Case Title: Kidwell v. Wyoming

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0238

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
KEVIN EUGENE KIDWELL v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 91Case Number: S-11-0238Decided: 06/27/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
KEVIN 
EUGENE KIDWELL,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County
The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. 
Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
 
[¶1]      Kevin Eugene 
Kidwell challenges his convictions for false imprisonment and simple 
assault.  He claims the prosecutor 
committed misconduct by failing to give prior notice of evidence suggesting he 
had attempted to persuade a witness to testify falsely in his favor at trial in 
violation of W.R.E. 404(b).  Mr. 
Kidwell has failed to demonstrate a clear violation of law or any prejudice; 
consequently, we affirm.

ISSUE
 
[¶2]      Mr. Kidwell 
presents the following issue on appeal:
 
Did 
the prosecutor commit misconduct when he admitted [sic] 404(b) evidence without 
providing notice?
 
The 
State provides a more detailed statement of the issue:
 
Proposed 
defense witness, Andrew Scott, abandoned his plan to testify falsely on 
Kidwell’s behalf and advised the prosecution of both his plan and his change of 
heart shortly before the end of the noon recess on the third day of trial.  Without first notifying defense counsel, 
the prosecutor called Scott, to repeat his story, as the second witness of the 
afternoon.  Does the record as a 
whole support the district court’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s omission was 
neither misconduct nor prejudicial?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      Mr. Kidwell and 
the victim, who was his girlfriend, lived together in an apartment in Casper, 
Wyoming.  The record contains a 
great deal of information about the history of the parties’ relationship; 
however, it is sufficient at this juncture to note that it was tumultuous, with 
the parties frequently fighting and the victim occasionally leaving the 
apartment to stay elsewhere for periods of time. 
 
[¶4]      In early June 
2010, the victim spent several days in Medicine Bow with a recent acquaintance. 
 She returned to the apartment she 
shared with Mr. Kidwell on June 12 or 13, 2010.  On June 14, 2010, the couple began to 
fight.  The fight escalated, and Mr. 
Kidwell repeatedly grabbed and choked the victim throughout the day.  The victim also claimed that he 
threatened her with a hammer.  That 
evening, they traveled to a gas station to get cigarettes.  Mr. Kidwell left the victim in his 
pickup truck when he went into the store.  
He left the keys in the ignition, and the victim took that opportunity to 
leave and drive to a local hospital.    
 
[¶5]      Hospital staff 
and law enforcement officers observed that the victim’s body was covered in 
bruises.  She also had a sore 
throat, difficulty swallowing and other symptoms resulting from the 
choking.  Mr. Kidwell was charged 
with one count of kidnapping; one count of aggravated assault and battery 
(unlawfully attempting to cause serious bodily injury); one count of aggravated 
assault and battery (threatening to use a drawn deadly weapon—the hammer); and 
one count of interference with an emergency “911” call.      

 
[¶6]      The matter went 
to trial in January 2011.  The 
defense listed Andrew Scott as a witness.  
The prosecution interviewed Mr. Scott during the lunch break on the third 
day of trial.  He had been Mr. 
Kidwell’s cellmate at the Natrona County jail and reported that he had witnessed 
Mr. Kidwell and the victim at the gas station on June 14, 2010.  He stated that the victim was the 
aggressor and Mr. Kidwell was simply trying to defend himself and calm her 
down.  A short time after recounting 
this tale to the prosecution’s investigator, Mr. Scott recanted and stated that 
he had been lying and, in fact, had not seen the victim and Mr. Kidwell at the 
gas station.   

 
[¶7]      Although Mr. 
Scott had been listed as a defense witness, the prosecution called him to the 
stand and had him recount his original plan to testify in Mr. Kidwell’s favor 
and his subsequent change of heart.  
Mr. Kidwell did not object to either the State calling Mr. Scott as a 
witness or the testimony about his original story and his recantation.  The defense, however, later moved for a 
mistrial because it had not been given prior notice of Mr. Scott’s 
testimony.  The defense did not 
specifically mention W.R.E. 404(b) in its mistrial motion.  Instead, defense counsel argued the 
State was “put on notice that this witness was going to testify falsely, did not 
notify myself about that; but rather chose to place him on the stand and have it 
come out on the stand in front of the jury.  We at least – it’s a violation of 
discovery. . . .  At least we would 
have requested a hearing before the Court on whether or not that information 
would be admissible.”  The district 
court denied the mistrial motion.   

 
[¶8]      The jury returned 
a verdict which was decidedly favorable to Mr. Kidwell.  They acquitted him on the kidnapping 
charge and the lesser included offense of felonious restraint.  They convicted him, however, of the 
lesser included misdemeanor, false imprisonment.  The jury also acquitted Mr. Kidwell on 
the charge of aggravated assault and battery—serious bodily injury, but 
convicted him of the lesser included misdemeanor, simple assault.  The jury returned not guilty verdicts on 
Counts Three and Four – aggravated assault and battery with a drawn deadly 
weapon and interference with an emergency 911 call.  After the district court sentenced him, 
Mr. Kidwell appealed.     

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶9]      This case comes 
to us in an unusual procedural stance.  
Although Mr. Kidwell claims the evidence of Mr. Scott’s plan to testify 
falsely was other bad acts evidence and governed by W.R.E. 404(b) procedural 
requirements, he does not specifically challenge the admissibility of the 
evidence or analyze it under the relevant factors.  See, e.g., Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d 332, 340 
(Wyo. 2002).  In addition, although 
he moved for a mistrial in the district court, he does not expressly challenge 
the district court’s denial of his motion.  
Instead, he maintains that the prosecutor committed misconduct by failing 
to give the defense notice of Mr. Scott’s testimony.
 
[¶10]   “Allegations 
of prosecutorial misconduct are settled by reference to the entire record and 
'hinge on whether a defendant’s case has been so prejudiced as to constitute 
denial of a fair trial.’”  Schreibvogel 
v. State, 
2010 WY 45, ¶ 39, 228 P.3d 874, 887 (Wyo. 
2010), 
quoting Mazurek 
v. State, 
10 P.3d 531, 542 (Wyo. 
2000).  See also, Benjamin v. State, 2011 WY 147, ¶ 50, 264 P.3d 1, 13 
(Wyo. 2011).  Because Mr. Kidwell 
did not pose a contemporaneous objection to Mr. Scott’s testimony, he has the 
burden of demonstrating plain error.  
“Plain error exists when: 1) the record is clear about the incident 
alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule 
of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was denied a substantial right which 
materially prejudiced him.”  Talley v. State, 2007 WY 37, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d 256, 260 
(Wyo. 2007).    
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶11]   On appeal, Mr. Kidwell maintains 
the prosecutor violated the notice requirements we have implemented for W.R.E. 
404(b) evidence.1  In Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 23, 42 P.3d 483, 491 
(Wyo. 2002), we stated:
 
We 
now hold that where a defendant files a pretrial demand for notice of intent to 
introduce evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), the same shall be treated as the making 
of a timely objection to the introduction of such evidence.  The State must then respond with 
sufficient information to meet the balance of the Huddleston test adopted in Vigil.  
Not only will such a rule enhance the defendant’s prospects of 
receiving due process and a fair trial, it will also enhance the district 
court’s ability to reflect and rule upon a significant evidentiary issue.  Rulings on uncharged misconduct evidence 
are too important to be made in the heat and pressure of a trial, with the jury 
twiddling its thumbs in the next room.
 
[¶12]   Mr. Kidwell filed a pretrial demand 
for notice of intent to introduce 404(b) evidence, and the State gave notice 
that it intended to introduce other evidence under Rule 404(b) but did not 
include Mr. Scott’s testimony.  As a 
threshold matter, we must determine whether the evidence of Mr. Scott’s plan to 
fabricate testimony falls within the purview of W.R.E. 404(b).  That rule reads:
 
(b) 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. 
– Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution 
in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or 
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the 
general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at 
trial.
 
[¶13]   In order to be considered under 
Rule 404(b), the proposed testimony must be evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, 
or acts.”  Here, there was no clear 
indication that Mr. Kidwell committed any other crime, wrong or act with respect 
to Mr. Scott’s testimony.  Mr. Scott 
testified that he and Mr. Kidwell had discussed their cases with one another 
while sharing a cell at the Natrona County jail and he decided that he could 
testify on behalf of Mr. Kidwell.  
During questioning by the prosecutor, Mr. Scott described the false 
testimony he was going to give:
 
Q.        What 
had you planned on testifying about as to what happened at the Red 
Eagle?
A.        I was 
going to tell the Courts [sic] that I was sitting across the street at the 
Colonial Motel and that I seen his ex-girlfriend going off on him, assaulting 
him.
Q.        Is 
any of that true?
A.        I did 
not personally witness it.
Q.        Were 
you even there?
A.        
No.
. 
. . .
Q.        And 
what were you going to testify to that’s not true?
A.        I was 
going to say that I had seen his ex-girlfriend there drunk, that I had witnessed 
him trying to keep her calm, going inside the Red Eagle, and coming back out, 
and that I was going to witness that she’s the one that assaulted him and then 
took off with his truck.
Q.        None 
of that’s true?
A.        Not 
that I know of.  

. 
. . .
Q.        . . . 
[T]hen today, you had a discussion when Detective Wes Gudahl showed up; is that 
correct?
A.        Yes, 
sir.
Q.        And 
he had asked you about your testimony that you were planning; is that 
correct?
A.        
Yes.
Q.        And 
you -- you didn’t inform him at the time, Mr. Gudahl, that you were going to 
testify falsely or did you?
A.        No, I 
did not.
Q.        
Okay.  You got thinking about 
it and then you came to me; is that correct?
A.        I 
came to Mr. Gudahl first.
Q.        
Okay.  And you had a -- you 
had an opportunity to think about what you were going to 
do?
A.        Yes, 
sir.
Q.        You 
recognize --
A.        I’ve 
been thinking about this for a couple weeks, and it’s been eating at me 
hard.
Q.        You 
knew that you were going to commit perjury on the witness 
stand?
A.        
Yes.  
 
[¶14]   Mr. Scott stated, however, that Mr. 
Kidwell had not asked him to testify falsely in his favor and never agreed to 
the plan.  The most that can be said 
of Mr. Kidwell’s actions with regard to Mr. Scott’s plan to testify is that he 
passively acquiesced to the plan.  
Mr. Scott stated:  “[Mr. 
Kidwell] never agreed.  He never 
disagreed.  He just kind of left it 
up in the air.”      

 
[¶15]   Mr. Kidwell testified about his 
discussion with Mr. Scott at trial.  
He stated that, after the victim had driven away from the gas station in 
his truck, he talked to a gentleman in a white van who had asked if he needed 
any help.  While they were visiting 
in jail, Mr. Scott told Mr. Kidwell that he was the man in the white van, 
although that did not turn out to be true.  
Mr. Kidwell also stated that he did not ask Mr. Scott to testify for him 
at all, and certainly not to testify falsely on his behalf.  The thrust of this testimony is that Mr. 
Kidwell did not attempt to persuade Mr. Scott to testify falsely.  As such, there was no “other crime, 
wrong or act” and the State was not required to give notice under Rule 404(b).2  The record does not, therefore, 
demonstrate a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  
 
[¶16]   Mr. Kidwell also has not 
demonstrated prejudice as a result of Mr. Scott’s testimony.  As we explained above, the evidence did 
not establish that Mr. Kidwell attempted to persuade Mr. Scott to testify 
falsely and, consequently, it was not prejudicial to Mr. Kidwell.  Moreover, Mr. Kidwell was convicted of 
only two misdemeanors as a result of the altercation with the victim—false 
imprisonment and simple assault.  
The district court instructed the jury on the elements of false 
imprisonment, as follows:
 
The 
elements of the crime of False Imprisonment, as a lesser included offense of the 
charge of Kidnapping, as charged in Count One of the Amended Information in this 
case, are:
 
1.    
On 
or about the 14th day of June, 2010 through 
on or about the 15th day of June, 
2010
2.    
In 
Natrona County, Wyoming
3.    
The 
Defendant, Kevin Eugene Kidwell
4.    
Knowingly 
and unlawfully
5.    
Restrained 
another person, [the victim] and
6.    
That 
restraint substantially interfered with the liberty of [the victim]. 

 
The 
district court also instructed the jury on the crime of simple assault in 
Instruction No. 21:
            
The elements of the crime of Simple Assault, as a lesser included offense 
of the charge of Aggravated Assault and Battery, Serious Bodily Injury, as 
charged in Count Two of the Amended Information in this case, 
are:
 
1.    
On 
or about the 14th day of June, 2010 through 
on or about the 15th day of June, 
2010
2.    
In 
Natrona County, Wyoming
3.    
The 
Defendant Kevin Eugene Kidwell
4.    
Having 
the present ability to cause bodily injury to another person, [the 
victim]
5.    
Unlawfully 
attempted to cause bodily injury to that person.  
 
[¶17]   The evidence on these two counts 
was overwhelming.  With regard to 
the false imprisonment charge, the victim testified that Mr. Kidwell had 
restrained her by choking her and grabbing her numerous times over the course of 
the day.  She 
testified:
 
Q.        Do 
you recall how it is you got a lot of these bruises?
A.        Him 
[Mr. Kidwell] grabbing me, throwing me down, trying to keep me from 
leaving.
 
That 
restraint obviously substantially interfered with her liberty as she was pinned 
to the spot and unable to leave.  
Another witness testified that he had observed Mr. Kidwell forbid the 
victim from leaving the apartment on another occasion.  This evidence was clearly sufficient for 
the jury to find Mr. Kidwell guilty of false imprisonment.   
 
[¶18]   The evidence on the simple assault 
charge was also compelling.  Again, 
the victim testified that Mr. Kidwell had grabbed and choked her many 
times.  The medical and law 
enforcement testimony confirmed that she had numerous bruises and superficial 
injuries.  This evidence was 
unquestionably sufficient to establish that Mr. Kidwell had the ability to cause 
injury to the victim and unlawfully attempted to do so. 
 
[¶19]   Under these circumstances where Mr. 
Scott and Mr. Kidwell both testified that Mr. Kidwell did not persuade Mr. Scott 
to testify falsely and the evidence established that Mr. Kidwell attacked and 
restrained the victim, Mr. Scott’s testimony, even if it were considered 
improper, did not sway the jury.  
There is simply no basis to find that Mr. 
Kidwell’s case was “so prejudiced as to constitute denial of a fair trial.’” 
Schreibvogel, 
¶ 39, 228 P.3d  at 887, quoting Mazurek, 
10 P.3d  at 542.
 
[¶20]   Affirmed.  
 
FOOTNOTES
1As we stated above, in arguing that a mistrial should be declared, 
defense counsel did not mention Rule 404(b) and stated, instead, that the State 
had simply violated its discovery obligations by failing to give notice of Mr. 
Scott’s testimony.  He does not, 
however, argue on appeal that the State violated its discovery responsibilities 
under any other rules.    

2We recognize that this analysis essentially renders Mr. Scott’s testimony 
irrelevant.  However, Mr. Kidwell 
makes no argument that the evidence should have been excluded as irrelevant 
under W.R.E 401.