Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Lane

Citation: 367 Md. 633

Docket Number: 52ag/00

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Samuel Joseph Lane
AG No. 52, September Term, 2000
Headnote:
A Petition for Discipli
nary Action was f
il
ed allegi
ng that in the course of
representing two cl
ients,  Mr. Lane had failed to act di
ligently and that he m
ade
misrepresentati
ons to the cli
ents.  We referred the case to the Circuit Court for
Washington County to conduct an evidenti
ary hearing.  In i
ts findings of f
act and
concl
usi
ons of law, the Circuit Court found that Mr. Lane had violated Maryland
Rules of Professional
 Conduct 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), and 8.4(a), (c), and
(d).  After independently reviewing the record, we hold that the Circuit Court’s
findings of f
act and concl
usi
ons of
 law are supported by the record.  The
appropriate sanction for Mr. Lane i
s disbarment. 
Circuit Court for Washington County
Case # 21-C-10760 CIVIL
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG
No. 52
September Term, 2000
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND
v.
SAMUEL JOSEPH LANE
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathel
l
Harrel
l
           Battagl
ia,
    
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell
, J.
      Bell, C.J., joins i
n the result only
           Filed: February 7, 2002
On January 17, 2001, the Attorney Grievance Commi
ssion of Maryland, petitioner, by
1 The relevant MRPC state:
“Rule 1.1.  Competence.
A lawyer shall provide competent representati
on to a client.  Competent
representation requires the legal
 knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation.
Rule 1.2.  Scope of representation.
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objecti
ves of
representation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), and, when appropriate, shal
l consul
t
with the client as to the means by whi
ch they are to be pursued.  A lawyer shall abide by
a client’s decision whether to accept an offer of settlem
ent of a matter.  In a criminal
 case,
the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, af
ter consul
tati
on with the lawyer, as to a
plea to be entered, whether to waive jury tri
al and whether the client wil
l testify.
Rule 1.3.  Diligence.
A lawyer shall
 act with reasonable dil
igence and promptness in representing a
client.
Rule 1.4.  Communication.
(a) A l
awyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter
and promptly com
ply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall expl
ain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
Rule 1.5.  Fees.
.     .     .
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter f
or which the servi
ce is
rendered, except in a m
atter i
n whi
ch a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or
(continued...)
Melvin Hirshman, Bar Counsel, and Glenn M. Grossman, Deputy Bar Counsel, fi
led a Petition
for Disciplinary Action against Samuel Joseph Lane, respondent.  The petition al
leged that
respondent, based on his representation of Lance D. Williams and Cheryl
 Lynn Bair, had
vi
olated Maryland Rul
es of Professional
 Conduct (MRPC) 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(c), and
8.4(a), (c), and (d).1  This Court, by Order dated January 18, 2001, transmitted the action to the
1(...continued)
other law.  The terms of a conti
ngent fee agreement shal
l be communicated to the client in
wri
ting.  The communication shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined,
including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of
settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery,
and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is
calcul
ated.  Upon concl
usi
on of a contingent fee matter, the l
awyer shall provi
de the client
with a wri
tten statement stati
ng the outcome of the matter, and, if there is a recovery,
showing the remittance to the client and the m
ethod of i
ts determination.
Rule 8.4.  Misconduct.
It is professional
 misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist
or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
.     .     .
(c) engage in conduct involvi
ng dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the admini
stration of justice . . . .”
2 The May 14, 2001 hearing was conti
nued because an agreem
ent had been reached by the parties.
The parties filed a Joint Petition for Consent with thi
s Court.  We denied the petition and the hearing
proceeded.
-2-
Circui
t Court for Washi
ngton County for that court to m
ake findi
ngs of fact and concl
usi
ons
of l
aw.  The Circuit Court held evi
dentiary hearings on May 14, 2001 and August 17, 2001.2
On October 3, 2001, the Circui
t Court for Washi
ngton County fi
led its Findings of Fact
and Conclusi
ons of Law.  The record from the Circui
t Court was then transferred to our Court
for oral argument.
I.  Facts
On June 21, 1995, respondent was adm
itted to the Bar of
 Maryland.  In February of
1996, respondent began practicing law as a sole practitioner with a focus on divorce, child
support, and preparing will
s.  Respondent’s previous legal experience was as a student i
n a l
aw
-3-
school cli
nic and as an intern with the Office of the State’s Attorney for Montgomery County.
In September of 1997, respondent closed hi
s private practice to accept a position with the
Public Defender’s Office in Allegany County.  Whi
le with the Publi
c Defender’s Office
respondent was offered a position i
n the Offi
ce of the State’s Attorney for Allegany County.
Respondent joined the State’s Attorney’s Off
ice in September of 1998 and he currently works
for that office as a circuit court felony prosecutor.
The two complaints against respondent arose from hi
s representation of clients whi
le
he was a sole practitioner.  In i
ts findings of f
act, the Circui
t Court for Washi
ngton County has
done a complete job of sum
marizi
ng the facts of the two complaints.  We shal
l, therefore,
quote the Circuit Court, which stated:
“Williams Case
“Mr. Williams retai
ned the Respondent i
n April 1996 to oppose the
claim of Jeanette Miller, the mother of his daughter, for an i
ncrease in child
support paym
ents.  Mr. Williams also complained that he had been deni
ed
vi
sitati
on with his daughter.  In Jul
y 1996, a hearing was held before a Master of
the Circuit Court for Al
legany County.  Mr. Williams’ child support obligation
was found to be $562.00 per month.  On October 31, 1996, Wil
li
ams’
exceptions were overruled by the Honorable J. Frederi
ck Sharer and no appeal
was taken pursuant to Mr. Lane’s advi
ce.
“In February 1997, Mr. Willi
ams again engaged the services of the
Respondent.  This time, he sought a reduction i
n child support and vi
sitati
on.
The Respondent agreed to fil
e a Complaint to Establish Visitation and a Motion
to Modify Child Support.  The Respondent does not dispute that he was retained
[to] handl
e these issues.  From
 February 1997 through September 19[9]8, Mr.
Lane took no substantive action on behal
f of
 Mr. Williams.  No pleadings or
motions were fil
ed with the court, and no contact was made with Ms. Mi
ll
er or
her attorney.
“During this time, however, the Respondent engaged i
n a course of
-4-
conduct to conceal the fact that he had taken no action on behalf
 of Mr.
Williams.  Mr. Lane told numerous deliberate falsehoods to Mr. Will
iam
s: he
stated that counsel for Ms. Miller agreed to a reduction in the chil
d support
payments; that he had attended a hearing wi
th Ms. Mill
er’s counsel and that Mr.
Williams’ attendance was not necessary; that Ms. Mill
er had filed pleadings to
oppose Mr. Will
iams’ claim f
or visi
tation; that court dates had been cancelled.
“Perhaps the most incredul
ous web of falsehoods was i
n regard to a
hearing allegedl
y scheduled for February 28, 1998.  Mr. Lane informed Mr.
Williams that a hearing had been scheduled for that date and that he had issued
a subpoena compelling Ms. Miller’s attendance.  There was no hearing and no
subpoena.  However, Mr. Will
iams and his wif
e met the Respondent at the
courthouse where the Respondent i
nformed them that Ms. Miller had fail
ed to
appear.  Whi
le Mr. Williams and hi
s wife waited, Mr. Lane pretended to have a
meeting with the Judge.  He then falsely informed Mr. Williams and his wif
e
that the Judge would rul
e in Wi
lliams’ favor, and further falsely advised them
that he would f
orward papers to the Judge for the Judge’s signature.  He later
told Mr. Willi
ams that the ‘papers’ were on the Judge’s desk and that Ms. Miller
had filed for a stay with respect to the Judge’s Order.  As there had been no
hearing and no judi
cial determination, all of these representations were untrue.
“When Mr. Lane joined the Office of the State’s Attorney for Allegany
County in September 1998, he informed Mr. Williams that his case had been
referred to George McKinley, Esqui
re.  Mr. Lane f
alsely advised Williams that
a hearing had been schedul
ed for October 13, 1998.  In fact, no heari
ng had been
scheduled for that or any other date.  At this point, Mr. Williams had not
established an attorney-client relationship with Mr. McKinley.  On October 13,
1998, Mr. Will
iams went to the Allegany County Circui
t Court and reviewed his
case fi
le.  He discovered that no papers of any kind had been filed by the
Respondent.
“Mr. Williams searched for and l
ocated the Respondent, who admitted
that no Complaint for Visitation or Motion for Reduction of Child Support had
been fi
led.  Mr. Lane stated, however, that the matter coul
d be ‘taken care of’
that very day.  As of October 13, 1998, Mr. Wil
liams had not seen hi
s daughter
for approxim
ately two years.
Bair Case
“Cheryl Lynn Bair retained Mr. Lane on or about July 19, 1997 to
represent her in a claim
 against Lanaconing Water Company (LWC) for
-5-
term
ination of water service to her home.  The Respondent agreed to represent
her on a contingency fee basi
s but the terms of the fee were not communicated
to Ms. Bair in writi
ng.
“Although Ms. Bair’s water service had been termi
nated in July 1997, the
Respondent did not fil
e a Complaint seeking an em
ergency ex parte injunction
until February 26, 1998.  Mr. Lane f
iled a Compl
aint f
or money damages against
LWC contemporaneously with the filing of the Complaint f
or Injunction.  As an
expl
anation for his dilatory behavi
or, Mr. Lane explained to this Court that he
had never fil
ed for an injuncti
on and, thus, he di
d not know the steps to take in
doing so.
“At the time Mr. Lane f
iled for an injunction, Ms. Bair owed the water
company approximately $772.00.  The Respondent paid $550.00 from his own
funds to LWC and LWC restored water service to Ms. Bair.  The Respondent did
not inform Ms. Bair that he had pai
d LWC, but rather gave her the impressi
on
that the injunction had been granted.  Withi
n approximately one month, Ms.
Bair’s water servi
ce was again terminated.  Mr. Lane falsely advised Ms. Bai
r
that he had fi
led a Motion for Sanctions against LWC for termi
nating her water
service agai
n.  Subsequently, he told Ms. Bai
r that LWC had been sanctioned by
the Court.  From his own funds, he paid Ms. Bair $1,700.00 and indicated to her
that said sum had come from LWC as a result of the sanctions.
“Perhaps the most incredul
ous web of falsehoods in regard to Ms. Bair’s
case centered around Mr. Lane’s statement to her on or about June 30, 1998 that
he had filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and that a judgment was granted
in her favor in the amount of eleven[-]and-a-half m
illion dollars.  He further
indicated that LWC had filed an appeal, [or] that LWC woul
d im
mediately file
same.
“In January 1999, Mr. Lane false[ly] advised Ms. Bai
r that he was
involved in settlement discussi
ons with LWC.  In January or early February
1999, he tol
d Ms. Bair that her case had settled f
or over el
even mi
ll
ion doll
ars.
He also misrepresented the nature of the settlement; that the Court had ordered
paym
ent to be made and that the Internal Revenue Servi
ce had charged Ms. Bair
taxes on the settlement.  Mr. Lane told his client to come to the Circuit Court
for the purpose of receiving the Court ordered award.  He told her to bring a
sui
tcase for the purpose of carrying the substantial amount of cash whi
ch
comprised part of the settlement.  She was also told to have someone
accompany her f
or the purpose of security.  On February 10, 1999, at the Circuit
Court for Allegany County, the Respondent disclosed to Ms. Bair for the f
irst
-6-
time that he had misled her concerning her l
awsuit and he also disclosed that no
money would be forthcoming from LWC.”
The Circuit Court concluded that respondent, i
n his representation of Mr. Williams, had
vi
olated MRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d).  The court found that
respondent had violated the MRPC through the following actions:
 hi
s failure to take
substantive action on behalf of Mr. Willi
ams, respondent’s representation 
was 
not
characterized by diligence and prom
ptness, hi
s deception deprived Mr. Williams of being able
to make informed decisions about hi
s case, he did not abide by his client’s decision concerning
the objecti
ves of the case, he did not keep Mr. Williams reasonably i
nformed about the case,
and hi
s misrepresentations about the status of Mr. Williams’ case prevented Mr. Williams
from obtaining the legal
 relief he had sought.
In Ms. Bair’s case, the Circui
t Court concluded that respondent had violated MRPC 1.1,
1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(c), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d).  The court found that respondent had
violated the MRPC through the following actions: his failure to provide Ms. Bair with the
terms of the conti
ngency fee in writing, respondent failed to understand how to fi
le for an
injunction and failed to take action on Ms. Bai
r’s case, he di
d not abide by Ms. Bai
r’s deci
sions
concerning the objectives of the case, he did not act in a diligent and prompt manner,
respondent knowingly misled and made misrepresentations to 
Ms. Bair, respondent’s
misrepresentations prevented hi
s client from m
aking informed decisions about her case and
kept her f
rom being reasonabl
y i
nformed about the status of her case, and respondent’s decei
t
kept Ms. Bair from pursui
ng her interests in court.
-7-
Respondent has not fi
led any exceptions to the Circuit Court for Washi
ngton County’s
findings of fact or concl
usi
ons of law. The “hearing court’s findings of f
act are prima facia
correct and will not be disturbed unl
ess they are shown to be clearly erroneous.”  Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 392, 692 A.2d 465, 469 (1997) (citing
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 347, 624 A.2d 503, 505
(1993)).  After a review of the record, we hold that the f
indings of f
act of the Circuit Court are
not clearly erroneous.  We hol
d that the Circui
t Court’s conclusi
ons of law are supported by
the facts.  The onl
y i
ssue bei
ng disputed by respondent is the appropriate sanction for his
violati
ons of the MRPC.
II.  Sanction
We exam
ined the purpose behind the attorney grievance procedure and the appropriate
sanction for an attorney in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Franz, 355 Md. 752, 760-61,
736 A.2d 339, 343-44 (1999), when we stated:
“It is well-settled that the purpose of disciplinary proceedings is to
protect the publ
ic rather than to punish the erring attorney.  Attorney G rievance
Comm’n of Maryland v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 446-47, 635 A.2d 1315, 1318
(1994); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 364, 624
A.2d 503, 513 [(1993)]; Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Protokowicz, 329 Md.
252, 262-63, 619 A.2d 100, 105 (1993); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Myers,
302 Md. 571, 580, 490 A.2d 231, 236 (1985); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v.
Velasquez, 301 Md. 450, 459, 483 A.2d 354, 359 (1984); Attorney Griev.
Comm’n v. Montgomery, 296 Md. 113, 119, 460 A.2d 597, 600 (1983).  The
public interest is served when thi
s Court i
mposes a sanction whi
ch dem
onstrates
to members of the legal
 profession the type of
 conduct that will not be
tolerated.  Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Kerpelman, 288 Md. 341, 382, 420 A.2d
940, 959 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970, 101 S. Ct. 1492, 67 L. Ed. 2d 621
(1981).  By imposing such a sanction, this Court fulfi
ll
s its responsibili
ty ‘to
insist upon the maintenance of the i
ntegri
ty of the Bar and to prevent the
-8-
transgression of an individual lawyer from bringing its image i
nto disrepute.’
Maryland St. Bar Assen v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 549, 318 A.2d 811, 814
(1974).  Therefore, the public interest is served when sancti
ons designed to
effect general and speci
fi
c deterrence are imposed on an attorney who violates
the disciplinary rul
es.  See Protok owicz, 329 Md. at 262-63, 619 A.2d at 105;
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334, 355, 587 A.2d 511, 521
(1991); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Alison, 317 Md. 523, 540-41, 565 A.2d
660, 668 (1989).  Of course, what the appropriate sanction for the particul
ar
misconduct is, in the public interest, generally depends upon the facts and
circum
stances of the case.  Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Babbitt, 300 Md. 637,
642, 479 A.2d 1372, 1375 (1984) (the facts and circumstances of a case will
determine how severe the sanction shoul
d be); Montgomery, 296 Md. at 120,
460 A.2d at 600; Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Pollack, 289 Md. 603, 609, 425
A.2d 1352, 1355 (1981).  The attorney’s prior gri
evance history, as well as facts
in mitigation, constitutes part of those facts and circumstances.  Maryland
State Bar Assen v. Phoebus, 276 Md. 353, 362, 347 A.2d 556, 561 (1975).”
Petitioner recommends to this Court that the appropriate sanction i
s for respondent to
be disbarred.  Petitioner, relyi
ng on our recent case of Attorney Grievance Commission v.
Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 773 A.2d 463 (2001), states that disbarment should be the
sanction for intentional dishonest conduct.  Petitioner also contends that respondent has not
presented any m
iti
gation with regards to his conduct at the tim
e of the misrepresentations.
Petitioner states that respondent has onl
y presented testi
monials about hi
s job performance
with the Public Defender’s Officer and the State’s Attorney’s Offi
ce, neither job being where
the misrepresentations occurred.
Respondent recommends to this Court that the appropri
ate sanction 
for 
his
misrepresentations is either (1) a suspension period of n
inety days, (2) a suspension period
of eighteen months, with all but the first si
xty days of the suspension held in abeyance, subject
to such monitoring conditions as this Court finds necessary and appropriate or (3) an indefinite
3 The State’s Attorney for Allegany County, Lawrence V. Kelly testifi
ed on behalf of
 respondent
before the Circui
t Court, and Deputy State’s Attorney Barry R. Levi
ne and Robert A. Al
derson, Esq.,
wrote letters of recommendation f
or respondent.
-9-
suspension of eighteen months, with the respondent being suspended indefi
ni
tely from the civi
l
practice of law, but being allowed to continue the criminal practice of l
aw as an Assistant
State’s Attorney, again with such monitoring as this Court deems appropriate.
In mi
tigation of his misrepresentations, respondent states that at the time of the
misconduct he had been practicing law for less than three years and had no previous l
egal
experi
ence outside of a l
aw school cl
ini
c and an internship with the Offi
ce of the State’s
Attorney for Montgom
ery County.  Respondent also states that since closing his civi
l practice
he has recei
ved a positive evaluation from the Office of the Publi
c Defender and an excel
lent
eval
uation from the Office of the State’s Attorney f
or Al
legany County.  Respondent i
s also
involved in the community as an assistant football coach at Bishop Wal
sh High School and as
a coach f
or the Allegany High School mock trial team.
In mitigation, respondent also states that he is extremely remorseful
 and has no prior
disciplinary record.  Furthermore, the Circuit Court found that respondent’s acti
ons were not
caused by a selfi
sh m
otive, and respondent has been cooperati
ve and forthcoming throughout
the entire grievance process.  Respondent also states that he was i
nexperienced at the time of
the misconduct in the law and in client relations, and that he i
s a well-respected prosecutor and
person, as shown by his letters of support.3  Respondent contends that the delay f
rom the time
of the misconduct to the current proceedings works against hi
s being severely sanctioned as
-10-
he has proven to be a good lawyer with the Offi
ce of the State’s Attorney and his being severely
sanctioned would not satisfy the purpose of
 the discipli
nary proceedings of protecting the
public because he has proven i
n the delay that he i
s no l
onger a threat to the publi
c.
Furtherm
ore, respondent contends that Vanderlinde did not establ
ish a bright-line rule
that “thi
s Court will impose disbarment for misrepresentations, regardless of circum
stances
or mi
tigati
on.”  Respondent further posits that the facts of Vanderlinde are distingui
shable
from the facts of the case at bar and that the sanction i
n any disciplinary case results from the
facts and ci
rcumstances of that particul
ar case.  Respondent contends that this Court’s holding
in Vanderlinde occurred after respondent’s conduct, so even i
f Vanderlinde did establish a
new bright-li
ne rul
e for intentional dishonesty cases, that rule should not be applied to this
case.
In Vanderlinde, Susan Vanderlinde adm
itted to steal
ing $3,880.67 from her employer,
King’s Contrivance Community Association (KCCA).  Ms. Vanderlinde had returned the
money before her employm
ent with KCCA ended and her thefts had remained undetected until
after she l
eft KCCA.  Ms. Vanderlinde admitted that she had violated MRPC 8.4(a), 8.4(b), and
8.4(c).  Ms. Vanderlinde cl
aimed that “the pressures of her life and the i
mpairment of her
mental facul
ties, including her periods of depression, mi
tigate against severe sanctions for the
off
enses she admits committing.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md.
376, 381, 773 A.2d 463, 466 (2001).  Specifically, she contended that her depression and
mental im
pairment should miti
gate her punishm
ent to a sanction less than di
sbarment.  Sim
ilar
to attorney di
scipli
nary proceedings where this Court has consi
dered alcohol and drug
4 Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kenney, 339 Md. 578, 664 A.2d 854 (1995).
-11-
problems in respect to mitigation of sanctions, Ms. Vanderlinde l
ikened her mental condi
tion
to an attorney with a drug or alcohol problem.  She was, therefore, argui
ng “that where there
is a fi
nding that an attorney’s conduct is, in whole or in part, a result of a mental condition that
affects her or his actions, the Court should recogni
ze a new mitigation circum
stance that
warrants less than a serious sanction.”  Id. at 387, 773 A.2d at 469.
After exam
ini
ng the hi
story of the cases involving attorneys who were attem
pting to use
drug or alcohol
 abuse to mitigate their sanction i
n a di
sciplinary proceeding, we held:
“Accordingly, we reiterate once again the position we announced in
Kenney.[4] Moreover, we expound upon i
t by hol
ding that, in cases of intentional
dishonesty, misappropri
ation cases, fraud, stealing, serious criminal
 conduct
and the like, we will not accept, as ‘compelling extenuating circumstances,’
anything less than the most serious and utterly debilitati
ng m
ental or physi
cal
health conditions, ari
sing from any source that is the ‘root cause’ of the
misconduct and that also result in an attorney’s utter inabili
ty to conform his
or her conduct in accordance with the law and wi
th the MRPC.  Only if
 the
circum
stances are that compell
ing, wi
ll
 we even consider imposi
ng less than the
most severe sanction of disbarment in cases of steal
ing, dishonesty, fraudulent
conduct, the i
ntentional mi
sappropriation of funds or other serious criminal
conduct, whether occurring in the practice of law, or otherwise.”
Id. at 413-14, 773 A.2d at 485 (some emphasis added).  We then stated, in looking to future
cases involving i
ntenti
onal dishonesty, that:
“Upon reflection as a Court, in disciplinary matters, we wil
l not in the
future attem
pt to distingui
sh between degrees of intentional
 dishonesty based
upon convictions, testim
onial
s or other factors.  Unlike matters relating to
competency, diligence and the l
ike, intentional
 dishonest conduct i
s closely
entwined with the most important matters of
 basic character to such a degree as
to make intenti
onal
 dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse.
Honesty and di
shonesty are, or are not, present in an attorney’s character.”
-12-
Id. at 418, 773 A.2d at 488.   We held that di
sbarment was the appropri
ate sanction for Ms.
Vanderlinde.
We agree with respondent that in attorney grievance proceedings we must exami
ne the
facts, circum
stances, and m
itigation involved in each case and not take a procrustean approach.
Nevertheless, as we stated in Vanderlinde, where money was misappropriated from an
employer, “Disbarment ordinari
ly should be the sanction for intentional
 dishonest conduct.”
Id. at 418, 773 A.2d at 488.  We have not, however, always found disbarment to be the
appropriate sanction 
when 
there 
is 
misrepresentation 
involved, 
especially where
misappropri
ation of money was not involved.  In Attorney Grievance Commission v.
Harrington, ___Md. ___, ___A.2d ___(2001), we found an indefini
te suspensi
on to be the
appropriate penal
ty f
or an attorney who had made one m
isrepresentation to one client but
whose major transgression was hi
s lack of cooperation with the Attorney Grievance
Comm
ission.  We did not apply Vanderlinde as a bri
ght-l
ine rule, but appl
ied the facts and
circum
stances of that case to determine the appropriate sanction.  What Vanderlinde holds
is that “ordinarily” disbarment will be the appropri
ate sanction when dishonesty is involved,
however, we must stil
l exami
ne the facts, circumstances, and mitigation in each case.  In
Harrington, there was one instance of a degree of misrepresentation. There was, however, no
pattern of a course of deceitful
 conduct over an extensi
ve period of time sufficient, in our
view, to support a disbarment.  The gravamen of the disciplinary proceeding was the attorney’s
lack of diligence and his lack of cooperation with bar counsel.  There, we determined that the
appropriate sanction was an indef
ini
te suspension.
-13-
In the case sub judice, the appropriate sanction for respondent’s repeated material
misrepresentations that constitute a pattern of deceitful
 conduct, as opposed to an i
solated
instance, is disbarment.  Respondent engaged i
n a 
pattern 
of 
continued deceitful
misrepresentations of the m
ost egregious nature, to the extent that his conduct amounted to
intentional dishonesty.  He has not provi
ded any mitigation 
for 
his 
pattern 
of
mi
srepresentations.  Respondent failed to diligently act on his clients’ behalf and he then
compounded thi
s fai
lure by engaging in a pattern of deceitful and lying conduct designed to
conceal
 hi
s lack of di
ligence.
He has provi
ded evi
dence about hi
s professional
 career after the dishonest conduct, but
no evi
dence in m
itigation of the dishonest conduct.  Respondent’s continual deceit and
sometimes outlandi
sh conduct, along with hi
s lack of mitigation for the dishonesty, could
herald problems for his future clients.  As stated, supra, the purpose of this proceeding is to
protect the publ
ic.  In cases like this, where the attorney’s pri
mary misconduct is a pattern of
serious deceitful
 conduct, ordinarily, the appropriate sanction, as it is in the case at bar, should
be disbarment. 
Chief Judge Bel
l joins i
n the result only.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY
ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS
COURT, 
INCLUDING 
THE 
COSTS OF ALL
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE
16-761(b), FOR WHICH 
SUM JUDGMENT IS
ENTERED 
IN 
FAVOR 
OF THE ATTORNEY
GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
AGAINST SAMUEL JOSEPH LANE.