Case Title: State v. Tahash

Citation: 131 N.W.2d 214

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1964-11-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
131 N.W.2d 214 (1964) STATE of Minnesota ex rel. John Alfred LEE, Appellant, v. Ralph H. TAHASH, Warden Minnesota State Prison, Respondent. No. 39224. Supreme Court of Minnesota. November 13, 1964. John S. Connolly, St. Paul, for appellant. Walter F. Mondale, Atty. Gen., Charles E. Houston, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent. ROGOSHESKE, Justice. Appeal from an order of the District Court of Washington County denying the petition of John Alfred Lee for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner is confined in the State Prison under a sentence imposed by the District Court of Beltrami County. He was convicted on September 11, 1956, following a plea of guilty to the crime of assault in the first degree. The sentence imposed was for a term of not less than 10 nor more than 20 years, the maximum and minimum terms for first-degree assault having been *215 doubled by reason of his plea to an additional information whereby he acknowledged that he had previously been convicted in California of the crime of assault with intent to commit rape. Had the penalty not been increased as authorized by Minn.St. 610.28, he would be entitled to release as he has now served the 10-year maximum term, with credit for good behavior, permitted to be imposed for first-degree assault.[1] Petitioner attacks the validity of the prior-felony information upon the claim that the information charged him with a "nonexistent" crime of "second offender" and, in any event, the out-of-state crime would not be a felony if committed in this state. 1. After alleging petitioner's September 11 conviction of first-degree assault, the information, filed pursuant to § 610.31, reads as follows: Upon arraignment, petitioner acknowledged that he had been so convicted, whereupon the court imposed the following sentence: The clerk, in certifying to the minutes of the proceedings, reported that petitioner was charged with, and adjudged guilty of, "the crime of Second Offender under M.S.A. 610.28." Although the allegations of the information do not use this term, it does close with the statement that such prior conviction is contrary to § 610.28, which section of the Habitual Criminal Act simply directs a sentence of twice the minimum and maximum terms for a second offense. Apparently, it is this part of the record upon which petitioner bases his claim that he was charged and convicted of the crime of "second offender." The record does not support this contention. Petitioner relies on State ex rel. Hansen v. Rigg, 258 Minn. 388, 104 N.W.2d 553, where it was held improper to charge an accused with being a habitual offender. *216 Unlike that case, petitioner here was neither charged nor sentenced for an offense defined as "second offender." Contrary to the clerk's minutes, the information charged the existence of a previous out-of-state felony conviction. It merely informed the court of petitioner's status which, if true, justified an increased punishment for the underlying substantive offense. Under the requirements laid down in State ex rel. O'Neill v. Tahash, 265 Minn. 407, 122 N.W.2d 165, the information is clearly sufficient. As is manifest from the language of the sentence (reaffirmed by the transcript of the proceedings), petitioner was not sentenced for assault in the first degree because of his previous conviction; only the penalty for the underlying offense was increased by reason thereof. The crime for which petitioner was previously convicted in California is defined in California Penal Code Ann. § 220, as follows: Minn.St. 619.38, in effect at the time of the California conviction, prohibits an assault upon another with intent to commit a felony and provides that upon conviction punishment may be by imprisonment in the State Prison. Section 610.01 defines a felony as including a crime punishable by imprisonment in the State Prison. Section 617.01 declares that rape is punishable by imprisonment in the State Prison. In State ex rel. Guren v. Grimes, 245 Minn. 241, 245, 71 N.W.2d 885, 887, we said: It follows that assault with intent to commit rape as defined in California is included within the crime of assault with intent to commit a felony under our code. Thus, the California crime would have been punished as a felony if committed in Minnesota, and the court had jurisdiction to increase the penalty for the underlying offense of assault in the first degree. Affirmed. [1] Minn.St. 619.37.