Case Title: State v. Villamil

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP000791-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 74 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP791-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Petitioner, 
     v. 
Ernesto E. Lazo Villamil, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 371 Wis. 2d 519, 885 N.W.2d 381 
PDC No:  2016 WI App 61 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 12, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Donald J. Hassin Jr. and Michael J. Aprahamian 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
KELLY, J., joined by R.G. BRADLEY, J. concurs 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. dissents (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Michelle L. Velasquez and Civitas Law Group, Milwaukee, and 
an oral argument by Michelle L. Velasquez. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-cross petitioner, there were 
briefs filed by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney 
general, and Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and an oral 
argument by Thomas J. Balistreri. 
 
 
 
2017 WI 74 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2015AP791-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2012CF1343) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross 
Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Ernesto E. Lazo Villamil, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  This case examines issues that 
arise from statutory language that appears to make the offense 
of causing a death while knowingly operating a motor vehicle 
after revocation both a felony and a misdemeanor offense.  Such 
an unusual scenario has generated both a petition and cross-
petition for review of the court of appeals' decision. 
¶2 
Petitioner, Ernesto Lazo Villamil (Villamil), seeks 
review of a court of appeals' decision affirming a circuit court 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
2 
judgment of conviction and order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief.1 
¶3 
Villamil asserts that the court of appeals erred 
because the statutory scheme underlying his conviction and 
sentence, Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1)(b) (2009-10) and Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44(2)(ar)4 (eff. March 1, 2012), is ambiguous as to 
whether he should have been charged with a misdemeanor or a 
felony.  Therefore, he contends that the rule of lenity2 applies 
and he should have been charged with a misdemeanor, rather than 
a felony. 
¶4 
He further argues that the statutory scheme is 
unconstitutional because it violates his rights to both due 
process and equal protection.3  According to Villamil, the 
failure of a statute to give fair notice of the proscribed 
conduct 
and 
its 
consequences 
violates 
due 
process.  
Additionally, he contends that a statute violates his right to 
equal protection when there is no rational basis for the 
distinction between misdemeanor and felony penalties. 
¶5 
We 
conclude 
that 
any 
ambiguity 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.44(1)(b) (2009-10) and Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4 (eff. 
                                                 
1 State v. Villamil, 2016 WI App 61, 371 Wis. 2d 519, 885 
N.W.2d 381 (affirming in part and reversing in part a judgment 
and order for Waukesha County, Donald J. Hassin, Jr., and 
Michael J. Aprahamian, J.J., presiding). 
2 For a definition of the rule of lenity, see infra ¶27. 
3 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws."   
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
3 
March 1, 2012) is clarified by the statutes' legislative history 
and thus the rule of lenity does not apply.  We further 
determine that the statutory scheme does not violate his rights 
to either due process or equal protection.  Villamil had fair 
notice that the prohibited conduct of committing a knowing OAR-
violation causing death could result in a felony charge and 
there is no evidence that the charging decision was based upon 
an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other 
arbitrary classification. 
¶6 
As cross-petitioner, the State seeks review of that 
part of the court of appeals decision remanding Villamil's case 
to the circuit court for resentencing.  The court of appeals 
determined that the circuit court failed to consider specific 
factors enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b) (2013-14) at 
sentencing.  The State, however, asserts that the statute is 
directory, rather than mandatory.  Thus, it contends that the 
sentencing court was not required to consider all of the 
enumerated factors. 
¶7 
We agree with the court of appeals that Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44(2)(b) is mandatory and that the record at sentencing 
must demonstrate that the circuit court considered the factors 
enumerated in the statute. 
¶8 
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals decision 
and remand to the circuit court for a new sentencing hearing 
because the record fails to demonstrate that the circuit court 
considered 
the 
required 
factors 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.44(2)(b). 
I 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
4 
¶9 
The underlying facts in this case are not in dispute.  
Villamil drove into the rear of another vehicle, killing the 
operator of that vehicle.  At the scene of the collision, 
Villamil told the police officer that he did not have a valid 
driver's license because it had been revoked for an operating 
while intoxicated offense ("OWI"). 
¶10 Villamil was charged with operating after revocation 
("OAR"), causing death, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 343.44(1)(b) 
and (2)(ar)4.4  Wisconsin Statute § 343.44(1)(b), operating after 
revocation, provides in relevant part that no person may 
knowingly 
operate 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
after 
revocation.  
Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4, provides that a 
person who violates sub. (1)(b) and causes the death of another 
person, shall be charged with a misdemeanor, except "if the 
person knows at the time of the violation that his or her 
operating privilege has been revoked, the person is guilty of a 
Class H Felony." 
¶11 In exchange for his no-contest plea, the State 
recommended a prison sentence, but agreed not to argue for a 
particular length of time.  During the plea colloquy the circuit 
court discussed the factual basis and elements of the offense.  
Villamil told the court he was aware that his license had been 
revoked for an alcohol-related offense. 
                                                 
4 Villamil was originally charged with one count of OAR, 
causing great bodily harm, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1)(b) 
and (2)(ar)3.(1).  Following the death of the driver of the 
other vehicle, the State filed an amended complaint charging 
Villamil with "knowingly operating while revoked-causing death," 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1)(b) and (2)(ar)4(2). 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
5 
¶12 Neither the complaint, nor anything else in the record 
alleged that the collision was related to impaired driving.  The 
accident reconstruction report stated that there was "no 
evidence to suggest that Mr. Lazo Villamil had diminished 
driving abilities." 
¶13 Defense counsel argued for a term of probation with an 
imposed and stayed sentence because Villamil had already been in 
the county jail for fifteen months.  Counsel's argument 
highlighted mitigating factors, such as Villamil's completion of 
treatment and other programming, including obtaining his GED.  
Additionally, he argued that Villamil met all the requirements 
to reinstate his license, but was unable to do so because of a 
change in the law. 
¶14 At sentencing, the court considered the seriousness of 
the 
offense, 
the 
need 
to 
protect 
the 
public, 
and 
the 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant.  It observed that the 
felony offense for a knowing violation of OAR-causing death was 
new and that the statute's purpose was to protect the public 
from people whose licenses had been revoked.  The court further 
stated that it could not understand why Villamil was driving on 
the day of the collision.  It opined that matters were made 
worse because he had been twice convicted of drunk driving and 
previously served time in jail for an OAR conviction. 
¶15 The sentencing court commented on the continued 
problem of people driving without a license, and concluded that 
all it could do "to respond to the needs of the community as 
best it can under facility of the law" was to impose the maximum 
term of imprisonment.  It concluded that "this is a serious 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
6 
operating after revocation" and sentenced Villamil to the 
maximum sentence of six years, with three years of initial 
confinement and three years of extended supervision.   
¶16 Villamil filed a postconviction motion arguing that 
Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4 is ambiguous and unconstitutional.  
Additionally, he requested resentencing, asserting that the 
sentencing court had not provided an adequate explanation of why 
it imposed the maximum penalty.  The circuit court denied 
Villamil's postconviction motion in its entirety. 
¶17 The court of appeals determined that the rule of 
lenity was not applicable and the statutory scheme under which 
Villamil was convicted and sentenced is constitutional.  State 
v. Villamil, 2016 WI App 61, ¶2, 371 Wis. 2d 519, 885 
N.W.2d 381.  However, the court of appeals remanded for a new 
sentencing hearing because it concluded that the evidentiary 
record failed to demonstrate that the circuit court considered 
the enumerated factors set forth in Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b).  
Id. 
II 
¶18 The interpretation of a statute presents a question of 
law that we decide independently of the decisions rendered by 
the circuit court and the court of appeals.  State v. Harrison, 
2005 WI 5, ¶37, 360 Wis. 2d 246, 858 N.W.2d 372. 
¶19  Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  It is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used, in relation to 
the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes.  Id., 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
7 
¶46.  We interpret a statute reasonably in order to avoid absurd 
results.  Id. 
¶20 A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being 
understood in two or more ways by reasonably well-informed 
persons.  Id., ¶47.  When a statute is ambiguous, we may consult 
legislative history as part of our statutory analysis.  Id., 
¶51. 
¶21 We 
are 
also 
tasked 
with 
reviewing 
whether 
the 
statutory scheme is unconstitutional.  Legislative enactments 
are presumed constitutional and the party challenging the 
constitutionality 
must 
demonstrate 
the 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. McManus, 
152 Wis. 2d 113, 129, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989). 
¶22 Finally, we are asked to determine whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44(2)(b) requires a sentencing court to consider on the 
record the factors enumerated in the statute.  "To determine how 
a sentencing court satisfies its obligation to consider any 
applicable sentencing guideline," we must interpret the relevant 
statutory provision.  State v. Grady, 2007 WI 81, ¶14, 302 
Wis. 2d 80, 734 N.W.2d 364.  As set forth above, statutory 
interpretation is a matter of law we review independently of the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court of 
appeals.  Id. 
¶23 We will remand for a new sentencing hearing only if 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion at 
sentencing.  State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 
678 N.W.2d 197 (citing McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 278, 
182 N.W.2d 512 (1971)).  A court erroneously exercises its 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
8 
sentencing discretion when it fails to consider factors it is 
required by statute to consider.  LaRocque v. LaRocque, 139 
Wis. 2d 23, 33, 406 N.W.2d 736 (1987). 
III 
¶24 We begin by setting forth the relevant statutory 
language.  Villamil was charged with a knowing violation of OAR-
causing death, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 343.44(1)(b) and 
(2)(ar)4.  Wisconsin Stat. § 343.44(1)(b), knowingly operating 
after revocation, provides in relevant part: 
No person whose operating privilege has been duly 
revoked under the laws of this state may knowingly 
operate a motor vehicle upon any highway in this state 
during the period of revocation . . . . 
(Emphasis added). 
Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4. provides: 
Any person who violates sub. (1)(b) and, in the course 
of the violation, causes the death of another person 
shall be fined not less than $7,500, nor more than 
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year in 
the county jail or both, except that, if the person 
knows at the time of the violation that his or her 
operating privilege has been revoked, the person is 
guilty of a Class H Felony.  
(Emphasis added). 
¶25 According 
to 
Villamil, 
the 
statutory 
scheme 
is 
ambiguous because it provides that a person who commits the 
offense of causing death while knowingly operating a motor 
vehicle after revocation could be charged with either a 
misdemeanor or a felony.  He asserts that the first part of the 
statute sets forth a misdemeanor sentence with a fine of "not 
less than $7,500, nor more than $10,000 or imprison[ment] for 
not more than one year in the county jail or both . . . ."  Wis. 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
9 
Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4.  However, the second part of the statute 
classifies the offense as a "Class H felony."  Id. 
A 
¶26 The problem that Villamil identifies with Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44(2)(ar)4. is that "knowledge" of revocation is already 
required as an element of the misdemeanor charge because a 
person cannot violate Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1)(b), the offense for 
operating after revocation, unless he knows that his license has 
been revoked.  Yet, the second part of the statutory provision 
also contains a knowledge requirement.  He asserts that this 
interaction 
between 
the 
statutes 
makes 
the 
"knowledge" 
distinction between the misdemeanor and felony charge illusory.  
Accordingly, Villamil contends that the statute is ambiguous and 
that the rule of lenity should apply because the same offense is 
punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony. 
¶27 The rule of lenity "provides generally that ambiguous 
penal statutes should be interpreted in favor of the defendant."  
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶67, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700.  
However, the rule of lenity applies only if two conditions are 
met:  (1) the penal statute is ambiguous; and (2) we are unable 
to clarify the intent of the legislature by resort to 
legislative history.  Id. 
¶28 It is undisputed that the statute is ambiguous.  The 
State, however, contends that this court should resolve any 
ambiguity by finding that the knowledge element of the offense 
of OAR has been impliedly repealed. 
¶29 We agree with the parties that the statute is 
ambiguous. 
 
Here, 
the 
interaction 
between 
Wis. 
Stat. 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
10 
§ 343.44(1)(b) and Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4 creates ambiguity 
because the same offense is punishable as either a misdemeanor 
or a felony.  DOC v. Schwarz, 2005 WI 34, ¶14, 279 Wis. 2d 223, 
693 N.W.2d 703 ("ambiguity can be found . . . by the words of 
the provision as they interact with and relate to other 
provisions in the statute and to other statutes.") (quotation 
marks and quoted source omitted). 
¶30 Because we determine that the interaction of the 
statutory scheme renders it ambiguous, we turn next to the 
relief requested by the parties.  First, we do not agree with 
Villamil that the rule of lenity should be applied in this case.  
Although the rule of lenity provides generally that ambiguous 
penal statutes should be interpreted in favor of the defendant, 
it applies only if a penal statute is ambiguous and "we are 
unable to clarify the intent of the legislature by resort to 
legislative history."  Cole, 262 Wis. 2d 167, ¶67. 
¶31 Examining the legislative history of Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44 clarifies the intent of the legislature that persons 
who commit a knowing violation of OAR-causing death be charged 
with a Class H felony.  The Legislative Reference Bureau 
analysis for 2011 Assembly Bill 80 ("A.B. 80") recognized that 
under the law as it existed prior to enactment of 2011 Wisconsin 
Act 113 ("Act 113"), a defendant who committed a knowing OAR 
violation was guilty of "a Class A misdemeanor, punishable by a 
maximum fine of $10,000 or a maximum term of imprisonment of 
nine months or both."  See Drafting file for 2011 Wis. Act. 113, 
Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau of 2011 A.B. 80, 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.; see also Wis. Stat. 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
11 
§ 343.44(2)(b) (2009–10).  It explained that A.B. 80 "creates 
new penalties for [OAR] violations in which the person, in the 
course of the violation, causes . . . death to another person." 
LRB Analysis of A.B. 80, p. 2 (emphasis added). 
¶32 The LRB's analysis additionally observed that under 
A.B. 80, the penalty is intended to increase if a person 
committed a knowing violation: 
If the person causes the death of another in the 
course of the OWL or OWS violation, the person: 1) 
must forfeit not less than $7,500 nor more than 
$10,000 if the person did not know, respectively, that 
he or she did not possess a valid operator's license 
or that his or her operating privilege was suspended; 
or 2) is guilty of a Class H felony if the person 
knew.  A Class H felony is punishable by a maximum 
fine of $10,000 or a maximum term of imprisonment of 
six years or both . . . If the person causes the death 
of another in the course of the OAR violation, the 
person: 1) must be fined not less than $7,500 nor more 
than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year 
or both if the person did not know that his or her 
operating privilege was revoked; or 2) is guilty of a 
Class H felony if the person knew. 
LRB Analysis of A.B. 80 at 2–3 (emphasis added). 
¶33 Thus, the legislative history clarifies that the 
legislature intended to write these provisions so that when a 
person causes the death of another while committing an OAR 
violation, the penalty would be less severe if the defendant did 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
12 
not know his license was revoked and more severe if he knew.5  
Specific to this case, the legislative history shows the 
legislature's intent to treat an OAR-causing death offense as a 
misdemeanor if the defendant did not know his license had been 
revoked and as a Class H felony if he knew. 
¶34 It appears, however, that the legislature failed to 
remove the "knowledge" element from the misdemeanor language of 
Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1)(b) and thus failed to accomplish the 
first part of this intent.  Nevertheless, in his case, Villamil 
caused the death of another and knew his license had been 
revoked. 
 
The 
legislative 
history 
shows, 
and 
Villamil 
acknowledges, that the legislature intended to treat his offense 
as a Class H felony.  Given this clarification, the rule of 
lenity cannot be invoked. 
B 
¶35 The State urges this court to conclude that the 
knowledge element of the offense of operating after revocation 
has been impliedly repealed.  According to the State, repeal of 
                                                 
5 Based on the LRB Analysis of A.B. 80 and the Legislative 
Council Memo regarding Act 113, it appears that the legislature 
intended that that the offenses of operating while suspended and 
operating after revocation have symmetrical penalties.  See LRB 
Analysis of A.B. 80 at 2–3; see also Wis. Leg. Council, Act 
Memo, 2011 Wis. Act. 113.  The legislature made the offense of 
operating while suspended a non-knowing offense.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44(1)(a) ("A person's knowledge that his or her operating 
privilege is suspended is not an element of the offense under 
this paragraph.").  However, the legislature failed to similarly 
revise the offense of operating after revocation pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1)(b). 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
13 
the element of knowledge in the offense of operating after 
revocation is implied by the legislative history of Act 113. 
¶36 Although 
we 
agree 
that 
the 
legislative 
history 
indicates that the legislature intended to create a misdemeanor 
offense for persons who did not know their license had been 
revoked, we are tasked with interpreting the words that the 
legislature wrote.  Kalal explained that "[i]t is the enacted 
law, not the unenacted intent, that is binding on the public."  
Id., ¶46.  Here, the legislature wrote the statutory scheme so 
that knowledge of revocation status is an element of both the 
misdemeanor and felony provision.  As set forth above, in this 
case Villamil was charged with the felony offense intended by 
the legislature for a knowing violation of OAR-causing death. 
¶37 We further observe that implied repeal is a disfavored 
rule of statutory construction.  See, e.g., Heaton v. Larsen, 97 
Wis. 2d 379, 392-93 ("Repeals by implication are not favored in 
the law.").  If the legislature desires to create a misdemeanor 
offense for an unknowing violation, as the legislative history 
indicates, then the legislature may do so by future amendment of 
the statutory text.  See State v. Reagles, 177 Wis. 2d 168, 176, 
501 N.W.2d 861 (1993) ("If a statute fails to cover a particular 
situation and the omission should be cured, the remedy lies with 
the legislature, not the courts.").  Thus, we decline the 
State's invitation to rewrite the statute in order to create an 
offense for an "unknowing" violation and hold the application of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 343.44(1)(b) and (2)(ar)4. to the language the 
legislature wrote.  See State v. Jadowski, 2004 WI 68, 273 
Wis. 2d 418, 680 N.W.2d 810 (it is legislature's broad power to 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
14 
promote the public welfare that authorizes it to create and 
define criminal offenses). 
¶38 Accordingly, we agree with the court of appeals that 
the rule of lenity does note apply here.  We hold the 
application of Wis. Stat. §§ 343.44(1)(b) and (2)(ar)4. to the 
language the legislature wrote——that the defendant's "knowledge" 
of his revocation status is an element of both the misdemeanor 
as well as the felony provision.  It was the legislature's 
intent to apply the more severe penalty to Villamil's offense 
and he was appropriately charged with a Class H felony.   
IV 
¶39 We turn next to Villamil's argument that statutes 
which prescribe significantly different penalties for the exact 
same conduct cannot be applied constitutionally.  According to 
Villamil, the failure of a statute to give fair notice of the 
proscribed conduct and the consequences violates due process.  
Additionally, 
he 
contends 
that 
a 
statute 
violates 
equal 
protection when there is no rational basis for the distinction 
between misdemeanor and felony penalties. 
¶40 Our analysis of Villamil's constitutional arguments 
begins with the observation that legislative enactments are 
presumed 
constitutional 
and 
the 
party 
challenging 
the 
constitutionality must prove the statute unconstitutional beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  McManus, Wis. 2d at 129.  If possible, we 
construe the statute to preserve it.  State v. Popanz, 112 
Wis. 2d 166, 172, 332 N.W.2d 750 (1983). 
¶41 Due process requires that penal statutes provide fair 
notice of the conduct they seek to proscribe.  State v. Nelson, 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
15 
2006 WI App 124, ¶41, 294 Wis. 2d 578, 718 N.W.2d 168.  This 
notice does not have to be provided with absolute clarity.  Id., 
¶36.  Additionally, when considering an equal protection 
challenge that does not involve a suspect or quasi-suspect 
classification, "the fundamental determination to be made . . . 
is 
whether 
there 
is 
arbitrary 
discrimination 
in 
the 
statute . . . and thus whether there is a rational basis which 
justifies a difference in rights afforded."  In re Joseph E.G., 
2001 WI App 29, ¶8, 240 Wis. 2d 481, 623 N.W.2d 137. 
¶42 This court's decision in State v. Cissell, 127 
Wis. 2d 205, 378 N.W.2d 691 (1985), guides our analysis of 
Villamil's constitutional challenge.  Cissell asserted, and this 
court agreed, that the elements of felony abandonment were 
substantially identical to the elements of misdemeanor failure 
to support.  Id. at 214.  He argued that statutes with identical 
substantive elements but different penalty schemes violate due 
process and equal protection.  Id. 
¶43 Similar to this case, Cissell contended that the State 
violated his constitutional rights by charging him with a felony 
rather than a misdemeanor.  Id.  Cissell further argued that 
"disparate sentencing exposures for crimes with identical 
elements are irrational and arbitrary."  Id. 
¶44 Following United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 
(1979), the Cissell court determined that "identical element 
crimes with different penalties do not violate due process or 
equal protection."  127 Wis. 2d 215.  It explained that the 
Batchelder court concluded that overlapping criminal statutes 
with different penalty schemes "do not violate constitutional 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
16 
principles unless the prosecutor selectively bases the charging 
decision upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, 
or other arbitrary classification."  Id. (citing Batchelder, 442 
U.S. at 125 n.9). 
¶45 Cissell reasoned that "[T]he fact that the defendant's 
conduct may be chargeable under either of two statutes does not 
make prosecution under one or the other statute improper per 
se . . . ."  127 Wis. 2d 216.  It explained that "the focus 
instead is on whether the prosecutor unjustifiably discriminated 
against any class of defendants."  Id.  "Differences in 
treatment between individuals . . . are determined as a matter 
of prosecutorial discretion. . . . [S]uch discretion is not 
unconstitutional unless the prosecutor discriminates on the 
basis of unjustifiable criteria."  Id. 
¶46 Thus, in Cissell we concluded that "[a]lthough [the 
statutes] are identical crimes with different penalties, the 
state does not deny equal protection or due process by charging 
defendants with the more serious crime."  Id. at 224.  This 
court determined that the statute at issue in Cissell did not 
violate due process because it "provide[d] adequate notice of 
the conduct proscribed by the statute and those who must obey 
it."  Id. at 225.  We explained that "[i]t also provides a 
defined standard for those who must enforce the law and 
adjudicate guilt."  Id.   
¶47 In this case, Villamil makes no suggestion the 
prosecutor chose to charge him with a felony violation instead 
of a misdemeanor based upon his race, religion, or other 
arbitrary classification.  Accordingly, under Cissell, neither 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
17 
the existence of different penalties for the same violation nor 
the prosecutor's decision to charge Villamil with a felony 
violates his rights to due process or equal protection. 
¶48 Villamil attempts to distinguish the facts of this 
case from Cissell by arguing that in Cissell there were two 
different offenses with substantively identical elements, where 
here there is one offense within the same statutory provision 
containing two distinct punishments.  Although Villamil points 
to a Utah Supreme Court case as support for this distinction, we 
are not convinced that a meaningful distinction exists between 
the circumstances here and those in Cissell.  See State v. 
Williams, 2007 UT 98, ¶1, 175 P.2d 1029. 
¶49 Whether there is one criminal statute or two, both 
this 
case 
and 
Cissell 
involve 
criminal 
statutes 
with 
substantially 
identical 
elements 
where 
prosecutors 
have 
discretion to decide whether they will charge a defendant with a 
misdemeanor or a felony.  Although a defendant could be charged 
with a misdemeanor instead of a felony for a knowing violation 
of OAR-causing death, the public is on notice that this offense 
may be punished as a Class H felony pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 343.44(1)(b) and (2)(ar)4.  Because Villamil knew he was 
operating after his license was revoked, the statutes provide 
sufficient notice that this violation could be charged as a 
felony. 
¶50 Accordingly, we determine that Villamil has failed to 
meet 
his 
burden 
of 
demonstrating 
that 
the 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. 
V 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
18 
¶51 We turn to address the State's cross-petition, which 
asserts that the sentencing court was not required to consider 
all of the statutorily enumerated factors on the record. 
¶52 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.44(2)(b) provides that the court 
"shall review the record and consider the following": 
1.  The aggravating and mitigating circumstances in 
the 
matter, 
using 
the 
guidelines 
described 
in 
par. (d). 
 
2.  The class of vehicle operated by the person. 
 
3.  The number of prior convictions of the person for 
violations of the section within the 5 years preceding 
the person's arrest. 
 
4.  The reason that the person's operating privilege 
was revoked, or the person was disqualified or ordered 
out 
of 
service, 
including 
whether 
the 
person's 
operating privilege was revoked for an offense that 
may be counted under s. 343.307(2). 
 
5.  Any convictions for moving violations arising out 
of 
the 
incident 
or 
occurrence 
giving 
rise 
to 
sentencing under this section. 
¶53 In Grady, this court determined that "a circuit court 
satisfies its [statutory] obligation when the record of the 
sentencing 
hearing 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
court 
actually 
considered the sentencing guidelines and so stated on the 
record."  302 Wis. 2d 80, ¶3.  Similar to the statute addressed 
in Grady, Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b) states that "[i]n imposing 
sentence under par. (ar) or (br) the court shall . . . consider 
the following," and then lists the specifically identified 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
19 
factors to be considered.6  Villamil asserts that the circuit 
court failed to address several factors at sentencing. 
¶54 The State does not dispute that the circuit court 
failed to enumerate all of the statutorily-enumerated sentencing 
factors on the record.  Instead, it contends that at sentencing 
Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b) should be construed to be directory, 
rather than mandatory.  Although the State acknowledges that the 
word "shall" is presumed to be mandatory, it asserts that there 
is no per se rule to determine which way the word is used.  See, 
e.g., State ex rel. Marburry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶16, 262 
Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 155; State v. R.R.E., 162 Wis. 2d 698, 
707, 470 N.W.2d 283 (1991).  Thus, according to the State, in 
determining whether the legislature intended "shall" to be 
mandatory or directory, we should consider the objectives 
intended to be accomplished by the statute and the potential 
consequences of each interpretation. 
¶55 The word "shall" can be construed as directory if 
"such a construction is 'necessary to carry out the intent of 
the legislature.'"  Warnecke v. Estate of Warnecke, 2006 WI App 
62, ¶12, 292 Wis. 2d 438, 713 N.W.2d 109 (quoting Karow v. 
Milwaukee Co. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 565, 571 N.W.2d 214 
(1978)).  According to the State, interpreting the word "shall" 
as mandatory leads to an unreasonable result because similar 
                                                 
6 The statute considered in State v. Grady, 2007 WI 81, 302 
Wis. 2d 80, 734 N.W.2d 364, provided that "the court shall 
consider . . . [i]f the offense is a felony, the sentencing 
guideline."  See Wis. Stat. § 973.017(2)(a) (2003-04). 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
20 
offenses, such as operating while suspended, do not require 
consideration of these factors.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 343.44(1)(a). 
¶56 However, we agree with the court of appeals that the 
State's argument underscores that the legislature intended to 
treat OAR offenses differently.  Villamil, 371 Wis. 2d 519, ¶26.  
We do not assume that the legislature chose the word "shall" 
lightly, but instead assume it intended to require courts to 
consider the factors under Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b), for a 
knowing violation of OAR-causing death. 
¶57 Additionally, this case is distinguishable from other 
cases in which courts have determined that an interpretation of 
"shall" as mandatory would lead to an absurd result.  See, e.g., 
In re Paternity of S.A. II, 165 Wis. 2d 530, 534-36, N.W.2d 21 
(Ct. App. 1991).  For example, in child custody matters, Wis. 
Stat. ch. 767 previously provided that "the court shall 
incorporate" the terms of a stipulation regarding a modification 
of placement or custody into a revised order.  Id.  However, the 
court of appeals reasoned that the best interests of a child are 
the primary consideration in custody determinations, regardless 
of the parties' stipulation.  Id.  Thus, it concluded that it 
would be an absurd result if "shall" were interpreted to 
prohibit an examination of the best interests of the child.  
Id.; see also Eby v. Kozarek, 153 Wis. 2d 75, 80-81, 450 
N.W.2d 249 (1990) (use of the word "shall" for statutory time 
limit was directory because construing the statute as mandatory 
would lead to an overly harsh result). 
¶58 No such consideration applies here.  Indeed, all of 
the factors listed here are relevant to a sentencing decision 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
21 
for a knowing violation of OAR-causing death.  These factors, 
such as aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the class of 
the vehicle, prior convictions, the reason for revocation, and 
any convictions for moving violations arising out of the 
incident are all relevant to punishment for this specific 
offense.  Accordingly, making their consideration mandatory does 
not lead to an absurd result. 
¶59 Finally, 
"support 
is 
given 
to 
a 
mandatory 
interpretation of 'shall' when the legislature uses the words 
'shall' and 'may' in a particular statutory section, indicating 
the legislature was aware of the distinct meanings of the 
words."  State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶16, 262 
Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 155.  In this case, the legislature used 
the word "shall" with regard to the factors set forth in Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.44(2)(b), 
but 
used 
"may" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.44(2)(c), which provides that "penalties may be enhanced 
by imprisonment and additional fines . . . ."  Thus, "we can 
infer 
that 
the 
legislature 
was 
aware 
of 
the 
different 
denotations and intended the words to have their precise 
meanings."  State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶16. 
(quotation marks and quoted source omitted). 
¶60 In light of the above, we conclude that the State has 
failed to rebut the presumption that "shall" is mandatory here.  
We thus determine that Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b) is mandatory 
and that the record at sentencing must demonstrate that the 
circuit court considered the factors enumerated in the statute. 
¶61 The State does not dispute that the circuit court 
failed to express its consideration of the statutory factors on 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
22 
the record.  Nor does it contend that the circuit court 
considered those factors, but simply failed to reference Wis. 
Stat. § 343.44(2)(b) on the record.  We therefore remand for a 
new sentencing hearing because the record in this case fails to 
demonstrate that the court considered the required factors under 
Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b). 
V 
¶62 In sum, we conclude that any ambiguity in Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44(1)(b) (2009-10) and Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4 (eff. 
March 1, 2012) is clarified by the statutes' legislative history 
and thus the rule of lenity does not apply.  We further 
determine that the statutory scheme does not violate his rights 
to either due process or equal protection.  Because Villamil 
knew he was operating after his license was revoked, the 
statutes provide fair notice that the prohibited conduct of 
committing a knowing OAR-violation causing death could result in 
a felony charge.  There is no evidence that the charging 
decision was based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, 
religion, or other arbitrary classification. 
¶63 Additionally, we agree with the court of appeals that 
Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b) is mandatory and that the record at 
sentencing must demonstrate that the circuit court considered 
the factors enumerated in the statute. 
¶64 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals decision 
and remand to the circuit court for a new sentencing hearing 
because the record fails to demonstrate that the circuit court 
considered 
the 
required 
factors 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.44(2)(b). 
No.  2015AP791-CR 
 
 
23 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
No.  2015AP791-CR.dk 
 
1 
 
¶65 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  Both the State and 
Mr. Villamil want us to find an ambiguity in Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44, but for different reasons.  The State would create out 
of this ambiguity a new criminal offense——strict-liability 
Operating After Revocation.  Mr. Villamil, on the other hand, 
would use the ambiguity to secure a misdemeanor punishment 
instead of a felony sentence.  The court agreed the statute is 
ambiguous, but without showing it to be so.  Consequent upon 
this unexplained premise, it embarked on a wholly unnecessary 
exploration of legislative history, the rule of lenity, and the 
due process implications of prosecutorial discretion.  As a 
result, I cannot join Part III of the court's opinion. 
I 
¶66 I disagree with the court's assumed premise.  It said 
"the interaction between Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1)(b) and Wis. 
Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4 creates ambiguity because the same 
offense is punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony."  
Majority op., ¶29.  But the plain language of the statute does 
not allow such an option.  It provides for a felony or nothing 
at all. 
¶67 Notwithstanding our fretting, applying Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44 to Mr. Villamil is entirely straightforward.  The first 
step, of course, is determining the meaning of the statute, 
which begins with the language the legislature used.  If there 
is a plain meaning to be found there, that is where the analysis 
No.  2015AP791-CR.dk 
 
2 
 
also ends.1  Mr. Villamil's situation requires us to consider the 
statute's definition of the crime with which he is accused (Wis. 
Stat. § 343.44(1)(b)), as well as the penalty to which he is 
subject (Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4.). 
¶68 The offense of "Operating After Revocation" is defined 
as follows:  "No person whose operating privilege has been duly 
revoked under the laws of this state may knowingly operate a 
motor vehicle upon any highway in this state during the period 
of revocation . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1)(b) (emphasis 
added).  The penalty for this offense depends, in part, on 
whether the person harmed others while committing the offense.  
If the driver causes the death of another, as Mr. Villamil did, 
the statute provides the following penalty: 
Any person who violates sub. (1)(b) and, in the course 
of the violation, causes the death of another person 
shall be fined not less than $7,500 nor more than 
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year in 
the county jail or both, except that, if the person 
knows at the time of the violation that his or her 
operating privilege has been revoked, the person is 
guilty of a Class H felony. 
Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4 (emphasis added). 
¶69 Mr. Villamil says this language prevents him from 
knowing whether he is subject to a misdemeanor or a felony 
penalty.  But if we give careful attention to how the actual 
                                                 
1 State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶45, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
681 
N.W.2d 110 
("[S]tatutory 
interpretation 'begins with the language of the statute.  If the 
meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the 
inquiry.'" (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 
Wis. 2d 211, 232, 612 N.W.2d 659)). 
No.  2015AP791-CR.dk 
 
3 
 
language of the offense and penalty provisions of this statute 
operate, it will become almost immediately apparent that this 
isn't so.  There are four words in this statute that are 
especially important to its proper functioning.  The first is 
"knowingly," and it appears in the definition of the offense.  
The next two are "except that"——they appear in the penalty 
provision and serve as the hinge point for the gate that gives 
access to either the misdemeanor or the felony penalty.  The 
last is "know," and it helps tell us which way the gate should 
swing. 
¶70 I begin with the definition of the offense, where we 
find that Operating After Revocation is not a strict liability 
crime.  It requires that the defendant know his privilege has 
been revoked:  "No person whose operating privilege has been 
duly revoked under the laws of this state may knowingly operate 
a motor vehicle . . . during the period of revocation . . . ."  
Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1)(b) (emphasis added).  Thus, if the person 
does not know he is operating a motor vehicle while his 
operating privileges are revoked, he cannot be prosecuted under 
this statute at all.  Mr. Villamil knew he was driving while his 
operating privilege was revoked——as did everyone else convicted 
under this version of the statute——and so he was properly 
convicted of this offense.  
¶71 Upon conviction, the court must proceed to the penalty 
phase.  Because Mr. Villamil caused a death while operating with 
revoked privileges, we turn to Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4. for 
the appropriate penalty.  There is no doubt this penalty 
No.  2015AP791-CR.dk 
 
4 
 
provision describes both misdemeanor and felony sentences.  But 
there is also no doubt that it is impossible to be sentenced as 
a misdemeanant under Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4. 
¶72 The key to applying this penalty provision lies in the 
hinge point created by the "except that" clause in subsection 
(2)(ar)4.  The misdemeanor penalty lies on one side of it, the 
felony on the other.  The condition identified by the "except 
that" clause controls which way the gate swings.  Satisfy the 
condition, and the defendant is a felon.  Leave it unsatisfied, 
and the defendant is instead a misdemeanant. 
¶73 This condition is where we come across the fourth 
important word——"know."  Here it is in context:  "[E]xcept that, 
if the person knows at the time of the violation that his or her 
operating privilege has been revoked . . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44(2)(ar)4.  So the condition that controls which way the 
gate swings is whether the defendant knew, or did not know, that 
he was operating his vehicle after revocation.  Mr. Villamil 
satisfied the condition because he knowingly operated his 
vehicle after revocation. 
¶74 Mr. Villamil is not the only one who will satisfy this 
condition upon arriving at subsection (2)(ar)4.  In fact, 
everyone who reaches this subsection satisfies the condition.  
For the gate to swing open on the misdemeanor penalty, the 
defendant who stands for sentencing must not have known he had 
operated his vehicle after revocation of his driving privileges.  
But we know that will never happen because "knowing" is an 
element of the offense——so the gate is always open only to the 
No.  2015AP791-CR.dk 
 
5 
 
felony penalty.  Thus, so long as the statute remains as it is, 
there will never be a pathway to the misdemeanor penalty. 
¶75 So the only way to access the misdemeanor portion of 
subsection (2)(ar)4.——as written——is to stop reading it before 
reaching the "except that" language.  But that is no way to read 
a sentence.  One must persevere to the period, and there is no 
way to get there without encountering the exception. 
¶76 That brings me back to the alleged ambiguity, which——
remember——is supposed to be that a prosecutor could opt between 
misdemeanor and felony penalties.  Because the statute's 
explicit terms welded the gate closed on the misdemeanor option, 
the plain language can yield no such prosecutorial discretion.  
So it turns out the alleged ambiguity, the thing we spent so 
much time and effort fixing, is a problem of our own creation.  
We 
called 
it 
into 
existence 
by 
substantially 
re-writing 
subsection (2)(ar)4.  To make the misdemeanor and felony 
sentences equally available, we had to make that statute say 
this: 
Any person who violates sub. (1)(b) and, in the course 
of the violation, causes the death of another person 
shall be fined not less than $7,500 nor more than 
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year in 
the county jail or both, except that, if the person 
knows at the time of the violation that his or her 
operating privilege has been revoked, or the person is 
guilty of a Class H felony. 
We didn't explain why we should do this, nor did we even 
acknowledge we did it.  When the curtain went up and our 
analysis started, the statute made its first appearance with 
No.  2015AP791-CR.dk 
 
6 
 
this meaning already attached to it.  Responsibility for that 
meaning lies not with any deus ex machina, it lies with us. 
¶77 It is true that, one way or another, some part of 
subsection (2)(ar)4. is going to be inoperable.  It will happen 
either because we recraft the language, or because we apply the 
language as adopted by the legislature.  Unfortunately, the 
court chose the former.  It struck out the "except that" clause 
that previously governed how the gate swings and transferred its 
erstwhile function to the State's prosecutors.  We are supposed 
to be chary of such readings.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 
("Statutory language is read where possible to give reasonable 
effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."). 
¶78 The part of subsection (2)(ar)4. that is inoperable is 
the 
part 
providing 
for 
a 
misdemeanor 
penalty. 
 
That 
inoperability, however, does not result from judicial language-
tweaking.  It results from the inexorable operation of the 
statute's duly adopted words.  The legislators orphaned the 
misdemeanor penalty, but it was theirs to orphan and it is no 
business of ours to countermand them.  We do not dishonor 
Kalal's admonition by applying the statute as written because we 
did not create the surplusage.  It was already there when Mr. 
Villamil brought it to us.  If there is to be surplusage, let it 
be a result of the legislature's work, not ours. 
¶79 As a practical matter, we have a pretty good idea of 
how this problem came to be; it was most likely a drafting 
error.  See Majority op., ¶¶31-34.  The legislature apparently 
aimed at changing "Operating After Revocation" to a strict 
No.  2015AP791-CR.dk 
 
7 
 
liability offense, but with a more onerous penalty for knowing 
violations.  It didn't quite get there.  We do not, however, 
have the authority to complete what it started.  Therefore, 
because we can apply the language as it exists, and the result 
is neither irrational nor absurd, that is what we should have 
done.  Because we didn't, I cannot join Part III of the court's 
opinion. 
II 
¶80 Perhaps the court reached the conclusion it did 
because, at its core, the analysis rests on an enigma:  The 
court said Wis. Stat. § 343.44 is ambiguous, but it did not say 
why.  Ambiguity arises, of course, when a statute "is capable of 
being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or 
more senses."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶47, 271 N.W.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  If that 
occurs, we apply our disambiguation canons to get at the proper 
meaning.  The first step, however, is diagnostic——we must 
determine whether the statute can carry multiple meanings.   
¶81 The court skipped this step and jumped straight to the 
conclusion that a statute giving prosecutors discretion to seek 
either misdemeanor or felony penalties is ambiguous.  But if 
that is true, then our opinion thoroughly undercuts itself.  
While naming this discretion an ambiguity, we simultaneously 
affirmed that it is just fine so long as the prosecutor does not 
unjustifiably discriminate against the defendant in making his 
choice.  Quoting State v. Cissell, we said "the fact that the 
defendant's conduct may be chargeable under either of two 
No.  2015AP791-CR.dk 
 
8 
 
statutes does not make prosecution under one or the other 
statute improper per se . . . ."  Majority op., ¶45 (quoting 
State v. Cissel, 127 Wis. 2d 205, 216, 378 Wis. 2d 691 (1985)).  
We didn't so much as breathe the word "ambiguous" in that case.  
And for good reason——Cissel relied largely on United States v. 
Batchelder, in which the Supreme Court ruled that no ambiguity 
arises from statutes that provide different penalties for the 
same conduct.  442 U.S. 114, 121 (1979). 
¶82 So our opinion is at odds with itself.  Charging 
options of this nature are either ambiguities in need of 
resolution (pace Batchelder), or they are legitimate grants of 
discretion to prosecutors.  They can't be both.  Thus, when we 
say Wis. Stat. § 343.44 "creates ambiguity because the same 
offense is punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony," we 
are creating an ambiguity.  Our opinion could be understood as 
asserting that a statute that allows for misdemeanor/felony 
charging options is, on that basis alone, ambiguous.  Or it 
could be understood as assuming the existence of ambiguous (and 
unidentified) language that could be read as allowing for such 
charging options.  If it is the former, our opinion refutes 
itself.  If it is the latter, we should have identified the 
ambiguous language and described the two senses in which it 
could be understood.  Because we didn't, the issue around which 
all else revolved——the statute's alleged ambiguity——remained an 
enigma to the last. 
No.  2015AP791-CR.dk 
 
9 
 
III 
¶83 Because I do not agree that Wis. Stat. § 343.44 is 
ambiguous, I cannot join Part III of the court's opinion.  
However, I join the rest of it, and the mandate, because the 
plain and unambiguous language of Wis. Stat. § 343.44 requires 
that Mr. Villamil receive a felony sentence. 
¶84 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2015AP791-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶85 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  I usually 
do not persist in a dissent.  Ordinarily after dissenting I am 
guided by the precedent established by a majority opinion.  In 
the instant case, however, I am persuaded that my dissent in 
State v. Cissell, 127 Wis. 2d 205, 228, 378 N.W.2d 691 (1985), 
continues to have merit.   
¶86 I 
wrote 
then 
and 
repeat 
now: 
 
Although 
broad 
prosecutorial discretion is an accepted part of our criminal 
justice system, the legislature's adoption of criminal statutes 
identical except for penalty is an unlawful delegation of power 
to the executive branch of government contrary to the separation 
of powers doctrine encompassed in the Wisconsin Constitution.  
There is no rational basis for two criminal statutes that are 
identical except for their respective penalties, and resting 
such unbridled discretion in the prosecuting attorney violates 
our concept of fundamental fairness and equal protection of the 
laws.  Wis. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 8(1).  
¶87 I agree with the dissection of United States v. 
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979), by Professors Wayne LaFave, 
Jerold Israel, Nancy King, and Orrin S. Kerr in 4 Criminal 
Procedure § 13.7(a) at 284-88 (4th ed. 2015).  The instant case 
is the third type of statute discussed by the professors: 
In assaying the Batchelder reasoning, it is useful to 
think about three types of situations in which a 
defendant's conduct may fall within two statutes.  
They are:  (1) where one statute defines a lesser 
included offense of the other and they carry different 
penalties (e.g., whoever carries a concealed weapon is 
guilty of a misdemeanor; a convicted felon who carries 
a concealed weapon is guilty of a felony); (2) where 
the statutes overlap and carry different penalties 
No.  2015AP791-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
(e.g., possession of a gun by a convicted felon, 
illegal alien or dishonorably discharged serviceman is 
a misdemeanor; possession of a gun by a convicted 
felon, fugitive from justice, or unlawful user of 
narcotics is a felony); (3) where the statutes are 
identical (e.g., possession of a gun by a convicted 
felon is a misdemeanor; possession of a gun by a 
convicted felon is a felony).  The Court in Batchelder 
had before it a situation falling into the second 
category, but [it] seems to have concluded that the 
three statutory schemes [were] indistinguishable for 
purposes of constitutional analysis.  But in terms of 
either the difficulties which are confronted at the 
legislative level in drafting statutes or in the 
guidance which is given to a prosecutor by the 
legislation, the three schemes are markedly different. 
The first of the three is certainly unobjectionable.  
Such 
provisions 
are 
quite 
common 
(robbery-armed 
robbery; battery-aggravated battery; joyriding-theft; 
housebreaking-burglary), and usually are a consequence 
of a deliberate attempt by the legislature to identify 
one or more aggravating characteristics which in the 
judgment of the legislature should ordinarily be 
viewed as making the lesser crime more serious.  They 
afford guidance to the prosecutor, but——as noted in 
Batchelder——do 
not 
foreclose 
the 
prosecutor 
from 
deciding in a particular case that, notwithstanding 
the presence of one of the aggravating facts, the 
defendant will still be prosecuted for the lesser 
offense. 
By contrast, the third of the three is highly 
objectionable.  It is likely to be a consequence of 
legislative carelessness, and even if it is not such a 
scheme serves no legitimate purpose.  There is nothing 
at all rational about this kind of statutory scheme, 
as it provides for different penalties without any 
effort 
whatsoever 
to 
explain 
a 
basis 
for 
the 
difference.  It cannot be explained in terms of giving 
assistance to the prosecutor.  "Where statutes are 
identical except for punishment, the prosecutor finds 
not the slightest shred of guidance."  It confers 
discretion which is totally unfettered and which is 
totally unnecessary.  And thus the Court in Batchelder 
is less than convincing in reasoning that this third 
category is unobjectionable simply because in other 
instances, falling into the first category, the need 
No.  2015AP791-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
for discretionary judgments by the prosecutor has not 
been and cannot be totally eliminated. 
As for the second of the three categories, it clearly 
presents a harder case.  Here as well, the dilemma is 
likely 
to 
have 
been 
created 
by 
legislative 
carelessness . . . . [O]verlapping statutes are very 
common at both the federal and state level, and it can 
hardly be said that in every instance they are a 
consequence of poor research or inept drafting.  
Drafting a clear criminal statute and still ensuring 
that in no instance could it cover conduct embraced 
within 
any 
existing 
criminal 
statute 
in 
that 
jurisdiction can be a formidable task.  (This fact 
alone may make courts somewhat reluctant to find 
overlap 
per 
se 
unconstitutional, 
although 
the 
consequence of such a finding, limiting punishment to 
that under the lesser of the two statutes until such 
time as the legislature decides what to do about the 
now-identified overlap, is hardly a cause for alarm.)  
Moreover, in the overlap scheme the two statutes will 
at least sometimes assist the prosecutor in deciding 
how to exercise his charging discretion.  (Footnotes 
omitted.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted this position.  See State v. 
Williams, 175 P.3d 1029 (2007). 
¶88 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
No.  2015AP791-CR.ssa 
 
1