Case Title: Cangiano v. LSH Building Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 050699

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Present:  All the Justices 
 
SALVATORE CANGIANO 
 
v.  Record Nos.  050699 and 
 
 
 
  051031 
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
JANUARY 13, 2006 
 
LSH BUILDING COMPANY, L.L.C. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
Michael C. Allen, Judge 
 
 
In these appeals, we consider whether the trial court 
erred in granting specific performance of a real estate 
purchase agreement and awarding attorney's fees.  For the 
reasons discussed below, we will affirm the judgment of the 
trial court in both appeals. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
On August 20, 2003, LSH Building Company, L.L.C. ("LSH") 
and Salvatore Cangiano ("Cangiano") signed a "Purchase 
Agreement" wherein Cangiano agreed to sell an approximately 
1,898-acre tract of land known as Lower Magnolia Green in 
Chesterfield County to LSH for 39 million dollars.  LSH 
planned to develop Lower Magnolia Green by constructing 2,370 
single-family units, 1,180 multi-family units, a golf course, 
and a 212-acre commercial center. 
 
As part of the "Warranties of Seller" in the Purchase 
Agreement, Cangiano warranted and represented "to the best of 
his knowledge and belief" in Paragraph 15(h) that he will have 
 
2
purchased/settled on all additional land and easements 
required for all offsite utilities, road widenings, turn lanes 
and any other offsite improvements required of this project.  
All land and easements to be transferred to [LSH] at 
'settlement.' 
In the event of default by Cangiano, Cangiano agreed in 
Paragraph 18 of the Purchase Agreement that 
[LSH] shall be entitled to all remedies 
available to [LSH] at law or in equity, 
including specific performance, all of such 
remedies shall be cumulative and not exclusive 
of each other.  Further[,] in the event of 
default hereunder, the defaulting party shall 
be liable for all costs incurred by the non-
defaulting party in enforcing this Agreement 
through court action or otherwise, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
 
 
After entering into the Purchase Agreement, a dispute 
arose between Cangiano and LSH concerning the number of 
easements Cangiano was required to acquire and convey to LSH 
pursuant to Cangiano's "Warranties of Seller."  Cangiano 
contended that he agreed only to acquire and convey easements 
necessary for the development of an initial phase consisting 
of 200 lots.  Cangiano then informed LSH that he was declaring 
their agreement null and void because LSH failed to provide, 
pursuant to Paragraph 16 of the Purchase Agreement, "proof of 
ability to perform financing." 
 
3
 
LSH filed a bill of complaint seeking declaratory 
judgment, specific performance, damages resulting from breach 
of contract, and attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 
Paragraph 18 of the Purchase Agreement.  Prior to trial, LSH 
withdrew its claim for breach of contract and the case 
proceeded on LSH's claims for declaratory judgment, specific 
performance, and attorney's fees and costs.  The parties 
agreed, and obtained the approval of the trial court, to 
bifurcate the issues and try LSH's claims for declaratory 
judgment and specific performance, and then try LSH's claims 
for attorney's fees and costs post-trial, if necessary.  See 
Lee v. Mulford, 269 Va. 562, 567-68, 611 S.E.2d 349, 352 
(2005).   
 
During its opening statement to the trial court, LSH 
framed the issues before the trial court as follows: 
We believe the evidence will show that LSH is 
entitled to a declaratory judgment, that the 
contract is in full force and effect, and that 
Mr. Cangiano is obligated to perform his 
obligations under the contract, including his 
obligation to not only convey the property, but 
to convey additional property and easements, if 
necessary, for the development of the property.  
LSH is also entitled, we submit, to a decree of 
specific performance requiring Mr. Cangiano to 
specifically perform his obligations. 
 
During Cangiano's opening statement to the trial court, he 
maintained that LSH failed to provide proof of financing, and 
raised for the first time his contention that the Purchase 
 
4
Agreement was unenforceable because there was neither a 
meeting of the minds nor an offer and acceptance: 
And I believe not only is the contract void, it 
never really was in fruition, but there was 
never a meeting of the minds; there was never a 
true offer and acceptance because of the 
difference of the attachments with this 
contract; and that the contract should fail, 
and that the [parties] should go their own 
ways. 
 
LSH objected to this change in position and argued that 
Cangiano had conceded that the Purchase Agreement was valid in 
Cangiano's answer and interrogatory responses. 
After the presentation of evidence, LSH restated its 
request for declaratory judgment and specific performance.  
Cangiano responded: 
So for all of those reasons, I don't believe 
this contract can stand.  I believe that we are 
in equity here.  They are asking for specific 
performance.  I honestly don't know, if the 
Court feels this contract should be 
specifically performed, how many years it is 
going to take to get these easements and if 
they are going to be happy with the easements 
because . . . it's a changing situation. 
 
Continuing, Cangiano concluded, "So for those reasons, I would 
ask that this contract be held to be unenforceable . . . . And 
I would ask that the plaintiff not be granted their relief 
. . . ." 
 
In announcing its ruling, the trial court held that 
Cangiano was bound by his statements in his answer and 
 
5
interrogatory responses that the Purchase Agreement was a 
valid contract.  The trial court then held that the Purchase 
Agreement was unambiguous and granted declaratory judgment in 
favor of LSH and decreed specific performance.  The trial 
court stated:  "The Court's decision grants complete relief to 
the plaintiff as requested in the bill of complaint . . . ." 
The trial court instructed the attorneys for LSH to 
prepare the final decree and circulate it to the attorney for 
Cangiano.  Subsequently, Cangiano obtained new counsel.  Prior 
to the post-trial hearing on attorney's fees, a dispute arose 
concerning the wording of the final decree.  Cangiano objected 
to the language employed by LSH in the draft version of the 
final decree, contending for the first time in the course of 
the litigation that LSH sought to have the trial court order 
Cangiano to perform "the impossible."  Cangiano asked the 
trial court, referring to the language used in Paragraph 15(h) 
of the Purchase Agreement, to require him only to use his 
"best efforts" to obtain the additional easements.  While LSH 
agreed to the insertion of Cangiano's "best efforts" language 
in the final decree, LSH objected to Cangiano's attempt to 
raise, for the first time and after the conclusion of the 
trial, the defense of impossibility.  At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. 
 
6
Upon further consideration of the briefs submitted by the 
parties, the trial court entered its final decree granting 
LSH's request for declaratory judgment and specific 
performance.  The trial court held that LSH did not breach the 
Purchase Agreement, that Cangiano did not properly terminate 
the Purchase Agreement according to its terms, and that LSH 
"did provide sufficient proof of ability to perform 
financing."  The final decree also ordered Cangiano 
to use his best efforts to specifically perform 
his obligations under the Purchase Agreement, 
including but not limited to his obligation 
under [Paragraph] 15(h) of the Purchase 
Agreement to use his best efforts to acquire 
and convey at closing all additional land and 
easements required for all offsite utilities, 
road widenings, turn lanes, and any other 
offsite improvements required to develop the 
entire property being conveyed under the 
Purchase Agreement, time being of the essence. 
 
 
On February 4, 2005, the trial court held a hearing on 
LSH's request for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 
Paragraph 18 of the Purchase Agreement.  Cangiano acknowledged 
that LSH "won" at trial, but argued that LSH's fees were 
unreasonable and that they should be no more than $120,000.00, 
double the attorney's fees Cangiano incurred.  The trial court 
disagreed.  In announcing its ruling, the trial court stated: 
[I have] considered the fee application with 
reference to the language in the default 
provisions in the contract and based on any 
considerations that I believe I am obligated to 
take into account in making this determination.  
 
7
Those, I think, have been identified by the 
parties and include time and effort to have 
been expended, the nature of the services, the 
nature of the case, the complexity of the case, 
the value of the services to the client, the 
results, the skill and experience brought there 
by the attorneys involved, and the question of 
whether the rates charged were consistent with 
the rendering of similar services in the 
context of this area or this market. 
 
In considering all of those circumstances, 
taking into account the arguments that have 
been adduced this morning, the [trial court] 
concludes that [LSH's] attorneys' fees are 
reasonable and cannot be categorized as 
unreasonable and will grant [LSH's] motion. 
 
Pursuant to Paragraph 18 of the Purchase Agreement, the trial 
court awarded LSH $258,256.26 in attorney's fees and costs:  
$235,679.26 for those incurred in litigating the underlying 
dispute and $22,577.00 for its post-trial "Motion for Award of 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs." 
 
Cangiano filed two appeals, which we granted.  Cangiano 
maintains the trial court "erred in granting specific 
performance requiring the seller to convey what he did not 
own” and “erred in granting specific performance of a contract 
provision which was not an affirmative duty but rather a 
representation of current conditions, made ‘to the best of 
[the seller’s] knowledge and belief.’ ”  Cangiano further 
argues that the trial court erred: 
(1) “in granting attorney’s fees to LSH under a 
contractual provision that required a ‘default 
 
8
hereunder,’ where no party was in default or determined 
by the trial court to be in default”; 
(2) “in granting attorney’s fees to LSH pending 
Cangiano’s timely appeal from the declaratory judgment”; 
(3) “in awarding fees at the unreasonable level of 
400% of the fees incurred by the opposing side for the 
same litigation, where the contractual provision was only 
for ‘reasonable’ attorney’s fees”;  
(4) “in awarding LSH’s attorney’s fees for post-
trial briefing and hearings, at which post-trial 
proceedings LSH did not prevail”; and  
(5) “in awarding LSH’s attorney’s fees for post-
trial briefing and hearings, where the parties’ contract 
provided for attorney’s fees only with respect to the 
enforcement of the duties in the Purchase Agreement and 
does not allow for such compound recovery of attorney’s 
fees.” 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Standard of Review 
"[T]he decision whether to award specific performance of 
a contract rests in the sound discretion of a trial court; it 
is not a matter of right."  Shepherd v. Davis, 265 Va. 108, 
124, 574 S.E.2d 514, 523 (2003); see also Walker v. Henderson, 
151 Va. 913, 927-28, 145 S.E. 311, 315 (1928).  Specific 
 
9
performance "may be granted or refused under established 
equitable principles and the facts of a particular case.  The 
chancellor's discretion must be exercised with a view to the 
substantial justice of the case."  Chesapeake Builders v. Lee, 
254 Va. 294, 300, 492 S.E.2d 141, 145 (1997) (citations 
omitted). 
Likewise, the amount of recoverable attorney's fees rests 
within the sound discretion of the trial court.  Coady v. 
Strategic Resources, Inc., 258 Va. 12, 18, 515 S.E.2d 273, 276 
(1999) (citing Ingram v. Ingram, 217 Va. 27, 29, 225 S.E.2d 
362, 364 (1976)).  As a general rule, " 'absent a specific 
contractual or statutory provision to the contrary, attorney's 
fees are not recoverable by a prevailing litigant from the 
losing litigant.' "  Mulford, 269 Va. at 565, 611 S.E.2d at 
350 (quoting Mullins v. Richlands Nat'l Bank, 241 Va. 447, 
449, 403 S.E.2d 334, 335 (1991)).  While expert testimony may 
be necessary to assist the fact finder in determining an award 
of attorney's fees, such testimony is not required in every 
case.  Mulford, 269 Va. at 565, 611 S.E.2d at 350-51 
(citations omitted). 
The trial court's interpretation of written documents 
like the Purchase Agreement involved in this case is reviewed 
de novo.  VEPCO v. Northern Va. Regional Park Auth., 270 Va. 
 
10
309, 315-16, 618 S.E.2d 323, 326 (2005); Perel v. Brannan, 267 
Va. 691,698, 594 S.E.2d 899, 903 (2004). 
B.  Specific Performance 
 
In the course of this litigation, Cangiano has taken at 
least four different positions regarding the interpretation of 
the Purchase Agreement and its potential enforcement.  First, 
during the pre-trial phase, Cangiano admitted in his answer 
that he entered into the Purchase Agreement, which the trial 
court characterized as a valid contract, but argued that the 
Purchase Agreement was terminated because LSH never furnished 
"proper proof of ability to perform financing." 
Second, during the trial phase, in addition to his 
termination argument, Cangiano argued that the Purchase 
Agreement was ambiguous, inconsistent, and unenforceable.  
Cangiano ultimately asked the trial court to rule in his favor 
because he alleged there was no meeting of the minds and thus 
no contract. 
Third, during the post-trial hearing to resolve the 
dispute as to the wording of the final decree, Cangiano argued 
for the first time that a party cannot be ordered to 
specifically perform an act that is "impossible."  It was 
during this hearing that Cangiano asked for the "best efforts" 
language to be included in the final decree.  LSH had no 
 
11
objection to this language and it was incorporated by the 
trial court in the final decree. 
Fourth and finally, Cangiano advances the arguments on 
appeal contained in his assignments of error now before the 
Court:  (1) the trial court "erred in granting specific 
performance requiring the seller to convey what he did not 
own”; and (2) the trial court “erred in granting specific 
performance of a contract provision which was not an 
affirmative duty but rather a representation of current 
conditions, made ‘to the best of [the seller’s] knowledge and 
belief.’ ” 
Simply stated, Cangiano's first assignment of error 
concerning the interpretation of the Purchase Agreement and 
its enforcement does not accurately state what the trial court 
ordered.  The trial court ordered Cangiano to use his "best 
efforts" to acquire and convey the easements at issue.  
Cangiano is correct when he states that equity will not compel 
that which is impossible to perform.  Here the trial court 
only required Cangiano's "best efforts" to perform.  
Cangiano's first assignment of error regarding specific 
performance is therefore without merit. 
 
In his second assignment of error, Cangiano argues that 
the Purchase Agreement merely contained a "representation of 
current conditions" and that the trial court erred in 
 
12
concluding that he was contractually obligated by the terms of 
the Purchase Agreement to obtain the additional easements.  As 
already stated, on appeal we review a trial court's 
interpretation of a contract de novo.  VEPCO, 270 Va. at 315-
16, 618 S.E.2d at 326. 
 
In its final decree granting declaratory judgment, the 
trial court stated: 
Under [Paragraph] 15(h) of the Purchase 
Agreement, [Cangiano] is obligated to use his 
best efforts [to] acquire and convey to [LSH] 
at closing all additional land and easements 
required for all offsite utilities, road 
widenings, turn lanes[,] and any other offsite 
improvements required to develop the entire 
tract of land being conveyed pursuant to the 
Purchase Agreement, time being of the essence. 
 
In ordering Cangiano to specifically perform his contractual 
obligations, the trial court held that Cangiano must 
use his best efforts to specifically perform 
his obligations under the Purchase Agreement, 
including but not limited to his obligation 
under [Paragraph] 15(h) of the Purchase 
Agreement to use his best efforts to acquire 
and convey at closing all additional land and 
easements required for all offsite utilities, 
road widenings, turn lanes, and any other 
offsite improvements required to develop the 
entire property being conveyed under the 
Purchase Agreement, time being of the essence. 
 
For two reasons, we agree with the judgment of the trial 
court. 
 
First, Cangiano conceded below that Paragraph 15(h) of 
the Purchase Agreement affirmatively required him to obtain 
 
13
additional easements – but maintained that he was required to 
obtain only those easements necessary to develop an initial 
phase consisting of 200 lots.  In this concession, Cangiano 
implicitly agreed that the language is that of contractual 
obligation.  He merely contested the scope of the obligation.  
Additionally, Cangiano's own expert testified on direct 
examination that, while it would cost him as much as $850,000 
and require 12 to 18 months, Cangiano could obtain the 
additional easements.  A party may not approbate and reprobate 
by taking successive positions in the course of litigation 
that are either inconsistent with each other or mutually 
contradictory.  Nor may a party invite error and then attempt 
to take advantage of the situation created by his own wrong.  
Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 107, 144, 590 S.E.2d 537, 560 
(2004); Cohn v. Knowledge Connections, Inc., 266 Va. 362, 367, 
585 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2003); Smith v. Settle, 254 Va. 348, 354, 
492 S.E.2d 427, 431 (1997); Leech v. Beasley, 203 Va. 955, 
961-62, 128 S.E.2d 293, 297-98 (1962). 
Second, a de novo review of the Purchase Agreement 
indicates that it unambiguously imposes upon Cangiano the 
affirmative obligation of using his best efforts to obtain the 
contested easements.  In Paragraph 15(h), as part of his 
"Warranties of Seller," Cangiano agreed that he 
 
14
will have purchased/settled on all additional 
land and easements required for all offsite 
utilities, road widenings, turn lanes and any 
other offsite improvements required of this 
project.  All land and easements to be 
transferred to [LSH] at "settlement." 
 
Furthermore, at the conclusion of Paragraph 15, Cangiano 
agreed that 
[i]n the event any of the representations, 
warranties, additional undertakings of Seller 
in this paragraph 15 and/or other 
responsibilities of the Seller, as set forth in 
this Agreement, are not accurate and cannot be 
or are not ratified or fulfilled prior to 
Settlement, then the Purchaser shall have the 
right at its sole option, to take any or none 
of the following actions:  (i) waive the 
inaccurate, unratified or unfulfilled 
representation, warranty, additional 
undertakings and/or responsibility of Seller, 
and proceed with Settlement hereunder, 
provided, however, that such waiver shall be in 
writing, or (ii) terminate this Agreement, 
whereupon all rights and responsibilities 
hereunder shall be null and void, and neither 
party shall have any further obligation 
hereunder, other than the obligation of Escrow 
Agent to return the Deposit, or (iii) have such 
other remedy as may be available to Purchaser 
at law or in equity. 
 
Thus, it is clear from the plain and unambiguous language of 
the Purchase Agreement that Cangiano agreed it was his duty to 
"have purchased/settled on all additional land and easements" 
required for the project.  This is reinforced by the 
conclusion of Paragraph 15, which reflects that Cangiano 
clearly understood that the Purchase Agreement obligated him 
to perform "additional undertakings of Seller in this 
 
15
paragraph 15."  In the event Cangiano failed to perform, LSH 
possessed the "right at its sole option" to take any or none 
of three options, one of which being "such other remedy as may 
be available to Purchaser at law or in equity."  Obviously, 
LSH's request for specific performance falls within this 
clause. 
For these reasons, Cangiano's second assignment of error 
regarding specific performance is without merit.  As reflected 
in its decree, the trial court correctly concluded that the 
Purchase Agreement unambiguously imposes upon Cangiano the 
affirmative obligation of using his best efforts "to acquire 
and convey at closing all additional land and easements 
required for all offsite utilities, road widenings, turn 
lanes, and any other offsite improvements required to develop 
the entire property being conveyed under the Purchase 
Agreement, time being of the essence." 
C.  Attorney's Fees 
 
Cangiano failed to argue below his first, second, and 
fifth assignments of error regarding the trial court's award 
of attorney's fees to LSH.  Because these arguments were not 
preserved below, Cangiano is barred by Rule 5:25 from raising 
them for the first time on appeal. 
 
In his third assignment of error, Cangiano argues that 
LSH's fees incurred up to and including the trial were 
 
16
unreasonable because they were 400% greater than those he 
incurred.  We do not agree. 
In determining whether attorney's fees are reasonable, 
a fact finder may consider, inter alia, the 
time and effort expended by the attorney, the 
nature of the services rendered, the complexity 
of the services, the value of the services to 
the client, the results obtained, whether the 
fees incurred were consistent with those 
generally charged for similar services, and 
whether the services were necessary and 
appropriate.  
 
Chawla v. BurgerBusters, Inc., 255 Va. 616, 623, 499 S.E.2d 
829, 833 (1998).  In reaching its conclusion, the trial court 
specifically considered these factors in awarding attorney's 
fees to LSH pursuant to Paragraph 18 of the Purchase 
Agreement.  In assessing the reasonableness of attorney's 
fees, the issue is not how the fees incurred by one party 
compare directly with those incurred by an opponent.  Instead, 
the issue is "whether the fees incurred were consistent with 
those generally charged for similar services" and "whether the 
services were necessary and appropriate."  Chawla, 255 Va. at 
623, 499 S.E.2d at 833.  The trial court held that the fees 
requested by LSH were consistent with those generally charged 
for similar services, and necessary and appropriate. 
 
In his fourth assignment of error, Cangiano argues that 
LSH should not receive attorney's fees for the post-trial 
hearing regarding the wording of the final decree granting 
 
17
declaratory judgment and specific performance because LSH did 
not "prevail" at the hearing.  At the conclusion of the trial 
on LSH's bill of complaint for declaratory judgment and 
specific performance, the trial court held in favor of LSH and 
stated that its "decision grants complete relief to [LSH] as 
requested in the bill of complaint."  Paragraph 18 of the 
Purchase Agreement, which addresses the award of attorney's 
fees in this case, states in relevant part that "in the event 
of default hereunder, the defaulting party shall be liable for 
all costs incurred by the non-defaulting party in enforcing 
this Agreement through court action or otherwise, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee." 
 
Clearly, LSH prevailed in its efforts to enforce the 
Purchase Agreement and at the post-trial hearing concerning 
the wording of the final order.  The issue is the "costs 
incurred" by LSH in enforcing the Purchase Agreement.  
Cangiano takes the post-trial dispute regarding the wording of 
the final decree out of context.  Looking at the post-trial 
dispute in context, it is clear that LSH was the prevailing 
party at trial and Cangiano was therefore liable for "all 
costs" resulting from the necessity to seek judicial remedies 
in order to enforce the Purchase Agreement. 
In his two assignments of error regarding the award of 
attorney's fees that were properly preserved below, Cangiano 
 
18
does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court 
in making its award of attorney's fees to LSH.  Additionally, 
because the parties agreed in Paragraph 18 of the Purchase 
Agreement that "the defaulting party shall be liable for all 
costs incurred by the non-defaulting party in enforcing this 
Agreement through court action or otherwise, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee," we will remand these cases to the 
trial court for determination of an award of reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred by LSH in the course of 
this appeal and upon remand. 
III.  Conclusion 
 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering 
specific performance of the Purchase Agreement or in awarding 
LSH attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the terms of the 
Purchase Agreement.  We will affirm the judgment of the trial 
court in both appeals and remand them for an additional award 
of reasonable attorney's fees and costs to LSH, pursuant to 
Paragraph 18 of the Purchase Agreement, incurred by LSH in 
defending its judgment on appeal and upon remand. 
Record No. 050699 – Affirmed and remanded. 
Record No. 051031 – Affirmed and remanded. 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent.  In my view, the chancellor 
erred, under the particular facts of this case, in fashioning 
 
19
the award of specific performance so as to require the seller 
to use his “best efforts . . . to acquire and convey . . . all 
additional land and easements required for all offsite 
utilities, road widenings, turn lanes, and any other offsite 
improvements required to develop” the tract of land to be 
conveyed to the buyer. 
Reduced to its essential context, this case arises from a 
purchase contract for a large tract of land for residential 
and commercial development.  The buyer sought to have the land 
fully engineered at the time of closing and, thus, ready for 
the commencement of the intended development without the usual 
delays of obtaining the necessary offsite easements, such as 
water and sewer easements.  The agreed purchase price included 
the anticipated costs for those easements.  The seller agreed 
to acquire and convey those easements, but breached the 
contract by failing to do so within the time specified for 
closing the transaction, and that breach continued until the 
matter came before the chancellor on the buyer’s request for 
an award of specific performance of the purchase contract. 
The majority correctly acknowledges “that equity will not 
compel that which is impossible to perform,” which in the 
applicable context of this case is merely another way of 
saying that equity will not require a seller to convey land 
which he does not own.  See, e.g., Hawks v. Sparks, 204 Va. 
 
20
717, 720, 133 S.E.2d 536, 539 (1963); see also Shepherd v. 
Colton, 237 Va. 537, 541, 378 S.E.2d 828, 830 (1989) (holding 
that “a court may not decree specific performance when it is 
impossible for a party to comply with a contractual 
condition.”).  The majority, however, resolves the issue here 
by noting that the chancellor merely required the seller to 
use his “best efforts” to acquire and convey the necessary 
easements contemplated by the parties’ contract.  That 
resolution leaves unresolved the merits of the issue. 
There is no dispute that the “best efforts” limitation 
was adopted by the chancellor at the request of the seller, 
and that limitation facially would appear to support the 
chancellor’s award of specific performance regarding the 
acquisition and conveyance of the land and easements in 
question.  It takes little reflection, however, to reasonably 
conclude that “best efforts” is a requirement under the 
circumstances of this case that lacks certainty and portends 
future litigation before the chancellor and additional expense 
to the parties.  Adjoining landowners may or may not be 
willing to convey their land or grant easements over their 
land so as to permit the seller to comply with the 
chancellor’s order.  The possible complications are practical 
and boundless.  Such need not be the case.  Specific 
performance should not be awarded where “enforcement of the 
 
21
decree would be unusually difficult for the court.”  Perel v. 
Brannan, 267 Va. 691, 700, 594 S.E.2d 899, 904-05 (2004). 
“Generally, when there is a deficiency in title, 
quantity, or quality of an estate, the purchaser has the 
option to require the seller to convey such part as the seller 
is able, with an abatement of the purchase price for any 
deficiency.”  Chesapeake Builders, Inc. v. Lee, 254 Va. 294, 
300-01, 492 S.E.2d 141, 145 (1997).  The chancellor is to 
exercise sound discretion in deciding whether to award 
specific performance.  Shepherd v. Davis, 265 Va. 108, 124, 
574 S.E.2d 514, 523 (2003).  However, “[t]he chancellor’s 
discretion must be exercised with a view to the substantial 
justice of the case.”  Chesapeake Builders, 254 Va. at 300, 
492 S.E.2d at 145.  The facts of a particular case are always 
paramount in the proper exercise of that judicial discretion.  
Firebaugh v. Hanback, 247 Va. 519, 526, 443 S.E.2d 134, 137 
(1994). 
In the present case, I have no quarrel with the 
majority’s conclusion that the chancellor did not err in 
deciding to award specific performance of the parties’ 
purchase contract.  In my view, however, the chancellor should 
have been guided by Chesapeake Builders in doing so.  There is 
no question that there was a deficiency in the title and 
quantity of the estate the seller had contracted to convey to 
 
22
the buyer.  The remedy fashioned by the chancellor was 
incomplete because it is uncertain in its requirement that the 
seller use his “best efforts” to rectify the deficiency or 
when that might be expected reasonably to be accomplished.  
Indeed, such incompleteness and uncertainty left future 
litigation a probable expectation. 
The record reflects that the monetary cost of acquiring 
the necessary land and easements was a matter capable of 
determination at the time of the hearing before the 
chancellor.  Had the chancellor required that determination to 
be made, an award of specific performance requiring the seller 
to convey the land and whatever easements he had acquired, and 
granting the buyer an abatement of the purchase price for the 
deficiency in that which was contemplated by the parties’ 
contract, would have afforded complete relief to the buyer and 
not left the seller with the uncertainty that his “best 
efforts” would not satisfy the requirements of the 
chancellor’s order.  Clearly, such an award would have 
accomplished “substantial justice [for] the case.”  Chesapeake 
Builders, 254 Va. at 300, 492 S.E.2d at 145. 
For these reasons, I would reverse that part of the 
chancellor’s award of specific performance requiring the 
seller, Salvatore Cangiano, to use his best efforts to acquire 
and convey interests he did not own, and remand the case for 
 
23
further proceedings to determine the amount of an appropriate 
abatement in the purchase price as of the date of the future 
hearing before the chancellor.