Case Title: PETER B. KIBBEE v. FIRST INTERSTATE BANK, SHERIDAN WYOMING ET AL.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0022

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
PETER B. KIBBEE v. FIRST INTERSTATE BANK, SHERIDAN WYOMING ET AL.2010 WY 143Case Number: No. S-10-0022Decided: 11/05/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

PETER 
B. KIBBEE,Appellant (Plaintiff),v.FIRST INTERSTATE BANK, 
SHERIDAN, WYOMING, as Trustee of the CHANDLER H. KIBBEE TRUST AGREEMENT dated 
May 26, 1987, and the MERCEDES K. KIBBEE TRUST AGREEMENT dated May 26, 1987, as 
amended March 15, 1996, and any subsequent amendments thereto, the SHARON K. 
LOBO CHARITABLE REMAINDER ANNUITY TRUST dated September 10, 2006, the JOSHUA 
KIBBEE LOBO CHARITABLE LEAD UNITRUST dated November 2, 2006, the AURORA LOBO 
CHARITABLE LEAD UNITRUST dated November 2, 2006, the PETER B. KIBBEE CHARITABLE 
REMAINDER ANNUITY TRUST dated November 2, 2006, and as Co-Personal 
Representative of the ESTATE OF MERCEDES K. KIBBEE, DECEASED; ROBERT FERRIL, 
Trustee of the CHANDLER H. KIBBEE TRUST AGREEMENT dated May 26, 1987, and the 
MERCEDES K. KIBBEE TRUST AGREEMENT dated May 26, 1987, as amended March 15, 
1996, and any subsequent amendments thereto;  CHANDLER H. KIBBEE AND MERCEDES K. 
KIBBEE FOUNDATION FOR CHILDREN; SHERIDAN COUNTY YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN 
ASSOCIATION; SHARON K. DELOBO, individually, and as Co-Personal Representative 
of the ESTATE OF MERCEDES K. KIBBEE, DECEASED; AURORA LOBO; JOSHUA KIBBEE LOBO; 
LAURA GALLOWAY; DARRYL KURTZ, SR.; DARRYL KURTZ, JR.; SCOTT STEWART; NADEEN 
IOTT; HAROLD JOHNSON; and MARY SENE;Appellees (Defendants).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County

The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Patrick 
J. Crank of Speight, McCue & Crank, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming, and Greg L. 
Goddard and Christopher M. Wages of Goddard, Wages & Vogel, Buffalo, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Crank.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee First Interstate Bank:

Tom 
C. Toner of Yonkee & Toner, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee YMCA and Other Beneficiaries:

Dennis 
M. Kirven and Timothy J. Kirven of Kirven & Kirven, P.C., Buffalo, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. Timothy 
Kirven.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee Sharon K. de Lobo:

Kim 
D. Cannon of Davis & Cannon, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees Aurora Lobo and Joshua Kibbee Lobo:

Thomas 
M. Hogan of Hogan & Company Law Offices, Casper, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from the granting of multiple summary judgments arising out of a challenge by 
the appellant, Peter B. Kibbee, to changes made to the estate plan of his 
step-mother, Mercedes Kibbee.  Peter 
asserts that documents that significantly modified Mercedes' estate plan are 
invalid because Mercedes lacked the requisite mental capacity, that she was 
unduly influenced by her previously-estranged daughter, Sharon de Lobo, and that 
Sharon was guilty of the tort of intentional interference with an inheritance 
expectancy.  Finding no disputed 
questions of fact surrounding any of the above claims, and finding that the 
appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      1.    Are there disputed questions 
of fact regarding the decedent's mental capacity at the time she executed the 
documents in question?

 
 
2.    Are there disputed questions 
of fact regarding any activity by the decedent's daughter unduly influencing the 
decedent?

 
 
3.    Should the affidavits of 
expert witnesses have been stricken for failure to attach the documents 
referenced therein and relied upon in reaching their 
conclusions?

 
 
4.    Are there disputed questions 
of fact regarding whether the decedent's daughter was guilty of the tort of 
intentional interference with an inheritance expectancy?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Mercedes and 
Chandler Kibbee were married in 1947.  
Both Mercedes and Chandler had been married previously.  Chandler had a successful career in 
business, rising to become the Chief Financial Officer of Philip Morris in that 
company's New York City office.  
When Chandler retired, he and Mercedes bought land near and moved to 
Sheridan, Wyoming.  Over the years, 
the Kibbees amassed a substantial estate valued at approximately 
$32,000,000.00.  Chandler died in 
1992.

 
 
[¶4]      The appellant, 
Peter Kibbee, is Chandler's adopted son.  
Peter was raised primarily by his adoptive mother and her new husband in 
California, and then attended boarding school.  Peter worked in Washington, D.C., but 
came to Wyoming almost every summer.  
One of the appellees, Sharon de Lobo, is Mercedes' daughter from her 
previous marriage.  Sharon went to 
finishing school in Switzerland from 1955 to 1960, and then married and lived in 
Spain for a time but ultimately settled in New York.  Although Sharon went long periods of 
time without visiting Wyoming, her daughter, Aurora, spent significant time at 
the family ranch.

 
 
[¶5]      After Chandler's 
death, Mercedes established a revocable trust in 1996 ("1996 Trust"), which 
trust provided that upon her death:  
1) the trust would pay Sharon $50,000 per year; 2) one-half of the 
remainder of the trust property was to go to Peter; and 3) the other one-half 
was to be held in trust for Sharon's daughter, Aurora.

 
 
[¶6]      On May 18, 2000, 
Mercedes gave a durable power of attorney for health care to Peter and Aurora. 
 On July 4, 2005, Mercedes fell and 
broke her hip and was admitted to Westview Health Care Center, a nursing home in 
Sheridan, Wyoming.  On October 27, 
2005, after Mercedes had been in the nursing home for nearly four months, her 
primary physician, Dr. Thomas Niethammer, noted that there was no medical reason 
to keep her in the nursing home, stating:

 
 
Mercedes 
has been in the nursing home for several months after her severe hip 
fracture.  Rather surprisingly she 
has done very well.  She has had no 
pulmonary difficulty, no exacerbation of or congestive heart failure.  Recent films demonstrate at least some 
healing of the fracture.  She is 
able to now stand with assistance and no weight bearing and really gone up to 
much discomfort.

 
 
            
At this point she really wants to go home.  [Aurora] does not want her to go home 
for fear she will fall or have other trouble.  . . . .

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
At this point I have no medical reason to keep her in the nursing home 
environment as the care being provided can certainly be done in a home 
environment with the resources that she has available to her.  [Mercedes] certainly has the resources 
to be cared for at home.  [Aurora] 
does not want her at home but I do feel from a medical-legal standpoint that the 
patient has the right to go home and fail as long as she understands that risk 
which I think she does. 

 
 
            
At this point I feel that I am in the middle of a family dispute.  The patient's attorney will be 
a[d]dressing this issue.  I do have 
to state that from a medical standpoint she can certainly return home with 
adequate caregivers.

 
 
[¶7]      As the settlor 
and trustee for the 1996 Trust, Mercedes was responsible for making all decision 
regarding trust property.  However, 
the 1996 Trust also provided that if two physicians certified that Mercedes had 
become incapable of managing her trust affairs, then she would cease to be 
trustee and Peter and two other individuals would act as successor 
trustees.  On December 22, 2005, 
Aurora and Peter came to Dr. Niethammer's office without an appointment and 
insisted that he sign an affidavit certifying that Mercedes was incapable of 
managing her own financial affairs.  
Although Dr. Niethammer signed the document, he later expressed regret, 
stating that it was an "intimidating situation" and indicated that he felt that 
he signed "under significant duress."  
The same day Dr. Niethammer signed the affidavit, Aurora fired him as 
Mercedes' physician.  A second 
affidavit certifying that Mercedes was unable to manage her financial affairs 
was signed by Dr. Michele Bennett, who had not seen Mercedes since 2004, when 
Dr. Niethammer took over her care.

 
 
[¶8]      A few months 
later, Laura Galloway, Mercedes' long-time secretary and bookkeeper visited 
Mercedes in the nursing home.  
During that visit, Mercedes asked Ms. Galloway how she could get her out 
of the nursing home.  Ms. Galloway 
told Mercedes that she needed an attorney and Mercedes asked for 
recommendations.  Ms. Galloway first 
recommended the attorney who assisted in administration of the 1996 Trust.  Mercedes rejected this recommendation 
stating that she wanted her own attorney.  
Ms. Galloway then suggested a local attorney, Deb Wendtland.  Mercedes immediately called Ms. 
Wendtland and left a message saying she would like to speak with 
her.

 
 
[¶9]      On April 5, 2006, 
Ms. Wendtland answered Mercedes' second telephone call.  At that time, Mercedes told Ms. 
Wendtland that she needed help getting out of the nursing home and that her 
granddaughter was forcing her to stay there.  Ms. Wendtland agreed to meet with 
Mercedes.  They met that same day 
and Mercedes explained that she had given Aurora a medical power of attorney, 
that her doctor had said she could go home with help, but that Aurora had told 
her she could not afford to go home, and that she wanted to hire Ms. Wendtland 
to get her out of the nursing home.  
Mercedes explained that she had plenty of money to hire help to assist 
her at home and while she loved Aurora, she had grown to fear her and that she 
had to beg Aurora to hire caregivers to be with her at the nursing home.  Mercedes said that Aurora required the 
staff at the nursing home and her caregivers to report to her if Mercedes had 
any visitors and who they were.  
Mercedes also expressed anger that she was not allowed to even have money 
to take friends to lunch.

 
 
[¶10]   Ms. Wendtland explained that 
getting Mercedes out of the nursing home might damage her relationship with 
Aurora.  Mercedes acknowledged the 
risk and said that she was to have lunch with Aurora the next day and would 
discuss her desire to leave the nursing home and give Aurora another chance to 
allow her to go home.  Finally, Ms. 
Wendtland explained that Mercedes would have to revoke the medical power of 
attorney and indicated that it would be helpful if Mercedes had a medical 
checkup to confirm her mental state.  
Ms. Wendtland suggested Dr. Hugh K. Batty to assist her with this, and 
Mercedes said she would contact him and request that he meet with 
her.

 
 
[¶11]   On April 8, 2006, Mercedes called 
Ms. Wendtland and said that Aurora had not shown up for lunch and asked Ms. 
Wendtland to meet with her and "bring the papers."  That same day, Ms. Wendtland visited 
Mercedes and Mercedes signed a Revocation of Power of Attorney, terminating 
Peter and Aurora's power of attorney, and a Representation Agreement, retaining 
Ms. Wendtland as her attorney.  The 
next day, Mercedes informed Ms. Wendtland that she had contacted Dr. Batty, who 
had agreed to examine her that day.  
Ms. Wendtland spoke to Dr. Batty who informed her that he had concluded 
that Mercedes was mentally competent and should be allowed to go home.  Dr. Batty and another doctor, Dr. 
Michael J. Strahan, provided affidavits attesting to Mercedes' mental capacity 
and ability to manage her financial affairs.

 
 
[¶12]   On April 10, 2006, Ms. Wendtland 
sent Dan Riggs, the attorney who she believed represented Peter and Aurora, a 
letter informing him of Mercedes' actions and Dr. Batty's examination.  On April 17, 2006, Ms. Wendtland 
attended a meeting at Mr. Riggs' office where Aurora and Peter were present, and 
their attorney, Tom Hogan, participated by telephone.  Following that meeting, Mr. Hogan sent a 
letter indicating Peter and Aurora's consent to the Revocation of Power of 
Attorney, stating:  "Both Aurora and 
Peter are in agreement with Mercedes that she is entitled to make her own health 
care decisions and to exercise control over the Family Trust and neither of my 
clients wishes to disturb her decisions."

 
 
[¶13]   As she prepared to return home, 
Mercedes indicated to Ms. Wendtland that while she wanted to be in charge, she 
did not want to deal with bill paying and investments.  Following Ms. Wendtland's suggestion, 
Mercedes agreed to meet with a trust officer at First Interstate Bank (First 
Interstate), where she was currently a customer, who could explain the services 
the bank could provide.  After this 
meeting, Mercedes signed Amendment No. 3 to her revocable trust, which amendment 
added First Interstate as co-trustee with her during her life and provided that 
upon her death First Interstate and Robert Ferril would serve as successor 
co-trustees.

 
 
[¶14]   As co-trustee, First Interstate was 
charged with gathering all of Mercedes' assets to determine the extent of her 
estate.  On May 15, 2006, Jerry 
Pilch, a trust officer at First Interstate, and Ms. Wendtland met with Mercedes 
at her home.  Mr. Pilch explained 
that First Interstate was beginning to understand the significant extent of her 
assets and was working to collect them.  
Ms. Wendtland stated, "I believe it was on this date that [Mr. Pilch] 
first raised the issue of potential tax issues and estate planning."  Ms. Wendtland's notes regarding a 
meeting with Mercedes the following day read, in part:  "Discussed problem of large estate tax 
due at her death.  She was very 
upset nothing had been done.  I 
assured her we could still fix it.  
I suggested we hire an attorney experienced in estate planning for large 
estates.  She authorized me to find 
one."  Another officer at First 
Interstate recommended Robert Leonard, an estate planning attorney located in 
Laramie, Wyoming.  On June 12, 2006, 
Ms. Wendtland had a telephone conference with Mr. Leonard and Mr. Pilch 
concerning Mr. Leonard's willingness to assist with Mercedes' estate planning, 
and Mr. Leonard was hired a few days later.  In his representation letter, Mr. 
Leonard stated that he would provide "estate planning techniques or documents 
that may reduce your estate tax burden," which recommendations would include 
both "charitable and non-charitable estate planning 
options."

 
 
[¶15]   After being released from the 
nursing home, Mercedes asked Ms. Wendtland to contact her daughter Sharon and 
ask that she come to visit.  After 
Ms. Wendtland was unsuccessful in reaching Sharon, Mercedes called Sharon 
herself and asked her to come visit.  
On June 24, 2006, Ms. Wendtland picked up Sharon in Billings, Montana, 
and brought her to Sheridan, Wyoming.

 
 
[¶16]   On June 28, 2006, Mercedes met with 
Mr. Pilch and Ms. Wendtland to discuss estate planning options.  At that time, Mercedes told them that 
her priorities were to provide for Peter, Aurora, Sharon and Joshua (Aurora's 
son).  She also indicated that she 
wanted to reduce her estate tax and liked the idea of benefitting a charity and 
was going to give some thought to the kind of charity she wanted to 
benefit.  On July 5, 2006, Ms. 
Wendtland met with Mercedes again to ask about possible local charities she 
might want to benefit.  Ms. 
Wendtland suggested the Sheridan County Dog and Cat Shelter as a possible 
option, and Mercedes asked for other suggestions.  On July 10, 2006, Ms. Wendtland and 
Mercedes met again, and Mercedes indicated that she was anxious to talk to Mr. 
Leonard about trust changes and ways to save taxes.  On July 24, 2006, Mr. Leonard, Mr. Pilch 
and Ms. Wendtland met in Ms. Wendtland's office to discuss Mr. Leonard's 
suggested estate planning options.  
The three then went to Mercedes' home, where Mr. Leonard presented his 
recommendations to Mercedes.  During 
that meeting, Mr. Leonard explained different estate planning options, 
specifically addressing charitable possibilities and trust options.  Mr. Leonard described the discussion 
with Mercedes in detail:

 
 
Q.    Okay.  And tell me what you recall about that 
discussion with [Mercedes] on July 24th, 2006.

 
 
A.    Well, it was kind of a 
general discussion of options to change her estate plan, and we talked about 
charitable possibilities.  We talked 
about charitable remainder trusts, we talked about charitable lead trusts, 
and I discussed the differences between the two of them, as to what they 
do.

 
 
        We -- 
She expressed the desire that her plan benefit charities.  She mentioned the Sheridan YMCA.  She also mentioned a dog and cat shelter 
in Sheridan.  We talked about a 
charitable remainder trust specifically for Sharon because she was concerned 
that Sharon was going to return to New York City, and the cost of living there 
was pretty high, and she wanted her to have some assured level of income on an 
annual basis.  And we thought a 
charitable remainder trust would take care of really two things.  It would provide that income for Sharon, 
and benefit a charity, because what happens with a charitable remainder trust 
after the income interest is up, the remainder goes to 
charity.

 
 
        We 
also discussed the possibility of a charitable remainder trust for Peter at that 
point, but there was no decision made that I took at that point.  And we discussed the possibility of 
Peter having input as to who the charitable beneficiary might be, the 
remainder.

 
 
Q.    Who would receive the 
principal at the end of the series of payments, correct?

 
 
A.    That's right, the charitable 
beneficiary, remainder beneficiary.

 
 
Q.    You said there was no 
decision made at that time.  What do 
you mean by that?

 
 
A.    I came away from that with 
the idea that she wanted a charitable remainder trust drafted for Sharon, that 
she made that decision but no decision was made as to whether one should be done 
for Peter.

 
 
Q.    Okay.

 
 
A.    We also talked about a lead 
trust for Joshua because she expressed a concern that Joshua have funding for 
education, for his health into the future, and we talked about having a 
charitable lead trust that at some point in the future gave him the remainder 
after paying the charity for a period of time.

 
 
Q.    Okay. What else do you recall 
discussing in that July 24th, 2006 meeting?

 
 
A.    We did talk about doing the 
donor advised fund for the Sheridan YMCA, and I don't think we made a decision 
on that because she was still up in the air as to whether the Sheridan YMCA 
should be the primary beneficiary of the charitable activities or maybe whether 
other children's activities in Sheridan might be involved in that. 

 
 
According 
to Mr. Leonard, Mercedes was alert and understood and participated in the 
discussion.  He 
explained:

 
 
A.    . . .  We talked about the differences between 
charitable lead and charitable remainder trust, which is not actually a simple 
thing for people to understand who are lay people, but she understood the 
differences between the two trusts.

 
 
It 
was my impression that she understood what we were talking about.  She participated in the 
conversation.  She asked questions 
and indicated that she understood what I said, and wanted to know more about 
what I was saying.

 
 
[¶17]   Following this meeting, during the 
months of July and August, a number of other meetings occurred between Mercedes 
and Ms. Wendtland to discuss and refine her wishes with respect to how the 
estate would pass to family members, friends, and various charitable 
organizations.  In one of those 
meetings, Ms. Wendtland asked if Mercedes would authorize her to discuss the 
estate planning with Peter and Aurora.  
Mercedes responded, "Hell no.  
It is none of their business.  
Just once I wish they would be interested in me for me and not for my 
money.  Tell them 
nothing."

 
 
[¶18]   On August 13, 2006, Sharon had a 
conversation with Mercedes which was tape recorded.  Peter repeatedly refers to this meeting 
as a pivotal event showing that Sharon exercised undue influence over 
Mercedes.  The details of this 
meeting will be outlined and discussed in more detail in the undue influence 
section of the discussion below.  See infra ¶¶ 
51-52.

 
 
[¶19]   During July and August, Mercedes 
had the opportunity to gain a greater understanding of the YMCA and its 
function.  On July 16, 2006, with 
the help of the YMCA and another local children's group, a number of children 
visited Mercedes' ranch and spent the day swimming and had a cookout on the 
terrace.  Ms. Wendtland attended 
this event and explained that Mercedes spent four hours on the terrace in her 
wheelchair watching and talking to the children.  At the conclusion of this event, 
Mercedes asked to have arrangements made for the children to come back the next 
weekend.  On August 14, 2006, 
Mercedes met with the executive director of the YMCA and told him that her 
husband had been involved with the YMCA and thought highly of it and said she 
would like to take a tour of the facilities. 

 
 
[¶20]   On August 30, 2006, Mercedes again 
met with Mr. Pilch and Ms. Wendtland.  
At that meeting, Mercedes approved the declaration of gift to the YMCA 
and confirmed that she wanted to create a charitable remainder trust for Sharon, 
but was undecided about what to do with Peter and Aurora and wanted to give it 
more thought.  Following this 
meeting, on September 7, 2006, Ms. Wendtland met with Mercedes and reviewed a 
Declaration of Gift to the YMCA that had been prepared by Mr. Leonard.  Following Ms. Wendtland's explanation of 
the document, Mercedes signed the Declaration of Gift.  At the conclusion of that meeting, Ms. 
Wendtland left Mercedes a copy of a letter drafted by Mr. Leonard discussing the 
charitable remainder trust he had prepared for Sharon, as well as other 
charitable estate planning options.  
On September 10, 2006, Ms. Wendtland again met with Mercedes and read to 
her the entire charitable remainder trust for Sharon.   Sharon's trust was to be funded 
with $5,000,000 and would pay Sharon 5% of the initial amount for the rest of 
her life resulting in an annual benefit of $250,000.  After reading the document, Mercedes 
signed it and Ms. Wendtland notarized her signature.  Mercedes then indicated that she wanted 
to do the same thing for the rest of the family.

 
 
[¶21]   Ms. Wendtland contacted Mr. Leonard 
and conveyed that Mercedes had decided to provide a similar trust for Peter and 
Aurora as she had for Sharon.  On 
September 15, 2006, Mr. Leonard sent Mercedes a charitable remainder trust for 
Peter.  Peter's trust, to be funded 
at $3,000,000, would pay Peter 5% per year for an annual benefit of 
$150,000.  On October 3, 2006, Mr. 
Leonard sent Mercedes a proposed charitable lead trust for Joshua Lobo.  Like Sharon's trust, Joshua's trust was 
funded at $5,000,000; however, it was to pay 7% annually to the charity with an 
expected remainder payment to Joshua of $8,203,000 after 25 years.  Finally, on October 31, 2006, Mr. 
Leonard sent Mercedes a proposed charitable lead trust for Aurora.  Aurora's trust was funded with 
$3,000,000 and would pay 8% of its annual value to charity for ten years, at 
which time Aurora would receive the expected remainder of 
$3,550,837.

 
 
[¶22]   In late October through 
mid-November 2006, Mercedes was hospitalized for pneumonia and congestive heart 
failure.  At this point Peter, 
Aurora, and Joshua's respective trusts had not been executed.  On November 2, 2006, Mercedes contacted 
Ms. Wendtland and asked her to come to the hospital to see her.  Mercedes told Ms. Wendtland that she 
wanted to sign the documents Mr. Leonard had prepared.  Ms. Wendtland went to the hospital to 
see Mercedes and showed her each of the trusts and discussed their basic 
provisions.  After discussing the 
documents with Ms. Wendtland, Mercedes signed each of 
them.

 
 
[¶23]   The next day, Ms. Wendtland went 
back to the hospital to visit Mercedes.  
After a brief conversation, Ms. Wendtland asked Mercedes if she was "up 
to" signing three more documents and she said yes.  Mercedes then signed Amendment No. 4 to 
the 1996 Trust, placing $2,000,000 into a health and education trust for the 
benefit of Sharon, Aurora and Joshua.  
Amendment No. 4 also created the Chandler H. Kibbee and Mercedes K. 
Kibbee Foundation for Children, which foundation was to receive all of the 
residual assets.  Mercedes also 
signed a Codicil to the Will and a letter directing First Interstate to fund 
Peter, Aurora and Joshua's trusts.

 
 
[¶24]   Mercedes was released from the 
hospital on November 14, 2006.  The 
next day, Mr. Leonard came to Sheridan to meet with Mercedes and review all of 
the trust documents she had signed and the estate plan which had now been 
implemented.  Besides Mr. Leonard, 
Ms. Wendtland and Mr. Pilch were present in the meeting.  That same day, Ms. Wendtland and Mr. 
Leonard sent a letter to Peter and Aurora and their attorney explaining the 
estate planning work that had been done.  
The letter described the estate plan which Mercedes had adopted and 
explained that Mercedes' estate had been in danger of paying 46% of its total 
value to the federal government and that to save several million dollars in 
estate taxes and leave a lasting legacy to honor the Kibbee family in the 
community, Mercedes had adopted the described estate plan.  Peter immediately responded by letter, 
on November 17, 2006, writing, "I've received all the papers about the 
Foundation, trusts and the Ranch, and I thank you for the considerable financial 
package I am to receive."  While 
expressing gratitude for Mercedes' generosity, Peter also indicated concern that 
the ranch was not remaining with the family:

 
 
I 
recognize the good intentions in establishing the Foundation, but ask you to 
include the possibility of the Foundation selling the property to us (I believe 
it's called right of first refusal).  
The YMCA would get a sizable financial reward and the C Lazy M could 
remain in the Family, as planned.

 
 
On 
November 17, 2006, Ms. Wendtland signed and filed with the Wyoming Secretary of 
State the Articles of Incorporation of the Chandler H. Kibbee and Mercedes K. 
Kibbee Foundation for Children.

 
 
[¶25]   On February 9, 2007, Peter filed 
his complaint in the present case alleging that the estate planning documents 
signed by Mercedes in 2006 should be cancelled because they were signed while 
she was incompetent and subject to undue influence.  The complaint was later amended to 
include a claim that Sharon owed him damages for intentional interference with 
an inheritance expectancy.  Also, 
Peter filed a petition to have Mercedes declared incompetent and to have Aurora 
appointed as her guardian and conservator.  
Mercedes responded to the petition and submitted physician affidavits 
stating that she was competent.  
That petition, however, was never resolved because Mercedes passed away 
on April 15, 2007.

 
 
[¶26]   On April 29, 2009, Sharon filed a 
motion for partial summary judgment on the intentional interference with an 
inheritance expectancy claim.  The 
district court found in Sharon's favor and dismissed that claim on June 29, 
2009.  Summary judgment motions for 
the remaining issues (incompetence and undue influence) were then filed.  In an effort to oppose the motions, 
Peter submitted the affidavits of Bruce Kahn, a psychiatrist, and Jeffrey 
Wallace, a physician.  Both doctors 
opined that based on their review of certain medical records, Mercedes was 
incompetent at the time she executed certain of the estate planning 
documents.  However, the medical 
records upon which the doctors relied in formulating their opinions were not 
attached to their affidavits, therefore, the district court struck the 
affidavits for failure to comply with W.R.C.P. 56(e).  The court then addressed the motions for 
summary judgment and determined that Peter had failed to present evidence 
raising genuine issues of material fact regarding Mercedes' competence or 
Sharon's alleged undue influence and granted summary judgment. 

 
 
[¶27]   Peter filed a timely notice of 
appeal.

  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶28]                          
We evaluate the 
propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and using the 
same materials as the district court.  Cook v. Shoshone First 
Bank, 2006 WY 13, 
¶ 11, 126 P.3d 886, 
889 (Wyo. 2006).  Thus, our review is plenary.  Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 
Inc., 2003 WY 102, 
¶ 7, 75 P.3d 640, 647 
(Wyo. 2003).

 
 
Wyo. 
R. Civ. P. 56 governs summary judgments.  A summary judgment is 
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  W.R.C.P. 
56(c).  When reviewing a summary judgment, we consider the record in 
the perspective most favorable to the party opposing the motion and give that 
party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be fairly drawn from the 
record.  We review questions of law de novo without giving any deference to 
the district court's determinations.

 
 

Cathcart 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2005 
WY 154, ¶ 11, 123 P.3d 579, 586 (Wyo. 2005), quoting Baker v. Ayres and Baker Pole and 
Post, Inc., 2005 WY 97, 
¶ 14, 117 P.3d 1234, 
1239 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

"A 
genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, 
would establish or refute an essential element of a cause of action or a defense 
that the parties 
have asserted."  Christensen v. 
Carbon County, 2004 WY 
135, ¶ 8, 100 P.3d 411, 413 
(Wyo. 2004) (quoting Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, 
¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 
1055 (Wyo. 2002)).  The party requesting a summary judgment bears the 
initial burden of establishing 
a prima facie case for summary 
judgment.  If he carries his burden, "the party who is opposing the 
motion for summary judgment must present specific facts to demonstrate that a 
genuine issue of material fact exists."  Id.  We have 
explained the duties of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment as 
follows:

 
 
"After 
a movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, the opposing 
party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial showing 
there are genuine issues of material fact.  The opposing party must 
affirmatively set forth material, specific facts in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment, and cannot rely only upon allegations and pleadings . . ., and 
conclusory statements or mere opinions are insufficient to satisfy the opposing 
party's burden."

 
 

            
The evidence opposing a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment 
"must be competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be 
entirely eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere 
conjecture or wishful speculation."  Speculation, conjecture, the 
suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or even probability, 
are insufficient to establish an issue of material fact.  Cook, 
¶ 12, 126 P.3d  at 890, quoting Jones v. Schabron, 2005 WY 65, ¶¶ 9-11, 113 P.3d 34, 37 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 

Hatton 
v. Energy Elec. Co., 2006 
WY 151, 
¶¶ 8-9, 148 P.3d 8, 12-13 (Wyo. 
2006).

DISCUSSION
 
[¶29]   
In this appeal, Peter argues that there were contested issues of 
material fact with regard to whether Mercedes had the requisite mental capacity 
to execute the documents in question, and whether Mercedes was unduly influenced 
in executing the documents in question.  
Additionally, Peter claims that the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment on his intentional interference with an inheritance expectancy 
claim.  We will address each of 
these issues in turn.  

  
Mental 
Capacity
 
[¶30]   
Peter concedes that Mercedes possessed the mental acuity to make the 
decision to leave the nursing home in April of 2005.  However, he argues that at all points 
after that date, Mercedes lacked the requisite mental capacity to make estate 
planning and financial decisions.  
Although Peter's challenge to Mercedes' capacity is broad, his appellate 
arguments focus primarily on the irrevocable trusts Mercedes executed on 
September 10, 2006, benefitting Sharon, and those benefitting Peter, Aurora, and 
Joshua, executed between November 2, and November 6, 2006, while Mercedes was 
hospitalized.
 
[¶31]   With regard to the mental capacity 
necessary to execute a trust, we have said:
 
"Mental 
incompetency, which will defeat the trust, exists where a person is incapable of 
understanding and acting with discretion in ordinary affairs of life, or is 
incapable of understanding, in a reasonable manner, the nature and effect of the 
trust.  Strictly speaking, the 
question presented in such a case is not necessarily whether the settlor was 
generally of sound mind, but whether he had sufficient mental capacity to 
understand the trust which he executed."
 
Hilbert 
v. Benson, 
917 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Harrison 
v. City Nat'l Bank of Clinton, 
210 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D. Iowa 1962) 
(quoting 89 
C.J.S. 
Trusts 
§ 
73 (1955)).  The essential question 
is "whether a person is capable of understanding in a reasonable manner, the 
nature and effect of the act in which the person is engaged." Hilbert, 
917 P.2d  at 1156 (quoting In re 
Estate of Head, 615 P.2d 271, 274 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1980), cert. denied, 615 P.2d 992).  We have said that a "higher degree of 
mental capacity is required to execute an inter vivos conveyance or contract or to 
transact business generally, than is required in executing a will."1  Hilbert, 917 P.2d  at 1156.  It is axiomatic that any determination 
of mental capacity must be made at the time 
when the document is executed.  Street v. Street, 2009 WY 85, ¶ 10, 211 P.3d 495, 499 (Wyo. 2009); In re Estate of McLean, 2004 WY 126, ¶ 10, 99 P.3d 999, 1003-04 (Wyo. 2004); 
Hilbert, 
917 P.2d  at 1156.  "Mental incapacity is not always 
permanent and a person may have lucid moments or intervals when that person 
possesses the necessary capacity to convey property."  Street, 2009 WY 85, ¶ 10, 211 P.3d  at 
499.  In a trial setting, the party 
claiming that a document was executed by an individual without the requisite 
capacity has the burden to demonstrate such lack of capacity.  Hilbert, 917 P.2d  at 1156 ("[The 
appellant], as the one asserting incompetence, had the burden to show lack of 
contractual capacity by clear and convincing evidence.").  However, in the context of summary 
judgment, the movant has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing of mental 
capacity.  McLean, 2004 WY 126, ¶ 12, 99 P.3d  at 
1004.  
 
[¶32]   To meet this initial burden, the 
appellees provided specific evidence regarding Mercedes' mental state at the 
time she executed the trusts while hospitalized.  Ms. Wendtland described her November 2, 
2006, meeting with Mercedes as follows:
 
I 
directed [Mercedes] to the issue of what she wants to do with her estate when 
she dies.  She said, "I want to get 
those documents signed that you have."  
I showed her the CRT for Joshua.  
She remembered on her own that Joshua wouldn't get any money from the 
trust until he turned age 40. She remembered on her own, that until Joshua 
reaches age 40, the YMCA or foundation will get the money.  She signed the CRT for Joshua.  She was very upset that her signature 
was so bad, but she was tired and weak.  
She insisted on getting it done.  
At one point I pointed to the line where she was to sign.  She leaned her forehead against mine and 
said, "I know.  I'm not a 
child."  She signed and Nadine 
witnessed.
 
Next 
I gave her Peter's trust to sign.  
Again, she recalled that Peter will get money each year and when he dies 
the rest will go to the YMCA or foundation.  Again, she signedpoorlybut 
signed.  Nadine 
witnessed.
 
Finally 
I gave her the CLT for Aurora.  I 
asked her if I needed to go over the document again with her she said: 
"No."  She explained to me that this 
trust was to take care of Aurora in place of leaving her the ranch.  I tried to clarify that statement by 
asking her:  "Do you want Aurora to 
have the ranch?  She said: 
"Absolutely NO!"  I said "do you 
want Aurora to live on the ranch so that it can go to Joshua later?"  She said, "Hell, NO!"  Both Nadine and I were surprised by the 
strength of her conviction and the energy that it took for her to express her 
opinion as loud as she did.  Then 
she said:  "Let's get this 
signed."
 
Regarding 
all of the documents Ms. Wendtland observed Mercedes sign, Ms. Wendtland stated, 
under oath:
 
Each 
time Mercedes Kibbee signed any document prepared for her by Robert Leonard or 
by me, I explained the meaning and consequences of the document to her, and when 
[Mercedes] signed those documents, she was coherent, lucid and rational.  I would not have allowed her to sign 
those documents if I had thought that she did not understand the nature and 
effect of what she was doing.
 
Mercedes' 
treating physician at the time, Dr. Hugh Batty, opined in his affidavit as to 
her mental state, based on personal knowledge and observations during that 
period:
 
8.    In early November of 2006, 
[Mercedes] was hospitalized for congestive heart failure and pneumonia.  She responded to treatment well.  On November 2, 2006 [Mercedes'] physical 
condition had improved and in my opinion she was mentally able to make decisions 
concerning her medical care and her financial assets.  On November 4, 2006 I specifically noted 
in my office notes that she was "able to deal with legal documents."  Her physical condition continued to 
improve and she was discharged from the [hospital] to return to her home on 
November 14, 2006.
 
9.    I am aware that [Mercedes] 
signed various legal documents pertaining to the disposition of assets between 
November 2 and November 6, 2006 and based upon my examination and care of her 
during that period I believe she was mentally competent to understand the legal 
decisions she was making. 
 
Elaborating 
further, Dr. Batty described Mercedes more fully as 
follows:
 
A.    Well, I thought that she 
possessed the executive function.  I 
thought she had capacity, and I thought that she probably did not have 
Alzheimer's because of my experience and how engaging she was. She was 
appropriate.  She was coy.  She was cagey.  She was interesting.  She had humor and 
insight.
 
        And I 
thought that she tired easily.  But 
she had wit and intelligence, and I thought that she had kind of an ironic sort 
of personality where she would be almost like she was testing me.  And I was the so-called tester, and she 
was testee; but she had turned it around.
 
Q.    Was there any doubt in your 
mind about her capacity to understand and execute legal documents pertaining to 
her estate?
 
A.    I had no  I had no thought 
that she could not deal with her legal documents in that 
regard.
 
The 
day after Mercedes was released from the hospital, Mr. Leonard traveled to 
Sheridan to discuss with Mercedes the changes she had made to her estate 
plan.  Mr. Leonard described this 
meeting as follows:
 
Q.     What was the purpose of 
that meeting?
 
A.     That was primarily to 
talk about the foundation some more, and figure out what kind of a foundation we 
were going to do, but I also used it as an opportunity to verify for myself that 
[Mercedes] was the same degree of competence then as she was the last time I saw 
her in July, and that everything I had done for her up to that point was 
something that she wanted done, and that the entire plan was what she had wanted 
done.  So we took time to go over 
every document again.  We didn't 
read them, but we talked about every document, its purpose, how it fit into the 
plan, what the total plan was, what the tax savings were, and verified  I 
verified with her that all of those things were things that she wanted, she 
desired, and were still things that she wanted and desired on November 15th; 
that there hadn't been any change in her mind, and verified in my mind at that 
point that she was the same degree of competency she had been on July 24th, the 
last time I met with her.  And I was 
quite thorough in doing that because I had not seen her since July 24th.  So I wanted to verify for myself that 
she understood every document I prepared for her, what its purpose was, what it 
did, and that's what she wanted.  
And not only that, but every document was part of a plan that she 
wanted.
 
. 
. . . 
 
Q.     And as of that day, I 
assume you'd tell me she was tracking, she understood it all, it was her 
intent?
 
A.     Oh, yeah.  She was very lively, very alert.  She invited my wife and I to a party she 
was going to be having out at the ranch that was coming up, to celebrate the 
forming of the foundation.  And she 
thanked me for what I had done. . . . 
 
[¶33]   We have found that the first-hand 
observations of the decedent's attorney and treating physician provide 
persuasive evidence of capacity.  McLean, 2004 WY 126, ¶¶ 12-16, 99 P.3d  
at 1004-05 (concluding that affidavits from attorney, treating physician, and 
others who witnessed the execution of the document established capacity and 
warranted summary judgment).  In McLean, the Court made note of the 
following evidence:
 
. 
. . the attorney who drafted McLean's will, stated that during their meetings, 
McLean was "coherent, alert and very assertive about her wishes," and that she 
"asked many questions throughout the drafting process which exhibited her 
understanding of the meaning of her Will and the manner in which she wished to 
distribute[ ] her estate." 
 
Id. 
at ¶ 12, at 1004.
 
In 
a sworn statement, McLean's treating physician stated that after independent 
examination and discussion with McLean, his impression was that she was mentally 
and physically capable of making appropriate decisions.  Id. at ¶ 13, at 1004.  The quality and character of the 
evidence submitted in this case is nearly identical to that demonstrating 
capacity in McLean.  We conclude, as the district court did, 
that the evidence presented is sufficient to make a prima facie showing that Mercedes had 
the mental capacity to execute the challenged documents.
[¶34]   Upon this showing, the burden 
shifted to Peter to demonstrate, by "clear and convincing evidence," that 
Mercedes lacked the requisite mental capacity  that is, that she did not understand in a reasonable manner the nature and 
effect of the act in which she was engaged.  Hilbert, 917 P.2d  at 1156.  To attempt to meet this burden, Peter 
asserts that the weak signatures on the documents executed while Mercedes was 
hospitalized in November are evidence of Mercedes' lack of capacity.  Further, Peter calls our attention to 
the statement of one individual who was with Mercedes right before she signed 
the trusts on November 2, 2006.  
Finally, Peter relies on the affidavits of two experts to show that 
Mercedes lacked mental capacity.
 
[¶35]   It is true that the signatures on 
the documents are difficult to discern.  
Ms. Wendtland explained the signatures:
 
That 
particular day [Mercedes] was laying in her bed, and she had her knees propped 
up; and she insisted on not letting me bring the table around so she could put 
the document on the table and sign on the table.
 
Instead, 
she tried to sign this document on her knees, propped up; and it just didn't 
work very well.
 
The 
statement of the family friend, Ms. Ferrill, is not taken from a sworn affidavit 
by Ms. Ferrill, but instead extracted from the testimony of Ms. Wendtland, who 
explained the statement as follows:
 
By 
the time I got to the hospital [Mercedes] was being helped to the restroom and 
so I waited in the hall and spoke to Jane Ferrill.  She didn't think [Mercedes] had known 
who she was.  I went in and 
[Mercedes] immediately knew who I was and patted me on the cheek.  I believe Jane saw this.  I invited Jane to stay but she 
left.
 
. 
. .  Because of Jane's comment I 
asked [Mercedes] several different questions to assure myself that she was 
mentally tracking and knew what we were talking about.  She answered questions about Mr. Kibbee, 
the ranch, her clothes at home, changes she wants to make to the ranch house, 
and the fact that she doesn't want to make any changes to her 
room.
 
[¶36]   Even viewing these facts in the 
light most favorable to Peter, we cannot say that they are adequate to defeat 
the prima facie showing that Mercedes 
had the requisite capacity.  Not 
only are both the signature and Ms. Ferrill's comments explained and refuted by 
sworn testimony, but both pieces of evidence are speculative, at best.  We have said that:
 
The 
evidence opposing a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment "must be 
competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be entirely 
eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere 
conjecture or wishful speculation."  
Speculation, conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or 
even probability, are insufficient to establish an issue of material 
fact.
 
Hatton, 
2006 WY 151, ¶ 9, 148 P.3d  at 13 
(quoting Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 
2006 WY 13, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 886, 890 (Wyo. 2006)).
  
[¶37]   The other evidence that Peter 
offered to rebut the prima facie 
showing by the appellees was the affidavits of two doctors, Dr. Bruce A. 
Kahn and Dr. Jeffrey Wallace.  
Neither Dr. Kahn nor Dr. Wallace had examined or treated Mercedes; 
nevertheless, they offered opinions, presumably to refute the opinion of 
Mercedes' treating physician, Dr. Batty.  
Both doctors opined, based on their review of the documents, as to 
Mercedes' mental capacity at the time she executed the documents.  Dr. Wallace stated, "[t]he overwhelming 
majority of the medical record [sic] during this hospitalization raises serious 
doubts about [Mercedes'] physical and mental condition and indicates that she 
was lacking capacity to manage her affairs and also highly vulnerable to undue 
influence."  Likewise, Dr. Kahn 
concluded:  "Accordingly, it is my 
opinion with reasonable medical probability that [Mercedes] was likely to have 
been rendered mentally incapacitated to sign or otherwise execute legal 
documents during the time frame of October 28, 2006 through December 12, 
2006."
 
[¶38]   The appellees moved to strike the 
affidavit of both doctors on multiple grounds.  Among the appellees' challenges to the 
affidavits was an assertion that they failed to comply with W.R.C.P. 56(e), 
which reads as follows:
 
(e) 
Form of affidavits; further testimony; 
defense required. - Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein.  Sworn or certified copies of all papers or 
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed 
by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits.  When a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported as provided in this rule an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse 
party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial.
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Although both affidavits 
referenced many medical records that the doctors reviewed and upon which they 
relied in reaching their conclusions, none of the records were attached to the 
affidavits, as required by the highlighted portion of Rule 56(e) above.  Therefore, the district court granted 
the appellees' motion to strike the affidavits for summary judgment 
purposes.
 
[¶39]   We find that the district court's 
striking of the affidavits was proper and consistent with Wyoming law.  Regarding Rule 56(e), this Court has 
said that "[t]he Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 
were adopted to promote an orderly and efficient means for the handling and 
disposing of litigation. Compliance with these rules of procedure in summary 
judgment matters is mandatory."  
Greenwood 
v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Wyo. 1987) (quoting Hickey v. Burnett, 707 P.2d 741, 745 (Wyo. 
1985)).  Rule 
56(e), in specific terminology, requires that affidavits:  1) be made on personal knowledge; 2) set 
forth facts which are admissible in evidence; 3) 
demonstrate the competency of the affiant to testify on the subject matter of 
the affidavit; and 4) have attached to them the papers and documents to which 
the affidavit refers.  Bangs 
v. Schroth, 2009 
WY 20, ¶ 15, 201 P.3d 442, 449 
(Wyo. 2009).
 
[¶40]   We have, on a number of occasions, 
deemed inadequate affidavits wherein the affiant failed to attach the document 
upon which the affidavit is based.  Id. at ¶ 28, at 455 (district court 
erred in not striking affidavit where the affiant "fail[ed] to attach the 
medical records to which he refers" and "fail[ed] to attach a letter from [a 
doctor] to which he refers in paragraph nine"); Lamar Outdoor Adver. v. Farmer's Co-op Oil 
Co. of Sheridan, Wyo., 2009 WY 
112, ¶ 12, 215 P.3d 296, 301 (Wyo. 2009) (finding affidavit defective under 
Rule 56(e) where the affiant did not attach the application or letter of 
notification referred to in the affidavit); Greenwood, 741 P.2d  at 1085-86 (two 
affidavits that failed to include the factual basis for conclusions and not 
attaching documents were insufficient).

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶29]   
In this appeal, Peter argues that there were contested issues of 
material fact with regard to whether Mercedes had the requisite mental capacity 
to execute the documents in question, and whether Mercedes was unduly influenced 
in executing the documents in question.  
Additionally, Peter claims that the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment on his intentional interference with an inheritance expectancy 
claim.  We will address each of 
these issues in turn.  

  

 
 
Mental 
Capacity

 
 
[¶30]   
Peter concedes that Mercedes possessed the mental acuity to make the 
decision to leave the nursing home in April of 2005.  However, he argues that at all points 
after that date, Mercedes lacked the requisite mental capacity to make estate 
planning and financial decisions.  
Although Peter's challenge to Mercedes' capacity is broad, his appellate 
arguments focus primarily on the irrevocable trusts Mercedes executed on 
September 10, 2006, benefitting Sharon, and those benefitting Peter, Aurora, and 
Joshua, executed between November 2, and November 6, 2006, while Mercedes was 
hospitalized.

 
 
[¶31]   With regard to the mental capacity 
necessary to execute a trust, we have said:

 

"Mental 
incompetency, which will defeat the trust, exists where a person is incapable of 
understanding and acting with discretion in ordinary affairs of life, or is 
incapable of understanding, in a reasonable manner, the nature and effect of the 
trust.  Strictly speaking, the 
question presented in such a case is not necessarily whether the settlor was 
generally of sound mind, but whether he had sufficient mental capacity to 
understand the trust which he executed."

 
 

Hilbert 
v. Benson, 
917 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Harrison 
v. City Nat'l Bank of Clinton, 
210 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D. Iowa 1962) 
(quoting 89 
C.J.S. 
Trusts 
§ 
73 (1955)).  The essential question 
is "whether a person is capable of understanding in a reasonable manner, the 
nature and effect of the act in which the person is engaged." Hilbert, 
917 P.2d  at 1156 (quoting In re 
Estate of Head, 615 P.2d 271, 274 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1980), cert. denied, 615 P.2d 992).  We have said that a "higher degree of 
mental capacity is required to execute an inter vivos conveyance or contract or to 
transact business generally, than is required in executing a will."1  Hilbert, 917 P.2d  at 1156.  It is axiomatic that any determination 
of mental capacity must be made at the time 
when the document is executed.  Street v. Street, 2009 WY 85, ¶ 10, 211 P.3d 495, 499 (Wyo. 2009); In re Estate of McLean, 2004 WY 126, ¶ 10, 99 P.3d 999, 1003-04 (Wyo. 2004); 
Hilbert, 
917 P.2d  at 1156.  "Mental incapacity is not always 
permanent and a person may have lucid moments or intervals when that person 
possesses the necessary capacity to convey property."  Street, 2009 WY 85, ¶ 10, 211 P.3d  at 
499.  In a trial setting, the party 
claiming that a document was executed by an individual without the requisite 
capacity has the burden to demonstrate such lack of capacity.  Hilbert, 917 P.2d  at 1156 ("[The 
appellant], as the one asserting incompetence, had the burden to show lack of 
contractual capacity by clear and convincing evidence.").  However, in the context of summary 
judgment, the movant has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing of mental 
capacity.  McLean, 2004 WY 126, ¶ 12, 99 P.3d  at 
1004.  

 
[¶32]   To meet this initial burden, the 
appellees provided specific evidence regarding Mercedes' mental state at the 
time she executed the trusts while hospitalized.  Ms. Wendtland described her November 2, 
2006, meeting with Mercedes as follows:

 
 
I 
directed [Mercedes] to the issue of what she wants to do with her estate when 
she dies.  She said, "I want to get 
those documents signed that you have."  
I showed her the CRT for Joshua.  
She remembered on her own that Joshua wouldn't get any money from the 
trust until he turned age 40. She remembered on her own, that until Joshua 
reaches age 40, the YMCA or foundation will get the money.  She signed the CRT for Joshua.  She was very upset that her signature 
was so bad, but she was tired and weak.  
She insisted on getting it done.  
At one point I pointed to the line where she was to sign.  She leaned her forehead against mine and 
said, "I know.  I'm not a 
child."  She signed and Nadine 
witnessed.

 
 
Next 
I gave her Peter's trust to sign.  
Again, she recalled that Peter will get money each year and when he dies 
the rest will go to the YMCA or foundation.  Again, she signedpoorlybut 
signed.  Nadine 
witnessed.

 
 
Finally 
I gave her the CLT for Aurora.  I 
asked her if I needed to go over the document again with her she said: 
"No."  She explained to me that this 
trust was to take care of Aurora in place of leaving her the ranch.  I tried to clarify that statement by 
asking her:  "Do you want Aurora to 
have the ranch?  She said: 
"Absolutely NO!"  I said "do you 
want Aurora to live on the ranch so that it can go to Joshua later?"  She said, "Hell, NO!"  Both Nadine and I were surprised by the 
strength of her conviction and the energy that it took for her to express her 
opinion as loud as she did.  Then 
she said:  "Let's get this 
signed."

 
 
Regarding 
all of the documents Ms. Wendtland observed Mercedes sign, Ms. Wendtland stated, 
under oath:

 
 
Each 
time Mercedes Kibbee signed any document prepared for her by Robert Leonard or 
by me, I explained the meaning and consequences of the document to her, and when 
[Mercedes] signed those documents, she was coherent, lucid and rational.  I would not have allowed her to sign 
those documents if I had thought that she did not understand the nature and 
effect of what she was doing.

 
 
Mercedes' 
treating physician at the time, Dr. Hugh Batty, opined in his affidavit as to 
her mental state, based on personal knowledge and observations during that 
period:

 
 
8.    In early November of 2006, 
[Mercedes] was hospitalized for congestive heart failure and pneumonia.  She responded to treatment well.  On November 2, 2006 [Mercedes'] physical 
condition had improved and in my opinion she was mentally able to make decisions 
concerning her medical care and her financial assets.  On November 4, 2006 I specifically noted 
in my office notes that she was "able to deal with legal documents."  Her physical condition continued to 
improve and she was discharged from the [hospital] to return to her home on 
November 14, 2006.

 
 
9.    I am aware that [Mercedes] 
signed various legal documents pertaining to the disposition of assets between 
November 2 and November 6, 2006 and based upon my examination and care of her 
during that period I believe she was mentally competent to understand the legal 
decisions she was making. 

 
 
Elaborating 
further, Dr. Batty described Mercedes more fully as 
follows:

 
 
A.    Well, I thought that she 
possessed the executive function.  I 
thought she had capacity, and I thought that she probably did not have 
Alzheimer's because of my experience and how engaging she was. She was 
appropriate.  She was coy.  She was cagey.  She was interesting.  She had humor and 
insight.

 
 
        And I 
thought that she tired easily.  But 
she had wit and intelligence, and I thought that she had kind of an ironic sort 
of personality where she would be almost like she was testing me.  And I was the so-called tester, and she 
was testee; but she had turned it around.

 
 
Q.    Was there any doubt in your 
mind about her capacity to understand and execute legal documents pertaining to 
her estate?

 
 
A.    I had no  I had no thought 
that she could not deal with her legal documents in that 
regard.

 
 
The 
day after Mercedes was released from the hospital, Mr. Leonard traveled to 
Sheridan to discuss with Mercedes the changes she had made to her estate 
plan.  Mr. Leonard described this 
meeting as follows:

 
 
Q.     What was the purpose of 
that meeting?

 
 
A.     That was primarily to 
talk about the foundation some more, and figure out what kind of a foundation we 
were going to do, but I also used it as an opportunity to verify for myself that 
[Mercedes] was the same degree of competence then as she was the last time I saw 
her in July, and that everything I had done for her up to that point was 
something that she wanted done, and that the entire plan was what she had wanted 
done.  So we took time to go over 
every document again.  We didn't 
read them, but we talked about every document, its purpose, how it fit into the 
plan, what the total plan was, what the tax savings were, and verified  I 
verified with her that all of those things were things that she wanted, she 
desired, and were still things that she wanted and desired on November 15th; 
that there hadn't been any change in her mind, and verified in my mind at that 
point that she was the same degree of competency she had been on July 24th, the 
last time I met with her.  And I was 
quite thorough in doing that because I had not seen her since July 24th.  So I wanted to verify for myself that 
she understood every document I prepared for her, what its purpose was, what it 
did, and that's what she wanted.  
And not only that, but every document was part of a plan that she 
wanted.

 
 
. 
. . . 

 
 
Q.     And as of that day, I 
assume you'd tell me she was tracking, she understood it all, it was her 
intent?

 
 
A.     Oh, yeah.  She was very lively, very alert.  She invited my wife and I to a party she 
was going to be having out at the ranch that was coming up, to celebrate the 
forming of the foundation.  And she 
thanked me for what I had done. . . . 

 
 
[¶33]   We have found that the first-hand 
observations of the decedent's attorney and treating physician provide 
persuasive evidence of capacity.  McLean, 2004 WY 126, ¶¶ 12-16, 99 P.3d  
at 1004-05 (concluding that affidavits from attorney, treating physician, and 
others who witnessed the execution of the document established capacity and 
warranted summary judgment).  In McLean, the Court made note of the 
following evidence:

 
 
. 
. . the attorney who drafted McLean's will, stated that during their meetings, 
McLean was "coherent, alert and very assertive about her wishes," and that she 
"asked many questions throughout the drafting process which exhibited her 
understanding of the meaning of her Will and the manner in which she wished to 
distribute[ ] her estate." 

 
 

Id. 
at ¶ 12, at 1004.

 
 
In 
a sworn statement, McLean's treating physician stated that after independent 
examination and discussion with McLean, his impression was that she was mentally 
and physically capable of making appropriate decisions.  Id. at ¶ 13, at 1004.  The quality and character of the 
evidence submitted in this case is nearly identical to that demonstrating 
capacity in McLean.  We conclude, as the district court did, 
that the evidence presented is sufficient to make a prima facie showing that Mercedes had 
the mental capacity to execute the challenged documents.
[¶34]   Upon this showing, the burden 
shifted to Peter to demonstrate, by "clear and convincing evidence," that 
Mercedes lacked the requisite mental capacity  that is, that she did not understand in a reasonable manner the nature and 
effect of the act in which she was engaged.  Hilbert, 917 P.2d  at 1156.  To attempt to meet this burden, Peter 
asserts that the weak signatures on the documents executed while Mercedes was 
hospitalized in November are evidence of Mercedes' lack of capacity.  Further, Peter calls our attention to 
the statement of one individual who was with Mercedes right before she signed 
the trusts on November 2, 2006.  
Finally, Peter relies on the affidavits of two experts to show that 
Mercedes lacked mental capacity.

 
 
[¶35]   It is true that the signatures on 
the documents are difficult to discern.  
Ms. Wendtland explained the signatures:

 
 
That 
particular day [Mercedes] was laying in her bed, and she had her knees propped 
up; and she insisted on not letting me bring the table around so she could put 
the document on the table and sign on the table.

 
 
Instead, 
she tried to sign this document on her knees, propped up; and it just didn't 
work very well.

 
 
The 
statement of the family friend, Ms. Ferrill, is not taken from a sworn affidavit 
by Ms. Ferrill, but instead extracted from the testimony of Ms. Wendtland, who 
explained the statement as follows:

 
 
By 
the time I got to the hospital [Mercedes] was being helped to the restroom and 
so I waited in the hall and spoke to Jane Ferrill.  She didn't think [Mercedes] had known 
who she was.  I went in and 
[Mercedes] immediately knew who I was and patted me on the cheek.  I believe Jane saw this.  I invited Jane to stay but she 
left.

 
 
. 
. .  Because of Jane's comment I 
asked [Mercedes] several different questions to assure myself that she was 
mentally tracking and knew what we were talking about.  She answered questions about Mr. Kibbee, 
the ranch, her clothes at home, changes she wants to make to the ranch house, 
and the fact that she doesn't want to make any changes to her 
room.

 
 
[¶36]   Even viewing these facts in the 
light most favorable to Peter, we cannot say that they are adequate to defeat 
the prima facie showing that Mercedes 
had the requisite capacity.  Not 
only are both the signature and Ms. Ferrill's comments explained and refuted by 
sworn testimony, but both pieces of evidence are speculative, at best.  We have said that:

 
 
The 
evidence opposing a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment "must be 
competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be entirely 
eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere 
conjecture or wishful speculation."  
Speculation, conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or 
even probability, are insufficient to establish an issue of material 
fact.

 
 

Hatton, 
2006 WY 151, ¶ 9, 148 P.3d  at 13 
(quoting Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 
2006 WY 13, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 886, 890 (Wyo. 2006)).

  
  

 
[¶37]   The other evidence that Peter 
offered to rebut the prima facie 
showing by the appellees was the affidavits of two doctors, Dr. Bruce A. 
Kahn and Dr. Jeffrey Wallace.  
Neither Dr. Kahn nor Dr. Wallace had examined or treated Mercedes; 
nevertheless, they offered opinions, presumably to refute the opinion of 
Mercedes' treating physician, Dr. Batty.  
Both doctors opined, based on their review of the documents, as to 
Mercedes' mental capacity at the time she executed the documents.  Dr. Wallace stated, "[t]he overwhelming 
majority of the medical record [sic] during this hospitalization raises serious 
doubts about [Mercedes'] physical and mental condition and indicates that she 
was lacking capacity to manage her affairs and also highly vulnerable to undue 
influence."  Likewise, Dr. Kahn 
concluded:  "Accordingly, it is my 
opinion with reasonable medical probability that [Mercedes] was likely to have 
been rendered mentally incapacitated to sign or otherwise execute legal 
documents during the time frame of October 28, 2006 through December 12, 
2006."

 
 
[¶38]   The appellees moved to strike the 
affidavit of both doctors on multiple grounds.  Among the appellees' challenges to the 
affidavits was an assertion that they failed to comply with W.R.C.P. 56(e), 
which reads as follows:

 
 
(e) 
Form of affidavits; further testimony; 
defense required. - Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein.  Sworn or certified copies of all papers or 
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed 
by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits.  When a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported as provided in this rule an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse 
party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Although both affidavits 
referenced many medical records that the doctors reviewed and upon which they 
relied in reaching their conclusions, none of the records were attached to the 
affidavits, as required by the highlighted portion of Rule 56(e) above.  Therefore, the district court granted 
the appellees' motion to strike the affidavits for summary judgment 
purposes.

 
 

[¶39]   We find that the district court's 
striking of the affidavits was proper and consistent with Wyoming law.  Regarding Rule 56(e), this Court has 
said that "[t]he Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 
were adopted to promote an orderly and efficient means for the handling and 
disposing of litigation. Compliance with these rules of procedure in summary 
judgment matters is mandatory."  
Greenwood 
v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Wyo. 1987) (quoting Hickey v. Burnett, 707 P.2d 741, 745 (Wyo. 
1985)).  Rule 
56(e), in specific terminology, requires that affidavits:  1) be made on personal knowledge; 2) set 
forth facts which are admissible in evidence; 3) 
demonstrate the competency of the affiant to testify on the subject matter of 
the affidavit; and 4) have attached to them the papers and documents to which 
the affidavit refers.  Bangs 
v. Schroth, 2009 
WY 20, ¶ 15, 201 P.3d 442, 449 
(Wyo. 2009).

 
 

[¶40]   We have, on a number of occasions, 
deemed inadequate affidavits wherein the affiant failed to attach the document 
upon which the affidavit is based.  Id. at ¶ 28, at 455 (district court 
erred in not striking affidavit where the affiant "fail[ed] to attach the 
medical records to which he refers" and "fail[ed] to attach a letter from [a 
doctor] to which he refers in paragraph nine"); Lamar Outdoor Adver. v. Farmer's Co-op Oil 
Co. of Sheridan, Wyo., 2009 WY 
112, ¶ 12, 215 P.3d 296, 301 (Wyo. 2009) (finding affidavit defective under 
Rule 56(e) where the affiant did not attach the application or letter of 
notification referred to in the affidavit); Greenwood, 741 P.2d  at 1085-86 (two 
affidavits that failed to include the factual basis for conclusions and not 
attaching documents were insufficient).

[¶41]   Although 
Peter recognizes the general requirements of Rule 56(e) that documents referred 
to in an affidavit be attached, he argues that the evidentiary rules governing 
experts, W.R.E. 703 and 705, somehow relieve expert witnesses of this 
requirement.  Specifically, he 
points to the language of Rule 703 that provides: 

 
 
The 
facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the 
hearing.  If of a type reasonably 
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences 
upon the subject, the facts or 
data need not be admissible in evidence."

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  He also calls our attention 
to the following language from Rule 705:

 
 
The 
expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons 
therefor without prior disclosure 
of the underlying facts and data, unless the court requires otherwise.  The expert may in any event 
be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on 
cross-examination.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶42]   Peter 
argues that there is an inherent inconsistency between the explicit requirement 
of W.R.C.P. 56(e) to provide documents and the above-emphasized language of the 
Evidentiary Rules.  Any tension 
between these rules was addressed in Western Sur. Co. v. Town of Evansville, 
675 P.2d 258, 261-63 (Wyo. 
1984).  There, we found deficiencies 
in a retained expert's affidavit submitted in response to a summary judgment 
motion, in large part because the affidavit did not include documents forming 
the basis of the expert's opinions.  
We said:

 
 
Affidavits 
used in summary judgment proceedings must set forth such facts as are admissible 
in evidence, and that is especially 
true when the affidavit contains significant opinions and conclusions that may 
be critical in the outcome of the case.  
It matters not that the 
opinion of an expert may be admissible at trial without first revealing the 
underlying facts and basis for that opinion. This is a summary judgment hearing 
and the requirements are different.  
The fact finder must have the material facts, determine 
whether they are in dispute, and if undisputed, whether judgment results as a 
matter of law.  . . . 
.

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
. 
. . it is apparent that the affidavit presented by appellee, insofar 
as it presents opinions and conclusions resulting from an analysis of records 
not before the court, may not be considered for the purpose of 
awarding summary judgment.

 
 

Id. 
at 262-63 (Emphasis added.)

 
 
[¶43]   Rule 56(e)'s requirement that 
documents referenced in an affidavit be attached is not merely a formality or 
technicality.  To allow an expert to 
state opinions and conclusions without requiring any documented support of such 
not only violates the plain language of Rule 56(e), but is also contrary to the 
summary judgment requirement that evidence opposing a motion for summary be 
"competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be 
entirely eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere 
conjecture or wishful speculation."  Hatton, 2006 WY 151, ¶ 9, 148 P.3d  at 
13.  Without the benefit of 
cross-examination to test the accuracy, competency, and truthfulness of expert 
opinions, district courts and this Court, when examining motions for summary 
judgment, would be left with only the bald assertions of the expert.  Lamar, 2009 WY 112, ¶ 12, 215 P.3d  at 301 
("A party's assertion, without evidentiary support, is meaningless in summary 
judgment procedure.").

 
 
Undue 
Influence

 
 
[¶44]   We recently 
addressed the issue of undue influence in the execution of trusts in Retz v. Siebrandt, 2008 WY 44, 181 P.3d 84 (Wyo. 2008).  There we affirmed summary judgment 
against a plaintiff and said that in order to establish that a trust was 
executed under undue influence, the plaintiff must establish four elements:  1) the relation between the one charged 
with exercising undue influence and the decedent afforded the former an 
opportunity to control the testamentary act; 2) the decedent's condition was 
such to permit subversion of his freedom of will; 3) there was activity on the 
part of the person charged with exercising undue influence; and 4) such person 
unduly profited as a beneficiary under the trust.  Id. at ¶ 19, at 
91.

 
 
[¶45]   To prevail on an undue influence 
claim, the plaintiff must establish all four of the above-outlined 
elements.  This rule was aptly 
illustrated as follows:

 
 
In 
the case at bar the evidence which is undisputed or favorable to appellant 
indicates that, beginning in 1976, the living arrangements established by [the 
alleged influencer] and [the testator] provided ample opportunity for the 
exercise of impermissible influence.  
[The testator]'s alcoholism, poor health, and despondency following the 
death of a close companion suggest that he may have been susceptible to any 
influence.  Furthermore, [the 
alleged influencer], as sole beneficiary, profited under the terms of the will 
to the complete exclusion of [the testator]'s son and 
grandchildren.

 
 

The 
foregoing factual information is wholly immaterial, however, unless it can be 
tied to evidence that [the alleged influencer] actually exerted control over the 
testator so as to make the 1976 instrument her will rather than his.

 
 

In 
re Estate of Brosius, 683 P.2d 663, 666 (Wyo. 1984).  
The 
present case presents a similar factual scenario.  The record before us reveals that the 
first two elements of undue influence listed above  opportunity to influence 
and condition such to permit subversion  were likely present in this case.  See supra ¶ 44.  Upon arriving in Sheridan, it is 
undisputed that Sharon became heavily involved in the day-to-day activities of 
her mother.  Also, Mercedes was an 
elderly woman suffering from many health problems.  As illustrated in Brosius, however, such facts are 
immaterial unless Peter can show clear evidence of, or at least a disputed 
material fact surrounding, activity undertaken by Sharon to unduly influence 
Mercedes.   

 
 
[¶46]   Before examining the evidence 
surrounding the undue influence claim, we once again note that the movant has 
the initial burden of making a prima 
facie case for summary judgment.  
McLean, 2004 WY 126, ¶ 12, 99 P.3d  at 
1004.  Once such a showing has been 
made, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to "present specific and substantiated 
evidence showing the existence of a material fact as to undue influence with 
respect to the trust document."  Retz, 2008 WY 44, ¶ 26, 181 P.3d  at 
92.

 
 
[¶47]   In order properly to examine the 
parties' specific arguments regarding the undue influence claim, we briefly 
review the factual context surrounding the creation of Mercedes' estate 
plan.  On April 5, 2006, Mercedes 
contacted Ms. Wendtland to assist her in securing release from the nursing 
home.  From that point until 
Mercedes passed away, Ms. Wendtland represented and assisted Mercedes in 
resolving and/or facilitating the resolution of her legal issues and in bringing 
about the changes to her estate plan.  
It was Ms. Wendtland who drafted and assisted Mercedes in executing the 
document revoking Peter and Aurora's power of attorney and Amendment No. 3 to 
her revocable trust, which amendment added First Interstate as co-trustee and 
provided that upon her death First Interstate would serve as successor 
co-trustee.  Also, it was Ms. 
Wendtland who assisted Mercedes in hiring First Interstate to help her manage 
her trust and handle her finances.  
Representatives from First Interstate first raised the issue of the 
substantial tax liability to which Mercedes' estate would be subject unless 
modification to her estate plan was made.  
Likewise, it was a representative from First Interstate who suggested 
hiring Mr. Leonard to address this problem.  Ms. Wendtland set up the meeting with 
Mr. Leonard, and a representation agreement between Mr. Leonard and Mercedes was 
signed on June 23, 2006.

 
 
[¶48]   It is undisputed that Sharon was 
not even in Sheridan, Wyoming, and had not spoken with Mercedes in many years 
when the above-outlined events occurred.  
These events were the groundwork for Mercedes' modification of her estate 
plan, and all these events occurred before Sharon was even in the picture.  The impetus and genesis of the modified 
estate plan was First Interstate's concern with tax consequences.  The details and drafting of the estate 
plan arose primarily from Mr. Leonard's expertise and recommendations, and the 
execution of the estate plan was facilitated by Ms. Wendtland.  Peter does not dispute the independence 
of either Ms. Wendtland or Mr. Leonard.  
We find the involvement of these two, and other professionals, to be 
significant in our analysis of whether Sharon was able to exercise undue 
influence.  Regarding the effect of 
independent legal counsel in undue influence disputes, it has been 
said:

 
 
Independent 
or disinterested advice is legitimate and appropriate, and the testator's receipt of 
independent competent advice is relevant to determining whether there was undue 
influence, including particularly 
independent advice from attorneys or investment counselors.  The lack of advice from an independent 
attorney may also be a factor in determining whether there was undue 
influence.

 
 
79 
Am. Jur. 2d Wills § 390 
(2002).

 
 

[¶49]   In 
making their prima facie showing of a 
lack of undue influence, the appellees argue that not only were Ms. Wendtland 
and Mr. Leonard integral in formulating and executing Mercedes' estate plan, but 
the record indicates that they were vigilant in ensuring that the plan reflected 
Mercedes' wishes, and that Sharon was not involved in the decisions surrounding 
the estate plan.  Mr. Leonard 
testified as follows about these efforts:

 
 
Q.    [By Peter's Attorney] And did 
that cause you concern as the estate planner, that maybe [Sharon] was exercising 
undue influence?

 
 
A.    No.

 
 
Q.    And why was 
that?

 
 
A.    Because I felt that between 
[Ms. Wendtland] and I, and a little bit of involvement by First Interstate, that 
we were assuring ourselves every step of the way that what was being done here 
is what [Mercedes] wanted, not what Sharon wanted.

 
 
Mr. 
Leonard further testified concerning the lack of influence Sharon had on his 
work for Mercedes:

 
 
Q.    To the best of your 
knowledge, Mr. Leonard, did [Sharon] ever attempt to influence Mercedes Kibbee 
concerning the terms of the trusts that you drafted and were established or any 
other element of Mercedes Kibbee's estate planning?

 
 
A.    To the best of my knowledge, 
no. We tried to take precautions to prevent that.

 
 
Q.    And exactly what precautions 
were taken?

 
 
A.    In having the documents 
executed with Sharon not being present; having meetings without Sharon being 
present; going back over and reading the documents to [Mercedes], make sure she 
understood them without Sharon being present. Going over my letters without 
Sharon being present, with the exception, apparently Sharon did review one of my 
letters; August 30th, I think, letter, if I recall.

 
 
Q.    To the best of your knowledge 
did [Sharon] ever express an opinion as to the terms of any of the charitable 
trusts that were drafted by you and executed by 
[Mercedes]?

 
 
A.    She never expressed an 
opinion to me, no.

 
 
Q.    Were you aware of any opinion 
that she ever had concerning the amount of principal of the, either of the 
charitable remainder trusts that were established for herself or Peter 
Kibbee?

 
 
A.    No.  The only opinion I'm aware of that she 
may have expressed was with respect to the foundation's 
structure.

 
 
Q.    And was that opinion 
expressed after November 15, 2006?

 
 
A.    Yes.

 
 
Q.    Did you ever have any 
discussion with [Sharon], or did she attempt to have any discussion with you 
about the terms of any of the these charitable trusts?

 
 
A.    No.

 
 
Q.    Was [Sharon] present at any 
time you were discussing matters with Mercedes Kibbee pertaining to the estate 
planning or terms of the trust?

 
 
A.    [Ms. Wendtland]'s chronology 
reflects she was at the meeting November 15th, but I don't recall that, and I 
don't recall her being there specifically when I was going over the terms of the 
charitable trust with [Mercedes]. She might have been there later when we were 
going over the foundation terms, but I don't recall her being there at all when 
we were discussing the overall plan and the terms of the 
trust.

 
 
Q.    At any time, at any meeting 
or telephone call that you had with Mercedes Kibbee prior to November 15th, 
2006, was [Sharon] present?

 
 
A.    No.

 
 
Likewise, 
Ms. Wendtland unequivocally testified that Sharon was not involved in Mercedes' 
estate planning decisions:

 
 
Q.    And at some point [Sharon] 
also became actively involved in estate planning for 
[Mercedes]?

 
 
A.    No.

 
 
Q.    Well, there was a 
presentation that she did that was a CD presentation and posters.  Were you present for 
that?

 
 
A.    No.  I think that had to do with the 
foundation.

 
 
Q.    All right.  Well, when was her first involvement 
with regard to the estate planning.

 
 
A.    Well, Sharon was never 
present for any of my and [Mr. Pilch]'s meetings with [Mercedes].  And Bob Leonard's meetings with 
[Mercedes], Sharon was never present for those.  She was never present for any of the 
signing of the documents, either.

 
 
We 
conclude that the above testimony is adequate for the appellees to meet their prima facie burden of showing that 
Sharon undertook no activity to unduly influence Mercedes.

 
 
[¶50]   To refute these facts, Peter points 
to very few specific facts, but rather makes broad arguments such as the 
following:

 
 
Upon 
arriving in Sheridan, Wyoming, [Sharon] deliberately and intentionally became 
the sole person who controlled Mercedes Kibbee's entire environment at the 
family ranch.  [Sharon] became the 
person who supervised the caretakers who were providing medicine and daily care 
to Mercedes Kibbee.  [Sharon] became 
the person who cooked meals for Mercedes Kibbee.  [Sharon] became the person who solely 
controlled the operation of the house and ranch, and who had access to Mercedes 
Kibbee.  [Sharon] was the only 
person who had 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year access to Mercedes 
Kibbee.  Based on her total control 
of the environment and circumstances of Mercedes Kibbee's daily living 
activities, [Sharon] was able to unduly influence the ultimate disposition of an 
estate valued in excess of $32,000,000.

 
 

Although 
many of Peter's statement above are true, such is not sufficient to establish 
undue influence without some evidence of actual activity by Sharon subverting 
Mercedes' freedom of will.  
Brosius, 683 P.2d  at 666.

 
 
[¶51]   The one event to which Peter 
repeatedly refers is an August 13, 2006, tape-recorded conversation between 
Mercedes and Sharon.  Peter quotes a 
few specific comments made by Sharon during this conversation which, he argues, 
"clearly and unequivocally show[] undue influence."  The first was when Sharon stated to 
Mercedes, "My agenda was and I brought it to you.  This project for the children that 
Aurora could work for.  So, I 
brought it to you at that time it was my agenda."  Peter claims that this demonstrates that 
Sharon was trying to force her "agenda" onto Mercedes.  To show Mercedes' frail state, Peter 
argues that Mercedes' "sole concern" during this meeting was when her pain 
medication was going to kick in.  As 
evidence for such, he quotes a portion of the transcribed conversation when 
Mercedes states, "How long ago did I take that pill?"  To which an unidentified person 
responded "About a half an hour.  It 
takes about an hour to work."  
Finally, Peter argues that Sharon's intent to unduly influence Mercedes 
is graphically illustrated by a chart Sharon used during this conversation to 
illustrate the estate plan.  The 
chart diagramed the estate plan and Sharon's ideas for the foundation and 
included pictures of children.   
Peter argues that there is no reason to have the pictures of the children 
other than to influence Mercedes.  
Regarding this meeting, Peter states:

 
 
When 
faced with uncertainty that Mercedes Kibbee might not follow the estate plan 
dreamed up and devised by [Sharon], [Sharon] captured Mercedes Kibbee in a room, 
presented her with a written estate plan surrounded by pictures of unfortunate 
children, and made poor Mercedes Kibbee try and relate what her intent might 
be.

 
 
[¶52]   When we review the entire 
transcript of the recorded meeting and consider it in light of all the facts and 
circumstances, we cannot agree with Peter's interpretation of the nature of this 
meeting, or his conclusion that this meeting clearly and unequivocally 
demonstrates Sharon's undue influence.  
The transcript shows that Mercedes was aware and engaged in the 
discussion.  Contrary to Peter's 
assertions, nothing in the transcript supports his assertion that Sharon 
"captured" Mercedes in the room, or that Mercedes' sole concern was with her 
medication.  At the beginning of the 
conversation, Sharon and Mercedes carried on a lengthy conversation about family 
animals and where Mercedes and Sharon planned to go for lunch.  Nothing indicates that Mercedes was 
being held, or forced to carry on the conversation against her will.  Mercedes was engaged in the conversation 
and clearly expressed her goal to change her estate plan so that Aurora would 
have to work instead of living off Mercedes' assets.  Also, the transcript shows that Mercedes 
did not simply adopt Sharon's suggestions, but instead that she indicated that 
she wanted more information about the project and would think about it.  What is most telling is that Mercedes' 
final estate plan differed significantly from that presented by Sharon and 
illustrated on the poster board.

 
 
[¶53]   As noted above, to succeed in a 
claim of undue influence, the proponent must "present specific and substantiated 
evidence showing the existence of a material fact," and "clear proof of" each of 
the elements of the undue influence claim.  
Retz, 2008 WY 44, ¶¶ 26, 30, 181 P.3d  at 
92, 93; In re Estate of Anderson, 71 Wyo. 238, 249, 255 P.2d 983, 986 (1953) ("Clear 
proof of such influence is required in order that a solemnly executed statement 
may be set aside for undue influence.").  
Peter simply fails to present the clear evidence required to show undue 
influence, or disputed material facts regarding that question.  Instead, the undisputed facts show that 
Sharon was absent not only during the time when the initial decision to modify 
the estate plan was made, but was also excluded from virtually all discussions 
between Mercedes and her attorneys concerning her estate planning.  Furthermore, many undeniably independent 
professionals worked with Mercedes in crafting and executing her estate 
plan.  Each of these professionals 
was cautious and thorough in his or her efforts to ensure that Mercedes' wishes 
were honored, and that her decisions were made independent of outside 
influences.  Even viewing the facts 
in the light most favorable to Peter, we cannot say that there are disputed 
material facts regarding whether Mercedes was subjected to undue 
influence.

 
 
Intentional 
Interference with an Inheritance Expectancy

 
 
[¶54]   In this last issue, Peter 
challenges the district court's summary judgment ruling in favor of Sharon on 
his asserted tort claim of intentional interference with an inheritance 
expectancy.  This claim was not 
asserted until October 10, 2008, nearly two years after the original complaint 
was filed.  The amended complaint 
asked for damages, including punitive damages, resulting from Sharon's alleged 
interference with Peter's inheritance expectancy.  In her motion for summary judgment, 
Sharon argued that even if the district court decided to adopt this new tort, 
Peter was required to assert the tort claim in the probate proceedings, and his 
failure to do so barred the claim.  
The district court, in granting summary judgment to Sharon, 
stated:

 
 
This 
is not a tort which has been recognized in Wyoming.  Spear v. Nicholson, 882 P.2d 1237 (Wyo. 1994).  The cause of action might be appropriate 
in some circumstances, as in the Spear 
case, where the contestants had filed a claim in the probate action.  If a probate court determined that there 
was undue influence, then it might follow that the responsible party could be 
held to answer in a tort action.  
However, that is not the case here.  
Plaintiff did not file claims in probate or with the trustee.  Allowing this tort claim to proceed 
could result in a situation where there are contradictory rulings as to the 
intent of the deceased.  

 
 
[¶55]   This appellate issue raises three 
separate questions:  1) whether 
adoption of this new tort is appropriate; 2) whether such a tort claim may be 
properly asserted outside of probate court; and 3) whether there are disputed 
questions of fact, and if not, which party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.  The first question is a 
threshold issue that must be answered, inasmuch as any decision on the other two 
questions would be premature if the new tort is not adopted.  

 
 
[¶56]   This Court has always been very 
cautions and deliberate in deciding whether to adopt new causes of action.  See Borns ex rel. Gannon v. Voss, 2003 WY 74, ¶¶ 34, 35, 70 P.3d 262, 275 (Wyo. 2003) 
(recognizing that dog bite liability would be best addressed by the legislature 
and appellant had other viable causes of action without adopting new rule); Hoblyn v. Johnson, 2002 WY 152, ¶ 22, 55 P.3d 1219, 1227 (Wyo. 2002) 
(rejecting claim where important public policy in conflict with tort and 
appellants failed to state prima 
facie case of elements); Hulse v. 
First Amer. Title Co., 2001 WY 
95, ¶ 48, 33 P.3d 122, 137 (Wyo. 2001) (refusing to adopt tort where 
appellants failed to demonstrate a duty); Richey v. Patrick, 904 P.2d 798, 802-03 (Wyo. 1995) 
(declining request to adopt tort of nondisclosure because appellants' claim 
would fail); Cosner v. Ridinger, 882 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Wyo. 1994) 
(declining to adopt tort of interference with parental rights because the 
appellant was non-custodial parent).  
Regarding the specific tort or intentional interference with an 
inheritance expectancy, we have had one prior occasion to consider its adoption 
in Spear v. Nicholson, 882 P.2d 1237 (Wyo. 1994).  There, as here, the district court did 
not explicitly make any decision on whether or not the tort should be recognized 
in Wyoming.  Id. at 1240.  As such, on appeal we declined to 
address the question, stating:

 
 
As 
part of their appeal, the children suggest we should recognize the torts of 
intentional interference with expectancy and civil conspiracy as causes of 
action in Wyoming.  The trial court 
did not reach that issue, and it would be premature for us to address it.  Our rule is that we do not furnish 
advisory opinions.

 
 

Id. 
at 
1242.

 
 
[¶57]   We find the record before us to be 
insufficient to allow us to undertake the careful and deliberate analysis 
required to warrant adoption of a new tort.  Although Sharon argues against the 
adoption of the tort in her appellate brief, Peter's brief virtually ignores the 
issue and focuses almost exclusively on attacking the district court's finding 
that the probate court is the proper forum within which to assert such a 
claim.  It is not until near the end 
of his argument that Peter makes any sort of substantive statement regarding the 
tort, when he says, "[t]he issue that should have been considered by the court 
was whether there were material facts in dispute regarding whether [Sharon] 
intentionally interfered with [Peter's] expectancy of an inheritance."  This is the extent of his argument 
regarding the viability of his claim for the tort of intentional interference 
with an inheritance expectancy.  
Sharon points out Peter's failure to designate any materials or facts to 
support this unrecognized claim.  In 
response, Peter states that a "Supplemental Rule 56.1 Statement as well as the 
additional materials filed in opposition to [Sharon's] Motion for Summary 
Judgment showed that there were material facts in dispute which precluded a 
grant of summary judgment on this claim."  
The Rule 56.1 statement to which Peter refers consists of four enumerated 
sentences, none of which sets forth the elements of the tort, make any arguments 
in favor of adoption of the tort, or contain any analysis or discussion of the 
facts as they relate to the tort.2  Although Peter claims the record 
contains "additional materials" supporting his claim, he does not specify the 
location or substance of such.  In 
fact, in the summary judgment proceedings, although it appears that Peter filed 
a response to Sharon's motion for summary judgment, that response is 
inexplicably absent from the record.

 
 
[¶58]   As we have said many times, the 
appellant carries the burden of bringing a 
complete record to this Court for review.  Stroup v. 
Oedekoven, 995 P.2d 125, 129 (Wyo. 1999).  In Retz, 2008 WY 44, ¶ 15, 181 P.3d  at 90 
n.2, we discussed this concept in the context of summary judgment, 
stating:

 
 

Appellants 
filed several motions and supplements in opposition to the motions for summary 
judgment, but only designated one of those for inclusion in the record on 
appeal. Although we review a grant of summary judgment 
de 
novo, that 
standard does not alter the fact that we only consider the portions of the 
record that the parties have properly designated for appellate review.  In this case, we have considered the 
arguments made and the exhibits cited in the documents we have in the 
record.

 
 
"When a party fails to provide 
pertinent legal authority, cogent argument, or factual support for an issue, we cannot 
provide meaningful review."  Davison v. Wyo. Game & Fish 
Comm'n, 2010 WY 121, ¶ 39, 238 P.3d 556, 568 (Wyo. 2010); see also Kruckenberg v. Ding Masters, 
Inc., 2008 WY 40, ¶ 25, 180 P.3d 895, 903 (Wyo. 2008).  

 
 
[¶59]   Given the relative dearth of argument, factual analysis, or 
legal support found in the record supporting Peter's claim for adoption of the 
tort of intentional interference with an inheritance expectancy, we find that 
this is not a proper case within which to undertake such action.  Therefore, we will affirm the district 
court's award of summary judgment on the appellant's claim.  Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 551 (Wyo. 
1995) 
("We will 
affirm a grant of summary judgment if it can be sustained on any legal ground 
appearing in the record.").

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶60]   Upon plenary review of all the 
evidence submitted, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Peter, 
we affirm the granting of summary judgment on all issues raised on appeal.  Peter has failed to demonstrate a 
disputed question of material fact regarding Mercedes' mental capacity to 
execute the estate planning documents, or Sharon's alleged undue influence.  Furthermore, because Peter has failed to 
present cogent argument or cite to pertinent authority favoring adoption of the 
tort of intentional interference with an inheritance expectancy, we will affirm 
the summary judgment regarding that claim as well.

FOOTNOTES

1The 
elements of testamentary capacity, as distinguished from contract capacity, 
described in the body, are as follows:

 
 
The 
testator must be able to comprehend:

 
 
"* 
* *  (1) [T]he extent and nature of 
the estate, (2) the identity of the beneficiaries and their relationship, 
whether by blood or circumstances, to the testator, and (3) the nature of the 
testamentary act, that it is a disposition of property to take effect at 
death."  1 Bowe-Parker, Page on 
Wills, supra, § 12.21 at 608 [(1960)].

 
 

In 
re Estate of Roosa, 
753 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo. 1988).  
Inasmuch 
as we find that Mercedes possessed the "higher degree of mental capacity" 
required to execute inter vivos 
documents, such as the irrevocable trusts in question here, we must likewise 
conclude that she possessed the lower degree of mental capacity necessary to 
execute the testamentary documents, such as the will codicil and trust 
amendments. 

 
 

2The 
four enumerated sentences read:

 
 

1.     
Defendant 
Sharon De Lobo exercised undue influence over Mercedes Kibbee prior to her death 
in an effort to cause her to change her estate planning documents. 

2.     
Defendant 
Sharon De Lobo intentionally interfered with Plaintiff's with [sic] expectancy 
to inherit from Mercedes Kibbee.

3.     
Plaintiff 
did submit a claim to the trustee in the form of a civil 
complaint.

4.     
This 
complaint notified the trustee that there were challenges to the validity of the 
trust.