Case Title: Soler v. Evans, St. Clair & Kelsey

Citation: 2002-Ohio-1246

Docket Number: 20002181

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Soler v. Evans, St. Clair & Kelsey, 94 Ohio St.3d 432, 2002-Ohio-1246.] 
 
 
SOLER ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. EVANS, ST. CLAIR & KELSEY ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Soler v. Evans, St. Clair & Kelsey (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 432.] 
Civil procedure — Frivolous conduct in civil actions — Pursuant to R.C. 
2323.51, an aggrieved party has option of filing a sanctions motion 
anytime prior to commencement of trial or within twenty-one days of 
final judgment — R.C. 2323.51, construed — General jury demand 
included within a complaint applies to issues raised in a compulsory 
counterclaim even if complaint is later voluntarily dismissed. 
(No. 00-2181 — Submitted October 30, 2001 — Decided March 20, 2002.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 99AP-1020. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  Pursuant to R.C. 2323.51, an aggrieved party has the option of filing a 
sanctions motion at any time prior to the commencement of the trial or 
within twenty-one days of a final judgment.  R.C. 2323.51(B) construed. 
2.  A general jury demand included within a complaint applies to issues raised in a 
compulsory counterclaim even if the complaint is later voluntarily 
dismissed. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  Appellant Susan Soler, along with her 
mother and brother, inherited sizable real estate investments when her father died 
in 1982.  The three family members began a partnership in 1983 that was 
managed by Soler’s brother.  In 1988, appellant began to suspect that her brother 
was misappropriating partnership assets, so she retained attorney Robert St. Clair, 
appellee, to seek an accounting and conduct an audit of the partnership.  When 
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Soler’s mother died a few months later, leaving Soler’s brother as the executor of 
the estate, Soler enlisted St. Clair and his firm to protect her interest in the estate. 
 
Appellant soon became concerned with her attorneys’ representation.  
Eventually, her misgivings gave way to a complete breakdown in the attorney-
client relationship.  In November 1995, Soler, through new counsel, appellant 
James Connor, brought this action alleging that St. Clair and his law firm were 
liable for damages resulting from their breach of contract, legal malpractice and 
negligence, and conversion of appellant’s funds.  Among the parties listed as 
defendants in the complaint and amended complaint were appellees St. Clair, J. 
Michael Evans, Charles Kelsey, Carol King, and David Bainter, all attorneys 
whom plaintiff believed to have been partners of the firm.1  Soler’s complaint and 
amended complaint contained jury demands.  In his answer, St. Clair asserted a 
counterclaim for legal fees. 
 
Motions for summary judgment were filed by all of the parties.  The trial 
court granted the motions of most of the defendants, including Bainter, Kelsey, 
and King.  Before trial, however, Soler voluntarily dismissed her case pursuant to 
Civ.R. 41(A).  Thus, the only issue remaining was St. Clair’s counterclaim for 
legal fees.  Soler filed a motion in limine demanding a jury trial.  The trial court 
denied the motion, finding that it was untimely.  After a bench trial was held, the 
court granted judgment in St. Clair’s favor for the exact amount requested:  
$47,823.72 plus interest. 
 
Defendants St. Clair, Bainter, Kelsey, Evans, and King then filed motions 
for sanctions.  The court found that Soler and Connors2 had engaged in frivolous 
conduct and were jointly and severally liable for a total amount of $283,294.20 
plus ten percent interest. 
                                                          
 
1. 
Paul Aucoin, Michael Nieset, David Belinky, Randall Yontz, Robert Hetterscheidt, David 
Heier, and Jan Maiden were also named as defendants. 
2. 
Soler and Connors are hereinafter collectively referred to as Soler. 
January Term, 2002 
3 
 
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the counterclaim 
judgment for St. Clair.  However, the court denied Soler’s request for a jury trial 
on remand.  The court of appeals also reversed and remanded the decision on the 
sanctions motions as to Evans, Kelsey, King, and Bainter.3  Yet, the court found 
that all sanctions motions were timely filed. 
 
The court of appeals, finding its judgment to be in conflict with the Sixth 
Appellate District in Edinger v. DeRail, Inc. (Apr. 12, 1991), Lucas App. No. L-
90-158, unreported, 1991 WL 53777, and the Ninth Appellate District in 
Skidmore & Hall v. Rottman (1987), 38 Ohio App.3d 40, 525 N.E.2d 824, 
certified these matters for our review.  The cause is now before the court on a 
certified conflict. 
 
The first certified issue contains two parts: 
 
“In an action involving multiple parties and multiple claims, must a party 
who has received summary judgment file a motion, pursuant to R.C. 2323.51, 
within twenty-one days of such summary judgment or may the party wait until 
twenty-one days of when the remaining claims are resolved. 
 
