Case Title: Harbel v. Wintermute

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93-169

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Harbel v. Wintermute1994 WY 113883 P.2d 359Case Number: 93-169Decided: 10/21/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Douglass E. HARBEL and 
Janet D. Harbel,

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

Earl WINTERMUTE and Lloyd 
Hess,

Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

Appeal from District 
Court, Sheridan County, John C. Brackley, J.

 

Representing 
Appellants:

George Santini of Santini 
Law Offices, Cheyenne.

Representing 
Appellees:

Anthony T. Wendtland of 
Davis & Cannon, Sheridan.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* MACY** and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

* Retired July 6, 
1994.

** Chief Justice 
at time of oral argument.

TAYLOR, Justice.

[¶1]      This co-employee 
tort action presents a narrow question which has been broadly argued to 
implicate issues of fairness and government accountability. The injured party 
operated a front-end loader at a road construction site. The injured party 
maintains the front-end loader was unsafe and his employer did not correct the 
problems. Furthermore, the injured party contends that a supervisor and a 
mechanic permitted the front-end loader to be operated despite their knowledge 
of the unsafe conditions. However, the resolution of this case does not depend 
upon a finding of culpable negligence. Instead, the resolution is governed by 
sovereign or governmental immunity. The employer is a governmental entity. The 
injured party, the supervisor and the mechanic were all employees of the 
governmental entity acting within the scope of their duties at the time of the 
injury. As a result, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
supervisor and the mechanic. The district court determined, under Wyoming's 
closed-end governmental tort claims act, immunity had not been 
waived.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant, the 
injured party, frames two issues:

1. Are the [Appellees] 
subject to liability under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act for "negligence 
in the operation of a motor vehicle" where they directed the use of heavy 
equipment which was known to be in a dangerous and unsafe condition?

2. In assuming an 
exception to governmental immunity under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act 
exists, does requiring the use of heavy equipment known by the [Appellees] to be 
in a dangerous and unsafe condition constitute culpable negligence?

[¶4]      Appellees, the 
supervisor and the mechanic, identify more issues:

I. Does the recent 
holding in Copp v. Redmond render Douglass Harbel's negligence claims 
moot?

II. Did the District 
Court properly grant the Defendants summary judgment under the plain language of 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act including W.S. 1-39-105 and W.S. 1-39-120 
based on the record in this case?

A. Was Douglass Harbel 
operating a "motor vehicle" at the time of his injury as that term is set out in 
W.S. 1-39-105 and as that term is statutorily defined in W.S. 31-1-101(a)(xv) 
and W.S. 31-1-101(a)(xvii)?

B. Were Earl Wintermute 
and/or Lloyd Hess "operating" a motor vehicle at the time Douglass Harbel 
injured himself such that sovereign immunity for them is waived under W.S. 
1-39-105?

III. If the culpable 
negligence issues in this case are considered in this appeal, have the Harbels 
met their summary judgment burden to establish that a genuine issue of material 
fact exists to show that Earl Wintermute and/or Lloyd Hess were culpably 
negligent in a way which caused Douglass Harbel's injury?

II. 
FACTS

[¶5]      On July 26, 1988, 
Douglass E. Harbel (Harbel) was assigned to operate a Model 950 Caterpillar 
front-end loader (loader) owned by his employer, the Road and Bridge Department 
of Sheridan County, Wyoming (the department). Harbel used the loader to remove 
rocks from a steep slope of private land adjoining a road construction project. 
As Harbel steered the loader into one pile of loose rocks, the bucket hit solid 
rock underneath. The loader lunged forward tossing Harbel into the windshield 
and the roof of the cab. Harbel suffered neck and back injuries.

[¶6]      At the time 
Harbel was injured, the safety equipment installed in the loader by the 
manufacturer had not been properly maintained by the department. The seat belt 
in the loader was missing the part of the mechanism used to buckle the belt. In 
addition, the latching mechanism that anchored the seat to the loader's frame 
was broken allowing the seat to catapult forward on impact. Finally, the back 
cushion of the loader's seat was torn and missing some of its protective 
padding.

[¶7]      As the supervisor 
of operations at the department, Earl Wintermute (Wintermute) was responsible 
for assigning employees to projects. Wintermute assigned Harbel to operate the 
loader at the road construction project on the day he was injured. Ordinarily, 
Wintermute never inspected safety features of the department's equipment. 
Instead, he relied on reports from employees to alert him of problems with 
safety features. However, Wintermute knew that the back cushion in the loader 
was torn and missing some of its protective padding when he assigned Harbel to 
operate the loader.

[¶8]      Lloyd Hess (Hess) 
was the department's mechanic. His responsibilities included repairing equipment 
and ordering necessary parts. Hess had received several reports from the 
department's employees, including Harbel, about the condition of the loader's 
back cushion. Hess had ordered a replacement, but at the time Harbel was 
injured, the new back cushion had not been installed. Because the back cushion 
problem was considered minor, Hess had not taken the loader out of 
service.

[¶9]      Harbel received 
benefits for a permanent partial disability under the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act. Harbel also filed a claim with Sheridan County under the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. The Sheridan County Commission denied the 
claim.

[¶10]   On July 26, 1991, Harbel and Janet 
Harbel (collectively Harbel) filed this co-employee tort action against 
Wintermute and Hess. Harbel maintained that Wintermute and Hess acted 
"knowingly, willfully and intentionally" in failing to make necessary repairs to 
correct the unsafe conditions of the loader. Harbel sought damages for his 
injury, emotional distress, loss of income and disability. Janet Harbel sought 
damages for loss of consortium.

[¶11]   After nearly two years of 
discovery, Wintermute and Hess filed a motion for summary judgment. Wintermute 
and Hess asserted that the action was barred by sovereign or governmental 
immunity under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. The district court 
determined that as employees of a governmental entity, Wintermute and Hess were 
acting within the scope of their duties at the time Harbel was injured. 
Furthermore, the district court ruled that immunity had not been waived to 
permit a tort action under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of Wintermute and Hess.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶12]   Summary judgment is properly 
granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the prevailing party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Prudential Preferred Properties 
v. J and J Ventures, Inc., 859 P.2d 1267, 1271 (Wyo. 1993); W.R.C.P. 56(c). 
Our review of the record is conducted in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion. Lynch v. Norton Const., Inc., 861 P.2d 1095, 1097 
(Wyo. 1993). This court accords no deference to the district court's decisions 
on issues of law. Coones v. F.D.I.C., 848 P.2d 783, 795 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting 
Powder River Oil Co. v. Powder River Petroleum Corp., 830 P.2d 403, 406-07 
(Wyo. 1992)). Because we review a grant of summary judgment from the same 
perspective as the district court using the same factual materials and the same 
standards, a summary judgment may be affirmed on any legal ground appearing in 
the record. Moncrief v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., 861 P.2d 516, 
523 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Deisch v. Jay, 790 P.2d 1273, 1278 (Wyo. 
1990)).

[¶13]   This action involves the 
interrelationship between two laws which either grant or waive forms of 
immunity. The Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 27-14-101 through 
27-14-805 (1991 & Cum.Supp. 1994) (hereinafter Worker's Compensation Act), 
grants statutory immunity to participating employers from common law wrongful 
death and personal injury torts in return for the employer's participation in a 
no-fault industrial insurance fund to provide "`rapid and certain relief for 
work-related injuries and death * * *.'" Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 697 P.2d 606, 616, reh'g denied with opinion, 701 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Wyo. 1985) 
(quoting Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885, 887-88 (Wyo. 
1984)). The exclusive remedy provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act do not 
provide immunity to a co-employee who commits intentional acts or willful and 
wanton misconduct. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 55 (Wyo. 1992). 
See Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-104(a) (permitting co-employee tort action when 
"employees intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury to the injured 
employee * * *."). Therefore, under the Worker's Compensation Act, Harbel was 
permitted to sue Wintermute and Hess to recover damages for personal injury 
suffered in a work-related accident that allegedly resulted from the culpable 
negligence of his co-employees. Copp v. Redmond, 858 P.2d 1125, 1126-27 
(Wyo. 1993) (holding that for claims accruing between July 1, 1987 and February 
18, 1993, proof of culpable negligence was required for co-employee tort 
action). See Wyo. Stat. § 27-12-103(a) (1983) (repealed 1986) 
(establishing culpable negligence as standard of negligence for co-employee 
litigation under Worker's Compensation Act). However, even if Harbel could 
establish culpable negligence, he could only recover if immunity had been waived 
under provisions of the second law applicable to this case because Wintermute 
and Hess were employees of a governmental entity.

[¶14]   The Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-39-101 through 1-39-120 (1988 & Cum.Supp. 1994) 
(hereinafter Governmental Claims Act), waives sovereign or governmental immunity 
but only for certain enumerated torts. Veile v. Board of County Com'rs of 
Washakie County, 860 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Wyo. 1993). See Worthington v. 
State, 598 P.2d 796, 800 (Wyo. 1979) (characterizing the distinction between 
sovereign and governmental immunity).

(a) A governmental entity 
and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted 
immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 
1-39-112.

Wyo. Stat. § 
1-39-104(a). The Governmental Claims Act is a closed-end tort claims act. 
Worden v. Village Homes, 821 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Wyo. 1991).

[¶15]   This court has previously addressed 
the interrelationship between the immunity grant of the Worker's Compensation 
Act and the waiver of immunity under the Governmental Claims Act. In 
Hamlin, 701 P.2d  at 1142, we held that an injured employee of a 
governmental entity may structure a claim against his or her co-employees. We 
explained that under the Worker's Compensation Act, the injured employee must be 
able to establish that the tortious conduct of the co-employees involved the 
required degree of negligence. Id. See Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 
1362-63 (Wyo. 1981) (holding supervisor was culpably negligent for failing to 
repair defective brakes in truck which injured co-employee). Before the 
co-employee litigation can proceed, however, there must be a determination that 
immunity under the Governmental Claims Act has been expressly waived. 
Hamlin, 701 P.2d  at 1144.

[¶16]   While the parties broadly argued 
the fairness of the immunity grants and waivers and the proof of the required 
degree of negligence in this case, our attention is focused on the waiver of 
sovereign or governmental immunity under the Governmental Claims Act. As public 
employees acting within the scope of their duties, Wintermute and Hess contend 
they have been granted immunity because there is no provision of the 
Governmental Claims Act which waives immunity for their actions. Harbel 
responds, to the contrary, that the Governmental Claims Act contains a specific 
provision waiving immunity even though Wintermute and Hess were acting within 
the scope of their duties. Both sides point to the same language of the same 
statute to support their positions. 

A governmental entity is 
liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or 
property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while 
acting within the scope of their duties in the operation of any motor 
vehicle, aircraft or watercraft.

Wyo. Stat. § 
1-39-105 (emphasis added).

[¶17]   To determine whether sovereign or 
governmental immunity bars this action, we must determine the intent of the 
legislature as found in the Governmental Claims Act. This court's rules of 
statutory interpretation were summarized in Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. 
Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Wyo. 1993):

We make the determination 
as to meaning, that is, whether the statute's meaning is subject to varying 
interpretations. If we determine that the meaning is not subject to varying 
interpretations, that may end the exercise, although we may resort to extrinsic 
aids of interpretation, such as legislative history if available and rules of 
construction, to confirm the determination. On the other hand, if we determine 
that the meaning is subject to varying interpretations, we must resort to 
available extrinsic aids. If an ambiguous statute has been construed by an 
agency charged with administering it, we will accord deference to, but are not 
bound by, that construction. After all, the final construction of an ambiguous 
statute is a question for the court.

In interpreting 
the Governmental Claims Act, this court must strictly construe the statutory 
exceptions to immunity against potential claimants and, conversely, liberally 
construe the grant of immunity in favor of the governmental entity. Martinez 
v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 956 (Wyo. 1990); Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-101 
(1988). See also 1 Shepard's Editorial Staff, Civil Actions Against 
State and Local Government, Its Divisions, Agencies, and Officers, § 3.3 at 
181 (Jon. L. Craig ed. 2nd ed. 1992).

[¶18]   The Governmental Claims Act 
includes a statement of purpose which offers substantial insight into 
legislative intent. Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-102(a) provides:

(a) The Wyoming 
legislature recognizes the inherently unfair and inequitable results which occur 
in the strict application of the doctrine of governmental immunity and is 
cognizant of the Wyoming Supreme Court decision of Oroz v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 575 P.2d 1155 (1978). It is further recognized that the state 
and its political subdivisions as trustees of public revenues are constituted to 
serve the inhabitants of the state of Wyoming and furnish certain services not 
available through private parties and, in the case of the state, state revenues 
may only be expended upon legislative appropriation. This act is adopted 
by the legislature to balance the respective equities between persons injured by 
governmental actions and the taxpayers of the state of Wyoming whose revenues 
are utilized by governmental entities on behalf of those taxpayers. This 
act is intended to retain any common law defenses which a defendant may have by 
virtue of decisions from this or other jurisdictions.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶19]   This court's interpretation of the 
provisions of the Governmental Claims Act has sought to apply the principles of 
fairness and balance inherent in the legislation. The legislature has expressed 
its intent to waive immunity when a specific exception is stated, otherwise the 
claim is barred. Sawyer v. City of Sheridan, 793 P.2d 476, 478 (Wyo. 
1990). In Hamlin, 701 P.2d  at 1144, we concluded: "The legislature sought 
to afford a remedy to persons injured by negligent public employees, while 
avoiding the repeated litigation of the question of governmental immunity." As 
the typical example, we pointed to, "the negligent operation of an automobile by 
a public employee in the scope of his or her duties is tortious conduct excepted 
from the shield of governmental immunity whether raised by the government or the 
employee." Id. Hamlin involved a culpably negligent public employee whose 
actions resulted in the death of a co-employee riding with him in an automobile. 
Hamlin, 697 P.2d  at 608.

[¶20]   In two previous cases, we have 
addressed the legislative intent of Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-105. In DeWald v. 
State, 719 P.2d 643, 649 (Wyo. 1986), we determined the legislature 
authorized a waiver of immunity when a police officer negligently operated a 
patrol car. Recently, in Romero v. Hoppal, 855 P.2d 366, 370 (Wyo. 1993), 
we held that the legislature authorized a waiver of immunity when a snowplow 
operator negligently operated a snowplow. DeWald and Romero 
involved accidents in which the public employee, acting within the scope of 
his or her duties while operating a motor vehicle, was alleged to have 
negligently caused injuries to others.

[¶21]   Unlike, DeWald and 
Romero, the injuries to Harbel occurred while he was operating the 
loader. The duties of Wintermute and Hess involved supervision of work schedules 
and equipment or maintenance of the loader. All parties agree, therefore, that 
the dispositive issue is what constitutes the "operation of any motor vehicle * 
* *." Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-105. Harbel argues for a broad interpretation so that 
Wintermute and Hess would be considered as taking part in the "operation" of the 
loader. Wintermute and Hess contend that Harbel's interpretation would 
erroneously equate supervisory and maintenance obligations with the "operation" 
of the loader. We must determine what meaning the legislature intended for 
"operation."

[¶22]   The legislature did not define the 
term "operation" as used in the Governmental Claims Act. When a term is not 
defined in a statute, this court will furnish an ordinary and obvious meaning. 
Sheridan Commercial Park, Inc. v. Briggs, 848 P.2d 811, 815 (Wyo. 1993) 
(quoting Parker Land and Cattle Co., 845 P.2d at 1042). The Motor Vehicle 
Safety-Responsibility Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 31-9-101 through 31-9-414 (1994), 
provides a definition for an "operator" of a motor vehicle. Wyo. Stat. § 
31-9-102(a)(ix) states: "`Operator' means every person who is in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle[.]" This definition is consistent with the ordinary 
meaning of "operate." In White v. State, 41 Wyo. 256, 262, 284 P. 764, 
765 (1930), this court considered whether a person could "operate" a liquor 
still and, at the same time, not be the person who used the still. The defendant 
had challenged the language of an information because he said the charged crime 
required his use of the still. Id. We concluded that the ordinary meaning 
of "operate" includes the idea of personal use because "operate" means "`to put 
into, or to continue in, operation or activity.'" Id.

[¶23]   Other jurisdictions that have 
considered the issue agree that "operation" of a motor vehicle consists of the 
personal acts necessary to actually put the motor vehicle in motion. 
Feitelberg v. Matuson, 124 Misc. 595, 208 N.Y.S. 786, 789 (1925); City 
of Pittsburgh v. Jodzis, 147 Pa.Cmwlth. 234, 607 A.2d 339, 349 (1992). 
"Operation" of a motor vehicle involves "manipulation of the car's controls in 
order to propel it as a vehicle." Visintin v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 78 
Ill. App.2d 75, 222 N.E.2d 550, 553 (1966). Accord Indemnity Ins. Co. of 
North America v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 33 N.J. 507, 166 A.2d 355, 358 (1960). "Operation" is the "direction and control of [a vehicle's] 
mechanism as its driver for the purpose of propelling it as a vehicle." 
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Marshbank, 226 F.2d 637, 639 (3rd Cir. 1955). 
Accord Metcalf v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 176 Neb. 468, 126 N.W.2d 471, 474 (1964) and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 154 W. Va. 448, 175 S.E.2d 478, 480-81 (1970). See also State v. 
Dirker, 610 P.2d 1275, 1280 (Utah 1980) (holding "operate" means "the 
personal act of working the mechanism of the automobile").

[¶24]   Applying these standards, Harbel 
was the person in actual physical control of the loader. Harbel was the person 
directing and controlling the mechanism as a driver for the purpose of 
propelling it as a motor vehicle when he was injured. But could the "operation" 
of the loader also be imputed to Wintermute and Hess as a part of their 
responsibilities as supervisor and mechanic? We hold that the answer is no. 
There is persuasive authority against imputing "operation" to a supervisor or 
others not in actual physical control of the motor vehicle.

[¶25]   In Chee Owens v. Leavitts 
Freight Service, Inc., 106 N.M. 512, 745 P.2d 1165, 1166 (1987), the parents 
of an injured child brought an action against several governmental officials and 
a school bus driver to recover for injuries the student suffered crossing a road 
to meet the bus. The court determined that sovereign immunity had not been 
waived under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act for the governmental officials who 
adopted and enforced regulations governing the design, planning and enforcement 
of safety rules. Id., 745 P.2d  at 1168. The court reasoned that the 
actions of these governmental officials did not constitute "operation" of a 
motor vehicle. Id. However, the court held the action against the school 
bus driver was not barred by sovereign immunity since he was operating the bus 
at the time the student was injured. Id. at 1169. See Lawrence J. 
Wolfe, Comment, Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity With 
Exceptions - A Statutory Analysis, XV Land & Water L.Rev. 619, 623 
(1980) (noting that Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act is similar to the New 
Mexico Tort Claims Act).

[¶26]   In Force v. Watkins, 118 
Pa.Cmwlth. 87, 544 A.2d 114, 115 (1988), the personal administrator of a 
motorist killed during a highspeed chase filed a tort claim. The defendants 
included the chief of police who allegedly failed to adequately instruct and 
supervise the officers involved in the chase, the officer who observed the minor 
traffic violation that precipitated the chase, and the officer who was driving 
the pursuing patrol car. The court held that under Pennsylvania's governmental 
claims act, sovereign immunity had not been waived to permit an action against 
the chief of police and the officer that observed the traffic violation. The 
court concluded that they had no role in the "operation" of the patrol car that 
was in pursuit. Id., 544 A.2d  at 116. See also Jodzis, 607 A.2d  at 351 
(holding police dispatcher and radio operator who gave instructions to patrol 
car's driver had no role in the "operation" of the vehicle for purposes of the 
governmental claims act).

[¶27]   Finally, in Conti v. Rose Hill 
Poultry Co., Inc., 3 Conn. App. 246, 486 A.2d 1145, 1146, cert. denied, 195 
Conn. 802, 491 A.2d 1103 (1985), an employee, injured while driving his 
employer's truck, brought a negligence action against two co-employees for 
assigning him to drive a vehicle with defective brakes. The defendants were the 
general manager and the mechanic in charge of servicing the company's vehicles. 
Id. Under Connecticut's worker's compensation law, a co-employee action 
could only be brought if a fellow employee was negligent "in the operation of a 
motor vehicle * * *." Id., 486 A.2d  at 1146 n. 2. The court determined 
that "operation of a motor vehicle" does not include activities unrelated to 
driving or moving the vehicle. Id. at 1147. The court affirmed a grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the general manager and the mechanic. 
Id.

[¶28]   Wintermute and Hess were not in 
actual physical control of the loader at the time Harbel was injured. Wintermute 
and Hess were not controlling the mechanism of the loader as drivers. Therefore, 
we hold Harbel was the sole person engaged in the "operation" of the loader 
under the unambiguous language of Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-105.

[¶29]   The parties have also argued that a 
loader is not a "motor vehicle." Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-105. The legislature did not 
define this term in the Governmental Claims Act. But cf. Wyo. Stat. § 
31-1-101(a)(xv) (1994) (defining "motor vehicle" as "every vehicle which is 
self-propelled except vehicles moved solely by human power"). For purposes of 
this opinion, we have assumed, without deciding, that a loader is a "motor 
vehicle." See V. Woerner, Annotation, What is "Motor Vehicle" Or The 
Like Within Statute Waiving Governmental Immunity As To Operation of Such 
Vehicles, 77 A.L.R.2d 945 (1961).

[¶30]   The legislature has chosen to state 
a limitation on the waiver of sovereign or governmental immunity under Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-39-105. The limitation is inherent in the choice of the word 
"operation." See Sawyer, 793 P.2d  at 478 (holding passage of city 
ordinance did not involve negligence in the "operation" of a public utility). 
The legislature has stated that a governmental entity is liable for damages when 
bodily injury, wrongful death or property damages are caused by the negligence 
of a public employee, acting within the scope of his or her duties, in the 
"operation of any motor vehicle * * *." Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-105. If the 
legislature had intended to waive immunity for negligent supervision or 
maintenance of motor vehicles, it would have provided a clear expression of that 
intent. See Soles v. State, 809 P.2d 772, 773-74 (Wyo. 1991) (holding 
building inspections did not involve negligent "maintenance" of building). 
Without a clear expression of intent to waive sovereign or governmental 
immunity, the claim by Harbel against Wintermute and Hess is barred.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶31]   The legislative decision to grant 
or waive sovereign or governmental immunity presents difficult policy choices. 
Fairness directs that parties injured due to the negligence of a public employee 
have some opportunity for a remedy. In this case, the legislature provided an 
exclusive remedy for Harbel under the Worker's Compensation Act. At the same 
time, the legislature barred Harbel from seeking a recovery against his 
co-employees under the Governmental Claims Act. If these policy choices disclose 
inherently unfair and inequitable treatment of injured parties, then the remedy 
is with the legislature, not the courts.

[¶32]   The decision of the district court 
is affirmed.

CARDINE, Justice, Retired, 
dissenting.

[¶33]   I would reverse. The critical 
question to be resolved is one of legislative intent in enacting W.S. 1-39-105 
(1988), which provides in part:

A governmental entity is 
liable for damages resulting from bodily injury * * * caused by the negligence 
of public employees * * * in the operation of any motor vehicle * * 
*.

Damages "caused 
by * * * public employees * * * in the operation of any motor 
vehicle" is equated by the court to damages caused by the operator while 
operating a motor vehicle. If the legislature had intended this narrow 
interpretation, it could have said so. The construction of this statute by the 
court today will result in governmental immunity for damages caused by 
defectively repaired state vehicles put in operation on a highway and causing 
injury to its citizens. Thus, if a state employee is negligent in the repair of 
brakes on a vehicle so that "in the operation" of the vehicle the brakes fail 
and a pedestrian, child or another is killed or injured, the State will shirk 
its responsibility for the resulting loss - because the State has immunity, the 
majority of this court now holds. This construction of the statute by the court 
does not do much to recognize "the inherently unfair and inequitable results 
which occur in the strict application of the doctrine of governmental immunity" 
in W.S. 1-39-102(a) (1988), nor does it correct that unfairness. By this 
dissent, I do not mean to suggest that appellant should recover damages - only 
that appellant has a claim not subject to decision on summary 
judgment.

[¶34]   I am convinced the legislature 
intended to compensate citizens injured in accidents involving motor vehicles, 
if such accidents and injuries are the result of negligence on the part of the 
state employees. For the reasons stated,

[¶35]   I dissent and would 
reverse.