Case Title: State v. Jendusa

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018AP002357-LV

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2021-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2021 WI 24 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the matter of the commitment of: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Anthony James Jendusa, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 10, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 26, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee     
 
JUDGE: 
Joseph R. Wall   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
ZIEGLER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, 
C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioner-petitioner, there were briefs filed by 
Lisa E.F. Kumfer, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Lisa E.F. Kumfer. 
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Dustin C. Haskell assistant state public defender. There was an 
oral argument by Dustin C. Haskell. 
 
2021 WI 24 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP2357-LV 
(L.C. No. 
2016CI5) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the commitment of: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Anthony James Jendusa, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
MAR 10, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
ZIEGLER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, 
C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of an order of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA 
FRANK 
DALLET, 
J.   Anthony 
Jendusa 
seeks 
discovery of a Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) 
database in an effort to challenge the sexually violent person 
commitment proceeding initiated against him over four years ago.  
Jendusa believes that the DOC's Wisconsin-specific data provides 
a more relevant basis upon which to calculate his risk of 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
2 
engaging in future acts of sexual violence——a calculation that 
may result in a lower estimate of his risk than that advanced by 
the State's expert witness.  He argues that the database is 
discoverable pursuant to both Wis. Stat. § 980.036 (2019-20)1 and 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as 
interpreted in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  The State 
disagrees with Jendusa's interpretation of § 980.036 and the 
applicability of Brady.  It further argues that disclosing the 
DOC database may violate state and federal health-privacy laws. 
¶2 
This case comes before us as a review of the court of 
appeals' denial of the State's petition for leave to file an 
interlocutory appeal of the circuit court's discovery order.2  We 
hold that the court of appeals did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in denying that petition.  We nevertheless reach the 
underlying merits of that petition and conclude that the DOC 
database is discoverable pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5).  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' order and further 
conclude that the circuit court did not err when it granted 
Jendusa's discovery request.  We remand the cause to the circuit 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 State v. Jendusa, No. 2018AP2357-LV, unpublished order 
(Wis. Ct. App. July 16, 2019) (denying the State's petition for 
leave to appeal a non-final order of the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, the Honorable Joseph R. Wall presiding). 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
3 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
In December 2016, the State petitioned to commit 
Jendusa as a sexually violent person pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
ch. 980.  At the probable cause hearing, Dr. Christopher Tyre, a 
licensed psychologist employed by the DOC, testified that 
Jendusa met the statutory definition of a sexually violent 
person.3  Dr. Tyre stated that he assessed Jendusa's likelihood 
of engaging in one or more future acts of sexual violence over 
Jendusa's 
lifetime 
using 
the 
Static-99 
and 
Static-99R 
assessments (as informed by the Rapid Risk Assessment for Sex 
Offense Recidivism (RRASOR) and the Sex Offender Treatment 
Intervention and Progress Scale (SOTIPS)).4  Dr. Tyre reported 
                                                 
3 "Sexually violent person" is defined as one "who has been 
convicted of a sexually violent offense . . . and who is 
dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that 
makes it likely that the person will engage in one or more acts 
of sexual violence."  Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).  "Likely," in 
turn, means "more likely than not," § 980.01(1m), which courts 
interpret to mean the person has a more than 50-percent chance 
of engaging in a future act of sexual violence over his or her 
lifetime.  See State v. Richard, 2011 WI App 66, ¶3, 333 
Wis. 2d 708, 799 N.W.2d 509 (citing State v. Smalley, 2007 
WI App 219, ¶¶3, 10, 305 Wis. 2d 709, 741 N.W.2d 286). 
4 Sex-offender risk assessments generally fall into two 
categories:  those that measure "static" risk factors, and those 
that measure "dynamic" risk factors.  The Static-99, the Static-
99R, and the RRASOR are static assessments.  The RRASOR assesses 
recidivism 
based 
on 
sexual 
deviance; 
the 
Static-99 
and 
Static-99R consider six additional risk factors to assess 
recidivism based on a more general criminal or antisocial 
disposition.  Dr. Tyre testified that because the Static-99 
instruments measure a person's general antisocial disposition, 
there is a potential for "noise" in estimating the more 
particularized likelihood of committing a future act of sexual 
violence.  He explained that the RRASOR, with its sexual 
deviance focus, helps him address that "noise." 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
4 
his conclusions in his Special Purpose Evaluation, which was 
received into evidence.5 
¶4 
According to Dr. Tyre, each assessment is based on the 
same foundational method.  Researchers observed several groups 
of sex offenders after their release to see whether they 
recidivated.6  The proportion of those who recidivated provided 
the researchers with a "base rate," or the general likelihood of 
re-offense across the studied population.  For the Static-99, 
                                                                                                                                                             
The SOTIPS assesses dynamic risk.  Dynamic risk assessments 
attempt to adjust the static assessments' estimated likelihood 
of future sexual violence by accounting for fluid behavioral 
factors, such as adjustment to supervision, self-management, 
compliance within an institutional setting, and continued sexual 
interests or deviance. 
5 During the roughly three months between the initial 
detention order and the subsequent probable cause hearing, 
Dr. Tyre twice updated his Special Purpose Evaluation.  Neither 
update changed the substance of his conclusion that Jendusa met 
the statutory criteria for civil commitment as a sexually 
violent person. 
6 For 
purposes 
of 
the 
actuarial 
risk 
assessments, 
"recidivism" is defined as an arrest or conviction for a new sex 
offense within a specified time period of 5, 10, or 15 years.  
In the ch. 980 context, this definition is imperfect.  On the 
one hand, the risk assessments underestimate the likelihood of 
future 
sexual 
violence 
because 
numerous 
sex 
offenses 
go 
unreported or uncharged and because a ch. 980 commitment is 
based on an offender's lifetime risk.  On the other hand, this 
definition 
overestimates 
the 
likelihood 
of 
future 
sexual 
violence because it encompasses sex offenses beyond the narrower 
subset of "sexually violent offense[s]" relevant to ch. 980.  
See Wis. Stat. § 980.01(6).  For these reasons, this opinion 
differentiates between a "re-offense," which, like recidivism, 
refers to a subsequent arrest or conviction for a sex offense, 
and a "future act of sexual violence," which encapsulates all 
statutorily defined sexually violent offenses regardless of 
whether they are reported or result in a criminal complaint. 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
5 
which studied Canadian and Danish offenders, the researchers 
observed that a small subset of the studied groups recidivated 
at a higher rate despite similar risk factor scores as those in 
the other groups.  To account for this variability, the 
researchers 
divided 
the 
groups 
into 
two 
comparison 
"norms":  "routine" and "high-risk/high-needs."  Each norm has 
its own base rate, with the high-risk/high-needs norm's base 
rate being the higher of the two. 
¶5 
In order to assess an individual using one of these 
instruments, an examiner first determines the norm, and thus the 
base rate, that is the most apt comparison for the individual.  
The examiner then numerically scores the individual based on the 
presence and severity of certain risk factors that have been 
found to correlate positively with sexual recidivism.  The sum 
of those scores places the individual into a risk category.  The 
examiner then cross-references that risk category with the 
selected norm's base rate to calculate a range of "absolute" 
recidivism rates.  These "absolute" rates purport to predict the 
likelihood that the assessed individual will commit another sex 
offense over future periods of time (e.g., in the next five or 
ten years). 
¶6 
Dr. Tyre testified that he assigned Jendusa the 
high-risk/high-needs norm and that Jendusa's total scores placed 
him in the high-moderate risk category on the RRASOR assessment 
and in the above-average risk category on the two Static-99 
assessments.  Applying those risk categories to the high-
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
6 
risk/high-needs norm's base rate, Dr. Tyre predicted that 
Jendusa has the following absolute recidivism rates: 
 52 percent over 15 years (according to the 
Static-99); 
 33 to 37 percent over ten years (according to the 
Static-99R); and 
 17 to 25 percent over five years (according to 
the Static-99R). 
Dr. Tyre stated that Jendusa's score on the SOTIPS, which 
additionally considered several of Jendusa's dynamic risk 
factors, indicated that Jendusa's absolute recidivism rate was 
likely slightly higher than that estimated by the Static-99 and 
Static-99R.  Dr. Tyre also acknowledged that certain mitigating 
factors, such as Jendusa's age (51 years old) and his 
participation in sex-offender programming, slightly reduced 
Jendusa's likelihood to engage in future acts of sexual 
violence; yet Dr. Tyre ultimately concluded that Jendusa is more 
likely than not to engage in a future act of sexual violence. 
¶7 
On cross-examination, Dr. Tyre revealed that the DOC 
maintains a Wisconsin-specific database of individuals that it 
has evaluated for sexually violent person commitments and that 
he was in the beginning stages of analyzing this data.  Dr. Tyre 
testified that nearly two years prior, one of his colleagues had 
emailed him the preliminary results of that analysis, including 
a Wisconsin-specific base rate, but Dr. Tyre claimed he had not 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
7 
yet reviewed that email.7  Nevertheless, he acknowledged that the 
Wisconsin-specific base rate could be lower than the base rates 
in the Static-99 or Static-99R, and that a lower base rate may 
affect his assessment of Jendusa's likelihood to engage in a 
future act of sexual violence. 
¶8 
Based on Dr. Tyre's evaluation, the circuit court 
found probable cause to believe that Jendusa is a sexually 
violent person, ordered the DOC to detain him, and bound him 
over for trial pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.04(3). 
¶9 
Jendusa then moved the circuit court to order the DOC 
to disclose its database so that he could have an expert analyze 
the 
Wisconsin-specific 
base 
rate 
citing 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.036(2)(h), (2)(j), and (5), as well as the Fifth and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution.  
Jendusa argued that the database is potentially exculpatory 
evidence——it either tends to show he does not meet the 
commitment criteria or impeaches Dr. Tyre's evaluation——because 
the Wisconsin-specific base rate may be lower than the base 
rates Dr. Tyre employed to evaluate him.  Application of a lower 
Wisconsin-specific base rate, in turn, could result in a 
                                                 
7 Nearly two years prior to the hearing, Dr. Tyre's co-
researcher compared the names of the offenders in the DOC 
database against Wisconsin court records in the Consolidated 
Court Automation Programs and produced a de-identified database 
containing information on who recidivated and their respective 
scores on various actuarial instruments.  For purposes of this 
opinion, "de-identified" means that all personally identifying 
information, such as an individual's name and birthdate, is 
removed. 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
8 
predicted lifetime recidivism risk below 50 percent, undermining 
the State's contention that Jendusa is "likely" to engage in 
future acts of sexual violence.  Jendusa also argued that the 
database 
was 
exculpatory 
impeachment 
material 
because 
a 
Wisconsin-specific base rate may better capture unique cultural 
and social features not present in the Canadian and Danish 
samples represented in the Static-99.8 
¶10 The State opposed disclosure on three grounds.  It 
first 
argued 
that 
the 
database 
is 
not 
in 
the 
State's 
"possession" because it is in the DOC's possession.  Second, the 
State argued that the database itself cannot be exculpatory 
since only an analysis of that data could reveal a different 
base rate, which may or may not be lower than the one used by 
Dr. Tyre.  The State argued that therefore there is no statutory 
or constitutional requirement to disclose the data itself.  
Finally, the State claimed that Jendusa has an adequate 
alternative remedy via a research request pursuant to the DOC's 
Executive 
Directive #36 
("Directive #36"), 
"Human 
Subject 
Research Requests Process and Procedure."  See https://doc.wi.go
v/DataResearch/ConductingResearch/WIDOCExecutiveDirective36.pdf.  
The State maintained that because Directive #36 was developed in 
                                                 
8 See R. Karl Hanson et al., What Sexual Recidivism Rates 
Are Associated with Static-99R and Static-2002R Scores?, 28 
Sexual 
Abuse: 
 
J. Rsch. & Treatment 
218, 
241 
(2015) 
(recommending that evaluators use "local STATIC norms" because 
they "can account for the unique cultural and social features of 
a specific jurisdiction"). 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
9 
accordance with state and federal health-privacy laws, it is the 
exclusive means of accessing such sensitive "medical" data. 
¶11 In 
fact, 
Jendusa 
had 
requested 
the 
data 
under 
Directive #36, but to no avail.  The DOC's Research Review 
Committee approved his request, but later communications between 
Jendusa and the DOC's lead research analyst indicated that the 
DOC was confused about which database Jendusa had requested.  
Their correspondence also revealed that the lead research 
analyst was working with Dr. Tyre to identify the database.  
Eventually, the DOC told Jendusa that he had to sign a 
memorandum of understanding before it could transfer any data to 
him and that it was in the process of drafting that memorandum.  
The DOC never forwarded that memorandum, and it has yet to 
transfer the database to him. 
¶12 Jendusa similarly encountered obstacles in court.  
After learning that Dr. Tyre had received a preliminary analysis 
of a Wisconsin-specific base rate, Jendusa requested by subpoena 
duces 
tecum 
that 
Dr. Tyre 
produce 
the 
database 
and 
the 
preliminary analysis.9  The State made no attempt to quash the 
subpoena; yet, on the advice of the DOC's counsel, Dr. Tyre 
appeared at the motion hearing without the database or the 
preliminary analysis. 
¶13 The circuit court then ordered Dr. Tyre to "personally 
open 
and 
read 
the 
spreadsheet 
containing 
de-identified 
                                                 
9 A subpoena duces tecum is a request that the witness 
produce not only himself or herself for live testimony but also 
certain physical evidence. 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
10 
recidivism data," "familiarize himself with the contents of that 
file and be prepared to testify about said contents," and "bring 
a copy of the aforementioned de-identified file so as to refer 
to the file if need be."  Dr. Tyre, again on the advice of the 
DOC's counsel but without objecting to the circuit court's 
order, did not bring the de-identified database to court.  He 
did, 
however, 
review 
the 
database 
and 
his 
colleague's 
preliminary analysis.  He testified that roughly 7 percent of 
the 913 Wisconsin sex offenders in the database were convicted 
of a new sex offense.  That number, according to Dr. Tyre, 
required additional follow-up and refinement to verify.  Still, 
Dr. Tyre confirmed that this preliminary base rate was roughly 
one-third of the base rate he relied on to predict Jendusa's 
recidivism risk. 
¶14 After hearing Dr. Tyre's testimony, the circuit court 
ordered the DOC to transmit the full, unredacted database to 
Jendusa 
so 
that 
Dr. David 
Thornton, 
the 
court-appointed 
psychologist and co-creator of the Static-99, could analyze it.  
Dr. Thornton's role was limited to analyzing the data to 
"determine recidivism information."  The circuit court stayed 
its order pending resolution of the State's petition for leave 
to appeal that non-final order.  The court of appeals denied the 
State's petition, stating only that the petition "fails to 
satisfy the criteria for permissive appeal."  State v. Jendusa, 
No. 2018AP2357-LV, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. July 16, 
2019). 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
11 
¶15 We granted review of the court of appeals' denial of 
the State's petition for interlocutory appeal and further 
directed the parties to address the underlying substantive 
issues related to the circuit court's discovery order.10 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 We review for an erroneous exercise of discretion the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
denial 
of 
the 
State's 
petition 
for 
interlocutory appeal.  See Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2); Leavitt v. 
Beverly Enters., Inc., 2010 WI 71, ¶42, 326 Wis. 2d 421, 784 
N.W.2d 683.  The court of appeals erroneously exercises its 
discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard or makes a 
decision not reasonably supported by the facts of record.  See 
State v. Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶23, 345 Wis. 2d 407, 826 N.W.2d 60. 
¶17 We review de novo the circuit court's interpretation 
and application of Wis. Stat. § 980.036 as the basis for 
ordering the disclosure of the DOC database.  See Moreschi v. 
Vill. of Williams Bay, 2020 WI 95, ¶13, 395 Wis. 2d 55, 953 
N.W.2d 318. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶18 We begin by reaffirming our longstanding and sound 
practice of typically not reviewing the court of appeals' 
                                                 
10 We asked the parties to address whether the DOC database 
was discoverable on grounds outside of Wis. Stat. ch. 980, 
including Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  We also 
directed the parties to brief the applicability of Wisconsin and 
federal health-privacy laws.  Because we uphold the discovery 
order under Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5), we do not address these 
additional questions. 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
12 
discretionary denial of a petition for interlocutory appeal.  
Additionally, we clarify that the court of appeals need not 
explain why it denied leave to file an interlocutory appeal.  
Although we conclude that the court of appeals did not err in 
denying the State's petition for interlocutory appeal, we 
address the merits of that appeal and determine that the DOC 
database is "raw data" that is discoverable under Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.036(5). 
A.  Review of Interlocutory Appeal Denials 
¶19 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 808.03(2) 
governs 
appeals 
from 
non-final orders: 
(2) Appeals by permission.  A judgment or order not 
appealable as a matter of right under sub. (1) may be 
appealed to the court of appeals in advance of a final 
judgment or order upon leave granted by the court if 
it determines that an appeal will: 
(a) Materially advance the termination of the 
litigation or clarify further proceedings in the 
litigation; 
(b) Protect the petitioner from substantial or 
irreparable injury; or 
(c) Clarify an issue of general importance in the 
administration of justice. 
The plain language of § 808.03(2) entrusts to the court of 
appeals discretion over interlocutory appeals.  As a matter of 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
13 
well-settled practice,11 we respect this legislative choice by 
generally not reviewing a court of appeals' decision to decline 
a 
petition 
for 
interlocutory 
appeal. 
 
See 
Leavitt, 
326 
Wis. 2d 421, ¶47. 
¶20 There are several sound reasons for this practice.  To 
do otherwise would "divest" the court of appeals of a power 
explicitly "entrusted to it" by the legislature.  Id. (quoting 
Aparacor, Inc. v. DILHR, 97 Wis. 2d 399, 404, 293 N.W.2d 545 
(1980)).  Moreover, by affording litigants two opportunities to 
seek leave to appeal non-final orders, we would encourage more 
interlocutory appellate practice.  Such a practice would 
undermine the two purposes of Wis. Stat. § 808.03:  "(1) to 
                                                 
11 This court has jurisdiction to review a denial of leave 
to file an interlocutory appeal under both the Wisconsin 
Constitution and Wis. Stat. § 808.10(1).  See Leavitt v. Beverly 
Enters., Inc., 2010 WI 71, ¶46, 326 Wis. 2d 421, 784 N.W.2d 683 
("[T]he Wisconsin Constitution provides that we have 'appellate 
jurisdiction over all courts' and we 'may review judgments and 
orders of the court of appeals.'" (quoting Wis. Const. art. VII, 
§ 3(2)-(3))); see also § 808.10(1) ("A decision of the court of 
appeals is reviewable by the supreme court only upon a petition 
for review granted by the supreme court.").  We acknowledge that 
language from our cases decided shortly after the creation of 
the court of appeals might be read to mean this court lacks 
jurisdiction to review such denials.  See Aparacor, Inc. v. 
DILHR, 97 Wis. 2d 399, 403–04, 293 N.W.2d 545 (1980) ("Where the 
court of appeals denies permission to appeal from an order 
conceded by the parties to be nonfinal, no review by this court 
is permitted."); State v. Whitty, 86 Wis. 2d 380, 388, 272 
N.W.2d 842 (1978); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis. 2d 74, 77 n.2, 97D, 
288 N.W.2d 114 (1980), modified per curiam on reconsideration, 
94 Wis. 2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980).  As we clarified in 
Leavitt, however, this "strong" language is not a jurisdictional 
holding but rather an endorsement of our practice of not 
reviewing 
denials 
of 
petitions 
for 
interlocutory 
appeal.  
Leavitt, 326 Wis. 2d 421, ¶¶45-47. 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
14 
protect 
the 
trial 
proceedings 
by 
avoiding 
unnecessary 
interruptions and delay caused by multiple appeals[;] and (2) to 
reduce the burden on the court of appeals by limiting the number 
of appeals to one appeal per case and allowing piecemeal appeals 
only 
under 
the 
special 
circumstances 
set 
forth 
in 
[§] 808.03(2)."  Heaton v. Larsen, 97 Wis. 2d 379, 395–96, 294 
N.W.2d 15 (1980).  Given these considerable disadvantages, we 
reaffirm that this court will generally not review the court of 
appeals' denial of a petition for interlocutory appeal.12 
                                                 
12 The court has routinely declined to encroach upon the 
court of appeals' discretion regarding certain classes of 
interlocutory appeals despite compelling reasons to do so.  See 
Lassa v. Rongstad, 2006 WI 105, ¶¶84-89, 294 Wis. 2d 187, 718 
N.W.2d 673 (declining to require the court of appeals to 
categorically grant petitions for interlocutory appeal regarding 
discovery orders in defamation cases even where constitutional 
privileges are implicated); State ex rel. Hass v. Wis. Ct. of 
Appeals, 2001 WI 128, 248 Wis. 2d 634, 636 N.W.2d 707 (same 
regarding denied motions for issue or claim preclusion based on 
a final federal judgment despite federal-state court comity 
concerns); Jenich, 94 Wis. 2d 74, 97A n.1 (as modified per 
curiam on reconsideration) (same regarding denied motions to 
dismiss based on double jeopardy, despite the substantial and 
irreparable harm of subjecting a defendant to an unlawful second 
trial). 
This court has directed the court of appeals to grant 
petitions for interlocutory appeal as a matter of course 
pursuant to our constitutional superintending power in only one 
circumstance: 
 
qualified 
immunity. 
 
See 
Arneson 
v. 
Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996).  We reached 
that conclusion on exceptionally strong grounds:  denial of 
those petitions for interlocutory appeal would result in no 
adequate remedy for the person seeking immunity and in the 
potentially needless cost and hardship of litigating a case 
where the defendant is ultimately immune from liability.  
Id. at 226–30. 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
15 
¶21 That conclusion also leads us to reject the parties' 
request to extend State v. Scott, 2018 WI 74, 382 Wis. 2d 476, 
914 N.W.2d 141.  In Scott, we held that, in order to "facilitate 
judicial review," the court of appeals must explain the reasons 
for its discretionary decisions.  Id., ¶¶38-41.  But Scott's 
rationale is inapposite here; when the court of appeals denies a 
petition for interlocutory appeal, there generally is no 
judicial review to facilitate.  See Leavitt, 326 Wis. 2d 421, 
¶47.  And in the rare instance that we do review such denials, 
we do so for larger policy considerations that transcend the 
particulars of any one case and that are unrelated to any 
reasons articulated by the court of appeals.  See Arneson v. 
Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996).  Therefore, 
it is not necessary for the court of appeals to explain why it 
denied a party leave to file an interlocutory appeal. 
¶22 In this case, the court of appeals concluded "that the 
petition fails to satisfy the criteria for permissive appeal," 
citing Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2).  As § 808.03(2) is the correct 
legal standard governing such decisions and the court of appeals 
reasonably determined the petition did not satisfy those 
criteria, we conclude that the court of appeals did not 
erroneously 
exercise 
its 
discretion. 
 
See 
Avery, 
345 
Wis. 2d 407, ¶23. 
B.  The Discoverability of the DOC Database 
¶23 We proceed with a de novo review of the circuit 
court's order and interpret Wis. Stat. § 980.036 as it applies 
to the DOC database.  The general discovery provisions set forth 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
16 
in Wis. Stat. ch. 804 do not apply to a Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
proceeding.  Wis. Stat. § 980.036(11).  In such a proceeding, 
§ 980.036 provides the "only methods of obtaining discovery."  
Id.  Jendusa contends that the DOC database is discoverable 
under the following three subsections of § 980.036: 
(2) What a Prosecuting Attorney Must Disclose to a 
Person Subject to this Chapter.  Upon demand, a 
prosecuting attorney shall disclose to a person 
subject to this chapter or his or her attorney, and 
permit the person subject to this chapter or his or 
her attorney to inspect and copy or photograph, all of 
the following materials and information, if the 
material or information is within the possession, 
custody, or control of the state: 
. . .  
(h) The results of any 
physical or mental 
examination or any scientific or psychological 
test, instrument, experiment, or comparison that 
the prosecuting attorney intends to offer in 
evidence at the trial or proceeding, and any raw 
data that were collected, used, or considered in 
any manner as part of the examination, test, 
instrument, experiment, or comparison. 
. . .  
(j) Any exculpatory evidence. 
. . .  
(5) Testing or Analysis of Evidence.  On motion of a 
party, the court may order the production of any item 
of evidence or raw data that is intended to be 
introduced at the trial for testing or analysis under 
such terms and conditions as the court prescribes. 
¶24 We focus on the plain language of § 980.036.  "If the 
meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the 
inquiry."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
17 
WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoted source 
omitted).  If not specially defined or technical, statutory 
language "is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning."  
Id.  We read statutory provisions in context rather than in 
isolation and in a way that "avoid[s] absurd or unreasonable 
results."  Id., ¶46. 
¶25 We begin with subsec. (5) because it is the broadest 
provision.  The first clause of subsec. (5), "[o]n motion of a 
party," unambiguously applies to motions by either party.  Here, 
that clause was satisfied when Jendusa moved the circuit court 
for the DOC database's disclosure. 
¶26 The 
second 
clause, 
"the 
court 
may 
order 
the 
production," indicates that if the requested item meets the 
other criteria in subsec. (5), then the circuit court has 
discretion to order its production.  That is because we 
traditionally interpret "may" as permissive, Waukesha Cnty. v. 
S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, ¶36, 387 Wis. 2d 333, 929 N.W.2d 140, and to 
"impl[y] a discretionary element," Swatek v. Cnty. of Dane, 192 
Wis. 2d 47, 59, 531 N.W.2d 45 (1995).  To that end, subsec. (5) 
further empowers the circuit court to order the production of 
applicable evidence "under such terms and conditions as the 
court prescribes."  Read together, these clauses afford the 
circuit court wide discretion regarding not only whether a 
requested item should be produced but also the manner and 
conditions of its production. 
¶27 Next, subsec. (5) covers only "item[s] of evidence" or 
"raw data."  Jendusa contends that the DOC database, at least in 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
18 
the format that he requests it, is raw data.  "Data," according 
to its dictionary definition,13 can mean "[f]actual information, 
especially information organized for analysis or used to reason 
or make decisions" or "information represented in a form 
suitable for processing by computer."  Data, The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 475 (3d ed. 1992).  
The modifier "raw" signifies that the data has "[n]ot . . . been 
subjected to adjustment, treatment, or analysis."  Raw, American 
Heritage Dictionary, supra, at 1502.  This dictionary definition 
of "raw data" comports with the term's common use in the social 
science research context as "information that is gathered for a 
research study before that information has been transformed or 
analyzed in any way."14  Raw Data, Encyclopedia of Survey 
Research Methods (Paul J. Lavrakas ed., 2008); see also Feist 
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) 
(defining 
"raw 
data" 
as 
"wholly 
factual 
information 
not 
accompanied by any original written expression"). 
¶28 The DOC database fits the definition of "raw data."  
As it is described in the record, the database contains 
unprocessed 
information, 
such 
as 
individuals' 
names 
and 
                                                 
13 "[W]e may ascertain the term's plain and ordinary meaning 
through sources such as dictionaries."  E.g., State v. Hager, 
2018 WI 40, ¶29, 381 Wis. 2d 74, 911 N.W.2d 17. 
14 "A court 'should assume the contextually appropriate 
ordinary meaning unless there is reason to think otherwise.'"  
State v. Steffes, 2013 WI 53, ¶25, 347 Wis. 2d 683, 832 
N.W.2d 101 (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading 
Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 69 (2012)). 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
19 
birthdates, criminal histories, mental health diagnoses, and 
scores on various actuarial assessments.  That information is 
organized by column, and an individual's unique numerical score 
in each category is inputted in the intersecting row associated 
with that individual.  In this form, which is how Jendusa has 
requested it, the data will not have been processed or analyzed.  
Thus, 
this 
matrix 
of 
unprocessed, 
factual 
information 
constitutes "raw data." 
¶29 But while satisfying the definition of raw data is 
necessary, it is not sufficient.  The purview of subsec. (5) 
extends only to raw data that is "intended to be introduced at 
the trial."  Unlike the neighboring subsecs. (2) and (3), both 
of which speak to evidence that a specific party intends to 
introduce, subsec. (5) contains no similar limitation.  Thus, 
subsec. (5) must apply to raw data that either party intends to 
introduce at trial.  See State v. A.L., 2019 WI 20, ¶17, 385 
Wis. 2d 612, 
923 
N.W.2d 827 
("When 
the 
legislature 
uses 
different terms in a statute, the terms are presumed to have 
distinct meanings."). 
¶30 That leaves a final interpretive question:  what does 
it mean to intend to introduce raw data at trial?  The State 
suggests that because Jendusa did not intend to introduce only 
the DOC's raw data, subsec. (5) does not apply.  That reading is 
overly formalistic and disregards the context of ch. 980.  We 
must instead interpret the plain language of subsec. (5) "in the 
context in which it is used."  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  
In the ch. 980 context, raw data is data that informs an 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
20 
expert's analysis regarding the risk a respondent will engage in 
future acts of sexual violence.  But without that analysis, the 
raw data alone has no probative value.  Indeed, the language of 
subsec. (5) reflects this reality in that it acknowledges the 
purpose of requesting raw data is to subject it to "testing or 
analysis."  Thus, in the ch. 980 context, the only reasonable 
reading of "raw data that is intended to be introduced at the 
trial" is that the analysis of the raw data is intended to be 
introduced. 
¶31 Therefore, Jendusa's intent to introduce an analysis 
of the DOC's raw data at trial satisfies the requirement in 
subsec. (5) that he intend to introduce the raw data.15  Because 
                                                 
15 The State levels a cursory argument that, under Burnett 
v. Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 589 N.W.2d 21 (1999), the circuit court 
can never order a court-appointed expert to perform an analysis 
of data.  This argument misunderstands the Alt privilege and 
ignores the facts of this case.  The Alt court announced that 
experts have an implied legal privilege to refuse to provide 
expert testimony.  Id. at 86.  So, "absent a showing of 
compelling circumstances, an expert cannot be compelled to give 
expert testimony whether the inquiry asks for the expert's 
existing opinions or would require further work."  Id. at 89.  
Alt based this privilege on the text of Wis. Stat. § 907.06, 
which predicated a court's appointment of an expert witness on 
the expert witness' "consent[]."  Id. at 86 ("If a court cannot 
compel an expert witness to testify, it logically follows that a 
litigant should not be able to so compel an expert."). 
Alt is of no avail to the State for two reasons.  First, 
the State concedes in its brief that "Dr. Thornton has no 
objection" to this court appointment or to analyzing this data, 
and so § 907.06 permits both.  Second, only the privilege 
holder——here, Dr. Thornton——can invoke the privilege, and he has 
not done so.  Cf. 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series:  
Wisconsin Evidence § 504.3, at 410 (4th ed. 2017) ("A party to a 
lawsuit cannot invoke the [patient-provider] privilege unless he 
or she is the holder . . . ."). 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
21 
the DOC database is discoverable under subsec. (5), there is no 
need to address whether it is also discoverable under Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.036(2)(h) or (j).  See Maryland Arms Ltd. P'ship v. 
Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15. 
¶32 Of 
course, 
in 
addition 
to 
the 
conditions 
of 
subsec. (5), a defendant's request for raw data must also 
satisfy the other rules of evidence.  In particular, the raw 
data requested must be relevant to the case.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.02.  That is, a defendant must show that the raw data has 
some tendency to make more probable his claim that he is not 
likely to commit future acts of sexual violence.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.01.  After all, subsec. (5) does not authorize a fishing 
expedition for any raw data based on speculation that an 
analysis of that data might be relevant. 
¶33 Here, Jendusa's request for raw data satisfies this 
relevance requirement.  Dr. Tyre testified that, although he did 
not conduct a full analysis of the DOC's data, his colleague's 
preliminary analysis indicated that it may be exculpatory.  
Jendusa is not required to wait for the State to conduct a full 
analysis in order to prove its relevancy.  Such an analysis is 
likely not forthcoming given that the preliminary analysis 
suggests that the DOC may be overestimating the recidivism risk 
for offenders such as Jendusa.  Dr. Tyre's testimony is 
sufficient to establish that the DOC database is relevant to 
Jendusa's defense.  Therefore, we conclude that the circuit 
court permissibly granted Jendusa's motion requiring the DOC to 
produce the database for Jendusa to analyze. 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
22 
¶34 Finally, we reject the State's argument that the 
circuit court cannot order the State to turn over the DOC 
database because the database is not in the State's possession.16  
The thrust of the State's argument is that the DOC "has no 
connection" to Jendusa's Wis. Stat. ch. 980 proceeding, likening 
the DOC to the state hospital in State v. Darcy N.K., 218 
Wis. 2d 640, 581 N.W.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1998).  In Darcy N.K., the 
court of appeals concluded that a child sexual assault victim's 
psychiatric records were not in the State's possession because 
the state hospital that held the records played no role in the 
defendant's prosecution.  Id. at 649-57.  The hospital's sole 
connection to the prosecution was treating the victim.  That 
stands in stark contrast to the critical role the DOC has and 
continues to play in Jendusa's ch. 980 proceeding.  It was a DOC 
employee, Dr. Tyre, who evaluated Jendusa and, based on DOC 
records, declared him eligible for commitment as a sexually 
violent person.  The circuit court relied upon that same DOC 
employee's Special Purpose Evaluation and testimony to find 
probable cause that Jendusa is a sexually violent person.  And 
it is the DOC who detained Jendusa following the probable cause 
determination.  Thus, far from having "no connection" to 
                                                 
16 Unlike neighboring Wis. Stat. § 980.036(2) and (3), 
§ 980.036(5) does not explicitly require that the requested 
evidence be "within the possession, custody, or control of the 
state." 
 
The 
significance 
of 
that 
phrase's 
absence 
in 
subsec. (5), however, is left for another day because we 
conclude for other reasons that the DOC is "the state" for 
purposes of Jendusa's Wis. Stat. ch. 980 proceeding. 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
23 
Jendusa's 
Wis. 
Stat. 
ch. 980 
proceeding, 
the 
DOC 
is 
so 
inextricably intertwined with this case that it qualifies as 
"the state" for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 980.036. 
¶35 Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that Wis. 
Stat. § 980.036(5) provides the circuit court the discretion to 
order the disclosure of raw data, like the DOC database, when 
the respondent moves for such disclosure and intends to 
introduce an analysis of that raw data at trial. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶36 We reaffirm our longstanding and sound practice of 
typically not reviewing the court of appeals' discretionary 
denial of a petition for interlocutory appeal.  We hold that 
when the court of appeals denies a petition for an interlocutory 
appeal, it need not explain why.  We conclude that, here, the 
court of appeals did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
denying the State's petition for interlocutory appeal.  Lastly, 
we conclude that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5), the 
circuit court permissibly ordered the disclosure of the DOC 
database for the purpose of testing or analysis because Jendusa 
moved for such disclosure, he intends to introduce an analysis 
of that raw data at his ch. 980 trial, and it is relevant to 
that trial.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' order 
and the circuit court's discovery order and remand the cause to 
the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
No. 
2018AP2357-LV 
 
24 
By the Court.—The order of the court of appeals is 
affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
No.  2018AP2357-LV.akz 
 
1 
 
¶37 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (dissenting).  I write 
separately because the majority undermines our review of future 
cases and misreads the plain language of the statute.  The 
majority errs when it concludes that the court of appeals does 
not need to explain why it denies a party's motion for leave to 
file an interlocutory appeal because of our general deference to 
the court of appeals in this area.  The majority also errs when 
it concludes that the Department of Corrections' (DOC) database 
is discoverable in this case under Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5) 
because raw data has meaning only in the context of analysis.  
These errors will impact 
not only 
this case, but will 
detrimentally affect our review of the court of appeals in 
future cases.   
¶38 To reach its conclusions, the majority ignores our 
prior cases and the choice of the legislature.  It carves out an 
exception from a general rule that allows us to review the 
decisions of the court of appeals.  Moreover, it reads language 
into the statute that the legislature did not include.   
¶39 I conclude that the court of appeals must explain its 
reasoning when it denies a party's motion for leave to file an 
interlocutory appeal.  I also conclude that the DOC's database 
is not discoverable under Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5)'s plain 
language.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
 
I.  THE COURT OF APPEALS MUST EXPLAIN ITS REASONING  
WHEN IT EXERCISES ITS DISCRETION. 
¶40 When a party moves for leave to file an interlocutory 
appeal, the court of appeals is statutorily bound to assess 
certain factors in making its determination.  See Wis. Stat. 
No.  2018AP2357-LV.akz 
 
2 
 
§ 808.03(2).  The court of appeals may hear an appeal of a non-
final order "if it determines that an appeal will": 
(a)  Materially advance the termination of the 
litigation or clarify further proceedings in the 
litigation;  
(b)  Protect the petitioner from substantial or 
irreparable injury; or 
(c)  Clarify an issue of general importance in 
the administration of justice.   
Id.  "It is well settled that petitions seeking review of a 
court of appeals' denial of leave to appeal are generally not 
permitted."  Leavitt v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 2010 WI 71, 
¶47, 326 Wis. 2d 421, 784 N.W.2d 683 (quoted source omitted).  
However, this general practice does not mean we do not have 
jurisdiction to review these denials.  Id., ¶5 ("Article VII, 
§ 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that this court has 
jurisdiction to review an order issued by the court of 
appeals.").   
¶41 When we exercise our constitutional power to review 
discretionary decisions of the court of appeals, we must have 
some explanation of the court of appeals' reasoning.  State v. 
Scott, 2018 WI 74, ¶¶35-41, 382 Wis. 2d 476, 914 N.W.2d 141 
(requiring the court of appeals to explain its reasoning when it 
exercises its discretion).  As we explained in Scott, "[o]ur 
jurisprudence governing the proper exercise of circuit court 
discretion is instructive in determining whether the court of 
appeals must explain the reasons underlying its discretionary 
decision-making."  Id., ¶38.  Accordingly, we may look to the 
requirements we have placed upon the circuit courts and 
No.  2018AP2357-LV.akz 
 
3 
 
determine whether those requirements apply to the court of 
appeals in the context of the denial of a motion for leave to 
file 
an 
interlocutory 
appeal. 
 
