Case Title: Griffin v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Griffin v. State1988 WY 6749 P.2d 246Case Number: 86-295Decided: 01/21/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 
 
 

  

 
 
CAROL L. GRIFFIN, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Big HornCounty, John T. Dixon, 
J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain (argued), Deputy State Public 
Defender, Julie D. Naylor, Appellate Counsel, for appellant. 

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Asst. Atty. 
Gen. (argued), for 
appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1.]     Following a jury trial 
upon a charge of first-degree murder, appellant Carol Griffin was convicted, for 
killing her husband, of voluntary manslaughter in violation of § 6-2-105(a)(i), 
W.S. 1977, which provides:

"(a) A person is guilty 
of manslaughter if he unlawfully kills any human being without malice, expressed 
or implied, either:

"(i) Voluntarily, upon a 
sudden heat of passion * * *."

She received a 
sentence of eight to ten years in the Wyoming Women's Center.

[¶2.]     On appeal, she states 
the issues as:

1. "Was the competent 
evidence presented to the jury insufficient to sustain the conviction of 
voluntary manslaughter."

2. "Was the introduction 
of Appellant's request for an attorney and her subsequent statements reversible 
error."

3. "Did the trial court 
improperly limit voir dire."

4. "Was it error for the 
Court to refuse proffered jury instruction F."

We affirm.

[¶3.]     The critical question 
presented for our review is whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain 
appellant's voluntary manslaughter conviction. Appellant contends she was a 
battered wife who in self-defense shot and killed her husband. We must abide by 
our established rule that after conviction, on appeal, we view all the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the State, drawing all possible, reasonable 
inferences therefrom to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have 
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the elements of the crime necessary for 
conviction. If, after viewing the evidence in this light, there exists 
sufficient evidence to support a conviction, the jury's verdict of conviction 
must be affirmed. Capshaw v. State, Wyo., 737 P.2d 740 (1987); Dangel v. State, Wyo., 724 P.2d 1145 (1986).

"`Stated another way - it 
is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for us, 
but rather whether it is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference 
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the jury when the evidence is 
viewed in the light most favorable to the State.'" Grabill v. State, Wyo., 621 P.2d 802, 803 (1980), quoting Harvey v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1386, 1387 (1979). See also 
Polston v. State, Wyo., 685 P.2d 1 (1984).

[¶4.]     It is claimed that 
appellant is a battered wife, i.e., a woman so physically, emotionally and 
psychologically destroyed by continuous, severe beatings that she has become an 
emotional cripple, unable to resist, unable to act, fearful of leaving, 
believing there is nowhere to turn and no one to help, unable to contemplate 
divorce or separation, who in utter desperation kills her husband. Thus it is 
said:

"Battered women have 
traditionally been reluctant to seek help. If `seeking help' would not protect 
her from further physical abuse and if there was no place to go to escape from 
the assaults, then what was the use of seeking help? For many years this was the 
plight a battered woman faced. All too often these women have been ashamed of 
being victims of spouse abuse. They have endured repeated assaults because of an 
overriding desire to keep the family together, uncertainty over where to get 
legal aid and social work services, fear of poverty, guilt that they are in some 
way to blame for the abuse, and fear of intensified physical reprisals if they 
left home or filed a complaint against the husband." A. Roberts, Sheltering 
Battered Women, at 7 (1981).

[¶5.]     Appellant hardly 
qualifies for what the literature describes as a battered wife. She was not 
afraid to contact the police, having done so on five prior occasions. Each time 
the police came to their residence, there was an argument between the parties 
over who had done what, who was at fault; and in each instance appellant was 
enormously drunk. She had pushed Clyde Griffin out of the house on several 
occasions, fought with him and cut him with a broken bottle and knife, had 
employed a lawyer and entered into two separation agreements. The parties were 
separated at the time of the shooting. She had been married four times prior to 
this marriage to the deceased, three of those marriages ending in divorce. She 
knew how to get out of her marriage without killing Clyde Griffin. She could 
hardly have believed it necessary to kill him to terminate the 
relationship.

FACTS

[¶6.]     The appellant, Carol 
Griffin, married the deceased, Clyde Griffin, on July 1, 1983. It was 
appellant's fifth marriage and the deceased's first. The marriage, marked by 
alcohol abuse, separation and acts of violence by both husband and wife, ended 
with the death of Clyde Griffin on January 26, 1986.

[¶7.]     The events leading to 
the killing began when David Lopez, Jeanette Alphin, Charles Kellogg and 
appellant met the evening of January 25, 1986, at appellant's mobile home in 
Cowley, Wyoming, to celebrate the birthday of Lopez. 
Everyone except Kellogg had been drinking before they moved the celebration to 
Powell, Wyoming. They returned to Cowley about 
midnight, and the party continued at Kellogg's mobile home until about 2:45 a.m. 
Sunday. Appellant remained at Kellogg's home until about 6:00 a.m. She and 
Kellogg then went to the appellant's home where, at 6:38 a.m., she telephoned 
Clyde at the ranch house near Byron where he 
was staying during the couple's separation. Ten or fifteen minutes later, 
Clyde called back to ask for help in getting a 
vehicle out of a ditch. Appellant and Kellogg traveled to the ranch bringing 
appellant's gun with them.

[¶8.]     Appellant, Clyde and Kellogg practiced shooting the gun. It was the 
first time appellant had fired the gun. Kellogg and appellant then returned to 
appellant's home about 9:30 a.m. Kellogg cleaned the gun, reloaded it and placed 
it on a coffee table in appellant's living room.

[¶9.]     At about 10:00 a.m., a 
neighbor, Melvin Buck, drove Clyde to 
appellant's home. Buck found Clyde to be 
friendly and calm. Clyde entered the trailer 
house, accused Kellogg of "bird dogging" his wife, and ordered Kellogg out of 
the mobile home. Kellogg started to leave when the appellant fired the gun, its 
bullet hitting a closet. Kellogg heard Clyde say: "[Y]ou are not going to shoot 
me, are you, Carol?" and before he reached the bottom of the steps, the 
appellant fired a second shot, striking and killing Clyde.

[¶10.]  Appellant called the Big Horn County 
Sheriff's office in Lovell and informed the dispatcher that she had just shot 
her husband. Two deputies arrived at the mobile home five minutes later to find 
Clyde slumped against a wall, dead. While 
traveling to the sheriff's office in Lovell, appellant stated she would like to 
speak to an attorney and was advised that an attorney would be provided. At the 
sheriff's office, she waived her Miranda rights after they were read to her and 
was left in the custody of a Lovell police officer until transportation to the 
BigHornCounty jail in Basin could be arranged. 
Although the officer asked no questions about the shooting incident, appellant 
started talking about it. When appellant asked if she should lie and say someone 
else shot Clyde, the officer suggested she say 
no more until she consulted with an attorney. A blood alcohol test showed her 
blood alcohol level to be .23 percent some three hours later.

[¶11.]  Appellant's trial on the first-degree 
murder charge began on April 28, 1986. The jury rejected appellant's 
self-defense justification for the shooting and, on May 7, 1986, found her 
guilty of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter under § 
6-2-105(a)(i), supra.

SUFFICIENCY OF 
EVIDENCE

[¶12.]  The State's evidence was directed to 
proof of premeditation, motive and malice necessary to establish murder in the 
first degree. Thus, witnesses testified that appellant would drink daily in 
bars, make advances to other men, and other men would come on to her. The 
deceased's employer, Peterson, testified that "he [Clyde] was upset by her 
association with other fellows"; that "[h]e handled it much better than I would 
have," and one morning when Mr. Peterson gave appellant a ride as they drove 
past Kellogg's trailer, appellant said,

"Carol's down to 
Kellogg's, and he got out and walked down to the trailer. That was about 
8:30.

"Q. In the 
morning?

"A. In the morning, 
yes.

"Q. Was -

"A. He was aware that she 
was staying down there at nights and this bothered him to some 
extent."

[¶13.]  Sandra Folkerts testified:

"Q. Now then, did 
Clyde ever mention to you the relationship 
between his wife and Mr. Kellogg?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Was that causing him 
any concern?

"A. It was causing him a 
lot of grief, heartache.

* * * * * *

"A. He came to my house 
one night and he said that he had been over to Cowley and that Carol was at 
Chuck's house and he asked her for the checkbook and credit cards, he felt if 
she was going to have a relationship with Chuck he was not going to continue to 
support her, I guess, I don't know."

[¶14.]  Mr. Garrett testified:

"Q. And did he ever 
mention any suspicions or fears he may have had about Mr. Kellogg?

"A. He said he felt Mr. 
Kellogg and Mrs. Griffin were having an affair."

There was also 
the testimony set forth in the dissent concerning a customer in a bar playing 
with appellant's breasts. There was not a single objection to any of this 
testimony. It is not surprising there was no objection, for such evidence is 
clearly relevant to motive, malice and plan to kill.

[¶15.]  Doctor Welch, who saw appellant after 
their fights, testified: "She was under the influence of alcohol each time," and 
stated further: "[M]y impression was that she was a pusher, Carol was a pusher. 
When she would get drunk she would drive him up the wall and whether it was a 
short fuse or not, it was understandable I felt at the time." And finally Dr. 
Welch stated that he never considered her injuries serious.

[¶16.]  Mr. Lopez, a friend of appellant's, 
testified that the difficulties, verbal fights, and pushing were the result of 
alcohol and that "usually when things got pretty bad * * * he [Clyde Griffin] 
would leave."

[¶17.]  Mr. Whittman testified:

"A. Carol slapped 
Clyde.

"Q. What was his response 
to this?

"A. He was trying to hold 
her arms together and take her home because she was yelling and screaming and 
waking up the kids. I asked them to leave.

"Q. Did you ever see 
Clyde Griffin physically attack his wife during that altercation?

"A. No.

"Q. Were there any other 
instances which you witnessed or which you were party to which led you to form 
an opinion as to Carol Griffin's temper?

"A. Quite often she would 
start arguments with him."

[¶18.]  Ms. Folkerts stated:

"A. He told me that he 
had to defend himself against her. He came to the house one time and mentioned 
to me that she had broken a bottle and gone after him with it in their home. And 
he came to me at a different time and told me that she had gone after him with a 
butcher knife.

"Q. Did you ever see any 
indications of injury on him?

"A. He had wrapped his 
arm one day and said it was cut. It was wrapped when he came over and he was 
telling me about one of these incidents, yes. He told me another time that she 
pushed him out the back door of the trailer and they had no steps."

[¶19.]  For five months the parties were 
separated pursuant to two separation agreements. Upon the expiration of the 
agreements, they lived together for about two months when, on December 22, 1985, 
decedent again moved out of the trailer. During all of this time Clyde Griffin 
was appellant's sole support. For the last five months Clyde Griffin had stopped 
drinking, was attending Alcoholics Anonymous, and was living alone at the house 
on his parents' ranch. His employer had suggested to him that he get a divorce. 
Clyde Griffin informed Ms. Folkerts one night that he was thinking about 
"changing his will and getting a divorce * * *." The jury could have inferred 
that appellant was interested in other men; was having an affair with one of 
them; that while separated she was being supported by Clyde Griffin; that if she 
and Clyde were divorced she would have no further support, but if he died while 
they were still married, she would inherit from his estate. Fifteen days before 
Clyde was shot and killed by appellant, she 
purchased a .38 caliber handgun and two boxes of ammunition. The day of Clyde 
Griffin's death, she telephoned him at the ranch where he was staying. She and 
Mr. Kellogg then went to the ranch, taking the gun and the ammunition with them. 
She had never fired the gun before. At the ranch she fired the gun for the first 
time engaging in target practice. A few hours later, while seated on her sofa, 
in a drunken condition, she picked up her handgun and, as in target practice, 
fired a shot into the center of Clyde Griffin's chest, killing him almost 
instantly. There was considerable evidence of premeditation and malice necessary 
for a conviction of first-degree murder.

[¶20.]  Appellant was convicted of manslaughter, 
however, because of her drunken condition at the time of the killing. At her 
sentencing hearing her attorney conceded drunkenness was the cause, and so did 
her doctor who testified as follows:

"She has done something 
that is absolutely not acceptable in our society, and that's killed someone. For 
that there ought to be some punishment and the jury of her peers so agreed. What 
that punishment should entail is difficult to assess. Carol does have a disease, 
and a disease led her to do what she did and, nonetheless the act was committed, 
a life was lost that can never be given back. It's done and gone forever, so 
there is absolutely no restitution that can be made, and so for that reason 
that's why I don't envy the judge in this situation. I think that whatever 
sentence is imposed, ought to be absolutely tied to alcoholic 
treatment."

[¶21.]  The judge, in sentencing appellant to 
eight to ten years, stated:

"I also during the trial, 
of course, had an opportunity to observe you, listen to your testimony during 
that period of time and also here again this morning and I have the distinct 
feeling and impression that while you regret what happened, you more regret it 
because it got you in the mess you are in today and brought you before this 
court and that you somehow in your own mind feel the taking of Clyde Griffin's 
life, under the circumstances, was justified. It is not. It cannot be, and this 
Court is never going to tell the public or society that if you have a problem 
which is greater than yourself the way to solve it is to pick up a gun and shoot 
someone else.

"You had ample 
opportunity prior to the time of the shooting to solve that problem by other 
means and other sources and you took no steps whatsoever as far as this Court's 
concerned to avoid the eventuality that occurred when Clyde Griffin 
died."

Twelve citizens 
in Big Horn County sitting on this jury heard all of the testimony, observed all 
of the witnesses, their manner of testifying, the inflection in their voices, 
their appearance, and assessed their credibility and truthfulness and found 
appellant guilty of manslaughter.

[¶22.]  The dissent1 would have us believe that an 
appellate judge, having heard not one bit of testimony from a live witness, 
never having observed the expression and demeanor of a single witness on the 
stand, and having had no opportunity to judge credibility, is in a better 
position, from the cold written word in a transcript of testimony, to ascertain 
who is truthful and who is lying, who is a perjurer, and to resolve disputed 
questions of fact. It is not the function of an appellate court to retry cases 
upon their facts. Twelve jurors believed appellant was guilty of manslaughter. 
The trial judge believed appellant was guilty of manslaughter. He denied a 
motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced her upon conviction.

[¶23.]  When viewed in a light most favorable to 
the State, the jury could have reasonably concluded that appellant was guilty of 
voluntary manslaughter. Appellant relies in part on the Eagan rule to advance her 
contention that the killing was justified by reason of self-defense. The 
Eagan rule 
states:

"Where an accused is the 
sole witness of a transaction charged as a crime, * * * his testimony cannot be 
arbitrarily rejected, and if credibility has not been impeached, and his 
testimony is not improbable, and is not inconsistent with the facts and 
circumstances shown, but is reasonably consistent therewith, then his testimony 
should be accepted." Eagan v. State, 58 
Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215, 226 (1942).

[¶24.]  Appellant was the only witness to the 
shooting, but other people witnessed the events leading up to the shooting. Buck 
testified that the deceased was calm when he entered the trailer. Kellogg 
testified that the deceased reacted with a fearful statement after appellant 
fired the first shot. Expert testimony and evidence showed that the deceased was 
struck from a weapon fired from a distance of more than five feet. There was 
substantial evidence to support the jury's rejection of the self-defense claim 
and substantial evidence to support its finding.

APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY AND SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS

[¶25.]  Appellant contends that her rights under 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 11 of the 
Wyoming 
Constitution2 were violated because the Lovell 
police officer testified about the statements she made to him concerning the 
killing. The dissent suggests that the police officers in this small rural town 
lied, cheated, and took advantage of appellant when it states: "[H]e [the police 
officer] never intended to honor her initial request for counsel * * *"; that a 
police officer and appellant were sitting together in a room for "an undisclosed 
time for an undisclosed purpose [and t]hen, almost by magic, after something is 
said that is deemed incriminatory, the attendant officer leaves the room to 
draft his notes * * *"; this was "[c]learly, a deliberate elicitation plan * * * 
portrayed in the events, including factors of time, place, circumstance, and 
prompted response * * *."

[¶26.]  The statements by appellant were not the 
result of interrogation, compulsion, overreacting, or anything else. They were 
nothing more than the ramblings of a drunken woman. But, if it were otherwise, 
it is absurd to suggest that the statements made by appellant while sitting in a 
room, guarded by a police officer, awaiting transportation to Lovell, made any 
difference in the outcome of this case. The statements by appellant were as 
follows, Officer Irwin testifying: "[A]nd then she says, it was premeditated, I 
was tired of him beating me up"; then she said, "should I lie and tell them 
somebody else shot him? I told her she probably shouldn't make any more 
statements until she talked to an attorney." And then she said: "[H]e attacked 
me." Later, on redirect examination concerning the statement, should I lie and 
say someone else did it, Officer Irwin was asked:

"Was it your impression 
after listening to her and observing her demeanor that this was 
genuine?

"A. No, it 
wasn't.

"Q. Why do you say 
that?

"A. All of her tone of 
voice, the way she said it, like it was - it's hard to explain. Like it was kind 
of a joke or said facetiously. I don't know how to explain it."

[¶27.]  The jury knew appellant had killed Clyde 
Griffin. Kellogg saw her fire the first shot, heard the second shot, returned to 
the trailer where there was only appellant with her smoking gun and Clyde 
Griffin slumped against the wall, dead. Appellant called the dispatcher at the 
police station and told them she had shot Clyde Griffin. Finally, she testified 
at the trial as follows:

"First of all, I guess 
you are not denying that he is dead?

"A. I am not denying 
that.

"Q. You are denying that 
you shot him?

"A. I am not denying 
that.

"Q. And you are also not 
denying that he is not here to rebut or counter anything you have 
said?

"A. That's 
true."

The jury 
obviously did not believe the killing was premeditated when it refused to find 
her guilty of first-degree murder but found her guilty only of the 
lesser-included offense of manslaughter. To suggest that these few innocuous 
statements made any difference in the outcome of this case is pure fantasy, 
having no rational basis. The statements were voluntary, concerned matters 
admitted by appellant or were disregarded by the jury in convicting her of 
manslaughter.

[¶28.]  This court is committed to the protection 
of those rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and the requirement that an 
accused be advised of those rights, including right to counsel as stated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 
16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); Best v. State, Wyo., 736 P.2d 739, 742 (1987). The 
purpose behind the Miranda decision is to prevent government officials from 
using the coercive nature of confinement to extract confessions that would not 
be given in an unrestrained environment. Arizona v. Mauro, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S. Ct. 1931, 1936, 95 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1987). Once an accused has expressed his 
desire to deal with police only through counsel, he is not subject to further 
interrogation until counsel is made available, unless the accused initiates 
further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police. Arizona v. Mauro, supra, 107 S. Ct.  at 1934; Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 
484-485, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981). Absent interrogation, no 
infringement of such rights occurs. Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S.  at 486, 101 S. Ct.  at 1885. Interrogation reflects a measure of compulsion above and beyond 
that inherent in custody itself. Rhode Island 
v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689, 
64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980). The definition of interrogation includes only words or 
actions by police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response. Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S.at 302, 
100 S. Ct.  at 1690.

[¶29.]  In the instant case, no interrogation 
took place. Appellant was being held in Lovell in a room with a police officer 
only until transportation to the BigHornCounty jail could be 
provided. The place at which this killing occurred is a rural, sparsely 
populated area having limited numbers of law enforcement personnel. The police 
officer having custody of appellant had no reason to suspect that she would make 
incriminating statements.

[¶30.]  Appellant also contends her statements 
were involuntary because she was intoxicated. A statement that is not the 
product of interrogation or compulsion attributable to authorities or some other 
improper action, is voluntary and admissible. See 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 817 
(1961). Apparently, appellant here contends the statement was the product of 
compulsion resulting from the existing circumstances. We question the efficacy 
of that contention, but nevertheless respond to the claim. Although tests showed 
appellant's blood alcohol percentage to be high, testimony at trial effectively 
rebutted any presumption that she was intoxicated. Two law enforcement officers 
noticed no signs of intoxication, and expert testimony at the trial indicated 
that a heavy drinker (as appellant) can function normally even with a high blood 
alcohol percentage. There was no factor other than the use of alcohol that would 
support a claim that the statement volunteered by appellant was involuntary. In 
Mayer v. State, Wyo., 618 P.2d 127, 128 (1980), the defendant 
was interrogated by police and made a statement which he later sought to have 
suppressed because he

"was seventeen years of 
age, intoxicated, was suffering from physical injuries incurred from a severe 
beating, was emotionally overwrought and had been deprived of the counsel of his 
mother."

We affirmed the 
trial court's finding that the statement was voluntary, stating:

"An examination of the 
cases cited by appellant in support of his argument reflects the circumstances 
in each are far more aggravated and severe than those in this case. The trial 
court relied upon the factual situation as presented to it by the evidence, and 
it considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding the transaction. 
Such evidence as gauged against such standard supports the findings of the trial 
court." 618 P.2d  at 130.

[¶31.]  Clearly, the circumstances here were not 
as aggravated as in any of the cases cited in Mayer v. State, supra. The 
evidence before the court supports the conclusion that the statement was 
voluntary. There was no error in its admission.

VOIR DIRE

[¶32.]  During voir dire, appellant's attorney 
questioned juror Creech concerning self-defense:

"MR. SPERRY: * * * 
Suppose that the Court gave you an instruction relating to self defense and it 
said in essence that an attack which appeared to a reasonable person to threaten 
serious bodily harm to that person might under certain circumstances that the 
Court would outline, authorize the use of deadly force or the necessary force to 
repel that threatened injury, that is, to serious bodily harm not just death to 
the defender. How do you feel about that, Mr. Creech? Could you abide by that 
Court instruction or would it put a little more burden on the 
defendant?

"JUROR CREECH: That's a 
hard question to answer. I would have to use my own feelings regardless of what 
I was told.

"MR. SPERRY: And, of 
course, you have told us here, Mr. Creech, haven't you, that you feel that 
force, deadly force with a weapon, should be used only when the life is 
threatened; right?

"JUROR CREECH: 
Right.

"MR. SPERRY: Are you 
telling us then if the Court instructs you that self defense comes into play and 
is an effective defense for the defendant in this action, even if only serious 
bodily harm is threatened, that you would have a problem obeying that 
instruction of the Court?

"JUROR CREECH: Yes. I 
think so. 

"MR. SPERRY: Well, Your 
Honor, I would ask to excuse Mr. Creech.

"THE COURT: Mr. Creech, 
you don't have that option. You have to follow what the Court gives you. The 
Court gives you the law of the case as it exists in the State of Wyoming and has been 
developed and handed down from the English Court. I don't have it. If the 
Supreme Court says to me, jump over the Bench, I have to jump over the Bench. 
You are in the same position. Does that change your opinion?

"JUROR CREECH: I still 
think I would have to give it a lot of thought on my own.

"THE COURT: I think Mr. 
Sperry, what you are getting into is an area we can't determine. If what you 
heard during the trial fits what the Court gives you that is the jury's 
instruction.

"I don't think that's a 
proper challenge for cause. I don't think Mr. Creech has said he is going to 
ignore the Court and become sole unto himself as the Judge and jury in this 
case, and you are also giving him a hypothetical which may not occur which we 
wouldn't know until we get all the evidence just exactly what instructions the 
Court will give.

"Therefore, voir dire on 
the instruction at this time is not a proper method, and I know and I will 
explain this to the jury that both counsel in the case have a fairly accurate 
idea of what they are going to produce before you, but trials take funny turns, 
not everything that the attorney thinks he will present to you always 
happens.

"I think we are premature 
at this time."

Mr. Sperry then 
resumed voir dire by questioning a different prospective juror on another area 
of self-defense.

[¶33.]  The purpose of voir dire is to inquire of 
the prospective jurors as to their prejudices and biases which would interfere 
with their ability to decide the case fairly. Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79, 111 
(1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982). In 
voir dire examination, counsel shall not instruct the jury on the law or argue 
the case. Rule 701(d)(4), Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of 
Wyoming. The 
impartiality of the jurors is a question of fact to be determined by the trial 
court upon the basis of proper questioning. Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 682 P.2d 991, 1000 
(1984). Deference is afforded to the trial court in determining the permissible 
bounds of voir dire examination. Summers v. State, Wyo., 725 P.2d 1033, 1039 
(1986).

[¶34.]  By focusing on one aspect of 
self-defense, appellant's attorney in the instant case sought, through voir 
dire, to argue his case. The attorney's questions did not give the juror a 
complete statement of law, only a part of the law taken out of context.3 The trial court could not, in this 
circumstance, decide whether a challenge for cause should be granted. The trial 
court properly held the challenge for cause premature. Appellant could have 
inquired further of possible bias or prejudice with respect to self-defense 
without reference to instructions or law. This approach would be preferable and 
more likely to develop information useful in exercising challenges for cause or 
peremptory challenges. Appellant chose not to interrogate juror Creech further. 
There was no error in voir dire.

JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS

[¶35.]  Appellant's proffered instruction F 
reads:

"One who has reasonable 
grounds to believe that another will attack her, and that the anticipated attack 
will be of such a character as to endanger her life or limb, or to cause her 
serious bodily harm, has a right to arm herself for the purpose of resisting 
such attack.

"If the defendant armed 
herself in reasonable anticipation of such an attack, that fact alone does not 
make the defendant the aggressor or deprive the defendant of the right to 
self-defense."

The trial court 
refused this instruction because it felt the first paragraph had no pertinence 
to the case and other instructions covered the information presented in the 
second paragraph. The court also noted that appellant's attorney was unable to 
present any authority stating the proposition presented as law.

[¶36.]  If an offered instruction is sufficient 
to apprise the court of the defendant's theory of the case, that theory still 
must be supported by competent evidence. Best v. State, supra, 736 P.2d  at 744. 
The defendant's own testimony indicated that she purchased the gun to protect 
herself from the person making the telephone calls; and although she initially 
suspected the deceased of making these calls, her suspicions soon focused on 
another person. She did not purchase the gun because she believed Clyde would attack her; she was not armed for that reason. 
On the contrary, she, having no fear of Clyde, 
had invited him to move back to her trailer. There was no evidence to support 
the giving of that part of the instruction.

[¶37.]  If part of an instruction is erroneous, a 
trial court may properly reject the entire instruction. Evans v. State, 
Wyo., 655 P.2d 1214, 1218 (1982). A trial court may refuse a proposed instruction if the 
principle embodied in the requested instruction is covered by other 
instructions. Summers v. State, supra, 725 P.2d  at 1044; Britton v. State, 
Wyo., 643 P.2d 935, 938 (1982). Because the first part of the instruction was erroneous, the 
trial court could have refused the entire instruction on that ground alone. 
However, the trial court found the second part redundant. Instructions 27, 28, 
30 and 31 adequately covered the law of self-defense. Thus, the court properly 
refused both paragraphs of the proffered instruction.

[¶38.]  Affirmed.

THOMAS and MACY, JJ., filed separate specially 
concurring opinions.

URBIGKIT, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 This is not a 
fact-sensitive case, but one in which the facts were in dispute. The disputed 
facts were resolved by the jury. The majority opinion, as first circulated, was 
an unemotional, dispassionate, non-inflammatory statement of facts with law 
application. Following an emotional dissent founded upon nonexistent wife abuse 
and attacking the character of decedent, a revision of the majority opinion was 
necessary. Justice Urbigkit objects to revision of majority opinions as 
"constructionally unproductive." Justice Macy, in support of Justice Urbigkit, 
does not "condone replying to a dissent." I am disappointed. Response to a 
dissent is neither novel nor new in the law, see Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987), and B.E. 
Whitkin's Manual on Appellate Court Opinions (1977).

(a) Except for addition 
of this footnote to the footnote above, the majority opinion was unchanged after 
the revised dissent. Now we are responding to footnotes. Suffice to say that the 
jury had before it everything to which the dissent alludes and concluded this 
was not technically wife abuse as would constitute a defense and as described in 
the literature. I continue to insist that the evidence was conflicting - thus 
the sheriff's incident report of September 23, 1984, states:

"Carol then began bad 
mouthing his parents and the Mormon church which upset Clyde. He then advised that Carol jumped up and came at 
him and grabbed him[;] he advised that at this point he pushed her away and she 
hit the corner of the couch * * *.

"At the time I spoke with 
Clyde he was not drunk * * *. Clyde advised that he thought the trouble in the marriage 
was his and her drinking and advised that he had tried to get help on this but 
he ended up going for counseling but that she would not."

2 The Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:

"No person shall be * * * 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself * * 
*."

Article 1, § 11 of the 
Wyoming Constitution provides in pertinent part:

"No person shall be 
compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case * * *."

3 The common-law 
requirements for self defense are:

"(1) [T]hat the slayer 
was not at fault in bringing on the difficulty; (2) that he believed, at the 
time of the killing, that he was in such immediate danger of losing his own 
life, or of receiving serious bodily injury, as made it necessary to take the 
life of his assailant; (3) that the circumstances were such to warrant 
reasonable grounds for such belief in the mind of a reasonable man; (4) that 
there was no other reasonable method of escaping or otherwise resolving the 
conflict." Patterson v. State, Wyo., 682 P.2d 1049, 1053 (1984), quoted in Best v. State, Wyo., 736 P.2d 739, 746 (1987).

THOMAS, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶39.]  I agree with the result reached in the 
majority opinion and much of the reasoning there set forth. I cannot join in 
that opinion.

[¶40.]  With respect to Instruction F, relating 
to the right of the defendant to arm herself, in my judgment, that question is 
disposed of as a matter of law in Brown v. State, 80 Wyo. 12, 336 P.2d 794 
(1959), cited with approval in Summers v. State, Wyo., 725 P.2d 1033 (1986). 
Clearly, no error occurred in this regard.

MACY, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶41.]  I concur in the results reached in this 
case but do not condone the practice of replying to a dissent in a majority 
opinion.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶42.]  I respectfully dissent from the decision 
of this court. In terms of the appellate process, this is a fact-sensitive 
case1 when related to Art. 1, §§ 10 and 
11, of the Wyoming Constitution2 and the Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh 
Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.

[¶43.]  The deputy sheriff, after arriving at the 
Cowley homicide site, arrested appellant and took her the approximate five miles 
to Lovell by car. Prior to that time, appellant had been consuming alcoholic 
beverages intermittently for over a 12-hour period, and when tested some more 
than two hours later, still had a .23 percent blood-alcohol content.

[¶44.]  On that short drive, the following 
occurred as related by the deputy sheriff:

"Q. Now then, after you 
got Mrs. Griffin down to the Big Horn County Sheriff's Office, what, if 
anything, took place there?

"A. On the drive from 
Cowley to Lovell she advised that she would like to speak to an 
attorney.

"Q. Okay.

"A. I told her once we 
get to Lovell and got things started squaring away, I would let her speak to 
one."

[¶45.]  Then, in Lovell, for a time clearly in 
excess of an hour and in the late morning without making any effort to afford 
her the right to the requested attorney, the arresting officer first gave the 
accused her Miranda rights,3 and then turned her over to police 
officer Lewis to "sit with her" while he "conducted another interview." So Carol 
Griffin sat there for an hour with the officer watching her while she waited to 
be given the opportunity to see an attorney and the arresting officer waited to 
take her from Lovell to the county seat, Basin, approximately 36 miles further 
away.4

The officer 
testified:

"Q. You knew she was 
about to make some incriminating or what you thought to be incriminating 
statements, didn't you?

"A. I did not know 
that.

"Q. You didn't know what 
she - she was going to, after she started them, did you know the general train 
of the conversation that would be there?

"A. Not until she 
actually spoke the words.

"Q. Did you ever tell her 
maybe she ought to consult her lawyer?

"A. Yes, I 
did.

"Q. When did you do that 
throughout the statement?

"A. She asked if she 
could call her attorney. I told her that when Officer Lewis came back he would 
have made arrangements for her to call and then she said, do you think I should 
lie and tell them somebody else shot him? I said, maybe you shouldn't make any 
more statements until you talk to your attorney.

"Q. At that juncture that 
was the end of it?

"A. Yes. Sergeant Lewis 
came out and I told him that she had been making some statements. He told me to 
write them down and I did.

"Q. Did you write them 
down as they were made after that time after Sergeant Lewis came in?

"A. That was when I went 
and wrote them down, at that time.

"Q. After Sergeant Lewis 
came in?

"A. Yes."

[¶46.]  At trial, appropriately refreshed by 
reading his notes, the officer further testified:

"Q. I am going to hand 
you a document, Officer, and ask if you can recognize that?

"A. Okay.

"Q. What is that document 
you just referred to?

"A. This is my written 
statement that I made that day.

"Q. That was the 
statement that you made that day?

"A. Yes.

"Q. After the part where 
she asked you if you hunted, do you recall what she said next?

"A. Well, I was mistaken 
in the sequence. She says, I have never even killed a deer before, and she asked 
me if I ever killed anybody and I said, no, and then she asked me if I ever went 
hunting and I said, yes, and then she says, it was premeditated, I was tired of 
him beating me up.

* * * * * *

"Q. That's when you told 
her that Officer Lewis would see that she got to call her attorney?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What happened from 
that point?

"A. Well, then I told her 
that she - that's when she said, should I lie and tell them somebody else shot 
him? I told her she probably shouldn't make any more statements until she talked 
to her attorney.

