Case Title: Conley v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 21S-PC-00256

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2022-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 21S-PC-256 
Andrew Conley, 
Appellant-Petitioner, 
–v–
State of Indiana, 
Appellee-Respondent. 
Argued: September 9, 2021 | Decided: March 23, 2022 
Appeal from the Ohio Circuit Court 
No. 58C01-1302-PC-2 
The Honorable James D. Humphrey, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 19A-PC-3085 
Opinion by Justice David 
Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
Chief Justice Rush concurs in result. 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Mar 23 2022, 2:03 pm
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David, Justice. 
Seventeen-year-old Andrew Conley was sentenced to life in prison 
without parole (LWOP) for the brutal murder of his ten-year old brother.  
We affirmed his sentence on direct appeal. At issue now is whether trial 
counsel’s failure to present evidence of Conley’s age and juvenile brain 
development, to call or examine certain witnesses and expert witnesses, to 
challenge the State’s mental health experts, and failure to conduct further 
investigation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. 
We hold Conley did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel and 
affirm the post-conviction court.  
Facts and Procedural History 
As this Court explained in Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 869–70 (Ind. 
2012) (“Conley I”):  
Conley was [a] seventeen-and-a-half-year-old when he 
murdered his ten-year-old brother, Conner. The murder took 
place between 8:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. His mother and 
adoptive father were at work that evening until the early 
morning hours. As was not uncommon, Conley was 
responsible for watching Conner that evening. Conley's mother 
told him he would have to find a babysitter for Conner if he 
wished to go out with his friends. 
Conley wanted to go out that evening, so Conley drove Conner 
to their grandmother's house in Rising Sun, Indiana, but she 
was not home. He next asked his uncle to watch Conner but 
was told no. After they returned home, Conley and Conner 
began wrestling.  
At some point, Conley got behind his brother and choked him 
in a headlock with his arm until Conner passed out. Conner 
was bleeding from the nose and mouth. Conner was still 
breathing. Conley drug Conner into the kitchen, retrieved a 
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pair of gloves, and continued to choke Conner from the front, 
around his throat. Conley choked Conner for approximately 
twenty minutes total. 
Conley next got a plastic bag from a drawer in the kitchen and 
placed it over Conner's head. Conley used black electrical tape 
to secure the bag by wrapping the tape around Conner's head. 
Conner was still alive. In fact, Conner's last words were 
“Andrew stop.” 
Conley then drug Conner's body to the steps that lead to the 
basement, drug him down the steps by his feet, across the floor, 
and outside the home. Conley slammed Conner's head on the 
concrete multiple times to ensure Conner was dead and then 
placed his body in the trunk of his car. Conley cleaned himself 
up and put on new clothes. He put the bloody clothes in his 
closet and hid the bloody gloves in a chair. 
Conley next drove to his girlfriend's house. While there they 
watched a movie, and he gave her a “promise ring.” Conley's 
girlfriend testified at the sentencing hearing that Conley was 
“[h]appier than I'd seen him in a long time.” Conley spent two 
hours at his girlfriend's house, while Conner's body remained 
in the trunk of the car. After leaving his girlfriend's house, 
Conley drove to an area behind the Rising Sun Middle School. 
Conley decided to drag Conner's body into the woods and 
covered the body with sticks and vegetation. 
Conley returned home during the early morning hours on 
Sunday the 29th when no one was home. He cleaned up the 
blood in the house. When his father returned home around 2:30 
a.m., Conley was acting normal. Conley said that Conner was 
at his grandmother's house and Conley also asked his father for 
some condoms. 
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Conley's mother arrived home around 5:45 a.m., and Conley 
and his mother had popcorn, watched a movie together, and 
cracked jokes back and forth. His mother fell asleep. On two 
occasions that early morning, Conley went into his father's 
bedroom and stood over him with a knife. Conley said he had 
the intent to kill his father, but he decided not to. 
Later that same Sunday, Conley watched football with his 
father. Following football, Conley left home and drove to the 
park in Rising Sun where Conner's body had been discarded, 
but he never went to the actual location. Instead, Conley spoke 
to two friends and told [them] that he had killed Conner. 
Thereafter, around 8:00 p.m., Conley drove his car to the Rising 
Sun Police Department and voluntarily reported he 
“accidentally killed his brother” or that he “believed” he had 
killed his brother. 
The police contacted Conley's parents, and after consulting 
with his parents and waiving his right to counsel, Conley 
confessed to intentionally killing his ten-year-old brother. 
Conley was charged with murder and ultimately pleaded 
guilty, without a plea agreement. The penalty phase of the trial 
was conducted from September 15 to 21. Following the 
sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Conley to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 
This Court affirmed Conley’s sentence on direct appeal. Thereafter, 
Conley sought post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Our Court of 
Appeals reversed the post-conviction court on this issue (affirming on the 
other issues), finding that Conley received ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Conley v. State, 164 N.E.3d 787 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), vacated. The 
State sought transfer, which we granted, vacating the Court of Appeals’ 
opinion. See Ind. App. R. 58(A).  
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Standard of Review 
Because Conley failed to carry his burden of proving his claims by a 
preponderance of evidence in the post-conviction court, he appeals from a 
negative judgment. As such, Conley must show that “the evidence as a 
whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that 
reached by the postconviction court.” Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 
597 (Ind. 2001) (citation omitted). For factual matters, we examine only the 
probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the post-
conviction court's determination and do not reweigh the evidence or 
judge the credibility of the witnesses. Taylor v. State, 717 N.E.2d 90, 92 
(Ind. 1999). The post-conviction court’s decision will be disturbed “only if 
the evidence is without conflict and leads only to a conclusion contrary to 
the result of the postconviction court.” Timberlake, 753 N.E.2d at 597.  
When a defendant fails to meet this “rigorous standard of review,” this 
Court will affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. Wilson v. 
State, 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1170 (Ind. 2020) (cleaned up). 
Discussion and Decision 
Conley alleges that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel at 
sentencing. That is, he raises several evidentiary issues, and argues 
counsel was deficient in the handling of records, lay witnesses, and expert 
witnesses.1 Although not raised by Conley, our Court of Appeals sua 
sponte found that counsel was ineffective for not presenting evidence of 
juvenile brain development under United States Supreme Court precedent 
 
1 Conley raises several additional grounds on which he argues that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel for 
failing to provide proper advice on a guilty plea and that his plea was not knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent. He also argues that the post-conviction court should vacate his 
sentence because of newly discovered evidence (i.e., Conley’s mother’s updated victim 
statement) and that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to 
request permission to re-brief or present a Miller v. Alabama argument in the rehearing brief, 
567 U.S. 460, 473, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2465, 183 L.Ed. 2d 407 (2012). On these issues, we summarily 
affirm the Court of Appeals. See App. R. 58(A)(2); see also Conley, 164 N.E.3d at 806, 813–14. 
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and found that there was cumulative prejudice necessitating a new 
sentencing hearing. For the reasons discussed herein, we hold that Conley 
did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and 
accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court in full.  
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated under the well-
known, two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). To prevail, Conley must show that: (1) counsel’s performance was 
deficient based on prevailing professional norms; and (2) the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind. 
2012) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). “Failure to satisfy either prong 
will cause the claim to fail.” French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002).  
In analyzing whether counsel’s performance was deficient, the Court 
first asks whether, “‘considering all the circumstances,’ counsel’s actions 
were ‘reasonable[ ] under prevailing professional norms.’” Wilkes, 984 
N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668). Counsel 
is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and 
judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly deferential. Id.  
There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 
professional judgment. Stevens, 770 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Ind. 2002). Counsel is 
afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics and these 
decisions are entitled to deferential review. Id. at 746–47 (citing Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 689). Furthermore, isolated mistakes, poor strategy, 
inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render 
representation ineffective. Id. at 747 (citations omitted). 
To demonstrate prejudice, “the defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  
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I. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to present 
evidence on Conley’s age and juvenile brain 
development. 
Our Court of Appeals reversed the post-conviction court on a ground 
Conley did not raise on appeal. It found counsel was deficient for not 
presenting evidence of juvenile brain development and juveniles’ lesser 
moral culpability, as discussed in U.S. Supreme Court precedent, Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). We 
agree with the State that an appellate court’s role is an impartial 
adjudicator, not an advocate. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 965 N.E.2d 70, 77 n.2 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (stating that an appellate court should not “make up 
its own arguments” when a “party has not adequately presented them” 
because this causes the court to become “an advocate rather than an 
adjudicator”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Nevertheless, we 
will address this issue briefly. 
It is true that counsel did not raise any brain development cases during 
sentencing. But we note that Roper and Graham’s ultimate holdings are not 
directly applicable to Conley’s case. For example, Roper held that it is 
unlawful to impose the death penalty for a crime that was committed 
while the offender was under the age of eighteen. 543 U.S. at 575–78. And 
Graham held that a juvenile LWOP sentence is unlawful for a conviction 
other than homicide. 560 U.S. at 82. Here, Conley did not receive the death 
penalty, and he was convicted of homicide. Therefore, neither Roper nor 
Graham’s holdings clearly apply to or otherwise conflict with the facts 
here. 
Instead, counsel made arguments based on Conley’s age and character, 
focusing on mitigators specific to Conley rather than evidence about 
juvenile brain development in general. While counsel could have brought 
this line of cases regarding juvenile brain development to the court’s 
attention, we do not find the failure to do so falls below the prevailing 
professional norms because neither Roper nor Graham’s ultimate holdings 
clearly apply to Conley's case. 
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In addition, we find no prejudice for failing to present this line of 
precedent. When this Court considered the aggravating and mitigating 
factors on direct appeal, we noted: “The most fundamental take away 
from Graham was that ‘youth matters in determining the appropriateness 
of a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of parole.’” Conley I, 
972 N.E.2d at 875 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 473). And, after noting the 
duty of a trial court to recognize that children are different for purposes of 
sentencing, we held that “Judge Humphrey did just that in the present 
case.” Conley I, 972 N.E.2d at 876. Indeed, in the detailed sentencing 
statement, the trial court did find that Conley’s age was a mitigator and it 
assigned “some” weight to it. DA Tr. Vol. 5 at 1030.  However, the court 
noted Conley was just six months from his eighteenth birthday, had 
normal cognitive functioning, and could make rational decisions. Further, 
the post-conviction court (again, Judge Humphrey) found that Conley’s 
situation was distinguishable from other juvenile cases in that Conley was 
the caretaker of his brother, he was not acting out of immature rage or 
outside pressures, and he took care to avoid creating evidence of his 
crime.  
 Because the trial court did thoughtfully consider Conley’s age, did find 
it to be mitigating, and explained in great detail why it gave this factor 
only some weight, we do not find a reasonable probability that the 
outcome would have been different had counsel presented additional 
evidence about juvenile brain development. This is especially true, as this 
Court was well aware of the case law at issue on direct appeal and we still 
upheld Conley’s LWOP sentence in response to his Appellate Rule 7(B) 
challenge.  
Of course, juvenile LWOP sentences are not the default, but the 
exception. Moreover, this Court has recognized that juveniles have 
diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, and we have 
given juvenile offenders relief where appropriate. See, e.g., State v. Stidham, 
157 N.E.3d 1185 (Ind. 2020) (revising a 138-year sentence to 88 years for a 
seventeen-year-old convicted of stabbing a man 47 times and throwing his 
body in a river); Wilson, 157 N.E.3d at 1163 (revising a 181-year sentence to 
100 years for a sixteen-year-old convicted of two murders, a robbery, and 
a criminal gang enhancement); Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157 (Ind. 2017) 
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(revising an LWOP sentence to 80 years for a sixteen-year-old convicted of 
shooting and killing another juvenile); Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1 (Ind. 
2014) (revising a 150-year sentence to 80 years for a sixteen-year-old 
convicted of two counts of murder and one count of burglary). Yet, we 
consider Conley I to be an important guidepost for juvenile LWOP cases 
where, even considering the notable differences between juveniles and 
adults, the juvenile’s crimes are so reprehensible and heinous that an 
LWOP sentence would be appropriate.   
II. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to call 
certain witnesses close to Conley. 
Conley also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to call or 
failing to effectively examine witnesses who knew him well and could 
provide helpful mitigation evidence. However, it is not clear if or how 
such evidence would have helped Conley. As the post-conviction court 
found, many of the witnesses called to testify at the post-conviction 
hearing had also been called at the sentencing hearing; the bulk of the 
testimony from the witnesses on post-conviction was about how shocked 
they were that Conley killed his brother. The post-conviction court further 
found not only that Conley failed to elicit anything new and helpful, but 
also that some of the new testimony would have harmed him. For 
instance, Ashley Palaima, a witness called at the post-conviction hearing 
but not at the sentencing hearing, acknowledged on cross-examination 
that she could not think of a more serious or worse crime than what 
Conley did to his brother Conner.  
At sentencing, defense counsel presented numerous lay witnesses, 
including Conley’s grandmother, his former Cub Scout leader, two of his 
teachers, his high school principal, and his former school counselor, who 
also owned a restaurant where Conley once worked Counsel also elicited 
testimony from lay witnesses called by the State, including Conley’s 
parents, his girlfriend, and two of his close friends. Conley fails to 
demonstrate how such additional evidence would have been helpful. The 
fact that counsel did not call every person Conley knew or present 
cumulative evidence regarding how his crime was out of character does 
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not constitute deficient performance. See Moredock v. State, 540 N.E.2d 
1230, 1232 (Ind. 1989) (observing that the decision not to call a witness 
whose testimony is cumulative does not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel). Conley also has not shown prejudice when the testimony offered 
at post-conviction contained information that either was not new or was 
not helpful to him. Therefore, Conley has failed to meet his burden to 
show that the result of the proceeding would have been different if 
counsel had called additional witnesses.    
III. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
challenge the State’s expert regarding factual 
issues about the nature of the crime.   
Conley argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when 
his counsel failed to call a defense pathologist to refute testimony from the 
State’s pathologist, Dr. Hawley. Dr. Hawley’s testimony included the facts 
that: (1) Conner had been sexually assaulted; and (2) Conner could have 
been alive when the plastic bag was placed over his head. During the 
post-conviction hearing, Conley presented evidence through pathologist, 
Dr. Nichols. Conley argues that Dr. Nichols was able to refute both of Dr. 
Hawley’s points and that trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting 
such evidence at sentencing.   
However, Dr. Nichols’ testimony isn’t as clear or helpful as Conley 
suggests. While Dr. Nichols takes issue with some of Dr. Hawley's 
findings about the precise cause of Conner's death, ultimately, he admits 
that it was unknown whether Conner was alive when Conley placed the 
plastic bag on Conner's head. The most he could testify to is that Conner 
did not live long enough to develop hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy, a 
brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation, as Dr. Hawley opined he did. 
While it seems Conley is attempting to allege that Conner’s murder is not 
as horrific as Dr. Hawley made it seem, the trial court considered the full 
nature of Conner’s death in detail, including the fact that Conley 
“performed four separate violent acts on his brother, Conner, over a 
considerable period of time.” DA Tr. Vol. 5 at 1032. Also, as the post-
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conviction court aptly noted: “[t]he issue of whether the child was still 
alive at the time the bag was placed on his head is but a small part of the 
horror that was this child’s death.” PCR Order at 14. 
It cannot be said that counsel was deficient for failing to put on an 
expert witness who provides evidence about points which were not 
necessary or even considered by the trial court. Further, the post-
conviction court weighed the testimony of both experts, considered the 
record, and reaffirmed the testimony of Dr. Hawley. Moreover, our 
standard of review demands that we do not reweigh this type of evidence. 
See Taylor, 717 N.E.2d at 92. And there is certainly no prejudice where the 
trial court would have come to the same conclusions about the horrific 
nature of the crime regardless of whether Conner was alive when the bag 
was placed over his head.  
With regard to the evidence that Conner was sexually assaulted, Dr. 
Nichols testified that evidence of anal dilation, without more, is not 
necessarily indicative of sexual assault. This evidence would serve to 
rebut testimony from Dr. Hawley that there had been a forced anal sexual 
act. However, again, it is not clear how such evidence would have been 
helpful to Conley or impacted the outcome where the State conceded at 
sentencing that there was no evidence of sexual assault and the court 
found the same. Indeed, the court did not even mention this information 
when discussing the nature of the crime at sentencing. Because the State 
conceded that there was no evidence on this issue, counsel was not 
ineffective for not putting on an opposing expert, and Conley cannot show 
prejudice where the court did not consider this evidence when 
determining his sentence.  
IV. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
properly challenge State’s experts regarding 
Conley’s mental health.  
Conley also faults counsel for not properly challenging the State’s 
mental health experts, Dr. Daum and Dr. Olive. He argues counsel was 
ineffective for not having Dr. Daum’s testimony excluded when Dr. Daum 
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never examined Conley himself and based his opinions only on written 
records. Conley also argues that counsel failed to bring to the court’s 
attention the fact that there was a Seventh Circuit opinion wherein a Dr. 
Olive was “discredited.” However, Conley has shown neither deficient 
performance of counsel nor prejudice. 
As for Dr. Daum, his testimony was offered by the State to rebut the 
evidence of Conley’s expert, Dr. Connor. Defense counsel moved to strike 
Dr. Daum’s testimony after asking preliminary questions about the 
methodology he used and otherwise objected to him offering his opinions. 
The court denied the motion to strike and overruled the objections but 
noted that counsel’s objections would be taken into account when 
considering the weight of the evidence. Defense counsel also cross-
examined Dr. Daum to reveal flaws in his position. The court specifically 
noted at sentencing that it did not allow Dr. Daum the opportunity to 
opine as to Conley’s diagnosis; the same court noted later that it had 
discounted Dr. Daum’s testimony at sentencing.  
While counsel did not put on another expert to rebut Dr. Daum or ask 
certain questions, he did move to strike Dr. Daum, made appropriate 
objections, and effectively cross-examined Dr. Daum. Accordingly, we do 
not find that counsel’s performance was deficient. Also, the sentencing 
statement and the post-conviction order make clear that the court gave Dr. 
Daum’s testimony little weight compared to the other experts. For 
instance, the post-conviction order observes that “the Court discounted 
Dr. Daum’s testimony at sentencing, a point shown by the fact that Dr. 
Daum is only referenced twice in the Court’s Order and Judgment. The 
Court only found as to Dr. Daum that he testified and was not permitted 
to present a diagnosis of psychopathy.” Conley has failed to show 
prejudice from counsel’s failure to prevent Dr. Daum’s testimony.  
As for Dr. Olive, he was appointed by the court to render an opinion. 
Conley argues briefly that defense counsel failed to alert the court to the 
fact that there was a Seventh Circuit case where a Dr. Olive was 
“discredited.” However, as the post-conviction court aptly notes, it is not 
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clear that this is the same Dr. Olive.2 It also is not clear that the Seventh 
Circuit opinion, even if offered, would have been admitted and/or 
resulted in precluding Dr. Olive’s testimony in this case. Notably, Conley 
does not demonstrate how Dr. Olive’s testimony was objectionable or how 
he was prejudiced by its inclusion. We agree with the post-conviction 
court and will not reweigh these factual findings under our standard of 
review.  
V. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to more 
thoroughly investigate. 
Finally, Conley argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
complete a more thorough investigation through the defense investigator 
and for not requesting Conley’s jail records. Our Court of Appeals is 
critical of the fact that the investigator stated in a letter that this matter 
was “very complex” and “there are several matters that require further 
investigation.” Conley, 164 N.E.3d at 809-10 (quoting PCR Ex. Vol. 1, p. 
101). It found this additional investigation was not completed.  
Here, the investigator made this statement in his first letter outlining the 
scope of his completed work and indicating work he believed he still 
needed to complete, which he estimated was about ten to twelve more 
interviews. As indicated in subsequent letters, he then completed additional 
work by conducting at least ten interviews and gathering more records. 
Further, the investigator supplied an affidavit for the post-conviction 
proceedings outlining the work he performed during the case; it does not 
aver that he had work left undone. Thus, under our standard of review, 
counsel’s investigation does not fall below the prevailing professional 
norms because the record does not support the allegation that work 
remained incomplete after the investigator’s first letter. As such, counsel 
was not ineffective for failing to permit a more thorough investigation.   
 
2 Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d 576, 578 (7th Cir. 2007), refers to a “Dr. Dan A. Olive.” The doctor in 
this case is Don Olive.  
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Conley also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
when his trial counsel failed to request certain jail records from Conley’s 
arrest and incarceration. Specifically, Conley argues that these records 
would have further corroborated the fact that he was experiencing 
“thought disturbance and suicidal ideation,” and their introduction would 
have assisted expert witnesses in evaluating Conley’s mental state at the 
time of the crime. Appellant’s Br. at 22–23. However, Conley had already 
presented other evidence about his mental health at the time of his crime, 
and such additional jail records would be cumulative of the evidence that 
was already presented.  
For example, Conley already presented evidence that he suffered from 
schizoaffective disorder and depression; that he suffered from a mental 
disease or defect that affected his ability to control himself; that he felt 
remorse for the crime; and that he did not have a psychopathic 
personality. And Conley’s expert, Dr. Connor, testified that he did not 
find anything significant in the new materials provided in the post-
conviction proceeding—which included these jail records—and that they 
simply corroborated what he had already known and considered. 
Therefore, given the cumulative effect of these jail records, counsel’s 
decision not to request them was objectively reasonable. See Moredock, 540 
N.E.2d at 1232. In sum, Conley did not receive ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failing to conduct a more thorough investigation, either 
through the investigator or by not requesting Conley’s jail records. 
VI. Conley’s Appellate Rule 7(B) arguments are 
barred by res judicata. 
Conley argues that his LWOP sentence should be revised under 
Appellate Rule 7(B). This Rule enables this Court to “revise a sentence 
authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's 
decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the 
nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. App. R. 
7(B). The principal role of 7(B) review is to leaven the outliers, not to 
achieve a perceived correct sentence. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1197 
(Ind. 2021) (citations and quotations omitted). 
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However, we already addressed the appropriateness of Conley’s 
LWOP sentence in Conley I, and therefore, Conley’s 7(B) arguments 
seeking sentence revision are barred by res judicata. See Conley I, 972 
N.E.2d at 876–77 (holding Conley’s LWOP sentence was not inappropriate 
in light of Conley’s character and the nature of his offenses). “As a general 
rule, when a reviewing court decides an issue on direct appeal, the 
doctrine of res judicata applies, thereby precluding its review in post-
conviction proceedings.” Stidham, 157 N.E.3d at 1191 (citations omitted). 
Notwithstanding res judicata, “[a] court has the power to revisit prior 
decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance.” Id. 
(quoting State v. Huffman, 643 N.E.2d 899, 901 (Ind. 1994)). This power 
should only be used in “extraordinary circumstances” where the initial 
decision “was clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice.” 157 
N.E.3d at 1191 (internal quotations omitted).    
In Stidham, we found the requisite “extraordinary circumstances” 
existed to overcome res judicata’s bar on revisiting and revising a juvenile 
offender’s sentence under Article 7, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution.3 
Id. at 1192–93. There, we observed two fundamental shifts in sentencing 
law between 1994, when our Court of Appeals first evaluated whether 
Stidham’s sentence should be revised, and 2020, when we considered the 
matter on post-conviction relief. Id. The first major shift was that Indiana’s 
standard for reviewing and revising sentences under Article 7, Section 4 of 
the Indiana Constitution changed. Id. (noting the change from the 
“manifestly unreasonable” standard to the existing “inappropriate in light 
of the nature of the offense and character of the offender” standard under 
App. R. 7(B)). The second major shift between 1994 and 2020 was the 
evolution in the way that we evaluate juvenile offenders, informed by U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent from the 2000s. Id. at 1193 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. 
551; Graham, 560 U.S. 48; and Miller, 567 U.S. 460).  
 
3 Article 7, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution provides, in part: “The Supreme Court shall 
have, in all appeals of criminal cases, the power to review all questions of law and to review 
and revise the sentence imposed.” 
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Conley’s case does not present “extraordinary circumstances” sufficient 
to overcome res judicata. Unlike in Stidham, the Appellate Rule 7(B) review 
standard has remained the same since 2012, when Conley I was issued. In 
Conley I, we also had the benefit of considering the evolution in how our 
jurisprudence treats juveniles convicted of serious crimes—indeed, Conley 
I discussed and cited Roper, Graham, and Miller. See Conley I, 972 N.E.2d at 
875–79. And even considering this shift, Conley I carefully evaluated 
Conley’s sentence and considered the brutal nature of his crimes and his 
character, including his juvenile status, when holding that his LWOP 
sentence was not inappropriate. Id. at 876–77. And given that we do not 
find that Conley received ineffective assistance of counsel, we cannot say 
that this is one of the rare cases that present “extraordinary 
circumstances” to overcome the restraints of res judicata. 
Because Conley I’s 7(B) decision was not clearly erroneous and would 
not work manifest injustice, his post-conviction argument that his 
sentence is inappropriate under 7(B) is barred by res judicata.  
Conclusion 
Because Conley cannot overcome the “rigorous standard of review” for 
evaluating the post-conviction court’s determinations, Wilson, 157 N.E.3d 
at 1170, we cannot say that the evidence “leads unerringly and 
unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the postconviction 
court.” Timberlake, 753 N.E.2d at 597. Therefore, in light of the facts in the 
record, which we will not reweigh, Conley has not demonstrated that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, Conley has not met 
his burden to show that counsel’s performance fell objectively below the 
prevailing professional norms or that he was prejudiced by any of 
counsel’s alleged errors. We affirm the post-conviction court.  
Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
Rush, C.J., concurs in result. 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-PC-256 | March 23, 2022 
Page 17 of 17 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T  
Deidre R. Eltzroth 
Steven H. Schutte 
Deputy Public Defenders  
Amy E. Karozos 
Public Defender of Indiana  
Indianapolis, Indiana  
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AM IC US CU R IA E , I ND I A NA PU BL IC  DE FE N D E R 
C O U NC IL  
Bernice A. Corley 
Indiana Public Defender Council 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Joel C. Wieneke 
Indiana Public Defender Council 
Wieneke Law Office, LLC 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Theodore E. Rokita 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Ellen H. Meilaender 
Supervising Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana