Case Title: In the Matter of Registrant J.M.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-142-99

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2001-03-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The issue raised in this appeal is whether the Attorney General's Registrant Risk Assessment Scale (RRAS) and the Registrant Risk Assessment Scale Manual (Manual), which are used to determine the risk of re-offense by a sex offender pursuant to the Registration and Community Notification Laws, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11, (RCNL or Megan's Law), can consider prior convictions of a sexual nature as criminal history factors even where those convictions would not require registration under the RCNL. Registrant J.M. has an extensive criminal background, and it is his 1966 rape conviction that brings him within the purview of the RCNL. In August 1999, the Essex County Prosecutor served J.M. with notice of intent to designate him a Tier 3, High Risk, Sex Offender designation, due to his score of eighty-nine points on the RRAS. The High Risk designation would require notification to public and private educational institutions, day care centers, camps, community organizations, and specified residential and business addresses. J.M. objected to the classification and was appointed counsel to represent him at a hearing. J.M. argued at the hearing that the State erroneously considered his 1987 conviction for attempted criminal restraint when evaluating the criminal history factors, numbers one through seven on the RRAS. The conviction arose out of a charge of attempted kidnapping, in which the State alleged that J.M. drove alongside a sixteen-year- old girl who was walking to school and attempted to pull her into the car. The girl managed to elude J.M.. J.M. pled guilty to the crime of third-degree attempted criminal restraint, and he was sentenced to five years probation and one-year in jail. J.M. disputed his point assessments for virtually all of the categories on the RRAS because this 1987 conviction was included in arriving at those assessments. For similar reasons, J.M. also objected to his three lewdness offenses being considered. J.M.'s argument was premised on the fact that the 1987 attempted criminal restraint conviction and his lewdness offenses do not fit within the definition of sexual offense requiring registration under Megan's Law. Because those crimes were not registrable offenses, he argued, they should not be included among the criminal history factors indicative of high risk of re-offense. The trial court agreed with J.M., and held that an offense that does not require registration is not a sex offense for purposes of Megan's Law and could be considered only under factor eight of the RRAS, History of Anti-Social Acts. Accordingly, the Court reassessed J.M.'s RRAS score, resulting in J.M. being classified as a Tier Two sex offender and subject to more limited notification. The State appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that registrant's criminal restraint and lewdness offenses could not be considered when evaluating J.M.'s risk of re-offense under factors one through seven. The State argued that for the RRAS to serve as an accurate predictor of a registrant's risk of recidivism, all prior crimes with a sexual component must be considered as part of a registrant's criminal history. The Appellate Division rejected the State's argument. It reasoned that N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 specifically enumerates offenses that are deemed sex offenses [f]or purposes of this act . . . and that attempted criminal restraint and lewdness were not identified in that provision. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certification. 1. Under the RCNL, the task of establishing a methodology for assessing risk of re-offense was delegated to the Attorney General, informed by the RCNL's enumeration of factors to be included. The Attorney General was directed to consult with an advisory council and to promulgate guidelines and procedures for community notification. In constructing the RRAS, the Attorney General and his experts focused on the seriousness of the offense should the offender recidivate and the likelihood that the offender will recidivate. The RRAS is divided into four categories that encompass factors relevant to placing an offender within one of the three tiers based on the future risk of re-offense: (1) seriousness of the offense; (2) offense history; (3) characteristics of offender; and (4) community support. Pertinent to this appeal are the three factors under the seriousness of-offense category and the five factors under the offense-history category. The RRAS and Manual instruct the prosecutor to rate the offender Low Risk, Moderate Risk or High Risk for each factor, and the offender is attributed the score of 0, 1, or 3, respectively. Because certain categories are deemed more important than others in evaluating an offender's risk of re-offense and the seriousness of any future offense, the categories are weighted differently. An offender's score for each factor under the seriousness-of-offense category is multiplied by five, whereas the offender's score for each factor under the offense history category is multiplied by three. The offender's scores are totaled, and the offender is assigned a tier designation depending on that total score. (Pp. 7-14) 2. The Court has already approved the weighted approach of the Attorney General's guidelines. In re Registrant C.A., 146 N.J. 71 (1996). In that case, the Court stated that the RRAS was appropriately designed so that people like exhibitionists, who are likely to re-offend but whose offenses are low in seriousness, would not be ranked as high as people who commit fewer, but more serious offenses, like rapists or sexual thrill killers. The Court's reference to exhibitionists was not gratuitous. The Court also noted the expert panel's express use of lewdness as an example of proper weighting when using the RRAS. Thus, the Court contemplated lewdness, or exhibitionist offenses, as appropriate for consideration and weighting under all of the criminal history factors of the RRAS. (Pp. 14-19) 3. Registrant cites to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2b, Registration of Sex Offenders, which states that for purposes of this act a sex offense shall include the following, and does not include lewdness and attempted criminal restraint among the enumerated offenses. This section, however, is not a general definitional section of the RCNL, but rather specifies to whom the registration requirement will apply. Reading that definition as controlling the Attorney General in his construction of a RRAS to reliably assess risk of re-offense defies common sense and thwarts the community protection purpose of the RCNL. (Pp. 19-23) 4. The Legislature balanced the public interest with that of registrants when determining which offenders would have to register. Once it is determined that an offender must register, however, the analysis changes to the likelihood of re-offense. It was entirely reasonable for the Attorney General and his experts to determine that sexual offenses in a registrant's past require assessment through the prism of the seven criminal history factors, which include degrees of force, contact, age of victim, victim selection, and length of time since last offense. The one factor focusing on anti-social acts does not, as fully, examine a past sexual offense episode. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the RCNL does not prohibit the Attorney General from concluding that non-registrable sexual offenses are best evaluated on the RRAS under the criminal history factors of numbers one through seven. (Pp. 23- 26) 5. The lower courts' assessment of the registrant's risk of re-offense was flawed by the disallowance of consideration of the 1987 conviction for attempted criminal restraint and his lewdness offenses under criminal history factors one through seven, and therefore the matter must be remanded. Because there is a factual dispute concerning the number of lewdness offenses, the trial court will address those offenses, as well. (P. 26) The matter is REVERSED and REMANDED. JUSTICE STEIN and JUSTICES COLEMAN, LONG, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA's opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICE VERNIERO did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 142 September Term 1999 IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT J.M. ________________ Argued January 30, 2001 _ Decided March 28, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Jessica S. Oppenheim, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant, State of New Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Brian J. Neff, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for respondent, J.M. (Peter A. Garcia, Acting Public Defender, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by LaVECCHIA, J. This is yet another challenge to the Attorney General Guidelines for Law Enforcement for the Implementation of Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Laws, specifically the Registrant Risk Assessment Scale ( RRAS ) and the Registrant Risk Assessment Scale Manual ( Manual ) components of those guidelines. Previous challenges to the RRAS and the Manual have been addressed by this Court. In re Registrant G.B., 147 N.J. 62, 69 (1996); In re Registrant C.A., 146 N.J. 71, 100- 01 (1996); Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 24 n.5 (1995); see also Paul P. v. Farmer, 80 F. Supp. 2d 320, 325 (D.N.J.), judgment vacated by 92 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414 (D.N.J. 2000) (dissolving injunction and allowing amended guidelines on uniform method of distribution of community notification to proceed). We have upheld the RRAS, imbuing it with an entitlement to deference, but noting that the ultimate responsibility for determining the extent of community notification is reposed with the trial court, assisted in certain circumstances by expert testimony. In re G.B., supra, 147 N.J. at 69. The RRAS is composed of four categories and, within each, numerous factors. (Appendix A). It is recognized as a useful tool for assessing risk of re-offense of a registrant, designating an individual's tier of risk of re-offense, and the scope of community notification pertinent to that tiered designation. Ibid. In this matter, registrant objects to the inclusion under the RRAS's criminal history factors one through seven of certain prior convictions for offenses of a sexual nature. Specifically, he contends that if the offense would not require his registration under the Registration and Community Notification Laws, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11 (RCNL), commonly known as Megan's Law, then it should not be included under factors one through seven of the RRAS that examine criminal offense history. Instead, he asserts that those nonregistrable sex offenses should be limited to consideration only under the anti-social acts factor of the RRAS, thus reducing the capacity of those offenses to inflate the assessment of his risk of re-offense. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division agreed and held that registrant's nonregistrable sex offenses could not be considered under the criminal history factors one through seven. We granted certification, 165 N.J. 489 (2000), and now reverse. In compliance with that directive, the Attorney General promulgated guidelines that initially were determined to be deficient, Doe v. Poritz, supra, 142 N.J. at 24 n.5, leading to the promulgation of replacement guidelines containing the current RRAS and Manual to guide prosecutors in risk assessment and to promote uniformity in notification. In re C.A., supra, 146 N.J. at 100-01. The guidelines were revised in March 2000 in response to a determination by the District Court that there was no uniform method of distribution which ensures that, in all twenty- one counties, Megan's Law notices will be distributed in a manner reasonably calculated to get the information to those with a 'particular need for it' while avoiding 'disclosure to those who have no similar need.' Paul P., supra, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 325 (quoting Fraternal Order of Police v. Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1987). In complying with the court's direction, however, the Attorney General did not alter either the RRAS or Manual. Paul P., supra, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 414. Turning to the development of the RRAS, we note that the Attorney General did convene a committee composed of mental health experts as well as members of the Law Enforcement Committee, which drafted [a] Scale and the accompanying Registrant Risk Assessment Manual . . . which explains the Scale. In re C.A., supra, 146 N.J. at 82 (footnote omitted). The RRAS takes an objective approach in determining an offender's risk of re-offending and, accordingly, establishing the scope of notification. In constructing the RRAS, the Attorney General focused on the seriousness of the offense should the offender recidivate and the likelihood that the offender will recidivate. Registrant Risk Assessment Scale Manual at 2-3. The RRAS is divided into four categories that encompass factors relevant to placing an offender within one of three tiers based upon the future risk of re-offense. Those four categories are (1) seriousness of the offense; (2) offense history; (3) characteristics of offender; and (4) community support. Id. at 4. Thirteen factors are distributed among the four categories, incorporating both statutory factors and factors deemed by the Committee to be relevant to the risk of re-offense. In re C.A., supra, 146 N.J. at 82; Registrant Risk Assessment Scale Manual at 6-10. In selecting the criteria to be incorporated into the Scale, the statutory requirements set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-6 [sic] have been subsumed in the criteria. Registrant Risk Assessment Scale Manual at 2; see In re C.A., supra, 146 N.J. at 88 (noting that N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8b enumerates certain factors relevant to risk of re-offense that 'shall [be] include[d]' in the guidelines, but provides that the guidelines need 'not be limited to' the enumerated factors ). Pertinent to this appeal are the three factors under the seriousness-of-offense category and the five factors under the offense-history category. The seriousness-of-offense category includes the following factors: (1) degree of force; (2) degree of contact; and (3) age of victim. Registrant Risk Assessment Scale. The factors under the offense-history category are (1) victim selection; (2) number of offenses/victims; (3) duration of offensive behavior; (4) length of time since last offense; and (5) history of antisocial acts. Ibid. The RRAS and Manual instruct the prosecutor to rate the offender Low Risk, Moderate Risk or High Risk for each factor. Depending on that rating, the offender is attributed a score of 0, 1, or 3, respectively. Because the Attorney General deemed certain categories more important than others in evaluating an offender's risk of re-offense and the seriousness of that future offense should the offender recidivate, the categories are weighted differently. An offender's score for each factor under the seriousness-of-offense category is multiplied by five, whereas the offender's score for each factor under the offense history category is multiplied by three. Registrant Risk Assessment Scale Manual at 4-5. The offender's scores for each factor in each category are totaled, and the offender is assigned a tier designation depending on his or her total score. A total score ranging from 0 to 36 results in a low risk or Tier One classification; a score of 37 to 73 results in a moderate risk or Tier Two classification; and a score of 74 to 111 results in a high risk or Tier Three designation. Registrant Risk Assessment Scale Manual at 5; see also In re Registrant C.A., supra, 146 N.J. at 81 ( All registrants are subjected to at least Tier One notification, which requires registration with law enforcement agencies. ). Ultimate responsibility for the scope of notification is reposed with the trial court, which is to determine tier classification and scope of notification following a hearing in which the burden of proof is on the State. Doe v. Poritz, supra, 142 N.J. at 12; see also E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1111 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that due process requires clear and convincing standard of proof with burden on the State to determine risk level, geographic area of notice, and to whom notice will be provided). More recent studies continue to demonstrate that static factors, such as offense history, are better predictors of long-term recidivism. R. Karl Hanson & Andrew J.R. Harris, Where Should We Intervene? 27 Criminal Justice & Behavior 6 (2000) (citing R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussiere, Predicting Relapse: A Meta- Analysis of Sexual Recidivism Studies, 66 Journal of Consulting & Criminal Psychology, 348-362 (1998). The Court also approved another weighted aspect of the RRAS's design, which is the emphasis placed on assessment of the seriousness of the prior offenses: The Scale was therefore appropriately designed so that people who are very likely to recommit their offense, but whose offenses are low in seriousness, such as exhibitionists, would not be ranked as high on the Scale as people who commit fewer, but more serious, offenses such as rapists or sexual thrill killers. The Attorney General's decision to include factors in the Scale that relate to the quality or nature of a re-offense is consistent with the RCNL and Doe v. Poritz. [In re C.A., supra, 146 N.J. at 102 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).] The Court's reference to exhibitionists was not gratuitous. In understanding and approving the RRAS's weighted approach to static factors generally and, then again, with the weighted factor of seriousness of offense, the Court noted the expert panel's express use of the offense of lewdness in its example of proper weighting when using the RRAS to evaluate risk of re-offense. The expert panel and the Attorney General clearly envisioned prior criminal history to include assessment of, among other sexual offenses, acts of lewdness, adjusting the scoring of such offenses to reflect the panel's view of the lower risk presented by such behaviors even if the registrant were compulsive: The criteria listed in the seriousness of offense category have been given the most weight, to be multiplied by five. The panel's reasoning is twofold. First, it is intended that the violent, predatory offender be rated higher than those who have not committed such offenses. Giving the highest weighting score to the seriousness of offense characteristics accomplishes this goal. Second, the panel wishes to have those with lower level offenses, in particular, lewdness crimes, such as exhibitionism, rated as lower risk even though the registrant might be quite compulsive, so as to reflect the lower risk of harm to the community. This goal, too, is accomplished by the heavy weighing of these criteria. These goals mirror both the relative severity of statutory penalties as well as the intent of the notification statue itself. [Registrant Risk Assessment Scale Manual at 4 (emphasis added).] See also Registrant Risk Assessment Scale Manual at 6 (setting forth examples of use of criteria: Degree of Force detailing Low Risk example to include offender exposes self to child, and Degree of Contact detailing exhibitionism as low risk example). Thus, the Court in In re C.A., supra, contemplated lewdness, or exhibitionist offenses, as appropriate for consideration and weighting under all of the criminal history factors of the RRAS. Although not squarely confronted with an argument that such offenses could not be so considered because they do not fit the RCNL's definition of sex offenses, the Court's acceptance of the RRAS's design of heavily weighted static factors as best predictors of the risk of re-offense is consistent with our approach to that specific argument now. The RRAS should operate to serve at its optimum in predicting risk of re-offense, for that is the very purpose of the RCNL. The Attorney General and his experts determined that all offenses of a sexual nature are best assessed, when evaluating risk of re-offense, under the various factors of criminal history, and not confined to the one factor of anti-social acts. To restrict their consideration as registrant would prefer thwarts the design of the RRAS. Aside from its apparent inconsistency with the Court's approval of the RRAS's design, the registrant's argument is inconsistent with the scope of the Attorney General's delegated authority to devise an assessment tool for use in reliably and uniformly predicting risk of re-offense. In In re C.A., supra, 147 N.J. at 89, the Court concluded that the use of nonconviction offenses was intended by the Legislature to be part of the statutory factors of criminal history and other criminal history that were meant to be considered in the assessment of risk of re-offense. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8b(3) and (4). Even if not perceived to fall within the reasonable contemplation of those statutorily identified factors, the Court determined that including information concerning nonconviction offenses was within the scope of the Attorney General's delegated power, which was not limited to consideration of only enumerated factors. Ibid. The Attorney General's decision to include such information in the scale was within that delegated discretion so long as the Attorney General's exercise of discretion did not plainly transgress the statute. Ibid. We are unpersuaded that the legislative reference in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2b, stating that for purposes of this act a sex offense shall include the following, was meant to constrain the Attorney General in his construction of a tool for use by law enforcement agencies in reliably predicting risk of re-offense by a sex offender. We are inclined to take a less restrictive approach with RRAS. The Attorney General and his consulting experts had a difficult task assigned to them. The Legislature did not prescribe to the Attorney General an exhaustive list of factors to be used, as noted in In re C.A., supra. It allowed the administering agent, the Attorney General, and his experts, latitude in bringing their expertise to bear in determining what factors are more or less reliable in helping to predict risk of re-offense. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8b (stating factors relevant to risk of re-offense shall include, but not be limited to, the following . . . . ). Indeed, the section of the statute concerning notification refers generally to both sex offense and offense signaling a breadth of information available to the Attorney General to use and weigh accordingly. N.J.S.A. 2C:7- 8b(3). Other language in that section also supports the conclusion that the Attorney General was not prohibited from determining that nonregistrable sexual offenses are best evaluated, for purposes of assessing risk of re-offense, under the registrant's criminal history on the RRAS. N.J.S.A. 2C:7- 8a provides that the guidelines shall identify factors relevant to the risk of re-offense and some relevant factors that shall be included are [c]riminal history factors indicative of high- risk of re-offense; [w]hether the offender's conduct was found to be characterized by repetitive and compulsive behavior; and [t]he number, date and nature of prior offenses. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8b. That language suggests that flexibility be afforded to the Attorney General to review comprehensively a registrant's past sexual offense history, not just registrable sex offenses, when judging the registrant's risk of re-offense. Reading the definition of sex offenses, contained not in a general definitional section of the RCNL, but rather in the section specifying to whom the registration requirement will apply, as controlling the Attorney General in his construction of a RRAS to reliably assess risk of re-offense, defies common sense and thwarts the community protection purpose of the RCNL. Furthermore, we must not lose sight of the fact that originally the Legislature passed a series of separate acts, all collectively known as The Registration and Community Notification Laws. The registration requirement, wherein the for purposes of this act language appears, is contained in the piece of legislation enacted as L. 1994, c. 133. The legislation containing the requirement for the creation of notification guidelines, and the factors the Attorney General was to use, was enacted as L. 1994, c. 128. Those separate, but obviously complementary, enactments require sensible application consistent with the Legislature's overarching intent to protect the citizenry. Sutherland Statutory Construction 46:05 at 154 (6th ed. 2000)(stating that statute's overall scheme is to be considered, and its various parts animated by one general purpose and intent); Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 108 N.J. 123, 129 (1987) (finding that court should not consider only specific statute in question, but rather should consider entire legislative scheme of which it is part). N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2b does set forth those offenses that the term sex offenses shall include for purposes of the act. Lewdness and attempted criminal restraint where the conviction occurred before the enactment of the RCNL are not included. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2, however, concerns the Registration of Sex Offenders, and thus we read that section only as precluding consideration of either of those offenses to require registration. We will not import from that section a restriction on the Attorney General in determining how to assess past criminal conduct of a sexual nature when assessing risk of re-offense. The Legislature balanced the public interest with that of registrants when determining which offenders would have to register under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2. See Doe v. Poritz, supra, 142 N.J. at 20 (stating that it has never been explained or challenged why certain offenders, but not others, must register under the act). However, once it has been determined that an offender must register, the analysis changes. Id. at 14 (stating that Megan's Law has two basic provisions, to register certain offenders, and secondly to notify the public of the scope of that notice measured by the likelihood that such offender will commit another offense ). The registrant's past offenses that include a sexual component are relevant in assessing the registrant's risk of re-offense. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2, this registrant's 1987 conviction for attempted criminal restraint would have required him to register under Megan's Law but for the fact that the conviction occurred before the effective date of Megan's Law. Once it was determined, however, that petitioner was subject to registration under the RCNL by virtue of his rape conviction, his 1987 attempted criminal restraint conviction as well as his past lewdness convictions play a different, yet important, role in assessing registrant's risk of re-offense. Consideration of past crimes of a sexual nature is crucial to understanding a registrant's propensity to use force or target children, as well as understanding the registrant's duration of offensive behavior, number of victims, and length of time since his last offense. That information that aids in the assessment and design of the proper scope of notification is abundantly relevant to the protection of the public. Thus, it was entirely reasonable for the Attorney General and his experts to determine that sexual offenses in a registrant's past require assessment through the prism of the seven factors that examine past criminal history from several aspects, such as degrees of force, contact, age of victim, victim selection, and length of time since last offense. The one factor focusing on anti-social acts does not, as fully, examine a past sexual offense episode. Registrant's several lewdness offenses also deserve similar examination to discern their appropriate value when assessing his risk of re-offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4c provides that 'lewd acts' shall include the exposing of genitals for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of the actor or any other person. A failure to consider those offenses under the seven criminal history factors undermines the evaluation of his compulsion, repetitiveness, and victim choice to determine the scope of notification that should be provided. Fundamentally, it would thwart the remedial objective of Megan's Law not to evaluate those offenses under the more complete analysis of the criminal history factors of the RRAS, as it was designed to do. Doe v. Poritz, supra, 142 N.J. at 13; N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1. Accordingly, we conclude that the RCNL does not prohibit the Attorney General from concluding that nonregistrable sexual offenses are best evaluated on the RRAS under the criminal history factors of numbers one through seven. Such past criminal conduct need not be restricted to the single factor of anti- social acts. REGISTRANT RISK ASSESSMENT SCALE NO. A-142 IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT J.M. ____________________ DECIDED March 28, 2001 Justice Stein