Case Title: RAWLINSON v. CHEYENNE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
RAWLINSON v. CHEYENNE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITIES2001 WY 617 P.3d 13Case Number: 00-36Decided: 01/23/2001

OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2000

January 23, 2001

BARBARA 
RAWLINSON, AARON RAWLINSON, and ADRIENNE RAWLINSON and KRISTEN RAWLINSON, 
minors, by and through their next best friend and mother, BARBARA RAWLINSON, 
Appellants 
(Plaintiffs)v.CHEYENNE BOARD OF 
PUBLIC UTILITIES, Appellee (Defendant)

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie 
County

The Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge 
     

Representing 
Appellants:

Carol K. 
Watson and Bernard Q. Phelan of Phelan-Watson Law Office, Cheyenne, Wyoming  

Representing 
Appellee:

  Deborah Ford Mincer of Murane & 
Bostwick, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL & KITE, JJ.

KITE, 
J., 
delivered the opinion of the Court; LEHMAN, C.J., filed a dissenting 
opinion 

KITE, 
Justice.

[¶1]           
The sole 
issue before this Court is whether the district court properly granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Cheyenne Board of Public Utilities (the BOPU) 
concluding that the appellants' claim was time barred under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act statute of limitations.  The order granting the BOPU's motion for 
summary judgment is affirmed.

ISSUES

[¶2]           
The 
appellants present the following issue for our review:

Whether 
the district court abused its discretion in finding that the appellants' cause 
of action accrued no later than June 23, 1995, rather than July 22, 1998, for 
purposes of applying the two-year statute of limitation, Wyo. Stat. §1-39-113, 
against the Board of Public Utilities.

The BOPU 
lists the issues as follows:

  1.  Whether the District Court 
properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Board of Public Utilities 
based on the Governmental Claims Act statute of 
limitations?

  2.  In the alternative, 
whether the record establishes that summary judgment should be affirmed because 
the Plaintiffs produced no admissible evidence of negligence by the Board of 
Public Utilities?

  3.  Whether sanctions should 
be ordered in light of the Appellants' failure to designate a record and the 
pursuit of this frivolous appeal?

FACTS

[¶3]  Before Barbara Rawlinson purchased a 
home in Cheyenne, a home inspector issued a written report dated December 16, 
l994, regarding a structural evaluation of the home.  The report specified in pertinent 
part:  "soil in the crawl space 
area was wet.  A positive, 
no-leak' condition cannot be established because of the wet area."  Following the purchase of the home, Ms. 
Rawlinson testified that she was aware of water damage as early as June 
1995  and continued to investigate 
the water in the crawl space.  She 
engaged two engineers to inspect the property, and each engineer issued a 
report.  The first report was issued 
on June 23, 1995, and the second report was issued on July 9, 1997.  The engineers reported that the home had 
property damage due to water seepage.  
In addition, an employee with the BOPU visited Ms. Rawlinson's home in 
1997 and noted wet dirt in the crawl space.  The BOPU received a report that the home 
had water seepage problems on and off for at least two years, and, as a result, 
the BOPU performed tests to check for leaks.

[¶4]            
Three 
and a half years later, Ms. Rawlinson presented an itemized statement to the 
BOPU for its negligence in failing to properly maintain a fire hydrant and the 
resulting damage to her home.  The 
following day, December 11, 1998, she filed a complaint against the BOPU and 
several other defendants, alleging various causes of action.  The BOPU filed a motion for summary 
judgment claiming the two-year limitation under the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act had expired and it had not committed an act of negligence.  The district court granted the BOPU'S 
motion for summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations.  It determined that Ms. Rawlinson 
discovered her cause of action on June 23, 1995, the date she became aware of 
property damage.  The district court 
concluded that Ms. Rawlinson's claim exceeded the two-year limitation and the 
BOPU was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  It declined to rule on the merits of the 
underlying negligence claim.  Ms. 
Rawlinson appeals to this Court.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶5]            
We 
review a summary judgment in the same light as the district court, using the 
same materials and following the same standards.  Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 11 P.3d 353, 2000 WL 1357716, at *2 (Wyo. Sept. 21, 2000).  We examine the record from the vantage 
point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that party 
the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record.  Id.  The review of a grant of summary 
judgment involving a question of law is de novo.  Id.  

DISCUSSION

[¶6]            
The 
determinative issue in this case is whether discovery of the claim occurred when 
the damage was discovered or when a particular alleged tortfeasor was 
discovered.  Ms. Rawlinson argues 
that the date of discovery was the date she realized the water could be coming 
into her basement from the BOPU city water supply.  According to Ms. Rawlinson, the summer 
of 1998 had been unusually dry, and she had ceased to water her lawn in an 
effort to determine the cause of her flooding problems.  On July 22, 1998, the sump pump, which 
Ms. Rawlinson had installed to remove water from the basement, suddenly quit 
working.  The structural engineer 
stated that it was unusual for a sump pump to abruptly stop pumping unless a 
constant source of water flooding the basement had simply dried up, such as a 
leak in the city water system.  Ms. 
Rawlinson contends that July 22, 1998, is the date of discovery as this was the 
date she first suspected the BOPU was responsible for her standing water 
problem.  As a result, she insists 
that she complied with the applicable statute of 
limitations.

[¶7]            
The BOPU 
argues that the date of discovery was June 1995 and Ms. Rawlinson's admission 
that she was aware of property damage in June 1995 should result in a bar to her 
claim under the statute of limitations.  
We agree.

[¶8]            
It is 
undisputed that the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act applies in this case.  The statutory claims procedure under the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act provides as follows:

(a)  No 
action shall be brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the 
claim upon which the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized 
statement in writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error 
or omission, except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two 
(2) years after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant 
can establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

(i)  Not 
reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

(ii)  The 
claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two 
(2) year period despite the exercise of due diligence.

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a) (LEXIS 1999).  Wyoming precedent is unequivocal in 
holding that failure to file a claim with the governmental entity within the 
two-year period provided in § 1-39-113(a) is an absolute bar to suit.  Davis v. City of Casper, 710 P.2d 827, 829  (Wyo. 1985).

[¶9]            
Statutes 
of limitations are pragmatic devices to save courts from stale claim litigation. 
Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo.), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S.  863 
(1979).  Such statutes represent 
legislative and public policy controlling the right to litigate.  Id.  They are arbitrary by their very nature, 
and we must give full force to the applicable statutes without regard to the 
merits of the particular claim.  
Id.  When a statute of 
limitations is being considered, the nature and extent of the injury and the 
amount of money damages involved are only significant in the effect they may 
have on when the cause of action arose and when the time expired for pursuing 
the applicable judicial remedy.  589 P.2d  at 340.

[¶10]  Settled Wyoming precedent confirms that 
Wyoming is a discovery state.  
Amoco Production Company v. EM Nominee Partnership Company, 2 P.3d 534, 542 (Wyo. 
2000).  The discovery rule delays 
the accrual of the cause of action in cases in which the injury or damage 
is not immediately apparent.  
Nowotny v. L & B Contract Industries, Inc., 933 P.2d 452, 456 (Wyo. 
1997).  This rule protects an 
injured person who would otherwise be barred from bringing an action simply 
because he is unaware of an injury.  
933 P.2d  at 457.

[¶11]        
In 
Waid v. State by and through Department of Transportation, 996 P.2d 18 (Wyo. 2000), 
this Court addressed the plain meaning of the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act.  We said the plain language of 
the statute measures the time for filing a claim not from the date damage occurs 
but from the date on which the "act, error or omission" occurs or when a 
claimant discovers it.  996 P.2d  at 
25.  The facts in Waid 
involved two separate incidences of flooding, which caused damage to the 
claimants' property.  
Id.  The claimants 
were clearly on notice that an "act, error or omission" occurred on the date of 
the first flood; however, they failed to make a claim at that time. The 
claimants argued that, although the damage arising out of the initial flood was 
time barred, the recurrence of the second flood started the statutory period to 
begin again.  Id.  We held the statute of limitations began 
to run when the claimant discovered the initial flood and said: "The situation 
had not changed by 1993, and although that flood caused additional damage, there 
was no new act, error or omission,' or a fresh discovery of such that would 
cause the statutory time period to start anew."  Id.  

[¶12]        
The 
statute begins to run from the first time claimants are chargeable with 
information which should lead them to believe they have a claim.  The occurrence of a subsequent incident 
does not extend the statutory period.  
Absent such a conclusion, in cases where there is an ongoing condition, 
such as water seepage, there would be no means to determine when the statute of 
limitations should commence.  When 
Waid is applied to the facts in this case, Ms. Rawlinson was chargeable 
with knowledge of an "act, error or omission" when she discovered property 
damage.  Her claimed discovery in 
1998 that the BOPU might be legally responsible is not a new "act, error or 
omission" that would cause the statutory time period to begin anew.  

[¶13]        
In 
Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316 (Wyo. 1984), 
this Court addressed a similar claim in which several homeowners sought to 
recover for property damage which occurred as a result of water seepage.  In that case, we explained that the 
statute of limitations begins to run when the injured party knows or reasonably 
ought to know that some damage has resulted from the wrongful act even 
though the damage is slight, it continues to occur, or additional damage caused 
by the same wrongful act may result in the future.  681 P.2d  at 1321.  Although based upon a different statute 
of limitations, this Court held in part:  
"Each homeowner's cause of action accrued on or about the date water 
seepage was first noticed and damage occurred."  Id.  The language of the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act does not direct the application of a different rule when the 
government is a possible tortfeasor.  

[¶14]        
Furthermore, 
in Barlage v. Key Bank of Wyoming, 892 P.2d 124 (Wyo. 1995), 
a case with very similar facts, this Court determined discovery of water 
seepage, not discovery of the cause of the seepage, triggered the applicable 
statute of limitations.  The Court 
explained its decision:

It is 
clear Barlage was first aware of water seepage into the crawl space in 
1986.  In endeavoring to avoid the 
statute of limitations, Barlage argues he was not aware he had a claim against 
Key Bank although he was aware of the invasion of the water.  This contention is not consistent with 
Wyoming law which, in the area of tort injuries, can perhaps be summarized by 
the proposition that the occurrence of damage satisfies the requirement that the 
injured party knew or reasonably should have known of the 
potential of a wrongful act being the cause.

892 P.2d  
at 126-27 (emphasis added).

[¶15]        
Finally, 
this Court stated in Nowotny, 933 P.2d at 458:  "We do not choose to expand the 
discovery rule to encompass a requirement that the identity of the tort[]feasor 
must be known."  Nowotny 
cites to Staiano v. Johns Manville Corp., 450 A.2d 681 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1982), as articulating the proper rule on whether the discovery rule should 
be expanded to include the identity of the tortfeasor.  933 P.2d 457.  The court in Staiano 
stated:

"[O]nce 
[a plaintiff] possesses the salient facts concerning the occurrence of his 
injury and who or what caused it, he has the ability to investigate and 
pursue his claim."  Here, it is 
enough that appellant-husband knew that his asbestosis was caused by the 
inhalation of asbestos dust emanating from asbestos products on the work 
site.  We find no reason to postpone 
the commencement of the statute until a plaintiff has in addition discovered who 
manufactured the products that he knows have injured him.  Indeed, to do so would "nullify the 
justifiable rationale of the statute of limitations and permit the prosecution 
of stale claims."

450 A.2d  
at 685 (citation omitted).  The same 
Pennsylvania court further refined this rule:  "It does not matter whether a plaintiff 
is aware that someone may be legally responsible for his injury.  Once he knows or should 
know the cause of that injury, he must investigate the situation and 
ascertain who might be legally culpable."  
Redenz by Redenz v. Rosenberg, 520 A.2d 883, 886 (Pa. Super. Ct.), 
appeal denied, 533 A.2d 93 (Pa. 1987) (emphasis added).  

[¶16]        
The 
precedent set forth in Waid, Anderson, Barlage, and Nowotny 
establishes the standard for claims of this nature.  A cause of action accrues when a claimant 
is chargeable with knowledge of an "act, error or omission."  The occurrence of damage satisfies the 
requirement that an injured party knew or reasonably should have known of 
the potential of a wrongful act being the cause; however, it is not necessary 
for a claimant to know that someone may be legally responsible for his 
injury.  The statute of limitations 
in this case began to run when, by her own admission, Ms. Rawlinson discovered 
property damage in June of 1995.  We 
conclude that, with notice of the water seepage and its subsequent damage, Ms. 
Rawlinson reasonably should have known of a potential wrongful act being the 
cause.  She then had to ascertain 
whether anyone was legally culpable.  
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Ms. Rawlinson had some reason to 
complain to the BOPU with regard to the seepage.  In 1997, the BOPU received a report, 
presumably from Ms. Rawlinson, that her home had water seepage problems on and 
off for at least two years.  As a 
result, the BOPU performed tests to check for leaks.  Ms. Rawlinson's contention that July 22, 
1998, was when she first suspected the BOPU was the source of the incoming water 
is contrary to the evidence presented in the record.  Despite the fact that Ms. Rawlinson's 
experts later developed a new theory of causation, the statute of limitations 
still applies.  We conclude that Ms. 
Rawlinson discovered an "act, error or omission," which provided the basis of 
the claim against the BOPU, when she discovered the property damage caused by 
the water seepage in June of 1995.  

[¶17]        
Ms. 
Rawlinson mistakenly relies on Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414 (Wyo. 
1985), a medical malpractice case, as the principal authority for her 
argument.  We recognize that, under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 (LEXIS 1999), the medical malpractice statute of 
limitations, a plaintiff discovers an "act, error or omission" when he learns 
that his harm resulted from the wrongful conduct of the defendant.  709 P.2d  at 419.  However, in Metzger we emphasized 
unique policy reasons underlying medical malpractice cases which are 
inapplicable here, and this Court declines to extend the same standard to all 
claims of damage.

[¶18]        
As it is 
applied in Wyoming, the discovery rule provides two years from the time an 
alleged "act, error or omission" is discovered until a cause of action must be 
instituted.  This is a reasonable 
period of time for an injured party to discover both a claim and a potential 
tortfeasor.  After careful review of 
the record, we conclude the statute of limitations began to run when Ms. 
Rawlinson discovered property damage in June 1995.  Her failure to timely file results in an 
absolute bar to suit.  We further 
conclude that this is not one of those rare circumstances where sanctions under 
W.R.A.P. 10.05 are appropriate.

[¶19]        
Affirmed.

LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice, dissenting.

[¶20]  I must 
respectfully dissent from the majority's decision that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-113 of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act bars Mrs. Rawlinson's claim 
against the Board of Public Utilities (BOPU).  I believe the majority errs when it 
fails to apply the plain language of the governing statute; mistakenly equates 
the discovery of damage with the discovery of the act, error or omission which 
caused that damage; and ultimately concludes that summary judgment was 
appropriate.

[¶21]  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 (LEXIS 1999) 
provides that:  

(a)  No action shall be brought under this 
act against a governmental entity unless the claim upon which the action is 
based is presented to the entity as an itemized statement in writing within two 
(2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, except that a cause 
of action may be instituted not more than two (2) years after discovery of 
the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can 
establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

(i)  Not reasonably discoverable within a two 
(2) year period; or

(ii)  The claimant failed to discover the 
alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period despite the 
exercise of due diligence. 

[¶22]  The majority cites to our recent 
discussion in Waid v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp., 996 P.2d 18, 25 (Wyo. 
2000), where we explained that "the time for filing a claim [under Wyo. Stat. § 
1-39-113] is measured not from the date damage occurs, but from the date on 
which the act, error or omission' occurs, or when it is discovered by a 
claimant."  In Waid, we held 
that the plaintiffs' claim was barred stating, "there was no new act, error or 
omission,' or a fresh discovery of such that would cause the statutory 
time period to start anew." Id. (emphasis added).   

[¶23]  I think the plaintiff correctly relies 
on Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414 (Wyo. 1985), 
for the proposition that discovery of the act, error or omission as contemplated 
by the statute means actual discovery.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a) (LEXIS 
1999) , the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions, contains 
identical language to the relevant portion of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 later 
adopted by the legislature.1  In Metzger we interpreted the 
statute's plain language and, after an extended, thoughtful discussion of the 
issue, determined that "[i]n view of the specific language of [the statute] and 
the rationale behind the discovery rule generally, . . . a plaintiff discovers 
an alleged act, error or omission' within the meaning of [the statute] when he 
learns that his harm resulted from the wrongful conduct of the defendants." 
Id. 709 P.2d  at 419.  This 
court in Metzger pointed out that the applicable statute extends the 
limitation period based on the plaintiff's actual discovery of the 
alleged conduct.  Id. at 
420.  The court went on to say:  "We are not concerned with what 
appellants in this case may have suspected or what they should have known in 
December, 1981.  The affidavits 
submitted on behalf of appellants establish that they learned of appellees' 
alleged wrongdoing on July 15, 1982."  
Id.

[¶24]  According to the plain language of the 
statute, Mrs. Rawlinson can properly rely on the discovery provision of § 
1-39-113(a) if she establishes that she failed to discover BOPU's alleged 
negligence within two years of the act, error or omission if either (i) it was 
not reasonably discoverable within that period, or (ii) she did 
not discover it during that period despite her exercise of due diligence.  The majority, however, applies neither 
the discovery provision nor the due diligence section of the statute. 

[¶25]  The record shows that Mrs. Rawlinson had 
a pre-purchase inspection of her home done in December of 1994, which disclosed 
the soil in the crawl space of her home was wet. After an incident in June of 
1995 when water flooded the basement, Mrs. Rawlinson hired the first of two 
structural engineers to determine the cause of the water seepage.  The first engineer issued a report on 
June 23, 1995, in which he determined that some of the water damage was caused 
by a downspout draining toward the house.  
He also reported that "ponding adds to the ground water next to the 
foundation and migrates into the residence."  The report, read as a whole, indicates 
that the first structural engineer believed that improper downspouts as well as 
water shedding off the residence ponding with ground water was the 
source of the water seepage.  
Mrs. Rawlinson testified in deposition that the summers of 1995, 1996, 
and 1997 were unusually wet, and she believed rain and/or groundwater was the 
source of the seepage in her home that led to standing water in her 
basement.  Mrs. Rawlinson began 
repairs to her home to solve the water seepage problems that took place during 
the summer months.  In July of 1997, 
a second structural engineer hired by Mrs. Rawlinson issued a report in which he 
indicates that rain and/or groundwater draining into the home is probably the 
source of the water seepage.  In 
June of 1997, BOPU visited Mrs. Rawlinson's home for the first time purportedly 
to test new equipment.  After being 
informed that the homeowner had been experiencing water problems for two years, 
BOPU conducted further tests on or near the residence twice more in July of 
1997.  On her part, Mrs. Rawlinson 
continued to make the recommended repairs to her home which would eliminate the 
water seepage in her basement.  

[¶26]  According to metereological data, the 
summer of 1998 was unusually dry, and Mrs. Rawlinson had ceased to water her 
lawn in an attempt to discover the source of her home's water seepage.  While the structural engineer was in her 
basement, he remarked that the sump pump seemed to be working abnormally, 
cycling gallons of water every 60 seconds even after extensive repairs to the 
foundation had been made. When the sump pump abruptly stopped, he remarked that 
was unusual and would appear as if it had been fed from a constant source of 
water that had simply dried up, like a leak in the city's water system.  Mrs. Rawlinson later on that same day 
learned that the city had changed a hydrant near her home at approximately the 
same time.  Thus, Mrs. Rawlinson's 
actual discovery of the alleged act, error or omission took 
place at the earliest, on that date: July 22, 1998.  On July 29, 1998, she had both water and 
soil samples tested in an attempt to determine whether fluoride and chloride in 
the water could indicate its source as city water.  She filed her written claim against BOPU 
on December 10, 1998.  Based on the 
facts before me, I cannot determine as a matter of law that Mrs. Rawlinson did 
not exercise due diligence in an attempt to uncover the cause of her 
injury.  Further, I do not believe 
that under the circumstances Mrs. Rawlinson was unreasonable in initially 
believing that the source of the water seepage in her basement was rainwater or 
groundwater.

[¶27]  I believe the majority's reasoning is 
erroneous because it mistakenly equates discovery of damage with discovery of 
the cause of damage.  It is 
undisputed that Mrs. Rawlinson knew she had water seepage in her basement on 
June 23, 1995; however, that does not mean that she simultaneously 
discovered the act, error or omission which gives rise to her 
cause of action (BOPU's alleged failure to maintain its hydrant).2  The majority errs by improperly applying 
non-analogous cases to the facts before us.  It is one thing for this court to hold, 
as we have, that discovery of water seepage in the basement is sufficient to 
concurrently alert a plaintiff to the fact that they have a potential cause of 
action against their builder, their seller, the city inspector, or the county 
planner;3 it is quite another to determine 
that, as a matter of law, discovery of water seepage in the basement is 
sufficient to concurrently alert a plaintiff to the fact that they have a 
potential cause of action against BOPU for failure to maintain its hydrant.  

[¶28]  Moreover, the majority opinion flouts 
the standard for reviewing this issue. This court has held that only if 
uncontroverted facts exist which specify when a reasonable person should have 
been placed on inquiry notice can we resolve the question as a matter of law. 
Hiltz v, Robert W. Horn, P.C. 910 P.2d 566, 569 (Wyo. 
1996); Bredthauer v. Christian, Spring, Seilbach and Associates, 824 P.2d 560, 562 (Wyo. 
1992); Mills v. Garlow, 768 P.2d 554, 556 (Wyo. 
1989).  Otherwise, "[o]rdinarily, 
entering a summary judgment on the issue of when a statute of limitations 
commences to run would be inappropriate." Hiltz, 910 P.2d  at 569 (citing 
Palmer v. Borg-Warner Corp., 818 P.2d 632, 634 (Alaska 1990)).

[¶29]  In addition, although not a suit brought 
under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, the majority's reasoning also departs 
from the rule we announced in Nowotny v. L. & B. Contract Industries, 
Inc., "once [a plaintiff] possesses the salient facts concerning the 
occurrence of his injury and who or what caused it, he has 
the ability to investigate and pursue his claim."  933 P.2d 452, 457 (Wyo. 
1997) (quoting Staiano v. Johns Manville Corp., 450 A.2d 681, 685 
(Pa.Super. 1982) (emphasis in original)).  
In Nowotny, the appellant was injured when the allegedly defective 
restaurant bench seat he was sitting on collapsed. This court appropriately 
determined that the appellant knew of both his injury and its 
cause on that date and his failure to determine the identity of 
manufacturer of the bench seat within the four-year statute of limitations 
barred his claim.  Mrs. Rawlinson's 
case could properly be analogized to that of the plaintiff in Nowotny if 
she had known the water seepage in her basement was caused by a negligently 
maintained fire hydrant yet failed to determine the identity of the party who 
exercised dominion over the hydrant until after the claims period had 
expired.  However, when the majority 
in its opinion improperly labels Mrs. Rawlinson's lack of knowledge on June 23, 
1995, as merely that of the identity of her potential tortfeasor 
rather than what it truly wasa lack of knowledge of the cause of her 
injuryit misconstrues our holding in Nowotny and works a 
serious injustice on both precedent and the claimant in this case contrary to 
the stated purpose of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act:  "to balance the respective equities 
between persons injured by governmental actions and the taxpayers of the state 
of Wyoming."4   Thus, therein I cannot 
concur.  

FOOTNOTES

1Compare 1976 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch.18, 
§ 1 to 1979 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157, § 1.  

2The statute is difficult to apply 
under the circumstances of this case because, while both the majority and I 
address the date of discovery of the act, error, or omission in 
question, the actual date of the act, error or omission has not been 
established.  It appears 
indisputable that, if BOPU were negligent, its negligence 
must have occurred prior to the flooding of Mrs. Rawlinson's basement in June of 
1995.

3See Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316 (Wyo. 1984); 
Barlage v. Key Bank, 892 P.2d 124 (Wyo. 1995); 
Davis v. City of Casper, 710 P.2d 827 (Wyo. 
1985).

4Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-102(a)(LEXIS 
1999).