Case Title: Wells v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015-SC-000608-MR

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2017-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
RENDERED: MARCH 23, 2017
‘10 BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2015-SC-000608-MR
DON STERLING WELLS, JR. ‘APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT.
v. HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
NO. 14-CR-00022

(COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE WRIGHT
AFFIRMING

 

A Fayette County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Don Wells, Jr.,
on two counts of first-degree rape (victim under the age of twelve) and two
counts of first-degree sodomy (victim under the age of twelve). Wells entered a
conditional guilty plea to one count of first-degree rape, one count of second-
degree rape, and one count of second-degree sodomy. The trial court
sentenced Wells to twenty-five years’ imprisonment, By entering a conditional
guilty plea, Wells reserved his right to appeal the trial court’s order denying his
motion to suppress evidence of his confession. He now raises that issue on

‘appeal.

 

Wells contends that police obtained his confession in violation of Miranda
v, Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), because he did not knowingly and voluntarily

waive his rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, The Commonwealth argues that Miranda does not apply
because Wells was not in custody at the time he made incriminating
statements to police. We agree with the Commonwealth despite the fact that
the parties did not argue this issue to the lower court. Even if a lower court
reaches its judgment for the wrong reason, we may affirm a correct result upon
any ground supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Fields, 194 8.W.34
255, 257 (Ky. 2006) (“The Court of Appeals improperly held that the
prosecution could not present on appeal an alternative reason justifying the
decision of the trial judge. This Court has affirmed a judgment or decision of
the trial court even if that court reached the right result for the wrong
reason.”); Jarvis v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Ky. 1998)

Here, Lexington Police Detective James Jefiries went to the residence
Wells shared with his girlfriend and her children. Officer Sisk, a uniformed
patrol officer, accompanied Detective Jeffries, along with a representative of

 

headquarters to answer some questions about allegations made against him.
Wells agreed. Because Wells did not have a valid driver's license, he rode to
police headquarters in the back of Officer Sisk’s cruiser. Even though Wells
was not in handculfs, Detective Jeffries failed to clarify to Officer Sisk that
Wells was not in custody. When Officer Sisk and Wells arrived at police
headquarters, Officer Sisk placed Wells in a holding cell. Detective Jeffries
arrived five minutes later. He then removed Wells from the holding cell and

took him to an interview room.
While questioning Wells, Detective Jeffries never placed Wells in
handcufs, nor any other type of restraints. During the interview, Detective
Jellies said that: 1) police would provide Wells a ride home after the interview;
2) Wells had the right not to talk to him; 3) he would not harm Wells, and he
could not beat Wells into talking to him; 4) Wells could end the interview at any
point; 5) Wells was not in custody; and 6) if Wells decided he was done with the
interview, Jeffries could not stop him from leaving. In fact, Detective Jeffries
had Wells physically get up out of his chair and walk to the door of the
interview room as if he were leaving to illustrate the point that Wells was not in
custody, Only after making the aforementioned statements and having Wells
enact leaving the interview room did Detective Jeffries begin the interrogation.

We first note that “Miranda warnings are required only where there has
been such a restriction on the freedom of an individual as to render him in
custody.” Commonwealth v. Lucas, 195 S.W.3d 403, 405 (Ky. 2006).

According to the United States Supreme Court, “custody’ is a term of art that

 

specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger

of coercion.” Howes v. Fields, 182 8. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012). In Stansbury v.

 

California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994), the Supreme Court stated that, “[ojur
decisions make clear that the initial determination of custody depends on the
objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views
harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”
‘Therefore, when determining if an individual was in custody, “courts must

‘examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” Howes, 132

3
8. Ct. at 1189, and ask whether “a reasonable person would have felt he or she
was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” id. (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted.)

First, Wells was unmistakably in custody when Officer Sisk placed him
in the holding cell; however, during the five minutes he remained there, police
did not interrogate Wells, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, (*{T]he term
‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to
any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”), nor did Wells
make any incriminating statements at that time, Moreover, Wells was not
entitled to @ Miranda warning unless he remained in custody while Detective
Jeffries questioned him. United States v. Swan, 842 F.3d 28, 32 (Ist Cir. 2016)
(‘Swan was not entitled to a Miranda warning unless she remained in custody

 

at the stationhouse when she made the statements now at

 

issue.") (emphs
added).

Next, we must decide whether Wells was ‘in custody” at the time he
made incriminating statements to police in order to determine whether a
Miranda warning was required. Because we agree with the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit that in a custodial-interrogation analysis, “we

focus on the time that the relevant statements were made,"! id. at 31, our

 

? That Court also noted other instances the First Circuit applied
this rationale:

4
analysis focuses on the taped interview in which Wells made incriminating *
statements. In analyzing the interview, we turn to the factors set out by the
‘Supreme Court of the United States in Howes. The “[rjelevant factors include
the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during the
interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the
questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the

* Howes, 132 8. Ct. at 1189 (internal citations and quotation

 

questioning .

marks omitted).

{l]n United States v. McCarty, 475 F.3d 39 (Ist Cir. 2007),
‘we considered whether to suppress unwarned statements,
bby a defendant who had been handcuffed only minutes
‘beforehand. Although we observed that the defendant
undoubtedly had been “in custody” while restrained, we
held that the situation became non-custodial by the time
that the questioning began. Id. at 45-46. This was
because the officers had taken off the defendant's
‘handoufis and “explained . . . that he was not under arrest,
that he was free to leave at any time, and that he did not,
hhave to answer any questions.” Id. at 46. Accordingly,
there was no need to administer a Miranda warning.”
‘Swan, 842 F.3d at 31-92.
Furthermore, the First Circuit notes that two other circuits
‘have also applied this same rationale:
Other circuits have applied a similar analysis. See United
States v. Gordon, 294 Fed. Appx. 579, 584 (11th Cir. 2008)
(per curiam) (unpublished) (holding that the defendant's
telephone conversation with an agent after his arrest and
release was not subject to Miranda requirements because
the defendant “was not in custody at the time he made the
statements at issue’); United States v. Wallace, 323 F 34
1109, 1113 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining that interrogation
was non-custodial despite the fact that law enforcement
“corralled the [defendant] at the onset of the search”
because the “main focus must be on the individual's
restraint during the interview" (emphasis in original)).

id, at n.1.
5
Here, Detective Jeffries questioned Wells in an interview room at police
‘headquarters for less than one hour and fifteen minutes. During the interview,
police never placed Wells in handcuffs, nor in any other type of physical
restraints. In fact, Detective Jeffries informed Wells that he would not harm
him or beat him into talking, Detective Jeffries told Wells that he could end the
interview at any point, and that if Wells wanted to walk out the door, Jeffries
could not stop him. Furthermore, Wells never told Detective Jeffries that he
wanted to leave, even after Jeffries informed Wells that police would provide
him a ride home when the interview concluded, Although Wells did not walk

he confessed to the

 

out of police headquarters a free man after the interview (
crimes for which he ultimately pled guilty), Detective Jeffries provided sufficient
opportunity and explanation for Wells to stop the interrogation and leave before
‘he made the incriminating statements that led to his arrest.

Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that a
reasonable person in Wells's position would have felt he had the liberty to
terminate the interrogation and leave before making incriminating statements.
Id. Therefore, we hold that the interrogation was non-custodial. When an
interrogation is non-custodial, police need not give a Miranda warning. Lucas,

195 S.W.34 at 405.2

2 Because we hold that Wells was not in custody—and thus not entitled to a
‘Miranda warning—we need not address Wells's argument that the warning given by
Detective Jeffries was inadequate. However, we do note that from the transcript of the
interview, it appears likely that Detective Jefities's dialogue with Wells properly
‘apprised Wells of his rights. We will not analyze this issue in depth, however, as it
does not impact the outcome of this matter.

6
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court
denying Wells's motion to suppress evidence of his confession.

All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
John Gerhart Landon
Assistant Public Advocate
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Andy Beshear
Attorney General of Kentucky

James Daryl Havey
Assistant Attorney General