Case Title: Commonwealth v. Henderson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11702 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  FREDERICK HENDERSON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 8, 2019. - November 30, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide. 
 Firearms. 
 Constitutional 
Law, Assistance 
of counsel, 
Identification. 
 Identification. 
 Evidence, 
Identity, 
Exculpatory, Expert opinion, Motive, Testimony before grand 
jury.  Witness, 
Expert. 
 Jury 
and Jurors. 
 Practice, 
Criminal, 
Capital 
case, Assistance 
of counsel, 
Instructions 
to jury, Argument by prosecutor, Transcript of testimony 
before grand jury, Grand jury proceedings, Jury and jurors, 
Challenge to jurors, Voir dire. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 19, 2011. 
 
 
The cases were tried before 
Patrick 
F. Brady, 
J.; a motion 
for a new trial, filed on February 11, 2015, was considered 
by William 
F. Sullivan, 
J., and a motion 
for reconsideration 
was 
heard by him. 
 
 
 
Dennis 
Shedd for 
the defendant. 
 
Cailin 
M. Campbell, 
Assistant 
District 
Attorney, 
for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
                    
 
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant 
of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation.  The jury also convicted the defendant of 
unlawful possession of a firearm.  The Commonwealth alleged that 
the defendant and his codefendant fatally shot the victim, 
Derrick Barnes, when Barnes returned to his former neighborhood 
to visit 
with family and friends.2 
 The motive for the killing, 
according to the Commonwealth, was that the victim had 
"snitched" to law enforcement in an unrelated case.  The 
defendant asserted an alibi defense by presenting evidence that 
he dropped his niece off at a church event around the time of 
the shooting. 
 
On appeal, the defendant challenges the convictions on 
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
contends as well that he is entitled to a new trial because the 
judge erred in allowing the introduction of certain evidence, 
and because the judge abused his discretion in allowing the 
prosecutor to exercise a peremptory challenge.  For the reasons 
that follow, we affirm the convictions and conclude that relief 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is not warranted. 
                    
 
 
2 At a joint trial with the defendant, the codefendant was 
convicted of murder in the first degree and unlawful possession 
of a firearm.  We affirmed the convictions.  See Commonwealth v. 
Herndon, 475 Mass. 324, 337 (2016). 
3 
 
1.  Background. 
 We recite 
the facts 
the jury could have 
found, reserving certain details for our discussion of 
particular 
issues. 
 The victim 
and his brother, 
Darryl 
Barnes,3 
grew up in the Dorchester section of Boston.  In 2009, the 
victim testified in an unrelated criminal trial, and then moved 
to a town outside Boston.  Thereafter, the victim rarely visited 
his old neighborhood. 
The defendant and the codefendant, who were friends, lived 
on the same street in the victim's former neighborhood.  The 
defendant was known by the nickname "Drano," while the 
codefendant was known as "Jigga."  During the time that the 
victim lived on the defendant's street, he "hung out" with the 
defendant and the codefendant. 
On August 27, 2011, the day of a large festival in Boston, 
the victim and his brother returned to their former address to 
visit family and friends.  The brothers met up with their 
cousin, Rondale Williams, and some friends.  Darryl left to 
drive another cousin home.  The victim and Williams continued to 
walk down the street, and stopped to talk to Shantee Griffin.  
Griffin, who had lived at her mother's house, at no. 14, for two 
years, knew Williams, and the victim was introduced to her as 
"Doughboy."  Eventually, the victim, Williams, another man, and 
                    
 
 
3 Because they share a last name, we refer to the victim's 
brother, Darryl Barnes, by his first name. 
4 
 
a woman gathered on the front porch of no. 11.  Griffin, who had 
left the victim and Williams, stood on the sidewalk in front of 
a house located 
across 
the street.4 
At 7:05 P.M., two men, later identified as the defendant 
and the codefendant, walked down the street and stopped in front 
of no. 11.  The victim and the codefendant got into an argument.  
The victim said, "I'm saying, mother, you want to holler at me, 
holler at me then."  The codefendant asked, "[N]ow, what's up 
with that rattin' shit?"  After this exchange, the codefendant 
and the defendant, standing side by side on the sidewalk, pulled 
out handguns and fired multiple shots at the victim.  The victim 
dropped to the floor.  Both assailants walked away from the 
porch.  The codefendant turned around, approached the fallen 
victim, and shot him again at close range.  The victim suffered 
five gunshot wounds, including a fatal wound to the head. 
Griffin telephoned 911 and then attempted to aid the victim 
until police and emergency medical services arrived.  At the 
scene she told police that she had heard shots from across the 
street but had not seen the shooter.  She also provided police 
                    
 
 
4 In a police interview and in her grand jury testimony, 
Griffin said that she had been positioned "across the street" 
from the house at no. 11, in the area of the houses at nos. 10-
12.  While the motion judge found that Griffin had been standing 
outside her house at no. 14, home surveillance videotape footage 
later revealed that Griffin actually had been standing farther 
down the street, in front of no. 6. 
5 
 
with her telephone number.  During a telephone interview on the 
evening of the shooting, Griffin told police the names of the 
two shooters.  Williams was interviewed by police approximately 
a week after the shooting.  He told police that he had been on 
the porch with the victim when the defendant and codefendant 
walked up onto the porch.  The codefendant pulled out a gun and 
shot the victim, and then shot him again after he fell. 
Police collected three expended .32 caliber shell casings 
at the crime scene, and recovered two .32 caliber projectiles 
from the victim's body.  The casings were fired from the same 
firearm.  The two projectiles, however, had been fired from two 
different weapons. 
At trial, the Commonwealth called Williams and Griffin as 
eyewitnesses.  Williams knew both the defendant and the 
codefendant.  He had met the defendant in 2005, when the 
defendant "was going through a situation" and came to live with 
one of Williams's relatives.  He had known the codefendant for 
approximately fifteen years.  Williams testified that he had 
been on the front porch with the victim immediately prior to the 
shooting.  He did not hear an argument prior to the gunfire.  
Williams testified that he could not identify anyone because he 
never looked at either gunman's face.  He also said that he had 
been highly intoxicated that evening from drinking vodka, 
smoking marijuana, and "popping" pills, and that he had been 
6 
 
"rolling a blunt" when the shooters walked up.  Williams also 
testified that he could not remember talking to police the week 
after the shooting, when he identified the codefendant as the 
shooter. 
Griffin testified that she did not know the defendant or 
the codefendant.  She said that she had heard gunshots, but did 
not see the shooting because she was looking in the opposite 
direction and, in any event, her view across the street had been 
obstructed.  She also testified that she had been pressured by a 
detective to testify falsely before the grand jury and to 
present information supplied by the police. 
After the judge determined that Griffin and Williams were 
feigning a lack of memory or testifying inconsistently to prior 
recorded statements, the Commonwealth was allowed to introduce 
out-of-court statements, admitted substantively, that Williams 
and Griffin 
previously 
had identified 
the defendant.5 
 These 
                    
 
5 The judge allowed the substantive introduction of 
statements by Griffin and Williams to the grand jury "insofar as 
inconsistent with their trial testimony."  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(1)(A) (2020).  He also allowed the introduction as 
substantive evidence of out-of-court statements of 
identification made by Griffin and Williams to police.  See 
Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(C).  The portions of Griffin's August 
2011 telephone conversation with detectives that were not 
relevant to her identification of the perpetrators also were 
admitted, over the defendant's objections, but the jury were 
instructed that they were introduced for the limited purpose of 
establishing Griffin's state of mind.  The judge instructed that 
these other statements were admissible only on the issue whether 
Griffin's grand jury testimony and statements of identification 
7 
 
statements included Griffin's telephone call to police, 
Griffin's and Williams's statements to police during interviews, 
and Griffin's and Williams's grand jury testimony. 
In his interview with investigators, introduced 
substantively, Williams stated that the defendant and the 
codefendant (whom he referred to as "Drano" and "Jigga," 
respectively) walked up to the porch at no. 11.  After an 
exchange of words with the victim, the codefendant pulled out a 
gun and fired.  Both men then started to leave.  The codefendant 
turned around, returned to the porch, and fired several shots at 
the wounded victim. 
On the evening of the shooting, Griffin told a responding 
patrol officer that she had heard shots but did not see 
anything.  She told another officer that she had seen a single 
shooter run away from the scene.  Later that evening, a 
detective telephoned Griffin to follow up on the information she 
had given the uniformed officers.  During that conversation, 
Griffin said that there had been two assailants, whom she 
identified as "Drano" and "Jigga." 
A few days later, detectives interviewed Griffin at Boston 
police headquarters.  She told them that she had been standing 
on the opposite side of the street and had observed the 
                    
 
"were the result of pressure, coercion or suggestion by the 
police." 
8 
 
defendant and the codefendant (known to her as "Drano" and 
"Jigga") walk down the street.  They said something to the 
victim (whom she knew as "Doughboy").  The codefendant then 
pulled out a gun and started firing at the victim.  She did not 
see a firearm in the defendant's hand.  She had known the 
defendant and codefendant "for about a year" from spending time 
on that street.  At the end of the interview, the detectives 
displayed two photographs of the individuals they believed to be 
Drano and Jigga.  Griffin identified the defendant as Drano and 
the codefendant 
as Jigga.6 
On September 1, 2011, Griffin testified before the grand 
jury.  She testified that she had lived on the same street for 
approximately two years.  When she first moved in, a friend 
introduced her to the codefendant.  The codefendant hung around 
at the top of the street, and Griffin would see him "almost 
every day."  Griffin was less familiar with the defendant.  
During the two years that she had lived on the same street, in 
her mother's house, she had seen the defendant "three to four 
times."  They had never had an actual conversation, but were 
familiar enough with each other to say hello. 
                    
