Case Title: Felix F. v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11644

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11644 
 
FELIX F., a juvenile  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 5, 2015. - May 26, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, 
JJ. 
 
 
Youthful Offender Act.  Controlled Substances.  Grand Jury.  
Practice, Criminal, Grand jury proceedings, Indictment.  
Evidence, Grand jury proceedings, Threat. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on December 9, 2013. 
 
 
The case was heard by Spina, J. 
 
 
 
Paul R. Rudof, Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(Joseph D. Mulhern, Jr., Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
with him) for the juvenile. 
 
Shoshana E. Stern, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  The defendant, a juvenile, was indicted as a 
youthful offender under G. L. c. 119, § 54, for possession of 
heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32 (a).  Under the youthful offender statute, a juvenile may 
2 
 
be prosecuted as an adult if the charge involves the "infliction 
or threat of serious bodily harm."  G. L. c. 119, § 54.  Arguing 
that the evidence presented to the grand jury was insufficient 
to establish this requirement, the juvenile moved to dismiss the 
indictment.  A judge in the Juvenile Court denied the motion,1 
and the juvenile filed a petition for relief pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3.  This appeal, from the denial of the juvenile's 
petition, presents the issue whether evidence of the generalized 
potential for harm from the distribution and use of heroin meets 
the probable cause standard for "infliction or threat of serious 
bodily harm."2  We conclude that it does not and reverse the 
decision of the single justice denying the defendant's G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, petition.3 
                     
 
1 The juvenile was also indicted as a youthful offender on a 
charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, 
G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a).  The judge allowed the juvenile's 
motion to dismiss that indictment.  The Commonwealth does not 
contest the dismissal. 
 
 
2 Because the single justice concluded that there is no 
other adequate appellate remedy to the loss of the protective 
nature of juvenile proceedings if a juvenile is erroneously 
tried as a youthful offender, this court determined that the 
requirements of S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 
(2001), had been met and permitted the juvenile to pursue this 
appeal from the judgment of the single justice. 
 
 
3 If a youthful offender indictment is dismissed, the 
prosecutor must proceed by complaint, rather than indictment.  
See Commonwealth v. Quincy Q., 434 Mass. 859, 864 (2001). 
3 
 
 
Background.  Only one witness, a Taunton police officer, 
testified before the grand jury.  We summarize that testimony as 
background for our discussion.  On August 27, 2013, at 
approximately 2:45 P.M., the officer observed two males on an 
all-terrain, off-road vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed 
in the opposite direction on Oak Street in Taunton.  He was 
concerned for the safety of the males and other motorists 
because of the speed of travel and because the males were not 
wearing helmets, a requirement of all-terrain vehicle use. 
 
The males looked directly at the officer and then turned 
onto railroad tracks running perpendicular to the road.  The 
officer drove down various crossroads to the railroad tracks in 
an effort to get in front of the vehicle, eventually stopping 
his police cruiser twenty to thirty yards in front of the males.  
When the officer got out of his cruiser, the vehicle stopped and 
the two males identified themselves.  The driver was eighteen 
years of age and the juvenile, a passenger, was sixteen years of 
age. 
 
The juvenile got off of the vehicle without prompting.  The 
officer then ordered the driver to do so and both to lie on the 
ground.  After a second officer appeared, the first police 
officer pat frisked the driver while the second officer pat 
frisked the juvenile.  On the driver, the officer found a baggie 
containing a small amount of marijuana, approximately $300, two 
4 
 
bags of heroin the size of golf balls, two cellular telephones, 
a small white pill, and a lighter.  The substance found on the 
driver was field tested and indicated positive for heroin.  On 
the juvenile, the second officer found a mason jar full of 
marijuana, a small baggie of marijuana, and two cellular 
telephones.  Both the driver and the juvenile were arrested.  
Because the juvenile was on probation, he was taken to a 
juvenile detention facility.  When personnel at the detention 
facility were preparing the juvenile's clothes to be laundered, 
they found a larger baggie containing several smaller baggies of 
a substance, believed to be heroin, hidden in a hood of the 
juvenile's clothing. 
 
To support the intent to distribute element of the offense, 
the Commonwealth elicited testimony from the police officer 
identifying several factors indicative of distribution rather 
than personal use:  the packaging, the hidden location, and the 
quantity of heroin.  One of the cellular telephones carried by 
both the driver and the juvenile was a disposable, inexpensive 
telephone often used in the sale of narcotics.  The officer 
noted that the driver and the juvenile did not appear to be 
under the influence of any drugs and did not exhibit withdrawal 
symptoms. 
 
As to the requirement of the juvenile offender statute that 
the offense involve the "infliction or threat of serious bodily 
5 
 
harm," the Commonwealth adduced testimony that heroin is highly 
addictive and a "pretty nasty drug."  The officer related his 
professional experience with heroin overdoses, where users 
become extremely ill and die.  In addition to the description of 
the effect of heroin on users, the officer testified that the 
drug trade is associated with acts of violence, explaining that 
drug deals may result in "robberies, guns, knives, violence, you 
know, injuries involved.  It can be a very violent trade."  He 
added that persons involved in the drug trade as drug dealers 
are known to be dangerous to themselves as well as others.  No 
testimony suggested the juvenile's direct connection to any 
violence or threat of violence in the commission of the offense.  
The grand jury were instructed that they could consider the 
underlying facts of the offense in addition to the testimony 
describing the violent consequences of the drug trade to 
determine the defendant's youthful offender status. 
 
Discussion.  In order to support a youthful offender 
indictment, the Commonwealth must present evidence sufficient to 
support a finding of probable cause as to the following 
statutory requirements:  (1) the juvenile was between fourteen 
and seventeen years old at the time of the offense; (2) the 
offense, if committed by an adult, is punishable by imprisonment 
in State prison (i.e., a felony); and (3) the juvenile 
previously has been committed to the Department of Youth 
6 
 
Services, or "the offense involves the infliction or threat of 
serious bodily harm," or the juvenile committed certain 
enumerated firearms violations.  G. L. c. 119, § 54. 
 
The juvenile contests the sufficiency of the evidence to 
establish probable cause as to the third requirement, 
specifically that the offense charged must involve either "the 
infliction or threat of serious bodily harm," the only one of 
the three options for satisfying the requirement that could be 
applicable, and argues that the indictment must be dismissed on 
this ground.  See Commonwealth v. Washington W., 462 Mass. 204, 
209-210 (2012) (indictment subject to dismissal unless grand 
jury presented "with sufficient evidence to support a finding of 
probable cause" to believe requirements are satisfied); 
Commonwealth v. Quincy Q., 434 Mass. 859, 862-863 (2001).  The 
Commonwealth counters that the mere possession of heroin with 
the intent to distribute satisfies the definition of "threat" 
because heroin is inherently dangerous and possession of heroin 
with intent to distribute is a very serious crime that has the 
"potential" to cause actual serious bodily harm.  Although we 
agree that heroin is a dangerous drug with the potential to 
cause overdose deaths and that possession of the drug with 
intent to distribute is a serious crime, the potential for harm 
derived from heroin is not what the Legislature intended when 
7 
 
setting forth the "threat" requirement for a youthful offender 
indictment. 
 
In accordance with legislative intent and the approved 
usage of the term "threat," we hold that the definition of 
"threat" in the juvenile offender statute requires a 
communication or declaration, explicit or implicit, of an actual 
threat of physical injury by the juvenile.  Accordingly, we 
reject the Commonwealth's suggestion that a "threat," for this 
purpose, may be based solely on a potential for harm that may 
occur independently of the defendant's actions. 
 
We construe statutes according to the Legislature's intent 
as expressed in the words of the statute and read in light of 
"the ordinary and approved usage of the language."  Hanlon v. 
Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934), citing Commonwealth v. S.S. 
Kresge Co., 267 Mass. 145, 148 (1929).  "At the same time, a 
statute should be read as a whole to produce an internal 
consistency."  Telesetsky v. Wight, 395 Mass. 868, 873 (1985).  
Beginning with the words of the statute, the Legislature 
expressed its intent with regard to offenses that are serious 
and have a potential for harm but which do not themselves 
involve either an infliction or threat of serious bodily harm.  
In setting forth this requirement for a youthful offender 
indictment, the Legislature explicitly enumerated certain 
firearms offenses that trigger a youthful offender indictment, 
8 
 
but did not enumerate any drug offenses.  See G. L. c. 119, 
§ 54.  Like heroin, firearms are inherently dangerous,4 but only 
firearms offenses are specifically enumerated in the youthful 
offender statute.  If the Legislature intended "threat" to 
include a mere potential for harm, there would have been no need 
to separately enumerate firearms offenses. 
 
While this is our first opportunity to consider the 
application of the statute where the conduct underlying the 
crime does not itself involve an explicit threat and there is no 
identifiable victim, we are guided as well by our interpretation 
of the phrase, "threat of serious bodily harm," in prior cases 
under the juvenile offender statute.  See Washington W., 462 
Mass. at 210; Quincy Q., 434 Mass. at 863-864; Commonwealth v. 
Clint C., 430 Mass. 219, 225-226 (1999).  We have noted that the 
"infliction or threat of serious bodily harm" need not be an 
element of the crime itself, but the conduct constituting the 
offense must involve the infliction or threat of serious bodily 
harm.  Quincy Q., supra at 863, citing Clint C., supra at 225.  
The parties agree that the conduct test, not the element test, 
is operative here and that only the "threat" of serious bodily 
harm is at issue here. 
                     
 
4 See Commonwealth v. Tu Trinh, 458 Mass. 776, 784 (2011) 
(describing firearm as inherently dangerous weapon). 
9 
 
 
We discern no legally cognizable threat of serious bodily 
harm in the juvenile's conduct in this case.  From the evidence 
presented to the grand jury, it is undisputed that the juvenile 
did not engage in conduct that communicated an explicit threat 
to any person.  Where, as here, the juvenile has not made an 
explicit threat of serious bodily injury, we have considered 
whether the conduct involves an implicit threat based on the 
effect of that conduct on the victim.  See Washington W., 462 
Mass. at 210; Quincy Q., 434 Mass. at 863-864; Clint C., 430 
Mass. at 226.  In Clint C., supra at 220, the juvenile was 
indicted for rape of a child.  The juvenile had an authoritative 
and dominant position over the six year old victim for whom the 
juvenile was babysitting.  Id.  In those circumstances, the 
invasive nature of penetration combined with the young victim's 
vulnerability to domination by the older juvenile was sufficient 
to establish an implicit threat of serious bodily harm.  Id. at 
226.  In Washington W., supra at 210 & n.4, we emphasized that 
the juvenile's conduct must be considered in relation to the 
effect on the victim and rejected the Commonwealth's argument 
that the act of penetrating a child, without more, satisfies the 
threat of serious bodily harm component of the youthful offender 
statute.  We concluded, however, that the test was satisfied 
because the victim could reasonably perceive an implied threat 
10 
 
of bodily harm if he were to resist based on the juvenile's act 
of pushing him to the ground before penetration.  Id. at 210. 
 
Our holding today is in accord with our interpretations of 
"threat" in other contexts, which consider the effect of the 
defendant's actions on a victim where there has not been an 
explicit threat.  In our interpretation of the Massachusetts 
Civil Rights Act, G. L. c. 12, § 11I, we defined a "threat" as 
"the intentional exertion of pressure to make another fearful or 
apprehensive of injury or harm."  Kennie v. Natural Resource 
Dep't of Dennis, 451 Mass. 754, 755, 763 (2008), quoting Planned 
Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Blake, 417 Mass 467, 474, 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868 (1994).  The offense of threat to 
commit a crime, G. L. c. 275, § 2, requires that there be "an 
expression of intention to inflict a crime on another"; the 
expression may contain an explicit or implicit threat.  See 
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 426-427 (2011), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Sholley, 432 Mass. 721, 725 (2000), cert. 
denied, 532 U.S. 980 (2001).  For purposes of the rape statute, 
G. L. c. 265, § 22, "threats of bodily harm" may be expressed or 
implied, so long as it is reasonable in the circumstances for 
the complainant to be in fear and not resist.  Commonwealth v. 
Sherry, 386 Mass. 682, 694, 696 (1982).  Further, a "threat," 
for purposes of the offense of accosting or annoying a person of 
the opposite sex, G. L. c. 272, § 53, may occur "even in the 
11 
 
absence of an explicit statement of an intention to harm the 
victim as long as circumstances support the victim's fearful or 
apprehensive response."  Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 Mass. 229, 
234 (2001).  None of these cases relies on a mere potential for 
harm independent of the defendant's specific conduct; instead, 
they consider whether the defendant made an explicit threat of 
bodily harm or if the defendant's conduct created an implied 
threat through its effects on the victim, neither of which 
occurred here. 
 
The Commonwealth attempts to distinguish the facts of this 
case by analogizing to manslaughter convictions where 
distribution of heroin was determined to be conduct that 
"involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will 
result to another."  Commonwealth v. Catalina, 407 Mass. 779, 
780, 789 (1990), quoting Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 
383, 399 (1944).  Commonwealth v. Auditore, 407 Mass. 793, 796 
(1990), quoting Welansky, supra.  Those cases support our view, 
however, because the court considered whether the defendant 
engaged in the wanton or reckless conduct necessary for the 
manslaughter conviction by reviewing the defendant's actions and 
the circumstances of the heroin distribution.  In Catalina, 
supra at 790 & n.12, the defendant's knowledge that the heroin 
was highly potent and that the recipient had a low tolerance and 
a prior overdose were considered in connection with the inherent 
12 
 
dangerousness of the drug.  In Auditore, supra at 796, the court 
considered the defendant's sale of a type of heroin that was two 
times stronger than the average dose and had previously caused 
two deaths in the local area. 
 
In this case, the evidence presented to the grand jury 
lacked any information about the potency of the heroin found on 
the juvenile.  As there was no identifiable buyer, there was no 
information about known history of abuse or the effect that a 
sale could have on a buyer.  Although there was evidence that 
drug deals can result in "robberies, guns, knives, [and] 
violence," there was no evidence that the juvenile's offense 
involved weapons or violent conduct.  With other evidence that 
the juvenile's conduct created an implied threat of serious 
bodily harm, possession of heroin with the intent to distribute 
could be a factor supporting that finding.  The mere potential 
for serious bodily injury or death from the sale or use of 
heroin, however, without evidence of an explicit or implied 
threat tied to the juvenile's conduct, is insufficient to 
support a youthful offender indictment. 
 
Conclusion.  Because the evidence presented to the grand 
jury does not support a finding that the juvenile's conduct 
explicitly or implicitly created a threat of serious bodily 
harm, we reverse the decision of the single justice denying the 
defendant's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition.  The case is remanded 
13 
 
to the county court, where the single justice is directed to 
enter an order reversing the Juvenile Court judge's order 
denying the defendant's motion to dismiss. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.