Case Title: State v. Campbell

Citation: 

Docket Number: S060046

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2013-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  October 17, 2013 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON 
 
STATE OF OREGON, 
Respondent on Review, 
 
v. 
 
HAROLD LEE CAMPBELL, 
Petitioner on Review. 
 
(CC F16027; CA A143237; SC S060046) 
 
 
On review from the Court of Appeals.* 
 
 
Argued and submitted November 5, 2012; resubmitted January 7, 2013. 
 
 
Susan Fair Drake, Senior Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and 
filed the briefs for petitioner on review.  With her on the briefs was Peter Gartlan, Chief 
Defender, Office of Public Defense Services. 
 
 
Rebecca M. Johansen, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and 
filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, 
Attorney General, and Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General. 
 
 
Before Balmer, Chief Justice, and Kistler, Walters, Linder, Landau, and Baldwin, 
Justices.** 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 
The petition for review is dismissed as improvidently allowed. 
 
 
Walters, J, concurred and filed an opinion. 
 
 
*Appeal from Union County Circuit Court, Phillip A. Mendiguren, Judge. 247 Or 
App 353, 271 P3d 154 (2011). 
 
**Brewer, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
1 
 
 
The petition for review is dismissed as improvidently allowed.
2 
 
1 
 
 
WALTERS, J., concurring. 
1 
 
 
This court allowed review in this criminal case to decide whether 
2 
defendant's prosecution for possession of a controlled substance was barred under 
3 
Oregon's former jeopardy statute -- ORS 131.515(2).  Defendant originally was charged 
4 
in the same indictment with driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), reckless 
5 
driving, and two counts of possession of a controlled substance.  When defendant agreed 
6 
to plead guilty to DUII and reckless driving, the possession charges were dismissed with 
7 
defendant's agreement that the state could refile them if defendant violated the terms of 
8 
his probation.  However, defendant reserved his right to raise a double jeopardy objection 
9 
to such a subsequent prosecution.  Defendant did later violate the terms of his probation, 
10 
and the state refiled one of the possession charges.  Thus, what was originally intended as 
11 
one consolidated prosecution on all charges proceeded as two successive prosecutions.  
12 
This court has determined that those facts are unlikely to arise again in the future and that 
13 
review was improvidently allowed.  I concur in that decision.  However, having thought 
14 
about the issues, I write to alert the bench and bar to the correct standard for deciding 
15 
when joinder is compulsory under ORS 131.515(2) and to raise an issue about the 
16 
application of that standard for the legislature's consideration. 
17 
 
 
Stated simply, the question that this case presents is whether a defendant 
18 
can be successively prosecuted for DUII and drug possession when the driving and the 
19 
possession occur simultaneously.  The statute that controls the answer to that question is 
20 
ORS 131.515(2), which provides: 
21 
 
"No person shall be separately prosecuted for two or more offenses 
22 
 
2 
based upon the same criminal episode, if the several offenses are 
1 
reasonably known to the appropriate prosecutor at the time of 
2 
commencement of the first prosecution and establish proper venue in a 
3 
single court." 
4 
(Emphasis added.)  
5 
 
 
In this case, the trial court concluded that defendant's alleged drug 
6 
possession was not part of the same "criminal episode" as his DUII, because "the 
7 
elements are not the same."  In resting its ruling on that reasoning, the trial court erred.   
8 
 
 
In State v. Brown, 262 Or 442, 497 P2d 1191 (1972), this court considered 
9 
whether possession of a concealed weapon and felon in possession of a firearm were the 
10 
same "offense" for purposes of the constitutional double jeopardy provision -- Article I, 
11 
section 12, of the Oregon Constitution.1  The court held that, even though the two crimes 
12 
had different elements, they constituted the same "offense."  Thus, the fact that two 
13 
charges have different elements does not determine whether they constitute the same 
14 
"offense."  ORS 131.515(2) assumes that a defendant has been charged with at least two 
15 
offenses and precludes separate prosecution, not when the elements or offense are the 
16 
same, but when separate offenses are based on the same "criminal episode."  
17 
Consequently, for purposes of ORS 131.515(2), the correct inquiry is not whether the 
18 
elements of two offenses are the same, but whether the offenses are based on the same 
19 
"criminal episode." 
20 
                                              
 
1 
Article I, section 12, provides: 
 
"No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offence [sic], 
nor be compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself." 
 
3 
 
 
ORS 131.505(4) defines the phrase "criminal episode," as used in ORS 
1 
131.515(2), to mean: 
2 
"continuous and uninterrupted conduct that establishes at least one offense 
3 
and is so joined in time, place and circumstances that such conduct is 
4 
directed to the accomplishment of a single criminal objective."   
5 
(Emphasis added).  In this court, the parties argued, appropriately, about the application 
6 
of that definition to the facts of this case.  Defendant argued that the simultaneity of the 
7 
acts of driving and drug possession demonstrated that the offenses were based on the 
8 
same "criminal episode" and that the charges must be joined in the same prosecution.  
9 
The state argued that the charges could be separately prosecuted because defendant did 
10 
not demonstrate that the alleged unlawful driving and drug possession were "directed to 
11 
the accomplishment of a single criminal objective," as ORS 131.505(4) requires. 
12 
 
 
The legislative history, set out in the Commentary to the Proposed Oregon 
13 
Criminal Procedure Code, includes a lengthy discussion of the role that the requirement 
14 
of a "single criminal objective" plays and states: 
15 
 
"The definition of 'criminal episode' recognizes that a single course 
16 
of criminal conduct can create different harms and violate different statutes 
17 
but still be closely related in time, place and circumstances.   
18 
 
"The criterion of 'single criminal objective' is one part of the test[.] 
19 
* * *The determination of whether the conduct is 'directed to the 
20 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective' is an objective 
21 
determination.  In other words, the subjective intent of the person should 
22 
not be considered in determining whether or not a certain offense was part 
23 
of the criminal episode.  Instead, the determination would depend upon 
24 
what reasonably appeared under the circumstances to be within a single 
25 
criminal objective." 
26 
Commentary to Criminal Law Revision Commission Proposed Oregon Criminal 
27 
 
4 
Procedure Code, Final Draft and Report (Commentary) § 26, 17 (Nov 1972) (emphases 
1 
added). 
2 
 
 
The Commentary goes on to describe various situations illustrating those 
3 
principles.  It explains, for example, that, if a person committed multiple burglaries on the 
4 
same evening, then each burglary would be a separate criminal episode, because each 
5 
was committed at a different time and place.  Id.  By contrast, the Commentary states that 
6 
a defendant who enters a bank, confronts a teller and manager with a gun, demands 
7 
money, ties up the manager, takes the teller as a hostage, and, as he flees the bank, fatally 
8 
wounds the bank guard who attempts to prevent the escape, commits those crimes in one 
9 
criminal episode; the defendant's single criminal objective is to successfully commit the 
10 
bank robbery without capture.  Id.  However, the Commentary also observes that, if the 
11 
defendant forces the teller into the back room before fleeing and rapes her, it is less clear 
12 
that the robbery and rape are directed at the same criminal objective and, therefore, part 
13 
of the same criminal episode.  The robbery was already completed before the rape took 
14 
place, and thus it would appear that the defendant had two separate objectives -- robbery 
15 
and rape.  Id. at 17-18. 
16 
 
 
In another situation described in the Commentary, a defendant steals a car 
17 
at 9:00 p.m., robs a market at 9:30 p.m., and flees in the stolen car.  The Commentary 
18 
states that defendant's crimes would be part of one criminal episode consisting of the 
19 
crimes of robbery and theft.  But, if a police officer later sees the defendant entering a 
20 
tavern at 11:00 p.m., attempts to arrest the defendant, and is wounded by the defendant in 
21 
an exchange of gunfire, then the defendant's crimes would compose two criminal 
22 
 
5 
episodes:  one consisting of the crimes of robbery and theft, and the other consisting of 
1 
the crimes of resisting arrest and assault.  Id. at 18.   
2 
 
 
What I take from those examples is that, to be directed to the 
3 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective, the two offenses need not be similar, need 
4 
not have the same elements, need not be proved by the same evidence, and need not share 
5 
the same statutory intent.  Rather, they may be as dissimilar as robbery and murder or as 
6 
robbery and rape.  It also appears that a "single criminal objective" is not a narrow 
7 
concept:  Two or more offenses may be directed toward more than one criminal objective 
8 
and still be part of the same criminal episode, as long as they reasonably can be seen to 
9 
be directed toward a single overarching criminal objective. 
10 
 
 
Those examples from the Commentary are helpful in assessing how closely 
11 
distinct criminal events must be connected in time and place before they can be said to 
12 
share a criminal objective.  They are not as helpful in resolving the question that this case 
13 
poses, however.  The only example included in the Commentary that addresses drug 
14 
possession that occurs simultaneously with other criminal conduct is an example of a 
15 
person who both sells and possesses drugs.  The Commentary states that, when sale and 
16 
possession occur simultaneously, the resulting charges must be joined.  Commentary § 26 
17 
at 17.  That example could be understood to require joinder for either of two reasons.  It 
18 
might indicate an assumption that, to sell drugs, a defendant also must possess them, 
19 
which might, therefore, permit a conclusion that the defendant's conduct was directed 
20 
toward a single overarching criminal objective to engage in the sale of illegal drugs.  That 
21 
assumption may not be correct, however, and, alternatively, that example could be 
22 
 
6 
understood to illustrate the effect of simultaneity on the analysis:  When a defendant 
1 
simultaneously sells and possesses drugs, the defendant has a criminal objective to 
2 
engage in the two acts simultaneously.  The Commentary does not disclose its reasoning.  
3 
However, the example of the simultaneous possession and sale of drugs evidences an 
4 
intent to require joinder of such charges. 
5 
 
 
The circumstance that this case presents is similar, but, depending on how 
6 
the Commentary is understood, may call for a different result.  When a defendant drives 
7 
under the influence of a controlled substance, that substance may or may not be illegal 
8 
drugs and the defendant may or may not need to possess the drugs to drive under their 
9 
influence.  Thus, if a defendant drives and simultaneously possesses illegal drugs, the 
10 
drugs may or may not have any necessary connection to the unlawful driving.  If the 
11 
legislature intends the simultaneity of a defendant's driving and drug possession to 
12 
establish that the defendant's conduct is directed toward the accomplishment of a single 
13 
criminal objective, then it intends that the two acts are based on the same criminal 
14 
episode and must be joined.  However, if the legislature means to impose a requirement 
15 
that, to share a criminal objective, the possession of the drugs must be necessary to 
16 
accomplish the unlawful driving, then the two acts may or may not be part of the same 
17 
criminal episode, depending on the particular facts presented.  The problem is especially 
18 
difficult because the Commentary specifies that a particular defendant's intent is not 
19 
determinative:  The analysis is an objective one. 
20 
 
 
This court considered a similar problem in State v. Boyd, 271 Or 558, 533 
21 
P2d 795 (1975), the only case in which it has construed ORS 131.515(2).  In Boyd, the 
22 
 
7 
police had probable cause to believe that the defendant's husband had been involved in a 
1 
burglary and obtained a warrant to search the defendant's home for evidence of that 
2 
crime.  In the ensuing search, the officers found, among other things, a quantity of 
3 
amphetamine tablets, some marijuana, and a television set that had been stolen several 
4 
months earlier.  The state first indicted the defendant for theft, committed by retaining 
5 
and concealing the television, and then later indicted her for possession of the 
6 
amphetamine tablets.  When the jury acquitted the defendant on the theft charge, the 
7 
defendant moved to dismiss the drug indictment on former jeopardy grounds.  The trial 
8 
court granted the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
9 
 
 
On review, this court considered whether the theft and the drug charges 
10 
were based on the "same criminal episode" under ORS 131.515(2).  The court interpreted 
11 
ORS 131.515(2) to require joinder in the same circumstances in which joinder is 
12 
statutorily permitted.  The permissive joinder statute in effect at that time -- ORS 
13 
132.560(2) (1975) -- permitted joinder when charges were based on "the same act or 
14 
transaction."2  The court had interpreted the permissive joinder statute in State v. 
15 
                                              
 
2 
ORS 132.560(2) (1975) provided: 
"When there are several charges against any person or persons for the same 
act or transaction, instead of having several indictments, the whole may be 
joined in one indictment in several counts; and if two or more indictments 
are found in such cases, the court may order them to be consolidated."  
ORS 132.560 has been amended over the years in ways that do not affect my analysis.  
The concept underlying ORS 132.560(2) (1975) is now found in ORS 132.560(1)(b)(B), 
which still refers to crimes based on the "same act or transaction" and provides: 
 
 
8 
Fitzgerald, 267 Or 266, 516 P2d 1280 (1973), and held there that,  
1 
"the two charges arise out of the same act or transaction if they are so 
2 
closely linked in time, place and circumstance that a complete account of 
3 
one charge cannot be related without relating details of the other charge." 
4 
Id. at 273.  The court in Boyd adopted that same standard for determining whether 
5 
charges must be joined under ORS 131.515(2) and explained: 
6 
"We are unable to conceive of 'continuous and uninterrupted conduct * * * 
7 
so joined in time, place and circumstance' that such conduct is directed to 
8 
the accomplishment of a single criminal objective, which at the same time 
9 
would not fulfill the test of Fitzgerald and be 'so closely linked in time, 
10 
place and circumstance that a complete account of one charge cannot be 
11 
related without relating details of the other charge.' * * * We hold, 
12 
therefore, that 'same criminal episode' in ORS 131.515(2) is synonymous 
13 
with same transaction in ORS 132.560(2)[1975]." 
14 
Boyd, 271 Or at 565-66 (first ellipsis in original). 
15 
 
 
However, the court concluded, that test did not resolve the issue in the case 
16 
then before the court.  With respect to the offenses at issue, the court determined, 
17 
criminal culpability was based not on a series of "relatable events," but on a "single 
18 
condition" -- the defendant's possession of different items of contraband at one time and 
19 
                                              
 
"(1) A charging instrument must charge but one offense, and in one 
form only, except that: 
 
"* * * * * 
 
"(b)  Two or more offenses may be charged in the same charging 
instrument in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged are 
alleged to have been committed by the same person or persons and are: 
 
"* * * * * 
 
"(B)  Based on the same act or transaction[.]" 
 
9 
in one place:  
1 
"The interrelationship deemed essential [to determining whether multiple 
2 
offenses are part of the same criminal episode] is lacking in the present case 
3 
because the possession of the separate items of property do not constitute 
4 
relatable events but rather a single condition characterized by the manner in 
5 
which the items are held by the accused. * * * The charge is a single charge 
6 
of illegal possession of goods at one time and place." 
7 
Id. at 570 (emphases in original).  Moreover, the court explained, when the condition is 
8 
possession of contraband, it does not matter that the defendant may have obtained the 
9 
various items at different times and places: 
10 
"If a defendant is charged with the possession of drugs, some of which had 
11 
been acquired at one time and the rest at another time, it would seem clear 
12 
that he would be entitled to object to multiple prosecutions.  There would 
13 
be no reason other than harassment of the defendant for the state to divide 
14 
the condition of possession into parts and prosecute separately on each."   
15 
Id. at 571.  The court ultimately held that, because the defendant had simultaneously 
16 
possessed the several items of contraband, ORS 131.515(2) precluded successive 
17 
prosecutions.  The theft and possession charges had to be joined. 
18 
 
 
Although the court in Boyd may have been mistaken in so closely equating 
19 
the compulsory and permissive joinder statutes and may not have sufficiently considered 
20 
the definition of "criminal episode" as used in ORS 131.515(2), and particularly the role 
21 
of the "single criminal objective" in that definition, I think that the court reached the 
22 
correct result.  I also think that that same result should obtain here.  When a defendant 
23 
drives unlawfully and, at the same time, illegally possesses contraband, there is only one 
24 
criminal "episode."  Both unlawful acts occur at the same time and certainly could be 
25 
understood to share the same criminal objective -- to drive while in possession of 
26 
 
10 
contraband. 
1 
 
 
In this case, the state initially joined the DUII and drug possession charges.  
2 
In doing so, it implicitly recognized that, in the ordinary case, there is no reason to 
3 
successively prosecute such charges.  To eliminate any doubt that that is what the 
4 
legislature intended to require or that this court's decision in Boyd is controlling, the 
5 
legislature may wish to explicitly address the issue. 
6 
 
7