Case Title: Columbus Bar Assn. v. Boggs

Citation: 2011-Ohio-2637

Docket Number: 20101846

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Boggs, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2637.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-2637 
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. BOGGS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Boggs,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2637.] 
Attorneys at law — Multiple violations of Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including failure to provide competent representation and failure to notify 
clients of lack of professional-liability insurance — Indefinite suspension. 
(No. 2010-1846 — Submitted February 16, 2011 — Decided June 7, 2011.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-083. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Kenneth Ray Boggs of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0025305, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1980.  In 
1988, he was publicly reprimanded by this court.  Columbus Bar Assn. v. Boggs 
(1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 601, 529 N.E.2d 936.  In 2004, this court imposed a one-
year suspension, stayed on conditions, for failing to keep accurate records of 
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client money in his trust account.  Columbus Bar Assn. v. Boggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 
108, 2004-Ohio-4657, 814 N.E.2d 815, ¶ 12, 15. 
{¶ 2} On respondent’s third appearance before this court, the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommends that we indefinitely 
suspend respondent’s license to practice law.  The parties have submitted 
stipulations of fact and misconduct for some of the allegations, and a panel of the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline conducted a hearing on 
the remaining allegations.  The panel accepted the parties’ agreed stipulations, 
made additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, and recommended that 
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years, with one year of 
the suspension stayed, upon conditions including monitoring of his practice.  The 
board, after citing respondent’s disciplinary record and inability to follow ethical 
rules, recommends that respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of 
law.  Respondent filed objections to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
recommendation made by the board.  However, we adopt the board’s findings and 
conclusions that respondent violated ethical standards incumbent on Ohio 
lawyers.  Therefore, we indefinitely suspend respondent’s license to practice law 
in Ohio. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 3} On October 12, 2009, relator, Columbus Bar Association, charged 
respondent in a five-count complaint with numerous violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
Count 1 (The Miller Matter) 
{¶ 4} Respondent stipulated that in 2007, he met with Miller to discuss 
her representation in a domestic-relations matter.  Respondent and Miller had 
several phone discussions regarding strategy, and respondent prepared the 
appropriate documents to initiate divorce proceedings.  Miller paid respondent 
$1,250 in October and executed the appropriate documents.  Respondent 
January Term, 2011 
3 
deposited the money that he received, a portion of which was for anticipated court 
costs, directly into his business account, rather than into his client trust account. 
{¶ 5} After paying the retainer, Miller terminated the representation and 
asked for a refund.  In December 2007, Miller asked relator to help her obtain a 
refund from respondent.  Respondent showed relator proof, in March 2008, that 
he and Miller had agreed to a refund of $750.  To make the refund, respondent 
deposited money from his regular business account into his trust account and then 
sent a trust-account check to Miller. 
{¶ 6} Respondent also stipulated that he did not maintain professional-
liability insurance during the course of his representation of Miller and that he did 
not advise Miller in writing that he did not carry insurance. 
{¶ 7} The parties have stipulated and we agree that, as alleged in the 
complaint, respondent’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer 
to inform the client if the lawyer does not maintain professional-liability 
insurance) and 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to hold property of a client separate 
from the lawyer’s own property) and (c) (requiring a lawyer to deposit into a 
client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance).  
Because relator did not present any evidence of the charged violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(d) (requiring a lawyer, upon request, to promptly render a full 
accounting of funds or property in which a client has an interest), the panel and 
board treated the allegation as dismissed.  We concur and dismiss the charge. 
Count 2 (The Goheen Matter) 
{¶ 8} In January 2008, Goheen paid respondent $1,300 to represent her 
in a bankruptcy case.  At that time, Goheen provided the necessary information to 
complete the bankruptcy forms.  Respondent deposited the entire fee into his 
business account.  Goheen executed the necessary forms but failed to complete 
the required consumer-credit counseling and debtor-education briefing required 
by the bankruptcy court.  In June 2008, Goheen terminated the representation and 
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requested a return of the fees she had paid to respondent.  Respondent issued a 
refund check for $1,300 from his business account. 
{¶ 9} Respondent did not maintain professional-liability insurance 
during the course of his representation of Goheen and did not advise her in 
writing that he did not carry insurance. 
{¶ 10} The parties stipulated, and we agree, that respondent’s conduct 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c) and 1.15(a) and (c).  Because relator did not present 
any evidence of the charged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to 
act with reasonable diligence in representing a client), the panel and board treated 
the allegations as dismissed.  We concur and dismiss the charges. 
Count 3 (The Stevens Matter) 
{¶ 11} The panel found that relator failed to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence any of the alleged violations of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct in count 3 of the complaint.  The panel treated the violations alleged in 
this count as dismissed.  The board adopted the findings.  We agree and dismiss 
the charges relating to count 3. 
Count 4 (The Dotters Matter) 
{¶ 12} Dotters met with respondent in January 2007 to discuss matters 
involving the death of her father, his probate estate, and related issues regarding 
her father’s girlfriend.  Dotters retained respondent and paid him $9,700 as a 
retainer, which he stipulated that he deposited in his operating account.  
Respondent also stipulated that there was no written fee agreement.  When 
Dotters asked for a written statement of the time spent on the case and a refund of 
any unused money, respondent told her that the entire retainer had been 
exhausted.  Although respondent performed some work on the case, he never filed 
a legal action on her behalf and never produced an accounting for the time spent 
on the case. 
January Term, 2011 
5 
{¶ 13} Respondent stipulated that his conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 
1.15(a) and (c).  In addition, the panel and board found that respondent also 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (failing to provide competent representation), 1.3 
(failing to act with diligence and promptness), 1.4(a)(3) (failing to keep a client 
reasonably informed about the status of a matter), 1.5(a) (charging a clearly 
excessive fee), and 8.4(h) (engaging in conduct reflecting adversely on the 
lawyer’s fitness to practice law).  The panel and board treated as dismissed an 
allegation that respondent had violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(d) (requiring a lawyer 
to promptly deliver funds or other property that the client is entitled to receive) 
because it was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
{¶ 14} Respondent has filed objections, arguing that the findings made by 
the panel and adopted by the board were insufficient to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence any violations that were not stipulated and thus were 
erroneous as a matter of law.  We disagree. 
{¶ 15} “We will defer to a panel’s credibility determination in our 
independent review of discipline cases unless the record weighs heavily against 
those determinations.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio St.3d 521, 
2008-Ohio-91, 880 N.E.2d 467, ¶ 39, citing Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 101 
Ohio St.3d 14, 2003-Ohio-6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 8.  The panel found that 
Dotters was very credible and set out evidence in support of that finding.  There 
was evidence that Dotters paid respondent $9,700 to assist her in an estate matter.  
Respondent never provided Dotters with an explanation of how the money was 
spent, with an engagement letter, or with an accounting of the hours that he had 
worked or the services that he had provided to Dotters.  We agree with the panel’s 
and board’s findings, dismiss the allegation of violating Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(d), and 
conclude that the remaining violations were proven by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
 
 
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Count 5 (The Peacock Matter) 
{¶ 16} After respondent and Peacock met in November 2007 to discuss 
Peacock’s alleged wrongful termination of employment,  Peacock paid respondent 
$4,000 to review substantial records and pursue a case for wrongful termination.  
Respondent deposited the money into an account other than his client trust 
account. 
{¶ 17} Peacock, on respondent’s advice, pursued administrative remedies 
and arbitration through the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).  During the arbitration 
proceedings, Peacock was represented by his union; under Peacock’s employment 
contract and union agreement, respondent was not permitted to represent Peacock 
at the arbitration hearing.  Respondent did offer advice and his assistance to the 
union representative, but he was told that was the extent of what was allowed.  
Peacock alleged that respondent did not return his calls during the EEOC and 
civil-rights actions. 
{¶ 18} Following arbitration, Peacock was returned to his job, without 
back pay or benefits.  Respondent then advised his client that based upon his 
review of the case and law, the arbitration award was not reversible and there was 
nothing more he could do.  He also told Peacock that he would not refund any of 
the fee that was paid.  Respondent did not provide Peacock an accounting of the 
time spent during the course of the representation. 
{¶ 19} Respondent did not maintain professional-liability insurance 
during the representation, and he did not inform Peacock of that fact in writing. 
{¶ 20} Respondent stipulated, and the panel and board found, that his 
conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3) and (c).  The panel treated the allegation 
of violating Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(d) as dismissed because it was not proven by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
January Term, 2011 
7 
{¶ 21} In addition, the panel concluded that respondent violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.5(a). 1.15(c), and 8.4(h).  Respondent objected to the 
findings, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the violations 
found by the panel and adopted by the board.  The panel concluded, based on the 
evidence, that once respondent took Peacock’s retainer, he did little, if any, work.  
Further, the panel concluded that Peacock had an extremely difficult time finding 
out what, if anything, respondent was doing on his case. 
{¶ 22} The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct.  
We agree, and conclude that respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and 
(c), 1.5(a). 1.15(c), and 8.4(h).  We dismiss the allegation of violating 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(d). 
Aggravation and Mitigation 
{¶ 23} The panel and board found that the following aggravating factors 
exist:  respondent has been previously disciplined twice, BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(a); he exhibited a dishonest or selfish motive by taking excessive fees 
from Dotters and Peacock and failing to make restitution, BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(b), and he engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving four different 
clients and multiple offenses, BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c) and (d). 
{¶ 24} In mitigation, the only factor found by the panel and board in 
respondent’s favor was that he had made full disclosure to the board and exhibited 
a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(d).  
Despite this finding, the panel and board were concerned that respondent took 
large sums of money from two of his clients and could neither document nor 
demonstrate to the clients the work that was done. 
Sanction 
{¶ 25} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the duties violated by the lawyer in question and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
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St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  Before making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10.  See Lake Cty. Bar Assn. v. Troy, 121 Ohio St.3d 
51, 2009-Ohio-502, 901 N.E.2d 809, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 26} We have identified respondent's breaches of his duties to his 
clients, the legal profession, and the judicial system.  Respondent urges us to 
adopt the sanction recommended by the panel that he be suspended from the 
practice of law for two years, with one year of that suspension stayed on 
conditions.  The board, however, recommends that respondent be indefinitely 
suspended from the practice of law.  We adopt the recommendation of the board. 
{¶ 27} The panel pointed to two cases with facts that are similar to the 
ones in the case at bar.  In Disciplinary Counsel v. Wise, 108 Ohio St.3d 381, 
2006-Ohio-1194, 843 N.E.2d 1198, this court concluded that the respondent’s 
extended misuse of his client trust account, his failure to maintain or produce 
adequate records documenting account deposits and withdrawals, his multiple 
overdrafts from the trust account, and his lack of cooperation and candor during 
the disciplinary process warranted an indefinite suspension.  Id. at ¶ 16.  In Wise, 
as in this case, the respondent had been the subject of a prior suspension.  Id. at ¶ 
1.  Although respondent has been more cooperative in the disciplinary process 
than Wise was, respondent has committed multiple acts of misconduct. 
{¶ 28} We issued an indefinite suspension in Wise and emphasized the 
importance of maintaining personal and office accounts separate from client 
accounts:  “[I]t is ‘of the utmost importance that attorneys maintain their personal 
and office accounts separate from their clients’ accounts’ and * * * any violation 
of that rule ‘warrants a substantial sanction whether or not the client has been 
harmed.’ [Erie-Huron Counties Joint Certified Grievance Commt. v.] Miles 
[(1996)] 76 Ohio St.3d [574] at 577, 669 N.E.2d 831.  * * * [T]he ‘mishandling of 
clients’ funds either by way of conversion, commingling, or just poor 
January Term, 2011 
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management, encompasses an area of the gravest concern of this court in 
reviewing claimed attorney misconduct.’  Columbus Bar Assn. v. Thompson 
(1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 667, 669, 23 O.O.3d 541, 433 N.E.2d 602.”  Id. at ¶ 15. 
{¶ 29} In Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Kaplan, 124 Ohio St.3d 278, 
2010-Ohio-167, 921 N.E.2d 645, the respondent had neglected client matters, 
failed to maintain a record documenting the receipt of a client’s fee, failed to 
promptly comply with reasonable client requests for information, and failed to 
cooperate in the disciplinary proceeding.  Id. at ¶ 16.  We concluded that these 
actions merited an indefinite suspension.  Kaplan had no prior disciplinary record 
in 43 years of practice, but he did fail to respond to the complaint. 
{¶ 30} In his objections, respondent agrees that a two-year suspension, 
with one year stayed, is warranted, but he points to various cases with lesser 
sanctions to argue against an indefinite suspension.  The cases cited by respondent 
are not comparable to the case at bar.  First, we note that this is respondent’s third 
disciplinary action before this court.  Respondent argues that his cooperation in 
the disciplinary proceedings is a reason to give him a lesser sanction, but, as 
relator notes, however contrite and cooperative respondent may be when facing 
ethics charges, he still has not rectified his unprofessional conduct.  Relator also 
argues that respondent’s trust-account violations are more serious than those in 
his preceding disciplinary action in 2004.  We agree.  Respondent still lacks the 
ability to represent clients appropriately, even though he has previously been 
disciplined for misconduct similar to the charges he is now facing.  Thus, an 
indefinite suspension is appropriate in order to properly protect the public from 
further misconduct by respondent. 
{¶ 31} Having weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case 
and having considered the sanctions previously imposed for comparable conduct, 
we adopt the board’s recommended sanction of an indefinite suspension. 
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{¶ 32} Accordingly, we indefinitely suspend Kenneth Ray Boggs from the 
practice of law.  We condition any future reinstatement on the submission of 
proof that  respondent has completed 12 hours of continuing legal education in 
law-office 
management 
in 
addition 
to 
the 
continuing-legal-education 
requirements of Gov.Bar R. X.  In addition, respondent is required to prove that 
he has made restitution, within 90 days of this order, of $9,700 to the client 
discussed in count 4 and $4,000 to the client discussed in count 5.  Costs are taxed 
to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Michael L. Close, Bruce A. Campbell, and A. Alysha Clous, for relator. 
Kenneth Ray Boggs, pro se. 
__________________