Case Title: Silbersack v. ACands

Citation: 402 Md. 673

Docket Number: 53/07

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2008-01-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Donna Silbersack, Personal Representative of the Estate of Dominic Casino, et al. v. 
AC and S, Inc., et al., No. 53, September Term 2007.  Opinion by Wilner, J.
CIRCUIT COURT’S DENIAL OF A REQUEST TO ENTER JUDGMENT UNDER
MARYLAND RULE 2-602(b) IS NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT FOR PURPOSES OF
ALLOWING AN IMMEDIATE APPEAL.   
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND
No. 53
September Term, 2007
_______________________________
DONNA SILBERSACK, PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
DOMINIC CASINO, ET AL.
v.
AC AND S, INC., ET AL.
_______________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, Specially           
        Assigned),
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, Specially            
        Assigned),
JJ.
_________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
_________________________________
                    Filed: January 4, 2008
1 In accordance with procedures established by the court for asbestos cases filed by
appellants’ counsel, the complaint referenced, but did not repeat, the allegations in
counsel’s Bethlehem Steel Cases Master Complaint, so there are no factual averments in
the complaint regarding the time, circumstances, or effect of Mr. Casino’s exposure to
asbestos products or the nature of the products.  The Master Complaint is not in the
This case has a complex history, but the issue before us is a simple one.  No final
judgment, as we have consistently defined that term, has been entered in the case by the
Circuit Court.  There are still claims pending against nine defendants who are in
bankruptcy.  Appellants asked the court to enter a judgment, under Maryland Rules 2-601
and 2-602(b), and the court declined to do so.  Appellants acknowledge that such a
decision is both a discretionary and interlocutory one and that no appeal ordinarily lies
from it.  Their case, they believe, calls for a different result.  They insist that, in their case,
the court’s refusal to exercise its discretion in their favor constitutes a final judgment. 
We disagree and shall dismiss their appeal.
BACKGROUND
This case began as, and remains, an action for wrongful death and personal injuries
suffered by Dominic Casino as the result of his workplace exposure to asbestos products
allegedly manufactured or supplied by the defendants.  Mr. Casino was diagnosed with
lung cancer in November, 1994; he died from that disease in February, 1995.  In March,
1997, Mr. Casino’s widow and the personal representative of his Estate, appellants, filed
their initial complaint against nineteen defendants in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City.1  For nearly five years, the action was pursued as an asbestos case.   Then, in
record before us, but, from the allegations contained in the amended complaint and from
our experience in dozens of other asbestos cases, we may fairly infer that, when coupled
with that Master Complaint, the complaint in this case alleged that Mr. Casino’s lung
cancer and ultimate death were caused by his exposure, as an employee of Bethlehem
Steel Corporation, to asbestos products that had been manufactured, supplied, or installed
by the defendants.
2 In May, 1996, about ten months before filing this action, the law firm
representing appellants in this case filed a separate, independent class action suit against
manufacturers and distributors of tobacco products to recover for personal injuries,
disease, and nicotine addiction caused by smoking cigarettes or using smokeless tobacco
products.  In May, 2000, this Court concluded that that action could not proceed as a class
action, and, through the issuance of an extraordinary writ of mandamus, directed the
Circuit Court to vacate its order of class certification.  See Philip Morris v. Angeletti, 358
Md. 689, 752 A.2d 200 (2000).
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December, 2001, appellants filed an amended complaint which added seven new
defendants – six manufacturers and sellers of tobacco products and an alleged public
relations and lobbying “arm” of the six manufacturers.2  The amended complaint is quite
lengthy.  The thrust of it is that, although smoking and exposure to asbestos can each,
independently, cause lung cancer, the combination of the two act in “synergy” and greatly
heighten the risk of developing that disease, so that both the asbestos defendants and the
tobacco defendants, separately and in combination, are responsible for the illness and
death of Mr. Casino.
The tobacco defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint against them on
the ground that, because the personal injury claims against the two sets of defendants
involved different products, different methods of distribution, and different uses, the
joinder of asbestos and tobacco defendants was improper.  In April, 2002, the court
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granted those motions.  It agreed that the claims involved different products, methods of
distribution, and uses and concluded that the joinder of asbestos and tobacco defendants
(1) would not achieve the goals of joinder – a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of all disputes between the parties, but (2) would, instead, “disrupt the orderly procedures
that the asbestos docket now has in place” and cause confusion to the jury because “a
unique set of practices and procedures have developed under the asbestos docket” which
the court believed would be prejudicial to the tobacco defendants if they were then added
to the case.  Aggrieved by that ruling, appellants sought a writ of mandamus from this
Court directing the trial judge to vacate the orders of dismissal or, in the alternative,
directing her to enter an order of final judgment pursuant to Rule 2-602(b), which would
enable appellants to appeal that decision.  We denied the petition.  Allen v. The Honorable
M. Brooke Murdock, Misc. No. 11, Sept. Term 2002.
In July, 2005, in accordance with the court’s procedures relating to its asbestos
docket, this case was consolidated for trial in March, 2006, along with ten other lung
cancer asbestos cases.  By the time of trial, nine of the defendants had filed for
bankruptcy, thereby automatically staying further proceedings against them (see 11
U.S.C. § 362), and appellants had either dismissed or resolved their claims against the
other defendants.  In April, 2006, appellants moved to “reinstate” the tobacco defendants. 
Noting that, by reason of the bankruptcy of some of the asbestos defendants and full
resolution of appellants’ claims against the others, they argued that “[t]his case is now in
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a position to proceed against the Cigarette Defendants, since all claims that could be
resolved against the Asbestos Defendants in these proceedings have now been fully
resolved.”  In January, 2007, the court denied that motion.
Upon that denial, appellants moved for the entry of final judgment pursuant to
either Rule 2-601 or Rule 2-602(b).  The avowed purpose of the motion was to permit
appellants to appeal from the court’s denial of their effort to join and proceed against the
tobacco defendants in the asbestos case.  Because there remained in the case nine asbestos
defendants in bankruptcy, against whom they could not then proceed but whom they did
not choose, on their own, to dismiss, they recognized that “[a]s of this date, a final
judgment pursuant to Rule 2-601 and consistent with the requirements of Rule 2-602 has
not been entered,” thereby precluding immediate appellate review.  
To deal with that problem, they sought alternative relief.  First, they asked the
court to “administratively” dismiss the asbestos defendants in bankruptcy, subject to their
being “reinstated” upon their emergence from bankruptcy, on the theory that, if
administratively dismissed in that manner, they would no longer be in the case and final
judgment could be entered.  Second, they moved that the court declare, pursuant to Rule
2-602(b), that there was no just reason for delay and enter a final judgment as to all of the
other (non-bankrupt) defendants.  The court denied that motion as well, and appellants
have brought this appeal from that denial.
DISCUSSION
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To set the context, there is a long-standing bedrock rule of appellate jurisdiction,
practice, and procedure that, unless otherwise provided by law, the right to seek appellate
review in this Court or the Court of Special Appeals ordinarily must await the entry of a
final judgment that disposes of all claims against all parties.  See Shoemaker v. Smith, 353
Md. 143, 165, 725 A.2d 549, 560 (1999); Smith v. Lead, 386 Md. 12, 21, 871 A.2d 545,
550 (2005); Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41, 566 A.2d 767, 773 (1989).  Rule 2-
602(a), subject to an exception provided for in section (b) of that Rule, makes clear that
an order or decision “that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims in an action . . . or that
adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all of the parties to the action: (1) is not
a final judgment; (2) does not terminate the action as to any of the claims or any of the
parties; and (3) is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment that
adjudicates all of the claims by and against all of the parties.”  That includes a party in
bankruptcy, notwithstanding that, unless the Bankruptcy Court lifts any stay that it has
entered or that is imposed by operation of law pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), the court is
precluded from proceeding further against the party.  See Starfish Condo. v. Yorkridge
Serv., 292 Md. 557, 440 A.2d 373 (1982).
Rule 2-602(b) provides a limited exception.  It allows the Circuit Court to order
the entry of a judgment as to fewer than all of the claims or parties if the court expressly
determines in a written order that “there is no just reason for delay.”  For more than three
decades, however, we have made clear that the discretion to enter judgment under Rule 2-
3 Because cases construing former Rule 605a. are relevant and precedential, we
shall regard them as applying to Rule 2-602(b) and avoid specific reference to the former
Rule.
4 Conversely, but also supporting that view is the fact that, when the case is all
over, the party previously upset at one or more interlocutory rulings may have prevailed,
thereby eliminating the need for, or ability to, appeal.  
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602(b), or its predecessor Rule 605a., was to be reserved for the “very infrequent harsh
case.” 3  Diener Enterprises v. Miller, 266 Md. 551, 556, 295 A.2d 470, 473 (1972).  We
pointed out in Smith v. Lead, supra, 386 Md. 12, 25, 871 A.2d 545, 553 that the purpose
of Rule 2-602(a) is to prevent piecemeal appeals “which, beyond being inefficient and
costly, can create significant delays, hardship, and procedural problems.”  We noted,
among other things, that piecemeal appeals may cause the appellate court to be faced with
having the same issues presented multiple times and may burden the parties with having
to assemble records, file briefs and record extracts, and prepare and appear for oral
argument on multiple occasions.  That is “precisely why,” we said, “Rule 2-602(b) is
reserved for the ‘infrequent harsh case,’ and why the trial judge, who normally has a
much better grasp of the situation than an appellate court, is viewed, at least in the first
instance, as the ‘dispatcher.’” Id. at 26, 871 A.2d at 553.4 
The great majority of cases in which this Court or the Court of Special Appeals has
been called upon to consider discretionary rulings under Rule 2-602(b) have involved
situations in which the Circuit Court has entered a final judgment under that Rule, and, as
we pointed out in Smith v. Lead, supra, 386 Md. at 25, 871 A.2d at 552, both courts have
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consistently emphasized the limited nature of the trial court’s discretion to do that, and
have “not hesitated to countermand the entry of judgment under Rule 2-602(b) and
dismiss an appeal upon a finding that the trial court had not articulated a sufficient reason
why there was no just reason for delay, sufficient to allow an immediate appeal.” A string
citation documenting that statement is unnecessary.
In Brown v. Gress, 378 Md. 667, 838 A.2d 362 (2003), we examined the converse
situation.  There, as here, suit was filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for
personal injuries and wrongful death due to workplace exposure to asbestos products. 
Indeed, counsel in this case also filed that action.  For at least four years (and upwards of
ten years with respect to some of the parties), the action proceeded as an asbestos case. 
As was done here, in 2001, following our ruling in Philip Morris v. Angeletti, supra, 358
Md. 689, 752 A.2d 200, an amended complaint was filed which added several tobacco
defendants and charged that smoking and exposure to asbestos acted in “synergy” to
multiply the risk of contracting lung cancer.  As here, the court found the joinder
impermissible and dismissed the tobacco defendants.  As here, the plaintiffs asked the
court to enter judgment under Rule 2-602(b), so they could immediately appeal that
ruling, and the court refused.  As here, notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment,
the plaintiffs appealed.
Recognizing the jurisdictional problem arising from the lack of a final judgment,
the Gress plaintiffs asked the Court of Special Appeals to enter a final judgment itself
-8-
under Maryland Rule 8-602(e), so that the appeal could proceed.  That Rule provides, in
relevant part, that
“If the appellate court determines that the order from which
the appeal is taken was not a final judgment when the notice
of appeal was filed but that the lower court had discretion to
direct the entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 2-602
(b), the appellate court may, as it finds appropriate, (A)
dismiss the appeal, (B) remand the case for the lower court to
decide whether to direct the entry of a final judgment, (C)
enter a final judgment on its own initiative or (D) if a final
judgment was entered by the lower court after the notice of
appeal was filed, treat the notice of appeal as if filed on the
same day as, but after, the entry of the judgment.”
In the belief that joinder of asbestos and tobacco defendants was appropriate, the
Court of Special Appeals, acting under Rule 8-602(e)(1)(C), did what the Circuit Court
had refused to do.  It entered a final judgment, vacated the order dismissing the tobacco
defendants, and remanded the case for further proceedings.  Gress v. ACANDS, 150 Md.
App. 369, 820 A.2d 616 (2003).
We reversed that judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Special Appeals
with instructions to dismiss the appeal.  Brown v. Gress, supra, 378 Md. 667, 838 A.2d
362.  Our reasoning was clear and precise – that the appellate court’s authority under Rule
8-602(e)(1)(C) to enter judgment on its own initiative may be exercised only when the
circuit court has never exercised its own discretion in the matter and not when the trial
court was asked to enter judgment under Rule 2-602(b) and expressly declined to do so:
“We hold that where a trial court has been invited to direct
entry of a final judgment in a case in which that trial court has
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discretion to do so and that trial court expressly declines to do
so, and the merits of that ruling is not appealed, Rule 8-
602(e)(1)(C) does not authorize an appellate court
nevertheless to enter final judgment on its own initiative.”
Id. at 682, 838 A.2d at 371.
Appellants’ premise that an appeal lies from a circuit court’s denial of a request to
enter judgment under Rule 2-602(b) hinges on two footnotes, one in Starfish Condo. v.
Yorkridge Serv., supra, 292 Md. 557, 569, n.9, 440 A.2d 373, 380, n.9, and the other in
Brown v. Gress, supra, 378 Md. at 682, n.8, 838 A.2d at 371, n.8.  Starfish Condo.
involved consolidated breach of warranty claims by the Council of Unit Owners and
several individual unit owners in a condominium against a number of defendants.  The
claims were adjudicated against all defendants save one, who allegedly was in
bankruptcy.  No request was made of the court to enter judgment under then Rule 605a. 
Even in the absence of such a judgment, cross-appeals were noted.  
The actual status of the one defendant was not clear, but, on the assumption that he
was, in fact, in bankruptcy and that the automatic stay now provided for under 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) was in force, we held that there was no appealable judgment and dismissed the
appeals.  In doing so, we observed that, when the case returned to the Circuit Court, the
parties would presumably request the entry of judgment under the Rule.  If they did so,
we added, the court first would have to determine the status of the one defendant, and, if a
bankruptcy stay was in effect, the court would then have to “balance ‘the exigencies of
the case . . . with the policy against piecemeal appeals and then only allow a separate
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appeal . . .’ if this is one of ‘the very infrequent harsh case(s).’” Starfish Condo., 292 Md.
at 569, 440 A.2d at 380 (quoting from Diener Enterprises, Inc. v. Miller, supra, 266 Md.
at 556, 295 A.2d at 473).  Factors involved in the balancing, we stated, “would include
the degree of likelihood that the stay will be lifted, on application to the bankruptcy court,
and the extent of anticipated delay.”  Starfish Condo..
 As a footnote to that last statement, we said:
“Were a trial court to refuse to enter an order under Rule
605a. in the face of a record clearly demonstrating that a
bankruptcy stay of proceedings against one defendant will not
likely be lifted for a long time, and that its duration will be so
prolonged as to deprive the party applying for the order of the
means of proceeding further to enforce the right of appeal, the
refusal under such circumstances would constitute a final
order, reviewable for an abuse of discretion.”
Id. at 569, n.9, 440 A.2d at 380, n.9.
As indicated, in Brown v. Gress, supra, 378 Md. 667, 838 A.2d 362, we held that,
where the circuit court expressly declined to enter a final judgment under Rule 2-602(b),
the appellate court has no authority to enter such a judgment under Rule 8-602(e).  We
noted in Brown that the appellants had not appealed from the trial court’s denial of their
Rule 2-602(b) request but merely asked the Court of Special Appeals to enter a judgment
on its own initiative.  In expressing our holding that the appellate court was without
authority to do so, we observed, in n.8, that the defendants “would have us go further and
hold that a ruling refusing to direct the entry of a final judgment is not appealable.”  Id. at
682, 838 A.2d at 371.  We responded that “[w]e have not gone so far and decline to do so
5 Planning Board involved two appeals that had been consolidated.  In one, the trial court
purported to enter judgment under Rule 2-602 with respect to an order that was not eligible for
that treatment under the Rule.  In the other, it had declined to enter such a judgment.
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in this case,” pointing out that, in Planning Board v. Mortimer, 310 Md. 639, 647, 530
A.2d 1237, 1242 (1987), we held “albeit arguably in the context of the directing of the
entry of final judgment, that the exercise of the trial court’s discretion as the ‘dispatcher’
of final orders . . . is reviewable.” 5
Notwithstanding those footnote statements, which were neither part of nor
essential to the holdings in the respective cases and therefore constitute mere obiter dicta,
we are not aware of any occasion on which this Court has ever entertained an appeal from
the express denial of a request to enter final judgment under Rule 2-602(b), and none has
been cited to us.  Nonetheless, we are not inclined in this case to disavow those
statements or to close the door entirely on the prospect of entertaining an appeal to
consider whether a trial court has abused its discretion when denying a request for entry
of judgment under Rule 2-602(b).  
If we were to consider such a prospect, however, we would need to start with three
very basic precepts.  The first is that, unless authorized by statute (see Maryland Code, §
12-303 of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article, for example), the collateral order doctrine, or
pursuant to Rule 2-602(b), appeals from orders or decisions that do not resolve or
complete the resolution of the entire case, and are therefore interlocutory in nature, are
not only not favored, they are not allowed.  
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The second, pertaining to Rule 2-602(b), is the recognition that the trial court “not
only has greater knowledge than an appellate court regarding the overall effect of an
immediate appeal but a greater interest in whether the case remaining before it should be
‘put on ice’ while an interlocutory appeal proceeds.” Smith v. Lead, supra, 386 Md. at 26,
871 A.2d at 553.  For that reason, we have regarded trial judges as the “dispatchers” in
this regard and accorded them very wide discretion.  Finally, we have made very clear
that the discretion to deny a request for the entry of judgment under Rule 2-602(b) is far
greater than the discretion to grant one.  As noted, we have never had occasion to reverse
the denial of such a request, but we have had no hesitancy in countermanding the grant of
one when we thought it was inappropriate under the circumstances.  Ultimately, the
question is whether the case should remain in the trial court until the case is over, which,
for good reason, is what the law generally requires.
One anomaly posed by entertaining an appeal from the denial of a Rule 2-602(b)
request is that, as a practical matter, the threshold jurisdictional decision to entertain the
appeal will almost always dictate the decision on the merits.  The footnote in Starfish
Condo. referenced the situation of a bankruptcy stay likely to be so prolonged as to
deprive the party seeking the Rule 2-602(b) judgment “of the means of proceeding further
to enforce the right of appeal.”  Inferentially, at least, denial of the Rule 2-602(b) request
under that circumstance would necessarily amount to an abuse of discretion.   But how
does the Court define when that situation exists?  Is a year long enough, or five years, or
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six months?  Does it depend on how many parties are in bankruptcy and how many are
not, or what the relationships are between the two groups?  Does it matter whether there
are cross-claims or counterclaims outstanding between parties in bankruptcy and parties
who are not?  If there are partial settlements by some but not all defendants alleged to be
joint tortfeasors, is it likely that claims for contribution between or among defendants in
bankruptcy and those who are not may be made at some point?  Will it depend on the
nature of the case?  Is it limited to bankruptcy situations, and, if not, what other situations
would be eligible? 
However this Court may resolve those issues, which historically have been left to
the trial court to determine in the context of the case then before it, any decision by the
appellate court that the denial of a request to enter a Rule 2-602(b) judgment suffices
under its criteria to constitute a final judgment will almost necessarily require a finding
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the request.  What would be presented,
therefore, is the somewhat anomalous situation whereby the preliminary decision to
review the ruling will amount to a determination that the ruling constituted an abuse of
discretion.  As a practical matter, the right to appeal translates into a right to win the
appeal.  If the Court is to travel that road, of effectively co-mingling the right to appeal
with the merits of the appeal, it must be extremely cautious in doing so.  That kind of
situation seems more appropriate to be presented in a petition for extraordinary relief
through mandamus, which is also very rarely granted (see Forster v. Hargadon, 398 Md.
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298, 920 A.2d 1049 (2007)), rather than an appeal.  Against that backdrop, we look at this
case.
Appellants sought to fall within the ambit of the Starfish Condo. footnote through
an affidavit of one of their lawyers, Armand Volta, and exhibits attached to that affidavit. 
Mr. Volta claimed extensive expertise and familiarity with ongoing bankruptcy
proceedings involving the manufacturers and sellers of asbestos products.  He asserted
that the “normal course” with respect to a bankrupt manufacturer of asbestos products is
to create a trust to settle claims without litigation, through compromise and various ADR
techniques, and he briefly described that process.  His conclusion was that it was “highly
probable that the bankruptcy proceedings relating to the Asbestos Bankrupts in this case
will result in full resolution of the plaintiffs’ claims . . . in this case” and that the
exhaustion of those procedures “would probably take years to accomplish before the
Plaintiffs could seek further relief . . . .”  Appellants asserted further, in their brief, that
“no defendant in Maryland asbestos cases that has filed for bankruptcy has ever emerged
out of bankruptcy to join tort litigation.”
No evidence was presented with respect to the actual status in bankruptcy of any of
the nine bankrupt defendants – where in the process the respective cases stood, any
realistic estimate of when the respective bankruptcies may end, whether maintenance of
the action against those defendants in the Circuit Court was a prerequisite to pursuing
claims against them in the bankruptcy cases, whether appellants could lawfully dismiss
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those defendants from the Circuit Court action without permission from the Bankruptcy
Court and, if not, what the prospects were of getting that permission, and, however those
issues might be resolved, what the prospects were of any recovery in the bankruptcy
cases.  Mr. Volta’s affidavit was very general.  That information might be highly relevant
in light of Mr. Volta’s belief that it was “highly probable” that the bankruptcy
proceedings would “result in full resolution of the plaintiffs’ claims . . . in this case” and
appellants’ assertion that no Maryland asbestos defendant in bankruptcy “has ever
emerged out of bankruptcy to join tort litigation.”  If those statements are correct, there
would seem to be little reason not to dismiss the bankrupt defendants now so that a final
judgment could be entered in the normal course, and, if permission of the Bankruptcy
Court is required to do that, to attempt to obtain such permission.  
In looking at whether this is one of those “very infrequent harsh cases” that cries
out for a Rule 2-602(b) judgment, we note that it is implicit from appellants’ brief and
was made explicit at oral argument that appellants are in no way aggrieved by the
resolution of their claims against the non-bankrupt asbestos defendants.  They are not
seeking to appeal because they are unhappy with any judgments entered with respect to
those defendants.  They merely want an appellate court to allow them to proceed now
against the tobacco defendants that they did not seek to join until the case had been
pending for nearly five years.  
In that regard, two things are relevant.  First, appellants had every opportunity to
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sue the tobacco defendants years ago, and, in fact, they did so as part of the class action
suit in Philip Morris v. Angeletti, supra.  We did not allow the case to proceed as a class
action, but appellants’ right to proceed separately was never denied.  Second, the very
arguments they make in this appeal were made in their petition for mandamus in Allen v.
Murdock, supra.  In that petition, they argued that the court’s dismissal of their claims
against the tobacco defendants and the court’s refusal to enter judgment under Rule 2-
602(b) constituted “gross abuses of discretion,” “exceeded its authority,” and caused them
“irreparable harm.”  As noted, we denied the petition.
Our conclusion is this: Even if there were a case in which the denial by a circuit
court of a request to enter judgment under Rule 2-602(b) could be regarded as a final
judgment for purposes of allowing an immediate appeal, this is not that case.  As to
appellants’ request that the court “administratively” dismiss the bankrupt asbestos
defendants, subject to their being reinstated if and when they emerge from bankruptcy, we
note only that we are unaware of any such procedure of “administrative” dismissal subject
to reinstatement.  For one thing, if the dismissal is for the purpose of allowing a final
judgment to be entered, there would be no case left to which the dismissed defendants
could be rejoined or reinstated.  Moreover, although proceedings against a defendant can
be stayed for one reason or another, we have never created any kind of mystic “never-
never land” where a defendant is both in and not in a case.  Suspended animation does not
go that far.
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APPEAL DISMISSED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLANTS.