Case Title: State v. Tolliver

Citation: 2014-Ohio-3744

Docket Number: 2013-0351

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-09-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Tolliver, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3744.] 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-3744 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. TOLLIVER, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Tolliver, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3744.] 
Criminal law—R.C. 2901.21(B)—R.C. 2911.02(A)(3)—R.C. 2901.21(B), the 
statute for determining whether an offense imposes strict liability or 
requires proof of recklessness, applies only if “the section defining an 
offense does not specify any degree of culpability.”  If the section already 
requires proof of a culpable mental state for any element of the offense in 
any division or subdivision, R.C. 2901.21(B) does not apply, and the state 
need prove culpability only as specified in the section—Because R.C. 
2911.02 defines every robbery to include the culpable mental states of the 
predicate theft offense, R.C. 2901.21(B), which applies only to statutes not 
specifying any degree of culpability, does not apply, and the state is not 
required to prove a culpable mental state with respect to the force element 
in R.C. 2911.02(A)(3). 
(No. 2013-0351—Submitted February 5, 2014—Decided September 2, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 24716, 
2013-Ohio-115. 
____________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. R.C. 2901.21(B), the statute for determining whether an offense imposes strict 
liability or requires proof of recklessness, applies only if “the section 
defining an offense does not specify any degree of culpability.”  If the 
section already requires proof of a culpable mental state for any element of 
the offense in any division or subdivision, R.C. 2901.21(B) does not 
apply, and the state need prove culpability only as specified in the section.  
[State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 107, 2010-Ohio-6301, 942 N.E.2d 347, 
followed.] 
2. Because R.C. 2911.02 defines every robbery to include the culpable mental 
states of the predicate theft offense, R.C. 2901.21(B), which applies only 
to statutes not specifying any degree of culpability, does not apply, and the 
state is not required to prove a culpable mental state with respect to the 
force element in R.C. 2911.02(A)(3). 
____________________ 
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} The General Assembly has defined the offense of robbery to 
require proof of a culpable mental state (or mens rea) for some elements of the 
offense but not for others.  In this appeal, we consider whether the state must 
prove a culpable mental state with respect to the element contained in R.C. 
2911.02(A)(3), that the offender did “[u]se or threaten the immediate use of force 
against another.”  We hold that it need not and that the strict-liability and read-in-
recklessness rules of R.C. 2901.21(B) do not apply. 
Background 
{¶ 2} The Montgomery County Grand Jury indicted appellee, Kevin 
Tolliver, for one count of robbery under R.C. 2911.02(A)(3).  The indictment 
alleged that Tolliver, “in attempting or committing a theft offense, or in fleeing 
immediately after the attempt or offense, did recklessly use or threaten the 
January Term, 2014 
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immediate use of force against” Jasmine Jordan.  The indictment largely tracked 
the language of the robbery statute, but it added the word “recklessly” with 
respect to the force element; R.C. 2911.02(A)(3) does not specify any such mental 
state. 
{¶ 3} At Tolliver’s jury trial, evidence established that Tolliver stole 
merchandise from a Dollar General store and escaped by using and threatening 
force against a store employee who tried to stop him.  The employee, Jasmine 
Jordan, testified that Tolliver pushed her and that she pushed back, at which point 
Tolliver raised his fist as if to punch her in the face.  Tolliver took the stand and 
admitted shoplifting and raising his fist at Jordan.  He also admitted that the 
surveillance video showed that he extended his arms into Jordan’s chest, causing 
her to move backward, but he refused to admit that he pushed her. 
{¶ 4} The trial court’s instructions to the jury mirrored the statutory 
definition of robbery and did not instruct the jury that the state was required to 
prove any mental state with respect to the force element in R.C. 2911.02(A)(3).  
In defining the elements of a completed or attempted “theft offense,” an element 
of robbery set forth in R.C. 2911.02(A), the trial court instructed the jury on the 
elements of theft in R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), including the mental states of “purpose” 
to deprive the owner of property or services and “knowingly” obtaining or 
exerting control over the property or services without consent.  R.C. 2913.02(A).  
The trial court also defined an “attempt” as an offender “knowingly” engaging in 
conduct that, if successful, would have resulted in the completed offense.  The 
jury found Tolliver guilty as charged in the indictment. 
{¶ 5} Tolliver appealed, arguing that the trial court committed plain error 
by not instructing the jury that the state had to prove that he had recklessly used 
force while committing or attempting to commit theft.  The court of appeals 
agreed and reversed Tolliver’s conviction.  2013-Ohio-115, 986 N.E.2d 34, at 
¶ 26, 35. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 6} We accepted jurisdiction over the state’s appeal. 
Analysis 
{¶ 7} As it applies to Tolliver, R.C. 2911.02 defines robbery as follows: 
“(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense or in fleeing 
immediately after the attempt or offense, shall do any of the following: * * * (3) 
Use or threaten the immediate use of force against another.”  The issue in this 
appeal is whether the state must prove the culpable mental state of “recklessness” 
in proving the force element R.C. 2911.02(A)(3) requires. 
{¶ 8} We begin with the text of R.C. 2911.02, which does not explicitly 
or impliedly require proof of any culpable mental state for the force element in 
subdivision (A)(3).  It does, however, require proof of culpability for other 
elements of the offense.  Division (A) expressly predicates every robbery on the 
elements of a completed or attempted “theft offense,” including all culpable 
mental states.  R.C. 2911.02(A) 
{¶ 9} Tolliver’s predicate theft offense, according to the jury 
instructions, was the theft offense defined in R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), which includes 
the mental states of “purpose” and “knowingly.”  To find Tolliver guilty of an 
“attempted” theft offense, the jury had to find that Tolliver “knowingly” engaged 
in conduct that, if successful, would have resulted in the completed offense. 
{¶ 10} The analysis is straightforward for statutes like R.C. 2911.02, in 
which the General Assembly has already said which elements of the offense 
require proof of culpability and which do not.  “For these offenses, if the General 
Assembly intends for the additional elements to carry their own mens rea, it must 
say so.”  State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 107, 2010-Ohio-6301, 942 N.E.2d 347, 
¶ 38.  The state need prove culpability only for the elements for which a mental 
state is specified in the section defining the offense, and courts should not fill any 
gaps by inserting culpability requirements that the text and ordinary rules of 
construction cannot bear.  See id. at ¶ 42.  It is our duty “to give effect to the 
January Term, 2014 
5 
 
words used, not to delete words used or to insert words not used.”  Columbus-
Suburban Coach Lines, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 20 Ohio St.2d 125, 127, 254 
N.E.2d 8 (1969). 
{¶ 11} The only way to read a culpable mental state where one does not 
exist is through R.C. 2901.21(B), which applies only to those statutes that “do[] 
not specify any degree of culpability.”  Today, we hold that R.C. 2901.21(B) does 
not apply to the statute defining robbery. 
Mens Rea, Legislative Silence, and R.C. 2901.21(B) 
{¶ 12} Before the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2901.21(B) in 1974, 
there was no universal rule for construing statutes that did not specify any element 
of mens rea.  When legislatures first began codifying criminal offenses, courts 
(including this one) interpreted those statutes to require an element of mens rea, 
even though the legislature did not specify one.  See Sayre, Public Welfare 
Offenses, 33 Colum.L.Rev. 55, 62 (1933) (collecting decisions); see e.g., Birney v. 
State, 8 Ohio 230, 238 (1837) (stating, “We know of no case where positive 
action is held criminal, unless the intention accompanies the act, either expressly 
or necessarily inferred from the act itself”).  This presumption of mens rea rested 
on the common-law tradition that all crime included “some mental element,” and 
courts assumed that legislative silence “merely recognized that intent was so 
inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation.”  
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). 
{¶ 13} With the advent of statutes defining newer offenses and the strict-
liability offense, however, it became less clear whether statutory silence assumed 
a culpable mental state or, in the case of strict liability, imposed liability “without 
any kind of mental state whatsoever.” 1 Lafave, Substantive Criminal Law, 
Section 5.1, at 336 (2d Ed.2003); Sayre at 62-66.  The United States Supreme 
Court addressed this issue, stating that courts should presume that a culpable 
mental state should be proven unless the statute contained a “contrary direction,” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Morrisette at 263, or “clear expression” to impose liability without fault, id. at 
254, fn. 14.  This court took the opposite approach and construed statutes as 
imposing strict liability unless they specified an element of intent.  See State v. 
Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27, 1 N.E.2d 313 (1936), paragraph one of the syllabus 
(holding that “if a statute defining an offense is silent on the question of intent, it 
is not necessary to allege and prove an intent to commit the offense”). 
{¶ 14} Against this backdrop, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 
2901.21(B), which provides the following rule for determining whether statutes 
not specifying any culpable mental state impose strict liability or instead require 
some level of culpability, that is, recklessness: 
 
(B)  When the section defining an offense does not specify 
any degree of culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to 
impose strict criminal liability for the conduct described in the 
section, then culpability is not required for a person to be guilty of 
the offense. When the section neither specifies culpability nor 
plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, recklessness is 
sufficient culpability to commit the offense. 
 
{¶ 15} This text identifies two conditions that must exist before a court 
can read recklessness into an offense.  First, the “section” defining the offense 
must not specify “any degree of culpability,” meaning that the section does not 
already require proof of a culpable mental state for any element of the offense in 
any division or subdivision.  R.C. 2901.21(B); see also Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 
107, 2010-Ohio-6301, 942 N.E.2d 347, at ¶ 31 (“R.C. 2901.21(B) requires us to 
examine the entire section defining the offense, not merely a clause or 
subsection”); State v. Maxwell, 95 Ohio St.3d 254, 2002-Ohio-2121, 767 N.E.2d 
242, ¶ 22 (“we need to determine whether the entire section includes a mental 
January Term, 2014 
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element, not just whether division (A)(6) includes such an element” [emphasis 
sic]).  Second, the section must not plainly indicate a purpose to impose strict 
liability.  R.C. 2901.21. 
{¶ 16} In Maxwell, we phrased this standard as a two-step inquiry:  
 
[A] court must be able to answer in the negative the following two 
questions before applying the element of recklessness pursuant to 
R.C. 2901.21(B): (1) does the section defining an offense specify 
any degree of culpability, and (2) does the section plainly indicate 
a purpose to impose strict criminal liability? 
 
Id. at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 17} In Johnson, we acknowledged that “our use of R.C. 2901.21(B) 
has been imprecise” in prior decisions in which we had unnecessarily applied it to 
statutes that already specified a culpable mental state for one or more of the 
elements of the offense.  Id. at ¶ 40, 42.  We clarified that R.C. 2901.21(B) “does 
not cover” these cases and refused to apply it to R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), a statute 
prohibiting the possession of a weapon while under disability, which contains a 
mental state of “knowingly” in division (A).  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 31.  We 
concluded that, because division (A) “already contains the mens rea of 
‘knowingly,’ R.C. 2901.21(B) does not apply,” and “the state is not required to 
prove a culpable mental state for the element” of the offense in subdivision 
(A)(3).  Id. at ¶ 42. 
R.C. 2901.21(B) Does Not Apply to R.C. 2911.02, the Statute Defining Robbery 
{¶ 18} Like the statute at issue in Johnson, the section defining robbery 
already requires proof of culpability for one or more elements of the offense.  
R.C. 2911.02(A) predicates every robbery on the elements of a completed or an 
attempted “theft offense,” which, for Tolliver, included the mental states of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“purpose” and “knowingly.”  R.C. 2913.02(A).  Because R.C. 2911.02(A) 
“already contains [a] mens rea,” by reference to the predicate theft offense, the 
section already specifies culpability, and we cannot apply R.C. 2901.21(B)’s rules 
for determining whether an offense imposes strict liability or requires proof of 
recklessness.  See Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 107, 2010-Ohio-6301, 942 N.E.2d 
347, at ¶ 42.  The section defining robbery makes clear which elements of the 
offense require proof of culpability, and the force element in R.C. 2911.02(A)(3) 
is not one of them. 
{¶ 19} We reached a similar conclusion in State v. Wharf, 86 Ohio St.3d 
375, 715 N.E.2d 172 (1999), and held that the deadly-weapon element of robbery 
in R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) “does not require the mens rea of recklessness” or any 
“specific mental state.”  Id. at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.  Because 
the “theft offense” element of the robbery statute already required proof of one or 
more culpable mental states (for Wharf, purpose and knowledge, id. at 377, at fn. 
1), we concluded that the state did not need to prove any culpable mental state 
“beyond that required for the theft offense.”  Id. at 377. 
{¶ 20} Because R.C. 2901.21(B) does not apply to the section defining 
robbery, it is illogical to ask whether that section “plainly indicates a purpose to 
impose strict liability” or instead requires proof of “recklessness.”  By definition, 
the section defining robbery cannot plainly impose strict liability because it 
always includes the mens rea of the predicate theft offense.  See Black’s Law 
Dictionary 453 (10th Ed.2014) (defining “strict-liability crime” as a crime that 
“does not require a mens rea element”); R.C. 2901.21(B) (stating when an offense 
is a strict-liability offense).  Likewise, recklessness cannot be “sufficient 
culpability to commit the offense,” R.C. 2901.21(B), because the robbery statute 
requires the state to prove more than mere recklessness by predicating the robbery 
on a knowing and/or purposeful theft offense. 
January Term, 2014 
9 
 
{¶ 21} Simply put, R.C. 2901.21(B) does not apply whenever an element 
of an offense is missing a mens rea.  The General Assembly has the power to 
selectively assign culpable mental states to some elements and not others.  Unlike 
the Model Penal Code approach, which requires culpability for “all material 
elements” of an offense, see Model Penal Code Section 2.02(4), R.C. 
2901.21(A)(2) adopts the view that a person need possess only the “requisite 
degree of culpability for each element as to which a culpable mental state is 
specified by the section defining the offense.”  (Emphasis added.)  In this respect, 
Ohio follows the view that “a crime may be defined so as to require one type of 
fault as to one element, another type as to another element, and no fault at all as to 
a third element.”  1 LaFave, Section 5.5, at 382. 
{¶ 22} We stressed this point in Johnson and refused to apply R.C. 
2901.21(B) on an “element-by-element” basis wherever culpability is missing.  
128 Ohio St.3d 107, 2010-Ohio-6301, 942 N.E.2d 346, at ¶ 33, 34, 38.  There 
must be “a complete absence of culpability in the section defining the offense” 
before a court can apply R.C. 2901.21(B)’s strict-liability and read-in-
recklessness rules.  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 34.  Here, there is not a complete 
absence of culpability, because R.C. 2911.02 requires every robbery to include 
the culpable mental states of the predicate theft offense. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 23} R.C. 2901.21(B), the statute for determining whether an offense 
imposes strict liability or requires proof of recklessness, applies only if “the 
section defining an offense does not specify any degree of culpability.”  If the 
section already requires proof of a culpable mental state for any element of the 
offense in any division or subdivision, R.C. 2901.21(B) does not apply, and the 
state need prove culpability only as specified in the section.  Because R.C. 
2911.02 defines every robbery to include the culpable mental states of the 
predicate theft offense,  R.C. 2901.21(B), which applies only when a mental state 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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is not specified in a section defining an offense, does not apply, and the state need 
not prove a culpable mental state with respect to the force element in R.C. 
2911.02(A)(3). 
{¶ 24} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, LANZINGER, and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
____________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 25} The majority opinion holds that the mere reference to a theft 
offense within R.C. 2911.02(A)(3) supplies a culpable mental state to the third-
degree-felony offense of robbery, so that the state need not prove that a defendant 
recklessly used or threatened the immediate use of force against another.  For the 
following reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
{¶ 26} The 
third-degree-felony 
offense 
of 
robbery 
under 
R.C. 
2911.02(A)(3) requires the use of force or the threat of the use of force, but the 
statute does not explicitly require proof of any culpable mental state.  The statute 
provides:   
 
(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense 
or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense, shall do any 
of the following: 
* * *  
(3) Use or threaten the immediate use of force against 
another. 
 
January Term, 2014 
11 
 
The definition of this offense does not specify that the offender must have acted 
purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. 
{¶ 27} We have clarified that the General Assembly has intended that 
R.C. 2901.21(B) provides a default rule of recklessness when a mens rea is 
missing from the definition of the offense and strict liability has not been clearly 
indicated.  State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 107, 2010-Ohio-6301, 942 N.E.2d 
347, ¶ 34.  But in Johnson, we examined the offense of having weapons when the 
defendant is under indictment or has been previously convicted of a felony drug 
offense.1  Because that offense was defined by specifying the mens rea of 
“knowingly” with respect to the possession of a weapon, we held that R.C. 
2901.21(B) did not apply.  Id. at ¶ 42. 
{¶ 28} Johnson did not contemplate the incorporation by reference of 
elements from another statute.  On its face, the third-degree-felony offense of 
robbery defined in R.C. 2911.02(A)(3) does not contain any mens rea.  R.C. 
2901.21(B) states: 
 
When the section defining an offense does not specify any 
degree of culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to impose 
strict criminal liability for the conduct described in the section, 
then culpability is not required for a person to be guilty of the 
offense. When the section neither specifies culpability nor plainly 
indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, recklessness is 
sufficient culpability to commit the offense. 
 
                                                          
 
1 That offense states that “no person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry or use any firearm or 
dangerous ordinance, if * * * [t]he person  is under indictment for or has been convicted of any 
offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration, distribution, or trafficking in any 
drug of abuse.” R.C. 2923.13(A)(3). 
 
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{¶ 29} In answering the initial question whether the “the section defining 
an offense” specifies any culpability, the majority determines in Kevin Tolliver’s 
case that a reference to a “theft offense” in R.C. 2911.02(A)(3) incorporates the 
elements of theft set forth in R.C. 2913.02(A)(1).  It then concludes that because 
theft includes the mental states of “purpose” and “knowingly,” the reference 
supplies a mens rea to R.C. 2911.02(A)(3) so that no analysis under R.C. 
2901.21(B) is warranted.  But “theft offense” is defined by statute to have the 
same meaning as in R.C. 2913.01,2 that is, a variety of meanings.  R.C. 
2911.02(C).  Not all “theft offenses” contain a culpable mental state.  See R.C. 
2911.12(B), 2913.43, and 2921.41. 
{¶ 30} The majority broadly declares that “Division (A) [of 2911.02] 
expressly predicates every robbery on the elements of a completed or attempted 
‘theft offense,’ including all culpable mental states.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Majority opinion at ¶ 8.  But R.C. 2911.02(A)(3), the offense we are discussing, 
says nothing about culpability. 
                                                          
 
2 R.C. 2913.01(K) states: 
 
“Theft offense” means any of the following: 
(1) A violation of section 2911.01, 2911.02, 2911.11, 2911.12, 
2911.13, 2911.31, 2911.32, 2913.02, 2913.03, 2913.04, 2913.041, 2913.05, 
2913.06, 2913.11, 2913.21, 2913.31, 2913.32, 2913.33, 2913.34, 2913.40, 
2913.42, 2913.43, 2913.44, 2913.45, 2913.47, 2913.48, former section 2913.47 
or 2913.48, or section 2913.51, 2915.05, or 2921.41 of the Revised Code; 
(2) A violation of an existing or former municipal ordinance or law of 
this or any other state, or of the United States, substantially equivalent to any 
section listed in division (K)(1) of this section or a violation of section 2913.41, 
2913.81, or 2915.06 of the Revised Code as it existed prior to July 1, 1996; 
(3) An offense under an existing or former municipal ordinance or law 
of this or any other state, or of the United States, involving robbery, burglary, 
breaking and entering, theft, embezzlement, wrongful conversion, forgery, 
counterfeiting, deceit, or fraud; 
(4) A conspiracy or attempt to commit, or complicity in committing, 
any offense under division (K)(1), (2), or (3) of this section. 
 
January Term, 2014 
13 
 
{¶ 31} I cannot agree with the majority’s use of a predicate offense to 
supply a mens rea when the section defining the offense itself does not specify a 
mens rea.  The use of force or the threat of the immediate use of force on another 
distinguishes third-degree-felony robbery from other theft offenses.  Without the 
use of force, Tolliver could not have been convicted of robbery.  In my opinion, 
we should look only at the language in the section that defines the offense.  
Because R.C. 2911.02(A)(3) does not expressly specify any degree of culpability, 
we must then decide whether the General Assembly indicated a purpose to impose 
strict liability for this offense involving the use or threat of the use of force.  The 
mere lack of a mental state is not sufficient to show strict liability.  The General 
Assembly must plainly indicate that intention in the statute.  R.C. 2901.21(B).  
Because there are no words to that effect in the offense of third-degree-felony 
robbery, I would use the default mens rea of recklessness and apply it to the use 
or the threat of the immediate use of force against another, rather than assume that 
the offense is one of  strict liability.  I would therefore affirm the court of appeals. 
PFEIFER and O’NEILL, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Andrew T. French, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Murr, Compton, Claypoole & Macbeth and Charles M. Blue, for appellee. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Kenneth R. Spiert, Assistant 
Public Defender, urging dismissal of the appeal as improvidently accepted, or, in 
the alternative, affirmance for amicus curiae Office of the Ohio Public Defender. 
_________________________