Case Title: Battaglia v. Battaglia

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86, 2005

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
BLANCHE BATTAGLIA,
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No. 86, 2005
Respondent Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below: Family Court
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of the State of Delaware, in and
v.
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for New Castle County
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VICTOR F. BATTAGLIA, 
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No. CN00-08828
Executor of the Estate of
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Nicholas Battaglia,
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Petitioner Below,
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Appellee.
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Submitted: July 19, 2005
Decided: August 24, 2005
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.
O R D E R
This 24   day of August 2005, on consideration of the parties’ briefs, it appears
th
to the Court that:
(1)
The respondent-appellant, Blanche Battaglia, appeals a property division
decision of the Family Court which denied her claims of interest in certain property
owned by her late former husband, Nicholas Battaglia.  Nicholas and Blanche
Battaglia (“Husband” and “Wife”) were married on May 26, 2000 and divorced by
final decree of the Family Court on November 26, 2003.  Husband died on January
24, 2004 and the petitioner-appellee, Victor F. Battaglia, executor of Husband’s estate,
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was substituted for Husband in this proceeding.  Wife contends that the Family Court
erred by not awarding her any interest in certain real estate,  and that it further erred
in its award of proceeds from the sale of certain personal property.  We find no merit
to her claims.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Family Court.
(2)
Husband, as sole owner of Brandywine Securities, Inc., purchased real
property located at 100 Havernill Lane, Centerville, Delaware with the contract of sale
executed on March 29, 1999 and the final settlement occurring on June 3, 1999.  The
parties, however, did not begin any discussion of marriage until April 1999 and Wife
did not contribute any funds towards the purchase of the home.  Nor did Wife ever
serve as a homemaker for the Havernill property, since the parties never moved in or
treated it as a marital residence.  Husband, as part of his business, also purchased two
other properties located on Washington Street and on Wood Road in Wilmington.
During the marriage, Husband and Wife also purchased furnishings together, which
were sold by Husband’s estate for $8,700.  
(3)
The Family Court concluded that the Havernill property was not
purchased in contemplation of marriage and therefore denied Wife any interest in the
proceeds from its sale.  The Family Court further concluded that Husband’s purchase
of the other properties was part of his normal course of business, and that because
Wife did not contribute financially to the purchase, she was not entitled to any portion
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(b) & (c) (2005).
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 1993 WL 331899, at *2 (Del. Fam. Ct.).
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of the profits made from resale.  Finally, Wife retained possession of the bedroom
furnishings which were valued at $2,500. As a result of Wife keeping this furniture,
the Family Court deducted Husband’s portion of the bedroom furniture’s value from
Wife’s portion of the $8,700 and awarded her only $3,100. 
(4)
On appeal, Wife first argues that the Family Court erred as a matter of
law in denying her any interest in the Havernill property.  Wife contends that even
though talk of marriage did not begin until after the purchase of the house, Husband
purchased the property with the intention of sharing it with Wife.  Wife also contends
that she made equitable contributions to the house by buying and moving furniture
into the house.  
(5)
Delaware law defines marital property as any property acquired by either
party subsequent to the marriage.   In Wilson v. Lynn, however, the Family Court
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carved out an exception to that rule, stating that marital property may also include any
property acquired prior to marriage but “in contemplation of the marriage.”   Wife
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argues that the Havernill property should fall within that exception.  Wilson sets forth
a four-prong test to determine whether property is acquired in contemplation of
marriage: 1) the property must have been acquired within three months of the
 Id. at *3.
3
 1995 WL 775118 (Del. Fam. Ct.).
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marriage; 2) a wedding date must have been previously set; 3) there must be a
compelling legal or financial reason for not placing title in both parties’ names; and
4) both parties must have taken active involvement in the purchase.   
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(6)
Applying the Wilson test, it is clear that the Havernil property was not
purchased in contemplation of marriage.  The record shows that the house was
purchased on March 27, 1999, yet the marriage did not occur until May 26, 2000, well
past the specified three month period.  Wife attempts to avoid the Wilson test by citing
Bennett v. Bennett, a Family Court case which chose not to follow Wilson and instead
advocated deciding such matters on a case by case basis.   Even if we were to ignore
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the Wilson test, the Family Court did not abuse its discretion in deciding  that the
Havernill property was not purchased in contemplation of marriage.  The parties never
moved into the house, with each living in their own separate residence during their
marriage, and the husband made all mortgage payments on the property.  The only
contribution Wife made to the improvement of the property was buying and moving
furniture for the house, actions that the Family Court found legally insufficient.  We
find no error in that determination. 
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(a)(6) (2005).
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(7)
Wife next argues that the Family Court erred in not awarding her any
interest in the Washington Street and Wood Road real estate properties.  Although
Delaware law presumes that all property acquired subsequent to the marriage qualifies
as marital property under 13 Del. C. § 1513 (c), the Delaware Divorce Statute
provides factors for dividing marital property, specifically “[t]he contribution or
dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation
of the marital property, including the contribution of a party as homemaker, husband,
or wife ... .”   The record indicates that Husband purchased the two properties through
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separate business funds and that Wife did not supply any deposit money or contribute
in any way to the  purchase or preservation of the property, except for attending the
sale with Husband and encouraging him to  purchase the properties.  The Family
Court acted within its discretion in determining that Wife was not entitled to any
equitable interest in the properties under the circumstances of this case.
(8)
Finally, Wife argues that the Family Court erred in only awarding her
$3,100 of the marital furnishings and appliances from the entire estate.  Wife claims
that the $8,700 determined by the Family Court as the value of the marital furnishings
and appliances was undocumented and incorrect, and that their actual value was
$84,859.  Wife, however, never submitted any appraisal value for the furnishings to
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disprove the $8,700 amount, nor did she seek leave to present documentation of the
value of the furnishings subsequent to trial.  The Family Court  accepted the
documented proceeds from the sale of the furnishings as their value and divided them
on a equal 50/50 basis, deducting wife’s portion of the bedroom furniture paid for by
the estate.  Thus, the Family Court did not err in finding that $8,700 was the only
documented value of the marital furnishings and appliances.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family Court
is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
   /s/ Henry duPont Ridgely  
Justice