Case Title: Commonwealth v. Moore

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11857

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-01-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11857 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LAWRENCE MOORE. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     October 6, 2015. - January 11, 2016. 
 
Present (Sitting at New Bedford):  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, 
Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Parole, Search and seizure, Burden of proof, 
Reasonable suspicion.  Search and Seizure, Expectation of 
privacy, Presumptions and burden of proof, Reasonable 
suspicion.  Practice, Criminal, Parole, Motion to suppress.  
Controlled Substances. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 25, 2013. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Thomas 
F. McGuire, Jr., J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Botsford, J., in the Supreme Judicial 
Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by 
her to the Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court granted an 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Rachel W. van Deuren, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Nancy A. Dolberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for the defendant. 
 
2 
 
 
CORDY, J.  In October, 2011, the New Hampshire parole board 
issued a certificate of parole to the defendant, Lawrence Moore, 
who was serving a sentence of from two and one-half to ten years 
for assault with a firearm.  The defendant's parole was 
transferred to the Commonwealth in May, 2012.  On November 16, 
2012, the defendant's parole officer and others searched the 
defendant's apartment without a warrant and seized seventeen 
"twists" of "crack" cocaine in the defendant's bedroom drawer, 
as well as a digital scale and a gun lock.  The defendant was 
indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in 
violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c).1  He filed a motion to 
suppress the evidence seized from his home, arguing that the 
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.2 
 
After a hearing, the motion judge issued a written order 
allowing the defendant's motion to suppress, holding that, while 
the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment, it was barred 
                                                          
 
 
1 The New Hampshire parole board also issued a warrant for 
the defendant's arrest. 
 
 
2 The defendant sought also to suppress evidence seized from 
his girl friend, Virginia Sequeira, during a traffic stop made 
prior to the search of the defendant's apartment.  The motion 
judge, noting that the Commonwealth agreed that it would not 
introduce the drugs seized during the traffic stop at trial, 
limited the motion to suppress to the evidence seized during the 
warrantless search of the defendant's home. 
3 
 
under art. 14.  The motion judge concluded that art. 14 offers 
the same protections for parolees as it does for probationers, 
and, therefore, searches of a parolee's residence must be 
supported by both reasonable suspicion and either a search 
warrant or a traditional exception to the search warrant 
requirement.  See Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 402 Mass. 789, 792-
794 (1988).  In granting the motion to suppress, the judge ruled 
that, while the Commonwealth had reasonable suspicion to search 
the defendant's apartment for evidence of a drug-related parole 
violation, the search was unconstitutional because there was 
neither a search warrant nor the presence of a traditional 
exception to the warrant requirement. 
 
The Commonwealth was given leave to proceed with an 
interlocutory appeal to the Appeals Court.  We granted the 
Commonwealth's application for direct appellate review in order 
to determine the privacy protections afforded to parolees under 
art. 14 against warrantless searches and seizures in their 
homes. 
 
We conclude that art. 14 offers greater protection to 
parolees than does the Fourth Amendment.  Article 14 does not, 
however, offer as much protection to parolees as it affords to 
probationers.  Therefore, where a parole officer has reasonable 
suspicion to believe that there is evidence in the parolee's 
home that the parolee has violated, or is about to violate, a 
4 
 
condition of his parole, such suspicion is sufficient to justify 
a warrantless search of the home.  Because we also agree with 
the motion judge's finding, not contested on appeal by the 
defendant, that the officer had reasonable suspicion that a 
search of the defendant's home would produce evidence of a 
parole violation, we vacate the allowance of the defendant's 
motion to suppress the evidence. 
 
1.  Background.  As noted, the defendant was paroled on 
October 11, 2011, by the New Hampshire parole board.  The 
certificate of parole, with which the defendant agreed to 
comply, contained several conditions, including that the 
defendant would "permit the parole officer to visit [the 
defendant's] residence at any time for the purpose of 
examination and inspection in the enforcement of the conditions 
of parole, and submit to searches of [his] person, property, and 
possessions as requested by the parole officer."  The defendant 
also agreed to "be of good conduct and obey all laws" and to 
"not illegally use, sell, possess, distribute, or be in the 
presence of drugs." 
 
On April 6, 2012, the defendant filed an application to 
transfer his parole supervision to Massachusetts.  His 
application acknowledged an agreement to comply with the terms 
and conditions of parole set out by both New Hampshire and 
Massachusetts.  In May, 2012, the Massachusetts parole board 
5 
 
issued -- and the defendant signed -- a certificate of parole, 
which included a condition, among others, stating, "supervise 
for drugs."  Parole Officer Robert Jackson was assigned to 
supervise the defendant. 
 
In late October or early November, 2012, Jackson received 
an anonymous tip that the defendant was dealing in illegal drugs 
in New Bedford.  Based on that call, Jackson decided to review 
records of the defendant's location, obtained through a global 
positioning system (GPS) device that the defendant was required 
to wear.  The records revealed that the defendant traveled to 
Boston on November 9, 2012, where he made two stops, for a few 
minutes each, before returning to New Bedford.  During the 
following two days, the defendant made several short stops in 
New Bedford.  Continuing to monitor the GPS device, Jackson 
observed the defendant, on November 16, 2012, make a "six, seven 
minute stop in Boston," before heading back toward New Bedford. 
 
Jackson immediately issued a warrant for detainer purposes 
for the defendant,3 and contacted the State police.  Shortly 
thereafter, Trooper Marc Lavoie of the State police and 
Detective Jason Gangi of the New Bedford police department 
pulled over the vehicle in which the defendant had been 
                                                          
 
 
3 A warrant for detainer purposes, issued by a parole 
officer, allows for the fifteen-day detainment of a parolee if 
the parole officer has "reasonable belief that a parolee has 
. . . violated the conditions of his parole."  120 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 303.04 (1997). 
6 
 
traveling on his way back to New Bedford.  There was a woman 
driving the vehicle who turned out to be the defendant's girl 
friend, Virginia Sequeira.  Lavoie smelled a strong odor of 
marijuana, and Gangi observed a marijuana cigarette in the 
defendant's lap. 
 
State police Trooper Marc Cyr arrived at the scene and 
separated Sequeira and the defendant.  The two gave differing 
accounts for why they had been in Boston.  The defendant said he 
had spent an hour at a friend's house.4  The police then searched 
the defendant and the vehicle, finding nothing.  Cyr falsely 
told Sequeira that the defendant had admitted to possession of 
cocaine, and Sequeira then produced two bags containing cocaine.5 
 
After arresting the defendant and Sequeira, Cyr contacted 
Jackson and related to him what had occurred.  As a consequence, 
Jackson and three police officers went to, and conducted a 
search of, the defendant's apartment.  Jackson found seventeen 
bags of drugs in the defendant's bedroom, along with a digital 
scale and gun lock.  Jackson did not have a warrant to search 
the apartment. 
 
2.  Discussion.  In reviewing a motion to suppress, "we 
                                                          
 
 
4 This story was inconsistent with the global positioning 
system (GPS) data that prompted the warrant for detainer and the 
motor vehicle stop. 
 
 
5 State police Trooper Marc Cyr had been involved in 
arresting Virginia Sequeira for cocaine possession two years 
prior to November 16, 2012. 
7 
 
accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear 
error," but "review independently the motion judge's application 
of constitutional principles to the facts found."  Commonwealth 
v. Franklin, 456 Mass. 818, 820 (2010).  Where there has been an 
evidentiary hearing, "we defer to the credibility findings of 
the judge, who had the opportunity to observe and evaluate the 
witnesses as they testified."  Commonwealth v. Peters, 453 Mass. 
818, 823 (2009). 
 
The Fourth Amendment and art. 14 prohibit "unreasonable" 
searches and seizures.  See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 472 Mass. 
767, 775-776 (2015).  We determine whether a search is 
reasonable by "balanc[ing] the intrusiveness of the police 
activities at issue against any legitimate governmental 
interests that these activities serve."  Id. at 776.  See Samson 
v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006).  "In balancing these 
factors, we keep in mind that art. 14 may provide greater 
protection than the Fourth Amendment" (quotation omitted).  
Rodriguez, supra. 
 
a.  Parolee's expectation of privacy.  The United States 
Supreme Court has, in a series of cases, established that, under 
the Fourth Amendment, probationers and parolees have a 
significantly diminished expectation of privacy.  In Griffin v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 868, 875-876 (1987), the Court held, 
under the "special needs" exception to the warrant requirement, 
8 
 
that a warrantless search of a probationer's home, pursuant to a 
State regulation requiring reasonable grounds and approval of 
the probationer's supervisor for such a search, did not violate 
the probationer's privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment.  
Years later, in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 
(2001), the Court indicated that a warrantless search based on 
reasonable suspicion that a probationer (who was subject, as a 
condition of his probation, to warrantless searches) was engaged 
in criminal activity was not intrusive because of the 
"probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests."  
Most recently, the Court found that a parolee's expectation of 
privacy is diminished even beyond that of a probationer.  See 
Samson, 547 U.S. at 850, 852 (allowing suspicionless and 
warrantless searches of parolees based purely on status as 
parolees). 
 
Under art. 14, we have already established that a 
probationer has a diminished expectation of privacy.  See 
LaFrance, 402 Mass. at 792 ("We accept for art. 14 purposes the 
principle that a reduced level of suspicion, such as 'reasonable 
suspicion,' will justify a search of a probationer and her 
premises").  Not yet having had an opportunity to address the 
same issue in the context of parolees, we now conclude that art. 
14 provides to a parolee an expectation of privacy that is less 
than even the already diminished expectation afforded to a 
9 
 
probationer. 
 
In evaluating the defendant's expectation of privacy, his 
status as a parolee is "salient."  Samson, 547 U.S. at 848, 
quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 118.  A parolee is, during the 
balance of his or her sentence, effectively a ward of the 
Commonwealth.  See 120 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 101.01, 101.03 (1997) 
(parolees under custody of parole board, which is executive 
agency).  Like probationers, parolees are on the "continuum of 
[S]tate-imposed punishments" (quotation omitted).  Samson, 547 
U.S. at 850.  However, unlike probationers, the parole system 
entrusts to the Commonwealth the custody and supervision of 
parolees, affording them an established alternative to the 
incarceration to which they were sentenced.  Given that 
probation is, instead, offered as a judicially imposed sentence 
in lieu of incarceration, parolees have an expectation of 
privacy that is diminished beyond that of probationers because 
"parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is."  Id. 
 
b.  Government interest in supervising parolees.  While a 
parolee's expectation of privacy is diminished, the 
Commonwealth's supervisory "interests, by contrast, are 
substantial."  Samson, 547 U.S. at 853.  The Commonwealth need 
not "ignore the reality of recidivism or suppress its interest 
in 'protecting potential victims of criminal enterprise,'" id. 
at 849, quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 121, and "may therefore 
10 
 
justifiably focus on [parolees] in a way that it does not on the 
ordinary citizen."  Knights, supra.  See Samson, supra at 854 
(Supreme Court has "acknowledged the grave safety concerns that 
attend recidivism"). 
 
The parole system reflects the need for enhanced 
supervision.  See G. L. c. 127, § 130 (parole permits "shall be 
granted only if the [parole] board is of the opinion . . . that 
there is a reasonable probability that, if the prisoner is 
released with appropriate conditions and community supervision, 
the prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating 
the law and that release is not incompatible with the welfare of 
society"); Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk 
Dist., 471 Mass. 12, 23 (2015) ("The question the [parole] board 
must answer for each inmate seeking parole [is] whether he or 
she is likely to reoffend . . ."). 
 
We conclude that the Commonwealth's supervisory interests 
are more significant than a parolee's diminished expectation of 
privacy. 
 
c.  Constitutional implications.  We next consider the 
constitutional ramifications of these determinations, and we 
conclude that reasonable suspicion, but not a warrant, was 
needed to justify a search of a parolee's home. 
 
