Case Title: State v. Newman-Caddell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 121956

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2023-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 121,956 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
BRADY ALLEN NEWMAN-CADDELL, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
A court does not err in applying the extreme sexual violence departure factor in 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6815(c)(2)(F)(i) when sentencing a defendant for an aggravated 
kidnapping involving a nonconsensual act of sexual intercourse or sodomy. 
 
2. 
A motion to correct an illegal sentence may not be used to litigate a constitutional 
due process claim.  
 
3. 
An appellate court may affirm a departure sentence as long as one or more of the 
factors relied on by the sentencing court was substantial and compelling. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed October 22, 
2021. Appeal from Johnson District Court; BRENDA M. CAMERON, judge. Opinion filed April 21, 2023. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
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Korey A. Kaul, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for 
appellant.  
 
Jacob M. Gontesky, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Stephen M. Howe, district 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
LUCKERT, C.J.:  After entering a guilty plea to one count of aggravated 
kidnapping, two counts of rape, and one count of aggravated sodomy, Brady Newman-
Caddell appeals his aggravated kidnapping sentence. The district court judge doubled the 
presumptive sentence after finding two aggravating factors:  (1) Newman-Caddell 
committed a crime of extreme sexual violence and was a sexual predator and (2) he posed 
a risk of future dangerousness to society. On appeal, Newman-Caddell argues the judge 
erred because neither aggravating factor applies.  
 
He first contends his aggravated kidnapping conviction is not a crime of extreme 
sexual violence as defined by the departure sentence statute. Under that statute, a crime of 
extreme sexual violence is a felony "crime involving a nonconsensual act of sexual 
intercourse or sodomy with any person." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6815(c)(2)(F)(i)(a). 
Newman-Caddell pleaded guilty to rape and sodomy, both of which are crimes of 
extreme sexual violence. But he contends the departure factor cannot apply to aggravated 
kidnapping because it does not include an element of sexual violence.   
 
We reject Newman-Caddell's contention that the elements of aggravated 
kidnapping must include an act of extreme sexual violence for K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-
6815(c)(2)(F)(i) to apply. Nothing in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6815(c)(2)(F)(i) explicitly 
imposes that requirement; instead, it extends the aggravating factor to any crime 
involving a nonconsensual act of sexual intercourse or sodomy. The kidnapping statute 
3 
 
 
 
contemplates that a kidnapping will involve other crimes. The Legislature has defined 
kidnapping to include "the taking or confining of any person, accomplished by force, 
threat or deception, with the intent to hold such person:  . . . (2) to facilitate flight or the 
commission of any crime." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5408(a). Any crime 
may include a crime of extreme sexual violence.  
 
Consistent with the kidnapping provision, the State charged Newman-Caddell with 
"unlawfully, knowingly, and feloniously tak[ing] or confin[ing] a person . . . with the 
intent to hold such person to facilitate the commission of a crime, to wit:  rape and/or 
aggravated sodomy." Newman-Caddell stipulated to facts supporting his plea to rape and 
aggravated sodomy and to an aggravated kidnapping in which he took or confined a 
person with the intent to commit rape, a nonconsensual act of sexual intercourse, or 
sodomy. In other words, Newman-Caddell committed an aggravated kidnapping 
involving crimes of extreme sexual violence. We thus hold the district court judge did not 
err in applying the statutory departure factor in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6815(c)(2)(F)(i). 
 
Because we affirm Newman-Caddell's sentence based on the first departure factor, 
we need not—and do not—address his second argument that increasing his sentence 
based solely on a nonstatutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness to society 
would violate his due process rights. We affirm his sentences.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Newman-Caddell was convicted of one count of aggravated kidnapping, two 
counts of rape (one as an aider and abettor and the second as the assailant), and one count 
of aggravated sodomy (as an aider and abettor). The focus of this appeal is on the upward 
durational departure sentence for his aggravated kidnapping conviction.  
 
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The State charged Newman-Caddell with aggravated kidnapping in the criminal 
complaint by alleging:  
 
"COUNT I - That between the 7th day of October, 2016 and the 8th day of 
October, 2016, [in the] County of Johnson and State of Kansas, BRADY ALLEN 
NEWMAN-CADDELL, did then and there unlawfully, knowingly and feloniously take 
or confine a person, to-wit:  H.J., by force, threat or deception, with the intent to hold 
such person to facilitate the commission of a crime, to-wit:  rape and/or aggravated 
sodomy, as defined in K.S.A. 21-5503, 21-5504, and/or to inflict bodily injury or to 
terrorize the victim, and did inflict bodily harm on such person, a severity level 1 person 
felony, in violation of K.S.A. 21-5408(b), K.S.A. 21-6804 and K.S.A. 21-6807. 
(aggravated kidnapping)"  
 
Factual Basis for Plea  
 
At the plea hearing, the State recited a factual basis for the plea. The criminal 
activities began when a male assailant struck H.J. in the head and then forced her into a 
car driven by Newman-Caddell. The assailant raped and sodomized H.J. while Newman-
Caddell drove around. Eventually, the car stopped, and the men switched places. 
Newman-Caddell then inserted something in H.J.'s vagina; she could not tell if it was his 
penis or fingers. After driving for a considerable time, the men eventually let H.J. out of 
the car and drove away.  
 
DNA evidence, the discovery of some of H.J.'s belongings in Newman-Caddell's 
possession, and other evidence led to him being charged. On the eve of trial, Newman-
Caddell entered a guilty plea, without a plea agreement, and stipulated to the factual basis 
for the plea. Although he waived his right to have a jury determine whether he was guilty, 
he requested a jury determine whether the State met its burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the two departure factors it had set out in a motion seeking an upward 
durational departure sentence.   
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Departure Motion and Sentencing 
 
In the State's departure motion filed before Newman-Caddell entered his guilty 
plea, the State asserted two departure factors applied:  (1) "[T]he current crime of 
conviction is a crime of extreme sexual violence and the defendant is a predatory sex 
offender" and (2) "substantial and compelling facts" show "the defendant presents risk of 
future dangerousness to the public safety."  
 
Before the trial on the departure motions, Newman-Caddell waived his right to 
have a jury determine whether the State met its burden to prove the two aggravating 
factors beyond a reasonable doubt. His waiver included a stipulation "that sufficient facts 
exist to prove the existence of aggravating factors number 1 and number two in the 
State's Notice of Intent and Motion for Upward Durational Departure." He also stipulated 
that evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that substantial and compelling reasons 
support an upward durational departure and that these aggravating circumstances 
outweigh any mitigating circumstances. He recognized his sentence could be up to 660 
months total and he would have to register as a sex offender.  
 
 
The district court judge reviewed Newman-Caddell's waiver on the record. 
Newman-Caddell confirmed he signed the waiver and initialed, read, and understood 
each paragraph. The judge walked through each paragraph to confirm Newman-Caddell 
understood and agreed with the statements in the document he had signed. The judge then 
accepted the waiver and stipulation but still set the case for an evidentiary hearing on the 
State's upward durational departure motion.  
 
At the departure hearing, H.J. testified about the crimes committed against her. 
Her testimony detailed the facts of the two men kidnapping and raping her and of 
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Newman-Caddell's co-assailant sodomizing her. She discussed being hit and choked 
which caused pain, mental trauma, and bodily harm. 
 
The State also called T.H., who testified about a different incident when multiple 
men, including Newman-Caddell, broke into her apartment and sexually assaulted her in 
the presence of her young daughter. Newman-Caddell and another man repeatedly raped 
and sodomized her for about 30 minutes to an hour. A third man then joined the sexual 
assault. All three penetrated or tried to penetrate T.H. at the same time. DNA connected 
Newman-Caddell to the crimes against T.H. When confronted with the DNA evidence, 
Newman-Caddell admitted penetrating T.H.'s vagina. Newman-Caddell also 
acknowledged T.H.'s two-year-old was in bed next to her while this was going on and the 
child awoke during the rape.  
 
The State also presented the testimony of two women who had been in abusive 
domestic relationships with Newman-Caddell in which he had caused them physical 
harm and threatened to kill them.  
 
Finally, the State presented expert testimony from a board-certified psychiatrist 
and neurologist, who concluded Newman-Caddell posed a threat of future dangerousness 
that neither drugs nor therapy would lessen. The expert identified Newman-Caddell as a 
leader in the assault, pointing to Newman-Caddell's role in saying when the assault was 
over and letting H.J. leave the car.  
 
In arguments before sentencing, Newman-Caddell's counsel acknowledged his 
client's conduct was egregious. But counsel argued the sentence should be less than the 
maximum departure requested by the State because "any objective analysis would 
conclude that [Newman-Caddell's co-assailant's] conduct . . . was the more egregious" 
and H.J. told detectives she thought the outcome would have been worse if Newman- 
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Caddell had not been in the car. He pointed out that Newman-Caddell was an aider and 
abettor on two of the counts. Counsel also noted that Newman-Caddell had cooperated 
with law enforcement.  
 
Newman-Caddell spoke before sentencing. He apologized to H.J. and her family. 
Describing himself as sick and weak and ruined by drug addiction, he said he was 
ashamed and regretted his actions. He promised to make himself a better person in prison 
and asked that any sentence provide him a chance to "rectify my life and my mistakes." 
 
Following these arguments and statements, the judge explained her decision to 
grant the upward durational departure, noting, "It's hard to put into words truly how 
horrific this case is. There really are no words. No words to adequately describe the 
horror that [H.J.] endured." The judge also stated, "[T]here are no words to describe how 
dangerous this defendant is." Although acknowledging that Newman-Caddell was not as 
aggressive as his co-assailant, the judge also found that "[t]he defendant was not a minor 
participant at all. He was, in fact, a leader in this."  
 
The judge ended her discussion of the circumstances of the crime by saying, "The 
crimes in this case are particularly heinous and cruel. In and of themselves, [Newman-
Caddell] has shown to be a tremendous risk and a predator, but that's not all." The judge 
then turned to the testimony of the other witnesses, noting T.H. had testified to Newman-
Caddell's "horrific" conduct and the two domestic violence victims had testified "about 
the pain they suffered in his hands." 
 
The judge then discussed the testimony of the State's psychiatrist and stated she 
"was moved by how very dangerous Mr. Newman-Caddell is." She found that Newman-
Caddell had exhibited predatory aggression and a history of violence since he was 16. 
She also cited the psychiatrist's opinion about various risk factors for future 
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dangerousness observed in Newman-Caddell's history. The judge also noted that the 
psychiatrist found "psychopathic traits, which makes him much more likely to commit 
crimes again." Further the psychiatrist "didn't know of anything to treat this sort of 
disorder, and the defendant has a longstanding trait in this defendant not usually 
responsive to medication, and he doesn't see any decrease in dangerousness for this 
defendant." Continuing to address Newman-Caddell's future dangerousness, the judge 
observed that the psychiatrist "testified the defendant is a sexual predator, and he's even 
concerned for the women who work in the Department of Corrections, as well as the pets 
in pet therapy."  
 
 
Based on this evidence the judge found that Newman-Caddell was a "predator. He 
is a great risk to women in our community, as well as women in the Department of 
Corrections. He is a great risk to future harm, absolutely a predator and a risk to future 
harm." The judge ended her findings by saying, "This crime was horrific, and Mr. 
Newman-Caddell is extremely dangerous. He deserves every single minute of every 
single day that I can give." 
 
 
 
The district court sentenced Newman-Caddell to the maximum 165-month 
sentence on Count 1, aggravated kidnapping, then doubled it to 330 months. The district 
court imposed the 165-month sentence for Count 2, rape, then doubled it to 330 months. 
The district court explained it departed on Counts 1 and 2 based "upon the fact the 
defendant is a predator and future harm." The district court ordered the sentences be 
consecutive for a 660-month term. The district court imposed a 165-month sentence for 
Count 3, rape, to run consecutive to Count 1 and concurrent to Count 2. The district court 
imposed a 165-month sentence for Count 4, aggravated criminal sodomy, to run 
consecutive to Count 1 and concurrent to Counts 2 and 3.  
 
 
9 
 
 
 
Appeal 
 
Newman-Caddell timely appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the departure 
sentence, holding Newman-Caddell committed a crime of extreme sexual violence by 
kidnapping H.J. to facilitate rape and sodomy. The panel concluded it need not address 
the district court's findings of future dangerousness because the extreme sexual violence 
aggravating factor alone supported the district court's departure sentence. See State v. 
Newman-Caddell, No. 121,956, 2021 WL 4932035, at *6 (Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished 
opinion). 
 
Newman-Caddell timely petitioned for review. The State filed a conditional cross 
appeal, urging us to reach the issue of Newman-Caddell's future dangerousness and to 
affirm the judge on that basis if we reject Newman-Caddell's argument that his 
aggravated kidnapping conviction was not a crime of extreme sexual violence. This court 
granted the petition and cross-petition and has jurisdiction. See K.S.A. 20-3018(b) 
(providing for jurisdiction over petitions for review of Court of Appeals decisions); 
K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review Court of Appeals decisions 
upon petition for review). 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The revised Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA) applies to Newman-
Caddell's sentence. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6801; K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6802. The 
KSGA provides that a district court "shall impose the presumptive sentence provided by 
the sentencing guidelines unless the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons to 
impose a departure sentence." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6815(a). The statute provides a 
nonexclusive list of aggravating factors that may support an upward departure sentence. 
See State v. Nguyen, 304 Kan. 420, 426, 372 P.3d 1142 (2016) (recognizing statutory 
10 
 
 
 
factors are nonexclusive). Here, the State relied on the crime of extreme sexual violence 
statutory factor in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6815(c)(2)(F)(i). It also presented the 
nonstatutory factor of future dangerousness to society. See State v. Yardley, 267 Kan. 37, 
44, 978 P.2d 886 (1999) ("Future dangerousness may constitute a factor for an upward 
departure."). 
 
Newman-Caddell's petition for review first focuses on the Court of Appeals' 
ruling upholding the district court's decision to depart because Newman-Caddell 
committed a crime of extreme sexual violence. Newman-Caddell argues his sentence 
was illegal because aggravated kidnapping is not a crime of extreme sexual violence. 
He asks us to limit crimes of extreme sexual violence as defined by K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 
21-6815(c)(2)(F)(i) to those explicitly including a statutory element requiring a 
nonconsensual act of sexual intercourse or sodomy. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5408(a), 
defining kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping, does not refer to nonconsensual acts of 
sexual intercourse or sodomy. Newman-Caddell thus argues his departure sentence was 
illegal because it depended on an erroneous application of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-
6815(c)(2)(F)(i). 
 
Illegal Sentence Considerations and Standard of Review 
 
Newman-Caddell presents this issue for the first time on appeal. Usually, a party 
may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal. This general rule does not apply, 
however, when a defendant frames the issue on appeal as an illegal sentence claim 
because a defendant may raise an illegal sentence claim at any time while serving the 
sentence. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3504(a); State v. Eubanks, 316 Kan. 355, 360, 516 
P.3d 116 (2022).  
 
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A sentence is illegal if (1) a court without jurisdiction imposes it, (2) it fails to 
conform to the applicable statutory provision in character or term of authorized 
punishment, or (3) it is ambiguous as to the time and manner it is to be served. K.S.A. 
2022 Supp. 22-3504(c). Newman-Caddell's argument hinges on the second basis for 
sentence illegality. He contends the sentence fails to conform to the applicable statutory 
provision because the phrase "a crime of extreme sexual violence" does not encompass 
the offense of aggravated kidnapping. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6815(c)(2)(F)(i). 
Sentence legality poses a question of law subject to unlimited review. State v. Jamerson, 
309 Kan. 211, 214, 433 P.3d 698 (2019).  
 
Newman-Caddell's stipulation that facts supported the departure factor also does 
not foreclose his appeal because the appeal presents a question of law. It is well-settled 
Kansas law that stipulations "cannot be invoked to bind or circumscribe a court in its 
determination of questions of law." In re Estate of Maguire, 204 Kan. 686, 691, 466 P.2d 
358 (1970).  
 
We thus consider the question of the legality of the sentence for the first time on 
appeal. At the heart of this question of law is the meaning of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-
6815(c)(2)(F)(i). Statutory interpretation also presents a question of law subject to 
unlimited review. Jamerson, 309 Kan. at 214.  
 
Well-established principles guide courts when interpreting a statute. First, we 
recognize that legislative intent controls. To discern that intent, we consider the statute's 
words. When the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we apply the language as 
written. But when the language is not plain but ambiguous, we may determine legislative 
intent by considering other sources, such as legislative history, canons of construction, 
and background considerations. Jarvis v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 312 Kan. 156, 159, 
473 P.3d 869 (2020).  
12 
 
 
 
 
We recently clarified a point that applies when, as with K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 
21-6815(c)(2)(F)(i), other statutory provisions may help determine legislative intent. The 
doctrine of in pari materia means that statutes relating to the same matter may be read 
together to discern intent. While the doctrine is sometimes applied to an ambiguous 
statute, courts may also use it "to assess whether the statutory language is plain and 
unambiguous in the first instance." Bruce v. Kelly, 316 Kan. 218, 224, 514 P.3d 1007 
(2022). Courts may look to the context in which the Legislature used the language and 
the broader context of the entire statute to discern legislative intent. In this way, the 
doctrine "can provide substance and meaning to a court's plain language interpretation of 
a statute." 316 Kan. at 224.  
 
If, however, we conclude the statutory language in a criminal statute is ambiguous, 
courts may apply the rule of lenity by strictly construing the provision and resolving any 
reasonable doubt as to the meaning in the defendant's favor. "But this is subordinate to 
the rule that judicial interpretation must be reasonable and sensible to effect legislative 
intent." State v. Griffin, 312 Kan. 716, 720, 479 P.3d 937 (2021).  
 
With these principles in mind, we consider the sentencing scheme that applies to 
upward durational departure sentences and the offense of aggravated kidnapping.   
 
Crime of Extreme Sexual Violence Aggravating Factor 
 
The statutory provision we here interpret allows a departure from the presumptive 
sentence if the "current crime of conviction is a crime of extreme sexual violence and the 
defendant is a predatory sex offender." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6815(c)(2)(F). The statute 
defines what crimes a court may consider to be a "crime of extreme sexual violence" with 
a list of criteria. The only criteria potentially applicable here is "a crime involving a 
13 
 
 
 
nonconsensual act of sexual intercourse or sodomy with any person." See K.S.A. 2022 
Supp. 21-6815(c)(2)(F)(i)(a).  
 
Newman-Caddell stipulated to the existence of this statutory factor before the 
district court. Now on appeal, he does not dispute the district court judge's finding that he 
is a predator, but he does contend his crime of aggravated kidnapping is not a crime of 
extreme sexual violence. As we have noted, he argues the statutory definition of a crime 
of extreme sexual violence requires the crime include or incorporate elements of a 
nonconsensual act of sexual intercourse or sodomy, which aggravated kidnapping does 
not.  
 
Reading the definition of crime of extreme sexual violence in pari materia, we 
conclude this is too narrow a reading. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6815(c)(2)(F)(i) states:  
 
"(i) 'Crime of extreme sexual violence' is a felony limited to the following: 
 
"(a) A crime involving a nonconsensual act of sexual intercourse or sodomy with 
any person; 
 
"(b) a crime involving an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy or lewd fondling and 
touching with any child who is 14 or more years of age but less than 16 years of age and 
with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of 
victimization; 
 
"(c) a crime involving an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy or lewd fondling and 
touching with any child who is less than 14 years of age; 
 
"(d) aggravated human trafficking, as defined in K.S.A. 21-5426(b), and 
amendments thereto, if the victim is less than 14 years of age; or 
 
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"(e) commercial sexual exploitation of a child, as defined in K.S.A. 21-6422, and 
amendments thereto, if the victim is less than 14 years of age." 
 
Unlike subpart (a), which is at issue, subparts (d) and (e) include the phrase "as 
defined in" and then refer to a specific statute that sets out elements of a crime. This 
wording thus incorporates the elements defined by those statutes—the outcome Newman-
Caddell seeks under subpart (a).   
 
Subparts (a), (b), and (c) do not include similar wording, however, and instead 
describe crimes involving specified acts. "Involving" is the gerund of the verb involve. 
"Involve" has different meanings, including "to have within or as part of itself:  include"; 
"to require as a necessary accompaniment:  entail"; "affect"; "to relate closely:  connect." 
See Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available at https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/involve; American Heritage Dictionary 923 (5th ed. 2011).  
 
In subparts (c)(2)(F)(i)(a), (c)(2)(F)(i)(b), and (c)(2)(F)(i)(c), the Legislature 
defined the crime as "involving" certain described sexual acts but without incorporating 
elements of a crime. Rather than describe or incorporate elements, each describes facts 
that must exist. Subpart (a) requires the facts establish that nonconsensual intercourse or 
sodomy occurred. Subparts (b) and (c) also apply when there is proof of sexual 
intercourse or sodomy. But, unlike subpart (a), they do not require a lack of consent and 
apply only when the victim of a prescribed sexual act is of an age within a specified 
range. Although subparts (a), (b), and (c) have differences, in each, the Legislature used 
the word "involving" before specifying a sex act, an age of the victim, or another 
circumstance to define whether the charged crime is a crime of extreme sexual violence. 
The Legislature thus intended consideration of the facts involved, not the elements 
delineated in a statute defining a crime.  
 
15 
 
 
 
Other uses of the verb "involve" in parts of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6815(c)(2) other 
than (F)(i), the extreme sexual violence provision, confirm this interpretation. For 
example, (c)(2)(D) provides that an aggravating factor may be found when the "offense 
involved a fiduciary relationship which existed between the defendant and the victim." 
This subsection uses the term "involved" to preface a description of the factual 
relationship that must be found to exist for the aggravating factor to apply. Cf. State v. 
Horn, 40 Kan. App. 2d 687, 697, 196 P.3d 379 (2008) (existence of fiduciary relationship 
determined on case-by-case basis), rev’d on other grounds by 291 Kan. 1, 11-12, 238 
P.3d 238 (2010). 
 
These various provisions considered in para materia reveal that the Legislature 
could have narrowed the scope of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6815(c)(2)(F)(i)(a) to specific 
crimes as it did in (c)(2)(F)(i)(d) and (c)(2)(F)(i)(e) if that had been its intent. Instead, it 
drafted (a) broadly enough to encompass those instances, such as this one, when a crime, 
as committed, involves nonconsensual acts of sex or sodomy even when the statute 
defining the crime of conviction did not prescribe such conduct as a necessary element of 
the offense.  
 
At oral argument, Newman-Caddell's counsel made a different in para materia 
argument, suggesting the Legislature used the terms "offense" and "crime" to mean 
different things in the statute. He posited the Legislature used "offense" when it intended 
that a jury or a court could look at the facts of the offense but used "crime" when the 
Legislature intended a jury or a court to look only at the elements set forth in the statute 
defining the crime of conviction. We disagree.  
 
Our review of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6815 reveals the Legislature used the terms 
synonymously. Perhaps the clearest example of this is in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-
6815(c)(1)(E), defining a mitigating factor as the "degree of harm or loss attributed to the 
16 
 
 
 
current crime of conviction was significantly less than typical for such an offense." 
(Emphases added.) Here, the phrase "such an offense" refers to the "current crime of 
conviction," showing the Legislature equates "offense" with "crime," at least for purposes 
of this statute. Other places in the statute also show equivalence between offense and 
crime in describing mitigating and aggravating factors. E.g., K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-
6815(c)(1)(C)-(D), 21-6815(c)(2)(B)-(D), (G) (using offense); 21-6815(c)(1)(A)-(B), (F), 
21-6815(c)(2)(F), (H), 21-6815(c)(3) (using crime). In short, the Legislature here uses 
"crime" and "offense" to mean the same thing in this statute. 
 
We thus reject Newman-Caddell's statutory interpretation arguments and hold 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6815(c)(2)(F)(i)(a) unambiguously allows consideration of the 
facts involved in the crime when determining whether the State has proven the extreme 
sexual crime aggravating factor.  
 
We find no constraints against such an interpretation of the statute. While 
Newman-Caddell argues against considering the facts involved in the crime, he cites no 
authority in his petition for review suggesting any statutory or constitutional provision 
forbids such an approach. Below, he cited two cases, neither of which prohibits the 
approach we take today.  
 
First, Newman-Caddell relied on this court's opinion in State v. Spencer, 291 Kan. 
796, 825, 248 P.3d 256 (2011). There, we noted that crimes of extreme sexual violence 
include "rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, and aggravated indecent liberties perpetrated 
on children younger than 14." As the Court of Appeals panel noted in distinguishing the 
case, "the Spencer court did not find that the crimes covered by the statute were limited to 
the exclusive list highlighted by Newman-Caddell." Newman-Caddell, 2021 WL 
4932035, at *5. The Spencer list merely highlights some crimes covered, and Newman-
Caddell overreads that brief description to say it "emphasiz[ed] the nature of the crimes 
17 
 
 
 
themselves, meaning the elements of the crimes, as opposed to the acts committed during 
those crimes." The Spencer court did not decide the question now presented about 
whether we look to elements or facts when applying K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-
6815(c)(2)(F)(i)(a). Spencer does not support Newman's preferred statutory 
interpretation. See Spencer, 291 Kan. at 819-29. 
 
Second, Newman-Caddell cited Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 
120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), to the Court of Appeals. But Apprendi's 
protections do not apply to him because he voluntarily waived the right to a jury trial on 
the departure factors and stipulated "that sufficient facts exist to prove the existence of 
aggravating factors number 1 and number two in the State's Notice of Intent and Motion 
for Upward Durational Departure." He also stipulated that evidence proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that substantial and compelling reasons support an upward durational 
departure and that these aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating 
circumstances. See Horn, 291 Kan. at 11 ("To summarize, if a defendant waives a trial 
jury by pleading guilty to the criminal offense and the district court has accepted the plea 
and the trial jury waiver, K.S.A. 21-4718[b][4] directs that an upward durational 
departure sentence proceeding is to be conducted by the court, not a jury."); see also State 
v. Bello, 289 Kan. 191, 199, 211 P.3d 139 (2009) ("[T]he 'statutory maximum' for 
Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of 
the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." [quoting Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004)]).  
 
Newman-Caddell gives us no basis to conclude constitutional or statutory law 
precluded the judge from applying the departure factor for a crime of extreme sexual 
violence after finding that the factual basis for his plea established he had committed an 
aggravated kidnapping to facilitate rape and sodomy.  
 
18 
 
 
 
In sum, the district court judge did not err in applying the extreme sexual violence 
departure factor in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6815(c)(2)(F)(i) because Newman-Caddell 
committed an aggravated kidnapping involving a nonconsensual act of sexual intercourse 
or sodomy. We hold the district court imposed a legal sentence when it granted the State's 
upward departure motion. 
 
Unpreserved Due Process Challenge 
 
Newman-Caddell also challenged his upward durational departure sentence as 
violating due process because the district court relied on a nonstatutory factor to support 
its decision—its determination he presented a risk of future dangerousness. He 
acknowledges he failed to raise the issue below, but he argues we may consider it a 
motion to correct an illegal sentence or under a preservation exception.  
 
But a motion to correct an illegal sentence may not be used to litigate a 
constitutional due process claim. See State v. Kingsley, 306 Kan. 530, 536, 394 P.3d 1184 
(2017) ("Kingsley's due process claim is not cognizable in a motion to correct an illegal 
sentence."); see also K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3504(c)(1) (defining "illegal sentence"). 
Newman-Caddell thus may not raise his due process challenge as an illegal sentence 
claim under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3504.  
 
That means we should consider Newman-Caddell's due process argument only if 
we, in our discretion, apply a preservation exception. State v. Keys, 315 Kan. 690, 696, 
510 P.3d 706 (2022). We decline to exercise that discretion here. We have recognized 
that an appellate court may affirm a departure sentence as long as one or more of the 
factors relied on by the sentencing court was substantial and compelling. State v. Ippert, 
268 Kan. 254, Syl. ¶ 2, 995 P.2d 858 (2000). And we have already affirmed the district 
court's upward departure sentence because Newman-Caddell's crime was a crime of 
extreme sexual violence and he is a sexual predator. Addressing this unpreserved 
19 
 
 
 
question would change nothing in this case. We would in essence be rendering an 
advisory opinion, something we do not do. State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 285 Kan. 
875, 898, 179 P.3d 366 (2008). We decline to exercise our discretion to consider 
Newman-Caddell's unpreserved constitutional due process challenge to the nonstatutory 
departure factor applied by the district court here. 
 
Likewise, we need not consider the State's conditional cross-petition on this issue. 
The State asked us to address this issue only if we found the district court judge erred in 
finding Newman-Caddell committed a crime of extreme sexual violence. And we have 
affirmed that finding.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We hold Newman-Caddell's aggravated kidnapping committed to facilitate rape 
and aggravated sodomy constituted a crime of extreme sexual violence under K.S.A. 
2022 Supp. 21-6815(c)(2)(F)(i). We affirm the district court's upward durational 
departure sentence on the aggravated kidnapping count. 
 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. 
Judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
STANDRIDGE, J., not participating.