Case Title: Kelley v. Kelley

Citation: 75 So. 2d 191

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1954-10-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
75 So. 2d 191 (1954)
Nida Ellen KELLEY, Appellant,
v.
J.L. KELLEY, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida. Division B.
October 19, 1954.
*192 Virgil L. Milbrath, Ocala, for appellant
Sturgis & Sturgis, Ocala, for appellee.
DREW, Justice.
Plaintiff in the court below, appellant here, [hereinafter called wife], instituted proceedings in the lower court on October 13, 1953 to set aside a decree of divorce granted in favor of the defendant husband [hereinafter called husband] on December 20, 1951 on the ground that the affidavit for constructive service was false and fraudulent and in making thereof the husband was guilty of perjury.
The husband answered the complaint and, among other things, denied the allegations as to the charges of perjury in the affidavit for constructive service; he further charged that the wife had been guilty of laches in not sooner instituting proceedings to set aside said decree. The answer incorporated a motion to dismiss on the grounds, among others, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that the wife was guilty of laches. Such motion also contained the charge that there had been a prior judicial determination that the husband had not committed perjury in the execution of the affidavit for constructive service by virtue of the fact that he had been acquitted by a jury upon a trial for such alleged perjury in the same court in which the proceedings to set aside the decree were pending.
The record here shows that on December 18, 1953, on consideration of the bill, answer and motion to dismiss, the lower court entered an order terminating the cause in the following language:
This appeal is from the above final order.
No part of the record of the trial of the husband on the charge of perjury was introduced in evidence or otherwise made a part of the record in the suit to set aside the decree being considered by the lower court. All of these facts and circumstances were in the mind and memory of the Circuit Judge but not in the record of the cause he was then considering. It is a part of the fundamental law of this State that the final judgments and final decrees of the Circuit Court are subject to review by this Court on proper proceedings. It is elemental that in reviewing the actions of Circuit Courts, we are confined to the record produced here. It is from that record that we must determine whether the judgment of the lower court is lawful. From the record in this cause, we have no way of determining whether, as recited by the lower court in his order, the wife "deliberately separated herself from the defendant her husband". We are unable to determine whether "she left this state and went to another state where she kept herself in hiding without communicating with her husband" nor are we able to say from the record, to which we must look, that "neither before nor after her husband procured a decree of divorce did she communicate with him." Moreover, there is no way for us to determine whether the lower court was correct in concluding that the wife "returned to Marion County and procured an indictment on the" charge of perjury. We are entitled to assume on this latter point that the prosecuting officer of Marion County had reasonable cause to believe that perjury had been committed, otherwise there would have been a dereliction of duty in charging the husband with the commission of that crime. The wife was no more than a witness for the purpose of proving the violation of the criminal laws of this State by the husband.
The record before the lower court in the equity proceedings to set aside the final decree of divorce, the cause then being considered by the court, did not afford any basis for the finding that the lower court could not in equity and good conscience lend its aid to the further harassment of the defendant. Even if the court was of the view that the equity cause amounted to harassment of the defendant, such conclusion was based upon circumstances and facts which were not a part of the record in the cause then being tried and which the court had no right to consider.
The late Chief Justice Davis, in Atlas Land Corporation v. Norman, 116 Fla. 800, 802, 156 So. 885, 886, in dealing with a similar occasion, said:
We think the foregoing reasoning and the authorities cited are peculiarly applicable to this controversy, and we reaffirm the principles quoted more than twenty years ago.
The appellee argues that even if the lower court was in error in dismissing the complaint because of his consideration of the record in the criminal proceedings, it affirmatively appeared on the face of the record that the plaintiff wife had been guilty of laches in not sooner instituting these proceedings. We are unable to agree with this argument. So far as the record shows, there had been no change in the status of the parties of the character which would have resulted in injury, embarrassment or disadvantage to the husband. The mere assertion that nearly two years had elapsed since the divorce was granted and some twelve months since the wife discovered that fact before the bill was filed is not in itself sufficient to constitute laches. Nor do we think that the filing of an information by the prosecuting officer of a county charging the husband with perjury because of false swearing to the affidavit for constructive service in itself can afford the basis for such defense. The answer in this cause does not establish as a matter of law that such delay has resulted in legal injury, embarrassment or disadvantage to the defendant and it was therefore error to dismiss the cause at that stage of the proceedings on this ground. See Lightsey v. Lightsey, 150 Fla. 664, 8 So. 2d 399; Tampa Water Works Co. v. Wood, 104 Fla. 306, 139 So. 800.
It may be that the trial of this cause on the merits will produce evidence sufficient to establish the defense of laches but that question is not before us.
This cause is reversed with directions to vacate the order of December 18, 1953 dismissing the complaint and for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.
ROBERTS, C.J., and THOMAS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.