Case Title: Michael Pries v. Raymond McMillon

Citation: 2010 WI 63

Docket Number: 2008AP000089

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
2010 WI 63 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP89 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Michael Pries, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, 
     v. 
Raymond McMillon, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
ABC Insurance Company, 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2008 WI App 167 
Reported at: 314 Wis. 2d 706, 760 N.W.2d 174 
(Ct. App. 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 9, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael B. Brennan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK and GABLEMAN, JJ., join the dissent. 
 
GABLEMAN, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-cross-respondent-petitioner the 
cause was argued by Charlotte Gibson, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney 
general. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-cross-appellant there was a 
brief by Merrick R. Domnitz, Anthony J. Skemp, and Domnitz & 
Skemp, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Merrick R. Domnitz. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert L. Jaskulski and 
Habush, Habush & Rottier, S.C., Milwaukee, and William C. 
Gleisner, 
III 
and 
the 
Law 
Offices 
of 
William 
Gleisner, 
Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin Association for Justice. 
 
 
2010 WI 63
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP89 
(L.C. No. 
2006CV3800) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Michael Pries, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Raymond McMillon, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
 
ABC Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 affirming the circuit 
court's 
judgment 
that 
the 
defendant, 
Raymond 
McMillon 
                                                 
1 Pries v. McMillon, 2008 WI App 167, 314 Wis. 2d 706, 760 
N.W.2d 704. 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
2 
 
(McMillon), is not entitled to governmental immunity2 as a state 
employee for negligently causing injuries to the plaintiff, 
Michael Pries (Pries), when the parties were disassembling horse 
stalls at the Wisconsin State Fair Park.  
¶2 
The scope of our analysis is limited.  The parties do 
not dispute the circuit court's findings that McMillon was 
negligent and that his negligence caused injury to Pries.  
Additionally, there is no dispute that McMillon is a state 
employee to whom governmental immunity could apply to shield him 
from liability for his negligent acts.  Rather, the issue here 
is whether under these circumstances either of two exceptions to 
immunity applies:  the ministerial duty exception and the "known 
danger" exception.  Both the circuit court and the court of 
appeals concluded that an exception applied, and that McMillon 
was not entitled to the defense of governmental immunity. 
However, each court reached that conclusion based on a different 
exception.  The circuit court, the Honorable Michael B. Brennan 
presiding, 
concluded 
that 
McMillon 
was 
not 
protected 
by 
governmental immunity under these circumstances because the 
ministerial duty exception applied; that court also determined 
that the known danger exception was not applicable.  In 
contrast, the court of appeals held that McMillon was not 
                                                 
2 Governmental immunity is also described as "discretionary 
immunity" or "discretionary act immunity" in our case law.  See, 
e.g., Bicknese v. Sutula, 2003 WI 31, ¶67 n.3, 260 Wis. 2d 713, 
660 N.W.2d 289; Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 546 N.W.2d 151 
(1996).  For simplicity, we use the term "governmental immunity" 
throughout this opinion. 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
3 
 
entitled to governmental immunity because the known danger 
exception applied, but it declined to address whether the 
ministerial duty exception was applicable. 
¶3 
We affirm, although on different grounds than the 
court 
of 
appeals. 
 
We 
are 
satisfied 
that, 
under 
the 
circumstances presented here, the ministerial duty exception to 
governmental immunity applies.  Specifically, State Fair Park 
instructions to "[a]lways have someone holding up the piece that 
you are taking down" created a ministerial duty that McMillon 
violated when he failed to ensure that the stall pieces were 
secured.  Hence, McMillon is not protected by a defense of 
governmental immunity, and is liable for his negligent acts that 
caused injury to Pries. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶4 
In September 2005, through an arrangement between the 
Milwaukee House of Corrections and the Wisconsin State Fair 
Park, a group of approximately 12 inmates were brought to the 
Park to assist in taking down structures.  Pries was one of the 
inmates in that group, which was assigned to dismantle horse 
stalls.  McMillon, a full-time employee with the State Fair 
Park, supervised the inmates. 
¶5 
The stalls are made up of four steel pieces:  a front, 
back, and two sides.  Each piece is solid steel with horizontal 
bars running across the upper portion.  Each piece measures 
approximately 10 feet high, 10 feet wide, and four inches thick, 
and each weighs approximately 200 pounds.  According to Ross 
Stein 
(Stein), 
the 
supervising 
correctional 
officer 
who 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
4 
 
accompanied 
the 
inmates, 
each 
piece 
"usually 
took 
four 
individuals to pick [it] . . . up."  When assembled, the pieces 
are secured to each other with pins, and the side and back 
pieces are secured to a wall with chains.  In total, there were 
10 to 12 stalls in a row where the inmates were working. 
¶6 
Pries 
dismantled 
several 
stalls 
with 
two 
other 
inmates.  At one point, Pries' crew struggled to dislodge a 
stall piece that was stuck to another piece.  According to 
Pries, McMillon approached the inmates and told them, "[L]et me 
show you how we do it."  McMillon observed that the chains 
responsible for securing the pieces had been removed and 
commented they should not have been.  Despite that, according to 
Pries, McMillon "jumped up" on and straddled a stall next to the 
piece that the inmates were trying to free and "started jerking 
it up and down" with his hands.  Immediately after, there was a 
"devastating accident," according to Stein, in which unchained 
stall pieces started falling in a "domino effect" on the 
inmates, striking all three of them.  As for Pries, a falling 
piece struck him in the face, knocked him to the ground, and 
pinned him underneath it.  After several people helped lift the 
piece to free Pries, he was taken to a hospital and treated for 
a broken foot, along with other injuries. 
¶7 
Pries sued McMillon and the State Fair Park's insurer 
on a theory of negligence.3  McMillon filed a motion to dismiss 
                                                 
3 Pries also included the Milwaukee County Department of 
Health and Human Services as a defendant.  Pries subsequently 
voluntarily dismissed the department as a party.   
No. 
2008AP89   
 
5 
 
and a motion for summary judgment, asserting that, as a state 
employee, he was entitled to governmental immunity for negligent 
acts committed in the scope of his employment and that no 
exceptions to that rule of immunity applied.  The Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court, the Honorable Francis T. Wasielewski 
presiding, denied each of McMillon's motions.  The case 
proceeded to a court trial.   
¶8 
At trial, two other witnesses corroborated Pries' 
description of the accident.  However, McMillon denied jumping 
on or shaking the stall or causing the collapse.  Rather, he 
claimed that he was working about 60 feet away in a different 
area of the barn.  He testified that Pries' crew drew his 
attention because they were "taking down the chains and there 
was no one holding up the stalls."  He claimed that he started 
to approach them to correct the situation, and that the stalls 
began falling when he was about 30 feet away. 
¶9 
At 
trial, 
Pries 
introduced 
a 
two-page 
written 
procedure in effect at the time of the accident setting forth 
the proper method of disassembling the horse stalls.  Patricia 
Hedden (Hedden), the operations director at the State Fair Park, 
acknowledged that the instructions were a State Fair document in 
effect before September 2005.  Ken Jaeger (Jaeger), McMillon's 
supervisor, described those instructions as "the procedure that 
we created for . . . putting up and taking down the . . . horse 
stalls."  McMillon testified that he received those instructions 
years before the accident, and that the procedure had not 
changed in the years leading up to the accident.  Those 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
6 
 
instructions require a "[m]inimum of [four] people to set up the 
stalls" 
and 
explain 
how 
to 
secure 
the 
pieces 
together.  
Specifically, that document provided procedures for "Take Down" 
in section six.  Part (a) of that section states, "Always have 
someone holding up the piece that you are taking down."  
(Emphasis added.)  The instructions do not mention the chains or 
how to proceed if the stall pieces become jammed together. 
¶10 McMillon acknowledged that the written instructions 
were in effect at the time of the accident and that he was 
familiar with them.4  He stated that he did not have the ability 
to vary from the take-down procedure when taking down or 
removing the stalls and confirmed that the "same procedure [had] 
to be followed in the tear-down procedure every single time."5 
¶11 He also stated that he knew that if the stalls were 
not disassembled in an appropriate manner, they posed a risk of 
                                                 
4 McMillon later stated that he first saw the instructions 
after the accident, in connection with the present case.  On 
cross-examination, however, he acknowledged deposition testimony 
in which he stated that he was familiar with the instructions 
and that they had been in use at the State Fair Park for several 
years leading up to the time of the accident. 
5 McMillon gave conflicting testimony as to the level of 
discretion he could use when taking down the stalls.  After 
telling Pries' counsel that he had to follow the same procedure 
every time, he later stated, when asked by his counsel, that he 
was able to use his own judgment in performing his job tasks and 
that the take-down procedures in section six did not describe 
everything he did when taking down stalls.  Pries' counsel, as 
the circuit court noted, then successfully impeached McMillon's 
in-court testimony with his answers to questions at his 
deposition that he was to follow the same procedures every time 
he dismantled the stalls, and that he did not have the ability 
to change the procedure to be followed. 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
7 
 
injury.  He confirmed that he knew that if the chains had been 
removed from the back stall pieces, the stalls could fall and 
injure people standing nearby, particularly if someone jumped up 
on the stalls.  He also confirmed that he knew that the chains 
in fact had been removed from the stall piece that started the 
collapse. 
¶12 Jaeger 
testified 
that 
the 
written 
instructions 
contained the "fundamentals" of taking down the stalls.  He said 
that he exercised discretion and judgment when taking down the 
pieces, and expected his employees to do so as well.  However, 
when asked whether there was any legitimate reason to stand on 
or shake unsecured stall pieces, Jaeger noted that although 
there was no written policy expressly forbidding such behavior, 
it was "more of a common sense thing, if the chains were 
removed, then one should not be jumping on stalls."6 
                                                 
6 In a pre-trial deposition, Jaeger also made the following 
comments: 
Q [Pries' counsel]:  And if someone were to go down and 
remove the chains on all of the separate pieces, that would be a 
violation, correct? 
A [Jaeger]:  Correct. 
Q:  Do you know why that would be a violation of the 
procedure? 
A:  Because all the stall pieces would fall. 
Q:  Which would create a danger for those taking down the 
stalls, correct? 
A:  Correct. 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
8 
 
¶13 The circuit court, the Honorable Michael B. Brennan 
presiding,7 found that Pries' description of the accident was 
more credible than McMillon's and that McMillon "was jumping on 
the stalls to loosen them before the stalls toppled and 
injured . . . Pries."8  It also found "McMillon's statement 
regarding the chains, including [his statement in Exhibit 14, a 
statement in which McMillon reiterated that he noticed, from a 
distance, that the inmates had created a hazardous situation by 
removing the chains], to be self-serving and not credible."  
Based on those facts, the circuit court concluded that McMillon 
was negligent and that that negligence was a substantial factor 
in causing Pries' injuries: 
Defendant 
McMillon 
had 
experience, 
training, 
and 
knowledge with regard to the assembly and disassembly 
of these stalls.  In contrast, this was plaintiff 
Pries'[] first time doing so.  Defendant McMillon saw 
                                                 
7 In July 2007, Judge Brennan replaced Judge Wasielewski as 
the presiding judge on this case. 
8 The witnesses, parties, circuit court, and court of 
appeals use a variety of terms to describe the four individual 
stall pieces, such as "section," "piece," "fence," and "wall."  
We understand those terms to be used interchangeably to refer to 
the individual stall pieces. 
Additionally, the witnesses, parties, circuit court, and 
court 
of 
appeals 
also 
appear 
to 
use 
the 
term 
"stall" 
interchangeably to refer to a fully or partially assembled horse 
stall as well as individual stall pieces.  Generally, context 
clarifies the intended meaning of "stall" when that word appears 
in the record, briefs, and other materials.  However, unless 
directly quoting, we use, for consistency, the word "stall" to 
refer to fully or partially assembled horse stalls and "piece" 
or "pieces" to refer to one or more of the individual stall 
pieces.   
No. 
2008AP89   
 
9 
 
the inmates having problems, defendant McMillon was 
aware the stalls were stuck, he was aware the chains 
were undone, and was aware that inmates were standing 
next to the stuck stall.  Defendant McMillon was 
negligent to jump on the stalls, which created danger, 
the stalls fell, and plaintiff was injured by the 
falling stalls. 
¶14 As to whether McMillon was protected by immunity from 
liability for that negligence, the circuit court concluded that 
Pries met his burden of proof in establishing that defendant 
violated a ministerial duty provided "by State Fair policy" in 
the written instructions:   
The 
guidelines 
for 
disassembling 
the 
horse 
stalls . . . do not indicate that employees following 
the directives have any discretion to disassemble (or 
assemble) the stalls in any way they chose.  Chains 
necessary for holding the stalls together had been 
disconnected.  Defendant McMillon jumped on the stall 
anyway. 
 
Defendant 
McMillon 
was 
aware 
of 
the 
disassembly methods as specifically designated by the 
State Fair policy . . . but did not follow them.  He 
deviated from the written procedure, which resulted in 
plaintiff Pries'[] injuries.  
¶15 The circuit court also concluded that McMillon, based 
on his own deposition and testimony, did not have discretion to 
deviate from the disassembly instructions.  Accordingly, it held 
the ministerial duty exception applied and that as a result, 
governmental immunity did not shield McMillon from liability.  
It awarded a total judgment to Pries for his medical bills and 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
10 
 
for pain and suffering of approximately $14,000 plus costs and 
attorney fees.9 
¶16 McMillon appealed to the court of appeals, arguing 
that the circuit court erred in concluding that the ministerial 
duty exception applied.  Pries cross-appealed the portion of the 
circuit court's judgment in which it concluded that the known 
danger exception did not apply.  The court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court on different grounds.  It accepted the circuit 
court's findings of fact, but diverged from the circuit court's 
reasoning by concluding that the known danger exception to 
immunity applied.  The court of appeals based that determination 
on McMillon's knowledge that the stalls were dangerous to stand 
or jump on when unchained, his awareness that the chains were 
undone when he jumped on the stall, and his awareness that the 
inmates were standing in the path of the stall pieces if they 
fell.  Pries v. McMillon, 2008 WI App 167, ¶¶24-25, 314 
Wis. 2d 706, 760 N.W.2d 174.  Based on that conclusion, the 
court of appeals declined to evaluate whether the ministerial 
duty exception also applied.  Id., ¶1. 
                                                 
9 The circuit court also concluded that the known danger 
exception did not apply under these circumstances, rejecting 
Pries' theory that McMillon's failure to train and supervise the 
inmates created a "known and present danger" of inmate injury.  
It observed that there was no evidence in the record that 
previous volunteers or inmates created dangerous situations 
warranting such a duty to train and supervise. 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
11 
 
II. PARTIES' ARGUMENTS, ISSUES, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 Before this court, McMillon argues that the court of 
appeals erred in concluding that the known danger exception 
applies under these circumstances.  Pries responds that the 
court of appeals correctly concluded that the known danger 
exception applies.  Pries further asserts that, even if that 
exception did not apply, the ministerial duty exception should 
apply as an alternative ground to affirm the court of appeals.  
Moreover, at oral argument, counsel for Pries urged this court 
to reaffirm a general rule initially set forth in Holytz v. City 
of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).  That rule, 
since abrogated by case law, provided that in cases alleging 
negligent acts by public officials, liability was the rule and 
governmental immunity was the exception.10   
¶18 Hence, the issues we confront here focus on whether 
either the ministerial duty exception or, alternatively, the 
known danger exception applies under these circumstances to 
deprive McMillon of the defense of governmental immunity.   
¶19 A 
defense 
of 
governmental 
immunity 
for 
public 
employees focuses on whether the action or inaction upon which 
liability is premised is entitled to immunity.  Lodl v. 
Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶17, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 
N.W.2d 314.  Whether an exception to immunity applies requires 
                                                 
10 The Wisconsin Association for Justice submitted an amicus 
curiae brief with a similar argument urging this court to expand 
the exceptions to governmental immunity currently recognized in 
Wisconsin. 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
12 
 
us to determine the proper scope of the common law doctrine of 
governmental immunity; that is a question of law that we review 
de novo without deference to the circuit court or court of 
appeals, but benefitting from the analysis of each court.  Kimps 
v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 546 N.W.2d 151 (1996).  However, we 
are to uphold the circuit court's factual findings unless they 
are clearly erroneous.  Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2009 WI 
74, ¶34, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 615. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶20 The rule of governmental immunity provides that state 
officers and employees are immune from personal liability for 
injuries resulting from acts performed within the scope of their 
official duties.  Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 10.  Grounded in common 
law, the doctrine of governmental immunity is based on "public 
policy considerations that spring from an interest in protecting 
the public purse and a preference for political rather than 
judicial redress" for actions.11  Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶23; see 
                                                 
11 The doctrine of sovereign immunity is distinct from 
governmental immunity.  Bicknese, 260 Wis. 2d 713, ¶67.  
Sovereign immunity is based in article IV, section 27 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution and is procedural in nature.  Id., ¶68.  
That doctrine provides, in essence, that the state cannot be 
sued without its consent.  Id.  A successful motion to dismiss 
on sovereign immunity grounds deprives the court of personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant, i.e., the state.  Id.   
No. 
2008AP89   
 
13 
 
also Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 299, 240 
N.W.2d 610 (1976) (listing other policy considerations, such as 
the danger of influencing public officials with the threat of a 
lawsuit and the deterrent effect that the threat of a lawsuit 
might have on those considering public positions). 
¶21 The rule of immunity is subject to exceptions, which 
seek 
to 
balance the rights of injured parties to seek 
compensation with the need for public officers and employees to 
perform their duties freely.  Lister, 72 Wis. 2d  at 300.  The 
two exceptions at issue here apply when an officer or employee 
has no discretion in the performance of a particular duty.   
¶22 First, a state officer or employee will not be 
"shielded from liability for the negligent performance of a 
purely ministerial duty."  Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 10.  The test 
in Wisconsin for whether a duty is discretionary or ministerial 
was articulated initially in Meyer v. Carman, 271 Wis. 329, 332, 
73 N.W.2d 514 (1955).  That test, as described by this court, 
provides: 
A public officer's duty is ministerial only when it is 
absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the 
performance of a specific task when the law imposes, 
prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for 
                                                                                                                                                             
As for the doctrine of governmental immunity, it treats 
municipal 
officials 
and 
employees 
differently 
from 
state 
employees 
in 
several 
ways. 
 
Most 
significantly, 
unlike 
governmental immunity as applied to state employees where 
immunity is the rule and liability is the exception, the 
opposite is true for municipal actors, i.e., liability is the 
rule and immunity is the exception.  Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. 
Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶22, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314. 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
14 
 
its performance with such certainty that nothing 
remains for judgment or discretion.   
Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301; see also C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d  
701, 711-12, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988).  Stated differently,  
a duty is regarded as ministerial when it has been 
positively 
imposed 
by 
law, 
and 
its 
performance 
required at a time and in a manner, or upon conditions 
which are specifically designated, the duty to perform 
under the conditions specified not being dependent 
upon the officer's judgment or discretion.  If 
liability is premised upon the negligent performance 
(or non-performance) of a ministerial duty imposed by 
law or government policy, then immunity will not 
apply.   
Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶26 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
¶23 Second, 
the 
known 
danger 
exception 
operates 
in 
situations where an obviously hazardous situation exists and 
"the nature of the danger is compelling and known to the officer 
and is of such force that the public officer has no discretion 
not to act."  C.L., 143 Wis. 2d at 715.  The seminal Wisconsin 
case applying the known danger exception is Cords v. Anderson, 
80 Wis. 2d 525, 259 N.W.2d 672 (1977).  Cords involved an 
accident where hikers, legally accessing a park hiking trail 
during nighttime, fell into a deep gorge from a hazardous 
portion of the trail.  In that case, we concluded that the park 
manager, who had known that the trail was particularly dangerous 
after dusk, had a ministerial duty to place warning signs or 
advise superiors of the trail condition.  Id. at 541-42; see 
also Voss v. Elkhorn Area Sch. Dist., 2006 WI App 234, 297 Wis. 
2d 389, 724 N.W.2d 420 (holding that a ministerial duty to end a 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
15 
 
class exercise arose for purposes of the known danger exception 
where students wearing sight-altering goggles began stumbling 
and falling in a room full of hard obstacles). 
¶24 The two exceptions overlap to an extent, inasmuch as 
they both require the identification of a ministerial duty.  
Indeed, the court of appeals in this case concluded that the 
known danger exception applied because "it should have been 
self-evident to McMillon that once he saw the chains had been 
removed, he had a ministerial duty based on the known danger to 
stop the disassembly until the chains were reattached and to not 
jump on the unchained stall."  Pries, 314 Wis. 2d 706, ¶25.  As 
explained above, a ministerial duty for purposes of the 
ministerial duty exception is imposed by law or policy and 
performance is required in a time, manner, and under conditions 
where the officer does not exercise discretion or judgment.  In 
contrast, the ministerial duty for purposes of the known danger 
exception arises not from a written law or policy, but when an 
obviously dangerous situation presents itself.  As this court 
explained in C.L., "[C]ircumstances may give rise to such a 
certain duty, where . . . the nature of the danger is compelling 
and known to the officer and is of such force that the public 
officer has no discretion not to act."  143 Wis. 2d at 715. 
¶25 We begin with our analysis of whether the ministerial 
duty exception applies under the circumstances presented here.  
Pries identifies the take-down instructions as a source of law 
or policy dictating the ministerial duty here to disassemble the 
stalls in a specific manner.  McMillon responds that those 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
16 
 
instructions do not create a ministerial duty because they lack 
direction on how employees are to use the chains or how they are 
to respond to the circumstances here, i.e., when pieces are 
stuck together.  In light of the parties' positions, we frame 
the specific question here as follows:  Did the instructions 
establish a ministerial duty that McMillon then violated when he 
jumped on and shook the stuck stall knowing that "the chains 
were undone" and knowing of the instructions to "[a]lways have 
someone holding up the piece that you are taking down"?  Our 
case law provides some guidance in answering that question. 
¶26 Where there is a written law or policy defining a 
duty, we naturally look to the language of the writing to 
evaluate whether the duty and its parameters are expressed so 
clearly and precisely, so as to eliminate the official's 
exercise of discretion. 
¶27 For example, in Meyer, 271 Wis. at 331, the issue was 
whether injured students could recover from school board 
officials, in their individual capacities, for failure to erect 
guardrails or other safety devices in a retaining wall.  We 
assessed statutory language that officials had a duty to "keep 
the buildings and grounds in good repair, suitably equipped and 
in safe and sanitary condition at all times," and concluded that 
that language did not create a ministerial duty.  As we 
explained: 
[A] great many circumstances may need to be considered 
in deciding what action is necessary to do so, and 
such decisions involve the exercise of judgment or 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
17 
 
discretion rather than the mere performance of a 
prescribed task.   
Id. at 331-32. 
¶28 Similarly, in Lodl, we looked at a statute and a 
police department policy to determine whether those materials 
created a ministerial duty for officers to control traffic 
manually when responding at an intersection where traffic 
signals were inoperable.12  253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶27.  We noted, 
first, that the relevant statute mandated a series of whistle 
signals that an officer must use when directing traffic; 
however, the statute did not require an officer to perform 
manual traffic operation in a given situation, nor did it strip 
an officer of discretion to determine when to effectuate manual 
control.  Id., ¶27. 
¶29 Likewise, 
in 
Lodl, 
the 
language 
of 
the 
police 
department 
policy 
on 
operations 
and 
procedures 
was 
not 
ministerial, where the language merely provided suggestions for 
an officer to follow when manually controlling traffic.  The 
policy did not mandate when or whether an officer should 
undertake such control.  Moreover, it was significant to this 
court that (1) the police chief described the policy as merely 
"guideline[s]"; (2) other language in the manual stated that 
                                                 
12 The court in Lodl assessed whether a ministerial duty was 
present within the framework of the known danger exception.  
Although that exception is different from the ministerial duty 
exception, there is an overlap between the two exceptions, as we 
have noted.  In any event, our assessment in Lodl of the known 
danger exception does not differ markedly from how we have 
generally 
assessed 
the 
duty 
under 
the 
ministerial 
duty 
exception. 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
18 
 
officers are expected to use their judgment in addressing 
problems; and (3) the language of the policy paragraph at issue 
used the discretionary word "should" throughout.  Id., ¶¶29-30.  
Similarly, in Noffke v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 
N.W.2d 156, we assessed language in "spirit rules" governing 
responsibilities for cheerleading coaches to determine whether 
those rules imposed a ministerial duty.  We concluded that the 
rules did not impose such a duty, based in part on language 
describing the rules as "guidelines," "a useful reminder of 
basic procedures," and other permissive language such as 
"should" (rather than a mandatory "must" or "shall") throughout.  
Id., ¶46. 
¶30 Indeed, the choice of discretionary versus mandatory 
language is a significant factor in determining the existence of 
a ministerial duty.  For example, in Chart v. Dvorak, 57 Wis. 2d 
92, 203 N.W.2d 673 (1973), where the failure alleged was 
improper placement of a highway warning sign, we assessed 
several statutory provisions as well as a State Highway 
Commission (commission) manual.  We assessed statutory language 
stating that the commission "shall erect and maintain" guide and 
warning 
signs 
"as 
it 
deems 
necessary" 
and 
that 
"[n]o . . . sign . . . shall be installed unless the design, 
installation and use or operation of such sign . . . conforms to 
the rules of the . . . commission."  Id. at 99 n.5.  (Emphasis 
added.)  We understood that language to mean that although the 
commission had discretion as to whether to place the signs at 
all (i.e., "as it deems necessary"), once officials decided to 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
19 
 
place a particular sign, workers were bound by a duty to erect 
and maintain that sign in conformance with commission-developed 
directives.  Accordingly, those directives were "absolute, 
certain and imperative" and set forth a ministerial duty once a 
decision was made to place a sign, and the defendants' negligent 
failure to comport with the relevant directives would not be 
protected by governmental immunity. 
¶31 Our first task in this case is to identify a source of 
law or policy imposing a ministerial duty on McMillon.  Although 
we have not expressly defined what manner of "law" is sufficient 
in this context to serve as a source for a ministerial duty, we 
have traditionally assessed a wide variety of materials to 
determine whether a ministerial duty existed.  See, e.g., 
Bicknese, 260 Wis. 2d 713, ¶25 (evaluating employee policy 
manual); 
Lodl, 
253 
Wis. 2d 323, ¶¶28-30 (reviewing police 
department operations policy); Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 14-15 
(assessing employee job description).  Moreover, the court of 
appeals has understood "law" in this context to encompass a 
relatively broad, but not limitless, spectrum of materials.  See 
Meyers v. Schultz, 2004 WI App 234, ¶19, 277 Wis. 2d 845, 690 
N.W.2d 873 (concluding that manufacturers' instructions that the 
governmental unit did not create and that did not establish a 
contractual obligation by the entity was not "an act of 
government" that could satisfy the minimal requirements of a law 
or policy for purposes of the ministerial duty exception). 
¶32 Here, the take-down instructions fall within the range 
of documents that could serve as a basis for a ministerial duty.  
No. 
2008AP89   
 
20 
 
Both Hedden and Jaeger provided testimony that the procedures 
were State Fair Park documents and created by State Fair Park 
staff for use in State Fair Park work.  Moreover, Hedden, 
Jaeger, and McMillon all acknowledged that the procedures set 
forth the steps required by State Fair Park employees to take 
down the stalls safely.  Accordingly, we are satisfied that the 
set of procedures is a source of "law" for purposes of 
establishing a ministerial duty.   
¶33 We now return to the central inquiry here:  Did the 
instructions establish a ministerial duty that McMillon then 
violated when he jumped on and shook the stuck stall knowing 
that "the chains were undone" and knowing of the instructions to 
"[a]lways have someone holding up the piece that you are taking 
down"?  We are satisfied that the instructions created such a 
ministerial duty and that McMillon violated that duty based on 
the following reasons.13 
                                                 
13 We strongly disagree with the dissent's assertions that, 
by holding that a ministerial duty is present here, we depart 
from precedent and abandon our courts' "time-tested approach" to 
assessing the limited ministerial duty exception.  See Justice 
Bradley's dissent, ¶¶48, 50.  We do no such thing.  Rather, we 
reach our holding by applying the law as this court has 
developed it over the last fifty years to the facts and 
circumstances presented in this case and record.  Based on that 
exercise, we are satisfied that a narrow ministerial duty exists 
here. 
Accordingly, we dispute the dissent's unfounded concerns 
that our holding here expands——to any degree——the narrow 
ministerial duty exception to immunity that state and local 
governments have been subject to for the last half century.  
No. 
2008AP89   
 
21 
 
¶34 First and foremost, the language in the written 
instructions for the take-down procedure in section 6(a) has the 
requisite specificity and definition of the "time, mode and 
occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing 
remains for judgment or discretion."  Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301.  
As we noted above, the instructions require workers taking down 
stall pieces to "[a]lways have someone holding up the piece that 
you are taking down."  (Emphasis added.)  That instruction may 
be brief, but it is significant.  The word "always" imparts a 
mandatory requirement, unlike discretionary words such as "may" 
or "should."  "Always" does not permit discretion as to whether 
to have workers hold up the piece being taken down.  Rather, it 
requires workers to ensure that the pieces are secured from 
falling during the take-down process.  In other words, just as 
the 
language 
of 
the 
highway 
commission 
manual 
in 
Chart 
foreclosed the possibility that workers could place highway 
signs in a location that did not conform to the rules, the 
instructions here definitively proscribe attempting to take down 
pieces of a stall without those pieces being secured during that 
process. 
¶35 Furthermore, testimony supports our conclusion that 
the take-down requirement to "[a]lways have someone holding up 
the piece that you are taking down" defines the "time, mode and 
occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing 
remains for judgment or discretion."  McMillon testified that 
the instructions provided the steps to be taken in the take-down 
process, and that he was required to follow those instructions 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
22 
 
"every single time" he took down stalls.  Moreover, Jaeger 
testified that, although some discretion was permitted to State 
Fair Park employees to do their jobs, it was a violation of 
State Fair Park procedure to leave the stall sections unsecured. 
¶36 Those circumstances are distinguishable from the facts 
in Lodl, where the police chief testified to the importance of 
permitting officers discretion in performing their jobs, and 
where the policy had discretionary language such as "should" 
throughout.  Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶29; see also Noffke, 315 
Wis. 2d 350, ¶46 (noting that permissive language and use of the 
word "should" in spirit rules suggested that the rules at issue 
permitted discretion).  Here, the circuit court made the 
following findings of fact: 
 
According to defendant McMillon's deposition, the 
same dismantling process is followed each time; the 
employees do not have the ability to change the 
process; the only acceptable way to dislodge the walls 
is to use a hammer rather than jump on top of the 
walls; the stalls have to be put up and taken down in 
a certain manner or there is a danger of someone being 
hurt. 
(Citations to the record omitted).  Those findings are not 
clearly erroneous, and we agree with the circuit court that 
those findings compel the conclusion that McMillon knew of the 
proper take-down procedures pursuant to the instructions, and 
that he understood he was required to follow those instructions 
every time he disassembled the stalls. 
¶37 In addition to the mandatory language to "[a]lways 
have someone holding up the piece that you are taking down" and 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
23 
 
McMillon's understanding that he was to follow the instructions 
"every time" he dismantled the stalls, the nature of the work 
and the context in which it is performed support our conclusion 
that instruction section 6(a) creates a ministerial duty for 
State Fair Park employees.  According to instruction section 
1(a), at least four people are required to set up the stalls.  
Moreover, testimony at trial established that each steel piece 
was large (10 feet by 10 feet), weighed approximately 200 
pounds, and required four people to lift it.  Put differently, 
the take-down process involves multiple workers and volunteers——
at least some of whom do not have experience with the equipment 
or procedures involved——moving large, heavy, awkward equipment 
used at least annually at State Fair Park events.  In light of 
that, the presence of instructions imparting a nondiscretionary 
set of procedures is a necessity.  As the circuit court noted, 
"[D]isassembling horse stalls is a process that can, and should, 
be controlled with set guidelines so as to preserve equipment 
and prevent injury, workers are not given discretion as to 
performing 
disassembly."  Those circumstances support the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
instruction 
in 
section 
6(a) 
is 
not 
discretionary but is purely ministerial.   
¶38 Moreover, that purely ministerial duty encompasses a 
proper use of chains during the disassembly process.  As the 
court of appeals observed, it is undisputed that the stalls are 
made up of four separate pieces:  a front, two sides, and a 
back, with the sides and back pieces each chained to a wall to 
prevent those pieces from falling when workers removed the pins 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
24 
 
attaching the pieces together.  It is also undisputed that the 
proper method of disassembling the stalls is to first remove the 
front by removing the pins and lifting that piece, then each 
side one at a time by again removing the pins and removing the 
chains while workers hold the piece up, and finally the back by 
removing the chain, with the workers again holding it up to 
prevent it from falling.  Additionally, both McMillon and Jaeger 
provided testimony explaining the chains' important role in the 
stall disassembly process.  Further, Jaeger stated in his 
deposition that removing chains from stall pieces other than the 
pieces the workers are moving is a violation of procedure.  
Accordingly, we understand the precaution of securing the side 
and back pieces with chains is logically encompassed within the 
literal instruction to "[a]lways have someone holding up the 
piece that you are taking down."  Thus, the ministerial duty 
here requires employees to ensure that the pieces they are 
taking down are secured.14   
                                                 
14 Neither part 6(a) nor the remainder of the instructions 
refer to the chains or designate their proper use.  That 
omission would be problematic if our analysis of the ministerial 
duty exception required us to look strictly at the language of 
the policy.  Our assessment is not so limited.  Review of 
whether a policy contains a ministerial duty focuses on the text 
of the relevant policy or rule and its nature.  However the 
context in which the policy is used and the circumstances of the 
case are relevant considerations that can support or negate a 
conclusion that policy language creates a ministerial duty.  
Compare, e.g., Bicknese, 260 Wis. 2d 713, ¶¶27-30 (looking to 
mandatory 
language 
of 
policy 
as 
well 
and 
employee's 
acknowledgement and understanding that he was subject to the 
duties) 
with 
Lodl, 
253 
Wis. 2d 323, 
¶¶24-34 
(looking 
to 
permissive language and testimony stating that policies were 
only guidelines to determine that no ministerial duty existed).  
No. 
2008AP89   
 
25 
 
¶39 Given that ministerial duty to ensure that the stall 
pieces were secure from falling and McMillon's awareness of that 
duty, we also are satisfied that McMillon violated that duty 
here.  Although this record makes it difficult to discern where 
the inmates were positioned and what else was happening when 
McMillon jumped on the stalls, Pries testified that he was 
standing near "the end of" a piece when McMillon jumped on the 
stalls.  Moreover, given that falling stall pieces hit all three 
of the inmates indicates that they were standing well within the 
trajectory of the unsecured pieces.  The most relevant testimony 
came from McMillon, who stated that before the stalls fell, he 
saw that the chains were removed and that "no one was holding up 
the stall sections."  That testimony came in the context of 
McMillon's denial that he was not near the stalls when the 
sections fell, a denial that the circuit court appears to have 
found to be incredible.  It is worth noting, however, that it 
was 
McMillon's 
denial, 
not 
some 
of 
his 
other 
specific 
observations, that the court found incredible. 
¶40 Furthermore, 
the 
record 
clearly 
supports 
the 
conclusion that McMillon was aware that the chains were undone 
on the back piece.  In testimony that the circuit court found to 
be credible, Pries testified that McMillon stated that the 
chains were off——and should not have been removed——before 
                                                                                                                                                             
Here, we are satisfied that all of those considerations, taken 
together, establish a ministerial duty to ensure that stall 
pieces are secured by chains or by "someone holding up the piece 
that you are taking down." 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
26 
 
jumping on the stall.  Accordingly, McMillon was aware that 
those pieces were unsecured, that the inmates were standing 
nearby, and that the unsecured pieces could cause injury if they 
fell.  Because he did not take the steps required, before 
attempting to dislodge the stuck stall piece, to ensure that any 
unsecured pieces were properly secured, he failed to comport 
with the ministerial duty established in section 6(a) of the 
take-down instructions.  Accordingly, the ministerial duty 
applies and governmental immunity is not available as a defense 
for him under the circumstances presented here. 
¶41 Because 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
ministerial 
duty 
exception applies here, it is not necessary for us to determine 
whether the known danger exception also applies.  Moreover, we 
decline the invitation extended by Pries' counsel to revisit 
Holytz and resurrect its general rule.  That question was not 
fully briefed or argued by the parties.  Moreover, it is 
unnecessary for us to undertake such an analysis and case law 
review given our conclusion that the ministerial duty exception 
to governmental immunity applies here.  See Stoughton Trailers, 
Inc. v. LIRC, 2007 WI 105, ¶5 & n.3, 303 Wis. 2d 514, 735 
N.W.2d 477 (explaining that we decide cases on the narrowest 
grounds). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶42 We affirm, although on different grounds than the 
court 
of 
appeals. 
 
We 
are 
satisfied 
that, 
under 
the 
circumstances presented here, the ministerial duty exception to 
governmental immunity applies.  Specifically, State Fair Park 
No. 
2008AP89   
 
27 
 
instructions to "[a]lways have someone holding up the piece that 
you are taking down" created a ministerial duty that McMillon 
violated when he failed to ensure that the stall pieces were 
secured.  Hence, McMillon is not protected by a defense of 
governmental immunity, and is liable for his negligent acts that 
caused injury to Pries. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2008AP89.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶43 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the majority opinion that Raymond McMillon is not immune 
from liability.  Although I go along with the majority's 
ministerial duty analysis, I write separately because I conclude 
that the known danger analysis upon which the Court of Appeals 
resolved this case provides a simpler, and to me, a more 
persuasive means of resolving this case.1 
¶44 The 
known 
danger 
reasoning 
in 
our 
precedent 
establishes that where "the nature of the danger is compelling 
and known to the officer and is of such force that the public 
officer has no discretion not to act," a ministerial duty 
arises.2     
¶45 The seminal case explaining the known danger rationale 
is Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525, 259 N.W.2d 672 (1977), in 
which the court concluded that a park trail's obvious drop-offs 
and location within a foot of the edge of a high bluff were 
sufficiently dangerous to give rise to the park manager's 
"absolute, certain, and imperative duty" to close the trail, 
place warning signs, notify his superiors, or otherwise ensure 
adequate protection of the public who had been invited to use 
                                                 
1 The circuit court, like the majority, concluded that the 
"ministerial duty" analysis applied. 
2 C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 715, 422 N.W.2d 614 
(1988). 
No.  2008AP89.ssa 
 
2 
 
the park.  80 Wis. 2d at 532, 539, 541.3  The court held that the 
manager was liable for breach of that absolute duty, saying 
"There comes a time when 'the buck stops,'" and set aside 
immunity where the manager "knew the terrain . . . was dangerous 
particularly at night; . . . was in a position as park manager 
to do something about it; . . . [and] failed to do anything 
about it."  80 Wis. 2d at 541.4 
¶46 The Cords analysis is fully applicable in the present 
case.  The pieces of solid steel horse stalls weigh 200 pounds, 
are typically handled by no less than four workers, and need to 
be constantly supported during disassembly.  Disassembly here is 
                                                 
3 See also Domino v. Walworth County, 118 Wis. 2d 488, 490-
91, 347 N.W.2d 917 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding the known danger 
analysis from Cords applied where the sherriff's dispatcher knew 
of a downed tree across a road at night but failed to reassign a 
squad car to the scene after the first response was diverted); 
Voss ex rel. Harrison v. Elkhorn Area Sch. Dist., 2006 WI App 
234, ¶¶19-22, 297 Wis. 2d 389, 724 N.W.2d 420 (holding that "the 
known and present danger exception applies" where a teacher had 
students wear "fatal vision goggles" that distort vision and 
sense of balance in a classroom filled with metal desks created 
an immediate risk of injury; "it should have been self-evident 
to the teacher that the activity was hazardous and the only 
option was to put an end to it."). 
4 The availability of several possible ways to fulfill an 
absolute duty arising from a known danger does not bring a 
defendant within the scope of governmental immunity.  See Domino 
v. Walworth County, 118 Wis. 2d 488, 491, 347 N.W.2d 917 (Ct. 
App. 1984) ("[S]imply allowing for the exercise of discretion 
does not suffice to bring the actions under the blanket of 
immunity provided by sec. 893.80(4), Stats., when the facts or 
the allegations reveal a duty so clear and absolute that it 
falls within the concept of a ministerial duty.").   
For a discussion of the known danger exception, see also 
Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶¶32-48, 253 
Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314; id. at ¶¶53-60 (Bradley, J., 
dissenting). 
No.  2008AP89.ssa 
 
3 
 
an "accident waiting to happen"5 and gives rise to an absolute 
duty to take steps to prevent the steel horse stall pieces from 
falling.  McMillon knew the unchained steel stall pieces were 
dangerous; he was in a position as supervisor to do something 
about the danger; and he failed to do anything about it——worse, 
he jumped onto the stalls.6  In my view, he thereby breached a 
duty that was "absolute, certain, and imperative" following the 
analysis of the known danger cases.  Accordingly, an immunity 
defense is not available to him.  
¶47 For the foregoing reasons, I concur.  
 
 
                                                 
5 See Voss, 297 Wis. 2d at 398. 
6 The circuit court found that McMillon "was aware the 
chains were undone, . . . was aware that inmates were standing 
next to the stuck stall," and "knew that if the chains holding 
those back stalls to the wall had been removed, they could 
fall." Pries v. McMillon, 2008 WI App 167, ¶¶23-24, 314 
Wis. 2d 706, 760 N.W.2d 174.  
No.  2008AP89.awb 
 
1 
 
¶48 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
Today's 
decision expands the liability of public officers far beyond the 
confines established by more than a half-century of precedent.  
The result of this expansion could expose not only the Wisconsin 
State Fair Park to liability, but also villages, towns, cities, 
school boards, and other state and local government treasuries 
at a time when these entities can least afford it. 
¶49 Just last term, we reaffirmed the narrow definition of 
ministerial duty and recognized that "[t]he definition of 
ministerial duty has remained substantially the same since it 
was adopted in 1955[.]"  Umansky v. Fox, 2009 WI 82, ¶11, 319 
Wis. 2d 622, 769 N.W.2d 1 (citing Meyer v. Carman, 271 Wis. 329, 
73 N.W.2d 514 (1955)). A ministerial duty imposed by law is an 
"absolute, certain and imperative duty."  Lister v. Board of 
Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).  It 
involves "the performance of a specific task" when the law 
"defines the time, mode and occasion for its performance with 
such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion."  
Id.   
¶50 To determine whether a public officer or employee can 
be held liable, courts have always looked to the written 
language of the relevant statute, regulation, policy, or 
procedure to see if it fits within the very limited ministerial 
duty exception to immunity.  See, e.g., Bicknese v. Sutula, 2003 
WI 31, ¶¶27-28, 260 Wis. 2d 713, 660 N.W.2d 289; Lodl v. 
Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶¶27-28, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 
No.  2008AP89.awb 
 
2 
 
646 N.W.2d 314.  Today, however, the majority abandons this 
time-tested approach.   
¶51 Tucked away in a footnote, the majority explains that 
it is untethering its analysis from the language of the relevant 
written procedure.  Majority op., ¶38 n.14.  Instead it analyzes 
and relies on the extraneous opinions of coworkers about how to 
safely perform the job.   
¶52 The problem with relying on the opinions of coworkers 
to inform the nature of the ministerial duty is two-fold: (1) 
the majority essentially rewrites the text, expanding the duties 
beyond those found in the written procedure; and (2) it 
conflates the analysis of negligence with the ministerial duty 
immunity defense.  Both the writing in of ministerial duties 
beyond those that appear in the text and the conflation of 
negligence with immunity will result in diminished governmental 
immunity and increased exposure of all levels of government to 
costly lawsuits.  
¶53 I conclude that there is another way to resolve this 
case.  In examining the text of the take-down procedure, I 
determine that the procedure suffers from a critical lack of 
particularity as to time, mode and occasion for performance.  
The written procedure is not sufficiently particularized to 
remove McMillon's discretion as he faced the dilemma of what to 
do when the stalls became stuck together.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
No.  2008AP89.awb 
 
3 
 
¶54 The majority begins by examining the language and 
parameters of the take-down procedure.  Majority op., ¶26.  The 
written procedure provides: "Always have someone holding up the 
piece that you are taking down."1  Initially focusing on the 
language of that instruction, the majority determines that the 
word "always" imparts a mandatory requirement.  Id., ¶34.   
¶55 The majority apparently recognizes that the written 
procedure 
is 
insufficiently 
particularized 
to 
impose 
a 
ministerial duty.  It departs from the language of the 
instruction and examines instead testimony of State Fair Park 
employees about their understanding of their duties.  Id. ¶38 & 
n.14.  Although the written take-down procedure does not mention 
chains or discuss their proper use, the majority concludes that 
the "purely ministerial duty encompasses a proper use of 
chains."  Id., ¶38.   
                                                 
1 Section 6 sets forth the entire written take-down 
procedure.  It provides in full:  
a. Always have someone holding up the piece that you 
are taking down. 
b. Take out the top pins on the top of the stall piece 
and then lift the stall piece off the bottom pins. 
c. The sides can be stacked horizontally with 15 to a 
stack. 
d. Fronts must be stored vertically, if possible put 
in storage racks. 
e. Make sure all of the pins are picked up and put 
into the storage box.  (These can not be lost) 
f.  
No.  2008AP89.awb 
 
4 
 
¶56 Ultimately, the majority appears to conclude that the 
written procedure does not mean what it says.  Although the 
written procedure provides that McMillon should "[a]lways have 
someone holding up the piece that [he is] taking down," the 
majority determines that actually, McMillon need not always have 
someone holding up the piece that he is taking down.  Rather, 
according to the majority, McMillon could choose between 
securing the stalls by having someone hold them up or securing 
the stalls with chains——as long as McMillon "ensure[s] that the 
stall pieces [are] secure from falling."  Id., ¶39, ¶38 n.14.        
A 
¶57 By untethering its analysis from the language of the 
written procedure, the majority departs from our established 
approach.  Although courts have reviewed employee testimony to 
confirm that an employee is responsible for complying with the 
text of a specific statute, regulation, or procedure, they have 
not used testimony to change the meaning of that text, as the 
majority does here.    
¶58 To determine whether there is a ministerial duty, we 
have always examined the language of the applicable statute, 
regulation, or procedure.  See, e.g., Bicknese, 260 Wis. 2d 713, 
¶¶27-28 (examining the "clear mandate" of § 7.04 of the 
University of Wisconsin Faculty Policies and Procedures, which 
set forth the procedure for calculating tenure clocks); Lodl, 
253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶¶27-28 (examining the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.40 and the Town of Pewaukee Police Department's Operations 
Policy). 
No.  2008AP89.awb 
 
5 
 
¶59 In the past, we have referenced employee testimony to 
confirm that an employee was required to adhere to the text of a 
statute, regulation, or procedure.  See, e.g., Bicknese, 260 
Wis. 2d 713, ¶27 (discussing an employee's admission that one of 
his job duties was to calculate tenure clock according to the 
terms of § 7.04 of the University of Wisconsin Faculty Policies 
and Procedures); Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶¶29-30 (concluding that 
the Operations Policy set forth a guideline rather than a 
ministerial duty, relying in part on the drafter's statement 
that he could not sit in his office and dictate the best way for 
officers to do their many jobs).     
¶60 However, we have not used employee testimony as the 
majority does here——to alter and expand the meaning of the text, 
adding new duties that cannot be found in the text of the 
procedure.  Compare the duty identified by the majority——"ensure 
that the stall pieces [are] secure from falling"——with the text 
of the procedure, which provides that McMillon must "have 
someone holding up the piece that [he is] taking down."   
¶61 Because the majority uses employee testimony to alter 
and expand the meaning of the text, the ministerial duty 
identified by the majority is much broader than any duty 
identified in the text of the take-down procedure.  Under the 
majority's analysis, it would appear that McMillon has violated 
a ministerial duty any time that the stalls fall, regardless of 
whether he was adhering to the text of the written take-down 
procedure. 
No.  2008AP89.awb 
 
6 
 
¶62 The 
result 
of 
the 
majority's 
innovation 
is 
an 
expansion of liability.  By relying on sources extraneous to the 
text of the relevant law, it broadens the scope of duties that 
may be considered ministerial duties imposed by law.  As a 
result, more duties will be considered ministerial in nature, 
increasing the exposure of state and municipal treasuries. 
B 
¶63 Further, by focusing on the testimony of employees and 
the circumstances of the case, the majority conflates the 
standards for negligence and immunity.  Negligence and immunity 
are 
separate 
inquiries. 
 
"The 
immunity 
defense 
assumes 
negligence, focusing instead on whether the municipal action (or 
inaction) upon which liability is premised is entitled to 
immunity under the statute, and if so, whether one of the 
judicially-created exceptions to immunity applies."  Lodl, 253 
Wis. 2d 323, ¶17.   
¶64 "[O]ne has a duty to exercise ordinary care under the 
circumstances."  Hoida, Inc. v. M&I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, 
¶30, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17.  If a person acts or fails 
to act in a way "that a reasonable person would recognize as 
creating an unreasonable risk of injury or damage," that person 
"is not exercising ordinary care under the circumstances, and is 
therefore negligent."  Id.     
¶65 Unlike the duty of ordinary care, a ministerial duty 
imposed by law is an "absolute, certain and imperative" duty.  
Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301.  It involves "the performance of a 
specific task" when the law "defines the time, mode and occasion 
No.  2008AP89.awb 
 
7 
 
for its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for 
judgment or discretion."  Id.  "Just because a jury can find 
that certain conduct was negligent does not transform that 
conduct into a breach of a ministerial duty."  Kimps v. Hill, 
200 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 546 N.W.2d 151 (1996). 
¶66 A State Fair Park employee's testimony about how to 
safely perform his job may be relevant in determining whether 
McMillon was negligent for failing to use ordinary care.  Such 
testimony could inform the factfinder's determination of whether 
a reasonable person would recognize that McMillon's actions or 
inactions would create an unreasonable risk of injury. 
¶67 However, the same testimony is not relevant in 
identifying a ministerial duty.  An opinion of an employee about 
how to safely perform his job does not create a duty that is 
"absolute, certain and imperative."  
¶68 By 
conflating 
the 
standards 
for 
negligence 
and 
immunity, I am concerned that the majority opinion could be 
understood to hold that an officer who fails to exercise 
ordinary care has violated a ministerial duty.  Such a departure 
from established law would broaden the narrow ministerial duty 
exception to encompass all cases involving negligence of public 
officers.  Again, this expansion of the exception would result 
in increased liability for public officers and increased 
exposure for public treasuries.    
II 
¶69 Contrary to the majority, when I examine the take-down 
procedure here, I conclude that it does not impose a ministerial 
No.  2008AP89.awb 
 
8 
 
duty.  To fit within the exception, the law imposing a duty must 
be both mandatory and highly particularized.  "[F]or a duty to 
be ministerial, a public officer must be not only bound to act, 
but also bound by law to act in a very particular way, leaving 
nothing for judgment or discretion."  Yao v. Chapman, 2005 WI 
App 200, ¶29, 287 Wis. 2d 445, 705 N.W.2d 272. 
¶70 Just last term, we applied this standard in a case 
involving a death at Camp Randall stadium.  See Umansky, 319 
Wis. 2d 622.  In that case, the plaintiff fell to his death 
while working on an unguarded platform located eight feet above 
ground.  Umansky's estate argued that the director of facilities 
was required under the Wisconsin Administrative Code to adhere 
to an OSHA regulation, which mandated railings on all platforms 
located more than four feet above ground.     
¶71 The regulation in Umansky was "highly specific."  Id., 
¶18.  It stated: "Every open-sided floor or platform 4 feet or 
more above adjacent floor or ground level shall be guarded by a 
standard railing (or the equivalent as specified in paragraph 
(e)(3) of this section) on all open sides except where there is 
entrance to a ramp, stairway, or fixed ladder. . . ."  Id., ¶6.  
It further provided specifications for a standard railing:  
A 
standard 
railing 
shall 
consist 
of 
top 
rail, 
intermediate rail, and posts, and shall have a 
vertical height of 42 inches nominal from upper 
surface of top rail to floor, platform, runway, or 
ramp level.  The top rail shall be smooth-surfaced 
throughout 
the 
length 
of 
the 
railing. 
 
The 
intermediate 
rail 
shall 
be 
approximately 
halfway 
between the top rail and the floor, platform, runway, 
or ramp.  The ends of the rails shall not overhang the 
terminal posts except where such overhang does not 
constitute a projection hazard.   
No.  2008AP89.awb 
 
9 
 
Id., ¶16 n.8.2 
¶72 We agreed with and adopted the court of appeals' 
conclusion that "[t]he duty to have a railing meeting the 
regulation's requirements is imposed by law, it is absolute, 
certain and imperative, and it requires performance in a 
specified manner and upon specified conditions that are not 
dependent upon the exercise of judgment or discretion."  Id., 
¶¶3-4, 17.  As the court of appeals had explained, "[i]t is the 
mandatory and specific nature of the duty the government has 
chosen to impose that triggers the expectation that the duty 
will be carried out and the concomitant imposition of liability 
if it is not."  Umansky v. ABC Ins. Co., 2008 WI App 101, ¶35, 
313 Wis. 2d 445, 756 N.W.2d 601.   
¶73 By contrast, in Yao, 287 Wis. 2d 445, a regulation 
that 
contained 
mandatory language nevertheless lacked the 
requisite particularity to impose a ministerial duty.  In that 
case, a researcher stored his cells in a nitrogen tank at a 
university laboratory.  The cells were destroyed when a 
professor 
permitted 
students 
to 
access 
the 
tank 
without 
providing training or instruction.  Id., ¶23.  Yao introduced 
                                                 
2 The 
regulation 
also 
provided 
specifications 
for 
an 
equivalent rail: "Other types, sizes, and arrangements of 
railing construction are acceptable provided they meet the 
following conditions: (a) A smooth-surfaced top rail at a height 
above floor, platform, runway, or ramp level of 42 inches 
nominal; (b) A strength to withstand at least the minimum 
requirement of 200 pounds top rail pressure; (c) Protection 
between top rail and floor, platform, runway, ramp, or stair 
treads, equivalent at least to that offered by a standard 
intermediate rail . . . ."  Umansky v. Fox, 2009 WI 82, ¶16 n. 
9, 319 Wis. 2d 622, 769 N.W.2d 1. 
No.  2008AP89.awb 
 
10 
 
evidence that one of the students replaced the lid improperly, 
allowing the liquid nitrogen to evaporate.  Id.   
¶74 The 
Wisconsin 
Administrative 
Code 
mandates 
that 
laboratory employers ensure that their employees are properly 
trained to work with chemical cryogenics such as liquid 
nitrogen.  Id., ¶30.  The regulation states that employers 
"shall provide employees with information and training to ensure 
that they are apprised of the hazards of chemicals present in 
their work area," and "[s]uch information shall be provided at 
the time of the employee's initial assignment[.]"  Id., ¶31.   
¶75 Although the regulation contained mandatory language, 
the court concluded that it "suffer[ed] from a critical lack of 
particularity as to time, mode and occasion for [] performance."  
Id., ¶31.  The court explained: "The standards say nothing about 
access to or control of a liquid nitrogen tank, how or how often 
to determine whether the liquid nitrogen level is sufficient, 
how to replenish the liquid nitrogen when it becomes necessary 
to do so, or how to properly open and refasten the tank lid."  
Id., ¶32.  
¶76 Umansky and Yao make clear that mandatory language in 
a regulation is not enough to impose a ministerial duty.  In 
addition 
to 
mandatory 
language, 
the 
regulation 
must 
be 
sufficiently particularized so that there is nothing left to the 
officer's discretion about where, when, and how to perform the 
duty.   
¶77 Here, although the take-down procedure contains the 
word "always," I conclude that the procedure suffers from a 
No.  2008AP89.awb 
 
11 
 
critical lack of particularity as to time, mode and occasion for 
performance. 
 
The 
written 
procedure 
is 
not 
sufficiently 
particularized to remove McMillon's discretion and impose a duty 
that is purely ministerial.  It does not describe how many 
workers are necessary to hold up a stall piece.  It does not 
describe when and where those workers should be positioned.  
Rather, it provides more particularity about how to ensure that 
the stalls are properly stored to prevent loss or damage than it 
does about how to prevent injury when dismantling the stalls. 
¶78 Critically, the procedure does not mention the use of 
chains, much less prescribe their use with such particularity 
that nothing is left to discretion or judgment.  How many chains 
are need to safely secure a stall?  Should chains be used at all 
times, or only after the top pins have been removed?  Should the 
chains 
remain 
attached 
while 
the 
workers 
are 
lifting 
a 
particular stall piece off the bottom pins, or must the chains 
be removed before that time?   
¶79 Finally, the procedure does not specify what an 
employee should do if the stalls become stuck together, as 
occurred in this case.  Rather, the procedure does not seem to 
contemplate that the stalls could become stuck.   
¶80 Because of the gaps in the procedure, an employee 
necessarily must use discretion in how best to dismantle the 
stalls.  As a result, I conclude that the written procedure does 
not delineate a duty that is "absolute, certain and imperative, 
involving merely the performance of a specific task when the law 
imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for 
No.  2008AP89.awb 
 
12 
 
its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for 
judgment or discretion."   
III 
¶81 In Scott v. Savers Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 
we acknowledged that governmental immunity could produce harsh 
results, especially when the negligence of a public officer "was 
so clear."  2003 WI 60, ¶37, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715.  
"Yet," we concluded, "the doctrine of governmental immunity 
plays a significant role in our legal system.  Imposing 
liability in this case would therefore not serve the policy 
underlying the doctrine of immunity."3  Id. 
¶82 Over the years, we have adhered to a consistent 
approach to governmental immunity.  In Umansky, for example, the 
injured plaintiff argued that we "should repudiate the current 
formulation of public officer immunity."4  We rejected the 
argument and declined to alter longstanding law.  Id., ¶14 n.6.   
¶83 Similarly, in Scott, we declined to alter our approach 
to municipal officer immunity.  262 Wis. 2d 127, ¶¶34-37.  
Writing in concurrence, the Chief Justice explained that 
"construing governmental immunity anew [would] have a far-
reaching impact, and this court should only undertake such a 
task 
with 
the benefit of full information."  Id., ¶59 
                                                 
3 One 
of 
the 
public policies underlying immunity is 
protecting the public purse and taxpayers against liability for 
money damages.  See Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, 
¶23, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314. 
4 Response Brief of Harold Umansky at 11, Umansky, 319 
Wis. 2d 622, ¶11 (available at the Wisconsin Law Library). 
No.  2008AP89.awb 
 
13 
 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).  Unfortunately, the majority's 
approach construes immunity anew without even acknowledging that 
it is doing so.  For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully 
dissent.    
¶84 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this dissent.  
 
 
 
No.  2008AP89.mjg 
 
1 
 
¶85 MICHAEL 
J. 
GABLEMAN, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
Justice 
Bradley's 
dissent 
ably 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
ministerial 
exception does not apply under our existing case law.  I join it 
in full.  I write separately, however, because our case law is, 
troublingly, untethered from the governing statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) (2007-08).1 
¶86 Governmental immunity has its roots in the common law.  
This court abrogated the prior rule of immunity in Holytz v. 
City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).  We 
made clear that in regard to municipalities, going forward, "the 
rule is liability——the exception is immunity."  Id. at 39.  We 
outlined an exception to immunity, however, stating that a 
government body is not liable for actions done "in the exercise 
of its legislative or judicial or quasi-legislative or quasi-
judicial functions."  Id. at 40.  If the legislature disagreed 
with this new approach, we noted, "it is, of course, free to 
reinstate immunity."  Id. 
¶87 In the year following our decision in Holytz, the 
legislature waded into this area in a comprehensive way for the 
first time.  It created a new statute essentially codifying our 
language in Holytz.  The current version of the statute provides 
as follows: 
No suit may be brought against any volunteer fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employees nor may any suit be 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2008AP89.mjg 
 
2 
 
brought 
against 
such 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
agency or volunteer fire company or against its 
officers, officials, agents or employees for acts done 
in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4). 
¶88 The context of this statute's adoption and its plain 
language suggest that liability should be the rule, and that 
suits are generally barred under only two circumstances.2  First, 
the statute bars suits against the listed governmental bodies 
"for the intentional torts of [their] officers, officials, 
agents or employees."  Second, it bars suits against the listed 
governmental bodies and employees "for acts done in the exercise 
of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial 
functions." 
¶89 Reading this statute, one might surmise that, where 
the claim did not involve an intentional tort, our cases would 
center on whether the allegedly harmful acts were legislative, 
quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial in nature.  Yet, 
this is not the reality. 
¶90 In the years following the legislature's proclamation 
in 1963, this court has interpreted this subsection to mean that 
the listed government officials are entitled to immunity for any 
acts that involve "the exercise of discretion and judgment."  
                                                 
2 I say "generally" because the legislature has granted 
immunity in other specific factual scenarios.  See, e.g., Wis. 
Stat. § 301.46(7) (granting immunity "for any good faith act or 
omission regarding the release of information" concerning sex 
offenders under that section); Wis. Stat. § 30.2026(5) (granting 
immunity "for acts or omissions that cause damage or injury and 
that relate to the construction, maintenance, or use of any 
artificial barrier" authorized by § 30.2026(1)). 
No.  2008AP89.mjg 
 
3 
 
Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶21, 253 
Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314.  Now, instead of adhering to the 
letter and spirit of the statute——which specifies exceptions to 
the rule of liability, we have created a series of common law 
exceptions to immunity.  See majority op., ¶¶21-24.  This court 
has recognized that its current doctrines in this area are, in 
effect, public policy judgments; they are the product of the 
court's attempt to balance competing societal interests.  Lodl, 
253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶¶23-24.  We seem to have dispensed with the 
notion that the text of the statute should be our guide.  
Something here is amiss.3 
                                                 
3 The United States District Court for the Western District 
of Wisconsin also recognized this in Baumgardt v. Wausau Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 475 F. Supp. 2d 800 (W.D. Wis. 2007).  Judge 
Crabb observed: 
On its face the immunity granted under [Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40(4)] appears limited.  Holytz v. City of 
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 39, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962) 
(first setting forth test now codified in Wis. Stat. § 
893.80(4) and noting "the rule is liability——the 
exception is immunity").  However, in a curious and 
expansive exercise of statutory construction, the 
Wisconsin courts have interpreted § 893.80(4) to mean 
that government officials are entitled to immunity for 
"any act that involves the exercise of discretion and 
judgment."  Lodl v. Progressive Northern Insurance 
Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶21, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314 
(2002).  Currently, there are four narrow categories 
of non-discretionary acts to which immunity does not 
apply: "(1) ministerial duties imposed by law, (2) 
duties 
to 
address 
a 
known 
danger, 
(3) 
actions 
involving professional discretion, and (4) actions 
that are malicious, willful, and intentional."  Scott 
v. Savers Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 2003 WI 
60, ¶16, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715 (2003).  
Thus, it appears that immunity is now the rule in 
Wisconsin rather than the exception. 
No.  2008AP89.mjg 
 
4 
 
¶91 Seven years ago, Justice Prosser issued a call for 
this court to reexamine its jurisprudence in this area.4  See 
Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, ¶¶75-82, 262 
Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715 (Prosser, J., dissenting).5  I now 
join this call.  My concern is rooted in the rule of law.  The 
legislature has chosen to address the issue of governmental 
immunity directly.  When the legislature has spoken, our 
obligation is to follow its intentions as expressed in the 
Wisconsin Statutes.  Our current case law has strayed from this 
constitutional duty. 
¶92 In short, though I agree with Justice Bradley's 
dissent that liability here is not warranted under our existing 
case law, I am not satisfied that our cases faithfully interpret 
§ 893.80(4), 
and 
urge 
my 
colleagues 
to 
reconsider 
our 
                                                                                                                                                             
Id. at 809 (emphasis added). 
4 This call to reexamine our approach was echoed in a 
concurrence written by Justice Bablitch and joined by Justice 
Crooks.  See Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, 
¶¶61-64, 
262 
Wis. 2d 127, 
663 
N.W.2d 715 
(Bablitch, 
J., 
concurring). 
5 See also Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 
2000 WI 56, ¶¶59-172, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693 (Prosser, 
J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Bablitch and Crooks). 
No.  2008AP89.mjg 
 
5 
 
jurisprudence to more closely align it with the legislative 
mandate. 
No.  2008AP89.mjg 
 
1