Case Title: People v. Sasser

Citation: 

Docket Number: S217128

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2015-04-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
Filed 4/23/15 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S217128 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/5 A136655 
DARREN DERAE SASSER, 
) 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. C156534 
 
____________________________________) 
 
When a defendant with one prior ―strike‖ is convicted of a subsequent 
felony, the second-strike provision of the Three Strikes law requires that he be 
sentenced to ―twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current 
felony conviction.‖  (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (e)(1); all subsequent statutory 
references are to this code.)  If the current offense is a serious felony, he is also 
subject to a five-year prior serious felony enhancement on top of that doubled 
term.  (§ 667, subd. (a)(1).)  In cases where the second-strike offender has only 
one current offense, the sentencing arithmetic is simple:  The trial court selects the 
base term, doubles it, and adds five years. 
But when a defendant‘s second-strike sentence includes multiple terms for 
several offenses, calculating the correct sentence can become more complex.  We 
granted review to determine whether the prior serious felony enhancement may be 
applied to the term imposed for each current offense or only once to the 
determinate portion of the overall sentence.  Finding our decision in People v. 
 
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Tassell (1984) 36 Cal.3d 77, 89–92 (Tassell) applicable in this context, we 
conclude that the prior serious felony enhancement may be added only once to 
multiple determinate terms imposed as part of a second-strike sentence. 
I. 
Defendant Darren Derae Sasser was convicted of 11 offenses arising from 
sexual assaults on two separate victims.  His convictions included three counts of 
oral copulation by force (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)), three counts of sodomy by force 
(§ 286, subd. (c)(2)), and five counts of rape by force (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)).  Sasser 
admitted that he had a prior conviction for a lewd act on a child (§ 288, subd. (a)), 
which qualified for sentencing purposes as a prior sex offense, a prior strike, and a 
prior serious felony.  The trial court imposed a sentence of 458 years and four 
months to life. 
Sasser appealed.  The Court of Appeal reversed two of the sodomy 
convictions due to instructional error, reversed the sentence with regard to several 
of the other counts, and remanded for resentencing.  On remand, the prosecutor 
dismissed charges on the two sodomy counts that the Court of Appeal had 
reversed.  The trial court then resentenced Sasser for the remaining nine 
convictions.  The court began by sentencing him under the habitual sexual 
offender law (§ 667.71) to 55 years to life on each of the nine counts, resulting in 
an aggregate sentence of 495 years to life.  Each of those nine indeterminate 
sentences of 55 years to life included a five-year enhancement based on Sasser‘s 
prior serious felony conviction.  Sasser does not challenge this sentence, and it is 
not at issue here.   
The trial court also imposed an alternative sentence under the One Strike 
law.  (§ 667.61.)  It started by sentencing Sasser to 25 years to life for each of two 
of the rape counts (one count for each victim).  The court then doubled the 
minimum terms for the life sentences pursuant to the Three Strikes law and added 
 
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five-year prior serious felony enhancements to both.  On the remaining counts, the 
court imposed seven determinate terms of 17 years each, i.e., the sum of the 
middle term of six years, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law, plus a five-
year prior serious felony enhancement.  Sasser‘s alternative sentence thus totaled 
229 years to life.  The court stayed this sentence in light of the lengthier 495 years 
to life sentence. 
Defendant appealed a second time, arguing that the trial court erred by 
applying a five-year prior serious felony enhancement to each of the seven 
determinate terms within the stayed 229 years to life sentence.  Relying on Tassell, 
Sasser argued that an enhancement based on a prior conviction may be applied 
only once to multiple determinate terms. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed.  It distinguished Tassell on the ground that 
Sasser was not sentenced under the determinate sentencing law ―but under the 
Three Strikes law, which permits multiple enhancements.‖  In light of the ―clear 
policy and intent behind the Three Strikes law — to increase punishment for prior 
felony convictions,‖ the Court of Appeal explained, ―a recidivism enhancement 
under section 667, subdivision (a)(1) may be imposed on each count‖ of Sasser‘s 
sentence.  We granted review. 
II. 
This case requires us to reconcile four statutory schemes:  the determinate 
sentencing law (§ 1170 et seq.) and, in particular, its rules governing multiple 
determinate terms (§ 1170.1, subd. (a) (hereafter section 1170.1(a)); enhanced 
penalty provisions for forcible sex offenses (§ 667.6); the prior serious felony 
enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1) (hereafter section 667(a)(1)); and the Three 
Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12). 
The Legislature in 1976 enacted the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act 
(Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, p. 5061), commonly referred to as the determinate 
 
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sentencing law (DSL).  In passing the law, the Legislature found that ―the purpose 
of imprisonment for crime is punishment‖ and that ―[t]his purpose is best served 
by terms proportionate to the seriousness of the offense with provision for 
uniformity in the sentences of offenders committing the same offense under 
similar circumstances.‖  (§ 1170, subd. (a)(1).) 
The DSL‘s emphasis on uniform punishment marked a shift away from a 
system in which most prisoners were sentenced to an indeterminate range of years, 
usually with a maximum term of life imprisonment.  (Nat. Inst. of Justice, U.S. 
Dept. of Justice, The Implementation of the California Determinate Sentencing 
Law (1982) pp. 12–13.)  The DSL replaced these indeterminate sentences with 
three fixed-year, or determinate, sentencing options for nearly all felony offenses.  
For example, the normal punishment for first degree robbery is ―imprisonment in 
the state prison for three, four, or six years‖ (§ 213, subd. (a)(1)(B)), and the 
sentencing court, exercising its ―sound discretion‖ and taking into account any 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, must select the term that ―best serves the 
interests of justice‖ (§ 1170, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2014, ch. 612, § 1 
[until Jan. 1, 2017]).  Today, most sentences are imposed under the DSL, and only 
death sentences and sentences of life imprisonment fall entirely outside its ambit.  
(3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) State Prison Term, § 309, 
p. 480; People v. Felix (2000) 22 Cal.4th 651, 659.) 
Section 1170.1, which was enacted as part of the DSL, ―generally governs 
the calculation and imposition of a determinate sentence when a defendant has 
been convicted of more than one felony offense.‖  (People v. Williams (2004) 34 
Cal.4th 397, 402 (Williams).)  If the sentencing court imposes consecutive terms, 
―the aggregate term of imprisonment for all these convictions shall be the sum of 
the principal term, the subordinate term, and any additional term imposed for 
applicable enhancements for prior convictions, prior prison terms, and [prior 
 
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offenses committed while released on bail or recognizance].‖  (§ 1170.1(a).)  The 
principal term consists of ―the greatest term of imprisonment imposed by the court 
for any of the crimes,‖ including any applicable offense-specific enhancements.  
(Ibid.)  The subordinate term consists of ―one-third of the middle term of 
imprisonment prescribed for each other felony conviction for which a consecutive 
term of imprisonment is imposed,‖ plus ―one-third of the term imposed for any 
specific enhancements applicable to those subordinate offenses.‖  (Ibid.)  So, for 
example, ―if a defendant were convicted of three counts of first degree robbery, 
with no enhancements, and the sentencing court imposed consecutive terms, the 
court would select either three, four, or six years for the principal term, and would 
then add to this principal term an additional term of sixteen months (one-third of 
the middle term of four years) for each of the remaining two counts.  The 
aggregate term would be the sum of the principal term (either three, four, or six 
years) and the two subordinate terms (of sixteen months each).‖  (People v. 
Nguyen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 197, 202 (Nguyen).) 
Since the DSL‘s enactment, voters and the Legislature have enacted various 
laws that call for increased punishment of certain offenders.  As these new 
provisions have been added to the Penal Code, we have been called upon to 
interpret their relationship to section 1170.1. 
In 1979, the Legislature enacted section 667.6, which applies to defendants 
convicted of certain forcible sex offenses.  (Stats. 1979, ch. 944, § 10, p. 3258.)  
As relevant here, the law provides that ―[i]n lieu of the term provided in Section 
1170.1, a full, separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each violation 
of an [enumerated forcible sex offense] if the crimes involve the same victim on 
the same occasion.‖  (§ 667.6, subd. (c) (hereafter section 667.6(c).)  The same 
legislation that created section 667.6 also added section 1170.1, subdivision (h), 
which said that for any violation of one of the enumerated sex offenses, ―the 
 
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number of enhancements which may be imposed shall not be limited . . . .  Each of 
such enhancements shall be a full and separately served enhancement and shall not 
be merged with any term or with any other enhancement.‖  (Stats. 1979, ch. 944, 
§ 12, pp. 3259–3261.)  The current version of that provision is functionally 
identical.  (§ 1170.1, subd. (h).) 
Then, in 1982, California voters enacted Proposition 8, sometimes called 
the Victims‘ Bill of Rights.  Among Proposition 8‘s provisions is the requirement 
that ―any person convicted of a serious felony who previously has been convicted 
of a serious felony in this state . . . shall receive, in addition to the sentence 
imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year enhancement for each 
such prior conviction on charges brought and tried separately.‖  (§ 667(a)(1).)  The 
voters‘ intent in enacting this enhancement was ―to increase sentences for 
recidivist offenders.‖  (People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142, 1147.) 
In Tassell, supra, 36 Cal.3d 77, we considered the interplay among section 
1170.1, section 667.6(c), and sentencing enhancements based on a defendant‘s 
prior convictions.  The defendant in Tassell was convicted of kidnapping, rape, 
and oral copulation, each of which calls for a determinate sentence.  Because the 
rape and oral copulation counts involved the same victim on the same occasion, 
the trial court exercised its discretion under section 667.6(c) to impose full 
consecutive terms for those offenses.  (Tassell, at p. 89.)  Based on the defendant‘s 
prior convictions, the trial court added recidivist enhancements under section 
667.5, subdivision (a) and section 667.6, subdivision (a) to both the rape and oral 
copulation counts.  ―The trial court justified its double use of the same prior 
convictions for enhancement by relying on section 1170.1, subdivision (i) . . . .‖  
(Tassell, at pp. 89–90.)  (The provision cited as § 1170.1, subd. (i) in Tassell is 
now labeled § 1170.1, subd. (h).) 
 
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We vacated the sentence, concluding that the recidivist enhancements 
should have been applied only once.  (Tassell, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 92.)  We 
explained that section 1170.1 ―refers to two kinds of enhancements:  (1) those 
which go to the nature of the offender; and (2) those which go to the nature of the 
offense.‖  (Tassell, at p. 90.)  Offense-related enhancements, such as those for use 
of a weapon or infliction of great bodily injury, may be added to any count to 
which they apply.  But enhancements for prior convictions go to the nature of the 
offender, not the offense, and thus ―have nothing to do with particular counts.‖  
(Ibid.)  ―Section 1170.1, subdivision (a) starts out by stating the basic rule that 
when a person is convicted of two or more felonies, the total sentence consists of 
(1) the principal term, (2) the subordinate term, and (3) any enhancements for 
prior convictions.  In so doing, it makes it very clear that enhancements for prior 
convictions do not attach to particular counts but instead are added just once as the 
final step in computing the total sentence.‖  (Ibid.)  Thus, although section 1170.1, 
former subdivision (i) serves to ―nullify certain limitations set forth in other parts 
of section 1170.1 regarding the number and length of enhancements that may be 
added to particular counts,‖ it does not ―affect the method by which enhancements 
for prior convictions are imposed.‖  (Tassell, at p. 90.) 
Although Tassell did not involve prior serious felony enhancements 
imposed under section 667(a)(1), we have subsequently confirmed that Tassell‘s 
rule applies to such enhancements.  (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 
1163–1164 [under Tassell ―only one section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement 
should have been imposed in connection with the aggregate sentence‖].) 
In 1994, the Legislature enacted the Three Strikes law.  (Stats. 1994, ch. 12, 
§ 1, p. 71, codified at § 667, subds. (b)–(i).)  Later that year, California voters 
enacted a nearly identical measure through ballot initiative.  (§ 1170.12.)  The 
Legislature‘s intent in passing the Three Strikes law was ―to ensure longer prison 
 
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sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been 
previously convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felony offenses.‖  
(§ 667, subd. (b).)  As pertinent here, the Three Strikes law increases punishment 
for second-strike defendants by doubling any determinate terms they otherwise 
would have received under the DSL.  If a defendant has one prior conviction for a 
serious or violent felony, then ―the determinate term . . . shall be twice the term 
otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction.‖  (§ 667, 
subd. (e)(1) (hereafter section 667(e)(1)).)   
In Nguyen, supra, 21 Cal.4th 197, we considered the relationship between 
section 1170.1 and the Three Strikes law.  The defendant in Nguyen was convicted 
of multiple felony counts and had one prior strike, which meant the trial court was 
required to impose ―twice the term otherwise provided‖ for his second-strike 
offenses under section 667(e)(1).  In addition to imposing one indeterminate life 
term, the trial court imposed five consecutive determinate terms ―us[ing] the 
principal term/subordinate term methodology of section 1170.1.‖  (Nguyen, at 
p. 200.)  The trial court calculated the subordinate terms by ―doubling one-third of 
the middle term for each offense.‖  (Ibid.)  We granted review to determine 
―whether the consecutive determinate term to be doubled [under the Three Strikes 
law] is one-third of the middle term or a full term (either the lower, middle, or 
upper).  Stated differently, the issue is whether the two strike sentencing provision 
incorporates the principal term/subordinate term methodology of section 1170.1 
. . . .‖  (Ibid.) 
Analyzing the text of section 667(e)(1), we reasoned that its use of the 
phrase ― ‗otherwise provided‘ would seem to encompass all sentencing provisions 
outside the Three Strikes law, except for those provisions that the Three Strikes 
law expressly abrogates.‖  (Nguyen, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 203.)  After 
determining that nothing in the Three Strikes law abrogates the relevant provisions 
 
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of section 1170.1, we held that the Three Strikes law‘s ―basic sentencing provision 
for two strikes defendants [citations] incorporates the principal term/subordinate 
term methodology of section 1170.1 and that, consistent with that methodology, 
the trial court here correctly computed subordinate terms by doubling one-third of 
the middle term for each such offense.‖  (Nguyen, at p. 207.)   
Most recently, in Williams, supra, 34 Cal.4th 397, we addressed whether 
the five-year prior serious felony enhancement can be applied to multiple 
indeterminate Three Strikes sentences.  The defendant in Williams, who had two 
prior strikes, was convicted and sentenced for several current felonies.  The trial 
court imposed four indeterminate sentences of 25 years to life and added a pair of 
five-year enhancements to each of the minimum terms, resulting in four sentences 
of 35 years to life.  (Id. at pp. 400–401.)  In affirming the judgment, we 
distinguished Tassell on the ground that section 1170.1 ―applies only to 
determinate sentences‖ and ―does not apply to multiple indeterminate sentences 
imposed under the Three Strikes law.‖  (Williams, at p. 402.)  Because the Three 
Strikes law does not distinguish between status-based enhancements and offense-
based enhancements in the same manner as section 1170.1, and because the Three 
Strikes law ―generally discloses an intent to use the fact of recidivism to separately 
increase the sentence imposed for each new offense,‖ we concluded that ―section 
667(a) enhancements are to be applied individually to each count of a third strike 
sentence.‖  (Williams, at p. 405.) 
III. 
Sasser acknowledges that his prior conviction qualifies as a strike.  As a 
result, the parties agree that section 667(e)(1) required the trial court to double the 
base term for each of his determinate sentences.  There is also no dispute that 
Sasser‘s prior conviction and all of his current offenses qualify as serious felonies 
under the five-year enhancement provision of section 667(a)(1).  Further, the 
 
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Attorney General does not contend that the enhancements should have been 
doubled.  The Three Strikes law calls for a ―determinate term‖ that is ―twice the 
term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction‖ 
(§ 667(e)(1), italics added), and an enhancement based on a prior conviction is not 
part of ―the term attributable . . . to the current felony conviction‖ (People v. 
Ramirez (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 559, 574).  Thus, the only question before us is 
whether the trial court erred in adding a five-year prior serious felony 
enhancement to each of Sasser‘s seven determinate terms. 
The Court of Appeal‘s analysis began with the premise that Sasser, unlike 
the defendant in Tassell, ―was not sentenced under section 1170.1, but under the 
Three Strikes Law.‖  This premise is incorrect.  Although we have said the Three 
Strikes law ―is a comprehensive, integrated sentencing scheme that applies to all 
cases coming within its terms‖ (People v. Casper (2004) 33 Cal.4th 38, 41), it 
does not operate to the exclusion of the rest of the Penal Code.  The Three Strikes 
law abrogates some non-Three Strikes provisions, expressly incorporates others, 
and implicitly adopts still others.   
The sentence at issue here illustrates this interaction.  For each of Sasser‘s 
seven determinate terms, the trial court began with a base term of six years, i.e., 
the middle-term sentence for rape, sodomy, and oral copulation under the 
determinate sentencing scheme.  (§§ 264, subd. (a), 286, subd. (c)(2)(A), 288a, 
subd. (c)(2)(A).)  When sentencing a defendant consecutively for multiple 
determinate offenses, the court typically may only impose ―one-third of the middle 
term‖ for each offense beyond the principal term.  (§ 1170.1(a).)  But since all of 
Sasser‘s convictions were forcible sex offenses (§ 667.6, subd. (e)), section 
667.6(c) authorized the court to disregard that limitation and impose seven full 
base terms.  Then, for each of the seven counts, the trial court applied the Three 
Strikes law to double the six-year base term ―otherwise provided.‖  (§ 667(e)(1).)  
 
11 
 
Only then did the court consider application of the five-year prior serious felony 
enhancement under section 667(a)(1).  As this summary shows, Sasser‘s 
determinate sentences were the product of multiple sentencing schemes. 
While acknowledging that the issue in this appeal ―arises at the 
intersection‖ of several sentencing provisions, the Attorney General adopts the 
Court of Appeal‘s view that Sasser was not sentenced under the DSL.  The 
Attorney General relies on Williams, where we said that section 1170.1 ―does not 
apply to multiple indeterminate sentences imposed under the Three Strikes law.‖  
(Williams, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 402.)  But Williams said nothing about 
application of enhancements to second-strike defendants who receive doubled 
determinate sentences under section 667(e)(1).  Williams addressed the 
applicability of enhancements in the context of indeterminate sentences imposed 
on ―each count of a third strike sentence.‖  (Id. at p. 405.)  We had no occasion to 
consider sentences arising in other contexts that implicate the Three Strikes 
scheme. 
Indeed, by emphasizing that ―[s]ection 1170.1 . . . applies only to 
determinate sentences,‖ Williams recognized that the distinction between 
determinate and indeterminate sentences is key to understanding whether a 
defendant is sentenced under the DSL.  (Williams, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 402.)  
Williams began its analysis by acknowledging that Tassell ―held that when 
imposing a determinate sentence on a recidivist offender convicted of multiple 
offenses, a trial court is to impose an enhancement for a prior conviction only once 
. . . .‖  (Williams, at p. 400.)  But, we concluded, ―Tassell‘s holding does not apply 
to multiple indeterminate third strike sentences . . . .‖  (Ibid.)  In other words, the 
reason Tassell did not control in Williams was that the DSL did not apply, and the 
reason the DSL did not apply was that the Three Strikes law mandates ―an 
indeterminate term of life imprisonment‖ for third-strike defendants.  (§ 667, 
 
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subd. (e)(2)(A); see Williams, at p. 402.)  In the second-strike context, ―the 
determinate term‖ to be doubled under section 667(e)(1) is calculated by reference 
to the DSL unless another statute provides otherwise. 
Our decision in Nguyen further indicates that the DSL and Three Strikes 
law are intertwined.  There we said the Three Strikes provision for second-strike 
defendants incorporates section 1170.1‘s principal term/subordinate term scheme.  
(Nguyen, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 207.)  Although Nguyen did not address 
sentencing enhancements based on prior convictions, its logic applies to the 
present context.  We explained in Nguyen that because the Three Strikes law 
expressly abrogates certain provisions of section 1170.1, its failure to mention 
other provisions ―supports the conclusion that features not expressly abrogated 
remain effective and have been incorporated into the Three Strikes law‘s 
consecutive sentencing scheme.‖  (Nguyen, at p. 204).  Sasser is a second-strike 
offender, subject to the same Three Strikes provision at issue in Nguyen, and 
nothing in the statutory language expresses an intent to abrogate section 1170.1‘s 
system for applying enhancements to multiple determinate sentences. 
Nor is Nguyen distinguishable or section 1170.1 rendered inapplicable on 
the ground that Sasser was sentenced under section 667.6(c).  As noted, that 
provision says that ―[i]n lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1, a full, 
separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each violation‖ of enumerated 
sex offenses ―if the crimes involve the same victim on the same occasion.‖  
(§ 667.6(c).)  In People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 346, we referred to 
section 667.6(c) as ―a separate and alternative sentencing scheme for offenses that 
fall within its ambit.‖  Tassell, in turn, cited Belmontes for the proposition that 
section 667.6(c) ―provides, as an alternative to consecutive sentencing under 
section 1170.1, a much harsher sentencing scheme for persons convicted of 
forcible sex offenses.‖  (Tassell, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 91.)  But Tassell did not 
 
13 
 
conclude that section 667.6(c) completely supplants section 1170.1 in any case 
where it applies. 
Like Sasser, the defendant in Tassell was sentenced ―pursuant to the special 
sentencing provisions of section 667.6, subdivision (c) for forcible sex offenses‖ 
and thus could receive full consecutive terms for both of his current offenses.  
(Tassell, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 89.)  In referring to section 667.6(c) as ―an 
alternative to consecutive sentencing under section 1170.1‖ (Tassell, at p. 91, 
italics added), Tassell made clear that section 667.6(c) supplants the manner of 
calculating consecutive sentences specified in section 1170.1.  Specifically, 
section 667.6(c) ―allows the court in its discretion to sentence a defendant to full 
term consecutive sentences rather than the ‗one-third of the middle term‘ 
consecutive sentence formula set forth in section 1170.1, subdivision (a).‖  
(Tassell, at p. 91.)  Tassell did not hold or suggest that section 667.6(c) supplants 
the manner of applying enhancements for prior convictions under section 1170.1.  
Instead, Tassell relied on section 1170.1(a) in concluding that ―enhancements for 
prior convictions [citations] are to be added just once.‖  (Tassell, at p. 91.) 
Thus, in light of Tassell, section 667.6(c)‘s phrase ―[i]n lieu of the term 
provided in Section 1170.1‖ refers to the calculation of principal and subordinate 
terms for current offenses, not to the application of prior conviction enhancements.  
In authorizing ―a full, separate, and consecutive term . . . for each violation of [a 
current forcible sex] offense,‖ section 667.6(c) leaves in place the default rule that 
―any additional term imposed for applicable enhancements for prior convictions‖  
(§ 1170.1(a)) should be imposed separately after calculating the determinate terms 
for the current offenses.  Here, as in Tassell, section 1170.1 governs enhancements 
for prior convictions even when the defendant has been sentenced to a determinate 
term under section 667.6(c). 
 
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Once it is understood that Sasser‘s enhancements for prior convictions are 
governed by section 1170.1, Tassell‘s interpretation of that statute controls.  As 
Tassell explained, section 1170.1 draws an important distinction between offense-
based enhancements, which apply to every relevant count, and status-based 
enhancements, which apply only once.  (Tassell, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 90.)  
According to section 1170.1(a), the aggregate term of imprisonment ―shall be the 
sum of the principal term, the subordinate term, and any additional term imposed 
for applicable enhancements for prior convictions . . . .‖  This structure ―makes it 
very clear that enhancements for prior convictions do not attach to particular 
counts but instead are added just once as the final step in computing the total 
sentence.‖  (Tassell, at p. 90.) 
We acknowledge that Tassell, in addition to relying on section 1170.1, also 
discussed section 667.6, subdivision (a), which was the statutory basis for one of 
the defendant‘s enhancements.  Tassell observed that ―[w]hile the Legislature 
enacted section 667.6, subdivisions (a) and (b) to increase the length of 
enhancements for prior convictions of recidivist sex offenders, there is no 
indication that it intended that such enhancements be otherwise treated differently 
than those in section 667.5.‖  (Tassell, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 91.)  In concluding 
that section 1170.1(a) ―makes it clear that enhancements for prior convictions 
(§§ 667.5, 667.6, 12022.1) are to be added just once‖ (Tassell, at p. 91), Tassell 
cited a Court of Appeal decision holding that the plain language of sections 667.5 
and 667.6, subdivision (a) — which refer to ―a[n]‖ enhancement for ―each‖ prior 
conviction — establishes that ―only one enhancement for the prior is imposed, not 
one enhancement on each new conviction.‖  (People v. Carter (1983) 144 
Cal.App.3d 534, 544–545 (Carter).) 
But whatever reliance Tassell may have placed on Carter or section 667.6, 
subdivision (a), we have since understood Tassell‘s holding to rest on section 
 
15 
 
1170.1.  (Williams, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 402 [―Tassell relied on the language of 
section 1170.1 . . . in concluding that at sentencing a trial court must impose a 
sentence enhancement for a prior felony conviction — including a section 667(a) 
enhancement — only once, regardless of the number of new felony offenses.‖]; id. 
at p. 403 [Tassell is ―not controlling or even helpful‖ in the third-strike context 
because it ―relied on section 1170.1‖].)  Moreover, even if we were to treat 
Tassell‘s discussion of section 667.6, subdivision (a) as an alternative basis for 
Tassell‘s holding, it would only strengthen Sasser‘s position.  The enhancement 
provision here, similar to the statutes discussed in Carter, refers to ―a five-year 
enhancement for each such prior conviction.‖  (§ 667, subd. (a)(1), italics added; 
see Carter, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at pp. 544–545.) 
The Legislature‘s subsequent amendment of section 1170.1 implicitly 
recognizes Tassell‘s distinction between offense-based and status-based 
enhancements.  In 1997, three years after enactment of the Three Strikes law, the 
Legislature added to section 1170.1 the explanation that the principal term 
includes ―any term imposed for applicable specific enhancements‖ and that the 
subordinate term for violent felonies includes ―one-third of the term imposed for 
any specific enhancements applicable to those subordinate offenses.‖  
(§ 1170.1(a), as amended by Stats. 1997, ch. 750, § 3, pp. 5065–5066.)  The same 
act created section 1170.11, which defined the term ―specific enhancements.‖  
(§ 1170.11, added by Stats. 1997, ch. 750, § 4, p. 9067.)  In its current form, this 
provision states that as ―used in Section 1170.1, the term ‗specific enhancement‘ 
means an enhancement that relates to the circumstances of the crime.‖  
(§ 1170.11.)  The five-year prior serious felony enhancement is a status-based 
enhancement; therefore, it is not a ―specific enhancement‖ that may be added to 
each individual count. 
 
16 
 
The Legislature‘s consistent use of the phrase ―any additional term‖ in 
section 1170.1 bolsters this conclusion.  Under section 1170.1 as it existed at the 
time of Tassell, the aggregate term for multiple offenses was ―the sum of the 
principal term, the subordinate term, and any additional term imposed pursuant to 
Section 667.5, 667.6 or 12022.1.‖  (As amended by Stats. 1982, ch. 1551, § 1.5, 
p. 6048; see Tassell, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 90, fn. 11, quoting former § 1170.1(a).)  
The Legislature has amended section 1170.1 numerous times since Tassell, yet it 
has never seen fit to change the singular phrase ―any additional term‖ to the plural  
―any additional terms.‖  
We are unpersuaded that the Three Strikes law‘s goal of punishing 
recidivists should change our conclusion.  The Three Strikes law‘s ―purpose is not 
a mantra that the prosecution can invoke in any Three Strikes case to compel the 
court to construe the statute so as to impose the longest possible sentence.‖  
(People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 501.)  As we recognized in Nguyen, the 
Three Strikes law expressly abrogates certain preexisting sentencing provisions, 
but it is intended to work in concert with those it does not abrogate.  (Nguyen, 
supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 203–204.)  
Because the determinate portion of Sasser‘s sentence was subject to section 
1170.1, the prior serious felony enhancement should have been applied only once 
to that portion of his overall sentence. 
 
17 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, we vacate Sasser‘s stayed sentence of 229 years to 
life and remand to the Court of Appeal with instructions to remand for 
resentencing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
1 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Sasser 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 223 Cal.App.4th 1148 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S217128 
Date Filed: April 23, 2015 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: C. Don Clay 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Dirck Newbury, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Ronald L. Brown, Public Defender (Los Angeles), Albert J. Menaster and Albert Camacho, Jr., Deputy 
Public Defenders, for Los Angeles County Public Defender as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
William J. Arzbaecher III for California Public Defender‘s Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. 
Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Catherine A. Rivlin and Gregg E. Zywicke, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Dirck Newbury 
P.O. Box 5575 
Berkeley, CA  94705 
(510) 644-1371 
 
Gregg E. Zywicke 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5961