 
6 The photograph itself, which was introduced in evidence, 
shows that Griffin wrote on the back, "I know this to be 
DrainO." 
9 
 
The defendant, who lived with his sister and his niece, 
presented an alibi defense.  On the evening of the shooting, his 
niece had been scheduled to dance at a church event, and the 
defendant agreed to take her there.  His niece's father, the 
church pastor, telephoned at 7 P.M. to find out where she was, 
and was told that the defendant was on his way.  The defendant 
dropped his niece off at the church at about 7:05 to 7:10 P.M., 
and returned to his apartment sometime between 7:20 and 
7:25 P.M. 
2.  Discussion. 
 The defendant 
raises 
three claims 
in this 
direct appeal from his conviction combined with his appeal from 
the denial of his motion for a new trial.  First, he contends 
that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, in 
violation of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Second, he argues that the 
judge erred in allowing a transcript of Griffin's grand jury 
testimony to be introduced in evidence.  Third, the defendant 
maintains that the prosecutor impermissibly exercised a 
peremptory challenge to exclude an African-American juror. 
a.  Ineffective 
assistance 
of counsel. 
 In his motion for a 
new trial, and in his supplemental motion, the defendant raised 
numerous claims of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel.  
In particular, the defendant argued that trial counsel was 
10 
 
ineffective because he (a) did not move to suppress Griffin's 
out-of-court identification; (b) did not present exculpatory 
evidence that would have called into question Griffin's ability 
to observe the shooters from across the street; (c) did not 
present testimony from an expert on eyewitness identification; 
(d) did not request a limiting instruction regarding the 
codefendant's motive to harm the victim for violating the "no 
snitching" code; and (e) did not object to misstatements in the 
prosecutor's closing argument. 
The motion judge, 
who was not the trial 
judge,7 
ruled that 
the defendant had not established that trial counsel was 
ineffective; trial counsel's performance did not fall below that 
which could be expected from an ordinarily fallible lawyer; and 
the defendant had not been deprived of an otherwise available, 
substantial 
ground of defense. 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Saferian, 
366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974). 
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
in a case of murder in the first degree, we apply a more 
favorable 
standard 
of review than that described 
in Saferian. 
 
We use essentially the same standard as we would for an 
unpreserved error at trial, and determine whether there was 
error and whether it created a substantial likelihood of a 
                    
 
 
7 The trial judge had retired. 
11 
 
miscarriage 
of justice. 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Vargas, 
475 Mass. 
338, 358 (2016).  Otherwise put, "[w]e consider whether there 
was an error in the course of the trial (by defense counsel, the 
prosecutor, or the judge) and, if there was, whether that error 
was likely to have influenced 
the jury's 
conclusion." 
 Id., 
quoting 
Commonwealth 
v. Lessieur, 
472 Mass. 317, 327, cert. 
denied, 577 U.S. 963 (2015).  If a defendant's claim of 
ineffective assistance is based on a tactical or strategic 
decision, however, we apply the more rigorous standard providing 
that, to be ineffective, the attorney's decision must have been 
manifestly 
unreasonable. 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Lang, 473 Mass. 1, 
14 (2015); 
Commonwealth 
v. Kolenovic, 
471 Mass. 664, 674-675 
(2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189 (2017). 
 
i.  Motion 
to suppress 
identification. 
 "The 
failure 
of 
counsel to litigate a viable claim of an illegal search and 
seizure is a denial of the defendant's Federal and State 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel" 
(citation 
omitted). 
 Commonwealth 
v. Comita, 
441 Mass. 
86, 90 
(2004).  To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim on this basis, a defendant is required to demonstrate the 
existence of a viable claim and a likelihood of success on the 
merits 
if a motion to suppress 
had been filed. 
 Id. at 90-91.  
Upon a finding that trial counsel did not file a motion to 
suppress where a defendant had a meritorious claim, a defendant 
12 
 
must demonstrate as well that admission of the evidence that 
could have been suppressed created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage 
of justice. 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Fulgiam, 
477 Mass. 
20, 29, 36-37, 
cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 330 (2017); 
Commonwealth 
v. Banville, 
457 Mass. 530, 534 (2010). 
 
Here, trial counsel provided an affidavit explaining his 
reasons for not filing a motion to exclude Griffin's out-of-
court identification.  He averred, "I thought a motion to 
suppress would not succeed because a judge would consider a 
dispute as to how often Griffin had seen [the defendant] to be a 
jury issue and an identification from a single photo is proper 
when the witness knows the perpetrator." 
The motion judge found that counsel reasonably believed 
that a motion to suppress the identification would have had a 
minimal chance for success where there was evidence that the 
witness 
knew the suspect. 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Carr, 464 Mass. 
855, 871 (2013) ("the witnesses knew the defendant from the 
neighborhood and witnessed the shooting in broad daylight; it is 
unlikely that suggestiveness would have played much of a role in 
their identifications"); 
Commonwealth 
v. Adams, 
458 Mass. 
766, 
770-771 (2011) ("Traditional identification procedures such as 
photographic arrays, showups, and lineups were designed 
primarily for witnesses who had never before seen a particular 
individual, or who may have seen the individual previously but 
13 
 
on a limited basis.  They are not normally used, and are not 
required, for witnesses who know an individual well").  On this 
basis, the judge concluded that trial counsel's decision did not 
deprive the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial 
ground of defense. 
Where, as here, the motion judge was not the trial judge, 
and did not conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion, we 
regard ourselves as in as good a position to assess the record 
as was the motion 
judge. 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Grace, 
397 Mass. 
303, 307 (1986).  After careful review of the record, we agree 
that the defendant did not establish that excluding the out-of-
court identification likely would have influenced the jury's 
verdicts.  In her telephone conversation with police, and 
subsequent interview at police headquarters, Griffin identified 
Drano as one of the two men involved in the shooting.  The 
detectives displayed a single photograph of the defendant, and 
then a single photograph of the codefendant, to Griffin after 
she provided this information.  One of the detectives explained 
that he displayed the individual photographs in order to confirm 
that the individuals Griffin knew as Drano and Jigga were, 
indeed, the defendant and the codefendant. 
In his reply brief, the defendant concedes that there was 
no doubt that he was known as Drano.  Three witnesses, Darryl, 
Williams, and the codefendant, also referred to the defendant by 
14 
 
this nickname.  Because the defendant has not shown that any 
error in choosing not to file a motion to suppress likely would 
have influenced the jury's verdicts, we need not address the 
issue whether trial counsel bypassed a meritorious motion to 
suppress the out-of-court identification. 
 
ii.  Exculpatory 
evidence 
of misidentification. 
 The 
defendant argues that trial counsel should have introduced 
exculpatory evidence that Griffin provided police a description 
of Drano's height that did not reflect the defendant's actual 
height.  The defendant maintains that showing that portions of 
Griffin's description did not match the defendant's actual 
characteristics would have "provided objective support" for her 
testimony at trial that she had not seen the shooter.  In her 
telephone conversation with the detectives, Griffin described 
Jigga as a black male, aged twenty-seven to twenty-eight, about 
five feet, seven inches tall, with a dark mark on the right side 
of his cheek.  She described Drano as a black male in his 
twenties, with "brown" skin and a "low haircut," wearing a blue 
polo shirt.  Later, in her in-person interview, Griffin told 
detectives that Jigga is approximately five feet, seven inches 
to five feet, eight inches tall, and that Drano is shorter.  In 
response to further questioning, Griffin estimated that Jigga is 
approximately six feet tall, and Drano approximately two inches 
shorter. 
15 
 
 
Trial counsel acknowledged that "Griffin stated Drano was 
shorter than Jigga, but the booking sheets show that [they] are 
the same height" (both are listed as six feet tall in Boston 
police department booking sheets).  Counsel explained that he 
did not attempt to elicit that evidence at trial because it 
would not have added much to the misidentification defense.  
Instead, in his closing argument, counsel focused on Griffin's 
trial testimony that she heard gunshots but did not see 
anything, and attempted to distance the testimony from Griffin's 
prior statements by arguing that she was a malleable witness, 
she had not been standing where she said she had been, and she 
had been so upset by her belief that her close friend had been 
killed that she had been unable to observe anything accurately.  
Counsel urged the jury to consider Griffin's demeanor and 
actions on the surveillance video footage as evidence that she 
would not have been in a position to identify anyone. 
The motion judge determined that the failure to introduce 
the booking sheets did not deprive the defendant of effective 
representation.  He noted that "the height difference was only a 
couple of inches at most.  The jury had the opportunity to view 
both defendants together at trial and make their own 
observations." 
 
In light of Griffin's trial testimony that she did not know 
the defendant, and did not see the shooters, trial counsel's 
16 
 
decision not to draw further attention to Griffin's previous 
statements of identification was not ineffective. 
 
iii.  Expert 
on eyewitness 
identification. 
 The defendant 
challenges the adequacy of trial counsel's investigation of the 
Commonwealth's identification evidence.  The defendant maintains 
that trial counsel was unable to make a reasonable tactical 
judgment as to how to challenge the eyewitnesses because he did 
not retain an expert witness to explore well-established factors 
contributing 
to mistakes 
in identification.8 
Trial counsel did not file a motion for funds to retain an 
expert witness because he believed that the judge would have 
denied it based on Griffin's familiarity with the defendant.  
Counsel also believed that he would be able adequately to 
                    
 
8 The defendant also claims that trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance because he should have joined the 
codefendant's request for an enhanced identification instruction 
based on State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011).  In Herndon, 
475 Mass. at 328, the codefendant argued that the judge erred in 
declining to give the requested instruction in light of the 
court's subsequent adoption of provisional enhanced 
identification instructions in Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 
352, 376, 379-388 (2015) (Appendix), S.C., 478 Mass. 1025 
(2018).  We concluded that the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion because the codefendant had not provided the trial 
judge sufficient information to enable "the judge to determine 
whether the principles in the defendant's proposed instruction 
were 'so generally accepted' that it would be appropriate to 
instruct the jury regarding them.  Herndon, supra at 329, 
quoting Gomes, supra at 359-360.  The defendant cannot establish 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice here, on 
the basis of his request for the same enhanced instruction, 
where he provided no information whatsoever as to the same point 
on which the codefendant's presentation was inadequate. 
17 
 
explore deficiencies in the identification evidence through 
cross-examination of the Commonwealth's witnesses. 
The motion judge reviewed an affidavit submitted by an 
expert witness retained by postconviction counsel.  The expert 
witness discussed the variables that can affect witness 
identifications generally and that might have influenced 
Griffin's and Williams's identifications of the defendant, 
including distance, lighting, exposure duration, stress, and 
intoxication.  The expert opined that the presence of these risk 
factors increased the likelihood of misidentification. 
The motion judge concluded similarly that the presentation 
of an expert witness would not have accomplished anything 
material for the defense.  He noted first that trial counsel 
challenged the reliability of the pretrial identification 
evidence through cross-examination of the Commonwealth's 
witnesses.  More importantly, the motion judge concluded that 
the ability of Griffin and Williams to identify the defendant 
was not the primary issue at trial.  Both witnesses 
unequivocally testified that they did not observe the shooting 
itself and could not identify the assailants.  The judge 
observed, "Rather, the issue before the jury was whether the 
eyewitnesses told the truth prior to trial when they identified 
[the defendant] as one of the shooters to the police and the 
grand jury or whether they were telling the truth at trial when 
18 
 
they testified that they previously lied and had not actually 
seen the shooters." 
"The decision to call, or not to call, an expert witness 
fits squarely within the realm of strategic or tactical 
decisions." 
 Commonwealth 
v. Ayala, 
481 Mass. 46, 63 (2018), 
and 
cases cited.  Here, the defendant has not established that trial 
counsel's decision not to retain an expert on eyewitness 
identification 
was manifestly 
unreasonable. 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Watson, 
455 Mass. 246, 257-258 
(2009). 
 The jury were 
required to resolve an issue of credibility, i.e., whether 
Griffin and Williams had been truthful, prior to trial, when 
they identified the assailants as Drano and Jigga.  
See Commonwealth 
v. Alvarez, 
480 Mass. 299, 313, S.C., 
480 Mass. 
1015 (2018) (witness credibility was not appropriate subject of 
expert testimony).  An expert witness's testimony concerning 
factors related to mistaken eyewitness identification would not 
have materially aided the defense; the jury did not need an 
expert to tell them that Griffin and Williams were perhaps 
mistaken due to external factors -- both testified that they did 
not closely observe the shooting and insisted that they had not 
been in a position 
to identify 
the suspects. 
 See Ayala, supra 
at 65 ("we cannot say that trial counsel's decision not to call 
an expert on eyewitness identification was one that lawyers of 
19 
 
ordinary training and skill in criminal law would not consider 
competent" [quotation and citation omitted]). 
iv.  Limiting 
instruction 
on motive 
evidence. 
 Prior 
to 
both men opening fire, the codefendant asked the victim, "[N]ow, 
what's up with that rattin' shit?"  During cross-examination, 
the codefendant stated that snitches could be both a "bad thing" 
and a "good thing," but agreed with the proposition that "bad 
things" could "happen" to "snitches."  The codefendant responded 
affirmatively to the questions whether snitches could get "beat 
up," "stabbed," or even "killed," "depending on who they told 
on."  The prosecutor used the codefendant's testimony to argue 
that both defendants "were mad about [the victim] testifying, 
and bad things happen to snitches." 
Trial counsel did not request an instruction limiting the 
jury's consideration of the codefendant's testimony to the 
codefendant alone.  Counsel acknowledged, in his affidavit, that 
he "should have done so because there was no evidence that [the 
defendant] was aware that [the victim] had testified at a trial 
in 2009 or that he shared [the codefendant's] opinions about 
snitching." 
In Commonwealth 
v. Keo, 467 Mass. 25, 33 (2014), 
we 
discussed the admissibility of evidence bearing on a defendant's 
state of mind that a codefendant was motivated to kill the 
victim.  The disputed evidence in that case consisted of numbers 
20 
 
scrawled on the codefendant's bedroom wall purporting to signify 
a desire 
to kill members 
of a rival gang. 
 Id. at 30, 32.  We 
concluded that attributing the import of the writings on the 
codefendant's 
wall to the defendant 
was "problematic." 
 Id. 
at 33.  There was no evidence that the defendant saw the 
writings on the codefendant's wall and affirmed his willingness 
to harm members 
of the rival gang. 
 Id. 
Here, by contrast, there was circumstantial evidence from 
which the jury could infer that the defendant and the 
codefendant shared the same motive to kill the victim.  The 
defendant stood side by side with the codefendant when the 
codefendant expressed displeasure about "rattin'."  As soon as 
the codefendant made this statement, in effect accusing the 
victim of violating the "no snitching" code, both men produced 
firearms and shot the victim. 
Moreover, the defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced 
by trial counsel's failure to request a limiting instruction.  
Motive is not an element of the crime of murder.  
See Commonwealth 
v. Carlson, 
448 Mass. 501, 508-509 
(2007). 
 The 
Commonwealth introduced substantial evidence that the defendant 
shared the codefendant's intent to kill the victim.  Producing a 
firearm and firing at the victim from close range is sufficient 
to establish 
such an intent. 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Gonzalez, 
475 
Mass. 396, 416 (2016) (bringing firearm to lethal encounter 
21 
 
implied 
shared 
intent 
to kill); 
Commonwealth 
v. Rosa, 468 Mass. 
231, 233-234 (2014) (defendant was one of three shooters seen 
firing 
at victim); 
Commonwealth 
v. Britt, 
465 Mass. 87, 88-89 
(2013) (intent to kill established where defendant brought gun 
to scene and fired at victim). 
v.  Prosecutor's 
closing 
argument. 
 The defendant 
also 
argues that counsel was ineffective because he did not object to 
portions of the prosecutor's closing argument.  We review this 
claim to determine 
whether 
any error 
in failing 
to object 
would 
have created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 Vargas, 
475 Mass. at 358.  See Commonwealth 
v. Martinez, 
476 Mass. 186, 198 (2017). 
 Accordingly, 
we assess 
the closing argument "in the context of the entire argument, and 
in light of the judge's instructions to the jury and the 
evidence 
at trial." 
 Commonwealth 
v. Carriere, 
470 Mass. 1, 19 
(2014). 
 
The defendant contends that the prosecutor misstated the 
evidence in discussing Griffin's testimony.  In particular, in 
describing Griffin's familiarity with the defendant and the 
codefendant, the prosecutor argued, "But these are gentlemen who 
[Griffin] knew for essentially two years, but at least a year.  
On a daily basis [Griffin] saw both of these guys.  She saw them 
on a daily basis."  According to the defendant, this argument 
has no basis in the trial evidence, as there was undisputed 
22 
 
testimony that Griffin had seen the defendant only three or four 
times over the course of the two years that she lived on the 
defendant's street. 
We agree that the prosecutor, in part, misstated the 
evidence with respect to Griffin's familiarity with the 
defendant.  In her interview, Griffin told the police that she 
had known the defendant 
and codefendant 
"[f]or 
about a year."9 
 
In her grand jury testimony, Griffin said that she lived on the 
same street for two years.  The prosecutor then asked, "How 
often, during the time that you lived [there], would you see or 
encounter [the defendant]?"  She answered, "Three to four 
times."  Thus, while the evidence could support the argument 
that Griffin had known the defendant over the course of two 
years, at no point did Griffin testify, or tell the police, that 
she had seen the defendant "on a daily basis." 
The defendant also contends that the prosecutor misstated 
the evidence by arguing that Griffin testified that she saw the 
defendant shoot the victim.  The prosecutor argued that the 
defendant was "the person in the [g]rand [j]ury [Griffin] 
                    
 
9 We reject the defendant's argument that this statement was 
admitted for the limited purpose of demonstrating whether 
Griffin's grand jury testimony was coerced.  Griffin's 
familiarity with the defendant provided context for her 
identification of the suspect and, therefore, was admissible 
without limitation.  See Commonwealth v. Adams, 458 Mass. 766, 
772 (2011); Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(C) (2020). 
23 
 
indicated, as well, was the person who shot [the victim]."  To 
the contrary, however, Griffin testified before the grand jury 
that the codefendant opened fire, and that she did not see a gun 
in the defendant's hand.  Thus, as the Commonwealth concedes, 
the prosecutor improperly misstated the facts. 
 
In the context of the argument as a whole, however, we 
conclude that the improper statements did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  While they 
were misstatements on the critical issue of identification, 
these were relatively brief misstatements in a complicated case 
involving two defendants and testimony by reluctant witnesses.  
They were not repeated or emphasized, and would not have 
detracted significantly from the other, accurate statements 
about the identification 
evidence. 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Copeland, 
481 Mass. 255, 264 (2019); 
Commonwealth 
v. Burgos, 
462 Mass. 53, 72, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1072 (2012).  In 
addition, the judge provided the jury with instructions that 
they were the sole and exclusive finders of fact, and that it is 
the jury's "collective memory [of the evidence] that controls," 
and not the memory of counsel.  The judge also instructed that 
the final arguments were just that:  "Arguments are arguments.  
They are not evidence." 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Goitia, 
480 Mass. 
763, 768 (2018); 
Commonwealth 
v. Rakes, 
478 Mass. 
22, 46-47 
(2017); 
Commonwealth 
v. Kozec, 
399 Mass. 514, 517 (1987). 
24 
 
b.  Admission 
of grand jury transcript. 
 The defendant 
challenges the decision to allow the introduction of Griffin's 
grand jury testimony on the ground that most of Griffin's trial 
testimony did not contradict what she said before the grand 
jury. 
On direct examination, Griffin testified that she did not 
recall testifying before the grand jury.  When presented with 
excerpts of her grand jury testimony, she testified that she 
either did not remember the events, or denied that she had made 
those statements.  For example, she testified concerning her 
familiarity with the defendant: 
Q.:  "And then you were asked a question [at the grand 
jury]:  'Ms. Griffin, during that period of time that you 
lived on [the defendant's] street, did you know an 
individual who went by the name of Drano?'  And the 
indication was yes.  Did I read that correctly?" 
 
A.:  "No." 
Q.:  "Did I read that correctly?" 
A.:  "Yeah, you read the paper." 
After a sidebar conference, the judge allowed the 
Commonwealth's motion to introduce the grand jury testimony 
substantively because he found that Griffin's lack of memory was 
feigned.  The prosecutor moved to introduce a copy of a 
transcript of Griffin's grand jury testimony in evidence.  The 
codefendant objected that introduction of the transcript would 
"accentuate that which was presented once [to the jury] in 
25 
 
testimonial form" by what the prosecutor had read during his 
questioning of Griffin.  The defendant joined this objection and 
added that he would be prejudiced by the cumulative presentation 
of evidence, much of which was duplicative but some of which had 
not been introduced at all.  The judge overruled the objection, 
and allowed the transcript to be introduced substantively, 
pending any redactions the parties might seek. 
Because the objection was preserved, we review the 
defendant's 
claim for prejudicial 
error. 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Nardi, 
452 Mass. 379, 396 (2008). 
In Commonwealth 
v. Andrade, 
481 Mass. 139, 141 (2018), 
we 
considered a claim that the Commonwealth improperly had 
presented grand jury testimony that was admitted as substantive 
evidence.  As in this case, the prosecutor there "chose to read 
relevant excerpts from the transcripts, punctuated by questions 
to the witness as to whether [the witness] recalled giving the 
grand jury testimony." 
 Id.  We held that "although 
the 
prosecutor's method was unconventional," the judge did not err 
in allowing the jury to treat the grand jury testimony as 
substantive 
evidence. 
 Id. at 144.  In so holding, 
we noted 
that 
the preferable method of introducing prior testimony as 
substantive evidence is to "read [the transcripts] directly into 
the record either by one person reading the questions and a 
colleague reading the answers, or by one person reading the 
26 
 
entire excerpt but making clear which portions are questions and 
which are answers." 
 Id. 
Based on our previous decisions, the judge believed that 
admission of a transcript to supplement oral testimony was a 
matter 
of his discretion. 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Maguire, 
392 
Mass. 466, 473 (1984); 
Commonwealth 
v. Bianco, 
388 Mass. 358, 
370, S.C., 390 Mass. 254 (1983); 
Commonwealth 
v. Mandeville, 
386 
Mass. 393, 404-406 (1982).  He did not have the benefit of 
the Andrade 
opinion 
to guide his decision. 
 If he did, the judge 
would have sustained the defendant's objection to the admission 
of the transcripts in evidence. 
We discern no reversible error from the manner in which the 
grand jury evidence was presented to the jury.  The grand jury 
transcripts that were introduced as exhibits may have been 
cumulative of the excerpts presented to Griffin, and it would 
have been preferable to read the transcript in evidence as set 
forth in Andrade. 
 It is entirely 
speculative 
to assume, 
however, as the defendant argues, that the jury improperly 
focused on this transcript to the exclusion of contradictory 
evidence.10 
                    
 
 
10 Moreover, to the extent the defendant argues, as he did 
in his motion for a new trial, that portions of the transcript 
were introduced that had not first been presented as questions 
to the witness before the jury, nothing in the transcript that 
was other than testimony concerning identification (a 
27 
 
c.  Peremptory 
challenge. 
 The defendant 
argues 
that the 
judge erred in ruling that the defendant had not established a 
prima facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges 
sufficient to support his objection to the prosecutor's exercise 
of his fourth peremptory challenge to excuse a black woman. 
The Fourteenth Amendment and art. 12 "prohibit a party from 
exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of race or 
gender." 
 Commonwealth 
v. Lopes, 
478 Mass. 593, 597 (2018). 
 
