Case Title: Lansdell v. County of Kauai.

Citation: 110 Haw. 189

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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a
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'E

000

a
ROBERT LANSDELL and KEIKO LANSDELL,
3)

Plaintiffs-Appellants

 

 

COUNTY OF KAUAI, STATE OF HAWAI'I,
Defendant s-Appellees

5S'5 WY OF wysou
omnes

 

and
BALI HAT VILLAS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, BALI HAT
PAMELA VOGEL,

VELLAS INC-, RICHARD VOGEL,
JOHN DOES 1-5, JOHN DOE CORPORATIONS 1-5, JOHN DOE
108 NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 1-5,

PARTNERSHIPS 1-5, R
‘and ROE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES 1-5, Defendants
a

Wo. 26415
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT
(CIv. NO. 00-21-0125)

MARCH 30, 2006

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.

In this consolidated appeal, we hold that (1) Hawai'i
Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter $20,’ the Hawai'i Recreational Use
Statute, does not apply to Defendant-Appellee County of Kaua'i

(the County), as an adjacent owner of “land,” or to lands owned

“i Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 520

 
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eee
by the government, including lands owned by Defendant~Appellee

State of Hawai'i (the State); (2) the County did not have a duty
to warn Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Lansdell (Lansdell) of any
dangers associated with diving in Queen’s Bath, an ocean tide
pool (Queen’s Bath or tide pool); (3) the County did not
voluntarily assume a duty to warn by virtue of its signs
pertaining to hazardous ocean and trail conditions; (4) any duty
that the County may have had towards Lansdell because of the
signs did not give rise to liability to him and Plaintiff-
Appellant Keiko Lansdell [collectively, Plaintiffs]; and (5) even
Af Queen's Bath is deemed a “de facto” beach park, no liability
on the part of the State and County arose because (a) the dangers
found in Queen’s Bath are natural conditions, which do not
trigger a duty to warn on the part of the State and County
defendants, and (b) the provisions of S.L.H. Act 190 (1996)?
expressly exempt the State and County from liability for failing
to warn of dangerous natural conditions. Accordingly, we affirm
the January 26, 2004 Judgment entered by the fifth circuit court

(the court)? dismissing all claims against the defendants.‘

Ae discussed more fully dpfza, Act 190 absolves the State of
Hewai't and the separate counties of any duty to warn of dangerous natural
Conditions in the cceen, on Beach accesses, coastal accesses, or in areas that
Gre not public beach parks. 1996 Haw, Sess. L, Act 190, § 2 at 435.

 

 

    

>the Honorable George M. Masuoks presided,

+ Phaintstte dismiesed Defendants Bali Hai Villas Linited
Pertnership, Beli Hai Villas Inc., Richard Vogel and Panele Vogel by
Stipulation, Plaintiffs never identified any of the potential oe or Roe
Gefendante, The state and County are the only enaining defendants on appeal.

  

 

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Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking damages arising
from a head injury suffered by Lansdell in a diving accident at
Queen's Bath located on the north shore of Kaua'i near
Princeville. ‘The complaint alleged that Lansdell was rendered =
quadriplegic and his injury resulted from the negligence of
various defendants in failing to warn the public of the dangers
of diving at Queen’s Bath. The defendants included Bali Hai
Villas Limited Partnership, Bali Hai Villas Inc., the County, the
State, Richard Vogel, and Panels Vogel, all of whom own property
associated with Queen’s Bath. No counterclaims or cross-claims
were filed.

The County filed a Motion for Sunmary Judgment on
February 27, 2003, on the grounds of lack of duty to warn and
lack of legal causation between the alleged failure to warn and
the injury. On April 16, 2003, the State joined the County's
motion, Plaintiffs filed their memorandum in opposition on April
25, 2003, after which the County filed its reply memorandum on
April 30, 2003.

on January 26, 2004, judgment was entered in favor of

 

the County and the State and against Plaintiffs on all claims.
‘The judgment dismissed the claims against all the other
defendants. on February 24, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a notice of

appeal.
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Queen's Bath is located on the north shore of Kaua'i at
the base of the cliffs adjacent to the Princeville neighborhood.
It is @ natural pool of water carved into a lava shelf with
inlets allowing for the ebb and flow of the ocean. The botton of
the tide pool varies and sone parts are replete with rocks while
other parts are sandy. The depth of Queen’s Bath also varies.
‘The State owns the tide pool and the related ocean
area. The County owns @ 5,669 square foot parking lot on the
street level, as well as an easement over a trail leading from
the parking lot down to Queen’s Bath. The trail is the only
apparent means of accessing the Queen's Bath area by foot. Tt is
disputed whether the County maintained the trail or whether it
just appeared to be maintained because it was well trodden.
Lansdell was a very good swinmer, As 3 menber of a
community swim team, and as a life-saving trainee, Lansdell had

been trained to perform “shallow dives”. According to Lansdell,

 

shallow dives are dives in which one tries to stay as close to

the surface as possible. He was confident in his ability to

 

execute such dives. All of his dives, up to and including the
dive in which he was injured, were shallow dives.

Lansdell first visited the Queen's Bath area in 1996.
His roommate had read about Queen’s Bath in a guide book and

decided to explore the area. His roommate visited Queen's Bath
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with Lansdell’s sister Karen, and her then-husband who were
visiting Kaua'l. According to Lansdell, the trio “came back very
excited.” Shortly thereafter, Lansdell accompanied his roommate
to the site. Lansdell wes very “cautious” during his first visit
to the tide pool, The first time he entered the water he jumped
into it rather then dived into it.

After gaining confidence he began diving into the tide
pool. Lansdell estimated that he had been to the pool
approximately three to seven times prior to the day of the
accident. During those visits, he dived into the tide pool
approximately fifteen to twenty-five times. These shallow dives
were performed from either the rock from which he dived when he
sustained the subject injury or a more elevated rock on the
opposite side of the tide pool.

8

on June 29, 1998, the day of the accident, Lansdell
took his parents, Mark and Catherine Lansdell, his sister Karen,
and Karen’s then boyfriend (and now husband), Jamie MacLaren, to
the tide pool. After parking their vehicle, the party headed
down the access trail to the tide pool. Plaintiffs entered into
evidence two photographs of signs that were posted at the top of
the trail. One sign cautioned that “hazardous ocean conditions
such as high surf, strong currents, sudden drop-offs and
sharp/slippery coral can cause dangerous swimming conditions.”

‘The other sign warned against hazardous trail conditions. None
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of the individuals in the party recall seeing any signs posted
that day on the parcel or easenent owned by the County, or within
the Queen’s Bath area.

upon arriving at the tide pool, Lansdell and MacLaren
changed into their swimsuits. Lansdell prepared to dive and
evaluated the depth of the water. He wanted to find the
appropriate place from which to dive. Lansdell intended to find
water that was deep enough so that he “wouldn't get hurt”. He
positioned himself on one of his two familiar dive spots, the
lower rock that was about three feet above the surface of the
water.

Karen warned him that the water appeared to be shallow,
or something to that effect. Although it is unclear whether
Lansdell responded to his sister, in his deposition he did
acknowledge that the area below the rock had a rocky bottom area.

Lansdell stated that his dive had to clear a small shallow area,

 

or “perimeter” of rocks in order to land in the deep sandy area

@ [COUNTY'S ATTORNEY]. The closest area of sand to
where you were diving was an area thet you hoped te reach on
your dive?” You're hesitating.

‘Ru then 1 took the dive I realized there was 2 portion
of rock that was a shallow portion that needed to be
cleared.

(0, Had you cleared the shallow eres of rocks would you
have hit your head on the botton?

‘a. Eodon’t think so. ‘That's why I dove because 1 felt
Line here Das diving #9 and where I was diving from were

(Q. In other words, you were diving from a rock into

wnat you thought was deep water, Bit vou knew there wae
‘between where vou were diving fron and where

 

 

 

shallow water between uf cs “
Re Sure. ahew there ea x
water,
(Emphases added.) In response to the question of whether
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Lansdell “knew there was shallow water between where (he) was
diving from and where (he) was diving to," Lansdell stated that
the "perimeter" was “less than three feet.” He dived head first
into the water and was injured when his head struck a rock.

After his dive, the MacLarens saw Lansdell floating in
the water and thought he was “kidding”, until a child standing
nearby noticed that Lansdell was bleeding. Karen and various
individuals imediately responded. In @ Honolulu-Star Bulletin
article dated September 30, 1998, Lansdell is quoted as saying,
“there's a rock you can dive off. I've done it many, many times,
but this time I guess the tide was too low and I ended up diving
into a rock and hitting my head.” Honolulu Star » “Care
of accident victim ‘like # good recon mission,’ September 30,
1998.

mt.

on appeal Plaintiffs argue that (1) summary judgment

should not have been granted inasmuch as a mixed question of fact

and law existed as to whether the County's duty to warn extended

 

beyond its premises to Queen’s Bath; (2) a question of fact and
law existed as to whether the County voluntarily assumed a duty
to warn when it posted signs at the top of the trail; (3) a fact

question existed as to whether Queen’s Bath was a “de facto

 

park”; (4) if Queen’s Bath was a “de facto park,” mixed questions

of fact and law existed as to whether the State and County
 

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complied with the requirements of Act 190,° so as to be shielded

by the Act's statutory immunity provisions; (5) a legal question

 

+ Act 190 took effect on July 1, 1996, 1996 Haw. Sess. L. Act 190,
$.7 at 437) dnd remains in effect today (the initial repeal date was June 20,
999, but thet dete ues extended to June 30, 2002, 1999 Haw. Sess. L. Act 10h,
§ 2 at 320, and then re-extended to June 30, 2007, 2002 Haw. Seas: L. Act 170,
$2 at G10}, Act 190 1s entitied, *A Bill for an'Act relating to Public Land
Lispility Immunity.” Pertinent sections are a2 follows:

HRS § 663- Conclusive presumptions relating te duty

of public entities to warn of dangers at public beach parks
‘or county operating 2 public" be:

have a uty to warn the public specifically of dangerous
Shore break or strone current in the ocean adiacent to-3
ic beach cark if these con:

Hisuof strieus iniury oF aesth

¢) A'sian or sians warning of other extremely
dangerous Datura) conditions in the ocean adiacent toa

 

Sonditions, if the State or county poste @ sign or signs
Narning of the extrenely dangerous natural condition and the
Gesign and placenent of the sign or signs have been approved
by the chairperson of the board of Land and natural
resources. The chairperson shall consult the task force on
beach and water safety pricr to issuing an approval of the
Gesign and placenent of 4 wersing sign oF signs pursuant to
'2) The State or county operating a public beach park
nay submit a comprehensive plan for warning of dangero
Ratursl ‘conditions in the ocesn adjacent to @ public beach
Park to the chairperson of the board of land and natural
Fesources who shell review the plen for adequacy of the
Merning es well ## the design and placement of the warning
igns, devices, or aystens.. The chairperson shall consult
in the cask force on pesch and water safety prior to
issuing an approval of the plan. The task force on beach and
water safety may seek public coment on the plan.” In che
Stent that the chairperscn approves the plan for’ the
particular beach park ater conauiting with the task force
End the State or county posts the warnings provides for in

the approved plan, then the warning aicna, devices, or
5 hel c

  

 

 

 

2)
‘shat are not public beach parks of danserous natural
‘conditions in the ocean,

1 State no: wuoty shall have 2 dus

‘Han a2 provided in thie section

2996 Haw. Sess. L. Act 190, § 2 at 435 (emphases added)

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existed of whether a landowner’s duty existed independent of a
plaintiff’s possible negligent conduct so that Lansdell’s conduct
involved, if at all, only comparative fault; and lastly, (6)
mixed question of fact and law existed as to whether Lansdell’s
diving into a body of shallow water constituted a voluntary
encounter of an open and obvious hazard.

In ite answering brief, the County maintains that
(2) any duty to wazn that the County may have had did not extend
beyond its ownership of the parking lot or easement trail;
(2) URS chapter 520 precludes its liability: (3) the County did
not voluntarily assume a duty to warn of the dangers of diving
into shallow water when it posted signs warning of dangerous
ocean conditions and hazardous trail conditions; (4) Queen's Bath
is not a “de facto” beach park, (5) because Queen’s Bath is not a
beach park, the obligations set forth in Act 190 are not relevant
to this case; (6) there is no duty to warn of open and obvious
dangers in Hawai'i; and (7) the absence of @ sign warning of the
dangers of diving into shallow water was not a legal cause of
Lansdell’s injuries.

The State agreed with and adopted the entirety of the
argunent section of the County's brief, except the State also

asserted that, as owner and occupier of the oct

 

in, the State only
had a duty to warn of dangerous unnatural conditions, and the
shallowness of a tide pool is not a dangerous unnatural

condition.
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Plaintiffs’ reply brief argues that HRS chapter 520 is

inapplicable to the County as it cannot be deemed “a landowner”
within the language of the statute. Plaintiffs request that this
court reverse or vacate the entry of judgment and remand the case
to the court for further proceedings.
Vv.

on appeal, the standard of review for the granting of
summary judgment is identical to that applicable to the trial
court’s consideration of the motion. Cuba v, Fernandez, 71 Haw.
627, 631, 801 P.2d 1208, 1211 (1990). “Unlike other appellate
matters, in reviewing summary judgment decisions an appellate
court steps into the shoes of the trial court and applies the
same legal standard as the trial court applied.” Beamer v.
Nishiki, 66 Haw, 572, 577, 670 P.2d 1264, 1270 (1983) (citing
Fernandes v. Tenbrugcencate, 65 Haw. 226, 228, 649 P.2d 1144,
1147 (1962)), This court reviews a circuit court’s grant or
denial of summary judgment motion de novo. Hawaii Caty, Fed.
Credit Union v. Keka, 94 Hawai'i 213, 221, 11 P.3d 1, 9 (2000).
‘The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is as
follows:

[s)uneary judi
depositions,
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
ie no genuine izeve ae to any material fact and that the
roving party ie entitled to judgnent as a matter of law. &
Tact 1s material Lf proof of that fact would have the effect
of establishing elements of 6 cause of action or defense
Svidence aust Be viewed in the
moving party. In ther

 

 

 

 

    

Light ost favorable te the
words, we must view all of the evidence and the inferences
eawn’ from then in the Light most favorable to the non~
moving party opposing the motion.

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Id, (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets
omitted).
v

 

We first address the County's and State’s argunent that
HRS chapter 520 exempts them from liability. As previously
mentioned, the County does not own the Queen’s Bath area. The
only properties owned by the County that “adjoins” the area is an
open lot used for parking located at the street level and an
easenent over a trail leading down to Queen’s Bath. According
to the County, if it owed a duty of care, such duty was abolished
by HRS chapter 520, which limits the duty of care of an owner of
land to person utilizing the property when the owner pernits
such use for recreational purposes.‘

In response, Plaintiffs contend that because the County
did not own the Queen's Bath area, the County could not be dened
a “landowner” within the language of HRS § 520-2 (Supp. 2005).

The relevant definitions of HRS § 520-2 are as follows:

“charge” means the admission price or fee asked in
return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the
Land

watercourses, private
\chinery oF equipment
hen attached co realty, gther than lands cued By the
souexmpent. .
tenants lessee, occupant, or person in control of the
premises

‘SHecreational purpose” includes but is not linited to
any of the following, oF any combination thereof: hunting,
fishing, swimming, Boating, camping, picnicking, hiking,

 

 

‘uns § £20-2 (2993) provides that the purpose of the Hawai'i
Recreational Use Statute “is to encourage cmners of land to make land and
water dreae available to the public for recreational purposes by liniting
thelr liability toward persone entering thereon for such purposes.”

 

 

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Griving, nature study, water skiing, winter sports,
ling oF enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic,
or scientific sites,

SRecrestionsl user” means any person who is on or
avout the premises that the owner of land either directly or
fedirectly invites or permite, without charge, entry onto
the property for recreational purposes.

 

(Emphases added.) In addition, HRS § 520-3 (Supp. 2005) defines
the scope of an owner's duty in the following manner:

Except as specifically recognized by or provided in
section 520-6, ‘of lan .
7 oer hes

Ten Gre; op activity on a ee ts
Eerecns eiterina for such ournoses, or to persons entering
Pettiipurpose in response to a recreational user who
requires assistance, either direct or indirect, including
Bot net Limited to rescue, medical care, or other form of
assistance.

(Smphasis added.) HRS § 520-6 (1993) also describes the duty of

 

 

care on the part of persons utilizing property of another for
recreational purposes. It states:

Persons using land. Nothing in this chapter shall be
Gy cre of cars nd of tor

‘iniuty te eeraont ox promenty

(2) Relieve any persen using the land of another for
Fecreational purposes from any obligation which the
person may have in the absence of this chapter to
Exercise care in the person's use of such land and in
the person's activities thereon, or from the legal
Sonsequences of failure to employ such care

 

(Emphasis added.)
A plain reading of the relevant definitions indicate
that HRS chapter 520 is not applicable in this case. See Franks
ve City & County of Honolulu, 74 Hew. 328, 334, 843 P.2d 668, 671
(1993) (holding that thie court's primary obligation in
construing a statute “is to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the legislature,” which “is to be obtained primarily

from the language contained in the statute itself" (quoting In re

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Hawasian Tel, Co., 61 Haw. 572, $77, 608 P.2d 383, 387 (1980)))7

see also State v. Kalama, 94 Hawai'i 60, 64, 8 P.3d 1224, 1228

 

(2000) (explaining that when construing a statute “the
fundamental starting point is the language of the statute itself

. [and] where the statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, [the appellate courts’} sole duty is to give effect
to its plain and obvious meaning”).

‘The plain language of HRS chapter 520 instructs that
protection is afforded only to an owner of land upon which en
injury occurs, To reiterate, HRS § 520-6 applies only to the
“owner” of “land” on the premises of which a person has entered
for “recreational purposes.” HRS § 520-2 defines “land” as
“land, roads, water, water courses, private ways, buildings,
structures, and machinery or equipment when attached to realty,
other than lands owned by the government.” (Emphases added.)
“owner” is defined in the same section as “the possessor of a fee
interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant, or person in control of the
premises.”

In this case, the County was not a possessor of a fee
interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant, or person in control of
Queen's Bath, where the injury occurred. Therefore, HRS chapter
520 is not applicable to the County as an adjacent land owner
Insofar as the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in Atahan v
Muramoto, 91 Hawai'i 345, 984 P.2d 104 (App.), cert, dismissed,

91 Hawal'l 345, 984 P.2d 104 (1999), concluded that an owner of a

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separate lot adjacent to the “land” where the plaintiff’s injury

actually took place was immunized from liability under HRS
chapter 520, we overrule it. HRS chapter 520 does not apply to
the State because Lansdell’s injury occurred in an ocean area
owned by the State. By the plain language of the statute, HRS
chapter 520 would not apply to the State, as it does not apply to
lands ouned by the government.

vr.

With regard to Plaintiffs’ argument that the County, as
an adjacent owner, may have had a common law duty to warn
Lansdell of any dangers associated with diving in Queen’s Bath,
we hold that such a duty did not attach. Plaintiffs rely on
Geremia v, State, 58 Haw. 502, 573 P.2d 107 (1977), and Littleton
Wa State, 66 Haw. 55, 656 P.2d 1336 (1982), in contending that
the County owed a duty to Lansdell even though his injury did not
occur on the County's property.

In Geremia, a boy drovned swimming at the “Waipahee
Slide” (the Slide), an area prone to sudden flooding after heavy
rains. $8 Haw. at $03, $73 P.2d at 109. The Slide was located
on private property. Id, This court reasoned that because the
State did not own the Slide, liability, if any, “must be
predicated upon a duty not running to the public at large as
would be the case with respect to public parks and other public
facilities, but to the individual whom the State has actually

misled to his injury.” Id

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This court set out two requirements to establish duty
in cixcunstances where @ defendant is a “non-occupier” of land at
which an injury occurs. First, the defendant affirmatively took
action to induce the plaintiff to engage in the conduct, and
second, the defendant created a false appearance of safety upon
Which the plaintiff relied on to his or her detriment. Id. at
808, 573 P.2d at 112. Hence, Plaintiffs must prove that the
county affirmatively took action to induce Lansdell to visit
Queens Bath and, further, that the County created @ false
appearance of safety regarding diving conditions.

But there is nothing in the record to indicate that the
County took affirmative action to induce Lansdell to visit and
Give at the Queen's Bath area. The vacant parking lot vas
conveyed to the County and, by deed, was to be used for a parking
lot only. While the existence of the lot could be considered an
implied invitation to park there, it is not an affirmative act
which can legally be said to have induced Lansdell to visit and
dive at Queen's Bath.

To establish duty for a non-occupier such as the
County, there must be sone affirmative action by the County that
induced Lansdeli to go to Queen's Bath. According to Lansdell's

n''s Bath because his roommate,

 

own testimony, he visited Qui

sister and her husband came back excited after they visited it
for the first time. The record also indicates that Lansdell had

previously dived there on several occasions.

1s
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Lansdell also contends that because the Queen’s Bath

area is mentioned in various guidebooks, including the guidebook
that his roommate read, the County affirmatively acted to induce
the public to go. However, the guidebooks that Plaintifts
entered into the record were privately published travel books,”
not brochures or informational pamphlets created by the County.*

Secondly, Plaintiffs must prove that the County created
a false impression of security. In Gexemia, this court reasoned
that a sign that read, “Waipahee Slide, Danger do not swim when
rain is falling in upper streams areas, Stream may flood
suddenly,” could possibly create a false impression of security
on @ day in which there was no rainfall. $8 Haw. at 511, 573
P.2d at 113. Because it did net rain on the day of the incident,
the plaintiff could have been under the impression that the Slide
was safe to use. Id, This court explained that if the plaintiff
had relied on the sign and used the Slide believing that there
would be no flooding, the second requirement would have been met.
Id, However, the “thrust of the plaintiff's presentation [in
that case] was to negate any knowledge of the sign, and the

testimony was to the effect that the boys were racing down the

 

trail and took a short cut before reaching the sign.” Id. Thus,

The County argues that the guidebooks entered into the record ere
not persuasive as they were all published after the date of the accident

 

+ to Gexemia vs state, $8 aw. $02, $73 F.2d 107 (1977), although
the survivors claimed thet they learned of the existence of the Waipahee Slide
through « brochure given to then by thelr hotel, they did not Link the
brochive co the State. Ig. at 50910, 573 P.28 at 112-13. It was concluded
by this court that wichowe svch @ connection the brochures would have no
Eelevance to the plaintiff's theory. Id. st $10, 573 P24 at 113.

 

16
 

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because the boys had not seen the sign, they could not then claim

to have been lulled into @ false sense of security by it.

In this case, the signage at the top of the trail on
the day of the accident? did not pertain to the accident in
question as the sign did in Gerenia. The contents of the signs
must have created 2 false sense of security upon which Lansdell
relied.!” One sign warned against hazardous swimming conditions
in the ocean, such as strong currents. The other sign warned
against hazardous trail conditions. Neither of these signs would
have created a false impression of security regarding the safety
of diving into Queen’s Bath. And as in Geremia, even if the two
signs could have created a false impression of security, the fact
that the witnesses could not recall seeing any signs would negate
any possibility of reliance.

Therefore, the facts, even when considered in a light
most favorable to Plaintiffs, would not fulfill the requirements
set out in Geremia. Accordingly, the County, as a non-occupier
or adjacent owner, did not owe a duty to Lansdell to warn him of
the dangers of diving in Queen's Bath. Because the County did

not owe @ duty to Lansdell, it is not necessary to address

+ te ds disputed whether the signs in the photographs were posted
during the tine of the accident. The photographs were taken sometine after the
secident

"one sign stated, “CAUTION - Hazardous ocean conditions such ae
high surf, strong currents, sudden drop-offs and sharp/slippery corel can
Cause dangerous swinning conditions. Use caution and common sense.
Carelessness has cost lives.” The cther sign read, “CAUTION ~ Razardous trail
Senditicns such as loose footing and rocks, steep inclines and ledges can
cause dangerous hiking conditions. Use caution snd common sense.”

 

  

 

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whether or not the open and obvious doctrine applies to
Lansdell.”

The Littleton case, cited by Plaintiffs, is also
distinguishable. In that case, the injury occurred in the
shallow area of the ocean fronting a beach park owned by the City
& County of Honolulu (the City). 66 Haw. at 56-57, 656 P.2d at
1339. In Littleton, this court decided that the City, which
owned and operated a beach park fronting the ocean, could be held
liable for an injury that occurred in the ocean in front of it.
‘This court stated that whether the City induced the plaintiff to
use the beaches adjoining the public beach was a question of
fact. Id, at 68-69, 656 P.2d at 1345, In this case, Lansdell
claims that, like Littleton, the County impliedly invited him to
visit the Queen’s Bath area by owning the parking lot at the top
of the trail. However, the County did not own, operate, or
maintain @ public beach park to which Lansdell could claim he was
impliedly invited. Thus, Littleton would not apply to this case,
inasmuch as the County does not operate a beach park, and only
owned a parking lot at the street level and the easement over a

trail leading down to the ocean

1 the County and State raised the issue of whether the open and
covious doctrine applied to Lansdell when he dove Head first into the water
knowing he needed £0 clear @ shallow “perimeter” of reck before lending in the
Seep pazt of the tide pool. They cite to Friedrich vi Dep't of Trans. 60
Maw, 52, $86 P.2d 1037. (1878), r yaa stated in
Bhakea ¥. County of Maui, 109'sawaii 198, 213, 124 P.3a 943, 960 (2005), for
fhe proposition that even where the State nay have had a duty to warn of
possitle dangers, said duty can be satisfied by the mere obviousness of the
hazard.” Regaraing the possibility that the State hada duty to warn, this,
court stated that *[t)he obviousness of a risk substitutes for an express
Wetning and satisfies this obligation.” Ig, at 36, S8£ F.24 at 1040.

 

 

 

    

18
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vir.
In their second argument, Plaintiffs contend that a
question of fact and law existed as to whether the County
voluntarily assumed the duty to warn when it posted signs at the
top of the trail. We conclude that the County did not
voluntarily assume such duty. According to Plaintiffs, even if
the County did not owe a duty to warn Lansdeli, the County
assuned that duty by posting two signs at the top of the trail.
Gerenia also addressed an assumption of duty issue. In

determined that the State did not have a duty to

 

Seremia, it wi
erect a warning sign at the Slide because it was located on
private property. 58 Haw. at 509, 573 P.2d at 112. However,
because the State voluntarily erected the sign, this court
concluded that the “State's liability could be assessed under 2
principle analogous to the general principle of liability which
requires an actor to exercise reasonable care when conferring a
gratuitous benefit.” Id, See also Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 323 (1965) which states

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration,
to render services to snother which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of the other's person or
things, Je subject to Lability to the other for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care
fo perform his undertaking, if

 

a)" Bis fatlure to exercise such care increases the
Fisk of such harm, or
te) the harm Le suffered because of the other's

reliance upon the undertaking
Judge Cardozo, as quoted by this court in Geremia, succinctly
said, “[iJt is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even

though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of

1s
‘**4FOR PUBLICATION*#*
ees

acting carefully if at all.” Geremia, 58 Haw. at 507, $73 P.2d

at 121 (quoting Glanzer v, Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y.
1922)). Again, in Geremia, this court examined (1) whether the

defendant affirmatively took action to induce the plaintiff to
engage in the conduct, and (2) whether the defendant created a
false appearance of safety upon which the plaintiff relied to his
or her detriment. As stated above, in this case, Plaintiffs did
not meet the Gerenia requirements, thus an assumption of duty is
not established.

We agree with the County that the Plaintiffs rely on
cases that are distinguishable. In the first case cited by
Plaintiffs, Kaczmarczvk v. City & County of Honolulu, 65 Hew.
612, 656 P.2d 89 (1982), superseded in part by statute, as stated
in Bhakta v. County of Maui, 109 Hawai‘i 198, 215, 124 P.3d 943,
960 (2005), the plaintiff and a friend were visiting from the
mainland. Ids at 613, 656 P.2d at 91. They went swimming at
Ehukai Beach Park in Oahu. Id, The two became caught in a
current which ultimately swept them out to sea. Id, The friend
managed to make it back to shore; however, the plaintiff
disappeared into the ocean. Id, One of the issues on appeal was
whether the City assumed a duty to patrons of the beach park by
voluntarily providing life guards. Id. at 616-17, 656 P.2d at
92-93.

‘This court stated that, “even where a municipality is
under no duty to provide life guard services, . . . if it
voluntarily assumes the protective responsibility it has a duty

20
**4FOR PUBLICATION***

to perform those services with reasonable care.” Id, at 617, 656
P.2d at 93. Kacemarcavk is distinguishable inasmuch as that case
concerned factually dissimilar circumstances. As the County
states, “the negligence in that case concerned the degree and
quality of training received by the lifeguards, and their
subsequent performance.” But a duty is assumed by the County
only if the Geremia factors are present, which, as earlier
stated, they are not.

In Collard v. United states, 691 F. Supp. 256 (D. Haw.
1938), a boy died while playing on @ log in the water near 2
beach at the Marine Corp Air Station. Id, at 257. Lifeguards
stationed on the beach had put up red flags earlier in the day
indicating swimming and surfing were prohibited due to rough
water and debris in the water, including the log. Id, Later,
after the log was apparently pushed over the reef, the lifeguards
posted yellow flags, indicating that persons must swim at their
own risk. Id, The yellow flags were posted at the time of the
accident. Id, The district court assuned that HRS chapter 520
could apply to the federal government and determined that the
government Likely had no duty to warn. Id. at 260. However, by
voluntarily manning lifeguards, and posting the different warning
flags, the district court concluded that the federal government
assumed 2 duty to do so with reasonable care. Ide

Because the lifeguards had seen the log and were aware
that it was somewhere in the water, the district court ruled that
whether the lifeguards acted with reasonable care was appropriate

2
‘***FOR PUBLICATION*#*
for the jury to decide. Id, Again, the facts of Collard are not

analogous to this case. The federal district court decided that
there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the
boys were induced inte the water and relied on a sense of
security provided by the presence of lifeguards and the changing
of the red flags to yellow flags. Based on the record, no such
issue exists here.

Lastly, Fink v. Kasler, Corp., 3 Haw. App. 270, 649
P.2d 1173 (1982), concerned a stop sign, and the maintenance of
such sign, There, the ICA stated that “the State had a duty to
properly maintain the sign for the safety of the traveling public
who had a right to rely on its continued presence.” Id, at 272,
649 P.2d at 1173, Again, the facts of this case are quite
dissimilar. Any assumption of duty in this case does not involve
the maintenance of the signs erected. Under Fink, if the County
had erected signs at the top of the trail, the only duty that the
County assumed was to erect and maintain the signs with
reasonable care, that is, in a non-negligent manner. There is
nothing in the record to indicate that any signs were negligently
erected or maintained. Hence, contrary to Plaintiffs’
assertions, the County did not assume a duty to warn so as to
give rise to liability for Lansdell’s injuries.

vinr.

Plaintiffs contend that the County was negligent
because it did not erect an additional sign specifically warning
against diving into Queens Bath. Plaintiffs entered into

22
+++FOR PUBLICATION*#*

evidence what they contend is a commonly used sign about the
possibility of injury as a result of diving, that they argue
should have been posted at Queen's Bath. However, the sign that
Plaintiffs submitted states, “DANGEROUS SHOREBREAK-Waves break in
shallow water, serious injuries could occur, even in small surf.
If in doubt, don’t go out.” The sign does not pertain to the
dangers of diving in a shallow area per se? it warns against
dangerous shorebreaks.

Further, although the County voluntarily warned against
strong currents in the ocean and the hazards of the trail, it did
not assume the duty of warning against diving in the tide pool.
Again, the Gexemia requirements establishing an assumption of
duty were not met. And, as stated above, because Lansdell was
not induced by the signs to dive into Queen’s Bath, no causal
relationship between the presence of such signs and Lansdell’s
injury existed in any event. As recounted previously, under the
facts he could not recall seeing the signs. The signs themselves
did not pertain to diving s0 as to create a false sense of
security that diving into Queen's Bath would be safe. Even if
the County had a duty towards Lansdell, it would have been to act
with reasonable care. Nothing in the record indicates that the
County did not act with reasonable care with regard to the signs.

Ix.
In their third argument, Plaintiffs assert summary

judgment should not have been granted inasmuch as a question of

23
+#*P0R PUBLICATION*#*

 

fact remained on whether Queen’s Bath was a “de facto” beach
park.” According to Plaintiffs, “(t]he nature of the Queen's
Bath's scenic sttraction creates a question of fact [of] whether
it is a de facto beach park, or something akin thereto, in which
case a duty to warn may exist.” (Emphases added and in
original.) Plaintiffs state that “[t]he scenic nature of the
area created the ‘implied invitation’ relevant to the need for 2
warning where the [County’s] easement access led to it." As
mentioned, Plaintiffs argue in their fourth argument that if
Queen’s Bath was a “de facto” park, mixed questions of fact and
law existed as to whether the State and County complied with the
requirenents of Act 190, so as to be shielded by the Act’s
statutory immunity provisions.
aL

The concept of a “de facto” beach park is mentioned in
the ICA’s decision in Kamakawivoole v, State of Hawaii, 6 Haw.
App. 235, 718 P.2d 1105 (1986), which Plaintiffs rely on to
support their contention that a duty to warn existed. Although
the ICA did not expressly define what a “de facto” beach park
was, the property involved in that case was an undemarcated
United States Army property surrounded by the State’s property,
wherein three landing ramps were located. Id. at 235-36, 718
P.2d at 1106. For an undisclosed number of years, the area had

been used by the public for picnicking, snorkeling, fishing,

Plaintiffs do not contend that the Queen's Bath is a public beach

 

park.

24
***FOR PUBLICATION*#*
swimming and camping. Id, at 236, 718 P.2d at 1106. ‘The

plaintiff in Kamakawivoole was injured after slipping on a ramp
while attempting to prevent her son from falling into the water.
Id, The plaintiff sued the State and the trial court awarded
sunmary judgment against the plaintiff and in favor of the State,
Id. at 236, 718 P.2d at 1106-07.

On appeal, the ICA cited to the common law rule that
‘an occupier of land fronting the beach and ocean who induces or
invites @ business or public invitee onto its land to engage in
an action on the adjoining public beach or ocean may owe a duty
to warn that invitee of the dangers involved in engaging in the
action.” Id, at 237, 718 P.2d at 1107 (citing Taxshis v. Lahaina
InvCorps, 480 F.24 1019 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding defendant
hotel liable for plaintiff's injuries after concluding that
defendant impliedly invited plaintiff by operating a hotel
fronting a public beach and ocean); Kaczmarczyk, 65 Haw. at 616-
17, 656 P.2d at 92-93 (concluding that plaintiff's decedent’s
injuries resulted after city’s implied invitation to swim in the
public ocean by operating a public park); Littleton, 66 Haw. at
69, 656 P.2d at 1345 (observing that defendant impliedly invited
plaintiff to walk on the public beach where accident occurred) ).

The ICA in Kemakawivoole first noted that the plaintiff
in that case was the State’s public invitee and the accident
occurred in an undemarcated area surrounded by the State's

property. Id, at 239-40, 718 P.2d at 1109. The ICA then vacated

25
++*FOR PUBLICATION***
the trial court's grant of summary judgment after determining

that a question remained as to “whether, by operating a de facto
public park partially fronting the public beach and ocean and
surrounding the Army's de facto public park fronting the public
beach and ocean, the State impliedly invited [the plaintiff in
that case) and her infant son to use the Army's park where the

accident occurred.” Id, at 240, 718 P.2d at 1109.

B
However, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Kamakawivoole is

foreclosed by this court’s ruling in Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel

publ’ns, Inc., 73 Haw. 369, 633 P.2d 70 (1992), the passage of

Act 190 in 1996, and our recent decision in Bhakta, and,
therefore, we are not convinced by Plaintiffs’ argument that
duty to warn exists in this case.

In Birmingham, the plaintiff, Joseph Birmingham
(Birmingham), was injured while body surfing in the ocean. 73
Haw. at 363, 833 P.2d at 73, Birmingham sued the State, Fodor's
Travel Publications, Inc. (Fodor's), and the County of Kaua'i.
Ada at 364, 833 P.2d at 73, The County owned Kekaha beach park
fronting the ocean where the surfing accident occurred. The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the three
defendants. Id. at 365, 633 P.2d at 73-74, On appeal, this
court affirmed summary judgment with regard to Fodor's and the
State, and vacated summary judgment against the County.

With regard to the State, this court affirmed the
Littleton rule that “(t]he State, as owner and occupier of the

26
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ocean water . . . , does not owe a duty to persons injured as a
result of water-related activities, unless the ‘facts are similar
to (Agate v. Matauda, $5 Haw. 334, 519 P.2d 1240 (1974)], oF
analogous thereto.'” Id. at 378, 833 P.2d at 80 (quoting
Littleton, 66 Haw. at 63 n.2, 656 P.2d at 1342 n.2). The Asato
factors are “(1) whether the condition causing the injury was a
dangerous unnatural condition in the area of water related
activity; and 2) whether the State had actual or constructive
knowledge of the condition.” Id. (emphasis added). If a court
determines that both factors are present, then the “State has a
duty to warn of the condition by taking whatever measures, if
any, are reasonably available to rectify and prevent the
condition.” Id.

In Birmingham, this court held that the wave, which
injured Birmingham, was a “naturally occurring phenomenon of the
ocean--not a man made object such as the floating poles, logs and
pilings at issue in Littleton.” Id, It was concluded that the
State had no duty to warn of the wave because it was not a
dangerous unnatural condition, and, thus, the first prong of the
Littleton test was not met. Id, at 379, 833 P.2d at 60.

This case is analogous to Birmingham. Lansdell was

injured in the tide pool. The State owned the Queen’s Bath a

 

as owner of the ocean and shoreline, The State argues that just
as Waves in the ocean are “naturally occurring phenomenon,” so

too are tide pools. Id, Plaintiffs do not contend that the tide

20
4+#*F0R PUBLICATION*#*

 

pool ie a “dangerous unnatural condition.” Id, at 378, 833 P.2d
at 60. There is no evidence that the shallowness in a rocky tide
pool is a dangerous unnatural condition for which the State
needed to warn. Therefore, just as in Birmingham, the first
prong of the Littleton test was not satisfied. Furthermore,
Plaintiffs have not set forth any evidence that the State had
actual or constructive knowledge of the condition.

c.

Section 2 of Act 190 specifically limits the State’s
and County’s duty to warn. Because Act 190 is in derogation of
common law tort principles, it must be strictly construed. First
Ins.Co. of Hawaii v. Lawrence, 77 Hawai'i 2, 8, 881 P.2d 489,
495, reconsideration denied, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149

(1994). “Where it does not appear that there was a legislative
purpose in the statute to supersede the common law, the conmon
law applies.” Doi v. Hawaiian Ins, 6 Guar, Co., 6 Haw. App. 456,
465, 727 P.2d 884, 890 (1986). Act 190 expressly limits the duty
of the State and several counties to warn of dangerous shorebreak
or strong current in the ocean at public beach parks. Hence,
based on the plain language of Act 190," it appears that the
legislature intended to restrict the State's and counties’ duty
to warn of “dangerous shorebreak or strong currents . . . if
these conditions are extremely dangerous . . . and if they pose a

risk of serious injury or death.” 1996 Haw. Sess. L. Act 190,

» See supra note 5:
28
‘+*#P0R PUBLICATION*#*

 

§ 2 at 435. Furthermore, the legislature specifically eliminated
the State’s and various counties’ duty to warn on “beach
accesses, coastal accesses, or in areas that are not in public
beach parks of dangerous natural conditions” and with regard to
“dangerous natural conditions in the ocean” other than as
provided by Act 190. Id. The legislative history of Act 190
also evinces this intention.

This bill would establish the duty of the State and counties

Sen. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 98, in 1996 Senate Journal, at 767
(emphasis added) .

In Bhakta, we discussed the implications of Act 190

 

with regard to the State’s duty to warn. We sai

 

Act 190 establishes that the State (1) has a duty to warn of
Gangerous conditions in the ocean adjacent to a public
each, but (2) has no duty to warn of dangerous natural
ocean conaitions on beach accesses, coastal sccesses, oF Jn

obier areas that are not public beach parks.
109 Hawai'i at 211-12, 124 P.3d at 956-57 (emphasis added). . We

 

 

 

concluded in that case that the state, as the owner and occupier
of the lending and its surrounding ocean water, “did not ove a
duty to [the plaintiffs in that case) to warn then of the
extrenely dangerous ocean conditions” in areas that are not
“public beach parks.” Id. at 215, 124 P.3d at 960.

Hence, even if it is assumed that Queen’s Bath can be
classified as a “de facto” beach park, which we believe it is

29
‘*#*FOR PUBLICATION***
not," such a classification would not be sufficient to trigger

the State's or County's duty to warn under Act 190 inasmuch as a
“de facto” beach park is “not [a] public beach park.” Moreover,
the injury involved in the instant case did not arise from
“dangerous shorebreaks or strong ocean current {s that] are
extremely dangerous . . . (or that] pose 2 risk of serious injury
or death” as contemplated by the Act." As this court has
previously stated, “where the language of 2 statute is plain, and
@ literal construction is consistent with the legislative
purpose, we are constrained to give effect to the plain meaning
of the statute, even if it results in the derogation of a common

law rule.” Saranillio v. Silva, 78 Hawai"i 1, 13, 989 P.2d 685,
697 (1995). Accordingly, we hold that Act 190 is not implicated

 

s0 as to give rise to liability on the part of the State or the

county.

x,

Inasmuch as Lansdell failed to establish a duty between

 

 

My addition, other than describing Queen’ s
attraction,” Plaintifes do not steve how the State inpliedly invited Lansdell
fo the tide pool area. We do not agree with Plaintiffs’ tacit assertion that
the fact chat an ores des “scenic attraction” creates an inplied invitation
on the part of the State or any county. Such an implication would charge the
State with impliedly inviting the public to every location considered «
Sscenso attraction.” As such, the caces cited in Kamskauin ss
Manslis € aw. App. 225, 718 F.24 1108. (1986), and relied upon by Plaintiff,
are inepposite.

 

 

% — piaineéfts do not provide 2 definition of # “de facto public
park.” However, they argue that classifying Queen's Bath as such, “squares
BIEN the! Gefinitions of Beach and park.” (Citing Mezrian-Mebster's Dictionary
{ith ed, Nov. 2003) (defining “beach” ss “a shore of a body of water covered
Gy seed, gravel, of lerger rock fragments,” or "a seashore area,” and defining
Spark" e's piece of ground st or nesr a city or town Kept fer ornamentation
and recreation” or San area maintained in ite natural state as a public
property"

 

 

 

  

30
‘+##P0R PUBLICATION***

the State or the County and himself to warn against the dangers
of diving into Queen's Bath, we need not consider Plaintiffs’
fifth and sixth arguments regarding comparative fault and the
open and obvious doctrine.
xr
In accordance with the foregoing reasons, we affirm the

court’s judgment entered on January 26, 2004.

co the betete 2g
Sones eueger for Spe

ent TEU Le. ;

enneth 8. Robkine ond SH Lavrar
sone 9 Sa hh euoe

(Robbins § Associates) for
defendant-appellee County

of Kauai a eet e
Dorothy Sellers and

Kimberly Tsumoto, Deputy Gn € Diaisi +
Attorneys General, for

defendant-appellee State
of Hawai'i.

  

3