Case Title: Robes v. Town of Hartford

Citation: 161 Vt. 187, 636 A.2d 342

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1993-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROBES_V_TOWN_OF_HARTFORD.92-098; 161 Vt. 187; 636 A.2d 342

[Filed 10-Dec-1993]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-098


 Peter Robes, Ash Bullard                     Supreme Court
 Charles Potter, Michael Wood,
 Roy Hathorn and Fred Davis
                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Windsor Superior Court

 Town of Hartford, et al.                     September Term, 1993



 Richard W. Norton, J.

 William D. Cohen of Abell, Kenlan, Schwiebert & Hall, P.C., Rutland, for
    plaintiffs-appellants

 Peter F. Welch of Welch, Graham and Manby, White River Junction, for
    defendant-appellee



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.




      JOHNSON, J.  Plaintiffs, developers of new residential buildings in the
 Town of Hartford, appeal from the order of the superior court, which held
 that 24 V.S.A. { 3615, as that statute read in 1986, authorized the Town of
 Hartford to impose an impact fee on new developments to finance future
 expansion of the Town's sewage capacity.  Defendants appeal the trial
 court's award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs.  We affirm in part and
 reverse in part.
      The Town of Hartford operates a municipal sewage system to which all
 residential buildings are required to be connected.  On December 29, 1986,
 
 
 
 the Town's Board of Selectmen passed a resolution imposing a "Plant Impact
 Fee" on all residential structures not occupied before January 1, 1987, and
 on existing residential structures requiring additional demand for sewage
 services after January 1, 1987.  The Town assessed the impact fee at a rate
 of $600 per bedroom and assumed each structure would have three bedrooms,
 for a total fee of $1800 for each affected structure.  The purpose of the
 Plant Impact Fee was to collect capital funds to finance the future
 expansion of the Town's sewage capacity.
      Plaintiffs, after incurring and paying the Plant Impact Fee, filed
 suit to declare the Plant Impact Fee illegal, to enjoin the Town from
 further enforcement, and to recover their payments and other damages,
 including attorney's fees and costs.
      After a bench trial, the court entered judgment for defendants.  The
 court held that 24 V.S.A. { 3615 authorized the Town to impose the Plant
 Impact Fee and that the fee rate was both reasonable and rationally related
 to the Town's purpose of financing expansion or new construction of sewage
 facilities to meet anticipated needs.  The court, however, also held that
 the 1986 resolution (FN1) was "defective" insofar as it lacked a mechanism for
 returning capital funds that went unexpended after a reasonable period of
 time.  The court found that this defect was not fatal to the operation of
 the Plant Impact Fee and ordered the Town to amend its ordinance to require
 the refund of monies not expended within six years of collection.
 
 

 Nevertheless, the court awarded attorney's fees to plaintiffs, on the theory
 that plaintiffs' suit, though not successful, had been "meritorious" in
 bringing to light a defect that ultimately preserved a so-called "common
 fund."
      Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's findings that the Town had acted
 pursuant to statutory authority when it imposed the impact fee and that the
 fee rate was reasonable and related to a legitimate public purpose.  Defend-
 ants, on cross-appeal, claim that it was error for the trial court to award
 attorney's fees and costs to plaintiffs, who had not prevailed on any of
 their claims.  We address these issues in turn.
                                     I.
      Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred in holding that 24
 V.S.A. { 3615 authorized the Town to impose the Plant Impact Fee.  At the
 time the Town enacted its Plant Impact Fee in 1986, { 3615 authorized a
 municipality to establish sewage disposal charges, "to be paid at such times
 and in such manner as the [municipal sewage disposal] commissioners may
 prescribe," based on:  (1) metered water consumption; (2) the number and
 kind of plumbing fixtures; (3) the number of persons residing in or
 frequenting the premises served; (4) the appraised value of the premises; or
 (5) a combination of the enumerated bases or "any other equitable basis."
 24 V.S.A. { 3615 (1983) (amended 1989).(FN2)

 

      Plaintiffs argue that { 3615 permitted municipalities to impose a
 sewage charge only to recoup money expended on an existing municipal sewage
 system, not to collect money in anticipation of future needs.  Plaintiffs
 also argue that even if { 3615 did contemplate charges for future needs, the
 statute required that the Town use an "equitable basis" for establishing
 such charges; they contend that the Plant Impact Fee does not use an
 "equitable basis" and must be struck down.  We believe plaintiffs'
 interpretation of { 3615 is too narrow.
      Before turning to plaintiffs' arguments, we note that in Vermont a
 municipality has only those powers and functions expressly granted to it by
 the legislature, such additional functions as may be incident, subordinate
 or necessary to the exercise thereof, and such powers as are essential to
 the declared objects and purposes of the municipality.  Bryant v. Town of
 Essex, 152 Vt. 29, 36-37, 564 A.2d 1052, 1056 (1989).  We construe municipal
 acts strictly, and we resolve any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt con-
 cerning a municipality's authority to act against the municipality.  In re
 Ball Mountain Dam Hydroelectric Project, 154 Vt. 189, 192, 576 A.2d 124, 126
 (1990).
                                     A.
      Plaintiffs contend that { 3615 cannot authorize the Plant Impact Fee
 because the fee is not a "sewage disposal charge" based on actual use.
 They point to our holding in Kirchner v. Giebink, 150 Vt. 172,