Case Title: TIMOTHY PAUL MARTINEZ V. STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
TIMOTHY PAUL MARTINEZ V. STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 20128 P.3d 652Case Number: 04-238Decided: 02/13/2006
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
TIMOTHY PAULMARTINEZ,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth M. Koski, State Public 
Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Megan Hayes, Special 
Assistant Public Defender.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney 
General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney 
General.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In May 2004, a 
NatronaCounty jury found Timothy 
Paul Martinez (the appellant) guilty of first-degree murder for brutally beating 
his wife to death with a shotgun.  
On appeal, the appellant claims that the State violated his 
constitutional rights because he lost material and favorable trial testimony 
when law enforcement officers threatened or coerced a potential defense witness, 
that his trial attorneys were ineffective, that his sentence was 
unconstitutional, and that his sentence was based on inaccurate 
information.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Whether the State violated the 
appellant's constitutional rights by threatening or coercing a potential defense 
witness?

 
 
2.   Whether the appellant's trial 
counsel were ineffective?

 
 
3.   Whether the constitutionality of 
the appellant's sentence was raised properly in the district court?  

 
 
4.   Whether the appellant was sentenced 
based on inaccurate information?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      It is not 
necessary for us to set forth the evidentiary facts in great detail due to the 
nature of the issues raised in this appeal.  Melissa Martinez (the victim) and the 
appellant were married in 1999, and they had two children (ages two and four at 
the time of the victim's death).  By 
September 2003, the victim had decided to leave their residence in Casper and move herself and the children back to her 
parents' residence in Sinclair, Wyoming.  To that end, the victim gathered her 
possessions, sold some of the possessions at a yard sale, and rented a U-haul 
truck the weekend of September 7.  
She also arranged for her parents to meet her at 11 a.m. that Sunday to 
load the U-haul and then caravan back to Sinclair.

 
 
[¶4]      When the victim's 
family arrived at her residence on Sunday, they encountered the appellant and 
the children but were unable to locate the victim.  Law enforcement officers subsequently 
discovered the victim's body in a duffel bag in the residence's laundry room, as 
well as a shotgun that had been placed in the rafters above the laundry 
room.  The coroner opined that the 
shotgun had been used to beat the victim about the headthe victim sustained at 
least ten blows to the head, including one blow that caused a six-inch skull 
fracture.

 
 
[¶5]      The appellant was 
charged with first-degree murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(a) 
(LexisNexis 2003).  He testified in his own defense at trial 
and essentially implicated another individual, Randy Anderson, in the 
killing.  Anderson testified that he 
had nothing to do with the victim's murder.  The jury found the appellant guilty of 
first-degree murder following an eight-day trial, and the district court 
sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole.  The appellant now appeals 
from the district court's judgment and sentence.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Compulsory 
Process

 
 
[¶6]      The appellant 
argues that the State intentionally caused the loss of material and favorable 
trial testimony because law enforcement officers threatened or coerced a 
potential defense witness, thereby interfering with the witness' "free and 
unhampered choice to testify" at the appellant's trial.  According to the appellant, this conduct 
impaired his ability to present his own witnesses and establish a defense, which 
violated his constitutional rights to due process and compulsory process.1  We generally review a claim "that a 
constitutional right has been violated by applying our de novo standard of review."  Pope v. State, 2002 WY 9, ¶ 14, 38 P.3d 1069, 1072 (Wyo. 2002); see also 
United States v. Serrano, 406 F.3d 1208, 1214 
(10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 277 (2005).  

 
 
[¶7]      The pertinent 
facts are undisputed.  On April 14, 
2004, the appellant filed a list of "potential" trial witnesses, which list 
included James Friedman (Friedman).  
At the district attorney's request, two Casper police detectives interviewed Friedman the next day 
at the NatronaCountyDetentionCenter.  The detectives advised Friedman of his 
Miranda rights and Friedman proceeded 
to tell the officers about his conversation with Randy Anderson (Anderson) in January 
2004.  Anderson "boast[ed]" to 
Friedman that he was a "collector"if "somebody needed something done, he was 
the guy to go to."  Anderson claimed that he and the appellant were using 
methamphetamine the night the victim was murdered, and the appellant sent 
Anderson to 
retrieve some stereo speakers from the basement of the appellant's 
residence.  When he encountered the 
victim at the residence, the victim told Anderson that he needed to leave.  Anderson refused to leave and the victim 
produced a shotgun, which "was jammed."  Anderson ultimately took the shotgun from the 
victim and struck her twice in the face.  
The appellant arrived at the residence about fifteen minutes later and 
saw that Anderson was covered with 
blood.

            

[¶8]      Upon reviewing an 
audiotape of the interview, detective Robin Tuma (Tuma) asked Friedman if he 
would "be willing to take a polygraph test to show that the information he had 
given . . . was true."2  Friedman agreed, and Tuma scheduled the 
examination for the next morning with detective Tim Weinhandl (Weinhandl).  On April 16, Friedman was transported 
from the detention center to an interview room, where Tuma removed Friedman's 
restraints.  Weinhandl followed his 
typical examination procedure and first obtained background and biographical 
information from Friedman.  During 
this portion of the examination (which was not recorded), Friedman mentioned 
that he "was in jail awaiting a [presentence] investigation" in a different 
case.  Weinhandl had no knowledge of 
this "underlying case" prior to the polygraph examination.  Weinhandl then, as was his practice, 
informed Friedman of his Miranda 
rights and Friedman ultimately signed a form3 waiving those rights as well as a 
"release of liability form."  

 
 
[¶9]      Friedman asked 
Weinhandl what effect the polygraph "would have on him."4  At first, Weinhandl thought Friedman was 
worried about being shocked by the polygraph machine.  When Friedman clarified that he was 
actually worried "about the statement he was going to give," Weinhandl replied 
that the appellant's case was an "ongoing criminal investigation," that 
Weinhandl's purpose was "to determine whether or not the information [Friedman] 
provided us with was the truth," and that if Friedman's information "was false 
in any way, that there are possible charges that could be filed against him" 
which also could "possibl[y]" affect his pending presentence investigation.  Weinhandl denied that he threatened to 
prosecute Friedman "if he lied."  
Rather, he told Friedman that he "wanted the truth in this matter and if 
the statement that he had already given [was] the truth, fine."  The detective then asked Friedman if his 
first statement to the detectives was the truth, and Friedman said that it "was 
not"the source of the information he provided in his first interview was not 
Anderson, but 
was instead the appellant (whom Friedman had known since 2001) and another jail 
inmate.

 
 
[¶10]   Weinhandl conferred with Tuma, and 
they called the district attorney.  
According to Weinhandl, the district attorney instructed them to tell 
Friedman "that . . . changing . . . his statement at this time is 
not going to affect the deal that he has going on right now" and that whatever 
Friedman said, "we just wanted the truth"it "didn't matter if he changed [his 
statement] or not."  According to 
Tuma, the district attorney instructed them to ensure that Friedman understood 
that "even though he lied previously, it wouldn't affect his deal, and he just 
needed to tell the truth"Friedman's "deal was not impaired in any way no matter 
what he said."  The detectives 
conveyed this information to Friedman.  
Tuma also reiterated to Friedman at some point that "by telling us the 
truth now and lying prior, that had not affected what he had worked out with his 
attorney and the district attorney," and Tuma denied that he indicated that 
Friedman "should or should not testify in any particular 
manner."

 
 
[¶11]   Since Friedman had stated that his 
first taped statement was partially untrue, Weinhandl told Friedman that the 
detectives wanted him to provide them another taped statement and Friedman 
indicated "that would be fine."  
Friedman was again advised of his Miranda rights and he apparently signed 
a form waiving those rights.  He 
stated during the taped interview that he had not told the truth to the 
appellant's investigator or to Tuma the previous day regarding the source of his 
information about Anderson's alleged role in the victim's 
murderthe source was not Anderson himself, but was instead the appellant5 and another inmate.  This statement was more detailed than 
Friedman's statement the previous day and differed in some other respects that 
are not material to this appeal.  
During the statement, Weinhandl also confirmed what he had previously 
discussed with Friedman regarding Friedman's pending presentence 
investigation:

 
 
[Weinhandl:]     And we talked about a 
previous [incident] that you're already in jail for that you [inaudible] a PSI 
for?

 
 
[Friedman:]      Yes, 
sir.

 
 
[Weinhandl:]     And you have some time 
hanging over your head for that, correct?

 
 
[Friedman:]      Yes, 
sir.

 
 
[Weinhandl:]     And I informed you 
that, uh, that interfering in a criminal investigation could result in some 
other criminal charges . . .

 
 
[Friedman:]      Yes, 
sir.

 
 
[Weinhandl:]     . . . which could also 
affect your PSI that's going on right now?

 
 
[Friedman:]      Yes, 
sir.

 
 
[Weinhandl:]     And I then asked you to 
tell me the truth about this?

 
 
[Friedman:]      Yes, 
sir.

 
 
[Weinhandl:]     Whether it's the 
statement you gave before or something different?

 
 
[Friedman:]      Yes, 
sir.

 
 
Friedman 
also acknowledged on tape that he had not been threatened or promised anything, 
and no one "threatened to throw [him] in jail or do anything like that or screw 
up any deals" that he already had in place.  The detectives ended the interview and 
returned Friedman to the detention center without completing the polygraph 
examination.6

 
 
[¶12]   On April 26, 2004 (the third day of 
the appellant's trial), the appellant filed a Motion for Mistrial Based on 
State's Intimidation of Listed Defense Witness.  The district court held a hearing on the 
motion that morning.  The district 
court ultimately denied the appellant's motion, concluding that Friedman had not 
yet invoked his right to remain silent with respect to his potential trial 
testimony7 and that neither the district 
attorney, nor any of his agents, had "meaningfully interfered" with the 
appellant's right to compulsory process.8  The appellant never called Friedman to 
testify in support of his motion, or during his trial.9 

 
 
[¶13]   The United States Supreme Court has 
said that the 

 
 
right of 
an accused to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor 
stands on no lesser footing than the other Sixth Amendment rights that we have 
previously held applicable to the States.  
. . .  The right to offer the 
testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in 
plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's 
version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide 
where the truth lies.  Just as an 
accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of 
challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to 
establish a defense.  This right is 
a fundamental element of due process of law.

 
 

Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1923, 
18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1967).  See generally also Person v. State, 2004 WY 149, ¶¶ 13-14, 
100 P.3d 1270, 1276-77 (Wyo. 2004); and Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶¶ 5-6, 63 P.3d 875, 879 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶14]   The "government cannot 
substantially interfere with a defense witness's decision to testify."  Serrano, 406 F.3d  at 1215; see also United 
States v. 
Smith, 997 F.2d 674, 680 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 937 (1993).  "Interference is substantial when the 
government actor actively discourages a witness from testifying through threats 
of prosecution, intimidation, or coercive badgering."  Serrano, 406 F.3d  at 1216.  In order to

establish 
a fourteenth amendment due process violation based on the denial of the right to 
compulsory process, a defendant must establish "more than the mere absence of 
testimony."  United 
States v. 
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 3446, 
73 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1982).  There must 
be a plausible showing that an act by the government caused the loss or erosion 
of testimony that was both material and favorable to the defense.  Id.; see also United 
States v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299 (1st 
Cir.1987) (construing Valenzuela-Bernal to require a nexus 
between the challenged government conduct and the defendant's inability to 
present evidence).

 
 

Griffin 
v. Davies, 929 F.2d 550, 553 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 878 (1991).  An 
analysis of these issues "must be conducted on a case-by-case basis."  Serrano, 406 F.3d  at 1216.  

 

[¶15]   We must first determine what 
government conduct is at issue in this appeal.  It is worth noting that the premise of 
the appellant's argument is that Friedman's statement to the police on April 15 
(the "first statement") was true and that the detectives proceeded to threaten 
or coerce Friedman such that he changed this statement on April 16 (the 
detectives, of course, accepting Friedman's representation that his taped 
statement to them on April 16 (the "second statement") was the "complete 
truth").  The appellant does not 
contend that the detectives threatened, coerced, or badgered Friedman during his 
first statement.  That being the 
case, the only meaningful differences we can discern between the circumstances 
surrounding Friedman's first statement and those surrounding his second 
statement are: 1) the setting of the second statement was in connection with a 
polygraph examination that Tuma requested; and 2) during the initial stages of 
the polygraph examination, and again after the detectives conferred with the 
district attorney, Friedman and the detectives discussed what might occur if 
Friedman lied during the polygraph examination.  

 
 
[¶16]   It was not inherently inappropriate 
for Tuma to ask Friedman whether he would agree to take a polygraph examination 
in the instant case, and the appellant has not directed us to any contrary legal 
authority.  Tuma did not, based on 
the record before us, threaten, coerce, or badger Friedman into agreeing to take 
the polygraph examination.  The 
record only reflects that Tuma, for whatever reason,10 made a single request regarding 
Friedman's willingness to take the examination "to show that the information he 
had given . . . was true."  Nothing 
in the record indicates that Tuma knew of Friedman's other pending case prior to 
making this request, that he mentioned the pending case in making the request, 
or that he threatened Friedman in the event that Friedman did not agree to take 
the polygraph examination.  
Friedman, clearly informed as to the purpose of the examination, simply 
agreed.  He could just as easily 
have rebuffed Tuma.  

 
 
[¶17]   Nor can we say that Friedman was 
threatened, coerced, or badgered during the initial stages of the polygraph 
examination.  Weinhandl followed his 
standard procedure in conducting the examination and our review of the record 
does not reveal the examination to have been unduly coercive.  It is undisputed that Weinhandl did not 
know about Friedman's other pending case prior to the polygraph examination, and 
that it was Friedman who first mentioned that fact to Weinhandl.  Friedman was advised of his Miranda rights, signed a written waiver 
of those rights, and never indicated that he wanted to end the examination or to 
consult an attorney.11

 
 
[¶18]   Friedman did express some concern 
about what would happen if he lied during the polygraph examination.  Our focus, then, shifts to the 
detectives' response to Friedman's concern.  Other courts have considered whether a 
judge or a prosecutor violated a defendant's constitutional rights by advising a 
witness of the implications of perjury, which would seem to be analogous to what 
occurred in the instant case.  The 
benchmark frequently used in measuring conduct of this nature is the United 
States Supreme Court's opinion in Webb v. 
Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S. Ct. 351, 34 L. Ed. 2d 330 (1972).  The following excerpt aptly describes 
what occurred in that case:

 
 
In Webb, the Court . . . held that a trial 
court judge deprived a criminal defendant of his right to compulsory process 
when the judge threatened a defense witness with prosecution for perjury, which 
effectively prevented the witness from testifying.  At the trial, the defense called only 
one witness.  On his own initiative, 
the trial judge said to the witness:

 
 
"Now you 
have been called down as a witness in this case by the Defendant.  It is the Court's duty to admonish you 
that you don't have to testify, that anything you say can and will be used 
against you.  If you take the 
witness stand and lie under oath, the Court will personally see that your case 
goes to the grand jury and you will be indicted for perjury and the [likelihood] 
is that you would get convicted of perjury and that it would be stacked onto 
what you have already got, so that is the matter you have got to make up your 
mind on.  If you get on the witness 
stand and lie, it is probably going to mean several years and at least more time 
that you are going to have to serve.  
It will also be held against you in the penitentiary when you're up for 
parole and the Court wants you to thoroughly understand the chances you're 
taking by getting on that witness stand under oath.  You may tell the truth and if you do, 
that is all right, but if you lie you can get into real trouble.  The court wants you to know that.  You don't owe anybody anything to 
testify and it must be done freely and voluntarily and with the thorough 
understanding that you know the hazard you are taking."

 
 
The 
witness thereafter refused to testify and was excused.

 
 
            
The trial court's error, the Supreme Court said, was to gratuitously 
single out this particular witness and admonish him, at an inordinately great 
length, about the dangers of perjury.  
Instead of just "warning the witness of his right to refuse to testify 
and of the necessity to tell the truth," the judge implied that he expected the 
witness to lie and, in unnecessarily strong terms, threatened the witness with a 
perjury conviction.  These 
admonishments likely exerted significant duress upon the witness, precluding him 
from freely and voluntarily choosing whether to testify.  Such judicial threats, the Court held, 
deprived the defendant of his right to due process. . . .

 
 

State v. 
Stanley, 720 A.2d 323, 327-28 (Md. 1998) (citations omitted).  

 
 
[¶19]   However, it has been said that a 
constitutional violation does not occur in that context "merely by advising a 
witness of the possibility that he or she could face prosecution for perjury if 
his or her testimony differs from that he or she has given previously."  Smith, 997 F.2d  at 680.  

 
 
A 
prosecutor faced with the prospect of an unrepresented defense witness who may 
be asked to provide self-incriminating testimony can do no more than to advise 
the witness of the risks he may bring upon himself, presenting this advice in a 
manner calculated to engender informed and uncoerced decisionmaking on the part 
of the witness.  Where the 
prosecutor simply provides the witness with a truthful warning, no 
constitutional violation occurs. [United 
States v.] Blackwell, 694 F.2d [1325,] 1335 (D.C. 
Cir.1982).  Where, however, the 
substance of what [is communicated] to the witness is "a threat over and above 
what the record indicate[s] was timely, necessary, and appropriate," the 
inference that the [government] sought to coerce a witness into silence is 
strong.  United 
States v. Simmons, 670 F.2d 365, 369 
(D.C.Cir.1982). 

 
 

United 
States v. 
Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 847 (7th Cir. 1991).

 
 
[¶20]   We conclude, as the Seventh Circuit 
did in Jackson, 935 F.2d  at 847, that 
the detectives' response in the instant case did not amount to the "highly 
intimidating' statements, excessive in number and badgering in tone or 
phrasing,' and obviously threatening,' that past cases [(including Webb and its progeny)] have identified 
as so coercive as to raise constitutional concerns."12  (Citations omitted.)  It was Friedman, not Weinhandl, who 
initiated the discussion about what might happen if he lied during the polygraph 
examination. Weinhandl simply responded that because the appellant's case was an 
ongoing criminal investigation, charges "could" be filed against Friedman if he 
interfered with that investigation by lying, which could possibly also affect 
the pending presentence investigation Friedman had mentioned.  Importantly, Weinhandl also made it 
clear that he only sought the truth, even if the truth was what Friedman had 
said in his first statement to Tuma (which did not inculpate the 
appellant).  After Friedman 
indicated that his first statement was partially untrue, the detectives 
conferred with the district attorney.  
They then reiterated to Friedman that they only sought the truth and 
that, whether he deviated from his first statement or not, it would not affect 
his pending presentence investigation.  
Friedman agreed to provide a second taped statement, was again advised of 
his rights, and continued to maintain that his first statement was partially 
untrue.  He also acknowledged that 
he had not been threatened in any way, particularly with respect to his pending 
presentence investigation. 

 
 
[¶21]   Accordingly, we cannot say that 
Friedman's representation that his first statement was partially untrue was due 
to any governmental "threats of prosecution, intimidation, or coercive 
badgering."  The fact that Tuma 
requested the polygraph examination, during which examination Friedman then 
claimed that his first statement was partially untrue, does not, ipso facto, prove otherwise.  The nexus between the government's 
alleged conduct and the loss of material and favorable trial testimony is also 
tenuous.  The record does not 
indicate that Friedman was unwilling to testify at the appellant's trial, that 
he intended to invoke his constitutional right not to testify, or that he was no 
longer available to the defense, due to improper governmental conductFriedman 
did not testify at the motion hearing and the appellant's trial counsel 
obviously made a strategic decision not to call Friedman as a trial 
witness.  See, for example, Kitchen v. United 
States, 227 F.3d 1014, 1023-24 (7th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing between 
counsel's decision not to call witness and witness' decision to refuse to 
testify).  We, of course, have no 
idea what Friedman's trial testimony would have been had either party called him 
as a trial witness.

 
 
Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel

 
 
[¶22]   Two public defenders represented 
the appellant at trial.  On appeal, 
the appellant contends that his trial counsel were ineffective in several 
respects.  The premise of the 
appellant's argument is that his trial counsel were obligated to take additional 
steps in responding to some incidents that arose during the trial.  In that regard, the appellant relies on 
the following excerpt from Simmons v. 
State, 2003 WY 84, ¶ 26, 72 P.3d 803, 812 (Wyo. 2003):

 
 
            
At the same time, defense counsel also bears a burden to ensure such 
potential prejudice is adequately addressed.  Where counsel has failed to ask the 
trial court to admonish the jury, move for a mistrial, or raise an objection to 
the trial court's response, we have declined to reverse.  See Clegg v. State, 655 P.2d 1240, 
1241-42 (Wyo.1982) (upholding trial court's response when victim called the 
defendant a goddamn liar during his testimony); Tryon v. State, 567 P.2d 290, 293-94 
(Wyo.1977) (upholding trial court's response to report that juror received 
anonymous telephone call concerning prior acts of defendant where defense 
counsel did not move for mistrial or object); Gallup [v. State], 559 P.2d [1024,] 1026 
[(Wyo.1977)] (upholding trial court's response to courtroom altercation between 
victim's father and defendant during victim's testimony where defense counsel 
failed to object, ask for further admonition, or move for mistrial).  In such cases, we inferred defense 
counsel considered the trial court's response sufficient.  Gallup, 559 P.2d  at 1026; Tryon, 567 P.2d  at 293.  These cases illustrate the point that 
defense counsel bears a substantial burden to ensure such error is adequately 
addressed at the time it occurs.  
Where, as here, defense counsel stood silent while the proceedings were 
allowed to continue without asking the trial court to admonish the jury, give a 
corrective instruction, or even inquire of the jury whether it heard any comment 
from the audience, we hold that no violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law occurred.

 
 
Standard 
of Review 

 
 
[¶23]              
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed under the 
following standard:

 
 
When 
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount 
determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.  Herdt v. State, 
891 P.2d 793, 796 (Wyo.1995); Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 1266-67 
(Wyo.1995); Arner v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo.1994); Frias v. 
State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo.1986).  
The reviewing court should indulge a strong presumption that counsel 
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise 
of reasonable professional judgment.  
Herdt, at 796, Starr, at 1266, Arner, at 
104; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

 
 
Under the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland and Frias, an 
appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the 
record that counsel's performance was deficient and that prejudice 
resulted.  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Starr, at 1266; King v. 
State, 810 P.2d 119, 125 
(Wyo.1991) (Cardine, J., dissenting); Campbell v. 
State, 728 P.2d 628, 629 
(Wyo.1986); Frias, 722 P.2d  at 145.  In other words, to 
warrant reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant 
must demonstrate that his counsel failed to "render such assistance as would 
have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney" and that "counsel's 
deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case."  Lower v. State, 
786 P.2d 346, 349 
(Wyo.1990).  
"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result."  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.

 
 

Asch [v. State, 2003 WY 18,] ¶ 11[, 62 P.3d 945, 950 
(Wyo.2003)] (quoting Becker v. State, 2002 WY 126, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d 94, ¶ 12 
(Wyo.2002); Reyna v. State, 2001 WY 105, ¶ 19, 33 P.3d 1129, ¶ 19 
(Wyo.2001); Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, ¶ 6, 18 P.3d 1164, ¶ 6 
(Wyo.2001); Grainey v. State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 
(Wyo.2000)).  
The burden of proving that counsel was ineffective rests entirely on an 
appellant.  Asch, at ¶ 11 (citing Barkell 
v. State, 2002 WY 153, ¶ 10, 55 P.3d 1239, ¶ 10 
(Wyo.2002)).  
To satisfy his burden, an appellant must provide more than mere 
speculation or equivocal inferences.  Sincock v. State, 
2003 WY 115, ¶ 37, 76 P.3d 323, ¶ 37 
(Wyo.2003) (citing Barkell, at ¶ 13).

 
 

Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 36, 99 P.3d 928, 943 (Wyo. 
2004), cert. 
denied, 125 S. Ct. 2513 (2005).  We have further stated that the appellant 

 
 
must demonstrate the existence of a reasonable probability 
that, absent that deficiency, the result of the proceedings would have been 
different.  
Counsel's ineffectiveness must be so serious as to undermine this court's 
confidence that the outcome was fair.  Laing v. State, 
746 P.2d 1247, 1248-49 
(Wyo.1987); Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 342 
(Wyo.1987); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145-47 
(Wyo.1986).

 
 

Rutti v. State, 2004 WY 133, ¶ 23, 100 P.3d 394, 405 (Wyo. 
2004), cert. 
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1990 (2005) (quoting Lower v. 
State, 786 P.2d 346, 349-50 
(Wyo. 1990)).  A failure to "make the required showing of 
either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness 
claim."  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 700, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2071, 
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  Indeed, if "it is easier to dispose of an 
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we 
expect will often be so, that course should be followed."  Id., 466 U.S.  at 697, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069.

 
 
Victim Buttons

 
 
[¶24]   The facts relevant to this issue are 
undisputed.  
Just prior to beginning the second day of the appellant's trial, the 
district court, sua 
sponte, consulted counsel for both parties about the propriety of continuing 
to allow the victim's family to wear certain buttons in the courtroom during the 
trial.  It 
appears, based on what we can discern from the record, that the buttons at issue 
said, "We will never forget" and contained a picture of the victim.  The district court 
noted the following while discussing the issue with counsel:  1) the buttons were 
small enough that it could not see the content of the buttons from the bench 
(the buttons were not "of such size that [they] could be read");  2) the jury was 
positioned so that it faced away from the courtroom spectators, including the 
victim's family, with ten to fifteen feet separating the two; 3) when the 
victim's family entered the courtroom wearing the buttons, the jury had already 
been seated (facing away from the spectators) for the afternoon trial session; 
and 4) the district court did not see any jurors actually look at the 
buttons.  The 
prosecutor stated that the victim's family had been instructed not to wear the 
buttons during jury selection and the record does not indicate that the family 
disobeyed that instruction.13  The appellant's trial counsel asked the 
district court to prohibit the buttons from the courtroom, and the district 
court ruled that buttons "reflecting either defense or victim" should only be 
displayed outside the courtroom and outside the presence of the jury.  

 
 
[¶25]   On appeal, the appellant claims that 
the buttons at issue injected an impermissible factor into the appellant's trial 
and that the buttons therefore "inherently" prejudiced his right to a fair 
trial.  See generally Holbrook 
v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 106 S. Ct. 1340, 89 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1986); and Asch v. State, 2003 WY 18, 62 P.3d 945 (Wyo. 
2003).  The 
appellant contends that his trial counsel were ineffective, despite the fact 
that the district court ruled in their favor and excluded the buttons, because 
counsel did not ask the district court also to "make any inquiries of the jury 
[or] admonish the jury regarding the buttons."

 
 
[¶26]   While the appellant focuses his 
appellate argument on whether we should presume that his right to a fair trial 
was prejudiced under the circumstances, it remains his burden to prove that his 
counsel's performance was deficient.  We, of course, "indulge a strong presumption 
that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in 
the exercise of reasonable professional judgment."  When this issue was 
raised in the district court, the appellant's trial counsel promptly asked the 
district court to exclude the buttons, and the district court granted that 
request.  Trial 
counsel's failure to take any additional action, then, must be viewed in light 
of the following circumstances:

 
 
           
1)   
The size of the buttons was not such that their content was apparent from 
any meaningful distance.

 
 
           
2)   
It is not clear from the record how many buttons were actually present in 
the courtroom during the trial.14

 
 
           
3)   
The jury had virtually no opportunity to view the buttons in the 
courtroom.  The 
only such opportunity was during the afternoon session on the first day of the 
appellant's trial.  
The district court convened that session at 2:51 p.m.  When the victim's 
family entered the courtroom wearing the buttons, the jury had already been 
seated facing the opposite direction.  The trial resumed continuously (with no 
breaks for the jury) until the district court recessed at 5:06 p.m.  It is reasonable to 
infer from descriptions of the courtroom layout that the jury then exited the 
courtroom without facing the courtroom spectators.

 
 
           
4)   
Though it is certainly not conclusive as to whether any jurors saw the 
buttons, the district court, which had noticed the buttons and observed the jury 
during the afternoon trial session, informed counsel that it did not see any 
jurors actually look at the buttons.

 
 
           
5)   
If the appellant's trial counsel had asked the district court to take any 
further action, such action would necessarily have focused additional attention 
on the very buttons that the appellant claims were inherently prejudicial.

 
 
We cannot say that, considering these circumstances, the 
appellant's trial counsel were ineffective.           

 
 
            
Out-of-Court 
Contact with Jurors

 
 
[¶27]   Prior to beginning the sixth day of the 
appellant's trial, the district court informed counsel that the bailiff had 
expressed "some concern" because when "the jurors are exiting, there [are] a 
number of people in the hallway and they can be overheard talking."  The prosecutor 
asked if the district court knew "of any [particular] conversations" that had 
been overheard and the district court (who obviously had spoken with the 
bailiff) responded that it did not "have any conversations noted."  In order to prevent 
such an occurrence thereafter, the district court stated that it would ask the 
jurors to exit via a different stairwell, would "have any indications of any 
improper communication reported to" the court, and cautioned the courtroom 
spectators in open court as follows: 

 
 
[W]e have jurors that come in and out of the building at 
various times.  
And it's important that you be attune[d] to those jurors so that your 
conversations and statements to one another do not get overheard by those 
jurors.

 
 
            
It's important that they not be exposed to information or discussions 
concerning this case outside of the courtroom.  And so I would just ask you to be aware of 
that so that you can be attune[d] to any juror presence and limit your 
conversation in terms of volume so that that is not overheard.

 
 
When the jury recessed for lunch later that morning, the 
district court also instructed the jury (as it had throughout the trial):  1) not to discuss 
the case with anyone, including family, other jurors, or anyone involved in the 
trial; 2) not to speak with any of the parties, witnesses, or attorneys; 3) to 
immediately tell the bailiff if anyone attempted to talk to them about the 
trial; and 4) to keep an open mind until they had heard all of the evidence, the 
closing arguments of counsel, and the court's final instructions.  

 
 
[¶28]   The appellant contends that his trial 
counsel were ineffective because they did not ask the district court to question 
the jurors about any conversations that they may have overheard or to admonish 
the jury to disregard anything that it may have overheard.  Yet, it is also the 
appellant's burden on appeal to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by this 
alleged deficiency.  
The appellant asks us to presume that he was prejudiced based on the 
following principle:

 
 
            
In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering 
directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending 
before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if 
not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and 
directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the 
parties.  The 
presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government 
to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact 
with the juror was harmless to the defendant.  

Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S. Ct. 450, 451, 98 L. Ed. 654 (1954) (citations omitted).15 

 [¶29]  In order to implicate such a presumption, 
however, there must be some quantum of evidence indicating that an out-of-court 
communication or contact occurred and that it concerned "the matter pending 
before the jury."  
See 
United States v. 
Brooks, 161 F.3d 1240, 1246-47 
(10th Cir. 1998).  
It appears from our review of the record that the bailiff in the instant 
case was merely concerned that the potential for such contact existed, and did 
not indicate to the district court that she was aware of any inappropriate 
contact that had actually occurred.16  We decline to 
presume prejudice under such speculative circumstances and the appellant does 
not allege that he was otherwise prejudiced in this regard.  Accordingly, the 
appellant has not satisfied his burden with respect to this issue.   

 
 
Sleeping Juror

 
 
[¶30]   On the afternoon of the sixth day of 
the appellant's trial, the appellant's trial counsel alerted the district court 
that a particular juror might have slept during the trial for about fifteen 
minutes the previous day.  The district court discussed the matter with 
counsel for both parties, during which discussion counsel and the court placed 
their respective observations on the record.  Ultimately, the district court indicated that 
they all should continue to monitor the jurors and that the court would address 
any subsequent concerns by taking a "stretch break."

 
 
[¶31]   Despite the fact that his trial counsel 
first alerted the district court to the issue, the appellant argues on appeal 
that his counsel were ineffective because they did not then "object to the trial 
court's course of action."  It remains the appellant's burden to 
establish that he was prejudiced by this alleged deficiency.  In that regard, the 
appellant merely declares in his appellate brief that he "was prejudiced."  We "have 
consistently held that we will not consider claims unsupported by cogent 
argument or pertinent authority."  Barkell v. State, 
2002 WY 153, ¶ 32, 55 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Wyo. 
2002).  We also 
note that the juror alleged to have been asleep was an alternate juror.  The district court 
subsequently discharged the juror and the juror did not deliberate with the jury 
that reached the verdict in this case.

 
 
Autopsy Photographs

 
 
[¶32]   The appellant's remaining claims 
concern several autopsy photographs that the district court admitted into 
evidence during the prosecutor's direct examination of the coroner.  The coroner, who 
autopsied the victim, used the photographs in testifying about his autopsy 
observations and findings.  The photographs apparently were also then 
published to the jury.

 
 
[¶33]   All but three of these photographs were 
admitted into evidence without objection.  The appellant's trial counsel objected to the 
remaining three photographs on the basis that they were cumulative of the 
photographs that previously had been admitted.  The district court overruled the 
objection.  On 
appeal, the appellant contends that his trial counsel were ineffective because 
they failed adequately to object to the photographshis trial counsel should 
have objected to more of the photographs as being "prejudicial" pursuant to 
W.R.E. 403, rather than objecting to only three such photographs as being 
"cumulative."  
While the appellant mentions Rule 403 in advancing this argument, we need 
not consider this issue further because he does not endeavor to even quote the 
rule or to cite any other supporting legal authority.   

 
 
[¶34]   Interestingly, the appellant then 
asserts that his trial counsel were ineffective in handling an issue concerning 
whether a juror failed to examine these allegedly "prejudicial" photographs when 
the photographs were published to the jury.  Following the prosecutor's direct examination 
of the coroner, the appellant's trial counsel alerted the district court that a 
particular juror was "putting her eyes down when the [autopsy photographs] were 
being testified [to] by [the coroner]" and that the appellant's investigator saw 
the juror "passing the [autopsy photographs] by without looking at them, and 
actually turning them over."  The prosecutor responded that he thought the 
juror had been looking at the photographs, but not "closely."  The district court 
stated that it had "observed" the juror, and that the juror was "watching when 
the exhibits are being talked about, but she did pass them up when they were 
being handed out"the juror appeared "to be paying attention to the testimony 
and to the exhibits as [they were] being shown."  The district court vowed to "watch that" and 
if any further concern arose, the court would "then say something" to the 
juror.17

 
 
[¶35]   The appellant contends that a juror's 
"inability to view the evidence raises concerns of bias" and that his trial 
counsel should have asked the district court to determine whether the juror 
could "consider all the evidence and would not be swayed by sentiment over the 
graphic autopsy photographs."   Aside from generally citing the Simmons case we 
previously referenced, the appellant cites only State v. Clark, 981 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1998) in support of 
this argument.  
In Clark, 
981 S.W.2d  at 145, the trial court ruled that defense counsel was "not entitled 
to voir dire on specifics of the case being tried,'" including the age of one of 
the murder victims (a three-year-old girl).  Clark argued in his appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court 
that the trial court had improperly restricted voir dire.  Id. at 146.  The court found 
that under the circumstances, the victim's age was a "critical fact" that could 
"implicate personal bias and disqualify prospective jurors," and that the trial 
court's "sweeping" ruling violated Clark's right to an impartial jury because it prevented 
the defense from attempting to discover such bias.  Id. at 147.  In evaluating 
whether this violation resulted in a "real probability of injury,'" the court 
considered the prosecutor's emphasis of the victim's age during the trial and 
that "one juror left the room crying after viewing autopsy photos of" the 
victim.  
Id. at 147-48.  The court 
ultimately reversed Clark's first-degree murder convictions and remanded the 
case for a new trial.  
Id. at 148.

 
 
[¶36]   We fail to see how this authority is 
relevant to the instant case, wherein the appellant does not contend that the 
district court restricted his ability to voir dire prospective jurors.  In fact, the 
prosecutor questioned prospective jurors about their ability to view autopsy 
photographs and the appellant's trial counsel questioned prospective jurors 
about their reactions upon seeing dead bodies.  The Clark case does mention that a juror left the room 
crying after viewing autopsy photographs of the victim in the context of whether 
Clark was prejudiced by 
the district court's ruling in that case.  However, the case clearly is not persuasive 
with respect to the appellant's contentions in the instant appeal.  We further note 
that the district court in the instant case:  1) instructed the jury to "keep an open mind 
until you have heard all the evidence in this case . . ." when recessing for 
lunch immediately after the autopsy photographs were published to the jury; and 
2) instructed the jury as follows just before they were to begin 
deliberating:

 
 
            
On the other hand, it is the exclusive province of the jury to weigh and 
consider all evidence which is presented to it; to determine the credibility of 
all witnesses and evidence, to determine the issues of fact in this case.

 
 
            
This duty you shall perform with sincere judgment, and sound discretion, 
uninfluenced by pity for or passion or prejudice against any of the litigants in 
this case.  The 
law forbids you to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, 
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.  The litigants have the right to demand and 
expect that you will conscientiously and dispassionately consider and weigh the 
evidence and apply the law of the case, and that you will reach a just verdict, 
regardless of what the consequence of such a verdict may be.[18]

 
 
[¶37]   The appellant also claims that a local 
newspaper article reported that "audible gasps" could be heard from where the 
victim's family was seated in the courtroom "as graphic pictures of [the 
victim's] body at autopsy were circulated among the jury."  This information 
does not appear in the record on appealthe appellant asks that we simply take 
judicial notice of the article.19  According to the appellant, the jury "most 
likely heard" the "audible gasps" referenced in the article, his trial counsel 
should have acted to ensure that the district court took "appropriate action," 
and he "was prejudiced" by this "omission."

 
 
[¶38]   We find the appellant's argument to be 
deficient in several respects.  The only pertinent legal authority cited by 
the appellant (aside from some authority on judicial notice) is 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 254 (1991), 
which section addresses demonstrations and outbursts by trial spectators.  The excerpt cited 
by the appellant, however, specifically refers to "misconduct . . . calculated 
to influence the jury."  The alleged conduct referenced in the article 
certainly, in the absence of additional information, does not rise to that level 
and cannot even be attributed to a particular individual or individuals.  The appellant also 
fails to specify in his appellate brief what his trial counsel should have done, 
what would have constituted "appropriate action" by the district court, and, 
again, merely states that he "was prejudiced" by this unspecified 
deficiency.  
The appellant clearly has not satisfied his burden with respect to this 
issue.

 
 
Sentencing

 
 
[¶39]   The appellant raises two appellate 
issues regarding his sentence.  He first claims that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-10120 is unconstitutional essentially because in a 
non-capital case, "it allows a defendant to be sentenced to the penitentiary 
with no chance at ever again enjoying the right to liberty, solely on the whim 
of a judge" and "without any guidelines for when [a life sentence without the 
possibility of parole] is to be imposed."  The appellant cites examples from other 
states that require "the jury to [first] find additional facts" in order to 
impose a life sentence without the possibility of parole or that a particular 
aggravating circumstance justify the sentence.  According to the appellant, "[s]uch 
arbitrariness" in Wyoming 
violates the appellant's due process rights under the United 
States and Wyoming Constitutions.

 
 
[¶40]   We must first consider the manner in 
which this issue was raised in the district court.  See Hyde v. State, 
769 P.2d 376, 381 
(Wyo. 1989) (we "have held that we will not 
consider a constitutional challenge raised for the first time on appeal" unless 
it involves fundamental error affecting a substantial right of the appellant or 
involves the jurisdiction of the court).  In Hyde, 769 P.2d  at 381 (quoting Jackson v. State, 624 P.2d 751, 755 
(Wyo. 1981)), we stated that "[c]onstitutional 
questions are too important to be answered unless fully and properly 
presented.  It 
is necessary that the constitutional questions be specifically phrased and 
completely argued before it would be proper for this court to pass upon 
them.'"    

 
 
[¶41]   It is clear from the record that the 
only cogent basis for the appellant's objection to his sentence in the district 
court was that it is contrary to Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000).  At 
sentencing, the appellant's trial counsel stated only that the statute was 
unconstitutional because it violates the appellant's "due process rights under 
the state and Federal constitutions.  That it is denying him his Sixth Amendment 
rights in accordance with Apprendi . . . ."  The prosecutor responded to this contention 
by arguing that Apprendi did not apply to the statute at issue, and the 
district court ruled that there was no "basis for argument pursuant to Apprendi."

 

[¶42]   Merely stating that the statute is 
unconstitutional because it violates the appellant's "due process rights" is too 
conclusory an assertion to permit our review in the instant case.21  See Daley v. Wenzel, 2001 WY 80, ¶ 22, 30 P.3d 547, 553 (Wyo. 
2001) ("conclusory assertion hardly satisfies the well-established requirement 
of formally raising or arguing' the constitutional claims to the trial court as 
required by this Court.") (citation omitted).  To the extent that the appellant claimed that 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 is somehow contrary to the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Apprendi, we have previously rejected that argument and 
the appellant has not renewed that argument on appeal.  See Kenyon v. 
State, 2004 WY 100, ¶ 13, 96 P.3d 1016, 1022 (Wyo. 
2004), cert. 
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1389 (2005).  

 
 
[¶43]   The appellant also contends that his 
due process right to be sentenced only on accurate information was violated 
because the presentence investigation report contained the following unverified 
and "unproven, unreliable hearsay":

  

As the Defendant could not answer any questions pertaining 
to the crime itself, this [probation and parole] Agent does not know if the 
Defendant feels any remorse for his actions nor does this Agent know if the 
Defendant takes any responsibility for his actions.  However this Agent 
feels the Defendant must not take responsibility as he has consistently denied 
any culpability in this case even though he was the only one known to be in the home 
besides the victim and two (2) children.  According to reports this Agent read during 
this investigation, the two (2) children both made statements about seeing the 
Defendant harm their mother.  In fact the male child has stated "daddy shot 
mommy" and the female child has stated "mom would be mad if I told you what 
happened."

 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The appellant essentially claims that this 
information is unreliable because it "does not identify what reports [the agent] 
was reading that supported this conclusion" and "does not identify to whom the 
children made these statements or under what circumstances the statements were 
made."

 
 
[¶44]   The district court generally referred 
to this information, as well as several other considerations, in sentencing the 
appellant.  It 
noted that "while [the appellant] was consumed with the beating of his wife, 
their two children . . . experienced a living nightmare which will undoubtedly 
be forever etched in their minds," and stated that "time will determine the 
ultimate impact upon [the appellant's children.]  One hopes, despite the witnessing of their 
mother's murder, that they will overcome this loss.  With the love and 
assistance of family members, they can and will persevere."

 
 
[¶45]   Our standard of review for issues of 
this nature is as follows:

 
 
            
When imposing sentence, the trial court is given broad discretion to 
consider a wide variety of factors about the defendant and his crimes.  Mehring v. State, 
860 P.2d 1101, 1115 
(Wyo.1993); Griebel 
v. State, 763 P.2d 475, 477 (Wyo.1988).  We will not disturb a sentencing decision 
absent a clear abuse of discretion.  Jones v. State, 771 P.2d 368, 371 
(Wyo.1989).  In 
sentencing, due process provides a right to be sentenced only on accurate 
information.  
Mehring, 
860 P.2d  at 1117; Clouse v. State, 776 P.2d 1011, 1014 
(Wyo.1989).  On 
appeal, the defendant must demonstrate that the trial court relied upon the 
statements in sentencing to prevail.  Mehring, at 1115.  "However, when no objection is made 
concerning the consideration of a particular factor, review is necessarily 
confined to a search for plain error.  Plain error, as we have often stated, occurs 
when the record clearly shows an error that transgressed a clear and unequivocal 
rule of law which adversely affected a substantial right."  Hornecker v. State, 
977 P.2d 1289, 1291 
(Wyo.1999); see also 
Craver v. State, 942 P.2d 1110, 1115 (Wyo.1997).

 
 

Manes v. State, 2004 WY 70, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d 289, 292 (Wyo. 
2004).  

 
 
            
Wyoming does not permit a sentencing decision 
based upon unreliable information, undocumented information, or inaccurate 
information.  
Mehring, 
860 P.2d  at 1117; DeLoge v. State, 2002 WY 155, ¶ 13, 55 P.3d 1233, ¶ 13 (Wyo.2002).

 
 

Id., 2004 WY 70, ¶ 13, 92 P.3d  at 293.  In Bitz v. State, 2003 WY 140, ¶ 14, 78 P.3d 257, 260-61 (Wyo. 2003), we further stated:

 
 
            
In Christy 
[v. State], 
731 P.2d [1204,] 1207-08 [(Wyo.1987)], we determined that the trial court may 
consider "filed reports and information" at sentencing, so long as the defendant 
is given the opportunity "to deny, dispute, or disprove."  Two years later, in 
Smallwood [v. State], 771 P.2d 
[798,] 802 [(Wyo.1989], we described this as "an opportunity to rebut 
pre-sentence information which is materially false or which furnishes invalid 
premises for the sentence which the judge is imposing."  In Clouse [v. State], 776 P.2d 
[1011,] 1015 [(Wyo.1989)], we made clear that it is the defendant's obligation 
to object to any sentencing information he contends is inaccurate.  And in Johnson [v. State], 790 P.2d 
[231,] 236 [(Wyo.1990)] (quoting Christy, 731 P.2d at 1208), we stated that 
objecting is not alone sufficient and we reiterated that a defendant must 
challenge the accuracy of the information and has the duty to "deny, dispute, or 
disprove" it. 

 
 

See also W.R.Cr.P. 32(a).

 
 
[¶46]   We first note that, contrary to the 
appellant's argument, other information contained in the presentence 
investigation report supports the passage to which he now objects.  The report quotes 
the sworn affidavit that was filed in support of the Information charging the 
appellant with first-degree murder.  That affidavit states that on September 8, 
2003, Mike Baden and Donna Allred (trained forensic interviewers employed by the 
Department of Family Services) each interviewed one of the appellant's two 
children.  One 
child stated that he or she was present when the appellant and the victim 
"became involved in an argument," that the victim "had been harmed by the gun," 
and that the appellant had been "cleaning up blood at the residence."  The other child 
stated that he or she saw "an individual, identified by the content of the 
conversation as [the appellant], shoot an individual, identified by the content 
of the conversation as [the victim,] in the face with a gun."

 
 
[¶47]   Furthermore, the district court 
expressly provided the appellant an opportunity to dispute the passage at issue 
during his sentencing hearing.  Prior to the August 13, 2004 sentencing 
hearing, the State filed a notice of its intent to present Mike Baden's and 
Donna Allred's testimony as to the children's observations the day the victim 
was murdered, and videotapes of their interviews of the children.  The appellant's 
trial counsel objected to the presentation of such evidence.  However, in 
discussing the appellant's objection with the district court, the prosecutor 
indicated more than once that there would be no need to present the evidence if 
the appellant did not dispute the information contained in the presentence 
investigation report.  
The district court then inquired as to whether the appellant had any 
"additions, corrections, or modifications that [he believed to be] necessary to 
verify the factual [accuracy] of the materials set forth" in the report.  The appellant's 
trial counsel directed the district court to two such issues, but never sought 
to deny, dispute, or disprove the information that the children were present 
during the murder.  
That being the case, we cannot find on the record before us that the 
district court sentenced the appellant based on unreliable, undocumented or 
inaccurate information.

 
 
[¶48]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, in pertinent part:  "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 
in his favor . . . ."  
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in 
pertinent part:  
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."

 
 
The appellant also argues that his rights pursuant to the 
Wyoming Constitution were violated.  See Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 10.  
However, the appellant merely notes that we are "free to grant more 
rights to our citizens under the Wyoming Constitution than they are entitled to 
have under the United States Constitution'" and asks that we "hold that his 
constitutional rights to due process and compulsory process under the Wyoming 
Constitution were violated by the actions of the government in depriving [the 
appellant] of important exculpatory evidence."  To the extent that the appellant asks us 
independently to interpret the Wyoming Constitution, this analysis does not 
constitute the "precise, analytically sound approach [required] when advancing 
an argument'" to do so.  Vassar v. State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 14, 99 P.3d 987, 993 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 484 
(Wyo. 1999)).  We will therefore analyze this issue 
according to federal constitutional authority.

 
 

2Friedman was the only individual that Tuma attempted to 
polygraph in this case.

 
 

3The document informs the subject of his "right to remain 
silent," to "talk to an Attorney before we ask you any questions, and to have 
him with you during questioning," and to "stop answering questions at any time 
during this interview."

 
 

4Tuma was observing the examination through a two-way mirror 
and confirmed that Friedman, not Weinhandl, initiated the conversation regarding 
Friedman's other pending case.

 
 

5Friedman stated that the appellant did not tell him to 
fabricate the fact that Anderson told him this 
information.

 
 

6Tuma testified that the polygraph examination was not 
completed because Friedman "changed his statements and said that the information 
he gave us [on April 16] was the truth"; the statement the officers intended to 
polygraph him on "had already changed," but if Friedman "had wanted to take [the 
examination], then, yes, we could have continued."

 
 

7In the event that Friedman did so, the district court indicated that it would conduct an in camera 
proceeding to determine whether or not Friedman's invocation was "in any way 
related to the communications he has had with the prosecution in this case."

 
 

8The appellant does not appeal the district court's denial 
of his mistrial motion.

 
 

9The appellant's trial counsel indicated during the hearing 
that "a significant portion of the . . . [appellant's] case has been compromised 
and whether we can clean it up or clear it up, I don't know."

 
 

10Neither party asked Tuma specifically why he requested the 
polygraph examination.

 
 

11Interestingly, the appellant appears to suggest that the 
detectives intimidated Friedman by "repeatedly" informing him of his Miranda 
rights.  We 
note that the detectives advised Friedman of his Miranda rights 
during his first taped statement, which statement the appellant does not claim 
was coerced.  
The detectives did not deviate from that practice during the polygraph 
examination or when Friedman provided his second taped statement.  We also note that 
Miranda 
advisements have been characterized as measures taken to insure that the right against compulsory 
self-incrimination is "protected."  See Mackrill v. State, 2004 WY 129, ¶ 14, 100 P.3d 361, 365 (Wyo. 
2004).  
Surely, if the detectives had not advised Friedman of his rights, the 
appellant would have relied heavily on that in claiming that the detectives had 
coerced Friedman.  
Advising Friedman, who was in custody and could have incriminated himself 
during the polygraph examination, of his rights was not inappropriate or 
unnecessary in the instant case. 

 
 

12The appellant cites numerous cases in his principal and 
reply briefs as examples of governmental conduct that "can deprive" a defendant 
of his compulsory process and/or due process rights.  We have reviewed 
these cases, and we do not feel compelled to distinguish them on an individual 
basis because the cases generally involve government conduct that is more 
egregious than the conduct at issue in the instant case or conduct that arose in 
a substantially different context. 

 

13On appeal, the appellant claims that the prosecutor's 
representation indicates that the prosecutor was "coaching the victim's 
family."  That 
claim is speculative based on the record before usthe prosecutor merely stated 
that the family members "were instructed not to wear [the buttons] during jury 
selection[]."  
One could just as easily infer that the prosecutor, if indeed he was the 
one that gave the instruction, was attempting to accommodate the family's desire 
to express itself while minimizing any potential prejudice to the 
appellant.  
Nevertheless, the appellant's trial counsel did express some concern 
about this to the district court and we are not certain what more the 
appellant's counsel were legally obligated to do in that regard.

  

14The appellant's trial counsel stated that "in excess of 17 
people" he believed to have been associated with the victim's family were 
present in the courtroom during the morning trial session.  However, nothing in 
the record indicates how many of them (assuming that number to be accurate) 
attended the afternoon trial session and also wore the buttons.

 
 

15See generally also United States v. Scull, 321 F.3d 1270, 1280-81 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 864 (2003); Sisneros v. Laramie, 773 P.2d 933, 935-37 (Wyo. 
1989); and Skinner 
v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶¶ 12-14, 33 P.3d 758, 762-64 (Wyo. 
2001), cert. 
denied, 535 U.S. 994 (2002).   

  

16There is no evidence that a juror or anyone else reported 
such a contact in response to the district court's instructions.

 
 

17The appellant also claims that the district court observed 
this same juror crying when the autopsy photographs were published to the 
jury.  However, 
the district court noted only that the juror "grabbed a Kleenex, but [did not] 
seem to be crying significantly or anything."  The appellant claims that his trial counsel 
should have requested that the district court inquire as to whether the juror 
could "carry out her duties properly" and "consider all the evidence."  We need not 
consider this issue further because the argument is not accompanied by any 
citation to pertinent legal authority and the appellant merely states that he 
"was prejudiced" by his counsel's alleged deficiency.

 
 

18The district court had given the jury a similar instruction 
prior to opening statements.

 
 

19We do not express any opinion regarding the propriety of 
taking judicial notice of the article.

 
 

20Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-101 provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows:

 
 
            
(a) Whoever purposely and with premeditated malice . . . kills any human 
being is guilty of murder in the first degree.

 
 
            
(b)  A 
person convicted of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death, life 
imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment according to law . . . .

 
 
            
(c)  A 
person convicted of murder in the first degree in a case in which the state 
seeks the death penalty shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of 
W.S. 6-2-102.  
In all other cases, including any case in which the state has determined 
not to seek the death penalty at any stage of the proceeding, the judge shall 
determine the sentence of life imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment 
taking into consideration any negotiated plea agreement and any evidence 
relevant to a determination of sentence which the court deems to have probative 
value.

 
 

21The appellant does not argue that this issue is fundamental 
in nature or involves the jurisdiction of the court.