Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Michael J. Hicks

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP002818-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2016-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
2016 WI 31 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP2818-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Michael J. Hicks, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Michael J. Hicks, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HICKS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 29, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 31
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP2818-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Michael J. Hicks, Attorney at Law: 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael J. Hicks, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 29, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.    Attorney's license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report of the referee, 
Attorney James J. Winiarski.  Based on the change of Attorney 
Michael J. Hicks' answer to a no contest plea pursuant to SCR 
22.14(2), 
the 
referee 
concluded 
that 
Attorney 
Hicks 
had 
committed each of the 19 counts of professional misconduct 
alleged in the complaint filed by the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR).  Referee Winiarski recommends that the court 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
2 
 
suspend the license of Attorney Michael J. Hicks for a period of 
one year consecutive to the two-year suspension imposed in Case 
No. 2014AP7-D, In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hicks, 
2016 WI 9, 366 Wis. 2d 512, 875 N.W.2d 117 (Hicks II), and that 
the court order Attorney Hicks to pay the full costs of this 
disciplinary proceeding, which were $2,717.14 as of October 14, 
2015. 
¶2 
Because no appeal from the referee's report has been 
filed, we proceed with our review of this matter pursuant to SCR 
22.17(2).1  After completing our review, we agree with the 
referee that the allegations of the OLR's complaint, which 
Attorney Hicks now does not contest, establish that he committed 
19 counts of professional misconduct.  While many of the acts 
that form the basis for this complaint also occurred during the 
time span at issue in Hicks II, we further agree that Attorney 
Hicks' license should be suspended for an additional period of 
one year, subsequent to the suspension imposed in Hicks II.  We 
do not impose any restitution obligation on Attorney Hicks, but 
we do require him to pay the full costs of this disciplinary 
proceeding. 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) states: 
 
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
3 
 
¶3 
Attorney Hicks was admitted to the practice of law in 
this state in June 1984.  He most recently practiced in West 
Allis.   
¶4 
Attorney Hicks has been the subject of professional 
discipline on two previous occasions.  In 2012 this court 
publicly reprimanded him based on his stipulation that he had 
committed nine counts of professional misconduct arising out of 
three client representations.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Hicks, 2012 WI 11, 338 Wis. 2d 558, 809 N.W.2d 33 (Hicks 
I).  For each representation, Attorney Hicks stipulated that he 
had failed to act with reasonable diligence or promptness, in 
violation of Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 20:1.3, that he had failed 
to communicate adequately with the client, in violation of SCR 
20:1.4(a)(2), (3) and (4) and SCR 20:1.4(b), and that he had 
failed to provide a timely response to the grievance filed with 
the OLR, in violation of SCR 22.03(2) and (6), which are 
enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h). 
¶5 
In February 2016 this court suspended Attorney Hicks' 
license to practice law in Wisconsin for a period of two years, 
effective March 18, 2016.  Hicks II, 366 Wis. 2d 512, ¶62.  In 
that proceeding, Attorney Hicks was again found to have 
committed four counts of failing to act with reasonable 
diligence or promptness, five counts of failing to communicate 
adequately with his clients, and 12 counts of failing to submit 
timely written responses to OLR grievance investigations.  In 
addition, he was found to have failed on multiple occasions to 
notify his clients, opposing counsel, or the relevant courts of 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
4 
 
the two temporary suspensions of his license.  Indeed, Attorney 
Hicks was found to have appeared in court on at least 12 
occasions despite the temporary suspensions of his license.  He 
also was found to have submitted false affidavits to the OLR 
regarding his compliance with rules regarding his temporary 
suspensions.  The general time frame for the actions underlying 
these violations was from mid-2011 through 2013. 
¶6 
The OLR commenced this disciplinary proceeding by 
filing 
a 
complaint 
alleging 
19 
counts 
of 
professional 
misconduct.  Attorney Hicks initially filed an answer in which 
he denied 53 out of 72 numbered paragraphs of the OLR's 
complaint and all of the allegations of professional misconduct.  
He alleged as affirmative defenses that he had experienced 
symptoms from significant health problems in 2012 and 2013 and 
that he had also experienced a heavy caseload from late 2011 
through early 2013, including a substantial number of cases 
where he was successor counsel to one or more prior attorneys 
and had difficulties establishing and continuing attorney/client 
relationships and in defending the clients against pending 
criminal charges.   
¶7 
Attorney Hicks subsequently withdrew his answer and 
filed a written plea of no contest to all of the counts alleged 
in the OLR's complaint.  He agreed that the referee could use 
the facts stated in the complaint as a basis to determine 
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys. 
¶8 
In Hicks II we described the general pattern of 
Attorney Hicks' misconduct.  Hicks II, 366 Wis. 2d 512, ¶12.  
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
5 
 
Attorney Hicks focused his practice primarily on representing 
indigent defendants in criminal cases through appointments 
either by the Office of the State Public Defender (SPD) or the 
court in which the case was pending.  After acknowledging the 
appointment, Attorney Hicks often ignored his clients' requests 
for information for substantial periods of time and often failed 
to follow through on necessary actions for the clients' defense.  
When a grievance was subsequently filed with the OLR, Attorney 
Hicks either failed to provide any initial response to the OLR 
or he failed to respond to the OLR's requests for further 
information. 
¶9 
At two separate points in time this court temporarily 
suspended Attorney Hicks' license due to his willful failure to 
cooperate with the OLR's grievance investigations.  See Hicks 
II, 366 Wis. 2d 512, ¶¶13-14.  The first such suspension ran 
from September 27, 2012, through October 16, 2012.  The second 
temporary suspension ran from February 12, 2013, through March 
11, 2013.  In each case, after the temporary suspension had been 
imposed, Attorney Hicks began to cooperate with the OLR and to 
provide the information and documents the OLR had requested.  
The OLR then informed the court of Attorney Hicks' cooperation 
and requested the reinstatement of Attorney Hicks' license to 
practice law in Wisconsin, which this court granted. 
¶10 The first seven counts in this proceeding relate to 
Attorney Hicks' representation of client R.A. in two criminal 
cases.  During these representations, Attorney Hicks' license 
was temporarily suspended twice, as discussed above.  Attorney 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
6 
 
Hicks failed to notify R.A., the court, or opposing counsel of 
either of the temporary suspensions. 
¶11 In one of the cases, Attorney Hicks filed a motion on 
R.A.'s behalf in September 2012 to withdraw his pleas.  The 
court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion on December 19, 
2012.  At the conclusion of that hearing, in response to a 
question from the court, Attorney Hicks responded that he wanted 
to submit argument on the motion in writing.  The court then 
established a briefing schedule.  Attorney Hicks, however, did 
not file a post-hearing brief on R.A.'s behalf, nor did he 
inform the court that he would not be doing so.  Thus, Attorney 
Hicks did not make any argument on the motion, either orally or 
in writing, after the evidentiary hearing.  When no brief was 
filed on R.A.'s behalf, the state eventually filed its own 
written argument. 
¶12 In a series of letters R.A. sent to Attorney Hicks in 
December 2012 and January 2013, R.A. asked Attorney Hicks about 
matters concerning the expected post-hearing brief.  He also 
expressed concern that Attorney Hicks had not been in contact 
with him since the December 19, 2012 evidentiary hearing and 
that he had failed to respond to either R.A.'s letters or his 
parents' efforts to prod Attorney Hicks to communicate with R.A.  
Attorney Hicks did not respond to R.A.'s letters except to 
provide certain documents to R.A. without any substantive 
comment.  Attorney Hicks did not disclose to R.A. that he had 
decided not to file a post-hearing brief on the motion.   
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
7 
 
¶13 The circuit court had scheduled a conference for 
February 8, 2013, at which it expected to issue its ruling on 
R.A.'s motion.  According to electronic docket records, Attorney 
Hicks did appear on that date, but he did not arrange for R.A. 
to appear.  The court noted that Attorney Hicks had not filed a 
brief or advised the court that he would not be doing so.  The 
court adjourned the matter until February 26, 2013, and ordered 
that R.A. be produced in court on that date.  It also ordered 
Attorney Hicks to advise R.A. of the reason why the court had 
not issued its decision on his motion on that date.  Attorney 
Hicks did send a letter to R.A. advising him of the new date for 
the court's decision, but did not inform him that Attorney Hicks 
had decided not to file a post-hearing brief on R.A.'s behalf. 
¶14 On February 26, 2013, although he was subject to the 
second temporary suspension of his license, Attorney Hicks 
appeared in court for what was scheduled to be the issuance of 
the court's oral ruling on R.A.'s motion to withdraw his pleas.  
Because of a communication error, R.A. was not produced for that 
court date.  The matter was therefore continued until April 5, 
2013.   
¶15 R.A. again sent a letter to Attorney Hicks expressing 
concern at Attorney Hicks' failure to respond to his letters or 
to the efforts of his family members to spur communication.  
Attorney Hicks did not respond and still did not advise R.A. 
that he had decided not to file any post-hearing brief in 
support of R.A.'s motion.   
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
8 
 
¶16 Prior to the April 5, 2013 appearance, R.A. wrote to 
the circuit court and asked for the appointment of new counsel.  
The court allowed Attorney Hicks to withdraw on that date so 
that the SPD could appoint new counsel for R.A.  The court ruled 
that successor counsel would be allowed to file a written 
argument in support of R.A.'s motion to withdraw his pleas.   
¶17 In March 2013 R.A. filed a grievance against Attorney 
Hicks with the OLR.  In April 2013 and again in December 2013, 
the OLR asked Attorney Hicks for a response to R.A.'s grievance, 
but Attorney Hicks did not respond.  Only after the OLR had 
filed yet another motion for a temporary suspension and this 
court had issued an order to show cause did Attorney Hicks 
finally submit a written response to R.A.'s grievance and 
provide requested documents to the OLR. 
¶18 The referee concluded that the allegations in the 
OLR's 
complaint 
concerning 
R.A. 
adequately 
supported 
the 
following seven counts of professional misconduct: 
[Count One]  By requesting to argue [R.A.'s] motion to 
withdraw his plea in writing following the evidentiary 
phase of the hearing on the motion, and then failing 
to file any written (or oral) argument, [Attorney] 
Hicks violated SCR 20:1.3.2 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.3 provides:  "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
9 
 
[Count Two]  By failing to respond to [R.A.'s] 
repeated requests for information, [Attorney] Hicks 
violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).3 
[Count Three]  By failing to provide [R.A.] with a 
copy of the State's written argument brief and to 
promptly advise [R.A.] of [Attorney] Hicks' decision 
not to file a post-hearing argument brief, [Attorney] 
Hicks violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) and (3).4 
[Count Four]  By failing to provide written notice to 
[R.A.] of his . . . September 27, 2012 and February 
12, 2013 suspensions, [Attorney Hicks] violated SCR 
22.26(1)(a) and (b).5 
[Count Five] By failing to provide written notice of 
his September 27, 2012 suspension to the court and 
opposing counsel in [R.A.'s two pending cases] and by 
failing to provide written notice of his February 23, 
2013 suspension to the court and opposing counsel in 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:1.4(a)(4) provides in part:  "A lawyer shall . . . 
promptly comply with reasonable requests by the client for 
information . . . ." 
4 SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) and (3) provide:  "A lawyer shall . . . 
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which 
the client's objectives are to be accomplished; (3) keep the 
client 
reasonably 
informed 
about 
the 
status 
of 
the 
matter . . . . 
5 Violations of SCR 22.26(1) for failing to provide written 
notices of suspensions to clients, courts, and opposing counsel 
are enforced via SCR 20:8.4(f), which provides that it is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to "violate a statute, 
supreme court rule, supreme court order or supreme court 
decision regulating the conduct of lawyers." 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
10 
 
[one of R.A.'s pending cases], [Attorney] Hicks 
violated SCR 22.26(1)(c).6 
[Count Six] By practicing law in Wisconsin at a time 
when his license to practice law was suspended, 
including by appearing on behalf of [R.A.] in [one of 
R.A.'s cases], [Attorney Hicks] violated SCR 22.26(2).7 
[Count Seven]  By failing to timely file a response to 
[R.A.'s] grievance, [Attorney] Hicks violated SCR 
22.03(2) and (6),8 enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h).9 
                                                 
6 SCR 22.26(1)(c) provides:  "On or before the effective 
date of license suspension or revocation, an attorney whose 
license 
is 
suspended 
or 
revoked 
shall 
do 
all 
of 
the 
following: . . . (c) Promptly provide written notification to 
the court or administrative agency and the attorney for each 
party in a matter pending before a court or administrative 
agency of the suspension or revocation and of the attorney's 
consequent inability to act as an attorney following the 
effective date of the suspension or revocation.  The notice 
shall identify the successor attorney of the attorney's client 
or, if there is none at the time notice is given, shall state 
the client's place of residence." 
7 SCR 22.26(2) provides:  "An attorney whose license to 
practice law is suspended or revoked or who is suspended from 
the practice of law may not engage in this state in the practice 
of law or in any law work activity customarily done by law 
students, law clerks, or other paralegal personnel, except that 
the attorney may engage in law related work in this state for a 
commercial employer itself not engaged in the practice of law. 
Practicing law in violation of a suspension order by this 
court and this court's rules would also appear to constitute a 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(f). 
8 SCR 22.03(2) and (6) provide:   
(2) Upon commencing an investigation, the director 
shall notify the respondent of the matter being 
investigated unless in the opinion of the director the 
investigation of the matter requires otherwise.  The 
respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts 
and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct 
within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a 
request for a written response.  The director may 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
11 
 
¶19 Counts eight through twelve arise out of Attorney 
Hicks' representation of L.S. during the early stages of his 
criminal case in the first half of 2013.  Less than a month 
after his appointment to represent L.S., Attorney Hicks' license 
was temporarily suspended for the second time.  He failed to 
notify L.S., the court, or opposing counsel of the suspension.  
While his license was suspended, he appeared at a scheduling 
conference on behalf of L.S. 
¶20 Attorney Hicks was removed as counsel for L.S. on May 
31, 2013.  During the roughly four months of the representation, 
Attorney Hicks had not communicated with L.S. regarding trial 
strategy or what Attorney Hicks was doing to prepare for trial.   
¶21 Once again, Attorney Hicks did not respond to the 
OLR's multiple requests for information after L.S. filed a 
                                                                                                                                                             
allow additional time to respond.  Following receipt 
of the response, the director may conduct further 
investigation and may compel the respondent to answer 
questions, 
furnish 
documents, 
and 
present 
any 
information deemed relevant to the investigation. 
. . . . 
(6) 
In 
the 
course 
of 
the 
investigation, 
the 
respondent's 
wilful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a 
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of 
the matters asserted in the grievance.  
9 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to:  . . . (h) fail to cooperate in the 
investigation of a grievance filed with the office of lawyer 
regulation as required by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 
22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), or SCR 22.04(1) . . . . 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
12 
 
grievance against him.  Only after the OLR filed another motion 
for a temporary suspension and this court issued an order to 
show cause did Attorney Hicks finally file a response to L.S.'s 
grievance. 
¶22 On the basis of these facts, the referee concluded 
that Attorney Hicks had committed the following five counts of 
misconduct: 
[Count Eight]  By failing to consult with [L.S.] 
regarding trial strategy and preparation prior to his 
February 12, 2013 suspension or between March 12, 2013 
and May 31, 2013, [Attorney] Hicks violated SCR 
20:1.4(a)(2). 
[Count Nine]  By appearing on behalf of [L.S.] in 
[L.S.'s criminal case] at a time when his license to 
practice law was suspended, [Attorney] Hicks violated 
SCR 22.26(2). 
[Count Ten]  By failing to provide written notice of 
his February 12, 2013 suspension to [L.S.], [Attorney] 
Hicks violated SCR 22.26(1)(a) and (b). 
[Count Eleven]  By failing to provide written notice 
of his February 12, 2013 suspension to the court and 
opposing counsel in [L.S.'s criminal case], [Attorney] 
Hicks violated SCR 22.26(1)(c). 
[Count Twelve]  By failing to timely file a response 
to [L.S.'s] grievance, [Attorney] Hicks violated SCR 
22.03(2) and (6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h). 
¶23 Counts thirteen through seventeen relate to Attorney 
Hicks' representation of T.C.  In December 2012 Attorney Hicks 
was appointed as successor counsel for T.C.  In January 2013 
T.C. sent a letter to Attorney Hicks, in which he asked Attorney 
Hicks to send him a copy of discovery materials received from 
the state and raised concerns about his case.  T.C. sent two 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
13 
 
more such letters to Attorney Hicks over the next approximately 
seven months.  Attorney Hicks sent T.C. two letters about the 
rescheduling of T.C.'s trial, but did not communicate with T.C. 
about the matters raised in his letters, did not discuss his 
preparation or strategy for trial, and did not provide a copy of 
the requested discovery. 
¶24 At a meeting with Attorney Hicks on August 18, 2013, 
T.C. repeated his request for a copy of the discovery materials 
and raised a number of questions about his case.  Attorney Hicks 
promised T.C. that they would meet again prior to the trial to 
discuss T.C.'s defense.  Over the following two months, however, 
Attorney Hicks did not provide T.C. with the requested discovery 
nor did he communicate with T.C. regarding his trial preparation 
and strategy.   
¶25 On October 21, 2013, pursuant to Attorney Hicks' 
advice to accept a plea agreement he had negotiated with the 
prosecutor, T.C. pled guilty to the pending charges.  After 
entering the plea, however, T.C. began pursuing the withdrawal 
of his plea.  On January 23, 2014, Attorney Hicks was allowed to 
withdraw as T.C.'s counsel. 
¶26 During the time that Attorney Hicks represented T.C., 
his license to practice law was suspended for the second time.  
Attorney Hicks, however, did not notify T.C., the court, or 
opposing counsel of the suspension. 
¶27 As had occurred in the other matters, Attorney Hicks 
initially did not provide all of the documents and information 
requested by the OLR, although in this instance he did provide 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
14 
 
some documents.  Ultimately, Attorney Hicks filed the response 
sought by the OLR after the OLR had moved for another temporary 
suspension and this court had issued an order to show cause.  
¶28 On the basis of these facts, the referee concluded 
that there was a sufficient basis to support five counts of 
misconduct: 
[Count Thirteen]  By failing between the date on which 
he received [T.C.'s] letter in January 2013 and 
February 12, 2013, between March 11, 2013 and August 
16, 2013, and between August 18, 2013 and October 20, 
2013, to communicate with [T.C.] regarding the issues 
raised 
in 
[T.C.'s] 
January 
2013 
letter 
and 
to 
otherwise consult with [T.C.] regarding trial strategy 
and 
preparation, 
thereby 
preventing 
[T.C.] 
from 
adequately understanding and participating in his own 
defense, [Attorney] Hicks violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(2). 
[Count Fourteen]  By failing to timely provide [T.C.] 
with a complete copy of the discovery materials, 
despite [T.C.'s] requests, [Attorney] Hicks violated 
SCR 20:1.4(a)(4). 
[Count Fifteen]  By failing to provide a written 
notice to [T.C.] of his February 12, 2013 suspension, 
[Attorney] Hicks violated SCR 22.26(1)(a) and (b). 
[Count Sixteen]  By failing to provide written notice 
to the court and opposing counsel in [T.C.'s pending 
criminal case] that his license to practice law had 
been suspended on February 12, 2013, [Attorney] Hicks 
violated SCR 22.26(1)(c). 
[Count Seventeen]  By failing to timely file a 
response 
to 
[T.C.'s] 
grievance, 
[Attorney] 
Hicks 
violated SCR 22.03(2) and (6), enforced via SCR 
20:8.4(h). 
¶29 The last two counts alleged in the OLR's complaint 
arise from Attorney Hicks' appointment to represent R.G. in a 
criminal case.  By the time of Attorney Hicks' appointment in 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
15 
 
August 2012, R.G. had been found guilty of three felonies in a 
jury trial.  During the time Attorney Hicks represented R.G., 
his license was temporarily suspended for the first time, but he 
failed to provide the required notices. 
¶30 The referee concluded that Attorney Hicks had engaged 
in the following two counts of misconduct: 
[Count Eighteen]  By failing to provide written notice 
of his September 27, 2012 suspension to [R.G.], 
[Attorney] Hicks violated SCR 22.26(1)(a) and (b). 
[Count Nineteen]  By failing to provide written notice 
of his September 27, 2012 suspension to the court and 
opposing counsel in [R.G.'s pending criminal case], 
[Attorney] Hicks violated SCR 22.26(1)(c). 
¶31 After Attorney Hicks filed his plea of no contest to 
the factual allegations and claims of professional misconduct 
summarized above, the referee held a hearing at which the OLR 
and Attorney Hicks were offered the opportunity to submit 
evidence and argument regarding the appropriate sanction, 
including 
evidence 
and 
argument 
regarding 
mitigating 
and 
aggravating factors.   
¶32 In his report, the referee noted that in Hicks II, 
Attorney 
Hicks 
had 
offered 
little 
explanation 
for 
his 
misconduct.  He had essentially claimed that his caseload had 
been the cause for not communicating with his clients and for 
failing to provide timely responses to the OLR's investigations 
of the grievances filed against him. 
¶33 The referee further stated that in the present case, 
Attorney Hicks had provided little additional argument to 
explain his actions.  He did, however, point to the affirmative 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
16 
 
defenses in his initial answer to the complaint, where he had 
alleged that during 2012 and early 2013, he had been suffering 
from significant health problems.  Attorney Hicks asserted that 
those medical conditions had prevented him from working as many 
hours as he needed to represent his clients properly.  The 
referee found, however, that aside from his personal testimony 
at the sanction hearing, Attorney Hicks had not offered any 
evidence to support his claims that he had suffered severe 
medical problems and that those conditions had been a cause of 
his failures to serve his clients properly. 
¶34 The referee rejected Attorney Hicks' claim that his 
medical conditions had prevented him from meeting his ethical 
obligations to his clients.  The referee noted that there was no 
testimony that Attorney Hicks had been forced to take a leave of 
absence or had been unavailable in his practice for extended 
periods of time.  On the other hand, there were extended periods 
of time during these representations when Attorney Hicks had 
little or no contact with his clients.  Further, Attorney Hicks 
also again claimed in his plea of no contest that he had an 
overwhelming caseload during the relevant time period.  The 
referee noted that Attorney Hicks had been able to handle many 
other criminal cases in which there were court hearings.  Given 
that fact, the referee could not accept that Attorney Hicks' 
medical conditions had actually caused the lapses in diligence 
and communication for the four clients whose cases were the 
subjects of this proceeding. 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
17 
 
¶35 The referee also pointed to the disturbing patterns he 
had discussed in his report in Hicks II.  366 Wis. 2d 512, ¶¶53-
55.  Those patterns include largely ignoring clients after being 
appointed to represent them, failing to keep his clients 
reasonably informed about their cases, and failing to appreciate 
the need to respond to grievances filed against him.   
¶36 The referee recognized that the misconduct at issue in 
the present case occurred in roughly the same time period and 
was of the same types as the misconduct at issue in Hicks II.  
He therefore questioned whether the OLR in Hicks II would have 
sought a suspension longer than two years if all of the 
misconduct in this case had been included in that case.  
Ultimately, he concluded that the additional 19 counts of 
misconduct at issue here merited an additional one-year period 
of suspension consecutive to the two-year suspension imposed in 
Hicks II.  He determined that if the OLR had "charged Attorney 
Hicks with all of the counts in a single disciplinary complaint, 
a 
three 
year 
suspension 
would 
have 
been 
reasonable 
and 
appropriate."  The referee also determined that the misconduct 
found in this disciplinary proceeding, when considered by 
itself, merited a one-year suspension.  The referee indicated 
that he believed a one-year suspension was justified by the 
analyses set forth in two cases involving Attorney Patrick 
Cooper.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cooper, 2007 WI 
37, 300 Wis. 2d 61, 729 N.W.2d 206 (imposing three-year 
suspension due to 35 counts of misconduct); In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Cooper, 2013 WI 55, 348 Wis. 2d 266, 833 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
18 
 
N.W.2d 88 (imposing two-year suspension, retroactive to and 
consecutive to the expiration of the 2007 suspension as a result 
of 42 counts of misconduct).  The referee considered Attorney 
Hicks' misconduct to be less egregious than Attorney Cooper's 
misconduct, 
which 
would 
support 
a 
consecutive 
one-year 
suspension in this case. 
¶37 The OLR did not request, and the referee did not 
recommend, that the court require Attorney Hicks to pay 
restitution to anyone as a result of his misconduct in this 
case.  The referee did recommend that the court impose the full 
costs of this proceeding on Attorney Hicks, noting that there 
did not appear to be any reason to depart from the court's 
general practice of imposing full costs on attorneys found to 
have committed misconduct. 
¶38 When we review a referee's report and recommendation 
in an attorney disciplinary case, we affirm the referee's 
findings of fact unless they are found to be clearly erroneous, 
but we review the referee's conclusions of law on a de novo 
basis. 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Inglimo, 
2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We determine 
the appropriate level of discipline to impose given the 
particular facts of each case, independent of the referee's 
recommendation, but benefiting from it.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 
660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶39 Given Attorney Hicks' no contest plea, we accept the 
referee's factual findings as taken from the OLR's complaint.  
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
19 
 
We also agree with the referee that those factual findings are 
sufficient to support a legal conclusion that Attorney Hicks 
engaged in the professional misconduct set forth in the 19 
counts described above. 
¶40 The primary issue in this matter is what is the 
appropriate level of discipline for the misconduct found in this 
case and whether that discipline should be imposed concurrent 
with or consecutive to the two-year suspension imposed in Hicks 
II. 
¶41 We confronted a similar issue regarding the timing of 
discipline in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka, 
2014 WI 34, 353 Wis. 2d 675, 847 N.W.2d 333 (Osicka V).  The 
issue of whether the 60-day suspension recommended in that case 
should be concurrent with or consecutive to another 60-day 
suspension arose because the misconduct at issue (three counts 
stemming from one representation and subsequent investigation) 
occurred during the same time period that other misconduct 
occurred, which was the subject of a separate disciplinary 
proceeding, In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Osicka, 2014 
WI 33, 353 Wis. 2d 656, 847 N.W.2d 343 (Osicka IV).  In other 
words, all of the misconduct alleged and found in Osicka V 
occurred prior to the filing of the complaint in Osicka IV and 
could have been included in that proceeding.  Further, the 
referee, who handled both disciplinary proceedings, concluded 
that if the OLR had brought all of the claims of misconduct in a 
single proceeding, the proper sanction for all of the misconduct 
would still have been a suspension of 60 days.  This court 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
20 
 
agreed with that conclusion.  Accordingly, the court imposed a 
60-day suspension in Osicka V, but made it run concurrently with 
the 60-day suspension imposed in Osicka IV. 
¶42 The present case is different from Osicka V in at 
least two crucial ways.  Most importantly, the timing of the 
misconduct and of the filing of the two complaints is different.  
The complaint in Hicks II was filed on January 2, 2014, and the 
complaint in the present case was filed approximately 11 months 
later in December 2014.  While much of the misconduct found in 
this case occurred in 2012 and 2013, before the filing of the 
complaint in Hicks II, some of the misconduct at issue here 
continued into March 2014, after the filing of the Hicks II 
complaint.  Specifically, with respect to the investigation of 
the grievances involving R.A., L.S., and T.C., the OLR was still 
attempting to obtain information from Attorney Hicks in January 
and February 2014.10  Indeed, letters requesting responses 
regarding those grievances were served on Attorney Hicks on 
January 24, 2014.  When Attorney Hicks still did not respond, 
the OLR moved this court for a temporary suspension of Attorney 
Hicks' license on February 24, 2012.  This court then issued an 
order to show cause.  Attorney Hicks' failure to cooperate with 
                                                 
10 The 
only 
counts 
relating 
to 
Attorney 
Hicks' 
representation of R.G. involved Attorney Hicks' failure to 
provide notice of his September 27, 2012 temporary suspension.  
Thus, it is true that those counts were complete well before the 
January 2, 2014 filing of the complaint in Hicks II and could 
have been included in that complaint. 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
21 
 
each of those three investigations, which was continuing 
misconduct, did not end until the latter part of March 2014, 
nearly three months after the OLR filed its complaint in Hicks 
II.  Thus, while it would have been possible for the OLR to have 
waited a few more months so that it could have included all of 
the counts of misconduct in one proceeding, it did not know in 
January 2014 when or if Attorney Hicks would provide responses 
to those grievances and whether any such responses might impact 
which claims of misconduct it would then pursue in a formal 
complaint.  Unlike the proceedings involving Attorney Osicka, 
this is not a situation where all of the misconduct was over 
prior to the filing of the first complaint. 
¶43 In addition, the nature and extent of the misconduct 
in this case is different from the misconduct found in Osicka V.  
In Osicka V, the OLR alleged, and the referee found, that 
Attorney Osicka had engaged in three counts of misconduct 
arising out of a single misrepresentation.  Those three counts 
were similar in nature and degree to the four counts of 
misconduct alleged in Osicka IV.  By contrast, in the present 
case there are an additional 14 counts of misconduct relating to 
the representations of four additional clients.  We conclude 
that the addition of these facts and counts of misconduct would 
have changed the nature of Hicks II and would have called for a 
suspension greater than two years. 
¶44 In Hicks II, we cited In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Lucius, 2008 WI 12, 307 Wis. 2d 255, 744 N.W.2d 605, as 
support for the two-year suspension we imposed on Attorney 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
22 
 
Hicks.  While the nature of some of the misconduct was similar 
(lack of diligence and failure to communicate), Lucius involved 
10 
counts 
of 
misconduct 
arising 
out 
of 
six 
client 
representations.  Hicks II involved findings of misconduct on 35 
counts 
arising 
out 
of 
12 
client 
representations. 
 
This 
demonstrates 
that 
each 
disciplinary 
proceeding 
must 
be 
considered on its own facts and that there are no perfect 
matches in terms of discipline between disciplinary proceedings. 
¶45 Adding another 14 counts of misconduct and another 
four clients, however, takes reliance on Lucius for a two-year 
suspension beyond the breaking point.  We conclude that if all 
49 counts of misconduct would have been alleged in a single 
case, the level of discipline would have been greater than the 
two-year suspension we imposed in Hicks II. 
¶46 Given that the nature of the misconduct in this 
proceeding is similar, but that the number of clients involved 
is less than in either Hicks II or Lucius, we conclude that an 
additional one-year suspension is an appropriate level of 
discipline to impose in this case.  We make that one-year 
suspension consecutive to the two-year suspension imposed in 
Hicks II. 
¶47 As was the case in Hicks II, we do not impose any 
restitution obligation on Attorney Hicks.  The OLR has not 
sought restitution with respect to any of Attorney Hicks' 
clients.  See SCR 21.16(1m)(em) and (2m)(a)1 (the court may 
impose 
restitution 
in 
instances 
of 
misappropriation 
or 
misapplication of funds). 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
23 
 
¶48 Finally, we turn to the issue of costs.  The OLR 
requested $2,717.14 in costs, and the referee recommended that 
the court follow its usual practice in requiring Attorney Hicks 
to pay the full amount of costs.  We agree that Attorney Hicks 
should bear the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding.  
While he did ultimately enter a plea of no contest with respect 
to the 19 counts of misconduct, his initial answer denied most 
of the substantive allegations in the OLR's complaint, requiring 
the litigation of this matter for at least a period of time.  In 
addition, even once he entered a no contest plea, there still 
remained the matter of the proper level of discipline, which 
required a short hearing before the referee and the preparation 
of a referee's report.  Finally, Attorney Hicks has not objected 
to the amount of costs requested by the OLR. 
¶49 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Michael J. Hicks to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of one year, 
effective March 18, 2018, consecutive to the two-year suspension 
imposed in Hicks II, 366 Wis. 2d 512, ¶62.  
¶50 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael J. Hicks shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶51 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Michael J. Hicks shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
24 
 
¶52 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.29(4)(c). 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2014AP2818-D   
 
 
 
1