Case Title: HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC. v. RETHA GUNTER, a personal representative of the estate of JAMES ALBERT BATES; In the Matter of the Estate of JAMES ALBERT BATES, Deceased: HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC. v. RETHA GUNTER, pesonal representative of the estate of JAMES ALBERT BATES

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-205

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC. v. RETHA GUNTER, a personal representative of the estate of JAMES ALBERT BATES; In the Matter of the Estate of JAMES ALBERT BATES, Deceased: HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC. v. RETHA GUNTER, pesonal representative of the estate of JAMES ALBERT BATES2007 WY 151167 P.3d 645Case Number: 06-205, S-07-0076Decided: 09/20/2007

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
HALLIBURTON 
ENERGY SERVICES, INC.,Appellant (Defendant),v.RETHA GUNTER, 
a personal representative of the estate of

JAMES 
ALBERT BATES,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
In the 
Matter of the Estate of JAMES ALBERT BATES, Deceased:HALLIBURTON ENERGY 
SERVICES, INC.,Appellant (Intervenor),v.RETHA C. GUNTER, 
personal representative of the estate of 

JAMES 
ALBERT BATES,Appellee (Plaintiff).



Case 
No. 06-205

W.R.A.P. 11 Certified Question from theUnited 
States 
District Court for the District of Wyoming, The Honorable William F. Downes, 
Judge

Case 
No. S-07-0076

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty The Honorable Jere 
A. Ryckman, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Roger E. 
Shumate and James C. Worthen of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.  
Argument in Case No. 06-205 by Mr. Shumate.

Representing 
Appellee:

Kent W. 
Spence and M. Kristeen Hand of The Spence Law Firm, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming.  
Argument in Case No. 06-205 by Mr. Spence.

Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and BURKE, JJ., and PRICE, 
D.J.

VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      The underlying 
question in these related cases is whether the personal representative appointed 
to pursue a civil wrongful death action under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102(a) 
(LexisNexis 2007) must be a resident of the State of Wyoming, as is required for 
intestate estate administrators under the probate code, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-4-201(c) (LexisNexis 2007).  We 
decline to answer that question because the probate court did not err in denying 
a wrongful death action defendant's motion to intervene in the probate for the 
purpose of challenging appointment of the personal representative, and because 
that wrongful death action defendant likewise does not have standing to 
challenge that appointment in the wrongful death action, 
itself.

FACTS

[¶2]      James Bates was 
fatally injured in an oil rig accident in Lincoln County, Wyoming, on December 23, 2003.  His brother, Kenneth Bates, was 
appointed by the probate court on April 13, 2005, as administrator of his 
intestate estate.  Subsequently, the 
decedent's sister, Retha Gunter, was appointed as substitute administrator for 
the specific purpose of pursuing a wrongful death action.  Gunter is not a resident of the State of 
Wyoming.

[¶3]      Gunter has filed 
two wrongful death actions:  one in 
the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, and one in the 
DistrictCourtofLincolnCounty.  Halliburton is one of several named 
defendants in both actions.  The 
present controversy has reached this Court via two separate routes.  Halliburton filed a motion to intervene 
in the probate action for the purpose of seeking a declaratory judgment in 
regard to application of the residency requirement for probate estate 
administrators to wrongful death action personal representatives.  That motion was denied, and has been 
appealed.  In the federal court 
wrongful death action, the same question has been certified to this Court by the 
Federal District 
Court.1

DISCUSSION

            
Intervention

[¶4]      "Intervention" is 
the process by which a non-party becomes a party to a lawsuit, either as an 
additional plaintiff or an additional defendant.  Black's Law Dictionary 840 (8th ed. 
2004).  In Wyoming, the right of 
intervention is governed by W.R.C.P. 24, which reads in pertinent part as 
follows:

(a)     Intervention of right.  Upon timely 
application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an 
action:

(1)     When a statute confers 
an unconditional right to intervene; or

(2)     When the applicant 
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject 
of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the 
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to 
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented 
by existing parties.

(b)     Permissive intervention.  Upon timely 
application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an 
action:

(1)     When a statute confers 
a conditional right to intervene; or

(2)     When an applicant's 
claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in 
common. . . .

. . . 
.

[¶5]      We described our 
standard for the review of the denial of a motion to intervene of right in Masinter v. Markstein, 2002 WY 64, ¶ 7, 
45 P.3d 237, 240-41 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Colley, 871 P.2d 191, 194 (Wyo. 1994) (citations 
omitted)):

            
Questions of law and judicial discretion are presented by the denial of a 
motion to intervene.  This court 
accords no deference to a district court's decisions on issues of law.  Therefore, if the district court 
erroneously denied intervention as of right under the first, second or third 
conditions of W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2), we will reverse.  However, the determination of the 
timeliness of an application to intervene is a matter within the discretion of 
the district court.  The district 
court is permitted to weigh the timeliness of an application to intervene in 
light of the circumstances of the particular case, including whether the 
applicant may have sought intervention earlier.  Therefore, to prevail on an appeal from a 
finding that an application to intervene is untimely, an abuse of discretion 
must be demonstrated.

[¶6]      "An applicant who 
fails to meet any of [the conditions of W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2)] is not permitted to 
intervene as of right . . . ."  State Farm v. Colley, 871 P.2d  at 
194.  In that regard, intervention 
of right is not available to a non-party whose interest in the litigation, 
rather than being a "significantly protectable interest," is merely 
"contingent," or reflects no more than a "concern" in the outcome.  Id.; Platte County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Basin 
Elec. Power Coop., 638 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Wyo. 1982).

[¶7]      The district 
court relied upon the reasoning of Murg 
v. Barnsdall Nursing Home, 2005 OK 73, 123 P.3d 21 (Okla. 2005), in 
concluding that Halliburton was not entitled to intervene of right in the 
probate action.  The court in Murg held that the nursing home was not 
a proper party to challenge appointment of the personal representative because 
it was not an interested party as a statutory heir of the decedent, it was not 
eligible to petition for letters of administration in its own right, and it had 
no connection to the deceased other than being potentially liable for her 
demise.  Id. at 30.  Under the circumstances, the nursing 
home was not an "interested party" in the estate.  Id.

[¶8]      We agree with 
that reasoning.  The language of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-206 (LexisNexis 2007) suggests that the Wyoming 
Legislature intended similarly to limit the number of "interested persons" who 
may contest a petition for letters of administration:

            
Any person interested may contest the petition by filing written 
opposition on the ground of the incompetency of the applicant, or may assert his 
own rights to the administration and pray that letters be issued to 
himself.  In the latter case the 
contestant shall file a petition and submit evidence in support thereof, taken 
and reduced to writing before the clerk or commissioner of the court, and the 
court shall hear the two (2) petitions together.

Clearly, 
in the absence of an incompetent administrator, one can contest appointment of 
the administrator only if one is entitled, in one's own right, to act as 
administrator.2  A potential wrongful death action 
defendant is not so entitled.3  Furthermore, referring back to W.R.C.P. 
24(a)(2), we do not find that Halliburton's interest, as a wrongful death action 
defendant, is such that it may only be protected by intervention in the probate 
action.  As the district court 
concluded, "[t]he appointment of the personal representative does not impair 
Halliburton's ability to protect its economic interest in the wrongful death 
action."

[¶9]      The district 
court also denied permissive intervention by Halliburton, on the ground that 
Halliburton did not show that its claim shared a common question of law or fact 
with the probate proceeding.  See W.R.C.P. 24(b)(2).  We review a denial of a motion for 
permissive intervention for an abuse of discretion, and our review is 
particularly deferential.  Masinter, ¶ 14, 45 P.3d  at 242.  In this case, we simply cannot say that 
the district court could not reasonably have decided as it did, or that it 
misapplied the law.  Halliburton's 
defense of its conduct, in the civil negligence action, has no correlative in 
the probate estate.  There was no 
abuse of discretion.

            
Standing

[¶10]   
The existence of standing is a legal issue that we review de novo.  It is an aspect of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Pedro/Aspen, Ltd. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs 
for Natrona County, 2004 WY 84, ¶ 8, 94 P.3d 412, 415 (Wyo. 2004); Jolley v. State Loan & Inv. Bd., 
2002 WY 7, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 1073, 1076 (Wyo. 2002); Tex. DOT v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2004); 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 34 (2002).  The doctrine of standing is based upon 
precepts quite similar to the precepts underlying the intervention doctrine, and 
the district court relied also upon standing in denying Halliburton's access to 
a declaratory judgment in the probate action.

