Case Title: JAMES MICHAEL EVENSON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0163

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
JAMES MICHAEL EVENSON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 24177 P.3d 819Case Number: S-07-0163Decided: 03/05/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
JAMES MICHAEL 
EVENSON,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. Lozano, State Public 
Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Donna D. Domonkos, Senior Assistant 
Appellate Counsel; Kirk Allan Morgan, Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Morgan.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; 
Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; Cathleen D. Parker, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Parker.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, 
HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]         
A jury 
found James Michael Evenson guilty of aggravated assault in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007).1  Due to prior felony convictions, he was 
sentenced under the habitual criminal statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-10-201,2 to life imprisonment.  He appeals his conviction.  We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]         
Mr. Evenson states his two 
issues as follows:

 
 
1.         
Whether the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct when he 
elicited opinion testimony, argued facts not in evidence, misstated the law, and 
argued community protection.

 
 
2.         
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Dr. Bruno's 
testimony as to the nature, extent, and cause of Mr. Montoya's injuries, as such 
testimony was not relevant under W.R.E. 401 and 402, and such testimony was 
unfairly prejudicial, confusing, and misleading to the jury under W.R.E. 
403.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]         
On the 
night of May 9, 2006, Jason Quinn, Michael Montoya, and two other members of the 
Wyoming Cavalry arena football team went to a bar in Casper, Wyoming.  
Shortly after they arrived, an altercation erupted between two other 
groups of men at the bar.  The 
football players decided to leave.  
Leaving through the back door, Mr. Quinn bumped into another man, 
and they exchanged words.  Outside, 
the situation became more heated, and the two began arguing and shoving.  Others joined in, and the brawl 
escalated into what Mr. Quinn called "a riot of mayhem."  

 
 

[¶4]         
The man 
Mr. Quinn bumped into was an acquaintance of Mr. Evenson.  Perhaps in an effort to protect his 
acquaintance, Mr. Evenson rushed at Mr. Quinn and slashed him with a boxcutter, 
leaving a severe cut across his chest.  
Mr. Quinn punched Mr. Evenson and knocked him to the 
ground.  At this point, several 
people were running around, fighting, yelling, and calling names.  An unidentified person threw a beer 
bottle at Mr. Quinn, and someone else tried to cut him with a broken 
bottle.  While Mr. Quinn was 
distracted, Mr. Evenson arose from where he had fallen, and attacked Mr. Quinn 
again, this time inflicting a severe cut on his side. 

 
 

[¶5]         
About a 
half block away, Mr. Quinn's teammate, Mr. Montoya, was separately 
involved in the melee.  He suffered 
cuts to the back of his neck and on his wrist.  Mr. Montoya's attacker was never 
identified, although Mr. Montoya confirmed that it was not Mr. Evenson.  Eventually the fight broke up, and 
Mr. Quinn and Mr. Montoya went to the hospital, where both were treated in 
the emergency room.  The emergency 
room physician described Mr. Quinn's injuries as deep, "slice type" wounds 
that, due to their location, were potentially 
life-threatening.

 
 

[¶6]         
Mr. 
Evenson did not go to the hospital, although there is evidence that he suffered 
severe injuries to his mouth.  He 
went instead with some friends to the home of an acquaintance.  A few days later, after police started 
interviewing employees and patrons of the bar where the fight occurred, 
Mr. Evenson left for Texas.  
He was arrested in Texas and returned to 
Casper, where he 
faced two counts of aggravated assault.  
One count was dismissed by the prosecution, and Mr. Evenson was 
tried on the remaining count.  At 
trial, Mr. Evenson did not deny that he had assaulted Mr. Quinn and cut his 
chest and side.  Mr. Evenson 
asserted, however, that he had acted in self-defense.  There was disputed evidence that 
Mr. Quinn had been holding a weapon, perhaps brass knuckles, when he hit 
Mr. Evenson.  The record 
further indicates that Mr. Quinn was 6' 2" tall and weighed approximately 225 
pounds, while Mr. Evenson was about 5' 8" tall and weighed around 160 
pounds.  The jury apparently 
rejected the claim of self-defense, and Mr. Evenson was convicted.  He appeals.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Prosecutorial 
misconduct

 
 

[¶7]         
Mr. 
Evenson claims four instances of prosecutorial misconduct.  He claims that the prosecutor elicited 
an improper opinion of guilt from a police officer, argued facts not in 
evidence, misstated the law of self-defense, and made improper community 
protection arguments.  Because no objections were made to these 
incidents at trial, we review for plain error, requiring Mr. Evenson to 
demonstrate that:  "1) the record 
is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression 
of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was 
denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him."  Talley v. State, 2007 WY 37, ¶ 9, 
153 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 2007).  We 
will reverse if there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have 
been more favorable to the appellant if the error had not occurred.  Id.  We review each instance separately, but 
recognize that allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are evaluated within the 
context of the entire record and the argument as a whole.  Sanderson v. State, 2007 WY 127, ¶ 37, 
165 P.3d 83, 93 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 

Opinion 
of guilt

 
 

[¶8]         
Mr. 
Evenson first cites the prosecution's direct examination of a police officer who 
had investigated the bar fight.

 
 
Q:        After 
you spoke to Mr. Sage, what did you do?

 
 
A:        Once 
we were able to determine exactly who the individual was that was responsible 
for the assault, we tried to locate that individual who would be Mr. Evenson, 
and we also at that point attempted to contact the players from the Cavalry and 
set up interviews with them.

 
 
Mr. Evenson 
claims that this amounted to an opinion that he was guilty.  Opinions of guilt are improper, and 
inadmissible as evidence.  
Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 67 (Wyo. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Large v. State, 2008 WY 22, ¶ 30, 
___ P.3d ___, ___ (Wyo. 2008).

[¶9]         
Mr. 
Evenson further asserts that the opinion of guilt was elicited by the 
prosecutor.  Citing McClelland v. State, 2007 WY 57, 
¶ 30, 155 P.3d 1013, 1023 (Wyo. 2007), he argues that this was error per 
se, requiring a reversal of his conviction even without a showing of 
prejudice.  However, if the 
prosecutor's question is read literally  "what did you do?"  it asked the 
witness what he did, not what his opinion was.  We 
therefore disagree with Mr. Evenson that the prosecutor elicited opinion 
testimony.  Further, we recently 
confirmed that an opinion of guilt, whether elicited by the prosecutor or not, 
must still be prejudicial before it justifies reversal.  Large, 2008 
WY 22, ¶ 30, ___ P.3d at ___.

[¶10]    
We also 
reject Mr. Evenson's claim that the testimony amounted to an opinion of 
guilt.  Being "responsible for the 
assault" is not the equivalent of being "guilty of aggravated assault."  The police officer's testimony described 
the course of his investigation and how he became aware of Mr. Evenson's 
involvement in the fight.  It did 
not assert that the officer believed Mr. Evenson was guilty of the crime 
charged.  The officer's testimony 
here was fundamentally different from testimony we have held to be improper in 
other cases.  Compare Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1338 
(Wyo. 1992) 
(officer testified that he "listened to her story and made a determination that 
she had been raped"); Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 62, 65-66 (three forensic experts testified that they thought the victim 
had been sexually abused, and two testified that they believed the defendant did 
it).  

 
 

[¶11]    
Moreover, 
even if the testimony had been improperly admitted, it was not prejudicial when 
evaluated in the context of this case.  
Mr. Evenson never disputed that he had been involved in the fight, 
or that he was the person who attacked and cut Mr. Quinn.  The officer's identification of 
Mr. Evenson was therefore harmless.  
Mr. Evenson asserted that he acted in self-defense, and as the State 
points out, "The obvious nature or quality of the plea of self-defense is that 
of justification or excuse for an otherwise unlawful homicide or assault and 
battery."  Mewes v. State, 517 P.2d 487, 488-89 
(Wyo. 
1973).  The basis of 
Mr. Evenson's self-defense argument was that his actions were justified or 
excused.  The officer's testimony 
contained no opinion about whether Mr. Evenson acted in self-defense, or 
whether his actions were justified or excused on that basis.  Mr. Evenson has not demonstrated 
that the testimony was admitted in transgression 
of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, or that it denied him a substantial 
right to his material prejudice.  We 
find no plain error.  

 
 
Facts not in 
evidence

 
 

[¶12]    
Next, Mr. 
Evenson challenges a statement made by the prosecutor in his closing 
argument.  Evidence at trial 
indicated that Mr. Evenson had been hit in the face by Mr. Quinn.  Mr. Evenson was knocked to the 
ground, and his mouth was severely injured.  Two witnesses testified that they had 
seen some metal object, perhaps brass knuckles, in Mr. Quinn's hand when he 
hit Mr. Evenson.  Other 
witnesses, including Mr. Quinn, denied that he was carrying brass knuckles 
or any other metal object.  
Commenting on the conflicting evidence, the prosecutor 
said:

 
 
I don't know how many of you ladies 
and gentlemen have ever had the opportunity to see or even hold a pair of brass 
knuckles, but for those of you who have or for those of you who haven't, I'm 
sure you can use your common sense and determine that if Jason Quinn had a pair 
of brass knuckles on his hands when he struck the defendant, Michael Evenson, 
there is no way that the defendant would have gotten back up that day.  In fact, for those of you who are 
familiar with a pair of brass knuckles and are familiar with Jason Quinn who 
testified on the witness stand, if he hit the defendant so hard that it knocked 
him down wearing a pair of brass knuckles, the defendant would not have any 
front teeth.

 
 
Mr. Evenson asserts that there 
was no evidence about the effect of being hit by a person wearing brass 
knuckles, and in particular, no evidence that being hit by someone wearing brass 
knuckles would incapacitate the victim or knock out all of his front teeth.  He relies on the "well-settled law that 
a prosecutor must restrict his argument to the evidence presented to the 
jury."  Talley, ¶ 19, 153 P.3d  at 
262.

 
 

[¶13]    
The State 
focuses on the prosecutor's invitation to the jury to "use your common sense" to 
determine the likely effects of being hit by someone wearing brass 
knuckles.  The prosecutor did not 
ask them to trust his knowledge, experience, or opinion about the effects of 
getting hit with brass knuckles, which would have been improper.  See, e.g., Talley, ¶ 21, 153 P.3d  at 263; Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889, 893 
(Wyo. 
1982).  However, the jury knew that 
Mr. Quinn was an athlete and considerably larger than Mr. Evenson.  The prosecutor asked them to consider, 
based on their own common sense, whether a blow from Mr. Quinn without 
brass knuckles could have knocked Mr. Evenson to the ground and injured his 
mouth, and whether a blow with brass knuckles might have caused more severe 
damage.  Based on these 
considerations, the prosecutor asked the jury to infer that Mr. Quinn was 
not wearing brass knuckles.  
Prosecutors, like defense counsel, are allowed latitude during closing 
argument to assist the jury by suggesting reasonable inferences from the 
evidence introduced at trial.  Lafond v. State, 2004 WY 51, ¶ 36, 
89 P.3d 324, 336 (Wyo. 2004); Dysthe v. 
State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 24, 63 P.3d 875, 884 (Wyo. 2003).  We find no error in the prosecutor's 
argument.

 
 
Misstatement of the law of 
self-defense

 
 

[¶14]    
Following 
up on the previous comment about brass knuckles, the prosecution presented this 
statement in his closing argument:

 
 
Now, the 
Defense is very desperately trying to put some kind of a weapon in Jason Quinn's 
hands.  They know that if they 
cannot do that, then they cannot assert his right to self-defense, and 
therefore, he would not be justified in doing what they say he 
did.

 
 
Mr. 
Evenson insists that this is a misstatement of the law.  A person claiming self-defense, he 
contends, must prove only that he had a reasonable belief that he was in 
imminent danger of bodily harm, and that the force used in response was 
reasonable under the circumstances.  
He does not have to prove that the other person had a weapon.  Mr. Evenson's contentions regarding 
self-defense are consistent with prior explanations from this 
Court:

 
 
The 
right to defend oneself, and the amount and type of force used, is relative to 
what is reasonably necessary under the circumstances.  It is for the jury to determine whether 
a defendant reasonably perceived a threat of immediate bodily injury under the 
circumstances and whether the defendant defended himself in a reasonable 
manner.  Thus, the jury must 
evaluate the totality of the circumstances and evaluate all of the defendant's 
options in protecting himself from such a perceived threat of 
harm.

 
 

Baier v. 
State, 891 P.2d 754, 758 (Wyo. 1995).  Under this formulation, the presence or 
absence of a weapon is relevant as part of the totality of the circumstances, 
but it is not determinative.  We 
therefore agree with Mr. Evenson that the prosecutor misstated the law when 
he said that Mr. Evenson could not assert self-defense if he could not prove 
that Mr. Quinn had a weapon.

 
 

[¶15]    
The State 
refers us to cases from other jurisdictions to propose that, with respect to a 
claim of self-defense, it is not reasonable to use a knife in a fist fight.  Cases such as In re QML, 570 S.E.2d 92, 94 (Ga. App. 
2002), indicate that a fact finder is "authorized to find that being struck by 
another's fists does not justify using a knife to stab that person."  But being authorized to find that is not 
the same as being required by law to find that.  The State has not supported its position 
that, as a rule of law, it is never justified to use a knife in a fist 
fight.  Particularly given the 
difference in physical characteristics between Mr. Evenson and 
Mr. Quinn, the jury would have been "authorized" to find that 
Mr. Evenson was justified in using a boxcutter to defend himself from 
Mr. Quinn's fists, whether or not Mr. Quinn had a 
weapon.

 
 

[¶16]    
While 
Mr. Evenson has shown error, he has not demonstrated prejudice.  Correct statements of the law of 
self-defense were emphasized in subsequent arguments by the prosecution, the 
closing argument by the defense counsel, and the jury instructions given by the 
trial court.  The effect of the 
prosecutor's single misstatement was so thoroughly diluted that the error can 
only be interpreted as harmless.

 
 

[¶17]    
The 
prosecutor never again suggested that Mr. Evenson was required to prove 
that Mr. Quinn had a weapon in order to rely on self-defense.  Instead, after discussing the testimony 
from various witnesses, the prosecutor began reviewing the instructions on 
self-defense that the trial court had already provided to the jury.  He paraphrased or quoted from three of 
the instructions, and in reciting these correct statements of the law, dulled 
any impact of his earlier misstatement.

 
 

[¶18]    
When 
reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, we evaluate the prosecutor's 
actions in the context of the entire record.  Sanderson, ¶ 37, 165 P.3d  at 93; Talley, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d  at 260.  It is appropriate, then, to consider the 
prosecutor's misstatement of the law of self-defense in light of the contrary 
arguments made by defense counsel.  
In his closing argument, defense counsel took the opportunity to explain 
why Mr. Evenson could, indeed, claim self-defense whether or not Mr. Quinn 
had a weapon.  

 
 
Jason 
Quinn had some type of weapon in his hand.  
And the thing about it is it really doesn't even matter if Jason Quinn 
had brass knuckles in his hand.  You 
saw Jason Quinn was six-two, 227 pounds.  
Mike Evenson has been described as I think five-eight, 160, 
somewhere in there.  Jason Quinn by 
himself without any weapons could kill somebody by beating them.  He himself is a dangerous 
weapon.

 
 
In this 
and similar arguments, defense counsel further diminished any remaining effect 
of the prosecution's misstatement.  
By arguing that Mr. Evenson could claim self-defense, "brass 
knuckles or no brass knuckles," defense counsel helped to ensure that the 
prosecutor's misstatement was rendered harmless.

 
 

[¶19]    
The 
trial 
court further diminished any potential prejudice by offering the jury several 
instructions that, read together, provided a thorough and accurate explanation 
of self-defense.  Instruction 12, 
for example, was particularly helpful in correcting the prosecutor's 
misstatement of the law.

 
 
It is 
lawful for a person who is being assaulted to defend himself from attack if he 
has reasonable grounds for believing and does believe that bodily injury is 
about to be inflicted upon him.  In 
doing so he may use all force which would appear to a reasonable person, in the 
same or similar circumstances, to be necessary to prevent the injury which 
appears to be imminent. 

 
 

[¶20]    
We have 
often stated that prosecutorial misconduct justifies a mistrial only if it 
worked material prejudice against the defendant by creating a substantial risk 
that justice was miscarried.  See, e.g., Farmer v. State, 2005 WY 162, ¶ 26, 
124 P.3d 699, 709 (Wyo. 2005).  In 
Mr. Evenson's trial, the prosecutor did make a misstatement of the 
law.  He followed that, however, 
with several correct recitations of the law.  His misstatement was directly 
contradicted in the closing argument for the defense, and was further countered 
by the trial court's jury instructions.  
Under these circumstances, we find no reasonable possibility that the 
jury might have reached a different verdict if the prosecution had not made this 
misstatement.  Finding no prejudice, 
we conclude there was no plain error.

 
 
Community 
protection argument

 
 

[¶21]    
In his 
final claim of prosecutorial misconduct, Mr. Evenson points to an argument that, 
he asserts, was "a kind of community outrage argument" asking the jury "to 
convict for reasons other than the evidence in order to protect the 
community."  The argument at issue 
was this:

 
 
If Jason Quinn would have hit him 
with a pair of brass knuckles . . . that all of a sudden 
justifies you being able to pull out a knife and hack and whack at that 
individual?  We would have a lot of 
people killed, injured seriously in the community and a lot of others if that 
was the case, wouldn't we, ladies and gentlemen?

 
 
Mr. Evenson is correct that a 
claim of self-defense must be decided on the facts of each individual case, and 
prosecutors "should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from its 
duty to decide the case on the evidence."  
ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice, The 
Prosecution Function, Standard 3-5.8(d) (1980).  Wyoming precedent is to that same 
effect:

  

Arguments which are calculated to 
appeal to the jury's prejudice or passion are improper because they pose a risk 
that the accused may be convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to his guilt or 
innocence.  Accordingly, it is 
improper for a prosecutor to encourage the jury to convict a defendant in order 
to protect the community rather than upon the evidence presented at trial. 

 
 

Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 15, 46 P.3d 309, 314 (Wyo. 2002) (internal citations omitted).

 
 

[¶22]    
To 
determine whether the prosecutor's arguments in Mr. Evenson's case were 
improper, it is useful to compare them to arguments previously reviewed by this 
Court.  In Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860-61 
(Wyo. 1998), 
we found improper the prosecution's invitation to the jury to join in a war 
against drugs:

 
 
Drugs, Ladies and Gentleman, is 
there a more insidious or terrible disease that affects our society today?  It tears families apart; steals away our 
youth.  It's ripping the seams of 
our nation.  Costs the taxpayers 
millions of dollars. . . .

 
 
Ladies and Gentleman, Lincoln County Law 
Enforcement is taking the war on drugs dead serious.  They are not going to tolerate the 
delivery of methamphetamine or any drugs in this county.  It doesn't matter if it's a small 
amount, like what we had here, or a large amount.  We are not going to tolerate it.  Absolutely not. . . 
.

This is your opportunity, as a 
jury, to take a stand with Lincoln County Law Enforcement and say that we will 
not tolerate drug dealers in our county.  
We will not tolerate it.

 
 
Not 
surprisingly, we found this argument "improper because it appealed to the jury's 
passion and prejudice against drug-related crimes."  Id. 
at 861.  In contrast, we found in 
Burton that the 
following argument did not justify reversal:

You heard a lot of testimony about 
these young kids and the behavior that they were involved with. But ask 
yourself, ladies and gentlemen, would they ever get the opportunity to be doing 
these kinds of things if not for the likes of the [drug pushers] of the world? . 
. . 

You ladies and gentlemen have the 
opportunity, the power to say that we are going to protect kids like [the 
victim] in our community.

 
 

Burton, ¶¶ 14, 19, 46 P.3d  at 314, 
315.  While we did not approve of 
this comment, we concluded that the prosecutor had not improperly urged the jury 
to convict on a basis other than the evidence.  We observed that it is not improper for 
the prosecutor to "remark that conviction of the accused will have the 
incidental effect of protecting the community if he does not urge the jury to 
convict on a basis other than the evidence against the accused."  Id., ¶ 20, 46 P.3d  at 315.

 
 

[¶23]    
On the 
whole, we find the arguments in Mr. Evenson's case more like the arguments 
in Burton than those 
in Gayler.  The comment about having "a lot of 
people killed, injured seriously in the community" treads close to the 
line.  However, unlike the improper 
argument in Gayler, the prosecutor 
here did not exhort the jury to take a stand or send a message.  The prosecutor asked the jury if it was 
reasonable to use a knife in a fist fight, and that was the precise question 
raised by Mr. Evenson's self-defense claim.  In the context of Mr. Evenson's 
trial, the prosecutor's argument did not improperly distract or mislead the jury 
into finding guilt for reasons beyond the evidence.  There was no transgression 
of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, and accordingly, no plain error.  

 
 
Evidence 
about Mr. Montoya's injuries

 
 

[¶24]    
One of 
the prosecution's witnesses was Dr. Bruno, the physician who treated 
Mr. Quinn and Mr. Montoya at the hospital after the fight.  Dr. Bruno provided details about the 
nature and extent of Mr. Quinn's injuries, and related how he had treated 
them.  He was then asked about 
treating Mr. Montoya, and about the nature, extent, and possible cause of his 
injuries.  Defense counsel objected 
that this testimony was not relevant, but the trial court overruled the 
objection and allowed the evidence.  
On appeal, Mr. Evenson continues to object that this testimony was 
not relevant and should not have been admitted into 
evidence.

 
 

[¶25]    
We 
review the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of 
discretion.

 
 
A trial 
court's decision on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to 
considerable deference, and will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant 
demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion.  
"[A]s long as there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court's 
ruling, that ruling will not be disturbed on appeal."  Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 116, ¶ 20, 142 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Wyo. 2006).  

 
 

Leyva v. 
State, 2007 
WY 136, ¶ 17, 165 P.3d 446, 452 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 
Even if 
the district court admitted evidence in error, we must consider whether the 
error was prejudicial or harmless.  Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 
(Wyo. 
1999).  Error is prejudicial if 
there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more 
favorable to the defendant if the error had not been made.  Id. Prejudicial error requires reversal, 
while harmless error does not.  W.R.A.P. 9.04.

 
 

Reay v. 
State, 2008 
WY 13, ¶ 8, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (Wyo. 2008).

 
 

[¶26]    
W.R.E. 
401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."  Evidence that is not relevant is not 
admissible.  W.R.E. 402.  As we have previously observed, "In 
criminal cases, evidence is relevant when it tends to prove or to disprove an 
element of the charged crime," Hodges v. 
State, 904 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo. 1995), or more broadly, when it "tends to 
make the question of guilt more or less probable."  Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 153 
(Wyo. 
1991).

 
 

[¶27]    
In this 
case, Mr. Evenson was tried for one count of aggravated assault for his attack 
on Mr. Quinn.  He was not 
charged with assaulting Mr. Montoya.  
Indeed, Mr. Montoya testified unequivocally that someone other than 
Mr. Evenson had attacked him.  
Thus, testimony about Mr. Montoya's injuries had no tendency to prove any 
element of the crime charged, or to make Mr. Evenson's claim of 
self-defense any more or less probable.  
Dr. Bruno's testimony about Mr. Montoya's injuries was not 
relevant evidence.

 
 

[¶28]    
The 
State asserted at trial, as it does now, that Dr. Bruno's testimony was 
necessary to bolster Mr. Montoya's credibility.  Defense counsel attacked Mr. Montoya's 
credibility, and in particular, asserted that he lied to hospital personnel 
about the presence of the police at the scene of the fight, and to a newspaper 
reporter about the cause of his injuries.  
The State maintains that a "corollary to the rule allowing a party to 
attack the credibility of a witness is to permit the opposing party to bolster 
that credibility."  Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522, 534 
(Wyo. 
1993).  Thus, the State posits, the 
defense's attack on Mr. Montoya's credibility entitled the prosecution to elicit 
evidence corroborating his testimony.

 
 

[¶29]    
The 
weakness in the State's position is that there was no dispute about the nature 
and extent of Mr. Montoya's injuries.  
Mr. Montoya was impeached concerning statements to hospital 
personnel and to a newspaper reporter.  
His credibility on those two challenged statements was not restored by 
evidence corroborating unchallenged statements by Mr. Montoya about his 
injuries.  While we have found no 
Wyoming cases 
directly addressing this point, we are persuaded by these comments from a noted 
authority on the law of evidence: 

 
 
[R]ehabilitating 
facts must meet the impeachment with relative directness.  The wall, attacked at one point, may not 
be fortified at another, distinct point.  
Credibility is a side issue, and the circle of relevancy in this context 
should be drawn narrowly.  When we 
reach the stage of rehabilitation after impeachment, we are rather far afield 
from the historical merits of the case; and the courts justifiably insist on a 
stronger showing of relevance to minimize the risk that the jury will lose sight 
of the merits.

 
 
1 
Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on 
Evidence § 47, 221-22 (6th ed. 2006) (footnote omitted).  Efforts to rehabilitate Mr. Montoya's 
credibility by corroborating unchallenged statements about injuries that were 
not relevant to the charges against Mr. Evenson went too far afield.  Dr. Bruno's testimony on this topic 
should not have been admitted into evidence.

 
 

[¶30]    
The fact 
that Dr. Bruno's testimony concerned an undisputed and irrelevant topic is, 
however, also part of the reason it was harmless error to admit such 
testimony.  Mr. Montoya made it 
clear that Mr. Evenson did not attack him or cause his injuries.  Testimony about the extent of his 
injuries could not, therefore, reflect badly on Mr. Evenson or unfairly 
turn the jury against him.  
Moreover, the record shows that Dr. Bruno's testimony was 
straightforward, professional, and unemotional.  There was nothing gruesome or 
sensational that might have upset or inflamed the jury.  In all, the challenged testimony took 
only a few minutes in the course of a three-day trial.  There is no reasonable possibility that 
the jury's verdict might have been different if Dr. Bruno's testimony had been 
excluded.  Because admission of the 
challenged testimony was harmless error, we find no reversible 
error.

[¶31]    
In all 
respects, Mr. Evenson either failed to demonstrate error or, where error was 
shown, failed to demonstrate prejudice.  
We affirm his conviction.

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502 provides that:  
"(a) A person is 
guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he . . . (ii) Attempts to cause, or 
intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; 
. . . (b) Aggravated 
assault and battery is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten 
(10) years."

 
 

2Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201 provides that:  
"(a) A person 
is an habitual criminal if:  
(i) He is convicted of a violent felony; and (ii) He has been 
convicted of a felony on two (2) or more previous charges separately brought and 
tried which arose out of separate occurrences in this state or elsewhere.  (b)  An habitual criminal shall be punished 
by imprisonment for:  (i) Not 
less than ten (10) years nor more than fifty (50) years, if he has two (2) 
previous convictions; (ii)  Life, if 
he has three (3) or more previous convictions."