Case Title: Cochran, et al. v. Kansas Division of Water Resources, et al. (Updated March 29, 2011)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 102498

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2011-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 102,498 
 
GARY L. COCHRAN and JERRI COCHRAN, 
Appellees, 
 
v. 
 
THE STATE OF KANSAS, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 
DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, and THE CITY OF WICHITA, KANSAS, 
Appellants. 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
 
Standing is a jurisdictional question whereby courts determine whether the 
plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant 
invocation of jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his or 
her behalf. 
 
2. 
 
Standing implicates the court's jurisdiction to hear a case; therefore, the existence 
of standing is a question of law over which this court's scope of review is unlimited. 
 
3. 
 
When the district court's ruling as to standing is made before commencement of 
discovery, an appellate court should accept the facts alleged in the petition as true, along 
with any inferences that can be reasonably drawn therefrom.  
 
 
 
 
Updated: March 29, 2011
4. 
 
The express language of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 82a-711(c) clearly limits standing to 
the applicant for administrative review of an adverse determination by the Chief Engineer 
of the Division of Water Resources with respect to a permit to appropriate water. 
 
5. 
 
The Kansas Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of Agency Actions 
(KJRA) confers standing on any party to the proceedings. Under the KJRA a party to the 
proceedings includes a person to whom the agency action is specifically directed or a 
person named as a party to any agency proceeding or allowed to intervene or participate 
as a party in the proceeding. 
 
6. 
 
The KJRA applies to all agencies and all proceedings for judicial review of agency 
actions not specifically exempted by statute.  
 
7. 
 
In a conflict between two statutes covering the same subject matter, the more 
specific statute must control over a more general statute. 
 
8. 
 
The provisions of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 82a-711(c) apply to administrative review. 
The provisions of K.S.A 77-601 apply to judicial review. 
 
9. 
 
The provisions of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 82a-711(c) and K.S.A. 77-601 do not 
concern the same subject matter and there is no conflict between the two statutes; 
therefore, it is improper to use the more-specific-statute rule of construction. 
 
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10. 
 
If a party has no administrative remedies available there is no additional 
requirement that the party exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking judicial 
review.  
 
11. 
 
In addition to the statutory qualifications conferring standing, a party seeking 
judicial review, in fact any party seeking to file an action in the courts of Kansas, must 
demonstrate he or she also meets the traditional requirements for standing.  
 
12. 
 
The traditional test for standing is twofold, a cognizable injury and a causal 
connection between the injury and the challenged conduct. 
 
Appeal from Sedgwick district court; ERIC R. YOST, judge. Opinion filed March 25, 2011. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
 
Burke W. Griggs, of Division of Water Resources, argued the cause and was on the briefs for 
appellant State of Kansas.  
 
Brian K. McLeod, deputy city attorney, argued the cause and Joe Allen Lang, chief deputy city 
attorney, was on the brief for appellant City of Wichita. 
 
Nancy Ogle, of Ogle Law Office, L.L.C., of Wichita, argued the cause, and John F. Reals, of Law 
Offices of John F. Reals, of Wichita, was with her on the brief for appellees.  
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
SMITH, J.: This case arises out of a determination by the district court that Gary 
and Jerri Cochran have standing to seek judicial review of the determinations made by 
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the Chief Engineer of the Division of Water Resources granting the applications of the 
City of Wichita to appropriate water for beneficial use. We affirm the district court. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 
There is no dispute of any essential fact. 
 
 
In 1993, the City of Wichita, Kansas adopted an "Integrated Local Water Supply 
Plan" to serve Wichita and surrounding cities and rural water districts through 2050. As 
part of that plan the City of Wichita, Water & Sewer Department (the City), applied to 
the Department of Agriculture, Division of Water Resources (DWR) for permits to 
appropriate water for beneficial use, File Nos. 45,296, 45,297, 45,298, 45,299, 45,300, 
and 45,301. The City sought to divert groundwater from the Equus Beds aquifer and 
Arkansas River bank storage water from an area known as the "Bently Well Field." The 
Chief Engineer approved the applications, and the permits were issued on or about 
February 6, 2008. 
 
 
Gary L. and Jerri Cochran (the Cochrans) are owners of prior water appropriation 
rights with points of diversion in the vicinity of the authorized points of diversion for the 
City's permits. During the permit process, the DWR received input from the Cochrans 
and their legal counsel, who expressed concerns that their prior appropriation rights may 
be affected by the City's proposed appropriation. Despite these concerns, the DWR 
approved the City's applications for the permits. 
 
 
The permits issued to the City included provisions to prevent impairment of 
existing water appropriation rights. For example, the Chief Engineer reserved the right to 
review the available hydrologic data and make modifications to the conditions of 
approval, including revocation of the permit if the use of water as authorized was found 
4 
 
to exceed the long-term sustainable yield of the aquifer, or caused impairment to existing 
water rights. Gary Cochran received a copy of the permits. 
 
 
After the permits were issued, the Cochrans sent a letter to the Kansas Department 
of Agriculture, requesting a hearing regarding issuance of the permits. The Chief 
Engineer of the DWR entered an initial order denying the Cochrans' request on March 26, 
2008, finding that the Cochrans lacked standing under K.S.A. 82a-711(c) to request a 
hearing challenging the City's permits. The Chief Engineer found that only the applicant 
enjoyed standing to appeal the determination relying on K.S.A. 82a-711(c). The 
Cochrans then filed a timely petition for administrative review of the Chief Engineer's 
order with the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture. The Secretary, in turn, issued 
an order, finding that the Cochrans lacked standing under K.S.A. 82a-711(c). The 
Secretary determined that K.S.A. 82a-711(c) conferred standing to request judicial 
review of a permit only to the applicant for a permit and not to third parties. 
 
 
On May 30, 2008, the Cochrans filed a petition for judicial review in district court 
in Sedgwick County. In their petition, the Cochrans argued that the permits granted to the 
City did not sufficiently protect their senior water rights. The Cochrans requested the 
district court to stay or enjoin DWR's action under the permits pending the Court's final 
decision; set aside or modify DWR's action; remand the matter for further proceedings 
before the DWR with directions to protect the Cochrans' senior water rights; and provide 
other just and equitable relief. 
 
 
The district court heard arguments limited to the issue of standing on January 29, 
2009, and found that, under this court's decision in Board of Sumner County Comm'rs v. 
Bremby, 286 Kan. 745, 189 P.3d 494 (2008), the Cochrans had standing to seek review of 
the Chief Engineer's order granting the permits. 
 
5 
 
 
The case is before this court on interlocutory appeal of the district court's 
determination of the Cochrans' standing. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Water Rights in Kansas 
 
 
Before addressing the standing question, a brief review of Kansas water law and 
the Kansas Water Appropriation Act (KWAA), K.S.A. 82a-701 et seq. is appropriate. 
 
 
Since passing the KWAA in 1945, Kansas has followed "a permit system for 
acquiring water appropriation rights based upon 'first in time, first in right." Hawley v. 
Kansas Dept. of Agriculture, 281 Kan. 603, 614, 132 P.3d 870 (2006) (citing Peck and 
Owen, Loss of Kansas Water Rights for Non-Use, 43 Kan. L. Rev. 801, 805 [1995]). 
Water rights are considered real property. K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 82a-701(g). Further, "a 
water right does not constitute ownership of the water itself; it is only a usufruct, a right 
to use water." Shipe v. Public Wholesale Water Supply Dist. No. 25, 289 Kan. 160, Syl. ¶ 
6, 210 P.3d 105 (2009); see K.S.A. 82a-707(a).  
 
 
Prior to enactment of the KWAA, Kansas followed the riparian doctrine for 
surface water and the absolute ownership doctrine for groundwater. Hawley, 281 Kan. at 
613-14. Under both of these doctrines, water rights were "generally not lost solely by 
failure to use the water." Hawley, 281 Kan. at 614 (citing 43 Kan. L. Rev. at 802). 
 
 
Under the KWAA, Kansas now follows the appropriation doctrine. Williams v. 
City of Wichita, 190 Kan. 317, 333, 374 P.2d 578 (1962). "The appropriation doctrine is 
based upon the premise[] that all unused water belongs to all of the people of the state. 
The first person to divert water from any source and use it for beneficial purposes has 
prior right thereto. In other words, first in time, first in right." F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. 
6 
 
Gibson, 230 Kan 224, 630 P.2d 1164 (1981). Under this doctrine, this court now 
approaches questions concerning water rights "'upon the basis of the interest of the people 
of the state without losing sight of the beneficial use the individual is making or has the 
right to make of the water.'" F. Arthur Stone & Sons, 230 Kan. at 231 (quoting State, ex 
rel. v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 555, 207 P.2d 440 [1949]). 
 
Issue on Appeal 
 
 
The sole question on appeal is whether the Cochrans have standing to seek review 
under the KWAA and/or the Kansas Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of 
Agency Actions, K.S.A. 77-601 et seq. (KJRA).  
 
 
This court has "explained that if a person does not have standing to challenge an 
action or to request a particular type of relief, then 'there is no justifiable case or 
controversy' and the suit must be dismissed." Bremby, 286 Kan. at 750 (citing Kansas 
Bar Ass'n v. Judges of the Third Judicial Dist., 270 Kan. 489, 490, 14 P.3d 1154 [2000]). 
"When a person who does not have standing to file suit nevertheless asks for relief, it is 
tantamount to a request for an advisory opinion. [Citation omitted.] Advisory opinions 
are an executive, not a judicial, power." 286 Kan. at 750 (citing State ex rel. Morrison v. 
Sebelius, 285 Kan. 875, 885, 179 P.3d 366 [2008]). 
 
Standard of Review 
 
 
"Standing is a jurisdictional question whereby courts determine 'whether the 
plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant 
invocation of jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his or 
her behalf.'" Bremby, 286 Kan. at 750-51 (quoting Moorhouse v. City of Wichita, 259 
Kan. 570, 574, 913 P.2d 172 [1996]). "Because standing implicated the court's 
jurisdiction to hear a case, the existence of standing is a question of law over which this 
7 
 
court's scope of review is unlimited." 286 Kan. at 751 (citing 312 Education Ass'n v. 
U.S.D. No. 312, 273 Kan. 875, 882, 47 P.3d 383 [2002]). 
 
 
The district court's ruling was made before commencement of discovery; 
therefore, this court should "accept the facts alleged in the petition as true, along with any 
inferences that can be reasonably drawn therefrom. If those facts and inferences 
demonstrate that the appell[ee]s have standing to sue, the decision of the district court 
must be [affirmed]." Bremby, 286 Kan. at 751. 
 
 
Additionally, the issue presented requires the court to interpret sections of the 
KWAA, K.S.A. 82a-701 et seq. and the KJRA, K.S.A. 77-601 et seq.  
 
"When courts are called upon to interpret statutes, the fundamental rule 
governing our interpretation is that 'the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can 
be ascertained. The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the 
language of the statutory scheme it enacted.' State ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 271 Kan. 
355, 378, 22 P.3d 124 (2001). For this reason, when the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, courts 'need not resort to statutory construction.' In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 
53, 79, 169 P.3d 1025 (2007). Instead, '[w]hen the language is plain and unambiguous an 
appellate court is bound to implement the expressed intent.' State v. Manbeck, 277 Kan. 
224, Syl. ¶ 3, 83 P.3d 190 (2004). 
 
". . . Generally, courts should construe statutes to avoid unreasonable results and 
should presume that the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless 
legislation. Hawley v. Kansas Dept. of Agriculture, 281 Kan. 603, 631, 132 P.3d 870 
(2006). We ascertain the legislature's intent behind a particular statutory provision 'from a 
general consideration of the entire act. Effect must be given, if possible, to the entire act 
and every part thereof. To this end, it is the duty of the court, as far as practicable, to 
reconcile the different provisions so as to make them consistent, harmonious, and 
sensible. [Citation omitted.]' In re Marriage of Ross, 245 Kan. 591, 594, 783 P.2d 331 
(1989); see also State ex rel. Morrison v. Oshman Sporting Goods Co. Kansas, 275 Kan. 
763, Syl. ¶ 2, 69 P.3d 1087 (2003). Thus, in cases that require statutory construction, 
8 
 
'courts are not permitted to consider only a certain isolated part or parts of an act but are 
required to consider and construe together all parts thereof in pari materia.' Kansas 
Commission on Civil Rights v. Howard, 218 Kan. 248, Syl. ¶ 2, 544, P.2d 791 (1975)." 
Bremby, 286 Kan. at 754-55.  
 
 
Finally, this court no longer gives deference to an agency's interpretation of a 
statute and, therefore, has unlimited review. Kansas Dept. of Revenue v. Powell, 290 Kan. 
564, 567, 232 P.3d 856 (2010). 
 
Standing under the KJRA and KWAA 
 
Both the KWAA and the KJRA contain provisions governing who has standing to 
seek review of the decisions of the Chief Engineer (in the case of the KWAA) or the 
agency (KJRA). See K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 82a-708b; K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 82a-711(c); 
K.S.A. 82a-716; K.S.A. 82a-717a; K.S.A. 77-611. Before determining whether the 
Cochrans have standing under traditional standards governing standing in this state, this 
court must consider whether the Cochrans meet the standing requirements of the KWAA 
and KJRA. See Bremby, 286 Kan. at 750. 
 
