Case Title: RUDE v NEAL KERR

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1974-12-30T00:00:00Z

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No. 12526 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 19 74 DEAN A. RUDE, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, J A M E S N E A L and WILBERT KERR, d/b/a KERR T R U C K I N G SALES, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Fourth ~ u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Gough, Booth, Shanahan and Johnson, Helena, Montana Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn and P h i l l i p s , Kalispell, Montana 1 . James Heckathorn, argued, Kalispell, Montana Goldman, McChesney and Datsopolous, Missoula, Montana Ronald B. MacDonald argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Harris, Jackson and Utick, Helena, Montana Andrew J. Utick argued, Helena, Montana Worden, Thane, Haines and Williams, Missoula, Montana ~hel&on C. Williams argued, Missoula , Montana Submitted: November 12, 1974 Decided : 3 0 i 974 Mr. Justice Frank I . Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a judgment entered in the district court, Lake County, in an automobile accident damage suit. Plaintiff Dean A. Rude was the driver of a Chevrolet involved in a collision with a Ford driven by defendant James Neal, in which the owner defendant William Kerr was a front seat passenger. The accident occurred about 6:40 p.m., September 16, 1970, in front of Sam White's Bar on U. S. 12 near Elliston, Montana. Rude was driving east toward Helena when the west- bound Ford driven by Neal made a left turn across the highway to enter the private driveway at the bar. Rude applied his brakes, but was unable to avoid the collision. All three parties were injured in the accident. Rude filed a complaint, alleging the negligence of Neal and imputing that negligence to Neal's passenger Kerr on the basis of joint venture. The complaint also charged Kerr with negligence on his own part. Kerr crossclaimed against Neal, alleging gross negligence and counterclaimed against Rude alleg- ing negligence on his part. The jury returned a verdict award- ing $10,000 to Rude in his claim against Neal and Kerr. The jury denied Kerr's claims and, in response to special inter- rogatories, found that: 1. Neal was negligent and his negligence was the proxi- mate cause of the accident. 2. Neal was neither grossly negligent nor guilty of willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. 3. Rude was not negligent. 4. Kerr was negligent and his own negligence was the proximate cause of his own injuries. 5. Neal and Kerr were engaged in a joint venture at the time of the accident. Neal and K e r r appeal from t h e combined judgment and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of t h e i r motions f o r judgment notwithstanding t h e v e r d i c t o r a new t r i a l . The i s s u e s r a i s e d by N e a l w i l l be considered f i r s t . They a r e : 1. Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury on Montana law prohibiting driving on t h e l e f t s i d e of t h e road i n a no-passing zone o r when approaching t h e c r e s t of a grade? 2 . Did t h e d i s t r i c t court err i n admitting opinion testimony as t o t h e speed of t h e vehicles and t h e cause of t h e accident? Although N e a l a l s o presents argument on t h e i s s u e of j o i n t venture, he admits not being prejudiced by t h a t alleged e r r o r . W e t h e r e f o r e w i l l consider t h a t i s s u e when we discuss K e r r ' s appeal. Neal does n o t suggest t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s complained of a r e an i n c o r r e c t statement of t h e law. It i s apparent t h a t they merely set f o r t h t h e requirements of s e c t i o n s 32-2156(a)(l) and 32-2157, R.C.M. 1947. N e a l argues, however, t h a t those s t a t u t e s do not apply t o l e f t t u r n s i t u a t i o n s . H e contends t h a t giving those i n s t r u c t i o n s , oombined with giving an i n s t r u c t i o n making s t a t u t o r y v i o l a t i o n s negligence as a matter of l a w , amounts t o a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t on t h e i s s u e of Neal's negligence. Section 32-2156, R.C.M. 1947, provides, i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : I' (a) N o vehicle s h a l l a t any t i m e be driven t o t h e l e f t s i d e cf t h e roadway under t h e following conditions: '1. When approaching t h e c r e s t of a grade o r upon a curve i n t h e highway where t h e d r i v e r ' s view is obstructed within such d i s t a n c e a s t o c r e a t e a hazard i n t h e event another vehicle might approach from t h e opposite d i r e c t i o n * * *". Section 32-2157, R.C.M. 1947, a s amended by Section 1, Chapter 97, Laws of Montana, 1957, and i n e f f e c t a t t h e t i m e of t h i s accident, provided: "(a) The commission is hereby authorized to determine those portions of any highway where overtaking and passing or driving to the left of the roadway would be especially hazardous and may by appropriate signs or markings on the roadway indicate the beginning and end of such zones and when such signs or markings are in place and clearly visible to an ordinarily ob- servant person every driver of a vehicle shall obey the directions thereof. " (b) Where signs or markings are in place to define a no-passing zone as set forth in para- graph (a) no driver shall at any time drive on the left side of the roadway within such no-pass- ing zone or on the left side of any pavement striping designed to mark such no-passing zone throughout its length." Both statutes provide that, under certain circumstances, no vehicle shall be driven on the left side of the road "at any time". Here, Neal turned left, in a no-passing zone within 500 feet of the crest of a hill. However, we are not persuaded that these statutes apply. In Wilburn v. Simons, 302 Ky. 752, 196 S.W.2d 356, 358, the Kentucky court dealt with statutory provisions virtually identical to section 32-2156, R.C.M. 1947. In applying their statute, the court said: " * * * It is the duty of a car driver to keep off the left side of a highway when he approaches the crest of a hill. KRS 189.340. While this does not mean that a driver could not turn left to enter a driveway just in front of the crest of a hill, yet it does mean, we think, that a driver should necessarily exercise care under these circumstances and turn at a reasonably safe angle.* * *" In Green v. Boney, 233 S.C. 49, 103 S.E.2d 732, 66 ALR2d 1370, the South Carolina court was called upon to apply a stat- ute similar to section 32-2157, R.C.M. 1947. That court held that it was not always negligence to turn left across a yellow barrier line for the purpose of entering a private driveway, but depended upon the circumstances of each case. While Rude has urged that we not follow this rationale, he has cited no c a s e s holding t h a t s i m i l a r s t a t u t e s p r o h i b i t l e f t t u r n s . I n 1957, t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e amended s e c t i o n 32-2157, R.C.M. 1947, adding t h e second paragraph a s it appears i n t h e s e c t i o n quoted above. Sec. 1, Ch 97, L. 1957. The t i t l e of t h a t a c t is: "An A c t t o Amend [Section 32-2157, R.C.M. 19471 by P r o h i b i t i n g Passing Over Pavement S t r i p i n g Designating No-Passing Zones * * *". (Bracketed words and emphasis s u p p l i e d ) . The l e g i s l a t u r e ' s i n t e n t t o p r o h i b i t p a s s i n q i s f u r t h e r evidenced by t h e p o s i t i o n i n g of t h i s s e c t i o n w i t h o t h e r s d e a l i n g w i t h over- t a k i n g and passing. ( S e c t i o n s 32-2153 through 32-2157, R.C.M. 1947). S t a t u t e s governing l e f t t u r n s a r e grouped t o g e t h e r else- where i n t h a t c h a p t e r . (Sections 32-2104 through 32-2167, R.C.M. 1947). Furthermore, t h e v e r y phrase "no-passing zone" s u g g e s t s a p r o h i b i t i o n of p a s s i n g , n o t t u r n i n g . The s e c t i o n governing N e a l ' s l e f t t u r n h e r e is s e c t i o n 32-2167, R.C.M. 1947. I n Sumner v. Amacher, 150 Mont. 544, 437 P.2d 630, we r e c o g n i z d t h a t t h i s s t a t u t e governed a l e f t t u r n made i n a no-passing zone, although t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d t h e r e were n o t t h e same as i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e . Here t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d g i v e an i n s t r u c t i o n based on s e c t i o n 32-2167, R.C.M. 1947, b u t e r r e d i n a l s o g i v i n g t h e two i n s t r u c t i o n s covering d r i v i n g on t h e l e f t s i d e of t h e roadway. When combined with t h e i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t s t a t u t o r y v i o l a t i o n s a r e negligence a s a m a t t e r of law, t h e e r r o r was c l e a r l y p r e j u d i c i a l . McDonough v. Smith, 86 Mont. 545, 284 P. 542; 13 B l a s h f i e l d , Automobile Law and P r a c t i c e , 3rd Ed., S 4 6 3 . 3 . Neal a l s o contends t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n allowing Sgt. Dale Hanson of t h e Montana Highway P a t r o l t o e x p r e s s h i s opinion a s t o t h e speed of t h e v e h i c l e s and t h e cause of t h e a c c i d e n t . The c h a l l e n g e is n o t t o S g t . Hanson's e x p e r t q u a l i f i - c a t i o n s , b u t t o t h e a l l e g e d i n s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e evidence upon which he based t h o s e opinions. Sgt. Hanson was t h e i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r , a r r i v i n g a t t h e scene approximately one half hour a f t e r t h e accident took place. H e observed t h e road and weather conditions, measured t h e skid marks, viewed t h e damage done t o t h e vehicles, ques- tioned witnesses a t t h e scene and t h e p a r t i e s l a t e r . Based on t h i s evidence and c h a r t s which he had been trained t o use, he estimated t h a t Rude was t r a v e l i n g a t approximately f i f t y m i l e s per hour before he applied h i s brakes. He concluded t h a t Neal was t r a v e l i n g a t approximately twenty-five miles per hour when he began h i s l e f t turn. H e a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n h i s opinion speed was not a f a c t o r i n t h i s accident, but t h a t it had been caused by Neal's f a i l u r e t o observe oncoming t r a f f i c and h i s f a i l u r e t o y i e l d r i g h t of way. The preceding paragraph is only a summary of t h e r a t h e r extended testimony of t h e o f f i c e r . O n t h e b a s i s of t h e e n t i r e t r a n s c r i p t , w e find t h a t Sgt. Hanson was properly q u a l i f i e d a s an expert, and was i n possession of s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s t o warrant t h e conclusions which he s t a t e d . A s t h i s Court r e c e n t l y noted i n Pachek v. Norton Concrete Co., 160 Mont. 16, 499 P.2d 766, expert opinion evidence is admissible i n explaining t h e cause of a p a r t i c u l a r accident. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d not err i n ad- m i t t i n g it here. K e r r , t h e passenger i n Neal's vehicle, a l s o appeals. H e a l l e g e s t h e following e r r o r s : 1. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t erred i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury on t h e l a w of j o i n t venture. 2. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t erred i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury t h a t a passenger's f a i l u r e t o warn h i s d r i v e r of imminent danger can be contributory negligence i n an a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h a t d r i v e r . 3 . There was i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o support a finding of Kerr's contributory negligence. The challenge t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n on j o i n t venture is not t h a t it is an i n c o r r e c t statement of t h e law, but t h a t t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o present t h e i s s u e t o t h e jury. The elements which must be present before j o i n t venture can be found have been succinctly s t a t e d i n Sumner v. Amacher, 150 Mont. 544, 554, 437 P.2d 630, where t h e Court s t a t e d : "The elements which are e s s e n t i a l t o a j o i n t venture a r e * * *: (1) an agreement, express o r implied among t h e members of t h e group; (2) a common purpose t o be c a r r i e d o u t by t h e group; ( 3 ) a community of pecuniary i n t e r e s t i n t h a t purpose among t h e members; and ( 4 ) an equal r i g h t t o a voice i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e e n t e r p r i s e , which gives an equal r i g h t of c o n t r o l . I' See a l s o , Rae v. Cameron, 1 1 2 Mont. 159, 1 1 4 P.2d 1060; Restate- ment, Torts 2d, S491, Comment (c) . Although Neal would have benefited by a finding of j o i n t venture, both by having h i s codefendant share t h e burden of a possible judgment and by using it a s a defense a g a i n s t Kerr's crossclaim, Neal t e s t i f i e d t h e r e w a s no j o i n t venture. K e r r t e s t i f i e d t h e r e was no j o i n t venture. Both Neal and K e r r denied any common purpose o r community of pecuniary i n t e r e s t i n t h e t r i p which ended i n t h e c o l l i s i o n . The only agreement expressed was t h a t Kerr agreed t o r i d e along t o "get away from m y [Kerr's] business f o r a day and enjoy t h e outing". The only evidence introduced which even remotely sug- g e s t s a community of pecuniary i n t e r e s t w a s t h a t on a t l e a s t one previous occasion, Kerr had traveled t o a construction s i t e t o see t h e type of use t h e contractor would make of trucks rented from K e r r . Although counsel f o r Rude made v a l i a n t e f f o r t s t o e l i c i t f u r t h e r information from Neal, Kerr, and business a s s o c i a t e s of K e r r , t h e r e i s simply no s u b s t a n t i a l evidence supporting a common purpose o r community of pecuniary i n t e r e s t . Accordingly, w e hold t h a t t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence, a s a matter of law, t o submit t h e i s s u e of j o i n t venture t o t h e jury. McDonough v. Smith, 86 Mont. 545, 284 P. 542; 13 Blashfield, Automobile Law and P r a c t i c e 3d 3d., § 463.3. F i n a l l y , we consider Kerr's claim of e r r o r i n t h e in- s t r u c t i o n s on t h e question of Kerr's contributory negligence and t h e sufficiency of t h e evidence t o support a finding of contrib- utory negligence. Although t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t did err i n its i n s t r u c t i o n s on driving on t h e l e f t s i d e of t h e road and on j o i n t venture, t h a t e r r o r d i d not t a i n t t h e j u r y ' s findings t h a t Rude was not negligent and N e a l was not grossly negligent. Thus K e r r cannot recover on h i s counterclaim a g a i n s t Rude i n any event. Likewise, Kerr cannot recover a g a i n s t h i s host, Neal, because t h e jury found t h a t Neal was not grossly negligent o r reckless i n h i s operation of t h e Ford under Montana's guest passenger s t a t u t e . Section 32-1113, R.C.M. 1947. This bars any recovery by Kerr a g a i n s t Neal, i r r e s p e c t i v e of Kerr's freedom from negligence. W e a f f i r m t h e judgments i n favor of Rude and Neal res- pectively on Kerr's counterclaim and crossclaim. W e dismiss Rude's claim a g a i n s t Kerr. W e vacate t h e judgment of Rude a g a i n s t Neal and remand t h a t claim t o the d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r a new t r i a l . J u s t i c e W e concur: A - >3- /' ...............................