Case Title: Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13274

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-11-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13274 
 
JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 6729  vs.  SEX 
OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     September 9, 2022. - November 7, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Practice, Civil, Sex offender.  
Evidence, Sex offender.  Regulation.  Administrative Law, 
Substantial evidence, Agency's interpretation of 
regulation. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
May 10, 2019. 
 
 
The case was heard by Camille F. Sarrouf, Jr., J., on 
motions for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Ashley M. Green for the plaintiff. 
 
David L. Chenail for the defendant. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  This case concerns the reclassification of John 
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 6729 (Doe), from a level 
2 
 
two to a level three sex offender.  The Sex Offender Registry 
Board (board) initiated an upward reclassification of Doe when 
he was charged with additional sex offenses.  After an 
evidentiary hearing, the board ordered Doe to register as a 
level three offender.  Doe challenges the board's determination, 
arguing that it was unsupported by substantial evidence, based 
on legal error, and arbitrary and capricious.  Doe argues that 
the board hearing examiner erred in applying factor two of the 
regulations governing classification in the absence of a finding 
of compulsive behavior and failed to assign a specific weight to 
eight other factors, while erroneously relying on factor twenty-
four, which addresses the failure to participate in sex offender 
treatment. 
Upon review of the hearing examiner's decision, we conclude 
that there was clear and convincing evidence supporting the 
level three classification.  Specifically, the element of 
compulsive behavior in factor two was satisfied by Doe's 
continuing to engage in sex offenses while being investigated 
for such offenses with another victim and having been convicted 
and imprisoned for sex offenses previously.  We also conclude 
that the hearing examiner properly applied the other factors on 
which she relied, except for factor twenty-four, which should 
not have been considered.  Considering this factor, however, was 
not prejudicial error, given the overwhelming evidence 
3 
 
supporting the level three classification.  We therefore affirm 
the board's decision to upwardly reclassify Doe. 
1.  Background.  a.  Sex offenses and allegations.  There 
are multiple reported instances of Doe's sexual misconduct 
involving three different victims.  First, on August 19, 1998, 
Doe sexually assaulted an eight year old girl (victim one),1 
looking up her shorts at her vagina when she was not wearing 
underwear, rubbing her back and legs, pushing his penis against 
her buttocks while she sat on his lap, and suggesting to her 
that she could see his penis if she asked.  On October 29, 1998, 
Doe pleaded guilty to this first sex offense, indecent assault 
and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, which required 
him to register as a sex offender.  On July 30, 2003, the board 
classified the plaintiff as a level two sex offender. 
Second, a fourteen year old girl (victim two) alleged that, 
from June to November of 2005, Doe sexually assaulted her on 
numerous occasions when she babysat for him and his wife.  Doe 
began by touching her legs, groin, and breasts and by kissing 
her.  He then penetrated her vagina digitally.  In late October 
or early November of 2005, Doe had sexual intercourse with the 
 
1 Victim one is described as eight years old by her mother 
in her mother's statement to police but described as nine years 
old by the detective who interviewed her.  We refer to victim 
one as eight years old at the time of the incident, based on her 
mother's statement. 
4 
 
victim.  The victim's mother reported these incidents to the 
police on March 7, 2007, after the victim disclosed the rape to 
her.  On March 12, 2009, a jury found Doe guilty on two counts 
of rape and abuse of a child without force and three counts of 
indecent assault and battery on a person age fourteen or older.2 
Third, after police in April of 2007 questioned Doe about 
the allegations brought by victim two, a fourteen year old girl 
(victim three) reported to police that Doe, then thirty-four, 
sexually assaulted her at a house party in July of 2007.  While 
sleeping in a bed alongside victim three, her friend, and 
another man, Doe kissed the victim, rubbed her breasts over her 
clothes, and "dry hump[ed]" her before having intercourse with 
her.  He then had intercourse with her in the shower.  On 
January 20, 2010, a jury found Doe guilty of two counts of rape 
of a child, and a judge sentenced him to from twelve to fifteen 
years of incarceration on each count, to run concurrently to one 
another but after his sentences for his convictions with regard 
to victim two.  In 2012, the Appeals Court reversed the 
convictions with regard to victim three and set aside the 
verdicts for failure to prosecute within the time frame set 
 
2 Doe was sentenced to from ten to fifteen years of 
incarceration with credit for 529 days served, to run 
concurrently, on the rape convictions and from four to five 
years with credit for 529 days served, to run concurrently with 
the rape sentences, on the indecent assault and battery 
convictions. 
5 
 
forth by Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (1), 378 Mass. 909 (1979).  
The hearing officer nonetheless determined, regarding victim 
three, "I find there to be substantial evidence, including the 
[v]ictim's detailed account, told consistently to police at the 
hospital and during a later [sexual abuse intervention network] 
interview, . . . to conclude that [Doe] did commit the rapes of 
[v]ictim [three] as alleged."  See Soe, Sex Offender Registry 
Bd. No. 252997  v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 381, 396 
(2013) (explaining that conviction is not required for board to 
find that sex offense has occurred, as lower standard of proof 
and different evidentiary requirements apply). 
 
b.  Procedural history.  In January of 2008, the board 
notified Doe of his duty to register as a level three sex 
offender after he was charged with the additional sex offenses 
related to victims two and three.  Doe requested a hearing 
challenging the recommendation, and following the hearing, the 
examiner found "by clear and convincing evidence . . . that 
[Doe] presents a high risk to reoffend and danger, and the 
degree of dangerousness posed to the public is such that a 
substantial public safety interest is served by active 
dissemination of his sex offender registry information."  In 
addressing factor two, the hearing examiner explained that Doe 
had engaged in additional sexual assaults after being convicted 
of one sexual assault and while being investigated for another.  
6 
 
The hearing examiner also considered factor twenty-four -- Doe's 
failure to engage in sex offender therapy -- despite Doe's 
concerns about confidentiality and the use of this information 
against him in civil commitment proceedings.  The hearing 
examiner ordered Doe to register as a level three sex offender 
on May 6, 2019.3 
Doe sought judicial review, pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, 
and G. L. c. 6, § 178M, and a Superior Court judge upheld the 
board's decision on July 30, 2020.  Doe appealed from the 
Superior Court's decision, and the Appeals Court affirmed the 
board's decision.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 6729 
v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 100 Mass. App Ct. 1124 (2022).  
Although the Appeals Court found that the hearing examiner 
applied risk factor twenty-four in error, the court determined 
that "the record adequately supports Doe's classification even 
in the absence of this factor," and this error resulted in "no 
prejudice" to Doe.  Id.  We allowed Doe's application for 
further appellate review to address uncertainty in the case law 
regarding the application of factor two's requirement of 
repetitive and compulsive behavior. 
 
3 The hearing was continued from January to June of 2008 to 
accommodate Doe's jury trial.  The record, including the hearing 
examiner's decision, is silent as to what caused the delay from 
2008 to 2019. 
7 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "A reviewing 
court may set aside or modify the board's classification 
decision where it determines that the decision is in excess of 
the board's statutory authority or jurisdiction, is based on an 
error of law, is not supported by substantial evidence,[4] or is 
an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion."  Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 339940 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
488 Mass. 15, 30 (2021) (Doe No. 339940), quoting Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 3177 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 486 
Mass. 749, 754 (2021) (Doe No. 3177).  When evaluating the 
board's decision, however, we "give due weight to the 
experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of 
the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred 
upon it."  Doe No. 339940, supra, quoting Doe No. 3177, supra.  
See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). 
b.  Sex offender classification and reclassification.  Per 
the board's enabling statute, the board must "promulgate 
guidelines for determining the level of risk of reoffense and 
the degree of dangerousness posed to the public" that then 
inform the "three levels of notification depending on such risk 
. . . and . . . dangerousness."  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1).  The 
 
4 "Substantial evidence is 'such evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'"  Doe, 
Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3177 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
486 Mass. 749, 757 (2021), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (6). 
8 
 
statute provides a nonexhaustive list of "[f]actors relevant to 
the risk of reoffense," beginning with those "indicative of a 
high risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness posed to the 
public," including factor two on "repetitive and compulsive 
behavior."  Id.  "A level three classification is appropriate 
'[w]here the board determines that the risk of reoffense is high 
and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public is such that 
a substantial public safety interest is served by active 
dissemination' of information about the offender to the public."  
Doe No. 339940, 488 Mass. at 30, quoting Doe No. 3177, 486 Mass. 
at 754.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (c). 
The board may initiate reclassification proceedings "upon 
receipt of information that indicates the offender may present 
an increased risk to reoffend or degree of dangerousness."  803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.32(1) (2016), citing G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178L (3).  The board may seek to reclassify a sex offender 
after he or she has "[b]een investigated for or charged with 
committing a new sex offense."  803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.32(2)(a). 
c.  Doe's challenges to the hearing examiner's decision.  
Doe asks this court to vacate the board's decision classifying 
him as a level three sex offender and remand for a new hearing.  
He argues that, because the board hearing examiner erroneously 
applied factors two and twenty-four and failed to ascribe 
9 
 
specific weight to eight other factors, see G. L. c. 6, § 178K 
(1) (a); 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33 (2016), the board lacked 
substantial evidence to reclassify him as a level three sex 
offender, see G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).5  Doe further argues that 
the hearing examiner failed to make specific and individualized 
findings on the necessity for the Internet dissemination of his 
sex offender registry information, see G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1) 
(a); Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 656-657 (2019) (Doe No. 496501), 
and that these failures amounted to arbitrary and capricious 
action by the board, see G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).  We address 
each argument in turn. 
i.  Factor two:  repetitive and compulsive behavior.  Among 
the "criminal history factors indicative of a high risk of 
reoffense and degree of dangerousness posed to the public," 
under G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1) (a) (ii), is "conduct .  . . 
 
5 Doe did not raise the arguments he presents here in his 
motion for judgment on the pleadings in the Superior Court.  
Rather, regarding factor two, he only argued that, since his 
last sex offense occurred over twelve years prior, there was "no 
evidence that he currently engages in repetitive[] or compulsive 
behavior."  As explained above, we have nonetheless taken this 
case to address and resolve the important disputed issue 
regarding the meaning of "repetitive and compulsive behavior" as 
defined by statute and the board's regulations.  Because the 
Appeals Court correctly recognized and resolved the error 
regarding factor twenty-four and alluded to the issue of the 
weighting of different factors, we briefly address these issues 
as well. 
10 
 
characterized by repetitive and compulsive behavior."  In its 
regulations, the board has interpreted the statutory term 
"repetitive and compulsive behavior" (also referred to as factor 
two) as follows: 
"Repetitive and compulsive behavior is associated with a 
high risk of reoffense.  Factor [two] is applied when a sex 
offender engages in two or more separate episodes of sexual 
misconduct.  To be considered separate episodes there must 
be time or opportunity, between the episodes, for the 
offender to reflect on the wrongfulness of his [or her] 
conduct." 
 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(2)(a).  The regulation further 
provides: 
"The [b]oard may give increased weight to offenders who 
have been discovered and confronted (by someone other than 
the victim) or investigated by an authority for sexual 
misconduct and, nonetheless, commit a subsequent act of 
sexual misconduct.  The most weight shall be given to an 
offender who engages in sexual misconduct after having been 
charged with or convicted of a sex offense." 
 
Id. 
In the instant case the hearing officer made the following 
finding regarding factor two: 
"[Doe] committed sexual assaults in 1998, 2005, and 2007.  
He committed the latter two after being convicted of 
sexually assaulting [v]ictim [one], and he raped [v]ictim 
[three] just months after being interviewed and polygraphed 
for his repetitive sexual assaults of [v]ictim [two].  I 
find his sexual misconduct to be highly repetitive and 
compulsive and I give full weight to this high risk 
factor." 
 
Doe -- relying on the concurring opinion in Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 22188 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 96 
11 
 
Mass. App. Ct. 738, 745-746 (2019) (Milkey, J., concurring), and 
a declaratory judgment decision on remand in that case, Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 22188 vs. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
Mass. Super. Ct., No. 2081CV1130B (Middlesex County Apr. 16, 
2021) (Doe No. 22188) -- contends that the hearing examiner 
failed to make a separate finding on whether Doe's behavior was 
compulsive and instead erroneously treated "repetitive and 
compulsive" in factor two as one element.  Doe argues that, 
without a distinct finding of compulsiveness, the hearing 
examiner could not ascribe this high-risk factor to Doe, which 
would, in turn, weaken the hearing examiner's determination that 
Doe is at a high risk of reoffending and thus ought to be 
classified as a level three sex offender.  We conclude that the 
fact finding made by the hearing officer that Doe engaged in 
sexual offenses after being convicted of, and while being 
investigated for, other sex offenses was sufficient to satisfy 
the separate requirement of proving that his conduct was 
compulsive as well as repetitive. 
We begin by recognizing the uncertain status of the factor 
two regulation itself.  In its declaratory judgment order in Doe 
No. 22188, the Superior Court invalidated the first two 
sentences of the regulation, which provided for a finding of 
repetitive and compulsive behavior based only on repetitive 
12 
 
offenses occurring after enough time for reflection.6  Doe No. 
22188, Mass. Super. Ct., No. 2081CV1130B, slip op. at 22, 26 
(Middlesex County Apr. 16, 2021).  The judge determined this 
portion of the regulation was not supported by the scientific 
research, including that conducted by Dr. Karl Hanson, a scholar 
in this field on whose work the board has heavily relied when 
crafting its regulations.  See id. at 6-9 (discussing research).  
In its brief in this case, the board explained that it has not 
appealed this declaratory judgment and is bound by that 
decision.  We agree that the regulation needs to be reconsidered 
and redrafted in accordance with expert understanding of 
compulsive behavior.  That understanding, although based on 
limited testimony, does, however, support a finding of 
compulsive, as well as repetitive, behavior in the instant case, 
and the hearing examiner made the necessary findings when 
applying the second portion of the regulation to Doe's case. 
 
6 This case has not yet been resolved, as the Appeals Court 
recently vacated the board's second classification of the 
offender and remanded for a third classification proceeding 
after determining that the board's decision was not supported by 
substantial evidence due to the hearing examiner's erroneous 
application of factor two.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. 
No. 22188 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 797, 
804-806 (2022).  In that case, "Doe was not discovered, 
confronted, or investigated between the two rapes" for which he 
was convicted.  Id. at 804.  The board chose not to defend the 
portions of the regulation invalidated by the trial court judge 
in that case.  Id. at 797, 804.  The Appeals Court also 
indicated that the board "is revising its regulations" in 
response.  Id. at 800. 
13 
 
Upon our request at oral argument, the board filed 
testimony from Dr. Hanson that had been previously presented to 
the board that illuminates the distinction between repetitive 
and compulsive.  Dr. Hanson notes that, while there is no 
predictive value for the risk of reoffending based solely on the 
commission of multiple sex offenses, there is such value "[i]f a 
person offends, gets caught[,] and then goes on to reoffend 
again," particularly when "the criminal justice system . . . 
doesn't inhibit them."  Where a sex offender reoffends in such 
circumstances, his or her conduct may be found not only to be 
repetitive but also compulsive. 
The language regarding compulsive behavior in the second 
part of the regulation regarding factor two accurately reflects 
Dr. Hanson's testimony on the risk of reoffending.  As the 
hearing officer's findings relied on this aspect of Doe's 
conduct in determining that his sexual offenses were repetitive 
and compulsive, we discern no error. 
Here, the board sought to reclassify Doe after he committed 
sex offenses against two new victims, following his 
incarceration for a prior sex offense conviction.  Furthermore, 
he sexually assaulted victim three just three months after 
police questioned him about and conducted a polygraph test in 
relation to the assault of victim two.  The hearing examiner 
considered these circumstances, including close proximity in 
14 
 
time, when she afforded "full weight"7 to the risk factor, which 
is appropriate when "an offender . . . engages in sexual 
misconduct after having been charged with or convicted of a sex 
offense."  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(2)(a).  As Dr. 
Hanson's testimony notes, the risk assessment for reoffending is 
supported where involvement with the criminal justice system 
fails to deter the offender from offending again.  Accordingly, 
we discern no error in the hearing examiner's application of 
factor two as a high-risk factor in Doe's case. 
ii.  Factor twenty-four:  less than satisfactory 
participation in sex offender treatment.  Doe asserts that the 
hearing examiner improperly held against him, in violation of 
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 23656 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 483 Mass. 131, 141-142 (2019) (Doe No. 23656), his 
refusal to participate in sex offender treatment out of a 
concern that such treatment was not confidential and could be 
used against him in his civil commitment proceeding.  We agree 
that the hearing examiner misapplied this factor; however, even 
when removing this factor from consideration, the hearing 
examiner's decision remains supported by substantial evidence. 
 
7 We understand the hearing examiner's use of "full weight" 
to refer to the regulation's language that "[t]he most weight 
shall be given to an offender who engages in sexual misconduct 
after having charged with or convicted of a sex offense," 803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(2)(a) (2016), although using the precise 
language of the regulation would have simplified our review. 
15 
 
In Doe No. 23656, 483 Mass. at 141, we held that "the 
refusal of nonconfidential [sex offender] treatment cannot be 
used to infer an unwillingness to be treated."  Nonetheless, in 
her decision, the hearing examiner made the following finding: 
"Factor [twenty-four]:  Less Than Satisfactory 
Participation In Sex Offender Treatment:  According to his 
[correction record], [Doe] has refused to participate in 
sex offender treatment.  Parole notations indicated that he 
refused to discuss the offense[] and was concerned about 
his comments being used in civil commitment proceedings 
. . . .  Given his refusal to participate in sex offender 
treatment offered to him while incarcerated, I consider 
this factor." 
 
Given Doe's expressed concerns regarding confidentiality, 
which were noted in his correction file, the hearing examiner 
erred when she considered his refusal to engage in sex offender 
treatment.  That error, however, was clearly harmless here.  For 
the reasons discussed supra and in the board's brief, there was 
overwhelming evidence to support the level three classification. 
iii.  Specified weight for all factors.  Doe also objects, 
for the first time on appeal, that the hearing examiner applied 
certain risk factors without denoting whether she ascribed a 
threshold, moderate, or high degree of weight to each factor.  
Doe posits that we should require board hearing examiners to 
ascribe weight to each factor they evaluate when classifying sex 
offenders within the framework set forth at 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.33, even when the regulations do not prescribe the weights 
that must accorded to a particular factor.  Given that the 
16 
 
hearing officer applied the regulations according to their terms 
and consistent with our case law, which provides for "discretion 
to determine how much weight to ascribe to each factor under 
consideration," we discern no error.  See Doe No. 23656, 483 
Mass. at 138-139, citing Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 
68549 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 470 Mass 102, 109-110 
(2014). 
iv.  Internet dissemination of offender status to protect 
public safety.  Doe also argues that the hearing examiner failed 
to make specific and individualized findings on the necessity of 
publicly disseminating Doe's sex offender status via the 
Internet, in violation of his State and Federal constitutional 
and common-law rights to privacy, due process, and freedom from 
cruel and unusual punishment.  This argument has no merit. 
When classifying an offender as level three, the hearing 
examiner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that 
"the risk of reoffense is high and the degree of dangerousness 
posed to the public is such that a substantial public safety 
interest is served by active dissemination" of the offender's 
registration information.  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (c).  See Doe 
No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 656-657 (interpreting statute in 
context of review of level two classification decision and 
extending to level three classifications).  In so doing, the 
hearing examiner must "make explicit" those three findings -- a 
17 
 
high risk of reoffense, a high degree of dangerousness, and a 
public safety interest is served by active dissemination of the 
offender's registry information -- in a manner that is 
particularized and detailed to the offender.  See Doe No. 
496501, supra.  "Where a prior classification decision fails to 
meet this requirement, and where an appeal is pending," we have 
the discretion to remand to the hearing examiner for these 
findings.  Id. at 657.  We need not remand, however, when "the 
underlying facts of the case . . . so clearly dictate the 
appropriate classification level."  Doe No. 23656, 483 Mass. at 
145, quoting Doe No. 496501, supra at 657 n.4. 
Although the hearing examiner explicitly determined that "a 
substantial public safety interest is served by active 
dissemination of [Doe's] sex offender registry information," she 
did not make explicit findings on this element that are detailed 
and particularized to Doe.  Her determination, however, follows 
a nearly four-page discussion of Doe's assaults against 
extrafamilial children, including multiple occasions where other 
people were present, among other high-risk indicators that puts 
the public at grave risk.  Because "the underlying facts . . . 
so clearly dictate" that Doe was properly classified as a level 
three sex offender, requiring active dissemination of his 
registry information, "we do not exercise our discretion to 
remand for further findings on this element."  Doe No. 23656, 
18 
 
483 Mass. at 145.  Rather, "we determine that there was 
substantial evidence to support each element by clear and 
convincing evidence," and so "there was no error in the hearing 
examiner's classification of" Doe as a level three sex offender.  
Id. at 146. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude 
that the hearing examiner's decision was supported by 
substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious.  
Therefore, the judgment affirming the board's decision to 
classify Doe as a level three sex offender is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.