Case Title: State v. Butler

Citation: 

Docket Number: 123742

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2023-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 123,742 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD CHANTEZ BUTLER, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1.  
 
When a defendant is convicted of taking or confining someone with the intent to 
facilitate the commission of another crime under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5408(a)(2), the 
three-part test set out in State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 547 P.2d 720 (1976), applies. 
Under that test, an appellate court will vacate the conviction if:  (1) the confinement is 
slight, inconsequential, and merely incidental to the other crime; (2) the confinement is 
inherent in the nature of the other crime; or (3) the confinement did not make commission 
of the other crime substantially easier or substantially lessen the risk of detection.  
 
2.  
 
The three-part test set out in State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 547 P.2d 720 (1976), 
applies only when the defendant is convicted of taking or confining a person with the 
intent to facilitate the commission of another crime under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-
5408(a)(2). The test does not apply when the defendant is convicted of taking or 
confining a person with the intent to inflict bodily injury or to terrorize the victim or 
another under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5408(a)(3). 
 
 
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Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed August 26, 2022. 
Appeal from Atchison District Court; ROBERT J. BEDNAR, judge. Oral argument held March 30, 2023. 
Opinion filed August 11, 2023. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court on the issue 
subject to review is reversed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed.  
 
Carol Longenecker Schmidt, of Adrian & Pankratz, P.A., of Newton, argued the cause and was 
on the briefs for appellant.  
 
Natalie Chalmers, assistant solicitor general, argued the cause, and Sherri L. Becker, county 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by  
 
WALL, J.:  Under Kansas law, a person who confines someone with the intent to 
facilitate the commission of another crime has committed a kidnapping. K.S.A. 2022 
Supp. 21-5408(a)(2). But some crimes, such as rape and robbery, by their nature may 
involve the confinement of a victim. Thus, nearly a half-century ago, we fashioned a 
three-part test to ensure that a defendant is not convicted of two crimes for identical 
conduct in these circumstances. State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, Syl. ¶ 10, 547 P.2d 720 
(1976). Under the Buggs test, a conviction cannot stand if the confinement was 
"incidental to" or "inherent in the nature of" the other crime, or if the confinement did not 
make commission of the other crime "substantially easier" or "substantially lessen[ ] the 
risk of detection." 219 Kan. 203, Syl. ¶ 10. 
 
Today, we consider the reach of that test. We reject the view, adopted by the panel 
of the Court of Appeals below and pressed by Richard Chantez Butler, that the test 
applies to kidnappings, like Butler's, committed with the intent to inflict bodily harm or 
terrorize a person. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5408(a)(3). Instead, we reaffirm what we 
held two decades ago:  the test set out in Buggs applies "only to a determination of  
 
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whether a taking or confinement was to facilitate the commission of another crime." State 
v. Burden, 275 Kan. 934, Syl. ¶ 3, 69 P.3d 1120 (2003). And so we reverse the decision 
of the Court of Appeals panel vacating Butler's conviction for aggravated kidnapping. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The question before us is about Butler's aggravated-kidnapping conviction, but the 
crimes here go well beyond that offense. Butler was sentenced to more than 45 years in 
prison after being convicted of aggravated kidnapping and 14 other crimes, including 3 
counts of rape and 2 counts of aggravated criminal sodomy, all against the same victim. 
The panel below carefully described the events underlying those convictions. See State v. 
Butler, No. 123,742, 2022 WL 3692866, at *1-5 (Kan. App. 2022) (unpublished opinion).  
 
Butler raised several issues before the Court of Appeals. Most of those issues are 
not before us because the panel ruled against Butler and he did not seek, or we did not 
grant, review of those holdings. But the panel agreed with Butler that insufficient 
evidence supported his aggravated-kidnapping conviction under the three-part test our 
court set out nearly 50 years ago in Buggs. Butler, 2022 WL 3692866, at *12-13. In the 
panel's view, Butler's confinement of the victim could not support a standalone 
aggravated-kidnapping conviction because the confinement "was incidental to the crimes 
of rape and aggravated sodomy," "was inherent to the crimes," and "had no significance 
independent of those crimes." 2022 WL 3692866, at *11. The panel vacated Butler's 
conviction, noting that its decision would not affect Butler's total sentence, which was 
based on consecutive sentences for two counts of rape and one count of aggravated 
criminal sodomy.  
 
The State appeals. It argues that under our precedent, the Buggs test applies only 
when the State alleges the defendant took or confined a person with the intent to facilitate 
the commission of a crime. See Burden, 275 Kan. 934, Syl. ¶ 3. The State says that its 
 
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sole theory at trial was that Butler had confined the victim with the intent to inflict bodily 
harm or terrorize her. And it argues that, under Burden, the Buggs test does not apply to 
that type of kidnapping. 
 
We held oral argument in the matter during our March 2023 docket. We have 
jurisdiction over the appeal. See K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (providing for Kansas Supreme Court 
review of Court of Appeals decisions). 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Before the Court of Appeals, Butler argued that there was insufficient evidence to 
support his aggravated-kidnapping conviction. Ordinarily, when a defendant raises a 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, an appellate court decides whether—after 
reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State—it is convinced that a 
rational fact-finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Chandler, 307 Kan. 657, 668, 414 P.3d 713 (2018). An aggravated kidnapping 
occurs when "bodily harm is inflicted upon the person kidnapped," so under the ordinary 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, an appellate court would decide whether the State 
had proved all the elements of a kidnapping plus the added element of bodily harm. 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5408(b). And it would make that determination without 
reweighing evidence, resolving evidentiary conflicts, or reassessing witness credibility. 
307 Kan. at 668. 
 
But nearly five decades ago in Buggs, our court fashioned a test that applies when 
a defendant is convicted under a specific subsection of the kidnapping statute. 219 Kan. 
203, Syl. ¶ 10. Under that subsection, a person commits a kidnapping by taking or 
confining someone with the intent "to facilitate flight or the commission of any crime." 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5408(a)(2). Confinement, however, can be inherent in some  
 
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charged crimes—a defendant who commits robbery by holding the victim at gunpoint, 
for example, may confine the victim. And as a result, an expansive reading of the 
kidnapping statute would allow the State to charge a person who has committed that type 
of crime with a kidnapping on top of the underlying crime. In other words, every 
defendant charged with a crime that necessarily involves confinement could also be 
charged with kidnapping for confining the victim with the intent to facilitate the 
underlying crime.  
 
In Buggs, we rejected that expansive interpretation of the kidnapping statute. We 
determined that the Legislature had not intended the term "facilitate" to include 
confinements that are "slight and 'merely incidental' to the commission of an underlying 
lesser crime." 219 Kan. at 214-15. Thus, we developed a three-part test that applies when 
"a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of 
another crime." 219 Kan. at 216. Under that test, an appellate court will vacate the 
kidnapping conviction if (1) the confinement is "slight, inconsequential and merely 
incidental to the other crime," (2) the confinement is "inherent in the nature of the other 
crime," or (3) the confinement did not make commission of the other crime "substantially 
easier" or "substantially lessen[ ] the risk of detection." 219 Kan. 203, Syl. ¶ 10.  
 
Later in Burden, the court made clear that the Buggs test applies only when the 
State alleges that the victim was confined with the intent to facilitate the commission of 
another crime. Burden held that the test does not apply when the State alleges that the 
victim was confined with the intent "to inflict bodily injury or to terrorize the victim or 
another," the specific intent now codified in subsection (a)(3) of the kidnapping statute. 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5408(a)(3); 275 Kan. 934, Syl. ¶ 3. Instead, an appellate court 
reviewing a conviction based on that subsection of the kidnapping statute applies the 
ordinary sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard. 275 Kan. at 936, 945.  
 
 
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Here, Butler was charged under (a)(3), so under Burden, the panel below should 
have reviewed his conviction under the ordinary sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard. 
But the panel declined to do so. According to the panel's reading of the trial record, the 
State had tried to evade the extra protections set out in Buggs by ostensibly charging 
Butler under (a)(3) and then arguing at trial that Butler had confined the victim with the 
intent to facilitate the commission of another crime under (a)(2). In the panel's view, that 
practice obliged the appellate courts to apply the Buggs test. And when the panel did that, 
it held that Butler's confinement of the victim "was incidental to the crimes of rape and 
aggravated sodomy," "was inherent to the crimes," and "had no significance independent 
of those crimes." Butler, 2022 WL 3692866, at *11. Thus, the panel reversed Butler's 
conviction for aggravated kidnapping.  
 
But the record belies the panel's repeated assertions that the State proceeded under 
subsection (a)(2) at trial. The original and amended complaints alleged that Butler had 
taken or confined the victim only with the intent "to inflict bodily injury on or to 
terrorize" her, the specific intent codified at (a)(3). The district court instructed the jury 
only on (a)(3)'s specific intent. And during closing arguments, the prosecutor argued for a 
conviction only under (a)(3). In sum, nothing in the trial record justifies the panel's 
departure from Burden, which held in no uncertain terms that the Buggs test does not 
apply to the type of kidnapping for which Butler was convicted. 
 
Butler suggested for the first time at oral argument that we should overrule Burden 
because a charge under (a)(3) is the functional equivalent of a charge under (a)(2) and 
should therefore engender the same protections. But a request to overturn controlling 
precedent should be briefed, not raised for the first time during oral argument—an 
observation that applies equally to the State's suggestion during rebuttal that we should 
abandon the Buggs test altogether. See State v. Gallegos, 313 Kan. 262, 277, 485 P.3d 
622 (2021) (issues not adequately briefed are deemed waived or abandoned). In short, 
Butler has not offered an adequate basis to depart from our precedent in Burden.  
 
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Because Burden controls, we apply the ordinary sufficiency-of-the-evidence test 
when reviewing Butler's aggravated-kidnapping conviction. The State alleged a 
kidnapping under subsection (a)(3), so the State had to prove beyond reasonable doubt 
that Butler confined the victim with the intent "to inflict bodily injury or to terrorize the 
victim or another." And to secure a conviction for aggravated kidnapping, the State 
needed to prove all the elements of kidnapping under (a)(3) plus the added element that 
the defendant inflicted bodily harm. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5408(b). 
 
 
The victim testified extensively at trial. Viewed in the light most favorable to the 
State, her testimony established that Butler held her against her will in her home for 
several hours. Butler took her keys and phone to prevent her from escaping or calling for 
help. Butler held a knife to her throat, threatened her and her family, and choked her. 
Butler repeatedly raped and sodomized her. And she was only able to escape after Butler 
fell asleep. Based on this evidence, we hold that a rational fact-finder could have found 
beyond reasonable doubt that Butler confined the victim with the intent to inflict bodily 
injury or terrorize her and he, in fact, inflicted bodily injury during the kidnapping.  
 
Finally, we note that the panel, without any prompting from the parties, suggested 
that an aggravated-kidnapping conviction was multiplicitous with Butler's other 
convictions in this case. Multiplicity is the charging of a single offense as more than one 
count on a charging document. State v. Thompson, 287 Kan. 238, 244, 200 P.3d 22 
(2009). That is a problem because it results in multiple punishments for a single offense, 
which violates the United States and Kansas Constitutions. 287 Kan. at 244. 
(multiplicitous convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights).  
 
 
 
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According to the panel, the only evidence that could support Butler's aggravated-
kidnapping conviction already supported his other convictions. For example, as we noted 
above, Butler threatened the victim and her family while confining her. That evidence 
could support a finding under (a)(3) of the kidnapping statute that Butler had confined the 
victim with the intent to terrorize her. But the State also relied on that evidence to support 
Butler's conviction for criminal threat. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5415(a)(1); K.S.A. 
2022 Supp. 21-5408(a)(3). In the panel's view, relying on that evidence to support 
convictions for both criminal threat and aggravated kidnapping would "allow the State to 
improperly use Butler's same conduct to convict him of two separate crimes," rendering 
the convictions multiplicitous. 2022 WL 3692866, at *12.  
 
But the panel's analysis is at odds with our established legal framework for 
analyzing multiplicity issues. Prior to 2006, when a defendant was convicted of violating 
multiple criminal statutes as part of the same course of conduct, we occasionally held that 
those convictions were multiplicitous when supported by a single wrongful act or single 
act of violence. See State v. Garcia, 272 Kan. 140, 146, 32 P.3d 188 (2001), disapproved 
of by State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, 133 P.3d 48 (2006). But this fact-intensive, 
"same evidence" test proved to be ambiguous and resulted in inconsistent and 
irreconcilable outcomes. Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 482.  
 
Thus, ever since our 2006 decision in Schoonover, we have applied a bright-line, 
"same-elements" test when the multiplicity issue arises from unitary conduct resulting in 
multiple convictions of different statutes. 281 Kan. 453, Syl. ¶ 12. The test serves as a 
rule of statutory construction to discern whether the Legislature intended multiple 
offenses and multiple punishments for the same conduct. 281 Kan. at 498. Under that 
test, if one statute requires proof of an element unnecessary to prove the other offense, 
then the statutes do not define the same crime and are not multiplicitous. 281 Kan. at 498.  
 
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Here, aggravated kidnapping does not share all its elements with rape, criminal threat, or 
any of Butler's other crimes of conviction. So there is no multiplicity issue under the 
same-elements test established in Schoonover. 
 
Which brings us to a final point. Both this court and litigants have discussed the 
Buggs test as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard. See, e.g., Burden, 275 Kan. at 937, 
944-45. But at its core, the test appears to be designed to inoculate against multiplicity—
it aims to ensure that a defendant is not convicted of two crimes for the same conduct. As 
noted at oral argument, one could question whether Buggs' approach to multiplicity is out 
of step with the same-elements test we just described. That inconsistency could also raise 
questions about our continued adherence to Buggs. Indeed, the State asked us to overrule 
Buggs during its rebuttal argument. 
 
 
While we acknowledge this potential tension between Buggs and Schoonover, we 
do not lightly disapprove of precedent. In re N.E., 316 Kan. 391, 412, 516 P.3d 586 
(2022). Our court decided Buggs nearly five decades ago. And under the principle of 
stare decisis, unless clearly convinced otherwise, "'points of law established by a court 
are generally followed by the same court . . . in later cases'" to promote stability in the 
legal system. 316 Kan. at 412. The continuing validity of Buggs is not an issue briefed by 
the parties. Nor did we agree to consider it when we granted review. And perhaps most 
importantly, we need not revisit Buggs to resolve this appeal. So we save that question 
for another day.  
 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing Butler's aggravated-kidnapping 
conviction is reversed. The district court's judgment is affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
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* * * 
 
 
STEGALL, J., concurring:  I concur in the judgment. See State v. Couch, 317 Kan. 
___, ___ P.3d ___ (2023) (No. 122,156, this day decided) (Stegall, J., dissenting), slip op. 
at 40-46.  
 
 
LUCKERT, C.J., and WILSON, J., join the foregoing concurring opinion.