Case Title: Williams v. State of New Jersey

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-129-04

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). 1. The separation of powers doctrine is a bedrock principle of our federal and state constitutional forms of government. It is premised on the theory that government works best when each branch acts independently within its designated sphere, and does not attempt to gain dominance over another branch. Article VI, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the State Constitution provides that: The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to law, the practice and procedure in all such courts. The Court s administrative authority is far-reaching and encompasses the entire judicial structure as well as all aspects and incidents related to the justice system. Because their administrative rulemaking authority cannot be circumscribed by legislation, the Supreme Court and Chief Justice exercise exclusive and plenary power over the governance of the judiciary. (pp. 9-16) 2. This Court s constitutional mandate to make administrative rules governing the court system brings within its compass probation officers, who historically have been considered an integral part of the judiciary. In Passaic County Probation Officers Ass n v. County of Passaic, 73 N.J. 247 (1977), the Court held that the control of probation officers and of the whole statewide system of probation, seemingly entrusted to the Judiciary by the terms of the Constitution, cannot be in any way diluted or modified by legislation. As a matter of comity and commonsense, however, the Court has respected legislative enactments that have not directly conflicted or interfered with the operation of the judiciary. (pp. 16-19) 3. The 1929 Probation Act is essentially intact today in our contemporary statutes. Those statutes clearly establish that the probation department is under the authority and part of the judiciary. A probation officer s duties include preparing presentence investigation reports in criminal cases, furnishing criminal defendants with a statement of conditions of their probation and supervising them while on probation, and collecting payments from persons under their supervision as ordered by the court. This Court has steadfastly maintained that probation officers must avoid any perception of partisanship in conducting court business. In furtherance of that policy, probation officers have been prohibited from performing traditional police functions or affiliating with law enforcement organizations. AOC Directive No. 10-73 specifically barred probation officers from carrying weapons in the regular performance of their work. In 1994, the Court issued an administrative ruling upholding its long-standing policy prohibiting probation officers from being members of law enforcement organizations. The Court reasoned that any affiliation with law enforcement by probation officers would seriously compromise judicial independence. (pp. 19-26) 4. By authorizing probation officers to be armed and make arrests, the Act is fatally at odds with this Court s administrative rules governing probation. Furthermore, the Act commands both the Supreme Court and the Administrative Director of the Courts to collaborate in a legislative program in contravention of long-standing rules and directives. The Court cannot agree that allowing probation officers to carry guns and arrest those they supervise will not impair the essential integrity of the judicial branch. The Act requires the Court not only to reallocate judiciary personnel to the Community Safety Unit, but to abrogate its own policy directives that prohibit probation officers from carrying weapons and performing law enforcement functions. (pp. 26-32) 5. PANJ has argued throughout this case that the constitutionality of the Act should be decided not by the State s judiciary, but rather by an arbitrator or special master. PANJ has contended that its collective bargaining agreements with the judiciary require submission of the Act s constitutionality to an arbitrator. The arbitration agreement by its terms does not apply to the issue before the Court and, in any event, the constitutionality of a statute cannot be decided by an arbitrator. The PANJ maintains that because the State s judges cannot be dispassionate in resolving a matter of self-interest to the judiciary, an independent hearing officer should be chosen. The rule of necessity forbids the disqualification of the entire judiciary from hearing a case even if there is some perception that the result may be tinged by self-interest. As the ultimate state tribunal authorized to decide the constitutionality of legislation, the Court can only hope that the public understands that judges, to the extent humanly possible, interpret the Constitution fairly, fearlessly, and independently, even when the issue touches on the judiciary s institutional concerns. (pp. 32-34) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, WALLACE and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE ALBIN s opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-129/ 130 September Term 2004 IN THE MATTER OF P.L. 2001, CHAPTER 362. ____________________________ RICHARD J. WILLIAMS, in his official capacity as Administrative Director of the Courts, Plaintiff-Respondent, Defendant-Appellant, and PROBATION ASSOCIATION OF NEW JERSEY, AND PROBATION ASSOCIATION OF NEW JERSEY PROFESSIONAL SUPERVISORS UNION, Intervenors-Appellants. Argued January 4, 2006 Decided April 19, 2006 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 375 N.J. Super. 485 (2005). Andrea J. Sullivan argued the cause for appellant (Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith & Davis, attorneys; Paul A. Rowe, of counsel; Ms. Sullivan, Mr. Rowe and Emily A. Kaller, on the briefs). David I. Fox argued the cause for intervenors-appellants (Fox and Fox, attorneys; Mr. Fox and Brendan E. Egan, of counsel and on the briefs). Cynthia M. Jacob argued the cause for respondent (Fisher & Phillips; attorneys; David J. Treibman, on the briefs). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. Probation officers are part of the judicial branch of government and perform many duties that are essential to the mission of our courts, including supervising probationers in criminal and juvenile cases. As an arm of the court, they are required to avoid any perception of favoring one side or another or of being in league with any party, particularly law enforcement. To that end, the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) has prohibited probation officers from carrying firearms, making arrests, or joining fraternal police associations. On January 7, 2002, the Legislature enacted the Probation Officer Community Safety Unit Act (Act), L. 2001, c. 362 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2B:10A-1 to -3, 2C:39-6(c)(17)). The Act creates in the heart of the judiciary a law enforcement unit comprised of no less than two hundred probation officers, who are authorized to carry firearms and arrest probation violators. The Act directs that the New Jersey Supreme Court promulgate rules for this new armed unit within the State s judiciary, that probation officers assigned to the unit be trained by police authorities, and that the Administrative Director of the Courts report to the Legislature on the unit s effectiveness. In this appeal, we must decide whether the Act interferes with this Court s exclusive constitutional authority over the administration of the courts under Article VI, Section 2, Paragraph 3 and Article VI, Section 7, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, and thus infringes on the powers of a separate and independent branch of government in violation of Article III, Paragraph 1. In the spirit of comity, we have accommodated legislative enactments touching on court administration, provided those enactments are not antithetical to the judiciary s core goals. Because the Act fatally compromises the independence of the judiciary, and hopelessly blurs the line between the role of our courts and law enforcement, we have no choice but to declare the Act unconstitutional. d. Probation officers working in the New Jersey state courts are not currently permitted to enforce these warrants; e. Probation officers in other states are permitted to act as law enforcement officers. [N.J.S.A. 2B:10A-1.] As a result of those concerns, the Legislature established within the Administrative Office of the Courts a Probation Officer Community Safety Unit, consisting overall of no less than 200 probation officers. N.J.S.A. 2B:10A-2(a). The Act requires that a Community Safety Unit of at least five probation officers be assigned to every county. N.J.S.A. 2B:10A-2(b). The Act authorizes the probation officers in those units to carry . . . firearm[s] and to enforce warrants for the apprehension and arrest of probationers who violate the conditions of their probation sentence. N.J.S.A. 2B:10A-2(a). In accordance with the Act, probation officers in the Safety Unit must undergo law enforcement, firearms, and self-defense training in courses administered by the Police Training Commission and must annually qualify in the use of a revolver or similar weapon prior to being permitted to carry a firearm. N.J.S.A. 2B:10A-2(a), -2(c), -3; N.J.S.A 2C:39-6(c)(17). The Act specifies that the law enforcement and self-defense training must be in accordance with rules adopted by the Supreme Court. N.J.S.A. 2B:10A-2(a), -3. The Act further specifies that probation officers in the unit must comply with rules to be adopted by the Supreme Court when they carry their firearms; arrest, detain, and transport probationers; and enforce the criminal laws. N.J.S.A. 2B:10A-2(a). Last, Section 5 of the Act provides that [t]he Administrative Director of the Courts shall report within 18 months of th[e] act s effective date to the presiding officers of the Senate and General Assembly regarding the effectiveness of the Probation Officer Community Safety Unit . . . in tracking and apprehending probationers. L. 2001, c. 362, 5. [N.J. Const. art. III, 1.] The separation of powers doctrine is premised on the theory that government works best when each branch of government acts independently and within its designated sphere, and does not attempt to gain dominance over another branch. See Gen. Assembly v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376, 381-83 (1982). Each branch of government operates within a greater framework of checks and balances that is intended to preserve our system of ordered liberty. See The Federalist Nos. 47, 48, 51, supra; Knight v. City of Margate, 86 N.J. 374, 387-88 (1981). The drafters of the 1947 State Constitution were well aware that in a representative democracy the Legislature would be capable of using its plenary lawmaking power to swallow up the other departments of the Government, unless there was a balance of powers among the three branches. Gen. Assembly v. Byrne, supra, 90 N.J. at 383 (internal quotation marks omitted). The purpose of the separation of powers doctrine is not to create three watertight governmental compartments, stifling cooperative action among the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Rather, the aim is to guarantee a system in which one branch cannot claim[] or receiv[e] an inordinate power. Commc ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Florio, 130 N.J. 439, 450 (1992) (quoting Brown v. Heymann, 62 N.J. 1, 11 (1972)). Nevertheless, to assure the proper functioning of our constitutional scheme, we have held that no deviation from the . . . separation of powers [doctrine] will be tolerated which impairs the essential integrity of one of the [three] branches of government. Massett Bldg. Co. v. Bennett, 4 N.J. 53, 57 (1950). [N.J. Const. art. VI, 2, 3.] Additionally, Article VI, Section 7, Paragraph 1 provides that: The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be the administrative head of all the courts in the State [and] shall appoint an Administrative Director to serve at his pleasure. [N.J. Const. art. VI, 7, 1.] Those two provisions give the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court sweeping authority to govern their own house. Two forms of rulemaking authority are conferred on the Supreme Court by Article VI, Section 2, Paragraph 3: the power to make rules governing the administration of all courts and the power to make rules -- subject to law -- governing the practice and procedure in all such courts. Only rules concerning practice and procedure are qualified by the words subject to law. In a tentative draft of the Judicial Article, the phrase subject to law applied to the administration of the courts. That draft provided: The Supreme Court shall, subject to law, make rules governing the administration and the practice and procedure in all the courts of the State. Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 258 (Case, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877, 71 S. Ct. 123, 95 L. Ed. 638 (1950). In Article VI, Section 2, Paragraph 3 s final form, however, the words subject to law were carefully preserved, but they were transferred so that they did not apply to the power of the court for self-administration but did apply to the control of practice and procedure. Id. at 258-59. In the groundbreaking case of Winberry v. Salisbury, this Court held that subject to law meant substantive law, such as legislation and the common law, as opposed to pleading and practice. Id. at 247-48. In Winberry, we held that a court rule limiting the time in which to file an appeal fell within the Court s constitutional authority over practice and procedure and that a statute conflicting with that rule exceeded the Legislature s powers. Id. at 243, 255; see also George Siegler Co. v. Norton, 8 N.J. 374, 381-82 (1952) (noting that statute [that is] wholly procedural in its operation must yield to procedural rule promulgated by Supreme Court under its constitutional authority). Contrary to defendants argument, this case does not implicate the Court s rulemaking authority over practice and procedure, a phrase, admittedly, not conducive to a facile definition. See footnote 1 Rules of practice and procedure in the courts cover a wide array of subjects from dismissal and directed verdict motions, see George Siegler Co., supra, 8 N.J. at 381-83, to the diversion of criminal defendants into pretrial intervention programs, see State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 367-68 (1977). See generally Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules (2006) (cataloging multitude of rules of practice and procedure that apply to court system). However elastic the phrase practice and procedure may be, it is the Court s power over administration that permits it to define the terms and conditions of employment of judiciary personnel and the functions they serve within the court system. See, e.g., Passaic County Probation Officers Ass n v. County of Passaic, 73 N.J. 247 (1977). The Court s administrative authority is far-reaching and encompasses the entire judicial structure [as well as] all aspects and incidents related to the justice system. Knight v. City of Margate, supra, 86 N.J. at 387; see also 2 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1947, at 1180 (vesting courts with [e]xclusive authority over administration ). That authority includes not only responsibility for the overall performance of the judicial branch, In re Mattera, 34 N.J. 259, 272 (1961), but also all facets of the internal management of our courts. Lichter v. County of Monmouth, 114 N.J. Super. 343, 349 (App. Div. 1971). The Supreme Court s administrative policies are pronounced through Court opinions, orders, rules, and directives. See State v. J.M., 182 N.J. 402, 415-16 (2005). Because their administrative rulemaking authority cannot be circumscribed by legislation, the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice exercise exclusive and plenary power over the governance of the judiciary. See Passaic County, supra, 73 N.J. at 252 (stating that Court s authority over court administration is unfettered and plenary, in contrast to its authority over practice and procedure, which is subject to law (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mt. Hope Dev. Assocs., supra, 154 N.J. at 150 ( Article VI, Section 2, paragraph 3 . . . has been broadly defined to vest this Court with the exclusive jurisdiction to administer the courts of this State. ); CWA Local 1044 v. Chief Justice, 118 N.J. 495, 497, 501, 509, 511 n.1 (1990) (per curiam) (describing Court s power over administration of state court system as exclusive ). [Id. (slip ruling at 3-4).] In recognition of the unique role they play as agents of the judiciary, we noted that probation officers would be less likely to win the trust of those they supervise if they were perceived in any way as law enforcers, as police, or if they acted as such. Id. at 18. At his best, a probation officer serves as a probationer s supporter, counselor, . . . and sometimes even a role model . . . committed to the probationer s rehabilitation under court order, with the help of family, friends, and community, all in the effort to achieve a normal productive life. Ibid. Moreover, [n]either the community groups, the family, nor the probationer would accept, work with, or be inspired by someone thought to have punishment as the main goal. Ibid. We thus concluded that if probation officers were allowed to identify themselves with the police, the impartiality of the judicial branch of government would be cast in doubt both in fact and in appearance. Id. at 42. See footnote 3 In rendering our decision, we again acknowledged the inherent dangers connected with some probation work and expressed support for measures that would enhance probation officers safety. In that regard, we strongly encourage[d] cooperation between probation and police officers. Id. at 6. Following our ruling, the AOC issued Directive No. 6-97, prohibiting probation officers from becoming members of the PBA or FOP and requiring that probation officers who were already members of those organizations resign by June 30, 1997. Administrative Office of the Courts, Directive No. 6-97 (April 28, 1997), 148 N.J.L.J. 445, 535 (May 5, 1997), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/directive/personnel/dir_6 _97.pdf. See footnote 4 Thus, through its decisions and directives, the Supreme Court has made clear that the special role of the judiciary in our constitutional scheme requires that there be no entangling alliances between law enforcement and judiciary employees. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-129/130 SEPTEMBER TERM 2004 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court IN THE MATTER OF P.L. 2001, CHAPTER 362. RICHARD J. WILLIAMS, in his official capacity as Administrative Director of the Courts, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Appellant, and PROBATION ASSOCIATION OF NEW JERSEY, AND PROBATION ASSOCIATION OF NEW JERSEY PROFESSIONAL SUPERVISORS UNION, Intervenors-Appellants. DECIDED April 19, 2006 Justice Long PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Albin CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY