Case Title: Maria N. Garcia v. Federal Insurance Company

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC06-2524

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-2524 
____________ 
 
MARIA N. GARCIA,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,  
Appellee. 
 
[October 25, 2007] 
 
CANTERO, J. 
 
In this case, we must determine an insurance policy’s scope of coverage for 
an additional insured.  Appellant, Maria Garcia, seeks coverage under a 
homeowner’s insurance policy issued to her employer by Appellee, Federal 
Insurance Company (“Federal”).  The policy extends coverage to “any other 
person or organization with respect to liability because of acts or omissions” of the 
named insured.  Reviewing the case on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit noted that “the dispute between Garcia and Federal hinges 
on whether the additional insured clause covers only the additional insured’s 
vicarious liability for the acts of the named insured.”  Garcia v. Fed. Ins. Co., 473 
F.3d 1131, 1133 (11th Cir. 2006).  Garcia argues that Federal’s policy is 
ambiguous and should be construed to cover her own acts as well as any vicarious 
liability for the named insured’s negligence.  Because this is an issue determinative 
of a cause pending in the Eleventh Circuit for which there appears to be no 
controlling precedent, that court certified two questions to us:   
1. Is an insurance policy that defines a covered person as “any other person 
with respect to liability because of acts or omissions of the insured” 
ambiguous? 
 
2. Does an insurance policy providing coverage for an additional insured “with 
respect to liability because of acts or omissions” of the named insured limit 
coverage to instances in which the additional insured is vicariously liable for 
acts of the named insured? 
 
Id. at 1136.  We have exercised our discretionary jurisdiction to answer them.  See 
art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const.  As explained below, we hold that Federal’s policy is 
unambiguous and limits coverage to instances of vicarious liability.  Therefore, we 
answer the first question “no” and the second question “yes.” 
I. BACKGROUND 
Maria Garcia worked as a caregiver for the insured, Laura Anderson.  As 
part of her duties, Garcia ran errands using a 1994 Volvo owned by Anderson’s 
son-in-law, Harry Mark Veith.  One day, with permission from Veith and 
Anderson, Garcia drove the Volvo to the supermarket.  As she drove into the 
parking lot, her foot slipped off the brake pedal.  The car struck and seriously 
 
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injured a pedestrian who had been withdrawing money from an ATM.  The victim 
sued Veith, Anderson, and Garcia, among others.  The complaint alleged that 
Veith, Anderson, and Garcia were each independently negligent for allowing the 
brake pedal to wear down to the point that bare metal was all that remained, 
causing Garcia’s foot to slip. 
At the time of the accident, Anderson was covered by Federal’s 
homeowner’s insurance policy.  The policy included coverage for personal 
liability, which covers “damages a covered person is legally obligated to pay for 
personal injury or property damage which take place anytime during the policy 
period and are caused by an occurrence, unless stated otherwise or an exclusion 
applies.”  The policy defines a covered person as follows:  
A covered person means: 
[1] You or a family member;  
[2] any other person or organization with respect to liability because 
of acts or omissions of you or a family member; or  
[3] any combination of the above. 
. . . . 
Definitions 
. . . . 
You means the person named in the Coverage Summary, and a spouse 
who lives with that person. 
. . . . 
Family Member means your relative who lives with you, or any other 
person under 25 in your care or your relative’s care who lives with 
you. 
 
Federal settled the victim’s claims against Anderson.  Garcia settled with the 
victim and then sought coverage from Federal, arguing that she qualified as “any 
 
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other person or organization with respect to liability because of acts or omissions” 
of Anderson.  Federal denied her claim, arguing that the policy’s additional insured 
clause only covers individuals who become vicariously liable for the acts or 
omissions of the named insured.  Because the victim sued Garcia for her own 
negligent acts, not for any acts or omissions of Anderson, Federal concluded that 
she did not qualify as an additional insured. 
Garcia sued Federal in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida, seeking a declaration that she is a covered person under the 
policy.  The district court concluded that Garcia would only be entitled to coverage 
under a theory of vicarious liability: 
A plain reading of “with respect to liability because of acts or 
omissions of  you” means, in this case, that Garcia is covered under 
the Policy if Garcia could be liable for striking the pedestrian because 
of Anderson’s failure to maintain the brake pedal of the automobile in 
a safe condition. 
 
Because the victim sued Garcia for her own negligence, the district court held that 
“Garcia is not a ‘covered person’ under the Policy.”   
The district court also relied on our opinion in Container Corp. of America 
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 707 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1998).  In that case, we referred to 
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 406 F.Supp. 1292 (W.D. Pa. 
1976), as a case where an additional insured provision clearly limited coverage to 
vicarious liability.  The policy in Consolidation Coal provided coverage for an 
 
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additional insured, “but only with respect to acts or omissions of the named 
insured.”  The district court noted that Federal’s additional insured provision is 
nearly identical to the clause in Consolidation Coal.  Based on its interpretation of 
the plain meaning of Federal’s policy and our statements in Container Corp., the 
district court held that Garcia was not entitled to coverage. 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that although the policy in 
Consolidation Coal is similar to Federal’s, it is not identical.  Specifically, the 
clause in Consolidation Coal includes the words “but only,” while Federal’s policy 
does not.  The court stated that “[i]t is therefore arguable that the language in 
Consolidation Coal, which the Florida Supreme Court considers to be clear, can be 
distinguished from the language in the instant case.”  Garcia, 473 So. 2d at 1136.  
The Eleventh Circuit was also unsure how our opinion in Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 913 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2005), where we 
interpreted the phrase “arising out of,” might affect our interpretation of Federal’s 
policy.  To resolve these uncertainties the Eleventh Circuit certified the two 
questions we address here. 
II. ANALYSIS 
This case raises a single issue of insurance contract interpretation.  We must 
decide whether a clause covering “any other person with respect to liability 
because of acts or omissions” of the named insured covers only vicarious liability 
 
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for the negligence of the named insured.  In deciding this issue, we (A) review the 
standard for interpreting insurance contracts; (B) examine the language of the 
clause at issue; (C) review cases from Florida and other jurisdictions interpreting 
similar policy language; and (D) explain why our opinion in Taurus Holdings 
interpreting the phrase “arising out of” does not apply.  We conclude by holding 
that the phrase “any other person with respect to liability because of acts or 
omissions of the named insured” is unambiguous and limits an additional insured’s 
coverage to instances of vicarious liability.   
A. The Standard for Interpreting Insurance  
Contracts in Florida 
 
“Under Florida law, insurance contracts are construed according to their 
plain meaning.”  Taurus Holdings, 913 So. 2d at 532.  “If the relevant policy 
language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one providing 
coverage and another limiting coverage, the insurance policy is considered 
ambiguous.”  Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So. 2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000).  
Ambiguities in insurance contracts are interpreted against the insurer and in favor 
of the insured.  Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So. 2d 161, 165 
(Fla. 2003).  To allow for such a construction, however, the provision must 
actually be ambiguous.  Taurus Holdings, 913 So. 2d at 532.  A provision is not 
ambiguous simply because it is complex or requires analysis.  Swire Pac. Holdings, 
 
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845 So. 2d at 165.  “Moreover, ‘if a policy provision is clear and unambiguous, it 
should be enforced according to its terms whether it is a basic policy provision or 
an exclusionary provision.’”  Taurus Holdings, 913 So. 2d at 532 (quoting Hagan 
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 675 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)). 
With these concepts in mind, we consider the particular policy language at 
issue. 
B. The Plain Meaning of Federal’s Policy 
We now examine the policy language at issue: “with respect to liability 
because of acts or omissions” of the named insured.  Two phrases are particularly 
relevant: “with respect to,” and “because of.”  When interpreting insurance 
contracts, we may consult references commonly relied upon to supply the accepted 
meanings of words.  See Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Novak, 453 So. 2d 1116, 
1118 (Fla. 1984) (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 11 (1966) 
to define “accident”); Beans v. Chohonis, 740 So. 2d 65, 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) 
(“One looks to the dictionary for the plain and ordinary meaning of words.”).  The 
phrase “with respect to” is defined as “concerning.”  Merriam Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary 997 (10th ed.1993).  The phrase “because of” is defined as “by reason 
of.”  Id. at 101.  When considered in context, these words clearly indicate that an 
additional insured is only entitled to coverage concerning liability that is caused by 
or occurs by reason of acts or omissions of the named insured.  An additional 
 
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insured’s liability thus must be caused by the acts or omissions—that is, the 
negligence—of the named insured.  The policy does not cover an additional 
insured’s liability arising from her own negligent acts.  Because the accident victim 
sued Garcia for her own negligence in failing to maintain the brake pedal, and did 
not allege that Garcia was liable for Anderson’s acts or omissions, Garcia is not 
entitled to coverage. 
C. Cases Interpreting Similar Language 
 
No Florida court has interpreted the precise language at issue.  We have, 
however, considered similar language.  In Container Corp., we noted that if an 
insurer had wished to limit an additional insured’s coverage to vicarious liability it 
could have included language similar to that used in Consolidation Coal: “Had 
Maryland wished to limit Container’s coverage to vicarious liability, it could have 
done so by clear policy language.  See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 406 F.Supp. 1292 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (construing coverage language as insuring 
the additional insured for vicarious liability).”  Container Corp., 707 So. 2d at 736.     
 
In Consolidation Coal, a coal company hired a hauler to transport various 
coal products.  As part of the contract, the hauler made the coal company an 
additional insured on its liability insurance policy.  The endorsement covered the 
coal company, “but only with respect to acts or omissions of the named insured.”  
During the contract term, a coal company train nearly struck an employee of the 
 
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hauler.  The company settled the employee’s subsequent claim and sought 
indemnification from the insurer.  The insurer denied coverage, arguing that the 
endorsement limited coverage to the coal company’s vicarious liability for the 
hauler’s acts or omissions.  A federal district court agreed, holding that “[t]he most 
likely meaning of the subject phrase is that it attempts to limit coverage to those 
instances where the acts or omissions—the negligence—of [the named insured] 
leads to [the coal company’s] liability.”  406 F.Supp. at 1300.  We approved this 
analysis in Container Corp. and confirm that view today.   
 
Courts from other jurisdictions have interpreted similar language to arrive at 
the same result.  See Vulcan Materials Co. v. Casualty Ins. Co., 723 F.Supp. 1263, 
1264-65 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that the phrase “any other person or organization 
but only with respect to his or its liability because of acts or omissions of an 
insured” is “plainly a vicarious liability provision and nothing more”); Sprouse v. 
Kall, 2004-Ohio-353, ¶¶ 3, 9 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2004) (an unreported Ohio 
opinion holding that the phrase “but only with respect to [its] liability because of 
acts or omissions of an insured” is “intended to protect [the additional insured] 
from vicarious liability for the acts or omissions of . . . the primary insured”); 
Transp. Ins. Co. v. George E. Failing Co., 691 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tex. App. 1985) 
(holding that the clause “any person or organization but only with respect to his or 
 
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its liability because of acts or omissions of an insured” only covers an additional 
insured’s liability for negligence of a named insured). 
The additional insured provisions in Consolidation Coal, Vulcan, Sprouse, 
and George E. Failing, are nearly identical to the clause at issue.  As Garcia and the 
Eleventh Circuit point out, however, the clause in each of these cases includes the 
words “but only,” while the policy here does not.  Garcia argues that the absence of 
“but only” renders Federal’s policy ambiguous.  We disagree.  Again, the phrase 
“because of” in the policy is relevant.  As one court has explained,  
there is a more circumscribed meaning to “because of” than merely 
being a sequential link in the chain of events. . . . The phrase appears 
to include persons or organizations held in by way of vicarious 
liability for derelictions of [the named insured].   
 
Long Island Lighting Co. v. Hartford Accident Ins. & Indem. Co., 350 N.Y.S.2d 
967, 972 (N.Y. Sup Ct. 1973).1  We agree with this assessment.  The omission of 
the words “but only” in Federal’s policy does not materially change the limitation 
of the additional insured provision to instances of vicarious liability. 
D. Cases Considering the Phrase 
“Arising Out Of” Do Not Apply in This Context 
 
 
Garcia also argues that Federal’s policy should be construed consistent with 
the phrase “arising out of,” which we interpreted in Taurus Holdings.  In Taurus 
                                          
 
1. Hartford interpreted an additional insured provision that extended 
coverage to “any other person or organization but only with respect to his or its 
liability because of acts or omissions of an insured.” 
 
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Holdings, a group of municipalities sued Taurus, a manufacturer and distributor of 
firearms, seeking recovery for the expenses associated with gun violence in their 
communities.  Taurus sought coverage for these suits from numerous insurers.  The 
insurers denied coverage based on provisions excluding coverage for “all bodily 
injury and property damage occurring away from premises you own or rent and 
arising out of your product.” Taurus Holdings, 913 So. 2d at 531.  We reviewed 
cases interpreting the phrase “arising out of” and concluded that it requires only 
“some level of causation greater than coincidence.” Id. at 533.  We noted that “the 
term . . . is broader in meaning than the term ‘caused by.’” Id. at 539 (quoting 
Hagen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 675 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)).  
Based in part on this broad construction of the exclusionary provision, we held that 
the insurers were not required to defend Taurus.   
The “arising out of” language at issue in Taurus Holdings, however, is 
broader than the language in Federal’s additional insured clause.  As we 
emphasized above, the presence of the words “because of” in Federal’s policy 
requires that an additional insured’s liability be “caused by” the acts or omissions 
of the named insured.  The phrase “arising out of” contemplates a more attenuated 
 
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link than the phrase “because of.”  For this reason, our opinion in Taurus Holdings 
has no bearing on our interpretation of Federal’s policy language.2 
CONCLUSION 
We hold that the phrase “any other person with respect to liability because of 
acts or omissions” of the named insured covers only an additional insured’s 
vicarious liability for the negligent acts or omissions of the named insured.  
Federal’s policy does not cover the additional insured’s independent acts of 
negligence.  Because the accident victim’s suit against Garcia sought recovery only 
for her direct negligence, and did not allege any liability based on acts or omissions 
of Anderson, Garcia is not entitled to coverage. 
 
Having answered the questions certified to us, we return this case to the 
Eleventh Circuit. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
                                          
 
2. Garcia also argues that Federal at least had a duty to defend her in the 
victim’s lawsuit against her.  This issue is outside the scope of the certified 
questions and we decline to address it.  See Hawkins v. Ford Motor Co., 748 So. 
2d 993, 997 n.5 (Fla. 1999) (“We decline to address the . . . issues raised by Ford 
. . . as those issues are outside the scope of the certified question.”). 
 
 
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Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit - Case No. 05-14720 
 
R. Hugh Lumpkin and Michael F. Huber of Ver, Ploeg and Lumpkin, P.A., Miami, 
Florida, and Jorge L. Guerra of Rodriguez, Tramont, Guerra, and Nunez, P.A., 
Coral Gables, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Irene Porter and Mark Hicks of Hicks and Kneale, P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee