Case Title: Ochs v. Town of Hot Sulphur Springs

Citation: 407 P.2d 677

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1965-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
407 P.2d 677 (1965) Edwin C. OCHS and Betty M. Ochs, Plaintiffs in Error, v. TOWN OF HOT SULPHUR SPRINGS, a municipal corporation of the State of Colorado, and Carl F. Fischer, County Treasurer of the County of Grand, State of Colorado, Defendants in Error. No. 21878. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. November 15, 1965. *678 Robinson & Curran, Lakewood, for plaintiffs in error. Henry J. R. Benac, Kremmling, for defendants in error. MOORE, Justice. The parties appear in this court in the same order as they appeared before the trial court and will be referred to as they appeared in the lower court. The plaintiffs asked for entry of a declaratory judgment that certain "frontage" taxes claimed by the Town of Hot Sulphur Springs were illegal and void and beyond the power of the town to exact. The trial court held that the taxes claimed by the town were valid, and the plaintiffs are here on writ of error to review that judgment. Although a formal appearance was entered by the defendants we were not favored by any brief attempting to support the judgment. The undisputed facts are as follows: The plaintiffs, Edwin C. Ochs and Betty M. Ochs, were owners of about 184 parcels of land situated entirely within the corporate limits of the town of Hot Sulphur Springs. None of the plaintiffs' lots lie within any special improvement district of the town. The total assessed value of the lots for the year 1962 was $2,830.00. The property taxes assessed against the property on an ad valorem basis were: A general levy of 18.97 mills or a tax of $53.69, a school district levy of 26.52 mills or a tax of $75.05, a Moffat Tunnel levy of .40 mills or a tax of $1.13, and a town levy of 20.00 mills or a tax of $56.60all being a total levy of 65.89 mills upon the assessed valuation with a resultant total tax of $186.47. Also it is undisputed that in addition to the town's 20 mill levy, it asserted a "frontage tax" and a "water frontage tax" against the plaintiffs' lots. The legality of these "frontage" taxes is the foundation of the instant suit. The "frontage tax," Town Ordinance No. 142, asserted a tax of ten cents per front foot upon properties within the town's corporate limits, and the revenues therefrom were allocated 60 per cent to the street department fund and 40 per cent to the equipment fund. The "water frontage tax," Town Ordinance No. 63, purported to levy a tax of $2 per each 50 feet of lot space fronting upon a water main, and was for the maintenance of the town's water system. Application of these "frontage" assessments to plaintiffs' platted property amounted to an additional tax of $655.00 or in excess of 23% of the total assessed valuation of the land. *679 It is argued as grounds for reversal of the judgment: If the ordinances under attack are to be given validity they must be justified within one of two types of taxes permitted under statutory or constitutional authority, namely: (1) a general ad valorem tax as prescribed by Article X, Section 3 of the Colorado Constitution, which must be imposed uniformly upon both real and personal property according to their assessed valuation, Gordon v. Wheatridge Water District et al., 107 Colo. 128, 109 P.2d 899, 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 26; or (2) an assessment in the nature of a special tax for purposes of municipal improvement conferring a special benefit upon the property being assessed, 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 1290, 1291. The source by which the municipality may impose either of these two types of taxes upon the properties within its corporate limits is found under the provisions of Article X, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution. In turn, this power is specifically amplified or implemented by the provisions of C.R.S. `53, 139-32-1(5) which provides: And the specific taxing power is governed by C.R.S. '53, 139-37-1: But what we must concern ourselves with is the distinction between an "assessment" and an ad valorem tax. This distinction was pointed out in City and County of Denver v. Tihen, 77 Colo. 212, 235 P. 777, from which we quote the following: If the "taxes" were special assessments upon the properties of the plaintiffs, the revenues therefrom could not be diverted to providing for general town purposes, but would necessarily have to be used and confined to payment for the capital improvement resulting in an equivalent benefit to *680 plaintiffs' properties. It is apparent that the ordinances in question do not purport to be a special "assessment" within the definition thereof as contained in City and County of Denver v. Tihen, supra. The trial court reached the conclusion that the "frontage" taxes imposed by the ordinances were authorized by C.R.S. 1953, 139-32-1(5) which provides that the governing body in cities and towns shall have power: In reaching this conclusion the trial court erred. It is sufficient to say that if the tax is for a "general" purpose it must be an ad valorem tax. If it is a tax for a "special" purpose it must meet the tests laid down in Pomroy et al. v. Board of Public Water Works of Pueblo, et al., 55 Colo. 476, 136 P. 78: To like effect is City and County of Denver v. Greenspoon, 140 Colo. 402, 344 P.2d 679, where we find this statement: Upon the trial the evidence was clear that there was nothing by the imposition of the taxes which specially enhanced the value of the plaintiffs' properties, and this being so, it is patent that the taxes were nothing more than a devise or a scheme, unsupported by any permissive revenue producing authority, to provide funds for the general community benefit, and hence violative of the due process of law guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment as prayed for in the complaint.