Case Title: King v. Industrial Comm'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87099

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 87099-Agenda 36-September 1999.
JOE W. KING, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (R.R. 
Donnelly, Appellee).
Opinion filed January 21, 2000.
JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
This appeal involves the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 
et seq. (West 1996)). The narrow question presented is whether a 
claimant who has been awarded permanent total disability under section 8(f) of 
the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(f) (West 1996)) may later be required to submit to an 
employer-requested medical examination under section 12 of the Act (820 ILCS 
305/12 (West 1996)), even where the employer has not filed a petition seeking to 
modify the claimant's benefits pursuant to section 8(f) or 19(h) of the Act (820 
ILCS 305/19(h) (West 1996)). We answer in the affirmative.
BACKGROUND
Claimant, Joe W. King, sought an adjustment of claim for a shoulder injury 
that he sustained in 1986 while employed by respondent, R.R. Donnelly 
(employer). The arbitrator awarded claimant temporary total disability for 154 
2/7 weeks and permanent total disability for life (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 48, 
pars. 138.8(b), (f)). The Industrial Commission (Commission) affirmed and 
adopted the decision of the arbitrator in 1991. The Commission held that 
claimant established his permanent total disability under section 8(f) of the 
Act. The Commission determined that claimant fell within the "odd-lot" category 
because, although claimant was not altogether incapacitated for work, his 
condition was such that he will not be employed regularly in any well-known 
branch of the labor market. In making this determination, the Commission 
considered the claimant's physical impairment along with the following factors: 
that claimant was 59 years of age (in 1991); that claimant had completed the 
third grade and was functionally illiterate; and that claimant had worked as an 
unskilled laborer for employer for 17 years. The record also disclosed that 
claimant had made a diligent but unsuccessful job search and that his attempt at 
vocational rehabilitation had failed. Neither party appealed.
Years later, on April 17, 1996, employer filed with the Commission a motion 
to suspend claimant's compensation under section 12 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/12 
(West 1996)). Employer argued that claimant's compensation should be suspended 
because claimant refused to comply with its section 12 request for a medical 
examination. The Commission held a hearing on the motion. Correspondence between 
the parties showed that claimant had refused to comply with employer's request 
on the advice of counsel.
Following the hearing, the Commission denied employer's motion to suspend 
claimant's compensation for his refusal to submit to a medical exam. The 
Commission ruled that a suspension of compensation was not warranted under the 
facts of this case. The Commission explained that, because claimant had 
qualified for permanent total disability under the odd-lot doctrine, claimant's 
physical condition was not the only factor contributing to his award. Other 
factors were claimant's age and his limited education, training and work 
experience. According to the Commission, employer thus failed to prove 
sufficient grounds on which to suspend compensation. The Commission, however, 
interpreted section 12 as granting employer the right to a medical exam. It 
therefore held that section 12 required claimant to submit to a medical exam and 
ordered him to do so.
The circuit court confirmed the decision of the Commission. Claimant then 
appealed, challenging only that portion of the Commission's order requiring him 
to submit to a medical exam.
The Industrial Commission division of the appellate court initially issued a 
unanimous opinion reversing that portion of the Commission's order requiring 
claimant to submit to a medical exam. On rehearing, however, the appellate court 
withdrew that opinion and issued a new opinion affirming that portion of the 
order requiring claimant to submit to a medical exam. 301 Ill. App. 3d 958. Two 
of the five justices dissented. Subsequently, three justices of the appellate 
court filed a statement that this case involves a substantial question 
warranting the consideration of this court. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We allowed 
claimant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We now affirm 
the judgment of the appellate court, for the reasons explained below.
ANALYSIS
There is no dispute in this appeal regarding whether claimant's compensation 
should have been suspended under section 12 for his failure to submit to a 
medical exam. The Commission held that a suspension was not warranted. Employer 
waived its right to challenge this holding before the appellate court and 
likewise does so here.
This appeal concerns only the propriety of the order requiring claimant to 
submit to a medical exam. To be precise, the issue is whether claimant, who 
received an award of permanent total disability under section 8(f), may now be 
required to submit to employer's request for a medical examination under section 
12, even though employer has not filed a petition to modify claimant's benefits 
pursuant to section 8(f) or section 19(h).
Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which this court reviews 
de novo. Sun Choi v. Industrial Comm'n, 182 Ill. 2d 387, 392 
(1998). The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give 
effect to the intent of the legislature. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory 
language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Illinois Graphics Co. v. 
Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994); Kraft, Inc., 138 Ill. 2d  at 
189. Moreover, courts afford considerable deference to the interpretation placed 
on a statute by the agency charged with its administration. Denton v. Civil 
Service Comm'n, 176 Ill. 2d 144, 148 (1997); City of Decatur v. 
American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Local 268, 
122 Ill. 2d 353, 361 (1988). In light of these principles, we turn to the 
statutory provisions at issue.
Section 8(f) provides, in relevant part:
As the plain language indicates, section 8(f) sets forth a procedure for 
modifying a section 8(f) award for permanent total disability. Superior Coal 
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 321 Ill. 240, 242-44 (1926). Section 8(f) 
provides for the termination of such an award where the employee thereafter 
returns to work or is able to do so and earns or is able to earn as much as 
before the accident. Section 8(f) also provides for the reduction of such an 
award where the employee thereafter returns to work or is able to do so and 
earns or is able to earn part, but not as much, as before the accident. 
Accordingly, a section 8(f) petition for modification looks to whether the 
employee has returned to work or is able to do so and to the employee's earnings 
or ability to earn. See Keystone Steel & Wire Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 85 Ill. 2d 178 (1981); Perry Coal Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 343 Ill. 525 (1931); Superior Coal Co., 321 Ill.  at 246. 
The burden of proof is on the employer to show that the claimant's award should 
be modified pursuant to section 8(f)'s provisions. See Keystone Steel & 
Wire Co., 85 Ill. 2d  at 184; E.R. Moore Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
71 Ill. 2d 353, 363 (1978).
In contrast to section 8(f), section 19(h) grants employers the right to have 
certain compensation awards reviewed, but only within 30 months. 820 ILCS 
305/19(h) (West 1996). The remedy provided in section 8(f) is separate from the 
remedy contained in section 19(h). Superior Coal Co., 321 Ill.  at 
244.
In the present case, employer has never filed either a section 8(f) or 
section 19(h) petition. Rather, as discussed above, employer initiated this 
proceeding by filing a motion to suspend claimant's compensation under section 
12 because claimant refused to submit to a medical exam. Employer asserts that 
it is entitled to a current medical exam of claimant to determine whether 
grounds exist for a section 8(f) modification of claimant's award.
Section 12 of the Act governs medical examinations. It provides, in pertinent 
part:
Claimant contends that section 12 does not authorize the order requiring him 
to submit to a medical examination. We disagree. Given its plain and ordinary 
meaning, the language of section 12 authorizes the medical exam here at issue. 
Claimant is "[a]n employee entitled to receive disability payments" (820 ILCS 
305/12 (West 1996)), having been awarded permanent total disability for life 
pursuant to section 8(f). Claimant concedes that employer requested a section 12 
medical exam of claimant at employer's expense and at claimant's convenience. 
Accordingly, pursuant to section 12, claimant "shall be required *** to submit 
himself *** for examination *** for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of 
compensation which may be due [claimant] from time to time for disability 
according to the provisions of this Act" (820 ILCS 305/12 (West 1996)). Employer 
requested the medical exam of claimant for the purpose of ascertaining whether 
the amount of compensation owed claimant possibly may be modified pursuant to 
section 8(f) of the Act. Therefore, section 12 authorizes the order requiring 
claimant to submit to a medical exam.
Claimant, however, argues that section 12 does not authorize the order 
requiring him to submit to a medical exam because his permanent total disability 
award under section 8(f) is final. According to claimant, when section 12 refers 
to the medical exam being "for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of 
compensation which may be due the employee from time to time for disability 
according to the provisions of this Act" (820 ILCS 305/12 (West 1996)), it is 
referring only to awards that are not final, such as temporary disability 
awards. We disagree with claimant that section 12's language is limited to only 
nonfinal awards. Section 12 requires employees entitled to receive disability 
payments to submit to medical exams at the employer's request "for the purpose 
of ascertaining the amount of compensation which may be due the employee from 
time to time for disability according to the provisions of this Act" (820 ILCS 
305/12 (West 1996)). According to section 8(f) of the Act, a final section 8(f) 
award for permanent total disability is modifiable under certain circumstances. 
Thus, this quoted language from section 12 allows for a medical exam so that an 
employer can ascertain whether the amount of compensation owed a claimant 
possibly may be modified pursuant to section 8(f)'s provisions.
Claimant also submits that actual earnings are required before a section 8(f) 
award for permanent total disability may be modified pursuant to section 8(f). 
Consequently, claimant argues, a change to one's physical disability is not 
relevant to the question of whether such an award is modifiable under section 
8(f). The plain language of section 8(f) belies claimant's position. Section 
8(f) allows for the modification of a section 8(f) award for permanent total 
disability where the claimant "returns to work, or is able to do so, 
and earns or is able to earn." (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 305/8(f) 
(West 1996). A section 8(f) modification, therefore, is not limited to 
situations where the claimant has actual earnings. Rather, a section 8(f) 
modification is obtainable where the employer proves that the claimant is able 
to return to work and able to earn. A change to a claimant's physical disability 
is relevant to these determinations.
Claimant argues in the alternative that employer is not entitled to a section 
12 medical exam unless employer first files a section 8(f) petition to modify 
claimant's compensation. We reject this argument. Section 12 does not contain 
any language restricting an employer's right to a medical exam in this manner. 
We will not engraft such a restriction onto section 12. See Jackson Coal Co. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 295 Ill. 18, 20-21 (1920) (declining to read a 
restriction into section 12). We also reject claimant's assertion that requiring 
him to submit to a medical exam when no other proceeding is pending before the 
Commission serves no meaningful purpose. A medical exam may be required for an 
employer to determine whether grounds exist for filing a petition to modify a 
claimant's benefits pursuant to the terms of section 8(f).
As a final matter, claimant contends that requiring claimants to submit to 
medical exams when no other proceeding is pending would open the door to the 
harassment of claimants by employers who demand exams after awards have been 
made. Claimant fears that employers may improperly utilize section 12 in an 
attempt to cut off liability.
Of course section 12 should not be used for the improper purpose of harassing 
claimants or in a wrongful attempt to cut off a claimant's compensation. These 
mere possibilities, though, do not persuade us to disregard the plain meaning of 
the language in sections 12 and 8(f) of the Act. Section 12 authorizes medical 
exams without requiring a pending petition for modification, and section 8(f) 
allows for the modification of a section 8(f) award for permanent total 
disability where the claimant has returned to work or is able to do so and is 
earning money or has the ability to earn. A medical exam will often be the best 
method of ascertaining whether the claimant currently is able to work and able 
to earn within the meaning of section 8(f). We note, moreover, that claimant's 
fear that employers will improperly utilize section 12 in an attempt to cut off 
liability fails to acknowledge the manner in which section 12 operates. Section 
12 cannot be utilized to suspend a claimant's compensation unless the claimant 
refuses to comply with a proper request for a medical exam. 820 ILCS 305/12 
(West 1996). A claimant, therefore, can avoid a suspension of compensation under 
section 12 through compliance.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Commission's order requiring claimant to submit 
to a medical exam was proper. Accordingly, the appellate court's judgment, 
affirming the judgment of the circuit court and the decision of the Commission, 
is affirmed.
Affirmed.