Case Title: Luplow v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-88

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Luplow v. State1995 WY 93897 P.2d 463Case Number: 94-88, 94-92Decided: 06/16/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Timothy LUPLOW,

 Petitioner 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming,

 Respondent 
(Plaintiff).

 

Charles Gary JENNINGS, 

Appellant 
(Appellant/Respondent),

v.

Kathryn M. CURRIER, 

Appellee (Appellee/Petitioner).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Sheridan County, John C. Brackley, 
J

Wyoming Public Defender 
Program: Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Deborah Cornia, Appellate 
Counsel, Cheyenne, and Stephen K. Palmer of McKinney Law Offices, Rock Springs, 
for petitioner.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., 
Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., D. Michael Pauling, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Mary Beth Wolff, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for respondent.

Thomas A. Fasse of Miller 
& Fasse, P.C., Riverton, for 
appellant.

David B. Hooper of Hooper 
Law Offices, P.C., Riverton, for 
appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      These combined 
cases raise the constitutionality of the Wyoming criminal statute proscribing 
stalking, WYO. STAT. § 6-2-506 (Supp. 1994), in two ways. Timothy Luplow 
(Luplow) was charged with misdemeanor stalking in the Sheridan County Court 
where the question of constitutionality of the statute was certified to the 
District Court for the Fourth Judicial District. That court certified the 
question of constitutionality to this court. In the Fremont County Court a 
protective order was entered against Charles Gary Jennings (Jennings) at the 
behest of Kathryn M. Currier (Currier). Jennings appealed to the District Court 
for the Ninth Judicial District, and that court certified the question of 
constitutionality of the criminal statute as well as the protective order 
statutes, WYO. STAT. §§ 7-3-506 to -511 (Supp. 1994), to this court. The 
challenge to the statutes is that they are facially unconstitutional as vague 
and overbroad. We are satisfied the statutes can be construed as constitutional 
and, as properly applied, they do not infringe upon constitutional protections. 
We so hold in answering the certified questions.

[¶2]      In the Order 
Certifying Question to Supreme Court entered in the District Court for the 
Fourth Judicial District in and for Sheridan County, the certified question of 
law is:

Whether WYO. STAT. § 6-2-506 is unconstitutional in 
that the statute as written is vague and overbroad.

In case 

No. 94-88, Luplow filed a 
Brief of Petitioner, in which the issues are stated as:

I.          
Whether W.S. § 6-2-506 is unconstitutionally vague under the provisions 
of Articles I, VI and XX [sic] of the Wyoming Constitution and the First, Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution?

II.          
Whether W.S. § 6-2-506 is unconstitutionally overbroad under the 
provisions of Articles I, VI and XX [sic] of the Wyoming Constitution and the 
First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution?

In its Brief of Respondent, 
the State identifies the issue as:

Whether W.S. § 6-2-506 is unconstitutionally vague or 
overbroad?

[¶3]      We initially 
address the question in the context of the criminal statute. It provides: 

(a)       As used in this 
section:

(i) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct 
composed of a series of acts over any period of time evidencing a continuity of 
purpose;

(ii) "Harass" means to engage in a course of conduct, 
including but not limited to verbal threats, written threats, vandalism or 
nonconsensual physical contact, directed at a specific person or the family of a 
specific person, which the defendant knew or should have known would cause a 
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and which does in 
fact seriously alarm the person toward whom it is 
directed.

(b)       Unless otherwise 
provided by law, a person commits the crime of stalking if, with intent to 
harass another person, the person engages in a course of conduct reasonably 
likely to harass that person, including but not limited to any combination of 
the following:

(i) Communicating, anonymously or otherwise, or 
causing a communication with another person by verbal, electronic, mechanical, 
telegraphic, telephonic or written means in a manner that 
harasses;

(ii) Following a person, other than within the 
residence of the defendant;

(iii) Placing a person under surveillance by 
remaining present outside his or her school, place of employment, vehicle, other 
place occupied by the person, or residence other than the residence of the 
defendant; or

(iv) Otherwise engaging in a course of conduct that 
harasses another person.

(c) 
       This 
section does not apply to an otherwise lawful demonstration, assembly or 
picketing.

(d) 
      Except as 
provided under subsection (e) of this section, stalking is a misdemeanor 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more 
than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both.

(e) 
      A person 
convicted of stalking under subsection (b) of this section is guilty of felony 
stalking punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, 
if:

(i)         The 
act or acts leading to the conviction occurred within five (5) years of a prior 
conviction under this subsection, or under subsection (b) of this section, or 
under a substantially similar law of another jurisdiction;

(ii)        The 
defendant caused serious bodily harm to the victim or another person in 
conjunction with committing the offense of stalking;

(iii)       The defendant 
committed the offense of stalking in violation of any condition of probation, 
parole or bail; or

(iv)       The defendant 
committed the offense of stalking in violation of a temporary or permanent order 
of protection issued pursuant to W.S. 7-3-508 or 7-3-509, or pursuant to a 
substantially similar law of another jurisdiction.

WYO. STAT. § 6-2-506 (Supp. 
1994).

[¶4]      In his brief, 
Luplow concedes the facts relating to the two counts charged of misdemeanor 
stalking. The victim in the first count was staying at the Holiday Inn in 
Sheridan. While she was there, the phone rang. She answered it, but no one 
replied on the other end. She hung up the phone and, minutes later, heard a 
knock at the door. When she went to the door, she found no one there and, a 
short time later, there was another knock at the door. Again, she was unable to 
find anyone there. A short while later, another call was made to the victim, and 
she was asked to dinner by a male voice. She declined the invitation, and the 
caller then asked whether she would like to perform fellatio on him. The victim 
hung up the phone and hung up each time when the phone rang another two times. 
She then contacted the front desk about the incident. An employee of the hotel, 
who had observed a man using the house phone immediately prior to the call from 
the victim, followed the man outside and noted he left in a vehicle which was 
registered to Luplow.

[¶5]      Nine days later, 
the victim of the conduct charged in the second count was also a guest at the 
Holiday Inn in Sheridan. When she was returning to her room, she observed a man 
following her. The man said something that she did not understand, and she 
entered her room without looking at him. About five minutes later, there was a 
knock on her door and, when she looked through the peephole, she saw the man she 
had earlier seen in the hall. She asked what he wanted, and he said he wanted to 
enter the room and talk with her. A few minutes later, her phone rang, and a 
male voice asked her why she would not open the door and talk to him. The caller 
then requested her to join him in the hot tub for sex. She hung up the phone, 
but received another call moments later from the same individual. That person 
told her he had been watching her all evening and, again, requested her to join 
him in the hot tub. She identified Luplow as the individual she had seen that 
evening from a photo lineup.

[¶6]      After he was 
charged with the two counts of misdemeanor stalking, Luplow entered pleas of not 
guilty. Prior to trial, the county court denied his motion to dismiss the 
charges upon the ground that the stalking statute was unconstitutional. The 
county court did, however, certify the question of constitutionality to the 
district court, and that court, in turn, presented the certified question to 
this court. We agreed to answer the certified question and consolidated the 
criminal case with case No. 94-92, Jennings v. Currier, an appeal from a 
stalking protection order entered in a county court.

[¶7]      We begin our 
analysis of the constitutionality of the stalking statute by recalling the 
jurisprudential rule that "every law must be presumed to be constitutional, with 
all doubt resolved in its favor." Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 266 (Wyo. 1985) 
(quoting Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 274 (Wyo. 1977)). More recent cases 
follow this rule. Wyoming Coalition v. Wyoming Game and Fish Comm'n, 875 P.2d 729 (Wyo. 1994); Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 
1992); Righter v. State, 752 P.2d 416 (Wyo. 1988). The burden then assigned to 
one who challenges a statute for facial unconstitutionality asserting vagueness 
is to demonstrate that (1) the statute reaches a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct; or (2) the statute specifies no standard of 
conduct at all. McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 745 (Wyo. 1993); Ochoa v. State, 
848 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Wyo. 1993); Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 975 (Wyo. 1988). 
We have said the ultimate test under a vagueness challenge is whether a person 
of ordinary intelligence could read the statute and comprehend what conduct is 
prohibited. Sanchez.

[¶8]      In McCone, we 
summarized our analysis with respect to vagueness, saying:

When we review a statute for vagueness, we begin by 
determining whether the statute may be challenged "facially" or only as it 
applies to the challenger's conduct. Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Wyo. 
1993) (citing Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 975 (Wyo. 1988)). We review a 
statute "facially," i.e., we examine the statute in light of how it might be 
applied to situations other than the challenger's, only if the statute "reaches 
a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct," or if the statute 
specifies no standard of conduct at all. Griego, 761 P.2d  at 975 (quoting 
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
494, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1982)); see also Ochoa, 848 P.2d  at 
1363. McCone asserts that W.S. 6-2-505(a) should be reviewed "facially" because 
it reaches a substantial amount of protected speech such as "practical jokes and 
groundless threats" and because it specifies no standard at 
all.

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

Simply because creative minds are able to devise a 
scenario where a statute could be used to punish constitutionally protected 
conduct does not mean the "statute reaches a substantial amount of protected 
conduct." Wyoming Statute 6-2-505 does not reach a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct.

Wyoming Statute 6-2-505 is not a statute which has no 
standard at all. A statute employs a standard, for purposes of vagueness, if 
"`by [its] terms or as authoritatively construed [it applies] without question 
to certain activities, but whose application to other behavior is uncertain.'" 
Griego, 761 P.2d  at 976 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 577-78, 94 S. Ct. 1242, 1249, 39 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1974)). Clearly the terms of this statute apply to 
certain activities, i.e., threatening to bomb a public facility with the intent 
to force evacuation of that facility.

Since we have determined that W.S. 6-2-505 does not 
reach a "substantial amount of protected conduct" and that it is not a statute 
with no standards at all, our review of the statute is limited to a 
determination of whether it is unconstitutionally vague as it applies to 
McCone's conduct. To determine whether W.S. 6-2-505 is unconstitutionally vague 
as applied to McCone, "we must decide whether the statute provides sufficient 
notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that [McCone's] conduct was illegal 
and whether the facts of the case demonstrate arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." Griego, 761 P.2d  at 976. In determining whether W.S. 6-2-505 
provides sufficient notice, we look to the statutory language and previous court 
decisions which have limited or applied the statute. Id.

McCone, 866 P.2d  at 
745-46.

[¶9]      It appears 
Wyoming is one of forty-eight states and the District of Columbia which has 
adopted a criminal statute forbidding stalking. M. Katherine Boychuk, Are 
Stalking Laws Unconstitutionally Vague or Overbroad?, 88 NW.U.L.REV. 769 (1993). 
This approach was pursued because of a legislative view that existing remedies, 
whether civil or criminal, were inadequate to address the problem. See Robert P. 
Faulkner & Douglas H. Hsiao, And Where You Go I'll Follow: The 
Constitutionality of Antistalking Laws and Proposed Model Legislation, 31 
HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2, n. 3 (1994). While the statutory language is not 
identical, the courts that have analyzed constitutionality of such statutes in 
light of a vagueness challenge or a challenge the statute is overbroad have 
upheld the constitutionality of the statute. Culbreath v. State, No. CR-94-291, 
1995 WL 217573, ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.Cr. App. April 14, 1995); People v. Heilman, 
25 Cal. App. 4th 391, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422 (1994); State v. Culmo, 43 Conn. Sup. 46, 
642 A.2d 90 (1993); Bouters v. State, No. 83,558, 1995 WL 242403, ___ So.2d ___ 
(Fla. 1995) (aff'g Bouters v. State, 634 So. 2d 246 (Fla.Ct.App. 1994)); Gilbert 
v. State, No. 84,161, 1995 WL 242390, ___ So.2d ___ (Fla. 1995) (aff'g Gilbert 
v. State, 639 So. 2d 191 (Fla.Ct.App. 1994)); Salatino v. State, 644 So. 2d 1035 
(Fla.Ct.App. 1994); State v. Tremmel, 644 So. 2d 102 (Fla.Ct.App. 1994); State v. 
Kahles, 644 So. 2d 512 (Fla.Ct.App. 1994); Pallas v. State, 636 So. 2d 1358 
(Fla.Ct.App. 1994); Johnson v. State, 648 N.E.2d 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); 
Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 449 S.E.2d 94 (1994); Commonwealth v. 
Kwiatkowski, 418 Mass. 543, 637 N.E.2d 854 (1994); State v. Benner, 96 Ohio 
App.3d 327, 644 N.E.2d 1130 (1994); Dayton v. Smith, 68 Ohio Misc.2d 20, 646 N.E.2d 917 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1994); State v. Saunders, 886 P.2d 496 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1994); Commonwealth v. Urrutia, 439 Pa. Super. 227, 653 A.2d 706 (1995); 
Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 840, 447 S.E.2d 530 (1994). We join those 
courts which have upheld the constitutionality of such 
statutes.

[¶10]   We afford to Luplow the benefit of 
the doubt on his facial challenge for vagueness, in the sense that we will deal 
with this as a justiciable issue. A facial challenge can be mounted only when 
the statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct 
or if the statute is shown to specify no standard of conduct at all. McCone; 
Ochoa; Griego.

[¶11]   We are satisfied WYO. STAT. § 
6-2-506(c) (Supp. 1994), which excludes "otherwise lawful demonstration, 
assembly or picketing," substantially disposes of any contention that the 
statute affects constitutionally protected conduct. It is true it may inhibit 
speech, but only in a constitutionally permissible way. McCone; Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1973); United States v. 
Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1988); Pallas; Benner. In addition, we are 
satisfied the statute does satisfy the requirement that there be a standard of 
conduct. Bouters.

[¶12]   Our analysis of the statute 
persuades us the definition in subparagraph (a)(i) is an appropriately clear 
statement of what constitutes a course of conduct. Luplow complains about the 
definition in subparagraph (a)(ii) of "harass," but the statute must be read in 
its entirety. The definition includes a course of conduct, and it alludes to 
"verbal threats, written threats, vandalism, or nonconsensual physical contact," 
all of which are specific articulations of the proscribed activities. There is 
concern about the phrase "but not limited to" but, in paragraph (b), 
subparagraphs (i), (ii), and (iii), other specific conduct is articulated. We 
are satisfied it is permissible to refer to that section of the statute in 
determining what the phrase "but not limited to" connotes in the definition of 
"harass."

[¶13]   Concern is expressed about the 
standard of a "reasonable person" who suffers "substantial emotional distress," 
but the concept of a "reasonable person" is well known and "emotional distress" 
is defined in our cases in a civil context so that there can be no uncertainty 
as to their meaning. R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26 (Wyo. 1994); Wilder v. Cody 
Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211 (Wyo. 1994); Town of Upton v. Whisler, 
824 P.2d 545 (Wyo. 1992); Davis v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., 802 P.2d 840 (Wyo. 1990); Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059 (Wyo. 1986). 
See Bouters; Woolfolk. The word "substantial" has a sufficiently definitive 
meaning that we think it can be understood by persons of common 
intelligence.

[¶14]   The statute encompasses in the 
definition of "harass" the concept of knowledge which is not unusual to our 
criminal law and, in subparagraph (b), it requires a specific intent to harass. 
These are features that other courts have found add to the specificity of the 
statutory proscription. Culbreath; Heilman; Johnson, 648 N.E.2d 666; Dayton; 
Saunders; Woolfolk.

[¶15]   With respect to subparagraph 
(b)(iv), which alludes to otherwise engaging in a course of conduct that 
harasses another person, we conclude the provision is limited to those acts 
encompassed within the definition of the word "harass" in subparagraph (a)(ii) 
and are not otherwise articulated in paragraph (b). The result of our statutory 
analysis is that sufficient specificity exists defining the conduct proscribed 
to meet the test of vagueness.

[¶16]   Turning to the claim that the 
stalking statute is overbroad, we note the definition of "overbroad," which we 
have adopted in the context of a facial challenge:

[I]f it "does not aim specifically at evils within 
the allowable area of [government] control, but * * * sweeps within its ambit 
other activities that constitute an exercise" of protected expressive or 
associational rights.

Ochoa, 848 P.2d  at 1363, 
(citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-27 at 1022 (2d ed. 
1988) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97, 60 S. Ct. 736, 742, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940)).

To be facially void as 
overbroad, the statute must have a substantial "chilling" effect on First 
Amendment expression. American Communications Ass'n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399, 70 S. Ct. 674, 684, 94 L. Ed. 925, reh'rg denied, 339 U.S. 990, 70 S. Ct. 1017, 94 L. Ed. 1391 (1950) (citing Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S. Ct. 762, 85 L. Ed. 1049 (1941). The government may regulate free expression if it is 
content neutral, furthers a substantial governmental interest, and imposes the 
least restrictive alternative on that expression. See United States v. Grace, 
461 U.S. 171, 103 S. Ct. 1702, 75 L. Ed. 2d 736 (1983). Other courts have held that 
such statutes do encompass a substantial or significant governmental interest. 
Culmo; Saunders. The regulation is content neutral and, in the context of the 
evil sought to be avoided, the statute probably imposes the least restrictive 
alternative on free expression. As we have noted above, the right of free speech 
is not an unqualified right.

[¶17]   In the Luplow case, we hold the 
Wyoming stalking statute is not void for vagueness, nor is it subject to 
constitutional attack as being overbroad. We answer the certified question in 
the Luplow case in the negative.

[¶18]   In the Certification Order from the 
District Court of the Ninth Judicial District in and for Fremont County, the 
question certified is stated to be:

1. Whether W.S. §§ 6-2-506 and 7-3-506 through 511 
are facially unconstitutional?

Jennings was designated as 
the Appellant, and in his Appellant's Brief the issues are stated to be: 

I. Whether W.S. §§ 6-2-506 and 7-3-506 through 511 
are facially unconstitutional?

A. 
       Are 
the Wyoming stalking statutes §§ 7-3-506 through 511 and 6-2-506 
unconstitutionally vague?

B. 
       Are 
the Wyoming stalking statutes §§ 7-3-506 through 511 and 6-2-506 
unconstitutionally overbroad?

In her Brief of Appellee, 
Currier offers two issues for consideration:

I. 
         
Whether Appellant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
Wyoming Statute Section 6-2-506?

II. 
         
Whether Wyoming Statute Sections 6-2-506 and 7-3-506 through 511 are 
facially constitutional?

[¶19]   The facts relied upon in the entry 
of the stalking protection order by the Fremont County court are somewhat 
complex. Currier and Jennings both live three to four miles north of Riverton 
and are rural neighbors. Currier, a retired school teacher, trains and shows 
horses and dogs, and Jennings is a farmer living one-half mile east of Currier. 
They have been neighbors for approximately fifty-two 
years.

[¶20]   Trouble between them started when 
Currier's German shepherd named "Cap" was shot and killed on February 4, 1991. 
Currier sued Jennings for shooting her dog, but a six-person jury decided the 
case against Currier. Currier was disappointed and distressed because she 
thought the verdict was the result of perjured testimony by Jennings. She admits 
she has told others Jennings lied under oath when they asked her about the 
trial. She has also sent letters to Jennings and his wife complaining of 
Jennings' lies and the loss of her pet. She defends this conduct as "necessary 
closure" to this episode in her life.

[¶21]   Even though Jennings prevailed at 
the trial, he has thwarted any attempt by Currier to effect closure and achieve 
peace of mind. The record supports the findings made by the county court as to 
Jennings' acts or the acts he caused to be done on his behalf. For clarity, the 
findings of the county court judge are:

1. On April 26, 1993, Jennings attended a Humane 
Society meeting and verbally harassed Currier;

2. On May 31, 1993, when Currier was riding horses 
with her son, Jennings yelled at them three times within a two-hour period 
telling them to ride their horses on the right side of the 
road;

3. On July 4, 1993, Jennings confined three stray 
dogs he alleged he found on his property and would not allow a sheriff's deputy 
on his property to rescue them, saying only that Currier would have to call him 
and obtain his permission to rescue the dogs;

4. On July 19 or 20, 1993, as Currier was riding her 
horse around the block, the words "Curriers are nuts" was written in the sand 
near the shoulder of the road close to Jennings' home;1

5. On August 14, 1993, the vehicle driven by 
Currier's husband, with Currier as a passenger, was followed dangerously close 
by Jennings in his truck until Currier's husband suddenly slowed down, causing 
Jennings to veer off to the north to avoid an accident;

6. On August 16, 1993, while Currier was riding a 
colt she was training, Jennings threw a bucket at her, causing the colt to 
lunge;

7. Also on August 16, after the "bucket incident", 
Currier recovered an "Ol' Roy" sack of dog food which had been partially burned 
and secured with a rock near the place where the bucket was thrown.2 Currier had seen Jennings earlier 
in the same location burning something, but didn't know what it was at that 
time;

8. On August 16, 1993, around midnight, the power 
transformer supplying electricity solely to the Currier home was shot out at 
close range;3

9. On August 18, 1993, after the transformer had been 
replaced, Jennings burned the grass and weeds surrounding the transformer pole, 
which is located on public property;

10. On August 20, 1993, Jennings tried to spook 
Currier's horse by spraying in her direction with a high-pressure water hose. 
Later that day, he returned, followed her in his truck, and again told her to 
stay on the right side of the road;4

11. On September 7, 1993, Jennings strung barbed wire 
fencing across the barrow pit Currier used to ride while training her horses;5

12. On September 9, 1993, Jennings rode his 
motorcycle toward Currier at a fast rate of speed on the shoulder of the road 
where she was riding;6 and

13. On September 10, 1993, Currier again found a sack 
of "Ol' Roy" dog food in her yard with a black circle around the name "Roy" and 
a line drawn through the name. Shortly after Currier discovered the sack, 
Jennings drove up and turned around in her driveway close to where the sack had 
been placed and secured with a rock.

The order of protection 
entered by the county court on October 12, 1993 was based upon these events. 
Jennings has appealed from that order and, after his appeal to the district 
court, that court certified the question of 
constitutionality.

[¶22]   The statutes which justify the 
entry of an order of protection are:

WYO. STAT. § 7-3-506 (Supp. 1994), which 
provides:

(a) As used in W.S. 7-3-506 through 
7-3-511:

(i) "Court" means the justice of the peace court, 
county court or the district court in the county where an alleged victim of 
stalking resides, or where the alleged perpetrator of the stalking is 
found;

(ii) "Order of protection" means a court order 
granted for the protection of a victim of stalking;

(iii) "Stalking" means conduct as defined by W.S. 
6-2-506(b).

WYO. STAT. § 7-3-507 (Supp. 
1994), which provides:

(a) A victim of stalking, or the district attorney on 
behalf of the alleged victim, may file with the court a petition for an order of 
protection.

(b) The petition shall be accompanied or supplemented 
by one (1) or more sworn affidavits setting out specific facts showing the 
alleged stalking and the identity of the alleged stalker.

(c) No filing fee shall be charged for the filing of 
a petition under this section nor shall a fee be charged for service of 
process.

(d) The attorney general shall promulgate a standard 
petition form which may be used by petitioners. The justice of the peace or the 
clerk of the county or district court shall make standard petition forms 
available to petitioners, with instructions for completion, without charge. If 
the petition is not filed by the district attorney, the court may appoint an 
attorney to represent an indigent petitioner. Nothing in this subsection shall 
prevent the victim from hiring an attorney or filing a petition pro 
se.

(e) A petition may be filed under this section 
whether or not the individual who is alleged to have engaged in a course of 
conduct prohibited under W.S. 6-2-506 has been charged or convicted under W.S. 
6-2-506 for the alleged crime.

WYO. STAT. § 7-3-508 (Supp. 
1994), which provides:

(a) Upon the filing of a petition for an order of 
protection, the court shall schedule a hearing on the petition to be conducted 
within seventy-two (72) hours after the filing of the petition, and shall cause 
each party to be served with an order to appear, a copy of the petition and a 
copy of the supporting affidavits. Service shall be made upon each party at 
least twenty-four (24) hours before the hearing. The failure to hold or complete 
the hearing within seventy-two (72) hours shall not affect the validity of the 
hearing or any order issued thereon.

(b) If the court determines from the specific facts 
shown by the petition and supporting affidavits that there exists a clear and 
present danger of further stalking or of serious adverse consequences to any 
person, the court may grant ex parte a temporary order of protection pending the 
hearing, and shall cause a copy of the temporary order of protection to be 
served on each party. The court may prescribe terms in the temporary order of 
protection which it deems sufficient to protect the victim and any other person 
pending the hearing, including but not limited to the elements described in W.S. 
7-3-509(a).

(c) A temporary order of protection issued under 
paragraph (b) of this section shall contain a notice that willful violation of 
any provision of the order constitutes a crime as defined by W.S. 7-3-510(c), 
can result in immediate arrest and may in some cases subject the perpetrator to 
enhanced penalties for felony stalking under W.S. 
6-2-506(e).

WYO. STAT. § 7-3-509 (Supp. 
1994), which provides:

(a) Following a hearing under W.S. 7-3-508(a) and 
upon a finding that conduct constituting stalking has been committed, the court 
shall enter an order of protection ordering the respondent to refrain from any 
further acts of stalking involving the victim or any other person. As a part of 
any order of protection, the court may direct that the 
respondent:

(i) Stay away from the home, school, business or 
place of employment of the victim or any other locations the court may describe 
in the order; and

(ii) Refrain from contacting, intimidating, 
threatening or otherwise interfering with the victim of the alleged offense and 
any other persons, including but not limited to members of the family or 
household of the victim, as the court may describe in the 
order.

(b) The order shall contain a notice that willful 
violation of any provision of the order constitutes a crime as defined by W.S. 
7-3-510(c), can result in immediate arrest and may in some cases subject the 
perpetrator to enhanced penalties for felony stalking under W.S. 
6-2-506(e).

WYO. STAT. § 7-3-510 (Supp. 
1994), which provides:

(a) An order of protection granted under W.S. 7-3-509 
shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure. A copy of the order of protection shall be filed with the sheriff of 
the county.

(b) An order of protection granted by the court under 
W.S. 7-3-509 shall be effective for a fixed period of time not to exceed three 
(3) months. The order may be extended repetitively upon a showing of good cause 
for additional periods of time not to exceed three (3) months 
each.

(c) Willful violation of a temporary order of 
protection issued under W.S. 7-3-508 or of an order of protection issued under 
W.S. 7-3-509 is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six 
(6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or 
both. A temporary order of protection issued under W.S. 7-3-508 and an order of 
protection issued under W.S. 7-3-509 shall have statewide applicability and a 
criminal prosecution under this subsection may be commenced in any county in 
which the respondent commits an act in violation of the order. 

(d) The remedies provided by W.S. 7-3-506 through 
7-3-511 are in addition to any other civil or criminal remedy available under 
the law.

WYO. STAT. § 7-3-511 (Supp. 
1994), which provides:

(a) A person who allegedly has been a victim of 
stalking may request the assistance of a law enforcement agency, which shall 
respond to the request in a manner appropriate to the 
circumstances.

(b) A law enforcement officer or agency responding to 
the request for assistance may take whatever steps are reasonably necessary to 
protect the victim, including:

(i) Advising the victim of the remedies available 
under W.S. 7-3-506 through 7-3-511 and the availability of shelter, medical 
care, counseling and other services;

(ii) Advising the victim, when appropriate, of the 
procedure for initiating proceedings under W.S. 7-3-506 through 7-3-511 or 
criminal proceedings and the importance of preserving evidence; 
and

(iii) Providing or arranging for transportation of 
the victim to a medical facility or place of shelter.

(c) Any law enforcement agency or officer responding 
to a request for assistance under W.S. 7-3-506 through 7-3-511 is immune from 
civil liability when complying with the request, provided that the agency or 
officer acts in good faith and in a reasonable manner.

[¶23]   We perceive this set of statutes as 
an effort by the legislature to provide an individual and civil remedy for 
stalking. Jennings complains the prosecutorial authority has been delegated to 
the unfettered discretion of any individual. His attack primarily focuses, 
however, upon the facial unconstitutionality of the criminal statute adopted by 
reference in WYO. STAT. § 7-3-506(a)(iii). We agree that the validity of this 
set of statutes depends upon the constitutionality of the criminal stalking 
statute because of the adoption of the definition from that statute. We have 
held, in the Luplow case, that the criminal statute is constitutional. 
Consequently, we answer the question certified by the District Court of the 
Ninth Judicial District in the negative.

[¶24]   We have only the certified question 
before us, which we answer in the negative. We also uphold the constitutionality 
of the statutes as applied to the Jennings case. We agree with the Fremont 
County court that the evidence garnered from the hearing it held demonstrates 
Jennings did engage in a "course of conduct" against Currier consisting of 
"verbal threats, written threats, vandalism or nonconsensual physical contact." 
We also agree, for the purpose of holding the statute constitutional as applied, 
with the finding that Jennings "knew or should have known [the conduct engaged 
in] would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress." 
The record supports the finding that Currier is a "reasonable person" who was in 
fact "seriously alarmed" by Jennings' continual harassing 
behavior.

[¶25]   These cases are remanded for 
further proceedings in accordance with our resolution of the certified 
questions.

FOOTNOTES

1 Having heard the testimony, the trial 
court listed this incident as part of Jennings' course of conduct even though 
Mrs. Jennings testified she wrote this message and her husband did not instruct 
her to do so.

2 Currier owned another valuable German 
shepherd, which she had named "Roy."

3 Even though the transformer incident 
was mentioned, the county court did not rely on it in issuing its Order of 
Protection because of the lack of evidence that Jennings shot it out. We agree 
with the trial court that one must wonder how this item is to be separated from 
the entire list of unfortunate events.

4 The record demonstrates it was 
Currier's custom to ride her horses in the barrow pit, rather than on the road 
itself. She had done that for approximately forty-two years without any comment 
from Jennings.

5 Currier's testimony was that, while she 
did not notice the barbed wire until almost upon it, she was able to avoid 
serious injury.

6 On this occasion also, Currier managed 
to keep her horse under control and was able to avoid 
injury.