Case Title: EUGENE R. BRUMBAUGH and ELIZABETH D. BRUMBAUGH, husband and wife V. MIKELSON LAND COMPANY, a Montana Corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0218

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
EUGENE R. BRUMBAUGH and ELIZABETH D. BRUMBAUGH, husband and wife V.  MIKELSON LAND COMPANY, a Montana Corporation2008 WY 66185 P.3d 695Case Number: S-07-0218Decided: 06/12/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
EUGENE 
R. BRUMBAUGH and ELIZABETH D. BRUMBAUGH, husband and 
wife,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.MIKELSON LAND COMPANY, 
a Montana Corporation,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofParkCounty

The 
Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

S. 
Joseph Darrah of Darrah, Darrah & Brown, P.C., Powell, Wyoming. 

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

            
Thomas 
P. Keegan of Keegan & Winslow, P.C., Cody, Wyoming.

            

Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

                  

[¶1]      In the early 
1970s, developer Flying L Skytel (Skytel) established the Skytel Country Estates 
subdivision in Park County, 
Wyoming by filing a plat and a 
declaration of restrictive covenants.  
After Eugene R. and Elizabeth D. Brumbaugh's (the Brumbaughs) predecessor 
in interest purchased two Skytel Country Estates lots, Skytel partially vacated 
the plat, amended the restrictive covenants and sold the remaining property to 
Mikelson Land Company (MLC), which incorporated it into a larger 
subdivision.  In 2003, the 
Brumbaughs purchased their lot and sought to construct a home on the land.  MLC, however, denied their requests for 
easements for power, sewer and access; to tap into a water system; and to build 
central livestock facilities.   

   

[¶2]      The Brumbaughs 
filed a declaratory and injunctive relief action against MLC seeking to enforce 
the rights they claimed pursuant to the Skytel Country Estates restrictive 
covenants and plat.  The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of MLC, holding the Brumbaughs were not 
entitled to any of their requests for relief.  On appeal, we hold, as a matter of law, 
the restrictive covenants and plat granted the Brumbaughs, as owners of a lot in 
the original Skytel Country Estates subdivision, the rights to easements for 
power, sewer and access.  Because 
the scope and location of the easements were not set out in the subdivision 
documents, those matters must be determined on remand considering what is 
reasonable and convenient under the circumstances.  The subdivision documents do not, 
however, grant the Brumbaughs the rights to connect to a water system or to 
locate central livestock facilities on subdivision property.  In addition, we conclude that MLC does 
not have the right to amend the declaration of covenants for the Skytel Country 
Estates subdivision and the appointment of MLC as the architectural committee 
for the subdivision was invalid.  
Consequently, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Although the 
parties present a convoluted statement of the issues, we believe they can be 
distilled to:

 
 

1.                  
What 
was the effect of the partial vacation of the Skytel Country Estates plat and 
corresponding amendment to the declaration of restrictive 
covenants?

 
 

2.                  
Whether 
the restrictive covenants and/or plat of the Skytel Country Estates subdivision 
grant the Brumbaughs easements for power, access, and a sewer system; the right 
to connect to a water system developed for an adjacent subdivision; and/or the 
right to place central livestock facilities in the common area of the original 
subdivision?

 
 

3.                  
Can 
MLC amend the Skytel Country Estates declaration of covenants?  

 
 

4.                  
Was 
MLC properly appointed as architectural control committee for the Skytel Country 
Estates subdivision?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      On January 1, 
1970, Skytel, a Wyoming corporation, conveyed to the 
Brumbaughs' predecessor-in-interest, Vincent Pascale, Lots 81 and 82 of the 
Skytel Country Estates subdivision.  
The deed stated it was "subject to reservation, exceptions, easements and 
rights-of-way in existence or of record and to declaration of restrictive 
covenants for Skytel Country Estates."    

 
 
[¶5]      On February 9, 
1970, Skytel recorded a plat for the Skytel Country Estates subdivision.  The plat showed numerous subdivision 
lots which were circular in shape.  
The lots were surrounded by areas referred to by the parties as "common 
areas" or "buffer areas."  The plat 
showed some roads in the subdivision, and the certificate of dedication 
stated:  

 
 
Access 
for the lots within the Skytel Country Estates is provided by a private road 
system linked to the ParkCounty road system.

 
 
[¶6]      On March 30, 
1971, Skytel executed a Declaration of Restrictive Covenants for Skytel Country 
Estates, which specifically incorporated the plat by reference.  The

covenants 
stated in relevant part:              

plans 
and restrictions

 
 
The 
following general use and building plans and restrictions for said land and area 
are hereby established.  It is 
covenanted, agreed and declared that all said land is held subject to these 
plans and restrictions, all of which shall be covenants running with the land 
and shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the undersigned, its 
grantees, successors and assigns.  
It is further covenanted, agreed and declared that all subsequent grants 
of said land or any part thereof shall be subject to these plans and 
restrictions.               

 
 
. . . . 

 
 

2.      
. . . 
.  All residence buildings shall be 
modern and have septic tanks with leaching fields or tanks according to the 
standards of the Wyoming State Health Department.  

 
 

3.      
No 
livestock may be kept on the land[,] but livestock may be kept in central 
facilities to be provided for the area at reasonable cost. . . 
.

 
 

4.      
If water 
should become scarce[,] meters will be installed in an approved manner at the 
property owner's expense. . . .

 
 

5.      
All 
residences, buildings and sewerage systems must be approved before installation 
or construction by an architectural committee appointed annually by the 
undersigned to serve for one year.

 
 

6.      
All 
easements required for sewer, water[,] power and other utilities across said 
lands either for lots in the subdivision or for access to and from the 
subdivision are hereby specifically reserved.

 
 

violations

 
 
            
The general plans and restrictions contained herein inure to the benefit 
of the purchasers of all lots within said subdivision and the undersigned.  If any grantee, his heirs, successors or 
assigns violates or attempts to violate any of the plans, covenants and 
restrictions herein it shall be lawful for the undersigned or any other person 
or persons owning any land in said subdivision to take appropriate proceedings 
against the person or persons violating or attempting to violate these plans, 
covenants and restrictions for the purpose of restraining such violation and 
recover any damages resulting therefrom.  
Invalidation of any one of these covenants or restrictions by judgment or 
court order shall not affect any of the other covenants and restrictions herein, 
all of which shall remain in full force and effect.

 
 
            
These restrictive covenants may be modified at any time by vote of the 
owners of at least two thirds of the land area within the Skytel Country 
Estates. 

 

[¶7]      On January 10, 
1973, Skytel recorded an amendment to the declaration of restrictive covenants 
and a partial vacation of the plat for the Skytel Country Estates 
subdivision.  The amendment to the 
declaration of restrictive covenants stated, in relevant 
part:

 
 
            
All of the restrictive covenants pertaining to Skytel Country Estates 
except insofar as they pertain to Lots 77, 81 and 82 are hereby annulled and 
cancelled and shall be superseded by the protective covenants pertaining to 
Cody's Country, according to the plat to be filed thereof, which plat shall 
include the land now described as Skytel Country Estates, together with other 
lands.  

 
 
The 
amendment also stated that the owners of Lots 77, 81 and 82 could choose to 
become part of the Cody's Country subdivision but, otherwise, would "remain 
subject to all of the terms and conditions of the restrictive covenants for 
Skytel Country Estates."  The 
partial vacation of the plat stated that "vacation of all of said plat excepting 
Lots 77, 81 and 82 will not abridge or destroy any of the rights and privileges 
of other proprietors in said plat."  Shortly thereafter, Skytel conveyed the 
remaining Skytel Country Estates subdivision property, except lots 77, 81 and 
82, to MLC, subject to "patent reservations, rights of way and easements of 
record, building, use and zoning restrictions . . . ."  

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. Pascale 
passed away in 2002 and, on September 18, 2003, the trustee of a trust 
established pursuant to Mr. Pascale's will conveyed Lot 82 of Skytel Country 
Estates to the Brumbaughs.  In June 
2004, Cecil A. Legg, who was formerly the president of Skytel and is now 
deceased, appointed MLC as the architectural committee for Skytel Country 
Estates.  He signed the document as 
an individual.    

