Case Title: People v. Powell

Citation: 

Docket Number: S137730

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2018-08-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 8/13/18 
 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S137730 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
   
TROY LINCOLN POWELL, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
)            Super. Ct. No. BA240299-01 
 
____________________________________) 
 
A jury convicted defendant Troy Lincoln Powell of the first degree murder 
of Tammy Epperson (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 and found true three special 
circumstance allegations:  that the murder was committed while defendant was 
engaged in the commission of rape (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(C)) and mayhem (§ 
190.2, subd. (a)(17)(J)), and the murder involved the infliction of torture (§ 190.2, 
subd. (a)(18)).  The jury also convicted defendant of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. 
(a)(2)), mayhem (§ 203), and torture (§ 206).  In a separate proceeding, the jury 
found that defendant was sane when he committed the crimes of which he was 
convicted.  
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
2 
The original jury was unable to reach a verdict in the penalty phase, but a 
newly-selected jury returned a verdict of death after a second penalty proceeding.  
Defendant moved for a new trial and for modification of his sentence to life 
without the possibility of parole.  The trial court denied those motions and 
sentenced defendant to death.2  This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  For 
the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase Evidence 
1. Prosecution evidence 
Tammy Epperson was a recovering heroin addict who had recently 
completed a 12-step treatment program and held a responsible job.  Epperson lived 
on her own at Ballington Plaza, an apartment complex that accepted referrals from 
substance abuse recovery and inmate rehabilitation programs.  The property 
manager there described Epperson as “a very good tenant. . . .  [S]he took care of 
herself.  She spoke well, she was very proud of what she was doing . . . , and she 
paid rent on time.”  Her apartment was “very neat, everything in the right places.”  
Defendant met Epperson in the summer of 2000, while he was residing at 
Weingart Center in Los Angeles, which provided short-term housing and 
programs for persons recovering from substance abuse.  Defendant had recently 
been released from prison.  Epperson had gone to Weingart Center to visit 
Timothy Todd, a mutual friend of defendant and Epperson who was working 
there.  Defendant noticed Epperson and later asked Todd to introduce him to her.  
Epperson was “hesitant” to meet defendant because “she didn’t want a 
                                              
2  
The court also sentenced defendant to the upper terms of eight years on the 
convictions for forcible rape and mayhem and to life imprisonment on the torture 
conviction, all to be served concurrently and stayed pursuant to section 654.  
3 
relationship” at that time.  Not long before, Epperson had broken off a romantic 
relationship when she discovered that her boyfriend, Ronald Sims, had lapsed 
back into substance abuse.  Todd persisted, however, and Epperson eventually 
relented.  Defendant, Epperson, and Todd soon began spending time together, 
attending movies, eating out, and driving together in defendant’s truck. 
The nature of defendant’s relationship with Epperson was the subject of 
conflicting testimony.  Todd, who was employed as Epperson’s assistant and 
claimed to be her confidant, did not believe she and defendant were ever 
romantically involved.  Photographs and other evidence, however, suggested that 
Epperson and defendant eventually spent time together in Todd’s absence.  
Without question, defendant became obsessed with Epperson, declaring to Todd 
that he loved her and saying, “If I can’t have her, nobody will.  I’ll kill her and 
myself.”  At some point, he became upset that she was “hanging around with other 
men.”  Defendant began to appear uninvited at Epperson’s workplace and to call 
her repeatedly.  His behavior eventually became distressing to Epperson.  In late 
October 2000, Todd testified, Epperson broke off relations with defendant, but he 
continued to call her “constantly” at work. 
On a Sunday in early November, defendant was loitering across the street 
from Epperson’s church after services ended.  She spotted him while she was 
standing outside the church, talking with Sims.  Epperson and defendant were both 
Caucasian, while Sims was African-American.  As will be discussed below, the 
inter-racial character of Epperson’s relationship with Sims may have been an 
irritant to defendant, who was affiliated with a white supremacist gang while in 
prison. 
Epperson told Sims she had to “deal with this matter now,” referring to 
defendant, and crossed the street to talk to defendant.  According to the visitors’ 
log at Ballington Plaza, defendant and Epperson entered the building that morning 
4 
at 10:45 a.m., and defendant left at 1:26 p.m.  The afternoon security guard, 
however, saw defendant walk through the lobby toward the exit doors between 
2:00 and 3:00 that afternoon.  Because the building required all guests to be 
escorted, the guard, who was familiar with Epperson and defendant, stopped 
defendant and asked him where Epperson was.  Defendant replied that she was 
“ ‘in her unit resting.’ ”  Later that day, defendant twice called Todd to ask him to 
check on Epperson, saying he had killed her, but Todd did not take defendant 
seriously. 
The police did not enter Epperson’s apartment until the next day, after she 
failed to appear for work.  Epperson’s body was lying on the floor, and her 
apartment appeared to have been ransacked.  Two days later, defendant was 
arrested at a local motel.  Epperson’s keys were found on a table next to the bed in 
the motel room. 
Conclusions about the manner of Epperson’s death were based largely on 
forensic evidence regarding the condition of her apartment and her body.  Officer 
Ronald Raquel, a criminalist who specialized in blood spatter and sexual assault 
analysis, examined Epperson’s apartment on the day following the killing.  Raquel 
said Epperson’s body was located in the center of the apartment’s living quarters, 
between the bed and a chest of drawers.  She was wearing a blouse and hooded 
sweatshirt on the upper portion of her body, but she was nude from the waist 
down, with a towel covering her lower body.  Her brassiere, underneath the 
clothing, had been pushed up above the nipples of her breasts.  The condition of 
her blood-soaked sweatshirt suggested that her head had been lying on top of it for 
some time without moving.  A pair of jeans and women’s panties were piled at her 
feet.  Blood stains and spatters were found throughout the living quarters and 
bathroom of the apartment. 
5 
Using a large number of photographs, Raquel described the pattern of blood 
residue in the apartment, explaining the inferences that could be drawn from the 
size, shape, and location of the stains and spatters.  Based on his observations, 
Raquel inferred that the assault began in the bathroom, where Epperson’s head 
was slammed against the wall at least six times as her knees gave out, resulting in 
a descending pattern of smears.  She was then carried into the living quarters and 
placed near the bed in the spot where her body was found.  There the attack 
continued. 
Large pieces of a plaster flower vase and a hard lamp, both weighing at 
least ten pounds prior to breaking apart, were strewn about.  Portions of each had 
been used to strike Epperson’s head repeatedly.  She had also been struck with a 
wooden footstool and, after the footstool broke apart, its individual pieces.  The 
cord of the lamp had been wrapped around her head.  Blood stains on the jeans at 
her feet were consistent with a pair of bloody hands unfastening the jeans and 
forcing them down.  The inner surface of her thighs contained residues consistent 
with “a bloody object [making] contact with the victim’s thighs after the . . . blue 
jeans were removed.”  A screwdriver found under Epperson’s arm had blood on 
the tip and could have been used to inflict a wound below her eye. 
Following the assault, the assailant ransacked the apartment, going through 
Epperson’s closet, drawers, and other property.  Paper towels thrown into the toilet 
had been used to clean a bloody object, possibly a pair of hands. 
Yulai Wang, M.D., a deputy medical examiner who performed an autopsy 
on Epperson, testified about the condition of her body.  Dr. Wang concluded that 
Epperson died from multiple blunt force injuries.  Epperson had bruises and 
abrasions on the back of her arm, hands, and her right leg that Wang characterized 
as “defensive wounds,” presumably suffered as Epperson sought to protect herself.  
Blows to her head had caused a large laceration on her forehead, with an 
6 
underlying open skull fracture, and there were multiple lacerations on her 
forehead, both eyes, nose, cheeks, and upper and lower lips, both inside and 
outside.  The wound to her lower lip went “through and through,” and the open 
skull fracture was “deep in through the inside of her head.”  She also had a seven-
inch gaping skull fracture on the left side that ran from the front to the back of her 
head and extensive fractures to the front and base of her skull.  Her nose and both 
cheekbones were fractured, and her face had been flattened by fractures of the 
underlying facial bones.  Three separate wounds had been cut into the left side of 
her neck and head, three-quarters of an inch, one and one-half inch, and two and 
one-half inches long.  A similar wound was on the right side of her neck.  These 
wounds had been inflicted by a sharp, irregular object, such as broken glass, rather 
than a knife.  None of these cuts had severed the carotid artery, an injury that 
would have been promptly fatal.  Hemorrhaging in her eyes and bruises on her 
neck suggested strangulation.  Her brain showed bruising and bleeding in several 
different places, and an area of bleeding beneath her scalp “almost cover[ed]” the 
right side of her head.  Pieces of glass of different colors were removed from her 
body, clothing, head, and hair.  In a career involving over 2000 autopsies, Dr. 
Wang had seen only a “very small number” of beatings this severe. 
Epperson also suffered injuries suggestive of sexual abuse.  She had bruises 
and abrasions in the back and both sides of her vaginal area, with hemorrhaging 
under the skin.  Dr. Wang concluded these injuries had been caused by “the blunt 
force penetration either by a penis with a lot of force or other kind of object of 
similar shape and size.”  She found the extent of trauma suffered by Epperson to 
this part of her body to be “very rare[].” 
Because death causes a loss of blood pressure, Dr. Wang testified, injuries 
inflicted after death do not cause bruising and bleeding.  Accordingly, she 
concluded that the “majority” of Epperson’s injuries, perhaps as much as 95 
7 
percent, were inflicted while she was still alive, including the extensive injuries to 
her vaginal area, face, and neck. 
The parties stipulated that DNA analysis identified defendant’s blood on 
Epperson’s jeans and panties, her inner thighs, and a washcloth and plastic water 
bottle found in the sink.  In some of these areas, Epperson’s blood was mixed with 
that of defendant, and her blood was identified in samples collected around the 
living quarters.  Defendant’s DNA was found in a vaginal swab, and his sperm 
was found in and outside her vagina. 
The prosecution also presented evidence of two prior assaults by defendant.  
A former girlfriend testified that, in 1992, she attempted to end their three-year 
relationship.  Defendant responded that he would kill her.  He grabbed her by the 
throat, dragged her to the ground and down the driveway, and kicked her twice in 
the head and neck.  As he dragged her, he told her, “You’re going to die.”  
Neighbors prevented any further injury, but the woman has had lingering neck 
pain.  The second assault victim met defendant in January 1999 and had a few 
dates with him.  Two months after they met, she told him to stay away from her.  
Soon after, defendant lured her to his apartment, where he blocked the door with a 
chair and began yelling at her.  When she responded, he hit her in the face, 
knocking her to the ground, climbed on top of her, and choked her into 
unconsciousness.  When she recovered, defendant ordered her at knife-point to 
take off her clothes, tearing at them in his impatience.  Eventually, defendant 
forced her, still at knife-point, to take him with her while she picked up her 
children from day care and then to drive him home.  Defendant continued 
harassing the woman with telephone calls until she reported him to the police. 
8 
2. Defense evidence 
Testifying in his own defense, defendant confirmed that he met Epperson in 
June 2000, while he was living at the Weingart Center and working as a tutor in its 
computer lab.  At the time, he was being medicated with Sinequan, a sedative that 
helps control paranoid feelings, as well as Depakote and Paxil.  Without the 
medications, defendant suffered from paranoid anxiety.  Through the end of July, 
defendant saw Epperson while in the company of Todd, but later Todd “no longer 
was basically in the picture anymore.”  Epperson began to call defendant and 
invite him to visit her.  By mid-August, he had a “standing invitation” to go to 
Epperson’s apartment.  On Fridays, defendant would escort Epperson from her 
place of employment to the bank to deposit cash generated at the business, and 
during a transit strike in September he drove her to and from work.  In late 
September, they began having sexual relations.  Around that time, defendant 
stopped taking his medication, believing the medications made it difficult for him 
to maintain an erection.  Photographs of Epperson’s apartment taken by defendant 
displayed a variety of small gifts he had given her, and he identified a series of 
furnishings he helped to install. 
One week before the killing, defendant said, he called Epperson to tell her 
he was leaving Los Angeles for a period of time because he “needed some time 
away.”  During the conversion, he told Epperson he “expected to be put No. 1” 
among her male friends.  When they spoke the next day, Epperson was angry 
because defendant had not consulted her about his decision to leave.  They 
exchanged repeated calls that day, and Epperson eventually pleaded for defendant 
to return to her.  He agreed that they would “call a truce and try and work this 
out.”  The day before the killing, they spent most of the day together, shopping 
and visiting Epperson’s son.  In the evening, they had sexual relations. 
9 
Epperson’s church was located across the street from the Weingart Center, 
where defendant resided.  On the morning of the killing, defendant testified, he 
saw Epperson standing outside the church, while he was standing outside the 
Center.  As he watched, Sims approached her.  She then crossed the street to 
where defendant was standing and asked him to walk her home.  When they 
arrived, she asked him to come in.  They later drove to a Christian book store, 
returned to the apartment, and had consensual sexual relations.  After they 
finished, Epperson went to the bathroom and took a telephone call.  From 
Epperson’s side of the conversation, defendant said, he could tell she was making 
social plans with someone.  When defendant asked her what the call concerned, 
she told him he did not “run her life” and refused to tell him who had called, other 
than it was a person from her church.  An argument ensued, during which 
Epperson, standing in the bathroom, told him they were “done.”  Defendant, 
feeling “crushed,” struck her.  He had no memory of what happened after that, 
although he remembered seeing her on the floor.  He said he had “blanked out” 
like this a few times before.  Defendant testified that he neither planned nor 
intended to kill Epperson.   
The defense also presented testimony from an expert witness regarding the 
biological materials found on the panties lying at Epperson’s feet, suggesting they 
had been worn, if at all, for a short time before being removed. 
3. Prosecution rebuttal evidence 
Charles Vannoy, who acknowledged knowing defendant “[a] little bit, 
vaguely” from prison, repeatedly denied remembering the substance of an 
interview he had with police following Epperson’s killing.  Over defense 
objection, the prosecution was permitted to play a redacted videotape of the 
10 
interview, which occurred three days after the killing and prior to defendant’s 
arrest. 
During the interview, Vannoy told police he first met defendant in prison in 
December 1999, and they became friends.  After their release, Vannoy saw 
defendant at the Weingart Center, and defendant helped him move into an 
apartment three days before the killing. 
Late in the afternoon on the day Epperson was killed, Vannoy told the 
police, defendant called him and asked to come to Vannoy’s apartment.  When 
defendant arrived, he was anxious and did not want to talk about what had 
happened.  Instead, he made phone calls to family members and others.  Very 
early the next morning, defendant told Vannoy he had beat Epperson to death 
because she had “rejected him” and “was seeing somebody else.”  Defendant said 
he had been having sexual relations regularly with Epperson for two weeks to a 
month prior to her killing.  On the day of the killing, a man phoned Epperson 
shortly after she and defendant finished having intercourse, and she appeared to 
make plans to see the man.  During an ensuing argument, Epperson insisted 
defendant did not “own” her and that she would see “who I want, when I want.”  
He then followed her into the bathroom, told her to sit on the toilet, and hit her 
with a candle holder.  As defendant was beating her, Epperson asked why he was 
doing it.  He told her, “All I wanted you to do was to love me, you know, and you 
wouldn’t do that.”  At some point during the beating she asked, “Are you going to 
kill me, Troy?” and he responded, “Yes, Tammy, I am.  I am going to kill you.”  
Defendant told Vannoy he cut both sides of Epperson’s neck with glass, hit her on 
the head with a wooden stool and a big lamp, and drove a screwdriver or ice pick 
into her head, leaving a “big hole” in her forehead. 
After some sleep, defendant signed over ownership of his truck to Vannoy 
and then asked Vannoy to take him to Hollywood.  When Vannoy dropped him 
11 
off, defendant said he was going “to have fun for a couple days” and then turn 
himself in.  He said he first intended to steal money from Epperson’s place of 
employment, using keys he had taken from her. 
The prosecution also called a detective who had searched Epperson’s 
apartment.  The detective stated that he found a broken candle holder in the 
bathroom and a broken stool and lamp elsewhere.  The officer had also seen “a 
hole to the middle of [Epperson’s] head” when he observed the body.  The 
detective later went to Epperson’s place of employment and confirmed that the 
keys found in defendant’s possession at the time of his arrest fit the locks on its 
doors.  Finally, the detective described various wounds on defendant’s body at the 
time of his arrest, including cuts and bruising on his hands, a small cut on his 
forehead, and a one-inch cut on his calf. 
B.  Sanity Phase Evidence 
Following defendant’s conviction in the guilt phase, the same jury heard the 
trial of defendant’s insanity defense. 
1.  Defense evidence 
Kyle Boone, Ph.D., a clinical neuropsychologist, administered to defendant 
a series of “objective” standardized tests designed to detect brain abnormalities.  
Dr. Boone found defendant’s intelligence to be at the low end of the average 
range.  Defendant did “well” on most of the characteristics measured, but his 
problem solving skills, involving reasoning and logic, were “very low, very 
impaired.”  The tests on which defendant performed poorly measured the ability to 
think creatively to solve problems, evaluate the consequences of behavior, and 
cease behavior that is not appropriate to a situation.  On a test that measured the 
“ability to inhibit,” or to stop behavior that is inappropriate or incorrect, defendant 
scored in the second percentile, suggesting “that in his daily life he would have a 
12 
great deal of difficulty stopping a behavior that was not appropriate to the 
situation.”  
Dr. Boone concluded that defendant’s poor performance on these particular 
tests demonstrated that the frontal lobes of his brain, which enable problem 
solving, emotional expression, and empathy, were “not working correctly” due to 
“brain damage or brain dysfunction.”  The dysfunction would cause defendant to 
make bad decisions and lose control of his behavior.  Stressful circumstances and 
alcohol would worsen this effect.  According to Dr. Boone, a person who 
performed like defendant did on the tests “really doesn’t have the brain equipment, 
the hardware, so to speak, to control their behavior.  They simply don’t have the 
apparatus to make reasoned decisions about their behavior.” 
Part of Dr. Boone’s testing involved an evaluation of defendant’s good faith 
in participating in the tests, and Dr. Boone, a specialist in detecting malingering, 
concluded defendant was “doing his best on the testing,” rather than faking 
symptoms.  In addition, as she pointed out, defendant’s normal to excellent 
performance on many of the tests and consistently poor performance on others was 
inconsistent with malingering, since he would have had to know on which tests to 
do well and poorly. 
Roger Bertoldi, M.D., a neurophysiologist, testified regarding the 
occurrence and effect of brain seizures, generically referred to as epilepsy.  Some 
types of epilepsy, in particular temporal lobe epilepsy, can result in a loss of 
control, leading to acts of violence.  A seizure of this type can result in 
uncontrollable rage.  Defendant began suffering seizures before he was three years 
old.  His seizures continued periodically during childhood, leading Dr. Bertoldi to 
conclude defendant suffered from “true epilepsy,” caused by abnormal brain 
activity.  As an adult, Dr. Bertoldi testified, defendant continues to exhibit 
symptoms of nocturnal seizures.  An electroencephalogram (EEG) performed on 
13 
defendant demonstrated two abnormalities.  First, the frontal portion of his brain 
had “too much slow activity,” which showed that this portion of his brain “is not 
functioning correctly.”  To this extent, Dr. Bertoldi said, his findings were 
consistent with those of Dr. Boone.  Second, defendant’s EEG indicated 
“paroxysmal activity,” periodic spikes of activity that arose and receded, which is 
also “consistent with underlying brain dysfunction.”  A computer analysis 
confirmed the abnormal slow function in the front of defendant’s brain, detected in 
fewer than 1 percent of the population and suggesting defendant suffered from 
epilepsy.  Defendant was prescribed Depakote to control the seizures by limiting 
the penetration of abnormal activity into his brain.  Defendant had told Dr. 
Bertoldi that prior to the various violent episodes in his life, he had ceased taking 
the drug.  This coincidence, in Dr. Bertoldi’s view, connected the violent episodes 
to an underlying epileptic disorder.  In Dr. Bertoldi’s experience, epileptic patients 
commonly describe a sense of disassociation from their conduct at the time of a 
seizure.  He explained that the type of brain dysfunction he observed in defendant 
can result in “extraordinary rage like a primitive, very primitive rage.” 
Saul Niedorf, M.D., is a psychiatrist who often worked with the victims and 
perpetrators of domestic violence.  Based on three interviews with defendant 
during his incarceration and Dr. Niedorf’s review of “a dozen” reports on 
defendant, he concluded defendant suffers from a mental condition known as 
“intermittent explosive disorder,” which is characterized by destructive or violent 
actions that occur suddenly and lack a “cutoff.”  Dr. Niedorf based his diagnosis 
on a number of factors, including (1) defendant’s history of neurological 
abnormalities from an early age, (2) the continued presence of slow brain waves in 
his recent EEG, which indicated a “failure of development,” (3) Dr. Boone’s 
testing, which indicated “the absence of a certain kind of function,” and (4) a 
recent positron emission tomography (PET) scan showing areas of abnormally low 
14 
activity in defendant’s brain, which suggested that his brain lacked the capacity to 
inhibit his rage once it started.  In addition, Dr. Niedorf observed, the harsh facts 
of defendant’s upbringing demonstrated that he was “programmed for violence” 
by the brutal conduct of an abusive father toward his family members, conduct 
that defendant internalized.  Dr. Niedorf noted that defendant also had a history of 
suicide attempts, beginning in childhood and continuing through his then-current 
incarceration, which was consistent with his diagnosis.  Further corroborating his 
diagnosis was defendant’s positive response to mood stabilizing medications, 
which reduce a person’s arousal level and prevent excessive agitation.  Dr. Niedorf 
also observed that, beginning in 1993 and continuing to the time of the killing, 
defendant had been diagnosed repeatedly with a variety of mental disorders, 
largely depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia. 
In Dr. Niedorf’s view, defendant met the legal definition of insanity at the 
time he committed the killing.  He neither knew nor understood the nature and 
quality of his actions at the time he was beating Epperson, existing instead in an 
altered state of consciousness in which he failed to feel empathy or recognize the 
significance of his actions.  He may have been aware, at the time, of the events 
occurring, but he was unable to register the emotions associated with the events 
until later.  Nor could defendant distinguish right from wrong because, at the time, 
the parts of his brain that initiate good behaviors and stop bad behaviors, his 
frontal and temporal lobes, were not functioning.  Given the “practiced” nature of 
the behaviors, he neither voluntarily initiated them nor had the ability to stop them 
once they had begun, and he was not conscious of his conduct at the time it 
occurred. 
William Vicary, M.D., a psychiatrist, first evaluated defendant in 1993 and 
1994, when he was retained by the court to evaluate defendant’s mental 
competence to stand trial.  In connection with the present proceedings, Dr. Vicary 
15 
had interviewed defendant on five or six occasions, for a total of ten hours.  Based 
on that investigation, he concluded defendant suffered from a “major mental 
disorder,” primarily bipolar disorder.  Dr. Vicary believed his conclusion was 
supported by defendant’s psychoactive medication schedule.  He said that the 
medications prescribed for defendant, if given to a normal person, would place 
him or her in “a semi-coma for a period of three days.”  That defendant could take 
the various medications at high doses and remain alert and rational at the time of 
his testimony demonstrated “that these medications are fitting in with his illnesses 
and helping him.”  If defendant were faking his disorder, “he would have been 
under the influence and barely able to speak.”  Dr. Vicary explained that bipolar 
disorder is characterized by alternating periods of moody, irritable, and frenetic 
activity and periods of depression and inactivity, including attempted suicide.  
Depression and bipolar disorder had featured in defendant’s diagnoses since he 
was a teenager, and Dr. Vicary found that defendant’s conduct displayed the 
diagnostic behaviors for bipolar disorder. 
Based on defendant’s account of the Epperson killing, Dr. Vicary believed 
defendant understood the nature and quality of his acts at the time.  He did not 
believe, however, that defendant could distinguish right from wrong.  One feature 
of bipolar disorder is “explosive outbursts,” in which the person is “not thinking, . 
. . just acting, and . . . there is no rationality, no restraint, there’s nothing that can 
stop the explosion.”  Although defendant had some understanding of what he was 
doing, he was unable to stop himself.  In Dr. Vicary’s view, defendant likely 
recognized to some degree the wrongfulness of his conduct once he had finished 
and regained his composure, but during the event he had no grasp of right and 
wrong. 
16 
2.  Prosecution evidence 
David Griesemer is a clinical neurophysiologist who studies epilepsy and 
EEG’s.  Prior to his testimony, he examined defendant and found his functioning 
normal.  According to Dr. Griesemer, defendant had no memory of suffering 
seizures after childhood, and about half of persons with childhood seizures 
“outgrow” them.  Defendant’s childhood EEG was interesting because, although 
the EEG was abnormal, he was not suffering symptoms, a finding “not 
inconsistent with some of the benign epilepsies.”  In reviewing defendant’s most 
recent EEG, Dr. Griesemer found “some subtle abnormal findings,” but “they 
were not epileptic findings.”  In other words, although Dr. Griesemer 
acknowledged the slowing in defendant’s EEG, he did not believe it indicated a 
“tendency to have epilepsy.”  Further, he did not believe it suggested “significant” 
frontal lobe slowing. 
Kris Mohandie, Ph.D., a psychologist, interviewed defendant on three 
occasions, reviewed his medical and psychiatric records, and administered two 
“objective” psychological tests.  The results of the tests, in particular, suggested to 
Dr. Mohandie that defendant was faking at least some of his psychiatric 
symptoms.  On both tests, defendant claimed to have more problems than most 
psychiatric patients claim, suggesting his responses were a “fake bad response.”  
One test indicated probable feigning, while the other indicated feigning.  Given 
defendant’s “tendency to exaggerate his symptoms,” Dr. Mohandie was unable to 
find reliable evidence to diagnose defendant with a major mental disorder.  When 
he interviewed defendant, Dr. Mohandie found no evidence of bipolar disorder, 
although such symptoms would have been expected despite his medication.  Nor 
did he see any indication of such symptoms on the videotape of defendant’s police 
interview, which occurred after he had stopped using medication.  
17 
Accordingly, Dr. Mohandie believed defendant was legally sane at the time 
of the killing.  As he explained, in defendant’s interviews with him, defendant 
disclaimed any overt symptoms of mental illness, such as voices, delusions, or 
hallucinations.  He had a very specific memory of all events leading up to the 
killing, and his behavior after the killing, which involved some cleaning up and 
avoiding detection, was inconsistent with a failure to recognize his conduct was 
wrongful.  His claim of amnesia surrounding the moment of the killing seemed 
“unlikely” to Dr. Mohandie.  Instead, Dr. Mohandie believed, defendant suffered 
from an antisocial personality with narcissistic traits, which caused him to commit 
the “garden variety violence” of killing a woman who he believed had treated him 
poorly.  Dr. Mohandie also rejected the diagnosis of intermittent explosive 
disorder, which he found inconsistent with the purposeful, motivated behavior 
displayed in the killing. 
C.  Penalty Phase Evidence 
1.  Prosecution case in aggravation 
Because the original jury deadlocked during the initial penalty phase, this 
proceeding was tried to a newly-selected jury.  Given the new jury, the 
prosecution presented essentially the same evidence regarding Epperson’s killing 
that was presented during the guilt phase, including testimony by the same 
percipient witnesses about the circumstances leading to the killing, the blood 
spatter, autopsy, and DNA evidence, Charles Vannoy’s interview with police 
about defendant’s statements and conduct afterward, and the two prior assault 
victims. 
In addition, the prosecution presented two witnesses familiar with 
Epperson’s life prior to meeting defendant.  Bette Ruiz de Esparza is the mother of 
Paul Grano, who was married to Epperson.  She testified that Epperson’s mother, 
18 
apparently an alcoholic, abandoned her when Epperson was a teenager.  Ruiz de 
Esparza and her son took Epperson in, looked after her, and treated her like 
family.  Grano, eight years older than Epperson, eventually married her, and they 
had a child together.  Both Grano and Epperson struggled with drug abuse, and 
Epperson was in and out of treatment and jail for a significant period.  In the year 
or two before her death, however, Epperson “sounded real positive, and her life 
was going good.”  Although Epperson and Grano had separated at some earlier 
time, “they were getting back together” at the time of her death.  During the 
separation, they had remained good friends, and Grano was “broken-hearted” by 
her death. 
Ruth Steward was a lay minister at Epperson’s Church, which was located 
on “skid row,” across the street from Weingart Center.  She had known Epperson 
for about a year prior to her death and was proud of Epperson’s strength, positive 
attitude, and determination.  During the year Steward knew her, Epperson was 
drug-free.  Steward was deeply affected by her “senseless” death. 
2.  Defense case in mitigation 
Through the testimony of defendant’s mother and two sisters, the defense 
provided evidence of defendant’s difficult family life and history of violence.  
Both of defendant’s parents, Joyce and Joe Powell, came from homes marked by 
alcohol abuse.  Joyce’s parents were alcoholics, and her father sexually abused her 
before she was ten years old.  Joe’s mother also drank heavily, and he was raised 
largely in a variety of foster homes.  The couple married young. 
Defendant’s younger sister, Montana, characterized Joe as a “monster.”  He 
was emotionally and physically abusive to Joyce and all four children.  As 
Montana said, “If we went to Disneyland or something, he still would find a way 
to make us feel bad.”  When defendant was two years old and threw an older boy 
19 
to the ground, Joe picked defendant up and threw him into a pole.  Six months 
later, defendant began having violent seizures.  For seven years, he was given 
medication to control the seizures.  Over the years, defendant’s behavior would 
occasionally trigger other angry responses from Joe, one time causing neighbors to 
call the police.  According to Joyce, similar incidents occurred “every time [Joe] 
came home and was angry.”  If Joyce attempted to intervene, Joe turned his anger 
on her. 
The family lived in fear of Joe.  Defendant’s older brother became so angry 
with Joe that he once waited with a gun for him to return home, planning to kill 
Joe.  Only his older sister’s intervention prevented the confrontation. 
Defendant’s first suicide threat occurred when he was thirteen years old.  
Around this time, Joyce said, “he was never actually really happy.”  His older 
sister recalled discovering him carrying a gun in a duffel bag, planning to harm 
either himself or Joe.  She talked him out of it. 
Defendant’s first violent outburst occurred before his eighteenth birthday 
when, in anger over a girlfriend, he attacked Montana with a lead pipe while she 
was sleeping.  Afterwards, defendant had no memory of the incident.  Although 
Joyce attempted to get him counseling, Joe refused to pay for it.  After a bout of 
drinking when defendant was 22-years old, he became enraged when Joyce told 
him she had no money to give him, and he threw her across the room, breaking a 
vertebrae in her back.  At some point he also assaulted his older sister when she 
attempted to rouse him from a drunken stupor, pushing her down the stairs and 
ripping a mirror from her car.  Both Joyce and his sisters testified that defendant 
would at times go into a state of vacant, uncontrolled rage.  As his older sister 
testified, “It’s like he’s doing things but he doesn’t know he’s doing them, but he’s 
doing them.” 
20 
Joyce viewed such conduct as uncharacteristic, testifying that defendant 
was a “caring and loving person” who was protective of others.  They are very 
close, and she does not fear him.  Defendant’s older sister also testified that she 
was close to him and believed he “had a big heart,” despite his anger.  
In addition to testimony by defendant’s family and friends, both childhood 
and adult, defendant presented the testimony of the same four psychiatric experts 
who testified during the sanity phase.  Although different in some details, the 
testimony was materially the same. 
3.  Prosecution rebuttal case 
In rebuttal, the prosecution also presented the testimony of Drs. Griesemer 
and Mohandie, which was materially the same as their testimony from the sanity 
phase. 
4.  Defense surrebuttal 
In surrebuttal, the defense presented Richard Romanoff, Ph.D., a clinical 
and forensic psychologist who had met with defendant for thirteen or fourteen 
hours.  Dr. Romanoff believed defendant suffers from a “complex set of mental 
disorders,” beginning with “organic impairment,” or abnormal brain function.  
This was compounded by the dysfunctional family circumstances during his 
youth, in which his “whole world [was] organized around fear of aggression and 
seeing people being victims of aggression.”  Dr. Romanoff agreed with the 
diagnosis of intermittent explosive disorder and criticized Dr. Mohandie’s contrary 
view as “incomplete.” 
21 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Guilt Phase Claims 
1.  The Ireland merger doctrine does not bar defendant’s convictions 
for torture-murder and mayhem-murder 
The trial court instructed the jury that it could convict defendant of first 
degree murder either by finding that Epperson’s killing was done intentionally 
with premeditation and deliberation or that it occurred during the commission or 
attempted commission of, among other charged felonies, mayhem or torture.  In 
People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 (Ireland), we held that the crime of assault 
with a deadly weapon cannot be used as the sole predicate crime for a second 
degree felony-murder conviction because, when a firearm is used in a killing, such 
an assault is “an integral part of the homicide.”  (Id., at p. 539.)  Defendant 
contends that the Ireland holding, which has come to be known as the “ ‘merger’ 
doctrine” (id., at p. 540), should be applied here to preclude a verdict of first 
degree murder in the course of the crimes of mayhem or torture because the 
commission of these crimes was, in defendant’s characterization, an integral part 
of his brutal heat of passion killing.  We find the argument unpersuasive. 
“ ‘The felony-murder rule makes a killing while committing certain 
felonies murder without the necessity of further examining the defendant’s mental 
state.’  [Citation.]  ‘Under the felony-murder doctrine, when the defendant or an 
accomplice kills someone during the commission, or attempted commission, of an 
inherently dangerous felony, the defendant is liable for either first or second 
degree murder, depending on the felony committed.  If the felony is listed in 
section 189, the murder is of the first degree; if not, the murder is of the second 
degree.’ ”  (People v. Bryant (2013) 56 Cal.4th 959, 965.) 
The defendant in Ireland was convicted of second degree murder after he 
shot his wife in the course of an argument in their home.  (Ireland, supra, 70 
22 
Cal.2d at p. 528.)  The jury had been instructed that it could convict the defendant 
of second degree murder if the killing occurred during the commission of a felony 
inherently dangerous to human life, expressly including assault with a deadly 
weapon.  (Id., p. 538.)  In reversing, we concluded, “[t]o allow such use of the 
felony-murder rule would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue 
of malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a 
result of a felonious assault — a category which includes the great majority of all 
homicides.  . . .  We therefore hold that a second degree felony-murder instruction 
may not properly be given when it is based upon a felony which is an integral part 
of the homicide and which the evidence produced by the prosecution shows to be 
an offense included in fact within the offense charged.”  (Id., at p. 539 [first italics 
added, second italics in original, footnote omitted].)  
In two subsequent decisions, we extended this doctrine to preclude 
convictions for first degree felony murder premised on a killing during the course 
of a burglary when the intended felony underlying the burglary was the assault 
that led to the homicide.  (People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 188-189 (Sears); 
People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431, 440 (Wilson) [precluding application of the 
felony-murder rule when “the entry would be nonfelonious but for the intent to 
commit the assault, and the assault is an integral part of the homicide”].) 
Although second degree felony murder is grounded in an interpretation of 
section 188, no statute specifically addresses second degree felony murder.  
(People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1182-1183.)  In contrast, first degree 
felony murder, along with the predicate crimes underlying it, is expressly 
described in section 189.  Citing this distinction in People v. Farley (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 1053 (Farley), we reconsidered and disapproved the extension of the 
merger doctrine to first degree felony murder.  As Farley reasoned, “ ‘ “ ‘the 
power to define crimes and fix penalties is vested exclusively in the legislative 
23 
branch.’  [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]  The courts may not expand the Legislature’s 
definition of a crime [citation], nor may they narrow a clear and specific 
definition.  In the context of second degree felony murder, courts must interpret 
section 188’s reference to an ‘ “abandoned and malignant heart.” ’  [Citation.]  In 
the context of first degree felony murder, however, there is no need for 
interpretation of the Legislature’s clear language.  Thus, the differences between 
the statutory bases for first and second degree felony murder support the 
conclusion that although this court properly may limit the breadth of second 
degree felony murder in a manner consistent with its interpretation of the 
Legislature’s intent, there is no room for interpretation when the Legislature has 
defined first degree felony murder to include any killing ‘committed in the 
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate,  . . . burglary.’ ”  (Id., at p. 1119.)    
The rationale of Farley requires us to reject defendant’s argument.  
Although Farley was concerned with felony murder based on burglary, its 
rationale applies equally to all of the predicate felonies expressly listed in section 
189.  Even prior to Farley, we had never applied the merger doctrine to first 
degree felony murder premised on a predicate crime other than burglary.  (See 
People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 942 [“our preexisting jurisprudence had 
limited Wilson to cases of burglary felony murder where the defendant’s only 
felonious purpose was to assault or kill the victim”].)  We have declined to apply 
Farley to cases involving convictions for first degree felony murder premised on 
burglary that were committed prior to the issuance of that decision in order to 
avoid retroactivity concerns (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 882; 
Farley, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1121), but there is no risk of an ex post facto 
violation in the circumstances presented here.  Because we have never suggested 
that the merger doctrine applies to murders premised on torture and mayhem, 
precluding that application on the rationale of Farley does not constitute “an 
24 
unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute.”  (Farley, at p. 1121; 
People v. Blakely (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 91 [“an unforseeable judicial enlargement 
of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates in the same manner as an ex 
post facto law”].)  Given the absence of any indication in our prior decisions that 
first degree murder premised on torture or mayhem is subject to the merger 
doctrine, and given our failure to extend the doctrine, over the course of thirty 
years at the time of defendant’s crimes, to any first degree felony murder other 
than one premised on the type of burglary involved in Sears and Wilson, our 
refusal to extend the doctrine to torture and mayhem is not a legal result “ ‘that the 
accused could not have foreseen at the time of the alleged criminal conduct.’ ”  
(People v. Whitmer (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733, 742.)  Accordingly, we hold that 
defendant’s argument fails because the merger doctrine is inapplicable to first 
degree felony murder. 
2.  The evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for 
torture murder 
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence before the jury to 
support the torture conviction, the first degree torture-murder conviction, and the 
special circumstance finding based on that theory. 
“When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the 
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence — that is, evidence 
that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which a reasonable trier of 
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (People v. 
Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27 (Lindberg).)  In so doing, a reviewing court 
“presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could 
reasonably deduce from the evidence.”  (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 
1053.)  The same standard of review applies to the sufficiency of the evidence 
25 
supporting special circumstance findings.  (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 
344, 389.) 
“ ‘All murder which is perpetrated by means of . . . torture . . . is murder of 
the first degree.’  (§ 189.)  Murder by torture requires (1) an act or acts causing 
death that involve a high degree of probability of death, (2) a causal relationship 
between the torturous act and death, (3) a willful, deliberate, and premeditated 
intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain on a person for the purpose of 
revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any other sadistic purpose, and (4) 
commission of the act or acts with such intent.”  (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 
Cal.4th 658, 715-716 (Edwards).)  The elements of a torture-murder special 
circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)) are similar but not identical.  “To prove that 
special circumstance allegation, the prosecution had to establish that ‘defendant 
intended to kill and had a torturous intent, i.e., an intent to cause extreme pain or 
suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or another sadistic 
purpose.’ ”  (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 65 (Brooks).) 
In a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to a torture-murder conviction or 
special circumstance finding, the focus is generally on “defendant’s torturous 
intent.”  (Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 65.)  The perpetrator must intend to 
“ ‘ “cause pain and suffering in addition to death.” ’ ”  (Edwards, supra, 57 Cal. 
4th at p. 716.)  Torturous intent “ ‘is a state of mind which, unless established by 
the defendant’s own statements (or by another witness’s description of a 
defendant’s behavior in committing the offenses), must be proved by the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense [citations], which 
include the nature and severity of the victim’s wounds.’ ”  (People v. Smith (2015) 
61 Cal.4th 18, 52.)  In this regard, “evidence that the defendant intentionally 
inflicted nonlethal wounds on the victim may demonstrate the requisite ‘ “sadistic 
intent to cause the victim to suffer pain in addition to the pain of death.” ’ ”  
26 
(Hajek and Vo, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1188.)  Such wounds support a finding of 
intent because they “evidence[] deliberate and gratuitous violence beyond that 
which was necessary to kill the victim.”  (Ibid.)  The focus, as noted, is on 
defendant’s intent to inflict pain and suffering, which is “at the heart of” torture 
murder.  (People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 268 (Davenport).)  It need 
not be demonstrated that that the victim was actually conscious and suffered pain 
at the time otherwise painful injuries were inflicted.  (Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 
p. 67.) 
Our most recent decision addressing the evidence necessary to support a 
torture-murder conviction is Brooks, in which we affirmed both a torture-murder 
conviction and special circumstance finding.  The defendant in Brooks developed 
a jealous, possessive attitude toward the victim, with whom he was having a 
romantic affair.  (Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 17, 66.)  He came to believe she 
was having a sexual relationship with another man and began spying on her.  One 
day after she left that man’s home, the defendant confronted her, strangled her into 
unconsciousness, placed her in her car, and, aware that she was still alive, set her 
and the car on fire.  (Id., at p. 66.)  We concluded that “a reasonable jury could 
infer from evidence of defendant’s intense possessiveness and all-consuming 
suspicions . . . , coupled with his dousing her and her car with accelerant and 
lighting them on fire, that defendant intended to inflict severe pain on [the victim] 
for the purpose of revenge.”  (Id., at pp. 66-67.) 
In this case, the jury could have concluded that defendant became similarly 
obsessed with Epperson, thereby satisfying the “purpose” element of torture 
murder.  He told Todd that he loved her and said “If I can’t have her, nobody will, 
I’ll kill her and myself.”  He was concerned that she might be seeing other men, 
began to appear uninvited at her place of work, and telephoned her persistently.  
By defendant’s own testimony, the immediate cause of the assault on Epperson 
27 
was a phone call that she took from another man, whom she refused to identify, 
during which she made social plans.  When this caused an argument, Epperson 
told defendant they were “done.”  Feeling “crushed,” he hit her.  As related earlier, 
defendant told Charles Vannoy that he instructed Epperson to sit on the toilet and 
then hit her with a candle holder.  As he began beating her, Epperson asked why 
he was doing it.  He told her, “All I wanted you to do was to love me, you know, 
and you wouldn’t do that.”  Accordingly, defendant’s own account of the killing, 
as well as the circumstances surrounding the crime, provide substantial evidence 
to support a finding that his purpose in assaulting her was revenge for Epperson’s 
romantic rejection. 
The testimony and forensic evidence further demonstrated that defendant 
engaged in far more violence than that necessary to kill Epperson, some of it 
unrelated to any attempt to kill, which provided substantial evidence to support a 
finding that he intended to inflict extreme and prolonged pain.  The beating alone 
was savage and beyond that necessary to cause death.  Defendant struck Epperson 
repeatedly in the bathroom, carried her into the living room, and then beat her with 
several different objects, striking with such force that each item was broken into 
pieces and flattening the features of her face.  In addition, he used broken glass to 
inscribe cuts into both sides of her neck and the left side of her face and drove a 
screwdriver or ice pick into her face.  Finally, defendant inflicted wounds to 
Epperson’s vaginal area of a severity the coroner found to be “very rare[].”  While 
some vaginal injury might be expected from a rape, the injuries inflicted on 
Epperson were extreme, suggesting an intent to inflict suffering beyond that 
caused by the violation of rape.  As the coroner testified, the majority of these 
injuries, perhaps as much as 95 percent, occurred while Epperson was still alive. 
In short, there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could 
have concluded that defendant, motivated by revenge for Epperson’s rejection of 
28 
him as a romantic partner, chose to inflict extreme pain and suffering on her, 
causing the dreadful injuries from which she eventually died.3 
The same evidence supports the jury’s true finding of the special 
circumstances allegation, which requires an intent to kill and an intent “ ‘to cause 
extreme pain or suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or 
another sadistic purpose.’ ”  (Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 65.)  Defendant’s own 
statements to Vannoy and the extreme nature of the beating provide adequate 
evidentiary support for a finding of intent to kill. 
Defendant properly argues that the severity of Epperson’s wounds cannot 
be the sole evidence to support a finding of torturous intent.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1273 [“Horrible wounds may be as consistent 
with a killing in the heat of passion or an explosion of violence, as with the intent 
to inflict cruel suffering”].)  But it is not so much the severity of Epperson’s 
wounds, as their nature, that supports a finding of intent to inflict pain and 
suffering here.  Defendant used three separate heavy objects to bludgeon 
Epperson, discarding each in turn as it broke into pieces, and presumably 
continued the beating long after she was rendered unconscious.4  He gratuitously 
cut both sides of her face and drove a sharp object into it, and inflicted severe 
injuries to the area around her vagina.  The nonfatal but undoubtedly painful 
                                              
