Case Title: Roehm v. Woodruff

Citation: 327 P.2d 339, 64 N.M. 278

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1958-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
327 P.2d 339 (1958) 64 N.M. 278 B. J. ROEHM, Petitioner, v. Theodore WOODRUFF, Warden of the New Mexico State Penitentiary, Respondent. No. 6369. Supreme Court of New Mexico. July 8, 1958. Santiago E. Campos, Santa Fe, for petitioner. Fred M. Standley, Atty. Gen., Robert F. Pyatt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Alfred P. Whittaker, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent. COMPTON, Justice. This is an original proceeding in habeas corpus. Petitioner was charged by information with having committed "the crime of embezzlement or fraudulent conversion, contrary to Section 40-45-19, New Mexico Statutes 1953 Annotated, in that he did embezzle or fraudulently convert to his own use property belonging to W.E. Mathers." Upon his arraignment for the offense charged, he entered a plea of guilty and was thereupon sentenced to serve a term in the State Penitentiary of not less than one year nor more than ten years. Petitioner asserts that the information is void for failure to allege the value of the property embezzled; and consequently that he was denied due process, contrary to Art. II, § 14, New Mexico Constitution. The contention requires a construction of the following statutory provisions: (1) or more of the following ways: Petitioner does not correctly evaluate the office of habeas corpus. In habeas corpus proceeding the information or indictment under which a petitioner was sentenced is not open to review on grounds of deficiencies therein. Such proceeding is a collateral attack upon the judgment and the only question for decision is whether the trial court possessed jurisdiction of the parties, jurisdiction of the subject matter, and the power to impose the sentence. Ex part Kelley, 57 N.M. 161, 256 P.2d 211; Smith v. Abram, 58 N.M. 404, 271 P.2d 1010, 1012. We readily conclude the trial court was vested with both jurisdiction and the power. Jurisdictional essentials were alleged, the entrustment of the property of another and its unlawful conversion, and the power to impose sentence therefor is expressly conferred by statute. Otherwise stated, jurisdiction does not depend upon the value of the property embezzled; value merely denotes the grade of the offense. In Smith v. Abram, supra, we said: We do not mean to hold, however, that an information charging embezzlement should not allege value. Obviously § 41-6-14, supra, is not without purpose. Had the sufficiency of the information been raised on motion to quash, motion in arrest of judgment, or on appeal, a different conclusion might well be reached. Smith v. Abram, supra; Ex parte Kelley, supra; State v. Lucero, 17 N.M. 484, 131 P. 491; State v. Jaramillo, 25 N.M. 228, 180 P. 286; State v. Anaya, 28 N.M. 283, 210 P. 567; State v. Overton, 193 Tenn. 171, 245 S.W.2d 188; Hogoboom v. State, 120 Neb. 525, 234 N.W. 422, 79 A.L.R. 1171; State v. Wilson, 150 La. 873, 91 So. 249. It is generally held, and almost without exception, in habeas corpus that the form of an indictment or information is not open to review unless the petitioner has suffered prejudice from it. The cases on the subject are collected under Key Number 30(2), Habeas Corpus, Sixth Decennial Digest. From what transpired, it is obvious petitioner was not prejudiced by failure to allege value. We quote: It is our conclusion that petitioner has been denied no right or privilege granted him under our constitution. The alternative writ should be discharged and it is so ordered. LUJAN, C. J., and SADLER, McGHEE, and SHILLINGLAW, JJ., concur.