Case Title: McCarthy v. Whitlock Const. and Supply

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84-211

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
McCarthy v. Whitlock Const. and Supply1986 WY 61715 P.2d 218Case Number: 84-211Decided: 03/06/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
DENNIS McCARTHY, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
WHITLOCK CONSTRUCTION AND 
SUPPLY, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, ParkCounty, John T. Dixon, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Dick L. Kahl (argued) and 
Tracy J. Copenhaver of Copenhaver & Kahl, Powell.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

James M. Guill of Goppert 
& Olson, Cody.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE,* ROONEY,** BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Retired November 1, 
1985.

** Retired November 30, 
1985. 

 
 

CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This was an action by 
appellant to recover damages for injuries suffered as a result of his tripping 
and falling into an open trench while crossing a street project being 
constructed by appellee. A verdict apportioning the comparative negligence in 
the accident, 85% to appellant and 15% to appellee, was returned by the jury. 
During the course of trial the court ruled that several exhibits offered by 
appellant as evidence of applicable safety standards in the construction 
industry were not admissible. Appellant has appealed claiming the effect of this 
ruling was to prevent him from establishing that appellee had breached the 
applicable standard of care by failing to provide adequate warnings or 
barricades for the protection of pedestrians around the construction site. Our 
review of the record has not established the asserted error as prejudicial, and 
we affirm.

 
 

[¶2.]     Appellant states the 
issues to be:

 
 
"1. The District Court 
improperly imposed a `locality' rule and a rule of local custom to exclude 
testimony concerning industry safety standards.

 
 
"2. The District Court 
improperly excluded evidence of industry safety codes and standards promulgated 
by the construction industry, the federal government and the National Safety 
Council in that such standards and codes contained material, relevant and 
competent evidence of proper safety management of construction 
site."

 
 
Our discussion will be 
confined to the second issue which we deem to be determinative of the 
appeal.

 
 

[¶3.]     Dennis McCarthy, 
appellant, was employed as a journalism instructor during the fall semester of 
1982 at NorthwestCommunity College in Powell, Wyoming. On September 9, 1982, appellant was 
crossing Seventh 
Street which bisected the campus on his way from his 
office to the administration building when he fell and was 
injured.

 
 

[¶4.]     At the time appellant 
was injured, Seventh 
Street was in the process of being reconstructed by 
appellee, Whitlock Construction and Supply. While school was in session the 
campus was occupied by approximately 2,000 students, faculty and staff members 
who were frequently required to cross the construction site due to its central 
location. The project called for appellee to perform site preparation and 
grading prior to repaving, including installing curbs, gutters, lighting, and an 
irrigation system for pedestrian islands called for by the plans. At the time of 
appellant's injury, appellee had dug trenches which were approximately two feet 
wide and two feet deep to install electrical and irrigation systems. These 
trenches were bordered by a series of stakes with string running between at a 
height of approximately six inches off the ground. It was appellant's theory 
that he had tripped over the stakes and string falling into the open trench. Two 
plywood crosswalks over these trenches had been installed by appellee; however, 
these were not used by appellant at the time of the accident. Other than 
providing the two crossings over the trenches, appellee took no additional 
precautions to direct pedestrian traffic through the construction 
site.

 
 

[¶5.]     A complaint alleging 
appellant was injured as a result of appellee's negligence in failing to provide 
adequate warnings or notice of its placement of the stakes and string near the 
trenches was filed on April 18, 1983. In its answer, appellee denied any 
negligence and asserted appellant's own comparative negligence as a defense. The 
matter was tried before a jury beginning on June 21, 1984. The jury returned a 
verdict in favor of appellee on June 26, 1984, allocating the percentages of 
negligence at 85% for appellant and 15% for appellee. Judgment on the verdict 
was entered July 17, 1984. From this judgment appellant 
appeals.

 
 

[¶6.]     At trial appellant 
sought to introduce excerpts from safety manuals published by the Federal 
Highway Administration, the National Safety Council, and the Associated General 
Contractors of America as exhibits during the 
testimony of his expert witness. These documents set forth recommended safety 
measures for the avoidance of pedestrian accidents during roadway construction 
and excavations. Appellant contends that, as a result of the court's refusal to 
admit these exhibits into evidence, he was prevented from establishing that 
appellee breached its duty of care by not complying with recognized safety 
standards in the construction industry. Specifically, it is argued that the 
trial court improperly imposed a "locality rule" standard by which to judge the 
reasonableness of appellee's conduct which was lower than that required in the 
construction industry generally.

 
 

[¶7.]     The record with respect 
to the introduction of these exhibits at trial reflects that they were 
originally admitted into evidence after being used by appellee during its direct 
examination of the city engineer for the city of Powell.1 That witness testified that the 
standards set forth in those exhibits had not been officially adopted by local 
ordinance.

 
 

[¶8.]     Appellant attempted to 
make further use of these exhibits during his examination of his expert witness, 
a consulting engineer specializing in safety and human practice engineering. 
This expert was allowed to identify the exhibits as generally accepted safety 
standards in the construction industry which, while not mandatory, were 
recognized and accepted by those in the industry.

 
 

[¶9.]     Appellee's counsel was 
allowed to voir dire the witness on the applicability of those standards as they 
related to construction projects in Powell, Wyoming, in 1982, at the conclusion of which 
the court withdrew the exhibits from evidence stating:

 
 
"I am saying simply, you 
cannot charge the defendant in this case with a degree of care or skill higher 
than that existed or applied to all other contractors of a similar nature at the 
time the accident took place. That does not mean you cannot elicit an opinion 
from your expert for whatever weight that may have, at least at this 
time."

 
 

[¶10.]  As required by Rule 103(a)(2), W.R.E.2, appellant made an offer of proof 
stating that the exhibits were admissible as evidence of what a reasonable, 
careful contractor would have used for proper signs, barricades and guard line 
on the project "to provide safety for the traveling public, pedestrians and for 
the protection of private property" as required by the Powell city ordinance at 
the time of the accident. The court did not rule on the offer of proof, but the 
exhibits were not reintroduced into evidence.

 
 
 
 

[¶11.]  The trial court erred in not admitting 
the exhibits into evidence. See, Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 148 (1974). See also Ruhs v. Pacific Power & Light, 671 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1982). Our review of the record, however, convinces us that 
such error was harmless and does not mandate reversal.

 
 

[¶12.]  One of the more difficult concepts to 
explain to dissatisfied litigants is that they are entitled only to a fair trial 
and not one which is error free. Our standards of appellate review require 
reversal only where an asserted error is prejudicial to a substantial right of a 
party affected. 37 Gambling Devices 
(Cheyenne Elks Club and Cheyenne Music and Vending, Inc.) v. State, Wyo., 694 P.2d 711 (1985); Anderson v. Bauer, 
Wyo., 681 P.2d 1316 (1984); and Herman v. Speed King Manufacturing Company, 
Wyo., 675 P.2d 1271 (1984). Our rules of appellate procedure phrase the concept as 
follows:

 
 
"Any error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded." Rule 7.04, W.R.A.P. Accord Rule 103(a), W.R.E., supra, n. 
2.

 
 

[¶13.]  It is the burden of the appellant to 
establish an error as prejudicial. Herman 
v. Speed King Manufacturing Company, supra; Cervelli v. Graves, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1032 (1983); and Cederburg v. Carter, 
Wyo., 448 P.2d 608 (1968). We have held that

 
 
"`for an error to be 
harmful, there must be a reasonable possibility that in the absence of error the 
verdict might have been more favorable [to the losing party].'" Herman v. Speed King Manufacturing Company, 
supra, 675 P.2d  at 1278, quoting ABC 
Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 632 P.2d 925, 935 
(1981).

 
 

[¶14.]  Evidentiary rulings are largely within 
the discretion of the trial court. In order to determine the harmful effect of 
such rulings, we have examined them in the context of all the evidence at trial. 
In the present case, our review does not support appellant's claim of 
prejudice.

 
 

[¶15.]  At trial appellant's expert was allowed 
to render an opinion as to what would have been proper signs, barricades and 
lighting to properly safeguard pedestrians crossing the construction site. It 
was his opinion that a reasonably careful contractor would have used barricades, 
crosswalks, and warning signs to direct the flow of pedestrian traffic safely 
through the area. It was further his opinion that the two plywood crosswalks 
over the trench were not safe. A continuous path through the construction site 
was not provided, and pedestrians were allowed to stray off the pathways into 
hazardous areas. In addition, a second expert witness, a general foreman for a 
Wyoming 
construction company, was allowed to testify as to what a reasonably careful 
contractor should do to channel pedestrian traffic through the job site. That 
witness also indicated that what was done by appellee was 
inadequate.

 
 

[¶16.]  At the conclusion of trial the court 
instructed the jury, in part, as follows:

 
 
"You are hereby 
instructed that a contractor who undertakes a project in or near a sidewalk or 
street is under a duty to exercise reasonable care for the protection of those 
rightfully in the proximity of the work. The contractor has a duty to guard, or 
maintain proper signs, barriers, lights or other warning signals as needed or 
reasonable under the circumstances at all times in order to provide safety for 
the traveling public and pedestrians around dangerous obstructions, excavations, 
or other hazards existing at the work site,"

 
 
and

 
 
"You are hereby 
instructed that at the time of the occurrence, the City of Powell had enacted 
Ordinance No. 20.3-202 relating to excavation in streets and alleys providing as 
follows:

 
 
"`The following general 
conditions shall control construction projects or work in, upon or under roads, 
streets, alleys, sidewalks, or other public ways or within dedicated easements 
or rights-of-way within the City':

 
 
"`6. Work sites shall be 
provided with proper signs, barricades and lighting at all times to provide 
safety for the traveling public, pedestrians and for the protection of private 
property.'

