Case Title: State v. Cummings

Citation: 253 P.2d 321, 57 N.M. 36

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1953-01-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
253 P.2d 321 (1953) 57 N.M. 36 STATE v. CUMMINGS. No. 5496. Supreme Court of New Mexico. January 28, 1953. Richard C. Losh, F. Craig Morton, Jr., Albuquerque, for appellant. Joe L. Martinez, Atty. Gen., James B. Cooney, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. LUJAN, Justice. Jack W. Cummings was convicted of the crime of involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to serve a term of not less than one year nor more than two years in the state penitentiary. His motion for a new trial was denied and he appeals from the verdict and sentence. On August 3, 1951, at about 12:15 in the morning, the defendant was driving his *322 automobile in a southerly direction along North Fourth Street in the City of Albuquerque, and at a point indicated by the testimony in the case he struck and killed Victor M. Van Geison. The testimony tends to show that the automobile, a 1946 Chevrolet, was being driven at a speed of forty or fifty miles per hour. There was also testimony tending to prove that the defendant was at the time intoxicated. The deceased was crossing North Fourth Street in the pedestrians cross-walk lane on Mountain Road when he was struck and killed. The defendant testified that he stopped at two different bars and had three beers before the accident; that he did not think he was going too fast; and that he did not see the deceased until he was right up on him. The defendant contends that he was prejudiced by the following instruction given by the court over his objection: This instruction assumes that facts may be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. It permitted the jury to weigh the evidence under the rule applicable to civil cases and, having so weighed it and ascertained which side the scale preponderated, to decide the case accordingly. It is in direct conflict with the other instructions in which the jury were told that, in order to convict, the evidence must satisfy them of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It led the jury to believe that they would be authorized to base a conviction on the greater weight of the evidence. We think, under the facts of this case, that this instruction was not only calculated to mislead and confuse the jury, but was hurtful to the defendant. From any point of view, such an instruction has no place in a criminal case. In State v. Crosby, 26 N.M. 318, 191 P. 1079, 1081, we said: See, also State v. Sherwood, 39 N.M. 518, 50 P.2d 968. In Steinmeyer v. People, 95 Ill. 383, the court said: *323 It is next contended that this case should be reversed by reason of the misconduct of the district attorney. This contention is based upon the following remark made by him: "This jury must consider that 285 deaths on our highways this year have resulted from traffic accidents." This remark was made three times during argument of the district attorney and was timely objected to the first two times and the objections were sustained. In sustaining the objections interposed the first two times, the trial court admonished the district attorney in the presence of the jury to confine himself to the issues of the case at bar and to try and not to attempt to sway the jury with sociological facts and inferences. Notwithstanding the admonition of the court, the district attorney for the third time repeated the challenged remarks and on this occasion the defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that this defendant was entitled to be tried on the evidence concerning this accident only and that the repeated injection of other fatal accidents into this case had deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The motion was overruled. The trial court should not have permitted remarks of this character. It is its duty to see that no improper statements are made likely to influence the jury in their verdict, and that the cause is tried upon the sworn testimony of the witnesses. It is not our intention to limit or restrict legitimate argument, but a statement of facts entirely outside of the evidence, and highly prejudicial to the accused, cannot be justified as argument. The district attorney repeatedly transgressed the bounds of propriety vested in him, and this in reference to a matter regarding which the passion of the jury was easily aroused. In the case of Kennamer v. State, 59 Okl. Cr. 146, 57 P.2d 646, 648, the court said: And in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633, 79 L. Ed. 1314, the court speaking through Justice Sutherland, said: It is doubtful if the sinister influence of the remarks complained of thrice repeated over objection could be erased, by withdrawal or any admonition the court could give. They were highly improper. The defendant was entitled to be tried by the court and jury, which was sworn to try the case. Their verdict should be based upon the law and the evidence, not on what other people did throughout the state. We hold that the erroneous instruction and the misconduct of the district attorney deprived the defendant of the protection of his constitutional rights to a fair and impartial trial. For the above reasons the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. It is so ordered. SADLER, C. J., and McGHEE, COMPTON and COORS, JJ., concur.