Case Title: Goreham v. Martins

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12761

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12761 
 
ROBERT GOREHAM  vs.  JOSE C. MARTINS & others.1 
 
 
 
Essex.     December 6, 2019. - June 22, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Snow and Ice.  Negligence, Snow and ice, Comparative.  Landlord 
and Tenant, Snow and ice, Habitability, Quiet enjoyment.  
Damages, Breach of implied warranty of habitability, Breach 
of covenant of quiet enjoyment. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Northeast Division of the 
Housing Court Department on December 9, 2011. 
 
 
The case was tried before David D. Kerman, J., and 
posttrial motions were considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Louis J. Muggeo (Jared J. Muggeo also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Peter C. Kober for the defendants. 
 
Christine A. Knipper & Timothy P. Whooley, for 
Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
                                                 
1 Rose S. Martins; and Martins Construction Company, Inc. 
2 
 
 
 
Martin J. Rooney, for Boston Housing Authority, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The plaintiff, Robert Goreham (tenant), was 
the second-floor tenant of a three-family home in Salem 
(premises) owned by the defendants Rose and Jose Martins 
(landlords).2  In the winter of 2010, the tenant slipped and fell 
on ice in the driveway adjacent to the premises, severely 
injuring himself.  He brought an action in the Northeast 
Division of the Housing Court Department against the landlords 
and Martins Construction Company, Inc.3 (snow plowing contractor) 
(collectively, defendants), the contractor retained to remove 
snow and ice from the driveway.  A jury found the landlords 
negligent for failing to exercise reasonable care in keeping the 
driveway free of ice.  However, they also found that the tenant 
was comparatively negligent and that he was more responsible for 
the injury than the landlords, resulting in a finding of no 
liability on the negligence claim. 
The tenant also brought claims against the landlords 
alleging breach of the common-law implied warranty of 
habitability and violation of the statutory covenant of quiet 
                                                 
2 Jose Martins died prior to trial. 
3 Martins Construction Company, Inc., is owned and operated 
by the landlords' son. 
3 
 
 
enjoyment, G. L. c. 186, § 14.  Based on the jury's finding, the 
judge found the landlords not liable on these additional claims.  
On appeal, the tenant contends that, because the jury found the 
landlords negligent, the judge was required as a matter of law 
to find that the landlords committed a breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability and violated the statutory covenant of 
quiet enjoyment and that he should therefore recover personal 
injury damages notwithstanding the jury's finding that he was 
comparatively negligent. 
We conclude that a tenant may not be awarded personal 
injury damages on a claim for breach of the implied warranty of 
habitability arising from a landlord's failure to keep common 
areas reasonably free of snow and ice.  We also conclude that, 
based on the facts of this case, the tenant may not recover 
personal injury damages under the statutory covenant of quiet 
enjoyment.4 
Factual and procedural background.  We recite the facts as 
the jury could have found them, reserving certain details for 
later discussion. 
The tenant had resided at the premises as a tenant at will 
since March 1, 2004.  The premises had two entrances:  a main 
                                                 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Boston 
Housing Authority and the Massachusetts Defense Lawyers 
Association. 
4 
 
 
entrance located on the side of the building and a fire escape 
located at the rear.  The main entrance led out to a few steps, 
which ended at a sidewalk, and the rear fire escape led out onto 
the driveway.  The tenant testified that he used only the rear 
fire escape because it was "easier" to enter and exit his 
apartment that way. 
The tenant also testified that, prior to his accident, the 
winter had been "very snowy" and "a lot worse than most other 
winters."  In fact, it had snowed between nine and eleven inches 
in the week prior to the tenant's fall.  The tenant also said 
that the snow plowing contractor had done a "great job" of 
plowing the driveway in previous years but that during that 
winter "it was just terrible"; he did not, however, complain to 
the landlords about what he considered to be the dangerous 
condition of the driveway. 
On January 25, 2010, the tenant decided to run some errands 
after returning from work.  He left the building from the rear 
fire escape and began to walk down the driveway in his sneakers, 
traversing "diagonally" to avoid the iciest spots.  Although he 
believed that he could safely navigate the driveway, he slipped 
approximately five feet away from the steps leading to the main 
entrance.  A neighbor who lived across the street saw the tenant 
lying on the driveway and went to assist him, almost falling 
herself in the process.  Emergency personnel transported the 
5 
 
 
tenant to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with a dislocated 
ankle and a fractured fibula.  As a result of those injuries, he 
required multiple surgeries over the next few years and 
continues to experience pain in his ankle. 
In December 2011, the tenant brought an action in the 
Housing Court against the landlords and the snow plowing 
contractor.  The complaint alleged that the landlords were 
negligent with respect to the removal of snow and ice on the 
driveway, that they committed a breach of the common-law implied 
warranty of habitability, and that they violated the statutory 
covenant of quiet enjoyment.5  The complaint also alleged 
negligence against the snow plowing contractor. 
After a hearing on several motions in limine, the judge 
decided to submit only the tenant's negligence claims to the 
jury because the judge believed that the tenant could not 
prevail on his claims against the landlords for breach of the 
warranty of habitability and violation of the covenant of quiet 
enjoyment claims unless the landlords were negligent; the judge 
reserved disposition of those claims for himself after trial.  
At trial, the judge also explained that, although there were no 
                                                 
5 Prior to trial, the Housing Court judge dismissed 
additional claims for violation of G. L. c. 93A and for strict 
liability under the building code, G. L. c. 143, § 51.  The 
dismissal of those claims is not challenged on appeal. 
6 
 
 
Massachusetts appellate decisions on the issue, he believed that 
damages awarded under both the warranty of habitability and 
covenant of quiet enjoyment claims were subject to apportionment 
based on the tenant's own negligence. 
The jury, in a special verdict, found that the landlords 
were negligent, the snow plowing contractor was not negligent, 
the tenant was comparatively negligent, the tenant's injuries 
were fifty-three per cent attributable to the tenant's 
negligence and forty-seven per cent attributable to the 
landlords' negligence, and the tenant suffered damages in the 
amount of $25,000.  Because more than fifty per cent of the 
tenant's injuries were attributable to the tenant's own 
negligence, the judge concluded that the landlords were not 
liable for negligence, breach of the warranty of habitability, 
or violation of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.  On the 
warranty of habitability claim, he determined that the tenant's 
negligence amounted to "unreasonable misuse" of the rear fire 
escape -- a doctrine that he borrowed from our products 
liability jurisprudence, citing Scott v. Garfield, 454 Mass. 
790, 795 n.7 (2009).  On the covenant of quiet enjoyment claim, 
he concluded that comparative negligence applied and that the 
tenant therefore could not recover damages because his 
negligence was greater than that of the defendants.  Judgment 
entered for the defendants on all of the claims. 
7 
 
 
On November 29, 2017, the tenant filed motions for a new 
trial, for additur, for judgment in his favor on the warranty of 
habitability and covenant of quiet enjoyment claims, and for an 
award of attorney's fees on the covenant of quiet enjoyment 
claim.  He contended that unreasonable misuse and comparative 
negligence were not applicable defenses to the warranty of 
habitability and covenant of quiet enjoyment claims, 
respectively, and that a finding of any negligence by the 
landlords meant that judgment should enter for him on both 
claims as a matter of law.  The judge denied the motions, and 
the tenant appealed from their denial.6  We transferred the 
appeal to this court on our own motion. 
Discussion.  Before we consider the tenant's claims for 
personal injury damages under the implied warranty of 
habitability and covenant of quiet enjoyment, we look first to 
the evolution of our common law regarding negligence liability 
for slip and falls on snow and ice. 
1.  Landlord liability in snow and ice cases.  Under the 
traditional common-law rules that governed premises liability in 
the Nineteenth Century and approximately the first two-thirds of 
the Twentieth Century, the standard of liability of a property 
                                                 
6 The tenant appeals only from the judge's ruling and order 
on the posttrial motions, not from the jury's verdict. 
8 
 
 
owner for injuries that occurred on the premises depended on the 
status of the plaintiff, that is, whether the plaintiff was a 
tenant, an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser.  Papadopoulos 
v. Target Corp., 457 Mass. 368, 370-371 (2010), citing Young v. 
Garwacki, 380 Mass. 162, 164 (1980).  "If the plaintiff was a 
tenant, the landlord had no duty to the plaintiff to maintain 
any area under the tenant's control in a safe condition:  the 
lease was treated as a transfer of property, and the landlord 
was only potentially liable for failing to warn the tenant of 
hidden defects that the landlord was aware of at the time of the 
lease" or for wantonly or negligently placing a dangerous 
obstruction in a common area.  Papadopoulos, supra at 371.  See 
Watkins v. Goodall, 138 Mass. 533, 536 (1885).  Snow and ice 
were regarded as potentially dangerous obstructions, but a 
landlord was not liable for injuries sustained by a tenant from 
a slip and fall in a common area on a "natural accumulation" of 
snow and ice.  Papadopoulos, supra at 372.  Rather, "[w]here the 
obstruction was snow or ice on stairs or a walkway, a landlord 
could be held liable to the tenant only if he placed the snow or 
ice there, or was otherwise responsible for it being there."  
Id. at 373. 
In contrast, "[i]f the plaintiff was an invitee, defined as 
a person invited onto the property by the property owner for the 
property owner's benefit, . . . the property owner owed a duty 
9 
 
 
to use reasonable care to keep the premises 'in a reasonably 
safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the 
likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, 
and the burden of avoiding the risk.'"  Id. at 371-372, quoting 
Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 708 (1973).  This duty 
required a property owner to make reasonable efforts to protect 
invitees from dangerous conditions, including those arising from 
snow and ice.  Papadopoulos, 457 Mass. at 375. 
"In 1977, in King v. G & M Realty Corp., 373 Mass. 658, 661 
(1977) . . ., the court abandoned the common-law distinction 
between a property owner's duty of care with respect to a tenant 
and an invitee, and imposed on a landlord a general duty to keep 
the common areas of a leased premises in a reasonably safe 
condition."  Papadopoulos, 457 Mass. at 375-376.  Yet rather 
than extend this reasonable care standard to all hazards, 
including snow and ice, the court later announced a rule that 
landlords were not liable for slip and fall injuries that 
occurred due to the "natural accumulation" of snow and ice, no 
matter whether the injured person was a tenant or invitee.  Id. 
at 376, quoting Aylward v. McCloskey, 412 Mass. 77, 79 (1992).  
Only where property owners allowed "unnatural and dangerous 
condition[s] of snow and ice" to arise could they be held 
liable.  Sullivan v. Brookline, 416 Mass. 825, 829-830 (1994). 
10 
 
 
In Papadopoulos, 457 Mass. at 369, we abolished this 
"distinction between natural and unnatural accumulations of snow 
and ice," and applied to the removal of snow and ice the same 
reasonable care standard that applies to all other hazards.  As 
a result, a tenant or invitee who slips and falls on snow or ice 
in a common area of the premises may now bring a negligence 
claim and recover damages from a landlord who failed to exercise 
reasonable care in removing the snow and ice, regardless of 
whether it was "natural" or "unnatural," unless the plaintiff is 
comparatively negligent and is more than fifty per cent 
responsible for his or her own injuries.  Id.  See G. L. c. 231, 
§ 85. 
The tenant here argues that a plaintiff who is precluded 
from recovering in negligence for a slip and fall on ice due to 
comparative negligence may still recover damages for his or her 
injuries under a contract claim for breach of the common-law 
implied warranty of habitability because the comparative 
negligence standard does not apply to such claims.  Implicit in 
this argument is the premise that a tenant may recover for 
personal injuries from slip and falls on snow and ice in common 
areas under the implied warranty of habitability.  We now 
examine that premise. 
2.  Implied warranty of habitability.  Implied in every 
residential lease is a warranty that the leased premises are fit 
11 
 
 
for human occupation and that they will remain so throughout the 
tenancy.  See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 
199 (1973) (Hemingway).  To understand the scope of this implied 
warranty and to determine whether it extends to snow or ice on a 
common area of leased premises, we begin by examining its 
history and evolution. 
This court first adopted the warranty of habitability in 
1892 in the context of short-term residential rentals.  See 
Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 350 (1892).  The court reasoned 
that, where a landlord rented a tenant a furnished house for a 
summer, the landlord impliedly agreed to deliver a house fit for 
human habitation, not one "infested with bugs."  Id. at 349.  
Because the rented premises were uninhabitable, the court held 
that the tenant could lawfully withhold or abate rent.  Id.  See 
also Hemingway, 363 Mass. at 203 ("the landlord's breach of its 
implied warranty of habitability constitutes a total or partial 
defence to the landlord's claim for rent being withheld"). 
In the 1940s, we expanded the scope of the warranty to 
include a short-term tenant's personal injuries resulting from a 
landlord's breach.  See Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 757 
(1942).  In that case, a tenant leased a furnished cottage for 
one month and was injured when a defective ladder leading to a 
bunk bed collapsed.  Id. at 755.  As discussed supra, as the 
common law existed at that time, the tenant did not have a claim 
12 
 
