Case Title: STANLEY BUDDER, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0241

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
STANLEY BUDDER, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 123238 P.3d 575Case Number: S-09-0241Decided: 08/31/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

STANLEY 
BUDDER, JR.,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County

The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel, State Public Defender 
Program.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Christyne M. 
Martens, Student Intern, Prosecution Assistance Clinical 
Program.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT,* and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
* 
Chief Justice at time of expedited conference

 
 
 
 
  

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Stanley Budder, 
Jr. (Budder) was convicted of burglary in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301 
(LexisNexis 2009)1 and wrongful taking or disposing of 
property in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-403 (LexisNexis 2009).2  On appeal, he challenges a jury 
instruction he argues relieved the State of proving all elements of the crimes 
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.  
We affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Budder presents 
one issue for our review:

 
 
Did 
the court improperly instruct the jury as to the burden shift required when 
excusing possession of recently stolen property when the defense theory was to 
deny possession rather than attempting to explain it?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The Crazy Woman 
Saloon in Dayton, Wyoming, was burglarized on October 20, 2008.  Over $3,000 in cash was taken in the 
burglary.  The money, sorted by 
denomination and bundled in $100 increments, was contained in a gallon size 
zip-lock bag.  About one week after 
the burglary, an individual named Tony Fox returned approximately $1,600 cash to 
the Crazy Woman Saloon.  The money 
was sorted, bundled and contained in a gallon size zip-lock bag.  

 
 
[¶4]      Fox testified he 
had gotten the money from Budder.  
Fox explained Budder had come to his residence the night before he 
returned the money and the two of them drank and watched movies.  During the course of the evening, Budder 
produced the money-filled zip-lock bag and placed it on a coffee table.  When Fox questioned Budder about the 
money, Budder gave no answer.  
Budder then made a statement to the effect that he would have to hurt Fox 
because Fox now knew too much.  Fox 
got nervous and waited for Budder to fall asleep.  He then took the money from Budder and 
left his residence.  Believing the 
money to be a portion of the money stolen from the Crazy Woman Saloon, Fox 
returned the money there.    

 
 
[¶5]      Further 
investigation revealed Budder was at the Crazy Woman Saloon until closing time 
the night of the robbery; Budder knew where and how the money was kept at the 
Crazy Woman Saloon; Budder had no alibi for the time of the robbery; Budder was 
burdened with various debts at the time of the robbery; and Budder did not have 
steady employment at the time of the robbery.  

 
 
[¶6]      Budder 
consistently denied ever possessing the money.  Budder, in his appellate brief, 
summarizes the general flavor of the trial proceedings:

 
 
The 
prosecution theory was that Mr. Budder had sole possession and that Mr. Fox was 
a fine, civic-minded hero who stole the money from Budder in order to 
eventually, after much soul-searching, return it to its rightful owner.  The defense theory was that Mr. Fox 
always had exclusive possession of the money and only after being observed by 
Mr. Budder with the ill-gotten loot, did he attempt to throw off suspicion by 
returning the remaining money and blaming Mr. Budder.  

 
 
After 
a three-day trial, a jury convicted Budder of both burglary and wrongful taking 
or disposing of property.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶7]      We review alleged 
errors in formulating jury instructions for an abuse of discretion.3  Trial courts are afforded substantial 
latitude to tailor the instructions to the facts of the case.  A trial court does not abuse its discretion by referring the 
jury to 
instructions that, when viewed as a whole and in the context of the 
entire trial, fairly and adequately cover the issues.  Garza v. State, 2010 WY 64, ¶ 19, 231 P.3d 884, 890 
(Wyo. 2010); Luedtke v. State, 2005 WY 98, ¶ 28, 117 P.3d 1227, 1232 (Wyo. 2005); 
Coburn v. State, 2001 WY 
30, ¶ 9, 20 P.3d 518, 520 
(Wyo. 2001); Merchant v. State, 4 P.3d 184, 190 (Wyo. 2000); 
Ellison v. State, 3 P.3d 845, 849 (Wyo. 2000); Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1126 (Wyo. 
1997).  

 
 
Jury 
Instruction

 
 
[¶8]      Budder challenges 
the following jury instruction:

 
 
Possession 
of recently stolen property is not of itself sufficient to permit a finding that 
the Defendant is guilty of the crimes here charged.  However, possession of recently stolen 
property, if not satisfactorily explained is ordinarily a circumstance from 
which the jury may reasonably draw the inference and find, in the light of 
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that the person in 
possession knew the property had been stolen, and is also a circumstance from 
which the jury may reasonably draw the inference that the person in possession 
not only knew it was stolen property, but also participated in some way in the 
theft of the property.

 
 
However, 
you are never required to make this inference.  It is the exclusive province of the jury 
to determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this 
case warrant any inference which the law permits the jury to draw from the 
possession of stolen property.

 
 
Although 
possession is a strong circumstance tending to show guilt, there must be 
corroborative evidence tending to prove Defendant's guilt of each charge.  However, this corroborative evidence 
need only be slight and may include: whether the Defendant had the opportunity 
to commit the crime charged, his conduct, his false or contradictory statements, 
if any, or other statements he may have made with respect to the property and 
any other evidence which tends to connect him with the 
crime.

 
 
If 
you find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence that the property was 
stolen and that, while recently stolen, the property was in the possession of 
the Defendant, you may, from those facts, draw the inference that the property 
was possessed by the Defendant with knowledge that it was stolen, but also that 
the Defendant participated in some way in the theft, unless such possession by 
the Defendant is explained to the satisfaction of the jury by other facts and 
circumstances in evidence of the case.

 
 
In 
considering whether possession of recently stolen property has been 
satisfactorily explained, you are reminded that in the exercise of 
constitutional rights the accused need not take the witness stand and 
testify.

 
 
Possession 
may be satisfactorily explained through other circumstances, other evidence, 
independent of any testimony of the accused.   

 
 
Propriety 
of Instruction

 
 
[¶9]      This instruction 
is virtually identical to an instruction approved by this Court in Vanvorst v. State, 1 P.3d 1223, 1230-31 (Wyo. 
2000).  Budder accepts that the 
instruction reflects a correct statement of law in cases, such as Vanvorst, where the defendant is caught 
in actual possession of recently stolen property.4  Budder argues, however, the instruction 
is nonsensical when applied to his case because of his denial of possession of 
the recently stolen cash.  We do not 
agree that the distinction being pressed by Budder is critical to a 
determination of the applicability of this instruction.  

 
 
[¶10]   A trial court's instructions to a 
jury are to be written with the particular facts and legal theories of each case 
in mind.  Montez v. State, 2009 WY 17, ¶ 21, 201 P.3d 434, 441 
(Wyo. 2009); Janpol v. State, 2008 WY 21, ¶ 7, 178 P.3d 396, 400 (Wyo. 2008).  Thus, the applicability of an 
instruction hinges, in part, on whether the instruction is supported by an 
appropriate evidentiary basis.  The 
instruction at issue requires the jury to find "beyond a reasonable doubt from 
the evidence that the property was stolen and that, while recently stolen, the 
property was in the possession of the Defendant."  Budder's argument seemingly posits a 
jury cannot make this determination unless a defendant is caught by law 
enforcement in actual possession of recently stolen property.  This is obviously false.  In this case, the State's evidence 
against Budder included the testimony of Fox and other corroborating and 
circumstantial evidence.  The 
evidence presented sufficed to support the giving of this instruction to the 
jury.  

 
 
[¶11]   In a corresponding argument, Budder 
claims it was improper for the trial court to give the instruction because there 
was no rational connection between the evidence and the inference.  We agree there must be a rational 
connection between an inferred fact and proven facts.  For it to be proper to give an 
instruction on an inference, it must be shown that it is more likely than not 
that the inferred fact flows from the proven fact on which it is made to 
depend.  Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 
842, 93 S. Ct. 2357, 2361, 37 L. Ed. 2d 380 (1973).  The inquiry is case specific.  The inference must be "one common sense 
justifies in light of the established facts of the case."  Harley v. State, 737 P.2d 750, 755 (Wyo. 1987).  Budder again, however, ignores the 
State's evidence.  Instead, he 
argues there was no rational connection between his being accused of possession of the stolen cash 
and his being involved in the theft.  
The proper focus should be on the relationship between his actual 
possession of the stolen cash, should the jury find such possession was proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the inference that Budder was involved in the 
theft of the cash.  Given the 
totality of the evidence presented by the State, we find the jury could 
rationally determine that it was more likely than not that Budder was involved 
in the theft of the cash once it determined Budder possessed the cash.  Again, the instruction was supported by 
the evidence.

 
 
[¶12]   Budder next argues the inference 
referred to in the instruction mandated he present a satisfactory explanation 
for possession of the cash in order to prevent the jury from finding he was 
involved in its theft.5  Budder continues that, since he denied 
possession, it is irreconcilable with his defense.  

 
 
[¶13]   This argument is based on a 
misapprehension of the language of the instruction.  The instruction does not demand a 
defendant explain possession of recently stolen property.  It does not demand a jury return a 
verdict of guilty if a defendant fails to do so.  Indeed, the instruction expressly 
charges the jury that it cannot find a defendant guilty without other 
corroborating evidence beyond mere possession.  Thus, rather than steering a jury 
towards a guilty verdict, the instruction is a permissive instruction offering 
guidance to the jury that it may 
consider unexplained possession of recently stolen property as an inference that 
Budder "participated in some way in the theft" of the property, if they feel 
such an inference is warranted by the evidence as a whole.  See Vanvorst, 1 P.3d  at 1230-32.  See generally Huff v. State, 992 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo. 1999) (a 
permissive inference allows, but does not require, a jury to infer the elemental 
fact from proof by the State of the basic fact and places no burden of any kind 
on the defendant).  As the 
instruction states:

 
 
[Y]ou 
are never required to make this inference.  
It is the exclusive province of the jury to determine whether the facts 
and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any inference which 
the law permits the jury to draw from the possession of stolen property.  

 
 
Accordingly, 
Budder was not required under the instruction to offer an explanation, and the 
jury was not directed by the instruction to read anything into such a lack of 
explanation.  The instruction did 
not impair Budder's ability to defend on the theory of lack of possession. 

 
 
[¶14]   Finally, Budder argues the 
instruction should have contained language instructing the jury that the burden 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies to the inference.  Budder cites Wyoming Rule of Evidence 
303(c) in support of this argument:

 
 
Rule 
303. Presumptions in criminal cases.

 
 
* 
* * * 

 
 
(c) 
Instructing the Jury.  Whenever the 
existence of a presumed fact against the accused is submitted to the jury, the 
court shall instruct the jury that it may regard the basic facts as sufficient 
evidence of the presumed fact but is not required to do so.  In addition, if the presumed fact 
establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or negatives a defense, the 
court shall instruct the jury that its existence, on all the evidence, must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

 
 
[¶15]   This argument is readily disposed 
of by existing Wyoming precedent.  
In Huff v. State, 992 P.2d 1071 (Wyo. 1999), the 
Court determined that, when a permissive instruction such as the one at issue is 
given, the mandate of W.R.E. 303 is satisfied by the inclusion in the jury 
instructions of other instructions informing the jury of the State's burden of 
proving all elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.   Huff at 1076.  See also Eckert v. State, 680 P.2d 478, 483-84 (Wyo. 
1984).  No fewer than six such 
instructions were included in the instant case.  

 
 
[¶16]   Budder argues we should take this 
opportunity to overrule Huff.  He points out that other states have 
concluded that their respective versions of W.R.E. 303 require language 
regarding the State's burden of proof be contained within the same instruction 
containing a permissive inference.  
Budder's supporting appellate argument, however, presents nothing new 
that causes us to reconsider our analysis in Huff.  We continue to hold that, in keeping 
with our traditional standard of review of reading jury instructions as a whole 
and not singling out any one instruction, W.R.E. 303 is satisfied by the 
inclusion of other instructions informing the jury of their burden to find all 
elements of an offense be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   The instruction at issue in this 
case was appropriate under the evidence introduced at trial by the State.  The instruction permitted the jury to 
infer Budder was involved in the theft of the cash from the Crazy Woman Saloon 
if it first found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Budder possessed the cash, 
and that other facts and circumstances also supported the inference.  This instruction did not deny Budder his 
defense.  The instructions as a 
whole also conformed to the mandates of W.R.E. 303 by informing the jury that 
the State bore the burden of proving every element of an offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 
  1Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 6-3-301 states, in relevant 
part:

 
 
(a) A 
person is guilty of burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a 
building, occupied structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied 
portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein.  

 
 
  2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-403 states, in 
relevant part:  

 
 
(a) A 
person who buys, receives, conceals or disposes of property which he knows, 
believes or has reasonable cause to believe was obtained in violation of law is 
guilty of:

 
 
(i) A 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the 
property is one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or more[.]

 
 

3The State 
suggests Budder did not adequately object to the challenged jury instruction at 
trial and our review should be limited to a review for plain error.  While the objection was dangerously 
casual, under the circumstances of this case we will accept the issue as 
preserved for our review.

 
 

4In Vanvorst, the defendant was arrested 
driving a stolen vehicle.

 
 

5Budder 
presents an argument that this inference should be applied to Fox, as the person 
known to possess the cash when he returned it to the Crazy Woman Saloon.  Budder fails to recognize the sequential 
nature of the instruction.  In order 
for the jury to reach the inference section of the instruction, it first must 
have found, beyond a reasonable doubt,that Budder was in possession of the 
cash.