Case Title: JONMICHAEL GUY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-151

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
JONMICHAEL GUY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 56184 P.3d 687Case Number: No. 06-151Decided: 05/22/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
JONMICHAEL 
GUY,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. Lozano, State Public 
Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; 
Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Causey.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, 
HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]         
Jonmichael Guy seeks to overturn his 
conviction for attempted second-degree murder.  He asserts numerous claims of 
error.  Finding no prejudicial 
error, we affirm.

[¶2]           
Mr. Guy 
presents the following issues.  
Slightly reworded, they are:

1.         
Did prosecutorial misconduct deprive Mr. Guy of his constitutional right 
to a fair trial?

2.         Did 
Mr. Guy receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel?

3.         
Was there sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Guy's 
conviction?

4.         
Did the district court allow excessive security in the 
courtroom?

5.         
Are Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-301, attempt, and 
6-2-104, murder in the second degree, unconstitutional as applied to Mr. 
Guy?

6.         
Does cumulative error exist, warranting reversal?  

[¶3]         
On the 
evening of December 4, 2004, Jacob Riske visited several Laramie bars with his 
friends, Cody Schuelke, and Joseph and Amanda Faycosh.  Sometime near midnight, the group left a 
bar called the "Ice Haus."  The four 
individuals then began to walk toward Elmer Lovejoy's, a restaurant-bar only a 
few blocks west.  As Mr. Riske and 
his friends reached the halfway point of the first full block of their walk, 
they observed a black Chevrolet Camaro pull partway into the alley just behind 
them.  Mr. Guy exited the vehicle 
and verbally accosted a group of people walking near Mr. Riske and his 
friends.  Mr. Guy yelled at the 
group.  He used profanity and 
confrontational language, was aggressive in his demeanor, and generally acted in 
a manner likely to result in a physical altercation.  Stephen Schwartz was the Camaro's 
driver.  While he also exited the 
car, his behavior was not belligerent.  
Mr. Riske and those in his party did not know anyone in the group Mr. Guy 
was accosting, but nevertheless stopped and helped persuade Mr. Guy and Mr. 
Schwartz to return to the vehicle and leave.  They did so without a physical 
confrontation.

[¶4]         
The 
Camaro did not go very far, however.  
It was stopped at the next intersection as Mr. Riske's group 
crossed.  They had to pass the 
Camaro, which was partially obstructing the crosswalk, and Mr. Schuelke 
testified that he "rubbed [his] hand across the spoiler of the car just in case 
they did start backing up."  After 
Mr. Riske's group reached the corner, the Camaro turned sharply into their path 
and stopped, blocking the other crosswalk at that corner.  Joseph and Amanda Faycosh went around 
the Camaro to cross the street, followed closely by Mr. Schuelke.  Mr. Riske was still on the corner when 
Mr. Guy exited the Camaro and confronted him.  Mr. Riske tried to calm Mr. Guy.  Mr. Schwartz exited the vehicle as well, 
but again did not join in Mr. Guy's confrontational behavior.  Mr. Schuelke returned to assist Mr. 
Riske.  At some point, 
Mr. Schuelke pinned Mr. Guy against a building or a nearby pole and urged 
him to leave.  He then released Mr. 
Guy, who returned to the Camaro via a route that led behind Mr. Riske.  At this time, Mr. Riske felt a "bump" or 
"sucker punch" to his back.  He 
testified that Mr. Guy was the only person within range to have delivered the 
blow.  Mr. Guy or 
Mr. Schwartz then yelled something to the effect of, "Let's go!" or "Let's 
get out of here!" and the two men ran to the Camaro and drove away at a high 
speed.

[¶5]         
Mr. 
Riske and Mr. Schuelke rejoined the Faycoshes, and they continued down the 
street.  In short order, however, 
someone in the group observed blood on Mr. Riske's back and determined that 
he was bleeding significantly.  
Mr. Riske sat in a nearby doorway, and the others flagged down a 
police officer.  Mr. Riske was taken 
to the hospital, where he was treated for a stab wound.  Against medical advice, he chose to 
leave the hospital that night.  He 
returned to the hospital the next day, however, and doctors determined that he 
had suffered a perforated liver from the stabbing.

[¶6]         
Mr. Guy 
was arrested at his home several hours after the attack.  He was charged with attempted 
second-degree murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-301(a)(i) and 
6-2-104 (LexisNexis 2007).  At 
trial, Mr. Riske, Mr. Schuelke, and the Faycoshes testified with minor variation 
to the version of facts set out above.  
None of them testified that they observed the stabbing.  Mr. Schwartz was also called as a 
witness for the State.  He testified 
that he and Mr. Guy were together that night, identified the Camaro as his, and 
testified that Mr. Guy had carried a knife in the past, but had lost it prior to 
the night of the stabbing.  Evidence 
introduced by the State established that the attack occurred within a few 
minutes of midnight.

[¶7]         
In his 
defense case, Mr. Guy presented several witnesses.  His first witness, Joseph Nichols, 
testified that he was at the scene of the second altercation, and that the 
confrontation between Mr. Guy and Mr. Riske was mutual.  He also testified that he did not 
observe the stabbing.  Joseph 
Pitchford was also called to testify by Mr. Guy.  Mr. Pitchford testified that he had 
come upon the fight after he had left the Ice Haus bar at 2:00 a.m., and that 
the altercation was mutual. He did not testify regarding whether he saw the 
stabbing, but did state that he did not observe a knife in Mr. Guy's 
possession.  Mr. Guy did not 
testify.

[¶8]         
The jury 
returned a guilty verdict and Mr. Guy was sentenced to 30-45 years in the state 
penitentiary.  He then initiated 
this appeal.  While his appeal was 
pending, Mr. Guy filed a motion with this Court seeking a limited remand to 
develop evidence of ineffective assistance of trial counsel pursuant to our 
decision in Calene v. State, 846 P.2d 679 (Wyo. 1993).  We granted the 
motion, and the district court held an evidentiary hearing.  The district court determined that Mr. 
Guy had failed to prove that he had received ineffective assistance from trial 
counsel.  This appeal then proceeded 
to briefing and argument. 

[¶9]         
Mr. Guy 
alleges numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct.  With one exception, discussed below, 
defense counsel did not object to any of the prosecution statements that Mr. Guy 
now alleges were improper.  Absent 
an objection, we review for plain error.  
Talley v. State, 2007 WY 37, ¶ 
9, 153 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 2007).  
"Plain error exists when: 1) the record is clear about the incident 
alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule 
of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was denied a substantial right which 
materially prejudiced him."  
Id.  We do not reverse the judgment "unless a 
reasonable probability exists, absent the error, that the appellant may have 
enjoyed a more favorable verdict."  
Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 
542 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting English v. 
State, 982 P.2d 139, 143 (Wyo. 1999)).

[¶10]    
We review 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in light of the entire record.  Talley, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d  at 260.  In this case, all of Mr. Guy's claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct that we address occurred during closing arguments.  Where the purported misconduct was a 
part of a closing argument, we also consider it in the context of the argument 
as a whole.  Id.  Furthermore, we are generally "reluctant 
to find plain error in closing arguments lest the trial court become[] charged 
with an adversary responsibility to control argument even when objection is not 
taken by the opposing attorney.'"  
Sanderson v. State, 2007 WY 
127, ¶ 37, 165 P.3d 83, 93 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting Farmer v. State, 2005 WY 162, ¶ 26, 124 P.3d 699, 
709 (Wyo.2005)).

[¶11]    
Mr. Guy 
claims two prosecution statements constituted improper comment on his right to 
remain silent as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.1  We have previously stated that "direct 
prosecutorial comment upon a defendant's exercise of his right to silence will 
entitle the defendant to reversal."  
Emerson v. State, 988 P.2d 518, 521 (Wyo. 
1999).  But we have also recognized 
that "a mere reference to his silence will not require reversal absent a showing 
of prejudice to the defendant."  
Id.  In evaluating whether a comment is an 
indirect reference to the defendant's silence, we have stated: 

"the test is whether the language 
used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would 
naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused 
to testify. . . .  It is not 
improper for the government to draw attention to the failure or lack of evidence 
on a point if it is not intended to call attention to the failure of the 
defendant to testify."

Oldham v. State, 534 P.2d 107, 112 (Wyo. 1975) (quoting Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 
170 (10th Cir. 1955)).

[¶12]    
The first 
statement that Mr. Guy claims is error is the emphasized portion of the 
following excerpt from the State's closing argument:

[Y]ou've already been told by the 
judge the law says that you can infer the existence of malice and an attempt to 
kill.  Why do we tell you that?  Because we're not mind readers.  And we rarely have the luxury of 
bringing you cases where everything was on video tape.  After it happened, everybody sat down, 
including the perpetrators, confessed, told us what they were thinking clearly, 
enunciated their intent, and elaborated on what they hoped had 
happened.  It hasn't happened to 
me yet.  I have been doing this long 
enough to know that if it was going to happen, I think I would know about 
it.  So we get back to 
inference.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶13]    
Mr. Guy 
asserts that there was no legitimate basis for the prosecutor's argument "other 
than to impermissibly comment on the fact that [he] never confessed' or 
testified, to explain his intent' to the jury."  He also claims that it "can also be 
easily construed as improper vouching for the strength of the prosecution case; 
that is, that this case has occurred like cases are expected to in the 
prosecutor's experience."  We 
disagree with Mr. Guy's characterization of the prosecutor's statement.  It is neither a direct nor indirect 
comment on Mr. Guy's exercise of his constitutional right to remain silent.  Rather, we perceive that the prosecutor 
intended to explain to the jury that Mr. Guy's state of mind can be 
inferred from the surrounding circumstances.  This argument is permissible.  Davis v. State, 2005 WY 93, ¶ 40, 117 P.3d 454, 469-70 (Wyo. 2005).  

[¶14]    
The 
second statement Mr. Guy claims infringes upon his right to remain silent is the 
following, also taken from the State's closing argument:

I ask you again whatit's not their 
burden, but we've presented a case to you that makes sense and everybody's 
testimony corresponds.  What evidence has the defendant presented to 
you to refute that?  Pitchford 
[a defense witness].  That's really it.  That surprise witness is really a 
nothing.  Pitchford.  What does that help you with?  How does that in any way make you think 
that these other witnesses didn't tell you exactly what 
happened?

(Emphasis added.)  Mr. Guy claims that "implying that [he] 
should have refuted' the prosecution case highlighted, improperly, [his] 
exercise of his right to silence."  We disagree.  It is generally "not error for the 
prosecutor to argue that [the State's] evidence is uncontradicted or that the 
evidence does not support the defendant's theory of the case."  Belden v. State, 2003 WY 89, ¶ 48, 73 P.3d 1041, 1089 (Wyo. 2003).

[¶15]       
Mr. Guy 
relies heavily upon United States v. 
Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1996) to 
support his position.  His reliance 
is misplaced.  In Cotnam, the court held that reference to 
the prosecution's evidence as "undisputed" is "a violation of the defendant's 
Fifth Amendment rights if the only person who could have contradicted, denied, 
rebutted or disputed the government's evidence was the defendant himself."  88 F.3d  at 497.  In Cotnam, a police officer testified 
regarding a conversation that he had with one of the defendants, Mr. 
Zadurski.  Id. at 499.  The officer testified that he and 
Mr. Zadurski tried to keep their conversations private.  The court found it important "that, at 
least for some of these discussions, only Zadurski himself could have refuted 
[the officer's] version of what was said."  
Id.  The court held in Cotnam that reference to evidence as 
"uncontradicted" is misconduct when "the only person who could have contradicted 
. . . the government's evidence was the defendant himself."  Id. 
at 497 (emphasis added).

[¶16]       
The 
private conversations in Cotnam are 
distinguishable from the events presented here.  Mr. Guy might have contradicted the 
eyewitness testimony had he testified, but he was not the only person who could 
have done so.  Several individuals 
witnessed the confrontation involving Mr. Riske and Mr. Guy.  Indeed, Mr. Guy called two witnessesMr. 
Pitchford and Mr. Nicholswho both contradicted portions of the State's version 
of events.  Cotnam is simply not applicable to the 
facts presented here.  Mr. Guy has 
failed to demonstrate a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, and 
consequently, has failed to establish plain error.

[¶17]    
Mr. Guy 
asserts that the prosecutor intentionally misstated the facts on several 
occasions during closing argument.  He takes issue with the following 
statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument:

1.                  
"All of 
the witnesses told you that when this happened, [Mr. Guy] ran behind [Mr. 
Riske], stabbed him, and jumped in the car and took off."

2.                  
"And 
every witness that has identified the perpetrator of this crime has pointed to 
and, under oath, identified the defendant as the person that committed this, not 
anybody else."

3.                  
"The 
officers who dealt with [the witnesses] also told you they weren't 
drunk."

4.                  
"And the 
officers have certainly established that they contacted every person they could 
identify and did their level best to get as much information out of them as they 
could."

5.                  
"The 
doctor told you that happens a lot: People get stabbed and don't know they have 
been stabbed, that maybe somebody punched them in the 
back."

[¶18]    
Mr. 
Guy concedes that no objection was made at trial to any of the alleged 
misstatements and that we must review for plain error.  Under a plain error analysis, 
Mr. Guy is required to establish that he was prejudiced by the alleged 
misstatements.  He has failed to meet that burden.

[¶19]    
In his 
brief, Mr. Guy states that it would be easy for the jury to become 
confused.  He also claims that, 
because the jury asked for a trial transcript almost immediately after beginning 
deliberations, "it is a reasonable inference that the jury was confused as to 
some point."  While the jury's 
request may signify confusion about some point, Mr. Guy has failed to 
demonstrate that the request related in any fashion to the statements he 
challenges here.  Furthermore, the 
jury in this case was instructed by the district court that the arguments of 
counsel are not evidence.  We 
presume that the jury followed those instructions.  Kennedy v. State, 559 P.2d 1014, 1018 
(Wyo. 
1977).  Mr. Guy has failed to 
demonstrate any prejudice from the prosecutor's comments, and has failed to 
establish plain error.

[¶20]    
Mr. Guy 
asserts that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the veracity of the law 
enforcement officers and the quality of their investigation.  Defense counsel, in his closing 
argument, criticized law enforcement officers' conduct.  In response, the prosecutor stated the 
following:

And the first thing I have to do is, 
make it very clear I stand behind Sergeant Brown and the investigation that was 
conducted in this matter.

Mr. Guy's trial counsel objected to 
this statement, and the district court sustained the objection.  Although the prosecutor's comment was 
apparently in response to defense counsel's closing argument, the prosecutor 
went too far, and his remarks were error.

[¶21]    
The 
prosecutor's comment at Mr. Guy's trial closely resembles the prosecutor's 
statement in Dysthe v. State 
regarding the quality of the investigation in that case.  2003 WY 20, ¶ 28, 63 P.3d 875, 886 (Wyo. 
2003).  In Dysthe, the prosecutor, also in response 
to defense argument, "stated that he worked with the investigators on the case 
and he could guarantee' that their investigations were not arbitrary.'"  Id.  We found the statement to be 
improper.  The risk in allowing such 
arguments is that counsel may be viewed as "an authority whose opinion carries 
greater weight than" that of the jury.  
Id., ¶ 29, 63 P.3d  at 
886 (quoting Barela v. State, 787 P.2d 82, 83 (Wyo. 1990)). 

[¶22]    
In order 
to justify reversal of his conviction, however, Mr. Guy must also establish that 
the prosecutor's statement impacted his substantial rights.  Earll v. State, 2001 WY 66, ¶ 9, 29 P.3d 787, 789 (Wyo. 2001).  A defendant's 
substantial rights have been affected when, absent the misconduct, there is a 
reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the 
defendant.  See id.  In Dysthe, the improper vouching regarding 
the quality of the investigation was merely one of several incidents of improper 
vouching.  ¶ 28, 63 P.3d  at 886. 
 The prosecutor also improperly 
vouched for the credibility of several of its witnesses.  Those comments were also improper.  "It is improper for the prosecuting 
attorney, even in responding to defense arguments, to personally vouch for . . . 
the state's witnesses.'"  Id., ¶ 29, 63 P.3d  at 886 (quoting Lane v. State, 
12 P.3d 1057, 1065 (Wyo. 2000)).  We 
determined that reversal was warranted because "the State's case depended 
entirely on the jury finding its witnesses credible."  Dysthe, ¶ 31, 63 P.3d  at 886.  In contrast, the State's case against Mr. 
Guy did not depend upon the quality of the investigation or the credibility of 
the officers' testimony.  The State 
did not call any of the investigating officers as witnesses during the 
presentation of its case.  It was 
Mr. Guy, not the State, who called the four officers as witnesses.  The State called only one officer as a 
rebuttal witness.

[¶23]    
Mr. Guy 
has not detailed the relevance of the police investigation to the disputed 
issues at trial.  The quality of the 
police investigation was, at most, a minor issue.  There was no dispute that Mr. Riske was 
stabbed and that Mr. Guy had a confrontation with Mr. Riske.  There was some dispute about the precise 
nature of that confrontation, but the testimony regarding the incident came from 
eyewitnesses, not the investigating officers.  We do not view the prosecutor's improper 
comment to be significant in light of eyewitness testimony regarding the 
incident.  We find no prejudice to 
Mr. Guy as a result of the prosecutor's improper comment.  There is no reasonable possibility that, 
absent the prosecutor's improper statement, the verdict would have been more 
favorable to Mr. Guy.

[¶24]    
Mr. Guy 
alleges that he did not receive effective assistance of trial counsel.  Pursuant to the framework set out in Calene v. State, 846 P.2d 679, 692 
(Wyo. 1993), 
we remanded this case for an evidentiary hearing in the district court.  After conducting the hearing, the 
district court issued a detailed opinion letter setting forth its factual 
findings. The court determined that Mr. Guy was not denied effective assistance 
of counsel.  Mr. Guy challenges 
that decision.  We accept the 
district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Robinson v. State, 2003 WY 32, ¶ 14, 64 P.3d 743, 747 (Wyo. 2003).  We 
review the district court's conclusions of law de novo.  Id.

[¶25]    
When 
reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the first question is 
whether trial counsel's performance was outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance.  Gleason v. 
State, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 44, 
57 P.3d 332, 346-47 (Wyo. 2002). 

An appellant claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance 
was deficient. Id. (citing Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). Ordinarily, he must also demonstrate that prejudice resulted. Under 
this test, the inquiry is whether or not counsel rendered the assistance a 
reasonably competent attorney would have offered and, if not, whether his 
failure to do so prejudiced the defense of the case. Id. . . 
.

We examine the conduct of defense 
counsel in light of all the circumstances in determining whether the identified 
acts or omissions fall outside the ambit of professionally competent assistance, 
bearing in mind the function of counsel is to make the adversarial testing 
process work in every case. Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 609 (Wyo. 1992). The benchmark 
for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Gleason, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332. We do not 
evaluate the efforts of counsel from a perspective of hindsight but endeavor to 
reconstruct the circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct and evaluate 
the professional efforts from the perspective of counsel at the time. 
Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 
609. We invoke a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate and 
reasonable assistance making all decisions within the bounds of reasonable 
professional judgment. Id. The burden is on the defendant to 
overcome this presumption that, in light of the circumstances, the challenged 
action or failure of the attorney might be considered sound trial strategy. 
Id.

Floyd v. State, 2006 WY 135, ¶ 12, 144 P.3d 1233, 
1235 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Leyva v. 
State, 2005 WY 22, ¶ 19, 106 P.3d 873, 878 (Wyo. 
2005)).

[¶26]    
Mr. Guy's 
first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is that his trial attorney 
provided incorrect advice that resulted in his decision not to testify at his 
trial.  Specifically, Mr. Guy 
asserts that defense counsel incorrectly advised him that there was a risk that 
aspects of his prior criminal history would be admissible as evidence if he 
testified.  Mr. Guy's prior criminal 
history included several juvenile offenses and three adult misdemeanors.  One of the misdemeanors was for domestic 
violence and apparently Mr. Guy may have violated his probation resulting from 
that conviction when he moved to Wyoming from 
California.  Defense counsel testified at the Calene hearing 
that:

[Mr. Guy] . . . absconded from 
probation from California, andand it was a violent crime, 
although I'm pretty sure it was a misdemeanor.  I was afraid that somehow we would 
either open the door or somehow that would come in if Mr. Guy testified. . 
. . I know it was a misdemeanor and not a felony, but . . . it is just so 
dangerous when the defendant takes the stand, and you can never completely 
control how that's going to work. . . .  
[I]f he would have testified that he [had] only been here in Laramie a 
short period of time, that then could have come out why he came here, and it 
could have been fair game just to the fact that he had abscond[ed] from 
probation in California.  And, 
further, I was afraid that it could have come out that it was from a violent 
crime.

[¶27]    
Mr. Guy 
contends on appeal that there was no risk of admission of evidence relating to 
the domestic violence conviction and probation violation.  We are unable to make that leap and 
instead agree with the district court's analysis:

It takes no stretch of the 
imagination to visualize a scenario whereby Guy may have opened the door to this 
evidence, which certainly would have been harmful to his credibility and his 
case.  It is well known that good 
defense attorneys cautiously approach any case where a defendant insists upon 
testifying in light of the potential pitfalls that always accompany such 
testimony.  This Court cannot fault 
[defense counsel] in his conservative approach in this 
case.

And, ultimately, it was Guy's 
decision whether or not to testify.  
He was advised of as much by both [defense counsel] and this Court.  Whether this Court would have permitted 
such evidence, particularly depending upon Guy's statements at trial, is 
something no one can ever know with certainty.  But, the fact exists that it was a very 
real, and very damaging, possibility.

We are unable to find that defense 
counsel's advice was unreasonable.

[¶28]    
Mr. Guy 
next contends that trial counsel was ineffective because he allowed two 
witnesses called by the State to testify that Mr. Guy routinely carried a 
black-handled, four inch, clip-style, folding knife.  Defense counsel did not object to the 
testimony but elicited testimony from both witnesses that Mr. Guy had lost the 
knife approximately one week prior to the attack.  On appeal, Mr. Guy 
contends that testimony concerning his knife is irrelevant because law 
enforcement never found the knife used in the attack and both witnesses 
testified on cross examination that Mr. Guy had lost his knife prior to the 
attack.  Although couched as an ineffectiveness of counsel claim, it seems 
more appropriately brought as a plain error evidentiary challenge.  
Regardless of how it is presented, the argument fails because the evidence was 
relevant.

[¶29]    
"Relevant evidence' means evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more . . . or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence."  W.R.E. 
401.  While the specific knife used in the attack was never located or 
identified, the fact that Mr. Guy customarily carried a knife of a size 
consistent with Mr. Riske's injury is unquestionably relevant.  Mr. Guy seems to tacitly concede this 
point when he argues that admission of this testimony was prejudicial.  The fact that Mr. Guy had lost a 
particular knife one week previously did not eliminate the possibility that he 
was in possession of a similar knife at the time of the 
attack.

[¶30]    
Mr. Guy 
also claims that defense counsel should have called Kelly Gorham to testify on 
his behalf.  Mr. Guy testified at 
the Calene hearing that he was with 
Mr. Gorham when he lost his knife, and Mr. Gorham helped him look for it.  Also at the Calene hearing, trial counsel explained 
his decision not to call Mr. Gorham as a witness: "I didn't see me being able to 
establish that Jon Guy couldn't have had a knife that evening, because he'd lost 
a knife in the past.  I really 
didn't see how that would effectively prove anything to our benefit at 
trial."  Counsel thus believed that 
calling Mr. Gorham would serve no useful purpose.  In light of our previous discussion, we 
can find no fault with the decision of defense counsel to not call Mr. Gorham as 
a witness.

[¶31]    
Mr. Guy 
next claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel did not call 
Officer Norman as a witness.  
Officer Norman was in training with the Laramie Police Department at the 
time of the stabbing, and was riding on patrol that night with Officer Jacobsen, 
one of the investigators in the case.  
When Mr. Riske was at the hospital, Officer Norman obtained a statement 
from Mr. Riske and wrote a report based on that statement.  In relevant part, the report contained 
the following:

Riske told me, as these two 
individuals [Guy and Schwartz] passed, he may have felt the bump from one of 
them but was unsure which of these individuals it had come from.  It should be noted that earlier while I 
was speaking with Riske, he told me that he had felt nothing at 
all.

(Paragraph break omitted.)  At trial, Mr. Riske testified that Mr. 
Guy was "within arm's length" when he felt the blow to his back.  Mr. Riske also testified that it was not 
possible for Mr. Schwartz to have reached him, and that Mr. Guy was the only 
person within range.  At the Calene hearing, Mr. Guy's trial counsel 
testified that he could not remember a specific reason that he did not call 
Officer Norman to testify.  He did, 
however, speculate that he might have been unsure that Officer Norman, as a 
police officer, would be helpful to Mr. Guy's case.  Mr. Guy claims that "[l]acking any 
strategic reason for not calling Officer Norman, defense counsel was 
prejudicially ineffective for not calling Officer Norman to testify."  Had Officer Norman testified, Mr. Guy 
asserts, his testimony "would have interrupted the chain of inferences the jury 
used to convict [him]."

[¶32]    
Mr. Guy 
contends that Officer Norman's testimony would have effectively impeached Mr. 
Riske's testimony.  He did not, 
however, call Officer Norman as a witness at the Calene hearing.  Without Officer Norman's testimony, we 
are left to speculate regarding what his testimony would have been.  See, e.g., Wilkening v. State, 2007 WY 187, ¶¶ 
9-12, 172 P.3d 385, 387-88 (Wyo. 2007) (failure to call officers as witnesses 
during remand hearing fatal to appellate challenge based on Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)).

[¶33]    
Perhaps 
more significantly, the record shows that defense counsel used Officer Norman's 
report to impeach Mr. Riske.  During 
cross-examination, defense counsel confronted Mr. Riske with the statements 
contained in the report.  Mr. Riske 
did not deny making the statements.  
He testified that he could not recall making the statements, but admitted 
that it was possible that he did so.  
Furthermore, defense counsel called Officer Jacobsen as a trial 
witness.  He testified specifically 
that Mr. Riske "wasn't sure which person [the bump'] came from, but that he 
might have felt a bump at that time."  Defense counsel then asked, "But he was 
very clear that he wasn't sure which of the two individuals the bump came from, 
correct?"  Officer Jacobsen replied, 
"That is correct."  In summary, at 
trial, defense counsel established the statement reflected in the report through 
Mr. Riske's admission and Officer Jacobsen's testimony.  Officer Norman did not testify at the Calene hearing, and we have no record 
detailing any testimony he would have provided at trial.  Mr. Guy has failed to establish that his 
trial counsel was ineffective because he did not call Officer Norman as a 
witness at trial.

[¶34]    
Mr. Guy 
next claims that trial counsel's actions prevented the defense investigator from 
testifying.  At the beginning of 
trial, the district court entered a witness sequestration order.  During trial, defense counsel called 
Joseph Pitchford as a witness.  Mr. 
Pitchford testified that he left the Ice Haus bar and came upon what appeared to 
be an altercation at the corner of Grand Avenue and Second Street.  He testified that he separated Mr. Guy 
and Mr. Schwartz from Mr. Riske.  He 
observed them until they got into their car and left.  The only mention of a knife or stabbing 
in Mr. Pitchford's testimony was his statement that he never saw a knife in Mr. 
Guy's hand.  Significantly, he also 
testified that this incident occurred at approximately 2:00 a.m.  He bolstered his testimony regarding the 
time of the incident by stating that it occurred when he left the Ice Haus bar 
when it closed at 2:00 a.m.

[¶35]    
Later at 
trial, defense counsel attempted to call Roy Holiday as a witness.  Mr. Holiday was the defense 
investigator, and had been present in the courtroom throughout the trial.  Before Mr. Holiday could testify, the 
district court reminded defense counsel of the sequestration order and pointed 
out that Mr. Holiday had been present throughout the trial.  As a result, the district court 
prohibited Mr. Holiday from testifying.  
At the Calene hearing, Mr. 
Holiday testified that, if allowed to testify at trial, he would have described 
his interview with Mr. Pitchford.  
Mr. Holiday asserted that Mr. Pitchford claimed in the interview that he 
left the Ice Haus bar at 10:00 p.m., not at 2:00 a.m. as Mr. Pitchford 
testified.

[¶36]    
The 
district court rejected Mr. Guy's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
after the Calene hearing, 
stating:

Assuming for the moment that 
[defense counsel]'s performance was somehow deficient in allowing Holiday to 
remain in the courtroom (which this Court does not here find), the question then 
becomes whether Guy was somehow prejudiced by the fact that Holiday was subsequently prevented from testifying.  Clearly, he was not.  Holiday's testimony indicates that the 
"best" outcome that could have occurred had Holiday been permitted to testify 
was to demonstrate that Pitchford was either mistaken in both his earlier statements and trial 
testimony (thus rendering his testimony even less effective) or, worse yet, that 
he was a liar both during his trial testimony and in his earlier interviews with 
Holiday.  Pitchford had explained 
his version of events as having occurred either at 10:00 PM (to Holiday) or at 
2:00 AM (to the jury), but, in either case, hospital and police records clearly 
show that he was flatly wrong.  The 
Court simply cannot fathom any prejudice to Guy in [defense counsel]'s inability 
to present this witness.

We agree with the district 
court.

[¶37]    
Mr. Guy 
next claims that there was insufficient evidence at trial to support his 
conviction.  When we review a 
criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, we view the facts in the 
light most favorable to the State.  
Downs v. State, 581 P.2d 610, 
614 (Wyo. 
1978).  We leave out any conflicting 
evidence of the defendant, and draw every reasonable inference in the State's 
favor.  Id.  The question we must answer is whether a 
reasonable and rational jury could have convicted the defendant of the crime 
based upon the evidence that was presented at trial.  Horn v. State, 554 P.2d 1141, 1145 
(Wyo. 
1976).

[¶38]    
A 
conviction for attempted second-degree murder requires that a defendant act both 
purposely and maliciously.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-104 and 6-1-301(a)(i).  
Mr. Guy contends that there is insufficient evidence to establish purpose 
and malice largely because no person testified to witnessing the stabbing.  We disagree.  "Malice may be inferred from the use of 
a deadly weapon in a dangerous and deadly manner if the facts and circumstances 
so allow.  Malice may also be 
inferred from all the other facts and circumstances."  Doe v. State, 569 P.2d 1276, 1279 
(Wyo. 1977) 
(citation omitted).  There was no 
dispute that Mr. Riske was stabbed.  
The inference that Mr. Guy stabbed Mr. Riske is supported by Mr. Riske's 
testimony that, when he felt a blow, Mr. Guy was the only person standing close 
enough to have delivered it.  The 
fact of the stabbing, together with testimony from Mr. Riske and other witnesses 
regarding Mr. Guy's confrontational behavior, makes it reasonable to infer that 
Mr. Guy stabbed Mr. Riske and did so purposely and with malice.  We conclude that the State presented 
sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to convict Mr. Guy of attempted 
second-degree murder.

[¶39]    
Mr. Guy 
asserts that his conviction should be reversed because the district court 
allowed an excessive display of security in the jury's presence.  After the jury had retired on the first 
day of trial, the following exchange took place:

[Defense counsel]: . . . .  I don't like to complain about things, 
and I don't like tobut I would ask the Court to admonish the detention center 
staff.  Part of their purpose here 
is to be as unobtrusive as possible.  
I recognize that they have to take care of security, but, Your Honor, I 
have been in courtrooms across this State with some of the most dangerous and 
violent defendants that [have] come through the state in the past five 
years.

The detention center staff is 
following Mr. Guy around when he has to go view an exhibit and perhaps what I'm 
most struggling with is, before lunch while the jury was still there in a voice 
loud enough to be heard by them, statements like, "Okay.  You got to come with us now during 
lunch."  And I would ask the Court 
to admonish the detention center staff that it is very important for them to 
remain unobtrusive, especially when the jury is present.

The 
Court: It is also 
important, Counsel, for them to remain in a position to enable them to do their 
job.  If your client wants to get up 
and go over across the courtroom and stand by the door, he's free to do 
that.  I will let him do that.  But one of them is going to go with him, 
because they are not going to be of any use to me or anybody else in this 
courtroom when they are over here on the other side of the courtroom and your 
client decides to do something.  So 
your client can either sit in his chair and stay there; if he wants to wander 
around, he is going to wander around with some accompaniment.  Okay?

[Defense counsel]: If we could just 
have somebody on both sides, we could easily solve that.  But it's just like a guy  coming in the courtroom in shackles and a 
jail uniform.

The 
Court: No, it is 
not.  No, it's not.  It is fundamentally different.  And they will follow him around the 
courtroom if he chooses to move around.  
If he doesn't want to be followed around, then he can stay in his 
chair.  That's pretty simple, 
okay?

[Defense counsel]: Yes, 
sir.

[¶40]    
Mr. Guy 
asserts that the security arrangements at his trial violated the procedure that 
we established in Asch v. State, 2003 
WY 18, ¶ 62, 62 P.3d 945, 964 (Wyo. 2003).  
We disagree.  In Asch, we stated:

[D]efendants shall not be shackled 
or otherwise physically restrained in the courtroom during a jury trial, nor 
shall other exceptional security measures be utilized, unless the State has 
first moved that such measures be utilized, the court has heard such motion, and 
after allowing the defendant an opportunity to contest the motion, the court has 
stated on the record the compelling reasons justifying the 
measures.

Id.  Mr. Guy was not shackled or otherwise 
physically restrained.  The presence 
of security personnel differs from shackling and is not inherently prejudicial 
to a defendant.  See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569, 106 S. Ct. 1340, 1346, 
89 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1986).  The State 
has a legitimate interest in maintaining custody during trial.  Id. 
at 571-72, 106 S. Ct.  at 1347.  Mr. 
Guy has failed to establish that the security measures utilized were exceptional 
or that he was prejudiced by the precautions approved by the district 
court.

[¶41]    
Mr. Guy 
next mounts an as applied constitutional challenge to the crime of attempted 
second-degree murder, as defined by the general attempt statute and the 
second-degree murder statute.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-301(a)(i), 6-2-104.  
He acknowledges, however, that we generally do not consider issues for 
the first time on appeal unless they involve jurisdiction or "a right so 
fundamental in nature that the court must take cognizance of it."  Jones v. State, 2006 WY 40, ¶ 7, 132 P.3d 162, 164 (Wyo. 2006).  Mr. Guy 
claims that a statute's constitutionality is, in fact, jurisdictional, and that 
we should address the merits of his constitutional challenge.  For support, he relies on Rutti v. State, 2004 WY 133, ¶ 10, 100 P.3d 394, 400-01 (Wyo. 2004).  We 
decline to give that decision the broad reading urged by Mr. Guy.  Instead, we consider Mr. Guy's as 
applied constitutional claim to be waived.

[¶42]    
In Rutti, we addressed constitutional 
challenges in an appeal from a defendant's conviction following a guilty 
plea.  In the unique context of a 
guilty plea, we have allowed defendants, though admitting all the elements of 
the crime charged, to contend for the first time on appeal that the statute 
violated by the defendant is unconstitutional.  Armijo v. State, 678 P.2d 864, 867 
(Wyo. 1984); 
Rutti, ¶ 10, 100 P.3d  at 400-01.  We explained that "[l]ittle purpose 
would be served by requiring a defendant to insist upon a trial in order to 
preserve his opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the statute, and 
we do not insist upon that."  
Armijo, 678 P.2d  at 
867.

[¶43]       
Despite 
the exception to the waiver rule articulated in Rutti and Armijo, an allegation that a 
statute is unconstitutional is not a jurisdictional defense and may be 
waived.  Jones, ¶ 8, 132 P.3d  at 164-65.  In Jones, the defendant was found guilty by 
a jury of escape pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-112(a)(i).  ¶ 1, 132 P.3d  at 163.  On appeal, she brought both an as 
applied and facial constitutional challenge to the escape statute.  Id., ¶ 2, 132 P.3d  at 163.  She did not raise 
these arguments in the district court.  
Id., ¶ 7, 132 P.3d  at 164.  Instead, she contended 
on appeal that the escape statute's constitutionality presented a jurisdictional 
issue and, therefore, an exception to the waiver doctrine applied.  Id.  We disagreed, stating the 
following:

The [constitutional] issue does not 
raise jurisdictional concerns. There is a strong presumption in favor of the 
constitutionality of a statute. Giles v. State, 2004 WY 
101, ¶ 10, 96 P.3d 1027, 1030 (Wyo. 2004). A trial court unquestionably has 
subject-matter jurisdiction over a controversy stemming from a violation of a 
state law that is presumptively valid.

Id., ¶ 8, 132 P.3d  at 164-65.  We concluded that Ms. Jones had waived 
her constitutional challenge in the district court and we declined to address it 
on appeal.  Id., ¶ 8, 132 P.3d  at 165.  We reach the same 
result here.  Mr. Guy did not enter 
a guilty plea and, accordingly, the exception we applied in Armijo and Rutti is inappropriate.  We decline to address Mr. Guy's 
constitutional challenge on appeal.  

[¶44]    
Mr. Guy 
also asserts that several other incidents of misconduct occurred during the 
prosecutor's closing argument and throughout his trial.  In particular, he claims that the 
prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof, improperly cross-examined two 
defense witnesses, and improperly argued from the victim's perspective in 
closing arguments.  He also presents 
two additional claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel: that his 
counsel failed to adequately raise a medical defense, and that trial counsel 
failed to object to what Mr. Guy asserts were numerous incidents of 
prosecutorial misconduct.  We will 
not recount each of the incidents because, again, Mr. Guy has failed to 
establish prejudice.  He merely 
contends that these incidents, apart or together, "deprived [him] of his right 
to a fair trial on its own merits."  We have addressed Mr. Guy's claims 
where he has presented relevant authority or cogent argument.  His remaining claims, however, are so 
inadequately presented that they do not allow meaningful review.  Consequently, we decline to address 
these issues.  W.R.A.P. 7.01(f); Schultz v. State, 2007 WY 162, ¶ 18, 169 P.3d 81, 87 (Wyo. 2007); Rion v. 
State, 2007 WY 197, ¶ 2, 172 P.3d 734, 736 (Wyo. 
2007).

[¶45]    
Lastly, 
Mr. Guy claims that all the incidents he asserts as error, when considered 
together, amount to cumulative error.  
He states that "[o]ne cannot be confident of the verdict in view of the 
nature and number of errors."  The 
purpose of evaluating for cumulative error is "to address whether the cumulative 
effect of two or more individually harmless errors has the potential to 
prejudice the defendant to the same extent as a single reversible error."  McClelland v. State, 2007 WY 57, ¶ 27, 
155 P.3d 1013, 1022 (Wyo. 2007).  In 
conducting a cumulative error evaluation, we consider only matters that we have 
determined to be errors.  Id.  We will reverse a conviction only when 
"the accumulated effect [of the errors] constitutes prejudice and the conduct 
of the trial is other than fair and impartial.'"  Id. (quoting Alcala v. 
State, 487 P.2d 448, 462 (Wyo. 1971)).  Based upon that standard, our detailed 
review of the record, and our analysis of the legal issues presented by Mr. Guy, 
we do not find any merit in his claim of cumulative error.

[¶46]       
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1The 
Fifth Amendment states, in relevant part, that "No person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself."