Case Title: Childrens Store v. Cody Enterprises

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1989-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 87-482


The Children's Store                         Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal From
     v.                                      Washington Superior Court

Cody Enterprises, Inc. and                   April Term, 1989
State of Vermont


Alden T. Bryan, J.

Richard E. Davis, Jr., of Richard E. Davis Associates, Inc., Barre, for
  plaintiff-appellant

Dorothy L. Helling of Theriault & Joslin, P.C., Montpelier, for defendant-
  appellee Cody Enterprises

James W. Spink of Dinse, Erdmann & Clapp, Burlington, for defendant-appellee
  State of Vermont


 PRESENT:  Dooley and Morse, JJ., and Barney, C.J. (Ret.), Martin, Supr. J.,
           and  Levitt, D.J., Specially Assigned



     DOOLEY, J.   The Children's Store (plaintiff) leased space in the "Cody
Block," a Montpelier building owned and maintained by defendant Cody
Enterprises, Inc. (Cody).  A fire consumed the building, and plaintiff sued
Cody alleging that Cody's negligence caused the fire.  Approximately three
years later plaintiff joined the State of Vermont (State), which ran a
liquor store in the building, as a defendant.  The complaint against the
State was dismissed because the court found that the statute of limitations
had run.  Trial by jury resulted in a verdict for Cody.  Plaintiff's motion
for a new trial was denied by the court.  Plaintiff now appeals both the
order granting summary judgment to the State and the denial of its motion
for a new trial.  We affirm as to defendant Cody and reverse as to
defendant State.
     Plaintiff argues here that: (1) the trial court improperly commented on
the weight of the evidence regarding a disputed issue of fact in the
presence of the jury; (2) the trial court failed to instruct the jury that
electricity is a dangerous agency; and (3) the trial court erroneously
granted summary judgment in favor of the State.  After a discussion of the
facts, we turn to plaintiff's arguments in order.
     The Children's Store was a tenant in the Cody Block, a mixed-use office
building in Montpelier.  The State of Vermont Liquor Store also leased space
in the block.  On December 20, 1980, a fire erupted and consumed a large
part of the building.  The Children's Store was destroyed.
     On October 28, 1983, plaintiff sued Cody alleging that Cody was
negligent in maintaining the electrical system in the building and that this
negligence was the proximate cause of the fire.  On December 20, 1983,
plaintiff moved to amend the complaint and to join the State of Vermont as
an additional party.  The motions were granted on January 17, 1984.  On
January 30, 1984, a summons was issued, and on January 31, 1984, the summons
and amended complaint were served on the Attorney General of the State of
Vermont at his offices in Montpelier.
     The State of Vermont answered the amended complaint and asserted the
affirmative defense of the statute of limitations. See V.R.C.P. 8(c); 12
V.S.A. { 512 (actions for injuries to persons or property "shall be
commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues, and not
after").  The State then moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
action was time-barred by the statute of limitations, and the trial court
granted the motion on August 13, 1986.  See V.R.C.P 56(b).
     Plaintiff's theory at trial was that the fire was caused by arcing
within electrical wiring in the space plaintiff leased.  The theory was
that the wire was coated with a rubber insulation, that the wire was very
old, that the insulation had become brittle and unsafe, and that the aging
of the insulation exposed bare copper wire to the metal conduit through
which the wire ran.  This exposure in turn caused an electrical arc and the
fire.  The jury also heard testimony that arcing often occurs if the
electrical power remains on during a fire, and, for this reason, it was
impossible to say what caused the fire.
     The jury trial resulted in a verdict for Cody.  The jury answered "no"
when asked by special interrogatory:  "Are you able to determine the
probable origin of the fire?"  The instructions specified that if the jury
could not determine the cause of the fire, it was to render a defendant's
verdict.  Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied, and this appeal
followed.
     Plaintiff's first argument is that the trial court's actions during
rebuttal argument denied plaintiff a fair and impartial trial, and therefore
reversal of the jury's verdict is required.  The action of the trial court
in issue came in response to an objection to plaintiff's closing argument.
Plaintiff had argued in closing that defendant Cody was negligent in failing
to follow up with a wiring inspection when fuses blew in the line to the
State liquor store.  Cody responded by arguing that the fuses were in a
different circuit, and therefore the cause of the blown fuses could not also
be the cause of the fire.  Plaintiff responded in rebuttal that Cody's
electrician had testified that the circuits involved were interconnected.
Cody's counsel objected to this rebuttal argument claiming it was not
supported by the evidence. Before the trial court ruled, it engaged in the
following colloquy with plaintiff's counsel:
         The Court:  Mr. Davis, I don't recall --

         Mr. Davis:  I will read it.

         The Court:  I think you better because that's not my
         memory.  I think that's so far off that I have to --

         Mr. Davis:  Well, I'm going to read it.

         The Court:  Go ahead.
     After plaintiff's counsel read extensively from the transcript and
resumed arguing, Cody again objected on the same ground.  An exchange
between counsel occurred, and the court intervened, ruling that plaintiff's
counsel could "finish his argument."  The court then initiated the following
discussion:
         The Court:  I understand what you're referring to here
         is not -- are you claiming that the two meters came from
         the upper box there where the fuses that we've been
         talking about were? . . . .

         Mr. Davis:  No.  No.  I'm saying the power went up
         through there, your Honor.  That's what I'm saying.

         The Court:  Are you saying that the liquor store line,
         the "L.Q." box was wired in above the 400 box somewhere
         in there?

         Mr. Davis:  Yes, sir.  That's what Mr. Brimblecomb said.

         The Court:  I beg to differ with you.  That's not what
         that says.

         Mr. Davis:  I have to disagree with the Court, if I may,
         just for a moment, and point out that Mr. Brimblecomb
         drew a plan which is their -- one of his exhibits. . . .
         Showing a line back there.

         The Court:  Where do you say the "L.Q." box is wired to?

         Mr. Davis:  It's wired to this meter.

         The Court:  Where does the meter get its source of
         power?

         Mr. Davis:  We don't know unless it comes out right here
         somehow.  There's nothing that comes out of the 800 or
         400.

         The Court:  Do you have any record in this case that
         that meter has its source of electricity up in the 200,
         100 box?

         Mr. Davis:  All of the electricity for the whole
         building, meaning the so-called liquor store building,
         if I can describe it that way, and not the so-called
         Gleason building, because that had all separate
         circuits.  Was powered through here [sic].

         The Court:  Okay.  I do not understand the evidence that
         way.  I'll let you finish your argument.  And Ms.
         Helling will have a chance to answer that. . . .  I'll
         let her address that.  We'll leave it to the jury to
         decide which version.
     Plaintiff argues that the expressions of opinion in the above
statements of the court deprived it of a fair trial.  Cody responds that the
court did not commit error but even if it did, the error is not grounds for
reversal because it was harmless in view of the eventual verdict of the jury
and it was not preserved for review.  We find that the court's statements
were not error and do not reach Cody's other arguments.
     Every litigant is entitled to a fair trial, free from the suspicion of
partiality. See Auger v. Auger, 149 Vt. 559, 561,