 
in tort because landlords were not liable for defects on the 
premises unless those defects were hidden, the landlord knew 
about them, and the landlord failed to warn the tenant.  Id. at 
756.  Recognizing that public policy required that premises 
offered for short-term lease be safe and fit for human 
habitation, the court held that the tenant properly alleged an 
action for breach of contract based on the implied warranty of 
habitability, and that the jury could award damages where they 
found that the tenant had suffered injury as a result of that 
breach.  Id. at 757.  See also Horton v. Marston, 352 Mass. 322, 
325-326 (1967) (tenant with nine-month lease could recover for 
personal injuries under breach of contract theory where 
defective oven exploded after tenant lit stovetop burner with 
match). 
We expanded the applicability of the implied warranty of 
habitability to all residential leases regardless of their 
length in Hemingway, 363 Mass. at 199.  The plaintiffs were 
long-term tenants of the Boston Housing Authority who withheld 
rent pursuant to G. L. c. 239, § 8A, on the ground that their 
apartments were in an uninhabitable condition in violation of 
the sanitary code.  Id. at 186.  However, § 8A permitted tenants 
to withhold rent under these circumstances only if they provided 
proper notice to the landlords, which these tenants had failed 
to do.  Id. at 186-187.  Consequently, the Boston Housing 
13 
 
 
Authority sued the tenants for nonpayment of rent, and judgment 
entered against them.  Id. at 187.  Concerned about the harsh 
effect of the tenants' failure to provide proper notice, we held 
that the implied warranty of habitability established as an 
exception in Ingalls, 156 Mass. at 350, "must now become the 
rule in an urban industrial society where the essential 
objective of the leasing transaction is to provide a dwelling 
suitable for habitation."  Hemingway, supra at 196-197.  Damages 
would accrue from the time the landlord knew or received notice 
of the defective condition, whichever occurred first, and would 
be calculated as the difference between the rental value of the 
premises had it been habitable ("the rent agreed on may be 
evidence of this value") and the rental value of the premises in 
its defective condition.  Id. at 203.  See McKenna v. Begin, 3 
Mass. App. Ct. 168, 172 (1975). 
Although this court in Hemingway explicitly did not 
consider whether the warranty of habitability would apply to 
personal injury claims by long-term tenants against landlords, 
see Hemingway, 363 Mass. at 200 n.13, we reached that issue six 
years later in Crowell v. McCaffrey, 377 Mass. 443, 444, 451 
(1979), where a tenant was injured when a railing on the third-
floor porch gave way.  Relying on the short-term lease decisions 
in Hacker, 310 Mass. at 757, and Horton, 352 Mass. at 325, the 
court held that the extension of the implied warranty of 
14 
 
 
habitability to long-term residential leases in Hemingway, supra 
at 196-197, "logically carrie[d] with it liability for personal 
injuries caused by a breach."  Crowell, supra at 451.  However, 
when Crowell was decided, in contrast with Hacker and Horton, a 
tenant could prevail on a negligence claim against the landlord 
who failed to "exercise reasonable care in keeping safe the 
common areas of an apartment building or similar structure for 
use by his tenants and their visitors."  Crowell, supra at 447, 
citing King, 373 Mass. at 660-662.  In fact, the court held in 
Crowell, supra at 449, that the evidence was sufficient to 
support a finding of liability on the tenant's negligence claim. 
The consequence of the evolution in our common law of the 
implied warranty of habitability is that, where a defective 
condition on leased premises results in injury to the tenant or 
to a tenant's guest, see Scott, 454 Mass. at 794-795, the 
injured party may recover personal injury damages through both a 
tort claim based on the landlord's negligence and a contract 
claim based on the landlord's breach of the implied warranty of 
habitability.  If a tenant could recover personal injury damages 
under the implied warranty for a slip and fall on ice in a 
common area, we would need to consider whether the judge erred 
as a matter of law in concluding that the tenant's claim failed 
because the jury's finding of comparative negligence was 
equivalent to a finding of "unreasonable misuse" of the rear 
15 
 
 
fire escape.  However, we need not reach that question because 
we conclude that personal injury damages for a landlord's 
unreasonable failure to clear snow and ice from a common area 
may be recovered under our common law in a tort action based on 
negligence but not in a contract action based on the implied 
warranty of habitability. 
In McAllister v. Boston Hous. Auth., 429 Mass. 300, 305-306 
(1999), overruled on other grounds by Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 
Mass. 734, 736 (2014), a tenant slipped and fell on ice on the 
exterior stairs of the landlord's premises and claimed that the 
landlord was liable under the implied warranty of habitability 
for failing to comply with State sanitary and building code 
provisions that require the removal of snow and ice.  We 
declared that "the implied warranty of habitability applies to 
significant defects in the property itself."  Id. at 305.  And 
we concluded that "[t]he natural accumulation of snow and ice is 
not such a defect."  Id. at 306.  However, as earlier noted, 
under the common law at that time, the natural accumulation of 
snow and ice was not deemed a defect in a tort claim for 
negligence, even if the landlord acted unreasonably in failing 
to clear it.  See Sullivan, 416 Mass. at 827-828 (landlord not 
liable where employees left ramp in icy condition after 
shoveling it). 
16 
 
 
Now, under our common law, a landlord may be liable in 
negligence for failing to act reasonably in snow and ice 
removal, even if the accumulation of snow or ice was natural.  
See Papadopoulos, 457 Mass. at 383.  But in abolishing the 
distinction between the natural and unnatural accumulation of 
snow and ice in tort, we did not intend also to declare that a 
tenant may now recover personal injury damages for a slip and 
fall on snow or ice under the implied warranty of habitability.  
Nor would recovery of personal injury damages in these 
circumstances fit neatly within the implied warranty of 
habitability. 
The warranty of habitability is an implicit provision in 
every residential rental contract and does not incorporate a 
fault element.  See Berman & Sons v. Jefferson, 379 Mass. 196, 
200 (1979) ("Considerations of fault do not belong in an 
analysis of warranty").  The warranty of habitability is not 
intended to punish landlords for misbehavior but rather to 
ensure that tenants receive what they are paying for:  a 
habitable place to live.  Id. at 202.  It recognizes that the 
landlord's promise "to deliver and maintain the demised premises 
in habitable condition" and the tenant's promise "to pay rent 
for such habitable premises" constitute interdependent and 
mutual consideration and that, consequently, "the tenant's 
obligation to pay rent is predicated on the landlord's 
17 
 
 
obligation to deliver and maintain the premises in habitable 
condition."  Hemingway, 363 Mass. at 198. 
Strict liability for the rental of a leasehold that is not 
habitable, based on the interdependence of rights and 
responsibilities, is well-suited to the warranty's original 
context of rent abatement.  It ensures that tenants who do not 
receive what they are paying for may be compensated for the 
reduced value of the premises during any period when it is 
uninhabitable.  See id. at 203. 
But negligence, not strict liability, is the standard of 
liability we generally apply in personal injury cases.  As we 
earlier explained, when we first awarded personal injury damages 
on a warranty of habitability claim, tenants had little help 
from negligence law to ensure that landlords made necessary 
repairs, and we believed that the public policy of holding 
landlords liable for furnishing unsafe premises justified 
fitting a square peg (personal injury damages) into a round hole 
(breach of the warranty of habitability).  See Hacker, 310 Mass. 
at 756-757.  Despite this poor fit, we have continued to hold 
that personal injury damages were recoverable for a breach of 
the warranty of habitability even after a tenant could invoke 
the same negligence standard as any lawful visitor.  See Scott, 
454 Mass. at 794-795; Crowell, 377 Mass. at 451.  But in those 
cases, there was considerable evidence that the landlord also 
18 
 
 
was negligent.  See Scott, 454 Mass. at 796 (jury returned 
verdicts in favor of plaintiff on both negligence and breach of 
warranty of habitability claims); Crowell, 377 Mass. at 452 
(jury could have found that landlord, in exercise of reasonable 
care, could have discovered and remedied building and sanitary 
code violations).  See also Young, 380 Mass. at 164 (jury found 
landlord negligent for failure to maintain premises).  Perhaps 
for that reason, we have consistently left unanswered the 
question whether landlord liability for personal injury damages 
under the implied warranty of habitability is strict liability 
or whether it is subject to a negligence standard requiring 
notice.  See Scott, supra at 796 n.8; Simon v. Solomon, 385 
Mass. 91, 98 (1982); Young, supra at 170 n.9; Crowell, 377 Mass. 
at 452. 
We need not answer that question here.7  Nor need we 
consider whether, now that our common law requires that 
                                                 
7 We note that, in 1995, the California Supreme Court 
reversed its earlier decision in Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 
454, 457, 465 (1985), in which it held that a landlord was 
strictly liable under the warranty of habitability for injuries 
suffered by a tenant who slipped and fell against a shower door 
made of glass that was not tempered.  See Peterson v. Superior 
Court, 10 Cal. 4th 1185, 1188 (1995) ("we erred in Becker in 
applying the doctrine of strict products liability to a 
residential landlord that is not a part of the manufacturing or 
marketing enterprise of the allegedly defective product that 
caused the injury").  In leaving behind the strict liability 
standard, the California Supreme Court noted that "nearly all 
states have recognized an implied warranty of habitability in 
19 
 
 
landlords exercise the same reasonable care towards tenants as 
lawful visitors to the premises, we should retreat from the path 
we previously have taken and allow tenants to recover for 
personal injuries only in tort rather than in both tort and 
contract.8  It suffices to say that, where personal injury 
results from a slip and fall on snow or ice in a common area, 
recovery of damages under our common law is limited to a tort 
claim for negligence.  Personal injury damages for such slips 
                                                 
residential leases," but that Louisiana was the only other State 
which imposed strict liability for personal injury claims.  Id. 
at 1205.  At the time, Louisiana imposed strict liability upon 
landlords by statute.  Id.  In 1996, however, the Louisiana 
statute was amended to abandon strict liability and to adopt a 
negligence standard instead.  See Ford v. Bienvenu, 804 So.2d 
64, 66 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2001). 
8 We recognize that several of our sister States have 
concluded that where personal injury is concerned, tort 
principles provide a "more straightforward way" to delineate the 
rights and duties of the parties.  Favreau v. Miller, 156 Vt. 
222, 229 (1991).  See Auburn v. Amoco Oil Co., 106 Ill. App. 3d 
60, 64 (1982) ("no action for personal injuries can result from 
a breach of the implied warranty of habitability"); Chiu v. 
Portland, 788 A.2d 183, 188 n.6 (Me. 2002) ("consequential 
damages are an inappropriate remedy for breach of the statutory 
warranty of habitability"); Curry v. New York City Hous. Auth., 
77 A.D.2d 534, 535 (1980) (finding it "quite improbable that the 
[Legislature] contemplated extension of the principle of strict 
liability to landlords for injuries and damages traditionally 
the subject of tort liability"); McIntyre v. Philadelphia Hous. 
Auth., 816 A.2d 1204, 1212(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (permitting 
recovery of personal injury damages on warranty of habitability 
theory "would eliminate the fundamental distinctions between 
contract and tort and only lead to further confusion regarding 
the nature and role of these two theories of recovery");. 
20 
 
 
and falls may not be recovered on a claim in contract under the 
implied warranty of habitability. 
There is a second reason for affirming the judge's finding 
that the landlord was not liable for breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability, albeit on different grounds:  viewing 
the facts of this case in the light most favorable to the 
tenant, as a matter of law there was no breach of the warranty.  
Habitability is measured by minimum community standards, which 
are generally, though not exclusively, reflected in the sanitary 
and building codes.  See Crowell, 377 Mass. at 451.  Although 
violations of the codes may provide compelling evidence that a 
dwelling is not habitable, they do not establish per se breaches 
of the warranty of habitability.  See McAllister, 429 Mass. at 
305 ("Not every breach of the State sanitary code supports a 
claim under the implied warranty of habitability").  The 
emphasis is on whether the premises are fit for human 
habitation, not merely on whether the landlord committed a code 
violation.  Second, the violation must relate to the "provision, 
maintenance, and repair of the physical facilities" of the 
property.  Doe v. New Bedford Hous. Auth., 417 Mass. 273, 282 
(1994).  "[T]he scope of the warranty of habitability includes 
only the physical maintenance and repair of a dwelling unit."  
Id. at 281.  Finally, the warranty of habitability applies only 
21 
 
 
to "substantial" violations or "significant defects."  See 
McAllister, supra; Berman & Sons, 379 Mass. at 201-202. 
The tenant makes no argument regarding whether the warranty 
of habitability applies to the driveway; he proceeds on the 
assumption that it does.  Nor does he specify any building or 
sanitary code violations that impaired the habitability of his 
dwelling unit.  We recognize that the sanitary code requires 
that a property owner "shall maintain all means of egress at all 
times in a safe, operable condition and shall keep all exterior 
stairways, fire escapes, egress balconies and bridges free of 
snow and ice."  105 Code Mass. Regs. § 410.452 (2007).  But, 
even if we were to assume that the accumulation of ice on the 
driveway violated this provision of the code, we decline to 
extend the warranty of habitability to cover a violation of the 
sanitary code that does not affect the habitability of a 
tenant's "dwelling unit."  See Doe, 417 Mass. at 281. 
Given the strict liability standard, the scope of the 
warranty of habitability must be interpreted to encompass only 
those conditions that render the tenant's apartment 
uninhabitable.  This does not mean that defects in common areas 
under the landlord's control can never render a dwelling 
uninhabitable:  if, for instance, the only way to exit the 
building were through the driveway, and the landlord had dug a 
gravel pit there, making any and all access to the apartment 
22 
 
 
dangerous, that would likely violate the warranty of 
habitability because the tenant would be unable safely to access 
the dwelling.  However, those are not the facts in this case.  
The tenant's preference to use the rear fire escape when another 
suitable and safe exit from the building existed does not 
require us to conclude that the mere presence of snow and ice on 
a driveway in the winter in Massachusetts rendered his apartment 
uninhabitable.  To do so would impose an unreasonable burden on 
landlords given the realities of a New England winter. 
2.  Covenant of quiet enjoyment.  Under G. L. c. 186, § 14, 
a landlord who "directly or indirectly interferes with the quiet 
enjoyment of any residential premises by the occupant" is 
subject to liability.9  This statutory right of quiet enjoyment 
                                                 
9 General Laws, c. 186, § 14, provides in relevant part: 
"Any lessor or landlord of any building or part thereof 
occupied for dwelling purposes, . . . who is required by 
law or by the express or implied terms of any contract or 
lease or tenancy at will to furnish water, hot water, heat, 
light, power, gas, elevator service, telephone service, 
janitor service or refrigeration service to any occupant of 
such building or part thereof, who willfully or 
intentionally fails to furnish such water, hot water, heat, 
light, power, gas, elevator service, telephone service, 
janitor service or refrigeration service at any time when 
the same is necessary to the proper or customary use of 
such building or part thereof, . . . or any lessor or 
landlord who directly or indirectly interferes with the 
quiet enjoyment of any residential premises by the 
occupant, . . . shall be punished by a fine of not less 
than twenty-five dollars nor more than three hundred 
dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than six months.  
23 
 
 
protects a tenant from "serious interference" with the tenancy, 
meaning any "acts or omissions that impair the character and 
value of the leasehold."  Doe, 417 Mass. at 285. 
The statute does not require that the landlord act 
intentionally to interfere with a tenant's right to quiet 
enjoyment.  Al-Ziab v. Mourgis, 424 Mass. 847, 850 (1997). "In 
analyzing whether there is a breach of the covenant, we examine 
the landlord's conduct and not his intentions."  Doe, 417 Mass. 
at 285, citing Blackett v. Olanoff, 371 Mass. 714, 716 (1977). 
Rather, liability under the covenant requires only "a showing of 
at least negligent conduct by a landlord." Al-Ziab, supra.  The 
key inquiry is whether the serious interference with the tenancy 
is a "natural and probable consequence of what the landlord did, 
what he failed to do, or what he permitted to be done" (citation 
omitted).  Doe, supra.   Therefore, a landlord is liable for 
"actual and consequential damages" under § 14 where the landlord 
(1) "had notice of or reason to know" of the condition 
interfering with the tenant's quiet enjoyment of the premises, 
                                                 
Any person who commits any act in violation of this section 
shall also be liable for actual and consequential damages 
or three month's rent, whichever is greater, and the costs 
of the action, including a reasonable attorney's fee, all 
of which may be applied in setoff to or in recoupment 
against any claim for rent owed or owing." 
24 
 
 
and (2) acted at least negligently in failing "to take 
appropriate corrective measures."  Al-Ziab, supra at 851. 
In ruling on the covenant claim, the judge stated that the 
jury's finding of negligence against the landlords satisfied the 
"fault or foreseeability" prerequisite to liability.  See id. 
("some degree of fault or foreseeability should be a 
prerequisite to liability under § 14").  He went on to state, 
however, that where there was no showing of reckless, willful, 
or intentional conduct on the part of the landlords, and where 
liability was based solely on negligence, comparative negligence 
principles applied.  And because the jury found the tenant more 
responsible for his injuries than the landlords, the tenant was 
barred from recovery under the covenant.  The landlords and the 
amici urge us to adopt this standard, and the amici argue that 
it would be unfair to provide for the recovery of statutory 
damages on a showing of negligence while denying landlords the 
defense of comparative negligence.  The tenant argues that the 
jury's finding that the landlords were negligent satisfies the 
covenant's fault requirement; the tenant's comparative 
negligence is not relevant to liability. 
We agree with the tenant that comparative negligence does 
not apply to claims brought under G. L. c. 186, § 14.  A 
landlord who interferes with a tenant's right to quiet enjoyment 
is subject to both civil and criminal liability.  G. L. c. 186, 
25 
 
 
§ 14 (landlords who violate statutory covenant of quiet 
enjoyment "shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-
five dollars nor more than three hundred dollars, or by 
imprisonment for not more than six months" and "shall also be 
liable for actual and consequential damages or three month's 
rent, whichever is greater, and the costs of the action, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee").  Under a criminal 
statute, an injured victim's conduct is relevant only if it 
justifies or mitigates the defendant's conduct, such as where a 
victim's conduct justifies a defendant's act in self-defense.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 351 Mass. 203, 210 (1966) 
(circumstances of homicide committed in self-defense mitigate 
crime from murder to manslaughter).  Where, as with § 14, a 
statute makes negligent conduct criminal, a landlord's negligent 
conduct is still criminal even if the injured victim was more 
negligent.  See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 394 Mass. 77, 87 
(1985) ("In criminal cases, as opposed to civil negligence 
suits, a victim's contributory negligence, even if it 
constitutes a substantial part of proximate cause [but not the 
sole cause], does not excuse a defendant whose conduct also 
causes" injury).  Where a landlord may be found criminally 
liable for negligence under § 14 regardless of the negligence of 
the tenant, we are not persuaded that the Legislature intended a 
different standard for the landlord's civil liability.  In the 
26 
 
 
absence of a strong indication of such legislative intent, we 
will not apply the civil doctrine of comparative negligence to a 
statute that provides for both criminal and civil liability. 
However, the fact that comparative negligence is 
inapplicable to claims brought under the statutory covenant of 
quiet enjoyment does not necessarily mean that the landlords are 
liable in this case:  the landlord's negligence is only one of 
the necessary prerequisites to a finding of liability.  To 
succeed on his claim, the tenant must also demonstrate that the 
landlords' negligence caused "serious interference with his 
tenancy" by "acts or omissions that impair[ed] the character and 
value of the" leased premises.  Doe, 417 Mass. at 285. 
The "loss of use" of a common area under the control of a 
landlord potentially might create a serious interference with a 
tenancy.  Id. at 286.  In this case, however, no reasonable 
finder of fact could find that the tenant lost the use of the 
driveway because of the icy condition.  He did not lose its use 
as a parking area, because he was not entitled to park a vehicle 
in the driveway under the lease.  And even if the icy condition 
caused him to lose its use as a safe means of egress to the 
sidewalk, no reasonable finder of fact could conclude that the 
temporary loss of this means of egress seriously interfered with 
his tenancy where the premises had a main entrance that led 
27 
 
 
after a few steps to the sidewalk.10  The fact that the tenant 
preferred to use the rear fire escape and access the sidewalk 
from the driveway suffices to show that the icy driveway was a 
temporary inconvenience, but it does not rise to the level of a 
serious interference that impairs "the character and value of 
the" leased premises.  Id. at 285.  We therefore affirm denial 
of the tenant's posttrial motion. 
Conclusion.  We affirm the judge's denial of the tenant's 
posttrial motions.  Judgment may enter for the defendant on all 
claims. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
                                                 
10 At trial, the tenant did not present evidence that 
exiting the building through the main entrance would have been 
equally unsafe, and the jury's finding that the tenant was 
comparatively negligent and that he was more responsible for the 
injury than the landlords indicates that they determined that 
the tenant could have more safely exited the building through 
the main entrance.