Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Viladegut

Citation: 

Docket Number: 54ag/19

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2021-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Angel Arturo Viladegut 
Misc. Docket AG No. 54, September Term 2019 
 
Attorney Discipline – Competence, Diligence, and Communication with Client – 
Mishandling of Client Funds – Misrepresentation – Disbarment.  Disbarment is the 
appropriate sanction where an immigration attorney failed to represent numerous clients 
competently and diligently and failed to communicate with them adequately concerning 
their cases, made knowing and intentional misrepresentations to tribunals, his clients and 
their family members, accepted fees he did not earn, failed to return unearned fees, 
abandoned his clients, and failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s investigations of his clients’ 
complaints. 
 
Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct 19-301.1, 19-301.2, 19-301.3, 19-
301.4(a)&(b), 19-301.5(a)&(b), 19-301.15(a)&(d), 19-301.16(d), 19-303.3(a), 19-
308.1(a)&(b), 19-308.4(a), (c)&(d). 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Case No. 477327 
Argument waived/submitted on papers 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 54 
 
September Term, 2019 
 
______________________________________ 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF 
MARYLAND 
 
V. 
 
ANGEL ARTURO VILADEGUT 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
 
 
 
McDonald 
 
 
 
Watts 
 
 
 
Hotten 
 
 
 
Getty 
 
 
 
Booth 
 
 
 
Biran, 
 
 
 
 
 
JJ. 
 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by McDonald, J. 
 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed:  March 29, 2021 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2021-04-06 10:47-04:00
 
 
This attorney disciplinary matter concerns Respondent Angel Arturo Viladegut, a 
Maryland attorney who committed various violations of the rules of professional conduct 
while providing immigration-related legal services in Maryland.  Four immigration clients 
complained, over a relatively short period of time, to Bar Counsel.  Those complaints, as 
documented by Bar Counsel, demonstrated a disturbing pattern of conduct in which Mr. 
Viladegut charged a fee to represent a recent immigrant at risk of removal from the United 
States, then did little or no work, and misrepresented the status of matters to the client and 
immigration court with adverse consequences to the client.   
Mr. Viladegut was no more diligent in responding to the inquiries of Bar Counsel.  
He did not cooperate with Bar Counsel’s investigation into his activities in Maryland, failed 
to respond to discovery requests in this proceeding, did not appear at the evidentiary 
hearing before the hearing judge, and did not respond to a show cause order as to whether 
he wished to participate in oral argument in this matter before this Court.   
On March 1, 2021, after considering the matter on the papers submitted, we 
disbarred Mr. Viladegut and assessed the costs of this proceeding against him.  We now 
explain the reasons why we took that action. 
I 
Background 
A. 
Procedural Context 
On December 17, 2019, the Attorney Grievance Commission, through Bar Counsel, 
filed with this Court a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Mr. Viladegut
2 
 
alleging that he had violated various provisions of the rules of professional conduct.1  In 
particular, Bar Counsel alleged that Mr. Viladegut had violated Rules 1.1 (competence), 
1.2(a) (scope of representation), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4(a) and (b) (communication), 1.5(a) and 
(b) (fees), 1.15(a) and (d) (safekeeping property), 1.16(d) (declining or terminating 
representation), 3.3(a) (candor to the tribunal), 8.1(a) and (b) (bar admission and 
disciplinary matters), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (misconduct).  Bar Counsel also alleged that 
Mr. Viladegut had violated former Maryland Rule 16-606.1 (attorney trust account record-
keeping),2 but later withdrew that charge. 
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-722(a), we designated Judge John M. Maloney of the 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County to conduct a hearing and to provide findings of fact 
and conclusions of law.  Thereafter, Mr. Viladegut was served with a summons, the 
petition, and Bar Counsel’s discovery request for admissions of fact and genuineness of 
documents.  Mr. Viladegut failed to respond.  The hearing judge entered an order of default 
on August 24, 2020.  Mr. Viladegut was issued a notice of the order of default but failed to 
respond. 
 
1 At the beginning of the pertinent time period, these rules were part of the Maryland 
Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) and codified in an appendix to 
Maryland Rule 16-812.  Effective July 1, 2016, the MLRPC were renamed the Maryland 
Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) and recodified in Title 19 of the 
Maryland Rules.  Presumably because Mr. Viladegut’s conduct straddled the effective date 
of the recodification, Bar Counsel charged both the MLRPC and MARPC versions of the 
alleged violations.  For ease of reference, we will use only the shorter designations of the 
MLRPC – i.e., Rule 1.1 in lieu of Maryland Rule 19-301.1.  See Maryland Rule 19-
300.1(22). 
2 Effective July 1, 2016, this rule was recodified as Maryland Rule 19-407.  
3 
 
The hearing judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on October 19, 2020.  Bar 
Counsel appeared, but Mr. Viladegut did not.  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-424(b), the 
matters set forth in Bar Counsel’s request for admissions of fact and genuineness of 
documents were deemed admitted and received into evidence.  At the hearing, Bar Counsel 
also submitted additional documents, which were admitted into evidence.  On November 
30, 2020, the hearing judge issued an opinion containing his findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, as well as his findings concerning aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.  Neither party filed exceptions.  We considered the matter on the papers 
submitted, without oral argument.3 
B. 
Facts 
As no exceptions have been filed, we treat the hearing judge’s findings of fact as 
established.  Maryland Rule 19-741(b)(2)(A).  We summarize below those findings of fact 
as they pertain to the violations alleged in the petition.   
1. 
Mr. Viladegut’s Law Practice 
Mr. Viladegut has been a member of the Maryland Bar since December 13, 2012.  
At all times relevant to the current action, he maintained an office for his legal practice in 
Silver Spring, Maryland.  
 
