Case Title: White v. City of Newport

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Elwanda WHITE v. CITY of Newport

96-1                                               ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered November 25, 1996


1.   Municipal corporations -- municipal immunity from tort -- city
     may be liable to extent it carries liability insurance. --
     Arkansas Code Annotated 21-9-301 (Repl. 1996) provides that
     municipalities are immune from tort actions except to the
     extent that they carry liability insurance. 

2.   Statutes -- power of legislature over common law -- when
     common law may be altered. -- Constitutional provisions
     concerning a citizen's right to redress were adopted to
     prevent arbitrary or unreasonable legislative abrogation of a
     cause of action; the legislature must be permitted to alter
     the common law when it stands in the way of a reasonable
     public-policy objective; the legislature must be able to
     adjust the law to the changes of time and circumstance; a
     literal reading of Ark. Const. art. 2,  13, or art. 5,  32,
     could prevent the use of such concepts as comparative fault,
     or the abolition of such outdated causes of action as
     alienation of affection.

3.   Statutes -- enactment of municipal-tort-immunity statute a
     reasonable means of achieving permissible public-policy
     objective -- statute not violative of Arkansas Constitution. -
     - In section four of Act 165 of 1969, the legislature declared
     that, in the absence of municipal tort immunity, cities were
     facing the imminent threat of bankruptcy and vital public
     services were in danger of being discontinued; the municipal-
     tort-immunity statute makes city governments bear some
     responsibility for their negligence by allowing recovery to
     the extent of insurance coverage but prevents the cities from
     being exposed to high judgments that would destroy them; the
     legislature's enactment of the municipal-tort-immunity statute
     was a reasonable means of achieving a permissible public-
     policy objective; therefore, Ark. Code Ann.  21-9-301 does
     not violate Article 2,  13, or Article 5,  32, of the
     Arkansas Constitution.


     Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court; Harold Erwin, Judge;
affirmed.
     H. David Blair, for appellant.
     Stanley Montgomery and David C. Schoen, for appellee.

     Bradley D. Jesson, Chief Justice.  
     At issue in this case is the constitutionality of Ark. Code
Ann.  21-9-301 (Repl. 1996), known as the municipal tort immunity
statute.  The appellant claims that the statute violates Article 2,
 13, and Article 5,  32, of the Arkansas Constitution.  The trial
court upheld the constitutionality of  21-9-301, and we affirm.
     The city of Newport owns and operates an ambulance service. 
On May 18, 1992, Dorse White, the husband of the appellant, Elwanda
White, began experiencing heart-attack symptoms.  Mrs. White dialed
911, and the city's ambulance service responded.  Mr. White was
taken to Harris Hospital in Newport, then transferred to Baptist
Medical Center in Little Rock.  He died on May 30, 1992.  On April
29, 1994, Mrs. White filed a complaint against the city alleging
that the failure of the ambulance attendants to perform
resuscitative measures on her husband constituted negligence which
was the proximate cause of his death.  The complaint further
alleged that the city's operation of the ambulance service was a
proprietary, as opposed to a governmental, activity.  The city
moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it was immune from
liability, pursuant to  21-9-301.  The trial judge considered Mrs.
White's argument that the statute violated Article 2,  13, and
Article 5,  32, but he found no constitutional infirmity.  Mrs.
White's complaint was dismissed, and she brings this appeal. 
     Article 2,  13, of the Arkansas Constitution reads as
follows:

     Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws
     for all injuries or wrongs he may receive in his person,
     property or character;  he ought to obtain justice
     freely, and without purchase, completely, and without
     denial, promptly, and without delay, conformably to the
     laws.

     The pertinent portion of Article 5,  32, of the Arkansas
Constitution reads:

     [N]o law shall be enacted limiting the amount to be
     recovered for injuries resulting in death or for injuries
     to persons or property. . . .


     Mrs. White contends that the municipal tort immunity statute
abridges her rights under these two constitutional provisions.  To
fully understand the issues presented, it is helpful to take a
brief glimpse into the history of municipal tort immunity in
Arkansas.  Our earliest opinions on the subject, City of Little
Rock v. Willis, 27 Ark. 572 (1872), and Mayor of Helena v.
Thompson, 29 Ark. 569 (1874), offer a brief, if somewhat confusing,
exploration of the municipal-immunity concept.  A careful reading
of those cases does indicate an acceptance of the most basic idea
that cities might be held liable for negligence in certain limited
situations, though not in others.  In Trammell v. Town of
Russellville, 34 Ark 105 (1879), we elaborated on the ideas that
were touched upon in Willis and Thompson.  For the first time, we
expressly introduced the concept that a city could be held
accountable for its negligence while performing in a proprietary
capacity, but could not be held liable for its negligence while
performing in a governmental capacity.  The
governmental/proprietary distinction became the polestar of
municipal immunity cases through the 1950's.  A police officer's
enforcement of the law, Franks v. Town of Holly Grove, 93 Ark. 250,
124 S.W. 514 (1910);  the operation of an electric plant, City of
Little Rock v. Holland, 184 Ark. 381, 42 S.W.2d 383 (1931);  the
maintenance of a city swimming pool, Yoes v. City of Fort Smith,
207 Ark. 694, 182 S.W.2d 683 (1944); and the operation of a garbage
truck, Kirksey v. City of Fort Smith, 227 Ark. 630,