Case Title: Bui v. State

Citation: 627 So. 2d 855

Docket Number: 1911509

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1992-11-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
627 So. 2d 855 (1992)
Ex parte State of Alabama.
In re Quang Ngoc BUI
v.
STATE of Alabama.
1911509.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 13, 1992.
Rehearing Denied January 8, 1993.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and William D. Little, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
Oliver W. Loewy and Bryan A. Stevenson, Montgomery, for respondent.
HOUSTON, Justice.
Quang Ngoc Bui, a Vietnamese immigrant, was convicted on June 12, 1986, of the capital murder of his three young children; he was sentenced to death by electrocution. Bui's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals on April 12, 1988. See Bui v. State, 551 So. 2d 1094 (Ala.Crim. App.1988), for a detailed statement of the appalling circumstances surrounding these murders. We affirmed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals on July 14, 1989. Ex parte Bui, 551 So. 2d 1125 (Ala.1989). On April 22, 1991, the United States Supreme Court vacated our judgment and remanded the case for our further consideration in light of Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1991), which had not been decided when this case was tried. Bui v. Alabama, 449 U.S. 971, 111 S. Ct. 1613, 113 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1991). We then remanded the case to the Court of Criminal Appeals on July 12, 1991, Ex parte Bui, 627 So. 2d 848 (Ala.1991), and the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for *856 a hearing with respect to the state's use of its peremptory strikes to remove black persons from the jury venire. Bui v. State, 627 So. 2d 849 (Ala.Crim.App.1991). After conducting several hearings, the trial court found that the prosecutors' use of 9 of the state's 13 peremptory strikes to remove black persons from the venire was not racially motivated. On return to remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed with the trial court's finding and reversed Bui's conviction, holding that the record established that the prosecutors had engaged in intentional discrimination by striking black persons from the venire solely on account of their race. See Bui v. State, 627 So. 2d 849 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), for a detailed discussion of the reasons underlying the court's decision. The state then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which we issued pursuant to Rule 39, A.R.App.P. We reverse and remand.
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that a prosecutor may not use the state's peremptory strikes to remove venirepersons of a defendant's race solely on the assumption that they would be biased toward the defendant merely because he is of the same race. Batson granted defendants the right to require the prosecutor to explain the reasons for the strikes if the defendant has established a prima facie case of discrimination. In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1991), the Court broadened the scope of Batson, holding that a defendant may object to race-based exclusions of venirepersons through peremptory strikes whether or not the defendant and the excluded person are of the same race. It was this decision that prompted the remand to the trial court in the present case for a Batson hearing.
On remand, the Honorable Charles Price, a respected black judge serving on the Montgomery County Circuit Court, ruled that Bui had established a prima facie case of discrimination. In doing so, however, Judge Price was clearly skeptical as to whether a prima facie case of discrimination had been shown. There were at least 13 black persons on the venire, and Judge Price noted that one black person served on the jury, that one was stricken by the defense, and that two were challenged by the state for cause. The following excerpts from the transcript reflect Judge Price's frustration with having to play what he called a "numbers game":
After listening to the prosecutors' reasons for striking the nine black persons from the venire, Judge Price came to the following conclusion:
Against this backdrop, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Bui's conviction.
The Court of Criminal Appeals essentially held that the record did not support the trial court's finding that the reasons given by the prosecutor (Ellen Brooks) at the hearing on remand were the reasons used in exercising the strikes at the trial. The concern of the Court of Criminal Appeals arose from the fact that Ms. Brooks's co-counsel at the trial, Jimmy Evans, actually struck the jury. We agree with the state's position, however, that the record supports the trial court's finding. Again, the following excerpts from the transcript reflect what occurred during the hearing:
Although it expressed concern over Mr. Evans's absence from the hearings, the trial court could have reasonably inferred from Ms. Brooks's testimony that Ms. Brooks and Mr. Evans worked as a team in striking the jury and, thus, that the reasons given by Ms. Brooks for striking the black persons from the venire were the reasons underlying the state's use of its peremptory strikes at the trial. In Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609 (Ala.1987), we approved the Court of Criminal Appeals' use of a "clearly erroneous" standard for reviewing factual findings by the trial court in Batson proceedings. Applying that standard here, we cannot hold as clearly erroneous the trial court's finding that the reasons given by Ms. Brooks for exercising the state's peremptory strikes were the reasons underlying the state's use of its peremptory strikes at the trial.
The Court of Criminal Appeals also held that even if the trial court did not err in considering Ms. Brooks's explanations for the state's strikes, Batson nonetheless dictated that Bui's conviction be reversed because Ms. Brooks could not recall why she and Mr. Evans had stricken one of the black persons from the venire (the state's 11th strike). We disagree with this interpretation of Batson as applied to the facts of this case.
Recently, in Huntley v. State, 627 So. 2d 1013 (Ala.1992), this Court held that in reviewing allegations that the prosecutor exercised the state's peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner, "the reviewing court's inquiry ... shall not be restricted by the mutable and often overlapping boundaries inherent within a Batson-analysis framework, but, rather, shall focus solely upon the `propriety of the ultimate finding of discrimination vel non.'" 627 So. 2d  at 1015, quoting United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.1987), in turn quoting Merrill v. Southern Methodist University, 806 F.2d 600, 605 n. 6 (5th Cir.1986). In United States v. Forbes, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, upholding the defendants' convictions, noted:
816 F.2d  at 1011 n. 7.
In Ex parte Demunn, 627 So. 2d 1010 (Ala. 1992) (released the same day as Huntley v. State), we applied the rationale of United States v. Forbes and United States v. David in affirming Demunn's conviction. In Demunn, the prosecutor gave race-neutral reasons for striking two black persons from the venire, but he could not recall why he had stricken the third. Even so, after carefully considering all of the circumstances surrounding the selection of the jury, we concluded that the record supported the inference *860 that the prosecutor had not exercised any of the state's peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner, and we affirmed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, on the authority of Huntley.
If all the facts in the present case are carefully considered (i.e., that Bui, who is Vietnamese, was tried for these murders before the United State Supreme Court's decision in Powers; that there was almost a five-year delay in requiring the prosecutors in this case to come forth with the reasons for striking blacks from the venire; that race-neutral reasons were given for striking eight of the nine black persons removed from the venire by the state; that this case does not involve a black defendant or a black victim; that one black person served on the jury (the prosecutors had the opportunity to strike this black person also, but did not); that the defense struck one black person from the venire; and that one of the most distinguished black circuit judges in this state was not convinced that the state's strikes were racially motivated), we cannot hold that the trial court's finding of an absence of racial discrimination with respect to the state's 11th strike was clearly erroneous. See Ex parte Branch.
We note that Ex parte Williams, 571 So. 2d 987 (Ala.1990), relied on by the Court of Criminal Appeals, is distinguishable on its facts. In that case the defendant was black and the prosecutor struck four out of the five black persons on the venire. We held that sufficient to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The prosecutor, however, made no attempt whatever to explain one of the state's four strikes, even though he was asked to do so immediately after the jury had been impaneled and sworn. We held that, under the circumstances, the prosecutor had failed to rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination with respect to at least one of the black persons stricken from the venire. As previously stated, the present case does not involve a black defendant, and the prosecutor, who was asked to reconstruct the events of the trial almost five years after the fact, was forthright in conceding that she could not remember why the state had exercised one of its strikes as it did to remove a black person from the venire.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for the reinstatement of Bui's conviction and sentence.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES, STEAGALL and INGRAM, JJ., concur.
ADAMS, J., concurs specially.
ADAMS, Justice (concurring specially).
Although this is a close case, I also must conclude, considering the totality of circumstances, that the State's inability to explain one peremptory strike does not necessitate a retrial. I concur specially in order to emphasize the factual peculiarity of this case.
As we explained in Ex parte Bird, 594 So. 2d 676 (Ala.1991), the persuasiveness of the State's explanations for one or more peremptory strikes can be undermined by the pretextual nature of the State's rationale for the other challenges. Id. at 683. It logically follows that the State's burden of explanation for one peremptory strike, for which it offers little or no rationale, may, in extraordinary cases, be met by the persuasiveness of its remaining explanations or by the overall circumstances to which it refers in rebuttal. I believe this is such a case.
The trial judge's determination in each case that peremptory challenges were not racially motivated is, ordinarily, entitled to considerable deference. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n. 21, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1724 n. 21, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986). Such a determination is one circumstance on which the State is entitled to rely on appeal. The weight to be accorded this circumstance by the reviewing court is significantly magnified if the trial judge himself shares the race of the challenged veniremembers.
After extensive testimony and consideration of the circumstances surrounding the State's voir dire in this case, Judge Price, an experienced black circuit judge and former prosecutor, emphatically rejected the defendant's allegations of discrimination. In doing *861 so, he specifically referred to his natural, preemptive "sensitivity" to this issue.
Judge Price's unique experience and perspective weigh heavily in favor of the State's argument. This factor, in my view, especially when considered in conjunction with the other mitigating circumstances noted in the principal opinion, overcomes the State's inability to explain its 11th peremptory challenge.