Case Title: In re Child of Charles V.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018 ME 143

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2018-10-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 143 
Docket: 
Som-18-215 
Submitted 
On Briefs: October 10, 2018 
Decided: 
October 23, 2018 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILD OF CHARLES V. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Charles V. appeals from a judgment of the district court (Skowhegan, 
Fowle, J.) terminating his parental rights to his child.1  He argues that the record 
does not support the court’s finding of parental unfitness.  We affirm the 
judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  In 2017, when the child was two weeks old, the Department of 
Health and Human Services filed a child protection petition and a request for a 
preliminary protection order.  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4032, 4034 (2017).  The petition 
alleged that there had been several reports from medical professionals and 
Department caseworkers that there was a threat of physical abuse and verbal 
                                         
1  The mother consented to termination of her parental rights.  Accordingly, we focus on the 
procedural history and findings regarding the father only.   
 
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aggression by the father.  Additionally, the petition alleged that the father’s 
home was unsanitary and unsafe for the child’s continued habitation.   
[¶3]  The court (Benson, J.) entered a jeopardy order, by agreement, 
placing the child with a foster family in September 2017.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4035 
(2017).  As part of the jeopardy order, the father was to participate in 
medication management; participate in mental health counseling with an anger 
management component; complete a court-ordered diagnostic evaluation 
(CODE); participate in random drug screens; establish a safe and sanitary 
home; and allow unannounced home visits by the Department.   
[¶4]  From the time of the jeopardy order until December 2017, the father 
stopped almost all visitation with the child.  In addition, the father ceased his 
mental health counseling in October 2017, resuming only after the Department 
petitioned for termination of his parental rights on February 2, 2018.  See 
22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2017).   
[¶5]  A hearing on the petition was held by the court (Fowle, J.) on 
April 26, 2018.  Following the hearing, the court entered a judgment granting 
the petition to terminate the father’s parental rights after making 
comprehensive findings of fact by clear and convincing evidence.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii); In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 21, 854 A.2d 195.  
 
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[¶6]  The court’s decision was based on the following findings of fact, all 
of which are supported by competent evidence in the record. 
In the present case, the court is concerned that the TPR 
petition was filed on February 2, 2018, or approximately seven and 
one half months following the removal of the child from the home, 
and slightly less than five months following the issuance of the 
jeopardy order.  Ordinarily, the court would expect that more time 
would elapse before the petition for termination was filed.  At first 
glance, this process seems to be moving very quickly, leaving one 
to wonder whether [the father] has been given sufficient time and 
opportunity to reunify with his child.  The TPR hearing itself was 
held 10.5 months following the removal of the child.  Additionally, 
the uncontroverted evidence presented at hearing established that 
the Department had been working with the [father] and [the 
mother] for several months prior to the removal of [the child] from 
the custody of her parents in June of 2017.  While [the mother’s 
older child] is not the biological child of the father in the present 
case, it is noteworthy that the Department was working with both 
parents in an effort to keep [the older child] safely in their home.  
According to court documents filed in conjunction with this case, 
the Department was quite concerned over [the father’s] treatment 
of [the older child], as a number of instances of disturbing conduct 
by [the father] toward [the older child] are described.  Thus, in 
considering parental fitness factors described at 22 M.R.S. [§] 4055, 
it is appropriate to do so in the context of well over one-year 
involvement by the Department with [the father] and [the mother].   
 
The evidence at hearing, including the testimony of the 
father, established conclusively that [the father] made very little 
effort toward reunification until February of this year.  Then the 
TPR petition was filed . . . .   
 
. . . . 
 
Between September and [the end of] December of 2017, the 
father chose not to attend any visit with [the child].  Between 
 
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October 16, 2017 and February 9, 2018 the father chose not to 
attend any counseling sessions with [his mental health counselor], 
or any other providers.  Based upon the testimony of [the CODE 
evaluator], [the mental health counselor], and other professionals, 
it is likely that the father was going to have a very difficult time in 
reunifying with [the child] during a timeframe reasonably 
calculated to meet [the child’s] needs.  His focus on work and lack 
of focus on his [child], and his counseling needs during this time 
frame caused severe harm toward any realistic prospect of timely 
reunification, particularly in light of the uncontroverted evidence 
that the [D]epartment had been working with [the mother] and 
[the father] for several months before the birth of [the child].   
 
. . . . 
 
The father is sincere in his expressed willingness to protect 
his child from jeopardy, and to take responsibility for [the child].  
The court concludes that the father loves [the child].  
Unfortunately, the evidence is overwhelming, and recited herein, 
that the father is not able to protect [the child] from jeopardy, and 
to take responsibility for [the child’s] care within a time period 
reasonably calculated to meet [the child’s needs].  [The child] has 
been in the custody of DHHS for all but sixteen days of her life.  
While the court does not doubt the father’s sincerity, the testimony 
of [the CODE psychiatrist] and [the mental health treatment 
provider] persuade the court, that despite the father’s current best 
efforts, it will be a long, long time before he is able to consistently 
protect the child from jeopardy and to provide for her needs.  One 
only has to consider the testimony of these witnesses and others 
. . . to conclude that [the father] is simply not ready to be [the 
child’s] parent and won’t be for years.  Even had [the father] not 
dropped out of his efforts toward reunification for an extended 
period during the fall of 2017, and even had he not stopped 
attending counseling with [his mental health treatment provider] 
for nearly four months, the court is at best uncertain[] as to 
whether that would have made a dispositive difference.  At the 
close of the hearing, the court noted the father’s recent progress, 
but told the father that he really wished that he had not stopped 
 
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attending visits and counseling.  The impact of the father’s decision 
to place work and income over the needs of his child, and his 
reunification with the child, cast the dye concerning the outcome of 
this case.  [The child] can simply not afford to wait for at well over 
an additional year for her father to be ready to provide for her 
needs and protect her from jeopardy.  The efforts made by the 
Department to assist the father toward responsible parenting 
capability have lasted well over one year, and he is closer to the 
starting line than he is the finish line.  Accordingly this court 
determines by clear and convincing evidence that the father . . . is 
an unfit parent as determined by statute. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶7]  The court did not err in finding that, despite more recent efforts by 
the father, he remains unable to protect the child from jeopardy or to take 
responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the 
child’s needs.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii); In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 
104, ¶ 21, 854 A.2d 195.  The father’s main argument is that the court’s finding 
that it would be over a year before he was able to safely and successfully parent 
his child is not supported by sufficient evidence.  He asserts that because the 
testimony about that timeframe was inconsistent between the two mental 
health professionals, the court could not, by clear and convincing evidence, find 
that he was unfit on that basis.   
[¶8]  Contrary to the father’s assertions, the court succinctly explained 
that “[w]hile [it] found [the counselor’s] testimony to be credible and helpful, 
 
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[it] also found [the counselor’s] testimony to border on advocacy to the father.”  
Further, the court did not disregard the testimony of the counselor, but rather 
viewed it as one piece of the overall larger picture of the father’s fitness as a 
parent.  See In re Child of James R., 2018 ME 50, ¶ 12, 182 A.3d 1252 (concluding 
that the district court did not err when the evidence “fully support[ed] the 
court’s assessment of the evidence” despite some conflicting testimony); In re 
Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶ 10, 154 A.3d 1199 (stating “[t]he weight and 
credibility of the testimony and other evidence . . . [is] for the fact-finder’s 
determination”).  The court particularly focused on the father’s past 
disconnection from services, noting that the father is essentially back at the 
starting line in terms of potential reunification.   
[¶9]  Likewise, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.  See 
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a); In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶¶ 16-17, 889 A.2d 
297. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Aaron B. Rowden, Esq., Waterville, for appellant father 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Skowhegan District Court docket number PC-2017-31 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY