Case Title: State ex rel. Newell v. Tuscarawas Cty. Bd. of Elections

Citation: 2001-Ohio-1806

Docket Number: 20011811

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Newell v. Tuscarawas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 93 
Ohio St.3d 592, 2001-Ohio-1806] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. NEWELL v. TUSCARAWAS COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS 
ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Newell v. Tuscarawas Cty. Bd. of Elections (2001), 93 
Ohio St.3d 592.] 
Prohibition — Writ sought to prevent Tuscarawas County Board of Elections 
from submitting issues proposing the repeal of voter-approved levies for 
the Newcomerstown Exempted Village School District to the electorate 
at the November 6, 2001 general election —– Writ denied, when —– 
Laches defense applicable to prohibition claims in expedited election 
matters. 
(No. 01-1811 — Submitted October 30, 2001 — Decided November 5, 2001.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  The November 5, 1963, May 6, 1969, December 9, 1969, 
May 5, 1970, November 4, 1975, and November 7, 1977 levies for the 
Newcomerstown Exempted Village School District provide over twenty mills of 
the 42.60 total voter-approved operating mills for the school district.  On August 
21, 2001, petitions were filed with respondent Tuscarawas County Board of 
Elections pursuant to R.C. 5705.261 to submit issues proposing the repeal of these 
levies to the electors of the school district. 
 
On September 10, 2001, twenty days after the petitions were filed with the 
board, relator, Charles E. Newell, a registered elector of Tuscarawas County, filed 
a protest against the petitions.  This protest consisted of six general categories of 
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objections.1  Newell claimed that persons had signed petitions before their voter 
registration applications had been approved by the board, that certain persons had 
requested that their signatures be removed before the petitions were filed but their 
names were not removed, that some petition signers’ addresses differed from their 
addresses filed with the board, that some signatures had been signed by someone 
other than the named signer, that some signatures could not be counted because 
they had been printed, and that certain petition papers had circulator statements 
specifying a signature total less than the number of signatures on the petition 
paper. 
 
On September 12, 2001, the board met in an emergency session and 
scheduled a hearing on Newell’s protest for September 13.  At the September 13 
hearing, the board decided to continue the hearing to permit Newell to further 
substantiate his protest because Newell had failed to specify all of the signatures 
being challenged by his protest.  Following the September 13 hearing, Newell’s 
attorney advised the board that he would be available to complete the hearing 
during the week beginning September 17, but according to Newell’s counsel, the 
board advised him that that week was unacceptable because board members 
would be attending the Tuscarawas County Fair.  On September 18, the board 
notified Newell that the hearing would be held on September 27. 
 
On September 27, the board conducted the protest hearing.  At the 
hearing, Newell submitted exhibits specifying the signatures he challenged and 
the reasons for each of his challenges.  Newell also submitted three affidavits of 
persons who had signed the petitions.  John L. Bryant and Bonnie Myers stated in 
their affidavits that a petition circulator had misrepresented the purpose of signing 
the petitions and that when they subsequently requested that the circulator strike 
                                          
 
1. 
The September 10, 2001 protest is not part of the record in this case.  The protests that are 
part of Newell’s evidence here were his supplemental submissions at the September 27, 2001 
board hearing. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
their names from the petitions, the circulator represented that he would strike the 
signatures, but he instead filed the petitions without striking Bryant’s and Myers’s 
names.  Ida Roberts stated in her affidavit that a petition circulator misrepresented 
the purpose of the petitions and did not witness her sign her own name as well as 
her husband’s name to the petitions.  The board had stricken Bryant’s and the 
Robertses’ signatures from the petitions. 
 
The board noted that it would have been preferable for Newell to have 
requested that the board subpoena the affiants as well as other petition signers so 
that they could have been subject to cross-examination at the protest hearing.  
Newell’s attorney apologized for not having these witnesses subpoenaed and 
claimed, without evidentiary support, that the three affiants were all unavailable 
to testify at the protest hearing.  Newell’s attorney stated that he had examined the 
petitions the night before the September 27 hearing to determine where it was 
clear that one person had signed for two persons. 
 
At the September 27 hearing, Newell requested that the board conduct a 
comparative analysis of petition signatures and voter registration records and that 
it subpoena some of the petition signers “if there is any doubt in the Board’s mind 
that the signatures are not of whom they purport to be.”  When one board member 
asked if delaying a protest decision upon Newell’s request for further board 
investigation would affect an election deadline, Newell’s attorney asked whether 
there were deadlines for putting the issues on the ballot and for printing the 
ballots. 
 
The board, following an executive session to consult with its attorney, 
allowed Newell to copy voter registration records, which he had failed to submit 
previously, to attempt to prove his claim that certain petition signatures were 
written by the same person.  The board’s deputy director, however, testified that 
her comparison of the challenged signatures could not establish that they were not 
the valid signatures they purported to be. 
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The board struck some signatures because of Newell’s challenges, but 
ultimately denied his protest, including his claim that the petition papers 
containing signatures that had not been witnessed by the circulator should be 
stricken.  The board determined that the petitions contained the following totals of 
valid signatures:  repeal of the November 5, 1963 levy, 461 signatures; repeal of 
the May 6, 1969 levy, 444 signatures; repeal of the December 9, 1969 levy, 469 
signatures; repeal of the May 5, 1970 levy, 465 signatures; repeal of the 
November 4, 1975 levy, 466 signatures; and repeal of the November 7, 1977 levy, 
456 signatures.  All of the petitions exceeded the four hundred and forty 
signatures required to place the issues on the November 6, 2001 election ballot. 
 
On October 11, 2001, fourteen days after the board’s decision denying his 
protest, Newell filed this expedited election action for a writ of prohibition to 
prevent respondents, the board of elections, and the Secretary of State of Ohio, 
from placing any of the proposed issues on the November 6, 2001 election ballot.  
After the board filed a motion to dismiss and the Secretary of State filed an 
answer, Newell and the Secretary of State filed briefs, and Newell filed evidence 
pursuant to the expedited election schedule in S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9).  The Ohio 
Education Association filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Newell.  This 
cause is now before the court for a consideration of the merits. 
 
Newell seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent the submission of the issues 
repealing the school district levies to the electorate at the November 6, 2001 
general election.  In order to be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, 
Newell must establish that (1) the board is about to exercise judicial or quasi-
judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) 
denial of the writ will cause injury for which no other adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law exists.  Stutzman v. Madison Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 511, 757 N.E.2d 297. 
January Term, 2001 
5 
 
Despite the board’s contentions to the contrary,2 it exercised quasi-judicial 
authority by denying Newell’s protest following an R.C. 3501.39 hearing that 
included the sworn testimony of the board’s deputy director.  Christy v. Summit 
Cty. Bd. of Elections (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 35, 37, 671 N.E.2d 1, 3; State ex rel. 
Baldzicki v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 238, 242, 736 
N.E.2d 893, 897.  And Newell has no other adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law to challenge the submission of the issues to the electorate.  Christy, 
77 Ohio St.3d at 37, 671 N.E.2d at 3. 
 
Therefore, at issue in this case is whether the board’s exercise of quasi-
judicial power in denying Newell’s protest and placing the issues on the 
November 6 ballot is unauthorized.  The board’s decision is legally unauthorized 
if Newell establishes that the board engaged in fraud or corruption, abused its 
discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions.  State ex rel. 
Phillips v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 535, 757 N.E.2d 
319.  Newell contends that the board abused its discretion and clearly disregarded 
applicable law, including R.C. 3501.38(E), by denying his protest and placing the 
issues on the November 6 ballot. 
 
We need not address Newell’s claims.  Both the board of elections and the 
Secretary of State assert that this case is barred by laches.  As we recently 
observed, “[w]e have consistently required relators in election cases to act with 
the utmost diligence.”  State ex rel. Carberry v. Ashtabula (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 
522, 757 N.E.2d 307.  A relator seeking extraordinary relief in an election-related 
matter bears the burden of establishing that the relator acted with the required 
diligence, and if the relator fails to do so, laches may bar the action.  State ex rel. 
                                          
 
2. 
The board filed a motion to dismiss, which is generally inappropriate in expedited 
election cases.  See State ex rel. Ryant Commt. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections (1999), 86 Ohio 
St.3d 107, 111, 712 N.E.2d 696, 700. 
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Hills Communities, Inc. v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 
465, 467, 746 N.E.2d 1115, 1117-1118. 
 
Newell did not satisfy this burden here.  He waited twenty days after the 
petitions were filed on August 21 to file his September 10 protest, and he then 
waited another fourteen days following the board’s September 27 decision to file 
this action for extraordinary relief.  See State ex rel. Demaline v. Cuyahoga Cty. 
Bd. of Elections (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 523, 526-527, 740 N.E.2d 242, 245, 
quoting State ex rel. Landis v. Morrow Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 
187, 189, 724 N.E.2d 775, 777 (“ ‘we have held that a delay as brief as nine days 
can preclude our consideration of the merits of an expedited election case’ “). 
 
Newell claims that any delay was justified because the board continued 
the September 13 protest hearing to September 27 and that his attempts to have 
the protest hearing rescheduled during the week of September 17 failed because 
the board members did not want to miss the county fair.  But any minimal delay 
caused by the board’s alleged actions does not excuse Newell’s delay in filing his 
protest and in instituting this action for expedited extraordinary relief.  Demaline, 
90 Ohio St.3d at 527, 740 N.E.2d at 246; State ex rel. Manos v. Delaware Cty. Bd. 
of Elections (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 562, 563, 701 N.E.2d 371, 372. 
 
In fact, the transcript of the board’s September 27 hearing indicates that 
the board continued the hearing from September 13 because Newell’s September 
10 protest, which is not contained in the evidence before the court, failed to 
sufficiently challenge specific signatures and that the board was affording Newell 
an additional opportunity to better specify and substantiate his protest.  Even at 
the September 27 hearing, Newell did not have any witness subpoenaed to testify, 
and he requested at that late date that the board conduct further investigations, 
including subpoenaing witnesses and comparing signatures with records that 
Newell failed to obtain before the protest hearing.  Newell’s attorney also 
January Term, 2001 
7 
expressed ignorance of the statutory deadlines involved in expedited election 
matters. 
 
By Newell’s apparent failure to comply with R.C. 3501.39(A) by not 
stating all of his objections in his September 10 protest with sufficient specificity, 
he necessitated the board’s continuance of the September 13 hearing.  See Ryant 
Commt., 86 Ohio St.3d at 113, 712 N.E.2d at 701 (“By not promptly submitting a 
statutorily sufficient protest and by engaging in acts of gamesmanship that did not 
assist the board in its objective of expeditiously determining their challenges, 
relators commenced a sequence of dilatory actions that necessitated our order to 
impound the ballots for the special election”).  Newell’s counsel also admits that 
he advised the board that he could not attend a protest hearing on either 
September 24 or 25.  Therefore, at least a portion of the delay resulting from the 
continuance of the hearing was attributable to Newell’s actions. 
 
Newell also contends that in expedited election prohibition cases, the 
laches doctrine should not be invoked because “the decision to remove an issue 
from the election can be made up until the time the ballots are counted.”  But we 
have never adopted a rule exempting prohibition cases from the laches doctrine 
applicable to expedited election matters.  For example, in State ex rel. Polo v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 143, 656 N.E.2d 1277, we 
unanimously held that a seventeen-day delay until October 6 to file an expedited 
election case for a writ of prohibition to remove a candidate’s name from the 
November 7, 1995 election ballot prevented our consideration of the prohibition 
claim based on laches; see, also, Manos (laches bars prohibition action to prevent 
rezoning and development issues from being placed on election ballot).  
Similarly, Newell delayed twenty days to submit a protest to the petitions, caused 
at least a portion of the delay in the continuance of the protest hearing, and then 
delayed another fourteen days until October 11 to file this prohibition action. 
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In addition, Newell’s counsel’s lengthy argument at the September 27 
protest hearing established that he “had a sufficient grasp of the pertinent legal 
issues to obviate extensive research time before filing” this expedited election 
action.  See Carberry, 93 Ohio St.3d at 524, 757 N.E.2d at 309. 
 
Finally, the deadline to have absentee ballots printed and ready for use for 
general absentee voters and to have them mailed to Armed Services absentee 
voters was October 2.  R.C. 3509.01 and 3511.04.  Newell’s unjustified delays in 
preparing and supporting his protest, in necessitating at least a portion of the delay 
between the September 13 and 27 protest hearings, and in filing this action 
resulted in the passing of this date over a week before he filed this case.  As noted 
previously, at the September 27 hearing, his attorney exhibited a lack of 
appreciation for the importance of these and other statutory deadlines in election 
cases.  Like the relators in Carberry, if Newell had been more diligent, he could 
have had his claim resolved before the passing of these deadlines or, at a 
minimum, the prejudice to the board in its statutory obligations to absentee voters 
would have been limited to fewer affected voters.  See, e.g., Polo; cf. State ex rel. 
Squire v. Taft (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 365, 369, 632 N.E.2d 883, 886. 
 
Permitting Newell’s belated challenge to proceed here would, as the 
Secretary of State persuasively argues, confuse voters and upset an election 
process that has already commenced.  See State ex rel. Oster v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 480, 486, 756 N.E.2d 649, 655-656 (Secretary of 
State is the state’s chief election officer and Secretary’s interpretation of election 
statutes is entitled to greater weight); see, also, State ex rel. Lewis v. Hamilton 
Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 1201, 1205, 655 N.E.2d 177, 179 
(Douglas, J., concurring) (“Once the election process has begun, absent a 
complete lack of authority to hold the election in the first instance, the process 
must not be disturbed”). 
January Term, 2001 
9 
 
Based on the foregoing, laches bars Newell’s prohibition action.  Newell 
did not act with the diligence required in expedited election cases.  By so holding, 
we need not address the merits of Newell’s claims.  See Carberry, 93 Ohio St.3d 
at 523, 757 N.E.2d at 309.  Accordingly, we deny the writ. 
Writ denied. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent.  For the reasons that 
follow, I would issue a writ of prohibition with regard to at least three of the six 
petitions at issue. 
 
In denying the writ, the majority accepts respondents’ argument that this 
case is barred by laches.  I disagree.  I believe the relator has established that he 
acted with the required diligence in pursuing this case.  He filed a written protest 
twenty days after the petitions were filed.  Although the actual protest is not part 
of the record, it is clear from the transcript of the hearing before the board that the 
written protest detailed at least six separate categories of irregularities with regard 
to the circulation of the petitions.  In preparing his protest, relator examined and 
compared over two thousand seven hundred signatures contained in the six 
petitions and interviewed and obtained affidavits from persons who had signed 
the petition regarding irregularities in the circulation of the petitions.  I believe 
that relator acted with due diligence in this regard.  Moreover, neither respondent 
argues this as grounds for laches, but, rather, both argue that the claim is barred 
by laches because relator did not file his action in this court until fourteen days 
after the board denied his protest. 
 
I would find that respondents are estopped from raising laches as a defense 
because of the board’s prior action of continuing the September 13 protest hearing 
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for fourteen days.  The majority finds that the continuance was necessitated by 
relator’s failure to comply with R.C. 3501.39(A) by not stating all of his 
objections in his September 10 protest with sufficient specificity.  I disagree with 
that finding. 
 
The transcript from the September 27 hearing indicates that at the 
September 13 hearing, Thomas Hisrich, chairman of the board, instructed relator 
to narrow his protest to just those signatures that the board certified as valid.  The 
September 13 hearing was then continued to allow relator time to narrow his 
protest.  Contrary to the majority’s assertion, this is not a requirement of R.C. 
3501.39(A).  It is clear to me that the hearing was continued as a matter of 
convenience to the board members who did not want to “waste a lot of time” 
listening to relator’s protests regarding petition signatures that were not certified. 
 
Relator advised Hisrich that he would be ready to continue the 
proceedings the following Monday, September 17.  Hisrich informed relator that 
the board would be unable to hold the hearing the week of September 17 because 
members of the board wished to attend the Tuscarawas County Fair that was 
scheduled for that week.  Therefore, Hisrich set September 27, fourteen days later, 
as the date for further hearing.  Thus, I conclude that respondents are estopped 
from raising laches based on relator’s fourteen-day delay in filing his complaint in 
this court when the board delayed the protest hearing fourteen days so its 
members could attend the county fair.  For the foregoing reasons, I would reject 
respondents’ laches defense and reach the merits of this case. 
 
Relator raised numerous objections to the petitions in his protest before 
the board and in his complaint before this court.  One stands out and is supported 
by the evidence.  That objection relates to the circulator affidavit that, pursuant to 
R.C. 3501.38, must be on each part-petition.  R.C. 3501.38 provides that all 
petitions filed with a board of elections on any issue “shall” be governed by the 
following: 
January Term, 2001 
11 
 
“(E) On each petition paper the circulator shall indicate the number of 
signatures contained thereon, and shall sign a statement made under penalty of 
election falsification that he witnessed the affixing of every signature, that all 
signers were to the best of his knowledge and belief qualified to sign, and that 
every signature is to the best of his knowledge and belief the signature of the 
person whose signature it purports to be.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Relator’s protest included the assertion that a petition circulator, Chester 
McVey, who had submitted part-petitions on each issue, had executed faulty 
affidavits on some of the part-petitions he circulated.  In support of his contention, 
relator offered an affidavit executed by Ida Roberts.  That affidavit contains the 
following statements: 
 
“2. On July 5, 2001, Chester McVey came to Affiant’s home with several 
petitions which he said were to lower property taxes and fix roads. 
 
“* * * 
 
“4. Chester McVey waited on Affiant’s porch while Affiant took the 
petitions inside her house. 
 
“5. While Affiant was inside her home, Affiant signed her name and that 
of her husband, Ollie Roberts, to the petitions. 
 
“6. Affiant returned to her porch with the petitions and handed them back 
to Chester McVey bearing the names of both Affiant and Ollie Roberts. 
 
“* * * 
 
“8. Chester McVey did not personally witness Affiant affix her signature 
to the petitions or sign her husband’s name on the petitions.” 
 
Because no evidence was submitted at the hearing to rebut this affidavit, 
the board should have found that McVey had executed faulty affidavits on the 
part-petitions containing Ida Roberts’s signature.  Furthermore, because election 
laws are mandatory and require strict compliance, State ex rel. Citizens for 
Responsible Taxation v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elections (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 167, 
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169, 602 N.E.2d 615, 617, the entire part-petitions containing the faulty affidavits 
should have been invalidated for failure to comply with R.C. 3501.38(E). 
 
The record shows that the board certified twenty-four to twenty-six 
signatures on each of the six part-petitions containing Ida Roberts’s signature.  
(Ida Roberts signed a part-petition for each of the six issues.)  Because I would 
find that these signatures should not have been certified, I would subtract the 
appropriate number from the number of signatures certified by the board on each 
petition and then determine whether each of the six petitions had the required 
number of signatures to place them on the ballot. 
 
Accordingly, the board certified four hundred sixty-one signatures on the 
petition to repeal the November 5, 1963 levy.  I would subtract twenty-five from 
that total, leaving four hundred thirty-six valid signatures.  Because each petition 
was required to have at least four hundred forty signatures to be placed on the 
ballot, I would find the number of signatures on this petition insufficient and 
would issue a writ of prohibition as to the petition to repeal the November 5, 1963 
levy.  Similarly, the board certified four hundred forty-four signatures on the 
petition to repeal the May 6, 1969 levy and four hundred fifty-six signatures on 
the petition to repeal the November 7, 1977 levy.  Thus, reducing these totals by 
twenty-five and twenty-six respectively leaves fewer than four hundred forty 
signatures on each.  Therefore, I would also issue a writ with regard to these 
petitions. 
 
On the other hand, the board certified four hundred sixty-nine signatures 
on the petition to repeal the December 9, 1969 levy.  Subtracting twenty-five 
signatures from that total leaves four hundred forty-four valid signatures, which 
are more than the four hundred forty signatures required.  Thus, I would not issue 
a writ of prohibition as to the petition to repeal the December 9, 1969 levy.  
Likewise, the board certified four hundred sixty-five signatures on the petition to 
repeal the May 5, 1970 levy and four hundred sixty-six signatures on the petition 
January Term, 2001 
13 
to repeal the November 4, 1975 levy.  Thus, when these totals are reduced by 
twenty-five and twenty-four respectively they still have the required number of 
signatures to place these issues on the ballot.  Notwithstanding these 
computations, it appears from the face of the petitions that they would be subject 
to further challenge upon other statutory and evidentiary grounds.  However, 
neither the board nor the relator pursued these issues at the hearing by developing 
or producing competent, sworn evidence to the apparent irregularities.  Therefore, 
I would not issue a writ with regard to these petitions. 
 
Accordingly, I would issue a writ with regard to the petition to repeal the 
November 5, 1963 levy, the petition to repeal the May 6, 1969 levy, and the 
petition to repeal the November 7, 1977 levy.  I recognize that ballots have been 
prepared and the election is already underway through absentee ballots.  Thus, in 
issuing a writ I would indicate that the votes cast on the three issues specified 
above should not be tabulated. 
__________________ 
 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., David J. Young and Michael R. Reed, 
for relator. 
 
Michael A. Cochran, Tuscarawas County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 
for respondent Tuscarawas County Board of Elections. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Darrell M. Pierre, Jr., and 
Elizabeth Luper Schuster, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent Secretary 
of State of Ohio. 
 
Susan J. Kyte, urging granting of the writ for amicus curiae, Ohio 
Education Association. 
__________________