Case Title: Ryan v. Centennial Race Track, Inc.

Citation: 580 P.2d 794

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1978-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
580 P.2d 794 (1978) Robert E. RYAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CENTENNIAL RACE TRACK, INC., a Colorado Corporation, and Otis Elevator Company, a New Jersey Corporation authorized to do business in Colorado, Defendants-Appellees. No. 27670. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. June 26, 1978. *795 Richard B. Bauer, Westminster, for plaintiff-appellant. Sheldon, Bayer, McLean & Glasman, P.C., Ronald C. Jaynes, Gary L. Palumbo, Denver, for defendant-appellee, Centennial Race Track, Inc. J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., David W. Robbins, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., John Kezer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Human Resources Section, intervenor on behalf of the defendant-appellee, Centennial Race Track, Inc. No appearance entered on behalf of Otis Elevator Company. ERICKSON, Justice. This is an appeal from a summary judgment in a negligence action in favor of the defendant on the ground that the provisions of Colorado's Workmen's Compensation Act, section 8-40-101, et seq., C.R.S.1973, barred recovery. We affirm. Robert A. Ryan was employed by the defendant, Centennial Race Track, Inc., in Littleton, Colorado. On August 1, 1975, he was fatally injured in an elevator accident while at work. The decedent's father, Robert E. Ryan, received a $1,000 funeral allowance but did not receive death benefits because he had not been financially dependent upon his son. Robert E. Ryan thereafter brought this action for wrongful death to recover damages for the loss of his son. Three issues require discussion on appeal: First, is the statutory presumption that employees who fail to affirmatively reject workmen's compensation coverage thereby elect to accept coverage constitutional? Second, does the payment to the subsequent injury fund under section 8-50-111(1)(a), C.R.S.1973, upon the death of a covered employee, constitute a taking of property? And finally, do the provisions of Colorado's Workmen's Compensation Act prohibit a decedent's father from pursuing common law remedies? We address the issues in the order stated. The first allegation of error relates to the constitutionality of section 8-43-103, C.R.S.1973, [1] which provides: The plaintiff contends that the statute violates rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, section 28 of the Colorado Constitution. We disagree. The election privilege was afforded employers and employees under many state workmen's compensation acts to avoid early constitutional doubts concerning compulsory acts. Constitutional doubts, however, no *796 longer persist and both elective and compulsory acts have been sustained. See, e. g., Ream v. Wendt, 2 Ariz.App. 497, 410 P.2d 119 (1966); Carbonneau v. Hoosier Engineering Co., 96 N.H. 240, 73 A.2d 802 (1950); Industrial Commission v. Hammond, 77 Colo. 414, 236 P. 1006 (1925); Karny v. Northwestern Malleable Iron Co., 160 Wis. 316, 151 N.W. 786 (1915); Deibeikis v. Link-Belt Co., 261 Ill. 454, 104 N.E. 211 (1914); 2A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law §§ 67.10, 67.30; 1 W. Schneider, Workmen's Compensation § 77; 81 Am.Jur.2d, Workmen's Compensation §§ 10, 39. The constitutional validity of Colorado's conclusive presumption as to an employer's acceptance was upheld in Industrial Commission v. Hammond, supra. In Hammond, the court declared: The logic of that early opinion applies equally well to the statutory presumption of an employee's acceptance involved in this case. Our legislature, through the enactment of a comprehensive workmen's compensation system, restricted the common law system of liability and substituted a system of compensation dependent solely upon the employee-employer relationship. The common law system often constituted a gamble in which an employee's recovery was dependent upon his ability to prove actionable negligence attributable to his employer. The Act was clearly intended to remove such uncertainty and benefit employees by providing recovery. The statutory scheme reveals that our legislature, while permitting the employer and the employee to elect not to participate, concluded that employees should be protected through the creation of a statutory presumption. We conclude that the statutory presumption is rationally related to the legislative purposes sought to be achieved and does not contravene any constitutional right. Since the plaintiff's son failed to reject the statutory coverage, he is conclusively presumed to have accepted such coverage. The plaintiff's second allegation of error is that a taking of property occurred when payments were made to the employees' subsequent injury fund instead of to the decedent's nondependent heirs. Section 8-50-111(1)(a), C.R.S.1973, establishes benefits to be paid upon the death of an employee who is not survived by dependents: These provisions, except to the extent of medical, hospital, and funeral expenses, make compensation for an employee's death relate directly to dependency. See London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Industrial Commission, 78 Colo. 478, 242 P. 680 (1925). The constitutionality of subsequent injury funds is well-established. 2 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 59.31, n. 51; 81 Am.Jur.2d, Workmen's Compensation § 23. Similarly, provisions which deny nondependent parents compensation for the death of a minor employee have been consistently upheld by a number of courts. Slagle v. Reynolds Metals Co., 344 So. 2d 1216 (Ala.1977); Mullarkey v. Florida Feed Mills, Inc., 268 So. 2d 363 (Fla.1972), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 411 U.S. 944, 93 S. Ct. 1923, 36 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1973); Gaston v. San Ore Construction *797 Co., 206 Kan. 254, 477 P.2d 956 (1970). In Mullarkey v. Florida Feed Mills, Inc., supra, the court held that the dependency requirement was rationally related to the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Since workmen's compensation recovery, unlike tort recovery, is directly related to the loss of an employee's earning capacity and support for those financially dependent upon the deceased employee, the court held that those not financially supported by a deceased employee suffer no compensable loss with his death. The thrust of the plaintiff's argument is that, if any payment is to be made as a result of an employee's death, it should be made to the employee's heirs and not to the subsequent injury fund. The plaintiff incorrectly assumes that absent payment to the subsequent injury fund a deceased employee's nondependent heirs would be entitled to compensation. As noted above, however, the legislature can legitimately deny nondependent heirs benefits upon the death of an employee. The fact that payments in such cases are made to the subsequent injury fund, therefore, does not deprive nondependent heirs of property. The final issue on appeal concerns the exclusivity of the remedy provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Section 8-42-102, C.R.S.1973, provides that an employer who complies with the provisions of articles 40 to 54 of title 8 shall not be: The record establishes that the plaintiff relies upon the provisions of sections 8-42-202 and 203, C.R.S.1973, of the Employer's Liability Act, as remedies provided in the articles. We need not examine the substance of the provisions of the Employer's Liability Act, since they were not enacted as part of Colorado's Workmen's Compensation Act, section 8-40-101, et seq., C.R.S.1973, although they appear as Part 2 of Article 42. The revisor of statutes erred in compiling the 1973 statutory revision by inserting the Employer's Liability Act [2] into the Workmen's Compensation Act. [3] The error has been corrected, and an "Editor's note" printed in the 1977 statutory supplement: The plaintiff, therefore, cannot rely upon the provisions of the Employer's Liability Act as providing a remedy excepted from abolition in section 8-42-102, C.R.S.1973. The trial court correctly held that the plaintiff's action is barred by the exclusive remedies provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. HODGES, LEE and CARRIGAN, JJ., do not participate. [1] Repealed effective September 1, 1975. Colo.Sess.Laws 1975, ch. 71, §§ 62, 63 at 311. [2] Formerly C.R.S.1963, 80-5-1, et seq., now section 8-2-201, et seq., C.R.S.1973 (1977 Supp.). [3] Formerly C.R.S.1963, 81-1-1, et seq., now section 8-40-101, et seq., C.R.S.1973 (1977 Supp.).