Case Title: Prink v. Tonak

Citation: 140 N.W.2d 70

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1966-01-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
140 N.W.2d 70 (1966) Willard PRINK, Respondent, v. Herman TONAK, Jr., et al., Appellants. No. 39375. Supreme Court of Minnesota. January 14, 1966. Rehearing Denied February 9, 1966. *71 Schermer & Gensler, Minneapolis, for appellants. Murnane, Murnane, Battis & DeLambert and Robert B. McCarthy, St. Paul, A. G. Johnson, Cannon Falls, for respondent. THOMAS GALLAGHER, Justice. Action by plaintiff, Willard Prink, against defendants, Herman Tonak, Jr., and Wallace R. Berg, for injuries and property damage sustained by plaintiff when a tractor-trailer unit owned by Tonak and operated by Berg collided with an Allis-Chalmers farm tractor owned and operated by plaintiff. The trial court directed a verdict for plaintiff on issues relating to negligence and contributory negligence and the jury returned a verdict for him in the sum of $18,900. Thereafter defendants moved for a new trial on the ground that the court erred in directing the verdict for plaintiff on the issues described and on the further ground that statements made in the final argument of plaintiff's counsel constituted prejudicial conduct. This appeal is from the order denying the motion described. The accident occurred April 24, 1962, at about 2:15 p. m. on State Highway No. 52, one mile south of Cannon Falls. Highway *72 No. 52 there consists of two lanes and extends northerly and southerly. At the time, plaintiff was driving his farm tractor northerly in the easterly lane of this highway when its left rear wheel was struck by the right front bumper of defendant's tractor-trailer, which was also proceeding northerly and to the rear of plaintiff. The weather was clear and the terrain and highway level, without any obstructions to the vision of drivers proceeding northerly thereon. As a result of the collision, plaintiff was knocked from the seat of his tractor and sustained injuries for which this action was instituted. In support of their contention that issues of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury, defendants refer to the deposition of Mr. Berg, wherein he testified that immediately prior to the accident the braking equipment of the tractor-trailer unit was in good condition; that a short distance before the point of impact he had descended a hill on Highway No. 52 and thereafter ascended a small knoll; that he had then proceeded to pass an automobile also proceeding northerly on the highway in front of the tractor-trailer; that then he had observed a truck approaching him in the westerly lane of the highway about 1,500 to 1,800 feet to the north; that he had then looked into his rearview mirror to ascertain whether he had cleared the automobile he was passing and could turn back into the easterly lane; that as he turned back toward such lane he had first observed plaintiff's tractor traveling northerly in front of him about 15 miles per hour in the easterly lane of the highway; that in rapid sequence he had then applied the tractor brakes, sounded its horn, pulled on its hand brakes, and operated the emergency valve controlling the trailer brakes; that after these actions the air-braking mechanism locked the trailer wheels as it was intended to do; that he had also tried to diminish his speed by shifting down two or three gears; that once or twice he had released the tractor brakes because of his fear that the trailer might "jack-knife" around the tractor; that at the same time he turned the tractor toward the east shoulder of the highway in an attempt to pass plaintiff's tractor on its right; that he then observed that he could not safely go onto the east highway shoulder, which had guardrails at its outer edge, because it was soft and a considerable distance above the bottom of the adjacent embankment; that he then tried to steer the tractor-trailer to his left to go between plaintiff's tractor and the oncoming truck and while all three vehicles were about to meet he again moved to his right, then striking the left rear wheel of plaintiff's tractor with the right bumper of his tractor; that at no time had he traveled more than 60 miles per hour and that prior to the impact he had reduced his speed to about 20 or 25 miles per hour while plaintiff's tractor had been traveling at a speed not in excess of 15 miles per hour; that after his tractor-trailer was brought to a stop, he discovered that the diaphragm or "pancake" in the braking system was leaking air but the only effect of this would be to lessen the air pressure after the trailer wheels were locked; and that this could not have had any relationship to stopping or braking the equipment prior to the accident. In his final argument plaintiff's counsel stated that defendants' medical testimony constituted an admission that the pain and injury to plaintiff's back were caused by the accident and also established that the lower portion of his spine would have to be fused and thereafter would be solid "like a poker." He further stated: He further stated with reference to plaintiff's son: At the close of this argument, defendants' counsel objected to the statements referred to on the grounds that (1) they conveyed the impression that defendants' doctor had testified that a fusion of the vertebrae would be required when actually his testimony was merely that the operation required at the time might indicate that such a fusion was necessary; (2) the reference to plaintiff's son was an attempt to inflame the jury; and (3) the argument conveyed the impression that plaintiff was earning $9,000 to $10,000 per year net. The following proceedings then took place out of hearing of the jury: In its instructions to the jury, the court stated: In commenting on defendants' contentions in a memorandum attached to the order denying defendants' motion for a new trial, the court stated: On appeal defendants urge that from the evidence above outlined the jury might have found (1) that a brake defect unknown to defendants prior to the accident had prevented Berg from stopping his vehicle in time to avoid the accident so that in the face of the emergency his conduct would not constitute negligence; (2) that plaintiff's operation of his farm tractor at a speed of about 15 miles per hour was a violation of Minn.St. 169.15[1] and constituted negligence proximately contributing to the accident; and (3) that plaintiff's failure to either keep a lookout to his rear or to listen for warning signals or to drive his tractor onto the east shoulder when danger became imminent was negligence proximately contributing to the accident. They also contend that the statements made by plaintiff's counsel in his final argument constituted prejudicial error. 1. We are of the opinion that the court did not err in directing a verdict in favor of plaintiff on the negligence issues. Mr. Berg testified that the tractor-trailer brakes were in good condition and that nothing in the mechanical condition of the tractor had anything to do with the happening of the accident. His testimony was that after the trailer wheels were properly locked and his equipment brought to a stop, he discovered that the diaphragm or "pancake" of the braking system was leaking air but that this had had no effect on his ability to stop his equipment prior to the accident. Accordingly, by no logical reasoning could it be held that this defect was a proximate cause of the accident. Trudeau v. Sina Contracting Co., Inc., 241 Minn. 79, 62 N.W.2d 492, and Minder v. Peterson, 254 Minn. 82, 93 N.W.2d 699, cited by defendants in support of their contention on this point, have no application here. In both of those cases it was held merely that where defective brakes were the cause of an accident, but where such defects were unknown to the owners of the equipment who had recently had brakes inspected for defects and such defects were not disclosed in such inspections, the court might properly instruct the jury with respect to the emergency doctrine. Here no evidence was presented of a prior brake inspection by defendants and all evidence was to the effect that all brakes were in good condition and had operated and functioned exactly as they were intended to operate prior to the collision. 2. All evidence makes it clear that the court correctly instructed the jury with respect to Berg's negligence. He conceded that just prior to the accident he had had a clear view of the highway to the north for approximately 1,800 feet and that for this distance there were no obstructions to conceal plaintiff's tractor from him, but that when he first saw it it was only from 400 *75 to 600 feet ahead of him on the highway. He testified: Obviously, had he been keeping a proper lookout for traffic moving on the highway and exercising commensurate care at the time, he would not have endangered plaintiff by attempting to pass the automobile preceding him when this could not be done with safety. 3. There is no evidence to sustain a finding that plaintiff was guilty of negligence proximately contributing to the accident by operating his tractor at a speed of 15 miles per hour at the time of the collision. No statute prohibits tractors of this type from using state highways, and had the legislature intended the provisions of § 169.15, above quoted, to have this effect, it would have so indicated in clear and definite terms. Further, the provisions of § 169.18, subd. 10,[2] clearly contemplate the operation of slow-moving vehicles upon the highways and that their use thereon is proper where they proceed as close as practicable to the right-hand edge of such highways. Likewise, Berg's testimony negatives the contention that plaintiff could have turned his tractor onto the right or east shoulder of the highway to avoid the accident. Such testimony established that because of the soft condition of this shoulder, as well as the deep ditch, and the adjacent guardrails, Berg feared to move his tractor onto it, and certainly plaintiff was not required to follow a course of conduct which defendants admit would have been dangerous to Berg. It is interesting to note that a similar contention with respect to a horse and wagon being driven on the highway was made in Stone v. Sigel, 189 Minn. 47, 248 N.W. 285, where Mason St.1927, § 2720-9, preceding Minn.St. 169.18, subd. 10, was under consideration.[3] There this court stated (189 Minn. 49, 248 N.W. 286): 4. Likewise, it seems clear that plaintiff's conduct prior to the collision in looking forward rather than to the rear did not constitute negligence. A similar contention was made in Nash v. Christenson, 241 Minn. 164, 169, 62 N.W.2d 800, 803, where this court stated: Based upon the foregoing we conclude, as did the trial court, that as a matter of law the evidence established that the sole cause of the accident was the negligence of defendant Berg in his operation of the tractor-trailer unit at the time of the accident. 5. We find no prejudicial error in the reference of plaintiff's counsel to the medical testimony in his final argument. Dr. Ralph Rayner, called by defendants, testified that if the symptoms in plaintiff's sciatic nerve, with the attendant pain in his left leg and toes, followed the accident in a matter of hours and had not been present for some 10 years prior thereto, in his opinion there would be a causal relationship between the accident and the symptoms described. He further testified that if after a period of conservative treatment plaintiff's back did not respond and the pain remained so that he could not perform his work properly (which was true at the time of trial), surgery for the removal of the herniated disc in plaintiff's back would be required and if mobility in the adjacent vertebrae was then disclosed such vertebrae would have to be fused to make them rigid. Accordingly, the final argument of plaintiff's counsel with reference thereto would not seem to be so far afield as to mislead the jury, particularly where the court instructed the jury that it was to rely upon its own recollection of the evidence rather than upon the argument of plaintiff's counsel. Likewise, the statement that plaintiff's son might be required to assist his father in the future was based upon an implication from evidence submitted without exception to the effect that since the accident he had been helping plaintiff. The court specifically instructed the jury as to the items upon which it should measure plaintiff's damages, no reference being made therein to *77 the son's future prospects because of the accident as an item to be considered. With respect to the contention of defendants that reference of plaintiff's counsel to plaintiff's earnings did not differentiate between gross earnings and net earnings and accordingly the jury was misled, we find no merit. Plaintiff's counsel specifically described the "nine or ten thousand dollars" as "gross earnings" and indicated what might be considered net earnings. Evidence concerning plaintiff's income tax statements, received without objection, further manifested his net earnings during the years referred to. Further, the court specifically instructed the jury that it should not consider past earnings in estimating plaintiff's damages. Under such circumstances, we find no prejudicial error in the statement referred to. Affirmed. [1] Minn.St. 169.15 provides in part: "No person shall drive a motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law." [2] Minn.St. 169.18, subd. 10, provides: "Upon all roadways any vehicle proceeding at less than the normal speed of traffic at the time and place and under the conditions then existing shall be driven in the right-hand lane then available for traffic, or as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway * * *." [3] Mason St.1927, § 2720-9, provides: "Upon all highways of sufficient width, except upon one way streets, the driver of a vehicle shall drive the same upon the right half of the traveled portion of the highway and shall drive a slow moving vehicle as closely as possible to the right-hand edge or curb of such highway, unless it is impracticable to travel on such side of the highway and except when overtaking and passing another vehicle."