Case Title: In re Krule

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. M.R. 16045-Agenda 15-September 2000.
								In re JEROME KRULE, Petitioner.
Opinion filed December 1, 2000.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the
court:
	Jerome Krule petitioned this court for review of the most
recent recommendation by the Committee on Character and
Fitness (the Committee) that he not be certified for admission to
the bar. 166 Ill. 2d R. 708(d). After the Committee filed its
response, we allowed Krule's petition and permitted the parties to
present oral argument. For the reasons that follow, Krule's
application for admission to the bar is denied.
	 Jerome Krule graduated from the John Marshall Law School
in 1994. In 1995, the Committee on Character and Fitness (the
Committee) voted not to recommend certification of Krule for
admission to the practice of law. In reaching that decision, the
Committee was most concerned with Krule's participation in an
insurance fraud scheme which resulted in his conviction of a
felony in 1988. The Committee felt that Krule was less than
candid in describing his role in the scheme and he had not
adequately demonstrated that he was rehabilitated. The Committee
also expressed concern over Krule's apparent lack of candor in
failing to apprise his law school of three previous misdemeanor
convictions.
	Krule sought a new hearing in 1996. Because his request was
made prior to expiration of the requisite two-year waiting period
following the Committee's 1995 decision, it was denied. Bar
Admission Rule 9.1. Krule then filed another petition for a new
hearing in 1998. This time the Committee granted the petition, and
the hearing panel convened a new hearing in the case in March of
1999.
	After taking evidence, the hearing panel concluded that Krule
had failed to meet his burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that he possesses the requisite moral character and
general fitness to practice law. The hearing panel further
concluded that Krule had once again failed to show that he had
been sufficiently rehabilitated. Based on these conclusions, the
Committee adhered to its original decision and voted not to
recommend certification of Krule.
	In undertaking our review of the Committee's decision, we
begin by noting that the final judgment regarding admission of an
applicant to the practice of law rests with this court. As a general
rule, a determination by the Committee on Character and Fitness
concerning the character and fitness of an applicant neither binds
this court nor limits our authority to take action. In re Loss, 119 Ill. 2d 186, 192 (1987). We have also held, however, that where a
hearing panel concludes that a petitioner does not possess the good
moral character and general fitness necessary for the practice of
law and recommends that certification be denied, as was the case
here, this court will not reverse unless that recommendation was
arbitrary. In re Glenville, 139 Ill. 2d 242, 252 (1990).
	The criminal conviction which led to the original denial of
Krule's certification arose from a scheme he facilitated to
systematically defraud insurance companies. At the time, Krule
was a licensed insurance professional. He testified that he
contacted an attorney named George Anderson to "go into
business with him in personal injury." The business worked this
way.
	Anderson owned some taxi cabs, and Krule took a job in his
office. When one of the taxi drivers was involved in an accident,
Krule would arrange for him to see a Dr. Starkman. With Krule's
knowledge and complicity, Starkman would deliberately generate
inflated bills containing charges for services that were not
necessary or were not performed. Krule, in turn, would submit the
fraudulent bills to insurance companies for reimbursement. Krule
engaged in this activity from August of 1986 through February of
1987. During this period he submitted scores of false claims to
eight different insurance companies.
	Krule's insurance fraud scheme ended with an 82-count
indictment issued by a Du Page County grand jury. Named as
defendants were Krule, attorney Anderson, Dr. Starkman, and six
other individuals. Krule pled guilty to one count of theft, a felony,
in exchange for his testifying as a government witness. He was
sentenced to 30 month's probation. As a condition of probation he
was required to complete 950 hours of community service and pay
$5,000 in restitution. Krule's probation was terminated
satisfactorily on October 1, 1990.
	Attorney Anderson also pled guilty to theft. He was ordered
to pay a fine of $100 and $77 in court costs and was placed on
conditional discharge. The condition imposed by the sentencing
judge was that Anderson was required to file a motion with our
court for disbarment on consent. Anderson filed such a motion on
February 16, 1990, and it was allowed by this court on March 27,
1990.
	Following these developments, Krule applied to and was
accepted for admission by the John Marshall Law School. As
previously indicated, Krule graduated from there in 1994. The
Committee on Character and Fitness subsequently refused to
certify him for admission to the bar, primarily because of his
felony conviction and the nature of his involvement in the
insurance fraud scheme.
	In ruling as it did, the Committee noted Krule's lack of candor
about these events when he applied for law school. Krule
characterized his role as that of a "clerk," even though his
testimony at trial indicated that he played a far more substantial
role and helped devise the scheme. A letter written by Krule to the
law school's dean contained falsehoods, and the Committee found
that Krule had refused to accept responsibility for his illegal and
unethical conduct. Finally, the Committee expressed concern that
Krule had failed to disclose three misdemeanor charges, two of
which involved pleas of guilty, on his law school application.
Krule admitted that the reason he was not truthful about those
charges is that he feared they would jeopardize his chances for
admission into law school.
	Following his felony conviction, Krule obtained employment
and engaged in volunteer and charitable activities beyond those
necessary to comply with the terms of his probation. The
Committee acknowledged these factors and took note of positive
testimony from character witnesses. The Committee nevertheless
concluded that "specific evidence" of rehabilitation was lacking.
The Committee also cautioned Krule that
		"an applicant for admission does not become entitled to
certification of his character and fitness simply by
fulfilling the educational requirements and by
participating in civic and charitable activities."
	When Krule obtained a new hearing in 1999, he testified on
his own behalf. He told the Committee that he would consider his
law license his most valuable possession. He has worked in the
Evanston community defender office and served as a teacher of
English as a second language in the Oakton Community College
adult education program. He stated that he would like to practice
law in the public sector and intended to continue his volunteer
work regardless of the Committee's decision.
	Krule admitted that because he was an insurance professional
at the time, "maybe he had more of a major role" than the other
participants in the insurance fraud scheme that resulted in his
felony conviction. He expressed remorse for his illegal conduct
and said he regretted his failure to report the misdemeanor
convictions when he submitted his law school application.
	In addition to testifying himself, Krule presented the
testimony of seven character witnesses. One of these was
Associate Circuit Judge Fe Fernandez of the circuit court of Cook
County, who appeared on Krule's behalf.(1) Prior to taking the
bench, Judge Fernandez had worked with Krule at the Evanston
community defender office. According to Judge Fernandez, Krule
had done volunteer work at the community defender office on an
"as needed" basis since he was denied certification in 1995. Robert
Roy, director of the community defender office, also testified. Roy
and Judge Fernandez opined that Krule is honest, trustworthy and
dedicated to his goal of becoming a lawyer.
	Additional testimony was provided by Patricia McCarthy, a
reading specialist at East Prairie school district in Skokie, and
Marilyn Antonik, program manager for volunteer teaching in the
adult education division and coordinator of the adult literacy
program at Oakton Community College. McCarthy and Antonik
described Krule's work with Oakton Community College and
reported that he was generous in donating his time and dedicated
to his students. They also attested to his trustworthiness.
	Edward Michael Reilly, a Chicago police officer and lawyer
who had attended law school with Krule, said that Krule would be
an ethical lawyer. Ralph Ruebner, a professor at John Marshall
Law School, and Elmer Gertz, a former professor at John Marshall
Law School, testified that they had known Krule since he was a
law student. Gertz is also a friend of Krule's family. Ruebner
believed that Krule had matured, and both professors thought that
he could be a competent and trustworthy lawyer.
	In addition to the foregoing testimony, Krule presented
affidavits from George Leighton, formerly a United States district
judge; Dean Robert Johnston of the John Marshall Law School;
and Professor William Carroll and Professor Seng, also of John
Marshall. All of these men supported Krule's application and
attested to his fitness to practice law.
	Following the hearing, witness Marilyn Antonik, from Oakton
Community College, reported an incident to the Committee that
changed her opinion of Krule's judgment and trustworthiness.
According to Antonik, Krule met with a foreign student at the
college and gave her a gift and a personal note. He also offered to
help her obtain a visa.
	 In his note to the student, which was signed "Love, Jerry,"
Krule offered to give the student money for a round trip plane
ticket to and from her homeland. This incident frightened the
student, who brought it to the attention of college officials. As a
result, Antonik terminated Krule's services with the college.
	The Committee received a copy of Krule's note to the student
as well as a copy of a statement from the student regarding Krule's
actions. One of the things the student claimed in her statement was
that Krule had shown her a card indicating that he was a lawyer.
She also said that Krule had told her not to show the note to
anyone and that the incident scared her.
	In response to this development, Krule's attorney wrote to the
Committee and submitted an affidavit from Krule. In his affidavit,
Krule attested that he did not present himself as an attorney to the
student. Rather, he told her he was a paralegal for the Evanston
community defender. The card he showed her was his John
Marshall alumni card. He has no business cards.
	Based upon the foregoing evidence, the Committee decided,
by a vote of 6 to 1, to adhere to its previous determination. The
Committee held that Krule had failed to show that he had been
"sufficiently rehabilitated to demonstrate that he possesses the
character and fitness to practice law." Accordingly, it concluded
that it could "not recommend the certification of Krule and his
application to be admitted to the practice of law in Illinois is
therefore denied."
	In assailing the Committee's determination, Krule takes
particular issue with the Committee's consideration of the post-hearing events involving Krule and the foreign student. Krule
contends that the evidence considered by the Committee consisted
of inadmissible hearsay. He claims that before the Committee
relied on the information from Antonik, it should have afforded
him the opportunity to subpoena and depose her under oath.
	The objections Krule raises to the Committee's procedures are
not insignificant. With respect to the matter of the lawyer
identification card, we note that the student was Japanese, and her
statement regarding the incident was written in Japanese. It is
entirely possible that she misunderstood what Krule had told her
about his professional status or that she did understand it, but the
translator simply conveyed what she had written incorrectly when
putting it into English. The way the Committee handled this
evidence, Krule had no opportunity to explore these possibilities.
	Even if the procedures followed by the Committee were not
subject to challenge, the Committee should not have allowed the
post-hearing events involving the foreign student to affect its
ultimate decision. Both Krule and the woman were adults. Krule
was not the woman's teacher and held no position of authority
over her. The gift he gave her was a cosmetics case, and he made
the offer regarding the plane ticket because she had expressed an
interest in returning to the United States. While he had a romantic
interest in the woman, he did not attempt to force himself on her
in any way. When she did not respond to his overtures, the matter
ended. The two had no further communication. The woman
returned to her homeland, and Krule went about his business. We
fail to see how any of this bears on Krule's fitness to practice law.
	Having said that, we nevertheless conclude that the
Committee's decision to deny Krule's petition for admission to the
bar must be upheld. Contrary to Krule's assertions, the incident
involving the foreign student was incidental to the Committee's
final determination. In ruling as it did, the Committee reviewed the
circumstances which led to its previous decision, then focused on
whether Krule had shown by clear and convincing evidence that
his rehabilitation is such that he is a fit person to practice law. See
In re Loss, 119 Ill. 2d  at 196-97.
	The criteria applied by the Committee were those set forth by
our court in In re Childress, 138 Ill. 2d 87, 100 (1990):
			" '(1) [C]ommunity service and achievements, as well
as the opinions of others regarding present character; (2)
candor before the court; (3) the age of the applicant at the
time of the offenses; (4) the amount of time which has
passed since the last offense; (5) the nature of the
offenses; and (6) the applicant's current mental state.' " 
Quoting In re Loss, 119 Ill. 2d  at 196.
	The Committee noted that Krule had performed "a good
amount of community service" since the Committee had last
considered his case. It credited him with caring for his elderly and
infirm parents. It acknowledged the array of character witnesses he
presented, which was impressive by any standard. Especially
significant to the Committee was that the people with whom Krule
worked at the Evanston community defender's office have placed
their trust and confidence in him.
	In contrast to the situation in 1995, when he was first turned
down by the Committee, Krule acknowledged his full role in the
insurance fraud scheme, "noting that as an insurance professional
he had knowledge about the operations of the industry that helped
to further the criminal enterprise." He also expressed his remorse
for "the impact his participation had on individuals and
organizations."
	Despite these developments, the Committee believed that the
positive aspects of Krule's application were still outweighed by
the nature and gravity of the criminal offense for which he had
been convicted. While a mature adult and a licensed professional,
he utilized his professional knowledge to help carry out a criminal
scheme involving deception and dishonesty. Thereafter, he
attempted to minimize his role in the scheme, made
misrepresentations, and failed to disclose three misdemeanors on
his law school application.
	Although Krule was a reliable and committed worker, the
Committee pointed out that his volunteer work "did not entail the
kind of independence or the exercise of judgment that would
permit a prediction about how Krule would perform in a setting
that did." In the Committee's view, the circumstances present
when the insurance fraud scheme was formulated back in the
1980s provided a better insight into how Krule might perform as
a lawyer when his independence and judgment were challenged.
The results were not good. Krule chose to commit a felony.
	Based on the record before it, the Committee was not satisfied
that the result would be different today. Krule professed that he
was sorry and had changed, but the Committee believed that his
words and actions may have been designed simply to satisfy the
requirements of bar admission. Moreover, to the extent Krule was
remorseful, the Committee believed that it may have been remorse
that his conduct interfered with his bar admission rather than a
genuine appreciation for how his illegal conduct affected others.
	In In re Glenville, 139 Ill. 2d 242 (1990), the applicant had a
history of juvenile delinquency, arrests for battery and convictions
for disorderly conduct, driving under the influence, and theft. In In
re Childress, 138 Ill. 2d 87 (1990), the applicant had been
convicted of rape and robbery and sentenced to prison while a
teenager. In In re Loss, 119 Ill. 2d 186 (1987), the applicant's
history involved juvenile delinquency and convictions for
disorderly conduct, possession and sales of marijuana and other
drugs, and theft.
	In each of the foregoing cases, our court denied the
applicant's petition for admission. Although the crime for which
Krule was convicted may not be as serious as some of the offenses
committed by Glenville, Childress and Loss, we note that Krule
was a mature adult when he engaged in the fraudulent scheme that
culminated in his conviction. Moreover, his criminal scheme arose
in the context of circumstances comparable to those with which he
would be faced as an attorney, evincing an inability on Krule's
part to carry out his professional responsibilities honestly.
	In that regard, the case is similar to In re Ascher, 81 Ill. 2d 485 (1980). Ascher was an accountant, licensed insurance agent
and broker, licensed real estate broker, and an "enrolled agent"
with the Internal Revenue Service who attended law school later
in life. Prior to passing the bar exam, he was sued by a client for
fraud and breach of his fiduciary duty as a tax accountant and real
estate agent-broker. He was also found to have engaged in a
subterfuge to practice law without a license. Even though Ascher's
conduct did not lead to criminal charges as Krule's did, this court
nevertheless concluded that it raised fundamental questions
regarding his "capacity to make those ethical judgments required
of an attorney in the course of his practice and the performance of
his fiduciary responsibilities." In re Ascher, 81 Ill. 2d  at 500.
	In denying Ascher's application for admission to the bar, this
court wrote,
		"The integrity of our profession can be no greater than
that of its members, and we protect neither our profession
nor the public when we admit to the profession those who
have demonstrated the insensitivity to its standards which
is evident here." In re Ascher, 81 Ill. 2d  at 502.
	We believe this sentiment is applicable to the matter before us
today. As impressive as Krule's character references and public
service may be, an applicant's subsequent exemplary behavior
cannot lessen the enormity of an earlier offense. In re Childress,
138 Ill. 2d  at 101. As we held in In re Childress, 138 Ill. 2d  at 104,
and as the Committee itself indicated when it last refused to
recommend Krule, applicants do not become entitled to admission
simply by fulfilling our educational requirements and participating
in civic and charitable activities.
	The public depends on this court to select qualified
professionals who will be conscientious in protecting their clients
and upholding the law. We take that responsibility seriously. As
careful as we try to be in the selection process, however, we
cannot detect every failing that may afflict an attorney. All we can
do is make our best judgment based on the results of the bar exam,
the contents of the applications and supporting documents, and the
recommendations from the Committee.
	With each law license we confer, there is a risk that the
attorney will not live up to his professional responsibilities. We
depend on the Committee to help us assess that risk. In this case,
the Committee has determined, in effect, that the risk is too great.
We cannot say that its determination is arbitrary. What Krule did
in defrauding the insurance companies is precisely the sort of
conduct which has brought the legal profession into disrepute. He
failed to convince the Committee that he is not going to repeat that
conduct, and he has failed to persuade us. In our view, Krule's
admission would deprecate the seriousness of his crime and
undermine the integrity of our profession.
	For the foregoing reasons, Krule's application for admission
to the bar is denied.
Petition denied.
	JUSTICE MILLER, specially concurring:
	I agree with the majority that the petitioner's application for
admission to the bar of this state must be denied. I write separately
to explain more fully the basis for my agreement with that
determination and to respond to Justice McMorrow's dissent in
this case.
	As the majority recounts, the petitioner, while a licensed
insurance professional, took part in an extensive scheme to
systematically defraud insurance companies. The petitioner took
a job in the office of a person who owned taxi cabs. Whenever a
driver was involved in an accident, the petitioner would have the
person go to a particular doctor. The doctor would later send out
inflated bills containing charges for unnecessary or unperformed
services. The petitioner would then submit the bills to insurance
companies for reimbursement. This activity went on from August
1986 through February 1987; according to the petitioner, he
submitted scores of fraudulent claims to eight different insurers.
Indicted the next year, the petitioner was later allowed to plead
guilty to one count of the 82-count indictment in exchange for his
testimony as a witness for the prosecution.
	Justice McMorrow asserts that the effect of today's decision
denying the petitioner's application for admission to the bar "is to
impose additional punishment upon him after he has been tried
and served the sentence which was deemed appropriate by
agreement of the court and the prosecution in his criminal case."
Slip op. at 21 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice McMorrow apparently believes that the seriousness
of an applicant's offense must necessarily fade over time, and that,
in any event, the severity of the misconduct should be measured
simply by the criminal sanction imposed at the time of
prosecution.
	These notions are contrary to long-standing precedent of this
court. In In re Childress, 138 Ill. 2d 87 (1990), an applicant who
had been convicted of rape and robbery 16 years earlier applied for
admission to the bar of this state, long after his release from
prison. The court observed that a felony conviction will not
automatically preclude an applicant's admission to the bar, or a
disbarred attorney's subsequent reinstatement. The court further
explained:
		"It is clear, however, that the degree of rehabilitation that
must be established to warrant admission or reinstatement
will depend in large measure on the nature of the wrong
committed. Just as a disbarred attorney's subsequent
exemplary behavior will not mitigate the seriousness of
his misconduct (In re Alexander (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 524,
534-35; In re Berkley (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 404, 410), so too
will an applicant's subsequent exemplary behavior fail to
lessen the enormity of an earlier offense." Childress, 138 Ill. 2d  at 101. 
Despite the lengthy period of time in that case between the
petitioner's offenses and his application, this court concluded that
time alone was not sufficient to overcome the enormity of the
applicant's misconduct. The court stated, "While a person's
conduct in the ensuing years is, of course, a relevant circumstance
in assessing rehabilitation, we do not believe that the passage of
time by itself is sufficient to demonstrate the rehabilitation that is
required of someone with a criminal record such as petitioner's."
Childress, 138 Ill. 2d  at 102.
 	A number of considerations are relevant in this case. The
petitioner was involved in an extensive, fraudulent scheme, and he
played an active role in the commission of those offenses,
Moreover, the petitioner was 45 years old at the time of his
involvement; thus, his offenses were not youthful indiscretions,
but the work of a mature adult, and they were closely related to
what was then his career in insurance. Also, the petitioner, who
applied to and was accepted by his law school after these offenses,
was not completely candid to the school about this misconduct
and, separately, failed to report on his law school application three
prior misdemeanor charges, two of which resulted in guilty pleas.
Just as there are some offenses so egregious that a lawyer who has
been disbarred for committing them may never be readmitted to
the bar (In re Richman, 191 Ill. 2d 238, 247-48 (2000); In re
Rothenberg, 108 Ill. 2d 313, 326 (1985)), so too, I believe, are
there offenses so serious that one who has committed them should
never be entitled to admission to the bar in the first place. Without
determining whether the present offenses fall into that category, I
believe that it is clear that the petitioner's application must be
denied. The nature and gravity of the petitioner's misconduct, his
age when he engaged in it, and his later lack of candor concerning
these and prior offenses on his law school application and in the
ensuing application process all militate against his admission to
the bar.




	JUSTICE McMORROW, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
	I am in agreement with the majority that the evidence relating
to the post-hearing events involving petitioner Jerome Krule and
a foreign student was inappropriately admitted and should not
have affected the ultimate decision of the Committee on Character
and Fitness (Committee). I respectfully dissent, however, from the
majority's denial of petitioner's application for admission to the
bar.
	Initially, I recognize that the privilege to practice law is
exactly that, a privilege and not a right. However, that privilege
should not be denied absent cogent reason. Although, in reviewing
the merits of petitioner's application for admission to the bar, my
colleagues note the many positive aspects of his application, they
nevertheless find that "[a]s impressive as Krule's character
references and public service may be, an applicant's subsequent
exemplary behavior cannot lessen the enormity of an earlier
offense." Slip op. at 9. After stating that petitioner's involvement
in the insurance scheme is "precisely the sort of conduct which has
brought the legal profession into disrepute," the majority
concludes that Krule "failed to convince the Committee that he is
not going to repeat that conduct, and he has failed to persuade us.
In our view, Krule's admission would deprecate the seriousness of
his crime and undermine the integrity of our profession." Slip op.
at 10.
	As I studied and pondered the majority opinion, one lingering
question always remained: What more could petitioner have done
that he did not already do to enable him to be allowed the privilege
to practice law? Stated otherwise, is there anything petitioner
failed to do to justify refusing him a license to practice law. The
majority does not answer this essential question. Instead, in
denying Krule's admission application, my colleagues appear to
single-mindedly focus upon the seriousness of petitioner's past
offense, to the virtual exclusion of the ample amount of positive
evidence presented in petitioner's favor during the Committee
hearing.
	The analysis employed by the majority in assessing the merits
of petitioner's admission petition does not adhere to this court's
prior pronouncements with respect to evaluating whether an
individual has shown sufficient rehabilitation of character and
fitness so that an application for admission to the bar may be
granted. It is well settled that, although the nature of an applicant's
past misconduct is one important consideration in assessing his or
her rehabilitation, a record of felony conviction need not by itself
automatically preclude one's admission to practice law in Illinois.
In re Childress, 138 Ill. 2d 87, 100-01 (1990); In re Loss, 119 Ill. 2d 186, 196 (1987); In re Mitan, 75 Ill. 2d 118, 126 (1979).
Additional factors to be considered in determining a petitioner's
rehabilitation are the petitioner's record of community service and
achievements, as well as the opinions of others with respect to
petitioner's present character; the candor of petitioner before the
court; petitioner's age at the time of the offenses; the amount of
time which has passed since the last offense; and the current
mental state of petitioner. Childress, 138 Ill. 2d  at 100; Loss, 119 Ill. 2d  at 196.
	Both the Committee in its findings, and the majority in its
opinion, stress that although Krule presented a substantial amount
of evidence in his favor during the hearing, this evidence did not
overcome his 1988 felony conviction. There is no question that
petitioner committed a serious offense and that he was a mature
adult when he engaged in this misconduct. However, the
seriousness of petitioner's crime has already been adjudicated. The
record reveals that, as part of an agreement with the prosecuting
office, petitioner pled guilty to one count of theft, in exchange for
his assistance in investigating the insurance scheme and for his
testimony on behalf of the government against other scheme
participants. At the culmination of the criminal proceedings, the
trial court evaluated petitioner's offense and sentenced him to 30
months' probation, conditioned upon his performance of 950
hours of community service. The record also reveals that the court
released petitioner early from his probation.
	It is axiomatic that the seriousness of petitioner's crime
remains constant. It does not diminish with the passage of time. It
is precisely because the gravity of the offense will be the same 10,
15, or 20 years henceforth-and forevermore-that this court has
looked to factors in addition to the seriousness of the crime
committed to determine whether an applicant has been sufficiently
rehabilitated to be admitted to the practice of law. In other words,
we must consider the seriousness of petitioner's offense against
the backdrop of the various indicia of rehabilitation of character
and fitness. The egregious conduct of petitioner, though deserving
of considerable weight, should not be the overriding factor in
assessing petitioner's fitness to practice law. The majority clearly
primarily bases its decision on the crime petitioner committed
more than 10 years ago.
	As stated, this court has previously held that a petitioner's
community service and achievements, the opinions of others
regarding his present character, petitioner's candor about his past
misconduct, and his present mental state all constitute important
indicia of rehabilitation. A wealth of information with respect to
these factors was introduced by petitioner during the hearing. It
was established that since 1995, petitioner has performed
extensive volunteer work with the Evanston Community Defender
Office (ECDO), which provides free legal and social work services
to low income Evanston residents under the age of 21. Robert Roy,
the director of ECDO, and Judge Fe Fernandez, a former staff
attorney with this organization, testified on petitioner's behalf.
Both witnesses informed the Committee that, at the time petitioner
approached them about volunteering with their organization, he
was very open about his background. In Roy's words, petitioner
spoke with "agonizing candor" about his past difficulties. Both
Roy and Fernandez stated that petitioner acknowledged that he
made serious mistakes in his past, that his involvement with the
insurance scheme was wrong, and that he showed a great deal of
remorse for his past misconduct. Roy testified that there was no
question in his mind that petitioner accepted full responsibility for
his past criminal behavior. Roy informed the Committee that he
frequently discussed ethical issues with petitioner, and that he
often provided petitioner with written materials concerning ethics
in the law.
	Both Roy and Fernandez testified that petitioner performed a
wide variety of legal and nonlegal tasks while volunteering at
ECDO, including answering telephones, transporting witnesses to
and from court, interviewing clients for background information,
serving subpoenas, conducting factual investigations, and
performing some legal research. Both witnesses testified that
petitioner did a very good job in completing all tasks assigned to
him, that he showed genuine concern and compassion for the
clients, that he communicated well with the clients, and that the
clients had many positive things to say about petitioner. Fernandez
testified that petitioner would make an "excellent" lawyer, and
Roy stressed that petitioner took his work very seriously and had
been "very responsible." Both witnesses characterized petitioner
as honest and trustworthy, and both recommended him for the bar
without hesitancy or reservation.
	During the hearing it was also established that for the past
several years petitioner served as a volunteer tutor for adult
literacy and education at both Oakton Community College and at
the East Prairie School District in Skokie. Marilyn Antonik and
Patricia McCarthy, the supervisors of these respective programs,
testified that petitioner interacted very well with the students, who
come from many different cultural backgrounds. Both witnesses
attested to petitioner's dedication to his students, with McCarthy
describing petitioner as "very supportive, and concerned and
caring," and with Antonik testifying that petitioner "has gone way
beyond what a tutor needs to do." Both witnesses stated that
petitioner has generously devoted his time to these programs, and
described him as "trustworthy," "sincere" and "committed."
Antonik expressed the "utmost confidence" in petitioner, testified
that he conducted himself in a "professional" manner, and drew a
distinction between petitioner's sincere commitment to his
students and that of other volunteers who were required to do
community service and who simply went "through the motions."
	Also testifying on behalf of petitioner was Ralph Ruebner, a
professor at John Marshall Law School. Professor Ruebner stated
that he became acquainted with petitioner as a result of their living
in the same neighborhood, and when petitioner began attending
John Marshall, they struck up a friendship. Professor Ruebner
testified that petitioner candidly revealed to him his past
difficulties, and that Ruebner recommended that petitioner
volunteer at ECDO because he felt it would "contribute to his
rehabilitation process." Professor Ruebner, a highly respected
member of the legal community, expressed his belief that
petitioner has "fully rehabilitated himself," explaining that he has
observed significant changes in petitioner's behavior over the past
years. Professor Ruebner stated that petitioner has "matured," to
the extent that he is very humble and expresses remorse and
responsibility for his past wrongdoing. Professor Ruebner also
testified that petitioner is a very caring individual, as evidenced by
the type of community work he has done, as well as by the fact
that petitioner is the primary care giver for two very ill, elderly
parents. Professor Ruebner concluded that petitioner would make
a competent and trustworthy lawyer.
	Attorney Elmer Gertz also testified on petitioner's behalf.
Gertz related that petitioner had been one of his students at John
Marshall Law School and also that petitioner was a family friend.
In Gertz's view, petitioner would be an ethical and trustworthy
lawyer. Gertz also testified that, because of petitioner's adverse
experiences in the past, petitioner would be keenly aware of
ethical problems and would know what situations to avoid.
	The final witness for petitioner was Edward O'Reilly, a
sergeant with the Chicago police department and a fellow
classmate of petitioner at John Marshall. Sergeant O'Reilly
testified that petitioner was supportive of him during law school,
and described petitioner as a "good human being" who is "kind,"
"trustworthy," "reliable," and "honest." O'Reilly informed the
Committee that, during law school, petitioner candidly disclosed
his background to him, and at that time petitioner was embarrassed
and sorry for his past misconduct. O'Reilly stated that petitioner
would be "an asset" to the bar, and that petitioner's past
experiences "would be a positive influence on his practicing law."
In O'Reilly's opinion, petitioner is "fully rehabilitated," and he
would conduct himself in a law-abiding and ethical manner.
O'Reilly concluded that although he always had a high opinion of
petitioner, that opinion has been further increased by petitioner's
extensive volunteer community work.
	Petitioner also testified during the hearing. Petitioner stated
that if he were to attain a law license, he would treat it "[a]s if it
were gold." On several occasions during his testimony, petitioner
expressed remorse for his past misconduct. Petitioner testified that
he has "moved in every possible direction to correct that type of
behavior and to make sure that it won't happen again." According
to petitioner, his motivation for cooperating with the authorities
during the insurance scheme prosecution was to "try and correct
some of the harm that I did and put an end to it also." Petitioner
revealed that he testified in the criminal case involving other
defendants who had participated in the insurance scheme, even
though he had received death threats, and even though his
agreement with the prosecution did not require him to do so.
Petitioner also stated that by performing his present volunteer
community service, "I've tried to correct what I did or do what I
can to correct what I did." Although petitioner stated that he
realized that he cannot "erase" his past misconduct, he testified
that "I can do everything in my power to change myself, which I
have tried to do, tried to grow and develop in another direction
totally, and I'm very sorry for what I did." Petitioner also candidly
admitted to the Committee that he played a "major role" in the
insurance scheme, and acknowledged that he used his "insurance
experience" in furtherance of that scheme. Petitioner testified that
if he is ever able to practice law, his desire is to practice in the
public sector, perhaps even as an attorney with ECDO.
	Also submitted in support of petitioner's application for
admission were several affidavits attesting to his rehabilitation and
fitness. Judge George Leighton, formerly of the United States
district court and a past commissioner and chairman of the
Committee on Character and Fitness, stated that he became
acquainted with petitioner when petitioner was a student at John
Marshall. Judge Leighton averred that petitioner is a fit applicant
for admission to the bar and stressed that he does "not make this
statement lightly." Judge Leighton stated that petitioner has
conducted himself in an "outstanding fashion," and he
commended petitioner for his dedication to his volunteer work and
his willingness to assist those less fortunate. Judge Leighton
concluded by stating that petitioner has shown a "true desire to be
a productive contributing member of society" and that his conduct
"demonstrates that he has been totally rehabilitated."
	Also submitting affidavits on petitioner's behalf were several
faculty members of John Marshall Law School. Robert Johnston,
the dean of John Marshall, averred that prior to petitioner's
acceptance at the school, then-Dean Helen Thatcher interviewed
petitioner and reviewed the circumstance of his conviction. Dean
Johnston stated that, based upon conversations with John Marshall
faculty and staff, petitioner was open and candid with Thatcher
about the circumstances of his conviction. Dean Johnston further
stated that while a student at John Marshall, petitioner conducted
himself in an ethical manner and "accepted responsibility for his
conviction." Dean Johnston believes that petitioner understands
the ethical obligations of the legal profession and will abide by
them. Professor William Carroll averred that he became
acquainted with petitioner while he was a student in three of his
classes. Citing petitioner's extensive volunteer work on behalf of
indigent individuals, Professor Carroll concluded that petitioner
has "conducted himself in an exemplary fashion and has
demonstrated his rehabilitation."
	In sum, several highly regarded members of the legal
community offered evidence in support of petitioner's application
for admission to the bar. The import of this uncontroverted
evidence is that petitioner is a trustworthy and honest individual,
that he has been candid about his past misconduct, that he accepts
responsibility for his part in the insurance scheme, that he has
expressed remorse, and that, based upon his performance and
service to the community in the more than a decade that has
followed his conviction, his admission to the bar should be
approved. Indeed, both the Committee in its findings, and my
colleagues in their opinion, acknowledge that petitioner has
performed "a good amount of community service" since 1995, and
that he assembled an "impressive" group of character witnesses
who attested to his rehabilitation, remorse for his past conduct, and
his fitness to practice law. Inexplicably, however, both the
Committee and the majority discount the value of this
uncontradicted evidence, and instead resort to mere speculation
and unsupported conclusions as the basis for denying petitioner's
application for admission to the bar.
	Indeed, this court has recently spoken against relying on
speculation in the context of attorney fitness matters. In In re
Eckberg, 192 Ill. 2d 70 (2000), we held that imposition of
conditions upon an attorney's continued practice of law, based on
incapacity, was not warranted. We rejected the recommendation
of the Review Board that, based upon the attorney's past mental
health problems, he only be allowed to practice law on the
condition, inter alia, that he continue in the course of regular
mental health treatment to avert a relapse. We held that "[i]t would
be too speculative for this court to conclude that, in the future,
respondent will experience mental difficulties which will
incapacitate him from continuing to practice law." Eckberg, 192 Ill. 2d  at 89-90. Although the context of the case at bar is
somewhat different from that in Eckberg, this rationale applies
with equal force here, and establishes that the majority's reliance
upon speculation is inappropriate.
	For example, despite the extensive amount of evidence
introduced with respect to the scope, extent and beneficial value
of petitioner's volunteer work, the majority accepts the
Committee's unsupported conclusion that "the circumstances
present when the insurance fraud scheme was formulated back in
the 1980s provided a better insight into how Krule might perform
as a lawyer." Slip op. at 8. The majority draws a similarly
unsupported and hypothetical conclusion when it writes that
petitioner's "criminal scheme arose in the context of
circumstances comparable to those with which he would be faced
as an attorney, evincing an inability on Krule's part to carry out his
professional responsibilities honestly." Slip op. at 9. There is no
basis in the record from which the majority may validly rely upon
in such speculation.
	Additional unsupported and speculative conclusions are
accepted by the majority with respect to the motivation and
sincerity of petitioner's candor in acknowledging responsibility for
his part in the insurance scheme, as well as petitioner's remorse
for his past misconduct. Completely discounting the veracity of
petitioner's testimony, my colleagues not only accept that the
"Committee believed that [petitioner's] words and actions may
have been designed simply to satisfy the requirements of bar
admission, " but also accept that "to the extent [petitioner] was
remorseful, the Committee believed that it may have been remorse
that his conduct interfered with his bar admission rather than a
genuine appreciation for how his illegal conduct affected others."
Slip op. at 8. Again, there is no basis in this record from which the
majority can reject the evidence presented during the hearing and
speculate with respect to petitioner's motives.
	Finally, the majority also accepts the Committee's conclusion
that petitioner's work "did not entail the kind of independence or
the exercise of judgment that would permit a prediction about how
[he] would perform in a setting that did." Slip op. at 8. It appears,
however, that the Committee and the majority would require
petitioner to perform the impossible: to present a record of
"exercise of judgment" in a legal setting, comparable to that of an
attorney, when petitioner cannot validly engage in such conduct.
During his testimony, the Committee inquired of Robert Roy
whether petitioner, while performing volunteer work at ECDO,
had occasion to make "serious judgment calls." Roy replied that
petitioner faced a dilemma, and explained that there is "a fine line
there, because when you start talking about serious judgment calls,
what you're talking about is exercising discretion in the practice
of law, and I never wanted to put [petitioner] in the position of
doing that." Roy further testified that in an effort to remedy this
dilemma, he advised petitioner to apply for a Rule 711 license, so
that petitioner could perform limited legal services under his
supervision. Roy testified that after this application was rejected,
he was very mindful not to place petitioner in the position where
his actions could be construed as the unauthorized practice of law.
	 The decision of the majority to deny petitioner's application,
despite the fact that the record contains substantial, uncontradicted
evidence of petitioner's rehabilitation and present good moral
character and fitness to practice law, leads me to the conclusion
that, in this case, the majority has determined that regardless of the
amount of positive evidence presented in petitioner's favor, the
nature of petitioner's offense automatically precludes his
admission to the bar.
	The clear and unmistakable effect of denying this petitioner
the opportunity to sit for the bar examination is to impose
additional punishment upon him after he has been tried and served
the sentence which was deemed appropriate by agreement of the
court and the prosecution in his criminal case. What Justice Heiple
said in his dissenting opinion in People v. Malchow, No. 88228
(September 21, 2000), rings true here. Although Malchow
presented facts and issues different from the matter at bar, Justice
Heiple's thoughts are equally applicable here: "What matters is
that the State has already had its opportunity to impose whatever
measure of retribution against defendant the criminal law allows.
Once an offender has served his sentence, the punishment must
stop." Malchow, slip op. at 15-16 (Heiple, J., dissenting). In the
case at bar, the punishment has not stopped, but continues. One
wonders whether, because of the emphasis the majority places on
the seriousness of his crime many years after petitioner served the
sentence given him, many years after petitioner expressed remorse,
and after many years of performing satisfactorily his work in the
legal arena, petitioner will ever be allowed the opportunity to
obtain a license to practice law.
	For these reasons, I dissent from the denial of petitioner's
application for admission to the bar.
1.      1There is no indication in the record that Judge Fe was subpoenaed.
He appears to have given testimony on Krule's behalf voluntarily. If that
is so, we feel constrained to point out Judge Fe's decision to support
Krule at his hearing may violate canon 2(B) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct (155 Ill. 2d R. 62(B)), which expressly states that "a judge
should not testify voluntarily as a character witness."