Case Title: Lazarus v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 41, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2013-09-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SIRWILL LAZARUS,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 41, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0509007292 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                         Submitted: August 2, 2013 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: September 9, 2013 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 9th day of September 2013, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Sirwill Lazarus, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s January 10, 2013 violation of probation (“VOP”) sentencing order.  
We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in October 2005, Lazarus was indicted 
on charges of Robbery in the First Degree, Assault in the First Degree, Possession of 
a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, Possession With Intent to 
Deliver Cocaine, Possession of Cocaine Within 300 Feet of a Church, Assault in the 
Third Degree, Criminal Mischief and Resisting Arrest.  In January 2006, Lazarus 
pleaded guilty to Robbery in the First Degree, Assault in the Second Degree and 
 
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Possession of Cocaine Within 300 Feet of a Church.  The remainder of the charges 
were dismissed.  Lazarus was sentenced on the robbery conviction to 3 years 
incarceration at Level V.  On the assault conviction, he was sentenced to 5 years at 
Level V, to be suspended for decreasing levels of supervision.  On the drug 
possession conviction, he was sentenced to 2 years at Level V, to be suspended for 18 
months at Level III probation.   
 
(3) 
On February 19, 2009, following a hearing, Lazarus was found to have 
committed a VOP.  He was sentenced to 5 years at Level V, to be suspended for 18 
months at Level III on the assault conviction.  The Superior Court discharged Lazarus 
as unimproved on the drug possession conviction.  On August 27, 2009, Lazarus was 
found to have committed a second VOP.  He was sentenced to 5 years at Level V, to 
be suspended after 60 days for probation.  
 
(4) 
Lazarus was found not to have committed a VOP at his third VOP 
hearing on June 10, 2010.  At that time, the Superior Court re-sentenced him to 3 
years at Level V, to be suspended for 3 years at Level I, restitution only.  On August 
30, 2012, Lazarus was found to have committed another VOP.  He was sentenced to 3 
years at Level V, to be suspended for 6 months at Level IV Work Release, to be 
followed by 1 year at Level III probation.  On January 10, 2013, Lazarus was found 
to have committed yet another VOP while housed at the Level IV Plummer 
Community Corrections Center and sentenced him to 2 years and 6 months at Level 
V, to be suspended after 18 months for Level I probation.  This appeal followed. 
 
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(5) 
In this appeal, Lazarus asserts several claims that may fairly be 
summarized as follows:  a) the administrative warrant for the VOP was factually 
inaccurate; b) tobacco-related violations are usually handled without charging 
offenders with a VOP; and c) the Superior Court judge who presided over the VOP 
hearing had a closed mind. 
 
(6) 
 Lazarus’s first claim is that the administrative warrant for the VOP was 
factually inaccurate.  The record before us reflects otherwise.  The warrant adequately 
placed Lazarus on notice that he had been caught smoking a cigarette off-limits with 
2 other offenders at the Plummer Center, which was forbidden.  Moreover, the 
warrant notes that, when given an order from an officer not to move, Lazarus 
attempted to throw the cigarette into a bathroom stall.  While Lazarus asserts that he 
was not the one with the cigarettes, the transcript of the VOP hearing reflects that he 
admitted that he was smoking.  We, therefore, conclude that Lazarus’s first claim is 
without merit. 
 
(7) 
Lazarus’s second claim is that he should not have been charged with a 
VOP because “technical” violations are usually handled by the Department of 
Correction (“DOC”).  He cites to Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4334(d) in support of his 
argument.  While that statute gives DOC the authority to resolve technical violations 
administratively, it does not require the DOC to do so.  Moreover, once a defendant 
commits a VOP, the Superior Court has the authority to require him to serve the full 
 
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amount of Level V time remaining on his original sentence.1  Lazarus does not claim, 
nor is there record support for a claim, that the Superior Court sentenced him to Level 
V time in excess of that remaining on his original Level V sentence.  As such, we 
conclude that Lazarus’s second claim is without merit.   
 
(8) 
Lazarus’s third claim is that the Superior Court judge had a “closed 
mind” when he presided over the VOP hearing.  A judge imposes sentence with a 
“closed mind” when the sentence is based upon a preconceived bias without 
consideration of the nature of the offense or the character of the defendant.2  The 
transcript of the VOP hearing does not reflect that the Superior Court judge sentenced 
Lazarus with a “closed mind.”  The judge stated that Lazarus had violated his 
probation on several different occasions and that, by his conduct, Lazarus was 
sending a message that he wanted to serve his sentence.  The statement by the judge 
was no more than an accurate reflection of Lazarus’s actions.  As such, we find no 
evidence of impropriety on the part of the judge and conclude that Lazarus’s third 
claim is, likewise, without merit.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
                                                 
1 Pavulak v. State, 880 A.2d 1044, 1045-46 (Del. 2005) (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4334(c)). 
2 Cruz v. State, 990 A.2d 409, 416 (Del. 2010).