Case Title: State ex rel. Nix v. Cleveland

Citation: 1998-Ohio-290

Docket Number: 19980068

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-10-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. NIX ET AL. v. CITY OF CLEVELAND ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Nix v. Cleveland (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 379.] 
Public records — Mandamus to compel release of investigatory and other records 
pertaining to alleged illegal wiretapping by Cleveland police officers or 
other individuals — Writ denied, when — Attorney fees denied, when. 
(No. 98-68 — Submitted August 19, 1998 — Decided October 14, 1998.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
 
This is one of several acrimonious cases arising from the following pertinent 
facts.  In 1993, relator John H. Nix, a licensed securities broker, befriended John R. 
Master, an elderly retired physician and widower.  Nix subsequently assisted 
Master in personal and business matters and moved into Master’s Brookside Drive 
residence in respondent city of Cleveland.  Nix, Master, and relator Rebekah 
Deamon formed a partnership to build homes on undeveloped land owned by 
Master that was adjacent to his home.  According to Master, his neighbors became 
upset about the prospective development of the property. 
 
During this period, Nix informed the FBI that bearer bonds owned by Master 
had been stolen by Master’s relatives, Lillian and Orlando Autuori.  Relators, Nix, 
Deamon, attorney Richard C. Klein, and accountant William A. Weinkamer, 
alleged that Cleveland Police Officer Sue Sazima, the grandniece of both Master 
and the Autuoris, became involved in the dispute between Nix and Master and 
their neighbors because Sazima wanted to assist the Autuoris and gain control of 
Master’s assets.  According to relators, the Brookside Drive residents, Sazima, and 
others conspired to achieve their various objectives by attempting to have Nix 
indicted for defrauding Master to garner control of his assets. 
 
Relators claim that, as part of the alleged conspiracy, telephone 
conversations conducted by Nix and Master from their Brookside Drive home were 
illegally intercepted and recorded in 1994.  The probate court later appointed Nix 
 
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conservator of the estate and person of Master, and Nix learned about the 
wiretapping. 
 
Upon relators and Master’s request, the Professional Conduct Internal 
Review Unit (“PCIR Unit”) of respondent Cleveland’s Division of Police and the 
Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office conducted a criminal 
investigation of the wiretapping.  In May 1995, relators requested to inspect all 
investigative records relating to the wiretapping and all tape recordings or 
transcripts of tape recordings of the intercepted telephone conversations.  After 
various Cleveland officials refused, relators and Master brought an action seeking 
a writ of mandamus to compel city officials to provide access to the requested 
records under the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, and to investigate the 
wiretapping.  We denied the writ to compel further investigation and ordered the 
city officials to submit the PCIR Unit investigative reports under seal for an in 
camera inspection.  State ex rel. Master v. Cleveland (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 23, 
661 N.E.2d 180. 
 
Upon examining the police investigative records submitted under seal, we 
held that the records were exempt from disclosure under the R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c) 
work-product, the R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a) uncharged-suspect, and the R.C. 
149.43(A)(1)(o) other-law1 provisions.  State ex rel. Master v. Cleveland (1996), 
76 Ohio St.3d 340, 667 N.E.2d 974.  We concluded that although the records 
submitted under seal indicated that some person or persons purposely intercepted 
Nix and Master’s cordless telephone conversations, the records did not establish 
any police cover-up or fictitious investigation, as relators had alleged.  Master, 76 
Ohio St.3d at 342-344, 667 N.E.2d at 975-977. 
 
In 1994 and 1995, relators and Master commenced two federal wiretapping 
cases involving similar allegations in federal district court. They subsequently filed 
an additional state case.  Thus far, relators’ claims have generally been found to be 
 
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meritless.  See, e.g., Master v. Sword (Nov. 9, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 68297, 
unreported, 1995 WL 662108; Master v. Chalko (June 5, 1997), Cuyahoga App. 
No. 70527, unreported, 1997 WL 298260; Nix v. Chalko (Feb. 19, 1998), 
Cuyahoga App. No. 72023, unreported, 1998 WL 72495; Master v. Fed. Bur. of 
Investigation (C.A.D.C.1997), 124 F.3d 1309. 
 
In 1995, Cleveland retained a private law firm to represent then city 
councilman Patrick O’Malley in the wiretapping litigation. The city thereafter 
defended O’Malley. 
 
According to relators, respondents, Cleveland and its mayor, Michael White, 
directed city attorneys to conceal O’Malley’s and Sazima’s involvement in the 
wiretapping, and the city attorneys knew of the cover-up and induced witnesses to 
falsify their testimony about the wiretapping. 
 
