Case Title: Idaho v. Alvarado

Citation: 

Docket Number: 47341

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2021-02-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 47341 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
      Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
ALFREDO ALVARADO, 
 
     Defendant-Appellant. 
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Boise, January 2021 Term 
 
Opinion filed: February 18, 2021 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk  
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Twin Falls County. Roger B. Harris, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant. Jason 
Pintler argued. 
 
            Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Jeff Nye argued. 
 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
MOELLER, Justice. 
 
 
In this appeal we are asked to clarify the meaning and extent of a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to conflict-free counsel. Appellant Alfredo Alvarado (“Alvarado”) argues his 
rights were violated because his public defender had previously represented a witness who was 
adverse to him on a felony charge. After disclosing the conflict, Alvarado’s attorney agreed that 
he and the public defender’s office would decline any future representation of the witness. 
However, Alvarado argues that counsel continued to have an actual conflict of interest because his 
ongoing ethical duties to the witness and former client prevented him from effectively cross-
examining the witness. Alvarado argues that this resulted in a structural defect in the trial, which 
necessitates overturning his convictions. In the alternative, Alvarado argues his unified aggregate 
sentence of twenty years to life for attempted strangulation and domestic abuse was excessive. 
 
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I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On the night of July 13, 2018, the Twin Falls Police Department received a call to search 
for Tina Verret (“Verret”), who could not be found after she had left her home earlier that evening 
following an argument with her boyfriend, Alvarado. Officers eventually found Verret and 
Alvarado near a Lowe’s Home Improvement store. Verret, who appeared to have been battered, 
told the officers Alvarado had tried to kill her. After law enforcement questioned both parties, 
Alvarado was arrested for domestic battery. He was later charged with three felonies—attempted 
strangulation, domestic battery, and intimidation of a witness—along with five misdemeanors 
concerning no-contact order violations and telephone harassment. Part II of the Information 
contained a persistent violator enhancement. 
Verret’s son, Garrett Peak (“Peak”), and his girlfriend, Kamille Davies (“Davies”), both 
witnessed the events that preceded the attack and observed Verret’s injuries when she returned 
home. During the trial, the prosecution called Verret, Peak, and Davies to testify. Prior to the 
prosecution’s direct examination of Peak, Alvarado’s attorney, George Essma (“Essma”) of the 
Twin Falls Public Defender’s Office, notified the court that he had previously represented Peak on 
a felony possession of a controlled substance charge. Peak had pleaded guilty to that charge and 
had been placed on probation two months before Alvarado’s trial. The Twin Falls Public 
Defender’s Office was also representing Peak on pending misdemeanor charges for which he was 
presently in custody awaiting trial.  
Essma explained that although the State had disclosed Peak on its witness list, he did not 
associate the name with his former client because the State had mistakenly listed Peak’s address 
as the Twin Falls County Prosecutor’s Office. Essma expressed concern that his prior relationship 
with Peak might create a conflict in his representation of Alvarado or future representation of Peak:  
I think in order for me to protect Mr. Peak’s ability to be represented by fair and 
impartial counsel down the road, if that’s what’s going to happen—and I don’t 
know—and for me to be able to proceed in this trial, I am going to have to—the 
Public—the Twin Falls Public Defender’s Office is going to have to conflict any 
further activity on Mr. Peak’s case to another attorney outside the main Public 
Defender’s Office, I believe. So I just wanted to make a record of that. 
 
The district court confirmed with Peak that he was currently in jail on misdemeanor charges 
and that he had not discussed those charges with Essma. The district court also observed that, given 
the misdemeanors, Peak might face probation violations in his felony case, and Essma would not 
be able to represent him. Peak agreed that Essma and the Twin Falls Public Defender’s Office 
 
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could withdraw from future representation of him. Essma and the prosecutor each indicated they 
were satisfied with the record made by the district court. Alvarado was present, seated next to 
Essma when this discussion took place; however, the district court did not ask Alvarado if he still 
approved of Essma continuing to represent him in his case.  
 
On direct examination, Peak was called to testify about the events leading up to and 
following the attempted strangulation and domestic battery of Verret. Peak wore a jail-issued 
orange jumpsuit while in court. He testified that Alvarado was dating Verret and had recently 
moved in with her. Peak, Davies, and Davies’ young son also lived in the house. On July 13, 2018, 
Peak overheard Verret and Alvarado arguing about “indecent gestures” Alvarado had been accused 
of making toward Davies. Peak confronted Alvarado and asked him to leave, but Alvarado only 
went as far as the front yard, where he banged on the door and window, challenging Peak to fight 
him. Peak went outside and pushed Alvarado, who fell backwards over a bicycle and landed in the 
street. Peak asked Alvarado if he wanted to continue fighting and Alvarado declined. Verret and 
Davies came outside and Alvarado insisted that Davies had offered to have sex with him in return 
for drugs. Verret asked Davies and Peak to go inside and calm down. Peak smoked a cigarette 
before returning to the front yard where he found Alvarado and his mother had gone. Peak went 
out searching for Verret but did not find her. When Verret returned home later that night, Peak 
testified that she was “scared, frantic, [and] pretty battered” and that she “was bleeding from her 
nose and lips,” “had clumps of hair missing out of her head,” “had bruises on her throat [and] 
shoulders,” and torn clothes.  
 
Before Essma cross-examined Peak, the prosecutor moved to prohibit Essma from asking 
Peak about why he was in custody because Peak did not have any convictions that were admissible 
under Idaho Rule of Evidence 609 for impeachment purposes, and he was currently in custody for 
alcohol use. Essma countered that, as a general matter, he should be allowed to ask questions about 
who the witness was, stating, “[i]t’s not getting into character; it’s just a matter of setting the stage 
for where we’re at with the witness the State proffered.” Essma claimed that other judges had 
allowed him to ask a witness generally about whether he was in custody for a criminal matter and 
the nature of the criminal matter, as well as whether any people involved in the present case were 
also involved in the witness’s criminal case. The district court said it would review Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 609, and Essma reiterated that his inquiry did not relate to character, saying, “the jury 
 
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sees a person coming in orange; I think they’re entitled to have some basic questions answered. 
And they’re relevant because I know why he’s in jail.”  
Essma then pivoted and argued instead that the evidence was admissible under Idaho Rules 
of Evidence 401 and 403: 
Mr. Peak is alleged to have committed domestic violence in two misdemeanor cases 
against Kamille . . . Davies, the very person who had been—he has mentioned is a 
participant in the activity that he’s testified to under oath. I think it’s relevant for 
the jury to hear, ‘Well, Mr. Peak, you’ve mentioned Kamille, but you yourself have 
committed a domestic battery against her; isn’t that correct?’ I think it’s relevant. 
The district court asked in what respect that information would be relevant, noting that it did not 
go to the witness’s propensity for truthfulness. Essma answered that it was not a matter of 
truthfulness but was “probative,” and that its probative value outweighed the risk of prejudice: 
Because he’s on the stand testifying against my client as a witness to what he says 
is a domestic violence when he, in fact, is being accused of the same crime against 
one of the very people that were [sic] at the scene that have accused my client. And 
I think the jury could know, ‘Gee, that’s why he’s in orange.’ It’s relevant, and it’s 
more probative—why is it prejudicial? It’s true. It’s what happened. This is who 
the State put on. That’s not my fault.   
When the district court explained that it still did not understand how the information was relevant, 
Essma continued to argue that it was relevant to the weight the jury would give Peak’s testimony 
because “[p]erhaps a juror would say ‘Look, well, yeah, he’s trying to take Mr. Alvarado down. It 
will make him feel better.’ ” The district court sustained the objection to the line of questioning 
about why Peak was in custody.  
 
Essma then moved to strike Peak’s testimony, arguing that the State violated a pre-trial 
discovery order because it had failed to disclose Peak’s criminal record and that he was in jail. The 
State averred that Essma and the Twin Falls Public Defender’s Office had represented Peak and 
so they knew about his criminal record and his incarceration and also offered a continuance to let 
Essma review Peak’s criminal record. The district court overruled Essma’s objection to Peak’s 
testimony because once again it found no reason why Peak’s prior convictions would be relevant. 
Once the cross examination began, Essma did not question Peak about his past convictions or why 
he was in custody.  
 
Davies’ testimony was similar to Peak’s. She testified that Alvarado had made sexual 
comments about her, which Alvarado and Verret argued about on July 13, 2018. Davies also 
testified that Peak had intervened in the argument, asking Alvarado to leave, and that Alvarado 
 
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had stayed in the yard, yelling, and Peak had gone outside and pushed him. Davies stated that, 
when Verret returned home later, she was “very battered”: 
She was very upset. Her hair was pulled out into pieces. You could see it shedding. 
She had scratch marks from her forehead all the way down to her chest. She was 
very in shock at first when she showed up. She wasn't crying yet. And then when 
she sat down, you could tell she was hurting. She was in a lot of pain. 
 
Verret described essentially the same events as Davies and Peak leading up to her leaving 
the house with Alvarado. She then testified that later, when she tried to go home, Alvarado grabbed 
her by the arm, pulled her behind a gas station, and pushed her to the ground. Verret tried to leave 
again and Alvarado threw her to the ground and laid on top of her. When Verret tried to yell for 
help, Alvarado put a hand over her mouth and then a hand around her neck, squeezing her throat 
until she could not breathe. Alvarado then said he was sorry and phoned his sister and had Verret 
speak with her. Verret asked Alvarado’s sister to phone 911, and Alvarado took the phone from 
Verret and slapped her. Verret then tried to run and Alvarado kicked her in the face and arm and 
told her “[y]ou’re never going to go home again” and “[y]our kids will never see you again.” He 
dragged her by the arm and hair to two other locations. Verret then told Alvarado he could come 
home with her. As they walked, Verret saw a police officer and ran toward him. The officer then 
intervened. 
 
Officer Dixon testified about what happened when he responded to a call to search for 
Verret. Dixon testified that when he saw them, Verret came toward him saying, “I need you. I need 
you,” and “[w]e need to get out of here.” Officer Wendlandt also responded to the call and testified 
that Verret was examined by emergency service personnel because she was complaining about 
neck pain from being strangled. Officer Wendlandt also observed Verret running her fingers 
through her hair and removing clumps of hair. Officer Kraft, the lead officer, arrived at the scene 
and spoke with Verret. Officer Kraft “observed some marks on her neck” and that her nose looked 
swollen, and she had blood on her face and a cut on her leg. He also testified that it appeared Verret 
had been drinking, but was not impeded from communicating. Alvarado told Officer Kraft that he 
had also been injured, but Officer Kraft could not see any injuries on Alvarado. Alvarado told the 
officer that Verret’s injuries occurred when she attempted to run away and fell down. However, 
Officer Kraft stated that Verret’s injuries did not match with Alvarado’s story. Officer Kraft then 
arrested Alvarado and charged him with attempted strangulation and domestic battery, and the 
district court entered an order prohibiting Alvarado from contacting Verret. While in jail, however, 
 
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Alvarado twice sent letters to Verret and phoned her multiple times, resulting in the four counts of 
violating the no contact order and one count of telephone harassment. The letters contained 
incriminating statements by Alvarado in which he admitted and apologized for the injuries he 
caused.  
 
Alvarado testified to a different version of the events. Alvarado claimed that Davies would 
flirt with him when they were alone, which made him uncomfortable. He alleged that on July 13, 
2018, he was at home with Davies and she propositioned him, asking him to buy her heroin in 
exchange for sex. Alvarado called Verret at work to tell her what had happened but Verret was 
busy. When Verret got home, she was angry Alvarado had kept calling her at work, and they 
argued about Davies. Both continued to drink beer and Verret became intoxicated. When he was 
in the front yard trying to explain what had happened, Verret, Peak, and Davies all started yelling 
at him, they pushed him against a car in the driveway, and punched him. Alvarado testified that he 
threw a punch that hit Verret, and Peak pushed Alvarado over his bicycle. Peak and Davies then 
went inside, and Alvarado and Verret went for a walk. He testified that Verret was still intoxicated 
and not wearing shoes, and she fell over, injuring herself.  
The jury found Alvarado guilty of attempted strangulation, domestic battery, four no 
contact order violations, and telephone harassment; however, he was acquitted of intimidating a 
witness. Alvarado then admitted to the persistent violator enhancement in Part II of the 
Information. Alvarado was later sentenced on the two felony counts to a unified aggregate sentence 
of life imprisonment, with the first twenty years fixed.1 He timely appealed.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case primarily concerns an indigent defendant’s right to counsel, as protected under 
the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. We freely review constitutional issues, which are 
questions of law. State v. Baeza, 161 Idaho 38, 40, 383 P.3d 1208, 1210 (2016). However, in 
determining whether a defendant has been properly afforded his rights under the Constitution in a 
particular case, we must look to the facts as found by the trial court. We will defer to the trial 
court’s factual findings unless they are shown from the record to be clearly erroneous. State v. 
Samuel, 165 Idaho 746, 755, 452 P.3d 768, 777 (2019).  
                                                 
1 The district court also sentenced Alvarado to 180-day concurrent sentences on each of the misdemeanor charges; 
however, he has only appealed his felony sentences. 
 
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III.  ANALYSIS  
A.  
Alvarado has failed to show his counsel’s representation constituted a fundamental 
error. 
Where a defendant alleges a constitutional violation occurred during trial, but failed to 
make a contemporaneous objection, Idaho appellate courts apply the fundamental error doctrine. 
State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 119, 443 P.3d 129, 133 (2019), reh'g denied (June 12, 2019). To 
obtain relief under the fundamental error doctrine, an appellant must show the following: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant’s unwaived 
constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or obvious, without 
the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, 
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision; and 
(3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant’s 
substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the 
outcome of the trial proceedings. 
Id. (quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010)). Inasmuch as Alvarado 
did not object to a possible conflict of interest at the trial, he must meet this standard to succeed 
on his claims. Thus, in order to establish that his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel 
was violated, Alvarado must show that Essma’s prior representation of Peak and continued 
representation of Alvarado constituted fundamental error. He has failed to do so. 
1. Alvarado has failed to demonstrate a violation of his right to counsel. 
The first prong of the fundamental error doctrine requires a defendant to show a violation 
of an unwaived constitutional right. See Miller, 165 Idaho at 119, 443 P.3d at 133. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that a defendant who did not object at trial to their counsel’s conflict of 
interest can establish a violation of their Sixth Amendment rights by demonstrating “that an actual 
conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 
348 (1980). According to Alvarado, Essma’s ongoing duties to Peak were directly adverse to 
Alvarado’s interests because Essma was prevented from cross-examining Peak about his 
probationary status—a status which left Peak open to possible influence by the State, but which 
Essma did not point out. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. Thus, we must first determine whether the 
respective duties Essma owed to Peak and Alvarado created an actual conflict of interest that 
adversely affected Essma’s cross-examination of Peak.  
According to the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer shall not represent clients 
with a concurrent conflict of interest unless each client provides informed consent, in writing. 
I.R.P.C. 1.7(b). The rule describes circumstances where a concurrent conflict of interest exists, 
 
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including where “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person 
or by the personal interests of the lawyer, including family and domestic relationships.” I.R.P.C. 
1.7(a)(2). The comments to Rule 1.7 emphasize that “[c]oncurrent conflicts of interest can arise 
from the lawyer’s responsibilities to . . . a former client[.]” I.R.P.C. 1.7 cmt. 1. Although Essma 
and the public defender’s office had declined any future representation of Peak prior to Essma’s 
cross-examination of him, we must nonetheless consider whether Essma’s ongoing duties to Peak 
as a former client created a “significant risk” that Essma would be “materially limited” in 
effectively questioning Peak. Several factors persuade us that no such significant risk existed. 
 
First, the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct describe the duties owed to former clients, 
which include that “[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present 
or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:”  
(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former 
client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or when 
the information has become generally known . . . . 
I.R.P.C. 1.9(c)(1). Again, the comments clarify the rule: “[t]he underlying question is whether the 
lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as 
a changing of sides in the matter in question.” I.R.C.P. 1.9 cmt. 2. Importantly, Comment 3 adds 
further clarification: “Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse 
to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying . . .” I.R.C.P. 1.9 cmt. 3. 
Alvarado argues that Essma was ethically obligated “to advise Mr. Peak about his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination,” which he states prevented Essma from asking about 
Peak’s probationary status. There are two problems with this argument. First, Peak’s convictions 
and probationary status were public information at the time of Alvarado’s trial. Thus, Essma did 
not owe a duty of confidentiality to Peak to withhold such information because the State was 
already aware of Peak’s past and current criminal charges. Second, the use of public information 
about Peak’s probation status or past record to suggest bias was not incriminating—it only would 
have affected his credibility in this proceeding. Had Essma cross-examined Peak about his 
probationary status at trial, it would not have necessarily resulted in any self-incriminating 
disclosures. Any attempt to impeach Peak’s testimony by suggesting that he had made a deal with 
the State, or that he maintained a hope that his testimony would somehow curry favor with the 
State, is not comparable to counsel “changing sides” on a matter in which he represented a client. 
 
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Eliciting testimony from a former client that may damage his credibility in a proceeding where he 
is merely a witness, is not equivalent to violating his right to self-incrimination or “changing 
sides,” provided the testimony only concerns matters of public record and does not breach the 
continuing duty of confidentiality.    
We must also consider whether the district court satisfied its duty to inquire about the 
potential for bias.  
[A] trial court has an affirmative duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever 
it knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict may exist. [A] trial 
court’s examination of the potential conflict must be thorough and searching and 
should be conducted on the record. The adequacy of the trial court’s inquiry is a 
constitutional issue over which we exercise free review. 
State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 793, 419 P.3d 1042, 1091 (2018) (internal quotations omitted). A 
court’s determination of whether an actual conflict of interest exists “rests in large part on analysis 
that only defense counsel can conduct.” Id. at 793, 419 P.3d at 1091 (citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 
346 (“[T]rial courts necessarily rely in large measure upon the good faith and good judgment of 
defense counsel” in determining the presence of a conflict.)).  
This Court has observed that, while courts rely on the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
to determine whether an actual conflict exists, the body of analysis is dependent on “specific and 
complete information about the nature and depth of each client’s representation by counsel, which 
is information only counsel would have.” Hall, 163 Idaho at 793, 419 P.3d at 1091. In Hall, we 
found that the district court did not err in relying on defense counsel’s assessment that no conflict 
was present between Hall and a witness whom counsel also represented, nor did the district court 
err in allowing questioning of the witness to proceed based on counsel’s assessment. Id. This also 
reflects the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Cuyler that a trial court is required to investigate 
timely objections to multiple representation; however, if no objection is made a trial court may 
assume that no conflict exists. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 346. 
Here, Peak notified the district court that he had represented Peak in the past and that he 
and the public defender’s office would decline future representation of Peak. The district court 
noted that Peak was currently incarcerated on misdemeanors—on which Essma had not 
represented him—and that Peak might face probation violations on his felony case. Peak agreed 
that Essma and the public defenders’ office could withdraw from future representation, and Essma 
and the prosecutor stated that they were satisfied with the arrangement. No one raised the issue of 
whether those potential probation violations might create a conflict of interest in the present case. 
 
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However, the district court did not err in relying on Essma to evaluate the potential for an additional 
conflict of interest. As Cuyler establishes, because no further objection was made, the district court 
was free to assume no other conflict existed. Further, the district court, like the court in Hall, was 
permitted to rely on counsel’s assessment of the potential for conflict and to proceed with the 
cross-examination. 
Finally, even if an actual conflict existed, there is substantial evidence that Essma’s 
performance was not adversely affected by it. Essma attempted to question Peak about his current 
incarceration, explaining first to the court that it was merely background information and later that 
he wanted to introduce the fact that Peak had also committed an act of domestic violence, thereby 
undermining Peak’s credibility. However, the district court rejected this line of questioning, 
finding it irrelevant to the witness’s reputation for honesty. Although Essma did not point to the 
potential for demonstrating bias due to the State’s supposed influence over Peak, the fact that 
Essma attempted to ask questions about Peak’s incarceration still strongly suggests Essma was not 
avoiding the issue of Peak’s convictions out of a professional ethical duty. See Chippewa v. State, 
156 Idaho 915, 921–22, 332 P.3d 827, 833–34 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 240 
F.3d 348, 361 (4th Cir.2001) (en banc) “[T]he [defendant] must establish that the defense counsel’s 
failure to pursue that strategy or tactic was linked to the actual conflict.”)). This situation is similar 
to Hall, where this Court found that a potential conflict had no adverse effect because the witness, 
whom counsel also represented, testified in an orange jumpsuit and the defense attorney asked 
about the circumstances of her confinement. 163 Idaho at 794, 419 P.3d at 1092. This Court found 
Hall’s attorney had not treated the witness in an appreciably different manner from any of the other 
witnesses, which supported its finding that any conflict of interest had not had an adverse effect 
on counsel’s performance. Id. Similarly, Peak appeared in court in an orange jump suit, and Essma 
attempted to question Peak about his incarceration. Though the district court did not allow him to 
proceed with that line of questioning, his attempt indicates that he treated Peak as he would have 
any other witness, regardless of their past attorney-client relationship. Thus, there is no indication 
Essma’s prior representation of Peak had an adverse effect on his actual performance. For these 
reasons, we hold that Alvarado’s right to conflict-free counsel was not violated, and he has failed 
to satisfy the first prong of the fundamental error doctrine. 
2. Alvarado has failed to identify an error that was clear or obvious from the record. 
 
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The second prong of the fundamental error doctrine requires that “the error must be clear 
or obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, 
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision.” See Miller, 165 
Idaho at 119, 443 P.3d at 133 (quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978). In Miller, this 
Court clarified the second prong of Perry, stating “the record must contain evidence of the error 
and the record must also contain evidence as to whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision 
in failing to object.” Id. at 119, P. 3d at 133. To meet this standard, it is insufficient for appellant’s 
counsel to merely contend that a failure to object could not have been tactical because “failing to 
object could not have benefitted the defendant.” Id.  
Alvarado asserts that, even if Essma’s decision to not question Peak about potential bias 
based on his probation status was tactical, Essma had no right to make such a tactical decision 
because it effectively waived Alvarado’s constitutional right to conflict-free counsel. In support, 
he cites State v. Vasquez, 163 Idaho 557, 416 P.3d 108 (2018), in which this Court found clear 
error in the record because the district court allowed counsel to proceed with a bench trial without 
asking whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to a jury trial. Alvarado 
claims that, here, the district court failed to verify he waived his right to conflict-free counsel. 
According to Alvarado, the district court’s failure to ask whether he waived his right constitutes 
clear error.  
However, Alvarado makes an inferential leap that the only reason Essma did not raise the 
issue of bias is because of his professional duties to Peak. That connection is not apparent from 
the record. In fact, Essma’s statements to the court more strongly suggest that he had no such 
motive inasmuch as he pushed rather strenuously for leeway to elicit even more damaging 
information about Peak’s record. By contrast, allowing a waiver of a right to a jury trial without 
voluntary and knowing consent in Vasquez was, by nature of the rules of criminal procedure, a 
self-evident error. Idaho Criminal Rule 23(a) states that waiver of a jury trial requires the written 
approval of the defendant in open court. Thus, a district court proceeding with a bench trial without 
a defendant’s approval is a clear violation of that rule, which protects the right to a jury trial, and 
by extension shows the right has been violated. The right to conflict-free counsel, on the other 
hand, does not exist within such definite boundaries because it is tempered by the reality that court-
appointed counsel often represent clients with overlapping interests, and the judge must rely on 
defense counsel to disclose the extent and nature of such conflicts. Accordingly, any resulting error 
 
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cannot be considered either “clear or obvious.” Miller, 165 Idaho at 119, 443 P.3d at 133 (quoting 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978). Instead the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct reflect 
that conflict is situation specific. See I.R.C.P. 1.9 cmt. 2.  
The appellate record does not show that Essma’s failure to pursue questioning Peak about 
his probation status stems from a conflict of interest as opposed to a ruling of the court or tactical 
decision. As such, Alvarado also does not satisfy the second prong of the fundamental error 
doctrine.  
3. Alvarado has neither demonstrated that an error affected the outcome of the trial, 
nor shown that a structural error denied him the right to counsel during a critical 
stage of the proceeding. 
In Miller, this Court clarified that the third prong of the fundamental error doctrine 
“requires that the defendant demonstrate that the clear error in the record—i.e., the error identified 
in the first and second prongs—actually affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.” Miller, 165 
Idaho at 119–20, 443 P. 3d at 133–34. However, Alvarado does not argue actual harm resulted 
from the conflict of interest. Instead, Alvarado relies on Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002) 
to assert that the harm was structural, depriving him of counsel at a critical stage in the proceedings.  
In Mickens, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that, “where assistance of counsel has been 
denied entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding,” the Court has “spared the defendant 
the need of showing probable effect upon the outcome, and ha[s] simply presumed such effect 
. . . .” 535 U.S. at 166. The Court continued: 
When that has occurred, the likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high that 
a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary. See Cronic, supra, at 658–659, 104 S.Ct. 
2039; see also Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 
592 (1976); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–345, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 
799 (1963). But only in ‘circumstances of that magnitude’ do we forgo individual 
inquiry into whether counsel’s inadequate performance undermined the reliability 
of the verdict. Cronic, supra, at 659, n. 26, 104 S.Ct. 2039. 
Id. The U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant did not need to show prejudice where defense 
counsel “actively represented conflicting interests,” such as when conflict arose from “multiple 
concurrent representation.” Id. at 174–75 (emphasis in original). The Court left open the question 
of whether a presumption of prejudice would apply in conflict of interest cases where 
representation was successive. Id. at 176. 
A “concurrent conflict,” as described in Rule 1.7(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct may involve a current and a former client. However, this is distinct from “concurrent 
 
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representation” which requires, by definition, that counsel represented both clients on the same or 
a substantially related matter. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 175. In Mickens, the U.S. Supreme Court 
observed that concurrent and successive representation are treated differently in the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, requiring a court to “inquire into the likelihood of conflict whenever jointly 
charged defendants are represented by a single attorney . . . but not when counsel previously 
represented another defendant in a substantially related matter, even where the trial court is aware 
of the prior representation.” Id. (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 346 n.10). At the time of Alvarado’s 
trial, Essma was no longer representing Peak for the felony charge for which Peak was on 
probation, nor was the Twin Falls Public Defender’s Office currently representing Peak because 
he had already been sentenced on his misdemeanor charges. Alvarado’s case did not overlap with 
any of Peak’s cases, past or current. Therefore, Essma’s representation of Alvarado and Peak was 
successive rather than concurrent. 
The U.S. Supreme Court did not determine in Mickens whether the presumption of 
prejudice would apply to successive representation, Mickens, 535 U.S. at 176, and the issue is one 
of first impression for this Court. However, in Sparks v. State, the Idaho Court of Appeals found 
that a presumption of prejudice does not apply to successive representation. 140 Idaho 292, 297, 
92 P.3d 542, 547 (Ct. App. 2004). Sparks involved a conflict of interest based “on an attorney's 
perceived obligation to a client he represented nine years earlier on an unrelated matter.” Id. at 
297, 92 P.3d at 547. The Court of Appeals observed that, in Mickens, the U.S. Supreme Court had 
based its determination that a defendant did not need to prove prejudice where defense counsel 
had actively represented conflicting interests during multiple, concurrent representation on the 
high likelihood that those circumstances would lead to an unreliable verdict. Id. The Court of 
Appeals noted that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure treat conflicts of interest in concurrent 
versus successive representation differently, and determined that the likelihood of an unreliable 
verdict, which justified the presumption of prejudice under Cuyler, was not equivalent in cases of 
successive representation. Id. 
Alvarado urges that Sparks must be overturned, invoking United States v. Cronic to support 
the proposition that the right to counsel exists “not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has 
on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.” 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). According to 
Alvarado, a defendant who can prove that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected counsel’s 
performance during a critical stage of the trial, should not also have to prove harm. We disagree.  
 
14 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Mickens that the presumption of prejudice was 
appropriate under “circumstances of [a] magnitude” where the verdict was so likely to be 
unreliable that case-by-case inquiry was not necessary. 535 U.S. at 184 n.8. Alvarado has not 
presented a circumstance of sufficient magnitude to warrant application of the presumption here. 
The Mickens Court cited Cronic in asserting that not all conflicts of interest require proving 
prejudice. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166. Cronic highlights that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment 
is to ensure a defendant receives a fair trial and allows that prejudice may be presumed where 
counsel has been denied at a critical stage in the proceeding, or “entirely fails to subject the 
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing” such as during cross-examination. Cronic, 
466 U.S. at 659. Presumption of prejudice is also appropriate where counsel is available but 
circumstances are such that “the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could 
provide effective assistance is . . . small . . . .” Id. at 659–60. An attorney actively representing 
conflicting interests in concurrent representations poses such a circumstance where ineffective 
assistance is so likely that prejudice may be presumed. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 175. However, 
the same cannot be said for successive representation, especially where the interests involved are 
unrelated to the former client’s case. While successive representation, like in the case at bar, may 
suggest an apparent conflict of interest, at most it amounts to a cosmetic crack in the exterior of 
the trial proceedings; the overall foundation—and our confidence in the outcome—remains firm 
nonetheless. For these reasons, we hold that claims of conflict of interest relating to successive 
representation require a showing of actual prejudice.  
Alvarado acknowledges that he cannot prove harm as a result of the alleged conflict of 
interest. The facts bear this out. Peak was not a direct witness to the attempted strangulation nor 
the domestic battery. Instead, he merely provided foundational testimony, which was duplicated 
by Davies and Verret, regarding the events that led up to Verret taking a walk with Alvarado and 
about her injuries when she returned home later. His testimony concerning the events leading to 
the attack helped set the stage for the later altercation, but it was largely cumulative. Most 
importantly, it did not touch on any of the acts the State was required to prove as part of the 
required elements of the crimes Alvarado was charged with at trial. Even without the testimony of 
Peak and Davies, Verret’s testimony, coupled with the corroborating evidence of her injuries and 
Alvarado’s incriminating statements before and after his arrest, would have been sufficient. 
Indeed, the recordings of Alvarado’s prison phone calls, his letters to Verret, and the arresting 
 
15 
 
officers’ body-cam footage after the incident provide far more bases for conviction than anything 
to which Peak testified. If Essma had questioned Peak about bias and completely discredited his 
testimony in the eyes of the jury, or if the district court had determined that Peak could not testify 
at all, we are satisfied that it would not have changed the outcome of the case. Accordingly, 
Alvarado cannot satisfy the third prong of the fundamental error doctrine. 
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Alvarado to 20 years to 
life. 
 
Where a district court has imposed a sentence within its statutory limits, “the appellant 
bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 
828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (internal quotations omitted). In analyzing whether a trial court 
abused its discretion at sentencing, this Court considers if the trial court: “(1) correctly perceived 
the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) 
reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State v. Villa-Guzman, 166 Idaho 382, 384, 458 
P.3d 960, 962 (2020) (quoting Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 
(2018)). “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable 
sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” Miller, 151 Idaho at 834, 264 P.3d at 941 (quoting 
State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148–49, 191 P.3d 217, 226–27 (2008)). Furthermore, “[a] sentence 
fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of 
discretion by the trial court.” State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016) (quoting 
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)). 
The district court sentenced Alvarado to consecutive sentences on the two felony charges. 
For the charge of attempted strangulation, he received a fixed sentence of ten years in prison and 
an indeterminate sentence of life. For the charge of domestic violence inflicting traumatic injury, 
he received a consecutive fixed sentence of ten years with no additional indeterminate sentence. 
Thus, Alvarado’s aggregate sentence on the two felony convictions was twenty years fixed with 
an indeterminate sentence of life. Each sentence, whether separate or combined, fell within the 
statutory bounds of the court’s discretion. Nevertheless, Alvarado argues that his sentence is 
excessive because the district court did not adequately account for mitigating factors, including his 
alcohol use and willingness to participate in treatment, as well as remorse for his actions—all 
factors which trial courts should consider in sentencing. See State v. Gratiot, 104 Idaho 782, 663 
 
16 
 
P.2d 1084 (1983); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982); State v. Albers, 121 Idaho 
204, 824 P.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1991).  
 
As noted, Alvarado’s sentences were all within statutory guidelines. Attempted 
strangulation carries a maximum sentence of fifteen years. See I.C. § 18-923. Felony domestic 
battery carries a maximum sentence of ten years. See I.C. § 18-918(2)(a). However, Alvarado was 
also convicted of being a persistent violator, which required the district court to sentence him to 
between five years and life in prison. See I.C. § 19-2514. The district court effectively sentenced 
him to life with twenty years fixed by giving him two consecutive ten-year sentences. This Court 
presumes “that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of 
confinement.” State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Beyond the fixed 
sentence, the time a defendant will serve is then left to the parole board, and “[c]ourts cannot 
intrude on this discretion when fashioning a sentence nor when reviewing a sentence.” Id. (quoting 
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007)).  
We cannot find an abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentencing of Alvarado. 
Alvarado has not proved the district court failed to consider mitigating factors, nor that it did not 
consider the impact of intoxication. At sentencing, the district court provided a detailed 
explanation of the reasons for its sentence. It addressed the “primary factors the Court has to 
consider in fashioning a sentence, delineating them as rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence, and 
the good order and protection of society.” See State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 
710 (Ct. App. 1982). The district court further reviewed in detail the factors set forth in Idaho Code 
section 19-2521 which direct a court to consider both mitigating and aggravating factors in 
fashioning its sentence, including the charge to avoid “imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, 
having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition 
of the defendant, it is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the       
public. . . .” I.C. § 19-2521(1). 
In so doing, the district court addressed both aggravating and mitigating factors in 
Alvarado’s history. It reflected on Alvarado’s long history of alcohol abuse and concluded that the 
record “clearly convinces me that you are a threat to society unless you receive long-term 
treatment, whether it be for alcohol or drugs.” The district court noted that although Alvarado 
contends he is remorseful, he refused to take responsibility and repeatedly violated the court’s no-
contact order while in jail by continuing to phone Verret and write her harassing letters. Further, 
 
17 
 
this was a crime of considerable violence—the injuries Verret sustained at Alvarado’s hands were 
severe, including a broken nose, marks on her throat from the attempted strangulation, headaches 
from Alvarado kicking her in the face, torn out hair, and an injured shoulder, as well as serious 
mental trauma.  
Additionally, the district court recounted Alvarado’s extensive criminal history. In addition 
to a prior domestic violence charge and violations of protective orders, Alvarado had at least ten 
prior felony convictions in Utah between 1998 and 2017 for two attempted robberies, absconding, 
forgery, three cases of illegal possession/use of a controlled substance, two retail thefts 
(shoplifting), and theft. His previous misdemeanor convictions include driving under the influence, 
theft, criminal mischief, assault, criminal trespass, marijuana possession, disorderly conduct, 
intoxication, attempted possession of a dangerous weapon, and attempted aggravated assault. 
While in custody at the Twin Falls County Jail awaiting disposition of this case, jail records 
admitted at sentencing show Alvarado was disciplined for arguing with staff, possessing a shank, 
fighting, and encouraging a riot. In sum, we conclude that the strict sentence Alvarado received is 
completely consonant with the totality of the evidence presented at sentencing 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion, 
applying the correct statutory guidelines and exercising reason, in arriving at the twenty-years to 
life sentence for Alvarado’s two felony convictions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, we hold that Alvarado was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment 
right to conflict-free counsel. We also hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
sentencing Alvarado to a twenty-year to life aggregate sentence on his two felony convictions. 
 
Chief Justice BEVAN and Justices BURDICK, BRODY and STEGNER CONCUR.