Case Title: Schuman v. State

Citation: 357 N.E.2d 895

Docket Number: 175S11

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
357 N.E.2d 895 (1976)
Richard Lee SCHUMAN, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 175S11.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
December 9, 1976.
*896 W. Henry Walker, East Chicago, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., David Lee Pflum, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
ARTERBURN, Justice.
The Appellant, Richard Lee Schuman, was indicted on September 13, 1967, for the killing of his wife on September 7, 1967. The indictment contained counts of first degree murder, second degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter. On November 1, 1967, the Appellant entered pleas of not guilty to all three counts. After several continuances, the Appellant was rearraigned on July 1, 1968, and changed his pleas to guilty of murder in the second degree. This plea was accepted by the trial court and the Appellant was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment.
On January 22, 1970, the Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After a number of continuances chargeable to the Appellant, the hearing of evidence on this petition was concluded on June 5, 1974. The petition was denied on July 24, 1974. On January 15, 1975, this court granted permission to file a belated appeal in this cause when the transcript of the Appellant's post-conviction remedy proceeding was not filed in a timely fashion.
The central contention of the Appellant is that the trial court erred in accepting the Appellant's guilty plea without first determining his competency to stand trial and enter his plea. It is conceded that the Appellant did not formally bring the question of his competency to stand trial to the attention of the trial court. It is asserted, however, that there was sufficient evidence before the trial court to give it reason to conduct a competency hearing sua sponte. We agree that a competency hearing should have been held in this case. We do not, however, think that a new trial must be granted.
The Appellant's argument is based upon Ind. Code § 35-5-3-2, Burns § 9-1706a (since repealed), which reads in part:
While the defendant in this case entered a plea of guilty and therefore did not go to trial, we think that this statute is applicable here. The duty imposed upon a trial court here arises if "at any time before the trial of any criminal cause" the trial court has "reasonable ground for believing the defendant to be insane." When the circumstances of a case bring this statutory duty to hold a competency hearing into being, a subsequent guilty plea does not dispel it. Indeed, the presence of a "reasonable ground for believing the defendant to be insane" would seem to indicate that such a competency hearing is necessary before any guilty plea can be accepted.
This case bears a marked similarity to Morris v. State, (1975) Ind., 332 N.E.2d 90, in which we reversed the second degree murder conviction of a defendant who had filed a motion asking that he be submitted to examination by "qualified and authorized doctors of mental diseases" to determine whether he was legally insane at the time of the crime. We looked at this motion in the light of Ind. Code § 35-5-3.1-1 (Burns 1975), which substantially recodifies the portion of Ind. Code § 35-5-3-2 quoted above. While the defendant in Morris had not filed a written plea of insanity, which would have resulted in the appointment of two physicians to examine the defendant, it was the opinion of this court that action by the trial court was required:
Morris v. State, supra at 92.
In this case, the Appellant neither entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity nor raised any question regarding his competency to stand trial. He did, however, request and receive three separate continuances based on the need for "further time to complete medical tests now in process and necessary for his defense." Sandwiched between the first and second continuances was the granting of a Petition for Medical Examination which authorized the transfer of the Appellant to South Bend for psychiatric examinations. A delay of some five months can be directly attributed to these efforts to explore the legal sanity of the Appellant.
It seems clear, then, that the trial court was "on notice that it was presented with a situation involving a defendant's mental condition." The record in this case does not reveal that the trial court received *898 a report of the results of the Appellant's psychiatric examinations, which might have removed the reasonable ground for believing the Appellant to be insane or incompetent. See Brown v. State, (1976) Ind., 346 N.E.2d 559. Given the scrutiny with which any plea of guilty must be viewed, the failure of the trial court to make a determination of competency was error.
In contrast to Morris v. State, supra, however, we do not think that the facts of this case require that the Appellant's plea be withdrawn and a new trial ordered. The record of the Appellant's post-conviction remedy hearing reveals that there is a substantial body of psychiatric information in existence which was compiled before the entry of the Appellant's plea. A retroactive determination of competency is possible under these circumstances. Evans v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 148, 300 N.E.2d 882. Moreover, this information has already been presented to the trial court at the Appellant's post-conviction remedy hearing.
The trial court, based upon the evidence heard at the post-conviction remedy hearing in this case, specifically addressed the questions of the Appellant's competency to stand trial and competency to enter his plea of guilty. It found:
The trial court's findings of fact on this issue summarize the testimony heard here:
The record thus indicates that the trial court heard testimony of the psychiatrist who had treated the Appellant and had seen him in jail prior to the entry of his guilty plea, another psychiatrist called by the Appellant, the Appellant's trial counsel, a man who interviewed the Appellant the day after entry of the plea, and, presumably, the Appellant himself. A letter from Dr. Burough, the psychiatrist whose examinations necessitated the continuances in this case, to the Appellant's trial counsel was also admitted into evidence at the post-conviction remedy hearing. That letter reported the doctor's conclusions: "I therefore, find him sane in the usual medical sense of the term as it is used in the courts of Indiana."
The scope of this hearing was sufficient to determine the competency of the Appellant, to enter his plea of guilty. As with any other factual determination by a trial court, we cannot weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. We cannot disturb the determination of the trial court when that determination is based upon substantial, though conflicting evidence. See: Riggs v. State, (1976) Ind., 342 N.E.2d 838, regarding rulings on the admissibility of a confession; Roberts v. State, (1975) Ind., 324 N.E.2d 265, regarding review of a trial court's finding arising from a post-conviction remedy hearing. While the evidence in this case certainly conflicts, there is substantial evidence to support the finding by the trial court that the Appellant was competent to enter his guilty plea. We cannot disturb that finding.
The Appellant also raises in this appeal the question of the competency of his trial counsel. The Appellant's motion to correct errors does not specify that the finding by the trial court on this issue was in error and the issue is therefore waived. Ind.R.Tr.P. 59; Finch v. State, (1975) Ind., 338 N.E.2d 629. We also note that the record presented to this court is not sufficient to determine this issue. Neither the testimony of the Appellant's attorney nor the testimony of the Appellant himself is included in the record. Nothing in the record is called to our attention to support this contention. It is the duty of an appellant to present an adequate record to an appellate court. Buchanan v. State, (1975) Ind., 332 N.E.2d 213; State v. Irvin, (1973) 259 Ind. 610, 291 N.E.2d 70. We cannot consider an allegation of error when there is nothing in the record to support it.
The judgment of the trial court denying the Appellant's petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed.
GIVAN, C.J., and PRENTICE, J., concur.
DeBRULER, J., concurs in result.
HUNTER, J., dissents with opinion.
HUNTER, Justice (dissenting).
The majority opinion finds error in the trial court's failure to order a competency hearing, but defendant's plea of guilty need not be withdrawn in view of the psychiatric testimony given at the post-conviction hearing. I dissent from that portion of the opinion authorizing a retrospective determination of competency.
*900 The evidence presented to the trial court and that evidence relied upon by the judge in his findings of fact exhibits the infirmities in a retrospective determination of competency. Two psychiatrists testified. One of the psychiatrists, Dr. Foster, had never examined petitioner and had never seen him prior to the hearing. His testimony was generally that petitioner could not have been competent at the time of his plea, but, of necessity, was restricted to theoretical answers to hypothetical questions. The other psychiatrist, Dr. Schmitt, had seen petitioner during a period of hospitalization prior to his arrest and had visited him twice while in jail. Dr. Schmitt's testimony was to the effect that in his opinion petitioner was competent to stand trial despite sociopathic character disorders. The conflict between these opinions was resolved, as would be expected, in favor of the opinion of Dr. Schmitt, who had personally examined petitioner at the time of trial. The petitioner's proof was hamstrung by a situation existing because of the trial court's failure to appoint two psychiatrists at the time it had reasonable cause to believe that petitioner may have been suffering from a mental disorder. In addition, the medical records of petitioner's hospitalization had been destroyed by fire in the interim, hindering petitioner's cross-examination of Dr. Schmitt and making impossible any certain determination of whether electroshock treatments had been administered to petitioner. Thus, favorable testimony was hindered by the fact that Dr. Foster had not personally examined petitioner. And the unfavorable testimony of Dr. Schmitt, heavily relied upon by the trial judge in his findings of fact, was given grace from effective cross-examination by the loss of evidence.
The procedure authorized by the majority opinion finds no sanction in the statute. It is there stated that the trial court must stop the proceedings and immediately appoint two psychiatrists to examine the defendant and hold a competency hearing. A later determination does not cure this error. As I have stated previously, a retrospective determination of competence invites judicial noncompliance and violates the statutory mandate. Miller v. State, (1976) Ind., 348 N.E.2d 14, 16 (dissenting opinion).
I would reverse and remand.