Case Title: Pfeffer v. North Dakota

Citation: 

Docket Number: 20160188

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 2016-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH
DAKOTA 2016 ND 248Cheryl L.
Pfeffer, Petitioner and Appellantv.State of North Dakota, Respondent and
AppelleeNo. 20160188Appeal from the District Court of Cass
County, East Central Judicial District, the Honorable
Steven E. McCullough, Judge.REVERSED AND REMANDED.Opinion of
the Court by VandeWalle, Chief Justice.Scott O. Diamond, 3523 45th St. S., Ste. 100, Fargo, ND
58104, for petitioner and appellant.Mark R. Boening
(argued), Assistant State's Attorney, and Gary E. Euren
(on brief), Assistant State's Attorney, P.O. Box 2806, Fargo, ND 58108-2806, for respondent
and appellee.Pfeffer v. StateNo.
20160188VandeWalle, Chief Justice.[¶1] Cheryl
Pfeffer appealed the district court's order denying her post-conviction relief for ineffective
assistance of counsel. We reverse and remand, holding the district court erred in requiring Pfeffer
to prove her appeal had a reasonable probability of success for her to have a valid claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.I.[¶2] Pfeffer was
charged with delivery of a controlled substance and convicted after a two day jury trial. During
Pfeffer's sentencing hearing, the State filed certified copies of two prior criminal judgments. With
these two prior offenses, the State argued Pfeffer's current conviction was a third offense, and
thus subject to a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence under N.D.C.C. §
19-03.1-23(1)(a)(2). Pfeffer's trial attorney argued against the conviction qualifying as her third
offense. One of the charges was out of Minnesota and had its imposition of sentence stayed for
five years and the five year period had expired prior to Pfeffer's current charge. As such, her trial
attorney argued it could not be used to enhance Pfeffer's current sentence. If the district court
excluded the Minnesota offense, Pfeffer would be subject to a 5-year mandatory minimum
sentence. The district court considered the Minnesota offense and sentenced Pfeffer to a 20-year
term of imprisonment.[¶3] After the sentencing, Pfeffer's trial attorney
testified he did not advise her of her right to appeal in writing, provide her with a copy of the
final judgment, or provide her with other information about the deadlines for filing an appeal.
The district court also did not advise Pfeffer of her right to appeal or the time line to appeal.
Pfeffer testified she did not become aware of her ability to appeal until a few months later, when
she was in the Dakota Women's Correctional and Rehabilitation Center. She filed a handwritten
notice of appeal after the deadline to appeal had passed. Because she missed the deadline, this
Court dismissed Pfeffer's appeal.[¶4] Following the dismissal, Pfeffer
applied for post-conviction relief. An evidentiary hearing was held and Pfeffer and her trial
attorney testified. After the hearing, the district court denied Pfeffer's application for
post-conviction relief. In its order, the district court found that although Pfeffer's trial attorney's
conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, she was unable to prove how his
deficient performance prejudiced her.II.[¶5] On
appeal, Pfeffer argues the district court erred as a matter of law when it analyzed the second
prong of the Strickland test. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
The district court ruled Pfeffer failed to prove the second prong because she could not show how
her appeal would have been successful if she had appealed. Pfeffer argues this analysis was
improper and she should have only been required to show that she would have appealed had she
known she had the right to appeal. Pfeffer also argues the district court erred in not granting her
relief from its failure to advise her of her right to appeal.A.[¶6] The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and
fact and is fully reviewable by this Court. Klose v.
State, 2005 ND 192, ¶ 10,
705 N.W.2d 809. The petitioner has the burden of establishing the grounds for post-conviction
relief. Flanagan v. State, 2006 ND 76, ¶ 10, 712 N.W.2d 602. We have outlined
the burdens placed upon a criminal defendant claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel:In accord with the two-pronged test established in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a defendant claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel bears the heavy burden of proving (1) counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's deficient
performance. Laib v.
State, 2005 ND 187, ¶ 9, 705 N.W.2d 845.[¶7] When the basis of an appellant's ineffective
assistance claim is counsel's failure to appeal, a more specific version of the Strickland
test applies. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, (2000). In Flores-Ortega, the
United States Supreme Court rejected a California rule "that a habeas petitioner need only show
that his counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal was without the petitioner's consent" in order to
have a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 475-76. The Court held any
such per se rule was "inconsistent with Strickland's holding that 'the performance
inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.'"
Id. at 478 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Instead of a per se rule, the
Court used a circumstance-specific analysis. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 478.1.[¶8] The first step of the circumstance-specific
analysis is to find whether counsel consulted with his or her client regarding an
appeal:the question whether counsel has performed deficiently by not
filing a notice of appeal is best answered by first asking a separate, but antecedent, question:
whether counsel in fact consulted with the defendant about an appeal. . . . If counsel has
consulted with the defendant, the question of deficient performance is easily answered: Counsel
performs in a professionally unreasonable manner only by failing to follow the defendant's
express instructions with respect to an appeal. . . . If counsel has not consulted with the
defendant, the court must in turn ask a second, and subsidiary, question: whether counsel's failure
to consult with the defendant itself constitutes deficient performance. 
Id. The Court defined "consult" as "advising the defendant about the advantages and
disadvantages of taking an appeal, and making a reasonable effort to discover the defendant's
wishes." Id.[¶9] The Court then used a modified version of
the Strickland test to determine when such failure to consult with a client regarding an
appeal constitutes deficient performance:counsel has a constitutionally
imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either
(1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous
grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that
he was interested in appealing.  Id. at 480. A defendant can satisfy
the first prong of Strickland by proving either of these two factors, or by showing
counsel's conduct fell below a state imposed standard of reasonableness. Id. at
479.[¶10] For the first prong, the district court held that Pfeffer's trial
attorney's failure to inform Pfeffer of her right to appeal in writing fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. The district court found Pfeffer's trial attorney's conduct fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness because he failed to conform to the professional standards
outlined in the Commission on Legal Counsel for Indigents - Performance Standards: Criminal
Matters. Performance Standard 13.2 requires attorneys to "inform the defendant of his or her
right to appeal, the action that must be taken to perfect an appeal, and the time in which that
action must be taken. This notice should be given in writing." Such performance standards are
guidelines, not rules of court and are not mandatory. Therefore, Pfeffer's trial attorney's failure to
inform Pfeffer of her right to appeal in writing does not alone fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness. However, at the hearing and oral argument, the State conceded Pfeffer's trial
attorney's conduct met the first prong of Strickland. Therefore we need not determine if
an attorney's failure to inform a client in writing of the right to appeal falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness. 2.[¶11] To satisfy the
second prong of Strickland, "a defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he would
have timely appealed." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 484. When a defendant, during a
critical stage of a judicial proceeding, was denied the assistance of counsel altogether, "no
specific showing of prejudice is required, because the adversary process itself is presumptively
unreliable." Id. at 483 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659
(1984)). The Court explained "counsel's alleged deficient performance arguably led not to a
judicial proceeding of disputed reliability, but rather to the forfeiture of a proceeding itself."
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 483. As such, the "deficiency deprived [the defendant] of the
appellate proceeding altogether," and therefore, "demands a presumption of prejudice."
Id. "Nevertheless, the Supreme Court said that although prejudice was presumed, the
defendant still had to show that counsel's deficient performance 'actually cause[d] the forfeiture
of the defendant's appeal.'" Whiteman v.
State, 2002 ND 77, ¶ 12, 643 N.W.2d 704 (quoting Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 484). The Court held, "to show
prejudice in these circumstances, a defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he would
have timely appealed." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 484.[¶12]
The United States Supreme Court outlined a number of factors to aid in determining this prong.
Such factors include, but are not limited to: whether the defendant pled guilty, the trial court's
instructions to the defendant regarding his right to appeal, any waiver of a right to appeal in a
plea bargain agreement, evidence of nonfrivolous grounds for appeal, and whether the defendant
promptly expressed a desire to appeal. Id. at 479-80, 485. It is not mandatory for a
defendant to show nonfrivolous grounds for an appeal to have a successful claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The Court stated:although showing nonfrivolous
grounds for appeal may give weight to the contention that the defendant would have appealed, a
defendant's inability to "specify the points he would raise were his right to appeal reinstated," . . .
will not foreclose the possibility that he can satisfy the prejudice requirement where there are
other substantial reasons to believe that he would have appealed.
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 486 (quoting Rodriquez v. U.S., 395 U.S. 327, 330
(1969)). The Court concluded "it is unfair to require an indigent, perhaps pro
se, defendant to demonstrate that his hypothetical appeal might have had merit before any
advocate has ever reviewed the record in his case in search of potentially meritorious grounds for
appeal." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 486 (emphasis in original).[¶13] In its order, the district court analyzed Pfeffer's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel under the traditional Strickland test, not the modified test of
Flores-Ortega. The district court found that Pfeffer's trial attorney's actions fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, but she failed to meet her burden of showing prejudice. The
district court held, "[a]t the hearing, Pfeffer failed to demonstrate that, but-for [her trial
attorney's] failure, there was a reasonable probability the result of her appeal would have been
different. Specifically, Pfeffer did not allege any grounds for an appeal she would have filed had
she been properly informed of her right to appeal."[¶14] This
analysis is incorrect under Flores-Ortega. Flores-Ortega altered the analysis for
prejudice; the second prong of Strickland simply requires the defendant to show he
would have appealed if not for his counsel's deficiencies. Therefore, the district court erroneously
required Pfeffer to show her appeal had a reasonable probability of succeeding; the proper legal
analysis would be to determine whether Pfeffer would have appealed if not for her trial attorney's
failure to inform her of her right to an appeal.B.[¶15] On appeal, Pfeffer also argues the district court erred when it found she
was not prejudiced by its failure to inform her of her right to appeal under N.D.R.Crim.P. 32. Rule 32(a)(3)
provides:After imposing sentence in a case that has gone to trial, the
court must advise the defendant of the defendant's right to appeal and of the right of a person
who is unable to pay the costs of an appeal to apply for appointment of counsel for purposes of
appeal.  In Wilson v.
State, this Court "adopt[ed] the holding of the United States Supreme Court in
Peguero v. U.S., 526 U.S. 23 (1999), that a court's failure to advise a defendant of his
right to appeal after sentencing is sufficient grounds for relief only when the defendant is
prejudiced by the court's error." 2013 ND 124, ¶ 16, 833 N.W.2d 492. This Court has
"consistently held a defendant must show he is prejudiced by a court's error in a Rule 52(a) harmless error analysis." Id. at ¶ 15. In analyzing harmless error, this
Court's "objective . . . is to determine whether the error was so prejudicial that substantial injury
resulted and a different decision probably would have resulted absent the error." Id. at ¶ 17 (quoting State v. Sivesind, 439 N.W.2d 530, 534 (N.D. 1989)). When a defendant has
"independent knowledge of his right to appeal," he is "not prejudiced by the trial court's
omission." Peguero, at 29-30.[¶16] In determining whether
Pfeffer was prejudiced by the district court's failure to advise her of her right to appeal, the
district court paralleled its logic of the second prong of the Strickland test. It found that
Pfeffer "failed to demonstrate any grounds for an appeal she would have filed had she been
properly informed of her right to appeal." Wilson, 2013 ND 124, ¶ 17. The district court did not determine
whether Pfeffer had independent knowledge of her right to appeal; instead, it relied solely on the
fact that Pfeffer did not assert any nonfrivolous grounds for an appeal.[¶17] As stated above, to show prejudice, the defendant must show that
"substantial injury resulted and a different decision probably would have resulted absent the
error." The question is, what is a "different decision?" The district court believes the different
decision means a reasonable probability of a successful appeal; whereas if the United States
Supreme Court's analysis in Flores-Ortega is taken into consideration, a different
decision means the defendant would have appealed.[¶18] The
concurrence in Peguero touched on this question. Justice O'Connor wrote on two
possible ways a defendant fails to show prejudice when a district court does not advise a
defendant of his right to appeal. Peguero, 526 U.S.  at 30, (O'Connor, J., concurrence).
The first, as was the case for the majority opinion, is where a defendant has independent
knowledge of his right to appeal. Id. The second is where the defendant has no
meritorious grounds for an appeal. Id. In disfavoring this second situation, O'Connor
wrote:In my opinion, there is no reason why a defendant should have to
demonstrate that he had meritorious grounds for an appeal when he is attempting to show that he
was harmed by the district court's error. To require defendants to specify the grounds for their
appeal and show that they have some merit would impose a heavy burden on defendants who are
often proceeding pro se in an initial . . . motion. If the district judge
had fulfilled his obligation to advise the defendant of his right to appeal, and the defendant had
wanted to appeal, he would have had a lawyer to identify and develop his arguments on appeal.
The defendant should not be penalized for failing to appeal in the first instance when his failure
to appeal is attributable to the errors of a district court judge. Id. In
Flores-Ortega, the Court cited to O'Connor's concurrence in determining what showing
of prejudice was required under the second prong of Strickland. 528 U.S.  at
486.[¶19] To provide consistency for the analysis of prejudice under
Rule 52(a), we will incorporate the analysis of the
prejudice prong of the Strickland test set forth in Flores-Ortega. Such standard
will require a defendant to show that but-for the district court's failure to inform him of his right
to appeal, he would have appealed and that the defendant did not have independent knowledge of
his right to appeal.[¶20] Here, the district court did not make a
finding on whether Pfeffer would have timely appealed if she had known of her right to do so.
Nor did the district court rule on whether Pfeffer had independent knowledge of her right to
appeal. Thus, the district court erred in its analysis of whether Pfeffer was prejudiced by the
district court's failure to inform her of her right to appeal.III.[¶21] We reverse and remand to the district court for appropriate analysis under
Flores-Ortega.[¶22] Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.Carol Ronning KapsnerLisa Fair
McEversDaniel J. CrothersDale V. Sandstrom