Case Title: The People v. Angel L. Cruz

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2010-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 52  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Angel L. Cruz,
            Appellant.
James Eckert, for appellant.
Stephen X. O'Brien, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM:
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed
and a new trial ordered.
Defendant was charged with two counts of Assault in the
First Degree for allegedly stabbing two men during a brawl
outside a bar.  At trial, defendant interposed the defense of
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No. 52
*  Indeed, the record in this case reflects that, prior to
the commencement of deliberations, the parties agreed to allow
the jury to review exhibits admitted in evidence upon its
request.
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misidentification.  During deliberations, the jury submitted a
note requesting to see the written statement prepared by a police
officer and signed by defendant in which he made certain
admissions.  Although the exhibit was ostensibly only to be used
to refresh the police officer's recollection, Supreme Court
received and marked this exhibit in evidence over the objection
of defense counsel.  Later, Supreme Court, outside the presence
of the jury, reversed its ruling and determined that this written
statement was not evidence, re-marking it as a court exhibit. 
Supreme Court failed to instruct the jury accordingly, however. 
The jury retired to deliberate and first requested certain
exhibits that had been marked in evidence, which were provided.* 
Later, the jury requested to see the written statement signed by
defendant, which it also believed was in evidence.  Nothing in
the record suggests that the judge received the jury note or
discussed its contents with the parties.    
Defendant appealed from the judgment convicting him of
two counts of first degree assault citing a violation of CPL
310.30 and People v O'Rama (78 NY2d 270 [1991]).  The Appellate
Division initially reserved decision on defendant's appeal and
remitted the case to Supreme Court for a reconstruction hearing
to determine "whether there was a jury note and, if so, what
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action was taken with regard to the jury note" (People v Cruz, 42
AD3d 901 [4th Dept 2007] [internal quotation marks, modifications
and citations omitted]).  
At the reconstruction hearing, the trial judge stated
that he had no independent recollection of receiving the
particular jury note at issue.  He discussed his standard
practice with the parties and noted that he generally allows
juries to review exhibits admitted in evidence upon their request
without reconvening, provided that the parties are in agreement
as they were here.  Significantly, he stated that, had he been
told that the jury in this case requested a court exhibit not in
evidence, he would have reconvened the proceeding in the presence
of defendant.  The Appellate Division, applying the presumption
of regularity, affirmed the judgment (People v Cruz, 57 AD3d 1453
[4th Dept 2008]).  
Typically, "a presumption of regularity attaches to
judicial proceedings" (People v Velasquez, 1 NY3d 44, 48 [2003];
see also People v Harrison, 85 NY2d 794, 796 [1995]).  Here, the
Appellate Division erred in holding that the presumption had not
been overcome.  The record shows that there was a significant,
unexplained irregularity in the proceedings in that defendant
established that the jury requested an exhibit not in evidence;
it was reasonable for the jury to believe the exhibit to be in
evidence, since it heard the trial court receive the item, but
was not privy to the court's subsequent reversal of that ruling;
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No. 52
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and the request was never brought to the judge's attention. 
Thus, there is no basis in the record to conclude that the jury
was informed by anyone that the item was not in evidence, and the
jury may have received the exhibit in error.  
We conclude that defendant met his burden of rebutting
the presumption of regularity by substantial evidence.  That
evidence includes the trial judge's statement at the
reconstruction hearing that he never saw the note, that he did
not reconvene with counsel, and that he did not know if the
exhibit was ever shown to the jury.  Nor can we agree with the
Appellate Division's determination that, even if the jury
received this unadmitted exhibit in error, such error was
harmless, since the exhibit contradicted defendant's
misidentification defense at trial (cf. People v Bouton, 50 NY2d
130, 137 [1980]). 
We need not reach defendant's remaining arguments.
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People v Angel Cruz
No. 52 
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge (concurring):
At trial, each of the two assault victims gave testimony to
the effect that defendant stabbed him outside a “little bar” in
Rochester on the night of February 2, 2003.  In addition, the
arresting officer testified that upon arriving at the scene he
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No. 52
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observed defendant with a knife in his hand.  Defendant and his
father, on the other hand, testified that defendant had been
misidentified –- that a fight had broken out inside the bar and
that defendant, his father and his uncle were attempting to
extricate themselves and leave the scene when the police arrived. 
Defendant denied possessing a knife or stabbing anyone on the
occasion charged.
After his arrest, defendant gave a statement to a police
officer.  The statement, as transcribed by the officer, included
the phrase, “I took the knife from him and started kicking his
ass.”  Defendant disputed whether he had, in fact, said this and
in pretrial proceedings it was stipulated, in lieu of a Huntley
hearing, that the statement could be used to impeach defendant
but would not be admissible for the truth of the matter asserted
on the People’s case.  Defendant was confronted with the above-
quoted portion of his statement on cross-examination and
immediately afterward the prosecutor requested that the entire
statement, which had been marked for identification as exhibit
28, be admitted in evidence for the jury’s examination.  The
court, over defendant’s objection and in the presence of the
jury, purported to accede to this request.  Subsequently, after
defendant’s re-direct testimony and out of the jury’s presence,
the court said it had been mistaken and that it had not intended
to receive exhibit 28 as evidence.  Although the exhibit was,
accordingly, not received, the jury was not advised that the
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evidentiary ruling announced in its presence had been
countermanded.
On the People’s rebuttal case, the police officer who had
taken defendant's statement testified, and in connection with his
testimony the prosecutor again sought admission of the statement. 
The court responded “At the present time I will receive it only
as a Court Exhibit,” and directed that the statement be marked
“Court Exhibit 1."
The record reflects that the jury, while deliberating, sent
the court a note requesting a readback of certain testimony and
to see specified evidentiary exhibits.  The court directed that
the note be marked “Court Exhibit 2."  The note was read to and
discussed with counsel and afterward the jury was advised that
the requested testimony would be read back by the court reporter. 
As to the exhibits, the court stated that he assumed that they
had already been delivered.  
There is nothing in the trial minutes indicating that any
further communication was received from the jury until it
informed the court that it had reached a verdict.
In preparing defendant’s appeal, counsel found among the
trial exhibits a jury note marked as “Court Exhibit 3" in which
the "report signed by Angel Cruz” was requested.  Defendant
argued that, inasmuch as there was no indication that the note
was disclosed to counsel or responded to by the court, the
requirements of CPL 310.30 and People v O’Rama (78 NY2d 270
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No. 52
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[1991]) had not been met.  Defendant contended that this failure
constituted a mode of proceedings error involving a matter of
substance and that reversal was therefore required (see id.). 
Although noting that “it appears on the record before us that
there was a jury note” and that “the record is silent with
respect to the court’s response to the note,” the Appellate
Division did not conclude that there had been a mode of
proceedings error, as defendant urged; it instead held the appeal
in abeyance and remitted the matter for a reconstruction hearing
to determine if there was a jury note and what, if anything, was
done in response to any such note (42 AD3d 901 [4th Dept 2007]).  
At the subsequently held “reconstruction hearing” (really
just a conversation between the court and counsel with some
testimony from the court reporter), no one had any independent
recollection of events at issue, which had transpired some four
years before.  The court was of the view that the trial had been
accurately recorded and, although he had no memory at all of the
events in question, he thought it probable that he never received
the jury note.  He initially expressed the view that the
requested exhibit must simply have been given to the jury as a
matter of course.  But, upon being reminded by counsel that the
exhibit had not been received in evidence, said that, in that
case the exhibit would not have been given to the jury, because
that wasn't done.  The court did say, however, that if he had
been given the note, “we would have reconvened because it’s not a
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People’s exhibit, it’s not a defense exhibit.”  At the hearing’s
conclusion, the court offered the unsolicited view that, in the
absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, the presumption
of regularity would require the conclusion that the jury had not
been given the unadmitted court exhibit.
The record of this very useful exercise in hand, the
Appellate Division resumed its consideration of defendant’s
appeal.  The court affirmed defendant’s convictions, concluding
that although there had been a jury note and the note had not
been addressed by the trial court, the defendant had not been
seriously prejudiced as a result.  In reaching this conclusion
the Appellate Division relied on pre-O'Rama decisions, evidently
requiring a showing of "serious prejudice," whose continued
vitality is marginal at best after O'Rama (see O'Rama, 78 NY2d at
279 [rejecting People's argument in reliance upon People v Agosto
(73 NY2d 963, 966 [1989]) and People v Lourido (70 NY2d 428, 435
[1987]) that a showing of specific prejudice was essential to
support reversal for noncompliance with CPL 310.30]), and found
significant the trial court’s statements to the effect that
unadmitted court exhibits were not typically given the jury (57
AD3d 1453 [4th Dept 2008]).
I agree with and join in the result the Court has reached
directing a reversal and a new trial, but the outcome of this
appeal should not turn upon whether the jury was given the
unadmitted court exhibit, something which we cannot know on this
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record and upon which the presumption of regularity manifestly
does not shed any light.  The fundamental problem in this case is
that there is no record as to how the jury note requesting an
unadmitted, potentially inculpatory statement by defendant was
dealt with.  This is precisely the kind of problem that
compliance with CPL 310.30 and People v O'Rama is meant to
obviate and there appears no reason why this appeal should not be
decided on the ground that those authorities were not complied
with; the completely dispositive issue properly before us is
whether defendant’s right to be present and participate in his
defense with the assistance of counsel was violated by the patent
absence of any notice to defendant and his counsel of the jury
note or of an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the
mandate of CPL 310.30 and O’Rama.
There was not at the time of defendant’s trial in 2004 any
question as to what a trial court must do upon receiving a jury
note requesting instruction on a substantive matter.  CPL 310.30
and People v O’Rama, decided more than a decade before, are
painstakingly clear in this regard: notice to counsel and an
opportunity to be heard as to how the jury’s inquiry should be
dealt with are indispensable in satisfaction of a defendant’s
basic entitlement to be present and participate with the
assistance of counsel at all critical stages of the trial, and
their denial will ordinarily be viewed as inherently prejudicial
and reversible, even where there is no showing of specific
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prejudice (O’Rama, 78 NY2d at 279-280).  The trial court was well
aware of this and, in fact, stated at the reconstruction hearing
that, if he had received the jury note requesting an unadmitted
exhibit, he would have reconvened the trial and addressed the
note with counsel. 
As the trial court retrospectively recognized, the inquiry
was plainly upon a matter of substance.  The jury’s request for
defendant’s statement suggested rather strongly that it believed 
defendant’s entire transcribed post-arrest statement had been
admitted as evidence and should therefore be available to it. 
Indeed, the jury must have so concluded from the court’s apparent
grant in its presence of the prosecutor’s request that the
statement be received in evidence -- an evidentiary ruling never
to its knowledge retracted.  Any competent defense counsel, upon
learning of such a request for an unadmitted, potentially
inculpatory statement by his or her client, would at a minimum
urgently request that the jury be instructed by the court that
the statement was not in evidence.  The People’s contention that
the jury note would not have merited discussion, is, in the
present context, untenable.
Nor should it avail the People or deter this Court in
applying O'Rama that the note may not have been brought to the
trial judge’s attention.  Here, it should be noted
parenthetically that the presumption of regularity works very
much against the inference the People would draw, since it would
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No. 52
**The Court, of course, also directed that the first court
exhibit, defendant's statement, be marked as such.
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appear highly irregular that the court, having directed that the
prior jury note be marked "Court Exhibit 2," would have had no
part at all in the marking of the jury note at issue as "Court
Exhibit 3"; it does not seem likely that the exhibit became a
"court exhibit" without the court's knowledge.**  In any case,
even if the jury note had been dealt with entirely by nonjudicial
court personnel, who either supposed wrongly that the note sought
an admitted exhibit, which could simply be given the jury without
further ado, or equally wrongly supposed, as the People do now,
that the note raised no properly judicial concerns, the result
from the defendant's perspective is the same.  Whether by reason
of the actions of the trial judge or nonjudicial court personnel,
defendant was denied notice of and the opportunity to participate
in framing a response to a jury inquiry upon a substantive
matter, and the jury went uninstructed upon that matter, which,
involving as it did an issue as crucial as the admissibility of
defendant's post-arrest statement to the police -- an issue that
was supposed to have been resolved by stipulation in lieu of a
Huntley hearing -- was quintessentially one that required a
"meaningful" response from the trial court under this Court's
precedents (see O'Rama, 78 NY2d at 276; People v Malloy, 55 NY2d
296, 301 [1982]).
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No. 52
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*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order reversed and a new trial ordered, in a memorandum.  Judges
Graffeo, Read, Smith and Pigott concur.  Chief Judge Lippman
concurs in result in an opinion in which Judges Ciparick and
Jones concur.
Decided April 6, 2010