Case Title: Moore v. Maroney

Citation: 

Docket Number: 981872

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
BRUCE MOORE, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 981872 
June 11, 1999 
 
ED MARONEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL 
CAPACITY AS CITY MANAGER FOR 
THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
Charles S. Russell, Judge Designate 
 
 
The Virginia Freedom of Information Act, Code §§ 2.1-340 
through -346.1 (the Act), provides that certain "official 
records" in the possession of any employee of a public body are 
"excluded" from the Act's disclosure requirements.  Code § 2.1-
342(A) and (B).  Among the records excluded are "personnel 
records containing information concerning identifiable 
individuals."  Code § 2.1-342(B)(3).  The Act does not define 
the term "personnel records." 
 
In August 1997, appellants Bruce Moore and WVEC Television, 
Inc., filed a petition for mandamus and injunctive relief 
against appellee Ed Maroney, in his official capacity as City 
Manager for the City of Newport News, and against appellee 
Dennis Mook in his official capacity as the City's "Interim" 
Chief of Police.  The defendants filed a demurrer. 
 
Upon consideration of memoranda of law and argument of 
counsel, the trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed 
the action in a June 1998 order, which did not state reasons for 
the ruling.  The plaintiffs did not move to amend the petition 
and appealed. 
 
The sole assignment of error is:  "The trial court erred 
when it ruled that documents relating to a police investigation 
of possible misconduct by a named public official are exempt 
from disclosure under [the Act] on the ground that they are 
personnel records within the meaning of the Act." 
 
We shall recite the sparse facts contained in this record 
according to settled principles of appellate review.  A demurrer 
admits the truth of all material facts that are properly 
pleaded.  All reasonable factual inferences fairly and justly 
drawn from the allegations must be considered in aid of the 
pleading.  But a demurrer does not admit the correctness of the 
pleader's conclusions of law.  Ward's Equip., Inc. v. New 
Holland N. America, 254 Va. 379, 382, 493 S.E.2d 516, 518 
(1997). 
 
In the petition, the plaintiffs alleged that Moore was 
employed by WVEC Television as a news reporter and that the 
service area of WVEC included the City of Newport News.  The 
plaintiffs further alleged that defendants transact public 
business and, in the course of their public duties, "maintain, 
create and possess certain official records" relating to the 
City's "Codes and Compliance Department." 
 
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The plaintiffs also alleged that in May 1997, reporter 
Moore sent a letter request under the Act to the City Manager 
and the Interim Chief of Police, who "was at that time a 
custodian of the documents in question."  The letter asked 
disclosure of:  "Any and all tapes, transcripts, photos and 
reports generated by the City's investigation of possible 
misconduct by employees within the Newport News Codes and 
Compliance Department."  The letter asked that the disclosure 
include "all material generated by the surveillance of" a named 
former plumbing inspector and another individual not employed by 
the City. 
 
The plaintiffs further alleged that defendant City Manager, 
in a June letter, refused the request and stated:  "'The 
information which you have requested constitutes personnel and 
medical records of employees of the City of Newport News.  
Therefore, pursuant to the provisions of § 2.1-342(B)(3), I must 
respectfully decline your request for copies of these records.'" 
 
The plaintiffs also alleged that the investigation had 
ended and all action taken by the City with regard to it had 
been completed.  Further, they alleged that the named plumbing 
inspector "has retired."  In addition, the plaintiffs alleged 
that "the information requested does not in any way constitute 
personnel records and is not contained exclusively in the 
personnel files of" the plumbing inspector. 
 
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Further, the plaintiffs alleged that the Interim Chief of 
Police "is a custodian of the requested documents and is not a 
custodian of the personnel files of any employees."  
Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that the "exemption" cited by 
the City Manager was "not applicable" because the records are 
not personnel records. 
 
In their request for relief, the plaintiffs asked for 
issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the defendants to 
comply with the Act and to disclose "immediately" the requested 
information.  The plaintiffs also sought an injunction requiring 
defendants to comply with the Act.  An affidavit of Moore 
corroborating the factual allegations and copies of the letters 
were filed with the petition. 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs, relying upon cases from other 
jurisdictions and upon opinions of the Attorney General of 
Virginia, contend the trial court's "holding that a police 
investigation of official misconduct would be a part of a public 
employee's personnel record gives a new meaning to the term 
'personnel records.'  In light of the . . . Act's clear 
admonition that it be interpreted to effectuate disclosure and 
to minimize the effect of exemptions from disclosure, the lower 
court's interpretation is erroneous." 
 
Continuing, the plaintiffs contend "[i]t is impossible to 
conceive or articulate a rationale for holding that a police 
 
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investigation of a public employee is a normal part of the 
personnel records of that employee.  This is especially true 
where, as here, the investigation results in the employee's 
retirement rather than disciplinary action, and the 
investigation was not internal, but was conducted by a separate 
public agency.  In fact, the documents were still in the hands 
of the police department when the request was filed." 
 
The trial court's ruling, according to the plaintiffs, 
"suggests that, for public employees, a police department can be 
equated with a private company's personnel department, and that 
a police investigation is an appropriate evaluative tool for 
measuring the performance of public employees.  Ruling that 
police surveillance tapes showing an official inspector's 
misconduct in the discharge of his professional duties is a 
typical employee record stretches the meaning of 'personnel 
records' as that term is commonly understood." 
 
Responding, defendants note that plaintiffs' request made 
reference only to an investigation of "possible misconduct" of 
the City employee, and that the City's response said nothing 
about material related to a criminal investigation, which is 
exempt from disclosure under Code § 2.1-342(B)(1).  Thus, "[t]he 
only reasonable inference to be drawn from the pleadings," 
according to defendants, "is that such investigative material as 
 
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does exist relates to misconduct under the City's standards for 
employee conduct, not to crimes." 
 
Under these circumstances, defendants contend, "the 
exigencies of local government frequently require police 
officers to perform activities only marginally related, at best, 
to . . . traditional [police] functions."  Defendants note that 
the City's Charter authorizes the City Manager to assign 
employees of any department to the temporary performance of 
duties in another department.  Accordingly, defendants argue, 
police participation in an internal investigation in another 
municipal department does not alter the nature of the record and 
negate its classification as a "personnel record." 
 
We are confronted in this case with a problem similar to 
the one that we encountered in LeMond v. McElroy, 239 Va. 515, 
391 S.E.2d 309 (1990), another appeal under the Act.  There, as 
here, we were presented with persuasive arguments on both sides 
of the important question presented.  Yet, the appellate record 
was insufficient, and we refused "to decide the issue in a 
vacuum."  Id. at 520, 391 S.E.2d at 312. 
 
In order to demonstrate the dilemma, we will summarize the 
bare facts alleged in the petition.  WVEC is a television 
station serving an area that includes the City of Newport News.  
Moore is a reporter for WVEC.  The City Manager and Interim 
Chief of Police are duly appointed public officials who transact 
 
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public business.  Moore sent a request under the Act to 
defendants for certain designated records.  The City Manager 
responded to the request stating that the requested information 
constituted "personnel and medical records" of City employees 
and were exempt from disclosure under the Act.  The individual 
who was the target of the investigation has retired.  At the 
time they were requested, the records were not contained in the 
employee's personnel file but were in the possession of the 
Interim Chief of Police.  In this summary, we have disregarded 
the pleader's conclusions of law, such as, "the information 
requested does not in any way constitute personnel records"; 
this is the ultimate issue of law in the case. 
 
The parties, on brief, have furnished us with additional 
facts unsupported by the allegations of the petition for 
mandamus, the legal sufficiency of which is tested by the 
demurrer.  For example, the plaintiffs tell us that "[p]olice 
investigative materials such as photos, surveillance tapes, 
etc., are not a standard part of a government employee's 
personnel file, nor are these materials normal evaluative tools 
for public employees."  We do not know from this record what is 
a "standard" part of personnel records in the City of Newport 
News, and we cannot judicially note that fact. 
 
Likewise, the defendants tell us that "[u]pon receiving 
allegations of possible misconduct by a plumbing inspector in 
 
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March 1997, the City of Newport News initiated an investigation.  
Because the inquiry was deemed to require specialized 
investigative skills and equipment, police officers were 
assigned to investigate.  Before the police chief could forward 
the results of the officers' investigation to the employee's 
department head for his consideration of possible disciplinary 
action, the employee elected to retire."  These assertions must 
be disregarded on demurrer, but they are consistent with our 
view that, under certain circumstances, investigative materials 
dealing with employee misconduct may indeed be a "standard" part 
of employee personnel records.  But we cannot judicially note 
that fact either. 
 
Moreover, and significantly, we also do not know from the 
factual allegations, or inferences flowing therefrom, the 
precise nature of the records with which we are dealing.  They 
have been described in general terms, i.e., "tapes, transcripts, 
photos and reports" as well as "material" generated by 
surveillance.  But we do not know, for example, whether the 
reports and surveillance "material" are addressed only to the 
supervisor of the police investigator, in which case they may be 
purely police records, or whether they are addressed to the head 
of the plumbing inspector's department, in which case they may 
indeed be personnel records. 
 
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"Routinely, confidential records are filed for in camera 
inspection by a trial court and, if necessary, by an appellate 
court."  LeMond, 239 Va. at 520, 391 S.E.2d at 312.  See 
Gloucester County Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Kennedy, 256 Va. 400, 
403-04, 507 S.E.2d 81, 82-83 (1998) (report of investigation of 
alleged child abuse submitted for court's in camera review).  
Here, the plaintiffs made no effort to have the records at issue 
produced for examination by the trial court in camera, a 
practice that we encouraged in cases of this type in LeMond, 239 
Va. at 520, 391 S.E.2d at 312.  In LeMond, as here, there was no 
evidentiary hearing; counsel for the parties merely made 
"factual representations and argument."  Id. at 518, 391 S.E.2d 
at 311. 
 
Accordingly, we reach the same result here that we reached 
under similar circumstances in LeMond.  The trial court's ruling 
will stand but without our approval.  The judgment will not be 
reversed because the responsibility for presenting an adequate 
appellate record is upon the appellants who seek reversal of the 
decision below.  Id. at 520-21, 391 S.E.2d at 312. 
 
Thus, the order appealed from will be 
Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE LACY, with whom JUSTICE KEENAN and JUSTICE KINSER join, 
dissenting. 
 
 
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This appeal comes to us from an order of the trial court 
sustaining the defendants' demurrer and dismissing the petition 
for writ of mandamus.  Unlike a motion for summary judgment in 
which the trial court decides the merits of a claim, a demurrer 
only tests the sufficiency of factual allegations to determine 
whether the pleading states a cause of action.  Fun v. Virginia 
Military Institute, 245 Va. 249, 252, 427 S.E.2d 181, 183 
(1993).  To the extent factual matter is in doubt, the doubt 
must be resolved in favor of the allegations in the pleading.  
See id. at 253, 427 S.E.2d at 183. 
In considering a demurrer the trial court is limited to 
consideration of the pleadings alone and may determine only 
whether the pleadings state a cause of action upon which relief 
can be granted.  The trial court cannot resolve the merits of 
the case or expand the record before it by considering other 
evidence.  In reviewing the decision of the trial court 
overruling or sustaining a demurrer, we are likewise limited to 
consideration of the pleadings alone and the facts contained 
therein.  Id. at 252, 427 S.E.2d at 183.  
Applying these principles, I cannot agree with the 
majority's conclusion that the petitioners, appellants here, 
failed in their burden to provide a record sufficient for us to 
review the decision of the trial court in this case.  The record 
before us, although slim, contains the petition for a writ of 
 
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mandamus, the demurrer, and the trial court's order granting the 
demurrer and dismissing the case.  No further record is 
necessary or proper for our consideration in resolving the issue 
presented by this appeal. In the procedural posture of this 
case, taking the allegations in the pleading as true as we must, 
I conclude that the petition for a writ of mandamus sufficiently 
states a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
In order to prevail on a petition for a writ of mandamus to 
enforce the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 
the material requested must be an "official record" maintained 
by a "public body" that is not exempt from disclosure under the 
terms of the Act.  See Code §§ 2.1-342, -346.  In this case, the 
petition for a writ of mandamus described the material requested 
("tapes, transcripts, photos and reports generated by the City's 
investigation of possible misconduct by employees" and "material 
generated by the surveillance" of a former employee and a non-
employee), identified the public body maintaining the material 
sought (the City, the City Manager and the interim Chief of 
Police) and asserted that the material sought was not a 
personnel record.*  Nothing on the face of the petition flatly 
                     
* Petitioner's assertion that the material sought is not a 
"personnel record" is a mixed conclusion of fact and law.  
Although we are not required to accept bare conclusions of law 
on demurrer, we are required to accept conclusions that turn on 
the resolution of factual disputes. 
 
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contradicts the assertions the petitioners make with regard to 
the nature of the material sought. 
The respondents argue that because the petitioners describe 
the material sought in the petition for writ of mandamus as 
relating to "possible misconduct" of employees the material is 
personnel records as a matter of law.  Since employee misconduct 
is a personnel matter, argue respondents, the material is exempt 
from disclosure under the FOIA.  Considering the pleadings as a 
whole, I disagree. 
Personnel records are not defined by the FOIA.  In the 
absence of provisions in the Act which unequivocally make the 
specific factual material described in this petition personnel 
records, the determination of whether the requested material 
constitutes personnel records will require development of a 
factual record and examination of such things as the precise 
nature of the material sought, the practice of the City with 
regard to the material it maintains as personnel records and the 
application of the purposes of the FOIA itself.  Although, as 
the majority notes, both the petitioners and the respondents 
allege factual matters relative to these factors in their 
arguments and briefs, those factual matters cannot be considered 
by us in this appeal.  
At this stage, it is impossible to say that material 
described in the petition as held by city officials and 
 
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concerning a former employee and non-employee is personnel 
records.  Thus, as the majority notes, resolution of the 
ultimate issue in the case — whether the material sought is 
exempt from disclosure under the personnel records exclusion — 
requires additional development of the record. Nevertheless, I 
cannot conclude that the appellants-petitioners failed to 
provide a sufficient record to determine the issue presented in 
this appeal, whether the petition can survive the demurrer filed 
by the defendants.  Regardless of whether the petitioners might 
ultimately prevail, I believe the petition sufficiently alleged 
a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. 
This conclusion normally would require that the trial 
court's judgment be reversed and the case remanded for further 
proceedings.  However, the petitioners' assignment of error and 
the arguments put forth under that assignment do not address the 
sufficiency of the pleadings.  Rather, the petitioners argue the 
merits of the case, asserting that the records sought are as a 
matter of fact and law not personnel records.  The petitioners 
do not ask that the case be remanded for further proceedings but 
that we conclude that the material requested is not personnel 
records and enter an order requiring production of the requested 
material.  The relief requested by the petitioners, although 
within the scope of appellate review when considering a trial 
court's action on a motion for summary judgment, is not 
 
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available when reviewing the sustaining of a demurrer.  
Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal as improvidently 
granted. 
 
 
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