Case Title: HARRY E. STEPHENS v. GREGORY D. LAVITT and DEBRA C. LAVITT

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0014

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
HARRY E. STEPHENS v. GREGORY D. LAVITT and DEBRA C. LAVITT2010 WY 129239 P.3d 634Case Number: No. S-10-0014Decided: 09/23/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

HARRY 
E. STEPHENS,Appellant (Plaintiff),v.GREGORY D. LAVITT and 
DEBRA C. LAVITT,Appellees (Defendants).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Frank 
J. Jones, Wheatland, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

Mitchell 
H. Edwards of Nicholas & Tangeman, LLC, Laramie, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.KITE, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Harry E. Stephens 
appeals from the district court's order adjudging him in contempt of court for 
violating an injunction that required him to lock a gate on his easement across 
property owned by Gregory D. and Debra C. Lavitt (Lavitts).  The district court terminated Mr. 
Stephens' easement as a sanction for the contempt.  He claims the district court did not 
have jurisdiction over a criminal contempt because it was not commenced in a 
separate case and, in any event, the court should not have extinguished his 
easement.  We affirm on the grounds 
that the contempt was civil rather than criminal in nature and termination of 
his easement across the Lavitts' property was a reasonable remedy under the 
circumstances of this case.  We 
conclude, however, that the district court abused its discretion by terminating 
Mr. Stephens' easement across properties other than the Lavitts' and, 
accordingly, reverse that portion of the order.  

            
            

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The parties raise 
various issues on appeal, but we have identified the following issues as 
dispositive:

 
 
            
1.         
Was the contempt proceeding criminal in nature, in which instance the 
district court did not have jurisdiction over the action because it was not 
brought as a separate case; or, was it civil in nature, so that the district 
court had jurisdiction under the original case?

 
 
            
2.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion by declaring forfeiture of 
Mr. Stephens' easement to remedy his violation of its injunction and misuse of 
the easement?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Stephens 
and the Lavitts own mountain property in Albany County, Wyoming.  Historically, Mr. Stephens accessed his 
property by using two routesLuman Road which traverses the Lavitts' property,1 or Mart Miller Road.  In 2001, the Lavitts placed a locked 
gate across the road on their property to prevent unwanted access by the public 
and to avert acts of vandalism.  Mr. 
Stephens was provided with a key to the lock so he could access his 
property.    

 
 
[¶4]      Mr. Stephens and 
his family members became dissatisfied with the locked gate, and, in 2007, he 
commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that he had a valid 
easement along Luman Road and an injunction prohibiting the Lavitts from 
interfering with his access by placing a locked gate across the road.  The Lavitts counterclaimed for a 
declaration that Mr. Stephens did not have a legal easement or, if he did have 
an easement, it had been terminated by his misuse.  They also sought injunctive relief 
prohibiting him from entering or damaging their property.    

 
 
[¶5]      The district 
court held a hearing on the competing claims for a temporary restraining order 
and granted the Lavitts' request by prohibiting Mr. Stephens from entering their 
property while the action was pending.  
The Lavitts subsequently alleged that Mr. Stephens had violated the 
temporary restraining order on several occasions.       

 
 
[¶6]      In the meantime, 
the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Stephens declaring 
that he had a valid appurtenant easement across the Lavitts' property on Luman 
Road.  The court concluded there 
were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Mr. Stephens had misused the 
easement and "what reasonable conditions may be placed on the use of the 
easement."    

 
 
[¶7]      The district 
court conducted a bench trial on the outstanding issues, including whether Mr. 
Stephens had violated the temporary restraining order.  The court ruled that Mr. Stephens had 
violated the restraining order but sanctions were not imposed at that time.  It also concluded that the locked gate 
was reasonable and necessary for the Lavitts' use, enjoyment and protection of 
their property.  The district court 
ordered Mr. Stephens to lock the gate immediately after his access and 
prohibited him from leaving the gate unlocked.  It also permanently enjoined him from 
venturing off the easement or harassing the Lavitts.    

