Case Title: Marysville Exempted Village Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Union County Bd. of Revision

Citation: 2013-Ohio-3077

Docket Number: 2012-1648

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Marysville Exempted Village Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Union Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip 
Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3077.] 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-3077 
MARYSVILLE EXEMPTED VILLAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
APPELLEE, v. UNION COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES; 
CONNOLLY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Marysville Exempted Village Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. 
Union Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3077.] 
Taxation—Real property—R.C. 5715.19(A)(1)—Legislature did not substantially 
interfere with Supreme Court’s authority to regulate practice of law by 
permitting nonlawyer salaried employees of corporate property owner to 
file valuation complaint on corporation’s behalf—Jurisdiction of board of 
revision properly invoked by complaint filed by salaried employee on 
behalf of corporate owner. 
(No. 2012-1648—Submitted April 23, 2013—Decided July 17, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals,  
Nos. 2011-K-4087 through 2011-K-4096. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This real property tax case presents an issue of the jurisdiction of 
the boards of revision:  Does a valuation complaint validly invoke jurisdiction 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
when the property owner is a corporate entity and the complaint was prepared and 
filed by a salaried employee of the entity who is neither an officer nor a lawyer?   
{¶ 2} In this case, ten valuation complaints were filed by a salaried 
employee on behalf of Connolly Construction Company as the property owner.  
In each case, the Union County Board of Revision (“BOR”) apparently ordered a 
decrease in value, after which the Marysville Exempted School District Board of 
Education (“school board”) appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”).  The 
school board asked the BTA to order that the original complaints be dismissed in 
each case because the complaints were allegedly signed by a salaried employee of 
the corporation who is not himself a lawyer, but who nonetheless purported to act 
on behalf of the corporate owner.  In support, the school board cited Sharon 
Village Ltd. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Revision, 78 Ohio St.3d 479, 678 N.E.2d 932 
(1997), and Worthington City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 85 Ohio St.3d 156, 707 N.E.2d 499 (1999).  While acknowledging that 
R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) now explicitly authorizes salaried corporate employees to file 
on behalf of the corporate owner, the school board argued that the statute cannot 
be given effect because that kind of filing constitutes the unauthorized practice of 
law. 
{¶ 3} On September 25, 2012, the BTA issued a consolidated decision 
granting the school board’s motion.  The BTA ordered that the appeals be 
remanded to the BOR to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.  Connolly 
Construction has appealed, and we now reverse the BTA. 
{¶ 4} Because the BTA erroneously ordered dismissal, the valuation 
complaints have not received a determination on the merits from the BTA.  We 
therefore remand to the BTA for further proceedings. 
Facts 
{¶ 5} The record in this case is sparse.  The BTA has certified the 
transcript of its proceedings to this court pursuant to R.C. 5717.04, but that record 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
does not contain any affidavits or testimony.  Moreover, the transcript from the 
BOR that would ordinarily be certified to the BTA pursuant to R.C. 5717.01 and 
included in the record before this court is absent.  Accordingly, the record does 
not contain the actual valuation complaints at issue or any other evidence bearing 
on the jurisdictional issue. 
{¶ 6} What the record does contain is the school board’s motion to 
dismiss filed at the BTA and Connolly Construction’s memorandum in 
opposition.  The motion asserts that “[t]he person who filed the complaints is only 
a salaried employee of the company, not the owner or a corporate officer with a 
fiduciary duty to the company.  Likewise, [the filer] is not an attorney and signing 
and filing the complaints was improper as an unauthorized practice of law.”  The 
memorandum in opposition does not dispute those facts; instead, the 
memorandum argues that (1) the filing by the salaried employee was proper 
because the complaint is a fact affidavit and the employee is the person with 
knowledge, (2) R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) as amended in 1999 specifically permits a 
salaried employee of a corporate property owner to file on behalf of the owner, 
and (3) the BTA has no authority to decline to apply the statute on constitutional 
grounds. 
