Case Title: Commonwealth v. Jones

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12255

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12255 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RICHARD JONES. 
 
 
 
Essex.     May 4, 2017. - October 4, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & 
Cypher, JJ.1 
 
 
Child Abuse.  Rape.  Indecent Assault and Battery.  Evidence, 
Medical record, Production on demand, Privileged record, 
Cross-examination, Prior misconduct. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 27, 2009. 
 
 
Motions for summonses for the production of records were 
heard by Timothy Q. Feeley, J., and the cases were tried before 
him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Nancy A. Dolberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for the defendant. 
 
David F. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney (Kimberly 
Faitella, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Meagen K. Monahan, Anthony D. Mirenda, Madeleine K. 
Rodriguez, Jeremy W. Meisinger, Stacy A. Malone, & Lindy L. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
Aldrich, for Victim Rights Center & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The defendant appeals from his convictions 
stemming from his sexual abuse of his two daughters.  He argues 
that (1) a Superior Court judge abused his discretion by 
refusing to issue summonses pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 17 (a) 
(2), 378 Mass. 885 (1979), regarding the release of the  mental 
health and counselling records of the younger of the daughters, 
Diane;2 and (2) the judge's restriction of the defendant's cross-
examination of Diane was an abuse of discretion.  We affirm the 
convictions.3 
 
Background.  In 2005 or 2006, when Diane was in the seventh 
grade and eleven or twelve years old, she stayed home from 
school one day.  She was sitting on a couch watching television 
and her father was at a nearby computer when a commercial with 
sexual themes came on the air.  After a discussion regarding sex 
sparked by the commercial, the defendant sat down next to Diane 
and she wound up in his lap.  The defendant then slid his hand 
under Diane's pants and underwear and touched her vagina.  Diane 
pushed her father's hand away and ran upstairs to her room. 
                                                          
 
 
2  A pseudonym. 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Victim Rights Law 
Center; Jane Doe, Inc.; and the Boston Area Rape Crisis Center. 
3 
 
 
 
In the fall of 2008, when Diane was a fourteen year old 
freshman in high school, she started acting out in school.  Due 
to her behavior she was referred to a psychiatrist and also met 
with a therapist at a counselling center.  At around the same 
time, Diane first disclosed to a friend at school that her 
father sexually abused her two years earlier.  A high school 
counsellor heard about the incident and spoke with Diane in the 
counsellor's office.  Diane told the counsellor that "it was all 
just a dream."  The counsellor called Diane's mother and on the 
way home from school that day Diane told her mother "it was a 
dream."  Diane testified that she was not ready to tell anybody 
else about the incident at that time because it was around 
Christmas and she did not want to break up her family. 
 
In February, 2009, Diane told her older sister, Beth,4 about 
the sexual abuse, and said she was going to tell the counsellor 
what happened to her.  Beth then told Diane that the defendant 
had been sexually abusive to her when she was younger.  Beth 
told Diane that she would take care of it and "would do 
something to put a stop to" the defendant's abuse.  Several days 
later, Beth took some money from her grandmother's purse.  The 
grandmother told the defendant, who became angry and yelled at 
Beth.  Beth then left the house with her friend and went to the 
                                                          
 
 
4 A pseudonym. 
4 
 
 
police and reported the sexual abuse.  The Department of 
Children and Families (DCF)5 then became involved. 
 
The defendant was convicted of five of the six charges he 
faced stemming from the abuse.6  We granted his application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Rule 17 (a) (2) motion.  The defendant 
argues that the trial judge abused his discretion by denying his 
motions requesting rule 17 (a) (2)7 summonses for (a) records 
                                                          
 
 
5 The events in this case straddle the name change of the 
Department of Social Services to the Department of Children and 
Families (DCF).  St. 2008, c. 176.  We refer to the agency as 
DCF. 
 
 
6 The defendant was found guilty on indictments charging 
three counts of rape of a child with force, G. L. c. 265, § 22A; 
and two counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under 
the age of fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B.  All of the 
convictions relate to conduct involving the defendant and Beth, 
except one of the indecent assault and battery convictions, 
which involved Diane.  The judge ordered a required finding of 
not guilty on one charge of indecent assault and battery on a 
child under the age of fourteen as to Beth. 
 
 
7 Rule 17 (a) (2) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, 378 Mass. 885 (1979), provides: 
 
 
"A summons may also command the person to whom it is 
directed to produce the books, papers, documents, or other 
objects designated therein.  The court on motion may quash 
or modify the summons if compliance would be unreasonable 
or oppressive or if the summons is being used to subvert 
the provisions of Rule 14.  The court may direct that 
books, papers, documents, or objects designated in the 
summons be produced before the court within a reasonable 
time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are 
to be offered in evidence and may upon their production 
permit the books, papers, documents, objects, or portions 
5 
 
 
from the psychiatrist and the counselling center and (b) 
counselling records from the middle school where Diane was a 
student.8 
 
Where "a defendant seeks pretrial inspection of statutorily 
privileged records of any third party," he must satisfy the 
protocol established in Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 
145-146 (2006).  Commonwealth v. Sealy, 467 Mass. 617, 627 
(2014)  The "protocol is designed to give the fullest possible 
effect to legislatively enacted privileges consistent with a 
defendant's right to a fair trial that is not irreparably 
prejudiced by a court-imposed requirement all but impossible to 
satisfy."  Dwyer, supra at 144.  To trigger the protocol, "a 
defendant must first comply with the threshold requirements of 
[rule] 17 (a) (2), as elucidated in [Commonwealth v. Lampron, 
441 Mass. 265, 269 (2004)]."  Sealy, supra.  Under the protocol: 
 
"[T]he party moving to subpoena documents to be 
produced before trial must establish good cause, satisfied 
by a showing '(1) that the documents are evidentiary and 
relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise procurable 
reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due 
diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for 
trial without such production and inspection in advance of 
trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may 
tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that the 
application is made in good faith and is not intended as a 
general "fishing expedition"'" (emphasis added). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
thereof to be inspected and copied by the parties and their 
attorneys if authorized by law." 
 
 
8 The Commonwealth agreed to the production of the records 
of the high school counsellor and DCF. 
6 
 
 
 
Dwyer, supra at 140-141, quoting Lampron, supra. 
 
To satisfy the first requirement of Lampron (i.e., that the 
documents sought are "evidentiary and relevant"), the defendant 
must make a factual showing "that the documentary evidence 
sought has a 'rational tendency to prove [or disprove] an issue 
in the case.'"  Lampron, 441 Mass. at 269-270, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Fayerweather, 406 Mass. 78, 83 (1989).  
"Potential relevance and conclusory statements regarding 
relevance are insufficient" to satisfy the rule.  Lampron, supra 
at 269.  "Relevance is merely one factor in the analysis, and it 
is not established by rank speculation."  Commonwealth v. 
Alcantara, 471 Mass. 550, 564 (2015).  The requested documentary 
evidence must also be "likely to be admissible at hearing or at 
trial."  Lampron, supra. 
 
The fourth requirement of Lampron9 acts as "a reminder that 
rule 17 (a) (2) is not a discovery tool" (emphasis in original).  
Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 142, citing Lampron, 441 Mass. at 269.  
Rather, it is intended to "expedite trial proceedings and to 
avoid delays caused when counsel must inspect or examine 
documents or objects produced in response to a summons."  
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 444 Mass. 786, 796-797 (2005). 
                                                          
 
 
9 The second and third requirements of Commonwealth v. 
Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 269 (2004), are neither disputed nor 
relevant to this appeal. 
7 
 
 
 
We review a judge's ruling on rule 17 (a) (2) motions for 
abuse of discretion.  Mitchell, 444 Mass. at 791.  "[A] judge's 
discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of discretion where 
we conclude the judge made 'a clear error of judgment in 
weighing' the factors relevant to the decision, such that the 
decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives" 
(citations omitted).  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 
n.27 (2014).  Here, there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
a.  Psychiatrist and counselling center records.  In his 
motions, the defendant argued that there were two grounds that 
made the records of the psychiatrist and from the counselling 
center relevant.  The defendant did not advance an argument as 
to why the records were likely to be admissible at a hearing or 
trial. 
 
i.  The defendant's first argument was based on the fact 
that Diane had received treatment from both the psychiatrist and 
the counselling center, in part because of behavioral issues at 
school, and that, after having told her friend about the abuse, 
she had denied to her mother and to the counsellor that abuse 
had occurred.  These records would be relevant to Diane's 
credibility, the defendant argued, regardless of whether Diane 
disclosed the abuse during them or not. 
 
The judge disagreed and ruled that, because at the time 
Diane was referred to the psychiatrist and the counselling 
8 
 
 
center she had not yet disclosed the abuse to anyone, the 
requested records would not contain any statements regarding 
abuse because both the psychiatrist and the counselling center 
were mandatory reporters under G. L. c. 119, § 51A, and neither 
had reported abuse.  He also ruled that the defendant's 
assertion that the lack of disclosure in the records was 
relevant was too speculative where a girl of Diane's age was 
referred to a psychiatrist and a counselling center for school 
behavior issues. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Bourgeois, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 433 (2007), 
the Appeals Court held that mental health records are not 
relevant simply because they exist and a victim is referred to 
mental health services at around the time she first revealed the 
abuse.  Id. at 437.10  In Commonwealth v. Olivier, 89 Mass. App. 
Ct. 836, 845 (2016), the Appeals Court held that a defendant's 
argument that the records of the victim's appointment with her 
therapist after the alleged rape might contain "an inconsistent 
account or meaningful silence" was too speculative where there 
was "no evidence the victim ever even spoke to her counsellor 
about the alleged rape."  Id. at 845-846.  This was so even 
                                                          
 
 
10 The Appeals Court drew this conclusion under the earlier, 
more stringent standard set forth in Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 
Mass. 216, 226 (1996).  Commonwealth v. Bourgeois, 68 Mass. App. 
Ct. 433, 437 (2007).  The court explained in a footnote, 
however, that even under Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122 
(2006), the defendant had not made the required showing.  
Bourgeois, supra at 437 n.10. 
9 
 
 
though the victim had been encouraged by her doctor to speak to 
the counsellor about the incident.  Id.  Contrast Commonwealth 
v. Labroad, 466 Mass. 1037, 1039 (2014) (access to complainant's 
records allowed because defendant "alleged, with particularity, 
that [they] contained specific information regarding her 
complaint of sexual assault"). 
 
Here, the defendant provided no factual basis to 
demonstrate that the materials sought were relevant or would 
likely be admissible at trial.  Although the fact that the 
psychiatrist and the counselling center did not file mandated 
reports under G. L. c. 119, § 51A, is not dispositive of the 
issue, it is a strong indicator that the records sought were not 
relevant.11  Without some basis demonstrating the relevance of 
the records beyond their mere existence, the defendant's motions 
and affidavits submitted by his counsel lacked sufficient 
specificity, and were thus too speculative under Lampron.  See 
Sealy, 467 Mass. at 628 (defendant failed to establish relevance 
of requested records where "all of the allegations contained [in 
the affidavit supporting the request] were couched in 
hypothetical language"). 
                                                          
 
 
11 The defendant's argument that the counsellor's failure to 
report the abuse after first speaking with Diane shows that 
mandatory reporters may not always report abuse is unavailing.  
Diane never told the counsellor that she was abused.  Rather, 
she denied it when the counsellor confronted her. 
10 
 
 
 
Further, were we to accept the defendant's argument that 
the records would be relevant both because they might contain 
information regarding the alleged assault and because they might 
not, certain statutory and common-law privileges would be 
rendered meaningless.12  See Olivier, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 845-
846; Bourgeois, 68 Mass. App. Ct. at 437. 
 
ii.  The defendant's second argument that the psychiatrist 
and the counselling center records were relevant was based on 
the fact that the DCF records that had been provided to the 
defendant, see note 8, supra, contained statements that 
indicated that Diane's allegations may be the result of 
repressed memories.  Specifically, counsel's affidavit averred 
that the DCF report stated Diane "only recalls one incident but 
is unsure if anything else happened that she can't remember" and 
that Diane "had a 'flashback' that was triggered by a class mate 
[sic] grabbing her leg."  The judge concluded that the 
defendant's argument that the allegations "may stem" from 
repressed memory was too speculative to satisfy the Lampron 
standard. 
 
The defendant's argument that Diane's allegations may have 
been the result of repressed memory was too speculative.  The 
                                                          
 
 
12 We further note that the acceptance of such an argument 
would destroy the rape crisis center counsellor privilege, G. L. 
c. 233, § 20J, because presumably any records of confidential 
discussion with a rape crisis counsellor would contain 
information relevant to sexual assault allegations. 
11 
 
 
DCF records do not indicate that Diane ever forgot the alleged 
abuse.  Further, the connection between a teenager's description 
of coming to terms with abuse (e.g., a "flashback") and 
repressed memory is not clear given that repressed memories can 
be a symptom of dissociative amnesia, which is a specific 
medical diagnosis.  See Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 
757 (2010) (discussing dissociative amnesia as defined in 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders).13 
 
b.  Middle school records.  The defendant also sought 
Diane's records from her middle school, including the records of 
the guidance counsellor there.  This motion was accompanied by 
an affidavit stating that Diane had attended this middle school 
and had received a letter of recommendation from a guidance 
counsellor there that reflected that she "helps her father 
work[] on cars, [and] she shares an interest in cars with her 
father." 
 
The judge denied this motion.  He reasoned that the 
requested documents predated Diane's initial disclosure of the 
alleged abuse; thus, although a lack of disclosure in the 
                                                          
 
 
13 On the day of trial, the defendant renewed his motion for 
the release of the records of the psychiatrist and the 
counselling center because the Commonwealth was planning to call 
an abuse expert as a witness.  The defendant argued that this 
would "open[] the door" to Diane's mental health history, and so 
he should have access to her records.  The judge denied the 
motion for the same reason he rejected the defendant's first 
argument regarding these records.  There was no abuse of 
discretion. 
12 
 
 
records "may well be relevant impeachment inquiry,"14 it did not 
make them "evidentiary and relevant." 
 
The motion regarding the middle school records was entirely 
speculative, and the defendant failed to provide a factual basis 
as to why the records may be relevant.  See Sealy, 467 Mass. at 
628.  That a middle school student made neutral (or mildly 
positive) statements regarding her father for the purpose of a 
recommendation letter for entrance into a high school is 
unsurprising, even where the child alleges abuse by her parent.  
The defendant's request to receive these records was a 
prohibited fishing expedition.  See Lampron, 441 Mass. at 269.15 
 
2.  Limitation on cross-examination.  Prior to trial, the 
Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to limit the defense from 
referencing "bad character" or "bad acts" of Diane.  Defense 
counsel opposed the motion and argued that the evidence the 
Commonwealth wanted to preclude went both to Diane's bias or 
motive to fabricate and to her ability to provide a reliable 
story, and therefore should be admissible.  The judge precluded 
inquiry into alleged specific instances of "bad acts" because 
they went to character and were not tied to a motive to 
                                                          
 
 
14 Indeed, Diane was cross-examined on her delayed 
disclosure and recantations at trial. 
 
 
15 We decline the invitation of the defendant to alter the 
Dwyer protocol. 
13 
 
 
fabricate.16  The judge also ruled that the defense's inquiry 
into Diane's mental and emotional health was not relevant to 
"either a motive to fabricate or some sort of inability to 
recall properly."  Rather, the judge ruled that the proposed 
inquiry constituted impermissible character evidence. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that this ruling by the 
judge was an abuse of discretion and violated his right to 
confront witnesses against him under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
 
A defendant has a well-established constitutional right "to 
cross-examine a prosecution witness to show the witness's bias, 
and hence to challenge the witness's credibility."  Commonwealth 
v. Tam Bui, 419 Mass. 392, 400, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 861 
(1995).  "A judge may not restrict cross-examination of a 
material witness by foreclosing inquiry into a subject that 
could show bias or prejudice on the part of the witness."  
Commonwealth v. Aguiar, 400 Mass. 508, 513 (1987). 
 
In order to pursue a subject in an attempt to demonstrate 
bias, a defendant "must make a plausible showing that the 
                                                          
 
 
16 Massachusetts does not have a rule of evidence similar to 
Fed. R. Evid. 608(b), which "permits the scope of permissible 
cross-examination to include evidence and inquiry relating to 
the facts of specific instances of prior misconduct on the part 
of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the 
witness's character for truthfulness."  Commonwealth v. Almonte, 
465 Mass. 224, 241 (2013). 
14 
 
 
circumstances existed on which the alleged bias is based."  Tam 
Bui, 419 Mass. at 401.  "Determining whether the evidence 
demonstrates bias, however, falls within the discretion of the 
trial judge."  Commonwealth v. LaVelle, 414 Mass. 146, 153 
(1993).  In addition, "[a] witness may 'be impeached by evidence 
challenging his testimonial facilities (e.g., ability to 
perceive the events or remember them accurately).'"  Alcantara, 
471 Mass. at 564, quoting Commonwealth v. Daley, 439 Mass. 558, 
564 (2003).  The scope of such impeachment is also a matter of 
the judge's discretion.  Alcantara, supra at 564-565. 
 
Here, the defendant's argument that Diane was biased was 
too tenuous because it depended on a showing that Diane so 
wanted to escape discipline by her father that she concocted a 
false story of abuse to have him removed from the family home.  
The defendant hoped to show bias by questioning Diane about, 
among other things, an allegation that she had stabbed another 
student at school; a dirt-covered doll that had no legs that she 
owned; and her desire to "do séances" and use a Ouija board.  
The defendant offered nothing that tied this evidence of conduct 
-- and the inquiry into Diane's mental and emotional health -- 
to Diane's motive to lie, bias, or inability to perceive 
reality.  See Alcantara, 471 Mass. at 564-565 (no error to 
exclude evidence where no nexus between mental health issues and 
ability to perceive and recall); Commonwealth v. Parent, 465 
15 
 
 
Mass. 395, 406 (2013) (no error to exclude evidence where "there 
was no plausible inference of bias or a motive to lie arising" 
from the proffered evidence).  See also Tam Bui, 419 Mass. at 
401. 
 
The excluded evidence and Diane's mental health history had 
minimal, if any, probative value and created a strong risk of 
misuse by the jury.  If this evidence was admitted it may have 
caused the jury to discount Diane's testimony, not because of 
bias or inability to perceive and recall, but because of her 
mental and emotional health.  See Commonwealth v. Weichel, 403 
Mass. 103, 106 (1988).  The judge did not abuse his discretion 
in excluding this evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.