Case Title: Matter of Adoption of BGD

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-85-1

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Adoption of BGD1986 WY 124719 P.2d 1373Case Number: C-85-1Decided: 05/30/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
In 
the Matter of the ADOPTION OF BGD, a Minor.

 
 
TD, 
By and Through her next friend and parents JD and ZD, Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
LDP 
and MFP, Appellees (Defendants)

 
 

Before 
Thomas, C.J., Brown,* 
Cardine,** 
Urbigkit,*** 
J.J. and Raper, J. Retired.

 
 
* 
Justice Brown filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Raper, retired, 
joins.

** 
Justice Cardine filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Brown and Justice 
Raper, retired, join.

*** 
Justice Urbigkit filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Thomas 
joins.

 
 
ORDER 
ON REHEARING

 
 

[¶1.]     This case came on 
before the Court pursuant to Order Granting Petition for Rehearing and Denying 
Petition for the Appointment of Weston County DEPASS as Guardian Ad Litem to 
Investigate the Parties to Aid in Determining What is in the Best Interest of 
BGD, a Minor, and Denying Motion to Disqualify Supreme Court Justices entered on 
March 28, 1986, 716 P.2d 983, and the Appellees' Brief on Order Granting 
Rehearing and the Appellant's Answer, and the Court having heard the oral 
arguments of counsel for the parties, and having examined the file and record of 
the Court and the opinion of the Court in this case which was filed on February 
14, 1986, 713 P.2d 1191 and being fully advised in the premises, finds that the 
opinion of the Court filed on February 14, 1986, should be confirmed in all 
respects; and it therefore is

 
 

[¶2.]     ORDERED that the 
opinion of this Court filed in this case on February 14, 1986, be and the same 
hereby is, confirmed.

 
 
BROWN, 
J., specially concurring, in which RAPER, J. (Retired), 
joins.

 
 

[¶3.]     It was with a heavy 
heart that I voted with the majority in this court's decision of February 14, 
1986.  It was equally difficult to 
join the majority in confirming the court's original opinion.  A judge is no stranger to difficult and 
unpopular decisions.  However, he 
must vote according to his conscience and uphold what he perceives to be the 
law.

 
 

[¶4.]     After the court's 
opinion of February 14, 1986, the Supreme Court was inundated with letters 
urging us to change our determination, which is unfortunate.  Over fifty of these letters were 
directed personally to me.  It was 
reported that one of those active in the letter writing campaign said: "I think 
the publicity and the letter writing campaign * * * * probably helped" (obtain a 
rehearing).  Casper Star Tribune, 
May 29, 1986; Newcastle Newsletter Journal, April 3, 1986.

 
 

[¶5.]     Those who organized the 
letter writing campaign misconceived the judicial process.  A judge cannot properly be influenced by 
public opinion or pressure.  I wish 
to assure the public that the letters did not have any influence whatsoever on 
the court's decision to grant a rehearing.  
It would be totally improper for the court to succumb to pressure or be 
influenced by public opinion.  Those 
interested in this case must understand that the courts cannot tinker with the 
rules in order to accommodate one circumstance.  The law applies the same to everyone in 
the state.

 
 

[¶6.]     If I ever make a 
decision based upon pressure or because of public opinion instead of my own 
professional judgment, I would have to resign from this court.  In that circumstance I would have 
compromised my principles, violated my oath, sacrificed my integrity, and no 
longer be of any value to the court.  
The other members of this court feel the same way.

 
 
CARDINE, 
Justice, specially concurring, with whom BROWN, Justice, and RAPER, Justice, 
Retired, join.

 
 

[¶7.]     The only question 
presented on rehearing is whether the court correctly interpreted and applied § 
1-22-109 and § 1-22-104, W.S.1977 to the facts of this case.  A review of these facts is helpful in 
answering that question.

 
 

[¶8.]     TD, a young, unwed, 
pregnant girl employed a doctor to deliver her baby. The doctor's office manager 
MFP, wanted to adopt a baby. The doctor discussed the "possibility [of adoption 
at] nearly every visit" of TD.  He 
advised MFP that "we have a baby that will be available." On March 15, 1983, 
seven days before the birth of baby girl D, the doctor advised TD that he knew a 
lawyer who handled adoptions.  The 
doctor then testified,

 
 
"I 
phoned him stating that I had a young lady who was interested, asked if he would 
see her * * * * could he see her at the same time she came for the appointment, 
could he please tell her about the legal aspects.  I did not ask [the attorney] to prepare 
any form, and I did not ask [TD] to sign anything.  I did ask her to please go and talk to 
him about the legal aspects * * * *. "

 
 

[¶9.]     When TD returned from 
the lawyer's office after signing a consent to adoption, the doctor 
testified,

 
 
"I 
was surprised.  I did not realize 
she was going to sign anything that day.  
My only basis for sending her was for her to gain information about legal 
aspects of this procedure."

 
 

[¶10.]  The lawyer 
testified,

 
 
"I 
had been called by Doctor Reimer and advised they were in town and would be 
coming down to see me, the purpose being to sign a Consent for Adoption, for her 
to give up her parental rights to a child."