 
 
[¶8]      On June 11, 2009, 
the Lavitts filed a motion for order to show cause as to why Mr. Stephens should 
not be found in contempt of court for violating the court's prior order by 
failing to lock the gate and stamping the combination on the lock so that anyone 
could open it.  They also alleged 
that Mr. Stephens had harassed and intimidated them.  The district court issued an order to 
show cause, held a hearing and issued the following findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment of contempt:

 
 
This 
action came before the Court on September 1, 2009. . . .  The Court advised Mr. Stephens as 
required by law in a hearing for Criminal Contempt, and then heard testimony and 
evidence.  The Court makes the 
following findings beyond a reasonable doubt:

 
 

1.    
On 
September 25, 2008, the Court entered an Order which placed the following 
requirements on [Mr. Stephens]:

 
 

a.    
[Mr.] 
Stephens and his guests who access the Luman [R]oad shall close and lock the 
Gate immediately following such access, and shall not leave the Gate open or 
unlocked and unattended.

 
 

b.    
[Mr.] 
Stephens . . . (is) hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED . . . from in any 
way harassing or intimidating [the Lavitts] . . . and from violating (the above 
restrictions about locking the gate).

 
 

c.    
[Mr.] 
Stephens shall use the Luman [R]oad easement only after placing his own lock on 
the gate . . . .

 
 

2.    
Before 
September 25, 2008, [Mr.] Stephens had violated this Court's Order by cutting 
locks off the gate and had been convicted in Circuit Court for failure to close 
the gate.

  

3.    
On 
April 28, 2008, July 21, 2008, and during the first week of August, 2008, [Mr.] 
Stephens violated this Court's Order by cutting the lock and entering the 
easement.

 
 

4.    
After 
September 25, 2008, [Mr.] Stephens put his own lock on the gate, in compliance 
with the Court's Order.  That lock 
was a combination lock.

 
 

5.    
In 
February 2009, [Mr.] Stephens stamped the lock combination on his lock, so it 
could be plainly seen.

 
 

6.    
[Mr.] 
Stephens claims he placed the combination [o]n the lock because he could not 
remember it.  The Court finds this 
testimony without any credibility.  
[Mr.] Stephens' demeanor, his memory of other items, the availability of 
other means to "remember" the combination and his attitude about the gate and 
lock all indicate that [Mr.] Stephens stamped the combination on the lock so the 
public could see it, and to circumvent the Court's Order.  

 
 

7.    
When 
a neighbor called [Mr.] Stephens and suggested that [Mr.] Stephens should change 
the lock, [Mr.] Stephens refused and stated he was "so mad it makes me want to 
shoot someone."

 
 

8.    
[Mr.] 
Stephens states that he intends to fight the gate as long as he 
lives.

 
 

9.    
Although 
[Mr.] Stephens now states he will keep the gate locked, his testimony in this 
regard is not credible.

 
 

10. 
[Mr.] 
Stephens' act of stamping the combination on his lock is in direct violation of 
the Court's Order.  A combination 
lock with the combination stamped on it is not a lock at 
all.

 
 

11. 
[Mr.] 
Stephens' statements about wanting to shoot someone demonstrate his attitude, 
but do not constitute harassment of [the Lavitts] because those statements were 
not directed to [them].

 
 

12. 
The 
Court is unable to enter an Order that will permit [Mr.] Stephens to use the 
Luman Road and accomplish the gate being locked, because [Mr.] Stephens has 
demonstrated his refusal to comply with such an Order.

 
 

13. 
[Mr.] 
Stephens' violation of the Court's Order constitutes misuse of his easement on 
Luman Road sufficient to cause forfeiture of that 
easement.

 
 

IT 
IS, THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that 
[Mr.] Stephens is in Criminal Contempt of this Court for failure to comply with 
this Court's Order to lock the gate.

 
 

IT 
IS FURTHER ORDERED that 
as a consequence of such Contempt, the Court declares [Mr.] Stephens' easement 
on Luman Road to be forfeited and terminated.

 
 

IT 
IS FURTHER ORDERED that 
the permanent injunction of September 25, 2008, is modified to prohibit [Mr.] 
Stephens, his agents, guests, employees and/or representatives from using the 
Luman [R]oad.  

 
 
 
 
Mr. 
Stephens filed a notice of appeal.    

