Case Title: Estate of Short

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Estate of Short1990 WY 8785 P.2d 1167Case Number: 89-121Decided: 01/26/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
THE 
ESTATE OF CHARLES LOUIS SHORT. OWEN SHORT, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE,
APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

WALTER EARL HALL AND 
VIRGINIA MAY HALL,

 APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Platte County, John T. Langdon, J.

Fred W. Phifer, 
Wheatland, for appellant.

Frank J. Jones, 
Wheatland, for appellees.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Owen 
Short, the personal representative of the estate of Charles Louis Short (the 
decedent), appeals from a partial summary judgment dismissing his complaint 
insofar as it pertained to the canceling of a deed transferring the decedent's 
farm to Appellees Walter Earl Hall and Virginia May Hall due to the alleged 
exercise of undue influence over the decedent. From a bench trial, Short appeals 
the district court's decision to exclude statements made by the decedent and the 
court's award to the estate for money the decedent gave or loaned to the 
Halls.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Short raises the 
following issues:

     1. The Court erred in 
granting the Appellees['] Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to the 
transfer of Charles Short's farm to the Appellees based upon a finding that 
there were no genuine issues of fact regarding undue influence.

     2. The Court erred in 
finding that Thirty-Five Hundred Dollars ($3,500.00) of the Six Thousand 
Dollar[s] ($6,000.00) represented by Check # 4366 was given to Appellees as 
payment for a joint enterprise in building a garage that was attached to the 
Appellees' house.

3. The Court erred in not 
granting the Appellant Judgment for the following money received by Appellees 
from Charles Short:

a.      
One 
Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) evidenced by Check # 4310

b.      
One 
Thousand Seven Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents ($1,007.99) evidenced by Check # 
4472 

     4. The Court erred in 
ordering that any testimony of Plaintiff's concerning any statement of 
decedent, which ultimately turned out to be uncorroborated, was to be 
disregarded as if said testimony had never been given.

[¶4]      The materials 
presented in favor of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment 
reveal that, in 1986, the decedent owned and lived on a farm near Wheatland, 
Wyoming. He was approximately sixty-nine years old and had been a widower since 
1985. On December 5, 1986, the decedent was hospitalized with acute abdominal 
pain and had surgery. After his release from the hospital on December 15, 1986, 
the decedent went to live with the Halls, despite the fact that he had family 
members living in the Wheatland area. The record does not clearly indicate the 
reasons for the decedent's decision to live with the Halls, but it does show 
that the decedent and the Halls had been friends for several years. The record 
also reveals that the decedent mistakenly believed that Mrs. Hall was a 
nurse.

[¶5]      On December 24, 
1986, the decedent executed a warranty deed conveying his farm to the Halls for 
one dollar and "other good and valuable considerations," and the Halls recorded 
the deed. According to Mr. Hall, while the decedent was in the hospital, the 
decedent told him that he was going to transfer the farm to the Halls. Mr. Hall 
was the only person present when the decedent made that statement.

[¶6]      In February 1987, 
the decedent had another surgery and subsequently learned that he had cancer. He 
continued to live with the Halls until March 1987, when he moved back to the 
farm. The Halls moved their trailer to the farm to live near the decedent. The 
decedent died of cancer on October 30, 1987.

[¶7]      On November 19, 
1987, Short filed a complaint, alleging that the Halls fraudulently induced the 
decedent to convey his farm to them for no valuable consideration. Short also 
alleged that the decedent was not mentally competent to voluntarily convey his 
property and that the Halls had used fraud and undue influence to strip the 
decedent of all his money and personal property. Short sought cancellation of 
the deed conveying the farm to the Halls, an accounting and judgment for all the 
personal property and money taken from the decedent, a judgment for the amount 
of the Halls' outstanding mortgages on the farm, and $50,000 in punitive damages 
for the Halls' willful and malicious conduct.

[¶8]      The Halls filed 
an answer, generally denying Short's allegations, and, after extensive discovery 
and one continuance, moved for a summary judgment on January 19, 1989. On March 
22, 1989, the district court issued an order, on the basis of a concession by 
Short, stating that Short did not have the right to object to the competency of 
the decedent or to the execution of the warranty deed in question. On April 5, 
1989, the district court granted a partial summary judgment in favor of the 
Halls on all issues pertaining to the decedent's transfer of his farm to the 
Halls. In its decision letter, the court stated that Short had failed to present 
any facts indicating that the Halls had exercised undue influence over the 
decedent by destroying his free agency. The district court also decided that the 
Halls were not entitled to a summary judgment on the issues relating to money 
and personal property which they had allegedly received from the decedent. The 
court held that the resolution of those issues involved factual questions, and, 
therefore, Short was entitled to a trial.

[¶9]      The evidence 
produced at the trial held on April 13, 1989, with conflicts properly resolved 
in favor of the Halls, revealed the following facts. On June 22, 1986, the 
decedent wrote a check payable to Mr. Hall for $10,000. The decedent and Mr. 
Hall agreed that the amount was a loan with an annual interest rate of eight 
percent. Mr. Hall made nine payments on the loan in the amount of $200 each. At 
the trial, Mr. Hall testified that he discontinued making payments because the 
decedent told him to forget about paying off the loan. Mr. Hall was unable to 
provide any other evidence supporting the contention that the decedent forgave 
the loan.

[¶10]   After the decedent and the Halls 
moved to the farm in 1987, the decedent wrote a $1,000 check payable to Mr. 
Hall. The Halls claimed that the money was for one-half of the cost of a 
television satellite dish which was to be utilized by both the decedent and the 
Halls. Approximately four and one-half months after the decedent wrote the 
check, the Halls purchased a satellite dish for $1,937.43. Mr. Hall testified 
that he originally used the $1,000 for another purpose but eventually completed 
the deal with the decedent and purchased the satellite dish. The decedent also 
wrote a check payable to Mr. Hall for $6,000, which the Halls claimed was a 
gift. Mr. Hall's testimony concerning the intended use of this money was 
inconsistent. At one point, he stated that the money was to be used for moving 
expenses and for the construction of a garage on the farm. He later testified 
that he actually used $2,500 of the $6,000 to modify his airplane.

[¶11]   In October 1987, just before he 
died, the decedent gave Mr. Hall another check in the amount of $1,007.99. Mr. 
Hall testified that the decedent wrote that check to pay for the property taxes 
due on the property which he had given to the Halls. Mr. Hall subsequently wrote 
a check payable to the Platte County Treasurer in the amount of $1,007.99. In 
addition, the decedent left Mr. Hall several signed blank checks and instructed 
him to use the rest of the money in the decedent's checking account to pay for 
the decedent's funeral expenses. Mr. Hall filled out one of the blank checks for 
$4,200 and paid three of the decedent's bills. Mr. Hall did not pay for the 
decedent's funeral, but he did offer to return the remainder of the $4,200 to 
the estate.

[¶12]   On May 4, 1989, the district court 
rendered a judgment in favor of Short for $16,909.95. The court first ordered 
that the Halls pay Short the unused portion of the $4,200 which the decedent had 
left for payment of his funeral expenses. That amount equaled $4,065.62. Second, 
the court found that the $10,000 check from the decedent to Mr. Hall was a loan 
which was not forgiven by the decedent. The court awarded $10,149.98 to Short - 
the unpaid balance plus eight percent interest.1 Third, the district court decided 
that the Halls owed $2,500 to Short for the portion of the decedent's $6,000 
they used to modify their airplane. The court stated in its decision letter that 
the decedent authorized the Halls to use the money on the construction of a 
garage but not on airplane modification. Fourth, the district court awarded 
$194.35 to Short for a refund the gas company made to the decedent. Finally, the 
court ordered that Short's testimony "concerning any statement of decedent, 
which ultimately turned out to be uncorroborated, must be disregarded pursuant 
to the provisions of Wyoming Statute 1-12-102 as if said testimony had never 
been given." Short appealed from that judgment and from the partial summary 
judgment in favor of the Halls.

[¶13]   Summary judgment is proper if the 
moving party establishes that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that 
the court should grant summary judgment as a matter of law. If the movant meets 
that burden, the party opposing the motion has the burden to present specific 
facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. Nelson v. 
Crimson Enterprises, Inc., 777 P.2d 73 (Wyo. 1989); Jones Land and Livestock Co. 
v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 733 P.2d 258 (Wyo. 1987).

Undue 
Influence

[¶14]   Short asserts that the district 
court erred by granting a summary judgment in favor of the Halls on the issue of 
undue influence. This Court recently stated that the three elements of undue 
influence are: "(1) opportunity to control; (2) a condition permitting 
subversion; and (3) activity on the part of the person charged." Macaraeg v. 
Wilson, 749 P.2d 272, 277 (Wyo. 1988). We have also held that courts should 
zealously scrutinize deed transactions between people in confidential 
relationships. If the party challenging the validity of a deed transaction on 
the basis of undue influence establishes a confidential relationship, the party 
who received the property has the burden to establish that the transaction was 
fair and conducted in good faith. Perry v. Vaught, 624 P.2d 776 (Wyo. 1981).2

[¶15]   Short has failed to present 
evidence sufficient to meet his burden in opposing the motion for summary 
judgment. The depositions of the decedent's family members exemplify Short's 
lack of sufficient evidence. Counsel for the Halls deposed the decedent's 
nephew, sister-in-law, and two brothers (one of which was Owen Short). All four 
deponents lived in the Wheatland area and claimed to know the decedent very 
well. When asked what they knew about the decedent conveying his farm to the 
Halls, all four deponents indicated they had no knowledge of the Halls exerting 
undue influence upon the decedent.

[¶16]   Short also contends that a 
confidential relationship existed between the decedent and the Halls and that, 
therefore, the Halls have the burden to establish the fairness of the 
transaction. We disagree. In Brug v. Case, 600 P.2d 710 (Wyo. 1979), we held 
that a confidential relationship existed between two parties in a deed 
transaction because of the grantee's active involvement in the procurement of 
the deed, the grantee's actions as a liaison between the grantor and the 
grantor's lawyer, the grantor's weakened physical and mental conditions, and the 
fact that the grantor gave the grantee a power of attorney.3 In Perry, 624 P.2d 776, we held 
that a confidential relationship existed because the grantor was totally 
dependent upon the grantee, the grantee helped procure the deed, and the grantor 
was somewhat senile and had no family in the area where he lived. Both 
relationships involved the reposal of confidence by the grantors and the 
exercise of control and dominance by the grantees.

[¶17]   In this case, Short failed to 
present any evidence indicating that the Halls controlled or even influenced the 
decedent's decisions concerning his financial affairs at the time when he 
conveyed the farm. To the contrary, the decedent's nephew and brother stated in 
their depositions that the decedent took care of his own financial affairs until 
just before he died. Thus, we hold that, with regard to the issue of undue 
influence, no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the Halls are entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law.

Sufficiency of the 
Evidence

[¶18]   Short contends that the district 
court erred when it found that the decedent's $6,000 payment to the Halls was 
his contribution to the joint enterprise of building a garage. Despite the fact 
that the district court awarded $2,500 to Short because the Halls used that 
amount for their own purposes, Short claims that he is entitled to the remaining 
$3,500.

[¶19]   Short's argument challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the district court's decision. We will 
review the evidence presented to the district court according to the following 
standard:

In reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support findings of fact by the trial court, this 
court will examine only the evidence favorable to the prevailing party and give 
to it every favorable inference. When examined under this standard, if there is 
substantial evidence to support the factual findings by the trial court, its 
order will not be disturbed.

State ex rel. 
Worker's Compensation Division v. Lewis, 739 P.2d 1225, 1226 (Wyo. 1987) 
(citations omitted), quoted in Bagshaw v. Circle H Oilfield Service, 753 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶20]   Substantial evidence exists to 
support the district court's findings that the decedent paid $6,000 to the Halls 
for their moving expenses and for his contribution to a joint enterprise and 
that the Halls used $3,500 of that $6,000 for those purposes. Mr. Hall testified 
that the decedent gave the Halls $6,000 for moving expenses and for the 
construction of a two-car garage. He also stated that they used less than $500 
for their move to the farm and that he used $2,500 to modify his airplane. In 
addition, Benny Ryff, a friend of the decedent's who helped build the garage, 
testified that the decedent was actively involved in designing and supervising 
the construction of the garage. In light of the fact that Short did not present 
any evidence to the contrary, the district court could have reasonably found 
that $3,500 of the $6,000 which the decedent gave to the Halls was for his 
contribution to a joint enterprise and for the Halls' moving 
expenses.

[¶21]   Short also challenges the district 
court's decision not to award him the $1,000 which, as the Halls testified, was 
the decedent's payment for one-half of the cost of a television satellite dish 
and the $1,007.99 which, as Mr. Hall testified, was the decedent's payment of 
property taxes on the farm. The district court's decision not to allow Short's 
recovery of those amounts is supported by substantial evidence. The Halls 
presented testimony and cancelled checks supporting their claim that the 
decedent voluntarily expended $1,007.99 for property taxes and $1,000 for a 
satellite dish.

Wyo. Stat. § 1-12-102 
(1977)

[¶22]   In its decision letter, the 
district court stated that, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 1-12-102 (1977), the court 
must disregard any uncorroborated testimony by Short concerning a statement made 
by the decedent. Short asserts, and the Halls concede, that the district court 
misconstrued § 1-12-102. Short also contends that the court's error was plain 
error.

Section 1-12-102 
provides:

     In an action or suit 
by or against a person who from any cause is incapable of testifying, or by or 
against a trustee, executor, administrator, heir or other representative of the 
person incapable of testifying, no judgment or decree founded on uncorroborated 
testimony shall be rendered in favor of a party whose interests are adverse to 
the person incapable of testifying or his trustee, executor, administrator, heir 
or other representative. In any such action or suit, if the adverse party 
testifies, all entries, memorandum and declarations by the party incapable of 
testifying made while he was capable, relevant to the matter in issue, may be 
received in evidence.

We agree with 
the parties that the district court erroneously concluded that Short's 
uncorroborated testimony should be disregarded. See Consolidated Construction, 
Inc. v. Smith, 634 P.2d 902 (Wyo. 1981) (discussing the application of § 
1-12-102). Section 1-12-102 does not specify the source of the uncorroborated 
testimony which is insufficient to sustain a judgment against a person incapable 
of testifying or that person's representative. It simply states that such a 
judgment cannot be founded upon uncorroborated testimony. We hold, however, that 
Short failed to show that the district court's interpretation of § 1-12-102 
prejudiced his substantial rights. Absent a showing of prejudice to substantial 
rights, we will not reverse. Weisbrod v. Ely, 767 P.2d 171 (Wyo. 1989); Anderson 
v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶23]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The trial court 
calculated the amount of interest owed for a period ending on April 30, 
1989.

2 While the analysis for 
undue influence is different for the transfer of property by deed than it is for 
the transfer of property by will, Bergren v. Berggren, 77 Wyo. 438, 317 P.2d 1101, 1107 (1957) (quoting 38 C.J.S., Gifts § 34 (1943)), this Court has 
examined the same or similar elements of undue influence in both situations. 
Brug v. Case, 600 P.2d 710 (Wyo. 1979). See O'Donnell v. Western National Bank 
of Casper, 705 P.2d 1242 (Wyo. 1985).

3 We note that Brug, 600 P.2d 710, involved a deed transaction between spouses. The existence of a family 
relationship, however, does not necessarily establish the existence of a 
confidential relationship. Id; Zullig v. Zullig, 502 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 
1972).