I 
conclude 
that 
those 
requirements do apply.  
¶42 "When a circuit court exercises its discretion, it 
must explain on the record its reasons for its discretionary 
decision 'to ensure the soundness of its own decision making and 
to facilitate judicial review.'"  Id. (quoting Klinger v. Oneida 
Cnty., 149 Wis. 2d 838, 847, 440 N.W.2d 348 (1989)).  We require 
this of circuit courts because "a circuit court's discretionary 
decision 'is not the equivalent of unfettered decision-making.'"  
Id. (quoting Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 
N.W.2d 16 (1981)).  This requirement ensures that a circuit 
court examined the relevant facts, applied the proper standard 
of law, and used a rational process to arrive at a conclusion 
that a reasonable judge would make.  Id., ¶39.  Absent an 
explanation on the record, we cannot determine whether the 
circuit court complied with this standard.  Accordingly, as we 
have held, "[i]f a circuit court fails to explain its exercise 
of discretion on the record, it has erroneously exercised its 
discretion."  Id.   
¶43 We have previously applied this rationale to the court 
of appeals.  See id., ¶¶40-41.  Although we found no case "that 
require[d] 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
to 
explain 
the 
reasons 
underlying its discretionary decisions," "the justification that 
this court has relied upon to require a circuit court to explain 
its discretionary decision-making applies equally to the court 
No.  2018AP2357-LV.akz 
 
4 
 
of appeals."  Id., ¶40.  "The court of appeals should explain 
its discretionary decision-making to ensure the soundness of 
that decision-making and to facilitate judicial review."  Id.   
¶44 This case presents us with an opportunity to reaffirm 
the principle that we set forth in Scott.  Instead of continuing 
to require the court of appeals to explain its discretionary 
decision-making, the majority balks and carves out an exception 
not found in Scott's proclamation.  See majority op., ¶¶20-21.  
The majority reasons that because we "generally [do] not review 
the court of appeals' denial of a petition for interlocutory 
appeal," the court of appeals need not explain its reasoning for 
a denial.  Majority op., ¶20.  However, the majority conflates 
general deference with actual review.  When we afford the court 
of appeals or the circuit court deference, we are merely stating 
that we will not second-guess their decision unless that 
decision cannot be supported by the facts, law, or rationality.  
See Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶¶39-40 (applying the standard of 
review to the court of appeals); Rechsteiner v. Hazelden, 2008 
WI 97, ¶28, 313 Wis. 2d 542, 753 N.W.2d 496 (applying the 
standard of review to the circuit court).  However, for us to 
understand whether a court of appeals' or circuit court's 
decision can be supported by the facts, law, or rationality, we 
must have that court's explanation of its reasoning.  Without 
No.  2018AP2357-LV.akz 
 
5 
 
the reasoning, we have nothing to actually review, and our 
constitutional power to review is gutted.1  
¶45 This case exemplifies why this is so.  Here, the court 
of appeals denied, without explanation, the State's motion for 
leave to appeal.  The court of appeals merely stated that the 
State's "petition fails to satisfy the criteria for permissive 
appeal."  However, when looking at the factors the court of 
appeals must consider, at least one of them seems to be 
implicated.  The State here has alleged that it will face 
"substantial or irreparable injury" if it is ordered to release 
the DOC database.  Presumably, the court of appeals disagreed.  
Why?  We will never know because the court of appeals never 
explained its reasoning.  We cannot know whether the court of 
appeals examined the relevant facts, applied the proper standard 
of law, or used a rational process to reach its conclusion.  How 
then are we to determine whether the court of appeals 
erroneously exercised its discretion?  We cannot.   
¶46 Accordingly, the majority has now given the court of 
appeals "unfettered decision-making" power over interlocutory 
appeals.  See majority op., ¶¶20-21.  Without anything to 
review, our "general deference" to the court of appeals 
transforms into total deference to the court of appeals.  Rather 
                                                 
1 For example, if a circuit court was to deny Jendusa's 
request to admit certain evidence, but failed to explain its 
reasons for denying the evidence, we would be left having to 
guess why the circuit court denied Jendusa's request.  Rather 
than reviewing the circuit court's decision, we would be making 
a decision as if we were the circuit court.  This would 
undermine any deference we afford the circuit court.   
No.  2018AP2357-LV.akz 
 
6 
 
than give the court of appeals total deference, I would require 
the court of appeals to explain its reasoning when it denies a 
party's motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal so that 
we have some basis to exercise our constitutional power to 
review the court of appeals.  Because the court of appeals did 
not 
explain 
its 
decision, 
it 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion.2   
 
II.  THE DOC DATABASE CANNOT BE DISCOVERED UNDER  
WIS. STAT. § 980.036(5). 
¶47 Moving to the underlying merits of the claim, the 
majority incorrectly concludes that the State must disclose the 
DOC database pursuant to the circuit court's order under Wis. 
Stat. § 980.036(5).  However, the majority impermissibly reads 
language into the statute to reach this conclusion.  Based on 
the plain language, Jendusa cannot obtain the DOC database 
because it was not intended to be introduced at trial.   
¶48 Statutory interpretation "begins with the language of 
the statute."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "If 
                                                 
2 The 
majority 
does 
not 
explain 
how 
addressing 
the 
underlying merits of this appeal does not "encroach upon the 
court of appeals' discretion regarding certain classes of 
interlocutory appeals . . . ."  Majority op., ¶20 n.12.  Indeed, 
it seems contradictory to say that we will not encroach upon the 
court of appeals' decision not to address the merits of an 
appeal, then address the merits of the appeal.  Moreover, 
addressing the merits of this appeal when affirming the court of 
appeals' dismissal is contrary to our longstanding doctrine that 
"[w]hen the resolution of one issue disposes of an appeal, we 
will not address additional issues."   Barber v. Weber, 2006 WI 
App 88, ¶19, 292 Wis. 2d 426, 715 N.W.2d 683 (citing Gross v. 
Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663 (1938)).   
No.  2018AP2357-LV.akz 
 
7 
 
the meaning of the statute is plain, [then] we ordinarily stop 
the inquiry."  Id.  We give statutory language "its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning."  Id.  We give "technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases" their "technical or special 
definitional meaning."  Id.  "Context is important to meaning" 
and must be interpreted "as part of a whole."  Id., ¶46. 
¶49 The legislature has limited the scope of discovery in 
chapter 980 proceedings.  Wis. Stat. § 980.036(11) ("This 
section provides the only methods of obtaining discovery and 
inspection in proceedings under this chapter.").  Accordingly, 
to receive the DOC database, Jendusa must show that it is 
discoverable under one of the provisions of § 980.036.  The 
majority focuses its analysis on § 980.036(5).3  Section 
                                                 
