Case Title: St. Clair v. Faulkner

Citation: 305 N.W.2d 441

Docket Number: 

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1981-05-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
305 N.W.2d 441 (1981) Connie Jo ST. CLAIR, Appellee, v. Richard FAULKNER, Appellant. No. 65546. Supreme Court of Iowa. May 13, 1981. *442 Steven E. Ort, Keokuk, for appellant. Barry M. Anderson of Anderson & McMurray, Keokuk, for appellee. Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and UHLENHOPP, HARRIS, ALLBEE, and LARSON, JJ. UHLENHOPP, Justice. The question before us is whether in the present circumstances Iowa courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate the right of custody of a child as between her parents under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. The merits of the custody dispute between the parents are not presented. The uniform act is found in chapter 598A of the Iowa Code. Indiana, the other state involved, has the act in sections 31-1-11.6-1 to .6-24 of its Code. This court dealt with various aspects of the act in Slidell v. Valentine, 298 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1980); In re Marriage of Mintle, 294 N.W.2d 564 (Iowa 1980); In re Mann, 293 N.W.2d 185 (Iowa 1980); Pierce v. Pierce, 287 N.W.2d 879 (Iowa 1980); and Barcus v. Barcus, 278 N.W.2d 646 (Iowa 1979). See also In re Marriage of Schissel, 292 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Iowa 1980); In re Marriage of Vogel, 271 N.W.2d 709, 711 (Iowa 1978); 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. IV. 1980) (Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980). Petitioner Connie Jo (now) St. Clair and respondent Richard Faulkner were married in 1969. On April 22, 1971, a child was born to them, Christina. At first the parties lived in Iowa, but they later moved to Ohio. In 1973 Richard obtained a divorce from Connie in Ohio, and the court awarded him custody of Christina. Connie Jo moved to Iowa. In 1974 Connie Jo went to Ohio and removed Christina to Iowa. Various court charges grew out of this incident and, after a home study was made of Richard's home, an Iowa juvenile court returned Christina to Richard. Richard subsequently married his present wife, Mary, and Connie Jo married her present husband, Thomas. Richard and Mary moved to Indiana, and from 1974 to 1979 Christina lived with them there. Connie Jo has visited the child at times, but not extensively. Richard and Christina have a close relationship as father and daughter. In June 1979, Richard and Mary experienced marital problems. Mary commenced a divorce suit in Indiana and obtained an injunction removing Richard from the home. Richard and Mary have a child of their own, and that child remained with Mary. But Richard had the problem of what to do about Christina while his marital problem was being resolved. Richard had Mary pack Christina's clothes and personal effects, and he brought the child and her clothing, effects, and bicycle to Connie Jo in Iowa. Richard next obtained an apartment in Indiana and notified Connie Jo he was coming to Iowa for the child. Thereupon Connie Jo, about three weeks after Richard had brought Christina to Iowa, commenced this suit to modify the Ohio decree and change custody of Christina to her, and Connie Jo also obtained an ex parte order giving her temporary custody. In her petition, Connie Jo alleged that for this state to assume jurisdiction would be in the child's best interests, that the child is present here, that Ohio no longer has any contact with the child, and that Richard has stated he does not care for the child but will not agree to *443 change custody, and she also made allegations relative to the merits of the custody question. Richard filed a special appearance challenging the jurisdiction of Iowa courts under the act, and the court held a hearing. The parties did not agree at the hearing as to what was said when Richard brought Christina to Connie Jo or as to their respective intentions at that time. Connie Jo and Thomas testified that Richard gave them the impression he was through with Christina and could no longer cope with custody of her. Richard testified that he did not intend to abandon Christina or leave her permanently, but only until he could work out his divorce problem. The following is illustrative of Connie Jo's testimony: Also: The Court: Ruling reserved. In addition: Thomas testified: In his testimony, Richard denied the St. Clairs' claims: Also: In addition: .... Richard also testified about Christina's connections with Indiana such as her friends, school, and physician. The court overruled the special appearance, saying: Connie Jo retained possession of the child. Richard and his wife obtained marriage counseling and reconciled. The parties subsequently tried the case on the merits of the custody question, completing the trial on July 15, 1980. On July 18, 1980, the trial court held for Connie Jo and awarded her custody, and thereafter Richard appealed. This court must resolve the jurisdictional issue. *445 I. Scope of review. The usual scope of review in special appearance proceedings is stated thus in Larsen v. Scholl, 296 N.W.2d 785, 787 (Iowa 1980): The situation is somewhat different, however, in cases under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. Those cases, involving custody, are equitable in nature. Doan Thi Hoang Anh v. Nelson, 245 N.W.2d 511, 513 (Iowa 1976); In re Marriage of Settle, 276 Or. 759, 772, 556 P.2d 962, 969 (1976). They involve two basic issues: which state is in the better position to resolve custody quickly, permanently, and on the merits and, if the forum state is in the better position, who should be granted custody, under the evidence. We call the first of these issues a question of jurisdiction of the subject matter, and our decided cases reveal that when that issue reaches this courtand the issue can be raised at any timewe actually decide all questions concerning it anew. E. g., Slidell, 298 N.W.2d at 601-02; Pierce, 287 N.W.2d at 881; Barcus, 278 N.W.2d at 650. We stated in Pierce, at 881-82: The trial court apparently regarded this special appearance as in equity; it did not rule on objections to evidence. We hold that this court gives de novo review to questions of subject-matter jurisdiction under the act, whether raised by special appearance or by some other procedural device in the course of litigation under the act. See People ex rel. Bruzzese v. Bruzzese, 70 A.D.2d 957, 958, 417 N.Y.S.2d 763, 764-65 (1979) (determination of jurisdiction under the act requires preliminary findings). In other respects the special appearance procedural rules, quoted from Larsen, apply. II. Jurisdiction of subject matter. We pass to the issue of jurisdiction. Ohio granted Richard custody in 1973. Connie Jo is asking the Iowa courts to change custody. In such cases, under Pierce, 287 *446 N.W.2d at 882, the starting point is section 598 A. 14 of the Code: A. Two requirements exist under section 598A.14: that Ohio does not have, or has declined, jurisdiction, and that Iowa does have jurisdiction. The first requisite is met: none of the parties has lived in Ohio for several years; that state has lost jurisdiction. Slidell, 298 N.W.2d at 604; Roberts v. District Court, 596 P.2d 65, 67 (Colo. 1979). The question therefore is whether Iowa has jurisdiction. B. In considering whether Iowa has jurisdiction, we accept Connie Jo's allegations as true and place the burden of persuasion on her. But if and when she establishes a prima facie case of jurisdiction, Richard has the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or overcome it. Larsen, 296 N.W.2d at 787. Jurisdiction in Iowa is determined under section 598A.3: Under the allegations and the evidence, Iowa did not have jurisdiction under paragraph 1(a) of section 598 A. 3 when Connie Jo commenced the action. Iowa was not Christina's home state at the commencement of this action or within six months before. A "home state" is defined thus in section 598A.2(5): *447 Under paragraph 1(b) of section 598 A. 3, Iowa had jurisdiction when the suit was started if (a) it was in Christina's best interest for this state to assume jurisdiction because Christina and at least one contestant have significant connections with this state and (b) substantial evidence exists here of such factors as the child's care and protection. We cannot say it is in Christina's "best interest" to have Iowa determine custody; she and her father and stepmother lived together for several years in Indiana. That state would appear to be in a better position to resolve the issue, and Richard contended throughout that the material witnesses are there. Schlumpf v. Superior Court, 79 Cal. App. 3d 892, 900-01, 145 Cal. Rptr. 190, 195-96 (1978). Moreover, while Connie Jo has a "significant connection" with Iowa, Christina did not have such a connection at the commencement of this action; she had been here only about three weeks. Matteson v. Matteson, 379 So. 2d 677, 680 (Fla. DCA 1980). Although evidence regarding such factors as care and protection exist here, no more such factors exist here than would be present in the usual case of an interstate custody controversy since one parent usually lives in the forum state. Considerably more evidence regarding Christina, her home, her associates, and her past must exist in Indiana than here. Iowa does not have jurisdiction under paragraph 1(b). Regarding paragraph 1(c), we observe the following in Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act § 3 (Commissioners' Note): Paragraph 1(c) requires (a) that Christina be physically present here and (b) that she has been abandoned or emergency protection is necessary because of subjection to or threat of mistreatment or abuse, or neglect or dependency exists. Christina was physically present in Iowa on commencement of the action, but we cannot say Richard "abandoned" her. While abandonment does not require any particular length of time, it connotes a "relinquishment or surrender of rights or property by one person to another; a giving up; a total desertion." Pitzenberger v. Schnack, 215 Iowa 466, 469-70, 245 N.W. 713, 714-15 (1932). The court stated on the same pages, "In a technical sense, the word means the relinquishment of a right; the giving up of something to which one is entitled; the giving up of a thing absolutely without reference to any particular person or purpose." "Abandon" is defined as follows in Black's Law Dictionary 9 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (citations omitted): "To desert, surrender, forsake or cede. To relinquish or give up with intent of never again resuming one's right or interest. To give up absolutely; to forsake entirely; to renounce utterly; to relinquish all connection with or concern in; to desert. It includes the intention, and also the external act by which it is carried into effect." On this record, we are persuaded that Richard temporarily placed Christina with Connie Jo while he attempted to work out his marital problem. Abandonment does not appear. In re Sagan, 261 Pa.Super. 384, 390, 396 A.2d 450, 453 (1978); Hricko v. Stewart, 99 Misc.2d 266, 269, 415 N.Y.S.2d 747, 749 (Fam.Ct.1979). Paragraph 1(c) also covers emergency situations where mistreatment, abuse, neglect, or dependency exists. These factors do not appear here. See Roberts, 596 P.2d at 68; Ruff v. Ruff, 98 Misc.2d 934, 935, 415 N.Y.S.2d 179, 180 (Fam.Ct.1979). Iowa does not have jurisdiction under paragraph 1(c). Finally, paragraph 1(d) does not apply because Indiana has not declined jurisdiction. *448 Cf. Mann, 293 N.W.2d at 186 (declination by Oregon). None of the provisions giving Iowa jurisdiction is satisfied. The natural desire of a court faced with a custody dispute is to resolve the dispute. Slidell, 298 N.W.2d at 601 ("the strong motivation of courts to reassess the child's circumstances and act `in his best interest'"). In many interstate custody cases, however, this bandies the child back and forth and leaves the child's permanent settlement in a state of suspension. Thus we should not be reluctant to give effect to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. At the time this suit began, Christina had lived most of her life in Ohio and Indiana, and Indiana has been her home most recently for several years and the home of her custodian-father, her stepmother, and her half brother. She was here only about three weeks before commencement of the suit and, we believe, not under "abandonment" by Richard but rather, pending resolution of his marital problem. Giving full effect to the language and intent of the act, we hold that Iowa did not have jurisdiction. The district court should have sustained the special appearance and dismissed the Iowa action, and we return the case to district court for that purpose. With dismissal of the action, the temporary custody order also falls. If Connie Jo desires to commence an action in Indiana, that is of course her prerogative. Unless within sixty days she commences such an action and obtains an Indiana order for temporary custody under its law, she is required to surrender Christina to Richard. Cf. Barcus, 278 N.W.2d at 652 (temporary stay). We do not reach Richard's arguments of forum non conveniens, under section 598 A. 7, and unclean hands, under section 598 A. 8. REVERSED.