Case Title: Roma, III, Ltd. v. Board of Appeals of Rockport

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12278

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-01-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12278 
 
ROMA, III, LTD.  vs.  BOARD OF APPEALS OF ROCKPORT. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 6, 2017. - January 8, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, 
JJ. 
 
 
Municipal Corporations, By-laws and ordinances.  Zoning, 
Validity of by-law or ordinance, Private landing area.  
Federal Preemption. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on 
March 12, 2015. 
 
 
The case was heard by Robert B. Foster, J., on motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Jackie Cowin for the defendant. 
 
Nicholas Preston Shapiro (Robert K. Hopkins also present) 
for the plaintiff. 
 
Maura Healy, Attorney General, & Elizabeth N. Dewar, State 
Solicitor, for division of aeronautics of the Department of 
Transportation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  A judge of the Land Court barred the town of 
Rockport (town) from enforcing a zoning bylaw that prohibited 
2 
 
the use of land for a private heliport without some form of 
approval, variance, or special permit because the bylaw had not 
been approved by the division of aeronautics of the Department 
of Transportation (division).  The issue on appeal is whether 
cities and towns may exercise their zoning authority to 
determine whether land in their communities may be used as a 
noncommercial private restricted landing area, here a heliport, 
or whether they may do so only with the approval of the division 
because the exercise of such zoning authority is preempted by 
the State's aeronautics statutes, G. L. c. 90, §§ 35-52 
(aeronautics code).  We hold that there is no clear legislative 
intent to preempt local zoning enactments with respect to 
noncommercial private restricted landing areas, and that a city 
or town does not need the prior approval of the division to 
enforce a zoning bylaw that requires some form of approval, 
variance, or special permit for land to be used as a private 
heliport.1 
 
Background.  Roma, III, Ltd. (plaintiff), is the owner of 
1.62 acres of oceanfront property in Rockport (property).  The 
property, improved by a single-family residence, is located in 
                                                          
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the division 
of aeronautics of the Department of Transportation (division).  
We also note that, although G. L. c. 90, §§ 35-52 (aeronautics 
code), makes reference to the "commission," the Transportation 
Reform Act of 2009, St. 2009, c. 25, § 150 (4), transferred the 
powers and duties of the former aeronautics commission to the 
division. 
3 
 
what is classified as a residential A zoning district. 
 
Ron Roma (Roma) is licensed as a helicopter pilot and 
regularly uses the helicopter he owns to travel to his various 
family homes, business engagements, and other activities.  Roma 
does not operate his helicopter for any commercial purpose.  In 
September, 2013, following Roma's request for a determination of 
airspace suitability for a private helicopter landing area on 
the property, the Federal Aviation Administration recognized the 
property as a licensed private use heliport.  Roma also received 
approval following an airspace review from the division.  The 
heliport on the property is a flat section of lawn near the 
ocean with a windsock installed to indicate the direction of the 
wind.  Roma stores his helicopter in a hangar located at the 
Beverly Airport. 
 
On November 14, 2014, Roma flew his helicopter to the 
property.  Later that month, the town building inspector issued 
an enforcement order stating that "a heliport is not allowed, 
either as a principal use of the property or an accessory use, 
in any zoning district in the [t]own," and that the use of the 
property for the landing of a helicopter is in violation of the 
town's bylaw.  The town building inspector ordered "that the 
landing of helicopters on the property be stopped immediately" 
and that the "[f]ailure to comply with this order may result in 
fines of up to $300 per day." 
4 
 
 
The plaintiff filed an appeal from the enforcement order to 
the board of appeals of Rockport (board).  After a public 
hearing, the board voted unanimously to deny the appeal.  It 
later issued a written decision noting that, under § I.B of the 
town zoning bylaw, uses that are not expressly permitted are 
deemed prohibited.  That section states that "[n]o parcel of 
land in any district shall be used for any purpose other than 
those authorized for the district in which it is located."  The 
board found that, because neither the table of permitted uses in 
§ III.B of the bylaw nor any other section of the bylaw 
authorizes the use of land for a heliport, the private heliport 
on the plaintiff's land was not permitted.  Nor, the board 
concluded, is the heliport allowed as a "customarily incidental" 
accessory use or as an accessory use normally associated with a 
one-family detached dwelling that is not detrimental to a 
residential neighborhood.  Consequently, the heliport would 
require "some form of approval, variance and/or special permit" 
after a separate hearing.  The board found that "[h]elicopter 
landings in a dense[,] village-style neighborhood are neither a 
minor nor an insignificant event" and that "[t]he vibration and 
noise resounding in this neighborhood[,] even when an over-ocean 
approach path would be utilized would, in the judgment of this 
[b]oard, be detrimental." 
 
The plaintiff filed a timely complaint appealing from the 
5 
 
board's decision to the Land Court, followed by two amended 
complaints, and the parties thereafter cross-moved for summary 
judgment.  The judge concluded that he was "constrained to 
apply" the Appeals Court's holding in Hanlon v. Sheffield, 89 
Mass. App. Ct. 392 (2016), which interpreted G. L. c. 90, § 39B, 
to indicate that a town may not enforce a zoning bylaw that 
would prohibit a private landowner from creating a noncommercial 
private restricted landing area on his or her property, unless 
the relevant bylaw had been approved by the division.2  Because 
the town zoning bylaw had not been approved by the division, the 
judge granted summary judgment to the plaintiff.3  We granted the 
board's application for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  Because the judge concluded that his decision 
was dictated by the controlling authority in Hanlon, which 
interpreted § 39B, we begin by discussing that statute.  Section 
39B, as enacted in 1946, consisted of what currently comprises 
the first, third, fourth, and sixth paragraphs of the statute, 
followed shortly thereafter by the insertion of the second 
paragraph in 1948.  In essence, as relevant here, the first 
through third paragraphs provide that, before a city or town 
                                                          
 
 
2 The judge noted that the decision in Hanlon v. Sheffield, 
89 Mass. App. Ct. 392 (2016), "may merit revisiting." 
 
 
3 Because he granted the motion for summary judgment filed 
by Roma, III, Ltd. (plaintiff), based on the holding in Hanlon, 
the judge did not reach the other claims advanced by the 
plaintiff. 
6 
 
acquires any property to construct, enlarge, or improve "an 
airport[4] or restricted landing area,"5 it must first apply to 
the division for a certificate of approval of the site.  
However, the fourth paragraph of § 39B provides: 
 
"This section shall not apply to restricted landing 
areas designed for non-commercial private use, nor to any 
airport, restricted landing area or other air navigation 
facility owned or operated within the commonwealth by the 
federal government; provided, that each person[6] 
constructing or maintaining a restricted landing area for 
non-commercial private use shall so inform the [division] 
in writing; and provided, further, that such person shall 
construct and maintain said restricted landing area in such 
manner as shall not endanger the public safety." 
 
As a result of the fourth paragraph, a private landowner who 
wishes to establish a noncommercial private restricted landing 
area does not need prior division approval; the landowner simply 
needs to inform the division in writing of its establishment, 
                                                          
 
 
4 An "[a]irport" is defined as "any area of land or water 
other than a restricted landing area, which is used, or intended 
for use, for the landing and take-off of aircraft, and any 
appurtenant areas which are used, or intended for use, for 
airport buildings or other airport facilities or rights-of-way, 
together with all airport buildings and facilities located 
thereon."  G. L. c. 90, § 35 (e). 
 
 
5 A "[r]estricted landing area" is defined as "any area of 
land or water other than an airport which is used, or is made 
available, for the landing and take-off of aircraft; provided, 
that the use of such an area may be restricted from time to time 
by the [division]."  G. L. c. 90, § 35 (f). 
 
 
6 A "[p]erson" is defined as "any individual, firm, 
partnership, corporation, company, association, joint stock 
association; and includes any trustee, receiver, assignee or 
other similar representative thereof."  G. L. c. 90, § 35 (o).  
This definition excludes cities, towns, and other government 
entities. 
7 
 
and ensure that it is not built or maintained in a manner that 
would endanger the public safety.   
 
In 1985, § 39B was amended to add a fifth paragraph, which 
provides: 
 
"A city or town in which is situated the whole or any 
portion of an airport or restricted landing area owned by a 
person may, as to so much thereof as is located within its 
boundaries, make and enforce rules and regulations relative 
to the use and operation of aircraft on said airport or 
restricted landing area.  Such rules and regulations, 
ordinances or [bylaws] shall be submitted to the [division] 
and shall not take effect until approved by the 
[division]." 
 
Under this provision, a city or town may enact rules and 
regulations governing "the use and operation of aircraft" at an 
airport or restricted landing area, but these rules and 
regulations cannot become effective until the division has 
approved them.  On its face, the fifth paragraph applies to all 
restricted landing areas; unlike the fourth paragraph, it is not 
limited to noncommercial private restricted landing areas.  
However, because the fourth paragraph declares that "[§ 39B] 
shall not apply to restricted landing areas designed for non-
commercial private use," the defendants in Hanlon and the board 
here contended that the language of the fifth paragraph that 
requires division approval of all "rules and regulations 
relative to the use and operation of aircraft on said . . . 
restricted landing area" does not apply to noncommercial private 
restricted landing areas. 
8 
 
 
The Appeals Court in Hanlon, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 396-397, 
rejected this argument, interpreting § 39B to require prior 
division approval before any city or town regulation "relative 
to the use and operation of aircraft" on a noncommercial private 
restricted landing area becomes effective.  The Appeals Court 
reasoned that the sole source of a town's authority to regulate 
the use and operation of aircraft derives from the fifth 
paragraph of § 39B; consequently, if the fourth paragraph 
eliminated this authority with respect to noncommercial private 
restricted landing areas, the town would have no authority to 
regulate the use and operation of aircraft in these areas.  Id. 
at 395.  According to the Appeals Court, its decision declining 
to interpret the fourth paragraph as removing this authority 
conserved the authority granted to the town under the fifth 
paragraph by allowing it to regulate the use and operation of 
aircraft in noncommercial private restricted landing areas, 
albeit subjecting that regulation to prior division approval.  
Id. 
 
The flaw in this reasoning is that, under the zoning bylaw 
in the town of Sheffield, land may not be used as a 
noncommercial private restricted landing area without specific 
zoning board approval in the form of a variance or special 
permit, which Hanlon had not obtained.  The relevant question in 
Hanlon, therefore, was not whether a city or town may regulate 
9 
 
"the use and operation of aircraft" on what was already a 
noncommercial private restricted landing area.  Rather, the 
relevant question was whether a city or town may regulate the 
use of land within its community through a zoning bylaw, and 
therefore determine whether a private landowner may use his or 
her land to establish a noncommercial private restricted landing 
area.  In short, what was at issue in Hanlon was not the "use 
and operation of aircraft," the regulation of which was governed 
by § 39B, but the use of land, the regulation of which has 
traditionally been within the domain of cities and towns through 
their zoning authority.  Accordingly, regardless of whether 
§ 39B is the sole source of a city or town's authority to 
regulate the "use and operation of aircraft," it plainly is not 
the source of a city or town's authority to regulate the use of 
land.7 
 
The Legislature has long bestowed broad authority on cities 
and towns to regulate the use of land through various zoning 
enactments.  See generally M. Bobrowski, Handbook of 
Massachusetts Land Use and Planning Law § 2.03 (3d ed. 2011).  
Article 89 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, 
ratified in 1966 and known as the Home Rule Amendment, provides 
                                                          
 
 
7 We note that the town of Sheffield did not advance any 
arguments on appeal in Hanlon and that no party in that case 
argued that the town's authority to determine whether land may 
be used as a noncommercial private restricted landing area 
rested within its traditional zoning authority. 
10 
 
that "[a]ny city or town may, by the adoption, amendment, or 
repeal of local ordinances or by-laws, exercise any power or 
function which the general court has power to confer upon it, 
which is not inconsistent with the constitution or laws enacted 
by the general court."  Art. 89, § 6, of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution.  See G. L. c. 43B, § 13 (Home Rules 
Procedures Act, which implements Home Rule Amendment).  See also 
Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm., 363 Mass. 
339, 359 (1973) ("zoning power is one of a city's or town's 
independent municipal powers included in [the Home Rule 
Amendment's] broad grant of powers to adopt ordinances or by-
laws for the protection of the public health, safety, and 
general welfare").  The authority of cities and towns to enact 
zoning bylaws, however, predates the adoption of the Home Rule 
Amendment.  In 1954, the Legislature enacted the Zoning Enabling 
Act, which, among other things, granted cities and towns the 
power to restrict the use, location, and construction of 
buildings through their enactment of ordinances or bylaws.  See 
G. L. c. 40A, §§ 1-22, inserted by St. 1954, c. 368, § 2.  Under 
G. L. c. 40A §§ 1-17 (Zoning Act), which replaced its 
predecessor in 1975, "[a] municipality may enact zoning 
provisions to deal with a variety of matters, including fire 
safety; density of population and intensity of use; the adequate 
provision of water, water supply, and sewerage; the conservation 
11 
 
of natural resources; and the prevention of pollution of the 
environment."  Sturges v. Chilmark, 380 Mass. 246, 253 (1980).  
See St. 1975, c. 808, § 2A.  "From the wide scope of the 
purposes of [t]he Zoning Act, it is apparent that the 
Legislature intended to permit cities and towns to adopt any and 
all zoning provisions which are constitutionally permissible, 
subject, however, to limitations expressly stated in that act 
(see, e.g., G. L. c. 40A, § 3) or in other controlling 
legislation."  Sturges, supra.  In fact, the breadth of the 
zoning power is reflected in the definition of the term 
"[z]oning" in the Zoning Act:  "ordinances and by-laws, adopted 
by cities and towns to regulate the use of land, buildings and 
structures to the full extent of the independent constitutional 
powers of cities and towns to protect the health, safety and 
general welfare of their present and future inhabitants."  G. L. 
c. 40A, § 1A. 
 
We have previously recognized the authority of a town, 
through its zoning bylaw, to prohibit a noncommercial private 
restricted landing area, albeit in a case where the division was 
not a party and where the issue of preemption was not raised.  
In Harvard v. Maxant, 360 Mass. 432, 433, 435-436, 440 (1971), 
we affirmed a town's application of its local zoning bylaw to 
prohibit a landowner from using his property in a residential-
agricultural district as a private landing strip for aircraft 
12 
 
owned by him and his son.  We concluded that a private landing 
strip, if considered the primary use of the land, was not a 
permissible use in that zoning district, id. at 436, and was not 
"customarily incidental" to the permissible residential use.  
Id. at 437-440. 
 
The plaintiff contends, however, that, unless approved in 
advance by the division, the town's zoning bylaw that prohibits 
the use of land to establish a noncommercial private restricted 
landing area is barred by State preemption doctrine because the 
Legislature, in enacting the statutes that comprise the 
aeronautics code, G. L. c. 90, §§ 35-52, intended to preclude 
this exercise of local zoning power.  Although the plaintiff 
does not contend that Federal preemption bars enforcement of the 
town's bylaw, our preemption analysis begins there because it is 
important to recognize what spheres in the realm of aeronautics 
are, and are not, exclusively governed by Federal regulation. 
 
1.  Federal preemption.  The doctrine of preemption 
originates from the supremacy clause of the United States 
Constitution, which provides that "[t]his Constitution, and the 
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . ."  
U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.  See Chadwick v. Board of 
Registration in Dentistry, 461 Mass. 77, 84 (2011).  "A Federal 
statute may preempt State law when it explicitly or by 
13 
 
implication defines such an intent, or when a State statute 
actually conflicts with Federal law or stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment of Federal objectives."  Boston v. 
Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 453 Mass. 389, 396 
(2009).  See Hoagland v. Clear Lake, Ind., 415 F.3d 693, 696 
(7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1004 (2006) (identifying 
"three ways in which [F]ederal law can preempt [S]tate and local 
law:  express preemption, conflict [or implied] preemption, and 
field [or complete] preemption").  The critical question in 
preemption analysis is whether Congress intended Federal law to 
supersede State law, see Bay Colony R.R. Corp. v. Yarmouth, 470 
Mass. 515, 518 (2015), but unless Congress's intent to do so is 
clearly manifested, we do not presume that Congress intended to 
displace State law on a particular subject.  See Boston, supra. 
 
Under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAA), 49 U.S.C. 
§§ 40101 et seq., "[t]he United States Government has exclusive 
sovereignty of airspace of the United States."  49 U.S.C. 
§ 40103(a)(1).  "The Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
Administration shall develop plans and policy for the use of the 
navigable airspace and assign by regulation or order the use of 
the airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the 
efficient use of airspace."  49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1). Federal 
courts have found preemption in matters pertaining to aircraft 
noise and aircraft safety, concluding that Federal regulation is 
14 
 
too pervasive in these areas to permit regulation at the State 
or local level.  See, e.g., Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal 
Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973); Abdullah v. American Airlines, 
Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 1999); French v. Pan Am 
Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1989); Pirolo v. 
Clearwater, 711 F.2d 1006, 1009-1010 (11th Cir. 1983); San Diego 
Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306, 1316 (9th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied sub nom. Department of Transp. v. San Diego 
Unified Port Dist., 455 U.S. 1000 (1982). 
 
Federal case law, however, has distinguished the preempted 
regulation of flight operations from the permitted regulation of 
aircraft landing sites.  In Gustafson v. Lake Angelus, 76 F.3d 
778, 783 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 823 (1996), the 
court upheld a municipal ordinance prohibiting seaplanes from 
landing on a lake, reasoning that Federal regulation of airspace 
and the regulation of aircraft in flight is distinct from the 
regulation of the designation of aircraft landing sites, "which 
involves local control of land . . . use."  Similarly, in Condor 
Corp. v. St. Paul, 912 F.2d 215, 219 (8th Cir. 1990), the court 
upheld a municipal land use decision denying a permit for the 
operation of a heliport, concluding that there was "no conflict 
between a city's regulatory power over land use, and the 
[F]ederal regulation of airspace."  See Hoagland, 415 F.3d at 
696-697 (town zoning ordinance designating heliport as special 
15 
 
use requiring special permission of zoning board of appeals not 
preempted by FAA); Faux-Burhans v. County Comm'rs of Frederick 
County, 674 F. Supp. 1172, 1174 (D. Md. 1987), aff'd, 859 F.2d 
149 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1042 (1989) ("no 
[F]ederal law gives a citizen the right to operate an airport 
free of local zoning control").  Within the Federal aviation 
framework, land use matters are "intrinsically local," 
Gustafson, 76 F.3d at 784, and the zoning of a heliport "remains 
an issue for local control."  Hoagland, 415 F.3d at 697. 
 
2.  State preemption.  State preemption analysis is similar 
to Federal preemption analysis in that we determine whether the 
Legislature intended to preclude local action, recognizing that 
"[t]he legislative intent to preclude local action must be 
clear" (citation omitted).  Wendell v. Attorney Gen., 394 Mass. 
518, 523 (1985).  See Bloom v. Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 155 
(1973) (in determining under Home Rule Amendment whether local 
ordinance or bylaw is "not inconsistent" with any statute, "the 
same process of ascertaining legislative intent must be 
performed as has been performed in the Federal preemption 
cases").  Legislative intent may be "express or inferred," that 
is, "local action is precluded either where the 'Legislature has 
made an explicit indication of its intention in this respect,' 
or where 'the purpose of State legislation would be frustrated 
[by a local enactment] so as to warrant an inference that the 
16 
 
Legislature intended to preempt the field.'"  St. George Greek 
Orthodox Cathedral of W. Mass., Inc. v. Fire Dep't of 
Springfield, 462 Mass. 120, 126 (2012), quoting Wendell, supra 
at 524.  "[A] local regulation will not be invalidated unless 
the court finds a 'sharp conflict' between the local and State 
provisions."  Doe v. Lynn, 472 Mass. 521, 526 (2015), quoting 
Easthampton Sav. Bank v. Springfield, 470 Mass. 284, 289 (2014). 
 
The plaintiff does not contend that the Legislature, in 
enacting the aeronautics code, explicitly indicated its intent 
to preempt local zoning enactments concerning noncommercial 
private restricted landing areas.8  Instead, the plaintiff argues 
that we should infer a clear intent to preempt such local zoning 
enactments to prevent frustration of the legislative purpose of 
the aeronautics code, except where a city or town obtains 
division approval of the enactment.  Consequently, we must 
determine whether "the local enactment prevents the achievement 
of a clearly identifiable [legislative] purpose."  Wendell, 394 
Mass. at 524.  Where there is no express legislative intent to 
preempt, "[i]f . . . the State legislative purpose can be 
achieved in the face of a local by-law on the same subject, the 
                                                          
 
 
8 As an example of explicit or express preemption, see 49 
U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) ("Except as provided in this subsection, a 
State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority 
of at least [two] States may not enact or enforce a law, 
regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of 
law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that 
may provide air transportation under this subpart"). 
17 
 
local by-law is not [held to be] inconsistent with the State 
legislation."  Id. 
 
Under the aeronautics code, the division has "general 
supervision and control over aeronautics."  G. L. c. 90, § 39.  
"Aeronautics" is defined to include, among other things, 
"transportation by aircraft; the operation . . . of aircraft 
. . . ; [and] the design, establishment, construction, 
extension, operation, improvement, repair or maintenance of 
airports, restricted landing areas or other air navigation 
facilities."  G. L. c. 90, § 35 (a).  The purpose of the 
division is to "foster air commerce and private flying within 
the [C]ommonwealth."  G. L. c. 90, § 40.  To advance this 
purpose, the division, among other things, "shall . . . 
encourage the establishment of airports and air navigation 
facilities."  Id.  The division is required to "prepare and 
revise from time to time a plan for the development of airports 
and air navigation facilities in the [C]ommonwealth."  G. L. 
c. 90, § 39A.  "Such plan shall specify, in terms of general 
location and type of development, the projects considered by the 
[division] to be necessary to provide a system of airports 
adequate to anticipate and meet the needs of civil aeronautics 
within the [C]ommonwealth."  Id.  The division, subject to 
appropriation by the Legislature, also may "construct, establish 
and maintain air navigational facilities within the 
18 
 
[C]ommonwealth," and may take, by eminent domain, the property 
needed to do so.  Id. 
 
Section 39B provides that no city or town may acquire 
property for the purpose of constructing or enlarging an airport 
or restricted landing area without the division's approval of 
the site.  See G. L. c. 90, § 39B.  However, § 39B also provides 
that no such approval is required where a private landowner 
seeks to create a noncommercial private restricted landing area.  
Id.  All that is required is that the person constructing or 
maintaining this type of landing area notify the division in 
writing and operate the landing area in a manner that does not 
jeopardize the public safety.  Id.  Under the aeronautics code, 
as long as safety is not threatened, it is inconsequential 
whether the noncommercial private restricted landing area is 
located in a densely populated residential neighborhood, or 
whether noise, vibrations, fumes, dust, and wind arising from a 
heliport will interfere with the neighbors' enjoyment of their 
property.  Consequently, if local zoning bylaws are preempted by 
the aeronautics code, a city or town will be unable to protect 
its residents from any of the potential harms and deleterious 
consequences that may arise from the location of a noncommercial 
private restricted landing area, unless the division agrees to 
the proposed restriction.  The plaintiff (and the division in 
its amicus brief) contend that, if cities and towns are allowed 
19 
 
without division approval to enact zoning bylaws that will 
prevent private landowners from establishing noncommercial 
private restricted heliports or landing areas on their property, 
the division's legislative mandate, under G. L. c. 90, § 40, to 
"foster . . . private flying within the [C]ommonwealth" will be 
so frustrated that we can infer a legislative intent to prohibit 
such zoning restrictions.  We are not persuaded by this argument 
for two reasons. 
 
First, the legislative purpose of "foster[ing] . . . 
private flying" does not suggest a legislative intent to 
encourage the development of private heliports and landing areas 
so that persons may land their helicopters and aircraft on their 
own private property.  The Legislature, in directing the 
division to prepare and revise plans for the development of 
airports and air navigation facilities in the Commonwealth, 
specifically required that the plan focus on projects needed "to 
provide a system of airports" adequate to meet the needs of 
civil aeronautics.  See G. L. c. 90, § 39A.  The Legislature did 
not direct the division to focus on providing a system of 
noncommercial private restricted landing areas to meet those 
needs.  This suggests that the Legislature recognized that 
private flying may be effectively fostered through the 
construction and expansion of airports and, perhaps, commercial 
restricted landing areas; the record is devoid of any suggestion 
20 
 
that the Legislature considered noncommercial private restricted 
landing areas to be necessary, or even central, to the 
division's mission of fostering private flying.  Therefore, even 
if every city and town were to enact zoning bylaws that would 
prohibit the use of land for noncommercial private restricted 
landing areas without some form of approval, variance, or 
special permit, and even if this were to cause some persons to 
cease private flying if they cannot land their helicopter or 
aircraft on their own property, this consequence is insufficient 
to warrant a finding of preemption where it would not 
significantly impair the State's legislative purpose of 
fostering private flying.  See Bloom, 363 Mass. at 156 
(existence of legislation on subject "is not necessarily a bar 
to the enactment of local ordinances and by-laws" affecting that 
subject if State legislative purpose can still be achieved). 
 
Second, in determining whether the Legislature intended to 
preempt local ordinances and bylaws, it is appropriate to 
consider whether the subject matter at issue has traditionally 
been a matter of local regulation.  See Easthampton Sav. Bank, 
470 Mass. at 289, citing Wendell, 394 Mass. at 525.  Where land 
use regulation has long been recognized by the Legislature to be 
a prerogative of local government, we will not infer that the 
enactment of the aeronautics code reflects a clear legislative 
intent to preempt all local zoning bylaws that might affect 
21 
 
noncommercial private restricted landing areas based on the risk 
of frustrating the legislative purpose of fostering private 
flying. 
 
Nor are we persuaded that the Legislature, by granting the 
division "general supervision and control over aeronautics," 
G. L. c. 90, § 39, intended to preempt all local land use 
regulation that might affect the use of land for private 
heliports.  If local zoning authorities must depend on division 
approval to protect their residents from the types of harm or 
nuisances that might arise from the establishment of a 
noncommercial private restricted landing area, cities and towns 
will be unable to ensure that their residents will be adequately 
protected from these harms and nuisances.  If the Legislature 
wishes to preempt local zoning regarding noncommercial private 
restricted landing areas, it must provide a clearer indication 
of such intent.9 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, the judgment below is 
vacated and the matter is remanded to the Land Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
 
9 Nothing in this opinion is intended to disturb either the 
notice and safety requirements for noncommercial private 
restricted landing areas mandated under G. L. c. 90, § 39B, 
fourth par., or the continuing authority of the division under 
the aeronautics code over aircraft landing areas that do not 
fall within the narrow definition of a noncommercial private 
restricted landing area.