Case Title: State ex rel. Internatl. Paper v. Trucinski

Citation: 2005-Ohio-4557

Docket Number: 20041941

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Internatl. Paper v. Trucinski, 106 Ohio St.3d 203, 2005-Ohio-4557.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. INTERNATIONAL PAPER, APPELLANT,  
v. TRUCINSKI ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Internatl. Paper v. Trucinski, 
106 Ohio St.3d 203, 2005-Ohio-4557.] 
Workers’ compensation — Permanent total disability — Loss of entire leg can 
equate to loss of two body parts for purposes of R.C. 4123.58(C) — State 
ex rel. Thomas v. Indus. Comm. approved and followed. 
(No. 2004-1941 — Submitted June 14, 2005 — Decided September 14, 2005.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 03AP-963, 2004-Ohio-5520. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellee Steven A. Trucinski worked for appellant, International 
Paper.  In 1998, a chemical explosion at the plant injured Trucinski’s left leg, 
resulting in an above-the-knee amputation.  He was eventually fitted with a 
prosthesis and, in time, secured other employment. 
{¶ 2} Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio awarded Trucinski 
scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) for the total loss of the left 
leg.  Claimant later applied for compensation for permanent total disability 
(“PTD”), pursuant to R.C. 4123.58(C) and State ex rel. Thomas v. Indus. Comm., 
97 Ohio St.3d 37, 2002-Ohio-5306, 776 N.E.2d 62.  The commission granted 
PTD in 2003. 
{¶ 3} International Paper unsuccessfully challenged Trucinski’s PTD 
award in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.  It now turns to this court on 
an appeal as of right, seeking to have Thomas overruled and claimant’s PTD 
award vacated. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶ 4} Statutory PTD is established by “[t]he loss or loss of use of both 
hands or both arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof.”  
R.C. 4123.58(C).  In 2002, Thomas declared the hand and arm to be distinct body 
parts for purposes of 4123.58(C).  Consequently, the loss of an entire single 
extremity can equate to the loss of two body parts and statutory PTD. 
{¶ 5} International Paper asks us to overrule Thomas.  Stare decisis, 
however, compels our adherence to precedent unless (1) the challenged decision 
was wrongly decided at that time or changes in circumstances no longer justify 
continued adherence to the decision, (2) the challenged decision defies practical 
workability, and (3) overruling the decision would not create an undue hardship 
for those who have relied upon it.  Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 
216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, at syllabus.  Because International Paper 
cannot satisfy Galatis, we decline its request that we overrule Thomas and we 
continue to adhere to its holding. 
{¶ 6} We are not persuaded that Thomas was wrongly decided.  Given 
the absence of a statutory definition for the terms “arm” and “leg,” we do not find 
that the Thomas court erred in construing the statute as it did. 
{¶ 7} Contrary to International Paper’s assertion, this conclusion does 
not conflict with State ex rel. Cook v. Zimpher (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 236, 17 
OBR 474, 479 N.E.2d 263.  Cook involved former R.C. 4123.57(C) (now 
4123.57(B)), not R.C. 4123.58(C), as here.  Workers’ compensation terms, 
moreover, can have different meanings in different statutes.  See State ex rel. 
Kaska v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 743, 591 N.E.2d 235.  That “leg” 
may include the foot for R.C. 4123.57(B) purposes does not compel the same 
interpretation for R.C. 4123.58(C). 
{¶ 8} We also reject International Paper’s claim that Thomas is 
constitutionally suspect.  Its equal-protection argument fails because it cannot 
establish disparate treatment between similarly situated individuals.  Regardless 
January Term, 2005 
3 
of the amputation site, so long as the commission has declared a total loss of use 
of an extremity, there is no dissimilar treatment — all such claimants will receive 
statutory PTD.  There is no equal-protection violation. 
{¶ 9} International Paper’s argument on substantive due process is more 
vague, consisting of the broad assertion that Thomas is forcing it to “pay for an 
injury that it did not cause.”  This declaration ignores the commission’s 
determination long ago that Trucinski’s injury occurred in the course of and 
arising from his employment with International Paper.  That the claimant is not 
literally totally disabled does not mean that the legislature’s decision to 
compensate him as if he were is invalid, nor does it mean that International Paper 
is paying for something unrelated to claimant’s employment.  There has been, 
therefore, no arbitrary deprivation of property. 
{¶ 10} We are equally unconvinced that the decision defies practical 
workability — the second prong of Galatis.  International Paper alleges dire 
financial consequences to the workers’ compensation system as a whole and to 
the state’s employers as a result of Thomas, but thus far — in the three years since 
the decision — that has not come to pass.  There has been no evidence presented 
that indicates that injuries of this magnitude occur with sufficient frequency to 
constitute a significant burden on the system.  Our experience bears this out:  
since Thomas was announced, only four cases invoking it have been decided by 
this court. 
{¶ 11} These facts contrast starkly with those in Galatis.  Galatis was 
generated by the court’s decisions four years earlier in Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 660, 710 N.E.2d 1116, and Ezawa v. 
Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Am. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 557, 715 N.E.2d 
1142.  Scott-Pontzer held that an uninsured-motorist endorsement that identified 
“you” as the named insured where “you” was a corporation must extend coverage 
to an employee outside the course and scope of employment.  Ezawa took Scott-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
Pontzer one step further by, in certain situations, extending that coverage to a 
family member of the employee. 
{¶ 12} The practical ramifications of Scott-Pontzer were staggering: 
{¶ 13} “Scott-Pontzer and its progeny defy practical workability.  The 
multitude of post-Scott-Pontzer issues before this court, the widespread criticism 
of the decision from other jurisdictions, and the numerous conflicts emanating 
from the lower courts indicate that the decision muddied the waters of insurance 
coverage litigation, converted simple liability suits into complex multiparty 
litigation, and created massive and widespread confusion — the antithesis of what 
a decision of this court should do.  Attorneys are forced to file briefs and 
appendixes that are several inches thick in an attempt to form a coherent picture 
out of the post-Scott-Pontzer morass.”  (Footnotes omitted.)  Galatis, 100 Ohio 
St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, at ¶ 50. 
{¶ 14} There is no such equivalent here.  International Paper also accuses 
Thomas of creating a windfall for claimants because it awards statutory PTD 
irrespective of a claimant’s ability to work — clearly a reference to Trucinski’s 
resumed employment after receiving his prosthesis.  International Paper 
misrepresents Thomas.  Statutory PTD has long been awarded irrespective of a 
claimant’s ability to work or even actual employment.  See State ex rel. 
Szatkowski v. Indus. Comm. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 320, 322, 530 N.E.2d 880.  
Granting PTD compensation despite the ability to work was a choice of the 
legislature, not a creation of Thomas, and does not support overruling the 
decision. 
{¶ 15} International Paper alternatively argues that if not overruled, 
Thomas should at least be distinguished from this case because, unlike the present 
case, Thomas involved the arm, not the leg.  We disagree.  The loss of any 
extremity is devastating in a way that those who have not experienced such a loss 
can never truly understand.  We decline to engage in a distinction that could be 
January Term, 2005 
5 
perceived as placing a value judgment on the degree and severity of the loss of an 
arm or leg.  The General Assembly accorded equal weight to both types of losses 
in R.C. 4123.58(C).  We will not disturb that determination. 
{¶ 16} Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Timothy L. Zix, and Majeed G. 
Makhlouf, for appellant. 
Philip J. Fulton Law Office, Philip J. Fulton, and William A. Thorman III, 
for appellee Steven Trucinski. 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Dennis L. Hufstader, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin, and Michael J. Hickey, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce. 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., and Thomas R. Sant, urging reversal for amici 
curiae Ohio Chapter of the National Federation of Independent Business and the 
Ohio Manufacturers’ Association. 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., and Steven M. Loewengart, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae Council of Smaller Enterprises. 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Robert A. Minor, and Robin 
Obetz, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Self-insurers’ Association. 
Gallon & Takacs Co., L.P.A., and Theodore A. Bowman, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
______________________