Case Title: Wawenock, LLC v. Department of Transportation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018 ME 83

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2018-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 83 
Docket: 
BCD-17-490 
Argued: 
May 15, 2018 
Decided: 
June 28, 2018 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
WAWENOCK, LLC, et al. 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
 
[¶1]  Wawenock, LLC; Bermuda Isles, LLC; 48 Federal Street LLC; and 
32 Middle Street LLC (collectively, the LLCs) appeal from a judgment on the 
pleadings entered in the Business and Consumer Docket (Mulhern, J.) in favor 
of the Department of Transportation on the LLCs’ complaint seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the Department’s plan to widen 
Route 1 in Wiscasset.  The LLCs argue that the court erred by determining that 
the Sensible Transportation Policy Act (STPA), 23 M.R.S. § 73 (2017), affords 
them no private right of action.  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  On February 14, 2017, the LLCs—four entities that own property in 
Wiscasset—instituted the present litigation in the Superior Court (Lincoln 
 
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County)1 against the Department, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 
regarding the “Wiscasset Downtown Improvement Project” (the Project) for 
the widening and alteration of Route 1/Main Street in Wiscasset.2  By amended 
complaint, the LLCs advanced nine counts claiming that the Department 
violated various constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and municipal provisions 
in planning and designing the Project.  In particular, in Count 1, the LLCs alleged 
that the Department violated the STPA by failing to allow public participation 
in the planning and design of the Project.3   
[¶3]  The Department moved for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant 
to M.R. Civ. P. 12(c), arguing that the complaint was nonjusticiable on a variety 
of grounds.  By judgment dated September 11, 2017, the court granted the 
motion and entered a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Department on 
all counts.  As to Count 1, the court concluded that the STPA affords no private 
right of action and that the LLCs were therefore precluded from seeking relief 
                                         
1  The matter was accepted by the Business and Consumer Docket on the LLCs’ request.  See M.R. 
Civ. P. 131. 
 
2  The LLCs named the Town of Wiscasset as a party in interest.  The Town participated in the 
proceedings before the trial court but takes no position in this appeal.   
 
3  The LLCs also alleged in Count 1 of the complaint that the Department violated 23 M.R.S. § 651 
(2017), but they do not pursue that argument in this appeal and we do not address it further.   
 
3 
on that basis.  The LLCs appeal from the denial of their motion for 
reconsideration.4  See M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(5), 59(e).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶4]  The LLCs challenge only that portion of the court’s judgment 
determining that the STPA affords them no private right of action and entering 
a judgment on the pleadings as to Count 1 on that basis.  When, as here, a motion 
for a judgment on the pleadings is filed by the defendant pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 
12(c), “only the legal sufficiency of the complaint is tested.”  Cunningham v. 
Haza, 538 A.2d 265, 267 (Me. 1988).  In such circumstances, the “[d]efendant’s 
motion for judgment on the pleadings is nothing more than a motion under M.R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted.”  Cunningham, 538 A.2d at 267.  We review the grant of a 
judgment on the pleadings de novo, Faith Temple v. DiPietro, 2015 ME 166, ¶ 26, 
130 A.3d 368, by “assuming that the factual allegations are true, examining the 
complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and ascertaining whether the 
complaint alleges the elements of a cause of action or facts entitling the plaintiff 
                                         
4  While the appeal was pending, the LLCs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking an 
order enjoining the Department from commencing construction on the Project pending the outcome 
of the appeal.  We denied the motion after oral argument based on the LLCs’ failure to demonstrate a 
likelihood of success on the merits of their appeal.  See Bangor Historic Track, Inc. v. Dep’t of Agric., 
2003 ME 140, ¶ 9, 837 A.2d 129.   
 
4 
to relief on some legal theory,” Cunningham, 538 A.2d at 267 (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
[¶5]  The sole issue before us is whether the STPA provides for a private 
right of action such that the LLCs may seek its enforcement through the court.  
A statute may provide for a private right of action by express language or by 
implication.  Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97, 101 
(Me. 1984). 
 
[¶6]  When a private right of action exists, however, it is most often 
created by express language: “[I]f our Legislature had intended that a private 
party have a right of action . . . , it would have either expressed its intent in the 
statutory language or legislative history or, more likely, expressly enacted one.”  
Id.; see In re Wage Payment Litig., 2000 ME 162, ¶ 7, 759 A.2d 217 (stating that 
“when the Legislature deems it essential that a private party have a right of 
action, it has expressly created one” (quotation marks omitted)).   
[¶7]  To determine whether the STPA provides for a private right of 
action, we interpret the statute de novo to effectuate the legislative intent.  
Foster v. State Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 205, ¶ 7, 716 A.2d 1012.  The first and best 
indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute itself.  Id.  If the 
statute is unambiguous, we interpret the statute according to its unambiguous 
 
5 
language, “unless the result is illogical or absurd.”  MaineToday Media, Inc. v. 
State, 2013 ME 100, ¶ 6, 82 A.3d 104 (quotation marks omitted).  If the 
language is ambiguous, we will “consider the statute’s meaning in light of its 
legislative history and other indicia of legislative intent.”  Id.  “[I]f a statute can 
reasonably be interpreted in more than one way and comport with the actual 
language of the statute, an ambiguity exists.”  Me. Ass’n of Health Plans v. 
Superintendent of Ins., 2007 ME 69, ¶ 35, 923 A.2d 918. 
A. 
Plain Language 
[¶8]  The STPA was enacted by a citizens’ initiative in 1991.  I.B. 1991, 
ch. 1, § 1 (effective Dec. 20, 1991); L.D. 719 (referred to the voters, 115th Legis. 
1991); see Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18.  It provides, 
§ 73.  Transportation policy  
 
1.  Short title.  This section may be known and cited as the 
“Sensible Transportation Policy Act.”  
 
2.  Purposes and findings.  The people of the State find that 
decisions regarding the State’s transportation network are vital to 
the well-being of Maine citizens, to the economic health of the State 
and to the quality of life that the citizens treasure and seek to 
protect.  
 
The people also find that these decisions have profound, 
long-lasting and sometimes detrimental impacts on the natural 
resources of the State, including its air quality, land and water.  
 
 
6 
The people further find that substantial portions of the state 
highway system are in disrepair and improvements to the State’s 
roads and bridges are necessary to provide a safe, efficient, and 
adequate transportation network throughout the State.  
 
The people further find that the State’s transportation network is 
heavily dependent on foreign oil, that such reliance is detrimental 
to the health of the State’s economy and that the health and 
long-term stability of the State’s economy require increased 
reliance on more efficient forms of transportation.  
 
The people further find that improvements to the transportation 
network are necessary to meet the diverse transportation needs of 
the people of the State including rural and urban populations and 
the unique mobility requirements of the elderly and disabled.  
 
The people further find that the decisions of state agencies 
regarding transportation needs and facilities are often made in 
isolation, 
without 
sufficient 
comprehensive 
planning 
and 
opportunity for meaningful public input and guidance.  
 
3.  Transportation policy.  It is the policy of the State that 
transportation planning decisions, capital investment decisions 
and project decisions must:  
 
A.  Minimize the harmful effects of transportation on public 
health and on air and water quality, land use and other 
natural resources;  
 
B.  Require that the full range of reasonable transportation 
alternatives be evaluated for all significant highway 
construction or reconstruction projects and give preference 
to transportation system management options, demand 
management strategies, improvements to the existing 
system, and other transportation modes before increasing 
highway capacity through road building activities;  
 
 
7 
C.  Ensure the repair and necessary improvement of roads 
and bridges throughout the State to provide a safe, efficient 
and adequate transportation network;  
 
D.  Reduce the State’s reliance on foreign oil and promote 
reliance on energy-efficient forms of transportation;  
 
E.  Meet the diverse transportation needs of the people of the 
State, including rural and urban populations and the unique 
mobility needs of the elderly and disabled;  
 
F.  Be consistent with the purposes, goals and policies of the 
Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act; and  
 
G.  Incorporate a public participation process in which local 
governmental bodies and the public have timely notice and 
opportunity to identify and comment on concerns related to 
transportation planning decisions, capital investment 
decisions and project decisions. The department and the 
Maine Turnpike Authority shall take the comments and 
concerns of local citizens into account and must be 
responsive to them.  
 
4.  Rulemaking.  The Department of Transportation shall 
adopt a rule within one year of the effective date of this Act, in 
coordination with the Maine Turnpike Authority and state agencies 
including 
the 
Department 
of 
Economic 
and 
Community 
Development, the Department of Agriculture, Conservation and 
Forestry and the Department of Environmental Protection, to 
implement the statewide comprehensive transportation policy. 
The rule must incorporate a public participation process that 
provides municipalities and other political subdivisions of the State 
and members of the public notice and opportunity to comment on 
transportation planning decisions, capital investment decisions, 
project 
decisions 
and 
compliance 
with 
the 
statewide 
transportation policy.  
 
 
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The Department of Transportation shall adopt a rule, in 
coordination with the Department of Agriculture, Conservation 
and Forestry, that establishes linkage between the planning 
processes outlined in this section and those promoted by Title 
30-A, chapter 187, subchapter 2 and that promotes investment 
incentives for communities that adopt and implement land use 
plans that minimize over-reliance on the state highway network. 
This rule is a major substantive rule as defined in Title 5, chapter 
375, subchapter 2-A.  
 
5.  Applicability to Department of Transportation.  
Transportation planning decisions, capital investment decisions 
and project decisions of the Department of Transportation are 
governed by and must comply with the transportation policy set 
forth in this section and rules implementing that policy.  
 
6.  [Repealed.]   
 
7.  Priorities, service levels, capital goals and reporting.  
The Department of Transportation shall classify the State’s public 
highways as Priority 1 to Priority 6 corridors using factors such as 
the federal functional classification system, regional economic 
significance, heavy haul truck use and relative regional traffic 
volumes. The department shall also establish customer service 
levels related to safety, condition and serviceability appropriate to 
the priority of the highway, resulting in a system that grades each 
highway as Excellent, Good, Fair, Poor or Unacceptable.  
 
To provide a capital transportation program that is geographically 
balanced and that addresses urban and rural needs, the 
department shall include the following goals as part of its capital 
improvement plans and program delivery. The goals are to:  
 
A.  By 2022, improve all Priority 1 and Priority 2 corridors so 
that their safety, condition and serviceability customer 
service level equals Fair or better; 
 
 
9 
B.  By 2027, improve all Priority 3 corridors so that their 
safety, condition and serviceability customer service level 
equals Fair or better;   
 
C.  By 2017, implement a pavement program for all Priority 
4 corridors that maintains their ride quality customer service 
level at Fair or better;  
 
D.  Continue the light capital paving program on a 7-year 
cycle for Priority 5 corridors outside compact areas as 
defined in section 754; and  
 
E.  By 2015, develop and implement a similar asset priority 
and customer service level system of measurement for all 
major freight and passenger transportation assets owned or 
supported by the department, including capital goals.  
 
The department shall report to the joint standing committee of the 
Legislature having jurisdiction over transportation matters by 
March 1st of each odd-numbered year quantifying progress 
realized and time that has elapsed since the goals were established. 
The department shall recommend any remedial actions, including 
additional funding or revisions to the goals, that the department 
determines to be necessary or appropriate. 
 
23 M.R.S. § 73 (footnotes omitted).  In short, the STPA has six primary 
components: it lists a series of “[p]urposes and findings” regarding 
transportation decisions; sets out seven policies to be integrated into 
transportation decisions; and requires the Department to adopt rules to 
implement the transportation policy, comply with the transportation policy 
and the rules implementing that policy, establish a priority system for state 
 
10 
highway improvements, and report to the Legislature on a biennial basis 
regarding its progress and plans in meeting those goals.  23 M.R.S. § 73. 
[¶9]  As the LLCs concede, the plain language of the STPA unambiguously 
provides for no express private right of action.5  The LLCs argue, however, that 
a private right of action is instead implied by the STPA.  We discern nothing in 
the language of the STPA that implies the creation of a private right of action.  
Contrary to the LLCs’ suggestion, the mere presence of the words “must” and 
“shall” in a statute does not mean that a private right of action exists to enforce 
it.  In Larrabee, for example, one of the statutes at issue provided that “[a]n 
employer shall” complete certain acts or else be “subject to a forfeiture of not 
less than $50 nor more than $500.”  486 A.2d at 101 & n.6 (quotation marks 
omitted).  Even given that language, we held that “nothing in the plain language 
or legislative history of [the provision] indicates that our Legislature intended 
a private party to have a right of action under [the statute].”6  Id. at 101.   
                                         
5  In other matters in which we have recognized an express statutory right of action, the language 
of the relevant statutes has provided, for example, “Any person who . . . suffers any loss . . . as a result 
of [the conduct at issue] may bring an action . . . for restitution and for such other equitable relief, 
including an injunction, as the court may deem to be necessary and proper.”  Bartner v. Carter, 
405 A.2d 194, 199 (Me. 1979) (quotation marks omitted) (referring to the Unfair Trade Practices 
Act); see Bank of Am., N.A. v. Camire, 2017 ME 20, ¶ 13, 155 A.3d 416 (stating that the Maine Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act affords consumers a private right of action by providing that “any debt 
collector who fails to comply with any provisions of this Act with respect to any person is liable to 
that person,” 32 M.R.S. § 11054(1) (2017)).  The STPA does not contain similar language. 
 
