Case Title: Schossow v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0183

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: DAWN M. SCHOSSOW v.STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2011 WY 111Case Number: S-10-0183Decided: 07/15/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF:DAWN M. SCHOSSOW, 

Appellant 
(Petitioner),v.STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' 
SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, 

Appellee 
(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Hampton 
M. Young, Jr., Law Office of Hampton M. Young, Jr., PC, Casper, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; James M. Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kelly Roseberry, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Dawn M. Schossow 
(the appellant) injured her back while working as a nurse.  Upon returning to work, the appellant 
requested Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) benefits, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-405(h) (LexisNexis 2011), which request was denied.  The Office of Administrative Hearings 
(OAH) upheld the denial of benefits and the district court affirmed the OAH's 
decision.  In this appeal, the 
appellant claims that the OAH hearing examiner erred as a matter of law in 
interpreting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h)(i), and that the hearing 
examiner's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.  We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      1.    Was the hearing examiner's 
interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h)(i) contrary to 
law?

 
 
2.    Was the hearing examiner's 
finding that the appellant failed to meet her burden of proving that she had 
suffered a loss of earning capacity supported by substantial 
evidence?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On August 17, 
2004, the appellant was lifting a comatose patient when she felt a "pop" in her 
lower back and her right leg went numb.  
After initial conservative treatment and a return to work, the appellant 
stopped working, and on September 27, 2005, she underwent a two-level anterior 
lumbar fusion at the L4-L5 and L5-S1 levels of the spine.  At the time of her injury, the appellant 
was employed as a nurse, working between 72 and 74 hours every two weeks, and 
earning $23.34 per hour, or between $3,555.07 and $3,742.18 per 
month.

 
 
[¶4]      After her 
surgery, the appellant was no longer able to work as a nurse due to restrictions 
imposed by her doctor.  The 
appellant was released to work part-time and began working at another medical 
facility as a quality assurance coordinator on December 27, 2005.  Her starting salary was $21.00 per 
hour.

 
 
[¶5]      In March of 2007, 
the appellant submitted an Application for Permanent Partial Disability Award or 
Vocational Rehabilitation Benefits.  
As a result of her application, the appellant was referred for a 
vocational evaluation.  The 
vocational evaluation report included the finding that there were three jobs 
available to the appellant with a beginning salary of 95% or higher than her 
salary at the time of her injury: Nurse Case Manager, $3,893.00 per month; Nurse 
4 Nurse Program Specialist, $3,896.00 per month; and Nurse Surveyor, $3,893.00 
per month.  As a result of these 
findings, the Division issued a final determination denying the appellant's 
application for PPD benefits, concluding that she was "not eligible for this 
benefit as the information indicates that you can return to an occupation at a 
comparable wage."  The appellant 
objected to the denial of her PPD claim and requested a contested case 
hearing.

 
 
[¶6]      The matter was 
referred to the OAH and a contested case hearing was held on March 3 and 19, 
2008.  Both parties presented 
evidence regarding the appellant's wages and employment opportunities following 
her injury, the details of which evidence will be examined in the discussion 
section below.  On April 16, 2008, 
the OAH issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, denying the 
appellant's requested PPD benefits.  
The OAH concluded that the appellant failed to meet her burden of 
showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was unable to return to 
employment at a wage that was at least 95% of her pre-injury monthly gross 
earnings.  The appellant appealed 
this determination to the district court and on June 23, 2010, the district 
court affirmed the OAH's decision.  
The appellant timely appealed the matter to this 
Court.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      When reviewing 
administrative decisions, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2011) 
requires us, among other things, to set aside agency action not in accordance 
with the law or decisions unsupported by substantial evidence.1  This appeal presents both a legal and an 
evidentiary question.

 
 
[¶8]      "The 
interpretation and correct application of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act 
is a question of law which is accorded plenary review.  The agency's conclusion[s] of law can 
only be affirmed if they are in accordance with the law."   Poll v. State ex rel. Dep't 
of Emp't, Div. of Workers' Safety & Comp., 963 P.2d 977, 980 (Wyo. 
1998) (citations omitted).  We have said that whether a post-injury 
wage is comparable to a pre-injury wage is a question of law.  
See Adams v. State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 975 P.2d 17, 19-20 (Wyo. 
1999).

 
 
[¶9]      With regard to 
the evidentiary question, we have said that the agency's findings of fact are 
afforded great deference, and we will not "adjust the decision of the agency 
unless it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence on the 
record."  Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
&  Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 26, 49 P.3d 163, 173 (Wyo. 2002).  We have consistently held that, "[i]f 
the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we cannot properly 
substitute our judgment for that of the agency and must uphold the findings on 
appeal."  Id. at ¶ 12, at 168 (quoting State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & 
Comp. Div. v. Jensen, 2001 WY 
51, ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 1133, 1136 
(Wyo. 2001)).  This "substantial 
evidence" test has been described as follows:

 
 

When 
the burdened party prevailed before the agency, we will determine if substantial 
evidence exists to support the finding for that party by considering whether 
there is relevant evidence in the entire record which a reasonable mind might 
accept in support of the agency's conclusions.  If the hearing examiner determines that 
the burdened party failed to meet his burden of proof, we will decide whether 
there is substantial evidence to support the agency's decision to reject the 
evidence offered by the burdened party by considering whether that conclusion 
was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the record as a 
whole.  
See, Wyo. 
Consumer Group v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Wyo., 882 P.2d 858, 86061 (Wyo. 1994); [Board 
of Trustees, Laramie County School Dist. No. 1 v.] 
Spiegel, 549 
P.2d [1161,] 1178 [(Wyo. 1976)] (discussing 
the definition of substantial evidence as "contrary to the overwhelming weight 
of the evidence").  If, in the 
course of its decision making process, the agency disregards certain evidence 
and explains its reasons for doing so based upon determinations of credibility 
or other factors contained in the record, its decision will be sustainable under 
the substantial evidence test.  
Importantly, our review of any particular decision turns not on whether 
we agree with the outcome, but on whether the agency could reasonably conclude 
as it did, based on all the evidence before it.

 
 

Dale 
v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 
WY 84, ¶ 22, 188 P.3d 554, 561 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Was 
the hearing examiner's interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h)(i) 
contrary to law?

 
 
[¶10]   The first question raised involves 
the proper interpretation and application of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-405(h)(i).  This statute 
governs the availability of PPD benefits and sets out three elements that an 
injured worker must prove in order to qualify to receive these 
benefits:

 
 
(h)    An injured employee awarded 
permanent partial impairment benefits may apply for a permanent disability award 
subject to the following terms and conditions:

 
 
(i)       The injured 
employee is because of the injury, unable to return to employment at a wage that 
is at least ninety-five percent (95%) of the monthly gross earnings the employee 
was earning at the time of injury;

 
 
(ii)      An application 
for permanent partial disability is filed not before three (3) months after the 
date of ascertainable loss or three (3) months before the last scheduled 
impairment payment, whichever occurs later, but in no event later than one (1) 
year following the later date; and

 
 
(iii)     The employee has 
actively sought suitable work, considering the employee's health, education, 
training and experience.

 
 
The 
only dispute in this case concerns subpart (i): whether the appellant is able to 
return to work earning "at least ninety-five percent (95%) of the monthly gross 
earnings [she] was earning at the time of injury."

 
 
[¶11]   The parties proffer different 
interpretations of this statutory language.  The appellant takes the position that 
earning capacity must be calculated based on the wage earned by a claimant 
immediately upon returning to the workforce following an injury.  To support this argument, the appellant 
relies primarily on State ex. rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division v. Savicki, 2004 WY 71, 92 P.3d 294 (Wyo. 2004).  There, the claimant was a drywaller 
earning $17.00 per hour at the time he was injured.  Id. at ¶ 4, at 295.  After being released to work following 
his injury, the claimant began working for a hotel as a van driver, earning 
$5.75 an hour.  Id. at ¶ 5, at 295.  He worked there a short time before 
being hired by another construction company, where his initial wage was $14.00 
per hour.  Id. at ¶ 6, at 295.  That wage fluctuated at various times 
depending on the nature of the work he was doing.  Id.

 
 
[¶12]   The claimant's application for PPD 
benefits was initially denied, because the Division concluded that the claimant 
was able to return to work at 95% of his pre-injury wage.  Id. at ¶ 7, at 295.  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Division divided the claimant's total post-injury wages by his total post-injury 
hours worked and determined that his post-injury hourly wage was $19.00 per hour 
 
more than 95% of his pre-injury wage.  Id.  
After a contested case hearing, the hearing examiner rejected this 
calculation and found that PPD benefits should be determined based on the 
"actual hourly rate before the injury and the actual hourly rate after returning 
to work."  Id. at ¶ 8, at 295.  On appeal, we upheld this decision 
stating: "Clearly, the hearing examiner has applied the plain meaning of the 
statue and in doing so has compared two wage rates at the particular points of 
time specified in the statute, resulting in looking at Savicki's wage rate 
immediately upon his return to work."  Id. at ¶ 13, at 
296.

 
 
[¶13]   The appellant in the present case 
argues that, based on Savicki, the 
wage that should be used in calculating her eligibility for PPD benefits is the 
$21.00 per hour she was earning immediately upon returning to work, and because 
this is not 95% of her pre-injury wage of $23.34, she should be entitled to 
benefits.

 
 
[¶14]   The appellee counters that an 
injured employee's wage on the date he or she returns to work is not dispositive 
of the question of entitlement to PPD benefits, and urges that the focus of the 
statute is on the employee's actual ability to earn.  In support of this position, the 
appellee cites Cochran v. State ex. rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 993 P.2d 320 (Wyo. 1999).  There, the claimant was earning $10.00 
per hour as a carpenter prior to his injury.  Id. at 322.  After his injury, he was re-hired by the 
same company and paid the same wage; however, he was laid off six months 
later.  Id. at 322-23.  After his layoff, and because of 
physical limitations caused by his injury, the claimant was unable to find work 
as a carpenter, and instead took a job as a warehouse manager, earning $8.00 per 
hour.  Id. at 322.  The claimant's request for PPD benefits 
was denied by the Division and that denial was upheld by the OAH.  Id.  
On appeal, we reversed the OAH.  
In doing so, we ignored the $10.00 wage the appellant earned immediately 
upon returning to employment following his injury and considered only the $8.00 
wage the claimant earned after being laid off.2  Id. at 322-23.

 
 
[¶15]   The appellee discusses this case to 
illustrate that a claimant's initial wage upon returning to employment following 
an injury is not the only indicator of a claimant's true earning capacity.  The appellee points out that when the 
claimant in Cochran first returned to 
work, he was earning his same pre-injury wage$10 
per hour.  Under the appellant's 
interpretation of the statute, this is the wage that should be considered in 
determining whether a claimant is entitled to PPD benefits.  However, this Court disregarded the 
$10.00 per hour wage, and considered the $8.00 wage inasmuch as that wage more 
accurately reflected the claimant's actual earning 
capacity.

 
 
[¶16]   We have said that "the focus of § 
27-14-405(h) is on the injured employee's true 
ability to earn a living."  
Bonsell v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. 
Div., 2006 WY 114, ¶ 25, 142 P.3d 686, 692 (Wyo. 2006) 
(emphasis supplied).  This 
determination cannot be made in a vacuum, nor can it be based on a static 
snapshot of the claimant's employment status and wage at any one time.  The limited interpretation of the 
language of that statute the appellant urges us to adopt could inhibit not only 
the Division's ability accurately to assess a claimant's actual earning 
capacity, but as illustrated by Cochran, it could potentially limit the 
availability of PPD benefits to a claimant who might otherwise be eligible.  In Cochran, had we considered only the 
claimant's wage when he first returned to work with his previous employer, he 
would not have qualified for benefits.

 
 
[¶17]   Furthermore, such an interpretation could create a 
disincentive for claimants seeking employment following an injury.  Such a result was discussed in Chavez v. Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater 
County, 2006 WY 82, 138 P.3d 185 (Wyo. 2006).  There, the claimant's request for PPD 
benefits was denied after a vocational evaluator concluded that, although 
presently unemployed, the claimant was eligible for jobs paying 95% of her 
pre-injury wage.  Id. at ¶ 4, at 187.  The claimant challenged this 
determination.  However, before a 
contested case hearing was held, the claimant secured employment out of state, 
earning a wage of more than 95% of her pre-injury wage.  Id. at ¶ 5, at 187.  The hearing examiner summarily dismissed 
her case, finding that because of her employment and wage, she did not qualify 
for PPD benefits.  Id.

 
 
[¶18]   On appeal, the claimant argued that the hearing examiner 
should not have been allowed to consider wage increases or job changes after she 
initially applied for and was denied PPD benefits.  Id. at ¶ 12, at 190.  We rejected that argument, 
stating:

 
 
If 
we were to accept Ms. Chavez's argument that employment commencing after the 
filing of an application for PPD benefits may not be considered, employees would 
have a disincentive to return to work following an injury.  Such an interpretation would clearly be 
inconsistent with § 27-14-405(h)(iii), which requires employees to show they 
have actively sought suitable work in order to qualify for PPD benefits.  The hearing examiner did not err, as a 
matter of law, by considering Ms. Chavez's actual post-injury employment even 
though it commenced after she applied for and was denied PPD benefits.  

 
 

Id. 
at ¶ 15, at 191.

 
 
[¶19]   In our review of the cases 
discussing PPD benefits eligibility, we found none that supports the appellant's 
assertion that, in computing PPD eligibility, the Division may only consider the 
initial wage received after the employee has been released to work.  Even Savicki, the case cited by the appellant 
to support her position, does not support her reasoning.  There, the claimant's first post-injury 
job paid $5.75 per hour driving a van.  
Under the appellant's argument, $5.75 should have been the wage used to 
determine PPD benefits.  However, we 
disregarded that amount and focused our analysis on the wage the claimant earned 
in his subsequent construction job, which wage more accurately reflected the 
claimant's actual earning capacity.

 
 
[¶20]   In the present case, when 
determining whether the appellant could return to work at 95% of her pre-injury 
wage, the hearing examiner stated: "This Office places its primary focus in this 
case on [the appellant's] true ability to earn a living after sustaining a 
significant, on-the-job injury to her lower back which resulted in a two level 
fusion."  In making that decision, 
the hearing examiner considered the appellant's pre-injury wages and work 
schedule, the nature of her injury and the physical limitations resulting 
therefrom, her post-injury employment history and conditions as described by the 
appellant and her employers, and her post-injury employment prospects as 
described by the vocational evaluator.  
We find, as a matter of law, that the hearing examiner properly applied 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h)(i) in assessing what wage to use 
when determining the appellant's PPD eligibility.  That is, the hearing examiner did not 
err in refusing to consider only the appellant's wage immediately upon returning 
to the workforce.

 
 
Was 
the hearing examiner's finding that the appellant failed to meet her burden of 
proving that she had suffered a loss of earning capacity supported by 
substantial evidence?

 
 
[¶21]   Although we conclude, as a matter 
of law, that the hearing examiner properly interpreted Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-405(h)(i) in assessing what wage to use when determining the appellant's 
PPD eligibility, we must now review whether the ultimate finding that she failed 
to meet her burden of proving a loss of earning capacity was supported by 
substantial evidence.

 
 

"In 
determining whether an employee has suffered a loss of earning capacity both 
medical and non-medical evidence may be relevant."  
Chavez 
v. Memorial Hosp. of Sweetwater County, 2006 
WY 82, ¶ 8, 138 P.3d 185, 189 
(Wyo. 2006).  
See 
also, McCarty 
[v. 
Bear Creek Uranium Co.], 
694 
P.2d [93,] 94-95 [(Wyo. 1985)]. 
 Although 
no individual factor is determinative, the following considerations are relevant 
to the loss of earning capacity inquiry: the employee's physical impairment, 
including the nature and extent of his injury; age; education; actual earnings, 
including pre-injury and post-injury earnings; ability to continue pre-injury 
employment; and post-injury employment prospects. 
 Chavez, 
¶ 
8, 138 P.3d  at 189.  
See 
also, State 
ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div. v. White, 837 P.2d 1095 (Wyo. 1992); Whiteman 
v. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 987 P.2d 670 (Wyo. 1999).  The fact 
finder has the discretion to assign weight to the individual 
factors.  
McCarty, 694 
P.2d at 95; Chavez, ¶ 
8, 138 P.3d  at 189.  
"Wages 
earned by the employee [are] material to the question of the employee's earning 
capacity and [are] entitled to whatever weight the fact finder gives to 
it."  
McCarty, 694 P.2d  at 95.

 
 

Bonsell, 
2006 WY 114, ¶ 12, 142 P.3d  at 
689.

 
 
[¶22]   The appellant argues that the 
finding that she was capable of earning 95% of her pre-injury wage was not 
supported by substantial evidence.  
The appellant's claim appears to be based primarily on her mistaken 
belief that the law requires a hearing examiner only to consider a claimant's 
wage immediately upon returning to the workforce.  This is evidenced by her argument that 
the hearing examiner ignored the $21.00 per hour wage she was earning when she 
first returned to work, which wage was less than 95% of her pre-injury 
wage.  Although the hearing examiner 
did not base the appellant's PPD eligibility exclusively on the $21.00 per hour 
wage, the decision letter clearly indicates that it considered this in making 
its findings.  The hearing 
examiner's findings noted the appellant's initial wage and the conditions under 
which she initially returned to the workforce.  The testimony at the hearing indicated 
that the appellant's initial return to work was on a "very part-time" basis, as 
she was still on prescription medication for her pain.  Also, the evidence before the hearing 
examiner showed that when the appellant initially re-entered the workforce, she 
had reached an "informal light-duty agreement" with the Division wherein the 
appellant "would turn into [the Division] her check stubs for the period of time 
she was working light duty and she would then be paid 80 percent of the 
difference between her pre[-]injury wage and what she was earning [at that 
time]."  Also, the hearing examiner 
reviewed and relied upon the vocational evaluation indicating that there were 
three jobs for which the appellant was qualified, each of which paid 95% or more 
of her pre-injury wage.  Finally, 
the hearing examiner considered the testimony of the appellant's current 
employer that at the time of hearing, the appellant was earning $25.00 per hour 
and working a 40-hour week.  This 
schedule and pay rate was more than she was earning prior to her 
injury.

 
 
[¶23]   Based on the evidence presented, 
the hearing examiner concluded that the appellant failed to meet her burden of 
proof to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that because of her injury 
she was unable to return to work at a wage that was at least 95% of her 
pre-injury monthly gross income.  
After reviewing the record before us, we conclude that this determination 
was supported by substantial evidence.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶24]   
The OAH did not err when it interpreted Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-405(h)(i) as allowing it to consider more than just the appellant's wage 
immediately upon returning to the workforce following her injury.  Also, the OAH's determination that the 
appellant was capable of earning 95% of her pre-injury wage, and thus not 
eligible for PPD benefits, was supported by substantial 
evidence.

 
 
[¶25]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1Section 
163114(c) provides:

 
 
(c)     To the extent necessary 
to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, 
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In 
making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of 
prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

(i)      Compel agency 
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

(ii)      Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A)     Arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

(B)     Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

(C)     In excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D)     Without observance of 
procedure required by law; or (E)         
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of 
an agency hearing provided by statute.

2The 
version of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405 applicable in Cochran did not have the specific 95% 
language, but only said that a claimant was entitled to benefits if he could not 
return to work at a "comparable or higher" wage.  In Cochran we concluded that $8.00 per hour 
was not a comparable wage to his pre-injury $10.00 per hour 
wage.