Case Title: APPEAL OF PARADISE VALLEY COUNTRY CLUB

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87-79

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-01-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
APPEAL OF PARADISE VALLEY COUNTRY CLUB1988 WY 3748 P.2d 298Case Number: 87-79Decided: 01/11/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
APPEAL OF PARADISE VALLEY COUNTRY CLUB FROM THE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION 
1983, 1984, AND 1985 TAX ASSESSMENTS.

PARADISE VALLEY COUNTRY CLUB, 
APPELLANT (PETITIONER),

v.

WYOMING STATE BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, APPELLEE (RESPONDENT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Jeffrey C. 
Gosman, Casper, 
for appellant. 

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., Robert J. Walters, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., for 
appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and 
MACY, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     We are presented with a 
real estate tax reassessment for a private golf club raising issues of the 
process used, the amount of increase of 2200 percent, and the denial of any 
protest hearing. Equality and fairness issues of a constitutional perspective 
were included in the various challenges made to the reassessment and tax 
increase. We remand on a procedural basis for the taxpayer to be provided a 
hearing.

ISSUES 
PRESENTED

1. Reassessment without 
notice violates due process under Art. 1, § 6, Wyoming Constitution and the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution - constitutional 
issue.

2. Illegality of the tax 
assessed and levied for 1984 in process and application - statutory and 
procedural issue.

3. The district court, in 
denial decision following administrative agency appeal from the state board of 
equalization, rejected the tax challenge as insufficiently documented in initial 
protest petition - form of the protest issue.

[¶2.]     We will avoid direct 
consideration of Issue 1 by reversing and remanding for a hearing on Issue 2, 
and will summarily dispose of Issue 3.

[¶3.]     
FACTS

[¶4.]     In 1983, Paradise 
Valley Golf and Country Club, Inc. (ParadiseValley) paid $4,738 in ad valorem taxes 
for the club property, based on an adjusted tax base valuation of $58,315. A 
similar assessment level was continued for the 1984 year, until in August, by 
reassessment, the base value before real-property tax-ratio allocation was 
increased from $271,583 to $3,394,787. At the same time, no similar assessment 
increase was made for the neighboring Casper Country Club golf course 
properties. As well as general invalidity, appellant ParadiseValley contended that the taxation 
differential between the two clubs was ten times, or about 1000 percent, 
although the intrinsic real estate value of the Casper Country Club properties 
was likely higher than that of appellant taxpayer.1

[¶5.]     The discriminatory 
feature of the tax assessment is not really in doubt on this record, but rather 
it is the procedure which circumscribes our review. The result actually arose 
from the county assessor's reassessment use of a commercial square-footage 
appraisal for the ParadiseValley golf grounds, as compared to an 
agricultural land basis for the comparable properties of the Casper Country 
Club.

[¶6.]     In contesting the 
evidentiary status of the tax bills, the State presented no record or 
documentation showing a regularly used system either at the county hearing or in 
the state tax commission proceedings, except that after the conclusion of the 
state proceedings there was a late-filed affidavit of the county assessor. This 
instrument furnished no facts, justification, or cogent reasoning for the 
discrimination between the Casper Country Club and ParadiseValley, or for assessing a golf course on 
a square-footage valuation basis. SeeTetonValley Ranch v. State Board of Equalization, 
Wyo., 735 P.2d 107 (1987).2 

[¶7.]     The regular assessment 
initially certified for the tax rolls in 1984 was about the same as for 1983. In 
August, the property was reassessed, and notice of the reassessment and 
increased tax was first received by an amended tax bill dated October 23, 
1984.

[¶8.]     Assessment for 1985 was 
similar in amount to the 1984 revised value, and by notice of appeal filed May 
16, 1985, ParadiseValley protested the 
increased assessments for both the 1984 and 1985 tax years. Taken first to the 
Natrona County Commissioners as ex officio county board of equalization pursuant 
to § 39-2-302, W.S. 1977, the protests to the increased assessments were 
summarily denied (although somewhat reduced) on June 10, 1985, by board action 
as reflected by the minutes:

"Jeffrey Gosman was 
present to protest the 1984-85 tax assessment notice for Paradise Valley Golf 
and Country Club, Inc. Mr. Gosman represented Mr. Deal Hembree, President of 
Paradise Valley Golf and Country Club.

"Mr. Gosman stated the 
tax assessment is inordinately high, and cannot be supported upon any rational 
formula representing the fair value of the property being taxed. He pointed to 
the fact the State Board requires that all taxation be uniform and equal in 
application. Casper Country Club has 40 acres more land, much of which is prime 
development real estate. The Paradise Valley Golf and Country Club is 
land-locked and cannot realistically be used for any other purpose than a golf 
course.

"Mr. Gosman requested to 
be taxed at the same rate of increase experienced by the Casper Country Club or 
upon some other basis whereby the actual value of the property is more 
realistically assessed.

"Assessor Maria Boling 
stated the property was designated commercial property. The course in ParadiseValley is platted land. Assessor Boling 
requested an appraisal of the property or a breakdown of square footage that the 
building, and parking lot comprise. This property could be assessed as 
commercial 5 [cents] per square foot, and remaining property 2 [cents] or 3 
[cents] per square foot noncommercial rate.

"It was moved by 
Commissioner Schulte, seconded by Commissioner Ellis to assess the Paradise 
Valley Golf and Country Club building site and surrounding footage as commercial 
at five [cents] per square foot, and the remaining land at noncommercial rate 2 
[cents] or 3 [cents] per square foot as recommended by Assessor Boling. Motion 
carried."

[¶9.]     By assessing the 
ParadiseValley golf course land as 
"commercial" or "platted," the property was initially valued at about 100 times 
higher than the neighboring golf course as then reduced to only 40 or 60 times 
higher by the county board of equalization correction.3

[¶10.]  An appeal pursuant to § 39-1-304(a)(xiv), 
W.S. 1977 was taken to the state board of equalization on June 25, 1985, 
asserting technical violations in denial of an open-meeting decision, 
tax-process violation of statutory and constitutional rights, and basic 
invalidity of the tax increase. The state board hearing was held November 14, 
1985, in regular form, with testimony including the minimal record from the 
county board session. On June 3, 1986, the commission reversed the assessed 
amount for 1985, and by order provided:

"1. That for the 1985 tax 
assessment only, the Natrona County Assessor classify and value the subject 
property in the same manner as was done to the Casper Country Club; 
and

"2. That the Natrona 
County Assessor forward such information to the Natrona County Treasurer for 
correction,"

but provided by 
the conclusions of law:

"6. Although the Natrona 
County Board agreed to hear objections to the assessed value of the subject 
property corresponding to the 1984 and 1985 tax years, such board acted outside 
of the scope of its authority respecting the 1984 assessment. Petitioner had an 
unqualified right to object to its 1984 assessment pursuant to W.S. 34-2-301. 
However, Petitioner did not object to such value in the then current tax year 
and waived any right to objection of the 1984 assessed value. As a result, only 
adjustments to the 1985 assessed value may be ordered."

[¶11.]  The taxpayer filed a petition for review 
in the district court requesting relief for the 1984 increased tax bill, with a 
further petition for leave to present additional evidence. It was argued that 
waiver had not been raised at the state board hearing but only first surfaced in 
the decision.

[¶12.]  After judicial appeal submission, the 
trial court ruled:

"3. Complaints of 
assessments must be brought within the times prescribed by W.S. 39-2-302, which 
contemplates that such complaints be filed with the county board of equalization 
before their final meeting of the year on the second Monday in June. Times for 
filing appeals are jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Therefore, the 
county board had no jurisdiction to consider an objection filed in 1985 of a 
1984 assessment.

"4. The objection filed 
by the Petitioner before the county board is and was also defective in the 
following respects:

"a. The notice is signed 
on behalf of the Petitioner, which has been identified as a corporation, by its 
president contrary to the requirement that attorneys must represent 
corporations; and

"b. The objection was not 
made in the form of a statement under oath, contrary to W.S. 39-2-302." 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶13.]  In result, the taxpayer was required to 
do something to protest action that has not yet happened.4 A strange divergence then develops 
in present argument as the taxpayer and the State respond to board and 
trial-court decisions. It is apparently the position of ParadiseValley that the assessment in amount was improper, and that consequent 
statutory or constitutional right to protest must be given. The State argues to 
the contrary that the incurred tax might be illegal since the reassessment 
process was in question but that any contest right passed on December 31, 1984. 
No authenticating statute was cited for those conclusions. Consequently, the 
State addressed an illegal tax as waived by inaction before the end of the year, 
but denied both an improper assessment or right of the taxpayer to protest where 
the statutory reassessment occurred after the protest period had 
passed.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR 
AD VALOREM TAX SCHEDULE

[¶14.]  In order to analyze and distinguish the 
different litigative conceptions, it is necessary to address the statutory 
process in Wyoming tax law.

1. Section 39-2-301, W.S. 
1977.5 Subsection (a): board of county 
commissioners in its first meeting in January divides the county into assessment 
districts;

2. subsection (b): 
furnishes assessment rolls and tax schedules to the county assessor January 
31;

3. subsection (c): county 
assessor obtains assessment statement from the taxpayer, commencing on the first 
Monday in February; and

4. subsection (e): 
returns the assessment roll enumerating assessed property and stating the value, 
on or before the fourth Monday in May.

5. Section 39-2-302, W.S. 
1977.6 Subsection (a): board of county 
commissioners as then constituting the county board of equalization meets at the 
office of the county assessor commencing on the fourth Tuesday in May and the 
second Monday in June to:

(a) subsection (b)(i): 
add to the assessment roll and value any taxable property within the county not 
included within the assessment roll;

(b) subsection (b)(ii): 
equalize the assessment and valuation of taxable property;

(c) subsection (b)(iii): 
correct any assessment and complete the assessment roll;

(d) subsection (b)(iv): 
hear and determine the complaint of any person relative to any property 
assessment or value as returned by the county assessor subject to the following: 

6. subsection (c): county 
assessor required to notify any person whose property assessment has been 
increased by the county board of equalization of the increase; 
and

7. any person wishing to 
contest an assessment of his property shall file a statement with the county 
board of equalization specifying the reason why the assessment is incorrect and 
may appear at either meeting of the board in support of the 
claim;

8. subsection (d): county 
assessor makes an abstract of the assessment roll; demonstration of the 
corrections; transmission to the board not later than the first Monday in 
July.

9. Section 39-2-403, W.S. 
1977.7 Board of county commissioners 
levies taxes as determined by the requisite mill levies furnished by the various 
taxing entities on or before the first Monday in August.

10. Section 
39-1-304(a)(v), W.S. 1977.8 State board of equalization shall 
require each county assessor immediately after the county boards of equalization 
have notified the state board of equalization of the amount of county values and 
state levy to certify to the state board of equalization on or before August 10 
all valuations and levies fixed in the respective 
counties.

11. Section 39-2-403.9

(a) Subsection (a): on or 
before the third Monday in August the county assessor shall compute all taxes 
from the valuations as corrected by the state board and entered by the county 
assessor and deliver the tax list and its warrant for collection of the taxes to 
the county treasurer, setting forth the assessment roll with the taxes extended; 
after which

(b) subsection (b): 
county treasurer shall proceed to collect the taxes;

12. subsection (c) county 
assessor may authorize change in the assessment roll or tax list at any time to 
correct errors in the name of the person taxed or to enter omitted property and 
its assessed value.

[¶15.]  In this case, apparently as a general 
activity but specifically as to ParadiseValley, a reassessment was made in August 
1984, resulting in an amended tax bill received by the taxpayer in 
October.

NOTICE 
REQUIREMENT

[¶16.]  This litigation is consequently defined 
as a question of a reassessment that occurred after the right to protest had 
passed for the tax year.

[¶17.]  Although not clearly perceived by the 
litigants, nothing of record indicates that notice of the reassessment was ever 
given to the taxpayer, but rather the original tax bill for 1984, No. 69159082, 
reflected a tax of $4,789.09, and a corrected tax bill, Supplement 42864 dated 
October 23, 1984, showed the increased tax of $20,845.69 computed from the 
increase of real estate adjusted assessment value from $13,400 to $258,183. On 
issue of notice, see Mennonite Board of Missions, Inc. v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 77 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1983); and Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 76 S. Ct. 724, 100 L. Ed. 1021 (1956).

[¶18.]  The substantive invalidity of the amended 
tax assessment amount was discerned by the state board in conclusion, with which 
we concur by review of the unquestioned evidence:

"5. That Petitioner has 
the burden of proof to demonstrate that the subject properties were assessed 
incorrectly, erroneously or in an otherwise unlawful manner. Petitioner has 
satisfied such burden of proof to the extent that there is no apparent 
reasonable basis for applying different land classification and valuation for 
the two country clubs under the facts of this case. Because different 
classification and valuation methodology was applied to the subject property 
from the Casper Country Club, the valuation is considered to have been made in a 
non-uniform manner; and the subject matter should be valued in the same manner 
as the Casper Country Club."10

PROTEST RIGHT TO REAL 
PROPERTY REASSESSMENT

[¶19.]  In a factual context, absent 
constitutional inquiry, it would seem that three possibilities exist to afford 
taxpayer hearing as contemplated by the statutes. Unfortunately, the legislature 
has afforded little direction for a consideration of legislative intent. See 
Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S. Ct. 1855, 95 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1987) on the applicable problem of assessment 
amount.

[¶20.]  The first choice would be to deny right 
of reassessment unless occurring within the time when the protest period for the 
same tax year could be activated; in other words, before the June meeting of the 
county board of equalization. This would mean that no reassessment could occur 
after the initial roll certification had been completed in April. Denial of 
flexibility to cure mistakes despite specific statutory reassessment provisions 
lacks persuasion for adoption of this choice as defining apparent legislative 
intent. This would invalidate all reassessed actions at least for that current 
year if made after the June protest time. Orcutt v. Crawford, 85 F.2d 146 (10th 
Cir. 1936).

[¶21.]  The second choice is to implement an 
additional protest hearing process without statutory justification or scheduling 
so that the county board of equalization procedure scheduled in May and June 
could be rescheduled by the board to occur later in the year in order to 
accommodate any interim reassessment. No statutory justification for the 
arrangement or provision for scheduling and notice requirements are found which 
could afford evidence of favorable legislative intent for this alternative. To 
utilize this choice, judicial creation of a process not statutorily provided 
would be required. Even so, selection of this choice could not provide a 
solution here, since no such session was noticed, scheduled, or held. Cf. 
McGregor v. Hogan, 263 U.S. 234, 44 S. Ct. 50, 68 L. Ed. 282 
(1923).

[¶22.]  The final choice is to permit the 
assessment amount to be protested at the next statutorily provided session to 
allow both years in issue to be considered. This was the arrangement attempted 
by ParadiseValley and now adopted by 
this court until such time as the legislature may choose another arrangement 
which alternatively would afford due-process rights in the taxation system. 
Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 28 S. Ct. 708, 52 L. Ed. 1103 
(1908).

[¶23.]  This court specifically declines in this 
case to address the constitutional problems which might be created if no right 
to hearing or protest is made available when late-year assessment occurs. 
Likewise, we decline to determine that Natrona County reassessments in 1984 were 
procedurally invalid as consequently creating a general level of illegal 
taxation for all properties covered in that extensive reassessment 
program.

[¶24.]  This decision assumes validity of the 
reassessment process, but affords relief to the taxpayer by a right to a hearing 
if the reassessment value is contested. Horton v. Driskell, 13 Wyo. 66, 77 P. 354 
(1904). The Wyoming ad valorem statutes as inherited from an agrarian society 
and essentially unchanged for a century, see Title 43, Revised Statutes of 
Wyoming 1887, and Title XII, Revised Statutes of Wyoming 1899, deserve 
legislative attention for schedule and process in order to provide a 
Twenty-First Century system from initial assessment through levy and collection. 
See The General Property Tax in Wyoming - A Symposium, 4 Wyo.L.J. 225 
(1950).

[¶25.]  The basic principle of Wyoming law was 
initially stated in Hecht v. Boughton, 2 Wyo. 385, 403 (1881), "constitutional 
law forbids the levying of a tax before the owners had an opportunity to object 
to the assessment," and Bass v. City of Casper, 28 Wyo. 387, 205 P. 1008, reh. 
denied 28 Wyo. 
387, 208 P. 439 (1922). The principle remains undisturbed, although generally 
attenuated by an adjunct development that the notice requirement relative to 
increasing the assessment of a single taxpayer may not apply when the increase 
was made for the property of a substantial number of taxpayers. Baker v. Paxton, 
29 Wyo. 500, 215 P. 257 (1923); Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing Association, 29 
Wyo. 461, 215 P. 244 (1923); Carton v. Board of County Commissioners of Uinta 
County, 10 Wyo. 416, 69 P. 1013 (1902). Cf. Corthell v. Board of CountyCommissioners of AlbanyCounty, 44 Wyo. 71, 8 P.2d 812 (1932); 4 Wyo.L.J. at 230, 
supra. The definitive statement of this court on the refund of an erroneous or 
illegally collected tax is found in Atlantic Richfield Company v. Board of 
County Commissioners, Sweetwater County, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1267 (1977).11

[¶26.]  In reasoning that the taxpayer cannot 
protest before the action is taken or the decision made, and that this court 
cannot create an administrative protest process not now afforded, we hold that 
the process statutorily available can be utilized by the taxpayer on the first 
statutory occasion available after the reassessment has occurred, even if during 
the next year. Support for this conclusion is derived from Art. 15, §§ 10 and 
11, Wyoming Constitution,12 as sustained by the county board 
of equalization process unlimited by any defined year in § 39-2-302, and by the 
state board in § 39-1-304(a)(xiv).

FORM OF THE PROTEST 
NOTICE

[¶27.]  The district court found fault with the 
protest notice filed with the county board of equalization pursuant to § 
39-2-302 in two particulars. The form was signed by an officer of the 
corporation rather than an attorney, and the form of attestation was rejected. 
Signing of notices, particularly when an oath or acknowledgment is required, is 
properly the responsibility of the entity officer and not the province of the 
attorney who might not have personal knowledge. Apperson v. Kay, Wyo., 546 P.2d 995 
(1976); Blyth & Fargo Co. v. Swensen Brothers, 7 Wyo. 303, 51 P. 873 
(1898). Cf. Stricker v. Frauendienst, Wyo., 669 P.2d 520 (1983). Additionally, we 
find the "acknowledged" form of execution to suffice for the tax assessment 
protest. Bowers Welding and Hotshot, Inc. v. Bromley, Wyo., 
699 P.2d 299, 301 (1985). For sufficiency of the execution of the tax protest 
petition we do not differentiate "under oath" from "acknowledgment" before a 
notary public. With regard to sufficiency of the execution of the tax protest 
petition, we do not differentiate "under oath" from "acknowledgment" before a 
notary public unless objection is taken by the governmental agency in order to 
afford an opportunity for reexecution by the complaining taxpayer. Receipt and 
consideration of the written taxpayer complaint, without objection by the 
taxation authority, constitutes waiver of technical sufficiency questions about 
the method of execution.13

[¶28.]  This case is remanded so that the state 
tax commission will be ordered to either adopt the November, 1985 hearing data 
to be applied to the year 1984, or to hold another hearing to consider an 
assessment for that year which is fair, equal, and uniform as related to 
comparable assessments, both for the taxpayer's property in other years and for 
other taxpayers similarly situated for the same year. This court only considers 
this case on its specific facts of a post-statutory schedule reassessment to 
assure a taxpayer right of hearing, and declines to consider the validity of 
reassessment in that protest and objection. Rights under the statutes and the 
Constitution are protected and preserved. By this conclusion, we avoid 
constitutional inquiry and afford a workable system until a different process is 
legislatively adopted.

[¶29.]  Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings in conformity herewith.

FOOTNOTES

1 In understatement, the 
State asserts:

"The record does not 
reflect any facts which establish any defect in the timing of the assessment 
notice which Appellant received indicating increase in assessed valuation. Nor 
does the record indicate that such defect, if any, had the effect of preserving 
Appellant's entitlement to challenge its 1984 assessment in the 1985 tax 
year."

Actually, no 
statutory authority for the Fall reassessment was discussed in appellee's 
brief.

2"* * * [I]n no way may 
mandates of the Constitution, Art. 1, § 28, and Art. 15, § 11 be subverted in 
the property assessment and taxation process. Sparks v. McCluskey, Ariz., 84 
Ariz. 283, 327 P.2d 295 (1958); Appeal of Farmer, 80 Idaho 72, 325 P.2d 278 
(1958); Gerner v. State Tax Commission, 71 N.M. 385, 378 P.2d 619 (1963); City 
of Arlington v. Cannon, Tex.Civ.App., 263 S.W.2d 299 (1953), rev'd in part on 
other grounds 153 Tex. 566, 271 S.W.2d 414 (1954) * * *." 735 P.2d  at 115-116, 
Urbigkit, J., concurring.

3 The nondefinitive two or 
three cents was probably not in itself a valid tax readjustment action in 
leaving the assessor a 50 percent discretion by reduction from five cents to 
either two or three cents, at her choice.

4 The United States 
Supreme Court, in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1994, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556, reh. denied 409 U.S. 902, 93 S. Ct. 177, 34 L. Ed. 2d 165 (1972), 
defined:

"For more than a century 
the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: `Parties whose 
rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may 
enjoy that right they must first be notified.' Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233, 17 L. Ed. 531. See 
Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. [3 Otto] 
274, 23 L. Ed. 914; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 17 S. Ct. 841, 42 L. Ed. 215; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 34 S. Ct. 779, 58 L. Ed. 1363. It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and 
an opportunity to be heard `must be granted at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.' Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 
85 S. Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62."

See also Palazzi 
v. Estate of Gardner, 32 Ohio St.3d 169, 512 N.E.2d 971, 974 
(1987).

5"(a) Each board of county 
commissioners during its first meeting in January may annually divide the county 
into assessment districts. * * *

"(b) Annually, 
on January 31, each board of county commissioners shall furnish suitable 
assessment rolls and schedules properly ruled and headed to the county assessor 
upon which shall be entered the legal description of taxable real property, an 
enumeration of taxable personal property and the name of the person to whom the 
property is taxable.

"(c) Except as 
provided by W.S. 39-2-201, annually, commencing on the first Monday in February, 
the county assessor or deputy assessors as provided by subsection (a) of this 
section shall obtain from each property owner or person having control of 
taxable property in the assessment district for which they were appointed, a 
full, complete and detailed statement of the amount of the taxable property 
owned by or subject to the control of the property owner. The county assessor or 
his deputies or any representative of the state board of equalization may 
examine any property. The county assessor or his deputies shall enter the fair 
value for taxation on the assessment roll. * * *

* * * * * 
*

"(e) The county 
assessor shall enter in books furnished for that purpose, from the tax schedule, 
the enumeration and fair value of all taxable property assessed by him or his 
deputies. The county assessor shall enter the names of persons against whom 
property is assessed in the county assessment roll in alphabetical order. On or 
before the fourth Monday in May the county assessor shall return the county 
assessment roll enumerating the property and value assessed by him or his 
deputies to the board of county commissioners together with a list stating the 
value of taxable property within each school district, municipality, or special 
district in the county." Section 39-2-301, W.S. 1977.

6"(a) The board of county 
commissioners of each county constitutes the county board of equalization. The 
county board shall meet at the office of the county assessor commencing on the 
fourth Tuesday in May for not exceeding seven (7) days and on the second Monday 
in June for not exceeding six (6) consecutive days. The county assessor shall 
act as clerk, attend all meetings and advise the county 
board.

"(b) The county 
board of equalization shall:

"(i) Add to the 
assessment roll and value any taxable property within the county not included 
within the assessment roll as returned by the county assessor at its meeting in 
May;

"(ii) Equalize the 
assessment and valuation of the taxable property which is assessed and valued by 
the county assessor;

"(iii) Correct any 
assessment or valuation contained in and complete the assessment 
roll;

"(iv) Hear and determine 
the complaint of any person relative to any property assessment or value as 
returned by the county assessor subject to subsection (c) of this 
section.

"(c) The county 
assessor shall notify any person whose property assessment has been increased by 
the county board of equalization of the increase. Any person wishing to contest 
an assessment of his property shall file a statement under oath with the county 
board of equalization specifying the reasons why the assessment is incorrect and 
may appear at either meeting of the board in support of the claim. A county 
board of equalization may receive evidence relative to any assessment and may 
require the person assessed or his agent or attorney to appear before it, be 
examined and produce any documents relating to the assessment. No adjustment in 
an assessment shall be granted to or on behalf of any person who willfully 
neglects or refuses to attend a meeting of a county board of equalization and be 
examined or answer any material question upon the board's request. Minutes of 
the examination shall be taken and filed with the county 
clerk.

"(d) Immediately 
after the assessment roll is corrected by the county board of equalization and 
not later than the first Monday in July, the county assessor shall make an 
abstract of the assessment roll containing the quantity and value of each class 
of property assessed for taxation and transmit the abstract to the board." 
Section 39-2-302, W.S. 1977.

7"(a) On or before the 
first Monday of August, the board of county commissioners shall by order entered 
of record levy the requisite taxes for the year. On or before the third Monday 
in August the county assessor shall compute the taxes from the corrected 
valuations as corrected by the state board and entered by the county assessor in 
the column of corrected valuations. The county assessor shall deliver the tax 
list and his warrant for the collection of the taxes to the county treasurer * * 
*.

"(b) The county 
treasurer upon receiving the tax list and warrant shall immediately proceed to 
collect the taxes levied for the current year and taxes remaining unpaid from 
preceding years. * * *

"(c) The county 
assessor may authorize changes in the assessment roll or tax list at any time to 
correct errors in the name of a person taxed or to enter omitted property and 
its assessed value. Property omitted from prior year tax lists discovered by the 
county assessor shall be added to the assessment roll and taxes computed and 
collected for the period the property was omitted not exceeding five (5) prior 
years or since the last change in ownership, whichever is less." Section 
39-2-403, W.S. 1977.

8"(a) The state board of 
equalization shall perform the duties specified in article 15, section 10 of the 
Wyoming 
constitution and shall hear appeals from county boards of equalization, review 
state excise taxes and review their own assessments of property and tax 
determinations. In addition, the board shall:

* * * * * 
*

"(v) Require 
each county assessor immediately after the county boards of equalization have 
been notified by the state board of equalization of the amount of the county 
values and state levy, to certify to the state board of equalization, on or 
before August 10 of each year, in the form and detail prescribed by the board, 
all valuations and levies fixed in their respective counties;" Section 
39-1-304(a)(v), W.S. 1977.

9 Supra n. 
7.

10 One thing not explained 
is why the county assessor had a heightened disaffinity for the taxpayer as 
compared to its neighboring competitor, the Casper Country Club. Comparable 
assessments for various golf courses considered in hearing evidence included 
Paradise Valley, .05 per square foot, reduced by the county board to either 2 or 
3 cents, whichever it may have been, without record determination as to whether 
the county assessor ever actually reduced the assessment in accord with the 
county board directive before the reversal for 1985 was mandated by the state 
board; Casper Country Club, .0047; Gillette, .0045; Sheridan, .0024; Laramie, 
.0008; Old Baldy in Saratoga, .0009; Westover in Gillette, 
.0002.

11 If we were to have 
adopted the position advanced by the State that the tax was illegal as 
differentiated from an improper assessment, then Atlantic Richfield Company v. 
Board of County Commissioners, supra, would apply, which teaches that no statute 
of limitation is presented. All the 1984 tax increases in the Fall reassessment 
for all NatronaCounty taxpayers might be 
subject to refund.

12"The duties of the state 
board [of equalization] shall be as follows: * * * Said board shall also have 
power to equalize the valuation on all property in the several counties * * *." 
Article 15, § 10, Wyoming Constitution.

"All property, 
except as in this constitution otherwise provided, shall be uniformly assessed 
for taxation, and the legislature shall prescribe such regulations as shall 
secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, real and personal." 
Article 15, § 11, Wyoming Constitution.

13 Few taxpayers, and 
perhaps not all lawyers, readily differentiate "verification" from "under oath" 
from "acknowledgment" from the generalized "sworn to" requirement. More modern 
administrative processes, as for example the United States Internal Revenue 
Code, simplify or eliminate this unnecessary confusion by statutory provisions 
which provide that a signature constitutes "execution under penalty of perjury."