Case Title: Binger v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-01-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Binger v. State1986 WY 3712 P.2d 349Case Number: 85-116Decided: 01/08/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
BRIAN BINGER, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, ParkCounty, John T. Dixon, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Leonard D. Munker, State 
Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, and Margaret Ann Maurer, 
Legal Intern, Wyoming Public Defender Program.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

A.G. McClintock, Atty. 
Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. 
Gen., and Darold W. Killmer, Legal Intern.

 
 

Before THOMAS, C.J., 
ROONEY,* BROWN and CARDINE, JJ., and 
GUTHRIE, J., 
Retired.

* Retired November 30, 
1985.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal is from a 
judgment and sentence entered after a jury trial in which appellant was found 
guilty of one count of forgery in violation of § 6-2-101, W.S. 1977. Appellant 
contends that he was denied his right to a speedy trial and that he was 
improperly sentenced under the felony forgery statute in effect at the time of 
the offense, rather than being sentenced under the subsequently enacted 
misdemeanor check fraud statute.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     On October 23, 1982, 
appellant attempted to pay for the purchase of clothing from a store in Powell 
with a check for $87.93, drawn on the American National Bank, which he signed 
with the name of Edward Brian. A telephonic attempt to verify the check as 
genuine by the store owner was unsuccessful, whereupon appellant tore up the 
check, returned some of the clothing, and paid for the remainder in cash. The 
forgery charge was based on this check. The pieces of the torn check were taped 
together and made an exhibit at the trial. The fact that neither appellant nor 
Edward Brian had ever had an account at the American National Bank was 
established at the trial.

 
 
SPEEDY 
TRIAL

 
 

[¶4.]     The following 
chronology is pertinent to appellant's contention that he was denied a speedy 
trial:

 
 
November 16, 1982 - 
Criminal complaint made and filed

 
 
November 18, 1982 - 
Appellant arrested

 
 
December 14, 1982 - 
Information was issued

 
 
December 20, 1982 - 
Information was filed

 
 
January 5, 1983 - 
Arraignment had and plea of not guilty entered

 
 
January 10, 1983 - Order 
setting trial for April 5, 1983 (filed January 12, 1983)

 
 
February 8, 1983 - 
Appellant wrote to judge stating that he had "relieved" the public defender from 
representing him, that he had contacted three law firms who would not represent 
him, and requesting appointment of one of two named attorneys to represent 
him

 
 
February 28, 1983 - 
Appellant wrote to judge stating that he had contacted five law firms who would 
not represent him, requested appointment of a named attorney, and requested 
access to some law books

 
 
March 14, 1983 - Judge 
wrote to appellant advising him that public defender would represent him unless 
a "cogent and logical" reason was presented to relieve him (filed March 15, 
1983)

 
 
April 6, 1983 - 
Notification of setting on May 26, 1983, for plea changes (filed April 13, 
1983)

 
 
May 31, 1983 - Appellant 
moved, pro se, to dismiss for lack of speedy trial (filed June 6, 1983) 

 
 
June 12, 1983 - Motion to 
dismiss set for hearing on June 23, 1983 (filed June 14, 
1983)

 
 
June 17, 1983 - Public 
defender moved to withdraw from case and court authorized withdrawal and 
appointed Dick Kahl to represent appellant (filed June 20, 
1983)

 
 
June 20, 1983 - Appellant 
again filed motion, pro se, to dismiss for lack of speedy trial (dated May 31, 
1983)

 
 
June 21, 1983 - Order 
allowing Dick Kahl to withdraw for conflict of interest and appointment of 
Ernest F. Fuller, Jr. to represent appellant (filed June 21, 
1983)

 
 
July 5, 1983 - Hearing 
set for June 23, 1983, was reset for July 7, 1983, because of recent appointment 
of Ernest Fuller, Jr. to represent appellant (filed July 5, 
1983)

 
 
July 11, 1983 - Order 
reflecting appearance for hearing on July 5, 1983, and request by appellant's 
counsel for continuance, and resetting hearing for July 11, 1983 (filed July 12, 
1983)

 
 
July 28, 1983 - Order 
setting trial for August 17, 1983 (filed July 28, 1983)

 
 
August 3, 1983 - Opinion 
letter that order denying motion for speedy trial be prepared inasmuch as "the 
Defendant himself occasioned many of the delays that came about by reason of his 
constantly changing counsel," and inasmuch as there was nothing to indicate that 
appellant was "prejudiced or greatly harmed" by the delay (filed August 4, 
1983)

 
 
August 9, 1983 - 
Appellant moved to change judge (filed August 9, 1983)

 
 
August 10, 1983 - 
Appellant moved for continuance of trial (filed August 10, 
1983)

 
 
August 10, 1983 - 
Appellant moved for discovery and inspection reciting that it was made at a 
reasonable time under Rule 18, W.R.Cr.P., inasmuch as appellant's present 
attorney was appointed a month and a half before filing of the motion (filed 
August 10, 1983)

 
 
August 15, 1983 - Order 
denying motion to dismiss reciting that appellant "occasioned many of the 
delays" by constant change of counsel and that he had not shown "prejudice or 
harm" (filed August 16, 1983)

 
 
August 10, 1983 - 
Appellant's request for setting of hearing on motions for change of judge, for 
discovery and inspection, and for continuance (filed August 18, 
1983)

 
 
August 17, 1983 - Setting 
of hearing on motions for change of judge, for discovery and inspection, and for 
continuance on August 17, 1983 (filed August 18, 1983)

 
 
August 24, 1983 - Order 
granting motion for continuance of trial until September 1, 1983 (filed August 
24, 1983)

 
 
August 23, 1983 - Order 
denying motion for change of judge (filed August 25, 1983)

 
 
September 1, 1983 - 
Letter reciting that three cases, including this one, are continued for trial 
until October 25, 1983, "due to the length of the Pote case" (filed September 2, 
1983)

 
 
September 14, 1983 - Bond 
posted for appellant (filed September 14, 1983)

 
 
October 11, 1983 - Motion 
by appellant's attorney to withdraw inasmuch as appellant was "in the process" 
of obtaining other counsel (filed October 11, 1983); other counsel was not 
obtained and the withdrawal was not made

 
 
October 11, 1983 - 
Appellant moved for continuance of trial (filed October 11, 
1983)

 
 
November 1, 1983 - Trial 
started; the jury was selected and opening statements were made; the judge 
became ill and the trial was continued

November 8, 1983 - Order 
setting trial for December 19, 1983 (filed November 9, 
1983)

 
 
November 2, 1983 - Motion 
for leave to dismiss all but one count of the information inasmuch as the State 
"is unable to secure the attendance of a material witness with respect" to the 
dismissed counts (filed November 18, 1983) 

 
 
December 19, 1983 - Trial 
resumed; the parties were then allowed to again voir dire the 
jury.

 
 

[¶5.]     Four factors are 
considered and balanced to determine whether a defendant is deprived of his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the 
reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of the right, and (4) 
prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972); Grable 
v. State, Wyo., 649 P.2d 663 (1982); Estrada v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 850 (1980); Phillips v. State, Wyo., 597 P.2d 456 (1979); Cherniwchan v. State, Wyo., 594 P.2d 464 
(1979). Considering and balancing these four factors in this case lead to the 
definite conclusion that appellant was not denied his right to a speedy 
trial.

 
 

[¶6.]     The time span from the 
time of the filing of the information, Tageant v. State, Wyo., 683 P.2d 667 
(1984), to the date of trial in this case was from December 20, 1982, to 
November 1, 1983, a period of about ten and one-half months. There was an 
additional continuance of the trial for one and one-half months occasioned by 
illness of the judge.

"* * * A defendant cannot 
be heard to claim that his rights to a speedy trial were violated because * * * 
a judge's illness forced trial continuances." Heinrich v. State, Wyo., 638 P.2d 641, 644 
(1981).

 
 
Almost two months of the 
ten-and-one-half-month time span were occasioned by a resetting of the trial 
date of September 1, 1983, to October 25, 1983, because of the length of time 
being taken by the trial of another case. This case had been set for trial on 
two previous occasions, once for April 5, 1983, which was continued for 
consideration of an indicated change of plea, and once for August 17, 1983, 
which was continued pursuant to appellant's motion. Appellant also moved for a 
continuance of the trial date of October 25, 1983.

 
 

[¶7.]     The length of delay in 
this case requires inquiry into the other three factors involved in the 
balancing process determinative of a violation of the constitutional right to a 
speedy trial.

 
 

[¶8.]     With reference to the 
second factor, most of the delay was caused by the appellant himself. He 
regularly expressed dissatisfaction with his attorneys and indicated his 
intention to change attorneys. He did change them three times. The judge 
appointed a new attorney each time. He indicated an intention to change again 
fourteen days before the trial commenced. He indicated that he had contacted 
five law firms in an unsuccessful effort to obtain counsel. The first request 
for a change came about a month after arraignment and about two months before 
the time originally set for trial. The last request to withdraw as counsel, made 
on October 11, 1983, fourteen days before the date set for trial, was 
accompanied by a second motion to continue the trial date. Hearings on motions 
of appellant were continued twice at his request. About a week before a trial 
date of August 17, 1983, appellant moved for continuance of it and for a change 
of judge. This first motion for continuance was granted on August 24, 
1983.

 
 

[¶9.]     Much of the cause of 
our delay was that occasioned by the appellant. As said in Barker v. Wingo, 92 S.Ct. at 
2195:

"* * * [B]arring 
extraordinary circumstances, we would be reluctant indeed to rule that a 
defendant was denied this constitutional right on a record that strongly 
indicates, as does this one, that the defendant did not want a speedy trial. * * 
*"

 
 
And as said in Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d at 
460-461:

"* * * [W]e find 
sufficient support in the record as to a whole for a determination that the 
delay was occasioned, at least in part, by the defendant 
himself.

* * * * * 
*

"* * * However, the tenor 
of the whole record - particularly the emphasis placed thereon by defendant in 
the affidavit and motions submitted by him - reflects the delay to have been 
occasioned, at least in part, by his desire and effort to obtain private legal 
representation. * * *" (Footnote omitted.)

 
 
And so it is with this 
case. The tenor of the record does not reflect a disregard of the requirement 
that appellant have attention given to the charge against him, that his case 
languish for want of diligent prosecution, or that there was a lack of good 
faith effort to attend to his case. The record does reflect delays occasioned by 
appellant's procedural actions - changes in attorneys, motions for continuances, 
change of judge, etc. Appellant is entitled to such procedural actions, but he 
cannot assert the loss of the constitutional right to a speedy trial when the 
trial delay is substantially a result of such actions on his 
part.

 
 

[¶10.]  The "reason for the delay" balancing 
factor weighs heavily against appellant in this case.

 
 

[¶11.]  Appellant asserted his right to a speedy 
trial by filing on June 6, 1983, and June 20, 1983, the two pro se motions for 
dismissal on that basis - about 168 and 182 days after the information was 
filed. About a fourth of that period was taken up with changing or attempting to 
change attorneys. Appellant's subsequent motions for continuance could indicate 
a lack of sincerity in the dismissal motions if not an actual waiver 
thereof.

 
 

[¶12.]  Appellant has failed to indicate the 
manner in which he was prejudiced by any delay. Time was allowed off his 
sentence for incarceration time prior to sentence. We said in Cherniwchan v. State, 594 P.2d at 
469:

"The nature of the 
prejudice that courts speak about when addressing speedy-trial constitutional 
rights run along these lines: Are the memories of the witnesses dimmed? Is the 
evidence lost? Have the delays brought about additional costs to the government 
and the defendant? How does a defendant go about showing the harm sustained by 
public accusation - public suspicion, the severing of family and social ties, 
and the personal anxiety? * * *"

 
 
Appellant was not 
penalized in any of these respects. All but one of the original counts in the 
information were dismissed when the State could no longer obtain the material 
witnesses to support them. The delay may well have worked to appellant's benefit 
rather than to his prejudice.

"A second difference 
between the right to speedy trial and the accused's other constitutional rights 
is that deprivation of the right may work to the accused's advantage. Delay is 
not an uncommon defense tactic. As the time between the commission of the crime 
and trial lengthens, witnesses may become unavailable or their memories may 
fade. If the witnesses support the prosecution, its case will be weakened, 
sometimes seriously so. And it is the prosecution which carries the burden of 
proof. * * *" Barker v. Wingo, 92 S. Ct.  at 2187.

 
 

[¶13.]  In this instance, appellant did not 
present any evidence at trial and relied upon failure by the prosecution to 
establish the elements of the crime. There is no suggestion that he lost a 
witness or other evidence. There is no indication that the witnesses' memory of 
the incident were dimmed by time. Appellant's reputation, social ties, and 
"personal anxiety" were little, if any, affected by the delay in view of his 
extensive criminal record and previous convictions and 
incarcerations.

 
 

[¶14.]  Balancing and weighing of all four of the 
factors by which a constitutional right to a speedy trial is determined result 
in a preponderance of weight that such right of appellant was not 
violated.

 
 
PROPRIETY OF 
SENTENCE

 
 

[¶15.]  Appellant argues that § 6-1-101(c), W.S. 
1977 (June 1983 Replacement), is applicable to this case. It 
reads:

"In a case pending on or 
after the effective date of this act, involving a crime committed prior to the 
effective date, if the penalty under this act for the crime is different from 
the penalty under prior law, the court shall impose the lesser 
sentence."

 

Section 6-1-101(c) is 
part of the Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982, a recodification of most of the 
crimes. It became effective on July 1, 1983. Section 6-1-101(c) is, thus, 
applicable to this case.

 
 

[¶16.]  The information charged a violation of § 
6-2-101, the forgery statute which was in effect at the time of the crime. The 
information charged the unlawful forgery of the name of Edward Brian to a check 
drawn on the American National Bank and an attempt to pass it. Section 6-2-101 
provided in pertinent part:

"Every person who shall 
falsely make, alter, forge or counterfeit any * * * check * * * or shall utter, 
publish, pass or attempt to pass as true and genuine * * * any of the 
above-named false, altered, forged or counterfeited matters as above specified 
and described (knowing the same to be false, altered, forged or counterfeited) 
with intent to prejudice, damage or defraud any person or persons * * * shall be 
deemed guilty of forgery, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by 
confinement in the penitentiary for a term not more than fourteen (14) 
years."

 
 

[¶17.]  The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982 
provides in pertinent part:

"§ 6-3-602. Forgery; 
penalties.

"(a) A person is guilty 
of forgery if, with intent to defraud, he:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) Makes, completes, 
executes, * * * issues or transfers any writing[1] so that it purports to be the act 
of another who did not authorize that act * *;

* * * * * 
*

"(b) * * * [F]orgery is a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both."

 
 

[¶18.]  Inasmuch as appellant's sentence was 
three to seven years, the sentence was within "the lesser" of the penalties 
provided for the crime of forgery under the Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982 and 
the crime of forgery as defined when the crime was committed. 
Accordingly,

appellant's argument that 
§ 6-1-101(c) makes improper the sentence in this case is without 
merit.

 
 

[¶19.]  Incidental to appellant's contention on 
this issue is his argument that he should have been charged under the "check 
fraud" statute rather than under the forgery statute since the check fraud 
statute is a more specific statute and is, therefore, an exception to the 
general statute, citing McArtor v. 
State, Wyo., 699 P.2d 288 (1985); and Capwell v. State, Wyo., 686 P.2d 1148 
(1984).

 
 

[¶20.]  At the time of the crime, §§ 6-3-110 and 
6-3-111, W.S. 1977, made it a misdemeanor to,

"(a) * * * with intent to 
defraud by obtaining money, merchandise, property, credit, or other thing of 
value, * * * make, draw, utter or deliver any check, draft or order for the 
payment of money * * * upon any bank * * * knowing at the time of such making, 
drawing, uttering or delivering that the maker or drawer has not sufficient 
funds in such bank * * * for the payment of such check * * in full upon its 
presentation * * *." Section 6-3-110(a).

 
 
Similarly, § 6-3-702(a), 
W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), of the Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982 provides 
in pertinent part:

"(a) Any person who 
knowingly issues a check which is not paid because the drawer has insufficient 
funds with the drawee, has issued a fraudulent check and commits fraud by check 
unless the check is paid by the maker within five (5) days of receiving notice, 
personally given or sent to the address shown on the instrument of dishonor or 
nonpayment. * * *"

 
 
It made the crime a 
misdemeanor if the check was for a sum of less than $2,000 and a felony if it 
was for $2,000 or more. 

 
 

[¶21.]  The legislative intent at all times was 
obviously to create two separate crimes, one for forgery and one for check 
fraud. The forgery prohibition is against the making of a deceptive document per 
se, and that of the check fraud is against the making of a document having 
validity other than the fact that the funds against which it is drawn are 
"insufficient." The check fraud statute concerns a "genuine" instrument although 
not collectible. The forgery statute concerns an instrument which is not 
genuine.

 
 

[¶22.]  Capwell v. State involved a situation 
not here present. In Capwell, we held 
the attempt of sexual assault could be properly charged only under the statute 
specifically dealing with attempted sexual assault and not under the general 
attempt statute. The latter carried a greater penalty. Nor is the other case 
relied upon by appellant of support to his position. In McArtor v. State, we recognized that a 
special statute would govern where a general statute is inconsistent with a 
special statute pertaining to the same subject matter, but we also pointed out 
that, in that case, the legislative intent was to address different conditions 
in the two statutes. We said that:

"* * * Both statutes 
involve sexual activity, but they are not mutually exclusive. It is not uncommon 
for two valid statutes to prohibit the same type of conduct, or for the 
prosecutor to decide under which statute to charge a defendant. [Citations.]" McArtor v. State, 699 P.2d  at 
293-294.

 
 

[¶23.]  So it is here. Both statutes involve 
fraudulent documents, but one (check fraud) primarily concerns the element of 
insufficient funds in the bank upon which the check is drawn. The other 
(forgery) primarily concerns the element of fabrication or falsity of the 
instrument itself.

 
 

[¶24.]  Appellant attempted to pass a check which 
was not genuine. It was signed by him under a fictitious name and was on a bank 
in which appellant did not have an account and in which there was no account 
under the fictitious name. Appellant was properly charged.

 
 

[¶25.]  Affirmed.

 
 

1 "`Writing'" is defined 
in § 6-3-601, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), as "printing or any other 
method of recording information, money, coins, tokens, stamps, seals, credit 
cards, badges, trademarks, and other symbols of value, right, privilege or 
identification."