Case Title: State v. White

Citation: 2012-Ohio-2583

Docket Number: 2009-1661

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. White, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2583.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-2583 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. WHITE, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. White, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2583.] 
Criminal law—Aggravated murder—Death penalty—Resentencing of capital 
defendant after death sentence has been set aside—R.C. 2929.06(B)—
Death penalty may be reimposed after penalty hearing with new jury—
Retroactivity—General Assembly intended R.C. 2929.06(B) to be applied 
retroactively—Retroactive application does not offend Ohio Constitution, 
Article II, Section 28—R.C. 2929.06(B) applies to resentencing in all 
capital cases where death penalty has been set aside due to legal error 
regardless of point at which error occurred. 
(No. 2009-1661—Submitted November 16, 2011—Decided June 14, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Ashland County, Nos. 07COA-037 and 
07COA-038, 2009-Ohio-3869. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  R.C. 2929.06(B) applies where an aggravated-murder conviction with a death 
specification has been affirmed, but the death sentence has been set aside 
for legal error, when the error infects and thus invalidates the sentencing 
phase of the trial.  In such a case, R.C. 2929.06(B) permits empanelment 
of a new jury to resentence the offender. 
2. The General Assembly has clearly expressed its intent that R.C. 2929.06(B) 
apply retroactively.  (R.C. 2929.06(E), applied.) 
3.  R.C. 2929.06(B) is remedial, not substantive.  Hence, the Retroactivity Clause 
of the Ohio Constitution does not bar its retroactive application in cases 
where the aggravated murder was committed before its enactment, but the 
death sentence was set aside after its enactment. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Maxwell D. White Jr., murdered State Trooper James 
Gross on January 19, 1996.  He was tried by a jury, convicted of aggravated 
murder with capital specifications, and sentenced to death.  On appeal, we 
affirmed White’s conviction and death sentence.  State v. White, 82 Ohio St.3d 16, 
693 N.E.2d 772 (1998).  However, on December 7, 2005, White obtained federal 
habeas corpus relief from his death sentence, obliging the trial court to resentence 
him.  White v. Mitchell, 431 F.3d 517 (6th Cir.2005). 
{¶ 2} R.C. 2929.06(B) requires the trial court, when resentencing a 
capital offender who was tried by a jury and whose death sentence has been set 
aside, to empanel a new jury and conduct a fresh penalty hearing, at which death 
may be a penalty to be considered by the jury.  This provision was enacted after 
White killed Trooper Gross, but before the federal court invalidated his death 
sentence. 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 3} The trial court held that it could not retroactively apply R.C. 
2929.06(B) in resentencing White, and therefore, White was ineligible for a death 
sentence.  The issue before us is whether the trial court should apply R.C. 
2929.06(B) on resentencing, thereby allowing the death penalty to once again be 
available on remand. 
{¶ 4} Because this appeal principally involves White’s claim that R.C. 
2929.06(B) may not be applied retroactively, we begin by outlining the history of 
that statute. 
{¶ 5} In State v. Penix, 32 Ohio St.3d 369, 513 N.E.2d 744 (1987), we 
held that a death sentence may be imposed only with the recommendation of “the 
trial jury,” because R.C. 2929.03, as written, required it.  Id. at 372. We further 
held that “the trial jury” must be the same jury that convicted the offender in the 
guilt phase.  Id. at 373.  Under Penix, when a death sentence imposed by a jury is 
vacated for penalty-phase error, the trial court on remand may not empanel a new 
jury to impose a new death sentence, but must impose one of the life sentences 
provided by statute.  Id. at 372-373.  On January 19, 1996, the date of the murder 
in this case, Penix was still good law. 
{¶ 6} Later in 1996, the 121st General Assembly enacted legislation to 
abrogate Penix.  Effective October 16, 1996, R.C. 2929.06 was amended by the 
adoption of R.C. 2929.06(B).1  See Sub.S.B. No. 258, 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 
10539, 10548-10549.  R.C. 2929.06(B), in its current form,2 provides that when a 
death sentence is set aside  
 
                                                 
1 When enacted, R.C. 2929.06(B) was designated R.C. 2929.06(A)(2).  It was given its 
current designation in 1998.  See Sub.S.B. No. 107, 147 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7435, 7438. 
 
2 R.C. 2929.06(B) and (E) were further amended by 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10.  
However, the 2007 amendments do not affect the issues presented in this case. 
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because of error that occurred in the sentencing phase of the trial 
* * *, the trial court that sentenced the offender shall conduct a 
new hearing to resentence the offender.  If the offender was tried 
by a jury, the trial court shall impanel a new jury for the hearing. 
* * * At the hearing, the court * * * shall follow the procedure set 
forth in [R.C. 2929.03(D)] in determining whether to impose upon 
the offender a sentence of death * * *. 
 
The 1996 amendment to R.C. 2929.06(B) thus established that a defendant may 
be resentenced to death on remand from a decision vacating his original death 
sentence. 
{¶ 7} On September 22, 2004, we decided State v. Williams, 103 Ohio 
St.3d 112, 2004-Ohio-4747, 814 N.E.2d 818.  In Williams, we held that R.C. 
2929.06(B) could not be applied to a case involving an aggravated murder 
committed before October 16, 1996, because the General Assembly had not 
expressly made R.C. 2929.06(B) retroactive.  Id. at syllabus. 
{¶ 8} The 125th General Assembly responded to Williams by further 
amending R.C. 2929.06.  The amendment, effective March 23, 2005, added a new 
division, R.C. 2929.06(E).  See Sub.H.B. No. 184, 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5043, 
5051.  R.C. 2929.06(E) provides:  
 
This section, as amended by H.B. 184 of the 125th general 
assembly, shall apply to all offenders who have been sentenced to 
death for an aggravated murder that was committed on or after 
October 19, 1981 * * * .  This section, as amended by H.B. 184 of 
the 125th general assembly, shall apply equally to all such 
offenders sentenced to death prior to, on, or after March 23, 2005 
[the effective date of H.B. 184], including offenders who, on 
January Term, 2012 
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March 23, 2005, are challenging their sentence of death and 
offenders whose sentence of death has been set aside, nullified, or 
vacated by any court of this state or any federal court but who, as 
of March 23, 2005, have not yet been resentenced. 
 
{¶ 9} While these statutory changes were being enacted, White was 
pursuing a federal habeas corpus challenge to his conviction and death sentence.  
On December 7, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the federal district court’s denial of habeas relief as to White’s 
conviction.  White v. Mitchell, 431 F.3d 517.  However, the Sixth Circuit held that 
White’s death sentence was constitutionally defective. 
{¶ 10} At trial, White had challenged a prospective juror on the ground 
that she was biased in favor of a death sentence.  The trial court overruled White’s 
challenge, and the juror took part in White’s trial and sentencing.  The Sixth 
Circuit found that the juror was biased and that the trial court had therefore erred 
by overruling White’s challenge.  Id. at 537-543.  Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit 
ordered that White’s death sentence be vacated “unless the State conducts a new 
penalty phase proceeding.”  Id. at 543. 
{¶ 11} On December 28, 2006, pursuant to the Sixth Circuit’s mandate, 
the federal district court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus and ordered 
that the state either conduct a new penalty hearing or vacate White’s death 
sentence.  On December 29, 2006, the state filed a motion in the trial court 
requesting a new penalty-phase proceeding in light of the federal court’s order. 
{¶ 12} White filed two motions in the trial court to prohibit the state from 
seeking the death penalty.  These were designated “Motion A” and “Motion B.”  
In Motion A, White argued that R.C. 2929.06(B) does not apply to a case where a 
death sentence has been set aside for error that took place during voir dire, such as 
the erroneous overruling of a challenge for cause.  In Motion B, he argued that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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R.C. 2929.06(B) cannot constitutionally be applied to a case involving a crime 
committed before its enactment. 
{¶ 13} The trial court granted Motion B in part, holding that the 
application of R.C. 2929.06(B) to White’s case would be unconstitutionally 
retroactive in violation of the Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 28, the 
Retroactivity Clause, which provides: “The general assembly shall have no power 
to pass retroactive laws * * *.”  Motion B also included a claim that application of 
R.C. 2929.06(B) would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 
Constitution.  The trial court did not address White’s ex post facto claim.  Nor did 
the court address Motion A. 
{¶ 14} The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that applying 
R.C. 2929.06(B) to White would not violate the Retroactivity Clause.  State v. 
White, 5th Dist. Nos. 07-COA-037 and 07-COA-038, 2009-Ohio-3869. 
{¶ 15} We granted White’s jurisdictional motion. State v. White, 123 Ohio 
St.3d 1508, 2009-Ohio-6210, 917 N.E.2d 811.  We now affirm the judgment of 
the court of appeals. 
I. Applicability of R.C. 2929.06(B) 
{¶ 16} As a threshold question, we must determine whether R.C. 
2929.06(B) is applicable to White’s case.  White contends that R.C. 2929.06(B), 
even if applied retroactively, does not authorize the trial court to empanel a new 
jury for resentencing under the circumstances of this case. 
{¶ 17} R.C. 2929.06(B) provides:  
 
 
Whenever any court of this state or any federal court sets 
aside, nullifies, or vacates a sentence of death imposed  upon an 
offender because of error that occurred in the sentencing phase of 
the trial * * *, the trial court that sentenced the offender shall 
conduct a new hearing to resentence the offender.  If the offender 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
was tried by a jury, the trial court shall impanel a new jury for the 
hearing. * * * At the hearing, the court * * * shall follow the 
procedure set forth in [R.C. 2929.03(D)] in determining whether to 
impose upon the offender a sentence of death * * *. 
 
{¶ 18} White contends that R.C. 2929.06(B) is inapplicable to his case 
because his death sentence was not vacated “because of error that occurred in the 
sentencing phase of the trial.”  White’s sentence was vacated because the trial 
court erroneously overruled a challenge for cause during jury selection.  
According to White, since the fatal error occurred during jury selection, it did not 
occur “in the sentencing phase.” 
{¶ 19} We note that one common pleas court has agreed with White’s 
reading of R.C. 2929.06(B), holding that an error occurring during voir dire 
“could not have occurred during the sentencing phase.”  State v. Jackson, Allen 
C.P. No. CR-2002-0011 (Nov. 21, 2006), slip op. at 4, on remand from State v. 
Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 53, 2005-Ohio-5981, 836 N.E.2d 1173. 
{¶ 20} However it is relevant to note that voir dire is not a substantive part 
of trial; rather, it is a mechanism to seat an impartial jury so that the due process 
rights of a defendant are protected.  Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729-730, 
112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992) (explaining that the Constitution does not 
provide for voir dire, but only that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury; 
“voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his 
constitutional right to an impartial jury will be honored).  But an error in the jury-
selection process that is not relevant to a guilt determination may become relevant 
at the time of sentencing, as in this case, in which the only bias issue concerned 
the juror’s views on the death penalty. Thus, we must interpret what “in the 
sentencing phase” means as used in R.C. 2929.06(B). While we must be mindful 
that, although criminal statutes are strictly construed against the state, R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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2901.04(A), they should not be given an artificially narrow interpretation that 
would defeat the apparent legislative intent.  In re Clemons, 168 Ohio St. 83, 87-
88, 151 N.E.2d 553 (1958). 
{¶ 21} It is evident that the intent of R.C. 2929.06(B) was to abrogate 
Penix and to make all capital offenders whose death sentences are set aside eligible 
for a death sentence on resentencing.  The statutory language at issue was taken, 
with only minor alteration, directly from Penix.  Penix states:  
 
[W]hen a case is remanded to the trial court following vacation of 
the death sentence due to error occurring at the penalty phase of 
the proceeding, the trial court, in resentencing the offender, is 
limited to the sentences of life imprisonment with parole eligibility 
after serving twenty full years of imprisonment or life 
imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years 
of imprisonment. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  32 Ohio St.3d 369, 513 N.E.2d 744, syllabus. 
{¶ 22} R.C. 2929.06(B) was intended to abrogate Penix.  The statutory 
language was taken (with minor changes) directly from Penix.  We may therefore 
infer that the statutory language is intended to mean whatever the similar 
language in Penix meant.  The language in Penix, “error occurring at the penalty 
phase of the proceeding,” does not mean only “error occurring during the penalty 
phase” but includes all errors that cause the death penalty to be set aside without 
affecting the guilt-phase verdict.  See State v. Scott, 8th Dist. No. 53120, 1988 
WL 132574, *5-8, *24 (Dec. 9, 1988) (where guilt-phase error was harmless as to 
conviction but fatal to death sentence, defendant was to be resentenced under 
Penix). Therefore, the language of R.C. 2929.06(B) has that meaning also. 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
{¶ 23} White’s proposed reading of the statute would create an odd 
dichotomy between sentencing-phase errors that invalidate a death sentence 
without affecting the conviction and errors having precisely the same effect but 
that happen to occur at some other point during the proceedings.  Errors of the 
first type would be covered by R.C. 2929.06(B), so that a new jury could be 
empaneled for resentencing, and the defendant could receive a death sentence on 
remand.  Errors of the second type would not be covered by R.C. 2929.06(B) and 
would entitle the defendant to avoid a death sentence. 
{¶ 24} Such a distinction would be completely arbitrary.  White suggests 
no reason why the General Assembly would want to treat resentenced capital 
offenders differently based on when the error that invalidated the death sentence 
occurred. 
{¶ 25} Accordingly, we reject White’s proposed interpretation of R.C. 
2929.06(B) and hold that R.C. 2929.06(B) applies where an aggravated-murder 
conviction with a death specification has been affirmed, but the death sentence 
has been set aside for legal error, when the error infects and thus invalidates the 
sentencing phase of the trial.  In such a case, R.C. 2929.06(B) permits 
empanelment of a new jury to resentence the offender. 
II. Retroactive Application of R.C. 2929.06(B) 
{¶ 26} The principal issue in this case is whether the application of R.C. 
2929.06(B) to White on remand would violate the Retroactivity Clause of the 
Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 27} Determining whether a statute’s retroactive application violates the 
Retroactivity Clause requires a two-step analysis.  First, we must determine 
whether the General Assembly intended that the statute apply retroactively.  If 
not, the statute may not be so applied.  See R.C. 1.48.  If the General Assembly 
has expressly indicated its intention that the statute apply retroactively, we must 
determine whether the statute is remedial, in which case retroactive application is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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permitted, or substantive, in which case retroactive application is forbidden.  See 
State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-Ohio-5059, 775 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 10, 15; 
Bielat v. Bielat, 87 Ohio St.3d 350, 353, 721 N.E.2d 28 (2000); State v. Cook, 83 
Ohio St.3d 404, 410-411, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998); Van Fossen v. Babcock & 
Wilcox Co., 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489 (1988), paragraphs one and two 
of the syllabus. 
A. Intent of the General Assembly 
{¶ 28} In this case, the result of the first step is obvious.  The trial court 
determined that R.C. 2929.06(E) expressly indicates the intention of the General 
Assembly that R.C. 2929.06(B) apply retroactively.  Both parties agree with the 
trial court’s conclusion.  So do we. 
{¶ 29} R.C. 2929.06(E) provides that R.C. 2929.06, as amended, “shall 
apply to all offenders who have been sentenced to death for an aggravated murder 
that was committed on or after October 19, 1981.”  (Emphasis added.)  October 
19, 1981, is the effective date of Ohio’s current death-penalty statute, 139 Ohio 
Laws, Part I, 1, 18-19, so all prisoners now on death row in Ohio were sentenced 
to death for an aggravated murder committed on or after that date.  Thus, R.C. 
2929.06(E) expressly makes R.C. 2929.06—including R.C. 2929.06(B)—apply to 
all offenders sentenced under Ohio’s death-penalty statutes. 
{¶ 30} To ensure that the legislative intent is clear, R.C. 2929.06(E) 
further provides that R.C. 2929.06,  
 
as amended by H.B. 184 * * *, shall apply equally to all such 
offenders sentenced to death prior to, on, or after March 23, 2005, 
including offenders who, on March 23, 2005, are challenging their 
sentence of death and offenders whose sentence of death has been 
set aside, nullified, or vacated by any court of this state or any 
January Term, 2012 
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federal court but who, as of March 23, 2005, of that act, have not 
yet been resentenced. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  By enacting R.C. 2929.06(E), the General Assembly has 
clearly expressed its intent that R.C. 2929.06(B) apply retroactively. 
B. Is R.C. 2929.06(B) Remedial or Substantive? 
{¶ 31} In construing the Retroactivity Clause, we have determined that 
“retroactivity itself is not always forbidden by Ohio law.”  Bielat, 87 Ohio St.3d 
at 353, 721 N.E.2d 28.  Thus, having determined that R.C. 2929.06(B) was 
intended to apply retroactively, we proceed to the second step of retroactivity 
analysis: determining whether the statute is remedial or substantive. 
1. Does R.C. 2929.06(B) Increase the Punishment for the Offense? 
{¶ 32} If a statute’s intent is punitive in nature, it cannot be considered 
merely remedial.  See Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 582, 700 N.E.2d 570.  Thus, Ohio 
retroactivity analysis prohibits a retroactive increase in punishment for a criminal 
offense.  See State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 
110, ¶ 39.  White contends that applying R.C. 2929.06(B) retroactively to his case 
violates the Retroactivity Clause because it would increase the punishment he 
faces for murdering Trooper Gross. 
{¶ 33} We disagree.  R.C. 2929.06(B) does not increase the punishment 
for aggravated murder.  The death penalty for aggravated murder existed on 
January 19, 1996, the date of Trooper Gross’s murder.  White plainly faces no 
greater punishment as a result of R.C. 2929.06(B) than he faced on January 19, 
1996. 
2. Did White Have a Vested or Accrued Right 
to Be Resentenced Without a Jury? 
{¶ 34} “The prohibition against retroactive laws * * * is a protection for 
the individual who is assured that he may rely upon the law as it is written and not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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later be subject to new obligations thereby.”  Lakengren, Inc. v. Kosydar, 44 Ohio 
St.2d 199, 201, 339 N.E.2d 814 (1975).  Thus, “[t]he constitutional test for 
substantive legislation focuses on new laws that reach back in time and create 
new burdens, deprivations, or impairments of vested rights.”  Bielat, 87 Ohio 
St.3d at 359, 721 N.E.2d 28. 
 
[A] statute is substantive when it * * * impairs or takes away 
vested rights; affects an accrued substantive right; imposes new or 
additional burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities as to a past 
transaction; creates a new right out of an act [that] gave no right 
and imposed no obligation when it occurred; creates a new right; 
[or] gives rise to or takes away the right to sue or defend actions at 
law. 
 
(Citations omitted.)  Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d at 107, 522 N.E.2d 489. 
{¶ 35} An “accrued right” is “a matured right; a right that is ripe for 
enforcement.”  Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary 1436 (9th Ed.2009).  “A right, not 
absolute but dependent for its existence upon the action or inaction of another, is 
not basic or vested * * *.”  Hatch v. Tipton, 131 Ohio St. 364, 368, 2 N.E.2d 875 
(1936). 
{¶ 36} On January 19, 1996, the day he murdered Trooper Gross, White 
did not have an “absolute” or “matured” right to be resentenced under Penix.  
That right could not come into existence until several intervening events took 
place.  First, White would have to be convicted of aggravated murder with at least 
one death specification; then, after the penalty phase, the jury would have to 
recommend a death sentence, and the trial judge would have to impose one; then 
upon appellate review the death sentence would have to be vacated. Only if all 
these conditions came to pass could the question of resentencing arise.  Only then 
January Term, 2012 
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could White’s right to be resentenced in accordance with Penix come into 
existence. 
{¶ 37} Ultimately, each of these preconditions for resentencing did come 
to pass.  But the last of them did not occur until December 7, 2005, the date when 
the Sixth Circuit invalidated White’s death sentence.  Before that date, White had 
no vested or accrued right to be resentenced under Penix.  But, before December 
7, 2005, the General Assembly had not only enacted R.C. 2929.06(B), but had 
enacted R.C. 2929.06(E), which made R.C. 2929.06 retroactive to October 19, 
1981.  Thus, upon the enactment of R.C. 2929.06(B), the Penix right was 
extinguished.  When the Sixth Circuit vacated White’s death penalty, there was no 
Penix right to vest.  For the same reason, White could not plausibly contend that 
he relied on Penix when he committed the murder.  We conclude that retroactive 
application of R.C. 2929.06(B) does not impair any vested or accrued right 
belonging to White. 
3. Would Retroactive Application of R.C. 2929.06(B) Create a New 
Right for the State While Imposing a New Burden on White? 
{¶ 38} The trial court rejected the state’s argument that “the law is not 
substantive because the Defendant did not have a ‘vested right’ to be resentenced 
to a life sentence * * *.”  The court stated: “There need not be a deprivation of a 
vested right in order for the law to be deemed a substantive retroactive law.  It is 
sufficient that the law creates a new right and imposes corresponding burdens.” 
{¶ 39} The trial court concluded that R.C. 2929.06(B) was substantive 
because it both created a new right and imposed a corresponding burden on 
White.  The court identified the new right created by the statute as the state’s right 
“to empanel a new jury for death penalty resentencing.”  The burden imposed on 
White was “the burden to defend a second death penalty proceeding where no 
such obligation existed under the prior law.” 
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{¶ 40} The trial court’s statement that “[i]t is sufficient that the law 
creates a new right and imposes corresponding burdens” is incomplete.  We have 
held that, to be deemed substantive, a law must impose a new burden on the 
complaining party.  “The constitutional test for substantive legislation focuses on 
new laws that reach back and create new burdens, deprivations, or impairments of 
vested rights.”  Bielat, 87 Ohio St.3d at 359, 721 N.E.2d 28.  The Retroactivity 
Clause prohibits the General Assembly from “passing new laws to reach back and 
create new burdens, new duties, new obligations, or new liabilities not existing at 
the time.”  Miller v. Hixson, 64 Ohio St. 39, 51, 59 N.E.2d 749 (1901). 
{¶ 41} The burden identified by the trial court was “the burden to defend a 
second death penalty proceeding where no such obligation existed under the prior 
law.”  But that was no new burden.  The burden of defending a death-penalty 
proceeding was the same burden to which White was liable on January 19, 1996, 
after the murder of Trooper Gross.  As the court of appeals aptly observed: 
“Appellee always had a right to have the death penalty determined by a jury and 
always had the obligation to defend against it.”  2009-Ohio-3869, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 42} Moreover, “a later enactment will not burden or attach a new 
disability to a past transaction or consideration in the constitutional sense, unless 
the past transaction or consideration, if it did not create a vested right, created at 
least a reasonable expectation of finality.”  State ex rel. Matz v. Brown, 37 Ohio 
St.3d 279, 281, 525 N.E.2d 805 (1988). 
{¶ 43} In this case, White can point to no event preceding the enactment 
of R.C. 2929.06(B) and (E) that entitled him to a reasonable expectation of 
finality.  White asks us to apply the law as it existed on the date he murdered 
Trooper Gross.  But in Matz, we held that “the commission of a felony” is not a 
transaction that creates a reasonable expectation of finality.  “Except with regard 
to constitutional protections against ex post facto laws * * *, felons have no right 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
to expect that their conduct will never thereafter be made the subject of 
legislation.”  Id. at 281-282. 
{¶ 44} Because White could have no reasonable expectation of finality 
with respect to Penix on the date of the murder, retroactive application of R.C. 
2929.06(B) to White’s resentencing does not create a new burden “in the 
constitutional sense.”  Matz at 281. 
4. Is a Statute Creating a New Jury-Trial Right 
Necessarily Substantive? 
{¶ 45} R.C. 2929.06(B) requires the trial court, when resentencing a 
capital offender who was tried by a jury and whose death sentence has been set 
aside, to empanel a new jury on resentencing if the offender was originally tried 
by a jury.  In its opinion, the trial court noted that the right to a jury trial was 
described as “substantive, not procedural” in Kneisley v. Lattimer-Stevens Co., 40 
Ohio St.3d 354, 356, 533 N.E.2d 743 (1988), citing Cleveland Ry. Co. v. 
Halliday, 127 Ohio St. 278, 188 N.E. 1 (1933), paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 46} But the creation of a new right—even a new substantive right—is 
not, by itself, enough to support a claim of unconstitutional retroactivity.  We 
have held that a claim that a statute is substantive, and hence unconstitutionally 
retroactive, “cannot be based solely upon evidence that a statute retrospectively 
created a new right, but must also include a showing of some impairment, burden, 
deprivation, or new obligation accompanying that new right.”  Bielat, 87 Ohio 
St.3d 350, 721 N.E.2d 28, paragraph two of the syllabus.  The court must inquire 
“whether the creation of rights in one party reciprocally impaired a right of the 
party challenging the retroactive law.  In other words, substantive, retroactive 
legislation that unconstitutionally creates a new right also impairs a vested right or 
creates some new obligation or burden as well.”  Id. at 359.  This is true even if 
the new right itself may be characterized as substantive. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 47} Kneisley is not to the contrary.  In Kneisley, we held that 
legislation eliminating a party’s accrued right to a jury trial was substantive and 
could not be retroactively applied.  40 Ohio St.3d at 356-357, 533 N.E.2d 743.  
Kneisley does not stand for the proposition that legislation granting a right to a 
jury trial is substantive, where such legislation does not impose a new burden on 
the other party.  Since the creation of a jury-trial right on remand does not impose 
any new burden on White—i.e., any burden that he did not face on January 19, 
1996—the substantive nature of the jury-trial right does not itself preclude 
retroactive application of R.C. 2929.06(B). 
{¶ 48} To sum up, the application of R.C. 2929.06(B) to White’s 
resentencing would not increase White’s potential sentence, impair any of 
White’s vested or accrued rights, violate any reliance interest or any reasonable 
expectation of finality, or impose any new burdens on him.  We therefore hold 
that R.C. 2929.06(B) is remedial, not substantive.  Hence, the Retroactivity 
Clause of the Ohio Constitution does not bar its retroactive application in cases 
where the aggravated murder was committed before its enactment, but the death 
sentence was set aside after its enactment. 
IV. The Ex Post Facto Clause 
{¶ 49} Although White’s brief is not completely clear on this point, he 
appears to be raising a claim under the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 
Constitution.  Moreover, amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio 
Foundation (“ACLU”) expressly contends that applying R.C. 2929.06(B) to 
White’s case on remand would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.  We will 
therefore consider this issue. 
{¶ 50} In Calder v. Bull (1798), 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, Justice Chase 
identified the four kinds of laws that come within Ex Post Facto Clause:  
 
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the 
law, and which was innocent when done, criminal;  and punishes 
such action.  2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it 
greater than it was, when committed.  3d. Every law that changes 
the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law 
annexed to the crime, when committed.  4th. Every law that alters 
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, 
than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in 
order to convict the offender. 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  The United States Supreme Court has adopted Justice Chase’s 
Calder opinion as an authoritative definition of ex post facto laws.  See, e.g., 
Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 611, 123 S.Ct. 2446, 156 L.Ed.2d 544 
(2003); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 525, 120 S.Ct. 1620, 146 L.Ed.2d 577 
(2000). 
{¶ 51} White contends that R.C. 2929.06(B) increases the punishment for 
aggravated murder, which would bring it within the third Calder category.  
However, R.C. 2929.06(B) does not increase the punishment for aggravated 
murder.  “[T]he focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative 
change produces some ambiguous sort of ‘disadvantage,’ * * * but on whether 
any such change * * * increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.”  
California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 
131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995), fn. 3. 
{¶ 52} The death penalty existed for aggravated murder on January 19, 
1996, the date of Trooper Gross’s murder.  “[I]ts existence on the statute books 
provided fair warning as to the degree of culpability which the State ascribed to 
the act of murder.”  Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 297, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
L.Ed.2d 344 (1977).  “This was sufficient compliance with the ex post facto 
provision of the United States Constitution.”  Id. at 298. 
{¶ 53} In Evans v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 468, 323 S.E.2d 114 (1984), 
the Virginia Supreme Court faced a question almost identical to that presented 
here.  That court had previously held (as we would later hold in Penix) that the 
relevant Virginia statute, as written, required that where a death sentence was 
invalidated, the defendant must be resentenced to life imprisonment, because only 
the jury that had convicted the offender could sentence him to death.  See also 
Patterson v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 653, 660, 283 S.E.2d 212 (1981). 
{¶ 54} Virginia’s legislature subsequently amended the statute to permit a 
new jury to fix a penalty on remand.  The defendant in Evans (like White) had 
committed his crime before the amendment’s adoption, but his death sentence was 
vacated after its adoption.  On resentencing, the trial court empanelled a new jury 
under the amended statute, and Evans was sentenced to death.  On appeal, he 
claimed that application of the amended statute to him violated the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.  Id. at 475. 
{¶ 55} 
The Virginia Supreme Court rejected Evans’s ex post facto 
argument. 
 
Pertinent to the ex post facto inquiry is whether the defendant had 
“fair warning as to the degree of culpability which the State 
ascribed to the act of murder.” [Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 297, 97 S.Ct. 
2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344.]  Manifestly, Evans had “fair notice” and 
“fair warning” at the time of his 1981 offense that the capital 
murder of a law-enforcement officer was a crime for which the 
death penalty could be imposed. 
 
Evans, 228 Va. at 476, 323 S.E.2d 114. 
January Term, 2012 
19 
 
{¶ 56} The court rejected Evans’s argument that “a full ‘fair warning’ 
inquiry must take into account that Evans was also deemed to understand that if 
he were to receive a death sentence and if his death sentence were to be set aside, 
his punishment would be life imprisonment.”  Id.  The court explained that “the ex 
post facto inquiry focuses on ‘the quantum of punishment attached to the 
crime’[Dobbert at 294], of which the defendant had notice at the time of the 
offense, and not on adjustments in the method of administering that punishment 
that are collateral to the penalty itself.”  Evans at 476-477. 
{¶ 57} The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
considering Evans’s case on habeas corpus review, reached the same conclusion 
in Evans v. Thompson, 881 F.2d 117, 119-121 (4th Cir.1989).  The amended 
statute “neither increased the punishment attached to [the] crime,” nor deprived 
the defendant of “a defense available to him when he committed murder.”  Id. at 
120.  It merely changed “the procedures surrounding the imposition of the death 
penalty.”  Id.  Hence, the state could apply the amended statute on remand 
without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
{¶ 58} The second Calder category consists of “[e]very law that 
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.”  (Emphasis 
sic.)  Id., 3 U.S. at 390.  The United States Supreme Court has explained that the 
second category applies “where a new law inflicts a punishment upon a person 
not then subject to that punishment, to any degree.”  (Emphasis sic.) Stogner v. 
California, 539 U.S. at 613-614, 123 S.Ct. 2446, 156 L.Ed.2d 544. 
{¶ 59} Stogner involved a statute extending the period of limitations for 
prosecution of sex crimes involving children.  The state sought to apply the 
extended limitations period to a case in which the former limitations period had 
expired before the extension was enacted.  Stogner held that the extended statute 
of limitations fell within the second Calder category, because the extension 
“retroactively withdraws a complete defense to prosecution after it has already 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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attached, and it does so in a manner that allows the State to withdraw this defense 
at will and with respect to individuals already identified.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Stogner at 632. The extension “subjects an individual * * * to prosecution long 
after the State has, in effect, granted an amnesty.”  Id. 
{¶ 60} Under Penix, a capital defendant whose death sentence was 
vacated on appeal had what amounted to a complete defense to the death penalty 
on remand, since the Penix rule precluded a death sentence on remand.  32 Ohio 
St.3d 369, 513 N.E.2d 744.  R.C. 2929.06(B) eliminates that defense. 
{¶ 61} But, unlike the statute in Stogner, the retroactive application of 
R.C. 2929.06(B) to White’s case would not withdraw a defense to the death 
penalty after that defense has attached.  White’s sentence was not set aside until 
after R.C. 2929.06(B) took effect.  Thus, no Penix defense to the death penalty 
had attached by the time R.C. 2929.06(B) became law. 
{¶ 62} Stogner noted that “courts have upheld extensions of unexpired 
statutes of limitations” and stated that “our holding today does not affect” such 
extensions.  (Emphasis sic.)  539 U.S. at 618, 123 S.Ct. 2446, 156 L.Ed.2d 544; 
see also id. at 632 (the state is not prevented “from extending time limits * * * for 
prosecutions not yet time barred”).  Applying R.C. 2929.06(B) to a defendant 
whose case was remanded for resentencing after that provision became law is 
analogous to extending an unexpired statute of limitations. 
{¶ 63} Finally, R.C. 2929.06(B) does not fall within the remaining Calder 
categories.  It neither retroactively criminalizes an innocent action, nor alters the 
rules of evidence to the state’s advantage, permitting conviction (or imposition of 
the death penalty) on “less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the 
time of the commission of the offence.”  Calder, 3 U.S. at 390. 
{¶ 64} We hold that R.C. 2929.06(B) does not fall within any of the four 
categories of ex post facto laws identified in Calder.  Hence, its application in this 
case does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
January Term, 2012 
21 
 
V. Double Jeopardy 
{¶ 65} Amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
(“OACDL”) contends that retroactive application of R.C. 2929.06(B) would 
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.  OACDL argues: “In effect, former [R.C. 
2929.06] created an irrebuttable presumption that the first jury, in the absence of 
the biased juror, would not have recommended death and therefore a life sentence 
must be imposed.  This is the equivalent of an acquittal of the death penalty that 
precludes reinstatement of that punishment.” 
{¶ 66} OACDL’s double-jeopardy argument rests on a misunderstanding 
of Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), 
and its progeny.  In Bullington, the United States Supreme Court applied double-
jeopardy principles to capital sentencing.  Bullington held that in a case where the 
jury had recommended a life sentence in the second stage of a bifurcated trial, the 
resulting life sentence imposed by the jury in that case deserved the same finality 
as an acquittal of the offense, because that recommendation “meant that ‘the jury 
has already acquitted the defendant of whatever was necessary to impose the 
death sentence.’ ”  Id. at 445, quoting State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 
908, 922 (Mo.1980) (Bardgett, C.J., dissenting). 
{¶ 67} Cases decided since Bullington make clear that “an ‘acquittal’ at a 
trial-like sentencing phase * * * is required to give rise to double-jeopardy 
protections.”  Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 107, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 
L.Ed.2d 588 (2003).  Moreover, to raise a double-jeopardy bar to resentencing, an 
acquittal on the merits is required.  See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211, 
104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984); Sattazahn at 107-108.  “Only a finding 
that the state has failed to prove its case for death constitutes an ‘acquittal of the 
death penalty’ for double-jeopardy purposes.”  State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 
57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 1032, ¶ 150. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 68} Thus, a jury’s verdict imposing a life sentence is an on-the-merits 
acquittal of the death penalty.  Bullington at 444-445.  Similarly, where state law 
requires a finding of an aggravating circumstance as a prerequisite to a death 
sentence, a jury’s refusal to make such a finding is an on-the-merits acquittal of 
the death penalty.  Rumsey at 211-212.  But a life sentence imposed by a judge 
solely because the jury has deadlocked, and thus failed to make any findings at 
all, is not an acquittal of the death sentence for double-jeopardy purposes.  
Sattazahn at 109-110. 
{¶ 69} Similarly, we held in Hancock that a trial court’s refusal to follow 
a jury’s death recommendation was not an acquittal of the death sentence because 
it was based, not on the trial judge’s weighing of aggravating circumstances and 
mitigating factors, but on the judge’s ruling that a procedural error invalidated the 
jury’s recommendation, leaving him without authority to impose a death sentence.  
Hancock at ¶ 144-149. 
{¶ 70} In this case, as in Hancock, “neither judge nor jury ever found that 
the prosecution had failed to prove its case that [the defendant] deserved the death 
penalty.”  Id. at  ¶ 145. To the contrary, at White’s original trial, the jury 
recommended a death sentence, and the trial judge imposed it.  Thus, both judge 
and jury found that the state had proven its case that White deserved the death 
penalty.  We therefore reject OACDL’s double-jeopardy argument. 
{¶ 71} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
___________________ 
 
 
January Term, 2012 
23 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 72} I respectfully dissent.  I would not reach the constitutional question 
because the statute does not apply to this case.  R.C. 2929.06(B) provides:  
 
Whenever any court of this state or any federal court sets 
aside, nullifies, or vacates a sentence of death imposed upon an 
offender because of error that occurred in the sentencing phase of 
the trial * * *, the trial court that sentenced the offender shall 
conduct a new hearing to resentence the offender.  If the offender 
was tried by a jury, the trial court shall impanel a new jury for the 
hearing. 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 73} In this case, error occurred during voir dire and the sentence of 
death was not reversed “because of error that occurred in the sentencing phase of 
the trial.”  Based on the plain language of the statute as informed by the rule of 
lenity, R.C. 2929.06(B) does not apply, and there is no need to empanel a new 
jury for the potential imposition of a new death sentence.  I would therefore 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the trial court’s order of 
resentencing pursuant to the law in effect at the time of his offense. 
The Sixth Circuit’s Opinion 
{¶ 74} The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated White’s sentence of 
death based on error during the jury selection phase of the trial because the trial 
court had not dismissed a juror who was biased.  The court found that “juror 
Sheppard was unable to ‘lay aside [her] impression or opinion and render a 
verdict based on the evidence presented in court.’ ”  (Brackets sic.)  White v. 
Mitchell, 431 F.3d 517, 542 (6th Cir.2005), quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 
723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
{¶ 75} No one has disputed that this error occurred during voir dire, a 
portion of the proceedings that is separate from the “trial phase” and “sentencing 
phase” of capital case proceedings.  See, e.g., State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 
2011-Ohio-4215, 954 N.E.2d 596 (separate analysis of voir dire, trial phase, and 
sentencing phase); State v. Gumm, 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 417, 653 N.E.2d 253 
(1995) (describing separation of guilt phase from sentencing phase of capital 
trial);  State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 443, 678 N.E.2d 891 (R.C. 2929.03(B)’s 
prohibition against informing jurors of potential penalties in capital case applies 
to guilt phase, not to voir dire). 
{¶ 76} The voir dire error in White’s case did not occur in the sentencing 
phase. 
The Meaning of the Statute 
{¶ 77} We have previously considered the import of the phrase “error that 
occurred in the sentencing phase of the trial,” which appears in R.C. 2929.06 as 
amended, and we held that the erroneous introduction of excluded evidence into 
the jury’s sentencing deliberations fell within that meaning.  State v. Hancock, 
108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 1032, ¶ 136.  We therefore 
remanded the case for application of the amended statute based on an exact 
reading of its language.  Now, however, the majority reads out the limiting phrase 
of “in the sentencing phase” and holds that R.C. 2929.06(B) permits empanelment 
of a new jury for resentencing, which may include a possible reimposition of the 
death sentence, “when the error infects and thus invalidates the sentencing phase 
of the trial” no matter at what point in the proceedings the error invalidating the 
sentence took place, i.e., at any phase of the trial. Paragraph one of the syllabus of 
the majority opinion thus flatly contradicts the statute as written. 
{¶ 78} The majority acknowledges that State v. Penix, 32 Ohio St.3d 369, 
513 N.E.2d 744 (1987), limited resentencing to penalties other than death 
“following vacation of the death sentence due to error occurring at the penalty 
January Term, 2012 
25 
 
phase of the proceeding.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at syllabus.  The Penix rule was 
favorable to the accused in that death could not be imposed after a remand.  As 
amended, R.C. 2929.06(B) removes the protection against a death sentence upon 
remand, requiring the empaneling of a new jury to consider all possible sentences, 
including, in White’s case, death, life imprisonment without parole, life 
imprisonment with parole eligibility after 20 full years of imprisonment, and life 
imprisonment with parole eligibility after 30 full years of imprisonment, as these 
were the penalties available on the date of White’s offense. 
{¶ 79} The majority would “infer” that the General Assembly intended 
this statute to apply to all capital offenders whose convictions are upheld but 
whose death sentences were set aside.  Majority opinion at ¶ 22.  But it is well 
accepted in determining legislative intent that a court must first look to the 
language of the statute itself.  Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105, 
304 N.E.2d 378 (1973).  “If the meaning of the statute is unambiguous and 
definite, it must be applied as written and no further interpretation is necessary.”  
State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 
543, 545, 660 N.E.2d 463 (1996).  It is also well settled that to determine the 
intent of the General Assembly, “ ‘it is the duty of this court to give effect to the 
words used [in a statute], not to delete words used or to insert words not used.’ ”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Bernardini v. Conneaut Area City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 58 
Ohio St.2d 1, 4, 387 N.E.2d 1222 (1979), quoting Columbus-Suburban Coach 
Lines v. Pub. Util. Comm., 20 Ohio St.2d 125, 127, 254 N.E.2d 8 (1969). 
{¶ 80} Bearing these principles in mind, it is improper for this court to 
insert words into a clear statute.  R.C. 2929.06(B) applies only when a death 
sentence is overturned “because of error that occurred in the sentencing phase of 
the trial.”  The majority rewrites the statute, broadening its scope based upon an 
inference regarding the General Assembly’s intent.  I would hold that “sentencing 
phase” means “sentencing phase.”  This straightforward interpretation is not “an 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
 
artificially narrow interpretation that would defeat the apparent legislative intent,” 
as the majority terms it.  Majority opinion at ¶ 20.  Instead, it is taking the 
legislature at its own word. 
The Rule of Lenity 
{¶ 81} With respect to criminal statutes, there is an additional concern.  
Even if there were an ambiguity, meaning two reasonable ways of reading the 
statute, R.C. 2901.04 provides that we must read the language of the relevant 
statute not in favor of the government, but in favor of the accused.  This rule of 
lenity, as codified, states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in division (C) or 
(D) of this section, sections of the Revised Code defining offenses or penalties 
shall be strictly construed against the state, and liberally construed in favor of the 
accused.”  R.C. 2901.04(A).  In other words, penal statutes may not be extended 
by implication to cases not falling within their terms.  We must be particularly 
mindful of the rule of lenity in death-penalty cases for as is commonly 
acknowledged, death is different. 
{¶ 82} We applied this rule in a case in which we were asked to consider 
whether a juvenile who was charged with aggravated murder and an aggravating-
circumstances specification but was ineligible for the death penalty due to age 
was entitled to the additional rights afforded to capital defendants.  State v. 
Harwell, 102 Ohio St.3d 128, 2004-Ohio-2149, 807 N.E.2d 330.  The state relied 
upon dicta from this court that “R.C. 2901.02(B) was amended effective April 4, 
1984 so that only an offense for which death may be imposed as a penalty is a 
capital offense.”  State ex rel. Corrigan v. McMonagle, 12 Ohio St.3d 15, 16, 465 
N.E.2d 382 (1984), fn. 1.  We recognized that although the statement may have 
aptly characterized what the General Assembly intended, it did not characterize 
what the General Assembly enacted.  Harwell at ¶ 6.  As in all other matters 
involving R.C. Title 29, our analysis is to be guided by the General Assembly’s 
overriding concern that criminal statutes shall be strictly construed against the 
January Term, 2012 
27 
 
state and liberally construed in favor of the accused.  Id.  We held that R.C. 
2901.04(B) plainly requires that an indictment charging an aggravating-
circumstances specification pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A) must be regarded as 
charging a capital offense.  Id. at ¶ 7-10.  We rejected the state’s position that the 
additional protections afforded a capital defendant attach only when there is an 
actual possibility of a death sentence.  To accept this proposition “would turn the 
legislative imperative of construing R.C. Title 29 strictly against the state and 
liberally in favor of the accused on its head.”  Id. at ¶10. 
{¶ 83} In my view, this is exactly what the majority has done in affirming 
the judgment of the court of appeals. 
{¶ 84} In another case, we vacated one of two death penalties because of a 
voir dire error and returned the matter to the trial court for resentencing.  State v. 
Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 53, 2005-Ohio-5981, 836 N.E.2d 1173, ¶ 178.  Although 
we upheld the aggravated-murder conviction and specification in Jackson, 
because the trial court abused its discretion by refusing defense counsel’s requests 
to advise prospective jurors that one of the murdered victims was a three-year-old 
child and by refusing to allow voir dire on possible bias stemming from that fact, 
we remanded the cause for “resentencing consistent with R.C. 2929.06.”  Id. at 
¶ 62. 
{¶ 85} Upon remand, the trial court concluded that amended R.C. 2929.06 
did not authorize the empaneling of a new jury to consider reimposition of a death 
sentence because the error had not occurred at the sentencing phase of the trial:  
 
Certainly, paragraph (B) does not clearly apply.  Paragraph (B) 
applies when a sentence of death is set aside, nullified, or vacated 
“because of error that occurred in the sentencing phase of the trial 
and if division (A) of this section does not apply.”  If the error 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
 
occurred during voir dire, which was before the sentencing phase, 
the error could not have occurred during the sentencing phase. 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  State v. Jackson, Allen C.P. No. CR-2002-0011, at 4 (Nov. 21, 
2006). 
{¶ 86} The trial court concluded that  
 
under R.C. 2929.06(A), a resentencing hearing is necessary 
wherein the Court shall impose upon the offender one of the 
sentences of life imprisonment that are available under division 
(D) of section 2929.03 * * * at the time the offender committed the 
offense for which the sentence of death was imposed. 
 
Id. at 6.  I believe that the trial court in Jackson correctly read the statute as it was 
written. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 87} The date of White’s offense was January 19, 1996.  We have held 
that R.C. 2929.06(B) could not be applied to a case involving an aggravated 
murder committed before October 16, 1996, because the General Assembly had 
not expressly made R.C. 2929.06(B) retroactive.  State v. Williams, 103 Ohio 
St.3d 112, 2004-Ohio-4747, 814 N.E.2d 818, syllabus.  The new amendment, 
effective March 23, 2005, applies only to certain offenders sentenced to death for 
an aggravated murder that was committed on or after October 19, 1981.  R.C. 
2929.06(E).  The class of offenders to whom R.C. 2929.06 applies by its terms are 
those whose sentence of death was vacated because of error that occurred in the 
sentencing phase of the trial.  Because I would hold that the amended statute does 
not apply to White, I dissent and would hold that he must be sentenced under the 
January Term, 2012 
29 
 
version of R.C. 2929.06(B) that was in effect on January 19, 1996, the date of his 
offense. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Nathan A. Ray and Randall 
L. Porter, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
Ramona Francesconi Rogers, Ashland County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Paul T. Lange, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Law Offices of Michael J. Benza and Michael J. Benza, urging reversal 
for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
Carrie L. Davis and James L. Hardiman, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation. 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 
Taylor, Chief Counsel, Appellate Division, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 
Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney Ron O’Brien. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Chief 
Deputy Solicitor General, and Emily S. Schlesinger, Deputy Solicitor, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General. 
______________________