Case Title: Kidd v. Kidd

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Kidd v. Kidd1992 WY 61832 P.2d 566Case Number: 91-205Decided: 05/29/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Karen R. KIDD, now known 
as Karen R. Seibert, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

William L. KIDD, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, Converse County, William A. Taylor, J.

Richard Kraemer, 
Ft. Collins, Colo., for appellant.

Richard G. 
Miller, Casper, for appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, and GOLDEN, JJ., and ROONEY, Ret. 
J.

ROONEY, Justice 
(Retired).

[¶1]      Appellant appeals 
from an Order Modifying Decree and Judgment in a divorce action. The decree was 
dated April 6, 1987. A Property Settlement and Child Custody and Support 
Agreement (Agreement) was included in the decree. On March 15, 1991, appellee 
filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause and Petition to Clarify or Modify the 
Decree, requesting a reduction in child support from that provided in the 
Agreement and decree. He also alleged improper retention by appellant of a 
$1,000 insurance check and an improper claim by her of a tax exemption for the 
children for the year 1990. On May 10, 1991, appellant filed a Motion for Order 
to Show Cause and Petition for Review to Increase Child Support and Modify 
Decree. In it she alleged a delinquency in payment of child support in the 
amount of $1,650; delinquency in payment of medical expenses in the amount of 
$575; a refusal to pay attorney's fees in the amount of $800 incurred in the 
original divorce proceeding; and that appellee's income had increased, wherefore 
the child support payments should also increase.

[¶2]      The district 
court granted appellee's motion to reduce the amount of child support and denied 
appellant's motion to increase them. It ruled that appellant's retention of the 
$1,000 insurance check be allowed to offset $918 owed by appellee for the 
children's camp expense; that appellee pay the $1,650 delinquency in child 
support; that appellee pay the $800 attorney fees; that appellant "sign the Form 
8332 allowing [appellee] to claim the children as exemptions for federal income 
tax purposes for the year 1990 and subsequent years"; and that appellant's claim 
of $575 for medical expenses be denied. It also granted appellee's Motion for 
Protective Order authorizing appellee to not respond in deposition or to 
interrogatories concerning his net income beyond the affidavit filed by him 
listing his net income for the years 1987 through 1990.

[¶3]      We reverse the 
order reducing child support and affirm the other rulings of the district 
court.

[¶4]      Appellant words 
the issues on appeal:

     "1. Did the trial 
court err when it lowered the child support [b]elow the amount fixed in the 
parties agreement which was clear and unequal and absent evidence justifying a 
reduction[?]

     "2. Did the trial 
court err in reducing the child support amount far below the statutory 
presumption amount established by W.S. Section 20-6-304 (1990 
Supp.)[?]

     "3. Where the property 
settlement agreement provided that the tax exemption claim of the non-custodial 
parent was conditioned on being current in the support obligation, and the court 
concluded the non-custodial parent was not current, was it error to conclude 
that the exemptions should belong to the non-custodial 
parent?

     "4. Was the evidence 
of the arrearage of $575.00 in medical bills sufficient where the evidence 
consisted of letters demanding the money and testimony that it was owed but the 
evidence did not contain an actual invoice?

     "5. Did the trial 
court err in its calculation by allowing a $1,000.00 offset to the 1991 "camp" 
expense when the testimony indicated that the money had been offset in 1990 and 
that $918.00 was still owed for 1991?

     "6. Did the trial 
court err in granting a protective order preventing the custodial mother from 
discovering documentary evidence of the non-custodial father's earnings in 
addition to the verified financial statement required by W.S. Section 
20-6-306(a) (1990 Supp.)[?]

     "7. Did the trial 
court err in failing to provide for an award of attorneys fees where such are 
allowed by the parties' divorce settlement agreement?"

[¶5]      Appellee words 
them:

     "1. Did the trial 
court err or abuse its discretion when it reduced monthly child support for a 
child, not yet nineteen, attending college full-time and living in the dormitory 
during the months the child is in school?

     "2. Did the trial 
court abuse its discretion when it ordered appellant to allow appellee the 1990 
tax exemptions for the children upon payment of unpaid child support and 
attorney's fees?

     "3. Did the trial 
court err or abuse its discretion in disallowing the $575.00 claim for medical 
bills and in offsetting the $1,000.00 against the 1991 camp 
expense?

      "4. Did the 
trial court err in requiring the parties to submit verified financial statements 
pursuant to Section 20-6-306(a), W.S. and not requiring production of income tax 
returns and documentation of all financial transactions for the years since the 
decree was entered?

     "5. Did the trial 
court abuse its discretion in not awarding appellant attorney's 
fees?"

CHILD 
SUPPORT

(First issue of each 
party, and second issue of appellant.)

[¶6]      The parties have 
three children. The oldest, Ginger, was 13 years old at the time of the 
Agreement. She entered college in September 1991, about a month after reaching 
the age of 18. She received an athletic scholarship, which paid her room, board 
and tuition. The Agreement, in Section 2, provided in 
part:

     "b) The husband shall 
pay child support in the amount of $1,100.00 per month per child until each 
child reaches the age of majority, is emancipated, or until further order of the 
Court. Said support shall continue at a reduction of 75% (i.e. a reduction to 
the sum of $275.00 per month per child) beyond the age of majority and until the 
child attains the age of twenty-three (23) years, contingent upon the child 
pursuing a higher education and/or living at least part-time with the mother. A 
record of such child support payment shall be kept by each of the parties and a 
receipt mailed to the Court by the wife. Payment of the child support shall 
commence on the 10th day of April 1987, and be due and payable in a like manner 
each and every month thereafter until said minor children reach the age of 
twenty-three (23), are emancipated or until further order of the 
Court.

* * * * * 
*

     "f) The husband shall 
provide room and board, tuition and books for the education of the parties' 
children at either a vocational, technical, or public institution of higher 
learning of the child's choice for each child through the equivalent of an 
undergraduate (bachelor's level) degree. However, this provision is not to be 
interpreted or construed to make the husband responsible for the cost of a 
preparatory or pre-college private school."

[¶7]      In its order, the 
district court recited in part:

     "The parties at the 
time of entering into the Agreement did not contemplate the affect of paragraph 
2b in the situation such as exists here when Ginger Kidd is attending college 
living in the dormitory but is under the age of 19 years. That provision of the 
Decree is hereby modified to provide that when a child is under the age of 19 
and attending school residing somewhere other than with the plaintiff, that for 
nine (9) months a year, i.e., September through May, the amount of child support 
payable for that child shall be $550.00 per month. During the three months 
summer break, i.e., June through August, if the child resides with the 
plaintiff, the child support shall be at the rate of $1,100.00 per month. Once 
the child reaches the age of 19 years, then child support shall be payable at 
the rate of $275.00 per month under the terms and conditions set forth in 
paragraph 2b of the Agreement."

[¶8]      The district 
court's effort to reach a fair result through its order reducing the amount of 
child support payments overlooked two aspects of this case which make successful 
a contest of the order on this issue: (1) the existence of the detailed and 
comprehensive Agreement, the contents of which rebut the alleged reason for 
decrease in the amount of the payments, and (2) the lack of a substantial change 
in circumstances not contemplated at the time of the Agreement and 
divorce.

[¶9]      The modification 
of child support provisions contained in a divorce decree is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court if there has been a substantial change of 
circumstances since the decree was entered. The district court ordered a 
modification in this case on the basis of what it believed the parties intended 
in the Agreement, rather than on a change in circumstances. The Agreement in 
this case is specific and plain in reflecting the contemplation of the parties 
to have been exactly contrary to that which the district court 
found.

[¶10]   As indicated in the above quoted 
portion of the Agreement, the $1,100 per month payment per child was agreed to 
continue until the child "reaches the age of majority, is emancipated, or until 
further order of the Court" - no exceptions. The next sentence reflects the 
recognition by the parties that the determining factor for reduction in child 
support would be the reaching of the age of majority (Ginger will reach that age 
on August 21, 1992), with appellee continuing the reduced support payments 
thereafter to age 23 as long as the child was either "pursuing a higher 
education" or was "living at least part-time with the mother." The fact that the 
support payments were not to be in lieu of "room and board, tuition and books" 
is evidenced by the later provision in the Agreement in which appellee agreed to 
pay such costs "through the equivalent of an undergraduate (bachelor's level) 
degree" - all without any reference to child support 
payments.

[¶11]   The Agreement provided that 
appellee be "entitled to a minimum of thirty-six (36) days of visitation with 
the children in each calendar year." There was no provision for waiver of child 
support payments during these 36 days or during other times of his 
"visitation."

[¶12]   Ginger's receipt of the scholarship 
is an advantage to appellee since he would otherwise have to pay that provided 
by the scholarship in addition to the child support. Under the Agreement, the 
child support obligation is separate and apart from the obligation to "provide 
room and board, tuition and books." Events which change one obligation do not 
necessarily change the other. The separation of the two obligations also is a 
recognition by the parties that child support includes more than room, board and 
school expenses, such as clothes, transportation, recreation, 
etc.

[¶13]   The Agreement is not ambiguous. "A 
contract is ambiguous if it is obscure in its meaning because of indefiniteness 
of expression or because of a double meaning being present." Cliff & Co., 
Ltd. v. Anderson, 777 P.2d 595, 599 (Wyo. 1989). The terms of the Agreement are 
definite and clear. There is no room for construction. We will not rewrite 
contracts under guise of interpretation and, so long as there is no ambiguity, 
we are bound to apply contracts as they were written. Arnold v. Mountain West 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Inc., 707 P.2d 161, 166 (Wyo. 1985); 
McCartney v. Malm, 627 P.2d 1014, 1020 (Wyo. 1981).

[¶14]   Beyond that, in order for a 
modification of divorce decree to be warranted, "it must be established that 
there has been a material or substantial change of circumstances which outweighs 
society's interest in applying the doctrine of res judicata." Mentock v. 
Mentock, 638 P.2d 156, 158 (Wyo. 1981); See also Manners v. Manners, 706 P.2d 671 (Wyo. 1985). In this case, the modification is requested on the basis of an 
alleged contemplation of the parties contrary to the terms of the Agreement and 
not on a change in circumstances. The present circumstances are those which 
existed at the time of the Agreement and of the divorce. The ages of the 
children were then known. The ages they would be when they entered college in 
the normal course of events were known. College expenses, such as board, room 
and tution were anticipated with provision that appellee would pay for them, 
without any arrangement for offset in support payments.

[¶15]   Since we find error in modifying 
the divorce decree contrary to the specific child support provisions of the 
Agreement, which was made part of the decree, and absent a substantial change in 
circumstances not anticipated at the time of the Agreement, it is unnecessary to 
consider whether or not the modification order was also violative of the child 
support guidelines in Wyo. Stat. § 20-6-304 (1991 Supp.) (appellant's second 
issue).1

TAX 
EXEMPTION

(Appellant's third issue, 
appellee's second issue)

[¶16]   The Agreement (made part of the 
divorce decree) provided in part:

     "The husband shall be 
allowed to claim the parties' children as dependents for income tax return 
purposes so long as he remains current in his obligations to the 
children."

[¶17]   Appellant did not sign the IRS 
exemption relinquishment for 1990 since appellee was then delinquent in child 
support payments. In the Order Modifying Decree and Judgment, the district court 
directed appellant to sign "Form 8332 allowing defendant to claim the children 
as exemptions for federal income tax purposes for the year 1990 and subsequent 
years." Since the district court also directed payment by appellee to appellant 
of all delinquencies in child support, it did not abuse its discretion in this 
ruling. Payment of the delinquencies removed the reason for loss of the 
exemptions. Even without consideration of the requirements of the tax laws in 
this respect, retention of the exemptions by appellant as a penalty against 
appellee for late payment of child support rather than in furtherance of the 
purpose for which exemptions are allowed (furnishing of support - here ordered 
to be paid) would be improper.

MEDICAL 
EXPENSE

(Appellant's fourth 
issue, part of appellee's third issue)

[¶18]   The Agreement made part of the 
divorce decree provided in part with reference to medical 
expenses:

     "The wife shall be 
responsible for all medical, dental and orthodontic and optical expenses not 
covered by insurance, up to a maximum of $300.00, per year and the husband shall 
be responsible for all health expenses for the minor children over the 
$300.00."

[¶19]   Appellant testified that appellee 
owed her $575 in excess of $300 spent in 1989, but supporting evidence as to the 
nature of treatment, recipient of it, itemization of charges, etc., was not 
presented. Appellant testified that this supporting evidence had been previously 
furnished to appellee, but was not presented to the court. Thus, it was within 
the discretion of the trial court to deny the claim. The denial did not exceed 
the bounds of reason under the circumstances. The court could reasonably 
conclude that the claim was not sufficiently established.

     "A court does not 
abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of 
reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse 
of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances."

Martinez v. 
State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980).

CAMP 
EXPENSE

(Appellant's fifth issue, 
part of appellee's third issue)

[¶20]   The Agreement provided in 
part:

     "The husband shall be 
responsible for extraordinary costs not contemplated or reasonably anticipated 
for the parties' children such as camps, sports related activities or other 
educational activities, in the amount of not more than $1,500.00 per year for 
the children."

[¶21]   In his Motion for Order to Show 
Cause and Petition to Clarify or Modify the Decree, appellee alleged that 
appellant had improperly cashed a $1,000 refund check from appellee's insurance 
company. In her response to said motion, appellant alleged that the check was 
made payable to her at appellee's direction, and that she used the money to 
apply to the $1,500 per year camp obligation for 
1990.

[¶22]   In the Order Modifying Decree and 
Judgment, the district court found and ordered that:

     "The claim for $918.00 
for camps for 1991 should be allowed, but the $1,000.00 insurance refund check 
kept and spent by the plaintiff may be retained by the plaintiff for payment of 
that amount." (Emphasis added.)

[¶23]   Appellant contends that the court 
inadvertently referred to the year 1991 in the Order rather than the year 1990, 
and that appellee still owes the $918 expended in 1991. One of appellant's 
exhibits (plaintiff's 11) reflects that appellant stated in a letter of July 23, 
1991, to appellee's attorney that she had applied the $1,000 to 1990 "camp" 
expenditures of $1,090. Another exhibit (plaintiff's 9), an itemization of 
expenses by appellant, reflects $918 as owed by appellee for such expenditures 
in 1991. Whether or not the court's order contains a typographical or other 
error is immaterial inasmuch as appellee has paid for one or the other of the 
obligations and still owes the one not paid for. The application of the $1,000 
check to one of the obligations leaves the other one still owed. If payment of 
the one still owed is not made by appellee on demand, appellant can again 
present the matter to the district court.

PROTECTIVE ORDER RE: 
DISCOVERY

(Appellant's sixth issue, 
appellee's fourth issue)

[¶24]   In furtherance of appellant's 
motion of May 10, 1991, to increase the amount of child support payments (among 
other things), appellant served some interrogatories on appellee in which 
detailed information was requested concerning his finances, including production 
of copies of his income tax returns. The district court granted appellee's 
request for a protective order preventing the production of the tax returns and 
ordering the filing of the affidavits referred to in Wyo. Stat. § 20-6-306(a) 
(1991 Supp.).2 The affidavit filed by appellee 
reflected the figures for the years 1986 through 1990. Appellee's deposition was 
taken, and appellee refused to answer questions concerning the tax returns. The 
court then reviewed appellee's tax returns in camera and reported that the 
returns were consistent with the affidavit and that the protective order would 
remain in effect.

[¶25]   In this instance, we do not find an 
abuse of discretion. The tax returns being consistent with that already known, 
they would add nothing to the determination of the issues in this case, and 
there would be no reason to make public the information in them. Only if the 
returns were inconsistent with the affidavit would appellant benefit from an 
examination of them. In its ruling, the district court did not exceed the bounds 
of reason. It could reasonably rule as it did. Martinez, 611 P.2d  at 
838.

ATTORNEY'S 
FEES

(Appellant's seventh 
issue, appellee's fifth issue)

[¶26]   The district court refused to award 
appellant attorney fees for services performed in this action for modification 
and enforcement of the divorce decree. Evidence necessary for the allowance of 
such fees was not presented, i.e., the reasonableness of them and the necessity 
for them. Attorney's fees cannot be awarded absent proof or an evidentiary basis 
upon which to determine the reasonableness of them. (See, e.g., Greenough v. 
Prairie Dog Ranch, Inc., 531 P.2d 499, 503 (Wyo. 1975). Such evidence was not 
here presented.

IN 
SUMMARY

[¶27]   We reverse the district court's 
order reducing the amount of child support and remand the case for the entry of 
an order accordingly. We affirm the other holdings of the district 
court.

FOOTNOTES

1 Wyo. Stat. 
§ 20-6-304 sets guidelines for fixing the amount of child support on the basis 
of the obligor's net monthly income.

2 The 
district court apparently treated this action as one under Wyo. Stat. § 
20-6-306(a). It provides in part:

     "Any party * * * may 
petition for a review and adjustment of any child support order that was entered 
more than thirty-six (36) months prior to the petition or which had not been 
adjusted within thirty-six months from the day of filing of the petition for 
review and adjustment. * * * The court shall require the parents to complete a 
verified financial statement, and shall apply the guidelines set out in this 
article in conducting the review and adjustment. * * * The provisions of this 
section do not preclude a party or assignee from bringing an action for 
modification of a support order, based upon substantial change of circumstances, 
at any time."