Case Title: Sallaz v. Rice

Citation: 

Docket Number: 42698

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2016-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 42698-2014 
 
DENNIS J. SALLAZ and MARCY FOX, 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, and MICHAEL RICE, 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
  
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Boise, November 2016 Term 
 
2016 Opinion No. 134  
 
Filed: November 23, 2016 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for Ada County.  Hon. Jason D. Scott, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Vernon K. Smith, Jr., Boise, argued for appellants. 
 
J. Kahle Becker, Boise, argued for respondents. 
 
 
 
EISMANN, Justice. 
 
This is an appeal out of Ada County from an order denying the Plaintiffs’ motion for a 
directed verdict.  We affirm the denial of the motion and therefore uphold the jury verdict and 
judgment in favor of the Defendants. 
 
I. 
Factual Background. 
 
 
 Dennis J. Sallaz was the owner of a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado that he had purchased in 
1964.  In 1991, Mr. Sallaz granted Eugene “Roy” Rice a lien on the Cadillac, and a new 
certificate of title was issued on July 17, 1991, showing that Roy Rice had a lien on the car.  On 
July 22, 1991, Mr. Sallaz had a duplicate of that certificate of title issued to himself. 
 
Mr. Sallaz was counsel for Mr. Rice, and they were close friends and business associates 
for many years.  Their relationship soured, and on January 17, 2011, Mr. Rice had his son 
 
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Michael Rice repossess the Cadillac.  On January 24, 2011, Michael Rice, on behalf of his father, 
presented an Affidavit of Repossession to the Idaho Transportation Department, and the 
Department issued a new certificate of title showing that the owner of the Cadillac was Eugene 
LeRoy Rice or Rose Jeanette Rice, who was his wife.  Mr. Rice later sold the Cadillac for the 
sum of $25,000. 
 
On April 11, 2011, Mr. Sallaz filed this action against Mr. Rice, his wife, and his son 
seeking to recover possession of the Cadillac or, if he could not do so, damages for conversion in 
the sum of $75,000.  In the verified complaint, Mr. Sallaz averred that “[a]t all times relevant 
hereto (except as may be specified), Plaintiff was the sole owner of a 1954 Cadillac, VIN 
546265334.”  He also averred that he had granted Mr. Rice a lien on the Cadillac in July 1991 
because Mr. Rice had offered to loan money to Mr. Sallaz, that the transaction never closed, and 
that Mr. Rice signed the certificate of title releasing his lien on July 20, 1995.  A copy of the 
duplicate title was attached to the complaint, and it showed a signature of “Roy Rice” releasing 
the lien.  In his verified answer and counterclaim, Roy Rice alleged that his purported signature 
releasing the lien was a forgery. 
The bottom portion of the duplicate title had a form for transferring ownership of the 
vehicle, and it had been filled out showing that on January 1, 2011, Mr. Sallaz had transferred 
ownership of the Cadillac to Marcy Fox, his fiancé.  She was later added as a plaintiff in this 
action, although Mr. Sallaz also continued to prosecute the case in his name pursuant to a power 
of attorney that she had executed on February 11, 2011.   
 
Mr. Sallaz sought a writ of possession to gain possession of the Cadillac, but the district 
court denied the writ because “Mr. Rice has shown with sufficient probability that he is the 
official owner of record of the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado and that he is entitled to possession of the 
vehicle.”  There were other claims filed between the parties, and all of the various claims were 
tried to a jury from June 30 through July 21, 2014.  The other claims are not relevant to this 
appeal. 
 
After the Defendants rested, Mr. Sallaz moved for a directed verdict.  The district court 
denied the motion, and the jury returned a special verdict finding that the Plaintiffs had failed to 
prove their claim against the Defendants for conversion of the Cadillac.  The Plaintiffs timely 
appealed. 
 
 
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II. 
Did the District Court Err in Denying the Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Directed Verdict? 
 
 
When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for a directed verdict, we conduct an 
independent review of the evidence and do not defer to the findings of the trial court.  
Gillingham Constr., Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Constr., Inc., 136 Idaho 887, 891, 42 P.3d 680, 684 
(2002).  Our standard of review is as follows: 
We must determine whether, admitting the truth of the adverse evidence and 
drawing every legitimate inference most favorably to the opposing party, there 
exists substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury.  The 
“substantial evidence” test does not require that the evidence be uncontradicted, 
or even that we find it persuasive.  We do not weigh the evidence or consider the 
credibility of the witnesses.  It requires only that the evidence be of sufficient 
quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that a verdict 
in favor of the party against whom the motion is made is proper.  A directed 
verdict is proper only where the evidence is so clear that all reasonable minds 
would reach only one conclusion—that the moving party should prevail. 
 
Id. at 891–92, 42 P.3d at 684–85. (Citations omitted.) 
A claim of conversion requires proof of three elements:  “(1) that the charged party 
wrongfully gained dominion of property; (2) that property is owned or possessed by plaintiff at 
the time of possession; and (3) the property in question is personal property.”  Taylor v. 
McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 846, 243 P.3d 642, 662 (2010).  In this case, there was no dispute 
that the Cadillac was owned by one of the Plaintiffs when it was repossessed and that it was 
personal property.  The only issue in dispute was whether the Defendants wrongfully gained 
dominion over it. 
Mr. Sallaz testified that in 1991 he and Roy Rice were working together to purchase 
something, that his part was to give Mr. Rice a lien on the Cadillac, that he did so, that Mr. Rice 
worked on the transaction for a long time, and that they backed out of the purchase because Mr. 
Rice could not get the price he wanted.  According to Mr. Sallaz, in 1995 he was going through 
his car documents and noticed that he had never had Mr. Rice release the lien.  He therefore went 
to Mr. Rice’s house and had him sign the release of lien.  Mr. Sallaz produced at trial the 
duplicate title that he had issued on July 22, 1991.  A signature purporting to be that of Roy Rice 
was written in the place on the title for releasing a lien against the Cadillac along with the release 
date of “7-20-95.”  Mr. Sallaz stated that after 1995, Roy and Michael Rice did not have any 
 
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basis for claiming to have a lien on the Cadillac.  Finally, he testified that neither of them ever 
made a demand for payment of the alleged loan or gave notice that they were going to repossess 
the Cadillac. 
Michael Rice died before the trial, and Roy Rice was too ill to attend the trial.  However, 
Mr. Sallaz took Roy Rice’s video deposition about a year before the trial.  In the portions of the 
deposition played during the trial, Mr. Rice testified that he received the lien on the Cadillac as 
security for a loan he made to Mr. Sallaz, that he thought the amount of the loan was in the 
neighborhood of $1,000, that he lawfully repossessed the Cadillac, and that Mr. Sallaz owed him 
money.  Mr. Rice also testified that in 2005 Mr. Sallaz testified in another case that Mr. Rice was 
the lienholder on the title.  The Defendants introduced a document titled “Husband’s Property 
and Debt Schedule” prepared by Mr. Sallaz in connection with his 2005 divorce action.  The 
schedule had several columns, one of which was titled “Description” and another which was 
titled “Husband’s Comments.”  He listed “54 Cadillac Eldorado Convertible” in the Description 
column, and with respect to that entry he wrote in the Husband’s Comments column, “Acquired 
title 2/4/1965, subject to lien.” 
After the Defendants rested, Mr. Sallaz’s counsel Vernon K. Smith moved for a directed 
verdict.  He argued:  “[W]e have no documents showing the loan, and we have no testimony as 
to the amount of the loan.  We have no testimony that it was not paid or that it was paid or that it 
was satisfied.”  He also argued that Roy Rice signed the title releasing the lien, that the district 
court could look at Mr. Rice’s purported signature on the duplicate title and his signature on two 
other documents, and that “I think you’ll conclude, that’s the same person who was the author of 
those signatures.  That demonstrates that in fact that was the release put on that title by Mr. Rice 
in 1995.”  Finally, he argued:  “There was never a demand. There was never notification of an 
obligation owing.  From 1991 until 2011, 20 years, there’s no notice of demand.  There’s no 
claim.  And you’ve got to give notice to an individual if you claim he is delinquent on a 
payment, if in fact there’s a lien.  So we’ve got no obligation.” 
In denying the motion, the district court stated that, assuming Roy Rice’s testimony was 
true, there was a $1,000 loan; there was no evidence of repayment; that without evidence of an 
agreed-upon time for repayment, the payment was due within a reasonable time; and that twenty 
years was not a reasonable time.  The district court was correct that there was conflicting 
 
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evidence, but Mr. Rice’s testimony, if believed, was sufficient to preclude the Plaintiffs’ motion 
for a directed verdict regarding their conversion claim. 
During Mr. Sallaz’s cross-examination, he was shown the duplicate title that he testified 
he saw Mr. Rice sign in 1995 to release the lien and a document that Mr. Sallaz had obtained 
from the Transportation Department on which Michael Rice had signed Roy Rice’s name 
pursuant to a power of attorney.  Mr. Sallaz testified that the Roy Rice signatures on both 
documents looked similar.  When it was pointed out that one “Roy Rice” signature was actually 
signed by Michael Rice, Mr. Sallaz’s response was, “Well, with those guys, I wouldn’t bet on 
anything.”  There were also other documents signed by Roy Rice that were admitted into 
evidence, and his signature on those documents did not look anything like his purported 
signature on Mr. Sallaz’s duplicate title.  The argument by Mr. Sallaz’s counsel that the district 
court should compare the purported signature of Roy Rice that was on Mr. Sallaz’s duplicate title 
with Mr. Rice’s signature on other documents was an acknowledgement that there was a genuine 
issue of fact as to whether Mr. Rice had signed Mr. Sallaz’s duplicate title. 
On appeal, Mr. Sallaz argues:  “Any repossession, in the absence of a demand and a 
default, under Article 9 of the UCC, is a failure to follow the required procedures under the 
Code, and is unlawful.  An unlawful repossession amounts to a conversion, as a matter of law.” 
Mr. Sallaz does not cite any authority requiring a demand by Roy Rice before he could 
take possession of the Cadillac.  Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code does not require any 
demand before the secured party can take possession of the collateral when there is a default.  
There was no testimony that the loan agreement specified a time for repayment or that it required 
a demand before the obligation to repay became due. 
Mr. Sallaz mistakenly believes that a debt payable “on demand” requires that a demand 
be made before the cause of action accrues.  “The authorities are to the effect that, where no time 
of payment is specified in a contract for the payment of money, it is payable immediately . . . .”  
Zaring v. Lavatta, 36 Idaho 459, 211 P. 557, 558 (1922).  “That a cause of action for money 
payable on demand accrues with the inception of the obligation and without the necessity for any 
demand hardly requires the citation of authority.”  Miguel v. Miguel, 193 P. 935, 936 (Cal. 1920) 
(emphasis added).   
A loan repayable on demand does not require that there be a demand before the 
repayment is due, as this Court held in Mahas v. Kasiska, 47 Idaho 179, 276 P. 315 (1928).  In 
 
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Mahas, the plaintiff brought an action to recover on a promissory note that was payable “on 
demand,” but the action was filed more than five years after the execution of the note.  Id. at 183, 
276 P. at 316.  The defendant raised the statute of limitations as a defense, but the trial court 
entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.  Id.  
On appeal, the defendant contended that the statute of limitations began to run when the 
note was executed, and the plaintiff contended that there was an oral agreement that the note 
would not be payable until demand had been made.  Id.  This Court reversed, holding that the 
statute of limitations began to run on the date the note was executed.  Id. at 184, 276 P. at 317.  
This Court explained as follows: 
The legal effect of an instrument payable on demand, such as the one in question, 
is that it is due immediately, and that the statute of limitations commences to run 
from the date of its execution.  To give such evidence the effect urged by 
respondent would change the legal effect of the note, in that, instead of maturing 
at the date of its execution, it would not mature, and the statute would not 
commence to run, until demand for payment was actually made.  Parol evidence 
is inadmissible to vary the plain terms and conditions of a promissory note; and its 
legal effect can no more be contradicted, changed or explained by extrinsic 
evidence than the writing itself. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 
The statute of limitations does not begin to run until the cause of action has accrued.  
Conway v. Sonntag, 141 Idaho 144, 147, 106 P.3d 470, 473 (2005).  If a demand is an essential 
element of, or a condition precedent to having, a cause of action, then the cause of action to 
enforce the note payable on demand in Mahas would not have accrued until demand was made.  
However, this Court held that the cause of action to enforce a note payable on demand accrued 
when the note was executed, not when demand was made.  Because there was no time agreed 
upon for the repayment of the loan, it was due immediately, and no demand was necessary. 
On appeal, Mr. Sallaz contends that the alleged debt owing to Roy Rice was time barred 
by the statute of limitations.  He asserts, “The debt, had it ever existed, became time barred and 
uncollectable by the four year statute of limitations for oral contracts (I.C. § 5-217).”  If it was 
time barred, then there was obviously no necessity for a demand because the cause of action 
accrued without a demand. 
Mr. Sallaz is correct that a default was required before the Cadillac could be repossessed.  
Idaho Code section 28-9-609 provides that after default, a secured party may take possession of 
the collateral without judicial process, if the secured party can do so without a breach of the 
 
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peace.1  There was no contention in this case that the Defendants breached the peace when 
repossessing the Cadillac.  The statute of limitations would have run on an action by Mr. Rice to 
collect the amount owing on the loan.  However, the running of the statute of limitations does not 
extinguish the debt.  Joseph v. Darrar, 93 Idaho 762, 766, 472 P.2d 328, 332 (1970).  “Statutes 
of limitations are limitations on a party’s right to bring an action.  A statute of limitations does 
not apply (1) to defenses where no affirmative relief is sought, or (2) to self-help set-offs and 
pledges.”  Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 114 Idaho 680, 683, 760 P.2d 19, 22 
(1988). (Citation omitted.)  The Uniform Commercial Code does not provide a definition of the 
word default, but the definition of that word is “[t]he omission or failure to perform a legal or 
contractual duty; esp., the failure to pay a debt when due.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 428 (7th ed. 
1999).  It was undisputed that Mr. Sallaz did not repay the loan made by Mr. Rice.  In fact, Mr. 
Sallaz contended that there never was a loan.  Therefore, there was sufficient evidence of Mr. 
Sallaz’s default. 
  Mr. Sallaz asserts that there was no testimony that Mr. Rice had personally made the 
loan.  That assertion is incorrect.  Mr. Rice was asked whether one of his businesses made the 
loan, and he stated, “I was the one who come up with the money for the loan.” 
The district court did not err in denying Mr. Sallaz’s motion for a directed verdict.  The 
court correctly held that, admitting the truth of the adverse evidence and drawing every 
legitimate inference most favorably to the Defendants, there existed substantial evidence to 
justify submitting the case to the jury. 
 
III. 
                                                 
1 The statute states: 
28-9-609.  Secured party’s right to take possession after default. (a) After default, a secured 
party: 
(1)  May take possession of the collateral; and 
(2)  Without removal, may render equipment unusable and dispose of collateral on a 
debtor’s premises under section 28-9-610. 
(b)  A secured party may proceed under subsection (a) of this section: 
(1)  Pursuant to judicial process; or 
(2)  Without judicial process, if it proceeds without breach of the peace. 
(c)  If so agreed, and in any event after default, a secured party may require the debtor to assemble 
the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured 
party which is reasonably convenient to both parties. 
 
 
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Did the District Court Err in Permitting the Defendants to Withdraw Their Counterclaim 
for Quiet Title to the Cadillac? 
 
 
On April 28, 2011, Roy and Rose Rice filed a counterclaim seeking to quiet their title in 
the Cadillac.  Their prayer requested that the court issue an order quieting their title in the 
Cadillac.2  On May 12, 2014, they filed a third amended counterclaim.  Although the quiet title 
cause of action remained in the counterclaim, the prayer no longer included a request for a court 
order quieting their title in the Cadillac.  By the time the third amended counterclaim was filed, 
Roy Rice had sold the Cadillac to a third party.   
An action can be brought to quiet one’s title in real or personal property.  I.C. § 6-401.  In 
an action for quiet title, there is no right to a jury trial.  Anderson v. Whipple, 71 Idaho 112, 121, 
227 P.2d 351, 356 (1951).  After the jury verdict, the district court raised the issue of whether 
there should be a court trial regarding the quiet title counterclaim.  The Defendants agreed that 
the counterclaim was moot, and the Plaintiffs disagreed.  In its memorandum decision denying 
post-trial motions, the district court held that the quiet title claim was moot.  The court found the 
following facts: 
3.  During the course of litigation, Rice sold the Cadillac to a third party 
for $25,000.  The jury nevertheless found that Sallaz (and Marcy Fox, to whom 
Sallaz had attempted to gift the Cadillac) failed to prove conversion of the 
Cadillac. 
4.  No party to this action knows or recalls the buyer’s identity or knows 
the Cadillac’s present location. 
5.  No facts admitted into evidence at trial suggest there is reason to 
believe the Cadillac will be located in the future. 
 
 
The district court then held that the issue was moot, reasoning as follows: 
 
5.  Under the legal standards set forth above, the mootness doctrine 
focuses on whether granting the requested relief would provide a real 
remedy to the claimant.  A judgment for quiet title to the Cadillac would 
have no practical impact on the Rices.  They have sold the Cadillac to a 
third party, and the jury has exonerated them from the claim that their 
taking and sale of the Cadillac was an unlawful conversion of the Cadillac, 
leaving them without an identifiable need for a judicial determination that 
their already-relinquished claim to the Cadillac is superior to Sallaz’s 
claim to it.  Consequently, the Rices’ quiet-title counterclaim is moot—a 
                                                 
2 Mr. Rice apparently believed that once he repossessed the Cadillac, he became its owner.  He filed for and 
received a certificate of title naming him or his wife as the owners of the car.  The Plaintiffs did not file a claim 
seeking the difference between the amount of the lien and either the sale price of the car or the value of the car. 
 
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conclusion that can be reached without need to consider whether a 
judgment refusing, rather than granting, the requested relief would have 
practical significance. 
 
Whether the trial court correctly held that a cause of action was moot is a question of law 
over which we exercise free review.  State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 342, 127 P.3d 954, 958 
(2005).  A cause of action is moot when the party asserting it has received all of the relief to 
which that party might have been found to be entitled, only a hypothetical question remains, and 
it is impossible for the court to grant that party any other or additional relief.  Dorman v. Young, 
80 Idaho 435, 436–37, 332 P.2d 480, 481 (1958). 
 
The district court did not err in holding that the Rices’ counterclaim for quiet title was 
moot.  They had successfully defended against the Plaintiff’s conversion claim, and they had 
sold the Cadillac to a third party.  The court could not give them any other or additional relief, 
and they certainly would not have a quiet title claim against the person who had purchased the 
Cadillac for cash.3 
 
IV. 
Are the Defendants Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal? 
 
 
The Defendants requested an award of attorney fees on appeal, stating: 
Respondents seek an award of attorney fees and costs for defending 
against this frivolous appeal pursuant to IAR 40 and 41.  The standard for making 
an award of attorney fees on appeal is whether the appeal was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.  East Shoshone Hosp. 
Dist. v. Nonini, 109 Idaho 937, 712 P.2d 638 (1985). 
 
They then argued why the appeal was pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without 
foundation. 
This Court has “ ‘repeatedly held that simply requesting an award of attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, without citing any statutory or contractual basis for the 
award, is insufficient to raise the issue of attorney fees on appeal.’ ”  International Real Estate 
Solutions, Inc. v. Arave, 157 Idaho 816, 821–22, 340 P.3d 465, 470–71 (2014).  “A party must 
                                                 
3 Mr. Sallaz’s claim against the Defendants was based solely upon the contention that they had stolen the Cadillac.  
He did not claim damages pursuant to Idaho Code section 28-9-625, including the right to a surplus realized from 
the sale of the Cadillac. 
 
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point to a statute or contractual provision authorizing an award of attorney fees on appeal.”  
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 127, 157 P.3d 613, 621 (2007). 
The Defendants do not cite any statutory authority for an award of attorney fees, but they 
do cite East Shoshone Hospital District v. Nonini, 109 Idaho 937, 712 P.2d 638 (1985), for the 
proposition that “[t]he standard for making an award of attorney fees on appeal is whether the 
appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.”  In 
that case, the hospital sought an award of attorney fees on appeal on the ground that “the county 
has defended this suit frivolously and without foundation.”  Id. at 942, 712 P.2d at 643.  In 
denying the requested award of attorney fees, this Court stated: 
Unless otherwise provided for by statute or by contract, “attorney fees will only 
be awarded when this court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.”  
Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078, 1085 
(1979). 
Id. 
In Minich, this Court held that, “[i]n normal circumstances, attorney fees will only be 
awarded [under Idaho Code section 12-121] when this court is left with the abiding belief that 
the appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.”  
99 Idaho at 918, 591 P.2d at 1085.  In Kelley v. Yadon, 150 Idaho 334, 247 P.3d 199 (2011), this 
Court held that the respondents had adequately cited Idaho Code section 12-121 for their 
requested award of attorney fees on appeal by citing a case that addressed the award of attorney 
fees on appeal under that statute.  Id. at 338, 247 P.3d at 203.  Under Kelley, the Defendants have 
adequately cited Idaho Code section 12-121. 
 
The Defendants did not include any argument regarding attorney fees in the argument 
section of their brief, but they did include argument in the section of their brief titled “Additional 
Issues on Appeal.”  “[W]e have repeatedly held that when a request for fees is accompanied by 
citation to authority and argument for the request, we will not deny the request simply based on 
the location of the argument.”  Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Med. Investor, LLC, 156 
Idaho 709, 721, 330 P.3d 1067, 1079 (2014); accord Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 
449, 461, 259 P.3d 595, 607 (2011).  We agree that this appeal was brought frivolously, 
unreasonably, and without foundation.  We therefore award the Defendants attorney fees on 
appeal. 
 
 
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V. 
Conclusion. 
 
 
We affirm the judgment of the district court, and we award Respondents costs and 
attorney fees on appeal. 
 
 
Chief Justice J. JONES and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.