Case Title: Parish v. Parish

Citation: 

Docket Number: 092279

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2011-01-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Mims, JJ., and Lacy and 
Russell, S.JJ. 
 
DAVID M. A. PARISH, 
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE 
OF EUGENE NEAL PARISH 
 
v.  Record No. 092279 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
DIANE E. PARISH, ET AL.  
 
 
 
January 13, 2011 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
Norman A. Thomas, Judge 
 
In this appeal of a will contest, we consider whether the 
circuit court properly found that the decedent, an “incompetent” 
person with appointed conservators, had testamentary capacity, 
and whether the circuit court properly held there was no 
presumption of undue influence when a major beneficiary of the 
will also was the decedent’s conservator and acted as the 
decedent’s translator during the drafting of the will. 
BACKGROUND 
 
The decedent, Eugene Neal Parish (“Eugene”), suffered a 
head and spinal cord injury in 1982 due to being struck in the 
head with a metal pipe while at a bar.  The injury left him 
paralyzed in his legs and right arm.  Eugene sued the bar and 
the person who attacked him and recovered $3.5 million.  At the 
time of his injury, Eugene’s only child, David M. Parish 
(“David”), was eleven months old. 
 
1
In 1983, Eugene was declared incompetent in Florida due to 
encephalopathy.1  His wife was appointed as guardian.  For the 
court to make such an appointment, Eugene had to be shown 
“incapable of caring for himself or managing his property or 
. . . likely to dissipate or lose his property or inflict harm 
on himself or others.”  Former Fla. Stat. § 744.331 (as in 
effect prior to amendment by 1989 Fla. Laws ch. 89-96, § 35).2  
Later, Eugene’s mother assumed the duties as his guardian. 
In 1989, Eugene moved to Tennessee and resided at a nursing 
facility near Memphis.  David Wayne Parish (“David Wayne”), 
Eugene’s brother, lived approximately 40 to 50 miles from 
Eugene’s nursing facility.  Diane E. Parish (“Diane”) and David 
Wayne were married in 1998.  Eugene’s mother, who had acted as 
his conservator, remained in Florida.  She agreed to transfer 
the conservatorship to David Wayne and Diane in Tennessee. 
                     
1 Encephalopathy is “[g]eneralized brain dysfunction marked 
by varying degrees of impairment of speech, cognition, 
orientation, and arousal.  In mild instances, brain dysfunction 
may be evident only during specialized neuropsychiatric testing; 
in severe instances, . . . the patient may be unresponsive even 
to unpleasant stimuli.”  Taber’s Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 
761 (21st ed. 2009). 
2 The order of the Florida court cites former Fla. Stat. 
§ 744.31(7), the provisions of which were repealed in 1974 and 
subsequently incorporated into the version of Fla. Stat. 
§ 744.331 in effect in 1983.  See 1974 Fla. Laws ch. 74-106, 
§§ 1, 3 (repealing former Fla. Stat. § 744.31 and enacting 
former Fla. Stat. § 744.310, a predecessor of current Fla. Stat. 
§ 744.331), and 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-222, §§ 9, 26 (enacting 
Former Fla. Stat. § 744.3101, a predecessor of current Fla. 
Stat. § 744.331). 
 
2
In 2000, David Wayne and Diane petitioned to be appointed 
as Eugene’s co-conservators in Tennessee.  They described the 
reason for the appointment as Eugene’s encephalopathy.  
Tennessee law required that David Wayne and Diane show that 
Eugene was a “[d]isabled person,” which “means any person 
eighteen (18) years of age or older determined by the court to 
be in need of partial or full supervision, protection and 
assistance by reason of mental illness, physical illness or 
injury, developmental disability or other mental or physical 
incapacity.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-101(7).  The Tennessee 
court granted the petition, and David Wayne and Diane became 
Eugene’s conservators. 
 
In the fall of 2002, David Wayne assisted Eugene in 
preparing a Last Will and Testament (the “will”).  David Wayne 
testified at trial that Eugene had informed him “out of the 
blue” that he wanted a will.  During Eugene’s meeting with the 
paralegal who drafted the will, David Wayne acted as a 
translator because Eugene, who spoke through a voice box due to 
a tracheotomy, was difficult to understand.  David Wayne was 
present in the room with the witnesses and the notary when the 
will was executed and witnessed on October 2, 2002. 
In the will, Eugene bequeathed 25% of his estate to David 
Wayne, 25% to Diane, 25% to David, and 25% to other family 
 
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members.3  Eugene’s will appointed David Wayne as executor and 
Diane as substitute executor.  Neither David Wayne nor Diane 
informed David that Eugene had executed a will. 
In 2003, David Wayne and Diane executed a statement of 
fiduciary in the probate court of Tennessee “to demonstrate to 
the court the need, or lack of need, for the continuation of the 
fiduciary’s services.”  The statement averred that Eugene 
continued to need conservators because his “condition remains 
[the] same – encephalopathy.” 
In 2004 David Wayne and Diane requested that David and his 
wife Jessika Parish (“Jessika”) take over as conservators and 
guardians of Eugene.  David and Jessika, who lived in Virginia 
Beach, petitioned the local circuit court in Virginia to 
adjudicate Eugene incompetent and appoint them as guardians and 
conservators.  The circuit court appointed a guardian ad litem 
(“GAL”), who reported that Eugene required a guardian and 
conservator. 
Specifically, the GAL reported that Eugene “had difficulty 
speaking but was communicative and obviously could understand 
your guardian ad litem’s questions and was able to respond.”  In 
response to one of the GAL’s questions, Eugene “indicated that 
he was aware of the guardian/conservator proceeding, and even 
                     
3 In the absence of a will, Eugene’s entire estate would 
pass to his son David under Virginia’s law of intestacy. Code 
 
4
pointed out that his son’s name was incorrect in the original 
Petition.”  The GAL further stated that Eugene’s “understanding 
of his finances, however, seemed to be somewhat impaired in that 
he indicated that he presently had $3.5 million in the bank, 
obviously not recognizing the fact that his funds have been 
expended over the last twenty years in caring for him.” 
The Virginia circuit court granted the petition.  The 2004 
order appointing a temporary conservator found that Eugene “is 
incapacitated to such an extent that he is unable to care for 
himself, make medical decisions, manage his estate or understand 
his debts as they come due.” 
Eugene died in 2006.  David qualified as his administrator.  
Diane then petitioned the circuit court to have David removed as 
administrator and herself appointed as executor pursuant to 
Eugene’s will.4  David filed a counterclaim to impeach the will.  
David claimed that Eugene lacked testamentary capacity to 
execute a will due to encephalopathy.  He further claimed that 
David Wayne and Diane subjected Eugene to undue influence.  At 
trial, the court found that Diane had proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that Eugene had testamentary capacity, and 
that Eugene was not subjected to undue influence. 
                                                                  
§ 64.1-1. 
4 Diane averred that David Wayne had declined to serve as 
executor. 
 
5
David assigns error to the circuit court’s judgment as 
follows: 
(1) The trial court erred in holding that the decedent 
had testamentary capacity to execute his Last Will and 
Testament because when a person is adjudicated mentally 
incompetent, it is prima facie evidence of their 
testamentary incapacity, and in order to overcome a 
presumption of testamentary incapacity, the burden is on 
the proponent of the will to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that testamentary capacity existed 
at the time the will was drawn and executed, which 
petitioner failed to do.  
 
(2) The trial court erred in holding that the decedent 
was not subject to undue influence because a presumption 
of fraud was created when the conservators, during their 
time of service to decedent, assisted decedent in the 
execution of his will and were made major beneficiaries 
in that will, and petitioner failed to overcome that 
presumption.   
 
DISCUSSION 
A. EFFECT OF ADJUDICATIONS OF INCOMPETENCE 
Relying on Western State Hospital v. Wininger, 196 Va. 300, 
83 S.E.2d 446 (1954), David assigns error to the circuit court’s 
ruling that Eugene’s adjudications of incompetence did not 
invoke a presumption that he lacked capacity.  In Western State, 
we required clear and convincing proof of capacity to overcome a 
presumption of insanity when the testator previously was 
adjudicated insane.  Id. at 311-12, 83 S.E.2d at 452-53. 
However, we previously have held that “the mere fact that 
one is under a guardianship does not deprive him of the power to 
make a will.”  Gilmer v. Brown, 186 Va. 630, 637, 44 S.E.2d 16, 
 
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19 (1947).  See also Gibbs v. Gibbs, 239 Va. 197, 202, 387 
S.E.2d 499, 502 (1990) (“the appointment of a guardian cannot be 
regarded as prima facie evidence of mental incapacity”). 
In Gilmer, we explained:  
Mental weakness is not inconsistent with 
testamentary capacity.  A less degree of capacity 
is requisite for the execution of a will than for 
the execution of contracts and the transaction of 
ordinary business.  One may be capable of making a 
will yet incapable of disposing of his property by 
contract or of managing his estate.  Mental 
strength to compete with an antagonist and 
understanding to protect his own interest are 
essential in the transaction of ordinary business, 
while it is sufficient for the making of a will 
that the testator understands the business in 
which he is engaged, his property, the natural 
objects of his bounty, and the disposition he 
desires to make of his property.  The condition of 
being unable, by reason of weakness of mind, to 
manage and care for an estate, is not inconsistent 
with capacity to make a will. 
 
