Case Title: Jones v. State

Citation: 414 Md. 686

Docket Number: 100/09

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
HEADNOTE: 
Jay Anthony Jones v. State of Maryland, No. 100, September Term, 2009. 
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - RIGHT TO ALLOCUTION
During a resentencing, the standard rules for sentencing apply.   This means that the trial
court must comply with Maryland Rule 4-342, which grants the defendant an absolute right
to allocute and present mitigating evidence to the trial court to be adduced prior to
sentencing.   Failure to allow the defendant this opportunity is grounds for reversal.   
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - PRESERVATION
The right to allocute is not fundamental, nor constitutional and must be asserted at trial in
order to preserve the issue on appeal.  A request by defendant or his counsel to present
mitigating evidence to the trial court is sufficient to preserve the matter, as the onus is on the
trial court, once a request is made, to provide the defendant an opportunity to allocute and
present mitigating evidence. 
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 103149031
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 100
September Term, 2009
JAY ANTHONY JONES
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
  Bell, C.J.
  Harrell
  Battaglia
  Greene
  Murphy
  Barbera,
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C. J.
Filed:   June 17, 2010
1 With regard to Mr. Knowlin, the first-degree assault conviction was merged with
(continued...)
The genesis of this case is an improper sentence that was imposed upon Jay Anthony
Jones, the petitioner, by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  Having been tried in
connection with the shooting and robbery of David Knowlin and Jamile Thomas, the
petitioner was convicted of, inter alia, first degree assault and robbery with a dangerous
weapon.  Despite the petitioner’s arguments  in mitigation, that: he was the least culpable of
those involved in the crime, he had family support and he had no prior contact with the
judicial system, the petitioner was sentenced to sixty-five (65) years in prison.  The actual
shooter received seventy (70) years imprisonment.
The petitioner noted an appeal, challenging that sentence, to the Court of Special
Appeals.  He argued in that court that the trial court erred in refusing to merge the first-
degree assault count with the armed robbery count, as it pertained to one of the victims.
Agreeing with that argument, the intermediate appellate court, in order  to remedy the illegal
sentence, remanded the case, in an unreported opinion, to the Circuit Court. Its mandate
provided: 
“Sentence imposed under Count 3 of indictment No. 103149031 for first-
degree assault and sentence imposed under Count 1 of indictment No.
103149033 (robbery with a deadly weapon) vacated; case remanded to the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City for imposition of a new sentence in
accordance with the views expressed in this opinion; judgments otherwise
affirmed; costs to be divided equally between appellant and the Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore.”  
At a resentencing hearing, the trial court reduced the petitioner’s sentence from sixty-
five years (65) to sixty years (60);1 however, although the petitioner indicated his desire to
1(...continued)
the armed robbery conviction, resulting in a total sentence of twenty (20) years, to be
served consecutively with an additional twenty (20) year sentence for the use of a
handgun in the commission of a violent crime.  For the armed robbery conviction relating
to Mr. Thomas, the petitioner received a twenty (20) year sentence, to be served
consecutively with the sentence in the Knowlin case, bringing his total sentence to sixty
(60) years. The petitioner’s remaining convictions merged.    
2
offer such evidence, the trial court refused to consider any mitigating evidence.  The basis
of this refusal may be found in the following colloquy: 
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor I wanted to argue for mitigation before
you imposed sentence.
“THE COURT: I don’t believe there is anything to mitigate on.  I think this
was sent back for merger. 
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.” 
Thus, the trial court seemed to believe, improperly so, we think, that it was constrained by
the Court of Special Appeals’ remand only to merge the first-degree assault count with the
armed robbery count, and that it was precluded from considering, for purposes of sentencing,
any factors that could mitigate the petitioner’s “new sentence.” 
The petitioner again appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, this time arguing based
on Sanders v. State, 105 Md. App. 247, 659 A.2d 356 (1995), that the sentencing court
should have permitted him to offer mitigating evidence before resentencing him.  The State,
in response, maintained that the issue of mitigation was not properly preserved or, if it were,
was without merit.  
“Assuming without deciding” the validity of the petitioner’s preservation argument,
3
the Court of Special Appeals concluded that there was “no error.” Addressing Sanders, it
determined the case to be inapplicable because the petitioner “has failed to provide evidence
of ‘events subsequent to the first trial that may have thrown new light upon the defendant’s
life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities.’” (quoting North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2079, 23 L. Ed. 2d  656, 668 (1969)).  The
intermediate appellate court held, therefore, that the petitioner did not meet his burden to
show that the trial judge misconstrued or misapplied the law and observed that, unlike the
trial judge in Sanders, the trial judge here was not “‘stuck with a handicap’” from the
previous trial judge’s ruling. The intermediate appellate court concluded that “[t]he court’s
statement here that ‘I don’t believe there is anything to mitigate on’ does not indicate,
contrary to appellant’s assertion, that it felt it was precluded from considering argument in
mitigation.”  
This Court granted certiorari, Jones v. State, 410 Md. 701, 980 A.2d 482 (2009), to
determine two issues. The first, whether “the trial court err[ed] in failing to allow [the]
petitioner to offer argument in mitigation before imposing sentence.”  The second, briefly
stated, is whether the “petitioner fail[ed] to preserve his claim that the trial court failed to
allow him to offer argument in mitigation.”  We disagree with the determination of the Court
of Special Appeals, and hold, to the contrary, that the trial court’s refusal to allow mitigating
evidence to be adduced prior to the resentencing was in error. 
The mandate of the intermediate appellate court  was clear: the trial court was to issue
“a new sentence in accordance with the views expressed in [its] opinion.” The court certainly
4
did not expressly foreclose the trial court from considering mitigating evidence.  It is also
significant that the “views expressed” did not include a directive that the trial court impose
a term of years, or any particular sentence.  The court simply held that a merger of two of the
sentences was required.  The intermediate appellate court’s concluding remarks on the
merger issue are instructive in this regard:
“Therefore, appellant’s first-degree assault conviction must merge into the
robbery-with-a-deadly-weapon conviction.  If the jury believed, as it may have
done pursuant to the court’s instructions, that the shooting was part of the
robbery, then the first-degree-assault conviction merges into the greater
offense (robbery with a dangerous weapon).  Because we have no way of
knowing whether the jury believed that the shooting was separate from the
armed robbery, we hold that, for sentencing purposes, the first-degree-assault
charges merged into the crime of robbery with a dangerous weapon.” 
Thus, the Court of Special Appeals only instructed the trial court to merge the two
convictions, for sentencing purposes, without any additional express or implied limitations.
I.  The Right of Allocution is Required in Resentencing. 
We begin our analysis with the acknowledgment that a trial judge has “very broad
discretion in sentencing.” Jackson v. State, 364 Md. 192, 199, 772 A.2d 273, 277 (2001);
Gary v. State, 341 Md. 513, 516, 671 A.2d 495, 496 (1996); Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 531,
671 A.2d 501, 505 (1996); Jennings v. State, 339 Md. 675, 683, 664 A.2d 903, 907 (1995);
Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 265, 647 A.2d 1204, 1209 (1994); State v. Dopkowski, 325 Md.
671, 679, 602 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1992); Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 480, 425 A.2d 632, 642
(1981). Nonetheless, we have made clear that the trial judge should tailor the criminal
sentence to fit the “‘facts and circumstances of the crime committed and the background of
5
the defendant, including his or her reputation, prior offenses, health, habits, mental and moral
propensities, and social background.’”  Jackson, 364 Md. at 199, 772 A.2d at 277 (quoting
Poe, 341 Md. at 532, 671 A.2d at 505.   
It is well established that:
“‘only three grounds for appellate review of sentences are recognized in this
State: (1) whether the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or
violates other constitutional requirements; (2) whether the sentencing judge
was motivated by ill-will, prejudice or other impermissible considerations; and
(3) whether the sentence is within statutory limits.’” 
Jackson, 364 Md. at 200, 772 A.2d at 277 (quoting Gary, 341 Md. at 516, 671 A.2d at 496);
citing Teasley v. State, 298 Md. 364, 370, 470 A.2d 337, 340 (1984); see generally Logan
v. State, 289 Md. 460, 425 A.2d 632 (1981); Kaylor v. State, 285 Md. 66, 400 A.2d 419
(1979); Clark v. State, 284 Md. 260, 396 A.2d 243 (1979). This case does not involve a
contention that the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment or that it was not
within statutory limits.  It does, however, demand a discussion under (2), particularly as it
pertains to whether the trial court during sentencing was “motivated by...impermissible
considerations.” 
To be sure, the trial court correctly noted that the case was remanded “for merger.”
This does not mean, however, that the hearing was confined simply and solely to the
implementation of that mandate.  To accomplish merger a new resentencing was required,
and because mitigating evidence may be offered at a sentencing, the petitioner was within
his right to raise the issue and the trial court should have considered such evidence as may
have been offered by him.
2 The Maryland Rule in effect at the time of petitioner’s sentencing trial, provided:
Rule 4-342. “Sentencing – Procedure in non-capital cases.”
“(a) Applicability. This Rule applies to all cases except those governed by
(continued...)
6
The first question that must be asked and answered is whether a “resentencing” or a
“new sentence” is a “sentencing.”  The answer is yes.  Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175,
297 A.2d 696 (1972) is clear on this point.  In Bartholomey, the decision in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972), prompted this Court
“summarily [to] vacate[] death sentences imposed in 120 other cases then pending on its
docket ... and remand[ ] all the cases ‘for further proceedings.’” 267 Md. at 183, 297 A.2d
at 700.  In one of the cases on review in Bartholomey, Sterling v. State, 248 Md. 240, 235
A.2d 711 (1967), in which the defendant was sentenced to death for rape, Bartholomey, 267
Md. at 191, 297 A.2d at 704, the sentencing court, in error, despite the vacating of that
sentence pursuant to Furman,“automatically mandate[d] imposition of the next most severe
penalty.” Bartholomey, 267 Md. at 191, 297 A.2d at 704.  We reversed.  Id. at 192, 297 A.2d
at 705.  We stated: “[o]n the contrary, in resentencing ... the sentencing court must approach
its task [of sentencing] as if no sentence had ever been imposed.” Id. at 193, 297 A.2d at 706.
The trial court is charged, therefore, with “exercising its sentencing discretion” as if the
sentence was occurring for the first time. Id. 
During resentencing, therefore, especially one where the mandate specifies, for “a new
sentence” the Maryland courts must rely on the standard rules of sentencing.  This comports
with Maryland Rule 4-342(a)2 which provides: “Applicability.  This Rule applies to all cases
2(...continued)
Rule 4-343.
“(b) Statutory sentencing procedure. When a defendant has been found
guilty of murder in the first degree and the State has given timely notice of
intention to seek a sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility
of parole, but has not given notice of intention to seek the death penalty, the
court shall conduct a sentencing proceeding, separate from the proceeding
at which the defendant's guilt was adjudicated, as soon as practicable after
the trial to determine whether to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life
or imprisonment for life without parole.
****
“(c) Judge. If the defendant's guilt is established after a trial has
commenced, the judge who presided shall sentence the defendant. If a
defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere before trial, any judge
may sentence the defendant except that, the judge who directed entry of the
plea shall sentence the defendant if that judge has received any matter, other
than a statement of the mere facts of the offense, which would be relevant
to determining the proper sentence. This section is subject to the provisions
of Rule 4-361.
“(d) Presentence disclosures by the State's Attorney. Sufficiently in advance
of sentencing to afford the defendant a reasonable opportunity to
investigate, the State's Attorney shall disclose to the defendant or counsel
any information that the State expects to present to the court for
consideration in sentencing. If the court finds that the information was not
timely provided, the court shall postpone sentencing.
“(e) Notice and right of victim to address the court.
“(1) Notice and determination. Notice to a victim or a victim's
representative of proceedings under this Rule is governed by
Code, Criminal Procedure Article, § 11-104 (e). The court
shall determine whether the requirements of that section have
been satisfied.
“(2) Right to address the court. The right of a victim or a
victim's representative to address the court during a
sentencing hearing under this Rule is governed by Code,
Criminal Procedure Article, § 11-403.
****
“(f) Allocution and information in mitigation. Before imposing sentence,
the court shall afford the defendant the opportunity, personally and through
(continued...)
7
2(...continued)
counsel, to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of
punishment.
“(g) Reasons. The court ordinarily shall state on the record its reasons for
the sentence imposed.
“(h) Credit for time spent in custody. Time spent in custody shall be
credited against a sentence pursuant to Code, Criminal Procedure Article, §
6-218.
“(i) Advice to the defendant. At the time of imposing sentence, the court
shall cause the defendant to be advised of any right of appeal, any right of
review of the sentence under the Review of Criminal Sentences Act, any
right to move for modification or reduction of the sentence, and the time
allowed for the exercise of these rights. At the time of imposing a sentence
of incarceration for a violent crime as defined in Code, Correctional
Services Article, § 7-101 and for which a defendant will be eligible for
parole as provided in § 7-301(c) or (d) of the Correctional Services Article,
the court shall state in open court the minimum time the defendant must
serve for the violent crime before becoming eligible for parole. The circuit
court shall cause the defendant who was sentenced in circuit court to be
advised that within ten days after filing an appeal, the defendant must order
in writing a transcript from the court stenographer.