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 

1.    
 Nature of Contempt 
Proceeding

 
 

[¶9]      Mr. Stephens 
argues the contempt proceeding was criminal in nature, and the district court 
did not have jurisdiction because it was not brought in a separate, independent 
action.  See, e.g., BW v. State, 2010 WY 18, ¶ 5, 226 P.3d 272, 274 (Wyo. 2010); Swain v. State, 
2009 WY 142, ¶¶ 13-17, 220 P.3d 504, 507-09 (Wyo. 2009).  The Lavitts counter that the contempt 
proceeding was civil and the district court had jurisdiction to hear it as part 
of the original case.  "Whether a 
court has jurisdiction is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.'"  Hamilton v. Hamilton, 2010 WY 35, ¶ 5, 
228 P.3d 51, 52 (Wyo. 2010), quoting SEG v. 
GDK, 
2007 WY 203, ¶ 4, 173 P.3d 395, 395 (Wyo. 2007). 

 
 
[¶10]   In Swain, ¶¶ 13-17, 230 P.3d  at 507-09, we 
stated that a criminal contempt proceeding is "between the public and the 
contemnor and is a separate and independent proceeding from, and is not a part 
of, the original case in which the contempt aroseit is instituted, tried and 
treated as a distinct criminal action."  
Id., ¶ 14, 230 P.3d  at 508, citing Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 
221 U.S. 418, 31 S. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797 (1911).  A district court does not have 
jurisdiction over a criminal contempt proceeding unless it is brought as a 
separate action, in the name of the state.  
Any criminal contempt order issued in an action not properly commenced is 
null and void.  Swain, ¶ 14, 230 P.3d  at 508.  
In contrast, a civil contempt proceeding is a dispute between the 
original parties and is "instituted, tried and treated as a part of the main 
case."  Id.   

 
 
[¶11]   In Munoz v., Munoz, 2002 WY 4, ¶ 11, 39 P.3d 390, 393 (Wyo. 2002), we identified four factors that may be considered in 
determining the nature of a contempt proceeding:

 
 
            
1.         
In what manner did the contempt happen, that is, did the 
contemnor refuse to do an affirmative act or did the contemnor do that which he 
was ordered not to do;

 
 
            
2.         
what was the substance of the proceeding;

 
 
            
3.         
what kind of punishment was imposed; and

 
 
            
4.         
for what reasons did the court impose that kind of 
punishment.

 
 
[¶12]   Analyzing the first factor, if the 
contemnor refuses to do an affirmative act previously ordered by the court, the 
proceeding is considered to be civil; if the contemnor does something he was 
ordered not to do, the proceeding is criminal.  Id.  See also, United Mine Workers of America, Local 1972 
v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Wyo. 1989), superseded on other 
grounds by rule as recognized by CRB v. 
State, Dept. of Family Services, 974 P.2d 931, 936 (Wyo. 1999).  The Lavitts' motion to show cause 
alleged both a failure to perform an affirmative action previously ordered by 
the district court (lock the gate) and the doing of an act which was prohibited 
(harassing them).  The district 
court, however, found Mr. Stephens in contempt only for failing to lock the 
gate.  The court held the evidence 
did not establish that Mr. Stephens had harassed the Lavitts.  On the whole, this factor indicates the 
contempt proceeding was civil.  

 
 

[¶13]   The substance of a contempt 
proceeding is determined by analyzing the course of proceedings.  Mr. Stephens apparently assumes the 
contempt proceeding was criminal because the district court proceeded under 
W.R.Cr.P. 42.  The process set out 
in Rule 42 follows typical criminal law procedure.  However, in Munoz, ¶ 13, 39 P.3d  at 393, this Court 
rejected the notion that a proceeding will always be considered criminal if the 
district court proceeds under Rule 42.  
We explained that 
W.R.Cr.P. 
42 
and 42.1 
expressly recognize the possibility of imposing either criminal or civil sanctions for contempt of court.  W.R.Cr.P. 
42.1(b) 
states in relevant part:  "If, after 
notice and hearing, the court finds that a person has failed or refused to 
perform an act that is yet within the person's power to perform, the court may 
find the person in civil contempt of court . . . ."  The fact that the district court provided 
the accused contemnor with the protections and advisements provided by the 
Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure does not automatically render the proceeding criminal in nature.  Munoz, ¶ 13, 39 P.3d  at 393.   