3 Because the majority concludes that the DOC's database is 
discoverable under Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5), the majority does 
not address the other bases upon which Jendusa argues he may 
obtain the data, namely Wis. Stat. § 980.036(2)(h) and (2)(j).  
However, Jendusa would still not be able to discover the DOC's 
database under either of these provisions.  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 980.036(2)(h) 
provides 
that 
the 
prosecuting attorney must disclose: 
[t]he results of any physical or mental examination or 
any scientific or psychological test, instrument, 
experiment, 
or 
comparison 
that 
the 
prosecuting 
attorney intends to offer in evidence at the trial or 
proceeding, and any raw data that were collected, 
used, or considered in any manner as part of the 
examination, 
test, 
instrument, 
experiment, 
or 
comparison. 
No.  2018AP2357-LV.akz 
 
8 
 
980.036(5) provides that "[o]n motion of a party, the court may 
order the production of any item of evidence or raw data that is 
intended to be introduced at the trial for testing or analysis 
under such terms and conditions as the court prescribes."  
(Emphasis added.)  This language is as clear as it could be——
some party must intend to introduce at trial the raw data 
requested.  Neither the State nor Jendusa claimed they would 
introduce the raw data at trial.  As such, under the plain 
language of the statute, Jendusa cannot obtain the DOC database 
under Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5).   
¶50 The majority asserts that it is "overly formalistic" 
to comply with the plain language of the statute.  Majority op., 
¶30.  The majority concludes that "the only reasonable reading 
of 'raw data that is intended to be introduced at the trial' is 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Emphasis added.)  Here, the database was not "collected, used, 
or considered in any manner as part of the examination, test, 
instrument, experiment, or comparison."  The State does not 
intend to offer the database, or anything generated from the 
database, at the trial or proceeding.  Accordingly, the 
prosecuting attorney is not required to disclose the DOC's 
database to Jendusa under subsec. (2)(h).  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 980.036(2)(j) 
provides 
that 
the 
prosecuting attorney must disclose "[a]ny exculpatory evidence."  
Despite Jendusa's claim that the DOC's database may prove that 
he does not meet the criteria for commitment, unanalyzed raw 
data cannot serve as exculpatory evidence because it is unclear 
whether testing "would produce inculpatory, exculpatory, or 
inconclusive 
results," 
and 
the 
defendant 
cannot 
put 
an 
"exculpatory 
spin" 
on 
the 
unanalyzed 
data 
to 
make 
it 
discoverable.  State v. Franszczak, 2002 WI App 141, ¶¶21, 23, 
256 Wis. 2d 68, 647 N.W.2d 396.  Here, the DOC's database is 
unanalyzed 
raw 
data 
and 
thus 
not 
exculpatory 
evidence.  
Accordingly, the prosecuting attorney is not required to 
disclose the DOC's database to Jendusa under subsec. (2)(j). 
No.  2018AP2357-LV.akz 
 
9 
 
that the analysis of the raw data is intended to be introduced."  
Id.  The majority is wrong for two reasons.  First, it ignores 
our basic mandate that when the meaning of the statute is plain, 
we stop the inquiry.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  As 
explained above, the language could not be any clearer that the 
raw data must be intended to be introduced at trial.  Second, 
the majority commits the basic error of reading language into 
the statute.  State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, ¶20, 353 
Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811 ("We should not read into the 
statute language that the legislature did not put in.").  The 
majority asserts intending to introduce the analysis of raw data 
is the same as intending to introduce the raw data itself.  
Majority op., ¶30.  However, this is not what the statute 
states.  The statute states that only the "raw data that is 
intended to be introduced at the trial" is discoverable.  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.036(5).  The majority's contention is even more 
confusing considering an expert's analysis would be "evidence."  
As 
such, 
an 
expert's 
analysis 
of 
raw 
data 
is 
already 
discoverable under § 980.036(5).  Despite the majority's wishing 
the language to be in the statute, it is not.  The legislature 
permitted a party to discover only the raw data that is intended 
to be introduced——not its analysis or results of tests from the 
raw data.  
¶51 The majority's error is even more clear when comparing 
Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5) to nearby statutes.  See Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("[S]tatutory language is interpreted . . . in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
No.  2018AP2357-LV.akz 
 
10 
 
statutes . . . .").  Pursuant to section 980.036(2), the State 
must disclose certain information to an individual subject to a 
chapter 980 proceeding.  Included in this information are both 
the results of any tests and the raw data used in those tests.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.036(2)(h) ("The results of any physical or 
mental examination or any scientific or psychological test, 
instrument, experiment, or comparison that the prosecuting 
attorney intends to offer in evidence at the trial or 
proceeding, and any raw data that were collected, used, or 
considered in any manner as part of the examination, test, 
instrument, experiment, or comparison.").  If the legislature 
intended an individual to receive raw data that could be used as 
part of a test, it could have mirrored the language of 
subsection (2)(h) in subsection (5).  Instead, the legislature 
did not use such language, indicating that it provided for the 
discovery of only raw data that is intended to be introduced at 
trial, not raw data that could then be part of an expert's 
analysis, which may or may not be introduced.   
¶52 Following 
a 
natural 
progression, 
the 
majority's 
conclusion transforms chapter 980 discovery from extremely 
limited, 
as 
the 
legislature 
devised, 
see 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.036(11), to a fishing expedition——allowing an individual 
to seek any data from the State that may assist the individual's 
case.  Certainly when the legislature limited discovery in 
chapter 980 cases, it did not incidentally leave open this door.   
¶53 I would apply the plain language that the legislature 
chose——"intended to be introduced"——and conclude that Jendusa 
No.  2018AP2357-LV.akz 
 
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may not receive the DOC database under Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5) 
because no party intended to introduce this raw data at trial.   
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶54 To reach its conclusions, the majority ignores our 
prior cases and the choice of the legislature.  It carves out an 
exception from a general rule that allows us to review the 
decisions of the court of appeals.  Moreover, it reads language 
into the statute that the legislature did not include.   
¶55 I conclude that the court of appeals must explain its 
reasoning when it denies a party's motion for leave to file an 
interlocutory appeal.  I also conclude that the DOC's database 
is not discoverable under Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5)'s plain 
language.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶56 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK and Justice REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this 
dissent. 
 
 
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