Case Title: State v. Jordan

Citation: 122 N.J. 328, 585 A.2d 345

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 1990-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 19–1442 
 
Submitted April 14, 2021—Filed May 14, 2021 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
TRAVIS JAMES JORDAN, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Kurt L. 
Wilke, Judge. 
 
The 
defendant 
challenges 
the 
sentence 
imposed 
following 
convictions on pleas of guilty, alleging the prosecutor breached the plea 
agreement 
by 
failing 
to 
remain 
silent 
regarding 
a 
sentencing 
recommendation.  AFFIRMED. 
  
 
Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all 
justices joined. 
 
 
Jesse A. Macro Jr. of Macro & Kozlowski, L.L.P., West Des Moines, 
for appellant. 
 
 
2 
 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney, Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant Attorney 
General, Darren D. Driscoll, County Attorney, and Brad M. McIntyre, 
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
 
 
 
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CHRISTENSEN, Chief Justice. 
The plea agreement here provided the defendant would plead guilty 
to his pending charge of third-degree burglary, be released with 
supervision until sentencing, and be free to argue for probation at 
sentencing.  Additionally, as part of the defendant’s supervised release 
agreement that he signed after entering his plea, he agreed to attend all 
court hearings.  In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the other pending 
charge against the defendant and remain silent at sentencing.  However, 
the defendant absconded after the plea hearing and failed to appear for 
the sentencing hearing.  Following his arrest nearly seven months later, 
he appeared for sentencing, where the State advocated for a prison 
sentence, which the district court then imposed.   
The defendant appealed, arguing the prosecutor breached the 
parties’ plea agreement by failing to remain silent at sentencing and his 
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to this breach.  The court 
of appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction under Iowa Code section 814.7 (2020), which requires 
ineffective-assistance claims to be brought in postconviction proceedings 
rather than by direct appeal.  After the court of appeals issued its decision, 
we issued our opinion in State v. Boldon, 954 N.W.2d 62 (Iowa 2021), in 
which we held Iowa Code section 814.7 did not preclude our review of an 
alleged prosecutorial breach of a plea agreement.  Id. at 71.  On further 
review, we hold we have subject matter jurisdiction and authority to 
consider the defendant’s appeal and affirm the defendant’s sentence 
because the defendant forfeited any rights to enforce the plea agreement 
when he breached it by absconding and failing to appear at the originally-
scheduled sentencing. 
 
4 
 
I.  Background Facts and Proceedings. 
On September 24, 2018, Fort Dodge Police Officer Jacob Naatz was 
on patrol in Fort Dodge when he observed Travis Jordan walking down an 
alley, seemingly going from garage to garage in the area.  Officer Naatz 
continued to patrol the alleys and observed Jordan walk out of a garage 
with a backpack, leading Officer Naatz to stop Jordan and ask Jordan why 
he was in the garage.  Jordan claimed he was in the garage because he 
thought it was his friend’s and he went in to go to the bathroom.  The 
record is unclear how Officer Naatz discovered the materials in Jordan’s 
backpack, but the record shows Jordan’s backpack contained binoculars, 
gloves, wrenches, a knife, and a flashlight along with Jordan’s wallet.  
Officer Naatz then went into the garage and located a second flashlight on 
the ground where Jordan had been standing when Officer Naatz first made 
contact with him.  This awoke the homeowner, who came out to talk with 
Officer Naatz and informed him that the flashlight was his and had been 
inside his vehicle parked in the garage.  The homeowner told Officer Naatz 
that Jordan had no right to be in the garage.   
Jordan was subsequently arrested and charged with burglary in the 
third degree, a class “D” felony, in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1 
and 713.6A(1) (2018), and possession of burglary tools, an aggravated 
misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code section 713.7.  Jordan and the 
State entered into a plea agreement, which was placed on the record 
during the plea hearing on October 22.  As Jordan’s counsel explained at 
the hearing, 
Mr. Jordan is going to enter a guilty plea to Count I for 
burglary in the third degree.  The State is agreeing to dismiss 
Count II.  The parties are agreeing to release Mr. Jordan [with 
supervision by the Second Judicial District Department of 
Correctional Services] after the hearing today. 
 
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The recommendation of the county attorney -- the 
county attorney’s going to agree to remain silent at 
sentencing, and the defendant is free to argue for probation.  
And that’s essentially the plea agreement. 
The assistant county attorney confirmed “[t]hat is the plea 
agreement reached between the parties,” and Jordan also confirmed that 
was his understanding of the plea agreement.  In accepting Jordan’s plea, 
the district court specifically advised Jordan “to contact the Department 
of Correctional Services within 48 hours [of the hearing] and sign a 
contract of expectations of release agreement.”  As part of this agreement 
Jordan signed after the plea hearing, he agreed to “appear in Court when 
required.”  
The district court set Jordan’s sentencing for November 26, but 
Jordan failed to appear and a warrant was issued for his arrest.  Jordan 
was arrested on June 2, 2019, and his sentencing occurred on August 19.  
Jordan did not have the same counsel or district court judge at sentencing 
as he did during his plea hearing.  The court began the hearing by 
explaining that “Mr. Jordan entered a plea of guilty to burglary in the third 
degree.”  Instead of remaining silent, the assistant county attorney 
advocated for a five-year term of imprisonment, stating,  
I have no witnesses or evidence, just a recommendation, and 
that recommendation matches that of the PSI that was filed 
in this case.  The defendant has a long criminal history that 
includes burglary and theft cases much like the one that is 
before the Court today and also includes violent charges.  He 
has been previously incarcerated four times in the State of 
Iowa.  And in this case, he was set for sentencing in November 
of 2018, and as the addendum to the presentence 
investigation report states, he failed to appear at that time and 
his whereabouts were unknown from November until June 
3rd of 2019, when he was arrested.  So for seven months he 
absconded.  He also has other absconsions on his record from 
the past.  Given his criminal history, the unknown 
whereabouts for seven months pending sentencing after his 
plea in this matter, the State believes that for protection of the 
community from future offenses and for rehabilitation of the 
defendant, that imposition of the five-year -- the term not to 
 
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exceed five years is appropriate.  With that, due to the 
incarceration, the State would ask that the fine and surcharge 
be suspended.  There is a $125 Law Enforcement Initiative 
surcharge that would be imposed.  I believe that’s the 
recommendation of the State. 
Jordan’s counsel sought a suspended sentence and probation without 
objecting that the State breached the plea agreement by failing to remain 
silent.  The district court decided to “go along with the recommendation of 
the PSI and the recommendation of the State,” ordering Jordan to “be 
placed with the Iowa Department of Corrections for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years.” 
Jordan filed a timely appeal, arguing his counsel was ineffective in 
failing to object to the prosecutor’s breach of the plea agreement.  We 
transferred the case to the court of appeals, which concluded it must 
dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Iowa Code 
section 814.7 because Jordan only raised ineffective-assistance claims.  
Jordan filed an application for further review, and we granted that 
application. 
II.  Standard of Review. 
A defendant’s allegation of prosecutorial breach “is a species of 
sentencing error.”  Boldon, 954 N.W.2d at 70.  Thus, we review it for the 
correction of errors at law.  See State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 
2020).  “We will not reverse a sentence unless there is ‘an abuse of 
discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.’ ”  Id. (quoting State 
v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002)). 
III.  Jurisdiction. 
The State contends we lack jurisdiction to consider Jordan’s appeal 
under Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3), which establishes there is no right 
of appeal from a guilty plea unless the defendant establishes “good cause.”  
Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3).  After the parties submitted their briefs in this 
 
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case, we decided Damme, in which we held the good cause requirement is 
satisfied “when the defendant challenges his or her sentence rather than 
the guilty plea.”  Id. at 105.  Because Jordan’s challenge is to his sentence 
instead of his guilty plea, he has good cause to appeal and section 
814.6(1)(a)(3) does not deprive us of subject matter jurisdiction.  See id. 
The State also argues we lack subject matter jurisdiction to address 
Jordan’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal under 
Iowa Code section 814.7 (2020), which requires ineffective-assistance 
claims to be brought in postconviction proceedings rather than by direct 
appeal.  See Iowa Code section 814.7.  We disagree.  Section 814.7 does 
not limit jurisdiction; it limits the authority of Iowa’s appellate courts to 
resolve ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal.  See Boldon, 954 
N.W.2d at 69 (characterizing the statute as regulating the court’s 
authority); State v. Emery, 636 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Iowa 2001) (“[S]ubject 
matter jurisdiction should not be confused with authority.” (quoting State 
v. Yodprasit, 564 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Iowa 1997))). 
Here, we have jurisdiction, and we have the authority to resolve the 
sentencing issue on direct appeal.  After the parties submitted their briefs 
and the court of appeals issued its decision dismissing this appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction, we issued our opinion in Boldon.  There, we held Iowa Code 
section 814.7 did not preclude our review of an alleged prosecutorial 
breach of a plea agreement because the alleged breach was a claim of 
sentencing error that could be reviewed directly without being cast as an 
ineffective-assistance claim.  Boldon, 954 N.W.2d at 71.  As we explained, 
“[a] prosecutor’s breach of the plea agreement at sentencing irreparably 
taints the sentencing proceeding and a claim of breach is reviewable on 
direct appeal even in the absence of contemporaneous objection.”  Id.  
 
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Consequently, Iowa Code section 814.7 is inapplicable here and does not 
preclude our review of Jordan’s claim of breach. 
IV.  Analysis. 
Jordan maintains the prosecutor breached the parties’ plea 
agreement when the prosecutor recommended a five-year term of 
imprisonment instead of remaining silent as agreed upon on the record as 
part of the plea agreement reached nearly ten months earlier.  Jordan 
seeks specific performance of the plea agreement and does not contend he 
should have been able to withdraw his plea due to the alleged breach.  The 
State argues it was relieved of its obligation to remain silent at sentencing 
when Jordan breached the agreement by absconding and failing to appear 
at his originally-scheduled sentencing hearing in November 2018.  We 
agree with the State. 
The terms of a plea agreement must be mutual for the agreement to 
be binding, and “[t]he State has no obligation to make available the 
anticipated benefits of a plea agreement when the defendant fails to 
perform his or her end of the bargain.”  State v. Dudley, 856 N.W.2d 668, 
675 (Iowa 2014).  In construing a plea agreement, we look to the parties’ 
“justified expectations.”  Boldon, 954 N.W.2d at 71; see also United States 
v. Rivera, 954 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1992) (“We look to ‘what the parties 
to this plea agreement reasonably understood to be the terms of the 
agreement.’ ” (quoting Paradiso v. United States, 689 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 
1982) (per curiam))).  Implicit in the plea deal was the expectation Jordan 
would show up for the sentencing hearing.  See United States v. Munoz, 
718 F.3d 726, 729–30 (7th Cir. 2013) (“When Munoz fled the country and 
spent nearly five years as a fugitive in Mexico, he breached what we believe 
was an implied but obvious term of the plea agreement that he remain in 
the country and show up for sentencing.”); Rivera, 954 F.2d at 124 (“[T]he 
 
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reasonable meaning of the plea agreement is that Rivera’s failure to appear 
for sentencing . . . would release the government from its obligations to 
recommend a sentence reduction.”).   
As part of the parties’ agreement to release Jordan with supervision 
following his plea hearing, Jordan agreed in his supervised release 
contract of expectations to “appear in Court when required.”  Jordan 
clearly did not fulfill his end of the bargain, as he failed to appear at his 
November 2018 sentencing date and absconded for seven months with no 
information on his whereabouts until he was arrested on June 3, 2019.  
Consequently, the State had no obligation to abide by the plea agreement 
and therefore did not breach the plea agreement because Jordan forfeited 
any rights to enforce the plea agreement by breaching it first.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Wells, 211 F.3d 988, 995 (6th Cir. 2000) (“a defendant 
who breaches a plea agreement forfeits any right to its enforcement”); 
Rivera, 954 F.2d at 124 (“[B]ecause [the defendant] failed to live up to his 
obligation [under the plea agreement], the government was not required to 
recommend a sentence reduction.  Therefore, the government did not 
breach the agreement by declining to make such a recommendation.”); 
United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379, 1390 (10th Cir. 1981) (“It is 
clear that a defendant’s failure to fulfill the terms of a pretrial agreement 
relieves the Government of its reciprocal obligations under the 
agreement.”); cf. Munoz, 718 F.3d at 730 (“No defendant could reasonably 
expect that he could abscond for five years and still hold the government 
to its promises under the plea agreement.”). 
Although we conclude the State did not breach the plea agreement 
in this case, we do so with a cautionary admonition.  Nowhere in the record 
is there any acknowledgment by the sentencing court that the parties 
agreed Jordan had breached the plea agreement, let alone that Jordan’s 
 
10 
 
breach of the agreement automatically relieved the State of its agreement 
obligations.  Nevertheless, there is no factual dispute that a bench warrant 
was issued because Jordan absconded and failed to appear at his first 
sentencing in violation of his release contract, and the sentencing court 
discussed Jordan’s absconding and failure to appear at his first sentencing 
in issuing Jordan’s sentence.  Thus, the record in this case is adequate to 
determine the issue of breach as a matter of law without an evidentiary 
hearing.  See United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d at 1390 (“The question 
of a defendant’s breach is not an issue to be finally determined unilaterally 
by the government.  If the pleadings reveal a factual dispute on the issue 
of breach, the district court must hold a hearing to resolve the factual 
issues.  If the pleadings reveal no disputed factual issues, no hearing is 
necessary and the court may determine the issue of breach as a matter of 
law.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Novosel, No. 03–4190, 
2004 WL 1406319, at *4 (10th Cir. June 24, 2004) (concluding the 
sentencing court’s statements about the defendant not being entitled to a 
sentencing adjustment based on his failure to appear at sentencing and 
absconding were adequate to indicate a judicial determination of breach 
and a release of the government from its plea agreement obligations).  But 
that will not always be the case.  Attorneys and sentencing courts should 
strive to ensure any issues involving a breach of a plea agreement are 
discussed on the record at the sentencing hearing to avoid the potential 
need for remand and resentencing following an appeal. 
V.  Conclusion. 
For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm Jordan’s sentence. 
AFFIRMED.