 
 
[¶9]      In July 2005, 
the Brumbaughs filed a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief action in the 
district court.  They sought a 
declaration that, pursuant to the original Skytel Country Estates subdivision 
documents, they are entitled to:  easements for utilities; place their 
septic system in the common area of the subdivision; use all developed roads in 
the subdivision, including Heidi Drive; tap into the water system used by the 
Cody's Country subdivision; and construct and use central livestock facilities 
within the common area for their horses.  
In addition, they sought a declaration that Mr. Legg's appointment of MLC 
as the architectural committee for Skytel Country Estates subdivision was 
invalid.  The Brumbaughs also 
requested comparable injunctive relief.  
MLC answered and counterclaimed for declaratory and injunctive relief 
contrary to the Brumbaughs' claims.  
MLC also sought a declaration that it had the authority to modify the 
Skytel Country Estates subdivision covenants.    

 
 
[¶10]   The parties filed cross motions for 
summary judgment, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
MLC, ruling:

 
 

(1)               
That 
the Plaintiffs['] claims are barred by the Statute of Frauds.  There is no deed or writing that gives 
them a right to easements, water rights or rights to the buffer zone.     

 
 

(2)               
The 
vacation of the plat does not abridge or destroy any of the rights or privileges 
of the Plaintiffs in the plat, and the only rights or privileges associated with 
the plat is a private road system linked to the Park County road 
system.

 
 

(3)               
The 
Plaintiffs['] claim to rights and easements is wholly unsupported in law or 
fact.  The language used in the 
Declaration of Restrictive Covenants clearly indicates that the reservation of 
rights is reserved to the title owner which, at the time of their creation, was 
Flying L Skytel and is now currently the Mikelson Land 
Company.

 
 

(4)               
That 
the Plaintiffs have demonstrated no right, in either Skytel or themselves, to a 
water permit or a water right.  A 
permit from the State of Wyoming and a Special Use Permit issued by the 
United States Forest Service are issued in the name of Mikelson Land 
Company.

 
 

(5)               
That 
the Mikelson Land Company is entitled to vote on the modification of the 
covenants as it is the owner of more than two-thirds of the original land area 
within the Skytel Country Estates.  
It is clear, from the language of the covenants, that the grantor is 
entitled to vote on modification because the covenants refer to ownership of 
land within the subdivision, as opposed to lots.

 
 

(6)               
That 
the appointment of the Mikelson Land Company to the Architectural Control 
Committee was valid.

 

The 
Brumbaughs appealed.    

 
 
SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT STANDARD

 
 
[¶11]   Summary judgment motions are 
governed by W.R.C.P. 56(c):

 
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 
We 
review a district court's summary judgment rulings de novo, using the same materials and 
following the same standards as the district court.  The facts are reviewed from the vantage 
point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that party 
the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record.  Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc. v. 
South Douglas Highway Water & Sewer Dist., 2007 WY 206, ¶ 8, 173 P.3d 398, 401 (Wyo. 2007); Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, 
¶ 11, 126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶12]   Before we address the specific 
issues presented in this case, we will discuss our rules for interpreting 
covenants and plats.  A covenant is 
a promise "to do, or to refrain from doing, certain things with respect to real 
property."  20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions § 
1 (2008).  Although our case law has 
typically discussed covenants which restrict a party's rights on the land, see, e.g., Stevens v. Elk Run Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 
2004 WY 63, 90 P.3d 1162 (Wyo. 2004), covenants can be affirmative or 
negative in nature.  20 Am. Jur. 2d 
Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions § 20 (1995).  
Covenants may also create easements.  Such covenants are typically deemed to 
be appurtenant to and run with the land.   20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions § 
21 (1995).      

 
 
[¶13]   Express covenants are contractual 
in nature and are, therefore, interpreted in accordance with principles of 
contract law.  Stevens, ¶¶ 12-13, 90 P.3d at 1165-66; 
Goglio v. StarValley 
Ranch Ass'n, 2002 WY 94, ¶ 23, 48 P.3d 1072, 1081 (Wyo. 2002); Anderson v. Bommer, 926 P.2d 959, 961 
(Wyo. 
1996).  Similarly, we interpret the 
language used in a plat in accordance with contract interpretation 
principles.  See, Sunshine, ¶ 18, 173 P.3d  at 403; Owsley v. Robinson, 2003 WY 33, ¶ 12, 65 P.3d 374, 377 (Wyo. 2003).  When the language is clear and 
unambiguous, the interpretation and construction of contracts is a matter of law 
for the courts.  Hasvold v. Park County School Dist. No. 
6, 2002 WY 65, ¶ 13, 45 P.3d 635, 638 (Wyo. 2002).  As with all contracts, our goal in 
interpreting covenants and plats is to determine and effectuate the intentions 
of the parties, especially the grantor.  
Stevens, ¶ 13, 90 P.3d  at 
1166; Owsley, ¶ 12, 65 P.3d  at 
377.  In order to accomplish that 
goal, we consider the entire instrument rather than a single clause.  Anderson, 926 P.2d  at 961.  

 
 
1.         
Partial Vacation of Plat and Amendment to Restrictive Covenants of the 
Skytel Country Estates Subdivision

 
 
[¶14]   After the Brumbaughs' predecessor, 
Mr. Pascale, purchased his lots in the Skytel Country Estates subdivision, the 
original developer, Skytel, filed a partial vacation of plat and an amendment to 
the restrictive covenants.  In order 
to resolve this case, we must determine what effect those filings had on the 
rights and obligations of the owners of the remaining Skytel Country Estates 
lots.  

 
 
[¶15]   The original declaration of 
restrictive covenants stated that it could be modified by "vote of the owners of 
at least two thirds of the land area within the Skytel Country Estates."  There is no debate about the fact that, 
when the amendment to the restrictive covenants was filed, Skytel still owned at 
least two-thirds of the land within the Skytel Country Estates subdivision.  

 
 
[¶16]   The amendment to the restrictive 
covenants stated that the covenants were annulled and cancelled except as they 
pertained to the three lots which had already been sold.  It also stated that the owners of Lots 
77, 81 and 82 could choose to become part of the Cody's Country subdivision but, 
otherwise, would remain "subject to all of the terms and conditions of the 
restrictive covenants for Skytel Country Estates."  The deed from Skytel to MLC specifically 
stated that it was subject to "patent reservations, rights of way and easements 
of record, building, use and zoning restrictions . . . ."  

 
 
[¶17]   The partial vacation of the plat 
specified that the Skytel Country Estates subdivision plat was vacated except as 
to Lots 77, 81 and 82.  Moreover, it 
provided that the vacation would "not abridge or destroy any of the rights and 
privileges of other proprietors in said plat."  That statement was consistent with Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 34-12-108 (LexisNexis 2007), which states:

 
 
Any part 
of a plat may be vacated under the provisions, and subject to the conditions of 
this act provided, such vacating does not abridge or destroy any of the rights 
and privileges of other proprietors in said plat; and provided, further, that 
nothing contained in this section shall authorize the closing or obstruction of 
any public highways laid out according to law.   

 
 
[¶18]   Under the plain language of the 
amendment to the declaration of covenants, the vacation of the plat and § 
34-12-108, the owners of Lots 77, 81 and 82 in the Skytel Country Estates 
subdivision continued to enjoy the rights and be bound by the obligations 
contained in the relevant subdivision documents.  The amendment to the covenants and the 
vacation of the plat did not change those rights.  Our focus in this case, therefore, must 
be on what rights were granted when the Skytel Country Estates subdivision was 
created.

            

 
 
[¶19]   Paragraph 6 of the Skytel Country 
Estates subdivision covenants states, "All easements required for sewer, 
water[,] power and other utilities across said land either for lots in the 
subdivision or for access to and from the subdivision are hereby specifically 
reserved."  The district court 
concluded that the covenant reserved the right to such easements only to "the 
title owner which, at the time of their 
creation, was Flying L Skytel and is now currently the Mikelson Land 
Company" and those rights did not belong to individual lot owners, like 
the Brumbaughs.  Considering the 
language of the entire declaration, we conclude, as a matter of law, that the 
district court's interpretation was mistaken.1

 
 
[¶20]   Paragraph 6 clearly reserves 
easements for utilities and access, although it does not specify to whom the 
easements are reserved.  
Nevertheless, other sections of the declaration clearly indicate that the 
rights set forth in the covenants are for the benefit of the grantor and his 
successors.  The declaration states 
that the covenants "shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the 
undersigned, its grantees, successors and assigns" and "[t]he general plans and 
restrictions contained herein inure to the benefit of the purchasers of all lots 
within said subdivision and the undersigned."  When the entire declaration is 
considered, there is simply no question that the rights conveyed in Paragraph 6 
were to inure to the benefit of the Skytel Country Estates lot owners.   The Brumbaughs, as lot owners, 
have a right to easements for utilities and access. 

 
 
[¶21]   The declaration does not, however, 
define the location or scope of the easements.  "An express easement not stating the 
location and dimensions is called a floating easement and is defined as an 
[e]asement for right-of-way which, when created, is not limited to any specific 
area on servient tenement.'"  Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, 
Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 855 (Wyo. 1996), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 640 
(6th ed. 1990).  See also, RCR, Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 587-88 (Wyo. 1999).2  When a floating easement is created, 
"[t]he parties are presumed to have intended an easement that is reasonably 
convenient or necessary under the circumstances."  Edgcomb, 922 P.2d  at 855, quoting Jon W. Bruce and James W. Ely, 
Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in 
Land 7.02 (Rev. ed. 1995).   
In order to locate the easement, the court must engage in a factual 
inquiry.  RCR, 978 P.2d  at 587-88.  In Edgcomb, 922 P.2d  at 855-56, we referred 
to the Bruce and Ely treatise and identified a number of factors for the court 
to consider in locating a floating easement.  Because the ultimate goal is to 
determine the intention of the parties, the court first considers whether any 
oral or collateral written agreements were made by the parties.  If no such agreement exists, then the 
court considers other factors, including the purpose of the easement, the 
geographic relationship between the dominant and the servient estates, the use 
of each of the estates, a comparison of the benefit to the dominant owner to the 
burden of the servient holder, and the actual use of the servient property by 
the dominant owner, if any.  
Id.  See also, RCR, 978 P.2d  at 587-88.   On remand, the district court will 
have the responsibility of applying these principles to determine the location 
and scope of the Brumbaughs' easements.  

 
 
[¶22]   The Brumbaughs claim that the 
covenants allow them to place their entire septic system within the common 
area.  While we agree that, as a 
matter of law, they are entitled to an easement for sewer purposes, we cannot 
say that they are necessarily entitled to place their entire septic system in 
the common area.  Instead, it will 
be the district court's responsibility to conduct the appropriate factual 
analysis to determine a location, scope and dimension of the Brumbaughs' sewer 
easement that is "reasonably convenient or necessary under the 
circumstances."

 
 
[¶23]   The Brumbaughs also claim that they 
are entitled to use all roads which have been developed in the original Skytel 
Country Estates subdivision, including Heidi Drive.  Paragraph 6 of the covenants reserved 
access to and from the subdivision and the certificate of dedication on the 
Skytel Country Estates subdivision plat stated: 

 
 
[a]ccess 
for the lots within the Skytel Country Estates is provided by a private road 
system linked to the ParkCounty road system.

 
 
[¶24]   Some roads are shown on the plat, 
although the precise access sought by the Brumbaughs, Heidi Drive, is not 
shown.  Nevertheless, Heidi Drive 
apparently exists.  It is not 
entirely clear from the record whether any of the roads shown on the plat have 
actually been developed and could be used by the Brumbaughs to access their 
property.  R.A. Mikelson, the owner 
of MLC, stated in his affidavit that to his best information and belief, "none 
of the platted roads were ever constructed."  In a supplemental affidavit, Mr. 
Mikelson explained:  "The roads 
depicted in the plat wind their way between lots up and down the mountain with 
no concern for the steepness of hills and could not physically be built as shown 
on the plat."    

 
 
[¶25]   We conclude, as a matter of law, 
the Brumbaughs are entitled to access to their lot across the lands formerly 
within the Skytel Country Estates subdivision.   Considering the plat, together 
with the certificate of dedication and the restrictive covenants, we conclude 
that their right of access is not limited to the roads shown on the plat. 
Genuine issues of material fact, therefore, exist concerning the appropriate 
mode of access to the Brumbaughs' property.  On remand, the district court will need 
to determine the status of the Heidi Drive access or whether other 
"reasonably convenient or necessary" access to the Brumbaughs' lot through 
subdivision property exists or may be developed.    

      

[¶26]   The Brumbaughs also claim that they 
are entitled to tap into a water system servicing the Cody's Country 
subdivision.  They base this 
argument upon documents filed with various governmental agencies by the Skytel 
Country Estates developer, that indicated it intended to develop a water system 
for the subdivision, and documents indicating MLC has developed a water system 
to service some of the residents of the Cody's Country subdivision.  These documents do not, however, 
determine the Brumbaughs' rights with regard to the water system.  Instead, we must look to the Skytel 
Country Estates subdivision documents, the covenants and plat, to determine the 
Brumbaughs' rights.  The plat makes 
no reference to providing water to the lots.  As quoted above, Paragraph 6 of the 
covenants refers to easements for water and Paragraph 4 states that if water 
becomes scarce, meters will be installed.  
The express language of the covenants, including the references to water 
easements and the possibility of installing meters, does not expressly create an 
obligation for the developer to provide water nor does it convey a right to tap 
into any water system.   

 
 
[¶27]   The fact that there is no express 
grant of a right to connect to a water system distinguishes this case from cases 
where courts have recognized a right to use resources developed for adjacent 
lands.  For example, in Nordin v. May, 188 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1951), the court enforced a covenant 
expressly requiring the grantor to provide the grantee with steam power from a 
power system on adjacent property to operate a flooring plant on the conveyed 
property.  Similarly, in Slife v. Kundtz Properties, Inc., 318 N.E.2d 557 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974), the court recognized a covenant expressly 
requiring the grantor who reserved natural gas rights in land to supply the 
grantee with gas for residential purposes.  
In contrast to the wording about water in the covenants in this case, the 
language used in Nordin and Slife expressly created the respective 
rights.

 
 
[¶28]   Our rules of contract 
interpretation prohibit us from amending or modifying a contract under the guise 
of interpretation.  See, e.g., Goglio, ¶ 27, 48 P.3d  at 1082.  If we were to interpret the covenants as 
requiring MLC to provide water to the Brumbaughs or allow them to connect to the 
Cody's Country subdivision water system, we would be violating that 
principle.   

 
 
[¶29]   The Brumbaughs also argue that the 
right to tap into the Cody's Country subdivision water system is implied by the 
easement language.  It is true that 
"the general rule of law is that when a party grants a thing he grants, by 
implication, whatever is incident to it and necessary to its beneficial 
enjoyments."  Wallis v. Luman, 625 P.2d 759, 767 
(Wyo. 1981), citing Franks v. Hicks, 4 Wyo. 502, 35 P. 475 (Wyo. 1894).  However, the right is limited by its 
terms to implication of things necessary to enjoyment of the granted 
rights.  The right to connect to the 
Cody's Country subdivision water system is not implied in the express grants 
contained in the Skytel Country Estates subdivision covenants.  The fact that the Brumbaughs may have a 
right to an easement for water and other utilities does not morph into a right 
to connect to the water system.  
Moreover, while the reference to water meters may suggest some type of 
communal water source, it would be improper for us to essentially add language 
to the covenant to create a right to connect to a water system that is not even 
mentioned in the subdivision documents.  

 
 
[¶30]   The Brumbaughs' proposed 
interpretation does more than imply those rights which are necessary to 
enjoyment of granted rights; it would create a new right (the right to connect 
to the Cody's Country subdivision water system) by implication.  As we have recognized in the past, 
"implied covenants are not favored in the law and will not be found to exist 
unless the language of the instrument leads unerringly to the conclusion that 
the parties [so] intended . . . ."  
Kincheloe v. Milatzo, 678 P.2d 855, 859 (Wyo. 
1984).  The language of the Skytel 
Country Estates covenants does not lead unerringly to the conclusion that the 
Brumbaughs should be allowed to connect to the Cody's Country subdivision water 
system.  Consequently, we rule, as a 
matter of law, the Brumbaughs are not entitled to that 
right.

 
 
[¶31]   The Brumbaughs also claim a right 
to construct and use central livestock facilities in the common area of the 
original Skytel Country Estates subdivision.  They base their claim upon the following 
language in Paragraph 3 of the covenants:   "No livestock may be kept on the 
land but livestock may be kept in central facilities to be provided for the area 
at reasonable cost."  The covenant 
is largely a prohibition against using lots within the subdivision to keep 
livestock.  However, it also states 
that livestock may be kept in "central facilities to be provided for the 
area."  These facilities were not 
identified on the plat and have never been constructed.  The Brumbaughs argue that the central 
livestock facilities should be located in the common area of the original Skytel 
Country Estates subdivision.  While 
the covenants indicate that they are generally to run with the land, Paragraph 3 
does not state that the livestock facilities would be located on subdivision 
land.  It states that central 
livestock facilities will be "provided for the area" as opposed to "in the 
common area" or "on subdivision lands."  
Unlike Paragraph 6 which specifically states that the easement burden 
applies to subdivision lands, Paragraph 3's reference to central livestock 
facilities to be "provided for the area" does not specifically burden 
subdivision land.3  

 
 
[¶32]   The express language of the 
covenant does not create an obligation for the developer to build such 
facilities,4 does not indicate where the 
facilities would be located and, more importantly, does not state whether they 
would be located anywhere on subdivision property.  Thus, as we pointed out in our 
discussion of the water issue, if we were to interpret the covenants as 
requiring construction of central livestock facilities on subdivision lands, we 
would be altering the covenants under the guise of interpretation.  We rule, as a matter of law, the 
property formerly included in the common area of the Skytel Country Estates 
subdivision is not burdened by the requirement that central livestock facilities 
be placed upon it.  

 
 

 
 
[¶33]   The district court ruled that MLC is "entitled to vote on the modification 
of the covenants as it is the owner of more than two-thirds of the original land 
area within the Skytel Country Estates."  
The Brumbaughs challenge that ruling.  

 
 
[¶34]   The declaration of covenants states 
that the covenants "may be modified at any time by vote of the owners of at 
least two thirds of the land area within the Skytel Country Estates."  Prior to the vacation of the plat, the 
owner of two-thirds of the land in the Skytel Country Estates subdivision had 
the authority to modify the covenants.  
In fact, that was the authority Skytel used when it canceled the 
covenants.  The plat was vacated and 
the covenants were canceled in 1973, except insofar as they applied to the three 
lots which had been sold.  The 
district court's ruling does not account for the fact that the Skytel Country 
Estates subdivision had been vacated when MLC took title to its property.   Thus, MLC is not an owner of land 
in the Skytel Country Estates subdivision.  
We conclude that MLC does not have the right to modify the Skytel Country 
Estates subdivision covenants.  That 
right belongs to two-thirds of the owners of land within the remaining part of 
the subdivision. 

 
 
[¶35]   The Brumbaughs also challenge the 
district court's approval of Mr. Legg's appointment of MLC as the architectural 
committee in 2004.  Paragraph 5 of 
the declaration of covenants stated:

 
 
All 
residences, buildings and sewerage systems must be approved before installation 
or construction by an architectural committee appointed annually by the 
undersigned to serve for one year.

 
 
[¶36]   Mr. Legg, as president of Skytel, 
signed the declaration.  We do not 
know whether Mr. Legg was still the president of Skytel when he appointed MLC as 
the architectural committee for Skytel Country Estates in June 2004; however, we 
do know that Mr. Legg signed the appointment document as an individual and not 
in his capacity as a representative of Skytel.  Moreover, the record indicates that Mr. 
Legg is now deceased and the Skytel corporation has been administratively 
dissolved by the Wyoming Secretary of State, although we do not know when that 
took place.   

 
 
[¶37]   The Brumbaughs present a number of 
arguments challenging the district court's approval of the appointment, 
including questioning the authority of a developer, who did not own any interest 
in the subdivision, to appoint an entity, which does not own any interest in the 
subdivision, as architectural committee.  
Although we have serious questions about the Brumbaughs' stated concerns, 
we conclude that this issue may be resolved on narrower grounds.  

 
 
[¶38]   Under the plain language of the 
covenants, the developer corporation, Skytel, not its former president in his 
individual capacity, had the capacity to appoint an architectural 
committee.  Moreover, under the 
plain language of the covenants, the appointment (whether otherwise correct or 
not) was only valid for one year.  
The Brumbaughs filed their declaratory judgment action in July 2005, 
after the one year appointment of MLC as architectural committee had already 
expired.  Thus, the appointment was 
invalid at the time the complaint was filed for at least two reasons:  Mr. Legg did not have the authority, as 
an individual, to make the appointment in June 2004; and the June 2004 
appointment had already expired, as it was only valid for one year.  

 
 
[¶39]   We are not persuaded by MLC's 
argument that, if we hold the appointment invalid, it will create a "vacuum" of 
power to enforce the restrictive covenants.  While it is true that our ruling will 
mean that an architectural committee no longer exists to pre-approve buildings, 
etc. within the subdivision, the power to enforce the covenants still belongs to 
the owners within the subdivision.  
We do not believe our ruling will frustrate the overall purposes of the 
covenants.  We reverse the district 
court's ruling that the appointment was valid.

            

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶40]   The Skytel Country Estates 
subdivision documents grant the Brumbaughs easements for power, sewer and access 
across lands originally in the Skytel Country Estates subdivision, and the 
district court erred by ruling as a matter of law that they did not have those 
rights.   Because the location 
and scope of the easements were not set out in the written documents, they are 
floating easements and the district court will have to consider the relevant 
facts to determine a reasonable and convenient location and scope for those 
easements.  

 
 
[¶41]   The district court properly 
concluded that the covenants did not grant the Brumbaughs the right to connect 
to the water system developed by MLC or to central livestock facilities located 
in the common area of the original Skytel Country Estates subdivision.  We, therefore, affirm those aspects of 
the district court's summary judgment order.  

 
 
[¶42]   Finally, we conclude MLC does not 
have the authority to modify the Skytel Country Estates subdivision covenants 
and Mr. Legg's appointment of MLC as the architectural committee was not 
valid.  Accordingly, we reverse 
those aspects of the district court's decision.

 
 
[¶43]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The district 
court ruled that the rights claimed by the Brumbaughs were barred by the statute 
of frauds because there was no deed or writing that provided the rights 
claimed.  The statute of frauds, 
which is codified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-23-105 (LexisNexis 2007), "requires 
that every conveyance of real estate, or any interest therein, shall be in 
writing."  Fowler v. Fowler, 933 P.2d 502, 504 
(Wyo. 
1997).  We do not agree that the 
statute of frauds is implicated because there are writings which govern this 
case  the declaration of restrictive covenants and the subdivision plat.  Instead, resolution of this case 
requires interpretation of those documents to determine whether they granted the 
claimed rights.    

 
 

2Floating 
easements are no longer allowed under Wyoming law.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-141 (LexisNexis 
2007) states:

 
 
(a) Except 
as provided in subsection (c) of this section, easements across land executed 
and recorded after the effective date of this act which do not specifically 
describe the location of the easement are null and void and of no force and 
effect.

 
 
            
(b) 
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, agreements entered into 
after the effective date of this act which grant the right to locate an easement 
at a later date and which do not specifically describe the location of the 
easement are null and void.

 
 
            
(c) For purposes of this section an easement or agreement which does not 
specifically describe the location of the easement or which grants a right to 
locate an easement at a later date shall be valid for a period of one (1) year 
from the date of execution of the easement or agreement.  If the specific description is not 
recorded within one (1) year then the easement or agreement shall be of no 
further force and effect.

 
 
            
(d) For purposes of this section the specific description required in an 
easement shall be sufficient to locate the easement and is not limited to a 
survey.

 

Section 
34-1-141 does not, however, mandate that the floating easements in this case be 
declared null and void because the declaration was filed prior to adoption of 
the statute in 1981, and we held in Edgcomb, 922 P.2d  at 859, the statute does not apply 
retroactively.  

 
 

3The record 
includes evidence indicating that Skytel and/or its principal owned other 
property in the area when the subdivision was created.   (Vol. I, p. 
69).

 
 

4It is not entirely clear 
whether the Brumbaughs are arguing that MLC should build the facilities or 
simply provide a place to build them.  
We note, however, that even if the covenants or plats had established a 
location for the facilities, it would not have necessarily imposed the 
requirement that such improvement actually be constructed by the developer.  See, e.g., Majers v. ShiningMountains, 711 P.2d 1375 (Mont. 1986) (holding that 
the reference on a plat to road easements does not necessarily impose an 
obligation on the developer to construct the roads).  However, many modern statutory 
provisions allow governmental authorities to mandate a developer construct 
certain improvements before it will approve a subdivision.  See, e.g., Scherpenseel v. Bitney, 865 P.2d 1145 
(Mont. 
1993).  See also, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 15-1-501, et. seq. (LexisNexis 
2007) (land use planning in cities and towns) and §§ 18-5-101, et. seq. 
(LexisNexis 2007) (county land use planning).