Case Title: Operton v. Labor & Industry Review Commission

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP001055

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 46 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1055 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Lela M. Operton, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Labor and Industry Review Commission, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
Walgreen Co. Illinois, 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
369 Wis. 2d 166, 880 N.W.2d 169 
(2016 WI App 37 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 4, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 10, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
John C. Albert 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs, joined by BRADLEY, A. 
W., J. (opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER, J. concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, R. G., J. concurs, joined by GABLEMAN, 
J. and KELLY, J. (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there was a brief 
by William Sherlin Sample  and Labor & Industry Review 
Commission, Madison, and oral argument by William Sherlin Sample 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief by Marilyn 
Townsend, and Law Offices of Marilyn Townsend, Madison, and oral 
argument by Marilyn Townsend. 
 
 
 
2 
For Amicus Curiae Wisconsin Employment Lawyers Association, 
a brief was filed by Victor Forberger, Madison. 
 
For Amicus Curiae Wisconsin State AFL-CIO, a brief was 
filed by Matthew R. Robbins, Sara J. Geenen and The Previant Law 
Firm, Milwaukee. 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 46
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP1055 
(L.C. No. 
2014CV3050) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Lela M. Operton, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Walgreen Co. Illinois, 
 
          Defendant. 
FILED 
 
MAY 4, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded.    
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   This is a review of 
a published decision of the court of appeals1 reversing a circuit 
court order that affirmed a determination by the Labor and 
Industry Review Commission (LIRC).2  LIRC determined that Lela 
Operton (Operton) was ineligible for unemployment benefits 
because she was terminated for substantial fault.  
                                                 
1 Operton v. LIRC, 2016 WI App 37, 369 Wis. 2d 166, 880 
N.W.2d 169. 
2 The Honorable John C. Albert of Dane County presided. 
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
2 
 
¶2 
We conclude that LIRC incorrectly denied Operton 
unemployment benefits.  Operton was entitled to unemployment 
benefits because her actions do not fit within the definition of 
substantial 
fault 
as 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.04(5g)(a)(2013-14)3.  Stated more fully, Operton was 
terminated for committing "One or more inadvertent errors" 
during the course of her employment, and therefore pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2., she was not terminated for 
substantial fault.  We further conclude that, as a matter of 
law, Operton's eight accidental or careless cash-handling errors 
over the course of 80,000 cash-handling transactions were 
inadvertent. 
¶3 
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and remand 
to LIRC to determine the amount of unemployment compensation 
Operton is owed.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
The 
following 
undisputed 
facts, 
unless 
otherwise 
noted, are based on the findings of the Department of Workforce 
Development's (DWD) administrative law judge (ALJ) that LIRC 
adopted.  From July 17, 2012 to March 24, 2014, Operton worked 
as 
a 
full-time 
service 
clerk 
for 
Walgreens. 
 
Operton's 
employment sometimes entailed more than one hundred cash-
handling transactions in a day during the twenty months she was 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
3 
 
employed full-time by Walgreens.  She completed an estimated 
80,000 cash-handling transactions4 throughout her employment.   
¶5 
During her period of employment, Operton made various 
cash-handling errors.  First, on October 19, 2012, Operton 
accepted a Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) check for $8.67 
when the check should have been for $5.78.  As a result, 
Walgreens lost $2.89 and gave Operton a verbal warning as 
punishment for her mistake.  
¶6 
Next, on February 12, 2013, Operton accepted a WIC 
check for $14.46, but did not get the customer's signature on 
the check.  On March 6, 2013, she gave a $16.73 check back to a 
customer, and Walgreens suffered a $16.73 monetary loss as a 
result.  Walgreens was unable to process these two checks and 
gave Operton a written warning for these two errors.  
¶7 
A few months later, Operton took a WIC check for 
$27.63 before the date on which it was valid.  Walgreens was 
unable to process the check, and Operton received a final 
written warning.  
¶8 
On January 1, 2014, Operton returned a WIC check for 
$84.95 back to a customer that the customer had tried to use to 
purchase $84.95 worth of goods.  Walgreens suffered a monetary 
loss of $84.95 because of this error and gave Operton an 
additional final written warning.  And, on January 29, 2014, 
Operton received another final written warning as well as a two-
                                                 
4 Neither side disputes that this is roughly the number of 
cash-handling transactions that Operton completed.  
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
4 
 
day suspension after she accepted a check for $6.17 even though 
it was valid for $6.00, thereby causing Walgreens to lose 
seventeen cents.  Soon after, a customer attempted to pay for 
$9.26 worth of items using a food share debit card, but the 
customer left the store without completing the transaction on 
the pin pad, which caused Walgreens to suffer a monetary loss of 
$9.26.  Operton was issued another final written warning, which 
stated that any additional cash-handling errors would lead to 
her termination.  
¶9 
Furthermore, on March 22, 2014, Operton allowed a 
customer to use a credit card to purchase $399.27 worth of 
items, but did not check the customer's identification in 
violation of Walgreen's policy that employees must check a 
customer's identification on credit card purchases over $50.  As 
a result, Walgreens suffered a monetary loss of $399.27.  
Walgreens later found out that the credit card was stolen when a 
manager was contacted by police.  
¶10 As a result, on March 24, 2014, Walgreens terminated 
Operton's employment.  Walgreens indicated that Operton was 
terminated due to multiple cash-handling errors as well as her 
inability 
to 
improve 
despite 
the 
accompanying 
warnings.  
Walgreens did not contend that any of Operton's errors were 
intentional or malicious.   
¶11 After being terminated, Operton filed for unemployment 
benefits.  Walgreens contested her request and contended that 
she was terminated due to an inability to perform her job.  And, 
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
5 
 
initially, the DWD denied Operton unemployment benefits based on 
misconduct.   
¶12 Operton appealed and an ALJ for the DWD held an 
evidentiary hearing.  At the hearing, the ALJ concluded that 
Operton was ineligible for unemployment benefits.  The ALJ found 
that there was "no evidence that the employee intentionally or 
willfully disregarded the employer's interests by continuing to 
make cash-handling errors.  Additionally, her actions were not 
so careless or negligent so as to manifest culpability or 
wrongful intent."5  Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Operton 
had not committed "misconduct connected with her employment."6  
¶13 However, the ALJ denied Operton unemployment benefits 
and concluded that Operton was terminated for substantial fault.  
The ALJ reasoned that Operton "did not dispute that the 
transactions for which she was given disciplinary action 
occurred, nor did she provide any testimony to establish that 
she did not have reasonable control over the actions that led to 
her discharge.  She was aware of the employer's policies, 
including the cash-handling and WIC check procedures, but 
continued to make cash-handling errors resulting in actual 
financial loss to the employer, after receiving multiple 
warnings."7   
                                                 
5 In the matter of Lela Operton, Hearing No. 14001606MD 
(June 4, 2014).  
6 Id.  
7 Id. 
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
6 
 
¶14 On September 19, 2014, LIRC adopted the findings and 
conclusions of the ALJ.  Referring to the instance in which 
Operton failed to check an individual's identification when 
processing a credit card payment, LIRC stated:  "This major 
infraction, taken together with the final warning regarding 
earlier cash transactions, persuades the commission that the 
employee's discharge was due to substantial fault."8  
¶15 The circuit court affirmed LIRC's decision.  In doing 
so, the circuit court deferred to LIRC in its entirety.   
¶16 The court of appeals set aside LIRC's decision.  The 
court concluded that LIRC "erred in its construction and 
application of 'substantial fault' to the facts presented."9  The 
court of appeals reasoned that LIRC was owed no deference, and 
therefore de novo review was appropriate.  Next, the court 
concluded, consistent with Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a), that an 
employee's multiple errors do not automatically transform the 
errors from inadvertent into intentional.10  
¶17 This court granted LIRC's petition for review.  We now 
affirm the court of appeals and remand to LIRC to determine the 
amount of unemployment compensation Operton is owed.  
                                                 
8 Lela Operton v. Walgreen Co., ERD No. 14001606MD (LIRC, 
September 19, 2014).    
9 Operton, 369 Wis. 2d 166, ¶1.   
10 Id., ¶32. 
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
7 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶18 "When there is an appeal from a LIRC determination, we 
review LIRC's decision rather than the decision of the circuit 
court."  Masri v. LIRC, 2014 WI 81, ¶20, 356 Wis. 2d 405, 850 
N.W.2d 298.  "LIRC's findings of fact are upheld if they are 
supported by substantial and credible evidence."  Brauneis v. 
LIRC, 2000 WI 69, ¶14, 236 Wis. 2d 27, 612 N.W.2d 635 (citing 
Hagen v. LIRC, 210 Wis. 2d 12, 23, 563 N.W.2d 454 (1997)).  
¶19 In contrast, this court is "not bound by an agency's 
interpretation of a statute."  Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 
Wis. 2d 650, 659, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995).  However, "depending on 
the circumstances, an agency's interpretation of a statute is 
entitled to one of the following three levels of deference:  
great weight deference, due weight deference or no deference."  
Cty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶14, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 
N.W.2d 571.   
¶20 "Which 
level 
is 
appropriate 
'depends 
on 
the 
comparative institutional capabilities and qualifications of the 
court and the administrative agency.'"  UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 
Wis. 2d 274, 284, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996) (quoting State ex rel. 
Parker v. Sullivan, 184 Wis. 2d 668, 699, 517 N.W.2d 449 
(1994)).  "Our basis for giving even due weight deference to an 
agency's statutory interpretation is bottomed on two required 
assumptions:  the statute is one that the agency was charged 
with administering and the agency has at least some expertise in 
the interpretation of the statute in question."  Racine Harley-
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
8 
 
Davidson, Inc. v. Wis. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 2006 WI 86, 
¶107, 
292 
Wis. 2d 
549, 
717 
N.W.2d 184 
(Roggensack, 
J., 
concurring).    
¶21 "In according due weight deference, we defer to an 
agency's statutory interpretation only when we conclude that 
another interpretation of the statute is not more reasonable 
than that chosen by the agency."  Id., ¶105.  As such, under due 
weight deference, the court is tasked with determining whether 
there is a more reasonable interpretation of the statute.  "In 
order to decide that question, we make a comparison between the 
agency's interpretation and alternate interpretations.  This 
comparison requires us to construe the statute ourselves."  Id.   
¶22 "We note here that there is little difference between 
due weight deference and no deference, since both situations 
require us to construe the statute ourselves.  In so doing, we 
employ judicial expertise in statutory construction, and we 
embrace a major responsibility of the judicial branch of 
government, deciding what statutes mean."  Cty. of Dane, 2009 WI 
9, ¶19 (internal quotations omitted).  
¶23 In the present case, the level of deference we afford 
LIRC is inconsequential as LIRC did not provide an articulated 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 108.04 in denying Operton 
unemployment benefits.11  LIRC adopted the conclusions of the 
                                                 
11 It is not entirely clear what role the substance of an 
agency's interpretation does or should play in determining the 
level of deference.  Many of our cases discussing the levels of 
deference focus not on the presence or substance of an agency's 
interpretation; 
rather, 
they 
focus 
on 
the 
institutional 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
9 
 
DWD's ALJ.  But the ALJ did not describe its interpretation of 
the statute at issue, Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a).   
¶24 Specifically, 
there 
are 
three 
types 
of 
actions 
exempted from the definition of substantial fault.  However, the 
ALJ concluded that Operton's conduct did not fall within any of 
these categories without reasoning through each provision 
individually.  Importantly, the ALJ never examined Operton's 
errors to determine if the errors were "inadvertent" under Wis. 
Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2.12  The ALJ stated that "Operton was aware 
of the employer's policies, including the cash-handling and WIC 
check procedures, but continued to make cash-handling errors 
resulting in financial loss to the employer, after receiving 
                                                                                                                                                             
capabilities of the agency as well as factors that pertain to 
the nature of the legal issue before the court.  For this 
reason, perhaps our standard of review analysis in cases 
involving an agency's interpretation of a statute should include 
a threshold determination of whether the agency has articulated 
its interpretation of the statute.  If the agency has not 
provided the court with an articulated interpretation of the 
statute, then the level of deference the agency is afforded is 
not at issue; we simply interpret and apply the statute.  
However, if the agency provided an articulated interpretation of 
the statute, we would proceed under our well-established 
framework to determine the level of deference to which the 
agency is entitled.  Such a requirement seems intuitive.  
Nevertheless, we need not address this tension for purposes of 
the present case.   
12 As 
discussed 
more 
in 
depth 
below, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.04(5g)(a)2. exempts inadvertent errors by an employee from 
the type of conduct included in substantial fault.  
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
10 
 
multiple warnings."13  It is unclear which prong of Wis. Stat. 
§ 108.04(5g)(a) the ALJ was considering.  
¶25 LIRC's decision adopting the findings and conclusions 
of the ALJ provided no clarification.  Importantly, LIRC also 
did not discuss whether the errors that Operton committed were 
inadvertent and therefore a type of error exempted from the 
definition of substantial fault.  LIRC merely stated: 
The employee did not offer any explanation for not 
checking the ID which would lead the commission to 
conclude that she lacked the ability to conform her 
conduct to the employer's reasonable requirement to 
check ID for large credit card transactions.  This 
major infraction, taken together with the final 
warning regarding earlier cash transactions, persuades 
the commission that the employee's discharge was due 
to substantial fault.[14]    
Absent from this reasoning is any discussion of "inadvertent 
errors" or the conduct the legislature explicitly exempted from 
the definition of substantial fault.  
¶26 Accordingly, LIRC did not provide an articulated 
interpretation of the statute that it then applied.  As such, 
whether we afford LIRC due weight deference or no deference is 
of no consequence.  See deBoer Transp., Inc. v. Swenson, 2011 WI 
64, ¶36, 335 Wis. 2d 599, 804 N.W.2d 658 ("However, we agree 
with the court of appeals that we need not decide the applicable 
                                                 
13 In the matter of Lela Operton, Hearing No. 14001606MD 
(June 4, 2014). 
14 Lela Operton v. Walgreen Co., ERD No. 14001606MD (LIRC, 
September 19, 2014).     
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
11 
 
standard of review here because LIRC's statutory interpretation 
and application is unreasonable, and therefore, it will not 
withstand 
any 
level 
of 
deference." 
(citation 
omitted)).  
Therefore, 
we 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.04 
under 
well-
established principles of statutory interpretation to clearly 
explain the law.  
B.  Statutory Interpretation, General Principles 
¶27 It is axiomatic that "the purpose of statutory 
interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it 
may be given its full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "We assume that the legislature's 
intent is expressed in the statutory language."  Id.  For this 
reason, "statutory interpretation 'begins with the language of 
the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  Id., ¶45 (quoting Seider v. 
O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  
"Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases are given their technical or special definitional 
meaning."  Id., ¶45.   
¶28 "Context 
is 
important 
to 
meaning." 
 
Id., 
¶46.  
Accordingly, "statutory language is interpreted in the context 
in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results."  Id. (citations omitted).  
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
12 
 
¶29 Moreover, we need not consult extrinsic sources of 
interpretation if there is no ambiguity in the statute.  Id.  
And, "a statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being 
understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more 
senses."  Id., ¶47 (citing Bruno v. Milwaukee Cty., 2003 WI 28, 
¶19, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656).  After all, "the court is 
not at liberty to disregard the plain, clear words of the 
statute."  Id. (quoting State v. Pratt, 36 Wis. 2d 312, 317, 153 
N.W.2d 18 (1967)). 
¶30 These 
principles 
guide 
our 
interpretation 
and 
application of Wis. Stat. § 108.04 in the present case.   
C.  LIRC'S Interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g) 
¶31 Wisconsin's unemployment compensation statutes embody 
a strong public policy in favor of compensating the unemployed.  
This policy is codified in Wis. Stat. § 108.01, which provides: 
"In good times and in bad times unemployment is a heavy social 
cost, directly affecting many thousands of wage earners.  Each 
employing unit in Wisconsin should pay at least a part of this 
social cost, connected with its own irregular operations, by 
financing benefits for its own unemployed workers."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 108.01(1).   
¶32 Consistent with this policy, Wis. Stat. ch. 108 is 
"liberally 
construed 
to 
effect 
unemployment 
compensation 
coverage for workers who are economically dependent upon others 
in respect to their wage-earning status."  Princess House, Inc. 
v. DILHR, 111 Wis. 2d 46, 62, 330 N.W.2d 169 (1983). 
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
13 
 
¶33 Nevertheless, not all employees are entitled to 
unemployment benefits.  Under Wis. Stat. § 108.04, an individual 
may be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.   
¶34 In 2013, the legislature changed the standard an 
employer must meet to disqualify an employee from receiving 
benefits.  The legislative amendment created a two-tier system 
for determining when an employee is disqualified from receiving 
unemployment benefits.  See Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5) & (5g).  The 
first tier, disqualification for misconduct, existed prior to 
these amendments and is codified in § 108.04(5).  This provision 
operates to prevent any employee discharged for misconduct from 
obtaining unemployment benefits.  The legislature defined 
misconduct as: 
one or more actions or conduct evincing such willful 
or wanton disregard of an employer's interests as is 
found 
in 
deliberate 
violations 
or 
disregard 
of 
standards of behavior which an employer has a right to 
expect of his or her employees, or in carelessness or 
negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest 
culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design of equal 
severity to such disregard, or to show an intentional 
and substantial disregard of an employer's interests, 
or an employee's duties and obligations to his or her 
employer. 
§  108.04(5).  The statute then provides examples of several 
actions that constitute misconduct.  § 108.04(5)(a)-(g).  If an 
employee is terminated as a result of any of the statutorily 
delineated 
actions 
or 
under 
the 
general 
definition 
of 
misconduct, then the employee's termination was for misconduct, 
and the employee is ineligible for unemployment benefits.  
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
14 
 
¶35 After the legislative amendments to the unemployment 
benefits statutes in 2013,15 an employee who has not committed 
misconduct may nevertheless be ineligible for unemployment 
compensation.  Stated otherwise, when an employee's conduct does 
not rise to the level of misconduct, the employee may be denied 
unemployment benefits if the employee was terminated for 
substantial fault.  See Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g).  The statute 
provides:  
An employee whose work is terminated by an employing 
unit for substantial fault by the employee connected 
with the employee's work is ineligible to receive 
benefits until 7 weeks have elapsed since the end of 
the week in which the termination occurs and the 
employee earns wages after the week in which the 
termination occurs equal to at least 14 times the 
employee's weekly benefit rate  under s. 108.05(1) in 
employment or other work covered by the unemployment 
insurance law of any state or the federal government.  
For 
purposes 
of 
requalification, 
the 
employee's 
benefit rate shall be the rate that would have been 
paid had the discharge not occurred.  
§ 108.04(5g)(a).  
¶36 Wisconsin Stat. § 108.04(5g) defines substantial fault 
broadly.  It includes "acts or omissions of an employee over 
which the employee exercised reasonable control and which 
violate reasonable requirements of the employee's employer."  
Id.  However, the legislature did not disqualify every employee 
who commits such errors from receiving unemployment benefits.  
                                                 
15 Though enacted in 2013, these amendments became effective 
on January 5, 2014.  
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
15 
 
¶37 Instead, the legislature provided three types of 
conduct that are explicitly exempt from the definition of 
substantial fault.  Under the statute, substantial fault does 
not include: 
1. One or more minor infractions of rules unless 
an infraction is repeated after the employer warns the 
employee about the infraction. 
2. One or more inadvertent errors made by the 
employee. 
3. Any failure of the employee to perform work 
because of insufficient skill, ability, or equipment.  
Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a).  Accordingly, if an employee is 
terminated for conduct that falls within any of the types of 
actions described by the legislature in para. (a), an employee's 
termination was not due to the "substantial fault" of the 
employee.  § 108.04(5g)(a)1-3. 
¶38 The burden is on the employer to show that the 
termination was due to the substantial fault of the employee.  
This is consistent with our past cases interpreting the 
unemployment benefits statutes in which we have held that "the 
party (the employer here) resisting payment of benefits has the 
burden of proving that the case comes within the disqualifying 
provision of the law. . . ."  Brauneis, 236 Wis. 2d 27, ¶22; see 
also Consolidated Const. Co., Inc. v. Casey, 71 Wis. 2d 811, 
820, 238 N.W.2d 758 (1976) (reasoning the burden is on the 
employer to show that "some disqualifying provision . . . should 
bar the employee's claim." (citing Kansas City Star Co. v. ILHR 
Dep't, 60 Wis. 2d 591, 602, 211 N.W.2d 488 (1973)).   
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
16 
 
¶39 Each of the provided-for exceptions are similar in 
nature insofar as they remove a type of conduct from what is 
considered substantial fault.  Specifically, the statute exempts 
from the definition of substantial fault conduct that suggests 
the employee was prone to accidental errors or simply unable to 
adequately perform his or her job.  
¶40 A review of the three types of actions the legislature 
exempted from substantial fault gives context to the definition 
of substantial fault.  Wisconsin Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)1. removes 
minor infractions from the type of conduct that is substantial 
fault, unless the employee had previously been warned about the 
infraction.  An analysis of the proposed changes by the DWD 
states that this exception was intended to exempt "[m]inor 
violations of rules unless employee repeats the violation after 
receiving a warning."  Department of Workforce Development, 
Analysis of Proposed UI Law Change, D12-01 (October 24, 2012).  
As such, employees who are terminated for a repetitive type of 
minor 
violation 
are 
not 
at 
substantial 
fault 
for 
their 
termination.  If, however, the employee is warned about minor 
violations of an employer's rules and continues to commit the 
same violation, then the employee's termination may be due to 
the substantial fault of the employee.   
¶41 Likewise, Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)3. provides that 
an employee was not at substantial fault for his or her 
termination if the employee was incapable of performing the work 
the employment required.  By its plain language, this provision 
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
17 
 
includes employees who are terminated for a lack of skill as 
well as employees who are not able to master job performance.    
¶42 Operton does not contend that her conduct is exempt 
from substantial fault under either Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)1. 
or § 108.04(5g)(a)3.  Rather, Operton contends that her conduct 
does not fall within the definition of substantial fault because 
the errors for which she was discharged were "inadvertent" 
errors.   
¶43 Accordingly, at issue in the present case is LIRC's 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2., which exempts 
from substantial fault, "One or more inadvertent errors made by 
the employee."  As discussed above, LIRC's decision contains no 
articulated interpretation of this subparagraph.  Accordingly, 
we determine the proper meaning of the statutory provision in 
order to apply the law. 
¶44 Under Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2., an employee's 
termination is not for substantial fault if the termination 
resulted from one or more inadvertent errors.  Inadvertence is 
defined 
as 
"[a]n 
accidental 
oversight; 
the 
result 
of 
carelessness."  Inadvertence, Black's Law Dictionary, 827 (9th 
ed. 2009); see also Queen Ins. Co. of America v. Kaiser, 27 
Wis. 2d 571, 577, 135 N.W.2d 247 (1965) (concluding that "an 
inadvertent act of omission" was only "passive negligence" or 
"the failure to do something that should have been done").  The 
DWD's comment about these substantial fault provisions explained 
that this paragraph exempts "[u]nintentional mistakes made by 
the 
employee" 
from 
the 
definition 
of 
substantial 
fault.  
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
18 
 
Department of Workforce Development, Analysis of Proposed UI Law 
Change, D12-01 (October 24, 2012).  Consequently, the words of 
the 
statute 
require 
courts 
to 
examine 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding an employee's error to determine if it was careless 
or unintentional.16  
¶45 It is important to view Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2. 
in context to ascertain the types of conduct to which it 
applies.  Notably, § 108.04(5g)(a)1. makes a distinction that 
§ 108.04(5g)2. 
does 
not. 
 
Specifically, 
§ 108.04(5g)(a)1. 
provides that one or more minor infractions does not constitute 
substantial fault unless an infraction is repeated and the 
employer 
has 
previously 
warned 
the 
employee 
about 
the 
infraction.  In contrast, § 108.04(5g)(a)2. contains a different 
definition.  There, an employer's warning is not dispositive of 
whether errors were inadvertent under § 108.04(5g)(a)2.  That is 
not to say an employer's warning can never be relevant to 
whether an employee's error was inadvertent.  However, an 
employee who is warned about an inadvertent error is not 
necessarily terminated for substantial fault even if the 
employee subsequently makes another error.   
¶46 Finally, the statute does not state whether there is a 
limitation on the number of inadvertent errors an employee may 
commit before the employee's errors are no longer inadvertent.  
                                                 
16 This definition of inadvertent is not inconsistent with 
the way in which the court of appeals defined inadvertent in 
Easterling v. LIRC, 2017 WI App 18, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d 
___.   
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
19 
 
However, we need not determine if a numerical limit exists.  
Under the facts of this case, it suffices to interpret the 
statute to mean that multiple inadvertent errors, even if the 
employee has been warned about the errors, does not necessarily 
constitute substantial fault.   
D.  Application of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g) 
¶47 In the present case, we must determine whether 
Operton's errors are exempted from the statutory definition of 
substantial fault.  Specifically, we must determine whether 
Operton was terminated by Walgreens for "one or more inadvertent 
errors" during the course of her employment.  We conclude that 
she was, and therefore her actions are exempted from the 
definition of substantial fault, and she is entitled to 
unemployment compensation. 
¶48 At the outset, we note that LIRC's findings of fact 
within its misconduct analysis support our conclusion.  LIRC 
found that none of Operton's errors was intentional or willful.  
Specifically, LIRC found that "there is no evidence that the 
employee intentionally or willfully disregarded the employer's 
interests 
by 
continuing 
to 
make 
cash 
handling 
errors."17  
Moreover, LIRC also found that Operton's "actions were not so 
careless or negligent so as to manifest culpability or wrongful 
intent."18  As discussed below, there is nothing in the record 
                                                 
17 Lela Operton v. Walgreen Co., ERD No. 14001606MD (LIRC, 
September 19, 2014) (adopting DWD administrative law judge's 
findings).    
18 Id.  
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
20 
 
that suggests these findings are erroneous.  Accordingly, LIRC's 
factual findings support our conclusion that Operton's conduct 
falls within the "one or more inadvertent errors" provision, and 
therefore was the type of conduct the legislature exempted from 
the definition of substantial fault. 
¶49 However, despite these findings, LIRC concluded that 
Operton was not entitled to unemployment compensation because 
she was terminated from Walgreens for substantial fault.19  LIRC 
cited Operton's eight cash-handling errors and reasoned that she 
was aware of Walgreen's procedures but continued to make errors.  
¶50 However, Operton's eight cash-handling errors were not 
so egregious as to warrant the conclusion that the errors were 
transformed from inadvertent to reckless or intentional under 
the facts of this case.  Her errors occurred over a 21-month 
time period when Operton completed approximately 80,000 cash-
handling transactions.  Accordingly, we conclude that Operton's 
eight accidental or careless errors were, as a matter of law, 
"inadvertent errors" because Operton made these errors over the 
course of 80,000 cash-handling transactions during a 21-month 
period.    
¶51 The length of time between Operton's errors supports 
this conclusion.  Operton went months without making an error.  
                                                 
19 We agree with LIRC that Operton's actions fall within the 
general definition of substantial fault before the exceptions 
are considered.  Operton exercised reasonable control over the 
cash-handling transaction, and Walgreens' expectation that she 
handle such transactions properly was reasonable.   
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
21 
 
For example, after Operton's cash-handling error on October 19, 
2012, she did not commit another error until February 12, 2013.  
Likewise, after her cash-handling error on July 26, 2013, she 
did not commit another error until January 1, 2014.  Therefore, 
there were substantial periods of time in which Operton 
performed the duties of her job error-free.  
¶52 Moreover, Operton was not repeatedly making the same 
error.20  Yes, the errors were similar in nature; all of the 
errors were cash-handling mistakes.  Yet, for the most part, 
Operton violated different rules or procedures each time.  
Operton's first error occurred when she accepted a WIC check for 
$8.67 worth of items even though the check was worth only $5.78.  
Operton committed a different type of error when she accidently 
gave a check back to a customer who had made a purchase for 
which the check was to serve as payment.  This was the only time 
during her employment when she made this type of error.  And, on 
a different occasion, a customer left without finishing the 
transaction on the pin pad.  Again, this was not an error 
Operton made more than once.  Finally, the error that she was 
ultimately terminated for——not checking identification of an 
individual using a credit card for a purchase over $50——was a 
different type of error than those she had previously made.   
                                                 
20 It is worth noting that LIRC found that Operton was a 
conscientious employee, and her supervisor offered to serve as a 
reference for her following her termination from Walgreens.   
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
22 
 
¶53 Accordingly, the length of Operton's employment, the 
number 
of 
transactions 
Operton 
handled 
throughout 
her 
employment, and the variety of the errors she committed compels 
the conclusion that she was not terminated from Walgreens for 
substantial fault.  While all of the errors fell within the same 
general cash-handling duties of her employment, the errors were, 
nevertheless, inadvertent.   
¶54 Consequently, as a matter of law, Operton's errors are 
the type of conduct the legislature intended to exempt from 
substantial fault.21  And, as a result, the LIRC improperly 
denied Operton unemployment benefits.     
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶55 In light of the foregoing, we conclude that LIRC 
incorrectly denied Operton unemployment benefits.  Operton was 
entitled to unemployment benefits because her actions did not 
fit within the definition of substantial fault as set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g).  Stated more fully, Operton was 
terminated for committing "One or more inadvertent errors" 
during the course of her employment, and therefore pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2., she was not terminated for 
substantial fault.  We further conclude that, as a matter of 
law, Operton's eight accidental or careless cash-handling errors 
                                                 
21 We leave open whether there is a point at which the 
number of errors that seem inadvertent in isolation cease to be 
inadvertent when viewed in their totality.  Because we conclude 
that, under the facts of this case, Operton's eight errors were 
inadvertent, we need not reach this issue.  
No. 
2015AP1055   
 
23 
 
over the course of 80,000 cash-handling transactions were 
inadvertent. 
¶56 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and remand 
to LIRC to determine the amount of unemployment compensation 
Operton is owed.   
By the Court.—The court of appeals is affirmed, and the 
cause is remanded to the Labor and Industry Review Commission.  
No.  2015AP1055.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶57 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  Wisconsin 
was the first state in the nation to have an unemployment 
compensation law.1  We should get this decision right.  
¶58 I agree with the court's mandate.  The employer has 
the burden of proving that Lela Operton is not eligible for 
unemployment benefits.  It has not met this burden.  Lela 
Operton wins.   
¶59 I do not join the majority opinion for two principal 
reasons:  (1) This is a "no deference" case.2  (2) The majority 
opinion injects extra-statutory considerations into its analysis 
of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2.  
(1) 
¶60 This is a "no deference" case.  The court of appeals 
got it right:  De novo review is appropriate because LIRC "is 
applying a new statute to a new concept."  Operton v. LIRC, 2016 
WI App 37, ¶20, 369 Wis. 2d 166, 880 N.W.2d 169.3  This court 
                                                 
1 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Wisconsin State AFL-CIO; Brief 
of Amicus Curiae Wisconsin Employment Lawyers Association. 
2 I have difficulty with footnote 12 of the majority 
opinion.  I do not understand the nature and scope of the 
majority opinion's reference to the "facts that pertain to the 
nature of the legal issue" or to the "substance of an agency's 
interpretation," which it refers to as a "threshold question."  
Nothing suggestive of this remark has been raised or briefed in 
the instant case.     
3 See also Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. State, Div. of 
Hearings & Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶20, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 565–66, 
717 N.W.2d 184 (footnotes omitted): 
Thus, due weight deference and no deference to an 
agency's interpretation of a statute are similar.  
(continued) 
No.  2015AP1055.ssa 
 
2 
 
independently 
decides 
how 
to 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.04(5g)(a)2.  Regardless of the deference issue, LIRC 
erred.       
(2) 
¶61 The 
majority 
opinion's 
analysis 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.04(5g)(a)2. significantly strays from the statutory text. 
It injects two extra-statutory considerations into its analysis 
of § 108.04(5g)(a)2.   
¶62 The first statutory misstep is that the majority 
opinion 
adds 
the 
idea 
of 
a 
"warning" 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.04(5g)(a)2.  The court of appeals got it right, concluding 
that "[t]he ALJ and LIRC erred in merging the 'warning' 
component 
set 
forth 
in 
the 
'infraction' 
exception 
in 
§ 108.04(5g)(a)1. with the 'inadvertent error' exception in 
§ 108.04(5g)(a)2. . . . Inadvertent 
errors, 
warnings 
or 
no 
warnings, never meet the statutory definition of substantial 
fault."  Operton, 369 Wis. 2d 166, ¶¶24, 28.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Under both due weight deference and no deference, the 
reviewing court may adopt, without regard for the 
agency's interpretation, what it views as the most 
reasonable interpretation of the statute.  When due 
weight deference is accorded an agency, however, a 
reviewing 
court 
will 
not 
reverse 
the 
agency's 
statutory 
interpretation 
when 
an 
alternative 
interpretation is equally reasonable.  In contrast, in 
a no deference review of an agency's statutory 
interpretation, the reviewing court merely benefits 
from the agency's determination and may reverse the 
agency's 
interpretation 
even 
when 
an 
alternative 
statutory interpretation is equally reasonable to the 
interpretation of the agency.   
No.  2015AP1055.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶63 Although the majority opinion concedes that the 
"inadvertent errors" language in § 108.04(5g)(a)2. (in contrast 
with the language in § 108.04(5g)(a)1.)4 contains no language 
regarding warnings to employees, the majority opinion tells 
readers, with a straight face, that "an employer's warnings" are 
"relevant" in § 108.04(5g)(a)2.  Majority op., ¶45.   
¶64 I agree with Judge Lundsten's concurrence in the court 
of appeals:  "Warnings are not relevant under the 'inadvertent 
errors' alternative."  Operton, 369 Wis. 2d 166, ¶45 (Lundsten, 
J., concurring).   
¶65 The second statutory misstep occurs when the majority 
opinion "leave[s] open whether there is a point at which the 
number of errors that seem inadvertent in isolation cease to be 
inadvertent when viewed in their totality. . . . "  Majority 
op., ¶54 n.21.  By reserving this question, and thus including 
this extra-statutory consideration in its analysis, see majority 
op., ¶¶51-53, the majority opinion once again performs a 
statutory analysis that is not tethered to the statutory 
language.  
                                                 
4 Compare Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)1. (Substantial fault 
does not include "[o]ne or more minor infractions of rules 
unless an infraction is repeated after the employer warns the 
employee 
about 
the 
infraction.") 
(emphasis 
added) 
with 
§ 108.04(5g)(a)2. (Substantial fault does not include "[o]ne or 
more inadvertent errors made by the employee.").  See also 
Operton, 369 Wis. 2d 166, ¶45 (Lundsten, J., concurring) ("This 
omission [of warnings], on the heels of express warning language 
in the rules infractions alternative, supports the conclusion 
that warnings are not relevant under the 'inadvertent errors' 
"alternative.").  
No.  2015AP1055.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶66 The statutory language provides that substantial fault 
does not include "one or more inadvertent errors . . . ."  Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.04(5g)(a)2. 
 
According 
to 
this 
text, 
the 
"inadvertent errors" analysis contains no numerical limits.   
¶67 I agree with Judge Lundsten's concurrence in the court 
of appeals:  "[T]he statute tells us that, if all we have is 
repeated . . . 'inadvertent errors,' we do not have 'substantial 
fault.'"5   
¶68 These missteps demonstrate that the majority opinion 
does not apply the rule that the unemployment compensation law 
is 
to 
be 
"liberally 
construed 
to 
effect 
unemployment 
compensation coverage for workers who are economically dependent 
upon others in respect to their wage-earning status."  Princess 
House, Inc. v. DILHR, 111 Wis. 2d 46, 62, 330 N.W.2d 169 (1983).   
¶69 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that Lela 
Operton prevails, but I do not join the majority opinion.   
¶70 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
                                                 
5 Operton, 369 Wis. 2d 166, ¶43 (Lundsten, J., concurring). 
No.  2015AP1055.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶71 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the court's opinion.  I write separately to make a brief 
observation about agency deference.  While the subject of agency 
deference may currently be a "hot button" issue, the law in 
Wisconsin on the subject is well-established: under proper 
circumstances this court will defer, to varying degrees, to an 
agency's interpretation of a statute.  See, e.g., Wisconsin 
Dep't of Revenue v. Menasha Corp., 2008 WI 88, ¶¶47-50, 311 
Wis. 2d 579, 754 N.W.2d 95.  The parties in this case did not 
ask the court to address whether changes to that approach are 
warranted.  There is little doubt that ending the court's 
practice of according deference to agency interpretations of 
statutes would constitute a sea change in Wisconsin law, and  
many 
interested 
parties 
would 
likely 
wish 
to 
weigh 
in.  
Consequently, I would want to see the issue set forth, briefed, 
and argued before expressing an opinion on the merits of such a 
change. 
¶72 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
No.  2015AP1055.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶73 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  Although I 
join the majority opinion, I write separately to question 
whether 
this 
court's 
practice 
of 
deferring 
to 
agency 
interpretations 
of 
statutes 
comports 
with 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, which vests judicial power in this court——not 
administrative 
agencies. 
 
The 
Labor 
and 
Industry 
Review 
Commission (LIRC) asks this court to give "great weight" 
deference to its interpretation of the term "substantial fault" 
in Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a) (2013-14).  Because "LIRC did not 
provide an articulated interpretation of § 108.04 in denying 
Operton unemployment benefits," the majority properly conducts 
an 
independent 
interpretation 
of 
§ 108.04 
without 
giving 
deference to LIRC.  Majority op., ¶¶23-26.  The doctrine of 
deference to agencies' statutory interpretation is a judicial 
creation that circumvents the court's duty to say what the law 
is and risks perpetuating erroneous declarations of the law.  
Because the court in this case fulfills its interpretive duty, I 
join the majority opinion but urge the court to reconsider its 
decades-long abdication of this core judicial function. 
¶74 This court's current deference framework arises out of 
two cases from the mid-1990s.  In Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 
196 Wis. 2d 650, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995), the court identified 
"three distinct levels of deference to agency interpretations: 
great weight, due weight and de novo review."  Id. at 659-60 
(citing Jicha v. DILHR, 169 Wis. 2d 284, 290, 485 N.W.2d 256 
(1992)).  "Great weight" deference applies when four conditions 
are met: 
No.  2015AP1055.rgb 
 
2 
 
(1) the agency was charged by the legislature with the 
duty 
of 
administering 
the 
statute; 
(2) 
[] 
the 
interpretation of the agency is one of long-standing; 
(3) 
[] 
the 
agency 
employed 
its 
expertise 
or 
specialized knowledge in forming the interpretation; 
and (4) [] the agency's interpretation will provide 
uniformity and consistency in the application of the 
statute. 
Id. at 660 (citing Lisney v. LIRC, 171 Wis. 2d 499, 505, 493 
N.W.2d 14 (1992)).  If an agency's interpretation of a statute 
qualifies for great weight deference, then the "interpretation 
must [] merely be reasonable for it to be sustained," and an 
interpretation is unreasonable only "if it directly contravenes 
the words of the statute, [] is clearly contrary to legislative 
intent or [] is without rational basis."  Id. at 661-62. 
¶75 In UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 548 N.W.2d 57 
(1996), this court elaborated on the "due weight" deference 
standard.  "Under the due weight standard, 'a court need not 
defer to an agency's interpretation which, while reasonable, is 
not the interpretation which the court considers best and most 
reasonable.'"  Id. at 286 (quoting Harnischfeger, 196 Wis. 2d at 
660 n.4).  Courts give due weight deference when an agency has 
"some experience" interpreting a statute but not so much as to 
"develop[] the expertise which necessarily places it in a better 
position" than a court "to make judgments regarding the 
interpretation."  Id.  An agency lacking special knowledge or 
expertise nevertheless might receive some deference if "the 
legislature has charged the agency with the enforcement of the 
statute in question."  Id.  A court giving due weight deference 
to an agency interpretation "will not overturn a reasonable 
agency decision that comports with the purpose of the statute 
No.  2015AP1055.rgb 
 
3 
 
unless the court determines that there is a more reasonable 
interpretation available."  Id. at 286-87. 
¶76 Examination of the pre-Harnischfeger standard for 
reviewing agency interpretations of statutes suggests that the 
Harnischfeger court did not simply apply existing law——it recast 
it.1  Before Harnischfeger, this court often articulated a 
slightly different standard of review:  "[I]t is a well-
established 
principle 
of 
statutory 
construction 
that 
the 
construction and interpretation of a statute adopted by an 
administrative agency charged with the duty of applying the law 
is 
entitled 
to 
great 
weight." 
 
Schwartz 
v. 
DILHR, 
72 
Wis. 2d 217, 
221, 
240 
N.W.2d 173 
(1976). 
 
Tracing 
that 
principle's 
development 
in 
Wisconsin 
law 
backwards 
from 
Harnischfeger leads to its source:  Harrington v. Smith, 28 Wis. 
43 (1871).2 
¶77 Harrington presented this court with a dispute over 
the interpretation of a statute.  Observing that "[t]he statute 
                                                 
1 For 
a 
more 
complete 
evaluation 
of 
the 
court's 
characterization of existing law in Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 
196 Wis. 2d 650, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995), see Patience Drake 
Roggensack, 
Elected 
to 
Decide: 
Is 
the 
Decision-Avoidance 
Doctrine of Great Weight Deference Appropriate in This Court of 
Last Resort?, 89 Marq. L. Rev. 541, 548-61 (2006). 
2 See, e.g., Lisney v. LIRC, 171 Wis. 2d 499, 505-06, 493 
N.W.2d 14 (1992); West Bend Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 121 Wis. 2d 1, 
12, 357 N.W.2d 534 (1984); Pigeon v. DILHR, 109 Wis. 2d 519, 
524-25, 
326 
N.W.2d 752 
(1982); 
Schwartz 
v. 
DILHR, 
72 
Wis. 2d 217, 221, 240 N.W.2d 173 (1976); City of Milwaukee v. 
WERC, 43 Wis. 2d 596, 599-601, 168 N.W.2d 809 (1969); Mednis v. 
Indus. Comm'n, 27 Wis. 2d 439, 444, 134 N.W.2d 416 (1965); 
Trczyniewski v. City of Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 2d 236, 240, 112 
N.W.2d 725 (1961). 
No.  2015AP1055.rgb 
 
4 
 
in question was enacted and has been continuously interpreted, 
understood and acted upon by the executive department of the 
government, 
the 
officers 
appointed 
by 
law 
to 
carry 
its 
provisions into effect, . . . for a period of over twenty-one 
years, and during twelve successive administrations of the 
state," the court concluded that "[g]reat weight is undoubtedly 
to be attached to a construction which has thus been given."  
Id. at 68-69.  Accordingly, the Harrington court explained:  
"Long and uninterrupted practice under a statute, especially by 
the officers whose duty it was to execute it, is good evidence 
of its construction, and such practical construction will be 
adhered to, even though, were it res integra,[3] it might be 
difficult to maintain it."  Harrington, 28 Wis. at 68.  In 
support of that proposition, this court cited, among other 
authorities, Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206 
(1827), which stated that, "[i]n the construction of a doubtful 
and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those who 
were called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to 
carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very great 
respect."  Id. at 210.4 
                                                 
3 Latin for "an entire thing," as a legal term res integra 
refers to an "undecided question of law" or a "case of first 
impression."  Res Integra, Black's Law Dictionary 1503 (10th ed. 
2014) (citing Res Nova, id. at 1504). 
4 In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Supreme Court also cited 
Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206 (1827), among 
many other cases, when constructing the two-step framework that 
has become the cornerstone of judicial review of agency 
determinations at the federal level.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP1055.rgb 
 
5 
 
¶78 By recognizing the value of executive interpretations 
without entirely ceding interpretive authority to the executive, 
these older cases reflect a more nuanced appreciation for 
judicial interaction with agency interpretation than this 
court's post-Harnischfeger deference standards permit.  The 
prevailing scheme of deference hamstrings a court of last 
resort——with 
self-imposed 
shackles——from 
independently 
interpreting the law, thereby thwarting the constitutional 
structure of dispersing power among the three branches of 
government.  Because this structure has long been recognized as 
the essential safeguard of individual rights and liberty,5 this 
                                                                                                                                                             
n.14.  Although I will not, in this writing, endeavor to conduct 
a comprehensive review comparing federal agency deference to 
Wisconsin law, it suffices for now to note that federal 
administrative deference under Chevron seems to raise separation 
of powers concerns under the United States Constitution similar 
to those I identify in Wisconsin.  See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 
135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing 
that transferring "ultimate interpretive authority" to the 
Executive "is in tension with Article III's Vesting Clause, 
which vests the judicial power exclusively in Article III 
courts, not administrative agencies"); City of Arlington v. FCC, 
133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("It 
would be a bit much to describe the result as 'the very 
definition of tyranny,' but the danger posed by the growing 
power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed."); see 
also Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) ("Transferring the job of saying 
what 
the 
law 
is 
from 
the 
judiciary 
to 
the 
executive 
unsurprisingly invites the very sort of due process (fair 
notice) and equal protection concerns the framers knew would 
arise 
if 
the 
political 
branches 
intruded 
on 
judicial 
functions."). 
5 "In 
the 
compound 
republic 
of 
America, 
the 
power 
surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct 
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided 
among distinct and separate departments.  Hence a double 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP1055.rgb 
 
6 
 
court should reinforce that structure as a check against the 
concentration of power in the executive branch.  "The doctrine 
of separation of powers, a fundamental principle of American 
constitutional government, is embodied in the clauses of the 
Wisconsin Constitution providing that the legislative power 
shall be vested in a senate and assembly, the executive power in 
a governor . . . , and the judicial power in the courts."  State 
v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 816, 266 N.W.2d 597 (1978) 
(citations omitted).  No less than in the federal system, in 
Wisconsin "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is."  State v. Williams, 
2012 WI 59, ¶36 n.13, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460 (quoting 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); see also 
State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 436-37, 
424 N.W.2d 385 (1988). 
¶79 Acknowledging 
respect 
for 
a 
longstanding 
interpretation of a statute is a far cry from a judicial 
doctrine of "great weight" deference that relinquishes the 
court's responsibility to independently interpret statutes.  
Equally 
troubling 
is 
the 
possibility 
that 
seven 
elected 
justices——or, indeed, any elected judge accountable to the 
people of Wisconsin——might give "great weight" deference to an 
agency decision by a single, unelected administrative law judge 
or hearing examiner against whom the people have no recourse.  
Administrative rulemaking already shifts some lawmaking power to 
                                                                                                                                                             
security arises to the rights of the people."  The Federalist 
No. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 
No.  2015AP1055.rgb 
 
7 
 
unelected officials and away from the processes of passage and 
presentment 
contemplated 
by 
our 
constitution. 
 
Judicial 
deference to executive interpretations further widens the gap 
between the people and the laws that govern them. 
¶80 The framers of our constitutions chose to disperse 
authority within the federal Republic and our state because they 
recognized that "[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, 
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny."  The Federalist 
No. 47 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  As this 
court has recognized since Harrington, no harm comes to that 
separation when the judicial branch treats a well-developed 
executive interpretation of a statute as "some evidence of what 
the law is."  Harrington, 28 Wis. at 69.  But when the 
legislature delegates broad authority to an executive agency, 
which in turn interprets and enforces that delegated authority, 
the judiciary risks the liberty of all citizens if it abdicates 
its 
constitutional 
responsibility 
to 
check 
executive 
interpretations of the law.  Because no such abdication occurs 
here, I join the majority opinion and respectfully concur. 
¶81 I am authorized to state that Justices MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN and DANIEL KELLY join this concurrence. 
No.  2015AP1055.rgb 
 
 
 
1