Case Title: State v. Little

Citation: 167 Vt. 577, 705 A.2d 177

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1997-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Little (95-243); 167 Vt. 577; 705 A.2d 177

[Opinion Filed 16-Sep-1997]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 9-Oct-1997]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 95-243

                               JUNE TERM, 1997

State of Vermont                }     APPEALED FROM:
                                }
                                }
     v.                         }     District Court of Vermont,
                                }     Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit
Frederick A. Little             }
                                }     DOCKET NO. 2781-7-93Cncr

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant Frederick Little appeals his conviction for second-degree
  murder following a jury trial in Chittenden District Court.  Defendant
  claims that the trial court erred when it (1) refused to instruct the jury
  that defendant was justified in using deadly force to suppress the
  attempted commission of a felony, (2) instructed the jury that defendant
  could be found guilty if he acted with wanton disregard of the potential
  consequences, and (3) admitted certain photographs of the victim.  We
  affirm.

       On July 9, 1993, defendant, the victim (Robbie Pasho), and two other
  friends gathered for a social evening at defendant's house.  After spending
  the night at a club, defendant and Pasho returned to defendant's house
  around 1:00 a.m., where they sat up talking with defendant's friend, Holli
  Smith.  Defendant then went to bed, leaving Pasho and Smith chatting at the
  dining-room table.

       Defendant testified that later that night he was awakened by Smith,
  who was next to him in bed squeezing his hand.  When defendant opened his
  eyes, he saw the silhouette of a man at the doorway of the bedroom.  After
  a moment, the man dropped to his knees and started crawling toward the bed. 
  As the man reached the bed, defendant jumped over Smith and began fighting
  with the intruder.  The struggle moved down the hallway and into the living
  room, where the intruder broke free and ran out the door.

       Defendant grabbed his glasses and a handgun and followed the man
  outside.  He saw the man sitting in a car in the driveway and walked up to
  the car.  He testified that the man made a quick motion as if reaching for
  a gun, whereupon defendant shot him.  Defendant testified that at no time
  during the incident did he recognize the person as Pasho, nor did he
  recognize Pasho's car.  Pasho died almost immediately from a gunshot
  through the head.

       Defendant first asserts that the trial court erred when it refused to
  instruct the jury that his killing of Pasho was justified if he used deadly
  force to suppress the attempted commission of a felony.  The trial court
  ruled that the evidence did not support such a charge.  See State v.
  Cantrell, 151 Vt. 130, 135-36, 558 A.2d 639, 643 (1989) (to be entitled to
  instruction on particular defense, defendant must establish prima facie
  case on each of its elements).

       The statute to which defendant refers states that homicide is
  justified if it occurs "[i]n the suppression of a person attempting to
  commit murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, burglary or
  robbery, with force or violence."  13 V.S.A. § 2305(2).  Citing historic
  sources,

 

  defendant urges an interpretation that would justify any killing in the
  suppression of a listed felony, as long as the felony was committed in the
  defendant's presence.  See 1 J. Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the
  Criminal Law *16-17 (5th ed. 1847) ("Private individuals are enjoined by
  law to arrest an offender when present at the time a felony is committed .
  . . . [W]hen the felony is committed in the view of a private person . . .
  any one [sic] may justify breaking open doors upon following the felon, and
  if he kill him, provided he could not otherwise take him, the act is
  justifiable. . . .").

       We see no need to debate the finer points of this eighteenth-century
  statute, for it is clear that it requires evidence that the victim acted
  "with force or violence."  13 V.S.A. § 2305(2). There was no evidence of
  force or violence on Pasho's part until he was attacked by defendant.
  Defendant testified that he saw a person's silhouette, which he assumed to
  be a man, in the bedroom doorway.  The man then dropped to his knees and
  began crawling toward the bed.  The fight began only after defendant jumped
  across the bed and, as he testified, "engaged th[e] intruder."  The fight
  then moved down the hallway and into the living-room area where Pasho broke
  away and ran from the house.  Pasho was killed after defendant got his gun,
  followed Pasho out of the house, and shot him sitting in his car. 
  Defendant told a detective soon after the incident that he did not believe
  the intruder had a weapon while in the house, and no weapon was found in
  Pasho's car.  Thus, we agree that the evidence did not support a § 2305(2)
  justified-homicide charge.

       Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in instructing the
  jury that it could find defendant guilty if defendant acted with wanton
  disregard, because the wanton-disregard instruction permitted conviction of
  a crime not charged.  We first note that defendant failed to preserve this
  issue by objecting to the instruction before the jury retired.  See
  V.R.Cr.P. 30; State v. Pelican, 160 Vt. 536, 538,