Case Title: Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. Piontek

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018AP001033-J

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2019-05-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
2019 WI 51 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1033-J 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings  
Against the Honorable Michael J. Piontek: 
 
Wisconsin Judicial Commission, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
the Honorable Michael J. Piontek, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST PIONTEK 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 21, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
      
 
 
2019 WI 51
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP1033-J 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against the Honorable 
Michael J. Piontek: 
 
Wisconsin Judicial Commission, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
The Honorable Michael J. Piontek, 
 
          Respondent. 
FILED 
 
MAY 21, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
Judicial disciplinary proceeding.  Judge suspended from 
office.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.91 (2015-2016),1 a Judicial Conduct Panel's findings of 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 757.91 provides:  
The supreme court shall review the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and recommendations under s. 
757.89 and determine appropriate discipline in cases 
of misconduct and appropriate action in cases of 
permanent disability.  The rules of the supreme court 
(continued) 
No. 
2018AP1033-J   
 
2 
 
fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation for discipline for 
Racine County Circuit Court Judge Michael J. Piontek.  We 
conclude 
that 
a 
five-day 
suspension 
is 
the 
appropriate 
discipline for Judge Piontek's judicial misconduct.  
¶2 
At the time of the events in question, Judge Piontek 
had been a circuit court judge for Racine County for about two 
years.  Before assuming the bench, Judge Piontek was a 
practicing lawyer for about 38 years, including time as a county 
prosecutor.  Until this disciplinary matter, he had never been 
the subject of a complaint or grievance as an attorney or judge. 
¶3 
The Judicial Commission filed a complaint against 
Judge Piontek on June 5, 2018, alleging that he had engaged in 
judicial 
misconduct 
by 
his 
actions, 
described 
below, 
in 
presiding over two different criminal matters. 
¶4 
Judge Piontek filed a response to the complaint in 
which he generally admitted the allegations but alleged various 
mitigating circumstances.   
¶5 
Consistent with an order issued by the Judicial 
Conduct Panel, the parties filed briefs on the issue of the 
appropriate discipline to be imposed.  After receiving these 
briefs, the panel made findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and recommended that this court suspend Judge Piontek between 
five and 15 days.  This recommendation exceeded the disciplinary 
sanction that Judge Piontek suggested in his brief to the panel:  
                                                                                                                                                             
applicable to civil cases in the supreme court govern 
the review proceedings under this section. 
No. 
2018AP1033-J   
 
3 
 
a public reprimand.  The panel's recommendation more closely 
followed the sanction proposed by the Judicial Commission, which 
suggested discipline ranging from a reprimand to a short 
suspension. 
¶6 
The facts involved in this matter are as follows.  
The S.S. Criminal Case  
¶7 
Between August 2014 and February 2015, Judge Piontek 
presided over a criminal case involving defendant S.S.  Judge 
Piontek set the matter for a March 4, 2015 trial.  Sometime 
before December 3, 2014, Judge Piontek received at his chambers 
an informal visit from the prosecutor assigned to the S.S. case; 
the prosecutor was seeking an adjournment of the trial.   
¶8 
On December 3, 2014, Judge Piontek telephoned the 
prosecutor, without including defense counsel in the call or 
giving defense counsel notice that he planned to make the call.  
During 
the 
three-minute-and-seven-second 
phone 
call, 
Judge 
Piontek told the prosecutor that he wanted S.S.'s trial to go 
forward on the scheduled trial date; that any plea negotiation 
should involve S.S. being convicted of a felony; and that people 
like S.S. who involve themselves "in scams like this" need to be 
stopped. 
¶9 
Judge Piontek never disclosed his December 3, 2014 
conversation with the prosecutor to S.S. or S.S.'s attorney. 
¶10 On or about January 29, 2015, the prosecutor sent a 
letter to defense counsel in which he summarized his account of 
the judge's December 3, 2014 phone call.  Shortly thereafter, 
the prosecutor submitted a copy of the letter to Judge Piontek. 
No. 
2018AP1033-J   
 
4 
 
¶11 Only after receiving the prosecutor's letter did Judge 
Piontek recuse himself from handling the S.S. case. 
¶12 During the pendency of the Judicial Commission's 
investigation into the S.S. matter, Judge Piontek at least twice 
denied the assertions made in the prosecutor's January 29, 2015 
letter.  In a September 18, 2015 response letter to the Judicial 
Commission, Judge Piontek denied that he initiated the December 
3, 2014 phone call to the prosecutor, and denied making the 
statements attributed to him by the prosecutor.  In a September 
14, 2017 Response to Notice of Formal Proceedings, Judge Piontek 
denied that his ex parte conversation with the prosecutor 
involved discussions of plea negotiations.  Only later, when he 
filed his response to the Judicial Commission's complaint, did 
Judge Piontek admit that he initiated the December 3, 2014 phone 
call.  He further admitted making "off-handed comments about the 
manner in which he believed the case should be resolved." 
¶13 The Judicial Commission's complaint alleged, and the 
Judicial Conduct Panel concluded, that Judge Piontek's contact 
with the prosecutor on December 3, 2014, constituted a willful 
violation of Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 60.04(1)(g),2 which 
                                                 
2 SCR 60.04(1)(g) provides: 
A judge may not initiate, permit, engage in or 
consider ex parte communications concerning a pending 
or impending action or proceeding except that: 
1. A judge may initiate, permit, engage in or 
consider 
ex 
parte 
communications 
for 
scheduling, 
administrative purposes or emergencies that do not 
(continued) 
No. 
2018AP1033-J   
 
5 
 
prohibits ex parte communications concerning pending matters 
unless an exception exists under the law. 
¶14 The Judicial Commission's complaint also alleged, and 
the Judicial Conduct Panel concluded, that Judge Piontek's 
contact violated his obligations: 
• pursuant to SCR 60.02,3 to participate in establishing, 
maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct 
and to personally observe those standards; 
• pursuant to SCR 60.03(1),4 to comply with the law and 
act at all times in a manner that promotes public 
                                                                                                                                                             
deal with substantive matters or issues on the merits 
if all of the following conditions are met: 
a. The judge reasonably believes that no party 
will gain a procedural or tactical advantage as a 
result of the ex parte communication. 
b. When the ex parte communication may affect the 
substance of the action or proceeding, the judge 
promptly notifies all of the other parties of the 
substance of the ex parte communication and allows 
each party an opportunity to respond. 
3 SCR 60.02 provides: 
An 
independent 
and 
honorable 
judiciary 
is 
indispensable to justice in our society. A judge 
should participate in establishing, maintaining and 
enforcing 
high 
standards 
of 
conduct 
and 
shall 
personally 
observe 
those 
standards 
so 
that 
the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary will be 
preserved. This chapter applies to every aspect of 
judicial behavior except purely legal decisions. Legal 
decisions made in the course of judicial duty on the 
record are subject solely to judicial review. 
No. 
2018AP1033-J   
 
6 
 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary;  
• pursuant to SCR 60.04(1)(e),5 to perform judicial 
duties without bias or prejudice; and  
• pursuant to SCR 60.04(4),6 to recuse himself from 
handling S.S.'s case earlier than he did because a 
reasonable, well-informed person, knowledgeable about 
judicial ethics, would reasonably question his ability 
to be impartial.   
                                                                                                                                                             
4 SCR 60.03(1) provides:  "A judge shall respect and comply 
with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that 
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of 
the judiciary." 
5 SCR 60.04(1)(e) provides: 
A judge shall perform judicial duties without 
bias or prejudice. A judge may not, in the performance 
of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias 
or prejudice, including bias or prejudice based upon 
race, gender, religion, national origin, disability, 
age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and 
may not knowingly permit staff, court officials and 
others subject to the judge's direction and control to 
do so. 
6 SCR 60.04(4) provides: 
Except as provided in sub. (6) for waiver, a 
judge shall recuse himself or herself in a proceeding 
when the facts and circumstances the judge knows or 
reasonably should know establish one of the following 
or 
when 
reasonable, 
well-informed 
persons 
knowledgeable about judicial ethics standards and the 
justice 
system 
and 
aware 
of 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances the judge knows or reasonably should 
know would reasonably question the judge's ability to 
be impartial. 
No. 
2018AP1033-J   
 
7 
 
The P.E. Criminal Case 
¶15 Between August 2014 and August 2015, Judge Piontek 
presided over a criminal case involving defendant P.E.  P.E., a 
former nurse, pled guilty in June 2014 before another judicial 
official to two counts of delivery of non-narcotic controlled 
substances.  A presentence investigation (PSI) was ordered, and 
the matter was scheduled for sentencing before Judge Piontek on 
October 6, 2014. 
¶16 On October 3, 2014, Judge Piontek conducted an 
independent internet investigation concerning P.E.'s nursing 
licenses and related matters in several states.  Judge Piontek 
did so because he believed that P.E. was untruthful in her 
comments to the PSI writer.  Judge Piontek's independent 
internet investigation led him to discover what he believed to 
be incriminating information from the states of Texas and 
Illinois.  Judge Piontek incorrectly deduced from his research 
that P.E. had never been licensed as a nurse in Illinois.    
¶17 Prior to sentencing, Judge Piontek did not provide the 
parties or their attorneys with either notice of his intent to 
conduct his investigation or the nature of his investigation and 
its results. 
¶18 At P.E.'s sentencing hearing, Judge Piontek waited 
until after the parties' arguments were completed and after P.E. 
exercised her right of allocution to discuss the results of his 
independent investigation.  P.E. and her attorney did not have 
an opportunity to view the documents that Judge Piontek had 
apparently printed from his internet research. Judge Piontek 
No. 
2018AP1033-J   
 
8 
 
stated that, according to his independent research, P.E. never 
had an Illinois nursing license.  When P.E. attempted to provide 
information about her Illinois nursing license, Judge Piontek 
told her that her "lies are getting [her] in trouble," suggested 
that she "close [her] mouth," stated that her "license in the 
State of Illinois does not exist," and said that he did not want 
any further comment from her.7  When sentencing P.E., Judge 
Piontek relied on the incorrect information he had obtained from 
the internet regarding P.E.'s Illinois nursing license. 
¶19 P.E. 
filed 
a 
postconviction 
motion 
requesting 
resentencing because Judge Piontek, at sentencing, relied on 
inaccurate information resulting from his internet research.  At 
a hearing on that motion, Judge Piontek implicitly acknowledged 
conducting an independent investigation, asserting that he 
simply sought out the truth and relied on public records.  Judge 
Piontek denied P.E.'s resentencing request, essentially taking 
the position that he did not rely on the inaccurate information.  
He claimed that "whether she had an Illinois license or didn't 
have an Illinois license, that wasn't a big deal to me."  
¶20 P.E. appealed.  The court of appeals reversed her 
judgment of conviction and the order denying resentencing, and 
remanded the matter for resentencing before a different judge.  
The court of appeals concluded that the record was inconsistent 
                                                 
7 We take these quotes from the decision on P.E.'s appeal, 
described below, which quoted extensively from the sentencing 
hearing. 
No. 
2018AP1033-J   
 
9 
 
with Judge Piontek's assertion that he did not rely on the 
misinformation obtained from his independent investigation.  
Therefore, the court of appeals concluded, Judge Piontek denied 
P.E. her right to be sentenced upon accurate information.   
¶21 In his brief to the Judicial Conduct Panel, Judge 
Piontek 
implicitly 
conceded 
that 
his 
independent 
factual 
investigation was not an isolated instance of this conduct.  He 
stated that "[l]ong before his formal appearance before the 
Judicial 
Commission, 
Judge 
Piontek 
ceased 
conducting 
any 
independent factual research in cases before him."  The Judicial 
Conduct Panel construed the plain meaning of this statement to 
be 
that 
Judge 
Piontek 
had 
conducted 
independent 
factual 
investigations in other "cases," but that he had stopped this 
practice. 
¶22 The Judicial Commission's complaint alleged, and the 
Judicial 
Conduct 
Panel 
concluded, 
that 
Judge 
Piontek's 
investigation 
of 
P.E.'s 
background 
prior 
to 
sentencing 
constituted a willful violation of SCR 60.04(1)(g), the comment 
to which states, "[a] judge must not independently investigate 
facts in a case and must consider only the evidence presented."     
¶23 The Judicial Commission's complaint also alleged, and 
the Judicial Conduct Panel concluded, that Judge Piontek's 
conduct violated his obligations: 
• pursuant to SCR 60.02, to participate in establishing, 
maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct 
and to personally observe those standards; and  
No. 
2018AP1033-J   
 
10 
 
• pursuant to SCR 60.03(1), to comply with the law and 
act at all times in a manner that promotes public 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
¶24 The Judicial Conduct Panel concluded that each of 
these violations was willful and thus constituted judicial 
misconduct under Wis. Stat. § 757.81(4)(a).8 
¶25 We 
adopt 
the 
panel's 
undisputed 
findings 
and 
conclusions of law.  We therefore turn to the question of the 
appropriate discipline for the misconduct. 
¶26 In 
imposing 
discipline——which 
may 
be 
reprimand, 
censure, suspension, or removal——we must bear in mind that the 
goal of judicial discipline is not to punish the erring judge, 
but to protect the public from unacceptable judicial behavior, 
considering both the seriousness of the judge's misconduct and 
the likelihood that it would recur.  See In re Judicial 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crawford, 2001 WI 96, ¶38, 245 
Wis. 2d 373, 629 N.W.2d 1.  The sanction that we impose must 
also "convey to the public the gravity with which this court 
views judicial misconduct."  Id., ¶39.  We impose discipline on 
a de novo basis, benefitting from but not bound by the panel's 
recommendation.  See id., ¶38. 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 757.81(4)(a) states that misconduct 
includes "[w]illful violation of a rule of the code of judicial 
ethics."  
No. 
2018AP1033-J   
 
11 
 
¶27 In recommending a suspension between five and 15 days, 
the Judicial Conduct Panel found both mitigating and aggravating 
factors.  On the mitigating side, the panel noted that Judge 
Piontek has a long history of community involvement; has no 
history of prior ethics complaints; and did not act to satisfy 
personal desires or receive any personal benefit.  In addition, 
the panel gave "some" weight, but not significant weight, to the 
fact that Judge Piontek had served only about two years on the 
bench when he engaged in the conduct at issue.  The panel 
declined to assign additional weight to this factor on the basis 
that Judge Piontek's 38 years of practice experience, including 
as a county prosecutor, should have made him aware of the 
prohibitions on ex parte communications, judicial involvement in 
plea bargaining, and independent factual research specific to 
parties.   
¶28 Also on the mitigating side, the Judicial Conduct 
Panel noted that Judge Piontek now appears to understand that he 
may not engage in the type of conduct underlying his violations 
and, thus, has indicated an effort to modify his conduct.  The 
panel also gave "some" weight, but not significant weight, to 
the fact that Judge Piontek's misconduct was somewhat isolated, 
though the panel noted that Judge Piontek implicitly conceded 
that he had engaged in independent factual investigation in 
other cases.  The panel further noted that Judge Piontek did not 
attempt to conceal his misconduct, and, as to the P.E. case, did 
not seem aware that his behavior was improper.  
No. 
2018AP1033-J   
 
12 
 
¶29 The Judicial Conduct Panel went on to discuss a 
variety of factors on the aggravating side of the scale.  The 
panel noted that Judge Piontek's misconduct occurred while he 
was representing the judicial system within the courtroom.  The 
nature of his misconduct was serious; it showed bias and had the 
potential to unfairly affect the outcomes of the cases at issue, 
and therefore was of the sort that damages public confidence in 
judicial integrity, judicial impartiality, and fairness in the 
decision-making process.   The panel also determined that, as to 
the S.S. case, Judge Piontek was not credible in asserting he 
was unaware of the impropriety of his ex parte communication 
with the prosecutor in which he commented on the defendant's 
culpability and the need for any plea agreement to include a 
felony conviction.   
¶30 Also weighing on the aggravating side of the scale, 
according to the Judicial Conduct Panel, was Judge Piontek's 
delay in admitting some of his conduct and his attempts to 
minimize 
the 
impropriety 
of 
his 
conduct. 
 
For 
example, 
concerning the S.S. case, Judge Piontek at first falsely denied 
to the Judicial Commission that he had made the phone call to 
the prosecutor or the statements in question.  While he 
eventually admitted his actions, he chalked his initial denial 
up to a faulty memory and downplayed his statements to the 
prosecutor as "off-handed."  In so doing, the panel wrote, Judge 
Piontek appeared to have only admitted his wrongdoing when he 
was caught, in the apparent hope that it would mitigate any 
punishment.   
No. 
2018AP1033-J   
 
13 
 
¶31 Judge Piontek's failure to acknowledge the seriousness 
of his misconduct was also apparent in his handling of the P.E. 
case, according to the Judicial Conduct Panel.  The panel noted 
that the court of appeals' decision in the P.E. case quoted 
extensively from a postconviction hearing in which Judge Piontek 
did 
not 
acknowledge 
the 
impropriety 
of 
his 
independent 
investigation, but instead explained that he conducted his 
investigation because he was dissatisfied with the information 
in the PSI——an assertion that Judge Piontek largely repeated in 
his brief to the panel.  Also at the postconviction hearing, 
Judge Piontek dismissed any notion that he did not give P.E. 
sufficient time to respond to his internet research as an 
example of blame-shifting by P.E.  Judge Piontek also claimed at 
the postconviction hearing that he did not rely on the erroneous 
results of his independent research at sentencing——a claim that 
the court of appeals rejected as inconsistent with the record. 
¶32 The Judicial Conduct Panel declined to accept Judge 
Piontek's other attempts to downplay the seriousness of his 
misconduct.  For example, Judge Piontek attributed all of his 
misconduct to a newcomer's misunderstanding of the judge's role 
in felony court versus more collaborative settings; e.g., the 
veterans treatment court.  The panel was unpersuaded, noting 
that Judge Piontek, from his long experience as a lawyer, was 
surely familiar with a judge's normal role.  The panel was 
similarly unpersuaded by Judge Piontek's claim that his heavy 
criminal caseload helped explain his behavior.  The panel found 
No. 
2018AP1033-J   
 
14 
 
this explanation implausible given that Judge Piontek's behavior 
involved devoting extra time to the cases in question. 
¶33 The Judicial Conduct Panel cited three cases as 
particularly 
analogous 
to 
this 
matter: 
 
In 
re 
Judicial 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carver, 192 Wis. 2d 136, 531 
N.W.2d 62 (1995); In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Calvert, 2018 WI 68, 382 Wis. 2d 354, 914 N.W.2d 765; 
and In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Aulik, 146 
Wis. 2d 57, 77, 429 N.W.2d 759 (1988).  In Carver, we imposed a 
15-day suspension after a judge failed to promptly disqualify 
himself from a criminal case pending against a friend.  The case 
arose from a gambling investigation.  The judge failed to 
truthfully disclose his communications with the defendant, and 
made on-the-record comments that minimized the seriousness of 
the 
offense 
charged, 
questioned 
the 
legitimacy 
of 
the 
investigation and prosecution of the defendant's case and others 
like it, and suggested that minimum sentences should be imposed 
for such crimes.  See Carver, 192 Wis. 2d at 137-46.  We 
concluded 
that 
the 
judge's 
aggravated 
failure 
to 
act 
impartially, objectively, and truthfully warranted a 15-day 
suspension.  Id. at 154-55. 
¶34 In Calvert, we imposed a 15-day suspension as a result 
of a circuit court commissioner's independent investigation of 
the facts of a case before him, which included engaging in ex 
parte communication, and his false statements to the parties 
that any further calls to police about their dispute would 
result in disorderly conduct tickets that would be sustained 
No. 
2018AP1033-J   
 
15 
 
throughout the judicial system.  We held that the commissioner's 
conduct was "undeniably serious" because "a judge's objectivity 
and impartiality are critical to the proper functioning of the 
judicial system."  Calvert, 382 Wis. 2d 354, ¶26.   
¶35 In Aulik, we imposed a 90-day suspension as a result 
of a circuit court judge's ex parte communications with counsel 
on the merits of a contested matter, and failure to fully 
disclose the communications to counsel for the other party after 
the communications were discovered.  Aulik, 146 Wis. 2d at 58-
59, 73-79. 
¶36 Analogizing these cases to the facts at hand, the 
Judicial Conduct Panel reasoned that Judge Piontek's misconduct 
deserved more than the sanction he requested:  a reprimand.  The 
Judicial Conduct Panel also concluded that Judge Piontek's 
statements during the course of these proceedings showed that he 
did not appreciate the serious nature of his violations and 
their impact on the integrity of the judicial system.  The 
Judicial Conduct Panel therefore recommended that the court 
impose a suspension ranging from five to 15 days. 
¶37 We agree with the Judicial Conduct Panel that a 
suspension, rather than a reprimand, is in order.  The 
misconduct in this case is concerning.  Regardless of his 
newness to the bench or the weight of his caseload, Judge 
Piontek's ex parte communication with the prosecutor on the 
merits of a criminal case was obviously unethical; even the 
newest and busiest judge must know as much.  In addition, Judge 
Piontek's independent investigation concerning P.E.'s nursing 
No. 
2018AP1033-J   
 
16 
 
licenses plainly violated his duty of neutrality; it is clearly 
improper 
for 
a 
judge 
to 
both 
conduct 
an 
independent 
investigation and to fail to give a party a chance to respond to 
the judge's misinformed allegations based on that investigation.  
We also share the Judicial Conduct Panel's concern that Judge 
Piontek's initial denials and later defenses of his conduct 
suggest that, for much of these proceedings, he failed to fully 
appreciate the seriousness of his misconduct and its impact on 
the judicial system.  Simply put, this was not a close case 
under the undisputed facts, and a reprimand, as Judge Piontek 
requests, would be an insufficient response. 
¶38 Finding that suspension is warranted, the question 
becomes what length of suspension is appropriate.  As stated 
above, the Judicial Conduct Panel recommended a suspension 
ranging from five to 15 days.  We conclude that a suspension at 
the bottom end of this range is warranted.  Acknowledging that 
the imposition of discipline is not an exact science, we find 
that Judge Piontek's conduct was not as egregious as that which 
resulted in 15-day suspensions in Carver and Calvert, and 
thereby warrants a lesser sanction.  In Carver, we noted, among 
other things, that the respondent-judge used his judicial office 
in order to make an on-the-record criticism of a gambling 
investigation.  Carver, 192 Wis. 2d at 139, 154.  In Calvert, we 
noted, among other things, that the respondent-judge gave the 
impression to the litigants before him that the judge had 
essentially rigged the judicial and criminal justice systems 
against them.  Calvert, 382 Wis. 2d 354, ¶¶19, 21, 26.  Judge 
No. 
2018AP1033-J   
 
17 
 
Piontek's actions, while misguided and serious, do not rise to 
the same level of impropriety.  As we previously noted, the goal 
of judicial discipline is not to punish the erring judge, but to 
protect the public from unacceptable judicial behavior.  Id., 
¶22.  We believe this goal will be adequately served by 
suspending Judge Piontek for five days. 
¶39 IT IS ORDERED that Michael J. Piontek is suspended 
from the office of circuit judge without compensation, and 
prohibited from exercising any of the powers or the duties of a 
circuit judge in Wisconsin, for a period of five days, 
commencing June 24, 2019. 
 
No. 
2018AP1033-J   
 
 
 
1