 
 

[¶11.]  The lawyer, who had been employed by MFP 
and had previously prepared the consent form, advised TD that it "would be 
necessary for her to sign."

 
 

[¶12.]  Baby girl D was born March 22, 1983.  The doctor had previously told TD 
concerning the adoption, "you can change your mind at any time." TD testified 
that she informed the doctor in the delivery room before the birth that she 
wanted to keep her baby. The doctor testified,

 
 
"I 
do not recall that exact statement.  
I certainly do know that she was ambivalent about this, and, you know, a 
part of her did not want to do this, and she may have said that to me and I do 
not recall that exact statement."

 
 
Whatever 
the situation, the doctor admits that he lied to TD when he told her that it was 
too late to "keep her baby" because the adoptive parents were flying in from 
California.  That evening, seven 
hours after baby girl D was born, the doctor took the baby from the hospital to 
his home where he delivered it to his office manager MFP and her husband LDP, 
the prospective adoptive parents.

 
 

[¶13.]  During trial the judge said to the 
doctor, who was on the witness stand,

 
 
"THE 
COURT: Doctor, let me say to you, * * * * who are you representing here?  Don't you realize you've put yourself in 
a predicament?  I hope you don't 
ever do that again.  Now, were you 
representing the adoptive parents or were you representing this girl who had the 
baby? You can't carry water on both shoulders, and that's what you're trying to 
do."

 
 

[¶14.]  Shortly after the birth of her baby, when 
it was still at the hospital, TD called the lawyer and 
said,

 
 
"I 
told him that--I asked him if the parents would change their mind on the 
adoption and that I wanted her back, and he told me that I was 16 years old and 
I wouldn't be able to take care of a baby and also that if I wanted another baby 
I could have another one; and that's when I told him that the adoptive parents 
can adopt another baby and they don't have to have mine."

 
 

[¶15.]  The next morning TD asked to see her baby 
and was told it was gone.  TD then 
checked out of the hospital fast "so I could go home and start trying to find a 
lawyer."

 
 

[¶16.]  In this case the adoptive parents contend 
that they should prevail because they have had possession of baby girl D for 
approximately three years, and because they are financially better able to 
provide for her.  In a similar case, 
an eighteen-year-old unmarried natural mother signed a consent and surrendered 
her child to the adoptive parents.  
Within two or three weeks she decided it was a mistake and asked that her 
daughter be returned.  The adoptive 
parents refused.  The natural mother 
resisted the adoption and brought habeas corpus.  In deciding in favor of the natural 
mother, the court stated,

 
 
"The 
hardships produced by a separation of the child and the petitioners at this time 
are in substantial measure the result of the petitioners' resistance to the 
natural mother's efforts to regain custody. Those hoping to become adoptive 
parents cannot create their best argument for keeping a child's custody by 
thwarting a natural parent's known wishes."

 
 
and 
continuing, the court stated,

 
 
"Where, 
as here, a natural mother not represented by legal counsel at the time consent 
is given attempts to withdraw that consent within a few weeks and thereafter 
takes reasonable steps available to regain the custody of her child, neither 
so-called 'vested rights' nor superior economic or social position of the 
proposed adoptive parents will serve to deprive that withdrawal of legal 
effect." Small v. Andrews, Or., 20 Ore. App. 6, 530 P.2d 540 
(1975).

 
 

[¶17.]  See also Adoption of Vaida, Or., 
34 Ore. App. 631, 579 P.2d 313 (1978), wherein it was 
stated,

 
 
"Knowing 
and voluntary consent by a child's parent or parents is the basis of the 
adoption process.  The integrity of 
the private placement system requires that such consent be scrupulously 
obtained.

 
 
"The 
interests of the child are always a primary consideration, and it does not come 
easy to render a decision which appears to be inconsistent with his interests 
emotionally, economically, and environmentally.  But we are not authorized 
to

 
 
"'* 
* * * interfere with the natural relationship of parent and child upon the sole 
ground that the proposed adoptive parents are able to give the child superior 
advantages over those within the means or social status of the natural 
parents.'"

 
 

[¶18.]  The adoptive parents also contend that 
TD's consent obtained before the birth of baby girl D was irrevocable 
and, therefore, they should be permitted to keep TD's baby. The contention finds 
little support in law.  And even 
where the consent form is executed after the birth of a child, undue 
influence (over persuasion) will result in an insufficient 
consent.

 
 

[¶19.]  Thus, in In Re Alsdurf's Petition, 
Minn., 270 Minn. 236, 133 N.W.2d 479, 481 (1965) the court 
stated:

 
 
"The 
natural mother has been the victim of misguided meddling and officious pressures 
on the part of persons who were bent on persuading her to part with the custody 
of her infant daughter.

* 
* * *

"From 
the moment Charlotte Sadler first consulted her doctor on February 5, 1962, she 
was subjected to pressures from every source. * * * * Shortly after the birth of 
the child, a hospital employee, characterized by the court as a self-styled 
unofficial social worker, intruded herself, uninvited, into Miss Sadler's double 
room for the admitted purpose of assisting Mrs. Alsdurf, a fellow employee at 
the hospital, to secure the infant for adoption.  She joined Mrs. Alsdurf on February 27 
in discussing with Miss Sadler the relinquishment of custody at a time when Miss 
Sadler was weeping and obviously distraught.  The same evening the Alsdurfs' attorney 
presented a consent for Miss Sadler's signature.  During all of this period, when the 
doctor, the welfare department, the hospital official, the adoptive mother, and 
her lawyer were wittingly or unwittingly bringing pressure to bear on Miss 
Sadler, she received no disinterested counsel designed to protect her against an 
ill-advised and impulsive decision at a time of physical and emotional 
distress."

 
 

[¶20.]  A physician, on ten visits over a three 
and one-half month period, urged a mother to dispose of her baby and referred 
her to a social worker who advised that it was the right thing to do.  Her consent was obtained within 24 hours 
after a difficult birth involving cesarean section.  One week after release from the hospital 
she contacted the doctor and began seeking return of her child.  The Utah Supreme Court held the consent 
void.  D P v. Social Service 
& Child Welfare Department, Utah, 19 Utah 2d 311, 431 P.2d 547 (1967). 
See also additional cases listed in 50 A.L.R.3d 929 
(1972).

 
 

[¶21.]  The cases cited are just a few of the 
multitude of cases in which a natural parent seeks to regain her child.  The attachment of a mother who gives 
birth to a child is a natural phenomenon resulting in part from pregnancy, 
carrying the child nine months to term and the trauma and pain of 
childbirth.  Thus we have 
said,

 
 
"The 
earliest and most hallowed of the ties that bind humanity, in all countries 
considered sacred, is the relationship of parent and child.  Therefore, parents have the first and 
natural right to their children.  A 
decree of adoption tears asunder forever the parent-child relationship and for 
all legal and practical purposes, that child is the same as dead to the parent 
affected.  The parent has lost the 
right to ever again see the child or even know of his whereabouts.  Courts cautiously guard the parent-child 
relationship." Matter of Adoption of Voss, Wyo., 550 P.2d 481, 485 
(1976).

 
 

[¶22.]  At the time this matter arose, § 
1-22-109, W.S. 1977 was in effect and provided:

 
 
"(a) 
A written relinquishment of the child and written consent to adoption shall be 
filed with the petition to adopt * * * *

* 
* * *

"(c) 
The consent may be signed at any time * * * *

"(d) 
Consent to adoption and the relinquishment * * * * are irrevocable." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶23.]  Subsequently, legislation was enacted as 
ch. 118, 1986 S.L. of Wyoming, § 1-22-109(e), which 
provides:

 
 
"(e) 
The consent to adoption and the relinquishment of a child for adoption may be 
contained in a single instrument.  A 
separate post-birth written or physical relinquishment is not 
required."

 
 
Though 
ch. 118, 1986 S.L. of Wyoming cannot retroactively affect this case, it needs 
discussion.  The statute was hastily 
written, poorly conceived, and stands alone among the statutes of the 50 
states.  It offers little protection 
to the rights of a mother who gives birth to her child.  It was adopted during an emotional 
period, in a short legislative budget session.  Little consideration was given to its 
long-term effect upon future cases.

 
 

[¶24.]  Sections 1-22-109(c), (d) and (e) provide 
that a consent and relinquishment may be signed "at any time," that such consent 
and relinquishment is irrevocable, and a separate post-birth written or physical 
relinquishment is not required. Does "at any time" mean during the first month 
of pregnancy, or any month, or even before conception?  Can the baby now be relinquished before 
it is born?  Having signed the 
consent and relinquishment, is the pregnant woman obligated to carry the baby to 
term, deliver the child, and hand it over?  
Suppose the unmarried pregnant woman marries the father before the birth 
of her child.  According to the 
statute, she must give up her child for her previous consent is irrevocable. 
Suppose that she signs the consent when she is overwhelmed by the pregnancy, 
ill, distraught, confused, uncertain as to what to do, but resolves all of her 
concerns before birth. Can she change her mind and keep her child?  Not according to the recently enacted 
legislation, for her consent is irrevocable and she is forever barred from 
having her own child.  Her doctor 
can take the baby from the hospital, as in this case, and deliver it to 
strangers.

 
 

[¶25.]  Appropriate legislation should give due 
consideration to the rights of both the natural and the adoptive parents.  It ought to clearly spell out those 
rights and be fair to all.

 
 

[¶26.]  An examination of statutes of other 
states relating to consent, relinquishment, its validity and the right of 
withdrawal are helpful.  Statutes 
from the following states illustrating various methods of treating with these 
questions are as follows:

 
 
CONSENT 
INVALID UNLESS EXECUTED AFTER BIRTH

 
 
Nevada 
Revised Statutes § 127.070;

"1. 
All releases for and consents to adoption executed by the mother before the 
birth of a child are invalid."

 
 
Florida 
Statutes Annot. § 63.082;

"(4) 
The consent shall be executed only after the birth of the child, in the presence 
of two witnesses, and be acknowledged before a notary 
public."

 
 
Arkansas 
Statutes Annot. § 56-208;

"(a) 
The required consent to adoption shall be executed at any time after the birth 
of the child and in the manner following."