“Similarly, must a party file the motion within twenty-one days of a 
voluntary dismissal, pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A), when a counterclaim remains 
pending or may the party wait until twenty-one days of when the counterclaim is 
resolved?” 
 
The second certified issue asks: 
 
“Is a general jury demand in a complaint preserved as to the issues in a 
counterclaim when the demand is contained in a complaint that is later dismissed 
pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)?” 
 
Both issues are separately discussed below. 
I 
                                                          
 
3. 
The court of appeals upheld St. Clair’s sanction award but reduced it to thirty percent of 
his attorney’s fees. 
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SANCTIONS MOTIONS 
 
The first certified issue relates to the question of the timeliness of the 
sanctions motions filed by appellees.4  Specifically, we are asked to determine 
what the word “judgment” means as used in R.C. 2323.51, the frivolous conduct 
statute. 
 
R.C. 2323.51(B) provides: 
 
“(1)  [A]t any time prior to the commencement of the trial in a civil action 
or within twenty-one days after the entry of judgment in a civil action * * *, the 
court may award court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and other reasonable 
expenses incurred in connection with the civil action * * *.” 
 
In this case, Bainter was awarded summary judgment on May 4, 1998, 
King was awarded summary judgment on June 17, 1998, and Kelsey was awarded 
summary judgment on September 15, 1998.  However, they did not file their 
sanctions motions until November 12, 1998, which was within twenty-one days of 
Soler’s voluntary dismissal.5  Soler argues that, according to R.C. 2323.51(B), the 
motions should have been filed within twenty-one days of each defendant’s 
receiving summary judgment.  On January 12, 1999, St. Clair was awarded 
judgment on his counterclaim.  He filed his sanctions motion within twenty-one 
days of the counterclaim judgment, on February 2, 1999.  Similarly, Soler 
contends that St. Clair should have filed his motion within twenty-one days of the 
voluntary dismissal.  Soler relies on the holding found in Edinger. 
 
In Edinger, a malpractice case against attorney Thomas Yoder, was 
dismissed due to improper joinder.  Approximately five months later, the 
remainder of the action was dismissed.  Ten days after that, Yoder filed a motion 
pursuant to R.C. 2323.51.  The trial court denied the motion, finding that it was 
                                                          
 
4. 
At the sanctions hearing, Connors admitted that Evans’s motion was timely filed. 
5. 
The sanctions motions of Bainter, Kelsey, and King were actually filed on the twenty-
second day from the voluntary dismissal, since the twenty-first day was a legal holiday. 
January Term, 2002 
5 
untimely filed.  The Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, holding 
that Yoder should have filed his motion within twenty-one days of his dismissal 
or when he received notice of his dismissal.  The court relied upon the language in 
the statute that allows a motion for sanctions to be filed before the trial begins as 
support for its decision.  The court further stated: 
 
“Preventing a party from filing a motion pursuant to R.C. 2323.51 until all 
the claims in a complex action were determined would defeat the purpose of that 
statute.  * * * [T]he plain language of the statute discloses a purpose to prevent 
abuse of process during the course of litigation by providing a means for 
immediate judicial determination and sanctioning of such abuse.  Precluding any 
action by an aggrieved party at the time of the alleged abuse would greatly reduce 
its power to deter such conduct thereby circumventing that purpose.  Limiting the 
time for the motion to twenty-one days after judgment is similar to a statute of 
limitations or the time constrictions set for many other types of motions and is 
included to bar stale or retaliatory claims.” 
 
In rejecting the Edinger court’s analysis, the appellate court in the instant 
case agreed with the Seventh District Court of Appeals in Olivito v. Cavanaugh 
(Dec. 30, 1992), Jefferson App. Nos. 90-J-33 and 90-J-39, unreported, 1992 WL 
398435, which found Edinger’s holding too restrictive. Olivito recognized that 
one of the primary purposes of the statute is to inhibit frivolous conduct during 
the discovery process. Thus, Olivito found that the statutory language supports the 
conclusion that a party is not required to wait until the end of the litigation to file 
a motion for sanctions.  However, Olivito found that it is not necessary that the 
moving party always file the motion within twenty-one days of the entry of any 
judgment that could pertain to frivolous conduct.  Instead, Olivito believed that 
the statutory language gives the moving party some discretion in deciding when to 
file the motion.  Thus, Olivito found that the statute permits the moving party to 
file the motion at any time prior to the start of the trial or within twenty-one days 
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after the entry of judgment, but that the term “judgment” should be interpreted as 
being synonymous with the term “final order” as defined in R.C. 2505.02 (i.e., 
“[a]n order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the 
action and prevents a judgment”). 
 
Olivito explained: 
 
“Since the first part of the conjunctive phrase [in the statute] refers to the 
entire period prior to trial, it follows that the only judgment to which the latter 
part refers is that which is rendered after the trial. * * * 
 
“[W]e believe that public policy supports the foregoing conclusion.  The 
Edinger holding places the onus upon a movant to file a motion for sanctions 
while the action is still pending.  If the movant is still a party to the action, this 
places an additional burden upon the very party who has allegedly been subject to 
the frivolous conduct.  Since the statute was meant to assist that party, he should 
have the option of deciding whether to bring the motion during the action or after 
its conclusion.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
We agree with the reasoning espoused in Olivito.  The plain meaning of 
the statute provides a means for an immediate judicial determination and a speedy 
sanctioning of such abuse.  However, the aggrieved party also has the option of 
waiting until the conclusion of the action to seek sanctions.  Construing the word 
“judgment” as used in the statute to mean a final appealable order serves the 
remedial purpose of the statute.  By enacting R.C. 2323.51, the General Assembly 
sought to provide a remedy for those harmed by frivolous conduct.  Yet, by the 
same token, the General Assembly manifested its intent that there be a cutoff time 
for this sanction to be imposed.  This purpose is served by giving the aggrieved 
party the option of filing the sanctions motion at any time prior to trial or within 
twenty-one days of the last judgment rendered in the case.  This would assure that 
twenty-one days after the entry of final judgment, the proceedings would be over.  
To adopt appellants’ interpretation would penalize the very parties that the statute 
January Term, 2002 
7 
seeks to benefit. Accordingly, we hold that pursuant to R.C. 2323.51, an 
aggrieved party has the option of filing a sanctions motion at any time prior to the 
commencement of the trial or within twenty-one days of a final judgment. 
 
In this case, the entries granting summary judgment to Bainter, Kelsey, 
and King did not specifically state that the rulings were final, appealable orders; 
thus, the final judgment in the case did not come until Soler voluntarily dismissed 
her suit.  Therefore, appellees’ motions, filed twenty-one days after the dismissal, 
were timely filed.  With respect to St. Clair, the voluntary dismissal was not a 
final order because his counterclaim remained pending.  When judgment was 
rendered on the counterclaim, the order became final for him.  Since St. Clair 
filed his sanctions motion twenty-one days after judgment on the counterclaim, 
we find that the motion was timely filed. The court of appeals’ decision on this 
issue is affirmed.6 
II 
JURY TRIAL 
 
Soler’s complaint and amended complaint contained a general jury 
demand. Along with his answer, St. Clair filed a counterclaim for legal fees but 
did not request a jury trial.  Soler’s reply to the counterclaim did not contain a 
jury demand. Later, Soler voluntarily dismissed her complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 
41(A). Thus, the issue is whether Soler was entitled to a jury trial on St. Clair’s 
remaining counterclaim in light of her voluntary dismissal. 
 
The right to a jury trial has its roots in the Magna Charta.  The right is 
reasserted in both our Ohio and United States Constitutions.7  It has long been 
held that the right of trial by jury is a substantive, fundamental constitutional 
                                                          
 
6. 
The appellate court found that the trial court had failed to consider Soler’s evidence 
offered to prove the existence of a partnership.  Thus, upon remand, it instructed the trial court to 
consider the partnership evidence and decide whether adjustments to the sanctions awards are 
necessary.  We do not disturb this finding. 
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right.  Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 415, 421, 633 N.E.2d 504, 510.  
Yet the right to a jury trial is not automatic.  Civ.R. 38, patterned after 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 38, deals with civil jury trials and places the burden of requesting a 
jury trial on the parties to the lawsuit.  The party who desires a jury trial must take 
affirmative action.  See Staff Note to Civ.R. 38. 
 
Civ.R. 38(B) provides, “Any party may demand a trial by jury on any 
issue triable of right by a jury by serving upon the other parties a demand therefor 
at any time after the commencement of the action and not later than fourteen days 
after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue.”  Civ.R. 38(C) states, 
“In his demand a party may specify the issues which he wishes so tried; otherwise 
he shall be deemed to have demanded trial by jury for all the issues so triable.”  
Therefore, if a general jury demand is made without specifying particular issues, 
it will be interpreted as a demand for a jury trial on all issues triable by a jury.  
Horwitz v. Alloy Automotive Co. (N.D.Ill.1988), 677 F.Supp. 564, 566, citing 9 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (1971), Section 2318, fn. 10.8  In 
Horwitz, the court construed this to mean that once a general jury demand is 
timely asserted, a second demand need not be made after the filing of a 
counterclaim to assure a jury trial on issues raised in the counterclaim or reply.  
Id. 
 
Hence, the fact that St. Clair or Soler did not demand a jury trial as to the 
counterclaim is irrelevant. Soler’s general demand served as notice to her 
opponents that she wanted a jury trial to the extent guaranteed by the Ohio and 
United States Constitutions.  Rosen v. Dick (C.A.2, 1980), 639 F.2d 82, 91.  This 
includes St. Clair’s counterclaim, which was compulsory, since it arose out of the 
same operative facts as the underlying claims in the complaint. See Civ.R. 13(A). 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
7. 
The right to a jury trial is found in Section 5, Article I of the Ohio Constitution and the 
Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
8. 
Civ.R. 38 and 39 bear language almost identical to Fed.R.Civ. 38 and 39.  See Staff Note 
to Civ.R. 38.  Thus, federal cases provide guidance to our interpretation of these rules. 
January Term, 2002 
9 
 
However, Soler voluntarily dismissed her complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 
41(A).  St. Clair argues that the effect of the voluntary dismissal was to eliminate 
Soler’s right to a jury trial. St. Clair asserts that according to Denham v. New 
Carlisle (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 594, 716 N.E.2d 184, a voluntary dismissal 
without prejudice leaves the parties as if no action had been brought at all.  Thus, 
St. Clair contends that once Soler filed her notice of dismissal, the jury demand 
was a nullity—it did not exist.  Therefore, since Soler did not request a jury trial 
in her answer to the counterclaim, St. Clair argues that a timely request was not 
made and a bench trial was proper. 
 
Soler disagrees with St. Clair’s argument.  She asserts that the voluntary 
dismissal of the underlying complaint is not a retraction of the jury demand.  She 
relies on the conflict case of  Skidmore & Hall v. Rottman (1987), 38 Ohio 
App.3d 40, 525 N.E.2d 824. 
 
In Skidmore, the reply to the counterclaim contained a general jury 
demand.  The counterclaim was dismissed prior to trial.  Thus, the issue was 
whether the demand applied to the remaining complaint.  In holding that it did, 
the appellate court found that once a general jury demand is made pursuant to 
Civ.R. 38, the only ways to waive such right are found in Civ.R. 39(A).  Since 
none of these methods applied, the right to a jury trial remained despite the 
voluntary dismissal of the counterclaim. 
 
We agree with the holding in Skidmore.  Civ.R. 38(D) states that once a 
party has demanded a jury trial, the demand cannot be withdrawn without the 
consent of the parties.  Civ.R. 39 provides the general methods to waive the right 
to a jury trial once such a request has been made.  Civ.R. 39(A) states: 
 
“The trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless (1) the parties 
or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed with the court or by an oral 
stipulation made in open court and entered in the record, consent to trial by the 
court sitting without a jury or (2) the court upon motion or of its own initiative 
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finds that a right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist.  The 
failure of a party or his attorney of record either to answer or appear for trial 
constitutes a waiver of trial by jury by such party and authorizes submission of all 
issues to the court.” 
 
The dismissal of the pleading containing the jury request is not mentioned 
as a possible method to waive the right to a jury trial.  In fact, such a holding 
would be contrary to the established case law.  Since none of the waiver methods 
mentioned in Civ.R. 39 was utilized in this case, Soler’s right to a jury trial 
remained intact. 
 
Therefore, we hold that a general jury demand included within a complaint 
applies to issues raised in a compulsory counterclaim even if the complaint is later 
voluntarily dismissed.  Thus, Soler was permitted to rely upon her general jury 
demand contained in her complaint as to all issues contained in the counterclaim. 
The court of appeals’ decision on this issue is reversed.  The cause is remanded 
for a jury trial on St. Clair’s counterclaim in accordance with the appellate court’s 
ruling that Soler has the right to assert legal malpractice as a defense. 
Judgment affirmed in part, 
reversed in part 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, BLACKMON, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in syllabus and judgment. 
 
PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for 
RESNICK, J. 
__________________ 
 
James P. Connors, for appellant Susan A. Soler. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Bruce L. Ingram, for appellant 
James P. Connors. 
January Term, 2002 
11 
 
Fry, Waller & McCann Co., L.P.A., and Barry A. Waller, for appellee 
Robert B. St. Clair. 
 
Downes & Hurst, Rufus B. Hurst and Edward S. Kim, for appellee Charles 
E. Kelsey. 
 
Chester, Willcox & Saxbe, L.L.P., Karen S. Hockstad and Eugene B. 
Lewis, for appellees Carol King and David Bainter. 
__________________