In August 1997, relators requested to inspect the following records:  (1) any 
records relating to the wiretapping of telephone conversations of Nix and Master, 
including all correspondence between any city employee and any other person 
pertaining to the wiretapping; (2) any files of the Cleveland Law Department 
pertaining to the wiretapping, including all correspondence between the law 
department and any other attorney concerning the wiretapping; (3) any 
correspondence between the Cleveland Law Department and the Cuyahoga County 
Prosecutor’s Office, FBI, and United States Attorney’s Office pertaining to the 
wiretapping; (4) any tape recordings or transcripts of telephone communications of 
Nix and Master during the period of the wiretapping; (5) any correspondence 
between any Cleveland employee and the Attorney General, Ohio Organized 
Crime Investigation Commission, and the state pertaining to the wiretapping; (6) 
all records relating to the city’s decision to provide a defense to O’Malley in the 
wiretapping litigation; and (7) all billings received and checks issued by Cleveland 
 
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to the private law firm for services rendered in the wiretapping litigation on behalf 
of O’Malley.  Relators also requested attorney fees. 
 
After respondents refused to provide access to the requested records, relators 
filed this action for a writ of mandamus under R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records 
Act.  Master is now deceased, and Nix brought this mandamus action both 
individually and as executor of Master’s estate.  Respondents filed an answer in 
which they claimed that the requested records were exempt from disclosure under 
the attorney-client privilege and the trial-preparation exemption. 
 
We issued an alternative writ, and the parties submitted evidence and briefs.  
From the evidence submitted, the only records in the city’s custody that are 
responsive to relators’ requests are (1) the police investigative file previously at 
issue in Master, 76 Ohio St.3d 340, 667 N.E.2d 974, (2) correspondence and 
filings in the wiretapping litigation, which relators already have, (3) requests to the 
Cleveland Law Department for representation by various Cleveland employees 
sued by relators, (4) status reports to the law department by the private law firm 
that represented O’Malley, (5) a fax transmittal from an attorney to a city police 
employee, (6) legal research conducted by the law department in connection with 
the wiretapping litigation, (7) law department attorney notes concerning the 
wiretapping cases, (8) law department attorney notes of a conversation with 
Sazima’s private attorney concerning Sazima’s request to the city for 
representation, and (9) bills and checks concerning the private law firm’s 
representation of O’Malley in the wiretapping cases.  The city mailed copies of the 
fax transmittal and bills and checks to relators. 
 
This cause is now before the court for a determination on the merits. 
__________________ 
 
Harold Pollock Co., L.P.A., and Harold Pollock, for relators. 
 
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Sylvester Summers, Jr., Director of Law, and Kathleen A. Martin, Chief 
Trial Counsel, for respondents. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Relators assert that they are entitled to a writ of mandamus 
compelling respondents to provide access to the requested records under R.C. 
149.43. 
 
Initially, to the extent that relators’ requests encompass the PCIR Unit 
investigative file, their claim is barred by res judicata.  State ex rel. Russo v. 
Deters (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 152, 154, 684 N.E.2d 1237, 1238-1239.  We 
previously held that this investigative file is exempt from disclosure under R.C. 
149.43.  Master, 76 Ohio St.3d 340, 667 N.E.2d 974.2 
 
In addition, relators’ claims are moot insofar as they request access to 
records that they either already possessed at the time they filed this action, e.g., 
correspondence and filings in the wiretapping cases, or that they now have as a 
result of respondents’ subsequent transmission of certain records, e.g., bills and 
checks related to the private law firm’s representation of O’Malley.  State ex rel. 
Gannett Satellite Info. Network v. Shirey (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 400, 401, 678 
N.E.2d 557, 559-560. 
 
Further, relators are not entitled to access to records that do not exist.  R.C. 
149.43 does not require that a public office create new documents to meet a 
demand for records.  State ex rel. Fant v. Mengel (1993), 62 Ohio St.3d 197, 198, 
580 N.E.2d 1085, 1086. 
 
Having held that relators are not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel 
access to most of the requested records, we now examine relators’ entitlement to 
the remaining records, which respondents claim are exempt from disclosure based 
on attorney-client privilege and the R.C. 149.43(A)(4) trial-preparation exemption.  
 
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Relators contend that respondents waived these exemptions by not properly raising 
them. 
 
Respondents, however, did not waive these exemptions.  Exemptions are 
usually fully applicable absent evidence that the public office having custody of 
the records disclosed the records to the public.  State ex rel. Gannett Satellite Info. 
Network, Inc. v. Petro (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 261, 265, 685 N.E.2d 1223, 1227.  
R.C. 149.43 exemptions are not affirmative defenses that must be raised in an 
answer to avoid waiver.  State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland 
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 31, 33-34, 661 N.E.2d 187, 189-190.  Respondents did not 
disclose the remaining records to the public, and even though they were not 
required to do so, they raise the claimed exemptions in their answer.  Contrary to 
relators’ assertion, respondents were not required to submit a “privilege log” in 
order to preserve their claimed exemptions.  Cf. Guy v. United Healthcare Corp. 
(S.D.Ohio 1993), 154 F.R.D. 172. 
 
