Case Title: State v. Long

Citation: 104 Wash. 2d 285, 705 P.2d 245

Docket Number: 50970-1

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1985-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
104 Wn.2d 285 (1985) 705 P.2d 245 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. PATRICIA M. LONG, Petitioner. No. 50970-1. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. August 22, 1985. Katherine Steele Knox, for petitioner. C.J. Rabideau, Prosecuting Attorney, and David W. Corkrum, Deputy, for respondent. CALLOW, J. The defendant, Patricia Long, appeals her conviction for negligent driving. She asserts that the district court judge should have provided her with court appointed counsel. She contends that because she was entitled to a jury trial she was also entitled to court appointed counsel, claiming that the right to counsel is coextensive with the right to a jury trial. We disagree. The conviction is affirmed. On September 24, 1983, the defendant was issued a citation for negligent driving under RCW 46.61.525. RCW *286 46.61.525 provides: She appeared and presented to the court an affidavit of indigency in support of appointment of counsel. On October 19, 1983, the district court judge found her financially qualified but not entitled to court appointed counsel under JCrR 2.11(a), or otherwise, because the crime for which she was charged, negligent driving, does not carry a jail penalty. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the decision of the District Court. Notice for discretionary review was granted by the Court of Appeals which later entered an order certifying the case to this court pursuant to RCW 2.06.030(2), (d). The right to counsel has been defined and elaborated upon during recent decades. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d 733 (1963) granted to defendants in state courts the right to court appointed counsel for felony prosecutions stating: Misdemeanor defendants also enjoy the right to counsel if faced with the possibility of incarceration upon conviction. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972). The Court said: (Footnotes omitted.) Argersinger, at 37-38. The Court continued at page 40: Subsequently the right of misdemeanor defendants to appointed counsel was again delineated in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979), the Court holding: (Footnote omitted.) The Washington State Constitution, article 1, section 22 (amendment 10) provides: "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person, or by counsel ..." Amendment 6 of the United States Constitution provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance *288 of counsel for his defense." The right to counsel under the state and federal constitutions has been held to be coextensive. See, e.g., Hendrix v. Seattle, 76 Wn.2d 142, 456 P.2d 696 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948 (1970); Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wn.2d 733, 409 P.2d 867 (1966). In State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wn.2d 436, 442-44, 610 P.2d 893, 18 A.L.R.4th 690, vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 977 (1980) we find: Hendrix v. Seattle, supra, noted that the right to counsel is not the equivalent of the right to free counsel, stating: Hendrix, at 150-51. The court continued: Hendrix, at 151. The court concluded, in part, Hendrix, at 152. In Tacoma v. Heater, supra, the court commented that where the language of the parallel state and federal constitutions is similar, the state constitutional language should receive the same interpretation and definition given the federal provision by the United States Supreme Court. Tacoma v. Heater, supra at 736. Hendrix v. Seattle, supra, was superseded, insofar as it found no right to appointment of counsel in misdemeanor cases, by McInturf v. Horton, 85 Wn.2d 704, 705-07, 538 P.2d 499 (1975) which held: Later, State v. Ponce, 93 Wn.2d 533, 611 P.2d 407 (1980) construed McInturf in light of Scott v. Illinois, supra, as follows: Ponce, at 537-38. The rules of court define the protection to be given indigent defendants as follows: "The right to counsel shall extend to all criminal proceedings for offenses punishable by loss of liberty ..." JCrR 2.11(a). The defendant proposes that under the state constitution the right to counsel should extend further. She argues that this court has found greater protection for the right to jury trial under the Washington Constitution than the federal courts have found under the United States Constitution. The federal courts have read the United States Constitution as requiring jury trial only for those offenses considered serious. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 16 L. Ed. 2d 629, 86 S. Ct. 1523 (1966) (crimes carrying penalties up to 6 months do not require a jury trial if otherwise qualified as petty offense); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491, 88 S. Ct. 1444 (1968) (federal constitution's Sixth Amendment right to jury trial is binding on the state). However, in Pasco v. Mace, 98 Wn.2d 87, 653 P.2d 618 (1982) a criminal defendant in Washington was held to have the right to a jury trial regardless of the serious or petty nature of the criminal offense charged, the court stating: (Citations omitted.) Pasco, at 96-97, 99-100. We recognize that RCW 46.61.525 has not been decriminalized under RCW 46.63.020(30) and retains a minor stigma from the legislative disapproval of negligent driving. However, the Legislature has removed any possibility of license revocation or imprisonment reflecting the modest disapprobation it places on the violation. [1] We conclude that there is no federal or state constitutional requirement that an indigent defendant receive the assistance of appointed counsel where there is no possibility of incarceration. JCrR 2.11(a) grants a defendant charged with a misdemeanor the right to court appointed counsel when the offense is one where imprisonment is possible as punishment. There is no constitutional requirement or *293 requirement under JCrR 2.11(a) for the appointment of counsel for a defendant charged only with negligent driving. The conviction is affirmed. DOLLIVER, C.J., and UTTER, BRACHTENBACH, DORE, PEARSON, ANDERSEN, GOODLOE, and DURHAM, JJ., concur.