Case Title: State v. Doleszny

Citation: 176 Vt. 203, 2004 VT 9, 844 A.2d 773

Docket Number: 2001-310

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2004-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Doleszny (2001-310); 176 Vt. 203; 844 A.2d 773

2004 VT 9

[Filed 30-Jan-2004]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                  2004 VT 9
  	
                                No. 2001-310

  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,

                                                 Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit
  John Doleszny                                  November Term, 2003

  David Suntag, J.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and John Treadwell, Assistant
    Attorney General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Anna Saxman, Deputy Defender
    General, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Reiber, JJ.

       ¶  1.  DOOLEY, J.   The question presented is whether the district
  court's decision permitting jurors to submit questions for the witnesses in
  this criminal trial deprived defendant of an impartial jury and a fair
  trial.  For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the practice of
  jurors questioning witnesses in the trial court's discretion is
  permissible.  In reaching this conclusion, we join the vast majority of
  states, federal courts, and commentators that have considered this issue.
  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.  
   
       ¶  2.  The pertinent procedural and factual background may be
  summarized as follows.  In July 2000, defendant was charged with bribing an
  executive officer in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1101(a)(1).  In a pretrial
  order, the district court invited the parties to comment on a set of
  proposed preliminary jury instructions, including an instruction that
  informed the jurors they could submit questions of their own to the
  witnesses after the attorneys had completed their examinations. Defendant
  filed a written motion, objecting to the proposed instruction on the ground
  that allowing juror questions risked compromising the jury's neutrality and
  reducing the State's constitutional burden of proving defendant's guilt. 
  The State filed no response. (FN1)  
           
       ¶  3.  The court denied defendant's motion in a ten-page written
  decision, concluding that juror questions would "enhance the search for
  truth without violating Defendant's right to due process," and that
  defendant's concerns could be adequately addressed through a series of
  procedural protections.  In its decision, the court noted that although
  defendant had failed to adequately support his claims that there were
  "compelling circumstances not to allow juror questioning in this case" and
  that allowing juror questions "will greatly reduce the State's burden to
  prove its case" both defendant and the State were permitted to "make
  specific objections to any question."  The court then proceeded to deliver
  the charge as proposed.  The instruction informed the jurors that they
  could seek to have questions of their own submitted to the witnesses after
  the attorneys had finished asking questions, but cautioned the jurors to
  exercise the opportunity "sparingly," to limit their questions to "facts,"
  and to "remain neutral and impartial and not assume the role of
  investigator or advocate."  The court explained that it would solicit juror
  questions after the lawyers had finished with each witness, that the jurors
  were to write their questions on a piece of paper without identifying
  themselves, and then give the paper to the court officer.  The court warned
  that it may decide not to ask a question or may ask the question in a
  modified form because of the rules of evidence or for other reasons, and
  asked the jurors not to speculate about why a question was not asked, or to
  hold it against the State or  defendant, or to give any more or less weight
  to a question solely because it was asked by a juror. (FN2)  Defendant did not
  place any objection on the record after the instructions were given.  The
  case proceeded to trial.  Each side presented one witness.  The State
  called the arresting officer, who testified that he was on patrol on the
  morning of May 26, 2000, when he observed a tow-truck towing a vehicle
  without flashing its emergency lights.  The officer followed the tow-truck
  for several blocks in his cruiser, clocked its speed at forty-five miles
  per hour in a twenty-five mile per hour zone, and signaled the driver to
  pull over.  The officer approached the tow-truck, asked the driver - later
  identified as defendant - for his license and registration, and informed
  him that he had been towing a vehicle without emergency lights and
  speeding. When defendant learned that the officer was preparing a speeding
  ticket, he pleaded with the officer to cite him for the emergency-lights
  violation instead in order to avoid the penalty points that accompany a
  speeding violation.  According to the officer, defendant then asked him if
  there was "any way we can work this out" and the officer asked defendant
  what he meant.  Defendant responded that "he could tow my car for free" and
  explained that he had towed the Police Department's cars for free in the
  past.  The officer declined the offer, completed the ticket, and followed
  defendant to the service station.

       ¶  4.  After the attorneys completed their examinations, the court
  inquired whether "[a]ny jurors have a question they'd like to put to this
  witness?"  Two questions were submitted.  The court convened a bench
  conference, and defense counsel indicated that she did not object to either
  question.  The State objected on relevance grounds to the second question,
  which the court overruled.  The court then addressed the two questions to
  the officer, inquiring first whether defendant had specifically  "used
  words about towing a police car or towing your personal car or neither?" 
  The officer responded that defendant had "told me that he could tow my car
  for me."  The second question was "how accurate" the officer considered his
  assessment of the tow-truck's speed.  The officer stated that it was "very
  accurate."  Defense counsel then engaged in a brief re-cross examination,
  inquiring into the distance required for an accurate determination of a
  vehicle's speed.  The State had no follow-up questions.      

       ¶  5.  Defendant was the only witness for the defense.  He
  acknowledged that he had asked the police officer for a "break" based on
  the services that he had provided the Police Department in the past. 
  Defendant claimed, however, that he was only attempting to persuade the
  officer to cite him for failing to illuminate the vehicle's
  emergency-lights rather than speeding.  He denied offering the officer
  anything in return for his dispensing with the speeding ticket.  
   
       ¶  6.  When the attorneys had completed their examination of
  defendant, the court once again inquired whether any of the jurors had
  questions for the witness. Five questions were submitted. At a bench
  conference to review the questions, neither counsel objected to the first
  question, which inquired about the make and model of defendant's tow-truck
  and the vehicle being towed.  Defense counsel objected on relevance grounds
  to the second question, which was whether the speeding ticket had been
  paid.  The court overruled the objection, observing that it was a
  "legitimate question . . . [and]  doesn't hurt anybody."  The next question
  was why the officer had followed defendant to the garage.  The State
  objected on the basis of relevance but the court overruled the objection. 
  The fourth question was whether or not it mattered that defendant was
  speeding "from a legal standpoint."  The court ruled without elaboration
  that it would not ask this question.  The final question was why defendant
  had towed police vehicles in the past for free.  There were no objections
  to this question. 

       ¶  7.  The court then addressed the four approved questions to
  defendant.  Defendant, in response, described the make and model of his
  wrecker and the car he was towing, indicated that the speeding ticket was
  still pending, stated that the officer had followed him to the garage
  because a "service engine" light was on in his cruiser, and explained that
  he had declined to bill the Police Department for services in the past "as
  a courtesy."  The State then re-cross examined defendant, asking why he had
  not billed the Police Department for services when he had testified that he
  could not afford to tow the officer's car for free.  Defendant responded
  that it was a general business practice among towing companies.  Defense
  counsel asked several additional questions on re-direct.  The State then
  re-called the officer as a rebuttal witness, inquiring as to the reason
  that he had followed defendant to the service station.  The officer
  confirmed that it was because of a "check engine" light.     

       ¶  8.  The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged.  The court
  denied a subsequent motion for new trial, and later sentenced defendant to
  zero to thirty days, all suspended, and placed defendant on probation. 
  This appeal followed.  
   
       ¶  9.  Defendant renews on appeal the objections that he raised
  below to the trial court's decision to allow juror questioning.  The State
  raises a procedural bar at the threshold, however, arguing that the claims
  were not adequately preserved for review because defendant failed to
  specifically object on the record to the court's decision to allow juror
  questioning after the court read the preliminary instructions to the jury. 
  For the reasons stated below, we agree with the State's argument and
  conclude that defendant needed to object to the preliminary juror
  instructions to preserve this question for appeal. 
   
       ¶  10.  This Court has continuously held that litigants must renew
  objections to instructions on the record in order to preserve the questions
  for appeal or this Court will review such issues only for plain error.  See
  State v. Tahair, 172 Vt. 101, 104-05, 772 A.2d 1079, 1082 (2001); State v.
  Carpenter, 170 Vt. 371, 374,