, 1993, the trial court entered an 
order prohibiting Mauzy from proceeding with the depositions, noting that “the 
discovery deadlines * * * have long since passed.” 
 
On August 24, Mauzy filed a motion pursuant to Civ.R. 56(F) “to 
complete discovery in this action in order to adequately respond to the pending 
summary judgment.”  She also argued, however, that further discovery “is 
 
28
necessary to the presentation of the merits of her claim.”  In particular, she 
sought to depose certain individuals, including her replacement, concerning the 
issues of discriminatory intent, replacement by a younger employee and the 
closing of the Mayfield office.  On August 27, 1993, the trial court denied 
Mauzy’s request for further discovery on the basis that it had already given 
Mauzy a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery when it stayed the 
proceedings on June 22 for sixty days, “thereby allowing Plaintiff’s counsel an 
opportunity to review the file [and] engage in discovery.”  The court did 
indicate, however, that “[d]ue to any misinterpretation of the Court’s prior 
order, the Court will grant Plaintiff an additional leave to 12:00 noon, 
September 3, 1993,” apparently to respond to appellees’ motion for summary 
judgment.  Mauzy filed her brief in opposition to appellees’ summary judgment 
motion on September 2. 
 
On September 15, appellees requested a continuance of the trial date 
along with a motion by their former counsel to withdraw as counsel of record.  
The motion was necessitated by Mauzy’s allegations that prior counsel for 
appellees had destroyed a key piece of evidence.  See fn. 1.  On October 6, the 
court granted appellees’ counsel’s motion to withdraw. 
 
29
 
On December 29 and 30, Mauzy again requested additional discovery in 
light of the rescheduling of the trial date until April 1994.  On January 18, 1994, 
the trial court denied this request and entered summary judgment in favor of 
appellees. 
 
The court of appeals held that: 
 
“It is apparent from the record that appellants were afforded ample time 
within which to conduct discovery.  Furthermore, it does not appear that the 
requested discovery would have affected the disposition of the summary 
judgment motion, as that motion was decided upon appellant’s failure to prove 
that she was discharged, as required by Kohmescher to establish a prima facie 
case.  Appellants’ proffered discovery dealt with the issue of age bias, which is 
irrelevant under R.C. 4101.17 unless the employee was discharged.  See 
Kohmescher, supra.  As a result, appellants have failed to demonstrate that the 
trial court abused its discretion * * *.” 
 
In light of our holding that summary judgment was improper under the 
record as presently developed, it is no longer of any concern whether “the 
requested discovery would have affected the disposition of the summary 
judgment motion.”  Accordingly, the issue of whether the trial court abused its 
 
30
discretion in denying Mauzy’s motion for discovery pursuant to Civ.R. 56(F) is 
moot.  Civ.R. 56(F) operates only when it appears that the nonmoving party 
cannot present facts essential to justify opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment.  Such a situation can no longer be said to exist. 
 
Thus, the only issue that confronts us is whether the trial court 
unreasonably denied Mauzy the pretrial opportunity to fully prepare her case for 
litigation. 
 
“In discovery practices, the trial court has a discretionary power not a 
ministerial duty.”  State ex rel. Daggett v. Gessaman (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 55, 
57, 63 O.O.2d 88, 90, 295 N.E.2d 659, 661.  Thus, the standard of review of a 
trial court’s decision in a discovery matter is whether the court abused its 
discretion.  See Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Industries, Inc. (C.A. Fed. 1986), 
785 F.2d 1017, 1022. 
 
Such discretion, however, is not without limits.  Although unusual, 
appellate courts will reverse a discovery order “when the trial court has 
erroneously denied or limited discovery.”  8 Wright, Miller & Marcus, Federal 
Practice & Procedure (2 Ed. 1994) 92, Section 2006.  Thus, “[a]n appellate 
court will reverse the decision of a trial court that extinguishes a party’s right to 
 
31
discovery if the trial court’s decision is improvident and affects the discovering 
party’s substantial rights.”  Rossman v. Rossman (1975), 47 Ohio App.2d 103, 
110, 1 O.O.3d 206, 210, 352 N.E.2d 149, 153-154.  See, also, Stegawski v. 
Cleveland Anesthesia Group, Inc. (1987), 37 Ohio App.3d 78, 86, 523 N.E.2d 
902, 910; Smith v. Klein (1985), 23 Ohio App.3d 146, 151, 23 OBR 387, 393, 
492 N.E.2d 852, 858; Simmons v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 
(1977), 53 Ohio App.2d 91, 97, 7 O.O.3d 65, 69, 372 N.E.2d 363, 368; Toledo 
Edison Co. v. GA Technologies, Inc. (C.A.6, 1988), 847 F.2d 335, 341; 
Weahkee v. Norton (C.A.10, 1980), 621 F.2d 1080, 1082 (employment 
discrimination action); Goldman v. Checker Taxi Co. (C.A.7, 1963), 325 F.2d 
853, 856; Wright, Miller & Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure, supra, at 92-
93, fn. 33, Section 2006; Annotation (1977), 31 A.L.R.Fed. 657. 
 
In his May 13, 1993 motion for a stay of proceedings, Mauzy’s substitute 
counsel indicated that he would need to conduct further discovery in order to 
properly undertake representation of Mauzy.  There is nothing in the record to 
suggest that this request was interposed as a dilatory tactic.  The record 
discloses that further discovery was warranted in order to fully prepare to 
litigate the issues of discriminatory animus and constructive discharge, and that 
 
32
the discovery that had already been conducted was not overburdensome.  
Moreover, the initial request for additional discovery was not raised, as 
appellees suggest, at the “eleventh hour.”  The motion for summary judgment 
was not ruled upon until January 18, 1994, with trial having been reset for some 
time thereafter.  Under these circumstances, we hold that it is improvident to 
deny further discovery to Mauzy’s substitute counsel. 
 
The trial court’s order of August 27, standing alone, creates the illusion 
that Mauzy’s second counsel was given the opportunity to conduct additional 
discovery.  That order denied Mauzy’s request for further discovery on the 
purported basis that the court had already granted a sixty-day stay to afford 
Mauzy’s second counsel “an opportunity to * * * engage in discovery.”  Yet, 
when Mauzy’s substitute counsel had attempted discovery during that period, he 
was met by the trial court’s August 23 order prohibiting the attempted discovery 
on the basis that “the discovery deadlines * * * have long since passed.”  These 
incongruous orders effectively denied Mauzy the opportunity to fully prepare 
her cause for litigation. 
 
33
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying Mauzy further discovery, and the decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed as to this issue. 
 
In light of all the foregoing, the judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
Judgment reversed 
 
and cause remanded. 
 
DOUGLAS, HILDEBRANDT, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., dissent. 
 
LEE H. HILDEBRANDT, JR., J., of the First Appellate District, sitting for 
WRIGHT, J. 
 
FOOTNOTES 
1. 
This note is the subject of much dispute.  During Mauzy’s deposition, 
Kelly’s former counsel handed Mauzy an exhibit consisting of several pages 
reflecting an evaluation of Mauzy for 1991.  The note was mixed in loosely 
with this evaluation.  Mauzy read the note, stated, “I don’t think you want me to 
 
34
have this note.  I already read it, though,” and handed it back.  Later, upon 
retaining new counsel, Mauzy served a document request upon Kelly and Hart 
seeking the note.  Kelly’s former counsel filed an affidavit in which he stated 
that the note was a memorialization of his own thought process, was not made 
by Kelly or any of its representatives and was inadvertently mixed in between 
pages of the exhibit, and that the characterizations ascribed to the note were 
inaccurate.  In particular, he stated that the note was written on “my own 
‘notepad stationery,’ with the heading ‘From The Desk Of:  Robert S. 
Gilmore.’”  Moreover, Gilmore claimed that “[h]e searched [his] files, but was 
unable to locate the notepaper,” and that in any event the note was protected 
under the attorney work-product doctrine.  Mauzy, however, filed an affidavit 
stating that “during [her] deposition, [she] looked at both sides of the note and it 
did not contain any printing, and specifically did not contain the printed words 
“From the Desk of:  ROBERT S. GILMORE.”  In addition, Mauzy’s affidavit 
recited that “[t]he note did contain handwriting in thin black ink which [she] 
recognized to be the handwriting of Patricia Hart.” 
 
We do not purport by this rendition to resolve any issues of fact or law 
that may arise from the circumstances surrounding this note.  Our only concern 
 
35
at this point is with Mauzy’s testimony regarding the note and the role it plays 
in light of the issues on appeal and Civ.R. 56(C). 
2. 
The fourth element for the establishment of the prima facie case set forth 
herein is questionable in light of the recent United States Supreme Court 
decision in O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp. (1996), 517 U.S. __, 116 
S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433, 1996 WL 142564. 
3. 
The dissent interpreted the holding of the case narrowly: 
 
“[I]n a limited number of cases Title VII plaintiffs, by presenting direct 
and substantial evidence of discriminatory animus, may shift the burden of 
persuasion to the defendant to show that an adverse employment decision would 
have been supported by legitimate reasons.  The shift in the burden of 
persuasion occurs only where a plaintiff proves by direct evidence that an 
unlawful motive was a substantial factor actually relied upon in making the 
decision.”  Price Waterhouse 490 U.S. at 280, 109, S.Ct. at 1806, 104 L.Ed.2d 
at 307. 
Justice White, however, unlike Justice O’Connor, did not indicate a preference 
for “direct evidence” in his concurring opinion.  Thus, only four Justices (three 
dissenting and one concurring) have indicated a preference for “direct 
 
36
evidence.”  Moreover, in light of the changed composition of the high court, it 
is impossible to gauge a majority position on this issue. 
4. 
Not all of the federal circuits agree on the legal standards by which to 
determine whether a constructive discharge has occurred.  See Levendos v. 
Stern Entertainment, Inc. (C.A.3, 1988), 860 F.2d 1227, 1230-1231.  The 
objective standard appears to be more consonant with the purpose of the prima 
facie case to raise an inference of discrimination.  To require proof that the 
employer’s actions were deliberately aimed at forcing resignation transcends the 
design of the prima facie case.  We note, however, that the result we reach in 
this case would not be affected by the application of a subjective standard. 
 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent.  My disagreement is particularly 
with the stated proposition that “direct” evidence is a method of proof rather than 
a type of evidence, and with the conclusion that it is a factual question whether 
Mauzy’s lateral transfer can amount to a constructive discharge. 
 
DIRECT EVIDENCE 
 
The law is settled that direct evidence of discrimination obviates the 
necessity of raising an inference of discrimination through a McDonnell Douglas 
 
37
showing of a prima facie case.  The court of appeals was correct in referring to 
Black’s Law Dictionary to define the term “direct evidence” as used in the 
Kohmescher syllabus.  Kohmescher v. Kroger Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 501, 575 
N.E.2d 439.  That case had it right in terms of the relationship between direct 
evidence of discrimination (such as documents disclosing the employer’s use of 
age as a criterion for employment decisions) and the alternative, prima facie 
showing through a McDonnell Douglas presentation. 
CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE 
 
Mauzy chose to sue her employer under R.C. 4101.17, which prohibits 
discharges on the basis of age.  Taking all of Mauzy’s testimony on the issue of 
her termination as true, as a matter of law, Mauzy was not discharged.  The 
majority concedes that in order to establish that she was constructively discharged, 
Mauzy must show that her employer made working conditions so intolerable that a 
reasonable person under the circumstances would have felt compelled to resign.  
The evidence, construed in Mauzy’s favor, amounts to the following:  Hart had an 
unjustified, negative, discriminatory attitude toward Mauzy which motivated the 
transfer decision. That is it. Hart’s discriminatory attitude is not actionable under 
R.C. 4101.17.  Hart’s action is the transfer.  This action is not prohibited by R.C. 
 
38
4101.17, even if it is motivated by a discriminatory animus.  What is prohibited is 
a discriminatory transfer that equates to a discharge. 
 
As a matter of law, Mauzy’s transfer cannot be said to equate to a discharge.  
She must show that the transfer rendered the working conditions so intolerable 
that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have felt compelled to 
resign.  The transfer was to a new position in a different branch office, in the same 
locale (i.e., greater Cleveland), at the same compensation level.  Indeed, Mauzy 
never even worked one day under the working conditions of the new job to which 
she was assigned.  The majority seems to go beyond the evidence presented in the 
summary judgment proceedings in implying that the new position offered to 
Mauzy was a sham, just a prelude to discharge.  Under the circumstances of this 
case, involving no change of residence or other such “detrimental reliance,” it 
would be pure speculation to label the voluntary relinquishment of the transfer a 
constructive discharge on the untested assessment that the position was a sham. 
 
Although Mauzy may have legitimately resented the overtones of her 
dealings with Hart, Hart did not fire her, did not insist Mauzy accept a transfer 
across the country as in Kohmescher, and did not even reduce Mauzy’s pay or her 
status as a management employee.  Whatever unlawful attitude Hart may have 
 
39
harbored and displayed, it is only her decisions as to Mauzy’s employment that are 
actionable, and under R.C. 4101.17, only discharge decisions. 
DISCOVERY 
 
I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals on the discovery issue 
because, like that court, I find that the requested discovery would not have 
affected the issue of whether or not Mauzy was discharged.  
 
For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment was properly granted and I 
would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.