 
 
3 On January 15, 2021, Bar Counsel filed a request to waive oral argument; Mr. 
Viladegut did not respond.  We then entered an order directing Mr. Viladegut to show cause 
as to why oral argument should be held; Mr. Viladegut again did not respond.  On March 
1, 2021, we granted Bar Counsel’s request. 
4 
 
2. 
Representation of Anny Mestichelli and her son, DM 
On March 25, 2015, Anny Mestichelli entered the United States through Texas with 
her one-year-old son, DM,4 fleeing domestic violence in Honduras.  They were 
apprehended by immigration agents and placed in removal proceedings.  While those 
proceedings were pending, Ms. Mestichelli and DM were released, and they traveled to 
Maryland to live with Ms. Mestichelli’s family in Silver Spring.  The removal proceedings 
were transferred from an immigration court in Texas to one in Baltimore.  
The immigration court in Baltimore mailed notices for a master calendar hearing 
scheduled for June 17, 2015.  Ms. Mestichelli did not receive the notices because they listed 
an incorrect apartment number.  As a result, Ms. Mestichelli did not attend the June 17 
hearing, and the immigration court ordered that she and DM be removed from the United 
States.  On August 24, 2016, Ms. Mestichelli was detained by immigration agents in 
connection with a report filed with Interpol by her estranged husband that Ms. Mestichelli 
had kidnapped DM.  At that time, Ms. Mestichelli learned about the immigration court’s 
removal order.   
On August 25, 2016, Ms. Mestichelli’s mother met with Mr. Viladegut about her 
daughter’s case.  Mr. Viladegut agreed to represent Ms. Mestichelli in immigration court 
 
4 Although there is no indication that anyone’s identities were placed under seal 
during the evidentiary hearing, in his opinion the hearing judge used initials for individuals 
younger than 18 years old.  We adopt the same convention. 
5 
 
for $500 per hearing, as well in the Interpol investigation.5  The hearing judge found that 
the terms of this agreement were not memorialized in a retainer agreement or other writing.  
On August 30, 2016, Mr. Viladegut filed with the immigration court an emergency 
motion to reopen Ms. Mestichelli’s removal proceedings and to stay her deportation 
pending a hearing on the merits.  Despite the earlier agreement with Ms. Mestichelli’s 
mother to represent Ms. Mestichelli for $500 per hearing, Mr. Viladegut’s motion stated in 
both its caption and text that he was representing Ms. Mestichelli pro bono.  The 
immigration court granted the motion, and Ms. Mestichelli’s mother then paid Mr. 
Viladegut $1,500 for the three hearings that Mr. Viladegut anticipated would occur in his 
representation of Ms. Mestichelli.  Mr. Viladegut provided Ms. Mestichelli’s mother with 
a receipt for the payment, which she subsequently lost.  
On September 26, 2016, Ms. Mestichelli was released from detention, and a master 
calendar hearing was scheduled for October 31, 2016.  In mid-October, Ms. Mestichelli 
and her mother met with Mr. Viladegut to discuss Ms. Mestichelli’s case.  Mr. Viladegut 
agreed to file an asylum application on behalf of Ms. Mestichelli, as well as custody and 
visa applications for DM.  He stated that these services would cost $7,000 plus costs and 
that Ms. Mestichelli could pay in installments.  The hearing judge found that, as with the 
earlier agreement with Ms. Mestichelli’s mother, Mr. Viladegut did not memorialize the 
terms of this agreement in a retainer agreement or other writing.  
 
5 Ms. Mestichelli’s husband withdrew the kidnapping report on August 25, 2016.  
Mr. Viladegut confirmed that fact by calling Interpol on August 26, 2016.  
6 
 
On October 31, 2016, Ms. Mestichelli and her family paid Mr. Viladegut $1,500.6  
That same day, Mr. Viladegut and Ms. Mestichelli were scheduled to appear before the 
immigration court for the master calendar hearing.  Immediately prior to the hearing, Mr. 
Viladegut asked Ms. Mestichelli to sign an asylum application, which he then submitted to 
the court.  Ms. Mestichelli did not have an opportunity to review the application before its 
submission.  Upon reviewing it a few days later, she noted numerous errors, including that 
it listed her last name and address incorrectly and that it indicated she was from Guatemala 
instead of Honduras. 
At the October 31, 2016, master hearing, Mr. Viladegut informed the immigration 
court that he would file a petition for special immigrant juvenile status (“SIJS”)7 on DM’s 
behalf in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.  The hearing judge found that Mr. 
Viladegut never filed an SIJS petition on DM’s behalf. 
In January 2017, Ms. Mestichelli and her parents met with Mr. Viladegut to discuss 
whether Ms. Mestichelli could apply for a work visa.  Mr. Viladegut asked Ms. Mestichelli 
to sign a blank application, which he said he would fill in later.    
 
