Case Title: PETER KOLE MURRAY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
PETER KOLE MURRAY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 134776 P.2d 206Case Number: 87-177Decided: 06/21/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
PETER KOLE 
MURRAY, 
APPELLANT (PETITIONER),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(RESPONDENT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LincolnCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

Martin J. 
McClain, Deputy State Public Defender, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and David K. Gruver, Asst. 
Atty. Gen. (argued), for 
appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ., 
and BROWN, J. Ret.*

* Retired June 29, 
1988.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant, Peter Kole 
Murray, seeks review of the district court's order dismissing his petition for 
post-conviction relief. We affirm.

[¶2.]     On January 18, 1983, a 
jury found Murray guilty of the crime of attempted sexual 
assault felony murder. Murray appealed that 
conviction, and we affirmed in Murray v. State, 
671 P.2d 320 (Wyo. 1983). The facts of the case are set out 
in that opinion. On August 19, 1986, Murray filed, pro se, a petition for 
post-conviction relief which raised three issues:

"[I] The petitioner was 
denied his rights under the Sixth Amendment to a fair and impartial jury in 
Lincoln County, Wyoming, due to extensive pretrial 
publicity.

"[II] The petitioner was 
denied his rights under the Sixth Amendment: and, the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: and, his rights under 
the Sixth Amendment to effective assistance of counsel when he was not provided 
the best defense available, a complete defense, and when the trial court 
repelled his right to assert complete defense which defense was best defense 
available.

"[III] The petitioner was 
denied his rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments when the prosecution knowingly entered 
fraudulent evidence."

In addition to 
raising these issues, Murray asked that counsel be appointed to 
represent him and that he be permitted to amend his petition and raise 
additional issues after consultation with counsel.

[¶3.]     An attorney was 
appointed to represent Murray and an amended petition for 
post-conviction relief was filed on December 2, 1986. The amended petition 
incorporated by reference the pro se petition and raised five 
issues:

i. Refusal of Murray's Motion for Change 
of Venue denied him his right to a fair and impartial 
jury.

ii. The evidence 
presented to the jury was insufficient to sustain the jury's finding of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.

iii. Wyoming's felony 
murder statute operates in such a manner as to allow a conclusive presumption on 
the issues of malice and premeditation and thus violates the rule of law 
enunciated in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 
(1979). 

iv. The trial court's 
refusal of an involuntary intoxication instruction denied Murray his constitutional 
right to a fair trial.

v. Murray was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel both at the trial stage and in the prosecution 
of his appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court.

[¶4.]     On June 16, 1987, the 
district court entered its order denying relief. On June 26, 1987, Murray filed a timely 
notice of appeal, and in his brief in this court he raised eight 
issues:

"1. Whether Appellant was 
afforded effective assistance of counsel during his trial or his appeal to the 
Wyoming Supreme Court.

"2. Whether the trial 
court erroneously denied Appellant's challenge for cause when eight jurors 
stated they would disregard the Court's instruction concerning the presumption 
of innocence and impose burden to prove his innocence on 
Appellant.

"3. Whether the 
introduction of Appellant's statements to law enforcement personnel was 
reversible error.

"4. Whether the use of a 
conclusive presumption to convict Appellant of first degree murder is plain 
error and requires reversal of the conviction.

"5. Whether it was error 
to allow the testimony of Dr. Cline.

"6. Whether the trial 
court's refusal to instruct the jury upon the defense of involuntary 
intoxication deprived Appellant of his constitutional right to have all 
questions of fact resolved by the jury.

"7. Whether Appellant was 
denied his right of confrontation by the admission of numerous statements made 
by the decedent.

"8. Whether Appellant was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel when neither Sonya Martin was called 
to testify nor her out of court statements introduced into evidence pursuant to 
Rule 804 of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence."

[¶5.]     Post-conviction relief, 
governed by W.S. 7-14-101 et seq., performs the same limited function as did the 
writ of coram nobis. It is not a substitute for direct appeal and is limited to 
review of specific types of error. 18 Am.Jur.2d Coram Nobis § 45, at 673 (1985). 
Post-conviction relief is an extraordinary authorization to seek relief under 
circumstances which suggest a "miscarriage of justice." Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1261 (Wyo. 1988). The substance of a fair trial must 
be missing in order to justify its application. Id.; State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, 
TetonCounty, 696 P.2d 54, 64 (Wyo. 1985); Johnson v. State, 592 P.2d 285 (Wyo. 
1979).

[¶6.]     Because the relief 
intended to be provided by the post-conviction procedure is extraordinary, we 
have imposed some rather strict limitations on the issues which may be raised in 
the procedure. Issues which have been or could have been raised on appeal are 
not open to challenge by a petition for post-conviction relief because they are 
foreclosed by the doctrine of res judicata. Cutbirth, 751 P.2d  at 1261; 
Hopkinson, 696 P.2d  at 64. Moreover, W.S. 7-14-103 provides that any claim of 
substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an 
amended petition is waived.

[¶7.]     We proceed to apply 
these rules to the issues raised by appellant in this court. Issues enumerated 
2, 3, 5, 7 and 8 were not raised in the trial court and were thus waived. W.S. 
7-14-103. We will not consider these issues on appeal. Issue enumerated 2 is 
really a variation of an issue raised in his original appeal which asserted that 
the trial court erroneously denied his motion for change of venue. Murray v. State, 671 P.2d  
at 325-27. We explored the issue in detail in that opinion, including the 
variation raised as issue 2 in this appeal. Although appellant's failure to 
raise the issue in the district court is dispositive, we note this additional 
reason why issue 2 must be rejected.

[¶8.]     Appellant asserts 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the first half of issue enumerated 1. 
The issue of effective assistance of counsel at the trial level and issues 
enumerated 4 and 6 are issues which could have been raised in appellant's 
original appeal to this court, and we will, therefore, not consider them in the 
context of a post-conviction procedure. Cutbirth, 751 P.2d  at 
1261-62.

[¶9.]     As in Cutbirth, we are 
finally left with the issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
Cutbirth was decided after this case had been processed through the trial court. 
The trial court, therefore, did not have the benefit of the test we formulated 
for determining claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, that test 
being:

"In submitting a claim of 
deficient representation by appellate counsel, the petitioner in the 
post-conviction proceeding must demonstrate to the district court, by reference 
to the record of the original trial without resort to speculation or equivocal 
inference, what occurred at that trial. The particular facts upon which the 
claim of inadequate representation by appellate counsel rests must be presented. 
The petitioner must then identify a clear and unequivocal rule of law which 
those facts demonstrate was transgressed in a clear and obvious, not merely 
arguable, way. Furthermore, the petitioner must show the adverse effect upon a 
substantial right in order to complete a claim that the performance of appellate 
counsel was constitutionally deficient because of a failure to raise the issue 
on appeal. The adverse effect upon a substantial right in the context of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is shown by demonstrating a `* * * 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' In this regard 
the test does address the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. 
The reasonable probability must be one that demonstrates a more favorable result 
to the appellant if the omitted issue had been pursued." (Citations omitted.) 
Cutbirth, 751 P.2d  at 1266-67.

[¶10.]  We have held that ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel is not subject to the waiver doctrine. We therefore must 
consider on review appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and 
resolve that issue. Three matters were presented to the trial court that could 
be the basis for the assertion of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
They are:

1. Should a competent 
appellate counsel have raised as an issue on appeal the assertion that 
Wyoming's 
felony murder statute operates in such a manner as to allow a conclusive 
presumption as to the issues of malice and premeditation?

2. Should a competent 
appellate counsel have raised as an issue on appeal the refusal of the trial 
court to give an involuntary intoxication instruction?

3. Should a competent 
appellate counsel have raised as an issue on appeal an assertion that Murray was denied the 
effective assistance of trial counsel?

When these three 
questions are tested against our holding in Cutbirth, it is clear that no viable 
issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel could be sustained by the 
record in this case.

[¶11.]  With regard to Wyoming's felony murder 
statute, appellant can point to no clear and unequivocal rule of law which would 
have prompted an appellate counsel to raise that issue. Rather it is clear that 
such a rule would plow wholly new ground. No jurisdiction has held that a felony 
murder statute violates the rule of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979).

[¶12.]  With regard to the trial court's refusal 
to give an involuntary intoxication instruction, there is a clear rule of law 
which requires a trial court to give a correct instruction to the jury 
encompassing the defendant's theory of the case, provided that defendant offers 
a sufficient instruction and the theory is supported by competent evidence. Best 
v. State, 736 P.2d 739, 744 (Wyo. 1987). In Best we also noted that the 
source of the competent evidence can be solely from the defendant himself. In 
this case, appellant did not testify. Appellant's counsel did elicit from 
several witnesses on cross-examination that appellant claimed, on the night the 
crime took place, that he had been "stuck with a needle" and suggested that he 
may have been drugged. One of these witnesses asked appellant about this claim 
the day following his crime; and at that time, appellant responded that he did 
not know why he would have made that claim. It is clear from the record that 
appellant defended on the theory that he did not commit the crime at all, not 
that he had done it under the influence of an intoxicating substance that had 
been administered to him against his will. The claim of error in the court's 
refusal of the involuntary intoxication instruction was at most an arguable 
proposition and not one that violated the governing rule of law in a clear and 
obvious way. Therefore, failure to raise the issue in the direct appeal does not 
result in ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

[¶13.]  We have adopted a clear rule of law that 
to establish ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial it must be 
demonstrated that counsel's representation was deficient by showing errors were 
made that were so serious that counsel was not functioning in accordance with 
the constitutional guarantee of counsel and that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the appellant. Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145-47 (Wyo. 1986); Cutbirth, 751 P.2d  at 1263-64. No such demonstration was made to the district court, to this 
court, nor is it apparent in the record of this case. The most that can be said 
is that other strategies, all of which were much less likely to succeed than 
those chosen by trial counsel, might have been employed. We do note that 
appellant was represented by one of the most experienced and capable trial 
attorneys in the public defender's office; and based on the totality of the 
record, we are comfortable with the conclusion that he afforded the appellant 
effective legal assistance.

[¶14.]  Those claims cognizable in this court as 
bearing on the issue of effective assistance of appellate counsel do not support 
the appellant's contentions.

[¶15.]  The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶16.]  After an abysmally insufficient appellate 
brief on first appeal, Murray v. State, 671 P.2d 320 (Wyo. 
1983), we are now presented with an obligation to consider by 
post-conviction-relief petition the life sentence of Peter Kole Murray. Evitts 
v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S. Ct. 830, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821, reh'g denied 470 U.S. 1065, 105 S. Ct. 1783, 84 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985); Anders v. State of California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493, reh'g denied 388 U.S. 924, 87 S. Ct. 2094, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1377 (1967); Jones v. State, 27 Ark. App. 24, 765 S.W.2d 15 
(1989). From this majority's present disindigenous waiver/forfeiture 
disengagement from the issues of that conviction, I respectfully 
dissent.

[¶17.]  My aversion to the waiver/forfeiture 
thesis for disposition of constitutional issues involving ineffectiveness of 
counsel has been pursued extensively in Amin v. State, 774 P.2d 597 (Wyo. 1989) and Kallas v. State, 776 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1989). This third 
case as also mired in the morass of waiver/forfeiture presents a different 
perspective where a post-conviction-relief hearing was actually held, although 
evidentiary presentation was denied. Here as differing from Amin, this majority 
recognizes that a new system was created in Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257 
(Wyo. 1988) 
for which retroactive application to prior hearings in other cases would be a 
strained adjudicatory process. Here, at least, ineffectiveness of the clearly 
apparent appellate counsel's presentation on first appeal does require review. I 
continue to reject the illogical and inefficient disregard by waiver/forfeiture 
of constitutional right as an adaptation of this court to ineffectiveness cases 
from preclusion by neglect of appellate counsel. Additionally, I call into 
question both the standard itself and its individualized application to this 
case.

[¶18.]  In initial appeal, appointed counsel for 
Murray found 
only two issues to consider:

1. [Whether] "[t]he trial 
court erred in denying appellant's motion for change of venue, which motion 
alleged that extensive pre-trial publicity made it impossible to select a fair 
and impartial jury."

2. [Whether] "[t]he trial 
court erred in denying appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal since there 
was insufficient evidence upon which the jury could base a verdict of guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt."

Murray, 671 P.2d  at 
323.

[¶19.]  A change of venue in a criminal case by 
W.R.Cr.P. 23 (F.R.Cr.P. 21) is vested in the discretion of the trial court and 
since this specific rule was last adopted in 1969, this court has apparently 
never reversed a criminal conviction founded on claimed error in denied change 
of venue. Actually, compelling consideration has probably never been given to 
these attempts by counsel for the convicted defendant to reverse conviction 
since Hamilton v. Territory of Wyoming, 1 Wyo. 131 (1873) or about one 
hundred and fifteen years ago. In that case, the conviction for maintaining a 
house of prostitution was reversed, although not on the requested venue change 
but from prejudice of the judge in the misdemeanor case since the right to 
change the judge was mandatory, but to have a venue change was only 
discretionary. SeeState v. Hambrick, 65 Wyo. 1, 196 P.2d 661, reh'g denied 65 Wyo. 1, 198 P.2d 969 (1948) and State v. Vines, 49 
Wyo. 212, 54 P.2d 826 (1936).1 Any criminal conviction appeal on a 
claim of abuse of discretion for a denied venue change with history lacking at 
least one success in over a hundred years is a slender reed for appellate 
advocacy. Additionally, that particular issue was not sufficiently documented 
for adequate presentation as witnessed by the superior effort made in 
post-conviction-relief presentation in this present appellate 
sequence.

[¶20.]  Sufficiency of the evidence appeals have 
not encountered a singularly higher degree of acceptability in this court. 
Success is almost totally confined to cases where any proof of an indispensable 
element is totally missing. See Mendicoa v. State, 771 P.2d 1240 (Wyo. 1989) and Eagan v. 
State, 58 Wyo. 
167, 128 P.2d 215 (1942). Compare Munson v. State, 770 P.2d 1093 (Wyo. 1989) and Dangel v. State, 724 P.2d 1145 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶21.]  At best, the first appeal and included 
briefing in this case were pro forma. Actually, after comparison of the 
appellate brief with the post-conviction-relief brief, Murray would have been 
better served to have written that first brief himself rather than to rely on 
his appointed counsel. The vibrancy of perceived responsibility to attack his 
conviction was missing. There certainly was not the "antagonist, the fighter, 
the inexorable adversary" portrayed. See Anders, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 and I. Stone, Clarence Darrow for the Defense 
(1941).

[¶22.]  Consequently, for this ineffectiveness of 
appellate counsel inquiry as related to trial processes, court decisions and 
omissions of trial counsel, if any, we are called to examine responsively what 
was omitted from the first appellate brief as apparent issues since, in essence, 
nothing of merit was included. Close reference to this present 70-page appellant 
brief is required (as the maximum permitted by this court's rules), compared 
persuasively to the 23-page life sentence, first appellate brief presentation. 
These present issues as quoted in the majority include:

(a) Questions of basic 
law in first appeal;

(1) Sandstrom v. 
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979) conclusive presumption in felony murder 
conviction;

(2) denial of involuntary 
intoxication instruction; 

(3) improperly denied 
challenges for cause; and

(4) community prejudice 
and publicity involving inappropriate denial of the request for a change of 
venue;

(b) evidentiary errors at 
trial;

(1) admission of 
improperly obtained inculpatory admissions from defendant without appropriate 
Miranda warning;

(2) admission of expert 
witness testimony on a rapist profile identification of the defendant; 
and

(3) admission of 
statements of decedent following the offense and prior to 
death;

(c) ineffectiveness of 
trial and appellate counsel which deterred or excluded consideration of these 
issues in proper appellate context.

[¶23.]  As a response to these present issues, 
the State challenges consideration of juror claim, admission of inculpatory 
statement of Murray, admission of rape profile testimony, admission of 
decedent's statement and ineffective assistance of trial counsel because they 
"were never raised in either the original or the amended petition for 
post-conviction relief." Conversely, the State then makes the argument that 
appellant has not established that he was denied effective assistance of either 
trial counsel or appellate counsel from representation at trial or forfeiture of 
issues by non-inclusion on appeal. As following, the State considers the 
Sandstrom felony murder question in argument three. Argument four asks whether 
appellant established a substantial denial of his constitutional rights by the 
trial court's failure to instruct on the defense of involuntary intoxication and 
argument five states, "[d]id appellant establish a substantial denial of his 
constitutional rights by the trial court's denial of his challenge for cause of 
eight jurors?" This majority adopts the structure of argument created by the 
State, determines that ineffectiveness of trial counsel was waived or forfeited 
by appellate counsel and that appellate counsel was not ineffective and that 
forfeiture denies consideration of all of these issues after exclusion from the 
initial appellate brief.

[¶24.]  Differing from my application in Kallas, 
776 P.2d 198, I am not going to address each issue now presented since most 
issues have not been considered substantively by either the State in their brief 
or this majority in decision. My direction is to demonstrate how absurd these 
waiver/forfeiture results become within a rational supervision of the justice 
delivery system responsibility and for individual case 
resolution.

[¶25.]  Having established what first appellate 
counsel presented (nothing of substance), we are directed to what the trial 
court on post-conviction relief then decided in its order denying 
relief:

After having fully 
examined the court file, affidavits, transcripts, and all other evidence cited 
by petitioner, the conclusion is that there are no legal grounds upon which 
relief should be afforded. The petition should be denied.

Thereafter, the 
trial court disposed of the first two issues on res judicata from initial 
appeal, decided that the third argument was invalid as a matter of law and as to 
the fourth argument, decided there was no evidence except from Murray leaving absent any 
factual basis to provide the jury instruction. The admissibility of evidence was 
rejected as a contention and finally, in regard to ineffectiveness of counsel, 
the trial court discerned in its order:

Lastly, petitioner 
contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel. There is absolutely no 
evidence of this claim in the record, nor in the petition. Post-conviction 
relief on the basis of inadequacy of counsel is not warranted absent evidence in 
the record to suggest incompetence. Bibbins v[.] State[,] 696 P.2d 1300 
(Wyo. 1985). 
No evidence presented by the petitioner suggests inadequacy of counsel. No 
evidence exists in the record to suggest incompetence. This claim must therefore 
be denied.

[¶26.]  The major difficulty with the present 
proceeding is that where ineffectiveness of counsel issues are to be considered, 
the record of the trial and first appeal is not now presented in this record 
from the post-conviction-relief proceedings. Additionally, the denial by the 
trial court of any evidentiary hearing on the post-conviction-relief petition 
excludes Murray's factual inquiry and our substantive or 
thoughtful appellate analysis.

[¶27.]  One issue, whether or not properly 
presented here by adequate presentation in trial court, should have required 
reversal by a continuum of the application of plain error.2 That issue is the admission of 
testimony of an expert on a "rapist profile." The rape perpetrator profile is 
singularly similar to the expert witness who provides the sex abuser profile. 
Admission of this kind of irrelevant and clearly prejudicial testimony as 
non-determinative evidence is universally held to be improper and usually 
prejudicial to an extent which requires reversal. See Hall v. State, 15 
Ark. App. 309, 692 S.W.2d 769 (1985); State v. 
Clements, 244 Kan. 411, 770 P.2d 447 (1989); and State v. 
Maule, 35 Wn. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96 (1983). On this subject, the testimony of 
Dr. Victor Cline was admitted over objection for him to opine about a profile of 
a rapist, which would be consistent with any and all drunks whose earlier 
propositions to another female had been rejected. By any standard, that 
character of evidence under the Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923) test or W.R.E. 802 was inadmissible and probably reversible error in 
a circumstantial evidence criminal case.

[¶28.]  It was obvious incompetence for appellate 
counsel to omit this issue on appeal. SeeState v. 
Bressman, 236 Kan. 296, 689 P.2d 901, 907 (1984) and 
Windmere, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 105 N.J. 373, 522 A.2d 405 (1987). 
Since the substance was serious, significant and apparent, conduct of appellate 
counsel as ineffective meets the test in omission of Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1986). Surely we can recognize that 
every drunk who propositions a female and is rejected does not then become a 
definable rapist prospect for anyone else. The evidence was "distractive and 
prejudicial." Hall, 692 S.W.2d 769; Maule, 667 P.2d 96. Tried and denied does 
not necessarily create a rape perpetrator.

[¶29.]  I particularly make note that even more 
valid evidence than testimony of an expert witness has been rejected by this 
court when tendered for defense. Krucheck v. State, 702 P.2d 1267, 1271 
(Wyo. 1985); Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 
1005 (Wyo. 1984); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981); Smith v. State, 564 P.2d 1194 
(Wyo. 1977). 
See also, Rules for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79 (1987) 
as supplementing the earlier Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187 (1983) on expert testimony. W.R.E. 702 cannot reach sufficiently far 
as to characterize all males who reach an alcoholic state to be anticipatory 
rapists. At least three of the usual four-point criteria of expert witness 
evidentiary admissibility are missing. United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1194 (6th Cir.), cert. granted ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 225, 98 L. Ed. 2d 185 
(1987), judgment aff'd and remanded, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 101 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1988) states the four-point test as:

For expert testimony to 
be admissible under Rule 702, a four-part test must be met: (1) a qualified 
expert; (2) testifying on a proper subject; (3) in conformity to a generally accepted 
explanatory theory; (4) the probative value of which outweighs any 
prejudicial effect. [Emphasis in original.]

Even if here we 
do not question the status of "a qualified expert," the remaining requirements 
are absent. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. 
United 
States, A Half-Century Later, 80 Colum.L.Rev. 
1197 (1980). Unfortunately, this singular issue of clearly prejudicial and 
erroneous trial evidence was lost from appellate review by omission in the 
initial brief and now by forfeiture, waiver and denied 
hearing.

[¶30.]  If this court and the Wyoming criminal justice 
system are going to live and die with waiver/forfeiture from non-inclusion in an 
initial appeal, then this court automatically approves and mandates opportunity 
before initial appeal to supplement the record in some proceeding. Contrary to 
what the court has suggested, we have followed an absolutely mandated rule that 
the record may not be supplemented by what was not considered by the trial 
court.

The Wyoming Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure are replete with 
means by which a record can be augmented so that all issues which can or should 
be treated on appeal may be supported by reference to a record on 
appeal.

Kallas, 776 P.2d  
at 200. See Spilman v. State, 633 P.2d 183 (Wyo. 1981). The reference by this court in 
Kallas misapplies the citation given and misdirects the subject raised. Spilman, 
of course, does not apply since it involved proceedings within the trial itself 
that were not recorded, namely voir dire and opening and closing statements and 
the issue of incompetency of trial counsel in the failure to have a reporter 
present. That incompetency is obviously demonstrated by the court in that a 
reconstruction of the record might have occurred. However, those events did 
occur before the trial court and reconstruction which involved the participation 
of the trial court augmenting a record for evidence which was not presented to 
the trial court recreates within the appellate court as a superannuated retrial 
tribunal. Specifically, we are then required in first appeal to consider for 
ineffectiveness issues facts beyond the initial trial transcript and 
record.

[¶31.]  Another significant and highly 
questionable omission by appellate counsel devolves from the non-inclusion of 
the denied involuntary intoxication instruction by the trial court before 
submission to the jury. This record is complete in effectively showing that the 
deputy sheriff and his wife, Gregg Goodman and Carol Goodman, engaged 
deliberately in getting Murray extremely drunk during the evening when 
the incident occurred. Further in question was some evidence within the context 
of the weight to be assessed whether Murray was also injected with a drug. They 
deliberately got him drunk and whether something else occurred is at least 
suggested to a state of conjecture.

[¶32.]  Ineffectiveness of appellate counsel is 
inexcusably injected in failure to include this principal defense issue and 
instruction denial as a major presentation in first appeal rather than venue and 
evidentiary sufficiency. This was not only in the words of the majority "an 
arguable proposition," but a principal effort in defense to be denied when the 
tendered instruction was rejected. Any reading of the record reveals that this 
defense effort was a principal strategy in trial 
presentation.

[¶33.]  In totality then as ineffectiveness of 
counsel issues now rejected by forfeiture or summary adjudication, this case 
presents:

1. Adequacy of trial in 
first appellate presentation of prejudicial climate regarding a change of 
venue;

2. Inadequate appellate 
presentation of fair and impartial juror, denied challenges for 
cause;

3. Introduction of 
involuntarily obtained inculpatory statements of Murray;

4. Use of conclusive 
presumption instruction from felony murder premised 
conviction;

5. Use of expert witness 
to establish a profile of a rapist to fit the drunken condition of Murray;

6. Denial of involuntary 
intoxication instruction;

7. Introduction of 
hearsay testimony of decedent's statements; and

8. Rejection for 
introduction of evidence of a subsequent rape in the community of the same 
character while Murray was in jail by virtue of the 
non-appearance of the subpoenaed witness. 

[¶34.]  In considering his life sentence, Murray 
actually only has now in two appeals received substantive review on change of 
venue, sufficiency of the evidence and the legal issue of conclusive 
presumption. This is neither an adequate access to justice nor justifiable legal 
representation for me. No matter what may have been the result of substantive 
review after trial court factual hearing and proper briefing, this procedural 
disposition fails to meet the criteria of equal protection and due process for 
which post-conviction-relief proceedings were initially enacted. If nothing 
else, Murray 
should be entitled by examination and analysis to review the quality of the 
legal assistance he received in first appeal. The thoughtful writing of Shklar 
in Comment, Giving Injustice Its Due, 98 Yale L.J. 1135 (1989) is objectively 
informative. In constitutional perspective, this appeal bespeaks to procedural 
injustice.

[¶35.]  Whatever may be the conception of this 
court in predilection of guilt by factual analysis, Murray had some very basic 
due process and equal protection questions that called for our appellate review. 
The synopses of "Goodness, he must be guilty" and "gone constitutional rights" 
as adjudicative processes lack persuasive validity. Whatever mission impelled 
Murray's first 
appellate counsel, whether inattention or disinterest, it cannot meet the 
calling of advocacy responsibility required for a participant in the justice 
delivery system. Two most contemporary national leaders could have received 
short shift if this is the only limiting standard of our justice delivery 
system.3

[¶36.]  Due process and equal protection should 
not be extinguished as applied to anyone who is brought forward to the bar of 
justice to answer for a contended criminal offense. A fourth grader by the laws 
of accident could have more suitably stood forward to sustain the interest of 
Murray as 
appellate counsel. In this re-examination, we now become infected with the same 
promiscuous virus when absolution to absurdity for first effort is presented as 
preclusion denying access to constitutional rights when resulting from the 
repelling viscosity of counsel failure and consequent forfeiture. A realistic 
evidentiary hearing and a reasoned decision are not unjustified. Compare Osborn 
v. State, 672 P.2d 777 (Wyo. 1983), cert. 
denied 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S. Ct. 1331, 79 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1984) and subsequent proceedings with Osborn v. Shillinger, 639 F. Supp. 610 (D.Wyo. 1986) and affirmed by Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612 (10th Cir. 
1988).

[¶37.]  Consequently, I 
dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 More current cases where 
the defendant has uniformly been unsuccessful in reversing a criminal conviction 
on a claim of error in denied change of venue include: Murray, 671 P.2d 320; 
Wilcox v. State, 670 P.2d 1116 (Wyo. 1983); Shaffer v. State, 640 P.2d 88 (Wyo. 
1982); Weddle v. State, 621 P.2d 231 (Wyo. 1980); Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1341 
(Wyo. 1979), cert. denied 446 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 2967, 64 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1980); 
Collins v. State, 589 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1979); Valerio v. State, 542 P.2d 875 
(Wyo. 1975); Jackson v. State, 522 P.2d 1356 (Wyo.), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1055, 
95 S. Ct. 637, 42 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1974); Mares v. State, 500 P.2d 530 (Wyo. 1972); 
Moss v. State, 492 P.2d 1329 (Wyo. 1972); Crouse v. State, 384 P.2d 321 (Wyo. 
1963); and State v. Spears, 76 Wyo. 82, 300 P.2d 551 (1956). More recent 
decisions include: Pote v. State, 733 P.2d 1018 (Wyo. 1987); Murry v. State, 713 P.2d 202 (Wyo. 1986); State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, 
TetonCounty, 696 P.2d 54 (Wyo.), cert. denied 474 U.S. 865, 106 S. Ct. 187, 88 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1985); and Pote v. State, 695 P.2d 617 (Wyo. 
1985).

2 In academic concept, the 
petition for post-conviction relief explicitly stated ineffectiveness of counsel 
as cause for reversal as addressing both trials in initial appellate counsel. We 
are faced with a denied hearing and present concept that the issue detail was 
not adequately developed in pleading for a hearing to be held. In essence, for 
post-conviction relief, this majority requires regression to the days of Code 
pleading. That regression in continuity only shows that this majority intends to 
assure that post-conviction relief never has any adjudicatory substance. I fail 
to see what is wrong if more specificity is needed for response by the State to 
leave that responsibility with litigants to pursue through motions to make more 
definite and certain or identify and specify if a claim of ineffectiveness of 
counsel is too broadly floating before an evidentiary hearing can be held to 
provide the details by evidence and argument.

3 The abrogation of the 
post-conviction review as a constitutional responsibility of this court to 
provide assurance to the defendant of the constitutional guaranty of adequate 
representation of counsel can be found by a comparison of this case with just a 
sampling of very recent cases from other jurisdictions: Osborn v. Shillinger, 
861 F.2d 612 (10th Cir. 1988); Freels v. Hills, 843 F.2d 958 (6th Cir. 1988); 
Jenkins v. Coombe, 821 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 704, 98 L. Ed. 2d 655 (1988); State v. Crenshaw, 210 Conn. 304, 554 A.2d 1074 (1989); Bassett v. State, 541 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1989); Arencibia v. State, 
539 So. 2d 531 (Fla. App. 1989); Madden v. State, 535 So. 2d 636 (Fla. App. 1988); 
People v. Albanese, 125 Ill. 2d 100, 125 Ill.Dec. 838, 531 N.E.2d 17 (1988), 
cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 2088, 104 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1989); State v. 
Broussard, 539 So. 2d 745 (La. App. 1989); Leatherwood v. State, 539 So. 2d 1378 
(Miss. 1989); Bonner v. State, 765 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. App. 1988); Com. v. Ciotto, 
555 A.2d 930 (Pa.Super. 1989); Frett v. State, 378 S.E.2d 249 (S.C. 1988); and 
State v. Mullins, 767 S.W.2d 668 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1988).

As the Montana court 
discerned:

Further, the mere fact of 
representation by counsel is not per se sufficient. In order to give meaning to 
the constitutional guarantees, the assistance must be effective. State v. 
McElveen (1975), 168 Mont. 500, 503, 544 P.2d 820, 822. Only then, 
can the right to the assistance of counsel, and the right to a fair trial, have 
true meaning.

State v. 
Enright, 758 P.2d 779, 781 (Mont. 1988). See Richardson v. State, 189 Ga. App. 113, 375 S.E.2d 59 (1988) and Com. v. Stonehouse, 
555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989).