Case Title: Spreeman v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0237

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
KRISTEN N. SPREEMAN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 88Case Number: S-11-0237Decided: 06/20/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
KRISTEN N. 
SPREEMAN,
 
Appellant
(Defendant),
 
v.
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,
 
Appellee
(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County
The 
Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane M. Lozano, 
State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Olson.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jackson M. Engels, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Engels.
 
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Appellant, 
Kristen N. Spreeman, challenges her conviction of felony driving while under the 
influence (DWUI) in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-5-233(b)(iii)(A) and 
(e).  She claims that she did not 
have three prior qualifying convictions, as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-233(e), to enhance her DWUI conviction to a felony.  We affirm.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      
Appellant presents 
the following issue:
 
Did the trial court 
err in denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss the felony “DUI” charge against 
her, since she did not have three prior qualifying 
convictions?
 
The State phrases the 
issue as follows:
 
Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-5-233(e), driving while under the influence becomes a felony if a defendant 
has three prior convictions in this or any other state under a law prohibiting 
“driving while under the influence.”  
One of Spreeman’s three previous Michigan convictions is for driving 
while “visibly impaired.”  Is 
Michigan’s prohibition against driving while “visibly impaired” a law that 
prohibits driving “while under the influence,” for purposes of sentencing 
enhancement under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(e)?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
The facts in this 
matter are undisputed.  On December 
19, 2010, an officer of the Gillette Police Department stopped Appellant for a 
traffic violation.  An assisting 
officer smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from Appellant and noticed that 
she was slurring her words and that her face was extremely flushed.  After performing field sobriety tests, 
Appellant was arrested for driving while under the influence.  Appellant was transported to the 
Campbell County Detention Center, where she agreed to provide a breath sample. 
 The breath test revealed a 
blood-alcohol content of .21%, over two-and-a-half times the legal 
limit.
 
[¶4]        
Appellant was charged 
by felony information with felony driving while under the influence in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-5-233(b)(iii)(A) and (e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).  The information alleged that Appellant 
had been convicted of three prior drinking and driving offenses within the last 
ten years, all of which had occurred in Michigan.  Two of the prior offenses were for 
driving while intoxicated in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.625(1).  The third prior conviction was for 
driving while visibly impaired in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.625(3). 
 Appellant moved to dismiss the 
felony DWUI, asserting that her Michigan conviction for driving while visibly 
impaired could not be considered for enhancement purposes because that 
conviction did not constitute a violation of a “law prohibiting driving while 
under the influence” under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(e).
 
[¶5]        
Following a hearing, 
the district court denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss.  In its order denying the motion to 
dismiss, the court stated that
 
A comparison of 
Wyoming’s Driving While Under the Influence statute and Michigan’s Operating 
While Impaired statute demonstrate both seek to prevent operation of a motor 
vehicle when alcohol consumption (i.e. consumption of intoxicating liquors) 
affects a person’s ability to operate a vehicle (i.e. results in the deprivation 
of a person’s normal control of his bodily or mental 
faculties).
 
Appellant entered a 
conditional guilty plea to the charged felony DWUI, reserving the right to 
challenge the denial of her motion to dismiss.  She was sentenced to twelve to fourteen 
months in prison.  This appeal 
followed.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶6]        
Whether Appellant’s 
Michigan conviction may be considered for enhancement purposes under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 31-5-233(e) involves a question of statutory interpretation.  We review questions of statutory 
interpretation de novo.  Harvey v. State, 2011 WY 72, ¶ 6, 250 P.3d 167, 170 (Wyo. 
2011).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶7]        
Appellant entered a 
conditional guilty plea to felony driving while under the influence in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-5-233(b)(iii)(A) and (e).  Those subsections provide, in relevant 
part, as follows:
 
§ 
31-5-233.  Driving or having control of vehicle while under influence 
of intoxicating liquor or controlled substances; penalties.     . . 
.
 
(b) No person 
shall drive or have actual physical control of any vehicle within this state if 
the person:
(i) Has an 
alcohol concentration of eight one-hundredths of one percent (0.08%) or 
more;    
(ii) Has an alcohol concentration of eight one-hundredths of 
one percent (0.08%) or more, as measured within two (2) hours after the time of 
driving or being in actual physical control of the vehicle following a lawful 
arrest resulting from a valid traffic stop; or  
 
(iii) To a 
degree which renders him incapable of safely driving:
(A) Is under 
the influence of alcohol;
 
. . . 

 
(e) . . . On a fourth 
offense resulting in a conviction or subsequent conviction within ten (10) years 
for a violation of this section or other law prohibiting driving while under the 
influence, he shall be guilty of a felony and fined not more than ten thousand 
dollars ($10,000.00), punished by imprisonment for not more than two (2) years, 
or both.
 
The statute defines 
“[o]ther law prohibiting driving while under the influence” as “a statute of 
another state . . . which prohibits driving while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, alcohol, controlled substances or drugs.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-233(a)(v).
 
[¶8]        
Appellant’s prior 
convictions, all of which were received in Michigan, arose from violations of 
Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.625, which provides as follows:
 
§ 257.625. 
   Operating motor vehicle while intoxicated; operating motor vehicle 
when visibly impaired; . . .         
(1) A person, 
whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or other 
place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles, 
including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, within this state if 
the person is operating while intoxicated. As used in this section, “operating 
while intoxicated” means any of the following:
(a) The person is 
under the influence of alcoholic liquor, a controlled substance, or a 
combination of alcoholic liquor and a controlled substance.    
(b) The person 
has an alcohol content of 0.08 grams or more per 100 milliliters of blood, per 
210 liters of breath, or per 67 milliliters of urine, or, beginning October 1, 
2013, the person has an alcohol content of 0.10 grams or more per 100 
milliliters of blood, per 210 liters of breath, or per 67 milliliters of 
urine.           

 
. . .       

(3) A 
person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle upon a 
highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to 
motor vehicles, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, within 
this state when, due to the consumption of alcoholic 
liquor, a controlled substance, or a combination of alcoholic liquor and 
a controlled substance, the person’s ability to operate the vehicle 
is visibly impaired. If a person is charged with violating subsection 
(1), a finding of guilty under this subsection may be rendered.            

 
(Emphasis 
added.)  In Michigan, the phrase 
“visible impairment” means that the defendant’s “ability to drive was so 
weakened or reduced by consumption of intoxicating liquor that defendant drove 
with less ability than would an ordinary, careful and prudent driver.”  People v. Calvin, 548 N.W.2d 720, 723 
(1996).
 
[¶9]        
Appellant 
contends that driving while “visibly impaired” under Mich. Comp. Laws § 
257.625(3) does not constitute a statute “which prohibits driving while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor, alcohol, controlled substances or drugs” 
because driving while “visibly impaired” in Michigan is a lesser included 
offense of “operating while intoxicated” under Mich. Comp. Laws § 
257.625(1).  Appellant also contends 
that the visible impairment standard is satisfied by a lesser degree of 
intoxication than operating a vehicle while “incapable of safely driving” as set 
forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b)(iii)(A), and is consequently not a 
qualifying offense for enhancement purposes under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-233(e).  The State claims, 
however, that Wyoming’s enhancement provision does not restrict qualifying 
convictions to offenses that arise from violations of laws that are identical, 
or even substantially similar, to Wyoming’s definition of driving while under 
the influence.  It claims that the 
plain language of Wyoming’s enhancement statute, in omitting any reference to 
the degree of intoxication required under another state’s statute, does not 
limit qualifying convictions to those that arise under statutes which prohibit 
driving while under the influence “in exactly the same fashion and to the same 
degree that Wyoming does.”  We agree 
with the State.
 
[¶10]     
In 
determining whether Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.625 constitutes an “other law 
prohibiting driving while under the influence” under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-233(e), we apply our usual rules of statutory 
interpretation.
 
Our paramount 
consideration is the legislature’s intent as reflected in the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the words used in the statute. Initially, we determine whether the 
statute is clear or ambiguous. 
 
A statute is clear 
and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree 
on its meaning with consistency and predictability. Conversely, a statute is 
ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying 
interpretations. If we determine that a statute is clear and unambiguous, we 
give effect to the plain language of the statute.
 
Parks v. 
State, 2011 WY 19, ¶ 11, 
247 P.3d 857, 859 (Wyo. 2011). 

 
[¶11]     
Appellant’s 
analysis attempts to focus our attention on the variation in the level of 
intoxication necessary to the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol 
to a degree which renders a person incapable of safely driving, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b)(iii)(A), and the level of 
intoxication necessary to the offense of driving with less ability than would an ordinary, 
careful, and prudent driver, in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.625(3).  We recognize that Wyoming precedent 
supports Appellant’s contention that the offenses are different with respect to 
degree.  In Redland v. State, 766 P.2d 1173, 1174 
(Wyo. 1989), this Court stated that “there is obviously a substantial difference 
between a standard of 'less able’ to safely drive a motor vehicle and 
'incapable’ of safely driving a motor vehicle.”  Appellant’s contention, however, largely 
misses the mark.  Notwithstanding 
the fact that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b)(iii)(A) and Mich. Comp. Laws § 
257.625(3) describe offenses requiring different levels of intoxication, we must 
look to the language of Wyoming’s DWUI enhancement provision, contained in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(e), to determine whether Appellant’s Michigan conviction 
can be used to enhance her current conviction to a felony.
 
[¶12]     
As 
noted above, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(e) states that a fourth conviction for 
“a violation of this section or other law prohibiting driving while under the 
influence” results in a felony.  The 
statute makes no qualifying reference to laws that specify a certain 
blood-alcohol content, or that require a degree of intoxication which renders a 
person “incapable of safely driving,” as set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
31-5-233(b)(i), (b)(ii), or (b)(iii).  
The statute also does not provide that another state’s law “prohibiting 
driving while under the influence” must be “substantially similar,” or even 
merely “similar,” to Wyoming’s law in order for a conviction to qualify for 
enhancement purposes.  Likewise, the 
definition of “other law prohibiting driving while under the influence” gives no 
indication that the phrase incorporates Wyoming’s criteria for conviction under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-5-233(b)(i), (b)(ii), or (b)(iii).  Rather, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(a)(v) 
defines “[o]ther law prohibiting driving while under the influence” simply as “a 
statute of another state . . . which prohibits driving while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor, alcohol, controlled substances or drugs.”  Again, the statutory definition makes no 
mention of a certain degree of intoxication that must be set forth in another 
state’s statute in order for a conviction to qualify for enhancement 
purposes.
 
[¶13]     
Although 
we do not find Wyoming’s DWUI enhancement provision to be ambiguous, we are 
nonetheless guided by well-established rules of statutory construction in 
determining whether Appellant’s Michigan conviction for driving while visibly 
impaired is a qualifying conviction under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(e).  “[A] basic tenet of statutory 
construction is that omission of words from a statute is considered to be an 
intentional act by the legislature, and this court will not read words into a 
statute when the legislature has chosen not to include them.”  Adelizzi v. Stratton, 2010 WY 148, ¶ 11, 
243 P.3d 563, 566 (Wyo. 2010).  
Further, as we have previously noted,
 
Where 
the legislature has specifically used a word or term in certain places within a 
statute and excluded it in another place, the court should not read that term 
into the section from which it was excluded. A word or words appearing in one 
section of a statute cannot be transferred into another section.  
 
In 
re Adoption of Voss, 
550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976) (internal citation omitted).1  In accordance with these rules of 
statutory construction, we must assume that the legislature did not intend to 
limit the qualifying convictions under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(e) as urged by 
Appellant.  There is simply no basis 
to conclude that Appellant’s Michigan conviction for driving while “visibly 
impaired” cannot be used to enhance Appellant’s current conviction to a 
felony.  
 
[¶14]     
Our 
conclusion is further supported by Wyoming precedent interpreting the meaning of 
the phrase “driving while under the influence,” as used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-233(e).  In Goich v. State, 80 Wyo. 179, 339 P.2d 119 (Wyo. 1959), the Court held that the phrase “under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor” means that “a person has taken into his stomach a 
sufficient quantity of intoxicating liquor so as to deprive him of the normal 
control of his bodily or mental faculties.”  Id., 80 Wyo. at 184, 339 P.2d  at 120; see also State v. Dobbs, 70 Wyo. 26, 40, 
244 P.2d 280, 285 (Wyo. 1952).  When 
this definition is compared to Michigan’s definition of visible impairment, 
which, as noted above, means that the defendant’s “ability to drive was so 
weakened or reduced by consumption of intoxicating liquor that defendant drove 
with less ability than would an ordinary, careful and prudent driver,” it is 
clear that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(e) encompasses violations of Michigan’s 
prohibition against driving while visibly impaired.
 
[¶15]     
The 
cases cited by Appellant as authority for the proposition that a conviction for 
driving while visibly impaired cannot be used to enhance her conviction are 
distinguishable based on the language of the applicable statutes in those 
jurisdictions.  In State v. Akins, 795 N.E.2d 1093 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2003), the Indiana Court of Appeals was called on to determine whether 
a conviction for driving while visibly impaired under Mich. Comp. Laws § 
257.625(3) could be used to enhance the defendant’s conviction for operating a 
vehicle while intoxicated to a felony under Indiana’s enhancement statute.  Id., 795 N.E.2d  at 1098.  As noted by the court, the Indiana 
statute provided that “A 'previous conviction of operating while intoxicated’ 
includes a previous conviction 'in any other jurisdiction in which the elements 
of the crime for which the conviction was entered are substantially similar to the elements of 
a crime described in I.C. § 9-30-5-1 through I.C. § 9-30-5-9.’”  Id., 795 N.E.2d  at 1096 (quoting I.C. 
9-13-2-130(2)) (emphasis in original).  The court determined that the Michigan 
conviction could not be used for enhancement purposes because Michigan’s statute 
prohibiting driving while visibly impaired was not substantially similar to 
Indiana’s statute prohibiting operation of a vehicle while intoxicated.  Id., 795 N.E.2d  at 
1098.
 
[¶16]     
Likewise, in State v. McNally, 50 P.3d 1080, 1081 (Mont. 2002), the issue 
presented to the Montana Supreme Court was “whether McNally’s prior convictions 
under Colorado’s 'Driving While Ability Impaired’ provision qualified as DUI 
convictions when sentencing McNally for Felony DUI under Montana’s DUI 
statutes.”  As in Akins, however, the McNally court noted that “When 
calculating the number of prior convictions for sentencing purposes, a prior DUI 
conviction includes 'conviction for a violation of a similar statute or 
regulation in another state.’ Section 61-8-734(1)(a), MCA. Therefore, we must 
determine if the District Court correctly concluded that Colorado’s DWAI was 
'similar’ to Montana’s DUI provision.”  Id., 50 P.3d  at 1083.  The court concluded that because the 
convictions were not “similar,” the Colorado conviction for driving while 
ability impaired could not be used to enhance the defendant’s Montana conviction 
to a felony.  Id., 50 P.3d  at 
1085.
 
[¶17]     
Finally, Appellant 
cites to Oxendine v. Secretary of 
State, 602 N.W.2d 847 (Mich. 
1999), in which the defendant’s Michigan driver’s license was revoked pursuant 
to a statute directing the secretary of state to revoke the driver’s license of 
a person violating “a law of this state, a local ordinance substantially 
corresponding to a law of this state, or 
a law of another state substantially corresponding to a law of this 
state[.]”  Id., 602 N.W.2d  at 849 (emphasis in 
original).  The issue before the 
court was whether a North Carolina statute prohibiting impaired driving 
substantially corresponded to Michigan’s statute prohibiting operating a vehicle 
while under the influence of liquor.  
Id., 602 N.W.2d  at 850.  After noting that a substantially 
corresponding statute “must be limited in scope to conduct that reasonably 
approximates” the crime of operating under the influence of alcohol, the court 
held that the North Carolina statute prohibiting impaired driving did not 
substantially correspond to Michigan’s statute prohibiting driving while under 
the influence of liquor.  Id., 602 N.W.2d  at 852; but see Marciniak v. State, 911 P.2d 1197, 1198 (Nev. 1996) (per curiam) (concluding that a conviction for driving 
while visibly impaired in violation of Michigan statute “is the same or similar 
conduct as driving under the influence of alcohol” in Nevada and could be used 
to enhance the appellant’s Nevada conviction) (citing McAdam v. State, 648 So. 2d 1244 (Fla.2d 
Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).    
 
[¶18]     
As noted above, 
Wyoming’s enhancement statute contains no requirement that a conviction for 
driving while under the influence must be received under a statute that is 
“similar,” “substantially similar,” or that “substantially corresponds” to 
Wyoming’s statute prohibiting driving under the influence.  As a result, the statutory element that 
was critical to the holdings in Akins, McNally, and Oxendine does not enter our 
analysis.  Because Wyoming’s 
enhancement provision, contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(e), does not 
incorporate the elements of driving while under the influence of alcohol set 
forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-5-233(b)(i), (b)(ii), or (b)(iii), we must 
conclude that Appellant’s Michigan conviction for driving while visibly impaired 
may be used to enhance the current conviction to a felony.
 
[¶19]     
Affirmed.
[¶20]     
FOOTNOTES
1Voss emphasized the 
importance of these rules of statutory construction by providing ample legal 
authority:
 
The omission of words 
from a statute must be considered intentional on the part of the legislature. State v. Reese, 1974, 12 Wash. App. 407, 
529 P.2d 1119. Words may not be supplied in a statute where the statute is 
intelligible without the addition of the alleged omission. Ward v. Yoder, Wyo. 1960, 355 P.2d 371, 
376, reh. den., 357 P.2d 180; Montoya v. 
McManus, 1961, 68 N.M. 381, 362 P.2d 771. Words may not be inserted in a 
statutory provision under the guise of interpretation. Kirkwood v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & 
Savings Ass’n., 1954, 43 Cal. 2d 333, 273 P.2d 532. The Supreme Court will 
not read into laws what is not there. Durante v. Consumers Filling Station Company 
of Cheyenne, 1953, 71 Wyo. 271, 299, 257 P.2d 347, 356; Cook v. Hill, 1960, 224 Ore. 565, 356 P.2d 1067. This court will not supply omissions in a statute and redress is with 
the legislature. Lo Sasso v. Braun, 
Wyo. 1963, 386 P.2d 630, 631-632. We are alerted by all this to the result that 
it is just as important to recognize what a statute does not say as it is to 
recognize what it does say.
 
Id., 550 P.2d  at 
485.
[¶21]