Case Title: State ex rel. Baroni v. Colletti

Citation: 2011-Ohio-5351

Docket Number: 2011-0455

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-10-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Baroni v. Colletti, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-5351.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-5351 
THE STATE EX REL. BARONI, APPELLANT, v. COLLETTI ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Baroni v. Colletti,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-5351.] 
R.C. 124.32—Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-30-04—Employee not entitled to back pay or 
vacation-leave credit—Public employer complied with timeline for 
reinstatement. 
(No. 2011-0455—Submitted September 6, 2011—Decided October 19, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 25334. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a complaint for a 
writ of mandamus.  The requested writ seeks to compel a public employer to 
provide an employee with either back pay or vacation-leave credit for the period 
between the employee’s certification by his treating physician that he was able to 
return to work and  his reinstatement to the payroll by his employer.  Because the 
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pertinent statutes and administrative rules do not authorize this relief under the 
circumstances of this case, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} Appellant, James E. Baroni, is employed by appellee Ohio 
Department of Mental Health (“ODMH”) in the position of Building 
Superintendent I in its Northcoast Behavioral Healthcare Facility (“Northcoast”) 
in Summit County, Ohio.  Appellee Sandra Stephenson is ODMH’s director, and 
appellee David Colletti is Northcoast’s chief executive officer.  Baroni was 
involuntarily separated from his employment due to disability. 
{¶ 3} On December 10, 2009, Baroni applied to be reinstated to his 
position pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-30-04.  Baroni submitted with his 
application a November 25, 2009 letter from his treating physician, Michael E. 
Felver, M.D., that cleared him to return to work on December 28, 2009. 
{¶ 4} ODMH referred Baroni to another physician, Dean W. Erickson, 
M.D., for an independent medical examination.  Dr. Erickson diagnosed him with 
a “[h]istory of osteomyelitis of the lumbar spine complicated by congestive heart 
failure, renal failure, pleural effusions, malnutrition, decubitus ulcers and 
gastrointestinal bleeding, all currently stable with minimal residual decubitus 
wound in the lower lumbosacral spine,” “[p]re-existing bilateral shoulder rotator 
cuff weakness with severe loss of range of motion,” “[r]ight knee degenerative 
arthritis with loss of range of motion,” “[s]evere right thumb degenerative arthritis 
with loss of motion,” “[p]re-existing cardiovascular disease with status post 3-
vessel coronary artery bypass graft with hypertension, under good control,” “Type 
II diabetes with diabetic peripheral neuropathy, currently controlled with diet and 
minimal medications,” and “[h]istory of severe malnutrition, status post 
rehabilitation, which is ongoing.” 
{¶ 5} Dr. Erickson concluded that Baroni was capable of returning to his 
former position as Building Superintendent I, but “only with significant 
January Term, 2011 
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restrictions,” including “[l]imit[ing] lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling to 10 
pounds,” avoiding “ladder and stair climbing, crawling, crouching, or kneeling,” 
working no more than “40 hours per week,” “[l]imiting standing and walking to a 
total of 1 to 2 hours per day,” and using a cane.  Dr. Erickson further concluded 
that Baroni was “not able to perform all of the physical functions” of his previous 
position and that it was “medically probable that some of his restrictions” were 
“due to pre-existing orthopedic conditions” that were unchanged. 
{¶ 6} On January 14, 2010, Dr. Erickson submitted his report to ODMH.  
ODMH then held a pre-reinstatement hearing on February 4.  By letter dated 
February 5, 2010, ODMH notified Baroni that it had granted his reinstatement 
request and that he would be reinstated to his former position as Building 
Superintendent I effective February 14, 2010, with February 16, 2010, as his first 
day to report to work.  The ODMH order did not specify that Baroni would be 
entitled to back pay or credit for the vacation leave he used while his application 
for reinstatement was pending.  Baroni resumed his job on February 16, 2010. 
{¶ 7} Because Baroni’s disability benefits expired near December 28, 
2009, the date that his treating physician certified that he could resume his job 
with ODMH, Baroni had asked his employer to charge his vacation-leave account 
while his application for reinstatement remained pending. 
{¶ 8} On February 15, 2010, Baroni appealed the ODMH reinstatement 
order to the State Personnel Board of Review, to the extent that the order did not 
award him back pay or credit his vacation leave for the period from December 28, 
2009, the date that his treating physician certified that he could return to work, to 
February 13, 2010, the day before he was returned to the payroll.  In March 2010, 
an administrative law judge for the board recommended that Baroni’s 
administrative appeal be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  The board then 
dismissed Baroni’s administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
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{¶ 9} On April 5, 2010, Baroni filed a verified complaint in the court of 
appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel appellees, ODMH, its director, and the 
Northcoast CEO, to remit back pay or restore vacation-leave credit charged 
against his account for the period from December 28, 2009, through February 13, 
2010.  Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, and Baroni filed a brief in opposition.  
On February 11, 2011, the court of appeals granted appellees’ motion and 
dismissed Baroni’s complaint. 
{¶ 10} This cause is now before the court upon Baroni’s appeal as of 
right. 
Legal Analysis 
{¶ 11} To be entitled to the writ, Baroni had to establish a clear legal right 
to the requested back pay or credit for vacation leave, a corresponding clear legal 
duty on the part of appellees to provide such back pay or vacation-leave credit, 
and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. 
Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 128 
Ohio St.3d 256, 2011-Ohio-625, 943 N.E.2d 553, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 12} In support of his claim, Baroni relies on R.C. 124.32 and Ohio 
Adm.Code 123:1-30-04.  R.C. 124.32 provides: 
{¶ 13} “(B) Any person holding an office or position in the classified 
service who has been separated from the service without delinquency or 
misconduct on the person's part may be reinstated within one year from the date 
of that separation to a vacancy in the same office or in a similar position in the 
same department, except that a person in the classified service of the state only 
may be reinstated with the consent of the director of administrative services. But, 
if that separation is due to injury or physical or psychiatric disability, the person 
shall be reinstated in the same office held or in a similar position to that held at 
the time of separation, within thirty days after written application for 
reinstatement, if the person passes a physical or psychiatric examination made by 
January Term, 2011 
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a licensed physician, a physician assistant, a clinical nurse specialist, a certified 
nurse practitioner, or a certified nurse-midwife showing that the person has 
recovered from the injury or physical or psychiatric disability, if the application 
for reinstatement is filed within two years from the date of separation, and if the 
application is not filed after the date of service eligibility retirement. The 
physician, physician assistant, clinical nurse specialist, certified nurse practitioner, 
or certified nurse-midwife shall be designated by the appointing authority and 
shall complete any written documentation of the physical or psychiatric 
examination.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 14} The administrative rules provide more detailed insight.  Under 
Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-30-01, “[a]n employee who is unable to perform the 
essential job duties of the position due to a disabling illness, injury or condition 
may be involuntarily disability separated.”  Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-30-04 governs 
the specific procedure for the reinstatement of a classified employee separated 
from employment on the basis of involuntary disability.  “An employee may 
make a written request to the appointing authority for reinstatement from a 
disability separation,” and the “appointing authority shall notify the employee of 
its decision to approve or deny the reinstatement request no later than sixty days 
after it receives the employee’s written request.”  Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-30-
04(A).  “The employee’s request for reinstatement shall be accompanied by 
substantial, credible medical evidence that the employee is once again capable of 
performing the employee’s essential job duties.”  Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-30-
04(B).  “Upon receiving this evidence, the appointing authority shall either 
reinstate the employee or require the employee to submit to a medical or 
psychological examination * * *.”  Id. 
{¶ 15} If the appointing authority decides to order the employee to submit 
to a medical or psychological examination, it must review the results and “make 
an initial determination of whether or not the employee is capable of performing 
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the essential duties of the employee’s position.”  Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-30-
04(C).  If the appointing authority “initially determines that the employee remains 
incapable of performing the essential job duties, the appointing authority shall 
institute a pre-reinstatement hearing.”  Id. 
{¶ 16} The appointing authority then makes a final determination and 
decides whether to reinstate the employee.  Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-30-04(E).  
“Once an appointing authority determines that the employee is to be reinstated, 
then the employee has a right to be assigned to a position in the classification the 
employee held at the time of disability separation.”  Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-30-
04(G).  An employee who is refused reinstatement can appeal to the State 
Personnel Board of Review within 30 days of receiving notice of the refusal.  
Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-30-04(I). 
{¶ 17} Baroni argues that these provisions, and in particular R.C. 124.32, 
supply the clear legal right and clear legal duty supporting his claim for back pay 
or vacation-leave credit from the date that his doctor certified that he could return 
to work until the date that he was reinstated to the payroll. 
{¶ 18} “The interpretation of statutes and administrative rules should 
follow the principle that neither is to be construed in any way other than as the 
words demand.”  Morning View Care Center-Fulton v. Ohio Dept. of Human 
Servs., 148 Ohio App.3d 518, 2002-Ohio-2878, 774 N.E.2d 300, ¶ 36.  “We must 
read undefined words and phrases [in statutes and administrative rules] in context 
and construe them in accordance with rules of grammar and common usage.”  
State ex rel. Turner v. Eberlin, 117 Ohio St.3d 381, 2008-Ohio-1117, 884 N.E.2d 
39, ¶ 14.  And because they relate to the same subject matter, we construe R.C. 
124.32 and Ohio Adm.Code 124:1-30-04 in pari materia.  See, e.g., Sheet Metal 
Workers’ Internatl. Assn., Local Union No. 33 v. Gene’s Refrigeration, Heating & 
Air Conditioning, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 248, 2009-Ohio-2747, 910 N.E.2d 444, ¶ 
43. 
January Term, 2011 
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{¶ 19} Notwithstanding Baroni’s argument to the contrary, R.C. 124.32 
does not support his claim.  Under the pertinent language of that statute, the duty 
to reinstate the classified employee within 30 days after written application to the 
same position held or to a similar position to that held at the time of separation is 
contingent upon several things, including that the person pass “a physical or 
psychiatric examination made by a licensed physician, a physician assistant, a 
clinical nurse specialist, a certified nurse practitioner, or a certified nurse-midwife 
showing that the person has recovered from the injury or physical or psychiatric 
disability.”  The conclusory report from Baroni’s treating physician, which Baroni 
submitted with his request for reinstatement, did not constitute the report 
referenced in the statute so as to invoke the duty of reinstatement, because the 
medical report was required to be made by a designee of the appointing authority.  
See R.C. 124.34(B) (“The physician, physician assistant, clinical nurse specialist, 
certified nurse practitioner, or certified nurse-midwife shall be designated by the 
appointing authority and shall complete any written documentation of the physical 
or psychiatric examination”). 
{¶ 20} Moreover, ODMH’s initial determination that Baroni was 
incapable of performing the essential job duties of his former position was 
reasonable based on Dr. Erickson’s conclusion that Baroni was “not able to 
perform all of the physical functions” of his former position.  This initial 
determination by ODMH authorized it to conduct the pre-reinstatement hearing.  
Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-30-04(C). 
{¶ 21} Therefore, appellees acted properly when they notified Baroni on 
February 5—just one day after the pre-reinstatement hearing—that he would be 
returned to the payroll on February 14, 2010.  As the court of appeals determined, 
ODMH complied with the timeline for reinstatement specified in the 
administrative rule by notifying Baroni of the decision to reinstate him “no later 
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than sixty days after it” received Baroni’s request on December 10, 2009.  Ohio 
Adm.Code 123:1-30-04(A). 
{¶ 22} Under these circumstances, which were alleged by Baroni in his 
complaint, neither R.C. 124.32 nor Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-30-04 required that 
appellees remit back pay or credit the vacation leave he used between December 
28, 2009, and February 13, 2010.  The plain language of these provisions does not 
support Baroni’s interpretation, and we cannot create this legal duty by adding 
language to the pertinent provisions.  State ex rel. Pipoly v. State Teachers 
Retirement Sys., 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 2002-Ohio-2219, 767 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 18 (“It is 
axiomatic that in mandamus proceedings, the creation of the legal duty that a 
relator seeks to enforce is the distinct function of the legislative branch of 
government, and courts are not authorized to create the legal duty enforceable in 
mandamus” [emphasis sic]); State ex rel. Asti v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 107 
Ohio St.3d 262, 2005-Ohio-6432, 838 N.E.2d 658, ¶ 29 (we cannot add or delete 
words in interpreting statutes). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 23} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals correctly dismissed 
Baroni’s complaint for extraordinary relief in mandamus to compel the award of 
back pay or vacation-leave credit.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court 
of appeals.  In addition, we deny Baroni’s request for oral argument because the 
parties’ briefs are sufficient to resolve this appeal. 
Judgment affirmed. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE 
BROWN, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
Law Offices of S. David Worhatch and S. David Worhatch, for appellant. 
January Term, 2011 
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Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Komlavi Atsou, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellees. 
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