Case Title: Smith v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2013-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WALTER L. SMITH,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 94, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0105019765 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                         Submitted: April 9, 2013 
Decided: April 30, 2013 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 30th day of April 2013, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Walter L. Smith, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s February 14, 2013 order denying his fifth 
postconviction motion pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
 
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Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in March 2002, a Superior 
Court jury found Smith guilty of Attempted Rape in the First Degree, 
Assault in the First Degree, Burglary in the First Degree and Wearing a 
Disguise During the Commission of a Felony.  He was sentenced to thirty-
six years of Level V incarceration.  This Court affirmed Smith’s convictions 
on direct appeal.2  Since that time, Smith has filed five postconviction 
motions, including the one from which he now appeals.  This Court affirmed 
the Superior Court’s denials of all four of Smith’s previous postconviction 
motions.3 
 
(3) 
In his appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his fifth 
postconviction motion, Smith claims that his conviction should be vacated 
because his trial counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations, thereby 
violating his Sixth Amendment rights.  He contends that, due to his 
counsel’s ineffectiveness, he did not accept the State’s plea offer, which 
entailed a twenty-year prison term, sixteen years less than the one he is 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Smith v. State, 2002 WL 31873704 (Del. Dec. 23, 2002). 
3 Smith v. State, 2004 WL 1874668 (Del. Aug. 13, 2004); Smith v. State, 2008 WL 
732009 (Del. Mar. 20, 2008); Smith v. State, 2010 WL 2169490 (Del. May 27, 2010); 
Smith v. State, 2012 WL 3870567 (Del. Sept. 6, 2012). 
 
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currently serving.  Smith asks that this matter be remanded to the Superior 
Court for an evidentiary hearing.   
 
(4) 
Delaware law requires that, when reviewing a postconviction 
motion, the Superior Court first determine whether the procedural 
requirements of Rule 61 have been met prior to considering the substantive 
merits of the defendant’s claims.4  In order to prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that his 
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
and that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.5  
The defendant must make concrete allegations of ineffective assistance, and 
substantiate them, or risk summary dismissal.6 
 
(5) 
Smith’s claim fails for the following reasons.  First, it is time-
barred pursuant to Rule 61(i) (1).  Moreover, the claim is procedurally 
barred pursuant to Rule 61(i) (2) and (3) because it was not asserted in a 
previous postconviction motion nor was it asserted in the proceedings 
leading to the judgment of conviction.   
                                                 
4 Maxion v. State, 686 A.2d 148, 150 (Del. 1996). 
5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
6 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
 
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(6) 
Smith’s attempt to avoid the time and procedural bars by 
asserting a violation of his constitutional rights pursuant to Rule 61(i) (5) 
due to his counsel’s ineffective assistance also must fail.  Smith himself 
admits that his trial counsel presented the State’s plea offer to him, but that 
he rejected it and proceeded to trial.  He offers no reliable factual support for 
his claim of ineffectiveness in connection with the plea offer, only 
unsubstantiated assertions made eleven years after the fact.  Nor does he 
explain why he waited until his fifth postconviction motion to assert the 
claim.  Because Smith has not sustained his burden of demonstrating that his 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance in connection with the plea 
bargaining process, we conclude that Rule 61’s time and procedural bars 
preclude his claim.  
 
(7) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice