Case Title: LEONARD LUIS BUSTOS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0130

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
LEONARD LUIS BUSTOS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 37180 P.3d 904Case Number: S-07-0130Decided: 04/08/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
LEONARD 
LUIS BUSTOS,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Donna D. 
Domonkos, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; and David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Public Defender.  Argument by Mr. Westling.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. 
Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric Johnson, Faculty 
Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; Brian Hunter, Student Director; and 
Holli Austin-Belaski, Student Intern.  
Argument by Ms. Austin-Belaski.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant was 
convicted of "[a]ttempt[ing] to cause, or intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] 
bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon," in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-502(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2007).  He appeals that conviction, 
raising the various issues set forth below.  We affirm in part and reverse in 
part.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Did the prosecutor commit 
misconduct by arguing facts not in evidence?

 
 
2.   Did the prosecutor commit 
misconduct by making improper remarks about defense counsel and the defense 
theory of the case?

 
 
3.   Did the district court err in 
considering psychiatric information contained in the presentence investigation 
report?

 
 
4.   Did the district court err in 
ordering the appellant to pay for the cost of impaneling the jury when the 
appellant failed to appear for a trial setting?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      During the 
evening of May 6-7, 2006, the appellant went with friends to the Parlor Bar in 
Laramie, Wyoming.  
Soon thereafter, a fight ensued, in which the appellant 
participated.  A bar patron, Brad 
Campbell, intervened by grabbing the appellant and pushing him face-first into a 
corner and pinning him against a wall.  At that point, the bartender, Grant 
Statton, attempted to break up the fight by shoving Campbell and the appellant 
apart.  Campbell fell across a 
table, where the appellant again "went after" him.  Statton then grabbed the appellant around 
the waist and began moving him toward the exit door.  As he did so, Statton felt what he 
described as a "big break" in his thigh.  
He pushed the appellant away and saw that the appellant was holding a 
knife in his hand.

 
 
[¶4]      The appellant 
stumbled partway down the stairs that led to the bar exit.  Statton and another bar employee, Nick 
Ondler, pursued him.  The appellant 
"took a swipe at" Ondler with the knife, but missed.  Statton and Ondler then chased the 
appellant outside, where they tackled him and took the knife from him.  A police officer was flagged down and the 
appellant was arrested.

 
 
[¶5]      On May 8, 2006, 
the State filed a Felony Information charging the appellant with one count of 
possession of a deadly weapon with unlawful intent, one count of aggravated 
assault and battery for stabbing Statton, and one count of aggravated assault 
and battery for lashing out at Ondler with the knife.  The appellant waived his right to a 
preliminary examination and was bound over to the district court for trial.  An identical Felony Information was 
filed in the district court on May 19, 2006, and the appellant was arraigned on 
the three charges a little over a month later.  He pled not guilty to each count.1

 
 
[¶6]      The appellant did 
not appear at the scheduled time for his jury trial on October 16, 2006, and the 
jury was dismissed.  When he 
appeared an hour later, he was arrested under a bench warrant, his bond was 
revoked, and he remained in jail until the rescheduled trial, which began on 
November 6, 2006.  After a two-day 
trial, the jury acquitted the appellant of possessing a deadly weapon with 
unlawful intent, and of attempting to cause bodily injury to Ondler, but 
convicted him of stabbing Statton.

 
 
[¶7]      The district 
court adjudicated the appellant guilty of aggravated assault and battery and 
ordered a presentence investigation on November 17, 2006.  The district court's order mandated 
inclusion in the presentence investigation report (PSI) of a substance abuse 
assessment pursuant to the Addicted Offender Accountability Act found at Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-1301 through 7-13-1304 (LexisNexis 2007).  The PSI, including the substance abuse 
assessment, was completed and sent to the district court on January 4, 
2007.  After a sentencing hearing, 
the appellant was sentenced to the custody of the Wyoming Department of 
Corrections for a period of three to six years, with credit for pre-sentence 
confinement, and with a recommendation that he be considered for placement in 
the Wyoming Youthful Offender Program.  
In addition to other fees and costs, he was ordered to pay $1,440.00 to 
the Clerk of District Court for the costs incurred as a result of his failure 
timely to appear for his first trial setting.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did the 
prosecutor commit misconduct by arguingfacts not in 
evidence?

 
 
[¶8]      The standard of 
review that we will apply to this issue is affected by the nature of the 
question and the context in which it arose.  During the State's rebuttal closing 
argument, the following colloquy occurred:

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you go 
back into the jury room, pay close attention to this green table in this 
photograph, because that green table is the mere witness that corroborates the 
testimony of Mr. Campbell.  Mr. 
Campbell told you that after he tried to pull this defendant off of Johnny 
Vigil; that Grant Statton came over, grabbed him, and threw him into the corner, 
and he landed across that green table.  
If you look at the green table, you can see where the top has been in [sic] from having somebody thrown on 
it.  That's what we call physical 
evidence.  That corroborates 
witness's testimony.

 
 
            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I'm going 
to object.  There was no testimony 
that that table was bent during that altercation, Your 
Honor.

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Overruled.  The jury can look at the 
photos.

 
 
[¶9]      Defense counsel's 
objection was couched in terms of stating facts not in evidence, as opposed to 
prosecutorial misconduct.  On 
appeal, the appellant does not characterize the issue as being an error on the 
part of the district court in overruling the objection, but as misconduct by the 
prosecutor in making the statement.  
While there may be some question whether the issue of prosecutorial 
misconduct was raised below, both parties presently treat the issue as 
such.  Consequently, we will do the 
same, especially in view of our historical position that it is unethical for a 
prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence.  See Butz v. State, 2007 WY 152, ¶ 28, 
167 P.3d 650, 657 (Wyo. 2007); Wilks v. 
State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 30, 49 P.3d 975, 987 (Wyo. 2002); Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 51, ¶ 5, 44 P.3d 22, 
24 (Wyo. 2002).  Our standard of 
review where there has been an objection to a prosecutorial statement in closing 
argument is as follows:

 
 
When an 
objection is launched to a statement made in closing argument, we defer to the 
trial court's ruling in the absence of a clear or patent abuse of 
discretion.  Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 
(Wyo. 
1998).  Even then, reversal is not 
warranted unless a reasonable probability exists, absent the error, that the 
appellant may have enjoyed a more favorable verdict.  Gayler, [957 P.2d] at 860.  See also Metzger [v. State], 4 P.3d [901], 910 [(Wyo. 
2000)].

 
 

Burton v. 
State, 2002 
WY 71, ¶ 12, 46 P.3d 309, 313 (Wyo. 2002).  
The allegedly offending statement is reviewed in the following 
context:

 
 
            
Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are settled by reference to the entire 
record and hinge on whether a defendant's case has been so prejudiced as to 
constitute denial of a fair trial.  
Similarly, the propriety of any comment within a closing argument is 
measured in the context of the entire argument.

 
 

Sanchez 
v. State, 2002 
WY 31, ¶ 18, 41 P.3d 531, 535 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 910 (Wyo. 
2000)).

 
 
[¶10]   The appellant contends that the 
prosecutor's statement was improper because no witness testified that the table 
was bent by Campbell being thrown upon it.  The State counters that such is a 
reasonable inference that could be drawn from the photograph in evidence, and 
that such inference would be corroborative of Campbell's testimony.2  We agree with the State.  First, no distinction exists between 
direct evidence and circumstantial evidence, and reasonable inferences may be 
drawn from the latter, as well as from the former.  Vanvorst v. State, 1 P.3d 1223, 1229 
(Wyo. 2000).  Second, it is for the 
jury to draw, or not to draw, inferences from the evidence.  Id.; Lovato v. State, 901 P.2d 1132, 1134 
(Wyo. 
1995).  Third, the prosecutor may 
argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence.  Valerio v. State, 527 P.2d 154, 157 
(Wyo. 
1974).

 
 
[¶11]   All of that is what happened in 
this case.  Campbell testified that he 
was thrown onto a table during the scuffle.  A photograph of that table, showing 
damage, was admitted into evidence.  
The prosecutor argued the reasonable inference that the table was damaged 
by Campbell 
being thrown upon it.  It was then 
appropriately left to the jury to determine whether or not such inference should 
be drawn from the photograph and the testimony.

 
 
[¶12]   Finally, we cannot see how the 
appellant could have been prejudiced by this rather inconsequential piece of 
evidence.  In his brief, the 
appellant suggests that the case was about conflicting stories, and that he was 
prejudiced by allowing an unfair inference to be used to corroborate a State 
witness.  But the appellant did not 
dispute Campbell's statement that he had pinned 
the appellant up against the wall, nor the fact that Campbell was pulled off of 
him just before Statton began forcing him toward the exit.  In short, it simply did not matter to the 
appellant's defense whether Campbell was thrown onto the table or whether 
he did or did not damage it.

 
 
Did the 
prosecutor commit misconduct by makingimproper remarks about defense counsel 
and thedefense theory of the case?

 
 
[¶13]   The appellant's second allegation 
of prosecutorial misconduct is directed at the following highlighted statements 
made in the State's rebuttal closing argument, which statements we will set 
forth in context:

 
 
            
We had some real assertions as to  I 
wrote it down as the truth according to [defense counsel].  But let's look at what he says is in 
dispute.  None of the victims were 
in uniform.  Well, even Mr. Bustos 
testified that he wasn't going to balk at paying the cover charge or showing his 
ID to the bouncers because they weren't in uniform.  It is not required under Wyoming law that bouncers 
wear uniforms, and rarely will any of you have any memories of bouncers at any 
kind of event like this wearing uniforms.  
That's not a justification for stabbing somebody in the leg.  "I stabbed him because he wasn't wearing 
a uniform."  That's pretty thin, 
when you really boil it down to what he's saying.

 
 
            
He says no one but the bouncers believe that the  that they identified 
themselves.  Actually, what you 
heard was that it was a crowded bar.  
There were 50 to 60 people in there  unless you believe the defendant 
and his friend's testimony that maybe there were a hundred or 200 in there, but 
at least 50 to 60 people.  The 
bouncer said they were running at capacity; they had to make sure there weren't 
too many people there.  But it's a 
crowded bar.  It's loud, and a fight 
has broken out.  Now, all of the 
other witnesses said they didn't hear it.  
They didn't say it didn't happen.  
And really, it doesn't even matter.  
Does it matter if they ran over there and said they were law enforcement 
officers?

 
 
            
What do we really know happened?  
Well, again, let's look at the truth 
according to [defense 
counsel].  He says that his 
client was the victim of a big guy holding him over the stairs.  He was looking down that landing and 
just knew he was going to be thrown down those stairs.  The same photograph that shows you the 
green table Mr. Campbell was thrown onto also lets you see that even if you're 
standing in the very doorway, you have a landing in front of you that's at least 
as wide as the door.  He wasn't 
standing on the brink of the stairs.  
He was simply looking out the door.  
He was being held by Mr. Statton in an attempt to restrain him.  He was not being thrown anywhere.  He was not  nobody testified he was 
picked up off the floor, except maybe Mr. Bustos.  I didn't hear that, but picked up off 
the floor and thrown  held over the stairs?  I don't know where that came from.  It's hard to 
refute.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶14]   Our standard for the review of this 
issue differs from the standard of review we applied to the first 
issue:

 
 
            
Because no objection to the prosecutor's closing argument was made at 
trial, we review the claim under our plain error standard.  Plain error exists when 1) the record is 
clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was 
denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him.  Prejudice results if [the appellant] can 
show that he was not allowed a trial on its own merits.  Where the plain error elements are met, 
we may correct the error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.

 
 

Dysthe 
v. State, 2003 
WY 20, ¶ 23, 63 P.3d 875, 884 (Wyo. 2003) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted).

 
 
[¶15]   The first prong of the plain error 
test has been met in that the questioned remarks clearly appear in the trial 
transcript.  As to the second prong, 
the appellant characterizes the prosecutor's remarks, first, as implying that 
the appellant's self-defense defense was a lie, and second, as being a personal 
attack upon defense counsel.  In 
support of the first contention, he cites Doherty v. State, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 22, 131 P.3d 963, 970 (Wyo. 2006) and Barnes v. 
State, 642 P.2d 1263, 1265-66 (Wyo. 1982), for the proposition that the 
prosecutor can only suggest that the appellant is a liar if that suggestion is 
supported by the evidence.  In 
support of the contention that disparaging remarks about defense counsel are 
improper, he cites Johnson v. Gibson, 
169 F.3d 1239, 1250 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled in part on other grounds by Green v. State, 1993 OK CR 30, 862 P.2d 1271 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).  The 
authority stated does, indeed, support the stated 
propositions.

 
 
[¶16]   In its brief, the State argues that 
the prosecutor's remarks did not violate a clearly established rule of law 
because it is the role of the jury in a credibility contest to determine who is 
telling the truth, and the prosecutor was merely emphasizing for the jury the 
two different versions of the event presented by the evidence.  See Miller v. State, 2003 WY 55, ¶ 22, 
67 P.3d 1191, 1197 (Wyo. 2003) (as fact finder, jury weighs credibility of 
witnesses).  We agree.  While we are not enamored of the 
prosecutor's phraseology, and we do not condone the personalization of closing 
argument, we do not find that these words, in this context, violated a specific 
and clear rule of law.  We condoned 
much more direct and more egregious statements that a defendant was lying in 
both Doherty, 2006 WY 39, ¶¶ 19, 22, 
131 P.3d  at 969, 970-71 ("There is no tale that is too tall to tell.  There is no person too sacred to lie to 
. . . .  [E]ven if it means taking 
the stand and lying to 12 jurors of your peers"); and Barnes, 642 P.2d  at 1265-66 ("While 
calling a defendant a thief and a liar may not be in good taste, the evidence 
discloses a reasonable inference that he was not truthful in his testimony and 
he was in fact a thief").  Further, 
an implication of disparagement, unchallenged below, simply does not rise to the 
level of professional misconduct that violates the rules of professional conduct 
for Wyoming lawyers, the ABA standards for 
prosecutors, or the right to due process of law.  See Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(e); and 
Trujillo, 2002 WY 
51, ¶ 5, 44 P.3d  at 24.

 
 
[¶17]   Even if the statements at issue 
could be seen as violating a clear rule of law, the appellant has not met his 
burden of proving that he was prejudiced thereby.  See Butz, 2007 WY 152, ¶ 28, 167 P.3d  at 
657.  At most, the two statements 
were "disparagement by innuendo," they were brief, and they were said within the 
context of a comparison of the two versions of the incident.  It just cannot be said that they 
prevented a trial on the merits or seriously affected the fairness of the 
trial.  Finally, we note that the 
jury was instructed that statements of counsel were not to be considered as 
evidence, and we assume that juries follow the court's instructions.  Doherty, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 28, 131 P.3d  
at 972; DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182, 187 (Wyo. 1986); Eckert v. State, 680 P.2d 478, 485 
(Wyo. 1984); Slaughter v. State, 630 P.2d 517, 519 
(Wyo. 
1981).

 
 
[¶18]   In his brief, the appellant opines 
that:

 
 
The 
disparaging remarks and relying on facts not in evidence could have affected the 
jury's deliberations.  This was not 
a case of overwhelming evidence and boiled down to whose version was 
believable.  The prosecutor's 
misconduct could have affected that decision to Mr. Bustos' 
detriment.

 
 
[¶19]   The problem with this argument, of 
course, is that "could have affected" is not the test for prejudice under plain 
error analysis.  Rather, the test is 
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the appellant would have received 
a more favorable verdict in the absence of the error.  Miller v. State, 2006 WY 17, ¶ 15, 127 P.3d 793, 798 (Wyo. 2006).  That 
standard has not been met in this case.

 
 
Did the 
district court err in considering psychiatric information contained in the 
presentence investigation report?

 
 
[¶20]   As set forth earlier herein, the 
PSI contained a statutorily required substance abuse assessment, known as an 
ASIAddiction Severity Index.  See supra ¶ 7.  Although he did not object below, the 
appellant contends on appeal that the district court erred in considering at 
sentencing psychiatric information found in the ASI.  The appellant believes we should review 
this "error" for an abuse of discretion, while the State argues that the lack of 
an objection below means that plain error analysis is 
appropriate.

 
 
[¶21]   Having just decided this very issue 
in Janpol v. State, 2008 WY 21, ¶¶ 
14-20, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (Wyo. 2008), we decline to repeat the detailed analysis 
of that case.  Suffice it to say 
that, because the question is one of statutory constructionwhether the judge is 
legally entitled under the statute to consider the psychiatric informationit is 
a question of law that we review de 
novo.  The short answer is that 
the very intent of the statute is to provide information to the sentencing judge 
concerning the possibility of placing the offender in a treatment program 
without creating a risk to public safety, and that the psychiatric information 
is vital to that determination.  
Furthermore, because the psychiatric information was used for the express 
purpose for which it was disclosedcompletion of the ASI and PSIthere was no 
confidentiality breach.  No error 
occurred.

 
 
Did the 
district court err in ordering the appellant to pay for the cost of impaneling 
the jury when the appellant failed to appear for a trial 
setting?

 
 
[¶22]   The sentence imposed upon the 
appellant in this case contained a requirement that he pay the Clerk of District 
Court $1,440.00 because he failed timely to appear for his first trial setting. 
 This sanction, requested by the 
State, represented the appearance fee for 48 prospective jurors.  No objection to the sanction was lodged 
at the time it was imposed.  The 
appellant now contends, however, that the district court erred 
thereby.

 
 
[¶23]   The parties' briefs provide little 
guidance in resolving this issue.  
The appellant cites Capellen v. 
State, 2007 WY 107, ¶ 11, 161 P.3d 1076, 1079 (Wyo. 2007), for the 
proposition that this Court reviews sentencing decisions for an abuse of 
discretion.  He then relies upon 
U.R.D.C. 501(b) and Johnson v. State, 
532 P.2d 598, 601 (Wyo. 1975), for the additional proposition 
that jury fees may not be taxed as part of the "costs of prosecution" in a 
criminal case.3  The State more accurately describes the 
$1,440.00 assessment as a sanction, rather than a cost, which may be imposed 
under U.R.D.C. 901 for the appellant's failure timely to appear for trial.4  Because there was no objection below, 
the State espouses plain error review in this Court.  That standard was set forth 
hereinabove.  See supra ¶ 14.  An error of law under the circumstances 
may be considered an abuse of discretion.  
In re CT, 2006 WY 101, ¶ 8, 
140 P.3d 643, 646 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶24]   The State cites Travelers Insurance Company v. Palmer, 
714 P.2d 765, 765-67 (Wyo. 1986), where this Court affirmed the district court's 
imposition of sanctions under U.R.D.C. 901 against a party for failing to appear 
at a scheduled pretrial conference.  
Further, the State contends that U.R.D.C. 503(b) specifically authorizes 
the district court to impose jury fees as a sanction for causing a mistrial, 
which the State defines as "[a] trial that the judge brings to an end, without a 
determination on the merits, because of a procedural error or serious misconduct 
occurring during the proceedings."  
See Black's Law Dictionary 
1023 (8th ed. 2004).  What neither 
party does, however, is point the Court to any precedent for the precise 
question of whether a court may require a criminal defendant to pay, as a 
sanction, the jury appearance fees for failing to appear at a scheduled 
trial.

 
 
[¶25]   Wyoming's case law is clear that 
"institutional costs," including jury fees, may not be assessed against a 
criminal defendant as "costs."  Seaton v. State, 811 P.2d 276, 282-83 
(Wyo. 1991); King v. State, 780 P.2d 943, 958 
(Wyo. 1989); Kaess v. State, 748 P.2d 698, 703 
(Wyo. 1987); Johnson, 532 P.2d  at 601; Arnold v. State, 306 P.2d 368, 378 (Wyo. 1957).  We are not satisfied, however, that this 
answers the question presently before us.  
Clearly, the reason for not allowing the assessment of jury fees against 
a criminal defendant is based upon the desire to protect the constitutional jury 
trial right.  Arnold, 306 P.2d  
at 377-78.  We are not convinced 
that this precept automatically insulates a criminal defendant against 
appropriate sanctions for failing to appear for a scheduled trial.  There is a fundamental difference 
between paying the cost of the jury before whom one was tried, and paying the 
one-day appearance fees for a jury venire that was dismissed due to one's 
dereliction.

 
 
[¶26]   Several paths exist, or at least 
have not been foreclosed by this Court, for the imposition of sanctions in these 
circumstances:  (1) the inherent 
power of a trial court to manage its docket and enforce its orders; (2) contempt 
of court; and (3) enforcement of U.R.D.C. 901 and 503(b).  See Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. District Court 
of Ninth Judicial Dist., 735 P.2d 709, 710-17 (Wyo. 1987); Jerrel v. State, 765 P.2d 982, 983-84 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1988); 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs § 109 (2005).  We are not willing to follow any of 
those paths in this case because the record simply does not provide us with 
sufficient facts to determine which path, if any, is appropriate.  The primary problem is the total lack of 
any evidence that the appellant's failure to appear was willful.  No transcript of the aborted trial is 
provided.  Neither is there any 
testimony from the appellant or his counsel as to his tardiness.  The only information in the record is 
found in The Court's Order Resetting Jury Trial, wherein the district court 
states that the appellant "thought the time for trial was at 10:00 A.M. not 9:00 
A.M."  This is an inadequate basis 
for the imposition of sanctions.  
Also lacking in the record is any evidence as to the computation of the 
$1,440.00, other than the district court's statement that such was "what it cost 
the County."  That portion of the 
judgment and sentence ordering payment to the Clerk of District Court is 
reversed.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶27]   
The prosecutor did not commit misconduct and it was not error for the 
district court to consider the psychiatric information contained in the 
presentence investigation report.  
The judgment and sentence is affirmed in that regard.  The record does not, however, contain 
sufficient evidence to sustain the imposition of sanctions against the appellant 
in the form of the jury costs from the aborted trial, and that portion of the 
judgment and sentence is reversed.

 
 
[¶28]   Remanded for entry of a judgment 
and sentence consistent herewith.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1An 
Amended Felony Information was filed on October 13, 2006, three days before the 
scheduled trial.  The only amendment 
appears to be a change in the alleged date of the offenses from May 7, 2006, to 
May 6 or 7, 2006.  The appellant did 
not object to the amendment.

 
 

2An 
inference is

 
 
a 
deduction from the facts given, which is usually less than certain but which may 
be sufficient to support a finding of fact; "a process of reasoning by which a 
fact or proposition sought to be established . . . is deducted as a logical 
consequence from other facts, or a state of facts, already proved or admitted. . 
. .  It has also been defined as a 
deduction of an ultimate fact from other proved facts, which proved facts, by 
virtue of the common experience of man, will support but not compel such 
deductions.'"

 
 

Ogden v. 
State, 2001 WY 
109, ¶ 14, 34 P.3d 271, 275 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Barron's Law Dictionary 231 (2d ed. 
1984)).

 
 

3U.R.D.C. 
501(b)(2) provides as follows:

 
 
            
(2)  Assessment of Costs Upon 
Defendant.  Payment of the costs of prosecution may be added to and made a part 
of the sentence in any felony case if the court determines that the defendant 
has an ability to pay or that a reasonable probability exists that the defendant 
will have an ability to pay.

 
 

4U.R.D.C. 
901 provides, in part, as follows:

 
 
The 
following may be imposed for violation of these rules:

            
. . . .

            
(2)  Monetary 
sanctions;

            
. . . .