6  The LLCs’ reliance on Roop v. City of Belfast, 2007 ME 32, 915 A.2d 966, is misplaced.  In that 
case, we held that city residents had common law standing to challenge the referendum process by 
 
11 
 
[¶10]  The LLCs further argue that the STPA would be a nullity—"a 
meaningless exercise”—in the absence of any enforcement mechanism.  They 
offer no authority for the proposition that a statute is a nullity unless it provides 
for a private right of action, however, and indeed, the STPA is similar in effect 
to numerous other statutory provisions that set out broad policy objectives, e.g., 
1 M.R.S. § 401 (2017); 9-A M.R.S. § 1-102(2) (2017); 18-A M.R.S. § 1-102(b) 
(2017); 22 M.R.S. § 4050 (2017), or require an entity to promulgate rules and 
regulations to further effectuate statutory objectives, e.g., 4 M.R.S. § 198 (2017); 
10 M.R.S. § 2369 (2017); 22 M.R.S. § 2124 (2017); 32 M.R.S. § 13722 (2017).  
That the STPA contains few or no particularities on how its broad 
transportation goals and policies are to be executed also indicates that it was 
not intended to afford any private right of action.  See Barbuto v. Advantage 
Sales & Mktg., LLC, 78 N.E.3d 37, 50 (Mass. 2017) (declining to imply a private 
right of action where the statute “provides no guidance as to what the 
appropriate contours of the implied right of action would be”). 
                                         
which an ordinance amendment was accomplished.  Id. ¶¶ 2-11.  We expressly declined to consider, 
however, whether the growth management statute—according to which the referendum process was 
completed—provided a private right of action because the parties never raised it.  Id. ¶ 9 n.2; see 
Lindemann v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 2008 ME 187, ¶ 8, 961 A.2d 538 
(“[T]he question of whether a specific individual has standing is significantly affected by the unique 
context of the claim.”).  To the extent Roop may have caused confusion, we take this opportunity to 
reiterate that, when there is no explicit language creating a private right of action, the courts should 
first determine whether a private right of action is available to enforce a statutory provision. 
 
12 
[¶11]  The STPA must be interpreted consistently with other provisions 
that unequivocally provide the Department with broad authority to manage the 
State’s highways as a delegation of Executive Branch power.  See 23 M.R.S. § 52 
(2017) (describing the Department’s powers regarding “the planning, design, 
engineering, 
construction, 
improvement, 
maintenance 
and 
use 
of 
transportation infrastructure”).  Nothing in the STPA suggests an 
encroachment on that authority.   
[¶12]  We therefore conclude that the plain language of the STPA 
unambiguously provides for no implied private right of action.  Because the 
plain language of the STPA resolves the question before us, we need not look 
beyond that language to discern the legislative intent.  See Stockly v. Doil, 
2005 ME 47, ¶ 12, 870 A.2d 1208.  Nevertheless, because the trial court and the 
parties focused on the legislative history of the statute, and in the interest of 
clarifying the means of determining legislative intent for citizen-enacted 
legislation, we address the legislative history of the STPA as well.  See id. 
B. 
Legislative History 
[¶13]  As an initial matter, we address the LLCs’ challenges to the 
procedure undertaken by the trial court when it evaluated the legislative 
history of the STPA to determine whether it discloses a legislative intent to 
 
13 
provide for a private right of action.  Contrary to the suggestion underlying 
many of the LLCs’ arguments, the legislative intent of any statutory enactment 
is determined wholly as a matter of law, not fact; the trial court determines 
legislative intent as a matter of law, and we determine legislative intent de novo 
as a matter of law on appeal.  MaineToday Media, Inc., 2013 ME 100, ¶ 7, 82 A.3d 
104; see In re Wage Payment Litig., 2000 ME 162, ¶ 4, 759 A.2d 217 (“If the plain 
meaning of the text does not resolve an interpretative issue raised, we then 
consider the statute’s history, underlying policy, and other extrinsic factors to 
ascertain legislative intent.”); State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶ 9, 704 A.2d 387 
(characterizing de novo review as “independent review for conclusions of 
law”); League of Women Voters v. Sec’y of State, 683 A.2d 769, 773-74 (Me. 
1996) (determining legislative intent without any evidentiary presentations); 
see also Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 189 
(Alaska 2007) (“We also apply our independent judgment to questions of 
statutory interpretation and adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in 
light of precedent, reason and policy.” (alteration omitted) (quotation marks 
omitted)).  Thus, no burden or standard of proof applies, judicial notice is not 
implicated,7 “evidence” of legislative history is not offered or admitted, and the 
                                         
7  Pursuant to M.R. Evid. 201, judicial notice applies to “an adjudicative fact only, not a legislative 
fact.”  Whereas an adjudicative fact is the “‘who-did-what-and-when’ kind of question that normally 
 
