Case Title: State v. Bayly. J. Nakayama concurring in the results only. ICA s.d.o., filed 09/24/2007 [pdf], 115 Haw. 476. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 02/12/2008 [pdf].

Citation: 118 Haw. 1

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2008-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
s+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HANAT'T

 

000.

 

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent/Plaintif£-Appellee

 

DAVID H, BAYLY, Petitioner/Defendant~Appelant
wo. 27984 ze, 3
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS g

(CASE NO. 2DTA-05-00234)
MAY 29, 2008

  

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.,
WITH NAKAYAMA, J., CONCURRING’ IN THE RESULT ONLY

OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY. J.

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant David H. Bayly seeks

review of the October 11, 2007 judgment of the Intermediate Court

of Appeals (ICA), which affirmed the district court of the second
circuit’s March 31, 2006 final judgment adjudging Bayly guilty of
inattention to driving in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes

(HRS) § 291-12 (Supp. 2006).* We accepted Bayly’s application

for a writ of certiorari and oral argument was held on April 17,

2008.
Bayly asserts that the ICA gravely erred in affirming

his conviction because there was insufficient evidence to prove

that he operated a vehicle without due care or in a manner as to

 

' the Honorable Rhonda Loo presided.

ons
 

#42 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

cause a collision with, or injury or damage to, as the case may
be, any person, vehicle or other property.

Based on the following, we reverse the ICA’s judgment.

T. BACKGROUND

On December 6, 2005, Bayly vas charged by complaint
with Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant
(OUI) in violation of HRS § 291£-61,? and inattention to driving,
in violation of HRS § 291-12.’ A bench trial was held on
March 31, 2006.
a ty. a

The following facts are dravn from the testimony of

officer Mark Hada and defendant Bayly at trial.

+ urs § 2916-62,
Antoxicant,” provide:

operating a vehicle under the influence of an
in relevant part!

 

 

(a) A person comits the offense of operating 2 vehicle under the
influence of an intoxicant if the person operates or assunes actual
physieal control of a vehicle:

(2) White under the influence of alcohol in an amount sufficient
£0 impair the person's normal mental faculties oF ability to
care for the person and guard against casualty:

(2) nile under che infisence of any drog that smpairs the
person's ability to operate the vehicle in a careful and
Prugent manner;

(3) With''0e"or more grams of alcohol per two hundred ten Liters
of breath} oF
(4) With 08 or more grams of alcohol per one hundred

millsiseers or cuble centimeters of 100d,

> uRS § 291-12 provides:

Inattention to driving. whoever operates any vehicle without due care or
{n'a manner as to cause a collision with, of Injury of damage to, as the
case may be, any person, vehicle or other property shall be fined not
hore than §400 sr iaprisoned not more than thirty days, oF both,
REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

 

On October 1, 2005, at around 12:

 

Oa.m., the Mavi
Police Department dispatch sent Wailuku patrel units to the
parking lot of 1325 Lower Main Street, on the island of Maui.
Officer Hada, who was assigned to the traffic department at that

time, heard the dispatch and arrived at the scene at

 

approximately 12:30 a.m. Officer Hada was told by other officers
at the scene that the driver was suspected of being intoxicated.
Officer Hada described the parking lot at 1325 Lover
Main Street as a flat, paved concrete parking lot. The parking
lot was an elevated structure, raised about seven to eight feet
above Lower Main Street, which ie north of the lot, and separated
by @ concrete wall. Between the edge of the parking lot and the
concrete wall is a grassy dirt area approximately two feet wide.
‘The parking lot is raised about one foot to one foot and a half
above the grassy dirt area, The parking spaces are angled so
that vehicles on the side where Bayly’s truck was parked face
northwest. Officer Hada observed that the lighting in the area
was “very adequate,” and that weather conditions were clear.
Although Bayly was not in the vehicle at the time
Officer Hada arrived, Hada testified that the front driver's side
of Bayly's truck was hanging off of the concrete parking area and
wes onto the grassy area. Hada did not notice any damage to any

property or to Bayly's truck.
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.

According to Officer Hada, the truck was stuck in this
position, and “there was not enough torque in the vehicle to
actually reverse it out without having to call for = tow.”

After approaching Bayly, Officer Hada observed that

Bayly was disheveled, had a circular and side-to-side sway, had a
strong odor of liguor, and had red, watery eyes, and slurred and
mumbling speech. Hada also testified that Bayly was “very
arrogant, very cocky, very uncooperative” in his interactions
with the officer. Hada perforned the horizontal and vertical
gaze nystagmus field sobriety tests on Bayly, and based on his
observations arrested Bayly for OUI. Bayly was given a blood
test at 2:15 a.m., and the parties stipulated that the test

showed Bayly to have 0.068 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters

 

of blood.
At trial, Officer Hada was shown a video of the parking

lot at Lower Main Street. Upon viewing the video, Hada recalled

 

+ officer Hada testified that sayly exhibited “six clues” during the
horizontel nystagmus test, and exhibited vertical gaze nystagmus ae well’

+ the prosecution also called or. Clifford wong, an expert in
toxicology, to testify regarding Bayly's likely level of intoxication at the
Eine of the incigent. Wong performed # retrograde extrapolation and. test ifiet
that Bayly’s blood-alcohol Level would have been “definitely greater” than
0.08 at sfound midaiont. The district court, however, found that because of
Gacertasney about the anount of tine elapsed between the incident and eh
blood test, the testimony was insufficient to establish the earlier Level
Because the prosecution failed to nest its burden of proving the OUT
charge, end nas not Brought an appeal on the cistrict court's Fuling, evidence
ssterial only to the OUI charge is not at issue in this case. Although the
fact that Bayly was under the influence of alcohol 1s “germane” to his
inattention to driving chacge, gee intra, the specific ang uncertain evidence
Eagarding the precise bloed-aicohel level is not inportant in this case,

 

 

 

     

“
 

‘+** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

that there was a yellow “bumpster [sic]” in the parking stalls
where Bayly’s truck had been parked, and that the driver's side
tire of Bayly’s vehicle was off the ledge. When asked whether
the “other side was still on” the parking lot, Hada testified
that he thought it was “partially off” and “believ[ed) it was
hanging on the edge.”

Bayly, testifying on his own behalf, stated that it was
the front passenger side of his truck that went off the edge of
the parking lot, while the left tire or driver's side was
touching the bumper.‘ According to Bayly, he slowly entered the
parking lot stall to ensure that his truck would touch the yellow
bumper with the driver’s side tire so that he would know when to
stop. Bayly explained his car going off the edge as follows:

Unfortunately that bumper isn't even attached to the
concrete and it was pet in a position to where my right side
Went off the embankment at the sane tine that I wae
Cechnically trying to be, you know, touch that bumper with
ny tire

 

 

Bayly added that he thought his car going off the edge “ha[d) to
do with @ bad parking stall,” not “anything to do with impairment
or judgment.” With respect to the bumper, Bayly also stated that
they are “completely loose,” and that “there's holes in then
where they're supposed to be mounted in the parking lot so that

they're stationary, but they’re not. They're loose.”

 

«an ite summary disposition order (S00), the ICA noted disagreenent on
this point, stating that “while the parties disagreed av to which tire went
over the edge of the parking surface, the parties agree that one Wheel did in
fact go over the edge.” Ica’ S00 at 2.

 

s
 

FoR Pui

 

CATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

On cross-examination, Bayly testified that he had been
to the parking let once before in the daytime, but that he was
not aware of the “parking situation” on the side of the lot in
which his car was parked on the night of the incident. Bayly
admitted that he had consumed two beers that night.

Before ruling, the district court summarized the
factual findings relevant to the inattention to driving charge
based on the testimony and video evidence. With respect to the
location of the vehicle, the court reiterated that Officer Hada
testified that the front end of the vehicle’s driver’s side tire
was over the parking concrete area, and based on the video stated
that there was a foot to a foct-and-a-half drop to the grassy
dirt area below. The court reiterated Officer Hada’s testimony
that the bottom of Bayly’s vehicle was touching the concrete area
and that the vehicle’s tire was hanging over the front.

Regarding the yellow bumper, the court found that it was heavy
but mobile with some force, and did not cover the whole length of
the parking stall, such that one tire of a vehicle could pass to
the side of the bumper and end up in the grassy dirt area.

B. Procedural History

After a bench trial, the district court acquitted Bayly
of the OUI charge, but found him guilty of inattention to
driving. The court explained the basis for Bayly’s conviction as

follows:
2+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

Count tho deal with the inattention to driving and,
again, the date end the defendant driving is not in contest

"phe court needs to setersine here whether or not lr

 

ate “sith iniury or dansae 13 =
vehicle, of other orooerty.

So this particular case, as far as the inattention to
griving, the Court does tind that Mr, Bayly wae operating
his venicle withost due-cars, 1 lookea at the derunitions

Sf Intentionally, knowingly and recklessly which would apply
Sn this particular area and the Court finds either by the
Getendant's intentional actions, by his knowing actions oF
by his reckless actions, that he definitely was acting
without oe care in this particular manner:

T o understand that driving 1s a muitit
activity whereby you need your hands to drive, your feet to
Sperate the ges pedal, your eyes to watch the road, and your
Brain to compute sll of this

Obviously the application of force on a gas pedal
combined with slowed reaction time due to the drinking, that
Mr. Bayly at the very least aduitted to two beers, net being
able to stop in time, and ending up in this grassy ar

  

 

i kind of

 

 

 

 

2 cinively thal
vehicle without duecare

‘Go the court does find the defendant guilty of coun
tuo and Finds tl the officer, Or- Wong”

       

Eestinony to be very credible in this particular area, and
Y'll find the defendant guilty of count two.

Bayly appealed, contending, as he does in his
application, that there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction.

The ICA affirmed the judgnent of the district court,
entering its judgnent on October 11, 2007. In its SD0, the ICA
stated that “HRS § 291-12 specifies that the elements of
inattention to driving are that a person: (1) operated a vehicle,
(2) without due care or in a manner as to cause, (3) a collision
with, or injury or damage to, as the case may be, any person,
vehicle, or other property.” ICA's SD0 at 2. After reviewing

each element, the court found that sufficient evidence existed
‘#* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
for each. The first element, operation of a vehicle, was

admitted. Id, The ICA found that there was sufficient evidence
for the second element, operation without due care, based on the

following:

 

Ofticer Hada testified that the area was adequately 1it
Further, while the parties disagreed as to wiich tire went
over the edge of the parking surface, the parties agree chat
one wae? dia in fact go over the edge. Sayly's treck endes
Sp hanging off the edge of the parking lot, insobilizes te
the point where a tow truck was’ required to ewtricate it
Based on the evidence, the district court could have
inferred that Bayly wes not operating his vehicle with doe
care, Bayly admitted consuming two Deere pricr to parking
the vehicle. Officer Hada testified that Bayly displayed
signs of intoxication and was arrogant and cocky. Or. Wong
testified that Bayly's Likely level of impairment at the
tine of the incident waz a blood alcohol content in excess:
of .08 grams. Evidence of impairment is “germane to 9 charge
of inattention to ariving.”” state v. Mitenell, 98° Havel’!
See, 401, 15 .3d 316, 327 (Appr 2000)

‘White tayly is Correct in his asiertion that the mere
occurrence of an accisent is insufficient to sustains
Conviction for inattention to Oriving, here we have the
eeldence of an accident, evidence of bayly's intoxication,
fand the testimonies of Bayly, the arresting officer, and the
Intoxication expert. viewed in the Light mest faverable te
the State, this is enough to sustain the conviction.
Michell, 94 Mawai't at 401-02, 18 P.3d at 327-26. "We need
hot Getermine that the evidence shows negligence ss 2 matter
ef law but merely that the evidence shows s possibility that
hegligence could be found es # matter of fact. Ja. ck 402,

15 3d at 328 (quoting State v. Tamanaha, (6 Haw. 245, 256,
S07 b.2d' 688, 696 (1962)

 

 

 

 

 

    

 

 

ICA's SDO at 2-3. With respect to the third element, the ICA
held that “the State adduced sufficient evidence of @ collision
between the botton of Bayly's truck and the concrete parking lot
surface to sustain Bayly’s conviction,” ICA's $b0 at 3, citing
this court's decision in State v. Williams for the proposition
that “the vehicle must nevertheless ‘collide’ with another

object.” 114 Hawai'i 406, 410, 163 P.3d 1143, 1147 (2007).
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Bayly filed an application for writ of certiorari on

Janvary 9, 2008. No response was filed and oral argument was

held on April 17, 2008.

11, STANDARDS OF REVIEW

sufti f Judi couittal

 

[Elvicence adduced in the trial court must be considered in the
strongest Light for the prosecution when the appellate court
passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to support a
Conviction; the same standard applies whether the case wae before
2 Judge or jury. The test on appeal 1s not whether guilt is
@stablished beyond a reascnable doubt, but whether there wes
Substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of
fact.

 

   

State v. Richie, 68 Hawai'i 19, 33, 960 P.2d 1227, 1241 (1998)
(quoting State v. Quitoa, 85 Hawai'i 128, 145, 938 P.2d 559, 576
(1997)). “Substantial evidence’ as to every material element of
the offense charged is credible evidence which is of sufficient
quality and probative value to enable a person of reascnable
caution to support a conclusion.” Richie, 88 Hawai'i at 33, 960
P.2d at 1241 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) .

‘The standard to be applied by the trial court in ruling upon a
notion for a Judgeent of acquittal ia whether, upon the evidence
‘sewed in the ligne most favorable to The prosecution and in full
Fecognition of the province of the trier of fact, @ reasonable
Bind might faicly conclude guilt Deyond a seaeonable doubt. An
appellate court employs the sane standard of review.

 

State v. Keawe, 107 Hawai'i 1, 4, 108 P.3d 304, 307 (2005)
(brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Pone, 78 Hawai'i 262, 265,
892 P.2d 455, 458 (1995)).
 

+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.

 

8. or ation
Statutory interpretation is a question of law
reviewable de nove.” State v. Levi, 102 Hawas's 262, 265, 75 P.3d
1273, 1176 (2003) (quoting State v. Arceo, 64 Hawai'i 1, 10, 928
F.2d 843, 852 (1996)). This court's statutory construction is

guided by established rules:

First, the fundamental starting point for statutory
interpretation is the language of the statute itself,
Second, where the statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, cur sole duty ie to give effect te its plain
‘and obvious’ meaning. Third, implicit in the task of
Statutory construction is our foremost obligation to

ih and give effect to the intention of the
ture, which 1s to be obtained primarily from the
Contained in the statute seself. Fourth, when
Ts Goubt, “doubleness of neaning, oF indistinctivensss
of uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an
ambiguity exis

  

 

Peterson v, Hawaii Elec, Light Cou, Inc., 85 Hawai'i 322, 327-28,
944 P.2¢ 1265, 1270-71 (1997), superseded on other grounds by HRS

§ 269-15.5 (Supp. 1999) (block quotation format, brackets,
citations, and quotation marks omitted) .

In the event of ambiguity ina statute, “the meaning of
the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with
which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be
compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning.” Id.
(quoting HRS § 1-15(1) (1993)). Moreover, the courts may resort
to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent, such as
legislative history, or the reason and spirit of the law. See

RS § 1-15(2) (1993).

10
 

“* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

TIT. DISCUSSION
A. ‘The Elemente of Inattention to Driving

HRS § 291-12, “Inattention to Driving,” provides as
follows:

Whoever operates any vehicle without due care or in a manner
as to cause a collision with, or injury or damage to, as the
Case may be, any person, vehicle or other property shall be
fined not nore than $500 or imprisoned not more then thirty
days, oF beth.
‘The ICA interpreted the offense to be composed of three parts:
(2) operation of a vehicle, (2) without due care or in a manner
as to cause, (3) a collision with, or injury or damage to, as the

c

 

nay be, any person, vehicle or other property.
As presented at oral argument, the statute is
susceptible to another interpretation, in which the disjunctive
‘orm provides for two alternative means of proving the offense
(the “alternative means” theory).’ The ambiguity in the statutory
text thus concerns whether the “without due care” requirement is

tied to the “collision”/*injury"/"damage” requirement (the

* This view was set forth by the ICA in an earlier published opinion
that examined the inattention to driving statute to determine whether it
punished the “sane conduct” as a forner statute for the offense of “Driving
Ender the influence of drugs,” HRS § 291-7(a) (1993) (repealed 2000). state
rtenoks, 96 Hewel'l 168, 46 P.54 1 (app. 2002). The ICA stated that “the
Sianent of driving ‘without due care’ is an alternative one to the element of
Griving ‘ina manner as to cause a collision with, or injury cx damage to, a8
the cae say De, any person, vehicle, or cther property(.)’" 1d, at 198) «6
Pid at @ (alteration in original).

‘Under the “alternative means” theory, the prosecuticn is required to
prove two things: (1) operation by defendant of a vehicle, and (za) "without
Sie"tare” or (2b) “in a manner ae to cause, a collision with, or injury or
Gamage to, az the case may be, any person, vehicle or other property.”

 

 

 

n
 

ct FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***_
“physical harm” element) or stands alone as a sufficient basis
for charging the crime.

Wie are convinced, based on our reading of the statute
in the context of the Hawai'i Penal Code, canons of statutory
interpretation, and prior precedent, that the ICA's

interpretation in the current case is a better construction of

 

the statute.
1, Problems With the "Alternative Means" Theory

ow care”: absur

Unconstitutional vagueness

The “alternative means” theory creates problems of

 

interpretation with regard to the firet means by which the
offense of inattention to driving could be committed -- namely,
to operate a vehicle “without due care.” It is a basic rule of
statutory interpretation that “[p}rovisions of a penal statute
will be accorded a limited and reasonable intezpretation . .. in
order to preserve its overall purpose and to avoid absurd
results.” State v. Bates, 84 Hawas'< 211, 220, 933 P.2d 48, 57
(1997), Under the first part of the “alternative means” theory,
one may be prosecuted for slips in attention or other instances
of “inattentiveness” while driving, such as momentarily taking

one’s eyes of the road, even when no harm results. Such

 

* We ditter slightly, however, in how we would parse the three parts of
the statute, See intra Section II1.A.3.

2
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.

possibilities show the potential for arguably absurd applications
resulting from the “alternative means” interpretation.

The “alternative means” theory also raises potential
constitutional concerns. “[WJhere possible, we will read 2 penal
statute in such a manner as to preserve its constitutionality.
To accord a constitutional interpretation of a provision of broad
or apparent unrestricted scope, courts will strive to focus the
scope of the provision to a narrow and more restricted
construction.” Id. Interpreting the statute to apply to any
Griving that betokens, without more, a lack of “due care” raises
potential problems of unconstitutional vagueness, by granting
indeterminate discretion to arresting officers to apply the
statute. This court has explained that

{clue process of law requires that 2 penal statute state
with reasonable clarity the act it prescribes and provide
xed standards for adjudicating guilt, or the statute ie
veld for vagueness. Statutes suse give the person of
ordinary intelligesce 2 ressonable opportunity to know what
Conduct is prohibited so that he or she may choose between
Teweal ang Unlawful conduct:

 

 

vagueness is measured by the following standard:

 

A) criminal statute is void for vagueness unless it:
i) gives the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited 40 that he or she may
act accordingly, snd 2) provides explicit standards for
those uno apply’ the statute, in order to avold arbitrary and
Gisershinatory enforcenent and the delegation of basic
Policy matters to policemen, Judges, ana juries for
Fesolution on an ed hoc and subjective basis

 

Id. Because it fails to specify an explicit standard, the mere

command that one not drive “without due care” -- regardless of

B
++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

any physical harm caused by such driving -- raises potential
problems of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcenent. The
potential of the “alternative means” theory to violate important
penal and constitutional principles suggests that a nore sensible
interpretation would be preferred.

b. Hawai'i o: not. m

“alternative means” theory.
Past decisions also provide implicit disapproval of the

“alternative means” theory in the context of inattention to

driving. In State v Mitchell, the ICA upheld a conviction for
inattention to driving when the defendant’s vehicle “plowed inte
the rear” of a car in front of it, which sustained “rear-end
damage.” 94 Hawai'i 388, 401, 15 P.3d 314, 327 (App. 2000). In
explaining its opinion, the ICA stated that

Witohelt contends, and se aatee, that mere occurrence of an

accident without tore, is anauféscrent to sustains

Conviction for inattention £0 ariving: ‘Adeittedly™ the

Fecord does not suffer fron plethors of evicence’ as to the

phyoteel circanatances of the accident. However” as

Seteiied Shove, there is nove in thas Zecord than the mere

occurrence of an accident”
Id. (citation omitted). By rejecting the possibility that a mere
accident could lead to Liability, the TCA also rejected,
impliedly and sub silentic, the non-culpable alternative of the
“alternative means” theory of the statute.* But see Momoki, 98

+ im tact, a8 alscvssed intra, it would violate the Hawal'i Penal Code

ke altow conviction for inattention'to driving based en homesipable sender,
Secause every elenent of « penal offense must cory a stare of bing of oe

Teast “recklessness” unless legislative purpose to inpose ebsolute Liability
(continued.--}

 
4° FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S 1

 

WAN'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Hawai'i 188, 46 P.3d 1 (endorsing the “alternative means” theory,
discussed supra note 7).

Moreover, in all prior published decisions concerning
HRS § 251-12, the physical harm element has been present, usualy
in the form of 2 collision. See State v, Reves, 57 Haw. 533,
533, 560 P.2d 114, 115 (1977) (defendant, “intending to make a
left turn froma tyo-lene highway into a gravel road, moved the
vehicle he vas driving from the right to the left lane, where it
was struck from behind by a vehicle which was overtaking a line
of three cars”); Mitchell, 94 Hawai'i 388, 18 P.3d 314 (xear-end
collision); State vs Lee; 55 Haw. 505, 523 P.2d 315 (1974)
(clarifying that the inattention to driving statute applies to
activity on private roads and accordingly reversing trial court's
dismissal of two cases: in both, the charge was that the
defendant's vehicle had collided with another vehicle).

2, A Unitary Approach to HRS § 291-12
A better starting point 1s to analyze the elements of

the inattention to driving offense according to the framework of

 

(.. .continued)
is strikingly clesr. See State v, Rushing, 62 Haw. 102, 105, 612 F.2d 103,
4106 (1380) (*(3]he mere absence of = specification of the requisite state of
ind does not provide a sufficient basis fron which to override the general
policy of the Hawaii Penal Code that ansolute or strict Liability in the penal
Taw ie indefensible if conviction regults in the possibility of imprisonment,
land condesnation. “That the legislative purpose to impose absolute liability
Should not be discerned lightly by the courts seens very clear.” (Citations
enitted.)]. When an offense fails to specify the nentel state required, the
Gefault mental states of vintentionsliy,” “knowingly,” and “recklessly” are
Spplied.” fae WRS 702-204; dnfra Section 211-Ac2-

 

 

 

 

1s
 

on

 

CATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

 

the Hawai'i Penal Code. See HRS § 702-205 (“Elements of an

offense,” include “conduct,” “attendant circumstances,” and
vresults of conduct”).! HRS §§ 701-114(1) and 701-114(2) (1993)
require proof beyond 2 reasonable doubt of “[e]ach element of the
offense,” as well as “(t]he state of mind required to establish
each element of the offense.” See also HRS § 702-204 (“[A]
person is not guilty of an offense unless the person acted
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law
specifies, with respect to each element of the offense.”
(Emphasis added.)).

‘The inattention to driving statute, HRS § 291-12, is
comprised, inter alia, of @ conduct element and a result of
conduct element. First, the statute includes a conduct elenent.
‘The conduct element, itself composed of several parts, includes
operation of @ vehicle," and the phrase “without due care or in a

manner.” The statute concludes with a result element, “as to

\ Although HRS § 291-12 was first enacted in 1971, 1972 Haw. Ses. L
Act 150, § 2, at 347, prior to the adoption of the Hawai'i Penal Code, 1972
Naw. Sess. L! Ret 9, $1, at 32-162, the Code nevertheless applies to it. ERS
$'761-102(3}" (1993); entivies, “All' offenses defined by status

Spplicabitity to offenses committed after the effective date,”
provisions of chapters 701 through 706 of the Code are applicabl
Sefined by other statutes, unless the Code otherwise provides.”

   

 

‘offenses

  

4H that one is operating a zshicla, rather than something else that can
be “operated” (e.g. @ bicycle), could also be analyzed as an attendant
Circumstance element cf the crime. However, because there is no dispute that
Bayly operated a vehicle, it is uinecessary to engage in this analysis.

 
_*#t FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***_
cause a collision with, or injury or damage to, as the case may
be, any person, vehicle or other property... .” HRS § 291-12.
‘Two aspects of the phrase “without due care or in a
manner,” which modifies the type of driving punishable by the
statute, should be noted. First, the phrase refers to the manner
in which a vehicle is operated, or the nature of that operation.
It thus describes conduct. In State v. Reves, this court,
apparently relying only on the “without due care” verbiage of the
statute, read the phrase to suggest state of mind requirenent,
and concluded that inattention to driving “requires only a
showing of negligence in the operation of [the] vehicle... .”
57 Haw. 533, 534-35, 560 P.2d 114, 115-16 (1977). However, the
Hawai'i Penal Code sets a higher standard for criminal negligence
than the mere lack of “due care.” For example, HRS § 702-
206(4) (a) (1993) specifies that “[a] person acts negligently with
respect to his conduct when he should be aware of a substantial
and_uniustifiable risk taken that the person's conduct is of the
specified nature.” (Emphasis added.) HRS § 702-206(4) (d) makes
clear that “[a] risk is substantial and unjustifiable within the
meaning of this subsection if the person’s failure to perceive
it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the

circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the

 

obs

n
 

14+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWA' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.
game situation.” (Emphasis added.).” “Gross deviation” from a
law-abiding person's standard of care denotes a higher level of
culpability than 2 mere deviation from the “due care” standard.
To the extent that the “without due care” designation fails to
map the state of mind requirement described as “negligently” in
the Hawai'i Penal Code, we believe that no state of mind is

clearly specified by the statute. Therefore, the default states

 

of mind of “intentionally,” "knowingly," or “recklessly,” would
be required as to each element of the statute. See HRS § 702-204
(then the state of mind required to establish en element of an

offense is not specified by the law, that elenent is established

if, with respect thereto, a person acts intentionally, knowingly,

 

or recklessly."). Accordingly, we overrule Reyes on this point.
‘The second important aspect of the phrase “without due

care or in a manner” follows naturally from the above analysis,

1 RS $ 702-206(4), defining “Negligently,” provides in fui2

{a} A person acts negligently with re
snould be aware of 9 substantial
the person's conduct is of the specified nature

 

(b) A person acts negligently with respect to attendant circunstances
nen he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that such clrounstances exist.

(c)_ A person acts negligently with respect to a result of his conduct
vinen he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that his conduct will cause such result.

(a) A Fisk Ls substantial and unjustifiable within the meaning of this
subsection if the person's failure to perceive it, considering the
ature and purpose of his conduct and the cireunstances known to

Involves a gross deviation from the standard cf care taat 2
sbiding person would cbserve in the sane situation.

 

1
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

namely, that the phrase should be understood as a unitary
expression of the type of driving punishable by the statute,
rather than a construction establishing alternative means to
prove the offense. Under this reading, the phrase “in @ manner
as to cause” is best understood as an extension of the “without
due care” language, linking the conduct and result elements. In
other words, beth phrases describe the manner of operation of the
vehicle -- which we have interpreted as requiring a mental state
of at least recklessness -- and link that manner to the result
element of causing a collision, injury, or property damage. In
this case, the term “or” is best read conjunctively. See HRS §
1-18 (1993); In. ze City é County of Honolulu Corp, Counsel, 54
Haw. 356, 374, 507 P.2d 169, 178 (1973) ("We are of the opinion
that the disjunctive ‘or’ in the context as used in [the statute]

actually imparts the meaning of the conjunctive ‘and’. The sense

 

of a word which harmonizes best with the whole context of the
statute and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy
and objects of the legislature mst be adopted.”). Because under
the Hawai'i Penal Code each of the two expressions, “without due
care” and “in a manner [as to cause], connote at least a
reckless state of mind with respect to the conduct of operating a
vehicle, interpreting them together best harmonizes the phrase

with the statute as a whole.

rr
 

{** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

 

This interpretation avoids the problems outlined above
-- potential absurdity and unconstitutional vagueness -- while
fulfilling the dictate that “[p]rovisions of a penal statute will
be accorded @ limited and reasonable interpretation... in
order to preserve its overall purpose,” Bates, 84 Hawai'i at 220,
933 P.2d at 57. It also represents a sensible approach to a
statute that is not 2 model of clarity, and is consistent with
the manner in which the statute has been applied in our caselew.

Based on the foregoing, we hereby reject the
“alternative means” theory of HRS § 291-12 expressed by the ICA
in Momoki and require that the conduct and result elements all be
proven, along with the requisite state of mind, to convict under
the statute.

3. Applying This Construction of HRS § 291-12 to the
Instant Case

Therefore, in order to convict under HRS § 291-12, the
prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that Bayly (1) operated a vehicle “without due cere or in a
manner," (conduct) (2) “as to cause 2 collision with, or injury
or damage to, as the case may be, any person, vehicle or other

Property” (result of conduct), HRS § 291-12, and that he did so

 

(3) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, HRS § 702-204.

1 We acknowledge that “reckless driving” is also punishable by another
statute. See HRS § 281-2 2007} ("Whoever operates any vehicle or rises any.
(Continued.

 

20
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

Bayly asserts that the ICA gravely erred in affirming
his conviction of inattention to driving, because there was
insufficient evidence to prove that Bayly operated a vehicle
without due care or in a manner as to cause a collision with, or
injury or damage to, as the case may be, any person, vehicle, or
other property. Because Bayly does not dispute that he operated
the truck on the night in question, we restrict our analysis to
the evidence of any collision, injury, or damage caused by
Bayly’ driving.

5 i
Sugties “collision With.

 

‘The Collision Requirement and Bayly’s Argument,
Under the result element of HRS § 291-12, the
prosecution must prove that there was @ collision, that a person
was injured, or that property was damaged. As no evidence of
property danage or personal injury was presented at trial, this

case hinges on the evidence of a “collision.”

 

(continued)
animal recklessly in disregard of the safety of persons or property is guilty
Of reckless Griving of vehicle or reckless riding of an animal, as
Sppropriate, snd shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than thirty days, or both.").. Indeed, this fact'supporte the idea that the
legislature criginally intended the “physical harm” component inthe
inattention fo driving statute to be a mandatory part of the offense, so as to
distinguish ceiving "without due care” from ite close relative, “recklessly in
Gieressra of the safety of persons of property.” Compare HRS $ 251-12 mith
hes §°251-2.

a
   

HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

In his application, Bayly argues that the prosecution
failed to adduce evidence that Bayly collided with any person,
vehicle, or other property. Bayly does not deny that his truck
“came into contact with the concrete parking lot surface.”
Rather, Bayly argues that “this incidental contact [did not]
constitute[) a ‘collision.’”

Notably, the district court made no findings with

respect to this element of the inattention to driving charge."

 

The ICA, in its S00, treated the issue as follow:

‘As to the third element, the State adduced sufficient
evidence of a collision between the bottom of Sayly's truck
Sha) the concrete parking lot surface to sustain Bay's
Conviction 114 Hawai'i 406, 410,163
bola 11463, 118) TOOT) the wehicle mast neverthelces
Scollige’ ‘with ancther object”)

 

Ica’s Spo at 3.
In its brief to the ICR, the prosecution argued that

Bayly’s “operation of his truck resulted in @ collision between

his vehicle and the surface of the parking lot,” based on Officer

Hada’s testimony that the bottom frame of Bayly’s truck was

M in its oral ruling, the court focused only on the “due care” elenent

of the statute, discussing the various pieces of evidence in favor of that
Ending, The absence of eny consideration of the “collisien"/"inguey")
“ganage” clement is clear from the manner in which the court conciuded its

 

Obviously the application of force on a gas pedal combined with

Slowed reaction time due to the drinking, that Hr. Bayly at the very,

least adnitted to two beers, not being able to stop in tine, and ending
“i

 

up in this grassy ares. xt dose nee!
So the court does sind the defendant quiltv of count two...

2
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
touching the concrete parking lot surface. According to the
prosecution, it could reasonably be inferred “that the bottom
frame of [Bayly’s] truck collided with the parking lot surface
when it went over the edge of the parking lot.” The prosecution
also noted that “the bottom frane of a truck is not @ portion of
the vehicle that normally cones into contact with the ground, as
the truck's tires usually keep the body above ground level.”
2. ‘The Meaning of “Collision”

Because the evidence adduced regarding the alleged
“collision” is not in dispute, the question whether 2 “collision”
occurred is a pure question of law. Specifically, at issue in
this case is whether contact between the botton of @ truck and
the surface on which the vehicle sits -- be it a road or a
parking lot -~ constitutes a “collision.” More broadly, the
basic issue is whether a “collision” occurs when some part of a
vehicle contacts only the road itself.

In order to answer this question, this court must heed
the “plain and obvious meaning” of the statute in order to give
effect to the intention of the legislature. See Beterson, 85
Hawai'i at 327, 944 P.2d at 1270. If the statute is ambiguous,
land no such plain or obvious meaning emerges, it is permissible
for the court to resozt to context and extrinsic aids. See HRS

§§ 1-15(1) and 1-15(2).

2
OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

We focus on the critical phrase: “collision with .
any person, vehicle or other property." HRS § 291-12. The term
“collision” is not defined in HRS chapter 291. As a general
matter, “(t]he words of a law are generally to be understood in
their most known and usval signification, without attending so
much to the Literal and strictly grammatical construction of the
words as to their general or popular use or meaning.” HRS § 1-14
(2993). To determine what meaning to attach to the term
“collision,” we first review relevant caselaw on the meaning of
“collision” in other criminal statutes as well as in the context
of automobile insurance policies that cover “collisions.”

a. saselaw definitions of “collision”

This court recently exanined, although in a different
context, a similar “collision” requirement in HRS § 2916-21
(supp. 2004), which mandates that police officers take a blood
sample to determine intoxication in the event of a “collision”
where the officer has probable cause to believe a person involved

committed an enumerated traffic offense. State v. Williams, 114

 

Hawai'i 406, 163 P.3d 1143 (2007). In Williams, a police officer
arrived at an accident scene to find a motorcycle on the side of
the roadway, and a male party about fifteen feet away, close to

the shoulder of the roadway. Id, at 407, 163 P.34 at 1244, The

male was bleeding from a cut on his lip and the officer detected

2
+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

an odor of alcohol from him. Id. At trial, the officer
testified that he did not find any debris on the ground, skid
marks, or “anything like that,” and concluded that the party fell
from his motorcycle to the ground, Id, at 408, 163 P.3d at 1145,
‘The officer later ordered that a blood draw be taken of the
defendant, without the latter's consent.

The defendant in Williams had asserted that the police
officer was not authorized to order a blood draw under HRS $
2916-21, because evidence of a “collision” was lacking. Id. at
410, 163 P.3d at 1147. In order to assess whether the evidence
was sufficient to constitute a “collision,” this court consulted
the Webster's dictionary definition:

“collision” ie defined as “the action or an instance of
colliding, violent encounter, of forceful striking together
typically by accident and so'as to harm or impede.

o : 46 (2385)

Williams, 114 Hawai'i at 410, 163 P.3d at 1147. The court further
stated that “although single-vehicle accidents may qualify as
collisions, in such a case the vehicle must nevertheless
‘collide’ with another object.” Id, (citing State v. Entrekin,
98 Hawai'i 221, 223, 47 P.3d 336, 338 (2002), in which a
automobile crossed the center divide of a highway and “collided

with a dirt embankment”)!

% “collide” is defined 2s “to becone impelled into violent contact”;
sto strike or dash together in collision typically by accident with a degree

 

cf ferce and shock angwith solid rather than lancine or sidssviping impact.”
(eontinued.--)

ey
 

*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

Noting the absence of any evidence of danage to the
motorcycle or of the motorcycle’s position with respect to the
road, the 1ack of physical evidence indicating a collision, and
the officers testimony concluding that the defendant “fell off
the bike,” this court concluded that the evidence was
insufficient to establish a collision. Id.

Williams did not directly address the question whether
the motorcycle’s position at the side of the road indicated that
it “collided” with the road when the defendant apparently fell
off the bike. However, by finding the evidence of collision
insufficient, we implicitly rejected the notion that a vehicle
striking the roadside qualifies as a “collision.”

A more direct consideration of the meaning of
“collision” can be found in an older Hawai'i case, Alexander vs
Home Insurance Co., 27 Haw. 326 (Terr. 1923). The sole question
in Alexander was “the liebility of the insurer under the
‘collision clause’ of its policy for damages occasioned an
automobile insured by it which accidently capsized or tipped over
on to the road over which it was being operated.” Id, at 326-27.
‘The insured car capsized when the driver applied the brakes
suddenly to avoid a collision with a horse that had dashed into

the road, coming into “violent contact with the ground at the

added).

 

26
 

FOR PUBLICATION

 

REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

side of the road sustaining danage to its body, machinery, and
equipment.” Id. at 327. The insured, arguing that the accident
was covered under the “accidental collision” policy of its
contract, asserted that the violent contact with the road was a
“teollision’ between the automobile and the side of the road
within the definition of that term as employed in the policy.”
Id.

‘The Alexander court ultimately held that the accident
did not involve a collision. Id. at 332. To reach this
conclusion, the court relied upon the generally accepted meaning
of the word, rather than what it termed the “technical
lexicographical definition," under which the accident might be
classified as the “striking together of two bodies” and thus a
scollision.” Id. at 328. The court explained the popular
meaning of “collision” in the following passage:

one describing the accident in the instant case would
not refer to it as a “collision.” the term “capsize” or
Neiprover" as esployed in the submission would be more
Feasonably descriptive of the accident. Were one to refer
Eeuan auterobile a2 Being “in collision” without giving
Further details, the mind of the auditor would naturally
‘Sisuelize an autonehsle cosing in contact with same other
BPittorecress: thie thought is best iilustrated, perhaps
Eycthe not ancsomon accident to 2 pedestrian slipping ena
failing to the pavenent.. One would not say that he collided
with Ene pavement, "A fall 48 not spoken of a8 2 collision.

 

 

 

 

 

[ds at 326-29 (emphasis added). The court also quoted the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's similar rejection of a hypertechnical
meaning of “collision”:

2
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

*opon, its face this appears to be good logic, but the
conclusion is neither convincing nor satisfying, One
instinctively withholds assent to the result, "the reason is
that it makes & novel and unusual use and application ef the
word ‘collision’. We do not speak of falling bodies as
Colliding with the earth.” In common parlance the apple
Eells to the ground; it does not collide with the

with all falling Bodies, We speak of the descent as a fall,
hnot @ collisions In popular understanging 2 collision does
nnot result, we think, from the force of gravity alone. Soch
fn application of the term lacks the support of ‘widespread
dnd frequent osage’.”

Id, at 331 (quoting Bell v. American Ins. Co., 181 N.W. 733 (Wis.
1921).

 

   

 

Courts in other jurisdictions have also examined
whether similar accidents were “collisions” in the context of
insurance coverage. A notable case representing a view opposite
to that of Alexander is Rayne v, Western Casualty & Surety Cou,
379 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964). In Bayne, the insured’s
tractor and trailer slipped and went onto the soft shoulder of a
highway, causing the tractor and trailer wheels to be submerged
in soft soil and materially damaging the trailer and its load.

Id. at 210. The court was required to determine whether such

 

contact with the soft shoulder of the highway was a “collision of

the automobile with another object” under the insurance policy.

i

& sayly cites @ Louisiana case, Brow v. Union Indemnity Co., 105 so,
918 (ua, 1925), that ia similar to Alexanger both factually and Interns of
the court's reasoning. In Brown, the Suprene Court of Loulsiens determined
that a there was no collision when the plaintiff-insured, to avoid hitting an
onccosing car, made 2 sharp turn that resulted in the cat tipping over and
coming into "violent contact with the surface of the road, dd.

2
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’

 

HAWANI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

With regard to “collision,” the court set out the

following reasoning:

Generally speaking, the determination of whether there
hag been a ‘collision’ within ehe intent and mesning of the
policy involves (1) whether there was an object which was
Struck, end (2) the manner of the striking. As noted by the
authorities, there is an irreconcilable conflict in the
efforts of the various courts in construing the meaning and
application of the word ‘collision’ as it appears in
Insurance policy clauses of the type before us. Some courts
constrve the word narrowly by limiting its meaning to a so
called spopular conception’, Le, £he

one 2 Select, and thers

‘SouLact with the around of the hiaheay or shoulder. The
majority of the courts, often noting there 1 no proof that
the word ‘collision’ hes some commonly known and generally
Fecognized restrictive meaning in insurance contracts take
the viewpoine that the word ‘collision’ ‘showls be
Sefined broadly and in ite dictionary ‘striking against’,
thus including every contact with eny part of the highway

Id. at 201.
Adopting a broad definition of “collision,” the

 

 

Missouri appellate court next addressed the holdings of other
courts with respect to impacts between motor vehicles and the

roads they travel on:

Courts which have ascribed to 2 dictionary or bread
definition of the word ‘collision’ have held that an impact
between a notor vehicle and obstacles on the rosd such ss
Focks, barricades, noles, excavations, and washoute are
Eollissene with ancther object within the policy provisions

nthe cther hand it has been held that contact of an
Giruepile sith the road itself as where the road surface
icimteaular or hes roush spots. does not consticute a

Spon ith an ebtect within the meaning of the policy
Sig this Senet ines because of 2 genera) feeling chat the

Dolley ai ~pomularly underatood” was not intended to furnish
Soverace Zor that tyse of scciaent and sometimes Because it

was felt that since the autonobile wheels were already in
EGistant contact with the highesy curtace and Tao -senge
striking it ae the eheels tumned around the collision clause

Spon which the autosobile ie Being driven.

However, it is obvious from 2 study of the decisions
that where the impact of striking occurs other than on the

 

 

29
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

road proper, i.e, not on that part constructed, intended and
used for travel thereon, the tendency 12 more Libersl toward
Finding coverage upon impact between the vehicle and ancther
object, incluging those formed by the terrein.

 

Id. at 212 (emphasis added). In applying these principles to the
stipulated incident, the Missouri appellate court ultimately
concluded that a “collision” within the meaning of the insurance
contract had taken place. In reaching this result, the court did
not conclude that 2 mere striking of the road was sufficient;
rather, it described the incident as the “sudden contact of a
moving body, the vehicle, with an obstruction in ite Line of
notion,” which it characterized as 2 “solid bank of earth . .

not part of the regular roadway intended and used for travel,” as
well as “the somewhat perpendicular dirt.” Id, at 212-13.

b. neanii * -

Based on Williams and Alexander, as well as the mandate
of HRS § 1-14 that “[t]he words of a law . . . be understood in

their most known and usual signification,” we believe that the
term “collision” in HRS § 291-12 should be understood in a
colloguial, rather than a technical sense. Under such @
construction, “collision” generally refers to “an automobile
coming in contact with sone other vehicle or some perpendicular

object obstructing the course of its progress.” Alexander, 27

Haw. at 328.

30
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WES

 

*S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

Basic canons of statutory construction provide
additional support for the adoption of this narrover
interpretation of “collision.” In the Bayne case, although the
Missouri appellate court adopted a broader interpretation of
“collision,” which covered the vehicle’s running off of the road
onto soft soil, the court made clear that its interpretation was
Limited to the context of insurance contracts. Indeed, the court
explicitly invoked “the fundamental principle of construction of
insurance contracts that where reasonable to do so such contracts
are to be construed in favor of the insured so as to provide
coverage and against the insurers who drafted the instrument.
379 S.W.2d at 211.°" The broader interpretation of “collision”
was consistent with this principle.

In contrast to Bayne, the instant case arises under the
penal law, where the basic canons of statutory construction
counsel in favor of a less expansive definition. This court has

"this principle has been recognized in Hawai'i, see Dairy Road
partners gy -dsland Ins Co., 92 Howoi's 398, 411-12, 952°P.2a 93, 106-07
fib00) (Ile have Long esbscribed to the principle that [insurance contracts]
host be construed Liberally in favor of the insured and (any) ambiguities

 

{must be) resolved against the insurer.” (Quoting Estate of =
{hss Grove, 86 Hawai! 262, 271, 948 P-2d 1103, 1132 (1997).)), and has bee

 

Gpplied in numerous cases construing collision insurance policies. See
Annotation, Recovery under automobile property danace oolicy expressly
nelods ‘exclu ae, uhere venicli -

23 A.L-R. 24389, 395
tigtei Minis, in accordance with the fandenentel principle of construction of
Insurence contracts that such contracts are to be construed in favor of the
insureds dt has been held in s number of cages that the word ‘collision,’ as
Sted in’ provisions insuring @ motor vehicle asainst collision, is to be
construed more strongly against the insurer.").

 

 

 

2
 

"OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **
stated that, “[wlhere a criminal statute is ambiguous, it is to
be interpreted according to the rule of lenity. Under the rule
of lenity, the statute must be strictly construed against the
government and in favor of the accused.” State v. Shimabukuro,
100 Hawai'i 324, 327, 60 P.34 274, 277 (2002) (citations omitted).
This rule makes it more appropriate to adopt @ less expansive
meaning of the term “collision.”

Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the term
“collision” in HRS § 291-12 should carry its common meaning, and
not the more expansive technical definitions used in sone
contexts.

3. Applying this Interpretation of “Collision” to the
Evidence in this ci

 

The prosecution asserts that there was a collision in
this case based on the contact of the bottom of Bayly's truck ~~
which normally does not touch the road surface -- with the
surface of the parking lot when one side of the truck went over
the parking lot edge. The prosecution has neither adduced
evidence nor proffered any theory about the severity of impact
the truck bottom had with the road surface. No evidence of
damage to the truck bottom appears in the record.

under these circumstances, we cannot say that Bayly
“operate(d] any vehicle . . . in @ manner as to cause a collision
with... other property.” HRS § 291-12. ‘The prosecution's

2
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

interpretation strains credulity in the face of the commonly
understood concept of “collision.” As the court recognized in
the similar circumstances of the Alexander case, “{o]ne
instinctively withholds assent to the result.” 27 Haw. at 331.
Unlike @ typical “collision,” there was no contact with a
“perpendicular object obstructing the course of [the vehicle's]
progress.” Id, at 328. As Bayly notes, the bottom of a vehicle
comes into contact with the road surface in other circumstances
that are not commonly understood as “collisions,” such as when 2
car “bottoms out” in a pothole or over a speed bump.

In short, Bayly’s vehicle was not involved in a
collision as a matter of law. Without satisfying the result of
conduct element, Bayly cannot be convicted of inattention to
driving. As such, it is unnecessary to reach Bayly’s argument
that the ICA erred in upholding the circuit court's determination
the he operated a vehicle without due care.

IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we reverse the ICA's judgment and the

district court’s March 31, 2006 final judgment.

Sandra Kim (Jon N. Tkenaga,
fon the application and
Teresa D. Morrison, on the Powe in

brief), Deputy Public
Defenders, for petitioner/
defendant“appellant

2
#** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

Renee Ishikawa-Delizo
(Gerald K. Enriques, on the
brief), Deputy Prosecuting
Attorneys, for respondent/
plaintiff-appellee

CONCURRENCE BY NAKAYAMA,
I concur in the result only.

Naa cornea

»