See Batson v. 
Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986); 
Commonwealth 
v. Soares, 
377 Mass. 461, 486, cert. 
denied, 
444 U.S. 881 
(1979). 
 A Batson-Soares 
objection 
to a proposed 
peremptory 
challenge, such as that raised by trial counsel, triggers a 
three-step 
process. 
 Commonwealth 
v. Robertson, 
480 Mass. 
383, 
390-391 (2018).  First, the burden is on the objecting party to 
establish a "prima facie showing of impropriety" sufficient to 
"overcome[] the presumption of regularity afforded to peremptory 
challenges" 
(citation 
omitted). 
 Id.  If the judge finds that 
the objecting party established a prima facie case of 
discrimination, the party attempting to exercise the peremptory 
challenge bears the burden of proving a "group-neutral" reason 
for striking 
the juror.  Id. at 391.  Finally, 
the judge 
                    
 
description of the events surrounding the shooting) would have 
made a difference in the jury's thinking. 
28 
 
evaluates whether the proffered reason is both adequate and 
genuine. 
 Id. 
We have emphasized that the burden of making the requisite 
prima facie showing is not "a terribly weighty one."  
See Commonwealth 
v. Jones, 
477 Mass. 
307, 321 (2017), 
quoting 
Commonwealth 
v. Maldonado, 
439 Mass. 
460, 463 n.4 
(2003).  The presumption of regularity can be rebutted by "a 
prima facie showing of either a pattern of challenges of members 
of the same discrete group, or, in certain circumstances, 
challenge of a single prospective juror within a protected 
class, where there is a likelihood that [the juror is] being 
excluded from the jury solely on the basis of . . . group 
membership" 
(quotation 
and citations 
omitted). 
 Commonwealth 
v. Issa, 
466 Mass. 1, 8 (2013). 
 In determining 
whether 
a 
pattern of discrimination exists, a judge may consider all of 
the relevant circumstances, including (1) "the number and 
percentage of group members who have been excluded"; (2) "the 
possibility of an objective group-neutral explanation for the 
strike or strikes"; (3) "any similarities between excluded 
jurors and those, not members of the allegedly targeted group, 
who have been struck"; (4) "differences among the various 
members of the allegedly targeted group who were struck"; 
(5) "whether those excluded are members of the same protected 
29 
 
group as the defendant or the victim"; and (6) "the composition 
of the jurors 
already 
seated." 
 Jones, 
supra 
at 322. 
The defendant 
raised a Batson-Soares 
objection 
to the 
Commonwealth's challenge to juror no. 179, "the third or fourth 
black person" excused by the prosecutor.  The trial judge 
rejected the defendant's contention that the prosecutor had 
engaged in a pattern of excluding black jurors.  The judge 
observed that the seated jurors included "four black people out 
of eight . . . .  So, obviously the Commonwealth passed on 
them."  The judge observed that the prosecutor had not exercised 
peremptory challenges on four black jurors who had been excused 
by request of the defendant or the codefendant.  He commented, 
"So that looks like . . . eight black African Americans that 
[the prosecutor has] passed on."  Out of fourteen challenges, 
the prosecutor sought to remove three prospective black jurors.  
The judge concluded, "I see no pattern at all.  So I'm not going 
to inquire as to [the prosecutor's] reason for excluding [juror 
no. 179]." 
It does not appear that the prosecutor exercised a 
disproportionate number of peremptory challenges against 
prospective black jurors.  Juror no. 179 was the thirty-seventh 
potential juror the judge found to be indifferent.  Of the 
thirty-seven indifferent jurors, twelve were black, and the 
prosecutor was content with nine (seventy-five percent) of 
30 
 
those.  In other words, the prosecutor used peremptory 
challenges to exclude three of the twelve indifferent black 
jurors (one quarter of the indifferent jurors).  At the point 
when the defendant 
raised 
his Batson-Soares 
objection, 
four of 
the eight seated 
jurors were black. 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Oberle, 
476 Mass. 539, 546 (2017).  Because one-half of the then-seated 
jurors were black, and three-quarters of the indifferent black 
jurors had not been excluded, there was no abuse of discretion 
in the judge's determination that the defendant had not 
established a pattern of racial discrimination. 
 
Relying 
on Jones, 
477 Mass. at 324-325, 
the defendant 
argues that the trial judge erred in finding that the "presence 
of some black people on the jury" was dispositive.  This case is 
readily 
distinguishable 
from Jones. 
 In that case, the trial 
judge "relied primarily, if not exclusively, on the presence of 
the single African-American who at that point had been 
seated." 
 Id. at 325.  Compare 
Commonwealth 
v. Ortega, 
480 Mass. 
603, 607 (2018) ("judge relied exclusively on the presence of a 
single female African-American who at that point had been seated 
in concluding that the defendant had not met his prima facie 
burden").  Here, by contrast, the trial judge did not rely 
"exclusively" or "primarily" on the number of black jurors 
seated in the jury box.  He considered the number of potential 
jurors determined to be indifferent and assessed whether the 
31 
 
prosecutor had challenged a disproportionate number of black 
jurors.  We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's 
finding that the defendant did not establish a prima facie case 
of excluding black jurors. 
 
d.  Review 
under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant 
asks 
us to use our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant him 
a new trial or to reduce the verdict of murder in the first 
degree.  We have conducted a thorough review of the entire 
record and discern no basis upon which to exercise our authority 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
3.  Conclusion. 
 We affirm 
the defendant's 
convictions 
and 
the denial of his motion for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.