{¶ 7} In its September 25, 2012 decision, the BTA observed that the 
BOR had failed to certify the transcript of its proceedings, yet held that the record 
was “adequate to resolve [the school board’s] motion.”  Marysville Exempted 
Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Union Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA Nos. 2011-K-
4087 through 2011-K-4096, 2012 WL 4766420, *1, fn. 1 (Sept. 25, 2012).  The 
complaints had been “prepared and filed on behalf of Connolly Construction by 
its employee, John R. Connolly,” who was neither a lawyer and nor an officer.  Id. 
at *1. 
{¶ 8} Relying on McDonald’s Corp. v. Union Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2012-
Ohio-3751, 974 N.E.2d 133 (3d Dist.), appeal accepted, 133 Ohio St.3d 1489, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
2012-Ohio-5459, 978 N.E.2d 909, the BTA concluded that salaried employees 
who are not lawyers could not be authorized to file a complaint on behalf of the 
corporation.  Accordingly, the BTA ordered remand to the BOR for  dismissal. 
Analysis 
A. Connolly’s admissions permit the jurisdictional issue to be determined 
{¶ 9} The BTA determined that the record was “adequate” to permit it to 
determine the jurisdictional issue the parties presented.  2012 WL 4766420, *1, 
fn. 1.  At first blush, this finding is puzzling.  Apparently, the BTA lacked any 
record—and therefore any factual basis for determining whether the asserted 
jurisdictional issue was in fact presented and, if so, how it should be resolved. 
{¶ 10} There is a danger in such a situation that the parties are asking the 
BTA (and on appeal the court) to render an advisory opinion on an issue that is 
not actually presented.  Nonetheless, the BTA was justified in reviewing the legal 
issue that the parties presented in spite of any deficiencies of the record.  That is 
so because of the elementary proposition that “when jurisdictional facts are 
challenged, the party claiming jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating that 
the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter.”  Ohio Natl. Life Ins. Co. v. 
United States, 922 F.2d 320, 324 (6th Cir.1990).  If Connolly Construction 
believed that a state of facts existed that established the BOR’s jurisdiction over 
its complaints, it had the burden to assert those grounds in opposition to the 
motion to dismiss and to offer concomitant proof as necessary in support of its 
assertions.  See Rapier v. Union City Non-Ferrous, Inc., 197 F.Supp.2d 1008, 
1012 (S.D.Ohio 2002); accord Oak Hills Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. 
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 134 Ohio St.3d 539, 2012-Ohio-5750, 983 N.E.2d 
1295, ¶ 16-18 (affirming jurisdictional dismissal of appeal to the BTA where 
appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence of alleged facts supporting 
jurisdiction). 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
{¶ 11} This burden is very much attendant here because a valuation 
complaint initiates an administrative proceeding that is specially created by 
statute.  Indeed, we have held that the complainant in a special statutory 
proceeding must  affirmatively plead the jurisdictional facts.  See Haskins v. 
Alcott & Horton, 13 Ohio St. 210, 216 (1862) (“where a statute, upon certain 
conditions, confers a right, or gives a remedy, unknown to the common law, the 
party asserting the right, or availing himself of the remedy, must, in his pleadings, 
bring himself, or his case, clearly within the statute”); see also S. Christian 
Leadership Conference v. Combined Health Dist., 191 Ohio App.3d 405, 2010-
Ohio-6550, 946 N.E.2d 282, ¶ 28 (2d Dist.).  This principle comports with the 
overarching doctrine that the proponent of jurisdiction must shoulder the burden 
of showing that the tribunal—here, the board of revision—may proceed to hear its 
complaint. 
{¶ 12} In this case, Connolly Construction never contested the factual 
assertions made by the school board, nor did it set forth alternative grounds for 
jurisdiction. Instead, Connolly Construction acquiesced in the school board’s 
factual assertions as a basis for determining the BOR’s jurisdiction.  Indeed, the 
only basis that Connolly Construction offered in support of jurisdiction was the 
provision in R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) permitting a salaried employee to file a valuation 
complaint on behalf of its employer, a corporate property owner.1  
                                                 
1 Our decision in Worthington City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 85 Ohio St.3d 156, 707 N.E.2d 499, 
established that even before the 1999 amendments to R.C. 5715.19(A)(1), the complaint need not 
be signed by an attorney as long as the attorney had substantial involvement in preparing and 
filing it.  Id. at 160.  This is important in this case in two respects.  First, Connolly Construction 
notably did not assert or offer to prove that the company’s legal counsel was involved in preparing 
and filing the complaint, which would have constituted an alternative ground for rejecting the 
motion to dismiss—one that would obviate any consideration of the constitutionality of the 1999 
amendments to R.C. 5715.19(A)(1).  Second, the holding of Worthington shows why it does not 
matter  that  the Department of Taxation’s complaint form is in the form of an affidavit, which 
would properly be signed by a fact witness rather than an attorney:  under Worthington, the 
lawyer’s involvement in preparing and filing means that there is no unauthorized-practice 
problem, even when the client is the one who signs the complaint. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
{¶ 13} We conclude that under these circumstances, we may proceed to 
review the BTA’s legal determination that despite R.C. 5715.19(A)(1)’s explicit 
authorization, a salaried employee may not file a valuation complaint on behalf of 
a corporation if that employee is not a lawyer. 
B.  The BTA may decline to apply a statute when the board relies on an 
appellate court decision declaring the statute unconstitutional 
{¶ 14} Connolly Construction argues that the BTA has no authority to 
declare a statute unconstitutional, because the BTA “ ‘is an administrative agency, 
a creature of statute, and is without jurisdiction to determine the constitutional 
validity of a statute.’ ”  Castle Aviation, Inc. v. Wilkins, 109 Ohio St.3d 290, 
2006-Ohio-2420, 847 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 35, quoting Cleveland Gear Co. v. Limbach, 
35 Ohio St.3d 229, 520 N.E.2d 188 (1988), paragraph one of the syllabus; accord 
Global Knowledge Training, L.L.C. v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 34, 2010-Ohio-4411, 
936 N.E.2d 463, ¶ 16; see also MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Limbach, 68 
Ohio St.3d 195, 198, 625 N.E.2d 597 (1994) (in an as-applied challenge, the 
BTA’s limited role is to “receive evidence for [the court] to make the 
constitutional finding”). 
{¶ 15} While the general proposition Connolly Construction relies upon is 
true, we do not agree that it applies in this context.  To be sure, the BTA’s status 
as a creature of statute does prevent it from declining to apply a pertinent statute 
on constitutional grounds based merely upon its own determination of the 
statute’s constitutionality.  But in this case, the BTA pointed to and relied on a 
decision from the Third Appellate District, McDonald’s Corp., 2012-Ohio-3751, 
974 N.E.2d 133, and the limits on the BTA’s jurisdiction as an administrative 
tribunal do not preclude it from attending to, and giving effect to, the 
pronouncements of the courts that review its decisions.  Indeed, no one has argued 
that a ruling issued by this court could be ignored by the BTA; the BTA would 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
not only have jurisdiction to apply this court’s precedent—it would have a duty to 
do so. 
{¶ 16} We conclude that the BTA had jurisdiction to apply the 
McDonald’s decision from the Third District and to order dismissal in this case 
based on the authority of that appellate decision.  We now turn to the merits of 
whether the BTA should have done so. 
C.  The potential conflict between legislative power and this court’s  
duty to regulate the practice of law 
1.  The Sharon Village doctrine 
{¶ 17} More than 15 years ago, we issued a consequential decision that 
addressed whether a corporation that owned real property could authorize a 
nonattorney to file a valuation complaint on its behalf.  In Sharon Village, 78 
Ohio St.3d 479, 678 N.E.2d 932, the court applied (1) the former version of R.C. 
5715.19(A), (2) R.C. 4705.01, a statute prohibiting the practice of law by 
nonlawyers, and (3) case law defining the practice of law.  We held that preparing 
and filing a valuation complaint on behalf of another constituted the practice of 
law.  As a result,  a person who is not a lawyer could not be authorized to file a 
valuation complaint on behalf of a corporate entity that owned real property 
because any such filing constituted the unauthorized practice of law and, 
accordingly, would not validly invoke the board of revision’s jurisdiction to hear 
the complaint.  Id.  at 483. 
{¶ 18} Sharon Village relied on case law that had expansively interpreted 
the practice of law.  The practice of law is not “ ‘limited to the conduct of cases in 
court,’ ” but it encompasses as well “ ‘the preparation of pleadings and other 
papers incident to actions and special proceedings,’ ” along with “ ‘the 
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges 
and courts.’ ”  Id. at 480, quoting Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 
129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934), paragraph one of the syllabus.  In addition, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
“ ‘conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and in general 
all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the 
law’ ” fell under this broad definition of the practice of law.  Sharon Village at 
480-481, quoting Dworken at paragraph one of the syllabus.  On that basis, 
Sharon Village held that the preparation and filing of valuation complaints on 
behalf of others constituted the practice of law.  Id. at 482. 
2.  Anti-Sharon Village legislation 
{¶ 19} Significantly, during the time at issue in Sharon Village and its 
progeny, R.C. 5715.19(A) did not specify persons who may file on behalf of a 
corporate property owner.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 603, 142 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4583, 
4589.  But R.C. 4705.01 did expressly prohibit a nonlawyer from “using or 
subscribing his own name” to commence, conduct, or defend any “action or 
proceeding” when the nonlawyer is not a party to the case.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 219, 
140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 662, 680-681.  Thus, at the time Sharon Village was 
decided, the statutes themselves did not authorize anyone but a lawyer to file on 
behalf of a corporate entity.  That circumstance makes it understandable that the 
filing of a valuation complaint by a nonlawyer was deemed to constitute a 
jurisdictional defect in the complaint itself. 
{¶ 20} In 1999, however, the General Assembly enacted Sub.H.B. No. 
694, which amended R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) to permit certain specified persons to 
file valuation complaints on behalf of the property owner without regard to 
whether those persons are lawyers.  147 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5373, 5375.  
Permitting nonlawyers to file as the agent of a property owner raised the issue 
“whether the legislative enactment can constitutionally be enforced in light of the 
duty to regulate the practice of law that the Ohio Constitution vests in this court.”  
Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 134 
Ohio St.3d 529, 2012-Ohio-5680, 983 N.E.2d 1285, ¶ 11. 
 
 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
3.  This court has upheld two H.B. 694 provisions 
{¶ 21} In two cases, this court has addressed different portions of the 1999 
amendments to R.C. 5715.19(A)(1).  First, in Dayton Supply & Tool Co., Inc. v. 
Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 111 Ohio St.3d 367, 2006-Ohio-5852, 856 
N.E.2d 926, the court considered the statutory provision authorizing nonlawyer 
corporate officers to file on behalf of the corporate property owner.  In that case, 
we set forth the relevant factors to consider in determining, on a case-by-case 
basis, whether a particular activity may be performed by nonlawyers.  Id. at ¶ 7-
13.  We concluded that “a corporate officer does not engage in the unauthorized 
practice of law by preparing and filing a complaint with the board of revision and 
by presenting the claimed value of the property before the board of revision on 
behalf of his or her corporation, as long as the officer does not make legal 
arguments, examine witnesses, or undertake any other tasks that can be performed 
only by an attorney.”  Id. at syllabus. 
{¶ 22} Next, in Columbus Bd. of Edn., 134 Ohio St.3d 529, 2012-Ohio-
5680, 983 N.E.2d 1285, we addressed the amended statute’s provision that 
authorizes a property owner’s spouse to file on behalf of the owner.  Concluding 
that the legislature did not substantially interfere with this court’s authority to 
regulate the practice of law by permitting a spouse to file a valuation complaint on 
behalf of the property owner, the court deferred to the General Assembly’s 
decision regarding how the jurisdiction of an administrative board may be 
invoked.  The court also declined to apply the case-by-case test utilized in Dayton 
Supply & Tool to decide who may file on another’s behalf, based on the court’s 
perception that the legislature did not intend that any such test be applied. 
{¶ 23} Thus, the decision in Columbus Bd. of Edn. provides a roadmap for 
considering the issue in this case, i.e., whether salaried employees of a corporate 
property owner may prepare and file a valuation complaint on behalf of the 
owner. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
D.  The General Assembly did not exceed its authority when it authorized 
salaried employees to file complaints on behalf of the corporation 
{¶ 24} At the outset, we note that Connolly’s heavy reliance on our 
decision in Toledo Public Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Revision, 124 
Ohio St.3d 490, 2010-Ohio-253, 924 N.E.2d 345, is misplaced.  In Toledo, a 
lawyer for a property-management company prepared and filed a valuation 
complaint on behalf of the property owner, pursuant to an agreement granting the 
management company that authority.  We confronted the issue whether a 
contractor could act as an agent of the property owner and held that it could.  Id. 
at ¶ 24, 28, and 30.  We specifically noted, however, that the issue of the 
unauthorized practice of law (which is at the heart of this case) did not arise, 
because a lawyer—the contractor’s lawyer—had been involved in preparing and 
filing the complaint.  Id. at ¶ 22.  Accordingly, Toledo is inapposite. 
{¶ 25} Because Toledo does not control, we must apply the test articulated 
in Columbus Bd. of Edn.  Under that case, three principles guide the court’s 
determination.  First, we decline to adopt an as-applied approach with a 
multifactor constitutional test that the legislature itself did not enact and did not 
intend.  Columbus Bd. of Edn. calls for reviewing each of the particular provisions 
added to R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) by Sub.H.B. No. 694 on an all-or-nothing basis, 
because “[l]itigants and agencies should be able to rely on the statute at all times 
or, alternatively, know that they may never rely on it.”  Id. at ¶ 20. 
{¶ 26} Second, we accord deference to the General Assembly’s authority 
to create administrative tribunals such as the boards of revision and to define how 
their jurisdiction may be invoked.  Id. at ¶ 22.  It follows that we will invalidate 
the filing of a complaint that complies with R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) only if we find 
that enforcing the statute would substantially interfere with this court’s duty to 
regulate the practice of law.  Id. 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
{¶ 27} Third, we uphold the legislative decision to authorize the filing of a 
complaint on behalf of the owner if the person so authorized may, by virtue of his 
or her relationship with the owner, be held accountable by the owner for his or her 
actions.  Id. at ¶ 24. 
{¶ 28} Applying these principles compels the conclusion that the General 
Assembly had authority to authorize salaried employees, though not lawyers, to 
file on behalf of the corporate property owner.  Although the salaried corporate 
employee does not necessarily have the same degree of fiduciary duty toward the 
corporation that an officer possesses, the relationship of a salaried employee to 
the corporate employer does “tend to involve an ongoing relationship between the 
owner and the filer” that “allow[s] the owner to hold the filer accountable for his 
or her actions.”  Columbus Bd. of Edn., 134 Ohio St.3d 529, 2012-Ohio-5680, 983 
N.E.2d 1285, at  ¶ 24.  Nor does allowing the salaried employee to file constitute 
any greater intrusion on our duty to regulate the practice of law than those 
authorizations that we have already upheld. 
{¶ 29} Moreover, we find the school board’s arguments to the contrary 
unavailing.  The school board first argues that “the legislature cannot widen the 
pool of people who may practice law.”  It is true that, because this court bears the 
ultimate constitutional responsibility to oversee the practice of law, the legislature 
can go no further in authorizing legal practice by nonlawyers than we permit.  But 
it is equally true that we have permitted nonlawyers to engage in a properly 
limited range of activity, even though that activity falls within the broad definition 
of legal practice.  We have held that “ ‘there are multiple interests to consider in 
determining whether a particular legal activity is acceptably performed by 
nonlawyers,’ ” so that even though “ ‘all representative conduct at the 
administrative level falls within the broad definition of the practice of law, yet 
still [we may] still authorize lay representatives to perform certain functions in the 
administrative setting when the public interest so demands.’ ”  Dayton Supply & 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
Tool Co., 111 Ohio St.3d 367, 2006-Ohio-5852, 856 N.E.2d 926, ¶ 13, quoting 
Cleveland Bar Assn. v. CompManagement, Inc., 104 Ohio St.3d 168, 2004-Ohio-
6506, 818 N.E.2d 1181, ¶ 69. 
{¶ 30} In CompManagement, we upheld the standards of Industrial 
Commission Resolution No. R04-1-01, which defined what certain nonlawyers 
(third-party administrators and union representatives) may do in connection with 
assisting claimants and employers with workers’ compensation claims before the 
Industrial Commission.  Those standards authorized nonlawyers, among other 
things, to assist parties “ ‘in the administration of a claim and the filing of claims 
and appeals.’ ”   Id. at ¶ 21, quoting paragraph (A)(2) of the Resolution.  Accord 
Henize v. Giles, 22 Ohio St.3d 213, 217, 490 N.E.2d 585 (1986) (“With this 
authority [to control the practice of law] is the concomitant responsibility to 
protect the public by preventing the unauthorized practice of law, while at the 
same time not exercising this authority so rigidly that the public good suffers”). 
{¶ 31} This background demonstrates that there is ample precedent for 
exercising deference to laws or policies that, in properly limited contexts, 
authorize nonlawyers to engage in activities that fall into the broad category of the 
practice of law.  Because the authorization of salaried employees to file on behalf 
of their corporate employers satisfies the relevant criteria, we uphold it. 
{¶ 32} Next, the school board attempts to distinguish this case from 
Dayton Supply & Tool by contrasting the duties of a corporate officer and those of 
a salaried employee.  The school board asserts that the person who prepares and 
files the valuation complaint must have a “fiduciary duty” to the corporate 
property owner and states that unlike corporate officers, salaried employees are 
not typically regarded as fiduciaries of the corporation. 
{¶ 33} We do not find this argument persuasive.  It has long been 
acknowledged that an employee is party to an “ ‘implied agreement * * * that he 
will faithfully serve and be regardful of the interests of his employer during the 
January Term, 2013 
13 
 
term of service and carefully discharge his duty to the extent reasonably implied 
by the relation of employer and employee.’ ”   (Emphasis deleted.)  Fremont Oil 
Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 26 O.O.2d 109, 92 Ohio Law Abs. 76, 192 N.E.2d 123, 
126 (C.P.1963), quoting 35 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d, Section 78, 500; see also 
Fugo v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 9th Dist. Summit No. C.A. 8380, 1977 WL 
198883 (June 2, 1977) (same); accord Columbus & Xenia R.R. Co. v. Webb’s 
Admr., 12 Ohio St. 475, 492 (1861).  This legal relationship makes the salaried 
employee sufficiently accountable to the property owner under the Columbus Bd. 
of Edn. test.  That is particularly true since, in that case, the spousal relationship 
met the test even in the absence of a business-fiduciary component. 
{¶ 34} In sum, we hold that the legislature acted within its authority in 
amending R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) to permit a salaried employee of a corporation who 
is not a lawyer to file a complaint on behalf of the corporation.  The complaints in 
this case therefore properly invoked the jurisdiction of the BOR, and dismissal 
was not warranted. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 35} For the foregoing reasons, the BTA erred by ordering that the 
valuation complaints at issue be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  We therefore 
reverse the decision of the BTA and remand for further proceedings.  
Additionally, the pending motion to consolidate this case with other cases is, with 
respect to this case, denied as moot. 
Decision reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
____________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
 
Britton, Smith, Peters & Kalail Co., L.P.A., Karrie Marie Kalail, and Paul 
J. Deegan, for appellee Marysville Exempted Village School District Board of 
Education. 
 
Luper, Neidenthal & Logan, Luther L. Liggett Jr., and David M. Scott, for 
appellant. 
________________________