Case Title: Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Podor

Citation: 2009-Ohio-358

Docket Number: 20081205

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Podor, 121 Ohio St.3d 131, 2009-Ohio-358.] 
 
 
CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. PODOR. 
[Cite as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Podor, 
 121 Ohio St.3d 131, 2009-Ohio-358.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Advancing financial assistance to clients — 
One-year stayed suspension. 
(No. 2008-1205 — Submitted October 8, 2008 — Decided February 5, 2009.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 07-029. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Kenneth Charles Podor of Solon, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0014067, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1978.  
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommends that this 
court suspend his license to practice law for one year, stayed on conditions.  It 
found that respondent had violated the Code of Professional Responsibility in that 
he provided financial assistance for living expenses to clients.  We agree that 
respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility as found by the 
board, and we further agree that a one-year suspension, stayed on the conditions 
that he complete an additional six hours of continuing legal education in ethics 
and office management and commit no further disciplinary violations, is 
appropriate. 
{¶ 2} Respondent was the sole owner of Podor and Associates, located in 
Beachwood and Solon, Ohio.  Respondent also owns International Media 
Marketing, Inc. (“IMMI”), which produces advertisements for legal services, 
primarily for television, and sells diet and exercise advice, primarily on the 
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Internet.  Respondent controlled both the law practice and IMMI and was 
responsible for all decisions. 
{¶ 3} Respondent represented Carla White, a long-time client and friend, 
and her husband, Charles White, in connection with their personal-injury 
litigation.  The board found that during the pendency of the personal-injury 
litigation, Ms. White asked respondent to advance her money for living expenses.  
Respondent, through his corporation IMMI, gave the Whites $19,800 while their 
case was pending.  Ms. White also made a brief appearance in one of IMMI’s 
commercials, and respondent suggested during the investigation of this case that 
the advance was actually payment for her commercial appearance.  The loan has 
since been repaid using the proceeds of the settlement of the lawsuit.  The parties 
have stipulated that this loan violated DR 5-103(B). 
{¶ 4} In its amended complaint, relator, the Cleveland Metropolitan Bar 
Association, charged respondent with four counts of professional misconduct.  
After dismissal of two counts, the matter proceeded to a hearing before the panel 
on counts one and three.  The panel found insufficient evidence supporting the 
relator’s allegations in count three that respondent had collected an illegal or 
clearly excessive fee.  We agree with the board’s recommendation to dismiss 
count three. 
{¶ 5} Count one of the amended complaint charged respondent with 
violating DR 5-103(B) of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  DR 5-103(B) 
provides:  “While representing a client in connection with contemplated or 
pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to 
the client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of 
litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical 
examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, the repayment of 
which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter.” 
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{¶ 6} The hearing panel found by clear and convincing evidence that 
respondent had violated DR 5-103(B) by advancing financial assistance to current 
clients. 
{¶ 7} In mitigation, the panel found that respondent had not acted out of 
a dishonest or selfish motive; as aggravating factors, the panel found that 
respondent had a prior disciplinary violation resulting in a stayed suspension from 
the practice of law in 1995, Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Podor (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 
40, 647 N.E.2d 470, and that he had engaged in a deceptive practice during the 
disciplinary process.  As a result, the panel recommended a one-year suspension 
from the practice of law, stayed on conditions.  The Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and recommended sanction. 
{¶ 8} Relator objects to the recommended sanction, urging that 
respondent’s prior disciplinary history and “equivocation and reluctance to be 
truthful” demonstrated a lack of remorse and a lack of understanding of his 
wrongdoing justifying a more severe sanction than the board recommends. 
{¶ 9} Respondent notes that the hearing panel did not find that he had 
been untruthful, but rather characterized his testimony as “somewhat guarded” 
and described respondent as “reluctan[t] to fully admit his motivation.”  
Respondent contends that any lack of clarity in his testimony stemmed from his 
inability to precisely describe the financial arrangement between himself and his 
clients in legal terms. 
{¶ 10} We accept the board’s findings that respondent’s financial 
assistance to the Whites violated DR 5-103(B). 
{¶ 11} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the duties the lawyer violated, the lawyer’s mental 
state, and sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 
96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
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determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 
473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.  Because each disciplinary case is 
unique, we are not limited to the factors specified in the rule but may take into 
account “all relevant factors” in determining what sanction to impose.  BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B). 
{¶ 12} Regarding mitigating factors, we accept the board’s finding that 
respondent did not act out of a dishonest or selfish motive.  Regarding 
aggravating factors, we also accept the board’s findings that respondent had a 
prior disciplinary offense and engaged in a deceptive practice during the 
disciplinary process in that he testified inconsistently about his motivations for 
giving the money to the Whites. 
{¶ 13} The primary purpose of the disciplinary process is to protect the 
public from lawyers who are unworthy of the trust and confidence essential to the 
attorney-client relationship and to allow us to ascertain the lawyer’s fitness to 
practice law.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Agopian, 112 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-
6510, 858 N.E.2d 368, ¶ 10.  In this case, that goal is served by a one-year 
suspension stayed on the conditions that respondent complete an additional six 
hours of continuing legal education in ethics and office management and that he 
commit no further disciplinary violations. 
{¶ 14} We therefore suspend respondent from the practice of law in Ohio 
for one year.  That suspension is stayed on the conditions that respondent 
successfully complete, during the stayed suspension period, at least six hours of 
continuing legal education in ethics and office management beyond the hours 
required of all other attorneys in Ohio and that respondent commit no further 
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disciplinary violations.  If respondent fails to comply with the terms of this stay, 
the stay will be lifted, and respondent will serve the entire one-year suspension. 
{¶ 15} Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 16} I respectfully dissent from the sanction imposed on respondent by 
the majority.  The violation of DR 5-103(B) and the aggravating factors present in 
this case warrant an actual suspension from the practice of law.  Respondent 
provided financial support to clients for living expenses in violation of the 
Disciplinary Rules.  DR 5-103(B).  The disciplinary hearing panel also found two 
aggravating factors.  First, during the disciplinary process, respondent engaged in 
a deceptive practice by giving guarded testimony regarding his motivation for 
providing the money to the client.  While he admitted that he gave the client 
money to provide her with financial support, he still attempted to claim that it was 
payment for appearing in a commercial.  We have stated previously that an actual 
suspension should be imposed for a “ ‘continuing course of deceit and 
misrepresentation designed to cover up’ wrongdoing.”  Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. 
Farrell, 119 Ohio St.3d 529, 2008-Ohio-4540, 895 N.E.2d 800, ¶ 21, quoting 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 190, 658 N.E.2d 
237.  While respondent’s guarded testimony certainly does not amount to a 
continuing course of deceit and misrepresentation, it is a factor that supports an 
actual suspension. 
{¶ 17} Second, respondent has previously been disciplined by this court 
for violations of DR 2-106(A), 5-105(A), and 5-105(B) when he collected a 
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clearly excessive fee and represented two clients with conflicting interests.  We 
imposed a six-month stayed suspension, an order from which I dissented, 
preferring not to stay the suspension.  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Podor (1995), 72 
Ohio St.3d 40, 647 N.E.2d 470.  An attorney’s “prior disciplinary record 
reinforces [a] decision to impose an actual suspension” because “ ‘[p]rior 
disciplinary offenses shall be considered as a factor that may justify an increase in 
the degree of discipline * * * for subsequent misconduct.’ ”  Disciplinary Counsel 
v. King (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 612, 614, 660 N.E.2d 1160, quoting Gov.Bar R. 
V(6)(C). 
{¶ 18} The presence of both of the above aggravating factors here, along 
with respondent’s violation of DR 5-103(B), makes an actual suspension 
appropriate.  I would adopt the relator’s recommendation of a six-month 
suspension. 
 
O’CONNOR, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
Ellen S. Mandell, Bar Counsel, and Brian P. Riley, for relator. 
 
Joseph E. Rutigliano, for respondent. 
______________________