Case Title: Stanley v. Webber

Citation: 

Docket Number: 991958

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
REBECCA A. STANLEY, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 991958   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
June 9, 2000 
DONALD WAYNE WEBBER, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROANOKE COUNTY 
Diane McQ. Strickland, Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal of a judgment entered in favor of the 
plaintiffs in a malicious prosecution action, we consider 
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict. 
 
Donald Wayne Webber and his son, Todd Anthony Webber 
(collectively, the Webbers), each filed a motion for judgment 
against S & A Restaurant Corporation, doing business as Steak & 
Ale (Steak & Ale), and Rebecca Ann Stanley, the manager of a 
Steak & Ale restaurant located in Roanoke (the restaurant).  The 
Webbers alleged that Stanley, acting on behalf of Steak & Ale, 
maliciously and falsely procured felony warrants against them, 
charging them with grand larceny of a commercial oven owned by 
the restaurant. 
 
We will state the evidence presented at trial in the light 
most favorable to the Webbers, the parties who prevailed in the 
trial court.  Hudson v. Lanier, 255 Va. 330, 331, 497 S.E.2d 
471, 472 (1998); Horton v. Horton, 254 Va. 111, 115, 487 S.E.2d 
200, 203 (1997).  The Webbers operate a business in Roanoke 
known as Security Food Equipment Services (Security Equipment), 
which repairs commercial food service equipment for restaurants 
and institutions.  Security Equipment had repaired food service 
equipment at the restaurant on numerous occasions over a period 
of between 10 and 15 years. 
 
In June 1995, Stanley, acting on behalf of Steak & Ale, 
placed a telephone call to Security Equipment's office and 
reported that one of the restaurant's convection ovens was not 
working.  Todd Webber went to the restaurant and, after 
examining the oven, estimated that the parts required to repair 
the oven would cost about $350.  Stanley told him that the Steak 
& Ale "home office" did not want to pay that much to repair the 
oven because it was to be replaced soon.  Todd Webber offered to 
pay for the parts and repair the oven without charge if Steak & 
Ale would agree to give the oven to the Webbers in "30 days or 
so, whatever" when the restaurant received the new oven.  
Stanley accepted Todd Webber's offer, and the Webbers repaired 
the oven the next day. 
 
During the remaining months of 1995, the Webbers contacted 
Stanley "four to five" times and requested delivery of the oven 
they had repaired.  Stanley repeatedly told them that the new 
oven was still "on order."  In January 1996, when the Webbers 
confronted Stanley at the restaurant and requested either 
payment for the repair work or delivery of the oven, Stanley 
 
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again told them that the new oven had not yet arrived.  During 
an ensuing argument, both Stanley and Donald Webber summoned the 
police. 
 
Officer Michael W. Dull of the Roanoke Police Department 
went to the restaurant and told the Webbers that the dispute was 
a "civil matter."  Dull suggested that the Webbers write a 
letter to Steak & Ale's corporate office or file a civil court 
action. 
 
Todd Webber sent a letter to Steak and Ale's corporate 
headquarters, explaining his agreement with Stanley and 
requesting that it be honored.  Both Donald and Todd Webber 
testified that they did not receive a response to this letter.  
Frederick R. Green, a regional supervisor for Steak & Ale, 
testified that he received Todd Webber's letter in late February 
1996, and that he ordered the new oven for the restaurant only 
after he received the letter. 
 
On the morning of March 11, 1996, the Webbers appeared at 
the restaurant, again requesting either payment for the repair 
work or delivery of the oven.  Stanley tried unsuccessfully to 
reach Green by telephone.  When Stanley warned the Webbers not 
to remove the oven, they replied that they had waited long 
enough to receive it.  The Webbers removed the oven, loaded it 
onto a trailer, and took the oven to Todd Webber's garage. 
 
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Stanley telephoned Officer Dull and told him that the 
Webbers had taken the oven.  Dull informed Stanley that she 
could institute a civil action against the Webbers, or that she 
could bring criminal charges against them.  Stanley told Dull 
that she wanted to pursue criminal charges and she prepared a 
written statement in which she stated that the oven had a value 
of $1,500. 
 
Officer Dull interviewed Todd Webber the same morning, 
retrieved the oven from him, and returned it to the restaurant.  
Based on Stanley's written complaint, Dull obtained arrest 
warrants for the Webbers on charges of grand larceny.  When Dull 
contacted the Webbers, they agreed to meet him in front of the 
magistrate's office at the jail, where he served the warrants on 
them.  The Webbers were taken into the jail, and their 
fingerprints and photographs were taken.  After about 1½ hours, 
the Webbers were released from custody on personal recognizance 
bonds. 
 
Later that day, Stanley telephoned the Security Equipment 
office and informed Donald Webber's wife that the restaurant had 
received its new oven and that the Webbers could take the old 
oven from the loading dock behind the restaurant.  When the 
Webbers arrived to take possession of the oven, Stanley signed a 
receipt presented to her by Todd Webber.  The receipt stated: 
"Received oven as payment in full on Invoice Number 27 date 6-
 
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25-1995.  That was to be paid in full by or around August, 1995.  
Seven months later transaction was completed." 
 
About two months later, when the Webbers had retained an 
attorney and appeared in court for a preliminary hearing, they 
were told that the prosecutor intended to seek dismissal of the 
charges against them.  Stanley testified that she and Green 
decided not to pursue the charges because they "wanted all of 
this to end."  The prosecutions were terminated prior to the 
scheduled preliminary hearing. 
 
At the end of the Webbers' evidence in the malicious 
prosecution actions, and again at the close of all the evidence, 
Steak & Ale and Stanley (collectively, the defendants) moved to 
strike the Webbers' evidence.  The trial court denied both 
motions to strike and submitted the actions to the jury, which 
returned a verdict in favor of the Webbers, awarding damages to 
each for malicious prosecution in the amount of $15,000.  The 
trial court denied the defendants' motion to set aside the 
verdict and entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. 
 
On appeal, the defendants argue that the Webbers failed to 
prove that Stanley initiated the grand larceny prosecution 
without probable cause to believe that the crime had been 
committed.  The defendants contend that the evidence showed that 
Stanley reasonably believed that the Webbers had taken an oven 
belonging to Steak & Ale, and that the Webbers lacked a 
 
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legitimate ownership claim to the oven because the restaurant 
had not yet received its replacement oven.  Thus, the defendants 
assert that, as a matter of law, Stanley maintained a reasonable 
belief under the facts and circumstances that the Webbers had 
committed the crime of grand larceny.  The defendants also argue 
that the Webbers actually were guilty of grand larceny, and that 
their guilt was a complete defense to the malicious prosecution 
actions. 
 
In response, the Webbers contend that the defendants' 
arguments are without merit because they depend on the 
resolution of factual issues that were properly submitted to the 
jury.  The Webbers assert that the jury resolved the issue of 
probable cause in their favor, and that the evidence supports 
the jury's conclusion.  They also argue that since the 
defendants lacked probable cause to institute the criminal 
charges and there was no additional evidence indicating that the 
crime had been committed, the evidence failed as a matter of law 
to establish that they were guilty of grand larceny.  We agree 
with the Webbers. 
 
In deciding this appeal, we apply an established standard 
of review.  When parties come before us with a jury verdict that 
has been approved by the trial court, they hold the most favored 
position known to the law.  Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliance v. 
Dave's Cabinet, Inc., 258 Va. 377, 380, 520 S.E.2d 362, 365 
 
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(1999); Smith v. Litten, 256 Va. 573, 578, 507 S.E.2d 77, 80 
(1998); Evaluation Research Corp. v. Alequin, 247 Va. 143, 147, 
439 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1994).  The trial court's judgment is 
presumed to be correct, and we will not set it aside unless the 
judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.  
Code § 8.01-680; Lumberman's Underwriting Alliance, 258 Va. at 
381, 520 S.E.2d at 365; Evaluation Research Corp., 247 Va. at 
147-48, 439 S.E.2d at 390. 
 
In an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff has 
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the prosecution was (1) malicious; (2) instituted by, or with 
the cooperation of, the defendant; (3) without probable cause; 
and (4) terminated in a manner not unfavorable to the plaintiff.  
Hudson, 255 Va. at 333, 497 S.E.2d at 473; Lee v. Southland 
Corp., 219 Va. 23, 26, 244 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1978); Bain v. 
Phillips, 217 Va. 387, 393, 228 S.E.2d 576, 581 (1976).  In the 
present case, the defendants contest the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the jury's finding that they instituted the 
criminal charges without probable cause. 
 
In the context of a malicious prosecution action, probable 
cause is defined as knowledge of such facts and circumstances to 
raise the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on those facts and 
circumstances, that the plaintiff is guilty of the crime of 
which he is suspected.  Lee, 219 Va. at 26, 244 S.E.2d at 758-
 
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59; Bain, 217 Va. at 394, 228 S.E.2d at 581; Gaut v. Pyles, 212 
Va. 39, 41, 181 S.E.2d 645, 647 (1971).  The determination 
whether a defendant had probable cause to believe that a crime 
was committed is judged with reference to the time the defendant 
took the action initiating the criminal charges.  Bill Edwards 
Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Carey, 219 Va. 90, 98, 244 S.E.2d 767, 773 
(1978); Bain, 217 Va. at 394, 228 S.E.2d at 581.  When the facts 
relating to the question of probable cause are in dispute, the 
issue is one of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact.  Lee, 
219 Va. at 27, 244 S.E.2d at 759; Giant of Virginia, Inc. v. 
Pigg, 207 Va. 679, 684, 152 S.E.2d 271, 275 (1967); Brodie v. 
Huck, 187 Va. 485, 488, 47 S.E.2d 310, 312 (1948). 
 
We consider the elements of the crime of grand larceny in 
determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support the 
jury's finding that the defendants lacked probable cause to 
initiate these charges.  Larceny, a common law crime, is the 
wrongful or fraudulent taking of another's property without his 
permission and with the intent to permanently deprive him of 
that property.  Commonwealth v. Taylor, 256 Va. 514, 518, 506 
S.E.2d 312, 314 (1998); Bryant v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 179, 
183, 445 S.E.2d 667, 670 (1994).  Under Code § 18.2-95, grand 
larceny includes a taking, not from the person of another, of 
goods having a value of $200 or more.  Taylor, 256 Va. at 518, 
506 S.E.2d at 314. 
 
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There can be no larceny if an accused, in good faith, 
believes that the property taken belongs to him, since the 
essential element of intent is absent in that circumstance.  Id. 
at 519, 506 S.E.2d at 314; Pierce v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 528, 
533, 138 S.E.2d 28, 32 (1964); Butts v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 
800, 811-12, 133 S.E. 764, 767-68 (1926).  Intent may, and often 
must, be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case, 
including the actions of the accused and any statements made by 
him.  Taylor, 256 Va. at 519, 506 S.E.2d at 314; see Guill v. 
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 140, 495 S.E.2d 489, 492 (1998); 
Ridley v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 834, 836, 252 S.E.2d 313, 314 
(1979). 
 
The evidence in the present case was disputed on the issue 
whether the defendants had probable cause to initiate the 
criminal charges against the Webbers.  Todd Webber testified 
that he and Stanley agreed that he would provide the parts and 
labor to repair the oven and that, in return, Steak & Ale would 
allow him to take the oven as payment for his services when 
Stanley received her new oven in "30 days or so, whatever."  
Donald Webber's testimony essentially corroborated Todd Webber's 
statement concerning the terms of the oral agreement. 
 
The jury could reasonably infer from this testimony that 
under the parties' agreement, the oven belonged to the Webbers 
once they repaired it, although they agreed to allow Stanley to 
 
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retain possession of it for a brief period thereafter.  
Alternatively, the jury could infer from the testimony that the 
parties' agreement transferred ownership of the oven to the 
Webbers about 30 days after they repaired it.  Either conclusion 
also was supported by the receipt signed by Stanley, which 
indicated that the oven constituted payment for the June 1995 
invoice, and that this payment was supposed to have been made 
around August 1995. 
 
Under either of these views of the evidence, the defendants 
lacked probable cause to initiate the grand larceny charges 
because the Webbers did not intend to permanently deprive Steak 
& Ale of any property owned by it, and Stanley knew this fact 
when she initiated the criminal charges.  Thus, we hold that the 
evidence was sufficient to support the jury's determination that 
the defendants initiated the criminal prosecutions against the 
Webbers without probable cause. 
 
We find no merit in the defendants' additional argument 
that these malicious prosecution actions were barred because the 
Webbers actually were guilty of grand larceny.  The jury was 
instructed that proof of the actual guilt of the person accused 
is a complete defense to a malicious prosecution action.  See 
Wiggs v. Farmer, 205 Va. 149, 152, 135 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1964); 
Horne v. Bridwell, 193 Va. 381, 389, 68 S.E.2d 535, 540 (1952).  
By its verdict, the jury rejected the defendants' assertion that 
 
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the Webbers were guilty of grand larceny, and the evidence 
stated above supports the jury's determination on this issue.  
Therefore, we hold that the trial court's judgment is not 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court's 
judgment. 
Affirmed. 
 
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