Case Title: Davis v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
  
DAVID C. DAVIS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 92, 2003 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN02-01-1856 thru 
§                               1858 
§ 
 
Submitted: 
July 23, 2003 
  Decided:   October 7, 2003 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 7th day of October 2003, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief 
filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, 
and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
In October 2002, the defendant-appellant, David C. Davis, was 
found guilty by a Superior Court jury of Criminal Mischief, Assault in the Second 
Degree, and Conspiracy in the Second Degree.  He was sentenced to a total of 6 
years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after 2 years for decreasing levels 
of probation.  This is Davis’ direct appeal. 
(2) 
Davis’ counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw pursuant to 
Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of a 
 
 
-2- 
motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold: (a) 
the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious 
examination of the record and the law for claims that could arguably support the 
appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine 
whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it 
can be decided without an adversary presentation.1 
(3) 
Davis’ counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By letter, 
Davis’ counsel informed Davis of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him 
with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying brief and the complete 
trial transcript.  Evans was also informed of his right to supplement his attorney’s 
presentation.  Davis responded with a brief that raises two issues for this Court’s 
consideration.  The State has responded to the position taken by Davis’ counsel as 
well as the issues raised by Davis and has moved to affirm the Court’s judgment. 
                                                 
1Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 
486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
(4) 
Davis raises two issues for this Court’s consideration.  He claims that: 
a) there was insufficient evidence presented by the State at trial to support his 
 
 
-3- 
convictions; and b) Ros Gordon, one of the State’s witnesses, should not have 
been permitted to testify. 
(5) 
The evidence at trial established that Davis and Eric Tucker were at 
the Wilmington residence of Tommy Schools early in the morning of December 
15, 2001.  Tucker testified that he was in a back bedroom of the residence when 
he was jumped by Davis and another individual named Lamont Barnes.  Barnes 
yelled at Davis to hit Tucker in the head with a stereo, which Davis did.  Davis 
then stabbed Tucker in the right leg with a knife and took $129 from his pocket.  
After Davis and Barnes left the room, Tucker climbed out a back window and 
went to his cousin’s house, where he called the police.  Tucker later gave a 
statement to Corporal Shawn Gordon of the Wilmington Police Department. 
(6) 
On cross examination, Tucker testified that December 15th was his 
birthday and that he asked Davis to find him a prostitute and some drugs so he 
could celebrate.  Davis later returned with a prostitute named Ros Gordon and 
some crack cocaine.  The fight was caused by a disagreement over the drugs.  
Tucker admitted that he did not tell the police about Ros Gordon or the drugs 
when he gave his statement. 
(7) 
Corporal Gordon testified that he met with Tucker around noon on 
December 15, 2001.  He observed that Tucker had bruises and cuts and had a stab 
wound on his right leg.  Tucker told Corporal Gordon that he was in a bedroom at 
 
 
-4- 
Tommy Schools’ residence when Davis and Barnes entered and began to assault 
him.  He said he had been hit in the head with a stereo during the fight and that 
Davis had stabbed him in the right leg.  After talking with Tucker, Corporal 
Gordon went to the residence and observed a stereo lying on the floor, a hole in 
the wall and several drops of blood.  He also obtained a statement from Tommy 
Schools, who stated that he saw Davis come out of the bedroom with a knife 
following the altercation. 
(8) 
On the second day of trial, Ros Gordon appeared at trial to testify as 
a witness for the State.  The attorneys asked for a sidebar with the judge because 
it appeared that she was intoxicated.  After conferring with the judge, the attorneys 
agreed that she should be questioned outside the presence of the jury to establish 
her competency to testify.  During the questioning, which was conducted by the 
judge and the attorneys, Gordon confirmed that she had ingested cocaine and gin 
prior to appearing at the trial.  She stated that she had some memory of what 
happened at Schools’ residence on December 15, 2001 and remembered giving a 
statement to the police about it.   
(9) 
After some discussion among the judge and the attorneys, it was 
decided that the attorneys would waive any objections to her competency and that 
the attorneys would limit their direct and cross examination.  After being sworn, 
Gordon testified that she knew Tucker and Davis; she identified the defendant as 
 
 
-5- 
Davis; she stated that she was at Schools’ residence at the time of the incident; she 
admitted that she was currently high on crack cocaine and gin; and she confirmed 
that she had given a statement to police about the incident.  The jury then listened 
to a tape of Gordon’s statement and reviewed a transcript of the statement.  
Detective Simmons, who took the statement from Gordon, testified that she was 
sober at the time she gave the statement.  
(10) This Court’s inquiry when reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence is “whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the [State], could have found the essential elements of the 
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.”2  In making this determination, the 
Court does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence.3  Moreover, 
it is for the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any 
conflicts in the testimony.4 
                                                 
2Morrisey v. State, 620 A.2d 207, 213 (Del. 1993). 
3Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560, 563 (Del. 1995). 
4Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1363 (Del. 1992). 
 
 
-6- 
(11) Davis’ claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of 
the charged offenses is without merit.  Both Tucker and Davis testified that a 
stereo system at Schools’ residence was damaged during the fight, which was 
sufficient evidence to prove that Davis “intentionally or recklessly . . . [d]amage[d] 
tangible property of another person.”5  Tucker testified that Davis stabbed him in 
the right leg with a knife at Schools’ residence and Davis confirmed that he 
grabbed a knife prior to the fight, resulting in the injury to Tucker’s leg.  This was 
sufficient evidence to prove that Davis “recklessly or intentionally cause[d] 
physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous 
instrument.”6  Finally, Tucker testified that Davis and Barnes jumped him, with 
Barnes yelling to Davis to hit Tucker in the head.  This was sufficient evidence to 
prove that Davis “agree[d] to aid [Barnes] in the . . . commission of the felony” 
and that he or Barnes “commit[ted] an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy.”7 
(12) Davis’ claim that Ros Gordon should not have been permitted to 
testify is also without merit.  The transcript of the trial reflects that neither side 
raised any objection to her testifying.  Thus, we review the Superior Court’s 
                                                 
5DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 811(a) (1) (2001). 
6DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 612(a) (2) (2001). 
7DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 512(2) (2001). 
 
 
-7- 
decision to permit her to testify for plain error.8  Under the plain error standard of 
review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights 
as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.9  Even assuming the 
Superior Court committed error when it permitted Ros Gordon to testify, we find 
that any such error was harmless, since there was more than sufficient evidence to 
support Davis’ convictions even without her testimony. 
(13) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 
Davis’ appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue. 
 We are also satisfied that Davis’ counsel has made a conscientious effort to 
examine the record and has properly determined that Davis could not raise a 
meritorious claim in this appeal. 
                                                 
8Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
9Id. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to 
withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-8-