Case Title: Virginia High School League v. J.J. Kelly H.S.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, JJ., and 
Stephenson and Whiting, Senior Justices 
 
VIRGINIA HIGH SCHOOL LEAGUE, INC. 
                                            OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 970053 
SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
                                         October 31, 1997 
J.J. KELLY HIGH SCHOOL 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WISE COUNTY 
 
Willis A. Woods, Judge Designate 
 
 
In this appeal, we apply corporate bylaws to resolve an 
issue between a nonstock corporation and one of its members. 
 
J.J. Kelly High School (Kelly) is a member of the Virginia 
High School League, Inc. (the League), a nonstock corporation 
organized to "foster among the public high schools of Virginia a 
broad program of supervised competitions and desirable school 
activities as an aid in the total education of students."  The 
principals of the over 280-member high schools and 14 other 
persons comprise the members of the Legislative Council in which 
the "general legislative powers of the League" are vested. 
 
Classifying high schools into three groups based on student 
membership in each school, bylaw §§ 11-1-1 and 11-2-1 define 
student membership for "classification purposes only . . . [as] 
original entries plus reentries minus withdrawals in grades 10, 
11 and 12."  As applicable here, bylaw § 11-1-1 directs that 
classifications be made "according to each school's membership on 
September 30 of the immediately preceding odd-numbered year."  
Under bylaw § 11-2-1, the group classifications are based on the 
following student memberships in the various high schools:  (1) 
Group A, 500 or fewer students; (2) Group AA, from 501 to l,000 
students; and (3) Group AAA, 1001 or more students. 
 
 
 
 
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Under bylaw § 21-1-1, each group is divided into districts 
within the State and the various schools are assigned to 
districts within their group classification.  Bylaw § 21-2-1 
provides that districts are established by group boards upon 
approval of (1) redistricting study committee recommendations or 
(2) requests from several schools within the same general area of 
the State for their inclusion in a new district.  However, 
pursuant to bylaw § 21-2-3, districts may also be established "by 
a Redistricting and Reclassification Committee appointed by the 
League Chairman on authority of the Legislative Council.  The 
plan of redistricting and reclassification proposed by the 
committee, when approved by the Executive Committee, . . . shall 
be final." 
 
In March 1995, the Legislative Council resolved "to appoint 
a Redistricting and Reclassification Committee in accordance with 
21-2-3 of the Handbook to gather data from schools, develop a 
plan of redistricting and reclassification of [all schools and 
all classes] and submit the plan to the Executive Committee for 
final approval at the September [30, 1995] meeting."  The 
committee was appointed, collected data from the schools, and, on 
July 29, 1995, submitted tentative redistricting and 
reclassification plans to its member school principals which, 
under bylaw § 11-1-1, would become effective in 1996.  However, 
instead of calculating school membership by using the September 
30, 1995, attendance figures of tenth through twelfth graders, 
 
 
 
 
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the committee used figures from March 31, 1995, of students in 
the ninth through eleventh grades.  The figures in these plans 
showed Kelly as having a membership of 512 students, thus 
removing it from Group A classification and placing it in Group 
AA and, therefore, in a different district. 
 
Kelly asserts that even though its protests against 
reclassification to the redistricting committee and the executive 
committee were unavailing, a correct application of the method 
prescribed by the bylaws would demonstrate that its student 
membership was less than 501 persons.  Consequently, Kelly filed 
this suit to enjoin the League from executing its plan to change 
Kelly's group status from Group A to Group AA and to transfer 
Kelly from its former Lonesome Pine District of Group A to the 
Highlands District of Group AA.  After an ore tenus hearing, the 
chancellor issued a written opinion in which he held that the 
League had arbitrarily and capriciously violated its own bylaws 
in reclassifying Kelly and directed counsel to prepare a decree 
enjoining such reclassification. 
 
Upon being advised that the parties had agreed to permit 
Kelly to remain in Group A pending the League's appeal of the 
court's judgment, the chancellor entered a decree directing the 
parties to comply with that agreement pending the appeal to this 
Court.  We awarded an appeal to the League. 
 
The League contends that bylaw § 21-2-3 is "an alternative 
means to redistrict and reclassify already in the bylaws."  It 
 
 
 
 
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also argues that because the Redistricting and Reclassification 
Committee report had to be submitted at the Executive Committee's 
September 30 meeting, it would have been impossible to include 
school membership figures from that same day as required by bylaw 
§ 11-2-1.  Accordingly, the League asserts that the committee's 
decision to use the March 31 figures for ninth through eleventh 
grade students was a reasonable construction of its rules. 
 
Kelly responds that the language of the bylaw sections in 
controversy is unambiguous and that we should give effect to the 
plain meaning of that language.  We agree with Kelly. 
 
Ordinarily, nonstock corporations and their members are 
controlled by the corporate bylaws.  See Code § 13.1-823(B); Blue 
Ridge Property Owners Ass'n v. Miller, 216 Va. 611, 615, 221 
S.E.2d 163, 166 (1976); cf. Knights of Columbus v. Burroughs' 
Beneficiary, 107 Va. 671, 680, 60 S.E. 40, 43 (1908) (member of 
mutual benefit society bound by its bylaws).  And, courts apply 
the bylaws in resolving disputes between those parties.  See, 
e.g., Blue Ridge Property Owners Ass'n, 216 Va. at 615, 221 
S.E.2d at 166.   
 
Moreover, "[t]he rules used to interpret statutes, 
contracts, and other written instruments are applicable when 
construing corporate bylaws."  8 William M. Fletcher, Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 4195 (perm. ed. 
rev. vol. 1992).  Hence, courts will not attempt to look beyond 
the language of bylaws written in unambiguous terms.  Id.; cf. 
 
 
 
 
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Seoane v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 249 Va. 469, 475, 457 S.E.2d 93, 
96 (1995) ("[I]f such contractual language is unambiguous, . . . 
 we do not apply rules of construction or interpretation; we 
simply give the language its plain meaning"); Brown v. Lukhard, 
229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985) ("If [statutory] 
language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for 
construction by the court; the plain meaning and intent of the 
enactment will be given it").  Similarly, when bylaw language is 
unambiguous, we need not defer to an interpretation of a 
corporation's various boards and committees. 
 
In this case there is no need to interpret or construe the 
unambiguous language of bylaw § 11-1-1 requiring the League to 
classify schools based upon student membership in "grades 10, 11, 
and 12" as of "September 30 of the immediately preceding odd-
numbered year."  This language tells the League exactly how the 
student membership of each member high school must be determined 
in classifying a particular school.  Nor does any language in 
bylaw § 21-2-3 conflict with this requirement, as suggested by 
the League.  Although empowering the Redistricting and 
Reclassification Committee to reclassify schools and establish 
districts, nothing in bylaw § 21-2-3 suggests that the 
committee's "means" of doing so can be other than that plainly 
set forth in bylaw § 11-1-1.   
 
Hence, we cannot accept the League's suggestion that the 
time constraints imposed upon the Redistricting and 
 
 
 
 
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Reclassification Committee by the Executive Committee authorized 
either of the committees or the League to use a different method 
for determining student population.  Such an authorization would, 
as the chancellor indicated, effectively permit those committees 
to amend the bylaws.  Bylaw § 25-4-1 vests the power of amendment 
solely in the Legislative Council and sets forth specific 
procedures for amendment, none of which was followed here. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the League action was a 
violation of its bylaws and is, therefore, invalid.  For this 
reason, we will affirm the trial court's judgment and remand the 
case for any further proceedings that may be necessary, 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
Affirmed and remanded.