Case Title: Davenport v. Epperly

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87-56

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1987-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Davenport v. Epperly1987 WY 142744 P.2d 1110Case Number: 87-56Decided: 11/03/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
SCOTT A. DAVENPORT, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 
HOWARD C. EPPERLY, JR., 
AND ROBERT COCHRANE, CARBON COUNTY COAL COMPANY, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CarbonCounty, Robert A. Hill, 
J.

 
 
George Santini of Charles 
E. Graves and Associates, Cheyenne, for appellant.

 
 
Catherine MacPherson of 
Johnson, MacPherson & Noecker, Rawlins, for appellees.

 
 
Before BROWN, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and LANGDON, District Judge.

 
 

BROWN, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Davenport contends that 
appellees Epperly and Cochrane intentionally interfered with his employment 
contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees and 
appellant appeals.

 
 

[¶2.]     Appellant states one 
issue:

 
 
"Are co-employees subject 
to liability for intentional interference with an employment contract between an 
employee and their common employer?"

 
 
Answering the issue posed 
by appellant in the affirmative would not dispose of this case. He argues 
principles other than those suggested by his statement of the 
issue.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellees present the 
issues as: 

 
 
"1. Was the entry of an 
order granting summary judgment proper, i.e., were there no genuine issues of 
material fact and were the defendants entitled to judgment in their favor as a 
matter of law on the claim of intentional interference with 
contract?

 
 
"2. Is a co-employee, who 
holds a supervisory position, as an agent of the company, and whose job duties 
require him to terminate and discipline employees, subject to liability for 
intentional interference with contract between another employee and their common 
employer?"

 
 

[¶4.]     We will 
affirm.

 
 

[¶5.]     Before October 24, 
1985, both appellant and appellees were employed by Carbon County Coal Company. 
Appellee Cochrane was the training coordinator while appellee Epperly acted as 
mine superintendent.

 
 

[¶6.]     On October 19, 1985, 
Cochrane saw Davenport hunting elk. At the time, appellant 
was receiving worker's compensation benefits and was on the employer's salary 
continuance program pending his return to work. On the salary continuance 
program, the employer pays the difference between the worker's compensation 
payment and the regular salary of the worker. Under the company's salary 
continuance program, disabled employees are required to report to the mine each 
work day at 9:00 a.m. October 19 was a Saturday, and ordinarily would have been 
Davenport's day off. The company had no written rules, policies or procedures 
limiting what employees on salary continuation could or could not do with the 
exception of requiring that said employees "report in."

 
 

[¶7.]     On the following 
Monday, Cochrane reported to Epperly that he had seen Davenport hunting elk on 
October 19. Based on this report, a decision was made to recommend Davenport's termination. 
Joel Strid, the general manager of the mine, approved the termination letter 
drafted by Epperly. In the letter, Davenport was informed that he was being 
terminated for the following reasons:

 
 
"Your misrepresentation 
of facts in regard to your ability to return to work from your disability status 
and to perform the duties and responsibilities of your 
job.

 
 
"Your misrepresentation 
of facts in regard to your disability status which resulted in your continuing 
to receive salary continuation benefits.

 
 
"Your use of time off, 
with the company's salary continuance program, to engage in activities which are 
contrary to the intent of this program which indicates a discrepancy in your 
disability status."

 
 

[¶8.]     While at a meeting with 
Epperly and the employee relations manager on October 24, 1985, Davenport was told that he 
was discharged. At that time, he protested the discharge on grounds that he went 
hunting with his doctor's verbal approval. He said he had exercised caution to 
avoid reinjury while elk hunting and transporting the meat back to his vehicle. 
Despite these protests, the termination was not rescinded; however, Davenport was told that if 
he obtained a written confirmation from his physician that he had permission to 
go elk hunting, the company would reconsider its decision. Davenport made numerous 
requests for such a letter from his treating physician but no letter was 
provided. However, in his deposition, Dr. Robert J. Curnow stated that he 
verbally approved appellant's hunting trip.

 
 

[¶9.]     Appellant filed suit 
against Cochrane and Epperly alleging "intentional interference with contract." 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees, resulting in 
this appeal.

 
 

[¶10.]  Wyoming does recognize the tort of 
"intentional interference with contract." We said in Toltec Watershed 
Improvement District v. Johnston, Wyo., 717 P.2d 808, 813-814 
(1986):

 
 
"Tortious interference 
with a contract is defined as:

 
 
"`One who intentionally 
and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract 
to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing 
the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the 
other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the 
third person to perform the contract.' Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, p. 7 
(1979).

 
 
"In an interference with 
contract action, Board of Trustees of Weston County School District No. 1 v. 
Holso, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1009, 1016-1017 (1978), we said that the necessary 
elements of proof were:

 
 
"`(1) the existence of a 
valid contractual relationship or business expectancy;

 
 
"`(2) knowledge of the 
relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferor;

 
 
"`(3) intentional 
interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or 
expectancy; and

 
 
"`(4) resultant damage to 
the party whose relationship or expectancy has been 
disrupted.'"

 
 

[¶11.]  Although Wyoming recognizes the tort of intentional 
interference with contract, we hold that the trial court properly granted 
appellee's motion for summary judgment. Rule 56(c), Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure, provides that summary judgment "* * * shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law * * *." The court granted summary judgment to appellees based on 
depositions, affidavits and stipulations contained in the pretrial 
order.

 
 

[¶12.]  This court's standard for reviewing the 
propriety of summary judgment is well established. England v. Simmons, Wyo., 
728 P.2d 1137 (1986). The initial burden is on the movant to show that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact. Fiedler v. Steger, Wyo., 
713 P.2d 773 (1986). Once that showing is made, it is incumbent upon the party 
opposing the motion to come forward with specific facts to show that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact. Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc., 
Wyo., 735 P.2d 722 (1987); and Bryant v. 
Hornbuckle, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1132 (1986). Conclusory 
affidavits are insufficient and specific facts must be shown. Blackmore v. Davis 
Oil Company, Wyo., 671 P.2d 334 
(1983).

 
 

[¶13.]  In Cordova v. Gosar, Wyo., 719 P.2d 625, 
634 (1986), we set forth a six-stage analysis normally used in determining 
whether summary judgment was properly entered by the district court. These six 
stages include:

 
 
"1. Legal sufficiency of 
the complaint.

 
 
"2. Procedural 
sufficiency of the motion for summary judgment and attached affidavits and 
deposition material.

 
 
"3. Substantive 
sufficiency of the affidavits to initially support the 
motion.

 
 
"4. Procedural 
sufficiency of responsive affidavits.

 
 
"5. Substantive legal 
issue disposition.

 
 
"6. Substantive 
sufficiency of responsive affidavits."

 
 
We will discuss this 
Cordova case following this six-stage analysis.

 
 

[¶14.]  Appellees do not question the legal 
sufficiency of the complaint, and summary judgment was not granted because of 
any deficiency or flaw in the complaint. We therefore need not discuss stage one 
of the summary judgment analysis of the Cordova case.

 
 

[¶15.]  Stage two of the analysis deals with the 
procedural sufficiency of the motion for summary judgment and the attached 
affidavits and deposition material in support of the motion. Appellant murmurs 
briefly about the affidavit of Epperly being filed a week after the motion for 
summary judgment; however, nothing in Rule 56, W.R.C.P., precludes filing a 
supporting affidavit after the motion for summary judgment has been filed. 
Appellant's complaint as to the timeliness of Epperly's affidavit is raised for 
the first time on this appeal; the issue was not raised at trial. An issue not 
called to the attention of the trial court will not be considered on appeal. ABC 
Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 
Wyo., 632 P.2d 925 
(1981).

 
 

[¶16.]  In any event, appellant was not denied an 
opportunity to respond to meet the contents of the Epperly affidavit. The motion 
for summary judgment was filed October 17, 1986. The Epperly affidavit was filed 
October 23, 1986. Appellant submitted materials in opposition on November 12 and 
14, 1986, and on December 9, 1986, the day the motion for summary judgment was 
heard.

 
 

[¶17.]  Appellant further argues that his motion 
to strike the Epperly affidavit on the basis that it was hearsay, and that it 
did not comply with the requirement that affidavits be made on personal 
knowledge containing facts which would otherwise be admissible in evidence, was 
not ruled upon by the district court. Appellant failed to call up the motion to 
strike for hearing as contemplated by Rule 301, Uniform Rules for the District 
Courts of the State of Wyoming. He also neglected to call the motion 
to the attention of the district court at the hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment. We need not consider on appeal questions not properly raised in the 
trial court. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, supra.

 
 

[¶18.]  Stage three involves sufficiency of the 
affidavits and depositions to support the motion for summary judgment. Appellees 
must make a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and that when applicable law is applied to the facts, movants are entitled 
to summary judgment as a matter of law. England v. Simmons, 
supra.

 
 

[¶19.]  Cochrane's deposition indicates that he 
was called into the office, that he reported what he had observed, and that he 
did not know the reason for Davenport's termination until four months after it 
occurred; however, he did know of the termination the following Thursday. In the 
deposition he recites what he observed, did, and discussed with Davenport and recites what 
he reported and did with regard to the company. It appears from the affidavit 
that Cochran had no part in recommending Davenport's termination or desiring 
termination. Epperly stated, in his affidavit, that he was of the opinion that 
Cochrane did not have malice or intent to harm appellant.

 
 

[¶20.]  The facts brought to the trial court's 
attention by Epperly in his affidavit pertain to his job assignment and duties 
as mine superintendent. At the time Epperly recommended appellant be terminated 
he was acting as an agent for the company, performing duties delegated to him. 
The affidavit also recites the information he received from Cochrane. Epperly 
further states that he received no benefit personally by recommending that 
Davenport be 
terminated; it was just part of his job. The affidavits and depositions 
submitted by appellees make a prima facie showing that they are entitled to a 
summary judgment.

 
 

[¶21.]  With respect to stage four of the summary 
judgment analysis, the sufficiency of responsive affidavits, appellees make no 
objection to materials submitted by appellant.

 
 

[¶22.]  Stages five and six of the summary 
judgment analysis in the Cordova case will be discussed together. Appellant 
fails to produce specific facts which show Cochrane did anything more than 
observe appellant after his kill and respond to questions asked of him. No 
specific facts were presented that show Cochrane knew Davenport had a "contract," although he knew Davenport worked at the company; or that he intended to 
have Davenport terminated by providing 
information about what he observed and heard from Davenport; or that he influenced the company to terminate 
Davenport by 
providing information. There are no contradictory facts or inferences that can 
be drawn from Davenport's version of the facts. Moreover, 
appellant's "facts" are not specific and do not focus on the issue of 
interference with contract.

 
 

[¶23.]  Appellant attempts to fashion a factual 
dispute by denying that he told Cochrane he had meat in his backpack as alleged 
by Cochrane and further denies that he had meat in his backpack. This dispute is 
not one regarding a material fact. The discharge of appellant was not based on 
whether or not he had meat in his backpack. The feeble nature of appellant's 
complaint against Cochrane is apparent from his deposition. While being deposed, 
appellant was asked:

 
 
"Q. Okay. What 
specifically did Mr. Cochrane do that was wrong? 

 
 
"A. [by Davenport] Well, as I see 
it, it wasn't any of his business what I was doing. And I wasn't doing anything 
wrong in the first place, so I would say it was wrong for him to run in and try 
to better himself at the discretion (sic) of others.

 
 
"Q. Is there anything 
else that you think Mr. Cochrane did wrong?

 
 
"A. That's all that I 
think he did wrong."

 
 

[¶24.]  Epperly asserted in his affidavit that it 
was his job to terminate and discipline employees, and that he was acting in 
such capacity when he terminated Davenport. He recites the information he 
received from Cochrane, which was essentially the same as that reported by 
Davenport in his 
deposition. Davenport fails to present specific facts to 
show Epperly acted in other than his official capacity. Nor were there any 
specific facts produced to show an improper motive for recommending appellant's 
termination.

 
 

[¶25.]  Appellant stated in his affidavit that 
because the company had received a large judgment, it had greater incentive to 
terminate him. We fail to see any connection between this judgment and a motive 
for either Epperly or Cochrane to seek the discharge of appellant. Appellant 
strains mightily to fashion a material issue of fact out of this 
circumstance.

 
 

[¶26.]  The weakness in appellant's cause of 
action against Epperly was disclosed in his deposition. In a dialogue with 
appellees' attorney, appellant was asked:

 
 
"Q. So I can have it in 
one concise place to the extent that it's possible, would you tell me what 
specifically you say Howard Epperly did wrong?

 
 
"A. [by Davenport] He relied upon 
things told to him by hearsay from Mr. Cochrane in his letter regarding my 
termination. I mean, I was never asked about anything other than if I went. And 
he just went entirely on what Mr. Cochrane had told him.

 
 
"Q. Is there anything 
else?

 
 
"A. That's 
it."

 
 

[¶27.]  The crucial facts that must be shown by 
appellant to be in dispute must relate to whether or not appellees intentionally 
and improperly interfered with the performance of a contract between appellant 
and his employer by inducing or otherwise causing the employer not to perform 
the contract. The facts developed in appellant's affidavit, and otherwise, are 
substantially the same as the general allegations contained in the complaint. 
The difference, if any, rather than going to the issue of interference with 
contract, went instead to the discharge made by the company and whether there 
was sufficient cause for the termination or whether it constituted a breach of 
employment contract. Wrongful discharge, however, is not the issue 
here.

 
 

[¶28.]  In summary, the materials submitted by 
appellant in opposition to the motion for summary judgment were not adequate to 
preclude summary judgment. The affidavits and materials contained conclusions, 
inadmissible statements relative to the judgment the company had received, and 
failed to set forth specific facts relative to the intentional interference with 
contract claim. An employee of a company is not liable for the company's breach 
of contract on the theory that the employee induced such breach if he acts in 
his official capacity, on behalf of the company, and not as an individual for 
his own advantage. Phillips v. Montana 
Education Association, 187 Mont. 419, 610 P.2d 154 (1980); 45 Am.Jur.2d, 
Interference § 54, p. 327 (1969).

 
 

[¶29.]  The general rule set out above is 
applicable to the case before us. Epperly was acting in his official capacity on 
behalf of the company when he recommended the discharge of appellant. He was not 
acting in an individual capacity or for his own benefit. Appellant said the only 
thing Cochrane did wrong was not mind his own business. We do not know of any 
authority that supports a cause of action against a co-employee who does not 
mind his own business. Appellant has produced no evidence to show that Cochrane 
had an improper motive in reporting to the company, nor is there a showing that 
Cochrane induced the company to discharge appellant. Furthermore, there is no 
showing that Cochrane gained any advantage by appellant's 
discharge.

 
 

[¶30.]  Appellant failed to demonstrate to the 
trial court that there were material facts in dispute. Summary judgment was 
proper.

 
 

[¶31.]  Affirmed.