Case Title: Horace Ex Rel. Horace v. Braggs

Citation: 726 So. 2d 635

Docket Number: 1970266

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
726 So. 2d 635 (1998)
Ashley HORACE, a minor who sues by her father and next friend, Alphonse HORACE; and Alphonse Horace, individually
v.
Joyce BRAGGS.
1970266.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 18, 1998.
*636 Daniel G. Sayers, Mobile, for appellants.
Carl Robert Gottlieb, Jr., of Reams, Philips, Brooks, Schell, Gaston, Hudson & Gottlieb, P.C., Mobile, for appellee.
COOK, Justice.
Ashley Horace and her father Alphonse Horace appeal from a summary judgment entered against them in their action seeking compensation from Joyce Braggs for personal injuries Ashley suffered in a swimming pool accident. We affirm.
None of the facts necessary to the resolution of this case is in dispute. On October 1, 1994, Joyce Braggs organized a birthday party for her 5-year-old daughter at the home of Braggs's sister, Cybil Thomas. Approximately 14 children were invited to the party, and those who attended ranged from 1 to 13 years of age. Thomas's home was customarily used as a family gathering place, in part because there was a swimming pool on the Thomas property. The swimming pool was located behind the house and was partially surrounded by a "wooden privacy fence."
On one side of the house was a carport. It was there that Braggs set up a barbecue grill on which she cooked for the party guests. The wooden fence hid the pool itself from the view of persons in the carport. During the party, refreshments were being served inside the carport.
Among the invited guests was 5-year-old Ashley Horace. She attended the party accompanied by her father Alphonse; her 12-year-old brother Alphonse, Jr.; and her 10-year-old brother Allen. Like other guests at the party, the Horaces and the Braggses were close relatives.
As soon as they arrived, Ashley went into the pool and her father told Alphonse Jr. to watch out for her. Eventually, Ashley got out of the pool and went to the carport for refreshments. As soon as she had eaten a portion of a hamburger, she started to return to the pool. At the insistence of her father, however, she waited a few more minutes before returning to the pool.
After Ashley returned to the pool, Mr. Horace remained in the carport for 15-20 minutes. From the carport, he went inside the house, where he spent approximately 10 minutes. While he was inside, children discovered Ashley lying on the bottom of the pool and they pulled her out. Although she survived and has partially recovered, she has permanent brain damage.
On July 3, 1996, Ashley and her father sued Braggs in a two-count complaint, alleging that Braggs had negligently or wantonly "failed to provide a safe place that was watched by adult supervision for the minor child to swim thus allowing the child to enter the pool area and fall in." The court granted Braggs's motion for a summary judgment. The plaintiffs appeal.
The question in this case is whether a social host, who is not the property owner, owes a duty to provide adult supervision for a child's activities in the landowner's swimming pool while the child's parent or guardian is present on the premises, and where the social host has not been requested, and has not volunteered, to provide supervision for the child.
At the outset, we note that "water hazards" are not regarded as inherently "dangerous instrumentalities." Massey v. Wright, 447 So. 2d 169, 173 (Ala.1984) (emphasis added); see also Glover v. City of Mobile, 417 So. 2d 175, 179 (Ala.1982); Bailey v. City of Mobile, 292 Ala. 436, 439, 296 So. 2d 149, 152 (1974); Mayo v. Mobile Asphalt Co., 272 Ala. 442, 445, 131 So. 2d 881, 884 (1961). Also, "[i]t is well settled in Alabama that where the danger from the instrumentality which caused the injury is patent and obvious *637 the doctrine of attractive nuisance is inapplicable." Earnest v. Regent Pool, Inc., 288 Ala. 63, 66, 257 So. 2d 313, 316 (1972). (Emphasis added.) "[B]odies of water have long been held to present an obvious danger of drowning, even to children." Englund v. Englund, 246 Ill.App.3d 468, 476, 186 Ill.Dec. 57, 615 N.E.2d 861, 867, appeal denied, 153 Ill. 2d 558, 191 Ill.Dec. 618, 624 N.E.2d 806 (1993) (emphasis added).
Moreover, it has been held that "[w]hen small children are being watched by their parents, or entrusted persons in supervision, landowners may be relieved of [a] duty to warn them of or remove [a] dangerous instrumentality the danger from which is apparent." Strode v. Becker, 206 Ill.App.3d 398, 405, 151 Ill.Dec. 420, 564 N.E.2d 875, 880 (1990). In Baldwin v. Mosley, 295 Ark. 285, 748 S.W.2d 146 (1988), the trial court held that a parent's presence on the premises at the time a minor was injured "negated any duty" the premises owner may have owed the minor. Id. at 286, 748 S.W.2d 146. The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed, at least where the offending instrumentality presented an "open and obvious" danger. Id. at 288, 748 S.W.2d  at 147.
Nowhere have we found this rule explained more fully than in Laser v. Wilson, 58 Md. App. 434, 473 A.2d 523 (Ct.Spec.App.1984), where a two-year-old child fell from a stairway in the home of a social host where the parents were present. Id. at 438, 473 A.2d  at 525. Concerning the duty of the social host vis-à-vis the parents, the court stated:
Id. at 445-47, 473 A.2d  at 528-29.
The Illinois Appellate Court's Englund case, supra, is essentially on point with this *638 present one. Like this present case, England involved a swimming pool accident that occurred at a children's birthday party while the parents were present on the premises. More specifically, the facts were as follows:
The trial court granted the homeowners' motion for a summary judgment, "implicitly [finding] that the homeowners had no duty to supervise Lauren under the circumstances." Id. at 472, 186 Ill.Dec. 57, 615 N.E.2d  at 864. The Illinois Appellate Court agreed, stating: "We believe that the question of the homeowners' liability was properly decided as a matter of law in this case, since the homeowners had no duty to protect Lauren from obvious dangers, especially those apparent to Lauren's parents, who undertook to supervise Lauren." Id. at 474, 186 Ill.Dec. 57, 615 N.E.2d  at 865 (emphasis added). That court further explained:
Id. at 476, 186 Ill.Dec. 57, 615 N.E.2d  at 867.
The court also rejected an argument of the plaintiff that the homeowners had, in a deposition statement, "admitted their negligence." Id. at 478, 186 Ill.Dec. 57, 615 N.E.2d  at 868. The alleged admission was: "We just got too relaxed." Id. The court merely reiterated that the parents, not the homeowners, had the "primary duty to watch Lauren." Id. (emphasis added). "Thus," the court explained, "even if the homeowners acknowledged that they were lax in their attention to Lauren, this does not relieve plaintiff of her duty to Lauren and does not render the homeowners liable for Lauren's death." Id. (emphasis added).
These cases suggest the proper holding and rationale in this case. The plaintiffs presented no evidence indicating that the primary duty for supervising Ashley had shifted to Braggs at the time of the accident. Mr. Horace expressly permitted Ashley to play in the swimming pool, and he knew that she was doing so. Thus, contrary to the allegations in the complaint, Ashley did not "fall in" the swimming pool, which, as we explained above, is not regarded in this state as a dangerous instrumentality.
Moreover, Mr. Horace knew that Braggs was busy attending to her guests and was not watching children in the pool. Indeed, he expressly ordered Alphonse Jr. to watch her. At no time, did Mr. Horace or Alphonse Jr. leave the premises. Under these facts, Braggs owed no duty to provide "adult supervision" for Ashley Horace. In other words, she owed no duty to provide more supervision for 5-year-old Ashley than she provided for her own 5-year-old daughter in whose honor the party was held.[1] See Laser v. Wilson, 58 Md.App. 434, 446, 473 A.2d 523, 529 (Ct.Spec.App.1984) (a social "host is not negligent [if] he has performed his duty of having the premises as safe for his guest as for his family and himself").
For these reasons, the trial judge properly entered the summary judgment for Braggs. That judgment is, therefore, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HOOPER, C.J., and ALMON, HOUSTON, KENNEDY, SEE, and LYONS, JJ., concur.
[1]  What we said in Williamson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 626 So. 2d 1261, 1266 (Ala.1993), is equally applicable here: "This decision is based on the specific facts in the record on appeal and it does not abrogate any other decision defining the scope of liability of a landowner; specifically, this decision does not affect that line of cases interpreting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339 (1977)."