Case Title: State v. Troisi

Citation: 2010-Ohio-275

Docket Number: 20082490

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Troisi, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-275.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-275 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. TROISI, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Troisi, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-275.] 
Testimony by a trademark-investigation expert that he is aware that certain 
trademarks are registered is insufficient to prove that the trademarks are 
registered for purposes of R.C. 2913.34 if the expert has never personally 
viewed the trademark-registration documents. 
(No. 2008-2490 — Submitted September 30, 2010 — Decided February 4, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lake County, No. 2008-L-060, 
179 Ohio App.3d 326, 2008-Ohio-6062. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A trademark-investigation expert’s testimony that he is aware that certain 
trademarks are registered but that he has never personally viewed the 
trademark-registration documents is insufficient to prove by itself that the 
trademarks are registered on the principal register in the United States 
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Patent and Trademark Office as required for a conviction under R.C. 
2913.34. 
__________________ 
MOYER, C.J. 
I 
{¶ 1} This case requires us to determine whether the requirements of  
R.C. 2913.34(A)(4) (trademark counterfeiting) are satisfied when the state’s only 
evidence regarding the trademarks’ registrations is an expert witness who testifies 
about the registration status of the trademarks without having personally viewed 
the registry documents.  We hold that a trademark-investigation expert’s 
testimony that he is aware that certain trademarks are registered but that he has 
never personally viewed the trademark-registration documents is insufficient to 
prove by itself that the trademarks are registered on the principal register in the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office as required for a conviction under 
R.C. 2913.34. 
II 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Juanita Troisi, hosted a “purse party” in Kirtland, Ohio, 
where she offered purses and other items for sale.  The Kirtland police were 
informed of this party by an invitee.  After determining that “knock-off designer 
labels” might be sold at the party, Sgt. Jamie Tavano contacted Timothy Richissin 
for help on the case.  Richissin, a sergeant with the Cleveland Police Department, 
was also employed at the time by the Professional Investigation Consulting 
Agency, where he specialized in investigating intellectual-property issues.  The 
police conducted a raid of the purse party, seizing over 1,700 allegedly counterfeit 
purses, wallets, and jewelry pieces.  At the scene, the police also obtained a 
written statement from Troisi in which she admitted knowing that “the purses and 
wallets were not authentic.” 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 3} Troisi was indicted on four counts: R.C. 2913.32(A)(4), R.C. 
2913.34(A)(4) and (5), and R.C. 2923.24.  Two counts were dismissed, and a trial 
proceeded on one count of trademark counterfeiting (R.C. 2913.34(A)(4)) and one 
count of possessing criminal tools (R.C. 2923.24).  At trial, Richissin testified that 
he had been trained by several purse and jewelry companies to recognize their 
trademarks and to recognize counterfeit products.  He testified that in his opinion, 
the items seized from the purse party were counterfeit.  No certified copies of the 
registered trademarks were offered as evidence; no other witness testified about 
the registration status of the trademarks; and no examples of genuine trademarks 
or genuine products were introduced at trial. 
{¶ 4} A jury found Troisi guilty of one count of trademark counterfeiting 
and one count of possessing criminal tools.  The Eleventh District Court of 
Appeals reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find 
that the items seized bore a counterfeit mark as defined by law and that 
Richissin’s testimony was improper because it was introduced without a proper 
foundation.  Troisi’s convictions were vacated.  We accepted the state’s 
discretionary appeal. 
III 
{¶ 5} The General Assembly has defined the crime of trademark 
counterfeiting in R.C. 2913.34.  R.C. 2913.34(A)(4) provides, “No person shall 
knowingly * * * [s]ell, offer for sale, or otherwise dispose of goods with the 
knowledge that a counterfeit mark is attached to, affixed to, or otherwise used in 
connection with the goods.”  R.C. 2913.34(F) defines “counterfeit mark” as “a 
spurious trademark” that is “identical with or substantially indistinguishable from 
a mark that is registered on the principal register in the United States patent and 
trademark office” and the use of which “is likely to cause confusion or mistake or 
[to] deceive other persons.” 
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{¶ 6} Troisi argues that the evidence, including Richissin’s testimony, 
was insufficient to prove that any of the trademarks were registered on the 
principal register, and that Richissin’s testimony was improperly used at trial.  
The state argues that sufficient evidence was presented and that Richissin’s 
testimony was properly admitted. 
{¶ 7} In deciding whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient 
to support a criminal conviction, a court must “ ‘determine whether such 
evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  In re Washington (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 337, 339, 
691 N.E.2d 285, quoting State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 
492, paragraph two of the syllabus.  The evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, and a reviewing court will not infringe upon the 
province of the jury by reweighing the evidence.  Id.  If the evidence is found to 
be insufficient to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt, the Double 
Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions bar retrial.  State v. 
Brewer, 121 Ohio St.3d 202, 2009-Ohio-593, 903 N.E.2d 284, ¶ 15.  In contrast, 
when sufficient evidence has been introduced at trial to convict, “but on appeal, 
some of that evidence is determined to have been improperly admitted,” retrial is 
not barred.  Id. at ¶ 25. 
{¶ 8} We hold that the state provided insufficient evidence to show that 
the trademarks Richissin compared with the marks on the seized bags were 
registered on the principal register in the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office.  The statute contains very specific language protecting only those marks 
registered on the principal register.  Richissin testified that through his “training 
and experience” he was aware that the marks were registered, but that he had 
personally never seen any documents from the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office showing the registration.  He had never obtained official 
trademark records, he had never seen any of the trademarks on a registry 
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document, and he did not know when the trademarks were issued, when they 
expired, or if they had been renewed.  In sum, his testimony was not sufficient to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the marks were registered.  Richissin’s 
testimony proved, at best, that the seized items bore marks that were “identical or 
substantially indistinguishable” to marks provided to him during his training, but 
not to any mark proven to be registered as required by the statute. 
{¶ 9} Nor does Troisi’s written confession help the prosecution meet its 
burden of proving the registration element of the crime.  Troisi admitted that she 
knew the “purses and wallets were not authentic,” but that does not prove that any 
of the marks Richissin used in his comparisons were registered.  The confession 
may be useful to the prosecution in proving other elements of their case, but it 
does not prove the registry status of any trademark. 
{¶ 10} This gap in evidence is not due to a “procedural deficiency,” 
permitting a retrial, as suggested by the state.  Our holding that the evidence is 
insufficient for a conviction is based on a review of all the evidence, including 
Richissin’s testimony.  Double-jeopardy protections therefore attach, and retrial is 
barred.  Brewer, 121 Ohio St.3d 202, 2009-Ohio-593, 903 N.E.2d 284, at ¶ 15. 
{¶ 11} We need not address the state’s second proposition of law, which 
argues that the appellate court’s decision improperly limited the prosecutor to 
introducing certified copies of trademark registrations to prove the “identical or 
substantially indistinguishable” element of the crime.  This issue is moot, as the 
state did not first prove the registration of the trademarks to which the seized 
trademarks must be identical or substantially indistinguishable. 
{¶ 12} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., dissent. 
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__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 13} I respectfully dissent because I believe that the state presented 
sufficient evidence to support Troisi’s conviction for selling counterfeit goods 
pursuant to R.C. 2913.34(A)(4). 
{¶ 14} It is a crime to offer for sale and to sell goods with knowledge that 
a counterfeit mark is attached to or otherwise used in connection with those 
goods.  R.C. 2913.34(A)(4).  A “ ‘counterfeit mark’ means a spurious trademark 
or a spurious service mark that satisfies both of the following:”  
{¶ 15} “It is identical with or substantially indistinguishable from a mark 
that is registered on the principal register in the United States patent and 
trademark office for the same goods or services as the goods or services to which 
or in connection with which the spurious trademark or spurious service mark is 
attached, affixed, or otherwise used * * *” and “[i]ts use is likely to cause 
confusion or mistake or to deceive other persons.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
2913.34(F)(1)(a)(i) and (ii). 
{¶ 16} A jury convicted Troisi of one count of trademark counterfeiting 
under R.C. 2913.34(A)(4).  However, the court of appeals held that the state 
provided insufficient evidence that the spurious marks attached to the counterfeit 
goods were identical with or substantially indistinguishable from the authentic 
trademarks that are registered with the United States trademark and patent office 
and therefore the state’s expert was not qualified to testify on that issue.  State v. 
Troisi, 179 Ohio App.3d 326, 2008-Ohio-6062, 901 N.E.2d 856, ¶ 37, 40.  The 
court of appeals suggested that the state’s expert would have been qualified to 
testify on this matter if he had personally examined trademarks as they appeared 
on the principal register.  Id. at ¶ 31. 
{¶ 17} The majority affirms the court of appeals’ judgment, holding that 
there was insufficient evidence to show that the trademarks at issue were 
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registered because Richissin had never personally viewed or obtained any 
trademark records.  Majority opinion at ¶ 8.  The majority further states that 
“Richissin’s testimony proved, at best, that the seized items bore marks that were 
‘identical or substantially indistinguishable’ to marks provided to him during his 
training, but not to any mark proven to be registered as required by the statute.”  
Id.  Finally, the majority determines that its decision makes moot the issue 
whether the appellate court’s decision “improperly limited the prosecutor to 
introducing certified copies of trademark registrations to prove the ‘identical or 
substantially indistinguishable’ element of the crime.”  Id. at ¶ 11. 
Expert Testimony 
{¶ 18} In essence, the majority holds that Richissin’s training is 
insufficient to qualify him as an expert to testify as to whether the trademarks at 
issue herein were registered or whether they were “identical with or substantially 
indistinguishable from” the marks on the seized goods because he had not 
personally viewed the registered trademarks. However, the majority cites no law 
to support its conclusion that trademark-counterfeiting cases can be proved only 
by direct evidence or personal observation of the trademark, and R.C. 2913.34 
imposes no such limitation.  I believe Richissin’s training and experience were 
sufficient to permit him to provide expert testimony that the trademarks in this 
case were registered and that they were identical or substantially indistinguishable 
to the marks on the goods seized from Troisi. 
{¶ 19} There are few Ohio cases that interpret R.C. 2913.34 and none that 
address the issue that is currently before this court.  However, “Ohio's trademark 
counterfeiting statute is substantially similar to the federal trademark 
counterfeiting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a), which prohibits someone from 
intentionally trafficking or attempting to traffic in goods or services and 
knowingly using a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods or 
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services.”  State v. Christley, 8th Dist. No. 92546, 2009-Ohio-6635, ¶ 11.  
Consequently, federal law is persuasive in interpreting R.C. 2913.34. 
{¶ 20} While personal observation or direct evidence of a trademark 
might be the best evidence in a trademark-counterfeiting case, it is not the only 
means of proving that a trademark is registered, nor is it the only means of 
proving that a counterfeit mark is identical or substantially indistinguishable from 
an authentic mark.  See United States v. Guerra (2002), 293 F.3d 1279, 1288  
(“[Federal trademark law] does not specify the means by which the Government 
may establish that the marks were ‘identical or substantially indistinguishable’ ”]; 
United States v. Xu (Dec. 4, 2008), S.D.Tex. No. H-07-362, citing United States v. 
Park (C.A.9, 2006),164 Fed.Appx. 584, 585; United States v. DeFreitas (2000), 
92 F.Supp.2d 272, 278 (while the government usually offers a certificate of 
registration to prove that a mark is registered, “registration can be proved by other 
types of evidence”). 
{¶ 21} “Evid.R. 702(B) provides that a witness may qualify as an expert 
by reason of his or her specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education.  Neither special education nor certification is necessary to confer 
expert status upon a witness. The individual offered as an expert need not have 
complete knowledge of the field in question, as long as the knowledge he or she 
possesses will aid the trier of fact in performing its fact-finding function.”  State v. 
Hartman (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 285, 754 N.E.2d 1150, citing, State v. Baston 
(1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 418, 423, 709 N.E.2d 128; State v. D'Ambrosio (1993), 67 
Ohio St.3d 185, 191, 616 N.E.2d 909. 
{¶ 22} A handbook on intellectual-property crimes published by the 
United States Department of Justice states that “[w]hen trying to determine which 
trademarks the defendant infringed, prosecutors and agents should consult with 
the victim.  Although the government itself can search for trademarks on the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office's website, these searches can be 
January Term, 2010 
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cumbersome. Given the range of perceptible elements that can be registered as 
marks—witness the color pink for Owens-Corning fiberglass, the NBC chime, the 
Burberry plaid, and the shape of the Coca-Cola bottle (respectively U.S. 
Trademark Reg. Nos. 1439132 and 2380742, 0916522, 2022789, and 1057884)—
the victim is best suited to identify which elements were registered as marks and 
which may have been counterfeited.”  (Emphasis added.)  United States 
Department of Justice, Prosecuting Intellectual Property Crimes (3d Ed.2006) 100 
(available 
at 
http://www.usdoj/criminal/cybercrime/ipmanual/ipma2006.pdf).  
Thus, trademark owners would also be best suited to instruct others on 
differentiating between authentic and counterfeit marks and products. 
{¶ 23} In the instant case, trademark owners, including Gucci, Prada, 
Coach, Dior, Fendi, Dooney & Bourke, Tiffany, Burberry, Chanel, Kate Spade, 
Louis Vuitton, and Versace trained Richissin to recognize their registered 
trademarks.  The training also taught Richissin how to recognize counterfeit 
goods from authentic trademarked goods by looking for “red-flag” indicators with 
respect to the product’s security tags, logos, and packaging.  Since 2002, 
Richissin has attended approximately 30 such training sessions and receives 
updates regarding product changes by e-mail.  Richissin also testified that he has 
participated in investigating over 50 trademark-counterfeiting cases in the past 
several years. 
{¶ 24} Because of Richissin’s training and experience, I would find that 
he was qualified to testify as an expert in trademark counterfeiting. 
