Case Title: State v. Deyo

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2004-179

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2006-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Deyo (2004-179)

2006 VT 120

[Filed 22-Nov-2006]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2006 VT 120

                                No. 2004-179


  State of Vermont                               Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

  Anthony Deyo                                   September Term, 2005


  John P. Wesley, J.

  David W. Gartenstein, Windham County Deputy State's Attorney, Brattleboro,
    for  Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Henry Hinton, Appellate Defender,
    Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.

       ¶  1.  REIBER, C.J.  Defendant Anthony Deyo appeals his conviction
  of aggravated sexual assault.  Defendant was tried and convicted by a jury
  of four counts: three counts of sexual assault on his child who was under
  the age of sixteen and one count of aggravated sexual assault based on
  repeated nonconsensual sexual acts as part of a common scheme or plan. 
  Defendant appeals the aggravated sexual assault conviction, claiming that
  the trial court twice erred in instructing the jury on that count.  We
  affirm. 
        
       ¶  2.  On December 27, 2001, the State charged defendant with three
  criminal counts of sexual assault on T.D., a minor, for alleged violations
  of 13 V.S.A. § 3252(b)(1) (prohibiting sexual acts with a person under the
  age of sixteen who is the actor's child).  Nearly two years later, on
  October 17, 2003, the State amended the information to add a fourth count,
  aggravated sexual assault, based on "repeated nonconsensual sexual acts as
  a part of the actor's common scheme or plan."  13 V.S.A. § 3253(a)(9).
  (FN1)  A jury trial was held in December 2003.  T.D. testified that between
  September and December 2001, when she was thirteen years of age, her father
  had sex with her ten to fifteen times.  Prior to trial, defendant had
  confessed to having sex with his daughter eight to twelve times over the
  same period, but he later challenged his confession at trial.  Defendant
  was convicted of all four counts, and this appeal followed.

       ¶  3.  On appeal, defendant raises two claims of error in the trial
  court's instructions to the jury: (1) in allowing the jury to use one of
  the incidents of the charged sexual conduct as a predicate for finding the
  element of "repeated" sexual acts for the aggravated charge; and (2) in
  instructing the jury that, because the complainant was under sixteen at the
  time of the alleged sexual acts, the acts were nonconsensual as a matter of
  law.

                                     I.
   
       ¶  4.   Defendant first argues that the trial court committed plain
  error in violation of double jeopardy principles and legislative intent
  because its instructions allowed the jury to convict him of aggravated
  sexual assault based on "repeated" sexual acts by finding, in addition to
  any acts proved in connection with the three individual counts, that only
  one uncharged compounding act had occurred.

       ¶  5.  The trial court instructed the jury on the count of aggravated
  sexual assault, in pertinent parts, as follows:

     These elements are as follows: that between September 11th, 2001
    and December 31st, 2001, at Rockingham, the defendant, Anthony
    Deyo, one, engaged in repeated sexual acts with [T.D.]; two, at a
    time when his child, [T.D.], was under the age of 16 years; three,
    and that he intentionally engaged in the sexual acts; four, and
    that the sexual acts were part of a common scheme or plan. . . . 
    As distinguished from counts one through three, count four does
    not require that you find that particular acts occurred at
    particular times.  This is in recognition of the difficulty of
    determining in retrospect the exact time of occurrence of sexual
    acts.  Rather, the State charges that in addition to the three
    distinct acts, which are the subject of counts one through three,
    Anthony Deyo engaged in other sexual acts with [T.D.].  

     Specifically, the State charges that on other occasions, the
    defendant placed his penis in [T.D's] vagina and also that contact
    occurred between Anthony Deyo's penis and [T.D.'s] mouth, and that
    contact occurred between Anthony Deyo's mouth and [T.D.'s] vulva.
    . . .  If you find that one or more sexual acts occurred between
    Anthony Deyo and [T.D.], in addition to any acts proved in
    connection with counts  one through three, the State will have met
    its burden of proof as to the element of repeated sexual acts. 
    (Emphasis added.)

       ¶  6.   After delivering the above charge to the jury, but before
  sending the jury to deliberate, the court conferred with counsel about its
  instructions pursuant to Rule 30 of the Vermont Rules of Criminal
  Procedure.  After that conference, the court instructed the jury:

     I need to make one more refinement, as to my instruction on count
    four, regarding aggravated child sexual assault. . . . [I]t is
    important that you be able to unanimously agree that the
    particular acts, beyond those charged in counts one through three
    did occur, and that you agree unanimously, what those acts were .
    . . you all agree on what they were and that they, in fact did
    occur.  (Emphasis added.)
   
       ¶  7.  Defendant did not object to the jury instruction, and so we
  review for plain error.  V.R.Cr.P. 52(b); State v. Tahair, 172 Vt. 101,
  104-05, 772 A.2d 1079, 1082 (2001).  To rise to the level of plain error,
  any claimed error must both seriously affect substantial rights and have an
  unfair prejudicial impact on jury deliberations.  In re Carter, 2004 VT 21,
  ¶ 21, 176 Vt. 322, 848 A.2d 281.  Such an error exists "only in
  extraordinary situations where it is obvious and strikes at the heart of
  defendant's constitutional rights or results in a miscarriage of justice." 
  State v. Forant, 168 Vt. 217, 220,