Case Title: Canarelli v. Dist. Court

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 72

Docket Number: 57032

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-11-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
427 Nev., Advance Opinion 72.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

LAWRENCE CANARELLI,
Petitioner,

vs.
‘THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE
SUSAN JOHNSON, DISTRICT JUDGE.
Respondents,

and
AMERICAN WEST HOMES, INC.;
MICHAEL A. AND SPRING H. STACY;
ANDREA AND MARK BARBUTI;
MARJORIE I. AND MICHAEL J.
BRYANT; ARPINA AND ROLAND
DEVIO; CINDY AND ROBERT DODGE;
ANDRE FARKAS; EMERY J. HEFLEY;
ERIN OXLEY-HUERTA; KIMBERLY R.
AND RANDY D. JOHNSON; ROBERT
MARSHALL; LEO J. AND THERESA G.
MILLETTE; IONA AND RICHARD L.
QUISOL; HEDY AND WARD S,
REIMER; MARGARET AND VERDELL
SINGLETON; REBECCA AND
WILLIAM WRIGHT; DEMLER A. AND
VIRGINIA ZAMORA; PATRICIA J.
ALDERS; JAMES BARTON; LARRY J.
AND DARLENE L. CROW; ROSEMARY
DRIGGERS; DREW A. AND LAUREL L.
ERICKSON; KEVIN AND CAROLYN
FRAZIER; SONYA M. HENSON-

 

 

BROWN; MICHAEL AND ROBYN
KACMAN; ROBERT AND NORMA
JANDLE; TERRY AND STACY MOLL;
CAROL A. QUILES; LORI RIVES;
FRANK BE. AND MARGARET M,
RUSSO; MARK AND JOANNE,
SCHWARTZ; RICKY GOWDY; JAMES

 

 

 

No. 57032

FILED

HOV 4.5 204,

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os ee

 

C. DAVIS; STEVE AND JENNIFER
VERWEYST; JOHNNY AND ANNA
BILLINGS; JAMES A. AND DARLENE
J. MASON; ANGELITO AND JOY D.
PASION; THOMAS F. JANNAZZO;
DORA AND MICHAEL D. COLFORD,
SR.; GREGORY ARAM; ELIZABETH
ATKINS; JUDITH ARNOLD; STACEY
AUDISS; NORMA AND BIENVENIDO
BATAC; CARMEN L. BRUCE;
SALVATORE AND MARIBEL CAPANO;
SUSAN J. AND JOHN CATONE; MARK
P. CRUZ; KEVIN DALTON; ESTER
DELROSARIO; JOSE DIAZ; OSCAR
AND JACQUELINE DIAZ; ROBERT K.
AND SHEILA E. DUNCAN; MIGUEL.
ELIAS; MATTHEW ESCHKER; AMOS
FOSTER; ANALIA AND JAMES
GIBSON; DIANE AND JEROME
GIULIANO; ESTER M. AND JULIUS C,
GOMEZ; ELIZABETH AND
FRANCISCO GONZALES; KENNETH
W. GUSTAFSON; EMILY L. HALSEY;
DENNIS HEIM; BONNI AND DANIEL
K. ITAKURA; KAREN AND
AUGUSTINE A. JIMENEZ; RICHARD
AND ROBERTA KENNETT;
RACHELLE AND SCOTT LARSEN;
CHRIS AND DONNA LEE; KING |
KEUNG LEE; WAI HO LO; DEBORAH
K. AND PAUL E. LOFGREEN; DENISE

W. AND INA L. SKOGLUND; WESLEY
|
|

 

 

 

 

MCCUTCHEN; GUY R. AND PHYLLIS
MEDLIN; MARIA AND MICHAEL G.
MITCHELL; ALPHONSO AND WIPHA
MONTERIO; FRANKLYN AND
MELANIE MUELLER; BRENDA R.
AND RODRIGO A. REANO; BRIAN
AND TRACI ANN REYES; GORDON S.
ROMBOUGH; DEBRA RUANO;

JEANETTE A. AND RICHARD D.

 
   
 
 
    

2

  

 

 
1 100

       
   
   
   
   
     
  
    
  

SACKOL; GLORIA C. AND JOSEPH
SALAZAR, JR.; MICHAEL E.
SANFORD; WILLIAM SMITH; NORMA.
AND VICTOR SORIANO; OSCAR.
‘TEJADA; ALEXANDER AND LUCIA,
‘TORNO; ALPHONSO AND MARIA,
VANCHERI; FRANK J. WASHKO, JR.
AND GUADALUPE WEATHERLY,
Real Parties in Interest.

Original petition for a writ of certiorari or mandamus
challenging district court orders requiring petitioner to serve as trustee for
a dissolved corporation in a constructional defect action,

Petition granted.

Greenberg Traurig, LLP, and Mark E. Ferrario and Tami D. Cowden, Li

Vegas,
for Petitioner.

 

Lee, Hernandez, Brooks, Garofalo & Blake, APC, and David 8. Lee, Las
Vegas,
for Real Party in Interest American West Homes, Inc.

 

Shinnick, Ryan & Ransavage, P.C., and Duane E. Shinnick, Erie
Ransavage, and Bradley S. Rosenberg, Las Vegas,
for Real Parties in Interest.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION
By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

In this petition for extraordinary writ relief, we must
determine whether the district court may appoint an unwilling director

 

 

 
oo ie

trustee of a dissolved corporation for the purpose of defending actions
against the corporation that arose post-dissolution and after completion of
the winding-up process. ‘To resolve this issue, we must construe Nevada's
corporate survival statutes and, in particular, NRS 78.600, which allows
the district court to “continue the directors trustees as provided in NRS
78.590 upon dissolution.” We conclude that NRS 78.600 does not confer
authority upon the district court to appoint an unwilling director trustee
of a dissolved corporation because, once the director trustee has completed
winding up the affairs of the corporation as provided for in NRS 78.590,
his or her power to act on behalf of the corporation terminates. Thus, writ
relief is appropriate here.
FACTS

Real party in interest American West Fomes, Ine., was formed
as a Nevada corporation in 1990. Prior to 2004, American West
constructed homes in two residential developments in Las Vegas. On
January 29, 2004, the corporation filed a certificate of dissolution with the
Secretary of State pursuant to NRS 78.580 and dissolved. After the
dissolution, certain American West directors, including petitioner
Lawrence Canarelli, remained as trustees pursuant to NRS 78.585 and
participated in winding up corporate affairs. They completed the winding-
up process in March 2008, when all assets were distributed, and Canarelli
officially resigned as a director trustee on June 24, 2009.

Meanwhile, on November 18, 2008, over four years after
dissolution and several months after wind up, a group of homeowners filed
a construction defect complaint against American West. On July 1, 2009,

 
shortly after Canarelli resigned, a second group of homeowners filed a
separate construction defect complaint against American West.!' Both
he filed

 

complaints were served on Canarelli, and after being serve
motions to quash service and dismiss the complaints, arguing that his

duties as a trustee concluded when the wind-up process wi

 

completed
and American West's debts were extinguished and its property was
distributed to the shareholders. The district court denied the motions to
quash service and dismiss the complaints in both cases, finding that
effective pursuant to NRS 78.750(2)* because
he had been an officer and director of American West.

srvice upon Canarelli wi

 

‘The plaintiffs in each case then filed motions to appoint
Canarelli to continue as a trustee pursuant to NRS 78,600, They argued

 

that the statutory dissolution process requires director trustees to
continue service for the purpose of defending claims against the former
corporation, and, pursuant to Beazer Homes Nevada, Inc. v. District
Court, 120 Nev. 575, 97 P.3d 1132 (2004), post-dissolution claims may be
filed indefinitely, limited only by the applicable statutes of limitations and

repose. Furthermore, they argued that Canarelli should continue as

‘The remaining real parties in interest, excluding American West,
comprise the two groups of homeowners.

"Pursuant to NRS 78.750(2), service of process on a dissolved
corporation may be made on either the registered agent of the corporation
or on “[elach officer and director of the corporation as named in the list,
last filed with the Secretary of State before the dissolution or expiration of
the corporation or the forfeiture of its charter.”

8In this writ petition, Canarelli does not challenge the district
court's denial of his motions to quash service.

 

 
trustee because he profited from his position as a director of American
West. In his opposition, Canarelli argued that the corporate dissolution
statutes do not permit the district court to force him to act as trustee and
that requiring him to serve as trustee would be a form of indentured
servitude. The district court reluctantly granted the motions to appoint
Canarelli

 

trustee, finding that it was constrained by Beazer’s holding
that allows post-dissolution claims to be filed indefinitely. Canarelli then
filed this writ petition seeking this court's intervention by way of
extraordinary relief.
DISCUSSION

Canarelli petitions this court for either a writ of certiorari or
a writ of mandamus compelling the district court to vacate its order
appointing him as trustee in tho underlying matters. “A writ of
‘mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law
requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station or to control an
arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.” Williams v. Dist. Ct, 127
Nev. _, __, __ P.8d __, __ (Adv. Op. No. 45, July 28, 2011) (quoting
International Game Tech. v. Dist. Ct,, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556,
568 (2008)); see also NRS 34.160. A writ of mandamus will not issue if the
“petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary

“A writ of certiorari is appropriate to remedy jurisdictional excesses
committed by an inferior tribunal, board, or officer, exercising judicial
functions.” Las Vegas Police Prot. Ass'n v, Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 230, 241,
130 P.3d 182, 190 (2006); NRS 34.020(2). Because the district court had
jurisdiction to consider the motions filed in the underlying actions and
Canarelli is not challenging the denial of the motions to quash service, we
determine that a writ of certiorari is not the appropriate mechanism in
this matter.

 

 
ne

 

course of law.” Williams, 127 Nev. at, __ P.3d at __ (quoting
Mineral County v. State, Dep't of Conserv., 117 Nev. 285, 243, 20 P.8d
800, 805 (2001)); see NRS 34.170. Because Canarelli is not a party to the
construction defect actions below, he cannot appeal the final judgment and
he has no other adequate remedy at law. See Walton v. District Court, 94
Nev. 690, 693, 586 P.2d 309, 310 (1978) (the opportunity to appeal a final
judgment typically provides an adequate legal remedy). ‘Therefore, we
exercise our discretion to consider Canarelli’s petition for a writ of
mandamus. See Mineral County, 117 Nev. at 243, 20 P.d at 805 (holding

that a writ may issue “where an important issue of law neods clarification”

 

(internal quotation omitted)),

In his writ petition, Canarelli makes several arguments in
support of his position that the district court cannot force him to serve as a
director trustee for purposes of defending the underlying construction
:
forcing him to act as director trustee constitutes indentured servitude in

defect actions on behalf of American West. He primarily argues that

 

violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
(2) this court erred in Beazer Homes Nevada, Inc, v, District Court, 120
Nev. 575, 97 P.3d 1132 (2004), by concluding that post-dissolution claims
are limited only by the statutes of limitation or repose of the underlying
claim; and (3) the term “continue” in NRS 78.600 does not allow the
district court to appoint a director trustee who previously resigned from
that post several years after the corporation dissolved. In considering
Canarelli's arguments, however, we must examine NRS 78.585, 78.590,
and 78.600 in the context of Nevada's overall corporate survival scheme
and the statutory obligations of director trustees upon dissolution. In

 
nes

Nevada, corporate survival and director trustees’ post-dissolution duties
are two separate concepts.
‘The district court cannot require arelli to continue as director trustee
In granting the motions to appoint Canarelli to continue as
director trustee of American West, the district court noted that it had to
harmonize the applicable statutes with this court's holding in Beazer.
Canarelli argues that the statutes do not give the district court discretion
to force him to “continue” as director trustee after he resigned from that
post. We review the “district court's conclusions of law, including
statutory interpretations, de novo.” Borger v, Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 1021,
1026, 102 P.3d 600, 604 (2004).
To resolve this writ petition, we examine NRS 78.585, 78.590,

 

and 78.600 to determine whether a district court may appoint an
unwilling director trustee of a dissolved corporation to continue as a
director trustee for the purpose of defending actions against the
corporation that arose post-dissolution and after the completion of the
winding-up process.’ NRS 78.585 governs the “[continuation of
corporation(s} after dissolution,” NRS 78.590 delineates the powers of
director trustees upon dissolution, and NRS 78.600 provides for the
continuation of director trustees or the appointment of a receiver to handle
corporate affairs after dissolution. Our analysis requires that we look to
the plain meaning of these statutes, J.E. Dunn Nw, v, Corus Constr.

°A claim arises for NRS 78.585 purposes when it is discovered or
should have been discovered. See Desert Fireplaces Plus. Inc. v, Dist. Ct.,
120 Nev. 632, 636-37, 97 P.3d 607, 609 (2004).

 
Venture, 127 Nev. __, _, 249 P.3d 501, 505 (2011), and we construe the

 

statutes to preserve harmony among them. Nevada Power Co. v.
Haggertv, 115 Nev. 353, 364, 989 P.2d 870, 877 (1999), However, we first
examine Nevada's statutory scheme for corporate survival and the
statutory powers of director trustees to wind up the affairs of a
corporation.

At common law, dissolution terminated the legal life of a
corporation. 16A William Meade Fletcher et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of
the Law of Private Corporations § 8113, at 216 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 2003);
Beazer, 120 Nev. at 581, 97 P.3d at 1136. However, every state ha
adopted statutes that provide for the survival of the corporation for limited
purposes, Fletcher et al., supra, § 8113, at 220, In Nevada, NRS 78.585
allows the corporation to exist post-dissolution for “prosecuting and
defending suits, actions, proceedings and claims of any kind or character
[arising before its dissolution] by or against it and of enabling it gradually
to settle and close its business, to collect and discharge its obligations, to
dispose of and convey its property, and to distribute its assets."* That

The Legislature amended NRS 78.585 in 2011. That statute now
states that

[t]he dissolution of a corporation does not impair
any remedy or cause of action available to or
against it or its directors, officers or shareholders
arising before its dissolution and commenced
within 2 years after the date of the dissolution.
‘The corporation continues as a body corporate for
the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits,
actions, proceedings and claims of any kind or
character by or against it and of enabling it
gradually to settle and close its business, to collect
continued on next page . ..

 

 

 
os

statute also provides that any claims against the corporation arising
before dissolution must be “commenced within 2 years after the date of the
dissolution.” NRS 78.585.

‘This ongoing corporate existence is distinct from the statutory

 

continuation of directors as trustees for the purpose of winding up
corporate affairs. See Willmschen v. Trinity Lakes Improvement, 840
N.E.2d 1275, 1280 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“Under the common law, a
corporation is a legal entity that exists separate and distinct from its
shareholders, officers, and directors.”); Black's Law Dictionary 340 (6th ed.
1990) (‘The corporation is distinct from the individuals who comprise it.”)
Pursuant to NRS 78.590, the former directors automatically become
trustees of the corporation upon dissolution “with full power to wind up

the business.”” Kelly Broadcasting v, Sovereign Broadcast, 96 Nev. 188,

continued

its assets, to collect and discharge its obligations,
to dispose of and convey its property, to distribute
its money and other property among the
stockholders, after paying or adequately providing
for the payment of its liabilities and obligations,
and to do every other act to wind up and liquidate
its business and affairs, but not for the purpose of
continuing the business for which it was
established.

2011 Nev. Stat., ch. 455, § 50, at 2791. However, this amendment does not

affect our analysis here.

 

‘The Legislature also amended Nevada's corporate dissolution
statutes in 2011 for the purpose of “allow[ing] the Nevada corporation to
dissolve in an orderly, predictable and structured process.” Hearing on

continued on next page...

10

 
om

 

190, 606 P.2d 1089, 1091 (1980), superseded by statute on other grounds
as stated in Countrywide Home Loans v. Thitchener, 124 Nev. 725, 741-
43, 192 P.8d 243, 258-55 (2008). Although they are not trustees of a trust,
in terms of the law of trusts, the director trustees of a dissolved

continued

$.B. 405 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 76th Leg. (Nev., April 5,
2011). Specifically, NRS 78.590(1) now states that director trustees have

full power to prosecute and defend suits, actions,
proceedings and claims of any kind or character by
‘or against the corporation and of enabling the
corporation gradually to settle and close its
business, to collect its assets, to collect and
discharge its obligations, to dispose of and convey
its property, and to distribute its money and other
property among the stockholders, after paying or
adequately providing for the payment of its
liabilities and obligations, and to do every other
act to wind up and liquidate its business and
affairs, but not for the purpose of continuing the
business for which the corporation was
‘established.

2011 Nev. Stat., ch. 455, § 51, at 2791.

Although we may consider amendments as indicative of legislative
intent, this rule of statutory construction does not apply unless the
Legislature was clarifying prior language. Publ
Prog. v. LVMPD, 124 Nev. 138, 157, 179 P.3d 542, 554-55 (2008)
(explaining that “when a statute's ‘doubtful interpretation’ is made clear
through subsequent legislation, we may consider the subsequent
legislation persuasive evidence of what the Legislature originally
intended” (quoting Matter of Estate of Thomas, 116 Nev. 492, 495, 998
P.2d 560, 562 (2000)). Here, the Legislature did not clarify doubtful
language in the statute, and we thus will not consider the 2011
amendment to NRS 78.590(1) in this analysis.

  

u

 
corporation serve the interests of shareholders in settling the corporation's
affairs and liquidating its assets. Fletcher et al., supra, §§ 8175, 8178, at
352-63, 361-62; see also United States v. Krueger, 121 F.2d 842, 844 (8d
Cir. 1941) (’Liquidating directors are not trustees in the sense of the law
of trusts.”).

NRS 78.590 also sets forth the statutory powers the director
trustees have in settling the affairs of the corporation, which include
“collect[ing] the outstanding debts, sellfing] and conveyling] the property,
real and personal, and divid[ing] the money and other property among the
stockholders, after paying or adequately providing for the payment of its
liabilities and obligations.” However, Nevada does not specifically define
what constitutes winding up, so we look to the common definition of that
term. See Wyman v, State, 125 Nev. _, __, 217 P.8d 672, 583 (2009)
(stating that when the Legislature does not specifically define a term, this

 

court “presume[s} that the Legislature intended to use words in their
usual and natural meaning.” (alteration in original) (quoting McGrath v.
State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 123 Nev. 120, 123, 159 P.3d 239, 241 (2007))).
Black's Law Dictionary defines “winding up” as “[t]he process of settling
accounts and liquidating assets in anticipation of a partnership's or a
corporation's dissolution.” 1738 (9th ed. 2009). Therefore, we determine
that winding up is complete upon the final disposition of assets to the
shareholders and the payment of debt to creditors. Notably, this
definition, as well as the powers bestowed by statute upon director
trustees in NRS 78.590, does not include defending actions against the
corporation that arise post-dissolution and after the director trustee has
completed the winding-up process for the corporation. ‘Thus, while the

corporation continues as a legal entity for the purpose of post-dissolution

 

 
claims, we determine that a director trustee's statutory power to act on
behalf of the dissolved corporation terminates once the wind-up process is
complete. In light of this distinction, we examine the district court's
authority to appoint a director trustee to handle post winding-up
activities.

Pursuant to NRS 78,600, the district court may continue the
service of a director trustee of a dissolved corporation in certain situations.
When any corporation organized under this
chapter shalll be dissolved or cease to exist in any
manner whatever, the district court, on
application of any creditor or stockholder of the
corporation, at any time, may either continue the
directors trustees as provided in NRS 78.590, or
appoint one or more persons to be receivers of and
for the corporation, to take charge of the estate
and effects thereof, and to collect the debts and
property due and belonging to the corporation,
with power to prosecute and defend, in the name
of the corporation, or otherwise, all such suits as
may be necessary or proper for the purposes

aforesaid
‘Thus, this statute allows the district court to continue a director trustee
for the purpose of exercising his or her winding-up powers pursuant to
NRS 78.590. However, we conclude that NRS 78.600 does not confer

authority upon the district court to appoint an unwilling director trustee

‘We note that nothing in the statutes prevents a director trustee of a
dissolved corporation from resigning after completion of the wind-up
process. Also, the amendment to NRS 78.590(1), which bestows upon
director trustees the power to prosecute and defend suits, does not alter
the conclusion that a director trustee's power to act on behalf of a
dissolved corporation terminates once wind-up is complete.

 

 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
    
     

of a dissolved corporation whose winding-up process has been completed to
serve as director trustee of the dissolved corporation in order to defend
against a post-dissolution claim that was unknown to the corporation prior
to the corporation winding up its affairs, NRS 78.600 clearly provides that
the district court “may ... continue the directors trustees as provided in
NRS 78.590,” and nothing in NRS 78.690 gives a director trustee the
power to defend against post-dissolution claims unknown until after the
corporation has completed winding up its affairs

Here, the district court, upon application of the plaintifis,
director trustee of American West to

 

appointed Canarelli to continue
defend against actions brought by the plaintiffs several years after the
corporation had dissolved and after the winding-up process had been
completed. Canarelli opposed having to continue as director trustee,
arguing that his obligation to American West ended once its debts were
extinguished and its property was distributed among the shareholders.
Because we conclude that NRS 78.600 does not confer authority to require
an unwilling director trustee to continue as director trustee after a
dissolved corporation has completed the winding-up process, we conclude
that the district court abused its discretion when it appointed Canarelli to
continue as director trustee.?
Finally, real parties in interest ask us to overturn our holding
in Beazer Homes Nevada, Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 575, 584, 97 P.3d
A director trustee may be required to “provid{e] for the payment of
[the corporation's] liabilities and obligations” as part of its winding-up
activities. NRS 78.590. However, the parties do not argue, and we

therefore do not reach, whether the director trustees of American West
fulfilled this obligation,

 

 
1182, 1138 (2004). We decline to do so at this time because the analysis in
Beazer does not apply to the appointment of a former director trustee to
represent the corporation after completion of the wind-up process. Rather,
Beazer dealt with an entirely different issue—the applicability of an
appropriate statute of limitations period for post-dissolution claims. Id.
at 580, 586-87, 97 P.Sd at 1135, 1139. As such, overturning Beazer would
not resolve the district court's authority to appoint an unwilling director
trustee after a corporation's affairs have been successfully wound up
because the statutes setting forth a director trustee's powers and
obligations, NRS 78.600 and NRS 78.590, do not require director trustees
to defend post-dissolution (post-windup) elaims."?

In Beazer, this court examined whether NRS 78.585 barred post-
dissolution claims even though the statute refers only to pre-dissolution
claims. 120 Nev. at 680, 97 P.3d at 1135, Because NRS 78.585 is silent as
to unknown post-dissolution claims, this court determined that the statute
was ambiguous, and it analyzed the statute's legislative history. Id. at
580-81, 97 P.3d at 1135-36. This court determined that, when NRS 78.585
was enacted in 1985, the Legislature based the statute on the Model
Business Corporation Act of 1969. Id, at 682 & n.24, 97 P.8d at 1137 &
n.24. However, as this court recognized, while the Act's 1984 amendments
provided a separate limitations period for post-dissolution claims, the 1969,
version was silent as to those unknown claims. Id. at 583, 97 P.3d at
1137. This court then concluded that the Legislature intended NRS
78.586 to incorporate the 1984 amendments, despite the fact that the
Legislature expressly adopted the 1969 version. Id, at 583-84, 97 P.3d at
1137-38. Whether Beazer's analysis is flawed, however, is not directly
before us in this proceeding.

 

 

'Because of our disposition, we do not reach Canarelli’s argument
that appointing an unwilling director trustee violates the ‘Thirteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

15

 
Accordingly, we conclude that Canarelli cannot be compelled
to act as director trustee for American West, and we grant Canarelli’
petition for extraordinary relief and direct the clerk of this court to issue a
writ of mandamus instructing the district court to set aside its order
appointing Canarelli to continue as a director trustee for the purpose of

defending against the underlying claims.12

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Pickering Parraguirre

We recognize the practical problems created for plaintiffs who
bring post-dissolution claims against corporations who have successfully
wound up their affairs, However, solutions to this issue must be
formulated in the district court or by the Legislature. Only the
Legislature can reconsider the Model Business Corporation Act of 1984,
which extends the statute of limitations against corporations for post-
dissolution claims in a manner that addresses not only the right to pursue
claims but also the party who must be responsible for defonding the
corporation in post-windup litigation.