186 Va. at 637, 44 S.E.2d at 19 (internal citations and 
quotations omitted).  In Thomason v. Carlton, 221 Va. 845, 276 
S.E.2d 171 (1981), we revisited this issue: 
Neither sickness nor impaired intellect is 
sufficient, standing alone, to render a will 
invalid.  If at the time of its execution the 
testatrix was capable of recollecting her 
property, the natural objects of her bounty and 
their claims upon her, knew the business about 
which she was engaged and how she wished to 
dispose of her property, that is sufficient. 
 
Id. at 852, 276 S.E.2d at 175 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  
 
7
The mere fact that one is under a conservatorship is not an 
adjudication of insanity and does not create a presumption of 
incapacity.  The conservator statutes at issue here are 
instructive.  Florida law required that Eugene be shown 
“incapable of caring for himself or managing his property or 
. . . likely to dissipate or lose his property or inflict harm 
on himself or others.”  Former Fla. Stat. § 744.331 (as in 
effect prior to amendment by 1989 Fla. Laws ch. 89-96, § 35).  
Similarly, Tennessee law required a showing that Eugene was “in 
need of partial or full supervision, protection and assistance 
by reason of mental illness, physical illness or injury, 
developmental disability or other mental or physical 
incapacity.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-101(7).  Virginia’s statute 
requires showing that the respondent is “incapable of receiving 
and evaluating information effectively . . . to such an extent 
that the individual lacks the capacity to . . . manage property 
or financial affairs or provide for his support . . . without 
the assistance or protection of a conservator.”  Code § 37.2-
1000. 
None of these statutes required a specific factual finding 
that Eugene was incompetent to such an extent that he could not 
execute a will under the standard we articulated in Gilmer and 
Thomason.  Accordingly, the circuit court correctly ruled that 
Eugene’s adjudications of incompetence due to encephalopathy and 
 
8
the attendant appointments of conservators did not create a 
presumption of incapacity. 
B. CAPACITY 
In the absence of a presumption of incapacity, “[t]he 
proponent of the will bears the burden of proving the existence 
of testamentary capacity by a preponderance of evidence and 
retains that burden throughout the proceeding.”  Gibbs, 239 Va. 
at 199, 387 S.E.2d at 500.5  In Gibbs, we further explained that 
the proponent of the will is entitled to a 
presumption that testamentary capacity existed by 
proving compliance with all statutory requirements 
for the valid execution of the will. Once the 
presumption exists, the contestant then bears the 
burden of going forward with evidence to overcome 
this presumption, although the burden of 
persuasion remains with the proponent. 
 
Id. at 200, 387 S.E.2d at 501.  To overcome the presumption of 
capacity, we do not require clear and convincing proof; rather 
“the contestants need only go forward with evidence sufficient 
to rebut the presumption.”  Id. at 201, 387 S.E.2d at 501. 
David does not dispute that the will was duly executed 
according to Tennessee law; consequently the presumption of 
                     
5 Though the will was executed in Tennessee, we apply 
Virginia law to determine testamentary capacity.  Poole v. 
Perkins, 126 Va. 331, 336, 101 S.E. 240, 242 (1919) (recognizing 
exception to Virginia’s lex loci rule for issue of capacity). 
See also Rochester v. Rochester Corp., 316 F. Supp. 139, 140 
(E.D. Va. 1970), rev’d on other grounds, 450 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 
1971); Restatement (Second) of Conflicts §§ 239(d), 244(h) 
(1971). 
 
9
testamentary capacity applies and the burden of producing 
evidence shifted to David, the contestant of the will. 
David testified that Eugene mistook him for David Wayne 
during a visit in December 2002.  Eugene told David that he had 
a sister, but “[i]t was one of those things where he would send 
29 cents a day to like Somalia or something like that. . . .  He 
thought he had adopted a kid.”  Eugene constantly forgot things, 
and had short-term memory problems.  They had discussions about 
a trust fund, when actually there was no such trust. 
Jessika also testified that during the December 2002 visit 
Eugene mistook David for David Wayne.  David had to explain 
“that he was little David all grown up.”  She described Eugene 
as “not all there.”  She described his difficulty comprehending 
the value of money: “[A]t Christmas time, when he was in the 
nursing home, he wanted to buy every employee at the nursing 
home either a fur coat or car, and almost couldn’t be talked 
down from the idea.”  
David also presented the expert testimony of Dr. Eric 
Goldberg, a board certified neurologist who treated Eugene on 
three occasions from November 2004 through June 2005.  Dr. 
Goldberg testified that the condition of a person with a 
traumatic brain injury, such as that suffered by Eugene, is 
“static,” becoming neither better nor worse over time.  He 
testified that Eugene “could follow a two-part command,” that he 
 
10
“was not oriented to person, place or time,” and that he had “no 
short term-memory.”  In Dr. Goldberg’s opinion, Eugene was not 
able to understand and know the value of his estate or to 
remember all of his family members.  He concluded that Eugene 
easily could be influenced and was not competent to execute a 
will.  
We will assume without deciding that the testimony of 
David, Jessika, and Dr. Goldberg was sufficient to overcome the 
presumption of capacity.  Therefore, the burden to produce 
evidence of capacity shifted back to David Wayne, the proponent 
of the will.  Gibbs, 239 Va. at 200, 387 S.E.2d at 501. 
“[I]t is the time of execution of the will that is the 
critical time for determining testamentary capacity.” Thomason, 
221 Va. at 853, 276 S.E.2d at 175.  “[T]he testimony of those 
present at the factum – when the will is executed – is entitled 
to the greatest consideration.”  Id.  “[I]n determining the 
mental capacity of a testator, great weight is to be attached to 
the testimony of the draftsman of the will, of the attesting 
witnesses, and of attending physicians.”  Hall v. Hall, 181 Va. 
67, 76, 23 S.E.2d 810, 814 (1943). 
Leonard Kyles was the paralegal who assisted Eugene in 
drafting the will and was a witness to its execution.  Kyles 
testified that he was satisfied that Eugene knew what he was 
doing when he signed the will.  Cheryl Campbell witnessed the 
 
11
execution of the will to notarize Eugene’s signature.  She 
testified that Eugene, when asked what the document was, replied 
it was his last will and testament.  Eugene did not do or say 
anything to cause her concern as to his understanding of what 
was happening.     
Dr. Elbert Hines, Eugene’s treating physician at the 
nursing facility in Tennessee, testified that he saw Eugene at 
least once every 60 days, beginning in the fall of 2000.  He 
assessed Eugene in September 2002 and testified with a 
reasonable degree of medical probability that Eugene was not 
confused in any way, that he knew what it was he was doing and 
who his relatives were at that time.  Dr. Hines saw Eugene again 
in October and December 2002, and testified that he was alert 
and oriented to self and place and that he had not deteriorated 
since the September visit.  Dr. Hines concluded with a 
reasonable degree of medical probability that Eugene could 
understand what property he owned and to whom he was giving it. 
Additionally, David Wayne testified that on the day he took 
Eugene to sign his will, his mental condition was “just 
regular[,] just a regular guy.”  He further testified that 
Eugene was not confused and that he knew who all his family 
members were.  Diane testified that Eugene’s mental condition 
“was great,” and that she conversed with him about family, 
politics, and baseball.  Arnold Lindseth, Eugene’s attorney in 
 
12
the Tennessee conservatorship, testified that in January 2003 he 
spent approximately two hours with Eugene at a bank setting up 
accounts and Eugene “seemed lucid [the] whole time” and “aware 
of what was going on.” 
Catherine Logan was Eugene’s social worker at the nursing 
facility.  She testified that Eugene understood who he was and 
who his relatives were.  She testified that he suffered no 
cognitive impairment, “just short-term memory [problems].”  
However, she did testify that Eugene, who enjoyed feeding the 
pigeons outside the facility, sometimes thought he was feeding 
pigeons when he actually was feeding rats. Additionally, she 
stated that on the day Eugene signed the will he told her he was 
leaving half of his estate to “Little David,” his son, when in 
fact he left only 25% to him. 
We review the circuit court’s finding of capacity for 
sufficient evidence.  Eason v. Eason, 203 Va. 246, 253, 123 
S.E.2d 361, 366 (1962) (“where the case has been fairly 
presented and there is credible evidence to support the 
conclusion” of the fact-finder, this court will not disturb the 
verdict); Gilmer, 186 Va. at 642, 44 S.E.2d at 21 (trial court’s 
approval of a commissioner’s report on testator’s capacity 
“should not be disturbed unless its conclusions are at variance 
with the evidence”). 
 
13
This evidence is sufficient to support the circuit court’s 
ruling that Diane proved Eugene’s testamentary capacity.6  
Consequently we affirm the circuit court on that issue. 
C. UNDUE INFLUENCE 
We now turn to David’s claim that the circuit court erred 
in finding that David Wayne and Diane did not exercise undue 
influence over Eugene.  It has long been the general rule that 
“suspicious circumstances place a burden upon the proponents of 
a will to make a satisfactory explanation.”  Barnes v. Bess, 171 
Va. 1, 8, 197 S.E. 403, 405 (1938). 
In Martin v. Phillips, 235 Va. 523, 369 S.E.2d 397 (1988), 
we observed that in the will context “a presumption of undue 
influence arises when three elements are established: (1) the 
testator was old when his will was established; (2) he named a 
beneficiary who stood in a relationship of confidence or 
dependence; and (3) he previously had expressed an intention to 
make a contrary disposition of his property.”  Id. at 527, 369 
S.E.2d at 399.7 
                     
6 The circuit court ruled that that Diane proved Eugene’s 
testamentary capacity by clear and convincing evidence.  
However, only a preponderance of the evidence was required.  
Gibbs, 239 Va. at 199, 387 S.E.2d at 500. 
7 With respect to the issue of undue influence in the 
execution of deeds or leases, see Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. 
Beckner, 268 Va. 23, 33, 597 S.E.2d 34, 39 (2004) (overruling 
Martin in part on that issue and setting forth the alternative 
standards governing undue influence determinations relating to 
execution of deeds and leases). 
 
14
The factors discussed in Martin regarding persons of 
advanced age are equally applicable to other testators who have 
weakness of mind, whether from injury as in this case or from 
any other cause.  We hold that when a person with such weakness 
of mind has named a beneficiary with whom the testator stood in 
a relationship of confidence or dependence, and when the 
testator either previously had expressed a contrary intention or 
previously had expressed no intention regarding the disposition 
of his property, a presumption of undue influence arises. 
 
Our prior decisions contemplated undue influence in the 
context of elderly testators, not of young victims of brain 
injuries.  E.g., Hartman v. Strickler, 82 Va. 225, 238 (1886) 
(“Where a will executed by an old man differs from his 
previously expressed intentions, and is made in favor of those 
who stand in relations of confidence or dependence towards him, 
it raises a violent presumption of fraud and undue influence.”) 
(emphasis added); Whitelaw v. Sims, 90 Va. 588, 589, 19 S.E. 
113, 113 (1894) (“old person”); Culpepper v. Robie, 155 Va. 64, 
87, 154 S.E. 687, 696 (1930) (“ ‘old man’ ”) (quoting Hartman, 
82 Va. at 237).  Such a requirement is too restrictive in this 
case, since Eugene was 22 years old at the time of his severe 
brain injury and 41 when he executed his first and only will.  
Likewise a “contrary expression” regarding disposition of 
property would be highly unusual at age 22.  The record in this 
 
15
case does not demonstrate that Eugene even had significant 
property until after his brain injury.  We therefore hold that 
the age and contrary disposition requirements discussed in 
Martin are inappropriate in determining whether Eugene was 
unduly influenced by David Wayne, his conservator, his 
translator during the drafting of the will, and his major 
beneficiary who would have taken nothing had the estate passed 
by intestacy. 
 
“Once the presumption of undue influence arises, the burden 
of producing evidence tending to rebut the presumption shifts to 
the opposing party.”  Martin, 235 Va. at 529, 369 S.E.2d at 400.  
Therefore, under the standards applicable in the present 
context, the burden of producing evidence to rebut the 
presumption of undue influence shifts to Diane.  However, we 
note the following statements from the bench by the circuit 
judge: 
[E]ven if the Court were to apply an evidentiary 
presumption of undue influence against [Diane and 
David Wayne,] the . . . ultimate outcome of the 
case and the issue of clear and convincing 
evidence respecting the . . . intent of the 
testator, the ultimate outcome would be the same 
in this case, whether the Court applies the 
presumption or it doesn’t. 
 
The circuit court also noted there was “no evidence” of undue 
influence and there was evidence that “notwithstanding the 
impairments that he suffered, [Eugene] was a stubborn man. . . . 
 
16
if he did not want to do something, he damn well knew how to 
resist.” 
These statements by the circuit court clearly indicate that 
if the presumption of undue influence in fact had been applied, 
the court as the fact-finder in this case would not have ruled 
differently.  In conclusion, the circuit court, after 
considering all the evidence and weighing the credibility of all 
the witnesses, found by clear and convincing evidence – a higher 
standard than required – that Eugene had sufficient testamentary 
intent and he was not subject to undue influence.  We will not 
disturb that finding upon appeal. 
For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment. 
Affirmed. 
 
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