Case Title: State v. Crotts

Citation: 2004-Ohio-6550

Docket Number: 20031161

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Crotts, 104 Ohio St.3d 432, 2004-Ohio-6550.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. CROTTS, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Crotts, 104 Ohio St.3d 432, 2004-Ohio-6550.] 
Criminal law – “Other acts” evidence – R.C. 2945.59 – Evid.R. 404(B) – Prior 
homosexual acts inadmissible to prove pedophilia. 
(No. 2003-1161 — Submitted September 15, 2004 — Decided December 15, 
2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 81477, 2003-Ohio-
2473. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} Steven Crotts was arrested on January 16, 1999, following a police 
investigation of an alleged sexual assault occurring at his home.  The victim, 12-
year-old “J,” alleged that he and his twin brother, “B,” had shoveled snow at 
Crotts’s residence on January 15.  After Crotts paid the boys for shoveling snow, 
they attended an Awana church event with him.  Following the event, they rented 
videos to watch at Crotts’s home.  The twins intended to spend the night there.  
After preparing dinner for the boys, Crotts fixed a plate for J, while B fixed his 
own plate.  While the boys watched videos over dinner, Crotts also brought a 
glass of root beer into the living room for J to drink, while B poured his own.  J 
and B reported that Crotts offered them a white pill, later determined to be 
melatonin, telling them it would help them sleep better and live longer.  Both boys 
refused to ingest the pills, instead putting the pills in their pockets. 
{¶ 2} B testified that J fell asleep unusually early that night.  J recalled 
feeling woozy and falling asleep on the couch.  He recalled being carried up the 
stairs at some point; he remembered seeing two white hands, Crotts’s face, and a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
pair of glasses.  J did not recall protesting.  J believed that Crotts had somehow 
managed to slip him the white pill to make him drowsy. 
{¶ 3} J woke up the next morning in Crotts’s bedroom on top of Crotts.  
J was naked except for his socks.  Crotts was also naked.  J stated that when he 
awakened, he was facing the appellant in a “riding position” and felt his penis 
rubbing against Crotts’s penis.  He felt Crotts’s hands on his buttocks, moving 
him up and down.  J also noted that both his penis and Crotts’s penis were erect 
and lubricated with oil.  J yelled at Crotts to get off him and attempted to climb 
off the bed.  Crotts smiled and said to him, “I know what you’re doing,” and 
grabbed J by the wrists.  When J finally managed to get off the bed, he felt a wet 
substance in his pubic area.  He put on his shorts and ran downstairs, where he 
awakened his twin brother, yelling, “Steve was trying to rape me – he was trying 
to do something to me.”  J called the police. 
{¶ 4} The twins’ older brother, 16-year-old P, worked for and resided 
with Crotts.  P never paid rent to Crotts; while he was living there, Crotts took 
pictures of P and his friend in risqué poses that Crotts printed with the captions 
“C’mon ’n’ Lick Me” and “Sisters for Life.”  P testified that he and a male friend 
returned to Crotts’s home in the early morning hours of January 16, 1999 and saw 
his younger brother, B, sleeping on the couch alone.  P and his friend went 
upstairs to go to sleep.  They were awakened several hours later by sounds of a 
commotion in the house.  Two officers came into his bedroom with their guns 
drawn.  P heard J saying, “Not in there, in here,” and heard the shower running.  P 
remained in his room until after Crotts was taken to the police station.  He and his 
friend later left the residence at the order of the police. 
{¶ 5} J and B were taken to the police station, where they were 
interviewed.  J was then taken to the hospital and a rape-kit examination was 
performed.  The examining doctor, Cary Scott, noted the presence of an emollient 
on J’s body, which may have been olive oil.  Dr. Scott noted no signs of trauma or 
January Term, 2004 
3 
physical evidence of molestation on the victim; however, Dr. Scott also noted that 
a lack of findings was not uncommon if a lubricant had been used or there was no 
forced penetration. 
{¶ 6} The Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (“BCI”) 
performed a chemical analysis of the white pill that B had turned over to police.  
Forensic scientist Jeffrey Houser determined that the white pill was melatonin, a 
dietary supplement.  No tests were performed to determine whether melatonin had 
been ingested by J.  The BCI report also contained the results of tests performed 
to find physical evidence on J’s shorts.  The report indicated the presence of 
sperm from J  but found no evidence of sperm or DNA from Crotts. 
{¶ 7} Crotts denied the allegations made against him.  He asserted that 
he was awakened on the morning of January 16, 1999 by someone throwing shoes 
at him.  He ignored it and tried to go back to sleep, but one of the twins – he 
couldn’t tell which one – appeared at his bedside with a bottle of oil in his hand, 
poised to pour the oil on him.  Crotts became angry and pushed the boy against 
the wall.  The boy spilled the oil against the wall, further angering Crotts, and the 
boy ran out, still carrying the bottle.  A few minutes later, one of the twins came 
into the room, tried to pull the sheet off Crotts, and again attempted to pour olive 
oil on him.  Crotts grabbed the boy’s arm, twisted it, and the boy fell to the 
ground.  Crotts was naked at the time.  He told the boy to give him the oil or he 
was going to “beat [him] like [his] father does.”  The boy ran downstairs, yelling 
that he was going to sue Crotts.  Crotts stayed in bed a little longer and then got 
up and took a shower.  The next thing he knew, he heard police telling him to get 
out of the shower. 
{¶ 8} Crotts was convicted of one count of kidnapping with a sexual-
motivation specification and two counts of gross sexual imposition, with each of 
the latter two counts carrying a specification that the victim was under 13 years of 
age.  Crotts was adjudicated to be a sexual predator. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
{¶ 9} The appellate court reversed the convictions because it found 
certain testimony and evidence to be inadmissible “other acts” evidence.  The 
evidence found offensive by the appellate court included (1) victim testimony that 
Crotts had photographs of nude juveniles and adults on his computer, (2) 
testimony that Crotts took the victim and his brother to an “all gay” church, (3) 
testimony that Crotts attended a second church catering to the gay community, (4) 
a photograph of P and a male friend, which Crotts had captioned “Sisters for 
Life,” (5) a second photograph, captioned “C’mon ’n’ Lick Me!,” of the same 
friend unclothed, partially covered by a sheet, and (6) testimony from P that he 
had  “personal experiences” with Crotts that “would make [him] believe he’s 
guilty * * *.” 
{¶ 10} We will begin by examining the admissibility of the first five items 
of evidence.  The opinion testimony will be addressed separately.  The state 
argues that the evidence listed in (1) through (5) above was properly admitted 
under Evid.R. 404(B) to demonstrate Crotts’s intent, motive, and plan.  The 
appellate court found that this evidence could not be used to show Crotts’s intent 
because “Crotts denied the acts, not their alleged purpose.”  The court reasoned, 
“[I]f the State could prove the acts occurred as alleged, Crotts’s intent would not 
be in dispute.”  The court also stated that the above-mentioned evidence, though 
purportedly offered to show intent, plan, or motive, actually goes solely to 
Crotts’s propensity to commit the crime and was admitted in violation of Evid.R. 
404(B). 
{¶ 11} The appellate court dismissed the state’s argument that the 
evidence shows Crotts’s plan to desensitize the victim and his brothers to 
pedophilia in order to facilitate his sexual advances, opining, “The inference of a 
plan can be made only if one first infers that Crotts is homosexual, that he, 
therefore, is attracted to minors, and that he employed boys in his businesses as a 
means of gaining access to them.  Not only are these inferences invalid, they can 
January Term, 2004 
5 
only be made after one has made the forbidden inference of propensity.”  
(Footnote omitted.) 
{¶ 12} We must note that the modern understanding of pedophilia is that 
it exists wholly independently from homosexuality.  The existence or absence of 
one neither establishes nor disproves the other.  “The belief that homosexuals are 
attracted to prepubescent children is a baseless stereotype.”  State v. Bates 
(Minn.App.1993), 507 N.W.2d 847, 852.  Thus, evidence of homosexuality is not 
relevant to establish pedophilia.  Id.  We are forced to state the obvious because of 
the reckless and bald assertion by the appellate court that the prosecutor argued, 
and the jury believed, that because Crotts is homosexual, he therefore is also a 
pedophile.  Fortunately, the appellate court is mistaken.  Neither the prosecutor 
nor the trial judge was that obtuse.  In fact, on the eve of trial, the trial judge 
warned the prosecution to be very careful in its treatment of the issue: 
{¶ 13} ”[T]he State is to be very clear that [Crotts’s] homosexuality 
cannot be used in a manner of prejudice against the defendant. 
{¶ 14} “* * * The Court may even on its own, step in if the Court feels 
that way and I will be watching for that. 
{¶ 15} “* * * I do want to severely caution [the prosecution] that this 
Court is not going to have homosexuality as the focus of the trial. 
{¶ 16} “I’m not going to allow the jurors to cast their verdict based on 
homosexuality.” 
{¶ 17} The prosecutor did not argue that Crotts abused J because Crotts is 
homosexual.  Rather, the prosecutor argued that over the course of time, Crotts 
attempted to condition J and his brothers to accept pedophilia as appropriate 
conduct.  The state argues that the controverted evidence was used to support this 
legitimate argument.  The question we must answer is whether the appellate court 
erred when it ruled that the trial court had abused its discretion by admitting the 
evidence to be used for this purpose. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
{¶ 18} Generally, extrinsic acts may not be used to suggest that the 
accused has the propensity to act in a certain manner.  Evid.R. 404(B); State v. 
Smith (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 137, 140, 551 N.E.2d 190.  However, there are 
exceptions.  Evid.R. 404(B) allows such evidence where it is offered to show 
“motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident.”  Even more relevant is R.C. 2945.59, which provides, “In 
any criminal case in which the defendant’s motive or intent * * * is material, any 
acts of the defendant which tend to show his motive or intent, the absence of 
mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant’s scheme, plan, or system in 
doing the act in question may be proved, whether they are contemporaneous with 
or prior or subsequent thereto, notwithstanding that such proof may show or tend 
to show the commission of another crime by the defendant.” (Emphasis added.)  
The defendant’s motive in this case is absolutely material, as he was charged with 
kidnapping with a sexual-motivation specification. 
{¶ 19} Neither R.C. 2945.59 nor Evid.R. 404(B) “requires that the other 
act be ‘like’ or ‘similar’ to the crime charged, as long as the prior act tends to 
show one of the enumerated factors.”  State v. Shedrick (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 
331, 337, 574 N.E.2d 1065.  The appellate court stated that proof of Crotts’s plan 
is immaterial if the state establishes that the defendant committed the acts 
charged.  While this statement is tautologically true, the standard for admitting 
other-acts evidence is not whether the evidence is necessary to prove an element 
of the offense.  Rather, the issue is whether the evidence “tend[s] to show” 
motive, plan, or intent. 
{¶ 20} The appellate court’s assertion that the state did not need to prove 
Crotts’s motive, intent, scheme or plan to prove that he committed the charged 
offenses was misguided in several ways.  First, it is not true in this case.  In order 
to prove the sexual-motivation specification to the kidnapping count, the state 
needed to prove motivation.  See R.C. 2971.01(J) and (K).  Second, even if the 
January Term, 2004 
7 
statement were true, it does not follow that evidence establishing motive, intent, 
scheme, or plan is immaterial.  Such evidence is always material because it tends 
to show why one version of events should be believed over another. 
{¶ 21} In this case, the trial court aptly limited the evidence to protect the 
defendant.  The trial court excluded from evidence any testimony regarding 
whether Crotts is homosexual or has AIDS.  It also excluded testimony that Crotts 
walked around his house naked in the presence of juveniles and had a sexual 
relationship with P.  The trial court excluded evidence that Crotts exposed J to 
pornography and sexual devices. The court severed this case from charges that 
Crotts sexually abused J’s twin brother.  The trial court also sustained an 
objection when the prosecutor asked P the meaning of “Sisters for Life.”    
Likewise, the court prevented P from testifying that he witnessed Crotts “lie[ ] 
about his health” to a sexual partner, in the apparent belief that it would lead the 
jury to speculate about Crotts’s HIV status.  The photos of P and his friend were 
admitted only to show that Crotts was indeed sexually attracted to young boys.  
Even so, the court carefully limited this evidence that Crotts was attracted to 
minors out of concern that cumulative evidence of this nature would be 
prejudicial.  J’s testimony that he viewed child pornography on Crotts’s computer 
is consistent with the state’s desensitization theory of the case.  The trial court’s 
careful stewardship of this sensitive evidence demonstrated a skillful application 
of the evidentiary rules and fell well within her realm of discretion. 
{¶ 22} The remaining controverted evidence took the form of witness 
testimony, which by its very nature cannot always be curtailed in advance.  Two 
of the statements described Crotts’s introduction of the boys to what one of them 
called an “all gay” church and to a second church that was characterized as gay-
friendly. The state offered this testimony as an element of its theory that Crotts 
exposed J to sex through photos, movies, casual nudity, and environment to 
desensitize him to man-boy sexual relationships.  One of the environmental 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
factors happened to be exposure to homosexuality.  The trial court recognized that 
homosexuality does not equate with pedophilia.  However, it also found that the 
state’s theory was not unreasonable.  Thus, the jury was permitted to weigh this 
evidence.  Crotts argues that this statement prejudiced him by implying that he is 
homosexual, leading the jury to convict him based upon his homosexuality. 
{¶ 23} As a legal term, “prejudice” is simply “[d]amage or detriment to 
one’s legal rights or claims.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.1999) 1218.  Thus, 
it is fair to say that all relevant evidence is prejudicial.  That is, evidence that 
tends to disprove a party’s rendition of the facts necessarily harms that party’s 
case.  Accordingly, the rules of evidence do not attempt to bar all prejudicial 
evidence – to do so would make reaching any result extremely difficult.  Rather, 
only evidence that is unfairly prejudicial is excludable. 
{¶ 24} “ ‘Exclusion on the basis of unfair prejudice involves more than a 
balance of mere prejudice.  If unfair prejudice simply meant prejudice, anything 
adverse to a litigant’s case would be excludable under Rule 403.  Emphasis must 
be placed on the word “unfair.”  Unfair prejudice is that quality of evidence which 
might result in an improper basis for a jury decision.  Consequently, if the 
evidence arouses the jury’s emotional sympathies, evokes a sense of horror, or 
appeals to an instinct to punish, the evidence may be unfairly prejudicial.  
Usually, although not always, unfairly prejudicial evidence appeals to the jury’s 
emotions rather than intellect.’ ”  Oberlin v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr. (2001), 91 
Ohio St.3d 169, 172, 743 N.E.2d 890, quoting Weissenberger’s Ohio Evidence 
(2000) 85-87, Section 403.3. 
{¶ 25} Because fairness is subjective, the determination whether evidence 
is unfairly prejudicial is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be 
overturned only if the discretion is abused.  State v. Robb (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 
59, 68, 723 N.E.2d 1019.  The unfairness that the appellate court found here 
apparently was the danger that the jury would presume that Crotts was guilty if it 
January Term, 2004 
9 
learned that he is homosexual.  Although we would be reluctant to overturn this 
ruling had it been made by the trial court, the court of appeals failed to articulate 
why the trial court acted outside its discretion when it concluded that the limited 
references to “all gay” and gay-friendly churches was not prejudicial.  The 
appellate court simply substituted its judgment for that of the trial court without 
demonstrating that the lower court abused its discretion. 
{¶ 26} The trial court granted Crotts’s motion to exclude evidence that he 
is homosexual.  No direct evidence that Crotts is gay was admitted.  Testimony 
that Crotts took the children to allegedly homosexual churches does not lead so 
inexorably to the conclusion that he is homosexual that admission of such 
testimony was an abuse of discretion.  Theoretically, testimony that a 
heterosexual male took children to a homosexual church would be more 
supportive of the state’s theory that it was done for the purpose of desensitizing J 
because a straight male would have less reason to attend a gay church, and his 
motive for taking a child there would be that much more suspicious. 
{¶ 27} The final controverted testimony was that P testified during 
redirect, “Well, I have had personal experiences with the defendant that would 
make me believe he’s guilty, but I’ve also known my brothers all their lives and 
heard their lies, so it’s kind of a lose/lose situation.”  In its opinion, the appellate 
court quoted only the first half of this statement.  The qualification that follows 
the “but” minimizes the effect of the first clause.  It is not clear to us why the 
sentence, taken as a whole, should be excluded.  Lay witness opinion testimony is 
permitted where it is “(1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) 
helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in 
issue.”  Evid.R. 701.  Opinion testimony is not excludable “solely because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”  Evid.R. 704.  This 
case was ultimately one of credibility.  J told one version of events, and Crotts 
told another.  Testimony expressing an opinion on whose version is more likely to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
be true would certainly aid the jury in reaching its conclusion.  “The credibility of 
a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or 
reputation, but * * * the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness * * *.”  Evid.R. 608(A).  P’s testimony was directed to Crotts’s 
character for untruthfulness.  And since P portrayed his brothers as habitual liars 
virtually in the same breath, Crotts’s claims of unfair prejudice must lose what 
little force they otherwise might have had. 
{¶ 28} The court of appeals erred in reversing the conviction, and its 
judgment is reversed.  The cause is remanded to the appellate court to address the 
assignments of error it found to be moot under App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., 
concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., dissents and would dismiss the appeal as improvidently 
allowed. 
__________________ 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, Peter 
Corrigan, Faris Asad, Chrisana C. Blanco, and Amy E. Venesile, Assistant 
Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant. 
 
Paul Mancino Jr., for appellee. 
______________________