"Q. Was there anything 
further said by her?

"Q. She said, Oh, and 
then said, he attacked me, and Officer Lewis walked out of the room and I walked 
out and wrote my statement."

[¶47.]  Not so surprisingly, right after the 
incriminating statement was made, the original officer reappeared to make 
arrangements and take Mrs. Griffin to Basin, where sometime later that day she 
was first permitted to contact an attorney.5 The confused state of the accused 
is clearly demonstrated by the factually unsustainable, shock-induced, 
alcoholic-related confinement statement in saying that "it [the offense] was 
premeditated, I was tired of him beating me up." To the contrary, the undisputed 
trial evidence, lacking conflict or contrary implication, proved that the 
decedent "busted" into her residence and verbally accosted her and the visiting 
friend with demonstrable intent to commit physical violence of the character 
which had permeated their short and violently disturbed marital relationship, 
including a large number of incidents of her physical abuse by him. The record 
portrays neither semblance of premeditation nor justification for any portion of 
the death-resulting conduct, except in the nature of a temper-induced, 
uncontrolled willingness to effectively put himself in a condition of, 
paradoxically, committing suicide by inviting what somewhat expectedly then 
happened.

[¶48.]  However, prosecuting counsel then said in 
closing argument:

"You have already been 
instructed that whoever kills another human being purposely and with 
premeditated malice commits first degree murder. What's the evidence show about 
that? You remember Tom Irwin, the Lovell police officer who testified about last 
Wednesday and what he testified to, his report's in evidence. That report says 
while watching Carol Griffin in Sergeant Nick Lewis's office she was talking 
about the incident. I did not ask any questions of her. She said, I have never 
even killed a deer before, have you ever killed anybody, no, it was 
premeditated, I was tired of him beating on me, do you go hunting, yes, Mom just 
had a stroke, I don't know how she is going to take it, his Mom, I don't know 
what I am going to do with Mom and Dad. Mom is eighty-eight and Dad is 
ninety-one I just killed their son. He looked awful. Can I call my attorneys. Do 
you think that I should lie and say somebody else shot him? Until you talk to 
your attorney maybe you shouldn't say anything. Okay. He attacked me. "Why does 
that statement have the ring of truth? Let's go through some of these things 
that happened at the trial. "We do know that on January 26, 1986, about 10:30 
a.m. Clyde Griffin was shot and killed in his residence at Cowley, Wyoming."

[¶49.]  Recognizing that some literary license in 
prosecutorial closing argument is justified, the pervasive inaccuracy of whose 
house was the site of death is also inexplicable, since the death did not occur 
at his residence nor at a place where he had any defined right of return except 
upon invitation, which had not then been given. Characteristic of this record is 
that decedent, who had weighed 350 pounds before his stomach was stapled, was a 
man of about 240 pounds at death, and the physically abused defendant was about 
93 pounds.6 

[¶50.]  Presented relevantly as the issue to be 
addressed, Mrs. Griffin was defined to the jury as having asked for an attorney 
twice and having made an incriminating statement that she might lie and had 
committed the offense with premeditation.

[¶51.]  Appellant accurately characterizes the 
essential transaction:

"Since Appellant made an 
un equivocal request for counsel, the only question is whether the suspect 
reinitiated contact with the police following the request."

[¶52.]  The testimony of Sergeant Lewis offers no 
basis for concluding that the Miranda warning occurred because appellant 
reinitiated contact with the police. The time sequences were to the contrary. In 
fact, the officer's testimony indicates that he never intended to honor her 
initial request for counsel by arrangements to be made at Lovell, although his 
response to her request was, "I told her once we get to Lovell and got things 
started squaring away, I would let her speak to [an attorney]." Apparently the 
squaring away was providing the Miranda warning and getting a statement. See 
Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 105 S. Ct. 1065, 84 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1985). It is not surprising that when appellant took 
the witness stand she testified that she had no recollection of making the 
statements upon which her trial objection to introduction was premised, as she 
testified that her first knowledge of the contended statements came in trial 
preparation by reading the police officer's notes.7

[¶53.]  This court justifies introduction of the 
incriminatory information by citation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974, reh. denied sub nom. California v. Stewart, 385 U.S. 890, 87 S. Ct. 11, 17 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1966); 
Arizona v. Mauro, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S. Ct. 1931, 95 L. Ed. 2d 458, reh. denied ___ U.S. ___, 107 S. Ct. 3278, 97 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1987); 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, reh. denied 452 U.S. 973, 101 S. Ct. 3128, 69 L. Ed. 2d 984 (1981); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980); and the Wyoming cases of 
Best v. State, Wyo., 736 P.2d 739 (1987); and 
Mayer v. State, Wyo., 618 P.2d 127 (1980).

[¶54.]  It is my conclusion that this court is 
wrong in that neither under appropriate precedent defining the United States 
Constitution nor under the criteria of the Wyoming Constitution should the 
incriminatory material have been admissible if rights to counsel and against 
self-incrimination are to be maintained as constitutionally justified protection 
for the accused individual. Cf. Erickson, The Unfulfilled Promise of Miranda v. 
Arizona 
Symposium, 24 Am. Crim.L.Rev. 291 (1986). It is possible that with a fair trial, 
even in this jurisdiction, the defendant might have been similarly convicted, 
although the probabilities are singularly unpersuasive either for BigHornCounty or anywhere else in Wyoming.8 

[¶55.]  It is apparent that Wyoming precedent in 
Cheatham v. State, Wyo., 719 P.2d 612 (1986); Daniel v. State, Wyo., 644 P.2d 172 (1982); and Best v. State, supra, has no application since these cases 
consider the question of equivocal requests for counsel, which question does not 
apply to this case involving a request for counsel which was clear, unequivocal, 
absolute and immediate. Unfortunately, by any question asked or an answer given, 
the record in this case does not reflect why the arresting officer did not 
comply with his agreement to afford an opportunity to get an attorney in 
Lovell.

[¶56.]  It is recognized that the test of 
admissibility of a confession as enunciated in Mayer v. State, supra, 618 P.2d  
at 128, "whether or not under the totality of the circumstances the waiver of 
constitutional rights and subsequent statements were given voluntarily, 
knowingly and intelligently," is applicable as effected by violation of an 
accused's right to counsel.

[¶57.]  Defendant included in the motion in 
limine filed April 4, 1986:

"4. Any statements of 
Defendant purporting to be made to Officer Irwin, Officer Lewis, or other 
officers after her arrest and made at the Lovell Law Enforcement Center, or made 
after the time that she was taken into custody by the authorities, including 
specifically the memo purportedly written by Officer Irwin relating to 
statements voluntarily made by Defendant in his presence. This Motion is based 
upon the fact that Defendant was so under the influence of alcohol and mentally 
unbalanced at the time that the statements alleged to have been made are far 
more prejudicial than probative of any relevant facts herein under 
consideration."

[¶58.]  No hearing on the motion was held prior 
to trial in the fairhearing mode as clearly contemplated by our precedent, Hayes 
v. State, Wyo., 599 P.2d 558 (1979), and by Rule 16, 
W.R.Cr.P. The procedure followed and rule announced in Dodge v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 303, 308 (1977) was unexplainably not followed here, where, prior to trial, 
a hearing was held in which the defendant sought to suppress statements made by 
her to the police on the grounds that they were not voluntary:

"The trial judge followed 
the approved procedure in conducting a separate hearing out of the presence of 
the jury to determine the voluntariness of the statements. There must be a 
separate fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness 
in front of the judge alone before the statements may be received in evidence at 
the trial for jury consideration."

[¶59.]  A fair-hearing and reliability 
determination on the issue of voluntariness as a determination uninfluenced by 
the truth or falsity of the confession, is a standard unequivocally established 
in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 1 A.L.R.3d 
1205 (1964), and then clearly reaffirmed in the Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S. Ct. 619, 30 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1972) decision. It is my conclusion that where the 
issue of voluntariness of a confession or other incriminatory statement is 
raised pursuant to Rule 16, W.R.Cr.P., at a time prior to trial, a hearing in 
the constitutional context required by Jackson v. Denno, supra, should be held 
also in advance of trial, so that counsel would know what the rules of the game 
would be in trial, and also so that the obviously pervasive effect of 
introduction, if subsequently permitted, will not permeate the atmosphere of the 
jury evaluation as derived from the recess for hearing otherwise required. Dodge 
v. State, supra. Attention is specifically directed to Lufkins v. Solem, 554 F. Supp. 988 (D.S.D. 1983), aff'd 716 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 467 U.S. 1219, 104 S. Ct. 2667, 81 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1984), in both the procedural and ineffectiveness contexts.

[¶60.]  A further problem is first raised in this 
case by appellant's brief discussing a trial defect not initially pursued at 
trial by specific objection or motion in limine. The prosecution was permitted 
to introduce into evidence defendant's request to see an attorney, to then be 
multiplied in trial harm by measured noncompliance until an incriminatory 
statement is obtained. It is recognized that specific objection to the admitted 
testimony of the request for an attorney was not made, and that the subject is 
consequently only here on a plain-error inquiry. The strategic finesse against 
comment on the privilege against self-incrimination is to present to the jury 
the testimony of the request for an attorney. Both are exceptionally prejudicial 
and similarly contravene the accused's constitutional rights. State v. Rogers, 32 Ohio St.3d 70, 512 N.E.2d 581 
(1987).

[¶61.]  This case presents an intoxicated 
individual without regard for the no-see, no-hear, no-explanation of the 
arresting and witnessing officers, a request for counsel promised and denied, 
and a strategy which may be related to a how-to book or seminar on 
interrogation, deliberately structured to elicit incriminating statements from 
the defendant in the absence of requested counsel. If this critique appears 
overblown, the factual events require reanalysis, including promise, process, 
denying opportunity to call from Lovell, unexplained delay in delivery to the 
county seat with two people, one a police officer and the second the person who 
has just been involved in a homicide, sitting together for an undisclosed time 
for an undisclosed purpose. Then, almost by magic, after something is said that 
was deemed incriminatory, the attendant officer leaves the room to draft his 
notes, while the other officer returns to the room and makes arrangements for 
transfer of the accused through car travel to the office in Basin. I would not 
find that the Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 106 S. Ct. 2616, 91 L. Ed. 2d 364 
(1986) notation of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1964), and United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 65 L. Ed. 2d 115 (1980), affords a justification for admission by its differentiation 
from the fundamental principles defined in Massiah and Henry. Clearly, a 
deliberate elicitation plan is portrayed in the events, including factors of 
time, place, circumstance, and prompted response by Miranda-form utilization. 
United 
States v. Henry, supra. The test of Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S.  at 300-301, 
100 S. Ct.  at 1689-1690, "a person in custody is subjected to either express 
questioning or its functional equivalent," is presented by rational application 
of the objective standard. The psychological pressure which was of concern to 
Justice Stevens dissenting in Innis is even more obviously portrayed here. 
Certainly this is not an Arizona v. Mauro, supra, case. Patton, The 
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel: Government Circumvention Through Surreptitious 
Interrogation, 20 J.Mar.L.Rev. 567 (1987). See also Brewer v. Wiliams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424, reh. denied 431 U.S. 925, 97 S. Ct. 2200, 53 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1977); Edwards v. 
Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880; Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682; Note, Moran v. Burbine, The Decline of Defense 
Counsel's "Vital" Role in the Criminal Justice System, 36 Cath.U.L. Rev. 253 
(1986).

VOIR DIRE

[¶62.]  A fair and impartial jury is a firm 
constitutional command of the Wyoming Constitution, Art. 1, § 9 and the Sixth 
Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Chief Justice John 
Marshall in 1807 established the fundamental standard for American 
adjudication:

"The great value of the 
trial by jury certainly consists in its fairness and impartiality." 
United 
States v. Burr, 25 Fed.Cas. 49, 50 [¶¶ 
14,692-14,694] (1807).

See Lee v. 
State, Wyo., 743 P.2d 296 (1987); and Summers 
v. State, Wyo., 731 P.2d 558 (1987), Cardine, Justice 
dissenting, and Urbigkit, Justice dissenting.

[¶63.]  The method provided by rule and statute 
for achievement of the constitutionally guaranteed liberty interest is an 
effective voir dire. All people are not equal when perceived and evaluated by 
basic prejudices, determined social values, and intrinsic attitudes. Expert 
trial attorneys and forensic psychologists conclude that in 90 percent of the 
cases, a jury trial is likely preordained at a time before the first witness is 
called to testify. The aim of the protagonist advocate, and particularly so in 
criminal defense, is to lower the 90-10 relationship to afford a better 
opportunity for reason and fairness considerations.9

[¶64.]  Although not in itself determinative in 
this case by virtue of an exercised peremptory challenge, as undeterminable from 
this record to have been provided by whichever party, the stark example is 
demonstrable. This case factually and forcefully demonstrates the long-time 
concern held by this writer about the constitutionality of Rule 701(d)(4), 
Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming,10 as applied in criminal cases, and 
its advocacy and propriety if misused in civil cases, whereby adequate inquiry 
is not afforded to properly exercise challenges for cause, or to knowledgeably 
utilize the rights to peremptory challenge. Neither the court nor counsel can 
determine the impartiality question unless an adequate voir-dire examination is 
authorized and pursued. Cf. Summers v. State, Wyo., 725 P.2d 1033 (1986), aff'd 731 P.2d 558 (1987); 
Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 682 P.2d 991 (1984). See National Jury 
Project, Inc., Jurywork, Systematic Techniques, Ch. 2, Improving 
Voir Dire Conditions (2d ed. 1986).

[¶65.]  To understand the scenario of this case, 
it must be noted that no complete list of witnesses to be used by the State was 
furnished; no pretrial conference was held; and no Jackson v. Denno hearing 
was provided in pretrial process. Subpoenas issued prior to the commencement of 
trial include a significant number of names, but obviously, in retrospect, not 
all the witnesses were called by the State to testify. Among the veniremen 
called for examination was Charles Scheeler, number 42.

[¶66.]  In voir-dire examination of venireman 
Scheeler, we find:

"MR. THARP: You heard the 
Court just go over an explanation of the functions of the Court and jury. With 
what you know about Clyde and his family, do 
you think you could be a fair juror, to be able to judge the case based on what 
comes from the witness stand?

* * * * * *

"THE COURT: How about 
you, Mr. Scheeler, you indicated you knew Clyde Griffin or members of his 
family?

"JUROR SCHEELER: I knew 
them when I moved to Byron. I run a business up there. Run into 
them.

"MR. THARP: How long you 
lived in Byron?

"JUROR SCHEELER: Seven 
years.

"MR. THARP: Would what 
you know about Clyde or his family, would that 
cause you any problems sitting here as a juror?

"JUROR SCHEELER: I don't 
think so.

"MR. THARP: What about 
Carol Griffin, you know her?

"JUROR SCHEELER: 
Yes.

"MR. THARP: Would you 
acquaintance with her cause you any problems being a juror in this 
case?

"MR. SCHEELER: I don't 
think so."

[¶67.]  After inquiry, the prosecuting attorney 
gave the names of a large number of potential witnesses, and inquired of the 
veniremen separately as to whether any association or acquaintanceship would 
adversely affect their fairness that "would cause you any problems being a 
juror." After these names had been separately listed in considerable detail, the 
following occurred:

"THE COURT: Gone through 
all your witnesses?

"MR. THARP: I think 
pretty much.[11]

"MR. SPERRY: Covered the 
waterfront, Your Honor."

It was 
established that Scheeler had been a military policeman in the Korean War; he 
didn't know what circumstance might "necessitate the taking of human life," and 
thought that drunkenness should not be used as an excuse to commit a crime 
because "I don't think it should be used, I sell it."

[¶68.]  Then, in answer to the inquiry of 
defendant:

"MR. SPERRY: Mr. 
Scheeler, you might well have heard some opinions expressed. You said you sold 
liquor; is that right?

"JUROR SCHEELER: I have 
that business.

"MR. SPERRY: I bet you 
have heard some opinions expressed, haven't you?

"JUROR SCHEELER: You hear 
all kinds of things in my place.

"MR. SPERRY: Well, have 
you ever expressed an opinion?

"JUROR SCHEELER: No. When 
I do, I do it in my own mind because I can't come out in the open. I got 
customers. I might lose a customer over it.

"MR. SPERRY: But you have 
formed in your own mind an opinion in this case, haven't you?

"JUROR SCHEELER: Well, I 
never did actually ever know what the truth really was. You hear so many 
different stories and different people come in there and I just listen to this 
and listen to that, might as well forget about it and get the real truth when it 
comes to Court.

"MR. SPERRY: You heard 
the Judge talking to you a minute ago about something relayed and several people 
hear it and pretty soon you can't really remember exactly. Do you think you 
would have any trouble if you would go to the jury room and sit there trying to 
help in deliberation separating out of your mind what you hear from this witness 
stand from what you have heard out there in the ByronBar?

"JUROR SCHEELER: I don't 
think that would have any effect on me actually.

"MR. SPERRY: Are - you 
think you could be fair and impartial?

"JUROR SCHEELER: I 
believe I could, because you got to if you are going to have, get along with 
your customers without fights or anything in the bar, too, you got to work with 
them and keep the peace. You got to work both sides. I work with women and men 
both, but I hate to tell you which one is the worse. 

"MR. SPERRY: We wouldn't 
get you into that."

[¶69.]  Selection of the jury was completed on 
the day the trial commenced, April 28. On May 2, a subpoena for Carol Scheeler, 
who was obviously the wife of the prior venireman, was issued without any record 
reflection of notice of her name or anticipated testimony. Then, as she was 
called in rebuttal to testify, we find her testimony in regard to an incident in 
the bar operated by the Scheelers in Byron, involving the defendant and a Frank 
Fitzgerald who was clearly antagonistic to the decedent as a prior employer of 
the defendant and who had previously testified for defendant. This testimony 
came late in the evidentiary stage in the midst of the accusative "been eating 
oyster" testimony as hearsay relating Charles Kellogg to a friend of Mrs. 
Griffin. The entire scenario bespoke of the problems evidenced in Schmunk v. 
State, Wyo., 714 P.2d 724 (1986), and Frias v. 
State, Wyo., 
722 P.2d 135 (1986). The elicited testimony was:

"BY MR. 
THARP:

"Q. Would you state your 
name, please?

"A. Carol 
Scheeler.

"Q. Where do you live, 
Mrs. Scheeler?

"A. Byron, Wyoming.

"Q. You work outside your 
home?

"A. Yes. My husband and I 
own the ByronBar and Cafe.

"Q. How long have you run 
the ByronBar?

"A. Six 
years.

"Q. Do you know Clyde 
Griffin or did you know Clyde Griffin?

"A. Yes.

"Q. How about Carol 
Griffin?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Do you know Frank 
Fitzgerald?

"A. He has been in a few 
times as a customer is the only way I know him.

"Q. You know who he 
is?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Do you recall when 
Clyde Griffin would have been in jail in Cody in November of 1985?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And do you know why 
he was there?

"A. I believe he had a 
DWI.

"Q. During that time do 
you recall Mrs. Griffin and Mr. Frank Fitzgerald being in your bar?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Do you remember what 
time of day this was?

"A. Oh, it was in about 
middle of the afternoon.

"Q. Were you personally 
present?

"A. Yes. I was 
working.

"Q. Were you tending 
bar?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What did they come in 
to the bar, you say, about the middle of the afternoon. Where did they sit in 
the bar?

"A. About the middle of 
the bar.

"Q. Did you see 
them?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Could you describe 
what they did while they were there?

"A. Well, I believe they 
said they had been to a sale and talking about something, about delivering a 
television and they had, I think, two drinks and they were giggling and Mr. 
Fitzgerald was playing with Mrs. Griffin's breasts.

"Q. Playing with Mrs. 
Griffin's breasts?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Describe what he was 
doing.

"A. Well, they were just 
sitting very close together and he was playing with her breasts and they were 
kissing.

"Q. Kissing in the 
bar?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You observed 
this?

"A. Yes.

"Q. How long did this go 
on?

"A. Oh, approximately 
twenty minutes.

"Q. And how long were 
they in the bar?

"A. Probably thirty 
minutes.

"Q. And have they ever 
been back in there together since?

"A. No.

"MR. THARP: I have I 
don't believe I have any further questions. 

"MR. SPERRY: I have no 
questions, Your Honor.

"THE COURT: Beg your 
pardon? [An audio recording at this point for tone-of-voice perception would be 
most interesting.]

"MR. SPERRY: No 
questions.

"THE COURT: You may step 
down."

[¶70.]  The record does not portray that counsel 
for defendant ever recognized what hit him, as initiated by inconclusive voir 
dire and the unlisted rebuttal witnesses. Obviously, the significance of these 
events would be much greater if Scheeler had stayed on the jury, even though we 
cannot tell whether the peremptory challenge which denied that result was by the 
State or the defendant. The point to be made in any confined voir-dire 
opportunity and obligation is, how many venirepersons of this character are not 
discovered and consequently not excused? Again, we have the same problem which 
existed in Braley v. State, Wyo., 741 P.2d 1061, 1070 (1987), Urbigkit, 
J., dissenting.

[¶71.]  It is of the essence of this nation's 
criminal system that the trial by a jury of a defendant's peers include an 
essential ingredient of that right that the jury consist of impartial or 
indifferent jurors. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961). The necessity of a thorough voir-dire inquiry to identify bias is 
recognized in Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 81 L. Ed. 2d 847 
(1984), and cases cited in n. 13 at 1038, 104 S. Ct.  at 2892, including In re 
National Broadcasting Co., 209 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 653 F.2d 609, 617 (D.C. Cir. 
1981); United States v. 
Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 865 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied 444 U.S. 871, 100 S. Ct. 148, 62 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1979); Calley v. Callaway, 
519 F.2d 184, n. 45 at 209 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Calley v. 
Hoffman, 425 U.S. 911, 96 S. Ct. 1505, 47 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1976). The Delaware Supreme Court, while recognizing that the practice 
favors limited voir dire, carefully reviewed the importance in constitutional 
terms by assessing before reversal "whether defendant was allowed to take 
adequate steps to make sure that he was tried by a fair and disinterested panel 
of jurors." Hughes v. State, Del. Supr., 490 A.2d 1034, 1041 
(1985).

[¶72.]  I categorically differ with the 
conclusion of this court that appropriate examination of the obvious areas of 
prejudice and antagonism cannot and should not be explored on voir dire. Perhaps 
the question was not as artfully composed as it might have been, but the subject 
of a singular issue of defense was perhaps a major responsibility of defending 
under the factual circumstances evidenced in this case. The whole field of the 
abused-wife syndrome, physical-violence proclivities, and retreat-to-the-wall 
criteria are inseparably invoked in the constitutional-fairness requirement of 
the individual juror.12

[¶73.]  I would adopt the carefully stated and 
specifically applicable constitutional analysis in a current opinion of the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, King v. Lynaugh, 828 F.2d 257, 259 (5th Cir. 
1987):

"The right to an 
impartial jury is basic to our system of justice. This right carries with it the 
concomitant right to take reasonable steps designed to ensure that a jury is 
impartial. Perhaps the most important device to serve this end is the jury 
challenge, a device based on voir dire examination. Although the proper scope of 
voir dire is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court, that 
discretion is not unfettered. Limits on voir dire that create an unreasonable 
risk of bias or prejudice infecting the trial process violate due 
process."

[¶74.]  I would reverse for a proper, fair, and 
reasonable trial, with improper evidence excluded. It is not only possible, but 
highly likely, that upon retrial, a Frias v. State, supra, result would be 
achieved by second-proceeding jury acquittal.

FOOTNOTES

1 In the pejorative attack 
on the character of defendant by rewritten majority opinion, one could discern 
the direction used to attempt essentially to eviscerate the adjudicative 
validity of the dissenting opinion. This writer remains persuaded that rewriting 
majority opinions in response to dissents is constructionally unproductive. 
Consequently, the dissent will not be rewritten to respond to the conclusory 
characterizations which intertwine legal analysis in present majority 
dissertation. Temptation, albeit fortuitously suppressed, exists to attach the 
original opinion by footnote or appendices so that communicative validity in the 
course of dialog could be preserved. However, nothing we now do, in rational 
assessment that none of the participants were angelic and that defendant acted 
rather predictably to the uncontrolled bad-temper conduct of decedent, as now 
followed by critique of the adequacy of process and representation, to be 
emotionally weighed by juristic fact conflict, will afford future precedential 
domination in legal rules and standards to be derived from this tragic 
episode.

I would only conclude, 
after the editing process of the court's opinion now achieved, that the court's 
contention of nonexistent wife abuse is not sustainable from the police-call 
records, evidenced physical injury to defendant, written separation agreements, 
or the entire trial transcript as evidencing a course of wife abuse which was a 
substantial feature of defense. Confirming these established facts were the two 
separation agreements, one of May, 1985, and the second of July, 1985, as 
somewhat restated in the second edition, providing:

"2. That HUSBAND agrees 
not to contact, harass, or interfere with WIFE in any manner until he has 
obtained psychological counseling and until such time as the treating 
psychologist states that HUSBAND'S emotional state is substantially more stable 
than now and is of no harm to WIFE. HUSBAND agrees not to verbally or physically 
threaten WIFE." (Emphasis added.) Agreement signed May 14, 1985.

Not choosing to rewrite 
this dissent in further factual response, I leave this case to litigants in 
rehearing request for argument about the facts, or to legal scholars for 
historical analysis. A fair current example is found in Johann and Osanka, "I 
Didn't Mean to Kill Him", Barrister (Fall 1987) at 18:

"Women are abused by spouses. Women do kill their men. And lawyers must 
defend them, and must understand society and today's criminal justice 
system,"

and I would add: 
within which scenario appellate courts and their individual members are only 
participatory functionaries.

2 "Right of accused to 
defend.

"In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to defend in person and by 
counsel, * * *." Article 1, § 10, Wyoming Constitution.

"Self-incrimination; 
jeopardy.

"No person shall 
be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case, * * *." Article 1, 
§ 11, Wyoming 
Constitution.

3 The Miranda form used 
contained the following information:

"LOVELL POLICE 
DEPARTMENT

"Lovell, Wyo.

"YOUR RIGHTS

"PLACE Lovell, Wyoming

"DATE 1-26-86

"TIME 11:24 
A.M.

"Before we ask you any questions, you must 
understand your rights.

"You have the right to 
remain silent.

"Anything you say may be 
used against you in court.

"You have the right to 
talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have him with 
you during questioning.

"If you cannot afford a 
lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning, if you 
wish.

"If you decide to answer 
questions now without a lawyer present, you still have the right to stop 
answering at any time.

"You also have the right 
to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.

"WAIVER OF 
RIGHTS

"I have read this 
statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make 
a statement and answer questions. I do 
not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No 
promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind 
has been used against me.

"Detaining Officer: . . . 
. 

Signed: /s/ Carol 
Griffin

"Witness # 1: /s/ Thomas 
Irwin 

Time: 11:27 A.M. Date 
Jan. 26, 1986

"Witness # 2: . . . . 

Address 
P.O. Box 733 

Cowley, WY 82420" 
(Emphasis added.)

4 The attorney who had 
represented Mrs. Griffin in the litigative involvements of the marital problems 
with decedent was Kenneth Koski from Powell, with an office in Lovell, and the 
attorney who had represented decedent was L.R. Garrett, from Lovell. 
Consequently, no benefit was served in leaving Lovell to go to Basin in order to 
contact counsel.

5 It belies the power of 
contemplation why an arresting officer in a murder case in Lovell would leave 
the individual to whom he had promised a right to call an attorney so that he 
could "interview another witness" in an apparent disassociated situation. 
Unfortunately, this record does not define, through either sharply directed 
motion in limine or suppression proceedings by detailed cross-examination, 
information which could possibly dispel the obvious skepticism engendered from 
this appeal record.

It is particularly 
curious that having asked for an attorney on the way to Lovell and then being 
detained on an apparent subterfuge, the Miranda warning was first given and then 
the arresting officer left the room to pursue the other duties for the next 
hour. The only possible purpose of the Miranda warning was to initiate and 
validate what happened - a conversation which might contain incriminating 
content.

It is also curious that 
the two officers were unable to observe any particular alcoholic influence or 
shock-related mental disturbance, even though some two hours later Mrs. Griffin 
still registered a blood-alcohol content of .23 percent.

6 In May, 1985, the 
parties admitted the domestic intranquility. Agreement was made wherein it was 
recognized that they were not living together, and for a 60-day period the 
husband agreed not to "contact, harass, or interfere with WIFE" or "to verbally 
or physically threaten WIFE." Events seemed to have improved during that period. 
When the agreement ended, the problems restarted, and a similar agreement was 
entered into July 24, 1985, for an additional 90 days. After expiration of that 
period, the problems recommenced in full fury until the separation on December 
22, 1985 which would have ended on January 27, 1986 by the return of decedent to 
the trailer house owned by Mrs. Griffin, except that one day earlier, when he 
barged into the residential unit, his return was untimely ended. On January 9, 
1986, he had written a painstakingly detailed request to be permitted to return 
and resume the marital relationship. Unquestionably he was a man of uncontrolled 
urges and violence in the classical mode of the physically abusive and 
wife-injuring husband. The case is also classic in the finally-too-much standard 
of the abused-wife homicide case, except here the husband was not in a mutually 
occupied residence when killed, and consequently the break-in and terrorizing 
attribute was added to the only too-frequently displayed societal 
panorama.

7 The series of events 
would be as clearly paraphrased in her intent in the statement, "I am not going 
to be beat up again. Stop or I will shoot you." He did not; she did.

8 Factually, we have a big 
male bully bursting into the residence of the separated, small wife, knowing she 
had been drinking and that she had recently purchased a firearm with which she 
was not familiar. A medal for the resulting disaster may not be appropriate, but 
neither was penitentiary confinement of the attacked and defensive female. 
Negligently, intentionally, or in pursuit of uncontrolled temper, the decedent 
suicidally approached. Whether fairly defined or not, decedent asked for what he 
got, and other bullyboys and woman-beaters, should be forewarned. The converse 
of this is found in Ramirez v. State, Wyo., 739 P.2d 1214 (1987), where the female 
was not killed, and the male went to prison for a long term. Specific attention 
is also directed to Cutbirth v. State, Wyo., 663 P.2d 888 (1983), where the abused 
wife was killed.

9 An exhaustive and 
specific analysis of this trial requirement is presented in an excellent 
treatise by the National Jury Project, Inc., Jurywork, Systematic Techniques (2d 
ed. 1986):

"Systematic jurywork is 
an overall approach to trial preparation for any jury trial. Two general 
premises underlie this approach.

"First, the trial team 
can and should concern itself with structural issues in the jury system and the 
jury selection process. Issues such as the procedures employed for conducting 
voir dire and empanelling juries, the manner in which peremptory challenges are 
used, and the extent to which jury pools are representative affect the fairness 
of an individual trial, and thus, every case that goes to trial.

"The second premise in 
this approach is that the conduct of an effective voir dire and the selection of 
a jury best suited to hear a particular case require that the perspectives 
jurors bring to the courtroom be integrated into the process of trial 
preparation for a case. If trial preparation includes careful examination of the 
witnesses, evidence, and jury instructions; concerted efforts to identify 
possible juror reactions to that material; and systematic analysis of the 
reasons that different jurors might react differently to the same evidence and 
argument, a case presentation can be developed that will be well received by 
jurors who have been carefully chosen for their ability to hear a particular 
case." Id., § 
1.01 Introduction, at 1-1.

10 Rule 25, W.R.Cr.P. 
states in pertinent part:

"(a) Examination of 
jurors. - The parties, or their attorneys, may conduct the examination of 
prospective jurors, but such examination shall be under the supervision and 
control of the court, and the court may itself conduct such further examination 
as it deems proper."

Rule 701, 
Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming 
states:

"(a) The only purpose of 
voir dire is to select a panel of jurors who will fairly and impartially hear 
the evidence and render a just verdict.

"(b) The court shall not 
permit counsel to attempt to precondition prospective jurors to a particular 
result, comment on the personal lives and families of the parties or their 
attorneys, nor question jurors concerning the pleadings, the law, the meaning of 
words, or the comfort of jurors.

"(c) The court may 
inquire of the prospective jurors.

"(d) In voir dire 
examination counsel shall not:

"(1) Ask questions of an 
individual juror that can be asked collectively;

"(2) Ask questions 
answered in a juror questionnaire except to explore some answer in greater 
depth;

"(3) Repeat a question 
asked and answered;

"(4) Instruct the jury on 
the law or argue the case;

"(5) Ask a juror what his 
verdict might be under any hypothetical.

"(e) The court may assume 
voir dire if counsel fails to follow this rule. If the court assumes the voir 
dire, it may permit counsel to submit questions in writing."

11 See Bailey and 
Rothblatt, Successful Techniques for Criminal Trials, § 6:19 Compelling the 
prosecutor to disclose his witnesses, at 175 (2d ed. 1985).

12 The obvious problem on 
this record is that Creese also was not included among the final jury 
membership, although it may be, but is not, determinable that the 
peremptory-challenge removal was required of defendant, then causing appellant 
to retain another undesired member on the jury.