Case Title: Abdul-Maleek v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 46/11

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2012-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Muhammad H. Abdul-Maleek v. State, No. 46, September Term 2011
APPELLATE REVIEW – IMPERMISSIBLE SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS
– WAIVER – Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-131(a), a criminal defendant must object to the
sentencing court’s consideration of allegedly impermissible sentencing factors, in order to
preserve that challenge for appellate review.  Pursuant to the same rule, the appellate court
retains the discretion to excuse, in the proper circumstance, the failure to preserve the claim.
CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 
– 
SENTENCING 
– 
IMPERMISSIBLE
CONSIDERATIONS – The record does not establish conclusively that the sentencing court
imposed a more severe sentence based on the defendant’s exercise of his right to appeal de
novo.  Explicit reference to that fact, however, could “lead a reasonable person to infer that
[the court] might have been motivated” by an impermissible consideration.  Jackson v. State,
364 Md. 192, 207, 772 A.2d 273, 281 (2001).  Doubt will be resolved in Petitioner’s favor,
the sentence vacated, and Petitioner resentenced.  
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 117504
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 46
September Term, 2011
 
MUHAMMAD H. ABDUL-MALEEK 
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Greene
Adkins
Barbera,
Wilner,
(Retired, Specially assigned),
Cathell, 
(Retired, Specially assigned)
JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, J.
Bell, C.J., Greene and Cathell, JJ., Concur
Filed:  April 27, 2012
1 Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol. & 2010 Supp.), § 12-401 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ), entitled “Right of appeal generally,” provides in pertinent
part:
(b) Criminal cases. — In a criminal case:
(1) The State may appeal from a final judgment entered in the District
Court:
(i) If the State alleges that the trial judge failed to impose the
sentence specifically mandated by the Code; or
(ii) Granting a motion to dismiss, or quashing or dismissing a
charging document.
(2) The defendant may appeal even from a final judgment entered in the
District Court though imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended.
***
(f) De novo and on record appeals. — In a civil case in which the amount in
controversy exceeds $5,000 exclusive of interest, costs, and attorney’s fees if
attorney’s fees are recoverable by law or contract, in any matter arising under
§ 4-401(7)(ii) of this article, and in any case in which the parties so agree, an
appeal shall be heard on the record made in the District Court.  In every other
case, including a criminal case in which sentence has been imposed or
suspended following a plea of nolo contendere or guilty, and an appeal in a
municipal infraction or Code violation case, an appeal shall be tried de novo.
(g) Right to jury trial. — In a criminal appeal that is tried de novo:
(1) There is no right to a jury trial unless the offense charged is subject
to a penalty of imprisonment or unless there is a constitutional right to a jury
trial for that offense; and
(2) On the filing of a notice of appeal, the circuit court may stay a
sentence of imprisonment imposed by the District Court and release the
defendant pending trial in the circuit court.
(Emphasis added.)
Pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol. & 2010 Supp.), § 12-401 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ)1, a criminal defendant convicted in the District
Court is entitled to appeal that judgment to the Circuit Court, for a trial de novo.  If convicted
in the Circuit Court, the sentencing judge is not limited by the sentence previously imposed
in District Court and “may impose a more severe sentence” so long as the sentence is
2 CJ § 12-702, entitled “Sentences following appeals,” provides in pertinent part:
(c) More severe sentence imposed following de novo appeal. — If a defendant
who appeals from a conviction in the District Court is convicted after a trial
de novo on appeal, the appellate court may impose a more severe sentence
than that imposed in the District Court, but if the case is one in which the
defendant was denied a jury trial under § 4-302(e)(2) of this article, the
sentence may not be for more than 90 days except under the conditions
prescribed in subsection (b) of this section.  Except as provided above, the
appellate court may impose any sentence authorized by law to be imposed as
punishment for the offense.  
(Emphasis added).
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“authorized by law to be imposed as punishment for the offense.”  CJ § 12-702(c).2  Petitioner,
Muhammad Abdul-Maleek, was convicted in the District Court of Maryland sitting in
Montgomery County, exercised his right to appeal, and was afforded a de novo trial by jury
in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.  The jury likewise convicted Petitioner of theft,
and the Circuit Court imposed a more severe sentence than that imposed by the District Court.
We issued a writ of certiorari to review Petitioner’s assertion that the Circuit Court
impermissibly “based [Petitioner’s sentence] on the fact that he exercised his right to appeal
and receive a de novo jury trial.”  We hold that Petitioner is entitled to resentencing because
the court’s comments at sentencing could cause a reasonable person to conclude that the
sentence was based in part on Petitioner’s exercise of his right to a de novo trial on appeal.
I.
A detailed account of the facts underlying Petitioner’s conviction is not necessary to
resolution of the issue before this Court.  To provide background, however, we include the
following narrative, derived primarily from the testimony of Ms. Leyla Monroy, the victim of
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Petitioner’s crime.
On July 20, 2010, Ms. Monroy, was visiting the public library in Rockville Town
Center and noticed her cell phone was missing.  She called her phone, a male voice answered,
and he indicated that he would return the cell phone if Ms. Monroy gave him fifty dollars.
While initially reluctant, Ms. Monroy agreed to meet the man at a nearby location and to pay
him the money.
Ms. Monroy met the man in a corridor between two establishments near the Rockville
Town Square.  She later identified Petitioner as the man she met and recognized his voice as
the man who had answered her cell phone.  Petitioner again told Ms. Monroy that he would
not return her cell phone until she gave him the money.  After some exchange between Ms.
Monroy and Petitioner, Ms. Monroy finally capitulated.  As Ms. Monroy was only carrying
three twenty-dollar bills and Petitioner had indicated he wanted fifty dollars, commenting
“[w]ell, do you want your phone or not, because you know, it’s up to you,” Ms. Monroy
turned over all three bills.  Upon receipt of the money, Petitioner then “just turned around and
walked away.”
Meanwhile, a parking enforcement officer, Jerry Adams, noticed the disagreement
between Ms. Monroy and Petitioner.  Adams testified that Petitioner explained that “he wanted
to help and he wasn’t the guy who [Ms. Monroy] talked to on the phone,” and the man on the
phone was Jerome, “a former student of [Petitioner]” who “looked homeless.”  Petitioner
reacted by commenting “[y]ou’re just parking enforcement.”  At that point, Adams stepped
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away to radio to the police.  When he returned, Ms. Monroy had already given Petitioner forty
dollars and Adams then observed her hand over her remaining twenty-dollar bill.
According to Adams, Petitioner then began to walk away but returned to show his
driver’s license to the officer, because, as Petitioner explained, “he didn’t want any trouble,
he wanted to, me to know that he was coming back; that he was just going to get her phone,
he was coming back.”  Petitioner then walked away, but Adams maintained visual contact with
him for the duration and “just simply saw him turn around and come back.”  Petitioner gave
the phone to Adams, to return to Ms. Monroy, as well as his business card, and he indicated
that “he would try to get her money back.”  Petitioner then departed.
Shortly thereafter, the police arrived and Adams turned over Petitioner’s business card
to them.  By using the information on the business card the police officers obtained
Petitioner’s residential address, visited that address and ultimately arrested Petitioner there.
Procedural Background
Petitioner was charged in the District Court of Maryland with (1) obtaining by extortion
money having a value of less than $500 in violation of Maryland Code (2002 & 2010 Supp.),
§ 3-701(b) of the Criminal Law Article (CR), and (2) stealing Ms. Monroy’s cell phone having
a value of $100, less than $1,000, in violation of CR § 7-104.  On January 10, 2011, the
District Court found Petitioner not guilty on the first count and guilty on the second.  The court
sentenced him to eighteen months’ incarceration, sixteen months suspended, with one year of
supervised probation upon release, and a fine of $500, $350 of which was suspended.  The
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court also ordered Petitioner to pay restitution to Ms. Monroy in the amount of $60.  That
same day, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from the District Court judgment.
Petitioner’s two-day de novo jury trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
commenced on April 6, 2011, on the sole charge of theft.  On April 7, 2011, the jury returned
a guilty verdict.  At the sentencing proceeding that afternoon, defense counsel argued that
Petitioner should receive no jail time and unsupervised probation and, alternatively, should
the court impose executed incarceration, the court should decline to order probation.  The State
argued, in part, that the nature of Petitioner’s actions, “tak[ing] advantage of someone under
these circumstances,” warranted “executed incarceration.”  The State continued:
It’s in light of that, Your Honor, the State is asking for executed
incarceration.  To give you an idea, [the District Court Judge], gave the
defendant 18 months, suspend all but 60 days.  That’s neither here nor there.
It’s a de novo appeal.  I would ask for more than that, Your Honor.  The
defendant had the opportunity to sort of let that lie, take responsibility for his
actions.  He did not do that.  I would ask the Court for an executed incarceration
above and beyond the 60 days.  How far above and beyond, I will leave in the
Court’s sound judgment.  Thank you.
The Court, after hearing from Petitioner, imposed its sentence, explaining:
Mr. Abdul-Maleek, you may indeed be a kind, caring, and conscientious
individual, but none of those adjectives or descriptions apply to what you did
to this young lady on this day.  Nothing kind about it, nothing caring about it,
nothing conscientious about it, quite the contrary, and I just, I’m at a loss for
words.
An individual who has a job, has a family, to do something like this and
the total disregard that you had for this young lady, I’m really at a loss.  I mean,
if you had a drug addiction and you did it to get the money to support your drug
addiction, that doesn’t make it right but at least there’s some explanation.
Your attorneys did a very fine job on your behalf, notwithstanding the
fact that that may have been a record, returning a verdict of five minutes or
3  Petitioner framed the issue as two separate questions:
I. 
Whether the circuit court violated Section 12-702(c) of the Maryland
Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article when it increased the
defendant’s sentence based on the fact that he exercised his right to
appeal and receive a de novo jury trial.
II. 
Whether the circuit court violated the defendant’s due process rights as
(continued...)
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thereabouts, but that had nothing to do with your attorneys.  It had more to do
with the facts that were presented to the jury, and obviously, they didn’t have
any problems with that.  
***
You have every right to go to trial in this case, which you did – not
once, but twice.  Ms. Monroy was victimized, and then she had to come
back and testify in District Court; then she had to come back again and
testify in the Circuit Court, and she had to do that because you have every
right to have all of those opportunities to put forth your position.  I am at
a total loss. 
The Court will impose a sentence of 18 months to the Montgomery
County Detention Center.  The Court will suspend all but eight months, and the
Court will recommend the Pre-Release Center, place you on 18 months of
supervised probation upon your release.
(Emphasis added.)
The sentencing court also explained that Petitioner was to comply with standard
probation conditions, to submit to drug and alcohol testing as deemed appropriate, to have no
contact with Ms. Monroy and to pay restitution to Ms. Monroy in the amount of sixty dollars.
The court waived Petitioner’s fines and court costs.  
Petitioner timely filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted.  Abdul-Maleek
v. State, 420 Md. 463, 23 A.3d 895 (2011).  We now consider whether the Circuit Court’s
reference at sentencing to the fact that Petitioner exercised his de novo appeal right gave the
appearance that the court based the sentence on an impermissible consideration.3
(...continued)
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
Article 24 of Maryland Declaration of Rights as set forth in North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) and Colten v. Kentucky, 407
U.S. 104 ([1972]).
(Footnote omitted).  In his reply brief, Petitioner argues that the Circuit Court based its
sentence on the impermissible consideration of Petitioner’s exercise of his de novo appeal
right.  As we will reiterate infra, we review a sentence on three grounds:  “(1) whether the
sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or violates other constitutional
requirements; (2) whether the sentencing judge was motivated by ill-will, prejudice or other
impermissible considerations; and (3) whether the sentence is within statutory limits.”
Jackson v. State, 364 Md. 192, 200, 772 A.2d 273, 277 (2001) (quoting Gary v. State, 341
Md. 513, 516, 671 A.2d 495, 496 (1996)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
Because we decide this case on the grounds of “impermissible considerations,” we
need not determine whether there was a violation of any statutory or constitutional
limitation.  We note that, at oral argument, Petitioner agreed that the statute, referring to CJ
§ 12-702, unquestionably allows the court to impose a more severe sentence after a de novo
appeal.  Additionally, Petitioner was sentenced within the statutorily prescribed maximum
penalty for the crime.  See Md. Code (2002 & 2010 Supp.), § 7-104(g)(2)(i)-(ii) of the
Criminal Law Article (CR) (establishing the maximum penalties as 18 months imprisonment,
a $500 fine, or both, in addition to restoration of the property or payment of the value of the
property or services).  We also note that our prior decisions reflect that notions of
fundamental fairness guide our analysis of what is considered an impermissible
consideration.  See Jackson, 364 Md. at 206-07, 772 A.2d at 281 (explaining that “[i]t is well
settled in Maryland that fundamental to a defendant’s right to a fair trial is an impartial and
disinterested judge,” “[t]his fundamental right of fairness extends to the sentencing phase of
a trial,” and, finally, “a defendant ‘has a right to a trial in which the judge is not only
impartial and disinterested, but who also has the appearance of being impartial and
disinterested,” and concluding that consideration of defendant’s origin “from the city” was
impermissible (internal quotation mark and citations omitted)).  We believe that our
restatement of the issue fairly encompasses Petitioner’s assertions.
-7-
II.
A. Waiver
Before we arrive at the merits of Petitioner’s contentions, we must address the State’s
argument that Petitioner’s contentions are not preserved for appellate review because he
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lodged no objection to the sentencing court’s statements concerning his exercise of the
statutory right to a de novo trial on appeal.  Petitioner counters that requiring a defendant to
object in the circumstances presented here, where the trial court’s comments before imposing
sentence referred to a right Petitioner had already exercised, would require counsel to risk
subjecting her client to an increased sentence.  This is so because, according to Petitioner, a
court might seek retribution for defense counsel’s contemporaneous suggestion of error;
therefore, ordinary principles of waiver should not apply to the challenge presented here.  
Maryland Rule 8-131(a) prescribes that, “[o]rdinarily, the appellate court will not
decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided
by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the
trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.”  We have recognized in the
limited context of review of sentences alleged to be inherently illegal that the failure to object
will not preclude appellate review and that those sentences may be reviewed at any time.  E.g.,
Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 466, 918 A.2d 506, 509 (2007); Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422,
427, 488 A.2d 949, 951 (1985).  As we have explained, “[t]he scope of this privilege, . . .
excluding waiver as a bar to relief, is narrow. . . .  We have consistently defined this category
of ‘illegal sentence’ as limited to those situations in which the illegality inheres in the sentence
itself.”  Chaney, 397 Md. at 466, 918 A.2d at 509-10.  Moreover, we have consistently
recognized that allegations of impermissible considerations at sentencing are not “illegal
sentences” subject to collateral or belated review and “must ordinarily be raised in or decided
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by the trial court . . . .  [A]nd, subject to the appellate court’s discretion under Maryland Rule
8-131(a), the defendant is not excused from having to raise a timely objection in the trial
court.”  Id. at 466-67, 918 A.2d at 510.
Petitioner recognizes that his challenge does not fall within the narrow class of
inherently illegal sentences to which the general rules of waiver do not apply.  He asks,
though, that we expand the application of the preservation exception to the circumstances of
this case.  We decline to do so, as there is no good reason why either the circumstances
presented here should be exempt from the preservation requirement or the trial court should
not have been given the opportunity to address at the time the concern that Petitioner now
raises.
Despite the applicability of general preservation principles, however, we are not
precluded absolutely from reviewing Petitioner’s claim.  We have explained time and again
that Rule 8-131(a) grants an appellate court discretion to consider issues deemed to have been
waived for failure to make a contemporaneous objection.  See Bible v. State, 411 Md. 138,
148, 982 A.2d 348, 354 (2009) (plurality opinion) (“[A]n appellate court’s review of
arguments not raised at the trial level is discretionary, not mandatory.  The use of the word
‘ordinarily’ clearly contemplates both those circumstances in which an appellate court will not
review issues if they were not previously raised and those circumstances in which it will.”
(quoting State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 188, 638 A.2d 107, 113 (1994)) (internal quotation mark
omitted)).  This discretion, however, should be exercised with caution.  Chaney, 397 Md. at
-10-
468, 918 A.2d at 511.  In deciding whether to review an issue that has been waived, we should
“[f]irst . . . consider whether the exercise of . . . discretion will work unfair prejudice to either
of the parties . . . .  Second, the appellate court should consider whether the exercise of its
discretion will promote the orderly administration of justice.”  Bible, 411 Md. at 151-52, 982
A.2d at 356 (quoting Jones v. State, 379 Md. 704, 714-15, 843 A.2d 778, 784 (2004)) (final
alteration in original).
In the matter sub judice we see no prejudice to either party should we consider this
issue.  There is, of course, no prejudice to Petitioner, as he has sought and been granted
review of his claim of error.  See Bible, 411 Md. at 152, 982 A.2d at 356.  And, there is only
de minimis prejudice to the State, as our review would not broach the underlying judgment of
conviction but rather would be confined to resentencing, at which the same sentence could be
imposed, based on proper considerations.  Moreover, by addressing the issue presented, we
are able to comment on the sentencing issue in the context of de novo appeals and thereby
promote the “orderly administration of justice.”  See id., 982 A.2d at 356.  We therefore
choose to exercise our discretion to consider the merits of Petitioner’s claim.
B. Sentence Review
Petitioner’s arguments reduce to the assertion that the sentencing court, in effect,
penalized him for having exercised his right to a de novo appeal, as evidenced by the court’s
reference to that fact during sentencing.  Petitioner asserts that the right to appeal must be “free
and unfettered” by any vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge.  (Quoting North
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Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969).)  Petitioner adds that the sentencing court’s
comments at least suggest impermissible considerations and he argues that, because the court’s
comments “give the appearance or inference of bias,” the sentence must be vacated.
The State responds that, considering the entirety of the record, the Circuit Court did not
impose a more severe sentence because Petitioner chose to appeal de novo from the District
Court judgment, but rather because of the circumstances surrounding the crime.  The State
emphasizes that CJ § 12-702(c) permits the court to impose an increased sentence after a de
novo appeal and there is no constitutionally-based presumption of vindictiveness in that
context.
We begin with the recognition that “a trial judge has ‘very broad discretion in
sentencing.’”  Jones v. State, 414 Md. 686, 693, 997 A.2d 131, 134-35 (2010) (quoting
Jackson v. State, 364 Md. 192, 199, 772 A.2d 273, 277 (2001)).  This Court, therefore, will
only review a sentence on three grounds:  “(1) whether the sentence constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment or violates other constitutional requirements; (2) whether the sentencing
judge was motivated by ill-will, prejudice or other impermissible considerations; and (3)
whether the sentence is within statutory limits.”  Jackson, 364 Md. at 200, 772 A.2d at 277
(quoting Gary v. State, 341 Md. 513, 516, 671 A.2d 495, 496 (1996)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).  Petitioner’s contentions fall under the second basis for review.
We have observed that
[a] judge should fashion a sentence based upon the facts and circumstances of
the crime committed and the background of the defendant, including his or her
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reputation, prior offenses, health, habits, mental and moral propensities, and
social background.  The judge is accorded this broad latitude to best accomplish
the objectives of sentencing – punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation.
Jackson, 364 Md. at 199, 772 A.2d at 277 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (alteration
in original).  We have recognized also that de novo appeal proceedings occupy a “unique
position as both an appeal and a trial,” Stone v. State, 344 Md. 97, 105, 685 A.2d 441, 444
(1996), and such proceedings are to be treated “as wholly original proceedings, that is, as if
no judgment had been entered in the lower court,” id., 685 A.2d at 444 (quoting Hardy v.
State, 279 Md. 489, 493, 369 A.2d 1043, 1046 (1977)).  In that vein, CJ § 12-702 permits the
Circuit Court to impose any lawful sentence on a defendant who has exercised the right to de
novo appeal, including a more severe sentence than that imposed by the District Court
originally.  
In Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 539, 336 A.2d 113, 115 (1975), we reviewed the
sentencing court’s explicit comments referring to the defendant’s decision to enter a plea of
not guilty and exercise his right to a trial.  The sentencing court had explained, “if you had
come in here with a plea of guilty . . . you would probably have gotten a modest sentence,”
indicating that the court “at least to some degree, punished Johnson more severely because he
failed to plead guilty and, instead, stood trial.”  Id. at 543, 336 A.2d at 117.  We reviewed the
court’s comments in full and concluded that “the words just quoted [that Johnson would have
received a more lenient sentence had he pleaded guilty] manifest that an impermissible
consideration may well have been employed.  Any doubt in this regard must be resolved in
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favor of the defendant.”  Id., 336 A.2d at 117.  This was true even though “a reading of the
judge’s remarks in full d[id] not necessarily demonstrate that a more severe sentence was
imposed” based on Johnson’s exercise of his right to trial.  Id., 336 A.2d at 117.
We looked to our reasoning and holding in Johnson to distinguish the circumstances
of Jennings v. State, 339 Md. 675, 664 A.2d 903 (1995).  In Jennings, the petitioner asserted
that the sentencing court impermissibly considered his expression, or lack thereof, of remorse.
Id. at 681, 664 A.2d at 906.  The petitioner argued that the “court may not consider a
defendant’s failure to acknowledge guilt after conviction nor may it punish the defendant for
‘protestations of innocence’” and forcing a defendant to acknowledge guilt “violates the
defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination.”  Id., 664 A.2d at 906.  In rejecting those
arguments, we discussed our decision in Johnson.  Id. at 687, 664 A.2d at 909.  We recognized
that in Johnson this Court discussed the permissible scope of sentencing criteria and
emphasized transcript portions that explicitly referred to Johnson’s decision to plead not
guilty.  Id., 664 A.2d at 909.  We then suggested in Jennings that, in Johnson, “absent the
explicit reference to the defendant’s failure to plead guilty and the modest sentence that would
have produced, the Court would not have found Johnson’s sentence flawed.”  Id., 664 A.2d
at 909.
Turning to the matter sub judice, the record reflects that the Circuit Court considered
several permissible factors, including the facts and circumstances of the crime, Petitioner’s
previous criminal record, and Petitioner’s family background.  The sentencing court, perhaps
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because the prosecutor himself injected the issue in his sentence recommendation, went further
and explicitly mentioned Petitioner’s exercise of his de novo appeal right:
You have every right to go to trial in this case, which you did -- not once, but
twice.  Ms. Monroy was victimized, and then she had to come back and testify
in District Court; then she had to come back again and testify in the Circuit
Court, and she had to do that because you have every right to have all of those
opportunities to put forth your position.
Reading these statements in the context of the entire sentencing proceeding (which necessarily
includes consideration of the State’s explicit request that the court impose a higher sentence
than the District Court had imposed), we do not conclude that the sentencing court actually
considered the fact of Petitioner’s exercise of his right to a de novo appeal and imposed a more
severe sentence as punishment for having done so.  To the contrary, we infer that the judge’s
comments were intended simply to explain to the victim the reason for her return to court for
a second trial, while, at the same time, to underscore Petitioner’s entitlement to avail himself
of a right granted him by our system of justice.  Likewise, we are quite conscious of the
doctrine that judges are presumed to know the law and apply it correctly, Medley v. State, 386
Md. 3, 7, 870 A.2d 1218, 1220 (2005), and we are confident the court did precisely that here.
All that said, we are constrained nonetheless to remand this case for resentencing
because the court’s explicit reference to Petitioner’s exercise of his de novo appeal right could
“lead a reasonable person to infer that [the court] might have been motivated” by an
impermissible consideration.  Jackson, 364 Md. at 207, 772 A.2d at 281 (emphasis added).
In this circumstance, we are bound to resolve any doubt in Petitioner’s favor.
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SENTENCE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
MONTGOMERY COUNTY IS VACATED;
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO RE-SENTENCE IN
CONFORMANCE WITH THIS DECISION;
COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY
MONTGOMERY COUNTY.
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No.117504
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 46
September Term, 2011
 
MUHAMMAD ABDUL-MALEEK 
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Greene
Adkins
Barbera,
Wilner, Alan M.
(Retired, Specially assigned),
Cathell, Dale R.
(Retired, Specially assigned)
JJ.
Concurring Opinion
by Bell, C.J.,  which
Greene and Cathell, JJ.,  join.
Filed:   April 27, 2012
1  The petitioner initially framed the issue as two separate questions:
I. 
Whether the circuit court violated Section 12-702(c) of the Maryland
Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article when it increased the
defendant’s sentence based on the fact that he exercised his right to
appeal and receive a de novo jury trial.
II. 
Whether the circuit court violated the defendant’s due process rights as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
Article 24 of Maryland Declaration of Rights as set forth in North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) and Colten v. Kentucky, 407
U.S. 104, 112 (1953).
(Footnote omitted).  The focus of both questions was the court’s reference to the petitioner’s
exercise of one of his  rights and its effect on the sentence it imposed.  In his reply brief, the
petitioner stated the argument more directly; he argues that the Circuit Court based its
sentence on the impermissible consideration of the petitioner’s exercise of his de novo
appeal right.     
2The Court reasons:
“Despite the applicability of general preservation principles . . . we are not
precluded absolutely from reviewing Petitioner’s claim.  We have explained
time and again that Rule 8-131(a) grants an appellate court discretion,
nevertheless, to consider issues deemed to have been waived for failure to
make a contemporaneous objection.  See Bible v. State, 411 Md. 138, 148,
We granted the Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioner, Mohammad Abdul-
Maleek, Abdul-Maleek v. State, 420 Md. 463, 23 A.3d 895 (2011), to decide whether, in
referencing, at sentencing, the fact that the petitioner exercised his de novo appeal right, and
subsequently increasing the sentence imposed by the District Court, the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County violated Maryland Code (1957, 2006 Repl. Vol., 2011 Supp.) § 12-702
(c) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article.1  In the State’s answer to the Petition, it
noted the petitioner’s failure to object to the court’s comments or the sentence itself and
challenged the petitioner’s right to direct appellate review of his sentence.
Exercising our discretion, under Maryland Rule 8-131 (a), to consider unpreserved
issues,2  we rejected the State’s challenge and reached the merits of the issues presented.  On
982 A.2d 348, 354 (2009) (plurality opinion) (“[A]n appellate court’s review
of arguments not raised at the trial level is discretionary, not mandatory.  The
use of the word ‘ordinarily’ clearly contemplates both those circumstances in
which an appellate court will not review issues if they were not previously
raised and those circumstances in which it will.” (quoting State v. Bell, 334
Md. 178, 188, 638 A.2d 107, 113 (1994)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
This discretion, however, should be exercised with caution.  Chaney, 397 Md.
at 468, 918 A.2d at 511.  In deciding whether to review an issue that has been
waived, we should “[f]irst . . . consider whether the exercise of . . . discretion
will work unfair prejudice to either of the parties . . . .  Second, the appellate
court should consider whether the exercise of its discretion will promote the
orderly administration of justice.”  Bible, 411 Md. at 151-52, 982 A.2d at 356
(quoting Jones v. State, 379 Md. 704, 714-15, 843 A.2d 778, 784 (2004))
(final alteration in original).
“In the matter sub judice we see no prejudice to either party should we
consider this issue.  There is, of course, no prejudice to Petitioner, as he has
sought and been granted  review of his claim of error.  See Bible, 411 Md. at
152, 982 A.2d at 356.  And, there is only de minimis prejudice to the State, as
our review would not broach the underlying judgment of conviction but rather
would be confined to resentencing, at which the same sentence could be
imposed, based on proper considerations.  Moreover, by addressing the issue
presented, we are able to comment on the sentencing issue in the context of de
novo appeals and thereby promote the “orderly administration of justice.”  See
id., 982 A.2d at 356.  We therefore choose to exercise our discretion to
consider the merits of Petitioner’s claim.”
Abdul-Maleek, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.3d at ___ (slip op. at 9-10).  
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the merits, we hold that the court erred and, accordingly, that the petitioner must be
resentenced.  We reason that “the court’s explicit reference to Petitioner’s exercise of his de
novo appeal right could ‘lead a reasonable person to infer that [the court] might have been
motivated’ by an impermissible consideration.”  Abdul-Maleek v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___,
___ A.3d ___, ___ (slip op. at 15) (quoting  Jackson v. State, 364 Md. 192, 207, 772 A.2d
273, 281 (2001) (emphasis added).  Indeed, the Court expressly states, in that regard, that,
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upon review of the record, it does not believe “that the sentencing court actually considered
the fact of Petitioner’s exercise of his right to a de novo appeal and imposed a more severe
sentence as punishment for having done so.”  Abdul-Maleek, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.3d at
___ (slip op. at 14) (emphasis in original).   
I agree with the result reached in this case and, therefore, join the judgment.  The
petitioner is, as the Court concludes, entitled to appellate review of his sentence and he is
entitled to a resentencing.  I do not agree with the rationale given by the Court for either
conclusion.  I write separately to explicate my reasons for believing that this case is correctly
decided. 
The petitioner’s objection to the court’s sentencing decision was, I believe,
preserved.  Accordingly, there was, and is, no need for the Court to exercise its discretion
to reach the issue.  
The purpose of the preservation rule,  requiring an objection to preserve a matter for
appellate review, is to guard against “sandbagging” the judge.  See In Re Kaleb K, 390 Md.
502, 513, 889 A.2d 1019, 1025 (2006); Brice v. State, 254 Md. 655, 661, 255 A.2d 28, 31
(1969); Banks v. State, 203 Md. 488, 495, 102 A.2d 267, 271 (1954).  There is no
“sandbagging” here.  See also Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427, 488 A.2d 949, 951
(1985) (“When [a] trial court has allegedly imposed a sentence not permitted by law, the
issue should ordinarily be reviewed on direct appeal even if no objection was made in the
trial court.”).  As judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it correctly, Thornton
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v. State, 397 Md. 704, 736, 919 A.2d 678, 697 (2007), the petitioner well could have
assumed, and most probably, did assume, that the trial judge was saying what he meant and
meant what he was saying.  The question was ripe for appellate review when the trial judge
stated his sentencing rationale.  An objection at that point is, and in this case, would have
been, an useless gesture.  It also should be acknowledged that interposing an objection at this
point, rather than having an ameliorating effect, could ensure that such violations of right are
shielded from redress.  If, for example, having been  made aware of the petitioner’s specific
concerns, the trial judge simply denied that he was using an improper consideration,  the
right to redress would be the victim; the petitioner’s right to redress will not be able to be
vindicated.    
 The court’s reference to the petitioner’s exercise of his right to de novo appeal,
clearly expressed displeasure with that decision and conveyed the assumption, not simply
the implication, that it was just another way of further harassing the victim.  It would be
unreasonable to expect any defendant, already at an apparent disadvantage and aware of  the
court’s evident, if not explicit disapproval, under these circumstances, to lodge an objection,
which has to, in effect, accuse the judge of acting inappropriately, the basis of which are the
very same disapproval statements.  Such an objection could antagonize the court and make
it even more displeased, thus, subjecting the defendant to yet another, perhaps greater, risk.
This is especially the case when the court’s critical remarks follow the State’s demand for
a greater sentence and immediately precede the imposition of the increased sentence.  This,
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it strikes me, is an equally important reason why this Court is not precluded from reviewing
the merits of the petitioner’s appeal. 
On the merits, I do not believe that this is a close case and I certainly do not believe
that it is an “appearance” case.  It is clear to me that the sentence imposed not only gave the
appearance of being, but was, in fact, based on the petitioner’s exercise of his appeal right,
which under the circumstances was an impermissible sentencing consideration. Indeed, it is
my position that there was no conclusion that could be drawn from the trial judge’s remarks
referencing the petitioner’s exercise of his right to appeal other than that the fact that the
petitioner exercised his right to a de novo appeal was the basis for the enhanced sentence that
the trial court imposed.  The circumstances of the case bear this out.
After being tried in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Montgomery County,
of extortion, pursuant to Maryland Code (2002, 2010 Supp.), § 3-701(b) of the Criminal Law
3§ 3-701(b) of the Criminal Law Article provides:
“(b) Obtaining or attempting to obtain property prohibited. -- A person may
not obtain, attempt to obtain, or conspire to obtain money, property, labor,
services, or anything of value from another person with the person's consent,
if the consent is induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened:
“(1) force or violence;
“(2) economic injury; or
“(3) destruction, concealment, removal, confiscation, or possession of any
immigration or government identification document with intent to harm the
immigration status of another person.”
47-104 (g) (2) of the Criminal Law Article provides:
“(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (3) and (4) of this subsection, a
person convicted of theft of property or services with a value of less than $
1,000, is guilty of a misdemeanor and:
“(i) is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 18 months or a fine not
exceeding $ 500 or both; and
“(ii) shall restore the property taken to the owner or pay the owner the value
of the property or services.
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Article3 (“CR”), and theft, CR § 7-104 (g) (2),4 and convicted only of the latter, receiving
a period of incarceration, a suspended sentence, probation, a fine and being required to pay
restitution, the petitioner exercised his right to de novo appeal and elected a jury trial in the
Circuit Court.  Following his conviction, the State, at sentencing, argued for incarceration,
asserting that the nature of the petitioner’s actions, “tak[ing] advantage of someone under
these circumstances,” warranted “executed incarceration,” greater than that imposed by the
District Court.  During the presentation of its argument and, in context, in support of its
incarceration request, the State mentioned the petitioner’s de novo appeal:
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“It’s in light of that, Your Honor, the State is asking for executed
incarceration.  To give you an idea, [the District Court Judge], gave the
defendant 18 months, suspend all but 60 days.  That’s neither here nor there.
It’s a de novo appeal.  I would ask for more than that, Your Honor.  The
defendant had the opportunity to sort of let that lie, take responsibility for his
actions.  He did not do that.  I would ask the Court for an executed
incarceration above and beyond the 60 days.  How far above and beyond, I
will leave in the Court’s sound judgment.  Thank you.”
In imposing a sentence greater than that imposed by the District Court, the court also
referenced the petitioner’s exercise of his appeal right:   
“You have every right to go to trial in this case, which you did – not
once, but twice.  Ms. Monroy was victimized, and then she had to come back
and testify in the Circuit Court, and she had to do that because you have every
right to have all of those opportunities to put forth your position.  I am at a
total loss. 
(Emphasis added).  It did so after expressing consternation at how the petitioner treated the
victim, lamenting the lack of an explanation for his behavior and noting that the jury had
little trouble, taking only five minutes to do so, sorting out what happened between the
victim and the petitioner.  A sentence was imposed immediately after the de novo appeal
comments.
The crux of the petitioner’s arguments is that the sentencing court penalized him for
having exercised his right to a de novo appeal.  This is demonstrated, he submits, by the
court’s reference to that fact during sentencing, and its increase of his sentence of executed
incarceration by 400 percent.  In this regard, the petitioner argues that the court’s comments
did more than simply give “an appearance of bias” since, although it is not possible to
discern, with certainty, the weight the court gave to the fact that the petitioner exercised his
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right to a de novo appeal, the very fact that the court referred to the petitioner’s exercise of
this right twice, and the immediate proximity of these comments to the announcement of the
petitioner’s sentence, demonstrate that it, at least, played a part in the Circuit Court’s
ultimate sentence.
In response, the State asserts that it can not be said, based on a review of the record
as a whole, that the Circuit Court impermissibly imposed a more severe sentence on those
grounds.  The circumstances surrounding the crime counsel otherwise, it submits.  The State
also notes that, pursuant to CJ § 12-702(c), a circuit court may impose an increased sentence
after a de novo appeal.  The state emphasizes that there is no constitutionally based
presumption of vindictiveness in such a context.
While it is true that “a trial judge has ‘very broad discretion in sentencing,’”  Jones
v. State, 414 Md. 686, 693, 997 A.2d 131, 134-35 (2010) (quoting Jackson, 364 Md. at 199,
772 A.2d at 277), the judge must “‘fashion a sentence based upon the facts and
circumstances of the crime committed and the background of the defendant, including his
or her reputation, prior offenses, health, habits, mental and moral propensities, and social
background.’”  Jackson, 364 Md. at 200, 772 A.2d at 277 (quoting Poe v. State, 341 Md.
523, 532, 671 A.2d 501, 505 (1996)).  This Court may review such a sentence on three
grounds:  “(1) whether the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or violates
other constitutional requirements; (2) whether the sentencing judge was motivated by ill-
will, prejudice or other impermissible considerations; and (3) whether the sentence is within
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statutory limits.”  Jackson, 364 Md. at 200, 772 A.2d at 277 (quoting Gary v. State, 341 Md.
513, 516, 671 A.2d 495, 496 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The petitioner’s contentions, as the Court correctly notes, Abdul-Maleek, ___ Md. at
___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 12), fall under the second basis for review.  Applying these
principles to the facts of the case sub judice, I, like the petitioner, believe there is sufficient
basis for  this Court to conclude that the Circuit Court, in fact, actually, and impermissibly,
based its decision of increased incarceration on the petitioner’s decision to exercise his right
to appeal.
I do not disagree with the majority, that “the Circuit Court considered several
permissible factors, including the facts and circumstances of the crime, Petitioner’s previous
criminal record, and Petitioner’s family background.”  Abdul-Maleek, ___ Md. at ___, ___
A.3d at ___ (slip op. at 14).  Indeed, had the sentencing judge simply ended his commentary
after chastising the petitioner for his conduct, it is quite likely that this issue would not be
here.  Not satisfied with expressing consternation with respect to the petitioner’s conduct and
finding it to be inexplicable, he went further, explicitly mentioning and, in so doing, I
submit, faulting, the petitioner’s exercise of his de novo appeal right:
“You have every right to go to trial in this case, which you did – not once, but
twice.  Ms. Monroy was victimized, and then she had to come back and testify
in the District Court; then she had to come back again and testify in the Circuit
Court, and she had to do that because you have every right to have all of those
opportunities to put forth your position.”
Viewing the court’s remarks in their entirety and in context, it is hard to imagine that it was
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not, at the very least, a basis for the Circuit Court’s sentencing decision.  Indeed, read in the
context of the entire sentencing proceeding, it is readily apparent from these statements that
the sentencing court not only considered the fact of the petitioner’s exercise of his right to
a de novo appeal, it used that fact to support the imposition of a more severe sentence as
punishment.  As a matter of fact, there is no other explanation for the references.  There
simply was no reason for the court to mention the petitioner’s exercise of appeal rights if it
played no part in its sentencing analysis and imposition.
Even without the explicit references, it is hard to make a case that the court’s
sentencing decision did not take account of, and factor in, the petitioner’s exercise of his
appeal rights.  It is one thing, and justifiable, to focus on, and take account of a victim’s
treatment at the hands of her victimizer; it is quite another, and not justifiable, when that
treatment is expanded to include post arrest activities of the then defendant, that are
guaranteed and, thus, protected by law.  In other words, I submit that it was enough to trigger
“impermissible considerations” concerns when the court commented on the victim’s being
forced to testify more than once when the only reason for that need was an action by the
defendant that was authorized by law.
To be sure, judges are presumed to know the law and apply it correctly, Medley v.
State, 386 Md. 3, 7, 870 A.2d 1218, 1220 (2005).  That presumption does not, and should
not trump a petitioner’s entitlement to resentencing if it even appears that the court’s
comments “could cause a reasonable person to question the impartiality of the judge.”
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Jackson, 364 Md. at 207, 772 A.2d at 281-82.  A defendant’s right to a fair trial should be
afforded its due weight, and in those cases where there exists some ambiguity about a
judge’s impartiality, we are, as the majority recognizes, bound to resolve any such doubt in
the petitioner’s favor.  Abdul-Maleek, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.3d at ___ (slip op. at 15).
Here, I do not believe that there exists any ambiguity as to the court’s statements.  The
comments made by the court in the case sub judice do more than raise a question as to the
judge’s impartiality; they demonstrate that conclusively there is one and that it has substance.
Judges Greene and Cathell have authorized me to state that they join in this
concurring opinion.