Case Title: Brown v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 79, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-09-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WINFRED O. BROWN, SR., 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 79, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID. 03605001486 
§   
§ 
 
Submitted:  July 19, 2006 
Decided:  September 22, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and JACOBS, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
 
This 22nd day of September 2006, after careful consideration of 
appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to affirm, and the record below, 
it appears to the Court that: 
(1)  
The appellant, Winfred O. Brown, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief.  The 
State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s judgment on 
the ground that it is manifest on the face of Brown’s opening brief that the 
appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
The record reflects that Brown pled guilty in February 2004 to 
one count of trafficking in cocaine and one count of possession of a firearm 
 
2
during the commission of a felony.  In exchange for his guilty plea, the State 
dismissed twelve other charges against him. The Superior Court sentenced 
Brown to a total period of forty years at Level V imprisonment to be 
suspended after serving a mandatory minimum term of six years 
incarceration followed by one and a half years of decreasing levels of 
supervision.  Brown did not appeal from his guilty plea and sentence.  
Instead, Brown filed two different motions seeking to correct or modify his 
sentence.  The Superior Court denied both motions which this Court 
affirmed on appeal.1   
(3) 
Thereafter, Brown filed a motion for postconviction relief, 
alleging six grounds: (i) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (ii) defective 
search warrant; (iii) exculpatory evidence withheld; (iv) erroneous denial of 
a continuance request; (v) preliminary hearing testimony was perjured; and 
(vi) not guilty of weapon offense.  The Superior Court denied Brown’s 
motion.  On appeal, Brown raises the same six claims, as well as a claim that 
the Superior Court abused its discretion in not conducting a hearing on his 
postconviction motion. 
(4) 
 In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel with respect to his guilty plea, Brown must establish that: (i) 
                                                 
1  Brown v. State, 2004 WL 2154319 (Del. Sept. 17, 2004); Brown v. State, 2004 
WL 2149141 (Del. Sept. 13, 2004). 
 
3
counsel’s representation was professionally unreasonable; and (ii) but for 
counsel’s deficiencies, there is a reasonable probability that Brown would 
not have pled guilty but would have insisted on going to trial and been 
acquitted.2  The standard is highly demanding,3 and there is a strong 
presumption that counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.4 
(5) 
Under the circumstances, Brown has failed to substantiate his 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  As the Superior Court noted, 
Brown was indicted on fourteen serious charges and faced the prospect of a 
substantial prison sentence if convicted of all charges.  Brown’s counsel was 
able to negotiate a plea bargain on his behalf that resulted in Brown’s 
conviction on only two of the fourteen charges with a six-year minimum 
mandatory sentence.  Given the strength of the State’s evidence against him, 
the plea bargain clearly was advantageous to Brown.  At his guilty plea 
colloquy, Brown told the Superior Court that he was satisfied with his 
counsel’s representation.  Absent clear and convincing evidence to the 
contrary, Brown is bound by that representation.5 
                                                 
2 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 59 (1985). 
3 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 754 (Del. 1990). 
4 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 
5 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
 
4
(6) 
With respect to the other five claims raised in his 
postconviction motion, which allege errors occurring prior to the entry of his 
plea, Brown’s voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of those claims.6  
Under the circumstances, we find no error in the Superior Court’s dismissal 
of Brown’s postconviction motion without holding a hearing.7 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                                 
6 Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003). 
7 Maxion v. State, 686 A.2d 148, 151 (Del. 1996).