3  
Defendant concedes that if the intent element of torture murder is supported 
by the evidence, his conviction for torture, apart from torture murder, is supported 
by the evidence. 
4  
Defendant contends there is no reason to believe these objects were used 
“in so skillful a manner as to deliberately impose pain and suffering — but not 
death,” but there is no requirement that a defendant calculate each of his or her 
blows so as to cause suffering without death. 
29 
injuries, particularly, evidenced an intent to inflict pain apart from an inevitably 
fatal beating. 
Defendant also argues the evidence was consistent with a killing due to an 
“ ‘explosion of violence’ ” (Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 268), rather than an 
intent to torture.  He cites People v. Anderson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 351 (Anderson), in 
which the defendant killed a young girl who may have resisted an attempted 
sexual assault.  The manner of the homicide — the infliction of more than 40 knife 
wounds — was certainly consistent with an intent to inflict pain and suffering (id., 
at p. 355), but the court found insufficient evidence to support a conviction for 
torture murder.  The court explained that the record lacked sufficient evidence of 
“the requisite intent,” but its subsequent discussion made clear that the term 
“intent” in that phrase refers to purpose or motive — that is, the infliction of pain 
and suffering “for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any other 
sadistic purpose.”  (Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 715, 723.)  Because there 
was no evidence to suggest the Anderson defendant had a proscribed purpose in 
inflicting the wounds, the court held, “the instant case shows only an explosion of 
violence.”  (Anderson, at p. 360.)  A similar result was reached in People v. 
Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, in which the Attorney General “d[id] not contend 
that defendant was motivated by revenge, extortion, or persuasion” and sought to 
demonstrate a “ ‘ “sadistic intent to cause the victim to suffer pain in addition to 
the pain of death” ’ ” merely on the basis of the defendant’s delivery of repeated 
blows to the victim’s head.  (Id., at p. 1136.)  In that case we found insufficient 
evidence to support a torture-murder special circumstance, concluding “[t]he 
killing was brutal and savage, but there is nothing in the nature of the injuries to 
suggest that defendant inflicted any of them in an attempt to torture [the victim] 
rather than to kill her.”  (Id., at p. 1137.) 
30 
That is simply not the case here.  First, there was substantial evidence from 
which the jury could reasonably have found that defendant was motivated by 
revenge, beginning with his acknowledgment that he first struck Epperson because 
she had terminated their relationship.  Second, as discussed above, defendant’s 
infliction of gratuitous injuries in addition to the fatal beating provided substantial 
evidence of an intent to inflict pain and suffering for their own sake.5 
3.  The evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for 
rape-murder 
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the rape 
conviction, the rape-murder theory of first degree felony murder, and the special 
circumstance finding based on that theory. 
A homicide “committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate . . . 
rape” is first degree murder.  (§ 189; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 
1086.)  Forcible rape is “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished  . . .  [¶]  . . .  
[¶]  . . .  against a person’s will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or 
fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.”  (§ 261, 
subd. (a)(2); People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 850.)  A rape-murder 
special-circumstance finding requires the homicide to be committed while the 
defendant was engaged in the commission of, or attempted commission of, rape.  
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(C); People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1292 (Lewis).)  
                                              
5  
Defendant also cites People v. Leach (1985) 41 Cal.3d 92, in which we 
reversed a torture-murder special-circumstance finding because the jury was not 
instructed that intent to inflict pain and suffering was an element of the finding.  
(Id., at pp. 109-110.)  We declined to affirm in spite of the error because the 
evidence did not demonstrate intent to inflict pain “ ‘as a matter of law,’ ” noting 
the “strong evidence of intent to kill militates to some extent against a finding of 
intent to inflict pain.”  (Id., at p. 110.)  Because the jury was properly instructed 
here, the evidence need not demonstrate intent to inflict pain as a matter of law.  
Leach has no application. 
31 
As noted above, we review the jury’s verdict for substantial evidence.  (Lindberg, 
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 27.) 
There was substantial evidence of forcible rape here.  Defendant’s DNA 
was found in a vaginal swab, and his sperm was found in and outside Epperson’s 
vagina.  When her body was discovered, Epperson was still wearing a sweatshirt, 
blouse, and bra on her upper body, but her lower body was nude, a pattern 
consistent with forced intercourse.  (Lewis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1290.)  In 
addition, her brassiere had been pushed above her nipples.  Blood stains on her 
jeans, which were found lying near her body, suggested that defendant had, with 
bloody fingers, unbuttoned the pants, put his hands inside the pockets, and pulled 
the pants off, and the blood stains on the inner surface of Epperson’s thighs were 
consistent with the forcing apart of her legs.  The medical examiner found the 
degree of trauma to Epperson’s vaginal area “very rare[],” caused by “the blunt 
force penetration either by a penis with a lot of force or other kind of object of 
similar shape and size.”  From these facts, the jury readily could have concluded, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Epperson had forced intercourse and that her 
death occurred while defendant was engaged in this rape. 
Defendant’s argument to the contrary focuses on the fact that Epperson’s 
jeans were found lying on top of her panties, the reverse of what would be 
expected if defendant had removed her clothing, and the testimony of a defense 
forensic expert who examined a liner in the panties and concluded it was likely she 
had not worn them.  This evidence, defendant argues, suggests that Epperson was 
not wearing clothing on her lower body at the time the assault began.  Defendant’s 
interpretation of the forensic evidence, however, fails to account for the unusual 
blood stains on her jeans, which suggest that they were removed after both 
Epperson and defendant had been bloodied.  If she were not wearing jeans at the 
time of the assault, there would be no explanation for the blood stains in her 
32 
pockets.  It may simply be that Epperson was wearing the jeans without 
underwear, a circumstance that would also explain how the jeans ended up on top 
of the panties.  Defendant’s interpretation also ignores the pattern of blood stains 
on her thighs and the severe trauma to her genitals.  In any event, that Epperson 
might not have been clothed from the waist down is not inconsistent with a 
forcible rape. 
Noting that he testified to having had voluntary intercourse with Epperson 
prior to the assault, defendant argues that Epperson’s vaginal trauma could have 
been the result of consensual sexual intercourse between a relatively small woman 
and a very large man.6  It is unlikely, however, that Epperson would willingly 
have endured intercourse that caused vaginal injury as severe as that found by the 
medical examiner.  In any event, the totality of the evidence provides substantial 
evidence of rape, notwithstanding the possibility of an alternate explanation. 
Defendant contends these circumstances are comparable to those in People 
v. Craig (1957) 49 Cal.2d 313 (Craig), and Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d 15, in 
which the evidence was found insufficient to support first degree felony-murder 
convictions based on rape.  Both cases are distinguishable.  In Craig, the victim 
had been beaten to death.  When found, her body was dressed in a slip or 
nightgown, covered by a raincoat.  Her panties, which had been found underneath 
the body, were torn open.  (Id., at p. 316.)  Yet the court in Craig found 
insufficient evidence to support a rape-murder conviction because, 
notwithstanding the suggestive condition of the victim’s clothing, neither the 
defendant’s nor the victim’s clothing “bore any evidence of the sexual act” (id., at 
p. 318), and there was no other evidence to suggest sexual intercourse had 
                                              
6 
At the time of the killing, defendant was between 6 feet, three inches and 6 
feet, four inches tall and weighed about 280 pounds. 
33 
occurred.  (Ibid.)  In Anderson, as noted above, the victim had been stabbed to 
death.  Her body was nude, and the crotch had been cut from her underwear.  (Id., 
at pp. 20-21.)  Again, the court found insufficient evidence to support a charge 
under section 288 of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14 
years because there was no physical evidence of sexual contact or any evidence 
that the defendant harbored sexual feelings toward the victim or had ever engaged 
in lewd conduct with her.  (Id., at pp. 35-36.)  In contrast with these cases, the 
state of Epperson’s clothing was not the only evidence supporting the charge of 
rape.  As discussed above, there was no question defendant had sexual intercourse 
with Epperson, and there was substantial forensic evidence to support the charge 
that the intercourse had occurred by force and against her will.7 
4.  The trial court’s admission of gang affiliation evidence during the 
guilt phase was harmless 
Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error in permitting 
the introduction of evidence during the guilt phase that he had been affiliated in 
prison with a white supremacist gang and that he had tattoos suggesting racist 
sympathies.  He also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct in eliciting 
some of this evidence. 
Epperson was Caucasian.  Around the time she met defendant, Epperson 
had broken off her romantic relationship with Sims, an African-American, but the 
                                              
7  
Defendant also contends his conviction for premeditated first degree 
murder was not supported by substantial evidence.  Because we have concluded 
that substantial evidence supports defendant’s first degree murder conviction on 
the theories of torture murder and rape murder, and because defendant has not 
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the theory of mayhem-
murder, we need not, and do not, address the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the charge of premeditated first degree murder.  (See Hajek and Vo, 
supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1192, fn. 20.)   
34 
two remained friends, and defendant was aware of their relationship.  On the 
morning of the day Epperson was killed, defendant saw her talking to Sims outside 
her church. 
Although Sims and defendant had lived in the same building during two 
years of rehabilitation, they had never formally met or spoken.  When Sims 
testified that he felt “intimidated” by defendant because defendant was a “white 
supremacist,” the trial court struck this testimony and admonished the jury to 
disregard it.  Timothy Todd, Epperson’s friend and assistant at her workplace, 
later testified, without objection, that defendant, “on several occasions,” said that 
“he would kill that nigger [Sims] if he kept trying to see” Epperson. 
During the cross-examination of defendant, he acknowledged, without 
explanation, that he “had a problem” with Sims because of “what he did to” 
Epperson.  When defendant denied being a “racist” and disliking Sims because he 
was an African-American, the prosecutor was permitted to introduce, over 
objection, photographs of defendant’s tattoos, two of which read, “White Pride” 
and “White Anger.”  Defendant said he had gotten the tattoos “years ago” in 
prison.   
During the prosecution’s rebuttal case, the trial court permitted the 
introduction of gang-related statements made by defendant’s friend, Charles 
Vannoy, during his police interview.  The jury therefore heard Vannoy describe 
himself as a one-time member of the Aryan Brotherhood, although he had since 
left the group.  Vannoy acknowledged having tattoos, one of which was a 
swastika, and said he was aware defendant did not like Sims, whom the 
interviewer had referred to as Epperson’s “Black boyfriend.”  In closing argument, 
neither attorney mentioned the tattoos or gang evidence. 
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence “for abuse 
of discretion, and [the ruling] will not be disturbed unless there is a showing that 
35 
the trial court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner resulting in a 
miscarriage of justice.”  (People v. Wall (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1048, 1069.)  When 
evidence is erroneously admitted, we do not reverse a conviction unless it is 
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have 
occurred absent the error.  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; see 
People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 887-888 (Covarrubias) [Watson 
standard applies in evaluating prejudice from state law error in admitting 
evidence].)  We apply a similar standard of prejudice when considering a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct.  (E.g., People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 798-
799, 804.) 
We need not address the propriety of the trial court’s admission of this 
evidence or the prosecutor’s conduct in eliciting it during the guilt phase because 
any error in its admission was harmless.  The evidence of defendant’s guilt was 
very strong.  There was no question that he was the killer.  The forensic evidence 
powerfully revealed the manner of Epperson’s death, and the testimony, including 
defendant’s own testimony, provided ample evidence of the obsession that appears 
to have motivated the crimes.  At most, the evidence of defendant’s possible racist 
sympathies would have provided an additional reason for the intensity of his anger 
at the time of the killing.  Defendant’s gang membership was therefore largely 
irrelevant to the issues before the jury in the guilt phase, and any negative reaction 
the jurors might have had to the gang evidence would not have had a significant 
influence on their evaluation of the evidence.   
Nor do we conclude, for similar reasons, that any misconduct by the 
prosecutor in eliciting this testimony “infect[ed] the trial with such unfairness as to 
make the conviction a denial of due process.”  (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 
Cal.4th 1293, 1331.) 
36 
Defendant argues admission of the evidence was “inherently prejudicial” 
because it created a risk the jury would improperly infer defendant has a criminal 
disposition and is therefore guilty of the offense charged, citing People v. Williams 
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 193 (Williams).  Whether defendant had a “criminal 
disposition” was rendered moot by the strength of the evidence bearing on his 
guilt.  Concerns about the possible “inflammatory impact” of this type of evidence 
(id., at p. 193) were similarly alleviated by the nature of the evidence of 
defendant’s guilt.8 
5.  The special circumstance findings of torture murder and mayhem 
murder are supported by the evidence  
Defendant argues that the jury’s torture-murder and mayhem-murder 
special-circumstance findings were not supported by sufficient evidence because 
he had no “independent felonious purpose” in committing the predicate crimes.  
(People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61 (Green.)  According to defendant, the 
acts of torture and mayhem were, in effect, a means to the end of killing Epperson, 
rather than ends in themselves.9 
The requirement of an independent felonious purpose applies to felony-
murder special-circumstance findings under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17).  
(People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal 4th 1, 87.)  This subdivision 
authorizes a special circumstance finding when the murder “was committed while 
                                              
8  
We also reject defendant’s contention that the introduction of this evidence 
in the guilt phase violated his right to due process, since any error in the admission 
of this evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Chapman v. California 
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.) 
9  
Although a heading in defendant’s brief asserts that this argument is 
addressed to “all” of the special circumstance findings, he concedes in a footnote 
that the argument actually applies only to the torture-murder and mayhem-murder 
special-circumstance findings.  
37 
the defendant was engaged in . . . the commission of [or] the attempted 
commission of ” various other specified felonies.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).)  Section 
190.2 was enacted in response to United States Supreme Court decisions requiring 
that a jury’s discretion in imposing the death penalty be “suitably directed and 
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”  
(Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 189; Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 61.)  
With respect to the felony-murder special circumstances, Green explained that the 
Legislature found it appropriate for the jury to consider a penalty of death when a 
defendant “killed in cold blood in order to advance an independent felonious 
purpose.”  (Id., at p. 61.)  The Legislature’s goal, Green concluded, would not be 
achieved “when the defendant’s intent is not to [commit the predicate felony] but 
to kill and the [predicate crime] is merely incidental to the murder . . . because [the 
predicate crime’s] sole object is to facilitate or conceal the primary crime,” i.e., the 
murder.  (Ibid.)  In the intervening years, these phrases from Green, “independent 
felonious purpose” and “merely incidental,” have become talismanic, but they 
remain useful concepts that give meaning to the statutory requirement that the 
murder occurred “in the commission of” the predicate felony.  They are not 
separate and independent requirements for a felony-murder special circumstance.  
(Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 117.) 
Although defendant raises this claim with respect to both the torture-murder 
and mayhem-murder special-circumstance findings, we have never required an 
independent felonious purpose to support a special-circumstance finding for 
torture murder.  From its inception, section 190.2 has codified the special 
circumstance for a murder involving torture separately from the felony-murder 
special circumstances.  (See Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 49.)  At the time of 
defendant’s crimes, as today, the felony-murder special circumstances were 
codified in section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17).  A different subdivision defines the 
38 
torture-murder special circumstance, permitting the finding when “[t]he murder 
was intentional and involved the infliction of torture.”  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18).)  
Because subdivision (a)(18) lacks the requirement that the murder be committed 
while the defendant was “engaged in  . . .  the commission of” torture, the 
requirement of an independent felonious purpose, which implements this 
language, does not apply to a torture-murder special circumstance.  Defendant 
provides no reason for questioning this conclusion, which follows directly from 
the statutory language.  His argument therefore provides no basis for challenging 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the torture-murder special-circumstance 
finding. 
The jury also found true the mayhem-murder special circumstance 
allegation, which is specified in Section 192, subdivision (a)(17).  Mayhem 
requires, in very general terms, the intentional infliction of a maiming or 
disfiguring injury.  (See People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999, 1004-1005; §§ 
190.2, subd. (a)(17)(J), 203.)  Defendant has not challenged the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support his conviction for the crime of mayhem, and we have no 
reason to question the jury’s conclusion that, in the course of his assault, defendant 
intentionally inflicted disfiguring injuries on Epperson.10  In convicting defendant 
of the underlying crime of mayhem, the jury necessarily found that defendant 
possessed the specific intent to disfigure Epperson, which would have been 
independent of any intent to kill her.  This independent purpose to disfigure 
                                              
10 The superfluous ragged gashes in Epperson’s neck, at a minimum, would 
qualify as intentional disfigurement.  (See People v. Newble (1981) 120 
Cal.App.3d 444, 447, 449-450 [infliction of three-inch facial laceration likely to 
leave a permanent scar constitutes mayhem].) 
39 
provided adequate evidentiary support for the mayhem-murder special-
circumstance finding. 
Defendant argues that he elected a particularly brutal method of murdering 
Epperson and his infliction of disfigurement upon her was an incidental 
consequence of his chosen manner of killing.  Whether defendant simply used a 
brutal means to kill Epperson, or whether his brutality was part of an independent 
design to commit mayhem, was a factual determination for the jury to make.  As 
discussed above, in convicting defendant of the underlying crime of mayhem, the 
jury necessarily found that defendant did possess that independent design. 
According to Charles Vannoy, at some point during the beating defendant 
admitted to Epperson that he planned to kill her.  We have repeatedly held, 
however, that a defendant’s possession of the intent to kill concurrently with the 
intent necessary to support a predicate felony does not necessarily render 
commission of the predicate felony incidental to the murder.  As explained in 
People v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, “ ‘a jury deciding the truth of the 
special circumstance allegation is not required to assign a hierarchy to the 
defendant’s motives in order to determine which of multiple concurrent intents 
was “primary,” but instead the jury need only determine whether commission of 
the underlying felony was or was not merely incidental to the murder.’ ”  (Id., at 
pp. 1326-1327; see also, People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 609 [“even if a 
defendant harbored the intent to kill at the outset, a concurrent intent to commit an 
eligible felony will support the special circumstance allegation”].)  Evidence that 
defendant intended to kill Epperson at the time he committed mayhem did not 
preclude the jury from finding true the mayhem-murder special-circumstance 
allegation. 
40 
B.  Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting the Jury’s Verdict at the 
Sanity Trial. 
Defendant contends the jury’s finding that he was sane at the time of the 
killing must be reversed because “the evidence of insanity was of such weight and 
quality that a jury could not reasonably reject it.”  
“Under California’s statutory scheme, ‘[p]ersons who are mentally 
incapacitated’ are deemed unable to commit a crime as a matter of law.  (§ 26, par. 
[2].)  Mental incapacity under section 26 is determined by the M’Naghten test for 
legal insanity provided in section 25, subdivision (b).  (M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 
8 Eng.Rep. 718, 722; People v. Phillips (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 170, 173; see Stats. 
2007, ch. 31, § 5, pp. 138–139.)  Under M’Naghten, insanity is established if the 
defendant was unable either to understand the nature and quality of the criminal 
act, or to distinguish right from wrong when the act was committed.”11  (People v. 
Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 140.) 
In a sanity trial, the burden is on the defendant to prove insanity by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  (§ 25, subd. (b); People v. Hernandez (2000) 22 
Cal.4th 512, 521.)  A defendant “may suffer from a diagnosable mental illness 
without being legally insane under the M’Naghten standard.”  (People v. Mills 
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 672.) 
                                              
11  
Section 25, subdivision (b), enacted by Proposition 8 in 1982, actually 
states that a person can be found insane only if “he or she was incapable of 
knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act and of 
distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense.”  
(italics added.)  In People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, we held that 
Proposition 8 was intended to embody the traditional M’Naghten test, which holds 
that insanity is demonstrated if a defendant was unable to understand the nature 
and quality of the criminal act or to distinguish right from wrong when the act was 
committed.  (Id., at p. 777.) 
41 
1.  A finding of sanity is subject to the substantial evidence standard of 
review 
Before we address defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence argument on its 
merits, it is necessary to settle the standard of review.  Defendant’s argument, that 
the jury’s sanity determination must be reversed because the expert evidence he 
presented “was of such weight and quality that a jury could not reasonably reject 
it,” is based on a misreading of People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333 (Drew).  In 
that case, we adopted an alternative to the M’Naghten sanity test, a decision that 
was subsequently abrogated by the electorate with the 1982 passage of Proposition 
8, which re-adopted the M’Naghten test.  (See People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 
765, 768-769.)  In changing the sanity test in Drew, we also recognized that the 
defendant was entitled to review of the jury’s finding that he was sane under the 
M’Naghten standard, the standard prevailing at the time.  (Drew, at p. 349.)  As we 
noted, “Defendant Drew argues that even under the M’Naghten test the jury’s 
finding of sanity is not supported by substantial evidence.  If Drew should prevail 
in this contention, he would be entitled to an order directing the trial court to find 
him insane, thus avoiding a retrial of the case” under the newly adopted test.  
(Ibid.)  In undertaking a review of the jury’s finding, we confirmed, quoting 
People v. Wolff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 795, 804, that the applicable standard of review 
was substantial evidence.  (Drew, at p. 350.) 
The only evidence introduced at the sanity trial of Drew was the testimony 
of two court-appointed psychiatrists, both of whom opined that defendant was 
insane under M’Naghten.  The prosecution presented no evidence at all.  (Drew, 
supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 338-339, 350.)  In arguing for reversal of the finding of 
sanity, the defendant relied on the unchallenged unanimity of expert opinion.  We 
explained, however, that a finding of sanity could be upheld even “in the face of 
contrary unanimous expert opinion.”  (Id., at p. 350.)  Because the defendant has 
42 
the burden of proof, “if neither party presents credible evidence on that issue the 
jury must find him sane.”  (Id., at p. 351.)  When no affirmative evidence of sanity 
has been presented, we held, “the question on appeal is not so much the 
substantiality of the evidence favoring the jury’s finding as whether the evidence 
contrary to that finding [i.e., the unanimous expert opinions] is of such weight and 
character that the jury could not reasonably reject it.”  (Id., at p. 351.)  For reasons 
the decision explained, the value of both experts’ evaluations could be questioned, 
permitting the jury to reasonably reject both.  Accordingly, Drew affirmed the 
finding of sanity.  (Ibid.) 
As the foregoing suggests, the Drew standard, focusing the substantial 
evidence inquiry on the “weight and character” of the expert opinions of insanity, 
arose in the context of a sanity trial in which the expert evidence of insanity was 
uncontested, and we have applied Drew’s articulation of the standard only in that 
specific context.  Most recently, in In re R.V. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 181, we were 
required to determine the standard of review for a finding of competency to stand 
trial in a juvenile wardship proceeding.  (Id., at p. 199.)  We determined that the 
appropriate standard was “the deferential substantial evidence standard” (id., at p. 
200), but we noted that “[t]here is . . . no single formulation of the substantial 
evidence test for all its applications.”  (Ibid.)  Because the only evidence bearing 
on the juvenile’s competence was provided by a defense expert, we applied the 
Drew standard for substantial evidence, noting it was the appropriate standard “in 
a case such as this one, in which the evidence before the court consists of the 
opinion of a qualified expert . . . and the materials on which the expert relied.”  
(Id., at p. 203.) 
Here, the evidentiary record is considerably more complex, consisting of 
the testimony of several expert witnesses for each side.  We have been provided 
with no justification for departing, in these circumstances, from the most common 
43 
formulation of the substantial evidence test, in which the appellate court reviews 
the entire record in the light most favorable to the jury’s determination and affirms 
that determination if it is supported by evidence that is “reasonable, credible and 
of solid value.”  (People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 885.)  This is the 
standard of review applied to a jury finding of competency to stand trial, an 
analogous inquiry in which the defendant bears the burden of proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  (Ibid.; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 
31.)  We therefore hold that a jury’s finding of sanity will be affirmed if it is 
supported by evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which 
a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant sane by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
2.  The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that 
defendant was not insane at the time of the killing 
Having determined the appropriate substantial evidence test to be applied in 
these circumstances, we have no difficulty in finding substantial evidence to 
support the jury’s finding that defendant was legally sane at the time he committed 
the murder.  Although one of the prosecution’s experts, Dr. Griesemer, found 
some slowing in defendant’s EEG test, he did not believe it indicated organic 
deficiencies and concluded defendant’s functioning was normal.  Dr. Mohandie, 
the prosecution’s other expert, believed defendant was feigning at least some of 
his psychiatric symptoms.  He also found no evidence that defendant suffered 
from bipolar disorder, as testified by the defense experts.  In Dr. Mohandie’s view, 
some symptoms of the disorder would have been expected despite defendant’s 
medication, yet, as he noted, defendant disclaimed symptoms of mental illness, 
such as voices, delusions, or hallucinations.  Dr. Mohandie found the defense 
experts’ diagnosis of intermittent explosive disorder inconsistent with the 
purposeful behavior displayed in the killing.  Based on his observations, Dr. 
44 
Mohandie believed defendant was aware of the nature of his actions at the time of 
the killing and could distinguish right from wrong.  These experts’ testimony 
suffices to support the jury’s finding of sanity. 
Further, although the testimony of defendant’s experts provided strong 
evidence that defendant suffered from mental or emotional disabilities, that is not 
the same as legal insanity, and their testimony was less clear in demonstrating the 
elements of insanity.  For example, the defense experts were unified in suggesting 
that defendant was unable to control his conduct as a result of mental defects.  
Merely because a person finds it difficult or impossible to control his or her 
behavior, however, does not necessarily mean that the person lacks the ability to 
understand the nature and quality of that behavior or to distinguish right from 
wrong.  On the latter issues, the defense experts were less unified, and the 
evidence supporting their conclusions was less compelling. 
Defendant’s claim of insufficiency of the evidence is based on a detailed 
comparison of the testimony of his own experts with that of Drs. Griesemer and 
Mohandie, which, he contends, demonstrates that the prosecution experts failed to 
account for all of the various factors that were cited by the defense experts.  The 
issue of legal sanity is, of course, a complex and uncertain one about which fully 
competent experts can reasonably disagree.  While their testimony might not have 
revealed that Drs. Griesemer and Mohandie took into account all of the matters 
raised by the defense, we are satisfied by their qualifications and the nature of 
their testimony that their opinions were of sufficient quality that the jury could 
rely on them in finding defendant sane.  Nothing more is required to constitute 
substantial evidence. 
45 
C.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1.  The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant’s 
possible gang affiliation and racist beliefs 
As noted ante, part A.4, defendant argues that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in admitting evidence of his racist tattoos and gang membership.  
We discuss the admission of gang-related evidence separately for the guilt and 
penalty phases because they were tried to different juries and the exact nature of 
the evidence introduced at the two proceedings differed.  The penalty phase jury 
was unaware of, and therefore unaffected by, the tattoo and gang membership 
evidence introduced in the guilt phase. 
Prior to the second penalty phase trial, the defense sought to exclude 
evidence of defendant’s tattoos.  The court acknowledged that the contemplated 
gang-related evidence was “dangerous” and asked the prosecution to justify its 
admission.  The prosecutor responded that defendant had seen Sims and Epperson 
together on the morning of the killing and could have believed they were getting 
back together.  Racial animus, the prosecutor claimed, could have been “the spur, 
the additional spur that caused the defendant to murder her and to torture her.  
That’s the People’s theory.”  
The court agreed with the prosecutor and declined to exclude the evidence, 
explaining, with regard to the tattoos, “This isn’t somebody else’s opinion that 
he’s a racist.  He puts this on himself. . . .  [T]hat this white woman, the victim in 
the case, was interested in an African-American man, would make a racist very 
angry.”  Racial animus, the court believed, might explain the extreme nature of 
defendant’s rage, expressed in the savage beating of Epperson.  As the court 
summarized its thinking, evidence of the tattoos “goes to the motivation and 
explosive nature of his conduct at the time of the crime.”  
46 
When called to testify, Charles Vannoy, defendant’s friend, confirmed that 
he had both a swastika tattoo and a lightning bolt tattoo and that lightning bolts are 
a “sign” of the Aryan Brotherhood.  Vannoy, however, denied affiliation with the 
Aryan Brotherhood.  When the prosecutor asked, “Isn’t it true that you and 
[defendant] belong to . . . ,” she was stopped in mid-sentence by an objection, 
which was sustained.  Soon after, the prosecutor noted that defendant told Vannoy 
that Epperson’s ex-boyfriend was an African-American and asked whether 
Vannoy saw “any significance to saying that the boyfriend was black.”  Defense 
counsel objected, and the prosecutor withdrew the question after being persuaded 
that the detective interviewing Vannoy, rather than defendant, had brought up 
Sims’s race.  No admonishment was requested or given. 
As in the guilt phase, Timothy Todd, Epperson’s friend and assistant, 
testified that defendant told him, “if [Sims] kept pursuing [Epperson], he would 
kill [Sims].”  An objection was sustained to the prosecutor’s follow-up inquiry 
whether defendant had used a “racial epithet” when he made the threat, but not 
before Todd confirmed that an epithet had been used.  Counsel did not request that 
the answer be stricken.  Todd was thereafter allowed to testify, over objection, that 
in the year 2000, defendant told Todd he belonged to a “white gang.”  Although 
Todd did not recall which gang, he said, “Well, I know there’s several white 
gangs.  There’s the LRL, Aryan Nations, gangs like that.” 
Sims testified that while he was together with defendant in a rehabilitation 
program, Sims did not know defendant well and avoided him.  Over objection, 
Sims was permitted to testify that he avoided defendant because defendant had 
tattoos on his calves and arms, without describing the tattoos.  Sims also testified 
that on four separate occasions defendant had engaged in intimidating conduct 
with him, although he described only one incident, when defendant swore at Sims 
as he was entering the Weingart Center. 
47 
 
When the defense presented the testimony of an African-American friend 
of defendant, whom he had met at the Weingart Center, the prosecutor asked the 
witness whether she was aware of defendant’s tattoos, without describing them.  
The witness said she had seen the tattoos and was not bothered by them, again 
without any express indication of their content.  Defendant’s mother, Joyce, 
testified that defendant’s father was a “bigot, . . . major big time,” but she said that 
defendant had not “picked up on that.”  Joyce confirmed that she was aware of 
defendant’s prison tattoos, but when the prosecutor suggested the tattoos were 
“associated with, for want of a better word white supremacist,” Joyce said she 
“didn’t know that, no, I did not.” 
 
In closing argument, the prosecutor never raised the possibility that 
Epperson’s killing was related to Sims or his race. 
 
As the foregoing indicates, the evidence of defendant’s alleged gang 
membership admitted during the penalty phase was limited.  Vannoy testified 
about his tattoos and denied gang membership, but he was prevented from 
testifying about defendant’s gang membership.  Todd testified that defendant 
claimed to have belonged to a white gang and had used a racial epithet in speaking 
about Sims.  Sims confirmed that he felt threatened by defendant, without 
expressly attributing his discomfort to perceived racism.  Two African-American 
witnesses acknowledged an awareness of defendant’s tattoos, but neither described 
them; only the fact that the topic arose during the testimony of African-American 
witnesses hinted at their content.  When the prosecutor eventually attempted to 
suggest to defendant’s mother that the tattoos related to racist sympathies, his 
mother denied it.  And, as noted, none of this featured in the prosecutor’s closing 
argument. 
 
Evidence of a defendant’s racist beliefs is inadmissible in the penalty phase 
of a capital trial if it is not relevant to an issue in the case.  (Dawson v. Delaware 
48 
(1992) 503 U.S. 159, 167; People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 104 
(Merriman).)  When evidence suggesting racist beliefs by a defendant is probative 
of an issue raised by the proceedings, however, we have affirmed its admission, 
notwithstanding any risk of prejudice.  (See, e.g., People v. Townsel (2016) 63 
Cal.4th 25, 66-67 [evidence of a racial slur used in the course of making a threat 
held admissible when the threat was relevant to the killing]; Merriman, at pp. 104-
105 [evidence of defendant’s racist beliefs admissible to explain defendant’s past 
attacks and fights]; People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1030 [evidence 
of defendant’s leadership of white prison gang admissible to explain his ability to 
control others].) 
 
We agree with the trial court that evidence of defendant’s tattoos and racial 
gang membership was relevant to explain the motivation for and savagery of his 
attack on Epperson.  Wounded racial pride could have caused him not only to 
assault Epperson, but to do so in a manner intended to cause her both great 
suffering and disfigurement. 
 
Nor do we find error in the trial court’s decision not to exclude the evidence 
under Evidence Code section 352, which permits the court to exclude otherwise 
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
probability that its admission will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice.  
“ ‘Evidence is substantially more prejudicial than probative [citation] [only] if, 
broadly stated, it poses an intolerable “risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the 
reliability of the outcome.” ’ ”  (People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 144; 
see People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 188 [“ ‘Prejudice’ in the context of 
Evidence Code section 352 is not synonymous with ‘damaging’: it refers to 
evidence that poses an intolerable risk to the fairness of the proceedings or 
reliability of the outcome”].)  Further, as we have noted in connection with the 
admission of crime scene photographs during the penalty phase, “ ‘the trial court’s 
49 
discretion [at the penalty phase] to exclude circumstances-of-the-crime evidence 
as unduly prejudicial is more circumscribed than at the guilt phase.  During the 
guilt phase, there is a legitimate concern that crime scene photographs . . . can 
produce a visceral response that unfairly tempts jurors to find the defendant guilty 
of the charged crimes.  Such concerns are greatly diminished at the penalty 
phase because the defendant has been found guilty of the charged crimes, and the 
jury’s discretion is focused on the circumstances of those crimes solely to 
determine the defendant’s sentence.  Indeed, the sentencer is expected to 
subjectively weigh the evidence, and the prosecution is entitled to place the capital 
offense and the offender in a morally bad light.’ ”  (People v. Moon (2005) 
37 Cal.4th 1, 35.)  We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence over an 
Evidence Code section 352 objection for abuse of discretion.  (Eubanks, at 
pp. 144-145.)   
 
A crime involving the degree of violence demonstrated here is in some 
manner incomprehensible and inexplicable.  In attempting to affix the appropriate 
penalty, the jury was entitled to hear evidence bearing on the factors that possibly 
brought on the violence, whether, in the defense’s view, defendant’s mental 
instability, or otherwise.  One of those possible factors was Epperson’s past 
intimate relationship, and her continued personal relationship, with an African-
American man.  Although we recognize the potential adverse consequences 
resulting from the introduction of evidence suggesting defendant held racist 
beliefs, those consequences do not constitute undue prejudice because his alleged 
beliefs might have contributed to the commission of the crime.  In these 
circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that 
the risk of undue prejudice was outweighed by the probative value of the evidence.  
50 
2.  Imposition of the death penalty on a mentally ill defendant does not 
violate the Eighth Amendment 
Defendant contends that even if he was not found to be legally insane at the 
time of the killing, the evidence demonstrates that he was and is mentally ill.  He 
contends that imposition of the death penalty on a mentally ill person violates the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 
We considered the identical argument in Hajek and Vo, supra, 58 Cal.4th 
1144, concluding that neither the Eighth Amendment nor United States Supreme 
Court authority precludes imposition of the death penalty on mentally ill persons.  
(Id., at p. 1251.)  As we held, “[m]ost significantly, the circumstance that an 
individual committed murder while suffering from a serious mental illness that 
impaired his judgment, rationality, and impulse control does not necessarily mean 
he is not morally responsible for the killing.  There are a number of different 
conditions recognized as mental illnesses, and the degree and manner of impairment 
in a particular individual is often the subject of expert dispute.  Thus, while it may 
be that mentally ill offenders who are utterly unable to control their behavior lack 
the extreme culpability associated with capital punishment, there is likely little 
consensus on which individuals fall within that category or precisely where the line 
of impairment should be drawn.  Thus, we are not prepared to say that executing a 
mentally ill murderer would not serve societal goals of retribution and deterrence.  
We leave it to the Legislature, if it chooses, to determine exactly the type and level 
of mental impairment that must be shown to warrant a categorical exemption from 
the death penalty.”  (Id., at p. 1252.)   
Soon after the issuance of Hajek and Vo, our decision in People v. Mendoza 
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 856 (Mendoza), re-affirmed its holding.  We noted that Hajek and 
Vo’s “broad holding applies in the present case as well — especially considering that 
in this case the jury, after a separate trial involving copious testimony from mental 
51 
health experts, rejected defendant’s claim that he was not culpable for the murders on 
the ground of insanity as defined by our law, and at the penalty phase rejected his 
argument that because of his mental illness the death penalty was not warranted.”  
(Mendoza, at p. 910.)  Just as in Mendoza, a jury found defendant legally sane after a 
trial and rejected his argument in the penalty phase that, because of his mental illness, 
he should not be put to death. 
Defendant has presented no argument that was not considered and rejected 
in Hajek and Vo and Mendoza, and his claimed mental illness is not of a type that 
is materially different, for purposes of the Hajek and Vo analysis, from the 
impairments suffered by the defendants in those cases.  We therefore decline to 
hold that the Eighth Amendment precludes defendant’s execution by reason of 
mental illness. 
3.  Defendant’s various constitutional challenges to California’s 
imposition of the death penalty fail   
Defendant raises a series of challenges to California’s death penalty statute.  
As he acknowledges, these arguments have been rejected by this court in past 
decisions.  As he anticipates, we decline to revisit our prior holdings with respect 
to these issues, which are listed below.  Given the longstanding nature of our 
rulings, we do not reiterate their rationale. 
California’s death penalty laws adequately narrow the class of murderers 
subject to the death penalty.  (People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 45 
(Henriquez).)  In particular, the special circumstances of section 190.2, which 
render a murderer eligible for the death penalty, are not so numerous and broadly 
interpreted that they fail adequately to narrow the class of persons eligible for 
death.  (People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 654-655; People v. Myles 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1224-1225.) 
52 
Section 190.3, factor (a), which permits the jury to consider the 
circumstances of the capital crime in its penalty determination, does not license 
the jury to impose death in an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of the 
United States Constitution.  (Henriquez, supra, at p. 45; People v. Brown (2004) 
33 Cal.4th 382, 401.) 
The federal Constitution does not require that the jury agree unanimously 
on which aggravating factors apply.  (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 372 
(Jackson); People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 533.)  Nor is the death penalty 
unconstitutional for failing to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
aggravating circumstance has been proved (other than section 190.3, factor (b) or 
(c) evidence), that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, or that 
death is the appropriate sentence.  (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 
1235.)  For that reason, again other than section 190.3, factors (b) and (c), the jury 
need not be instructed that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required.  (People v. 
Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1429.)  These conclusions are not affected by 
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 or Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 
584.  (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 732.) 
The jury need not make written findings regarding the existence of 
aggravating factors.  (Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 916; People v. Clark 
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 1007.) 
 There is no Eighth Amendment requirement that our death penalty 
procedures provide for intercase proportionality review.  (People v. Johnson, 
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 656; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1043.) 
The jury’s reliance on unadjudicated criminal activity as a factor in 
aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b), without any requirement that the jury 
unanimously find that the activity was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, does not 
deprive a defendant of any federal constitutional right, including the Sixth 
53 
Amendment right to trial by jury and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process.  (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1007; People v. Balderas (1985) 
41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205.) 
Nor does section 190.3’s use of adjectives such as “extreme” and 
“substantial” in factors (d) and (g), respectively, act as a barrier to the jury’s 
consideration of mitigating evidence, in violation of constitutional commands.  
(People v. Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 656; People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 
207, 270.)  The court was not required to instruct the jury that the statutory 
mitigating factors were relevant solely to mitigation, and the court’s instruction 
directing the jury to consider “whether or not” certain mitigating factors were 
present did not invite the jury to use the absence of such factors as an aggravating 
circumstance, in violation of state law and the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  (People v. Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 656; People v. Coffman 
and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 123.) 
The failure to afford capital defendants at the penalty phase the same 
procedural safeguards afforded to noncapital defendants does not offend equal 
protection principles, because the two groups are not similarly situated.  (Brooks, 
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 116; People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 91.) 
California does not regularly use the death penalty as a form of punishment, 
and “its imposition does not violate international norms of decency or the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”  (People v. 
Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1008.) 
D.  Alleged Cumulative Effect of Asserted Errors 
Defendant argues that the cumulative impact of the asserted errors at the 
guilt and penalty phases rendered his trial fundamentally unfair and deprived him 
of other constitutional rights.  Because we have concluded there was no 
54 
error related to the trial on the capital offenses or their punishment, there is 
nothing to cumulate and, in any event, we reject the claim that any asserted 
cumulative effect warrants reversal. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed in its entirety. 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JOHNSON, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*        Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, 
Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Powell 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S137730 
Date Filed: August 13, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: William Pounders 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
R. Clayton Seaman, Jr., under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster and Pamela C. Hamanaka, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
R. Clayton Seaman, Jr. 
P.O. Box 12008 
Prescott, AZ  86304 
(928) 776-9168 
 
Pamela C. Hamanaka 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 269-6208