Case Title: Affordable Erecting, Inc. v. Neosho Trompler, Inc.

Citation: 2006 WI 67

Docket Number: 2004AP002746

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 67 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP2746 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Affordable Erecting, Inc., 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Neosho Trompler, Inc., 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2005 WI App 189 
Reported at: 286 Wis. 2d 403, 703 N.W.2d 737 
(Ct. App. 2005–Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 9, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 21, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washington   
 
JUDGE: 
Annette K. Ziegler 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Robert N. Meyeroff and Robert Meyeroff Law Office, Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Robert N. Meyeroff. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief by Steven 
P. Bogart, Bridget M. Hubing and Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren, 
s.c., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Steven P. Bogart. 
 
 
2006 WI 67
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP2746  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV614) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Affordable Erecting, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Neosho Trompler, Inc., 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 9, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   Affordable Erecting, Inc. 
("Affordable") seeks review of a decision by the court of 
appeals affirming a decision of the Washington County Circuit 
Court, Honorable Annette K. Ziegler, granting dismissal to 
Neosho Trompler, Inc. ("Neosho").  The circuit court determined 
that the mediation agreement met the statutory requirements for 
a valid settlement under Wis. Stat. § 807.05 (2003-04)1 because 
Affordable's attorney signed the document.  The circuit court 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
2 
 
also determined that Affordable was equitably estopped from 
pursuing its March 2, 2004, claim against Neosho.   
¶2 
The court of appeals determined that the circuit court 
erred when it decided that there was a settlement agreement 
under Wis. Stat. § 807.05, but affirmed the circuit court's 
dismissal by applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel.  
Affordable Erecting, Inc. v. Neosho Trompler, Inc., 2005 WI App 
189, 286 Wis. 2d 403, 703 N.W.2d 737. 
¶3 
We agree with the court of appeals.  Although the 
settlement agreement does not meet the statutory requirements 
established in Wis. Stat. § 807.05, we conclude that Affordable 
is nonetheless estopped from pursuing its claim because Neosho 
has proven that actions and non-actions by Affordable induced 
reasonable reliance by Neosho to its detriment.  We further 
determine that the record contains no genuine issues of material 
fact, and no reasonable alternative inferences that can be drawn 
from undisputed material facts, sufficient to warrant a trial.  
We therefore affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶4 
The material facts are not disputed.  On March 22, 
2001, Affordable and Neosho contracted to have Affordable 
relocate Neosho's equipment from Hustisford, Wisconsin, to 
Hartland, Wisconsin.  Affordable moved the equipment and 
demanded payment.  According to Neosho, some of Neosho's 
equipment was damaged during the move due to Affordable's 
negligence.  Neosho therefore refused to pay the $17,877.50 
billed by Affordable.   
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
3 
 
¶5 
On October 11, 2001, Affordable filed a complaint in 
Washington County Circuit Court claiming breach of contract by 
Neosho and requesting approximately $17,900 in damages.  Neosho 
counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract by Affordable and 
common carrier liability, contending that its equipment was 
damaged during the move and that it was not obligated to pay 
Affordable under the terms of their contract.     
¶6 
Both companies' insurance companies became parties to 
the suit.  Acuity, a Mutual Insurance Company and Affordable's 
insurer ("Acuity"), joined the suit to defend against Neosho's 
counterclaims.  General Casualty Company of Wisconsin ("General 
Casualty") was permitted to intervene to pursue claims against 
Affordable as to its liability for damage to Neosho's equipment, 
which would otherwise be paid under Neosho's General Casualty 
policy.2   
¶7 
On April 4, 2002, Honorable David C. Resheske ordered 
the four parties to enter into mediation.  The parties 
participated in the court-ordered mediation on May 21, 2003.  
Affordable's attorney, Phillip J. Eckert, attended the mediation 
unaccompanied by any other representative from Affordable.  The 
parties appeared to have reached a settlement agreement, with 
Acuity agreeing to pay $12,500 total, inclusive of all costs, 
disbursements, attorney fees, and damages: $5,000 to Neosho, 
$3,500 to Affordable, and $4,000 to General Casualty.  The 
                                                 
2 According to the record, General Casualty had paid $10,000 
to Neosho for damages that were the subject of its counterclaim 
against Affordable. 
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
4 
 
agreement also provided that parties would not bring future 
claims or lawsuits against one another arising out of the facts 
and issues from the lawsuit, would release each other from any 
further liability, and that the settlement would be binding. 
¶8 
Attorneys for Acuity, General Casualty, and Neosho, as 
well as the owner of Neosho, signed the agreement on May 21, 
2003.  Affordable's attorney also signed the agreement, but 
noted that the "Settlement [was] contingent on approval from 
Tracy Haferkorn [Affordable's owner] by May 22, 2003 [at] 12 
p.m."  Nothing in the record indicates that Tracy Haferkorn 
authorized the settlement by noon the following day, as required 
by the contingency.   
¶9 
According to the circuit court's decision in this 
case, on May 23, 2003, the circuit court received a letter and a 
telephone 
call 
from 
the 
attorney 
for 
General 
Casualty, 
indicating the case was settled and that a stipulation would be 
forthcoming.  Affordable v. Neosho, No. 04CV614, (Washington 
County Cir. Ct. Sept. 20, 2004).   
¶10 On May 29, 2003, Acuity issued checks in the amounts 
agreed to in the May 21 settlement.  Acuity mailed the checks, 
along with releases, stipulations, and orders for dismissal 
according to the terms of the settlement agreement, on June 4, 
2003.  Acuity signed the documents on May 28, 2003, and Neosho 
and General Casualty signed the documents on June 9, 2003, and 
cashed the checks issued by Acuity.  Although Affordable did not 
sign the documents, Attorney Eckert held Affordable's settlement 
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
5 
 
check in his trust account and did not return the money to 
Acuity for more than seven months.   
¶11 An affidavit by Eckert, submitted to the circuit 
court, indicates that at some point approximately three weeks 
after the May 22, 2003, 12:00 p.m. deadline, Janice Haferkorn3 
informed 
Eckert 
that 
Affordable 
approved 
the 
settlement.  
According to the affidavit and Affordable's representations at 
oral argument, Affordable's acceptance of the settlement terms 
was communicated to Acuity.   Moreover, Eckert called the court 
and indicated they had signed a stipulation on June 25, 2003.  
Affordable v. Neosho, No. 04CV614, (Washington County Cir. Ct. 
Sept. 20, 2004).  Several weeks later, Janice Haferkorn 
retracted this statement, informing Eckert that Affordable would 
not approve the settlement.   
¶12 Because the circuit court had received no written 
settlement agreement from the parties by July 24, 2003, the 
court notified the parties it would dismiss the case in 20 days 
unless good cause was shown.  Five days later, General Casualty 
sent a letter to the other parties requesting completion of the 
formalized settlement. 
¶13 On August 13, 2003, nearly two years after Affordable 
filed its original claim, Judge Resheske executed a Dismissal 
Order for the original case filed in Washington County, finding 
                                                 
3 Janice Haferkorn is an employee of Affordable and the wife 
of Affordable's owner, Tracy Haferkorn.  
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
6 
 
the matter had not been diligently prosecuted.  The court 
dismissed the case without prejudice. 
¶14 Following the circuit court's order, on August 18, 
2003, Neosho sent a letter to Affordable requesting completion 
of the formalized settlement. 
¶15 On December 10, 2003, Affordable hired new counsel and 
the circuit court signed an order for the substitution of 
Affordable's attorney.   
¶16 Approximately eight months after Affordable received 
the check issued by Acuity pursuant to the terms of the May 21, 
2003, settlement agreement, Affordable returned the money to 
Acuity.  
¶17 On March 2, 2004, Affordable filed a complaint in 
Waukesha County virtually identical to its October 11, 2001, 
complaint, alleging the same facts and making the same claim 
against Neosho as in its original complaint.4  Neosho filed a 
counterclaim, asserting the same arguments as before, as well as 
a breach of the settlement claim.  Neosho also filed a motion to 
enforce the settlement and dismiss Affordable's claim with 
prejudice.  Affordable responded that it had never approved the 
settlement, and moved to dismiss the counterclaims on the ground 
that Neosho released any claims pursuant to the settlement and 
received 
payment. 
 
The 
Washington 
County 
Circuit 
Court, 
Honorable Annette K. Ziegler, granted Neosho's motion and 
                                                 
4 The original suit was filed in Washington County.  This 
suit was filed in Waukesha County.  However, by stipulation, the 
second suit was transferred to Washington County. 
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
7 
 
dismissed Affordable's complaint with prejudice, concluding that 
Affordable and Neosho had entered into a valid and enforceable 
settlement 
agreement 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 807.05 
and 
also 
concluding 
that 
Affordable 
was 
equitably 
estopped 
from 
reasserting its claim against Neosho.   
¶18 Affordable appealed.  On July 6, 2005, the court of 
appeals reviewed the case as a summary judgment order and, in a 
published opinion, overruled the circuit court's determination 
that the mediation agreement complied with Wis. Stat. § 807.05, 
but affirmed the dismissal, concluding that Affordable was 
equitably estopped from pursuing the claim.5   
II 
¶19 Although the circuit court granted Neosho's motion to 
dismiss, because the court relied on information outside the 
pleadings, like the court of appeals, we review the circuit 
court's decision as a grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Neosho. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 802.06(3). 
 
Summary 
judgment 
is 
appropriate 
"if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  We 
review summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light 
                                                 
5 Affordable Erecting, Inc. v. Neosho Trompler, Inc., 2005 
WI App 189, ¶¶13, 23, 26, 286 Wis. 2d 403, 703 N.W.2d 737.  
 
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
8 
 
most favorable to the non-moving party, Affordable, and making 
all reasonable inferences in Affordable's favor.  See Johnson v. 
Rogers Memorial Hosp., Inc., 2005 WI 114, ¶30, 283 Wis. 2d 384, 
700 N.W.2d 27. 
¶20 We are asked to determine whether the circuit court 
properly 
concluded 
that 
the 
statutory 
requirements 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 807.05 were met.  In this case, the parties agree 
that the facts are undisputed.  Whether undisputed facts fulfill 
a statutory requirement is a question of law, reviewed de novo.  
Ide v. LIRC, 224 Wis. 2d 159, 166, 589 N.W.2d 363 (1999). 
¶21 We are also asked to determine whether equitable 
estoppel bars Affordable's claim in this case.  In general, when 
the facts are undisputed, or when the facts are disputed and the 
circuit court's factual findings are not clearly erroneous, this 
court reviews the application of equitable estoppel de novo.  
Randy A.J. v. Norma I.J., 2004 WI 41, ¶12, 270 Wis. 2d 384, 677 
N.W.2d 630 (citing Milas v. Labor Ass'n of Wisconsin, Inc., 214 
Wis. 2d 1, 8, 571 N.W.2d 656 (1997)).  Because we are reviewing 
a grant of summary judgment, however, if the facts are disputed, 
then summary judgment is improper.  Village of Hobart v. Brown 
County, 2005 WI 78, ¶¶18-21, 281 Wis. 2d 628, 698 N.W.2d 83.  On 
the other hand, if undisputed facts in the record lead to the 
conclusion that the elements of equitable estoppel are present, 
and no alternate view of the facts supports a contrary 
conclusion, the decision to apply the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel is within the circuit court's discretion.  Salveson v. 
Douglas 
County, 
2001 
WI 
100, 
¶38, 
245 
Wis. 2d 497, 
630 
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
9 
 
N.W.2d 182; State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 342, 346-47, 548 
N.W.2d 817 (1996). 
III 
¶22 We begin our analysis of whether the settlement 
agreement 
met 
the 
requirements 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 807.05 
by 
examining the text of that statute.  Our analysis begins with 
the statutory language because we assume the legislature means 
what it writes.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  The 
relevant statute states, in full: 
No agreement, stipulation, or consent between the 
parties 
or 
their 
attorneys, 
in 
respect 
to 
the 
proceedings in an action or special proceeding shall 
be binding unless made in court or during a proceeding 
conducted under s. 807.13 or 967.08 and entered in the 
minutes or recorded by the reporter, or made in 
writing and subscribed by the party to be bound 
thereby or the party's attorney. 
Wis. Stat. § 807.05 (emphasis added). 
¶23 This statute creates additional requirements that must 
be met in order for an otherwise valid oral agreement to be 
enforceable "when the agreement is reached in the course of a 
claim that is in the process of adjudication."  Kocinski v. Home 
Ins. Co., 154 Wis. 2d 56, 67-68, 452 N.W.2d 360 (1990).  "An 
oral contract reached by stipulation in the course of court 
proceedings is unenforceable unless formalized in the way 
required by sec. 807.05."  Id.   The purpose of this rule is "to 
prevent disputes and uncertainties as to what was agreed upon."  
Adelmeyer v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 135 Wis. 2d 367, 372, 400 
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
10 
 
N.W.2d 473 (Ct. App. 1986) (citations omitted).  In this case, 
because the settlement was not made in court and on the record, 
Wis. Stat. § 807.05 unambiguously requires the settlement to be 
memorialized in writing and subscribed6 by each party or its 
attorney.   
¶24 Although the May 21, 2003, settlement agreement was 
clearly in writing and counsel for Acuity, General Casualty, and 
Neosho, as well as the owner of Neosho, signed the agreement, 
when Affordable's attorney signed the agreement, he noted that 
Affordable's acceptance was contingent on Affordable's owner 
consenting to the agreement by noon the following day.  It is 
undisputed that this contingency was not met.  Therefore, we 
must determine whether the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 807.05 
are satisfied when a party's attorney has signed the agreement 
but added a contingency that was not fulfilled.   
¶25 Affordable contends that because the contingency was 
not met, the circuit court erred when it found the settlement 
agreement 
in 
compliance 
with Wis. Stat. § 807.05.  
Neosho 
asserts that Affordable's attorney assured the other parties 
involved in the litigation that Affordable would approve the 
settlement and failed to inform any party that Affordable 
rejected the settlement until months after all other parties 
performed all of their obligations.  Neosho further asserts that 
                                                 
6 "[T]he requirement that a name be 'subscribed' is to be 
distinguished 
from 
the 
requirement 
that 
there 
be 
a 
'signature.' . . . A signature is not required by sec. 807.05."  
Kocinski v. Home Ins. Co., 154 Wis. 2d 56, 64, 452 N.W.2d 360 
(1990). 
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
11 
 
Affordable failed to respond to Acuity's June 4, 2003, letter to 
Neosho, General Casualty, and Affordable, which announced that 
the case had settled and contained a check for the amount agreed 
upon at the May 21, 2003, mediation.   
¶26 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
agreed 
with 
Affordable, 
concluding that even though Affordable's attorney assured the 
other parties that Affordable would approve the settlement 
agreement, "verbal assurances of Affordable's attorney do not 
satisfy 
the 
statutory 
requirement 
that 
an 
agreement 
be 
'subscribed' by a party or the party's counsel."  Affordable, 
286 Wis. 2d 403, ¶13.  The court of appeals concluded that the 
statutory requirements of Wis. Stat. § 807.05 are an exception 
to the general rule that oral agreements are binding.  Id., ¶14.  
We agree with the court of appeals.   
¶27 This court's reasoning and conclusions in Kocinski, 
154 Wis. 2d 56, are instructive.  In that case, Kocinski's 
attorney and the attorney for the City of Milwaukee orally 
agreed to settlement terms during a telephone conversation.  Id. 
at 60-61.  Kocinski's attorney memorialized their agreement in a 
letter to the Milwaukee City Attorney.  Id.  The letter 
indicated that the settlement was contingent on the approval of 
the Common Council of the City of Milwaukee.  Id. at 61.  
However, Kocinski withdrew her consent to the settlement shortly 
after the offer was mailed to the City Attorney.  Id.  This 
objection and withdrawal occurred prior to the satisfaction of 
the contingency, as the Milwaukee Common Council had not yet 
approved the settlement.  Id.  This court concluded that because 
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
12 
 
Kocinski's revocation was communicated to the City prior to the 
City's written acceptance, the offer was properly revoked and an 
enforceable settlement was never reached.  Id. at 71. 
¶28 When terms of a contract specify that the contract 
must be accepted within a particular period of time, the 
contract must be accepted within the time limit expressed.  
Conrad Milwaukee Corp. v. Wasilewski, 30 Wis. 2d 481, 485-86, 
141 N.W.2d 240 (1966) (concluding that acceptance of a contract 
must be made within the time limit prescribed.); C.G. Schmidt, 
Inc. v. Tiedke, 181 Wis. 2d 316, 321, 510 N.W.2d 756 (Ct. App. 
1993) ("Ordinarily, a contract cannot be formed if acceptance 
does not occur within the time provided in the offer.") (citing 
Atlee v. Bartholomew, 69 Wis. 43, 49-50, 33 N.W. 110 (1887)).  
In the present case, Affordable's attorney made the May 21, 
2003, settlement agreement contingent on Haferkorn's consent by 
noon the following day.  Haferkorn did not consent to the 
settlement 
agreement 
by 
the 
deadline 
created 
by 
this 
contingency.  Therefore, because the parties failed to agree to 
a settlement within the time period expressed by Haferkorn's 
contingency, the May 21, 2003, settlement is not enforceable. 
¶29 Moreover, subsequent actions by the parties cannot 
fulfill the statutory requirements.  The court of appeals has 
previously rejected the argument that a party may "subscribe" to 
an agreement by his or her conduct.  Laska v. Laska, 2002 WI App 
132, ¶11, 255 Wis. 2d 823, 646 N.W.2d 393.  The Laska court 
concluded that the plain meaning of the term "subscribe" 
requires that the parties' assent or approval be formalized on 
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
13 
 
the document itself.  Id., ¶12 (citing Kocinski, 154 Wis. 2d at 
67-68).  Similarly, this court has declined to elevate a 
telephone conversation with opposing counsel, where counsel 
stated that a written stipulation would be filed but never was, 
to the status of a stipulation conforming to the requirements of 
the statute.  Sheridan v. Sheridan, 65 Wis. 2d 504, 512, 223 
N.W.2d 557 (1974).7     
¶30 Neither the untimely oral assurances by Affordable's 
attorney to the other parties, nor its attorney's call notifying 
the court that a settlement had been reached, satisfy the 
contingency 
set 
forth 
in 
the 
May 
21, 
2003, 
agreement. 
Furthermore, Affordable's subsequent conduct fails to satisfy 
the 
statutory 
requirements 
that 
a 
settlement 
must 
be 
"subscribed" by the party or the party's counsel.8  See 
Wis. Stat. § 807.05.  Because the record contains no valid 
written settlement agreement properly subscribed by all parties, 
we 
conclude 
that 
there 
exists 
no 
enforceable 
settlement 
agreement under § 807.05. 
                                                 
7 The predecessor statute, Wis. Stat. § 269.46(2)(1973-74), 
provided: 
No agreement, stipulation or consent, between the 
parties 
or 
their 
attorneys, 
in 
respect 
to 
the 
proceedings in an action or special proceeding, shall 
be binding unless made in court and entered in the 
minutes or made in writing and subscribed by the party 
to be bound thereby or by his attorney. 
8 Even if we were to construe (we do not) a timely oral 
response as having satisfied the statutory requirements, as the 
deadline was contained in the written agreement, it is clear 
that no such response was timely made that satisfied the 
contingency.   
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
14 
 
IV 
¶31 Concluding 
that 
the 
requirements 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 807.05 were not met and therefore no settlement 
agreement is enforceable against Affordable, we next examine 
whether Affordable may pursue its March 2, 2004, claim against 
Neosho.   
¶32 Wisconsin Stats. § 807.05 is rooted in the statute of 
frauds, which provides that particular contracts will not be 
enforced unless they are in writing.  Adelmeyer, 135 Wis. 2d at 
371-72.  The purpose of requiring certain contracts to be in 
writing is to "prevent disputes and uncertainties as to what was 
agreed upon."  Id. at 372 (citations omitted).  Requiring a 
contract to be in writing, however, "was intended to prevent 
fraud and perjury, not to give one party or another a technical 
escape from a fair and definite agreement."  U.S. Oil Co. v. 
Midwest Auto Care Servs., Inc., 150 Wis. 2d 80, 90, 440 
N.W.2d 825 (Ct. App. 1989) (footnote omitted).  Therefore, even 
when the statute of frauds requires a contract be in writing, 
courts will employ the equitable remedy of estoppel in order to 
avoid an unjust result.  Id.  "When the elements of equitable 
estoppel are met, the equities of the situation take the 
transaction out of the statute of frauds, and the contract is 
enforceable according to its terms."  Id.  Consequently, 
although Wis. Stat. § 807.05 requires a settlement agreement to 
be formalized in a particular manner, we conclude that the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel can be applied to settlement 
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
15 
 
agreements that fail to meet the requirement of § 807.05 if all 
elements of the estoppel doctrine are met. 
¶33 There are four elements of equitable estoppel: (1) 
action or non-action; (2) on the part of one against whom 
estoppel is asserted; (3) which induces reasonable reliance 
thereon by the other, either in action or non-action; (4) which 
is to the relying party's detriment.  Hobart, 281 Wis. 2d 628, 
¶36.   
¶34 Affordable concedes that the first two elements have 
been met.  We therefore examine whether the undisputed facts, 
and any reasonable inferences drawn from the undisputed facts in 
the light most favorable to Affordable, support a finding that 
the third and fourth elements of estoppel are present, and, if 
so, whether the circuit court properly exercised its discretion 
in applying the doctrine. 
A 
¶35 Affordable 
contends 
that 
there 
is 
nothing 
that 
Affordable did or failed to do that would have induced 
reasonable reliance by Neosho.  According to Affordable, Neosho 
knew or should have known that there was no valid settlement 
agreement when Affordable did not consent to the May 21, 2003, 
settlement agreement by noon on May 22, 2003, as required by 
Affordable's contingency. 
¶36 Neosho 
asserts 
that 
it 
reasonably 
relied 
on 
Affordable's representations that Affordable would agree to the 
settlement and on the fact that Neosho received a settlement 
check from Acuity, Affordable's insurer.  In addition, Neosho 
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
16 
 
contends it reasonably relied on the fact that Affordable did 
nothing when Acuity sent the check accompanied by a letter 
stating that the case was settled, and did nothing when the 
circuit court dismissed the original case for its failure to 
prosecute.  Together, what Affordable did and did not do, 
according to Neosho, resulted in Neosho's reasonable reliance 
that the case had been settled.  
¶37 The court of appeals agreed with Neosho and found that 
the circuit court properly determined that Neosho (as well as 
Acuity and General Casualty) reasonably relied on the May 21, 
2003, settlement agreement.  The court of appeals concluded that 
the facts in the record supported a finding that Neosho 
reasonably 
believed 
Affordable 
accepted 
the 
settlement. 
Affordable, 286 Wis. 2d 403, ¶19. 
¶38 Because this case involves a review of a grant of 
summary judgment for Neosho, we must make every inference from 
the undisputed facts in favor of Affordable.  Upon review, we 
conclude that the record supports the conclusions by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals, which determined that Neosho 
reasonably relied on Affordable's actions and non-actions.    
¶39 Affordable's attorney assured Neosho that Affordable 
would approve the settlement.  Affordable also notified its 
attorney, who notified Acuity, that Affordable accepted the 
terms of the settlement.  In addition, Neosho received a letter 
from Acuity that announced the case had settled and was 
accompanied by releases, stipulations, and orders for dismissal, 
as well as Acuity's payment to Neosho of $5,000, per the terms 
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
17 
 
of the settlement agreement, and Affordable made no efforts to 
correct or clarify its position regarding the correspondence to 
Neosho from Acuity.  Similarly, Affordable took no action when, 
almost two years after Affordable filed its original claim, the 
circuit court warned the parties it would dismiss the case for 
failure to prosecute, and later dismissed the case because the 
matter had not been diligently prosecuted.  
¶40 The actions and non-actions by Affordable lead to only 
one reasonable inference: that Affordable accepted the terms of 
the May 21, 2003, settlement.  Affordable had knowledge that the 
other parties were relying upon the settlement agreement, yet 
made no attempt to clarify its position.  This court has 
previously concluded that a party's failure to act can amount to 
acquiescence by silence.  Wisconsin Brick & Block Corp. v. 
Vogel, 54 Wis. 2d 321, 328, 195 N.W.2d 664 (1972) (reasoning 
that the party "had actual knowledge of the sale and knowledge 
the other parties were relying upon the sale and it made no 
protest under circumstances when a protest ought to have been 
made by a reasonable [person].").  When Acuity informed the 
other parties that the case was settled, Affordable remained 
silent.  When the circuit court notified the parties that it 
would dismiss the case for failure to prosecute, Affordable 
remained silent.  Affordable remained silent even though it had 
actual knowledge that the other parties were relying on the 
settlement agreement. 
¶41 Reviewing all of Affordable's actions and non-actions 
together, the only reasonable inference that Neosho could have 
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
18 
 
made was that Affordable accepted the terms of the settlement.  
We therefore conclude that Neosho reasonably inferred that 
Affordable had accepted the settlement. 
B 
¶42 In addition to the requirement that Neosho's belief 
was reasonable, Affordable's actions or non-actions must have 
caused Neosho to change its position to its detriment.  Milas, 
214 Wis. 2d at 13. 
¶43 Although silence or non-action generally cannot be 
construed as acceptance, Shearer v. Dunn County Farmers Mut. 
Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 2d 240, 246-47, 159 N.W.2d 89 (1968) (citing 
Shakman v. United States Credit Sys. Co., 92 Wis. 366, 375, 66 
N.W. 528 (1896)), this court has previously concluded that when 
a party's silence leads others to believe that the offer has 
been accepted, acceptance may be inferred if the party's conduct 
causes others to change their position to their detriment, 
satisfying the elements of equitable estoppel.  Vogel, 54 
Wis. 2d at 328. 
¶44 Affordable asserts that Neosho has lost neither time 
nor resources in defending the original claim because it had 
only mediated the claim and the claim had not gone to trial, and 
that mediation conferences often end with no settlement.  
Affordable also asserts that the approximate ten-month delay in 
refiling this claim is not detrimental to Neosho.   
¶45 In contrast, Neosho contends that it relied on 
Affordable's actions and non-actions to its detriment by 
foregoing legal alternatives, spending substantial resources 
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
19 
 
