Case Title: State v. Williams-Holmes

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2021AP000809-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2023-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
2023 WI 49 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP809-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Junior L. Williams-Holmes, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 404 Wis. 2d 88,978 N.W.2d 523 
PDC No:2022 WI App 38 - Published  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 20, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 23, 2023   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Bruce E. Schroeder   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ROGGENSACK 
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Dustin C. Haskell, assistant state public defender. 
There was an oral argument by Dustin C. Haskell, assistant state 
public defender.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
John W. Kellis, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
 
 
2 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by John W. Kellis, assistant attorney general.  
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 49 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2021AP809-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2019CF687) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Junior L. Williams-Holmes, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ROGGENSACK 
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   This case concerns a challenge to 
a 
condition 
of 
extended 
supervision 
and 
probation 
that 
prohibited Junior Williams-Holmes from living with any women or 
unrelated 
children 
without 
the 
permission 
of 
the 
Court.  
Williams-Holmes moved for postconviction relief, asking the 
circuit court to transfer the approval power from the circuit 
court to the Department of Corrections (DOC).  The circuit court 
No. 
2021AP809-CR   
 
2 
 
denied the motion, and suggested that it had the power to 
supervise Williams-Holmes through case-by-case approval.    
¶2 
The question before us is whether the circuit court 
had the authority to do so.  Wisconsin law empowers circuit 
courts 
to 
impose 
conditions 
of 
extended 
supervision 
and 
probation and to modify those conditions through a formal 
statutory process.  However, actual administration of the 
sentence and conditions is entrusted to DOC.   
¶3 
In this case, we conclude that the circuit court 
likely stepped over the line.  It all but said it intended to 
administer 
Williams-Holmes' 
condition 
through 
case-by-case 
oversight, which it cannot do.  Therefore, we reverse and remand 
the cause to the circuit court for it to either clarify how the 
condition imposed is consistent with the law or to modify its 
order accordingly. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
While on probation for a felony battery conviction, 
Williams-Holmes physically assaulted his girlfriend.  The State 
brought charges and he eventually pled guilty to two counts of 
battery, one count of false imprisonment, and one count of bail 
jumping, each as a repeat offender.  On the battery charges, the 
circuit court1 imposed consecutive sentences consisting of one 
year 
of 
initial 
confinement 
and 
one 
year 
of 
extended 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Bruce E. Schroeder of the Kenosha County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2021AP809-CR   
 
3 
 
supervision.  The court withheld sentence on the bail jumping 
and false imprisonment charges, ordering probation for three 
years to be served consecutive to his sentences on the battery 
charges.2  On both the extended supervision and probation 
periods, the court imposed a condition that Williams-Holmes 
could not live with any women or unrelated children without the 
permission of the Court.3   
¶5 
Williams-Holmes moved for postconviction relief.  He 
asked the circuit court to amend the judgment of conviction to 
require that permission to reside with women or unrelated 
children must come from DOC, not the court.   
¶6 
The circuit court denied the motion.  The court 
explained that it "was the practices of the Department of 
Corrections which led me initially to impose the requirement for 
my 
approval 
of 
the 
department's 
practice 
of 
residential 
placements of offenders with unrelated children."  To show an 
example of what it saw as DOC's past "practice," the court 
attached a 2019 email exchange between a DOC probation and 
parole agent and the court.  In the example, the court had 
imposed a similar condition as in Williams-Holmes' case——the 
defendant could not "reside with children unless he received 
                                                 
2 The circuit court ordered probation for two years on the 
bail-jumping count and three years on the false imprisonment 
count concurrent to one other. 
3 The Judgment of Conviction stated:  "Do not reside with 
any person in any place in which children reside unless you are 
related to them by blood w/o Court's permission.  Not to reside 
w/ anyone of the opposite sex w/o Court's permission."  
No. 
2021AP809-CR   
 
4 
 
permission from the Court."  The agent emailed the court to ask 
if it would allow the defendant to live at his girlfriend's 
residence with her and several of her family members, including 
her young son.  In an email response, the court said no.  It 
explained that it "would not approve the placement which DOC is 
proposing without more information" because of the defendant's 
history of violence and drug use.  This email chain illustrated 
why the court believed DOC's practices were "incompatible with 
the 'program of probation envisioned by the court.'"  Therefore, 
the court declined to transfer the authority to regulate 
Williams-Holmes' residential placements to DOC.   
¶7 
Williams-Holmes appealed.  In a thoughtful opinion 
with which we largely agree, the court of appeals observed that 
the circuit court's condition could be administered in one of 
two ways.  State v. Williams-Holmes, 2022 WI App 38, ¶¶17-18, 
404 Wis. 2d 88, 978 N.W.2d 523.  The condition could be 
effectuated 
"through 
the 
informal, 
oversight/'regulation'/'supervision' 
procedure 
that 
the 
[circuit] court appears to have utilized" in the past.  Id., 
¶17.  This would not be lawful, however.  Id.  Alternatively, 
the condition could be effectuated consistent with the law 
through the statutorily authorized modification process.  Id., 
¶18.  The court of appeals then construed the condition as 
referring only to the statutory modification process and 
affirmed the circuit court's decision on the postconviction 
motion on that basis.  Id., ¶23.  We granted Williams-Holmes' 
petition for review. 
No. 
2021AP809-CR   
 
5 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶8 
Circuit courts are granted broad authority to hold 
those convicted of crimes accountable for their actions——
including 
discretion 
to 
impose 
conditions 
on 
extended 
supervision and probation.  Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01(5) (2021-22);4 
973.09(1)(a); 
State 
v. 
Oakley, 
2001 
WI 103, 
¶12, 
245 
Wis. 2d 447, 629 N.W.2d 200.  The question in this case, 
however, is whether the circuit court's condition transgressed 
DOC's statutory authority to administer extended supervision and 
probation.  Statutory interpretation is "a question of law we 
review independently."  Doubek v. Kaul, 2022 WI 31, ¶3, 401 
Wis. 2d 575, 973 N.W.2d 756.  
¶9 
When a defendant is sentenced to probation, Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.10(1) states that this has "the effect of placing the 
defendant in the custody of" DOC, and the defendant is under the 
"the control of the department under conditions set by the court 
and rules and regulations established by" DOC.  Under this 
statutory structure, then, the court can impose probation and 
place conditions upon it, but control over the defendant and 
administration of the terms of probation are carried out by DOC. 
¶10 A circuit court may also sentence someone to prison, 
which includes a mandatory period of extended supervision 
following confinement.  Wis. Stat. § 973.01.  As with probation, 
"the court may impose conditions upon the term of extended 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2021-22 version. 
No. 
2021AP809-CR   
 
6 
 
supervision."  § 973.01(5).  And DOC "may not discharge a person 
who is serving a bifurcated sentence from custody, control and 
supervision until the person has served the entire bifurcated 
sentence."  § 973.01(7).  The structure here also places the 
power to sentence with the court, but supervision, custody, and 
control thereafter belongs to DOC. 
¶11 The broad statutory authority given to DOC in Wis. 
Stat. 
ch. 
301 
confirms 
this. 
 
It 
is 
DOC 
that 
"shall . . . Administer" extended supervision and probation.  
Wis. Stat. § 301.03(3).  The legislature chose its words 
carefully.  "Administer" means to "have charge of; manage."  
Administer, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 22 (3d ed. 1992).  This naturally and logically 
includes not just administering DOC's own rules and conditions,5 
but those set by the circuit court as well.   
¶12 While the circuit court is not involved in the day-to-
day administration of probation or extended supervision, its 
role is not necessarily extinguished.  The statutes also provide 
that 
conditions 
imposed 
by 
the 
court 
for 
both 
extended 
supervision and probation are not set in stone; they can be 
modified.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 302.113(7m)(a); 973.09(3)(a).  This 
                                                 
5 DOC has established standard rules all defendants on 
extended supervision or probation must comply with.  See Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ DOC 
328.04(3) 
(Oct. 
2019). 
 
For 
example, 
defendants must obtain permission from a probation agent prior 
to changing their residence or place of employment, traveling 
out of state, purchasing a car, or borrowing money.  § DOC 
328.04(3)(h)-(k).   
No. 
2021AP809-CR   
 
7 
 
occurs via a formal process.  A party seeking "to modify any 
conditions of extended supervision set by the court"——and 
modification can be requested by DOC or the person subject to 
extended supervision——"may petition the sentencing court" to do 
so.  § 302.113(7m)(a).  The statute then provides various 
processes, standards, and restrictions governing the sentencing 
court's consideration of the petition.6  Ultimately, the court 
can grant the petition only "if it determines that the 
modification would meet the needs of the department and the 
public and would be consistent with the objectives of the 
person's sentence."  § 302.113(7m)(c).  Similarly, a court "may 
extend probation for a stated period or modify the terms and 
conditions thereof" before the expiration of the probation 
period.  § 973.09(3)(a).  However, the extension or modification 
of conditions can only occur "for cause and by order."  Id.   
¶13 With this in view, we turn to the present dispute:  
whether the circuit court lawfully imposed the condition that 
Williams-Holmes could not live with any unrelated women or 
children without the permission of the Court.  The court of 
appeals acknowledged the possibility that this condition could 
either refer to a type of supervision the statute entrusts to 
DOC, or to the statutorily permitted modification process.  
Williams-Holmes, 404 Wis. 2d 88, ¶¶17-18.  But to "harmonize the 
statutes and do so in a manner consistent with the circuit 
                                                 
6 For example, the statute makes provision for victim 
notification (Wis. Stat. § 302.113(7m)(b)) and a hearing on the 
petition (§ 302.113(7m)(c)).   
No. 
2021AP809-CR   
 
8 
 
court's probationary program," the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court and determined that Williams-Holmes can only 
receive the permission of the circuit court through statutory 
modification.  Id., ¶¶20, 23.   
¶14 We take a different approach.  While we agree with the 
court of appeals' analysis of the statutory scheme, the record 
strongly suggests the circuit court intended to administer this 
condition of supervision itself, and not leave future permission 
to a statutorily authorized modification.  In its postconviction 
explanation, the circuit court appears to have envisaged 
Williams-Holmes (or a probation or parole agent) communicating 
with the court directly and as needed to obtain the necessary 
approval for him to live with a woman or an unrelated child.  
This 
would 
constitute 
impermissible 
supervision 
and 
administration of the conditions of probation by the court, 
which the legislature has entrusted to DOC.  The affirmation of 
the condition by the court of appeals therefore seems at odds 
with the circuit court's own explanation.7  Therefore, we reverse 
and remand the cause to the circuit court to afford it an 
opportunity to either clarify how the condition imposed is 
consistent with the law or to modify its order accordingly. 
                                                 
7 In the dissent's telling, the circuit court clearly 
intended for its "permission" to come only via statutory 
modification.  Dissent, ¶¶15, 19.  Yet no one other than the 
dissent reads the record that way.  The court of appeals does 
not suggest this.  Even the State acknowledged during oral 
argument it was unclear.  In any event, if the dissent's 
interpretation of the condition is correct, our remand order 
allows the circuit court to say so. 
No. 
2021AP809-CR   
 
9 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
No.  2021AP809-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶15 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (dissenting).  I 
dissent because I would simply affirm the court of appeals' 
well-reasoned decision.  It correctly interpreted the circuit 
court's condition as referring to the statutory modification 
process.  Though the circuit court's use of the phrase "court 
permission" in the conditions of extended supervision appears 
ambiguous, the record shows that the court was referring to the 
statutory modification process under Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(3)(a) 
and 302.113(7m), which involves a hearing and modification by 
order.  The circuit court's order denying post-conviction 
relief, beyond citing § 973.09(3)(a), alludes to aspects of the 
modification process.  This shows that the circuit court 
intended for "court permission" to be effectuated through that 
statutory process.  Accordingly, as the court of appeals 
concluded, the circuit court's condition is lawful, and we 
should affirm the court of appeals' decision.  
¶16 The majority provides a rather cursory interpretation 
of the circuit court's order setting conditions for extended 
supervision.  A more careful reading reveals that the court's 
envisioned probationary program conforms to the law.  The phrase 
"court permission" in the conditions of extended supervision 
refers to the modification process. 
¶17 We interpret a circuit court's order independently, 
"look[ing] to the whole of the decision which was reduced to 
judgment."  Schultz v. Schultz, 194 Wis. 2d 799, 806, 535 
N.W.2d 116 (1995).  "A court interprets a judgment in the same 
manner as other written instruments."  Jacobson v. Jacobson, 177 
No.  2021AP809-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
Wis. 2d 539, 546, 502 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1993).  "Only when 
judgments are ambiguous is construction permitted, allowing the 
court to consider the whole record . . . ."  Id. at 547.  
"Ambiguity exists where the language of the written instrument 
is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations, either on 
its face or as applied to the extrinsic facts to which it 
refers."  Schultz, 194 Wis. 2d at 805-06.  However, "[w]e defer 
to a trial court's interpretation of its own ambiguous order as 
long as it is a reasonable interpretation."  Thorp v. Town of 
Lebanon, 225 Wis. 2d 672, 683, 593 N.W.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1999).   
¶18 The circuit court's order contains the condition, "Do 
not reside with any person in any place in which children reside 
unless you are related to them by blood [without] Court's 
permission."  The order also restates this condition as 
follows:  "[n]ot to reside with anyone of the opposite sex 
[without] Court's permission."  The circuit court's order does 
not clearly explain what "court permission" means.  At a high 
level, it is plain that the condition prevents Williams-Holmes 
from residing with unrelated women or children unless the 
circuit court affirmatively permits him to do so.  But the 
condition is silent as to what form this "court permission" must 
take.  As the court of appeals observed, the condition is 
ambiguous regarding whether "court permission" means "a type of 
informal, situation-by-situation oversight by the court" or 
"modifi[cation] 
through 
the 
mechanisms 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 973.09(3)(a) and 302.113(7m)(a)."  State v. Williams-Holmes, 
2022 WI App 38, ¶16, 404 Wis. 2d 88, 978 N.W.2d 523. 
No.  2021AP809-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
¶19 The circuit court's order denying Williams-Holmes' 
motion 
for 
post-conviction 
relief 
clarifies 
that 
"court 
permission" refers to the statutory modification process.  For 
background, 
two 
statutes 
cover 
modification 
of 
probation 
conditions:  Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a), which discusses the 
court's ability to modify conditions on its motion; and Wis. 
Stat. § 302.113(7m), which discusses a defendant's ability to 
petition the court for modification.  Under § 973.09(3)(a), 
"[p]rior to the expiration of any probation period, the court, 
for cause and by order, may extend probation for a stated period 
or modify the terms and conditions thereof."  A criminal 
defendant may also "petition the sentencing court to modify any 
conditions 
of 
extended 
supervision 
set 
by 
the 
court."  
§ 302.113(7m)(a).  "The court may conduct a hearing to consider 
the petition."  § 302.113(7m)(c).  The court may also "provide 
notice of the petition to a victim of a crime committed by the 
person who is the subject of the petition."  § 302.113(7m)(b).  
At the hearing, the court determines whether "modification would 
meet the needs of the [DOC] and the public and would be 
consistent with the objectives of the person's sentence."  
§ 302.113(7m)(c).  If the defendant instead seeks modification 
to the term of a bifurcated sentence, the defendant must prove 
"by 
the 
greater 
weight 
of 
the 
credible 
evidence" 
that 
modification would serve the public interest.  § 302.113(9g)(e).   
¶20 The circuit court's order denying post-conviction 
relief confirms that "court permission" refers to the statutory 
modification process.  In fact, the order expressly references 
No.  2021AP809-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
the circuit court's ability to modify conditions by order.  It 
cites our decision in State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 590 N.W.2d 
918 (1999), and notes that decision "held 'that Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(3)(a) allows circuit courts to modify conditions of 
probation at any time'" (quoting id. at 69).  Additionally, 
while 
discussing 
how 
the 
circuit 
court 
"began 
to 
cite 
governmental statistical data which [the court] felt clearly 
justified these conditions," the court noted "the burden is on 
the offender, not [the court], to prove the inaccuracy of the 
information."  This burden the order references most reasonably 
seems to be the defendant's burden of persuasion under Wis. 
Stat. § 302.113(9g)(e) to prove that modification "would serve 
the public interest."   
¶21 The majority's conclusory assertion that "the record 
strongly suggests the circuit court intended to . . . not leave 
future permission to a statutorily-authorized modification" 
appears to be based on an email the circuit court included in 
its order to illustrate the court's displeasure with the 
Department of Corrections ("DOC").  Majority op., ¶¶7, 14.  This 
email does not serve as an example of the procedure for 
obtaining "court permission" the circuit court envisioned.  
Quite to the contrary, the circuit court disapproved of nearly 
every aspect of the email.  
¶22 The circuit court included the email in its order as 
"one example of how [DOC] even now approaches this issue."  The 
first email was sent from DOC to the circuit court asking 
whether the court "[w]ould . . . be willing to" permit a 
No.  2021AP809-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
defendant serving probation to live with the defendant's 
girlfriend as well as her son and adult sister.  In its 
response, the circuit court remarked on the "substantial 
information gap about" the defendant and said the court 
"definitely would not approve the placement which DOC is 
proposing without more information."  The court further stated 
it "would also want to hear the opinion of the child's father, 
if available, so [the court can be made] sure that he 
understands the history of the man living with his child."   
¶23 The circuit court hardly offered this email as an 
example of what it meant by "court permission."  The reason the 
court included the email in its order was to demonstrate why the 
court disapproved of DOC's practices.  Its purpose was not to 
demonstrate the form of "court permission" the court envisioned.  
The majority reads far too much into the email's inclusion in 
the order.  To the extent the email does reveal what the court 
meant by "court permission," it shows that the circuit court 
disapproved of how DOC raised the matter.  The circuit court's 
stated concerns about needing "more information" and possibly 
hearing from the child's father indicate that the court expected 
to——and quite likely normally does——hold a hearing on whether to 
grant permission consistent with the statutory modification 
process. 
¶24 Our process for interpreting a circuit court's order 
yields a clear result:  "court permission" as used in the 
conditions of extended supervision refers to the statutory 
modification process.  But the majority eschews this task in 
No.  2021AP809-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
favor of remanding with direction for the circuit court to 
clarify what is already clear.  Not only is this remedy 
inappropriate and unnecessary, but none of the parties requested 
it.  Williams-Holmes requested reversal "and remand with 
instructions that the judgment of conviction be modified to 
require [Williams-Holmes] to obtain agent permission."  The 
State asked that we affirm the court of appeals and, at oral 
argument, pointed out that the circuit court could modify or 
clarify the condition on its own motion anyway "without . . . a 
needless remand."  
¶25 By failing to interpret the circuit court's condition 
and imposing a remedy nobody requested, the majority turns its 
ruling into an advisory opinion.  This court will normally not 
"assume various hypothetical states of fact and determine 
[lawfulness] prospectively under each of these states of fact."  
Waukesha Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Baird, 45 Wis. 2d 629, 643, 173 
N.W.2d 700 (1970).  That is exactly what the majority does here.  
The opinion is unmoored from any concrete facts being declared 
lawful or unlawful.  It abstractly declares the law and tells 
the parties to go forth and apply it to whatever the facts may 
be.  I would fully resolve the case at hand, which is what we 
agreed to do when we accepted review.    
¶26 The court of appeals got this case exactly right, but 
the majority adds confusion to the law by reversing a decision 
with which it agrees.  The circuit court intended for "court 
permission" to be effectuated through that statutory process, 
which both the court of appeals and the majority agree is 
No.  2021AP809-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
lawful.  Accordingly, we should affirm the court of appeals' 
decision. 
¶27 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶28 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
No.  2021AP809-CR.akz 
 
1