Case Title: Stickney v. Murdock Steel & Engineering, Inc.

Citation: 212 Kan. 653, 512 P.2d 339

Docket Number: 46,904

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1973-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
212 Kan. 653 (1973)
512 P.2d 339
HAROLD A. STICKNEY and RICHARD L. McMILLAN, d/b/a Air Control Co., Appellees,
v.
MURDOCK STEEL AND ENGINEERING, INC., and ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellants.
No. 46,904

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 14, 1973.
Lelyn J. Braun, of Garden City, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellants.
Daniel J. High, of Calihan, Green, Calihan and High, of Garden City, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCHROEDER, J.:
This is an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien. The only question presented to the trial judge, who heard the matter without a jury, was whether or not the mechanic's lien was filed within ninety (90) days from the date material or labor was last supplied by the plaintiffs to the project in question. The trial judge determined the lien to be valid.
On appeal the controlling question is whether the findings of the trial court are supported by the evidence.
Pertinent findings and conclusions of the trial court are:
* * * * *
"The Court concludes as follows:
*655 Murdock Steel and Engineering, Inc., and St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company (defendants-appellants) contend the trial court erred: (1) In finding that the switch was part of the original contract thereby extending the time for filing the lien; (2) in finding that the lien filed in November, 1969, was filed within the statutory time as provided for by K.S.A. 60-1103, as amended; and (3) in overruling Murdock Steel's motion for additional findings and in particular that the work performed by appellees was not done within a "reasonable time."
The evidence disclosed the substantial portion of the work under the appellees' subcontract was completed during January, 1969. Following completion of the major portion of the work under the subcontract for electrical, plumbing, and heating aspects of the project, two matters remained unfinished. The first involved a water cooler which did not function correctly. The other item dealt with a light switch on the pump room. The pump room was sealed so as to be dust free. The building owner wanted a pilot light on the outside wall switch which would indicate to someone outside the room when lights were on within the room. He felt this to be an important feature to his operation.
At that time it was determined the switch had not been cabled at the time of the original installation and the subcontractor did not have the wiring necessary to complete the job along with him on the trip.
The subcontractor returned to Scott City, a distance of 35 miles from his place of business at Garden City, on the 15th day of October, 1969, and completed the cabling of the additional wire necessary to properly install the pilot light switch, wired the switch, and received word from the building owner that he then considered the subcontractor's work under the original contract to have been satisfactorily concluded.
The work on the pilot light switch did not involve the replacement of work which functioned properly after initial installation and then became defective. Rather, the work was simply not done completely at the time of initial installation by the subcontractor. The work necessary to properly wire the switch involved cabling, as well as wiring the switch.
The building owner considered the switch and the water cooler to be part of the original contract and felt that such work was not finished until October, 1969. No charge was made for the work, *656 aside from the billing rendered in connection with the original subcontract.
Our decision in Benner-Williams, Inc. v. Romine, 200 Kan. 483, 437 P.2d 312, is controlling. There the court said:
The foregoing rule was approved in Berthot v. Stroble, 208 Kan. 839, 494 P.2d 1133.
It has been recognized that where a contract to furnish material is to be regarded as completed, a subsequent gratuitous furnishing of material in the nature of a substitution or replacement to remedy a defect in the material originally delivered will not operate to extend the time within which to file a mechanic's lien. But a demand of the owner for a substitution or replacement of material insisting that the contract is not complete and acceptable owing to some imperfection will operate to permit the contractor to continue the contract so as to include the date of the replacement of the material, and to validate a mechanic's lien filed within the statutory period thereafter (53 Am.Jur.2d Mechanic's Liens, § 203).
In the instant case the owner did not regard the original contract as complete until the pilot switch was properly functioning, and the trial court found the appellees were not acting in bad faith to extend the time for the filing of a lien.
Because of the distance involved between the appellees' place of business and the job site (Garden City to Scott City), some delay was encountered. The water cooler was not available from the supplier until July, 1969, and when it arrived the subcontractor installed it within a week. The subcontractor planned to replace the switch at the same time on the same trip, but found the problem encountered was not that of a defective switch, but a failure to run a necessary cable. The necessary materials to complete this task were not with him at that time, and he waited until he again had occasion to be in Scott City. At no time has the owner of the *657 building alleged bad faith on the part of the appellees, nor does the record contain any such assertion.
The record discloses substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's findings that the additional work on the switch was part of the original contract, thereby extending the time for filing the mechanic's lien. Accordingly, the lien filed in November, 1969, was filed within the statutory time as provided in K.S.A. 1972 Supp. 60-1103.
Appellant Murdock Steel and Engineering, Inc., filed a motion for an additional finding of fact on June 9, 1971, after the trial court's decision herein. The motion prayed that the court find the lien was obtained through bad faith, neglect, inadvertance and unreasonable delay, and was filed out of time. The trial court denied the motion. The record affirmatively supports the trial court's finding that the work on the switch and pilot light was done in good faith and not merely as a sham to extend the filing time on their lien. We find no merit in the appellant's contention.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
FROMME, J., not participating.