Case Title: De La Puente v. Frederick County

Citation: 386 Md. 505

Docket Number: 50/04

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2005-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
De la Puente v. Frederick County Dept. of Parks and Recreation, No. 50, September Term
2004.  Opinion by Harrell, J.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TORT CLAIMS ACT - PUBLIC OFFICIALS - QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
Various employees of the Frederick County Parks and Recreation Commission were sued for
negligence after a sledding accident at Pinecliff Park resulted in injuries to a minor child.
The park is owned by Frederick County, Maryland, and is maintained by the Frederick
County Department of Parks and Recreation.  The defendant employees, comprising the
Director of Parks, Capital Improvement Administrator, Recreation Superintendent, Park
Superintendent, and Safety Inspector, moved to dismiss the suit on, among other grounds,
public official immunity.  If the individuals were mere government employees, they would
not be immune from suit.  There are four guidelines enumerated in James v. Prince George’s
County, 288 Md. 315, 324, 418 A.2d 1173, 1178 (1980), to aid in the analysis of whether a
particular individual enjoys public official status for purposes of common law immunity,
which include (i) whether the position was created by law and involves continuing and not
occasional duties; (ii) whether the holder performs an important public duty; (iii) whether the
position calls for the exercise of some portion of the sovereign power of the State; and, (iv)
whether the position has a definite term for which a commission is issued and a bond or oath
are required.
Applying these guidelines to the analysis of the present case, the individuals sued are not
public officials.  There is nothing in the record to indicate that their positions are “created by
law,” “have a definite term for which a commission is issued,” or “require a bond or an
oath.” James, 288 Md. at 324, 418 A.2d at 1178.  Although the individuals perform important
public duties in their positions with the Frederick County Parks and Recreation Commission,
there is nothing in the record to indicate that the individuals have the power to make or
enforce laws; therefore, they lack sovereign power to exercise.  They may not assert common
law public official immunity.
Circuit Court for Frede rick County
Case # 10-C-02-000097 0T
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 50
September Term, 2004
ISABEL DE LA PUENTE, et al.
v.
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF
FREDERICK COUNTY, et al.
Bell, C.J.
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed:   May 5, 2005
1Additional defendants were named, but they were dismissed by consent prior to the
ruling on the motion affecting Appellees.  The dismissal of the other defendants is not
challenged in the present appeal.
2The trial judge stated, “I have listened carefully to the arguments of both counsel and
I have reviewed the documents, the motions as well as the memoranda.”  The record also
reflects that a supporting affidavit was filed by Appellees with their motion, that its contents
were raised in argument by counsel at the motions hearing, and that those contents were
relied on by the trial judge in ruling.  Therefore, although the trial judge said “. . . and
therefore I will grant the motion to dismiss,” her action was in fact the grant of a motion for
summary judgment.  When a trial judge considers matters presented outside the four corners
of the complaint, a motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for summary judgment,
pursuant to Md. Rule 2-322(b,c), 2-501.  See Converge Servs. Group, LLC v. Curran, 383
Md. 462, 475-76, 860 A.2d 871, 879 (2004).  See also Dual Inc., v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
383 Md. 151, 161, 857 A.2d 1095, 1100 (2004).
This litigation began with the filing of a complaint in the Circuit Court for Frederick
County by Isabel de la Puente and Mark Willoughby (collectively “Appellants”) pertaining
to a sledding accident on Frederick County parkland in which their minor child, Amelia
Willoughby, was injured.  The third amended complaint, seeking compensatory damages
only, alleged simple negligence on the parts of at least seven individuals employed in various
capacities by the Frederick County Department of Parks and Recreation.  The defendants
included: Paul Dial, Director of Parks; “Bob” Failor, Capital Improvement Administrator;
Deborah Spalding, Recreation Superintendent; Earl Eyler, Park Superintendent; and James
Gist, Safety Inspector (collectively referred to here as “Appellees”).1   Appellees moved to
dismiss, or for summary judgment.  One of the grounds argued in support of the motion was
public official immunity.  At the conclusion of a hearing on 17 March 2004, the Circuit Court
effectively granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on that ground, 2 which
judgment was entered the following day.   Appellant noted a timely appeal to the Court of
3Final judgment ostensibly was entered by the trial court on Thursday, 18 March 2004.
Appellants noted an appeal on Friday, 19 March 2004.  On 29 March 2004, however, within
10 days of entry of the trial court’s judgment (see Md. Rule 1-203(a) for computation of time
in such a circumstance), Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Md. Rule
2-534 and a motion for a new trial pursuant to Md. Rule 2-533; both were denied on 11 May
2004.  Md. Rule 8-202(c) extends the time for filing an appeal to 30 days after entry of the
order disposing of the post-judgment motion.  A second, “protective” notice of appeal was
filed on 18 May 2004.
4When we assume jurisdiction over an appeal pending, but undecided, before the
Court of Special Appeals, we “consider those issues that would have been cognizable by the
Court of Special Appeals.” Md. Rule 8-131(b)(2).  We most frequently do so based on the
appellants’ brief filed in the Court of Special Appeals.  Thus, we rely on appellants’ question
or questions as framed in their brief before the intermediate appellate court to frame the issue
or issues we consider.  See Converge Servs. Group, LLC v. Curran, 383 Md. 462, 467, 860
A.2d 871, 874 (2004).  See also Dual Inc., v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 383 Md. 151, 161, 857
A.2d 1095, 1100 (2004).  That is the case in this instance.
2
Special Appeals.3   Before the intermediate appellate court could consider the appeal,
however, this Court, on its initiative, issued a writ of certiorari to consider whether Appellees
are “public officials” entitled to assert the defense of qualified public official immunity.4  
We shall reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and remand the case to the Circuit
Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
I.
There being no argument tendered here that a genuine dispute of material fact was
generated in the Circuit Court on the question of public official immunity, we recite the facts
as alleged by Appellants, as the non-moving parties below, giving them the benefit of any
reasonable inferences.  On 16 January 1999, Amelia was sledding with her father at Pinecliff
Park in Frederick, Maryland.  The sledding/toboggan run (“Slope”) at Pinecliff  Park,
including the land and improvements, is owned by Frederick County, Maryland, and
5Appellants, in their complaint, did not allege on the part of any defendant: (a) malice;
(b) gross negligence: (c) recklessness; or, (d) action or inaction beyond the scope of
employment.
3
maintained by the Frederick County Department of Parks and Recreation for public
recreational use.  Amelia’s toboggan veered off the Slope and collided with a tree, resulting
in significant physical injuries to her.   She was flown by helicopter to the Shock Trauma
Unit at the University of Maryland School of Medicine where she underwent two major
operations, followed by months of physical therapy and rehabilitation.  She continues to have
permanent physical disabilities as a result of the accident.
In their complaint, Appellants alleged, in separate counts as to each Appellee,
respectively, that he or she was negligent in maintaining an inherently dangerous facility,
failing to prevent use of the slope, failing to warn the public that the slope was inherently
dangerous due to icy conditions, failing to hire competent people to maintain the slope, and
failing to assure that the slope was safe for public use, all of which were alleged to be the
proximate cause of Amelia’s injuries.  As noted earlier, the Circuit Court granted summary
judgment in favor of Appellees on the sole ground of public official immunity.5  Appellants
contended that Appellees were mere government employees and, therefore, not entitled to
assert this defense.  The trial judge, however, stated that “. . . the Court does find that the
[Appellees] . . . by their conduct the [Appellants] are alleging that [Appellees] are exercising
some portion of the sovereign power of the state.  And furthermore, clearly alleges to me that
[Appellees] were performing discretionary as opposed to ministerial acts” entitling them to
6The Local Government Tort Claim Act, at § 5-303(d), provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this section,
this subtitle does not waive any common law or statutory
defense or immunity in existence as of June 30, 1987, and
possessed by an employee of a local government.
Md. Code (1987, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2004 Cum Supp.), § 5-303(d) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article.
4
assert public official immunity, as permitted by the Local Government Tort Claims Act
(“LGTCA”).6 
II.
A motion for summary judgment may be granted where “there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and [the moving] party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Md.
Rule 2-501.  “An appellate court reviews a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary
judgment de novo.”  Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 579, 831 A.2d 18, 24 (2003)
(citations omitted).   “The trial court will not determine any disputed facts, but rather makes
a ruling as a matter of law.  The standard of appellate review is whether the trial court was
legally correct.” Id.  When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court first
determines whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Id.  If no such dispute exists,
we proceed to review determinations of law.  Id.  “The facts properly before the court, and
any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them will be construed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.”  Id. at 579-80, 831 A.2d at 24.   The only issue presented
in this case is whether Appellees are public officials, a question of law, which we review de
7Although Appellees alternatively argue for affirmance of the trial court’s judgment
based on the Maryland Recreational Use Statute (Md. Code (1973, 2000 Repl. Vol.)), § 5-
1101 et seq. of the Natural Resources Article, an alternative basis for their motion below,
Maryland procedure directs that, “in appeals from grants of summary judgment, Maryland
appellate courts, as a general rule, will consider only the grounds upon which the [trial] court
relied in granting summary judgment.” Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 695, 785 A.2d
726, 729 (2001) (quoting PaineWebber v. East, 363 Md. 408, 422, 768 A.2d 1029, 1036
(2001)).  See also Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 378 Md. 509, 536, 836 A.2d 655,
671 (2003).  It is clear on this record that the trial judge, in granting summary judgment in
favor of Appellees, relied exclusively on their public official immunity argument.    
5
novo.7 See Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, 370 Md. 447, 478-80, 805 A.2d 372,
390-91 (2002).
III.
Appellants maintain that the Circuit Court erred in concluding that Appellees were
public officials entitled to the benefit of public official immunity for merely negligent
performance (or non-performance) of their duties.   For the following reasons, we agree with
Appellants. 
In Muthukumarana, we outlined the doctrine of common law public official immunity:
At common law, a government actor will enjoy qualified
immunity from liability for his or her “non-malicious acts
where: (1) he ‘is a public official rather than a mere government
employee or agent; and (2) his tortious conduct occurred while
he was performing discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, acts
in furtherance of his official duties. Ashburn v. Anne Arundel
County, 306 Md. 617, 622, 510 A.2d. 1078, 1080 (1986)
(quoting James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315, 323,
418 A.2d 1173, 1178 (1980)) (emphasis omitted).  See also
Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 704-05, 785 A.2d 726, 734
(2001) (quoting James).  Once it is established that the
individual is a public official and the tort was committed while
performing a duty which involves the exercise of discretion, a
qualified immunity attaches; namely, in the absence of malice,
6
the individual involved is free from liability. Lovelace, 366 Md.
at 705, 785 A.2d at 734 (quoting James).
 
Muthukumarana, 370 Md. at 479, 805 A.2d at 391. 
In James, this Court established four guidelines to aid in the analysis of whether a
particular individual is a public official for purposes of common law immunity:
(i)
whether the position was created by law and involves
continuing and not occasional duties;
(ii)
whether the holder performs an important public duty;
(iii)
whether the position calls for the exercise of some
portion of the sovereign power of the State; and
(iv)
whether the position has a definite term for which a
commission is issued and a bond or oath are required. 
James, 288 Md. at 324, 418 A.2d at 1178 (citing Duncan v. Koustenis, 260 Md. 98, 105, 271
A.2d 547, 550 (1970)).
These four guidelines are not exclusive, nor do they carry equal weight in the analysis;
rather, they are employed using the specific facts and circumstances of each individual’s
position.  James, 288 Md. at 324, 418 A.2d 1178.  Moreover, even if an individual’s position
does not satisfy the guidelines, that individual may be “nevertheless considered a public
official” if he or she meets one of the two additional scenarios provided in Duncan.
Muthukumarana, 370 Md. at 479-80, 805 A.2d at 391 (quoting Duncan, 260 Md. at 106, 271
A.2d at 551, (citation omitted)).   Those scenarios are an individual who exercises “a large
portion of the sovereign power of government”or “can be called on to exercise police powers
as a conservator of the peace.” Id.  (quoting Duncan, 260 Md. at 106, 271 A.2d at 551)
(citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).  See also James, 288 Md. at 324-25, 418 A.2d at 1178-
79 (quoting Duncan).   
8The Frederick County Code created the Frederick County Parks and Recreation
Commission and delegated to it the responsibility and authority to determine and adopt all
necessary rules and regulations for the conduct of business and protection of properties under
its control and to employ such personnel as it may consider necessary to administer its
functions properly.  Frederick County Code §§ 1-12-21, 28, 30 (2004).  These sections of the
code remain unchanged since enactment in 1959.  Appellees are employed by the Frederick
County Department of Parks and Recreation, but do not serve on the Frederick County Parks
and Recreation Commission.  Thus, while the Commissioners’ positions may be said to have
been created by law, to wit, the County Code, the positions of the Commission’s employees
may not be so characterized.
9Positions previously considered by Maryland’s appellate courts as providing an
important public duty are discussed in Muthukumarana, 370 Md. at 480, 805 A.2d at 391
(911 operators and dispatchers); Macy v. Heverin, 44 Md. App. 358, 363, 408 A.2d 1067,
1070 (1979) (volunteer ambulance driver of a volunteer fire company and volunteer
firemen); Duncan, 260 Md. at 107, 271 A.2d at 552 (teachers); Bd. of Supervisors v. Attorney
General, 246 Md. 417, 439, 229 A.2d 388, 400 (1967) (delegate to a constitutional
convention).  Nonetheless, in each of these cases, none of the individuals was determined by
the appellate courts to be a public official.
7
Applying the guidelines to the analysis of the record, such as it is, in the present case,
we conclude that Appellees are not public officials.  A position “created by law” means that:
(a) the office was created by Constitutional or legislative enactment, such as a statute or local
ordinance; (b) an oath is generally prescribed; and (c) a commission is issued.  See Duncan,
260 Md. at 108, 271 A.2d at 552.  See also Gary v. Bd. of Trs. of Employees’ Ret.  Sys., 223
Md. 446, 451, 165 A.2d 475, 478 (1960).  There is nothing in this present record to indicate
that the positions of Director of Parks, Capital Improvement Administrator, Recreation
Superintendent, Park Superintendent and Safety Inspector, respectively, were positions
“created by law,” 8 “have a definite term for which a commission is issued,” or “require a
bond or an oath.”  James, 288 Md. at 324, 418 A.2d at 1178.   The parties concede that the
Appellees perform important public duties within the meaning of Duncan.9  Duncan, 260
8
Md. at 105, 271 A.2d at 550.   There is some dispute, however, as to whether the Appellees
“exercise some portion of the sovereign power of the State.”  Duncan, 260 Md. at 105, 271
A.2d at 550.   
Appellants contend that Appellees are “mere” local government employees.
Appellees, however, argue that Appellees have “each been sued because their job titles
reflect policy-making duties (exercising a portion of the State’s sovereignty).”  Appellees
also argue that Appellants sued Appellees “because of their ability to make important
policy.”  As stated by this Court in Carder v. Steiner, 225 Md. 271, 276, 170 A.2d 220, 222
(1961), “[i]mmunity from liability rests not on the dignity of the office but rather upon the
nature of the function exercised.” 
The Circuit Court’s express rationale for granting summary judgment in favor of
Appellees was its perception that they  “exercise some portion of the sovereign power of the
State.”  Appellees, however, on this record, do not appear to be vested with any sovereign
power.  Sovereign power, in its simplest terms, means “the power to make and enforce laws.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1430 (8th ed. 2004).  As stated in Duncan, sovereign power
generally contemplates someone serving “in a legislative or policymaking capacity.”  260
Md. at 106, 271 A.2d at 551.  In Duncan, a public school teacher was not considered to
possess sovereign power because he “d[id] not make rules and regulations or determine
county education policy.” Id.   Using a similar touchstone here,  Appellees do not satisfy this
requirement because, by the nature of their duties, they do not make park rules, regulations,
10Appellants allege in their complaint that Appellees had numerous duties and
responsibilities that included: maintenance of the Slope, assuring that the Slope was safe for
public use, providing adequate protections to correct defects in the slope, closing the Slope
because it was not safe, warning the public that the Slope was dangerous, and hiring
competent people to maintain the Slope, duties that do not reflect the “power to make and
enforce laws.” 
9
or policy.10   Rather, they execute the policies determined and adopted by the Frederick
County Parks and Recreation Commission, the body to which these powers are committed.
See supra n. 8.  
Because Appellees’ positions do not satisfy a majority of the analytical guidelines
found in Duncan, we look next to the additional scenarios where an individual may be
“nevertheless considered to be a public official.” Duncan, 260 Md. at 106, 271 A.2d at 551.
The first requires that the individual exercise  “a large portion of the sovereign power of
government.”  Duncan, 260 Md. at 106, 271 A.2d at 551.  As noted earlier, Appellees cannot
satisfy this exception because they do not exercise any sovereign power of the State or
Frederick County. 
Appellees do not qualify as public officials under the second scenario because they
are not “called on to exercise police powers as a conservator of the peace.” Id.  For example,
Appellees do not serve in the capacity of any position the same as or similar to any previously
held by us to come within this description.  See Livesay v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 1, 862
A.2d 33 (2004) (corrections officer); Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 753 A.2d
41 (2000) (police officer); Carder v. Steiner, 225 Md. 271, 170 A. 2d 220 (1961) (prison
guard); Clark v. Ferling, 220 Md. 109, 151 A.2d 137 (1959) (prison superintendent);  Harris
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 151 Md. 11, 133 A. 888 (1926) (park policeman); and  Cocking v.
10
Wade, 87 Md. 529, 40 A. 104 (1898) (sheriff).  Furthermore, to the extent that Appellees
exercise any authority, such has not been shown on this record to be characterized fairly as
in the nature of “police power or conservator of the peace.” Duncan, 260 Md. at 106, 271
A.2d at 551.
Accordingly, we conclude, on the state of this record, that Appellees are not “public
officials” and may not assert as a defense common law public official immunity.   We
therefore need not address whether the conduct attributed to Appellees involved discretionary
(and performed within the scope of their official duties) or ministerial acts.  
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR FREDERICK COUNTY REVERSED;
CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
NOT 
INCONSISTEN T 
WIT H 
THIS
OPINION;   APPELLEES TO PAY COSTS.