Case Title: People v. Frahs

Citation: 

Docket Number: S252220

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2020-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ERIC JASON FRAHS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S252220 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Three 
G054674 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
16CF0837 
 
 
June 18, 2020 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the Court, 
in which Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, and 
Groban concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
S252220 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
In June 2018, the Legislature enacted Penal Code1 
sections 1001.35 and 1001.36, which created a pretrial diversion 
program for certain defendants with mental health disorders.  
(Stats. 2018, ch. 34, § 24.)  We granted review in this matter to 
determine whether the mental health diversion statute applies 
retroactively to cases in which the judgment is not yet final, and 
whether the Court of Appeal erred when it conditionally 
reversed defendant Eric Jason Frahs’s convictions and sentence 
and remanded this case for a diversion eligibility hearing. 
Here, defendant stole two beverages from a convenience 
store and threw rocks at passing cars.  At trial, he introduced 
evidence that he suffers from a form of schizophrenia.  After 
defendant was convicted, and while his appeal was pending, the 
mental health diversion statute came into effect.  The Court of 
Appeal concluded that section 1001.36, which contains the 
diversion 
measure’s 
substantive 
provisions, 
applies 
retroactively to all cases not yet final on appeal before the 
statute became effective, including defendant’s case.  It 
conditionally reversed defendant’s convictions and sentence, 
and remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to 
 
1  
All subsequent statutory citations are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise indicated. 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
conduct a diversion eligibility hearing.  (People v. Frahs (2018) 
27 Cal.App.5th 784 (Frahs).) 
In In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), we held 
that an amendatory statute lessening punishment for a crime 
was presumptively retroactive and applied to all persons whose 
judgments were not yet final at the time the statute took effect.  
In People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299 (Lara), 
we applied the Estrada rule to legislation that mitigated the 
possible punishment for a class of persons.  The statute here is 
similar to the scheme we considered in Lara, in that section 
1001.36 by design and function provides a possible ameliorating 
benefit for a class of persons — namely, certain defendants with 
mental disorders — by offering an opportunity for diversion and 
ultimately the dismissal of charges.  Moreover, neither the text 
nor the history of section 1001.36 clearly indicates that the 
Legislature intended that the Estrada rule would not apply to 
this diversion program.  Therefore, consistent with our decision 
in Lara, we conclude that Estrada’s inference of retroactivity 
applies.  We also agree with the Court of Appeal’s determination 
that defendant is entitled to a limited remand for the trial court 
to decide whether he should receive diversion under section 
1001.36.  We express no view regarding whether defendant will 
be able to show eligibility on remand or whether the trial court 
should exercise its discretion to grant diversion if it finds him 
eligible.   
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In March 2016, defendant entered a small market in 
Santa Ana.  The store owner, remembering that defendant had 
tried to steal a pack of cigarettes one week prior, told defendant 
to leave.  Defendant exited the store, picked up rocks, and threw 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
them at passing cars.  He struck the windshield of one car, 
shattering the glass.  Defendant then reentered the store and 
grabbed a can of beer and an energy drink.  The store owner and 
his son stood at the front door to block defendant from leaving.  
Defendant rushed toward the door, punched the owner in the 
head, and eventually pushed his way through.  The store owner 
and his son detained defendant in the parking lot and called the 
police.   
Defendant was charged with two counts of second degree 
robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (b)) and one felony count 
of throwing a substance at a motor vehicle with intent to cause 
injury (Veh. Code, § 23110, subd. (b)).  For sentencing purposes, 
it was alleged that defendant had suffered a prior serious felony 
conviction.  (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1).)   
Defendant testified in his own defense.  He stated that he 
experienced hallucinations and delusions beginning in his early 
twenties and had been hospitalized at least eight times.  In 
2015, a conservator was appointed to care for him for 
approximately seven months.  Defendant had stopped taking his 
prescribed medications four days before the incident at the 
Santa Ana market and was experiencing severe hallucinations 
and delusions during that time.  He testified that he thought an 
angel flew by on a horse and talked to him just before he entered 
the market.   
A clinical and forensic psychologist also testified on 
defendant’s behalf.  Based on his review of a hospital report 
detailing defendant’s confinement and his conversations with 
defendant and his parents, the psychologist stated that 
defendant had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, 
which is “a combination of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder,” 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
and was very ill and unstable.  He also concluded that defendant 
had been suffering from a psychotic episode and was not in touch 
with reality in the days preceding the incident at the Santa Ana 
market.  He testified that defendant’s behavior at the market 
was a byproduct of a psychotic episode.   
The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of second 
degree robbery and of the lesser included misdemeanor offense 
of throwing a substance at a motor vehicle without intent to 
cause injury.  Following a bench trial on the prior serious felony 
conviction allegation, which the trial court found to be true, 
defendant was sentenced to nine years in prison.   
When defendant’s appeal was pending, the Legislature 
enacted sections 1001.35 and 1001.36 as part of Assembly Bill 
No. 1810 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1810), an 
omnibus budget bill.  (Stats. 2018, ch. 34, § 24.)  Section 1001.36 
gives trial courts the discretion to grant pretrial diversion for 
individuals suffering from certain mental health disorders.  
(§ 1001.36, subd. (a).)  As part of the budget bill, the diversion 
statute became effective immediately.   
The Court of Appeal concluded that section 1001.36 
applies retroactively to all nonfinal judgments.  It also 
determined that defendant is entitled to a limited remand 
because his case is not yet final on appeal and the record 
demonstrates that he appears to satisfy at least one of the 
statute’s threshold eligibility requirements, a diagnosed and 
qualifying mental disorder.  (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(A).)  On 
these grounds, the court conditionally reversed defendant’s 
conviction and sentence and remanded the matter to the trial 
court to conduct a mental health diversion eligibility hearing 
under section 1001.36.  (Frahs, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 792.)   