 
 
[¶14]   Although the district court 
referred to the contempt action as criminal and utilized criminal procedure, the 
course of proceedings in this case demonstrates that the proceeding was 
civil.  The action was brought by a 
private party, rather than the state, to enforce compliance with the protections 
provided in the injunction.  

 
 
[¶15]   The third and fourth factors 
address the type of punishment imposed and the district court's reasons for 
imposing the punishment and are often denominated as the principal 
considerations in determining whether a contempt proceeding is criminal or 
civil.  Horn v. District Court, Ninth Judicial 
District, 647 P.2d 1368, 1372-73 (Wyo. 1982).  We expounded on the punishment element 
in Horn v. Welch, 2002 WY 138, ¶ 12, 
54 P.3d 754, 759 (Wyo. 2002):

 
 

A 
contempt is considered civil when the punishment is wholly 
remedial, serves only the purposes of the complainant, and is not intended as a 
deterrent to offenses against the public. Horn, 
647 P.2d  at 1373. 
A civil contempt is generally intended to 
compel a party to comply with a lawful court order while a criminal contempt is punitive in nature and is 
enforced so the authority of the law and the court will be vindicated. 
Id. Stated simply, the primary purpose of criminal contempt is to punish while the 
primary purpose of civil contempt is to coerce. Anderson 
v. Anderson, 
667 P.2d 660, 662 (Wyo.1983); 
Horn, 
647 P.2d  at 1373. 
Appellate courts are obligated to decide whether a contempt is civil or criminal based on the reasons for a 
particular penalty. Id.

 
 
[¶16]   The permanent injunction was 
focused on compelling Mr. Stephens to act properly on the easement, including 
keeping the gate locked.  The 
Lavitts' motion to show cause alleged that Mr. Stephens had violated the 
injunction and prayed that the court would permanently enjoin Mr. Stephens from 
entering their property.  The 
district court reviewed the history of Mr. Stephens' refusal to comply with its 
orders and succinctly and clearly explained its rationale for terminating Mr. 
Stephens' easement:

 
 
12.  The Court is unable to enter an Order 
that will permit [Mr.] Stephens to use the Luman Road and accomplish the gate 
being locked, because [Mr.] Stephens has demonstrated his refusal to comply with 
such an Order.  

 
 
13.       [Mr.] 
Stephens' violation of the Court's Order constitutes misuse of his easement on 
Luman Road sufficient to cause forfeiture of that 
easement.

 
 
Unquestionably, 
the reason the district court imposed the punishment of forfeiture of the 
easement was to enforce its order that the gate should be locked.  The purpose of its order was to remedy 
the harm done to the Lavitts rather than to protect the public or punish Mr. 
Stephens.  

 
 
[¶17]   The punishment factors, like the 
others, confirm that the action was civil in nature.  It was, therefore, properly brought 
under the original docket number, as a private matter between the original 
parties.  The district court had 
jurisdiction to entertain the action.  

            
 

 
 

2.    
Remedy

 
 
[¶18]   Mr. Stephens also challenges the 
remedy imposed by the district court for his violation of the permanent 
injunctionextinguishment of his easement on Luman Road.  A court has the inherent power to punish 
contempts of court and discretion to determine what sanction is 
appropriate.  We will not intrude 
upon a district court's contempt order unless the appellant shows a clear and 
grave abuse of discretion.  Greene v. Finn, 2007 WY 47, ¶ 5, 153 P.3d 945, 948 (Wyo. 2007).  In 
determining whether the district court abused its discretion, we consider 
whether it "could have reasonably concluded as it did."  Horn, ¶ 8, 54 P.3d  at 758.  

 
 
[¶19]   Mr. Stephens' argument that the 
remedy was unauthorized assumes that the contempt proceeding was criminal in 
nature.  He offers no cogent 
analysis regarding whether forfeiture of the easement was a proper sanction for 
civil contempt or misuse of the easement.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-28-107 (LexisNexis 2009) and Rule 42.1 provide broad 
powers for a court to enforce its orders with civil sanctions.  Section 1-28-107 
states:

 
 

            
An injunction or 
restraining order granted by a judge may be enforced as the act of the court, 
and disobedience may be punished by the court as a contempt. An attachment may be issued 
against the disobedient party upon satisfactory showing by affidavit of the 
breach of the injunction or 
restraining order. The disobedient party may be required by the court or judge 
to pay a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars ($200.00), to make immediate 
restitution to the party injured and to give further security to obey the injunction or restraining order. In 
default thereof, he may be committed to custody until he complies with the 
requirements or is otherwise legally discharged. Fines collected under this 
section shall be paid to the state treasurer and credited as provided in 
W.S. 
8-1-109.

 
 
Rule 
42.1 outlines non-exclusive coercive and compensatory remedies.  

 
 
[¶20]   In addition to finding that Mr. 
Stephens was in contempt of court for violating its injunctive order, the 
district court also ruled that Mr. Stephens' violation of the injunction 
amounted to misuse of the easement sufficient to justify forfeiture.  It is a basic precept of our law that 
forfeitures are abhorred.  See, e.g., Walker v. Graham, 706 P.2d 278, 281-82 
(Wyo. 1985); Younglove v. Graham & 
Hill, 526 P.2d 689, 692 (Wyo. 1974).  
Although this tenet applies in the context of easements, there is 
authority that forfeiture of an easement may be ordered in the face of 
significant misuse of the servient property by the dominant owner.  "Use of an easement for an unauthorized 
purpose, or excessive use or misuse of it, is not sufficient to cause a 
forfeiture of the easement, unless the misuse of the easement is willful and 
substantial and not merely minor or technical."  25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 99 (2010) 
(footnotes omitted).  In Frenning v. Dow, 544 A.2d 145, 146 (R.I. 
1988), the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that "[g]enerally courts have not 
favored extinguishing an easement unless injunctive relief would be ineffective 
to relieve the servient tenement."

 
 

[¶21]   While the remedy was onerous, under 
the specific facts of this case, we are not convinced the district court abused 
its discretion by ordering forfeiture of the easement to remedy Mr. Stephens' 
violation of its injunctive order and misuse of the easement.  It had governed this case for several 
years and witnessed Mr. Stephens' continued refusals to comply with its 
orders.  The district court 
conducted the contempt proceeding and was unconvinced by Mr. Stephens' 
representation that, at that late date, he would finally comply with the court's 
order.  We defer to the district 
court's findings of witness credibility.  
Pond 
v. Pond, 
2009 WY 134, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 650, 652 (Wyo. 2009).  

 
 
[¶22]   The evidence demonstrated that Mr. 
Stephens' misuse of the easement was willful and substantial and further 
injunctive relief would not have been effective in relieving the servient 
estate.  See, 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 99; Frenning, 544 A.2d  at 146.  Moreover, Mr. Stephens can still access 
his property by using the Mart Miller Road, although that road traverses more 
difficult terrain and requires more maintenance.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion by ordering termination of the easement over the Lavitts' property 
under the particular circumstances presented here.  

 
 
[¶23]   The district court's order also 
extinguished Mr. Stephens' easement over property belonging to landowners who 
were not parties to the contempt proceedings.  Considering that we have determined that 
this was a civil contempt proceeding between the Lavitts and Mr. Stephens, the 
district court abused its discretion by extinguishing Mr. Stephens' easement 
over lands owned by persons who were not parties to the contempt 
proceeding.  See, e.g., Horn, ¶ 12, 54 P.3d  at 759 (holding 
punishment for a civil contempt "serves only the purposes of the 
complainant").  We, therefore, 
reverse that aspect of the contempt order.2   

 
 
[¶24]   Affirmed in part and reversed in 
part.       

 

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Luman Road crosses properties belonging to people besides the 
Lavitts.  Although other landowners 
participated in the underlying action, they did not join in the contempt 
proceeding.  We will generally refer 
to these landowners as "the Lavitts" unless there is reason to separately 
identify them.  

 
 

2As a practical matter, the remaining portions of Mr. Stephens' easement 
are not usable.  Since he cannot 
cross the Lavitts' property, he will not be able to access his property from 
Luman Road.