 
 
Alaska 
Statutes § 25.23.060;

"(a) 
The required consent to adoption shall be executed at any time after the birth 
of the child in the presence of the court or in the presence of a person 
authorized to take acknowledgments.

 
 
CONSENT 
INVALID UNLESS SPECIFIED TIME AFTER BIRTH

 
 
Arizona 
Revised Statutes § 8-107;

"B. 
A consent given before seventy-two hours after the birth of the child is 
invalid." (Emphasis added.)

 
 
Revised 
Code of Washington Annot. § 26.33.160;

"(4) 
The written consent to adoption shall be signed under penalty of perjury and 
shall state that:

 
 
"(a) 
It is given subject to approval of the court;

 
 
"(b) 
It has no force or effect until approved by the court;

 
 
"(c) 
The consent will not be presented to the court until forty-eight hours after it 
is signed or forty-eight hours after the birth of the child, whichever occurs 
later."

 
 
Code 
of Virginia § 63.1-225;

"The 
consent of a parent for the adoption of his or her child shall not be valid 
unless the child be at least ten days old at the time the consent is 
signed."

 
 
CONSENT 
SIGNED BEFORE JUDGE

 
 
Michigan 
Statutes, Annot. § 27.3178(555.44);

"(1) 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the consent required by section 43 
shall be by a separate instrument executed before the judge of probate having 
jurisdiction or, at the court's direction, before another judge of probate in 
this state."

 
 
 Tennessee Code Annot. § 
36-1-114;

"(a) 
All surrenders must be made before a judge in chambers of chancery or circuit 
court except as hereinafter provided."

 
 
See 
also 10 O.S.  § 60.5, Oklahoma 
Statutes.

 
 
CONSENT 
MAY BE WITHDRAWN

 
 
Iowa 
Code Annot. § 600.7;

"3. 
A consent to the adoption may be withdrawn prior to the issuance of an adoption 
decree under section 600.13 by the filing of an affidavit of consent withdrawal 
with the court."

 
 
See 
also 74 A.L.R.3rd 435, 436 for list of states allowing absolute right of 
withdrawal, and 2 Am.Jur.2d Adoption § 46.

 
 

[¶27.]  Consideration should be given to 
legislation of other states with a view to providing definiteness as to the 
rights of the parties for the protection of both the natural and adoptive 
parents.  If no action is taken it 
seems clear that we can expect more controversy and more litigation of this 
kind.

 
 

[¶28.]  One last comment.  It has been suggested that we ignore the 
law and award custody to the adoptive parents because they have had possession 
of baby girl D for approximately three years.  If that premise is valid, then we should 
award custody to a parent who kidnaps children and hides them for three years 
while bonding occurs.  That would be 
contrary to law.  We are not free to 
do as suggested, but must apply the law as we find it.  TD's grandmother says TD still cries 
over this ordeal.  This is a tragedy 
for both parties, and has been difficult for the Court. The result, however, is 
mandated by law and for the reasons stated I continue to concur. 

 
 
URBIGKIT, 
Justice, dissenting, with whom THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
joins.

 
 
"There 
will be a moaning in your heart,

There 
will be an anguish in your eyes;

You 
will see your dearest ones depart,

You 
will hear their quivering good-byes.

Yours 
will be the heart-ache and the smart,

Tears 
that scald and lonely sacrifice;

There 
will be a moaning in your heart,

There 
will be an anguish in your eyes.

"There 
will come a glory in your eyes,

There 
will come a peace within your heart;

Sitting 
'neath the quiet evening skies,

Time 
will dry the tear and dull the smart.

You 
will know that you have played your part;

Yours 
shall be the love that never dies."1

 
 

[¶29.]  With extraordinary specificity, the cold 
glaze of history will also perceptively judge each participant once or hereafter 
involved with this child, BGD, in her future, now redirected and certainly 
conjectural.

 
 

[¶30.]  Having become also only lately involved, 
I would dissent from the present disposition of BGD by the court in affirming 
the prior opinion and decision, Matter of Adoption of BGD, Wyo., 713 P.2d 1191 (1986).

 
 

[¶31.]  The custody/adoption conflict was tried 
in the district court on the theory of duress and undue persuasion to which 
adverse findings of fact were made by the trial court on the contested 
issues.

 
 

[¶32.]  On appeal, differing from the contested 
trial-court issues, this court in the earlier opinion based the decision on 
statutory interpretation in order to invalidate the executed consent and 
relinquishment document:

 
 
"I, 
[TD], having been first duly sworn according to law, and having been fully 
advised of my rights in this matter and of the effect of signing this consent to 
adoption, upon my oath do hereby certify and declare:

"That 
I am the natural mother of a child, that I am not married and that the child 
will be born to me out of wedlock.

 
 
"That 
I do hereby voluntarily and freely give my full and free consent to the adoption 
of my child by [LDP] and [MFP], it being understood by me that in giving such 
consent that I am relinquishing all of my rights of whatsoever nature in and to 
said child and that said child can never be claimed by me and that this consent 
is irrevocable.

 
 
"That 
believing it to be for the best interest of the said child, I do hereby 
voluntarily relinquish and release forever all right, claim, interest and 
control which I may have in and to said child; and that I do hereby voluntarily 
relinquish and release unto the above-named adopting parents the lawful physical 
custody and control of my said child so that they may have and keep the child in 
their home and treat said child as their own; and that I agree that by the entry 
of a decree of adoption by the court that the said child shall, to all legal 
intents and purposes, become the child and heir at law of the above-named 
adopting parents and cease to be my child.  
I also hereby give my full and free consent that the said child shall 
take the family name of the above-named adopting parents.

 
 
"That 
I do hereby expressly waive any and all notice of the time and place, as may be 
required by law, in connection with any adoption proceedings brought in any 
court of competent jurisdiction in regard to the adoption of said child, and I 
do hereby consent that any such adoption matter may be heard at any time in the 
discretion of the court without further notice to me and without my presence, 
even though I may be entitled to such notice and to be present at any 
hearings.

 
 
"DATED 
this 15th day of March, 1983.

"/s/ 
[TD]

"[TD]

"[Acknowledgment.]"

 
 
 
 

[¶33.]  Now the decision will be reaffirmed upon 
a restatement of an obviously unintended statutory conception which has been 
subsequently rejected by the legislature and with a reconceptualization of the 
facts to reverse the factual finding of the trial court.  Sadly, the best interest of the child 
gains no decisional significance in this conclusion.  See recent decisions of this court, 
Matter of Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 894 (1986); and Matter of Parental 
Rights to ARW, Wyo., 716 P.2d 353 (1986).

 
 

[¶34.]  Post-rehearing dissents occasion little 
contributory opportunity to advance the course of jurisprudence, and probably no 
benefit to the object of the litigative processes.  However, concern about the child, and 
obligation to the law to be applied in future cases mandates 
comment.

 
 

[¶35.]  The Wyoming legislature has now 
efficiently and directly restated by even more determined language what was 
earlier intended so that any present evaluation of legislative intention as 
embodied in the prior law appears confined only to BGD:

 
 
"AN 
ACT to amend W.S. * * * * 1-22-109 by creating a new subsection (e) relating to 
adoption * * * *.

* 
* * *

"1-22-109.  Consent to 
adoption.

"(e) 
The consent to adoption and the relinquishment of a child for adoption may be 
contained in a single instrument.  A 
separate post-birth written or physical relinquishment is not required." Ch. 
118, S.L. of Wyoming 1986, effective June 11, 1986.

 
 

[¶36.]  More critically evidenced in this custody 
resolution is the reappearance of the long-discarded philosophy that children 
are parental chattels to be baggaged and handled as possessions, not 
persons.  More recently, the 
constitutional attributes of parental rights have been reordered to be less 
significant than the separate constitutional interest, health and development of 
the child.  In re Adoption of 
Hiatt, 69 Wyo. 373, 242 P.2d 214 (1952).

 
 
Statutory 
Construction

 
 

[¶37.]  In his prior dissent in this appeal, 
Matter of Adoption of BGD, supra, 713 P.2d  at 1193, Chief Justice Thomas 
carefully followed the course of statutory changes in defining the requirements 
for consent and relinquishment documents to support 
adoption.

 
 

[¶38.]  The 1977 legislature, as derived from 
earlier Judiciary Committee interim session consideration, came to consider the 
Wyoming  law by introduction of a 
new adoption statute as House Bill 144, co-sponsored by the committee chairman, 
Ross Copenhaver, and other committee members.

 
 

[¶39.]  The singular change from the prior 
provisions afforded by Ch. 59, § 7, 1963 S.L. of Wyoming (§ 1-710.1, W.S.1957, 
1975 Cum. Supp.) was the inclusion of the very specific clause in subsection (c) 
of § 1-22-109, W.S.1977, providing, "The consent may be signed at any 
time." (Emphasis added.) This provision, as a categorical language addition, 
should reasonably reflect a legislative intent to extinguish and bury the prior 
question of the validity of the consent and relinquishment form which is signed 
either pre- or post-partum.  
Likewise added in the 1977 act, as noted by Chief Justice Thomas, was the 
provision specifically validating the minor's consent to afford finality of the 
form after execution.  See 
thoughtful comments in the partially concurring and dissenting opinion of Chief 
Justice Guthrie on legislative interpretation, in Matter of Adoption of 
Voss, Wyo., 550 P.2d 481, 487 (1976).

 
 

[¶40.]  The consent and relinquishment forms in 
this case, one signed by the mother, and another signed separately by the 
putative father, affords no question or confusion of intent or 
purpose.

 
 

[¶41.]  If ever a recognition of legislative 
intent was more specifically to be asserted, it would be recognized in this case 
where the ink was hardly dry on the original decision of this court before the 
legislature had immediately amended the statute to assure that the construction 
advanced by this court would no longer be sustainable.

 
 
"'Since 
the legislature has enacted statutes prescribing how adoptions shall be 
accomplished, this court has no power to change in any particular the law as 
expressed in those statutes . . . . The role of this court is limited to 
construing the adoption statutes and attempting to ascertain the meaning of the 
legislature as expressed therein.'" S.O. v. W.S., Alaska, 643 P.2d 997, 
1005 (1982), quoting from Strobel v. Garrison, 255 Ore. 16, 464 P.2d 688-690 (1970).

 
 
"* 
* * * Here, however, we have a statute which, from our decision, cannot by 
definition be contrary to public policy--it is public policy." In re Adoption 
of MM, Wyo., 652 P.2d 974, 978 (1982).

 
 
Cf. 
Matter of Adoption of Voss, supra.

 
 

Invalidity 
of the Trial Court's Findings

 
 

[¶42.]  The second singular issue in this case 
for the court to justify its decision is the attack on the finding of the trial 
court denying duress and undue persuasion.2

 
 

[¶43.]  Standard rules in support of the trial 
court and their special findings of fact are so well established as to afford 
little additional knowledge to the bench and bar by further recitation.  Sowerwine v. Nielson, Wyo., 671 P.2d 295 (1983); Whitefoot v. Hanover Ins. Co., Wyo., 561 P.2d 717 
(1977); United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 70 S. Ct. 711, 94 L. Ed. 1007 (1950).

 
 

[¶44.]  It could be considered that the United 
States Supreme Court, in rather succinct and specific fashion, addressed the 
appellate rules which should apply, in Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. 
Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 106 S. Ct. 1527, 89 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1986). Justice 
Rehnquist reordered and defined in proper perspective, in reversing the circuit 
court's earlier reversal of the district court determination of fact, in the 
following sequence:

 
 
1. 
A factual question as a specific finding could be set aside only if "clearly 
erroneous."3

 
 
2. 
If the appellate court believes that the trial court failed to make findings of 
fact essential to the proper resolution of the legal question, it should have 
remanded to the district court to make those findings.

 
 
3. 
If it was of the view that the findings were "clearly erroneous," within the 
meaning of Rule 52(a), it could have set them aside on that 
basis.

 
 
4. 
If the findings were unassailable, but the proper rule of law was misapplied to 
the findings, it could have reversed the district court 
judgment.

 
 
5. 
But it should not simply have made factual findings on its own. See 
Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, supra.

 
 

[¶45.]  At this juncture, in this case, the 
finite fallacy of legal resolution directly addressed by Justice Rehnquist is 
evidenced in this second appeal consideration where neither in trial 
consideration nor first appeal was that adverse factual complicity 
determined.

 
 

[¶46.]  Suffice it to be said that any present 
"findings" of this court of duress or undue persuasion are simply unjustified by 
this court's appellate practice, and implicate only by justification as a 
result-oriented, factually redetermined appellate disposition which the majority 
of this court has determined by opinion conclusion.

 
 

[¶47.]  Consequently, any detailed discussion at 
this time of the record reflecting the course of events in the consent, 
withdrawal and adoption process by dissent of this writer by further 
re-evaluation, can now only afford litigant frustration.

 
 

Best-Interest 
Criteria

 
 

[¶48.]  The rationale used by the court in 
construction of the statute and disagreement with the trial court on factual 
findings, is, however, for the delivery of BGD to the  mother by removal from the adopting 
parents, the reason I write this dissent.  
See thoughtful comments of Judge Ilsley in In re Adoption of 
Hiatt, supra; Matter of Adoption of D.P., Wyo., 583 P.2d 706 
(1978).

 
 

[¶49.]  The decision of this court places the 
"predilection to sustain the natural family" before the best interest of the 
child.  Matter of Adoption of 
BGD, supra, 713 P.2d  at 1193. This explains the conclusion that a written 
post-birth relinquishment is required by our statute, as it prevents "a natural 
parent * * * * from giving consent to adoption without counsel and careful 
deliberation." Id. at 1193. Construing the adoption statutes based on this 
"predilection" was, in my opinion, error.

 
 

[¶50.]  "* * * * The paramount question at all 
times, when the custody and control of a minor child is in dispute, is the 
welfare of such child." Kennison v. Chokie, 55 Wyo. 421, 100 P.2d 97, 
(1940); Morris v. Jackson, 66 Wyo. 369, 212 P.2d 78 (1949). This approach 
may, however, conflict with the rule of strictly construing adoption statutes in 
favor of the natural parent's claim.  
Matter of Adoption of Voss, supra (which case was in obvious 
conflict with earlier Wyoming cases).  
Other courts have recognized these conflicting goals in construing 
consent provisions and concluded that since the paramount purpose of the 
adoption lawsis to make provision for the welfare of children, the better rule 
is to construe adoption statutes in a manner which will promote this 
purpose.  S.O. v. W.S., 
supra, 643 P.2d  at 1002 n.7;4 In re Adoption of Barnett, 
54 Cal. 2d 370, 6 Cal. Rptr. 562, 354 P.2d 18, 22-23 (1960).

 
 

[¶51.]  The court here, in the first opinion, in 
construing the statute for child-custody disposition, failed to fully consider 
the best interest of the child.

 
 
"'* 
* * * The best interests standard involves a careful weighing of the myriad 
factors, such as the character and maturity of the parents, their commitment to 
the care of the child, the child's present bonds of affection, the family 
setting and stability, and so forth, which together form the foundation for a 
stable and happy home for the child.'" S.O. v. M.S., 643 P.2d  at 1006, 
quoting In re Andersen, 99 Idaho 805, 589 P.2d 957, 974 (1978), Bakes, 
J., dissenting.

 
 

[¶52.]  Commentators often recognize that 
permanent placement decisions should be made as soon as possible in order to 
prevent the trauma of separating the child from the adult with whom the 
dependency and affection relationship exists.  See Note, In the Child's Best 
Interests: Rights of the Natural Parents in Child Placement Proceedings, 51 
N.Y.U. L.Rev. 446, 451 (1976); and Note, Alternatives to Parental Right in 
Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 Yale L.J. 151, 161 
(1963).

 
 

[¶53.]  In this case, only passing reference was 
made to the child's best interest, even though the court professed that "the 
policy of this Court, in adoption cases, is to look at what is best for the 
child under all circumstances." Matter of Adoption of BGD, supra, 713 P.2d  at 1193. No mention of factors important to consideration of best interest 
is made, other than to note the three-year "association" between the child and 
her adoptive parents.  Thus, the 
only factor considered is labeled an "association," and quietly discarded.  I believe raising a child from newborn 
to the third year of life constitutes more than an "association," and I would 
place appropriate emphasis  on the 
relationship existing between the child and the adoptive 
parents.

 
 
"* 
* * * For the child, the physical realities of his conception and birth are not 
the direct cause of his emotional attachment. This attachment results from 
day-to-day attention to his needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, 
affection, and stimulation. * * * *

* 
* * *

"Where 
there are changes of parental figure * * * * the child's vulnerability and the 
fragility of the relationship becomes evident.  The child regresses along the whole line 
of his affections, skills, achievements and social adaptation." Goldstein, Freud 
& Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 17-18 
(1979).

 
 

[¶54.]  In addition to the thoughtful review and 
evaluation in the most current case of S.O. v. W.S., supra, an exhaustive 
analysis, Note, Family Law: Natural Parent Preference or the Child's Best 
Interests: The Court's Dilemma in S.O. v. W.S. (Alaska 1982), 12 UCLA-Alaska 
L.Rev. 141 (1982-83), is of singular interest.  Alaskan law had a differing feature in 
that a provision for a withdrawal of the consent and relinquishment was 
provided.

 
 
"[That 
law] does recognize the special status of the biological parent by providing the 
absolute right to withdraw the consent within ten days.  However, beyond that time period, the 
'statute ceases to accord the natural parents a right superior to that of the 
adoptive parents and instead mandates that the withdrawal be permitted only if 
such is in the best interest of the child being adopted.'

 
 
"A 
minority of jurisdictions have applied the parental preference in cases 
involving a biological parent's withdrawal of consent." 12 UCLA-Alaska L.Rev. at 
147, citing Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 424.

 
 

[¶55.]  In further reviewing the general law and 
the Alaska case, the case-note author detailed:

 
 
"The 
focus in these minority jurisdictions, despite any language to the contrary, 
rests on the rights of the parents rather than on the welfare of the child.  Undoubtedly the parents' rights should 
be respected.  But a young child's 
emotional and physical welfare hangs in the balance, and courts ignore a large 
body of relevant evidence by restricting their inquiry to the question of 
parental fitness. * * * *.

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
"The 
Alaska Supreme Court correctly rejected the parent-centered focus of the 
minority jurisdictions * * * * [and] the result it reached is strongly supported 
by legal commentators, judicial decisions in related kinds of child placement 
cases, and in the research and clinical experience of child development 
specialists.  The dominant theme 
interwoven throughout the work of these diverse professionals is that a child's 
physical, mental and emotional development depend largely upon the creation and 
maintenance, early in life, of strong, stable relationships with an adult who 
consistently provides attention, stimulation and affection, in addition to the 
fulfillment of basic physical needs.

 
 
"In 
their highly-regarded book concerning children cast into the legal world of 
child placement, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit [in Beyond the Best Interests of 
the Child (1973)] * * * * refer to these adults as 'psychological parents.' 
Psychological parents may be, and ordinarily are, the biological parents.  But biology is not determinative.  The mere physical tie between a woman 
and the child she bears does not form the foundation of a strong attachment 
bond, at least from the child's perspective.  Rather, strong bonds form after 
continuous periods of positive stimulation and interaction.  Many child development specialists agree 
with the Goldstein approach.  When 
talking of 'parent-child separation,' child development professionals typically 
mean the psychological parent rather than the biological 
parent.

 
 
"Once 
a child has developed strong attachment bonds with the psychological parent, a 
separation can be both physically and psychologically traumatic, even for 
infants and toddlers.  Studies 
conducted by Anna Freud and her colleagues indicate that disruption in the 
continuity of care may cause physical discomfort, chronic crying, digestive 
problems, sleeping problems, and delays in the infant's orientation and adaption 
to his or her surroundings.  On a 
long-term basis, such discontinuity of affection and care may cause the child to 
form shallow and indiscriminate attachments.

