Case Title: Branch v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 8, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOHN BRANCH, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 8, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0903009061 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: July 13, 2010 
  Decided: September 27, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 27th day of September 2010, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the 
State's response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
In October 2009, a Superior Court jury found the defendant-
appellant, John Branch (Branch), guilty of one count each of second degree 
assault and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a 
felony.  The Superior Court sentenced Branch to a total period of ten years at 
Level V incarceration to be suspended after serving four years for eighteen 
months at Level III probation.  This is Branch’s direct appeal. 
 
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(2) 
Branch's counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Branch's counsel asserts that, based upon 
a complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably 
appealable issues.  By letter, Branch's attorney informed him of the 
provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided Branch with a copy of the motion to 
withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Branch also was informed of his 
right to supplement his attorney's presentation.  Branch has raised several 
issues for this Court's consideration.  The State has responded to Branch’s 
issues, as well as to the position taken by Branch's counsel, and has moved 
to affirm the Superior Court's judgment. 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable 
claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of the record and 
determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1 
(4) 
The record at trial fairly supports the following facts:  On 
March 12, 2009, Branch was at a party at a house on Jackson Street in 
                                                 
 1Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of 
Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
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Wilmington.  The victim, Vickie Hand, also was at the party with her friend, 
Michele Petrucci.  All three were drinking.  Hand testified that as she left the 
house, Branch approached her and tried to punch her.  She tried to walk 
away, but Branch picked up a board and hit her with it several times.  
Petrucci then appeared and Branch dropped the board and ran away.  Hand 
went to the hospital by ambulance.  She testified that she was in pain and 
had to wear a cast on her fractured arm for three months after the assault.  
Officer Purner of the Wilmington Police Department responded to the 
hospital to interview Hand.  Officer Purner testified that Hand appeared to 
be intoxicated.  Purner learned where Branch lived and went to his address.  
Branch admitted that he hit Hand but claimed that he did so in self-defense 
after Hand advanced toward him holding a box cutter.  Branch testified to 
that effect at trial.  He also denied drinking that day.  Both Hand and 
Petrucci testified in rebuttal that they had observed Branch drinking before 
the assault.  Hand also denied that she had a box cutter in her hand.  The jury 
convicted Branch of all charges. 
(5) 
Prior to trial, Branch had submitted two additional voir dire 
questions: (i) Have you ever been employed by a law enforcement agency? 
and (ii) Would you be more likely to believe a law enforcement officer’s 
 
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testimony merely because of his or her status as a law enforcement officer?  
The Superior Court declined to ask either question of potential jurors. 
(6) 
In response to his counsel’s motion to withdraw, Branch 
submitted a twenty-four page, disjointed letter setting forth the following 
discernible points for the Court’s review: (i) the trial court abused its 
discretion in restricting voir dire of the jury; (ii) the trial court erred in 
allowing Michele Petrucci’s hearsay testimony; and (iii) neither the 
testimony of Vicki Hand nor Officer Purner was credible.  Branch also 
appears to argue that this counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 
witnesses’ credibility.  Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, 
will not be considered by this Court for the first time on direct appeal.2  
Accordingly, we will not address this claim. 
(7) 
The method of conducting voir dire examination is a matter 
within the sound discretion of the trial court.3  Accordingly, on appeal we 
review complaints about the trial court’s refusal to ask proposed voir dire 
questions for abuse of discretion.  The purpose of voir dire examination is to 
determine whether a prospective juror is qualified and able to render an 
                                                 
2 Wright v. State, 513 A.2d 1310, 1315 (Del. 1986). 
3 Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285, 292 (Del. 2005). 
 
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impartial verdict upon the evidence and the law.4  In this case, the Superior 
Court denied Branch’s request to ask the prospective jurors if they had ever 
been employed by a law enforcement agency because the question was 
duplicative of the juror questionnaire.  The Superior Court denied Branch’s 
second proposed question about whether the jurors would you be more likely 
to believe a law enforcement officer’s testimony merely because of his or 
her status as a law enforcement officer because it was not a fair question to 
determine the juror’s ability to render an impartial verdict in the case at 
hand.  We find no abuse of discretion in the Superior Court’s denial of 
Branch’s requests in this case. 
(8) 
Branch’s second argument on appeal appears to be that the trial 
judge erred in allowing Michele Petrucci to testify at all in light of her prior 
convictions for acts of dishonesty.  Despite Branch’s contention, however, 
there is no rule in Delaware that prohibits a person convicted of crimes of 
dishonesty from testifying as a witness at trial.  Instead, the witness’ 
testimony may be impeached by such prior acts of dishonesty,5 and the 
Superior Court permitted defense counsel to cross-examine Petrucci about 
her prior convictions in this case.  These prior convictions went to the 
                                                 
4 Jacobs v. State, 358 A.2d 725, 728 (Del. 1976). 
5 See Del. R. Evid. 609(a)(2) (2010). 
 
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weight of Petrucci’s testimony, not its admissibility, and the weight to be 
accorded her testimony in light of her prior convictions was a matter for the 
jury to decide.6   Moreover, to the extent Branch contends that Petrucci’s 
testimony included hearsay statements about Hand’s comments following 
the assault, we find no merit to this contention.  The Superior Court ruled 
that Hand’s statements following the assault fell within the “excited 
utterance” exception to the hearsay rule.7 We agree.  Accordingly, we reject 
Branch’s second argument on appeal.  
(9) 
Finally, Branch appears to argue that the testimony of both 
Hand and Officer Purner was not credible and that the evidence therefore 
was insufficient to sustain his convictions.  In reviewing a claim of 
insufficient evidence, this Court, viewing the record evidence in the light 
most favorable to the State, must determine whether any rational juror could 
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.8  Branch’s 
suggestion that the evidence was insufficient because the witnesses were not 
credible is unavailing.  It is solely within the jury’s responsibility to 
determine witness credibility, resolve conflicts in the testimony, and draw 
                                                 
6 Hall v. State, 788 A.2d 118, 124 (Del. 2001). 
7 See Del. R. Evid. 803(2) (2010). 
8 Williams v. State, 539 A.2d 164, 168 (Del. 1988) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 
433 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 
 
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any inferences from the proven facts.9  In this case, we find that the evidence 
was more than sufficient to establish Branch’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
(10) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Branch’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Branch's counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Branch could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
9 Poon v. State, 880 A.2d 236, 238 (Del. 2005).