Case Title: Idaho v. Meyer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 43332

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2017-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 43332 
 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
       Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
DOUGLAS EARL MEYER, 
 
       Defendant-Appellant. 
 
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Boise, November 2016 Term 
 
2017 Opinion No.  11 
 
Filed: February 3, 2017 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
    
    
    
 
__________________________________ 
 
 
Appeal from the district court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State  
            of Idaho, Ada County.  Hon. Richard D. Greenwood, District Judge. 
 
 
The district court’s judgment of conviction is affirmed. 
 
 
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellant Public Defender, Boise, attorneys 
 
for appellant.  Brian R. Dickson argued.  
 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney  
 
for respondent.  Jessica M. Lorello argued.  
 
W. JONES, Justice 
I.  NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Douglas Earl Meyer (“Meyer”), appeals his felony conviction for possession 
of over three ounces of marijuana. Meyer asserts on appeal that the district court erred when it 
denied his request for a jury instruction on the necessity defense. Meyer is a Washington State 
resident who has a prescription for medical marijuana and is the designated medical marijuana 
provider1 for one, Tammy Lee Rose.2 He was arrested while driving through Idaho on his way to 
California with over three ounces of marijuana in his vehicle. He argues that the district court 
was required to provide a necessity defense jury instruction because he had made a prima facie 
                                                 
1 In accordance with RCW 69.51A.005, medical marijuana patients in the state of Washington may identify a 
“designated provider” who is permitted to sell medical marijuana to them.  
2 Tammy Lee Rose lives at the same residence as Meyer. She was planning to meet Meyer in California and did not 
travel to Idaho with him.  
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showing of each of the elements of that defense: (1) he will suffer pain if he does not use 
marijuana; (2) he was not the cause of his medical condition; (3) marijuana is an effective 
medication for him where other medications have not been effective; and (4) any harm caused by 
violating the law is less than the harm that he would have suffered if he did not use marijuana. 
The State responds that Meyers did not make a showing of each of the elements of the necessity 
defense because: (1) Meyer’s use of marijuana to treat chronic pain does not constitute a specific 
threat of harm; and (2) Meyer could have avoided violating the law altogether by driving through 
Oregon instead of Idaho. The State further asserts that to the extent that Idaho Supreme Court 
precedent set forth in State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 801 P.2d 563 (1990) requires a necessity 
instruction in this case, Hastings should be overturned.  
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On August 24, 2014, Meyer was pulled over for driving in excess of the speed limit. 
Police recovered an amount of marijuana in excess of three ounces as well as $2,600 in cash. The 
State charged Meyer with: (1) possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in 
violation of Idaho Code section 37-2732(a), and in the alternative (2) possession of marijuana in 
excess of three ounces in violation of Idaho Code section 37-2732(e). Each of these crimes is a 
felony in the state of Idaho.  
 
On January 27, 2015, Meyer filed a motion for jury instructions. The motion contained 
the following necessity instruction: 
 
 
 
 
INSTRUCTION NO.______ 
 
The defendant cannot be guilty [of (name of crime)] if the defendant acted 
because of necessity. Conduct which violates the law is justified by necessity if:  
1. There is a specific threat of immediate harm to [the defendant] [name of 
person], 
2. The defendant did not bring about the circumstances which created the threat 
of immediate harm, 
3. The defendant could not have prevented the threatened harm by any less 
offensive alternative, and 
4. The harm caused by violating the law was less than the threatened harm. 
The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not 
act because of necessity. If you have a reasonable doubt on that issue, you 
must find the defendant not guilty. 
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On February 4, 2015, Meyer submitted an Offer of Proof to the district court. The Offer 
of Proof provided as follows: 
1) The Defendant has a prescription for medical marijuana issued by Presto 
Quality Care . . . . 
2) The Defendant has been designated as a Medical Marijuana Provider by the 
State of Washington for Tammy Lee Rose. . . . Additionally, Tammy Lee Rose 
will be available to confirm that Douglas Earl Meyer is her designated Medical 
Marijuana Provider. 
3) Douglas Earl Meyer was examined by Dr. Stephen A. McLennon . . . . Dr. 
McLennon will be available telephonically February 6th, 2015 at 9:00 am. 
4) Douglas Meyer will be available to explain to the Court his various ailments 
and medical issues. 
A copy of Meyer’s prescription for medical marijuana, his state designation as a medical 
marijuana provider, Dr. McLennon’s curriculum vitae and evaluation, and Meyer’s medical 
history were all submitted to the district court along with the offer of proof.  
 
Dr. McLennon’s evaluation stated as follows: 
[Meyer] has decided to forgo the use of prescription pain medications, which have 
caused unpleasant and intolerable side effects, without adequate pain relief. He 
prefers a natural plant medicine that helps manage numerous symptoms, without 
causing additional ones. 
 
On February 6, 2015, the district court held a hearing with respect to the jury instruction 
and offer of proof. The district court found that “there is no evidence proffered of a threat of 
immediate harm that I think is contemplated by the statute and by the cases . . . . We have 
someone who will undergo some discomfort for some period of time . . . I don’t mean to 
minimize the fact that pain hurts . . . [but] there is no suggestion it puts anyone in imminent 
danger of life or limb.” Accordingly, the district court denied Meyer’s motion for a jury 
instruction as to the necessity defense.   
On February 9, 2015, Meyer and the State entered into a stipulation to enter a conditional 
guilty plea. In that stipulation, Meyer agreed to plead guilty but withheld his right to withdraw 
that plea pending appellate review of the district court’s refusal to include Meyer’s proposed 
necessity jury instruction. In conjunction with the stipulation, Meyer pled guilty to possession of 
over three ounces of marijuana.  
On May 28, 2015, the district court entered a judgment of conviction and commitment, 
convicting Meyer of felony possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces, and sentencing 
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him to six months fixed and two years and six months indeterminate, a suspended fine of $5,000, 
and restitution of $2,574.46. 
 
Meyer appeals. 
III. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
1. 
Did the district court err by denying Meyer’s proposed jury instruction on the legal 
defense of necessity? 
IV.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A motion for a jury instruction is judged by whether there is a reasonable view of the 
evidence that supports the requested instruction. See State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874, 878, 920 
P.2d 391, 395 (1996). This Court reviews the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. Id.  
V.  ANALYSIS 
A. 
The district court correctly concluded that no reasonable view of the evidence 
presented would support a necessity instruction.  
A trial court presiding over a criminal case must instruct the jury on all 
matters of law necessary for the jury’s information. I.C. § 19–2132. In other 
words, a trial court must deliver instructions on the rules of law that are “material 
to the determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” State v. Mack, 132 
Idaho 480, 483, 974 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Ct.App.1999). This necessarily includes 
instructions on the “nature and elements of the crime charged and the essential 
legal principles applicable to the evidence that has been admitted.” State v. 
Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 172, 90 P.3d 920, 922 (Ct.App.2004). Each party is entitled 
to request the delivery of specific instructions. However, such instructions will 
only be given if they are “correct and pertinent.” I.C. § 19–2132. A proposed 
instruction is not “correct and pertinent” if it is: (1) an erroneous statement of the 
law; (2) adequately covered by other instructions; or (3) “not supported by the 
facts of the case.” State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 285, 647 P.2d 734, 741 (1982). 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710–11, 215 P.3d 414, 430–31 (2009). “If the requested 
instruction is not supported by the evidence, the court must reject the requested instruction.” 
Howley, 128 Idaho at 878, 920 P.2d at 395.  
 In State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 801 P.2d 563 (1990), this Court recognized the 
common law defense of necessity pursuant to Idaho Code section 73–116.  The Hastings Court 
set forth Idaho’s definition of the necessity defense as containing the following four elements: 
1. A specific threat of immediate harm; 
2. The circumstances which necessitate the illegal act must not have been brought 
about by the defendant; 
3. The same objective could not have been accomplished by a less offensive 
alternative available to the actor; and 
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4. The harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm avoided. 
Id. at 855, 801 P.2d at 564. It follows that in order for a court to be required to give a necessity 
instruction to the jury, the moving party must provide at least some factual support for each 
element identified in Hastings.  
 
In addition to providing for necessity defenses generally, the Hastings Court established 
that it is possible for a defendant charged with manufacturing of a controlled substance 
(marijuana) to provide facts sufficient to warrant a necessity instruction. Id. at 856, 801 P.2d at 
565. Hastings concerned the prosecution of an Idaho woman with rheumatoid arthritis who used 
marijuana to control pain and muscle spasms associated with the disease.  Id. at 855, 801 P.2d at 
564. The defendant requested a jury instruction on “medical necessity,” which was refused by 
the district court. Id. On appeal, this Court declined to recognize a special defense for “medical 
necessity,” but held that the district court erred in refusing to give a standard necessity 
instruction. Id. at 856, 801 P.2d at 565.  
Meyer asserts on appeal that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that 
there was no reasonable view of the evidence presented in this case sufficient to support a 
necessity instruction. As a preliminary matter, we agree with Meyer that the district court erred 
in its reasoning. The first element of necessity is that there must be a specific threat of immediate 
harm. The district court concluded that there was no reasonable interpretation of the facts that 
could lead a jury to find that a threat of immediate harm existed. It reasoned that “[w]e have 
someone who will undergo some discomfort for some period of time . . . I don’t mean to 
minimize the fact that pain hurts . . . [but] there is no suggestion it puts anyone in imminent 
danger of life or limb.”  
This reasoning was error on the part of the district court. The necessity defense does not 
require a threat of harm that qualifies as “danger of life or limb.” This is evident from a plain 
reading of this Court’s language in Hastings, which establishes that the necessity defense 
requires only “a specific threat of immediate harm”; there is no severity threshold either 
explicitly or implicitly in our language.  The fact that situations where the necessity defense has 
been found appropriate often have been situations involving danger to life or limb does not entail 
that such a magnitude of danger is requisite. Indeed, some of the examples of necessity that this 
Court cited in Hastings—disorderly conduct while engaging in a political protest and speeding to 
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allow a police officer in pursuit of another to pass—did not involve imminent danger to life or 
limb. 118 Idaho at 855–56, 801 P.2d at 564–65.  
Despite the fact that the district court may have erred in its reasoning, the district court 
did not err in its conclusion. In Hastings, this Court established that the necessity defense is only 
available where “[t]he same objective could not have been accomplished by a less offensive 
alternative available to the actor.” In this case, Meyer’s objective was to avoid pain caused by his 
medical condition. He brought over three ounces of marijuana into Idaho, which is a felony 
offense. He was planning to be in Idaho for roughly eight hours.3 Meyer did present some 
evidence suggesting that he had tried other medications which had not been as effective and had 
had negative side effects that led him to “prefer” marijuana. However, Meyer did not present 
evidence that there was no legal method by which he could manage his pain for the eight hours 
that he was in Idaho. Without a prima facie showing that Meyer did not have any legal 
alternative to manage his pain for that short period of time, including through the procurement of 
medications which are legal in the State of Idaho, Meyer cannot show that the district court erred 
in refusing to instruct the jury as to necessity. 
With respect to the State’s assertion that this Court should overturn its decision in 
Hastings, we decline to take such an action. This Court has established that is does not overturn 
precedent when a case can be resolved without conflicting with said precedent. See Houghland 
Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 987, 983 (1990) (“We should not consider 
overruling a controlling precedent, if there are other grounds for disposing of an appeal.”). 
Hastings was a case in which a defendant did provide facts such that a necessity instruction was 
supported in a marijuana case. It does not stand for the proposition that a necessity instruction is 
automatically warranted in all cases involving marijuana. Rather, it is within the purview of the 
district court to review the individual facts in each case and determine whether those facts 
provide a sufficient basis for each individual element of a necessity defense. Here, the facts fell 
short of that mark. There is no need for this Court to overrule Hastings in order to reach this 
conclusion. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
                                                 
3 The State points out that Meyer planned to be driving for the majority of his time in Idaho. While this is 
concerning, the district court was correct in determining that Meyer was not charged with driving under the 
influence, and, accordingly, in considering the “harm” that Meyer caused, the district court properly limited its 
analysis to felony possession of marijuana.   
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We affirm the district court’s judgment of conviction.  
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices EISMANN and HORTON, and Justice pro tem J. 
JONES, concur.