Case Title: State v. O'DELL

Citation: 108 Ariz. 53, 492 P.2d 1160

Docket Number: 2257

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1972-01-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
108 Ariz. 53 (1972) 492 P.2d 1160 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Audie O'DELL, Appellant. No. 2257. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. January 28, 1972. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen. by William P. Dixon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender by James H. Kemper, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant. *54 CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a jury verdict and judgment of guilty of robbery (§§ 13-641, et seq. A.R.S.) and a five year suspended sentence with incarceration for one year in the Maricopa County Jail (§ 13-1657, subsec. A, par. 1 A.R.S.). Appellant presents three questions for our determination: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter are as follows. From about 2:30 to 11 p.m. on 21 July 1970, the victim, Charles Loomis, was drinking in the Golden Eagle Tavern in Phoenix, Arizona. The defendant Audie O'Dell, who was a passing acquaintance of the victim, also was drinking at the Golden Eagle Tavern on the day in question. Between 3 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. the victim and the defendant had two general conversations. In their third conversation, defendant offered to sell the victim several cases of cigarettes, daring the victim to prove that he had enough money to buy the cases. The victim flashed out his three one hundred dollar bills and the defendant asked the victim to come outside to consummate the deal. It is at this point that there is a divergence as to what happened. According to the victim, the defendant hit him on the head shortly after they walked out of the bar and then robbed him of all his money three one hundred dollar bills and $84 in other currency. According to defendant the only thing that transpired when he and the victim went outside was that the deal was completed the defendant transferring the cigarettes to the victim's car and the victim giving the defendant $100. At 11:55 p.m. on 24 July 1970, three days after the alleged robbery, Police Officer Leo Brunette of the City of Phoenix, accompanied by Detective Robert Week, arrested defendant for the Loomis robbery. Incident to this arrest, Officer Brunette found on defendant a hundred dollar bill, bearing Loomis' signature in red ink. Officer Brunette read defendant his "Miranda" rights and took him to the City Jail. The following conversation was introduced into evidence over the objections of defendant: The defendant took the stand on his own behalf and testified that when he was asked to explain the hundred dollar bill that he *55 then thought "it very wise to consult an attorney first." The attorney for the State commented upon this in argument to the jury: Defendant produced several witnesses in his behalf. One, a Mr. Ross Pritt, was a bartender at a tavern near the Golden Eagle at the time. He testified on direct examination that he had seen Loomis drinking heavily and flashing money around earlier in the day. He also testified that he came across Loomis and two or three officers outside the Golden Eagle an hour or two after the alleged robbery took place. He stated (and this is uncontradicted) that he and an officer examined Loomis' head and found no signs of a wound or bruise. On cross-examination he testified as follows: For impeachment purposes, the Deputy County Attorney put Officer Brunette back on the stand and, over defense objection, he was allowed to testify as follows: ADMISSION BY SILENCE It is clear that admissions by silence can violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The federal courts have stated: *56 And this has been the law in Arizona: Although most courts seem to base their exclusion of "admissions by silence" in criminal cases on Fifth Amendment grounds, there are, we believe, persuasive evidentiary reasons for exclusions of this kind: The State, however, contends that: "Silence occurring in the midst of an argumentative discussion is not an admission by silence. It is rather a form of communication which can be testified to as if it were spoken." The State's argument is that the defendant had waived his right to remain silent by initiating the conversation with Officer Brunette and that by his silence he was not re-asserting his right to remain silent, but was tacitly admitting that he couldn't explain away the one hundred dollar bill. There is authority for admitting the evidence because of the peculiar circumstances, in this case, where a defendant, in custody and after being informed if his right to remain silent, voluntarily initiates a conversation attempting to exculpate himself: Whether a case in which the accused does not initiate the conversation, but responds to several questions, then lapses into silence when asked an embarrassing question falls into the same category is much more doubtful. In such a case it generally would not be as "natural" that the accused respond to an embarrassing question. It is much more likely that he is simply asserting his right to remain silent. Thus we limit our holding that an admission by silence can be admissible evidence to the facts of the case before us. It is noted also that defendant contended that he received the one hundred dollar bill as a result of the sale of the cigarettes and not by robbery. If the jury had chosen to believe him then the possession of the bill would not be damaging and the defendant's reason for not answering may have been more persuasive. WAS A STATEMENT BY ONE OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES INADMISSIBLE AS HEARSAY-UPON-HEARSAY? Defendant put a witness, Pritt, on the stand and on cross-examination Pritt was asked if he had told Officer Brunette that the defendant had told him that the defendant had committed the robbery. Pritt denied telling Officer Brunette this, so the State, for purposes of impeaching Pritt by a prior inconsistent statement, put Officer Brunette on the stand and asked him if he was told by Pritt that defendant had admitted the crime to Pritt. Officer Brunette said that he had been told this by Pritt. The testimony of Brunette and Pritt is reproduced, supra. *57 As to the defendant and the truth of what was said, Officer Brunette's testimony is hearsay-upon-hearsay. He is relating what Pritt told him the defendant told Pritt. Had Pritt so testified what the defendant allegedly told Pritt it would fall under the admission against interest exception to the hearsay rule. The State contends, moreover, that what Pritt allegedly told Officer Brunette is a prior inconsistent statement, usable for impeachment purposes as to Pritt. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence, Hornbook Series, § 39, p. 75. With this we agree: There is a problem which, though not raised in defendant's brief, the State has candidly admitted. Assuming that Officer Brunette's testimony is admissible only to impeach the witness Pritt by showing a prior inconsistent statement, was the jury properly instructed regarding the testimony? The defendant tendered as a jury instruction CALJIC 2.13: The court refused to give CALJIC 2.13, relying on MARJI No. 5 as covering the issue. MARJI No. 5 reads: The Arizona rule is clear that "* * * instruction by the court to the jury that evidence such as this statement is to be considered not as evidence bearing upon the guilt of the defendant but only upon the credibility of the witness testifying is required." State v. Favors, supra, 92 Ariz. at 150, 375 P.2d at 262. In Welch v. Medlock, 79 Ariz. 247, 250, 286 P.2d 756, 758-759 (1955) we stated: "* * * when a document is admitted solely for impeachment purposes the court should by an appropriate admonition tell the jury that it is being admitted for this limited purpose." The instructions given by the trial judge did not make this clear and on remand a more adequate instruction should be given. This matter was properly presented to the trial court and even though not raised by defendant on appeal we must review the record for fundamental error. § 13-1715 A.R.S. The failure to give a cautionary instruction in this case was both fundamental and prejudicial and the matter must be remanded for new trial. DID THE TRIAL COURT MAKE AN ADEQUATE VOLUNTARINESS FINDING? At the very outset of the trial, a hearing was held in the judge's chambers on the subject of the voluntariness of certain statements made by the defendant to Officer Brunette. After Officer Brunette had testified and undergone cross-examination, the judge made the following *58 ruling: "Then I'll admit it." We have stated: Upon remand this case must be followed if the matter is raised again. Reversed and remanded for new trial. HAYS, C.J., and LOCKWOOD, STRUCKMEYER and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.