Case Title: McElhanon v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Kevin Edward McELHANON v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-336                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered June 30, 1997


1.   Criminal law -- how defendant may be charged -- when
     information is sufficient. -- It is well established that a
     defendant may only be charged with committing a criminal
     offense by one of three ways:  information, indictment, or
     citation; an information or other charging instrument is not
     defective if it sufficiently apprises the defendant of the
     specific crime with which he is charged to the extent
     necessary to enable him to prepare a defense; an information
     is sufficient if the act or the omission charged as the
     offense is stated with a degree of certainty that enables the
     court to pronounce judgment on conviction.

2.   Criminal procedure -- variance between wording of information
     and proof at trial generally does not warrant reversal  --
     amendment of information -- appellant was prejudiced by
     change. -- A variance between the wording of an indictment or
     information and the proof at trial does not warrant reversal
     unless the variance prejudices the substantial rights of the
     defendant; an information may be amended during trial if the
     nature or degree of the crime is not changed and if the
     defendant is not prejudiced through surprise; here, the only
     offense with which appellant was charged was DWI; appellant
     was prepared to defend against the charge of DWI; he was thus
     prejudiced by the circuit court's decision to try him on the
     charge of DUI.

3.   Criminal law -- DUI not lesser-included offense of DWI --
     factors considered in finding lesser-included offense. -- DUI
     is not a lesser-included offense of DWI; to find a lesser-
     included offense, there are three factors to consider:  (1)
     the lesser offense must be established by proof of the same or
     less than all the elements of the greater offense; (2) the
     lesser offense must be of the same generic class as the
     greater offense; and (3) the distinction between the two must
     be based upon the degree of risk or injury to person or
     property or upon grades of intent or degrees of culpability;
     an offense is not a lesser-included offense of another if each
     crime requires a different element of proof; an offense is not
     a lesser-included offense solely because a greater offense
     includes all the elements of the lesser offense. 

4.   Criminal law -- defendant charged with greater offense may be
     found guilty of lesser-included offense. -- Where the evidence
     is insufficient to convict for a certain crime, but where
     there is sufficient evidence to convict for a lesser-included
     offense of that crime, the supreme court may reduce the
     punishment to the maximum for the lesser offense, reduce it to
     the minimum for the lesser offense, fix it at some
     intermediate point, remand the case to the trial court for the
     assessment of the penalty, or grant a new trial either
     absolutely or conditionally; although charged with a greater
     offense, a defendant may be found guilty of a lesser-included
     offense, and on appeal, the conviction may be modified from
     the greater to the lesser offense and the court may fix
     punishment or remand the case.

5.   Criminal law -- DUI not lesser-included offence of DWI --
     municipal court erred in changing offense -- circuit court
     erred in convicting appellant of uncharged offense. --
     Considering that DUI is not a lesser-included offense of DWI,
     in that DUI requires an additional element of proof of the
     defendant's age (less than twenty-one years) and a different
     level of intoxication (prohibiting 0.02% blood-alcohol
     content), the municipal court erred and prejudiced the
     appellant when it changed the charge from DWI to DUI on its
     own motion; because the municipal court erred in changing the
     offense, the circuit court likewise erred in trying and
     convicting appellant of the uncharged offense of DUI.

6.   Criminal law -- charges for DWI may not be reduced pursuant to
     Ark. Code Ann.  5-65-107 (Repl. 1993) -- charge erroneously
     changed to separate offense. -- Arkansas Code Annotated  5-
     65-107 (Repl. 1993) provides that persons charged with DWI in
     violation of section 5-65-103 "shall be tried on those charges
     or plead to such charges, and no such charges shall be
     reduced"; section 5-65-107 does not apply to the change to a
     lesser quantity of the same offense such as DWI fourth offense
     to DWI first offense; here the charge was erroneously changed
     to a separate offense, not a lesser-included offense, or an
     offense of lesser quantity, and this change was in violation
     of section 5-65-107; although appeals from municipal court to
     circuit court are tried de novo, the circuit court can render
     no judgment that the lower court is not authorized to render. 
      
7.   Criminal law -- appellant charged with one offense but found
     guilty of another -- case reversed and remanded so that
     appellant might be tried for proper offense. -- Where
     appellant was charged with one offense (DWI), but found guilty
     of another (DUI), appellant was entitled to be tried in
     circuit court on the same cause of action for which he was
     tried in the municipal court; the municipal court violated
     section 5-65-107, by altering the charge and, consequently,
     the circuit court was not authorized to change the charge on
     appeal; appellant could not be found guilty of a lesser-
     included offense of DWI, because there is no such offense;
     because appellant was charged with DWI in violation of section
     5-65-103, he could not be tried or found guilty of any other
     charge, because that would be a violation of section 5-65-107;
     the decision of the circuit court was reversed and the case
     remanded back to that court so that appellant might be tried
     for the offense of DWI.


     Petition for Review from the Arkansas Court of Appeals;
reversed and remanded.
     Cross, Kearney & McKissic, by:  Jesse L. Kearney, for
appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Clint Miller, Deputy Att'y
Gen., Sr. Appellate Advocate for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant Kevin McElhanon was charged in municipal court with
driving while intoxicated ("DWI") in violation of Ark. Code Ann.
 5-65-103 (Repl. 1993), but was convicted of driving under the
influence ("DUI") in violation of Ark. Code Ann.  5-65-303 (Repl.
1993).  He appealed to circuit court where he was tried and
convicted of DUI.  Appellant filed a petition for review from a
decision of the Arkansas Court of Appeals delivered on December 23,
1996, where a 3-3 vote affirmed the lower court decision.  Our
jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2 (e) (as amended by
per curiam July 15, 1996).  When we grant review following a
decision by the court of appeals, we review the case as though the
appeal was originally filed with this court.  Brunson v. State, 327
Ark. 567, 940 S.W.2d 440 (1997).  We reverse and remand.
     Appellant asserts five points for reversal, including error of
the trial court in failing to try him on the original charge of DWI
from municipal court, and entering judgment on the different charge
of DUI.  Because we find merit in that point, we need not address
the remaining points.
     Appellant was charged with DWI in violation of section 5-65-
103, but found guilty in municipal court of DUI under section 5-65-
303.  It is unclear whether the municipal court convicted Appellant
of DUI on the mistaken conclusion that DUI is a lesser-included
offense of DWI, or if the court elected to amend the charge to DUI. 
Upon de novo appellate review, the circuit court determined the
charge on appeal to be that of DUI rather than DWI.  Appellant was
then convicted of DUI in circuit court.  The court of appeals
affirmed Appellant's conviction of DUI on the ground that by
changing the charge from DWI to DUI, the nature of the original
charge was not altered.  We disagree with that analysis, because
Appellant was prejudiced by the circuit court's unauthorized action
in changing the charge from DWI to DUI when Appellant had never
been formally charged with anything other than DWI.  The nature of
the charge of DWI differs significantly with that of DUI in that
the minimum blood-alcohol level required to convict a person of DWI
is 0.10% while that required to convict of DUI is 0.02%.
     It is well established that a defendant may only be charged
with committing a criminal offense by one of three ways: 
information, indictment, or citation.  See Ark. Const. art. 2,  8;
Ark. Const. amend. 21,  1; Brewer v. State, 286 Ark. 1,