Case Title: In re Boyette

Citation: 

Docket Number: S092356

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2013-05-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 5/30/13 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re MAURICE BOYETTE 
) 
 
 
)  
S092356 
 
on Habeas Corpus. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
In 1993, an Alameda County jury convicted petitioner Maurice Boyette of 
two counts of first degree murder for shooting and killing Gary Carter and Annette 
Devallier.  (Pen. Code, § 187.)1  The jury also convicted petitioner of being a felon 
in possession of a firearm (§ 12021) and sustained allegations that he was both 
armed with (§ 12022, subd. (a)) and used (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) a firearm during 
the crimes.  The jury also sustained a multiple-murder special-circumstance 
allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), rendering him eligible for the death penalty.  
Following the penalty phase of trial, the jury sentenced petitioner to death.  This 
court affirmed his conviction and sentence in 2002.  (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 
Cal.4th 381.)   
While his appeal was pending, petitioner also filed a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus in this court.  Having found the petition stated a prima facie case for 
relief on several claims of alleged juror misconduct, this court issued an order on 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
noted. 
 
 
2 
November 15, 2006, instructing the Director of the Department of Corrections2 to 
show cause why relief should not be granted.  We thereafter appointed a referee to 
determine certain disputed facts.  After holding an evidentiary hearing, our referee 
filed his report with this court, and the parties filed their exceptions to it.  The case 
is now ripe for decision.  As explained below, we accept the referee‟s report and 
findings as supported by substantial evidence, discharge the order to show cause, 
and deny relief. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Facts of the Crimes 
The facts surrounding petitioner‟s crimes, set forth in more detail in our 
opinion on appeal (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 403-407), are not 
relevant to the analysis of the juror misconduct claims raised in the habeas corpus 
petition and contained in the order to show cause.  Suffice it to say the evidence 
showed that petitioner acted as a bodyguard for a drug dealer in Oakland named 
Antoine Johnson; Johnson learned the two victims, Carter and Devallier, had 
allegedly stolen rock cocaine and cash from a safe house Johnson maintained; and 
petitioner accompanied Johnson to the house, confronted the victims and, in the 
ensuing melee, shot and killed both victims at pointblank range. 
B.  The Habeas Corpus Petition 
Petitioner filed a lengthy petition for writ of habeas corpus raising 
numerous issues.  We found the petition stated a prima facie case for relief as to 
six claims, all of which related to various aspects of alleged misconduct by jury 
                                              
2  
The Department of Corrections is now called the Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation.  (See Gov. Code, § 12838, subd. (a); In re Large 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 544, fn. 4.) 
 
 
3 
foreperson Pervies Lee Ary, Sr. (Ary).3  (See People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 
464, 475 [“If . . . the court finds the factual allegations, taken as true, establish a 
prima facie case for relief, the court will issue an [order to show cause].”].)  
Accordingly, we issued an order to show cause, directing the custodian “to show 
cause before this court when the proceeding is ordered on calendar, why the relief 
prayed for should not be granted on the grounds that:  (1) Juror Pervies Ary 
concealed relevant facts or gave false answers during voir dire concerning his 
prior felony conviction and other contacts with the justice system; (2) Juror 
Pervies Ary concealed relevant facts or gave false answers during voir dire 
concerning the prior criminal records of his sons; (3) . . . ;[4] (4) Juror Pervies Ary 
                                              
3  
Petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus in 2000, and the 
petition includes the full names of the trial jurors.  Rule 8.332(b)(1) of the 
California Rules of Court presently addresses protecting juror anonymity in 
criminal cases, directing that “[t]he name of each trial juror . . . sworn to hear the 
case must be replaced with an identifying number wherever it appears in any 
document.”  As that rule was not effective until January 1, 2007, it could not apply 
to the petition.  The precursor to rule 8.332, former rule 31.3, was effective on 
January 1, 2004, but even that rule came after petitioner filed his petition.  Both 
rules of court implement Code of Civil Procedure section 237, which provides in 
pertinent part:  “Upon the recording of a jury‟s verdict in a criminal jury 
proceeding, the court‟s record of personal juror identifying information of trial 
jurors, as defined in Section 194, consisting of names, addresses, and telephone 
numbers, shall be sealed until further order of the court as provided by this 
section.”  (Id., subd. (a)(2).)  
 
Although we have generally treated rule 8.332 to have retroactive effect so 
as to maximize juror privacy, the petition, all subsequent briefing by both parties, 
as well as our order to show cause and the evidentiary hearing record all identify 
the jurors by name.  As no party has asked to shield the identities of the jurors, we 
decline to do so. 
4  
The order to show cause originally referenced petitioner‟s claim that Ary 
had concealed relevant facts when answering question No. 24 on the jury 
questionnaire, which asked whether he had ever witnessed a crime.  In his 
traverse, however, petitioner stated that, “given the other, numerous and even 
more egregious falsehoods of Juror Ary . . . , petitioner does not believe that a 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
4 
concealed relevant facts or gave false answers during voir dire concerning his 
problem with alcohol and his son‟s drug addiction; (5) Juror Pervies Ary 
introduced information into the jury deliberations concerning an alleged prior 
murder committed by petitioner Maurice Boyette, although no evidence of such a 
crime was introduced at trial; and (6) Juror Christine Rennie and one other juror, 
at the urging of Juror Ary, during the pendency of the jury deliberations, rented 
and watched a videotape of the movie American Me in order to gather background 
information for the trial.” 
The Attorney General, representing the Director of the Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation, thereafter filed a return (see People v. Duvall, 
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 475), and petitioner responded by filing his traverse (id. at 
p. 476; see generally In re Bacigalupo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 312, 332-333).  After 
considering the return (in which the Attorney General conceded the existence of 
disputed material facts) and the traverse (in which petitioner reasserted his original 
allegations of juror misconduct), we determined the case turned on disputed 
questions of fact requiring resolution in an evidentiary hearing.  Therefore, on 
September 9, 2009, we issued an order appointing the Honorable Jon Rolefson, 
Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, to serve as our referee in this 
proceeding and to answer specific factual questions, addressed in more detail 
below.   
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
determination of this fact is necessary to proving that Juror Ary was an 
unqualified, biased juror.  Petitioner would prefer to withdraw this allegation 
rather than prolong litigation in this case.”  Accordingly, we declined to ask the 
referee to take evidence on this topic. 
 
 
5 
C.  The Evidentiary Hearing, the Referee’s Report, and the  
Parties’ Exceptions Thereto 
1.  Ary’s Failure to Reveal His Criminal History 
Question No. 25 on the jury questionnaire given the prospective jurors in 
petitioner‟s case asked:  “HAVE YOU, A CLOSE FRIEND, OR RELATIVE 
EVER BEEN ACCUSED OF A CRIME, EVEN IF THE CASE DID NOT 
COME TO COURT?”  Ary answered “NO.”  Despite this response, petitioner 
alleges that Ary himself had several times been accused, and even convicted, of a 
crime and failed during voir dire to disclose that fact, to wit, that Ary (1) was 
charged in 1964 with two counts of robbery and grand theft, and was convicted 
that same year of felony grand theft; (2) was charged in 1971 with seven counts of 
robbery, but the charges were dismissed for insufficient evidence; (3) pleaded 
guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), a misdemeanor, in 1982 
and was placed on probation; and (4) had his probation revoked in 1982 and was 
reinstated to probation that same year.  Ary himself declares he “was arrested in 
. . . 1963 and spent some time in jail.”   
Petitioner also alleges his trial attorney was unaware of Ary‟s felon status 
or his concealments.  A declaration by Walter Cannady, petitioner‟s lead trial 
attorney, supports this allegation.  Cannady states he was unaware of Ary‟s prior 
felony conviction and that, had he known, he would have questioned Ary on the 
subject.  Moreover, based on his experience with the trial judge, Cannady is 
confident the court would have sustained a challenge against Ary for cause.  
Cannady further declares he would have used a peremptory challenge to remove 
Juror Ary in any event.   
In the return, respondent agreed a dispute of material facts existed “whether 
Ary deliberately misrepresented his prior criminal history from decades ago or 
whether he believed that record had been expunged, was too old to count, or was 
 
 
6 
otherwise not covered by the questions asked on voir dire.”  We thereafter directed 
our referee to answer the following questions:  “Given that Juror Pervies Lee Ary 
was in 1964 convicted of felony grand theft, was incarcerated as a result, was later 
charged in 1971 with six [sic] counts of robbery, later pleaded guilty to 
misdemeanor drunk driving in 1982, and then had his probation revoked in 1982, 
and given that Ary failed to disclose this information either on his juror 
questionnaire or during voir dire in petitioner‟s trial, what were Ary‟s reasons for 
failing to disclose these facts?  Was the nondisclosure intentional and deliberate?  
Considering Ary‟s reasons for failing to disclose these facts, was his nondisclosure 
of the above facts indicative of juror bias?  Was Ary actually biased against 
petitioner?” 
Ary was the first witness to testify at the evidentiary hearing, and he 
admitted he had been arrested and convicted of a felony in 1964 and served six 
months in jail.  Ary also was arrested and charged with robbery in 1971, but was 
exonerated when the actual culprit was apprehended.  In 1982, he was arrested for 
DUI and pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor; his punishment included participation 
in Alcoholics Anonymous.  
Ary further explained that when he was called for jury duty in petitioner‟s 
case, he called the telephone number on the jury summons and revealed his 1964 
felony conviction, but was told that because he entered military service just after 
his conviction, his conviction had been expunged and “that I don‟t have to be 
concerned with that as having a record.”  When asked why he did not reveal his 
1971 arrest for robbery, as he was clearly “accused” of the crime before his 
eventual exoneration, he explained that he understood question No. 25 as asking 
whether he had suffered any convictions, not whether he had merely been accused 
of a crime, that he had simply read the question incorrectly, and that he had “made 
a mistake.”  Regarding his failure to reveal his guilty plea to DUI in 1982, he first 
 
 
7 
stated, “I feel that I should have never gotten that” because he had consumed only 
two beers in a five-hour period, but then backtracked and said he did not consider 
the DUI charge to be a criminal matter and it did not seem important enough to 
mention.   
The referee found that Juror Ary honestly misunderstood question No. 25 
as asking only for criminal convictions, not merely criminal accusations.  “Clearly, 
the question was not limited to convictions, since it not only used the word 
„accused,‟ but also added the phrase, „even if the case did not come to court.‟  On 
the other hand, there was no further explanation provided, no additional questions 
on the subject, and no inquiry during voir dire that might have provided 
clarification.  Moreover, Mr. Ary expressed the same misunderstanding of the 
question while testifying at the hearing.  Thus, while his interpretation of the 
question was certainly unreasonable, it is not unbelievable under the 
circumstances.  Since his only convictions had been set aside, he believed he had 
none to report.” 
The referee further found that because Ary “believed” he was answering 
question No. 25 accurately, “his nondisclosure was not intentional and deliberate,” 
that such nondisclosure was therefore “not indicative of juror bias,” and that Ary 
was not actually biased against petitioner. 
Petitioner raises several exceptions to these findings, but we find none 
meritorious.  First, he contends the referee improperly limited his ability to present 
evidence relevant to the question of prejudice flowing from Juror Ary‟s various 
concealments, having erroneously decided “that any evidence of Ary‟s actions that 
demonstrated juror bias during the trial [was] barred.”  As we explain, we 
conclude petitioner did not preserve this claim for our review and that it lacks 
merit in any event. 
 
 
8 
Prior to calling the first witness, petitioner‟s habeas corpus counsel argued 
that to prove bias, an issue we had asked the referee to address, she “need[ed] to 
be permitted to establish by testimony the underlying elements of that question.”  
The referee responded to this argument:  “Actually, the Supreme Court has given 
me very specific guidances [as] to just what I am supposed to determine.  The 
issue of bias, it asks me in Question No. 1, was Mr. Ary‟s  . . . nondisclosure of 
certain facts indicative of juror bias and was he actually biased against petitioner, 
and I think you are talking about . . . two different concepts, implied bias and 
actual bias, and the same questions are asked in Question No. 2, and that‟s where 
those issues come in, and so I agree that those are relevant, but [proving the juror 
was] prejudice[d] is a different issue.”  (Italics added.)  Counsel agreed. 
Later, when questioning Ary, counsel asked:  “Mr. Ary, do you recall 
asking the [trial court] probably in writing during the guilt phase how can a 
homeless person obtain private lawyers or are they court appointed?”5  When the 
referee sustained the People‟s objection, counsel asked:  “Is that as to all of the 
questions [Juror Ary] asked?  What I‟m trying to establish, Your Honor, is I am 
going to ask the witness if he remembers question by question because he does not 
remember at this point. . . .”  The following colloquy then occurred: 
“THE COURT:  . . . I have very specific areas of inquiry, and that is not 
one of them, and I understand that there is a chance that this might peripherally 
                                              
5  
As we explained on appeal, “[d]uring the presentation of the defense case, 
the trial court received a note from a juror.  The juror asked four questions:  „How 
can a homeless person obtain such private lawyer[s] or are the [defense attorneys] 
court appointed?  [¶] [Regarding] the neighbor who lived 4 houses up the street[,] 
describe the size of the person he saw standing in the street or over (near) the body 
(sml, med, lrg) short or tall.  [¶] [Is t]his blind person being tried also or what[?]  
[¶] Did the person on trial [take,] or is he willing to take[,] a lie detector test[?]‟ ”  
(People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 429, fn. omitted.) 
 
 
9 
relate to one of the areas of inquiry that is spelled out by the Supreme Court.  
I mean, it could, but I don’t see it, so I might need you to explain it to me. 
“[COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I believe it goes to bias, and if you look at the 
question—  
“THE COURT:  I am going to ask you to—I‟m going to sustain the 
objection now.  I am going to sustain it now.  That’s not to say that if at a later 
time based on other evidence that is presented it becomes clear what the link 
might be, I won‟t let you ask it again, but as of right now, it‟s sustained.”  (Italics 
added.) 
Counsel did not later attempt to explain the link between the intended line 
of questioning and a theory of admissibility.  The referee and the parties had 
earlier agreed that no opening briefs would be filed before the reference hearing, 
so no fuller explanation of counsel‟s theory of admissibility was available until her 
briefs before this court.  Here, counsel argues the referee erroneously interpreted 
our order of reference as limited to Ary‟s state of mind at the time of the 
concealment, and thus limited to evidence of possible bias “at the time he omitted 
material evidence from the questionnaire.”  According to petitioner, the referee‟s 
interpretation of our order led him, for example, to exclude evidence of Ary‟s 
“labeling certain jurors as „naive‟; any discussion among some of the jurors 
concerning the lying in wait special circumstance; Ary‟s note to the trial court 
expressing his inappropriate hostility to petitioner.”  But this theory was not 
explained to the referee, who specifically indicated he was sustaining the People‟s 
objection subject to a later demonstration of how the evidence was relevant.  As 
petitioner did not thereafter try to show the link between the excluded evidence 
and a material fact to be proved at the hearing, he forfeited the claim.  (People v. 
Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 133 [where a trial court tentatively excludes 
evidence and states counsel is free to later ask the court to change its ruling, failure 
 
 
10 
to do so forfeits the issue for appeal]; People v. Ennis (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 721, 
735-736 [same].)  
Were we to find the issue was properly preserved for our review, we would 
find it meritless.  For example, question No. 1 of our September 9, 2009, order, 
which concerns Ary‟s failure to reveal his criminal past, directed the referee to 
determine “what were Ary‟s reasons for failing to disclose these facts?  Was the 
nondisclosure intentional and deliberate?  Considering Ary‟s reasons for failing to 
disclose these facts, was his nondisclosure of the above facts indicative of juror 
bias?  Was Ary actually biased against petitioner?”  (Italics added.)  Read in 
context, the question did not ask the referee to answer whether, as a global matter, 
Ary was a biased juror.  Instead, the referee reasonably interpreted the order‟s 
language to direct him to determine whether Ary’s concealment of his criminal 
past demonstrated that he was biased.  The language of the other questions is 
subject to the same interpretation.  Accordingly, we reject petitioner‟s first 
exception, both because it was forfeited and because it is meritless. 
Second, petitioner contends the referee was mistaken when he concluded 
Ary “did not disclose his own criminal history on voir dire because he was not 
asked about it.”  (Italics added.)  Clearly question No. 25 asked jurors such as Ary 
to disclose their criminal history.  But immediately following the passage in the 
referee‟s report to which petitioner excepts, the report explains that “[t]he only 
inquiry into this subject was a single question in the written questionnaire . . . .”  
Accordingly, the referee must have meant that Ary was never asked orally about 
his criminal past on voir dire, a circumstance confirmed by the transcript of the 
voir dire proceedings.  
Third, petitioner excepts to the referee‟s findings because the referee “failed 
to give any weight” to the fact Ary gave several different reasons for his failure to 
disclose his criminal history.  Further, according to petitioner, “[t]he hearing 
 
 
11 
record reflects Ary‟s complete lack of credibility.”  To be sure, Ary made some 
inconsistent statements, some of which could have undermined his believability, 
but “[t]he main reason for an evidentiary hearing is to have the referee determine 
the credibility of the testimony given at the hearing.  [Citation.]  Because the 
referee observes the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify, we generally defer 
to the referee‟s factual findings and „give great weight‟ to them when supported by 
substantial evidence.”  (In re Bacigalupo, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 333.)  
“ „Deference to the referee is particularly appropriate on issues requiring 
resolution of testimonial conflicts and assessment of witnesses‟ credibility, 
because the referee has the opportunity to observe the witnesses‟ demeanor and 
manner of testifying.‟ ”  (In re Price (2011) 51 Cal.4th 547, 559.) 
Although Ary made some inconsistent statements, “we assume the referee 
considered those discrepancies, along with [the witness‟s] demeanor, while 
testifying, before concluding he was a credible witness.”  (In re Bacigalupo, 
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 338 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).)  Accordingly, we reject 
petitioner‟s contention that the referee‟s findings as to Ary‟s credibility are 
unsupported by substantial evidence.  (In re Hardy (2007) 41 Cal.4th 977, 993 [we 
give great weight to findings of the referee that are supported by substantial 
evidence].)  Instead, we conclude that in light of all the evidence, including Ary‟s 
demeanor while testifying, the referee reasonably credited Ary‟s explanation for 
his failure to disclose his own criminal history when answering question No. 25 on 
the jury questionnaire.   
Accordingly, we reject petitioner‟s exceptions to the referee‟s findings and 
instead accept them, supported as they are by substantial evidence. 
 
 
12 
2.  Ary’s Failure to Reveal His Relatives’ Criminal History 
In addition to inquiring about the juror himself, question No. 25 also asked 
whether Ary had any relatives who had been “ACCUSED OF A CRIME, EVEN 
IF THE CASE DID NOT COME TO COURT.”  As noted, Ary answered “NO.”  
Petitioner alleged in his habeas corpus petition that Ary failed to disclose that his 
two sons, Pervies Lee Ary, Jr. (Pervies Jr.), and Pervies Lee Ary II (Pervies II),6 as 
well as two other relatives, had significant criminal histories.  Petitioner‟s 
documentary support for these allegations shows Pervies Jr. (1) was charged in 
1986 with four counts of transportation of narcotics, possession, and possession 
for sale, and pleaded guilty to all four counts in return for being sentenced to three 
years‟ probation on conditions including 210 days in jail; (2) pleaded guilty the 
same day in a different case to possession for sale of cocaine and was sentenced to 
probation on conditions including a consecutive term of 150 days in jail; 
(3) pleaded guilty in 1987 to sale of marijuana, was sentenced to three years in 
custody, had the sentence suspended, and was committed to the California 
Rehabilitation Center in Norco due to his narcotics addiction; and (4) pleaded 
guilty in 1990 to driving with a suspended license, a misdemeanor. 
Documents also indicate Ary‟s second son, Pervies II, had been charged in 
1993 with misdemeanor battery and that this criminal charge had been filed the 
same day Ary was questioned on voir dire in petitioner‟s case.  The battery charge, 
however, was ultimately dismissed. 
In his declaration, Ary also declares that “[o]ne of my first cousins got a 
life sentence during the 1950s for killing a man.”  Trial Attorney Cannady declares 
he was unaware of the arrests and convictions of Pervies Jr., but makes no mention 
                                              
6  
The juror‟s younger son is sometimes referred to as Pervies Ary II and 
sometimes as Pervies Ary III.  We will refer to him as Pervies II. 
 
 
13 
of Ary‟s cousin.  Cannady declares he would have used a peremptory challenge to 
remove Ary as a juror had he known these facts.  
Respondent, in the return, agreed that a dispute of material fact existed 
regarding whether “Ary deliberately misrepresented his family‟s prior criminal 
records.”  We thereafter asked the referee to answer these questions:  “Given that 
two of Juror Pervies Lee Ary‟s sons had criminal records, and that one of Ary‟s 
cousins was convicted of murder, and given that Ary failed to disclose this 
information on either his juror questionnaire or during voir dire in petitioner‟s 
trial, what were Ary‟s reasons for failing to disclose these facts?  Was the 
nondisclosure intentional and deliberate?  Considering Ary‟s reasons for failing to 
disclose these facts, was his nondisclosure of the above facts indicative of juror 
bias?  Was Ary biased against petitioner?” 
At the evidentiary hearing, Ary confirmed he has two sons:  Pervies Jr., 
born in 1964, and Pervies II, born in 1974.  Pervies Jr. was arrested in the 1980s 
on a drug-related charge; Ary remembered because Pervies Jr.‟s mother had called 
him at the time and asked him to help with raising bail.  Ary testified that he was 
estranged from Pervies Jr. and had learned the details of the arrest “after I was a 
juror” because he “wasn‟t around” his son.  He also testified, however, that he 
could not say if he had learned of Pervies Jr.‟s felony conviction before serving as 
a juror in petitioner‟s trial.   
Ary‟s younger son, Pervies II, also had trouble with the law.  Sometime 
before petitioner‟s trial, Ary accompanied his son to juvenile court to face a 
misdemeanor charge connected to an incident of road rage.  When Pervies II failed 
to complete an essay assigned as a condition of probation, he was arrested and 
committed to juvenile hall.  At the evidentiary hearing, Ary explained that he did 
not reveal Pervies II‟s criminal history on his jury questionnaire because, in his 
judgment, “it didn‟t go to court, so I said, well, that‟s not even important.”  
 
 
14 
Clarifying his comment, Ary said he thought he need not mention the matter 
because it was a juvenile proceeding.   
Ary testified at the hearing that he had both a nephew and a cousin who 
were serving sentences of life without parole for murder, and admitted he had 
revealed neither relative on his jury questionnaire.  He explained the omissions by 
saying, “I didn‟t think about it,” because the nephew was his ex-wife‟s sister‟s son 
and Ary did not have direct contact with him, and the cousin had been sentenced 
to life in prison almost 50 years ago and Ary had never had contact with him.   
The referee apparently credited Ary‟s explanations for his nondisclosure of 
the criminal history of his two sons and other relatives, for after noting Ary‟s 
explanations, the referee concluded that “Ary‟s nondisclosure . . . was due in part 
to his belief that he was answering the question accurately . . . .”  Moreover, Ary‟s 
omissions were due “in part to his failure of recollection” and thus were “not 
intentional and deliberate.”  Because Ary believed he was answering question No. 
25 accurately, his omission of his relatives‟ criminal history “was not indicative of 
juror bias,” and he was not in fact biased against petitioner. 
Petitioner raises exceptions to various portions of the referee‟s findings, but 
we find them meritless.  First, he contends the sheer number of Ary‟s relatives 
with serious criminal records is “revealing” and thus indicative of Ary‟s intent to 
conceal.  He also contends that Ary‟s testimony at the evidentiary hearing was 
inconsistent with what he had told the district attorney‟s investigator.  But these 
matters were fully aired at the hearing, and we assume the referee took these 
factors into account before concluding Ary‟s failure to disclose was unintentional.  
(In re Bacigalupo, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 338 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).)   
The same reasoning disposes of petitioner‟s further claim that because Ary 
testified that at the time of petitioner‟s trial he knew his son Pervies Jr. had been 
“arrested numerous times,” we should not credit the referee‟s conclusion that 
 
 
15 
Ary‟s omissions were due “in part to his failure of recollection.”  As Ary also 
testified that all he knew at the time of petitioner‟s trial was what he had heard 
from Pervies Jr.‟s mother, namely that Pervies Jr. had been arrested the one time, 
we assume the referee considered these possible inconsistencies before reaching 
his conclusion. 
Petitioner argues for a different result, citing Dyer v. Calderon (9th Cir. 
1998) 151 F.3d 970.  In Dyer, it came to light before the penalty phase of a capital 
trial that a juror‟s brother had been shot and killed six years earlier, but the juror 
had not mentioned the incident in her juror questionnaire.  When the trial court 
held a hearing and questioned the juror about it, she explained she thought her 
brother‟s death was an accident, not a crime.  The trial court concluded the juror 
did not demonstrate a lack of candor and allowed her to remain on the jury, which 
eventually sentenced the defendant to death.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
sitting en banc, disagreed, finding the trial court should have uncovered additional 
facts that clearly demonstrated the juror‟s explanation was unbelievable because 
“the killing had none of the earmarks of an accident.”  (Id. at p. 973.)  “[A] judge 
investigating juror bias must find facts, not make assumptions, and here the key 
facts were easily discernible.  A few questions to [the juror] about her relationship 
with her brother; an examination of the casefile; a request for confirmation from 
the prosecutor; an order to bring [her husband] into court—any or all of these 
would have disclosed that [the juror] knew a lot more about her brother‟s death 
than she was letting on.”  (Id. at p. 976.) 
Because the federal appellate court found “the facts were not properly 
developed by the state court, its finding that [the juror] was unbiased is not entitled 
to a presumption of correctness.”  (Dyer v. Calderon, supra, 151 F.3d at p. 979.)  
The Ninth Circuit thus felt free to determine de novo whether the juror was biased 
based on new facts discovered by federal habeas corpus counsel.  The federal 
 
 
16 
appellate court found her failure to disclose critical facts raised an inference of 
bias but admitted that whether the juror “was actually biased—i.e., whether she 
was disposed to cast a vote against Dyer—is difficult to figure out eighteen years 
later.”  (Id. at p. 981.)  Nevertheless, “there is every indication that she was not 
indifferent to service on the jury.  After watching a number of potential jurors 
disclose relatively minor crimes and get dismissed, she chose to conceal a very 
major crime—the killing of her brother in a way that she knew was very similar to 
the way Dyer was accused of killing his victims.  She also failed to disclose many 
other facts that would have jeopardized her chances of serving on Dyer‟s jury.  
Later on, when she was questioned about her brother‟s death, she lied once again 
by pretending she thought it was an accident, and by telling the judge that no one 
in her family had testified about the killing.  The inference we draw from all this is 
that [the juror] lied in order to preserve her status as a juror and to secure the right 
to pass on Dyer‟s sentence.”  (Id. at p. 982, fn. omitted.) 
In the circumstances of the Dyer case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
itself made an assessment of the offending juror‟s state of mind, at the time of her 
concealment, based on facts developed by federal habeas corpus counsel.  The 
court felt free to do so because it found the state trial court, which had questioned 
the juror, had failed to conduct a reasonably thorough investigation.  By contrast, 
the issue of the juror‟s state of mind in the instant case arose after trial, and we 
directed our referee to conduct an evidentiary hearing.  The referee made clear 
credibility determinations after observing Ary and other former jurors testify.  
Were we to assess the matter de novo, as the Dyer court did, we might come to a 
different conclusion, as Ary‟s concealments were unusual in their number and 
breadth.  But because the referee‟s credibility determinations are supported by 
substantial evidence, and there being no suggestion the referee‟s hearing was 
inadequate, we are not at liberty to disregard those findings.  As the Dyer court 
 
 
17 
itself cautioned:  “[W]e must be tolerant, as jurors may forget incidents long 
buried in their minds, misunderstand a question or bend the truth a bit to avoid 
embarrassment.  The Supreme Court has held that an honest yet mistaken answer 
to a voir dire question rarely amounts to a constitutional violation; even an 
intentionally dishonest answer is not fatal, so long as the falsehood does not 
bespeak a lack of impartiality.”  (Dyer v. Calderon, supra, 151 F.3d at p. 973.)  
Although we are not bound to follow the decisions of lower federal courts in any 
event (People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 431), Dyer is distinguishable on its 
facts and thus unpersuasive. 
Petitioner next contends that Ary‟s recollection of Pervies Jr.‟s mother 
asking him for bail money indicates that Pervies Jr.‟s troubles were “significant” 
for Ary, suggesting that Ary‟s explanation of his failure to recall the incident 
should not be believed.  We leave it to the referee to sort out these matters and 
conclude his decision to credit Ary‟s explanation—after hearing him testify and 
observing his demeanor—is supported by substantial evidence.  (In re Price, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 559.) 
Petitioner‟s final exception concerns Ary‟s nephews.  Petitioner argues that 
although Ary testified his former sister-in-law‟s four sons—Ary‟s nephews by 
marriage—were all in prison for drug- or homicide-related crimes, “[t]his 
testimony was ignored by the referee.”  We reject the claim.  Only one nephew‟s 
troubles were known to Ary at the time of petitioner‟s trial, and the referee found 
the omission nondispositive, reasoning that Ary did not think of the nephew 
because he was not a person with whom he had had any meaningful contact.  
Thus, according to the referee, Ary‟s failure to disclose “the criminal history of 
family members was due in part to his belief that he was answering the question 
accurately and in part to his failure of recollection.” 
 
 
18 
We conclude that in light of all the evidence, including Ary‟s demeanor 
while testifying, the referee reasonably credited Ary‟s explanation for his 
omissions in answering question No. 25 on the jury questionnaire with regard to 
the criminal histories of his sons and other relatives.  We thus reject petitioner‟s 
exceptions and accept the referee‟s findings. 
3.  Ary’s Alleged Failure to Reveal His Problem With Alcohol  
or His Son’s Drug Addiction 
Question No. 61 on the jury questionnaire asked:  “HAVE YOU, A CLOSE 
FRIEND OR RELATIVE EVER HAD A PROBLEM INVOLVING THE USE 
OF DRUGS OR ALCOHOL?”  Ary answered “NO.”  The question was relevant 
to jury selection because the murders of Carter and Devallier occurred in 
connection with the illegal drug trade, and the parties understandably wished to 
know if a potential juror had any personal connections or problems with that 
milieu.  Indeed, defense counsel at trial specifically informed Ary during voir dire 
that the killings took place at “a drug house.  And some of the people who may 
testify, you know, may have used drugs.”  Counsel then asked Ary, “Is that going 
to cause you any bias or prejudice one way or the other?”  Ary replied, “I don‟t 
think so.”  
Petitioner alleged in his habeas corpus petition that despite answering 
question No. 61 in the negative, Ary was in fact an alcoholic who had been 
ordered to attend Alcoholics Anonymous as a condition of his misdemeanor DUI 
conviction in 1982.  In addition, his son Pervies Jr. had been sent to the California 
Rehabilitation Center in Norco because he was a drug addict.  Respondent 
conceded an evidentiary hearing was necessary to resolve disputed facts 
concerning Ary‟s answer to question No. 61.  We thereafter asked the referee to 
answer these questions:  “Given that Juror Pervies Lee Ary had previously been 
convicted of driving under the influence and was as a result required to attend 
 
 
19 
meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous, and that one of his sons had several prior 
criminal convictions for drug-related crimes and had been incarcerated at the 
California Rehabilitation Center at Norco, and given that Ary failed to disclose 
this information on either his juror questionnaire or during voir dire in petitioner‟s 
trial, what were Ary‟s reasons for failing to disclose these facts?  Was the 
nondisclosure intentional and deliberate?  Considering Ary‟s reasons for failing to 
disclose these facts, was his nondisclosure of the above facts indicative of juror 
bias?  Was Ary biased against petitioner?” 
Ary‟s testimony at the evidentiary hearing was essentially consistent with 
the allegations in the petition for writ of habeas corpus and the district attorney‟s 
investigation, as described in the return.  Ary admitted that following his guilty 
plea in 1982 to DUI, his punishment included participation in Alcoholics 
Anonymous.  He admitted he imbibed “socially at clubs or . . . at home,” but 
claimed he had consumed only two beers during a five-hour party before being 
arrested for DUI.  He denied that abstinence from alcoholic beverages was a 
condition of his probation following his 1964 felony conviction, and further 
denied he had a problem with alcohol, explaining he answered “NO” to question 
No. 61 because he interpreted the question as asking whether he was an alcoholic. 
Ary also denied that any of his relatives were alcoholics or had a problem 
with drugs.  He knew his son Pervies Jr. had been arrested in the 1980s for selling 
drugs, that it had “something to do with marijuana,” but he did not know whether 
the crime involved cocaine.  When asked whether he knew his son had been 
sentenced to prison “in order to help rehabilitate himself from [drug] addiction,” 
he replied, “No, I didn‟t know he was addicted.”7  Ary admitted that a person 
                                              
7  
In fact, as noted, ante, in 1986 Pervies Jr. pleaded guilty in two different 
cases to marijuana- and cocaine-related offenses and was placed on probation on 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
20 
could be said to have a problem with drugs “if you are selling drugs instead of 
making a decent living for yourself,” but then asserted that “[t]here was a 
difference between having a problem and being involved with drugs or alcohol.  
You can be a drug dealer and never touch the stuff.”  Although he admitted he 
knew his older son smoked marijuana, he said that he “wasn‟t around him that 
much to say if he did have a problem . . . .” 
The referee found that, as far as Ary knew, “he was answering [question 
No. 61] accurately.  He did not consider himself to have ever been an alcoholic.  
While he did attend AA meetings, he was required to do so as a condition of DUI 
probation.  As for his son‟s addiction to and commitment for drugs, he wasn‟t 
aware of that until some time after [petitioner‟s] trial.  At the time of this trial, he 
only knew of a drug-related arrest.”  Because Ary believed he had answered 
question No. 61 accurately, his nondisclosures were neither “intentional” nor 
“indicative of juror bias,” and he was not, as a result, actually biased against 
petitioner. 
Petitioner raises exceptions to these findings, arguing generally that in light 
of the inconsistencies between Ary‟s testimony, his interview with the district 
attorney‟s investigator, and his pretrial declaration, he was not credible and the 
referee‟s findings are thus not supported by substantial evidence.  After 
considering these inconsistencies, however, and presumably also considering 
Ary‟s demeanor while testifying, the referee found him generally credible.  Under 
these circumstances, we defer to the referee‟s credibility determination. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
condition of 360 days in jail.  Following a 1987 guilty plea to sale of marijuana, 
his sentence was suspended and he was sent to the California Rehabilitation 
Center in Norco for treatment of his addiction to narcotics. 
 
 
21 
Petitioner identifies some specific inconsistencies.  For example, when 
asked at the evidentiary hearing where he had obtained his knowledge about 
prison life, Ary revealed for the first time that he had four nephews by marriage—
his ex-wife‟s sister‟s children—all of whom had been involved in the illegal drug 
trade in Los Angeles in the 1980s and who had been sentenced to lengthy prison 
sentences for drug- or homicide-related offenses.  But according to Ary, he had 
been in touch with only one of these nephews prior to serving as a juror in 
petitioner‟s case.  And although petitioner contends Ary said he learned about 
prison life from his son and then inconsistently said it was from his nephews, the 
record in fact shows he denied learning about prison life from his son and instead 
claimed he learned about an inmate‟s life in prison from his “previous marriage 
nephews,” from “street talk,” and from “listening to what other people have 
experienced.”   
Although petitioner contends Ary “could find no credible explanation as to 
why these relatives were not revealed in the questionnaire,” Ary in fact testified 
that he “wasn‟t close to them as far as being around them to just, boom, 
automatically think about them.”  In other words, Ary did not consider these 
people to be close relatives, and it did not occur to him to mention them in the 
questionnaire.  Despite petitioner‟s claims, Ary‟s explanation is not necessarily 
inconsistent with his ability to remember certain conversations he had had about 
prison life with one of his nephews.  We conclude that in light of all the evidence, 
including Ary‟s demeanor while testifying, the referee reasonably credited Ary‟s 
explanation for his omissions in answering question No. 61 on the jury 
questionnaire.  Accordingly, we reject petitioner‟s exceptions and accept the 
referee‟s findings. 
 
 
22 
4.  Ary’s Revelation of Petitioner’s Prior Homicide During Jury 
Deliberations 
Petitioner alleged in his habeas corpus petition that Ary committed 
misconduct by informing other jurors, during jury deliberations, that petitioner had 
previously committed murder, although no evidence of a prior murder had been 
introduced at trial.  In support of the petition, petitioner submitted a declaration in 
which Ary declares:  “[The jury] discussed the fact that this may have been the 
first murder for which Mr. Boyette had been caught but that he may have 
committed previous murders.  If we found second degree murder, when he got out 
in seven years he would feel like he‟d gotten away with these killings and would 
kill again.”  This description of the deliberations is supported by the declaration of 
Juror Lewis, which states:  “[Ary] told me that during the trial, another alleged 
murder was mentioned but the judge told us not to consider it.  I didn‟t remember 
the judge telling us this, but it stuck in the back of my mind after [Ary] told me.”  
Respondent conceded the following facts were disputed and should be 
referred to a referee:  whether Ary made such comments, whether the comments 
(if made) occurred during the guilt phase or the penalty phase deliberations, and 
whether any juror changed his or her vote as a result of such information.  We 
thereafter asked the referee to answer these questions:  “Did Juror Pervies Lee Ary 
assert during jury deliberations that petitioner had previously committed 
uncharged murders?  If so, did this occur during deliberations at the guilt phase or 
the penalty phase?  Did other jurors discuss this topic as well?” 
At the evidentiary hearing, Ary testified that the jurors “discussed the fact 
that this may have been the first murder Mr. Boyette had been caught at.  I don‟t 
think we discussed what he had done in the past or what he might do again.”  
Moreover, Ary said, “I don‟t know if he had committed a murder prior to this or 
would he kill again.  I don‟t know nothing about that . . . .”  Asked whether he told 
 
 
23 
another juror during deliberations that petitioner “may have committed . . . another 
murder,” Ary replied:  “It could have been brought up.  I don‟t recollect at this 
particular time.  It could have been stated, and it could have been said that he 
would kill again.  I don‟t remember.”  Questioned about a passage in his 
declaration where he suggested the jurors had discussed whether petitioner had 
previously committed murder, Ary replied:  “[M]aybe I did, maybe I didn‟t.  
I don‟t know.”  
By contrast, Juror Lewis testified that Ary (whom she knew as the tall, 
African-American bus driver) told her during the penalty phase deliberations that 
petitioner had committed previous uncharged murders, saying, “ „now you 
remember, he did kill somebody else.‟ ”  She averred the jurors had learned of the 
other crime in court but were instructed by the trial judge not to consider it.  She 
was not sure the crime was a prior murder; it may have involved a shooting or 
merely someone getting injured.  Thus, she understood Ary‟s comment as 
referring to that information and not a new fact injected into the deliberations by 
Ary himself.   
Other persons who served on petitioner‟s jury did not recall the subject of 
uncharged murders coming up during deliberations, or suggested it concerned 
something they had heard in court and were instructed not to consider.   
The referee accepted Ary‟s testimony and found Ary “did not assert that 
[p]etitioner had previously committed uncharged murders.”  Only Juror Lewis 
recalled such comments, and she was uncertain whether Ary had used the word 
“kill,” but in any event she took his comments to refer to a different crime 
mentioned in court.  Other jurors recalled they had discussed whether petitioner 
would kill again in prison, and the referee specifically found “Ms. Lewis has 
confused the two subjects in her memory over time.” 
 
 
24 
Petitioner raises exceptions to the referee‟s conclusions, but once again he 
merely disagrees with the referee‟s resolution of credibility issues.  For example, 
he contends it is “difficult to reconcile” the referee‟s findings with Juror Lewis‟s 
testimony that Ary told her during deliberations that she should remember 
petitioner “ „did kill somebody else.‟ ”  Petitioner also emphasizes Ary‟s 
somewhat testy responses when faced with his earlier inconsistent declaration on 
the subject.  But other jurors did not recall the comment about a prior murder, and 
Ary testified he did not remember making the comment.  Weighing this evidence, 
the referee reasonably found Lewis had confused two different events in her mind, 
i.e., she conflated mention in court of a past crime the trial court had instructed the 
jury not to consider, with deliberations on the subject of whether petitioner would 
kill again if sentenced to life in prison.  Under the circumstances, we reject 
petitioner‟s exceptions and instead defer to the referee‟s resolution of conflicting 
testimony, including his conclusion that Ary did not inject any outside information 
into the jury deliberations.   
5.  Ary’s Encouragement That Other Jurors Watch the Movie 
American Me to Learn About Life in Prison 
Petitioner alleged in his habeas corpus petition that Ary had urged the other 
jurors to rent and watch the movie American Me (Olmos Productions, Universal 
Pictures 1992).  The movie allegedly depicts the violence associated with life in a 
contemporary American prison and focuses especially on Hispanic prison gangs.  
Petitioner alleged Ary had argued to his fellow jurors that death was the 
appropriate penalty because petitioner, who was immature and tended to follow 
strong leaders, would simply join a Black prison gang (such as the Black Guerrilla 
Family) and continue his murderous ways if given a life sentence, a position that 
echoed the prosecutor‟s closing argument.  Petitioner further alleged two jurors 
 
 
25 
who were holding out for a life sentence watched the film and eventually changed 
their vote to impose the death penalty. 
Ary‟s declaration supported petitioner‟s allegations.  He declared:  “I told 
the holdout jurors that if they wanted to understand what it was like in prison, they 
should watch the movie American Me.  That is based on a true story.  [¶] Two of 
the jurors rented the movie and watched it over the weekend.  They finally 
understood that Mr. Boyette could kill again in prison if he was not sentenced to 
death.  After they watched the movie, they changed their votes to death.”   
Respondent conceded the following facts were in dispute:  “which jurors 
actually watched the movie during deliberations, which jurors had already seen the 
movie before the trial commenced, and whether any of them changed their 
decision as a result.”  We thereafter directed the referee to answer these questions:  
“Did Juror Pervies Lee Ary urge other jurors, during jury deliberations, to watch 
the movie American Me in order to learn about the nature of a prisoner‟s life in 
prison?  Did any juror actually watch the movie at any time during petitioner‟s 
trial or jury deliberations?” 
The evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing confirmed many of the 
allegations in the habeas corpus petition and the supporting declarations.  
Although some jurors had no recollection of any discussion about watching a 
movie, Ary himself testified that two female jurors “were so naive about street 
life” they took the position that life in prison was an adequate punishment because 
petitioner “will never hurt anyone as long as he is in the penitentiary for life.  
[¶] I said you just don‟t know anything about prison life.  I said you two go to 
Blockbuster and get the movie „American Me.‟  Sit down and look at it.  It will 
explain penitentiary life to you, and you will see what a person can do while he is 
in the penitentiary.”  Jurors Britton, Mann, Orgain and Perez corroborated this 
evidence, confirming that Ary and other jurors had urged jurors to watch the 
 
 
26 
movie.  Although Ary testified that his advice was directed at two “naive” female 
jurors, Juror McClaren recalled that the advice to watch the movie was directed at 
three or four jurors who were still undecided.  Juror Perez had already seen the 
movie American Me before being chosen as a juror and recalled that other jurors 
had too.8   
Juror McClaren admitted she watched the movie American Me during a 
break in jury deliberations, and Juror Rennie testified she had watched part of the 
movie.   
The referee concluded that “Ary, along with one or more other jurors, did 
urge two holdout jurors to watch the movie American Me in order to learn more 
about the nature of a prisoner‟s life in prison.”  Moreover, “[t]wo jurors— . . . 
McLaren [sic] and . . . Rennie—did watch the movie during the penalty phase 
deliberations.”  Although petitioner has filed exceptions to these findings, he 
essentially accepts the referee‟s conclusions, as they are in his favor.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
Our referee, acting as “an impartial fact finder for this court” (In re Scott 
(2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 818), has determined the facts of the case.  “The referee‟s 
factual findings are not binding on us, and we can depart from them upon 
independent examination of the record even when the evidence is conflicting.  
[Citations.]  However, such findings are entitled to great weight where supported 
by substantial evidence.”  (In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 296.)  As 
explained, we reject petitioner‟s exceptions to the referee‟s report and instead 
accept the referee‟s findings—and accord them great weight—because they are 
                                              
8  
American Me was released in theaters in the United States on March 13, 
1992.  ( (as of 
May 30, 2013).)  Petitioner‟s trial was held in March 1993. 
 
 
27 
supported by substantial evidence, primarily in the form of credibility 
determinations of the witnesses.  (In re Hardy, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 993; 
Hamilton, at p. 296.)  We now turn to the first three of petitioner‟s claims in our 
order to show cause, which in fact comprise a single legal question:  Is petitioner 
entitled to relief due to a juror‟s failure to make certain disclosures on voir dire?9   
A.  Concealment 
We addressed the question of juror concealment at length in In re Hitchings 
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 97:  “We begin with the general proposition that one accused of a 
crime has a constitutional right to a trial by impartial jurors.  (U.S. Const., 6th and 
14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; . . .)  „ “The right to unbiased and 
unprejudiced jurors is an inseparable and inalienable part of the right to trial by 
jury guaranteed by the Constitution.” ‟  [Citation.] 
“The impartiality of prospective jurors is explored at the preliminary 
proceeding known as voir dire.  „Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the 
criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be 
honored.  Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge‟s responsibility to remove 
                                              
9  
The issue in this case concerns Juror Ary‟s failure to disclose information 
during voir dire, not petitioner‟s right to a jury composed of 12 eligible persons.  
Article VII, section 8, subdivision (b) of the California Constitution provides in 
part that “[l]aws shall be made to exclude persons convicted of bribery, perjury, 
forgery, malfeasance in office, or other high crimes from office or serving on 
juries.”  (Italics added.)  The Legislature complied with this directive, enacting 
Code of Civil Procedure section 203, which provides in part:  “(a) All persons are 
eligible and qualified to be prospective trial jurors, except the following:  [¶] . . .  
[¶] (5) Persons who have been convicted of malfeasance in office or a felony, and 
whose civil rights have not been restored.”  (Italics added.)  But “[t]he Sixth 
Amendment does not bar ex-felons from jury service” (Coleman v. Calderon (9th 
Cir. 1998) 150 F.3d 1105, 1117), and state law (i.e., Code. Civ. Proc., § 203) did 
not “create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment” in having a jury composed of nonfelons (Coleman, at p. 1117). 
 
 
28 
prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court‟s 
instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled.  [Citation.]  Similarly, 
lack of adequate voir dire impairs the defendant‟s right to exercise peremptory 
challenges where provided by statute or rule . . . .‟  [Citation.] 
“The ability of a defendant, either personally, through counsel, or by the 
court, to examine the prospective jurors during voir dire is thus significant in 
protecting the defendant‟s right to an impartial jury.  Of course, the efficacy of 
voir dire is dependent on prospective jurors answering truthfully when questioned.  
As the United States Supreme Court has stated, „Voir dire examination serves to 
protect [a criminal defendant‟s right to a fair trial] by exposing possible biases, 
both known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors.  Demonstrated bias in 
the responses to questions on voir dire may result in a juror‟s being excused for 
cause; hints of bias not sufficient to warrant challenge for cause may assist parties 
in exercising their peremptory challenges.  The necessity of truthful answers by 
prospective jurors if this process is to serve its purpose is obvious.‟  [Citation.] 
“A juror who conceals relevant facts or gives false answers during the voir 
dire examination thus undermines the jury selection process and commits 
misconduct.  [Citations.]   
“Without truthful answers on voir dire, the unquestioned right to challenge 
a prospective juror for cause is rendered nugatory.  Just as a trial court‟s improper 
restriction of voir dire can undermine a party‟s ability to determine whether a 
prospective juror falls within one of the statutory categories permitting a challenge 
for cause [citations], a prospective juror‟s false answers on voir dire can also 
prevent the parties from intelligently exercising their statutory right to challenge a 
prospective juror for cause. 
“Such false answers or concealment on voir dire also eviscerate a party‟s 
statutory right to exercise a peremptory challenge and remove a prospective juror 
 
 
29 
the party believes cannot be fair and impartial.  We have recognized that „the 
peremptory challenge is a critical safeguard of the right to a fair trial before an 
impartial jury.‟  [Citation.]  As explained by the Court of Appeal, „[j]uror 
concealment, regardless whether intentional, to questions bearing a substantial 
likelihood of uncovering a strong potential of juror bias, undermines the 
peremptory challenge process just as effectively as improper judicial restrictions 
upon the exercise of voir dire by trial counsel seeking knowledge to intelligently 
exercise peremptory challenges.‟  [Citations.]  „The denial of the right to 
reasonably exercise a peremptory challenge, be it by either the trial court or a 
juror through concealing material facts, is not a mere matter of procedure, but the 
deprivation of an absolute and substantial right historically designed as one of the 
chief safeguards of a defendant against an unlawful conviction.‟ ”  (In re 
Hitchings, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 110-112, fn. omitted.)  We have since cited 
Hitchings with approval.  (In re Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 295; People v. 
Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 417.)   
The jury questionnaire asked Ary to disclose his own criminal history, that 
of relatives and friends, and whether he or a relative had a problem with alcohol or 
drugs.  As is now apparent, he failed to disclose information relevant to all three of 
these topics.  Trial counsel declared that, had he learned of this evidence, he would 
have exercised a peremptory challenge to remove Ary from the jury.  Although 
juror misconduct raises a presumption of prejudice (In re Hamilton, supra, 20 
Cal.4th at p. 295; People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 578), we determine 
whether an individual verdict must be reversed for jury misconduct by applying a 
substantial likelihood test.  That is, the “presumption of prejudice is rebutted, and 
the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record in the particular case, 
including the nature of the misconduct or other event, and the surrounding 
circumstances, indicates there is no reasonable probability of prejudice, i.e., no 
 
 
30 
substantial likelihood that one or more jurors were actually biased against the 
defendant.”  (Hamilton, at p. 296.)  In other words, the test asks not whether the 
juror would have been stricken by one of the parties, but whether the juror‟s 
concealment (or nondisclosure) evidences bias. 
On this record, and considering the totality of the circumstances, we 
conclude Ary was not a biased juror.  As the referee found, some of Ary‟s 
omissions from the questionnaire were based on a dubious interpretation of the 
relevant question, but his interpretation—though erroneous and unreasonable—
was sincerely held.  For other omissions, Ary simply did not recall, for example, a 
distant relative.  We have held that “good faith when answering voir dire questions 
is the most significant indicator that there was no bias” (In re Hamilton, supra, 20 
Cal.4th at p. 300) and “an honest mistake on voir dire cannot disturb a judgment in 
the absence of proof that the juror‟s wrong or incomplete answer hid the juror‟s 
actual bias” (ibid.).  Here, the referee‟s finding that Ary‟s failures to disclose were 
neither intentional nor deliberate supplies sufficient support for the ultimate 
conclusion that Ary was not biased against petitioner.  There being “no substantial 
likelihood” that Ary was “actually biased against” petitioner (id. at p. 296), 
petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground. 
B.  Reliance on Out-of-court Information 
The final two claims both concern the jury‟s alleged use of out-of-court 
information when deliberating the question of the proper penalty to impose.  We 
set forth the applicable law in People v. Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pages 578-
579:  “ „The requirement that a jury‟s verdict “must be based upon the evidence 
developed at the trial” goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in 
the constitutional concept of trial by jury. . . .  [¶] In the constitutional sense, trial 
by jury in a criminal case necessarily implies at the very least that the “evidence 
 
 
31 
developed” against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public 
courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant‟s right of 
confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel.‟  [Citation.]  As the United 
States Supreme Court has explained:  „Due process means a jury capable and 
willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it . . . .‟  [Citations.] 
“We assess the effect of out-of-court information upon the jury in the 
following manner.  When juror misconduct involves the receipt of information 
about a party or the case from extraneous sources, the verdict will be set aside only 
if there appears a substantial likelihood of juror bias.  [Citation.]  Such bias may 
appear in either of two ways:  (1) if the extraneous material, judged objectively, is 
so prejudicial in and of itself that it is inherently and substantially likely to have 
influenced a juror; or (2) even if the information is not „inherently‟ prejudicial, if, 
from the nature of the misconduct and the surrounding circumstances, the court 
determines that it is substantially likely a juror was „actually biased‟ against the 
defendant.  If we find a substantial likelihood that a juror was actually biased, we 
must set aside the verdict, no matter how convinced we might be that an unbiased 
jury would have reached the same verdict, because a biased adjudicator is one of 
the few structural trial defects that compel reversal without application of a 
harmless error standard.” 
The first claim is that Ary committed misconduct by introducing into the 
jury deliberations information that petitioner had previously committed an 
uncharged murder.  Whether Ary in fact did so was disputed, and after holding a 
hearing on the issue, the referee concluded that “Ary did not assert that Petitioner 
had previously committed uncharged murders” (italics added) and the contrary 
evidence from Juror Lewis was the result of her having “confused . . . two subjects 
in her memory over time.”  Under the circumstances, we conclude no substantial 
likelihood of bias exists.  (People v. Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 578-579.) 
 
 
32 
The second claim involved Ary‟s recommendation to the undecided jurors 
that they should watch the movie American Me during a break in the penalty 
phase deliberations to educate themselves about the realities of life in prison.  The 
habeas corpus petition frames the issue as one of juror misconduct by Ary that was 
indicative of his bias.10  After considering whether Ary‟s encouraging other jurors 
to watch a movie—standing alone—could be considered prejudicial misconduct 
had no juror complied with his suggestion, and considering the facts, as alleged, 
that Juror Rennie and possibly one other juror in fact watched the movie, our order 
to show cause focused not on Ary‟s actions but on the jurors who watched the 
movie.  Thus, our order stated in pertinent part:  “The Director of Corrections is 
ordered to show cause before this court . . . why the relief prayed for should not be 
granted on the grounds that:  . . . Juror  . . . Rennie and one other juror, at the 
urging of Juror Ary, during the pendency of the jury deliberations, rented and 
watched a videotape of the movie American Me in order to gather background 
information for the trial.”  Our order to the referee was similarly focused. 
As noted, the facts adduced at the evidentiary hearing generally supported 
petitioner‟s allegations:  the referee found that “Ary, along with one or more other 
jurors,” urged other jurors to watch American Me, and that Jurors McClaren and 
Rennie in fact watched the movie during the penalty phase deliberations.  In doing 
so, these two jurors committed misconduct.   
The trial court instructed the jury at the penalty phase with CALJIC No. 
1.03, as follows:  “You must decide all questions of fact in this case from the 
                                              
10  
At least one other juror probably encouraged other jurors to watch the 
movie as well.  Juror Perez testified at the evidentiary hearing that she had seen 
the movie American Me before being chosen as a juror in petitioner‟s trial, and 
that “knowing my personality, I believe I may have” encouraged other jurors to 
watch it. 
 
 
33 
evidence received in this trial and not from any other source.  You must not make 
any independent investigation of the facts or the law or consider or discuss facts as 
to which there is no evidence.  [¶] This means for example, that you must not on 
your own visit the scene, conduct experiments, or consult reference works or 
persons for additional information.”  (Italics added.)  Although merely to have 
watched a television show or movie that involved a topic or theme relevant to the 
subject of a trial is not necessarily misconduct for a sitting juror (People v. Melton 
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 749 [jurors in a capital case may have watched a television 
broadcast of The Executioner‟s Song]; Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1984) 
37 Cal.3d 540, 556 [jurors in a wrongful death trial involving a light airplane crash 
watched a 60 Minutes television broadcast criticizing the safety record of such 
aircraft]), to “deliberately set out to discover information regarding the issues at 
the trial” (Elsworth, at p. 557) is a different matter.  That a juror would watch a 
movie referred to by other jurors so as to know “what they were talking about” 
may be natural, but it is clear misconduct in disregard of the court‟s instructions 
not to consider any evidence outside that presented in court.  As such, it raises a 
presumption of prejudice “[which] the prosecution must rebut . . . by 
demonstrating „there is no substantial likelihood that any juror was improperly 
influenced to the defendant‟s detriment.‟ ”  (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 
347, 397.)   
In light of the referee‟s factual findings, respondent concedes the jurors 
who watched the movie committed misconduct, but argues no prejudice resulted.  
Did watching American Me and considering the information about prison life 
contained in the movie establish “a substantial likelihood of juror bias”?  (People 
v. Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 578.)  As we explain, we conclude in the 
negative.   
 
 
34 
At the outset, we find the information Jurors Rennie and McClaren may 
have acquired from outside the record (i.e., the contents of the movie American 
Me) is not the sort of evidence falling within Nesler‟s first category, i.e., evidence 
that, “judged objectively, is so prejudicial in and of itself that it is inherently and 
substantially likely to have influenced a juror.”  (People v. Nesler, supra, 16 
Cal.4th at pp. 578-579, italics added.)  The information, for example, was not of a 
suppressed confession or evidence of other crimes that the trial court had excluded 
as too prejudicial.  (See, e.g., People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1110 
[“The content of the article was extremely prejudicial; it revealed information 
about defendant‟s prior criminal conduct that the court had ruled inadmissible 
because of its potential for prejudice.”]; People v. Andrews (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 
358 [presumption of prejudice was not rebutted where the jury was inadvertently 
informed that a codefendant had pleaded guilty to charges stemming from the 
same crime].)  It was not akin to a bell that could not be unrung.   
Here, the movie Jurors McClaren and Rennie watched was one that two 
other jurors (Ary, Perez), and possibly more, had already seen within the last year.  
The most that can be said, therefore, is that McClaren and Rennie may have 
learned some general information about prison life that some of the other jurors 
already knew—and referenced during deliberations—from having seen the movie 
themselves before the trial.  (See People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 162 
[“ „[j]urors cannot be expected to shed their backgrounds and experiences at the 
door of the deliberation room.‟ ”].)  Indeed, had those other jurors simply told 
Jurors McClaren and Rennie what they had learned from American Me and not 
suggested the two watch the movie, no issue of misconduct or prejudice would 
have arisen.  The movie, and the information contained therein, was thus not 
inherently prejudicial within the meaning of Nesler‟s first category.  (People v. 
Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 578-579.)   
 
 
35 
Turning to Nesler‟s second category, reversal would be required if the 
record shows that “from the nature of the misconduct and the surrounding 
circumstances, . . . it is substantially likely a juror was „actually biased‟ against” 
petitioner.  (People v. Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 579.)  In other words, did the 
jurors here improperly acquire information that, under the circumstances of this 
particular case, rendered them biased against petitioner?  As we explain, a 
consideration of the testimony of jurors at the reference hearing and reasonable 
inferences therefrom persuade us that no substantial likelihood of bias arose and 
that any presumption of prejudice is rebutted by the record.   
The movie the jurors watched, American Me, had been the subject of 
discussion during penalty phase deliberations in connection with the point asserted 
by jurors favoring the death penalty that an incarcerated prisoner could still 
commit crimes.  Although some of the jurors, including Ary, had seen the film 
before trial, some of the undecided jurors had not; Ary urged them to do so, 
maintaining it would illustrate the point that an incarcerated defendant could still 
commit crimes.  Two of the undecided jurors, McClaren and Rennie, each rented 
the movie; McClaren watched the entire film, Rennie watched only part of it.  The 
following morning the jurors resumed deliberations.  Within 30 minutes, the jury 
foreperson informed the trial court the jury had reached a verdict. 
Evidence of a juror‟s mental process—how the juror reached a particular 
verdict, the effect of evidence or argument on the juror‟s decisionmaking—is 
inadmissible.  (Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a).)  Hence, in determining whether 
there is a substantial likelihood the jurors‟ misconduct caused them to become 
biased against petitioner, we look to what the jurors said about their viewing of the 
film, and what discussion of the film, if any, took place when the jury resumed 
deliberations the following morning.   
 
 
36 
Ary testified that upon resuming their deliberations “something” was said 
about the movie, but the jurors did not specifically discuss it, suggesting the movie 
was not a significant, if any, part of the deliberations.  Juror Salcedo corroborated 
this version of events, testifying that upon resumption of deliberations after the 
weekend, she “wasn‟t aware of anyone that watched the movie,” suggesting there 
was no discussion about it.   
Juror McClaren, who admitted to having watched the movie, explained that 
she was not in a “camp” holding out for a life sentence, but simply “needed more 
information.  I needed more time to make a decision.”  When asked about her 
recollection of American Me, she did not say that it opened her eyes about life in 
prison, that she had learned about prison gangs or the Black Guerilla Family or 
violence in prison, or that it showed how life prisoners could kill within the prison 
walls.  Instead, she replied simply “that it‟s a prison movie, and it talked about 
how they contact the people on the outside and could—I don‟t know.  I don‟t 
recall a lot of that now either.”  Although the referee directed McClaren to 
describe the movie in six words or less, her limited response does not appear to 
have been a result of that directive; rather, she stated that “I don‟t recall a lot” 
about the movie.  Her testimony suggests the movie did not make a strong 
impression on her, as one would expect had it motivated her vote.11 
Similarly, Juror Rennie testified that she watched part of American Me, 
“[m]aybe 45 minutes.”  Describing her recollection of the movie, she said “it was 
                                              
11  
Although the concurring and dissenting opinion suggests that Juror 
McClaren‟s failure to recall details of the movie “proves little” because the 
hearing was held 17 years after the penalty phase deliberations (conc. & dis. opn., 
post, at p. 7), the juror‟s recall seemed no sharper when she mentioned the incident 
in her 1999 declaration, just six years after the trial.  Juror Rennie executed her 
declaration in 2000 and likewise provided only the barest of details when asked to 
recall the movie. 
 
 
37 
rather repetitious.  I kind of just wanted to get an idea on what people had been 
talking about.”  Upon resuming deliberations the next day, she “eventually” voted 
for death, although she suggested her change of heart did not happen right away, 
noting that she changed her vote “at some point.”  Rennie recalled that “several 
people voiced concern” that petitioner might kill again if given a life sentence, but 
she did not remember any discussion about the movie when deliberations resumed, 
saying that “no one asked anyone if they watched the movie or not, or—and we 
didn‟t bring up the subject, and it was just, you know, then continuing on.”  Like 
McClaren‟s testimony, Rennie‟s testimony suggests the movie‟s content or 
message was of little importance to her. 
Juror Lewis, who denied watching the movie, had initially been in favor of 
a life sentence but eventually changed her vote.  She testified that the life-leaning 
(or undecided) jurors did not change their minds and vote for death all at once, but 
did so “[o]ne by one,” thus suggesting the persuasive effect of watching American 
Me was minimal.  
That Jurors McClaren and Rennie watched some or all of the movie during 
deliberations suggests they were thinking about the issue they faced and the 
arguments their fellow jurors had made, but does not in these circumstances 
establish a causal relationship between the movie and the verdict.  Rather, from 
the foregoing testimony we can infer the movie had no significant impact on either 
juror.  Had it been significant, we could reasonably presume one or both, having 
been urged to watch it or having been persuaded by it, would have mentioned that 
fact to the others who had seen the film when they cast their vote for the death 
penalty.  Neither did.  And their testimony at the reference hearing confirmed the 
film did not have a transformative effect on their decision.  Juror Lewis, who had 
also been undecided about the appropriate penalty but did not watch the film, 
similarly reached a conclusion favoring death upon resumed deliberations the next 
 
 
38 
morning.  The evidence, therefore, simply illustrates the unremarkable fact that 
reflection on the facts of the case and the arguments of fellow jurors, together with 
the passage of time, will prompt a decision. 
The film, significantly, imparted to Jurors McClaren and Rennie no new 
information about prison life not already possessed by the other jurors who had 
previously seen the film, information those jurors had already conveyed to 
McClaren and Rennie during deliberations.  In short, McClaren and Rennie 
learned nothing in viewing the film they had not already been told; they merely 
acquired information the other jurors already had.  That they sought out the film 
does not transform evidence of negligible impact into evidence showing 
substantial bias. 
The sequence of events is the one circumstance suggesting a substantial 
likelihood of bias, but in the circumstances here it is not determinative.  According 
to testimony at the evidentiary hearing, during the first full day of deliberations 
nine jurors concluded death was the appropriate penalty, while at least three jurors 
(McClaren, Rennie and Lewis) did not decide in favor of death until the next 
morning.12  The two jurors (McClaren and Rennie) who watched the movie 
proclaimed they had been merely undecided rather than “life-leaning.”  According 
to Juror McClaren, she “wasn‟t not in the camp” voting for the death penalty 
(italics added); she simply had not yet made up her mind.  Juror Rennie testified 
that there was some division about the appropriate penalty and she remembered 
saying that “it‟s harder for me . . . to come to a conclusion about a sentence,” but 
she did not identify herself as favoring a life sentence.  Juror Lewis, who did not 
                                              
12  
Ary testified at the evidentiary hearing that the vote on the first day of 
deliberations was 10 to two in favor of the death penalty, but in fact three jurors 
testified they had been undecided until the next day. 
 
 
39 
view the movie, testified that she had been voting against the death penalty but 
changed her vote at the end.  These facts suggest the case was not a difficult one in 
which to conclude the death penalty was appropriate, and that Jurors McClaren 
and Rennie (as well as Lewis) were simply undecided for a little longer than their 
fellow jurors.  Although one might speculate from the bare sequence of events that 
watching the movie convinced McClaren and Rennie to vote for the death penalty, 
their testimony suggests otherwise.  That Juror Lewis, who initially leaned toward 
a life sentence and did not watch the movie, also changed her position within a 
half-hour of resumed deliberations highlights the speculative nature of inferring 
bias solely from the timeline of events.   
We are similarly unpersuaded by petitioner‟s further contention that the 
movie‟s content or message was particularly prejudicial because it dovetailed with 
the prosecution‟s argument regarding petitioner‟s potential future dangerousness, 
i.e., that petitioner would kill again in prison if given a life term.  Some 
background is necessary to understand this claim:  In presenting his case in 
mitigation at the penalty phase, petitioner called an expert witness who testified 
that petitioner suffered from a dependent personality disorder and that he was 
easily led by persons with stronger, more assertive personalities.  This evidence 
suggested petitioner‟s crimes—killing Carter and Devallier—were less morally 
culpable because petitioner was under the sway of Johnson, a drug dealer.  When 
making her closing argument at the penalty phase, the prosecutor attempted to 
blunt this evidence by suggesting that petitioner, if sentenced to a life term, might 
simply fall under the influence of another strong personality, join a gang in prison, 
resume his role as an enforcer, and kill again.  The prosecutor‟s argument 
specifically referenced the Black Guerilla Family prison gang.  Petitioner contends 
the message of the film American Me lent support to the prosecutor‟s argument 
because “[o]ne of the central points of the film maker in American Me is that a 
 
 
40 
weak, easily led person who goes into prison will, whether he wants to or not, be 
forced to become part of a gang and do the gang[‟s] bidding which includes 
murder.  Moreover, the film depicts itself as being „a true story‟ and includes as 
one of the two primary prison gangs depicted, the Black Guerilla Family—the 
same prison gang named by the prosecutor.”  
Although the movie may have been consistent with the prosecutor‟s 
argument that someone like petitioner could continue his violent life of crime in 
prison, the record shows the movie did not introduce any new facts or ideas into 
the jury room.  A number of jurors had seen the movie before the trial and had 
argued at length during deliberations that petitioner would join a gang in prison 
and continue to commit crimes.  That the information contained in the movie was 
already before the jury diminishes the potential prejudicial impact of the 
misconduct despite its consistency with the prosecutor‟s closing argument. 
The “nature of the misconduct and the surrounding circumstances” (People 
v. Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 579) thus fails to suggest the movie was an 
important factor in convincing Jurors McClaren and Rennie to change their minds 
and vote to impose the death penalty.  On this record, we conclude petitioner has 
not demonstrated a “substantial likelihood that one or more jurors were actually 
biased” against petitioner.  (In re Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 296.)  This 
“standard is a pragmatic one, mindful of the „day-to-day realities of courtroom 
life‟ [citation] and of society‟s strong competing interest in the stability of criminal 
verdicts [citations].  It is „virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact 
or influence that might theoretically affect their vote.‟  [Citation.]  Moreover, the 
jury is a „fundamentally human‟ institution; the unavoidable fact that jurors bring 
diverse backgrounds, philosophies, and personalities into the jury room is both the 
strength and the weakness of the institution.  [Citation.]  „[T]he criminal justice 
system must not be rendered impotent in quest of an ever-elusive perfection. . . .  
 
 
41 
[Jurors] are imbued with human frailties as well as virtues.  If the system is to 
function at all, we must tolerate a certain amount of imperfection short of actual 
bias.‟ ”  (Ibid.) 
Finally, we reject petitioner‟s contention that the cumulative impact of 
Ary‟s multiple failures to disclose information on voir dire, coupled with Jurors 
McClaren and Rennie having watched the movie American Me, violated his right 
under the state and federal Constitutions to a trial by impartial jurors.  Having 
concluded Ary‟s omissions did not demonstrate bias, and having found the record 
rebuts the presumption of prejudice that arose from McClaren‟s and Rennie‟s 
misconduct, the cumulative impact of these events does not convince us 
petitioner‟s jury lacked impartiality. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Because our order to show cause and reference order were limited to the 
jury misconduct claims, we do not here address any other claim set forth in the 
petition for writ of habeas corpus, which will be resolved by a separately filed 
order. 
The order to show cause is discharged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
The movie American Me1 stars Edward James Olmos as a young man who 
is incarcerated and joins a prison gang, which he leads in a violent struggle over 
drug turf.  It is a raw, violent depiction of the American prison system, with 
multiple scenes of stabbing and sexual assault.   
It is this movie that two undecided jurors watched during a break in 
deliberations, at the urging of the jury foreman and other jurors voting for the 
death penalty.  There is no dispute that these two jurors committed misconduct by 
actively seeking out information not presented at trial.  There is no dispute that the 
jury did not reach a verdict after a full day of deliberations.  The next day, after 
these two jurors watched the film, the jury deliberated for only 30 minutes before 
returning a death verdict.  In light of this chronology, I disagree with the 
majority‟s conclusion that the presumption of prejudice arising from the jurors‟ 
misconduct has been rebutted.  The record as a whole demonstrates a substantial 
likelihood these two jurors were actually biased in that they were influenced to 
impose the death penalty based on external information they intentionally acquired 
in violation of their oath.   
                                              
1  
Olmos Productions, Universal Pictures 1992.   
 
2 
The misconduct must be considered in context.  The prosecutor argued 
against life without the possibility of parole because defendant could join a prison 
gang and kill again while incarcerated.  In urging undecided Jurors McClaren and 
Rennie to watch American Me, Foreman Ary took up the prosecutor‟s theme.  He 
explained at the evidentiary hearing:  “The two jurors, which [were] the two young 
ladies, they were so naive about street life until they were so determined that he 
couldn‟t harm no one while he was in prison for the rest of his life, and we 
discussed this, we deliberated and discussed it . . . .  We have to do something 
about this because it‟s been deliberated too long, so I asked these two young 
ladies, . . . but these two said he will never hurt anyone as long as he is in the 
penitentiary for life.  [¶] I said you just don‟t know anything about prison life.  I 
said you two go to Blockbuster and get the movie „American Me.‟  Sit down and 
look at it.  It will explain penitentiary life to you, and you will see what a person 
can do while he is in the penitentiary.”  Ary told them the movie was based on a 
true story.   
“When juror misconduct involves the receipt of information about a party 
or the case from extraneous sources, the verdict will be set aside only if there 
appears a substantial likelihood of juror bias.  [Citation.]  Such bias may appear in 
either of two ways:  (1) if the extraneous material, judged objectively, is so 
prejudicial in and of itself that it is inherently and substantially likely to have 
influenced a juror; or (2) even if the information is not „inherently‟ prejudicial, if, 
from the nature of the misconduct and the surrounding circumstances, the court 
determines that it is substantially likely a juror was „actually biased‟ against the 
defendant.  If we find a substantial likelihood that a juror was actually biased, we 
must set aside the verdict, no matter how convinced we might be that an unbiased 
jury would have reached the same verdict, because a biased adjudicator is one of 
the few structural trial defects that compel reversal without application of a 
 
3 
harmless error standard.”  (People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 578-579 
(Nesler); In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 653.)   
“Actual bias” in this context does not mean that a juror must dislike the 
defendant or harbor a desire to treat him unfairly.  Rather, “[t]he Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury and the due process right to a fundamentally 
fair trial guarantee to criminal defendants a trial in which jurors set aside 
preconceptions, disregard extrajudicial influences, and decide guilt or innocence 
„based on the evidence presented in court.‟  [Citations.]”  (Skilling v. United States 
(2010) 561 U.S. __ [130 S.Ct. 2896, 2948]; see Irvin v. Dowd (1961) 366 U.S. 
717, 723; People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1414.)  “An impartial juror is 
someone „capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence‟ presented 
at trial,” and “[t]he term „actual bias‟ may include a state of mind resulting from a 
juror‟s actually being influenced by extraneous information about a party.”  
(Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 581.)  “Juror misconduct involving the receipt of 
extraneous information about a party or the case that was not part of the evidence 
received at trial creates a presumption that the defendant was prejudiced by the 
evidence and may establish juror bias.”  (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 
519.)   
As the majority acknowledges, Jurors McClaren and Rennie committed 
“clear misconduct” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 33) that raised a presumption of 
prejudice.  Even assuming the movie did not fall within the category of inherently 
prejudicial material, the present record fails to rebut the presumption of bias.  
Indeed, the record shows a substantial likelihood that these two jurors were 
actually biased against defendant in that they relied on the extraneous material to 
his detriment.   
The timeline of deliberations provides strong evidence of the movie‟s 
influence on these two jurors.  The jury began penalty phase deliberations on 
 
4 
Tuesday, March 23, 19932 at 2:51 p.m. and adjourned nine minutes later at 3:00 
p.m.  The jury deliberated all day on Wednesday.  They resumed deliberations on 
Thursday at 9:40 a.m. and returned with a death verdict at 10:10 a.m., 30 minutes 
later.   
After a full day of deliberations, McClaren and Rennie remained 
undecided.  That evening, both jurors independently obtained the movie and 
watched at least part of it.  The next day, with little or no discussion of the film, 
the jury rendered a death verdict within 30 minutes.  Given the brevity of 
deliberations on Thursday, the most reasonable inference is that the movie 
influenced McClaren and Rennie to vote for death.  Indeed, McClaren testified 
that she was not a “holdout” juror but “simply needed more information” before 
rendering a verdict.  The only “information” she obtained between deliberations 
on Wednesday and Thursday was the movie.  “The foregoing evidence 
demonstrates that [their] misconduct was substantially related to important matters 
raised during trial.”  (Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 585.)   
Eight of the nine penalty phase jurors who testified at the evidentiary 
hearing confirmed that the jury discussed the movie during deliberations.  
Foreman Ary encouraged these “naive” jurors to watch the film because 
deliberations had gone on “too long.”  Juror Britton confirmed this account.  Juror 
Perez likewise remembered that two undecided jurors had been encouraged to 
watch the movie.  McClaren herself admitted she was encouraged to watch the 
movie to see “what life would be like in prison.”  Based upon the timeline of 
deliberations, there is little doubt that these events occurred on the only full day of 
deliberations, Wednesday, March 24.  The majority does not suggest otherwise.  
                                              
2  
Subsequent date references will be to the year 1993.   
 
5 
McClaren testified that she voted for death after seeing the movie.  Britton and 
Perez confirmed that the vote had been 10 to two in favor of the death penalty 
before McClaren and Rennie saw the film and the vote was unanimous for death 
thereafter.  Ary testified the two jurors voted for death “right after they saw the 
movie.”  Rennie testified there was no further discussion of the movie after she 
had viewed it.   
It should be remembered that American Me was hardly an evenhanded 
documentary about prison life.  Its central theme was that prison is a breeding 
ground for criminal activity.  The pro-death jurors here urged watching the film 
precisely because it made their point, that convicts can continue to kill and commit 
other crimes while incarcerated.  If McClaren and Rennie accepted the film as 
accurate, their viewing could only have been detrimental to the defense case.   
The majority suggests that the timeline did not “establish a causal 
relationship between the movie and the verdict.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 37.)  
Noting that Juror Lewis, who did not watch the movie, had also been undecided 
but eventually voted for death, the majority asserts that “[t]he evidence, therefore, 
simply illustrates the unremarkable fact that reflection on the facts of the case and 
the arguments of fellow jurors, together with the passage of time, will prompt a 
decision.”  (Ibid.)  That fact is unremarkable, but we cannot say that is what 
happened for McClaren and Rennie.  The assertion also fails to take into account 
the relevant standard.  McClaren and Rennie‟s conduct raises a presumption of 
prejudice.  “The rationale for the presumption is venerable.  „A juror is not 
allowed to say:  “I acknowledge to grave misconduct.  I received evidence without 
the presence of the court, but those matters had no influence upon my mind when 
casting my vote in the jury-room.”  The law, in its wisdom, does not allow a juror 
to purge himself in that way.‟  [Citations.]  When a person violates his oath as a 
juror, doubt is cast on that person‟s ability to otherwise perform his duties.  
 
6 
[Citation.]  The presumption of prejudice is appropriate in those situations.”  
(People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 835-836.)   
This court cannot do for a juror what she cannot do for herself:  simply 
disavow the misconduct.  In “reflect[ing] on the facts of the case and the 
arguments of fellow jurors” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 38), there is no dispute that 
McClaren and Rennie watched a movie about prison gangs.  The primary theme of 
the film is that prison is a breeding ground for criminal activity.  After remaining 
undecided for a full day of deliberations, these two jurors returned the following 
day and voted for death within 30 minutes.  That Juror Lewis, a juror who did not 
commit misconduct, also voted for death after initial indecision is beside the point.  
Might McClaren and Rennie have rendered the same verdict had they not seen the 
movie?  Did these jurors actually rely solely upon evidence admitted at trial?  We 
can but speculate.  Yet speculation cannot rebut the presumption of prejudice that 
their misconduct raised.   
The majority also suggests that the movie might not have affected the two 
undecided jurors because it introduced “no new information about prison life not 
already possessed by the other jurors who had previously seen the film, 
information those jurors had already conveyed to McClaren and Rennie during 
deliberations.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 38.)  Far from rebutting the presumption of 
prejudice, these facts support it.  The accounts of Foreman Ary and Juror Britton 
confirm that, even though the film‟s concepts were discussed at length, Jurors 
McClaren and Rennie remained unpersuaded.  Mere verbal descriptions of the 
movie and the prosecutor‟s argument failed to persuade these jurors to vote for 
death.  This explains why Ary, in order to break the deadlock, suggested the 
undecided jurors watch the movie, and why he emphasized it was based upon a 
true story.  The film would graphically illustrate the point the pro-death jurors had 
failed to convey through mere words.   
 
7 
Moreover, the active nature of the jurors‟ misconduct provides insight into 
the film‟s potential influence on them.  Jurors McClaren and Rennie each went to 
Blockbuster, rented the film, and watched it.  That they devoted such time to 
acquiring this extraneous information reflects that they believed it was important 
to consider in deciding upon a penalty.  The jury‟s speedy verdict after the film 
was viewed bolsters the conclusion that the film likely influenced the outcome.   
The majority reasons the movie could not have had much impact on Jurors 
McClaren and Rennie because they did not recall the movie in detail at the 
evidentiary hearing.  With respect to McClaren, the majority states:  “When asked 
about her recollection of American Me, she did not say that it opened her eyes 
about life in prison, that she had learned about prison gangs or the Black Guerilla 
Family or violence in prison, or that it showed how life prisoners could kill within 
the prison walls.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 36.)  Of course, McClaren would have 
been barred from providing much of this testimony by Evidence Code section 
1150, subdivision (a), which prevents jurors from testifying about what influenced 
them “to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes 
by which it was determined.”  Thus, McClaren and Rennie could not have testified 
about the effect the movie had upon them.  Indeed, the magistrate below sustained 
several objections on this ground when other jurors tried to testify regarding the 
movie‟s effects.   
With respect to McClaren‟s alleged failure of recall, the evidentiary hearing 
was held in 2010, 17 years after deliberations.  That McClaren could not recall, at 
this great remove, all the film‟s details proves little.3  Indeed, McClaren could not 
                                              
3  
The majority suggests that McClaren and Rennie‟s recall of the film was 
“no sharper” in their written declarations, executed in 1999 and 2000, respectively.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 36, fn. 11.)  However, McClaren simply declared that “[t]he 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
8 
even give a general physical description of Foreman Ary, nor could she recall the 
duration of deliberations.  The following facts are to the point.  McClaren recalled 
she was urged to see the movie to learn more about “what life would be like in 
prison,” and she voted for death the day after watching it.  At least two other jurors 
confirmed this timeline.  With respect to Rennie, the majority makes much of the 
circumstance that she did not watch the entire movie, testifying at the evidentiary 
hearing that she thought the movie was “rather repetitious”4 and she watched the 
movie because she wanted “to get an idea on what people had been talking 
about . . . being in prison.”  Far from suggesting that the movie had little impact, 
Rennie said she stopped watching the movie because she “had seen enough.”  She 
understood the point of the movie, and “what people had been talking about” when 
they argued that inmates can continue to commit violent crimes in prison.  The 
fact that the next day, within half an hour, Rennie voted for death bolsters the 
conclusion that there was a substantial likelihood the movie removed any 
remaining reservations.   
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
movie American Me was also mentioned during penalty deliberations” and did not 
purport to describe the movie.  Rennie declared that she was “not initially in favor 
of voting for the death penalty.”  Ary, whom she remembered as “the bus driver,” 
suggested that she watch American Me and that “it would be an education for 
[her] about what prisons were really like.”  She further declared:  “I rented the 
movie one night during the deliberations.  American Me is about gangs in 
California prisons and it was based on a true story.”  Far from suggesting a failure 
of recall, Rennie remembered the essential facts:  She did not initially vote for 
death, she watched American Me at Ary‟s urging to “educat[e]” herself “about 
what prisons were really like,” and the film was about prison gangs and was based 
upon a true story.  There was no reason in the context of this declaration to give a 
more detailed account of the film.   
4  
Our own viewing confirms this description.   
 
9 
The majority also suggests the movie did not affect deliberations because 
there was no discussion of it after McClaren and Rennie watched it.  Again, the 
majority fails to persuasively explain how this circumstance rebuts the 
presumption of prejudice.  If McClaren and Rennie watched the movie and 
accepted its premise, there would be no need for extensive discussion with 10 
other jurors who already agreed.  Indeed, the record confirms there was little 
discussion about any topic on the day of the verdict given the 30-minute time 
frame.  Although the majority suggests that neither McClaren nor Rennie 
mentioned they had seen the movie once deliberations resumed (maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 37), this suggestion is at odds with Ary‟s testimony that one or both of them 
mentioned the film.  The magistrate sustained a hearsay objection to any further 
elaboration on the point.  In any event, Ary was well-aware that McClaren and 
Rennie had seen the movie, suggesting the topic was at least mentioned.  The 
brevity of subsequent deliberations strongly suggests the movie played a part in 
the two jurors‟ decisionmaking.   
Finally, the majority relies upon the testimony of Jurors Lewis and Rennie 
suggesting the undecided jurors did not change their votes in unison.  When asked 
whether the undecided jurors changed their minds “one by one, or all together,” 
Lewis replied, “One by one.”  Rennie initially claimed that, after watching the 
movie, she did not vote for death “the next day” but she “eventually did.”  She 
later conceded she did not remember whether more than a day had passed between 
her seeing the movie and voting for death.  Their testimony hardly calls into 
question the film‟s likely impact.  The question is not whether McClaren and 
Rennie changed their minds at the same time, but whether there was a substantial 
likelihood that they did so because they were improperly influenced.   
In sum, Jurors McClaren and Rennie committed misconduct.  At the urging 
of other jurors, they watched a movie about prison gangs, for the express purpose 
 
10 
of acquiring information to use in reaching a penalty verdict.  This misconduct 
raises a presumption of prejudice against defendant.  The totality of the 
circumstances “evidence[s] a state of mind that rendered [McClaren and Rennie] 
unable to perform [their] duty not to prejudge the case and to render a decision 
based solely upon the evidence presented to the jury.”  (Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th 
at p. 589.)  Far from rebutting the presumption, the record reveals a substantial 
likelihood that they were actually biased.  Because this bias affected only the 
penalty phase, I would reverse the death verdict and remand for a new penalty 
phase trial.   
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
I CONCUR: 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Boyette 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S092356 
Date Filed: May 30, 2013 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Lynne S. Coffin, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Lynne S. Coffin, State Public Defender, 
Audrey Chavez and Gail Johnson, Deputy State Public Defenders, for Petitioner Maurice Boyette. 
 
Bill Lockyer, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and 
Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Ronald A. Bass and Gerald A. Engler, Assistant 
Attorneys General, Ronald S. Matthias, Glenn R. Pruden and Christina Vom Saal, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Respondent State of California. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Lynne Coffin 
Coffin Law Group 
548 Market Street, Suite 95752 
San Francisco, CA  94104 
(415) 218-8106 
 
Christina Vom Saal 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-3664 
(415) 703-5979