Case Title: Scott v. Darden

Citation: 130 S.E.2d 42, 259 N.C. 167

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1963-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
130 S.E.2d 42 (1963) 259 N.C. 167 Raymond A. SCOTT v. William T. DARDEN. No. 312. Supreme Court of North Carolina. March 27, 1963. *43 Braswell & Strickland by Thomas E. Strickland, Goldsboro, for plaintiff-appellant. Dees, Dees & Smith by William W. Smith, Goldsboro, for defendant-appellee. PARKER, Justice. Plaintiff's evidence is as follows: About 9:30 a. m. on 13 November 1961 Larry Shields, an employee of plaintiff, in furtherance of his employer's business was driving a 1953 GMC truck loaded with about thirteen tons of pulpwood south on U. S. Highway #117, and approaching a point where this highway is intersected by a paved road coming out of the town of Calypso. (The complaint alleges the time was 9:30 p. m. It is so stated in plaintiff's brief. Larry Shields, a witness for plaintiff, testified it was in the morning, about 9:30 a. m., and the time is so stated in defendant's brief.) U. S. Highway #117 is a paved four-lane highway, with two lanes for traffic going south and two lanes for traffic going north. Defendant's answer admits this allegation of paragraph five of the complaint: The weather was clear. There was no other traffic on the highway. Two days before 13 November 1961 the brakes on plaintiff's *44 truck had been repaired, and his truck was in good mechanical condition. When Shields approached the intersection he was driving the truck on the outside lane at a speed of about 40 to 45 miles an hour, and saw defendant driving a 1958 Ford pickup truck in a westerly direction on the road coming out of the town of Calypso and approaching the intersection. Shields testified as follows on direct examination: Shields testified on cross-examination: Shields further testified on redirect examination: "After these two vehicles came together my truck didn't even go as far as from here to that table." Plaintiff's evidence, and defendant's admissions in his answer, would permit a jury to find that plaintiff's truck was traveling on a dominant highway, and defendant's pickup truck was traveling on a servient highway, at whose entrance into the dominant highway a Stop sign had been erected pursuant to the provisions of G.S. § 20-158 (a); that in the daytime with an unobstructed view defendant failed to bring his pickup truck to a full stop before entering and proceeding to cross the dominant highway, and without stopping entered and was proceeding to cross the dominant highway when plaintiff's truck approaching the intersection was only a few feet away, and that this evidence considered with the other facts in the case would further permit a jury to find that defendant was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the damage to plaintiff's truck. Johnson v. Bass, 256 N.C. 716, 125 S.E.2d 19; Primm v. King, 249 N.C. 228, 106 S.E.2d 223; Sebastian v. Horton Motor Lines, 213 N.C. 770, 197 S.E. 539. Plaintiff alleges defendant's violation of G.S. § 20-158(a) proximately caused damage to his truck. Plaintiff's evidence would also permit a jury to find that defendant was operating his pickup truck in violation of the recklessdriving statute, G.S. § 20-140, proximately causing damage to plaintiff's truck, as alleged in his complaint. The driver of plaintiff's truck on the dominant highway protected by a statutory Stop sign did not have the absolute right of way, in the sense he was not bound to exercise care toward defendant's pickup truck approaching on the intersecting servient road. Blalock v. Hart, 239 N.C. 475, 80 S.E.2d 373. However, as said in Hawes v. Atlantic Refining Co., 236 N.C. 643, 74 S.E.2d 17, quoted with approval in King v. Powell, 252 N.C. 506, 114 S.E.2d 265: Considering all the facts here, particularly defendant's slowing down as he approached the intersection, it cannot be said as a matter of law that plaintiff's driver failed to exercise that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances, so as to bar a recovery by plaintiff on account of the contributory negligence of his employee-driver. Plaintiff has not proved himself out of court so as to nonsuit him on the ground of contributory negligence. Lincoln v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 207 N.C. 787, 178 S.E. 601. Defendant alleges in his answer that plaintiff cannot recover, because his employee-driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. In essence, the doctrine of last clear chance is one of proximate cause, McMillan v. Horne, N.C., 130 S.E.2d 52, or as it is differently stated, "the doctrine relates chiefly to, and is a phase of, the law of proximate cause in the sense that, where all the elements are present, defendant's negligence in failing to avoid the accident introduces a new element into the case, which intervenes between plaintiff's negligence and the injury and becomes the direct and proximate cause." 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 136, p. 761. See Combs v. United States, D.C., 122 F. Supp. 280. It is manifest that plaintiff's evidence does not show as a matter of law that his employee-driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision so as to hold plaintiff and his employee-driver solely responsible for the collision, and bar any recovery by plaintiff here. In passing on the motion for judgment of nonsuit we have, as we are required to do, taken plaintiff's evidence as true, considered it in the light most favorable to him, and given him the benefit of every legitimate inference to be drawn therefrom. Smith v. Rawlins, 253 N.C. 67, 116 S.E.2d 184, 85 A.L.R.2d 609. Plaintiff's allegata et probata, so considered, make out a case for the twelve. The judgment of involuntary nonsuit was improvidently entered, and is Reversed.