The attorney-client privilege, which respondents claim applies, exempts 
some of the remaining requested records.  R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(p) defines “public 
record” as “any record that is kept by any public office  * * * except  * * * 
[r]ecords the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law.”  The attorney-
client privilege, which covers records of communications between attorneys and 
their government clients pertaining to the attorneys’ legal advice, is a state law 
prohibiting release of these records.  TBC Westlake, Inc. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of 
Revision (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 58, 62-63, 689 N.E.2d 32, 36; State ex rel. Thomas 
v. Ohio State Univ. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 245, 249, 643 N.E.2d 126, 130.  The 
attorney notes of conversations between Cleveland Law Department attorneys and 
city employees named in relators’ wiretapping litigation are thus privileged, as are 
those employees’ requests to the law department for representation.  “Where a 
person approaches an attorney with the view of retaining his services to act on the 
 
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former’s behalf, an attorney-client relationship is created, and communications 
made to such attorney during the preliminary conferences prior to the actual 
acceptance or rejection by the attorney of the employment are privileged 
communications.”  Taylor v. Sheldon (1961), 172 Ohio St. 118, 15 O.O.2d 206, 
173 N.E.2d 892, paragraph one of the syllabus; David v. Schwarzwald, Robiner, 
Wolf & Rock Co., L.P.A. (1992), 79 Ohio App.3d 786, 798, 607 N.E.2d 1173, 
1180. 
 
Nevertheless, relators claim that the attorney-client privilege does not 
preclude disclosure of any of the requested records because they fit under the 
crime-fraud exception to the privilege.  A communication is excepted from the 
attorney-client privilege if it is undertaken for the purpose of committing or 
continuing a crime or fraud.  United States v. Collis (C.A.6, 1997), 128 F.3d 313, 
321; State v. Bissantz (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 108, 110, 3 OBR 123, 125, 444 
N.E.2d 92, 95, quoting State v. Mullins (1971), 26 Ohio App.2d 13, 18, 55 O.O.2d 
30, 32, 268 N.E.2d 603, 606 (“ ‘A privileged communication may be a shield of 
defense as to crimes already committed, but it cannot be used as a sword or 
weapon of offense to enable persons to carry out contemplated crimes against 
society.’ ”).  A party invoking the crime-fraud exception must demonstrate that 
there is a factual basis for a showing of probable cause to believe that a crime or 
fraud has been committed and that the communications were in furtherance of the  
crime or fraud.  United States v. Jacobs (C.A.2, 1997), 117 F.3d 82, 87.  The mere 
fact that communications may be related to a crime is insufficient to overcome the 
attorney-client privilege.  Id. at 88, quoting United States v. White (C.A.D.C.1989), 
887 F.2d 267, 271. 
 
Relators failed to introduce sufficient, credible evidence to overcome the 
attorney-client privilege based on the crime-fraud exception.  An in camera 
inspection is unnecessary.  See Jacobs, 117 F.3d at 87 (“Once there is a showing of 
 
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a factual basis, the decision whether to engage in an in camera review of the 
evidence lies in the discretion of the  * * * court.”).  Relators’ evidence consists 
mostly of affidavits replete with allegations based on belief and speculation rather 
than on personal knowledge.  Affidavits filed in original actions in this court 
should be based on personal knowledge, setting forth facts admissible in evidence, 
and showing affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to all matters 
stated therein.  See S.Ct.Prac.R. X(7); State ex rel. Alben v. State Emp. Relations 
Bd. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 133, 135, 666 N.E.2d 1119, 1123; cf. Civ.R. 56(E); 
Evid.R. 602; State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 
69 Ohio St.3d 217, 223, 631 N.E.2d 150, 155.  For example, one piece of evidence 
that relators place substantial reliance on is the statement from an unknown source 
that O’Malley accomplished the wiretapping by using his friend to install the 
equipment.  This is inadmissible hearsay.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Rogers v. Taft 
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 193, 197, 594 N.E.2d 576, 579.  The rest of relators’ 
evidence, including arguable inconsistencies between certain witnesses’ testimony 
in various wiretapping cases, also fails to establish a factual basis for relators’ 
claims of crime or fraud. 
 
The remainder of the requested records are exempt from disclosure as trial-
preparation records.  “ ‘Trial preparation record’ means any record that contains 
information that is specifically compiled in reasonable anticipation of, or in 
defense of, a civil or criminal action or proceeding, including the independent 
thought processes and personal trial preparation of an attorney.”  R.C. 
149.43(A)(4); State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 431-
432, 639 N.E.2d 83, 92.  The remaining records, i.e., attorney notes of trial 
proceedings, status reports concerning wiretapping cases, and legal research 
conducted by the law department, were specifically compiled in reasonable 
 
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anticipation of, or in defense of, the numerous civil actions brought by relators 
against Cleveland and various Cleveland employees. 
 
Based on the foregoing, relators are not entitled to the requested 
extraordinary relief in mandamus.  Relators are also not entitled to an award of 
attorney fees because their records requests were largely meritless.  See, e.g., State 
ex rel. Logan Daily News v. Jones (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 322, 324, 677 N.E.2d 
1195, 1197; State ex rel. Leonard v. White (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 516, 519, 664 
N.E.2d 527, 530.  Accordingly, we deny the writ. 
Writ denied. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
This exemption is now R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(p). 
2. 
Despite the breadth of relators’ requests, they state in their merit brief that 
they “seek to obtain City documents different from those which were sought in 
Master.”