Case Title: Claassen v. Nord

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87-205

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Claassen v. Nord1988 WY 81756 P.2d 189Case Number: 87-205Decided: 06/10/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
PERRY EVAN CLAASSEN, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

FINN E. NORD, AND GREEN MANAGEMENT, INC., APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

TOM COLLINS, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT AND THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF),

v.

FARMERS COOPERATIVE 
ASSOCIATION OF GILLETTE, 
WYOMING, A WYOMING CORPORATION, 
(THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Terrence L. 
O'Brien, J.

Robert J. 
O'Neil, Gillette, for 
appellant.

Robert Jerry 
Hand of Hand, Hand, and Hand, Casper, for appellee Finn E. 
Nord.

Ann M. Rochelle 
of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, for appellee Green Management Corp., 
Inc.

Michael K. Davis 
of Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for appellee Tom 
Collins.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
two trial court orders. The first order sets aside the entry of default and 
default judgment that appellant Perry Evan Claassen once possessed against 
appellee Finn E. Nord (Nord). The second order grants summary judgment to 
appellees Green Management Company (Green), Tom Collins (Collins) and Nord. 
Appellant raises the following issues:

"I.

"The trial court erred in 
removing the default entered against Nord on February 6, 1987 `as it was an 
abuse of discretion to so remove the default without a sufficient showing of 
`good cause' by Nord required by Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 
55(c).

"II.

"The trial court erred in 
finding that the duty of Nord to Claassen was the duty owed by a possessor of 
land to a trespasser and that Claassen failed to establish facts sufficient to 
support a finding that Nord breached that duty to Claassen or, in the 
alternative that Nord owed no duty whatsoever to Claassen.

"III.

"The trial court erred in 
finding that the duty of Green to Claassen was the duty owed by a possessor of 
land to a trespasser and that Claassen failed to establish facts sufficient to 
support a finding that Green breached that duty to Claassen or, in the 
alternative, in finding that Green owed no duty whatsoever to 
Claassen.

"IV.

"The trial court erred in 
finding that the duty of Collins to Claassen was the duty owed by a possessor of 
land to a trespasser and that Claassen failed to establish facts sufficient to 
support a finding that Collins breached that duty to Claassen or, in the 
alternative, in finding that Collins owed no duty whatsoever to 
Claassen."

[¶2.]     We affirm both 
orders.

FACTS

[¶3.]     This case centers on 
appellees' alleged tort liability arising out of a gas explosion in a four-plex 
apartment building that used to be located at 
104 1/2 Ross Avenue, Gillette, Wyoming
. Collins and his wife owned the 
building until August 29, 1975, when they sold it to Nord under a contract for 
warranty deed. They surrendered possession on the date of sale. Nord managed the 
four apartments in the building from the time he purchased them until May 1981. 
During this period, there was a fire in apartment number 4; after the fire that 
apartment was converted from propane gas appliances to electric 
appliances.

[¶4.]     The parties do not 
dispute that the propane-to-electricity conversion in 
apartment 4, was 
completed by a company named "Builders Diversified." Appellant also admits that 
Builders Diversified maintained the legal status of an independent contractor 
when it did the work. Cf. Holliday v. Bannister, Wyo., 741 P.2d 89, 95 (1987). Appellant has 
never alleged that any of the appellees might be liable in tort for damages from 
the explosion under a theory of negligent hiring of Builders Diversified. 
Rather, appellant's arguments attempt to build genuine issues of fact for his 
negligence action based on the differences in the deposition testimony of Nord 
and other witnesses concerning who might have supervised the independent 
contractor, or what appellees may have known about the conversion later on. Nord 
contends that his insurance adjuster, Wade Chalfant, hired and supervised 
Builders Diversified after the 1981 fire. Chalfant's deposition, however, 
indicates that Nord hired and supervised the independent contractor. Neither 
Nord nor Chalfant seem to have personal knowledge or recollection of the other's 
contacts with Builders Diversified. The record shows that the insurance company 
paid for the work.

[¶5.]     Also, there was 
speculation that the Gillette Fire Department turned off the gas supply to 

apartment 
4 after the 1981 fire by turning the valve on the meter located in 
a wooden box on the back of the building. This box was not locked but its cover 
was held shut by a pin.

[¶6.]     From the time 

apartment 
4 was converted to electricity, until April 1981, Nord managed the 
building personally. On April 7, 1981, he retained Green to manage and rent 

apartment 
4. Nord was responsible for repairs under his agreement with 
Green. This was Green's first involvement in the apartment, and Green never had 
a written agreement with Nord concerning the other three apartments at 
104 1/2 Ross 
Avenue. Green did, however, collect rents for all of 
the apartments at 104 1/2 Ross 
Avenue from April 1981 to June 
1982.

[¶7.]     In December 1981, Green 
entered into a six-month term lease agreement for 
apartment 4 with a 
man named Edd Nowlin. The lease prohibited subleasing without Green's consent. 
Appellant moved into 
apartment 4 in April 1982. He never signed 
a lease or other agreement with Green or Nowlin, but claims he paid some rent to 
Nowlin. He also claims both Green and Nowlin were aware of his presence in the 
apartment and did not object. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that 
Collins knew he was there.

[¶8.]     By March 1982, Nowlin 
was behind on his rent payments. He failed to pay after receiving a default 
notice from Green and his lease was terminated. Nowlin and appellant vacated the 
apartment in May 1982. It remained empty during most of June. Appellant moved 
into one of the other apartments in the building, again under some casual rental 
agreement with the occupant, but he kept a key to 
apartment 4 because 
he left a sofa/hide-a-bed there.

[¶9.]     On June 29, 1982, 
appellant entered 
apartment 4 intending to remove his sofa. 
Once inside, he lit a cigarette and set off a gas explosion. The explosion 
burned his face, arms, hands and torso and set 
apartments 3 and 4 on 
fire. As a result of his burns, appellant went to a hospital in Texas. His treatment 
involved repeated skin debridements and skin grafting.

[¶10.]  The only contact Collins had with the 
apartments in 1982 concerned Nord's failure to pay real property taxes, carry 
insurance on the building or make his payments under the contract for deed. 
Collins sent Nord notice of this fact in April 1982. In May 1982 Carole Collins 
sent the escrow agent a demand for return of the deed to the property and other 
escrow documents. Collins received the deed on May 14, 1982, and promptly 
recorded it. He did not inspect the building between August 1975 and May 1982. 
In May 1982, Collins went to inspect the apartments, but was unable to get 
inside because the door was pad-locked.

[¶11.]  About the same time, Carole Collins 
contacted Green regarding possession of the building. Green refused to surrender 
possession and Collins' attorney later told him he would probably have to sue 
Nord and Green to regain physical control of the property. In June 1982, Green's 
vice-president sent Nord a memo telling him of the Collins' inquiries and asking 
him for a response. Nord made no reply. Green sent Nord a second memo on July 
15, 1982, after the explosion and fire, asking about who currently owned the 
building. The memo stated that failure to respond would mean that Green could 
assume Nord no longer owned the building. There was no response to the second 
memo, and on August 3, 1982, Green wrote Nord and told him it was returning 
control and management of the property to him. This action was finalized with an 
August 9, 1982, letter from Green to the Collins' attorney stating that Finn 
Nord had control of the apartments.

[¶12.]  During the summer of 1982 the City of 
Gillette began 
condemnation proceedings against the building. At the same time, Collins filed a 
declaratory judgment action against Nord and Green seeking sole legal ownership 
and possession of the property. In September, Green, acting as agent for Nord, 
agreed to account to Collins for rents and profits if Collins would allow the 
building to be demolished. Nord agreed and delivered a warranty deed to Collins 
at the same time.

[¶13.]  In August 1982, the Farmers Co-operative 
Association of Gillette, which had supplied propane gas to the building, settled 
an earlier negligence action with appellant. As a result of that settlement, 
little evidence regarding the delivery of propane to the building is available 
as a part of this record.

[¶14.]  Appellant filed this negligence action 
against Nord, Collins and Green on June 27, 1986. Green and Collins answered on 
July 17 and 22, 1986, respectively. Collins counterclaimed against appellant and 
cross-claimed against Nord and Green. Green also cross-claimed against Nord and 
Collins.

[¶15.]  The record shows that Nord was not served 
with process until August 13, 1986, when a deputy sheriff located him in the 
Campbell County Library in Gillette. Nord denies that he was ever served but the 
trial court did not accept that assertion. By February 6, 1987, Nord still had 
not filed an answer; appellant filed an application for entry of default against 
Nord on that day. On March 3, 1987, appellant moved the trial court for a 
hearing on damages and a hearing was scheduled for March 10. By this time Nord's 
insurance company had retained an attorney for him. On March 7, Nord's attorney 
had been apprised of the upcoming hearing and he called appellant's attorney and 
asked for a continuance. This request was refused. On March 9, the trial court 
granted partial default judgment against Nord in the amount of $86,859 in 
medical expenses and $1,000,000 for pain and suffering. This default judgment 
was entered without an evidentiary hearing.

[¶16.]  Nord's new attorney filed a "Motion to 
Set Aside Entry of Default" the same day. The next day, the trial court heard 
argument on this motion and found good cause existed to set aside the entry of 
default and default judgment conditioned upon Nord paying $225 in attorney's 
fees to appellant's attorney. Nord, however, was not specifically required to 
show a meritorious defense to appellant's claims. Nord paid the $225 and filed 
an answer by March 20.

[¶17.]  Just before the default judgment 
controversy arose, Green and Collins filed motions for summary judgment against 
appellant on March 2. Nord made a similar motion on March 19. The trial court 
held a hearing on April 3, and April 21, on these motions, and then granted 
them. The parties agreed to drop their respective cross-claims and an order 
finalizing the ruling was entered on July 6, 1987. This appeal 
followed.

SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT AND 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

[¶18.]  Rule 55(c), Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure, is the trial court's authority to set aside entry of default and 
default judgment. It provides:

"(c) Setting aside default. - For good cause 
shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default 
has been entered may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)." 
(Emphasis added.)

Rule 60(b) 
W.R.C.P. provides in pertinent part:

"(b) Mistakes; 
inadvertence; excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, etc. - On 
motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether 
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within one (1) year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. * * *."

Default 
judgments are not favored in the law, but a moving defendant carries the burden 
to show the trial court that his request to set a default aside is within these 
rules. Annis v. Beebe & Runyan Furniture Company, Wyo., 685 P.2d 678, 
679-680 (1984). A defendant also is ordinarily required to show that he has a 
meritorious defense. Id.

[¶19.]  Rules 55(c) and 60(b), W.R.C.P., are 
remedial and are intended to promote decisions on the merits when possible. A 
trial court has wide judicial discretion to grant or deny a defendant's motion 
under these rules. Ryan v. Lowe, Wyo., 
753 P.2d 580, 582 (1988); and Annis v. Beebe & Runyan Furniture Company, 
supra. We will not disturb the exercise of that discretion unless appellant 
demonstrates that the trial court abused it and was clearly wrong. Ryan v. Lowe, 
supra. See also Martin v. State, Wyo., 720 P.2d 894, 897 (1986) (defining 
judicial discretion).

[¶20.]  Appellant has not made such a showing in 
this case. Nord's attorney informed the trial court that he first found out 
about the case on March 6, 1987, from Nord's insurance carrier. The insurance 
carrier apparently discovered the litigation from third parties and through its 
own investigation sometime during the late summer and early fall of 1987. At the 
hearing on Nord's motion to set the default judgment aside Nord's attorney 
asserted that Nord had never really been served, but that if the court accepted 
that he had, he was ready to submit to the trial court's jurisdiction, file an 
answer and defend the case. Nord's attorney also explained that he had contacted 
Claassen's attorney on March 7, 1987, and asked him for a continuance; that 
request was denied. On the afternoon of March 9, Claassen's attorney submitted a 
proposed default judgment against Nord to the trial court, but did not tell the 
court about his discussion with Nord's attorney on March 7. The trial court 
signed that judgment only to find that Nord's motion to set aside default had 
been filed on the afternoon of March 9. Based on all of this the trial court 
found good cause to set aside the default and the default judgment. The trial 
court did not specifically rule on the showing of a meritorious defense, but it 
must have believed such a defense existed, particularly in light of its later 
order granting summary judgment to Nord. Viewing these things together, and 
considering the fact that this appeal challenges an order setting aside default 
judgment, we do not see a clear abuse of discretion.

SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

[¶21.]  We review a trial court order of summary 
judgment as follows:

"A motion for summary 
judgment places an initial burden on the movant to make a prima facie showing 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that summary judgment should 
be granted as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. Once a prima 
facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to 
present specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. 
England v. Simmons, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1137, 1140-1141 (1986). We 
analyze challenges to a grant of summary judgment by reviewing the record in a 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion giving him all favorable 
inferences that can be drawn from the facts. * * *." Boehm v. Cody Country 
Chamber of Commerce, Wyo., 748 P.2d 704, 710 
(1987).

We also have 
held that self-serving affidavits that are not based in fact are insufficient to 
create a genuine issue of material fact in this context. Davenport v. Epperly, Wyo., 
744 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1987).

[¶22.]  The elements of any negligence claim 
include a "[d]uty or standard of care on the part of the defendant, and a 
failure to perform the duty, proximately causing damage to plaintiff. 
[Citations.]" Ely v. Kirk, Wyo., 707 P.2d 706, 709 (1985). We begin this 
part of the opinion by considering appellant's claims against Collins. Regarding 
negligence, no matter what type of duty Collins allegedly owed appellant, we are 
convinced that Collins was entitled to summary judgment. He made a factually 
based prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact existed 
suggesting he could be held liable for negligence. Appellant failed to offer 
even a shred of evidence to refute this showing. Appellant did not offer any 
facts that could be used to imply strict liability in tort against Collins. 
Summary judgment favoring Collins was proper.

[¶23.]  With respect to Green and Nord, appellant 
makes a confusing two-pronged argument that genuine issues of material fact 
exist concerning the duties these appellees owed appellant when the explosion 
occurred.

[¶24.]  The first prong of appellant's argument 
concerns Green. Appellant argues that lease documents in the record can be 
construed such that Nowlin's lease was still in effect when he set off the 
explosion. He contends that this in turn creates genuine issues of material fact 
in terms of a negligence duty Green allegedly owed appellant. Our review of the 
affidavits and documents the parties submitted with their summary judgment 
pleadings convinces us that Green made an unrefuted showing that it owed 
appellant a duty to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring him as a 
trespasser or licensee. See Yalowizer v. Husky Oil Company, Wyo., 629 P.2d 465, 
467-469 (1981). Even if we were to elevate the standard of care that Green owed 
appellant, appellant has failed to put forth any evidence refuting Green's showing 
that it did not breach even an invitee duty to provide reasonable and ordinary 
care for appellant's safety. See Mostert v. CBL & Associates, Wyo., 741 P.2d 1090, 1096 
(1987).

[¶25.]  Green's first involvement with 

apartment 
4 was well after that apartment had been converted to electrical 
appliances. Green inspected the apartment at that time and found a new, clean, 
electric apartment. Green was never responsible under agreement or by its 
actions for repair or maintenance of the apartment building. Green simply had no 
reason to foresee danger from an old propane gas line covered by a new linoleum 
floor under an electric water heater in a closet in 
apartment 4. 
Appellant did not produce any evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact that even suggested otherwise. His own affidavit only implies 
knowledge of potential danger to Green through hearsay and unsupported, 
self-serving statements. The affidavit of his expert witness, F.A. Davies, is 
also based on hearsay, double-hearsay and personal opinion and speculation, not 
on personal knowledge or other facts. These affidavits and appellant's other 
evidence are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact in a 
negligence action. See Davenport v. Epperly, supra. Summary judgment 
favoring Green was proper.

[¶26.]  Summary judgment for Nord was proper as a 
matter of law. See Davenport v. Epperly, supra. Appellant's 
argument concerning Nord is novel at best. He begins by asserting that under the 
definition set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 328 E (1965),1 Nord was not a "possessor" of 

apartment 
4 when it exploded. Appellant then urges that under our holding in 
Pan American Petroleum Company v. Like, Wyo., 381 P.2d 70 (1963), Nord is liable for 
negligence attributable to a person dealing with an ultrahazardous substance or 
agency, because he had knowledge that 
apartment 4 was converted from gas to 
electricity. This argument fails for a number of reasons, most obviously because 
the holding in Pan American Petroleum Company v. Like, supra, can be 
distinguished from this case. Pan American involved a negligence claim arising 
out of injuries received by a workman on a pressurized gas drilling rig. During 
drilling, the well leaked gas, which ignited and burned the plaintiff. The duty 
or standard of care applied in Pan American was high because drilling for gas is 
known, even by laypersons, to be an inherently dangerous activity. Pan American 
Petroleum Company v. Like, supra, at 74-75.

[¶27.]  In this case, appellant conceded that the 
conversion of 
apartment 4 from propane to electricity was 
actually done by an independent contractor hired by either Nord or his insurance 
carrier. Appellant also conceded that no claim for negligent hiring of the 
independent contractor exists. Consequently, appellant's entire negligence claim 
against Nord rests precariously on the idea that Nord's knowledge that the 
apartment had been converted from gas to electric appliances should subject him 
to negligence liability under an inherently dangerous activity standard of care. 
We do not agree. The only persons who could arguably be held to that standard of 
care in this case are the persons who converted the apartment and the persons 
who sold the gas. Appellant has already settled with the latter entity. He does 
not have a viable action against Nord.

[¶28.]  Affirmed as to all 
defendants.

FOOTNOTES

1 This section 
provides:

"§ 328 E. Possessor of 
Land Defined.

"A possessor of land 
is

"(a) a person who is in 
occupation of the land with intent to control it, or

"(b) a person who has 
been in occupation of land with intent to control it, if no other person has 
subsequently occupied it with intent to control it, or

"(c) a person who is 
entitled to immediate occupation of the land, if no other person is in 
possession under Clauses (a) and (b)."