Case Title: State v. Lloyd Fuller

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-76-02

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LLOYD FULLER, Defendant-Appellant. Argued December 2, 2003 Decided December 22,2004 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 356 N.J. Super. 266 (2002). Frank J. Pugliese, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). Deborah C. Bartolomey, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Ronald K. Chen argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Frank Askin, Director, Rutgers Constitutional Litigation Clinic, attorney; Edward L. Barocas and J.C. Salyer, of counsel and on the brief). Stephen M. Latimer submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae The Rutherford Institute (Loughlin & Latimer, attorneys). CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal raises the question whether a prosecutor may use peremptory challenges to excuse a potential juror who wears clothing associated with a religious group or who indicates in voir dire that he has worked as a missionary. During jury selection for defendant s trial, the prosecutor used four of his first five peremptory challenges to excuse African-American venirepersons. Defense counsel objected on the ground that those strikes constituted impermissible discrimination under State v. Gilmore, in which we held that a prosecutor may not use peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from the petit jury solely because the prosecutor believes that African Americans have a group bias. 103 N.J. 508, 517 (1986) (Gilmore). The prosecutor responded, in part, that two of the potential jurors he had excused were demonstrative about their religions, and that in his experience, such persons tend to favor defendants to a greater extent than do persons who are, shall we say, not as religious. The trial court accepted the prosecutor s explanation and, subsequently, denied a motion for a new trial that raised the same issue. Defendant appealed, and a divided panel of the Appellate Division affirmed. The majority distinguished between peremptory challenges exercised to exclude members of particular religious groups and peremptory challenges exercised to exclude persons the prosecutor believes have a pro-defendant bias because they are religious. State v. Fuller, 356 N.J. Super. 266, 279-80 (App. Div. 2002) certif. denied, 176 N.J. 426 (2003). In the view of the majority, the former constitutes discrimination based on religious principles and is prohibited by Article I, paragraph 5 of the New Jersey Constitution, whereas the latter is permissible because persons who are demonstrative about their religions are not part of a cognizable group capable of being targeted for group bias. Ibid. The dissent found that state discrimination against persons demonstrative about their religions offends the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as well as the prohibition against discrimination based on religious principles found in Article I, paragraph 5 of the New Jersey Constitution. Id. at 294-98. This appeal is before us as of right based on the dissent in the Appellate Division. R. 2:2-1(a)(2). [The w]hite juror I dismissed, I believe, was a minister, if memory serves me correctly, or was a missionary -- I tend to forget; but had some sort of religious affiliation. And the other juror was, apparently, Muslim, I would say, based upon his dress and the name, if I m not mistaken. But I did not dismiss any juror because of religious beliefs. I think what I said was it s been my experience that persons who strongly profess to religious belief or religious persuasion might be more lenient toward -- might be more forgiving toward a defendant, and might not listen to the evidence as perhaps they should. They may very well tend to be more accepting of a person s professions of innocence in the face of facts to the contrary. I don t even think [defense counsel] can say with utmost honesty what the ultimate religious composition of the jury was. I certainly can t. I don t think the Court can either. And [C.E.] who was the minister indicated to us that that was his profession, that s how we happened to know. So, there were other obvious manifestations and that s something that we drew conclusions to. In essence, the prosecutor argued that his use of peremptory challenges did not offend Gilmore because he lacked motive to discriminate against particular religious beliefs as evidenced by his having made no effort to learn either the religious affiliations of any potential juror or the religions composition of the jury ultimately empanelled. Rather, he took exhibitions of religious devotion as an indication of lenient tendencies towards the defense, a permissible basis for exclusion unlike the discrimination barred by Gilmore. Accepting the prosecutor s argument, the trial court, relying on State v. Watkins, 114 N.J. 259, 263 (1989), distinguished the use of peremptory strikes based on presumed group bias, which is unconstitutional[, from] situation specific bias, which is permitted. Because the court found situation-specific bias in this case, it denied defendant s motion for a new trial. A divided panel of the Appellate Division affirmed. Fuller, supra, 356 N.J. Super. at 270. The majority opined that, as a threshold matter in any Gilmore-based equal protection or fair cross-section claim, a defendant must first identify a constitutionally cognizable group, i.e., a group capable of being singled out for discriminatory treatment. Id. at 278 (citation omitted). Because people who are demonstrative about their religions [do not] constitute a cognizable group, defendant could not meet that requirement. Id. at 280 (internal quotations omitted). The majority viewed this case as analogous to State v. Bellamy, 260 N.J. Super. 449, 453 (App. Div. 1992), certif. denied, 133 N.J. 436 (1993), wherein the court held that age-defined groups are not cognizable for purposes of impartial jury analysis. 356 N.J. Super. at 278. Similarly, people who are demonstrative about their religions are no more cognizable than age-defined groups, which do not hold cohesive and consistent values and attitudes or . . . attitudes [that] are substantially different from other segments of the community. Id. at 278-79 (citing Bellamy, supra, 260 N.J. Super. at 454-55). The majority recognized that Article I, paragraph 5 of the New Jersey Constitution, which underpins Gilmore, does not contain a prohibition of discrimination based on age, whereas it does prohibit discrimination based on religious principles, but concluded that only when discrimination is directed against persons adhering to specific religious faiths, for example, Catholics, Jews, or Muslims, is there a claim against a cognizable group that offends the constitutional guarantee. Id. at 279. In support of that position, the majority pointed out that in Gilmore, [this] Court found the constitutional proscription against discrimination based on religious principles congruent with the then-statutory proscription of N.J.S.A. 2A:72-7 prohibiting discrimination in jury selection based on creed. Ibid. (citing Gilmore, supra, 103 N.J. at 526) (footnote omitted)). It followed that if the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to excuse M.S. based on his presumed adherence to the Muslim faith, then the exclusion would be constitutionally impermissible, id. at 279; by contrast, the prosecutor in this case stated that he did not dismiss any juror because of religious beliefs. Id. at 280. After reviewing the prosecutor s explanation, and considering the record further for signs of covert group bias, the majority held that the exercise of these peremptory challenges, although having to do with religion in a general sense, does not offend the constitutional prohibition against discrimination based on religious principles or creed. Ibid. Judge Fuentes, in dissent, criticized the majority for its narrow construction of the holding in Gilmore, [t]hat is, in order for a peremptory challenge to run afoul of the constitutional proscription against discrimination based on the exercise of religious principles, it must specifically target a juror because he or she is Catholic, or Jewish, or Protestant, or of the Muslim faith. Id. at 297. Such a view improperly limits an individual s religious beliefs to . . . group membership, without the concomitant fundamental right to publicly follow the teachings of one s faith, whether in the form of religious attire or through the pursuit of a missionary calling. Ibid. The dissent found that [u]nlike race, gender, ethnicity or national origin, where the individual s protected status is derived from being part of a group with readily apparent and immutable characteristics, the protection afforded to religious principles under Paragraph 5 [of the New Jersey Constitution] must include both denominational affiliation and the right to freely and openly express the precepts of one s faith. To protect the former but leave the latter exposed to invidious assaults would render meaningless the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. The [statute] imposes a unique disability upon those who exhibit a defined level of intensity of involvement in protected religious activity. Such a classification as much imposes a test for office based on religious conviction as one based on denominational preference. A law which limits political participation to those who eschew prayer, public worship, or the ministry as much establishes a religious test as one which disqualifies Catholics, or Jews, or Protestants. [Id. at 295 (quoting McDaniel, supra, 435 U.S. at 632, 98 S. Ct. at 1331, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 604).] The dissent reasoned that striking potential jurors because they are demonstrably religious amounts to an unconstitutional imposition of a special disability on the basis of religious views or status, and concluded that a citizen s right to participate in jury service [cannot be conditioned on] the suppression of constitutionally protected religious expression. Id. at 296 (citations omitted). Defendant appealed as of right under Rule 2:2-1(a)(2). See footnote 2 The American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey and the Rutherford Institute were granted amicus curiae status. right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, [for no other reason than race,] is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others. [I]t was highly significant to the State . . . that the man was a Jahovah [sic] Witness. I have a great deal of familiarity with the sect of Jahovah s Witness. I would never, if I had a preemptory [sic] challenge left . . . fail to strike a Jahovah Witness from my jury. In breaking the barrier between classifications that merit strict equal protection scrutiny and those that receive what we have termed "heightened" or "intermediate" scrutiny, J.E.B. would seem to have extended Batson's equal protection analysis to all strikes based on the latter category of classifications -- a category which presumably would include classifications based on religion. [Id. at 1115, 114 S. Ct. at 2122, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 680.] Justice Ginsburg, however, pointed out that the dissent s portrayal of the opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court is incomplete. Ibid. She reminded her colleagues that Davis relied in part on the self-evident nature of race and gender (as opposed to religious affiliation ), and on the general rule that voir dire in respect of religion is irrelevant and prejudicial. Ibid. (citations omitted). Since J.E.B., a number of state and federal courts have reviewed peremptory challenges based on religion and/or religious activities. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 669 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that after Batson and J.E.B. potential jurors cannot be excused solely because of religious affiliation, but, also, that [d]ifferentiating among prospective jurors on the basis of their [religious] activities does not plainly implicate the same unconstitutional proxies ); United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 510 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding no need [to] reach the question of whether peremptory strike based solely on religious affiliation would be unconstitutional because strikes at issue were properly based on religious activities); United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998) (suggesting but not deciding that peremptory challenges based on religious affiliation would be improper and perhaps unconstitutional, whereas strikes based on belief related to case and perhaps even based on religious tenets would be permissible); State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d 531, 553 (Conn.) cert. denied, 528 U.S. 969, 120 S. Ct. 409, 145 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1999) ( [O]ne s religious affiliation, like one s race or gender, bears no relation to that person s ability to serve as a juror. ); Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that challenges based on religious affiliation are justified as promot[ing] fairness and impartiality on the jury ). See generally, Caroline R. Krivacka & Paul D. Krivacka, Annotation, Use of Peremptory Challenges to Exclude Persons from Criminal Jury Based on Religious Affiliation - Post-Batson State Cases, 63 A.L.R. 5th 375 (1998). That case law is instructive. We discern, in the absence of a definitive ruling from the United States Supreme Court, an emerging consensus to extend the equal protection analysis of Batson and J.E.B. to peremptory challenges based solely on religious affiliation and to find those challenges unconstitutional. See footnote 5 Challenges based on religious beliefs or religious activities, however, are generally permitted. In respect of those challenges, the courts reason that the origin of a belief, religious, political or social, is irrelevant to the question whether the juror holding that belief will be able to carry out his or her duties in relation to the case at bar impartially and as instructed by the court. that . . . jurors will inevitably belong to diverse and often overlapping groups defined by race, religion, ethnic or national origin, sex, age, education, occupation, economic condition, place of residence, and political affiliation; that it is unrealistic to expect jurors to be devoid of opinions, preconceptions, or even deep-rooted biases derived from their life experiences in such groups; and hence that the only practical way to achieve an overall impartiality is to encourage the representation of a variety of such groups on the jury so that the respective biases of their members, to the extent they are antagonistic, will tend to cancel each other out. [Gilmore, supra, 103 N.J. at 525 (quoting Wheeler, supra, 583 P.2d. at 755) (emphasis added).] The rule does not . . . guarantee proportional representation of every diverse group on every jury (a practical impossibility in any case), but rather, makes possible a diversity of perspectives that fosters an overall impartiality of the deliberative process. Ibid. To achieve that goal, [t]he methods of [juror] selection must be so designed as to insure that juries are impartially drawn from community cross-sections, id. at 526 (citations omitted), and that peremptory challenges are not used to discriminat[e] against . . . discrete, cognizable groups. Ibid. Indeed, in Gilmore we were quite clear as to the floor for that protection: Article I, paragraphs 5 and 1 define the core cognizable groups for purposes of impartial jury analysis under the representative cross-section rule, but are not necessarily definitive of those groups. That is, at a minimum, cognizable groups include those defined on the basis of religious principles, race, color, ancestry, national origin, and sex (all of which are suspect or semi-suspect classifications triggering strict or intermediate scrutiny under federal equal protection analysis). [Id. at 526-27 n.3 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).] Unlike Batson, which is limited in application to race, or J.E.B., which is limited in application to gender, Gilmore explicitly includes religious principles among the group classifications that must be protected if the representative cross-section rule is to have meaning. But Gilmore also recognized the traditional role of both challenges for cause and peremptory challenges in securing an impartial jury. We observed that [p]eremptory challenges, when properly used, are intended to insure that the triers of fact will be as nearly impartial as the lot of humanity will admit. Id. at 530 (citations and internal quotations omitted). In that sense, we found that the purposes of the representative-cross-section rule and the peremptory challenge are congruent. Neither should be allowed to undermine the other; both must be delimited to further their common end. The peremptory challenge, exercised in an absolute unfettered manner, could be abused to strike all members of certain cognizable groups from the jury venire, and so could destroy the representative-cross-section rule. On the other hand, the representative-cross-section-rule, applied unflinchingly, exalts demographic representativeness above the overall impartiality it aims to further. . . . We begin with the rebuttable presumption that the prosecution has exercised its peremptory challenges on grounds permissible under Article I, paragraphs 5, 9, and 10 of the New Jersey Constitution . . . . [To rebut that presumption], the defendant initially must establish that the potential jurors wholly or disproportionally excluded were members of a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule. The defendant then must show that there is a substantial likelihood that the peremptory challenges resulting in the exclusion were based on assumptions about group bias rather than any indication of situation-specific bias . . . . [Id. at 535-38 (citations omitted); see State v. Watkins, 114 N.J. 259, 264-65 (1989) (reaffirming and applying burden of proof rule set forth in Gilmore).] Ordinarily at common law, inquiry on voir dire into a juror s religious affiliation and beliefs is irrelevant and prejudicial, and to ask such questions is improper. Questions about religious beliefs are relevant only if pertinent to religious issues involved in the case, or if a religious organization is a party, or if the information is a necessary predicate for a voir dire challenge. . . . The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, controls the questions that can be asked to keep the voir dire within relevant bounds. In this case, we do not know how the juror s religious affiliation came to light, but proper questioning for a challenge should be limited to asking jurors if they knew of any reason why they could not sit, if they would have any difficulty in following the law as given by the court, or if they would have any difficulty in sitting in judgment. [Davis, supra, 504 N.W.2d at 772 (citations omitted).] We add the following. When, after proper questioning it becomes apparent that a juror has a specific bias based, perhaps, in religious belief, that prevents him or her from serving impartially, that bias may be examined, but only in relation to the requirements of jury participation. Probing but focused voir dire when the prosecutor reasonably suspects views incompatible with a juror s duties should elicit a basis for exclusion when a basis exists. In such a case, we expect the trial courts to manage voir dire in a manner that neither disadvantages the State from obtaining the information it needs, nor ignores the privacy interests of potential jurors. Neutral questions unrelated to religious beliefs similar to those suggested by the Minnesota Supreme Court should suffice. Like many aspects of voir dire, the scope of that questioning is better left to the discretion of the trial courts. We emphasize that although prosecutors need not present reasons for disqualification rising to the level of a challenge for cause, they must not expect to rely on hunches to defeat a defendant s prima facie showing but, rather, on case specific information in respect of bias revealed on voir dire. Gilmore, supra, 103 N.J. at 538-39. NO. A-76 SEPTEMBER TERM 2002 ON REMAND FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LLOYD FULLER, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED December 22, 2004 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Chief Justice Poritz CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY