Case Title: DAVID G BYKER V THOMAS J MANNES

Citation: 

Docket Number: 116380

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C 
hief Just ice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MARCH 26, 2002  
DAVID G. BYKER,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 116380  
THOMAS J. MANNES,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
MARKMAN, J.  
This Court granted leave in this case to consider whether  
Michigan partnership law, MCL 
449.6(1), requires a subjective  
intent to form a partnership or merely an intent to carry on,  
as co-owners, a business for profit.  The trial court found  
that a partnership is formed by persons whose intent is to  
carry on as co-owners a business for profit, regardless of  
their subjective intention to be partners.  On the basis of  
this definition, the court determined that a partnership  
existed.  The Court of Appeals, in a split opinion, reversed,  
 
  
finding that no partnership existed because of, among other  
factors, the lack of evidence of the parties’ subjective  
intent to form a partnership.  We disagree with the definition  
of partnership applied by the Court of Appeals. 
In  
determining whether a partnership exists, the focus is not on  
whether 
individuals 
subjectively 
intended 
to 
form 
a  
partnership, that is, it is unimportant whether the parties  
would have labeled themselves “partners.”  Instead, the focus  
is on whether individuals intended to jointly carry on a  
business for profit within the meaning of the Michigan Uniform  
Partnership Act, MCL 449.1 et seq., regardless of whether they  
subjectively intended to form a partnership. Accordingly, we  
reverse the Court of Appeals decision and remand this matter  
for further consideration.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS  
This case arises out of an alleged partnership between  
plaintiff David Byker and defendant Tom Mannes.  In 1985,  
plaintiff was doing accounting work for defendant.  The two  
individuals talked about going into business together because  
they had complementary business skills—defendant could locate  
certain properties because of his real estate background and  
plaintiff could raise money for their property purchases.  
Indeed, the parties stipulated the following:  
[T]he Plaintiff . . . and Defendant . . . 
agreed to engage in an ongoing business enterprise,  
2  
to furnish capital, labor and/or skill to such 
enterprise, to raise investment funds and to share 
equally in the profits, losses and expenses of such 
enterprise. . . . In order to facilitate investment 
of limited partners, Byker and Mannes created 
separate 
entities 
wherein 
they 
were 
general 
partners or shareholders for the purposes of  
operating each separate entity.  
Over a period of several years, the parties pursued  
various business enterprises. They have stipulated that the  
following business entities were created during this time:  
a.  A 100% general partner interest in M & B 
Properties Limited Partnership, a Michigan limited 
partnership, which limited partnership owns a 50% 
partnership interest in Hall Street Partners, a 
Michigan partnership.  
b.  A 100% general partner interest in M & B 
Properties Limited Partnership-II, a Michigan 
limited partnership, which limited partnership owns 
a 50% partnership interest in Breton Commercial 
Properties, a Michigan partnership.  
c.  A 66-2/3% of the issued and outstanding 
shares of the common stock of JTD Properties, Inc., 
a Michigan corporation, which is the general 
partner of JTD Properties Limited Partnership I, a 
Michigan limited partnership, and which is also the 
general partner of M & B Properties Limited  
Partnership-III, a Michigan limited partnership. 
The interest was later increased to 100% when John  
Noel left the partnership.  
d.  A 66-2/3% of the issued and outstanding 
shares of the common stock of Pier 1000 Ltd., a 
Michigan corporation.  The interest was later  
increased to 100% when John Noel left the  
partnership.  
e. A 66-2/3% general partner interest in BMW 
Properties, a Michigan partnership.  
With regard to these entities, the parties shared equally in  
3  
 
 
the commissions, financing fees, and termination costs. The  
parties also personally guaranteed loans from several  
financial institutions.  
The business relationship between the parties began to  
deteriorate after the creation of Pier 1000 Ltd., which was  
created to own and manage a marina.  Shortly after the  
creation of Pier 1000 Ltd., the marina encountered serious  
financial difficulties.  To address these difficulties, the  
parties placed their profits from M & B Limited Partnership  
II into Pier 1000 Ltd. and borrowed money from several  
financial institutions.  
Eventually, defendant refused to make any additional  
monetary 
contributions.  
Plaintiff, 
however, 
continued 
to 
make  
loan payments and incurred accounting fees on behalf of Pier  
1000 Ltd., as well as on behalf of other business entities.  
Plaintiff also entered into several individual loans for the  
benefit of Pier 1000 Ltd.  These business transactions were  
performed without defendant’s knowledge.  
The 
marina 
was 
eventually returned to its previous owners  
in exchange for their assumption of plaintiff’s and  
defendant’s 
business 
obligations.  At this point, the business  
ventures between plaintiff and defendant ceased.  
Plaintiff then approached defendant with regard to  
equalizing payments as a result of the losses incurred from  
4  
  
  
 
the various entities. Defendant testified that this was the  
first time that he had received notice from plaintiff  
concerning any outstanding payments, and that he was  
“absolutely dumbfounded” by plaintiff’s request for money.  
After 
unsuccessfully 
seeking 
reimbursement 
from  
defendant, plaintiff filed suit for the recovery of the money  
on the basis that the parties had entered into a partnership.1  
Specifically, plaintiff asserted that the obligations between  
him and defendant were not limited to their formal business  
relationships established by the individual partnerships and  
corporate 
entities, 
but that there was a “general” partnership  
underlying 
all 
their 
business affairs.  In response, defendant  
asserted 
that 
he 
merely invested in separate business ventures  
with plaintiff and that there were no other understandings  
between them.  
The case proceeded to a bench trial where the trial court  
determined 
that 
the 
parties 
had 
created 
a 
general  
partnership.2  The court observed that, although Michigan had  
1  The parties stipulated that the alleged partnership 
was 
never 
memorialized in a written partnership agreement, had 
no formal name, no tax identification number, and no income 
tax filings.  
2  The trial court and the Court of Appeals termed the 
alleged partnership at issue a “super” partnership.  The trial  
court defined such a partnership as one that, although not 
entailing a formal business relationship by the parties, is a 
“general partnership between them underlying all of their 
(continued...)  
5  
 
  
 
 
not formally adopted § 202 of the 1994 Uniform Partnership Act  
(1994 UPA),3 the law in Michigan is that parties must merely  
have an intent to carry on a business for profit, not a  
subjective intent to create a partnership.  On this basis, the  
trial court concluded that the parties had maintained a  
business relationship that constituted a partnership.  It  
stated:  
Having 
weighed 
the 
credibility 
of 
the  
witnesses, principally plaintiff and defendant, we 
conclude that they began their relationship with a 
general agreement that they were partners and would 
share 
profits 
and 
losses 
equally. 
Whether  
understood or not they had a general or super 
partnership.
 The evidence supports that both 
understood it.  
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which  
reversed.  Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued February 1,  
2000 (Docket No. 205266).  In part, the Court of Appeals  
stated that the trial court incorrectly relied on § 202 “for  
the proposition that ‘the association of two or more persons  
to carry on as co-owners of business for profit forms a  
partnership, whether or not the persons intend to form a  
2(...continued) 
business affairs.”  Because the statutory and case law merely 
define a “partnership,” this Court will simply use that term 
without embellishment.  
3  
The Uniform Partnership Act, originally adopted in 
1914, is a statement of partnership law drafted by the 
National 
Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and  
is intended to contribute to the uniformity of state laws.  
6  
  
 
 
  
 
  
partnership.’”
 Slip op at 2 
(emphasis in original).  
Further, it stated that “[t]he absence of intent to form a  
partnership 
contradicts the established law in this state that  
the mutual intent of the parties is of prime importance in  
ascertaining whether a partnership exists.” Id. (emphasis in  
original).  Upon review of the facts, the Court of Appeals  
determined that the parties clearly did not intend to form a  
partnership.4 
Id. at 3.  
Judge White dissented. 
She stated that, although  
Michigan had not adopted § 202, the trial court correctly  
recognized that Michigan’s existing definition of partnership  
was consistent with that provision. White, J., concurring in  
part and dissenting in part, slip op at pp 2-3. Pursuant to  
Michigan 
law, 
“intent of the parties is determinative, whether  
or not they attached the term ‘partnership’ to that intent.”  
Id. at 2. 
Thus, in Judge White’s view, “[t]here is no  
necessity that the parties attach the label ‘partnership’ to  
their relationship as long as they in fact both mutually agree  
to assume a relationship that falls within the definition of  
a partnership.”  Id. at 3. 
We agree with Judge White’s  
reasoning.  
4  A significant factor in the Court of Appeals finding 
was the fact that the parties were unaware that they had 
formed a partnership until nine years after the parties 
entered into their informal relationship.  
7  
  
  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
Whether Michigan partnership law, MCL 449.6(1), requires  
a subjective intent to form a partnership or merely an intent  
to carry on as co-owners a business for profit is a question  
of law. This Court reviews questions of law under a de novo  
standard of review.  Kelly v Builders Square, Inc, 465 Mich  
29, 34; 632 NW2d 912 (2001).  
III. DISCUSSION  
A. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACTS  
In 1917, the Michigan Legislature drafted the Michigan  
Uniform Partnership Act.  1917 PA 72.  In this act, a  
partnership was defined as “an association of two [2] or more  
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit . . .  
.” Id. at § 6, codified in 1929 CL 9846.  Over the years, the  
definition has remained essentially constant.5 At present,  
partnership is defined as “an association of 2 or more  
persons, which may consist of husband and wife, to carry on as  
co-owners a business for profit . . . .”  MCL 449.6(1). This  
definition, as well as its predecessors, was modeled after the  
definition of partnership set forth in the 1914 UPA.  See MCLS  
and MCLA 449.6 (Historical Notes); 1929 CL 9841; 1948 CL  
5  For example, the second statutory definition stated 
that “a partnership is an association of 2 or more persons, 
which may include husband and wife, to carry on as co-owners 
a business for profit . . . .” 1948 CL 449.6(1).  
8  
 
449.1. 
In 1914, the UPA had defined a partnership as “an  
association of two or more persons to carry on as owners a  
business for profit.” Uniform Partnership Act of 1914, § 6.  
In construing § 6, courts had “universal[ly]” determined that  
a partnership was formed by “the association of persons whose  
intent is to carry on as co-owners a business for profit,  
regardless of their subjective intention to be ‘partners.’”  
See Uniform Partnership Act of 1994, § 202, Comment 1.  
In 1994, however, the UPA definition of partnership was  
amended by the National Conference of Commissioners.  The  
amended definition stated that “the association of two or more  
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms  
a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to form a  
partnership.”  Section 202 (emphasis added). 
Although the  
commissioners were apparently satisfied with the existing  
judicial construction of the definition of partnership, the  
commissioners added the new language “whether or not the  
persons intend to form a partnership” in order to “codif[y]  
the universal judicial construction of UPA Section 6(1) that  
a partnership is created by the association of persons whose  
intent is to carry on as co-owners a business for profit,  
regardless of their subjective intention to be ‘partners.’”  
Section 202 (Comment 1).  The commissioners emphasized that  
“[n]o substantive change in the law” was intended by the  
9  
  
 
   
 
amendment of § 6.  Id.  To date, Michigan has not adopted the  
amended definition of partnership.  
B. MCL 449.6(1)  
Although Michigan has not adopted the amended definition  
of partnership as set forth in § 202 of the Uniform  
Partnership Act of 1994, we believe nonetheless that MCL 449.6  
is consistent with that amendment. As stated numerous times  
by this Court, it is essential that this Court discern and  
give effect to the legislature’s intent.  In doing so, we must  
examine 
the 
language 
contained 
within 
the 
applicable 
statutory  
provision.  If the language is clear and unambiguous, this  
Court will presume that the Legislature intended the meaning  
plainly expressed and will enforce the statute as written.  
Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Systems, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631  
NW2d 686 (2001).  
As already noted, a partnership in Michigan is  
statutorily defined as “an association of 2 or more persons,  
which may consist of husband and wife, to carry on as co­
owners a business for profit . . . .”  MCL 
449.6(1).  That is,  
if the parties associate themselves to “carry on” as co-owners  
a business for profit, they will be deemed to have formed a  
partnership 
relationship 
regardless 
of 
their 
subjective 
intent  
to form such a legal relationship.  The statutory language is  
devoid of any requirement that the individuals have the  
10  
  
subjective intent to create a partnership.  Stated more  
plainly, the statute does not require partners to be aware of  
their status as “partners” in order to have a legal  
partnership.  
Further, the Court of Appeals emphasis upon subjective  
intent as being of “prime importance in ascertaining whether  
a partnership exists,” slip op at 2, belies the absence in the  
statute of even a reference to such “intent” as a factor for  
consideration.
 Indeed, MCL 449.7, entitled “Rules for  
determining 
existence of a partnership,” contains a listing of  
items to be specifically considered in this process and the  
subjective intent of the parties is conspicuously absent.6  It  
6  MCL 449.7 provides, in relevant part:  
(1) [P]ersons who are not partners as to each 
other are not partners as to third persons;  
(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy 
by the entireties, joint property, common property, 
or part ownership does not of itself establish a 
partnership, whether such co-owners do or do not 
share any profits made by the use of the property;  
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of 
itself establish a partnership, whether or not the 
persons sharing them have a joint or common right 
or interest in any property from which the returns 
are derived;  
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the 
profits of a business is prima facie evidence that 
he is a partner in the business, but no such 
inference shall be drawn if such profits were 
received in payment:  
(continued...)  
11  
 
 
is 
a 
well-established rule of statutory construction that this  
Court will not read words into a statute. Omelenchuk v City  
of Warren, 461 Mich 567, 575; 609 NW2d 177 (2000). We decline  
here to rewrite or embellish the statute. 
 C. COMMON LAW  
Although the provisions of MCL 449.6(1) set forth the  
standard for determining whether a partnership has been  
formed, we note that the Court of Appeals relied heavily on  
several of our earlier cases that, in the Court’s view,  
focused this inquiry on whether the parties mutually intended  
to form a partnership. However, upon further examination of  
these cases, we respectfully disagree with the Court of  
Appeals.  Rather, we find that, despite language that could  
potentially lead to such a conclusion, these cases, in fact,  
contemplated an examination of all the parties’ acts and  
conduct in determining the existence of a partnership.  
6(...continued) 
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise,  
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a 
landlord,  
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative 
of a deceased partner,  
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount 
of payment vary with the profits of the business,  
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the 
good-will of a business or other property by 
installments or otherwise.  
12  
 
 
When the Legislature initially drafted MCL 449.6(1) the  
definition of partnership was well established in our common  
law, and is consistent with the interpretation that we give it  
today.  See Beecher v Bush, 45 Mich 188, 193-194; 7 NW 785  
(1881); McDonald v Fleming, 178 Mich 206, 209; 144 NW 519  
(1913).7
 Indeed, judicial interpretations of the Michigan  
Uniform Partnership Act have regularly referenced the common­
law definition. See, e.g., Runo v Rothschild, 219 Mich 560,  
564-565; 189 NW 183 (1922) (citing the definition of a  
partnership from the statute and referencing the common-law  
test of partnership found in Beecher, supra); Van Stee v  
Ransford, 346 Mich 116, 133; 77 NW2d 346 (1956) (stating that  
“‘in the absence of an express agreement, . . . acts and  
conduct in relation to the business are the test to be used in  
determining if a partnership exists.’”).  
7 Additionally, there is some statutory evidence that the 
Legislature intended to maintain this definition.  Subsection  
2 of MCL 449.6 provides that  
any association formed under any other statute of 
this state, or any statute adopted by authority, 
other than the authority of this state, is not a 
partnership under this act, unless such association  
would have been a partnership in this state prior  
to the adoption of this act . . . . [Emphasis 
added.]  
This provision, although applicable to organizations formed 
under statutes other than the Michigan Uniform Partnership 
Act, implies that the common-law definition of a partnership 
is to assist in determining what constitutes a partnership.  
13  
 
Pursuant to this common law, individuals would be found  
to have formed a partnership if they acted as partners,  
regardless of their subjective intent to form a partnership.  
Speaking through Justice Cooley, this Court stated the  
following with regard to the law of partnership:  
If parties intend no partnership the courts 
should give effect to their intent, unless somebody 
has been deceived by their acting or assuming to 
act as partners; and any such case must stand upon 
its peculiar facts, and upon special equities.  
It is nevertheless possible for parties to 
intend no partnership and yet to form one.  If they 
agree upon an arrangement which is a partnership in 
fact, it is of no importance that they call it 
something else, or that they even expressly declare 
that they are not to be partners.  The law must  
declare what is the legal import of their  
agreements, and names go for nothing when the 
substance of the arrangement shows them to be 
inapplicable. [Beecher, supra at 193-194 (emphasis 
added); see also McDonald, supra.]  
Justice 
Cooley’s 
statements 
clearly 
express 
that, in  
determining the existence of a partnership, the focus of  
inquiry is on the parties’ actual conduct in their business  
arrangements, as opposed to whether the parties subjectively  
intend that such arrangements give rise to a partnership.  
Thus, one analyzes whether the parties acted as partners, not  
whether they subjectively intended to create, or not to  
create, a partnership.  The Court of Appeals in the instant  
case rejected the trial court’s reliance on the proposition  
that a partnership may be created where persons carry on as  
14  
 
co-owners 
a 
business 
for profit regardless of their subjective  
intent to be partners.  The Court emphasized that “[t]he  
absence of intent to form a partnership contradicts the  
established law in this state that the mutual intent of the  
parties is of prime importance in ascertaining whether a  
partnership exists.”  Slip op. at 2 (emphasis in original).  
However, the cases relied on by the Court of Appeals do not  
hold that, standing alone, the absence of subjective intent to  
create a partnership is determinative of the question of the  
existence of a legal partnership.8  Rather, it is one factor  
to consider in deciding if the parties did, in fact, carry on  
as co-owners a business for profit.  
This 
proposition has been consistently adhered to by this  
Court, although our decisions on occasion have utilized  
imprecise 
language 
and, 
therefore, 
created 
the 
possibility 
for  
some confusion.  For example, in Morrison v Meister, 212 Mich  
516, 519; 180 NW 395 (1920), this Court first began to refer  
to “the intention of the parties[as being] of prime importance  
[in 
determining 
the 
existence 
of 
a 
partnership].”  
Unfortunately, this language read out of context could lead  
8 Although Justice Cooley stated that the “doubtful” case 
must be resolved in favor of “intent,” warning that “otherwise 
we should ‘carry the doctrine of constructive partnership so 
far as to render it a trap to the unwary,’” Beecher, supra at  
194, this does not mean that the absence of subjective intent 
is dispositive to whether a partnership exists.  
15  
 
  
one to the conclusion that the intent referred to was not the  
intent to carry on as co-owners a business for profit, but the  
intent to form a legal partnership per se.  That this  
misunderstanding should be avoided can be seen by the fact  
that Morrison, even while stating “that there was no intention  
on the part of the defendants to form a partnership,” went on  
to clarify that statement by predicating its holding on the  
fact that very few of the other indicia of a partnership were  
present. 
Id.
 That is, the Court surveyed generally the  
parties’ actions and intentions to essentially conclude that  
they had not wanted to, nor did they in fact, carry on as co­
owners a business for profit. Thus, Morrison considered far  
more than merely whether the parties subjectively labeled  
themselves partners.  Likewise, in Lobato v Paulino, 304 Mich  
668, 675-676; 8 NW2d 873 (1943), there is similarly imprecise  
language.  In Labato, this Court observed that “[t]he factual  
situation now before us is quite like that in Morrison v  
Meister . . . where this court said: ‘the record is convincing  
that there was no intention on the part of the defendants to  
form a partnership.”  Id. at 676-677. 
The Court, as in  
Morrison, went on to find that “[t]he vagueness of the whole  
arrangement . . . renders it improbable that any partnership  
arrangement was mutually agreed upon by the parties.”  Id. at  
677.
 Plainly stated, Lobato turned on the fact that the  
16  
 
 
business arrangements of the parties, as well as their intent,  
afforded no evidence that they wished to jointly carry on as  
co-owners a business for profit.  See also Block v Schmidt,  
296 Mich 610, 616; 296 NW 698 (1941); Moore v DuBard, 318 Mich  
578, 593-594; 29 NW2d 94 (1947).  
In addition, we note that there are numerous other cases  
that expressly indicate that the focus of inquiry is on the  
parties’ intent to “carry on as co-owners a business for  
profit,” MCL 449.6(1), and on whether that intent is manifest  
in the actual agreement formed.  For example, in Runo v  
Rothschild, supra at 564, this Court identified the  
partnership statute and stated that “[w]hile the law has  
always 
considered 
the partnership relation one of contract and  
intention, it makes determination of the status of the parties  
from their agreement, and draws their intention from their  
acts.”  (Emphasis added.)  The Court concluded that the  
“agreement 
between [the 
plaintiff] 
and 
the 
defendant  
constitut[ed] them co-partners . . . .” Id. at 565.  
Similarly, in Klein v Kirschbaum, 240 Mich 368; 215 NW  
289 (1927), this Court determined that the relevant evidence  
did not establish a partnership relation. In so concluding,  
the Court focused on the parties’ intent to carry on as co­
owners a business for profit. Specifically, it stated:  
17  
 
 
Have they established the fact of their  
association with Kirschbaum under an agreement to 
carry on as co-owners the tailoring business for 
mutual 
profit? 
As 
between 
plaintiffs 
and  
Kirschbaum the question of whether there was a  
partnership 
depended 
upon 
intention 
mutually 
entertained 
to 
be 
established 
by 
facts 
and  
circumstances. [Id. at 371.]  
In Gleichman v Famous Players-Lasky Corp, 241 Mich 266, 272;  
217 NW 43 (1928), this Court again referenced the partnership  
statute, “appl[ied] the law as thus stated,” and concluded  
that the “indicia” of a partnership were absent.  Further, in  
Western Shoe v Neumeister, 258 Mich 662, 665; 242 NW 802  
(1932), the Court stated, on the matter of ascertaining the  
existence of a partnership, that “[i]f a partnership existed,  
it must have been created by consent of the parties either  
orally expressed or by conduct in connection with the business  
sufficient in law to constitute such a relation.” (Emphasis  
added.)  Similarly, in Van Stee, supra at 133, the Court noted  
that, absent an express agreement, “‘the test to be used in  
determining if a partnership exist[s]’” is to examine the  
“acts and conduct in relation to the business.” 
Quoting  
Western Shoe, supra.  
Accordingly, we believe that our prior case law has,  
consistent 
with 
MCL 
449.6(1), 
properly 
examined 
the  
requirements of a legal partnership by focusing on whether the  
parties intentionally acted as co-owners of a business for  
18  
 
  
 
profit, and not on whether they consciously intended to create  
the legal relationship of “partnership.”  We emphasize,  
however, that any future development of case law regarding  
partnership in our state must take place in accord with the  
provisions of the Michigan Partnership Act.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
With the language of the statute as our focal point, we  
conclude that the intent to create a partnership is not  
required if the acts and conduct of the parties otherwise  
evidence that the parties carried on as co-owners a business  
for profit.  MCL 449.6, 449.7. Thus, we believe that, to the  
extent that the Court of Appeals regarded the absence of  
subjective intent to create a partnership as dispositive  
regarding whether the parties carried on as co-owners a  
business for profit, it incorrectly interpreted the statutory  
(and the common) law of partnership in Michigan.  
Pursuant to MCL 449.6(1), in ascertaining the existence  
of a partnership, the proper focus is on whether the parties  
intended to, and in fact did, “carry on as co-owners a  
business for profit” and not on whether the parties  
subjectively intended to form a partnership.  To the extent  
that Morrison and its progeny are read to suggest that the  
absence of subjective intent to form a partnership is  
dispositive of the question whether a partnership exists, we  
19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
believe that such interpretations are in error.9  
Accordingly, we remand this matter to the Court of  
Appeals for analysis under the proper test for determining the  
existence of a partnership under the Michigan Uniform  
Partnership Act.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, 
KELLY, TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.  
9  We emphasize that while intent may be of “prime 
importance in considering whether a partnership exists,” 
Lobato, supra at 675, the focus of that intent is not on 
whether the parties intended to form a partnership, but on 
whether the parties intended to carry on as co-owners a 
business for profit, and whether they in fact did carry on 
such a business.  
20