Case Title: People v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County

Citation: 

Docket Number: S228642

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2017-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 2/16/17 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
 
 
) 
S228642 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/2 E061754 
THE SUPERIOR COURT  
) 
OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, 
) 
 
) 
San Bernardino County 
 
Respondent; 
) 
                                                                        ) 
Super. Ct. No. FVA015456 
JOHNNY MORALES,                                   ) 
                                                                        ) 
                     Real Party in Interest.                ) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Here we address whether a superior court has jurisdiction to grant a motion 
to preserve evidence relating to a capital case then pending review on automatic 
appeal to this court.  We conclude it does, limited to evidence potentially 
discoverable under Penal Code section 1054.9, which establishes a mechanism for 
postconviction discovery. 
Real party in interest Johnny Morales was sentenced to death in 2005; the 
State Public Defender (hereafter appellate counsel) has been appointed to 
represent him in his pending automatic appeal.  As a condemned prisoner, Morales 
is entitled to the appointment of habeas corpus counsel (Gov. Code, § 68662); 
owing to a shortage of qualified attorneys willing to accept appointment, however, 
habeas corpus counsel has not yet been appointed.  Appellate counsel‘s 
 
2 
responsibilities, as defined by the scope of her appointment, do not include the 
investigation and preparation of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, but—until 
habeas corpus counsel is appointed—do include ―preserv[ing] evidence that comes 
to the attention of appellate counsel if that evidence appears relevant to a potential 
habeas corpus investigation.‖  (Cal. Supreme Ct., Policies Regarding Cases 
Arising From Judgments of Death, policy 3, std. 1-1 (Policy 3).)   
As more fully described post, under Penal Code section 1054.9,1 enacted in 
2002, a defendant sentenced to death or life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole (LWOP) who is prosecuting a postconviction habeas corpus petition may 
seek discovery of ―materials in the possession of the prosecution and law 
enforcement authorities to which the same defendant would have been entitled at 
[the] time of trial.‖  (Pen. Code, § 1054.9, subd. (b); see In re Steele (2004) 32 
Cal.4th 682 (Steele).)  Here, appellate counsel filed in the superior court a ―Motion 
to Preserve Files, Records, Evidence and Other Items Related to Automatic 
Appeal,‖ citing in support her responsibilities under Policy 3 and Morales‘s rights 
under Penal Code section 1054.9.  Although the motion did not seek discovery 
under that statute as such (given that appellate counsel is not preparing a habeas 
                                              
1  
Penal Code section 1054.9 provides in relevant part:  ―(a) Upon the 
prosecution of a postconviction writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a 
judgment in a case in which a sentence of death or of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole has been imposed, and on a showing that good faith efforts to 
obtain discovery materials from trial counsel were made and were unsuccessful, 
the court shall, except as provided in subdivision (c), order that the defendant be 
provided reasonable access to any of the materials described in subdivision (b).  
[¶]  (b) For purposes of this section, ‗discovery materials‘ means materials in the 
possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities to which the same 
defendant would have been entitled at time of trial.‖  Subdivision (c) of Penal 
Code section 1054.9 addresses access to physical evidence for purposes of 
prosecuting a postconviction writ of habeas corpus or motion to vacate a 
judgment.   
 
3 
corpus petition), it did seek an order directing numerous law enforcement and 
social service agencies in San Bernardino County to preserve various categories of 
materials assertedly relevant to the investigation and prosecution of the case 
against Morales and comparable materials pertaining to other named individuals 
whose connection with Morales‘s case is not apparent on the face of the motion.  
The motion also sought preservation of materials apparently not within the scope 
of Penal Code section 1054.9, including an order directing (1) the San Bernardino 
County Jury Commissioner to preserve materials involving procedures and 
practices regarding the selection of jury venires in the years 2002 through 2004, 
(2) the San Bernardino County Indigent Defense Program to preserve materials 
pertaining to the procuring and awarding of contracts for the operation of the 
county‘s conflict panel between 2001 and 2004, and (3) the preservation of San 
Bernardino County Superior Court materials pertaining to the appointment of 
counsel for indigent defendants from 2001 to 2004.  The motion requested that the 
order remain in effect until either 30 days after execution of the death sentence or 
until destruction of the materials is approved by a court of competent jurisdiction 
after at least 90 days‘ written notice of any intention to allow such destruction has 
been provided to Morales, his counsel, the San Bernardino County District 
Attorney, and the Attorney General.  Finally, the motion sought an accounting, 
also not within the explicit scope of Penal Code section 1054.9, by the agencies 
named in the motion as to whether any of the materials sought ―are in the 
possession of any other governmental unit, entity, official, employee, or former 
employee and/or whether any of such material has been destroyed.‖ 
The District Attorney opposed the motion, contending it sought unauthorized 
postconviction discovery outside the court‘s jurisdiction to grant; the requested 
orders were unnecessary, overbroad, and onerous; the proposed expiration date of 
the preservation orders was unreasonable; and the request for an accounting of the 
 
4 
status of requested items was an improper discovery request, unauthorized by 
statute or case law.  
The superior court granted the motion in its entirety, observing that none of 
the entities served with the motion had filed opposition and reasoning that, as a 
matter of ―common sense,‖ unless the evidence is preserved, there will be nothing 
to discover under Penal Code section 1054.9.  
The Attorney General, on behalf of the People, filed a petition for writ of 
mandate asking the Court of Appeal to vacate the superior court‘s preservation 
order.  She argued that the superior court lacked authority to issue the order 
because judgment had been pronounced and there was no matter pending in the 
superior court to which jurisdiction for such an order could attach or, in the 
alternative, that even if the court had jurisdiction to enter a preservation order, the 
particular order exceeded its jurisdiction because it was not limited to materials for 
which Morales had a right to seek discovery under Penal Code section 1054.9.  
The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ, directing the superior court to 
vacate its preservation order and enter a new order denying the motion.  Morales‘s 
petition for review followed. 
Although the general rule is that a person seeking habeas corpus relief from a 
judgment of death is not entitled to postconviction discovery unless and until a 
court issues an order to show cause (Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 690; People v. 
Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1255–1261 (Gonzalez)), the Legislature has 
partially abrogated this rule by enacting Penal Code section 1054.9.  The statute 
creates a mechanism by which, as noted, a capital or LWOP prisoner prosecuting a 
habeas corpus petition can seek discovery of ―materials in the possession of the 
prosecution and law enforcement authorities to which the same defendant would 
have been entitled at [the] time of trial.‖  (Id., subd. (b).)   
 
5 
We enumerated the prerequisites to postconviction discovery under the 
statute in Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th 682.  The defendant must first make good faith 
efforts to obtain the materials from trial counsel, but the statute encompasses not 
only materials trial counsel actually possessed (but that have been lost for 
whatever reason) but also those ― ‗in the possession of the prosecution and law 
enforcement authorities to which the same defendant would have been entitled at 
[the] time of trial,‘ ‖ regardless of whether he or she specifically requested them.  
(Id. at p. 696, quoting Pen. Code, § 1054.9, subd. (b).)  That is, ―we interpret 
section 1054.9 to require the trial court, on a proper showing of a good faith effort 
to obtain the materials from trial counsel, to order discovery of specific materials 
currently in the possession of the prosecution or law enforcement authorities 
involved in the investigation or prosecution of the case that the defendant can 
show either (1) the prosecution did provide at [the] time of trial but have since 
become lost to the defendant; (2) the prosecution should have provided at [the] 
time of trial because they came within the scope of a discovery order the trial court 
actually issued at that time, a statutory duty to provide discovery, or the 
constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence; (3) the prosecution should 
have provided at time of trial because the defense specifically requested them at 
that time and was entitled to receive them; or (4) the prosecution had no obligation 
to provide at time of trial absent a specific defense request, but to which the 
defendant would have been entitled at time of trial had the defendant specifically 
requested them.‖  (Steele, supra, at p. 697.)   
―The discovery obligation . . . does not extend to all law enforcement 
authorities everywhere in the world but . . . only to law enforcement authorities 
who were involved in the investigation or prosecution of the case.‖  (Steele, supra, 
32 Cal.4th at p. 696.)  In other words, Penal Code ―[s]ection 1054.9, subdivision 
(b), should not be read as creating a broader postconviction discovery right‖ than 
 
6 
was operative at the time of trial.  (Steele, supra, at p. 696.)  Although we have 
said ―[t]he statute imposes no preservation duties that do not otherwise exist‖ and 
―does not impose a duty to search for or obtain materials not currently possessed‖ 
(id. at p. 695), the statute is silent regarding whether a court may order an entity 
possessing materials to which a defendant may be entitled under Penal Code 
section 1054.9 to preserve them pending the filing of an actual discovery motion 
under the statute. 
In granting the People‘s petition for relief from the preservation order, the 
Court of Appeal distinguished a motion seeking preservation of evidence, which it 
considered a species of discovery motion (see People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 
1183, 1257–1258 (Johnson) [―In requesting an order for preservation of the fruits 
of law enforcement and forensic investigations in the capital case . . . , defendant‘s 
motion essentially sought anticipatory postjudgment discovery‖]), from a motion 
under Penal Code section 1054.9.  Although it acknowledged there is no 
requirement a habeas corpus petition must have been filed at the time discovery 
under section 1054.9 is sought, it reasoned the superior court lacks jurisdiction to 
grant a motion for preservation when, in virtue of the appeal pending in this court, 
no criminal proceeding is then before it.  In support, the Court of Appeal cited 
Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at page 1257, which stated that ― ‗a discovery motion 
is not an independent right or remedy.  It is ancillary to an ongoing action or 
proceeding.  After the judgment has become final, there is nothing pending in the 
trial court to which a discovery motion may attach.‘ ‖  (See People v. Picklesimer 
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 337 [relief from mandatory sex offender registration based 
on long-final conviction must be sought by petition for writ of mandate].)  The 
court recognized that ―if Morales had chosen to proceed by filing a bare-bones 
habeas corpus petition, there would at least have been a proceeding to which his 
request could have attached, and the trial court could have reached the merits.‖  In 
 
7 
other words, the Court of Appeal concluded the preservation motion was actually 
a type of discovery motion falling outside the scope of Penal Code section 1054.9, 
and therefore the default rule of Gonzalez—there is no postconviction habeas 
corpus discovery before an order to show cause has issued—controlled. 
Although the Court of Appeal was correct as a general matter that a 
discovery motion is not an independent right or remedy but rather is ancillary to an 
ongoing action or proceeding, its analysis, as we shall explain, failed to give 
sufficient consideration to the provisions of Penal Code section 1054.9 and Code 
of Civil Procedure section 187.   
The Attorney General contends the superior court lacks jurisdiction under 
Code of Civil Procedure section 916, subdivision (a), to entertain preservation 
motions because such motions do not relate to any proceeding over which the 
court has jurisdiction, given the pendency of the death judgment on appeal.  When 
Gonzalez and Johnson were decided, no mechanism such as Penal Code section 
1054.9 existed for obtaining discovery as of right after a criminal judgment 
became final and before an order to show cause issued in a related habeas corpus 
proceeding.  Any motion seeking discovery, or preservation of evidence for future 
discovery, was ―free floating‖ in the sense it was untethered to any ongoing action 
or proceeding in the trial court or other matter ―embraced in the action and not 
affected by the judgment or order‖ (Code Civ. Proc., § 916, subd. (a) [stating 
exception to the automatic stay of proceedings in trial court upon perfecting an 
appeal]), and thus fell outside the limited scope of the trial court‘s jurisdiction 
while the appeal was pending.  This observation remains true, for, as we 
recognized in People v. Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, ―A 
habeas corpus matter has long been considered a separate matter from the criminal 
case itself,‖ and Penal Code section 1054.9 discovery is ―part of the prosecution of 
the habeas corpus matter, not part of the underlying criminal case.‖  (Pearson, 
 
8 
supra, at p. 572.)2  Similarly, Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at page 1258, 
characterized a motion to preserve evidence as one essentially seeking 
postconviction discovery and concluded it did not relate to the record correction 
proceedings pending in the trial court at the time of the motion.  (See ibid. [―The 
record correction proceedings pending before the trial court at the time of 
defendant‘s motion are not the type of proceeding that can support a request for 
discovery.‖].)   
Under current law, however, discovery is available as a matter of right under 
Penal Code section 1054.9, provided the motion satisfies the statutory 
requirements as explicated in Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at page 697.  The statute 
imposes no constraint on the timing of the motion, other than that it occur after 
sentencing and in the prosecution of a postconviction writ of habeas corpus; in 
Steele we declared, for practical reasons, that unless a movant‘s execution is 
imminent, the motion should be filed in the trial court.  (Id. at p. 692.)  
Consequently, the trial court in this case had jurisdiction to entertain a motion 
under section 1054.9, and Morales sought to invoke that jurisdiction with the filing 
of his preservation motion.  As noted, however, Morales has no habeas corpus 
counsel at present, and the filing of a motion seeking discovery under Penal Code 
section 1054.9 is outside the scope of appellate counsel‘s appointment; thus, when 
Morales may be in a position to file such a motion is unknown.  In the meantime, 
some of the evidence to which he would be entitled may be at risk of being lost, 
                                              
2  
Morales correctly points out that the issue before us in Pearson was the 
narrower question whether Penal Code section 1054.9 constituted an amendment 
to Proposition 115 (and thus subject to the latter‘s supermajority legislative vote 
requirement for amending the initiative‘s other criminal trial discovery 
provisions).  Pearson‘s observation that a habeas corpus matter is a separate 
proceeding from the criminal case to which it relates, however, remains valid.  
(See In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 645–646.) 
 
9 
which would render moot the trial court‘s power to grant discovery under Penal 
Code section 1054.9.   
Given the present statutory landscape, Morales contends the granting of a 
preservation motion falls within the trial court‘s inherent authority to carry out its 
Penal Code section 1054.9 postconviction discovery jurisdiction.  He reasons an 
evidence preservation order is a necessary means by which to carry out the court‘s 
jurisdiction to issue postconviction discovery orders under Penal Code section 
1054.9 and thus falls within the court‘s inherent power under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 187, which provides in relevant part that ―[w]hen jurisdiction is 
. . . by any . . . statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means 
necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this 
jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this 
Code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted 
which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this Code.‖  Courts have 
exercised inherent powers in ―situations in which the rights and powers of the 
parties have been established by substantive law or court order but workable 
means by which those rights may be enforced or powers implemented have not 
been granted by statute.‖  (Topa Ins. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies 
(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1344.)   
The Attorney General disputes this contention, arguing that the superior court 
lacks jurisdiction because Penal Code section 1054.9 does not explicitly authorize 
preservation orders and does not confer a right to a ―fishing expedition.‖  
According to the Attorney General, a court‘s inherent power under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 187 is limited to fashioning procedural rules in the absence of 
an established procedure, and Penal Code section 1054.9 already establishes the 
procedure governing postconviction discovery.  
 
10 
We find the Attorney General‘s interpretation of Code of Civil Procedure 
section 187 unduly narrow in this context.  Penal Code section 1054.9 authorizes 
the postconviction discovery motion procedure and describes the scope of 
available discovery, but does not speak to the situation in which a condemned 
prisoner who is otherwise entitled to seek discovery under the statute is 
temporarily prevented from doing so for lack of the appointment of habeas corpus 
counsel as guaranteed in Government Code section 68662.  We have previously 
described how a critical shortage of qualified attorneys willing to accept habeas 
corpus appointments resulted in delays in our meeting our responsibility to appoint 
counsel for condemned inmates like Morales and, in this compelling circumstance, 
we have adapted existing procedures to that regrettable reality.  (See In re Morgan 
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 932, 937–938 (Morgan).)3   
Thus, in Morgan, supra, 50 Cal.4th 932 and In re Zamudio Jimenez (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 951 (Zamudio Jimenez), we explained that, in order to preserve 
condemned inmates‘ ability to seek federal habeas corpus relief within the 
applicable one-year statute of limitations (see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)), we 
were recognizing an exception to the general rule that a habeas petitioner must 
raise all claims in a single, unamended petition.  This exception permits an 
unrepresented petitioner, or one whose habeas corpus counsel we appointed too 
late to enable him or her to prepare and timely file a reasonably thorough petition 
                                              
3  
Proposition 66, adopted by the electorate in the November 8, 2016 general 
election, amended Government Code section 68662 to shift responsibility for the 
appointment of capital habeas corpus counsel from this court to the superior court 
that imposed the death sentence.  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 
2016) text of Prop. 66, § 16, p. 217.)  We express no view regarding the effect of 
that enactment, regarding which a constitutional challenge is currently pending in 
this court (Briggs v. Brown, S238309, order to show cause issued Feb. 1, 2017), on 
the question before us. 
 
11 
raising all arguably meritorious claims, to file a cursory petition intended to be 
amended after an adequate opportunity for investigation and development of 
claims.  We then defer consideration of such a petition pending our appointment of 
habeas corpus counsel and the filing of an amended petition within the period of 
presumptive timeliness under our policies.  (Morgan, supra, at p. 942; Zamudio 
Jimenez, supra, at p. 959; see Policy 3.)  We were careful to note that the 
exception thus recognized did not alter the general requirement that a habeas 
corpus petitioner raise all claims in a single unamended petition.  (Zamudio 
Jimenez, supra, at p. 958, citing In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 781, 797.) 
Morgan and Zamudio Jimenez did not involve jurisdictional questions, and 
we therefore had no occasion to characterize our recognition of this exception as 
an exercise of our inherent authority under Code of Civil Procedure section 187.  
But these decisions reflect our recognition of the principle that our inability to 
timely appoint habeas corpus counsel in capital cases should not operate to deprive 
condemned inmates of a right otherwise available to them.  The same principle 
supports our view that trial courts, which have jurisdiction under Penal Code 
section 1054.9 to grant condemned inmates‘ motions for postconviction discovery, 
have the inherent power to protect that jurisdiction by entertaining motions for the 
preservation of evidence that will ultimately be subject to discovery under that 
statute when the movant is appointed habeas corpus counsel. 
Morales may be understood to argue that the enactment of Penal Code 
section 1054.9 operated more broadly to supersede the traditional rule, as stated in 
Gonzalez and Johnson, that discovery is unavailable in habeas corpus matters 
before the court has issued an order to show cause.  We are unpersuaded.  The 
statute carves out particular categories of material as subject to postconviction 
discovery, and nothing in its language or the legislative history suggests the 
 
12 
Legislature intended the statute to serve as a predicate for more wide-ranging 
postconviction discovery.   
Morales may further be understood to contend that this court‘s decisions in 
Townsel v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1084 and Varian Medical Systems, 
Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, undermined the holdings of Gonzalez and 
Johnson insofar as the latter decisions generally precluded postconviction 
discovery proceedings in the superior court pending appeal of the judgment.  Both 
Townsel and Varian, arising in non-discovery contexts, are founded on the 
premise that trial courts have jurisdiction to enter orders on matters ancillary or 
collateral to the judgment that do not interfere with the appellate court‘s 
jurisdiction by affecting the appeal or altering the judgment on appeal.  In Townsel 
we held that, while an automatic appeal of a death judgment is pending in this 
court, the trial court retains jurisdiction to enter orders governing appellate 
counsel‘s contact with trial jurors, reasoning that such orders, while embraced in 
the action, neither affect the judgment under appeal nor otherwise interfere with 
this court‘s appellate jurisdiction.  (Townsel, supra, at pp. 1089–1091.)  In Varian, 
we held that an appeal from the denial of a special motion to strike under the anti-
SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, effects an automatic stay, 
under Code of Civil Procedure section 916, subdivision (a), of proceedings on the 
merits of the complaint, inasmuch as a successful appeal of the motion would be 
irreconcilable with a judgment for the plaintiff on the merits of the claim if trial 
were allowed to proceed during the pendency of the appeal.  (Varian, supra, at 
p. 193.) 
Neither Townsel nor Varian affects our understanding of the scope of Penal 
Code section 1054.9 or Code of Civil Procedure section 187, or purports to change 
the general rule that for a trial court to retain jurisdiction to act in a matter that is 
then pending appellate review, the matter must be both embraced in the action and 
 
13 
unaffected by the judgment on appeal.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 916, subd. (a).)  As we 
have seen, postconviction discovery relating to the prosecution of a habeas corpus 
petition, as provided in Penal Code section 1054.9, is not embraced in the action 
that is pending appellate review because habeas corpus is a matter separate from 
the criminal case itself.  (See People v. Superior Court (Pearson), supra, 48 
Cal.4th at p. 572.)   
In sum, because the superior court has jurisdiction under Penal Code section 
1054.9 to grant postconviction discovery to the extent consistent with the statute, 
the court has the inherent power under Code of Civil Procedure section 187 to 
order preservation of evidence that would potentially be subject to such discovery.  
Questions as to whether a movant is actually entitled to discovery of the material 
to be preserved, including compliance with the procedural requirements of Penal 
Code section 1054.9, will await the eventual filing and determination of the 
postconviction discovery motion. 
Finally, to guide the lower courts on remand, we observe that the motion and 
related preservation order in this case appear to encompass materials beyond the 
scope of Penal Code section 1054.9.  The statute, as noted, provides for discovery 
of certain materials currently in the possession of the prosecution or law 
enforcement authorities involved in the investigation or prosecution of the case.  
(Pen. Code, § 1054.9, subd. (b); Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 697.)  It ―does not 
extend to all law enforcement authorities everywhere in the world but, we believe, 
only to law enforcement authorities who were involved in the investigation or 
prosecution of the case.‖  (Steele, supra, at p. 696.)  It also does not extend to 
judicial or other non-law-enforcement agencies, such as jury commissioners or 
indigent defense programs.  Nor does it specifically mandate that any agency 
within its scope provide an accounting as to whether the requested materials are in 
the possession of some other governmental unit, entity, official, or current or 
 
14 
former employee, or whether any of the requested material has been destroyed.  
An order purporting to require the preservation of materials beyond the scope of 
Penal Code section 1054.9 would thus exceed the trial court‘s jurisdiction on a 
motion to preserve evidence. 
 
15 
We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand to 
that court with directions to remand this matter to the superior court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.  
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Superior Court (Morales) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 239 Cal.App.4th 93 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S228642 
Date Filed: February 16, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: Ingrid Adamson Uhler 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Edward C. DuMont, State Solicitor General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. deNicola, Deputy 
State Solicitor General, Holy D. Wilkens and Michael T. Murphy, Deputy Attorney General, for Petitioner. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Michael J. Hersek and Mary K. McComb, State Public Defenders, Barry P. Helft, Chief Deputy State 
Public Defender, and C. Delaine Renard, Deputy State Public Defender, for Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Michael T. Murphy 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 645-3081 
 
C. Delaine Renard 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, Suite 1000 
Oakland, CA  94607 
(510) 267-3300