Case Title: Kim v. Comptroller

Citation: 350 Md. 527

Docket Number: 107/96

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Pet. No. 107, September Term, 1996
James Kim, Red Rib Ltd. t/a Act of Clubs v. Comptroller of the Treasury
[Reverses A Decision By The Circuit Court For Anne Arundel County Dismissing As
Premature A Petition For Judicial Review Of An Order Of The Maryland Tax Court]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 107
September Term, 1996
____________________________________________
JAMES KIM, RED RIB LTD.
t/a Ace of Clubs
v.
COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY
____________________________________________
Bell, C.J.,
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
        * Karwacki
Raker
Wilner, 
                                         JJ.
____________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
____________________________________________
        
Filed: July 30, 1998
* Karwacki, J., now retired, participated in the hearing
of this case while an active member of this Court; after
being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV,
Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and the
adoption of the opinion.
In this case we review a decision by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
dismissing as premature a petition for judicial review of an order of the Maryland Tax Court.
We shall reverse.
I.
The pertinent facts are relatively uncomplicated.  James Kim owned and operated a
tavern on Fort Smallwood Road in Anne Arundel County and held an alcoholic beverage
license for the property.  As a result of financial losses incurred by the tavern, Kim decided
to sell the business to The Red Rib, Ltd., and the real estate to G. Glenn Schiller.  Because
Schiller was a non-resident of Anne Arundel County and could not qualify for the transfer
of the alcoholic beverage license, Kim agreed to sign a liquor license application as Vice
President of The Red Rib, Ltd., thereby qualifying it as a corporate applicant.
Apparently the business failed to remit to the State sales and use taxes which it had
collected.  Therefore, the Comptroller levied an assessment against Kim, as an officer of the
corporation, in the amount of $16,417.06, pursuant to Maryland Code (1988, 1997 Repl.
Vol.), § 11-601 of the Tax-General Article.  Section 11-601(d)(1)(i) provides for personal
liability on the part of the “president, vice president or treasurer” of a corporation which fails
to remit sales and use taxes to the Comptroller.
Kim contested the assessment in the Maryland Tax Court, which affirmed the
assessment.  Kim argued in the Tax Court that he should not be subject to personal liability
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Although not briefed or argued by either of the parties, we note that, while the Comptroller
1  
(continued...)
under § 11-601(d)(1)(i) because he was not really the vice president of the corporation
although he did sign the liquor license application in that capacity as an accommodation to
Schiller.  At the conclusion of a hearing held on December 6, 1995, the judge of the Tax
Court orally ruled that the assessment was proper but that the penalties should be waived.
The judge also directed the Assistant Attorney General representing the Comptroller to
prepare a written order to that effect. 
On December 11, 1995, Kim filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County a
petition for judicial review of the Tax Court’s decision.  The petition requested “judicial
review of the oral denial of appeal . . . made by [the Tax Court] on December 6, 1995.”
Subsequently, on December 18, 1995, the Tax Court entered its written order “that the
assessment levied by the Comptroller, including interest, be and the same is hereby
AFFIRMED.  Penalty is to be abated.”  Kim then filed in the circuit court, on January 17,
1996, a memorandum in support of his petition for judicial review.  This memorandum was
captioned “Petition of James Kim . . . For Judicial Review of the Decision of the Maryland
Tax Court in the case of: James Kim . . . vs. Comptroller of the Treasury.”  Finally, on
January 22, 1996, the Comptroller filed its response to Kim’s petition for judicial review and
a motion to dismiss the petition as premature because it was filed before entry of the Tax
Court’s written order.  The Comptroller relied on cases dealing with premature appeals from
trial courts to appellate courts.1  
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(...continued)
1  
complained about the prematurity of Kim’s petition for judicial review, it appears from the record that
the Comptroller’s own response to the petition was untimely under Maryland Rule 7-204(c).  Under
Rule 7-204(c), the response was required to be filed “within 30 days after the date the agency mails
notice of the filing of the petition” to the parties.  According to its certificate of compliance filed with
the circuit court, the Tax Court mailed notice of the filing of the petition for judicial review to the
parties on December 19, 1995.  Therefore, the Comptroller was required to file its response by
January 18, 1996.  See Rule 1-203(a) (computation of time after an event).  The Comptroller,
however, filed its response four days late, on January 22, 1996.
After a hearing, the circuit court granted the Comptroller’s motion to dismiss Kim’s
judicial review action as premature.  The circuit court, relying upon Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck,
318 Md. 28, 566 A.2d 767 (1989), concluded that the final order by the Tax Court was
entered on December 18, 1995, when the written order was filed, and not when the Tax
Court judge ruled from the bench.  In Rohrbeck, 318 Md. at 42, 566 A.2d at 774, we stated
that
“whenever the court, whether in a written opinion or in remarks
from the bench, indicates that a written order embodying the
decision is to follow, a final judgment does not arise prior to the
signing and filing of the anticipated order unless (1) the court
subsequently decides not to require the order and directs the
entry of judgment in some other appropriate manner or (2) the
order is limited to be collateral to the judgment.”
The circuit court concluded, therefore, that the request for judicial review filed by Kim on
December 11, 1995, was premature, and dismissed the judicial review action, stating that
“[s]ince no petition for judicial review was filed subsequent to December 18, 1995, the
matter has not been appealed from the administrative agency.”  Kim appealed, and this Court
issued a writ of certiorari before consideration of the case by the Court of Special Appeals.
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Sections 10-222 and 10-223 of the State Government Article are part of the Administrative
2  
Procedure Act; they set forth generally the procedures to be followed by the court in conducting
judicial review actions in contested cases, and provide for an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.
Kim, Red Rib Ltd. v. Comptroller, 344 Md. 328, 686 A.2d 634 (1996).
II.
Judicial review of decisions of the Maryland Tax Court is statutorily authorized by
Code (1988, 1997 Repl. Vol.), § 13-532(a)(1) of the Tax-General Article, which states that
“[a] final order of the Tax Court is subject to judicial review as provided for contested cases
in §§ 10-222 and 10-223 of the State Government Article.”   The procedures for bringing
2  
a judicial review action from the Tax Court are contained in Maryland Rules 7-201 et seq.
Rule 7-203(a) specifies the time for filing a statutorily authorized judicial review action,
stating as follows:
“Except as otherwise provided in this Rule or by statute, a
petition for judicial review shall be filed within 30 days after the
latest of:
“(1) the date of the order or action of which review is
sought;
“(2) the date the administrative agency sent notice of the
order or action to the petitioner, if notice was required by law to
be sent to the petitioner; or
“(3) the date the petitioner received notice of the agency’s
order or action, if notice was required by law to be received by
the petitioner.”
In the instant case, the Tax Court was required by law to send its written order to Kim
and the Comptroller.  Section 13-529 of the Tax-General Article states as follows:
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“(a) In each appeal, the Tax Court shall issue a written order
that sets forth its decision.
“(b) Each order of the Tax Court shall be filed with its clerk.
“(c) The clerk of the Tax Court shall certify the order in an
appeal and mail a copy of the certified order to:
“(1) each party to the appeal; and
“(2) the tax determining agency from which the appeal is
taken.”
Therefore, under the statute and Rule 7-203(a)(2), the relevant date governing the timeliness
of an action for judicial review was the date the written order of the Tax Court was filed and
mailed to the parties.  Although it is somewhat unclear from the record, it appears that the
written order was mailed to Kim on December 18, 1995, the day the order was entered.
Thus, Kim’s petition for judicial review should have been filed within 30 days after
December 18, 1995.
We agree with the circuit court that the final agency action subject to judicial review
was the entry and mailing of the written order on December 18, 1995.  As  indicated
previously, under § 13-532(a)(1) of the Tax-General Article, only a final order of the Tax
Court is subject to judicial review.  Ordinarily an agency order is not final when it is
contemplated that there is more for the agency to do.   Holiday Spas v. Montgomery County,
315 Md. 390, 396, 554 A.2d 1197, 1200 (1989).  See also Maryland Comm’n on Human Rel.
v. B.G. & E. Co., 296 Md. 46, 56-57, 459 A.2d 205, 211-212 (1983).
In the instant case, the Tax Court’s December 6, 1995, ruling from the bench was not
a final order because more remained for the Tax Court to do, such as filing a written order
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and mailing it to the parties.  Kim should have waited to file his petition for judicial review
until all these steps were completed and the Tax Court’s order became final.
III.
Contrary to the position of the circuit court, however, we do not believe that the
prematurity determination completes the analysis of this case.  For the reasons set forth
below, the circuit court erred in dismissing the action for judicial review.
A.
Both the circuit court and the Comptroller improperly relied upon decisions dealing
with the effect of the premature filing of an appeal. Although often misinterpreted to be an
appeal, this Court has repeatedly emphasized that an action for judicial review of an
administrative decision is an original action.  It is not an appeal.  See, e.g., Driggs Corp. v.
Maryland Aviation, 348 Md. 389, 399, 704 A.2d 433, 438 (1998) (“As we have made clear,
a petition for judicial review of an administrative order invokes the original, not the
appellate, jurisdiction of the circuit court”).  See also, e.g., Gisriel v. Ocean City Bd. of
Supervisors of Elections, 345 Md. 477, 493-496, 693 A.2d 757, 765-767 (1997), cert.
denied, 118 S.Ct. 702, 139 L.Ed.2d 645 (1998), and cases there cited; Shell Oil Co. v.
Supervisor, 276 Md. 36, 43-47, 343 A.2d 521, 525-528 (1975) (because the Tax Court is an
administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, “review of a Tax Court decision
is an exercise of original and not appellate judicial jurisdiction”).
Because judicial review is an original action and not an appeal, the Comptroller’s and
the circuit court’s reliance on cases dealing with the premature filing of appeals was
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inappropriate.  The time requirements for filing appeals are ordinarily treated as
jurisdictional in nature.  See, e.g.,  Blake v. Blake, 341 Md. 326, 338, 670 A.2d 472, 478
(1996), quoting Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202, 108 S.Ct. 1717,
1722, 100 L.Ed.2d 178, 185 (1988),  (“‘The time of appealability [has] jurisdictional
consequences’”); Dabrowski v. Dondalski, 320 Md. 392, 398, 578 A.2d 211, 214 (1990);
Walbert v. Walbert, 310 Md. 657, 662, 531 A.2d 291, 293 (1987), quoting Houghton v.
County Comm’rs of Kent County, 305 Md. 407, 413, 504 A.2d 1145, 1148 (1986) (“We have
repeatedly stated that the timeliness of an order of appeal is ‘jurisdictional,’ and that if an
appeal is not filed within the prescribed time, ‘the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction
and the appeal must be dismissed’”),  and cases there cited.
Therefore this Court has held, absent a special statute or rule dealing with the matter,
that a prematurely filed appeal must be dismissed by an appellate court because the appellate
court has no jurisdiction over the matter.  See, e.g., Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 311
Md. 278, 282-283, 533 A.2d 1303, 1305 (1987); Blucher v. Ekstrom, 309 Md. 458, 463, 524
A.2d 1235, 1237 (1987) (“Under a long line of this Court’s decisions, when an order of
appeal is filed before the appealable judgment, the order of appeal is of no force and effect.
There must still be an order of appeal filed after the appealable judgment to confer appellate
jurisdiction”) (emphasis added); Md.-Nat’l Cap. P. & P. Comm’n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1,
38 n.17, 511 A.2d 1079,  1098 n.17 (1986) (a “premature . . . order of appeal would . . . not
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The principle applied in these cases has been modified, under certain circumstances, by Rule
3  
8-602(d) and (e).  See, e.g., Waters v. U.S.F. & G., 328 Md. 700, 709, 61 A.2d 884, 888 (1992).
confer appellate jurisdiction”).3  
The same cannot be said, however, of a prematurely filed petition for judicial review,
because the time requirements for filing a petition for judicial review are not jurisdictional.
It is in the nature of a statute of limitations.  As the Committee note to Rule 7-203 states,
“[t]he time for initiating an action for judicial review is in the nature of a statute of
limitations.”  See also, e.g., Colao v. County Council, 346 Md. 342, 362, 697 A.2d 96, 106
(1997) (“filings of petitions for judicial review are . . . governed by . . . the law relating to
statutes of limitations”); United Parcel v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 579-580, 650
A.2d 226, 231 (1994).  Statutes of limitations are not ordinarily jurisdictional, and are
generally waivable, including the 30-day time limit for filing a petition for judicial review.
Colao v. County Council, supra, 346 Md. at 364, 697 A.2d at 107 (“the 30-day requirement
for filing the petition [is] in the nature of an absolute statute of limitations, subject to waiver
by failure of a respondent to raise the defense in a proper manner”).  Because the 30-day
requirement of Rule 7-203 is not jurisdictional, it was improper for the circuit court and the
Comptroller to rely on cases concerning the timeliness of notices of appeal.
B.
In a case such as this, where a petition for judicial review is filed prematurely because
the agency action is not yet final, but where there is final agency action before any
proceedings are undertaken in the circuit court, it is improper to dismiss the petition as
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premature.   
 
  In Md.-Nat’l Cap. P. & P. Comm’n v. Crawford, supra, 307 Md. 1, 511 A.2d 1079,
an employee of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission brought an
action for damages and injunctive relief after being denied a transfer allegedly because of her
race.  She filed her action before she had fully exhausted her administrative remedies under
the Commission’s employment grievance system.  Thus, she filed “the court suit more than
two months before the final administrative decision.”  307 Md. at 16, 511 A.2d at 1087.  The
Commission filed a demurrer based on the employee’s failure to exhaust her administrative
remedies before bringing the court action.  This Court held that the circuit court properly
overruled the demurrer because “trial was held more than six weeks after the Merit System
Board issued its final decision . . . .  Hence the plaintiff reached the exhaustion point
contended for by the Commission by the time trial was held.”  307 Md. at 17, 511 A.2d at
1087.  We stated (307 Md. at 18, 511 A.2d at 1087-1088):
“In addition, in situations like that in the present case, where
there is both an administrative remedy and an independent
judicial remedy (i.e., a specific judicial remedy exists other than
judicial review of the administrative decision), where the
administrative agency may have primary jurisdiction, and where
the plaintiff invokes the judicial remedy prior to exhausting the
administrative procedures, it has been held that the trial court
may retain jurisdiction pending exhaustion of the administrative
procedures. . . . Once the administrative procedures are
exhausted, the trial court may proceed; the plaintiff whose case
is meritorious may be entitled to whatever relief is available
under either the independent judicial action or the
administrative/judicial review remedy.”
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See also McCullough v. Wittner, 314 Md. 602, 612-613, 552 A.2d 881, 886 (1989); Board
of Ed. for Dorchester Co. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 792, 506 A.2d 625, 634 (1986); Offutt
v. Montgomery Co. Bd. of Ed., 285 Md. 557, 562, 404 A.2d 281, 284 (1979).
Recently, in Goicochea v. Langworthy, 345 Md. 719, 729, 694 A.2d 474, 479, cert.
denied, 118 S.Ct. 321, 139 L.Ed.2d 249 (1997), we recognized a similar principle in the
medical malpractice arbitration context.  The Maryland Health Care Malpractice Claims Act,
Code (1974, 1995 Repl. Vol., 1997 Supp.), §§ 3-2A-01 through 3-2A-09 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article, requires “the submission of [medical] malpractice claims
against health care providers to an arbitration proceeding as a condition precedent before
maintaining a tort action in the circuit court.”  345 Md. at 725, 694 A.2d at 477.  In
Langworthy, we stated that the normal procedure to be followed when a tort action is filed
in the circuit court prior to completion of the arbitration process, rather than to dismiss the
tort action, is to “stay the civil action pending the conclusion of arbitration proceedings.”
345 Md. at 729, 694 A.2d at 479.  See also Jewell v. Malamet, 322 Md. 262, 276, 587 A.2d
474, 481 (1991). 
Just this term in Driggs Corp. v. Maryland Aviation, supra, 348 Md. 389, 704 A.2d
433, we had occasion to consider the proper remedy when a judicial review action is filed
prematurely.  In Driggs, a government contractor brought an action for judicial review of a
decision by the Board of Contract Appeals which had decided that a government agency had
properly terminated its contract for default.  The circuit court dismissed the judicial review
action on the ground that the contractor had acquiesced in the Board’s decision.  This Court,
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however, held that there had been no acquiescence but that the petition for judicial review
had been filed prematurely because issues remained to be resolved by the Board.  Faced with
this premature filing of an action for judicial review, Judge Wilner, writing for the Court,
concluded that the proper course of action was as follows (348 Md. at 408, 704 A.2d at 443)
(emphasis added):
“Accordingly, we shall vacate the circuit court judgment . . . and
remand the case to the circuit court.  If the damages issue has
not yet been resolved by [the Board of Contract Appeals], the
court shall dismiss the petition as being premature and remand
the matter to [the Board] for a final decision.  If, by now, the
damages issue has been resolved by [the Board], the court
should allow Driggs to file a new petition or amend the existing
one, as appropriate, and then proceed in accordance with § 10-
222 and the applicable rules to provide judicial review.”
This view is in accord with the general approach adopted by many courts which have
considered the issue of the premature filing of an original action.  As the Supreme Court of
California stated in Radar v. Rogers, 49 Cal.2d 243, 250, 317 P.2d 17, 21 (1957), “if the
stated ground [of prematurity] does not exist at the time of trial it may be disregarded.”
Other cases taking the position that premature original actions should not be dismissed under
the circumstances presented include, e.g., Moore v. Fellner, 50 Cal.2d 330, 343, 325 P.2d
857, 864 (1958); Archibald v. Iacopi, 120 Cal.App.2d 666, 669, 262 P.2d 40 (1953); Warren
v. Shands Teaching Hosp., 700 So.2d 702, 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Latin Express
Service, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 660 So.2d 1059, 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Hindman v. Reaser, 246 Iowa 1375, 1382, 72 N.W.2d 559, 563 (1955); Thompson v.
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A minority of cases have held that the premature filing of a suit cannot be cured by the accrual
4  
of a cause of action before the court considers the suit.  See, e.g., American Bonding and Trust Co.
v. Gibson County, 145 F. 871, 874 (6th Cir. 1906); Werber v. Atkinson, 84 A.2d 111, 113 (D.C.
1951); City Inv. Co. v. Williams, 171 La. 848, 850-851, 132 So. 367, 368 (1931); Sutton v.
Anderson, 176 Neb. 543, 546, 126 N.W.2d 836, 839 (1964).
Meyers, 211 Kan. 26, 33-34, 505 P.2d 680, 686 (1973); Tanzilli v. Casassa, 324 Mass. 113,
115, 85 N.E.2d 220, 221 (1949); Boydstun v. Pearson, 239 Miss. 479, 481-482, 123 So.2d
621, 622-623 (1960).4  
C.
An alternative reason for reversing the circuit court’s decision is that Kim in fact made
a filing sufficient to constitute a petition for judicial review within thirty days after the final
action by the Tax Court.  As noted earlier, on January 17, 1996, Kim filed a memorandum
in support of his petition for judicial review.  This memorandum was captioned “Petition of
James Kim . . . For Judicial Review of the Decision of the Maryland Tax Court in the case
of: James Kim . . . vs Comptroller of the Treasury.”  The memorandum contained a statement
of the facts underlying the disputed assessment as well as a discussion of the decision and
order of the Tax Court.  Thus, the memorandum unquestionably contained sufficient
information to satisfy the requirements of Rule 7-202(c), which states as follows:
“The petition shall request judicial review, identify the order or
action of which review is sought, and state whether the
petitioner was a party to the agency proceeding.  If the petitioner
was not a party, the petition shall state the basis of the
petitioner’s standing to seek judicial review.  No other
allegations are necessary.”
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This Court has previously found filings of much less substance than Kim’s
memorandum to be sufficient to constitute pleadings instituting actions or seeking relief.
See, e.g., Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 650-651, 574 A.2d 898, 906, cert. denied, 498
U.S. 950, 111 S.Ct. 369, 112 L.Ed. 331 (1990) (“memorandum of law” filed subsequent to
court order treated as a “motion under Rule 2-535(a) to revise the judgment”); Office of Fin.,
Balto. Co. v. Preveti, 296 Md. 512, 463 A.2d 842 (1983) (a letter sent to the county attorney
and forwarded to the District Court deemed sufficient to constitute an original pleading
instituting an action in the District Court).  
The memorandum filed by Kim was sufficient to be treated as a petition for judicial
review.  Furthermore, because Kim filed his memorandum on January 17, 1996, within thirty
days after the Tax Court’s final action, Kim met the timeliness requirements of Rule 7-
203(a).
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY REVERSED,
AND CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT
WITH THIS OPINION.  COSTS TO BE PAID
BY THE RESPONDENT.