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  The Mental Health Diversion Statute 
Section 1001.36 authorizes a pretrial diversion program 
for defendants with qualifying mental disorders.  The statute 
defines “ ‘pretrial diversion’ ” as “the postponement of 
prosecution, either temporarily or permanently, at any point in 
the judicial process from the point at which the accused is 
charged until adjudication, to allow the defendant to undergo 
mental health treatment . . . .”  (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).)  The stated 
purpose of the diversion statute “is to promote all of the 
following:  [¶] (a) Increased diversion of individuals with mental 
disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the 
criminal justice system while protecting public safety.  [¶] 
(b) Allowing local discretion and flexibility for counties in the 
development and implementation of diversion for individuals 
with mental disorders across a continuum of care settings.  [¶] 
(c) Providing diversion that meets the unique mental health 
treatment and support needs of individuals with mental 
disorders.”  (§ 1001.35, subds. (a)-(c).)   
As originally enacted, section 1001.36 provided that a trial 
court may grant pretrial diversion if it finds all of the following: 
(1) the defendant suffers from a qualifying mental disorder; 
(2) the disorder played a significant role in the commission of 
the charged offense; (3) the defendant’s symptoms will respond 
to mental health treatment; (4) the defendant consents to 
diversion and waives his or her speedy trial right; (5) the 
defendant agrees to comply with treatment; and (6) the 
defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public 
safety if treated in the community.  (Former § 1001.36, subd. 
(b)(1)-(6).)  Section 1001.36 was subsequently amended by 
Senate Bill No. 215 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 215) to 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
specify that defendants charged with certain crimes, such as 
murder and rape, are ineligible for diversion.  (§ 1001.36, subd. 
(b)(2), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1005, § 1.)   
If the defendant makes a prima facie showing that he or 
she meets all of the threshold eligibility requirements and the 
defendant and the offense are suitable for diversion, and the 
trial court is satisfied that the recommended program of mental 
health treatment will meet the specialized mental health 
treatment needs of the defendant, then the court may grant 
pretrial diversion.  (§ 1001.36, subds. (a), (b)(3) & (c)(1).)  The 
maximum period of diversion is two years.  (Id., subd. (c)(3).)  If 
the defendant is subsequently charged with an additional crime, 
or otherwise performs unsatisfactorily in the assigned program, 
then the court may reinstate criminal proceedings.  (Id., subd. 
(d).)  “If the defendant has performed satisfactorily in diversion, 
at the end of the period of diversion, the court shall dismiss the 
defendant’s criminal charges that were the subject of the 
criminal proceedings at the time of the initial diversion” and 
“the arrest upon which the diversion was based shall be deemed 
never to have occurred.”  (Id., subd. (e).)   
B.  Retroactive Application of Ameliorative 
Criminal Laws  
Generally, 
statutes 
are 
presumed 
to 
apply 
only 
prospectively.  (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 307.)  However, this 
presumption is a canon of statutory interpretation rather than 
a constitutional mandate.  (Ibid.)  Accordingly, “the Legislature 
can ordinarily enact laws that apply retroactively, either 
explicitly or by implication.”  (Ibid.)  Courts look to the 
Legislature’s intent in order to determine if a law is meant to 
apply retroactively.  (Ibid.)     
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
In Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, we held that amendatory 
statutes that lessen the punishment for criminal conduct are 
ordinarily intended to apply retroactively.  (Id. at pp. 744-745.)  
In endeavoring to ascertain the legislative intent in enacting 
such a statute, we found “one consideration of paramount 
importance.”  (Id. at p. 744.)  We explained:  “When the 
Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it 
has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was 
too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as 
punishment for the commission of the prohibited act.  It is an 
inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended 
that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now 
deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it 
constitutionally could apply.  The amendatory act imposing the 
lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts 
committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting 
the defendant of the act is not final.  This intent seems obvious, 
because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the 
Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a 
conclusion not permitted in view of modern theories of 
penology.”  (Id. at p. 745.)   
We reasoned that “ ‘[a] legislative mitigation of the 
penalty for a particular crime represents a legislative judgment 
that the lesser penalty or the different treatment is sufficient to 
meet the legitimate ends of the criminal law.  Nothing is to be 
gained by imposing the more severe penalty after such a 
pronouncement; the excess in punishment can, by hypothesis, 
serve no purpose other than to satisfy a desire for vengeance.  
As to a mitigation of penalties, then, it is safe to assume, as the 
modern rule does, that it was the legislative design that the 
lighter penalty should be imposed in all cases that subsequently 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
reach the courts.’ ”  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 745-746, 
quoting People v. Oliver (N.Y. 1956) 134 N.E.2d 197, 202.) 
“Estrada stands for the proposition that, ‘where the 
amendatory statute mitigates punishment and there is no 
saving[s] clause, the rule is that the amendment will operate 
retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed.’ ”  
(People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 792 (Nasalga); see also 
People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657 (Conley) [“The 
Estrada rule rests on an inference that, in the absence of 
contrary indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends for 
ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as 
possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences 
that are final and sentences that are not”].)  If there is no 
express savings clause, the statute must demonstrate contrary 
indications of legislative intent “ ‘with sufficient clarity’ ” in 
order to rebut the Estrada rule.  (Conley, at p. 657; Nasalga, at 
p. 793 [Estrada rule not implicated when “the Legislature 
clearly signals its intent to make the amendment prospective, 
by the inclusion of either an express saving[s] clause or its 
equivalent”].)   
We have applied Estrada’s inference of retroactivity to 
statutes governing penalty enhancements, as well as statutes 
governing substantive offenses.  (E.g., People v. Wright (2006) 
40 Cal.4th 81, 94-95 [newly enacted affirmative defense to 
transporting marijuana applies retroactively]; Tapia v. Superior 
Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 301 [statute specifying that certain 
death-penalty qualifying special circumstances must be 
intentional applies retroactively]; In re Kirk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 
761, 762-763 [amendment increasing dollar amount concerning 
insufficient funds checks applies retroactively].)   
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
Significantly, we have also applied the Estrada rule to 
statutes that merely made a reduced punishment possible.  
(Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 303; People v. Francis (1969) 
71 Cal.2d 66, 76 (Francis) [modified treatment of marijuana 
possession 
from 
straight 
felony 
to 
either 
felony 
or 
misdemeanor].)  In Francis, we inferred that the Legislature 
intended retroactive application of an amendment that allowed 
a trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion more favorably 
for individual defendants.  (Francis, at p. 76.)  We concluded that 
although the statute did not guarantee a lighter sentence — it 
instead granted trial courts discretion to impose a county jail 
term in lieu of imprisonment for possession of marijuana — the 
reasoning of Estrada applied in light of the Legislature’s 
determination “that the former penalty provisions may have 
been too severe in some cases and that the sentencing judge 
should be given wider latitude in tailoring the sentence to fit the 
particular circumstances.”  (Ibid.) 
More recently, in Lara, we determined that the Estrada 
rule applied to an amendatory act that “ameliorated the possible 
punishment for a class of persons.”  (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 
p. 308, italics added.)  Lara concerned the retroactivity of 
Proposition 57 (Prop. 57, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. 
(Nov. 8, 2016)) (Proposition 57), the relevant provisions of which 
prohibit prosecutors from directly filing charges against a minor 
in “adult” criminal court and give juvenile courts the sole 
discretion to determine, after conducting a transfer hearing, 
whether a minor can be prosecuted and sentenced as an adult.  
(Lara, at p. 303.)  We explained that although Proposition 57 did 
not mitigate punishment for any particular crime, the Estrada 
inference of retroactivity nevertheless applied because the law 
“reduces the possible punishment for a class of persons, namely 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
juveniles.”  (Lara, at p. 303.)  We noted that, given the 
significant distinctions between the juvenile justice system and 
the criminal justice system, “[t]he possibility of being treated as 
a juvenile in juvenile court — where rehabilitation is the goal — 
rather than being tried and sentenced as an adult can result in 
dramatically different and more lenient treatment.”  (Ibid.; see 
id. at pp. 306-307.)  For example, “ ‘the impact of the decision to 
prosecute a minor in criminal court rather than juvenile court 
can spell the difference between a 16-year-old minor . . . being 
sentenced to prison for 72 years to life, or a discharge from the 
[Division of Juvenile Justice’s] custody at a maximum of 
23 years of age.’ ”  (Id. at p. 308.)  We concluded that the 
potential ameliorating benefit of remaining in the juvenile court 
system was analogous to the potential reduction in a criminal 
defendant’s sentence in Estrada and Francis, and therefore the 
same inference of retroactivity should apply.  (Lara, supra, 
4 Cal.5th at pp. 308-309.)   
We also determined that nothing in Proposition 57’s text 
or ballot materials rebutted Estrada’s inference of retroactivity.  
(Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 303-304.)  To the contrary, certain 
provisions of Proposition 57, including its stated purpose to 
“ ‘[s]top the 
revolving 
door 
of 
crime 
by 
emphasizing 
rehabilitation, especially for juveniles’ ” and its instruction that 
the “ ‘act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes,’ ” 
“support[ed] the conclusion that Estrada’s inference of 
retroactivity is not rebutted.”  (Lara, at p. 309.)   
With this background in mind, we now consider whether 
section 1001.36 applies retroactively. 
 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
C.  The Mental Health Diversion Statute Applies 
Retroactively Because It Mitigates the Possible 
Punishment for a Class of Persons and There Is 
No Clear Contraindication of Legislative Intent  
As noted, the Court of Appeal held that Estrada’s 
inference of retroactivity applies to section 1001.36.  (Frahs, 
supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 791.)  It reasoned that, similar to the 
reforms 
adopted 
through 
Proposition 
57, 
the 
statute 
“unquestionably” offers an “ ‘ameliorating benefit’ ” for a 
defendant diagnosed with a mental disorder to have the 
opportunity for diversion, and ultimately, a possible dismissal 
of the criminal charges.  (Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal also 
concluded that the statute’s express purpose of promoting 
“ ‘[i]ncreased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to 
mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal 
justice system while protecting public safety’ ” indicated “the 
Legislature intended the . . . program to apply as broadly as 
possible.”  (Ibid., quoting § 1001.35, subd. (a), italics in Frahs.)   
The Court of Appeal rejected the People’s argument that 
the statute’s definition of “ ‘pretrial diversion’ ” as “the 
postponement of prosecution . . . at any point in the judicial 
process 
. . . 
until 
adjudication” 
(§ 1001.36, 
subd. 
(c)) 
demonstrated that the Legislature did not intend section 
1001.36 to apply retroactively.  (Frahs, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 791.)  The appellate court explained:  “The fact that mental 
health diversion is available only up until the time that a 
defendant’s case is ‘adjudicated’ is simply how this particular 
diversion program is ordinarily designed to operate.  Indeed, the 
fact that a juvenile transfer hearing under Proposition 57 
ordinarily occurs prior to the attachment of jeopardy did not 
prevent the Supreme Court in Lara from finding that such 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
hearing must be made available to all defendants whose 
convictions are not yet final on appeal.”  (Ibid.)   
We agree with the Court of Appeal.2  The parties concur 
that section 1001.36, like Proposition 57, offers a potentially 
ameliorative benefit for a class of individuals — namely, 
criminal defendants who suffer from a qualifying mental 
disorder.  On its face, the diversion statute states the legislative 
purpose “to promote . . .  [¶] [i]ncreased diversion of individuals 
with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and 
reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public 
safety” (§ 1001.35, subd. (a)), and the procedures instituted by 
the enactment carry the potential of substantial reductions in 
punishment for the aforementioned parties. 
The pertinent circumstances here are like those involved 
in Lara, in that the possibility of being granted mental health 
diversion rather than being tried and sentenced “can result in 
dramatically different and more lenient treatment.”  (Lara, 
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 303.)  A defendant who shows that he or 
 
2  
Several published appellate decisions are in accord.  
(People v. Burns (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 776, review granted 
Oct. 30, 2019, S257738 [§ 1001.36 applies retroactively]; People 
v. Hughes (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 886, review granted Nov. 26, 
2019, S258541 [same]; People v. Weaver (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 
1103, review granted Oct. 9, 2019, S257049 [same]; People v. 
Weir (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 868, review granted June 26, 2019, 
S255212 [same].)  Other Courts of Appeal have reached a 
different conclusion.  (People v. Lipsett (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 
569, review granted May 13, 2020, S261323 [§ 1001.36 does not 
apply retroactively]; People v. Khan (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 460, 
review granted June 26, 2019, S255212 [same]; People v. Craine 
(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 744, review granted Sept. 11, 2019, 
S256671 [same].)  As explained below (see pt. III, post), we will 
disapprove these contrary decisions.   
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
she is eligible and suitable for diversion may be referred to a 
mental health treatment program designed to meet the 
defendant’s specialized needs for up to two years.  (§ 1001.36, 
subd. (c)(1).)  If a defendant successfully completes diversion, 
the trial court “shall” dismiss the criminal charges and the 
“arrest upon which the diversion was based shall be deemed 
never to have occurred.”  (Id., subd. (e).)  Accordingly, the impact 
of a trial court’s decision to grant diversion can spell the 
difference between, on the one hand, a defendant receiving 
specialized mental health treatment, possibly avoiding criminal 
prosecution altogether, and even maintaining a clean record, 
and on the other, a defendant serving a lengthy prison sentence.  
(See Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 308.)  Indeed, the People 
concede in their briefing that “mental health diversion has a 
potentially ameliorative effect:  defendants who successfully 
complete the program would be able to have criminal charges 
wiped clean.”  Thus, the ameliorative nature of the diversion 
program places it squarely within the spirit of the Estrada rule. 
Because it is undisputed that the diversion statute 
provides a possible benefit to a class of criminal defendants and 
the statute does not contain an express savings clause that 
limits the program to prospective-only application, the specific 
question before us boils down to whether the Legislature 
“clearly signal[ed] its intent” to overcome the Estrada inference 
that section 1001.36 applies retroactively to all cases not yet 
final on appeal.  (Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 793.)   
We conclude that the text of the statute does not clearly 
signal such an intent.  At the outset, we note that the statute 
contains language that could be read as supporting the 
expansive application of its provisions.  The Court of Appeal 
reasonably regarded the statement of legislative purpose found 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
in section 1001.35, subdivision (a) as bolstering the conclusion 
“that the Legislature intended the mental health diversion 
program to apply as broadly as possible.”  (Frahs, supra, 
27 Cal.App.5th at p. 791.)  The breadth of the statute’s 
statement of purpose — aimed to “[i]ncrease[] diversion of 
individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ 
entry and reentry into the criminal justice system” (§ 1001.35, 
subd. (a), italics added) — is consistent with the retroactive 
application of the diversion scheme.  This statement of purpose 
further “support[s] the conclusion that the Estrada inference of 
retroactivity is not rebutted” — that is, that the Legislature 
intended to apply the provisions of section 1001.36 to every case 
to which it constitutionally could apply.  (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th 
at p. 309.)  But even if this statement of purpose is disregarded, 
the statute does not plainly communicate an intent that its 
provisions would apply only prospectively. 
On this subject, the People renew their argument that the 
statute’s 
definition 
of 
“ ‘pretrial 
diversion’ ” 
as 
“the 
postponement of prosecution . . . at any point in the judicial 
process 
. . . 
until 
adjudication” 
(§ 1001.36, 
subd. (c)) 
demonstrates that the Legislature intended to limit its 
application to cases that had not yet been adjudicated at the 
time 
of 
enactment, 
dispelling 
Estrada’s 
inference 
of 
retroactivity.  The People acknowledge that “the language of 
section 1001.36 does not necessarily demonstrate an intent to 
foreclose diversion to all those who committed a crime prior to 
the effective date of the Act,” but maintain that the phrase “until 
adjudication” expressly limits retroactive application of the 
statute to defendants whose cases had not yet been, in the 
People’s words, “resolved by a trier of fact.”     
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
We are not persuaded.  Like the Court of Appeal, we view 
the definition of “pretrial diversion” as simply reflecting the 
Legislature’s intent regarding how the statute will generally 
operate when a case comes before the trial court after section 
1001.36’s enactment.  In the ordinary course of procedure, a trial 
court determines whether a defendant is eligible for pretrial 
diversion before judgment is entered, and the defendant cannot 
be heard to seek such diversion afterward.  Broadly consistent 
with this common feature of pretrial diversion, the statute 
before 
us 
provides 
that 
diversion 
is 
available 
“until 
adjudication” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)), which the People construe 
as until the charge or charges against a defendant are resolved.3  
But that expectation regarding how the statute normally will 
apply going forward is quite different from the specific 
retroactivity question presented here, to which the Estrada 
inference applies.  
So understood, we conclude that the “until adjudication” 
language included in section 1001.36, subdivision (c) is not a 
clear expression of the Legislature’s intent to make the statute 
 
3  
As suggested by the text, we have no occasion here to 
precisely define “until adjudication,” as used in section 1001.36, 
subdivision (c), and our analysis should not be read as tacitly 
adopting the People’s interpretation of this language. 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
solely prospective.  (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 656-657.)4  
Here, it is helpful to contrast this language in the diversion 
statute with the language in Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18, subd. (a), 
approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) and amended by 
Stats. 2016, ch. 767, § 1, p. 5313) and the Three Strikes Reform 
Act of 2012 (Prop. 36, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 
2012)).  Both of these measures included specific resentencing 
provisions applicable to persons who had already been 
sentenced (§§ 1170.18, subd. (a), 1170.126, subd. (b)), and 
therefore overcame the inference of ameliorative retroactivity.  
(People v. DeHoyos (2018) 4 Cal.5th 594, 603; Conley, at p. 657.)  
Unlike these other measures, the “until adjudication” language 
within section 1001.36 does not “ ‘clearly signal[]’ ” the 
Legislature’s intent to rebut the Estrada inference.  (Nasalga, 
supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 793.)   
The People point to additional language in section 1001.36 
that also supposedly indicates a legislative intent to apply the 
diversion statute prospectively only.  They assert that the 
statutory provision permitting a trial court to “grant pretrial 
diversion to a defendant” (§ 1001.36, subd. (a), italics added) 
means that diversion is not available after trial.  They similarly 
maintain that the threshold eligibility factor requiring a 
 
4  
The People also emphasize that the assertedly limiting 
language in section 1001.36 comports with provisions found in 
other, similar diversion statutes.  But this observation adds 
little to the People’s argument regarding the intent behind 
section 1001.36.  These other statutes simply define what 
pretrial diversion is and how it is generally supposed to operate:  
For example, “pretrial diversion refers to the procedure of 
postponing prosecution of an offense . . . at any point in the 
judicial process from the point at which the accused is charged 
until adjudication.”  (§ 1001.1; see also, e.g., § 1001.70, subd. (b).)   
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
defendant to waive his or her right to a speedy trial (id., subd. 
(b)(1)(D)) makes clear that the Legislature did not intend for 
diversion to be available to defendants whose trials had 
concluded.  Again, we disagree.  As with the “until adjudication” 
phrasing, this language simply explains how the mental health 
diversion program will ordinarily function:  In the normal course 
of operations, a trial court would determine before trial whether 
a defendant is eligible for pretrial diversion.  This phrasing does 
not demonstrate a legislative intent to “modify, limit, or entirely 
forbid the retroactive application of ameliorative criminal-law 
amendments” (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 656) “with 
sufficient clarity that a reviewing court can discern and 
effectuate it” (In re Pedro T. (1993) 8 Cal.4th 1041, 1049).   
 
Overall, on the question of retroactivity we regard the 
provisions of section 1001.36 as comparable to the statutory 
language involved in Lara, in which we concluded that the 
electorate intended Proposition 57 to apply retroactively to all 
cases not yet final on appeal.  (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 304.)  
Like section 1001.36, Proposition 57 contains language 
regarding matters of timing and procedure, including a 
requirement that the prosecutor file a transfer motion “prior to 
the attachment of jeopardy.”  (Welf. & Ins. Code, former § 707, 
subd. (a), added by Prop. 57.)  Notwithstanding these provisions, 
we determined that “nothing in Proposition 57’s text or ballot 
materials rebuts th[e] inference” of retroactivity.  (Lara, at 
pp. 303-304; see id. at pp. 308-309.)  Here too, we do not divine 
from section 1001.36’s “until adjudication” language, or the 
other provisions cited by the People, a clear indication of 
legislative intent to apply the statute prospectively only.  Like 
Proposition 57, in providing instructions regarding how its 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
provisions are meant to operate generally, section 1001.36 does 
not rebut the Estrada inference of ameliorative retroactivity.   
Our conclusion finds additional support in Francis.  There, 
the People maintained that “ ‘the very nature’ of the amendment 
[giving trial courts discretion to impose only local jail time for 
possession of marijuana] leads to the conclusion that it was only 
intended to apply to cases where sentencing occurred after the 
effective date of the amendment.”  (Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d at 
p. 77.)  In rejecting this argument, we emphasized that we had 
previously declined to interpret statutory amendments vesting 
discretion in the trial court as an indication that they were 
intended to be limited to prospective application.  (Id. at p. 78, 
citing In re Corcoran (1966) 64 Cal.2d 447 and In re Ring (1966) 
64 Cal.2d 450.) 
Moreover, we are mindful that the Legislature “is deemed 
to be aware of existing laws and judicial constructions in effect 
at the time legislation is enacted.”  (People v. Weidert (1985) 
39 Cal.3d 836, 844.)  Four months before the Legislature 
enacted section 1001.36, we decided in Lara that a statute that 
reduced the possible punishment for a class of persons applied 
retroactively.  Our prior decisions have also made clear that in 
order to rebut Estrada’s inference of retroactivity concerning 
ameliorative statutes, the Legislature must “demonstrate its 
intention with sufficient clarity that a reviewing court can 
discern and effectuate it.”  (In re Pedro T., supra, 8 Cal.4th at 
p. 1049; see also Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 656-657; 
Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 793.)  Thus, when the 
Legislature enacted section 1001.36, it was aware that if it did 
not want the statute to apply retroactively to nonfinal 
judgments, it needed to clearly and directly indicate such intent 
in order to rebut Estrada’s inference of retroactivity.  The text 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
relied upon by the People does not establish a contrary 
legislative intent. 
Nor do we perceive in the legislative history a clear 
indication that the Legislature did not intend for the statute to 
apply retroactively.  Citing an Assembly report, the People 
suggest that the Legislature was motivated by potential cost 
savings in enacting section 1001.36, a motivation assertedly 
inconsistent with retroactive application.  (Assem. Conc. Sen. 
Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 1810 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended June 12, 2018, pp. 7-8.)  Yet even if one accepts for 
sake of argument the premise that retroactive application of the 
statute would not be cost effective (but see the discussion post), 
the People offer no reason to think the Legislature sought to cut 
costs at the expense of accomplishing the statute’s other aims.  
The report’s reference to cost savings tells us little, if anything, 
about whether the Legislature intended the statute to apply 
retroactively.  Therefore, we do not regard the mention of cost 
savings in a legislative report as a clear indication of contrary 
legislative intent. 
And in any event, it is not clear that a cost savings 
motivation would be inconsistent with retroactive application of 
the mental health diversion statute.  According to an analysis of 
Senate Bill 215, which amended section 1001.36 just a few 
months after it was enacted, community-based treatment for a 
mentally ill individual costs much less than jailing the same 
individual, and greatly reduces recidivism.  (Sen. Rules Com., 
Off. Of Sen. Floor Analysis, Unfinished Business Analysis of 
Sen. Bill 215 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 23, 2018, 
p. 2 [community-based treatment for a mentally ill defendant 
costs roughly $20,000 per year; jailing the same defendant costs 
more than $75,000].)  Thus, for an individual like defendant, 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
who is currently serving a nine-year prison sentence, 
participation in a mental health diversion program rather than 
serving the remainder of his sentence could potentially result in 
substantial cost savings to the state.     
The People also contend that the timing of Senate Bill 
215’s amendments to section 1001.36 supports their position.  
“Had the Legislature believed that the original enactment was 
retroactive for all cases not yet final on appeal,” the People 
argue, “presumably it would have taken urgent action in order 
to avoid allowing convicted murders and rapists with non-final 
judgments to avoid conviction in the interim.”  Instead, the 
People observe, the amendments to section 1001.36 that were 
implemented through Senate Bill 215 were approved by the 
Legislature in September 2018 and became effective only in 
January 2019.  
This is not a persuasive argument.  The Legislature’s 
decision not to enact subsequent amendments with urgency 
does not clearly indicate an intent to rebut the Estrada inference 
of retroactivity, particularly in light of the statute’s express 
purpose to increase diversion.  (§ 1001.35, subd. (a).)  Moreover, 
under the statutory scheme as originally enacted through 
Assembly Bill 1810, the diversion authorized by section 1001.36 
hinged on the satisfaction of criteria, including a finding by the 
court “that the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of 
danger to public safety.”  (Former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(6).)  In 
adopting Senate Bill 215, the Legislature could have regarded 
the preexisting criteria as adequate to protect public safety, at 
least until the new law took effect.  
The People further argue that applying Estrada’s 
inference of retroactivity to cases after adjudication would risk 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
potentially “undermining the legitimacy” of a jury’s verdict.  The 
People maintain that defendants suffering from mental illness 
will frequently pursue a mental health defense, which a jury 
must necessarily reject by reaching a guilty verdict.  Meanwhile, 
to find a defendant eligible for diversion under the statute, the 
court must be satisfied that the defendant suffers from a mental 
disorder (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(A)), and that the “disorder was 
a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense” 
(id., subd. (b)(1)(B)).  The People identify an overlap in this 
scenario between the issues that were before a jury and, later, 
to be decided by the court considering eligibility for diversion.  
They reason therefrom that it “would risk potentially 
undermining the integrity of [a] jury’s findings” if a trial court 
subsequently held a diversion eligibility hearing.  But even if we 
were to assume some such overlap in a subset of the cases to 
which the diversion statute may apply (the statute does not 
define the term “significant factor,” and we have no occasion 
here to do so), the more fundamental fact is that it would not 
provide a clear indication that the statute was not intended to 
apply retroactively.  The Legislature could well have intended 
to allow judges to decide under the statute whether a 
defendant’s mental disorder was a “significant factor in the 
commission of the charged offense” (ibid.) even after a verdict in 
which a mental health defense had been presented but rejected 
by the trier of fact.   
Finally, the People assert that section 1001.36 should not 
be given retroactive effect because it would be awkward to apply 
the scheme after adjudication.  They emphasize that some of the 
statute’s eligibility requirements, such as waiver of a 
defendant’s right to a speedy trial (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(D)), 
would no longer be pertinent, and language in the statute 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
providing that diversion be made “pretrial” would have to be 
ignored.  The potential logistical problems identified by the 
People in providing defendants with a diversion eligibility 
hearing after conviction, however, do not provide a sufficient 
basis to deny defendants the benefit of a hearing altogether.  
(See Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 312-313.)  Although applying 
section 1001.36 retroactively may be somewhat challenging, we 
remain optimistic that “the courts involved can implement [it] 
without undue difficulty.”  (Lara, at p. 313.)     
D.  Defendant Is Entitled to a Pretrial Diversion 
Hearing  
Having found that section 1001.36 applies retroactively, 
we must now consider the remedy.  In Lara, we endorsed a 
limited remand procedure described by the Court of Appeal in 
People v. Vela (2018) 11 Cal.App.5th 68 (judg. vacated and cause 
remanded (2018) 411 P.3d 526, reaffd. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 
1099) to allow the juvenile court to conduct a transfer hearing 
under Proposition 57.  (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 309-310, 
citing Vela, at p. 81 [now 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 1113].)  Noting its 
authority to “ ‘remand the cause to the trial court for such 
further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances’ ” 
pursuant to section 1260, the Vela court conditionally reversed 
the defendant’s conviction and sentence and ordered a limited 
remand to the juvenile court with instructions to conduct a 
juvenile transfer hearing, treating the matter as though the 
prosecutor had originally filed a juvenile petition in juvenile 
court and had then moved to transfer the defendant’s case to a 
court of criminal jurisdiction.  (Vela, at p. 81 [now 
21 Cal.App.5th at p. 1113], citing § 1260; see Lara, at p. 310.)   
Here, the Court of Appeal concluded that remand is 
warranted because defendant’s case is not yet final on appeal 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
and the record affirmatively discloses that he appears to meet 
at least one of the threshold requirements:  a diagnosed mental 
disorder.  (Frahs, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 791.)  The court 
conditionally reversed defendant’s convictions and sentence and 
directed the trial court on remand to make an eligibility 
determination regarding diversion under section 1001.36.  
(Frahs, at p. 791.)  It “instruct[ed] the trial court — as nearly as 
possible — to retroactively apply the provisions of section 
1001.36, as though the statute existed at the time [defendant] 
was initially charged.”  (Ibid.)  It further provided:  “If the trial 
court finds that [defendant] suffers from a mental disorder, does 
not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, and 
otherwise meets the six statutory criteria (as nearly as possible 
given the postconviction procedural posture of this case), then 
the court may grant diversion.  If [defendant] successfully 
completes diversion, then the court shall dismiss the charges.  
However, if the court determines that [defendant] does not meet 
the criteria under section 1001.36, or if [defendant] does not 
successfully complete diversion, then his convictions and 
sentence shall be reinstated.”  (Id. at p. 792.) 
The People argue that remand is inappropriate because 
defendant has not made an adequate showing of eligibility.  
They assert that a defendant must demonstrate that he or she 
satisfies all six threshold eligibility requirements before an 
appellate court may remand the case to the trial court for a 
diversion eligibility hearing.   
We conclude that imposing such a high bar in the posture 
of proceedings such as these would be unduly onerous and 
impractical.  When, as here, a defendant was tried and convicted 
before section 1001.36 became effective, the record on appeal is 
unlikely to include information pertaining to several eligibility 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
factors, such as whether the defendant consents to diversion 
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(D)), agrees to comply with treatment as 
a condition of diversion (id., subd. (b)(1)(E)), or has provided the 
opinion of a qualified mental health expert that the defendant’s 
symptoms would respond to mental health treatment (id., subd. 
(b)(1)(C)).  Moreover, the People elsewhere acknowledge that 
“some of the eligibility requirements no longer apply” to 
defendants whose cases were adjudicated before the diversion 
statute was enacted.  Accordingly, it makes little sense to 
require defendants to demonstrate on appeal that they would 
have waived their rights to a speedy trial.  Furthermore, 
requiring defendants to show they would meet all threshold 
eligibility requirements before the appellate court may remand 
the case to the trial court — which decides in the first instance 
whether a defendant is eligible for diversion — would be 
inconsistent with any sensible retroactive application of the 
statute.  That, in turn, would run counter to our usual inference 
that the Legislature intends ameliorative statutes like this one 
to apply as broadly as possible within the constraints of finality 
— an inference that has not been rebutted here.5  (See Lara, 
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 308, quoting Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th a 
p. 657.)  
 
5  
Our conclusion that the Estrada rule applies here also 
leads us to reject the People’s suggestion that an individual in 
defendant’s position must first file a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus demonstrating his or her eligibility.  The statute has 
direct retroactive application, with a remand allowing the trial 
court to ascertain defendant’s eligibility for diversion, so habeas 
corpus procedures are not implicated here.  (Cf. In re Kirchner 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1052.) 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
The People next claim that a remand would be pointless 
because the trial court has already made findings that cast 
defendant as unsuitable for diversion.  The People emphasize 
the trial court’s determination in the proceedings below that 
there were no “significant mitigating factors” that weighed in 
favor of striking defendant’s prior enhancement.  (See §§ 25, 
subd. (c), 1385, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.409, 
4.423(a)(7), (b)(2), 4.428(b)(1); People v. Williams (1998) 
17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)  Thus, the argument goes, the trial court 
has already concluded that defendant knew his actions were 
illegal (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423(a)(7)) and was not 
“suffering from a mental condition that significantly reduced 
culpability for” his crimes (id., rule 4.423(b)(2)) — and therefore 
would find defendant ineligible for diversion on remand.  But we 
agree with defendant that these findings do not conclusively 
establish that a remand would be futile.  Section 1001.36, 
subdivision (b)(1) provides that pretrial diversion may be 
granted if, among other requirements, the court is satisfied that 
“the defendant suffers from a mental disorder” (id., subd. 
(b)(1)(A)) and “the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant 
factor in the commission of the charged offense” (id., subd. 
(b)(1)(B)).  As defendant argues, the trial court could find that 
these criteria for diversion are satisfied even if that court 
believed defendant’s mental disorder did not significantly 
reduce his culpability for the crimes. 
The People further contend that defendant’s ineligibility 
for probation disqualifies him from mental health diversion 
because “diversion is similar in many respects to probation.”  
They maintain that by being ineligible for probation, defendant 
would also be ineligible for diversion because he would pose an 
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
community.  (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(F).)  Yet again, we are not 
convinced.  As a preliminary matter, the Legislature left it to 
trial courts to make fact-specific evaluations of risk under 
section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(1)(F).  If the Legislature had 
intended to make all defendants who are ineligible for probation 
also ineligible for diversion, it could have easily said so, just as 
the amendments enacted by Senate Bill 215 specified that 
defendants charged with certain crimes were categorically 
disqualified.  Moreover, a defendant may be ineligible for 
probation for numerous reasons other than being found to be an 
unreasonable risk of danger of public safety.  (E.g., § 1210.1, 
subd. (b).)  Here, defendant admitted he was ineligible for 
probation under section 1203, subdivision (k) [probation shall 
not be granted to any person who is convicted of a violent or 
serious felony and who was on probation for a felony offense at 
the time of the commission of the new felony offense].  The trial 
court made no finding regarding whether defendant would pose 
an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the 
community, and we decline to interpret its ruling in such a 
manner. 
The People also assert that defendant, having already 
been sentenced, is disqualified from diversion because the Penal 
Code prohibits a defendant who is ineligible for probation or who 
has a prior strike from receiving a suspended sentence.  (§§ 667, 
subd. (c)(2), 1203, subd. (k).)  The People reason that if diversion 
is granted, “the trial court would necessarily be required to 
suspend imposition of sentence while [defendant] pursued 
diversion,” contravening this rule.  But by conditionally 
reversing defendant’s convictions and sentence for an eligibility 
hearing under section 1001.36, the case would be restored to its 
procedural posture before the jury verdict for purposes of 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
evaluating defendant’s eligibility for pretrial mental health 
diversion.  (Burns, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 789.)  At that 
point, defendant faced a mere allegation of a prior serious felony 
conviction, which is not enough to prohibit a suspended sentence 
or diversion.   
Last, the People maintain that defendant is procedurally 
barred from obtaining relief because his case has already been 
adjudicated.  This argument is unconvincing.  As previously 
explained, the statute’s definition of “ ‘pretrial diversion’ ” as the 
postponement of prosecution at any point of the judicial process 
“until adjudication” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)) does not prevent the 
statute from applying retroactively.  By definition, a statute 
applies “retroactively” to cases already past the procedural point 
at which the new law ordinarily applies — here, cases that have 
already been adjudicated but are not yet final on appeal.  At the 
time section 1001.36 became effective, defendant’s case was 
adjudicated but the judgment was not yet final.  Accordingly, he 
is entitled to the benefits of the statute’s retroactive application.     
To summarize and apply the foregoing, we conclude that a 
conditional limited remand for the trial court to conduct a 
mental health diversion eligibility hearing is warranted when, 
as here, the record affirmatively discloses that the defendant 
appears to meet at least the first threshold eligibility 
requirement for mental health diversion — the defendant 
suffers from a qualifying mental disorder (§ 1001.36, subd. 
(b)(1)(A)).  Because this case does not present such an issue, we 
do not address the question of whether an appellate court may 
also decline a defendant’s remand request when the record 
clearly indicates the trial court would have found the defendant 
“pose[s] an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” (id., 
subd. (b)(1)(F)) and is therefore ineligible for diversion.  Nor are 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
we here addressing the separate question of whether the 2019 
amendments, which rendered defendants charged with certain 
crimes categorically ineligible for diversion, apply retroactively.  
(Id., subd. (b)(2), added by Stats. 2018, ch. 1005, § 1.) 
There is evidence in the record that appears to support the 
first of the statute’s threshold eligibility requirements, and one 
other besides.  A clinical and forensic psychologist testified that 
defendant suffers from a qualifying mental disorder (§ 1001.36, 
subd. (b)(1)(A)), and opined that his behavior at the Santa Ana 
market was a consequence of this disorder (id., subd. (b)(1)(B)).  
This evidence suffices to make a conditional limited remand 
appropriate here. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which 
conditionally reversed defendant’s convictions and sentence 
with the following instructions for the trial court in considering 
defendant’s eligibility for diversion under section 1001.36:  “If 
the trial court finds that [defendant] suffers from a mental 
disorder, does not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public 
safety, and otherwise meets the six statutory criteria (as nearly 
as possible given the postconviction procedural posture of this 
case), then the court may grant diversion.  If [defendant] 
successfully completes diversion, then the court shall dismiss 
the charges.  However, if the court determines that [defendant] 
does not meet the criteria under section 1001.36, or if 
[defendant] does not successfully complete diversion, then his 
convictions and sentence shall be reinstated.”  (Frahs, supra, 
27 Cal.App.5th at p. 792.)  We agree that the trial court should 
adopt these procedures, and therefore we remand the matter to 
the Court of Appeal with directions for it to remand the cause to 
PEOPLE v. FRAHS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with these 
instructions.  We express no view concerning whether defendant 
will be able to show eligibility on remand or whether the trial 
court should exercise its discretion to grant diversion if it finds 
him eligible. 
We also disapprove the opinions in People v. Lipsett, 
supra, 45 Cal.App.5th 569, review granted May 13, 2020, 
S261323; People v. Khan, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th 460, review 
granted Jan. 29, 2020, S259498; and People v. Craine, supra, 
35 Cal.App.5th 744, review granted Sept. 11, 2019, S256671, to 
the extent they are inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
We Concur: 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Frahs 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XX 27 Cal.App.5th 784 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S252220 
Date Filed:  June 18, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Orange 
Judge:  Glenn R. Salter 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Arthur Martin and Susan L. Ferguson, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, 
Assistant Attorney General, Matthew Mulford, Marilyn George, Meredith White, Daniel Hilton and Steve 
Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Steve Oetting 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92186-5266 
(619) 738-9207 
 
Arthur Martin 
Appellate Defenders, Inc. 
555 West Beech Street, Suite 300 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 696-0282