Case Title: EARLL v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
EARLL v. STATE2001 WY 6629 P.3d 787Case Number: 99-295Decided: 07/31/2001
 APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                            

                                                  HAWLEY 
A. EARLL,                                                     

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County

The 
Honorable John D. Troughton, Judge 

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia 
Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. 
Hughes, Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Ms. Hughes.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Cooley.

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

 

GOLDEN, 
J., delivers 
the opinion of the Court; HILL, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

  

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 [¶1]           
Appellant 
Hawley Anthony Earll, convicted as an accessory after the fact to the 
manufacture of methamphetamine in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-5-202(a)(b)(i) and § 35-7-1031(a)(i), contends that prosecutorial 
misconduct, a confrontation violation of the Sixth Amendment, and a violation of 
Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo. 1979), require that we reverse his 
conviction.  We hold that a 
reasonable possibility exists that the accused's right to a fair trial was 
affected by the error.  The 
conviction cannot stand, and we reverse and remand for a new trial.  

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
Earll 
presents the following issues for our review:

 

I.  Did the prosecutor commit prosecutorial 
misconduct in her cross examination of Appellant, wherein she referenced alleged 
statements of Appellant's girlfriend that were never made?

II.  Did the state's use of out of court 
statements of Appellant's girlfriend violate Appellant's Sixth Amendment right 
to confrontation?

III.  Did the trial court err in refusing to 
order a new trial?

IV.  Did the state's offer and the admission 
of testimony of Bunnie Larson and Samuel (Catfish) Yates that they were 
convicted of offenses arising out of the same circumstances leading to 
Appellant's trial, and the state's argument concerning those convictions, 
violate Appellant's right to have a trial on its own merits, constituting plain 
error?

 

 

The 
State rephrases the issues to be:

 

I.  Whether Appellant was denied a fair 
trial because of the prosecutor's improper questions?

II. 
Whether Appellant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was violated and 
whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for reconsideration 
on the issue?

III.  Whether the State improperly elicited 
testimony from Appellant's associates that they had been convicted of crimes 
similar to those for which Appellant was on trial?

 

  

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
On 
December 31, 1998, Earll was a passenger in a car driven by Samuel "Catfish" 
Yates.  Police suspected Yates of 
operating a methamphetamine lab in his trailer home and had him under 
surveillance.  The police knew that 
Yates had a suspended driver's license, and when he was observed driving away 
from the trailer, the police pulled his vehicle over. Yates was arrested at that 
time for driving with a suspended license and not possessing proof of insurance 
or registration.  Earll was not 
arrested.  Instead, the police 
warned Earll to avoid Yates and to stay away from the trailer because of the 
suspected drug activity. 

 

[¶4]           
Immediately 
after leaving Yates and the police, Earll returned to the trailer. Two 
individuals were at the trailer at that time:  Bunnie Larson, Yate's girlfriend, and 
Tracy Cox, Earll's girlfriend.  
Shortly thereafter, the police, who were still watching the trailer, 
observed Earll and the two women leave the trailer with several bags.  After loading the bags into a vehicle, 
the three attempted to drive off but the police quickly stopped them.  The vehicle's owner, Cox, gave the 
police permission to search the vehicle, and Larson gave permission to search 
her bags.  In a bag Earll had 
carried out of the trailer, the police found a Pyrex dish containing a fresh 
batch of methamphetamine.  Based on 
that discovery, Earll was arrested. 

 

[¶5]           
At his trial on 
the charge of accessory after the fact to the manufacture of methamphetamine, 
Earll's fate came down to a determination of his credibility versus Yates' and 
Larson's credibility. The State called both Yates and Larson as witnesses.  They testified that they had known Earll 
for several months and that he was aware of the existence of the methamphetamine 
lab.  Both stated that Earll had not 
only smoked some methamphetamine, but had purchased some, the morning of the 
arrests.  Larson testified that 
Earll had been the one who packed the bag containing the Pyrex dish.  

