Case Title: Tatman v. Cordingly

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-114

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Tatman v. Cordingly1983 WY 120672 P.2d 1286Case Number: 83-114Case Number: 83-114Decided: 11/23/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
E. BEN TATMAN, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

GARY L. CORDINGLY, 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the 
District Court, Albany County, Arthur T. Hanscum, J.

C.M. Aron 
and Sid L. Moller of Aron & Hennig, Laramie, for appellant.

Paul B. 
Godfrey of Godfrey & Sundahl, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]      E. Ben Tatman, 
appellant, sued Gary L. Cordingly, appellee, for assault and battery after the 
two had an altercation. Judgment was entered pursuant to a jury verdict finding 
that Cordingly acted out of self-defense. Tatman appeals the judgment on the 
grounds of faulty jury instructions and lack of sufficient evidence to support 
the verdict.

[¶2.]      We affirm. 

[¶3.]      There was a 
dispute between Tatman and Cordingly. This dispute precipitated a confrontation 
on June 1, 1982, in Albany County near the Old Fort Fetterman Road, miles from 
the nearest town. Tatman was 66 years old at the time of the incident, Cordingly 
in his early 20's. As a result of the fight that occurred Tatman was 
hospitalized for eight days and incurred substantial medical expenses. There 
were no witnesses to the scuffle other than the parties themselves, and they 
disagree as to the details. Both parties contend that the other was the 
aggressor.

[¶4.]      The issues 
presented in this case as stated by appellant are:

"1. Whether the Court 
below erred in refusing to give Appellant's proposed instructions and verdict 
form to the effect that each of two parties engaged in a fight is liable for 
injuries he inflicts on the other.

"2. Whether the 
verdict was contrary to the evidence; specifically, whether a verdict of 
reasonable self-defense could be sustained where the defender admitted he was 
struck no more than once and was uninjured yet he struck the other party 
violently many times and caused severe injuries."

I

[¶5.]      First we will 
discuss the second issue dealing with the sufficiency of the evidence. The 
standard of review we have repeatedly used in determining if the evidence is 
sufficient to support the verdict is that "[t]he trier of facts is the sole 
judge of the weight to be given to all testimony, and the matter of determining 
where the preponderance of the evidence lies is within the sound discretion of 
the trier of facts." Condict v. 
Hewitt, Wyo., 369 P.2d 278, 279 (1962). When reviewing cases on appeal, we 
are compelled to accept the evidence of the prevailing party as true, leaving 
out of consideration entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful party that 
conflicts with it, and giving to the evidence of the successful party every 
favorable inference which may reasonably and fairly be drawn from it. Jelly v. Dabney, Wyo., 581 P.2d 622 
(1978).

[¶6.]      Although there 
was much conflicting testimony in this case, we, as a court of review, will not 
disturb the findings of the trier of fact unless the findings are so totally in 
conflict with the great weight of evidence that they can be said to be 
irrational. Agar v. Kysar, Wyo., 628 P.2d 1350 (1981).

[¶7.]      In this case, 
judgment was entered on a jury verdict finding that Tatman committed a battery 
and Cordingly exercised reasonable self-defense. The jury was certainly entitled 
to believe Cordingly's testimony and find in his favor. There was evidence that 
Tatman had a bad temper, that he carried a gun and used it often, that he ran 
over Cordingly's motorcycle with his pickup truck, that Tatman struck Cordingly 
first, that Tatman was repeatedly trying to get to his rifle and that Cordingly 
feared for his life. From our review of the record, we find sufficient evidence 
for the jury to decide as they did.

II

[¶8.]      The appellant 
contends that the trial court erred in refusing two of his jury instructions. 
The first instruction denied reads:

"When it appears that 
a fight merely erupted between two parties and it is not clear who was the 
aggressor, then each party is liable for any injury inflicted on the 
other."

[¶9.]      This proposed 
instruction misstates the law. Each party is liable for the injury inflicted 
upon the other when there is a mutual affray. Condict v. Hewitt, supra. A mutual 
affray, however, differs from the situation where it is not clear who is the 
aggressor. Mutual affray is defined as a fight in which both parties willingly 
enter and is similar to a duel. Black's Law Dictionary 920 (5th ed. 1979). A 
mutual affray, therefore, requires mutual consent. There was no evidence that 
there was mutual consent to fight. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary; 
both parties claim that they were attacked by the other and reacted in 
self-defense. Therefore, regardless of whose side of the story is believed, 
there was no mutual affray.

[¶10.]    The second instruction at 
issue was partially denied by the trial court. The refused portion of 
plaintiff's proposed Instruction 3 reads:

"* * * Thus, even 
acting in self-defense, a person may be liable for injury inflicted upon the 
aggressor. That is the case when the defender is not justified in his belief 
that he was in danger, or when the defender uses excessive force, or when the 
defender continues to exert force after the aggressor is rendered disarmed or 
helpless."

This 
instruction is an accurate statement of Wyoming law on self-defense and its 
limits. The trial judge did, however, properly instruct the jury on these 
matters. The court gave jury Instructions 7, 8, and 9 which 
read:

"INSTRUCTION NO. 
7

 
 
"When it is apparent 
to a person that he is threatened with a battery, he has the right to determine 
from appearances and the circumstances then existing the necessity of resorting 
to force to repel any such apparent, threatened battery, and he has the right to 
do what seems reasonably necessary to protect himself against any such apparent, 
threatened attack, whether it is real or not, provided he believes it to be 
real."

"INSTRUCTION NO. 
8

"The defendant 
however is not liable to the plaintiff on his claim of battery if the 
affirmative defense of self-defense of a person is established. This defense is 
established if you find both of the following:

"1. The defendant 
honestly and reasonably believed (although perhaps mistakenly) that under the 
circumstances it was necessary for him to use force to protect himself against 
an actual or apparent threatened harmful contact; and

"2. The defendant 
used no more force than a reasonably prudent person would have used under the 
same or similar circumstances to protect himself against the actual or apparent 
threatened contact."

"INSTRUCTION NO. 
9

"A person who is 
battered by another has the privilege of self-defense, but that privilege ends 
when the aggressor is disarmed or helpless, or when all the danger has clearly 
passed."

[¶11.]    Instructions 8 and 9 
adequately cover the issue of self-defense and where the privilege of 
self-defense ends. It was not necessary for the court to duplicate these 
instructions by giving plaintiff's proposed Instruction 3 in full. Britton v. State, Wyo., 643 P.2d 935 
(1982); and Scheikofsky v. State, 
Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 (1981).

[¶12.]    Instruction 7, however, does 
not fully state the law in regard to the apparent necessity for acting in 
self-defense. According to Prosser:

"The privilege to act 
in self-defense arises, not only where there is real danger, but also where 
there is a reasonable belief that it exists. * * *

"The belief must, 
however, be one which a reasonable man would have entertained under the 
circumstances. * * * [I]t is not enough that he really believes that he is about 
to be attacked, unless he has some reasonable ground for the belief. * * *" 
Prosser, Torts, § 19, p. 109 (4th ed. 1971).

The 
Restatement of the Law (Second), Torts 2d, § 63(1), p. 98 (1965), 
states:

"An actor is 
privileged to use reasonable force, not intended or likely to cause death or 
serious bodily harm, to defend himself against unprivileged harmful or offensive 
contact or other bodily harm which he reasonably believes that another is about 
to inflict intentionally upon him."

Therefore, 
the standard to be applied in determining if there is the apparent necessity to 
act in self-defense is both subjective and objective. Not only must a person 
believe that a real danger exists, but that belief must also be reasonable. In 
the court's Instruction 7, a subjective standard is set out but the objective, 
"reasonable," standard is missing. To claim self-defense, the defendant's belief 
as to the necessity of defending himself must be based upon reasonable grounds. 
A subjective fear does not by itself entitle the defendant to use self-defense. 
Loy v. State, 26 Wyo. 381, 185 P. 796 
(1919). We recognize that Loy was a 
criminal case, but the principle we have just discussed is substantially the 
same in both criminal and civil cases. Jelly v. Dabney, supra; and 6A C.J.S. 
Assault and Battery, § 19, p. 342 (1975).

[¶13.]    This incomplete instruction 
is not reversible error. When the instructions given by the court are viewed in 
their entirety, a true and accurate representation of the law is given. 
Instruction 8 requires that the jury find both a subjective and an objective 
belief by the defendant that it was necessary for him to protect himself. 
Appellant has not established any prejudice as a result of this incomplete 
instruction or that a different result would have occurred had another 
instruction been given. Walton v. Texas Gulf, Inc., Wyo., 634 P.2d 908 (1981); 
and Pure Gas & Chemical Co. v. Cook, Wyo., 526 P.2d 986 (1974). We find that 
the error was harmless.

[¶14.]    The verdict form given in 
this case was a special verdict form wherein the jury was asked to answer 
several questions.1 The appellant contends that it was error for the 
trial court to refuse to ask the jury who was the aggressor, and that the 
verdict should have more clearly allowed the jury to find that both parties 
committed acts of battery.

[¶15.]    The aggressor in a 
confrontation is not entitled to exercise the privilege of self-defense unless 
and until he attempts to withdraw from the conflict. Jelly v. Dabney, supra. Appellant 
contends that the jury did not determine who was the aggressor or that the jury 
found Cordingly to be the aggressor but allowed the privilege of self-defense to 
stand without withdrawal from the conflict. We find that neither contention has 
merit.

[¶16.]    In this case, the jury was 
required to determine who was the aggressor but it was not a question on the 
special verdict form. By a review of the instructions it is clear that the jury 
had to make an initial determination as to who was the aggressor, and that the 
person acting to protect himself was not the 
aggressor.2

[¶17.]    Instruction 8 explains that 
the use of the privilege of self-defense only arises when the defendant honestly 
and reasonably believes that there was a need for him to use force to protect 
himself against an actual or apparent threatened harmful contact. The defendant 
can use no more force than a reasonably prudent person would use under the same 
or similar circumstances to protect himself against the actual or apparent 
threatened contact. Instruction 9 goes on to say that the privilege of 
self-defense ends when the aggressor is disarmed or helpless, or when all danger 
has clearly passed.

[¶18.]    The instructions assume that 
one person is the aggressor and the other person the protector. To properly 
apply these instructions to the facts, the jury must cast the parties in one 
role or the other. Although it was not specifically asked of the jury, "who was 
the aggressor," this determination had to be made to decide the case. The 
verdict makes it apparent to us that the jury found Tatman to be the aggressor. 
It is highly unlikely that the jury could have found that Cordingly was the 
aggressor and that he also acted in reasonable self-defense, especially 
considering the fact that Tatman was hospitalized after the incident and 
Cordingly was uninjured. The special verdict form was not 
erroneous.

[¶19.]    There was sufficient evidence 
in the record to support the verdict reached by the jury. The instructions given 
by the court adequately represented the law of self-defense and its limits. The 
special verdict form allowed the jury to decide this case in accordance with the 
law.

[¶20.]    We 
affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1 The special verdict 
form reads as follows:

"SPECIAL VERDICT 
FORM

"The Jury will answer 
the following questions submitted by the Court:

"1. Was a battery 
committed on June 1, 1983?

" X 
YES

"____ 
NO

"IF THE ANSWER TO THE 
ABOVE QUESTION IS YES, PLEASE STATE WHO COMMITTED A 
BATTERY:

"____ GARY 
CORDINGLY

" X BEN 
TATMAN

"2. If Ben Tatman 
committed a battery, did Gary Cordingly exercise reasonable 
self-defense?

" X 
YES

"____ 
NO

"3. If you find that 
Gary Cordingly committed a battery or that he did not exercise reasonable 
self-defense if Ben Tatman committed a battery, please determine the following 
damages, if any, for Ben Tatman:

"Medical Expenses 
............ $ 2,892.70

"General Damages 
............. $ ________

" TOTAL: $ 
________

"4. Was Gary 
Cordingly guilty of willful and wanton misconduct such that punitive damages 
should be awarded?

"____ YES                    
X NO"

2 Although the 
aggressor may change during a confrontation, here we speak of the initial 
aggressor.