Case Title: STATE v HIGGINS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1975-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12812 I N WE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE OF M O N T A N A 19 74 THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , ACTING BY AND THROUGH T H E D E P A R T M E N T O F H I G H W A Y S O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , Plaint i f f and Respondent, C H A R L E S C. HIGGINS and MARJORIE K. HIGGINS, husband and wife, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert Keller, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellants : Leif Erickson, Sr., argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent : Daniel J. Sullivan and James R. Beck argued, Helena, Montana -- - Submitted: November 21, 1974 Decided : JAR 2 3 1975 Mr. J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Charles and tlarjorie Higgins appeal from a preliminary order of condemnation entered i n t h e d i s t r i c t court of Lincoln County. The order determines t h a t t h e use t o which t h e Department of Highways seeks t o apply t h e Higgins' property i s a necessary public use authorized by law, and t h a t t h e taking is required by t h e public i n t e r e s t . The a c t i o n began with a complaint f i l e d by t h e Department of Highways on J u l y 26, 1972, seeking t o condemn a right-of-way through property owned by t h e Higgins i n t h e Yaak River Valley of northwestern Montana. Attached t o t h e complaint was a res- o l u t i o n of t h e S t a t e Highway Commission which asserted: That public i n t e r e s t and necessity required t h e construction of a s t a t e highway i n Lincoln County; t h a t a highway had been planned and located i n a manner most compatible with t h e g r e a t e s t public good and l e a s t p r i v a t e i n j u r y ; t h a t a portion of property owned by t h e Higgins was necessary f o r construction of t h a t highway; and t h a t t h e Department had been unable t o negotiate an agree- ment f o r purchase of t h e property. The owners, Charles and Marjorie Higgins, f i l e d an answer denying t h e m a t e r i a l allega- t i o n s of t h e complaint and claiming t h a t $50,000 would be a reasonable and j u s t compensation f o r t h e taking. A hearing was held on October 11, 1973, t o determine t h e "necessity" of t h e proposed condemnation. The Department i n - troduced t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h e S t a t e Highway Commission and then r e s t e d , relying on t h e presumptions a r i s i n g from t h e r e s o l u t i o n by v i r t u e of t h e provisions of s e c t i o n 32-3904, R.C.M. 1947. The property owners c a l l e d Higgins a s t h e i r only witness. H e r e l a t e d h i s present and a n t i c i p a t e d uses of t h e property and t h e adverse impact which t h e proposed condemnation and construc- t i o n would have on those uses. Testifying a s one experienced i n r e a l e s t a t e t r a n s a c t i o n s but unqualified a s an engineer, he expressed a belief t h a t t h e proposed highway could be constructed more economically on t h e e a s t s i d e of t h e v a l l e y , across t h e r i v e r from h i s property. O n cross-examination he admitted t h a t constructing t h e highway on t h e other s i d e of t h e r i v e r would n e c e s s i t a t e t h e use of a d d i t i o n a l bridges. H e expressed a personal opinion t h a t t h e a d d i t i o n a l c o s t of constructing these bridges might be o f f - s e t by t h e reduction i n c u t t i n g and f i l l i n g a r i s i n g from t h e east s i d e ' s less rugged t e r r a i n . Even i f t h e a l t e r n a t e r o u t e w a s was most c o s t l y , he f e l t t h e added expense/warranted by t h e lessened demand f o r p r i v a t e land. Most of t h e land on t h e e a s t s i d e of t h e r i v e r is owned by t h e f e d e r a l government, while much of t h e land on t h e w e s t s i d e of t h e v a l l e y is p r i v a t e l y owned. O n cross-examination, he professed no knowledge of whether o r not t h e f e d e r a l government would allow construction of t h i s highway on i t s land. When t h e property owners r e s t e d t h e Department reopened its case by c a l l i n g John Dillon, d i s t r i c t ranger f o r t h e Yaak Ranger D i s t r i c t of t h e Kootenai National Forest. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was opposed t o construction of a highway on f e d e r a l f o r e s t lands i n t h e Yaak River Valley. He had responded t o t h e Department's i n q u i r i e s by opposing a route on t h e e a s t s i d e of t h e r i v e r f o r t h r e e reasons: F i r s t , he was opposed t o dedication of a d d i t i o n a l f o r e s t land f o r a highway when one already e x i s t e d on t h e west s i d e of t h e r i v e r ; second, t h e construction would have an adverse impact on t h e Yaak River "water influence zone"; and f i n a l l y , a highway on t h e e a s t s i d e of t h e r i v e r would i n t e r - f e r e with moose and mule deer migration p a t t e r n s . Dillon a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s opinion had been concurred i n by h i s immediate supervisor, but t h a t he d i d not know whether t h e Department had pursued t h e inquiry t o higher l e v e l s within t h e f e d e r a l bureaucracy. Under cross-examination he a l s o ad- mitted t h a t t h e primary users of t h e present highway were loggers, hunters, and fishermen and t h a t t h e proposed highway would be used s i m i l a r l y . Following t h e hearing t h e preliminary order of condem- nation was issued and t h i s appeal w a s subsequently perfected. Appellants here argue t h a t a highway routing over public land should be preferred t o a l o c a t i o n on p r i v a t e land. They contend t h a t "necessity" has not been demonstrated u n t i l it i s shown t h a t t h e f e d e r a l land i s unavailable f o r construction of t h i s highway. It i s claimed t h a t t h e u n a v a i l a b i l i t y of f o r e s t lands here could not be established without a showing t h a t t h e requests were pursued t o t h e higher l e v e l s of t h e United S t a t e s Forest Service. The Department, on t h e o t h e r hand, argues t h a t t h e only question presented f o r our consideration i s whether o r not t h e Department acted a r b i t r a r i l y o r abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n routing t h e proposed highway on t h e w e s t s i d e of t h e r i v e r . The Depart- ment a s s e r t s t h a t appellants f a i l e d t o make such a showing by c l e a r and convincing proof and t h e r e f o r e they cannot p r e v a i l upon appeal. The requirements which must be s a t i s f i e d before p r i v a t e property can be condemned i n Montana a r e determined by s t a t u t e . The use f o r which t h e property i s t o be taken must be authorized by law and t h e taking must be necessary t o t h a t use. Section 93-9905, R.C.M. 1947. Before a right-of-way can be condemned, t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e highway must be made i n a manner most com- p a t i b l e with t h e g r e a t e s t public good and l e a s t p r i v a t e injury. Section 93-9906, R.C.M. 1947. The r e s o l u t i o n of t h e Highway Commission c r e a t e s a disputable presumption t h a t these s t a t u t o r y requirements a r e s a t i s f i e d . Section 32-3904, R.C.M. 1947. Appellants' arguments involve two basic propositions: (1) Routing over public lands should be preferred t o r o u t e s requiring taking of p r i v a t e land, and ( 2 ) t h e record here does not make a s u f f i c i e n t showing t h a t t h e S t a t e adequately pursued t h e a l t e r n a t i v e of routing across national f o r e s t lands. The foundation f o r t h e f i r s t proposition lies i n t h e balancing t e s t of s e c t i o n 93-9906, R.C.M. 1947. A l l other fac- t o r s being equal, it seems apparent t h a t a routing over public lands would be compatible with t h e g r e a t e s t public good and would s u r e l y involve t h e l e a s t p r i v a t e i n j u r y . This proposition received a t l e a s t t a c i t recognition i n S t a t e Highway Comm'n v. Danielsen, 146 Mont. 539, 4 0 9 P.2d 443. There t h r e e p o t e n t i a l routes were a v a i l a b l e f o r a proposed highway, one following an e x i s t i n g right-of-way. Recognizing t h a t t h e e x i s t i n g l o c a t i o n would r e q u i r e t h e l e a s t confiscation of p r i v a t e land, w e held t h a t a v a i l a b i l i t y of public land was one f a c t o r which must be considered i n determining location. A demonstration t h a t t h e Highway Commission had f a i l e d t o consider t h i s f a c t o r was t h e r e s u f f i c i e n t t o rebut t h e presumption generally accorded t h e Commission's r e s o l u t i o n t o condemn. Nonetheless, p r i v a t e i n j u r y is but one of t h e consider- a t i o n s present i n a condemnation. The present record contains f a c t s relevant t o both public good and p r i v a t e i n j u r y . While t h e r o u t e across f o r e s t lands would occasion t h e l e a s t p r i v a t e i n j u r y , it would a l s o be detrimental t o t h e public good, The r o u t e on t h e e a s t s i d e of t h e v a l l e y would n e c e s s i t a t e t h e con- s t r u c t i o n of more bridges, an economic consideration adverse t o t h e public good. Avoidance of increased c o s t s a s an element of t h e public good has been recognized by t h i s Court i n S t a t e ex rel. Livingston v. D i s t r i c t Court, 90 Mont. 191, 300 P. 916. S i m i l a r l y , damage t o watershed and w i l d l i f e a r e f a c t o r s bearing on t h e public good and a r e worthy of consideration here. Given t h e s e economic and ecological f a c t o r s , we cannot f i n d c l e a r and convincing proof t h a t t h e Highway Commission abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n o r acted a r b i t r a r i l y . A s w e noted i n S t a t e Highway Comm'n v . Crossen-Nissen Co., 145 Mont. 251, 257, 400 " * * * The evidence of hardship and t h e f a c t t h a t another f e a s i b l e r o u t e , over which t h i s highway could be b u i l t , e x i s t e d d i d not supply t h e c l e a r and convincing proof required by t h i s c o u r t before it w i l l s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment f o r t h e judgment of an agency e s p e c i a l l y q u a l i f i e d f o r making such decisions. There i s a public need f o r t h i s highway. It has t o be b u i l t over some r o u t e . The Highway Commission i s authorized and q u a l i f i e d t o select t h e r o u t e , and its de- c i s i o n i n so doing appears t o be compatible with t h e g r e a t e s t public good and t h e l e a s t p r i v a t e i n j u r y . " While t h e f a c t u a l considerations before us i n Crossen-Idissen a r e n o t t h e same a s those present i n t h e i n s t a n t case, t h e c o n t r o l l i n g law remains t h e same. The r e s o l u t i o n of t h e Highway Commission c r e a t e s a d i s - putable presumption t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y requirements f o r condem- nation have been s a t i s f i e d . Section 32-3904, R.C.M. 1947. The presumption may be controverted by o t h e r evidence. Section 93-1301-7, R.C.M. 1947. The evidentiary e f f e c t of a d i s p u t a b l e presumption a r i s i n g from t h e Highway Commission's r e s o l u t i o n was c l e a r l y defined i n S t a t e Highway Comm'n v . Yost Farm Co., 1 4 2 Mont. 239, 2 4 8 , 384 P.2d 277, where w e quoted t h e following r u l e with approval : "'A d i s p u t a b l e presumption, says t h e s t a t u t e , may be controverted by o t h e r evidence. It is successfully controverted when proof t o t h e contrary s a t i s f a c t o r i l y overcomes it. B y proof which s a t i s f a c t o r i l y overcomes it, i s meant t h a t which s u s t a i n s t h e a f f i r m a t i v e of t h e issue--a preponderance of t h e evidence. I n t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n c i v i l cases a r e t o be decided according t o t h e g r e a t e r weight of t h e evidence, and a bare preponderance i n favor of t h e party holding t h e affirmative of t h e i s s u e i s s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant, and should r e s u l t i n , a decision i n h i s favor. [Citing cases.] There- f o r e , when t h e evidence preponderates a g a i n s t a disputable presumption, it "fades away i n t h e face of contrary f a c t s . " ' " The d i s t r i c t c o u r t , t h e t r i e r of f a c t here, had before it t h e s t a t u t o r y presumption buttressed by t h e testimony of t h e d i s t r i c t ranger i n whose j u r i s d i c t i o n t h e construction was pro- posed. The s o l e controverting evidence was t h e testimony of t h e defendant landowner. The evidence was weighed by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t and was found t o e s t a b l i s h , among o t h e r things, * * * t h a t s a i d highway r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e complaint has been located along a route which w i l l be most compatible with t h e g r e a t e s t public good and t h e l e a s t p r i v a t e i n j u r y . " Our review of t h e record d i s c l o s e s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h a t finding. Moreover, t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l evidence supporting t h e choice of t h e proposed route, even though a loca- t i o n on t h e f e d e r a l lands might u l t i m a t e l y have been permitted by t h e f e d e r a l government. The f a i l u r e of t h e Highway Department t o pursue t h e i r i n q u i r i e s concerning t h e f o r e s t r o u t e t o t h e highest l e v e l s of t h e f e d e r a l government lacks importance under these f a c t s . However, under appropriate f a c t s , t h e f a i l u r e of t h e Highway Department t o exhaustively pursue t h e securing of f e d e r a l o r other public lands might c o n s t i t u t e a r b i t r a r i n e s s o r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n s i m i l a r t o t h a t found i n Danielsen. The preliminary order of condemnation is affirmed. J u s t i c e > ' 3 W e Concur: / J u s t i c e 4 Mr. Justice Wesley Castles dissenting: I dissent. I would require the condemnor to prove necessity for the taking of private land when publicly owned land is available. The condemnor should be required, under these conditions, to go further in pursuing alternate routing on public lands. I do not disagree with the general'statements of law applicable here, but merely say the state did not carry its burden of proof to prove necessity. Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison: I join with Mr. Justice Wesley Castles in what he has said in his dissent.