****
“(j) Terms for release. On request of the defendant, the court shall
determine the defendant's eligibility for release under Rule 4-349 and the
terms for any release.
“(k) Restitution from a parent. If restitution from a parent of the defendant
is sought pursuant to Code, Criminal Procedure Article, § 11-604, the State
shall serve the parent with notice of intention to seek restitution and file a
copy of the notice with the court. The court may not enter a judgment of
restitution against the parent unless the parent has been afforded a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. The hearing on
parental restitution may be part of the defendant's sentencing hearing.
“(l) Recordation of restitution.
“(1) Circuit court. Recordation of a judgment of restitution in
the circuit court is governed by Code, Criminal Procedure
Article, § 11-608 and Rule 2-601.
“(2) District Court. Upon the entry of a judgment of
restitution in the District Court, the Clerk of the Court shall
(continued...)
8
2(...continued)
send the written notice required under Code, Criminal
Procedure Article, § 11-610(e). Recordation of a judgment of
restitution in the District Court is governed by Code, Criminal
Procedure Article, §§ 11-610 and 11-612 and Rule 3-621.”
3 Md. Rule 4-343 applies exclusively to capital cases. 
9
except those governed by Rule 4-343.3”  “[A]ll cases” include resentencings.  
Before a sentence is imposed, a defendant’s long-recognized right of allocution is
triggered.  In Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 509 A.2d 120 (1986), a case which concerned the
right of allocution for a defendant sentenced to death, this Court confirmed the deep roots
allocution has within this State’s jurisprudence.  It stated: 
“The right of allocution existed in 1776 in essentially the form above outlined:
it was a formal, narrowly defined right viewed as an essential part of the
criminal sentencing procedure. This, therefore, was the nature of the common
law right originally secured for the citizens of Maryland by Article 5 of the
Declaration of Rights. 
****
“As sentencing statutes prescribing ranges of penalties rather than fixed
penalties became more common, judicial discretion assumed a significant role
in the sentencing process. Presumably in response to the trial courts' newly
vested discretion, the scope of allocution was broadened, permitting a criminal
defendant to inform the court of any mitigating factors relevant to sentencing,
or simply to plead for leniency.”
Id. at 354-55, 509 A.2d at 125 (footnote omitted).  “Allocution ‘provides a unique
opportunity for the defendant himself to face the sentencing body ... and to explain in his own
words the circumstances of the crime’” as well as “‘his feelings regarding his conduct,
culpability, and sentencing.’” Shifflett v. State, 315 Md. 382, 386, 554 A.2d 814, 816 (1989)
(quoting Harris, 306 Md. at 358, 509 A.2d at 127).  Section (f) of Rule 4-342 controls how
10
a trial court should treat allocution. It states: 
“(f) Allocution and information in mitigation. Before imposing sentence, the
court shall afford the defendant the opportunity, personally and through
counsel, to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of
punishment.” 
Rule 4-342(f).  
Case law speaks in terms of the type of information the court “may” consider.  See
Bartholomey, 267 Md. at 193, 297 A.2d at 706 (“[T]he sentencing judge may inquire into the
past criminal record of the defendant and hear evidence and receive reports in aggravation
or mitigation of punishment; the inquiry of the judge is not limited by the strict rules of
evidence and he is invested with wide discretion in determining the sentence to be imposed
within the authorized statutory limits.”); Purnell v. State, 241 Md. 582, 585, 217 A.2d 298,
300 (1966)(“It is almost, if not universally, held that opprobrious or kindly and commendable
action on the part of a convict may be considered in sentencing as a matter either of
aggravation or mitigation of possible punishment.”); Farrell v. State, 213 Md. 348, 131 A.2d
863 (1957).   This Court has made clear, however, that the Rule itself is not permissive.  See
Kent v. State, 287 Md. 389, 393, 412 A.2d 1236, 1238 (1980).  In Kent, the issue was the
validity of a sentence imposed in violation of Rule 772 d, the predecessor of Rule 4-342.
That Rule provided: 
“‘Allocution.
‘Before imposing sentence the court shall inform the defendant
that he has the right, personally and through counsel, to make a
statement and to present information in mitigation of
punishment, and the court shall afford an opportunity to exercise
this right.’”
11
Kent, 287 Md. at 393, 412 A.2d at 1238. As to the effect of the Rule, we stated:
“Considering the language of the rule, its requirements are clearly mandatory.
Brown v. State, 11 Md. App. 27, 272 A.2d 659, cert. denied, 261 Md. 722
(1971). See also In re James S., 286 Md. 702, 410 A.2d 586 (1980); State v.
Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979);  Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314,
384 A.2d 709 (1978).”
Id. at 393, 412 A.2d at 1238.  In a footnote the Court reasoned: 
“The history of Rule 772 d, which was previously numbered Rule 761 a,
confirms that it was intended to be mandatory. An excellent discussion of the
rule and the right to allocution generally, including the history of the right and
cases in other jurisdictions, is contained in Judge Thompson's opinion for the
Court of Special Appeals in Brown v. State, 11 Md. App. 27, 272 A.2d 659,
cert. denied, 261 Md. 722 (1971).”
Id. at 393 n. 3, 412 A.2d at 1238 n. 3.  
To be sure, in the evolution of this Rule, the trial court’s responsibility has diminished
- no longer is a trial court required to inform the defendant of his or her right of allocution.
Under Rule 4-342, the court is required only to afford the defendant the chance to “make a
statement and to present information.”  On this point, this Court, in State v. Lyles, 308 Md.
129, 133, 517 A.2d 761, 763 (1986), stated: 
“In our view there is simply no requirement that the court inform the accused
of his right to allocute under the present rule. Rule 4-342 is somewhat different
than former Rule 772(c). The former rule, by its terms, required the court to
inform an accused that he has the right, personally and through counsel, to
make a statement and to present information in mitigation of punishment
before sentence was imposed. The rule also required the court to afford the
defendant an opportunity to exercise this right. The requirement that the court
inform the accused of this right was eliminated in the present version of the
rule leaving only the requirement that an opportunity to make a statement be
afforded.”
The “requirement” that the petitioner have “an opportunity” to offer mitigating
4 Since its decision in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23
L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969), the Supreme Court has “limited” the “application” of its holding.
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799, 109 S. Ct. 2201, 2205, 104 L. Ed. 2d 865, 873
(1989). This limitation however pertains only to an increase in sentence, where there is a
“‘reasonable likelihood,’” United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373, 102 S. Ct. 2485,
2489, 73 L. Ed. 2d 74, 80 (1982), that this increase is “the product of actual
vindictiveness.”  Smith, 490 U.S. at 799, 109 S. Ct. at 2205, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 873. 
12
evidence was not complied with here.  See Shifflet, 315 Md. at 388, 554 A.2d at 817(footnote
omitted)(“That rule requires that the court afford the defendant an opportunity to make a
statement and present information in mitigation of punishment.”).  Indeed, the opportunity
was denied even though, in the instant case, the petitioner requested the opportunity to
present mitigating evidence; he was told, in effect and in fact, that he was not entitled to such
an opportunity.  That ruling directly violated Md. Rule 4-342(f). 
Affirming that the requirement that there be an opportunity to present mitigating
evidence is mandated is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s holding in North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969)4.   Addressing the
perimeters of the trial court’s authority on resentencing, the Court instructed:  
“A trial judge is not constitutionally precluded, in other words, from imposing
a new sentence, whether greater or less than the original sentence, in the light
of events subsequent to the first trial that may have thrown new light upon the
defendant's ‘life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities.’
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 [69 S. Ct. 1079, 1082, 93 L. Ed.
1337, 1341 (1949)]. Such information may come to the judge's attention from
evidence adduced at the second trial itself, from a new presentence
investigation, from the defendant's prison record, or possibly from other
sources. The freedom of a sentencing judge to consider the defendant's conduct
subsequent to the first conviction in imposing a new sentence is no more than
consonant with the principle, fully approved in Williams v. New York, supra,
that a State may adopt the ‘prevalent modern philosophy of penology that the
13
punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime.’ Id., at 247[, 69
S. Ct. at 1083, 93 L. Ed. at 1342].”
Id. at 723, 89 S. Ct. at 2079-80, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 668.  Although, in Pearce, a conviction,
rather than a sentence, had been vacated, the underlying rationale is the same. 
The Court of Special Appeals, relying heavily on this passage from Pearce, stresses
that the petitioner did not meet his burden to prove that he had new “life, health, habits,
conduct, and mental and moral propensities” since the first trial and sentencing.  Whether any
burden of proof is imposed on a defendant, the petitioner, in this case, was never given the
opportunity, prescribed by Rule 4-342(f), to meet it.  In response to the petitioner’s indication
that he wanted to present mitigating evidence, the trial court stated: “I don’t believe there is
anything to mitigate on. I think this was sent back for merger.”  Even if the petitioner had
new information or evidence, the opportunity for him to have introduced it was foreclosed.
The trial court thus treated the proceeding as being one for the limited purpose of merging
two counts.  It was unwilling to hear what the petitioner’s defense counsel had to say, and,
unfortunately, the petitioner neither pursued nor pushed the issue.  
The remand hearing was for the purpose of “resentencing” the petitioner.   Therefore,
the trial court was required, as with any sentencing proceeding, to listen to the evidence and
to decide whether to accept, or refuse, it as mitigation.  This Court does not share the Court
of Special Appeals’ confidence that there was no new, and possibly pertinent, information
to be adduced, as the opportunity to present it was precluded by the trial court’s refusal to
consider the matter of mitigation.
5 Sanders was initially convicted of second degree-murder, armed robbery, and use
of a handgun in the commission of a felony.  Sanders v. State, 105 Md. App. 247, 249,
659 A.2d 356, 357 (1995).  For this he was sentenced to thirty (30) years for second-
degree murder, twenty (20) years for armed robbery, and twenty (20) years for use of a
handgun in the commission of a felony, each sentence to be served consecutively.  Id. 
Sanders successfully filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, resulting in his being 
resentenced to fifteen (15) years for the handgun conviction, to be served consecutively
with the second-degree murder and armed robbery convictions.  Id. The issue before the
Court of Special Appeals, and relevant to this case, arose during the resentencing.
14
It is this Court’s position that the trial judge has to consider mitigating evidence when
it is offered; it may, but need not, accept it.  Nor is this Court to be understood as holding that
the petitioner’s right to allocate is unbridled.  In Harris v. State, 306 Md. at 359, 509 A.2d
at 127, we made this point with clarity.  There, commenting on the trial court’s authority to
control allocation, we said: 
“[W]e do not suggest that the exercise of this right [of allocution] may be
unlimited as to either duration or content.  Although a sentencing court may
not deny a defendant who elects to allocute a fair opportunity to exercise his
right, the court may in its discretion curtail allocution that is irrelevant or
unreasonably protracted.” 
Id. A related issue is the extent to which the trial court’s sentencing role in this case was
limited by the decision of the Court of Special Appeals.  Albeit involving a different judicial
relationship than at issue here - rather than the appellate court to trial court (law of the case),
it involved judges of the same bench, one the original sentencing judge and the other, his
successor - the decision of the intermediate appellate court, in Sanders v. State, 105 Md. App.
247, 659 A.2d 356, is instructive on the issue.  When, at his resentencing for use of a
handgun in the commission of a felony5, id. at 249, 659 A.2d at 357, the defendant, Sanders,
15
attempted to introduce mitigating evidence, the trial court stifled the effort, stating, 
“‘I’m certainly impressed by your eloquence and the fact that you’ve made so
much of your life. I’m also though, stuck with a handicap that because I was
appointed to take Judge Pines’s place and tried to stand in his shoes ... it’s hard
for me to sort of second guess what he would or would not do.’” 
Id. at 251, 659 A.2d at 358.  Not satisfied with the trial court’s resolution of the issue, the
Court of Special Appeals, relying on Danna v. State, 91 Md. App. 443, 605 A.2d 150
(1992), pointed out that “a resentencing judge could consider matters subsequent to the
original sentencing.”  Sanders, 105 Md. App. at 254, 659 A.2d at 360.  Given the trial judge’s
discretion and the importance of allocution, the court concluded: 
“It is apparent from the record that the resentencing judge felt bound by the
nature of the sentence imposed by the original trial judge. Prior to hearing the
evidence by Sanders's and his counsel, the judge checked with defense counsel
to be sure that the earlier sentence had been imposed consecutively. Prior to
announcing the sentence, the judge noted Sanders's accomplishments but then
he said that he was ‘stuck with a handicap’ and had to ‘stand in [Judge Pines's]
shoes.’ He indicated that it was hard to ‘second guess what [Judge Pines]
would or would not do,’ and then he imposed virtually the same sentence as
Judge Pines had, simply reducing it to the maximum that was legally allowed.
The law requires the judge to conduct his own inquiry and to reach his own
sentence based upon the evidence before him. Because it appears that the judge
erroneously felt constrained to follow his predecessor's decision and was
therefore motivated by impermissible considerations, Sanders is entitled to a
new sentencing hearing.”
Id. at 256-57, 659 A.2d at 361.  We agree with the reasoning of Sanders.  In this case, under
these circumstances, the trial judge’s role was not as limited as the trial court portrayed it.
From the trial judge’s statement, “I think this was sent back for merger,” it can be
inferred that he believed that his instructions from the Court of Special Appeals were to
merge two charges, and nothing more, and for that reason, he was not permitted to consider
16
mitigating evidence.  Significantly, the mandate of the intermediate appellate court, by its
express language, called for the “imposition of a new sentence in accordance with the views
expressed in this opinion.”  That the Court of Special Appeals indicated that the new
sentence be consistent with the views it expressed required that certain enumerated charges
be merged, to be sure, but that directive did not limit the proceedings to that action alone.
Neither its opinion nor its mandate precluded the trial court from hearing mitigating
evidence.  As we have seen, while what the trial court makes of evidence offered in
mitigation is a matter entrusted to its discretion, its application of Rule 4-342(f), however,
is mandatory.  The trial court was required to “afford the defendant the opportunity ... to
make a statement and to present information in mitigation of punishment.” See Rule 4-342(f).
 “Where there is a violation of th[is] rule, the remedy is resentencing.”  Kent, 287 Md. at
393-94, 412 A.2d at 1238; see Rome v. State, 236 Md. 583, 589, 204 A.2d 674, 677-678
(1964). 
II.  The Matter is Properly Preserved. 
The State argues that this Court need not reach the merits of the mitigation argument
because, by acquiescing in the trial court’s ruling, the petitioner waived the issue, thus failing
to preserve it for appellate review.  The petitioner rejoins that the matter clearly is preserved,
maintaining that “[c]ounsel’s acknowledgment and respectful deference to the ruling of the
court simply is not indicative of acquiescence or agreement with the court’s decision.”  Even
though defense counsel’s response of “Okay” to the trial court’s ruling denying the petitioner
17
the right to present mitigation evidence is not an objection, whether the petitioner objected
is not the dispositive inquiry in this case.  
In State v. Lyles, 308 Md. at 134, 517 A.2d at 764, we noted the right to allocute was
not a fundamental, constitutional right and accordingly “may be waived if not asserted at
trial.” See also Harris v. State, 306 Md. at 357, 509 A.2d at 126 (“[T]he right of allocution
... is waived if not asserted by the defendant before sentencing.”).  Waiver consists of
“failing to request an opportunity to address the court personally.” Lyles, 308 Md. at 134,
517 A.2d at 764.  This makes sense inasmuch as Rule 4-342 places the onus on the court to
“afford the defendant the opportunity ... to make a statement and to present information in
mitigation of punishment.”  When a defendant requests, or otherwise makes clear that he or
she wants the opportunity to introduce mitigating evidence, Rule 4-342 requires that he or
she be permitted to present such evidence as he or she may have.
Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 425 A.2d 632, is inapposite.  There, the trial court
offered the defendant a chance to speak, which the defendant declined.  During the 
“time for allocution [the trial judge asked the defendant if he] ‘care[d] to be
heard from[.]’ The reply was made by defense counsel in the presence of his
client: ‘No Your Honor.’ To this answer no objection or other register of
disagreement was made by the defendant; nor, after the imposition of sentence,
was there any objection noted. ... Thus, [the defendant] forfeited his right to
appellate review of the allocution issue.” 
Id. at 487, 425 A.2d at 646. 
To be sure, the U.S. Supreme Court also has addressed the effect of a violation of a
6 Rule 32 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that which was in effect at the
time of petitioner’s sentencing trial, stated, in relevant part: 
“(i) Sentencing.
   “(1) In General. At sentencing, the court:
“(A) must verify that the defendant and the defendant's
attorney have read and discussed the presentence report and
any addendum to the report;
“(B) must give to the defendant and an attorney for the
government a written summary of--or summarize in
camera--any information excluded from the presentence
report under Rule 32(d)(3) on which the court will rely in
sentencing, and give them a reasonable opportunity to
comment on that information;
“(C) must allow the parties' attorneys to comment on the
probation officer's determinations and other matters relating
to an appropriate sentence; and
“(D) may, for good cause, allow a party to make a new
objection at any time before sentence is imposed.
 “(2) Introducing Evidence; Producing a Statement. The court may permit
the parties to introduce evidence on the objections. If a witness testifies at
sentencing, Rule 26.2(a)-(d) and (f) applies. If a party fails to comply with a
Rule 26.2 order to produce a witness's statement, the court must not
consider that witness's testimony.
 “(3) Court Determinations. At sentencing, the court:
“(A) may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence
report as a finding of fact;
“(B) must--for any disputed portion of the presentence report
or other controverted matter--rule on the dispute or determine
that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not
affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the
matter in sentencing; and
“(C) must append a copy of the court's determinations under
this rule to any copy of the presentence report made available
to the Bureau of Prisons.
  
 “(4) Opportunity to Speak.
     
“(A) By a Party. Before imposing sentence, the court must:
 “(i) provide the defendant's attorney an
(continued...)
18
rule similar to Rule 4-342, Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure6, and held that
6(...continued)
opportunity to speak on the defendant's behalf;
 “(ii) address the defendant personally in order
to permit the defendant to speak or present any
information to mitigate the sentence; and
 “(iii) provide an attorney for the government an
opportunity to speak equivalent to that of the
defendant's attorney.
 “(B) By a Victim. Before imposing sentence, the court must
address any victim of a crime of violence or sexual abuse who
is present at sentencing and must permit the victim to speak or
submit any information about the sentence.  Whether or not
the victim is present, a victim's right to address the court may
be exercised by the following persons if present:
“(i) a parent or legal guardian, if the victim is
younger than 18 years or is incompetent; or
“(ii) one or more family members or relatives
the court designates, if the victim is deceased or
incapacitated.
“(C) In Camera Proceedings. Upon a party's motion and for
good cause, the court may hear in camera any statement made
under Rule 32(i)(4).”
 
19
under the circumstances there presented,  the violation was not reversible error. See Hill v.
United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S. Ct. 468, 471, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417, 421 (1962). It was the
posture of the case, and not the fact of the rule violation, that proved dispositive, however.
In Hill, the defendant was convicted in a Federal District Court of transporting a
kidnaped person and a stolen vehicle in interstate commerce. 368 U.S. at 424-25, 82 S. Ct.
at 469, 7 L. Ed. 2d at 419.  At sentencing, the trial judge made no inquiry as to whether the
defendant had mitigating evidence to present to the court.  Id. at 425, 82 S. Ct. at 469-70, 7
L. Ed. 2d at 419. That failure on the part of the trial judge was not objected to, nor was it
20
raised as an issue on appeal.  Four years later, the defendant collaterally attacked his sentence
by filing a motion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Federal custody; remedies on motion
attacking sentence], to vacate his sentence.  He argued, among other things, that, “at the time
of sentencing [he] had been ‘denied the right under Rule 32(a) of Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure ... to have the opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present
any information in mitigation of punishment.’” Id. at 425, 82 S. Ct. at 470, 7 L. Ed. 2d at
419.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the limited issue of whether a Rule
32 violation could be used to collaterally attack a sentence. Id.
The Court acknowledged that there was “no doubt as to what the Rule commands,”
id. at 426, 82 S. Ct. at 470, 7 L. Ed. 2d at 420, and it was equally clear that the defendant
“was not given an express opportunity” to make such a statement, nor did the defendant raise
the issue. Id. The Supreme Court, however, was not convinced that an error of that nature
constituted a successful collateral attack.  Id.  The Rule, it held, was not automatic, more
must be present, for instance:
“It is to be noted that we are not dealing here with a case where the defendant
was affirmatively denied an opportunity to speak during the hearing at which
his sentence was imposed. Nor is it suggested that in imposing the sentence the
District Judge was either misinformed or uninformed as to any relevant
circumstances. Indeed, there is no claim that the defendant would have had
anything at all to say if he had been formally invited to speak.”
Id. at 429, 82 S.Ct. at 472, 7 L. Ed.2d at 422. 
Although we need not address whether violating Md. Rule 4-342 is a viable basis for
a collateral attack, the aggravated circumstances referenced by the Court in Hill is precisely
21
what is present in this case: a defendant desiring to present mitigating evidence, a defense
counsel ready to present that information, and a trial court under the mis-impression that it
is bound by a ruling of the appellate court.  It was not.  When the petitioner, through his
counsel, expressed an interest in allocution, in accordance with Md. Rule 4-342, the trial
court was permitted to hear and consider the information before imposing the sentence.  That
the Court of Special Appeals’ mandate contained particular instructions to merge two of the
charges did not preclude the trial court from complying with its primary task - the
resentencing of the petitioner, which required it to take steps to ensure that the petitioner had
a fair sentencing. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED.
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAND
TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE 
CITY 
FOR 
NEW
SENTENCING. COSTS IN THIS COURT
AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
BALTIMORE.