 
This action involves a permit to appropriate water pursuant to the KWAA. The 
statute that confers standing for administrative review of the Chief Engineers' decisions 
under these circumstances is K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 82a-711(c) which provides: 
 
"With regard to whether a proposed use will impair a use under an existing water right, 
impairment shall include the unreasonable raising or lowering of the static water level or 
the unreasonable increase or decrease of the streamflow or the unreasonable deterioration 
of the water quality at the water user's point of diversion beyond a reasonable economic 
limit. Any person aggrieved by any order or decision by the chief engineer relating to 
that person's application for a permit to appropriate water may petition for review thereof 
in accordance with the provisions of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 82a-1901 and amendments 
thereto." (Emphasis added.)  
9 
 
 
 
The express language of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 82a-711(c) clearly limits standing for 
administrative review of adverse water permit determinations by the Chief Engineer to 
the applicant. The Cochrans concede the statute so provides. Contrary to the arguments 
made by the DWR and the City, analysis of statutory standing does not end there.  
 
The KJRA has a much more inclusive provision regarding standing. It is found in 
K.S.A. 77-611: 
 
"The following persons having standing to obtain judicial review of final or non-
final agency action: 
 
 
 
"(a) 
A person to whom the agency action is specifically directed; 
"(b) 
a person who was a party to the agency proceedings that led to the 
agency action; 
"(c) 
if the challenged agency action is a rule and regulation, a person subject 
to that rule; or 
"(d) 
a person eligible for standing under another provision of law." (Emphasis 
added.)  
 
The KJRA defines "party to agency proceedings," as the term is used in K.S.A. 77-
611(b), as "[a] person to whom the agency action is specifically directed" or "a person 
named as a party to any agency proceeding or allowed to intervene or participate as a 
party in the proceeding." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 77-602(f)(2); see Bremby, 286 Kan. 
at 752. 
 
 
The Cochrans have standing for judicial review under the KJRA if they 
participated as a party in the proceeding. In Bremby, this court considered this very 
question and determined that a "party" was a person who takes part in a transaction. 286 
Kan. at 755. Further, the court found that "the legislature intended the term 'proceeding' 
10 
 
as it is used in the KJRA to be read broadly to refer to the process by which an agency 
carries out its statutory duties," and the permit process KDHE undertook to consider 
whether to grant a landfill permit was a proceeding within the meaning of the KJRA. 286 
Kan. at 756. This court held that an interested person's "submission of written comments 
during a public notice and comment period and all persons' comments made during a 
public hearing held by an agency both qualify as participation within the meaning of the 
KJRA's standing requirements." 286 Kan. at 758, 761. 
 
 
The Cochrans meet the definition of "party" under K.S.A. 77-611 as interpreted in 
Bremby. The Cochrans own prior appropriation rights with points of diversion in the 
vicinity of the authorized points of diversion for the City's permits. The DWR received 
input from the Cochrans and their legal counsel during the consideration and processing 
of the City's applications for permits. Thus, the Cochrans participated in the process by 
which the Chief Engineer carried out his statutory duties. The process at issue was a 
permit process, just like the process in Bremby. While there is no evidence in the record 
that there was a public notice of the applications or a comment period, the record 
indicates that DWR received input from the Cochrans and their legal counsel and the 
Chief Engineer considered the Cochrans' concerns. 
 
The legislature enacted the KJRA after the KWAA. The latter was passed in 1945, 
and the act was amended to include K.S.A. 82a-711(c) in 1957. The KJRA, on the other 
hand, was passed in 1984. The KWAA and its standing provisions on water appropriation 
applications had therefore been in place decades before passage of the KJRA. "[C]ourts 
presume the legislature acts with knowledge of existing statutory and case law when it 
enacts legislation." Frick v. City of Salina, 289 Kan. 1, 23, 208 P.3d 739 (2009) (citing 
State ex rel. Board of Healing Arts v. Beyrle, 269 Kan. 616, 629, 7 P.3d 1194 [2000]); see 
State v. Bee, 288 Kan. 733, 738, 207 P.3d 244 (2009); Martin v. Kansas Dept. of 
Revenue, 285 Kan. 625, 631-32, 176 P.3d 938 (2008). 
 
11 
 
 
The KJRA applies to all agencies and all proceedings for judicial review of agency 
actions not specifically exempted by statute. K.S.A. 77-603(a) provides "[t]his act applies 
to all agencies and all proceedings for judicial review and civil enforcement of agency 
actions not specifically exempted by statute from the provisions of this act." See 
Lindenman v. Umscheid, 255 Kan. 610, Syl. ¶ 1, 875 P.2d 964 (1994); Heiland v. 
Dunnick, 270 Kan. 663, Syl. ¶ 1, 19 P.3d 103 (2001); and 10th Street Medical v. State, 42 
Kan. App. 2d 249, 254, 210 P.3d 670 (2009), rev. denied (June 23, 2010). 
 
 
We must presume the legislature enacted the KJRA with full knowledge of the 
provisions of the KWAA. Had the legislature intended exclusion of the DWR or the 
water appropriation process under the KWAA from the KJRA, or any provision thereof 
including its standing provisions, it would have so provided. On the contrary, K.S.A. 
2009 Supp. 82a-724 specifies the KJRA as the statutory scheme for judicial review under 
the KWAA. There is no provision for exclusion of the KJRA from application to the 
KWAA.  
 
 
To summarize our analysis on the statutory requirements of standing we hold 
K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 82a-711(c) confers standing on water appropriation applicants only 
and applies only to agency review of a determination of the Chief Engineer with respect 
to that application. The KJRA confers standing on a party to the proceeding as that term 
is defined in the act and interpreted in Bremby and applies to judicial review as 
contemplated under that act. The Cochrans participated sufficiently to be considered a 
party to the proceedings and thus have standing to seek judicial review of the agency 
determinations pursuant to the KJRA.  
 
 
Both DWR and the City have argued that the standing provisions of the KWAA 
are more specific than the general provisions of the KJRA; therefore, the KWAA 
controls. While it is an accurate statement of the law that "the more specific statute must 
control over a more general statute," see State v. Martinez, 290 Kan. 992, 1001, 236 P.3d 
12 
 
481 (2010) (citing In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 53, 82, 169 P.3d 1025 [2007], cert. denied 
____U.S. ____, 172 L. Ed. 2d 239, 129 S. Ct. 36 [2008]), that rule has no application in 
this context. The rule applies where a general statute is in conflict with a specific statute 
dealing with the same subject.  
 
 
"It is a cardinal rule of law that statutes complete in themselves, relating to a 
specific thing, take precedence over general statutes or over other statutes which deal 
only incidentally with the same question, or which might be construed to relate to it. 
Where there is a conflict between a statute dealing generally with a subject, and another 
dealing specifically with a certain phase of it, the specific legislation controls in a proper 
case. [Citations omitted.]" Chelsea Plaza Homes, Inc. v. Moore, 226 Kan. 430, 432, 601 
P.2d 1100 (1979). 
 
Here there is no such conflict as the KWAA standing statute concerns 
administrative remedies and the KJRA concerns judicial review. The legislature clearly 
adopted more expansive criteria in determining who may have standing for the purposes 
of seeking judicial review compared to standing to seek administrative review. There is 
no conflict between the two statutes; therefore, it is improper to use the more-specific-
statute rule of construction. See, e.g., In re Tax Exemption Application of Mental Health 
Ass'n of the Heartland, 289 Kan. 1209, 1218, 221 P.3d 580 (2009). 
 
 
The KJRA does require that one exhaust his or her administrative remedies, (see 
K.S.A. 77-612), but that statute provides: 
 
"A person may file a petition for judicial review under this act only after 
exhausting all administrative remedies available within the agency whose action is being 
challenged and within any other agency authorized to exercise administrative review." 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
13 
 
This statute has been interpreted to provide that if one has no administrative remedies 
available there is no additional requirement of "exhaustion." Beaver v. Chaffee, 2 Kan. 
App. 2d 364, 369, 579 P.2d 1217 (1978), cited with approval, In re Habeas Corpus 
Application of Pierpoint, 271 Kan. 620, 624, 24 P.3d 128 (2001); see 2 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Administrative Law § 606. Thus, the Cochrans have satisfied the requirements of K.S.A. 
77-612, and we find that, under the KJRA, they have standing to seek judicial review of 
the permits granted to the City. 
 
Traditional Standing 
 
It is important to emphasize that in addition to the statutory qualifications 
conferring standing, a party seeking judicial review—in fact, any party seeking to file an 
action in the courts of Kansas—must demonstrate he or she also meet the traditional 
requirements for standing. "A party must have a sufficient stake in the outcome of an 
otherwise justiciable controversy in order to obtain judicial resolution of that 
controversy." Moorhouse v. City of Wichita, 259 Kan. 570, 574, 913 P.2d 172 (citing 
Harrison v. Long, 241 Kan. 174, 176, 734 P.2d 1155 [1987]; Joe Self Chevrolet, Inc. v. 
Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 247 Kan. 625, Syl. ¶ 1, 802 P.2d 1231 [1990]). To 
demonstrate standing in Kansas, the traditional test is twofold: "a person must 
demonstrate that he or she suffered a cognizable injury and that there is a causal 
connection between the injury and the challenged conduct." Bremby, 286 Kan. at 761 
(citing Moorhouse v. City of Wichita, 259 Kan. 570, 574, 913 P.2d 172 [1996]). 
 
 
In Bremby, the plaintiffs alleged that the landfill, if unsuitable, could leak, 
contaminating the soil, groundwater, and surface water. 286 Kan. at 763. The petition in 
Bremby stated that plaintiff's organization members would "suffer damage to their real 
property and water supply if the . . . landfill site [wa]s unsuitable under applicable legal 
requirements and if it leak[ed], causing contamination to the soil, groundwater and 
surface water." 286 Kan. at 763. This court found that it could be "inferred from the 
14 
 
petition that [plaintiffs] will suffer imminent injury if the challenge to issuance of landfill 
permit is not permitted. The [plaintiffs] therefore have standing to sue." 286 Kan. at 763. 
 
 
Just as in Bremby, the district court entered its ruling prior to the commencement 
of discovery; therefore, this court must accept the facts alleged by Cochrans to be true 
together with all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. See 286 Kan. at 751. 
 
 
In their petition, the Cochrans claim that the permits do not sufficiently protect 
their senior water rights. Specifically, the Cochrans allege, as to Permit Nos. 45,296 and 
45,297, paragraph 9 is vague and immeasurable, and the permit should have stated that 
the City would not be allowed to decrease the stream flow. As to Permit Nos. 45,298, 
45,299, 45,300, and 45,301, the Cochrans complain that the City should be required to 
monitor water quality both above and below the competent clay unit; the water should be 
sampled daily when pumps are running and weekly when the pumps are not running; 
sampling and remedies should be extended to all Cochran domestic wells and all non-
domestic water rights held by the Cochrans and any future owners of the property; 165 
cubic feet per second is an inappropriate level by which to determine whether the bank 
storage well should be operated; and the permits do not specify any provisions or means 
to ensure that bank storage water is all that is withdrawn and no groundwater is 
withdrawn.  
 
During the hearing on the Cochrans' petition for judicial review, the Cochrans 
argued additional facts about their potential injury or impairment. First, the Cochrans 
have no other source of water for their home and land other than their two points of 
diversion. Further, they pointed out to the court that they spent between one and two 
million dollars building their home, anticipating it would remain rural, and, if they have 
no other water supply and no standing to challenge the grant of a permit to the city, they 
could not value their property accurately. This argument appears to stem from the 
concept that the City's subsequent appropriation of water will impair the Cochrans' prior 
15 
 
16 
 
water right to the extent that no one would purchase their home at a later time. Finally, 
the Cochrans also argue that there is no immediate response available to them if, at a later 
time, their supply of water is impaired. For these reasons, the Cochrans request that the 
court stay or enjoin the City's action under the permits; set aside or modify the permits; 
remand the matter for further proceedings before the DWR with directions to protect the 
Cochrans' senior water rights; and provide other just and equitable relief. 
 
 
As in Bremby, the Cochrans allege a potential injury and damage "to their real 
property and water supply" if the appropriations by the City were "unsuitable under legal 
requirements." See 286 Kan. at 763. Given those facts and inferences, under Bremby, we 
find the Cochrans allege sufficient imminent injury to the value of their property and the 
levels of water on their property. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The decision of the district court holding the Cochrans have standing under the 
KJRA to challenge the determinations of the Chief Engineer of the DWR is affirmed and 
the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings within the parameters of 
that act. 
 
Affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. 
 
RICHARD M. SMITH, District Judge, assigned.1 
 
1 REPORTER'S NOTE:  Pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme Court by art. 3, § 6(f) 
of the Kansas Constitution, Judge Smith was appointed to hear case No. 102,498 to fill the 
vacancy on the court created by the retirement of Chief Justice Robert E. Davis.