Case Title: Harris v. Bittikofer

Citation: 541 S.W.2d 372

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1976-08-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
541 S.W.2d 372 (1976) Nellie Gupton HARRIS, Appellant, v. Jawana Gupton BITTIKOFER, Appellee. Supreme Court of Tennessee. August 9, 1976. *373 Walter S. Clark, Jr., Nashville, for appellant. Charles Watson Cross, Nashville, for appellee. HENRY, Justice. The question in this suit for the construction of a will is the nature or quantum of the estate acquired by Nellie Gupton Harris in certain property devised by her mother. The Chancellor, relying upon Whitfield v. Butler, 30 Tenn. App. 221, 204 S.W.2d 537 (1947), held that the will vested in the plaintiff "a life estate with remainder to the defendant ... or her heirs". While we are not in full accord with the learned Chancellor's reasoning and do not fully concur in the precise results he reached, we are in agreement with his conclusion that Nellie Gupton Harris took a life estate under her mother's will. The pertinent provision of the will of Angie Heflin Gupton reads as follows: The case is before us on the technical record only and the pleadings are meager. Nellie Gupton Harris is alive; we infer she has no bodily issue from the fact that she is the sole plaintiff and the defendants are Jawana and her "unknown and unborn heirs". The record is silent as to Nellie's husband. The will was dated March 5, 1955. Jawana is an adult. Default judgment was taken against her so that we do *374 not have the benefit of her responsive pleading. The pleading of the Guardian ad litem sheds no light on the circumstances of the parties. The result is that this will must be construed from its language and without resort to any extrinsic evidence. The appellant (Nellie) insists that the will should be construed to create an estate tail with the result that § 64-102, T.C.A., abolishing estates tail, comes into play and operates to convert the devise to a fee simple estate. The appellees, the unknown and unborn children of Jawana, insist that Nellie received a life estate and Jawana, and her heirs, received a remainder in fee. As a prelude to an orderly discussion of the questions presented by this controversy we examine and analyze the pertinent provisions of the will of Angie Heflin Gupton. The opening sentence of the paragraph under consideration may be abridged and restated as follows: It will be noted that in the original form, and as restated, this sentence contains no emphatic or unequivocal words such as "in fee simple", or "absolutely" or "absolutely and in fee simple forever", or any other equivalent wordage from which a clear and unambiguous intent to pass a fee simple title may be inferred. Under § 64-501, T.C.A., and universal decisional law, this language, standing alone, was sufficient to convey a fee simple title. But, it does not stand alone. The ensuing sentence, couched in the form of the habendum clause of a deed, completely alters its meaning and significance. These two sentences might be combined into a single sentence, which we abridge and restate as follows: It should be noted at the very outset that the only interest actually identified in the will is a life estate. Any other estate must arise by construction of law, based upon an imputed intent on the part of the testator. The clause, "during her natural life" is of critical and controlling significance. We first address the insistence of the appellant that Nellie took a fee tail estate convertible under § 64-102, T.C.A. to a fee simple interest. To adopt this approach, it is necessary to hold that a fee tail estate may come into being under a conveyance specifically and initially limited to, a life estate. This we are not prepared to hold. Such a construction would be contrary to the massive weight of the decisional law of Tennessee. Section 64-102, T.C.A. is a codification of the Tennessee statute, designed to abolish estates tail, and reads as follows: While there is authority contra, as will be pointed out, the greater weight of the better *375 reasoned cases compel the conclusion that this statute has no application where the first taker takes only a life estate. The early case of Kirk v. Furgerson, 46 Tenn. 479 (1869), stands for the proposition that a conveyance "to A and his heirs", coupled with a gift over in default of issue, creates an estate tail convertible under the statute (now § 64-102) to a fee simple. This continues to be the law where the instrument shows facially that an absolute estate was transmitted to the first taker. In Skillin v. Loyd, 46 Tenn. 563 (1869), relied upon by the appellant and supportive of her position, where the devise was to Julia Frances Spring, "and the heirs of her body, for her own sole and separate use during her natural life", the Court held that this language created an estate tail converted into a fee simple. This case is out of harmony with later cases and is one of the few cases we find wherein a devise of a life estate, accompanied by fee tail language, was held sufficient to create a fee tail estate. The earliest case cited to us by appellee is Williams v. Williams, 57 Tenn. 566 (1873) which we discuss later in another context. (See Sec. IV, infra). There the language of the devise was: In legal effect this language is precisely the same as that contained in the case at bar. Applying the statute (§ 64-103) abrogating the rule in Shelley's Case, the Court held that Melville Williams took a life estate and his heirs took a contingent remainder. Appellant places strong reliance upon Meacham v. Graham, 98 Tenn. 190, 39 S.W. 12 (1897). There the pertinent portion of the will, after the creation of a trust (all money), read: Actually there were no limitations or restrictions on her spending the money while unmarried, and "[i]n the meantime the money is in her hands to use without limitation". 98 Tenn. at 202, 39 S.W. at 14. The Court held (1) that the term "during her natural life", measured "the duration of the trustee's, and not the duration of the daughter's estate", (2) that there was no valid executory devise since the first taker could defeat the limitation over and (3) that the daughter, upon the death of her father, took an absolute estate. It is evident that the Court's opinion was based, in substantial part, on the factual situation and the testator's intent. We consider next two cases decided by the old Court of Chancery Appeals, that are cited by both sides in support of their respective insistences. The first of these is Stratton v. McKinnie, 62 S.W. 636 (Tenn. Ch.App. 1900). After devises of certain properties to children and grandchildren, including an unqualified devise of a lot on Spruce Street to Mary McKinnie Hughes, the will provides: In a most excellent opinion by Judge M.M. Neil, later Chief Justice of this Court, the Court recognized the applicability of Shannon's Code Section 3674 (now § 64-103, *376 T.C.A.), abolishing the Rule in Shelley's Case, and the rule of construction that a subsequent clause must control a prior clause in a will, and held: Secondly, reliance is placed by the respective parties on Cook v. Collier, 62 S.W. 658 (Tenn.Ch.App. 1901), another case wherein Judge Neil wrote for the Court. To the extent here pertinent the will provision was as follows: It will be noted that this language is somewhat analogous to that in the case under consideration. The Court held that C.C. Collier took the money for life, and at his death without children, a surviving brother took the remainder. Scruggs v. Mayberry, 135 Tenn. 586, 188 S.W. 207 (1915), wherein Chief Justice M.M. Neil wrote for the Court, involved a devise after a title absolute. The precise language was The Court correctly held that the devise to Edward was in fee since such a devise operated to create an estate tail convertible to an estate in fee simple. But, again, the Court was dealing with an absolute interest as opposed to a life estate. Another case relied upon by appellant is Anderson v. Lucas, 140 Tenn. 336, 204 S.W. 989 (1918). There property was devised to trustees for the use of a daughter and The Court held that the clause, "and if she should die without lawful issue" was sufficient to create an estate tail, at common law, in the daughter. The Court quoted with approval from an English case quoted in Nott v. Fitzgibbon, 107 Tenn. 54, 58, 64 S.W. 26, 27 (1901), as follows: Appellant relies heavily upon Harwell v. Harwell, 151 Tenn. 587, 271 S.W. 353 (1924) wherein the language of the devise was as follows: In legal import, except for the life estate, this language is analogous to that of the case at bar. The Court agreed that it was the intention of the testator to create a life estate in the daughter; but, admittedly disregarded the clear intent of the testator and held that under the statute (now § 64-102, T.C.A.) the daughter took an estate tail convertible to a fee simple. The basis of *377 this holding was that the statute abolishing estates in fee tail and converting them to fee simple was not a rule of intention or construction but a rule of property.[2] In Walker v. Wynn, 4 Tenn. App. 572 (1927), the granting clause conveyed to The habendum was to The only issue was whether Nancy took a life estate or held title in fee simple. The Court, after commenting on the Meacham line of cases, said: The Court, relying largely on Williams, supra, held that Nancy took a life estate. It is appropriate that at this point we note the case of Whitfield v. Butler, 30 Tenn. App. 221, 204 S.W.2d 537 (1947), cited by the Chancellor and primarily relied upon by the appellees. The writer of this opinion has had a detailed familiarity with this celebrated Giles County case since its very inception and can say, with demonstrable authority, that no court has ever "construed" the will of Cope Whitfield; the courts could only attempt to "unravel" this unique document.[3] With utmost deference to the Chancellor and to counsel, this case stands for nothing except the proposition that it is abject folly for a layman to attempt to write his own will. Reduced to the bare essentials, by the first item, the testator gave all his property to his wife and children, and expressed the desire that his wife control it with the help of a son, until all the children became of age. Then he added the proviso that if she remarried before the children became of age, the son was to take charge of it and "the man she marrys be forever barred from having anything to do with it forever." 30 Tenn. App. at 223, 204 S.W.2d at 538. By the fourth item he provided: After signing his name he apparently felt that he had not sufficiently entailed his property, so he started over, and provided: The Court held that the widow and children took life estates with remainder over to the grandchildren. We reject Skillin v. Loyd and Anderson v. Lucas, supra, as being out of harmony with the prevailing view as expressed in the other cases discussed in this section. We hold that § 64-102, T.C.A. has no application to those cases wherein the first taker is devised a life estate. Ensuing sections will further clarify this holding. Relevant to the cases discussed in the preceding sections and particularly *378 bearing upon the construction to be given to the clause, "if [Nellie] should die leaving no bodily issue", is the rule of Meacham v. Graham, supra, sometimes designated as the rule of "substitutional construction", to the effect that if there is an absolute power of disposition or an immediate gift to a devisee followed by a limitation over in the event of death of the first taker without issue, the limitation over will take effect only in the event of the death of the devisee before the death of the testator, "unless a contrary intention clearly appear[s] from other provisions." 98 Tenn. at 208, 39 S.W. at 15. But it is important to note that this is but a rule of construction and not of property, Shannon v. Union Planters Bank, 537 S.W.2d 919 (Tenn. 1976), notwithstanding contrary language in some of the older cases. Our courts have addressed themselves to the definite failure vis a vis indefinite failure of issue in numerous and exhaustive opinions and with results which have not always been consistent. The general rule of Meacham has been followed by numerous cases[4] and continues to be a valid rule of law in this jurisdiction. However, our courts have not hesitated to apply exceptions to the general rule. In Cook v. Collier, 62 S.W. 658 (Tenn.Ch. App. 1901), the Court made it clear that the rule would not apply where the "limitation over were to take effect on the termination of a life estate." 62 S.W. at 660. To the same effect is Meek v. Trotter, 133 Tenn. 145, 180 S.W. 176 (1915), pointing out that Meacham, and its progeny all "dealt with immediate devisees or gifts to the one declared to be, under the rule, vested with title absolute." 133 Tenn. at 151. In Harwell v. Harwell, supra, the thrust of the Court's holding in this regard is that the use of the words, dying without heirs, imports an indefinite failure of issue, i.e., death at any time. Hence the Court's holding that an estate tail was created by the conveyance involved in that case. In Walker v. Wynn, supra, the Court declined to follow the Meacham line of cases, holding that "[T]hey are all cases in which, in the first instance an absolute estate was given... ." 4 Tenn. App. at 574. Eckhardt v. Phillips, 176 Tenn. 34, 137 S.W.2d 301 (1940), contains an elaborate discussion of future interests. In holding that this is a rule of construction and not a rule of property, and that under the facts presented, the limitation over was to take effect upon the death of the first taker without issue irrespective of when death might occur, the Court said: This Court in Griffin et al. v. Griffin et al., 183 Tenn. 693, 195 S.W.2d 5 (1946), recognized the rule of Meacham as a rule of construction and held that it has no application where "the first taker was given only a life estate." 183 Tenn. at 700, 195 S.W.2d at 8. In Vickers v. Vickers, 205 Tenn. 86, 325 S.W.2d 544 (1959), placing first emphasis on the intention of the testator, the Court construed the clause of a limitation over, "should either die without issue", to mean death at anytime and not just during the lifetime of the testator. This particular phase of this controversy is eloquently described by Professor Trautman, writing in Vol. 13, Vanderbilt Law Review (1960), page 1113-14 as follows: On the matter of substitutional construction and intention, see also Nichols v. Masterson, 186 Tenn. 38, 208 S.W.2d 332 (1948); on intention, see Patterson v. Alexander, 509 S.W.2d 834 (Tenn. 1974), and Martin v. Taylor, 521 S.W.2d 581 (Tenn. 1975). In Gregory v. Alexander, 51 Tenn. App. 307, 367 S.W.2d 292 (1962), the Court held that a deed, reserving a life estate, and providing that at grantor's death the land was to go to Rosalie Cox and her heirs, if any, and if she dies without bodily heirs, it is to revert to grantor's heirs, was operative to give grantee a life estate with remainder to her bodily heirs, to be ascertained at the time of her death. There remain for consideration three opinions authored by the present Chief Justice of this Court. The first of these, Lones v. Winzer, 486 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn. App. 1971) was written by Chief Justice Cooper while Presiding Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Eastern Section. In that case the will, after a straight-out devise to the testator's son, Alvin Lones, provided: It should be noted that there was no language in this will indicating the creation of a life estate, or as phrased by Justice Cooper: The second case, Martin v. Taylor, 521 S.W.2d 581 (Tenn. 1975), was written by Justice Cooper after becoming a member of this Court and was concurred in by all present members. After an exceptionally strong statement on the vitality of the testator's intent, Justice Cooper used, and quoted, language which puts this present problem in precise perspective: Finally, we rest our holding upon a reiteration of the conclusions announced by this Court on 24 May 1976, in the case of Shannon v. Union Planters National Bank, supra, involving a will creating a life estate with survivorship provisions. After recognizing the rule of Meacham as followed in ensuing cases, and noting its continuing validity, the Court said: This is precisely the situation in the case at bar. We devote this section to the Rule in Shelley's case, and the Tennessee statute in derogation thereof. We look to Simes, Law of Future Interests (1966), p. 46 for an accurate definition. To bring a conveyance or devise under the Rule it must contemplate a freehold interest,[5] but not a fee simple since a fee simple may not be followed by a remainder. This is because, under the doctrine of estates, a fee simple represents the totality of the ownership. There must be a freehold in the ancestor. The remainder must be limited to the heirs or heirs of the body of the person to whom the life estate is given. The remainder and the life estate must be created by the same conveyance or devise, and both must be of the same quality, i.e. both legal or both equitable interests. Law of Future Interests, pp. 48-51. It is important to bear in mind that the Rule only operated on the remainder given to the heirs of the ancestor, but does not disturb his estate. As Moynihan puts it "Thus, in the simple case of A conveying to B for life, then to the heirs of B, the Rule leaves undisturbed the life estate given B but converts what would be a contingent remainder in B's heirs into a vested remainder in B himself." See Moynihan, Introduction to Real Property, (1962), p. 142. The devise, in the instant suit would have created, at common law, a fee simple estate *381 in Nellie Harris, under the Rule in Shelley's case. But this Rule no longer prevails in Tennessee, and has not since 1851. By § 64-103, T.C.A., it is provided: Broadly speaking, title to real estate may be acquired either by descent or by purchase. Title by descent is based on inheritance as an heir, or on escheat. Every other acquisition is by purchase, whether it be by gift, conveyance or devise. Words of limitation mark or define the quantum of the estate; whereas words of purchase are related to the grantee. "Heirs" is a word of limitation. For example, when A conveys "to B for life", the words "to B" are words of purchase; the words "for life" are words of limitation.[6] It would seem evident that under the statute, Nellie would take a present possessory life estate and her children or heirs would take a future interest which ripens into a present possessory estate in fee upon the culmination of the prior particular estate by the death of Nellie, survived by issue. We analyze the Tennessee cases from this perspective. We think this case is controlled by a line of cases starting with Williams v. Williams, 57 Tenn. 566 (1873), which, according to our research, is the first pertinent reported Tennessee case after the adoption of the statute abolishing the Rule in Shelley's case. There the language of the devise (see Section III) was, in legal effect, precisely the same as that contained in the case at bar. The Court held (1) that [t]he limitation of this property ... to Melville Williams for life, and then to the heirs of his body, falls precisely within the terms of the celebrated canon of property known as "the rule in Shelley's case" (57 Tenn. at 567), (2) that under Code Sec. 2008, Code of 1858, (now § 64-103, T.C.A.) Melville Williams took a life estate; (3) that his heirs took a contingent remainder, and (4) that Code Sec. 2004, Code of 1858, (the context indicates that the Court intended 2007, now § 64-102, T.C.A.) had no application. As a predicate for the remainder of this section we deem it appropriate to quote from this opinion, the following apt language: There is an obvious interplay and a seeming inconsistency between § 64-102, T.C.A. abolishing estates tail and § 64-103 abolishing the Rule in Shelley's case; however, the inconsistency is more apparent than actual. If the criteria hereinabove set out are applicable, we have a Rule in Shelley's case situation and § 64-103 comes into play. The Court in Williams did not discuss the relationship between these two statutes. It simply stated: This will came before the Court again in Williams v. Williams, 62 Tenn. 55 (1873), and the same result was reached. It was again before the Court with the same result in Campbell v. Lewisburg & N.R.R. Co., 160 Tenn. 477, 26 S.W.2d 141 (1930). In Delk v. Williams, 10 Tenn. App. 246 (1929), the Court held that where a deed conveyed real estate to a grantee "during her natural life and at her death to go to her bodily heirs", the statute was applicable and a life estate is vested in the first taker and the remainder, at her death goes to her bodily heirs. The late Justice Swiggart, writing for the Court in Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Bedford, 161 Tenn. 187, 30 S.W.2d 227 (1930), analyzed a will wherein the pertinent language was as follows: After quoting with approval from Williams v. Williams, supra, Justice Swiggart, with great clarity and insight, wrote: A case of substantial significance bearing upon this issue is Guy v. Culberson, 164 Tenn. 509, 51 S.W.2d 500 (1932), wherein Justice Cook wrote for the Court. The deed was Relying upon § 64-103, T.C.A., the Court held that Guy took a life estate with remainder over to bodily heirs living at the time of his death. A more significant case is Butler v. Parker, 200 Tenn. 603, 293 S.W.2d 174 (1956), wherein Justice Burnett tacitly recognized the conflict between § 64-102 and § 64-103, T.C.A. This suit involved title to property conveyed to "Ralph Parker and at his death to his bodily heirs." 200 Tenn. at 605, 293 S.W.2d at 175. The interplay between these Code sections is discussed in these words: It will be borne in mind that the language in the case sub judice was to Nellie Gupton Harris "during her natural life, and her bodily heirs, if any, forever ..." The similarity is evident. Further, the Butler Court said: This case positively affirms Williams v. Williams, supra, and the cases hereinabove cited growing out of that case. The Court stated that "[i]t is impossible for us to make any distinction or legal difference between a conveyance `to Ralph Parker for life and at his death to his bodily heirs' and a conveyance `to Ralph Parker and at his death to his bodily heirs.'" Nor can we draw any distinction between either phraseology and a devise to Nellie Gupton Harris "during her natural life, and ... her bodily heirs, if any, forever ...". Indeed, if anything this latter devise is stronger in intent and implication. Butler was quoted, with obvious approval in Fehringer v. Fehringer, 222 Tenn. 585, 439 S.W.2d 258 (1969). We think this is a classic case for the application of § 64-103, T.C.A. Various competing rules of construction are urged upon the Court. *384 The appellant earnestly insists upon the application of the rule that courts will refuse to cut down an estate granted in fee or absolutely, by subsequent provisions of the will conveying a lesser estate or interest, absent language which is "clear, unmistakable and certain." Meacham v. Graham, supra. We agree that this is a recognized rule of construction; however, we find it to be inapplicable in the case at bar. First, there is no clear language manifesting an intent to convey an absolute estate. Secondly, the only interest positively identified and designated in the will is a life estate. There is no ambiguity. We have come a long way in ridding the law of wills of some of its harsh and unyielding rules of construction since this Court decided Polk v. Faris, 17 Tenn. 209 (1836). In that case the Court declared: When Polk v. Faris was decided, a harsh and technical rule of the common law was in the early stages of revision and viewed in the context of the times it is not difficult to see how courts could conclude that rigid application of corrective legislation was imperative. Today, we labor under no such compulsion. We regard the intention of the testator, to be gleaned from the entire instrument and the attendant circumstances, to be the overriding consideration and once that intention has been determined, it would be contrary to public policy and a rejection of reason for courts to frustrate the donor in his declared purpose. Thus, the one great Commandment in the construction of wills is the intention of the testator. The primacy of the rule of the intention of the testator was first announced in Hoggatt v. Clopton, 142 Tenn. 184, 192, 217 S.W. 657, 659 (1919), in these words: It was last enunciated by this Court in Martin v. Taylor, 521 S.W.2d 581, 584 (1975): We hold that the testator intended definite failure of issue, i.e. at the death of the life tenant. The estate tail at the common law rested upon the theory that a limitation over to another in fee upon the death of the first taker without issue, referred to an indefinite failure of issue, i.e. failure at any time. If the testator intended a definite failure of issue, then a gift over arises by purchase as opposed to limitation and no estate tail is created. See Vol. I, American Law of Property (1952), Sec. 2.14, p. 120. Again § 64-102, T.C.A. does not come into play to create an estate tail. Where it is clear, as we think it is here, that the testator intended the words used to be words of purchase, a fee tail estate does not arise. Collis v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 314 Ky. 15, 234 S.W.2d 164 (1950). We hold that under the will of her mother, Nellie Alberta Gupton Harris took a life estate, with alternative contingent remainder as follows: First, to Nellie's issue, if any. This interest would ripen into a present possessory interest in fee upon the culmination of the prior particular estate, by the death of Nellie. *385 Secondly, should Nellie die without issue and her husband, James V. Harris, survive her, the property vests in Jawana Sue Gupton in fee simple. If Nellie should die without issue and not survived by her husband, James V. Harris, it will revert to the estate of Angie Heflin Gupton for failure of the second of two conditions precedent. The decree of the Chancellor is modified accordingly and Affirmed. COOPER, C.J., and FONES, BROCK and HARBISON, JJ., concur. [1] The word "revert" in the will obviously is intended to mean "pass to", "go to" or words of like import. [2] See Sec. IV, infra, for a further commentary on this case. [3] By Item 2 he disposed of all his debts by making them "null and void" and asserting that "my estate not bound for anything of that kind." [4] See e.g., Vaughn v. Cator, 85 Tenn. 302, 2 S.W. 262 (1886); Stratton v. McKinnie, 62 S.W. 636 (Tenn.Ch.App. 1900); Katzenberger v. Weaver, 110 Tenn. 620, 75 S.W. 937 (1903); Frank v. Frank, 120 Tenn. 569, 111 S.W. 1119 (1908), treating it as a rule of property; Scruggs v. Mayberry, 135 Tenn. 586, 188 S.W. 207 (1915). [5] A life estate is a freehold estate not of inheritance. Harwell v. Harwell, 151 Tenn. 587, 271 S.W. 353. [6] Simes, Law of Future Interests (Second Ed. 1966) pp. 43-44; see also Moynihan, Introduction to Real Property (1962) p. 31; Tiedman, The American Law of Real Property (Third Ed. 1906) p. 667. [7] The context indicates that the Court intended Sec. 2007, Code of 1858, (now § 64-102, T.C.A.).