Evidence 
{¶ 25} Richissin testified that through his training he learned that the 
Gucci, Prada, Coach, Dior, Fendi, Dooney & Bourke, Tiffany, Burberry, Chanel, 
Kate Spade, Louis Vuitton, and Versace trademarks were registered on the 
principal register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office.  He also 
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testified that the goods offered by the state as evidence were represented as being 
made by these registered-trademark owners. 
{¶ 26} Richissin further testified that these goods had marks affixed to 
them that were identical or substantially indistinguishable from authentic, 
registered trademarks.  For example, he testified that a mark appearing on a purse 
seized from Troisi was “identical” to the registered Coach trademark.  Yet, he 
testified, the purse was not an authentic Coach purse, because it had plastic 
handles, which authentic Coach purses do not have.  Richissin also testified that a 
purported Tiffany trademark was not affixed to a piece of jewelry in the proper 
location to be an authentic Tiffany trademark and consequently the mark was 
counterfeit, as was the jewelry. 
{¶ 27} Distinguishing such fine details, especially where the counterfeit 
marks are almost indistinguishable from authentic marks, requires extensive 
training and experience of an expert because it is beyond the knowledge of the 
average juror.  In other words, the more identical or substantially 
indistinguishable the counterfeit trademark is, the more important it is to have the 
expert explain the differences between authentic goods and counterfeit goods. 
{¶ 28} Comparison of a counterfeit mark to an authentic trademark by a 
layman may be of little value in reaching the ultimate determination whether 
goods are counterfeit.  The majority gives far too much weight to this single 
factor. 
{¶ 29} Thus, I would hold that Richissin’s testimony aided the jury in 
determining whether Troisi engaged in trademark counterfeiting.  See State v. 
Hartman (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 285, 754 N.E.2d 1150. 
{¶ 30} The record also contains statements from Troisi admitting that the 
goods seized were counterfeit.  For example, Richissin testified that during his 
investigation in this case he attempted to buy a purse from Troisi.  The prosecutor 
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asked Richissin the following questions regarding his purchase of the purse from 
Troisi: 
{¶ 31} “Q. Was there any discussion prior to your purchase? 
{¶ 32} “A. We tried to get [Troisi] down on the price.  We asked her if we 
could purchase the purse for forty dollars, rather than fifty dollars. 
{¶ 33} “Q. And did she have a response for you? 
{¶ 34} “A. She said to me, Do you know [how] much it would cost to buy 
that purse if it was real.” 
{¶ 35} Moreover, in her statement to police, Troisi stated that she “had 
copy bags” and knew that “it was error to sell them.”  She also stated that she 
“knew that the purses and wallets were not authentic.” 
{¶ 36} Troisi’s admissions regarding her knowledge of the counterfeit 
nature of the goods is totally ignored by the majority.  I believe that Troisi’s 
testimony along with the seized goods and Richissin’s testimony establishes her 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 37} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, I would 
find that there is sufficient evidence to support Troisi’s conviction for trademark 
counterfeiting.  Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeals judgment and 
reinstate the jury’s verdict. 
 
O’CONNOR, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 38} I join Justice Lundberg Stratton’s dissent, but write separately to 
focus on the fact that the trier of fact, the jury, was in the best position to discern 
the weight and quality of the state’s evidence, including the testimony of the 
state’s expert, Mr. Richissin. 
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{¶ 39} The court of appeals’ decision focuses on the state’s failure to 
introduce a certified copy of the trademarks on file with the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office and concludes that the state’s omission is grounds for 
reversing the jury’s verdict.  But the focus should remain on the rule that it is the 
role of the jury, not the appellate court, to determine the weight and credibility of 
the evidence adduced at trial, including Richissin’s testimony that he can identify 
a counterfeit good by virtue of his training and experience. 
{¶ 40} The jury’s duty is to weigh the credibility of any witness, including 
an expert.  As we stated in State v. Jamison (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 182, 191, 552 
N.E.2d 180, “[t]he weight to be given evidence and the credibility of witnesses 
are jury issues.  State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 
N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus.  ‘It is the minds of the jurors and not 
the minds of the judges of an appellate court that are to be convinced.’ State v. 
Petro (1947), 148 Ohio St. 473, 501, 36 O.O. 152, 163, 76 N.E.2d 355, 369.” 
{¶ 41} Here, the jury was charged on the law and the elements of R.C. 
2913.34(A)(4), and it applied that law to the evidence.  The jury concluded that 
the state had proved its case.  In light of Troisi’s admission that she knew the 
goods were counterfeit, and Richissin’s testimony that he learned how to detect 
counterfeit goods through training provided by the owners of the trademarks and 
that Troisi’s goods were counterfeit, the jury’s verdict should be respected.  I 
therefore dissent. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, and Teri R. 
Daniel and Charles F. Cichocki, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant. 
Argie, D’Amico & Vitantonio and Dominic J. Vitantonio, for appellee. 
______________________