 
 
"Powell City Ordinance § 
20.3-202 sets forth a standard of conduct for a reasonable man engaged in the 
business of street construction, which standard of conduct is designed to 
protect pedestrians, the traveling public and private property, and if you find 
that the Defendant Whitlock Construction and Supply did not comply with the 
provisions of § 20.3-202 of the Powell City Ordinances, then you must find that 
the Defendant Whitlock Construction and Supply was 
negligent."

 
 

[¶17.]  A major area of factual dispute during 
the trial was whether appellant was injured as a result of tripping over the 
cord string at ankle height along the trench. During the course of its 
deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge requesting instructions on how 
to answer an interrogatory on the verdict form to reflect their finding that 
while they found appellant negligent, they did not believe he had met his burden 
of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that he tripped over the 
stakes and cord. An appropriate modification and finding was made on the 
verdict, and appellant did not object when it was returned. After less than four 
hours of deliberation the jury returned a verdict finding appellant 85% 
negligent and appellee only 15% negligent.

 
 

[¶18.]  Appellant does not demonstrate how, in 
the absence of the asserted error, the trial result may have been more 
favorable. In a similar context, where the issue was whether certain ski safety 
manuals should have been received into evidence, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held:

 
 
"Although the trial court 
might well have received the documentary evidence as to the uphill-downhill 
relationship (and even though this writer would have preferred such action), 
since oral testimony concerning it was received, we do not regard the court's 
action as prejudicial error. Under more aggravated circumstances we might take a 
different view as to the rejection of the guides being prejudicial." LaVine v. Clear Creek Skiing 
Corporation, 557 F.2d 730, 734 (10th Cir. 1977).

 
 

[¶19.]  Affirmed.

1 The appellee was allowed 
to call the city engineer as his own witness after he had testified for 
appellant in order to avoid the witness having to be recalled to testify on 
appellee's behalf. See Rule 611, W.R.E.

2 Rule 103(a)(2), W.R.E., 
provides:

 
 
"(a) Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial 
right of the party is affected, and

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(2) In case the ruling 
is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the 
court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were 
asked."

 
 

ROONEY, Justice, specially 
concurring.

 
 
 
 

[¶20.]  I concur in the result reached by the 
majority opinion on the basis that it is immaterial whether or not the exhibits 
were improperly excluded inasmuch as the exclusion did not prejudice appellant. 
I believe it is unnecessary to decide the question of proper or improper 
exclusion in this case and consider the majority holding on that issue to be 
dicta. It may or may not be accurate, but I am not ready to address it in this 
case.

 
 

ROSE, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶21.]  I am unable to agree with the holding of 
the majority that the trial court's refusal to admit into evidence nationally 
recognized safety standards amounted to harmless error. Had the trial court 
admitted the safety standards, the jury might well have measured appellee's 
conduct against a higher standard of care and rendered a verdict more favorable 
to appellant. The trial court's error, therefore, prejudiced appellant, and he 
is entitled to reversal and a new trial. See Herman v. Speed King Manufacturing 
Company, Wyo., 675 P.2d 1271, 1278 (1984); 
ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 632 P.2d 925 
(1981).

 
 

[¶22.]  We have held in the past that a 
defendant's conduct must always be gauged against a standard of due care, as 
determined by the jury, and that local customs or practices cannot establish a 
standard of care conclusively binding upon the jury. Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. 
Like, Wyo., 381 P.2d 70, 75-76 (1963). The trial 
court in the instant case improperly bound the jury to a reduced standard of 
care (1) by refusing to admit safety standards not specifically required by the 
City of Powell; (2) by declining to charge appellee with a higher degree of care 
than that practiced by similarly situated contractors; and (3) by instructing 
the jury that

 
 
"Powell City Ordinance § 
20.3-202 sets forth a standard of conduct for a reasonable man engaged in the 
business of street construction * * *." Instruction No. 8.

 
 

[¶23.]  This restriction upon the jury's ability 
to apply the appropriate standard of care clearly prejudiced appellant. If the 
jury had been permitted to measure appellee's conduct against a higher standard, 
a reasonable possibility exists that the jury would have attributed a higher 
percentage of the total negligence to appellee, with a concomitant reduction in 
the percentage of total negligence assigned to appellant. The verdict in such 
case might well have been more favorable to appellant.

 
 

[¶24.]  In support of their finding of harmless 
error, the majority note that the jury failed to find that appellant's injuries 
resulted from his tripping over the stakes and cord surrounding the trench. The 
essential question in this case, however, is not whether appellant's tripping 
over the cord caused his damages, but whether appellee's breach of duty (i.e., 
failure to take adequate protective measures at the construction site) caused 
appellant's damages. In this regard, the jury specifically found that appellee 
negligently maintained its work site and that such negligence proximately caused 
appellant's injuries.

 
 

[¶25.]  Thus, appellant established all of the 
elements of his cause of action in negligence against appellee. He failed to 
recover, however, because his assigned negligence exceeded that of appellee. I 
would reverse this case to afford appellant the opportunity to establish the 
proper standard of care in light of all of the relevant evidence and to permit 
the jury to determine the relative degrees of negligence based on such 
appropriate standard of care.