6 Thereafter they made monthly payments of $200 to Mr. Viladegut.   
7 Special immigrant juvenile status is an immigration classification designed to 
provide “humanitarian protection for abused, neglected, or abandoned child immigrants.”  
Romero v. Perez, 463 Md. 182, 187-89 (2019).  An application for such status involves two 
primary steps:  (1) an order from a state juvenile court that makes certain findings 
concerning the child’s eligibility for such status and (2) a petition to the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services that includes the state court order and other 
supporting documentation.  Id. 
7 
 
On February 4, 2017, Ms. Mestichelli and her parents met with Mr. Viladegut again.  
By this time, Ms. Mestichelli had become pregnant.  Mr. Viladegut asked the parents to 
leave the room.  According to Ms. Mestichelli, he then touched her in an inappropriate 
manner and stated that the pregnancy “decimated” her case but that he would give her a 
second chance.  
Ms. Mestichelli’s next hearing in immigration court was scheduled for April 10, 
2017, and as that date approached, she called Mr. Viladegut to prepare.  Mr. Viladegut told 
her he was unable to meet due to his own parents’ medical issues.  Mr. Viladegut failed to 
inform Ms. Mestichelli that her hearing had in fact been postponed until April 17, 2018 – 
a fact that she discovered when she called the immigration court.  
In June 2017, Ms. Mestichelli met with Mr. Viladegut concerning DM’s SIJS 
petition.  Mr. Viladegut told Ms. Mestichelli that he would charge $2,000 for that petition 
and visa application, and she paid him $165 at that time.  Ms. Mestichelli asked Mr. 
Viladegut for a copy of DM’s SIJS petition.  Mr. Viladegut responded that he would need 
to obtain a copy from the court.  
The hearing judge found that Mr. Viladegut misled Ms. Mestichelli about the status 
of DM’s SIJS petition until the end of July 2017, when Ms. Mestichelli independently 
determined that Mr. Viladegut had not submitted the SIJS petition.  She then asked Mr. 
Viladegut for an accounting of work performed on her behalf.  Mr. Viladegut failed to 
provide any accounting.  
On August 3, 2017, Ms. Mestichelli terminated Mr. Viladegut as her attorney.  She 
retained successor counsel on October 3, 2017.  In December 2017, Ms. Mestichelli 
8 
 
repeatedly asked Mr. Viladegut for papers related to her case.  Mr. Viladegut responded by 
telling Ms. Mestichelli to contact his secretary, who told Ms. Mestichelli that they could 
not find her file.  When Ms. Mestichelli again tried to reached Mr. Viladegut, he failed to 
respond.   
The hearing judge found that Ms. Mestichelli and her family paid Mr. Viladegut a 
total of $4,315 and that he failed to deposit or maintain those funds in an attorney trust 
account until earned.  
3. 
Representation of AB 
On June 16, 2015, 17-year-old AB entered the United States through Texas, having 
left El Salvador to join her mother who lived in Maryland.  AB was apprehended by 
immigration agents in Texas and placed in removal proceedings.  While those removal 
proceedings were pending, AB was released on August 18, 2015, and sent to Maryland to 
live with her mother.  Before being released, AB sought to have her removal proceedings 
transferred from an immigration court in Texas to one in Baltimore.   
Approximately a week after AB arrived in Maryland, AB’s mother met with Mr. 
Viladegut regarding her daughter’s case.  Mr. Viladegut agreed to represent AB in her 
immigration case.  AB’s mother paid Mr. Viladegut $50 in cash and signed a retainer 
agreement.  Mr. Viladegut did not provide AB’s mother with a copy of the agreement.  
Despite AB’s motion to transfer her case to Maryland, on August 27, 2015, the 
immigration court in Texas issued a notice for AB to appear for a master calendar hearing 
on September 8, 2015.  AB never received this notice because it listed her address 
incorrectly.  The hearing judge found that, despite having agreed to represent AB in the 
9 
 
matter, Mr. Viladegut had not entered his appearance in her immigration case or attempted 
to determine its status during the intervening two months.  As a result, neither AB nor Mr. 
Viladegut attended the September 8 hearing.  The immigration court ordered AB’s 
removal, which she received notice of on September 11, 2015.  
Later in September 2015, AB’s mother met with Mr. Viladegut regarding AB’s 
removal order.  AB’s mother paid Mr. Viladegut another $500.  Mr. Viladegut told AB’s 
mother that he would appeal the immigration court’s removal order and the underlying 
determination that AB should be deported.  On January 8, 2016, Mr. Viladegut attempted 
to file with the immigration court a notice of appearance and emergency motion to reopen 
AB’s removal proceedings and to stay her deportation pending a hearing on the merits.  
The immigration court rejected the filing.  In a form notice sent to Mr. Viladegut 
identifying the deficiency that resulted in the rejection of his filing, the immigration court 
had checked a box stating: “Please review practice manual.  Require current E-28, include 
party address.  E-28 exhibit.”  The hearing judge found that Mr. Viladegut failed to take 
any action to amend and re-file the emergency motion for approximately two months.   
On March 15, 2016, Mr. Viladegut refiled with the immigration court in Texas his 
notice of appearance form and emergency motion to reopen AB’s removal proceedings and 
stay her deportation pending a hearing on the merits.  Despite already having received $550 
for representing AB, Mr. Viladegut’s motion noted in both its caption and text that he was 
representing AB pro bono.  The hearing judge found that this statement in the motion was 
knowingly and intentionally false.   
 
 
10 
 
The immigration court granted the motion and set a master calendar hearing in AB’s 
case for May 25, 2016.  The hearing judge found that Mr. Viladegut did not advise AB of 
the new hearing date.  Sometime prior to the May 25 hearing, Mr. Viladegut filed an 
emergency motion to change the venue from Texas to Maryland.  That filing was not 
received by the immigration court until the day of the May 25 hearing.  It also erroneously 
listed what apparently was the name of a different client and included an incorrect address 
for AB.  The hearing judge found that Mr. Viladegut failed to tell AB that he had filed the 
motion or that it contained errors.  Mr. Viladegut did not attend the May 25 hearing.  
Without ruling on the motion to change venue, the Texas immigration court ordered AB’s 
removal for a second time.  The hearing judge found that Mr. Viladegut failed to advise 
AB or her mother of this removal order. 
On July 13, 2016, the immigration court rejected the motion to change venue.  The 
form deficiency notice stated: “Please review the practice manual.  This case was 
transferred to Houston Immigration Court.”  Sometime later in July, Mr. Viladegut’s 
assistant called AB’s mother and asked that she make an additional payment towards Mr. 
Viladegut’s fees.  AB’s mother paid another $400 and requested an update on AB’s case.  
Mr. Viladegut responded that “all was well.”  Between August 26, 2016, and January 25, 
2017, AB’s mother repeatedly texted Mr. Viladegut for updates on AB’s case.  Mr. 
Viladegut provided neither AB nor her mother with any substantive information regarding 
AB’s case. 
In December 2017, AB’s mother retained successor counsel for AB, and learned, 
for the first time, that AB’s removal had been ordered for a second time in May 2016.  After 
11 
 
retaining new counsel for AB, her mother wrote Mr. Viladegut on December 5, 2017, to 
inform him of successor counsel and requested a copy of AB’s file.  Successor counsel also 
wrote to Mr. Viladegut, requesting a copy of AB’s file as well as an explanation as to why 
AB was ordered removed in May 2016.  The hearing judge found that Mr. Viladegut did 
not respond to the requests for AB’s file or otherwise take any action on AB’s case after 
filing the emergency motion to change venue in 2016.  Successor counsel eventually had 
to file a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request with U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services to obtain a copy of AB’s file.  
4. 
Representation of the Garay Family 
In 2005, Ana Ramona Garay entered the United States, having left El Salvador and 
traveled to Maryland.  At the time, Ms. Garay left her 10-year-old daughter, SG, and seven-
year-old son, AG, with their aunt in El Salvador.  In 2013, SG entered the United States, 
was apprehended by immigration agents, and was later released and joined her mother in 
Maryland.  Sometime after SG entered the United States, AG followed, was apprehended 
by immigration agents, and was also released to join his mother and sister in Maryland.  
On November 24, 2014, Ms. Garay and SG appeared before the immigration court 
in Baltimore for a master calendar hearing.  SG requested a continuance to obtain counsel, 
and the court continued the hearing to March 25, 2015.  At that time, Ms. Garay was 
introduced to Mr. Viladegut.  Approximately one week later, Ms. Garay met with Mr. 
Viladegut to discuss her children’s cases.  Mr. Viladegut told Ms. Garay that SG and AG 
qualified for SIJS.  Ms. Garay retained Mr. Viladegut to represent SG and AG and paid 
12 
 
him $1,000 to begin work on their cases.  The terms of Mr. Viladegut’s representation were 
not memorialized in a retainer agreement or other writing.   
On March 25, 2015, Ms. Garay paid Mr. Viladegut an additional $1,000.  That same 
day, Ms. Garay, SG, AG, and Mr. Viladegut appeared before the immigration court for a 
master calendar hearing.  Mr. Viladegut told the court he intended to file SIJS petitions for 
SG and AG during the following week.  The immigration court originally scheduled a 
status hearing for July 15, 2015, but later continued it to July 20, 2015.  Mr. Viladegut did 
not file SG and AG’s SIJS petitions in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County until the 
day of the status hearing in immigration court – July 20, 2015.  
On July 20, 2015, Ms. Garay and Mr. Viladegut appeared before the immigration 
court for the status hearing.  Mr. Viladegut told the immigration court he had just “re-filed” 
the SIJS petitions because there were some issues with the “documentation.”  The 
immigration court scheduled another status hearing for February 18, 2016.  After the 
hearing, Ms. Garay paid Mr. Viladegut another $1,000.  
The hearing judge found that there was no evidence to support Mr. Viladegut’s 
statement to the immigration court on July 20, 2015 that he had previously filed the SIJS 
petitions in State court.  The hearing judge also found that Mr. Viladegut’s statements to 
the immigration court were knowingly false and intentionally misleading to conceal Mr. 
Viladegut’s neglect in filing the SIJS petitions.   
Later in 2015, Ms. Garay and AG met with Mr. Viladegut in his office.  Mr. 
Viladegut told Ms. Garay that her children’s cases were advancing.  Ms. Garay paid Mr. 
Viladegut another $1,000. 
13 
 
On November 23, 2015, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County issued a Notice 
of Contemplated Dismissal of SG and AG’s SIJS petitions pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-
507 for lack of prosecution.  On December 18, 2015, Mr. Viladegut moved to defer the 
dismissal.  The court granted that motion on January 12, 2016.   
In late 2015, Ms. Garay made numerous attempts to contact Mr. Viladegut.  Mr. 
Viladegut failed to respond.  When Ms. Garay went to Mr. Viladegut’s office to get an 
update, Mr. Viladegut said that he had filed the necessary paperwork for SG and AG’s SIJS 
petitions, and he requested another payment.  Ms. Garay paid him another $500.  
Mr. Viladegut requested a continuance of the February 18, 2016 status hearing due 
to illness.  The immigration court granted the request and continued the matter to a master 
calendar hearing on January 19, 2017.  In the meantime, on May 19, 2016, the Circuit Court 
for Montgomery County dismissed SG and AG’s SIJS petitions, without prejudice, for lack 
of prosecution.  
The hearing judge found that Mr. Viladegut failed to notify Ms. Garay of the 
dismissal of the SIJS cases.  Mr. Viladegut moved to vacate the dismissal.  That motion 
was granted by the Circuit Court on July 7, 2016.  The hearing judge found that, despite 
the reinstatement of SG and AG’s SIJS petitions, Mr. Viladegut failed to take any action.   
On November 14, 2016, the Circuit Court again dismissed the SIJS petitions, 
without prejudice, for lack of prosecution.  The hearing judge found that Mr. Viladegut did 
not notify Ms. Garay of that second dismissal or move to vacate it.  
On January 19, 2017, Ms. Garay and Mr. Viladegut appeared before the 
immigration court for a master calendar hearing.  During the hearing, Mr. Viladegut told 
14 
 
the immigration court he had not yet received a hearing date from the Circuit Court for SG 
and AG’s SIJS petitions which, in fact, the Circuit Court had dismissed two months earlier.  
The immigration court scheduled another status hearing for November 28, 2017.  On the 
day of the January 19 hearing, Ms. Garay paid Mr. Viladegut another $1,000.  
On November 28, 2017, Mr. Viladegut appeared before the immigration court for 
the status hearing and again told the court that SG and AG’s SIJS petitions were still 
pending in State court.  Thereafter, Ms. Garay periodically tried to contact Mr. Viladegut 
about the status of SG and AG’s SIJS petitions.  Mr. Viladegut failed to respond.  When 
Ms. Garay went to Mr. Viladegut’s office to get an update, she learned that his office had 
moved to another location.   
In April 2018, Ms. Garay retained successor counsel, who wrote to Mr. Viladegut 
requesting SG and AG’s files.  Mr. Viladegut did not respond.   
The hearing judge found that, in total, Ms. Garay paid Mr. Viladegut $5,5008 and 
that he failed to deposit or maintain those funds in an attorney trust account until earned.  
The hearing judge also found that Mr. Viladegut failed to provide Ms. Garay with an 
invoice for his services or otherwise to account for his time.  
5. 
Representation of Carlos Arturo Garcia Lemus 
On May 1, 2006, Carlos Arturo Garcia Lemus entered the United States through 
Texas, having left El Salvador to join his family in Maryland.  On or about June 29, 2018, 
 
8 Although the record supports the hearing judge’s findings as to the total amount 
paid to Mr. Viladegut by Ms. Garay, there appear to be some discrepancies as to the precise 
dates on which those payments were paid.  
15 
 
Mr. Lemus was arrested in Maryland and charged with driving on a suspended license.  
Because of his immigration status, he was detained and placed in removal proceedings.  
Mr. Lemus was scheduled for a hearing before the immigration court on August 27, 2018.  
In July 2018, Mr. Lemus’ wife retained Mr. Viladegut to represent her husband in 
his immigration case.  Mr. Viladegut told Mr. Lemus’ wife that he would file an asylum 
application on her husband’s behalf, based on Mr. Lemus’ fear of returning to El Salvador.  
During the course of her interactions with Mr. Viladegut, Mr. Lemus’ wife paid him a total 
of $1,200 to represent her husband.  Mr. Viladegut filed an asylum application on behalf 
of Mr. Lemus in August 2018, and the immigration court scheduled a hearing on the 
application for December 3, 2018.  
Between July and September 2018, Mr. Lemus’ wife called and texted Mr. 
Viladegut on numerous occasions asking for updates on her husband’s case.  Mr. Viladegut 
responded by text stating, among other things, that “all is going well” or “the case is moving 
forward.”  Mr. Viladegut also dissuaded her from calling him, telling her “please don’t call 
me unless it’s an emergency.”  
Frustrated with Mr. Viladegut’s failure to respond to her requests for information, 
Mr. Lemus’ wife retained successor counsel on October 5, 2018, to represent her husband.  
On October 17, 2018, with the assistance of successor counsel, Mr. Lemus’ wife wrote to 
Mr. Viladegut asking for her husband’s file and the return of any unused portion of the 
$1,200 she had paid him.  Mr. Viladegut did not respond.  Successor counsel eventually 
had to file a FOIA request with the Executive Office for Immigration Review to obtain a 
copy of Mr. Lemus’ file.  Successor counsel did not obtain a copy of Mr. Lemus’ file until 
16 
 
early December 2018, just before the December 3, 2018 hearing.  Mr. Lemus’ asylum 
application was denied, he was ordered removed, and he was deported to El Salvador on 
January 7, 2019.  
6. 
Mr. Viladegut Fails to Respond to Bar Counsel’s Inquiries 
Complaint by Ms. Mestichelli 
Ms. Mestichelli filed a complaint concerning Mr. Viladegut with Bar Counsel on 
February 14, 2018.  On February 22, 2018, Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Viladegut and 
requested a response by March 15, 2018.  The hearing judge found that Mr. Viladegut 
failed to respond either to that letter or to three follow-up letters sent on April 5, May 30, 
and June 18, 2018.  
On June 28, 2018, an investigator for Bar Counsel attempted to hand deliver copies 
of Bar Counsel’s prior letters concerning the Mestichelli complaint to Mr. Viladegut at his 
home.  The investigator spoke with Mr. Viladegut’s father, who confirmed that Mr. 
Viladegut lived at that address and agreed to give the letters to him.  Later that day, Mr. 
Viladegut left a voicemail for the investigator and stated he had not previously received 
the letters.  He also asked for an extension of time until July 2, 2018, to respond to the 
complaint.  He did, however, provide a brief response that same day by email.  In the email 
he stated, among other things, that he had worked on Ms. Mestichelli’s case “without 
payment.”  He also stated that he planned to collect all supporting information for his 
response to the complaint by July 1, 2018.  The hearing judge found that Mr. Viladegut’s 
statement that he was working on the case without payment to be “knowingly false and 
intentionally misleading.”  Mr. Viladegut did not provide any additional information in 
17 
 
response to the Mestichelli complaint by July 2, 2018.  Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Viladegut 
three more times on July 10, August 9, and September 5, 2018, requesting further 
information.  The hearing judge found that Mr. Viladegut failed to respond to those letters. 
Complaint by AB’s Mother 
AB’s mother filed a complaint concerning Mr. Viladegut with Bar Counsel on June 
29, 2018.  On July 13, 2018, Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Viladegut and requested a response 
to the complaint by July 26, 2018.  The hearing judge found that Mr. Viladegut failed to 
respond either to that letter or to two follow-up letters sent on August 22 and September 
28, 2018.  
Complaint by Ms. Garay 
Ms. Garay filed a complaint concerning Mr. Viladegut with Bar Counsel on July 9, 
2018.  On July 18, 2018, Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Viladegut and requested a written 
response to the complaint by August 1, 2018.  The hearing judge found that Mr. Viladegut 
failed to respond either to that letter or to two follow-up letters sent on August 20 and 
September 28, 2018.   
Acknowledgment of Complaints and Failure to Respond 
On November 11, 2018, an investigator for Bar Counsel delivered copies of Bar 
Counsel’s letters regarding the complaints filed by Ms. Mestichelli, AB’s mother, and Ms. 
Garay to Mr. Viladegut at his home.  Mr. Viladegut responded by email, asking for an 
extension of time to respond until December 18, 2018.  The hearing judge found that Mr. 
Viladegut did not thereafter respond to any of the complaints.  
 
18 
 
Complaint by Mr. Lemus’ Wife 
Mr. Lemus’ wife filed a complaint concerning Mr. Viladegut with Bar Counsel on 
October 29, 2018.  On November 2, 2018, Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Viladegut and 
requested a written response no later than November 21, 2018.  The hearing judge found 
that Mr. Viladegut failed to respond to that letter as well as two follow-up letters sent on 
January 2 and April 19, 2019.   
On June 25, 2019, an investigator for Bar Counsel spoke with Mr. Viladegut by 
phone.  Mr. Viladegut said he could not recall if he had received Bar Counsel’s prior letters.  
The investigator emailed the complaint of Mr. Lemus’ wife as well as Bar Counsel’s prior 
letters to Mr. Viladegut.  Mr. Viladegut said he would respond to Bar Counsel by July 5, 
2019.  The hearing judge found that Mr. Viladegut failed to respond.   
II 
Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
 
The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Viladegut had committed all of the alleged 
violations pursued by Bar Counsel.9  Neither Bar Counsel nor Mr. Viladegut excepted to 
these conclusions.  We review the hearing judge’s conclusions de novo.  Maryland Rule 
19-741(b)(1).   
 
 
 
9 As noted earlier, Bar Counsel withdrew the alleged violation of former Maryland 
Rule 16-606.1 (attorney trust account recordkeeping).   
19 
 
 
Failing to Meet Basic Standards of Representation 
 
The rules of professional conduct require a lawyer to:  provide competent 
representation – i.e., apply the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation (Rule 1.1); abide by direction received from 
the client (Rule 1.2); act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing the 
client (Rule 1.3); and ensure that the client is reasonably informed about the status of the 
matter, comply with the client’s reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter 
to the extent reasonably necessary for the client to make informed decisions (Rule 1.4).  
Conduct that violates one of these rules almost inevitably violates one or more of the others.  
Mr. Viladegut violated all four of these rules in his representation of Ms. Mestichelli and 
DM, AB, SG and AG, and Mr. Lemus. 
Mr. Viladegut violated Rule 1.1 by failing to keep his clients notified of their court 
dates, failing to appear on their behalf, and failing to adequately pursue the appropriate 
relief.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Aita, 458 Md. 101, 132 (2018); see also Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Gage-Cohen, 440 Md. 191, 197 (2014) (holding that an attorney, 
even if knowledgeable, provides “incompetent representation if [the attorney] is not 
thorough or is unprepared”).   
Mr. Viladegut failed to keep Ms. Mestichelli apprised of the status of her and DM’s 
case, including court dates, and either failed to pursue relief altogether (in the case of DM’s 
SIJS petition) or pursued it with insufficient thoroughness or preparation (in the case of 
Ms. Mestichelli’s error-ridden asylum application).  He also failed to appear on AB’s 
behalf at the master calendar hearings on September 8, 2015, and May 25, 2016 – absences 
20 
 
that resulted in the immigration court ordering AB’s removal.  He failed to inform AB or 
her mother that AB had been ordered removed from the country the second time.  He also 
delayed filing SG and AG’s SIJS petitions in State court and failed to pursue them in a 
timely manner – dilatory conduct that resulted in their cases being dismissed by the Circuit 
Court.  Further, he failed to inform Ms. Garay of the status of those petitions at any time.  
Lastly, after Mr. Lemus’ wife retained him for her husband’s immigration case, Mr. 
Viladegut failed to advance the case and deflected her inquiries about its progress with 
vague and inaccurate assurances. 
Mr. Viladegut violated Rule 1.2 through much of the same conduct.  Despite 
agreeing to pursue various avenues of relief that were the objectives of his representation 
of these clients, he failed to do so or to consult with the clients as to other options. 
Mr. Viladegut violated Rule 1.3 by failing to make meaningful efforts to advance 
the cases of any of these clients.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. De La Paz, 418 Md. 534, 
554 (2011) (an attorney violates Rule 1.3 if the attorney does “nothing whatsoever to 
advance the client’s cause or endeavor”).  The record reflects multiple instances in which 
Mr. Viladegut failed to act for his client altogether, filed papers with erroneous 
information, or made filings that effectively did little or nothing to advance the client’s 
case. 
Mr. Viladegut violated Rule 1.4 by failing to adequately communicate with his 
clients and keep them informed of the status of their cases, even when they made repeated 
efforts to contact him.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kwarteng, 411 Md. 652, 658 
(2009).  Mr. Viladegut failed to relay negative developments in Ms. Mestichelli’s, AB’s, 
21 
 
and SG and AG’s cases, and thereby prevented the clients from making informed decisions 
about how to pursue their cases.  The failure to communicate with Mr. Lemus’ wife, or the 
successor counsel she retained for her husband, despite their numerous attempts to contact 
him, impeded Mr. Lemus’ efforts to remain in the United States and contributed to the 
ultimate decision to deport him. 
 
Violation Related to Termination of Representation 
Rule 1.16(d) requires a lawyer to protect a client’s interests when terminating 
representation.  It provides: 
(d)  Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the 
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as 
giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of 
other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is 
entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has 
not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to 
the client to the extent permitted by other law. 
 
An attorney violates Rule 1.16(d) when the attorney abandons representation of a client, 
fails to return records, and refuses to communicate with the client or successor counsel.  
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Logan, 390 Md. 313, 318-19 (2005).  Mr. Viladegut 
violated Rule 1.16(d) in his representation of Ms. Mestichelli and DM, AB, SG and AG, 
and Mr. Lemus.  Although Mr. Viladegut did not explicitly terminate his representation of 
any of these clients, he effectively abandoned each of them by ceasing to respond to their 
inquiries or to pursue their cases.  In addition, he did not respond to successor counsel’s 
requests for records or communicate generally with the clients or their successor counsel 
after abandoning the clients.  
22 
 
 
 
Mishandling Money Matters 
Mr. Viladegut violated the rules of professional conduct, both in the amount of fees 
charged and in the disposition of the fee payments that he received. 
Rule 1.5(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] lawyer shall not make an agreement 
for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.”  The 
reasonableness of a fee is not measured solely at the outset of the representation; indeed, 
an otherwise reasonable fee can become unreasonable if the lawyer fails to earn it.  Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Garrett, 427 Md. 209, 224 (2012) (an otherwise reasonable fee 
became unreasonable because of the attorney’s neglect of the client’s matter and 
abandonment of the client’s representation); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Patterson, 421 
Md. 708, 732 (2011) (an otherwise reasonable fee became unreasonable because of the 
attorney’s lack of competence and diligence in representing the client).  
Mr. Viladegut violated Rule 1.5(a) in his representation of Ms. Mestichelli and DM, 
AB, SG and AG, and Mr. Lemus.  As discussed above, Mr. Viladegut did not act with 
competence and diligence in representing these clients, misled them as to the status of their 
cases, and effectively abandoned them.  The fees that Mr. Viladegut charged and received 
for each matter, whether or not they were reasonable for the representation he promised, 
became unreasonable when Mr. Viladegut failed to earn them by neglecting to perform the 
work necessary to advance the cases of those clients.  
Rule 1.15(a) requires, in pertinent part, that a lawyer “hold property of clients or 
third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate 
23 
 
from the lawyer’s own property.”  In particular, the rule requires that funds be kept in an 
attorney trust account.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hamilton, 444 Md. 163, 188 
(2015).  Rule 1.15(d) further requires that “a lawyer shall deliver promptly to the client … 
any funds or other property that the client … is entitled to receive and, upon request by the 
client …, shall render promptly a full accounting regarding such property.” 
Mr. Viladegut violated Rule 1.15 in his representation of Ms. Mestichelli and DM, 
AB, SG and AG, and Mr. Lemus.  He failed to deposit and maintain funds for any of these 
clients in an attorney trust account until earned.  He also failed to provide an invoice for 
his services or otherwise account for these funds.  He did not respond to requests for the 
return of unearned portions of those funds and thus improperly retained those funds. 
 
Lack of Candor and Truthfulness with Bar Counsel and Others 
 
Mr. Viladegut violated several rules that prohibit lawyers from making statements 
or engaging in conduct involving falsehoods or deceit. 
 
Rule 3.3 provides that “[a]n attorney shall not knowingly … make a false statement 
of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law 
previously made to a tribunal by the attorney.” 
 
Mr. Viladegut violated Rule 3.3 in his representation of Ms. Mestichelli and DM, 
AB, and SG and AG.  Mr. Viladegut’s filings in his representation of Ms. Mestichelli and 
DM, as well as in his representation of AB, indicated that he was representing those clients 
pro bono, even though he had already accepted fees in both of those cases.  He thus made 
false statements to the immigration court in those cases.  He also told the immigration court 
in SG and AG’s cases that their SIJS petitions had been “re-filed” in State court at a time 
24 
 
when in fact the petitions were filed for the first time that same day.  Further, he 
misrepresented to the immigration court, on two later occasions, that the SIJS petitions 
were pending or awaiting a hearing date, when in fact they had been dismissed. 
 
Rule 8.1 provides that “an attorney … in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall 
not … (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or (b) … knowingly fail to 
respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority 
….”  Failure to respond to an inquiry in a timely manner may violate the rule.  See Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Butler, 441 Md. 352 (2015) (attorney violated Rule 8.1(b) by failing 
to respond to Bar Counsel for two months).   
 
Mr. Viladegut violated Rule 8.1 with respect to Bar Counsel’s inquiries about all of 
the complaints filed by his former clients or their family members.  Bar Counsel wrote to 
Mr. Viladegut on at least 15 separate occasions requesting information regarding those 
complaints.  Mr. Viladegut either failed to respond to these requests altogether or 
responded without providing any significant information.  Mr. Viladegut also told Bar 
Counsel that he was representing Ms. Mestichelli “without payment,” which the hearing 
judge found to be knowingly false and intentionally misleading. 
 
Rule 8.4(c) provides that “[i]t is professional misconduct for an attorney to … 
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”  Mr. Viladegut 
violated Rule 8.4(c) in his representation of Ms. Mestichelli and DM, AB, SG and AG, and 
Mr. Lemus.  The false statements discussed above that violated Rule 3.3 and Rule 8.1 also 
violated Rule 8.4(c).  In addition, the retention of unearned fees in many of these cases was 
a violation of Rule 8.4(c).  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 502-
25 
 
3 (2002).  Finally, Mr. Viladegut also engaged in dishonest conduct when he told Ms. 
Mestichelli that he would have to obtain a copy of DM’s SIJS petition from the court when 
he had not filed such a petition and when he assured AB’s mother that “all was well” with 
AB’s case when in fact the immigration court had ordered AB to be removed from the 
country. 
 
General Violations 
Rule 8.4(a) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate a rule 
of professional conduct.  Rule 8.4(d) provides that it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” 
 
As indicated above, Mr. Viladegut violated several other rules of professional 
conduct.  No further discussion is necessary to conclude that he violated Rule 8.4(a).   
Mr. Viladegut violated Rule 8.4(d) in that his misconduct adversely affected the 
administration of justice in the immigration court and impaired public confidence in the 
legal system.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Riely, 471 Md. 458, 499 (2020) (misconduct 
is prejudicial to the administration of justice when it adversely affects the actual operation 
of the legal system); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Agbaje, 438 Md. 695, 717 (2014) 
(conduct that impairs public confidence in the legal system is conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice).   
Mr. Viladegut’s failure to diligently pursue his clients’ immigration matters and 
protect their interests resulted in multiple continuances, imperiled successor counsel’s 
efforts to rectify his mistakes and, in the case of Mr. Lemus, may have contributed to Mr. 
Lemus’ deportation.  In addition, Mr. Viladegut’s conduct towards his clients, various 
26 
 
tribunals, and the grievance process has the potential to impair public confidence in the 
legal system, which is also prejudicial to the administration of justice.10   
III 
Sanction 
 
As this Court has frequently stated, the sanction in an attorney disciplinary 
proceeding is intended to protect the public from an attorney who fails to satisfy standards 
of professional conduct, to deter similar misconduct by other attorneys, and to maintain 
public confidence in the legal system.  In devising the appropriate sanction, we consider 
not only the misconduct itself, but also any aggravating or mitigating factors present in the 
particular case.  In doing so, we refer to a list of factors identified by the American Bar 
Association.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Blatt, 463 Md. 679, 707-8 n.19 (2019) 
(listing aggravating and mitigating factors). 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
The hearing judge found that seven aggravating factors were proved by clear and 
convincing evidence:  selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple violations, bad faith 
obstruction, failure to acknowledge the wrongfulness of conduct, failure to make 
restitution, and vulnerable victims.  Those findings are amply supported by the record.   
A selfish motive was established by the fact that Mr. Viladegut accepted fees he did 
not earn, failed to return unearned fees, made knowing and intentional misrepresentations 
 
10 Although the hearing judge did not relate his finding of inappropriate physical 
contact by Mr. Viladegut with Ms. Mestichelli specifically to the violation of this rule, in 
our view, that incident also supports the finding of a violation of Rule 8.4(d). 
27 
 
to the clients and their family members regarding the status of their cases, and abandoned 
his clients and their cases.  He also engaged in a pattern of misconduct because he 
mishandled funds, made misrepresentations, and abandoned clients in several different 
matters.  Inevitably, that misconduct involved multiple violations of the rules of 
professional conduct with respect to each client.  He also failed to make restitution to any 
of his clients. 
Mr. Viladegut also engaged in bad faith obstruction of Bar Counsel’s investigation 
by ignoring numerous requests for information and, when he did communicate with Bar 
Counsel, by requesting an extension of time and promising a response that never came.  He 
never acknowledged the wrongfulness of his conduct to either his clients or Bar Counsel. 
Each of Mr. Viladegut’s clients was a vulnerable victim.  Each was at risk of 
removal from the United States, and thus a member of a marginalized group that may suffer 
severe consequences from attorney misconduct.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Landeo, 
446 Md. 294, 352-53 (2016). 
Mr. Viladegut bore the burden of proving any mitigating factors by a preponderance 
of the evidence.  Maryland Rule 19-727(c).  He did not participate in these proceedings 
and thus did not offer, much less prove, any mitigating factors.  However, absence of a 
prior disciplinary record is a mitigating factor – a mirror image of the aggravating factor 
of prior disciplinary offenses.  Given the absence of any evidence that Mr. Viladegut had 
incurred prior discipline, the hearing judge appropriately credited him with the mitigating 
factor, as do we.   
 
28 
 
Discussion  
 
It is evident from the record of this case that a sanction of disbarment is necessary 
to protect other potential clients – especially vulnerable immigration clients – from the 
same neglect and mishandling of their cases, misappropriation of fees paid, and failure to 
cooperate with successor counsel.  We hope that such a sanction will deter similar 
misconduct by other attorneys who may be called upon to represent similar clients. 
Disbarment – the most serious sanction we can impose – is also necessary to protect 
public confidence in the legal system.  Mr. Viladegut repeatedly made intentional 
misrepresentations to courts, clients, and Bar Counsel – a pattern of misconduct that cannot 
be countenanced if the legal system is to function properly.   
We have disbarred attorneys for similar misconduct in the past.  E.g., Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Blair, 44 Md. 387 (2014) (disbarring attorney who abandoned client, 
retained unearned fees, and failed to participate in grievance proceedings); Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Kaufman, 446 Md. 404 (2019) (disbarring attorney who abandoned 
client and failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s requests for information).   
For the reasons set forth above, we disbarred Mr. Viladegut. 
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here:  
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/coa/54a19agcn.pdf