Case Title: JENKINS v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
BOBBY JACK JENKINS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 141Case Number: No. S-11-0003Decided: 10/12/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
BOBBY 
JACK JENKINS,Petitioner,v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Respondent.
 
Original 
Proceeding
Petition 
for Writ of Review
District 
Court of Goshen County
The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge 
 
Representing 
Petitioner:
Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Olson.
 
Representing 
Respondent:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Stewart M. 
Young, Faculty Director, Jessica Y. Frint, Student Director, and Gregg 
Bonazinga, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Bonazinga.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      The petitioner, 
Bobby Jack Jenkins, was charged with misdemeanor animal cruelty after a horse he 
owned was discovered in very dire physical condition.  He was convicted in circuit court and 
the district court affirmed that conviction.  He now brings the matter to this Court 
on a petition for review, asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective and 
therefore the decision should be reversed.  
Finding no prejudicial error, we affirm.  
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      1.    Was the petitioner denied 
effective assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel’s failure to object 
to testimony and argument regarding the arrest and incarceration of both the 
petitioner and his brother?
 
            
2.    Was the 
petitioner denied effective assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel’s 
failure to object when the prosecutor elicited improper witness comment on 
another witness’s testimony?
 
            
3.    Was the 
petitioner denied effective assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel’s 
failure to object to the prosecutor’s questions relating to irrelevant 
evidence?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      On August 15, 
2009, L.N. went with the petitioner’s mother to an uninhabited ranch in Goshen 
County to look at a pickup truck that was for sale.  At the ranch, L.N. looked over some 
horses that were also for sale.  He 
was aghast to find a paint filly with a halter ingrown into her head, between 
her nostrils and eyes.  Upon L.N.’s 
return home, he described to his wife what he had seen and she insisted that 
they return to the ranch to care for the filly, which they did.  L.N. separated the filly and her mother 
from the other horses, roped the filly, and cut the halter from its head.  The filly’s breathing was labored and 
pus ran from its nose.  When L.N. 
cut the halter to remove it, blood gushed from the horse’s head and bone was 
exposed.  L.N. and his wife took the 
mare and the filly to a veterinarian and called the sheriff’s office.  When the petitioner arrived at L.N.’s 
house the following day to pick up the horses, he was arrested for animal 
cruelty.
 
[¶4]      A circuit court 
jury found the petitioner guilty of animal cruelty, a misdemeanor, in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-203(b) (LexisNexis 2011).  The petitioner appealed his conviction 
to the district court, where the conviction was affirmed.  This Court granted a petition for writ 
of review.  Finding no error 
appearing in the record, we also affirm.1  See W.R.A.P. 
13.08.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶5]      Our standard of 
review when considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is well 
known to Wyoming litigants:
 
An 
appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the 
record that: 1) counsel’s performance was deficient and 2) prejudice 
resulted.  Hirsch v. State, 2006 WY 66, ¶ 15, 135 P.3d 586, 594 (Wyo. 2006), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, [2064], 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  Both components of the ineffectiveness 
inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact.  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 698, 104 S.Ct. 
[at 2070].  Our review, therefore, 
is de novo.  United States v. Owens, 882 F.2d 1493, 
fn. 16 (10th Cir. 1989).
 
Dettloff 
v. State, 
2007 WY 29, ¶ 17, 152 P.3d 376, 382 (Wyo. 2007).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶6]      
The 
petitioner points to three separate instances in which he alleges his trial 
counsel was ineffective.  Before 
addressing these issues, however, we will articulate certain general principles 
of law that guide our analysis and govern the petitioner’s 
claims.
 
When 
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount 
determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel’s 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.  Hirsch, ¶ 15, 135 P.3d  at 593.  We indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 
exercise of reasonable professional judgment.  Id.  Under the two-prong standard articulated 
in Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 
2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)], to warrant reversal on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that his counsel failed to 
render such assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably competent 
attorney and that counsel’s deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case.  Id.  “The benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result.”  Id., quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S.Ct. 
[at 2064].
 
The 
burden of proving that counsel was ineffective rests entirely on the 
appellant.   Martinez v. State, 2006 WY 20, ¶ 23, 128 P.3d 652, 663 (Wyo. 2006).  The 
appellant must also demonstrate the existence of a reasonable probability that, 
absent the deficiency in counsel’s performance, the result of the proceedings 
would have been different.  Id.  A failure to make the required showing 
of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats an 
ineffectiveness claim.  Id.  An ineffectiveness claim may be disposed 
of solely on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice.  Id.  
 
Dettloff, 
2007 WY 29, ¶¶ 18–19, 152 P.3d at 382–83.  
We have also stated that when assailing counsel’s assistance, an 
appellant must provide more than mere speculation or equivocal inferences.  Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 36, 99 P.3d 928, 943 (Wyo. 2004), cert. 
denied, 544 U.S. 1062, 125 S. Ct. 2513, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1113 
(2005).
 
Was 
the petitioner denied effective assistance ofcounsel as a result of trial 
counsel’s failure toobject to testimony and argument regarding the 
arrestand incarceration of both the petitioner and his 
brother?
 
[¶7]      The petitioner’s 
first ineffective assistance claim involves his trial counsel’s failure to keep 
out of evidence comments about his arrest and his brother’s incarceration.  Regarding his arrest, the petitioner 
complains that several witnesses—his mother, L.N., and the Livestock Board 
investigator—all mentioned his arrest in some form during their testimony.  L.N. testified, “When [the petitioner] 
showed up to take the horse, he and his significant other, I guess you’d call 
it, they showed up with a pickup and a trailer, and he showed up to pick them 
up.  Well, he wound up getting 
handcuffed, arrested and hauled off.”  
The Livestock Board investigator testified:
 
Q.    So did you as part of your 
investigation make any attempt to contact [the 
petitioner]?
 
A.    Yes, we did find out where he 
was – where he was at.
 
Q.    And did you go to that 
location and speak with him?
 
A.    Yes, 
sir.
 
Q.    You and [another 
investigator]?
 
A.    Yes.
 
Q.    Okay.  Where was that?
 
A.    The detention center at 
Goshen County Sheriff’s Office.
 
The 
prosecutor, after questioning the investigator about the contents of his 
interview with the petitioner, stated, “All right.  Did that fairly conclude what you spoke 
of in your interview at the jail with [the petitioner]?”  Also, the prosecutor referred to the 
Livestock Board investigator’s interview with the petitioner during his opening 
statement, “So once [L.N.] notified the sheriff’s office, the animal was taken 
to the veterinarian, then the Livestock Board was notified, and they conducted 
an investigation.  As part of their 
investigation they interviewed the defendant while he was incarcerated at the 
Goshen County Detention Facility . . . .”  
The petitioner’s mother, when being questioned about the order of events 
stated, “I didn’t.  Wait a 
minute.  I don’t think I saw him, 
not till he was arrested.”  Finally, 
the prosecutor mentioned the petitioner’s incarceration in his closing argument 
when he said, 
 
When 
did [the petitioner’s] brother Pete thing come about?  I think the first mention of [it] was 
when [the Animal Board investigators] went down and interviewed on the 21st, 
came up here rather and interviewed him in the jail, then all of a sudden 
there’s talk of brother Pete.
 
. 
. . . 
 
            
Did [the petitioner] simply make up this story of Pete supposedly taking 
care of the horses?  Well, we heard 
him change one story.  When [the 
Animal Board investigators] talked to - - talked to him in the jail, they said, 
“How long did you have the halter on there?” 
 
[¶8]      Citing W.R.E. 
4022, the petitioner asserts that his 
trial counsel should have objected to the above-quoted testimony because it was 
irrelevant.  The relevance and 
admissibility of the statements, however, are immaterial inasmuch as we can 
discern no material prejudice arising from the statements.  Dettloff, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 19, 152 P.3d  at 382 (“An ineffectiveness claim may be disposed of solely on the ground 
of lack of sufficient prejudice.”).  
“Indeed, 'if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the 
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that 
course should be followed.’” Martinez v. 
State, 2006 WY 20, ¶ 23, 128 P.3d 652, 663 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
697, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2069, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)).
 
To 
show prejudice, Appellant must prove that “counsel’s errors were so serious as 
to deprive [appellant] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” [Pendleton v. State, 2008 WY 36, ¶ 20, 
180 P.3d 212, 219 (Wyo. 2008)].  
Stated differently, prejudice means that there is “a reasonable 
probability that, absent the deficiency in counsel’s performance, the result of 
the proceedings would have been different.”  Id. at ¶ 21, 180 P.3d  at 
219.
 
Montez 
v. State, 
2009 WY 17, ¶ 3, 201 P.3d 434, 436 (Wyo. 2009).  As noted above, it is the petitioner’s 
burden to show prejudice.  See supra ¶ 6.
 
[¶9]      The petitioner 
points to no specific prejudicial effect arising from these statements, but only 
makes this general assertion: “Instead of a fair assessment of [the petitioner], 
however the jury was presented with the idea of [sic] that he was the kind of 
person who was 'hauled off in handcuffs’ and that he came from a family of the 
same ilk.”  This vague assertion, 
without more, is simply inadequate to show a reasonable probability that the 
result of the proceedings would have been different if not for the admission of 
those statements.  In Foster v. State, 2010 WY 8, 224 P.3d 1 
(Wyo. 2010), finding no prejudice arising from testimony that the defendant was 
currently an inmate in jail, we said: 
 
By 
the nature of the case, the jury was aware that the appellant was charged with 
eleven drug-related crimes. Surely, it was not a big surprise to the jury to 
find that the appellant had been in jail as a result. We will not presume 
prejudice, and we therefore cannot say that the district court abused its 
discretion in admitting this testimony.
 
Id. 
at 
¶ 25, at 12.
 
[¶10]   In the present case, it is apparent 
that the references to the petitioner’s arrest and incarceration were made in 
passing and as a means of providing context and foundation for other 
testimony.  There was no undue 
emphasis placed on the petitioner’s arrest or incarceration, and there is no 
indication that the prosecution elicited or attempted to use the testimony for 
any substantive purpose, such as to impeach the petitioner’s credibility or for 
another purpose impermissible under W.R.E. 404(b).3  As discussed in Foster, it is doubtful that the jury 
would have been surprised to hear that the petitioner was arrested for the crime 
for which he was being tried, and that he was interviewed about that crime while 
in a detention facility.  Finally, 
we find that any prejudice that might have resulted would have been mitigated by 
the instruction advising the jury that: “Citation in this case is only a formal 
charge and is not to be considered evidence of guilt on the part of the 
[petitioner].  Nothing is to be 
taken by implication against him.”  
We conclude that the petitioner failed to show material prejudice, and as 
a result failed to show ineffective assistance.
 
[¶11]   We will briefly discuss the 
petitioner’s claim that ineffective assistance was rendered when his trial 
counsel failed to object to his brother testifying in a striped 
prison suit.  The petitioner’s 
brother was called to the stand and the following colloquy 
occurred:
 
Q.    . . . .  Could you tell the ladies and gentlemen 
of the jury your name, please.
 
A.    My name is Paul A. 
Jenkins.
 
Q.    And you were a resident at 
one time of Goshen County?
 
A.    Yes.
 
Q.    Did you grow up 
here?
 
A.    Yes.
 
Q.    Are you brother to [the 
petitioner]?
 
A.    Yes.
 
Q.    And, of course, you’re Patsy 
Shimic’s son?
 
A.    Yes.
 
Q.    I understand that you’re in a 
striped jumpsuit there because you didn’t pay a fine in Goshen County or - - 

 
A.    No, I’m in - - I’m in 
Sterling, Colorado now.
 
Q.    Okay.
 
A.    And I got arrested for 
domestic violence.
 
Q.    Okay.  Speak up so everybody can hear you.  You said domestic 
violence?
 
A.    Yes.
 
Q.    Okay.  When was the last time prior to now that 
you were in Goshen County, Pete?
 
[¶12]   The petitioner’s sole defense at 
trial was that he had asked his brother to care for the horses.  The petitioner’s brother testified on 
behalf of the State and directly denied the petitioner’s contention that the 
brother had agreed to care for the petitioner’s horse.  Inasmuch as the brother’s testimony was 
directly adverse to the petitioner’s defense, we find it to be a reasonable 
tactical choice not to object to the brother’s prison attire and allow any 
resulting adverse inferences about the brother’s credibility.  We have said that “[t]he burden is upon 
the defendant to overcome this presumption that, in light of the circumstances, 
the challenged action or failure of the attorney might be considered sound trial 
strategy.”  Dudley v. State, 951 P.2d 1176, 1181 
(Wyo. 1998) (quoting Johnson v. 
State, 936 P.2d 458, 467 (Wyo. 1997)).  
The petitioner fails to show how allowing an adverse witness to testify 
in prison attire is not sound trial strategy, or how he was prejudiced by 
such.
 
Was 
the petitioner denied effective assistance of counselas a result of trial 
counsel’s failure to object when the prosecutor elicited improper witness 
commenton another witness’s testimony?
 
[¶13]   The petitioner’s next claim of 
ineffective assistance arises from his counsel’s failure to object to 
prosecutorial misconduct.  
Specifically, the petitioner argues that the prosecutor invited witnesses 
to engage in improper commentary on another witness’s credibility.  The petitioner points to the following 
exchange between the prosecutor and the petitioner’s mother, wherein the 
prosecutor questioned the mother about a claim by the petitioner’s 
then-girlfriend that the petitioner called home every day to check on the 
horses.  
 
Q.    All right.  Now, I see a reference in the report 
indicating that you received calls every day from [the petitioner] asking you to 
have [the petitioner’s brother] remove the horse’s halter.
 
A.    That’s not true, 
no.
 
Q.    All right.  And if those were attributed to [the 
petitioner’s girlfriend], you’d say that that’s not true?
 
A.    No, it’s not.  They didn’t call me every 
day.
 
Later 
in the direct examination, the prosecutor again questioned the petitioner’s 
mother about the phone calls:  “And 
so if [the petitioner’s girlfriend] said she listened to [the petitioner] while 
he used her phone to call every day and talk to you about the halter, just not 
the case?”  To which the 
petitioner’s mother responded, “That’s a lie.”  The petitioner alleges that the 
prosecutor also attempted to get him to comment on [his girlfriend’s] 
credibility, saying, “If [your girlfriend] told the Livestock Board that she 
used - - that you used her cell phone every day to have [your brother] remove 
the halter from the filly, would she be making that up?”  To which the petitioner responded, “She 
might have made an error here.”
 
[¶14]   It is clearly “error and misconduct 
for the prosecutor to cross-examine a defendant using the 'lying’ or 'mistaken’ 
technique (i.e. well, then, if 
'so-and-so’ said 'such-and-such,’ was he 'mistaken’ or 'lying?’).”  Beaugureau v. State, 2002 WY 160, ¶ 17, 
56 P.3d 626, 635-36 (Wyo. 2002).  
Such questions “invade the province of the jury, create a risk that the 
jury may conclude that, in order to acquit the defendant, it must find that the 
other witness lied, and distort the state’s burden of proof.”  Id. at ¶ 17, at 636 (quoting State v. Stevenson, 70 Conn. App. 29, 
797 A.2d 1, 14 (2002)).  If a 
prosecutor merely asks what another witness had to say, and then allows the jury 
to draw its own conclusions, the question is not objectionable.  Beaugureau, 2002 WY 160, ¶ 17, 56 P.3d  
at 636.
 
[¶15]   The State concedes, and we agree, 
that the prosecutor’s questioning here resulted in misconduct.  Our task, then, is to determine whether 
prejudice resulted from the prosecutor’s misconduct.
 
To 
evaluate the prejudice of improper “were-they-lying” questions, courts weigh 
several factors: 1) the severity and pervasiveness of the misconduct; 2) the 
significance of the misconduct to the central issues in the case; 3) the 
strength of the State’s evidence; 4) the use of cautionary instructions or other 
curative measures; and 5) the extent to which the defense invited the 
misconduct.  
 
Talley 
v. State, 
2007 WY 37, ¶ 16, 153 P.3d 256, 262 (Wyo. 2007).  When we apply these factors to the facts 
here, we cannot find material prejudice. 
 
[¶16]   Regarding the first factor—the 
severity and pervasiveness of the misconduct—we have refused to find prejudice 
where the questioning was very brief and the prosecutor did not emphasize the 
responses in closing argument.  Schreibvogel v. State, 2010 WY 45, ¶ 42, 
228 P.3d 874, 888 (Wyo. 2010); Talley, 2007 WY 37, ¶ 16, 153 P.3d  at 
262.  Moreover, where the other 
factors weigh against prejudice, we have refused to reverse, even when “[t]he 
prosecutor asked [the defendant] several times whether or not she believed that 
other witnesses were lying if they contradicted her.”  Beaugureau, 2002 WY 160, ¶ 15, 56 P.3d  
at 633.  Given the brevity and lack 
of emphasis placed on the questions here, we cannot say that the misconduct here 
was particularly pervasive or severe. 
 
[¶17]   We turn to the second factor: the 
significance of the misconduct to the central issues in the case.  The central issue was whether the 
petitioner’s conduct resulted in “cruelty to animals” as defined in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-3-203(b) (LexisNexis 2011).4  To establish this, the prosecutor had to 
show that the petitioner had charge and custody of the horse and that he failed 
to provide the horse with appropriate care when it suffered from immediate, 
obvious, and serious illness or injury.  
The prosecutor’s misconduct (asking petitioner’s mother whether the 
petitioner’s girlfriend was lying about the petitioner calling every day) 
touched, at least peripherally, on this issue.  However, we cannot say that this 
misconduct had a significant impact on the central issue in the case.  Even if the jury had heard the 
girlfriend’s testimony, untainted by the prosecutor’s inappropriate questioning, 
it still could reasonably have concluded, based on the evidence presented, that 
the petitioner was guilty of “cruelty to animals” as defined in the 
statute.
 
[¶18]   The next factor requires us to 
consider the strength of the State’s evidence in weighing the prejudicial impact 
of the misconduct.  The evidence 
clearly showed, and it was virtually undisputed, that the petitioner owned the 
horse and that he was ultimately responsible for her care.  There was also considerable evidence 
that the petitioner neglected that duty, including the testimony of L.N., the 
petitioner’s mother and brother, the Board of Livestock investigator, and the 
veterinarian who treated the horse.  
Additionally, the State presented photographic evidence showing the 
horse’s condition.  We find that the 
quantum and quality of the State’s evidence cuts against the petitioner’s claim 
of prejudice.
 
[¶19]   Regarding the next factor—the use 
of cautionary instructions or other curative measures—no objection was lodged, 
and thus no curative measure was taken or instruction given.  However, the jury instructions, given 
before opening statements and again prior to deliberation, did advise as 
follows: “[I]t is the exclusive province of the Jury to weigh and consider all 
evidence which is presented to it; to determine the credibility of all witnesses 
who testify before you, and from such evidence and testimony, to determine the 
issues of fact in this case[.]” and “[t]he Jury is the sole judge of 
the credibility of the witnesses, and of the weight to be given their 
testimony.”  Any prejudice that may 
have resulted from the prosecutor’s misconduct would have been ameliorated by 
these instructions, which instructions we presume juries follow.  See, e.g., Janpol v. State, 2008 WY 21, 
¶ 24, 178 P.3d 396, 405 (Wyo. 2008); Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1177 
(Wyo. 1998); Rubio v. State, 939 P.2d 238, 243 (Wyo. 1997); and Burke v. 
State, 746 P.2d 852, 857 (Wyo. 1987).
 
[¶20]   Regarding the final factor, 
although he did not invite the misconduct, the petitioner may have otherwise 
mitigated the potential prejudicial impact when he stated that his girlfriend 
“might have made an error” in her testimony that he called his mother every day 
to check on the horses.
 
[¶21]   The petitioner failed to meet his 
burden of showing that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s 
misconduct.  As a result, we cannot 
say that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to object to the improper 
questions.
 
Was 
the petitioner denied effective assistance ofcounsel as a result of trial 
counsel’s failure to object tothe prosecutor’s questions relating to 
irrelevant evidence?
 
[¶22]   In this final issue, the petitioner 
claims that he was materially prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to 
object to the prosecutor’s questions about irrelevant facts.  The petitioner points to two specific 
instances in which he argues irrelevant testimony was elicited.  The first involved questions by the 
prosecutor about the condition of other horses and the land where all the horses 
were kept.
 
Q.    All right.  And the condition of the one horse 
you’ve described that you took the halter off, the condition of the other 
horses?
 
A.    Good to fair maybe.  The - - their hooves were extremely 
long.
 
Q.    What do you mean by 
that?
 
A.    Well, they’re - - the ground 
they were on is fairly soft, so the hooves naturally chip away, and there was no 
way that these hooves were getting chipped away.  The ground was too soft where they were 
at.
 
Q.    Does that require - - 

 
A. 
   
Trimming.
 
Q.    Okay.  Trimming.
 
A.    Yes, a horse 
farrier.
 
Q.    All right.  Other than that, though, pretty 
good?
 
A.    They could’ve used some 
worming because they were ribby.
 
Q.    They were 
ribby?
 
A.    Their ribs were 
showing.
 
Q.    Okay.  And anything else?  Is that about it?
 
A.    Some doctoring, but like I 
said, the stud had some pretty bad cuts on his right rear 
leg.
 
Q.    Uh-huh.
 
A.    And it looked like from some 
wire or - - I don’t know what, but it was cut up pretty bad.  The other colt filly had a really bad 
hernia.
 
[Defense Counsel]:  Your Honor, I’m going to object that 
this is irrelevant to the case, what the condition of the other horses 
was.
 
The 
Court:  Mr. [Prosecutor].
 
[Prosecutor]:  I - - I don’t have to explore any 
further, Your Honor.  I will leave 
it at that.
 
The 
Court:  Sustain the 
objection.
 
Additionally, 
the prosecutor asked the petitioner’s girlfriend, “Isn’t it true that citizens 
complained because the manure was about a foot deep in the 30-by-40 area that 
there were no windbreaks or any kind of shelters for the horse, that they were 
asked to be removed?”  To which the 
girlfriend responded, “No, that has nothing to do with it.”  The petitioner argues that because his 
cruelty to animals charge related only to the horse with the halter growing into 
her face, any testimony about the condition of other horses and land where the 
horses were located was irrelevant.
 
[¶23]   The other testimony to which the 
petitioner points as irrelevant and prejudicial came from the petitioner’s 
brother.  The prosecutor was 
questioning the brother about the extent of the petitioner’s communication to 
the brother about the horses.
 
A.     
I 
stopped at my mom’s, and my brother showed up there, and then it all come [sic] 
out in the open that he was staying out there at that ranch and had put five 
horses out there. 
 
Q.    All right.  Now, you say he was staying out 
there.  Was he staying out there 
during some of the time when you were here?
 
A.    No.  He left as soon as I showed 
up.
 
Q.    And that would’ve been around 
the 1st of July?
 
A.    Or whenever - - yeah, 
somewhere around there.
 
Q.    Do you know why he 
left?
 
A.    No, not really.   All I know is that he - - when me 
and my girlfriend showed up here, he - - we got - - my mom got a phone call to 
say come out here and pick him up because he had been stopped by a highway 
patrolman and got a ticket, and then so my girlfriend and my mom went out there 
and drove him back into town, and that was the first and last time I seen 
him.
 
Q.    All right.  Now, did you have any conversation with 
your brother during the short time that you saw him?
 
A.    Just 
briefly.
 
Q.    What kind of 
conversation?
 
A.    It had to do with something 
about that “I don’t have a driver’s license” and stuff, that, you know, he said, 
“It’s a shame that I lost my license for a long time” and just mediocre stuff, 
you know.
 
Q.    Anything at all about the 
horses, []?
 
A.    No.  No.
 
Q.    Did you talk at all about the 
five horses that were out there that he had just brought 
in?
 
A.    No.
 
Q.    Did he ever ask you to take 
care of those horses?
 
A.    No.
 
The 
petitioner asserts that his trial counsel should have objected to the reference 
to his speeding ticket and loss of license asserting that such evidence was 
irrelevant and inadmissible prior misconduct under W.R.E. 
404(b).
 
[¶24]   We will again focus our analysis of 
the petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim on the question of whether 
material prejudice arose from the alleged errors.  We need not address the propriety of the 
admitted testimony because we find that the petitioner has not met his burden of 
proving he was prejudiced thereby.  
His prejudice argument consists solely of a single sentence, concluding 
that “[h]ad defense counsel assertively advocated for [the petitioner], there is 
more than a 'reasonable possibility’ that the outcome of the trial may have been 
different.”  He does not discuss any 
specific prejudice arising from the admission of the above-quoted testimony and 
makes no attempt to explain, in light of the facts of the case, how the 
challenged statements adversely impacted his trial and, ultimately, the jury’s 
verdict.  The petitioner’s assertion 
is utterly inadequate to satisfy his burden of showing material prejudice 
arising from the alleged ineffective assistance.  See Grady v. State, 2008 WY 144, ¶ 38, 
197 P.3d 722, 734-35 (Wyo. 2008); Callen 
v. State,
 
 
2008 
WY 107, ¶ 22, 192 P.3d 137, 145 (Wyo. 2008); Doherty v. State, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 23, 
131 P.3d 963, 971 (Wyo. 2006); Bhutto v. 
State, 2005 WY 78, ¶ 44, 114 P.3d 1252, 1268 (Wyo. 2005). 

 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶25]   The petitioner has failed to show 
that he was materially prejudiced by the arrest and incarceration testimony 
elicited, the prosecutor’s improper questioning of a witness about the 
credibility of another witness, or the admission of the allegedly irrelevant 
testimony about the condition of other horses and the petitioner’s speeding 
ticket.  Given the reasons set forth 
above, we affirm the order entered by the district court affirming the judgment 
and sentence of the circuit court.
 
FOOTNOTES
 
1Although 
a citation was issued, the petitioner was arrested.  No other charging document was ever 
filed, and the petitioner went to trial solely on the citation.  The record does not reflect that 
probable cause was established by affidavit or sworn testimony at the 
petitioner’s initial appearance, but no issue has been raised in this 
regard.  See W.R.Cr.P. 
5(a).
 
2W.R.E. 
402 provides: “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided 
by statute, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme 
Court.  Evidence which is not 
relevant is not admissible.”
 
3W.R.E. 
404(b) provides:
 
Other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts.—Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon 
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide 
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence 
it intends to introduce at trial.
 
4The 
petitioner was convicted under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-203(b), which statute 
provides:
 
A 
person commits cruelty to animals if he has the charge and custody of any animal 
and unnecessarily fails to provide it with the proper food, drink or protection 
from the weather, or cruelly abandons the animal, or in the case of immediate, 
obvious, serious illness or injury, fails to provide the animal with appropriate 
care.