Case Title: California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland

Citation: 

Docket Number: S234148

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2017-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
SEE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION. 
Filed 8/28/17 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
CALIFORNIA CANNABIS COALITION ) 
et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S234148 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/2 E063664 
CITY OF UPLAND et al., 
) 
 
) 
San Bernardino County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. CIVDS1503985 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Here we consider the interplay of two constitutional provisions.  First, 
sections 8 and 11 of article II of the state Constitution contain the people’s 
initiative power, which we have described as “ ‘one of the most precious rights of 
our democratic process.’ ”  (Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of 
Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 591 (Associated Home Builders); Cal. Const., 
art. II (article II), §§ 8 [statewide power], 11 [local power].)  Second, 
article XIII C — added by one of several successful initiative constitutional 
amendments concerning taxation — limits the ability of “local governments . . . to 
impose, extend, or increase any general tax.”  (Cal. Const., art. XIII C (article XIII 
C), added by initiative, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996), commonly known as Prop. 218; 
Greene v. Marin County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. (2010) 49 
Cal.4th 277, 284-285 (Greene) [summarizing the purpose of Prop. 218].)   
2 
The question before us is whether article XIII C also restricts the ability of 
voters to impose taxes via initiative.  The Court of Appeal here concluded that 
article XIII C does not constrain voters’ constitutional power to propose and adopt 
initiatives, and that under article II, section 11 and Elections Code section 9214,1 
the initiative at issue should be submitted to the voters at a special election, not at 
a general election, as article XIII C would require.  In light of the text and other 
indicia of the purpose associated with the relevant constitutional and statutory 
provisions, we agree with the Court of Appeal that article XIII C does not limit 
voters’ “power to raise taxes by statutory initiative.”  (Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. 
State Bd. of Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, 251 [reaching the same conclusion 
with regard to article XIII A of the state Constitution] (Kennedy Wholesale).)  A 
contrary conclusion would require an unreasonably broad construction of the term 
“local government” at the expense of the people’s constitutional right to direct 
democracy, undermining our longstanding and consistent view that courts should 
protect and liberally construe it.  (E.g., Associated Home Builders, supra, 18 
Cal.3d at p. 591.)  As Ulysses once tied himself to the mast so he could resist the 
Sirens’ tempting song (Homer, The Odyssey, Book XII), voters too can 
conceivably make the clear and important choice to bind themselves by making it 
more difficult to enact initiatives in the future.  The electorate made no such clear 
choice to tie itself to the mast here.  Without a direct reference in the text of a 
provision — or a similarly clear, unambiguous indication that it was within the 
ambit of a provision’s purpose to constrain the people’s initiative power –– we 
will not construe a provision as imposing such a limitation.  (See Kennedy 
Wholesale, at p. 252.)  We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment.   
                                              
1  
Subsequent unlabeled statutory references are to the Elections Code. 
3 
I. 
 
The California Cannabis Coalition is a nonprofit corporation that drafted 
the medical marijuana initiative at issue here in 2014.2  The initiative proposed 
to repeal an existing City of Upland (City) ordinance banning medical marijuana 
dispensaries; to adopt regulations permitting and establishing standards for the 
operation of up to three dispensaries within the City; and to require that each 
dispensary pay the City an “annual Licensing and Inspection fee” in the amount of 
$75,000.   
 
In September 2014, initiative proponents Nicole De La Rosa and James 
Velez3 filed a notice of their intent to circulate the initiative petition (§ 9202), and 
the city attorney prepared a ballot title and summary (§ 9203).  The petition 
plaintiffs circulated included a request that the initiative be considered by voters at 
a special election.  At least 15 percent of the City’s registered voters signed the 
petition, meeting the statutory threshold for triggering consideration of the 
initiative (§ 9214), and the City accepted a certificate of sufficiency from the San 
Bernardino County Registrar of Voters on February 9, 2015.  At that point, section 
9214 obliged the City to either (1) adopt the initiative without alteration; 
(2) immediately order a special election; or (3) order an agency report and, once 
the report was presented, adopt the initiative or order a special election.  
(Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 
1029, 1033 (Tuolumne Jobs); see §§ 1405 [time for special election], 9212 
[referral to city agency for report].)  The City elected to order an agency report. 
 
Various city departments thereafter prepared a joint agency report.  Among 
other things, the report concluded that the $75,000 “fee” for the initiative would 
                                              
2  
We base this discussion of the facts on the Court of Appeal’s opinion. 
3  
We refer to De La Rosa, Velez, and the California Cannabis Coalition 
collectively as “plaintiffs.” 
4 
exceed the costs incurred from issuing a license to and conducting annual 
inspections of the dispensaries.  The report estimated actual costs to be slightly 
more than $15,000 and found the excess amount of the fee to constitute a general 
tax.  As such, the report determined that the initiative could not be voted on during 
a special election as required by section 9214, but rather, under article XIII C, 
section 2, had to be submitted to the voters at the next general election.4  On 
March 9, 2015, the city council received the agency report and adopted a 
resolution consistent with the report’s conclusions.  The city council also provided 
notice and direction for submitting the initiative to the voters on November 8, 
2016, the next general election. 
 
Plaintiffs then filed a petition for writ of mandate in superior court.  They 
alleged that the City violated section 9214 by failing to submit the initiative to the 
voters at a special election.5  They also argued that article XIII C, section 2 did not 
apply because the $75,000 charge proposed by the initiative was not a tax, nor was 
it imposed by local government.  The court denied the writ petition, determining 
that the charge constituted a tax and had to be placed on the next general election 
ballot.  The court, however, did not specifically address whether article XIII C, 
section 2 applies to taxes imposed by voter initiative. 
 
Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed.  The court held that 
article XIII C, section 2 only governs levies that are imposed by local government 
                                              
4  
Article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (b) prohibits a local government from 
imposing a general tax unless the tax is first submitted to and approved by the 
voters at an election “consolidated with a regularly scheduled general election for 
members of the governing body of the local government.” 
5  
Plaintiffs also alleged that the City’s true motivation in declaring the charge 
a general tax was its opposition to medical marijuana dispensaries. 
 
 
5 
and, therefore, it does not apply to the voter initiative at issue here.6  Moreover, 
the court noted that the people’s initiative power must be protected and construed 
liberally, with doubts resolved in favor of its exercise whenever possible.  (E.g., 
Rossi v. Brown (1995) 9 Cal.4th 688, 695 (Rossi); Associated Home Builders, 
supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591.)  The court determined that neither the text nor the 
history of article XIII C contains any evidence that the enactors’ intended purpose 
included constraining future voters’ ability to raise taxes via statutory initiative.  
The court accordingly directed the superior court to issue a writ of mandate 
compelling the City to place the initiative on a special ballot in accordance with 
section 9214. 
We granted the City’s petition for review on June 29, 2016.  On November 
8, 2016, the initiative at issue was submitted to the voters and defeated, with 64.38 
percent voting no.7  While the case is thus technically moot, it nonetheless 
presents important questions of continuing public interest that may evade review.  
(Peterson v. City of San Diego (1983) 34 Cal.3d 225, 227.)  We therefore exercise 
our discretion to retain the matter and address the issues.8  (People v. Carbajal 
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120, fn. 5.) 
II.   
We apply similar principles when construing constitutional provisions and 
statutes, including those enacted through voter initiative.  (Silicon Valley 
Taxpayers’ Assn., Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44 
                                              
6  
In light of its holding, the Court of Appeal did not address whether the 
$75,000 charge is a fee.   
7  
(San Bernardino County Registrar of Voters, Elections Office, City of 
Upland, Measure U  
[as of Aug. 28, 2017].) 
8  
Moreover, we note that neither party has sought dismissal on mootness 
grounds. 
6 
Cal.4th 431, 444.)  Our primary concern is giving effect to the intended purpose of 
the provisions at issue.  (Id. at p. 448 [explaining that we construe provisions “in a 
manner that effectuates the [enactors’] purpose in adopting the law”].)  In doing 
so, we first analyze provisions’ text in their relevant context, which is typically the 
best and most reliable indicator of purpose.  (Larkin v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals 
Bd. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 152, 157; Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 
Cal.4th 310, 321 [when interpreting voter initiatives, “ ‘we begin with the text’ ”].)  
We start by ascribing to words their ordinary meaning, while taking account of 
related provisions and the structure of the relevant statutory and constitutional 
scheme.  (Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court (2016) 39 
Cal.5th 282, 293; Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil (2006) 39 Cal.4th 
205, 212 (Bighorn).)  If the provisions’ intended purpose nonetheless remains 
opaque, we may consider extrinsic sources, such as an initiative’s ballot materials.  
(Larkin, at p. 158.)  Moreover, when construing initiatives, we generally presume 
electors are aware of existing law.  (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890, 
fn. 11 (Lance W.).)  Finally, we apply independent judgment when construing 
constitutional and statutory provisions.  (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Board 
of Equalization (2013) 57 Cal.4th 401, 416.) 
A. 
The people’s initiative power is contained in article II, sections 8 and 11.  
The former section provides, “The initiative is the power of the electors to propose 
statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them.”  (Art. II, 
§ 8, subd. (a).)  The latter contains the local power, providing that “[i]nitiative and 
referendum powers may be exercised by the electors of each city or county under 
procedures that the Legislature shall provide.”  (Id., § 11, subd. (a).)  In Associated 
Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d 582, we briefly described the history and 
longstanding judicial interpretation of the initiative power.   
7 
The state Constitution was amended to include the initiative power in 1911.  
The Constitution “speak[s] of the initiative and referendum, not as a right granted 
the people, but as a power reserved by them.”  (Associated Home Builders, supra, 
18 Cal.3d at p. 591.)  Since then, courts have consistently declared it their duty to 
“ ‘jealously guard’ ” and liberally construe the right so that it “ ‘be not improperly 
annulled.’ ”  (Ibid.; see, e.g., Perry v. Brown (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1116, 1140.)  
Moreover, when weighing the tradeoffs associated with the initiative power, we 
have acknowledged the obligation to resolve doubts in favor of the exercise of the 
right whenever possible.  (Associated Home Builders, at p. 591.)  We more 
recently explained that the enactment of the initiative power was sparked by 
“dissatisfaction with the then governing public officials and a widespread belief 
that the people had lost control of the political process.”  (Perry, at p. 1140.)  Its 
purpose, in effect, was empowering voters to propose and adopt provisions “that 
their elected public officials had refused or declined to adopt.”  (Id. at p. 1140.) 
When the right of initiative was grafted onto the Constitution, the 
Legislature also enacted statutory procedures for city and county voters to exercise 
the right.  (Tuolumne Jobs, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1042, citing Stats. 1911, Ex. 
Sess. 1911, ch. 33, § 1, pp. 131-132.)  Most relevant here is section 9214, the 
current statute setting forth a local government’s duty with respect to initiatives 
whose proponents request a special election.  The provision requires the city 
government, upon receipt of a petition signed by not less than 15 percent of the 
city’s voters, to (1) adopt the ordinance without alteration; (2) immediately order a 
special election; or (3) order an agency report and, once the report is presented to 
the city council, adopt the ordinance or order a special election.  (§ 9214; 
Tuolumne Jobs, at p. 1033.)  Section 9212 requires that an agency report be 
presented to the city council no later than 30 days after the initiative petition has 
been certified as having the sufficient number of signatures.  (§ 9212, subd. (b).)  
8 
And section 1405 generally requires that the special election “be held not less than 
88 nor more than 103 days after the date of the order of election.”  (§ 1405, 
subd. (a).)  Collectively, the intended purpose of these statutes is to require “public 
officials to act expeditiously on initiatives.”  (Tuolumne Jobs, at p. 1037.) 
Against this constitutional and statutory backdrop, we have held that the 
people’s power to propose and adopt initiatives is at least as broad as the 
legislative power wielded by the Legislature and local governments.  (See, e.g., 
Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 
Cal.4th 220, 253 (Guardino) [discussing statewide right to initiative]; DeVita v. 
County of Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 775 (DeVita) [discussing local right to 
initiative]; Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 696 [noting “local initiative power may be 
even broader than the initiative power reserved in the Constitution”].)  When 
voters exercise the initiative power, they do so subject to precious few limits on 
that power.9  (Rossi, at p. 695.)  Moreover, we have explained that procedural 
requirements imposed on the Legislature and local governments do not similarly 
constrain the electorate’s initiative power without evidence that such was their 
intended purpose.  (E.g., DeVita, at p. 785 [“existence of procedural requirements 
for the adoptions of local ordinances generally does not imply a restriction of the 
power of initiative”]; Associated Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 588, 593-
596.)  In Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pages 251 to 252, for example, 
we held that the constitutional requirement that the Legislature obtain a two-thirds 
vote before raising taxes (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 3) is a requirement that does 
not apply to voters’ initiative power. 
                                              
9  
The most often invoked limitation is the single-subject requirement.  (Art. 
II, § 8, subd. (d); see also art. II, §§ 8, subds. (e) & (f), 11, subds. (b) & (c), 12 
[containing other narrow limitations]; see Elec. Code, § 9218 [prohibiting two 
special municipal elections on the same subject matter within a 12-month period].) 
9 
Just how that power relates to taxation was the subject of our holding in 
Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th 688, which concerned a city ordinance added by voter 
initiative.  When the statewide initiative power was originally adopted, we 
observed, “taxation was not only a permitted subject for the initiative, but was an 
intended object of that power.”  (Id. at p. 699.)  We found evidence of that purpose 
in the history of the measure that added the initiative power in 1911, the 
contemporary understanding of the measure, and statements made by the 
measure’s drafter and leading proponent.  (Ibid.)  We also considered subsequent 
unsuccessful attempts to amend the initiative power “to exclude measures related 
to taxation,” efforts that “would have been unnecessary if tax-related measures 
were not permissible subjects of the initiative.”  (Ibid.; see id. at pp. 699-702.)  
There is no restriction, we concluded, “on the use of the initiative in the area of 
taxation.”  (Id. at p. 702.)  That is, electors may “use the initiative process to 
prospectively adopt or annul (repeal) statutes imposing taxes.”  (Ibid.; id. at 
p. 696.)   
Whether the context involves taxation or not, all of these cases underscore 
how courts preserve and liberally construe the public’s statewide and local 
initiative power.  Indeed, we resolve doubts about the scope of the initiative power 
in its favor whenever possible (Associated Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at 
p. 591), and we narrowly construe provisions that would burden or limit the 
exercise of that power (see Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 696; see also DeVita, 
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 781).  It is against this backdrop that we consider whether 
article XIII C, section 2 applies when voters seek to impose taxes via initiative.10 
                                              
10  
Article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e) defines “ ‘tax’ ” as “any levy, 
charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government,” with certain 
exceptions.  (Italics added.)  In light of our conclusion that article XIII C, section 2 
does not apply to voter initiatives, our use of the word “tax” throughout this 
 
10 
B. 
Article XIII C was added by Proposition 218, an initiative constitutional 
amendment adopted at the 1996 general election.  Article XIII C, section 2, 
subdivision (b) provides, “No local government may impose, extend, or increase 
any general tax unless and until that tax is submitted to the electorate and 
approved by a majority vote. . . . The election required by this subdivision shall be 
consolidated with a regularly scheduled general election for members of the 
governing body of the local government . . . .”  Despite no mention of voter 
initiatives, the City and the concurring and dissenting opinion (conc. & dis. opn., 
post, at pp. 1-2) contend this provision nonetheless applies to such instruments 
and, notwithstanding section 9214, requires that initiatives imposing, extending, or 
increasing a general tax must first be submitted to the electorate at a regularly 
scheduled general election, rather than a special election.  We disagree.   
By its terms, article XIII C, section 2 only applies to actions taken by a 
“local government.”  To cabin uncertainty about what “local government” 
connotes, article XIII C then defines the term to mean “any county, city, city and 
county, including a charter city or county, any special district, or any other local or 
regional governmental entity.”  (Id., § 1, subd. (b).)  The crux of the City’s 
argument is that this definition is broad enough to include the electorate.  (See 
conc. & dis. opn., post, pp. 4-5.)  It is true enough that in the contemporary 
understanding of our democracy, governmental entities exist to serve the public, 
and not the other way around.  (See art. II, § 1 [“[g]overnment is instituted for [the 
people’s] protection, security, and benefit”].)  But this important principle does 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
opinion is meant not as the term is defined in subdivision (e), but as it is 
commonly understood.  
11 
not, in the abstract or in the context of the laws at issue in this case, imply that we 
should assume the public and the governmental entity corresponding to where the 
public resides to be one and the same.  While one understanding of a city or 
comparable jurisdiction might blur the distinction between its residents, electorate, 
and government (e.g., American Heritage Dict. of the English Language (4th ed. 
2000) p. 339 [“city” includes “[t]he inhabitants of a city considered as a group”]; 
conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 5 [“city . . . refers to the municipal corporation and 
body politic”]), such an interpretation is unpersuasive –– at least in this context —
 and a survey of rationales specific to this provision, as well as broader principles 
in our jurisprudence, shows why.   
First, the common understanding of local government does not readily lend 
itself to include the electorate, instead generally referring to a locality’s governing 
body, public officials, and bureaucracy.11  (See Bighorn, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 
p. 212 [using term’s ordinary meaning]; see also Black’s Law Dict. (4th ed. 1951) 
p. 824 [defining “local government” as “[t]he government or administration of a 
particular locality; especially, the governmental authority of a municipal 
corporation, as a city or county, over its local and individual affairs”].)  Arguing to 
                                              
11  
The City argues that the separate use of the term “governing body” in article 
XIII C, section 2, subdivision (b) demonstrates that local government means 
something more than a city council.  We agree.  But the existence of a distinction 
between a local government and its governing body does not mean that local 
government must therefore include the electorate, any more than separate references 
to, say, the California Environmental Protection Agency and its top official imply the 
absence of a meaningful distinction between the agency and the public it serves.  Nor 
can we ignore the distinction between the electorate and the governmental entities 
identified in article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (b).  Consistent with its statutory 
definition here and its usage elsewhere in our law, the term “local government” 
plausibly refers to the entire organization constituting the local or regional 
governmental entity in question — including its bureaucracy and its corporate form 
— and not simply a locality’s elected officials.  (E.g., Banning Ranch Conservancy v. 
City of Newport Beach (2017) 2 Cal.5th 918, 925 [“every local government in the 
coastal zone must submit a local coastal program for Coastal Commission approval” 
(italics added)].)  
12 
the contrary, the concurring and dissenting opinion relies on In re Pfahler (1906) 
150 Cal. 71 (Pfahler), a 111-year-old case cited by none of the briefs.  (Conc. & 
dis. opn., post, at pp. 5-7.)  But that case considered whether a constitutional 
provision conferring local legislative power on “[a]ny county, city, town, or 
township” precluded a city’s charter from authorizing voters to exercise the city’s 
power via initiative.  (Pfahler, at p. 81.)  Answering in the negative, we explained 
that legislative power is not inherently reserved to representative assemblies.  (Id. 
at p. 83.)  We did not suggest, however, that the terms “local government” and 
“electorate” are equivalent or not meaningfully distinguishable, particularly when 
considering whether explicit restrictions on the former should impliedly be 
imposed on the latter.  (See id. at p. 87 [distinguishing between actions of a city 
council and electors].)12 
Moreover, construing local government as an entity distinct from the public 
is consistent not only with how the term is used in the provision’s text, but also 
with how it is used in its findings and declarations.  (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. 
(Nov. 5, 1996) text of Prop. 218, p. 108 [“This measure protects taxpayers by 
limiting the methods by which local governments exact revenue from taxpayers” 
(italics added)]; see also Orange Citizens for Parks & Recreation v. Superior 
Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 141, 154 [“The Governor’s Office of Planning and 
Research encourages local governments to structure their procedures to facilitate 
public involvement . . . .” (italics added)].)  Contrary to the concurring and 
dissenting opinion (conc. & dis. opn., post, at pp. 2, 5, 8), this understanding also 
                                              
12  
Of course, in the 111 years since we decided Pfahler, California has borne 
witness to significant developments affecting the extent and significance of the 
initiative power.  The 1906 earthquake occurred months before Pfahler was issued 
— and a political earthquake in the form of the constitutional initiative power 
followed five years later.  Since then, we have spilt much ink regarding the nature 
and scope of direct democracy in this state. 
 
 
13 
proves compatible with section 9200, which provides that “[o]rdinances may be 
enacted by and for any incorporated city,” encompassing situations where the 
electorate enacts an ordinance, via initiative, for the city.    
Second, the only portion of article XIII C even mentioning the voters’ 
direct democracy rights appears in section 3.  (Art. XIII C, § 3 [citing art. II, §§ 8 
& 9, respectively the people’s initiative and referendum powers].)  The concurring 
and dissenting opinion (conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 9) concludes this language 
means the voters knew the initiative power could affect local taxes and, further, 
must mean voters intended to (silently) subsume tax-related initiatives within the 
ambit of article XIII C, section 2.  But section 3’s single reference to the initiative 
power proves, at best, too slender a reed to support the substantial limitations that 
the City and the concurring and dissenting opinion would have us read into 
Proposition 218’s provisions.  If anything, the reference in section 3 makes the 
omission of any limitations on the initiative power in section 2 –– or anywhere 
else in article XIII C –– even more glaring.  To infer from that absence a 
calculated decision to squelch voters’ initiative rights is essentially to embrace a 
presumption against the initiative power, rather than in favor of it.  Such a 
conclusion would be profoundly at odds with our obligation to “ ‘jealously guard’ 
” the voters’ exercise of their initiative power.  (Associated Home Builders, supra, 
18 Cal.3d at p. 591.)  Confronted with the text of article XIII C, a reasonable 
reader would be unlikely to infer that Proposition 218 was designed to regulate the 
initiative power through an explicit reference in section 3 and an implicit one in 
section 2. 
Third, even if it were conceivably possible to treat the term “local 
government” in article XIII C as an unusually oblique reference to the voters who 
comprise the relevant electorate, the difficulty in accepting this inference ratchets 
up given how the definition of “local government” closes with the phrase, “or any 
14 
other local or regional governmental entity.”  (Art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (b).)  That 
the elected officials and civil servants more commonly understood to be part of a 
local government can be surprised by the actions of the voters they serve belies the 
idea that the amalgam of individuals who constitute the electorate comprise a local 
or regional governmental entity. 
What’s more, the principle of ejusdem generis suggests that when “specific 
words follow general words in a statute or vice versa,” the general words 
ordinarily are best construed in a manner that underscores their similarity to the 
specific words.  (International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers, 
Local 21, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 319, 342.)  Interpreting 
“city” to include the electorate would give that term a much broader meaning than 
the adjoining specific term, “local or regional governmental entity.”  (Art. XIII C, 
§ 1, subd. (b).)  Thus, our interpretation of local government is consistent with the 
ordinary understanding of the term, the text of related provisions, and the ejusdem 
generis principle.  By contrast, the interpretation of the City and the concurring 
and dissenting opinion would require us to insert words — such as “electorate,” 
“voters,” or “people” –– into section 1, subdivision (b) and section 2, subdivision 
(b) of article XIII C.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1858 [“In the construction of a 
statute or instrument, the office of the Judge is simply to ascertain and declare 
what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been 
omitted . . .”].)    
Our interpretation is also consistent with article XIII D of the state 
Constitution, which, like article XIII C, was added by Proposition 218.  (Greene, 
supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 285.)  Article XIII D addresses the imposition of 
assessments and property-related fees by local agencies, and section 4 of that 
article contains a variety of procedural requirements that must be fulfilled before 
an “agency” may adopt an assessment (Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 4 [e.g., notice 
15 
and hearing requirements].)  Article XIII D defines agency as “any local 
government as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1 of [article XIII C].”  (Id., 
§ 2, subd. (a).)  Under the City’s interpretation then, “agency” in article XIII D 
also includes voters — an understanding that seems, at best, quite an improbable 
version of what was plausibly contemplated when this provision was enacted. 
The alternative is to treat the term “local government” as encompassing the 
entire coterie of individuals constituting the electorate –– thus burdening voters’ 
power to propose and adopt initiatives concerning taxation.  (Rossi, supra, 9 
Cal.4th at p. 702.)  If this quite significant consequence were consistent with the 
most reasonable understanding of Proposition 218’s purpose despite the absence 
of text in articles XIII C or D bolstering this view, one would assume there would 
be some mention of such a goal elsewhere in Proposition 218 or its ballot 
materials.  (Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc. (2001) 531 U.S. 457, 468 
[enactors do not “hide elephants in mouseholes”]; see Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 
53 Cal.3d at p. 250.)  The City and the concurring and dissenting opinion cite no 
such evidence.  Nor can we find any.  To the contrary:  The crux of the concern 
repeatedly reflected in the ballot materials is with local governments and 
politicians –– not the electorate –– imposing taxes.  Nowhere in the materials is 
there any suggestion that Proposition 218 would rescue voters from measures they 
might, through a majority vote, impose on themselves. 
For example, Proposition 218’s findings and declarations state, “local 
governments have subjected taxpayers to excessive tax, assessment, fee and 
charge increases . . . . This measure protects taxpayers by limiting the methods by 
which local governments exact revenue from taxpayers without their consent.”  
(Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996) text of Prop. 218, p. 108, italics added 
(1996 Ballot Pamp.).)  The ballot materials are in accord.  The argument in favor 
of the measure, for example, stated that it “does NOT prevent government from 
16 
raising and spending money for vital services. . . .  If politicians want to raise 
taxes they need only convince local voters that new taxes are really needed.”  
(1996 Ballot Pamp., supra, argument in favor of Prop. 218, p. 76, italics added; 
id., rebuttal to argument against Prop. 218, p. 77 [“Proposition 218 simply gives 
taxpayers the right to vote on taxes and stops politicians’ end-runs around 
Proposition 13” (italics added)].)13  In short, these materials indicate both that 
article XIII C employs the term “local government” as it is commonly understood 
and that the provision’s intended purpose did not include limiting voters’ “power 
to raise taxes . . . by statutory initiative.”14  (See Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 
Cal.3d at p. 250.) 
This reading finds further support in the ballot materials concerning two 
related initiative constitutional amendments:  Proposition 13, which added article 
XIII A in 1978, and Proposition 26, which amended article XIII C in 2010.  The 
ballot materials concerning both initiatives similarly evince a specific concern 
with politicians and their imposition of taxes without voter approval.  (E.g., Ballot 
Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 6, 1978) rebuttal to argument against Prop. 13, p. 59 
[“We must not let the spendthrift politicians continue to tax us into poverty” 
(italics added)]; Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2010) argument in 
                                              
13  
The concurring and dissenting opinion (conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 10) 
cites other statements discussing the electorate’s right to vote on taxes and on local 
government’s actions.  The opinion rightly focuses on the purpose of article 
XIII C.  (E.g., conc. & dis. opn., post, at pp. 2, 6 [highlighting the “stated 
purposes” of Prop. 218], 10 [emphasizing the provision’s “overarching purpose”].)  
But it identifies no evidence or other reason to conclude that the provision 
encompasses the imposition of taxes by the electorate via initiative. 
14  
The City identifies another purpose of requiring that general taxes only be 
considered during regularly scheduled general elections.  It contends that this 
requirement forces politicians to face the voters at the same time as any tax 
proposal he or she may have supported or to answer questions about the 
politicians’ stance on tax measures.  But such a purpose makes limited sense in the 
context of taxes imposed by voter initiatives. 
17 
favor of Prop. 26, p. 60 [“STOP POLITICIANS FROM ENACTING HIDDEN 
TAXES” (italics added)]; ibid. [“[l]ocal politicians have been calling taxes ‘fees’ 
so they can bypass voters” (italics added)]; ibid. [“Proposition 26 requires 
politicians to meet the same vote requirements to pass these Hidden Taxes” (italics 
added)].)  All of this is more evidence that the drafters of these propositions, like 
the drafters of Proposition 218, simply did not contemplate that they were 
affecting the power of voters to propose taxes via initiatives.  (See Jacks v. City of 
Santa Barbara (2017) 3 Cal.5th 248, 258-260 [discussing relationship between the 
various propositions]; see also Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 250 
[“Nothing in the official ballot pamphlet supports the inference that the voters 
intended to limit their own power to raise taxes in the future by statutory 
initiative”].)15      
What the City contends in the alternative is that, even if “local government” 
does not directly encompass the electorate, article XIII C, section 2, subdivision 
(b) indirectly applies to voters for two reasons.  The City contends it applies to the 
electorate because, in the City’s view, the voters are the ones who ultimately 
impose every local tax.  The City notes that, under the provision, no local 
government may impose a general tax “unless and until” (art. XIII C, § 2, 
subd. (b)) the tax is submitted to the voters and approved by a majority vote.  For 
support the City cites Guardino, supra, 11 Cal.4th 220.  But in that case, we 
                                              
15  
The concurring and dissenting opinion posits that the ballot materials’ 
repeated reference to “politicians,” and silence regarding voter initiatives, simply 
reflects that “most local tax increases have, indeed, been initiated by elected 
officials.”  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 10.)  That is certainly one possibility.  
Another more plausible one is that the silence with regard to initiatives reflects 
that the drafters either were not concerned with initiatives proposing taxes — 
perhaps because such was a rare or unheard of occurrence or because such would 
constitute an expression of direct democracy — or they simply did not have that 
issue in mind. 
 
18 
simply noted that a local government’s imposition of a general tax “will not take 
effect” absent subsequent approval by the voters — in other words, the voters’ 
approval acts as a precondition (id. at p. 240) to a tax measure becoming 
operative.  But that does not transform voters into the “local government” 
referenced in article XIII C, section 2.  Nor does it mean it is always and only the 
electorate that imposes a tax.  Suppose a constitutional provision required that no 
city council could impose a zoning restriction unless and until the restriction was 
submitted to and approved by the city attorney.  Does that mean that it is the city 
attorney –– and not the city council –– that actually imposes zoning restrictions?  
No.    
The City also argues that article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (b) 
constrains voter initiatives because “statutory and constitutional limits on the 
power of local government apply equally to local initiatives.”  The City primarily 
relies on Legislature v. Deukmejian (1983) 34 Cal.3d 658, but that case offers the 
City no support.  It involved a statutory initiative that proposed to adjust state 
legislative and congressional district boundaries after the Legislature had already 
engaged in decennial redistricting.  (Id. at p. 663.)  Noting that the state 
Constitution prohibited the Legislature from redistricting more than once per 
decade (id. at p. 668), we concluded that the initiative was impermissible (id. at 
p. 663).  We explained that “the power of the people through the statutory 
initiative is coextensive with the power of the Legislature.”  (Id. at p. 675.)  Yet, as 
we later indicated, Legislature v. Deukmejian simply stands for the proposition 
that “neither the Legislature nor the voters may enact a law of a nature that 
exceeds a limitation on the state’s lawmaking power.”  (Kennedy Wholesale, 
supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 252; DeVita, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 776 [discussing local 
initiatives].)  By contrast, procedural requirements imposed on the Legislature or 
local governments are presumed not to apply to the initiative power absent 
19 
evidence that such was the intended purpose of the requirements.  (DeVita, at 
p. 776; Kennedy Wholesale, at p. 252.)  To illustrate:  When a local government 
lacks authority to legislate in an area, perhaps because the state has occupied the 
field (e.g., American Financial Services Assn. v. City of Oakland (2005) 34 
Cal.4th 1239, 1252 [predatory lending practices]), that limitation also applies to 
the people’s local initiative power.  (DeVita, at p. 776.)  In contrast, where 
legislative bodies retain lawmaking authority subject to procedural limitations, 
e.g., notice and hearing requirements (Associated Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d 
at p. 594) or two-thirds vote requirements (Kennedy Wholesale, at p. 251), we 
presume such limitations do not apply to the initiative power absent evidence that 
such was the restrictions’ intended purpose.  (DeVita, at p. 785; Kennedy 
Wholesale, at p. 252.) 
The concurring and dissenting opinion interprets these cases more 
narrowly, as applying exclusively when the procedural requirements at issue are 
“incompatible with initiative procedures.”  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at pp. 14-15.)  
Yet this reading proves too cramped an understanding of these cases’ holdings or 
their significance.  While our cases noted that the restrictions at issue made little 
sense in light of the distinct initiative process (e.g., Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 
Cal.3d at p. 252, fn. 5 [“electorate does not generally follow ‘legislative’ 
procedures when exercising the initiative power”]), nothing suggests those 
observations formed the metes and bounds of our holding.  To the contrary, our 
reasoning was broader and grew out of our presumption in favor of the initiative 
power.  (E.g., DeVita, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 785 [“it is well established in our 
case law that the existence of procedural requirements for the adoptions of local 
ordinances generally does not imply a restriction of the power of initiative or 
referendum”], 786 [this “rule is a corollary to the basic presumption in favor of the 
electorate’s power of initiative and referendum”].)  
20 
Taking account of this legal context, along with the relevant provision’s 
text and other indicia of purpose, we conclude that the requirement in article XIII 
C, section 2, subdivision (b) — mandating that general taxes be submitted to the 
voters at a regularly scheduled general election — applies only to local 
governments and not to the electorate’s initiative power without evidence that 
such was the intended purpose of the requirement.  The City cites no such 
evidence, because there is none here. 
Indeed, as we observed in Kennedy Wholesale, 53 Cal.3d at page 252, when 
an initiative’s intended purpose includes imposing requirements on voters, 
evidence of such a purpose is clear.  In article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (d), 
for example, the enactors adopted a requirement providing that, before a local 
government can impose, extend, or increase any special tax, voters must approve 
the tax by a two-thirds vote.  That constitutes a higher vote requirement than 
would otherwise apply.  (§ 9217 [providing for a majority vote].)  That the voters 
explicitly imposed a procedural two-thirds vote requirement on themselves in 
article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (d) is evidence that they did not implicitly 
impose a procedural timing requirement in subdivision (b).  (See Kennedy 
Wholesale, at p. 252.)  Moreover, had the voters wanted the procedural 
requirements contained in article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (b) to apply to the 
initiative power, Proposition 218 could have made that clear by providing, “No 
local government or initiative may impose, extend, or increase . . . ,” by defining 
local government to include the electorate exercising its initiative power, or by 
imposing an absolute ban, i.e., “No general tax shall be imposed, extended, or 
increased . . . .”  (See Kennedy Wholesale, at p. 253 [discussing similar language 
in Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 1, subd. (a)].)  The voters did not do so, and we will 
not infer such a purpose.  (Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 694; Kennedy Wholesale, at 
p. 252 [“ ‘Where the electorate has demonstrated the ability to make their intent 
21 
clear, it is not the province of this court to imply an intent left unexpressed’ ”].)  
Particularly because, given that article XIII C was enacted via initiative 
constitutional amendment, its enactors were certainly well aware of the initiative 
power.  (Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 890, fn. 11.)       
The City offers a final reason for applying article XIII C, section 2, 
subdivision (b) to the electorate here.  It contends that the term “impose” in that 
provision includes the collection of taxes by a local government, so subdivision 
(b) precludes the City from collecting a general tax imposed via initiative unless 
and until the tax is approved by the voters at a regularly scheduled election.  Not 
so.  The Court of Appeal in this case concluded that the ordinary meaning of 
“impose” is “to establish,” not to collect (e.g., Ponderosa Homes, Inc. v. City of 
San Ramon (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1761, 1770, citing Webster’s 3d New Internat. 
Dict. (1970) p. 1136), and because it found no reason to depart from this 
understanding of the term, it construed the meaning of “impose” in article XIII C, 
section 2, subdivision (b) as consistent with this understanding.  We agree.  
Indeed, in Guardino, supra, 11 Cal.4th 220, we interpreted nearly identical 
language and reached the same conclusion.  In that case, we construed a statute 
added by Proposition 62, a statutory initiative adopted at the 1986 general election.  
The relevant language provided, “No local government or district may impose any 
special tax unless and until such special tax is submitted to the electorate . . .” 
(Gov. Code, § 53722), and we explained that “impose” “in this context means 
enacted.”  (Guardino, at p. 240; see Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of 
Riverside (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 679, 681-682 [using “impose” and “enact” 
interchangeably when discussing Proposition 218]; see also Weisblat v. City of San 
Diego (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1034 [same with regard to Prop. 13].)  This 
is also consistent with usage in the relevant ballot materials.  (E.g., 1996 Ballot 
22 
Pamp., supra, analysis of Prop. 218 by the Legis. Analyst, p. 73 [using “create,” 
“establish,” and “impose” interchangeably].)16   
The City then seeks to bolster its argument for equating “impose” with 
“collect” by relying on Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra (2001) 
25 Cal.4th 809.  There we construed Proposition 62 for purposes of determining 
when the statute of limitations began to run on the plaintiffs’ action against the 
city for wrongfully “imposing and collecting a general tax.”  (Howard Jarvis, at 
p. 812.)  What we concluded is that the ongoing collection of the tax at issue 
constituted a continuing injury but, in reaching that conclusion, we relied on 
language stating that taxes imposed prior to the measure’s enactment “shall 
continue to be imposed only if approved by a majority vote of the voters.”  (Gov. 
Code, § 53727, subd. (b); Howard Jarvis, at p. 823; see also Gov. Code, § 53728 
[providing a remedy when a government continues to collect an unauthorized 
tax].)  We explained that, “[c]learly, in this provision, ‘imposition’ is not limited 
                                              
16  
Indeed, a critical aspect of our analysis involves understanding what 
“impose” means in the context of article XIII C.  The concurring and dissenting 
opinion conveniently assumes its conclusions about this term by concluding in 
effect that only local governments can impose taxes because, administratively, 
only local governments can collect and spend them.  (E.g., conc. & dis. opn., post, 
at pp. 2 [“A tax passed by voter initiative, no less than a tax passed by vote of the 
city council, is a tax of the local government, to be collected by the local 
government, to raise revenue for the local government”], 4 [“A local government 
tax is a local government tax, no matter how it may have been legislated into 
being”].)  Here, “impose” most plausibly means to establish or enact, and article 
XIII C, section 2 applies only if it is the local government doing so.  The 
concurring and dissenting opinion emphasizes that when the electorate exercises 
its initiative power, it is acting in a legislative capacity.  (E.g., conc. & dis. opn., 
post, at pp. 4-5.)  No doubt.  But that is not sufficient to establish that the 
electorate is indistinguishable from representative politicians for the purposes of 
triggering article XIII C, section 2, particularly when that provision gives no 
indication whatsoever that it was designed to interfere with the exercise of the 
initiative power.           
23 
to the time of initial enactment . . .” and Proposition 62’s intended purpose extends 
to cover “continued imposition or collection of [an unauthorized] tax as well.”  
(Howard Jarvis, at pp. 823-824, italics added.)  So Howard Jarvis is inapposite.17 
C. 
Given the language and other indicia of intended purpose for article XIII C, 
section 2, subdivision (b), we conclude the provision’s requirements apply only 
when a local government seeks to impose, extend, or increase a general tax.  (See 
DeVita, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 785.)  By contrast, its requirement that a general tax 
be submitted to the voters at a general election does not apply to taxes that are 
imposed by initiative after securing the electorate’s approval in a manner 
consistent with section 9214.  (See Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.4th at 
pp. 251-252.)  A contrary conclusion would work an implied repeal of 
section 9214, something against which we have a strong presumption.  (E.g., 
Tuolumne Jobs, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1039 [noting we will find an implied repeal 
only where there is no way to reconcile the two provisions].)   
Without an unambiguous indication that a provision’s purpose was to 
constrain the initiative power, we will not construe it to impose such limitations.  
Such evidence might include an explicit reference to the initiative power in a 
provision’s text, or sufficiently unambiguous statements regarding such a purpose 
in ballot materials.  The concurring and dissenting opinion queries “ ‘by what 
                                              
17  
Although the City does not cite the provision, we note that article XIII C, 
section 2, subdivision (c) provides, “Any general tax imposed, extended, or 
increased, without voter approval, by any local government on or after January 1, 
1995, and prior to the effective date of this article, shall continue to be imposed 
only if approved by a majority vote of the voters voting in an election on the issue 
of the imposition . . . .”  But this language does not alter our conclusion since, 
here, the tax would only have been imposed if a majority of the voters had voted 
for it. 
24 
authority’ ” we require clear evidence of an intended purpose to constrain exercise 
of the initiative power.  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 14.)  Our answer is rooted 
firmly in the longstanding and consistent line of cases emphasizing courts’ 
obligation to protect and liberally construe the initiative power (e.g., Associated 
Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591) and to narrowly construe provisions 
that would burden or limit its exercise (see, e.g., Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at 
p. 696).18  Those cases underscore the centrality of direct democracy in the 
California Constitution, and the status of our presumption liberally construing the 
initiative power as a paramount structural element of our Constitution.  (E.g., 
Associated Home Builders, at p. 591 [describing the initiative as “ ‘one of the most 
precious rights of our democratic process’ ”].)  A clear statement rule is consistent 
with, and indeed, appropriately advances our duty to safeguard the exercise of the 
initiative power.  Although limits may be placed on it, and in some cases they 
have been, the best way to implement our oft-repeated references to the 
importance of the initiative is to avoid presuming that a provision constrains that 
power without a clear statement or equivalent evidence that such was the 
provision’s intended purpose. 
                                              
18  
The concurring and dissenting opinion indicates it has “no quarrel with this 
general principle” (conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 14), but its analysis does not 
sufficiently grapple with the necessary implications of that presumption.  Our 
cases underscore courts’ obligation to “ ‘jealously guard’ ” (Associated Home 
Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591) and “liberally construe” (Perry v. Brown, 
supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1145, fn. 16) the initiative power, preserving its exercise 
“[i]f doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of [its] use.”  (Associated Home 
Builders, at p. 591.)  While the concurring and dissenting opinion acknowledges 
our precedent in passing (conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 14), it nonetheless begins its 
analysis looking for evidence that article XIII C, section 2 –– which makes no 
reference to initiatives –– evinces an intent to exempt initiatives from its 
provisions (conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 1).  This approach relegates our previous 
conclusions regarding the initiative power to the status of an afterthought, likely to 
hold little relevance in this case or perhaps any case. 
25 
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the concurring and dissenting opinion 
starts from the premise that the electors must have wanted to tie their own hands 
with respect to the imposition of local taxes.  This very premise then undergirds 
the opinion’s reading of the term “local government” as necessarily including the 
electorate.  Nothing supports this premise, despite the opinion’s confident 
assertion –– as if it were discussing the attitudes of an individual well known only 
to select observers –– that “[w]hether a local government tax has been enacted by 
voter initiative or by vote of the city council is not article XIII C’s concern.”  
(Conc. & dis. opn., post, p. 18).  Defending this assertion is difficult for the simple 
reason that nothing in the text of article XIII C, or its context, supports the 
conclusion that the term “local government” was meant to encompass the 
electorate.  Any reasonable construction of article XIII C, section 2 must take into 
account the robust importance of the initiative power in other constitutional 
provisions — irrespective of whether or not the “voter initiative” is “article XIII 
C’s concern” (conc. & dis. opn., post, p. 18).  (See, e.g., Associated Home 
Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591 [describing the importance of the initiative 
power].)  
In playing down the importance of giving full effect to these provisions, the 
concurring and dissenting opinion turns our case law on its head — by essentially 
demanding evidence that the electors intended to exempt the initiative power from 
article XIII C, section 2 as a precondition for preserving that power in 
unencumbered form.  (E.g., conc. & dis. opn., post, pp. 1-2, 9.)  To impose this 
requirement would be a stark departure from our precedent, and one impossible to 
square with our decisions on the power of initiative.  (E.g., DeVita, supra, 9 
Cal.4th at pp. 785-786 [refusing to infer limits]; Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 696 
[emphasizing breadth of initiative power and looking for express evidence of 
intent to limit].)  Our analysis in those decisions consistently begins with the 
26 
presumption that the initiative power is not constrained, then searches for clear 
evidence suggesting that electors could reasonably be understood to have imposed 
restrictions upon their constitutional power.  (E.g., Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 
Cal.3d at p. 253 [concluding the plaintiff failed to identify evidence of intent to 
limit initiative power]; DeVita, at pp. 785-786; Rossi, at pp. 695-696.)    
What the City maintains is that our interpretation, whatever its merits 
otherwise, would create a kind of loophole in article XIII C, section 2.  A 
hypothetical city council, it suggests, could conceivably collude with a public 
employee union to place a levy on the ballot as a means of raising revenue for a 
goal supported by both.  To repay the union for campaign support, or simply 
because the union and council agree on the policy, the council accepts the union’s 
contract proposal –– which will be funded by increasing a utility tax.  Under our 
interpretation, the City reasons, the city council could meet with the union, and the 
union could mobilize city employees to collect signatures on an initiative 
proposing the tax increase.  Once enough signatures are collected — 15 percent 
under section 9214 or 10 percent under section 9215 — the city council could 
simply adopt the ordinance without submitting the tax increase to the voters.  
(§§ 9214, subd. (a), 9215, subd. (a).)  Thus, the city council could effectively skirt 
article XIII C, section 2’s command that “[n]o local government may impose, 
extend, or increase any general tax unless and until that tax is submitted to the 
electorate and approved by a majority vote.”  (Ibid.)  These facts are not presented 
here, and we decline to take up what would happen should they arise. 
D. 
The sequence of the City’s actions with respect to the initiative causes us to 
make a final observation.  Upon receiving a petition signed by not less than 15 
percent of the city’s voters, section 9214 obliges a city to (1) adopt the ordinance 
without alteration; (2) immediately order a special election; or (3) order an agency 
27 
report and, once the report is presented to the city council, adopt the ordinance or 
order a special election.  These deadlines are mandatory (Tuolumne Jobs, supra, 
59 Cal.4th at p. 1038), and the City erred when it ignored them.  Its unilateral 
determination that the proposed initiative constituted a general tax and was 
therefore governed by article XIII C, section 2 did not relieve it of its obligation to 
adhere to section 9214 — particularly given that the initiative purported to propose 
a “fee” and was thus, facially at least, not a tax measure.  In the future, cities 
should follow section 9214 and order a special election.  At that point, either the 
city or other interested parties may pursue any appropriate legal challenge to the 
measure either in the pre-, or more likely, postelection context.  (E.g., Legislature 
v. Deukmejian, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 665-666 [discussing the propriety of 
preelection review].)   
 
28 
 
III.   
Multiple provisions of the state Constitution explicitly constrain the power 
of local governments to raise taxes.  But we will not lightly apply such restrictions 
on local governments to voter initiatives, “ ‘one of the most precious rights of our 
democratic process.’ ”  (Associated Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591.)  
Only by approving a measure that is unambiguous in its purpose to restrict the 
electorate’s own initiative power can the voters limit such power, tying themselves 
to the proverbial mast as Ulysses did.  Unless a provision explicitly constrains the 
initiative power or otherwise provides a similarly clear indication that its purpose 
includes constraining the voters’ initiative power, we will not construe provisions 
as imposing such limitations.  (See Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d at 
p. 252.)  We conclude that article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (b) does not limit 
voters’ power to propose and adopt initiatives concerning taxation.  Neither the 
provision’s text nor anything else shedding light on its intended purpose support a 
contrary conclusion.  We affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR:  
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KRUGER, J. 
Having gathered the necessary number of signatures, proponents of a local 
voter initiative requested that the city council of the City of Upland order a special 
election to present the initiative to the voters.  The city council refused, concluding 
that one of the initiative’s provisions imposed an “annual Licensing and Inspection 
fee” that was in fact a disguised general tax, and, as such, required voter approval 
at a general, rather than special, election under article XIII C of the California 
Constitution.  (Cal. Const., art. XIII C (article XIII C), added by Prop. 218, 
approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996) (Proposition 218).)  I agree with the 
majority that the city council erred in refusing the request, though for a narrow 
reason:  The city council should have put the initiative on the special election 
ballot and left questions about the validity of the fee to be sorted out in the courts.  
That conclusion would suffice to dispose of this case, which, as the majority says, 
is now moot in any event.  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 5.) 
The bulk of the majority opinion, however, addresses the separate question 
whether article XIII C, which imposes certain requirements for voter approval of 
local government taxes, applies at all to taxes enacted by initiative.  The majority 
says no:  In the majority’s view, when article XIII C speaks of taxes imposed by 
local government, it means taxes enacted by the city council or other public 
officials; local taxes enacted by voter initiative are exempt.  (See maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 23.)  But article XIII C contains no such exemption, and I see no basis for 
 
2 
interpreting it as though it did.  It is a basic tenet of the system that when a city’s 
voters enact legislation by initiative, they do so “by and for” the city itself.  (Elec. 
Code, § 9200.)  A tax passed by voter initiative, no less than a tax passed by vote 
of the city council, is a tax of the local government, to be collected by the local 
government, to raise revenue for the local government.  None of this could have 
been lost on the electorate that, also by initiative, amended the California 
Constitution to set ground rules for voter approval of local taxes. 
I concur in the judgment and in part II.D. of the majority opinion.  I 
respectfully dissent from the rest. 
I. 
A. 
Proposition 218, which added articles XIII C and XIII D to the California 
Constitution, is one of a series of voter initiatives imposing certain limitations on 
state and local governments’ taxing authority.  (See Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara 
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 248, 258–260 (Jacks).)  Since the first of these initiatives was 
passed in 1978, a recurring theme has been the expansion of voter approval 
requirements for the imposition of taxes.  (See ibid.)  Proposition 218, passed for 
the stated purposes of “ ‘limiting local government revenue and enhancing 
taxpayer consent’ ” (Jacks, at p. 267), is no exception to the rule. 
Borrowing and extending requirements introduced in previous voter 
initiatives, Proposition 218 set out two basic requirements for voter approval of 
local tax levies.  (Art. XIII C, § 2; cf. Gov. Code, §§ 53722–53724 [voter approval 
requirements of Prop. 62, approved by voters in 1986].)  As to general taxes, 
article XIII C provides:  “No local government may impose, extend, or increase 
any general tax unless and until that tax is submitted to the electorate and 
approved by a majority vote. . . .  The election required by this subdivision shall be 
 
3 
consolidated with a regularly scheduled general election for members of the 
governing body of the local government . . . .”  (Art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (b) 
(section 2(b)); see id., § 1, subd. (a) [defining “ ‘[g]eneral tax’ ” as “any tax 
imposed for general governmental purposes”].)  As to special taxes, article XIII C 
provides:  “No local government may impose, extend, or increase any special tax 
unless and until that tax is submitted to the electorate and approved by a two-thirds 
vote.”  (Id., § 2, subd. (d) (section 2(d)); see id., § 1, subd. (d) [defining 
“ ‘[s]pecial tax’ ” as “any tax imposed for specific purposes”].)  For purpose of 
both provisions, the term “ ‘[l]ocal government’ means any county, city, city and 
county, including a charter city or county, any special district, or any other local or 
regional governmental entity.”  (Id., § 1, subd. (b).) 
Both of these voter approval requirements differ from the statutory rules 
that ordinarily govern passage of local voter initiatives.1  If a local ordinance is 
proposed by an initiative petition with the necessary level of support, the initiative 
must, on request, be presented to the voters at a special (rather than general) 
election.  (See Elec. Code, §§ 1405, subd. (a), 9214; see also id., §§ 9116, 9310.)  
Such a proposed local ordinance ordinarily becomes law if a majority of the voters 
(rather than a supermajority) votes in favor of it.  (See id., § 9217; see also id., 
§§ 9122, 9320.)2 
                                              
1 
The Elections Code provides initiative procedures for general law cities, 
counties, and districts.  Charter cities may set their own initiative procedures.  (See 
Cal. Const., art. II, § 11, subd. (a); Elec. Code, § 9247; e.g., S.F. Charter, 
§ 14.101.)  The City of Upland is a general law city subject to the general statutory 
requirements.  (See Elec. Code, § 9200 et seq.) 
2 
A city council or other local legislative body may also directly adopt an 
ordinance proposed by initiative petition; if it does so, it is not required to submit 
the proposed ordinance to the voters.  (See Elec. Code, §§ 9214–9215; see also id., 
§§ 9116, 9118, 9310–9311.)  Like the majority, I set to one side this method of 
enactment, which is not at issue in this case (see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 26–27),  
 
 
4 
We are here specifically concerned with the rule in article XIII C, 
section 2(b) requiring that general taxes be approved by the voters at a general 
election.  The rule, by its terms, applies to taxes imposed by “local 
government” — a term defined to include cities and counties, as well as other 
local and regional governmental entities.3  The question is whether a tax is 
imposed by local government — here, the City of Upland — when the tax has 
been enacted by voter initiative, rather than by the city council directly.  The 
answer, as I see it, is yes:  A local government tax is a local government tax, no 
matter how it may have been legislated into being. 
The argument to the contrary depends on the idea that there is for these 
purposes some relevant difference between a tax enacted by the City of Upland 
and a tax enacted by City of Upland voters exercising their initiative power.  There 
is not.  The initiative power is the people’s power to enact the legislation by which 
they will be governed in the name of the state or relevant political subdivision.  
(See Professional Engineers in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 
Cal.4th 1016, 1042 (Professional Engineers); see also, e.g., American Federation 
of Labor v. Eu (1984) 36 Cal.3d 687, 695 [the voter initiative “is not a public 
opinion poll.  It is a method of enacting legislation”].)  This means that when a 
city’s voters exercise the power of initiative, they do not act merely as members of 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
and instead focus on ordinances proposed by initiative petition and submitted to 
the voters for approval.  As I read it, however, article XIII C, section 2(b) applies 
equally to all local general taxes, without regard to the manner of proposal or 
enactment. 
3 
By its terms, article XIII C applies to charter cities and other local 
governments alike (art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (b)), whereas the Elections Code’s 
initiative procedures do not necessarily apply to charter cities (see ante, fn. 1). 
 
 
5 
the public (cf. maj. opn., ante, at p. 11), but as legislators; in this capacity, their 
power to legislate is “generally co-extensive with the legislative power of the local 
governing body” (DeVita v. County of Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 775 (DeVita)).  
When the electorate of a city exercises the power of initiative, it exercises the 
legislative authority of the city, to enact laws “by and for [the] city.”  (Elec. Code, 
§ 9200.)  And if the initiative succeeds, the ordinance “become[s] a valid and 
binding ordinance of the city,” just as an ordinance enacted by the city council 
would.  (Id., § 9217.) 
These concepts are not remotely novel, and they point to a simple answer 
here.  It is, as a matter of fact, much the same answer as the one this court gave 
more than a century ago, when it was asked to consider whether a constitutional 
provision granting legislative authority to “ ‘[a]ny county, city, town, or 
township’ ” included the exercise of the initiative power by the voters of the City 
of Los Angeles.  (In re Pfahler (1906) 150 Cal. 71, 80 (Pfahler), quoting Cal. 
Const., art. XI, former § 11.)4  The court held that it did.  In so holding, the court 
made short work of the argument that the provision’s reference to a “ ‘city’ ” 
“must be construed as meaning some board or officers of the city.”  (Pfahler, at 
p. 81 [“Manifestly, there is nothing in this claim.”].)  The city, the court 
concluded, instead refers to the municipal corporation and body politic.  On that 
understanding, the court concluded that the California Constitution’s reference to 
lawmaking by the “city” encompassed the “direct exercise of legislative power by 
the people” of the City of Los Angeles.  (Id. at p. 83; see id. at pp. 81–84.)   
                                              
4 
Pfahler, supra, 150 Cal. 71, predated the 1911 amendment to the California 
Constitution reserving the people’s powers of initiative and referendum.  The 
initiative at issue had been enacted pursuant to a provision of the charter of the 
City of Los Angeles.  
 
6 
So too here, when article XIII C speaks of taxes imposed by “local 
government” — a term it defines to include “city” — the reference is naturally 
read to include local taxes enacted by voter initiative, just as it includes taxes 
enacted by vote of the city council or of any other legislative or governmental 
body.  And that reading makes perfect sense in the context of Proposition 218 — 
an initiative passed for the stated purposes of “ ‘limiting local government revenue 
and enhancing taxpayer consent’ ” (Jacks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 267) — and 
particularly in the context of article XIII C (entitled “Voter Approval for Local 
Tax Levies”), a provision we have previously described as applicable to “all local 
taxes” (Jacks, at p. 256).  After all, a local tax law passed by initiative is still a 
local tax law, just like any law passed by elected officials — a law of the local 
government, to be enforced by local government, for the purpose of raising 
revenue for local government. 
B. 
The majority’s primary response is that the term “local government” is an 
“unusually oblique” way of referring to voters, if that is what article XIII C was 
meant to do.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.)  The majority also points to article XIII C’s 
definition of “ ‘[l]ocal government,’ ” which includes the catchall phrase “any other 
local or regional governmental entity” (art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (b)), and to the 
definition of the term “ ‘[a]gency’ ” in article XIII D, which was also added by 
Proposition 218 and which incorporates article XIII C’s definition of local 
government (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13–15, citing art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (a)).  
According to the majority, it is “improbable” that Proposition 218 voters would 
have chosen the words “local government,” “local or regional governmental 
entity,” and “agency” to refer to the voters acting by initiative.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 15; see id. at pp. 13–15.)  In the majority’s view, these terms are more readily 
 
7 
read as “referring to a locality’s governing body, public officials, and bureaucracy.”  
(Id. at p. 11; see id. at pp. 11–15.) 
As I see it, there is nothing improbable about the conclusion that when 
article XIII C says “[n]o local government may impose” taxes without satisfying 
certain voter approval requirements, it means that all local government taxes must 
satisfy these requirements.  (Art. XIII C, § 2(b).)  The power to tax is a power of 
government.  (See Watchtower B. & T. Soc. v. County of L.A. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 
426, 429; see also Cal. Const., art. XI, § 11 [the Legislature may not delegate the 
power to levy taxes to a private person].)  And inasmuch as only government can 
impose taxes, it should not be surprising that Proposition 218 is directed to 
government and “governmental entit[ies].”  (Art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (b).) 
But equally to the point, Proposition 218’s enactors did not leave us 
guessing about what they meant by the term “local government”:  The term is 
defined, and the definition includes, as relevant here, “city.”  (Ibid.)  It is true, as 
the majority emphasizes, that the voters are not the city itself.  But neither is the 
city council.  (See Pfahler, supra, 150 Cal. at p. 81 [“The common council or 
other local legislative body and other charter officers do not constitute the ‘city,’ 
but are merely agents or officers of the city.”]; id. at pp. 85–86 [rejecting “the 
erroneous assumption . . . that the city council is the ‘city’ ”].)  Both bodies are, 
however, empowered to exercise the legislative authority of the city, and the 
products of their efforts equally become the city’s law.  If a tax enacted by the city 
council is a tax imposed by the city, so too is a tax enacted by the voters on the 
city’s behalf.  
As should by now be clear, this understanding of article XIII C does not 
require us to conclude, as the majority suggests, that the term “local government” 
is simply a synonym for “voters,” or vice versa.  We likely would not, for 
example, read a provision requiring local government to submit a “local coastal 
 
8 
program for Coastal Commission approval” as calling for citizen drafting sessions 
in local polling places.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11, fn. 11.)  But what this example 
illustrates is a point about the allocation of power and responsibility within local 
government, not any fundamental incompatibility in terms.  We do not read the 
coastal program provision in this manner, not because we believe the voter 
initiative process is categorically outside the bounds of local government, but 
because we understand that the voter initiative process is not the sum total of local 
government; many local government functions (including, typically, the drafting 
of local coastal programs) are discharged by other means. 
The case before us, by contrast, concerns the government’s power to 
establish taxes — a power that is shared by the people and their elected 
representatives.  (See Rossi v. Brown (1995) 9 Cal.4th 688, 699–705 (Rossi); maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 9.)  The question is whether a tax law of a local government — 
here, the City of Upland — is a tax imposed by the local government, even though 
it happens to have been enacted by vote of the electorate rather than of the city 
council.  (Art. XIII C, § 2(b).)  To answer that question in the affirmative in no 
way implies that the terms “local government,” “local or regional governmental 
entity,” and “agency” are interchangeable with “voters.”  (See maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 13–15.)  It simply requires reaffirmation of the settled principle that when the 
voters act in their legislative capacity through the initiative process, they enact 
legislation “by and for” the governmental entity in question.  (Elec. Code, § 9200; 
see id., § 9217; see also id., §§ 9100, 9125, 9300, 9323.)5  
                                              
5 
Elections Code section 9200 provides in full:  “Ordinances may be enacted 
by and for any incorporated city pursuant to this article.”  The majority says its 
reasoning is “compatible with section 9200” because “the electorate enacts an 
ordinance, via initiative, for the city.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.)  This response 
simply ignores the first preposition (“by”).  If what the majority means to suggest  
 
 
9 
The majority also relies on section 3 of article XIII C, which provides that 
“the initiative power shall not be prohibited or otherwise limited in matters of 
reducing or repealing any local tax, assessment, fee or charge,” and “[t]he power 
of initiative to affect local taxes, assessments, fees and charges shall be applicable 
to all local governments . . . .”  (Art. XIII C, § 3; see maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.)  But 
section 3 cuts against, not in favor of, the majority’s conclusion.  It confirms that 
Proposition 218’s enactors were aware of “[t]he power of initiative to affect local 
taxes,” and, moreover, understood the connection between the initiative power and 
the conduct of local government.  Had the enactors intended to exempt voter 
initiatives from article XIII C, section 2’s restrictions on new or increased local 
government taxes, it would have been easy enough to say so.  That the enactors 
provided for no such exemption, despite clearly signaling their awareness of “[t]he 
power of initiative to affect local taxes,” is strong evidence that no such exemption 
exists. 
C. 
The majority attempts to derive support for its voter initiative exemption 
from various extratextual considerations, but its efforts are unavailing.  The 
majority begins by observing that Proposition 218’s ballot materials do not say, in 
terms, that the voter approval requirements in article XIII C, section 2 were  
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
is that some ordinances enacted under that article of the Elections Code are 
enacted “by” a city, while others may be enacted “for” a city by some group of 
third party actors, it suffices to observe that no such distinction appears on the face 
of the statute, and long-held understandings of the nature of the initiative power 
are to the contrary.  (See Pfahler, supra, 150 Cal. at p. 81.) 
  
 
10 
Proposition 218 was concerned with “politicians” raising taxes.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 15–17.)  These references are not surprising, given that most local tax 
increases have, indeed, been initiated by elected officials, and few political 
campaigns are hampered by inveighing against “politicians.”  But the ballot 
materials make clear that the overarching purpose of Proposition 218 was more 
generally to “constrain local governments’ ability to impose fees, assessments, and 
taxes.”  (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996) analysis of Prop. 218 by Legis. 
Analyst, p. 73.)  And the arguments in favor of Proposition 218 also refer generally 
to guaranteeing the right to vote on local taxes and fees, with the particulars 
depending on the type of exaction at issue.  (See, e.g., Ballot Pamp., argument in 
favor of Prop. 218, at p. 76 [“Proposition 218 guarantees your right to vote on local 
tax increases”]; id., rebuttal to argument against Prop. 218, at p. 77 
[“Proposition 218 expands your voting rights.  It CONSTITUTIONALLY 
GUARANTEES your right to vote on taxes.”].)  Nothing in the ballot materials 
suggests that Proposition 218’s enactors intended to create an exemption for the 
subset of local taxes that are enacted by voter initiative.  
As the majority acknowledges, despite the broad statements in the ballot 
materials concerning the right to vote on taxes, article XIII C does more than 
simply secure the right to vote on taxes (a right voters generally have, with or 
without article XIII C, when a tax is proposed by initiative petition).  
Article XIII C secures the right to vote in a particular manner, and defines the 
applicable margin of victory.  In particular, article XIII C, section 2(b) secures the 
right to vote on local general taxes at a general, rather than special, election, and 
section 2(d) provides that the imposition of local special taxes requires a two-
thirds supermajority, rather than a simple majority.  Article XIII C thus secures for 
 
11 
the voters a set of rights concerning local taxes that they might not otherwise have 
under the usual rules governing passage of voter initiatives.6 
The majority suggests in passing that the specific aim of article XIII C, 
section 2(b)’s general election requirement may be one specific to taxes proposed 
by elected officials:  that is, to ensure that politicians are required to face the 
voters on the same ballot as the taxes they have proposed.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 16, fn. 14.)  Perhaps.  Or perhaps the aim is to ensure that general taxes are 
“voted on in general elections with their traditionally larger turnouts, not done in a 
corner in the middle of January in an odd-numbered year.”  (Jeffrey v. Superior 
Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 [“The obvious import of Government Code 
section 36502 is that a local term-limits initiative should not be sneaked through 
the electorate by scheduling it in a special municipal election where the turnout 
percentage is unlikely to reach double digits.”].)  Certainly the proponents of the 
                                              
6 
The majority suggests that construing article XIII C, section 2(b) to apply 
to initiative measures “would work an implied repeal of [Elections Code] 
section 9214, something against which we have a strong presumption.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 23.)  That is, according to the majority, section 2(b)’s requirement 
of a general election for a local general tax would effectively override a city 
council’s statutory duty to call a special election for certain ordinances proposed 
by initiative petition.  But the way to harmonize these provisions is to recognize 
that, while Elections Code section 9214 sets out the general requirements for local 
initiatives, the more specific requirement of article XIII C, section 2(b) applies 
when an initiative measure — or a provision thereof, if severable — concerns 
general taxes.  As a technical matter, a city council can fulfill its duty to call a 
special election under section 9214 even if the measure voted on at the special 
election cannot go into effect because it imposes, extends, or increases a general 
tax, and must be approved by the voters at a general election under section 2(b).  
But to the extent there is any conflict, section 2(b) must control, since 
article XIII C applies “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of th[e] Constitution” 
(art. XIII C, § 2), including the provision allowing the Legislature to prescribe 
procedures for local initiatives (Cal. Const., art. II, § 11, subd. (a)).  (Cf. 
Professional Engineers, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1037–1048.) 
 
 
12 
initiative here appear to regard the requirement as a meaningful constraint on their 
ability to enact the proposed legislation; otherwise the case would not be before 
us.  We cannot, in any event, simply dismiss article XIII C, section 2(b)’s general 
election requirement as beside the point in the context of local taxes enacted by 
voter initiative (and I do not understand the majority to seriously contend 
otherwise). 
The critical language we are construing here, moreover, appears in 
essentially identical form in article XIII C, section 2(d), which requires that special 
taxes be approved by a two-thirds vote of the electorate.  That provision, in 
language that closely parallels that of section 2(b), provides that “[n]o local 
government may impose, extend, or increase any special tax unless and until that 
tax is submitted to the electorate and approved by a two-thirds vote.”  (Art. XIII C, 
§ 2(d).)  If a local tax enacted by voter initiative is not a tax “impose[d]” by “local 
government,” as the majority insists, then from here on out, special taxes can be 
enacted by a simple majority of the electorate, as long as proponents can muster 
the necessary quantum of support to require consideration of the measure.  (See 
Elec. Code, §§ 9122, 9217, 9320 [a proposed initiative measure is enacted if 
approved by a majority of the voters]; see also, e.g., id., §§ 9116, 9118, 9214, 
9215, 9310, 9311 [ballot thresholds for counties, general law cities, and districts]; 
S.F. Charter, § 14.101 [ballot thresholds for one charter city].)  It is unlikely that 
Proposition 218’s enactors, who deliberately chose a supermajority requirement 
for the imposition of special taxes, intended such a result.7 
                                              
7 
The majority opinion contains language that could be read to suggest that 
article XIII C, section 2(d) should be interpreted differently from section 2(b).  
(See maj. opn., ante, at p. 20 [noting that the enactors of Prop. 218 “explicitly 
imposed a procedural . . . requirement on themselves in” art. XIII C, § 2(d), which 
“is evidence that they did not implicitly” do so in § 2(b)].)  I see no basis for 
 
 
 
13 
Finally, even if any doubts might remain after considering article XIII C’s 
text, purposes, and history, those doubts ought to be resolved in favor of applying 
article XIII C’s requirements to the enactment of new city taxes by voter initiative.  
Proposition 218 instructs that its provisions must “be liberally construed to 
effectuate its purposes of limiting local government revenue and enhancing 
taxpayer consent.”  (Prop. 218, § 5, reprinted at Historical Notes, 2B West’s Ann. 
Cal. Const. (2013 ed.) foll. art. XIII C, § 1, p. 363.)  The majority instead adopts a 
cramped interpretation of article XIII C that undermines, rather than effectuates, 
those purposes. 
II. 
Although the majority insists that its interpretation reflects the better 
reading of the constitutional text, it implicitly acknowledges otherwise when it 
invokes a new clear statement rule to guide its interpretation:  “Unless a provision 
explicitly constrains the initiative power or otherwise provides a similarly clear 
indication that its purpose includes constraining the voters’ initiative power, we 
will not construe provisions as imposing such limitations.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 28.)  In other words, according to the majority, it is not enough that 
article XIII C imposes generally applicable voter approval requirements for the 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
 construing the two provisions differently.  Sections 2(b) and 2(d) are, in all 
 pertinent respects, indistinguishable.  They are written in almost identical 
language, each providing that “[n]o local government may impose, extend, or 
increase” a particular kind of tax “unless and until that tax” is approved in a 
particular manner.  (Art. XIII C, § 2(b) & (d).)  The same definition of “local 
government” applies to both subdivisions.  (Id., § 1.)  If the majority is unwilling 
to accept the logical consequences of its interpretation of article XIII C, its 
reservations should cause it to reexamine its position; simply avoiding the 
implications of its approach will not do. 
 
14 
enactment of local taxes; the law must contain a “clear statement or equivalent 
evidence” that the requirements are meant to apply to local taxes enacted by voter 
initiative.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.) 
What we have said of other such clear statement rules is equally true here:  
It is not clear “by what authority” the majority proposes to “dictate to legislative 
drafters the forms in which laws must be written to express the legislative intent.”  
(In re Pedro T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1041, 1048–1049.)  The majority attempts to 
draw support for its clear statement rule from the general background principle 
that the initiative right must be “ ‘jealously guard[ed],’ ” and that doubts 
accordingly must generally be resolved in favor of the exercise of the right.  
(Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 
591 (Associated Home Builders); see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 6–9.)  I have no 
quarrel with this general principle.  But there is an important difference between a 
rule that resolves “reasonable doubts” in favor of preserving the right of initiative 
(Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 711) — that is, the rule established by our cases —  
and the majority’s novel clear statement rule, which would authorize courts to 
override the most natural reading of an across-the-board voter approval 
requirement simply because there are no “explicit reference[s] to the initiative 
power” or “sufficiently unambiguous statements . . . in ballot materials” (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 23). 
The cases on which the majority relies do not support the heightened 
standard it applies here.  In most of those cases, this court declined to extend 
procedural requirements obviously aimed at the conduct of a city council or other 
governing body because the requirements were incompatible with the initiative 
power — not simply for want of an “explicit reference” to an intent to place 
parallel limitations on professional legislators and the electorate.  (Maj. opn., ante,  
 
15 
at p. 23.)  In Associated Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d 582, for example, this 
court held that state zoning laws imposing notice and hearing requirements on 
certain ordinances had been drafted “with a view to ordinances adopted by vote of 
the city council,” and did not apply to initiative measures, because the procedural 
requirements would “effectively bar[] initiative action” and thus “would be of 
doubtful constitutionality.”  (Id. at pp. 594, 595.)  Similarly, in DeVita, supra, 9 
Cal.4th 763, this court held that general plans can be amended by initiative 
without meeting the public hearing and consultation requirements applicable to 
local governing bodies, because those requirements would be incompatible with 
initiative procedures.  (Id. at pp. 785–787; see also Tuolumne Jobs & Small 
Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029, 1038 [direct adoption 
of a proposed initiative measure by a city council is not subject to CEQA review 
because “if prior CEQA review is required, a city could never adopt a voter 
initiative . . . if that initiative had any potential impact on the environment”].)  In 
each case, the procedural requirements at issue were clearly aimed at governing 
bodies and would have been incompatible with initiative procedures; the court 
declined to infer from the existence of these requirements an intent to extinguish 
the initiative power altogether. 
Here, by contrast, no similar considerations are present.  Article XIII C, 
section 2(b) does not “squelch voters’ initiative rights,” as the majority claims.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.)  It does not constrain the voters’ ability to propose 
ordinances by initiative petition, and it expressly envisions a specific avenue for 
voter participation — approval at a general election.  Section 2(b) does not 
“ ‘place an insurmountable obstacle in the path of the initiative process and 
effectively give legislative bodies the only authority to enact this sort of . . . 
ordinance.’ ”  (DeVita, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 786.) 
 
16 
Nor does Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1991) 53 
Cal.3d 245 support the majority’s heightened standard.  In Kennedy Wholesale, the 
plaintiff argued that article XIII A, section 3 of the California Constitution, which 
requires state tax increases to be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Legislature, 
barred initiatives raising state taxes or, in the alternative, required initiatives 
raising state taxes to be approved by an analogous two-thirds vote of the 
electorate.  This court rejected both arguments.  As to the first argument, the court 
found the language ambiguous, and declined to construe it to impliedly repeal the 
reserved constitutional right of initiative.  (Kennedy Wholesale, at pp. 249–251.)  
As to the second argument, the court noted that the supermajority voting 
requirement was addressed expressly and exclusively to the Legislature, and, if 
applied to initiatives, would expressly conflict with another constitutional 
provision providing for a majority vote.  (Kennedy Wholesale, at pp. 251–252, 
citing Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a).)  Moreover, with respect to both 
arguments, the court stated:  “For the voters to have limited their power in the 
manner that plaintiff suggests would . . . have made no sense,” because “it would 
still be possible for a simple majority of voters to raise taxes by amending 
section 3.”  (Id. at p. 250.) 
Here, again, article XIII C, section 2(b) is not explicitly aimed at governing 
bodies and is not plausibly understood to eliminate the power of the voters to 
impose, extend, or increase local general taxes by initiative.  Construing 
section 2(b) to apply to initiatives would not expressly conflict with any other 
constitutional provision,8 nor is there anything nonsensical about this construction.  
                                              
8 
As the majority points out, construing article XIII C, section 2(b) to apply 
to initiative measures may conflict with statutory provisions (see maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 23), but this conflict is much less of a cause for concern (see ante, fn. 6). 
 
 
17 
While statewide voters can override a constitutional provision by majority vote 
(Kennedy Wholesale, at p. 250), local voters acting by initiative cannot do the 
same. 
If precedent does not explain the majority’s clear statement rule, what 
does?  Ultimately, the majority tells us, the rule is for the voters’ own good:  to 
prevent voters from too readily “tying themselves to the proverbial mast as 
Ulysses did” to resist the siren song of power.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 28; see id. at 
p. 2.)  And so in the name of cutting the voters loose from their self-imposed 
restraints, the majority thwarts the evident intent of the voters who passed 
Proposition 218 for the sake of governing all local taxes, not just some. 
III. 
The final part of the majority opinion does make one point with which I 
agree.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 27.)  This case arose because plaintiffs submitted a 
valid initiative petition containing signatures of at least 15 percent of the voters of 
the City of Upland, which obligated the city council either to adopt plaintiffs’ 
proposed medical marijuana ordinance outright or to submit it to the voters at a 
special election.  (Elec. Code, § 9214.)  The city council did neither; it instead 
unilaterally determined that the annual licensing and inspection fee included in the 
proposed ordinance, if enacted, would be a new general tax, such that the measure 
had to be voted on at a general, not special, election.  This was not the city 
council’s determination to make, and plaintiffs were entitled to a writ of mandate 
compelling the city council to order a special election for the purpose of 
considering the proposed initiative measure.  (See, e.g., Farley v. Healey (1967) 
67 Cal.2d 325, 327; Blotter v. Farrell (1954) 42 Cal.2d 804, 812–813.)  I would 
affirm the judgment on that basis alone. 
Although I agree with the majority that plaintiffs were entitled to have their 
proposed ordinance submitted to the voters at a special election, I cannot agree  
 
18 
that approval at a special election would have sufficed if, in fact, the challenged 
licensing and inspection fee was a general tax.  Article XIII C is a constitutional 
restriction on the taxation power of local government, and, by its terms, it applies 
to the imposition of all local government taxes.  Whether a local government tax 
has been enacted by voter initiative or by vote of the city council is not  
article XIII C’s concern.  Accordingly, while I concur in the majority’s judgment, 
I do not join most of its reasoning. 
 
KRUGER, J. 
I CONCUR: 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 245 Cal.App.4th 970 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S234148 
Date Filed: August 28, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: David Cohn 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Roger Jon Diamond for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Munger, Tolles & Olson, Ronald L. Olson, Fred A. Rowley, Jr., Mark R. Yohalem and David J. Feder for 
Chargers Football Company as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Foundation, Jonathan M. Coupal, Trevor A. Grimm, Timothy A. Bittle, Brittany 
A. Sitzer; Jones & Mayer, James R. Touchstone and Krista MacNevin Jee for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Nick Bulaich as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Dakessian Law, Mardiros H. Dakessian and Ruben Sislyan for California Taxpayers Association as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
William A. Adams, Rick A. Waltman and Robert T. Bryson II for Public Interest Advocacy Clinic as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Jack Cohen as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Daniel S. Hentschke; Remcho, Johansen & Purcell, Robin B. Johansen; Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, 
Michael G. Colantuono and Ryan Thomas Dunn for League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Meriem L. Hubbard and Harold E. Johnson for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Nikki E. Dobay, Fredrick J. Nicely and Karl A. Frieden for Council on State Taxation as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Roger Jon Diamond 
2115 Main Street 
Santa Monica, CA  90405 
(310) 399-3259 
 
Timothy A. Bittle 
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Foundation 
921 Eleventh Street, Suite 1201 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 444-9950