Case Title: Commonwealth v. Bolden

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11634

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11634 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MAURICE BOLDEN. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     October 9, 2014. - December 17, 2014. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Burglary.  Breaking and Entering.  Constitutional Law, Double 
jeopardy.  Practice, Criminal, Double jeopardy, Duplicative 
convictions, Amendment of indictment or complaint, 
Postconviction relief. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 15, 1993. 
 
 
A motion to correct illegal sentences, filed on February 7, 
2011, was heard by Bertha D. Josephson, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
William W. Adams for the defendant. 
 
Dianne M. Dillon, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  In the summer of 1993, the defendant broke into 
several homes in the Springfield metropolitan area, attacking 
the inhabitants and carrying off their possessions.  At trial, 
2 
 
he was convicted on seventeen indictments, including three 
counts of aggravated burglary that form the basis of this 
appeal.  Two of the three counts arose from the burglary of a 
dwelling in Agawam involving two assaults therein (Agawam 
indictments).  The third count arose from a break into a home in 
Springfield and an assault on one of its inhabitants 
(Springfield indictment). 
 
The convictions on those indictments were affirmed.  42 
Mass. App. Ct. 1105 (1997).  The defendant filed in the Superior 
Court a motion for postconviction relief seeking to correct 
illegal sentences, contending that the two Agawam indictments 
were duplicative and that an amendment to the Springfield 
indictment as to the person assaulted rendered that conviction 
unconstitutional, in violation of art. 12 of the Declaration of 
Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution, under the rule of 
Commonwealth v. Snow, 269 Mass. 598 (1930).  A judge denied the 
motion; the Appeals Court affirmed the denial in a memorandum 
and order pursuant to its rule 1:28, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 1106 
(2013), and we granted the defendant's application for further 
appellate review. 
 
With respect to the Agawam indictments, we agree with the 
defendant that G. L c. 266, § 14 (§ 14), permits only one 
burglary conviction per dwelling and that the conviction on the 
duplicative indictment must be vacated.  With respect to the 
3 
 
Springfield indictment, we conclude that because § 14 permits 
only a single conviction per dwelling, a conviction on the 
original Springfield indictment would have precluded a 
conviction on the amended one.  Therefore, the name of the 
person assaulted was not an essential element and the conviction 
on the amended Springfield indictment did not violate the rule 
set forth in the Snow case.  Accordingly, we reverse in part and 
affirm in part the order denying the defendant's motion for 
postconviction relief. 
 
1.  Background.  The following facts are drawn from 
testimony before the grand jury and are supplemented by 
testimony at trial.  In the middle of the night on June 29, 
1993, the defendant opened the unlocked rear door to a house on 
Winthrop Street in Springfield, entered the dwelling, pilfered a 
key to a 1989 Mercury Merkur automobile parked in the driveway, 
and -- while in the dwelling attempting to abscond with a 
television -- was confronted by one of the occupants, Sandra 
Goodrow.  The defendant struck Sandra in the head, fled the 
dwelling, and escaped in the Merkur.  Carmella Goodrow, her 
mother-in-law and owner of the dwelling, reported the break-in 
and assault to the Springfield police. 
 
Late in the evening on July 2, 1993, the defendant drove 
the Merkur to a street near the home of Stanley and Alice 
Glogowski in Agawam.  The defendant walked up to their home, 
4 
 
opened a rear door and entered the dwelling.  Stanley heard a 
noise, commenced an investigation, and soon discovered a two-by-
four piece of lumber lying by the unlocked rear door.  After 
locking the door, he retrieved the lumber and carried it down to 
the cellar.  The defendant, lying in wait, confiscated the 
lumber and struck Stanley in the head and back. 
 
Alice, on hearing the commotion, went to the top of the 
cellar stairs, where she observed the defendant standing over 
Stanley, who was unconscious and lying on the floor.  This 
prompted her to shut the door to the cellar and place the weight 
of her body against it.  The defendant forced the door open and 
grabbed Alice, striking her in the face and sending her tumbling 
down the stairs, before kicking open and escaping through the 
rear door from which he had entered.  Stanley called the police, 
who, on arrival, found the blood-spattered piece of lumber 
impressed with the defendant's fingerprint. 
 
The defendant was apprehended by the Springfield police and 
confessed to the break-ins.  A grand jury convened in Hampden 
County and heard excerpts from the defendant's statement to the 
police, as well as the testimony of a Springfield police officer 
that:  "On 6/29/93 Carmello [sic] Goodrow of . . . Winthrop 
Street reported that her home had been broken into and that 
during the break the subject had slapped her across the head 
5 
 
before fleeing the house . . . ."  The grand jury returned the 
Springfield indictment, which provided, in pertinent part: 
"MAURICE BOLDEN . . . did break and enter the dwelling 
house in the nighttime of Carmella Goodrow . . . with 
intent therein to commit a felony, or after having entered 
with such intent, did break such dwelling house in the 
nighttime, the said Carmella Goodrow being then lawfully 
therein, and the said Maurice Bolden did make an actual 
assault on said Carmella Goodrow, a person lawfully 
therein." 
 
The grand jury also returned the two Agawam indictments, 
premising one on the armed assault of Stanley and the other on 
the armed assault of Alice. 
 
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion to amend 
the Springfield indictment to change the name of the assault 
victim from Carmella Goodrow to Sandra Goodrow.  The defendant 
consented to the amendment, the judge allowed the motion, and 
the indictment was duly amended.  The defendant was tried by 
jury on the Springfield and Agawam indictments, each resulting 
in judgments of conviction.  He was sentenced on the Agawam 
indictments to two concurrent life terms in the State prison and 
on the Springfield indictment to a minimum term of ten years in 
the State prison.  The Appeals Court affirmed the convictions, 
42 Mass. App. Ct. at 1105, and we denied the defendant's 
application for further appellate review. 
 
The defendant filed a motion in the Superior Court pursuant 
to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 
6 
 
(2001), seeking to correct certain illegal sentences, which 
motion was denied as to the Springfield indictment (indictment 
no. 93-1183) and Agawam indictments (indictment nos. 93-1181 and 
93-1182).  The Appeals Court affirmed, 84 Mass. App. Ct. at 
1106, and we initially denied the defendant's application for 
further appellate review.  466 Mass. 1108 (2013).  On 
reconsideration, however, we granted the application.  467 Mass. 
1101 (2014). 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  The Agawam indictments.  "Under the 
double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Massachusetts common law, no person may 
be convicted twice for the same offense."  Commonwealth v. 
Horne, 466 Mass. 440, 449 (2013).  Where, as here, a defendant 
is convicted twice under the same statute, we endeavor to 
"examine the statute and ask what 'unit of prosecution' was 
intended by the Legislature as the punishable act."  Id. at 449-
450, quoting Commonwealth v. Rabb, 431 Mass. 123, 128 (2000).  
This inquiry is informed by the language and purpose of the 
statute, as well as the rule of lenity, which requires us to 
resolve any ambiguities in the defendant's favor.  Horne, supra 
at 450. 
 
The crime of aggravated burglary is defined in G. L. 
c. 266, § 14.  In identifying the intended unit of prosecution 
for violations of § 14, we do not write on a pristine page.  The 
7 
 
Appeals Court thoroughly analyzed this issue in Commonwealth v. 
Gordon, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 601 (1997).  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 
430 Mass. 182, 196 (1999).  In that case, the defendant broke 
and then entered a dwelling, threatening the lawful inhabitants 
with a sawed-off shotgun.  Gordon, supra at 601-602.  The 
Commonwealth obtained three convictions under § 14, each 
premised on indictments that were identical apart from the names 
of the assault victims.  As in the present case, the defendant 
argued that the convictions were duplicative.  Id. at 602. 
 
The Appeals Court agreed, framing its analysis around the 
two disjunctive clauses that comprise the first paragraph of 
§ 14.1  Gordon, 42 Mass. App. Ct. at 603-605.  The first clause 
embraces the predicate offense of common-law burglary, the 
elements being met by one who (i) "breaks and enters a dwelling 
house in the night time, with intent to commit a felony," or 
(ii) "after having entered with such intent, breaks such 
dwelling house in the night time."  G. L. c. 266, § 14; see 
Commonwealth v. Hope, 22 Pick. 1, 4-5 (1839), quoting 1 Hale, 
Pleas of the Crown 559 (1800) ("Lord Hale says . . . 'to make up 
                                                          
 
 
