Case Title: City of Charlotte v. Cook

Citation: 348 N.C. 222

Docket Number: 83PA97

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1998-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 83PA97
FILED: 8 MAY 1998
THE CITY OF CHARLOTTE
v.
J. ERNEST COOK; and wife, RUBY H. COOK
-------------------------------
THE CITY OF CHARLOTTE
v.
J. ERNEST COOK; and wife, RUBY H. COOK; and CRESCENT ELECTRIC
MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of
a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 125 N.C. App. 205,
479 S.E.2d 503 (1997), vacating judgments entered by Sitton, J.,
on 6 December 1995, in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County.  Heard
in the Supreme Court 11 September 1997.
This appeal involves a question as to the power of a
city to condemn property.  The City of Charlotte filed actions to
condemn a fee simple interest in two tracts of land in
Mecklenburg County for the laying of a pipeline as a part of the
North Mecklenburg Raw Waterline Project.  Defendants Cook owned
the property to be condemned, and defendant Crescent Electric
Membership Corporation had an option to purchase one of the
tracts.  The two actions were consolidated by consent for trial.
The project being constructed by the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Utility Department (CMUD) will supply
additional drinking water for Mecklenburg County.  The pipeline
to be constructed across the land will connect the raw water
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intake structure on Lake Norman and a water treatment plant in
north Mecklenburg County.
A hearing pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 136-108 was held to
determine all issues except compensation.  In his judgments,
Judge Sitton found the following facts:
17.
The decision by the City of
Charlotte to acquire the route for the
pipeline in fee simple was based on a number
of factors, including, but not limited to the
following:
a.
the depths (up to 40 feet deep) at
which the 60-inch diameter pipes will be
installed;
b.
the number and nature of the
facilities that will be located within the
pipeline route;
c.
the ability to exercise effective
control over all uses of the pipeline route
by having the ability to determine in advance
any proposed use[] of the pipeline route
which would be permitted by the City;
d.
the ability to protect the pipeline
facilities more effectively than if the City
of Charlotte only had an easement[;]
e.
the cost[s] for acquisition of a
fee simple interest were not anticipated to
be significantly different than for the
acquisition of an easement;
f.
the ability to select the most
economical electric power supplier.
Based on these findings of fact, Judge Sitton allowed
the plaintiff to acquire a fee simple estate in the property. 
The Court of Appeals vacated the judgments, and we allowed
discretionary review.
Office of the City Attorney, by H. Michael Boyd, Senior
Deputy City Attorney, and R. Susanne Knox, Assistant
City Attorney, for plaintiff-appellant.
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Bailey, Patterson, Caddell, Hart & Bailey, P.A., by
Allen A. Bailey and H. Morris Caddell, Jr., for
defendant-appellees J. Ernest Cook and Ruby H. Cook.
Crisp, Page & Currin, L.L.P., by Cynthia M. Currin and
Tyrus H. Thompson, for defendant-appellee Crescent
Electric Membership Corporation.
North Carolina League of Municipalities, by Andrew L.
Romanet, Jr., General Counsel, and John M. Phelps, II,
Assistant General Counsel, amicus curiae.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Grayson G.
Kelley and Robert G. Webb, Special Deputy Attorneys
General, and John F. Maddrey, Assistant Attorney
General, on behalf of the North Carolina Department of
Transportation, amicus curiae.
WEBB, Justice.
The Court of Appeals held that a condemning agency
cannot take a larger estate in the condemned land than is
necessary to carry out the public purpose for which the land is
condemned.  For this reason, said the Court of Appeals, the City
could condemn only an easement in the property.  We disagree with
the Court of Appeals.
In Raleigh & Gaston R.R. Co. v. Davis, 19 N.C. 451
(1837), we dealt with the condemnation of land for the
construction of a railroad.  Chief Justice Ruffin, writing for
the Court, explained the nature of the power of eminent domain. 
He pointed out that unlike the federal government, which has only
those powers delegated to it by the people through the
Constitution of the United States, the government of our state
has all the power necessary to exercise its sovereignty.  Id. at
457.  This sovereign power may be restricted only by the state or
federal Constitution.  The right of eminent domain is one of the
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sovereign powers.  Chief Justice Ruffin said it is for the
legislature to determine whether private property should be taken
and to what extent.  Id. at 467.
Following Rail Road, we have developed a rule governing
the taking by the State of private property.  Property may be
condemned only for a public purpose, and the Judicial Branch of
the government determines whether a taking is for a public
purpose.  The Legislative Branch decides the political question
of the extent of the taking, and the courts cannot disturb such a
decision unless the condemnee proves the action is arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion.  City of Charlotte v.
McNeely, 281 N.C. 684, 690, 190 S.E.2d 179, 184 (1972); N.C.
State Highway Comm’n v. Farm Equip. Co., 281 N.C. 459, 470, 189
S.E.2d 272, 278 (1972); Town of Morganton v. Hutton & Bourbonnais
Co., 251 N.C. 531, 533, 112 S.E.2d 111, 113 (1960).
It is unquestioned that the taking in this case was for
a public purpose.  The question then becomes whether the
defendants have shown that the action of the City in condemning a
fee simple estate was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion.  We cannot so hold.
The Charlotte City Council held two public hearings
before authorizing the commencement of the condemnation
proceedings.  An affidavit by Thomas W. Vandeventer, a
professional engineer, was submitted to the Council.  Mr.
Vandeventer said in his affidavit that it was necessary to
acquire a fee simple title to the property because of the depth
at which the line would be laid, the facilities that will be
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constructed close to the line, and the need to have effective
control over all uses of the pipeline route.  Mr. Vandeventer
also said that CMUD had experienced difficulties in other places
where facilities were within easements rather than on property
owned in fee.
The defendants filed an affidavit by James Roderick
Butler in which Mr. Butler refuted the reasoning of Mr.
Vandeventer and concluded that there was no reason for CMUD to
have more than an easement in the property in order to lay the
line.  There was conflicting evidence in the affidavits of the
two engineers, and we cannot disturb Judge Sitton’s decision to
accept the testimony of Mr. Vandeventer.  This testimony supports
findings of facts (a) through (d).  There was also evidence that
if the plaintiff did not have a fee simple title to the property,
it could not buy power from Duke Power Company but would have to
purchase power from Crescent at a higher rate.  See Crescent
Elec. Membership Corp. v. Duke Power Co., 126 N.C. App. 344, 485
S.E.2d 312 (1997).  This evidence supports finding of fact (f). 
The findings of fact support the conclusions of law that the City
may take a fee simple title in the property.
The defendants argue that the City of Charlotte has
admitted that a fee simple title is not necessary for the
construction of the line.  They base this argument on statements
made by a deputy city attorney at a meeting of the City Council,
who said, “It is possible that an easement could be used,” and
that the plaintiff could acquire additional rights in the
property if needed.  They also rely on a statement at the Council
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meeting by the director of CMUD, who said when asked if it was
possible with an easement to accomplish CMUD’s purposes, “[I]t is
technically possible, but not preferable.”
We do not believe the statements show a fee simple
title is not necessary.  The City does not have to show it would
be impossible to construct a line using an easement.  If the City
can show that it needs a fee simple title to construct and
operate the line under optimum conditions, this is proof of
necessity.
The defendants contend that the affidavit of Mr.
Vandeventer is not credible, especially when compared to the
affidavit of Mr. Butler.  The credibility of the respective
affidavits was for the City Council and the superior court to
determine.  We cannot overrule their findings.
The City took only an easement for the intake site on
Lake Norman, and the defendants contend this shows the plaintiff
did not need a fee simple title in their property.  We do not
know why the plaintiff acquired only an easement for the intake
facility.  The fact that it did so does not mean it does not need
a fee simple title in the property involved in this case.
The mayor pro tem of the City was an employee of Duke
Power Company.  The mayor was absent from the meeting at which
the City Council voted to condemn the property, and the mayor pro
tem presided over the meeting.  The mayor pro tem voted to
condemn a fee simple title.  He filed an affidavit in which he
said that if he had known Duke Power Company was involved in the
matter, he would not have participated in the meeting.  There was
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some evidence that he knew Duke was involved.  The defendants say
this makes the action by the Council arbitrary and capricious. 
We cannot so hold.  An ethical problem involving the Council has
to rise to a much higher level than this one for us to upset a
decision by the Council.
The defendants next say that the Council’s action must
be set aside because Robert’s Rules of Order were not followed at
the meeting at which the decision was made to condemn a fee
simple interest.  We do not know what rules the City Council
follows, but we shall let it judge its own procedure.
For the reasons given in this opinion, we reverse the
Court of Appeals and remand to that court for further remand to
the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, for reinstatement of the
judgments.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
=======================
Justice LAKE dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent because I believe this
decision, while satisfying two of our corporate giants, works a
grave injustice upon innocent and powerless people and impairs
the law on the taking of private property for a public purpose.  
The simple and uncontroverted facts in this case are as
follows.  The City of Charlotte (the City) is building a pipeline
to carry water from an intake center on Lake Norman to a new
treatment plant for the purpose of providing the City with
additional drinking water.  The proposed route crosses defendant
Cooks’ family dairy farm.  The design calls for the pipeline to
be buried as much as forty feet underground, and the pipe is to
be only five feet in diameter.
Evidence indicates that city officials knew it was
necessary to acquire only an easement across the Cooks’ property
in order to install the pipeline and to service it in the future. 
A deputy city attorney told the City Council, “It is possible
that an easement could be used,” and the director of the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Utility Department told the City Council,
“it is technically possible” to accomplish the project’s purposes
with only an easement.  In fact, the initial proposal for the
project was to acquire only an easement, and landowners were so
informed by city officials at public hearings.
Interestingly, and perhaps not insignificantly, the
Cooks’ property is located in territory which the North Carolina
Utilities Commission has assigned exclusively to Crescent
Electric Membership Corporation (Crescent).  The City would have
to buy power for the new plant from Crescent if the City acquired
only an easement across the Cooks’ property.  However, if the
City owned contiguous tracts of land on which the pipeline and
plant were constructed, the City would have the right under
N.C.G.S. § 62-110.2 to buy electric power from Duke Power Company
(Duke Power).
The record evidences multiple Duke Power internal e-
mail messages and memoranda reflecting that Duke Power and the
City collaborated to have the City acquire a fee simple title to
the property in order that Duke Power could provide the power to
the plant.  These e-mail messages indicate that the mayor pro
tempore of the City, an employee of Duke Power, as well as the
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project director had contact with Duke Power officials and
discussed condemning a fee simple interest for the project.  The
mayor pro tempore chaired the 12 September 1994 City Council
meeting where the subject of condemning a fee simple was
discussed, and he voted in favor of a fee simple condemnation. 
In the entire project, the only parcel of land upon which the
City settled for an easement instead of a fee simple title was
that parcel where the intake structure was to be located.  The
intake structure is one of the most important sites in the
project, and it will have employees working at the location.  The
pipeline between this intake and the plant, through the Cooks’
property, will merely pass underground.  Record evidence
establishes that Duke Power has property rights in the land on
which the intake structure will be constructed.
It has been the well-settled law in this state for over
three-quarters of a century that a governmental body may condemn
only the amount of property necessary to achieve the specific
public purpose which required the condemnation.  In Spencer v.
Wills, 179 N.C. 175, 102 S.E. 275 (1920), this Court stated,
“Condemnation by right of eminent domain is not allowed except so
far as it is necessary for the proper construction and use of the
improvement for which it is taken.”  Id. at 178, 102 S.E. at 277
(emphasis added).  Similarly, in Jennings v. State Highway
Comm’n, 183 N.C. 69, 110 S.E. 583 (1922), this Court noted that
in a condemnation proceeding, “the well considered cases on the
subject hold that when the Legislature has not defined the extent
or limit of the appropriation, the authorities charged with the
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duty are restricted to such property in kind and quantity as may
be reasonably suitable and necessary to the purpose designated.” 
Id. at 71-72, 110 S.E. at 584 (emphasis added).  In N.C. State
Highway Comm’n v. Farm Equip. Co., 281 N.C. 459, 189 S.E.2d 272
(1972), this Court recognized that when a condemning authority
seeks to take the property of a citizen, “‘the power to take
private property is in every case limited to such and so much
property as is necessary for the public use in question.’”  Id.
at 473, 189 S.E.2d at 280 (quoting Brest v. Jacksonville
Expressway Auth., 194 So. 2d 658, 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.),
aff’d per curiam, 202 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1967)).  Moreover, in
Highway Comm’n, Justice Sharp (later Chief Justice) emphasized
that it is unconstitutional for a governmental body to condemn
property for private purposes:
“The Legislature cannot under the guise
of exercising sovereign power of eminent
domain, which can only be exercised for a
public purpose, take a citizen’s property
without his consent and give it or sell it to
another for private use, . . . for to do so
would be in violation of the Constitution of
the United States Amendment 14.”
Highway Comm’n, 281 N.C. at 473, 189 S.E.2d at 280 (quoting
Brest, 194 So. 2d at 661).
These cases stand for three basic principles.  First, a
condemning authority may take only the amount of property and
interest necessary to achieve the public use, not the amount it
simply wants or prefers.  Second, the property may be condemned
only for a public purpose, not for the private purposes of
government officials or third parties.  Finally, the property
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taken must be for the direct public use in question, not some
other, collateral purpose.  The reason for these requirements is
the protection of private property under the state and federal
Constitutions.  See, e.g., Highway Comm’n, 281 N.C. 459, 189
S.E.2d 272; Trustees of the Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. 58
(1805).
In this case, it is not necessary for the City to have
fee simple title to the Cooks’ property.  The City has admitted
the public use can be achieved fully with a properly drafted
easement.  It is thus clear that the City simply prefers to have
a fee simple title for its own convenience or purpose extending
well beyond the public use in question.  Governmental convenience
is not synonymous with necessity, especially when private
property is at stake.  The public use in question for the taking
here is the construction of a water supply pipeline, not the
City’s preference for one electric supplier over another.  The
proper determination of the entity that provides electricity to a
water treatment plant is entirely separate from the proper
construction and maintenance of a water pipeline.
Had the excellent unanimous opinion of the Court of
Appeals been affirmed, as it should have been, the practical
effect of such decision would be that the City would get an
easement to bury its pipeline underground and to maintain it in
the future, and the Cooks would still be able to use their
property as a dairy farm, as they have since at least the early
1960s.  Private property rights would be respected, and the
legitimate public use in question would proceed unimpeded.  The
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result of the majority’s decision will be to split the Cooks’
dairy into two separate, disjointed parcels and keep them from
using the land even for grazing.  The decision will also allow
the improper use of the power of eminent domain to circumvent the
intent and purpose of the carefully devised statewide legislative
plan for settlement of electric service areas between electric
suppliers, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 62-110.2.
In light of the law and facts of this case, simple
justice and basic principles require that we affirm the opinion
of the Court of Appeals.  However, it appears in this case that,
“‘Justice is blind.’  Blind she is, an’ deef an’ dumb an’ has a
wooden leg.”  Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley’s Opinions (1900),
in The Harper Book of American Quotations 306 (Gorton Carruth &
Eugene Ehrlich eds., 1988).