 

[¶6]           
Against 
that damaging testimony, Earll took the stand.  Earll claimed that Yates was only a 
casual acquaintance and that he was with them the day of the arrests only 
because a mutual friend had asked him to help Yates fix his car.  Earll denied any knowledge of the 
methamphetamine lab, let alone that he had smoked or purchased any that 
day.  Similarly, Earll denied that 
he had packed the bag, disclaiming all knowledge of its contents. He claimed 
that since Larson had three bags to carry, he was being a gentleman and carried 
the largest bag for her.  During the 
prosecutor's cross-examination of Earll, the prosecutor engaged in the following 
questioning which, the State concedes, misrepresented testimony by Earll's 
girlfriend, Tracy Cox, at an earlier hearing:

 

[Prosecutor]:  Tracy is your girlfriend, is that 
right?

 

[Earll]:  That's correct.

 

Q:  And you claim you didn't  how long have 
you been, I guess, with Tracy?

 

A:  Approximately, five 
years.

 

Q:  In fact, she was involved in this other 
crime with you; is that right?

 

A:  Yeah.  She kind of was a victim of it, 
yes.

 

Q:  She was convicted?

 

A:  Yes, of 
conspiracy.

 

Q:  Trust Tracy?

 

A:  Yeah, I have to.  I've been with her long 
enough.

 

Q:  Would it surprise you to know that Tracy 
in another court hearing has already told the Court under oath that you, in 
fact, did smoke methamphetamine with her and Catfish and Bunnie that morning on 
December 31?

 

A:  I don't know anything about that, 
no.

 

Q:  Would it surprise you?  Would you think she's lying, 
too?

 

A:  I  I would be surprised she would say 
something like that because it didn't happen.

 

Q:  So she must be lying, 
too?

 

A:  If she said that, I  I don't under  I 
don't know why she was 

 

[Defense 
Counsel]:  I object, your 
Honor.  I don't think she said 
that.  I think she admitted she, 
Tracy, smoked.  I don't think she 
said that [Earll] had smoked.

 

[Prosecutor]:  Yes, she did.

 

[Defense 
Counsel]:  I would like to see it in 
the transcript because I don't think she did and I was 
there.

 

Q:  Did you and Catfish 

 

[The 
Court]:  Are you two wanting to be 
placed under oath, both of you?

 

[Prosecutor]:  No, Judge.  We'll move on.

 

[The 
Court]:  If you want to give 
testimony, we'll put you both under oath and then I'll cross-examine you.  (Laughter.)

 

[Prosecutor]:  We'll move on.  

 

Six 
short questions later, this exchange occurred:

 

[Prosecutor]:  [Y]ou claim that you weren't smoking 
that morning, even though everyone else that was there says you 
were?

 

A:  That's right.  I was not.

 

Later, 
during closing argument, the prosecutor made the following 
statements:

 

The 
police asked [Earll] if he knew of anything funny going on in the trailer.  "Oh, no, huh-uh.  Don't know anything about drugs."  But the testimony was, folks, that he 
was smoking the methamphetamine that morning.  He was smoking it with his girlfriend, 
Tracy.  He was smoking it with 
Catfish.  And he was smoking it with 
Bunnie.  The only person that says 
he wasn't is the Defendant.  

 

 

[¶7]           
After a two-day 
trial, the jury rejected Earll's version of the events and returned a guilty 
verdict. Before sentencing, Earll filed a motion for a new trial based on the 
prosecutor's misrepresentation of the testimony of Tracy Cox at the earlier 
hearing and the prosecutor's reference to that testimony during closing 
argument.

 

[¶8]           
The 
trial court, while acknowledging that the prosecutor had indeed misrepresented 
Cox's testimony, nevertheless denied the motion on the grounds that the jury had 
been instructed at the beginning of trial and before deliberations after the 
close of evidence that comments of counsel regarding the alleged testimony were 
not evidence.  Subsequently, Earll 
filed a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion for a new trial in light 
of the decision in Lilly v. Virginia,  527 U.S. 116, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 144 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1999).   Earll claimed 
that, pursuant to Lilly, the misuse of Cox's testimony had violated his 
constitutional right to confrontation.  
After concluding that Earll had received a fair trial, the trial court 
denied the motion for reconsideration.  
Earll has now appealed.

 

DISCUSSION

 

Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

 

[¶9]           
Prosecutorial 
misconduct "has always been condemned in this state."  Valerio v. State, 527 P.2d 154, 
156 (Wyo. 1974).  Whether such 
misconduct has been reviewed on the basis of harmless error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and 
W.R.A.P. 9.04, or on the basis of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 
9.05, this Court has focused on whether such error, as the State concedes exists 
in this case, affected the accused's "substantial rights."  The accused's right to a fair trial is a 
substantial right. Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 6, 9, and 10; and see, e.g., Jones 
v. State, 580 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Wyo. 1978).  Before we hold that an error has 
affected an accused's substantial right, thus requiring reversal of a 
conviction, we must conclude that, based on the entire record, a reasonable 
possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have 
been more favorable to the accused.  
Jones v. State, 735 P.2d 699, 703 (Wyo. 1987).  We read this standard to be in 
consonance with the standard followed by the United States Supreme 
Court:

 

            
Some aids to right judgment may be stated more safely in negative than in 
affirmative form.  Thus, it is not 
the appellate court's function to determine guilt or innocence.  Nor is it to speculate upon probable 
reconviction and decide according to how the speculation comes out.  Appellate judges cannot escape such 
impressions.  But they may not make 
them sole criteria for reversal or affirmance.  Those judgments are exclusively for the 
jury, given always the necessary minimum evidence legally sufficient to sustain 
the conviction unaffected by the error.

 

            
But this does not mean that the appellate court can escape altogether 
taking account of the outcome.  To 
weigh the error's effect against the entire setting of the record without 
relation to the verdict or judgment would be almost to work in a vacuum.  In criminal causes that outcome is 
conviction.  This is different, or 
may be, from guilt in fact.  It is 
guilt in law, established by the judgment of laymen.  And the question is, not were they right 
in their judgment, regardless of the error or its effect upon the verdict.  It is rather what effect the error had 
or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury's decision.  The crucial thing is the impact of the 
thing done wrong on the minds of other men, not on one's own, in the total 
setting.

 

            
This must take account of what the error meant to them, not singled out 
and standing alone, but in relation to all else that happened.  And one must judge others' reactions not 
by his own, but with allowance for how others might react and not be regarded 
generally as acting without reason.  
This is the important difference, but one easy to ignore when the sense 
of guilt comes strongly from the record.

 

            
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did 
not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the 
judgment should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a 
constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress.  But if one cannot say, with fair 
assurance after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous 
action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the 
error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not 
affected.  The inquiry cannot be 
merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase 
affected by the error.  It is 
rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence.  If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, 
the conviction cannot stand.

 

Kotteakos 
v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 763-65, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1247-48, 90 L. Ed 1557 (1946) (citations and 
footnotes omitted); and see, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 
637, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1721, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993).

 

[¶10]       
The 
State concedes that "[r]eview of Tracy's trial transcript did, indeed, reveal 
that she had not testified the way the prosecutor said she had."  Moreover, the State concedes that the 
prosecutor's questioning was improper.  
In the post-trial hearing on the accused's motion for new trial based on 
the prosecutor's error, the trial court reviewed Cox's testimony and found that 
she had not testified as the prosecutor had represented to the accused and the 
jury during her cross-examination of the accused.  The trial court also candidly admitted 
that the prosecutor's closing argument reference about the accused's smoking 
methamphetamine that morning of the arrest "just went right by me.  I didn't even catch that."  Moreover, the trial court commented 
about the impropriety of the prosecutor's error in light of that court's 
awareness of a disturbing habit that lawyers practicing in that court's 
jurisdiction have.  The court 
remarked:

 

They ask 
improper impeachment questions.  
They ask questions such as, "Would it surprise you to know or to learn or 
to hear that a witness in another hearing has stated thus and such?"  And following it up with a question "And 
would that""and so would that person, other person, be lying 
then?"

 

            
That's not the way that it should be done. . . .

 

* * * 

            
[I]t's been something I've noticed in just about every trial I 
have.

 

* * * 

            
But I'm not going to try to teach them because they resent that."  

 

 

[¶11]       
The 
accused's counsel presented to the trial court the essence of his position, the 
fundamental unfairness of the prosecutor's telling, expressly and by innuendo, 
the jury the untruth that even the accused's trusted girlfriend testified 
contrary to the accused's version of the facts.  The trial court then expressed the 
dilemma, "And the Court can't know  one way or another can't know whether the 
jury thought that was significant or whether they didn't pay any attention to it 
at all."   In reply, the 
prosecutor maintained that the error did not affect a substantial right because 
Yates' and Larson's statements "were sufficient for the jury to believe or not 
believe Mr. Earll . . . when he took the stand and said, No, I wasn't doing 
it.'"  Concluding that the error did 
not affect the jury's verdict, the trial court denied the motion for a new 
trial.

 

[¶12]       
Applying 
either harmless error or plain error analysis, we have several concerns 
regarding the error in question given the quality of the prosecution's case 
against the accused.  One of our 
concerns is what we generally know about a jury's view of a prosecutor.  Jurors recognize the prosecutor's role 
as a leader of law enforcement in their community; they naturally regard the 
prosecutor as a symbol of authority; that recognition and regard may impress a 
jury, causing jurors to give significant weight to the words of a 
prosecutor.  United States v. 
Herberman, 583 F.2d 222, 230 (5th Cir. 1978); Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633, 79 L. Ed. 2d 1314 (1935); ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice Prosecution Function and Defense Function, 
Standard 3-5.8, commentary, at 107 (3d ed. 1993).

 

[¶13]       
Another 
of our concerns is the nature of the error in question.  Not only did the prosecutor misrepresent 
to the jury, as sworn testimony before the court, the testimony of the accused's 
trusted girlfriend in an effort to impeach the accused's testimony, but the 
prosecutor also declared to the jury the prosecutor's personal knowledge of that 
trusted girlfriend's sworn testimony.

 

[¶14]       
We 
consider these concerns in the context of the quality of the prosecution's case 
against the accused.  The State 
maintains, as the prosecutor did below, that this was not a particularly close 
case.  As the prosecutor explained 
to the trial court, Yates' and Larson's statements "were sufficient for the jury 
to believe or not believe Mr. Earll. . . ."  We disagree.  Yates was a five-time felon, and Larson 
was his girlfriend.  Both had 
benefited from plea bargains from the prosecutors.  According to the trial judge, Yates had 
received "about the sweetest deal of anybody  that anybody could have wanted." 
The trial judge had a particularly interesting view of Yates, which he shared 
with the jury after it had returned its verdict.  The trial judge 
observed:

 

I want 
you to know that I thought that Mr. Catfish was one of the worst individuals 
that's been in this courtroom in a long, long time.  A little more than a year ago, we had 
three individuals in this courtroom that were charged with the brutal murder of 
an eighteen year old girl.  With the 
exception of one of the four people who were charged with that crime, Mr. 
Catfish, in my opinion, was worse than any of those people.  That was one bad actor and he will 
remain a bad actor.  I just wanted 
to tell you folks what my opinion of that man was and is.  

 

 

[¶15]       
In this 
prosecution, the prosecutor pitted Yates' and Larson's word against the 
accused's.  The prosecutor's two 
star witnesses were vulnerable to impeachment because of their unsavory criminal 
history and the "sweet" plea bargains given them in exchange for their testimony 
against the accused.  To bolster 
their credibility in the eyes of the jurors, and consequently bolster the case 
against the accused, the prosecutor told the jurors that even the accused's 
trusted girlfriend, Tracy Cox, testified under oath that, despite the accused's 
denial, the accused smoked methamphetamine with the three of them on the morning 
in question, permitting the inference to be drawn that the accused knew about 
Yates' and Larson's methamphetamine operation.  The trouble was that was not 
true.

 

[¶16]       
The 
State urges us to take into consideration, and we have, the trial court's 
instruction to the jury both at the start of the trial and at the start of jury 
deliberation to disregard as evidence anything counsels say in the course of the 
trial; the presumption that jurors follow instructions; and the failure of the 
accused's counsel to request a curative instruction from the court and to make 
appropriate objections.  In the 
exercise of our judgment on this issue, we have weighed the nature and gravity 
of the error, the prosecutor's duty as the representative of a sovereignty to 
see that justice is done and refrain from improper methods, the confidence that 
the average juror has that the prosecutor will faithfully perform these duties, 
the quality of the prosecution's case, and the factors which the State urges 
upon us.  In the final analysis, we 
must judge the issuewhat the error meant to the jurors in relation to all else 
that happened.  We must judge 
others' reactions, not our own.  
"[I]mproper suggestions, insinuations and, especially, assertions of 
personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they 
should properly carry none."  
Berger, 295 U.S.  at 88, 55 S. Ct.  at 633.  

 

[¶17]       
From our 
careful examination of the record, we conclude that the case against the accused 
was not strong.  Earll was not 
convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine but rather only of being an accessory 
after the fact.  The main testimony 
against Earll came from Yates and Yates' girlfriend.  Yates had a long criminal record, was 
obviously of impeachable character given the trial judge's low opinion of him, 
and had received the "sweetest" deal ever seen by the trial judge.  Yates' girlfriend also benefited from a 
plea bargain.  The credibility of 
both witnesses was highly vulnerable to attack by the defense.  This case is properly characterized as 
weak.  We hold that in these 
circumstances unfair prejudice to the cause of the accused is so highly probable 
that we are not justified in assuming its nonexistence.  We cannot say, with fair assurance, that 
the jury's verdict against the accused was not substantially swayed by the 
error.  We hold that a reasonable 
possibility exists that the accused's right to a fair trial was affected by the 
error.  The conviction cannot stand, 
and we reverse and remand for a new trial.  
Because the accused's issues on the denial of new trial and Sixth 
Amendment confrontation are also based on the prosecutor's error, we need not 
consider them in light of our decision on this issue.

  

Testimony Regarding Witnesses' Guilty 
Pleas

 

[¶18]       
Earll 
contends that the prosecutor elicited testimony from Yates and Larson regarding 
guilty pleas which arose out of the events on the morning of December 31, 
1998.  He claims this contravened 
this Court's decision in Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo. 1979), and 
its progeny.  Earll also claims that 
the prejudice associated with the introduction of such testimony was exacerbated 
when the prosecutor's closing argument emphasized to the jury that Yates and 
Larson had taken their punishment.  
No objection was made to the testimony in question; thus, our review 
would be confined to a search for plain error which would be established 
if:

 

(1) the 
record clearly reflects the incidents urged as error; (2) appellant is able to 
demonstrate violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (3) it is 
shown that a substantial right of the appellant was materially 
abridged.

 

Capshaw 
v. State, 11 P.3d 905, 911 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Seymour v. State, 949 P.2d 881, 883 (Wyo. 
1997)).  Because we are reversing 
and remanding for new trial on other grounds, we need not decide this issue; 
however, we would refer the State and the accused to the discussions of this 
issue in Capshaw and Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 535-40 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

[¶19]       
"We have 
long held that when two persons are indicted for separate offenses growing out 
of the same circumstances, the fact that one has pleaded guilty is inadmissible 
against the other.'"  
Capshaw, 11 P.3d. at 911 (quoting Kwallek, 596 P.2d at 
1375).  As we recently noted, the 
rationale behind this rule was set forth many years ago by Mr. Justice 
Jackson:

 

It is 
difficult for the individual to make his own case stand on its own merits in the 
minds of jurors who are ready to believe that birds of a feather are flocked 
together.  If he is silent, he is 
taken to admit it and if, as often happens, co-defendants can be prodded into 
accusing or contradicting each other, they convict each 
other.

 

Krulewitch 
v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454, 69 S. Ct. 716, 723, 93 L. Ed. 790, 800 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
concurring in judgment and opinion); Capshaw, 11 P.3d  at 
912.

[¶20]       
In 
Mazurek, we set forth several nonexhaustive factors to be considered when 
evaluating whether there was prejudicial plain error at the trial level, 
including:

 

(1)       the degree 
to which the prosecutor's remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and 
prejudice the accused; 

(2)       whether the remarks 
were isolated or extensive;

(3) 
      the 
strength of competent proof to establish guilt, absent the remarks; 

(4) 
      whether the 
comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to 
extraneous matters; 

(5) 
      the 
presence or absence of a limiting instruction; 

(6) 
      whether 
there was a proper purpose for introducing the conviction; 

(7)       whether the 
conviction was improperly emphasized; 

(8) 
      whether the 
conviction was used as substantive evidence of guilt; 

(9) 
      whether the 
error was invited by defense counsel; 

(10) 
    whether the failure to 
object could have been the result of tactical decisions; and 

(11) 
    whether, in light of 
all the evidence, the error was harmless.   

 

Mazurek, 
10 P.3d  
at 539 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235, 241-42 
(4th Cir. 1993)).  

 

[¶21]       
We 
reverse and remand for new trial.

  

HILL, 
Justice, 
dissenting.

 [¶22]   A review of the record has 
convinced me that the prosecutor's misconduct was a small part of the trial and 
does not rise to the level of prejudice accorded by the majority.  Therefore, I must respectfully dissent 
from the reversal of the appellant's conviction.

 

[¶23]   In view of all of the evidence at 
trial, the one isolated exchange during cross-examination did not affect the 
outcome of the trial.  The jury was 
afforded the opportunity to see and hear Earll, as well as Catfish and Bunnie, 
and weigh for itself the respective credibility of each; warts, plea bargains 
and all.  The testimony from Catfish 
and Bunnie was that Earll had not only smoked methamphetamine that morning but 
also had, in fact, purchased a quantity of it from Catfish.  There was ample testimony that Earll was 
good friends with Catfish and was very familiar with the methamphetamine 
operations at the trailer, not to mention the fact that law enforcement 
personnel observed Earll transporting a bag containing methamphetamine.  In that light, the statements regarding 
Cox's alleged testimony were merely cumulative.

 

[¶24]   In addition to the testimony of 
Catfish and Bunnie, the jury was instructed regarding statements made by 
counsel. The prosecutor's misrepresentations were quickly countered and denied 
not only by defense counsel but also by the defendant himself.  The trial judge immediately made it 
clear that the comments were not evidence, as indicated by his intimations that 
if counsel wanted to continue, they would be put under oath.  Rather, the instruction given by the 
trial court was specifically created for situations such as this one.  In the absence of any evidence to the 
contrary, we should assume that the jury has the ability to follow instructions 
and does, in fact, abide by those instructions. 

 

[¶25]   Furthermore, the closing argument 
did not constitute misconduct.  The 
prosecutor's statement that Earll was the only person who said he had not smoked 
methamphetamine was true.  The other 
two witnesses to the events of that morning and who testified during the trial 
stated that Earll had indeed smoked methamphetamine that morning.  The prosecutor's statement does not 
mention any statements by Tracy Cox at all.  In fact, it is clear from the context of 
the quote that the prosecutor was referring to testimony given at the 
trial.  That was a permissible 
argument based on the evidence adduced at trial.

 

[¶26]   The gravity the majority applies to 
the prosecutorial misconduct is based largely on the conventional belief that a 
jury automatically views a prosecutor in a favorable light, thus heightening the 
possibility of prejudice arising from perceived prosecutorial misconduct.  In view of some recent cases before 
national audiences, it may be that such conventional wisdom is open to 
reconsideration.

 

[¶27]   But assuming for the sake of this 
opinion that a jury will bring a certain regard for the prosecutor to the 
beginning of a trial, surely no one believes that such regard is immune to 
attack or erosion during the course of a trial.

 

[¶28]   Here, as soon as the prosecutor's 
misstatement was made, both the defense counsel and the defendant himself 
vigorously contradicted it.  The 
trial court immediately corrected, one might say ridiculed, counsel, eliciting 
laughter from the jury.  Later, 
after instructing the jury as to how to view the prosecutor's statements, the 
trial court saw fit to comment on the sins of prosecutors, generally.  Under these circumstances, given this 
climate, any exalted position afforded this prosecutor most certainly was 
destroyed.  Yet, the jury weighed 
all that it had heard and seen and returned a conviction.

 

[¶29]   Under these circumstances, viewing 
the trial record in its entirety, I can only conclude that the prosecutor's 
misuse of Tracy Cox's alleged testimony did not constitute substantial prejudice 
depriving Earll of a fair trial, and that Earll was convicted in spite of 
prosecutorial misconduct and the fallout it generated, not because of it.  I would affirm the 
conviction.