Case Title: Schinner v. Gundrum

Citation: 2013 WI 71

Docket Number: 2011AP000564

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 71 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP564 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Marshall Schinner, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Michael Gundrum, 
          Defendant, 
West Bend Insurance Company, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 340 Wis. 2d 195, 811 N.W.2d 431 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Published) 
PDC No: 2012 WI App 31 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 23, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washington 
 
JUDGE: 
James G. Pouros 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents. 
(Opinion filed.) CROOKS, J. joins Part II of the 
dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Jeffrey Leavell and Christopher John Koppes, and 
Jeffrey Leavell, S.C., Racine, and oral argument by Jeffrey 
Leavell. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there were briefs by Keith R. 
Stachowiak and Murphy & Prachthauser, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
Daniel P. Patrykus and Keberle & Patrykus, LLP, West Bend, and 
oral argument by Keith R. Stachowiak. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. Friedman and 
Linda S. Schmidt, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, on behalf 
of the Wisconsin Insurance Alliance, and oral argument by Linda 
S. Schmidt. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Mark L. Thomsen and 
Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., Brookfield, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Association for Justice. 
 
 
 
2013 WI 71
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2011AP564   
(L.C. No. 
2009CV870) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Marshall Schinner, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael Gundrum, 
 
          Defendant, 
 
West Bend Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals1 reversing a grant of summary 
judgment by the Washington County Circuit Court2 to West Bend 
                                                 
1 Schinner v. Gundrum, 2012 WI App 31, 340 Wis. 2d 195, 811 
N.W.2d 431.   
2 Circuit Judge James G. Pouros, presiding.   
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
2 
 
Mutual Insurance Company (West Bend)3 against one of its 
insureds.  
¶2 
The insured, Michael Gundrum (Gundrum), hosted an 
underage drinking party.  One of Gundrum's many guests, Matthew 
Cecil (Cecil), assaulted and seriously injured another guest.  
Gundrum knew that Cecil had a tendency to become belligerent 
when he was intoxicated but he permitted Cecil to drink anyway.  
The 
victim, Marshall Schinner (Schinner), ultimately sued 
Gundrum and West Bend to secure damages for Schinner's injuries. 
¶3 
West Bend disputed coverage.  The insurer argued that 
it had no duty to defend and indemnify Gundrum because his 
actions as a party host were intentional; thus, there was no 
"accident" and no "occurrence" under the Gundrum family's 
homeowner's insurance policy.  West Bend also contended that 
even if there were an occurrence under the policy, there was no 
coverage because of an exclusion in the policy for bodily injury 
arising out of a non-insured location.  The party had been held 
at a shed at Gundrum Trucking, a family-owned business that was 
not an insured location under the homeowner's policy. 
¶4 
The circuit court granted summary judgment to West 
Bend because it determined that there is no accident when 
someone intentionally procures alcohol for an underage drinking 
party, and even if Gundrum's actions were an accident, the 
victim suffered bodily injury at an uninsured location. 
                                                 
3 The parties, the circuit court, and the court of appeals 
have referred to the insurance company as "West Bend Insurance 
Company" and "West Bend Mutual Insurance Company." 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
3 
 
¶5 
The court of appeals reversed on both issues.  The 
court of appeals concluded that there was an occurrence because 
Schinner's assault was an accident when viewed from the 
standpoint of either the injured person (Schinner) or the 
insured (Gundrum).  The court of appeals also concluded that the 
non-insured location exclusion did not apply because Schinner's 
injury did not arise from some "condition" of that premises.   
¶6 
The primary question before us is whether Schinner's 
injury resulted from an occurrence as defined by the West Bend 
homeowner's insurance policy, thus triggering coverage for 
Gundrum.  If the answer is yes, we are required to determine 
whether that coverage was excluded because the injury "arose out 
of" an uninsured location that was not "used in connection with" 
an insured premises under the homeowner's policy.   
¶7 
After carefully considering the facts in the record, 
the allegations in Schinner's complaint, the pertinent language 
in 
the 
homeowner's 
insurance 
policy, 
and 
our 
previous 
interpretations 
of 
"occurrence" in insurance policies, we 
reverse 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
and 
reach 
the 
following 
conclusions. 
¶8 
First, Gundrum's actions in setting up an isolated 
shed for a drinking party, procuring alcohol and expecting 
others to bring alcohol, inviting many underage guests to the 
party, and encouraging the underage guests to drink——especially 
an underage guest known to become belligerent when intoxicated——
were intentional actions that violated the law.  Gundrum's many 
intentional wrongful acts were a substantial factor in causing 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
4 
 
Schinner's bodily injury.  Viewed from the standpoint of a 
reasonable insured, Gundrum's intentional actions created a 
direct risk of harm resulting in bodily injury, notwithstanding 
his lack of intent that a specific injury occur.  Thus, 
Schinner's bodily injury was not caused by an "occurrence" 
within the meaning of the policy, and West Bend is not obligated 
to provide insurance coverage for Gundrum. 
¶9 
Second, even assuming there was an occurrence under 
the West Bend homeowner's policy, coverage is excluded because 
the injury arose out of the use of an isolated shed for an 
underage drinking party on uninsured premises.  The fact that 
the Gundrums kept some personal property insured under the 
policy at the shed did not make the shed a premises used in 
connection with the insured's residence, as those terms are 
defined in the policy.  Thus, the business shed was not an 
insured location triggering coverage under the homeowner's 
policy.  
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
¶10 The facts of this case are derived from Schinner's 
Second Amended Complaint against Gundrum and West Bend, witness 
statements, police reports, Gundrum's deposition, and the West 
Bend insurance policies of record. 
¶11 In December 2008 Gundrum, then 21, resided with his 
parents, Scott and Teri Gundrum, at their residence on State 
Highway 144, near Slinger, Wisconsin.  The Gundrums had 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
5 
 
purchased a Home and Highway4 policy (homeowner's policy or the 
policy) from West Bend covering their residential premises.  The 
homeowner's policy contained personal liability coverage for 
persons insured under the policy, including Gundrum.   
¶12 The 
personal 
liability 
coverage 
applied 
to 
an 
"occurrence": 
A. 
Coverage E – Personal Liability 
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against 
an "insured" for damages because of "bodily injury" or 
"property damage" caused by an "occurrence" to which 
this coverage applies, we will: 
1. 
Pay up to our limit of liability for the 
damages 
for 
which 
an 
"insured" 
is 
legally 
liable. . . .  
2. 
Provide a defense at our expense by counsel 
of our choice . . . . 
¶13 The homeowner's policy defined "occurrence" as "an 
accident, 
including 
continuous 
or 
repeated 
exposure 
to 
substantially the same general harmful conditions." 
 
¶14 The policy contained an exclusion for bodily injury or 
property damage liability arising out of a premises that is not 
an "insured location."5 
                                                 
4 The highway, or automobile, portion of the policy is not 
relevant to this case.   
5 The homeowner's policy stated, "Coverages E and F do not 
apply to the following: . . . 'Bodily injury' or 'property 
damage' arising out of a premises: a. Owned by an 'insured'; b. 
Rented to an 'insured'; or c. Rented to others by an 'insured'; 
that is not an 'insured location'."   
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
6 
 
 
¶15 The 
homeowner's 
policy 
also 
defined 
an 
insured 
location in part as, "[t]he residence premises," the "part of 
other premises, other structures and grounds used by you as a 
residence," and any premises used by the insured "in connection 
with" the premises described above.   
 
¶16 West Bend had also issued a commercial general 
liability (CGL) policy to Howard, Jan, Scott, and Guy Gundrum, 
doing business as HJSG Enterprises, located on Arthur Road near 
Slinger.  The facilities at this address were commonly referred 
to as Gundrum Trucking,6 where the events in question took place.  
Because of its liquor exclusion clause, HJSG's CGL policy is not 
at issue in this case. 
¶17 On December 14, 2008, Gundrum hosted a party in a shed 
at Gundrum Trucking.  The party lasted into the early morning 
                                                                                                                                                             
The homeowner's policy also contained an exclusion for 
intentional injury, stating that coverage did not apply to 
"'[b]odily injury' or 'property damage' which is expected or 
intended by an 'insured'." 
6 West Bend issued the CGL policy to HJSG Enterprises, but 
the CGL policy does not refer to Gundrum Trucking.   
The record includes a printed copy of the Wisconsin 
Department of Financial Institutions (DFI) corporate record for 
Gundrum Trucking, Inc., with its principal office on Arthur 
Road, Slinger, presumably as proof of how HJSG Enterprises 
publicly conducted its business, or that HJSG is a parent entity 
of Gundrum Trucking, Inc.  However, the DFI record for Gundrum 
Trucking, Inc. does not refer to HJSG Enterprises.  Moreover, a 
search of DFI corporate records reveals a Scott Gundrum 
Trucking, LLC, also listing its principal office on Arthur Road 
in Slinger.  For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the 
entity conducting business on Arthur Road near Slinger as 
Gundrum Trucking.   
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
7 
 
hours of December 15.  It was not the first party hosted by 
Gundrum at the shed. Gundrum testified in a deposition that 
there was at least one prior party, but other witnesses recalled 
multiple prior parties.7   
¶18 As with previous parties, Gundrum texted friends about 
the party and expected his friends to text or tell others, 
ensuring a well-attended party.  Gundrum later estimated that 
more than 40 partygoers came to the shed on the night of 
December 14.  He also estimated that 40 to 50 percent of the 
people were under the age of 21. 
¶19 The site of the party was a pole barn approximately 
40-by-60 feet in size.  It had no windows.  This shed was used 
by the trucking company, but it also stored some personal 
property belonging to Gundrum's extended family.  The property 
included 
boats, 
a 
camper, 
and 
two 
snowmobile 
trailers.  
Gundrum's immediate family stored snowmobiles in the shed.  
These snowmobiles were insured under the Gundrums' homeowner's 
policy.  Gundrum referred to the shed as the "toy shed" because 
of "all the junk that's piled in there."   
¶20 A portion of the shed was set up for parties.  It was 
furnished with couches, chairs, a table, a Ping-Pong table, a CD 
player, and a refrigerator.  The law enforcement personnel who 
                                                 
7 At his deposition, Gundrum testified that his father was 
aware of small gatherings of friends at the shed, but that he 
told Gundrum to "[u]se [his] judgment" and "to not have big 
parties."   
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
8 
 
responded to Schinner's injury described the atmosphere in the 
shed as consistent with an "underage alcohol party."  
¶21 Alcohol was prevalent at the party, despite the fact 
that up to half of the guests were underage.  Some guests 
brought their own alcohol; underage guests expected to obtain 
alcohol from people who were of legal drinking age.  Gundrum 
purchased two cases of Busch Light beer for a friend and 
himself.  He kept the beer in the refrigerator but admitted that 
it was available for people who did not bring their own alcohol 
to the party.  Law enforcement officers reported a "large amount 
of alcoholic beverages" in the shed, and Gundrum was aware that 
guests were becoming intoxicated from the alcohol at the party.  
In fact, Gundrum himself stopped drinking when he realized that 
so many guests showed up and became intoxicated.  He claimed 
that he wanted to monitor the situation.  Nevertheless, alcohol 
consumption at the party continued.  One of the party games, 
"beer pong," utilized the Ping-Pong table in the shed and 
encouraged more alcohol consumption.8  
                                                 
8 According to Schinner's testimony at the preliminary 
hearing in Cecil's criminal assault case, beer pong is a game in 
which cups are set up on opposite ends of a Ping-Pong table. 
Teams of participants attempt to toss or bounce Ping-Pong balls 
into one of the other team's cups.  If successful, the other 
team must drink the beer in that cup.   
While there are many variations of the rules of beer pong, 
"the common object is the copious consumption of alcoholic 
beverages."  Venito v. Salverson, No. 104110/08, 2011 WL 
2464760, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. June 21, 2011).  See also Kirchoff v. 
Abbey, No. WMN-10-1532, 2011 WL 4711898 at *1 n.2 (D. Md. Oct. 
5, 2011) ("Beer pong is a game that encourages players to drink 
heavily.").   
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
9 
 
¶22 Cecil was one of the intoxicated underage guests who 
participated in beer pong during the party.  He was known by 
Gundrum and others to become belligerent when intoxicated.  
Gundrum testified that he knew from previous occasions that 
Cecil would become confrontational, had a history of picking on 
weaker kids, and used inflammatory language when intoxicated.   
¶23 Eventually, an intoxicated Cecil started to make fun 
of Schinner at the party.9  At least twice Schinner asked Gundrum 
to intervene. But Gundrum's lone entreaty to Cecil to cease his 
abusive behavior was only temporarily successful.  Cecil 
returned to making fun of Schinner.  
¶24 At approximately 2:30 a.m., Schinner and some of his 
friends left the shed and got into a car to leave the party.  
Cecil also left the shed to taunt Schinner.  When Schinner got 
out of the car, Cecil punched him twice in the face and then 
kicked him in the head after Schinner had fallen to the ground.  
Schinner was seriously injured in the assault.   
¶25 About a half hour later, Washington County Sheriff 
deputies and medical personnel were dispatched to Gundrum 
Trucking in response to an anonymous phone call about a physical 
altercation and an injured male.  Deputies had trouble locating 
Schinner because other guests had carried him inside the shed, 
which had no windows "to peer into," and no one in the shed 
would answer the door.  Eventually, law enforcement and medical 
                                                 
9 According to various accounts by Schinner and witnesses, 
Cecil referred to Schinner as a "pussy," "homo," and "fag."   
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
10 
 
personnel gained entry and treated Schinner for his injuries.10  
The sheriff's report noted that once law enforcement gained 
access to the shed, party guests scattered and hid on top of and 
behind a motorhome parked in the shed.   
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶26 Schinner sued Gundrum and his insurer, West Bend, for 
his injuries.  The Second Amended Complaint alleged, in part: 
6. 
Defendant Gundrum knew and expected, based 
on a similar party held there months earlier, that 
individuals he invited would invite other youths, who 
in turn would invite others. 
7. 
Defendant Gundrum knew and expected that a 
substantial number of individuals, 40%–50% of those in 
attendance, would be under the legal drinking age.  
The underage attendees at the party also knew that 
alcoholic beverages would be available for their 
consumption. 
                                                 
10 Schinner testified at the preliminary hearing in Cecil's 
criminal case that he suffered spinal cord damage as a result of 
the assault, and while Schinner has regained some movement in 
his arms and legs, he is "considered quadriplegic."   
The record does not indicate what criminal charges Cecil 
faced as a result of the Schinner assault.  The investigating 
sheriff's deputy indicated in his supplemental report on the 
assault that he would be requesting charges against Cecil for 
battery, with intent to cause either substantial or great bodily 
harm, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.19(2) (2007–08).  The deputy 
also recommended a hate crime penalty enhancer under Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.645(1)(b) (2007–08).   
According to Consolidated Court Automation Programs (CCAP) 
records, Cecil pled no contest to a charge of substantial 
battery with intent to cause bodily harm, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.19 (2007–08).  Another charge, second-degree recklessly 
endangering safety, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.30(2) (2007–
08), was dismissed but read in.   
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
11 
 
. . . .  
12. Defendant Michael Gundrum realized that the 
number of attendees, their age, and their intoxication 
level could lead to fights or arguments, and undertook 
the responsibility to monitor and supervise the party.   
¶27 Schinner's first claim in the Second Amended Complaint 
alleged a statutory violation in serving alcohol to minors.  It 
stated in part:   
21. On December 14th and 15th, 2008, Gundrum 
"procured" alcohol beverages for Cecil as that term is 
used in Chapter 125 of the Wisconsin Statutes or sold, 
dispensed[,] or gave away alcohol beverages to Cecil 
a[s] those terms are used in Chapter 125 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes.11 
22. Further, on December 14th and 15th, 2008, 
Gundrum committed affirmative acts which encouraged, 
advised and assisted Cecil in his consumption of 
alcohol. 
23. On December 14, 2008, Gundrum knew that 
Cecil had not attained the legal drinking age. 
24. On 
December 
14th 
and 
15th, 
2008, 
the 
consumption of beer by Cecil was a substantial factor 
in causing injury to plaintiff Marshall Schinner.   
¶28 Schinner's 
second 
claim 
in 
the 
Second 
Amended 
Complaint alleged a breach of duty as a party host that 
ultimately led to Schinner's injuries.   
¶29 West Bend moved the circuit court for "separate trials 
on the issues of insurance coverage and liability and a stay of 
proceedings 
on 
liability 
pending 
resolution 
of 
insurance 
                                                 
11 Gundrum pled no contest to a charge of selling or 
dispensing alcohol to underage persons, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 125.07(1)(a) (2007–08).   
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
12 
 
coverage issues."12  After conducting discovery, West Bend moved 
for summary judgment.   
¶30 The 
circuit 
court 
granted 
West 
Bend's 
motion, 
concluding that there was no occurrence because "[t]here is no 
allegation of any accidental conduct. . . .  [A]ny acts on the 
part of . . . Gundrum were intentional, namely his providing of 
alcoholic beverages to underaged persons."  In addition, the 
circuit 
court 
ruled 
that 
the 
location 
exclusion 
in 
the 
homeowner's policy was applicable "because the injury did not 
occur at an insured location."   
¶31 The court of appeals reversed.  Schinner v. Gundrum, 
2012 WI App 31, 340 Wis. 2d 195, 811 N.W.2d 431.  The court of 
appeals focused upon the assault on Schinner rather than on 
Gundrum's 
actions 
in 
determining 
whether 
there 
was 
an 
occurrence.  Id., ¶10.  Furthermore, the court of appeals 
focused upon whether the assault was an accident from the 
standpoint of the injured party——Schinner——although the court 
said it would have determined that there was an occurrence even 
if the assault were viewed from the standpoint of Gundrum, the 
insured.  Id., ¶¶10, 15.   
¶32 The court of appeals cited three decisions by this 
court to support its analysis that, "for purposes of determining 
                                                 
12 "Both the insurer and the insured have the right to have 
the court resolve the issue of coverage separate from any trial 
on liability."  Estate of Sustache v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
2008 WI 87, ¶26, 311 Wis. 2d 548, 751 N.W.2d 845; see also 2 
Arnold P. Anderson, Wisconsin Insurance Law § 7.39, at 39 (6th 
ed. 2012). 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
13 
 
whether an assault is an 'accident' or 'accidental' under an 
insurance policy, the assault and resulting injuries must be 
viewed from the standpoint of the person injured."  Id., ¶11 
(citing Tomlin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins. Co., 95 
Wis. 2d 215, 219, 222, 290 N.W.2d 285 (1980); Fox Wis. Corp. v. 
Century Indem. Co., 219 Wis. 549, 551, 263 N.W. 567 (1935); 
Button v. Am. Mut. Accident Ass'n, 92 Wis. 83, 85, 65 N.W. 861 
(1896)).  The court concluded that the assault was an accident 
from Schinner's standpoint and that this triggered coverage for 
Gundrum under the homeowner's policy.  Id., ¶15.  The court 
acknowledged that its conclusion appeared to conflict with 
Estate of Sustache v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 2008 
WI 87, 311 Wis. 2d 548, 751 N.W.2d 845, which viewed the 
question of whether an assault was an accident from the 
standpoint of the insured, but the court stated that "the 
outcome of the analysis is the same when viewed from either 
vantage point."  Schinner, 340 Wis. 2d 195, ¶16.   
¶33 The court of appeals also concluded that the exclusion 
for non-insured locations in the homeowner's policy did not 
apply.  Citing Newhouse v. Laidig, Inc., 145 Wis. 2d 236, 426 
N.W.2d 88 (Ct. App. 1988), the court of appeals determined that 
Schinner's injury did not "'aris[e] out of' the shed under the 
terms of the policy because, while [the shed] was the undisputed 
physical situs of injury, no particular condition of the 
premises correlates to the basis of liability for the injury."  
Id., ¶28 (emphasis added). 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
14 
 
 
¶34 West Bend petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on June 13, 2012.   
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶35 The interpretation of an insurance contract is a 
question of law which this court reviews de novo.  Everson v. 
Lorenz, 2005 WI 51, ¶10, 280 Wis. 2d 1, 695 N.W.2d 298.   
¶36 "We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, 
relying on the same methodology as the circuit court."  Estate 
of Sustache, 311 Wis. 2d 548, ¶17 (citing Doyle v. Engelke, 219 
Wis. 2d 277, 283, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998)).  Summary judgment is 
proper where the record demonstrates that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) 
(2009–10); Estate of Sustache, 311 Wis. 2d 548, ¶17. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
¶37 When determining whether an insurance policy provides 
coverage, a court first looks to the initial grant of coverage.  
Estate of Sustache, 311 Wis. 2d 548, ¶22; Wadzinski v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 75, ¶14, 342 Wis. 2d 311, 818 
N.W.2d 819.  Normally, if the court determines that the policy 
was not intended to cover the asserted claims, it is not 
necessary to examine the policy's exclusions.  Estate of 
Sustache, 311 Wis. 2d 548, ¶22.  "If the court determines that 
the initial grant of coverage does cover the type of claim 
presented, the second step requires the court to examine the 
policy's exclusions to determine whether coverage has been 
withdrawn by an exclusion."  Wadzinski, 342 Wis. 2d 311, ¶14 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
15 
 
(citing Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, 
¶24, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65).  "[I]f coverage for the 
claim has been withdrawn by an exclusion, the court examines any 
exceptions to that exclusion that might reinstate coverage for 
the claim."  Id. 
¶38 We interpret an insurance contract as it would be 
understood by a reasonable person in the position of the 
insured.  Am. Girl, 268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶23.  In interpreting 
insurance policy language, we seek to "give effect to the intent 
of the contracting parties."  Id. (citing Wis. Label Corp. v. 
Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 26, ¶23, 233 
Wis. 2d 314, 607 N.W.2d 276). 
A. Was There an "Occurrence"? 
¶39 The Gundrums' homeowner's policy states: 
A. Coverage E – Personal Liability 
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against 
an "insured" for damages because of "bodily injury" or 
"property damage" caused by an "occurrence" to which 
this coverage applies, we will: 
1. 
Pay up to our limit of liability for the 
damage to which an "insured" is legally liable. . . .  
2. 
Provide a defense at our expense by counsel 
of our choice . . . . 
(Emphasis added.)  As noted previously, the homeowner's policy 
defines an occurrence as "an accident, including continuous or 
repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful 
conditions . . . ." (Emphasis added.)  The homeowner's policy 
does not define the term "accident."   
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
16 
 
¶40 Our first task in this analysis is to determine from 
whose standpoint an alleged accident should be viewed: the 
injured party or the insured?  We then must determine whether 
the facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint constitute an 
occurrence or accident covered under the policy.   
1. From Whose Standpoint Should an Accident be Viewed? 
 
¶41 Liability insurance policies, like the homeowner's 
policy in this case, typically contain a provision in which the 
insurer agrees to indemnify the insured against liability 
resulting from claims for bodily injury or property damage 
caused by an occurrence or accident.  However, insurance 
treatises indicate that the definition of "occurrence" in 
standard liability policies has changed over time. 
¶42 Before 1966 standard insurance liability policies did 
not contain an occurrence requirement.  Instead, policies 
"required proof that the bodily injury or property damage was 
the result of an 'accident' which was interpreted to mean a 
sudden, identifiable event."  3 Martha A. Kersey, New Appleman 
on Insurance Law Library Edition § 18.02[6][a] (Jeffrey E. 
Thomas & Francis J. Mootz, III, eds., 2012).  Standard liability 
policies were changed in 1966 to include the word "occurrence," 
which was defined as "an accident, including continuous or 
repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury 
or property damage neither expected nor intended from the 
standpoint of the insured."  Id.   
¶43 In 1986 the definition was changed again, this time 
removing 
the 
phrase 
"not 
expected 
or 
intended 
from 
the 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
17 
 
standpoint of the insured" and moving that phrase to the 
intentional acts exclusion in the liability policy.  See id.   
¶44 Assaults, given their intentional nature, would seem 
never to constitute an occurrence under a general liability 
policy.  However, "courts have taken or adopted two divergent 
positions as to from whose perspective the assault is to be 
viewed in determining whether it constitutes an 'accident'."  
Annotation, Liability Insurance: Assault as an "Accident," or 
Injuries Therefrom as "Accidentally" Sustained, Within Coverage 
Clause, 72 A.L.R. 3d 1090, 1095 (1976); see also 9 Steven Plitt, 
Daniel Maldonado & Joshua D. Rogers, Couch on Insurance § 127:21 
(3d ed. 2008).  Some courts have held that this determination 
should be made from the standpoint of the injured party, while 
other courts have held that the determination must be made from 
the standpoint of the assailant who is often——but not always——
the insured.   
 
¶45 Schinner urges us to decide the question of whether an 
"accident" took place from the standpoint of the injured party.  
At oral argument, counsel for Schinner asserted that if the 
language "expected or intended from the standpoint of the 
insured" is not present in the definition of occurrence, then, 
as a default rule, the occurrence must be viewed from the 
standpoint of the injured party.  Schinner and the court of 
appeals both look to Button, Fox, and Tomlin as Wisconsin 
precedent on point.  We examine each case in turn. 
 
¶46 In Button, the insured plaintiff was injured by the 
"intentional discharge of a firearm" directed at him by an 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
18 
 
unknown person.  Button, 92 Wis. at 84.  The policy at issue, an 
accident policy, insured the plaintiff against "death or 
injuries through 'external, violent, and accidental means,'" but 
contained an exclusion for, among other things, intentional 
injuries.  Id. at 84–85.  The Button court concluded that "an 
injury intentionally inflicted on the insured person by another 
is an 'accidental injury,' when such injury is unintentional on 
the part of the insured."  Id. at 85 (citation omitted).  It is 
important to reiterate that, in Button, the injured party was 
also the insured party.  Id. at 84-85.  
 
¶47 In Fox, an insurer refused to indemnify an insured 
theater when one of the theater's employees assaulted a patron 
and the patron sued the theater for damages.  Fox, 219 Wis. at 
550 (summary of the case).  Citing Button, the Fox court held 
that "[w]hether or not an injury is accidental under the terms 
used in the policy here involved is to be determined from the 
standpoint of the person injured."  Id. at 551.  Thus, Fox's 
holding misconstrued Button by substituting the term "injured" 
for "insured."  While the Button plaintiff was both the injured 
and insured, Fox's holding focused exclusively on the injured 
party's perspective.13 
                                                 
13 The court later explained the theater's position: 
 
The appellant is subject to the liability for 
damages flowing from the tortious conduct of its 
employee.  This liability is imposed upon [the] 
assured by law under the rule of respondeat superior.  
Although the appellant may be held liable for such 
tort, it cannot be said that it committed the assault, 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
19 
 
 
¶48 Finally, in Tomlin this court concluded that injuries 
sustained by a state patrol officer who was stabbed by an 
insured 
motorist 
during 
a 
traffic 
stop 
were 
"caused 
by 
accident," within the meaning of the insured assailant's 
automobile liability policy.  Tomlin, 95 Wis. 2d at 222.  The 
Tomlin court stated:  
 
In determining whether an injury is "caused by 
accident" 
or 
"accidentally 
sustained" 
within 
the 
coverage afforded by a liability insurance policy, the 
courts have been primarily concerned with the question 
of whether the occurrence is to be viewed from the 
standpoint of the injured person or the insured.  The 
majority 
of 
courts, 
including 
this 
court, 
when 
considering the question, have held or recognized that 
the determination of whether injuries resulting from 
an assault were caused by "accident" or "accidentally 
sustained" must be made from the standpoint of the 
injured party, rather than from that of the person 
committing the assault.   
Id. at 219 (citing Annotation, Liability Insurance: Assault as 
an 
"Accident," 
or 
Injuries 
Therefrom 
as 
"Accidentally" 
Sustained, Within Coverage Clause 72 A.L.R.3d 1090 (1976); 12 
George J. Couch, Ronald A. Anderson, & Mark S. Rhodes, Couch on 
Insurance § 45:38, at 133-34 (2d ed. 1959)) (emphasis added).   
¶49 On the surface, Tomlin stands for the proposition that 
an accident should be viewed from the standpoint of the injured 
party, not the insured.  But there is a factual caveat.  In 
Tomlin, the injured officer was stabbed by a minor.  The officer 
                                                                                                                                                             
nor that it authorized it.  Thus the appellant has not 
placed itself outside the terms of the policy . . . . 
Fox Wis. Corp. v. Century Indem. Co., 219 Wis. 549, 551-52, 263 
N.W. 567 (1935). 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
20 
 
sued the minor and the minor's parents.  Under Wisconsin law, 
Wis. Stat. § 343.15(2) (1977–78), "Any . . . wilful misconduct 
of a person under the age of 18 years when operating a motor 
vehicle upon the highways is imputed to the parents . . . .  The 
parents . . . [are] jointly and severally liable with such 
operator 
for 
any 
damages 
caused 
by 
such . . . wilful 
misconduct." 
 
See 
also 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.035 
(1977–78).  
Consequently, the court may have perceived the parents as being 
in the same position as the theater in Fox. 
¶50 While the decisions in Button and Fox make good sense, 
the rule stated in Tomlin comes out of an extraordinary 
situation and is distinguishable on that basis. 
¶51 Analyzing an accident from the standpoint of the 
injured party goes against recent insurance decisions in 
Wisconsin, which considered whether the insured acted with lack 
of intent in a particular incident.  See, e.g., Estate of 
Sustache, 311 Wis. 2d 548, ¶52; Am. Girl, 268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶¶37–
49; Smith v. Katz, 226 Wis. 2d 798, 819–21, 595 N.W.2d 345 
(1999); Bruner v. Heritage Cos., 225 Wis. 2d 728, 737–38, 593 
N.W.2d 814 (Ct. App. 1999); Kalchthaler v. Keller Constr. Co., 
224 Wis. 2d 387, 397, 591 N.W.2d 169 (Ct. App. 1999); cf. 43 Am. 
Jur. 2d Insurance § 674 (2003) ("The determination of whether an 
injury resulted from an accident within an occurrence clause of 
a 
liability policy 
is made from the standpoint of the 
insured.").  This approach is consistent with the idea that a 
court should interpret an insurance policy from the standpoint 
of a reasonable person in the position of the insured.  
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
21 
 
Wadzinski, 342 Wis. 2d 311, ¶11.  Moreover, when interpreting an 
insurance contract a court should give effect to the intentions 
of the parties, Folkman v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, ¶12, 264 
Wis. 2d 617, 665 N.W.2d 857, not the intent of a third party.   
 
¶52 Therefore, we hold that when an insured is seeking 
coverage, the determination of whether an injury is accidental 
under a liability insurance policy should be viewed from the 
standpoint of the insured. 
2. Determining Whether an Accident Took Place 
 
¶53 Numerous courts and commentators, both inside and 
outside of Wisconsin, have attempted to define and interpret the 
term "accident" when determining whether insurance coverage 
applies.  Compare 9 Steven Plitt, Daniel Maldonado, & Joshua D. 
Rogers, 
Couch 
on 
Insurance 
§ 126:26 
("an 
accident 
is 
a 
distinctive event that is unforeseen and unintended") with 1 
Arnold P. Anderson, Wisconsin Insurance Law § 5.18, at 26 (6th 
ed. 2012) ("The difficulty comes in determining . . . what 
triggers the coverage."). 
¶54 This court has interpreted the term "accident" in an 
insurance policy in previous decisions, and we look to our 
earlier decisions for guidance. 
¶55 In Doyle we reviewed an employer's alleged negligent 
supervision of its employees.  Doyle, 219 Wis. 2d at 281.  The 
court was called upon to interpret the term "event" in a CGL 
policy, which defined "event" as "an accident, including 
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same 
general harmful conditions."  Id. at 289. 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
22 
 
¶56 Because the word "accident" was undefined in the CGL 
policy, the Doyle court looked to dictionary definitions and 
found that "accident" was commonly defined as "'[a]n unexpected, 
undesirable 
event' 
or 
'an 
unforeseen 
incident' 
which 
is 
characterized by a 'lack of intention.'"  Id. (quoting The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 11 (3d ed. 
1992)).  The Doyle court also examined the dictionary definition 
of negligence, which was defined as "'failure to exercise the 
degree of care considered reasonable under the circumstances, 
resulting in an unintended injury to another party.'"  Id. at 
289–90 (quoting The American Heritage Dictionary, supra, at 
1209).  The court noted that both definitions "center on an 
unintentional occurrence leading to undesirable results," and 
the 
court 
concluded 
that 
"a 
reasonable 
insured 
would 
expect . . . [a policy] provision defining 'event' to include 
negligent acts."  Id. at 290 (emphasis added).14   
                                                 
14 Relying on dram shop law in Chapter 125 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes, Schinner argues that furnishing alcohol to a minor in 
Wisconsin is negligent, not intentional, conduct.  He asserts 
that because negligence can constitute an occurrence under an 
insurance policy, Doyle v. Engelke, 219 Wis. 2d 277, 290, 580 
N.W.2d 245 (1998), Gundrum's furnishing of alcohol to minors was 
negligent and should trigger coverage. 
We reject this argument.  The facts alleged in a complaint 
or as supplemented by affidavits determine a duty to defend and 
trigger coverage under an insurance policy, not a plaintiff's 
theories of liability.  See, e.g., Doyle, 219 Wis. 2d at 284–85 
(stating that the insurer has a duty to defend where the 
plaintiff's complaint alleges facts that would give rise to 
liability under a policy); Berg v. Schultz, 190 Wis. 2d 170, 
177, 526 N.W.2d 781 (Ct. App. 1994) (courts "must focus on the 
incident or injury that gives rise to the claim, not the 
plaintiff's theory of liability").   
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
23 
 
¶57 In American Girl we interpreted a CGL policy to 
determine whether the policy provided coverage for property 
damages resulting from an alleged occurrence.  Am. Girl, 268 
Wis. 2d 16, ¶¶1–3.  In American Girl a subcontractor "gave 
faulty site-preparation advice to a general contractor in 
connection with the construction of a warehouse.  As a result, 
there was excessive settlement of the soil after the building 
was completed," and the warehouse was so damaged that it had to 
be torn down.  Id., ¶3.  Once again, the CGL policy defined 
occurrence as an accident, but the policy did not define 
accident.  Id., ¶37.   
¶58 As in Doyle, the American Girl court turned to 
dictionaries for help in interpreting the term accident: 
The dictionary definition of "accident" is: "an event 
or condition occurring by chance or arising from 
unknown or remote causes."  Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary of the English Language 11 
(2002).  Black's Law Dictionary defines "accident" as 
follows: "The word 'accident,' in accident policies, 
means an event which takes place without one's 
foresight 
or 
expectation. 
 