14 
court is not limited to reviewing those portions of legislative history that have 
been provided by the parties.  No matter what materials are directed to a court’s 
attention, the court’s review of any and all legislative history information in the 
course of its own evaluation of the law is not any more limited than a court’s 
review of precedent identified by the parties.   
[¶14]  Contrary to the LLCs’ contention, legislative intent is therefore 
properly analyzed in the context of a Rule 12(c) motion without any evidentiary 
process.  Further, although consideration pursuant to Rule 12(c) required the 
trial court—and, on appeal, requires us—to make all factual inferences in favor 
of the LLCs, they are entitled to no favorable inferences as to the legal 
interpretation of the STPA—including the legislative intent as determined 
through its legislative history.  See Cunningham, 538 A.2d at 267.   
[¶15]  In evaluating legislative intent using information beyond the 
language of the provision, we have relied on a variety of materials, including 
the statutory scheme in which the relevant section is found, see Charlton v. 
                                         
goes to a jury,” legislative facts “are those a court takes into account in determining the 
constitutionality or interpretation of a statute.”  M.R. Evid. 201 Advisers’ Note to 1976 promul. 
(quotation marks omitted).  We have also characterized legislative facts as those on which the 
Legislature relies as a matter of public policy in fashioning a statute.  See Aseptic Packaging Council v. 
State, 637 A.2d 457, 460 (Me. 1994); Durepo v. Fishman, 533 A.2d 264, 265 (Me. 1987).  As the United 
States Supreme Court has held, “a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding.”  FCC v. 
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993); see State v. $223,405.86, 203 So. 3d 816, 831 (Ala. 
2016) (stating that “the testimony of a trial witness as to what legislators intended in voting for a 
statute . . . is inadmissible as evidence”). 
 
15 
Town of Oxford, 2001 ME 104, ¶ 16, 774 A.2d 366; the history of relevant 
codifications, amendments, and repeals, see State v. Legassie, 2017 ME 202, 
¶¶ 16-20, 171 A.3d 589; the legislative committee file, including testimony 
before a committee and newspaper articles submitted to a committee, see Craig 
v. Caron, 2014 ME 115, ¶ 14, 102 A.3d 1175; Bank of Am., N.A. v. Cloutier, 2013 
ME 17, ¶ 19, 61 A.3d 1242; Me. Ass’n of Health Plans, 2007 ME 69, ¶¶ 50-51, 
923 A.2d 918; scholarly literature available at the time of the enactment, see 
Cloutier, 2013 ME 17, ¶ 20, 61 A.3d 1242; “preenactment history, including 
circumstances and events leading up to a bill’s introduction,” see Estate of 
Robbins v. Chebeague & Cumberland Land Tr., 2017 ME 17, ¶ 24, 154 A.3d 1185 
(quotation marks omitted); reports and recommendations from legislative task 
forces, committees, and working groups, see Me. Ass’n of Health Plans, 
2007 ME 69, ¶ 54, 923 A.2d 918; Darling’s v. Ford Motor Co., 1998 ME 232, ¶ 10, 
719 A.2d 111; narrative summaries and statements of fact accompanying 
proposed legislation and committee amendments, see Me. Ass’n of Health Plans, 
2007 ME 69, ¶¶ 49, 52, 923 A.2d 918; “pronouncements of the legislators 
during their initial consideration” of a statute, see id. ¶ 47; legislative debate, 
see id. ¶ 55; contemporaneous legislation, see In re Wage Payment Litig., 
2000 ME 162, ¶¶ 9, 12, 759 A.2d 217; Mundy v. Simmons, 424 A.2d 135, 138 
 
16 
(Me. 1980); interpretations of federal counterpart statutes, Batchelder v. 
Realty Resources Hospitality, LLC, 2007 ME 17, ¶ 20, 914 A.2d 1116; 
information from uniform codes from which the provision may have originated, 
see Guardianship of Sanders, 2016 ME 99, ¶ 9 n.7, 143 A.3d 795; and the analysis 
of legislation by the Office of Policy and Legal Analysis, see McLaughlin v. 
Superintending Sch. Comm., 2003 ME 114, ¶ 18, 832 A.2d 782.   
[¶16]  “Citizen initiatives are reviewed according to the same rules of 
construction as statutes enacted by vote of the Legislature.”  Opinion of the 
Justices, 2017 ME 100, ¶ 59, 162 A.3d 188; see League of Women Voters, 
683 A.2d at 771.  Interpreting citizen-enacted legislation requires us to 
“ascertain the will of the people” rather than the will of the Legislature.  
Opinion of the Justices, 2017 ME 100, ¶ 7, 162 A.3d 188 (quotation marks 
omitted). 
[¶17]  Legislative debate and other standard fare for determining 
legislative intent may be unavailable for citizen-enacted statutes, but we have 
the benefit of additional materials not available for Legislature-enacted 
statutes.  For example, the Attorney General is required by statute to issue a 
“brief explanatory statement that must fairly describe the intent and content 
and what a ‘yes’ vote favors and a ‘no’ vote opposes for each direct initiative.”  
 
17 
1 M.R.S. § 353 (2017).  The Office of Fiscal and Program Review also must 
“prepare an estimate of the fiscal impact on state revenues, appropriations and 
allocations of each measure that may appear on the ballot.”  1 M.R.S. § 353.  The 
language of the ballot question for a citizens’ initiative is also an indication of 
legislative intent.  State v. Brown, 571 A.2d 816, 818 (Me. 1990).   
[¶18]  We have relied on all such materials in determining legislative 
intent in prior matters.  Id. (“In the absence of a challenge to the Attorney 
General’s official explanation of the amendment, we assume that the voters 
intended to adopt the constitutional amendment on the terms in which it was 
presented to them . . . .”); League of Women Voters, 683 A.2d at 773-74 
(discussing the Attorney General’s explanatory statement attached to a 
referendum question); see also Kritz, 170 P.3d at 193 (“[W]hen we review a 
ballot initiative, we look to any published arguments made in support or 
opposition to determine what meaning voters may have attached to the 
initiative.”); People v. Clendenin, 232 P.3d 210, 215 (Colo. App. 2009) (noting 
that “the explanatory publication of the Legislative Council of the Colorado 
General Assembly, otherwise known as the Blue Book . . . provides important 
insight into the electorate’s understanding of [a citizen initiative] when it was 
passed and also shows the public’s intentions in adopting the [enactment].” 
 
18 
(quotation marks omitted)); Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 49 (“[W]e look to the closest 
equivalent to legislative history, which is the Information for Voters guide that 
is prepared by the Secretary of the Commonwealth and sent to each registered 
voter before the election.”).   
 
[¶19]  We turn to a review of all such materials relating to the enactment 
of the STPA.  In 1991, “An Act to Deauthorize the Widening of the Maine 
Turnpike and to Create a Sensible Transportation Policy” was first presented to 
the Legislature.  L.D. 719 (115th Legis. 1991).  The bill proposed the enactment 
of the STPA as well as the amendment of several other existing statutes within 
title 23.  L.D. 719 (referred to the voters, 115th Legis. 1991).  The Legislature 
declined to enact it, 1 Legis. Rec. H-751 (1st Reg. Sess. 1991); 3 Legis. Rec. S-801 
(1st Reg. Sess. 1991), and the statute was eventually enacted by citizen 
initiative on November 5, 1991.8  I.B. 1991, ch. 1, § 1 (effective Dec. 20, 1991); 
                                         
8  The “Rule for the Sensible Transportation Policy Act,” promulgated by the Department as 
required by the STPA, see 23 M.R.S. § 73(4) (2017), reiterates the policy goals in the STPA; sets out 
the “Statewide Long-Range Transportation Plan”; and addresses capital investment and project 
development strategies for the Department, the Maine Turnpike Authority, and municipalities.  
8A C.M.R. 17 229 103-1 to -18, §§ I-III (2008).  Like the STPA, to the extent the rule mandates any 
particular action by the Department, it does so only in the broadest of terms; it also places public 
participation procedures within the Department’s discretion based on the scope and nature of the 
project at issue.  E.g., 8A C.M.R. 17 229 103-7 § I(7)(C) (requiring that the Department “initiate a 
public participation process commensurate with the scope of [a given] project” and listing examples 
of what the “information provided through the public participation process may include”); 8A C.M.R. 
17 229 103-7 § I(7)(E) (stating that the Department “may hold a public hearing on the draft strategy 
evaluation and analyses”); 8A C.M.R. 17 229 103-9 § I(10)(A) (stating that the Department will 
“engage a public participation process” in the “preliminary design of funded projects, at [the 
 
19 
L.D. 719 (referred to the voters, 115th Legis. 1991); see Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, 
§ 18; 21-A M.R.S. §§ 901-906 (2017).   
[¶20]  The legislative history of the STPA persuades us that the particular 
focus of the bill was to prevent the Turnpike Authority from executing its plan 
to widen the Turnpike in southern Maine and to diminish the Turnpike 
Authority’s ability to accomplish similar plans in the future.  The Statement of 
Fact accompanying the legislation stated as much in declaring that the 
legislation would “ensure that transportation decisions and the substantial 
commitments of public funds resulting from them are made in the context of a 
comprehensive, statewide transportation policy”; deauthorize the widening of 
the Maine Turnpike between Exits 1 and 6-A; require the Turnpike Authority 
to obtain the Legislature’s approval for any widening or expansion of the 
Turnpike;9 require the Turnpike Authority to transfer surplus funds to the 
Department; and make the Turnpike Authority’s budget and expenditures 
subject to Legislative approval.  L.D. 719, Statement of Fact (referred to the 
voters, 115th Legis. 1991); see Office of Policy and Legal Analysis, Joint Standing 
                                         
Department’s] discretion or if requested by municipal officials”).  The rule contains no mention of 
any enforcement, right of action, court proceedings, or litigation of any kind. 
 
9  The Turnpike Authority had previously been required to obtain Legislative approval only when 
widening the Turnpike to include more than three lanes in each direction between Exit 1 and Exit 6A, 
or more than two lanes in each direction elsewhere on the Turnpike.  23 M.R.S.A. § 1965(1)(D), 
1968(1) (Supp. 1989); see L.D. 719, §§ 5, 7 (referred to the voters, 115th Legis. 1991). 
 
20 
Committee Bill Summaries, L.D. 719 (Aug. 1991).  It is notable in this regard 
that every portion of the bill except the one enacting the STPA worked 
amendments to title 23, chapter 24, the chapter dedicated to the Maine 
Turnpike.  L.D. 719 (referred to the voters, 115th Legis. 1991). 
[¶21]  More than forty people testified at a public hearing about the bill 
before the Transportation Committee; the overwhelming focus of that 
testimony was the Turnpike Authority’s plan to widen the Turnpike in southern 
Maine.  An Act to Deauthorize the Widening of the Maine Turnpike and to Create 
a Sensible Transportation Policy: Hearing on L.D. 719 Before the Comm. on 
Transp. (Hearing on L.D. 719), 115th Legis. (1991).  The supporters of the bill 
cited a host of financial, safety, air pollution, public health, and environmental 
concerns raised by the widening.  Hearing on L.D. 719 (testimony of Booth 
Hemingway, Kittery Coordinator; Marshall Burke, Dir. of the Am. Lung Ass’n of 
Me.; Brownie Carson, Exec. Dir. of the Nat. Res. Council of Me.; Elizabeth Lovejoy 
for the Me. Audubon Soc’y).  Opponents argued that failing to widen the 
Turnpike would compromise Maine’s economic prospects for tourism and 
other industries, deny residents job opportunities, and create road safety 
issues.  Hearing on L.D. 719 (testimony of Jerry G. Haynes for the Associated 
Gen. Contractors of Me., Inc.; Jon Olson, Exec. Sec’y of the Me. Farm Bureau; 
 
21 
David M. Spahn, Chairman of the Gov’t Affairs Comm. of the Sanford-Springvale 
Chamber of Commerce; Milton F. Huntington for the Me. Hwy. Users 
Conference; Clyde G. Berry, Master of the Me. State Grange).  Notably, a handful 
of opponents pointed out that proponents of the bill seemed to be unaware that 
the legislation would have any lasting effect other than to prevent the widening 
of the Turnpike.  Hearing on L.D. 719 (testimony of Laurie R. Winsor, Pres. of 
the Lewiston-Auburn Chamber of Commerce; Maria Fuentes, Dir. of the Me. 
Better Transp. Ass’n; Chuck Roundy for the Econ. Dev. Council of Me.). 
 
[¶22]  The LLCs rely on the testimony of the former Commissioner of the 
Department, who set out numerous concerns about the bill—among them, “I 
also fear that this new policy would give anyone the ability to stop a road 
improvement project by intervening or filing endless lawsuits.”  Hearing on L.D. 
719 (testimony of Dana F. Connors, Comm’r of the Dep’t of Transp.).  The 
Commissioner’s mention of the potential for litigation was a generalized 
statement that does little to suggest that the intent of the bill was to establish 
an implied private right of action; the testimony merely sets out the 
Commissioner’s fear that others might interpret the bill in that manner.10  
                                         
10  If a statute is ambiguous, we “will uphold the agency’s interpretation in its field of expertise 
unless the statute plainly compels a contrary result.”  Me. Ass’n of Health Plans v. Superintendent of 
Ins., 2007 ME 69, ¶ 32, 923 A.2d 918 (quotation marks omitted).  Whether the legislative intent of a 
statute was to create an implied private right of action is not within the Department’s technical 
 
22 
Further, although several opponents worried that a new transportation policy 
might hinder road improvements, none addressed precisely how, by whom, or 
in what circumstances road work could be stymied.  Hearing on L.D. 719 
(testimony of Fuentes; Paul Violette; Berry; Jack Dexter, Pres. of the Me. 
Chamber of Commerce and Indus.)  Rather, the opponents warned against a 
general anti-growth policy that they feared the enactment of the bill could 
signal.  Hearing on L.D. 719 (testimony of Roundy, Winsor).  Indeed, other than 
the Commissioner’s single mention, the testimony contains no reference to a 
private right of action or, in fact, any mention of the STPA at all.   
[¶23]  When the bill was presented to the voters by referendum, the 
ballot question was similarly focused on the broad policies at issue as applied 
to the widening of the Maine Turnpike; it asked, “Do you favor the changes in 
Maine Law concerning deauthorizing the widening of the Maine turnpike and 
establishing transportation policy proposed by citizen petition?”  G. William 
Diamond, Sec’y of State, Maine Citizen’s Guide to Upcoming Initiative, Bond 
Issues, and Proposed Constitutional Amendment (Citizen’s Guide) 3 (1991).     
                                         
expertise, and therefore we do not defer to the Department’s interpretation of the STPA on that 
subject.  See Kane v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2008 ME 185, ¶ 12, 960 A.2d 1196 
(stating that deference is afforded only as to matters not within this Court’s expertise); Nichols v. 
Cantara & Sons, 659 A.2d 258, 260-61 (Me. 1995) (holding that the calculation of a claim for loss of 
consortium is “not within the authority or traditional expertise of [the Workers’ Compensation] 
Board”). 
 
23 
[¶24]  The Citizen’s Guide to the 1991 referendum, published pursuant to 
1 M.R.S. § 353, also gave no hint that any private right of action would be 
created.  Like the Statement of Fact, the Citizen’s Guide stated that the bill would 
require the adoption of a new transportation policy, “repeal existing statutory 
authority to widen the Maine Turnpike,” require legislative approval of the 
Turnpike Authority’s budget, and require that surplus Turnpike Authority 
funds be transferred to the Department.  L.D. 719, Statement of Fact (referred 
to the voters, 115th Legis. 1991); Citizen’s Guide 12.   
[¶25]  Finally, although the STPA has undergone several amendments by 
the Legislature since 1991, in none of them has the Legislature made any 
adjustments indicating an intent to allow the enforcement of the STPA by 
implied private right of action.  See R.R. 1991, ch. 2, § 88; P.L. 2003, ch. 22, § 1 
(effective Sept. 13, 2003); P.L. 2007, ch. 470, § B-1 (effective June 30, 2008); 
P.L. 2011, ch. 610, §§ B-1, B-2 (effective Aug. 30, 2012); P.L. 2011, ch. 655, 
§§ JJ-9, JJ-41 (effective July 1, 2012); P.L. 2011, ch. 657, § W-5 (effective 
Aug. 30, 2012).   
[¶26]  These legislative history sources do not purport to set out the 
intent of all—or even most—of the citizens who voted to enact the STPA, but 
they do illuminate the context and substance of the statewide conversation that 
 
24 
culminated in the citizens’ enactment of the STPA in 1991.  See Brown, 
571 A.2d at 818 (adopting “a common sense view of the context in which the 
voters of Maine adopted [a provision]”).  The bulk of that conversation regarded 
the widening of the Maine Turnpike, indicating that the STPA was intended to 
reset the State’s broad transportation policy goals.  Citizen-initiated legislation 
must be interpreted liberally to effectuate its purpose, Opinion of the Justices, 
2017 ME 100, ¶ 59, 162 A.3d 188, but it should not be interpreted beyond the 
scope of the legislative intent underlying its enactment, League of Women 
Voters, 683 A.2d at 773 (“It is fundamental that we look to the purpose for 
which a law is enacted, and that we avoid a construction which leads to a result 
clearly not within the contemplation of the lawmaking body.” (quotation marks 
omitted)); see Kritz, 170 P.3d at 192 n.28 (“[T]o imply into statute what is not 
apparent on its face would be stepping over the line of interpretation and 
engaging in legislation.” (quotation marks omitted)).  None of these sources 
suggests that the legislative intent in enacting the STPA was to create an 
implied private right of action.   
[¶27]  We conclude that the STPA provides for no implied private right of 
action to allow enforcement of its terms and that the Superior Court committed 
 
25 
no error in entering a judgment on the pleadings as to Count 1 based on the 
nonjusticiability of the LLCs’ claim. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert S. Hark, Esq. (orally), Portland, and Peggy L. McGehee, Esq., and Lauren 
B. Weliver, Esq., Perkins Thompson, Portland, for appellants Wawenock, LLC, 
Bermuda Isles, LLC, 48 Federal Street LLC, and 32 Middle Street LLC 
 
Nathaniel M. Rosenblatt, Esq. (orally), and Kate J. Grossman, Esq., Farrell, 
Rosenblatt & Russell, Bangor, and James A. Billings, Esq., Maine Department of 
Transportation, Augusta, for appellee Department of Transportation 
 
 
Business and Consumer Docket docket number CV-2017-14 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY