Case Title: American Family Ins. Co. v. Bowen

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-276

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
American Family Ins. Co. v. Bowen1998 WY 73959 P.2d 1199Case Number: 97-276Decided: 06/15/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant (Applicant for 
Intervention),

v.

Richard S. BOWEN, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District Court, Albany County, 
Jeffrey A. Donnell, J.

 

Paul D. Schierer of Pence 
and MacMillan, Laramie, for Appellant(Applicant for 
Intervention).

Michael W. Strain of Morman 
Law Firm, Sturgis, SD, for Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

MACY, Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant American Family Insurance Company 
appeals from the order which denied its motion to intervene and its motion to 
vacate a default judgment.

 

[¶2] We 
affirm.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶3] American Family 
presents the following issues for our review:

 

I. 
Did the District Court err in denying Appellant's Motion To Vacate 
Judgment?

 

A. Were the Affidavit of Julie Urbaniak and Bowen's 
Resistance to American Family's Motions properly before the District Court for 
consideration when filed after the deadline provided by Rule 6(c)(1), Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure?

 

B. Did Bowen fail to establish personal jurisdiction 
over Defendant Harris under the Wyoming Non-Resident Motorist Statute, W.S. § 
1-6-301?

 

[C]. Should this Court rule the January 2, 1996, 
Judgment void, regardless of the District Court's decision on 
intervention?

 

II. Did the District Court err in denying Appellant's 
Motion To Intervene as untimely filed?

 

A. Were the Affidavit of Julie Urbaniak and Bowen's 
Resistance to American Family's Motions properly before the District Court for 
consideration when filed after the deadline provided by Rule 6(c)(1), Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure?

 

B. Can an attack against a void judgment entered 
without personal jurisdiction ever be considered untimely?

 

                                    
          FACTS

 

[¶4] On February 20, 1993, 
Appellee Richard Bowen was injured when his car collided with a car driven by 
David Harris on Interstate 80 near Laramie. Harris was a resident of the State 
of Washington and did not have insurance. Bowen was an Iowa resident, and 
American Family was his uninsured motorist carrier. American Family initially 
refused, however, to pay for most of Bowen's medical 
bills.

 

[¶5] On May 22, 1995, Bowen 
filed a complaint in the district court against Harris. He also sent copies of 
the complaint, summons, and demand for a jury trial to American Family and 
invited it to intervene in the action. American Family did not intervene at that 
time.  Bowen attempted to serve 
Harris with process by following the procedure set out in Wyoming's nonresident 
motorist statute, WYO. STAT. § 1-6-301 (1997). He served the Secretary of State 
with copies of the complaint and summons, but his efforts to serve Harris by 
mail were not successful. Harris did not answer the 
complaint.

 

[¶6] At Bowen's request, the 
district court filed an order on November 14, 1995, in which it directed the 
clerk of court to enter a default against Harris. Bowen notified American Family 
of the entry of default and informed the insurer that a hearing to determine his 
damages was scheduled for December 18, 1995. After the hearing, the district 
court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered a default 
judgment in the amount of $86,000.

 

[¶7] Bowen initiated an 
action in Iowa against American Family to collect on the Wyoming default 
judgment. After Bowen commenced the collection action, American Family filed a 
motion to intervene in the Wyoming case and a motion to vacate the default 
judgment against Harris. American Family claimed that the default judgment was 
void because Bowen did not properly serve Harris with process and that the 
district court, therefore, did not have personal jurisdiction over 
Harris.

 

[¶8] After holding a 
hearing, the district court issued a decision letter and filed an order, denying 
American Family's motions. American Family appealed to this 
Court.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

[¶9] American Family 
contends that the district court erred when it denied its motion to intervene in 
the action between Bowen and Harris. W.R.C.P. 24(a) sets forth the standard for 
intervention as a matter of right:

 

(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application 
anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:

 

          
(1) When a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; 
or

 

(2) When the applicant claims an interest relating to 
the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant 
is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter 
impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the 
applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing 
parties.

 

[¶10] American Family 
maintains that it was entitled to intervene under W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2). In State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Colley, 871 P.2d 191 (Wyo. 1994), 
this Court outlined four conditions which must be satisfied before a party may 
intervene under W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2).

 

First, the applicant must claim an interest related 
to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action. Second, the 
applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a 
practical matter, impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that 
interest. Third, there must be a showing that the applicant's interest will not 
be adequately represented by the existing parties. Fourth, the application for 
intervention must be timely. An applicant who fails to meet any one of these 
conditions is not permitted to intervene as of right under W.R.C.P. 
24(a)(2).

 

871 P.2d  at 194 (citations 
omitted).

 

[¶11] In this case, the 
district court and the parties focused on the fourth factor; i.e., the 
timeliness of American Family's motion to intervene. The district court has 
discretion in determining the timeliness of an application to intervene. Id. We 
will reverse a district court's decision only when an abuse of discretion has 
been demonstrated. Id.

 

[¶12] Four factors are 
utilized to ascertain whether an application to intervene was timely. 871 P.2d  
at 197.

 

First, the length of time the applicant for 
intervention knew or reasonably should have known of its interest in the case 
before the application for leave to intervene was filed. Second, the extent of 
the prejudice that the existing parties to the litigation may suffer as a result 
of the applicant's failure to seek intervention as soon as the applicant 
actually knew or reasonably should have known of its interest in the case. 
Third, the extent of the prejudice that the applicant for intervention may 
suffer if the application is denied. Fourth, the existence of unusual 
circumstances militating either for or against a determination that the 
application is timely.

 

Id. (citations omitted). We 
evaluate the totality of the circumstances of a case in determining the 
timeliness of an application to intervene under W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2). Id.; see also 
Curless v. Curless, 708 P.2d 426, 432 (Wyo. 1985).

 

[¶13] We must first address 
American Family's argument that the district court should have granted its 
motion to strike Bowen's resistance to American Family's motion to intervene and 
an affidavit in support of the resistance because they were not filed within the 
time required by W.R.C.P. 6(c). The record is not entirely clear as to when 
Bowen served the resistance and the affidavit; however, the parties seem to 
agree that they were not served on time. Although the district court did not 
expressly rule on American Family's motion to strike, the court obviously denied 
that motion because, in its decision letter, it relied on the documents which 
Bowen had submitted.

 

[¶14] W.R.C.P. 6(c)(1) 
provides in pertinent part that, "unless the court by order permits service at 
some other time, a party affected by the motion shall serve a response, if any, 
together with affidavits, if any, at least three days prior to the hearing on 
the motion or within 20 days after service of the motion, whichever is earlier." 
Under the plain language of W.R.C.P. 6(c)(1), the district court may permit the 
response to a motion to be served at a time other than the time specified in the 
rule. The district court also has discretion in deciding whether or not to 
strike a party's response. See Beck v. Adams, 62 Wyo. 431, 174 P.2d 134, 137 
(1946); Kimbel v. Osborn, 61 Wyo. 89, 156 P.2d 279, 288 (1945). American Family 
has not shown that it was prejudiced by the district court's denial of its 
motion to strike. The information which the district court relied upon in 
determining whether or not American Family's motion to intervene was timely was 
available to American Family as well as to Bowen. The district court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to strike Bowen's resistance and the documents 
which supported it.

 

[¶15] The first factor which 
is used to decide whether an application to intervene was timely is the length 
of time the applicant knew or should have known of its interest in the case 
prior to filing its application. The record is clear that American Family knew 
from the beginning of the case about its interest in the lawsuit. American 
Family and Bowen had exchanged correspondence before Bowen filed his lawsuit 
against Harris. The correspondence confirmed that American Family knew that it 
was Bowen's uninsured motorist insurer and that Harris did not have insurance. 
Bowen informed American Family that he had filed a complaint against Harris and 
invited American Family to intervene in the matter. Bowen continued to keep 
American Family apprised of the progression of the case. American Family did not 
attempt to intervene until after Bowen took a default judgment against Harris 
and commenced a collection action in Iowa against American Family. American 
Family waited a considerable length of time after it knew of its interest before 
attempting to intervene in the action.

 

[¶16] We next look at the 
prejudice which the existing parties could suffer as a result of American 
Family's failure to intervene when it first knew of its interest in the case. 
Harris would not be prejudiced by the delay because he did not appear in this 
case. Bowen, on the other hand, could be significantly prejudiced by American 
Family's delay in seeking intervention. He spent time and money in securing a 
default judgment against Harris and in initiating a collection action against 
American Family. If American Family were allowed to intervene at this late date, 
Bowen could be forced to litigate the underlying damages claim, and all his 
efforts would be sacrificed.

 

[¶17] The third factor that 
we consider is the prejudice which American Family could endure from not being 
allowed to intervene.  Obviously, 
American Family would be prejudiced by a denial of its motion because it would 
not be allowed to contest the default judgment.

 

[¶18] The last factor allows 
us to consider any unusual circumstances which militate either for or against 
allowing intervention. As the district court correctly found, the record in this 
case does not reveal any special circumstances which pertain to the issue of the 
timeliness of American Family's application.

 

[¶19] Looking at the case as 
a whole, we conclude that American Family's motion to intervene was not timely. 
American Family should have intervened much earlier - before the default 
judgment was entered and before the Iowa collection action was commenced.  "To wait until after adjudication of the 
issues is too late, barring extraordinary circumstances. . . . The application 
of the intervenor must be made when it is still practical for other parties to 
enter the action." Curless, 708 P.2d  at 432. The district court, therefore, did 
not abuse its discretion when it denied American Family's motion to 
intervene.

 

[¶20] American Family 
contends that, even if we determine that the district court did not err by 
denying its motion to intervene, we must still vacate the default judgment 
because the judgment is void. American Family maintains that the district court 
did not have personal jurisdiction over Harris because he was not properly 
served with process.

 

[¶21] Our decision that the 
district court did not err when it denied American Family's motion to intervene 
is dispositive in this case.  
American Family, as a stranger to this action, cannot raise the issue of 
whether or not Harris was properly served with process. That right belongs to 
Harris. "[I]t is a personal privilege of a defendant to require that he or she 
be served with process in a legal manner."  
20 AM.JUR.2D Courts § 103 at 407 (1995). A defendant has the right to 
consent to the court's jurisdiction even though he has not been appropriately 
served, and he may waive his right to contest such service. W.R.C.P. 12(b) & 
(h); Cotton v. Brow, 903 P.2d 530, 531 (Wyo. 1995); see also 20 AM.JUR.2D, supra 
If Harris appears and contests the validity of the judgment, the Wyoming courts 
may then address the personal jurisdiction issue.

 

[¶22] 
Affirmed.