Case Title: People v. Walker

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95285

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 95285-Agenda 1-March 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 							
AVELL A. WALKER, Appellee.
Opinion filed June 4, 2004. 
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	At issue in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its
discretion by allowing the prosecution to present evidence of the name
and nature of defendant's prior conviction after defendant offered to
stipulate to his felon status, an element of the crime for which he was
tried. The appellate court reversed defendant's conviction and
remanded for a new trial (335 Ill. App. 3d 102), relying on the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Old Chief v. United
States, 519 U.S. 172, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997). In
Old Chief, the Court held that a trial court abuses its discretion if it
spurns a defendant's offer to stipulate and, instead, "admits the full
record of a prior judgment, when the name or nature of the prior
offense raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations,
and when the purpose of the evidence is solely to prove the element
of prior conviction." Old Chief, 519 U.S.  at 174, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at
584, 117 S. Ct.  at 647.
	For the reasons that follow, we affirm the appellate court's ruling
and hold that, in the case at bar, the trial court committed reversible
error when it admitted evidence of the name and nature of defendant's
prior felony conviction rather than accept defendant's offer to
stipulate to his felon status. 
BACKGROUND
	Defendant, Avell A. Walker, was tried in the circuit court of
Du Page County on charges of unlawful possession of a weapon by a
felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 2000)) and unlawful sale of firearms
(720 ILCS 5/24-3(a) (West 2000)). Prior to trial, defense counsel
made an oral motion to stipulate that defendant had a prior felony
conviction. The following colloquy took place:
			"[Defense Counsel]: This is why-I don't have this third
motion in limine written out. I can make it orally. The State
will introduce evidence of prior conviction for possession of
a controlled substance which is again going to lead to the jury
considering the defendant a drug dealer, that's why I didn't
want it mentioned, that's why I mentioned in Paragraph B.
There is-one of the charges here is possession of weapon by
a felon which I understand the State will proceed on.
			I will either ask that the fact that Mr. Walker has a prior
felony, I am willing to stipulate to it, I am willing to stipulate
any amended indictment would be sufficient for knowledge
for trial today, I am not alleging any surprise. But I don't
think-the fact that he needs to be called a felon is necessary.
I think by stipulating to it, that's sufficient and is-otherwise,
I have a motion in limine to exclude it.
			Court: To exclude what?
			[Defense Counsel]: The fact of the prior conviction."
	The State rejected the offer to stipulate on the ground that
defendant's felon status was an element of the charged offense. The
court reserved ruling on defendant's motion.
	Jury selection began the next day and continued on into the
following day. When jury selection was completed, the State began
presentation of its case against defendant. Although defendant was not
charged with possession or sale of a controlled substance, the
prosecutor began his opening statement by saying, "This case is about
a drug deal gone bad." The prosecutor told the jury that the evidence
would show that on September 15, 2000, defendant delivered crack
cocaine to a man, failed to receive payment, and then returned with a
gun to extract payment from the man. The State then called its two
key witnesses, Aprylle and Crystal Watson, who had been granted
immunity by the State for their testimony.
	The testimony of Aprylle and Crystal Watson is set forth in detail
in the appellate court decision below. See 335 Ill. App. 3d at 104-07.
In sum, their testimony established that 16-year-old Aprylle and her
17-year-old sister, Crystal, were with defendant on the evening of
September 15, 2000. During the course of the evening, both sisters
became aware that defendant was in possession of crack cocaine. At
one point in the evening, defendant instructed Aprylle to drive him to
Woodridge, where he met with a man at an apartment building at
7715 Woodridge Drive. After defendant met with the man, they
waited outside the building for several minutes, but the man never
returned. Eventually, defendant told Aprylle to drive him to his
apartment in Bolingbrook. Aprylle and Crystal waited while defendant
went inside. When he came out, they said, he was wearing gloves and
holding his waist in a way that indicated that he had a gun.
	They returned to Woodridge. Aprylle, at her sister's direction,
went into the apartment building with defendant. Aprylle testified that,
while she was inside the building, defendant placed something heavy
in her inside jacket pocket and told her to go back to the car. When
she opened the front door of the apartment building, she saw several
police officers. The officers told her to get down on the ground.
Aprylle was arrested and a gun was recovered from her jacket pocket.
Crystal and defendant were arrested shortly thereafter.
	Both Crystal and Aprylle testified that they initially lied to the
police because they were scared. Aprylle testified that she initially told
the police that the gun was hers. Crystal also gave police an untrue
written statement. Later, however, when the police told them that
their stories "didn't match," they told "the truth." Aprylle and Crystal
said that they then gave police written statements in which they gave
the "true version" of events, consistent with their trial testimony.
	On cross-examination, defendant was able to establish certain
discrepancies and inaccuracies among the statements Aprylle and
Crystal had given to police and their trial testimony. It was also
established that Aprylle and Crystal, although not related to defendant,
visited defendant in jail three times since his arrest and, each time,
signed in as defendant's cousins. Aprylle testified that they lied
because they thought they had to be related to defendant to visit him
in jail. Also, Crystal revealed on cross-examination that she
recognized cocaine when she saw it because "she knew people who
have used it before." Crystal also admitted that she had been around
guns before that night and, in fact, had once been shot.
	The State then presented the testimony of Woodridge police
officers William Hoogland and Tom Stefanson. Both officers testified
that on September 15, 2000, they went to the 7700 block of
Woodward Avenue in response to a radio dispatch. Officer Stefanson
testified that he recovered a gun from Aprylle's inside coat pocket and
Officer Hoogland testified that he inventoried the gun recovered by
Officer Stefanson. Officer Hoogland identified State's Exhibit No. 1
as the gun he inventoried.
	On cross-examination, Officer Hoogland admitted that during his
investigation he never found any drugs or gloves on defendant or at
the scene. Officer Hoogland also admitted that on September 16,
2000, after Crystal and Aprylle were questioned, they were released
to their parents without being charged with an offense.
	After the witnesses were heard, it was stipulated that John
Collins, an expert in the field of ballistics, if called, would testify that
he examined and test fired State's Exhibit No. 1 and found it to be a
working firearm that functioned as designed. The State also placed in
evidence, over defendant's renewed objection, State's Exhibit No. 6,
a certified copy of conviction showing that defendant had been
convicted on December 2, 1999, for the felony offense of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.
	Before resting, the State moved to have its exhibits, including the
copy of Crystal Watson's second written statement to the police,
admitted into evidence. Arguing in favor of the admission of Crystal's
prior consistent written statement to police, the State said:
		"[T]here's a clearly delineated exception [to the hearsay rule]
where on cross-examination counsel suggests that there's a
recent motive to fabricate that you can in that context, to
counter that inference, admit as substantive evidence a prior
consistent statement, and I think that that's exactly what
we're trying to do and its proper for that reason."
	Over defendant's objection, Crystal's written statement was
admitted without reservation or limitation.
	The defendant called only one witness, Leroy Keith, a supervisor
in the criminal ballistics section of the Du Page County Sheriff's Crime
Laboratory, who testified that he checked State's Exhibit No. 1 for
latent fingerprints and none were found. Defendant then moved to
have defense Exhibit No. 3, Crystal's first written statement to police,
admitted as a prior inconsistent statement. After some discussion, the
court granted the motion.
	In closing argument, the State began by defining the charges
against defendant. The prosecutor told the jury:
			"Now the second charge, a person commits the offense of
unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon when he, having
been previously convicted of the offense of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver, knowingly
possesses a firearm on or about his person." (Emphasis
added.)
	The prosecutor elaborated further, telling the jury that one of the
propositions that had to be proven by the State was that "defendant
had previously been convicted of the offense of unlawful possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver." Later, repeating the
name of the prior offense, the prosecutor told the jury that "People's
Exhibit No. 6 is a *** self-authenticating document," meaning that it
is the "type of document that doesn't need anything but the seal of the
Circuit Court Clerk on it to show the truthfulness of the document.
You know the Defendant was convicted of that offense on December
2nd of 1999, before this occurred."
	In defense counsel's closing argument, the credibility of the two
Watson girls was attacked. Various inconsistencies and inaccuracies
were pointed out and it was hinted that the girls were covering for
each other and could not be trusted. In rebuttal, the State agreed that
there were inconsistencies, but argued that any inconsistencies went
only to inconsequential matters. The prosecutor then stated:
			"The author of this play is this man. It's this Defendant.
He picked the theme. Sell drugs for money. If you don't get
money, go back and get it. Bring a gun."
	Finally, the prosecutor asked the jury to find defendant guilty of
"possessing a weapon by a felon in his prior conviction of unlawful
delivery of a controlled substance."
	After receiving instructions, the jury retired to deliberate. After
a while, the jury sent the following request to the court:
			"We'd like to review the statements of the sisters, both
witness Crystal's and Aprylle's."
	The court discussed with counsel how to respond to the jury's
message, noting that Aprylle's written statement had never been
admitted. The court, however, expressed a willingness to send back
Crystal's two statements. Defense counsel objected to sending back
any of the statements, but the prosecutor argued that the two written
statements should be sent back, saying:
			"Both are admissible as substantive evidence. And with
respect to the hearsay exception for rebutting the inference of
fabrication, I think they're [the jury] entitled to consider it,
especially in light of their request to see them."
	After some additional discussion, the court sent Crystal's two
written statements back to the jury with a note that said:
			"The written statement of Aprylle was not admitted. You
may, however, consider the testimony regarding that
statement. Both written statements of Crystal's were offered
as exhibits, and those are being provided to you as
requested."
	Later, the jury sent the following question to the court:
			"When possession is concerned, does that entitle [sic] that
the gun was in the car, and he knew about it, or does that
mean that he had to have physical contact with it? And if so,
does physical contact mean that he just has to touch it to be
in or about his person, or does he have to hold and control
the weapon?"
	Over defendant's objection, the court responded by giving the
jury a copy of Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 4.16,
which contains definitions for constructive possession and joint
possession.
	After receiving the additional instruction on possession, the jury
sent the court a note posing the following question:
			"For the definition of give, does the person who has
possession have to physically hand or place the object on
another, or does give mean that the person who has
possession did not necessarily have to physically place or
hand the object over, just know the object has changed
hands, and the end result is that the object is in the possession
of another person? Does making an object available to a
minor mean the same thing as giving an object to a minor?"
	At the prosecutor's urging, the court responded to this question
by saying, "The word give should be afforded its common and
ordinary meaning."
	The jury then sent the court this question:
			"Is giving directly the same as giving indirectly? If you
have knowledge of something previously in your possession
ending up in someone's hands, did you give it to the person?"
	To this question, the court responded: "You must decide the case
based on the evidence you received and the instructions you've been
given."
	After some more time had passed, the court called the parties
back into court and said:
			"Here's the situation. The trial itself lasted about three-and-a -half hours. And at this point, they've been out about
six hours. They haven't sent out a note indicating they're
deadlocked. But in light of the hour and in light of the fact
that I have bond court to go to, I'm going to send them
home. And I'm going to bring them back next week."
	The jury was called into court. Because Monday was a legal
holiday, the jury was told to return on Tuesday. On Tuesday, February
21, 2001, the jury returned and continued to deliberate. At about 11
a.m. the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both charges.
	 In a posttrial motion, defendant, relying on the United States
Supreme Court decision in Old Chief and the appellate decision in
People v. Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d 961 (2001), argued that he had been
unfairly prejudiced by the introduction of evidence of the name and
nature of his prior felony conviction and should be granted a new trial.
	The trial court denied the motion, stating:
			"[W]ith respect to that prior conviction, it is an element of
the offense, and although there are ways to skirt around what
that conviction was for, I am not aware of any case that
provides that you can keep from the jury, the fact that he is
a convicted felon because that is an element of the offense.
*** [T]he argument that was made was that there would be
a stipulation so that it wouldn't be presented to the jury that
the defendant was a convicted felon."
	Defendant was then sentenced to 42 months' imprisonment and
he appealed.
	On appeal, the State argued that defendant had not properly
preserved the issue of whether the name and nature of his prior felony
conviction should have been excluded because, at trial, defendant
asked to bar evidence that he was a felon. The appellate court agreed
that defendant's argument at trial was imprecise, but held that
"assuming that a waiver occurred," review of the issue could be had
under the plain error rule. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 110. The appellate court,
adopting the reasoning in Old Chief, concluded that the trial court
abused its discretion when it allowed the State to introduce evidence
of the name and nature of defendant's prior felony conviction when
defendant had made an offer to stipulate. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 112. The
appellate court also found that the error could not be deemed harmless
because the evidence, "though it 'suffices to permit retrial without
offending double jeopardy,' " was not overwhelming. 335 Ill. App. 3d
at 113, quoting Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 972.
	The State filed with this court a petition for leave to appeal (see
177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), arguing that the appellate court erred when it
held that the admission of evidence of the name and nature of
defendant's prior conviction was reversible error. The State also
challenges the appellate court's ruling that the trial court had
improperly admitted Crystal Watson's second written statement as
substantive evidence. We allowed the State's petition.
	The defendant filed a cross-appeal (see 155 Ill. 2d R. 318(a); 134
Ill. 2d R. 612(b)), wherein the defendant argues that his constitutional
rights were violated when, in response to inquiries made by the jury
during deliberations, the court provided the jury with an instruction
which defined constructive possession, when the State's theory at trial
had always been based on actual possession.
	
ANALYSIS
	The primary issue in the case at bar is whether the trial court
abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution to present evidence
of the name and nature of defendant's prior conviction when a
stipulation was available. See People v. Boclair, 129 Ill. 2d 458, 476
(1989) (a trial court's admission of evidence is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion). As noted earlier, the appellate court, relying on the
Supreme Court decision in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172,
174, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574, 584, 117 S. Ct. 644, 647 (1997), and the
Illinois appellate court decision in People v. Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d
961 (2001), found an abuse of discretion, reversed defendant's
convictions, and remanded for a new trial. The State urges us to
reverse the appellate court's endorsement of Old Chief and,
accordingly, its ruling that defendant is entitled to a new trial.
	As a threshold matter we address the State's initial assertion that
the claim of error concerning the admission of the name and nature of
defendant's prior conviction was not properly preserved and, as a
result, not subject to appellate review. The State argues that defendant
waived review of this issue because, at trial, he did not offer to
stipulate to his felon status, but rather, sought to remove from the
jury's consideration the fact that he had a prior felony conviction. The
State contends that it was not until defendant's posttrial motion that
he argued that he would be unfairly prejudiced if a stipulation was not
substituted for evidence of the name and nature of his prior
conviction. For this reason, the State argues, the appellate court
should have found the issue waived and not reached its substantive
merits. In addition, the State, while maintaining that admission of the
name and nature of defendant's prior felony conviction was not error
at all, challenges the appellate court's holding that the error was
"plain" and, therefore, subject to review. The State argues that the
evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming and that there was no
substantial risk that admission of the prior-conviction evidence denied
defendant a fair trial.
	We have reviewed the record and find, as did the appellate court
below, that defense counsel's argument at trial was inartful and
imprecise. Counsel's statements could reasonably be interpreted as an
attempt to exclude the fact of defendant's prior conviction from the
jury's consideration, a proposition clearly not supportable by Old
Chief, nor any other case of which we are aware. Nonetheless, it is
also clear from the record that defense counsel offered to admit to the
fact that defendant had a prior felony conviction because he was
concerned about the prejudice that might inure to defendant should
the jury learn the name and nature of defendant's prior conviction.
Thus, we believe that defendant sufficiently called into question the
propriety of admitting evidence of the name and nature of his prior
conviction so that review of this claim need not be precluded.
	Having decided that defendant did not waive the issue, we now
review the appellate court's holding that defendant was unfairly
prejudiced by the admission of evidence of the name and nature of his
prior felony conviction when a stipulation was offered. Because the
appellate court relied on the decision in Old Chief in reaching this
conclusion, a careful examination of that case is appropriate.

A. Old Chief v. United States
	In Old Chief, the defendant was charged with possession of a
firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1); assault with
a dangerous weapon; and using a firearm in relation to a crime of
violence. Before trial, defendant offered to stipulate to the prior-conviction element of §922(g)(1) to prevent the State from presenting
evidence that he was previously convicted of assault causing serious
bodily injury. He argued that his offer to stipulate rendered the name
and nature of the prior conviction inadmissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, which allows a court to exclude relevant evidence when
its probative value is substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudice.
The assistant United States attorney rejected the defendant's offer to
stipulate and the district court, over defendant's objection, allowed the
government to introduce the order of judgment and commitment for
defendant's prior conviction. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court
rejected the claim of error, holding (in an unpublished opinion) that
" 'the government is entitled to prove a prior felony offense through
introduction of probative evidence.' " Old Chief, 519 U.S.  at 177, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 586, 117 S. Ct.  at 649.
	The Supreme Court granted certiorari "because the Courts of
Appeals have divided sharply in their treatment of defendants' efforts
to exclude evidence of the names and natures of prior offenses in
cases like this." Old Chief, 519 U.S.  at 177, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 586, 117 S. Ct.  at 649. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that, when the
prosecution must prove felony-convict status as an element of a crime
charged, "there is no cognizable difference between the evidentiary
significance of an admission and of the legitimately probative
component of the official record the prosecution would prefer to place
into evidence." Old Chief, 519 U.S.  at 191, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 594, 117 S. Ct.  at 655. The Court then concluded:
		"For purposes of the Rule 403 weighing of the probative
against the prejudicial, the functions of the competing
evidence are distinguishable only by the risk inherent in the
one and wholly absent from the other. In this case, as in any
other in which the prior conviction is for an offense likely to
support conviction on some improper ground, the only
reasonable conclusion was that the risk of unfair prejudice did
substantially outweigh the discounted probative value of the
record of conviction, and it was an abuse of discretion to
admit the record when an admission was available." Old
Chief, 519 U.S.  at 191, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 594-95, 117 S. Ct. 
at 655.
	In reaching this determination, the Court initally acknowledged
that the name and nature of a defendant's prior offense, as contained
in the record of conviction, constitutes "relevant" evidence. Old Chief,
519 U.S.  at 179, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 587, 117 S. Ct.  at 649. The issue,
then, was not whether this evidence was rendered "irrelevant" by
defendant's offer to stipulate, but rather, whether under Federal Rule
of Evidence 403 a trial court should exercise its discretion to exclude
this concededly relevant evidence because its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Old Chief,
519 U.S.  at 180, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 587, 117 S. Ct.  at 650.
	When conducting this Rule 403 balancing, the Court noted that
evidence of a defendant's prior criminal conduct always carries an
inherent risk of being translated by the fact finder into a generalized
notion that the defendant is of bad character and, thus, more likely to
have committed the offense currently being charged. Old Chief, 519 U.S.  at 180-81, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 588, 117 S. Ct.  at 650. Accordingly,
admitting evidence of a defendant's prior convictions will generally
present a danger of unfair prejudice because this evidence has the
capacity to "lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground
different from proof specific to the offense charged." Old Chief, 519 U.S.  at 180, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 588, 117 S. Ct.  at 650. The Court
concluded that "there can be no question that evidence of the name
and nature of the prior offense generally carries a risk of unfair
prejudice." Old Chief, 519 U.S.  at 185, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 591, 117 S. Ct.  at 652. Though the degree of risk would vary from case to case,
the risk of unfair prejudice would be substantial where the prior
conviction is for a gun crime or a crime similar to other charges in the
pending case. Old Chief, 519 U.S.  at 185, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 591, 117 S. Ct.  at 652. Therefore, the Court acknowledged that Old Chief, who
was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, assault with a
dangerous weapon, and using a firearm in relation to a crime of
violence, was correct to worry about the admission of evidence that
he had a prior conviction for assault causing serious bodily injury. Old
Chief, 519 U.S.  at 185, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 591, 117 S. Ct.  at 652.
	Finding that the admission of prior-conviction evidence presented
a danger of unfair prejudice did not end the Court's inquiry, however.
This danger of unfair prejudice had to be weighed against the
probative value of the evidence. Turning to the advisory committee
notes to Rule 403, the Court reasoned that "when a court considers
'whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice,' the 'availability
of other means of proof may ... be an appropriate factor.' " Old Chief,
519 U.S.  at 184, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 590, 117 S. Ct.  at 652, quoting Fed.
R. Evid. 403, advisory committee's note (reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app).
Thus, the Court opined, when deciding probative value, a trial court
should "evaluate the degrees of probative value and unfair prejudice
not only for the item in question but for any actually available
substitutes as well." Old Chief, 519 U.S.  at 182, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 589,
117 S. Ct.  at 651.
	Applying the above reasoning to the §922(g)(1) charge and the
government's concomitant duty to prove the prior-conviction element,
in light of the fact that Old Chief offered to stipulate to his felon
status, the Court analyzed the probative value of such a stipulation
against the "concededly relevant" evidence of the record of
conviction. The Court found that, in the context of a §922(g)(1) case,
a stipulation as to felon status was not merely relevant evidence, but
conclusive evidence of the prior-conviction element. Further, because
the statutory language demonstrated "no congressional concern with
the specific name or nature of the prior offense," that evidence (the
record of conviction), though technically relevant, "addressed no
detail in the definition of the prior-conviction element that would not
have been covered by the stipulation or admission." Old Chief, 519 U.S.  at 186, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 591, 117 S. Ct.  at 653. In other words,
the Court found that when felon status is all that the government
needs to prove, evidence of the name and nature of the prior
conviction is needless surplusage which has no probative value, yet
presents a high risk of unfair prejudice. Thus, the Court found it
logical to conclude that the name and nature evidence should generally
be excluded in favor of the admission or stipulation. Old Chief, 519 U.S.  at 186, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 591, 117 S. Ct.  at 653.
	The Court hastened to note that its reasoning was only applicable
in those limited situations where proving felon status was the only
evidentiary purpose for admitting prior-conviction evidence. The
Court reaffirmed that, as a general matter, it was "unquestionably
true" that "the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of
its own choice, or, more exactly, that a criminal defendant may not
stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case
as the Government chooses to present it." Old Chief, 519 U.S.  at 186-87, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 591-92, 117 S. Ct.  at 653, citing Parr v. United
States, 255 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1958). The Court assured that, under
ordinary circumstances, a defendant's offer to stipulate would not
prevent the prosecution, which bears the burden of persuasion, from
presenting its case in a manner that provides "evidentiary depth." Nor
could an admission deprive the prosecution of its right to present
evidence with multiple utility. Thus, if there was any other purpose for
admitting evidence of the name and nature of a prior conviction, the
prosecution must be allowed to present it.
	Although four members of the Court disagreed with this
"manufactured rule" for §922(g)(1) cases (see Old Chief, 519 U.S.  at
201, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 601, 117 S. Ct.  at 660 (O'Connor, dissenting,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia and Thomas, J.)), Old Chief has been
followed by the overwhelming majority of courts and every state court
of last resort to have considered the matter. See Brown v. State, 719 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1998); State v. Lee, 266 Kan. 804, 977 P.2d 263
(1999); Carter v. State, 374 Md. 693, 824 A.2d 123 (2003); State v.
James, 355 S.C. 25, 583 S.E.2d 745 (2003); State v. James, 81 S.W.3d 751, 762 (Tenn. 2002) . The only courts that have declined to
follow Old Chief distinguished its holding based on variations in the
applicable state statutory law. See State v. Ball, 756 So. 2d 275, 278
(La. 1999) (state statute required proof of a particular felony); State
v. Jackson, 139 N.C. App. 721, 535 S.E.2d 48 (2000) (state statute
specifically allowed prior felony to be proven by record of conviction);
State v. Jackson, No. 02AP-468 (Ohio App., March 31, 2003) (to
prove the offense of "possession of a weapon under disability," the
prosecutor had to prove prior drug conviction).
	In Brown, the Florida Supreme Court held:
			"In light of Old Chief, we *** conclude that, in view of
the limited purpose for which evidence of prior convictions
in felon-in-possession cases is offered, trial and appellate
courts should be relieved of making discrete and subjective
value judgments in dealing with what should be a routine
submission of prior felony conviction evidence. While there
is obviously some risk of prejudice inherent in establishing
that a defendant is a convicted felon, our concern here is in
dealing with the additional and unnecessary risk of prejudice
that comes with disclosure of the number or nature of the
prior convictions.
* * *
			*** Offering into evidence anything beyond what is
necessary to establish the defendant's legal status as a
convicted felon is irrelevant to the current proceeding, has
'discounted probative value,' and may needlessly risk a
conviction on improper grounds." Brown, 719 So. 2d  at 888-89.
	The Kansas Supreme Court in Lee relied on Old Chief and the
Florida decision in Brown, holding:
		"In a firearm criminal possession case, what fact does the
State seek to establish by offering into evidence a defendant's
prior record through a journal entry? The answer is the
defendant's status as a prior convicted felon. Lee agreed to
stipulate to prior convicted felon status. We see no need to
admit into evidence a journal entry reflecting the type and
nature of a prior conviction in order to prove that Lee was a
convicted felon.
* * *
			Unless there is a dispute over the status of the prior
conviction (for example, was it or was it not a felony), the
admission of the type and nature of the prior crime can only
prejudice the jury. See Brown, 719 So. 2d  at 886. Under the
limited focus here, what countervailing interests support
admission of the type and nature of the felony? There are
none in a status case.
 * * *
			We acknowledge that the State has the right and, in fact
the duty, to establish the elements of the crime charged. The
State also has an interest in presenting its case in its own way
by telling the story as the State wishes. But, Lee should be
judged only on the crimes charged and, as Brown observed,
'not being convicted on an improper ground due to the
admission of evidence that carries unfairly prejudicial
baggage.' " Lee, 266 Kan. at 813-15, 977 P.2d  at 269-70.
	More recently, the Maryland Supreme Court, upon considering
whether a defendant charged with "possession of a regulated firearm
by one previously convicted of a crime of violence" is unfairly
prejudiced by the admission of the name and nature of the defendant's
prior convictions, held:
			"We see no meaningful difference between Old Chief,
Brown, Lee, and the case before us. In all of those cases, the
prosecution needed to prove only that the defendants were
felons to satisfy the prior conviction element. Maryland
courts, like their Federal, Florida, and Kansas counterparts,
permit the exclusion of evidence if 'its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.'
Maryland Rule 5-403. We agree with Old Chief that the
name and nature of a previous conviction, although
'technically relevant,' 'addresses no detail in the definition of
the prior-conviction element that would not [be] covered by
the stipulation or admission [of that element].' Therefore, we,
too, are of the opinion that, when requested by the defendant
in a criminal-in-possession case under Maryland Code,
Article 27, Section 445, the trial court must accept a
stipulation or admission that the defendant was convicted of
a crime that qualifies under the criminal-in-possession statute.
We hold also that, in such situations, the name or nature of
the previous conviction should not be disclosed to the jury."
Carter, 374 Md. at 720-21, 824 A.2d  at 139-40.

C. Application of Old Chief to Illinois law
	At the outset, we recognize that Old Chief is not binding on this
court because the Supreme Court was interpreting federal statutory
law and this court is interpreting state law. Nevertheless, this court,
like the Florida, Kansas, and Maryland courts before us, finds the
reasoning in Old Chief persuasive.
	Section 24-1.1(a) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a)
(West 2000)), defines the offense of possession of a weapon by a
felon and provides:
			"It is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess on or
about his person or on his land or in his own abode or fixed
place of business any weapon prohibited under Section 24-1
of this Act or any firearm or any firearm ammunition if the
person has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this
State or any other jurisdiction."
	Our statute, like the federal statute in Old Chief, does not require
proof of a specific felony conviction. Thus, to prove a violation of
section 24-1.1, the prosecutor must establish only the defendant's
felon status. Under these circumstances, we agree with Old Chief that
"the evidentiary significance of an admission" is no different from "the
legitimately probative component of the official record the prosecution
would prefer to place evidence." See Old Chief, 519 U.S.  at 191, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 594, 117 S. Ct.  at 655. Thus, when a defendant offers to
stipulate to his felon status, the prosecution has available to it
evidence which is equally probative of the prior-conviction element of
the crime charged as the record of conviction would be.
	The question then becomes whether the trial court may permit the
State to refuse to accept a defendant's stipulation in place of his
record of conviction. In Old Chief, the Court resolved this issue by
turning to Federal Rule of Evidence 403. In Illinois, there is no rule of
evidence identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 403. However, Illinois
courts have long recognized, as a matter of common law, that a trial
court may exercise its discretion to exclude evidence, even when it is
relevant, if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative
value. See People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305 (1995). Moreover, as
noted in People v. Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d 961, 967 (2001), while our
common law rule lacks the "unfair prejudice" language of the federal
rule, this court has always provided for the exclusion of evidence due
to its " 'possibly unfair prejudicial nature.' " People v. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d 264, 281 (1990), quoting People v. Ward, 101 Ill. 2d 443, 455
(1984). Thus, we agree with the Court in Old Chief, that when
deciding whether to exclude certain evidence, the proper
consideration is whether the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
	Performing this balancing test in the context of cases requiring
proof of felon status, we conclude that the admission of a defendant's
record of conviction creates a risk that he will be unfairly prejudiced.
Moreover, because the only purpose for admitting a defendant's prior-conviction record is to establish felon status, the name and nature of
the prior convictions is unnecessary surplusage without any
evidentiary significance. Thus, a defendant's record of conviction has
"discounted" probative value. On the other hand, the defendant's
admission or stipulation is conclusive evidence of felon status which
presents little or no risk of unfair prejudice. On balance, then, the
probative value of the record of conviction is outweighed by the risk
of unfair prejudice and the trial court should require the prosecution
to meet its evidentiary obligation of proving felon status by using an
admission or stipulation if one is offered by the defendant. We
conclude, therefore, that when proving felon status is the only purpose
for admitting evidence of a defendant's prior convictions, and the
defendant offers to stipulate or admit to his prior felon status, a trial
court abuses its discretion when it admits the defendant's record of
conviction, thus informing the jury of the name and nature of the
defendant's prior convictions.
	The State argues that by adopting the rule announced in Old
Chief we deprive the prosecution of its duty, obligation, and
entitlement to prove the existence of each element of a crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. We do not agree. As we have already held, the
evidentiary significance of the record of conviction is indistinguishable
from that of the stipulation, except that one creates a substantial risk
of prejudice and the other does not. Thus, once a stipulation is
offered, the State has alternative evidence that is equally probative of
the element which the State has an obligation to prove. Simply stated,
the prosecution has no entitlement or right to present evidence that is
unfairly prejudicial when equally probative, nonprejudicial evidence is
available and will serve the same purpose.
	We also disagree with the State's assertion that our adoption of
the reasoning in Old Chief is at odds with our decision in People v.
Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144 (1999). In Buss, the defendant was not charged
with an offense which required proof of felon status, but rather, was
charged with the murder and kidnapping of 10½-year-old Christopher
Meyer. Defendant offered to stipulate to the time and cause of
Christopher's death to prevent the State from presenting "gruesome"
testimony concerning the process of identifying Meyer's body and
determining the time and cause of death. In ruling that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by rejecting defendant's offer to stipulate,
we employed the same balancing test, weighing probative value
against unfair prejudice. However, in that case, the evidence which
defendant sought to exclude was "highly probative with respect to the
identity of the body found in Hunting Area 7, the precise time of
Christopher's death, the manner and cause of his death, and the
weapon used." Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 220.
	Buss is distinguishable from the case at bar. The evidentiary
significance of the testimony which Buss sought to exclude was more
extensive than his proffered stipulation. The Court in Old Chief
acknowledged that a defendant's offer to stipulate will not deprive the
State of its opportunity to present evidence with "evidentiary depth."
Old Chief, 519 U.S.  at 190, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 593, 117 S. Ct.  at 654.
Thus, even when applying Old Chief's reasoning, the trial court in
Buss would not have been required to accept the defendant's offer to
stipulate and our decision in Buss would be unaffected. For identical
reasons, we find the State's reliance on People v. Kubat, 94 Ill. 2d 437 (1983), and People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177 (1968), to be
misplaced.
	We also find no conflict between our decision here today and this
court's rejection of the "mere-fact" method of impeachment. See
People v. Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d 450 (1999). In People v. Montgomery,
47 Ill. 2d 510, 519 (1971), this court adopted Federal Rule of
Evidence 609, to be used as a guide when deciding whether a
defendant's prior convictions should be admitted to impeach his
credibility. See also M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of
Illinois Evidence §§609.1, 609.2 (6th ed. 1994). As noted in Atkinson,
"[u]nder the Montgomery rule, evidence of a witness' prior conviction
is admissible to attack the witness' credibility where: (1) the prior
crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year,
or involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the
punishment, (2) less than 10 years has elapsed since the date of
conviction of the prior crime or release of the witness from
confinement, whichever is later, and (3) the probative value of
admitting the prior conviction outweighs the danger of unfair
prejudice." Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d  at 456. Accordingly, under
Montgomery, before the State may be allowed to impeach a defendant
using his prior convictions, the trial judge is required to conduct the
same balancing test, weighing the probative value of the evidence
against its potential unfair prejudice. Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d  at 456. In
Atkinson, it was proposed that a less prejudicial alternative might be
considered when performing this balancing: it was proposed that a
trial court, rather than exclude evidence of a defendant's prior
convictions because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative
value, could choose to inform the jury of the "mere fact" that the
defendant had prior convictions, without revealing the name and
nature of the convictions. In this way the defendant would be
impeached, but the prejudicial effect would be mitigated. This court
rejected this "mere-fact" method of impeachment, holding:
		"Our case law interpreting Montgomery suggests that it is the
nature of a past conviction, not merely the fact of it, that aids
the jury in assessing a witness' credibility. [Citations.] The
mere-fact approach undermines the Montgomery rule and
inhibits the jury's evaluation of a witness' credibility by
eliminating the jury's consideration of the nature of the past
crime." Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d  at 458.
	Admission of prior-conviction evidence to impeach a defendant's
credibility is a purpose beyond that of proving a defendant's felon
status. In Atkinson, we recognized that the decision in Old Chief was
not inconsistent with our decision to reject the mere-fact method of
impeachment. We held:
			"The circumstances involved in Old Chief indicate that the
Court's decision has no application to this case. Old Chief
involved neither the admission of a prior conviction as
impeachment evidence nor a general discussion of Federal
Rule of Evidence 609." Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d  at 461.
	Today we reaffirm that our decision in Atkinson to reject the
mere-fact method of impeachment is not in conflict with the logic and
reasoning in Old Chief.
	In sum, our holding in the case at bar is a very narrow one. We
determine, as did the Court in Old Chief, that where the prosecution's
sole purpose for introducing evidence of a defendant's prior felony
conviction is to prove his status as a convicted felon and the defendant
offers to stipulate to this element, the probative value of the name and
nature of the prior conviction is outweighed by the risk of unfair
prejudice and, thus, should be excluded.
	Finally, we decline the State's invitation to find that, in the case
at bar, the trial court's error in admitting evidence of the name and
nature of defendant's prior conviction was harmless. Defendant's prior
felony conviction was for possession of a controlled substance with
the intent to deliver. Although the current charges against defendant
did not include charges for possession or sale of a controlled
substance, the State's theory of the case, which formed the backdrop
to the charged offenses, was that defendant made a delivery of cocaine
and, when he did not get paid, went back with a firearm to extract
payment. As noted above, the State began its opening statement at
defendant's trial by saying, "This case is about a drug deal gone bad."
The fact that defendant had a prior drug conviction made the State's
story more plausible. Thus, by having the jury view defendant as a
drug dealer, it was more likely to find defendant guilty of the crimes
charged. The prosecution, aware of the impact that defendant's prior
conviction might have on the jury, repeatedly made reference to the
name and nature of the prior conviction in closing argument.
	We are also not convinced that the evidence in this case was
overwhelming. We recognize that the length of time a jury deliberates
is not always an accurate indicator of whether the evidence was
closely balanced. See People v. Boshears, 228 Ill. App. 3d 677
(1992); People v. Edwards, 77 Ill. App. 3d 237 (1979). Our concern
here, however, is not only with the length of time the jury expended
in deliberations, but with the notes and questions sent by the jury to
the court. The questions suggest that the jury did not find the
testimony of the Watson sisters entirely credible and, for that reason,
the evidence against the defendant was not as overwhelming as the
prosecution argues. Under the circumstances, it is possible that the
prior-conviction evidence tipped the scales against the defendant.
	For the reasons stated, we find a reasonable probability that
defendant was denied a fair trial by the admission of the evidence of
the name and nature of his prior conviction. We conclude that
revealing the name and nature of defendant's prior conviction to the
jury was prejudicial to defendant and cannot be viewed as harmless
error. Accordingly, remand for a new trial is required.

C. Prior Consistent Statement
	When defendant appealed his convictions to the appellate court,
he raised an additional claim of error concerning the improper
admission of Crystal Watson's prior consistent statement. Defendant
did not dispute that Crystal's second written statement to the police,
which was consistent with her trial testimony, was admissible to rebut
the suggestion that the State's grant of immunity had motivated her
to testify falsely. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 113-14. He argued, however, that
the trial court had erred by admitting Crystal Watson's second written
statement as substantive evidence.
	The State, in response, denied that Crystal's second written
statement was admitted substantively. In addition, the State argued
that defendant failed to preserve the issue for review by his failure to
lodge appropriate objections and by his failure to request or submit a
limiting instruction.
	The appellate court, having already decided that reversal was
required due to the admission of the name and nature of defendant's
prior conviction, chose to address this issue, finding it to be a matter
likely to recur on remand. See People v. Fuller, 205 Ill. 2d 308 (2002)
(on review, once it is decided that a new trial is required, additional
claims of error may be addressed if they are likely to arise again in the
course of retrial). The appellate court found that, although the trial
court did not expressly rule that Crystal's statement could be used
substantively, the fact that the State argued in closing argument that
the statement "tells the truth," and the fact that the statement was sent
back to the jury without any limiting instructions, suggested that the
substantive use of the statement had been permitted. Under these
circumstances, the jurors could have concluded that they were able to
consider the statement " 'as substantive evidence of the matters stated
therein.' " 335 Ill. App. 3d at 114, quoting People v. Carr, 53 Ill.
App. 3d 492, 499-500 (1977). The court concluded that error had
occurred because, in Illinois, prior consistent statements may be
admitted to rebut a charge or inference that the witness is motivated
to testify falsely or to rebut the inference that the witness' testimony
is of recent fabrication, but may not be admitted substantively to
corroborate the witness' testimony. People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173 (1991); People v. Lambert, 288 Ill. App. 3d 450, 453 (1997).
	The appellate court acknowledged that defendant had not
properly preserved this claim of error because he had not objected to
the substantive use of the statement, nor had he requested a limiting
instruction. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 114. Consequently, the appellate court
did not consider whether this error, standing alone, would support
reversal. The court merely took note of the error "to assist the trial
court on remand." 335 Ill. App. 3d at 114.
	In its appeal to this court, the State challenges the appellate
court's holding on this matter. The State does not take exception to
the appellate court's statement of the law and concedes that prior
consistent statements are generally inadmissible, but may be admitted
for the limited purpose of rebutting inferences that the witness is
motivated to testify falsely or that the testimony is of recent
fabrication. People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487, 500-01 (1983). Rather,
the State disputes the appellate court's finding that, in the case at bar,
Crystal's prior consistent statement was admitted substantively,
arguing that the record shows that the evidence was admitted under
the exception, that is, for the limited purpose of rebutting the
inference that Crystal was motivated to lie. The State also argues that
the appellate court should not have addressed the error because
defendant waived it. The State also makes a harmless error argument.
	We find the State's arguments unavailing. We agree with the
appellate court that the record suggests that Crystal's prior consistent
statement was admitted substantively. The prosecutor's arguments at
trial reveal confusion over the extent to which a prior consistent
statement may be admitted. When arguing for admission of Crystal's
written statement into evidence, the prosecutor asked that it be
admitted "as substantive evidence under the hearsay rule." (Emphasis
added.) Later, when seeking the admission of the State's exhibits, the
prosecutor, with regard to Crystal's second written statement, argued:
"[I]n that context, to counter that inference, [you can] admit as
substantive evidence a prior consistent statement, and I think that
that's exactly what we're trying to do and its proper for that reason."
(Emphasis added.) Later, in closing argument, the prosecutor used
Crystal's prior consistent statement substantively, arguing that it "tells
the truth." Also, when arguing in favor of sending the statement back
to the jury, the prosecutor argued: "Both are admissible as substantive
evidence. And with respect to the hearsay exception for rebutting the
inference of fabrication, I think they're [the jury] entitled to consider
it, especially in light of their request to see them." (Emphasis added.)
	We agree with the appellate court that, in light of the
prosecutor's argument and the fact that the jury was never instructed
that the evidence should be considered for a limited purpose, the
substantive use of the evidence was permitted. We recognize also that
defendant's failure to raise appropriate objections or to submit limiting
instructions might present procedural barriers to a reversal of
defendant's convictions based on the improperly admitted statement
However, because we affirm the appellate court's reversal of
defendant's convictions on other grounds and the cause is being
remanded for a new trial, we need not decide whether this error
constitutes an independent basis for reversing defendant's convictions,
nor is it necessary to engage in a harmless error review.
	Similarly, we also decline to address defendant's issue, raised in
his cross-appeal, that the jury was improperly instructed in response
to a question which arose during deliberations.

CONCLUSION
	The judgment of the appellate court, remanding the cause to
the circuit court for further proceedings, is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.