Case Title: OLLIE JENNING CRABTREE V. STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-13

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
OLLIE JENNING CRABTREE V. STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 62112 P.3d 618Case Number: No. 04-13Decided: 06/03/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
                                                                                                                        

OLLIE 
JENNING CRABTREE,        

Appellant 
(Defendant),         

 
 
 v.        

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,           

Appellee 
(Defendant). 

 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge 

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth M. 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. 
Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Ollie Jenning 
Crabtree was convicted of battery against a household member, a third offense 
felony under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).  Crabtree appeals the judgment and 
sentence related to that conviction.  
He claims the district court failed to properly instruct the jury and 
that the district court abused its discretion when it banished ("sundowned") him 
from NatronaCounty.  We affirm the conviction and reverse the 
sentence for the district court to strike the banishment 
term.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Crabtree advances 
two issues on appeal:

 
 
Whether the 
district court failed to properly instruct the jury.

 
 
Whether the 
trial court abused its sentencing discretion when it effectively "sundowned" Mr. 
Crabtree from NatronaCounty.

 
 
The State 
rephrases the issues as:

 
 
Is 
Appellant entitled to reversal of his conviction because of t he district 
court's response to a question posed by the jury during 
deliberations?

 
 
Did the 
district court abuse its discretion in sentencing 
Appellant?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Crabtree and the 
victim had an on and off relationship for approximately four years. The 
relationship was often contentious, and at times Crabtree physically injured the 
victim.  In fact, the incident that 
led to the instant charges occurred when Crabtree was awaiting sentencing on a 
prior battery committed against the victim. At that time, Crabtree was 
prohibited by court order from having contact with the victim. Nevertheless, 
Crabtree failed to comply with this no contact order and resumed a relationship 
with the victim. 

 
 
[¶4]      Once again the 
couple's relationship was filled with contention.   On March 26, 2003, Crabtree spent 
most of the day at the victim's apartment where the couple argued. In part, 
Crabtree was displeased about his legal problems and was angry with the victim 
at the possibility of serving time in jail for the prior instance of battery. 
After arguing for some time, the victim asked Crabtree to leave her apartment, 
and Crabtree did so.  

 
 
[¶5]      The next day 
Crabtree returned to the victim's apartment, where the two resumed their 
argument.  At some point, Crabtree 
followed the victim downstairs to her bedroom, pushed her down on the bed, and 
bit the victim on the side of her neck.   When the victim began crying and 
asked him to stop, Crabtree did so.  
However, he then pounded and rubbed his knuckles on her chest giving her 
a "red chest."  Following the "red 
chest," Crabtree bit the other side of the victim's neck until she once again 
cried and asked him to stop.  

 
 
[¶6]      At that point, 
Crabtree returned upstairs. The victim followed Crabtree hoping to escape out 
the door.  When Crabtree opened the 
door, the victim tried to sneak out. She was unable to do so because Crabtree 
pushed her against the wall in the entryway and then tried to drag her back 
downstairs.  The victim grabbed the 
railing to prevent this from happening and began to scream for help.  

 
 
[¶7]      The victim's 
neighbor heard the screams and came to the victim's door.  As the neighbor neared the door, 
Crabtree opened it and left.  The 
neighbor convinced the victim to call the police, and they came to investigate. 
On March 28, 2003, a criminal information was filed charging Crabtree with one 
count of battery against a household member. A jury trial commenced on July 14, 
2003.  During the course of its 
deliberations the jury sent a note to the district court asking if it could (1) 
have a copy of the police report; and (2) consider Crabtree's presence in the 
victim's apartment as unlawful for the purposes of Jury Instruction No. 7. After 
conferring with counsel, the district court informed the jury that it had to 
rely on the testimony, exhibits, and instructions presented at trial.  A short time later the jury returned a 
verdict finding Crabtree guilty.

 
 
[¶8]      After reviewing a 
presentence investigation report, the district court sentenced Crabtree to a 
term of imprisonment of eighteen to twenty-four months and ordered that the 
sentence be served consecutively to the sentence previously imposed for the 
earlier battery conviction.  In 
addition, the court requested that the sentencing order reflect the court's 
recommendation that Crabtree not be allowed to return to NatronaCounty. This recommendation was 
incorporated into the order.  
Crabtree now appeals.      

 
 
 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      The trial court 
has the duty to instruct the jury on the general principles applicable in the 
case and is given wide latitude to do so.  
Reversible error will not be found as long as the instructions when 
viewed as a whole and in the context of the entire trial fairly and adequately 
cover the issues.  Glenn v. 
State, 2003 WY 4, ¶18, 61 P.3d 389, ¶18 (Wyo. 2003); see also 
Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶9, 36 P.3d 1151, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001).  Additionally, we review the trial 
court's sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. Manes v. State, 
2004 WY 70, ¶9, 92 P.3d 289, ¶9 (Wyo. 2004).  A trial court abuses its discretion when 
it acts beyond the scope of its authority and imposes a sentence that is 
illegal.  Strickland v. 
State, 2004 WY 91, ¶¶37-38, 94 P.3d 1034, ¶¶37-38 (Wyo. 2004).  "An illegal sentence is one that exceeds 
statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of punishment for the same offense, or 
otherwise violates constitutions or the law."  Id. at ¶36.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   Crabtree argues that the district 
court erred when it failed to further instruct the jury in light of the jury's 
question regarding the term "unlawfully" as used in Instruction No. 7.  Instruction No. 7 
reads:

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Battery, as 
charged in this case, are:

 
 
1.  On 
or about the 27th day of March, 2003;

2.  In 
the County of Natrona, and State of Wyoming

3.  The 
Defendant, Ollie Jenning Crabtree;

4.  Unlawfully 
touch [sic] another, [victim]

5.  A 
household member

6.  In 
a rude, insolent or angry manner.

 
 
OR

 
 
4.  Intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly;

5.  Cause 
[sic] bodily injury to another, [victim]

6.  A 
household member.

 
 
If you find 
from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant 
guilty.

 
 
If, on the 
other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of 
these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should 
find the Defendant not guilty. 

 
 
After 
reviewing the jury's question and discussing it with counsel, the district court 
ultimately decided to refer the jury back to the evidence and the instructions 
previously provided. The district court called the jury back into open court and 
stated: 

 
 
[I]t is not 
possible for the Court to further instruct the jury.  It is not possible for the Court to 
respond to the question.  The only 
thing I can do is to refer you back to the evidence that was received and to the 
evidence and to the instructions that you have copies of.  And you'll need to utilize that evidence 
and those instructions to answer your questions in rendering a verdict. 

  

Certainly, 
it is possible for a district court to further instruct the jury when 
appropriate.  However, we find no 
error in the district court's decision not to in this instance.  

 
 
[¶11]   Jury instructions should inform the 
jury concerning the applicable law so that they can apply that law to their 
findings with respect to material facts.  
Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 939-40 (Wyo. 1997).  As a whole, the instructions should 
leave no doubt about under what circumstances the crime can be found to have 
been committed.  Id.   Failure to give an instruction on 
an essential element is error as is a confusing or misleading instruction.  Id.  While the jury's question in this 
instance does evidence some initial confusion about the term "unlawful," the 
plain language of Instruction No. 7 clearly indicates that unlawful modifies 
touching.  The district court 
referred the jury back to this proper and unambiguous instruction.  When rereading the instruction, as the 
district court instructed them to do, the jury undoubtedly noted the plain 
language of that instruction and realized that it was the touching that must be 
unlawful.  We therefore cannot 
conclude the court erred in failing to further instruct the jury. 

 
 
[¶12]   Furthermore, even if the district 
court erred by failing to further instruct the jury, Instruction No. 7 presented 
alternate theories of the crime.  
The verdict form also provided:

 
 
            
We the jury, duly empaneled and sworn to try the above-entitled cause, do 
find as follows:

 
 
            
1(A).  As to the charge of 
Battery by unlawfully touching [victim] in a 
rude, insolent or angry manner, charged in the Information, we find the 
Defendant, Ollie Jenning Crabtree:

 
 
            
____ Guilty

            
____ Not Guilty

 
 
Regardless 
of your answer to 1(A), you must proceed to answer 1(B).

 
 
            
1(B).    As to the 
charge of Battery by intentionally, knowingly 
or recklessly causing bodily injury to [victim], charged in the Information, we 
find the Defendant, Ollie Jenning Crabtree:

 
 
            
____ Guilty

            
____ Not Guilty  

 
 
 
 

The jury 
found Crabtree guilty on both alternatives. 1  The error that Crabtree asserts pertains 
only to the first alternate theory.  
Crabtree has not challenged the second alternative, and our review of the 
record indicates that there is sufficient evidence to support this 
alternative.  Accordingly, we affirm 
Crabtree's conviction.  

 
 
[¶13]   Crabtree next claims that the 
district court abused its discretion when sentencing him.  The district court in this instance made 
the following statement during the sentencing hearing, "And I would also ask 
that the order reflect that in the event that Mr. Crabtree is released early 
either on parole or by other means prior to his full service of sentence, that 
he not be allowed to return to Natrona 
County, Wyoming." The 
court's recommendation was included in the judgment and sentence in an "it is 
ordered" clause.  

 
 
[¶14]   We have recently had the 
opportunity to consider a similar banishment clause in Strickland v. 
State, 2004 WY 91, 94 P.3d 1034 (Wyo. 2004).  There we noted that it has been held 
that a defendant may be banished from certain small areas of the state, but such 
a condition must relate to the rehabilitative purposes of the sentence.  Id. at ¶37 (citing Sanchez v. 
State, 508 S.E.2d 185, 186-87 (Ga. App. 1998); and Commonwealth v. Thad 
T., 796 N.E.2d 869, 880 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003)).  Appellate courts have routinely 
invalidated conditions ordering a defendant to leave a broad geographical 
region.  State v. Charlton, 
846 P.2d 341, 344 (N.M. App. 1992).   
We also noted that "banishment" may be deemed so unreasonable as to 
render the sentence void.  In fact, 
there is case law to suggest that banishment has no rehabilitative role in 
modern penology and is instead contrary to public policy.  Strickland, at ¶37 (citing 
Charlton, 846 P.2d at 343-44).   

 
 
[¶15]   The courts finding that banishment 
violates public policy often focus on the problems associated with banishing a 
defendant from an entire state.  
These courts reason that "[b]anishment would tend to incite dissension, 
provoke retaliation, and disturb that fundamental equality of political rights 
among the several states which is the basis of the Union itself.  
To permit one state to dump its convict criminals into another is not in 
the interests of safety and welfare; therefore, the punishment by banishment to 
another state is prohibited by public policy."  Charlton, 846 P.2d  at 344 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  We find this reasoning equally 
applicable to banishment from entire counties.  Surely banishment from an entire county 
will incite dissention and provoke retaliation among counties just as it would 
among states.  

 
 
[¶16]   Furthermore, the rehabilitative 
purposes of sentencing are best served if the conditions are specifically 
tailored to address the particular defendant and the particular crime, not 
simply an arbitrary geographic boundary like an entire county.  SeeCommonwealth v. Pike, 701 N.E.2d 951, 
959 (Mass. 
1998).  Indeed, we too are hard 
pressed to see how a banishment of this sort has any role in modern 
penology.  Accordingly, upon further 
reflection we find it necessary to go a step beyond Strickland and hold 
that absent extraordinary circumstances banishment of this sort is never 
appropriate. We therefore conclude that this portion of Crabtree's sentence is 
unlawful and remand to the district court with the direction that the offending 
portion of Crabtree's sentence be deleted.  

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   For the reasons explained above we 
affirm Crabtree's conviction.  The 
district court did not err in instructing the jury.  However, we reverse the portion of 
Crabtree's sentence banishing him from NatronaCounty.  We remand and direct the district court 
to strike that portion of Crabtree's sentence.  

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1 
As we noted in May v. State, 2003 WY 14, ¶28, 62 P.3d 574, ¶28 (Wyo. 
2003), the State is not prohibited from presenting alternate theories of the 
crime.  However, if it is going to 
do so it must provide sufficient evidence of both or utilize a special 
interrogatory verdict form.  In this 
instance, the State wisely did both.