A 
result, 
though 
unexpected, is not an accident; the means or cause 
must be accidental."  Black's Law Dictionary 15 (7th 
ed. 1999). 
Id. (emphasis added).  In light of these definitions, the 
American Girl court concluded that the circumstances in the case 
                                                                                                                                                             
Furthermore, an allegation of negligence is not the 
equivalent of an occurrence.  Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. 
Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶45, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65 
("Doyle did not . . . equate the term 'accident,' as used in the 
CGL policy, with negligence as a form of legal liability; we 
simply held that negligent acts were 'accidental' within the 
meaning of the CGL's definition of 'event.'"). 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
24 
 
constituted an occurrence under the policy: the property damage 
was "clearly not intentional," nor was it "anticipated by the 
parties."  Id., ¶38.  More specifically:  
The damage to the [warehouse] occurred as a result of 
the continuous, substantial, and harmful settlement of 
the soil underneath the building.  [The] inadequate 
site-preparation advice was a cause of this exposure 
to harm.  Neither the cause nor the harm was intended, 
anticipated, or expected.  We conclude that the 
circumstances of this claim fall within the policy's 
definition of "occurrence." 
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).15   
¶59 In Everson we reviewed whether misrepresentation in a 
real estate transaction constituted an occurrence under a CGL 
policy.  Everson, 280 Wis. 2d 1, ¶2.  After the transaction, the 
buyers determined that a portion of their lot was in a 100-year 
floodplain, contrary to the representations made by the seller 
in a real estate condition report given to the buyers.16  Id., 
¶5.  As a result, the buyer was unable to build on that 
location.  Id.  The buyer sued the seller, but the seller's 
insurer argued that it had no duty to defend and indemnify under 
its CGL policy to the seller.  Id., ¶7.  The CGL policy covered 
                                                 
15 See also Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 
2008 WI 86, 311 Wis. 2d 492, 753 N.W.2d 448.  The Stuart court 
adopted American Girl's requirement that the underlying causal 
event must be accidental for the event to be an occurrence, not 
the unexpected result.  Id., ¶40.  "It does not matter whether 
[the defendants] intended a specific result; what matters is 
whether the cause of the damage was accidental."  Id.   
16 The real estate condition report appeared to have 
contained a typographical error that the buyer relied upon when 
purchasing a particular lot.  Everson v. Lorenz, 2005 WI 51, 
¶16, 280 Wis. 2d 1, 695 N.W.2d 298.   
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
25 
 
property damage caused by an occurrence.  The policy defined the 
term "occurrence" as an accident, but "accident" was not 
defined.  Id., ¶¶12, 15.  Thus, the Everson court had to 
determine 
whether 
the 
seller's 
alleged 
misrepresentation 
constituted an accident and triggered coverage under the CGL 
policy.   
¶60 Noting that "this court has often relied on dictionary 
definitions for assistance," the Everson court looked to Black's 
Law Dictionary, which defined an "accident" as "'[a]n unintended 
and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not 
occur in the usual course of events or that could not be 
reasonably anticipated.'"  Id., ¶15 (quoting Black's Law 
Dictionary 15 (7th ed. 1999)).  The court also cited the Doyle 
court's definition of "accident": "'[a]n unexpected, undesirable 
event' or 'an unforeseen incident' which is characterized by a 
'lack of intention.'"  Id. (quoting Doyle, 219 Wis. 2d at 289). 
¶61 Ultimately, the Everson court concluded that the 
seller's misrepresentations did not constitute an accident.  
Id., ¶18.  The seller's misrepresentation required a "degree of 
volition inconsistent with the term accident."  Id., ¶19 (citing 
Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 679 A.2d 540, 552–53 (Md. 
1999) (Karwacki, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).  The seller 
may have made a mistake in a real estate condition report when 
he initially placed the lot outside of the 100-year floodplain.  
Id., ¶¶5 n.3, 22.  However, the seller later acted with volition 
when he intentionally gave this information to the buyer.  Id., 
¶22 (emphasis added).  "[S]tripped to its essentials," an 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
26 
 
action, not an accident, caused the seller to give misleading 
information to the buyer.  Id. 
¶62 Finally, in Estate of Sustache, we reviewed an 
occurrence case somewhat similar to this matter.  Estate of 
Sustache involved a fight at an underage drinking party in which 
the insured punched a victim, causing the victim to fall to a 
curb and sustain severe injuries that ultimately led to death.  
Estate of Sustache, 311 Wis. 2d 548, ¶5.  There was no dispute 
that the insured assaulter intended to strike the victim, but 
there was also no dispute that the insured assaulter did not 
intend the blow to be fatal.  Id.  The estate and parents of the 
victim sued the assaulter and his insurer, American Family, 
which moved for summary judgment on the grounds that, inter 
alia, the damages were not caused by an occurrence under the 
policy.  Id., ¶¶6, 12.  Once again, the policy defined an 
"occurrence" as an accident, but the policy did not define the 
term "accident."  Id., ¶9.   
¶63 After reviewing our previous analysis of the term 
"occurrence" in Doyle, American Girl, Everson, and Stuart v. 
Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 2008 WI 86, 311 Wis. 2d 492, 
753 N.W.2d 448, we held in Estate of Sustache that the 
allegations in the complaint, supplemented by the deposition of 
the insured assaulter, could not "reasonably be construed to 
constitute a covered claim" under the American Family policy.  
Id., ¶51.   
¶64 Considering 
one 
of 
the 
Doyle 
definitions 
of 
"accident"——"an unintentional occurrence leading to undesirable 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
27 
 
results"——we concluded that the insured's actions did not 
constitute an accident.  The insured may not have intended the 
unexpected result, but he did intend to throw the punch that 
ultimately led to the death of the victim.  Id., ¶¶52–53 
(quoting Doyle, 219 Wis. 2d at 290).  American Girl's definition 
of "accident" also reinforced our conclusion.  The means or 
cause of the victim's bodily harm was an intentional punch; the 
punch could not be said to occur by chance or arise from an 
unknown or remote cause.  Id., ¶53 (citing Am. Girl, 268 
Wis. 2d 16, 
¶37). 
 
We 
also 
noted 
that, 
like 
the 
misrepresentation in Everson, the insured assaulter's action 
required a degree of volition inconsistent with the term 
"accident."  Id., ¶54 (citing Everson, 280 Wis. 2d 1, ¶19).   
¶65 With the above cases and their interpretations of an 
insurance policy's requirement of an "occurrence" or "accident" 
in mind, we turn to the facts of this case.   
¶66 At the outset, we must determine where to focus our 
analysis.  More specifically, what is the injury-causing event 
in this case?  Is it Cecil's assault on Schinner, or is it the 
actions of Gundrum in hosting the party?  In this case, as 
opposed to a case against Cecil, Schinner's Second Amended 
Complaint alleges that wrongful conduct by Gundrum caused his 
bodily injury.  Normally, the allegations in a complaint are the 
allegations an insurer must defend or indemnify, and it is these 
alleged facts that determine whether there is coverage under the 
homeowner's policy.  See Doyle, 219 Wis. 2d at 284-85.  Here, 
the circuit court considered additional evidence, but the 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
28 
 
additional evidence did not undermine or change the thrust of 
the allegations in the complaint. 
¶67 There is no question that Cecil intended to assault 
Schinner.  Schinner does not contend that Gundrum intended or 
approved of Cecil's assault or that he ever wanted to see 
Schinner injured.   
¶68 However, the allegations in Schinner's Second Amended 
Complaint and other evidence make clear that Gundrum took a 
number of intentional actions that ultimately caused Schinner's 
bodily injury.  Gundrum intended to host the party and, based on 
the experience from an earlier party he hosted, he intended that 
the "individuals he invited would invite other youths, who would 
in turn invite others."  Gundrum intended that minors attend his 
party.  He "knew and expected that a substantial number of 
individuals" were under the legal drinking age and that these 
underage attendees would consume alcohol made available to them 
at the party.  By making the arrangements for beer pong 
throughout the evening, Gundrum actively promoted heavy drinking 
at the party.  In violation of Chapter 125 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes, Gundrum procured alcohol for Cecil and other minors.  
Gundrum knew that Cecil was an underage individual who became 
belligerent when intoxicated.  Nonetheless, Gundrum "encouraged, 
advised and assisted Cecil in his consumption of alcohol."  
Gundrum's actions in hosting an underage drinking party and in 
procuring alcohol for Cecil and others were intentional.  See 
Doyle, 219 Wis. 2d at 290 (concluding that an "accident" is an 
"unintentional 
occurrence 
leading 
to 
undesirable 
results") 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
29 
 
(emphasis added).  Gundrum's actions were entirely volitional.  
He did not host the underage drinking party by mistake, against 
his will, or by chance. See Everson, 280 Wis. 2d 1, ¶19.   
¶69 As we stated in American Girl, "A result, though 
unexpected, is not an accident; the means or cause must be 
accidental."  Am. Girl, 268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶37 (citation omitted).  
Here, "the means or cause" of Schinner's bodily injury was not 
accidental.  The intentional, illegal procuring and serving of 
alcohol to Cecil exposed Schinner to harm.  Gundrum's many 
intentional acts were a substantial factor in causing Schinner's 
bodily injury.  The events leading up to the bodily injury were 
not remote and were not accidental. 
¶70 As a general rule, where an insured acts intentionally 
to cause bodily injury to another, insurance coverage for the 
injury will not be available.  This case is more difficult 
because bodily injury was not intended and there was no 
certainty that it would occur.  On the other hand, bodily injury 
was hardly unforeseeable.  All the conditions for a tragic 
injury had been put in place, and they were put in place 
intentionally.  As the Michigan Supreme Court concluded in an 
insurance coverage case dealing with an occurrence, "when an 
insured's intentional actions create a direct risk of harm, 
there can be no liability coverage for any resulting damage or 
injury, despite the lack of an actual intent to damage or 
injure."  Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Masters, 595 N.W.2d 832, 
839 (Mich. 1999) (quoting Auto Club Grp. Ins. Co. v. Marzonie, 
527 N.W.2d 760, 771 (Mich. 1994) (Griffin, J., concurring)).  
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
30 
 
 
¶71 Given the facts of this case, it is not reasonable to 
argue 
that 
a 
fight 
between 
intoxicated 
teenagers 
was 
"unexpected" 
or 
"unforeseen," 
Doyle, 
219 
Wis. 2d at 
289, 
especially when one of the underage drinkers was known to become 
belligerent when he was drunk.  Gundrum anticipated that 
something undesirable, like a fight, might happen at his party: 
he stopped drinking when he realized the increasing number of 
guests attending the party along with the amount of alcohol 
being consumed created a volatile situation.  It is no leap of 
logic to conclude that Gundrum knew that a combination of 
underage partygoers, alcohol, and games like beer pong would 
create a powder keg.  To aggravate this already volatile 
situation, Gundrum heard Schinner's pleas to intervene and stop 
the relentless taunting he was receiving from Cecil who had a 
reputation for belligerence when he was intoxicated.   
¶72 Schinner urges us to adopt an approach in determining 
an occurrence like the approach taken by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in American Family Insurance Co. v. Walser, 628 N.W.2d 605 
(Minn. 2001).  In that case, three youths were playing in a high 
school gym, when one of them, Jewison, jumped up and hung from 
the rim of the basketball hoop.  Id. at 607.  The other two 
pulled on Jewison's ankles several times until finally he fell 
and suffered bodily injury.  Id.  Jewison sued the other two 
youths, Walser and Shoemaker, but Walser's insurer, American 
Family, argued it had no duty to defend or indemnify Walser 
because there was no occurrence under Walser's homeowner's 
policy.  Id. at 608.  The definition of occurrence in the 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
31 
 
American Family policy was identical to the homeowner's policy 
in this case——"an accident," which the policy did not define.  
Id. at 609.   
 
¶73 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that "in analyzing 
whether there was an accident for purposes of coverage, lack of 
specific intent to injure will be determinative, just as it is 
in an intentional act exclusion analysis."  Id. at 612.  Thus, 
the court concluded that while Walser acted intentionally——
pulling at Jewison's ankles while he hung from the basketball 
hoop——Walser did not act with specific intent to injure Jewison, 
thereby constituting an occurrence and triggering coverage under 
the American Family policy.  Id. at 613.  The court also 
concluded that, since the three youths were merely "goofing 
around," that both Jewison and Walser had hung on the basketball 
rim before and fallen to the ground without injury, and that 
Walser's actions were merely impulsive actions resulting in 
unintentional injury, the intentional acts exclusion did not 
apply.  Id. at 614–15.   
 
¶74 We have two reservations about applying Walser to the 
present situation.  First, our insurance case law does not 
require that an insured intend to harm, or know with substantial 
certainty that harm will occur, in order to determine that the 
harm was not an accident.  An accident is "an unintentional 
occurrence 
leading 
to 
undesirable 
results." 
 
Doyle, 
219 
Wis. 2d at 290.  To assess the existence of an accident, a court 
will focus on the "means or cause" of harm to determine whether 
it was truly accidental, even if the result was unexpected.  Am. 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
32 
 
Girl, 268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶37.  Here, there was intentional conduct 
in throwing the illegal underage drinking party and encouraging 
Cecil to drink when Gundrum had knowledge of Cecil's aggressive 
behavior when intoxicated.  Intent, volition, knowledge, and 
foreseeability are all present, consistent with our case law.  
Gundrum's conduct was not accidental, so no occurrence triggered 
coverage under the homeowner's policy.   
 
¶75 Second, Gundrum's conduct and Schinner's injury differ 
greatly from the conduct and injury in Walser.  While the 
actions of the three youths in Walser were described as "goofing 
around" and "impulsive," Gundrum was doing more than "goofing 
around."  Gundrum planned a large drinking party, procured 
alcohol for minors, knew of Cecil's belligerence, and encouraged 
Cecil's consumption of alcohol.  We believe that the facts of 
this case——intentionally providing alcohol to minors, resulting 
in bodily injury——are closer to the facts in a Minnesota Court 
of Appeals case, Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Duffy, 618 
N.W.2d 613 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).17   
                                                 
17 The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in American Family 
Insurance Co. v. Walser, 628 N.W.2d 605 (Minn. 2001), did not 
specifically overrule the Minnesota court of appeals decision 
cited by West Bend in this case, Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. 
v. Duffy, 618 N.W.2d 613 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000), review denied 
(Jan. 26, 2001).  In fact, the Walser decision did not even 
mention Duffy.  In Duffy, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held 
that the intentional act of providing alcohol to minors was 
wrongful conduct and did not constitute an occurrence under a 
homeowner's insurance policy.  Duffy, 618 N.W.2d at 615.   
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
33 
 
 
¶76 Schinner also contends that the lack of a liquor 
exclusion in the homeowner's policy is important in this case.  
He argues that since other homeowner policies contain liquor 
exclusions,18 and West Bend could have put one in its policy, 
this court should not rewrite the contract to help West Bend 
avoid coverage.  Schinner also points to the presence of a 
liquor exclusion in the CGL policy for Gundrum Trucking.19  If 
West Bend anticipated liquor liability coverage under the CGL 
policy and specifically excluded it, he argues, then surely the 
homeowner's policy was expected to cover liquor liability in the 
absence of such an exclusion.  We are not persuaded. 
 
¶77 CGL policies typically contain an exclusion for liquor 
liability.  See, e.g., 1 Anderson, supra, at § 5.187; 9A Lee R. 
                                                                                                                                                             
It is not surprising that Duffy is still good law.  The 
Duffy court and courts in other states have found no accident, 
or no occurrence, under a homeowner's policy when an insured 
intentionally or knowingly provides alcohol to a minor and 
injury results.  See, e.g., Am. Modern Home Ins. Co. v. Corra, 
671 S.E.2d 802, 806–07 (W. Va. 2008) (holding that there is no 
occurrence and a homeowner's policy does not provide coverage 
when injury is caused by an insured's conduct in "knowingly 
permitting" a minor to consume alcohol on the insured's 
property); Allstate Ins. Co. v. J.J.M., 657 N.W.2d 181, 184 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that the insured "reasonably 
should have expected that giving minors enough alcohol to allow 
them to pass out would result in harm" and thus no accident 
giving rise to coverage existed).   
18 As an example of a homeowner's policy containing a liquor 
exclusion, Schinner cites Anderson v. American Family Mutual 
Insurance Co., 2002 WI App 315, 259 Wis. 2d 413, 655 N.W.2d 531.   
19 The written summary judgment decision in this case 
mistakenly placed the liquor exclusion in the homeowner's 
policy, not the CGL policy.   
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
34 
 
Russ, Thomas F. Segalla, Steven Plitt, Daniel Maldonado, & 
Joshua D. Rogers, Couch on Insurance § 129:32 (3d ed. 2005).  
However, these same treatises say nothing about the frequency of 
liquor liability exclusions in homeowner's policies.  Although 
Schinner cites one Wisconsin case20 to support his assertion that 
these exclusions are common to homeowner's policies, the absence 
of an exclusion does not necessarily mean the presence of 
coverage.   
 
¶78 As noted above, the first step in a court's analysis 
of an insurance contract is to examine whether the policy 
provides an initial grant of coverage.  See, supra, ¶37.  Hence, 
if a given set of facts do not trigger coverage, it is not 
necessary to look at a policy's exclusions.  West Bend could 
have inserted a liquor liability exclusion into the policy, but 
we would not have reached it under the facts of this case 
because Gundrum's intentional and illegal conduct did not lead 
to coverage.   
 
¶79 Finally, we note the strong public policy weighing 
against finding an occurrence in this situation.  As this court 
stated in Hedtcke v. Sentry Insurance Co., 109 Wis. 2d 461, 326 
N.W.2d 727 (1982): 
Even where the insurance policy contains no language 
expressly stating the principle of fortuitousness, 
courts read this principle into the insurance policy 
to further specific public policy objectives including 
(1) avoiding profit from wrongdoing; (2) deterring 
crime; (3) avoiding fraud against insurers; and (4) 
                                                 
20 See supra, n.18.   
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
35 
 
maintaining coverage of a scope consistent with the 
reasonable expectations of the contracting parties on 
matters as to which no intention or expectation was 
expressed. 
Hedtcke, 109 Wis. 2d at 484 (citing Keeton, Insurance Law 
§ 5.3(a) at 279 (1971)).  See also 7 Steven Plitt, Daniel 
Maldonado, Joshua D. Rogers, & Jordan R. Plitt, Couch on 
Insurance § 101:22 (3d ed. 2006) ("In general, it is against 
public policy for an insurance contract to provide coverage for 
the intentional or willful misconduct of an insured."); 43 Am. 
Jur. 2d Insurance § 478 (2003) ("Public policy does on occasion 
demand that a wrongdoer be forbidden to shift the cost of 
liability to another through insurance . . . .").   
¶80 Finding 
an 
occurrence 
and 
coverage 
under 
these 
circumstances would allow the host to escape responsibility for 
his intentional and illegal actions.  We would be sending the 
wrong message about underage drinking parties, implying that 
whatever tragic consequences might occur, insurance companies 
will be there to foot the bill.  Moreover, insurance contracts 
are construed from the standpoint of what a reasonable person in 
the position of the insured would believe the contract to mean.  
Acuity v. Bagadia, 2008 WI 62, ¶13, 310 Wis. 2d 197, 750 
N.W.2d 817; Liebovich v. Minn. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 75, ¶17, 310 
Wis. 2d 751, 751 N.W.2d 764.  We do not believe that a 
reasonable insured would expect coverage for bodily injury 
resulting from the hosting of a large, illegal underage drinking 
party.   
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
36 
 
 
¶81 We conclude that Gundrum's intentional actions in 
hosting a large underage drinking party——actions that were 
illegal——and providing alcohol to an individual known to become 
belligerent when intoxicated, were a substantial factor in 
causing Schinner's bodily injury.  These causes were not 
accidental.  Since there was no occurrence under the homeowner's 
policy, there was no initial grant of coverage to Gundrum under 
the policy. 
B. The Exclusion for "Arising Out Of" a Non-Insured Location 
¶82 Ordinarily, if we find no initial grant of coverage 
under an insurance policy, we end our inquiry.  See supra, ¶37.  
In this case, however, the court of appeals' interpretation of 
the non-insured location exclusion has been published and should 
be addressed.   
¶83 The homeowner's policy contained an exclusion for 
bodily injury or property damage liability arising out of a 
premises that is not an "insured location" (or a premises used 
by the insured "in connection with" an "insured location.")  
"Coverages E and F do not apply to the following: . . . 'Bodily 
injury' or 'property damage' arising out of a premises: a. Owned 
by an 'insured'; b. Rented to an 'insured'; or c. Rented to 
others by an 'insured'; that is not an 'insured location'."  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶84 The parties dispute the meaning of the phrase "arising 
out of."  West Bend argues that this phrase means, in the 
context of a general liability insurance policy, "originating 
from, growing out of, or flowing from."  Garriguenc v. Love, 67 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
37 
 
Wis. 2d 130, 137, 226 N.W.2d 414 (1975).  West Bend argues that 
the plain language of the exclusion precludes coverage because 
Schinner's injuries arose out of the shed and the Gundrums did 
not use the shed "in connection with" their insured residence.  
Schinner 
and 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
disagree 
with 
this 
interpretation, relying on Newhouse v. Laidig, Inc., 145 
Wis. 2d 236, 426 N.W.2d 88 (Ct. App. 1988).   
¶85 In Newhouse, an unsupervised child was injured when he 
became entangled in a silo unloader.  Id. at 238.  The 
defendant's homeowner's policy excluded coverage for bodily 
injury "arising out of any premises owned or rented to any 
insured which is not an insured location."  Id. at 239.  The 
farm silo was not an insured location.  Id.   
¶86 The Newhouse court found the non-insured location 
exclusion did not apply, and the homeowner's policy provided 
coverage to the farm owner.  Id. at 239–40.  Newhouse relied on 
a Missouri decision, Lititz Mutual Insurance Co. v. Branch.  
Lititz involved a similar "arising out of" exclusion, but the 
court held that the bodily injury in that case did not occur as 
a result of "a condition" of the non-insured location.  Lititz 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Branch, 561 S.W.2d 371, 374 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1977).  Newhouse adopted this approach: "The dispositive issue 
therefore is whether there is some correlation between the 
negligence giving rise to liability and a condition of the 
premises."  Newhouse, 145 Wis. 2d at 240 (emphasis added).   
¶87 Newhouse did not cite the Garriguenc case, which 
discussed the same "arising out of" language.  The Garriguenc 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
38 
 
court said: "The words 'arising out of' in liability insurance 
policies are very broad, general, and comprehensive; and are 
ordinarily understood to mean originating from, growing out of, 
or flowing from.  All that is necessary is some causal 
relationship between the injury and the event [here, "property"] 
not covered."  Garriguenc, 67 Wis. 2d at 137 (footnote omitted).   
¶88 The Newhouse court provided a much narrower reading of 
the "arising out of" exclusion than the Garriguenc court.  In 
effect, it attempted to overrule the Garriguenc decision.  We 
think a better reading of the exclusion is not to exclude all 
liability coverage for events not on an insured premises but 
rather to exclude liability coverage when there is a "causal 
relationship" between the premises that are not insured and the 
insured's action or non-action giving rise to liability.  Cf. 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. INA, 501 F. Supp. 136, 138 
(W.D. Va. 1980) (stating that "arising out of" are words of much 
broader significance than "caused by" and are usually understood 
to mean "incident to or having connection with").   
¶89 In this case, the homeowner's policy language is clear 
on its face.  The policy excludes coverage for injuries arising 
out of a non-insured premises, not from a condition of a non-
insured premises.  Schinner's bodily injury clearly arose out 
of, or originated, or flowed from, the shed where the illegal 
party took place on the premises of Gundrum Trucking, a non-
insured location.   
¶90 In this case, a causal relationship between the shed 
and Schinner's injury is present.  A portion of the shed was set 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
39 
 
up for a social gathering, especially an underage drinking 
party: chairs, tables, couch, a refrigerator, a CD player, and a 
Ping-Pong table for beer pong.  The shed had no windows, thereby 
concealing the illegal activities inside.  As counsel for West 
Bend aptly observed at oral argument for summary judgment, "It 
was an illegal party. . . .  [T]hat's not the kind of thing one 
could have rented out the Knights of Columbus Hall to do.  Or to 
have done out in your front yard at your residence.  This had a 
causal nexus to the premises."   
C. Whether the Shed was a Premises Used in Connection With 
an Insured Location 
¶91 Finally, Schinner advances the argument that the shed 
was in fact an insured location because it was used "in 
connection with" the Gundrum's insured residence.  Schinner 
points to the storage of the Gundrums' insured personal 
property, like snowmobiles, to turn the shed into an insured 
location.21  Such an assertion defies common sense.  If business 
owners were allowed to store insured personal property on their 
business premises and obtain insurance coverage for the premises 
through a homeowner's policy, there would be much less reason to 
obtain business insurance.  Such a result would be absurd.  
Olguin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 2d 160, 165, 237 N.W.2d 694 
(1976) ("[I]nsurance policies should be given a reasonable 
                                                 
21 The shed was used to store personal property for 
Gundrum's extended family.  If Schinner's argument were valid, 
the shed would be used "in connection with" more than one 
residence.  Tortfeasors from several residences would be able to 
claim coverage. 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
40 
 
interpretation and not one which leads to an absurd result."); 
Wilson Mut. Ins. Co. v. Risler, 2011 WI App 70, ¶12, 333 
Wis. 2d 175, 798 N.W.2d 898 ("We reject interpretations of 
insurance policies that lead to absurd results.").   
V. CONCLUSION 
¶92 Gundrum's actions in setting up an isolated shed for a 
drinking party, procuring alcohol and expecting others to bring 
alcohol, inviting many underage guests to the party, and 
encouraging the underage guests to drink——especially an underage 
guest 
known 
to 
become 
belligerent 
when 
intoxicated——were 
intentional actions that violated the law.  Gundrum's many 
intentional wrongful acts were a substantial factor in causing 
Schinner's bodily injury.  Viewed from the standpoint of a 
reasonable insured, Gundrum's intentional actions created a 
direct risk of harm resulting in bodily injury, notwithstanding 
his lack of intent that a specific injury occur.  Thus, 
Schinner's bodily injury was not caused by an "occurrence" 
within the meaning of the policy, and West Bend is not obligated 
to provide insurance coverage for Gundrum. 
¶93 Even assuming there was an occurrence under the West 
Bend homeowner's policy, coverage is excluded because the injury 
arose out of the use of an isolated shed for an underage 
drinking party on uninsured premises.  The fact that the 
Gundrums kept some personal property insured under the policy at 
the shed did not make the shed a premises used in connection 
with the insured's residence, as those terms are defined in the 
No. 
  2011AP564 
 
41 
 
policy.  Thus, the business shed was not an insured location 
triggering coverage under the homeowner's policy.  
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP564.npc 
 
1 
 
¶94 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the result reached by the majority that the homeowner's policy 
does not provide coverage for Schinner's injuries under these 
facts.  I write separately because my approach differs from both 
the majority opinion and that of the dissent.   
¶95 I agree with the dissent that under the insurance 
policy at issue and our case law, including Doyle v. Engelke, 
219 Wis. 2d 277, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998), and Estate of Sustache 
v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 2008 WI 87, 311 Wis. 2d 
548, 751 N.W.2d 845, Cecil's assault on Schinner constitutes an 
occurrence, and I join the analysis of the dissent on that 
issue.   
¶96 However, I agree with the majority that the non-
insured location exclusion applies because Schinner's injuries 
arose out of, originated, or flowed from a non-insured location, 
consistent with this court's interpretation of "arising out of" 
in Garriguenc v. Love, 67 Wis. 2d 130, 226 N.W.2d 414 (1975), 
and I join the analysis of the majority on that issue. 
¶97  Accordingly, I respectfully concur.   
 
 
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶98 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
the majority when it holds that the determination of what 
constitutes an "occurrence" under the insurance policy is to be 
analyzed from the standpoint of the insured, not the injured 
party.  Majority op., ¶52.  I part ways with the majority, 
however, when it fails to apply that holding. 
¶99 Like the unanimous court of appeals, I conclude that 
the "occurrence" here is the event of an assault.  The insurance 
policy defines an "occurrence" as an "accident."   
¶100 Applying 
the proper analysis, the question then 
becomes whether the assault of Schinner by the assailant was an 
"accident" from the standpoint of Gundrum, the insured?  As even 
the majority acknowledges, there is nothing in the record that 
suggests that Gundrum intended the assault or any subsequent 
injury to Schinner.  See id., ¶67.  Accordingly, when viewed 
from the standpoint of the insured, the assault was unintended 
and was an "accident," constituting an "occurrence" under the 
policy. 
¶101 Instead of identifying the assault as an "occurrence," 
the majority's analysis simply ignores it.  Rather than 
analyzing an "occurrence" from the standpoint of the insured, it 
develops a different test, conflating a discussion of negligence 
principles with the analysis required to interpret an undefined 
word 
in 
an 
insurance 
policy. 
 
Ultimately, 
its 
analysis 
undermines 
the 
well-established 
understanding 
that 
an 
intentional act by an insured is within the definition of an 
"occurrence" if the injury is unexpected and unintended.  
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
2 
 
¶102 In contrast to the majority, I conclude that the 
assault is an "occurrence" for the purposes of coverage and I 
further conclude that the non-insured location exclusion does 
not apply under these circumstances.  As a result, the relevant 
insurance policy provides coverage for damages arising from 
Schinner's injuries.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.    
I 
¶103 The Second Amended Complaint filed in this case 
identifies the assault as the occurrence.  It alleges that 
Schinner was "kicked . . . in the head [by the assailant], 
causing permanent paralysis."  The claims alleged against 
Gundrum sound in negligent supervision, negligence in failing to 
protect Schinner, and negligence as a matter of law.1 
                                                 
1 Specifically, Schinner alleged a violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 125.035, which is commonly known as the "dram shop" law.  It 
provides, in relevant part: 
(2) A person is immune from civil liability arising 
out of the act of procuring alcohol beverages for or 
selling, dispensing or giving away alcohol beverages 
to another person. 
. . . . 
(4)(a) In this subsection, "provider" means a person, 
including 
a licensee or permittee, who procures 
alcohol beverages for or sells, dispenses or gives 
away alcohol beverages to an underage person in 
violation of s. 125.07(1)(a). 
(b) Subsection (2) does not apply if the provider knew 
or should have known that the underage person was 
under the legal drinking age and if the alcohol 
beverages provided to the underage person were a 
substantial factor in causing injury to a 3rd party. 
In determining whether a provider knew or should have 
known that the underage person was under the legal 
drinking age, all relevant circumstances surrounding 
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
3 
 
¶104 Recognizing that identifying the event that should be 
considered 
the 
"occurrence" 
is 
critical 
to 
the 
coverage 
analysis, 
the 
majority 
jettisons 
the 
allegation 
of 
an 
"occurrence" stated in the Second Amended Complaint and asks 
what is "the injury-causing event in this case?"  Majority op., 
¶66.  It answers the question by pointing to a course of conduct 
by Gundrum that allegedly was a cause of Schinner's bodily 
injury and accordingly shifts its focus to Gundrum's acts as the 
apparent "occurrence" without further discussion of the assault.  
Id.   
¶105 The remainder of the majority's analysis is fixed upon 
developing a new objective test that examines remote theories of 
legal causation and events that occurred up the chain of 
causation.  It states that "Gundrum took a number of intentional 
actions that ultimately caused Schinner's bodily injury."  Id., 
¶68.  Ultimately, it concludes that "Gundrum's many intentional 
acts were a substantial factor in causing Schinner's bodily 
injury."  Id., ¶69.     
                                                                                                                                                             
the procuring, selling, dispensing or giving away of 
the alcohol beverages may be considered . . . . 
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
4 
 
¶106 Gundrum's 
alleged 
negligent 
acts 
are 
repeatedly 
characterized as "intentional" and "illegal."2  See id., ¶¶69, 
70, 81.  The majority takes Gundrum to task for failing to 
foresee Schinner being injured in an assault, stating that 
Schinner's "bodily injury was hardly unforeseeable."  Id., ¶70.  
Because his acts were both "intentional" and "illegal" and 
because he should have foreseen a risk of harm, the majority 
concludes 
that 
there 
was 
no 
"accident," 
and 
thus 
no 
"occurrence."  Id., ¶81.     
II 
¶107 At the outset, I observe that if the majority actually 
applied a "from the standpoint of the insured" test, it would be 
compelled to conclude that there is an initial grant of 
coverage.  Guided by public policy, however, it instead 
concludes that there should be no insurance coverage for hosting 
an illegal underage drinking party. 
                                                 
2 In order to determine whether the relevant homeowner's 
policy sets forth an initial grant of coverage for the claims 
presented, the coverage must be compared to the allegations 
advanced in the Second Amended Complaint.   This is the first 
step of a coverage determination——the court must examine the 
facts of the insured's claim to determine whether the policy's 
insuring agreement makes an initial grant of coverage.  Estate 
of Sustache v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 87, ¶22, 311 
Wis. 2d 548, 751 N.W.2d 845.  If the facts do not fall within 
the initial grant of coverage, the analysis ends there.  Id. 
 
The Second Amended Complaint does not once use the word 
"intentional," whether in reference to Gundrum or in reference 
to the third-party assailant.  It likewise makes no allegation 
that Gundrum in fact foresaw that a fight would occur, or that a 
fight was substantially certain to occur as a result of his 
acts. 
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
5 
 
¶108 In its quest to avoid "sending the wrong message" 
about underage drinking parties, the majority looks at the wrong 
policy.  Majority op., ¶80.  Instead of looking at public 
policy, it should be looking at the policy of insurance.   
¶109 This homeowner's policy has a broad grant of coverage.  
To narrow that coverage, the insurer in this case had available 
to it several standard exclusions that are relevant here: 
• An underage drinking exclusion;3 
• An illegal acts exclusion;4 
• An intentional acts exclusion.5 
¶110 Despite the availability of those exclusions, the 
insurer chose not to include them in the Gundrums' homeowner's 
insurance policy or assert them as a defense to coverage.  As a 
result of those deficits, the majority is forced to look 
elsewhere for support of its public policy determination.  It is 
not the court's role in this case to send a policy message, 
                                                 
3 A standard underage drinking exclusion would provide that 
"[w]e will not cover bodily injury . . . arising out of the 
insured's knowingly permitting or failing to take action to 
prevent the illegal consumption of alcoholic beverages by an 
underage person."  1 Susan J. Miller, Miller's Standard 
Insurance Policies Annotated 238.3 (Form HOEX) (6th ed. 2012).   
4 A standard illegal acts exclusion would negate coverage 
for "bodily injury . . . caused by violation of a penal law or 
ordinance committed by or with knowledge or consent of the 
insured."  1 Susan J. Miller, Miller's Standard Insurance 
Policies Annotated 238.3 (Form HOEX) (6th ed. 2012).   
5 The 
intentional 
acts 
exclusion 
in 
the 
Gundrums' 
homeowner's policy, which was not asserted as a coverage defense 
here, precludes coverage for bodily injury "which is expected or 
intended" by an insured even if the resulting bodily injury is 
"of a different kind, quality or degree than initially expected 
or intended . . . ." 
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
6 
 
right or wrong, about underage drinking parties or to determine 
whether Gundrum should "escape responsibility" under these 
facts.  Majority op., ¶80.  It is this court's role to interpret 
the insurance policy——the written contract entered into by the 
parties.    
¶111 I turn next to discuss the primary flaws in the 
majority's opinion.  Its analysis: (a) ignores the need to 
analyze the assault as an "occurrence," (b) develops a new 
objective test that conflates principles of negligence with the 
analysis required to interpret an undefined word in an insurance 
policy, and (c) undermines the well-established premise that 
intentional acts constitute an "occurrence" if the injury is 
unexpected or unintended. 
A 
¶112 The majority's public policy focus leads it to ignore 
the assault as an "occurrence."  Contrary to what the majority 
implies when it sets up a question setting forth two potential 
occurrences, whether an "occurrence" exists under a set of 
alleged facts is not an either-or proposition requiring the 
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
7 
 
court to choose between Gundrum's acts and the assault.6   An 
"occurrence" in this case is easily identified.  As the court of 
appeals unanimously recognized, the assault itself is the 
correct 
focus 
of 
the 
"occurrence" 
when 
viewed 
from 
the 
standpoint of Gundrum.  Schinner v. Gundrum, 2012 WI App 31, 
¶22, 340 Wis. 2d 195, 811 N.W.2d 431. 
¶113 Our prior precedent recognizes that an intentional 
assault by a third party can constitute an "occurrence."  In 
Estate of Sustache v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 87, 311 
Wis. 2d 548, 751 N.W.2d 845, this court was called upon to 
determine whether an intentional assault by an insured was an 
"occurrence," defined as an "accident."  Although the court 
determined that the assault was not an "occurrence," Estate of 
                                                 
6 Courts are to examine the factual circumstances alleged in 
the complaint to determine whether an "occurrence" exists.  See, 
e.g., Doyle v. Engelke, 219 Wis. 2d 277, 284-285, 580 N.W.2d 245 
(1998)("An insurer has a duty to defend a suit where the 
complaint alleges facts which, if proven at trial, would give 
rise to the insurer's liability under the terms of the 
policy."); Smith v. Katz, 226 Wis. 2d 798, 807, 595 N.W.2d 345 
(1999) ("The insurer's duty arises when the allegations in the 
complaint coincide with the coverage provided by the policy."); 
United Co-op v. Frontier FS Co-op., 2007 WI App 197, ¶15, 304 
Wis. 2d 750, 738 N.W.2d 578 (courts are to look to whether "some 
alleged event" was an "occurrence"); Glendenning's Limestone & 
Ready-Mix Co., Inc. v. Reimer (Glendenning's), 2006 WI App 161, 
¶37, 295 Wis. 2d 556, 721 N.W.2d 704 ("we are to look at the 
factual circumstances of the claim to decide whether there is an 
'occurrence' under the policy . . . ."); 1325 North Van Buren, 
LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 2006 WI 94, ¶58, 293 Wis. 2d 410, 716 
N.W.2d 822 ("We have repeatedly rejected the argument that 
insurance coverage is dependent upon the theory of liability.").  
The allegations are to be liberally construed in favor of 
coverage.  Glendenning's, 295 Wis. 2d 556, ¶41.   
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
8 
 
Sustache is distinguishable because the insured in that case was 
the assailant and intentionally caused the damage.  Id., ¶31.    
¶114 Further context is found in the analysis of this court 
in Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 2008 WI 86, 311 
Wis. 2d 492, 753 N.W.2d 448.  The Stuart court observed that 
courts must "focus on the incident or injury that gives rise to 
the claim, not the plaintiff's theory of liability."  Id., ¶36 
(quoting Berg v. Schultz, 190 Wis. 2d 170, 177, 526 N.W.2d 781 
(Ct. App. 1994)).7  In this case, the assault is an incident that 
gave rise to the claims at issue.   
¶115 The 
above 
cases 
counsel 
that 
when 
viewed 
from 
Gundrum's standpoint, the "occurrence" is the assault on 
Schinner.  Couch on Insurance further supports that the assault 
in this case is an "occurrence" under the policy.  It explains 
that when the insured is not an assailant in a claim involving 
an assault, the assault can constitute an "occurrence" when 
viewed from the standpoint of the insured: 
If the insured is also the assailant, the result is 
that there is no coverage for the assault. . . . 
However, where the insured is not the assailant but is 
instead 
liable 
based 
upon 
vicarious 
liability, 
negligent 
supervision, 
or 
some 
other 
negligence 
                                                 
7 Most recently, the court of appeals in Henshue Const., 
Inc. v. Terra Engineering & Const. Corp., slip op., no. 
2012AP1038 (Ct. App. May 9, 2013) analyzed whether flood damage 
caused by the insured "deliberately" cutting into a storm sewer 
pipe without providing means for storm water diversion was an 
"occurrence."  The Henshue Const., Inc. court cautioned that 
"the correct 'occurrence' question is whether the event that 
caused the damage, that is, the flooding event resulting from 
[the insured's] failure to divert storm water, was an accident."  
Id., ¶¶60-61.  Thus, the flooding event was an "occurrence."  
Id., ¶62. 
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
9 
 
theory, the assault may constitute an accident or 
occurrence, at least from the standpoint of the 
insured. 
Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 127:21 (3d 
ed. 2012). 
¶116 The majority fails to explain why the assault is not 
an "occurrence" when viewed from the standpoint of the insured.  
Instead of analyzing the assault as the "occurrence," it is 
simply ignored. 
B 
¶117 Furthermore, 
the 
majority 
develops 
a 
test 
that 
conflates a discussion of negligence principles with the 
analysis required to interpret the undefined word, "accident," 
in an insurance policy.  In developing that test, it introduces 
concepts that are superficially compelling, but which really do 
not, or should not, drive its analysis. 
¶118 The majority appears to analyze this case with an 
objective test in mind, looking at whether the resulting injury 
or damage was reasonably foreseeable to a reasonable person.  
That analysis is irrelevant.  As the majority recognized at the 
outset, the question to ask is: "Did this insured expect or 
intend the injury or property damage?" 
¶119 When applying the wrong test, the majority takes 
Gundrum to task for failing to foresee a fight.  It appears to 
conclude that a failure to anticipate or foresee a foreseeable 
risk of harm is not an "accident."  Majority op., ¶71.  Yet, 
injury or damage that should have been anticipated or foreseen 
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
10 
 
but was not is the very essence of negligence.8  Such a test 
conflates negligence principles with the concept of what 
constitutes an "accident" when interpreting this insurance 
policy. 
¶120 Negligence is defined as when "the person, without 
intending to do harm, does something . . . that a reasonable 
person would recognize as creating an unreasonable risk of 
injury or damage to a person or property."  Wis. JI-Civil 1005 
(2013).  In concluding that failure to anticipate or foresee 
harm here is not an "accident," the majority is really declaring 
that because negligent behavior is non-accidental, it is not 
covered by insurance liability policies.  That makes no sense 
because the very reason people buy liability insurance is to 
cover them for their negligent acts.       
¶121 In contrast, when interpreting the undefined word 
"accident" in a liability insurance policy, we often look to 
precedent for guidance.  This court has set forth a definition 
of the term "accident": "'[a]n unexpected, undesirable event' or 
'an unforeseen incident' which is characterized by a 'lack of 
intention.'"  Doyle v. Engelke, 219 Wis. 2d 277, 289, 580 N.W.2d 
245 (1998).  The definition of an "accident" by its nature 
                                                 
8 Cirillo v. City of Milwaukee, 34 Wis. 2d 705, 711, 150 
N.W.2d 460 (1967) (there is no necessity in establishing 
negligence that the actual harm was foreseen); see also Behrendt 
v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., 2009 WI 71, ¶¶29-31, 318 Wis. 2d 
622, 768 N.W.2d 568 (discussing foreseeability); Rockweit v. 
Senecal, 
197 
Wis. 
2d 
409, 
423, 
541 
N.W.2d 
742 
(1995) 
("Negligence is to be determined by ascertaining whether the 
defendant's exercise of care foreseeably created an unreasonable 
risk of harm to others."). 
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
11 
 
encompasses foreseeable events that were not in fact foreseen by 
the insured. 
¶122 The Doyle court recognized that most negligence is 
accidental for the purposes of interpreting an insurance policy, 
stating that liability policies are "designed to protect an 
insured against liability for negligent acts resulting in damage 
to third-parties."  Id. at 290 (citations omitted).  In short, 
our prior precedent recognizes that we buy insurance to cover us 
when we are negligent. 
¶123 The majority's focus on the fact that Gundrum should 
have anticipated or foreseen that "something undesirable" might 
occur is inconsistent with the definition of an "accident" set 
forth in Doyle.9   Majority op., ¶71 (emphasis in original).  An 
"accident" is an unforeseen event that causes injury or damage——
not an unforeseeable risk of harm that causes injury or damage.  
¶124 To the extent the majority opinion can be read to 
state that a risk of harm that should have been anticipated or 
foreseen is not an "accident" even when the risk in fact is 
unanticipated and unforeseen, it has rendered liability coverage 
illusory in many circumstances.  Defining the word "accident" so 
narrowly "so greatly restricts the insurer's liability as to 
render the policy valueless or even meaningless, and denies 
                                                 
9 The definition of an "accident" set forth in Doyle 
likewise focuses on a failure to foresee a specific harmful 
event rather than a failure to foresee general risk of harm.  It 
requires an "unexpected . . . event" or "unforeseen incident," 
not an unexpected or unforeseen risk of an injurious event or 
incident.  Doyle v. Engelke, 219 Wis. 2d 277, 289, 580 N.W.2d 
245 (1998). 
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
12 
 
coverage for what is the predicate of any likely liability 
against the insured."  J. P. Ludington, Liability Insurance: 
"Accident" or "Accidental" as Including Loss Resulting From 
Ordinary Negligence of Insured or his Agent, 7 A.L.R.3d 1262, 
§ 2 (1966).  
C 
¶125 Ultimately, the majority's analysis undermines the 
well-established understanding that an intentional act by an 
insured is within the definition of an "occurrence" if the 
injury or damage is unexpected and unintended.  Multiple 
treatises discussing general principles of insurance law explain 
that an "occurrence" exists if the injury or damage is 
unexpected and unintended.   
¶126 One treatise provides that the "vast majority of 
decisions" have held that "intentional conduct can constitute an 
accident if the insured did not intend or expect to cause 
injury." 
 
Allan 
D. 
Windt, 
Insurance 
Claims 
& 
Disputes: 
Representation of Insurance Companies & Insureds, § 11:3 (2013).  
It sets forth the straightforward rule embraced by the "vast 
majority of decisions" as follows: 
The correct analysis is as follows.  An "occurrence" 
is defined in a typical general liability policy as an 
"accident."  The word "accident" must be given its 
ordinary, dictionary definition, and the ordinary, 
dictionary definition of "accident" is a happening 
that occurs unintentionally.  Accordingly, damage that 
the insured intended——including . . . damage that is 
inherent or substantially certain to result——is not 
covered.  Damage that the insured did not intend is 
covered . . . . In fact . . . damage that the insured 
did not intend is covered regardless of whether the 
insured's act was volitional.  A standard insuring 
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
13 
 
agreement 
requires 
only 
that 
the 
property 
damage/bodily 
injury 
have 
been 
caused 
by 
an 
occurrence/accident. 
 
It 
is 
enough 
if 
the 
damage/injury "occurs unintentionally" by reason of 
something that the insured has done. 
Id.  In an admonition that should give the majority pause, it 
further states that courts should "[k]eep in mind" that "under 
standard policy language, the "occurrence" is not limited to 
actions taken by the insured, but includes any event that causes 
injury/damage during the policy period."  Id.   
¶127 Another 
treatise 
observes 
that 
courts 
ordinarily 
examine "whether the insured intends or expects the results of 
its conduct, not necessarily whether the insured intends or 
expects the conduct itself, to determine whether there is an 
'occurrence' 
. . . ." 
 
1 
New 
Appleman 
Law 
of 
Liability 
Insurance, § 1.09[1] (2d ed. 2012).  Yet another states that "in 
order for a claim to be actionable under a liability policy, the 
insured's negligence must result in an 'accident' . . . [t]he 
word 'accident' implies a misfortune with concomitant damage to 
a victim, and not the negligence which eventually results in 
that misfortune."  Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on 
Insurance § 126:26 (3d ed. 2012).  Many jurisdictions have 
accordingly focused on whether the injury or damages were 
unexpected and unintended.  See J.P. Luddington, Liability 
Insurance: 
"Accident" 
or 
"Accidental" 
as 
Including 
Loss 
Resulting From Ordinary Negligence of Insured or his Agent, 7 
A.L.R.3d 1262 (1966). 
¶128 This court has long adhered to the principle that 
insurance policies are to be interpreted as understood by a 
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
14 
 
reasonable person in the position of the insured.  Frost v. 
Whitbeck, 2002 WI 129, ¶20, 257 Wis. 2d 80, 654 N.W.2d 225.  A 
reasonable person in the position of the insured understands the 
word "accident" to encompass unexpected and unintended injuries 
or damages.  See Doyle, 219 Wis. 2d 277, 289 (ascribing the 
"common, everyday meaning" to the word "accident").   
 
 ¶129 
The majority's analysis not only appears to 
require unexpected and unintended injury or damage, but also 
that 
the 
acts 
of 
the 
insured 
non-assailant 
must 
be 
unintentional.  Majority op., ¶68.  Such a requirement appears 
to eliminate coverage anytime an insured acts with intention, 
regardless of whether the injury or damage is unexpected and 
unintended.10   
                                                 
10 The majority's citation to Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Masters (Masters), 595 N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 1999) affords it no 
assistance for two reasons.  First, the facts of that arson case 
are different from those in this case.  In Masters, the insured 
and his son intentionally set fire to their own clothing store 
so as to destroy inventory and collect the insurance proceeds.  
Id. at 835.  Here, Gundrum is not a participant in anything 
similar to an insurance scam.  The majority errs in making such 
a comparison. 
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
15 
 
 
¶130 In determining that there is no coverage under the 
insurance policy, the majority fails to apply its holding that 
the determination of what constitutes an "occurrence" is to be 
analyzed from the standpoint of the insured.  Instead it simply 
ignores the assault as an "occurrence," develops an objective 
test that conflates a discussion of negligence principles with 
the analysis required to interpret an undefined word in an 
insurance 
policy, 
and 
undermines 
the 
well-established 
understanding that an intentional act by an insured is within 
the definition of an "occurrence" if the injury or damage is 
unexpected and unintended.  By failing to apply its holding, the 
majority is led astray.   
III 
                                                                                                                                                             
Second, the majority does not capture the Masters court's 
complete analysis.  It reasoned that "[o]f course, 'an insured 
need not act unintentionally' in order for the act to constitute 
an 'accident' and therefore an 'occurrence.'"  Id. at 838-39.  
To illustrate its analytical framework, it gave an example of a 
fire that was started by a faulty electric cord on a coffeemaker 
owned by the insured.  Id. at 839 (quotation omitted).  It 
stated that "there is no doubt that [the insured] purposely 
plugged in the coffeemaker and turned on the switch," and acted 
"intentionally."  Id. (quotation omitted.)  Nevertheless, "[t]he 
fire 
remains 
an 
accident 
and 
the 
act 
constitutes 
an 
occurrence . . . because at the time of the insured's purposeful 
act he had no intent to cause harm.  The act of plugging in the 
coffeepot is not a sufficiently direct cause of the harm, and 
the fire in this example is an accident."  Id. (quotation 
omitted.)   
Thus, Masters not only does not help the majority, it 
undermines the analysis.  Masters counsels in favor of finding 
an "occurrence" in this case.  Gundrum is not like the insured 
that intentionally set a fire hoping to cause damage and thereby 
collect insurance proceeds.  Instead he is like the insured who 
plugged in a faulty coffeepot——he had no intent to cause harm, 
and the assault is an accident from his standpoint.  Id.     
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
16 
 
¶131 Even though the majority's coverage analysis should 
end with its determination that there is no coverage, it 
nevertheless proceeds to analyze whether coverage should be 
denied because of an exclusion for bodily injury or property 
damage liability "arising out of a premises" that is not an 
insured location.  Majority op., ¶¶82, 83.  The majority 
concludes for the second time that there is no coverage.     
¶132 In contrast to the majority, I apply the tried and 
true principles of coverage examination and conclude that 
coverage is not excluded by the non-insured location exclusion.  
I look first to determine whether there is a grant of coverage.  
Estate of Sustache, 311 Wis. 2d 548, ¶22.  If there is a grant 
of coverage under the facts alleged, I must determine whether an 
exclusion applies.  Id., ¶23.  If an exclusion applies, I then 
must determine whether an exception to the exclusion reinstates 
coverage.  See id.     
¶133 The Gundrums' homeowner's policy provides coverage for 
"bodily injury" or "property damage" that is "caused by an 
'occurrence.'"  It provides a basic grant of coverage in which 
the insurer agreed to pay all sums that Gundrum is legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property 
damage caused by an "occurrence":  
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an 
"insured" for damages because of "bodily injury" or 
"property damage" caused by an "occurrence" to which 
this coverage applies . . . . 
¶134 An "occurrence" is defined as "an accident, including 
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same 
general harmful conditions," but the word "accident" is not 
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
17 
 
defined in the policy.  This basic grant of coverage is 
substantially similar to countless standardized "occurrence"-
based liability insurance policies that are purchased by 
individuals and businesses throughout the state.  See 1 New 
Appleman Law of Liability Insurance, § 1.07[2] (2d ed. 2012). 
¶135 In order to fall within the grant of coverage, the 
Second 
Amended 
Complaint 
must 
allege 
facts 
showing 
that 
Schinner's bodily injury was caused by an "occurrence," which is 
defined as an "accident."  For the reasons discussed above, I 
conclude that the assault was an "occurrence" when viewed from 
Gundrum's standpoint.  Because the assault was an "occurrence," 
the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint fall within the 
policy's grant of coverage. 
¶136 Having determined that the assault is an "occurrence," 
the next step is to determine whether an exclusion applies.  
Estate of Sustache, 311 Wis. 2d 548, ¶23.  The only exclusion 
argued to apply in this case is a non-insured location 
exclusion, which excludes bodily injury "arising out of a 
premises" that is not an "insured location."11  An "insured 
location" is defined in part as "[t]he residence premises," the 
"part of other premises, other structures and grounds used by 
you as a residence," and any premises used by the insured "in 
connection" with the premises described in the policy.  
¶137 The court of appeals in Newhouse v. Ladig, Inc., 145 
Wis. 2d 236, 426 N.W.2d 88 (Ct. App. 1988) addressed the same 
                                                 
11 There is no liquor liability exclusion in the Gundrums' 
policy.  Likewise, no one argues that an exclusion precluding 
coverage for intentional acts applies.   
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
18 
 
issue before this court today——what is the meaning of the phrase 
"arising out of a . . . premises."  Its analysis is instructive 
in evaluating whether the non-insured location exclusion applies 
in this case.  
¶138 Under the interpretation adopted in Newhouse, the non-
insured location exclusion applies to bodily injuries "related 
to conditions of the premises on which an accident or occurrence 
takes place."  Id. at 239.  It does not, however, apply to 
"insureds' tortious acts occurring on uninsured lands."  Id.  
The ultimate test for whether there was bodily injury or 
property damage "arising out of a . . . premises" is "whether 
there is some correlation between the negligence giving rise to 
liability and a condition of the premises."12  Id. at 240.  
¶139 Thus, under Newhouse, the facts alleged must indicate 
that there was some correlation between Gundrum's negligence 
giving rise to liability and a condition of the premises on 
which the assault occurred.  Here, however, no condition of the 
shed itself or the surrounding premises is alleged to correlate 
with 
Gundrum's 
alleged 
negligence. 
 
The 
only 
arguable 
correlation between Gundrum's alleged negligence and the shed is 
that Gundrum's alleged negligence occurred at an underage 
                                                 
12 In interpreting a non-insured location exclusion, the 
Newhouse court relied upon Wisconsin's "policy of strictly 
interpreting exclusionary clauses."  145 Wis. 2d at 242.  It 
observed that "if the [insurance] company had intended to 
geographically limit coverage for tortious personal conduct, 'it 
could simply have provided that the exclusion ran to an accident 
'occurring on' other owned premises.'"  Id. (quotation omitted). 
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
19 
 
drinking party hosted by Gundrum on the premises where the shed 
was located.   
¶140 Such a tenuous connection to the premises is not 
enough to fall within the non-insured location exclusion.  The 
Newhouse court soundly rejected the argument that tortious acts 
occurring on a non-insured premises are excluded from coverage: 
It makes no difference whether the insured owns the 
premises on which his tortious act takes place.  Under 
the policy's terms, there is floating coverage for the 
insured's tortious personal acts wherever he might be.  
The dispositive issue is therefore whether there is 
some correlation between the negligence giving rise to 
liability and a condition of the premises.   
Id. at 240.  Like Newhouse, it makes no difference here that the 
alleged tortious acts merely occurred on a non-insured premises.  
The exclusion is therefore inapplicable and no analysis of any 
exceptions to the exclusion is required.  Estate of Sustache, 
311 Wis. 2d 548, ¶23. 
 
¶141 Because facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint 
fall within the policy's grant of coverage and because coverage 
is not excluded by the non-insured location exclusion, I 
conclude that the homeowner's policy provides coverage in this 
case.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
 
¶142 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. I am also authorized to state 
that JUSTICE N. PATRICK CROOKS joins Part II of this dissent.   
No.  2011AP564.awb 
 
 
 
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