Case Title: Vigil v. Ruettgers

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-26

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Vigil v. Ruettgers1994 WY 149887 P.2d 521Case Number: 94-26Decided: 12/20/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Gilbert VIGIL; Roseann 
Vigil; and Michael Vigil,

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

Ronald RUETTGERS, 
individually and as Assistant Warden; and the State of 
Wyoming,

Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

Appeal from District 
Court, Carbon County, Larry L. Lehman, J.

 

Juan Leo 
DeHerrera, Rawlins, for appellants.

Kurt Kelly and 
Thomas A. Thompson of Williams, Kelly & Waldrip, Rawlins, for Ronald 
Ruettgers.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Dennis M. Coll, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for State.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., THOMAS, MACY and TAYLOR, JJ., and HANSCUM, District 
Judge.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      In this appeal, 
we are asked to determine whether a training officer, acting within the scope of 
his employment at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, was immune from suit in 
February of 1989. Appellants filed a tort action against a training officer and 
the State of Wyoming. The district court granted the training officer's motion 
for summary judgment and the State's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellants 
present the following issues:

1. The Legislature 
intended to include prison guards within the definition of peace 
officer.

2. The act as applied to 
Gilbert Vigil is unconstitutional.

[¶4]      Appellee, Ronald 
Ruettgers, identifies the following issues:

I. Whether the facts 
appearing in the pleadings and affidavits demonstrate any genuine issue of 
material fact which would preclude the granting of summary judgment to the 
appellee, Ronald Ruettgers, as a matter of law.

II. Whether the district 
court properly dismissed the claims of appellants Roseann Vigil and Michael 
Vigil for their failure to file a timely governmental 
claim.

III. Whether the 
appellants are entitled to raise a constitutional argument for the first time on 
appeal.

[¶5]      The State 
summarizes its arguments as follows:

Argument 
I

The district court 
properly dismissed from the action the State of Wyoming, as there was no genuine 
issue of material fact, and the State of Wyoming was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.

Argument 
II

Immunity for correctional 
officers was never waived by the legislature in adoption or modification of the 
Governmental Claims Act.

Argument 
III

Plaintiffs' apparent 
constitutional argument of violation of equal protection rights was never 
asserted before the trial court.

II. 
FACTS

[¶6]      In this tort 
action, relief was denied due to sovereign immunity and appellants' failure to 
comply with the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Gilbert Vigil, joined by his 
wife Roseann Vigil and his son Michael Vigil (Vigils), filed suit against Ronald 
Ruettgers (Ruettgers) and the State.

[¶7]      There is some 
confusion in the record as to Ruettgers' job title at the time of the incident 
in question. The Vigils alleged that Ruettgers was an Assistant Warden/Training 
Officer for the Wyoming State Penitentiary. The State admitted Ruettgers was an 
Assistant Warden/Training Officer. Ruettgers denied that he was an Assistant 
Warden/Training Officer and asserted that he was a Staff Development Officer for 
the Wyoming State Penitentiary. The district court's opinion letter stated that 
"[t]he parties agree that at the time of accident in issue, Defendant Ruettgers 
was employed as an Assistant Warden/Training Officer by the State of Wyoming and 
he was acting within the scope of his employment." We will refer to Ruettgers as 
a training officer.

[¶8]      The Vigils 
alleged that Ruettgers and the State were liable for injuries that Ruettgers 
inflicted upon Gilbert Vigil on February 14, 1989. Gilbert Vigil claims he was 
injured when Ruettgers tackled him during a basketball game which was intended 
as a warmup for training officers participating in a refresher course at the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary. Ruettgers was acting within the scope of his 
employment when the incident occurred.

[¶9]      Gilbert Vigil 
filed two separate claims with the Wyoming State Auditor pursuant to the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act. The first claim was filed in February of 1991 and the 
second was filed in August of 1992. A risk supervisor for the State reviewed and 
denied both claims. The risk supervisor indicated by affidavit that neither 
Roseann Vigil nor Michael Vigil ever filed a claim with the State as required 
under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.

[¶10]   The State filed a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings on September 15, 1993. Ruettgers filed a motion for 
summary judgment on September 22, 1993. The district court granted judgment for 
Ruettgers and the State.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶11]   This appeal raises the issues of 
whether a training officer, acting within the scope of his employment at the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary, enjoyed immunity under the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act in February of 1989; whether failure to comply with Wyo. Stat. § 
1-39-113 (1988) bars claims; and whether the Vigils can raise an equal 
protection argument for the first time on appeal.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶12]   A motion for judgment on the 
pleadings is converted to a motion for summary judgment when matters outside the 
pleadings are presented. Bon v. Lemp, 444 P.2d 333, 334 (Wyo. 1968). The 
State's motion for judgment on the pleadings was converted to a motion for 
summary judgment when the risk supervisor's affidavit was presented to the 
district court. Id. The grant of the motion for judgment on the pleadings 
will be treated as a grant of summary judgment in favor of the State. The 
district court also granted Ruettgers' motion for summary 
judgment.

[¶13]   A summary judgment ruling is 
affirmed when there are no material issues of fact in dispute and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 
880 P.2d 103, 105 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Foianini v. Brinton, 855 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Wyo. 1993)); W.R.C.P. 56(c). "[T]he party who opposed the 
motion is given the benefit of any reasonable doubt and inferences drawn from 
the affidavits, depositions, and exhibits presented as underlying facts and are 
viewed in the light most favorable to that party." Wilder v. Cody Country 
Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 216 (Wyo. 1994). "This court accords no 
deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law." 
Id.

[¶14]   There are no material issues of 
fact disputed in this case. Therefore, the focus of our analysis will be on the 
rule of law applied by the district court. If the rule of law applied is 
supported by the record, we will uphold the ruling. Ulrich v. United Services 
Auto. Ass'n, 839 P.2d 942, 945 (Wyo. 1992).

IMMUNITY UNDER 
THE WYOMING GOVERNMENTAL CLAIMS ACT

[¶15]   The dispositive question in this 
case is whether a training officer, acting within the scope of his employment at 
the Wyoming State Penitentiary, enjoyed immunity from suit under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-39-101 through 1-39-120 (1988 & 
Cum.Supp. 1994), in February of 1989. The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act 
balances the interests of individuals harmed by negligent state action and the 
interests of the taxpayers who have to bear the cost of those injuries when 
sovereign immunity is removed. Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-102(a).

[¶16]   Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-104 provides, in 
pertinent part:

(a) A governmental entity 
and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted 
immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 
1-39-112.

[¶17]   Under the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act, immunity is the rule and liability is the exception. Hurst v. 
State, 698 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Wyo. 1985). Immunity is abrogated only if the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act contains express provisions waiving immunity. 
Id.

[¶18]   We have repeatedly held that Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 8 requires explicit legislative authorization before a suit can 
be maintained against the state. Worthington v. State, 598 P.2d 796, 801 
(Wyo. 1979); Hjorth Royalty Co. v. Trustees of University of Wyoming, 30 
Wyo. 309, 313, 222 P. 9, 9 (1924). As detailed below, immunity for training 
officers at the Wyoming State Penitentiary was not waived in 1989; therefore, 
the Vigils' claims are barred.

[¶19]   The Vigils argue that Ruettgers' 
immunity was removed by Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-112 which provides that peace officers 
are liable for tortious conduct that occurs while they are acting within the 
scope of their duties. Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-103 defines peace officer by reference 
to Wyo. Stat. § 7-2-101 (1987). The Vigils argue that the legislature intended 
to include Ruettgers, and other training officers at the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary, in the definition of peace officer. We analyze the definition of 
peace officer in effect in 1989 to determine whether the legislature intended to 
strip the training officers of their immunity by including them in the 
definition of peace officer.

[¶20]   This court analyzes statutes by 
looking first to the intent of the legislature. State Bd. of Equalization v. 
Tenneco Oil Co., 694 P.2d 97, 100 (Wyo. 1985). The legislature is assumed to 
have attached ordinary meaning to the terms used in the statute. Soles v. 
State, 809 P.2d 772, 773 (Wyo. 1991). The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act 
will be considered as a whole and applied in a way that fulfills its purpose. 
Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 
1042-43 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶21]   In 1989, Wyo. Stat. § 
7-2-101(a)(iv) provided:

"Peace officer" 
means:

(A) Any duly authorized 
sheriff, under sheriff or deputy sheriff;

(B) Any duly authorized 
member of a municipal police force, a college or university campus police force 
or the Wyoming highway patrol;

(C) Game and fish law 
enforcement personnel qualified pursuant to W.S. 9-1-701 through 9-1-707 and 
when enforcing Wyoming felony statutes following observation or discovery of the 
commission of a felony, during the performance of their statutory duties, or 
while responding to requests to assist other peace officers performing their 
official duties;

(D) Agents of the 
division of criminal investigation appointed pursuant to W.S. 9-1-613 and 
capitol security personnel designated and appointed under W.S. 9-2-1023(a)(i) [§ 
9-2-1023(a)(vi)]; and

(E) Inspectors of the 
Wyoming livestock board authorized under W.S. 11-20-201 who have qualified 
pursuant to W.S. 9-1-701 through 9-1-707 when enforcing W.S. 11-19-101 through 
11-24-115 and 11-29-101 through 11-30-113 and any laws prohibiting theft or 
mutilation of livestock or any part thereof.

[¶22]   In Hurst, 698 P.2d  at 
1133-34, interpreting an earlier version of Wyo. Stat. § 7-2-101, we held that 
parole officers are not "law enforcement officers" as defined in the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act. This court reasoned that if the legislature had 
intended to abrogate the parole officers' immunity, the parole officers would 
have been included in the definition of "law enforcement officer" articulated in 
Wyo. Stat. § 7-2-101. Hurst, 698 P.2d  at 1133-34. Parole officers were 
not included in the definition of "law enforcement officer" and they were, 
therefore, immune from suit. Id. at 1134.

[¶23]   The Hurst reasoning applies 
to the Vigils' claims. If training officers are not included in the definition 
of peace officer, then the legislature did not intend to waive their immunity. 
See, Soles, 809 P.2d  at 773-74 (holding inspections are not "maintenance" 
as defined in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act and that the inspectors are 
immune from suit); and Matthews v. Wyoming Dept. of Agriculture, 719 P.2d 216, 219 (Wyo. 1986) (holding that the commissioner of the Wyoming Department of 
Agriculture, the administrator of the state meat inspection program and a state 
meat inspector were not "law enforcement officers" as defined in the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act and were, therefore, immune from suit while acting in 
their official capacities).

[¶24]   Ruettgers, a training officer at 
the Wyoming State Penitentiary, was immune from suit while acting within the 
scope of his employment in 1989. Immunity for training officers at the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary had not been waived in 1989. The legislature provided no 
mechanism by which the Vigils could bring suit against the State in 1989; 
therefore, their claims are barred. Worthington, 598 P.2d  at 801; 
Hjorth Royalty Co., 222 P.  at 9.

[¶25]   The Vigils also argue that training 
officers were included in the definition of peace officers in 1991 when Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-2-101(a)(iv) was amended to include detention officers by reference to 
Wyo. Stat. §§ 9-1-701 through 9-1-707 (1991). The 1991 amendment to Wyo. Stat. § 
7-2-101(a)(iv) added subparagraphs (F) (G) and (H). The Vigils rely on Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-2-101(a)(iv)(H) (Cum.Supp. 1994), which provides, in pertinent 
part:

Any duly authorized 
detention officer in the performance of his duties and who has qualified 
pursuant to W.S. 9-1-701 through 9-1-707[.]

[¶26]   The Vigils contend that by adding 
detention officers to the statutory definition of peace officer in 1991, the 
legislature intended to include detention officers and training officers in the 
definition of peace officer in 1989. The opposite view is more compelling. 
Adding detention officers and training officers to the definition of peace 
officer in 1991 illustrates that the legislature did not intend to include them 
in the definition in 1989.

FAILURE TO 
COMPLY WITH WYO. STAT. § 1-39-113 BARS CLAIMS

[¶27]   The question of whether the claims 
asserted by Roseann Vigil and Michael Vigil are barred because of failure to 
comply with the filing requirements of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act must 
be answered in the affirmative. We hold that failure to meet the filing 
requirements of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act constitutes an independent 
basis for barring their claims.

[¶28]   Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-113(a) provides, 
in pertinent part:

No action shall be 
brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the claim upon which 
the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized statement in 
writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission * 
* *.

[¶29]   Failure to file a claim within the 
two year time period allowed under Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-113(a) bars the claim. 
Duran v. Board of County Com'rs of Sweetwater County, 787 P.2d 971, 974 
(Wyo. 1990). The risk supervisor's affidavit indicates that neither Roseann 
Vigil nor Michael Vigil filed a claim with the State. Their claims are, 
therefore, barred because of their failure to comply with Wyo. Stat. § 
1-39-113(a). Duran, 787 P.2d  at 974.

EQUAL PROTECTION 
ARGUMENT NOT RAISED BELOW

[¶30]   This court generally refuses to 
consider issues not presented to the district court and then raised for the 
first time on appeal. Iberlin v. TCI Cablevision of Wyoming, Inc., 855 P.2d 716, 728 (Wyo. 1993). Exceptions are available for jurisdictional issues 
and issues involving certain fundamental matters. Dennis v. Dennis, 675 P.2d 265, 266 (Wyo. 1984); Matter of Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 519 (Wyo. 1982).

[¶31]   Gilbert Vigil's equal protection 
argument does not involve a fundamental matter of which we will take cognizance. 
See White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102, 105 (Wyo. 1984) (addressing a 
separation of powers issue not raised in the district court or on appeal). 
Gilbert Vigil's right to sue the State is a statutory right. Wyo. Stat. §§ 
1-39-101 through 1-39-120. We refuse to consider, for the first time on appeal, 
the argument that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to Gilbert Vigil. 
See Bridge v. Eisenman Transport, Inc., 742 P.2d 768, 770 (Wyo. 
1987).

[¶32]   The State also invites us to rule 
on the question of whether the definition of detention officer, as articulated 
in Wyo. Stat. § 9-1-701(a)(iii), waives immunity for correctional officers at 
the Wyoming State Penitentiary. The invitation amounts to a request for an 
advisory opinion. We have repeatedly declined to render advisory opinions and 
will not do so at this time. See, Engberg v. State, 874 P.2d 890, 891-92 
(Wyo. 1994); Foster v. Wicklund, 778 P.2d 118, 121 (Wyo. 1989) and 
Brad Ragan Tire Co. v. Gearhart Industries, 744 P.2d 1125, 1126 (Wyo. 
1987).

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶33]   The fact that the State and 
Ruettgers were immune from suit in 1989 is dispositive of this case. Summary 
judgment was properly granted on that basis alone. Further, Roseann and Michael 
Vigil's claims were barred because of their failure to comply with the filing 
requirements of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Gilbert Vigil's equal 
protection argument was not raised below and we will not address it on 
appeal.

[¶34]   Affirmed.