Case Title: State v. Stowe

Citation: 376 Md. 436

Docket Number: 136/00

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2003-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Stowe,
No. 136, September Term, 2000
HEADNOTE:
CRIMINAL; 
PENITENTIARY 
MISDEMEANORS; 
STATUTE 
OF
LIMITATIONS
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 88276
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 136
September Term, 2000
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
DAVID ERWIN STOWE
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C. J.
Filed:    August 7, 2003
1By way of historical background, this Court explained:
“At common law, there was no general period of limitations
applicable to criminal proceedings.  1 Chitty, A Practical Treatise On The
Criminal Law 160 (1819); Hochheimer, The Law Of Crimes And Criminal
Procedure 78 (2d Ed.1904).  In Maryland, many criminal offenses are
subject to specific limitations periods by statute.  See, e.g., Code (1974,
1989 Repl.Vol.), § §  5-106(b)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article (two year limitations period for prosecutions under the vehicle code
for unlawfully using a driver's license), 5-106(e)(3) (two year limitations
period for criminal malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office by
State officers), and 5-106(g) (three year limitations period for welfare
fraud).
“In the absence of a specific statutory limitations period for a
particular offense, the State may institute a prosecution for a felony at any
time.  Greco v. State, 307 Md. 470, 478, 515 A.2d 220, 224 (1986).
“As to misdemeanors, the General Assembly over one hundred years
ago mandated: "No prosecution . . . shall be commenced for . . . any
misdemeanor except those punished by confinement in the penitentiary,
unless within one year from the time of the offence committed." Code
In Massey v. State, 320 Md. 605, 579 A. 2d 265 (1990), this Court considered, in the
context of a prosecution for welfare perjury, the appropriate limitations period for
misdemeanor prosecutions, and, in particular, those involving “penitentiary misdemeanors.”
When that case was decided, the general statute of limitations for misdemeanors was
contained in Md. Code (1974, 1989 Repl. Vol.), § 5-106 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article.  Pursuant to that section, except as it otherwise provided, “a prosecution
for a misdemeanor not made punishable by confinement in the penitentiary by statute shall
be instituted within one year after the offense was committed.”   Therefore, the statute of
limitations for a misdemeanor was one year, unless another period of limitations was
specifically provided or the misdemeanor was “made punishable by confinement in the
penitentiary.”  Id. at 611, 579 A. 2d at 268.1   As this Court put it, “[m]isdemeanors punished
(1860), Art. 57, §  10.  At that time, and for many years thereafter, it was
common for criminal statutes to designate not only the length of
incarceration for a criminal conviction but also the place where the
defendant would serve the sentence. Trial judges would sentence convicted
defendants to the particular institutions in accordance with the statutory
authorization.  Presumably, what the Legislature considered to be the most
serious misdemeanors were made punishable by confinement in the state
penitentiary. Sentences for misdemeanors apparently deemed less serious
were by statute to be served in the county jails or state institutions such as
the house of correction.”
Massey v. State, 320 Md. 605, 610-11, 579 A. 2d 265, 267 (1990).
2
by confinement in the penitentiary are excluded from the [one year limitation] provisions of
this section of the statute, and are placed along with felonies.” Id., (quoting  Schaumloeffel
v. State, 102 Md. 470, 472, 62 A. 803, 804 (1906) and citing Archer v. State, 145 Md. 128,
137-138, 125 A. 744, 747 (1924) (noting that these misdemeanors are “class[ed] . . . with
felonies”).    Moreover, the Court noted that it was the fact that imprisonment in the
penitentiary was statutorily authorized, rather than the sentence actually imposed, that
determined whether limitations was unlimited or one year.  Id. at 611-12, 579 A. 2d at 268,
(citing, inter alia, Archer, 145 Md.. at 136, 138, 125 A. at 747-748). 
Pursuant to (1957, 1985 Repl. Vol., 1989 Cum. Supp.), Art. 88 A, § 62 (a), welfare
perjury was defined by reference to the offense of perjury, and a person committing the
offense,“upon conviction therefor is subject to the penalties provided by law for perjury.” 
Md. Code (1957, 1987 Repl. Vol.) Article 27, § 439 prescribed, as the penalty for perjury,
“imprisonment in the jail or penitentiary for not more than ten years.”  Consequently, the
Court of Special Appeals, to which the State appealed the trial court’s dismissal of the
3
welfare perjury charge against Massey, concluded that welfare perjury was a penitentiary
misdemeanor and, for that reason, excluded from the one year limitation for misdemeanors
generally.   Massey, 320 Md. at 609, 579 A. 2d at 267.    And because there was not
otherwise provided in § 5-106 a specified period of limitations applicable to that offense, a
prosecution for welfare perjury was not subject to any limitations period. Id.
We granted Massey’s petition for writ of certiorari challenging the propriety of an
unlimited period of limitations for welfare perjury when allegedly greater offenses arising
out of the same acts were subject to a specified, and therefore shorter, limitations period.  We
added two questions, one of which addressed the meaning of the phrase, “not made
punishable by confinement in the penitentiary by statute” in light of Article 27, § 690,
governing the sentencing and confinement of persons convicted of crime.   Id. at 609-10, 579
A. 2d at 267.    As enacted by Ch. 556 of the Acts of 1916, Article 27, § 654, the predecessor
of § 690,  provided:
“When any person is convicted, before any Circuit Court of any County, or the
Criminal Court of Baltimore, of any crime . . . punishable by any imprisonment
whatsoever . . . said Court may, in its discretion, sentence such person to
imprisonment in jail or in the Maryland House of Correction or in the
Maryland Penitentiary.
“It is expressly provided, however, that nothing in this Section shall be
construed to add to, alter or change the class of crimes, as they existed before
this Act takes effect, with respect to the right of challenge or with respect to
the fees in criminal cases, or to make any crime infamous, by reason of any
sentence to the Maryland  Penitentiary, or transfer thereto, which would not
have been an infamous crime before this Act takes effect. . . .”
We explained that the first paragraph gave trial judges discretion in the sentencing of a
4
defendant convicted of a crime for which imprisonment was an option, to specify the
institution in which the defendant would be confined, thus, permitting a defendant convicted
of a crime for which the statute specified confinement in the penitentiary, to be sentenced to
imprisonment elsewhere.  Id. at 612, 579 A. 2d at 268.    
The second paragraph, the Court pointed out, indicated that the sentencing flexibility
given the judges “should not affect the classification of crimes based upon the statutorily
prescribed place of confinement,” id., and “was largely the reason for this Court's holding
in Archer v. State, supra, 145 Md. at 137, 125 A. at 747.    In that case, the Court held that
the 1916 statute was not intended to change the operation of Art. 57, § 11 [the predecessor
of § 5-106 (a)], concerning the periods of limitations for misdemeanor prosecutions.”  Id. 
Specifically, the Court said (145 Md. at 137-38, 125 A. at 747):
“There is certainly nothing in either the titles or the bodies of the Acts of 1916
and 1918 to indicate that in passing those Acts the Legislature meant to
practically repeal section 11 of article 57 of the Code, which would be the
result of the construction contended for by the State. On the contrary, it is
perfectly obvious that its purpose was to create a new agency to deal with the
State's penal institutions, and to provide for the convenient shifting of convicts
from one to the other without regard to the grade of the crime.
“Section 654 expressly provides 
‘that nothing in this section shall be construed to add  to, alter or
change the class of crimes as they existed before this act takes
effect, with respect to the right of challenge or with respect to
the fees in criminal cases, or to make any crime infamous by
reason of any sentence to the Maryland Penitentiary, or transfer
thereto, which would not have been an infamous crime before
the act takes effect.’
5
“The words, ‘and punishable by any imprisonment whatsoever or by fine and
imprisonment (other than imprisonment in default of fine)’ show that it was
not intended to change the grade of any crime, but to leave that as it was
already fixed by existing law or might be fixed by future legislation.
“Article 57, section 11, in excepting from the amnesty given after one year to
ordinary misdemeanors those punished by confinement in the penitentiary,
clearly meant to  class these with felonies; and in Schaumloeffel v. State, 102
Md. 470, 62 A. 803, that intention was recognized. But the provisions of
section 654 of article 27 expressly negative the idea that that section was
intended to ‘place along with felonies’ misdemeanors not so classed by the
then existing law or by subsequent legislation.”
Although there were amendments to § 654 over the years, and the section was renumbered
§ 690, the changes were rather minor and, in any event, the second paragraph remained
unchanged.   320 Md. at 613, 579 A. 2d at 269.   A constant was “the concept of sentences
to and confinement in specific state institutions.    Id.
Major changes in § 690 occurred in 1967 with the passage of Ch. 695 of the Acts of
1967.   Id.  Section (b) of new § 690 provided:
“(b) Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this Article or any other law to
the contrary, on and after June 1, 1967, judges, in the sentencing of convicted
persons (a) for any offense for which the provisions of this Article or any other
law requires the imprisonment to be served at any one of those institutions
enumerated in Section 689 of this Article or (b) any offense for which prior to
June 1, 1967, the sentence was made for whatever reason to one of those
institutions in Section 689, shall in all such cases sentence such persons to the
jurisdiction of the Department of Correction.  All such persons shall be
committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction and delivered to
him for imprisonment. Thereafter all such persons shall be held, confined in,
assigned to or transferred to such of the institutions and facilities under the
jurisdiction of the Department as the Department from time to time may order.
“Any person sentenced prior to June 1, 1967 to any one of the institutions and
6
facilities under the jurisdiction of the Department may, after such date, and not
withstanding such sentence, be held, confined in, assigned to or transferred to
such of these institutions and facilities as the Department may from time to
time order.”
In addition to limiting the length of sentences permitted to be made to the Department of
Correction, the legislation amended sections of Article 27 relating to the Department of
Correction by deleting references to the various state institutions and replacing them with
“Jurisdiction of the Department of Correction,” “Department of Correction,” etc.   Id at 614-
15, 579 A. 2d at 269-70.  Having repealed the second paragraph of former § 690, no similar
language was included in the new section.   Id.  “[P]erhaps the most significant change,” id.,
was the enactment of new § 690 (d), employing a commonly used drafting device to amend
every statutory provision relating to the sentencing and confinement options.  Id. at 615, 579
A. 2d at 270.    Pursuant to that section,
“Whenever in this Article or any other law reference is made to the sentencing
or confinement of prisoners to any of the institutions enumerated in Section
689, such reference shall after June 1, 1967, be construed to mean sentencing
or confinement to the jurisdiction of the Department rather than to any
particular institution or facility of the Department.”
         The Court described the effect of the legislation as follows:
“Ch. 695 repealed old Art. 27, §  690, and enacted an entirely new Art. 27, §
690.  The new statute largely removed from judges a role in deciding where a
person sentenced to imprisonment should be confined. Moreover, in place of
the concept of a sentence to a particular state institution, or a confinement in
a particular state institution, the new statute substituted the concepts of
sentence to and confinement under ‘the jurisdiction of the Department of
Correction’ or ‘the custody of the Commissioner of Correction.’”
7
Id. at 614, 579 A. 2d at 269.  Also:
“The conclusion is inescapable that Ch. 695 of the Acts of 1967 effected a
substantial change with respect to the appropriate period of limitations for
misdemeanor prosecutions.  As previously discussed, under former Art. 57, §
11, and present §  5-106(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, a
misdemeanor is subject to a one year limitations period unless it is ‘punishable
by confinement in the penitentiary by statute.’ After Ch. 695 of the Acts of
1967 became effective on June 1, 1967, no misdemeanors were ‘punishable by
confinement in the penitentiary by statute.’ Although persons could and still
can be confined in the penitentiary as a matter of fact, the sentence and
confinement ‘by statute’ was to the ‘jurisdiction of the Department of
Correction’ after June 1, 1967.  This was the thrust of Ch. 695 as a whole.
More importantly, new Art. 27, §  690 (d), now §  690 (e), had the effect of
amending every statute referring ‘to the sentencing . . . of prisoners to’ the
penitentiary and substituting for ‘the penitentiary’ the words ‘jurisdiction of
the Department of Correction.’”
Id. at 617, 579 A. 2d at 271.
The State argued that the limitations statute and § 690 serve different and distinct
functions, the former dealing with the time for initiating a prosecution and the latter with
sentencing and confinement.  We rejected that argument, noting their significant
interrelationship in one respect:
“The operation of the exception to the one year period of limitations for
misdemeanor prosecutions, contained in §  5-106(a), is entirely dependent
upon the sentencing provisions in criminal statutes.  There is no statute, and
never has been one, classifying offenses as ‘penitentiary misdemeanors’ for
limitations purposes, which is independent of the statutory sentencing
provisions associated with particular offenses.”
Id. at 618, 579 A. 2d at 271.
8
The Court held that welfare perjury, like perjury, also a  misdemeanor, has no specific
limitations period and, therefore, is subject to the one year period of limitations prescribed
by § 5-106.  Id. at 621, 579 A. 2d at 273.     We explained:
“The statutory provision concerning perjury, as presently set forth in Art. 27,
§  439, of the 1957 edition of   the Annotated Code of Maryland, literally reads
that one convicted of perjury is subject ‘to imprisonment in the . . . penitentiary
for not more than ten years.’ If that codified provision had literally read that
one convicted of perjury is subject ‘to imprisonment . . . under the jurisdiction
of the Division of Correction for not more than ten years,’ this case would
likely not be here.  It is doubtful that the State would have appealed from the
circuit court's dismissal of the welfare perjury charges.  Nevertheless, as a
matter of law, the statute punishing perjury does provide that one convicted of
the offense is subject ‘to imprisonment . . .  under the jurisdiction of the
Division of Correction for not more than ten years.’ The former reference to
the "penitentiary" is not simply unamended language which has become
obsolete for sentencing purposes.   Rather, the word ‘penitentiary’ has been
amended out of the statute.  Art. 27, §  690(e), formerly §  690(d), states that
‘[w]henever in this article or any other law reference is made to the sentencing
or confinement of prisoners to [the penitentiary] . . ., such reference shall be
construed to mean sentencing or confinement to the jurisdiction of the
Division [of Correction]. . . .’ As previously discussed, this is a drafting
technique regularly used by the General Assembly to change statutes.  Refusal
to give effect to this drafting technique could have grave consequences in the
application of a multitude of statutory provisions.”
Id. at 620-21, 579 A. 2d at 272-73.
The General Assembly at its 1991 session, being dissatisfied with the Court’s
interpretation of its action in amending the provisions pertaining to the sentencing and
confinement of persons convicted of crimes, enacted Ch. 371 Acts 1991, “[for] the purpose
of ... establishing that notwithstanding Article 27, § 690 (e) of the Code or the decision of the
court in Massey v. State, 320 Md. 605, 579 A. 2d 265 (1990), if a statute provides that a
2 Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 554 provides:
“Every person who is convicted of taking into his or her mouth the sexual
organ of any other person or animal, or who shall be convicted of placing his
or her sexual organ in the mouth of any other person or animal, or who shall
be convicted of committing any other unnatural or perverted sexual practice
with any other person or animal, shall be fined not more than one thousand
dollars ($1,000.00), or be imprisoned in jail or in the house of correction or in
the penitentiary for a period not exceeding ten years, or shall be both fined and
imprisoned within the limits above prescribed in the discretion of the court.”
This provision was initially re-codified at Maryland Code (2002) § 3-320 of the Criminal
Law Article. Ch. 26 of the Acts of 2002.   As a result of subsequent amendments, see Ch.
266, §  1 of the Acts of 2002 and Ch. 278, § 1 of the  Acts of 2002, it is now codified as § 3-
322.
9
misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, the State may institute a
prosecution for the offense at any time.”   Section 2 of that Chapter, provided that “there is
no statute of limitations for a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary,
notwithstanding any holding or dictum to the contrary in Massey v. State, 320 Md. 605, 579
A.2d 265 (1990).”    To accomplish that result, § 1 of Chapter 371 repealed each of the
statutes which Massey said had effectively been amended to excise the word “penitentiary”
and re-enacted each of them with the word “penitentiary” put back in.   It also provided  that
“this Act shall take effect July 1, 1991.”
I.  
David Erwin Stowe, the appellee, on March 13, 2000, was charged,  pursuant to
Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 554,2  with one count of unnatural and
3The charges were brought by Wellford Thomas Harrison Jr, an adult, fifty three
(53) year old man, and the facts on which the charges are based are uncontroverted.  The
sexual abuse, constituting the perverted practices, consisted of fellatio, either performed
on Harrison by the appellee or performed on the appellee by Harrison.   These acts of
abuse occurred on numerous occasions, beginning while Harrison was a boy scout and the
appellee a scout troop leader and continuing when the appellee became Harrison’s tutor.
4After being charged in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Montgomery
County, the appellee prayed a jury trial, whereupon the case was transferred to the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County and the appellee was charged by information.  In that
court, the appellee moved to dismiss the charge, arguing it “is barred by the Statute of
Limitations.”  
5 Md. Rule 8-301 provides, in pertinent part:
“Method of securing review -- Court of Appeals.
(a) Generally. Appellate review by the Court of Appeals may be obtained only:
10
perverted sexual practices.3   He moved to dismiss the criminal information4 arguing that it
“is barred by the Statute of Limitations.”   The trial court granted the motion and dismissed
the criminal information, ruling that, the crime charged having occurred over forty years ago,
its prosecution was precluded by limitations, which, for that offense and under the
circumstances, was one year.    It explained:
“At the time the events [charged] occurred, there was no statute of limitations
for this penitentiary misdemeanor; In 1967, legislative action resulted in the
creation of a one-year statute of limitations for penitentiary misdemeanors (see
Massey v. State, 320 Md. 605 (1990)); Curative legislative action in 1991
removing the one-year statute of limitations on penitentiary misdemeanors
cannot support prosecution of this case because it would violate ex post facto
prohibitions.  The one-year statute of limitations applicable to this charge has
run.”
The State timely noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals and also filed,
pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-301,5 a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court .  Before
“(1) by direct appeal or application for leave to appeal, where
allowed by law;.
“(2) pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Certification of
Questions of Law Act; or.
“(3) by writ of certiorari in all other cases.”
11
any proceedings in the intermediate appellate court, this Court granted the petition, State v.
Stowe, 362 Md. 624, 766 A.2d 147 (2001), to consider whether “the crime of unnatural and
perverted sexual practices [is] subject to a one-year statute of limitations where the crime
occurred between March 1, 1958 and July 31, 1960?”  We shall affirm.
II.
In this Court, the appellant, the State, notes that, between 1958 and 1960, when the
appellee’s conduct, the alleged criminal acts occurred, no limitations period was applicable
to the misdemeanor crime of unnatural and perverted sexual practice.  Moreover, in 2000,
when the appellee was charged, there likewise was no applicable statute of limitations.  Thus,
the State argues, to apply either the law in force when the alleged crime was committed or
the current law puts the appellee  in no different position than he was in some forty years ago.
In refutation of the applicability of the ex post facto principle, it asserts:
“To try Stowe today does not subject him to criminal liability for something
that was not criminal at the time of his conduct, the crime has not been
aggravated, the punishment has not increased, and no less evidence is required
to convict him now than would have been required in 1960.”
The appellee, on the other hand, relies on Massey, supra, 320 Md. 605, 579 A.2d 265.
As a result of that case, he argues  that, after 1967, and until the Legislature amended the
12
statutory scheme effecting that result,  all misdemeanors, whether penitentiary misdemeanors
or not,  were subject to a one-year statute of limitations.  Moreover, he contends, the
Legislature applied that one-year limitations period retrospectively  to all sentences imposed
prior to June 1, 1967.  Therefore, as of that date, 1967, the crime of unnatural and perverted
practice was subject to a one-year period of limitations.   Accordingly, as of that date, the
State had one year to prosecute him for the acts he allegedly committed between 1958 and
1960.  “As neither the complainant nor the State came forward to charge [respondent] within
that one year, they are now barred from initiating a prosecution 32 years later, he concludes.”
III.
A.
 It is true, to be sure,  that, at the time the conduct, with which the appellee has been
charged, allegedly occurred, the statute then in effect permitted the court to sentence a
defendant convicted of committing an unnatural or perverted sexual act against a minor to
“imprison[ment] in jail or in the House of Correction or in the Penitentiary.”    As the Court
pointed out in Massey, then, it was the rule that judges would prescribe both the length of the
sentence to be served and the place at which that service was to occur, 320 Md. at 610, 579
A. 2d at 267, and that it was the authorization in the statute for the judge to designate the
penitentiary as a place for service of the sentence, not the sentence itself,  that determined the
nature of the offense; “what the Legislature considered to be the most serious misdemeanors
were made punishable by confinement in the state penitentiary.”  Id. at 610-11, 579 A.2d at
13
267.   It was thus a “penitentiary misdemeanor,” Massey, 320 Md. at 609, 579 A.2d at 267;
In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 73, n.11, 763 A.2d 136, 148 n.11 (2000), as to which there
was no statute of limitations.    
As we have seen, in 1967, the ability of trial judges to designate the place of
confinement was terminated and the length of the sentences to the Department of Correction
curtailed.  And this, without a disclaimer as had accompanied the legislation that had given
them this flexibility.   After June 1 of that year, pursuant to the amendments to the sentencing
and confinement provisions of § 690, they could only sentence a defendant to the
“jurisdiction of the Department of Correction,”  Massey, 320 Md. at 614, 579 A.2d at 269,
and only for a term, since increased, of three (3) months or more.  The Department of
Correction, therefore, was charged with the sole responsibility of deciding where a particular
defendant would be confined, both before June 1, 1967, notwithstanding the designation of
the sentencing judge, and after.   Id.    In addition, using a common drafting technique, id.
at 615-16, 579 A. 2d at 269 - 70, the Legislature, in effect amended every statutory provision
relating to the sentencing to, or confinement of persons in, the penitentiary, house of
correction, etc., and substituted  the words “jurisdiction of the Department” for the words
“penitentiary,” “house of correction,” and the like.    As a result, the Massey Court concluded
that since, “[a]fter Ch. 695 of the Acts of 1967 became effective on June 1, 1967, no
misdemeanors were ‘punishable by confinement in the 
penitentiary by statute,’ id. at 617, 579
A. 2d at 271, there was no longer a distinction between ordinary misdemeanors and
14
penitentiary ones.   Id. at 621, 579 A. 2d at 273.
Applying that reasoning to the case sub judice produces the same  result.  When the
Legislature made the amendments detailed in Massey, as in the case of  welfare perjury, the
unnatural and perverted practices statute no longer authorized punishment by confinement
in the penitentiary and the trial judges lost the authority to designate the place of confinement
for defendants convicted of unnatural and perverted sex acts.    As a result, as of June 1,
1967, the statute of limitations for the crime of unnatural and perverted sex act was one year,
which, in the absence of the initiation of a prosecution, as in this case, expired June 1, 1968.
Relying on Johnson v. United States, 529 U. S. 694, 701, 120 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 146
L. Ed. 2d 727, 736  (2000) (“Absent a clear statement of that intent, we do not give
retroactive effect to statutes burdening private interests.”), the State argues that the 1967
amendments do not operate retroactively to affect the statute of limitations for acts occurring
prior to their effective date.   It notes that § 690 (b) stated expressly that “on or after June 1,
1967, judges ... shall in all such cases sentence such persons to the jurisdiction of the
Department of Correction.”   Aware of the significance that the Massey Court placed on the
enactment of § 690 (d), a new section, the State calls attention to the fact that, in that section,
the substitution of the Department of Correction for the references to the various institutions
was made to occur “after June 1, 1967.”    
The State is wrong.    The appellee directs our attention to the second paragraph of §
690 (b).   That provision, as we have seen addresses the situation in which the defendant was
15
sentenced prior to the effective date of the statute to “any one of the institutions and facilities
under the jurisdiction of the Department.”   As to such defendants, “after such date, and
notwithstanding such sentence, [they may] be held, confined in, assigned to or transferred
to such of these institutions and facilities as the Department may from time to time order.”
The appellee thus submits:
“Thus, the legislature clearly made the new law retroactively applicable to all
sentences imposed prior to June 1, 1967.     In other words, to the extent that
any sentence of any judge, in the future or in the past, assigns a defendant to
a particular institution or penitentiary, such sentence shall now be construed
as being to the Division of Correction.   The law had to be retroactive for a
very practical reason.    The judicial system could not have judges and the
Division of Correction independently deciding where inmates shall be held.”
The State next asserts that the Massey analysis was wrong and that, therefore, at the
next legislative session, the General Assembly “overruled” the decision and “re-affirmed that
misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary are not subject to any statute
of limitations.”   While the Legislature did revisit the issue of the limitations period for
penitentiary misdemeanors and made amendments that resulted in such amendments having
no statute of limitations and, thus, permitting them to be prosecuted at any time, it is not true
that Massey was overruled.   To the contrary, the Legislature actually accepted the Massey
analysis.    To achieve the result of ensuring that penitentiary misdemeanors was not subject
to any limitations period, it repealed each of the statutes once authorizing a judge to order
imprisonment in the penitentiary, in which the reference to “penitentiary” had been replaced
with “Department of Correction” as a result of the 1967 amendments and reenacted them
6The State points out that this Court “recently acknowledged that the Legislature
‘intended that there be no statute of limitations in respect to penitentiary misdemeanors,”
quoting  In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 76, 763 A. 2d 136, 150 (2000).   That statement in
Anthony R. referred to the legislative intent following the 1991 amendment; it does not
purport to, and does not, suggest the legislative intent “pre” that amendment.   Indeed, the
Court in Anthony R. demonstrated that the Legislature merely followed the Court’s
suggestion as to how to achieve a no limitations status after our decision (362 Md. at 75,
763 A. 2d at 149 - 50):
“Earlier in our discussion in Massey, 320 Md. at 620, 579 A.2d at 272, we
stated, concerning the provision then in section 5-106(a) excepting
penitentiary misdemeanors from the one-year limitation provision, that
‘If the Legislature today were to provide that, notwithstanding
Art. 27, § 690, a particular offense should be punished by
confinement in the penitentiary, the exception in section
5-106(a) would be fully operative with regard to that offense.’
  
“Apparently, the Legislature did just what we discussed, even using our
language, by enacting Chapter 371 of the Laws of Maryland of 1991 (House
Bill 396). Its title clause provided:  
‘FOR the purpose of . . . establishing that notwithstanding
Article 27,    § 690(e) of the Code or the decision of the 
Court in Massey v. State, 320 Md. 605, 579 A.2d 265 (1990),
if a statute provides that a misdemeanor is punishable by
imprisonment in the penitentiary, the State may institute a
prosecution for the offense at any time ; . . . and generally
relating to penitentiary misdemeanors.”  
16
with the word, “penitentiary” put back in.   Thus, in point of fact, the effect of the 1991
amendment was curative, i.e., it recognized the effect of what the legislature did in 1967, and
acted to reinstate the original “no statute of limitations.”  Nevertheless, from  1967 to 1991,
penitentiary misdemeanors had the same  statute of limitations as all other misdemeanors,
one year.6
We agree with the appellee, considering how inextricably the sentencing and
limitations provisions are intertwined, the result would be the same even if the 1967
7 The applicable statute of limitation was then found in Md. Code (1957), Art. 57 §
1, which required actions for personal injuries to “be commenced, sued or issued within
three years from the time the cause of action accrued . . . .”
17
amendments were prospective only.    After June 1, 1967, in any case, the sentencing
authority of trial judges with respect to the length and place of confinement to the
penitentiary did not any longer exist.
B.
We turn now to whether the 1991 amendment of the statute of limitations applies to
this case.    That question implicates the issue of whether the statute effecting the amendment
was intended to be applied retrospectively or prospectively.     
Blocher v. Harlow, 268 Md. 571, 303 A.2d 395 (1973), is instructive on the issue.
There, this Court was faced with whether the statute of limitations had run when, for the first
time, more than three years after an accident and more than 33 months after appointment as
administrator,  the administrator of an estate was named a party defendant.   The dispute
involved the 1957 version of Maryland Code, Art. 93, § 112, which provided that any “action
for injuries to the person to be maintainable against an executor or administrator must be
commenced within six calendar months after the date of the qualification of the executor or
administrator of the testator or intestate,” id. at 575, 303 A.2d at 397, and its 1966
amendment which permitted such an action “against the estate of a testator or intestate [to]
be instituted after the expiration of six months but within the statute of limitation . . . .”7  The
18
Court noted, 268 Md. at 579, 303 A.2d at 399, that “if the pre-1966 section applied the action
had to be filed by June 10, 1966, while if the 1966 amendment, effective June 1, 1966,
applied, the declaration filed September 28, 1966, was timely.”
Quoting Janda v. General Motors, 237 Md. 161, 168, 205 A.2d 228, 232 (1964), the
Blocher Court stated that “various rules have been formulated by the courts to aid in
determining whether a statute is to be applied retrospectively or prospectively.”  268 Md. at
579, 303 A.2d at 399.   In Janda, 237 Md. at 168-69, 205 A.2d at 232 the Court observed:
“(1) ‘Ordinarily a change affecting procedure only, and not substantive rights,
made by statute (and an amendment of the Maryland Rules has essentially the
same effect) applies to all actions [and matters] whether accrued, pending or
future, unless a contrary intention is expressed.’  Richardson v. Richardson,
217 Md. 316, 320 and cases cited.  (2) Ordinarily a statute affecting matters or
rights of substance will not be given a retrospective operation as to
transactions, matters and events not in litigation at the time the statute takes
effect:
‘* * * unless its words are so clear, strong and imperative in
their retrospective expression that no other meaning can be
attached to them, or unless the manifest intention of the
Legislature could not otherwise be gratified.  * * * (citing
cases).  An amendatory Act takes effect, like any other
legislative enactment, only from the time of its passage, and has
no application to prior transactions, unless an intent to the
contrary is expressed in the Act or clearly implied from its
provisions.’  Tax Comm. v. Power Company, 182 Md. 111,
117[, 32 A.2d 382, 384 (1943)].”
The Court held that the 1966 amendment to § 112 was not applicable where an
“[e]xamination of Chapter 642 of the Acts of 1966 by which this amendment to § 112 was
effected shows nothing in the act itself to indicate an intent that it be applied retrospectively
8 The Court, 268 Md. at 584-85, 303 A.2d at 401-02, expressly held:
“‘One of the cardinal rules of statutory construction is that wherever possible
an interpretation should be given to statutory language which will not lead to
absurd consequences.’  To hold that the claim accrues on the date of accident
for the purpose of the three year statute of limitations embodied in § 112 and
to hold that it accrues on the date of the appointment of the administrator for
the purpose of determining whether the amended § 112 applies to this incident
appears to us to be barred by this rule.  We see yet another anomalous result
that might stem from a determination that the date of grant of letters of
administration is the significant date in determining the applicability of the
amended statute.  If in this instance the driver of the King vehicle had also
been killed in the accident and letters of administration had been granted on
her estate prior to June 1, 1966, then under such an interpretation we would
have a result where with both drivers killed at the same time in the same
accident the plaintiffs would be required to sue one within the six month
provision of § 112 as it existed prior to June 1, 1966, but permitted to sue
within the three year statute of limitations provision placed in § 112 by the
1966 amendment as to the other driver, letters having been granted subsequent
to June 1, 1966.”
9 Maryland Rule 15-207(e), effective January 1, 1997, provides:
“(e) Constructive civil contempt -- Support enforcement action.
“(1) Applicability. This section applies to proceedings for constructive civil
contempt based on an alleged failure to pay spousal or child support, including
an award of emergency family maintenance under Code, Family Law Article,
Title 4, Subtitle 5.
“(2) Petitioner’s burden of proof. Subject to subsection (3) of this section, the
court may make a finding of contempt if the petitioner proves by clear and
convincing evidence that the alleged contemnor has not paid the amount owed,
accounting from the effective date of the support order through the date of the
contempt hearing.
“(3) When a finding of contempt may not be made. The court may not make
finding of contempt if the alleged contemnor proves by a preponderance of the
19
. . . .”  268 Md. at 581, 303 A.2d at 400.8  Thus, Blocher teaches that unless the words of a
statute are so clear, strong and imperative in expressing a retrospective effect, the statute is
prospective.
To the same effect, albeit interpreting a rule,  is  Rawlings v. Rawlings, 362 Md. 535,
766 A.2d 98 (2001).    In that case, we considered whether Maryland Rule 15-207(e) applied
retrospectively or prospectively.9   There, the Circuit Court, on March 19, 1999, found Mr.
evidence that (A) rom the date of the support order through the date of the
contempt hearing the alleged contemnor (i) never had the ability to pay more
than the amount actually paid and (ii) made reasonable efforts to become or
remain employed or otherwise lawfully obtain the funds necessary to make
payment, or (B) enforcement by contempt is barred by limitations as to each
unpaid spousal or child support payment for which the alleged contemnor does
not make the proof set forth in subsection (3)(A) of this section.
“(4) Order. Upon a finding of constructive civil contempt for failure to pay
spousal or child support, the court shall issue a written order that specifies (A)
the amount of the arrearage for which enforcement by contempt is not barred
limitations, (B) any sanction imposed for the contempt, and (C) how the
contempt may be purged. If the contemnor does not have the present ability to
purge the contempt, the order may include directions that the contemnor make
specified payments on the arrearage at future times and perform specified acts
to enable the contemnor to comply with the direction to make payments.”
20
Rawlings in contempt for failure to pay child support, pursuant to  the terms of a Pendente
Lite Order.  Mr. Rawlings argued that, “because ‘some of his child support  payments were
due prior to January 1, 1997,’ application of Rule 15-207 (e) to the evidence adduced at the
19 March 1999 contempt hearing regarding his total unpaid child support, most of which
accrued after 1 January 1997, constituted an impermissible retrospective application of the
Rule.”
This Court noted:
“To ascertain the permissible retrospective or prospective sweep of Rule 15-
207(e), it is necessary to examine and ‘effectuate the legislative intention.’
Generally, ‘retrospective operation is not favored by the courts . . . and a law
will not be construed as retroactive unless the act clearly, by express language
or necessary implication, indicates that the legislature intended a retroactive
application.’  Norman J. Singer, 2 Statutes and Statutory Construction § 41.04,
at 349 (5th ed. 1993).  We stated in Mason v. State [309 Md 215, 522 A.2d
1344 (1987)]:  
“Several well settled rules of statutory interpretation are
applicable in seeking to ascertain the actual intention of the
legislature.  These are: (1) A statute is presumed to operate
prospectively from its effective date, absent clear language to
10 We said in Rawlings, 362 Md. 535, 557, 766 A.2d 98, 110 (2001), “[t]he
definition of a remedial statute has . . . been stated as a statute that relates to practice,
procedure, or remedies and does not affect substantive or vested rights.”
21
the contrary, or unless the manifest intention of the Legislature
indicates 
otherwise; 
(2) 
Despite 
the 
presumption 
of
prospectivity, a statute effecting a change in procedure only, and
not in substantive rights, ordinarily applies to all actions whether
accrued, pending or future, unless a contrary intention is
expressed; and (3) A statute affecting or impairing substantive
rights will not operate retrospectively as to transactions, matters,
and events not in litigation at the time the statute takes effect
unless its language clearly so indicates.
Mason, 309 Md. at 219-20, 522 A.2d at 1346.”
Rawlings, 362 Md. at 554-55, 766 A.2d at 109 (string citation and footnotes omitted).  We
concluded that  the Rule only affected procedure, and not substantive rights; it was remedial
in nature and, therefore, operated retrospectively.10  Id. at 559, 766 A.2d at 111.
 State v. Humphrey, 139 Wn.2d 53, 983 P.2d 1118 (1999) is an example of the
application of a non-remedial statute.  In that case, the Supreme Court of Washington
addressed the correct application of an amendment to a statute which raised the amount of
a victim penalty assessment from $100 to $500.  The defendant had committed his offense
prior to the effective date of the amendment, but upon his conviction after the effective date,
he was assessed the $500 penalty, rather than the $100 penalty that was in effect when he was
charged.  Id. at 55, 983 P.2d at 1119.  Telling in the court’s analysis was the fact that the size
of the increase in the victim penalty assessment indicated that the amendment was not
remedial:
“[I]n deciding whether the increase is remedial or substantive, we look to the
effect, not the form of the law.  We find that the increase in the amount of the
22
assessment from $100 to $500 is more in the nature of a new liability than a
remedial increase in an already existing obligation. . . .  Because the . . .
amendment . . . appears to create a new liability, we find it is not remedial . .
. .”
Id. at 63, 983 P.2d at 1123.
Equally important, the court also noted that “[a]s a general rule, courts presume that
statutes operate prospectively unless contrary legislative intent is express or implied.  An
amendment is like any other statute and applies prospectively only.”  Id. at 60, 983 P.2d at
1121-22.  Noting that the language of the amendment did not indicate whether it was to be
applied to offenses committed before its enactment and prospective application of criminal
statutes meant application to offenses committed on, or after, the effective date of the statute,
the court declined to construe the amendment as applying retrospectively.
The 1991 amendment in the case sub judice is akin to a non-remedial statute.  The
increase in the statute of limitations period from one year to infinity, operated “more in the
nature of a new liability than a remedial increase in an already existing [punishment].”
Humphrey, at 63, 983 P.2d at 1123. 
Other courts have reached similar conclusions regarding the general rule of
prospectivity.  Oxford Tire Supply, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 253 Conn.
683, 691-92, 755 A.2d 850, 855 (2000) (“Whether to apply [statute] retroactively or
prospectively depends upon the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. . . . [S]tatutes
affecting substantive rights shall apply prospectively only. . . .  This presumption in favor of
prospective applicability, however, may be rebutted when the legislature clearly and
23
unequivocally expresses its intent that the legislation shall apply retrospectively. . . .  We
generally look to the statutory language and the pertinent legislative history to ascertain
whether the legislature intended that the amendment be given retrospective effect”);
Kentucky Insurance Guaranty Association v. Jeffers, 13 S.W.3d 606, 611 (Ky. 2000) (“laws
should not be applied retroactively, [and this applies] to laws of substance only, and not those
dealing strictly with the extent of remedy”); Bates v. State, 750 So. 2d 6, 10 (Fla. 1999) (“In
Florida, without clear legislative intent to the contrary, a law is presumed to apply
prospectively.  Retroactive application of the law is generally disfavored . . . and any basis
for retroactive application must be unequivocal and leave no doubt as to the legislative
intent.”); Board of Trustees of the Municipal Fire & Police Retirement Systems of Iowa v.
City of West Des Moines, 587 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Iowa 1998) (“Generally, a newly enacted
statute is applied prospectively.  While this rule is nearly always followed when the
legislation relates to substantive rights, we recognize a statute or amendment may be applied
retrospectively when it relates solely to a remedy or procedure.”); Western Security Bank v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles, 933 P.2d 507, 513 (Cal.1997) (“A basic canon of statutory
interpretation is that statutes do not operate retrospectively unless the Legislature plainly
intended them to do so.  . . .  Of course, when the Legislature clearly intends a statute to
operate retrospectively, we are obliged to carry out that intent unless due process
considerations prevent us.”).   
The Legislature enumerated the purpose of  Chapter 371:
11The State cites People v. Frazer, 982 P. 2d 180 (Cal. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S.
1106, 120 S. Ct. 1960, 146 L. Ed. 2d 792 (2000) for the proposition that “changing a
statute of limitation does not violate the [ex poste facto] Clause, particularly where, as
here, there was no change in 1991 from the limitations rule in effect in 1958 to 1960.”  
That case is inapposite.   There, unlike in this case, there was clear evidence that the
Legislature intended the new, extended statute of limitations to apply retrospectively.  The
Court pointed out that the amended limitations period “applies to a cause of action arising
before, on, or after January 1, 1994, the effective date of this subdivision” and that  “[t]he
1996 amendment also made explicit the Legislature’s intent to “revive any cause of action
barred by Section 800 or 801." 982 P. 2d at 186.   
Moreover, Frazer is no longer good law. Stogner v. California, ___ U. S. ___,123
S. Ct. 2446; 156 L. Ed. 2d 544 (2003).   In that case, referring to the statute at issue in
Frazer, the Supreme Court opined:
“The Constitution's two Ex Post Facto Clauses prohibit the Federal
Government and the States from enacting laws with certain retroactive
effects. See Art. I, §  9, cl. 3 (Federal Government); Art. I, §  10, cl. 1
(States). The law at issue here created a new criminal limitations period that
extends the time in which prosecution is allowed. It authorized criminal
24
“FOR THE PURPOSE of setting forth, without amendment, the provisions of
the Annotated Code of Maryland establishing certain criminal offenses as
misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary; establishing
that notwithstanding Article 27,    § 690 (e) of the Code or the decision of the
Court in Massey v. State, 320 Md. 605, 579 A.2d 265 (1990), if a statute
provides that a misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment in the
penitentiary, the State may institute a prosecution for the offense at any time
; . . . and generally relating to penitentiary misdemeanors.”
Interestingly, stricken from the Chapter was language that would have purported to
“confirm[], and clarify[] that these offenses are not subject to a statute of limitations,
notwithstanding” Massey.    Section 4 of the Chapter provides:  “And be it further enacted
that this Act shall take effect July 1, 1991.”
There is no indication, not to mention a clear one, to apply this amendment
retrospectively.11    By its very terms, it applies prospectively and, therefore, only to the
prosecutions that the passage of time had previously barred. Moreover, it
was enacted after prior limitations periods for Stogner's alleged offenses
had expired. Do these features of the law, taken together, produce the kind
of retroactivity that the Constitution forbids? We conclude that they do.”
Id. at ___, 123 S. Ct. at 2449, 156 L. Ed. 2d at ___.
25
unnatural and perverted sex practices law as amended in 1991, and not to that in force in
1958-60 or as amended in 1967.     
JUDGMENT  AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.