Case Title: Estate of Roxas v. Marcos. ICA Opinion, filed 02/12/2009 [pdf], 120 Haw. 123. Concurring Opinion by J. Leonard [pdf]. Dissenting Opinion by J. Nakamura [pdf]. ICA Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration of Opinion, filed 03/02/2009 [pdf]. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/31/2009. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 05/06/2009 [pdf].

Citation: 121 Haw. 59

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2009-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

 

UPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT

 

 

 

ESTATE OF ROGER ROKAS; and THE GOLDEN BUDHA CORPORATION, a
foreign corporation, Petitioners/Plaintifts-Appellges, a

 

 

INELDA MARCOS, Respondent/Defendant-Aappeliant; = SE
Soe oF
ana Be
FERDINAND MARCOS, Defendant. 3
wo. 28702

 

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CIV. NO, 88-0522-02)
AUGUST 10, 2009
C.J., NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, JJ.
3, RECUSED,

IN PLACE OF ACOBA,

Moon,
ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY

CIRCUIT JUDGE DEL” ROSARIO,
‘AND CIRCUIT JUDGE POLLACK,

oe: RY BY NAL
Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Appellees The Estate of Roger
Roxas and The Golden Budha Corporation ("GEC") (collectively,
“petitioners") petition this court to review the Intermediate
("ICA's") March 5, 2009 judgment on appeal.

court of Appeals’
‘The ICA's judgment was entered pursuant to its February 12, 2009

published opinion,’ Estate of Roxas v, Marcos (“Roxas II”), 120
(App. 2009), which reversed

Hawai'i 123, 126, 202 P.3d 584, 587

 

‘The opinion was authored by Associate Judge Daniel R, Foley, with
‘Leonard concurring separately. Associate Judge

 

Associate Judge Kathe:
Graig #. Nekamora wrote @ dissenting opinica.
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

the firet circuit court's ("circuit court's”)? July 24, 2007

order grant

 

1g Pet:

 

loners’ two May 8, 2007 motions to extend the
second and fourth amended judgments. The ICA held that the
circuit court erred in extending the Plaintiffs’ second and
fourth amended judgments because, under Hawai'i Revised Statute
(“HRS”) § 657-5 (2006),? “the August 28, 1996 [Judgment is the
‘original judgment’ for purposes of this case and the limitation
period for an extension commenced on its August 28, 1996 entry
date.” Roxas II, 120 Hawai'i at 126, 202 P.3d at 587. We
accepted Petitioners’ application for a writ of certiorari, and
oral argument was held on June 4, 2009.

Petitioners assert that the ICA gravely erred by
interpreting “original judgment” of HRS § 657-5 as the “first
judgment rendered by a court.” Id, at 126, 202 P.3d at 587.
‘They argue that this construction creates “an unreasonable result
in cases in which more than one judgment is entered between

different parties or as to different claims.” Petitioners

‘The Honorable Karen 3, 5. Abn presided
> RS § 657-5 provides:

Uniess an extension is granted, every judgment and decree of any
court of the State shall be presumed to be paid and discharged at
the expiration of ten years after the judgment or decree wi
fendered, No action shall be commenced after the expiration of
ten years from the date a judgnent or decree was rendered oF
cntended, Noveatension of a judanent cr decree shail be azanted
unless the extension is sought within ten vears of the date she

 

  

 

Siginal iudanect or decree was rendered. A court shall noe
extend any judgnent oF decree Bayona twenty years from the aate of
the original Judgnent or decree.” No extension shall be granted
hithout notice and che filing of @ nonchearing notion axa hearing
motion to extend the life of the judgment or decree.

 

 

 

(Emphasis added.)
IBLICATION IN WEST'S HA\

   

maintain that the limitations period on extending a judgment is
ten years from the date that the judgment to be extended was
firet entered.

We hold that the “original judgment” of HRS § 657-5
refers to the judgment that creates the rights and
responsibilities seeking to be extended, and, therefore, the
circuit court did not err in extending the second and fourth
amended judgments. Nevertheless, the circuit court erred when i
extended the fourth amended judgment until September 5, 2021,
because that date is beyond twenty years of the “original
judgment,” entered on June 26, 2000. Accordingly, we (1) vacate
the ICA’s March 5, 2009 judgment, (2) vacate the circuit court's
July 24, 2007 order, to the extent that it granted Petitioners’
motion to extend the fourth amended judgment until September 5,
2021, and (3) remand this case to the circuit court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History

On January 24, 1971, Roger Roxas ("Roxas") discovered
the legendary “Yamashita Treasure,” which, among other things,
consisted of a gold-colored buddha statue and bars of gold.
Roxas vi Marcos (“Roxas 1”), 89 Hawai'i 91, 100-1, 969 P.2d 1209,
1218-19 (1998).* Subsequently, on April 5, 1971, under the

direction of Ferdinand Marcos, individuals claiming to be from

 

. X provides a more detailed description of the background
facts established at trial. See Roxas f, 68 Hawai’ at 100-108, 969 F.2d at
1218-1227
   

HAWAII REPORTS AND PACTE

 

‘OR PUBLICATION IN W1

two Philippine national security agencies, knocked on Roxas’ s
door, claiming to have a search warrant for his house. Id, at
102, 969 P.2d at 1220, The men broke Roxas’s windows, pointed
the barrels of their rifles inside, and threatened to shoot him
Af he did not open the door. Id. Roxas opened the door, and the
men beat Roxas’s brother and ordered his family and two
bodyguards to lie down on the floor. Id, The men stole the
buddha, the diamonds, seventeen bars of gold, samurai swords, a
piggy bank belonging to Roxas’s children, and his wife's coin
collection, Id.

Subsequently, on May 18, 1971, Roxas was arrested and
tortured for information about his treasure. Id, at 103, 969
P.2d at 1221. He was kept in a room for two weeks, and he was
forced to sign an affidavit declaring that the raid in his house

had been performed “in a peaceful manner.” Id. Roxas eventually

 

escaped. Id.

In late 1974, Ferdinand Marcos and his aides and
generals, as well as Inelda Marcos’ personal security, sought the
services of Robert Curtis, an American who owned a mining
company, Id, at 105-06, 969 P.2d at 1223-24, They asked Curtis
to resmelt gold bars that Ferdinand Marcos claimed were from the
Yenashite Treasure. Id, Curtis testified that he entered = room
“tabout roughly 40 by 40,’ stacked to the ceiling with bars of
gold,” and also saw the solid gold buddha statue that Roxas had
discovered. Id.

On June 3, 1986, Roxas assigned all of his rights to
the Yamashita Treasure to GBC, in exchange for a minority holding
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

of non-voting shares. Id. at 107, 969 ®.2d at 1225.
B. Judgment And Amended Judgment

 

on February 19, 1988, Roxas and GBC filed a lawsuit
against Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. Id at 109, 969 P.2d at
1227. Roxas asserted claims of false inprisonment and battery
against Ferdinand Marcos. Id, GBC asserted clains against

Ferdinand and Inelda Marcos for conversion, constructive trust,

 

and fraudulent conveyances. 1

 

During the litigation, on September 29, 1989, Ferdinand
Marcos died, and the parties subsequently stipulated to
substitute Inelda Marcos as his estate’s personal representative.
Id, In 1993, during the litigation, Roxas also died, and the
circuit court granted a motion to substitute Felix Dacanay
("Dacanay"), personal representative of the Roxas Estate, for
Roxas as a party plaintiff. Ide

Pursuant to a July 13, 1996 jury verdict, the circuit
court filed 2 judgment on August 28, 1996 ("first-in-tine
judgment”) (1) in favor of Dacanay, as personal representative of
the Estate of Roger Roxas and against Ferdinand Marcos on the
battery and false imprisonment clains, (2) in favor of GBC and
against Ferdinand Marcos on the conversion claim, and (3) in
favor of Imelda Marcos, in her individual capacity, and against
Petitioners on all claims they asserted against her. Id. at 114,
969 P.2d at 1232.

The circuit court filed an amended judgment on October
21, 1996 ("Amended Judgment”), pursuant to Petitioners’ request

to correct the first-in-!

 

© judgment by “add{ing] the ‘Estate of
 

{++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

Ferdinand Marcos’ as a proper party defendant.” Id, at 114-15,
969 P.2d at 1232-33. Pursuant to the circuit court's prior
substitution of Imelda Marcos as a representative for the Estate
of Ferdinand Marcos, the court filed an Amended Judgment against
“Defendant Imelda Marcos, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos,” (1) in favor of Dacanay, as personal
representative of the Estate of Roger Roxas, in the anount of $6
million in damages for battery and false imprisonment, and (2) in
favor of GBC, in the amount of over $22 billion for conversion.
. The 1998 Roxas X Decision

Inelda Marcos, “in her alleged capacity as personal
representative of the Marcos Estate,” appealed from the Amended
Judgment, arguing that the court erred by amending the judgment
against her as “personal representative” of the Marcos Estate,
where she was substituted as “the representative of Defendant
Ferdinand Marcos deceased.” Id, at 99, 117, 969 .2¢ at 1217,
1235. Petitioners cross-appealed. Id. at 99, 969 P.2d at 1217.

This court issued Roxas I on November 17, 1998,
affirming, reversing, and vacating and remanding parte of the
Amended Judgment. Id, at 157, 969 P.2d at 1275. We held, among
other things, that generally, “an heir of an undistributed
estate, who has not been judicially appointed as the personal
representative of a decedent’s estate, is not = ‘proper party’
for substitution pursuant to [Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure

(HRCP")) Rule 25(a)(1)." Ide at 122, 969 P.2d at 1240. We

 

noted that Petitioners did not establish that Imelda Marcos was

appointed as the personal representative of the Marcos Estate,
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAM REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

and, therefore, Imelda Marcos did not bind the Marcos Estate to
the Judgment. Id, at 122 n,18, 126, 969 P.2d at 1240 n.18, 1248.
ie ruled, however, that Imelda Marcos deceived the court into
permitting her to represent Ferdinand Narcos, and, that

an ord

judieie!

to achieve justice consistent with the doctrine of

 

  
   

hota
tent of he:
nincaat in the aussts-of the Marsce Estate, for the anount of the
Blaintiffs-appeliees” Judgnent against Ferdinand (Marcos), a= that
Snount has been modified according to this opinion.
Id. at 126, 969 2.20 at 1244 (emphasis added). We vacated the
portion of the circuit court's Amended Judgment entered against
“efendant Inelda Marcos, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos” with respect to the (Petitioners’)
battery, false imprisonment, and conversion claims, and remanded
for entry of judgment as to those claims against “Imelda
[Marcos], in her personal capacity, to the extent of her interest
in the Marcos Estate.” Id, at 126-27, 969 P.2d at 1244-45.
Further, Roxas I (1) reversed that part of the Amended
Judgment avarding GBC $22 billion for “one storage area” of gold
bullion, (2) vacated the portion of the Amended Judgment awarding
Gac $1.4 million in damages for conversion of the golden buddha
statue and the seventeen gold bars, and entering judgment in
favor of Imelda Marcos and against Petitioners on GBC’s claim for
constructive trust, and (3) remanded for
({a1) a new trial on the value of the converted golden buddha
ue and seventeen gold bars, ((b]} an award of prejudgment
.stSn"the dazages awarded a2 2 consequence of the conversion
fe golden buddha and seventeen gold bars, commencing trex the
Gate corresponding to the value of the gold Sesignea by the sur;
and ({2]) furtner proceedings, to the extent necessary, on GBC's
equitable claim agsinst Imelda, in her personal capacity, for
Id. at 157, 969 P.2d at 1275.

  

 

 

   
#17 FOR PUBLI

 

D. Second, Third, And Fourth Anended Judgments

on October 18, 1999, the circuit court filed a second
amended judgment ("Second Amended Judgment") pursuant to Roxas I.
In pertinent part, the Second Amended Judgnent granted judgment
“in favor of (Dacanay,] as personal representative of the estate
of Roger Roxas in the amount of $6 million in general damages for
false imprisonment and battery against Imelda Marcos in her
personal capacity, to the extent of her interest in the Marcos
Estate." It also stated that the “judgment is entered nune pro
tune as of October 21, 1996," the date of the Amended Judgment.

on February 28, 2000, the circuit court held a bench
trial on the issue of damages for conversion. ‘The court filed a
third amended judgment (“Third Anended Judgment”) on June 26,
2000, amending the Second Amended Judgment’s sixth paragraph
stating that the court retained jurisdiction over GEC's
conversion claims. The Third Amended Judgment awarded GEC over
$13 million in damages and prejudgment interest (calculated from
the highest value of gold until the date of the Amended Judgment)
against “Imelda Marcos in her personal capacity, to the extent of
her interest in the Marcos Estate,” for conversion of the gold
buddha and seventeen small bars of gold. The Third Anended
Judgment was entered nunc pro tunc as of October 21, 1996, the
date of the Anended Judgment.

The parties appealed the Third Amended Judgment to this
court, but the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. In an order dated March 21, 2001, we ruled that

the Third Amended Judgment
s** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

dia not meet the certification requirements of BRCP (Rule) $4{b)

land the judgment is not an appeslable final Judgment on the

for conversion. ee NRCP [Rule] 84(B) ("(T)Re court may direct

ERE chery of a finest juagment a2 to one or nore but fewer than all.
‘the claime or parties only upon an express determination th:

there is no just reason for delay and upen direction for the ef
3. judgment

Further, we noted that the Amended Judgnent’s certification was

 

   

      

 

 

   

“effective only as to those claims certified as final on October
21, 1996 and not to claims subsequently decided by the (Second
and Third Amended Judgments), even though those judgments were
entered nunc pro tunc to October 21, 1996.”

‘The circuit court filed a fourth amended judgment
("Fourth Amended Judgment”) on Septenber 6, 2001, which amended
the Third Amended Judgnent by stating: “The court expressly
determines that there is no just reason for delay and expressly
directs for the entry of judgment.” This judgment was also
entered nunc pro tune as of October 21, 1996,” the date of the
Amended Judgment. All parties appealed from the Fourth Amended
Judgment. In a summary disposition order dated November 30,
2005, this court affirmed the Fourth Amended Judgment.
E. Motions To Extend Second and Fourth Amended Judgments

on May 8, 2007, Petitioners filed motions to extend the
Second Amended Judgment (filed on October 18, 1999) and Fourth
Amended Judgment (filed on September 6, 2001) for an additional
ten-year period. Imelda Marcos objected, arguing that an
extension was precluded under HRS § 657-5, which requires that
the extension “is sought within ten years of the date the
original judgment or decree was rendered.” She asserted that the

“original judgment” was rendered in 1996, and that, therefore,
{++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

the subject motions, filed more than ten years after that date,
on May @, 2007, were untimely. in response, Petitioners argued
that the 1996 judgment ceased to exist due to Roxas I vacating
the Amended Judgment and remanding the case. Moreover, they
pointed out that the Second and Fourth Amended Judgments are
against a “new and differest party defendant” from the first-in-

tine

 

doment.
on July 24, 2007, the circuit court granted

Petitioners’ motions to extend the Second and Fourth Amended
Judgments. The court ruled that “[a] vacation or reversal
extinguishes a judgment,” and noted that Roxas I reversed,
affirmed, vacated, and remanded differing portions of the first-
in-time judgment. Furthermore, the court stated that HRS § 657-
5's term “original judgment” is “plain and unambiguous” and
“reflect [s] the legislature’s intent to distinguish within [HRS]
§ 657-5 a judgment which has been extended from an initial
judgment and thus make clear that a [s]tate [c]ourt judgment may
enjoy but one extension.” The court ruled that the “entry of
final judgment should mark the beginning of the Limitations
period," and, therefore, Petitioners’ ten-year period to extend
the judgments had not expized. The court ordered that the Second
Amended Judgnent (filed on October 18, 1999) extend until October
17, 2019, and that the Fourth Amended Judgment (filed on
Septenber 6, 2001) extend until September 5, 2021.

on August 22, 2007, Imelda Marcos filed a timely notice
of appeal.

10
 

F. Roxas If Reversing The Circuit Court! s Order
on appeal, Inelda Narcos argued that the “original
judgment was rendered in 1996, and that, under HRS § 657-5,
Petitioners’ May 8, 2007 motions to extend the Second and Fourth
Judgments were untimely. Imelda Marcos contended that “original

judgment” does not mean “final judgment after appeal,” or

 

“amended judgment,” inasmuch as “original” refers to the “first
stage of existence” or “the first form.” Finally, she contended
that the motions were untimely because, even if the Second and
Fourth Amended Judgments were the starting point for extending
the judgments, they were entered nunc pro tune “as of October 21,
1996," and “relate[d) back to October 21, 1996, ‘as if the
judgment {s] had been rendered on that date.’” (Quoting Keahole
v. Board of
110 Haw. 419, 431, 134 P.3d 585, 597 (2006).
Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that under HRS
657-5, the “ten-year statute of limitations on judgments{] can be

 

extended for an additional ten years 1f application for an
extension is made before the original ten years has run.”

Because Roxas I vacated the Amended Judgment (filed in 1996), the
Amended Judgment “is no longer a valid and existing judgnent.”
Accordingly, they argued, their motions to extend the Second and
Fourth Amended Judgnents (entered on October 1, 1999 and
Septenber 6, 2001), which were filed within ten years of those
judgments, were timely. Moreover, they contended that the fact
that the amended judgments were entered nunc pro tune “has no

effect on when the statute of Limitations period begins to run,”

cy
 

‘+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

because the judgnes

 

Were not actually awarded until

 

actually filed.
In a February 12, 2009 published opinion, the ICA held
that the circuit court erred in extending Petitioners’ Second and
Fourth Amended Judgments. Roxas II, 120 Hawai'i at 126-27, 202
P.3d at 587-88. Based on the “ordinary use” of the word
“original,” the ICA ruled that the “‘toriginal judgment’ logically
at 126,

 

refers to the first judgment rendered by a court.'” Ide
202 P.3d at 587. It concluded that “the August 28, 1996 judgment
is the ‘original judgment’ for purposes of this case and the
Limitation period for an extension commenced on its August 28,
1996 entry date.” Id, at 126, 202 F.3d at 587. Under this
interpretation of HRS $ 657-5, Petitioners’ motions to extend the
Second and Fourth Judgments were untimely and the ICA reversed
the cireuit court’s orders. Id. at 127, 202 P.3d at 588.
Associate Judge Katherine G. Leonard wrote @ concurring
opinion emphasizing that “parties and the courts are best served
by the clear, plain understanding that, under HRS § 657-5, the
original judgment in any case is the first judgment entered.”
Id, at 128, 202 P.2d at $89 (Leonard, J., concurring). she
further asserted that (1) Roxas I did not extinguish the first~
in-time judgment, (2) the nunc pro tune judgments “shall have the
same legal force and effect” as if done at the 1996 date, and (3)
extending the 1ife of any final judgnent that is amended by,

before, or after an appeal would “eliminate the quality or state

 

of originality from the term original judgment.” Id. at 127-28,
202 P.3d at 588-89 (Leonard, J., concurring).

12
 

{++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

Associate Judge Craig H. Nakamura dissented, reasoning
that, “original judgment” as used in HRS § 657-5 means “the first
enforceable judgment that has not been vacated or extinguished.”
Id at 129, 202 P.3d at 590 (Nakamura, J., dissenting). In his
view, Roxas I “effectively extinguished the prior judgments
entered by the circuit court by changing the party against whom
the monetary awarde could be enforced." Id. Judge Nakamura
noted that the Second Amended Judgment was the first judgment
entered against Imelda Marcos in a personal capacity, but posited
that, because the Second and Third Amended Judgments did not
“contain{] the certification required by HRCP Rule 54(b) to make
4 judgment rendered on fewer than all of the claims or parties a
final judgment," they were not “enforceable” and thus, not
“rendered” under HRS § 657-5. Id. at 134, 202 P.3d at 595
(Nakamura, J., dissenting). Judge Nakamura’s dissent explained
that the original judgment was only rendered when the Fourth
Amended Judgnent was issued, inasmuch as it satisfied the HRC
Rule S4(b) certification requirements. Id. Moreover, Judge
Nakamura argued that the entry of the Second, Third, and Fourth
Amended Judgments nunc Eo tune as of October 21, 1996 “was a
‘fiction of law’ and did not change the date they actually becane
enforceable,” September 6, 2001. Id. at 135, 202 P.3d at 596
(Nakamura, J., dissenting).

‘he ICA filed a judament on appeal on March 5, 2009.
Petitioners filed an application for a writ of certiorari on
March 31, 2009. Imelda Marcos filed a response to the
application on April 15, 2008.

1B
 

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32, STANDARD OF REVIEW

othe interpretation of a statute is a question of law
reviewable de nove.” Capua v, Weyerhaeuser Co,, 117 Hawai'i 439,
443, 184 P.3d 191, 196 (2008) (citing Flor v, Holguin, 94 Hawai'i
70, 16, 9 P.3d 382, 388 (2000)) (brackets, citations, and
ellipses omitted). statutory construction is guided by the
following rules:

First, the fundamental starting point for statutory
Interpretation se the Language of the statute itself.
Second, where the statutory Language 1s plain and
nanbiguous, oor sole duty is ts give effect to its plain
ind obvious meaning. Thifd, implicit in the task of
Statutory construction 12 our foremost obligation to
Abcertain and give effect to the intention of the
Legislature, which 12 to be obtained primarily from the
Language contained in the statute itself. Fourth, when
there Ss dubt, doubleness of meaning, of indistinct veness
Sr uncertainty of an expression used ina statute, an
Gnbiguity exists. "And fifth, in construing an ambiguous
Statute, the meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by
Granining the context, with which the esbiguous words,
Phrases, and sestences nay be compared, in order to
Recertain their true meaning

Carlisle v. one (1) Boat, 119 Hawai'i 245, 256, 195 P.3d 1177,
1188 (2008) (quoting In _xe Contested Case Hearing op Water Use
Permit Application, 116 Hawai'i 481, 489-90, 174 P.3d 320, 328-29
(2007)) (block quotation format altered).

 

 

 

 

 

IIT, DIScussroN

 

Plain Language of HRS § 657-5
HRS § 657-5 ia a “[etatute of limitations) that applies

to actions seeking enforcement of domestic judgments and

decrees.” Brooks vs Minn, 73 Haw. 566, 575, 836 2.24 1081, 1086

14
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

992) (referring to HRS § 657-5 (1985)).? The issue in this

 

case, determining whether the ICA gravely erred by reversing the
trial court’s order granting Petitioners’ motions to extend the
Second and Fourth Amended Judgments, depends on when the
Limitations on the extension of these judgnents began to run
In intexpreting HRS § 657-5, we first look to the
language of the statute. See One (1) Boat, 119 Hawai'i at 256,
195 P.3d at 1188 (citation omitted). HRS § 657-5 provides:
Oniess an extension is granted, every Judgment and decree of any
Court of the State shal! be presimed to be paid and sischarged at
the expiration of ten years after the judgnent oF decree was

fendered. "Ro action shall be commenced after the expiration of
ten years from the date a judgnent or decree was rendered oF

 

Sxtended, Noveatension of 2 qudament or decree shall be granted
unless the extension is sought within ten veare of the date the
at iuanent R court ahali noe

Satend any judgrent oF decree beyond treaty years fron the aate of
the original Judgment or decree. No extension shall be granted
without notice and the filing of a non-hearing action or a hearing
otion to extend the Life of the judgment or decree.

 

(Emphasis added.) Although the statute precludes a court from
extending a judgment where the extension is sought more than ten
years after “the original judgment . . . was rendered,” the term
“original judgment” is not entirely clear.

As we have explained, when a “term is not statutorily
defined, this court may resort to legal or other well accepted
dictionaries as one way to determine its ordinary meaning.”
Gillan _v, Gov't Employees ins, Co., 119 Hawai'i 109, 115, 194

* tn 1985, HRS § 657-5 stated:

Every judgrant and decree of any court of record of the state
shell be presumed to be paid and discharged at the expiration of
ten years after the Judgment of decree was rendered, and no action
shall be commenced thereon after the expiration of ten years after
The jusoment oF decree was rendered.

15

 

 
{16 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **

P.3d 1071, 1077 (2008) (citations, brackets, and internal

 

quotation marks omitted), Accordingly, the ICA looked to the
dictionary definition of “original” and ruled that “ ‘original
judgment’ logically refers to the first judgment rendered by a
court.” Roxas Il, 120 Hawai'i at 126, 202 P.3d at $87 (citing
Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English
Language 1015 (1989).

Ruling that a motion to extend any judgment must be
filed within ten years of the date of the first-in-time judgment
would provide substantially more rights to a first-in-tine
judgment than a subsequent judgment. Under this rule, a first-
in-time judgment is valid for ten years and may be extended for
an additional ten year period, thus being able to be enforced for
a maximum of twenty years. In contrast, a judgment rendered

subsequent to the first-i

 

‘time judgnent would be afforded less
than twenty years to enforce the judgment. In fact, a judgrent
that is rendered ten or more years after the first-in-tine
judgment could not be extended and would only be enforceable a
maximum of ten years.

It ie true that there is no court rule or
constitutional right to extend every judgment. Nevertheless, if
We were to construe the “original judgment,” as the first-in-time
judgnent, it would “produce an absurd and unjust result, . .
clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the
statute.” State v. Lagat, 97 Hawai'i 492, 499, 40 P.3d 894, 902
(2002) (quoting State v. Villeza, 85 Hawai'i 258, 272-73, 942
P.2d 522, 534-35 (1997)) (block formatting altered). It is well-

16
 

{+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

established that “departure from a literal construction of a
statute ‘ie justified when such construction would produce an
absurd . . . result and the literal construction in the
particular action is clearly inconsistent with the purposes and
policies of the act.'” Richardson v. City and County of
Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i 46, 60, 668 P.2d 1193, 1207 (1994) (quoting
Exanks v. City and County of Honolulu, 74 Haw. 328, 341, 843 P.2d
668, 674 (1993))+ see also HRS § 1-15 (1993) (“Where the words of

 

 

a law are ambiguous[,] . . . (elvery construction which leads to
fan absurdity shall be rejected.”); Flores v. Rawlings Co., LLC,

117 Hawad't 153, 164, 177 P.34 341, 352 (2008) (**(T]he
legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result, and
legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible,
inconsistency, contradiction, and illogicality [.]"" (quoting
Beneficial Hawai'i, Inc. v. Kida, 96 Hawai'i 289, 309, 30 P.ad
995, 914-15 (2001)); State v, Gomes, 117 Hawai" 218, 232, 177
P.3d 928, 942 (2008) (Nakayama, J., dissenting) (**[E]ven where
there is no ambiguity, a departure from the Literal application
of statutory Language will be justified if such literal
application will lead to absurd consequences[,]’ for *{s|tatutory
language must be read in the context of the entire statute, and
the harm or evil it seeks to prevent must point the way to its
construction.'” (quoting State v. Ogata, 58 Haw. 514, 518, 572
P.2d 1222, 1225 (1977).

Holding that the first-in-time judgment controls the
statute of limitations for subsequent judgments would produce an

absurd result when the first-in-time judgment does not address or

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wes

resolve any of the claims ruled on by the subsequent judgment.
As Petitioners point out, a firet-in-time interpretation would
mean that the statute of limitations for extending judgments
would begin at the date of entry of the first-in-time judgment,
even if it is not “in his name,” “on his claim," or “against the
party against whom he seeks to enforce his own judgment." This
would arbitrarily confer more rights on the party that obtained

the first-in-time judgment than a party in a subsequent judgment.

In addition, the term “Judgment,” as used throughout
HRS § 657-5, must refer to a valid and enforceable judgment.
Although the statute states that “every judgment . . . shall be
presumed to be paid and discharged at the expiration of ten years
after the judgment . . . was rendered” (emphasis added), the
presumption that “every judgment” is “paid and discharged” in ten
years cannot be made when the judgment is invalid. See 2 Abrahan
Clark Freeman, A Treatise on the Law of Judgments Including ALL
Final Determinations of the Rights of Parties in Actions or
Proceedings at Law or in Equity § 1091, at 2268 (Edward W.
Tuttle, ed., rev. Sth ed, 1925) (*[I)£ the original judgment has
been reversed or satisfied, there can be no execution issued
pursuant to the revival by scire facias.”). Construing
“judgnent” as a valid judgment, therefore, requires that an
Yoriginal judgment” is a valid judgment. A first-in-time
judgment that has been vacated or reversed is no longer valid and
therefore cannot be an “original judgment.”

Consistent with this construction of “judgment,”

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Petitioners contend that an “original judgment” is simply a valid

 

Judgment that has not been extended. According to Petitioners,
the statutory use of “original judgment,” as opposed to
“judgment” in HRS § 657-5, distinguishes an “original judgment”
from an extended judgment in order to clarify that an original
judgment, but not an extended judgment, may be extended.
Pursuant to this interpretation, they contend that a valid
judgment may be extended and enforced during the same ten year
period. Thus, under Petitioners’ interpretation, “original
judgment” ie not necessarily the first-in-time judgment of a

In light of these conflicting interpretations of the
term “original judgment,” we do not agree with the ICA or the
circuit court that the meaning of the term, as it appears in HRS
§ 657-5, is “plain” or “unambiguous.” See Roxas II, 120 Hawai'i
at 126, 202 P.3d at 587; cf. Gillan v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co.,
119 Hawai'i 109, 117, 194 P.3d 1071, 1079 (2008). As we have
stated, “{a] statute is ambiguous if it 1s capable of being
understood by reasonably well-informed people in two or more
different senses.” Gillan, 119 Hawai'i at 117, 194 P.3d at 1079
(citations omitted). Our analysis of the plain language of HRS §
657-5 indicates that reasonable minds could differ as to which
judgment an “original judgment” refers to, and, as such, we hold
that the term is ambiguous. See id. (concluding that the term
“independent medical examiner” in HRS § 431:10C-308.5(b) (Supp.
2002) was ambiguous because it could be interpreted as requiring

an actual examination). Inasmuch as “original judgment” is

13
     

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susceptible to two interpretations,‘ we next look to extrinsic
aids to assist our interpretation of HRS § 657-5.

B. Extrinsic Aids

 

‘This court has numerous tools to construe an anbiguous
statute:

(t]he meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining
the context, with whlch the ambiguous words, phrases, and
Sentences may be compares, in order to ascertain their true
Meanings, Moreover, the courte may Fescrt to extrinsic aids in
Getermining legislative intent. "One avenue is the use of
Jegislative history az an interpretave tool. This court may also
Consider the reason and spirit of the lax, and the cause which
Snduced the legislature to enact it to digcover its true meaning.
Lave in PAE gasaria, or upon the sane subject matter, shall be
construed with seference to cach other. What is clear in one
Starute may be called spon in aid to explain what is doubt ful in
nether.

in re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai'i 97, 144, 9 P.3d
409, 456 (2000) (internal citations, internal quotation marks,

 

 

 

 

 

   

brackets, and ellipses omitted; block quote format changed). See
also HRS $ 1-15 ("Where the words of a law are ambiguous[,]
[t)he meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining

the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and

 

«__imelda marcos points to a

Anternational savings 4 Loan Agen vs
wise, £2 Howat’ 197, 921 ¢-2d 117 (i996), to support her claim that ARS §
Gs7-5 ss Gnambiquovs. (Quoting Miia for stating that “the plain Lanauaze of
HBs § 6578 clearly mandates... + Recordingly, pursuant to the plain
Language Of HAS $E57-5, the judgnont expired on March 8, 1994 =~ ven years
after the original judgnent was rendered.” (ellipses added) .) Io Mila, this
Court considered ‘whether a garnishment of wages survives the expiration of
ten year statutory limitation pursuant to [HRS § 657-5) on the life of the
Ungeflying judgment.” 82 #awal't at 198, 921 P.2d at 118. The plaintitr aia
hot renew OF extend its judgment against the defendant before the ten year
Period had fun, 2nd, thus, pleisly expized ten years after the first ang only
Susgnent was rendered, Id. at 199, 921 P24 at 119. tn Wiig, we were
Zoncerned with whether the garnishment order “tolled” the Iie of the judgment
beyond the ten year period, whereas Petitioners here do not seek to argue that
Snorder tolled the life of the judgment. gaealge Boxaz Ii, 120 Hewal't at
i2e-27, 202 F.3d at 587-86 (explaining that the circuit court erred by relying
on LLG in extending the judgment because that case is inapplicable). Because
lig dis net analyse the effect of multiple Judgnente on extending 2 Judgment,
St hae limited application to this case.

 

 

 

 

 

 

20
 

sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true
meaning.”

The 1992 Hawai'i Legislature anended HRS § 657-5 by
inserting the extension provisions at issue. 1992 Haw. Sess.
Laws Act 74, § 1 at 110, The amendments prohibited an “extension
of a judgment or decree” where (1) the extension was not “sought
within ten years of the date the original judgment was rendered,”
(2) it is “beyond twenty years from the date of the original
judgment or decree," and (3) there was no “notice and the filing
of @ non-hearing motion or a hearing motion to extend the life of

the judgment or decree.” Id, The legislative committee reports
on this bill offer limited guidance in interpreting “original
judgment .“?

The most telling statement about the limitation to
extend a judgment is from the House Judiciary Committee’s report.
In passing the bill that became Act 74, this committee stated,
“the purpose of this bill is to amend [HRS §] 657-5, to prohibit
a judgnent or decree of any court of the State from being
extended, renewed, or revived beyond ten years after the date the
Judament_or decree was rendered.” H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 543
in 1992 House Journal, at 1036 (emphasis added). This stated
purpose of the amendment indicates that the relevant date for

>the Senate Judiciary coomittee’s report on this Bill explained

that the committee amended the Gill “so that the statute of linitations for
extensions ia the same for all decrees and judgnents.”” Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep.
No. 2480 in 1982 Senate Journal, at 1117. The legislative intent that “all
decrees and Judgnenta” have the “sine” ton your statute of Limitations for
extensions 12 open to two interpretations, The legislature nay have intended
that each Sudgrent fay be extensed (1) for the “sane” amount of time (ten
years fom the date that the judgment 439 entered), or (2) until the “sane
Gate (cen years after the firse-in-tine judgment) «

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extending a judgment is the “date the judgment or decree was

rendered.” Id, (Emphasis added.)

 

While the legislative intent of this statutory language

is not entirely clear, the statute is clearly designed to

 

prohibit a party from seeking to extend a judgment more than ten
years after the “original judgment” is rendered. The statute of
Limitations for extending a judgnent begins to run on “the date
the original judgment or decree was rendered.” HRS § 657-5.

This provision is part of the HRS § 657 “Limitation of
Actions” chapter. Under HRS § 1-16 (1993): “Laws dn pari
materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with
reference to each other, What is clear in one statute may be
called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.” The
sections in this chapter have similar elements and aid in our
interpretation of BRS § 657-5. See State v. Cardus, 86 Hawai'i
426, 435, 949 P.2d 1047, 1056 (App. 1997) (referring to other
sexual assault statutes in construing the offense of sexual
assault in the second degree because the statute was included in
the “series of offenses”).

Other statutes of limitations in HRS Chapter 657 begin
when the “cause of action accrued.” See HRS § 657-1 (1) (1993)
(relating to, among other things, actions to recover debt
“founded upon any contract, obligation, or liability"); HRS §
657-4 (1993) (relating to libel or slander); HRS § 687-6 (1993)
(relating to causes arising in foreign jurisdictions); HRS § 657-
7 (1993) (zelating to recovering for damage to persons or

property); see also Kaho'chanchano v. Dep't of Hunan Servs., 117

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Hawal's 262, 315, 178 P.3d $38, $91 (2008) ("In a negligence

 

on, the claim for relief does not accrue until plaintiff knew
or should have known of defendant’s negligence.”). Black’s Law

Dictionary 22 (8th ed. 2004) defines “accrue” as “[t]o come into
“original judgment” of HRS § 657-5, in pari materia within the

tence as an enforceable claim or right.” In construing

 

framework of the entire statutory scheme governing limitations of
actions, the statute of Limitations for extending a judgment
begins to run when the cause of action -- the judgment that
creates the enforceable claim or right -- “come[s] into existence
as an enforceable claim or right.” All judgments, even those
that aze modified or amended, becone “enforceable claim{s] or
rights)” only when the judgments creating those rights are
entered. It is only at the time that the judgment is rendered
when the parties are (1) aware of their rights and
responsibilities created by the judgment and (2) able to enforce
these rights. Accordingly, the statute of limitations for
extending a judgment begins to run at the creation of the
Judgment that creates the rights and responsibilities that the
party is seeking to extend.

‘The foregoing construction comports with other states’
statutes that permit a party to bring an action to extend a

judgment before that judgment to be extended expires.‘ See Llift

+ other juriedietions permit 2 litigant to revive a judgment even
after it has expired. See Magnun Conme’ns Ltd., v. Samoluk, 620 5.6. 439, 4st
(ca. ce. App. 2008); Inge Seoadand, 240 B-R. iil, 116-17 (Bankr. W.9, ono
2000); Bevis intern, inc. ex rel. Patel v. Berryman, 730 So. 24 242, 244
(Ala. Civ. App. 1999)7 Gaxdner v Garduee, 916 P.2d 43, 45 (Kan. Ct.” App.
1996); Fitet Nat. Bonk of Maenoo v, Loffelmacher, 603'w.£.24 80, 63-84 (111

‘cont inved.

 

 

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ve Dustrud, 107 Cal. App. 4th 1201, 1207-08, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d
848, 852-53 (2003)7 accord Robbins v. A.B, Goldberg, 185 P.3d

794, 796 (Colo. 2008) ("A revived judgment must be entered within
twenty years after the entry of the judgment which it revives.”
(quoting C.R.C.P. Rule 54)); Shamrock, Dev, Inc., 737 N.W.2d at
376 (observing that a party may move to renew a judgment if it is
prior to the judgment’s expiration) (citation omitted); Citizens
Sav. and Loan Ass'n v, McDonald, 80 P.3d $32, 535 (Or. Ct. App.
2003) (observing that the state statute permits a court to extend
a judgment before it expires): Kroop ¢ Kurland, PA. v. Lambros,
703 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) ("A notice of
renewal may be filed by the judgment holder at any time before
the expiration of the judgnent.”); Hanks v. Rees, 943 S.W.2d 1,
3-4 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the motion to revive a
judgment must be filed before the judgment expires).*

In considering whether the period to renew an amended judgment

 

*(.s.continuea)

app. ct. 1992)

* _tnelda Marcos pointed to cases that referred to the first~in-tine
judgment as the “original judgnent.”  (eLeing Pos v

Board, 98 Hawaii 4i6, 417, 49 F.30 382, 363 (2002); Chattem Inc. v. Baile,
TeeU.s, 1059, 2831 fahite, J., dissenting) ). Gee als Tit? v. dusted, 10:
Gal. ip. 0n'1201, 1206, 132 "Cal. sper. 24.848, 652 (2003) .

However, other coufts have referred to the judgment that may be extended
ag the “original judgment.” See Shamrock Dev, tne. v. Smith, 737 NoW.2a372,
376 Minn. Ct. App. 2007), geversed on other arqunds py 754 N.w.2d 377" (Minn.
2008) "{cuiing that a party aay move to renew a judgsont “within ten years
Gfter entry of the original judgment,” “so that the judgments extend beyond
the initial ten-year period”); Jannet v. Jacob, S18 N.W.24 263, 186 (ND.
$854)" [providing that an “original sudgment™ may be renewed under state law
Ange Sitars, 130 B.R, 720, 725 8,20 (Bankr. D. Minn, 1998) (noting that the
Sgriginal sudgrent lapses” and is unenforceable if at is not renewed). 8y
atating that an "original judgeent” nay be extended, the courts wore
Recesssrily referring to a Judgnent with enforceable claims, because only
valid judgnent may be extended. Ses SURE.

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begins at the date of the first-in-time or amended judgment, the

California Court of Appeals held that, based on state law, “any
money judgment . . . regardless of whether it be a modified or
amended judgrent, and without regard to finality” may be extended
“before the expiration of the 10-year period of enforceability.”
LLiEE, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 1207-08, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 852-53
(citing California Code of Civil Procedure $ 683.130").

‘This construction does not contradict the definition of
“original” as provided by the ICA. See Roxas IL, 120 Hawai'i at
126, 202 P.3d at SE7. The ICA posited that, “{i}n its ordinary

use, the word ‘original’ denotes the ‘beginning of something, .

 

. sa primary form or type from which varieties are derive.’”
See id, (quoting Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of
the English Language 1015 (1989)). Although it concluded, in
reliance of this definition, that “original judgment” “refers to
the firet judgment rendered by a court,” a first-in-time judgment
will not always conform with the definition of “original” as
supplied by the ICA. Id, The first-in-time judgment is not “a
primary form or type from which varieties are derived” in certain
circumstances. For example, the first-in-time judgment is not a
“primary form or type from which varieties are derived” where an

issue is not resolved in the first-in-time judgment, but rather,

 

California Code of Civil Procedure $ 663.020 states: “Except a=
otherwise provided By statute, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date
Of entry of a money juognent cr a judgment for possessica of property: (a)
The Judgment may not be enforced, LEC, 107 Cal, App. dth at 1207, 132 Cal,
pte, at 853,” California Code of Civil Procedure § 682.130(z) states in

jt a lump-sum money judgment may be extended by renewal of
py tine before the expiration of the 10-year period of

 

   

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in a subsequent judgment. In addition, the first-in-time
judgment may not even “begin{]” to resolve a claim or cause of

 

on for a party in a case that involves multiple plaintiffs or
defendants. Under such conditions, the first-in-time judgment
has absolutely no bearing on subsequent judgments and does not
create any “form or type from which varieties are derived.”

In contrast, an unextended valid judgment that created
the rights that a party is seeking to extend is consistent with
the foregoing definition of an “original” judgment. The
“beginning” stage of a valid and not previously extended judgment,
is the “primary form or type from which varieties(, i.e, extended
Judgments, ] are derived.” Webster’'s Encyclopedic Unabridged
Dictionary of the English Language 1015. Each unextended
judgment that has an enforceable claim -- even those that pertain
to only one of multiple parties or issues -- is an “original”
judgment under the foregoing definition, because it may be the
“primary form or type from which” extended judgments are
derived. Based on the plain language of the statute, we cannot
conclude that “original judgment” refers to the first-in-tine
judgment. We hold, rather, that “original judgment” of HRS §
657-5 pertains to the judgment that creates the rights and
responsibilities that the moving party is seeking to enforce and

extend.

 

Under this construction of original judgment,” there may be more
than one “original judgment." See Konstadtv, Konstadt, 570 Av2d 48s, 486,
488 (N.3, Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) {referring to two judgments that’ decided
different issues on the case as “original judgments” in the context of
Geviving the original judgrents under 2 law that permite enforcement "within
five years of the Judgeent’s original rendering”)

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Imelda Marcos does not point to a single jurisdi

 

that (1) prohibits an extension on an unextended judgment that is
not expired or (2) starts the statute of limitations for
extending an amended judgment at the time the first-in-time
judgment is rendered. We can think of no reason why the first
in-time judgment should control the timing of the extension of
all subsequent judgments."

Based upon the plain language of the statute, and
construed in pari materia within the framework of the entire
statutory scheme governing limitations of actions, “original
Judgment” of HRS § 657-5 refers to the judgment that creates the
rights and responsibilities that the party is seeking to extend.
C. An Amended “Original Judgment”

We next must address the issue of when the time limit
begins for extending a judgment where the judgment that created
the enforceable rights was amended. In light of the above
interpretation of “original judgment,” the time limit for
extending a judgment that created the enforceable rights at issue
and is later amended, depends on the type of amendment. Cf. Boe
v.Hawai's Labor Relations Bd, 98 Hawai'i 416, 418-19, 49 P.3d
382, 384-85 (2002). In Poe, this court determined whether the

appellant timely filed a notice of appeal under Hawai'i Rules of

 

% Ag discussed auata, the ICA's construction of HRS § 657-5 ie
fawed particularly where the enforceable claim or right that a party seeks to
Gutend Say aot save Deen created at the tine of the farst-in-tine judgment

ed on the procedural history of the case, the firat-in-time Judgment 19 an
arbitrary starting point to Degin the statute of limitations for a subsequent
Judgment that wes amended in a natersal ang substantial way. Further, here.
Lego basis for pemstting the firet-in-tine judgment to be enforceable for up
to twenty years, while precluding sone judgeents fros any extensicn at all.

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Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a) (1), which requires the notice to be

£

 

d “within [thirty] days after entry of the judgment or

appealable order.” 98 Hawai'i at 418, 49 P.3d at 384, The

 

appellant filed a notice of appeal twenty-nine days after a
second amended judgment, but more than thirty days after the

entry of the first amended judgment. Id, at 417, 49 P.3d at 383.

 

In deciding from what date to measure the time for

appeal, this court declared:
The general rule is that where @ judgment is amended in a material
ang Substantial respect, the time within which an appeal from uch
determination nay be taken begins to run from the date of the
Gnendnent, aithsdgh where the snendsent relates only te the
Correction of a clerical... error, it does not affect the tine
Sllowed for appeals

Id, at 418, 49 P.3d at 384 (quoting Korsak v, Hawai'| Permanente

Medical Group, 94 Hawai'i 297, 304, 12 P.3d 1238, 1245 (2000)

(quoting Interstate Printing Co, v, Department of Revenue, 459

N.W.2d 519 (Web, 1990))). Bos observed that an amended judgment

that did not materially alter rights “did not create a right of

     

appeal where one did not exist,” and, thus, did not extend the
time allowed for appeal. Id. at 419, 49 P.3d at 385.
We hold that a rule similar to Poe and Korsak should be

 

adopted here. Where an unextended judgment is “amended in a
material and substantial respect,” so that it creates the rights
that are being extended, the time within which a motion to extend
the judgment may be brought “begins to run from the date of the

amendnent,” because that judgment created those rights. See Poe,

98 Hawai'i at 418-19, 49 P.3d at 384-85. Where, on the other

 

hand, the unextended judgment merely makes non-substantive or

non-material amendments to a prior judgment, it does not create

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an enforceable right. In that situation, it is not appropriate

nd the time allowed to revive the

 

that the amended judgment ¢:
enforceable judgnent.”

Under the foregoing rule, a judgment that is entered
nunc pre tunc as of a prior date may be the “original judgment”
for purposes of HRS § 657-5 if it changed a prior order in 2
material and substantial manner. Although we have stated that a
“pune pro tung order relates back to the original date of the
matter it affects,” Keahole Defense Coalition, Inc. v. Board of
and and Natural Resources, 110 Hawai'i 419, 430, 134 P.3d 585,
596 (2006) (quoting Bos, 98 Hawai'i at 423, 49 P.3d at 389
(Acoba, J., dissenting)), the date of the prior entry is not “the
effective date of the judgment for all purposes.” Horer va
Chapman, 119 U.S. 587, 602 (1887). As the United States Supreme
Court explained, a nune pro tune date is “a fiction of law, made
and considered to be the true date of the judgment” only to “bind
the defendant by the obligation” of the earlier date. Borer, 119
U.s. at 602.

Hawai'i appellate courts have determined that, even
when a judgment is entered nunc pro tunc to a prior date, the
statute of limitations for filing a notice of appeal begins on
the date that the judgment was actually entered, rather than from
the nunc pre tunc date. See One Boat, 119 Hawai'i at 250-52,

254, 199 P.3d at 1182-84, 1196 (holding that the defendant timely

» This construction addresses Judge Leonard’ s concern againat
vefsectively extend|ing] the life of any final judgsent that is amended
before, by, of after an appeal, no fatter how significant of insignificant en
amenanent might be-” KoxaS 1,120 Hawai'i at 128, 202 P.3d at 389. (Leonard,
Sey concureing)-

   

   

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ed a notice of appeal from a judgment that was entered pune
pro tune, effective on a date two years prior, because the
defendant could not actually appeal from the order until it was
reduced to a judgment); Carlisle v, One Boat, 118 Hawai'i 107,
185 P.3d 855 (App. 2008).* Similarly, even though a judgment is

 

entered pune pre tune as of a prior date, a court can only exten«

 

that judgment after it is actually entered. The fact that the

judgment is entered nunc pro tune does not alter the date that
the “original judgment” was rendered. Pursuant to the “original
judgment” test set forth above, the nunc pro tune date will only
serve as the date the “original judgment” was rendered if the

subsequent judgment made a non-

 

jubstantive change. However, a
judgment that is entered nunc pro tun will begin the limitations
period for extending the judgment where it materially or
substantially amended the earlier judgment.

Thus, where multiple judgments created the same rights
that the party is seeking to extend, the “original judgment” is
(2) the unamended judgment where the amended judgnent makes non-
material amendments to a prior judgment, but (2) the amended

judgment whi

 

fe it amended the prior judgment “in a material and

substantial respect.”

In One Boat, the circuit court entered an order dismissing
petition against the defendant on February 1, 2002, and it entered a judgment
Over two years later, on Gecenber 6, 2006. 19 Hawai'l at 250-52, 195 F.3d at
1182-84. "Defendant moved to anend the judgrent to correct errors and ester
the judgment pune pro tune, effective on the date of the order, February 1,
2002, ds at 251, 195 P.34 at 1163. The circuit court granted this motich,
But it “held that’ the puse pko iunc provision could not be used to defeat the
State's right to appeal from the Judgnent and the State’s time to appeal ran
from the date of entry of the circuit court's order.” Ida

30
 

D. Moving To Extend The Second and Fourth Amended Judgments
Under the foregoing construction of HRS § 657-5,

Petitioners timely sought to extend the Second and Fourth Amended

 

Judgments. Petitioners moved to extend these judgments within
ten years of the date that the judgments that created the rights
to be extended were rendered.

‘The Second Anended Judgment, filed on October 18, 1999,
granted judgment “in favor of [Dacanay,] as personal
representative of the estate of Roger Roxas in the amount of 6
million in general damages for false imprisonment and battery
against Inelda Marcos in her personal capacity, to the extent of

her interest in the Marcos Estate.” This right was created by

  

the Second Amended Judgment. The firat-in-time judgment
(rendered on August 28, 1996) and the Amended Judgment (rendered
on October 21, 1996) do not qualify as an “original judgrent” for
purposes of extending the Second Amended Judgment, because they
did not present enforceable rights on Petitioners’ claims of
battery and false imprisonment against Imelda Marcos in her
peraonal capacity. See Roxas I, 89 Hawai'i at 114, 969 P.2d at
1232 (vacating the portion of the Amended Judgment entered
against “Defendant Imelda Marcos, as Personal Representative of

the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos”). The first-in-time judgment and

 

Amended Judgment were materially and substantially ch:
Second Amended Judgment." Accordingly, the Second Amended

aged by the

 

‘The fact that the Second, Third, and Fourth Amended Judgments we
“entered nunc Bra func 28 of October 21, 1996," the date of the Anended
assent, doe2 nov alter the date that the “original Judgments” were rendered
See sunsa-

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Judgment ig the “original judgment” on the false imprisonment and

by

 

ery claims against “Imelda Marcos in her personal capacity,
to the extent of her interest in the Marcos Estate.”

Petitioners sought to extend the Second Amended

 

judgment on May 8, 2007, This motion was filed within ten years

of the date the original

 

dgment, the Second Anended Judgment
(giled on October 18, 1999) was rendered. Accordingly, the
circuit court properly ordered that the Second Amended Judgnent
be extended.

Petitioners also sought to extend the Fourth Amended
Judgment, which awarded GBC over $13 million in damages and pre-
judgment interest against “Imelda Marcos in her personal
capacity, to the extent of her interest in the Marcos Estate” for
a conversion claim. The “original judgnent” that created this
right is the Third Amended Judgment. ‘The first-in-time, Amended,
and Second Arended Judgments** did not render this right to GBC.
See Roxas I, 89 Hawai'i at 187, 969 P.2¢ at 1275 (reversing the
edzcuit court's Amended Judgment against Defendant Imelda Marcos,

as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos,

 

with respect to GBC’s conversion claim and remanding the matter
for a new trial on the value of this claim).

The Third Amended Judgment, which was entered on June
26, 2000, was amended by the Fourth Amended Judgment on September
6, 2001. Yet, the Fourth Amended Judgment’s only change to the
Third Amended Judgment was an additional paragraph, stating, “The

 

1 the Second Amended Judgrent did not present any enforceable right
fon GRC’s conversion claim, It stated that the court retained jurisdiction
Over Gac's conversion claims.

  

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FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay
and expressly directs for the entry of judgment.” This was

merely a non-substantiv

 

change -- it did not change the Third

Amended Judgment in a material manner. Thus, the “original

 

judgment,” for purposes of extending the Fourth Anended Judgme:
is the Third Amended Judgnent. Petitioners sought to extend the
Fourth Amended Judgment on May 8, 2007, within ten years of June
26, 2000, the date the Third Amended Judgment was rendered.
Accordingly, the circuit court was permitted to extend the Fourth
Amended Judgnent.
1B. Extending The Fourth Anended Judgment Beyond Twenty Years of
the Original Judgnent

‘The circuit court extended the Second Anended Judgment
until October 17, 2019, and the Fourth Anended Judgment until
Septenber 5, 2021. The extension of the Second Anended Judament
to October 17, 2019 was proper, inasmuch as this date is less
than twenty years from the date of its “original judgment” (the
Second Anended Judgment, entered on October 18, 1999). See HRS $
657-5 ("A court shall not extend any judgment or decree beyond
twenty years from the date of the original judgment or decree.”)
However, the circuit court erred by extending the Fourth Anended
Judgment (filed on September 6, 2001) to September 5, 2021,
inasmuch as the extension is more than twenty years beyond the
date of the “original judgment.”

As detexmined supra, the “original judgaent” for
purposes of extending the Fourth Amended Judgment is the Third
Anended Judgment. Because the Third Anended Judgment was

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FOR PUBLICATION IN.

IAWAN REPORTS AND PACIFIC

 

rendered on June 26, 2000, the court was precluded from extending

the Fourth Amended Judgment beyond June 25, 2020. See HRS $ 657-

5 ("A court shall not extend any judgment or

al. judgment

 

years from the date of the o}
court, therefore, erred when it extended the
Judgment beyond June 25, 2020.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing analysis,

ICA's March 5, 2009 judgment, (2) vacate the

decree beyond twenty
or decree.”). The

Fourth Amended

we (1) vacate the

eireuit court's July

24, 2007 order, to the extent that it granted Petitioners’ motion

to extend the fourth amended judgment until September 5, 2021,

and (3) remand this case to the circuit court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

nR. Magana, pro hac vice,
(Daniel C. Cathcart, pro hac

vice, of Nagana, Catheart &
Motarthy and Ward D. Jones Gorm

of Bervar 5 Jones, with him

fon the application and briefs)
for petitioners/plaintiffs- Peceetea Telia are
appellees

Joseph A. Stewart (Lex R. Smith Venwe Ducts +

and Maria Y. Wang of Kobayashi,

Sugita & Goda and Janes P. Linn Meld that fotsio

and D, Patrick Long (special
counsel to the firm) of James P.

Linn Law Firm, with him on the buch Weck,

response and briefs) for respondent/
defendant-appellant

 

34