Case Title: Commonwealth v. Wilson

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11985

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11985 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  QUOIZEL L. WILSON. 
 
 
 
Barnstable.     March 6, 2020. - November 30, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide. 
 Cellular 
Telephone. 
 Practice, 
Criminal, 
Motion 
to 
suppress, Affidavit, Warrant, Assistance of counsel, 
Capital 
case. 
 Search 
and Seizure, 
Affidavit, 
Warrant, 
Fruits 
of illegal 
search. 
 Constitutional 
Law, Search and 
seizure, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 12, 2013. 
 
 
A pretrial 
motion 
to suppress 
evidence 
was heard by Gary A. 
Nickerson, 
J., a motion for reconsideration 
was considered 
by 
him, and the cases were tried before him; and a motion for a new 
trial, 
filed on August 
2, 2018, 
was considered 
by Robert C. 
Rufo, J. 
 
 
 
Janet Hetherwick 
Pumphrey 
for the defendant. 
 
Elizabeth 
A. Sweeney, 
Assistant 
District 
Attorney, 
for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
                    
 
 
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Quoizel L. 
Wilson, of murder in the first degree on the theories of 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, after 
he shot the victim, Trudie Hall, multiple times in the torso, 
killing her.  The defendant also was convicted of assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon and improper disposition 
of a human body.  The defendant raises two primary arguments:  
(1) his cell site location information (CSLI) should have been 
suppressed because originally it was obtained by police without 
a warrant and a subsequent search for the same information 
pursuant to a warrant was tainted by the initial warrantless 
search; and (2) his trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to move to suppress the fruits of the 
initial warrantless CSLI search.  We consolidated the 
defendant's direct appeal with the appeal from the denial of his 
motion for a new trial, and we now affirm.  We also decline to 
grant extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
Background. 
 1.  Facts. 
 We summarize 
the facts the jury 
could have found, reserving certain facts for later discussion.  
On July 27, 2010, Hall, a Nantucket resident, traveled to 
Hyannis, where she and her husband, Ram Rimal, checked into 
separate rooms at the Bayside Resort hotel.  The two were 
scheduled to attend an appointment in Boston the following day.  
Rimal had rented a vehicle.  He and Hall drove to a mall to see 
3 
 
a movie together, and then bought take-out food for dinner.  
Afterward, they returned to the hotel; Rimal went to his room, 
and Hall took the rental vehicle, saying she had to print some 
things.  That was the last time Rimal saw her. 
The following morning Rimal unsuccessfully tried to reach 
Hall by cellular telephone (cell phone).  Hall was not in her 
hotel room, but the bed appeared to have been slept in, and Hall 
had left a shopping bag containing clothes and money in the 
room.  Rimal contacted Hall's mother, Vivienne Walker, and the 
two reported Hall's disappearance to police.  Rimal later 
obtained call records for Hall's cell phone, and Walker tried 
calling the numbers Hall most recently had contacted.  One of 
the telephone numbers belonged to the defendant.  Walker later 
gave the list of telephone numbers to police. 
Hall was five months pregnant at the time of her 
disappearance.  She had been having an affair with the 
defendant, who also was married.  Walker also had received a 
telephone call from an unknown woman who made "slander-ish" 
remarks about Hall's pregnancy.  Walker told police she thought 
the caller was the wife of the father of Hall's baby. 
On July 29, 2010, police located the rental vehicle in a 
commuter parking lot by Route 6.  The interior of the vehicle 
was stained with a significant amount of human blood, later 
shown to belong to Hall, consistent with a fatal amount of blood 
4 
 
loss if left untreated.  Among other things, police recovered 
from the vehicle a copper jacket fragment from a spent 
projectile, two lead fragments, and one lead core portion of a 
spent projectile, apparent bone fragments, and a piece of human 
flesh.  The copper jacket fragment was fired from a .38 caliber 
class weapon, which could include a nine millimeter handgun. 
The defendant was the registered owner of a nine millimeter 
Beretta 92FS pistol; records showed that the pistol had not been 
reported missing.  The defendant also previously had made 
statements in front of friends implying that he carried a gun 
with sixteen rounds, consistent with a nine millimeter Beretta 
92FS pistol. 
Hall had told a friend that she thought the defendant was 
the father of her unborn child and that he wanted her to get an 
abortion.2 
 On July 29, 2010, 
someone 
sent a message 
from the 
victim's social media account, claiming she was in the hospital 
after an abortion.  Police determined that Hall was not a 
patient at any area hospital. 
At about 1 A.M. on July 30, 2010, police spoke with the 
defendant on the front steps of his house.  His wife was in the 
house at the time.  The defendant told police that he was a 
                    
 
 
2 An analysis of the fetal skeletal remains later confirmed 
that the defendant was the father. 
5 
 
friend of Hall and admitted that he had seen her at the hotel on 
July 27, but he denied having any sexual relationship with her. 
On August 2, 2010, police obtained cell phone subscriber 
information and call logs for Hall, the defendant, and another 
number belonging to the defendant's wife.  The records showed 
numerous calls and text messages between Hall and the defendant 
on July 27, until about 10 P.M.  Between 10:09 and 10:18 P.M., 
Hall made eleven calls, each lasting only seconds, to a 
telephone number belonging to Mawande Senene.  The activity on 
Hall's telephone ceased at 10:49 P.M.  Police interviewed Senene 
on August 2, and he stated he had noticed the calls, but did not 
pick up because he did not recognize the number.  He said he had 
a voicemail from a "Rudy," "Trudie," or "Judy," asking him to 
call her back, but he did not.  Instead, he called the defendant 
because he recognized the number as a Nantucket exchange, and he 
knew the defendant used to live there. 
On August 3, 2010, police obtained additional cell phone 
records 
that included 
CSLI3 for 
the same three numbers 
belonging 
                    
 
 
3 The term "CSLI" (cell site location information) refers to 
"a cellular telephone service record or records that contain 
information identifying the base station towers and sectors that 
receive transmissions from a [cellular] telephone" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Fredericq, 482 Mass. 70, 71 n.2 
(2019).  "It may be used to identify the approximate location of 
the cellular telephone based on the telephone's communication 
with a particular cell site."  Id. 
 
6 
 
to Hall, 
the defendant, 
and the defendant's 
wife.4 
 The 
defendant's CSLI placed him at the victim's hotel, at the 
commuter lot where the rental vehicle was found, and in the 
location where the victim's body would later be discovered, at 
relevant times on the night of the murder.  The CSLI also showed 
that Hall's cell phone and the defendant's cell phone traveled 
together throughout the evening of July 27. 
The defendant was interviewed by police for the second time 
on August 3, 2010, at his own request.  During the interview, 
which was recorded, the defendant admitted that he had been 
having an affair with Hall, but insisted he had been at home the 
night of the murder.  After being confronted with the fact that 
police had information (based on the CSLI) showing that he was 
not at home, the defendant stated that he had been driving on 
the Service Road that night to sell cocaine to a friend named 
J.D. Lang. 
Police interviewed Lang on August 4, 2010.  Lang at first 
stated that he had met up with the defendant the night of the 
murder, but later admitted that he had been lying and that the 
defendant had called him and asked him to give that false story 
                    
 
 
4 In order to access the CSLI, police obtained an order 
pursuant to the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).  
The § 2703(d) order was obtained by orally presenting 
information to a judge in chambers.  No written affidavit was 
submitted in support of the application. 
7 
 
if someone called asking about him.  Police also interviewed 
Senene again on August 4, 2010.  Senene then told police that on 
July 29, the defendant had requested that Senene meet him at his 
house, and when Senene arrived, the defendant had asked him to 
lie and say he was with the defendant the night of July 27.  
Senene refused. 
Police interviewed the defendant again on August 5, 2010, 
the same day that they executed a search warrant for the 
defendant's home.  During the interview, the defendant repeated 
his claims that he had met with Hall at the hotel the afternoon 
of July 27, and denied meeting with her later in the evening.  
He repeated his assertion that he had met with Lang later that 
evening to sell him drugs.  Even after being confronted with 
information (derived from the CSLI) that contradicted his 
claims, the defendant insisted on his version of events. 
Hall's remains were discovered nearly two years after the 
murder by a man walking his dog in a wooded area near a water 
tower off Hayway 
Road in Falmouth.5 
 Hall's 
skeleton 
showed 
damage consistent with gunshot trauma.  The trauma indicated 
that the bullets traveled from the back or side of Hall's body 
toward the front. 
                    
 
 
5 Employment records showed that Hayway Road was on the 
defendant's recycling collections truck route. 
8 
 
Seven jacketed spent projectiles and one jacket from a 
spent projectile were recovered from the scene at Hayway Road, 
all of which were .38 caliber ammunition bearing markings 
consistent with having been shot from a Beretta model 92.  The 
medical examiner determined that the cause of death was gunshot 
wounds to the torso. 
In 2014, police acquired a search warrant to obtain the 
same CSLI information that they previously had obtained in 2010 
pursuant to a § 2703 order. 
2.  Procedural 
background. 
 Prior to trial, the defendant 
moved to suppress all of the cell phone records obtained by the 
Commonwealth.  The trial judge denied the motion, determining 
that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the 
Commonwealth's access to records other than his own; that the 
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
subscriber and call records; and that although the defendant did 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his own CSLI, there 
was no constitutional violation because "[t]he facts known to 
[police] as of August 3rd, and conveyed [orally] to [the judge 
who authorized the order], established probable cause for the 
issuance of an order compelling the disclosure of CSLI data." 
The defendant moved for reconsideration, which was denied.  
A single justice of this court denied the defendant's 
application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal.  The 
9 
 
defendant renewed his objection to the admission of the cell 
phone records during trial.  In May of 2015, after a jury trial, 
the defendant was convicted on all counts.  He timely appealed. 
On August 2, 2018, the defendant filed a motion for a new 
trial and for an evidentiary hearing, arguing that under the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court's 
opinion 
in Carpenter 
v. United 
States, 
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), 
and this court's 
prior 
decision 
in Commonwealth 
v. Augustine, 
467 Mass. 
230 (2014) 
(Augustine 
I), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 448 (2015), 
it was error 
not to suppress his CSLI.  The defendant further argued that his 
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move 
to suppress a variety of evidence as "fruits" of the illegal 
search.  The motion judge, who was not the trial judge, denied 
the motion.  The defendant's appeal from the denial of his 
motion for a new trial was consolidated with his direct appeal. 
Discussion. 
 1.  Standard 
of review. 
 When considering 
a 
defendant's direct appeal from a conviction of murder in the 
first degree along with an appeal from the denial of a motion 
for a new trial, we review the entire case pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth 
v. Upton, 
484 Mass. 
155, 
159–160 
(2020); 
Commonwealth 
v. Goitia, 
480 Mass. 
763, 768 
(2018).  In so doing, we review "raised or preserved issues 
according to their constitutional or common-law standard and 
analyze any unraised, unpreserved, or unargued errors, and other 
10 
 
errors we discover after a comprehensive review of the entire 
record, for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice." 
 Upton, 
supra at 
160, citing Commonwealth 
v. Brown, 
477 Mass. 805, 821 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018).  
"For an error to have created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice, it must have been likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion" (quotation and citation 
omitted). 
 Upton, 
supra. 
2.  Suppression 
of the defendant's 
CSLI.  The defendant 
first contends that the trial judge erred in failing to suppress 
his CSLI, and that the motion judge erred in denying the 
defendant's motion for a new trial and for an evidentiary 
hearing on this same basis, particularly in light of the United 
States 
Supreme 
Court's 
opinion 
in Carpenter, 
supra, and this 
court's 
prior 
opinion 
in Augustine 
I, supra.6 
When reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, we 
accept the judge's findings of fact absent clear error, but we 
conduct "an independent determination as to the correctness of 
the judge's application of constitutional principles to the 
facts as found." 
 Commonwealth 
v. Estabrook, 
472 Mass. 
852, 857 
                    
 
 
6 The parties do not dispute that the holdings in Carpenter 
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), and Commonwealth v. 
Augustine, 467 Mass. 230 (2014) (Augustine I), S.C., 470 Mass. 
837 and 472 Mass. 448 (2015), apply retroactively to the CSLI 
search at issue here. 
11 
 
(2015), 
quoting 
Commonwealth 
v. Watson, 
455 Mass. 
246, 250 
(2009).  With respect to a motion for a new trial, we "examine 
the motion judge's conclusion only to determine whether there 
has been a significant error of law or other abuse of 
discretion." 
 Commonwealth 
v. Wright, 
469 Mass. 447, 461 (2014), 
quoting 
Commonwealth 
v. Weichell, 
446 Mass. 785, 799 (2006). 
 
"If the motion judge did not preside at the trial, we defer only 
to the judge's credibility determinations and 'regard ourselves 
in as good a position as the motion judge to assess the trial 
record.'" 
 Wright, 
supra, 
quoting 
Weichell, 
supra. 
In Carpenter, 
the Supreme 
Court 
held that "[g]iven 
the 
unique nature of cell phone location records, . . . an 
individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI," and 
therefore, where the government seeks access to at least seven 
days' worth of such information, as it did in that case, that 
access constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment 
to the United 
States Constitution. 
 Carpenter, 
138 S. Ct. at 
2217 & n.3.  In such circumstances, the Court held that "the 
Government's obligation is a familiar one -- get a 
warrant." 
 Id. at 2221.  The Court 
also concluded 
that a court 
order to obtain such information under the Stored Communications 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703, which required the government to show 
"reasonable grounds" that the information was "relevant and 
12 
 
material to an ongoing investigation," "falls well short of the 
probable 
cause required 
for a warrant." 
 Id. 
Significantly, although the Court held that government 
requests for CSLI were generally subject to the warrant 
requirement under the Fourth Amendment, the Court explicitly 
recognized that "case-specific exceptions may support a 
warrantless search of an individual's [CSLI] records under 
certain 
circumstances." 
 Id. at 2222.  The Court discussed 
one 
such "well-recognized exception" for exigent circumstances, 
suggesting that other well-recognized exceptions also might 
apply. 
 Id. 
In Augustine 
I, we held that the warrant 
requirement 
of 
art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights applied to a 
situation where the Commonwealth sought a two-week period of 
historical 
CSLI.7 
 Augustine 
I, 467 Mass. at 232.8  There, 
we 
                    
 
 
7 The term "historical CSLI" refers to "information that has 
already been generated when the data are requested," as opposed 
to "prospective CSLI," which refers to "location data that will 
be generated sometime after the order authorizing its 
disclosure."  Fredericq, 482 Mass. at 77 n.6, citing Augustine 
I, 467 Mass. at 240 n.24. 
 
 
8 We also have held that, "assuming compliance with the 
requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2703, the Commonwealth may obtain 
historical CSLI for a period of six hours or less relating to an 
identified person's cellular telephone from the cellular service 
provider without obtaining a search warrant, because such a 
request does not violate the person's constitutionally protected 
expectation of privacy."  Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 
852, 858 (2015). 
13 
 
remanded the case for a determination whether the written 
affidavit submitted in support of the Commonwealth's application 
for an order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) demonstrated probable 
cause with respect 
to the records 
at issue.  Id. 
We also have had occasion to apply exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule under art. 14 in the context of CSLI.  
See Commonwealth 
v. Fredericq, 
482 Mass. 70, 85 (2019) 
(Commonwealth failed to show that attenuation doctrine applied 
to fruits of search of defendant's residence, where defendant's 
consent to search was "intimately intertwined" with information 
gleaned 
from prior warrantless 
CSLI search); 
Estabrook, 
472 
Mass. at 865, 870 (Commonwealth met its burden under 
"independent source" doctrine to show that CSLI search pursuant 
to warrant was untainted by prior warrantless search for same 
information). 
The "independent source" doctrine is a well-recognized 
exception to the exclusionary rule under both the Fourth 
Amendment 
and art. 14.  See Murray 
v. United 
States, 
487 U.S. 
533, 537 (1988); 
Commonwealth 
v. DeJesus, 
439 Mass. 616, 624-625 
(2003), and cases cited.  Pursuant to that doctrine, "evidence 
initially discovered as a consequence of an unlawful search may 
be admissible if later acquired independently by lawful means 
untainted 
by the initial 
illegality." 
 DeJesus, 
supra at 
624. 
14 
 
In DeJesus 
and other recent 
cases applying 
the independent 
source doctrine, we have focused our analysis on whether "the 
affidavit in support of the application for a search warrant 
contains information sufficient to establish probable cause 
. . . apart from [information obtained from the prior illegal 
search]." 
 DeJesus, 
439 Mass. 
at 625.  See Estabrook, 
472 Mass. 
at 866 (same); 
Commonwealth 
v. Tyree, 
455 Mass. 676, 692 (2010) 
(same).9 
 The defendant 
urges 
us to conduct 
a similar 
analysis 
in 
                    
 
 
9 A case currently pending before this court on further 
appellate review raises the issue whether, in cases such as 
Estabrook and Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676 (2010), we 
have inappropriately omitted an additional, subjective prong of 
the independent source analysis discussed in Murray v. United 
States, 487 U.S. 533, 542-543 (1988), namely, whether the 
officers would have sought the warrant absent information 
obtained in the initial illegal search.  See Commonwealth vs. 
Pearson, No. SJC-12930.  The defendant has not raised such an 
argument here.  Nonetheless, having considered the issue as part 
of our plenary review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we conclude 
that this case does not require us to resolve the open questions 
regarding the applicability and contours of such a subjective 
prong.  Rather, even assuming that such questions would be 
resolved in the manner most favorable to the defendant, we 
conclude that there is no substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice in this case, where the record provides 
ample support for the conclusion that the officers would have 
sought the warrant even in the absence of the CSLI obtained in 
the initial illegal search.  Among other things, call logs 
obtained before the illegally obtained CSLI established that the 
defendant's cell phone had communicated with the victim's cell 
phone multiple times on the day of her disappearance, and police 
had information that the defendant, who was married to another 
woman, was the father of the victim's unborn child.  In the 
circumstances, "[t]here can be no doubt that the police were 
committed to an investigation" of the defendant's whereabouts on 
the night of the murder, and they "would have sought the search 
warrant with or without [the illegally obtained CSLI]."  
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 439 Mass. 616, 627 n.11 (2003). 
15 
 
this case and to conclude that without the tainted CSLI, the 
warrant obtained in 2014 lacked probable cause. 
Here, we proceed from the premise that the 2010 CSLI search 
violated the requirements of G. L. c. 276 and art. 14 because 
police did not obtain a search warrant, and the application for 
the § 2703(d) order was not accompanied by a written affidavit 
demonstrating 
probable 
cause. 
 See Augustine 
I, 467 Mass. 
at 
232.  The absence of a written affidavit was not a mere 
technical 
violation. 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Sheppard, 
394 Mass. 
381, 388-389 (1985). 
Nonetheless, the CSLI need not be suppressed if the 2014 
search pursuant to a warrant satisfied the "independent source" 
doctrine.  As noted, the defendant's sole argument in this 
regard is that, when stripped of information gleaned from the 
prior illegal search, the 2014 warrant affidavit lacked probable 
cause.  We disagree, concluding instead, as the motion judge 
did, that "[t]he affidavit in support of the 2014 warrant sets 
out ample probable cause derived from wholly untainted facts 
known to police before the August 3, 2010 acquisition of the 
defendant's 
CSLI."  See Estabrook, 
472 Mass. 
at 870. 
As summarized by the motion judge in his decision denying 
the defendant's motion for a new trial, the untainted facts in 
the affidavit accompanying the application for the search 
warrant showed that 
16 
 
"the victim was likely murdered using a class of firearms 
which included [nine millimeter] handguns; the defendant 
made public statements implying that he carried a gun with 
[sixteen] rounds, consistent with a [nine millimeter] 
Beretta 92FS pistol; firearms records showed that the 
defendant registered a [nine millimeter] Beretta 92FS 
pistol which had not been reported missing; the defendant 
was the likely father of the victim's unborn child, causing 
financial obligations to the victim and the ire of the 
defendant's wife; the victim told her friend that the 
defendant asked her to get an abortion; the defendant and 
the victim communicated extensively by cellphone throughout 
July 27, until shortly before the victim's cellphone 
activity ceased at 10:49 P.M.; and someone, probably not 
the victim, sent a Facebook message from the victim's 
account on July 29, after she was reported missing, 
claiming she was in the hospital after an abortion, 
although police determined that she was not a patient at 
any area hospitals." 
 
For all of these reasons, the trial judge did not err in 
denying the defendant's motion to suppress the defendant's CSLI, 
and the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the 
defendant's motion for a new trial and for an evidentiary 
hearing 
on this issue.10 
3.  Ineffective 
assistance 
of counsel. 
 The defendant 
next 
contends that his trial counsel provided constitutionally 
ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress the fruits 
                    
 
 
10 In his decision on the defendant's motion for a new 
trial, the motion judge also concluded that the disputed CSLI 
was admissible under the "good faith" exception to the Fourth 
Amendment.  The Commonwealth urges this court to reach a similar 
conclusion and to adopt, for the first time, a good faith 
exception under art. 14.  Because we conclude that the 
independent source doctrine supports the admissibility of the 
CSLI, we decline at this time to address the issue of the good 
faith exception. 
17 
 
of the initial warrantless search of the defendant's CSLI.  
Ordinarily, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must show that there has been a "serious incompetency, 
inefficiency, or inattention of counsel -- behavior of counsel 
falling below that which might be expected from an ordinary 
fallible lawyer," and that such behavior "likely deprived the 
defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of 
defence." 
 Commonwealth 
v. Saferian, 
366 Mass. 
89, 96 (1974). 
 
However, where a defendant has been convicted of murder in the 
first degree, we apply a standard more favorable to the 
defendant, determining whether counsel's errors, if any, created 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Simon, 481 Mass. 861, 866-867 
(2019), 
and 
cases cited. 
 See also Commonwealth 
v. Wright, 
411 Mass. 678, 
682 (1992) ("the statutory standard of § 33E is more favorable 
to a defendant than is the constitutional standard for 
determining the ineffectiveness of counsel"). 
Here, the motion judge issued a detailed written decision 
on the defendant's motion for a new trial, in which he analyzed 
each category of challenged evidence individually to determine 
whether 
it was purged 
of the taint 
of the illegal 
CSLI search.11 
 
                    
 
 
11 As summarized by the motion judge, the challenged 
evidence included 
 
18 
 
This approach 
was consistent 
with our observation 
in Estabrook, 
472 Mass. at 860, that the "crucial question" regarding "whether 
a particular statement must be suppressed as the fruit of [an] 
initial illegal search of [the defendant's] CSLI is whether that 
statement has been come at by exploitation of . . . [the illegal 
search] or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the primary taint" (quotation and citation omitted).  
As a result of this analysis, the motion judge concluded that 
only two categories of evidence were tainted by the initial, 
warrantless CSLI search and thus subject to suppression under 
the exclusionary rule:  (1) the defendant's statements to police 
during the August 3, 2010, interview after he was confronted 
with the illegally obtained CSLI; and (2) the defendant's 
                    
 
"the trial testimony of Mawande Senene and any references 
thereto; the trial testimony of Joseph 'J.D.' Lang, and any 
references thereto; Detective [Marc] Powell's trial 
testimony referencing Senene and Lang; the defendant's 
statement to police on August 5, 2010 that he only called 
his wife one time on July 27, 2010; the entirety of the 
defendant's statements to police on August 3, 2010; any 
references to the defendant's [sport utility vehicle], car 
or motorcycle or items seized therefrom, including 
cellphones; any references to anything seized from the 
defendant's home, including cellphones, a towel with red-
brown stains, and handgun-related accessories; the 
testimony of [a] firearm dealer; the testimony of [a] 
Barnstable town employee who issued the defendant's firing 
range permit; the defendant's range permit and firearms 
records; and all evidence that the defendant formerly owned 
firearms and practiced at a firing range." 
19 
 
statements during the August 5, 2010, interview in response to 
questions based on the illegally obtained CSLI. 
The motion judge then assessed the effect of the tainted 
evidence on the jury to determine whether trial counsel's 
failure to move to suppress the evidence deprived the defendant 
of a substantial 
ground of defense. 
 See Saferian, 
366 Mass. at 
96.  After determining that the statements at issue were 
"relevant only to consciousness of guilt" and that they were 
"merely cumulative of other substantial evidence," the motion 
judge concluded that the statements "had minimal, if any, 
effects on the jury such that the error was non-prejudicial." 
We find no fault with the motion judge's analysis or 
conclusions in this regard.  And for the same reasons the motion 
judge concluded that admission of the tainted evidence was 
nonprejudicial, we conclude that any error in admitting the 
tainted evidence was unlikely to have influenced the jury's 
decision 
for purposes 
of our § 33E analysis. 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Hobbs, 
482 Mass. 538, 556 (2019) 
(no substantial 
likelihood 
of miscarriage of justice where testimony at issue was 
cumulative of other evidence and did not likely influence jury's 
conclusion); 
Commonwealth 
v. Brown, 
474 Mass. 576, 586 (2016) 
(no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice where 
erroneously admitted evidence did not likely influence jury's 
conclusion).  Here, in light of the substantial evidence against 
20 
 
the defendant -- including the defendant's CSLI, which was 
admitted 
properly 
for the reasons 
discussed 
supra, 
placing 
the 
defendant at the victim's hotel, at the commuter lot where the 
rental vehicle was found, and in the location where the victim's 
body was discovered, all at relevant times on the night of the 
murder -- trial counsel's failure to move to suppress the fruits 
of the initial illegal search did not result in a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
4.  Review 
pursuant 
to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, 
after 
conducting a thorough review of the record pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, we decline to exercise our authority to grant a 
new trial or to reduce or set aside the jury's verdict of murder 
in the first degree. 
Conclusion. 
 For the foregoing 
reasons, 
we affirm 
the 
defendant's convictions and the denial of the defendant's motion 
for a new trial and for an evidentiary hearing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.