Case Title: Glenn v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0197

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-09-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
STEVE B. GLENN v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation2011 WY 126Case Number: No. S-10-0197Decided: 09/09/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
STEVE B. 
GLENN,
Appellant 
(Plaintiff),
 
v.
 
UNION PACIFIC 
RAILROAD COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation,
Appellee 
(Defendant).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County
The 
Honorable Nena R. James, Judge

 
Representing 
Appellant:
Frederick J. 
Harrison, Frederick J. Harrison, PC, Rawlins, Wyoming; Robert T. Moxley, Robert 
T. Moxley, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Harrison.  

 
Representing 
Appellee:
Mark C. Hansen, Union 
Pacific Railroad Company; George E. Lemich, Lemich Law Center.  Argument by Mr. 
Hansen.
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
This 
case comes before us a second time.  
Previously, we reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Union 
Pacific after finding that the railroad had a duty to exercise ordinary and 
reasonable care in the operation of its railway.1  After remand, the jury determined that 
both parties, as well as two non-party actors, were negligent and awarded 
damages to Mr. Glenn.  Mr. Glenn 
appeals, contending that the district court erred in refusing to admit evidence 
of a prior incident involving Union Pacific that was the catalyst for a change 
in his employer’s safety procedures.  
We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in excluding 
evidence of the prior incident and that the error was prejudicial to Mr. 
Glenn.  As a result, we reverse and 
remand for a new trial.
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      
Mr. Glenn presents 
the following issues:
 
1.    
Did the trial court 
err in excluding evidence of a “near-miss” at the tipple that occurred two weeks 
before Glenn’s accident, even after the Railroad “opened the 
door”?
 
2.    
Did the trial court 
err in refusing Glenn’s proposed instruction about intervening and supervening 
cause and permitting the jury to consider the fault of two nonparty 
actors?
 
3.    
Should the doctrine 
of cumulative error be applied in this case?
 
Union Pacific phrases 
the issues in a substantially similar manner.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
Mr. Glenn was 
employed as a blaster at the Black Butte coal mine in Sweetwater County.  On June 30, 2000, he went to work 
expecting to weigh semi-trucks as they left the mine, but when he started his 
shift, the mine production superintendent asked him to attend to a problem with 
a Union Pacific train that was waiting to be loaded.  The train consisted of 102 rail cars that 
unloaded through dump doors in the floors of the cars.  When the train arrived at Black Butte, 
however, the dump doors on approximately 40 of the cars were either open or 
unlocked.  As the train could not be 
loaded with open dump doors, and closed but unlocked doors created a risk of 
derailment, the dump doors needed to be closed and securely locked before the 
train was loaded.
 
[¶4]        
The production 
superintendent dropped Mr. Glenn off near the tracks, where a coworker was 
waiting with the conductor of the train.  At this point, the train was parked on 
the balloon track, an oval-shaped section of track situated just ahead of the 
tipple, which is the structure used to load coal into the train cars.  The production superintendent instructed 
Mr. Glenn and his coworker to check the train cars by walking the length of the 
balloon track, also referred to as the “loop.”  The conductor told Mr. Glenn and his 
coworker that he would cause the train to be pulled up, so that they could close 
the dump doors on the paved area near the tipple, which accommodated five or six 
train cars at a time.  However, due 
to an incident that occurred less than two weeks earlier, Black Butte had 
changed its car-checking procedure to require its employees to check the cars 
while the train remained stationary.2marker1fn0 
 The previous incident, which is at 
the heart of this appeal, occurred while Black Butte employees were engaged in 
the same activity of checking the train cars to see that they were properly 
locked before loading the Black Butte coal.

[¶5]        
At the time of the 
previous incident, Black Butte’s safety procedures required that all cars be 
inspected at the tipple.  An 
employee in the tipple would be able to observe the interior of the cars for 
residue that might come out when the doors were opened, and the employees 
closing and locking the cars would do so on the paved area around the tipple. 
 After the cars were checked, the 
train would move ahead so that additional cars could be inspected at the tipple. 
 Cleav Porter was a mine employee 
engaged in this inspection process.  For reasons that are unclear from the 
record, he was underneath a Union Pacific train in the tipple area when it 
unexpectedly moved forward.  
Fortunately, Mr. Porter was not injured, but he was very upset about the 
close call.
 
[¶6]        
As a result of this 
incident, the mine issued a letter on June 27, 2000 changing the inspection 
procedure.  The letter, which was 
authored by the same production superintendent who had instructed Mr. Glenn to 
check the cars by walking the loop, provided as follows: 
 
            
In light of the recent incident in checking the train, the following 
process will be followed when checking and closing rail car 
doors.
 
            
The train[] will not be checked when it is moving.  Instead, as the train is backing in, 
cars with open doors will be noted.
 
            
Then the train will be parked and the brakes will be set.  The crew will then get off the train 
while Black Butte personnel close doors and check the units for loading.  When all checks have been made and all 
doors are closed the train crew can start loading.

            
Until we can come up with a process to check trains that insures that we 
will not compromise the safety of our people while checking the cars, we will 
follow this procedure.
 
            
Your help on this matter is greatly appreciated.
 
[¶7]        
In accordance with 
Black Butte’s new car-checking procedure and the production superintendent’s 
instructions, Mr. Glenn and his coworker informed the train conductor that they 
would be checking the cars by walking the loop.  Mr. Glenn had never before closed dump 
doors.  His coworker showed him what 
to do.  Using a pry bar, the two 
first opened the doors and then swung them closed again to engage the locking 
mechanism.  After opening and 
closing several dump doors, Mr. Glenn and his coworker discovered that some of 
the rail cars contained coking coal, which was subsequently determined to have 
been left in the train after it was unloaded at a facility owned by FMC Astaris 
in Don, Idaho.  When Mr. Glenn 
opened the unlocked doors of one of the cars, a substantial amount of coking 
coal fell out and trapped his leg so that, as he fell backward, his right leg 
was broken.
 
[¶8]        
Mr. Glenn filed suit 
claiming that his injury was caused by Union Pacific’s negligence.  Union Pacific denied negligence and 
asserted that Mr. Glenn, Black Butte, and FMC Astaris were at fault for the 
accident.  Prior to trial, Union 
Pacific filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent the jury from hearing any 
evidence regarding the Cleav Porter incident.  Union Pacific asserted in its written 
motion that the evidence was irrelevant and that, even if the evidence was 
determined to be relevant, it should still be excluded because the probative 
value of the evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  Mr. Glenn resisted the motion and 
asserted in his written response that the evidence was relevant, in part, 
because the incident was “a primary reason that Steve Glenn came to be where he 
was, doing what he was doing, when he was injured.”  
 
[¶9]        
The district court 
considered Union Pacific’s motion at a hearing held on June 23, 2009.  At the hearing, Union Pacific argued that 
evidence of the prior incident was not “in any way relevant to the Glenn 
incident.”  Union Pacific contended 
that Mr. Glenn was offering the evidence “to show that the railroad is 
negligent, they don’t pay any attention to their rules, for a number of 
different reasons.”  The district 
court agreed that the evidence could not be admitted to prove that Union Pacific 
was negligent, but stated that the evidence could be admitted if Union Pacific 
argued that Black Butte should not have allowed its employees to inspect 
incoming trains on the balloon track.  In a written order memorializing the 
ruling made at the hearing, the court granted Union Pacific’s motion in limine 
to exclude “Any argument, evidence, or reference to a purported 'near miss’ 
regarding Cleav Porter which occurred prior to Mr. Glenn’s accident.”  In accordance with the district court’s 
ruling, the letter changing Black Butte’s car-checking procedure was redacted to 
eliminate the first sentence referring to the “recent incident in checking the 
train” before the letter was admitted into evidence. 
 
[¶10]     
In their Joint 
Statement, the parties stipulated that the balloon track at Black Butte was not 
a safe workplace for Mr. Glenn to close, latch, and lock the coal car 
doors.  At several junctures during 
trial, Mr. Glenn attempted to introduce evidence of the prior incident in 
response to argument and testimony that the balloon track was not a safe area in 
which to check the train cars.  Each 
attempt to do so, however, was rebuffed by the district court, which held that 
the evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial to Union Pacific.  
 
[¶11]     
A jury verdict was 
ultimately entered in Mr. Glenn’s favor.  However, in the ensuing judgment, the 
total damage award was significantly reduced by the percentage of fault 
attributed to other actors.  The 
jury apportioned 70% of the fault to non-party Black Butte, 20% to Union 
Pacific, 5% to non-party FMC Astaris, and 5% to Mr. Glenn.  Mr. Glenn appeals, claiming that 
the district court’s refusal to admit evidence of the prior incident was 
prejudicial error.  He also contends 
the district court erred in allowing Astaris to be listed as an actor on the 
verdict form, and in refusing to give the jury an “intervening cause” 
instruction.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶12]     
We 
review a trial court’s evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. 
  Rulings 
on the admission of evidence are placed within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and, in order to challenge these rulings successfully on appeal, an 
appellant must show that the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion. 
 Schmid v. Schmid, 2007 WY 148, ¶ 10, 166 P.3d 1285, 1288 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
A 
trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence are entitled to 
considerable deference, and, as long as there exists a legitimate basis for the 
trial court’s ruling, that ruling will not be disturbed on appeal. The appellant 
bears the burden of showing an abuse of discretion.  Even when a trial court errs in an 
evidentiary ruling, we reverse only if the error was prejudicial. The appellant 
must show a reasonable probability that, without the error, the verdict might 
have been different.
 
Id. 
(citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
 
[¶13]     
Mr. 
Glenn argues that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to admit 
evidence of the prior incident at Black Butte.  He challenges the court’s initial ruling 
granting Union Pacific’s motion in limine, and also contends that the court 
erred in refusing to admit the evidence after Union Pacific repeatedly “opened 
the door” by arguing that the balloon track was not a safe place to check the 
train cars.  Mr. Glenn argues that, 
due to the fact that Black Butte was immune from suit, the district court’s 
decision to exclude the evidence was prejudicial because it impeded his ability 
to defend Black Butte against Union Pacific’s allegations of negligence.  According to Mr. Glenn, he should have 
been allowed to introduce the prior incident in order to rebut evidence 
indicating that Black Butte was at fault for his injury.
 
[¶14]     
Union 
Pacific argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the 
prior incident was not relevant under W.R.E. 401.  It argues that the relevant inquiry was 
whether Black Butte’s car-checking procedure was reasonably safe or not 
reasonably safe, and that this determination is unrelated to the fact that Black 
Butte’s policy was changed in response to the prior incident.  Union Pacific also argues that it did 
not “open the door” to introduction of the prior incident.  Finally, Union Pacific contends that, 
even if the evidence was relevant, the district court properly excluded the 
evidence under W.R.E. 403 because the probative value of the evidence was 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
 
Black Butte’s 
Car-Checking Procedure
 
[¶15]     
Before we address the 
parties’ main contentions, we must address a factual issue raised by Union 
Pacific.  On appeal, Union Pacific 
contends that “the new Black Butte car checking procedure, in effect at the time 
of [] Glenn’s accident, dictated that Black Butte employees should do the car 
checking job at the tipple, not on the balloon track.”  Further, Union Pacific argues that “The 
testimony at trial established that Glenn was working on the balloon track 
because [the production superintendent] ordered him to do so, in clear violation 
of the Black Butte car checking procedure.”  There was substantial testimony presented 
at trial, however, indicating that Black Butte intended for its employees to 
check the cars on the balloon track, although that testimony was not entirely 
consistent.  The production 
superintendent, who had authored the new procedure and who had instructed Mr. 
Glenn to walk the loop, was less than perfectly clear about its intended 
execution in his testimony at trial.  
During direct examination by counsel for Union Pacific, he testified as 
follows: 
 
COUNSEL:  Where in this policy does it tell the 
employees that they should either do this job, that is the car checking job, at 
the tipple or on the loop?
 
WITNESS:  It doesn’t.
 
COUNSEL:  Should it say that?  Should it tell the employees that I 
don’t want you doing it out on the loop because it’s bad footing, I want you to 
do it up by . . . the tipple where you have got a smooth flat 
area?
 
WITNESS:  I think the point we are trying to make 
is not to do anything with a moving train or the possibilities of a moving 
train.
 
COUNSEL:  But when you formulated this policy on 
June 27 did you intend to convey to the coal plant personnel that you wanted 
them to do this job, that is the job of checking the doors, and closing, 
latching and locking the doors up at the tipple?
 
WITNESS:  No, it didn’t specify at the 
tipple.
 
COUNSEL:  I know you didn’t specify at the tipple, 
but I guess what I’m asking is was that your intention, was that your thought 
that that is where I want them to do that?
 
WITNESS:  I can’t be sure.  I think the intent was, like I said, 
that we didn’t want to endanger employees with the possibility of a train moving 
through the checking process.
 
COUNSEL:  Okay. That was the only idea you wanted 
to convey to the car checking crews?
 
WITNESS:  Yes.
 
. . . 

 
COUNSEL:  So you didn’t care one way or the other 
where the employees closed, latched and locked the doors?
 
WITNESS:  I didn’t say I didn’t care.  I just said our fear was we wanted to 
make sure they were safe around moving equipment.  And they have to determine on their own 
if it is safe.  Look at the 
environment you are working in, if there’s obstructions or whatever.  It’s part of your hazard recognition to 
ensure you are going to be safe.  
There is nothing to say you can’t slip in the tipple area either.  But you have to make that determination 
on your own.
 
COUNSEL:  So you left that up to the employees to 
determine where they were going to do the job of closing, latching and locking 
the doors?
 
WITNESS:  Yes.
 
Later on in his 
testimony, however, the production superintendent indicated that the new 
procedure did require cars to be checked at the tipple:
 
COUNSEL:  When you dropped off Mr. Glenn, did you 
assume that Mr. Glenn and [his co-employee] were going to do this job at the 
tipple?
 
WITNESS:  I’m not sure the circumstances, whether 
the train didn’t have a crew and it was parked there or if the crew was on board 
and they were going to pull through.  
I’m not clear right now the exact status of that 
train.
 
COUNSEL:  But when you dropped Mr. Glenn off to do 
that job did you assume he was going to do that at the tipple pursuant – 

 
WITNESS:  That would have been my assumption, 
yes.
 
COUNSEL:  Because that would have been pursuant to 
the policy and procedure?
 
WITNESS:  Yes.
 
COUNSEL:  Doing it out on the loop would have been 
contrary to the policy and procedure?
 
WITNESS:  According to the process, 
yes.
 
The testimony of 
other witnesses, however, was less ambiguous.  Mr. Glenn, the coworker who helped him 
check the cars, the drill and blaster superintendent on duty at the time of the 
accident, and the head mine superintendent on duty at the time of the accident 
all testified, in unequivocal terms, that the new procedure required Black Butte 
personnel to close the dump doors on the balloon track rather than exclusively 
at the tipple.  In light of the 
testimony of these witnesses, and the apparently contradictory testimony of the 
production superintendent, we find sufficient evidence to support 
Mr. Glenn’s contention that checking the train cars on the balloon track 
was consistent with Black Butte’s new car-checking 
procedure.
 
Issue 1: 
Admissibility of Prior Incident Evidence
 
[¶16]     
In 
addressing Mr. Glenn’s first claim of error, the issues we must resolve are (1) 
whether the reason for Black Butte’s change in safety procedures is relevant, 
and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in rejecting that 
evidence.  Throughout the trial, Mr. 
Glenn sought to introduce evidence of the prior incident at Black Butte for 
several purposes, one of which was to counter Union Pacific’s argument that 
Black Butte was negligent in requiring its employees to check incoming trains by 
walking the balloon track.  Our 
review focuses on the admissibility of evidence of the prior incident for this 
purpose.
 
a.    
 Relevance under W.R.E. 
401
 
[¶17]     
We 
begin our analysis by addressing the issue of whether the evidence was 
relevant.  For evidence to be 
admissible, it must be relevant.  
W.R.E. 402.  Relevant 
evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence.” W.R.E. 401.  This definition of relevance, which is 
identically expressed in Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “is generous 
and it distinctly favors broad admissibility.”  1 Christopher B. Mueller 
& Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal 
Evidence § 4.1, at 541 (3d ed. 2007) (footnote omitted).  According to Professors 
Mueller and Kirkpatrick,
 
            
If evidence has only slight probative force, it may well be excludable, 
but the reason is not that it is irrelevant.  Quite deliberately, Fed. R. Evid. 401 
ignores suggestions that legal relevance means that each bit of proof should 
carry a “plus value” or should make the point or proposition sought to be proved 
more probable than not.  Instead Fed 
R. Evid. 401 requires no more probative worth than that which reasonable persons 
would require in making thoughtful decisions in life outside the 
courtroom.
 
Id. 
(footnote omitted).  Similarly, we 
have stated that “Generally speaking, '[t]he test of relevancy is one of 
reasonableness and common sense, liberally applied to favor admissibility rather 
than the exclusion of evidence.’”  
Foster v. State, 2010 WY 8, ¶ 
20, 224 P.3d 1, 8 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Callen v. State, 2008 WY 107, ¶ 
17, 192 P.3d 137, 144 (Wyo. 2008)).
 
[¶18]     
Mr. Glenn contends 
the evidence of the prior incident was relevant because it tended to show “why 
Black Butte changed the car-checking procedure and why Glenn was out walking the 
loop.”  We agree that the incident 
is relevant because it provides a context for Black Butte’s decision to change 
its car-checking procedure.  As 
noted by Mueller and Kirkpatrick, “Circumstantial evidence that provides such 
background may be relevant if it throws other evidence into sharper relief, 
helps clarify or explain it, or makes it more vivid or real.”  Id. at 559.  At the very least, the prior incident 
helps explain Black Butte’s decision to change its car-checking procedure, which 
was made in direct response to the incident involving Mr. Porter.  More fundamentally, however, the prior 
incident was relevant to the question of whether Black Butte’s new car-checking 
procedure was more or less safe than its former procedure, or the procedure 
suggested by Union Pacific at trial.  
Black Butte’s attempt to eliminate the risk of injury from a moving train 
by switching to a procedure that required the train to be stationary until all 
cars were checked tends to show that the procedure in place at the time of 
Mr. Glenn’s accident was, in at least one respect, a safer alternative to 
the former procedure.  The degree of 
safety of Black Butte’s car-checking procedure had direct implications for the 
jury’s determination as to Black Butte’s degree of fault, one of the ultimate 
issues in this case.  The evidence 
was relevant.
 
[¶19]     
The district court 
appears to have determined that, by stipulating to the fact that the balloon 
track was an unsafe place for Mr. Glenn to check the train cars, Mr. Glenn 
purged the prior incident of its potential relevance.  During the hearing on Union Pacific’s 
motion in limine, the court indicated that there was no need to explain why the 
cars were checked on the balloon track, as opposed to the tipple, in light of 
the stipulation:
 
The reason [Mr. 
Glenn] went out there is it was the policy of Black Butte at that point to walk 
the line, or whatever, walk the loop.  
He doesn’t have to testify about why it’s the policy unless – well, I 
guess since there is a stipulation that it wasn’t a safe workplace it kind of 
covers it.  Doesn’t 
it?
 
The evidence of the 
prior incident, however, did not become irrelevant merely because Mr. Glenn 
admitted that the balloon track was not a safe place to check the train 
cars.  First, as we have previously 
stated, “an evidentiary admission is not conclusive but is subject to 
contradiction or explanation.”  Jewell v. Chrysler Corp., 994 P.2d 330, 335 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting 2 
McCormick on Evidence § 254, at 137-38 (5th ed. 1999)).  Second, even if the stipulation had 
removed from consideration the issue of whether the balloon track was “safe,” 
Mr. Glenn’s admission does not answer the question of whether Black Butte’s new 
car-checking procedure was more or less safe than other possible car-checking 
procedures.  At trial, Union Pacific 
argued that all train cars should be checked near the tipple, where the footing 
was sound.  This procedure 
necessarily required the train to be moved periodically during the inspection 
process.  Black Butte’s new 
procedure, however, eliminated the risk of injury from a moving train. The prior 
incident was relevant to a determination as to the degree to which Black Butte’s 
procedure was safe or unsafe, and it was ultimately the jury’s responsibility to 
factor that determination into its apportionment of fault.  The stipulation that the balloon track 
was not a safe place to check the train cars did not render the prior incident 
irrelevant.         

b.    
Balance of probative 
value and danger of unfair prejudice under W.R.E. 
403
 
[¶20]     
Next, 
we must answer the more difficult question of whether the district court abused 
its discretion in its application of W.R.E. 403.  W.R.E. 403 provides that, “Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”  As a general principle, we have stated 
that “This rule is to be used sparingly, because it excludes evidence which is 
concededly relevant and probative.”  
Mintun v. State, 966 P.2d 954, 
959 (Wyo. 1998) (citing Towner v. State, 685 P.2d 45, 49 (Wyo. 
1984)).  Further, W.R.E. 403, by its 
terms, is “weighted in favor of admissibility, allowing evidence to come in 
unless prejudicial effect substantially outweighs probative worth.”  Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, ¶ 22, 193 P.3d 228, 237 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, 3 Federal Evidence § 
6:42 (3d ed. 2007)).  
 
[¶21]     
Unfairly 
prejudicial evidence is evidence which will likely “stimulate an excessive 
emotion or . . . awaken a fixed prejudice . . . and thus dominate the mind of 
the [jury] and prevent a rational determination of the truth.”  Furman v. Rural Elec. Co., 869 P.2d 136, 
146 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting 22 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence 
§ 5215, at 278 (1978)).  We have 
previously noted the importance of characterizing potential prejudice as 
“unfair” under Rule 403: “Rule 403 does not allow the exclusion of evidence 
simply because it is prejudicial.  All of the evidence against appellant 
[is] 'prejudicial.’  The evidence 
must be unfairly prejudicial before 
its prejudicial effect is weighed against its probative value.”  Robinson v. State, 716 P.2d 364, 367 n.2 
(Wyo. 1986) (emphasis in original); see 
also Pena v. State, 792 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Wyo. 1990) (“For the prejudice 
factor to come into play the [trial] court must conclude that it is unfair.”); 
Heinemann v. State, 12 P.3d 692, 702 
(Wyo. 2000) (“Evidence that is not in some way prejudicial would be irrelevant, 
since the purpose of evidence is to persuade the trier of fact of the validity 
of the charge.”).  With these 
principles in mind, we turn to the district court’s evaluation of probative 
value and unfair prejudice.
 
[¶22]     
As 
noted above, at the hearing on Union Pacific’s motion in limine, the court 
determined that evidence of the prior incident should be excluded, but stated 
that its admissibility at trial would depend on whether Union Pacific “opened 
the door” to the evidence.  
The transcript from 
the hearing provides as follows:
 
THE COURT:  Well, I can see where [the prior 
incident] would have some relevance if the argument is made that they shouldn’t 
have sent him out to walk the track, that it’s unsafe to do that.  I don’t know if the railroad is going to 
do that.  But just to bring in that 
the railroad is dangerous and obviously it was dangerous then and so it’s 
dangerous now, I can’t see just saying it’s not a big – it can come in on that 
basis.  I could see where – 
depending on what the railroad does here, could see where it could come in on a 
limited basis maybe based on what Mr. Harrison just said.
 
COUNSEL FOR UNION 
PACIFIC:  Your Honor, we are – we 
believe that this evidence is coming in for the purpose of, the railroad was 
negligent, didn’t pay any attention to the rules, it was dangerous, they almost 
killed Cleav Porter, so let’s get all riled up about the railroad.  It doesn’t have anything to do with 
Steve Glenn’s accident.
 
            
The notice – if Mr. Porter’s incident put the railroad on notice of 
anything it was, if you have somebody operating under the cars while the train 
is moving that can be dangerous.  
That doesn’t have anything to do with this case, with the Glenn 
case.  The cars were 
stationary.  They weren’t 
moving.
 
THE COURT:  Okay.  I have no problem granting your motion in 
regard to what you just said.  But 
if the issue comes up about it being unsafe or why was Mr. Glenn out there, that 
Black Butte was negligent in making him go out there and having that policy of 
walking the loop and checking these cars, then at that point, I think that opens 
the door for it to come in.
 
COUNSEL FOR UNION 
PACIFIC:  So that is the Court’s 
ruling?
 
THE COURT:  That is my ruling.  Your motion in limine is granted except 
if you – it will be ungranted if you open the door on the basis of what I just 
said.
 
During 
a colloquy in the judge’s chambers just prior to trial, the court again 
indicated that admissibility of the prior incident would depend on Union 
Pacific’s arguments at trial:
 
THE COURT:  I think U.P. has to be careful in how it 
handles that issue, but I am not interested in having the Cleav Porter incident 
in this trial unless U.P. puts me in a position where I have to let it 
in.
 
. . . 

 
I think that is what 
I said before is I could foresee a possibility that U.P. could open the door, 
but I think I was sending a signal, don’t open that door.  I think that is what I was trying to 
say.
 
Based 
upon the district court’s pretrial ruling, it was clear that evidence of the 
prior incident would not be allowed to prove that Union Pacific was 
negligent.  It was also clear, 
however, that Union Pacific could open the door to admissibility of that 
evidence “if the issue comes up about it being unsafe or why was Mr. Glenn out 
there, that Black Butte was negligent in making him go out there and having that 
policy of walking the loop and checking these cars.”  Mr. Glenn contends that Union Pacific 
“opened the door” to receipt of the evidence and that the district court erred 
in excluding the evidence after Union Pacific had “opened the door.”  We agree.
 
[¶23]     
During 
opening statements, counsel for Union Pacific stated that Black Butte should not 
have allowed its employees to inspect train cars on the balloon track, and 
asserted that checking cars at the tipple was the safer 
alternative.
 
COUNSEL:  . . . What [Black Butte] forgot to tell 
their employees is we want you checking the cars in this flat area, in this 
smooth area by the tipple.  Again, 
I’m the tipple, the road crossing is here, nice, smooth, level area.  Out here is the asphalt or concrete 
apron on either side of the track.  
That is where Black Butte wanted their employees to check the cars, but 
they didn’t tell them that.  This is 
an awful procedure.  They didn’t – 
Black Butte didn’t tell their employees one of the critical aspects – two of the 
critical aspects of the procedure.  
Number one, get an operator up in the tipple.  Number two, check the cars, and close, 
latch and lock the doors where it’s safe.  
Not out on a balloon track.
 
            
There isn’t going to be much, if any, dispute in this case about the fact 
that the balloon track is not a reasonably safe place to be closing, latching or 
locking doors.  You have got a 
choice here.  Nice smooth area here 
and here, or you go out on the balloon track where it’s sloped, where you have 
got some of these coking briquettes, and it’s a ballast shoulder.  It’s a rock shoulder.  Which one is safer?  It’s obvious which one is safer and 
everyone is going to agree.  It’s so 
obvious we stipulated to it.  That 
is not a reasonably safe place to work for Mr. Glenn.  Black Butte knew that, but they didn’t 
bother to convey that to their employees in this little procedure 
note.
 
Further, 
during Union Pacific’s direct examination of Black Butte’s production 
superintendent, counsel for Union Pacific elicited testimony regarding the 
relative safety of checking cars on the balloon track as opposed to at the 
tipple:
 
COUNSEL:  Is it important out at the mine to 
provide employees with good footing when they are working?
 
WITNESS:  Yes.
 
COUNSEL:  Do you feel that’s Black Butte’s 
responsibility to provide its employees with a safe place to 
work?
 
WITNESS:  Yes, it is.
 
COUNSEL:  Is providing employees with good footing 
where they are working part of that responsibility to provide a safe place to 
work?
 
WITNESS:  You do the best you can to provide safe 
conditions such as footing.
 
COUNSEL:  I thought it was beyond doing the best 
you could.  I thought there was an 
absolute mandatory duty that Black Butte had to provide its employees with a 
safe place to work.
 
WITNESS:  Yes, you provide your employees the best 
conditions.
 
COUNSEL:  The best conditions, working conditions, 
in the mining industry, I think I saw in one of the policy 
statements.
 
WITNESS:  Yes.
 
COUNSEL:  Would be the absolute safest workplace 
in the mining industry?
 
WITNESS:  Yes.
 
COUNSEL:  You don’t want employees to be working 
in an area where they don’t have good footing; is that 
right?
 
WITNESS:  If there is not good footing we need to 
address the situation to make it as safe as possible.  Sometimes you can’t completely eliminate 
the hazard so you have to address it.
 
COUNSEL:  And avoid it if you can’t eliminate 
it?
 
WITNESS:  Yes, that is one of the 
possibilities.
 
COUNSEL:  We have got a stipulation in this case 
that the judge read to the jury in the beginning of the case and that 
stipulation is the balloon track at Black Butte was not a safe workplace for Mr. 
Glenn to close, latch and lock the coal car doors.
 
WITNESS:  Okay.
 
COUNSEL:  Would you agree with 
that?
 
WITNESS:  It’s not the most desirable location, 
that is for sure.
 
COUNSEL:  The most desirable location is up at the 
tipple?
 
WITNESS:  If I was going to perform that job that 
is where I would want to do it.
 
COUNSEL:  Not out on the balloon 
track?
 
WITNESS:  No.
 
COUNSEL:  And the balloon track has – when you go 
out there you have got railroad ties and rails and then this loose rock ballast 
that slopes down, right?
 
WITNESS:  Yes.
 
COUNSEL:  That doesn’t sound like ideal.  That is not ideal footing 
conditions?
 
WITNESS:  Not in my opinion.
 
COUNSEL:  And there is – if you go out there there 
is product, there is coke and there is coal that is spilled from the cars mixed 
in with the ballast?
 
WITNESS:  In some areas, 
yes.
 
COUNSEL:  That would contribute to the bad footing 
conditions?
 
WITNESS:  Yes, it would.
 
And again, during 
direct examination of Black Butte’s safety supervisor at the time of Mr. Glenn’s 
accident, counsel for Union Pacific elicited testimony relating to the footing 
on the balloon track and the area surrounding the tipple.
 
COUNSEL:  Did Mr. Glenn tell you where the 
accident happened?
 
WITNESS:  No, I don’t think Steve told me.  [His coworker] told me.  [His coworker] told me specifically 
where it happened.
 
COUNSEL:  What did he tell 
you?
 
WITNESS:  It was outside the tipple area headed 
west out on the rail loop.
 
COUNSEL:  What was your reaction to 
that?
 
WITNESS:  That surprised me.
 
COUNSEL:  Why did that surprise 
you?
 
WITNESS:  Well, we have this specifically built 
area with a nice concrete pad that provides a good footing.  Where the accident occurred is out – 
actually out on the rail loop where there is poor footing and steep bank for the 
ballast.
 
COUNSEL:  So you provided the Black Butte 
employees with a safe place to do that job and Mr. Glenn and [his coworker] had 
chosen an unsafe place to do it?
 
WITNESS:  Yes.
 
. . 
.
 
COUNSEL:  And they are in a dangerous 
workplace?
 
WITNESS:  It’s a tough place to even walk out on 
the railroad loop.
 
COUNSEL:  Why is that, the railroad loop a tough 
place to work?
 
WITNESS:  Just the steep edges of the ballast 
itself, the ballast material, the railroad ties.  That is why the concrete pad was 
specifically built at the tipple.  
Nice, smooth, level area for that work to be 
performed.
 
COUNSEL:  Is the ballast that we are talking about 
almost fist-sized rocks?
 
WITNESS:  Yeah. Three inch, 
yeah.
 
COUNSEL:  And to a certain extent if it’s sloped 
like you said it is, as you walk on it it can shift and it’s 
loose?
 
WITNESS:  Sure.
 
COUNSEL:  And it takes – does it make it very 
difficult to walk on that?
 
WITNESS:  It’s tough to walk, yeah.  It’s tough to walk along the 
rail.
 
COUNSEL:  And you have known for a number of years 
prior to the day of the accident that walking on that steep, loose ballast 
wasn’t safe?
 
WITNESS:  Yes.
 
COUNSEL:  Would it be something that would be 
obvious to somebody the minute they started walking on the 
ballast?
 
WITNESS:  It would be instantly 
obvious.
 
COUNSEL:  It would just scream at 
you?
 
WITNESS:  Sure.
 
COUNSEL:  And especially if you were at the tipple 
where you could see the concrete pad, it’s smooth, it’s level.  Do you keep it 
clean?
 
WITNESS:  That is what it was put there for, so 
you could get a bobcat in there for ease in keeping it clean.  There is enough room in there to get a 
skid steer loader to help keep it clean, yes.
 
COUNSEL:  So if you check the cars there and there 
was any spillage from carry-back material you could very easily clean it 
up?
 
WITNESS:  Yes.
 
[¶24]     
Despite the district 
court’s earlier warnings that evidence of the prior incident may be admissible 
if Union Pacific argued that “Black 
Butte was negligent in making him go out there and having that policy of walking 
the loop and checking these cars,” the court determined that Union 
Pacific had not “opened the door” to that evidence.  When counsel for Mr. Glenn sought to 
introduce testimony regarding the prior incident to defend against the argument 
that Black Butte was negligent, the court responded as 
follows:
 
THE COURT:  You are saying they only had two 
choices?  That is it?  That is one of the issues that I 
have.  I mean, the jurors – one of 
the jurors said it really well yesterday when he said that every rule is made 
for a reason and they are written in blood, basically.  And we aren’t looking at the reason for 
all of the rules, whether it be Black Butte, whether it be why UP has these 
rules, whether it be why anybody has a rule.  We are not looking at the reasons.  We are dealing with the rules as they 
are.
 
            
There is a stipulation in this case that the balloon [track] was not a 
safe workplace.  I think it’s a 
question, then, of responsibility.  
Both of you have stipulated it’s not a safe workplace.  The issue that I have is, so the Cleav 
Porter incident happens and that alerts people there is this issue.  So Black Butte changes its rule or its 
policy.  Why didn’t it change it to 
a safer policy?  I think you are 
trying to convince me that there are only two rules, the one that was in effect 
before Cleav Porter and the one that they chose afterwards.  Isn’t there some middle ground?  Like they should come up there and 
unload or check the cars at that safe place.  Why didn’t they have that rule?  Or why didn’t they do a rule that we 
will clean out an area on the balloon track and let these cars be checked there 
or pour some concrete so there is special footing?
 
. . 
.
 
            
They enacted another rule, it seems to me, that wasn’t any better than 
the one they had before.
 
. . 
.
 
COUNSEL FOR MR. 
GLENN:  We just want to show the 
jury why they did it.
 
THE COURT:  Why aren’t we showing them why they have 
all the other rules out there?  
Every rule has a reason.
 
. . 
.
 
COUNSEL FOR MR. 
GLENN:  The reason why has to be 
part of the comparative fault because otherwise – I mean, if you ran out in the 
street because a semi is coming one way at you and another vehicle is coming 
another way and you have to make a quick decision, then all of that should be 
weighed into the facts.  That is 
what we are saying, all of this information ought to be weighed into the facts, 
why they acted the way they acted.  
The jury is not knowing why they acted the way they 
acted.
 
THE COURT:  They don’t know why all the other rules 
are in effect either.  I mean, all 
these rules that you guys are talking about.  No.  And on top of all of that, what I said 
is that there is a relevance issue in my mind and the prejudice outweighs the 
probative value and that is where I’m at on it.  I just – between the stipulation – 

 
COUNSEL FOR MR. 
GLENN:  I don’t see how the 
stipulation estops us to warn – to demonstrate the facts.  I mean, obviously we stipulate to facts 
to save time, but we – and obviously that was an unsafe situation.  But obviously, the tipple itself was an 
unsafe situation because Union Pacific violated its red zone rules and almost 
killed Cleav Porter.  But Union 
Pacific is telling this jury that it’s Black Butte’s fault that they are not 
using the tipple when, in fact, it’s Union Pacific’s fault that they are not 
using the tipple.  And if you are 
comparing fault, the pot is calling the kettle black.
 
THE COURT:  But I thought it had to be that the 
train was stopped.  That that was 
the new rule, that it couldn’t be checked until it was stopped.  So why couldn’t it have been 
periodically stopped?  I don’t know 
how big that flat area is.  Why 
couldn’t they have pulled up enough cars there – or they could have walked to 
the loop.  Here is my solution . . . 
. Walk around it and see what needs to be fixed, closed and latched and locked 
and all of that and mark those cars or make a note.  Then have the UP people pull them up to 
that safe area and stop the train.
 
COUNSEL FOR UNION 
PACIFIC:  And do it 
there.
 
THE COURT:  So we don’t have another Cleav Porter 
incident.
 
COUNSEL FOR MR. 
GLENN:  That is what they were doing 
with Cleav Porter.  They knew where 
the cars were and the tipple was a short space.  So the idea was they move a car, have 
Cleav Porter go underneath and close the doors.  Then they would let him get out from 
under it, move the cars again, and he would go underneath and close them.  Only he was underneath one of them and 
they moved the train.
 
THE COURT:  Yes, I know it.  I don’t think the jury needs to hear 
that.  I think it’s inflammatory, 
it’s prejudicial.  The facts are 
different from this case.  I’m not 
letting it in.  I think that Black 
Butte had a damn good reason for changing their rule, but they should have come 
up with a better one.
 
[¶25]     
The district court’s 
refusal to admit evidence of the prior incident allowed Union Pacific to shift 
blame to Black Butte by producing testimony that its safety procedures were 
inadequate, but prevented Mr. Glenn from defending against those allegations by 
presenting the prior incident as the catalyst and justification for its change 
in procedure.  Our precedent reflects a general reluctance 
to uphold evidentiary rulings which exclude evidence necessary to a party’s 
defenses or theory of the case.  For 
example, in Capshaw v. WERCS, 2001 WY 
68, 28 P.3d 855 (Wyo. 2001), a case involving an alleged breach of an employment 
contract, we addressed a challenge to the trial court’s grant of a motion in 
limine, which prevented the plaintiff from arguing that his complaints relating 
to the defendant’s mismanagement constituted the true motivation for his 
discharge.  Id., ¶ 4, 28 P.3d  at 856-57.  We held that the trial court abused its 
discretion in excluding the evidence because the ruling effectively prevented 
Mr. Capshaw from presenting his theory of the case to the jury.  Id., ¶ 10, 28 P.3d  at 858.  We noted that 

 
Mr. 
Capshaw clearly has the right to argue and attempt to persuade the jury that his 
criticism of management was in good faith and his discharge was in violation of 
his contract requiring good cause for termination. The only way he can succeed 
at trial is to convince the jury he had good reason for his criticism of 
management and problems did exist. “A party should be allowed an appropriate 
opportunity to present and develop that evidence relevant to that party’s theory 
of the case.” Stauffer Chemical Company 
v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083, 1098 (Wyo. 1989).
 
Id.  Further, we noted the patent unfairness 
in the one-sided effect of the trial court’s ruling:
 
            
In addition, the precise language of the order granting the motion in 
limine appears to limit only Mr. Capshaw’s presentation of his theory of 
pretextual discharge with no corollary effect on WERCS. Therefore, it has the 
unfortunate potential to permit WERCS to raise the mismanagement issue in its 
opening and evidentiary presentation in support of its counterclaim while 
restraining Mr. Capshaw from responding in kind. This circumstance alone raises 
concerns the order is arbitrary, capricious, and, hence, an abuse of 
discretion.
 
 Id., ¶ 11, 28 P.3d  at 
858.
 
[¶26]     
Likewise 
in Schmid, 166 P.3d 1285, a case 
involving a dispute relating to the plaintiff’s salary bonus, we addressed a 
challenge to the trial court’s decision to exclude the defendant’s proposed 
witness testimony indicating that the defendant’s agreement with the plaintiff 
employee was similar to an agreement he had with two other employees.  Id., ¶¶ 7-9, 166 P.3d  at 1288.  In holding that the decision to exclude 
the evidence was an abuse of discretion, and that the error was prejudicial, we 
noted that 
 
this 
Court has indicated that a litigant is usually entitled to a remand and a new 
trial if he was unfairly restricted in developing and presenting his theory of 
the case. Capshaw v. WERCS, 2001 WY 
68, ¶ 10, 28 P.3d 855, 858 (Wyo. 2001); Stauffer Chem. Co. v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083, 1100 (Wyo. 1989). When the issue is the exclusion of evidence, we 
generally prefer to allow a party his “day in court” to resolve a controversy on 
its merits. Winterholler [v. Zolessi], 989 P.2d [621,] 628 [(Wyo. 
1999)]. The trial court’s rulings unduly restricted the presentation of [the 
defendant’s] theory of his case, and largely denied [the defendant] his day in 
court, further supporting the conclusion that the error was unfairly 
prejudicial. 
 
Id., 
¶ 21, 166 P.3d  at 1291.
 
[¶27]     
As 
in Capshaw and Schmid, the district court’s evidentiary 
rulings in this case prevented Mr. Glenn from presenting a vital part of his 
theory of the case, which was that the car-checking procedure in effect at the 
time of Mr. Glenn’s accident arose as a direct result of the prior incident, and 
that the subsequent procedure was more 
safe than the former procedure in light of that incident.  Further, as in Capshaw, the district court’s rulings 
had the unfortunate effect of allowing Union Pacific to argue repeatedly that 
Black Butte was negligent in allowing its employees to inspect train cars on the 
balloon track, while restraining Mr. Glenn from responding to those arguments 
with any concrete justification for Black Butte’s judgment that the new 
procedure was safer than its former procedure.  Although the district 
court was legitimately concerned with the danger of unfair prejudice, the 
court’s rulings unduly restricted Mr. Glenn from presenting his theory of the 
case.  Because the excluded evidence was essential to 
Mr. Glenn’s defense against the allegations that Black Butte was negligent, and 
because it was the jury’s prerogative to determine the degree of safety of Black 
Butte’s car-checking procedure, we must conclude that the district court abused 
its discretion in applying W.R.E. 403.  
 
[¶28]     
In 
holding that the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of 
the prior incident, we repeat the qualification offered in Capshaw, where we stated 
that
 
We 
are not saying the court must allow any and all evidence the parties offer on 
the subject of mismanagement, but it must allow sufficient, admissible evidence 
to permit them to argue to the jury that Mr. Capshaw either did or did not have 
a good faith basis to criticize management.  Ultimately, the judge has discretion to 
control the amount of evidence and the resulting length of the trial. Hall v. Hall, 708 P.2d 416, 421 (Wyo. 
1985).
 
Id., ¶ 12, 28 P.3d  at 
858.  Likewise, in this case, the 
district court has discretion to tailor presentation of the evidence to prevent 
the jury from hearing unnecessary or inflammatory details of the prior 
incident.  Additionally, the dangers 
of “unfair prejudice” can be addressed 
through an appropriate limiting instruction.  Counsel for Mr. Glenn indicated his 
amenability to a limiting instruction on several occasions, stating at one point 
during trial that “We don’t have any problems with the Court giving 
limiting instructions or crafting our presentation of that so as to avoid 
unnecessary drama, but we think the facts of the case are intimately related to 
this Cleav Porter incident and that we should be allowed to tell the jury about 
it.”  As we noted in Capshaw, managing evidence through 
proper jury instructions “accommodates the receipt by the trier of fact of all 
relevant evidence and, at the same time, permits the parties to fully 
litigate their case theories.”  Id., ¶ 13, 28 P.3d  at 859.  
 
c.    
Prejudicial 
error
 
[¶29]     
We 
must also conclude that exclusion of the prior incident evidence was 
prejudicial.  Mr. Glenn was 
effectively prevented from defending against argument and inference that Black 
Butte was at fault for his injury.  
As Mr. Glenn’s employer, Black Butte was immune from suit under Wyoming’s 
Worker’s Compensation Act.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104.  However, 
under Wyoming’s comparative fault statute, the jury was permitted to allocate 
fault to actors, including Black Butte, who were not made parties to the 
action.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-1-109.  As a result of this 
statutory scheme, Mr. Glenn was placed in the position of having to defend 
against allegations relating to Black Butte’s negligence, for any percentage of 
fault allocated to Black Butte would necessarily diminish his recovery.  Absent evidence of the prior incident, 
however, Mr. Glenn was unable to provide the jury with a clear justification for 
Black Butte’s decision to require its employees to walk the balloon track when 
checking the train cars.  Given that 
any increase in the allocation of fault to Black Butte had a direct effect on 
Mr. Glenn’s recovery, there is at least a reasonable probability that the 
verdict would have been different if the error in excluding the evidence had not 
occurred.  Accordingly, we find that 
the error was prejudicial, and so we reverse and remand for a new 
trial.
 
Issue 2: Fault 
Attributable to FMC Astaris
 
[¶30]     
Although 
we reverse based on our resolution of the first issue, we will also consider Mr. 
Glenn’s second issue due to the fact that it is likely to arise again in the new 
trial.  In his second issue, Mr. 
Glenn contends the district court erred in “permitting the jury to consider the 
fault of two nonparty actors,” referring to Astaris and Black Butte.  This issue, however, which actually 
consists of two separate arguments, relates only to Astaris.  Contrary to Mr. Glenn’s issue statement, 
he does not argue that the jury should not have been allowed to attribute fault 
to Black Butte.  Rather, he contends 
that the district court erred by (1) finding that Astaris owed him a duty of 
care, and (2) refusing to instruct the jury on the law of intervening cause as 
it relates to Astaris.  We will 
address these issues separately.
 
a.    
Duty of 
care
 
[¶31]     
Mr. 
Glenn’s first argument is that Astaris did not owe him a duty of care and that, 
as a result, the district court erred in denying his motion for a directed 
verdict3 in favor of Astaris.  In his motion, Mr. Glenn argued that 
Astaris was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it did not owe a 
duty of care under contract, statute, or common law.  He repeats this argument on appeal.  Mr. Glenn also argues that “[t]here is 
certainly no relationship that would 'impose’ on Astaris 'an obligation to act 
reasonably for the protection’ of Glenn.”  Further, he contends that his injury was 
not foreseeable to Astaris because “Astaris’s conduct occurred nearly four weeks 
before the injury, over 300 miles away from Black Butte.” 
 
[¶32]     
The 
existence and scope of a duty is a question of law, which we review de novo.  Rice v. Collins Commun., Inc., 2010 WY 
109, ¶¶ 8, 10, 236 P.3d 1009, 1013-14  
(Wyo. 2010).  Further, we 
review the decision to grant or deny a motion for judgment de novo.  Sayer v. Williams, 962 P.2d 165, 167 
(Wyo. 1998).  However, we view the 
facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s 
decision.
 
            
A judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when reasonable jurors could 
reach but one conclusion as to the verdict. We regard the nonmoving party’s 
evidence as being true, and we give that party the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. Additionally, we do not weigh 
the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. A judgment as a matter 
of law deprives the opposing party of the opportunity to have the jury determine 
the facts, and the court should, therefore, use caution in granting such a 
judgment.
Schmid, ¶ 26, 166 P.3d  at 1292. 

 
[¶33]     
As 
noted above, under Wyoming’s comparative fault statute, a non-party actor may be 
placed on the verdict form if the actor’s fault is determined to be a proximate 
cause of injury.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-1-109 (LexisNexis 2011).  The 
relevant portions of the statute provide as follows:
 
§ 
1-1-109.  Comparative fault.      
(a) As used in this section: 

(i) 
“Actor” means a person or other entity, including the claimant, whose fault is 
determined to be a proximate cause of the death, injury or damage, whether or 
not the actor is a party to the litigation;           
. . .       
(iv) “Fault” includes acts or omissions, determined to be a 
proximate cause of death or injury to person or property, that are in any 
measure negligent, or that subject an actor to strict tort or strict products 
liability, and includes breach of warranty, assumption of risk and misuse or 
alteration of a product;        
. . .       

(b) Contributory 
fault shall not bar a recovery in an action by any claimant or the claimant’s 
legal representative to recover damages for wrongful death or injury to person 
or property, if the contributory fault of the claimant is not more than fifty 
percent (50%) of the total fault of all actors. Any damages allowed shall be 
diminished in proportion to the amount of fault attributed to the claimant.        
(c) Whether or not the claimant is free of fault, the court 
shall:
(i) If 
a jury trial:          

(A) Direct 
the jury to determine the total amount of damages sustained by the claimant 
without regard to the percentage of fault attributed to the claimant, and the 
percentage of fault attributable to each actor; and       
(B) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination 
of the percentage of fault.       

(ii) If 
a trial before the court without jury, make special findings of fact, 
determining the total amount of damages sustained by the claimant without regard 
to the percentage of fault attributed to the claimant, and the percentage of 
fault attributable to each actor.          

(d) The 
court shall reduce the amount of damages determined under subsection (c) of this 
section in proportion to the percentage of fault attributed to the claimant and 
enter judgment against each defendant in the amount determined under subsection 
(e) of this section.          
(e) Each defendant is liable only to the extent of that 
defendant’s proportion of the total fault determined under paragraph (c)(i) or 
(ii) of this section.
 
Id.  Because 
the definition of “fault” includes acts or omissions “that are in any measure 
negligent,” one who seeks to include a non-party actor on the verdict form must 
prove that the actor was negligent by showing (1) the actor owed a duty of care 
to the plaintiff, (2) the actor breached the duty, (3) the actor’s breach was 
the proximate cause of injury or loss to the plaintiff, and (4) the plaintiff 
suffered actual injury or loss.  See Andersen v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 
2002 WY 105, ¶ 11, 49 P.3d 1011, 1014 (Wyo. 2002).
 
[¶34]     
A 
duty of care “may arise by contract, statute, common law, or when the 
relationship of the parties is such that the law imposes an obligation on the 
defendant to act reasonably for the protection of the plaintiff.”  Rice, ¶ 10, 236 P.3d  at 1014.  We have stated that a duty exists where, 
“upon the facts in evidence, such a relation exists between the parties that the 
community will impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the other – 
or, more simply, whether the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered 
invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the defendant.”  Daniels v. Carpenter, 2003 WY 11, ¶ 21, 
62 P.3d 555, 563 (Wyo. 2003).  In 
considering whether a duty exists, we have balanced the following factors to aid 
in that determination:
 
(1) 
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the closeness of the connection 
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, (3) the degree of 
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the moral blame attached to 
the defendant’s conduct, (5) the policy of preventing future harm, (6) the 
extent of the burden upon the defendant, (7) the consequences to the community 
and the court system, and (8) the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance 
for the risk involved.
 
Id.  These factors were originally adopted in 
Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 
196 (Wyo. 1986) from Tarasoff v. Regents 
of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976).  In Tarasoff, the Supreme Court of 
California recognized the “fundamental principle” that “'whenever one person is 
by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another . . . that if 
he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct . . . he would cause 
danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use 
ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.’”  Id. (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 
(Cal. 1968)).  With regard to the 
eight-factor test, the Tarasoff court 
held that “[t]he most important of these considerations in establishing duty is 
foreseeability.”  Id.  The primacy of foreseeability in 
determining whether a duty exists has been echoed by numerous courts and 
commentators.  For example, in Beugler v. Burlington Northern & Santa 
Fe Ry., 490 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2007), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
stated that 
 
Many 
factors inform the duty analysis, but the most important consideration is 
foreseeability. Generally a defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are 
foreseeably endangered by his conduct with respect to all risks which make the 
conduct unreasonably dangerous. Foreseeability establishes a 'zone of risk,’ 
which is to say that it forms a basis for assessing whether the conduct creates 
a generalized and foreseeable risk of harming others.       
Id. 
at 1228 (quoting Iglehart v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Rogers County, 2002 
OK 76, 60 P.3d 497, 502 (Okla. 2002)); see also Henderson v. United States, 846 F.2d 1233, 1234 (9th Cir. 1988); Winschel 
v. Brown, 171 P.3d 142, 146 (Alaska 2007); 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 121, at 196 (2004) (“The 
most important consideration in the determination of whether the defendant owed 
the plaintiff a duty is whether the defendant was foreseeably endangered by the 
defendant’s conduct.”) (footnote omitted).  

 
[¶35]     
On appeal, both 
parties have presented a brief analysis of each of the Gates factors.  Given the relatively straightforward 
circumstances surrounding Mr. Glenn’s injury, however, we find it unnecessary to 
examine each of the elements in the Gates test.  Instead, we will focus exclusively on 
the foreseeability of injury in determining whether Astaris owed a duty to Mr. 
Glenn.
 
[¶36]     
The 
district court, determining that Mr. Glenn’s injury was foreseeable, held as 
follows:
 
            
Well, my thinking on this is this.  
I think there is enough evidence in the record to establish 
foreseeability.  I think it’s a 
common sense issue on top of everything.  
If you have stuff left in [the train car] and it has to be taken out, 
that it could pose a hazard to somebody or something whether it be a derailment 
or a person.  Then there is this 
relationship with the parties, which seems to exist based on the testimony of 
the custom of the industry.
 
We 
agree with the district court that the injury to Mr. Glenn was foreseeable.  Both the general nature of Mr. Glenn’s 
accident and the evidence presented at trial support a finding that Mr. Glenn’s 
injury was foreseeable.  First, it 
is entirely reasonable to expect that leftover material in an improperly cleaned 
and closed train car will fall from that train car and cause injury to a person 
who is ultimately tasked with emptying the car.  One needs only a basic familiarity with 
the law of gravity to anticipate that heavy material precariously perched on an 
unlocked door may come down with unfortunate consequences.  Given the uncomplicated nature of the 
accident at issue here, we find that Mr. Glenn’s injury was reasonably 
foreseeable.
 
[¶37]     
Second, the evidence 
in the record indicates that Mr. Glenn’s injury was foreseeable based on the 
relationship between Astaris and Black Butte.  An Astaris employee testified at trial 
that Astaris had a responsibility to clean all of the coal out of the train 
cars.  The employee testified that 
“[a]ny person releasing a car [is] supposed to release it in a safe 
condition.”  He also testified that 
Astaris had received complaints from another company “from time to time” that 
coking coal was left over in the train cars after leaving Astaris’ plant.  After the employees of that company went 
on strike, Astaris requested that Black Butte provide coal for its operation in 
Don, Idaho.  Given that Astaris was 
aware that leftover material created problems for its shippers, and that it had 
requested coal from the Black Butte mine, it was reasonably foreseeable that 
material left in an improperly unloaded car could cause injury to a Black Butte 
employee.  In sum, we hold that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding that Astaris owed a duty to Mr. Glenn and, 
accordingly, did not err in denying Mr. Glenn’s motion for judgment as a matter 
of law.
 
b.    
Intervening cause 
instruction
 
[¶38]     
In 
Mr. Glenn’s second argument relating to the fault of Astaris, he contends that 
“alternatively, the jury was not adequately instructed on the law of causation 
as it relates to Astaris.”  More 
precisely, he argues that the district court erred in refusing to give the jury 
an intervening cause instruction.  
He contends that Union Pacific’s failure to provide cars that were 
reasonably safe for their intended purpose cuts off any negligence by Astaris. 
 Mr. Glenn argues that “there is no 
evidence that Astaris could foresee that the Railroad would repeatedly fail to 
inspect the car as it was required to do.”
 
[¶39]     
We 
review a district court’s decision to give or refuse a particular jury 
instruction for an abuse of discretion.  Pina v. Christensen, 2009 WY 64, ¶ 8, 
206 P.3d 1298, 1300 (Wyo. 2009).       

 
            
When examining the propriety of jury instructions, this Court reviews 
whether the instructions, taken as a whole, adequately and clearly advise the 
jury of the applicable law. The trial court is not obligated to give an 
instruction offered by a party as long as the jury is adequately instructed on 
the law as it pertains to that case. The trial court’s ruling on an instruction 
will not constitute reversible error absent a showing of prejudice, and 
prejudice will not be said to result unless it is demonstrated that the 
instruction confused or misled the jury with respect to the proper principles of 
law. Sellers v. Dooley Oil Transport, 
2001 WY 44, ¶ 9, 22 P.3d 307, 309 (Wyo. 2001); Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032, 1036 
(Wyo. 1983). The burden is on the appellant to show prejudicial error. Daley v. Wenzel, 2001 WY 80, ¶ 29, 30 P.3d 547, 554-55 (Wyo. 2001).
 
Parrish 
v. Groathouse Constr., Inc., 
2006 WY 33, ¶ 7, 130 P.3d 502, 505 (Wyo. 2006).
 
[¶40]     
As 
Mr. Glenn’s argument suggests, an intervening cause is one that comes into being 
after a negligent act has occurred, and if it is not a foreseeable event, it 
will insulate the original actor from liability.  Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1092 
(Wyo. 1985).  An unforeseeable 
intervening cause is also described as a “superseding cause.”  See id. at 1093; 65 C.J.S. Negligence, § 223 (2011).  We have stated that the notion of 
intervening cause is an “alternative method” for explaining the concepts of 
legal or proximate cause and the “substantial factor” test.  Buckley, 703 P.2d  at 1092.  In similar terms, other courts have 
determined that superseding cause is merely a subset of the inquiry into 
proximate cause.  Convit v. Wilson, 980 A.2d 1104, 1125-26 
(D.C. 2009); Mobile Gas Service Corp. v. 
Robinson, 20 So. 3d 770, 780-81 (Ala. 2009).  Moreover, at least one jurisdiction has 
concluded that the doctrine of superseding cause “has no place in our modern 
system of comparative fault and apportionment” because “it is inconsistent to 
conclude simultaneously that all negligent parties should 
pay in proportion to their fault . . . but that one negligent party does 
not have to pay its share because its negligence was somehow 'superseded’ by a 
subsequent negligent act.”  Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 
263 Conn. 424, 441-42, 820 A.2d 258, 269 (2003).  The commonality in the analysis of 
proximate cause and intervening cause, and the mandates of Wyoming’s comparative 
fault statute, may have contributed to the 2009 Pattern Jury Instructions 
Committee’s disapproval of a pattern intervening cause instruction.  The committee note accompanying the 
instruction states that
 
            
The 2009 Committee agreed that a pattern “intervening cause” is not 
appropriate.  The Committee felt 
that the majority of cases do not call for an “intervening cause” instruction 
where such matters are addressed through comparative fault instructions.  However, the Committee also felt it 
appropriate to provide practitioners with an example of such an instruction as a 
“Use Note” for consideration in an appropriate case.
 
Wyoming Civil Pattern 
Jury Instruction No. 3.12, Use Note (2009).
 
[¶41]     
The district court, 
after initially reserving judgment on the intervening cause instruction, in 
order to give the issue further study, subsequently determined that the 
instruction should not be given.  
The court cited the Committee’s note as one among several reasons for its 
decision to deny the requested instruction:
 
            
I will not give an intervening cause instruction.  I did some research about foreseeability 
and other elements of that doctrine.  
I am not giving it for four reasons.  First of all, because of the testimony 
and inferences from that testimony regarding custom and practice in the railroad 
and mining industry.  Second, 
because of the jury instruction committee’s fractured position on the 
issue.  Third, because I think it 
would be confusing to the jury.  And 
fourth, because I think the jury is being adequately instructed on comparative 
fault, causation and foreseeability, among other things, and I think it gives 
you the basis to argue whatever you want to argue regarding those issues.  So that instruction will not be 
given.
 
Ultimately, the court gave the following instructions 
relating to comparative fault and causation:
 
Instruction 
No. 15
 
            
In this case it is claimed that Black Butte Coal Company and Astaris were 
at fault in the June 30, 2000 incident in question.  Even though these two companies have not 
appeared or offered evidence, it is necessary that you determine whether Black 
Butte Coal Company or Astaris was at fault in the June 30, 2000 incident in 
question and determine the percentage of fault, if any, attributable to each of 
these two companies.  For purposes 
of these instructions, Black Butte Coal Company and Astaris will hereafter be 
referred to as non-parties.
 
Instruction 
No. 31
 
            
Your verdict in this case must be determined on the basis of the 
comparative fault of the parties and the non-parties at 
fault.
 
. 
. .
 
            
It will be necessary for you to determine the comparative fault, if any, 
of each of the parties involved in the occurrence and the non-parties at 
fault.  It also will be necessary 
for you to determine the total amount of damages, if any, sustained by the 
plaintiff.
 
            
Your findings as to fault will affect the plaintiff’s recovery.  It is my duty to explain how that may 
occur.
 
            
The defendant’s liability for damages is limited to the percentage of 
fault, if any, that you find is attributable to the 
defendant.
 
            
The plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by the percentage, if any, of fault 
that you find is attributable to the plaintiff and the non-parties at 
fault.  If you find that the 
plaintiff’s fault exceeds fifty percent (50%), the plaintiff will not be 
entitled to recover any damages.
 
. 
. . 
 
Instruction 
No. 17
 
            
The negligence, if any, of the defendant and the non-parties is not a 
“cause” of any injuries to the plaintiff unless injury to a person in the 
plaintiff’s situation was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of that 
negligence.  The exact or precise 
injury need not have been foreseeable, but the defendant or the non-parties may 
be found to be a “cause” of the plaintiff’s harm within the meaning of these 
instructions if a reasonably careful person, under similar or the same 
circumstances as the defendant or the non-parties, would have anticipated that 
injury to a person in the plaintiff’s situation might result from the 
defendant’s conduct.
 
Instruction 
No. 18
 
            
If more than one act or failure to act contributed to the claimed injury, 
then each act or failure to act may have been a “cause” of the injury within the 
meaning of these instructions.  A 
cause does not have to be the only cause or the last or nearest cause.  It is sufficient if the act or failure 
to act joins in a natural and probable way with some other act or failure to act 
to cause some or all of the claimed injury.
 
Instruction 
No. 23
 
            
An injury or damage is caused by an act, or a failure to act, whenever it 
appears from the evidence that the act or omission played a substantial part in 
bringing about the injury or damage.
 
We 
find that these instructions adequately address the issues of causation and 
comparative fault.  In the final 
analysis, the same facts that supported Mr. Glenn’s argument for an intervening 
cause instruction also allowed him to argue that Astaris’ comparative fault was 
minimal in relation to the other actors in this case.  In light of the rule that “[t]rial courts 
are afforded substantial latitude to tailor the instructions to the facts of the 
case,” we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
to give an intervening cause instruction.  
See, e.g., Budder v. State, 
2010 WY 123, ¶ 7, 238 P.3d 575, 577 (Wyo. 2010).  
 
Issue 3:  Cumulative 
Error
 
[¶42]     
Finally, 
because we reverse based on the district court’s exclusion of the prior incident 
at the Black Butte facility, we do not address Mr. Glenn’s contention that we 
should remand on the basis of cumulative error.
 
[¶43]     
Reversed 
and remanded for a new trial.
 
FOOTNOTES
 
1Glenn 
v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 
2008 WY 16, 176 P.3d 640 (Wyo. 2008).
 
2There is some dispute 
as to whether the new car-checking procedure required employees to check the 
cars by walking the balloon track.  
See discussion infra, at ¶ 
15.
 
3The term directed 
verdict is now identified as judgment as a matter of law. A motion for a 
directed verdict is procedurally identical to a motion for judgment as a matter 
of law under the current W.R.C.P. 50.  Pokorny v. Salas, 2003 WY 159, ¶ 7 n.3, 81 P.3d 171, 174 n.3 
(Wyo. 2003).