Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Lawrence F. Pitts

Citation: 2007 WI 112

Docket Number: 2005AP002925-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 112 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2925-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Lawrence F. Pitts, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Lawrence F. Pitts, 
          Respondent.   
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST PITTS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 27, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
2007 WI 112
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2925-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Lawrence F. Pitts, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Lawrence F. Pitts, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 27, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the referee's recommendation 
that the license of Attorney Lawrence F. Pitts to practice law 
in this state be suspended for a period of six months due to his 
professional misconduct.   
¶2 
Prior to addressing the merits of this disciplinary 
proceeding, we consider a procedural issue regarding the effect, 
if any, of a medical incapacity stipulation signed by only 
Attorney Pitts and sent to the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
2 
 
only 
after 
the 
issuance 
of 
the 
referee's 
report 
and 
recommendation.   
¶3 
The OLR filed a ten-count complaint against Attorney 
Pitts in November 2005.  According to the record of the 
proceedings before the referee, the OLR filed two motions for 
default due to Attorney Pitts' failure to file an answer to the 
complaint.  Although the time for filing an answer had expired, 
the referee twice issued orders to Attorney Pitts directing him 
to file an answer.  After the second such order, Attorney Pitts 
did fax an unsigned copy of an answer to the attorney for the 
OLR.  Attorney Pitts, however, never signed the answer and never 
filed it with the clerk of this court or the referee.  Thus, no 
valid answer was ever filed. 
¶4 
The referee did not rule on the default motions 
apparently due to ongoing discussions between the OLR and 
Attorney Pitts about the possible filing of a petition for 
consensual revocation pursuant to SCR 22.19(1) and (2)1 or a 
medical 
incapacity 
stipulation 
pursuant 
to 
SCR 
22.16(4).2  
                                                 
1 SCR 22.19(1) and (2) provides:  Petition for consensual 
license revocation. 
 
(1) An attorney who is the subject of an 
investigation 
for 
possible 
misconduct 
or 
the 
respondent in a proceeding may file with the supreme 
court a petition for the revocation by consent or 
[sic] his or her license to practice law. 
 
(2) The petition shall state that the petitioner 
cannot successfully defend against the allegations of 
misconduct. 
2 SCR 22.16(4) provides:  Proceedings before a referee. 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
3 
 
Indeed, although the counsel for the OLR sent a proposed medical 
incapacity stipulation to Attorney Pitts in both November and 
December 2006, Attorney Pitts did not return a signed copy to 
the OLR.   
¶5 
Since no stipulation had been received by the OLR or 
filed with the referee, the OLR once again renewed its motion 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(4)(a) If in the course of the proceeding the 
respondent claims to have a medical incapacity that 
makes the defense of the proceeding impossible, the 
referee shall conduct a hearing and make findings 
concerning whether a medical incapacity makes defense 
of the proceeding impossible.  The referee may order 
the examination of the respondent by qualified medical 
or psychological experts. 
 
(b) All 
papers, 
files, 
transcripts, 
communications, 
and proceedings on the issue of 
medical incapacity shall be confidential and shall 
remain confidential until the supreme court has issued 
an order suspending the attorney's license to practice 
law, or has otherwise authorized disclosure. 
 
(c) If the referee finds no medical incapacity 
that 
would 
make 
the 
defense 
of 
the 
proceeding 
impossible, 
the 
referee 
shall 
proceed 
with 
the 
misconduct action. 
 
(d) If 
the 
referee 
finds 
that 
a 
medical 
incapacity 
makes 
the 
defense 
of 
the 
proceeding 
impossible, the referee shall file a report promptly 
with the supreme court.  If the court disapproves the 
referee's finding, the court shall direct the referee 
to proceed with the misconduct action.  If the court 
approves the referee's finding, the court shall abate 
the misconduct proceeding and suspend the respondent's 
license to practice law for medical incapacity until 
the court orders reinstatement of the attorney's 
license under SCR 22.36.  Upon reinstatement, the 
court shall direct the referee to proceed with the 
misconduct action. 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
4 
 
for the entry of a default against Attorney Pitts.  On 
February 5, 2007, the referee, Attorney Norman C. Anderson, 
granted the motion and entered findings of fact and conclusions 
of law based on the allegations of the complaint.  The referee 
recommended that the license of Attorney Pitts to practice law 
in this state be suspended for a period of six months.  The 
referee 
also 
recommended 
that 
as 
a 
condition 
of 
the 
reinstatement of his license, Attorney Pitts be required to 
create an office management and business plan establishing a 
daily calendar, appropriate trust account records, and an 
appropriate billing and filing system.  The referee further 
recommended that Attorney Pitts be required to submit copies of 
his client trust account records to the OLR on a quarterly basis 
for a period of two years if his license is reinstated.  
Finally, the referee recommended that Attorney Pitts be required 
to pay the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding. 
¶6 
No appeal of the referee's report and recommendation 
was filed.  On May 7, 2007, Attorney Pitts filed a letter with 
the clerk of this court.  According to the letter, Attorney 
Pitts had been traveling a great deal in his motor home and had 
only recently received some of his mail.  He claimed that he had 
not seen the referee's report and recommendation, although his 
reference to it acknowledged that he knew of its existence.  
Attorney Pitts' letter claimed that the only way he could be 
reached was to call his cell phone.  The letter gave no new 
address to which filings should be mailed.  The letter also 
claimed that while he had been in Madison earlier in 2007, 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
5 
 
Attorney Pitts had given a copy of the medical incapacity 
stipulation to a friend to mail to the OLR, although the OLR is 
also located in Madison.  The letter indicated that Attorney 
Pitts was now heading back out on the road "full time" with an 
expectation that at some point he would end up in Alaska. 
¶7 
On May 8, 2007, the OLR filed a letter attaching a 
copy of an SCR 22.16(4) medical incapacity stipulation that had 
been signed by Attorney Pitts.  The letter indicated that 
although a proposed stipulation had been sent to Attorney Pitts 
in 2006 and although Attorney Pitts had promised on January 10, 
2007, to return a signed stipulation to the OLR by the following 
Monday, the OLR did not receive the stipulation until May 2, 
2007, nearly three months after the referee found Attorney Pitts 
to be in default and filed his report and recommendation.  
Although the OLR provided the stipulation signed by Attorney 
Pitts to the court for its consideration, the OLR did not sign 
the stipulation and requested that the court disregard it as 
untimely. 
¶8 
We are thus faced with the question whether to proceed 
with the review of the referee's report and recommendation for 
the imposition of discipline or to accept an SCR 22.16(4) 
stipulation that has not been executed by the OLR and was not 
returned to the OLR until well after the filing of the referee's 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
6 
 
report.  We determine that the stipulation is untimely and 
therefore will not be considered by this court.3   
¶9 
Although the stipulation attached to the OLR's May 8, 
2007 letter indicates that Attorney Pitts has been suffering 
from health problems for a number of years and contains a 
reference to a doctor's opinion that Attorney Pitts' condition 
renders him unable to practice law safely at this point in time, 
we cannot excuse his continued delay in this proceeding.  
According to his letter filed May 7, Attorney Pitts had the 
necessary ability to drive his motor home from New Mexico to 
Wisconsin earlier this year and planned to drive it from 
Wisconsin to Alaska.  He was even in Madison for a period of 
time earlier in the year.  It is therefore clear from his letter 
that he was not incapacitated such that he could not file 
documents with the referee or this court.  He had the ability to 
file a motion requesting an extension of time if necessary.  
Nonetheless, he failed to ensure that the stipulation was 
received by the OLR, executed by the OLR, and filed with the 
court.   
                                                 
3 It should be noted that under SCR 22.16(4)(d), even if the 
court accepts a medical incapacity stipulation, the pending 
disciplinary proceeding is only abated, but not dismissed while 
the attorney's license is suspended during the incapacity.  If 
the attorney subsequently seeks and is granted reinstatement, 
the disciplinary proceeding against the attorney is also 
reinstated.  Thus, in any event, Attorney Pitts would have to 
face discipline for any professional misconduct in which he 
engaged. 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
7 
 
¶10 The referee and this court cannot be expected to wait 
for months without receiving correspondence or formal motions as 
to the defense of the ongoing proceedings.  Attorney Pitts' 
conduct exhibits an indifference to the rules of this court 
governing attorney disciplinary proceedings.  Even after he was 
aware that the referee had filed a report and recommendation, he 
did not take steps to learn of its contents and file an appeal, 
if he believed one to be necessary.  Consequently, we determine 
that his mailing of an SCR 22.16(4) stipulation to the OLR after 
the referee had already issued a report and recommendation is of 
no legal effect and does not preclude us from reviewing the 
referee's report pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).4 
¶11 We now turn to that review.  When we review a 
referee's report and recommendation, we affirm the referee's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 243, 
562 N.W.2d 137 (1997).  We review the referee's conclusions of 
law, however, on a de novo basis.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 
636 N.W.2d 718.  Finally, we determine the appropriate level of 
                                                 
4 SCR 22.17(2) provides:  Review; appeal. 
 
(2) If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme 
court shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject 
or modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
8 
 
discipline, independent of the referee's recommendation.  See In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.  
¶12 According to the referee's report, which incorporated 
the factual allegations of the OLR's complaint, Attorney Pitts 
was admitted to the practice of law in Wisconsin in January 
1996.   
¶13 Counts 1—3 relate to Attorney Pitts' representation of 
S.M. in a personal injury matter resulting from an alleged slip 
and fall in an apartment complex.  S.M. executed a contingency 
fee agreement and an authorization form allowing Attorney Pitts 
to obtain his records and to speak on his behalf.  Because S.M. 
did not speak English, Attorney Pitts communicated directly only 
with S.M.'s wife, O.M., although Attorney Pitts apparently spoke 
with her only on one occasion, when she went in person to his 
office.  Other than that conversation, in which Attorney Pitts 
claimed he was waiting for a settlement offer, Attorney Pitts' 
paralegal handled all communications with S.M. and O.M. 
¶14 After Attorney Pitts reviewed S.M.'s medical records 
in the fall of 1999, the paralegal prepared a draft demand 
letter to Society Insurance (Society), the insurer of the 
apartment complex, and sent the draft to S.M. and O.M. for their 
review.  In January 2000, the paralegal drafted a second demand 
letter, offering to settle the matter for $25,000.  Society 
never received any such demand letter. 
¶15 In October 2000, Attorney Pitts made his first contact 
with Society by faxing a settlement letter.  Society responded 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
9 
 
that it had reviewed the matter and had determined that it had 
no liability because there had been no actual or constructive 
knowledge of the defect alleged by S.M.  Society also enclosed a 
copy of O.M.'s recorded statement from September 1998.  Attorney 
Pitts did not contact Society in response to its letter. 
¶16 In February 2001, Society contacted Attorney Pitts 
about the status of his review of the matter.  Attorney Pitts 
told Society that he had been ill and would respond within 90 
days.  In March 2001, Attorney Pitts informed Society that he 
could not find the materials it had sent in October 2000 and 
asked Society to send those materials again, which Society did.  
Society's March 2001 communication reiterated its position of no 
liability and asked Attorney Pitts to respond after he had 
reviewed the information.  Attorney Pitts never contacted 
Society again. 
¶17 The statute of limitations on any claim by S.M. 
subsequently expired and Society closed its file on the matter.  
In October 2001, O.M. filed a grievance with the OLR, alleging 
that Attorney Pitts had not pursued S.M.'s claim and had not 
informed them of the expiration of the statute of limitations. 
¶18 In his response to S.M. and O.M.'s grievance, Attorney 
Pitts told the OLR that he had met with S.M. and O.M. in 
December 1999 and had informed them that he did not believe they 
had a valid claim, advising them to contact another attorney.  
Attorney Pitts also claimed that he had informed Society in 
December 1999 that he would not pursue a claim on behalf of S.M. 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
10 
 
¶19 Attorney Pitts also told the OLR that he had spoken 
with S.M. and O.M. by telephone in August 2001 and informed them 
that they would have to file a legal action before the 
expiration of the statute of limitations.  Attorney Pitts 
asserted that his paralegal had apparently filed a claim with 
Society on behalf of S.M. without his knowledge. 
¶20 Attorney 
Pitts' 
statements 
to 
the 
OLR 
were 
contradicted by Society's records, which showed that it had 
written or telephonic contact with Attorney Pitts in October 
2000, February 2001, and March 2001.  In addition, Attorney 
Pitts' paralegal had Attorney Pitts review a draft demand letter 
on behalf of S.M. 
¶21 Based on these facts, the referee concluded that by 
failing to pursue S.M.'s claim diligently and by allowing the 
statute of limitations to expire, Attorney Pitts had failed to 
act with reasonable diligence and promptness, contrary to SCR 
20:1.3.5  The referee also concluded that Attorney Pitts had 
failed to keep his client reasonably informed about the status 
of the matter, in violation of SCR 20:1.4(a).6  Additionally, the 
referee 
determined 
that 
Attorney 
Pitts 
had 
made 
                                                 
5 SCR 20:1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
6 SCR 20:1.4(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall keep a 
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and 
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information." 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
11 
 
misrepresentations to the OLR, thereby violating SCR 22.03(6)7 
and SCR 20:8.4(f).8 
¶22 Counts 4—7 relate to Attorney Pitts' representation of 
D.H. in a divorce proceeding.  When D.H. paid Attorney Pitts an 
initial $1000 retainer in May 2000, Attorney Pitts informed her 
that she would receive regular billing statements for his legal 
services.  Attorney Pitts did not deposit the initial retainer, 
however, until October 10, 2000.  On that date, Attorney Pitts 
disbursed the entire retainer to his business account as payment 
for legal services already rendered, although he had not sent 
any bills to D.H. 
¶23 The judgment in the divorce matter was filed on 
June 11, 2001.  Pursuant to the judgment, D.H.'s ex-husband was 
to make a property equalization payment in excess of $5000.  A 
dispute arose concerning this payment due to damages to the 
marital home that D.H. had allegedly caused.  Opposing counsel 
sent a letter to Attorney Pitts concerning a reduction of the 
equalization payment based on an estimate of the needed repairs 
due to this damage.  Opposing counsel also enclosed a check in 
                                                 
7 SCR 22.03(6) provides that "[i]n the course of the 
investigation, 
the 
respondent's wilful failure to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance." 
8 SCR 20:8.4(f) states that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers." 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
12 
 
the amount of $439.36 as an initial deposit toward the 
equalization payment.  Attorney Pitts did not deposit the 
$439.36 check into his client trust account or inform D.H. that 
he had received it.  He later claimed that his office had 
accidentally shredded the check. 
¶24 The 
circuit 
court 
subsequently 
reduced 
the 
equalization payment to be made by D.H.'s ex-husband to $2365.  
A check in that amount made payable to Attorney Lawrence Pitts 
Trust Account was received by Attorney Pitts.  He did not 
immediately deposit the money into his client trust account or 
notify D.H. of his receipt of the payment. 
¶25 On July 30, 2001, a couple of days after Attorney 
Pitts received the check, D.H. went to Attorney Pitts' office.  
Attorney Pitts informed D.H. that the entire amount of the 
property 
equalization 
payment 
would 
be 
applied 
to 
his 
outstanding balance for legal services.  Prior to this time, 
Attorney Pitts had not informed D.H. that her initial $1000 
retainer had been exhausted or that she owed Attorney Pitts 
additional money.  No billings or accountings had been sent to 
her. 
¶26 D.H. 
told 
Attorney 
Pitts 
that 
she 
needed 
the 
equalization payment for her living expenses.  She also 
requested a billing statement showing Attorney Pitts' services 
on her behalf. 
¶27 Attorney Pitts then "loaned" $1000 to D.H. out of the 
equalization payment and applied the rest toward her outstanding 
balance.  D.H. was informed that she needed to make monthly 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
13 
 
payments toward her outstanding bill and the loan.  Attorney 
Pitts did not inform D.H. of her right to seek the advice of 
independent counsel prior to agreeing to the loan, reduce the 
loan agreement to writing, or obtain D.H.'s written consent to 
the loan. 
¶28 Although Attorney Pitts wrote a check drawn on his 
trust account for $1000 to D.H. for the loan on July 30, 2001, 
there were no funds belonging to her in the trust account at 
that time.  Attorney Pitts did not deposit the $2365 check for 
the equalization payment into his client trust account until 
August 1, 2001.  On that date, Attorney Pitts also wrote a trust 
account check to his law office for $2365, thereby converting 
D.H.'s money.9 
¶29 D.H. eventually filed a grievance with the OLR, and 
Attorney Pitts filed an initial response to the grievance.  The 
OLR then reviewed Attorney Pitts' trust account records.  
Because of additional concerns it had, the OLR requested 
Attorney Pitts to appear personally as well as to produce 
records relating to the D.H. representation and additional 
records concerning his client trust account.  After multiple 
delays, Attorney Pitts did appear before the OLR in May 2004, 
but failed to produce the requested records concerning the D.H. 
representation and some of the requested client trust account 
                                                 
9 When the OLR subsequently reviewed Attorney Pitts' trust 
account records for this time period, it discovered that 
Attorney Pitts had also written a trust account check for $1029 
to the Brown County Animal Hospital to pay for personal 
veterinary services. 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
14 
 
records.  The OLR made additional requests for the D.H. 
documents, but Attorney Pitts never produced them.  Although 
Attorney Pitts did produce some further trust account records, 
those records were incomplete and he never produced all of the 
trust account records requested by the OLR. 
¶30 The referee concluded that Attorney Pitts had violated 
SCR 20:1.8(a),10 when he entered into a loan transaction with 
D.H. without giving her a reasonable opportunity to seek the 
advice of independent counsel, reducing the loan agreement to 
writing, or obtaining her written consent to the loan.  The 
referee also determined that Attorney Pitts had failed to notify 
his client of the receipt of the equalization payment and to 
deliver such funds promptly to his client, in violation of 
                                                 
10 SCR 20:1.8(a) provides: Conflict of interest: prohibited 
transactions. 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business 
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an 
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary 
interest adverse to a client unless: 
 
(1) the transaction and terms on which the 
lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable 
to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted 
in writing to the client in a manner which can be 
reasonably understood by the client; 
 
(2) the 
client 
is 
given 
a 
reasonable 
opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel 
in the transaction; and 
 
(3) the client consents in writing thereto. 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
15 
 
former SCR 20:1.15(b).11  Further, Attorney Pitts' actions in 
disbursing 
out 
of 
his 
client 
trust 
account 
the 
$2365 
equalization payment to himself and the $1029 payment for 
personal 
veterinary 
services 
had 
violated 
former 
SCR 
20:1.15(a).12  In addition, the referee concluded that Attorney 
                                                 
11 Former SCR 20:1.15 applies to misconduct committed prior 
to July 1, 2004.  Former SCR 20:1.15(b) provides: Safekeeping 
property. 
 
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in 
which a client or third person has an interest, a 
lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third 
person in writing.  Except as stated in this rule or 
otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the 
client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client 
or third person any funds or other property that the 
client or third person is entitled to receive and, 
upon request by the client or third person, shall 
render a full accounting regarding such property. 
12 Former SCR 20:1.15(a) provides: Safekeeping property. 
 
(a) A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from 
the lawyer's own property, that property of clients 
and third persons that is in the lawyer's possession 
in connection with a representation or when acting in 
a fiduciary capacity.  Funds held in connection with a 
representation or in a fiduciary capacity include 
funds held as trustee, agent, guardian, personal 
representative of an estate, or otherwise.  All funds 
of clients and third persons paid to a lawyer or law 
firm shall be deposited in one or more identifiable 
trust accounts as provided in paragraph (c).  The 
trust account shall be maintained in a bank, savings 
bank, trust company, credit union, savings and loan 
association or other investment institution authorized 
to do business and located in Wisconsin.  The trust 
account shall be clearly designated as "Client's 
Account" or "Trust Account" or words of similar 
import.  No funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm, 
except funds reasonably sufficient to pay or avoid 
imposition 
of 
account 
service 
charges, 
may 
be 
deposited in such an account.  Unless the client 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
16 
 
Pitts had failed to fully and fairly disclose to the OLR the 
facts and circumstances concerning the D.H. grievance and to 
cooperate with the OLR's investigation of that grievance, 
contrary to SCR 21.15(4),13 SCR 22.03(2),14 SCR 22.03(6), and SCR 
20:8.4(f). 
                                                                                                                                                             
otherwise directs in writing, securities in bearer 
form shall be kept by the attorney in a safe deposit 
box in a bank, savings bank, trust company, credit 
union, 
savings 
and 
loan 
association 
or 
other 
investment institution authorized to do business and 
located in Wisconsin.  The safe deposit box shall be 
clearly designated as "Client's Account" or "Trust 
Account" or words of similar import.  Other property 
of a client or third person shall be identified as 
such and appropriately safeguarded.  If a lawyer also 
licensed in another state is entrusted with funds or 
property 
in 
connection 
with 
an 
out-of-state 
representation, this provision shall not supersede the 
trust account rules of the other state. 
13 SCR 21.15(4) provides:  Duties of attorneys. 
 
(4) Every attorney shall cooperate with the 
office of lawyer regulation in the investigation, 
prosecution and disposition of grievances, complaints 
filed with or by the director, and petitions for 
reinstatement. 
 An attorney's wilful failure to 
cooperate 
with 
the 
office 
of 
lawyer 
regulation 
constitutes violation of the rules of professional 
conduct for attorneys. 
14 SCR 22.03(2) provides:  Investigation. 
 
(2) 
Upon 
commencing 
an 
investigation, 
the 
director shall notify the respondent of the matter 
being investigated unless in the opinion of the 
director the investigation of the matter requires 
otherwise.  The respondent shall fully and fairly 
disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served 
by ordinary mail a request for a written response.  
The director may allow additional time to respond.  
Following receipt of the response, the director may 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
17 
 
¶31 After Attorney Pitts' bank reported an overdraft in 
his client trust account in August 2002, the OLR audited the 
account.  It discovered that the account had a balance on May 6, 
2002, of $7346.70, the ownership of approximately $5000 of which 
was unknown.  The OLR also found that Attorney Pitts had failed 
to maintain proper records for his client trust account, 
including records showing deposits into the account, subsidiary 
ledgers for individual clients, monthly schedules of each 
client's account, monthly balances, monthly reconciliations, and 
cancelled checks.  The OLR's audit also revealed that Attorney 
Pitts had disbursed a $10,000 trust account check to himself 
when at least $4600 of those funds belonged to identifiable 
clients or third parties.  Although Attorney Pitts claimed that 
the $10,000 check went to Moose Charities and resulted from 
funds he had privately raised for that entity, the OLR 
determined that all of the funds, with the exception of a $368 
payment to Moose Charities, were used by Attorney Pitts for 
personal expenses.  When Attorney Pitts subsequently wrote a 
$1000 trust account check to Moose Charities, at least $764 of 
that amount belonged to other clients or third parties.  
Attorney Pitts' actions resulted in overdrafts of the trust 
account when trust account checks payable to other clients were 
presented for payment.  Although Attorney Pitts did not maintain 
                                                                                                                                                             
conduct further investigation and may compel the 
respondent to answer questions, furnish documents, and 
present 
any 
information 
deemed 
relevant 
to 
the 
investigation. 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
18 
 
proper 
records 
concerning 
his 
trust 
account, 
he 
falsely 
certified in his fiscal 2001 state bar dues statement that he 
was in compliance with each of the trust account record-keeping 
requirements in former SCR 20:1.15(e).15   
¶32 With respect to Attorney Pitts' trust account, the 
referee concluded that Attorney Pitts' $10,000 disbursement to 
himself, which had converted at least $4606.11 in funds 
belonging to clients or third persons, had violated former SCR 
                                                 
15 Former SCR 20:1.15(e) provided:  Safekeeping property. 
 
(e) Complete records of trust account funds and 
other trust property shall be kept by the lawyer and 
shall be preserved for a period of at least six years 
after termination of the representation.  Complete 
records shall include: (i) a cash receipts journal, 
listing the sources and date of each receipt, (ii) a 
disbursements journal, listing the date and payee of 
each disbursement, with all disbursements being paid 
by check, (iii) a subsidiary ledger containing a 
separate page for each person or company for whom 
funds have been received in trust, showing the date 
and amount of each receipt, the date and amount of 
each disbursement, and any unexpended balance, (iv) a 
monthly schedule of the subsidiary ledger, indicating 
the balance of each client's account at the end of 
each month, (v) a determination of the cash balance 
(checkbook balance) at the end of each month, taken 
from the cash receipts and cash disbursement journals 
and a reconciliation of the cash balance (checkbook 
balance) with the balance indicated in the bank 
statement, and (vi) monthly statements, including 
canceled 
checks, 
vouchers 
or 
share 
drafts, 
and 
duplicate deposit slips.  A record of all property 
other than cash which is held in trust for clients or 
third persons, as required by paragraph (a) hereof, 
shall also be maintained.  All trust account records 
shall be deemed to have public aspects as related to 
the lawyer's fitness to practice. 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
19 
 
20:1.15(a).  The referee also found that Attorney Pitts had 
failed to maintain complete trust account records, contrary to 
former SCR 20:1.15(e).  Finally, the referee determined that 
Attorney Pitts had filed a false certification with the state 
bar, in violation of former SCR 20:1.15(g).16 
¶33 In light of the professional misconduct found by the 
referee, he recommended that Attorney Pitts' license to practice 
law in Wisconsin be suspended for a period of six months.  He 
also adopted the OLR's recommendation that this court condition 
the reinstatement of Attorney Pitts' license on his creation of 
                                                 
16 Former SCR 20:1.15(g) provided: Safekeeping property. 
 
(g) A member of the State Bar of Wisconsin shall 
file with the State Bar annually, with payment of the 
member's State Bar dues or upon such other date as 
approved by the Supreme Court, a certificate stating 
whether the member is engaged in the private practice 
of law in Wisconsin and, if so, the name of each bank, 
trust company, credit union or savings and loan 
association in which the member maintains a trust 
account, safe deposit box, or both, as required by 
this section.  Each member shall explicitly certify 
therein that he or she has complied with each of the 
record-keeping requirements set forth in paragraph (e) 
hereof. 
 
A 
partnership 
or 
professional 
legal 
corporation may file one certificate on behalf of its 
partners, associates, or officers who are required to 
file under this section.  The failure of a member to 
file the certificate required by this section is 
grounds for automatic suspension of the member's 
membership in the State Bar in the same manner as 
provided in SCR 10.03(6) for nonpayment of dues.  The 
filing of 
a 
false certificate is unprofessional 
conduct and is grounds for disciplinary action.  The 
State Bar shall supply to each member, with the annual 
dues statement or at such other time as directed by 
the Supreme Court, a form on which the certification 
must be made and a copy of this rule. 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
20 
 
an office management and business plan establishing a daily 
calendar, proper trust account records, and an appropriate 
billing and filing system, with a requirement that Attorney 
Pitts submit copies of his client trust account records to the 
OLR on a quarterly basis for two years after reinstatement.  The 
referee further indicated that Attorney Pitts should be assessed 
the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding. 
¶34 We affirm the referee's entry of a default in this 
case and adopt the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law.  As recommended by the referee, we conclude that Attorney 
Pitts' license to practice law in this state should be suspended 
for six months.  We further agree with the reinstatement 
conditions recommended by the referee.  Finally, we determine 
that Attorney Pitts should be required to pay the costs of this 
disciplinary proceeding, which were $2495.98 as of February 23, 
2007. 
¶35 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Attorney Lawrence F. 
Pitts to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 
six months, effective August 31, 2007. 
¶36 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Attorney Lawrence F. Pitts shall pay to the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If 
the costs are not paid within the time specified and absent a 
showing to this court of his inability to pay those costs within 
that time, the license of Attorney Pitts to practice law in 
Wisconsin shall remain suspended until further order of the 
court. 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
21 
 
¶37 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that reinstatement of Attorney 
Pitts' license to practice law in Wisconsin is conditioned on 
the following requirements: (1) his creation of an office 
management and business plan establishing a daily calendar, 
appropriate client trust account records, and an appropriate 
billing and filing system; and (2) his furnishing of his client 
trust account records to the Office of Lawyer Regulation on a 
quarterly 
basis 
for 
a 
period 
of 
two 
years 
following 
reinstatement. 
¶38 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if he has not already done 
so, Attorney Lawrence F. Pitts shall comply with the provisions 
of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose license to 
practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended. 
 
No. 
2005AP2925-D   
 
 
 
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