Case Title: Miller v. City of Laramie

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93-182

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-09-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Miller v. City of Laramie1994 WY 83880 P.2d 594Case Number: 93-182Decided: 09/07/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Gerald 
R. MILLER,

Petitioner,

v.

The 
CITY OF LARAMIE,

Respondent.

 

Appeal 
from District Court.

 

Representing 
Petitioner:

Christopher 
H. Hawks, Director, Lawyers and Advocates for Wyoming, 
Jackson.

Representing 
Respondent:

Douglas 
K. Bryant of Corthell & King, Laramie.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE*, MACY and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

* 
Retired July 6, 1994.

CARDINE, 
Justice, Retired.

[¶1]      We granted a 
petition for review to consider Gerald R. Miller's claim that his right of free 
speech, as guaranteed by Art. 1, § 20 of the Wyoming Constitution and the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution was abridged by the City of 
Laramie's littering ordinance. Petitioner Miller was convicted of the crime of 
littering for distributing his free newspaper, The Adviser, by 
house-to-house delivery.

[¶2]      We hold that the 
record here readily demonstrates that The Adviser burdened the City of 
Laramie in an extraordinarily minor way and that, likewise, the burden placed on 
the citizens of Laramie and private property in that city was exceedingly 
trivial. We are confident that the vast majority of citizens will agree that 
such insignificant and slight burdens are a small price to pay for a free 
society - and then hasten to add that even a solid majority may not extend its 
prohibitions in such a manner as to violate the United States or the Wyoming 
Constitutions. Therefore,

[¶3]      We 
reverse.

[¶4]      Miller 
articulates these grounds for appellate review:

A. 
The Petitioner's actions and conduct in causing copies of "The Adviser" 
to be placed on the front porches, in the yards and on the grounds of the homes 
of several Laramie residents is conduct entitled to protection under the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article One Section 20 of the 
Wyoming Constitution.

(i) 
The City of Laramie's interest in preventing the visual blight caused by the 
unrequested door-to-door distribution of the Petitioner's free weekly newspaper 
does not outweigh the defendant's fundamental rights of free speech, press and 
circulation.

B. 
Prosecuting Mr. Miller for littering is not a reasonable time, place and manner 
restriction on Mr. Miller's conduct because Mr. Miller did not exercise his 
right of free speech in a public forum.

(i) 
The District Court's reliance on Schenck v. The United States [249 U.S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919)] to affirm the decision of the Municipal 
Court's conviction of Mr. Miller was a misapplication of the law and should be 
disregarded.

C. 
Prosecuting the publisher of a free weekly newspaper for littering violates his 
rights of equal protection when his paper is delivered consistent with other 
area papers with the exception that it is done so without 
subscription.

[¶5]      The City of 
Laramie abbreviates the controversy with this contention:

Whether 
application of the City of Laramie's litter ordinance to the unrequested 
placement of copies of The Adviser upon private residential properties 
violates the [Petitioner's] constitutional rights as to speech and 
press.

[¶6]      The First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:

Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances.

[¶7]      Article 1, § 20 
of the Wyoming Constitution provides: 

Every 
person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible 
for the abuse of that right; and in all trials for libel, both civil and 
criminal, the truth, when published with good intent and [for] justifiable ends, 
shall be a sufficient defense, the jury having the right to determine the facts 
and the law, under direction of the court.

[¶8]      The City of 
Laramie Municipal Ordinance § 8.20.030 provides:

It 
is unlawful for any person to throw, discard, place or deposit, or cause to be 
thrown, discarded, placed or deposited, litter in any manner or amount on any 
public or private property within the corporate limits of the city except in 
containers or areas lawfully provided therefor.

And 
Ordinance § 8.20.010(A) defining litter provides:

A. 
"Litter" is any quantity of uncontainerized paper, metal, plastic, glass, animal 
feces, or miscellaneous solid waste which may be classed as trash, debris, 
rubbish, refuse, garbage or junk.

[¶9]      Miller 
distributed a free weekly newspaper, The Adviser, in Laramie. 
Approximately 6,000 copies of the newspaper were delivered door to door by 
depositing the paper on the porches of residences and buildings. In some 
instances, the papers came to be on the lawns, driveways or sidewalks of Laramie 
residences. An additional 1,000 copies were distributed by other means such as 
news racks. Miller did not solicit subscriptions nor did he seek the consent of 
residents before making delivery. The Adviser contained community news; sources 
of free information on such things as recipes, voice programming, parenting, and 
healthful sleep; sports stories; television programming for the coming week; a 
crossword puzzle; horoscope column; gossip column; a children's page; want adds; 
and numerous advertisements.

[¶10]   Our recital of facts herein is from 
the exhibits, stipulated statement of evidence by the parties, and the record in 
this case. The audiotape transcript of testimony was erased by the clerk of the 
municipal court after the record was returned following appeal to the district 
court. The erasure occurred during the appeal process. Our choices at this point 
are to reverse and remand for new trial for lack of a record, through no fault 
of petitioner, or decide this appeal on the record before us. We think the 
exhibits, admissions, stipulation of the parties and record are sufficient for 
our decision in this appeal.

[¶11]   By information filed on February 1, 
1993, Miller was charged with seven counts of littering based upon complaints 
made by seven Laramie residents. The complaints were tried before a municipal 
judge on March 22, 1993. Miller was found guilty on four counts and not guilty 
on one count (apparently because the testimony of that witness was to the effect 
that the paper was found on his porch; all others testified that the papers were 
found on their sidewalks, driveways or in their yards). The complaints which 
alleged littering on the same day were consolidated, resulting in the 
disposition of the other two counts. Miller was fined $50.00 per count and 
assessed $10.00 costs, for a total fine of $210.00.

[¶12]   A timely notice of appeal was 
filed, and the convictions were reviewed by the district court. Miller's only 
defense throughout trial, on appeal, and in this petition for writ of review is 
that the littering statute, as applied to the delivery of his newspaper, was a 
violation of his constitutional right of free speech and equal protection. The 
district court affirmed the convictions, finding that the restrictions created 
by the littering ordinance were reasonable time, place and manner restrictions 
on the right of free speech.

[¶13]   Miller's petition for writ of 
review in this court was granted September 29, 1993. The parties have agreed 
that the newspaper in question contained news, advertising and other 
information; and no question is directly posed as to whether it was commercial 
or noncommercial speech. It is a necessary first step in our analysis, however, 
to expressly acknowledge that, because of its varied content, the newspaper must 
be categorized as noncommercial. See Ad World, Inc. v. Township of 
Doylestown, 672 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (3rd Cir. 1982). Because it is 
noncommercial speech, it is entitled to the full protection of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as Art. 1, § 20 
of the Wyoming Constitution. See Edenfield v. Fane, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 
113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798, 123 L. Ed. 2d 543, 552-53 (1993); Ad World, 672 F.2d  
at 1140. Purely commercial speech is tested against a more relaxed standard. 
Edenfield.

[¶14]   Miller has maintained from the 
beginning that the Laramie ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to the 
distribution of his newspaper. The general rule is that one who alleges 
unconstitutionality bears a heavy burden and must clearly and exactly show the 
unconstitutionality beyond any reasonable doubt. Pauling v. Pauling, 837 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Wyo. 1992). However, that rule does not apply where a citizen's 
fundamental constitutional right, such as free speech, is involved. The strong 
presumptions in favor of constitutionality are inverted, the burden then is on 
the governmental entity to justify the validity of the ordinance, and this Court 
has a duty to declare legislative enactments invalid if they transgress that 
constitutional provision. See Witzenburger v. State ex rel. Wyoming Community 
Dev. Auth., 575 P.2d 1100, 1114 (Wyo. 1978), reh'g denied 577 P.2d 1386. The rule we apply under the circumstances of this case 
is:

Where 
rights, privileges, and immunities of the citizen are involved, the usual strong 
presumption in favor of constitutionality does not apply, and this rule is 
applicable to First Amendment rights. This is true in situations involving the 
right of freedom of expression or thought, or of speech, or association, or of 
the press, or of religion. Under some authority, the usual presumption in favor 
of constitutionality is merely weaker where the statute arguably inhibits 
fundamental rights.

Indeed, 
it is the rule that where the governmental action impinges on a fundamental 
constitutional right the usual presumption is inverted, and the presumption, 
sometimes characterized as heavy, is against the constitutionality of a statute 
or governmental action involving a right explicitly or implicitly secured by the 
Constitution, including a right secured by the First Amendment, such as freedom 
of speech or expression. Moreover, every reasonable presumption against waiver 
of fundamental constitutional rights is indulged by the courts and they do not 
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. In view of the inversion 
of the usual presumption of constitutionality, the burden is on the state of 
justifying the validity of the statute or other governmental action, as by a 
demonstration that the statute serves a compelling governmental 
interest.

(footnotes 
omitted) 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, § 106a (1984); and see Parrish v. 
Lamm, 758 P.2d 1356 (Colo. 1988); Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1982); 
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972). Thus, we are duty bound to strictly scrutinize the 
ordinance in the light of the preeminent role played by the First Amendment in 
our free society.

[¶15]   The City of Laramie directs our 
attention to the fact that its littering ordinance prohibits all littering, 
without regard to whether it is commercial or noncommercial, and without regard 
to whether it relates to matters of politics, religion or whatever. In other 
words, not only does the ordinance affect (prohibit) the delivery of The 
Adviser, but it also prohibits the depositing of litter which contains a 
religious, political, or any other sort of message. Thus, the question posed 
boils down to whether Laramie may place a complete ban on speech, a form of 
prior restraint, if that speech is in a form which may eventually be viewed as 
litter.

[¶16]   The record from the trial in 
Laramie Municipal Court does not sustain Laramie's argument that the ordinance 
is merely a ban on litter in any form which, therefore, easily passes 
constitutional muster. The City of Laramie had an onerous burden of 
demonstrating clearly and precisely that the ordinance is, in fact, applied in a 
nondiscriminatory manner. From this record, we discern that based on a mere 
handful (perhaps not more than a dozen out of some 7,000 papers distributed 
weekly) of citizen complaints that the newspaper was found in their yards, 
Miller was prosecuted for littering. There was no evidence adduced by Laramie 
that the ordinance is generally enforced, or at least often enforced. The record 
makes no suggestion that the ordinance is generally enforced against those who 
"litter" in a more traditional sense of that "crime" (see W.S. 6-3-204 
(1988)). Moreover, the proof of littering in this instance was based solely upon 
rather gossamer circumstances, e.g., that the newspaper was found in the 
yard (was it placed there by Miller, or did it blow there, or did a dog drag it 
there, etc.); that it was found on the sidewalk (again without any demonstration 
of how it arrived at that location - might a disgruntled citizen carry it to the 
street and deposit it there and assert that the publisher is consequently 
responsible? - Is this publisher any more responsible for where his newspaper 
was found than is a fast food restaurant for waste products that bear its 
logo?). As noted above, the burden must fall on Laramie to demonstrate that the 
restrictions imposed on speech by its littering ordinance are narrowly tailored 
to achieve the goal of reducing litter and that any time, place and manner 
restrictions that might affect Miller and those similarly situated are guardedly 
balanced in a constitutional sense.

[¶17]   Counsel for the City of Laramie 
maintain that Miller should not be entitled to have his acts of littering be 
regarded as protected speech. Quite the contrary is the case: Miller is entitled 
to have his right of free speech not curtailed by an ordinance designed solely 
to prevent littering:

We 
are of [the] opinion that the purpose to keep the streets clean and of good 
appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person 
rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing to receive 
it. Any burden imposed upon the city authorities in cleaning and caring for the 
streets as an indirect consequence of such distribution results from the 
constitutional protection of the freedom of speech and 
press.

Schneider 
v. New Jersey, 
308 U.S. 147, 162, 60 S. Ct. 146, 151, 84 L. Ed. 155, 165 (1939); and see 
McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 24.389 (3rd ed. 1989). In this case, though clear 
proof is absent, it would appear from the few complaints that 6,990 persons may 
have been willing to receive The Adviser.

[¶18]   The parties had stipulated that the 
Laramie policeman testified that petitioner's newspaper, as it lay before him in 
the courtroom, was not litter. Apparently, according to Laramie, it became 
litter when it was found on the sidewalk and petitioner was then guilty of a 
crime without any proof that petitioner was responsible for the newspaper being 
on the sidewalk - surely a questionable result. We also suggest that the Laramie 
ordinance, on its face, demonstrates a legislative intent that a newspaper like 
The Adviser is not litter, litter being defined as "trash, debris, rubbish, 
refuse, garbage or junk." But that is unnecessary to our decision 
here.

[¶19]   We hold that Laramie may not ban 
all distribution of noncommercial speech materials which it views as litter 
under its wide-sweeping ordinance. It may place reasonable restrictions on such 
distributions so long as they do not have the effect of squelching legitimate 
speech which is protected by the constitution and so long as Laramie can 
demonstrate that other substantial means of communicating such speech are 
meaningfully available, including economic feasibility. See e.g., 
Distribution Systems of America, Inc. v. Village of Old Westbury, 785 F. Supp. 347 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Project 80's, Inc. v. City of Pocatello, 942 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1991). Balancing the constitutional right of free speech with 
the evidence adduced by Laramie to sustain the validity of its ordinance, we 
find that the minor burden of receiving Miller's paper was indisputedly 
outweighed by his right of free speech and that the justification for 
restrictions upon distribution (finding a few papers in a driveway, on a 
sidewalk or street) which resulted in violation of the ordinance were not 
reasonable.

[¶20]   We hold that the ordinance, as 
applied to Miller, violated constitutional guarantees. Hence, we remand with 
directions that the district court further remand to the municipal court for 
vacation of the convictions and dismissal of the littering 
charges.

[¶21]   Reversed and remanded with 
directions that the convictions for littering be vacated and that the charges 
against Miller be dismissed.

MACY, 
J., filed an opinion specially concurring.

GOLDEN, 
C.J., filed a dissenting opinion.

MACY, 
Justice, specially concurring.

[¶22]   I concur in the result reached by 
the majority but for a different reason. If it were not necessary to dance 
through the "litter" of cases in deciding whether the ordinance is or is not 
constitutional, I would join in the dissent of Chief Justice Golden. I do not, 
however, think that it is necessary to invoke the Constitution to decide this 
case. Pisano v. Shillinger, 835 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Wyo. 1992); Wheeler 
v. Parker Drilling Company, 803 P.2d 1379, 1383 n. 1 (Wyo. 
1991).

[¶23]   The ordinance in question states 
that litter includes uncontainerized paper which may be classified as being 
trash, debris, rubbish, refuse, garbage, or junk. Those words clearly describe 
anything which has been discarded as being of no value. There is a total lack of 
proof that The Adviser had been discarded as being of no value. The proof was to 
the contrary.

GOLDEN, 
Justice, dissenting.

[¶24]   As indicated by this court's 
previous freedom of speech and press decisions, there can be little doubt of our 
relentless concern to avoid abridgments to freedom of expression. But this 
trivial city ordinance hardly qualifies as a menace to those revered freedoms. 
It neither suppresses content nor prohibits distribution and, as applied by the 
trial court, cannot even be said to prohibit THE ADVISER from being distributed 
door to door except when that distribution is so careless as to be littering. 
Such innocuous regulation of littering is not a speech or press violation and I 
must dissent.

[¶25]   The record is clear that Laramie 
punished Mr. Miller for those distributions of his newspaper that were 
carelessly strewn about neighborhoods.1 The record is also clear that Mr. 
Miller was acquitted in those instances where the newspaper was placed on the 
porch of the household. This distinction indicates that, as the record stands, 
Laramie is neither making a content-based determination of what newspapers shall 
or shall not be distributed nor unreasonably restricting distribution, but is 
controlling "litter."

[¶26]   Appellant contends that the 
constitutional violations occur when the ordinance is applied to his newspaper 
distribution and sweepingly states that every law which impinges on free 
expression is to be strictly scrutinized. In other words, any limitation on 
freedom of expression is unconstitutional; quite candidly, this is a banal 
argument routinely rejected by the United States Supreme Court since the 1943 
case of Martin v. Struthers, when it recognized that "the peace, good 
order and comfort of the community may imperatively require regulation of the 
time, place and manner of distribution." Martin, 319 U.S. 141, 143, 63 S. Ct. 862, 863, 87 L. Ed. 1313, 1317 (1943). Appellant attempts to assert the 
ordinance violates WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 20, but finds it of such insignificance 
that his only reference to the provision is as "passim" in his table of 
contents. Accordingly, appellant provides no analysis, authority, or cogent 
argument concerning the state constitutional provision's application to the 
issues. Instead, appellant relies on federal case law and does not distinguish 
between the two provisions of the two constitutions.

[¶27]   This court has previously 
admonished Wyoming lawyers that it is imperative they properly brief this court 
on relevant state constitutional questions. Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc. 839 P.2d 903, 909 (Wyo. 1992). "To develop and prove [his] position with respect to 
the state constitutional provision, [Miller], and any other similarly situated 
litigant, must use `a precise, analytically sound approach.' Counsel must 
provide this court with proper arguments and briefs to ensure the future growth 
of this important area of law." Dworkin 839 P.2d  at 909 (quoting Robert 
F. Utter, Advancing State Constitutions in Court, TRIAL, Oct. 1991, at 
45). "Recourse to the Wyoming Constitution as an independent source for 
recognizing and protecting the individual rights of our citizens must spring 
from a process that is articulable, reasonable, and reasoned." Saldana v. 
State, 846 P.2d 604, 621 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 813 (1986)) (Golden, J., concurring). Appellant's 
failure to properly brief the state constitutional arguments limits our review 
to his federal constitutional arguments.

[¶28]   The United States Supreme Court's 
modern day jurisprudence requires that in noncommercial speech 
cases:

The 
normal inquiry that our doctrine dictates is, first, to determine whether a 
regulation is content-based or content-neutral, and then based on the answer to 
that question, to apply the proper level of scrutiny.

Ladue 
v. Gilleo, 
___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2047, 129 L. Ed. 2d 36, 50 (1994) (O'Connor, 
J., concurring).

[¶29]   If a regulation is content-neutral, 
the United States Supreme Court has upheld reasonable "time, place, or manner" 
restrictions when justified without reference to the content of speech. Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 675 (1989); Martin, 319 U.S.  at 143, 63 S. Ct.  at 863, 87 L. Ed.  at 
1316-17.

[¶30]   Although THE ADVISER is primarily 
comprised of commercial speech, I agree with the majority's initial 
classification of THE ADVISER as noncommercial speech and concur that it is 
entitled to full first amendment protection. See Central Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1980). Although the majority makes no determination of the 
ordinance's effect upon free speech, that is, whether it is content-based or 
content-neutral, the language and level of scrutiny employed forces an 
assumption that the majority must have concluded it is a content-based 
regulation. I find no basis for such a conclusion.

[¶31]   I am of the opinion that the 
ordinance is constitutionally valid as a reasonable, time, place and manner 
regulation. The United States Supreme Court has upheld justified "time, place 
and manner" regulations which are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest and leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information. See Ward, 491 U.S.  at 791, 109 S. Ct.  at 
2753, 105 L. Ed. 2d  at 675. Laramie justifies the ordinance as a means to achieve 
its significant interest in maintaining clean streets. The United States Supreme 
Court has stated that cities have a legitimate interest in clean streets. See 
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162, 60 S. Ct. 146, 151, 84 L. Ed. 155, 165, 
(1939); Martin, 319 U.S.  at 143, 63 S. Ct.  at 863, 87 L. Ed.  at 
1316-17.

[¶32]   The Court specifically stated in 
Schneider that the guarantee of freedom of speech or of the press does 
not "deprive a municipality of power to enact regulations against throwing 
literature broadcast in the streets. Prohibition of such conduct would not 
abridge the constitutional liberty since such activity bears no necessary 
relationship to the freedom to speak, write, print or distribute information or 
opinion." Schneider, 308 U.S.  at 1611, 60 S. Ct.  at 151, 84 L. Ed.  at 165. 
Following the instructive advice of Schneider, this court "should be 
astute to examine the effect of challenged legislation" in each case in which 
legislative abridgment of the fundamental personal rights and liberties of 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press is asserted.

Mere 
legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may 
* * * be insufficient to justify [regulation which] diminishes the exercise of 
rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases 
arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the 
circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in 
support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the 
rights.

Schneider, 
308 U.S.  at 161, 60 S. Ct.  at 151, 84 L. Ed.  at 165.

[¶33]   In Schneider, the 
distributors of literature on a public street had been convicted by the city for 
littering. The Schneider court's analysis revealed the facts to indicate 
that although the distributors were convicted of littering, it was actually the 
persons receiving the literature who were throwing it down on the streets. Under 
these facts, the Court explained that "any burden imposed upon the city 
authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets as an indirect 
consequence of such distribution results from the constitutional protection 
of the freedom of speech and press." Schneider, 308 U.S.  at 162, 60 S. Ct. 
at 151, 84 L. Ed.  at 165. (Emphasis added). But, the Court observed that such 
constitutional protection does not deprive a city of all power to prevent street 
littering and among the obvious methods of preventing littering is to punish 
those who actually throw papers on the street. Id.

[¶34]   In significant contrast to the 
facts of Schneider, an ordinance which punished a citizen who merely 
handed a leaflet to a passing pedestrian who in turn threw the leaflet on the 
ground, the facts of the case before us present an ordinance which punished a 
citizen who was found at trial to have actually thrown papers on "driveways, 
yards, sidewalks, a window well, the street, and a snow bank." Thus, in my view, 
this ordinance falls within that class of those "obvious methods of preventing 
littering" which the Court expressly referred to as passing constitutional 
muster, namely, an ordinance which punishes those who actually throw papers on 
the ground. Clearly, the Laramie ordinance does not punish the citizen who 
merely hands the paper to a passing pedestrian; instead, it has punished only 
that citizen who has thrown the paper on a driveway, yard, sidewalk, the street, 
or snow bank, or into a window well. Under the facts of this case, Mr. Miller 
was not punished when he threw the paper on the residence porch or doorstep. It 
is clear that the ordinance reasonably regulates the manner of distribution 
without reference to content, is serving a significant governmental interest and 
leaves open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. I 
would hold there has been no constitutional violation and affirm the 
convictions.

Footnotes

1 The newspapers were found in yards, driveways, snowdrifts, the street, 
and a window well.