Case Title: AHEARN v. TOWN OF WHEATLAND

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
AHEARN v. TOWN OF WHEATLAND2002 WY 1239 P.3d 409Case Number: 00-276Decided: 01/29/2002
 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                            

 

FRANCIS 
B. AHEARN, 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

TOWN OF 
WHEATLAND, 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Platte County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Francis B. Ahearn, pro se.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Douglas 
W. Weaver, Wheatland, Wyoming.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]           
Appellant 
Francis Ahearn (Ahearn) challenges the validity of Appellee Town of Wheatland's 
municipal ordinance that provides abbreviated procedures for resubdividing 
property within an existing subdivision on grounds that it conflicts with 
various state statutes.  He contends 
that, by state statutory definition, division of a previously subdivided tract 
into three parcels is the creation of a new subdivision which cannot be 
accomplished without proceeding under those statutes and ordinances governing 
the creation of a new subdivision.  
Ahearn also contends that the municipality's failure to notify a party 
holding a certificate of sale violated the ordinance's provision requiring 
notice to property owners of record within 140 feet, excluding streets, from the 
parcel and requires reversal of approval.  
The district court determined no conflict existed because the state 
statutes authorized the Town of Wheatland to enact ordinances governing 
subdivision and authorized resubdividing in this manner.  It held that approval was properly 
granted and granted summary judgment to the Town of 
Wheatland.

 

[¶2]           
We hold 
that the Town of Wheatland has acted in accord with all governing law and affirm 
the summary judgment.

 

 

 

[¶3]           
Ahearn 
presents these issues for our review:

 

I.  Is a division of a tract or parcel of 
land into three (3) or more parts for immediate or future sale or building 
development considered a subdivision pursuant to Wyoming 
law?

 

II. 
Shall every original owner of a subdivided tract of land have to give their free 
consent and sign the subdivision plat map?

 

III. Can 
a municipality enact ordinances which allow a developer to subdivide a tract of 
land into three (3) parcels without complying with Wyoming statutes for 
recording a plat map?

 

The Town 
of Wheatland (Wheatland) restates the issues as:

 

(1) Was 
the district court correct in granting summary judgment in favor of the Town of 
Wheatland and as such holding that Ordinance No. 670 was 
valid?

 

(2) Did 
the Town of Wheatland correctly follow the procedures outlined in Ordinance No. 
670 when it approved the application filed by Anderson/ Bishop pursuant to 
Ordinance No. 670?

 

[¶4]           
The 
property at the center of this dispute is 4.84 acres known as Tract G that is 
located in the Town of Wheatland in a subdivision known as Black Mountain 
Village, Filing No. 1, which was, according to the application filed by 
Anderson/Bishop, originally platted on September 30, 1986.  Tract G is owned in part by the general 
partnership of Anderson/Bishop (Anderson), which sought approval to divide its 
part of the tract into three lots.  
On January 19, 1999, Anderson filed an application with the Wheatland for 
an "abbreviated method of replatting land within a part of an improved and 
platted subdivision in accordance with Ordinance No. 670 of the ordinances of 
the Town of Wheatland."  Ordinance 
No. 670 provides for an abbreviated method of resubdividing previously 
subdivided land as long as the subdivision contains tracts or parcels that can 
be split into three or fewer parcels.  
State statute defines 
subdivision as the division of a tract or parcel of land into three (3) or more 
parts for immediate or future sale or building development.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-501(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2001).

 

[¶5]           
Anderson 
does not own all of Tract G; 1.110 acres is owned by Pine Lawn Investment 
Company (Pine Lawn) and was not part of the application.  Ahearn is an owner of Pine Lawn and 
holds a mortgage on the 1.110 acres owned by it.

 

[¶6]           
On 
February 8, 1999, the town council held a public hearing on Anderson's 
application, and Ahearn objected to its approval.  The town council voted unanimously to 
preliminarily approve the application and to consider final approval at a 
special meeting on February 24, 1999.  
Ahearn appeared at that meeting also and voiced his objections.  Final approval was unanimously given at 
that meeting. 

