Case Title: Harris v. Taylor

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Harris v. Taylor1998 WY 149969 P.2d 142Case Number: 98-103Decided: 12/09/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Gerald G. "Arky" HARRIS, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Burt TAYLOR, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Gaylene Harris, Deceased, Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Teton County, D. Terry Rogers, J.

 

Donald J. 
Sullivan, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Appellant.

Monty L. Barnett 
of White and Steele, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for 
Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
expedited conference; retired November 2, 1998.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      In this case, we 
consider whether WYO. R. CIV. P. 60(b) affords any relief for an untimely appeal 
of an order granting summary judgment, and if so, whether a personal injury 
creditor's failure to give notice of a claim to the estate's personal 
representative permits summary judgment against the creditor when the personal 
representative did not provide actual notice to a known creditor as required by 
WYO. STAT. § 2-7-205(a) (1997).

[¶2]      We reverse the 
district court's order of summary judgment and remand for dismissal without 
prejudice.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant Gerald 
G. Harris (Harris) presents these issues for our review:

1. Whether the 
trial court erred in granting summary judgment against Plaintiff's complaint on 
the basis of failure to file a notice of creditor's claim, where the estate had 
neither published a notice to creditors or given individual notice to 
Plaintiff.

2. Whether the 
trial court erred in ignoring the dual statutory prerequisites of publication of 
notice to creditors and individual notice to this known 
claimant.

[¶4]      Appellee, 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Gaylene Harris (Personal 
Representative), presents these issues for our review:

1. Whether this 
Court has jurisdiction over this matter.

2. Whether 
appellant's failure to file a claim with his wife's estate and have the claim 
rejected by the personal representative bars this action.

In his reply 
brief, Harris responds:

1. May a 
litigant constitutionally be deprived of his right to present his appeal based 
solely on the failure of the court to afford him notice of the court's adverse 
action?

FACTS

[¶5]      On March 23, 
1993, Harris was a passenger in a car driven by his wife, Gaylene Harris. Harris 
contends that she negligently operated the car causing it to leave the roadway, 
roll over and injure him. Mrs. Harris died on November 19, 1993, from unrelated 
causes.

[¶6]      On August 5, 
1996, Harris petitioned the district court to appoint an administrator of his 
wife's estate, stating in the petition that his request was made in order to 
file a personal injury suit against the estate. Harris requested Burt Taylor be 
appointed as personal representative of the wife's estate. Taylor was appointed 
on August 6, 1996, and Harris brought suit on February 14, 1997. On July 31, 
1997, the personal representative moved for summary judgment claiming that 
Harris had not filed a notice of claim as required by WYO. STAT. §§ 2-7-703(a) 
and 706. After receiving an extension, Harris responded to the motion for 
summary judgment on October 20, 1997, contending that notice of his claim was 
not required because the estate's personal representative had not provided him 
(Harris) notice as required by WYO. STAT. § 2-7-205(a).

[¶7]      The district 
court granted the personal representative's motion for summary judgment on 
January 8, 1998. The court did not notify or inform Harris of its decision, and 
did not serve him with the order granting summary judgment. On February 27, 
1998, well after the time for appeal had expired, Harris inquired of the court 
about the status of the pending motion and was advised that the order had been 
filed. The court clerk entered an affidavit that the failure to notify Harris of 
the summary judgment decision had been accidental and had resulted from a 
misfiling with the Clerk's office. Harris filed a notice of appeal and filed a 
motion under WYO. R. CIV. P. 60(b) asking the same court to extend the time for 
taking an appeal.

[¶8]      The district 
court reviewed the facts and the clerk's affidavit and by order extended the 
time for Harris' filing of the notice of appeal on March 11, 1998. The personal 
representative filed a motion for relief from the order, and it was 
denied.

DISCUSSION

Standard of 
Review

[¶9]      Although this 
appeal is from an order granting summary judgment, the issues relate to the 
procedural requirements of the Wyoming Probate Code, and our standard of review 
for summary judgments is superfluous.

Jurisdiction

[¶10]   The personal representative 
challenges this Court's jurisdiction to hear the case because we have ruled 
before that Rule 60 does not generally permit an amended notice of appeal where 
the party has not shown due diligence, or sufficient reason for the lack 
thereof, or other special circumstances. Ahearn v. Anderson-Bishop Partnership, 
946 P.2d 417, 423 (Wyo. 1997). The personal representative contends that Mr. 
Harris has not made this requisite showing of due 
diligence.

[¶11]   Ahearn discussed the interworking 
of the relevant rules of civil and appellate procedure which determine our 
jurisdiction in the appeal. Ahearn, 946 P.2d  at 422. WYO. R. CIV. P. 77(d) 
requires the clerk to mail a copy in the manner provided in Rule 5 to every 
party. It also states, however, that lack of notice of the entry by the clerk 
does not affect the time to appeal or relieve or authorize the court to relieve 
a party for failure to appeal within the time allowed, except as permitted by 
the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. WYO. R.APP. P. 2.01(a)(i) authorizes 
the district court to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal for another 
fifteen days past the original time prescribed for appeal. Ahearn, 946 P.2d  at 
422. In those cases where Rule 2.01 does not afford relief, we said in Ahearn 
that Rule 60 can extend the time of appeal if the party has shown due diligence, 
or sufficient reason for the lack thereof, or other special circumstances. Id. 
at 423. We ruled that the factor that the clerk did not mail notice of the entry 
of the final judgment is insufficient to afford relief under Rule 60. Id. We 
reasoned that Rule 60(b) was not intended as a means of enlarging the time for 
appeal except in compelling circumstances where justice requires that course. 
Id. (citing Kennedy v. Kennedy, 483 P.2d 516, 518 (Wyo. 
1971).)

[¶12]   Harris points out that if the 
inter-working of the rules is to be considered for extending the time of appeal, 
then it must be considered that, according to WYO. R. CIV. P. 6(c)(2), the 
personal representative's summary judgment motion is deemed denied if not 
decided within ninety days after the motion is filed. Thus, Harris had no duty 
to exercise due diligence under Ahearn after the expiration of that ninety-day 
period. We agree with Harris and will extend Rule 60(b) to allow an enlargement 
of the time for appeal to those special circumstances where summary judgment is 
entered against a nonmovant after the time has passed when the motion is deemed 
denied and a court's clerical error fails to notify the nonmovant when an order 
is issued. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal.

Probate Code's 
Statutes of Limitations and Conditions Precedent

[¶13]   The personal representative next 
argues that this action is barred under WYO. STAT. § 2-7-706 for Harris' failure 
to file a notice of claim with the personal representative of the estate under 
the rule of Scott v. Scott, 918 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1996). Harris contends that the 
statutory requirement that the personal representative give notice under WYO. 
STAT. § 2-7-205(a) is a condition precedent to a creditor's obligation to file a 
notice with the personal representative.

[¶14]   The legislature requires the 
personal representative to publish notice of admission of an estate to probate, 
WYO. STAT. § 2-7-201(1997), and to mail that notice to heirs, beneficiaries, and 
creditors, § WYO. STAT. § 2-7-205(a) (1997). Actual notice to a known or 
reasonably ascertainable creditor is constitutionally required. Hanesworth v. 
Johnke, 783 P.2d 173, 176 (Wyo. 1989). In this case, the personal representative 
knew that Harris intended to file a personal injury suit against his wife's 
estate; therefore, Harris was a known creditor entitled to actual notice under 
WYO. STAT. § 2-7-205(a) (1997). When the personal representative has given 
proper notice, WYO. STAT. § 2-7-706 (1997) requires a creditor to then file a 
claim against the estate within the time limits set out in WYO. STAT. § 
2-7-703(a) (1997). Only when these conditions are met and the claim rejected by 
the personal representative may suit be filed. See Matter of Estate of Campbell, 
950 P.2d 557, 560 (Wyo. 1997); Scott, 918 P.2d  at 201.

[¶15]   Once notice of the claim is filed 
with the personal representative and rejected, under the statute of limitations 
set out in WYO. STAT. § 2-7-718 (1997), the creditor has thirty days to file an 
action in district court. Estate of Campbell, 950 P.2d  at 560. A creditor's 
failure to comply with this statute of limitations is an affirmative defense to 
an action filed after the deadline. Id. We have held that unless there has been 
strict compliance with the notice requirements of Wyoming's Probate Code, its 
statutes of limitation are not triggered. Matter of Estate of Reed, 768 P.2d 566, 572 (Wyo. 1989). We will extend this rule to say that unless the personal 
representative has strictly complied with the notice requirements of the code, 
conditions precedent are not triggered. In this case, the failure of the 
personal representative to provide actual notice to Harris as a known creditor 
precludes a finding that Harris had an obligation to file a notice of claim 
against his wife's estate within the time frames expressed in the code. We hold 
that, in the absence of a filed claim that has been rejected, Harris' action is 
procedurally deficient, and it is subject to dismissal. Clearly, however, a 
claim against the estate is not time-barred.

[¶16]   The order granting summary judgment 
is reversed, and this case is remanded to the district court with instructions 
to dismiss Harris' action without prejudice in order for the personal 
representative to comply in the first instance with the statutory notice 
requirements.