Case Title: People v. Ortiz

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88833

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 88833-Agenda 13-September 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								EDWIN ORTIZ, Appellant.
Opinion filed May 24, 2001.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Bureau County,
defendant Edwin Ortiz was convicted of drug trafficking (720
ILCS 570/401.1 (West 1994)) and sentenced to 35 years'
imprisonment. Defendant appealed, and in December 1995 the
appellate court filed with its court clerk a document which
purported to reverse defendant's conviction on the grounds of
insufficiency of the evidence. The State's petition for rehearing
was denied, and we denied leave to appeal in June 1996.
Subsequently, in August 1997, the State moved for a writ of
mandamus or a supervisory order, directing the appellate court to
vacate its December 1995 order and issue a "valid opinion." We
issued a supervisory order to that effect, and denied defendant's
motion for reconsideration. Defendant's subsequent petition for a
writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court was also
denied. In January 1999, the appellate court issued a document in
the form of an opinion to be published, which denied defendant's
motion to have that court declare its December 1995 filing a final
order. In December 1999, the appellate court affirmed defendant's
conviction. No. 3-95-0261 (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23).
	We thereafter granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal
(155 Ill. 2d R. 315) from the appellate court's December 1999
order affirming his conviction. For the reasons that follow, we
reverse.
BACKGROUND
	Defendant's conviction arose out of the events of December
9, 1994. On that date, pursuant to a consensual search after a
traffic stop, police discovered 100 kilograms of cocaine inside a
secret compartment in the truck tractor semi-trailer which
defendant was driving.
	At defendant's trial, the following evidence was adduced
during the State's case in chief. The State's first witness was
Illinois State Trooper John Balma, who testified as follows. On
December 9, 1994, Balma observed a blue tractor trailer traveling
eastbound on Illinois Route 80. The vehicle was moving at a speed
of 63 miles per hour, which was 8 miles per hour in excess of the
posted speed limit. Balma stopped the truck to issue a traffic
citation.
	Defendant was driving the truck, and there was a female
passenger in the cab with him. Upon Balma's request, defendant
produced his license and registrations. Balma testified that
defendant produced his driver's license from his pocket; he did not
remember where the registrations had been kept. Defendant's New
Jersey driver's license was valid and the registrations for the
tractor and the trailer matched the VIN numbers for the vehicles.
The vehicles were registered to a Danny Estrella, which Balma
confirmed by radio. Balma testified that even though this
paperwork was in order, defendant seemed "extremely nervous,"
more so than was in his experience ordinary for a traffic stop.
	Defendant told Balma that he was hauling oranges from
Fillmore, California, to New Jersey, and produced a bill of lading.
The bill of lading indicated that the truck contained 630 cases of
oranges, which were owned by Star Produce. "Star Produce" was
written on the side of the truck, as well.
	Balma requested defendant's log books, in which were kept
the records of every stop made by the truck. The books indicated
that defendant's trip had actually begun in Tennessee, not
California. When Balma asked defendant why he had begun
driving in Tennessee, defendant told him that he and a codriver,
Juan Colon, had driven together from New Jersey to California;
Colon had driven from New Jersey to Tennessee and defendant
began driving in Tennessee. Balma also determined from the log
books that this was the second cross-country trip defendant had
made in the recent past, and on the other trip Colon was with him
the entire way as a codriver. Defendant told Balma he was paid
$900 to $1,000 for each trip, even though he had a codriver on the
previous trip.
	Balma testified that this was an abnormal pay arrangement.
Balma had been a truck driver for approximately 15 years before
becoming a law enforcement officer. Based on his prior
experience, he believed driving pay was based either on mileage
or an hourly rate, but in either event the total amount of money
was split between the drivers if there was more than one. For a
driver to receive the same pay regardless of whether he had a
codriver was "very unusual." However, Balma admitted that time
was sometimes of the essence in delivery and that a truck would
be able to make better time more safely with two drivers sleeping
in shifts than with a single driver.
	Balma further noted from his review of the log books that
after defendant and Colon had driven to California they had stayed
there approximately a week before beginning the return trip to
New Jersey. When he asked defendant why he had been there so
long, defendant stated that he was "waiting for them to pick their
oranges." When Balma asked if his trailer was full, defendant
stated that it was only half-full, which Balma also found very
unusual, because it was not cost-effective to transport half-loads
of products across the country. Balma stated that defendant said
that Colon had loaded first and filled his trailer, and defendant just
took what was left of the load. Balma admitted that during his
years in the industry he had sometimes thought that an employer
was not making the best use of his truck or his time, but he still
did what his employer asked because that was what he was being
paid for.
	When Balma asked about the female passenger in the vehicle
defendant said that she was his wife. He said that she had not
driven out with him to California from New Jersey. Balma
testified that defendant told him that the truck owner, Estrella, had
flown her out from New Jersey to California to be with him. At
this point Balma observed that defendant "was becoming
extremely nervous." Defendant was "constantly rubbing his hair,"
tapping his foot, and "wiggling" his leg. Balma admitted that he
did not know defendant and had no idea of his general demeanor.
	Balma inspected the truck and issued defendant a written
warning. Shortly before Balma gave defendant the warning,
defendant volunteered that it had been "a bad trip, he got stuck in
California. He was searched three times in Utah. And now this."
After giving defendant the warning and returning his documents,
Balma advised him that he was free to go. However, Balma then
asked defendant if he had anything illegal in his vehicle. Balma
testified that defendant turned his head away and replied, "No, do
you want to look?" Balma told defendant that he would like to,
and produced a voluntary consent form, which defendant signed.
	Balma called for backup and Troopers Kathy Miroux and
Michael Ketter responded. Defendant retrieved a key for a padlock
on the trailer portion of the truck and opened it. Balma proceeded
to search the truck while defendant sat in Balma's patrol car in the
custody of the other troopers.
	The truck was approximately half-full of boxes, which were
labeled as containing oranges. The entire load was towards the
front half of the trailer. Balma climbed on top of the boxes and
crawled approximately 20 to 25 feet over the top of them to the
front of the trailer. When he shone his flashlight down he saw a
sheet of aluminum "diamond plate" affixed to the front wall of the
trailer which appeared to be fairly new. He testified that it was
obvious as soon as he saw it that the plate was not part of the
original makeup of the trailer, but admitted that the plate was not
visible from the rear of the truck.
	When Balma shone his flashlight between the plate and the
front wall of the trailer he saw a yellow wrapped package. Further
observation revealed that there was more than one package. He
punctured one of the packages and the material inside appeared to
be cocaine. Balma exited the vehicle and placed defendant under
arrest, telling him that there was cocaine in the vehicle. According
to Balma, defendant "just basically submitted to the arrest. He
didn't ask why or where or who or anything. He just showed very
little emotion."
	Balma testified that after arresting defendant he seized $561
from defendant's person. Balma also identified two pagers which
were found on the visor above the driver's seat in the cab of the
truck. He stayed with the truck while it was towed to a location
where the oranges could be unloaded and then watched as the plate
at the front of the truck was removed. Behind the plate were 61
packages of cocaine, containing what was stipulated to be 100
kilograms of 76.9% pure cocaine, with an estimated street value
of $30,760,000.
	Trooper Balma also testified over objection that on September
28, 1994, he had arrested two men, Pedro Then and Orlando
Fernandez, when he found 67 kilograms of 88.1% pure cocaine in
a Ryder truck in which they were traveling eastbound on I-80.
	Balma admitted on cross-examination that when he was a
driver he had hooked his tractor to preloaded trailers without
observing the loading process. He stated that although he would
look inside the trailer before leaving, the inspection was limited to
making sure that the load was secure. If things appeared to be
loaded correctly he did nothing further. He also testified that at
some point during the stop, defendant had told him that Colon was
in another truck and was also hauling oranges and was somewhere
behind him.
	Illinois State Trooper Kathy Miroux verified Balma's
testimony that after she and Trooper Ketter arrived on the scene
they took custody of defendant while Balma entered the trailer and
conducted the search. She testified that defendant looked very
nervous while Balma was in the truck and that he mostly watched
the rear of the truck during the six- or seven-minute search.
	The State next called Ottawa Police Officer John Malone,
who was assigned to the District 17 State Police Drug Task Force
at the time of defendant's arrest. He interviewed defendant after
his arrest. Defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and
waived them. Malone testified that defendant was very calm
during the interview. He told Malone that all he knew was that he
was hauling oranges from the west coast. He stated that when he
picked up his load at the Sunkist Corporation in Fillmore,
California, the trailer was already loaded. He merely hooked up
the tractor and headed out.
	Defendant told Malone that Danny Estrella owned the tractor
trailer he was driving. He had met Estrella only once, at a
restaurant in New York. Juan Colon, a codriver and a friend of his,
had introduced them, and defendant had agreed to drive for
Estrella. Defendant told Malone that Colon was also driving a
tractor-trailer containing oranges to New Jersey, but the last time
defendant had seen him was near the Iowa border, because
Colon's truck had broken down.
	Malone testified that he found a photograph in the cab of
defendant's truck. The photograph showed defendant and Colon
standing in front of two trucks. Colon had what appeared to be a
large gun tucked into the waistband of his pants. Malone also
found several truck parking receipts from Ship-side Service, Inc.,
in Elizabeth, New Jersey. Each one listed the name of the driver
who had picked up a truck on a particular date. The most recent
receipt, dated November 24, 1994, listed defendant as the driver.
An earlier receipt listed Colon, while two others listed the driver
simply as "Pedro" and another receipt was issued to "Danny."
Malone testified that the receipts had been found in the cab of the
truck defendant was driving, but he did not know where
specifically, whether on the floor of the cab or among defendant's
belongings. He admitted that it would make sense that whoever
had picked up the truck would simply drop the receipt in the cab.
	Additionally, Malone found a bill from a New Jersey truck
stop in the name of Orlando Fernandez in a blue binder or folder
holding the registrations for the tractor and trailer in the cab of the
truck defendant was driving. Malone admitted that it would make
sense that the folder belonged with the truck, rather than
defendant, since the registration had to be kept with the vehicle.
	Malone was also permitted to testify that he had found a
receipt for a repair bill signed by Pedro Then among Colon's
belongings in the truck Colon was driving when he was arrested
later that day.
	Malone admitted that defendant answered all of the questions
which were posed to him. However, when Malone asked
defendant to "cooperate with [the police] in terms of bringing the
truck to New Jersey and following through," defendant refused,
telling Malone that Colon got the job for him. Malone understood
defendant to be saying that Colon knew Estrella better than
defendant did.
	Illinois State Trooper Larry Thomas made a traffic stop of
Colon later that day. After a consensual search of his truck, police
discovered 285 kilograms of 88.4% pure cocaine, a shipment with
a street value of over $100 million. Thomas testified that he had
been specifically advised to look for the trailer Colon was driving
as a result of Malone's interrogation of defendant.
	At the conclusion of the State's case in chief, the defense
moved for a directed verdict, which the circuit court denied. The
judge stated that
		"[t]he main thing is the inference that arises from
narcotics being found in the premises or in this case a
truck within the control of the defendant. Gives rise to a
presumption of knowledge that's not overcome unless
there are other facts and circumstances which might lead
to reasonable doubt as to the guilt in the minds of the jury.
And I'm citing People v. Bell, 53 Ill. 2d 122."
	Defendant testified on his own behalf. Defendant was a
resident of New Jersey. Of all the names the State had mentioned
during its case in chief, the only person he knew was Colon, with
whom he had been good friends for about 20 years. Before his
arrest he had never heard of Pedro Then or Orlando Fernandez,
and the only time he had met Estrella was in early November
1994. Defendant was having engine trouble with his own truck,
and Colon introduced him to Estrella at a restaurant. On cross-examination defendant maintained that he did not know Colon's
address, beyond the town in which he lived. Until two or three
months before his arrest, he had never visited Colon's home
during the 20 years that they had been friends.
	Defendant only made two trips for Estrella. The first time he
flew out to California with Colon in early November and they
drove a single truck back together. The second time was the trip on
which he was stopped.
	On this later trip, defendant and Colon had driven a truck
from New Jersey to California together. When they arrived in
California, they had to wait four or five days before starting back
because they had to wait for the oranges to be picked. While there,
defendant called Estrella to ask if his girlfriend could fly out to
join him. She flew out and stayed with him for the last two days he
was there, in a different hotel, for which defendant paid.
	Defendant and Colon drove back to New Jersey in separate
trucks. Colon's truck was loaded before his, and defendant was not
even present when Colon's truck was loaded. Nor did defendant
participate in or observe the subsequent loading of his truck. He
merely looked in the truck after it had been loaded to determine
whether the oranges were stable and he saw that they were.
	When Colon's truck broke down in Iowa, Colon gave
defendant his beeper so that defendant could continue on to New
Jersey. Defendant explained that the other beeper found in the
truck was his own, but it was "strictly local" to New Jersey.
Defendant took Colon's beeper because Estrella might want to
contact him during the trip outside of the area in which his beeper
would function. Also, his instructions were that upon arrival in
New Jersey he was supposed to bring the truck to Port Security, a
parking lot with 24-hour security. He was then to contact Estrella.
The beeper Colon gave him had the contact telephone number
written on it. Defendant had his own beeper because he was a
freelance trucker and he needed employers to be able to contact
him with work.
	When first asked, defendant testified that he did not tell
Trooper Balma that Estrella had paid for his girlfriend to come to
California. He believed that he told Balma that his girlfriend's
mother had paid for the airfare and that he, defendant, was going
to reimburse her mother. Later, he said that he might have told
Balma that he had to call Estrella for permission, and finally
defendant admitted that he did not remember what he told Balma,
and he may have told him that Estrella paid for the flight. He
stated that he was nervous when talking to Balma, because no one
was supposed to be in the truck with him and he was worried
about getting fined. He also admitted that he had referred to his
passenger as his wife because they had been living together for
nine years, but they were not actually married.
	Defendant testified that the gun tucked into Colon's
waistband in the picture found in the cab of defendant's truck was
a bb gun. He stated that the blue folder in which the registrations
were found was kept in the truck, and it was not his folder. During
the trip he used the folder as a place to keep his receipts, because
in addition to his pay of $800 or $900 he would also be
reimbursed for his personal expenses related to the trip. He did not
pay any attention to any papers in the folder other than his receipts
and the registrations.
	Regarding the log books, defendant stated that he was
unfamiliar with their format, despite his experience in the industry.
He explained that he was almost exclusively a local trucker; other
than his two deliveries for Estrella, the furthest he had ever driven
was Pennsylvania. He did not use the long-distance driving type
of log books for local deliveries.
	Defendant testified that he did not know about the secret
compartment in the truck and that he did not know that he was
hauling anything other than oranges.
	The State called Trooper Balma as a rebuttal witness. Balma
reaffirmed that in his conversation with defendant, defendant had
told him that Estrella had flown defendant's girlfriend out to
California to be with him. Defendant specifically named Estrella
as the vehicle owner. Balma denied having testified that defendant
explicitly stated that Estrella had paid her way out to California;
he said that defendant simply "stated that she was flown out there
by Mr. Estrella." Upon inquiry by the court, Balma testified that
when he stopped defendant, defendant produced his driver's
license from his person, but the registrations for the truck were in
the folder.
	The court acknowledged that the case was "very close" and
that the evidence was wholly circumstantial, but convicted
defendant. The court stated that "possibly no one item *** or
possibly no two or three of them put together could convince me
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. But all of
them taken together, the totality of the circumstances in this case
lead to that finding." The court stated with respect to People v.
Bell,
		"Naturally I would give less weight or it would be less of
an inference where the defendant is driving a tractor
trailer and may pick it up without checking anything other
than the stability. There's less of an inference there, at
least, in my mind than there is in deciding this case than
[sic] if the drugs are found in his suitcase or glove
compartment or trunk or car. That would create a stronger
inference. But, that inference stands under the law unless
as stated in People v. Bell[,] 53 Ill. 2d 122[, o]ther facts
and circumstances might leave a reasonable doubt as to
the guilt in the minds of the jury."
The court stated that the light loads in the trucks driven by both
defendant and Colon were
		"one of the strongest things that's, that's [sic] of suspicion
and imputed to the knowledge of the defendant is the fact
that all of these oranges from looking at the pictures could
have been put in one truck and there'd still be room for
another big load of oranges. Unless it somehow exceeded
the weight. Which may, it, to drive an empty truck from
the east coast to the west coast and then bring two trucks
back with so few oranges in each one again is certainly a
suspicious situation that the defendant knew what was
going on [sic]."
	In convicting defendant, the court also focused on the fact that
defendant was to deliver the truck to Port Security, a parking lot.
The court stated that it found this unusual, and that although
defendant did not have to explain anything, he chose to explain
this and the explanation was unsatisfactory.
	On defendant's motion for a new trial, the court allowed the
defense to introduce testimony and documents demonstrating that
Port Security was a storage facility where people could park
trailers or containers taken from ships. There was 24-hour security
in the lot and there were "plug-ins" which could run refrigerated
units. The court acknowledged that any confusion regarding Port
Security had "certainly been cleared up," but denied the motion for
a new trial, stating that even disregarding everything with respect
to the parking arrangement at Port Security, the evidence would
still support the conviction. The court reiterated that defendant's
suspicions should have been aroused by being flown to California
on the first trip, his girlfriend coming out on the second trip, and
the light loads in both of the trucks.
	Defendant appealed his conviction to the Third District of the
appellate court. Justices Holdridge, Stouder, and Lytton comprised
the three-judge panel assigned to the case. On December 12, 1995,
a document was filed with the clerk of the appellate court for the
Third District. This document was in the form of an order issued
by the appellate court, and purported to reverse defendant's
conviction on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence. It was
authored by Justice Holdridge, and stated that it had the
concurrence of Justice Stouder. However, Justice Stouder had died
on December 7, 1995, before the document was filed. The
document also contained a writing in the form of a dissent,
authored by the third member of the panel, Justice Lytton.
	The State petitioned this court for leave to appeal pursuant to
our Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). The State argued that the
document was not a valid order because Justice Stouder had died
before it was filed, and also contended that if it was a valid order,
it erred in its resolution of the merits of the case. We denied leave
to appeal in June 1996. The appellate court's mandate was then
spread of record, and the defendant was released from custody.
	In August 1997 the State filed with this court a motion for
leave to seek a writ of mandamus or, in the alternative, for a
supervisory order directing the appellate court to vacate the
document filed in December 1995 and issue a "valid opinion."
Defendant responded that the December 1995 "order" became
final when this court denied leave to appeal, and thus any order
directing the appellate court to reconsider his case would violate
his guarantees against double jeopardy. This court issued a
supervisory order in which we directed the appellate court to
"vacate its decision and order of December 12, 1995 ***, and all
subsequent orders in that appeal," and instructed the court to
"proceed with the appeal in a manner not inconsistent with this
court's opinion in Proctor v. Upjohn, 175 Ill. 2d 396 (1997)." We
denied defendant's motion for reconsideration. Defendant's
subsequent petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court was denied. Ortiz v. Illinois, 522 U.S. 982, 139 L. Ed. 2d 380, 118 S. Ct. 444 (1997).
	In the appellate court, defendant filed a motion for an order to
the effect that the December 1995 filing was a final order not
subject to review. In January 1999 the court filed with its clerk a
document in the form of an appellate court opinion designated for
publication. The filing solely addressed defendant's motion.
Therein, the court stated that by denying the State's petition for
leave to appeal from the December 1995 filing, this court "in
effect ruled on, and rejected," the arguments raised in the petition,
specifically the arguments that the December 1995 filing was not
a valid order and that if it was a valid order, it reached the wrong
conclusion on the merits. Thus, the court reasoned, res judicata
should have prohibited the State from raising either of those issues
in its motion for a supervisory order. Accordingly, the court
concluded, to vacate the December 1995 filing, as directed by this
court's August 1997 supervisory order, "clearly subjected the
defendant to double jeopardy." However, the court stated that it
was "powerless to act upon [its] conclusion" because it was bound
to follow this court's supervisory order and consider the merits of
the case "even though by doing so we are clearly violating the
defendant's constitutional rights by subjecting him to double
jeopardy." Accordingly, it directed the parties to brief the merits
of the case.
	Subsequently, in December 1999, the appellate court affirmed
defendant's conviction in an unpublished order, holding that the
evidence sufficed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
No. 3-95-0261 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule
23).
	Defendant petitioned for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315),
and alternatively requested an appeal as a matter of right (134 Ill.
2d R. 317). We granted leave to appeal.
ANALYSIS
	Defendant raises two issues in this appeal. He first contends
that the vacatur of the appellate court's December 1995 filing
violated his guarantee against double jeopardy. Additionally, he
contends that the appellate court erred in affirming his conviction
in December 1999. We shall address these contentions in turn.
A. Double Jeopardy
	Defendant first contends that all of the proceedings
subsequent to this court denying the State's petition for leave to
appeal in June 1996 have been in violation of his federal and state
constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy. See U.S. Const.,
amend. V; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §10. The double jeopardy
clauses are intended to uphold the principle " 'that the State with
all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty.' " People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293, 307 (1999), quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184,
187-88, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199, 204, 78 S. Ct. 221, 223 (1957). The
prohibition against double jeopardy "protects against three distinct
abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense."
People v. Placek, 184 Ill. 2d 370, 376-77 (1998). The protection
afforded by the Illinois constitution is no greater than that provided
by the federal constitution. People v. Levin, 157 Ill. 2d 138, 160
(1993). Normally, double jeopardy concerns are not implicated by
retrying a defendant after a successful appeal of a conviction.
However, there is an exception to this rule. A reversal of a
conviction based on insufficiency of the evidence is the equivalent
of an acquittal in the trial court for double jeopardy purposes and
thus bars a subsequent retrial of the defendant. Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1, 15-17, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1, 12-13, 98 S. Ct. 2141,
2149-50 (1978); People v. Daniels, 187 Ill. 2d 301, 310 (1999).
	Defendant contends that the instant case is governed by Burks.
He asserts that the appellate court's December 1995 "order"
became final when this court denied the State's petition for leave
to appeal in June 1996. He maintains that at that point any
irregularity in the "order" became irrelevant-he had received the
equivalent of an acquittal and the State should forever thereafter
have been barred from attempting to prosecute him for the acts
which formed the basis of the prior prosecution. He posits that
because the appellate court had jurisdiction of the case and the
parties in December 1995, the December 1995 "order" was not
void, but merely voidable. Accordingly, he reasons, it is immune
to collateral attack, and must stand.
	We disagree, because there was no order entered in December
1995. Although the court had jurisdiction over the case and
parties, the court never disposed of the case. As we will explain,
the document filed with the clerk was wholly without legal effect,
and the case in fact remained pending before the appellate court.
	The authority of the appellate court derives from the Illinois
Constitution. Section 5 of the judiciary article of the constitution
provides that "the concurrence of a majority of [an appellate court]
division is necessary for a decision." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §5.
In this context the term "division" means "panel." 145 Ill. 2d R.
22(b). Accordingly, the concurrence of at least two judges is
required for the appellate court to render a valid decision. Proctor
v. Upjohn Co., 175 Ill. 2d 394, 396 (1997); Cirro Wrecking Co. v.
Roppolo, 153 Ill. 2d 6, 17 (1992); 145 Ill. 2d R. 22(c). When a
document in the form of an order is issued without the
concurrence of two judges, that document is not a valid judgment.
Proctor, 175 Ill. 2d  at 396-97.
	On its face, the December 1995 filing proclaimed that it did,
in fact, have the concurrence of two judges. But one of those
judges, Justice Stouder, had died before the opinion was filed.
Because his authority to act ceased immediately when by his death
he vacated his office, his purported concurrence in the
subsequently filed opinion was without legal effect. The reason is
clear; until the opinion is filed, any or all of the judges deciding
the case remain free to change their minds regarding the outcome.
No judge is bound by a vote cast before the opinion is filed.
Accordingly, Justice Stouder's prefiling concurrence cannot be
counted in support of the December 1995 filing, so that filing did
not receive the concurrence of two judges.
	Because the December filing did not have the concurrence of
two judges, it was not a decision of the court. Ill. Const. 1970, art.
VI, §5; Proctor, 175 Ill. 2d  at 396-97. It had no more effect than
if one of the judges on the panel decided a case wholly on his own,
and filed a document with the clerk in the form of a decision.
Because there was no valid order, there is no basis for defendant's
double jeopardy claim.
	We recognize that this court gave different instructions as to
what should be done when an appellate court panel could not
obtain the concurrence of two judges, in People ex rel. Director of
Finance v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 74 Ill. 2d 561, 566
(1979). There, no two of the three judges participating in the case
could agree, and we stated that because all of the remaining
justices in the Fourth District recused themselves from the case,
the case could not be submitted to a new panel. We stated that in
such a situation the appellate court should summarily affirm the
trial court. People ex rel. Director of Finance v. Young Women's
Christian Ass'n, 74 Ill. 2d  at 567. In this respect we overrule this
case.
	Although the appellate court is divided into five districts for
purposes of election (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §2), Illinois has but
one unitary appellate court. People v. Granados, 172 Ill. 2d 358,
371 (1996); People v. Layhew, 139 Ill. 2d 476, 489 (1990);
Renshaw v. General Telephone Co., 112 Ill. App. 3d 58, 61-62
(1983). Because there is but a single appellate court, there is no
reason for a rule that a case must be summarily affirmed absent the
agreement of two judges in the district in which the appeal is
brought. Should that panel be unable to reach agreement because
a judge originally assigned to the case departed the court before
the case was decided, another judge may be substituted; if the
original panel of three cannot decide the case, the case may be
assigned to a new panel. Litigants have no due process right to
have cases heard by a particular judge or judges. People v.
Williams, 124 Ill. 2d 300, 308 (1988). Even in a situation such as
existed in People ex rel. Director of Finance, where all of the
other judges in the district had recused themselves from the case,
this court has the power to assign judges to the various divisions
(145 Ill. 2d R. 22(b)), a power which we can and do utilize when
necessary to assign judges from one district to hear and decide
cases originally brought in another. See Renshaw, 112 Ill. App. 3d
at 62 (noting this practice). The appellate court cannot dispose of
a case absent the agreement of two judges.
	Returning to the instant case, defendant does not even argue
that Justice Stouder's concurrence was valid. Instead, he contends
that the State should be barred at this juncture from arguing to the
contrary, under the doctrine of res judicata. He suggests that after
this court denied leave to appeal in June 1996, the appellate
court's December 1995 filing became final and the State should be
precluded from assailing it on any bases which the State had
already raised, including the argument that the order was not valid
and that it erred on the merits.
	We reject this argument. The simple answer is that
defendant's res judicata argument shares with his double jeopardy
argument the fatal flaw that there was no order upon which to
anchor the doctrine. See Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill. 2d 325, 335 (1996) (for res judicata to apply, there must be a final
judgment on the merits).
	Defendant urges that our June 1996 denial of leave to appeal
constituted a judgment on the merits. We recognize that in its
January 1999 filing the appellate court stated that by denying leave
to appeal this court "in effect ruled on, and rejected," the
arguments raised in the petition. We have at least two concerns
with this document. First, although it was in the form of an
opinion to be published, it was not publishable. It did not decide
the case-it did no more than dispose of a motion. The case
remained before the court until December 1999, when the court
filed the unpublished order affirming defendant's conviction.
Under our Rule 23, only decisions of the appellate court may be
published. 166 Ill. 2d R. 23(a). We direct the appellate court to
designate the January 1999 filing as nonpublishable. Had the court
wished to publish its analysis, the proper course would have been
to include that analysis in the order disposing of the case.
	Moreover, the appellate court erred in its characterization of
our June 1996 denial of leave to appeal. It is well settled that our
denials of leave to appeal are not decisions on the merits of the
case. They "carry no connotation of approval or disapproval of the
appellate court action, and signify only that four members of this
court, for reasons satisfactory to them, have not voted to grant
leave." People v. Vance, 76 Ill. 2d 171, 183 (1979). Accord
Guerino v. Depot Place Partnership, 191 Ill. 2d 314, 319 (2000);
Koenig v. National Super Markets, Inc., 231 Ill. App. 3d 665, 667
(1992); United States ex rel. Falconer v. Lane, 708 F. Supp. 202,
205 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
	Defendant also contends that the evidence was insufficient to
uphold his conviction. To sustain the charge of controlled
substance trafficking which was levied against defendant in this
case, the State was required to prove that defendant, with
knowledge, brought into this state a controlled substance for the
purpose of delivery or with the intent to deliver. People v.
Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 360 (1992); 720 ILCS 570/401.1(a)
(West 1994). Defendant disputes only the State's proof of his
knowledge of the cocaine.
	Initially, defendant contends that the trial court infringed upon
his presumption of innocence by improperly applying People v.
Bell, 53 Ill. 2d 122, 126 (1972). There, we stated that "[w]here
narcotics are found on premises under the defendant's control, it
may be inferred that he had requisite knowledge and possession,
absent other facts and circumstances which might leave a
reasonable doubt as to guilt in the minds of the jury." This
presumption has been extended to automobiles under a
defendant's control. See, e.g., People v. Wells, 241 Ill. App. 3d
141, 146 (1993). Defendant contends that the presumption should
not apply in this case, where drugs were found in a secret
compartment in a vehicle driven for hire which the driver did not
own. Defendant notes that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has
held that when drugs are in secret compartments, mere control of
a vehicle is not sufficient to demonstrate knowledge on the part of
the driver. See, e.g., United States v. Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d 907 (5th
Cir. 1995) (and cases cited therein). See also Whitney v. State, 726 N.E.2d 823 (Ind. App. 2000) (adopting Fifth Circuit's rule).
Rather, there must be additional evidence suspicious in nature or
indicating guilty knowledge. Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d  at 911. Other
states have also held that knowledge cannot be based on mere
presence in a vehicle owned by another where the contraband is
out of sight. See Ferrell v. State, 649 So. 2d 831 (Miss. 1995);
Commonwealth v. Garcia, 409 Mass. 675, 569 N.E.2d 385 (1991).
New York has codified a presumption that every person in an
automobile is in knowing possession of any controlled substance
present therein, but carved out an exception for "a duly licensed
operator of an automobile who is at the time operating it for hire
in the lawful and proper pursuit of his trade." N.Y. Penal Law
§220.25(1)(a) (McKinney 2000).
	We agree that we would be dubious of a result based solely on
a presumption of knowledge in a case such as the instant one,
where drugs were found in a secret compartment in the trailer of
a vehicle driven for hire, which the driver did not own. However,
the State does not argue in favor of such a rule. Rather, the State
contends that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence in this
case to uphold the result reached by the trial court.
	In reviewing this claim, the question is whether any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State. People v. Perez, 189 Ill. 2d 254, 265-66
(2000). It is the trier of fact's responsibility to determine the
witnesses' credibility and the weight given to their testimony, to
resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from the evidence; we will not substitute our judgment
for that of the trier of fact on these matters. People v. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d 91, 132 (1999). However, although determinations by the
trier of fact are entitled to great deference, they are not conclusive.
Rather, we will reverse a conviction where the evidence is so
unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a
reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 542 (1999) (jury trial); People v. Pellegrino, 30 Ill. 2d 331,
334 (1964) (bench trial).
	In this case there are several pieces of uncontradicted
evidence which weigh in defendant's favor. For instance, Trooper
Balma's testimony regarding the trucking industry tended to
exculpate defendant, specifically his testimony that a driver would
normally only check if the load was secure before driving; that the
diamond plate panel could not be seen from the rear of the truck;
and that when he was a driver he drove the load he was given
where he was told, even when he did not think his employer was
making the best possible use of the truck. Also supporting
defendant are the facts that defendant not only gave the police
permission to search the vehicle after being told he was free to
leave, but informed the police-both Balma and, later, Malone-that
Colon was also driving a truck on the same route. The trial judge
acknowledged that this latter fact would seem to militate in
defendant's favor, but stated that he was "never surprised at some
of the things that are done."
	Still, the State maintains that there is sufficient circumstantial
evidence of defendant's guilt to uphold his conviction. Knowledge
may be, and ordinarily is, proven circumstantially. People v.
Crane, 308 Ill. App. 3d 675, 683 (1999); People v. Nash, 282 Ill.
App. 3d 982, 985 (1996); People v. Weiss, 263 Ill. App. 3d 725,
731 (1994); People v. Farrokhi, 91 Ill. App. 3d 421, 427 (1980).
Cf. People v. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d 256, 292 (1997) (" '[i]n a
prosecution for home invasion, knowledge may be proven by
circumstantial evidence so long as the State presents sufficient
evidence from which an inference of knowledge can be made' "),
quoting People v. Ramey, 240 Ill. App. 3d 456, 462 (1992). In this
case, the State relies on the following evidence adduced at trial:
(1) defendant's connection to other drug smugglers; (2)
inconsistent and suspicious testimony by defendant; (3) the value
of the cocaine; (4) the presence of two pagers in the cab of the
truck; and (5) defendant's nervousness. The State contends that
these facts, taken in concert, suffice to uphold defendant's
conviction.
	The State's assertion that "the defendant, Colon,
Then/Fernandez, and Estrella were intimately associated with one
another's activities" fails to find support in the evidence. Other
than defendant's admission that he was a friend of Colon, the only
evidence linking defendant and any of the other persons mentioned
are (1) defendant's admission that he had met Estrella, who owned
the truck defendant was driving; (2) the August 1994 truck repair
bill in Fernandez's name for the truck Colon was driving, found in
the folder containing the registration of the truck defendant was
driving; and (3) several old parking receipts, found somewhere in
the cab of the truck defendant was driving. The unrebutted
evidence, established not only by defendant's testimony but also
by the log books in his truck, was that he had driven for Estrella
only once before the trip during which Trooper Balma stopped
him. The three-month-old truck repair bill and the parking receipts
simply do not bear the weight placed on them by the State. The
evidence presented at trial is no basis for an inference that
defendant and the others were "intimately associated." Moreover,
as the trial court stated, the question is not whether there was a
drug ring operating; clearly there was. The question is what
defendant knew.
	The next evidence upon which the State relies is "inconsistent
and suspicious testimony by the defendant." For instance, the State
contends that defendant testified inconsistently about exactly when
Estrella hired him to go to California. We see no inconsistency
here. Defendant testified that when he met Estrella at the
restaurant he agreed to drive for him, but he did not find out the
exact date he would be going until Estrella called him later.
	The State also observes that defendant claimed to have called
Estrella from California to ask permission for his girlfriend to
come out but could not remember Estrella's telephone number at
trial. We again see no inconsistency. Defendant never claimed to
have dialed from memory, and his failure to recollect the number
is further explained by his uncontradicted testimony that Estrella's
telephone number was written on Colon's pager.
	The State further points to defendant's inability to give the
address of Star Produce or Rocky Road Trucking at trial. But
Officer Malone testified that defendant had given him the street
and town where Star Produce was located during the post-arrest
interview. A few hours after the interview Malone telephoned the
New Jersey authorities to inform them of this information.
Defendant's bill of lading and the written warning which Trooper
Balma issued to defendant also contain the address of Star
Produce, and the town in which Rocky Road Trucking was located
was written in defendant's log books. These facts derail the State's
implication-and the trial court's speculation-that there were no
such companies as Star Produce or Rocky Road. The State
produced no evidence that Star Produce or Rocky Road did not
exist, despite being in possession of facts enabling the State to
make such a determination. Moreover, even assuming arguendo
that the companies did not exist, we would see no reason to impute
this knowledge to defendant or to fault him for failing to
investigate his employer.
	The State denigrates defendant's testimony that he was
unfamiliar with the log books, in light of his 17 years of
involvement with the trucking industry. However, this ignores his
uncontradicted testimony that he was only a local driver and the
log books were of a type only used for long hauls. We note that the
State did not impeach this testimony through its rebuttal witness,
Trooper Balma.
	The State also notes that defendant testified that he had
known Colon for 20 years but did not know his address. This is
peculiar, but we fail to see the significance. A great deal of the
State's case was devoted to attempting to demonstrate links
between defendant and Estrella and the other persons who had
driven for him, including Colon especially. The State is not
contending that defendant's ignorance of Colon's address implies
that they did not in fact know each other. Nor does the State
contend that defendant was feigning ignorance of Colon's address
in order somehow to protect Colon. Indeed, such a claim would be
somewhat perplexing even beyond the question of what harm it
could do Colon for defendant to testify as to his address, in light
of the facts that (1) defendant knew that Colon had already been
arrested for cocaine trafficking, and (2) Colon had been arrested
because defendant had told the police about him.
	In the context of discussing defendant's testimony, the State
also notes the circumstances of the two trips defendant made for
Estrella. The State reiterates that according to defendant's own
testimony, first he and Colon flew out to California and drove
back together, for which defendant was paid $900, then on the
second trip he and Colon drove from New Jersey to California,
stayed in California for four to five days, then returned to New
Jersey in separate trucks. For this trip he was also to be paid $800
or $900. On the return trip neither defendant's truck nor Colon's
truck was more than half full. As previously noted, the fact that
neither truck was full was one of the key pieces of evidence upon
which the trial court relied in convicting the defendant.
	However, the weight of this evidence depends almost entirely
on the presumption that defendant knew Colon's truck was not
full. Defendant testified that Colon had loaded first and he,
defendant, was not even present when Colon's truck was loaded.
Defendant stated that he believed that he just got what was left
over. The State introduced no evidence showing that defendant
knew what Colon was carrying. We note that the State was in
possession of both defendant's and Colon's bills of lading, but
only introduced defendant's into evidence. That document showed
the exact time that defendant was loaded and the company which
did the loading. If defendant's story regarding the loading
procedure was a fabrication, the State had the means in its
possession to so demonstrate. It did not do so. There was no
evidence from which defendant's knowledge of the light load
Colon was carrying could be inferred.
	The trial court also found the financial circumstances of the
trip unusual. The court believed defendant's suspicions should
have been aroused when he was flown out to drive back on the
first trip because he should have known that the employer could
get a California driver to make the trip. The court also stated that
defendant could not have made any money on the second trip if he
was paid only $900 to drive round trip between New Jersey and
California, waiting for four or five days between trips and paying
for a hotel and meals during that time. However, defendant's
testimony was that Colon paid for all meals and hotel rooms
except for the two days when defendant and his girlfriend stayed
in a separate room together in California, which defendant thought
cost approximately $45. Nor was there any basis for the inference
that defendant knew before leaving New Jersey that he would be
delayed in California. He testified that he was only so informed
upon arrival. The daily pay would have been much better if not for
the delay.
	Moreover, the trial court apparently accepted defendant's
testimony that he had never driven further than Pennsylvania
before working for Estrella, stating, "here is a driver who has
never been beyond Pennsylvania and going coast to coast with
Colon." We cannot see any basis for imputing to this defendant
knowledge that he was transporting narcotics based on the fact that
he was driving less than a full load of perishable fresh produce to
the east coast during winter. Further, the court relied in part on the
fact that defendant had been flown to California, which occurred
not on this trip, but the previous one. This fact is remote to the
question of defendant's knowledge that he was transporting
cocaine on this trip.
	Finally, as previously noted, Trooper Balma admitted that
when he, as a trucker, had believed that his employer was not
making an efficient use of his truck or time, he still drove where
he was told. It was simply not his job to question the economics of
the trip he was being asked to take.
	The State also contends that the high value of the contraband
found in this case constitutes a proper basis for an inference that
defendant was not simply an unwitting "mule," citing United
States v. Pollock, 926 F.2d 1044 (11th Cir. 1991). The defense
contends that the value of the drugs is equally susceptible to the
opposite inference. That is, the defense argues that a smuggler
might prefer that a driver not know the drugs are there, because of
the risk of theft of a valuable shipment. Although we generally
leave inferences to the trier of fact, the trial court made no mention
of the value of the drugs in explaining its ruling. We note that
Pollock is based on the notion that one would not ordinarily put an
extremely valuable cargo in the hands of a stranger. However, in
this case, defendant was supposed to make the entire trip in the
company of Colon. Colon introduced defendant and Estrella and
Colon's vehicle contained drugs worth over three times as much
as the drugs in defendant's truck. Accordingly, even if defendant
was unaware of the drugs in his truck, the trafficker would not
truly have "entrust[ed] a shipment" of considerable worth to an
outsider (Pollock, 926 F.2d at 1050), because Colon was with him
the entire time. We take judicial notice that Colon was convicted
of controlled substance trafficking and sentenced to 60 years'
imprisonment for the incident in question. People v. Colon, No.
3-95-0486 (1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule
23). The fact that Colon was supposed to be with defendant the
entire trip lessens any intrinsic weight to be accorded to the value
of the drugs.
	The State also argues that the large amount of cocaine found
in the truck gives rise to an inference that the two pagers "were
part of the tools of the trade of the drug business." The State
provides no authority for this inference or any explanation as to
how or why we should impute knowledge of the drugs to
defendant because of the presence of the pagers. Defendant
explained at trial that (1) he carried his own pager with him all the
time, and he had one because he was a freelance driver and he
needed prospective employers to be able to contact him; (2) he
was supposed to contact Estrella when he dropped off the cargo
and Estrella's telephone number was written on the pager Colon
gave him; and (3) he also had Colon's pager because Estrella
might wish to contact him during the trip to see where he was and
his own pager only operated in New Jersey and New York. The
State presented no evidence to impeach or cast doubt on
defendant's explanations.
	The final factor the State cites in favor of upholding
defendant's conviction is his nervousness during the traffic stop.
Defendant argues that according to the testimony he was most
nervous when he was being interrogated regarding his girlfriend.
He contends that, accordingly, his nervousness should be
interpreted as relating to her presence, as he explained at trial,
rather than the cocaine. Defendant's explanation is somewhat
supported by Trooper Balma's testimony that generally only the
driver or drivers of the truck are allowed to be in the truck. But
Balma testified that defendant was nervous even when he was not
being questioned about his passenger, as did Trooper Miroux. We
agree with the State that defendant's nervousness militates in favor
of a finding of knowledge. See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 263 Ill.
App. 3d 348, 353 (1994); People v. Peter, 220 Ill. App. 3d 626,
630 (1991). Still, as the State concedes, although nervousness does
weigh in favor of a finding of knowledge, it is not in and of itself
sufficient to uphold such a finding. United States v. Diaz-Carreon,
915 F.2d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding in that case that
nervousness was linked to the presence of the drugs because the
defendant, before being told that drugs had been found,
volunteered the statement "If the truck is loaded, I didn't know
about it").
	In a criminal case it is our duty carefully to examine the
evidence adduced at trial. We must give due consideration to the
fact that the fact finder saw and heard the witnesses. But "[i]f,
after such consideration we are of the opinion that the evidence is
not sufficient to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, it is our duty to reverse the judgment of conviction." People
v. Bartley, 25 Ill. 2d 175, 180 (1962); People v. Jefferson, 24 Ill. 2d 398, 402 (1962). "[A] judgment of conviction can be sustained
only upon credible evidence that removes all reasonable doubt of
guilt, and where the evidence of the prosecution is improbable,
unconvincing or contrary to human experience, we will not
hesitate to reverse" that conviction. People v. Stevenson, 25 Ill. 2d 361, 365 (1962). We cannot sustain defendant's conviction on the
evidence adduced in this case. The circumstantial evidence was
scant at best, and appears even weaker in light of the evidence
supporting a not guilty finding.
	Of course, a fact finder need not accept the defendant's
version of events as among competing versions. People v. Dean,
207 Ill. App. 3d 640, 643 (1990). But in this case much of the
evidence supporting defendant came not only from defendant, but
from Trooper Balma, the State's own witness. He testified that a
driver would normally do no more than check if the load was
secure before driving, and acknowledged that the diamond plate
panel could not be seen from the rear of the truck. Balma also
testified that he did not make it his business, as a driver, to
question the economics of a trip he was being paid to take, even
when he did not think his employer was making the best possible
use of the truck. Other facts indicative of defendant's innocence
are wholly uncontradicted, i.e., defendant's consent to the search
and his telling the police that Colon was also driving a truck on the
same route.
	We recognize that this case involves a very serious crime.
But, as this court recently observed, this does not affect the
bedrock principle at issue:
			"What is involved here is the standard of proof which
is applicable to all crimes. That is to say, conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether the crime charged be
trespass, shoplifting, armed robbery, or murder, the test is
the same. The burden of meeting this standard falls solely
on the prosecution. If it fails to meet this burden, a
defendant is entitled to a finding of not guilty. No
defendant is required to prove his innocence.
			While a not guilty finding is sometimes equated with a
finding of innocence, that conclusion is erroneous. Courts
do not find people guilty or innocent. They find them
guilty or not guilty. A not guilty verdict expresses no view
as to a defendant's innocence. Rather, it indicates simply
that the prosecution has failed to meet its burden of proof.
While there are those who may criticize courts for turning
criminals loose, courts have a duty to ensure that all
citizens receive those rights which are applicable equally
to every citizen who may find himself charged with a
crime, whatever the crime and whatever the
circumstances. When the State cannot meet its burden of
proof, the defendant must go free. *** It is no help to
speculate that the defendant may [be guilty]. No citizen
would be safe from prosecution under such a standard."
Smith, 185 Ill. 2d  at 545-46.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons above stated, we reverse the judgment of the
appellate court and reverse defendant's conviction and sentence.
	Judgments reversed.