  

[¶7]           
Ahearn 
filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in district court in February 26, 
1999.  Ahearn alleged that the town 
council had violated Ordinance No. 670 by preliminarily approving the 
application at its February 8, 1999, meeting in violation of the notification 
requirements; had violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-12-103 and the Wheatland 
Development Code by approving an application that did not include the signatures 
of all property owners in Tract G; had violated the Wheatland Development Code 
by failing to obtain review of the Wheatland Planning Commission; and had 
violated Ordinance No. 670 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 15-1-602 and 15-1-203 and the 
Wheatland Development Code by failing to give proper notice to all adjacent 
property owners.  The complaint 
requested that the court declare Ordinance No. 670 void because it conflicts 
with Wyoming statutes and is vague, and declare the town council's approval void 
for all the violations alleged; it also sought damages and attorney 
fees.

 

[¶8]           
Wheatland 
filed a motion to dismiss, and the claim for damages was dismissed for failure 
to comply with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113.1  Wheatland then filed an answer, and the 
district court heard argument on the parties' motions for summary judgment.  Summary judgment was granted to 
appellees, and this appeal followed.  

 

 

 

Standard of Review

 

[¶9]           
When 
this Court reviews a summary judgment granted in a declaratory judgment action, 
we invoke our usual standard for review of summary judgments.  Fontaine v. Board of County Comm'rs 
of Park County, 4 P.3d 890, 892 (Wyo. 2000).  Summary judgment is proper only when 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
Mountain Cement Co. v. 
Johnson, 884 P.2d 30, 32 (Wyo. 1994); W.R.C.P. 56(c).  We review a summary judgment in the same 
light as the district court, using the same materials and following the same 
standards.  "We examine the record 
from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we 
give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be 
drawn from the record."  Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Constr., 
Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 238 (Wyo. 1991).  
Summary judgment serves the purpose of eliminating formal trials where 
only questions of law are involved.  
Blagrove v. JB Mechanical, 
Inc., 934 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Wyo. 1997); England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137, 1141 
(Wyo. 1986).  We review a grant of 
summary judgment by deciding a question of law de novo and afford no deference 
to the district court's ruling on that question. Sammons v. American Auto. Ass'n, 912 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Wyo. 1996); Blagrove, 934 P.2d  at 
1275.

 

 

Subdivision 
Controls

 

[¶10]       
The Town 
of Wheatland is a municipal corporation.  
In Wyoming, municipal corporations are creatures of the legislature and 
thereby subject to statutory control.  
Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 
662 P.2d 888, 894 (Wyo. 1983). Wyoming statutes prohibit selling lots in a town 
unless a plat is approved by the governing body and filed and recorded.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 15-1-415, 510, 511 
(LexisNexis 2001);2 Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-12-102, 103, 
and 115 (LexisNexis 2001).  In 
addition to this mandate, Wyoming statutes provide several methods for the 
control of land use within a community.   Enabling legislation authorizing 
annexation, zoning, and comprehensive planning is contained in various articles 
to Title 15, Chapter One.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 15-1-401 through 422 (LexisNexis 2001) (annexation); Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 15-1-501 through 512 (LexisNexis 2001) (planning); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
15-1-601 through 611 (LexisNexis 2001) (zoning).  By this enabling legislation, cities and 
towns are authorized to enact ordinances and regulations governing planning, 
subdivisions and zoning.  Generally, 
zoning ordinances provide control over land use within a neighborhood and are 
part of a comprehensive plan for community development.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 15-1-501 through 511 
(LexisNexis 2001); see Ford v. Board of County Comm'rs of Converse 
County, 924 P.2d 91, 94-95 (Wyo. 1996).

 

[¶11]       
Under 
the comprehensive planning statutes, a city or town develops a master plan for 
the future growth and development of the city by planning for new streets and 
the platting of new neighborhoods in order to minimize the financial loss that 
may result from imperfect planning.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 15-1-503, 15-1-601(d)3; Ford, 924 P.2d at 94-95; 4 
Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 25.03, at 284 
(4th ed. 1997).

 

[¶12]       
In 
Wheatland, the collection of ordinances governing planning and zoning is called 
the Wheatland Development Code.  
Wheatland has a planning commission to review applications for new 
subdivisions.  Although the Code is 
missing from the record, it appears that the planning commission makes 
recommendations to the town council, which approves or rejects the 
recommendation.  

