Case Title: Ex parte Marvin Gray.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1180999

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2020-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
rel:   April 24, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1180999
____________________
Ex parte Marvin Gray
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Ruthie Thomas
v.
Marco Trevino, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, and Marvin Gray)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-19-900114)
STEWART, Justice.
Marvin Gray petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the Montgomery Circuit Court ("the trial court") to
1180999
dismiss an amended complaint filed by Ruthie Thomas naming him
as a defendant on the ground that the claims asserted against
him in the amended complaint are barred by the applicable
statute of limitations. Because we conclude that the amended
complaint relates back to the filing of the original complaint
under Rule 15, Ala. R. Civ. P., we deny the petition.
Facts and Procedural History
On January 19, 2017, Thomas was involved in two-vehicle
automobile accident with Gray in a parking lot in Montgomery.
On January 18, 2019, Thomas filed a complaint alleging
negligence and wantonness and naming Marco Trevino as a
defendant.1 According to the parties, Trevino was not involved
in the accident and was, instead, the law-enforcement officer
who responded to and investigated the accident.
On April 17, 2019, 89 days after she filed the original
complaint, Thomas filed a motion for leave to amend her
complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. In the
motion, she asserted that she had made "scrivener's errors" 
resulting in the incorrect identification of one of the
1Thomas also asserted a claim for uninsured-motorist
coverage against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company and included fictitiously named defendants A, B, and
C as defendants.
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defendants in the original complaint. That same day, Thomas
filed an amended complaint naming Gray as the defendant in
place of Trevino.2 On April 29, 2019, the trial court granted
Thomas's motion for leave to amend the complaint. 
Gray filed a motion to dismiss the claims against him,
asserting that he was not added as a defendant until after the
statute of limitations had expired. Gray argued that the
amended complaint did not relate back to the filing of the
original complaint because, he argued, it did not satisfy the
requirements of Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., regarding
fictitiously named defendants. In particular, Gray asserted
that Thomas was aware of Gray's name 12 days following the
accident and well before the expiration of the statute of
limitations. In support of his motion, Gray attached as
exhibits a January 2017 letter from Gray's insurance company
addressed to Thomas that identified Gray as the policyholder
and an envelope from Thomas addressed to Gray's insurance
company postmarked January 31, 2017.
Thomas filed a response to Gray's motion to dismiss in
which she asserted that "due to a mere clerical error,
2Gray does not dispute that he was served with the amended
complaint. 
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[Thomas] named an incorrect party in the style and body of the
Complaint." Thomas argued that her amendment was timely under
Rule 15 and that she was permitted to correct a clerical error
under Rule 60(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. Thomas also asserted that
the amended complaint related back to the filing of the
original complaint under Rule 15(c)(3). 
Gray filed a reply to Thomas's response in which he
asserted, among other things, that Thomas had failed to
establish an "identity of interests" between him and Trevino
and that, accordingly, the amended complaint could not relate
back to the original complaint. The trial court denied Gray's
motion to dismiss, which we treat as a motion for a summary
judgment.3 Gray timely filed a petition for a writ of mandamus
to this Court.
Standard of Review
"'"'A 
writ 
of 
mandamus 
is 
an
extraordinary remedy, and it "will be
issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order
sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a
3Because the trial court had before it materials outside
the pleadings that it did not expressly decline to consider,
Gray's motion to dismiss was converted into a motion for a
summary judgment. Ex parte Novus Utils., Inc., 85 So. 3d 988,
995 (Ala. 2011).
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1180999
refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court."'" Ex parte
Monsanto Co., 862 So. 2d 595, 604 (Ala.
2003) (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d
173, 176 (Ala. 2000), quoting in turn Ex
parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So.
2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993)). ... A petition
for a writ of mandamus ... is the proper
means to seek review of an order denying a
motion to dismiss or for a summary judgment
filed by a defendant added after the
statute of limitations has run, under Rule
15(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., which governs
the relation back of amended complaints
when the defendant has received notice of
the action so that the defendant will not
be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on
the merits and the defendant knew or should
have known that, but for a mistake
concerning the identity of the proper
party, the action would have been brought
against the defendant. See, e.g., Ex parte
Empire Gas Corp., 559 So. 2d 1072 (Ala.
1990) ....' 
"Ex parte Novus Utilities, Inc., 85 So. 3d 988, 995
(Ala. 2011)."
Ex parte Profit Boost Mktg., Inc., 254 So. 3d 862, 866 (Ala.
2017). 
Discussion
Gray contends that Thomas's amended complaint naming him
as a defendant in lieu of Trevino was barred by the two-year
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limitations period prescribed in § 6-2-38(l), Ala. Code 1975.4
Gray contends that the amended complaint did not relate back
to the filing of the original complaint under Rule 15(c).
Thus, he argues, the statute of limitations was not tolled and
he is entitled to a writ of mandamus directing the trial court
to dismiss the claims against him as being filed outside the
statute of limitations. Thomas argues that the failure to name
Gray in the original complaint was a clerical error, that the
trial court was permitted to allow the correction pursuant to
Rule 60(a), and that the amended complaint relates back to the
original complaint under Rule 15(c)(3).5 Accordingly, Thomas
contends, the filing of the original complaint tolled the
statute of limitations for asserting claims against Gray.
4Section 6-2-38(l) provides that "[a]ll actions for an
injury to the person or rights of another not arising from
contract and not 
specifically enumerated in this section shall
be brought within two years."  
5Thomas also argues that Gray did not meet the burden
required for a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.
We note that, generally, "the denial of a motion to dismiss
based upon Rule 12(b)(6) is not reviewable by a petition for
a writ of mandamus." Ex parte Nautilus Ins. Co., 260 So. 3d
823, 831 (Ala. 2018) (citing Ex parte Kohlberg Kravis Roberts
& Co., L.P., 78 So. 3d 959 (Ala. 2011)).
 
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We first examine the parties' contentions concerning the
relation-back doctrine in Rule 15(c)(3). Generally, a party
may amend a pleading pursuant to Rule 15 without leave of
court "at any time more than forty-two (42) days before the
first setting of the case for trial, and such amendment shall
be freely allowed when justice so requires." Rule 15(a). 
Under Rule 15(c), 
"[a]n amendment of a pleading relates back to the
date of the original pleading when
"(1) relation back is permitted by the law that
provides the statute of limitations applicable to
the action, or
"(2) the claim or defense asserted in the
amended 
pleading 
arose 
out 
of 
the 
conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to
be set forth in the original pleading, except as may
be 
otherwise 
provided 
in 
Rule 
13(c) 
for
counterclaims maturing or acquired after pleading,
or
"(3) the amendment, other than one naming a
party under the party's true name after having been
initially sued under a fictitious name, changes the
party or the naming of the party against whom a
claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is
satisfied and, within the applicable period of
limitations or one hundred twenty (120) days of the
commencement of the action, whichever comes later,
the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has
received such notice of the institution of the
action that the party will not be prejudiced in
maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or
should have known that, but for a mistake concerning
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1180999
the identity of the proper party, the action would
have been brought against the party, or
"(4) relation back is permitted by principles
applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to
Rule 9(h)."
Rule 15(c)(3) "applies to a plaintiff's attempt to amend in
order to correctly identify a defendant included in or
contemplated by the plaintiffs' original complaint." Profit
Boost Mktg., 254 So. 3d at 870. Because Thomas amended the
complaint to correct the name of a defendant, we apply this
subsection to our relation-back analysis.
Rule 15(c)(3) provides three criteria that must be met
before an amended complaint can relate back to the original
complaint.  First, the claim asserted in the amended complaint
must meet the criteria specified in Rule 15(c)(2), i.e., the
claim in the amended complaint "arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set
forth in the original pleading." Second, "within the
applicable period of limitations or one hundred twenty (120)
days of the commencement of the action, whichever comes later,
the party to be brought in by amendment" must have "received
such notice of the institution of the action that the party
will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the
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1180999
merits." Finally, within that same time frame, the party to be
added must know or should have known "that, but for a mistake
concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would
have been brought against the party."
Gray does not dispute that Thomas's claims against Gray
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth
in the original complaint, thus satisfying the first Rule
15(c)(3) criterion. Moreover, Gray does not assert that he did
not know that, but for Thomas's mistake naming Trevino as the
defendant, the action would have been brought against him. As
a result, the third Rule 15(c)(3) criterion has also been
satisfied. Gray's argument focuses on the second criterion of
Rule 15(c)(3), and Gray contends that he did not receive
notice within 120 days of its commencement that the action had
been commenced, because, he argues, Thomas failed to 
establish
an "identity of interest" between him and Trevino. 
In support of his identity-of-interest argument, Gray
relies on Bank of Red Bay v. King, 482 So. 2d 274, 280 (Ala.
1985), Ex parte Novus Utilities, Inc., 85 So. 3d 988, 995
(Ala. 2011), and Profit Boost Marketing, supra. However,
although those cases address the application of the relation-
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1180999
back doctrine to amended complaints under Rule 15(c)(3), they
are procedurally inapposite to the present case. 
In Bank of Red Bay, the plaintiffs asserting fraud claims
against a bank filed an amended complaint nearly one year
after the filing of the initial complaint to add additional
plaintiffs. The bank alleged that the added plaintiffs learned
of the purported misrepresentations underlying the fraud
claims 16 months before the filing of the amended complaint
and that, therefore, the claims were barred by the statute of
limitations. Citing Manning v. Zapata, 350 So. 2d 1045 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1977), this Court examined three elements of a test
established by the Court of Civil Appeals to determine whether
the amended complaint related back:
"(1) [That] there was the requisite 'identity of
interest,' (2) [that] the claim arose out of the
same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as set
forth in the original complaint, and (3) [that] the
defendant was given notice when the initial
complaint was filed ...."
Bank of Red Bay, 482 So. 2d at 280. In concluding that the
amendment adding the additional plaintiffs satisfied those
three elements, this Court held that there was an identity of
interest between the initial plaintiffs and the added
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1180999
plaintiffs sufficient for the doctrine of relation back to
apply. Id.
In his petition, Gray seeks to apply the three elements
referenced in Bank of Red Bay to Thomas's amended complaint in
the 
present 
case. 
Bank 
of 
Red 
Bay, 
however, 
is
distinguishable. Bank of Red Bay addressed the addition of
plaintiffs –- not defendants –- to an action, and this Court
noted that "Rule 15(c) can be applied by analogy to amendments
changing plaintiffs." Bank of Red Bay, 482 So. 2d at 279-80.
In addition, the amended pleading in Bank of Red Bay was filed
nearly a year after the original complaint and well outside
the 120-day time frame in Rule 15(c)(3). An examination of the
identity-of-interest between the initial plaintiffs and the
new plaintiffs was necessary to determine whether the new
plaintiffs had implicit notice of the proceedings within 120
days of the commencement of the action. 
Gray's reliance on Novus Utilities, supra, and Profit
Boost Marketing, supra, in support of his contention that
there is no identity of interest between him and Trevino is
equally misplaced. In Profit Boost, the amended complaint was
filed, and the subsequent defendant served, more than 120 days
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1180999
after the action was commenced, and the issue was whether the
notice of the suit had been imputed to the new defendant
within 120 days of the commencement of the action. In Novus
Utilities, the plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint
almost three years after the commencement of the action to
name Novus Utilities, a subsidiary of the original defendant,
as a defendant. The question presented in that case was
whether Novus Utilities received notice of the 
commencement of
the action by virtue of the suit being brought, initially,
against its parent company. This Court held that Novus
Utilities had notice of the commencement of the action, that
Novus Utilities would not be prejudiced in defending the
action, and that the amended complaint related back to the
original complaint naming the parent company as a defendant. 
In the present case, an inquiry regarding an identity of
interest between Trevino and Gray is not necessary. Gray, who,
as the petitioner, has the burden to establish a clear legal
right to the relief he seeks, does not dispute that he
received notice of the commencement of the action within the
120-day period prescribed by Rule 15(c)(3).  The identity-of-
interest 
inquiry 
is 
relevant 
only 
to 
determine 
the
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relationship between the original defendant and the new
defendant when the plaintiff is trying to establish, by virtue
of that relationship, that notice of the action was imputed to
the new defendant within 120 days of its commencement. As this
Court stated in Novus Utilities:
"The party added must have received notice of the
institution of the action within the applicable
limitations period or within 120 days of the filing
of the original complaint (whichever comes later) so
that it is not prejudiced in maintaining a defense
on the merits. Rule 15(c)(3). A court may impute
notice of the institution of an action against the
original defendant to a subsequently named defendant
if there is an 'identity of interests.' See Bank of
Red Bay v. King, 482 So. 2d 274, 280 (Ala. 1985)."
85 So. 3d at 1001.
It is evident from the materials presented to the trial
court, and to this Court on mandamus review, that Thomas made
a mistake concerning the identity of the defendant in the
original complaint. Thomas filed the amended complaint naming
Gray as a defendant 89 days after she filed the original
complaint, which was within the 120-day period prescribed by
Rule 15(c)(3). As explained above, Gray does not dispute that
he was served with the amended complaint or that he otherwise
received notice of the commencement of the action before the
expiration of the 120-day period. In addition, Gray does not
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assert that he will suffer any prejudice from defending the
action on the merits. Because Gray has failed to establish
that he did not have proper notice of the complaint within 120
days of the commencement of the action and because Gray has
not alleged the existence of any prejudice resulting from
maintaining a defense on the merits, Gray has not demonstrated
that Thomas's amendment should not relate back to the filing
of the original complaint under Rule 15(c)(3).
Because we conclude that the amendment of the complaint
to add Gray as a defendant was proper and because Gray has not
satisfied his burden for mandamus relief, we need not address
the parties' contentions concerning the purported application
of Rule 60(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., to a plaintiff's mistake in
identifying 
a 
defendant 
in 
an 
original 
complaint. 
Furthermore, it is undisputed that Thomas did not substitute
Gray for a fictitiously named defendant and that she was aware
of Gray's identity before she filed the original complaint;
therefore, Rule 15(c)(4) is not applicable, despite the
parties' discussion of that subsection in their arguments
before this Court. 
Conclusion
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A petitioner carries a heavy burden in securing mandamus
relief. See Ex parte McWilliams, 812 So. 2d 318, 321 (Ala.
2001). Based on the materials before this Court, Gray has not
demonstrated a clear legal right to have the claims against
him dismissed, and the trial court correctly denied the motion
for a summary judgment. Accordingly, his petition is denied.
PETITION DENIED.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, and
Mitchell, JJ., concur.  
Sellers, J., concurs in the result.
15