We note at the outset, as did the motion judge, that the 
Fourth Amendment offers no solace to parolees such as the 
11 
 
defendant.  Under Samson, parolees do "not have an expectation 
of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate."  Samson, 
547 U.S. at 852.  A search such as the one Jackson conducted was 
thus reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  However, we must 
also consider the privacy implications under art. 14, as "a 
State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater 
restrictions on police activity than those [the Supreme] Court 
holds to be necessary upon [F]ederal constitutional standards" 
(emphasis omitted).  Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).  
See Rodriguez, 472 Mass. at 776. 
 
Traditionally, we have maintained that art. 14 affords 
greater protections for probationers than does the Fourth 
Amendment.  In 1988, one year after the Supreme Court released 
its decision in Griffin, we decided in LaFrance that art. 14 
guarantees that any condition of probation compelling a 
probationer to submit to searches must be accompanied by 
reasonable suspicion.  LaFrance, 402 Mass. at 792-793.  We also 
held that "a warrantless search of a probationer's home, barring 
the appropriate application of a traditional exception to the 
warrant requirement, cannot be justified under art. 14."  Id. at 
794.  This interpretation remains the standard for probationer 
searches under art. 14 despite the Supreme Court's subsequent 
decision in Knights, construing the Fourth Amendment. 
 
We conclude that, in the parole context, although the 
12 
 
privacy protections afforded to parolees under art. 14 are 
incrementally less than those granted to probationers, 
individualized suspicion is still the appropriate standard, at 
least with respect to a search of the parolee's home.  To 
require more would be "both unrealistic and destructive of the 
whole object of the continuing [parole] relationship," Griffin, 
483 U.S. at 879, while dispensing with individualized suspicion 
in its entirety would, outside the realm of "special needs" 
exceptions, establish a precedent we are not inclined to set.6  
However, while we determined in LaFrance that there was no 
reason "to eliminate the usual requirement imposed by art. 14 
that a search warrant be obtained," LaFrance, 402 Mass. at 794, 
we conclude that, with regard to parolees, imposing a warrant 
requirement would hinder the Commonwealth in addressing its 
significant supervisory interests.7 
                                                          
 
 
6 Our decision to establish a reasonable suspicion 
requirement under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights for searches of parolees' homes obligates all such 
parolee searches to be conducted under an individualized 
suspicion standard.  The parole board, in creating conditions of 
release, may not contract around the reasonable suspicion 
requirement by making the issuance of a prisoner's parole 
subject to suspicionless searches and seizures of his home.  
Such authority would inappropriately allow the parole board to 
compel a parolee, keen to commute his or her sentence, to accept 
a condition that would unnecessarily and unreasonably limit his 
or her art. 14 privacy rights. 
 
 
7 Despite our decision to eliminate the warrant requirement 
for searches of parolees' homes, the Commonwealth is still 
appropriately limited in its ability even to conduct such 
13 
 
 
d.  Application of principles to the present case.  Having 
concluded that reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify the 
warrantless search of a parolee's home, we consider whether 
Jackson had such suspicion in the present case. 
 
In LaFrance, we left open the definition of "reasonable 
suspicion" for searches of probationers.  Id. at 793.  In so 
doing, we suggested that an appropriate standard may be that set 
out in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and its progeny.  
LaFrance, supra.  We now apply the reasonable suspicion standard 
associated with stop and frisks to warrantless searches of a 
parolee's home.8 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
warrantless searches, as parole officers may only "make such 
investigations as may be necessary."  G. L. c. 27, § 5. 
 
 
8 In considering the legality of such searches, we look to 
"whether the intrusiveness of the government's conduct is 
proportional to the degree of suspicion that prompted it. . . . 
[W]e must balance the need to . . . conduct the search against 
the intrusion on the defendant" (citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Torres, 433 Mass. 669, 672 (2001).  In 
justifying the search, we require that the officer's actions be 
"based on specific and articulable facts and reasonable 
inferences therefrom, in light of the officer's experience," 
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 441 Mass. 390, 394 (2004), indicating 
that a search of a parolee's home, pursuant to a parole 
condition, would render evidence that the parolee has violated, 
or is about to violate, a condition of parole. 
 
 
"[I]n making that assessment it is imperative that the 
facts be judged against an objective standard," such that "the 
facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or 
the search" would, taken as a whole, "warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was 
appropriate" (quotations omitted).  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
21-22 (1968).  See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 511 
14 
 
 
The motion judge found that, at the time of the search, 
Jackson had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was dealing 
in illegal drugs, in violation of the conditions of his parole, 
and that evidence of such violation would be found in his 
residence.9  We agree. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we note that Jackson's "need 
to . . . conduct the search" was high, as the defendant was on 
parole for a violent crime.  Commonwealth v. Torres, 433 Mass. 
669, 672 (2001).  The defendant's parole was subject to several 
conditions, including that he "not illegally use, sell, possess, 
distribute, or be in the presence of drugs."  He was also 
subject to the condition that his parole officer supervise him 
for drugs.  Therefore, when Jackson received an anonymous tip 
that the defendant was dealing in drugs, it was incumbent on him 
to investigate that tip for evidence of corroboration.  In so 
doing, Jackson reviewed the defendant's recent GPS data, which 
showed that, several days before, he had made a trip from New 
Bedford with a brief stop in Boston.  The stop was made in what 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(2009).  "Seemingly innocent activities taken together can give 
rise to reasonable suspicion" (quotation omitted), but 
"reasonable suspicion may not be based merely on good faith or a 
hunch."  Id. 
 
 
9 The defendant did not challenge this ruling on appeal. 
 
15 
 
the Boston parole office referred to as a "high crime area."10  
After returning to his home in New Bedford from that trip, the 
GPS data revealed that the defendant made several short stops in 
New Bedford over the following two days, consistent with the 
delivery of drugs to others.  Based on his experience on the 
gang unit task force, which often dealt with narcotics-related 
investigations, Jackson became increasingly concerned that the 
defendant was dealing in drugs. 
 
Jackson later checked the current GPS data on the defendant 
and learned that he had just made another trip to Boston, 
stopping off briefly (this time for six or seven minutes), again 
in a high crime area, and was heading back towards New Bedford.  
Acting on information from Jackson and on observation that the 
automobile in which the defendant was traveling was exceeding 
the speed limit, the police stopped it. 
 
During the stop, the driver of the automobile, the 
defendant's girl friend, was "extremely nervous,"11 and the 
                                                          
 
 
10 "Although an individual's presence in a high crime area 
alone will not establish a reasonable suspicion, . . . it may 
nevertheless be a factor leading to a proper inference that the 
individual is engaged in criminal activity" (citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 427 Mass. 729, 734, cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1008 (1998). 
 
 
11 See Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 372 (2007) 
("Although nervous or furtive movements do not supply reasonable 
suspicion when considered in isolation, they are properly 
considered together with other details to find reasonable 
suspicion"). 
16 
 
officers observed the defendant in possession of marijuana.  The 
defendant lied about where he had just been,12 and the officers 
then found two concealed bags of cocaine on the defendant's girl 
friend (with whom the defendant shared a bedroom in their joint 
residence in New Bedford).  This activity established that the 
defendant had violated the conditions of his parole regarding 
possessing and being in the presence of drugs, and provided 
further corroboration for the anonymous tip that the defendant 
was dealing in drugs.13 
 
Based on the tip, the evidence of the defendant's conduct 
consistent with that tip, and in light of Jackson's experience, 
both with narcotics and with other parolees, it was reasonable 
for him to suspect that a search of the defendant's home would 
produce further evidence of drug-related parole violations, 
including illegal possession or distribution.  See 2 W.R. 
                                                          
 
 
12 See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 469 Mass. 257, 264 (2014) 
(defendant's false denial of having participated in suspicious 
activity of which police were already aware "strengthens the 
suspicion that the defendant had participated in a drug 
transaction"). 
 
 
13 "Where police conduct an investigatory stop based on 
information gleaned from an anonymous tip, courts assess the 
sufficiency of the information in terms of the reliability of 
the informant and his or her basis of knowledge."  Commonwealth 
v. Walker, 443 Mass. 867, 872, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1021 
(2005).  Where the required standard is reasonable suspicion 
rather than probable cause, "a less rigorous showing in each of 
these areas is permissible."  Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 456 Mass. 
385, 396 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 409 Mass. 16, 19 
(1990).  "Independent police corroboration may make up for 
deficiencies in one or both of these factors."  Lyons, supra. 
17 
 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(d), at 530-531 (5th ed. 2012) 
("it is commonly held . . . that drug dealers ordinarily keep 
their supply, records and monetary profits at home").14  Among 
other things, the defendant's conduct over the course of 
multiple days after his trip to Boston suggested that a stash 
was stored somewhere overnight, and it was reasonable to 
conclude that instrumentalities, whether they be drugs, records, 
or profits from drug sales, would be located where the defendant 
lived.15,16 
                                                          
 
 
14 See also United States v. Sanchez, 555 F.3d 910, 914 
(10th Cir.), cert denied, 556 U.S. 1145 (2009) (it is "merely 
common sense that a drug supplier will keep evidence of his 
crimes at his home"); United States v. Spencer, 530 F.3d 1003, 
1007 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1017 (2008) ("Common 
experience suggests that drug dealers must mix and measure the 
merchandise, protect it from competitors, and conceal evidence 
of their trade . . . in secure locations," and "[f]or the vast 
majority of drug dealers, the most convenient location to secure 
items is the home"); United States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 
218 (4th Cir. 2005) (search made pursuant to warrant was upheld 
because "it is reasonable to suspect that a drug dealer stores 
drugs in a home to which he owns a key"). 
 
 
15 Parolees "have . . . an incentive to conceal their 
criminal activities  . . . because [they] are aware that they 
may be subject to supervision and face revocation" of parole.  
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 849 (2006). 
 
 
16 Moreover, under the assumption that the defendant was 
dealing in drugs, it was also reasonable to assume that the 
drugs, cash, and any records from drug distribution not found 
during a search of the defendant's automobile would be located 
at his home.  See Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 302 
(2003) ("nexus may be found in the type of crime, . . . the 
extent of the suspect's opportunity for concealment, and normal 
inferences as to where a criminal would be likely to hide the 
drugs he sells" [quotation omitted]).  See also United States v. 
18 
 
 
We need not conclude that the tip, the GPS findings, the 
defendant's behavior, and the violation of the parole conditions 
concerning drugs would have been sufficient to establish 
probable cause in support of a search warrant for his home.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pina, 453 Mass. 438, 441 (2009), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 213, cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983) ("Information establishing that a 
person is guilty of a crime does not necessarily constitute 
probable cause to search a person's residence"); Commonwealth v. 
O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 300 (2003) ("To establish probable cause 
. . . the affidavit must contain enough information for the 
issuing magistrate to determine that the items sought . . . may 
reasonably be expected to be located in the place to be 
searched" [quotation omitted]).  Rather, in light of the 
defendant's diminished expectation of privacy, and the lesser 
standard of reasonable suspicion, the facts in this case, 
including seemingly innocent activities, taken together were 
sufficient to justify a search of the defendant's home for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Lewis, 71 F.3d 358, 362-363 (10th Cir. 1995) (police, armed with 
information deemed to be reliable that parolee was involved in 
drug activity, had reasonable suspicion on that basis alone to 
"justify[] the parole agents' warrantless search of his 
residence"); 2 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(d), at 528-
530 (5th ed. 2004) ("[T]here need not be definite proof that the 
seller keeps his supply at his residence . . . . [I]t will 
suffice if there are some additional facts . . . which would 
support the inference that the supply is probably located 
there"). 
19 
 
evidence of a parole violation.  See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 
Mass. 506, 511 (2009). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Our decision today effectively balances 
the Commonwealth's significant interest in supervising parolees 
-- and, at the same time, protecting the Commonwealth's citizens 
from the risks of recidivism -- with the parolees' diminished 
expectations of privacy.  Individualized suspicion, jettisoned 
by the Supreme Court in an analogous scenario, remains, under 
art. 14, an important safeguard against unfettered police 
authority.  However, because the need to supervise parolees 
weighs heavily against that backdrop, reasonable suspicion that 
there is evidence in the parolee's home that the parolee has 
violated, or is about to violate, a condition of his or her 
parole, is sufficient to justify a search of the parolee's home 
without the need for a warrant. 
 
Because the defendant was a parolee when the officers 
searched his home, and because the search was conducted under 
reasonable suspicion that the defendant had violated a condition 
of his parole by dealing drugs, the drugs, digital scale, and 
gun lock seized during the search should not have been 
suppressed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
HINES, J. (dissenting, with whom Duffly, J., joins).  I 
agree with the court's ruling that a parole officer may conduct 
a warrantless search of a parolee's home based on reasonable 
suspicion that the search will reveal evidence that the parolee 
has, or is about to, violate a condition of his or her parole.  
I do not agree, however, with the court's application of that 
principle to this case.  Even assuming the corroboration of the 
anonymous tip that the defendant was selling drugs in New 
Bedford, the totality of the information known to the police at 
the time of the search does not establish reasonable suspicion 
that evidence of the defendant's drug dealing activities would 
be found in his home.  For this reason, I respectfully dissent. 
 
The test for reasonable suspicion to conduct a warrantless 
search of a parolee's home is the same as that articulated in 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and its progeny, see 
Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 406 (1974).  Ante at [13].  
It requires that the officer's actions be based on "specific and 
articulable facts and the specific reasonable inferences" that 
the search would reveal evidence that the parolee has, or is 
about to, violate a condition of parole.  Silva, supra.  The 
court's analysis leans heavily on the tip that the defendant 
violated the conditions of parole by selling illegal drugs and, 
based in large part on that information, finds the required 
nexus to the defendant's home.  The analysis is flawed insofar 
2 
 
 
as it is premised on an unacceptably conclusory view of the 
facts known to the parole officer at the time of the search.  
The substance of the court's reasoning is that "[b]ased on the 
tip, the evidence of the defendant's conduct consistent with 
that tip, and in light of [the parole officer's] experience, 
both with narcotics and with other parolees, it was reasonable 
for him to suspect that a search of the defendant's home would 
produce further evidence of drug-related violations, including 
illegal possession or distribution."  Ante at [17].  The 
required nexus between the defendant's criminal activity and his 
home demands more specificity than is supplied by the bare-bones 
"tip" and the "evidence of the defendant's conduct consistent 
with that tip" on which the court relies.  Id.  At best, the 
information relied on by the court to find a nexus between the 
defendant's illegal activity and his home established only that 
he was suspected of a crime and that he lived at the residence 
where the search was conducted.  "Information establishing that 
a person is guilty of a crime does not necessarily constitute 
probable cause [or in this case reasonable suspicion] to search 
the person's residence."  Commonwealth v. Pina, 453 Mass. 438, 
441 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 213, 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983).  Similarly, reasonable 
suspicion that evidence of the defendant's illegal drug activity 
would be found in the defendant's home "is not established by 
3 
 
 
the fact that the defendant lives there."  Pina, supra. 
 
Although our cases addressing the nexus between the 
suspected criminal activity and the place of the search arise in 
the context of probable cause for the issuance of a search 
warrant, the analytical framework underlying those cases is 
instructive.  In that context, the issue is whether the warrant 
establishes "a sufficient nexus between the defendant's drug-
selling activity and his residence to establish probable cause 
to search the residence."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. O'Day, 
440 Mass. 296, 304 (2003).  Applying that framework to the 
warrantless search of a parolee's home, the issue is the same:  
whether there is a sufficient nexus between the criminal 
activity and the defendant's home.  The test, however, is the 
less rigorous standard of reasonable suspicion rather than 
probable cause. 
 
As we recently observed, "[n]o bright-line rule can 
establish whether there is a nexus between suspected drug 
dealing and a defendant's home."  Commonwealth v. Escalera, 462 
Mass. 636, 643 (2012).  Nonetheless, our cases provide 
sufficient guidance to warrant the conclusion that the nexus was 
lacking in this case.  We have found a sufficient nexus in cases 
involving observations by police of a suspect leaving his or her 
home and proceeding directly to a controlled sale on multiple 
occasions.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cruz, 430 Mass. 838, 841-
4 
 
 
842 (2000) (undercover officer purchased cocaine from defendant 
in parking lot of defendant's apartment building during six 
separate controlled sales); Commonwealth v. Monteiro, 80 Mass. 
App. Ct. 171, 175 (2011) (multiple controlled purchases after 
defendant observed leaving his home); Commonwealth v. Hardy, 63 
Mass. App. Ct. 210, 211–212 (2005) (defendant left from 
apartment for two controlled purchases).  A nexus may also be 
shown where the police made a single observation of a suspect 
departing from his or her home for a drug deal "coupled with 
other information, such as statements from credible informants."  
Escalera, supra at 644.  Ultimately, "there need not be definite 
proof that the seller keeps his supply at his residence" 
(citation omitted).  Id. at 645.  Rather, it will suffice "if 
there are some additional facts [that] would support the 
inference that the supply is probably located there" (citation 
omitted).  Id. 
 
Accepting for the sake of argument the reliability of the 
anonymous tip that the defendant was selling illegal drugs in 
New Bedford,1 nothing in the information available to the parole 
                                                          
 
 
1 I am not persuaded that the anonymous tip was reliable 
inasmuch as the additional information relative to the 
defendant's movements fell short in corroborating the claim that 
he was selling drugs in New Bedford.  Although the parole 
officer was able to track the defendant's movements, there was 
no testimony detailing the defendant's specific location.  Nor 
does the record contain evidence that the defendant was observed 
engaging in conduct consistent with drug activity. 
5 
 
 
officer prior to the search connected that activity to the 
defendant's home.  When questioned about the details of the tip 
at the motion to suppress hearing, the parole officer responded 
unequivocally that the anonymous tipster provided no information 
other than "he [the defendant] was dealing drugs.  That's all."  
Thus, the tip contained no information from which the parole 
officer reasonably could infer that this particular illegal 
activity was occurring at the defendant's home. 
 
The other available information concerning the defendant's 
movements, on which the court relies, adds nothing to the 
picture of how the defendant conducted his business and, more 
specifically, whether the defendant's home was used in the 
operation of the enterprise.  The parole officer was aware that 
the defendant had made two trips to Boston, staying for only a 
brief time and then returning to New Bedford.  On the days 
following the return from Boston, the defendant moved about New 
Bedford, suggesting that he might have been selling illegal 
drugs.  Without more information, however, it is simply not 
possible to draw any inferences regarding the location of the 
defendant's supply or the place where the sales occurred.  That 
the defendant was in the company of a person who had drugs on 
her person and that the defendant was found in possession of a 
"blunt" when he was stopped by the police, of course, is 
evidence of a parole violation.  It is not suggested, however, 
6 
 
 
that any such violation was the predicate for the search of the 
defendant's home.  Unquestionably, the search was related to the 
drug activity and it must be validated on that basis alone.  
 
I recognize that the "facts and inferences underlying the 
officer's suspicion must be viewed as a whole when assessing the 
reasonableness of his acts."  Commonwealth v. Thibeau, 384 Mass. 
762, 764 (1981).  At the same time, a mere hunch is 
insufficient.  Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 511 (2009), 
citing Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 139 (2001).  In 
my view, all of the information, taken together, amounted to no 
more than a mere hunch that evidence of drug activity would be 
found in the defendant's home.  To cross the mere hunch 
threshold, our cases, as discussed above, have attached 
relevance and significance to facts simply not present here.  In 
the complete absence of specific articulable facts establishing 
a nexus between the defendant's drug activity and his home, the 
search cannot be justified.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent.