Case Title: Excel Constr., Inc. v. Town of Lovell

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0001

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
EXCEL CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Wyoming corporation v. TOWN OF LOVELL, WYOMING, an incorporated municipality2011 WY 166Case Number: S-11-0001Decided: 12/20/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
EXCEL 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Wyoming corporation,Appellant 
(Plaintiff),v.TOWN OF LOVELL, WYOMING, an incorporated 
municipality,Appellee (Defendant).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Big Horn County
The 
Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Patrick 
J. Murphy of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, 
Wyoming
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Tracy 
J. Copenhaver of Copenhaver, Kath, Kitchen & Kolpitcke, LLC, Powell, 
Wyoming; Bradley D. Bonner of Bonner Stinson, P.C., Cody, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Copenhaver.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      Excel 
Construction, Inc. (Excel) entered into a contract with the Town of Lovell to 
replace the Town’s water and sewer system mains and service connections.  Excel subsequently filed a complaint 
against the Town for breach of that contract and related claims.  The district court dismissed Excel’s 
claims for failure to submit a governmental notice of claim that met the 
itemization requirements of the Wyoming Constitution and the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act.  We 
reverse.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Excel presents 
its issues on appeal as follows:
 
            
A.        
Whether the District Court erred when it found that Excel Construction 
did not present an “Itemized Statement” in its Notice of 
Claim.
 
            
1.         
Did Excel Construction need to further categorize its $2,688,173.80 in 
claimed damages with the missing “Exhibit A Page?”
 
            
2.         
Did Excel Construction’s Notice of Claim contain all the information   required by the Constitution, the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, and the Wyoming Supreme Court (even without the 
“Exhibit A Page?”)?
 
            
B.        
Should Excel’s counsel’s clerical mistake be corrected pursuant to Rule 
          
60(a), W.R.Civ.P.?
 
            
C.        Did 
Excel Construction timely present its First Amended Notice of Claim         to 
the Town of Lovell on July 10, 2009?
            
D.        Did 
Excel Construction properly present its Notice of Claim and First Amended Notice 
of Claim to the Town Mayor and Town Administrator (instead of to the Town 
Treasurer)?
 
            
E.        Did 
the District Court somehow “lose” its subject matter jurisdiction when Excel 
Construction filed its Amended Complaint without the Beaulieu II averments (after filing its 
original Complaint with the Beaulieu 
II averments)?
 
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      On March 15, 
2006, Excel and the Town of Lovell entered into a contract for Excel to replace 
the Town’s water and sewer system mains and service connections.  The parties disagree as to the date on 
which the project reached substantial completion and the date on which Excel 
last performed work on the project, but they do agree that within the 
statutorily prescribed time, on January 24, 2008, Excel served a Notice of Claim 
on the Town.   

 
[¶4]      Excel served its 
Notice of Claim by certified mail with copies delivered to Town Mayor Bruce 
Morrison, Town Administrator Bart Grant, Town Attorney Sandra Kitchen, and Frank 
Page of HKM Engineering, the Town’s project engineer.  The Notice of Claim was a four page 
document that contained four identified categories of information: 1) “Time, 
Place and Circumstances of the Loss or Injury;” 2) “Claimant and Its Attorneys;” 
3) “Compensation;” and 4) “Service this Notice of Claim.”  
 
[¶5]      The 
“Compensation” paragraph of the Notice of Claim set forth the monetary damages 
that Excel sought from the Town and its officials.  The paragraph detailed those damages as 
follows:
 
Lovell 
has failed to pay Excel the monies owed under the contract, including that for 
retainage, change orders, and affirmative claims, all in breach of the 
Construction Agreement.  An itemized 
statement of the amount owed to Excel is attached hereto as Exhibit A.  In sum, it shows that Lovell owes Excel 
at least $2,688,173.80.  Excel seeks 
these $2,688,173.80 in damages for breach of contract, breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and declaratory 
judgment. 
 
[¶6]      When Excel served 
its Notice of Claim on the Town of Lovell, its attorney inadvertently failed to 
attach the “Exhibit A” referred to in the paragraph detailing Excel’s 
damages.  “Exhibit A” broke down 
Excel’s claimed damages as follows:
 
1.         
Retainage                                                     
$512,084.00
 
2.         
Additional work completed between
 11/1/06 and 8/24/07                                                
$739,169.25
 
3.         
Additional Work Impacts Reports 1-90     
$715,166.34
 
4.         
Additional Work Impact Report 91            
$  
68,010.96
 
5.         
Additional Work Impact Report 92            
$353,089.28
 
6.         
Additional Work Impact Report 93            
$264,277.81
 
7.         
Additional Work Impact Reports MDU     $  20,356.16
 
8.         
Excel Letter 344/HKM#6 (4/24/06) 
re: 
Annodes                                                  
$  
16,020.00
                                                
                                                                                    
                                                
         
$2,688,173.80
 
[¶7]      Bruce Morrison, 
Town Mayor, and Bart Grant, Town Administrator, both noticed and discussed with 
each other that the “Exhibit A” referenced in the Notice of Claim was not 
attached to the document they received.  
Mayor Morrison did not attempt to obtain a copy of the missing exhibit or 
seek to have the claim audited.  He 
instead referred Excel’s claim to the Town’s attorney for further handling. 

 
Q:        You 
knew as mayor that you were going to quickly just turn it over to your lawyer 
for further handling?
 
A:        
That’s – that’s pretty much the way we do things.  We’d been advised by our             
counsel to do that.
 
* 
* * *
 
Q:        As 
the mayor and as the town, you never intended to do a review and/or audit of 
that Notice of Claim because you perceived that it was going into litigation 
very quickly?
 
A:        I as 
the mayor did that, yes.
 
Q:        Did 
anybody with the town suggest to you that the town should perform a review 
and/or audit of that Notice of Claim?
 
A:        They 
did not.
 
Q:        And 
you didn't ask anybody to?
 
                        
A:        I did 
not.  
 
 
 
[¶8]      On February 5, 
2008, Excel filed its Complaint against the Town of Lovell.  Paragraph 13 of Excel’s Complaint 
alleged compliance with the signature and certification requirements of Article 
16, Section 7 of the Wyoming Constitution and the filing requirements of the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, as required by this Court’s ruling in Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, 86 P.3d 863 (Wyo. 2004)(Beaulieu II), 
overruled on other grounds by Brown 
v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, 248 P.3d 1136 (Wyo. 2011).  On June 13, 2008, Excel filed its first 
Amended Complaint, in which it added HKM Engineering as a party.  Due to a drafting oversight, Paragraph 
13 of Excel’s original Complaint was not included in Excel’s first Amended 
Complaint.  
 
[¶9]      On July 10, 2009, 
Excel learned that the Notice of Claim it served on the Town of Lovell did not 
have the referenced “Exhibit A” attached to it.  On that same date, Excel notified the 
Town of the omission and served on it a First Amended Notice of Claim that 
included the previously omitted “Exhibit A.”   
 
[¶10]   On June 17, 2010, the Town of 
Lovell filed a summary judgment motion.  
The Town alleged it was entitled to summary judgment on three separate 
grounds: 1) Excel failed to timely file with the Town a Notice of Claim with the 
required full itemization of damages; 2) Excel failed to serve its Notice of 
Claim on the proper town officer, specifically, the town treasurer; 3) Excel’s 
first Amended Complaint failed to plead compliance with the Beaulieu II requirements.  On July 8, 2010, Excel filed a Motion 
for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint wherein it sought “leave to file 
its Second Amended Complaint to reassert (and to expound upon) allegations 
originally contained in its original Complaint, but that were accidently, 
inadvertently, unknowingly, and unintentionally deleted when plaintiff later 
filed its Amended Complaint.”  

 
[¶11]   The district court concluded that 
because Excel omitted “Exhibit A” from its original Notice of Claim, the Notice 
of Claim failed to provide a full itemization of Excel’s damages as required by 
the Wyoming Constitution and the Governmental Claims Act.  It further concluded that Excel’s 
attempt to amend its Notice of Claim failed because the First Amended Notice of 
Claim was not filed within two years of the alleged act, error or omission that 
gave rise to Excel’s claim, as required by the Governmental Claims Act.  The district court finally concluded 
that due to Excel’s failure to comply with the Governmental Claims Act in its 
submission of its original Notice of Claim, the court had no subject matter 
jurisdiction and could not rule on Excel’s Motion for Leave to File a Second 
Amended Complaint.  On these 
grounds, the district court granted the Town of Lovell’s Motion to Dismiss 
and/or Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed Excel’s claims against the 
Town.
 
 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶12]   The district court ruled that the 
Town of Lovell was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  
“The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that 
we review de novo.”  Madsen v. Bd. of Trustees of Mem’l Hosp. of 
Sweetwater Cty., 2011 WY 36, ¶ 9, 248 P.3d 1151, 1153 (Wyo. 
2011).
 
DISCUSSION
 
Itemization 
of Excel’s Claim
 
[¶13]   The Town of Lovell contends that 
Excel’s failure to attach its “Exhibit A” to its Notice of Claim rendered that 
notice constitutionally inadequate with respect to the itemization of its 
damages.  The omission of the 
exhibit is the Town’s only objection to the notice, and it is the Town’s 
position that in all other respects the Notice of Claim, at least as to its 
content, met the requirements of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act and Article 
16, Section 7 of the Wyoming Constitution.  
The district court agreed and held that because Excel failed to 
categorize its damages, as it had in the omitted exhibit, its Notice of Claim 
was fatally defective.
 
[¶14]   The Town of Lovell and the district 
court read the constitutional and statutory damage itemization requirements, and 
our cases interpreting those requirements, as mandating some level of 
categorization of the damages demanded by a claimant.  We disagree.

[¶15]   Article 
16, Section 7 of the Wyoming Constitution requires that a claim be submitted as 
“a full itemized statement in writing, certified to under penalty of perjury.” 
The Governmental Claims Act likewise requires that a governmental claim 
be presented to the entity as an itemized statement in writing.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a) 
(LexisNexis 2011).  It provides in 
particular that the claim state:
 
            
(i) The time, place and circumstances of the alleged loss or injury 
including the name of the public employee involved, if 
known;
 
            
(ii) The name, address and residence of the claimant and his 
representative or attorney, if any; and
 
            
(iii) The amount of compensation 
or other relief demanded.
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(b) (LexisNexis 2011) (emphasis added).    
 
[¶16]   We have held that the primary 
purpose to be served by the filing of a notice of claim is “to provide 
governmental entities with notice to assist them in budgeting and financial 
decision making.”  Madsen, ¶ 15, 248 P.3d  at 1154 (citing 
Hochalter v. City of Gillette, 2005 
WY 125, ¶ 21, 120 P.3d 674, 680 (Wyo. 2005)).  Our decisions recognize that this 
purpose is served, and the statutory and constitutional itemization requirements 
are met, when a claimant specifies the dollar amount of damages being 
demanded.  See Madsen, ¶¶ 17-19, 248 P.3d at 1154-55; 
City of Gillette v. Hladky Constr., 
Inc., 2008 WY 134, ¶¶ 22-26, 196 P.3d 184, 194-95 (Wyo. 2008).  Our decisions in those cases turned not 
on the categorization of the damages but on the identification of a specific 
damages amount.
 
[¶17]   In Hladky, the 
notice of claim quantified the damages sought as the difference between the 
claimant’s bid price and the actual cost incurred in completing the 
contract.  Hladky, ¶ 25, 196 P.3d  at 195. An 
attached exhibit set forth the total damages as $1,300,016.57 and separated that 
total into five categories, two of which were further broken down into 
subcategories. We concluded that the notice of claim set forth the damages the 
claimant alleged resulted from the city’s conduct and thus complied with 
§ 1-39-113.  Hladky, ¶ 26, 196 P.3d  at 195.  In so holding, we 
stated:
 
Pursuant 
to this provision, the notice of claim is not required to specify the legal 
theories upon which the claimant is relying. Instead, the notice of claim is 
required to state in pertinent part “the time, place and circumstances of the 
alleged loss of injury” and the amount 
of compensation demanded.
 
Id., 
¶ 23, 196 P.3d  at 195 (emphasis added).
 
[¶18]   In Madsen, the notice of claim alleged total damages in the amount of 
$750,000 and separated that total into four general categories: direct 
contractual damages, consequential damages, lost income, and relocation.  We held that this itemization complied 
with the requirements of § 1-39-113(b) and Article 16, Section 7 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  Madsen, ¶ 19, 248 P.3d  at 
1155.
 
[¶19]   Although 
we held in Hladky and Madsen that the general categorization 
of damages in those cases satisfied the constitutional and statutory itemization 
requirements, we did not hold that the categorization itself is an independent 
requirement.  That is, our decisions in Hladky and Madsen did not depend on the claimants’ 
classification or categorization of the damages in their notices of claim.  Nor in those cases did we endeavor to 
define the number or types of categories into which damages should be 
broken.  The critical finding in 
each of the cases was the claimant’s specification of the amount they were 
requesting in damages.
[¶20]   It is difficult for any claimant to 
know what approach a given entity may take to its investigation or “audit” of a 
claim, if any.  As a practical 
matter, many governmental entities may immediately turn their claims over to 
legal counsel without any further investigation, as the record shows the Town of 
Lovell did in this case.  This of 
course makes it especially difficult to gauge what level of detail may be 
necessary to make a damages categorization at all useful or helpful.  
 
[¶21]   That the Governmental Claims Act, 
the Constitution, and our prior decisions do not require a claimant to engage in 
such an exercise is illustrated by our review of the categories the claimants 
used in Hladky and Madsen.  In Hladky, the claimant separated its 
damages into five categories: extended overhead cost impact, direct cost 
impacts, other costs, insurance and bonding, and sales tax increase.  The “direct cost impacts” and “other 
costs” categories were further broken down into subcategories that we did not 
discuss or identify in the decision.  
Hladky, ¶ 25, 196 P.3d  at 
195.  That we did not devote much 
discussion to the categories, or even identify the subcategories, indicates the 
lack of emphasis this Court placed on the categorization as compared to the 
requirement that the claimant’s notice provide a clear identification of the 
total damages amount being demanded. 
 
[¶22]   The same is true in Madsen.  The claimant in that case separated his 
damages into four categories: direct contractual damages, consequential damages, 
lost income, and relocation.  Madsen, ¶ 19, 248 P.3d  at 1155.  These are plainly broad and general 
categories that could only minimally assist an entity’s investigation of the 
claims, if at all.  Again, the 
bottom line in our decision was the claimant’s clear identification of the total 
amount of damages he was demanding.
 
[¶23]   Likewise in this case, neither the 
Town of Lovell nor the district court explained how including Excel’s “Exhibit 
A” as part of the Notice of Claim would have meaningfully enhanced the Town’s 
ability to act on the Claim.  As in 
Hladky and Madsen, the categories into which Excel 
broke its damages were broad and general.  
In fact, the two of Excel’s categories that account for the greatest 
compensation demanded, both in excess of $700,000, are labeled with little more 
information than “additional work.”  
Specifically, Item No. 2 is for additional work over a ten-month period, 
and Item No. 3 is for additional work over ninety work reports.       The categories, like 
those in Hladky and Madsen, specify the dollar amounts of 
damages demanded, but do little more than that.  We cannot agree with the Town of Lovell 
or the district court that this breakdown of the total damages into general 
categories could transform a claim from one that is constitutionally infirm to 
one that is a constitutionally and statutorily adequate itemization, or 
transform a vague claim into one that is sufficiently auditable.   
 
[¶24]   Given the limited information 
provided by the categorization of damages we have seen in our prior cases and in 
this case, we would be elevating form over substance to hold that it is 
mandated.  The itemization required 
by Article 16, Section 7 of the Constitution and § 1-39-113(b)(iii) is a 
statement of the dollar amount of damages demanded.  Hladky, ¶ 23, 196 P.3d  at 195.
 
[¶25]   The Town of Lovell argues that even 
if this Court were to conclude that the damages itemization required is simply a 
statement of the damages demanded, Excel’s notice of claim was nonetheless 
defective because it specified its demanded compensation as a minimum amount of 
“at least $2,688,173.80.”  The Town 
contends that a demand made in such terms, with no maximum amount identified, is 
impossible for an entity to evaluate and plan for in its budget.  It thus argues that to allow the claim 
to stand would undermine the primary planning and budget purpose served by the 
notice of claim requirement.  

 
[¶26]   The Town’s argument misconstrues 
Excel’s demanded compensation.  
Excel’s Notice of Claim set forth its damages 
as follows:
 
Lovell 
has failed to pay Excel the monies owed under the contract, including that for 
retainage, change orders, and affirmative claims, all in breach of the 
Construction Agreement.  An itemized 
statement of the amount owed to Excel is attached hereto as Exhibit A.  In sum, it shows that Lovell owes Excel 
at least $2,688,173.80.  Excel seeks these $2,688,173.80 in 
damages for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and declaratory judgment. 

 
(Emphasis 
added.)  In referring to the amounts 
categorized in its “Exhibit A,” Excel used the words “at least.”  In its demand for damages in the next 
sentence, however, Excel used only the dollar amount, with no qualifying 
terms.  We are satisfied that the 
amount demanded is the specific dollar amount: $2,688,173.80.  
 
[¶27]   Having concluded that Excel 
identified the precise dollar amount of damages it was seeking in its Notice of 
Claim, we hold that Excel’s Notice of Claim met the itemization requirements of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(b)(iii) and Article 16, Section 7 of the 
Constitution.  Because we find 
Excel’s Notice of Claim adequately itemized the damages it was demanding, we do 
not address Excel’s W.R.C.P. 60(a) argument or the timeliness of its Amended 
Notice of Claim.1
 
 
Notice 
of Claim Service on Proper Town Official 
 
[¶28]   In its dispositive motion before 
the district court, the Town of Lovell argued that Excel’s Notice of Claim was 
also constitutionally defective because it was served on the Town Mayor and the 
Town Administrator, but not on the Town Treasurer.  On appeal, the Town declined to present 
argument on this issue because the district court did not rule on the question 
below.  Because it is not clear that 
the Town has abandoned this position, and to avoid piecemeal consideration of 
the jurisdictional issues raised before the district court, we will take this 
opportunity to address the question.
 
[¶29]   Article 16, Section 7 of the 
Wyoming Constitution provides that no claim against a government entity shall be 
allowed or paid “until a full itemized statement in writing, certified to under 
penalty of perjury, shall be filed with the officer or officers whose duty it 
may be to audit the same.”  The Town 
of Lovell argues that pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-2-203, it is the Town’s 
Treasurer whose duty it is to audit governmental claims against the Town, and 
thus Excel’s failure to serve its Notice of Claim on the Treasurer rendered the 
notice constitutionally infirm.  We 
find no support for the Town’s argument in the referenced statute or in the 
Town’s own practices, and therefore reject its argument.
 
[¶30]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-2-203 
(LexisNexis 2011) provides as follows concerning the responsibilities of a town 
treasurer:
 
            
The treasurer of the town shall keep his accounts so as to show when and 
from what sources all monies paid to him have been derived and to whom and when 
the monies or any part thereof have been paid out.  His books, accounts and vouchers are at 
all times subject to examination by the governing body or any elector of the 
town.  It is the duty of the 
treasurer to provide the governing body with a financial report at such times, 
but not less than quarterly, and in a form as the governing body requires. 

 
The 
language of this provision cannot be stretched to find even an obligation for a 
town treasurer to perform an auditing function, let alone to find an 
interpretation that makes a town treasurer the sole town official upon whom a 
governmental claim may be served.  
It imposes only obligations with respect to how a town’s accounts must be 
maintained, their availability for inspection and a town treasurer’s reporting 
frequency.
 
[¶31]   The Town’s own practices further 
belie its proposed interpretation of § 15-2-203.  Valerie Beal has been Lovell’s Town 
Treasurer since 2002. The Town has not specifically designated in writing who is 
responsible for auditing or reviewing governmental claims, and Ms. Beal has 
never been told that it is one of her responsibilities.  Although there have been at least three 
governmental claims against the Town of Lovell during Ms. Beal’s tenure as Town 
Treasurer, Ms. Beal has never conducted a review or audit of a government claim 
filed against the Town.  

 
[¶32]   It is clear that the Town of Lovell 
has not in writing or by practice designated its Town Treasurer to be the 
official on whom governmental claims must be served.  This would suggest at least some 
indication that the Town itself does not interpret § 15-2-203 to mandate that a 
town treasurer be the sole official responsible for receiving, reviewing and 
auditing governmental claims.  

 
[¶33]   Alternatively, the record does 
provide ample support for Excel’s decision to serve its Notice of Claim on the 
Town Administrator and Town Mayor.  
The written job description for the Town Administrator assigns to the 
administrator, among other duties, the following 
responsibility:
 
Prepares 
annual Town budget by compiling revenue and expense figures; presents budget to 
Town Council; reviews, monitors and controls all financial transaction[s] of the 
Town. 
 
[¶34]   With respect to the Town Mayor, it 
was the mayor whom the Lovell Town Council designated to be the Town’s 
representative on the water and sewer project.  The minutes from a meeting of the Town 
Council on April 9, 2007, reflect that designation as 
follows:
 
Council 
discussed designating the Mayor as a representative to act in the Town’s behalf 
on the North Water and Sewer Project without having to call special meetings as 
the project proceeds.  Scott Allred 
made a motion to designate Mayor Bruce Morrison as the Town’s official 
representative for the project with full authority to suspend or stop work, 
negotiate change orders, accept defective work at a reduced price, to file 
claims or respond to claims filed by Excel or Citizens and with full authority 
to execute on behalf of the Town all documents related thereto.  Second by Jodi Lindsay.  All in favor.  Motion passed.  
 
[¶35]   We conclude that Excel complied 
with the service requirements of Article 16, Section 7 of the Wyoming 
Constitution when it served its Notice of Claim on the Lovell Town Mayor, Lovell 
Town Administrator, Lovell Town Attorney, and the Town’s project engineer on the 
water and sewer project from which Excel’s claims arose.
 
[¶36]   In our decisions interpreting the 
statutory and constitutional provisions governing governmental claims, we have 
emphasized the need for claimants to strictly adhere to those claim 
requirements.  The requirements are 
not, however, intended to be traps or to be used by governmental entities as 
traps.  Regarding the designation of 
a governmental official to receive service of claims, we have said that 

 
the 
appointment of the person charged with the auditing function should be 
memorialized in some official action of the governmental entity. At a minimum, 
such established procedures and criteria will satisfy the requirements of the 
constitution.
 
Beaulieu 
v. Florquist, 
2001 WY 33, ¶ 18, 20 P.3d 521, 527 (Wyo. 2001).  For future claims, should it be 
genuinely important to the Town of Lovell that its Town Treasurer be the town 
official served with all government claims, we encourage the Town to memorialize 
that requirement in some appropriate form of writing.
 
District 
Court’s Jurisdiction over Amended Complaint
 
[¶37]   The final issue before this Court 
is whether the district court lost jurisdiction over this action when Excel 
filed its first Amended Complaint and inadvertently omitted the required 
constitutional and statutory governmental claim averments.  The Town of Lovell in its brief on 
appeal stated that “based upon this Court’s determination in Brown v. City of Casper, Lovell does not 
intend to pursue its argument that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed for 
failing to allege compliance with the statutory and constitutional requirements 
for bringing the claim.”   

 
[¶38]   We agree with the Town that the 
issue was resolved in Brown, wherein 
this Court held that “subject matter jurisdiction is invoked upon the filing of 
a complaint alleging a claim against a governmental entity,” and “in cases where 
a notice of claim has been properly presented but the complaint fails to allege 
that fact, district courts have the discretion to allow amendment of the 
complaint to cure the failure.”  Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, ¶ 
9, 248 P.3d 1136, 1139 (Wyo. 2011).  
The district court has jurisdiction to rule on Excel’s motion for leave 
to file a second amended complaint.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶39]   Excel’s Notice of Claim identified 
the specific dollar amount of compensation it was demanding from the Town of 
Lovell and therefore met the damages itemization requirements of Article 16, 
Section 7 of the Wyoming Constitution and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-113(b)(iii).  We further 
conclude that Excel served its Notice of Claim on the proper town officials and 
that the district court has jurisdiction to consider Excel’s motion for leave to 
file a second amended complaint.  We 
reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.2
 
FOOTNOTES
 
1Counsel for the Town of Lovell suggests that Excel’s itemization 
arguments are undermined by the fact that counsel for Excel argued the opposite 
side of the issue in a separate and unrelated case, representing a different 
party.  This argument is 
misplaced.  We do not require 
attorneys to reconcile the positions they argue in unrelated cases with 
unrelated parties.  We decide a case 
based on the application of the controlling law to the facts of that particular 
case.
2The 
Town of Lovell objected to Appendices G, I, and N attached to Excel’s Brief as 
documents extraneous to the record and not authenticated or reviewed by the 
district court.  This Court did not 
consider the referenced exhibits, and the exhibits were not material to our 
decision.  We therefore overrule the 
Town’s objection.