 

[¶13]       
In 1998 
Wheatland enacted Ordinance No. 670, which states the following as its title and 
purpose:

 

AN 
ORDINANCE PROVIDING FOR AN ABBREVIATED METHOD OF REPLATING (sic) LAND WITHIN A 
PART OF AN APPROVED AND PLATTED SUBDIVISION.

 

            
Whereas it has come to the attention of the governing body for the Town 
of Wheatland that there are areas within the Town of Wheatland which have been 
previously subdivided, and which contain tracts of land which can be split into 
three or fewer parcels; 
and

            
Whereas, as the owners of said tracts of land desire to divide said 
property into no more than three 
parcels, they currently would be required to follow the subdivision 
ordinances under the Wheatland Town Code; and

            
Whereas, it may be costly to the landowner to follow said subdivision 
ordinances, and it would simply duplicate processes which have previously taken 
place.

 

In order 
to assure that only duplicative processes are eliminated the ordinance further 
provides that these requirements be met:

 

Section 1.  The governing body for the Town of 
Wheatland may, but is not required to, accept any previously approved 
documentation regarding lot size, utilities, etc., under the subdivision 
regulations and approve an application for a replat, if, at the minimum, the 
following are met:

(a) The 
tract of land or parcel of land is not being divided into more than three 
parcels, and each parcel has at least minimum dimensions and area, less any 
easements, as required by the applicable zoning regulations for the Town of 
Wheatland.

(b) The 
tract of land or parcel of land lies within and is a part of an existing 
subdivision which has been approved by the governing body of the Town of 
Wheatland.

(c) The 
owner/developer of the parcel of land takes all necessary steps to grant unto 
the appropriate entity any and all easements necessary for the 
following:

                                                                          
i.      
All 
utility service, including but not limited to water, telephone, electric and 
cable television.

                                                                        
ii.      
Every 
parcel has frontage (minimum of 35 feet) on a dedicated public 
street.

                                                                      
iii.      
All 
necessary fire protection facilities.

(d) The 
owner/developer of the parcel of land shall pay all costs in advance for the 
required utility extensions and fire protection facilities.  It is understood that the initial costs 
paid in advance will be estimates, however, the owner/developer will be required 
to pay any amounts which are above the estimated costs, and will receive a 
refund if the costs are less than those estimated.

(e) The 
owner/developer of the parcel of land shall prepare application for the 
exemption setting forth all of the above facts and provide to the governing body 
a detailed plat of said property.  
The application and plat will be distributed to the Town staff, including 
but not limited to the building inspector, fire chief, police chief, town 
planner, town engineers, and town attorney for their review and comments, at 
least three weeks prior to the council meeting when the application is to be 
considered.

(f) The 
owner/developer of the parcel of land will be required to meet all other zoning 
and building requirements within the Town of Wheatland.

 

In its 
final provision, due process requirements are addressed:

 

(g) 
Property owners of record within 140 feet, excluding streets, from the parcel in 
question shall be sent, by certified mail, a copy of the application at least 
ten days prior to the council meeting when the application will be 
considered.

 

 

In this 
case, affidavits have been submitted indicating that proper, timely notices were 
sent to property owners of record. 

 

[¶14]       
Ahearn 
contends that Ordinance No. 670 conflicts with the definition of subdivision 
provided in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-501(a)(iii) and the ordinance is therefore 
void.  Ahearn is correct that, if 
the ordinance conflicts with state statute, then the ordinance is void.  The authority of a municipality to adopt 
a zoning ordinance is limited by state statute, and the general grant of power 
to municipalities to adopt zoning laws in the interest of public welfare does 
not permit the local governing bodies to override the state law and the policies 
supporting it.  State ex rel. 
Baker v. Strange, 960 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Wyo. 1998) (citing City of Green 
River v. Debernardi Const. Co., Inc., 816 P.2d 1287, 1290-91 (Wyo. 1991); 
Vandehei Developers v. Public Service Comm'n of Wyoming, 790 P.2d 1282, 
1286-87 (Wyo. 1990)).  See 
also, River Springs Ltd. Liability Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs of 
Teton County, 899 P.2d 1329, 1337 (Wyo. 1995) (a county may only regulate 
mineral activity in such a way that it does not conflict with state 
regulation).  The justification for 
this rule of law is that municipalities have no sovereignty independent from 
that of the state, and the only power available to them is the power that has 
been delegated to them by the state.  
Baker, 960 P.2d  at 1018 (citing City of Green River, 816 P.2d  at 1290; and K N Energy, Inc. v. City of Casper, 755 P.2d 207, 210 
(Wyo. 1988)).  Thus, the statute 
takes precedence over the municipal ordinance.  Id.  

 

[¶15]       
Section 
15-1-501(a)(iii) defines subdivision, and the entire statute 
provides:

 

(a) 
For the purposes of this 
article:

(i) 
"Commission" means the planning commission authorized by W.S. 
15-1-502;

(ii) 
"Street" includes streets, highways, avenues, boulevards, parkways, roads, 
lanes, walks, alleys, viaducts, subways, tunnels, bridges, public easements and 
rights-of-way and other ways;

(iii) 
"Subdivision" means the division of a tract or parcel of land into three (3) or 
more parts for immediate or future sale or building 
development.

 

(emphasis 
added).  Ahearn contends that, under 
this statutory definition, the town council has approved a new subdivision 
without following those procedures governing a new subdivision.  The town council approved a 
resubdivision, and generally that action does fall under the definition of a 
subdivision unless the statute provides otherwise.  See Wilkerson v. Marks, 538 P.2d 403, 405 
(Ariz. 1975); Leeward Realty Holding Corp. v. Zoning Board of Review of the 
Town of Westerly, et al., 1997 WL 1526513, at *3 (R.I. Super., May 12, 
1997); Young, supra, § 25.02, at 282.  By this definition, we agree that the 
statute intends that any division of land that falls under the definition must 
be treated as a subdivision.  
Wheatland did treat Anderson's proposal as a subdivision.  State statute does not provide further 
governing law regarding the process to be followed in creating a subdivision; 
that law is provided by Wheatland's municipal ordinances.  In this case, the only applicable law is 
Ordinance No. 670 which provides for an abbreviated procedure for a 
resubdivision that has already been subjected to those procedures applicable to 
a new subdivision.  Wheatland has 
acted on the proposed resubdivision in accordance with the only law governing 
it, Ordinance No. 670, and we find that ordinance did not omit any procedures, 
but merely allowed a resubdivision to occur without duplicating procedures.  No state statute prohibits this, and no 
conflict exists.

 

[¶16]       
Ahearn 
contends that resubdivision violates the Wheatland Development Code's provision 
that states that "repetitive division of parcels into two lots for the purpose 
of avoiding compliance with (subdivision requirements) is illegal and in 
conflict with the intent of this chapter."  
That Code is not part of the record.  Ahearn's citation to the record is to 
the district court's decision letter which states:

 

The 
Development Code goes [on to] require that subdivisions (division of tracts into 
3 or more parts) be reviewed by a planning commission. . . . However, the Code 
specifically permits the Town Council to waive requirements that subdivision 
procedures be redone in the circumstances addressed in Ordinance No. 670. . . 
.  The Court finds that the 
Wheatland Development Code specifically authorizes Ordinance No. 670 rather than 
conflicts with it. 

 

A 
governing body must comply with those requirements established by law.  Hoke v. Moyer, 865 P.2d 624, 631 
(Wyo. 1993); Ford, 924 P.2d  at 95; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-510 (LexisNexis 
2001).   Here, the subdivision 
ordinance was the applicable law, and we agree with the district court that 
state statute does not prohibit the abbreviated method used in Ordinance No. 670 
and that the town council has complied with it.  Accordingly, Ordinance No. 670 does not 
conflict with the state statutory definition of 
subdivision.

 

[¶17]       
Ahearn 
next contends that Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-12-102 and 103 have been violated.  As we have already stated, the statutes 
of this article require that all lots must be platted and recorded and approved 
by governing bodies of a city or town.  
Ahearn points to § 102's language establishing a covenant of warranty and 
§ 103's language "with the free consent, and in accordance with the desires of 
the undersigned owners and proprietors" to argue that these statutes were 
violated because he, as an owner of a part of Tract G, did not consent to the 
subdivision of Anderson/Bishop's part of Tract G.  These specific provisions 
state:

 

Every 
original owner or proprietor of any tract or parcel of land, who has 
heretofore subdivided, or shall hereafter subdivide the same into three (3) 
or more parts for the purpose of laying out any town or city, or any 
addition thereto, or any part thereof, or suburban lots, shall cause a plat of 
such subdivision, with references to known or permanent monuments, to be made, 
which shall accurately describe all the subdivisions of such tract or parcel of 
land, numbering the same by progressive numbers, and giving the dimensions, and 
length and breadth thereof, and the breadth and courses of all the streets and 
alleys established therein.  
Descriptions of lots or parcels of land in such subdivisions, according 
to the number and designation thereof, on said plat contained, in conveyances, 
or for the purposes of taxation, shall be deemed good and valid for all intents 
and purposes.  The duty to file 
for record a plat, as provided herein [§§ 34-12-101 through 34-12-104, 34-12-106 
through 34-12-115], shall attach as a covenant of warranty, in all conveyances 
of any part or parcel of such subdivisions by the original owners or 
proprietors, against any and all assessments, costs and damages, paid, lost 
or incurred by any grantee, or person claiming under him, in consequence of the 
omission on the part of said owner or proprietors to file such 
plat.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 34-12-102 (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis added). 

 

Every 
such plat shall contain a statement to the effect that "the above or 
foregoing subdivision of (here insert a correct description of the land or 
parcel subdivided) as appears on this plat, is with the free consent, and in 
accordance with the desires of the undersigned owners and proprietors", which 
shall be signed by the owners and proprietors, and shall be duly 
acknowledged before some officer authorized to take the acknowledgement of 
deeds.  The plat shall meet the 
approval of the board of county commissioners if it is of land situated without 
the boundaries of any city or town or by the governing body of the city or town 
if situated within the boundaries of such city or town.  When thus executed, acknowledged and 
approved, said plat shall be filed for record and recorded in the office of the 
clerk of the proper county; provided, however, that any such plat of land 
adjacent to any incorporated city or town, or within one (1) mile of the 
boundaries of any such city or town, shall be jointly approved by both the board 
of county commissioners of said county and the governing body of said city or 
town before same shall be filed and recorded in the office of the county clerk 
as aforesaid.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 34-12-103 (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis added).

 

[¶18]       
Ahearn 
argues that this statutory language applies to him as an original owner of Tract 
G.  He does not provide any argument 
or authority to support this interpretation.  Statutory interpretation, however, 
presents a question of law, and we will therefore address his argument.  Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyo. Game 
and Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993).   Our rules of statutory 
interpretation are well-established:

 

We decide initially whether the 
statute is clear or ambiguous.  This 
Court makes that determination as a matter of law.  If we determine that a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the statute.  In effectuating the plain language of 
the statute, we begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious 
meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and 
connection.  We construe the statute 
as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe 
together all parts of the statute in pari materia.  If, on the other hand, we determine that 
the statute is ambiguous, we resort to general principles of statutory 
construction to determine the legislature's intent.  

 

Wesaw v. 
Quality Maintenance, 2001 
WY 17, ¶13, 19 P.3d 500, ¶13 (Wyo. 2001).  

 

[¶19]       
Statutory 
language is clear if reasonable persons are able to agree to its meaning with 
consistence and predictability.  
Parker, 845 P.2d  at 1043.   In Parker we 
stated:

 

We read 
the text of the statute and pay attention to its internal structure and the 
functional relation between the parts and the whole.  We make the determination as to meaning, 
that is, whether the statute's meaning is subject to varying 
interpretations.  If we determine 
that the meaning is not subject to varying interpretations, that may end the 
exercise, although we may resort to extrinsic aids of interpretation, such as 
legislative history if available and rules of construction, to confirm the 
determination.

 

Id. 
at 
1045.

