Case Title: Appelt v. Appelt

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-02-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Appelt v. Appelt1989 WY 46768 P.2d 596Case Number: 88-129Decided: 02/17/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
RALPH 
LEONARD APPELT, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 
SALLY SUE 
APPELT, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofWashakieCounty, Gary P. Hartman, 
J.

 
 
John W. 
Davis, Davis, Donnell, Worrall & Bancroft, P.C., Worland, for appellant.

 
 
H. Richard 
Hopkinson, Gorrell & Hopkinson, Worland, for appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

 
 

I[¶1.]    n this appeal, we address the 
question of whether a trial court can enter a divorce decree that encompasses a 
property settlement contrary to the agreement of the parties without a hearing 
duly noticed. We conclude that the decree is void insofar as it changed the 
agreement of the parties. Consequently, we reverse the order of the district 
court even though it declined to find the appellant in contempt of court because 
the same order required him to pay the disputed property 
settlement.

 
 

[¶2.]     In the husband's brief 
as appellant, the following issues are stated:

 
 
"1. WHETHER 
OR NOT THE INSERTION IN THE DECREE OF A PROVISION REQUIRING A PAYMENT OF 
$4,500.00, WHEN SUCH PROVISION WAS NOT IN THE STIPULATION ENTERED INTO BY THE 
PARTIES, REPRESENTS A VIOLATION OF THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW.

 
 
"2. WHETHER 
OR NOT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE STIPULATION OF JULY 31, 
1986 CONTAINED A `SCRIVENER'S ERROR' WHICH WAS CORRECTED IN THE DECREE OF 
DIVORCE DATED AUGUST 25, 1986.

 
 
"3. WHETHER 
OR NOT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
COULD TESTIFY ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT, AND COULD ALSO CONTINUE TO REPRESENT 
DEFENDANT.

 
 
"4. WHETHER 
OR NOT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT OFFERED INTO EVIDENCE, ON ITS OWN 
MOTION, AND ACCEPTED A LETTER OSTENSIBLY FROM JULIA 
BRADSBY."

 
 
The wife, 
as appellee, states the issues in this way:

 
 
"1. WHETHER 
OR NOT THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT HAS TIMELY FILED AN APPEAL WHEN HE FAILS TO 
CHALLENGE VALIDITY OF PROVISIONS OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE UNTIL HIS THIRD 
APPEARANCE IN COURT CONSIDERING THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
DECREE.

 
 
"2. WHETHER 
OR NOT THE INSERTION IN THE DECREE OF A PROVISION REQUIRING PAYMENT OF $4,500.00 
WHEN SUCH PROVISION WAS AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES BUT WAS INADVERTENTLY LEFT OUT 
OF THE STIPULATION ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES, AND SUCH ENTRY INTO THE DECREE 
WAS AGREED TO BY COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT REPRESENTS A VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

 
 
"3. WHETHER 
OR NOT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE STIPULATION OF JULY 31, 
1986 CONTAINED A `SCRIVENER'S ERROR,' WHICH WAS CORRECTED IN THE DECREE OF 
DIVORCE DATED AUGUST 25, 1986.

 
 
"4. WHETHER 
OR NOT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL COULD 
TESTIFY WHEN CALLED BY THE PLAINTIFF AND COULD CONTINUE TO REPRESENT DEFENDANT 
WHEN THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT 
TESTIFYING.

 
 
"5. WHETHER 
OR NOT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT OFFERED INTO EVIDENCE, ON ITS OWN 
MOTION, AND ACCEPTED A LETTER FROM JULIA BRADSBY.

 
 
"6. WHETHER 
OR NOT THERE IS REASONABLE CAUSE FOR PLAINTIFF'S APPEALAS 
REQUIRED BY W.R.A.P. 10.05."

 
 

[¶3.]     In its inception, this 
was a simple divorce case. The parties are of modest means and, in the course of 
the proceeding, they agreed to divide their property and memorialized that 
agreement in a document entitled Stipulation and Agreement. The executed 
Stipulation and Agreement made no mention of a $9,000 lump sum retirement 
benefit attributable to a prior employment of the husband. It is clear from 
evidence presented at the hearing on the order to show cause that the parties 
had reached an agreement to divide the $9,000 fund equally, but it was 
inadvertently omitted from the Stipulation and Agreement. Initially, the 
parties' attorneys proposed that an addendum to the Stipulation and Agreement 
should be prepared. When that was done, the husband refused to sign or agree to 
the addendum. At that juncture, this matter could have been resolved easily and 
directly.

 
 

[¶4.]     What occurred, however, 
is that the wife's attorney then drafted the final decree of divorce which 
included, in paragraph 15, a provision that the husband should pay to the wife 
$4,500. The wife's attorney did not seek approval of the form of decree by the 
husband's attorney, but simply presented the decree to the district judge for 
signature. The decree was signed in this form and entered by the district court 
on August 25, 1986.

 
 

[¶5.]     The matter was not 
pursued further until the wife, on March 31, 1988, caused the district court to 
issue an Order to Show Cause to the husband, directing him to appear and show 
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for failure to pay the sum 
of $4,500 to the wife as required by the decree. The district court conducted a 
hearing and received testimony from the husband, the wife, and the wife's 
attorney. The husband defended, contending that the requirement to pay $4,500 
was not a part of the Stipulation and Agreement by which the parties had settled 
their property rights and, for that reason, it should not have been incorporated 
in the divorce decree. The district court then found that the Stipulation and 
Agreement was the subject of a scrivener's error; it did not find the husband in 
contempt; but it did order that he pay the wife the $4,500 in forty-five days. 
The essence of the court's determination was that the decree should be enforced 
as entered.

 
 

[¶6.]     The evidence in this 
record is insufficient to sustain the finding of the district court that there 
was a scrivener's error. In Pfister v. Brown, 498 P.2d 1243 (Wyo. 1972), we discussed 
the concept of a "scrivener's error." Quoting from Stoll v. Nagle, 15 Wyo. 86, 86 P. 26, 28 
(1906), we there reiterated the limitations which apply to the right of 
reformation on account of mistake.

 
 
"`The 
mistake, however, must have been a mutual one. There must have been a meeting of 
minds and a contract actually entered into, but, by reason of the mistake, the 
instrument as written does not express what was really intended by the parties. 
Both the mistake and its mutuality must be established by evidence that is clear 
and satisfactory.'" Pfister v. Brown, 498 P.2d  at 1245.

 
 
What is 
evident from the proceedings in this case is that, although the parties may have 
once agreed in the course of their discussions that the wife should receive 
$4,500 out of the lump sum retirement benefit, by the time the written contract 
was presented the husband was not willing to continue in his agreement for the 
inclusion of that provision. It was not proper to present to the district court 
a decree which counsel knew was disputed by the husband. Instead, the proper 
course of action would have been to present the issue to the district court at a 
hearing conducted for that purpose. The court is not bound by a stipulation of 
the parties in dividing marital property but, instead, its duties are set forth 
in § 20-2-114, W.S. 1977, which requires it to divide that property in a just 
and equitable way. David v. David, 724 P.2d 1141 (Wyo. 1986). It would have 
been an easy matter for counsel to have had the dispute resolved in a proper 
manner.

 
 

[¶7.]     In David, we held that 
the district court can, in the exercise of its discretion, properly impose a 
lien on property of one spouse to secure a debt owed to the other spouse. This 
can be accomplished as an adjunct to a divorce settlement whether or not 
supplementary to terms of any settlement agreement mutually executed by the 
parties. In reaching that decision, we emphasized that the imposition of the 
lien did not in any way change the status of the parties' separate property. 
That is not true in this case, which we hold to be controlled by our decision in 
Rinehart v. Rinehart, 52 Wyo. 363, 75 P.2d 390 (1938). In the David 
case, we were able to distinguish the Rinehart case primarily because the status 
of the parties' property was not changed. In Rinehart, the parties had entered 
into an agreement pursuant to which the wife received certain property and cash 
as well as $60 a month in alimony. The court awarded her $100 a month in alimony 
in the decree which was entered. We held that the husband could challenge that 
award at a late date because he was justified in his assumption that the 
stipulation of the parties would control. The case was reversed and remanded to 
the district court for disposition to be made after giving notice to the husband 
and affording him an opportunity to be heard.

 
 

[¶8.]     In this case, the 
husband properly could assume that the Stipulation and Agreement entered into by 
the parties would control, and that, if the agreement was to be subject to 
change by the court in the entry of its decree, or if it were to be challenged 
by the other party, that would be done only after notice and an opportunity to 
be heard. While the facts before us suggest quite strongly that the district 
court would, upon proper application, divide this $9,000 fund equitably between 
the husband and wife, we neither can condone the actions of the wife's attorney, 
which resulted in this legal quagmire, nor can we permit the court to adjust the 
disposition of the parties' property without affording a hearing. We hold that 
paragraph 15 of the decree, which awarded the wife $4,500, is void, and the case 
is reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.

 
 

[¶9.]     In the course of its 
hearing in this matter, the court did accept as evidence, over the husband's 
objection, a letter apparently sent to the judge by the husband's current wife. 
That letter tended to suggest the husband knew of the inclusion of this 
provision in the decree all along, suggesting his acquiescence by inaction. 
Furthermore, as noted, the district court did receive testimony from the former 
wife's attorney who appeared as a witness in this case. Because of our 
disposition, it is not necessary to address either of these questions of 
admissibility of evidence because, in our view, neither the letter nor the 
testimony of the former wife's attorney would have any relevance to the question 
of equitable distribution of the $9,000 fund.

 
 

[¶10.]  The wife did raise as an issue whether 
there was reasonable cause for this appeal, and she sought a certification in 
accordance with Rule 10.05, W.R.A.P. The appellant has prevailed in this appeal, 
and we obviously cannot grant this request. We do note, however, that the wife's 
legal problems in this matter largely were the result of poor judgment on the 
part of her counsel, and we question whether he should accept or demand any 
compensation from his client relating to the expense of resolving the 
issue.

 
 

[¶11.]  The order of the district court is 
reversed and remanded.

 
 

MACY, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶12.]  I dissent. This matter should be remanded 
for hearing to determine whether or not the parties agreed that the wife would 
receive $4,500 of the husband's retirement benefits. The court is bound by the 
stipulations of the parties in the absence of any valid ground or reason for 
refusing enforcement. Thompson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division, 768 P.2d 600 (Wyo. 1989); Bard Ranch, Inc. v. Weber, 538 P.2d 24 (Wyo. 
1975); Stringer v. Miller, 80 Wyo. 389, 343 P.2d 508, reh'g denied and opinion 
modified 345 P.2d 786 (1959). Neither Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114 (1977) nor David v. 
David, 724 P.2d 1141 (Wyo. 1986), carved out an exception to this 
general rule nor are they germane to the issues on appeal in this 
case.