Case Title: Potter v. Great Falls Insurance Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020 ME 144

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 144 
Docket: 
WCB-19-456 
Argued: 
September 18, 2020 
Decided: 
December 29, 2020 
 
Panel: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. 
 
 
DARLA J. POTTER 
 
v. 
 
GREAT FALLS INSURANCE COMPANY et al. 
 
 
CONNORS, J.
[¶1]  The question presented in this appeal is whether Darla J. Potter—
an aquaculture worker—is a “seaman” within the meaning of the Jones Act, 
46 U.S.C.S. § 30104 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-214).  The answer, based on 
the facts in this record, is no. 
[¶2]  Great Falls Insurance Company appeals from a decision of the 
Workers’ Compensation Board Appellate Division affirming the decree of the 
Board (Pelletier, ALJ) granting Potter’s petitions for award of compensation for 
injuries sustained in the course of her employment with Cooke Aquaculture 
USA, Inc.1  Great Falls contends that the Appellate Division erred by applying a 
                                         
1  Before the Board and on appeal, Cooke Aquaculture has supported Potter’s petitions and 
opposed Great Falls’ position that Potter is a Jones Act seaman.  At oral argument, Great Falls 
 
2 
deferential standard of review to the ALJ’s decree and by affirming the ALJ’s 
determination that Potter is not a seaman for purposes of the Jones Act.  We 
disagree and affirm the decision. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶3]  The following facts found by the administrative law judge and 
contained in the Board’s decree are deemed final for the purpose of this 
appellate review.  See Bailey v. City of Lewiston, 2017 ME 160, ¶ 9 & n.6, 
168 A.3d 762; 39-A M.R.S. §§ 318, 322(3) (2020). 
 
[¶4]  Potter worked as a marine technician for Cooke Aquaculture’s 
offshore saltwater salmon farming operation in Eastport for twenty-five years.  
As a marine technician, her primary job was to care for the salmon, which were 
raised in cages located less than one mile offshore.  Potter’s duties consisted of 
tending, feeding, and harvesting the fish, as well as cleaning, maintaining, and 
repairing the pens and nets.  The job was physically demanding, requiring her 
to tend salmon cages that were 300 feet in circumference and to stand for hours 
on pipes that bobbed up and down in the ocean. 
                                         
explained that it insures Cooke Aquaculture for workers’ compensation claims but that Cooke 
Aquaculture has a different insurer for Jones Act coverage. 
 
3 
 
[¶5]  To feed the salmon, Potter occasionally spent time on a “feed barge,” 
which was a large blue box anchored to the ocean floor for years at a time.  The 
feed barge had no means of self-propulsion or running lights for navigation, and 
a tow boat was required to move it.  Because the feed barge could not move 
under its own power, a large motorized barge was used to transport the feed to 
the feed barge. 
 
[¶6]  To reach the salmon cages, Potter traveled by either the large 
motorized barge or a twenty-four-foot skiff.  The ride took approximately thirty 
minutes in each direction.  While aboard the transportation vessels, Potter was 
a crew member engaged in activities associated with being a seaman.2  On 
occasion, Potter returned to shore during her work day to get additional 
supplies or feed, but the time that she spent on the transportation vessels for 
this occasional trip was offset by other duties that she performed onshore.3  
                                         
2  Potter testified that “crew member” is not a term that she would use but that she occasionally 
operated the transportation vessels and performed maintenance on them when necessary, such as 
repairing a cable or propeller and changing the oil.  She explained that it was advantageous to know 
how to operate the transportation vessels in case of an emergency and to be able to repair the vessels 
in the event that they stopped running while out on the water. 
3  Potter testified that she typically worked offshore all day but that, in an average week, she may 
work onshore for three to four hours, gathering feed and nets.  She further testified that, after the 
salmon are harvested, the cages must remain fallow for at least one year.  Potter explained that, 
during these fallow periods, she continued to work on the cages, cleaning and inspecting them; 
otherwise, she might work on aquaculture operations in other coves, but, on one occasion, she spent 
six months onshore preparing rope. 
 
4 
Great Falls presented no evidence demonstrating that Potter’s onshore duties 
were connected to the maintenance or operation of the transportation vessels. 
 
[¶7]  Potter typically worked between eight and nine hours a day, and 
75 percent of her work day was spent undertaking duties associated with the 
salmon cages.  According to the ALJ, Potter’s testimony that less than 30 percent 
of her working hours were spent working on a vessel was “entirely credible.”  
No evidence was presented regarding how much time Potter spent on the feed 
barge. 
 
[¶8]  In November 2015, Potter slipped on a pipe connected to the salmon 
cages, and her left knee struck a hard surface.  She continued to work on the 
salmon cages until January 2017, when the progressive worsening of her knee’s 
condition prevented her from working on the salmon cages, and she was given 
an onshore job. 
 
[¶9]  Potter filed petitions seeking compensation for the November 2015 
sudden injury and the January 2017 gradual injury.  Great Falls opposed both 
petitions, raising the affirmative defense that the Board lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction because Potter was a “seaman” pursuant to the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. 
§ 30104, and was therefore not an “employee” entitled to benefits pursuant to 
the Workers’ Compensation Act, 39-A M.R.S. § 102(11) (2020). 
 
5 
 
[¶10]  In 2018, the ALJ held a two-day hearing at which it heard testimony 
from Potter and another Cooke Aquaculture employee and admitted 
documentary exhibits, including photographs, medical records, and certain 
employment-related forms.  In its decision, the ALJ acknowledged that the 
parties had agreed to certain stipulations of fact and law, including that the 
salmon cages were not “vessels” for purposes of the Jones Act.4  Based on these 
stipulations and evidence admitted at the hearing, the ALJ concluded that Great 
Falls had failed to establish that Potter was a Jones Act seaman and granted 
Potter’s petitions.  Great Falls filed a motion for further findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, which the ALJ denied. 
 
[¶11]  Great Falls appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appellate Division 
and requested that it review the ALJ’s decision de novo, citing Dorr v. Maine 
                                         
4  Although the Board’s decree reflects that it accepted the parties’ stipulations, there is no 
evidence of the stipulations in the record.  At oral argument, the parties confirmed that they had 
agreed to certain stipulations.  In the absence of a written stipulation from the parties, the ALJ 
described one stipulation as an agreement that, in order for the Jones Act to apply, “the worker must 
spend at least 30 percent of their working hours on a ‘vessel.’  Conversely, a worker who spends less 
than 30 percent of his/her time in service of a vessel in navigation does not qualify as a ‘seaman’ under 
the Jones Act.”  (Emphasis added.)  As discussed in this opinion, the difference between time spent 
on versus in service of a vessel might matter in determining whether the Jones Act applies, rendering 
the stipulation as described in the Board’s decree unhelpful.  Given its imprecision, we treat this 
“stipulation” as nothing more than an acknowledgment by the parties that the relevant test for 
determining who is a seaman under the Jones Act is set forth in Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 
368 (1995).  In contrast, the parties’ stipulation that the salmon cages were not “vessels” within the 
meaning of the Jones Act is precise, with a factual dimension we do not second guess, particularly in 
the context of our limited review.  See 39-A M.R.S. § 322(3) (2020); M.R. App. P. 23(b)(3).  The best 
practice for parties wishing to enter into a stipulation is to either file a written stipulation signed by 
the parties or their attorneys or orally enter the stipulation on the record. 
 
6 
Maritime Academy, 670 A.2d 930 (Me. 1996).  The Appellate Division declined 
Great Falls’ request, stating that the issue of whether Potter was a seaman 
pursuant to the Jones Act is a mixed question of fact and law and that its review 
of factual findings was limited to ensuring that the findings were supported by 
competent evidence.  See 39-A M.R.S. § 321-B(2) (2020).  The Appellate Division 
further stated, “Because we do not possess superior expertise than the ALJ in 
evaluating the claimant’s status as an employee or a seaman, we apply our 
ordinary standard of review, as set forth in Pomerleau.”  See Pomerleau v. United 
Parcel Serv., 464 A.2d 206 (Me. 1983). 
 
[¶12]  The Appellate Division concluded that the ALJ’s finding that Potter 
spent less than 30 percent of her working hours on or in service of a vessel was 
supported by competent evidence in the record.  Although Potter spent some 
amount of time on the feed barge, the Appellate Division declined to address 
the ALJ’s conclusion that the feed barge was not a vessel because there was no 
evidence in the record indicating how much time Potter spent on the feed barge, 
and, therefore, Great Falls had failed to sustain its burden of proof on that issue.  
With less than 30 percent of her documented time spent on a vessel, the 
Appellate Division agreed with the ALJ’s conclusion that Potter was not a Jones 
Act seaman and affirmed. 
 
7 
 
[¶13]  We granted Great Falls’ petition for appellate review.  See 
39-A M.R.S. § 322 (2020); M.R. App. P. 23. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
[¶14]  The central issue in this appeal is whether Potter’s claims fall 
within the jurisdiction of federal admiralty law or state workers’ compensation 
law.  As a preliminary matter, however, Great Falls contends that the Appellate 
Division erred by applying a deferential standard of review to the ALJ’s factual 
findings and legal conclusions because our holding in Dorr required the 
Appellate Division to review the Board’s decree de novo.  Great Falls likewise 
urges us to undertake a de novo review of the record. 
 
[¶15]  Great Falls interprets our holding in Dorr too broadly.  Whether a 
worker is a “seaman” as that term is used in the Jones Act is a “mixed question 
of law and fact.”  46 U.S.C.S. § 30104; Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 369 
(1995); McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 356 (1991).  In Dorr, we 
stated that “[t]he issue of whether an employee falls within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of a federal statute does not involve an interpretation of the 
Workers’ Compensation Act, nor does it fall within the [Board’s] traditional 
area of expertise,” so we conduct an “independent review.”  670 A.2d at 932 
 
8 
(citing LeBlanc v. United Eng’rs & Constructors Inc., 584 A.2d 675, 677 
(Me. 1991)). 
[¶16]  By “independent review,” we did not mean a de novo review of the 
facts and law.  Id.  This point is clear from our citation in Dorr to LeBlanc.  In 
Leblanc, the issue was whether the full faith and credit owed to a prior New 
Hampshire award barred the Maine Workers’ Compensation Commission from 
granting disability benefits.  584 A.2d at 677-78.  In answering in the negative, 
we stated that, in our review of the Commission’s decision for errors of law 
only, we defer to its expertise.  Id.  Given that its expertise is limited to the Maine 
Workers’ Compensation Act, however, “we conduct an independent review of 
the jurisdictional requirements imposed by the United States Constitution.”  Id. 
at 677.  Thus, this aspect of our recitation of the standard of review in Dorr, as 
in LeBlanc, stands merely for the proposition, applied with respect to most 
administrative decisions by state governmental bodies, that we defer to their 
reasonable construction of the statutes that they administer and review other 
legal issues de novo.  See Reed v. Sec’y of State, 2020 ME 57, ¶ 14, 232 A.3d 202 
(“[W]e defer to the agency’s reasonable construction when the agency is tasked 
with administering the statute and it falls within the agency’s expertise.”). 
 
9 
 
[¶17]  In the workers’ compensation context, moreover, our role on 
appeal, like the Appellate Division’s role, is limited by statute.  See 39-A M.R.S. 
§§ 318, 321-B(2), 322(3); M.R. App. P. 23(b)(3).  Although we review the 
Appellate Division’s interpretation of federal law de novo, “in the absence of 
fraud, [the ALJ’s decision] on all questions of fact is final.”  39-A M.R.S. § 318; 
accord Bailey, 2017 ME 160, ¶ 9 & n.6, 168 A.3d 762; Huff v. Reg’l Transp. 
Program, 2017 ME 229, ¶ 9, 175 A.3d 98. 
[¶18]  In sum, because the question of whether a worker is a seaman 
within the meaning of the Jones Act is a mixed question of law and fact, we 
accept the ALJ’s findings of fact.  We review de novo, with no deference to either 
the Board or the Appellate Division, the application of federal law to these facts. 
B. 
Seaman Status 
[¶19]  Pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act, the term “employee,” 
identifying those covered by the Act, excludes “[p]ersons engaged in maritime 
employment . . . who are within the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty law or 
the laws of the United States.”  39-A M.R.S. § 102(11)(A)(1).  Hence, a “seaman” 
within the meaning of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 30104, is precluded from 
receiving protection from the state statute.  See Dorr, 670 A.2d at 932 (“It is 
generally understood that the Jones Act supersedes state workers’ 
 
10 
compensation laws applicable to seamen.”); Chandris, 515 U.S. at 356 (stating 
that an injured worker who does not qualify as a seaman pursuant to the Jones 
Act “may still recover under an applicable state workers’ compensation 
scheme”). 
[¶20]  “The Jones Act, however, does not define the term ‘seaman’ and 
therefore leaves to the courts the determination of exactly which maritime 
workers are entitled to admiralty’s special protection.”  Chandris, 515 U.S. 
at 355.  Although the Supreme Court’s test has evolved over the years, the term 
“seaman” is generally understood to refer to a “master or member of a crew of 
any vessel.”  Dorr, 670 A.2d at 932 (quotation marks omitted); see also 
Wilander, 498 U.S. at 355 (“The key to seaman status is employment-related 
connection to a vessel in navigation.”); Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 
520 U.S. 548, 553-55 (1997) (affirming the importance of a substantial 
connection between an employee and a vessel in navigation when determining 
seaman status). 
[¶21]  In Chandris, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for 
determining seaman status: 
First, . . . an employee’s duties must contribute to the function of the 
vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission.  The Jones Act’s 
protections, like the other admiralty protections for seamen, only 
extend to those maritime employees who do the ship’s work.  But 
 
11 
this threshold requirement is very broad: All who work at sea in 
the service of a ship are eligible for seaman status. 
 
Second, and most important for our purposes here, a seaman 
must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an 
identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of 
both its duration and its nature.  The fundamental purpose of this 
substantial connection requirement is to give full effect to the 
remedial scheme created by Congress and to separate the 
sea-based maritime employees who are entitled to Jones Act 
protection from those land-based workers who have only a 
transitory or sporadic connection to a vessel in navigation, and 
therefore whose employment does not regularly expose them to 
the perils of the sea. 
 
515 U.S. at 368 (alteration, citations, and quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶22]  Regarding the temporal element in the “most important” second 
part of the test, the general rule is that an employee who spends less than 
30 percent of her time on or in service of a vessel in navigation does not qualify 
as a seaman.  Id. at 368, 371; see also Dorr, 670 A.2d at 933 (concluding that an 
engineer who spent 25 percent of his working hours onboard a research vessel 
was not a Jones Act seaman). 
 
[¶23]  Here, the ALJ found, and the record reflects, that Potter spent less 
than 30 percent of her time on the transportation vessels.  On this record, and 
with the limited scope of our review, we cannot disturb the ALJ’s findings to 
add any of the time Potter spent on the feed barge or salmon cages to the 
 
12 
calculation of time spent on a Jones Act vessel.  See 39-A M.R.S. § 322(3); M.R. 
App. P. 23(b)(3). 
[¶24]  Great Falls’ arguments as to why this factual finding is not 
dispositive can be divided into two categories.  First, Great Falls argues that 
time that Potter spent onshore preparing the transportation vessels and 
offshore working on the feed barge should have counted toward meeting the 
30 percent threshold.  Second, more broadly, Great Falls defines “in service of a 
vessel” to include the time that Potter worked on the cages, because, in its view, 
the “mission” of the transportation vessels was to tend to the salmon, and all 
the time Potter that spent offshore advanced this mission.  In support of this 
view, Great Falls notes that when Potter was on the water—whether on a 
transportation vessel, the feed barge, or the cages a mile out at sea—she was 
exposed to the perils of the sea. 
[¶25]  With respect to the first argument, we cannot adjust the ALJ’s 
finding upward to climb past 30 percent because any additional time related to 
occupying or serving a vessel is not quantified in the record, and we cannot 
disturb the ALJ’s findings of fact.  See 39-A M.R.S. § 322(3); M.R. App. P. 
23(b)(3); Bailey, 2017 ME 160, ¶ 9 & n.6, 168 A.3d 762. 
 
13 
[¶26]  The second argument is more invocative of our role in applying the 
federal law to the ALJ’s factual findings.  From a legal perspective, the 
30 percent threshold is neither a strict bright line nor necessarily dispositive in 
isolation.  Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371; Dorr, 670 A.2d at 933.  Judicial authority is 
virtually nonexistent as to whether aquaculture workers should be deemed 
Jones Act seamen and is almost as sparse in indicating how broadly to identify 
the “mission” of a vessel.  Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368 (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶27]  The closest analogy to the instant situation in the case law may be 
to workers transported daily to offshore oil drilling operations.  The analogy is 
imperfect for many reasons, but generally speaking, if work is performed on a 
non-vessel, such as a work platform affixed to the sea bed, then no court 
appears to have considered the time spent achieving the objective of the 
non-vessel, e.g., drilling for oil, to be a part of the mission of the vessel 
transporting the worker to the non-vessel.5  See generally 14 Arthur Larson 
& Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 146.02 (2020). 
                                         
5  Although much of the case law addressing the status of offshore oil workers applied a 
pre-Chandris test developed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, that test also considered whether 
a worker’s activities contributed to the accomplishment of a vessel’s mission.  See Offshore Co. v. 
Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959); see also Chandris, 515 U.S. at 365-66.  In the absence of the 
worker’s activity taking place on a vessel itself, none of this case law contemplates that oil-drilling 
activity on a non-vessel was the mission of any vessel.  See, e.g., Barrios v. Engine & Gas Compressor 
Servs., Inc., 669 F.2d 350, 353-54 (5th Cir. 1982) (concluding that a worker was not a seaman where 
the compressor stations on which he worked were not Jones Act vessels and there was no showing 
that the worker’s transportation on and contribution to the functioning of crew boats moving from 
 
14 
[¶28]  Also, although a worker on a non-vessel platform in the water is 
exposed to the elements of the sea, she is not engaged in a traditional 
sea-centric occupation.  Just as one might drill for oil on land or on the sea, so 
also can the activity in which Potter was engaged—fish farming—be 
accomplished on land as well as on the sea.  Notably, the Maine Workers’ 
Compensation Act expressly contemplates that at least some aquaculture 
workers will fall within its application.  See 39-A M.R.S. §§ 102(3), 
401(1)(B)-(C) (2020). 
[¶29]  An occupation that can occur on land as well as on the sea does not 
in itself exempt a worker from Jones Act seaman status.  For example, a cook on 
a ship can be a seaman.  See Me. Mar. Acad. v. Fitch, 411 F. Supp. 3d 76, 79-84 
(D. Me. 2019); Wilander, 498 U.S. at 343-44.  But such a cook is easily deemed 
to engage in “the ship’s work” and serves the ship itself.  Chandris, 515 U.S. 
at 368 (quotation marks omitted).  The same cannot be said for someone who 
spends the bulk of her time essentially engaged in farming activities on 
non-vessels in the sea. 
                                         
platform to platform was anything “other than transitory and incidental to his employment as a 
mechanic on the compressor stations”); Longmire v. Sea Drilling Corp., 610 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 
(5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting a claim that a worker was a Jones Act seaman because the worker “indicated 
that his primary responsibilities concerned drilling operations on the drilling rig and platform, and 
that most of his work aboard the tender was only incidental thereto”). 
 
15 
[¶30]  Each case is fact-sensitive, and there may be situations in which an 
aquaculture worker might be deemed a seaman.  See generally Timothy E. 
Steigelman, The Jones Act Fish Farmer, 33 Hawaii L. Rev. 223 (2010).  
Considering the facts of this case, and in the absence of any authority to the 
contrary, we deem the mission of the transportation vessels here to be to 
transport workers and not the broader task of fish farming.  Although the ALJ 
found that Potter was a crew member on the transportation vessels and that 
she engaged in seaman-related activities, the ALJ concluded that her “primary 
job was not to work as a crewman on a boat, but to work on the salmon pens; 
tending, feeding, harvesting the fish, and cleaning, maintaining, and repairing 
the pens and nets.”  On this record, we conclude that the finding that Potter 
spent less than 30 percent of her time associated with vessel-centric activities 
is dispositive.  She is not a seaman within the purview of the Jones Act, and the 
decision of the Appellate Division is affirmed. 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
Joshua Birocco, Esq., and Chelsea Suvlu, Esq. (orally), Tucker Law Group, 
Bangor, for appellant Great Falls Insurance Company 
 
Kevin M. Noonan, Esq. (orally), McTeague Higbee, PA, Topsham, for appellee 
Darla J. Potter 
 
Michael Tadenev, Esq., and Ryan P. Dumais, Esq. (orally), Eaton Peabody, 
Ellsworth, for appellee Cooke Aquaculture USA, Inc. 
 
 
Workers’ Compensation Board Appellate Division case number 19-0004 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY