Case Title: State v. Evans

Citation: 2009-Ohio-2974

Docket Number: 20080363

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Evans, 122 Ohio St.3d 381, 2009-Ohio-2974.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. EVANS, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Evans, 122 Ohio St.3d 381, 2009-Ohio-2974.] 
Criminal law — Lesser included offenses — Robbery — R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) and 
2911.01(A)(1). 
(No. 2008-0363 — Submitted January 21, 2009 — Decided July 7, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 89057,  
2008-Ohio-139. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  Robbery as defined in R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) is a lesser included offense of 
aggravated robbery as defined in R.C. 2911.01(A)(1). 
2.  In determining whether an offense is a lesser included offense of another, a 
court shall consider whether one offense carries a greater penalty than the 
other, whether some element of the greater offense is not required to prove 
commission of the lesser offense, and whether the greater offense as 
statutorily defined cannot be committed without the lesser offense as 
statutorily defined also being committed. (State v. Deem (1988), 40 Ohio 
St.3d 205, 533 N.E. 2d 294, clarified.) 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} In this matter, we are called upon to determine whether robbery is 
a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery.  In resolving that issue, it is 
necessary to revisit the test for lesser included offenses set forth in State v. Deem 
(1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 294. 
{¶ 2} On November 18, 2005, Catrice Stewart drove to the Collinwood 
Village Food Mart on St. Clair Avenue at London Road, in Cleveland, Ohio.  
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After she parked her car and began walking toward the store, Timothy Evans 
approached her from behind, grabbed her purse, and yelled, “Give me this purse, 
bitch,” and upon her resistance, he declared, “I’ve got a gun,” moving his hand as 
if to reach for something.  Stewart then replied, “Well, you know what?  You’re 
going to have to use it,” and began to kick and fight him.  Although Evans 
repeated several times that he had a gun, Stewart stated that she never saw it.  
Observing the struggle, a nearby driver sounded her horn.  That noise and 
Stewart’s resistance caused Evans to flee without Stewart’s purse.  Police 
responded, but were unable to apprehend Evans that night. 
{¶ 3} About two months later, Stewart saw Evans walking down the 
street and recognized him as the man who had tried to take her purse.  She called 
police, who arrested Evans.  A Cuyahoga County grand jury indicted Evans on 
one count of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), stating that 
he “did, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in Section 2913.01 
of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense upon 
Catrice Stewart have a deadly weapon to-wit:  gun, on or about his person or 
under his control and either displayed the weapon, brandished it, indicated that he 
possessed it, or used it.” 
{¶ 4} Evans waived the right to a jury, and at the bench trial, the court 
granted his Crim.R. 29 motion with respect to the aggravated robbery charge, 
finding that the state had not presented sufficient evidence to prove that Evans 
had a weapon on his person when he committed the offense; however, the court 
found him guilty of robbery as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. 
{¶ 5} Evans appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, arguing 
that his conviction for the unindicted offense of robbery was unconstitutional 
because robbery is not a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery.  Applying 
the test for lesser included offenses set forth in State v. Deem (1988), 40 Ohio 
St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 294, the appellate court determined that robbery is not a 
January Term, 2009 
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lesser included offense of aggravated robbery, because robbery includes an 
element that aggravated robbery does not – inflicting, attempting to inflict, or 
threatening to inflict physical harm. Concluding that the facts necessary to support 
this element of robbery were not presented to the grand jury, the court reversed 
Evans’s robbery conviction as plain error. 
{¶ 6} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal to consider whether 
robbery is a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery and to clarify the 
criteria for determining whether one offense is a lesser included offense of 
another.  For the reasons that follow, robbery as defined in R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) is 
a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery as defined in  R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), 
and, having reviewed Deem, we modify the second part of the lesser included 
offense analysis to delete the word “ever,” to clarify its application in future 
cases. 
The Deem Test 
{¶ 7} Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides that “no 
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous, crime, unless 
on presentment or indictment of a grand jury * * *.”  We have long recognized 
that “[t]his provision guarantees the accused that the essential facts constituting 
the offense for which he is tried will be found in the indictment of the grand jury.”    
