Case Title: Martino v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Pueblo

Citation: 360 P.2d 804

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1961-04-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
360 P.2d 804 (1961) John F. MARTINO, Albert John Martino, and Fred George Martino, Plaintiffs in Error, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF PUEBLO, Defendants in Error. No. 19426. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. April 3, 1961. Phillip J. Cabibi, Pueblo, for plaintiffs in error. Matt J. Kikel, Pueblo, for defendants in error. MOORE, Justice. Defendants in error, hereinafter referred to as the commissioners, filed an action in the district court of Pueblo county to enjoin plaintiffs in error from obstructing a certain highway known as Boggs Flat road. We will refer to plaintiffs in error as the Martinos. Following trial the court granted the injunction sought by the commissioners, and the Martinos seek review by writ of error. February 2, 1959, the Martinos received a patent from the State of Colorado to a section of land to which we will refer as section 16. The adjoining section 15 is owned by one Bergemann. The particular portion of the road which the Martinos were obstructing ran on the section line between sections 15 and 16, a portion thereof running along the east side of section 16, another along the west side of section 15. The Martinos, in their answer, justified closing of the road as follows: The trial court made findings of fact which include the following: "That the road or highway in question is commonly known as the `Boggs Flat County Road' and sometimes as *805 the Bergemann Road, and has been in existence and in use as a road since 1911 as shown by the County's records, and as far back as 1906 by one of the witnesses. The trial court further found that the Martinos had barricaded the road and, with a gun, threatened the users of the highway to prevent removal of the obstruction; and further: As grounds for reversal of the judgment it is argued by counsel for the Martinos that the road in question is not a "public highway" as that term is defined by pertinent statutory provisions. C.R.S. 1953, 120-1-1 reads as follows: "The following are hereby declared to be public highways: C.R.S. '53, 120-3-2, originally adopted in 1921, and amended without change in so far as pertinence to this controversy is concerned, reads as follows: C.R.S. '53, 120-3-18, provides: *806 It is contended by counsel for the Martinos that within the coverage of the above quoted statutes the road is not a public highway for the reason that it was never created "by law." It is argued that even though the road was in use for more than forty years, no prescriptive rights could be acquired by the public for the reason that until the year 1959 the State of Colorado owned the land for school purposes, and no rights can be acquired against the state by prescription. It is further contended that C.R.S. 120-1-4 and 120-1-5 define the methods by which the commissioners could have acquired the right to establish a public highway over the land in question. Admittedly no action was taken under these statutes. In effect the contention is that as against school lands the sections of the statute last above mentioned provide the exclusive method of creating "by law" a public highway. The attorney for the commissioners argues, with reference to that portion of the road which crosses section 16 owned by the Martinos, that a highway can be created by dedication and that C.R.S. '53, 120-1-4 and 120-1-5 do not set forth the only methods by which roadways can become public highways. In substance, his position is that the road in question is a public highway by virtue of a dedication by congressional grant of the lands over which it runs; that this express dedication for rights of way was accepted by user on behalf of the public; that the Martinos acquired their property subject to said rights of way and therefore have no right to prevent the use thereof by the public. In 25 Am.Jur. 344 (§ 9) we find the following: From 16 Am.Jur. 350 (§6) we quote the following: The question for determination is whether the road acquired the status of a public highway by dedication. It is provided by 43 U.S.C.A. § 932 (adopted in 1866) that: "The right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted." In referring to this provision of the U. S. Code this court in Nicolas v. Grassle, 83 Colo. 536, 267 P. 196, 197, stated: In Sprague v. Stead, 56 Colo. 538, 139 P. 544, 545, the court, also referring to the same provision, stated: In Leach v. Manhart, 102 Colo. 129, 77 P.2d 652, 653, we find the following: "The premises considered, we think a statute of the United States enacted in 1866 R.S. § 2477, U.S.Comp.Stat.1918, *807 § 4919, Title 43, U.S.C.A. § 932, reading as follows: `The right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted,' is controlling. We have had occasion to consider that statute in varying situations. See Sprague v. Stead, 56 Colo. 538, 139 P. 544; Greiner v. Board of County Commissioners, 64 Colo. 584, 173 P. 719; Dunbar v. Kohler, 66 Colo. 272, 180 P. 739; Nicolas v. Grassle, 83 Colo. 536, 267 P. 196, 197; Korf v. Itten, 64 Colo. 3, 169 P. 148. The sum of our holdings is that the statute is an express dedication of a right of way for roads over unappropriated government lands, acceptance of which by the public results from `use by those for whom it was necessary or convenient.' It is not required that `work' shall be done on such a road, or that public authorities shall take action in the premises. User is the requisite element, and it may be by any who have occasion to travel over public lands, and if the use be by only one, still it suffices. `A road may be a highway though it reaches but one property owner. 29 C.J. 367. He has a right to access to other roads and the public has a right of access to him. Pagels v. Oaks, 64 Iowa 198, 19 N.W. 905, 907. Its character is not determined by the fact that but few persons use it.' * * *." In 1921 when the statute which now appears as C.R.S. 1953, 120-3-2, was adopted, the road here in dispute was being used by the public and had been so used for many years. That statute declared: The legislature in 1921 adopted the following statute (Session Laws 1921, p. 380): The term "public domain" as used in this statute includes school lands. The road, well established at the time of the adoption of the 1921 statute, was a public highway at least from and after that date as declared by act of the legislature. The judgment is affirmed.