Case Title: State v. Thomas G. Martwick

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1998AP000101-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 5 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Thomas G. Martwick,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  221 Wis. 2d 223, 584 N.W.2d 234 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998-Unpublished) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
January 19, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 9, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Price 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick J. Madden 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BABLITCH and BRADLEY, J.J., join the dissent. 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
Robert P. Rusch and Rusch & Rusch Law Office, S.C., Medford and 
oral argument by Robert P. Rusch. 
 
2000 WI 5 
  
 
 
1 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 98-0101-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Thomas G. Martwick,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.    The state, as petitioner, 
seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, 
State v. Martwick, No. 98-0101-CR, unpublished slip op. (Ct. 
App. July 21, 1998), which reversed a Price County Circuit Court 
judgment.  The circuit court, the Honorable Patrick J. Madden 
presiding, 
convicted 
the 
respondent, 
Thomas 
G. 
Martwick 
(hereinafter Martwick), of manufacturing THC, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 961.41(1)(h)1 (1995-96).1  The court of appeals reversed, 
holding that the circuit court erroneously denied a suppression 
motion concerning evidence of marijuana plants seized by 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 text unless otherwise noted.  
FILED 
 
JAN 19, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark, Acting 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
2 
sheriff's deputies from the curtilage2 of Martwick’s home.  
Martwick, Slip op. at 1-2.   
¶2 
We reverse.  We hold that a curtilage determination is 
a question of constitutional fact subject to a two-step standard 
of review:  a circuit court’s historical findings of fact are 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, while the ultimate 
question of constitutional fact is reviewed de novo.  We further 
hold that applying this two-step process, the five marijuana 
plants the deputies initially found were outside of the 
curtilage of Martwick's home.  Accordingly, we reverse the court 
of appeals' decision, which overturned Martwick's conviction. 
I. 
 
¶3 
The record before the circuit court reflects that on 
June 9, 1997, Brian Roush, a Price County Deputy Sheriff, 
learned of information conveyed by a confidential informant 
regarding drug activity occurring at the Martwick residence.  On 
May 3, 1997, the informant apparently saw large amounts of 
processed and unprocessed marijuana, as well as live plants in 
Martwick's house.  (R. at 35:5-6.)  According to the informant, 
                     
2 A curtilage 
is the 
land and buildings 
immediately 
surrounding a house.  See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 
300 (1987).  Black's Law Dictionary notes that the word 
curtilage is  
derived from the Latin cohors (a place enclosed around 
a yard) and the old French cortilliage or courtillage 
which 
today has been 
corrupted 
into 
court-yard.  
Originally, it referred to the land and outbuildings 
immediately adjacent to a castle that were in turn 
surrounded by a high stone wall . . . . 
  
Black's Law Dictionary 384 (6th ed. 1990). 
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
3 
Martwick complained that he needed to keep his plants inside 
because the weather was too cold in May to transplant them 
outdoors. 
¶4 
After reviewing the written report with fellow Deputy 
Sheriff Chris Jarosinski, Deputy Roush inquired about the 
possibility of obtaining a search warrant of the residence with 
the assistance of the Price County District Attorney’s office.  
District Attorney Patrick G. Schilling thought the confidential 
information was probably stale because the informant observed 
the marijuana at Martwick’s residence in May.  Because the 
district 
attorney 
was 
concerned 
about 
the 
information’s 
potential staleness, Deputy Roush decided to investigate further 
by viewing Martwick’s property himself.   
¶5 
Before 
even 
reading 
the 
confidential 
informant’s 
report, 
Deputy 
Roush 
had 
suspected 
Martwick 
of 
growing 
marijuana.  Two years before, a county drug officer told Deputy 
Roush that he had found remnants of old marijuana growth in the 
Town of Elk.  Martwick’s name appeared on the pails used to grow 
the marijuana.  (R. at 35:37.)  Then, during the summer of 1996 
another small marijuana plant was found on property thought to 
belong to Martwick. 
¶6 
Deputy Roush and Deputy Jarosinski drove to Martwick’s 
residence on June 9, and a neighbor gave them permission to park 
their squad car on the neighbor’s property.  The boundary lines 
of Martwick’s property are unmarked.  The property is one of a 
group of recreational and year-around homes located along the 
Wilson Flowage in Price County.  Approximately 20 homes fall 
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
4 
within a one-mile radius of Martwick’s home, and Martwick’s 
nearest neighbor lives directly across the road.    
¶7 
Martwick’s 1.52-acre property is irregularly shaped.  
According to Martwick’s hand-drawn diagram, his property is 
approximately 122 feet long on its eastern edge, 260 feet long 
on its western edge, 333 feet long on its northern edge, and 413 
feet long on its southern edge.  (Exhibit 26.)  On this diagram, 
Martwick's house appears near the center of the property, 
approximately 100 feet from E. Wilson Flowage Road, the main 
road bounding his property.  At the extreme edge of the property 
farthest from the road are two ginseng sheds.  Martwick also 
raises worms near the ginseng sheds.  A gravel driveway leads up 
to the house from the road.   
¶8 
Martwick does not cultivate a traditional mowed lawn. 
 As defense counsel admitted to the circuit court, his “client’s 
home would not win a Martha Stewart award.”  (R. at 35:48.)  
Instead, a twenty-foot clearing surrounds the house in which 
only low-lying weeds, brush, and wildflowers grow.  Woods cover 
the remainder of the property past the clearing.  A footpath 
begins within ten feet of the house and extends into the wooded 
section leading to the ginseng sheds.  Martwick occasionally 
clears the path with a brush cutter.     
 
¶9 
After parking their squad car, the two deputies walked 
onto 
Martwick’s 
property 
from 
the 
neighboring 
property.  
According to Martwick's hand-drawn diagram, the deputies entered 
his property from the southern edge at a point between the house 
and the ginseng sheds.  (Exhibit 26.)  In the woods, Deputy 
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
5 
Roush tripped over what he thought was some sort of wire placed 
no more than one foot above the ground.  Then, the deputies 
observed five marijuana plants in four five-gallon plastic 
pails.  Deputy Roush estimated that the pails were located 
between 50 and 75 feet from the house along the path leading to 
the ginseng sheds.  The plants were approximately two and one-
half to three and one-half feet tall.  Deputy Roush and Deputy 
Jarosinski cut a leaf slip off of one of the suspected marijuana 
plants and returned immediately to the district attorney’s 
office to conduct a Duquenois-Levine test.  The leaf slip 
produced a positive result indicating that it contained THC, the 
active ingredient in marijuana. 
 
 
¶10 Based on their observations and the test results, that 
same day the deputies applied for and obtained a search warrant. 
 Within approximately three hours the deputies executed the 
search warrant and seized the plastic pails with the five 
marijuana plants, 29 smaller marijuana plants, baggies with 
green plant material and marijuana seeds, and plant cultivation 
products, among other items.  Deputy Roush also took photographs 
of Martwick’s property.  Deputy Roush testified that from the 
vantage point of the potted plants, he could see the top of 
Martwick’s house in the distance.  (R. at 35:9.)(Exhibit 27.)  
However, from the house, a person could not see the plants. 
¶11 The 
state 
charged 
Martwick 
with 
manufacturing 
marijuana contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(h)2.  On August 21, 
1997, Martwick moved to suppress the evidence the deputy 
sheriffs obtained on the basis that the search warrant for his 
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
6 
residence was not supported by probable cause, since the 
deputies improperly obtained evidence supporting probable cause 
to search the entire property by illegally entering the 
curtilage of his residence.  Martwick later moved to suppress on 
the basis that the search warrant was not issued by a neutral 
and detached magistrate.3 
 
 
¶12 The circuit court denied the defendant’s first motion 
to suppress, stating that the deputies’ initial warrantless 
search on Martwick’s premises was valid because they had 
searched outside the property’s curtilage.  Therefore, the 
search warrant they subsequently obtained was properly supported 
by probable cause.  While retaining his right to appeal,4 
Martwick pleaded guilty to and was convicted of manufacturing 
marijuana in violation of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(h)1.5  The 
circuit court withheld his sentence and ordered 18 months of 
probation.6 
                     
3 This second motion was filed with the circuit court on 
September 16, 1997, six days after the motion hearing about the 
curtilage issue.  Martwick seems not to have taken further 
action regarding the second motion.  The record also does not 
disclose what proceedings, if any, took place pertaining to this 
motion.  Martwick, however, does not raise this issue on appeal. 
   
4 See Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10).    
5 The record indicates that Martwick’s charge was amended to 
a lesser offense.  (R. at 25.)  
6 As conditions of probation, Martwick was to pay a fine and 
costs, spend 90 days in jail with work release privileges, and 
make restitution.  Additionally, his driver’s license was 
suspended for six months.  (R. at 26.)  
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
7 
¶13 Martwick appealed the conviction.  The court of 
appeals first held that “the scope of curtilage for Fourth 
Amendment purposes is a question of constitutional fact reviewed 
without deference to the trial court.”  Slip op. at 3.  The 
court relied on State v. Kennedy, 193 Wis. 2d 578, 583, 535 
N.W.2d 43 (Ct. App. 1995), for its reasoning, even though 
Kennedy relied on State v. Lange, 158 Wis. 2d 609, 617, 463 
N.W.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1990), a case that left the issue of 
standard of review unanswered.  Slip. op. at 3.  Citing Cook v. 
Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997), the court 
explained that it is bound by its own prior decisions.  Slip op. 
at 3. 
¶14 The court then concluded that the leaf slip was seized 
in an area that was part of the curtilage surrounding Martwick’s 
home.  Slip op. at 4.  In coming to this conclusion, the court 
analyzed the four factors that determine the extent of curtilage 
surrounding a home as set forth in United States v. Dunn,7 480 
U.S. 294, 300 (1987).  Slip op. at 4.  In regard to the Dunn 
factors, the court felt that the marijuana was in close 
proximity to the home, and because the marijuana grew in a 
                     
7 The following are the four factors:  
the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to 
the home, whether the area is included within an 
enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses 
to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the 
resident to protect the area from observation by 
people passing by. 
   
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301.    
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
8 
garden setting, it appeared to be growing in an area "'use[d] 
for intimate activities of the home.'”  Slip op. at 5-6  
(quoting Lange, 158 Wis. 2d at 619).  Moreover, the overgrown 
nature of the property indicated that Martwick wished to prevent 
public observation.  Slip op. at 6.  Finally, the court stated 
that the “lack of a barrier more formal than heavy flora 
overgrowth” was insufficient “to diminish Martwick’s expectation 
of privacy.”  Slip op. at 6.   
¶15 The court of appeals concluded that the marijuana 
pails were within the curtilage of Martwick’s home.  Therefore, 
the deputies had improperly seized the leaf slip, and it could 
not serve as the basis for probable cause to obtain a search 
warrant for the premises.  Because the search warrant was 
invalid, the circuit court erred in failing to suppress all of 
the evidence seized.  Slip op. at 7.    
II. 
¶16 We first address the issue of standard of review in a 
curtilage case.  We conclude that a curtilage determination 
presents an issue of constitutional fact.  An issue of 
constitutional fact is a mixed question of law and fact subject 
to a two-step standard of review.  State v. Phillips, 218 
Wis. 2d 180, 189, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998).  As we recently 
explained in Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 190, a circuit court 
determining an issue of constitutional fact must first make 
decisions regarding pertinent evidentiary or historical facts.  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines evidentiary facts as “[t]hose 
facts which are necessary for determination of the ultimate 
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
9 
facts; they are the premises upon which conclusions of ultimate 
facts are based.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 557 (6th ed. 1990).   
¶17 Resolution of an issue of constitutional fact then 
requires a circuit court to apply constitutional principles to 
the evidentiary or historical facts.  State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 
153, 171, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986).  A constitutional fact is one 
whose “determination is 'decisive of constitutional rights.'”  
William R. Bishin and Christopher D. Stone, Constitutional 
Facts, reprinted in Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Judicial Process 
703, 
704 
(1976). 
 
Justice 
Frankfurter 
elaborated 
that 
constitutional facts are “issues which, though cast in the form 
of determinations of fact, are the very issues to review [for] 
which this Court sits.”  Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 51 
(1949). 
¶18 On appeal, an appellate court applies a different 
standard 
of 
review 
to 
each 
step 
in 
a 
circuit 
court’s 
determination of constitutional fact.  An appellate court 
applies a deferential, clearly erroneous standard to a circuit 
court’s findings of evidentiary or historical fact.8  Phillips, 
                     
8 Phillips actually stated that evidentiary or historical 
findings would not be overturned “'unless they are contrary to 
the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.'”  
State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 190, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998) 
(quoting State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 715, 345 N.W.2d 457 
(1984)).  We may rely on this articulation of the standard, 
however, because “cases which apply the ‘great weight and clear 
preponderance’ test . . . may be referred to for an explanation 
of [the clearly erroneous] standard of review [since] the two 
tests in this state are essentially the same.”  Noll v. 
Dimiceli’s Inc., 115 Wis. 2d 641, 643, 340 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 
1983).  See also State v. Michels, 141 Wis. 2d 81, 90, 414 
N.W.2d 311 (Ct. App. 1987).    
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
10
218 Wis. 2d at 190 (quoting State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 
715, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984)).  An appellate court then determines 
the questions of constitutional fact independently.  Id.    
 
    
¶19 We base our conclusion that a curtilage determination 
is a question of constitutional fact on Ornelas v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996), in which the United States 
Supreme 
Court 
held 
that 
on 
appeal, 
a 
judge’s 
ultimate 
determination of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should 
be reviewed de novo, while findings of historical fact should be 
reviewed only for clear error.  In Ornelas, the Court explained 
that independent appellate review prevents “varied results” even 
“'[i]n the absence of any significant difference in the facts'” 
supporting a judge’s determinations.  Id. at 697.  Moreover, the 
Court stated that “the legal rules for probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion acquire content only through application.  
Independent review is therefore necessary if appellate courts 
are 
to 
maintain 
control 
of, 
and 
to 
clarify 
the 
legal 
principles.”  Id. (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 
(1985)).  Finally, the Court explained that “de novo review 
tends to unify precedent” and provide law enforcement officers 
with clear rules that guide them in making legally correct 
decisions before acting to invade someone’s privacy.  Id.     
¶20 Similarly, 
this 
court 
also 
grants 
“independent 
appellate review of matters of constitutional fact [in order] to 
provide 
uniformity 
in 
constitutional 
decision-making.”  
Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 194.  By independently applying 
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
11
constitutional principles, an appellate court is able to add 
substance and meaning to a skeletal constitutional rule.  Id. 
(quoting State v. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 156, 165, 570 N.W.2d 384 
(1997)).    
¶21 Moreover, this court traditionally applies the two-
step standard of review to constitutional search and seizure 
inquiries.9  Whether an officer has illegally searched within the 
curtilage of a person’s residence is a search and seizure issue 
under the Fourth Amendment, Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170, 
180-81 (1984), and 
art. 
I, 
§ 11 of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  In keeping with our preference for independent 
review of issues of constitutional fact, and our use of the two-
step standard of review for other search and seizure inquiries, 
we hold that the two-step standard of review applies to 
curtilage determinations.   
¶22 The state advocates the use of a clearly erroneous 
standard 
of 
review 
for 
the 
ultimate 
determination 
of 
constitutional fact.  In support, the state cites to cases from 
several federal circuits, which have held that as a factual 
inquiry, a curtilage determination should be reviewed under a 
                     
9 See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 147 Wis. 2d 824, 829, 434 
N.W.2d 386 (1999); Isiah B. v. State, 176 Wis. 2d 639, 646, 500 
N.W.2d 637 (1993); State v. Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 441, 447, 477 
N.W.2d 277 (1991); State v. Whitrock, 161 Wis. 2d 960, 973, 468 
N.W.2d 696 (1991).  
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
12
clearly erroneous standard.10  These cases generally reason that 
although a curtilage determination is a mixed question of law 
and fact, because it is an “'essentially factual' inquiry,” the 
clearly erroneous standard of review must apply.   See, e.g., 
United States v. Traynor, 990 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 
1993)(quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 
(9th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984)). 
¶23 We find this line of reasoning unpersuasive.  A 
circuit court’s curtilage determination is not essentially a 
factual inquiry because it requires review of mixed questions of 
law and fact.11  See Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 189 (stating that 
"[t]his 
court 
has 
traditionally 
treated 
questions 
of 
constitutional fact as mixed questions of fact and law, and it 
has applied a two-step standard when reviewing lower court 
determinations 
of 
constitutional 
fact.") 
 
The 
initial 
determination of historical or evidentiary fact is no more 
important than the ultimate determination of constitutional 
fact.  The federal cases imply that once a circuit court answers 
                     
10 See, e.g., United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1275, 
aff’d on reh’g, 91 F.3d 331 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Friend, 50 F.3d 548, 552 (8th Cir. 1995), vacated on other 
grounds, 517 U.S. 1152 (1996); United States v. Benish, 5 F.3d 
20, 24 (3rd Cir. 1993); United States v. Knapp; 1 F.3d 1026, 
1029 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Traynor, 990 F.2d 1153, 
1156-57 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hatch, 931 F.2d 1478, 
1480 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 883 (1991); United 
States ex rel. Saiken v. Bensinger, 546 F.2d 1292, 1297 (7th 
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977); Hodges v. United 
States, 243 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir. 1957).  (Pet. Br. at 10.)  
11 Moreover, the cases the state cites were decided before 
Ornelas, which was decided in 1996.    
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
13
the four individual Dunn factors, the court’s analysis is 
complete.  See, e.g., Swepston, 987 F.2d 1510, 1513 (10th Cir. 
1993)(stating that the Dunn four-factor test “involves purely 
factual determinations”).  However, answering each individual 
Dunn factor does not complete the analysis.  The court must 
still apply the constitutional principles to the facts at hand 
to answer the question of law.  As such, the Dunn inquiry cannot 
be a purely factual inquiry.  
¶24 In sum, a curtilage determination involves an issue of 
constitutional fact.  We therefore apply a two-step standard of 
review in which we first review a court’s evaluation of the 
individual Dunn factors for clear error, whether such findings 
are contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence.  Then we review a court’s ultimate determination of 
the extent of curtilage de novo. 
III. 
¶25 Next, we address whether the five marijuana plants the 
deputies found growing on Martwick’s property lay outside the 
curtilage of his residence.  We conclude that the five marijuana 
plants were located outside the curtilage of the residence, and 
therefore, the deputies could enter that part of the property 
and seize a leaf slip from one of the plants during their 
initial warrantless search. 
¶26 The Fourth Amendment provides that “people [are] to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . and [that] no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”  U.S. Const. 
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
14
amend. IV.  The protection provided by the Fourth Amendment to a 
home also extends to the curtilage of a residence.  Oliver, 466 
U.S. at 180.  The curtilage is actually “considered part of 
[the] home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes,” id. at 180, 
and is defined at common law as ”the area to which extends the 
intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man’s home 
and the privacies of life.'”  Id. (quoting Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
¶27 The protections of the Fourth Amendment do not attach 
to land beyond the curtilage of a home.  See Hester v. United 
States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).  Such land includes public areas 
and what has been described as "open fields."  See id.   
¶28 The open fields concept was observed in Hester, in 
which Justice Holmes explained that "the special protection 
accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 
'persons, houses, papers and effects,' is not extended to the 
open fields.  The distinction between the latter and the house 
is as old as the common law."  Hester, 265 U.S. at 59 (citation 
omitted).  In Hester, police officers seized a jug and bottle of 
illegal whiskey on Hester's land.  Id. at 58.  The Court held 
that even though police officers had trespassed on Hester's 
land, the jug and bottle were not illegally seized because they 
were seized in the area of the property designated by the Court 
as the open fields.  Id. at 58-59.   
¶29 The distinction observed in Hester was reaffirmed in 
Oliver, which stated that "[t]he distinction implies that only 
the curtilage, not the neighboring fields, warrants the Fourth 
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
15
Amendment protections that attach to the home."  Oliver, 466 
U.S. at 180.  Open fields are not confined literally to fields. 
 Id. at n.11.  Further, "an individual has no legitimate 
expectation that open fields will remain free from warrantless 
intrusion by government officers.”  Id. at 181.  In fact, “there 
is no constitutional difference between police observations 
conducted while in a public place and while standing in the open 
fields.”  Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304. 
¶30 In 
Dunn, 
480 
U.S. 
at 
301, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
articulated four factors that a court should refer to when 
defining the extent of a home’s curtilage: 
 
the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to 
the home, whether the area is included within an 
enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses 
to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the 
resident to protect the area from observation by 
people passing by.12 
   
We now examine the application of the Dunn factors to the facts 
of this case. 
                     
12 The Court also cautioned that 
[w]e do not suggest that combining these factors 
produces 
a 
finely 
tuned 
formula 
that, 
when 
mechanically applied, yields a 'correct' answer to all 
extent-of-curtilage questions.  Rather, these factors 
are useful analytical tools only to the degree that, 
in any given case, they bear upon the centrally 
relevant consideration – whether the area in question 
is so intimately tied to the home itself that it 
should be placed under the home’s 'umbrella' of Fourth 
Amendment protection.   
 
Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301.  
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
16
 
¶31 We review for clear error the circuit court’s findings 
of fact.  At the September 10, 1997, suppression hearing, the 
circuit court made few findings of evidentiary or historical 
fact.  However, if a circuit court fails to make a finding that 
exists in the record, an appellate court can assume that the 
circuit court determined the fact in a manner that supports the 
circuit court’s ultimate decision.  See Sohns v. Jensen, 11 Wis. 
2d 449, 453, 105 N.W.2d 818 (1960).  Moreover, the court stated 
that the area where the deputies found the five marijuana plants 
was not posted or fenced, and that Martwick had a reduced 
expectation of privacy in that part of his property.13  (R. at 
35:38.)  Finally, the court concluded: 
I look at all the information provided, all the 
testimony provided, all the evidence provided, and I 
find that the interests of law enforcement in curbing 
illegal activity is sufficiently a concern of this 
Court, that the Court reiterates that this officer 
proceeded with – proceeded cautiously with information 
which he believed to be reliable.  He had private, 
previous information of his own.  He proceeded to 
verify that information. 
I am of the opinion, and let the Appeals Court 
proceed as they see fit, but there are no open fields 
                     
13 Martwick also argues that the deputies violated his 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area 50-75 feet from 
his home.  (Resp. Br. at 14-16.)  However, “[t]he [open fields 
doctrine] 
is 
consistent 
with 
respect 
for 
'reasonable 
expectations of privacy.'”  Oliver, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).  
In fashioning the Dunn factors, the United States Supreme Court 
clearly took into consideration an individual’s right to 
privacy.  See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300.  As such, the privacy issue 
is interwoven with the curtilage determination and need not be 
considered separately.     
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
17
in this particular area.  This is a wooded area.  This 
is the northwoods, and that’s what it looks like, and 
this is outside the curtilage. 
I am clearly of the opinion, and based on the 
case law as cited by Mr. Schilling I’m further of the 
opinion this is outside the curtilage.  There is no 
expectation of privacy in that particular area, and 
that 
the 
warrant 
then 
was appropriately 
sought, 
appropriately drafted, appropriately executed, and the 
Court then and therefore denies the motion. 
(R. at 35:52.)  There has been nothing presented which would 
lead us to conclude that any of Judge Madden’s findings are 
clearly erroneous.  
 
¶32 Our own analysis of the Dunn factors leads us to 
conclude that the five marijuana plants were indeed outside the 
curtilage of Martwick’s home.  Therefore, the deputies could 
legitimately seize a leaf slip from one of the plants, which, 
when tested, provided probable cause for the subsequent issuance 
of a search warrant covering the entire Martwick property. 
¶33 First, the record indicates that the pails were 
located between 50 and 75 feet from the house.  If the proximity 
factor would be the sole factor examined in the Dunn analysis, 
this would be a close case.  However, no bright-line rule exists 
for ascertaining when a distance is in close proximity, and 
cases are often inconsistent in this regard.  See United States 
v. Soliz, 129 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1997)(comparing a variety 
of federal cases in which similar distances were held to be 
either within or outside the curtilage). 
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
18
¶34 Further, it is helpful to examine the distance in 
relation to the total size of the property.  See United States 
v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1277 (2d Cir. 1996).  On a smaller 
property, such as Martwick’s property, the curtilage may very 
well extend for less distance than on a larger property, where 
the owner has more room to conduct his or her “intimate 
activit[ies] of . . . life.”  Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.  Simply 
because a property is small, and the relative distances involved 
are less than that of a large property, it does not mean that 
virtually the whole property must be within the curtilage.  
Therefore, while the distance between Martwick’s home and the 
marijuana plants was not vast, our inquiry does not end with 
this factor. 
¶35 We also distinguish our recent curtilage analysis in 
State v. O’Brien, 223 Wis. 2d 303, 316, 588 N.W.2d 8 (1999), in 
which we found that a truck parked approximately 200 feet from a 
farmhouse was within the curtilage.  Although that distance is 
obviously greater than the distance in this case, other factors 
strongly 
indicated 
that 
the 
truck 
was 
still 
within 
the 
curtilage.  Most significantly, the truck was parked next to the 
outbuilding of the farm complex.  O’Brien, 223 Wis. 2d at 303.  
The farm complex consisted of a “duplex, a barn, an outbuilding, 
a small backyard and two driveways.”  Id. at 310.  This court 
stated that in the context of a “rural setting,”  id. at 316, 
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
19
the area extending to the outbuilding was in the curtilage.  Id. 
at 316.  See also Dunn, 480 U.S. at 307-09 (Brennan, J., joined 
by Marshall, J., dissenting)(pointing out that in the context of 
a farm, many state and federal courts hold that the curtilage of 
the farmhouse often extends to barns and outbuildings).  
¶36 In contrast, Martwick’s property is not a farm.  As 
such, our analysis in O’Brien14 is not analogous to this case.  
Moreover, because Martwick’s property is not a farm, the 
curtilage does not automatically extend to his ginseng sheds. 
¶37 Second, Martwick did not erect any fence or other 
enclosure surrounding his home.  Deputy Roush tripped over some 
wire on the property, but that wire apparently did not surround 
the home.   
¶38 It is significant that the marijuana plants did not 
stand in the area of low-cut weeds and brush surrounding the 
house.  Oliver noted that the curtilage of most homes is clearly 
marked.  Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182, n.12.  Similarly, in United 
States v. Jenkins, 124 F.3d 768, 773 (6th Cir. 1997), the Sixth 
Circuit found that the curtilage of the home only extended to 
the portion of the property that was maintained as a backyard in 
                     
14 In O’Brien there were other significant differences as 
well.  Officers entered onto the property with a search warrant 
that permitted them to search the premises.  Because the search 
warrant extended to the premises, the issue was whether the 
physical proximity test applied to the search warrant.  State v. 
O’Brien, 223 Wis. 2d 303, 314, 588 N.W.2d 8 (1999).  
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
20
contrast to the rest of the property, which was a wooded field.15 
  
¶39 In this case, the curtilage is clearly marked by the 
low-cut weeds and brush.  The photographs introduced into 
evidence of Martwick’s property indicate that the low-cut weeds 
extend approximately twenty feet from the house.  The tree line 
then suddenly appears at twenty feet, and the trees further 
continue to the property’s border and beyond.  Moreover, from 
the photographs, there is no way to differentiate between the 
edge of Marwick’s property and the property of his abutting 
neighbors.  (Exhibits 1-25, 27-28.) 
¶40 Martwick argues that trees and shrubs that surround a 
house can fulfill the enclosure requirement.  (Resp. Br. at 11.) 
 For this proposition Martwick cites Lange, 158 Wis. 2d at 618. 
 We disagree.  The facts in Lange actually support our 
conclusion.  The court of appeals explained that “the house and 
garden stood alone in the middle of farm fields, surrounded 
except for the driveway entrance on all four sides by trees . . 
. .”  Lange, 158 Wis. 2d at 618-19 (emphasis added).  In this 
case, the point where the woods begin also marks the boundary of 
                     
15 The Sixth Circuit described the contrast by stating that 
“[d]efendants’ backyard is clearly demarked as a continuation of 
the home itself.  No one could mistake the yard, and its neatly 
mowed lawn and garden arrangements, for the unkempt open fields 
composing the remaining portion of defendants’ rural property.” 
 United States v. Jenkins, 124 F.3d 768, 773 (6th Cir. 1997).  
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
21
the curtilage.  However, the wooded area is not within the 
curtilage because the trees begin at a point twenty feet from 
the house, and therefore, mark the end of the twenty-foot 
clearing surrounding the house. 
¶41 Third, Martwick did not use the area where the 
marijuana plants were found for anything in particular.  While 
the marijuana was found near the rough footpath on the property, 
we do not consider that fact significant.  Martwick also argues 
that the footpath leads to a “garden.”  (Resp. Br. at 12-13.)  
We agree with the state that the sheds where Martwick cultivated 
ginseng and worms do not constitute a garden, “as that term is 
commonly understood.”  (Pet. Reply Br. at 10.)  Moreover, no 
witness characterized the ginseng sheds as a garden at the 
suppression hearing.  Nothing indicates that the area was used 
for “intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man’s 
home and the privacies of life.'”  Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 
(quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630). 
¶42 Fourth, 
the 
photographs 
introduced 
into 
evidence 
indicate that the trees at the edge of Marwick’s property were 
fairly dense.  By placing the marijuana among the dense trees, 
Martwick was able to protect the marijuana from observation from 
the street.  However, as we noted above, Martwick seems to live 
in a naturally wooded area.  He did not plant or cultivate the 
trees that grow on his property.  Martwick therefore did not 
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
22
create this protected area, as opposed to an individual who 
plants a tree line around his or her property, or builds a high 
wall or fence.  Martwick simply has not exercised dominion over 
his woods, so as to make the woods an intimate part of his home. 
 If the entire lot were curtilage, then this court would be 
creating an observation-free zone for criminal activity on all 
wooded property, greatly undercutting legitimate law enforcement 
efforts.  Therefore, this final factor supports the other 
evidence that the marijuana was found outside of the curtilage 
of the home. 
IV. 
¶43 In conclusion, we hold that a curtilage determination 
is a question of constitutional fact subject to a two-step 
review.  The findings of evidentiary or historical fact are 
reviewed for clear error, to determine whether such findings are 
contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence.  The ultimate determination of constitutional fact is 
reviewed de novo.  We further hold that applying this two-step 
process, the five marijuana plants the deputies initially found 
were outside of the curtilage of Martwick’s home.  Because they 
were outside the curtilage, the deputies could seize a leaf 
sample.  The leaf sample, when tested, provided probable cause 
for the search warrant, and therefore, the deputies’ subsequent 
search and seizure of the evidence of marijuana cultivation was 
No. 
98-0101-CR 
 
 
23
proper.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ decision, 
which overturned Martwick’s conviction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
98-0101-CR.dtp 
 
1 
¶44 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.    (concurring).   This important 
case interprets the scope of protection from a warrantless 
search under the Fourth Amendment.  I join the mandate and 
opinion of the court but write separately to respond to the 
dissent and to emphasize certain elements underlying the 
decision. 
¶45 Price County sheriff's deputies had reason to believe 
that Thomas Martwick was growing marijuana at his home.  An 
informant reported seeing marijuana plants inside his house, but 
more than a month passed after this sighting before the evidence 
was presented to the district attorney.  The district attorney 
understood both the sanctity of the home and the integrity of 
the warrant process.  He was concerned that the evidence to 
support a search warrant was stale, and after consulting with 
the judge, he deferred taking action. 
¶46 Thereafter, two deputies went to the Martwick property 
to see if they could secure fresh evidence to support the 
issuance of a warrant.  They entered Martwick's wooded land from 
the south and soon encountered five marijuana plants in plastic 
pails situated along a primitive path at least 50 feet from the 
house. 
¶47 The question before the court is whether Martwick 
placed the five marijuana plants within a zone around his 
housethe curtilagein which he could legitimately expect 
privacy.  The majority concludes that the curtilage ended where 
98-0101-CR.dtp 
 
2 
the woods began16about 20 feet from the house and at least 30 
feet away from the marijuana plants.  The dissent implies that 
the entire 1.52 acres of property, except the area of the 
driveway leading from the street and the area in plain view from 
that driveway, was curtilage. 
¶48 All that this court must decide is whether the 
curtilage of the Martwick property extended more than 50 feet 
from the house, because the deputies never came closer than 
within 50 feet of the house. 
¶49 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
¶50 Curtilage is treated as an extension of a person's 
house.  "At common law, the curtilage is the area to which 
extends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a 
man's home and the privacies of life,' Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), and therefore has been considered part 
of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes."  Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).  Courts define 
curtilage "by reference to the factors that determine whether an 
                     
16 In State v. Lange, 158 Wis. 2d 609, 618, 463 N.W.2d 390 
(Ct. App. 1990), the court of appeals affirmed a circuit court 
finding that the "tree line surrounding Lange's garden marked 
his curtilage."  
98-0101-CR.dtp 
 
3 
individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately 
adjacent to the home will remain private" (citations omitted).  
Id. 
¶51 These factors were explicitly spelled out in United 
States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987): 
 
[1] the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage 
to the home, [2] whether the area is included within 
an enclosure surrounding the home, [3] the nature of 
the uses to which the area is put, and [4] the steps 
taken by the resident to protect the area from 
observation by people passing by. 
¶52 It is beyond dispute that "proximity" is not the only 
factor in determining curtilage.  "The distance from a house to 
the area in question, while a useful factor in the analysis, is 
by no means dispositive since the three other factors must also 
be considered."  State v. Hall, 719 A.2d 435, 437 (Vt. 1998).  A 
home's curtilage often depends upon the lay of the land and what 
the homeowner has done with the property. 
¶53 The dissent complains that the majority "ends the 
curtilage - and ends constitutional protection for the home - at 
20 feet from the house, far less than 10 yards, the distance of 
a 'first down.'"  Dissent at ¶5.  That determination, of course, 
applies to the facts in this case.  The reason the curtilage in 
this case stops short of a "first down" is that the tree line 
was the limit of Martwick's "forward progress."  He could have 
pushed the curtilage the length of an entire football field if 
he had made the effort - if he had moved the frontier of his 
ungroomed, unmanaged, uncontrolled woods farther from his house, 
98-0101-CR.dtp 
 
4 
or taken other action to improve or assert control over his 
land. 
¶54 Martwick never took control of his property in a way 
that would give him an expansive curtilage.  A property owner 
cannot reasonably argue that wooded land is "part of the home 
itself" if the property owner does not fence the land, clear the 
land, or use the land for some purpose consistent with the 
"privacies of life." 
¶55 In Oliver, the Supreme Court strongly affirmed the 
vitality of the "open fields" doctrine first announced in Hester 
v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).  "Open fields" are the 
antithesis of curtilage even though they may be privately owned, 
because they are open areas not intimately linked to the home, 
either physically or psychologically.  See California v. 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). 
¶56 The Oliver decision included a consolidated case, 
Maine v. Thornton, No. 82-1273, highly relevant to the case at 
hand.  The Court stated the facts as follows: 
 
After receiving an anonymous tip that marihuana was 
being grown in the woods behind respondent Thornton's 
residence, two police officers entered the woods by a 
path between this residence and a neighboring house.  
They followed a footpath through the woods until they 
reached two marihuana patches fenced with chicken 
wire.  Later, the officers determined that the patches 
were on the property of respondent, obtained a warrant 
to search the property, and seized the marihuana. 
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 174.  The trial court held that "No 
Trespassing" signs on the property and the secluded location of 
the "marihuana" patches evinced a reasonable expectation of 
98-0101-CR.dtp 
 
5 
privacy.  Therefore, it said that the "open fields" doctrine did 
not apply, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.  Id. 
at 175.  The United States Supreme Court reversed, saying: 
 
. . . [O]pen fields do not provide the setting for 
those intimate activities that the [Fourth] Amendment 
is intended to shelter from government interference or 
surveillance.  There is no societal interest in 
protecting the privacy of those activities, such as 
the 
cultivation 
of 
crops, 
that 
occur 
in 
open 
fields. . . . [T]he asserted expectation of privacy in 
open fields is not an expectation that "society 
recognizes as reasonable." 
Id. at 179.  The Court declared that "[a]n open field need be 
neither 'open' nor a 'field' as those terms are used in common 
speech. . . . [A] thickly wooded area . . . may be an open field 
as that term is used in construing the Fourth Amendment."  
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180, n.11 (emphasis added). 
 
¶57 The 
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Vermont 
reached 
the 
same 
conclusion in Hall, 719 A.2d at 437: 
 
The Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to permit 
warrantless entry onto "open fields," or areas outside 
of 
the 
curtilage 
where 
there 
is 
no 
reasonable 
expectation of privacy. . . .  Since no signs were 
posted, nor were other methods used, to indicate that 
defendant sought to exclude the public from the woods 
adjacent to his yard, we conclude that defendant had 
no expectation of privacy from a walk-on search in the 
wooded area behind his house. 
See also Bedell v. State, 521 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Ark. 1975); State 
v. Webb, 943 P.2d 52 (Idaho 1997). 
 
¶58 The dissent voices concern for a property owner's 
privacy, but it fails to articulate a test that distinguishes 
one part of Martwick's extensive woods from another.  It implies 
98-0101-CR.dtp 
 
6 
that the entire wooded area of this 66,000 square-foot property 
(not including the area directly visible from the driveway) is 
protected from warrantless police investigation, even though 
there was nothing to mark the boundaries of the property from 
the property of neighbors, no signs excluding trespassers, no 
serious fencing, and no evidence of use of the woods except for 
a rough path between the ginseng sheds at the back of the lot 
and the house. 
 
¶59 The placement of several five-gallon pails containing 
marijuana plants along the path was no doubt intended to conceal 
criminal activity and escape attention.  Martwick's expectation 
of privacy was not, however, "legitimate in the sense required 
by the Fourth Amendment."  Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182.17  Society is 
not willing to recognize all "expectations" of privacy as 
                     
17 The officers took photographs of the Martwick house from 
the spot where they discovered the pails.  The officers could 
see only the top of the house.  If the officers were able to see 
no more than the top of the house, their "prying eyes" did not 
invade Martwick's privacy. 
98-0101-CR.dtp 
 
7 
reasonable.18  People who own wooded property cannot expect to 
grow illegal crops in their woods, free from surveillance, 
without doing considerably more to secure their privacy than 
leave their property in a natural state. 
¶60 Martwick did not place any enclosure around his woods 
or take steps to discourage public entry onto his property.  He 
                     
18 The United States Supreme Court observed that Fourth 
Amendment analysis hinges on two questions: "first, has the 
individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
object of the challenged search?  Second, is society willing to 
recognize that expectation as reasonable?"  California v. 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).  For the first inquiry, Martwick no doubt 
manifested a subjective expectation that his illegal plants 
would remain concealed in privacy.  For the second inquiry, 
whether Martwick's expectation of privacy was "reasonable," we 
must consider "'whether the government's intrusion infringes 
upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.'"  Id. at 212 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 
U.S. 170, 181-83 (1984)).  Here, there was no infringing 
intrusion upon protected values because Martwick failed to 
extend the sanctity and privacy of his home to his land. 
98-0101-CR.dtp 
 
8 
did not use the woods for the kind of lawful activities 
intimately associated with the home.  Therefore, the circuit 
court was correct in denying Martwick's motion to suppress 
evidence. 
 
No. 98-0101.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶61 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  
This decision allows law enforcement officers who have no search 
warrant to enter the residential subdivision lot and search 20 
feet from the house where the defendant resides. 
¶62 The property in question is a one and one-half acre 
lot in a platted residential subdivision next to a public lake 
lined with cottages.  The lot is near roads and adjacent to 
neighbors' houses in the same subdivision.  Except for the 
house, driveway and sheds at the rear of the property, the lot 
has been left in a natural state.  A drawing of the lot based on 
the defendant's sketch is attached. 
¶63 I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  
I dissent because I conclude that allowing a warrantless search 
20 feet from the house violates the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.19  The State has failed to meet its burden of 
proving that the area in which the marijuana was found was 
outside the home protected by the Fourth Amendment from 
warrantless searches.  The uncontroverted evidence is that the 
                     
19 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
 
No. 98-0101.ssa 
 
2 
defendant’s use of the area in question is a use ordinarily 
considered as part of the curtilage to the home. 
¶64 The fundamental constitutional principle governing 
this 
case 
is 
that 
a 
warrantless 
search 
of 
a 
home 
is 
“presumptively unreasonable.”  Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 
749 (1984) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 
(1980)).20 
¶65 The home protected by the Fourth Amendment includes 
more than the house.  The constitutional protections attach to 
land surrounding the house.  The land around the house protected 
by the Fourth Amendment is known in the law as the curtilage of 
the home.21  The majority opinion in this case ends the curtilage 
— and ends constitutional protection for the home — at 20 feet 
from the house, far less than 10 yards, the distance required 
for a "first down." 
                     
20 Before entering the defendant’s property the officers 
attempted to get a search warrant but were rebuffed by the 
district attorney and the judge, who determined that the 
officers did not have probable cause to believe that evidence of 
a crime would be found on the defendant’s property.  There is no 
evidence to suggest that an emergency existed or that the 
officers otherwise had legal grounds to search the defendant’s 
property. 
The majority’s decision may have an unforeseen consequence. 
 In narrowing the meaning given to curtilage the court also may 
be narrowing the scope of searches permissible under a warrant 
authorizing a search of a building. 
21 Areas within the curtilage may be subject to police 
observation.  The U.S. Supreme Court has allowed police 
observation of a curtilage from a plane in public navigable 
airspace. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
No. 98-0101.ssa 
 
3 
¶66 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the protected 
curtilage extends to the land that "an individual reasonably may 
expect . . . should be treated as the home itself."22  The 
curtilage is an area so intimately tied to the home that it 
should be placed under the home’s protective umbrella.23 
¶67 The State has the burden of proving that a warrantless 
search does not violate the U.S. Constitution.24  In other words, 
                     
22 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987). 
23 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301. 
The 
relation 
between 
the 
curtilage 
and 
open 
fields 
doctrines is unclear.  The open fields cases appear to deal with 
the issue of whether a person may have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy and protection of the Fourth Amendment in property 
that is not within the home’s curtilage.  See Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 n. 11 (1984) (“Neither petitioner 
Oliver nor respondent Thornton has contended that the property 
searched is within the curtilage.  . . .  It is clear, however, 
that the term 'open fields' may include any unoccupied or 
undeveloped area outside of the curtilage.”); Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure at § 2.3(d) (3rd ed. 1996) (“in applying 
Oliver in United States v. Dunn [480 U.S. 294 (1987)], the Court 
ruled that merely looking into a barn outside the curtilage was 
no search, but did not challenge the defendant’s assertion ‘that 
he possessed an expectation of privacy independent from his 
home’s curtilage. . . . ’”); at § 2.4(a) (“Because Oliver takes 
the 
position 
that 
to 
fall 
within 
the 
‘open 
fields’ 
classification the area in question must be outside the 
curtilage, the meaning of that concept has become increasingly 
important . . . ”). 
Also murky is the relation of the reasonable expectation of 
privacy doctrine to the open fields doctrine.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Santa Maria, 15 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
although defendant’s trailer was outside the curtilage to the 
home, it was still protected from warrantless searches by the 
Fourth Amendment). 
24 State v. Washington, 134 Wis. 2d 108, 120, 396 N.W.2d 156 
(1986). 
No. 98-0101.ssa 
 
4 
the State must prove that the area searched in this case is not 
curtilage.  The State has not met this burden.  Accordingly, I 
agree with the court of appeals that this search violated the 
U.S. Constitution.25 
¶68 The State argues that the use to which the property is 
put is the determinative factor in determining curtilage in this 
case.  Petitioner’s Brief at 14, 17.  Several courts have held 
that a homeowner’s maintenance of a garden in an area being 
searched is strong evidence that the area is part of the 
protected curtilage.26 
¶69 The defendant testified that the marijuana pots were 
on a path that he "routinely" traveled between his house and the 
sheds at the rear of the lot, which contained his ginseng and 
goldenseal plants.  He also raised worms in horse manure in this 
area and kept a compost heap, which he used to fertilize the 
ginseng.  He further testified that he kept the path open with a 
brush cutter.   
                     
25 I also agree with the court of appeals (and the majority 
opinion) that the scope of curtilage for Fourth Amendment 
purposes is a question of constitutional law that an appellate 
court decides independently, benefiting from the legal analyses 
of other courts that have addressed the issue. 
26 See, e.g., State v. Lange, 158 Wis. 2d 609, 618-20, 463 
N.W.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1990) (marijuana seized was within the 
defendant’s curtilage since it was next to a vegetable garden 
and enclosed by a fence on three sides); United States v. 
Jenkins, 124 F.3d 768, 773 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that part of 
a search was unlawful because it invaded defendants’ enclosed 
backyard, which had a garden, a laundry line, and other homelike 
activities). 
No. 98-0101.ssa 
 
5 
¶70 The investigating officer agreed there was a path or 
trail leading from the house toward the back of the lot. 
According to the officer, he did not follow the path beyond the 
marijuana pails and therefore offered no evidence about the use 
of the sheds.  The State thus presented no evidence to 
contravene the defendant’s testimony. 
¶71 The majority opinion finds that the sheds where the 
defendant cultivated ginseng and worms do not constitute a 
garden "'as that term is commonly understood.'"  Majority op. at 
¶41 (quoting Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 10).  It is unclear 
what evidence the majority opinion relies on to make this 
factual finding. 
¶72 The circuit court made no finding of fact about the 
defendant’s use of the area in question.  Furthermore, the 
circuit court made no mention of how the evidence fits within 
the test established by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States 
v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).  The circuit court simply 
concluded that "there was no expectation of privacy in that 
particular area and that the warrant was appropriately sought." 
 The circuit court’s findings and decision are quoted in full at 
¶31 of the majority opinion. 
¶73 The majority acknowledges that the circuit court made 
"few findings of evidentiary or historical fact" but asserts 
that "an appellate court can assume that the circuit court 
determined the fact in a manner that supports the circuit 
court’s ultimate decision."  Majority op. at ¶31 (citing Sohns 
No. 98-0101.ssa 
 
6 
v. Jensen, 11 Wis. 2d 449, 453, 105 N.W.2d 818 (1960)).  This 
rule of appellate practice does not apply in the present case. 
¶74 An appellate court can assume that the circuit court 
made a finding of fact only when evidence exists in the record 
to support the "assumed fact."  If the record does not support 
the "assumed fact" then the finding of the "assumed fact" is 
clearly erroneous and cannot be sustained.  Nothing in the 
record supports a factual finding by the circuit court that the 
area in question was not used for gardening.  Thus the circuit 
court could not make this particular finding of fact, which the 
majority assumes it made.  An appellate court as a rule cannot 
make any findings of fact.27  I conclude therefore that the State 
has not met its burden to prove that the area searched was not 
curtilage. 
¶75 In addition to relying on a record that is factually 
insufficient, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
fails 
to 
provide 
any 
compelling overall rationale or theoretical basis for its 
conclusion that the curtilage ends 20 feet from the house.  The 
majority opinion concedes that the four factors set forth in 
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987), a case which 
involved a search on a 198-acre ranch, are not to be applied 
mechanically.28 
 
The 
majority 
nevertheless 
undertakes 
a 
formalistic review of each of the Dunn factors but engages in no 
                     
27 Wurtz v. Fleischman, 97 Wis. 2d 100, 108, 293 N.W.2d 155 
(1980). 
28 See majority op. at ¶30 n.12 (quoting United States v. 
Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301). 
No. 98-0101.ssa 
 
7 
analysis of the Dunn factors as a whole, how they interact, or 
how they weigh against each other. 
¶76 The majority opinion delivers two messages that are of 
dubious validity.  First, the majority opinion seems to say that 
law enforcement has a right to observe at least some part of 
everyone’s wooded residential lot without a search warrant, or 
it "would be creating an observation-free zone for criminal 
activity on all wooded property."  Majority op. at ¶42.  I 
disagree with the suggestion that law enforcement must be given 
an area in every residential wooded lot from which to observe 
the property without a warrant. 
¶77 Second, the majority suggests that if homeowners want 
Fourth Amendment protection for land around their house then 
they must chop down any existing trees and plant new ones.  The 
majority opinion suggests that if the defendant had planted the 
trees, the tree line would support an expectation of privacy on 
his lot, but because the defendant merely left trees standing he 
did not express an expectation of privacy.  Majority op. at ¶42. 
 I cannot agree with this reasoning.  See State v. Lange, 158 
Wis. 2d 609, 620, 463 N.W.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1990) (whether 
defendant planted trees or "merely chose to live on the property 
because the trees afforded privacy, he took steps to protect the 
area from observation by people passing by"). 
¶78 I agree with the court of appeals that the facts in 
this record are insufficient to support a conclusion that the 
warrantless search was constitutional.  If the majority is 
unwilling to suppress the evidence of the marijuana plants, it 
No. 98-0101.ssa 
 
8 
should remand this case to the circuit court to give the State a 
second chance to prove that the land in question is outside the 
curtilage.  Before this court impinges on the privacy of a home, 
the court should demand a better record than exists in the 
present case.29 
¶79 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶80 I am authorized to state that JUSTICE WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and JUSTICE ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
                     
 29 This case is one of several in which I believe the court 
has not been sufficiently protective of the privacy of the home. 
 For example, in State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 321 N.W.2d 245 
(1982), this court allowed law enforcement officers to enter a 
home to arrest a driver suspected of driving under the influence 
of intoxicants, which was a non-criminal offense at that time 
under Wisconsin law.  The U.S. Supreme Court overturned this 
decision.  Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984). 
In State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994) 
and State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 845, 549 N.W.2d 218 (1996), 
this court declared that a no-knock entry is permissible when 
officers have a warrant to search the home of a suspected felony 
drug dealer.  The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that our court 
had erred in adopting this categorical approach.  Richards v. 
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997). 
Similarly 
the 
majority 
does 
not 
give 
sufficient 
consideration to the Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home 
in this case and in State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___. 
No. 98-0101.ssa 
 
9 
Drawing of the Lot Based on the Defendant's Sketch