1 "Whoever breaks and enters a dwelling house in the night 
time, with intent to commit a felony, or whoever, after having 
entered with such intent, breaks such dwelling house in the 
night time, any person being then lawfully therein, and the 
offender being armed with a dangerous weapon at the time of such 
breaking or entry, or so arming himself in such house, or making 
an actual assault on a person lawfully therein, shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any 
term of not less than ten years."  G. L. c. 266, § 14. 
8 
 
burglary, it must not be only to break and enter a house in the 
night time, but either a felony must be committed in the house, 
or it must be to the intent to commit a felony'").2 
 
The second clause embraces the various methods by which 
common-law burglary may be aggravated into a violation of § 14:  
(i) "any person being then lawfully therein, and the offender 
being armed with a dangerous weapon at the time of such breaking 
or entry," or (ii) "so arming himself in such house," or (iii) 
"making an actual assault on a person lawfully therein."  G. L. 
c. 266, § 14.  The Appeals Court reasoned that " when viewed from 
the perspective that the assault aggravates the burglary, there 
can be only one conviction under G. L. c. 266, § 14, for armed 
burglary, regardless of how many people the perpetrator assaults 
once inside the dwelling."  Gordon, 42 Mass. App. Ct. at 605. 
 
The Commonwealth attempts to distinguish the Gordon case on 
its facts, pointing out that the present case involved separate 
                                                          
 
 
2 Although deeply rooted in the common law, burglary has 
been punished by statute in Massachusetts since at least 1642.  
Commonwealth v. Hope, 22 Pick. 1, 9 (1839).  At that time, the 
General Court pronounced:  "if any person shall commit Burglary:  
by breaking up any dwelling house, . . . such person so 
offending shall for the first offence, be branded on the 
forehead, with the letter (B) And if he shall offend in the same 
kind, the second time, he shall be branded as before & also be 
severely whipped; and if he shall fall into the like offence, 
the third time, he shall be put to death as being incorrigible."  
General Laws of Massachusetts Colony, at 7 (1660), reprinted in 
Colonial Laws of Massachusetts 1660-1672 (1889).  The present 
iteration, at G. L. c. 266, § 15, continues to track the common-
law elements of the crime, while scaling back the penal 
consequences considerably. 
9 
 
and discrete criminal acts underlying each conviction.  Indeed, 
here, the defendant first broke into the dwelling and assaulted 
Stanley; and then broke from the cellar into the interior of the 
dwelling and assaulted Alice.  We think the Commonwealth draws a 
distinction without a difference. 
 
The language of § 14 regarding an intruder who, "after 
having entered with such intent [to commit a felony] breaks such 
dwelling house in the night time," is clearly a reference to one 
who first enters the home through an open door or window and 
then commits a proper "break" once inside the dwelling.  This 
alternate element tracks the traditional rule that one who 
simply enters through the open door or window of a home commits 
no burglary absent proof of some interior break.  See E. Coke, 
The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 63-65 
(E. and R. Brooke ed. 1797) ("So it is if the window of the 
house be open, and a thiefe with a hook or other engine draweth 
out some of the goods of the owner:  this is no burglary because 
there is no actual breaking of the house").  See also State v. 
Wilson, 1 N.J.L. 439, 441 (1793) ("If a man lifts up the latch 
of an outward door, or if an outward door, being open, a thief 
enters and unlatches or unlocks a chamber door, with a felonious 
intent, in either case his act comes up to the idea affixed by 
the law to the word breaking, so as to constitute the crime of 
burglary").  Our review of the common law suggests that multiple 
10 
 
breaks of a single dwelling did not create distinct, punishable 
burglaries, but "were in law but one transaction."  People v. 
Gibson, 25 N.W. 316, 317 (Mich. 1885).  Finding no intent by the 
Legislature to depart from this precept, we conclude that once a 
dwelling is "broken," any subsequent breaks occurring therein -- 
reasonably close in time and purpose -- are but a continuation 
of the offense and thus insufficient to support separate 
convictions under § 14.  See Commonwealth v. Burke, 392 Mass. 
688, 690 (1984), quoting Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 495, 514 
(1830) ("As has long been recognized, a statute should not be 
interpreted as being at odds with the common law 'unless the 
intent to alter it is clearly expressed'").  See generally 
Horne, 466 Mass. at 450 (describing continuous offense 
doctrine). 
 
Alternatively, the Commonwealth asks us to overrule the 
Gordon case and adopt a victim-based unit of prosecution.  We 
decline that invitation.  In addition to the historical accuracy 
and commonsense appeal of the Gordon court's analysis, we are 
persuaded by the Legislature's placement of § 14 in a chapter 
devoted to "Crimes against Property."  That placement is in 
contrast to the placement of the similar home invasion statute, 
G. L. c. 265, § 18C (entering dwelling place armed and using 
force or threatening same against any person therein), in a 
chapter devoted to "Crimes against the Person."  See 
11 
 
Commonwealth v. Levia, 385 Mass. 345, 348 (1982).  Whereas the 
language and placement of the latter supports separate 
prosecutions for each victim, the language and placement of the 
former does not.  Compare Commonwealth v. Doucette, 430 Mass. 
461, 471 (1999) (two counts of armed home invasion under G. L. 
c. 265, § 18C, not duplicative of each other), with Gordon, 42 
Mass. App. Ct. at 605. 
 
Once a person has broken and entered any part of the 
dwelling, at night, and with intent to commit a felony therein, 
the predicate offense of burglary as to that dwelling is 
complete.3  Because arming oneself with a dangerous weapon and 
assaulting the inhabitants of that dwelling merely aggravate 
that singular predicate offense, the Commonwealth may not 
aggregate such actions into multiple units of prosecution under 
§ 14.  See Commonwealth v. Hogan, 249 Mass. 555, 564 (1924) 
("The offence is an offence which may be committed in either of 
the acts charged, and whether singly or together subjects the 
defendant on conviction to one punishment").  Notwithstanding 
this limitation, the Commonwealth was free to -- and, in fact, 
did -- prosecute the defendant for other crimes committed 
                                                          
 
 
3 We need not address the question posed by the defendant 
whether breaking out for purposes of escape is sufficient to 
constitute the "break" required under G. L. c. 266, § 14.  The 
Commonwealth does not allege such a construction, nor is such a 
construction necessary to the Commonwealth's case.  The evidence 
is ample that the defendant committed the required break by 
opening the rear door to the dwelling and thereupon entering it. 
12 
 
against the inhabitants of the dwelling.  See, e.g., G. L. 
c. 265, § 18 (a) (armed assault of person sixty years of age or 
older with intent to rob). 
 
There is no question that, on the evening of July 2, 1993, 
the defendant committed the predicate offense of burglary in 
Agawam; nor is there any question that the defendant aggravated 
that offense by arming himself with a dangerous weapon and 
assaulting the lawful inhabitants of the burgled dwelling.  
However, the defendant cannot stand twice convicted for this 
singular violation of § 14.4  Because each conviction carried 
identical, concurrent life sentences, there is little profit in 
a remand.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Rivas, 466 Mass. 184, 190-
192 & n.9 (2013).  The judgment of conviction on indictment no. 
93-1182 is vacated, the verdict is set aside, and the indictment 
is dismissed. 
                                                          
 
 
4 We also reject the Commonwealth's direct estoppel and 
waiver arguments.  The defendant raised the duplicative 
conviction issue in his direct appeal and was entitled to the 
benefit of the decision in Commonwealth v. Gordon, 42 Mass. App. 
Ct. 601 (1997), which was issued during the pendency of his 
initial application for further appellate review.  To the extent 
the defendant failed to raise this argument in his initial 
motions for postconviction relief, we review for a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 
Mass. 675, 675-676 (2002), S.C., 444 Mass. 72 (2005).  It is 
well established that duplicative convictions pose such a risk, 
even where the punishments are imposed concurrently.  
Commonwealth v. Jones, 382 Mass. 387, 395-396 (1981).  
Accordingly, there is no procedural bar to the relief sought by 
the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 375 Mass. 380, 393 
(1978); Gallinaro v. Commonwealth, 362 Mass. 728, 737 (1973). 
13 
 
 
b.  The Springfield indictment.  The defendant next 
challenges the amendment of the Springfield indictment, 
hearkening back to our pronouncement in the case of Commonwealth 
v. Blood, 4 Gray 31, 32 (1855): 
"Nothing can be more clear than the duty of the 
Commonwealth to prove the identity of the offence charged 
in a complaint or indictment, with that on which it seeks 
to convict the party charged before the jury of trials.  
The fundamental principles of our government require this 
as an essential safeguard to the rights and liberty of the 
citizen.  If it were not so, the constitutional privilege 
of a party, before he is held to answer to an offence, to 
have it 'fully and plainly, substantially and formally 
described to him,' and to be secure from arrest until 'the 
cause or foundation of the warrant be previously supported 
by oath or affirmation,' might be violated at the pleasure 
of prosecutors." 
 
We think that the concerns articulated in the Blood case, since 
refined through the development of our statutory and common law, 
have been satisfied in this case. 
 
One of those refinements occurred by way of the 
Legislature's enactment of St. 1926, c. 227, providing that: 
"Upon motion of the district attorney or prosecuting officer, 
the court may order the complaint or indictment amended in 
relation to allegations or particulars as to which the defendant 
would not be prejudiced in his defence."5  The breadth and 
                                                          
 
 
5 The substance of this statute, codified at G. L. c. 277, 
§ 35A, and repealed by St. 1979, c. 344, § 35, now applies in 
broader terms by way of Mass. R. Crim. P. 4 (d), 378 Mass. 849 
(1979):  "Upon his own motion or the written motion of either 
party, a judge may allow amendment of the form of a complaint or 
14 
 
constitutionality of this enactment were tested in Commonwealth 
v. Snow, 269 Mass. 598 (1930), a case on which the defendant 
leans heavily. 
 
The crime charged in the Snow case was extortion, carried 
out by a threat against the person and property of one Nora 
Downs.  Id. at 599.  The question posed was whether the grand 
jury's indictment could be modified, consistent with art. 12, to 
premise the extortion on a threat against the safety of Nora 
Downs's child.  Snow, 269 Mass. at 604-605.  We observed that an 
indictment may be properly amended only in "matters of form and 
those not essential to the description of the crime charged."  
Id. at 606.  The materiality of the amendment, in turn, depended 
on "whether judgment of conviction or acquittal on the 
indictment as drawn would be a bar to a new indictment drawn in 
the form in which it stood after the amendment."  Id. at 609-
610.  Concluding that a judgment on the original indictment 
would not have raised such a bar, we reversed the allowance of 
the amendment.  Id. at 610. 
 
Although we agree that the Snow case is controlling here, 
that will be cold comfort to the defendant.  As we explain 
today, § 14 may support only one conviction per burglary. 
Applying the test set forth in the Snow case, it is plain that a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
indictment if such amendment would not prejudice the defendant 
or the Commonwealth." 
15 
 
judgment of conviction on the indictment as originally drawn 
would bar a new indictment drawn in its amended form, as each 
indictment was premised on the same burglary.  The name of the 
assault victim was, therefore, not an essential element to the 
crime charged in this case.  It follows, therefore, that the 
change was one of form rather than substance, and we detect no 
constitutional error in the conviction on the amended 
Springfield indictment.6 
 
Absent such constitutional concerns, a judge may amend an 
indictment on the motion of the Commonwealth so long as it does 
not prejudice the defendant.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 4 (d), 378 Mass. 
849 (1979).  Here, in light of the defendant's statement to the 
police and his consent to the pretrial amendment, he suffered no 
prejudice.  Commonwealth v. Miranda, 441 Mass. 783, 789-790 
(2004) (no prejudice where defendant was fully informed of 
                                                          
 
 
6 The amendment did not materially change the work of the 
grand jury.  See Commonwealth v. Benjamin, 358 Mass. 672, 679-
680 (1971).  Properly contextualized, the reasonable inference 
flowing from the grand jury testimony was that the defendant 
struck the woman he encountered, who, regardless of the name 
ascribed to her, appeared to be a lawful inhabitant of the 
dwelling.  Where, as here, the amended indictment charges the 
same crime as the original indictment, and the crime described 
to both the grand jury and the trial jury is the same in all 
material respects, there is no interference with the art. 12 
guaranty to an indictment by grand jury.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Roby, 462 Mass. 398, 405 (2012) (nonmaterial 
variance based on trial evidence "did not materially change the 
work of the grand jury"); Campagna v. Commonwealth, 454 Mass. 
1006, 1008 (2009) ("there is no confusion about the conduct 
underlying the indictments"). 
16 
 
nature of charge and assented to amendment).  Accordingly, the 
Commonwealth's motion was properly allowed and the defendant is 
not entitled to relief from the judgment of conviction on 
indictment no. 93-1183. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion 
to correct illegal sentences is affirmed as to indictment nos. 
93-1181 and 93-1183, and reversed as to indictment no. 93-1182. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.