Case Title: FARMERS & MERCH BK. v. Farmers & Merch. Bk.

Citation: 216 S.E.2d 769

Docket Number: 

State: west-virginia

Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1975-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
216 S.E.2d 769 (1975) The FARMERS AND MERCHANTS BANK OF KEYSER, West Virginia, a corporation, Executor of the Estate of Mary Pauline Gelwicks, Deceased, v. The FARMERS AND MERCHANTS BANK OF KEYSER, West Virginia, a corporation, as Trustee of the First United Methodist Church Foundation, et al. No. 13513. Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. July 22, 1975. *770 Anthony G. Halkias, Charleston, Gary Athey, Keyser, for appellants. James, Wise, Robinson & Magnuson, Robert E. Magnuson and Joseph S. Beeson, Charleston, Charles W. Smith, Keyser, for appellee. SPROUSE, Justice: This is an appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Mineral County in a civil action to construe a will. The judgment interpolated into the will a clause, containing the amount of a specific bequest, which had been omitted during its preparation. The action was instituted by the Farmers and Merchants Bank of Keyser, Executor of the Estate of Mary Pauline Gelwicks, against Jess C. Little, Frances K. Vossler, Charles E. Vossler, Kathryn B. Vossler, Virginia Vossler Lyons, and the Farmers and Merchants Bank in its fiduciary capacities as trustee for the First United Methodist Church Foundation, trustee for the Methodist Children's Home at Burlington, and as trustee for Frances K. Vossler. Mary Pauline Gelwicks died on June 25, 1971. The paragraph, designated "THIRD" in her will, provided: Following the first bequest, the testatrix made certain other bequests and then devised the remainder of her estate in equal shares to Jess C. Little; the Bank as trustee for Frances K. Vossler for life and then to Charles E. Vossler, Kathryn B. Vossler, and Virginia Vossler Lyons; and the Bank as trustee for the Methodist Children's Home at Burlington. The appellants maintained in the trial court that the bequest to the Foundation was so vague and ambiguous that it was impossible to give it a meaningful interpretation, *771 thereby rendering the clause inoperative and void. The trial court, however, on its own motion ruled and ordered that Joseph A. Blundon, the attorney who prepared the will, appear and testify concerning the alleged omission of language in the third paragraph. At a subsequent hearing, Blundon testified, over objection of counsel for the residuary legatees, that he prepared the will in question from an interlinear copy of a prior will. Blundon stated: At the direction of the testatrix, Blundon had prepared the trust agreement creating the Methodist Church Foundation. During her lifetime, the testatrix contributed $13,510.75. Blundon testified that she was an active participant in her church. Despite the fact that Miss Gelwicks read the will and initialed each page, she made no comment about it at the time of execution. Blundon testified that the third provision of the new will was essentially the same language used in the prior will, although the former will "to the best of [his] recollection" provided for "a set amount and did not provide for any deduction for gifts made during her lifetime." Based upon this parol evidence, the circuit court interpolated into the will the clause testified to by Blundon as having been omitted. Having interpolated the language in this manner, paragraph THIRD read: By order, the court instructed the executor to pay the bank, as trustee for the foundation, $35,000, less $13,510.75 given to said foundation during the lifetime of said Mary Pauline Gelwicks, or a balance of $21,489.25 * * *." *772 A motion for a new trial and a motion to alter or amend the findings and judgment filed by counsel for two of the three groups of residuary legatees were subsequently overruled by the trial court. The paramount principle in construing or giving effect to a will is that the intention of the testator prevails, unless it is contrary to some positive rule of law or principle of public policy. Goetz v. Old National Bank of Martinsburg, 140 W.Va. 422, 84 S.E.2d 759; 4 Page, Wills, § 30.4, page 17. In Bell's Admr. v. Humphrey, 8 W.Va. 1, this Court stated that the intention of the testator must be judged exclusively by the words of the instrument. Legal presumptions and rules of construction may be resorted to only when the language of the will affords no satisfactory clue to the real intention of the testator. Neal v. Hamilton Company, 70 W.Va. 250, 73 S.E. 971. In the case sub judice, the intention to make a bequest is clear, but the amount of the bequest is not just ambiguously stated it is nonexistent. No clue as to the amount intended can be gleaned from an examination of the will itself. The question then becomes to what extent may extrinsic evidence, including parol testimony, be considered in ascertaining that intent. The general rule is: (1) Where the will is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show the intention of the testator or to give the language a different meaning; (2) such evidence is not admissible to vary, contradict, or add to the terms of a will or to show a different intention on the part of the testator; but (3) evidence of extrinsic circumstances is admissible to explain or apply an ambiguous will. 57 Am. Jur., Wills, § 1040, pages 674-75. The admissibility of extrinsic evidence in this latter category is often dependent upon the nature of the ambiguity, i. e., latent or patent. 57 Am.Jur., Wills, § 1042, page 676. In Hobbs v. Brenneman, 94 W.Va. 320, 326-27, 118 S.E. 546, 549, the Court acknowledged this distinction: The Court reaffirmed these principles as late as 1957 by the decision in Weiss v. Soto, 142 W.Va. 783, 98 S.E.2d 727. While it would be inaccurate to state that extrinsic evidence may never be *773 admitted in explanation of a mistake or omission in a will, it is permitted only to the extent that the office and effect of the evidence are to interpret and apply language actually embodied in the will. It may not be used to vary or contradict such language, or to interpolate therein a provision, word, or name of which there is no semblance in the instrument. 57 Am.Jur., Wills, § 1045, pages 679-80. This Court has repeatedly held that it will not construe a will based on speculation and conjecture. Harris v. Eskridge, 124 W.Va. 283, 20 S.E.2d 465. Extrinsic evidence may not, therefore, be admitted to fill up a total blank, or to determine the person or property intended by the testator, where there is a total failure to designate any. 57 Am.Jur., Wills, § 1047, page 681. See also Lee v. Gaylord, 239 Mich. 274, 214 N.W. 104; Neal v. Hamilton, supra; Graham v. Graham, 23 W.Va. 36. This result obtains whether the mistake or omission is one of the testator or of a scrivener. "It has also been held or recognized that a draftsman's mistake consisting of an inadvertent omission of words from the will, such as the amount of a legacy, a residuary clause, devises or bequests, the name of a legatee or devisee, is to be regarded as a mistake of the testator and binding upon him." Annot., 90 A.L. R.2d 924, 939. See also Engelthaler v. Engelthaler, 196 Ill. 230, 63 N.E. 669; De Benedictis v. De Benedictis, 21 N.J.Super. 479, 91 A.2d 368; MacDonald v. Fagan, 118 S.C. 510, 111 S.E. 793. The omission of the amount of the bequest in the Gelwicks will cannot under any theory be supplied by parol evidence. To do so, we would be required to rewrite the will. While it may be unfortunate in particular cases that intention of testators cannot be ascertained by broader evidentiary inquiries, we adhere to the policy of preserving the integrity of wills. The trial court was, therefore, clearly in error in permitting the testimony of the will's scrivener and interpolating into the will the clause supplied by this testimony. For the reason stated, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Mineral County is reversed. Reversed.