 
 
* 
* * *"Testimony regarding considerations such as separation trauma and 
continuity needs in children of a particular age will be useful, as will expert 
testimony addressing the psychological make-up of the child in question.  Other important factors which might be 
introduced during the hearing include (1) the quality and length of the 
emotional attachments; (2) the amount of time the child has lived with the 
prospective adoptive parents; (3) the amount of time the child lived with, and 
has been separated from, the natural parent; (4) evidence of the character, 
moral fitness, and maturity of the parents and prospective adoptive parents; (5) 
the commitment to the care and development of the child; (6) the home 
environment and family setting, and its stability; (7) the age, sex and health 
of the child; and (8) the desirability of continuing the existing child-third 
party relationship.  Finally, and 
certainly not to be overlooked if the child is of a reasonable age, thewishes of 
the child should be respectfully considered." 12 UCLA-Alaska L.Rev. at 
149-153.

 
 

[¶56.]  Directly stated, I would contend that the 
best interest of BGD, a girl now slightly more than three years old, has simply 
disappeared as a responsive test in the adjudicatory demarche.  It was improper to invalidate the 
consent to void the adoption, but surely more unjustified to commit the child to 
the natural mother with whom no post-birth association has existed, for an 
improbable future, without otherwise determining present concerns for the best 
interest of this young child.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Robert Service, The Mother.

 
 

2

"1. The court finds that plaintiff, [TD], is now of the age of seventeen 
years and is the natural mother of the minor child, who is the subject of this 
action, said minor child being born to plaintiff on March 22, 1983 in Newcastle, 
Wyoming. * * * * The plaintiff whose legal name is [TR] became pregnant when she 
was fifteen years of age and resided in Lusk, Wyoming with her mother and 
step-father, [ZD] and [JD].

* * * *

"6. * * * * That defendants [appellants herein] have paid the doctor and 
medical costs incurred in the birth of the minor 
child.

"7. * * * * The court in the said interlocutory decree found that the 
natural mother had freely and voluntarily given her full and free consent to the 
adoption of her minor child.

"8. That although the parents of the natural mother, [TD], testified that 
after the signing of the consent by [TD] and prior to the birth of the child 
they and [T] may have had some second thoughts about the adoption they, 
nonetheless placed [T] under the care of Dr. Reimer for the delivery of the 
child.  At the time, of the birth of 
the child, [T] and her parents were living in Lusk which is 86 miles from 
Newcastle.  They traveled to 
Newcastle for the birth of the baby under the care of Dr. Reimer.  Had they truly had some question about 
the adoption they could have very easily taken [T] from the care of Dr. Reimer 
and had the baby delivered at some other place.  It would be reasonable to conclude that 
if persons had really changed their mind about the adoption they would have 
severed all relations with people who were interested in the adoption including 
the doctor.

"9. The court observed [TD] on the witness stand and came to the 
inescapable conclusion that she was very immature and had little touch with 
reality.

"10. She had seven days after signing the consent to reconsider her 
actions and to take whatever steps were necessary to revoke, or rescind the 
consent to adoption. She did nothing to change the matter which she put in 
motion by signing the consent.  If 
there were any infirmities in the consent she has waived them by failing to take 
appropriate timely action.  She 
cannot be heard to complain at this late date.  She could have refused to sign the 
consent when it was presented to her and consulted with an attorney before she 
signed it.  After she signed the 
consent she consulted with her step-father and if she then determined that she 
did not want to go through with the adoption she and her step-father could have 
prior to the birth of the child called the lawyer and advised him that the 
consent was withdrawn.  Had that 
been done the court would have granted the plaintiff's 
prayer.

"11. Although there is a conflict in the evidence the court finds that 
neither [TD] or her parents communicated that [T] wished to withdraw her consent 
to the adoption until after 10:00 a.m. on the morning after the baby was born 
and at that time the defendants had the baby in custody and the petition for 
adoption had been filed in the District Court."

 
 

3Rule 52(a), W.R.C.P., does not 
contain the "clearly erroneous" criterion of Federal Rule 52(a).  However, no difference in result is 
perceived, since this court has by continued decisions adopted the "clearly 
erroneous" test for special findings of fact.  Shores v. Lindsey, Wyo., 591 P.2d 895, 899 (1979):

 
 
"Clearly erroneous or against the great weight of the evidence * * * 
*.  [It will be set aside] if the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm 
conviction that a finding is mistaken."

 
 
Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co. v. Central Engineering & Equipment Co., 
Wyo., 611 P.2d 863 (1980); Rutar Farms & Livestock, Inc. v. Fuss, 
Wyo., 651 P.2d 1129, 1133 (1982).

 
 

4S.O. 
v. W.S., 
supra, contains a number of similarities to the present case, including a claim 
by the natural mother that there was an invalid "consent" since the consent 
appeared on a document entitled "Relinquishment of Parental Rights." The Supreme 
Court of Alaska had no trouble in finding that the statements within the 
document as well as the circumstances leading to its execution meant that it 
satisfied the requirements of a valid consent.  Likewise, I find a consent stating: "I 
am relinquishing all of my rights of whatsoever nature in and to said child," to 
be a valid relinquishment. I also note that greater emphasis is placed on the 
child's best interest, as compared to the natural parent's rights, in a case in 
which the validity of a consent to adoption is at 
issue.