Case Title: Fritzeen v. Gravel

Citation: 175 Vt. 537, 2003 VT 54, 830 A.2d 49

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Fritzeen v. Gravel (2002-075); 175 Vt. 537; 830 A.2d 49

2003 VT 54

[Filed 23-May-2003]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2003 VT 54

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2002-075

                             JANUARY TERM, 2003

  Eric and Louise Fritzeen and	        }	APPEALED FROM:
  William and Constance B. Coates	}
                                        }
       v.	                        }	Chittenden Superior Court
                                        }	
                                        }
  John Gravel, Esq.	                }	DOCKET NO. S0779-01 CnC

                                                Trial Judge: Mary Miles Teachout

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Plaintiffs Eric and Louise Fritzeen and William and Constance
  B. Coates appeal a decision of the Chittenden Superior Court granting
  summary judgment to defendant, attorney John Gravel.  The trial court found
  that plaintiffs' claim for legal malpractice was barred by 12 V.S.A. § 511
  ("A civil action . . . shall be commenced within six years after the cause
  of action accrues and not thereafter.").  Plaintiffs argue that the trial
  court erred in determining that the cause of action accrued before the
  conclusion of the appeal in the underlying proceeding.  We affirm.

       ¶  2.  The trial court found the following undisputed facts. 
  Attorney Gravel, defendant, represented plaintiffs from August 1993 to June
  1994 in connection with an ongoing condominium development project. 
  Plaintiffs had obtained a new wastewater permit in January 1992, which
  their neighbors opposed.  The neighbors sought revocation of the permit in
  a hearing before the Agency of Natural Resources' Department of
  Environmental Conservation (the Department), and plaintiffs prevailed. 
  Defendant assumed representation of plaintiffs when the neighbors appealed
  the decision of the Department to the Water Resources Board in August 1993.
  (FN1)  On October 21, 1993, legal counsel to the Water Resources Board
  circulated to all parties a detailed list of the specific exhibits before
  the Board on appeal.  The parties then had an opportunity to supplement the
  record with additional exhibits.  The exhibits list on record did not
  include certain technical documentation that the Department had relied upon
  for its decision in support of plaintiffs' position.  Defendant did not
  attempt to supplement the record with these documents on behalf of his
  clients.
          
       ¶  3.  On June 1, 1994, the Water Resources Board reversed the
  Department's decision and remanded the matter for further revocation
  proceedings because "the record does not fairly and reasonably support the
  ANR's conclusion[s]" that the wastewater disposal system met several
  requirements of the Environmental Protection Rules.  One week later,
  defendant wrote a letter to plaintiffs in which he notified them of the
  outcome and identified four future courses of action.  Attorney Liam Murphy
  then assumed representation of plaintiffs and, on June 16, 1994, filed a
  motion to correct the decision with the Water Resources Board.  

       ¶  4.  In July 1994, attorney Murphy filed plaintiffs' motion to
  supplement the record on appeal along with an attached affidavit from
  plaintiff Eric Fritzeen in which Fritzeen expressed his knowledge that
  defendant had not supplemented the file before the Water Resources Board
  with documents supportive of plaintiffs' position.  Plaintiff Fritzeen's
  sworn statement included the following language:  

    At no time did [defendant] ever inform me of receipt of the
    October 1993 memorandum from the Board counsel which indicated
    that the Board record was limited to seven listed exhibits and
    that any party wishing to supplement the record would have to file
    a petition to the Board. . . .  At the Board hearing on the
    revocation, a number of questions were asked by Board members
    about certain data and plans and [defendant] replied that such
    data was part of the file.  I understood at that time the entire
    file was before the Water Resources Board. . . .  Certain critical
    information and plans that are necessary for the Board to make a
    just decision on the complete record were omitted from the
    original exhibits and if I had known earlier that these were not a
    part of the Record, I would have petitioned the Board to include
    them.

  At the hearing on the motions held in August 1994, attorney Murphy
  responded to the hearing officer's inquiry concerning "good reasons for
  failure to present" the additional evidence, see 3 V.S.A. § 815(b), by
  stating that "the prior lawyers in this case did an inadequate job in
  presenting . . . [and] that certainly may leave [plaintiffs] with a
  malpractice suit . . . against [defendant,] the lawyer that represented him
  on appeal."  The Board issued its written decision on September 14, 1994,
  denying plaintiffs' motions to correct the decision and supplement the
  record on appeal.  Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to this Court, which
  was later dismissed by stipulation of the parties in December 1995.

       ¶  5.  On December 9, 1994, a year before the stipulated dismissal
  of the appeal, attorney Murphy wrote a letter to defendant Gravel,
  notifying him that plaintiffs were considering a malpractice action against
  defendant based on the omission of documents and the limited record
  presented on appeal to the Water Resources Board.  Attorney Murphy
  explained in his letter that he "discovered the problem when [he] read the
  Water Resources Board decision and it stated that there was no evidence
  relating to the percolation test data in the record."  He wrote that, after
  reviewing the record and finding it only contained limited exhibits, he
  immediately filed the motion to supplement the record on July 5, 1994.  
          
       ¶  6.  Plaintiffs then waited until June 15, 2001 to file this action.
  (FN2)  On January 18, 2002, the trial court granted summary judgment to
  defendant, finding that the action had accrued by December 9, 1994 at the
  latest and thus was barred by the six-year statute of limitations in 12
  V.S.A. § 511.  This appeal followed.

       ¶  7.  We review a summary judgment determination on appeal using
  the same standard as the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate when
  the record demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact
  remaining and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Politi
  v. Tyler, 170 Vt. 428, 431,