Case Title: Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternal Ass'n v. BOARD OF COUNTY

Citation: 207 Kan. 514, 485 P.2d 1297

Docket Number: 46,020

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1971-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
207 Kan. 514 (1971)
485 P.2d 1297
SIGMA ALPHA EPSILON FRATERNAL ASS'N, a Corporation, Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF DOUGLAS COUNTY, KANSAS, and BESSIE M. BENNETT, County Treasurer, Douglas County, Kansas, Appellees. ALPHA KAPPA LAMBDA BUILDING ASS'N, a Corporation, Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF DOUGLAS COUNTY, KANSAS, and BESSIE M. BENNETT, County Treasurer, Douglas County, Kansas, Appellees. ALPHA KAPPA LAMBDA BUILDING ASS'N, a Corporation, Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF DOUGLAS COUNTY, KANSAS, and BESSIE M. BENNETT, County Treasurer, Douglas County, Kansas, Appellees. SIGMA ALPHA EPSILON FRATERNAL ASS'N, a Corporation, Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF DOUGLAS COUNTY, KANSAS, and BESSIE M. BENNETT, County Treasurer, Douglas County, Kansas, Appellees.
No. 46,020

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 12, 1971.
*515 Walter J. Kennedy, of Hoskins, King, Springer, McGannon and Hahn, Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause, and Fred N. Six, of Barber, Emerson & Six, of Lawrence, was with him on the brief for appellants.
Daniel A. Young, county attorney, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FATZER, J.:
These four consolidated actions were filed pursuant to K.S.A. 79-2005 to recover real and personal property taxes paid under protest. The actions also sought to enjoin the defendants, and each of them, from the assessment and collection of such taxes in the future.
The actions were consolidated for trial, and tried to the district court. There is no error alleged as to rulings on motions pertaining to the pleadings; no error is alleged as to the admission or exclusion of evidence, and since there were no post-trial motions, no error is alleged in that respect. The only evidence introduced at the trial was by the plaintiffs, hence, there is no dispute as to the evidence.
The parties make no claim of error with respect to the findings of fact made by the district court, and concede the findings correctly recite all of the facts necessary for decision. The error claimed revolves around the issue whether there was substantial evidence to support the findings of the district court that the real and personal property owned by the plaintiff corporations did not constitute property used exclusively for educational purposes within the purview of the Kansas Constitution and statutes. (Art. 11, Sec. 1 of the Constitution, and K.S.A. 79-101 and 201 Third.)
The district court made findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the stipulation contained in the pretrial order and the evidence offered and received at the trial. Since all the issues are concisely stated and discussed in the district court's memorandum opinion, we quote its findings and conclusions in full:
Activity Amount
*519 "From the facts as found it is concluded that:
In harmony with its findings and conclusions, the district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants, and each of them, and against the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs contend the district court erred in finding the evidence failed to show their real and personal property to be so used as to be exempt from taxation under the Constitution and statutes heretofore referred to. We are of the opinion, the findings of the district court are amply supported by the evidence, and we conclude that, as did the district court, this case is controlled by Alpha Tau Omega v. Douglas County Comm'rs, 136 Kan. 675, 18 P.2d 573, where it was held:
It is abundantly clear from the evidence and the findings of the district court, that in addition to the educational use stressed by the plaintiffs, the property is used for fraternal purposes including initiations, for alumni reunions, homecoming activities, parties, rest, recreation, entertainment of guests, rush activities, and other social activities, and that the members of the active chapter of each fraternity participate in those activities as a fraternal group. In addition, the members send representatives to the conventions and meetings of the national fraternity and publish newsletters for its members and alumni. Over ten percent of the Sigma Alpha Epsilon income *520 is budgeted for activities as is nearly nine percent of the Alpha Kappa Lambda income.
Under the many decisions of this court, including Washburn College v. County of Shawnee, 8 Kan. [*] 334; St. Mary's College v. Crowl, 10 Kan. [*] 44; Sunday School Board of the Southern Baptist Convention v. McCue, 179 Kan. 1-5, 293 P.2d 234, and Kansas State Teachers Ass'n v. Cushman, 186 Kan. 489, 500, 501, 351 P.2d 19, the plaintiffs' claim that whether the property in question is "used exclusively" for educational purposes, means whether the property is "used primarily" for that purpose, cannot be sustained. The two terms are not synonymous, and our decisions so hold. The case of Kansas Wesleyan Univ. v. Salina County Comm'rs, 120 Kan. 496, 243 Pac. 1055, upon which the plaintiffs rely, was discussed at length and distinguished in Alpha Tau Omega v. Douglas County Comm'rs, supra, as being inapplicable to support their claim. The Wesleyan case was likewise discussed and distinguished as being inapplicable to support the claim of exclusive educational use of property claimed to be exempt from taxation in Kansas Teachers Ass'n v. Cushman, supra. It was held the total use of the property must be measured, and that since the headquarters building owned by the association was used in part for the individual benefit of the teacher members, the property was not used directly, immediately, solely and exclusively for educational purposes as those terms are defined by the decisions of this court. And so here.
We next turn to the district court's conclusion the furnishings of the plaintiffs' chapter houses were not exempt from taxation as household goods not used for the production of income as contemplated by Article 11, Section 1 of the Constitution.
The identical issue here presented, was involved in the case of Association of Sigma of Gamma Phi Beta, Inc., et al. v. Brookover, et al., No. 24060, in Douglas district court. In rendering judgment in that case, the district court filed a memorandum decision which states succinctly the grounds upon which the court's decision was based denying the plaintiffs' claimed exemption of "household goods." Because the issues and contentions are thoroughly discussed in the court's memorandum opinion, the pertinent portions are quoted:
This court is of the opinion the district court correctly interpreted and construed Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution, and the provisions of Section 79-201 here in question. It is apparent the exemption afforded by Section 1, Article 11 for "household goods not used in the production of income" was intended to replace the former constitutional exemption of "$200 for each family." Likewise, the legislature, in amending 79-201 and describing the property to the extent therein limited, provided that household goods and personal effects not used in the production of income, shall include "all items of furniture, cooking utensils, refrigerators ... used in or about the home ..." (Emphasis supplied.)
The legislative intent to not exempt the personal property of *523 the plaintiff corporations is clear. The word "household" has been defined as substantially synonymous with the word family, and means those dwelling under the same roof with a domestic head. (2 Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1462.) If doubt persists as to the meaning intended, one need look only to K.S.A. 77-201 which defines household as follows:
Members of each of the fraternities here involved do not legally comprise a family, and the corporate owners of each of the chapter houses and the personal property therein situated, may not be said to be householders.
The plaintiffs lastly argue the assessed personal properties are not used in the production of income, and attempt to show that the monthly house bills of the fraternity members are calculated to break even for the year's operation. The point is not well taken. The evidence clearly showed the plaintiffs are corporate owners which rent the houses and furnishings for cash, the proceeds of which are used to retire debts and acquire assets. The plaintiffs receive in excess of $140,000 income each year which they could not do without the property they claim is exempt from taxation.
The plaintiffs have not established any fact which tends to distinguish the operation of their fraternity houses from that of any other private person or corporate owner engaged in the sale of board and room to college students, and they are not entitled to the exemptions claimed. (Alpha Tau Omega v. Douglas County Comm'rs, Supra.) In the latter case, this court quoted with approval a portion of Mr. Justice Brewer's opinion for the court in Washburn College v. County of Shawnee, supra, as follows:
*524 The district court properly concluded the plaintiffs failed to show themselves to be within the terms of any constitutional or statutory exemption from taxation, and it did not err in entering judgment in favor of the defendants.