 

 

[¶20]       
Our 
primary purpose is to ascertain the legislative intent.  Id.  The plain language of § 102 does not 
apply to Ahearn as an owner of part of Tract G.  Plainly, the phrase "[e]very 
original owner or proprietor of any tract or parcel of land, who has 
heretofore subdivided, or shall hereafter subdivide the same into three (3) 
or more parts for the purpose of laying out any town or city, or any 
addition thereto, or any part thereof, or suburban lots, shall cause a plat of 
such subdivision" applied to the original owners of the land subdivided to 
create Tract G, not to Ahearn, a subsequent owner of a part of Tract G.  

 

[¶21]       
Although 
the tract to be subdivided is within Tract G, Ahearn's portion of tract G was 
not to be resubdivided.  The 
statutory language states procedures that apply to the owner of the parcel to be 
subdivided which, in this case, is Anderson.  This statute does not apply to Ahearn as 
an owner adjacent to Anderson's parcel and gives Ahearn no rights under it.  Accordingly, § 103's language is to be 
read as referring only to the parcel to be resubdivided, which would not include 
Ahearn's parcel, and again, although he is an owner of a parcel in the 
subdivision, Ahearn is not an owner of the parcel to be resubdivided, and the 
language mandating a signature affirming free consent does not apply to 
him.

 

[¶22]       
Other 
statutes in Title 34, Chapter Twelve, govern vacating of a plat.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-12-106, 108 
(LexisNexis 2001).4   We shall consider whether these 
statutes apply.  We have previously 
decided that this set of statutes in its various forms was enacted to ensure a 
dedication was complete when a subdivision plat was prepared in conformity with 
the details specified and when the plat was recorded in the office of the county 
clerk.  Prudential Trust Co. v. 
City of Laramie, 492 P.2d 971, 972 (Wyo. 1972).  In Tissino v. Mavrakis, 67 Wyo. 
560, 228 P.2d 106 (1951), we held that the language of the statute requiring the 
platting of a subdivision, and the sale of lots in accordance therewith, 
constituted a public dedication of the streets which are shown upon the 
plat.  A dedication of land affected 
by platting and sale of lots would operate by way of grant and without the 
necessity of acceptance by the public.  
Id. at 115.  We also 
held that the platting and recording of a subdivision in accordance with the 
statutes resulted in the county or city acquiring fee title to all streets and 
ways set out therein.  Id. 
 We modified the Tissino 
holding in two later cases.  
Ruby Drilling Co., Inc. v. Billingsly, 660 P.2d 377, 380 (Wyo. 
1983) (discussing Gay Johnson's Wyoming Automotive Service Co. v. City of 
Cheyenne, 367 P.2d 787 (Wyo. 1961), and Payne v. City of Laramie, 398 P.2d 557 (Wyo. 1965)).  

 

[¶23]       
We see 
then that the primary intent of this statutory article is to provide for the 
platting and dedication of public streets, and the vacating of the plat and 
dedication.  In addition, other 
dedications such as utility easements, access easements, parks or other public 
uses on a plat are likewise subject to this article.  The replat at issue here resulted in 
Anderson's submitting a new plat for his parcel, and no modification or vacating 
of dedicated streets, or any other dedication, was apparently involved which 
would have deprived Ahearn of the access, or any other right, he is entitled to 
under the original plat.  Plainly, 
the resubdivision involved here was not a proceeding intended to vacate or 
partially vacate a plat.  Even 
assuming the filing of the new plat resubdividing the lot in question 
constituted a vacation of the original plat, it could only be considered a 
partial vacation, and Ahearn made no showing that any of his rights or 
privileges were "abridged or destroyed" so no violation of the statutes could 
have occurred.

 

[¶24]       
As part of his 
last issue, Ahearn expresses concern that Ordinance No. 670 is arbitrary and 
capricious because it does not state "guidelines or assurances that can be 
relied upon by an applicant," when it states that it is enacted because "it may 
be costly to the landowner to follow said ordinances."  Ahearn contends that the word "costly" 
is not interpreted in the ordinance.  
Although he provides us with two examples of the possible meaning of 
costly, we fail to see any relevance to the issues that he has presented or to 
the facts presented here.  We, 
therefore, assume that he is asserting that the ordinance is void for 
vagueness.  The sentence is part of 
the preamble to the ordinance describing the purpose of the ordinance.  The ordinance does not require that a 
landowner prove that the regular subdivision procedures are too costly to follow 
and so it does not matter that this term used in the purpose has not been 
defined.

 

[¶25]       
Lastly, 
Ahearn contends that another person who was not a party in this action was an 
owner entitled to notice under Ordinance No. 670 and was not provided any as 
required.  Ahearn presented this 
issue to the district court which found that the other party held only a 
sheriff's certificate of sale and not a sheriff's deed.  Finding that the notification 
requirements applied to property owners of record, the district court determined 
that the sheriff's deed, not the certificate of sale, transfers ownership and 
the absence of the deed precludes a finding that the other person is a property 
owner of record.  The district court 
also ruled that Ahearn had not demonstrated that he had standing to raise this 
issue on behalf of this other person.  
On appeal, Ahearn repeats his argument. 

 

[¶26]       
Assuming 
that Ahearn does have standing as an adjacent landowner to object to an 
application that has not complied with all of the ordinance's requirements, 
Ahearn contends that under the town code's definition any form of recorded 
ownership is entitled to notice.  
See Hoke, 865 P.2d  at 628.  
The definition he relies upon was quoted by the district court in its 
decision letter which states:

 

Section 
1-5 of the Wheatland Town Code defines owner as follows:

Owner.  The word "owner" when applied to a 
building or land, shall include not only the owner of the whole but also any 
part owner, joint owner, tenant in common or joint tenant of the whole or a part 
of such building or land and shall include any agent of such owner, and where 
such owner is a body corporate, it shall include the managing agent or officer 
within the town.

 
Ahearn 
argues that this definition should be construed broadly to include a person in 
possession of a sheriff's certificate of sale.  We disagree that this definition 
applies.  If it satisfies due 
process, the law governing notice applies.  
Id. at 631.   
Here, notice is mandated by Ordinance No. 670 which directs written 
notice be given to the "property owner of record."  The certificate of purchase which is 
presented to the successful bidder at the foreclosure sale is only a lien 
against, or an equitable interest in, the property.  The legal title to the property remains 
with the owner, and a certificate of sale does not extinguish the title and 
interest of the owner.  First 
Southwestern Financial Services v. Laird, 882 P.2d 1211, 1216 (Wyo. 
1994).  Accordingly, the term 
"property owner of record" must be interpreted as the owner who has the recorded 
deed.  Wheatland has provided 
affidavits that the property owner of record was Ahearn, who received notice, 
attending hearings, and voiced objections. We find no violation. 

 

 

 

[¶27]       
Ordinance 
No. 670 does not conflict with state statutes, and its procedures were properly 
followed.  The order granting 
summary judgment to the Town of Wheatland is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 (LexisNexis 
2001) provides in part:

            
(a) No action shall be brought under this act against a governmental 
entity unless the claim upon which the action is based is presented to the 
entity as an itemized statement in writing within two (2) years of the date of 
the alleged act, error or omission . . . .

2§ 15-1-415. Additions to cities or 
towns by subdividing landowners; plat requirements; filing and effect thereof; 
controlling layout of streets.

            
(a) The owner of any land within or contiguous to any city or town may 
subdivide the land into lots, blocks, streets, avenues and alleys and other 
grounds under the name of . . . . addition to the city (town) of . . . . An  accurate map or plat shall be made 
designating the subdivided land and particularly describing the lots, blocks, 
streets, avenues and alleys and other grounds of the addition.  The lots must be designated by numbers, 
and the streets, avenues and other grounds by name or 
numbers.

            
(b) The plat shall:

(i) Be acknowledged before some 
officer authorized to acknowledge deeds;

(ii) Have appended a survey made by 
a land surveyor registered under the laws of this state with a certificate that 
he has accurately surveyed the addition, and that the parts thereof are 
accurately staked off and marked with an appropriate metal monument including 
magnetic iron, inscribed at least with the registration number of the land 
surveyor to provide source identification, at all lot corners and survey control 
points of the addition.

            
(c) When the map or plat is made out, acknowledged, certified and 
approved by the governing body, it shall be filed and recorded in the office of 
the county clerk.  When filed it is 
equivalent to a deed in fee simple to the city or town from the owner, of all 
streets, avenues, alleys, public squares, parks and commons and of that portion 
of the land set apart for public and city use, or dedicated to charitable, 
religious or educational purposes.  
All additions thus laid out are a part of the city or town for all 
purposes, and the inhabitants of the addition are entitled to all the rights and 
privileges and subject to all the laws, ordinances, rules and regulations of the 
city or town.

            
(d) The governing body, by ordinance, may compel the owner of any 
addition to lay out streets, avenues and alleys to correspond in width and 
direction and be continuations of the streets, ways and alleys in the city or 
town or other additions thereto.  No 
addition is valid unless the terms and conditions of the ordinance are complied 
with and the plat submitted and approved by the governing 
body.

 

§ 
15-1-510. Major street plan; subdivision plats; approval required; preparation 
and adoption of governing regulations.

            
(a) If any commission adopts a major street plan and certifies it to the 
governing body, no plat of a subdivision of land lying within the municipality 
may be filed or recorded in the office of the county clerk until it has been 
submitted to and approved by the governing body and its approval entered in 
writing on the plat by the clerk of the governing body.  No county clerk may file or record a 
plat of a subdivision without approval by the governing body and any unapproved 
filing or recording is void.

            
(b) The commission shall prepare regulations governing the subdivision of 
land within the municipality.  The 
governing body may adopt the regulations for the municipality after a public 
hearing thereon.

 

§ 
15-1-511. Major street plan; subdivision plats; when penalty for not preparing; 
exception; enforcement.

            
Subject to appropriate eminent domain proceedings, if anyone transfers or 
sells any land located within any area for which a major street plan has been 
adopted by the commission and the governing body, except for land located in a 
recorded subdivision, without first preparing a subdivision plat and having it 
approved by the commission and governing body and recorded in the office of the 
county clerk, he shall pay a penalty of one hundred dollars ($100.00) for each 
lot transferred or sold.  The 
description by metes and bounds in the instrument of transfer or other document 
used in the process of selling or transferring does not exempt the transaction 
from such penalties.  The 
municipality may enjoin the transfer or sale or may recover the penalty by civil 
action.

3(d) All regulations shall be 
made:

            
(i) In accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed 
to:

                        
(A) Lessen congestion in the streets;

                        
(B) Secure safety from fire, panic and other 
dangers;

                        
(C) Promote health and general welfare;

                        
(D) Provide adequate light and air;

                        
(E) Prevent the overcrowding of land;

                        
(F) Avoid undue concentration of population; 
and

(G) Facilitate adequate provisions for 
transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks and other public 
requirements.

            
(ii) With reasonable consideration, among other things, of the character 
of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses; 
and

            
(iii) With a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging 
the most appropriate use of land throughout the city or 
town;

            
(iv) With consideration given to the historic integrity of certain 
neighborhoods or districts and a view to preserving, rehabilitating and 
maintaining historic properties and encouraging compatible uses within the 
neighborhoods or districts, but no regulation made to carry out the purposes of 
this paragraph is valid to the extent it constitutes an unconstitutional taking 
without compensation.

 

4§ 34-12-106. Vacation; 
generally.

            
Any such plat may be vacated by the proprietors thereof at any time 
before the sale of any lots therein, by a written instrument declaring the same 
to be vacated, duly executed, acknowledged or proved and recorded in the same 
office with the plat to be vacated, and the execution and recording of such 
writing shall operate to destroy the force and effect of the recording of the 
plat so vacated, and to divest all public rights in the streets, alleys, commons 
and public grounds laid out or described in such plat, and in case where any 
lots have been sold, the plat may be vacated as herein provided, by all the 
owners of lots in such plat joining in the execution of the writing 
aforesaid.  No plat or portion 
thereof within the corporate limits of a city or town shall be vacated as herein 
provided without the approval of the city or town.

 

§ 34-12-108. Vacation; partial 
vacation; when permitted.

            
Any part of a plat may be vacated under the provisions, and subject to 
the conditions of this act [§§ 34-12-101 through 34-12-104, 34-12-106 through 
34-12-115]; provided, such vacating does not abridge or destroy any of the 
rights and privileges of other proprietors in said plat; and provided, further, 
that nothing contained in this section shall authorize the closing or 
obstruction of any public highways laid out according to 
law.