Case Title: Acadia Resources, Inc. v. VMS, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 126

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 126 
Docket: 
Cum-16-457 
Submitted 
On Briefs: May 25, 2017 
Decided: 
June 22, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
ACADIA RESOURCES, INC. 
 
v. 
 
VMS, LLC, et al. 
 
 
SAUFLEY, C.J. 
[¶1]  Acadia Resources, Inc., appeals from a judgment of the District 
Court (Portland, Woodman, J.) dismissing its fraudulent transfer complaint as 
having been filed outside the applicable statute of limitations.  Because we 
agree with Acadia that the court should have treated the motion to dismiss 
filed by VMS, LLC, and VEI, LLC, as a motion for summary judgment, we vacate 
the judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings.   
 
[¶2]  In April 2016, Acadia filed a complaint against VMS and VEI 
alleging the following facts.  Acadia agreed to lend VMS money through a line 
of credit on or about August 3, 2006.  In November 2008, VMS defaulted on 
the agreement by failing to pay amounts due, which remain unpaid.  After the 
default, on April 21, 2010, VMS executed a deed to VEI of real property located 
 
2 
on Middle Road in Falmouth.  The deed was recorded eight months later, on 
December 21, 2010.   
 
[¶3]  Acadia’s complaint alleged that the transfer of real property from 
VMS to VEI violated the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 14 M.R.S. §§ 3575, 
3576 (2016).  VMS and VEI moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to M.R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the ground that the applicable six-year statute of 
limitations began to run on April 21, 2010, and therefore expired on April 21, 
2016—one day before the date that the docket record indicates Acadia’s 
complaint was filed.  See 14 M.R.S. § 3580 (2016).   
 
[¶4]  Acadia objected to the motion and argued, among other things, 
that the motion to dismiss should be treated as a motion for summary 
judgment because extrinsic evidence showed that the complaint was filed on 
April 21, 2016, not April 22, 2016, as docketed.  Acadia’s attorney attached an 
affidavit from her paralegal averring that she had sent the complaint to the 
clerk’s office by overnight mail on April 20, 2016, and the paralegal included 
as an exhibit to that affidavit a FedEx receipt showing that a clerk had signed 
for the parcel containing the complaint and filing fee on the morning of 
April 21, 2016.   
 
3 
 
[¶5]  Without hearing further from the parties, the court granted the 
motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice.  Acadia appealed from the 
judgment of dismissal.  See 14 M.R.S. § 1901 (2016); M.R. App. P. 2.   
 
[¶6]  When a party has moved to dismiss a complaint for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, but “matters outside the pleading 
are presented to and not excluded by the court,” the court must treat the 
motion “as one for summary judgment.”  M.R. Civ. P. 12(b); see Estate of Kay v. 
Estate of Wiggins, 2016 ME 108, ¶ 9, 143 A.3d 1290; Angell v. Hallee, 2012 ME 
10, ¶ 12, 36 A.3d 922.  When a motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for 
summary judgment, “all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.”  M.R. 
Civ. P. 12(b); see Beaucage v. City of Rockland, 2000 ME 184, ¶ 5, 760 A.2d 
1054. 
 
[¶7]  Here, Acadia’s submission of extrinsic evidence in the form of an 
affidavit with exhibits, including a FedEx receipt, converted the motion to 
dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, cf. Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery 
Comm’n, 2004 ME 20, ¶ 11, 843 A.2d 43, and the court erred in failing to 
proceed with the summary judgment process, see M.R. Civ. P. 12(b), 56.  
 
4 
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of dismissal and remand for further 
proceedings.1 
The entry is: 
Judgment dismissing the complaint vacated.  
Remanded for further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Allison A. Economy, Esq., Rudman Winchell, Bangor, for appellant Acadia 
Resources, Inc. 
 
Thomas L. Douglas, Esq., Douglas McDaniel Campo & Schools LLC, PA, 
Westbrook, for appellees VMS, LLC, and VEI, LLC 
 
 
Portland District Court docket number RE-2016-9 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                         
1  Acadia also argues on appeal that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until 
December 21, 2010, when the deed from VMS to VEI was recorded in the registry of deeds, citing to 
14 M.R.S. § 3577(1)(A) (2016) and 33 M.R.S. § 201 (2016).  Acadia may raise that and any other 
pertinent issues for the motion court’s full consideration on remand.