[¶11]   "Standing" is short for "standing 
to sue," which requires a "legally protectible and tangible interest at stake in 
the litigation."  Olsten Staffing Servs., Inc. v. D.A. Stinger 
Servs., Inc., 921 P.2d 596, 599 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1405 (6th ed. 
1990)).  The phrase "tangible 
interest" has been equated with the phrase "personal stake in the outcome."  Goshen Irrigation Dist. v. Wyo. State Bd. of 
Control, 926 P.2d 943, 947 (Wyo. 1996); State ex rel. Bayou Liquors, Inc. v. City of 
Casper, 906 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Wyo. 1995).  The person alleging standing must show a 
"perceptible," rather than a "speculative" harm from the action; a remote 
possibility of injury is not sufficient to confer standing.  Sinclair Oil Corp. v.  Wyo. PSC, 2003 WY 22, 
¶ 13, 63 P.3d 887, 894-95 (Wyo. 2003)

[¶12]   The district court properly 
analyzed and resolved the issue of standing against Halliburton in this 
case.  Following the concepts 
outlined above, the district court concluded that Halliburton had "no genuine 
legal interest in the probate court's appointment of Retha Gunter as personal 
representative."  Once again, we 
agree with the district court.  
Halliburton's "personal stake" was in its defense of the wrongful death 
action, not in the probate court's appointment of a personal 
representative.

[¶13]   Our conclusion that Halliburton 
lacks standing to raise this issue carries over into the federal court wrongful 
death action.4  That is because Halliburton's "personal 
stake" is the same in both cases.  
Therefore, inasmuch as Halliburton lacks standing to challenge the 
appointment of the personal representative, it would be inappropriate for us to 
answer the underlying substantive question of the validity of the 
appointment.  This resolution is 
consistent with the doctrine that prevents collateral attack upon a judgment or 
ruling, absent facial invalidity.  
See In re Estate & 
Guardianship of Andrews, 2002 WY 17, ¶ 19, 39 P.3d 1021, 1026 (Wyo. 2002); 
Ashley v. Read Constr. Co., 195 F. Supp. 727, 730 (D. Wyo. 1961); 22A Am. Jur. 2d Death § 322 (2003) (validity of 
appointment of personal representative may not be collaterally attacked in 
wrongful death action absent jurisdictional defect appearing on face of 
pleadings).  See also State ex rel. American Flyers 
Airline Corp. v. Superior Court of Creek County, 1967 OK 144, ¶ 2, 435 P.2d 131, 133 (Okla. 1967); Hoskins v. Eastern 
Air Lines, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 842, 845 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Beresford v. American Coal Co., 124 
Iowa 34, 98 N.W. 902, 902-03 (Iowa 
1904).

CONCLUSION

[¶14]   
A wrongful death action defendant does not have standing to challenge 
the appointment of the estate's personal representative because a wrongful death 
action defendant does not have a personal stake or tangible interest in that 
appointment.  Neither may a wrongful 
death action defendant intervene in the probate estate action as a matter of 
right for the purpose of challenging the appointment of the personal 
representative.  Finally, the 
district court, sitting in probate, did not err as a matter of law or abuse its 
discretion in denying permissive intervention of the wrongful death action 
defendant into the probate estate action.

FOOTNOTES

1The 
certified question reads as follows:

            
When filing a wrongful death action, must a personal representative for 
an intestate estate comply with the Wyoming Probate Code's residency 
requirements for administrators, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-201(c), or may a personal 
representative be a citizen of another state without associating with a 
co-representative who is a Wyoming resident?

            
In other words, is there a distinction in Wyoming law between an estate 
opened purely for purposes of pursuing a wrongful death action, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-38-102(a), and an estate opened for purposes of administering an intestate 
decedent's estate?

2"Competency" 
in this instance means mental competency.  
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-1-301(a)(xxi) (LexisNexis 2007).  
See also In re Estate of 
Peters, 2001 WY 71, ¶ 9, 29 P.3d 90, 92 (Wyo. 2001) (to be an "interested 
person" under the statute, one must stand to inherit under the 
estate).

3In citing 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-1-301, we are cognizant of the mandate that there is a 
difference between probate estates and wrongful death estates, and that the 
statutes governing the latter are in the civil code rather than the probate 
code, but we believe the probate code statute is instructive in determining the 
intent of the civil code statute.  
See Ashley v. Read Constr. 
Co., 195 F. Supp. 727, 729 (D. Wyo. 1961).

4In Murg v. Barnsdall Nursing Home, 2005OK 73, 123 P.3d 21 (Okla. 2005), the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court premised its "interested party" analysis upon the doctrine of 
standing.  Id. at ¶ 21, 123 P.3d  
at 29.  It did the same in a 
companion case under circumstances similar to ours, where the issue arose in 
both the probate action and the civil action.  Murg v. Barnsdall Nursing Home, 2005 OK 
74, ¶ 22, 123 P.3d 11, 20 (Okla. 2005).