litigating the case the first time, and spending additional 
resources defending against the present claim. 
¶46 Upon review, we find no view of the facts that 
reasonably supports Affordable's position.  Under the terms of 
the May 21, 2003, settlement, Neosho accepted $5,000 from 
Acuity, and agreed not to bring future claims or lawsuits 
against Affordable arising out of the facts and issues from the 
lawsuit.  This $5,000 payment was $74,000 less than the amount 
Neosho claimed it was owed by Affordable.9  Because Neosho 
believed it had reached a settlement with Affordable, Neosho 
relinquished all other legal claims, including a suit against 
Affordable for full restitution.   
¶47 Moreover, believing that Affordable had agreed to the 
terms of the settlement, Neosho did not object when the circuit 
court dismissed the case without prejudice for Affordable's 
failure to prosecute the case.  Under Wisconsin law, a dismissal 
for failure to prosecute should "operate[]as an adjudication on 
the merits . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 805.03.  Neosho did not object 
to the circuit court improperly dismissing the case without 
prejudice because Neosho reasonably believed Affordable had 
agreed to the terms of the settlement.  Because the case was 
dismissed without prejudice, Affordable was not precluded from 
refiling the same claims, and Neosho has been forced to 
                                                 
9 According to Neosho's counterclaim filed on April 19, 
2004, Affordable caused significant property damage to a lathe, 
resulting in actual damages in excess of $25,000 to repair the 
damaged lathe.  Neosho further claimed that it sustained 
additional damages in excess of $54,000. 
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
20 
 
relitigate the same claims already raised and dismissed for 
failure to prosecute five years earlier.  Neosho has expended 
numerous additional resources to defend against this second 
incarnation of the same claims.   
¶48 The 
record clearly 
supports 
the 
conclusion 
that 
Affordable's actions and non-actions caused Neosho to change its 
position to Neosho's detriment. 
¶49 Finding that the record supports the conclusion that 
all the elements of equitable estoppel have been met, we also 
conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion when it applied the estoppel doctrine.  Reviewing the 
record and the trial court's findings, and considering the 
overall conduct of Affordable, we conclude that the reliance by 
Neosho was reasonable.  Affordable's acts and omissions, such as 
its failure to object to the settlement checks issued by Acuity, 
induced Neosho to rely to its detriment.  It would be unjust to 
allow Affordable to now pursue its claims against Neosho.  We 
conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly invoked the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel.    
V 
¶50 Finally, we address whether summary judgment was 
appropriately granted.  Summary judgment is appropriate "if the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, 
and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).   
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
21 
 
¶51 We agree with the court of appeals that the material 
facts underlying the disputed settlement agreement are that 
Affordable's attorney included a contingency on the mediated 
agreement that was never met, and that Tracy Haferkorn never 
subscribed to the formalized settlement document.  Affordable, 
286 Wis. 2d 403, ¶25.  As such, we agree that only questions of 
law remained:  (1) "whether the mediated agreement conformed to 
the requirements for an agreement under Wis. Stat. § 807.05;"10 
and (2) whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel was properly 
applied by the circuit court to preclude Affordable from 
proceeding on its claim.  Based on our review of the record, 
because we conclude that there exists no genuine issues of 
material fact, nor reasonable alternative inferences that may be 
drawn from the undisputed facts in favor of Affordable's 
position, we conclude that the circuit court appropriately 
granted summary judgment in favor of Neosho.     
VI 
¶52 We conclude that the circuit court properly granted 
Neosho summary judgment when it determined that Affordable's 
claim was equitably estopped.  Although the settlement agreement 
does 
not 
meet 
the 
statutory 
requirements 
established 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 807.05, Affordable is nonetheless estopped from 
pursuing its claim because actions and nonactions by Affordable 
induced reasonable reliance by Neosho to Neosho's detriment.  
The record contains no genuine issues of material fact, and no 
                                                 
10 Affordable, 286 Wis. 2d 403, ¶25. 
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
22 
 
reasonable alternative inferences that can be drawn from 
undisputed material facts, sufficient to warrant a trial.  We 
therefore affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
2004AP2746   
 
 
 
1