Case Title: State v. Wilson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2016-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 112,009 
 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DERICK A. WILSON, 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
An individual has a right based on the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights to withdraw consent to a 
search, including a consent implied by operation of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1001. Punishing 
an individual for exercising that right with criminal penalties, as the State has chosen to 
do with K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 is facially 
unconstitutional. 
 
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; MARK S. BRAUN judge. Opinion filed February 26, 2016. 
Affirmed. 
 
Jodi E. Litfin, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Chadwick J. Taylor, district 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellant.  
 
Kevin P. Shepherd, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee. 
 
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The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
LUCKERT, J.:  Derick A. Wilson, like the defendant in State v. Ryce, No. 111,698, 
this day decided, challenges the constitutionality of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025. In Ryce, 
we hold that 8-1025 is facially unconstitutional. Based on our decision in Ryce, we affirm 
the district court's decision to dismiss the charge against Wilson that alleged a violation 
of 8-1025.  
 
FACTS AND BACKGROUND PROCEDURAL  
 
On an early March morning in 2013, a Shawnee County Sheriff's Deputy stopped 
a vehicle for an improper turn. The deputy smelled the odor of alcohol while speaking 
with the driver, Wilson. Wilson admitted that he had been drinking, and he exhibited 
several clues of impairment when the deputy asked him to perform standard field sobriety 
tests. At the scene, Wilson refused to perform a preliminary breath test.  
 
The deputy arrested Wilson and took him to the law enforcement center. After 
reading Wilson the implied consent advisory, Wilson refused to provide a breath sample 
for testing. So the deputy applied for and received a warrant to search Wilson's blood. 
Security and sheriff's deputies had to hold Wilson down to obtain a blood sample. Later 
testing revealed that Wilson's blood alcohol content was .18—over the legal limit. The 
State charged Wilson with multiple counts, including:  driving under the influence, 
refusing to submit to testing under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025, interference with law 
enforcement under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5904(a)(3), refusing to submit to a preliminary 
breath test, driving while suspended, and improper left turn.  
 
Wilson filed a motion to dismiss and argued K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 was 
unconstitutional because it criminalized the refusal to consent to a search that is 
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unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In addition, he claimed K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-
1025 violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination 
because refusing a search constituted a crime.  
 
After a hearing on Wilson's motion, the district court concluded that while 8-1025 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, it did violate due process rights. It recognized 
Wilson was only subjected to a search pursuant to a warrant, which rendered the search 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, focusing on the fact that Wilson 
was charged with a separate crime under 8-1025 for refusing to submit to a warrantless 
search despite his Fourth Amendment right to insist that a search not proceed until 
officers obtained a warrant, the district court found that criminalizing this assertion of a 
constitutional right violated due process.  
 
In addition, the district court found 8-1025 violated the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination. It reasoned that 8-1025 compels a person to make 
an incriminating statement by refusing a test, a statement which is no longer mere 
evidence of a crime but instead a crime itself. And because a suspect must give up his or 
her Fifth Amendment rights to assert his or her Fourth Amendment rights, the district 
court turned to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as an alternative basis for 
finding 8-1025 unconstitutional. The district court declined to find, however, that 
Wilson's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when he was asked to submit to 
an evidentiary test without the assistance of counsel. It also concluded 8-1025 was not 
void for vagueness. The court later dismissed the remaining charges against Wilson, and 
this court retained jurisdiction over the State's premature notice of appeal. The 8-1025 
refusal charge is the only count before this court; the State based that charge on Wilson's 
refusal to submit to the initially requested test under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1001. This 
appeal does not involve the additional charges arising from Wilson's later refusal to 
submit to the search authorized by a warrant.  
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ANALYSIS 
 
Wilson essentially raises the same issues as did the defendant in Ryce. In that 
decision we hold that K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025, violates the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and is facially unconstitutional. 
Slip op. at 76. Those holdings are equally applicable to Wilson and resolve his case. 
 
Although the reasons for our decision in Ryce differ in some respects from those 
of the district court in this case, we reach the same result and for many of the same 
reasons. We can, therefore, still affirm the district court. State v. May, 293 Kan. 858, 870, 
269 P.3d 1260 (2012) (appellate court can affirm even if reasoning differs from district 
court). We accordingly affirm the district court's decision to dismiss the charge against 
Wilson that alleged a violation of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025.  
 
Affirmed.  
 
* * * 
 
STEGALL, J., dissenting:  For the reasons set forth in my dissent in State v. Ryce, 
___ Kan. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 111,698, this day decided), I dissent.