Case Title: State v. Carpenter

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-221


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont,
Gardner Carpenter                            Unit No. 3, Orleans Circuit

                                             April Term, 1990


Dean B. Pineles, J.

Jane Woodruff, Orleans County State's Attorney, Newport, and Pamela Hall
  Johnson and Gary S. Kessler, Department of State's Attorneys, Montpelier,
  for plaintiff-appellee

Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellant



PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.



     GIBSON, J.   Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated assault
on grounds that the State did not prove the element of a substantial risk of
death and that the conviction was inconsistent with his acquittal on charges
of sexual assault.  We affirm.
     Defendant was charged with sexually assaulting his 15-year-old adopted
stepdaughter (13 V.S.A. { 3252(3)) and with causing her serious bodily harm
(13 V.S.A. { 1024(a)(1)).  The State based both charges on related events in
February of 1988, when defendant picked the daughter up at his sister's
house after school.  After stopping to buy groceries and wine coolers, he
drove with the daughter to his own residence, which consisted of a trailer
and a barn.  The girl drank some of the wine cooler, but was uncertain as to
how much she drank and whether defendant pressured her to do so.  Though the
original plan had been for the daughter to return to defendant's sister's
home to sleep, she and defendant remained at defendant's residence, and the
daughter went to bed there after she and defendant watched some videotapes.
Since she had not brought her pajamas, she got into bed with her clothes on.
Defendant thereafter came into her room to sleep with her, stating that the
trailer's living room was cold.  She then left the bedroom and went back to
the living room.  In a few minutes, defendant went to the barn, and when he
requested help with the animals, she accompanied him.  The alleged sexual
assault took place in the barn, and subsequently, in the trailer.  The
juvenile testified that following the sexual assault, defendant continued
with a physical assault in order to frighten her into silence about the
sexual assault.  It is that conduct that provided the basis for the
aggravated assault charge.
     At the close of the State's case, defendant filed an acquittal motion
to the aggravated assault charge, arguing that the State had failed to show
that defendant had caused a "substantial risk of death" within the meaning
of 13 V.S.A. { 1021(2). (FN1) In denying the motion, the trial court found
that, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and
excluding modifying evidence, the evidence at trial showed:
            1. The defendant forced the victim's head into a
          bucket of water three times in rapid succession. The
          victim was unable to breathe while her head was emersed
          [sic].

            2. When the victim was able to knock the bucket over,
          the defendant immediately placed his hands on her neck
          and began choking her.

            3. While the choking progressed, the victim lost
          consciousness for an indeterminate period of time,
          regained consciousness briefly, then lost consciousness
          again for an indeterminate period.  She was unable to
          breathe while being choked.

            4. Upon regaining consciousness the second time, she
          found herself vomiting blood into a sink.

            5. The choking caused a contusion on her neck.

            6. The choking caused petechiae (red, freckle-like
          marks) to form on her face.  These petechiae are formed
          when tiny blood vessels rupture as a result of an
          impedence [sic] of the outflow of blood from the brain.
          According to Dr. Peck, these marks were located all over
          her face, and were "prominent" and "remarkable."

            7. The choking also cause[d] hemorrhaging of the tiny
          blood vessels in her eyes.  This hemorrhaging was also
          "prominent."

            8. Dr. Peck, while not an expert of choking, testified
          from his general medical knowledge that lapsing into
          unconsciousness from choking results from a depletion of
          oxygen to the brain, and that oxygen depletion can
          eventually result in death.

The jury found defendant innocent of the charge of sexual assault but guilty
of aggravated assault.  The present appeal followed.
     Defendant argues first that the State failed to prove that he had
caused a bodily injury which created a substantial risk of death within the
meaning of the statute and that the motion for acquittal should have been
granted.  In deciding such a motion, the court's inquiry must be whether the
prosecution has introduced evidence "fairly and reasonably tending to show
the defendant's guilt, that is, whether the jury on that evidence would be
justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."  State v. Chenette,
151 Vt. 237, 241, 560 A.2d 365, 369 (1989).  In the instant case, the trial
court carefully spelled out the evidence that met the standard, and the
evidence was substantial.  The testimony that defendant repeatedly forced
the daughter's head into a bucket of water, that the child was unable to
breathe, that defendant choked her, and that she lost consciousness and
vomited blood was more than sufficient to withstand the dismissal motion.
See State v. Blakeney, 137 Vt. 495, 500,