Case Title: Commonwealth v. Alcantara

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11468

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11468 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LEVI OMAR ALCANTARA. 
 
 
 
Essex.     February 6, 2015. - June 1, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Consciousness of guilt, Hearsay, Third-
party culprit, Relevancy and materiality, Medical record, 
Privileged record, Cross-examination, Impeachment of 
credibility.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, 
Hearsay, Record, Capital case.  Witness, Cross-examination, 
Credibility. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 7, 2006.   
 
 
The cases were tried before Leila R. Kern, J.  
 
 
 
Jeffrey L. Baler for the defendant. 
 
Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  On April 22, 2006, Maria Sastre was beaten to 
death with a hammer in her home.  When one of her children, 
Jesus, attempted to intervene, he, too, was beaten with the 
hammer but was able to escape.  Soon thereafter, the defendant, 
2 
 
Levi Omar Alcantara, called the police from a nearby gasoline 
station claiming that he had also been a victim of the attacks 
in Maria's home.  In contrast, both Jesus and his brother, 
Christopher, identified the defendant as the assailant.  The 
handle of the hammer tested positive for the defendant's 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), and red-brown stains on the 
defendant's clothing were consistent with the DNA of both Maria 
and Jesus.   
 
The defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree, 
assault with intent to kill, and assault and battery by means of 
a dangerous weapon.  A jury convicted him of all of the charges, 
including murder in the first degree by reason of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  On appeal, the defendant assigns error to 
several evidentiary rulings made by the trial judge.  We find no 
reversible error and no basis for exercising our authority under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the level of guilt or to order a 
new trial.  Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's convictions.  
 
1.  Background.  a.  The trial.  We recite the facts that 
the jury could have found, reserving certain details for the 
issues raised on appeal.  On April 22, 2006, Jesus awoke to the 
sound of his mother screaming inside their home on Washington 
Street in Lawrence.  On further investigation, he observed a man 
beating his mother with a hammer.  Another of Maria's children, 
Christopher, then observed the assailant on top of Jesus, 
3 
 
beating him with the hammer.  Jesus was able to rid the 
assailant of the hammer, at which point the assailant struck him 
with a vase.  Jesus wrested himself free and ran from the home.  
Christopher then observed the assailant leave the home, jump 
over a fence, and escape down an alley.   
 
Jesus ran to a neighbor, who placed an emergency 911 
telephone call in which she reported that "some guy went inside 
[her] neighbor's house and he hit a little kid and he's bleeding 
out of his head . . . screaming to [her] to call the ambulance 
to help him."  Lawrence police officers responded to the scene 
and interviewed Jesus, who described the assailant as wearing a 
blue or white T-shirt and blue or dark jeans.  Jesus and 
Christopher, who were fourteen and twelve years of age, 
respectively, at the time of the assault, told the police that 
they recognized the assailant as the cousin of their mother's 
former boy friend, Ysidro Santos.1  Maria was transported to the 
hospital, where she was pronounced dead as a result of skull 
fractures and brain lacerations caused by multiple "chop wounds" 
of the head that were consistent with blows from a hammer. 
 
Nineteen minutes after the neighbor's 911 call, the 
defendant placed two 911 calls in which he stated that 
 
1 The defendant was known to refer to persons as his 
"cousin" regardless of any actual legal relation.  Jesus and 
Christopher testified that the defendant had previously 
frequented their home with Santos and, on occasion, without him.   
                                                          
 
4 
 
"something happened to [him]"; that he had been at Washington 
Street; and that he was now at a gasoline station about one-
quarter mile away.  An officer responded to the gasoline station 
and found the defendant clad only in boxer shorts, socks, dress 
shoes, and a torn and stained blue T-shirt; with scratches on 
his face, forearms, and chest; and with a cut on his right hand.  
The defendant approached the officer and screamed, "they tried 
to kill me.  They threw me in the car and they tried to kill me, 
too."   
 
The defendant was transported to the police station for 
further questioning.  The defendant told the police that four 
Hispanic men entered Maria's home and beat him with a baseball 
bat and the victim with a hammer.  Two of the men then forcibly 
removed the defendant from the home, placed him in their 
automobile, removed his clothing, and robbed him.  The defendant 
stated that he subsequently was able to escape from the vehicle, 
at which point he ran to the gasoline station and placed the 911 
calls.  When the defendant was being escorted to the police 
station bathroom -- and, in the process, by an interview room 
where Christopher was sitting with the door ajar -- Christopher 
exclaimed:  "That's the guy."  Christopher and Jesus were 
subsequently presented with photographic arrays and asked if any 
of the photographs depicted the assailant.  Both Christopher and 
Jesus selected the defendant's photograph.     
5 
 
 
A request was made for Santos to submit a DNA sample, but 
Santos never submitted the sample and the police never followed 
up with him.  The police did, however, obtain DNA samples from 
the defendant, Maria, Jesus, and Christopher.  The defendant's 
DNA was consistent with a profile obtained from a red-brown 
stain on the handle of the hammer.  The handle also reflected 
DNA from an unknown person.  There was other DNA evidence 
implicating the defendant as the hammer-wielding assailant.  For 
example, a red-brown stain on the defendant's shoe was 
consistent with Maria's DNA, while a red-brown stain on the 
defendant's T-shirt was consistent with both Maria's and Jesus's 
DNA.  The police did not find the remainder of the defendant's 
clothing, which the Commonwealth attempted to explain by the 
high water level of a nearby river.2 
 
The theory of the defendant's case was misidentification 
and the failure by the police to conduct an adequate 
investigation into other plausible suspects, including Santos 
and the four men mentioned in his statement at the police 
station.  The defendant highlighted discrepancies between 
Jesus's and Christopher's descriptions of the assailant, as 
compared to the clothing the defendant was wearing at the 
gasoline station and in surveillance footage from a convenience 
 
2 The inference was that the defendant had discarded his 
clothing into the river. 
                                                          
 
6 
 
store shortly before the attack.  The defendant also attempted, 
with varying success, to introduce evidence that Santos was a 
third-party culprit and that the police should have conducted a 
more extensive investigation into his alleged role in 
orchestrating the attack on Maria, Jesus, and, indeed, the 
defendant.3    
 
b.  Suppression and admission of the custodial statement.  
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the 
statements he had made at the gasoline station and police 
station.  The motion judge observed that the statement at the 
gasoline station was not made in response to police questioning 
and, therefore, was not subject to suppression.  In contrast, 
the judge concluded that the Commonwealth failed to prove that 
the custodial statement at the police station was voluntary 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Consequently, the statement made at 
the police station was suppressed.   
 
At trial, however, the defendant moved to admit the 
suppressed statement as evidence of a third-party culprit, 
consciousness of innocence, and the inadequacy of the police 
investigation.  The Commonwealth objected and the judge 
initially denied the motion, ruling that, even if the defendant 
 
3 A voir dire was held in which a State trooper testified 
that he interviewed Santos on the day of the attack.  Santos 
confirmed that he was Maria's boy friend, but averred that he 
was with his parents at the time of the attack.   
                                                          
 
7 
 
could waive his constitutional right to the suppression, the 
statement constituted inadmissible hearsay.  The Commonwealth 
then withdrew its objection to the statement with respect to the 
adequacy of the police investigation, prompting the judge to 
admit the statement only for that limited purpose.  The judge 
then instructed the jury that the statement was "permitted to be 
introduced by the defendant only as it bears on the police 
investigation of this case.  So it should be clear that the 
Commonwealth had no choice, they were not permitted to introduce 
this during their case-in-chief." 
 
During the charge conference, the Commonwealth requested a 
consciousness of guilt instruction referencing several 
statements that the defendant had made to the police.  The 
defendant objected to the use of the custodial statement for 
this purpose, as it had only been admitted for the purpose of 
challenging the police investigation.  The judge disagreed, 
stating to counsel that "once the Commonwealth withdrew its 
objection to the custodial statements it obviously mooted or 
made moot that limiting instruction."  The judge later 
instructed the jury: 
"You've heard evidence suggesting that the defendant may 
have made false statements; that is, he may have 
intentionally made certain false statements around the time 
of his arrest.  If the Commonwealth has proven the 
defendant did make those statements, you may consider 
whether such actions indicate feelings of guilt by the 
8 
 
defendant and whether in turn such feelings of guilt might 
tend to show actual guilt on these charges." 
 
 
c.  Midtrial hearings.  During the trial, a hearing was 
held to determine the admissibility of a statement by a local 
convenience store clerk that there was "hearsay in the 
neighborhood" that Santos had stated that Maria "deserved what 
she got."  In addition, a voir dire hearing was conducted to 
determine whether the statements of Maria's daughter, Chabley, 
and the godfather of Maria's children could be introduced 
through the testimony of two State police officers as evidence 
of a third-party culprit or inadequate police investigation.  
Trooper Brian O'Neil testified that the neighbor gave him a 
handwritten statement stating that Chabley had told the neighbor 
that "her mother's boyfriend had threatened the mother.  He told 
her to watch her back, that one of these days something bad was 
going to happen to her."  Lieutenant James Dowling testified 
that the godfather told him that Chabley had said "that [Y]sidro 
Santos stated that he was going to have her mother killed 
because she did not want to be with him anymore."   Although, at 
first, the godfather told Lieutenant Dowling that Chabley told 
him this directly, the godfather later stated that he had heard 
it from another person who had heard it from Chabley.   The 
judge concluded that each of these statements was unreliable 
and, thus, inadmissible at trial.  
9 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Consciousness of guilt instruction.  
The defendant contends that the judge erred in allowing his 
custodial statement to be considered as evidence of 
consciousness of guilt, where the judge previously instructed 
the jury that the statement was only admissible insofar as it 
reflected on the adequacy of the police investigation.  See 
generally Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980). 
Because his challenge to the instruction was preserved at trial, 
we review the claim for prejudicial error.  Commonwealth 
v. Burgos, 462 Mass. 53, 67, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 796 
(2012). 
 
"A consciousness of guilt instruction is permissible where 
'there is an inference of guilt that may be drawn from evidence 
of flight, concealment, or similar acts, such as false 
statements to the police, destruction or concealment of 
evidence, or bribing or threatening a witness.'"  Id., 
quoting Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 453 (2008).  
"False statements to police may be considered as consciousness 
of guilt if there is other evidence tending to prove the falsity 
of the statements."  Commonwealth v. Robles, 423 Mass. 62, 71 
(1996).  Such statements are not ensnared by the rule against 
hearsay because they are offered not for their truth, but for 
the proposition that the defendant's "version of events was 
10 
 
intended to be a lie."  Commonwealth v. Caillot, 454 Mass. 245, 
256 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 948 (2010). 
 
Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence, apart from the 
defendant's custodial statement, warranting a consciousness of 
guilt instruction.  The defendant's statements at the gasoline 
station and during the 911 calls portrayed a version of events 
in stark contrast to the testimony of the victim's children.  
According to the defendant, the perpetrators kidnapped him and 
attempted to kill him.  According to Jesus and Christopher, 
however, the defendant was the perpetrator.  If the jury 
accepted the children's version of the events, then the 
defendant's statements reflected an attempt to lie to the police 
about his role in the killing and assault.  See id.  
Consequently, it was not error for the judge to instruct the 
jury that they could consider the defendant's statements as 
evidence of consciousness of guilt if the Commonwealth proved 
that the statements were false.  See Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 
Mass. 291, 308-309 (2014) (erroneous admission of cumulative 
consciousness of guilt evidence not prejudicial error). 
 
Nonetheless, as the Commonwealth concedes, the judge's 
ruling that the consciousness of guilt instruction could also 
encompass the defendant's custodial statement was inconsistent 
with her prior ruling and instruction limiting that statement's 
use to the adequacy of the police investigation.  The 
11 
 
prosecutor's discussion of consciousness of guilt during closing 
argument, however, was focused on the defendant's missing 
clothing, his 911 calls, and his statement at the gasoline 
station.  In contrast, the prosecutor's use of the defendant's 
custodial statement in her closing focused the jury specifically 
on the reasonableness of the police response to the information 
the defendant had provided.4  See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 425 
Mass. 633, 643 (1997) (prosecutor's closing argument did not 
guide jury to prohibited inference).5 
 
Moreover, the judge did not share with the jury her ruling 
that the statement was available to be used for consciousness of 
guilt purposes, nor, in her final instructions, did she 
explicitly invite the jury to draw a connection between the 
custodial statement and consciousness of guilt.  Although the 
better practice would have been for the judge to have reminded 
the jury that they could consider that statement only as 
 
4 The prosecutor posed to the jury, "So the police, what do 
the police do. . . .  The police interview the defendant.  And 
he makes a number of statements to them.  And you can consider, 
I think when you consider the police investigation in this case, 
whether they made any sense.  They had spoken to Jesus Mandes, 
and they had spoken to Christopher Mandes.  They had that 
information. . . .  His story simply didn't make sense, and the 
police, I would suggest, understood that." 
 
 
5 In his closing argument, defense counsel contended that 
the defendant's willingness to speak to the police at the police 
station, "after they tell him, look, you have a right [not to 
say anything]," and "a right to a lawyer," was consistent with 
his innocence. 
                                                          
 
12 
 
evidence of the adequacy of the police investigation, "[w]e 
presume that a jury follow all instructions given to 
it."  Commonwealth v. Watkins, 425 Mass. 830, 840 (1997).  As 
far as the jury knew, the prior limiting instruction remained in 
effect and the custodial statement was not part of the 
Commonwealth's case.  Thus, to the extent the judge's ruling on 
consciousness of guilt constituted error,6 the error "did not 
 
6 At trial, the defendant argued that he was entitled to use 
the suppressed statement as a shield, but that the Commonwealth 
remained constitutionally precluded from using the statement as 
a sword against him.  Although the judge appeared to accept this 
argument initially, we are not aware of any direct support for 
it in the case law.  As one commentator has explained: 
 
"By introducing evidence obtained illegally, the defendants 
should also waive their rights to exclude other evidence 
obtained in the same unlawful search, seizure, or 
interrogation as that which yielded the evidence they 
introduce.  It does not advance the goal of protecting 
affected defendants from the consequences of those 
constitutional violations if they are not so much objecting 
to the violation of their rights as trying to take 
strategic advantage of it with evidence they would not 
otherwise have.  While they undoubtedly would prefer to 
take advantage of suppression to use any exculpatory proof 
gathered illegally while excluding the inculpatory proof, 
there is no justification for allowing them to do so. . . . 
A defendant insisting in good faith on protection from the 
consequences of authorities' illegality is hard pressed to 
claim that he is entitled to exploit those consequences 
selectively. . . ." 
 
Kainen, Shields, Swords, and Fulfilling the Exclusionary Rule's 
Deterrent Function, 50 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 59, 92 (2013).  These 
principles have found general application both in the 
Commonwealth and in other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Redmond, 357 Mass. 333, 341 (1970) (in insisting 
his attorney question witness concerning certain events, 
defendant "lost the benefit of the earlier order suppressing 
                                                          
 
13 
 
influence the jury, or had but very slight 
effect."  Commonwealth v. Bresilla, 470 Mass. 422, 440 (2015), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 729 (2010). 
 
b.  Admission of the neighbor's 911 call.  The neighbor's 
911 call, in which she stated that "some guy went inside [her] 
evidence"); United States v. Pierson, 101 F.3d 545, 546 (8th 
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1202 (1997) (defendant opened 
door to government's use of inculpatory statement previously 
suppressed on Miranda grounds); Pettijohn v. Hall, 599 F.2d 476, 
481 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979) ("Once a 
defendant attempts to introduce testimony that is intimately 
interrelated with previously suppressed testimony, the defendant 
waives his objections to the introduction of that related 
evidence"); State v. James, 144 N.J. 538, 562-563 (1996) 
(defendant may not selectively introduce suppressed evidence 
without allowing government opportunity to place evidence in 
proper context). 
 
 
Yet, there is a tension in applying these principles to a 
defendant's use of statements already deemed involuntary.  On 
one hand, involuntary statements are considered unreliable and 
incompetent evidence, repugnant to due process and inadmissible 
for any purpose at trial.  Commonwealth v. Durand, 457 Mass. 
574, 591-592 & n.22 (2010).  On the other hand, prior to the 
voluntariness determination, a defendant may waive the issue by 
using the purportedly involuntary statements, thereby opening 
the door to their use by the Commonwealth.  Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 379 Mass. 600, 604-605 (1980).  Assuming without 
deciding that the defendant was properly allowed to waive 
voluntariness altogether and introduce the statement after 
prevailing on his motion to suppress, it was not constitutional 
error to allow the Commonwealth to respond by arguing that the 
statement was false.  See id. at 606 ("When a defendant, acting 
through competent counsel, puts particular evidence in issue, he 
may not effectively argue on appeal that his own trial strategy 
denied him his constitutional rights"); Commonwealth v. 
Pettijohn, 373 Mass. 26, 31 (1977) ("We assume without deciding 
that the defendant is correct in his premise that, having 
prevailed on the motion to suppress . . . the defendant was 
privileged to make a timely waiver of his rights as to the 
entire suppression issue").   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14 
 
neighbor's house and he hit a little kid," was admitted in 
evidence over the defendant's objection.  The defendant conceded 
that the majority of the statement was admissible as an excited 
utterance, see Mass. G. Evid. § 803(2) (2014), but that the 
words "some guy" constituted inadmissible hearsay because they 
were not based on the neighbor's personal knowledge.  The 
defendant renews this argument on appeal, contending that its 
admission improperly undermined his narrative of four men 
entering the house to commit the killing.  We review for 
prejudicial error.   Commonwealth v. Middlemiss, 465 Mass. 627, 
631 (2013). 
 
"The broad rule on hearsay evidence interdicts the 
admission of a statement made out of court which is offered to 
prove the truth of what it asserted."  Commonwealth v. DelValle, 
351 Mass. 489, 491 (1966), S.C., 353 Mass. 684 (1968).  However, 
a statement is admissible as an excited utterance, "if (1) there 
is an occurrence or event 'sufficiently startling to render 
inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the 
observer,' and (2) if the declarant's statement was a 
'spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event and not the 
result of reflective thought.'"  Commonwealth v. Santiago, 437 
Mass. 620, 623 (2002), quoting 2 McCormick, Evidence § 272, at 
204 (5th ed. 1999).  "Generally, evidence based on a chain of 
statements is admissible only if each out-of-court assertion 
15 
 
falls within an exception to the hearsay rule."  Commonwealth 
v. McDonough, 400 Mass. 639, 643 n.8 (1987). 
 
Here, the neighbor's statement made on the 911 call in the 
presence of the bleeding and screaming child was clearly 
admissible as an excited utterance.  See Middlemiss, 465 Mass. 
at 631 & n.4 (victim's 911 call seeking assistance admissible as 
excited utterance); Commonwealth v. Harbin, 435 Mass. 654, 657 
(2002) (bystander declaration admissible as excited utterance).  
However, the neighbor did not observe "some guy" strike Jesus.  
As such, that portion of the statement constituted totem pole 
hearsay requiring its own exception to the hearsay rule.  
See McDonough, supra.  See also Commonwealth v. King, 436 Mass. 
252, 255 (2002) ("declarant must have personal knowledge of the 
event in question").  At the hearing on this issue, defense 
counsel contended that it was Jesus who relayed this information 
to the neighbor.7  The judge replied aptly that the statement of 
a child "who is standing in front of [the neighbor] bleeding 
from his head" is likewise encompassed by the excited utterance 
 
7 Although the defendant now argues that the identity of the 
third-party declarant is unknown, the evidence supports the 
position taken at trial.  During the 911 call, the neighbor 
asked, "What guy?" to a person in her presence.  In light of the 
fact that the neighbor also described Jesus as presently 
bleeding from his head and screaming to her for help, it is at 
least a reasonable inference that her question was in response 
to his statement that a "guy" had struck him.  Indeed, the 
defendant used this to his advantage during closing argument by 
pointing out that Jesus was unable to answer the neighbor's 
question. 
                                                          
 
16 
 
exception.  See Commonwealth v. Snell, 428 Mass. 766, 777, cert. 
denied, 527 U.S. 1010 (1999) (victim's statements to neighbor 
immediately after defendant tried to kill her admissible as 
excited utterance).  There was no error.  See King, supra at 257 
(judge has broad discretion to determine whether prerequisites 
for excited utterance have been met). 
 
c.  Exclusion of third-party culprit evidence.  The 
defendant contends that the judge erred in preventing him from 
introducing the testimony of Trooper O'Neil, Lieutenant Dowling, 
and the convenience store clerk, as well as the defendant's own 
statement at the police station, as third-party culprit 
evidence.  We disagree. 
 
"A defendant has a constitutional right to present evidence 
that another may have committed the crime."  Commonwealth 
v. Conkey, 443 Mass. 60, 66 (2004), S.C., 452 Mass. 1022 (2008).  
Consequently, we afford "wide latitude" to such 
evidence, Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 800 
(2009), insofar as it tends to show that another person "had the 
motive, intent, or opportunity to commit it."  Id., 
quoting Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 404 Mass. 378, 387 (1989).  
However, "because the evidence is offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted -- that a third party is the true culprit -- we 
have permitted hearsay evidence that does not fall within a 
hearsay exception only if, in the judge's discretion, 'the 
17 
 
evidence is otherwise relevant, will not tend to prejudice or 
confuse the jury, and there are other "substantial connecting 
links" to the crime.'"  Silva-Santiago, supra at 801, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Rice, 441 Mass. 291, 305 (2004).  
Moreover, "the evidence, even if it is not hearsay, 'must have a 
rational tendency to prove the issue the defense raises, and the 
evidence cannot be too remote or speculative.'"  Silva-
Santiago, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 22 
(1996). 
Here, defense counsel essentially conceded that the store 
clerk's testimony repeated an unsubstantiated rumor lacking in 
evidentiary value.  See Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 
400, 418-419 (2011) (defendant not entitled to base third-party 
culprit defense on rumor).  With respect to Trooper O'Neil's 
testimony, the judge observed that there was no evidence as to 
when Santos made the alleged statements to Chabley.  
See Commonwealth v. Hunter, 426 Mass. 715, 716-717 (1998), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Keizer, 377 Mass. 264, 267 (1979) ("acts 
of the other person [must be] so closely connected in point of 
time and method of operation as to cast doubt upon the 
identification of [the] defendant as the person who committed 
the crime").  With respect to Lieutenant Dowling's testimony, 
the judge concluded that Loriano's statement was unreliable 
because of the variations and multiple levels of hearsay.  
18 
 
See Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 470 Mass. 201, 216 (2014) (layered 
hearsay with uncertain sources unreliable and inadmissible as 
third-party culprit evidence).  See also Commonwealth 
v. O'Brien, 432 Mass. 578, 589 (2000) ("testimony would have no 
tendency to prove that [a third party] was actually the 
murderer, and would be confusing as no more than an opinion of 
[the third party's] involvement").  The defendant's 
constitutional rights were not violated by the exclusion of the 
various hearsay statements implicating Santos.   
It was likewise proper for the judge to exclude the 
defendant's custodial statement as third-party culprit evidence.  
The "substantial connecting links" between Santos and the 
killing were clearly lacking in this case, where the only 
admissible evidence of motive or intent was that Santos and 
Maria had recently ended their relationship.  See Commonwealth 
v. Wright, 469 Mass. 447, 466 (2014) (evidence of former boy 
friend's ill will or possible motive insufficient to support 
third-party culprit defense).  Moreover, the only evidence 
supporting the defendant's version of the events involving the 
four unidentified assailants was his own self-serving statement.  
See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600 (1994) 
("Self-exculpatory statements are exactly the ones which people 
are most likely to make even when they are false").  Although it 
is possible that the police would have discovered additional 
19 
 
evidence had they conducted a more thorough investigation, their 
failure to do so was admissible for Bowden, rather than third-
party culprit, purposes.  Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 802-803.  
The judge was within her discretion to so limit the defendant's 
use of that statement to the adequacy of the police 
investigation.8  See id. at 801 ("admission of feeble third-party 
culprit evidence poses a risk of unfair prejudice to the 
Commonwealth"). 
 
d.  Exclusion of evidence undermining police investigation. 
The defendant next argues that the judge abused her discretion 
in failing to allow the defendant to introduce evidence of an 
inadequate police investigation.  The defendant assigns error to 
the exclusion of the following:  (i) the exclusion of the 
defendant as a source of the DNA found in Maria's vaginal cells; 
(ii) the presence of illegal drugs in Maria's body revealed 
 
8 Moreover, the defendant was not precluded from presenting 
a third-party culprit defense to the jury.  The jury heard 
evidence, which defense counsel reinforced in closing argument, 
that there was deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of an unknown person 
on the hammer; that there was hair from an unknown person found 
in Maria's fingernail scrapings; that Santos and Maria had 
recently ended their relationship; that Maria's blood was not 
found on the defendant's hands; that the defendant purported to 
be a victim of the attacks in his 911 calls and gasoline station 
statement; and that Jesus's and Christopher's descriptions of 
the assailant's clothing were inconsistent with the clothing the 
defendant was depicted wearing in surveillance footage recorded 
shortly before the killing.  See Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 459 
Mass. 400, 419 (2011) ("Nor did the judge's exclusion of these 
statements deprive the defendant of the ability to present a 
defense suggesting that [the third party] was the killer"). 
                                                          
 
20 
 
during her autopsy; and (iii) the testimony of Trooper O'Neil 
and Lieutenant Dowling that Chabley said that Santos made 
threatening statements about Maria.  These claims are without 
merit. 
 
"Defendants have the right to base their defense on the 
failure of police adequately to investigate a murder in order to 
raise the issue of reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt 
in the minds of the jury."  Commonwealth v. Phinney, 446 Mass. 
155, 165-166 (2006), S.C., 448 Mass. 621 (2007).  "[T]he 
inference that may be drawn from an inadequate police 
investigation is that the evidence at trial may be inadequate or 
unreliable because the police failed to conduct the scientific 
tests or to pursue leads that a reasonable police investigation 
would have conducted or investigated, and these tests or 
investigation reasonably may have led to significant evidence of 
the defendant's guilt or innocence."  Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 
at 801.  This generally is referred to as the Bowden defense.  
See generally Bowden, 379 Mass. at 486.  Where, as here, the 
defendant asserts a Bowden defense, the trial judge must 
determine "whether the probative weight of the Bowden evidence 
exceed[s] the risk of unfair prejudice to the Commonwealth from 
diverting the jury's attention to collateral matters."  Silva-
Santiago, supra at 803.  "[T]he exclusion of evidence of 
a Bowden defense is not constitutional in nature and therefore 
21 
 
is examined under an abuse of discretion standard."  Id. at 804 
n.26. 
 
Here, the judge held hearings to determine the 
admissibility of the proposed Bowden evidence.  The sperm and 
drug evidence was lacking in probative value.  There was no 
indication that Maria, who was found fully clothed, was engaged 
in sexual intercourse around the time of the attack, nor was 
there any evidence whatsoever suggesting that the killing arose 
from a sexual relationship.  The judge did not abuse her 
discretion in ruling that the proposed evidence was likely to 
confuse the jury.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 Mass. 236, 
254 (2008) ("for inconclusive DNA evidence to be admissible, it 
must be probative of an issue of consequence in the case").  
Similarly, the judge did not abuse her discretion in ruling that 
the drug evidence was not probative of police thoroughness, 
where there was no indication that the drugs or supplier of the 
drugs played any role in causing Maria's death.  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 429 Mass. 388, 401 (1999) ("bare 
statement that [a third party] and the victim dealt drugs 
together lacks probative quality and would merely mislead the 
jury"). 
 
Moreover, as previously stated, it was within the judge's 
discretion to exclude the unreliable evidence of Santos's 
threats.  The defendant may not bootstrap that unreliable 
22 
 
evidence into a claim that the police haphazardly failed to 
confirm Santos's alibi, where the police had two eyewitnesses -- 
each of whom knew both the defendant and Santos -- who 
identified the defendant as the only assailant.  As 
in Commonwealth v. Wood, 469 Mass. 266, 278 (2014), where the 
only reliable evidence implicating a third party in the killing 
was a deteriorated relationship with the victim, the judge 
properly excluded the evidence as more prejudicial than 
probative. 
 
In any event, the defendant "was permitted to challenge the 
adequacy of the investigation as a whole," id., including the 
failure of the police to follow up with Santos for testing in 
connection with the unidentified DNA on the hammer and in 
Maria's finger nail scrapings.  See note 8, supra.  The jury 
were also allowed to hear the defendant's custodial statement, 
in which he described the four men that he alleged committed the 
killing and assaults.  During closing argument, defense counsel 
vigorously argued these points, as well as the inconsistencies 
between the eyewitness descriptions of the assailant and the 
clothing the defendant was observed wearing prior to and 
following the killing.  "Thus, where the issue of an inadequate 
investigation was fairly before the jury, the defendant suffered 
no prejudice from the exclusion of the proffered 
evidence."  Wood, supra. 
23 
 
 
e.  Access to Christopher's treatment records.  During 
empanelment, the Commonwealth became aware that one of its 
witnesses, Christopher, had been committed to a psychiatric 
hospital in Florida on more than one occasion following the 
killing.9  The Commonwealth informed the defendant, prompting him 
to seek discovery of the treatment records on grounds that the 
information contained therein might reflect an impaired ability 
to recall the events in question.  The judge denied the motion, 
ruling that the mere fact of subsequent psychiatric assistance 
does not, by itself, constitute the necessary evidentiary 
showing to allow a defendant access to a witness's treatment 
records.10   
 
On appeal, the defendant appears to argue that showing a 
potential for uncovering relevant information is sufficient to 
compel access to statutorily privileged treatment records.  That 
 
9 Christopher was committed to psychiatric care pursuant to 
a Florida law allowing for the hospitalization of an individual 
at the request of a mental health professional, judge, or law 
enforcement official, if believed that the person suffers from a 
mental illness and poses a significant risk of harm to either 
himself or herself or other people.   
 
 
10 In denying the defendant's motion, the trial judge noted 
that the evidence could become admissible if the Commonwealth 
opened the door by suggesting that Christopher's condition was 
triggered by the traumatic experience of finding his mother 
beaten to death and his brother badly injured.  During the 
hearing, the Commonwealth indicated that it had no intention of 
doing so.  
  
                                                          
 
24 
 
is not the law.  A party seeking to access statutorily 
privileged treatment records must: 
"establish good cause, satisfied by a showing '(1) that the 
documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are 
not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by 
exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party cannot 
properly prepare for trial without such production and 
inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to 
obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the 
trial; and (4) that the application is made in good faith 
and is not intended as a general "fishing expedition."'"  
 
Commonwealth v. Sealy, 467 Mass. 617, 627 (2014), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 269 (2004). 
 
Relevance is merely one factor in the analysis, and it is 
not established by rank speculation.11  See Sealy, supra at 628.  
Compare Commonwealth v. Bourgeois, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 433, 437 
(2007) ("broad claims concerning the victim's lack of 
credibility as a result of mental health problems are entirely 
speculative and lack the specificity and reasonableness 
required"), with Commonwealth v. Labroad, 466 Mass. 1037, 1039 
(2014) ("Unlike in Bourgeois, [supra,] the defendant in this 
case alleged, with particularity, that the [victim's] 
 
11 For example, one might speculate that a child who finds 
his mother beaten to death with a hammer would be prompted to 
seek psychiatric assistance as a result.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Bourgeois, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 433, 438 (2007) ("references to 
various psychiatric and other problems the victim appeared to be 
experiencing all occurred at or about the time she revealed the 
abuse and reasonably could be viewed as a consequence of the 
defendant's abuse").  Yet, it is unclear, absent some further 
showing, how this would be relevant to the witness's capacity to 
perceive or recall the underlying event.   
                                                          
 
25 
 
psychological records contained specific information regarding 
her complaint of sexual assault").  Moreover, the defendant does 
not even offer an argument on appeal as to the remaining factors 
germane to the analysis.  See Lampron, supra.  In consequence, 
we cannot say that the judge erred in denying the defendant 
access to Christopher's treatment records.  
 
f.  Limitation on cross-examination of Christopher.  During 
the defendant's cross-examination of Christopher, the defendant 
sought to impeach the witness's credibility by inquiring into 
his use of prescription antipsychotic drugs around the time of 
the incident.  Notwithstanding the fact that he was unsure 
whether Christopher was actually taking such drugs at the time 
of the incident, defense counsel argued that the subject was 
fodder for cross-examination because drug use could adversely 
affect Christopher's ability to perceive or recall the events in 
question.  The judge found no evidence countermanding the clear 
recall exhibited by Christopher and, as a result, barred defense 
counsel from exploring the witness's drug use on cross-
examination.  The defendant assigns error to this ruling.  We 
are not persuaded. 
 
A witness may "be impeached by evidence challenging his 
testimonial facilities (e.g., ability to perceive the events or 
remember them accurately)."  Commonwealth v. Daley, 439 Mass. 
558, 564 (2003).  "While defendants are entitled to reasonable 
26 
 
latitude on cross-examination, the scope of such cross-
examination, including the extent of impeachment of a witness 
for credibility and competency, are well within the judge's 
sound discretion."  Commonwealth v. Carrion, 407 Mass. 263, 273 
(1990).  Evidence of a witness's use of legal or illegal drugs 
is admissible on cross-examination if it would demonstrate an 
impaired ability by the witness "to perceive and to remember 
correctly."  Id. at 273-274.  However, the party seeking 
admission of such evidence must show a connection between the 
drug use and the witness's ability to perceive, remember, or 
testify to the event in question.  Commonwealth v. Caine, 366 
Mass. 366, 369 (1974).  
 
In the present case, the defendant did not introduce any 
evidence that Christopher was on psychiatric medication at the 
time of the incident other than an averment that the defendant 
believed it to be so.  Even if Christopher had been prescribed 
psychiatric medication at or around the time of the incident, 
there was no evidence to show that it would have impaired his 
ability to perceive or recall the incident.  Thus, the defendant 
failed to establish the requisite nexus between Christopher's 
alleged antipsychotic medication use and any possible 
impairment.  See Commonwealth v. Arce, 426 Mass. 601, 604 (1998) 
("evidence of the use of drugs is not alone sufficient to show 
that drug usage adversely affected [a witness's] perception and 
27 
 
memory").  See also Caine, supra at 370 (mere fact that witness 
was committed to State hospital insufficient to compel testimony 
regarding alleged habitual intoxication and drug addiction).  
The trial judge did not abuse her discretion in limiting the 
defendant's cross-examination on this point. 
 
g.  General Laws c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
record in accordance with G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and have found no 
basis to set aside or reduce the verdict of murder in the first 
degree or to order a new trial.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.