State v. Headley (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 478, 6 OBR 526, 453 N.E.2d 716, 
citing Harris v. State (1932), 125 Ohio St. 257, 181 N.E. 104.  An indictment will 
satisfy this constitutional requirement if it, “ ‘first, contains the elements of the 
offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he 
must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of 
future prosecutions for the same offense.’ ”  State v. Childs (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 
558, 565, 728 N.E.2d 379, quoting Hamling v. United States (1974), 418 U.S. 87, 
117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590. 
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{¶ 8} We also recognize, however, that R.C. 2945.74 provides that a 
criminal defendant may be found guilty of a lesser included offense even though 
the lesser offense was not separately charged in the indictment.  Lesser included 
offenses need not be separately charged in an indictment, because when an 
indictment charges a greater offense, it “ ‘necessarily and simultaneously charges 
the defendant with lesser included offenses as well.’ ”  State v. Smith, 121 Ohio 
St.3d 409, 2009-Ohio-787, 905 N.E.2d 151, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Lytle (1990), 49 
Ohio St.3d 154, 157, 551 N.E.2d 950.  Thus, a conviction for a lesser included 
offense does not deprive an offender of his constitutional right to presentment or 
indictment by the grand jury, because by indicting the offender for the greater 
offense, the jury has necessarily considered each of the essential elements of the 
lesser offense. 
{¶ 9} In Deem, this court established a three-part test for courts to use to 
determine whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another, stating:  
“An offense may be a lesser included offense of another if (i) the offense carries a 
lesser penalty than the other; (ii) the greater offense cannot, as statutorily defined, 
ever be committed without the lesser offense, as statutorily defined, also being 
committed; and (iii) some element of the greater offense is not required to prove 
the commission of the lesser offense.”  Deem, 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 
294, at paragraph three of the syllabus.  We clarified the Deem test in State v. 
Smith, 117 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-1260, 884 N.E.2d 595, and held that when 
a statute sets forth mutually exclusive ways of committing the greater offense 
(e.g., where one element of the offense can be satisfied by proving either that the 
defendant actually committed another offense or attempted to commit it), a court 
is required to apply the second part of the Deem test separately to each alternate 
method of committing the greater offense.  Smith, at paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  Following that clarification, we determined that the crime of theft – 
depriving an owner of property without consent – was a lesser included offense of 
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robbery – causing harm to another while attempting, committing, or fleeing after a 
theft offense.  Id. at ¶ 29.  There, because the trial court had found that the state 
had not proven the harm element beyond a reasonable doubt but had found that all 
elements of theft had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, we determined that 
Smith’s conviction for the lesser included offense of theft was proper.  Id. at ¶ 5, 
30. 
{¶ 10} In the instant case, we observe that the first part of the Deem test 
requires a review of penalties, and we note that aggravated robbery carries a 
greater penalty than robbery; next, pursuant to the third part of the Deem test, we 
examine the elements of the offenses and note that aggravated robbery as defined 
in R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) contains an element – possession of a deadly weapon – that 
robbery does not.  Thus, our analysis here focuses again on the troublesome 
second part of the Deem test, which requires that “the greater offense cannot, as 
statutorily defined, ever be committed without the lesser offense, as statutorily 
defined, also being committed.” (Emphasis added.)  Deem, at paragraph three of 
the syllabus. 
{¶ 11} The state contends that the strict comparison of elements required 
by the second part of the Deem test has produced incongruous and illogical results 
that fail to hold criminal defendants accountable for crimes in the absence of 
specific indictments for each related offense.  The state urges us to modify the 
second part of the Deem test to permit courts to consider the particular facts and 
circumstances of each case in determining whether one offense is a lesser 
included offense of another, or to consider whether “the offenses are so similar 
that the commission of one offense will necessarily result in commission of the 
other,” as we have done in our analogous test for allied offenses of similar import.  
See State v. Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625, 886 N.E.2d 181, 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
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{¶ 12} On the other hand, Evans contends that adoption of the state’s fact-
based approach will impinge upon a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to a 
grand jury indictment, permitting convictions for offenses that were either 
considered and rejected or never even contemplated by the grand jury.  He asserts 
that the state’s proposed test would create uncertainty for prosecutors, defendants, 
and the courts by making it impossible to predict, before trial, what lesser 
included offenses would be at issue.  In addition, Evans argues that because we 
have previously held that robbery is not a lesser included offense of aggravated 
robbery, applying a contrary ruling would violate his due process rights. 
{¶ 13} We have consistently held that in applying Deem to lesser included 
offenses, “ ‘ “ ‘the evidence presented in a particular case is irrelevant to the 
determination of whether an offense, as statutorily defined, is necessarily included 
in a greater offense.’ ’’ ’ ” Smith, 117 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-1260, 884 
N.E.2d 595, ¶ 9, quoting Shaker Hts. v. Mosely, 113 Ohio St.3d 329, 2007-Ohio-
2072, 865 N.E.2d 859, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Barnes (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 26, 
759 N.E.2d 1240, quoting State v. Kidder, 32 Ohio St.3d 279, 282, 513 N.E.2d 
311; see also State v. Koss (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 213, 218-219, 551 N.E.2d 970.  
Indeed, in Barnes, we rejected the state’s request that we consider the specific 
facts of the case in determining whether felonious assault with a deadly weapon 
was a lesser included offense of attempted murder.  Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d at 26.  
But we note that the facts of a case are relevant in determining whether a court 
should instruct the jury on a lesser included offense.  Specifically, we have stated 
that after the three parts of the Deem test are met, “[i]f the evidence is such that a 
jury could reasonably find the defendant not guilty of the charged offense, but 
could convict the defendant of the lesser included offense, then the judge should 
instruct the jury on the lesser included offense.”  Shaker Hts. v. Mosely at ¶ 11, 
citing State v. Shane (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 632-633, 590 N.E.2d 272.  See 
also State v. Thomas, 40 Ohio St.3d at 216, 533 N.E.2d 286; Kidder, 32 Ohio 
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St.3d at 282-283, 513 N.E.2d 311.  Based upon the foregoing, we decline the 
state’s invitation to abandon our precedent in this regard. 
Robbery as a Lesser Included Offense of Aggravated Robbery 
{¶ 14} The second step of the Deem test requires a court to examine the 
statutory elements of the two offenses.  Here, we consider whether aggravated 
robbery as defined in R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) can ever be committed without also 
committing robbery as defined in R.C. 2911.02(A)(2). 
{¶ 15} R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) defines one way to commit the crime of 
aggravated robbery:   
{¶ 16} “(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as 
defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after 
the attempt or offense, shall do any of the following: 
{¶ 17} “(1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or 
under the offender's control and either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate 
that the offender possesses it, or use it.” 
{¶ 18} R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) defines one way to commit the crime of 
robbery: 
{¶ 19} “(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense or in 
fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense, shall do any of the following: 
{¶ 20} “* * * 
{¶ 21} “(2) Inflict, attempt to inflict, or threaten to inflict physical harm 
on another.” 
{¶ 22} Thus, in determining whether robbery is a lesser included offense 
of aggravated robbery, we are called on to consider whether displaying, 
brandishing, indicating possession, or using a deadly weapon in the attempted 
commission of a theft offense is also a threat to inflict physical harm as defined in 
R.C. 2911.02(A)(2).  While these elements are not identically phrased, we have 
recognized:  “This test is not a word game to be performed by rote by matching 
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the words chosen by the legislature to define criminal offenses.  Some offenses, 
such as aggravated murder and murder, lend themselves to such a simple 
matching test; others do not. * * * We would also note that the elements of the 
offenses are ‘matched’ only in part (iii) of the test to determine if ‘some element’ 
of the greater offense is not found in the lesser offense.  The proper overall focus 
is on the nature and circumstances of the offenses as defined, rather than on the 
precise words used to define them.”  State v. Thomas, 40 Ohio St.3d 213 at 216-
217, 533 N.E.2d 286.  Thus, the test does not require identical language to define 
the two offenses, but focuses upon whether the words used in the statute defining 
the greater offense will put the offender on notice that an indictment for that 
offense could also result in the prosecution of the lesser included offense. 
{¶ 23} Robbery as defined in the instant case requires the state to prove a 
threat to inflict physical harm.  R.C. 2911.02(A)(2).  However, “the threat of 
physical harm need not be explicit; rather, an implied threat of physical harm is 
sufficient to support a conviction under R.C. 2911.02(A)(2).”  State v. Harris, 
Franklin App. No. 07-AP137, 2008-Ohio-27, at ¶ 14; State v. Exum, Franklin 
App. No. 05AP-894, 2007-Ohio-2648, at ¶ 31; State v. Ellis, Franklin App. No. 
05AP-800, 2006-Ohio-4231, at ¶ 7.  One cannot display, brandish, indicate 
possession of, or use a deadly weapon in the context of committing a theft offense 
without conveying an implied threat to inflict physical harm.  It is the very act of 
displaying, brandishing, indicating possession, or using the weapon that 
constitutes the threat to inflict harm because it intimidates the victim into 
complying with the command to relinquish property without consent. 
{¶ 24} Despite making the statement to Stewart “I have a gun” as he tried 
to take her purse, Evans now argues that a person can indicate possession of a 
deadly weapon without implying a threat to inflict physical harm, for example, by 
purchasing a hunting knife in a hardware or sporting goods store as he 
simultaneously shoplifts a bag of nails by placing them in his pocket.  This 
January Term, 2009 
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argument is not well taken.  In State v. Winn, 121 Ohio St.3d 413, 2009-Ohio-
1059, 905 N.E.2d 154, ¶ 24, we rejected similarly implausible examples advanced 
in the context of an allied offense analysis, stating that they “lapse into the strict 
textual comparison” that this court has previously rejected.  Having previously 
rejected such strict textual comparison in the context of the Deem lesser included 
offense analysis, emphasizing that a court should focus “on the nature and 
circumstances of the offenses as defined, rather than on the precise words used to 
define them,” we now reject the implausible scenario advanced by Evans in this 
case.  Thomas, 40 Ohio St.3d at 217, 533 N.E.2d 286. 
{¶ 25} Moreover, to ensure that such implausible scenarios will not derail 
a proper lesser included offense analysis, we further clarify the second part of the 
Deem test to delete the word “ever.”   This clarification does not modify the Deem 
test, but rather eliminates the implausible scenarios advanced by parties to suggest 
the remote possibility that one offense could conceivably be committed without 
the other also being committed.  Deem requires a comparison of the elements of 
the respective offenses in the abstract to determine whether one element is the 
functional equivalent of the other.  If so, and if the other parts of the test are met, 
one offense is a lesser included offense of the other. 
{¶ 26} Thus, in determining whether an offense is a lesser included 
offense of another, a court shall consider whether one offense carries a greater 
penalty than the other, whether some element of the greater offense is not required 
to prove commission of the lesser offense, and whether the greater offense as 
statutorily defined cannot be committed without the lesser offense as statutorily 
defined also being committed. 
{¶ 27} As this clarification of Deem relates to the offenses of aggravated 
robbery and robbery as defined in this case, to establish aggravated robbery, the 
state carries the burden to prove that Evans had a deadly weapon and indicated his 
possession of it; and to establish robbery, the state must prove a threat to inflict 
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physical harm on the victim.  Indicating possession of a deadly weapon 
constitutes an implied threat to inflict physical harm because it intimidates a 
victim and is designed to compel relinquishment of property without consent.  
Therefore, an element-to-element comparison reveals an equivalence between 
indicating possession of a deadly weapon in order to compel compliance with a 
demand for property and an implied threat to inflict physical harm.  Thus, 
aggravated robbery as statutorily defined in this case cannot be committed 
without also committing the offense of robbery.  Accordingly, robbery as defined 
in R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) is a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery as 
defined in R.C. 2911.01(A)(1). 
{¶ 28} In State v. Harris, 122 Ohio St.3d 373, 2009-Ohio-3323, __ N.E.2d 
__, we held that aggravated robbery and robbery are allied offenses of similar 
import; we now conclude that robbery is a lesser included offense of aggravated 
robbery.  These holdings are neither inconsistent nor mutually exclusive.  Other 
courts have considered whether two offenses can be both allied offenses of similar 
import and lesser included offenses. 
{¶ 29} In State v. Harris (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 257, 258, 12 O.O.3d 265, 
389 N.E.2d 1121, we noted that “it appears that the statutory definition of 
robbery, when applied to the routine facts of this cause, is sufficiently 
comprehensive to embrace grand theft either as an allied offense of similar import 
(R.C. 2941.25) or as a lesser included offense (R.C. 2943.09).”  Because the 
grand theft conviction did not require proof of any element not also required to 
prove the robbery conviction, we held that they were the same offense for 
purposes of double jeopardy and vacated the defendant’s grand theft conviction. 
{¶ 30} In State v. Johnson (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 420, 424, 6 OBR 466, 453 
N.E.2d 595, we held that involuntary manslaughter and murder are allied offenses 
of similar import, and in State v. Thomas, 40 Ohio St.3d at 215, 533 N.E.2d 286, 
that involuntary manslaughter is also a lesser included offense of murder.  More 
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recently, in State v. Hooper, Columbiana App. No.  03 CO 30, 2005-Ohio-7084, 
at ¶ 16, the Seventh District Court of Appeals stated, “Appellant is correct that 
gross sexual imposition (R.C. § 2907.05) is both a lesser included offense and an 
allied offense of similar import of rape (R.C. § 2907.02).”  Id., citing State v. 
Johnson (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 224, 522 N.E.2d 1082, and State v. Abi-Sarkis 
(1988), 41 Ohio App.3d 333, 336, 535 N.E.2d 745.  The court did not express any 
concern with one of the offenses being a lesser included offense and both offenses 
being allied offenses to each other.  However, the court rejected Hooper’s 
argument that he could not be separately punished for gross sexual imposition 
simply because it is an allied offense to or a lesser included offense of rape, 
because “[t]here is no statutory or constitutional prohibition against imposing 
separate punishments for allied offenses or lesser included offenses if they are 
committed independently or with a separate animus.”  Id. at ¶ 19, citing R.C. 
2941.25(B), and State v. Gopp, 154 Ohio App.3d 385, 2003-Ohio-4908, 797 
N.E.2d 531, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 31} In State v. Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625, 886 
N.E.2d 181, paragraph one of the syllabus, we explained that there need not be an 
“exact alignment” of the elements for two offenses to be allied offenses but that 
“if, in comparing the elements of the offenses in the abstract, the offenses are so 
similar that the commission of one offense will necessarily result in commission 
of the other, then the offenses are allied offenses of similar import.”  This allied 
offenses test corresponds to step two of the Deem test which, as clarified, states 
“whether the greater offense as statutorily defined cannot be committed without 
the lesser offense also being committed.”  Thus, application of the Cabrales test 
for allied offenses and the Deem test for lesser included offenses suggests that a 
lesser included offense will always be an allied offense, although an allied offense 
may not necessarily be a lesser included offense, because a lesser included 
offense must also satisfy the first and third steps of Deem. 
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{¶ 32} We also reject Evans’s contention that our application of this 
holding to his case will deprive him of a constitutional right to due process.  The 
United States Supreme Court has held that a judicial alteration of criminal law 
violates the principle of fair warning and must not be given retroactive effect only 
when it is “ ‘unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been 
expressed prior to the conduct in issue.’ ”  Rogers v. Tennessee (2001), 532 U.S. 
451, 462, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697, quoting Hall, General Principles of 
Criminal Law (2d Ed.1960), 61. 
{¶ 33} Despite this assertion by Evans, our decision in State v. 
Merriweather (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 57, 18 O.O.3d 259, 413 N.E.2d 790, holding 
that robbery was not a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery under an 
earlier version of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), does not render our holding today either 
unexpected or indefensible by reference to law expressed prior to the commission 
of Evans’s offense.  Merriweather involved a different statute that required the 
state to prove only that the offender had a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance 
on or about his person or under his control while attempting or committing a theft 
offense.  1972 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1922.  In contrast, 
the current version requires the state to prove that the offender possessed a deadly 
weapon or dangerous ordnance and that he either displayed it, brandished it, 
indicated that he possessed it, or used it in attempting or committing a theft 
offense.  Therefore, Merriweather does not apply here.  Furthermore, we adopted 
the Deem test for lesser included offenses, which forms the basis for our decision 
today, in 1988 – well before Evans’s 2005 offense.  Therefore, applying our 
holding to Evans does not violate due process.  We reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals and reinstate this conviction. 
Judgment reversed. 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and LANZINGER, JJ., 
concur. 
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PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment. 
CUPP, J., concurs in judgment and the first paragraph of the syllabus. 
__________________ 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Matthew 
E. Meyer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and David M. King 
and John T. Martin, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellee. 
__________________