Case Title: WILLIS A. CENTER, SR. v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0211

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILLIS A. CENTER, SR. v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 73Case Number: No. S-10-0211Decided: 04/27/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
 

WILLIS 
A. CENTER, SR.,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
E. Courselle, Defender Aid Program, University of Wyoming College of Law; and 
Shannon McDonald, Student Intern.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Justin A. 
Daraie, Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

HILL, 
J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., files a dissent, with whom 
BURKE, J., 
joins.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Willis 
A. Center, Sr. (Center), appeals from an order of the district court denying his 
motion to correct an illegal sentence.  
His initial brief was filed pro 
se.  However, a brief in reply 
to the brief filed by the State was filed on his behalf by the University of 
Wyoming, College of Law, Defender Aid Program.  He contends that the district court sent 
him from an alcohol treatment center (WYSTAR), to the state penitentiary, in a 
manner that violated his constitutional rights (due process of law).  In a closely related argument, Center 
contends that the district court imposed a sentence that permitted non-judicial 
personnel to revoke his placement at WYSTAR in a manner that violated his rights 
to due process of law.  We will 
remand this matter to the district court with directions that the district court 
credit Center for all time served in connection with his detention at 
WYSTAR.  The district court's 
sentence is otherwise affirmed.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Center raises 
these issues:

 
 
1.  The 
district court was in error by sending [Center] directly to prison, without 
holding either a preliminary or final probation revocation hearing, in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
6.

 
 
2.  The 
district court improperly imposed a sentence providing for a later revocation by 
non-judicial personnel, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6.

 
 
The 
State reformulates those issues in this phrase:

 
 
Is 
[Center's] sentence illegal merely because the district court stayed its 
issuance of the mittimus, in order to conditionally release [Center] for alcohol 
abuse treatment, and later issued the mittimus without a further 
hearing?

 
 
Center's 
Reply Brief asserts that the State's brief suggests these additional 
issues:

 
 
1.  [The 
State] argues that Center's claim of illegal sentencing is barred by res 
judicata because it could have been raised on direct appeal, in Center's motion 
for sentence reduction, or in Center's petition for post-conviction 
relief.

2.  [The 
State] maintains that Center's claims are untimely because they should have been 
raised either on direct appeal from the judgment and sentence or on appeal from 
the order that led to his incarceration following his termination at 
WYSTAR.

3.  [The 
State] argues that if this Court reviews Center's claims, it should do so under 
the "plain error" standard rather than the "abuse of discretion" 
standard.

4.  [The 
State] argues that to the extent Center's sentence permitted his treatment at 
WYSTAR, it was unambiguously designated a furlough, not a sentence of 
probation.

5.  [The 
State] asserts that the district court granted [him] a "furlough" after it 
imposed a legal sentence, and therefore conferring upon WYSTAR officials the 
power to determine whether Center should be expelled from treatment and sent 
instead to prison, without an opportunity to be heard, was not improper 
delegation or otherwise unlawful.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      Center entered a 
plea of nolo contendere to the crime of aggravated assault and battery on 
September 4, 2008.  W.R.Cr.P. 
11(a)(1)(A).  Judgment was entered 
on that plea on September 23, 2008.  
Sentence and a Mittimus were entered on November 24, 2008.  The sentence imposed was incarceration 
for a period of 36 to 80 months and no mention is made of probation, except that 
the district court saw little hope for him on "supervision."  Instead, the execution of the sentence 
was, in essence, conditionally stayed pending Center's admission to WYSTAR, and 
Center was granted a "furlough" for that purpose.  With respect to a "furlough," Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-13-701 (LexisNexis 2009) provides:

 
 
§ 
7-13-701. Definitions; establishment of programs.

(a)  As 
used in this section:

(i)  "Department" 
means the state department of corrections;

            
(ii) "Compassionate leave" means a temporary release to visit a 
member of the inmate's immediate family who is in danger of death, or to attend 
the funeral services or other last rites of a member of the inmate's immediate 
family;

(iii) "Immediate 
family member" means a spouse, child, parent, brother or 
sister.

(b)  The 
department may adopt reasonable rules and regulations which will provide for a 
reentry furlough program for inmates of any state penal institution.  The reentry furlough program shall be 
designed for inmates who are about to be released on parole or final discharge 
from imprisonment to aid in their reintegration as productive members of 
society.  The program may provide 
for escorted or unescorted temporary leaves of absence from the institution for 
purposes of:

                        
(i) Securing community living arrangements;

                        
(ii) Job interviews with prospective 
employers;

(iii) Learning 
or relearning necessary living skills; and

(iv) Other 
purposes, consistent with the public interest, necessary for the inmate's 
successful reintegration into society.

(c)  The 
department may adopt reasonable rules and regulations which will establish a 
furlough program to provide for escorted or unescorted temporary leaves of 
absence from any state penal institution for purposes of:

(i) Maintaining 
the prisoner's relationship with immediate family members; 
and

                        
(ii) Providing for compassionate leaves.

 
 
[¶4]      The district 
court recognized that it was taking a risk in allowing Center to receive alcohol 
rehabilitation treatment pending execution of his sentence, and to a significant 
extent what the district court did here was an "ad hoc" sentence, although one 
that was not necessarily contrary to the law that applies to sentencing.  The district court made it very clear 
that if Center did not succeed at WYSTAR, he would be remanded to the Department 
of Corrections, "no hearing, no nothing."  
In his reply brief, Center characterized the sentence as "hopelessly 
confusing."  In the full context of 
the proceedings in this case, the sentence actually is quite clear.  Center had an extensive criminal history 
that included ever more serious criminal offenses.  The district court was willing to give 
Center a chance at some rehabilitative treatment before incarceration 
began.  Based on the material in the 
record on appeal, it is apparent that Center willfully refused to conform his 
behavior to the expectations of the WYSTAR program.

 
 
[¶5]      Center failed at 
WYSTAR for several reasons, but most importantly because he refused to complete 
his written "first step" of the Alcoholics Anonymous program utilized by 
WYSTAR.  A document in the file 
dated October 26, 2009, appears to be Center's effort at completing AA's first 
step.  The State concedes that the 
record does not reflect with certainty the means used to transfer Center from 
WYSTAR to the Department of Corrections.  
However, Center does not assert, much less offer any sort of proof, that 
the sentence at issue was imposed in a manner that strayed from what the 
district court represented to him at the sentencing hearing.  Moreover, Center has not offered any 
cogent argument that the district court's sentence was "illegal," as that term 
is contemplated by our precedents.  
See, e.g., Sanchez v. State, 
982 P.2d 149, 150-51 (Wyo. 1999).  
In his reply brief, Center suggests that his transfer from WYSTAR to the 
penitentiary was not explained to him.  
However, much of the documentation Center supplied to the district court 
makes it abundantly clear that Center knew why he was considered to have failed 
at WYSTAR and why he continued to fail at the Wyoming State Penitentiary.  The record does indicate that on January 
28, 2009, Center was transferred by the Sheridan County Sheriff, to the Campbell 
County Detention Center, and then to the custody of the Department of 
Corrections.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      We apply this 
standard of review in a circumstance such as this:

 
 
Sentencing 
decisions are normally within the discretion of the trial court.  Bitz v. State, 2003 WY 140, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 257, 259 (Wyo. 2003).  "Such 
discretion is limited, however, inasmuch as a court may not enter an illegal 
sentence.  A sentence is illegal if 
it violates the constitution or other law."  In re CT, 2006 WY 101, ¶ 8, 140 P.3d 643, 646 (Wyo. 2006) (internal case citation omitted).  Whether a sentence is illegal is a 
question of law, which we review de 
novo.  Manes v. State, 2007 WY 6, ¶ 7, 150 P.3d 179, 181 (Wyo. 2007). 

 
 

Endris 
v. State, 
2010 WY 73, ¶ 13, 233 P.3d 578, 581 (Wyo. 2010) (citing Jackson v. State, 2009 WY 82, ¶ 6, 
209 P.3d 897, 898-99 (Wyo.2009)).

 
 
[¶7]      In addition, we 
have held:

 
 
W.R.Cr.P. 
35(a) allows a court to correct an illegal sentence at any time.  "An illegal sentence is one which 
exceeds statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of imprisonment for the same 
offense, or otherwise violates constitutions or the law."  Brown v. State, 2004 WY 119, ¶ 7, 
99 P.3d 489, 491 (Wyo. 2004); Ryan v. 
State, 988 P.2d 46, 62-63 (Wyo. 1999); Cardenas v. State, 925 P.2d 239, 240 
(Wyo.1996).  Whether a sentence is 
illegal is determined by referencing the applicable statute or constitutional 
provisions, and is subject to statutory interpretation.  Brown, ¶ 7, 99 P.3d  at 491; Ryan, 988 P.2d  at 
62-63.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
. . . We 
have repeatedly held that claims brought pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) are subject 
to the principles of res 
judicata.  McCarty v. State, 929 P.2d 524, 525 
(Wyo. 1996); Lacey v. State, 2003 WY 
148, ¶ 11, 79 P.3d 493, 495 (Wyo. 2003); Dolence v. State, 2005 WY 27, ¶ 6, 
107 P.3d 176, 178 (Wyo. 2005); Amin v. 
State, 2006 WY 84, ¶ 5, 138 P.3d 1143, 1144 (Wyo. 2006).  We have also repeatedly held that the res judicata doctrine applies when a 
defendant could have raised such an issue in an earlier appeal or motion for 
sentence reduction but did not do so.  
Hamill v. State, 948 P.2d 1356, 1358-59 (Wyo. 1997); Mead v. 
State, 2 P.3d 564, 566 (Wyo. 2000); Gould, ¶ 16, 151 P.3d  at 
266.

 
 

McDaniel 
v. State, 
2007 WY 125, ¶¶ 7, 9, 163 P.3d 836, 838 (Wyo. 2007); also see Mead v. State, 2 P.3d 564, 566 (Wyo. 
2000).

 
 
[¶8]      Center did not 
appeal the judgment and sentence imposed by the district court in November of 
2008.  In a pleading filed in the 
district court on November 2, 2009, Center filed a "Motion for Reduction of 
Sentence," but did not challenge the sentence itself.  In January of 2010, Center filed a 
"Petition for Writ of Review" in this Court.  That petition was denied by order 
entered on February 9, 2010.  Center v. State, Case No. 
S-10-0019.  On April 23, 2010, the 
district court entered its order denying Center's motion for correction of 
illegal sentence.  Center filed a 
timely notice of appeal, and the appeal was docketed in this Court on October 1, 
2010.  We conclude that Center's 
sentence was not illegal and, when viewed in its entirety and in the unusual 
context of this case, he was not denied due process of 
law.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶9]      The sentence 
imposed by the district court was unusual and, perhaps, ill-advised.  We do not approve of this departure from 
the many sentencing alternatives that are available to the district court.  However, we do not find in the record on 
appeal circumstances that render it an "illegal" sentence.  The order of the district court denying 
Center's motion to correct an illegal sentence is remanded to the district court 
for the purpose of amending the disputed sentence so as to credit Center for all 
time served in connection with his detention at WYSTAR.  The sentence is otherwise 
affirmed.

  

VOIGT, 
Justice, 
dissenting, with whom BURKE, Justice, joins.

 
 
[¶10]   I dissent because I cannot find a 
statute or court rule that authorizes the district court to sentence the 
appellant in the manner that it did.  
This is what the record reveals:  
At his arraignment on September 4, 2008, the appellant pled no contest to 
aggravated assault and battery, a felony.  
Judgment of conviction was entered orally on the same date, and a written 
judgment was entered on September 23, 2008.  Sentencing took place on November 4, 
2008.  The district court imposed a 
sentence of 36 to 80 months, and gave the appellant credit for 107 days 
served.  The district court then stayed execution of the sentence, with 
the following conditions:  (1) the 
appellant was not remanded to the Department of Corrections; (2) the appellant 
was to be transported to and from WYSTAR by "law enforcement"; (3) successful 
completion of the WYSTAR program would lead to a hearing and the possibility of 
the appellant being allowed to participate in an adult community corrections 
program; (4) failure to complete the WYSTAR program would lead to immediate 
arrest, execution of the sentence, and transfer to the Department of 
Corrections, without a hearing; (5) no credit for time served would be allowed 
for attendance at WYSTAR; (6) unauthorized absence from WYSTAR would constitute 
escape.

 
 
[¶11]   A written sentence was filed on 
November 24, 2008, in which the district court stated that "execution of this 
sentence and the accompanying order for Mittimus is stayed pending the 
Defendant's admission to WYSTAR."  
The written sentence, while containing provisions similar to those stated 
orally at the sentencing hearing, also provided that "the Defendant shall be 
granted a furlough to inpatient 
treatment at WYSTAR . . . ."  
(Emphasis added.)  The rest 
is history; upon the appellant's failure to complete the WYSTAR program, he was 
discharged, arrested, and transported to the Wyoming State Penitentiary without 
hearing.1

 
 
[¶12]   The district court purportedly 
suspended the execution of sentence in this case.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-302(a)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2009) provides as follows:

 
 
(a)    After conviction or plea of 
guilty for any offense, except crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, 
and following entry of the judgment of conviction, the court may:

 
 
(i)    Suspend the imposition or 
execution of sentence and place the 
defendant on probation[.]

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)2  Revocation of probation requires a 
hearing.  W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(1).  Perhaps because the district court 
contemplated the appellant's delivery to the Department of Corrections without a 
hearing in the event of a failure at WYSTAR, the district court did not place 
the appellant on probation, even though that seems to be the procedure mandated 
by the statute.  Instead, in the 
written Sentence, the district court characterized the appellant's 
post-sentencing release as a "furlough."  
I find no statute, however, that allows a district court to furlough a 
felon once that felon has been sentenced.  
Rather, it appears that the only "furlough" program is the one 
established by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-701 (LexisNexis 2009), which grants such 
authority only to the Department of Corrections.

 
 
[¶13]   In short, I have been unable to 
locate in statute or court rule authority for a district court to impose a 
prison sentence, stay execution of that sentence, release the defendant with 
conditions, but not on probation, have that release revoked without a hearing, 
and not give credit for time served at a facility where the defendant was 
subject to a charge of escape.  "A 
sentence that imposes a punishment not authorized by the legislature . . . is 
illegal."  Endris v. State, 2010 WY 73, ¶ 15, 233 P.3d 578, 581 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Apodaca v. State, 891 P.2d 83, 85 (Wyo. 
1995)).  See also Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 
247 (Wyo. 1984) ("The legislature is the body empowered to determine what crimes 
are punishable and prescribe punishment for those acts."), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920, 926 (Wyo. 1999).  This was an illegal sentence.

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The Mittimus is in the court file, attached to the Sentence, and without 
a separate file stamp, so it appears to have been filed along with the 
Sentence.

 
 

2W.R.Cr.P. 38, entitled "Stay of execution of sentence," does not appear 
to modify the statutory scheme for such a stay.