Case Title: Tivan Johnson v. State of Florida (Corrected Opinion)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1999-11-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
  
____________
No. 86,134
____________
TIVAN JOHNSON,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[October 14, 1999]
CORRECTED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal the judgment of the trial court adjudicating Tivan
Johnson guilty of first-degree murder and other crimes and sentencing him to
death.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida
Constitution.  We affirm Johnson's convictions but vacate his death sentence and
remand for a new penalty phase proceeding before a jury based upon the absence
of Johnson and his counsel during part of the penalty phase proceedings.
Tivan Johnson and codefendant Albert Cooper were charged with the first-
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degree murder for the May 25, 1991, killing of pawnshop owner Charles Barker. 
Both men were also charged with the armed burglary of Barker’s pawnshop, the
armed robbery of Barker, and the commission of a felony with a firearm.
The evidence presented at trial revealed the following facts:  Cooper and
Johnson planned the robbery of Barker's pawnshop by visiting the location prior to
the robbery.  They chose this location because there was no security video camera
and only one person worked in the pawnshop.  Cooper and Johnson arrived at the
pawnshop shortly before closing time on May 25; they were driving a silver Ford
Probe belonging to Johnson's wife at the time, Renee Carey.   Cooper and Johnson
backed the car into a parking spot near the entrance of the pawnshop in order to
make it easier to load the items they planned to take and to conceal the car's license
plate.  Cooper carried a .380 mm automatic gun and Johnson was armed with a
snub-nose .38 mm revolver.  Johnson talked to the owner about buying a rifle while
two other customers were present.  After the customers left, Cooper and Johnson
pulled out their weapons and began shooting at Barker.  Cooper fired first, but
Johnson also shot Barker.  In all, they shot Barker twelve times, including a fatal
gunshot wound to the heart and numerous wounds to the abdomen.  After Johnson
emptied his gun, he loaded one more cartridge and shot at Barker's head as he lay
on the floor.
1 The prosecutor asked Blount if either defendant used "a certain expression as to what
would happen to the man that led you to believe that they [were] talking about killing the guy." 
Blount replied that Cooper stated that "they were going to splat him."  Blount further testified that
Cooper and Johnson discussed a plan for Cooper to hold the pawnshop owner while Johnson  shot
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Cooper and Johnson took an undetermined amount of cash and a number of
weapons from the pawnshop, including a 12-gauge Mossberg shotgun that was
recovered from a pawnshop in South Dade County.  Johnson told the police where
they had pawned the shotgun.  The fingerprint on the police report form for the sale
of the Mossberg shotgun was identified as Cooper's.  Cooper's and Johnson's prints
were also found on papers recovered from the counter top at Barker's pawnshop.  A
.38 mm gun, which was recovered from the back of the U-Haul vehicle occupied
by Cooper and his girlfriend, was identified as one of the weapons used in Barker's
shooting.
Cooper and Johnson were arrested separately on June 14, 1991, and taken to
the Metropolitan Dade County Police Headquarters for questioning about another
incident.  Johnson was with his wife in the Ford Probe when he was arrested. 
Cooper and his girlfriend Admonia Blount were stopped in a U-Haul vehicle
containing Cooper's and Johnson's possessions.  During questioning of Blount, the
police learned that Cooper and Johnson had robbed and shot a pawnshop owner. 
Blount testified at trial that the pair had planned the pawnshop crime in advance
and stated their  intent to "splat" the owner.1
him.
2 Cooper's direct appeal was recently considered by this Court.  See Cooper v. State, 24
Fla. L. Weekly S383 (Fla. July 8, 1999), in which we affirmed Cooper's convictions, vacated his
death sentence, and remanded for imposition of a life sentence without possibility of parole for
twenty-five years..
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When confronted by the police with the information about the pawnshop
robbery and murder, both Cooper and Johnson waived their rights and confessed
their involvement in Barker's robbery and murder.  At trial, one of the May 25
pawnshop customers also identified Cooper as one of the men in the shop just
before closing time.
After the joint trial, the jury found both Johnson and Cooper guilty of all
four counts.  After a joint penalty phase, the jury recommended death for both
defendants by a vote of eight to four.2
The court found that three aggravating circumstances applied to Johnson:  he
was previously convicted of a capital or violent felony; the murder was committed
during a robbery and was committed for pecuniary gain (which the court merged
into one factor); and the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP). 
See § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (f), (i), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990).  The court found the
statutory mitigating circumstance of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, see
§ 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990), and a number of nonstatutory mitigating
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circumstances, including that Johnson had experienced a life-threatening case of
meningitis as an infant; his siblings had treated him badly; he suffered from
learning disabilities; he was well-behaved as a child; he was devoted to his mother;
he had limited contact with his father; and he had been involved in the community
through his participation in the Boy Scouts.  The court concluded that the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and followed
the jury's recommendation by imposing a death sentence.
Based upon the fact that the capital felony in this case and Johnson's
conviction for another first-degree murder that occurred after this case could not be
scored, the court departed from the sentencing guidelines and sentenced Johnson to
two consecutive life sentences for the armed burglary and armed robbery
convictions.  The court also imposed two three-year minimum mandatory sentences
based upon the use of a firearm in each offense.  The State announced a nolle
prosequi on count four (committing a felony while possessing a firearm) and the
trial court vacated judgment on that count.
Johnson raises eleven issues on appeal, claiming that the trial court erred in
the following:  (1) denying Johnson's motion to suppress his custodial confessions;
(2) denying his peremptory challenge of Juror Darias; (3) permitting the prosecutor
to inform the jurors that Johnson was in custody on an unrelated matter at the time
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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that he confessed his involvement in this incident; (4) allowing the jurors to view
Johnson in shackles and handcuffs; (5) failing to submit special verdict forms to
the jury regarding the alternate theories of felony murder and premeditated murder;
(6) the absence of Johnson's counsel during a critical stage of the penalty phase
proceeding; (7) denying Johnson's motion to sever the penalty phase proceedings;
(8) Johnson's absence during a critical stage of the penalty phase without a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to be present: (9) the death sentence is
disproportionate in this case; (10) judge's extemporaneous comments to the victims'
family prior to sentencing; and (11) the death penalty is unconstitutional.
Guilt Phase
Johnson raises five issues relating to the guilt phase proceedings, three of
which we have already considered and found without merit in Cooper's direct
appeal (issues one, three, and four).  See Cooper v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S383,
S384 n.8 (Fla. July 8, 1999).  In issue one, Johnson claims that his confessions to
both the instant case and another robbery and murder should have been suppressed
because the Metropolitan Dade County Miranda3 warning form did not adequately
apprise Johnson of his right to consult with counsel prior to questioning as well as
during questioning.  As we stated in Cooper, the language of the warning form
4 Johnson raised an identical claim in the appeal of his other conviction for first-degree
murder.  The Third District Court of Appeal found "no deficiency in the standard Miranda rights
form utilized by the Metro-Dade Police Department."  Cooper v. State, 638 So. 2d 200, 201 (Fla.
3d DCA 1994).  Johnson also raised this issue in a federal habeas corpus petition, and the district
court denied his petition.  See Johnson v. Singletary, No. 95-2646-CIV-UNGARO-BENAGES
(S.D. Fla. June 25, 1996), aff'd, 162 F.3d 97 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1367
(1999).
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"tracks the language of Miranda."  Id.  Thus, Johnson's confessions were properly
admitted by the trial court.4
Johnson's third issue is also identical to an issue raised in Cooper's direct
appeal to this Court and found to be without merit:  informing the jurors that
Johnson was in custody on an unrelated matter at the time that he confessed his
involvement in the instant crimes.  The record shows, however, that during the
guilt phase proceedings the jurors were never told that the defendants were under
arrest or suspects in the unrelated matter nor informed about the nature of that
other investigation, but were simply told that the defendants had been
"interviewed" along with six or seven "other witnesses."  See Cooper, 24 Fla. L.
Weekly at S384 n.8.  Because this evidence was relevant to the jury's determination
of whether Johnson's confession was voluntary, the court properly admitted this
testimony and we find no error.  See id.
Issue four involves an issue also raised in Cooper's direct appeal:  the jury's
observation of the defendants in handcuffs and chains as they were brought into the
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courtroom.  Johnson was not forced to stand trial in handcuffs and chains.  The
jury's observation occurred as the defendants were escorted past the jury in a
hallway outside the courtroom.  Consistent with our ruling in Cooper, we find that
the jury's inadvertent view of Johnson in handcuffs does not warrant reversal of
Johnson's convictions or sentences.  See Cooper, S384 Fla. L. Weekly at S384 n.8.
Johnson raises two other guilt phase issues.  Issue two involves the court's
denial of Johnson's peremptory challenge to a juror during voir dire.  When
Johnson's attorney attempted to peremptorily strike Juror Darias, the State
challenged the strike, noting that the juror "is a female and may be Hispanic." 
When asked by the court to explain his reasons for striking Darias, Johnson's
attorney offered the following explanation: 
She has been on a prior civil jury.  She has been the victim of a car theft. 
She has –I got the impression that she had a problem with – from her
responses with a presumption of innocence, as well as this is my impression. 
I can't necessarily give any more than that, and I tend to think that she would
be too intelligent for the case.
When the court denied the peremptory challenge, Johnson's attorney expressed his
disagreement with the court's ruling.  Counsel further stated that he would
"probably try" to strike Darias again before the conclusion of voir dire, that he
"may come up with a better reason" for striking her, and that he "may ask her some
more questions."  However, counsel did not pursue his challenge of Darias and she
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was ultimately seated on the jury without objection by Johnson.  Under these
circumstances, we conclude that Johnson waived any objection to the court's
disallowance of his peremptory challenge.  See Joiner v. State, 618 So. 2d 174, 176
(Fla. 1993) (holding that defendant waived any objection to a peremptory strike
against a minority juror by affirmatively accepting jury immediately prior to its
being sworn without reserving earlier-made objection); Schummer v. State, 654 So.
2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (stating that to preserve error relating to disallowance
of peremptory challenge under State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984), defendant
must make objection to jury panel prior to acceptance of jury).  As this Court
explained in Joiner, "counsel's action in accepting the jury led to a reasonable
assumption that he had abandoned, for whatever reason, his earlier objection."  618
So. 2d at 176.  In the instant case, a new venire panel was questioned between the
denial of Johnson's challenge of Darias and the swearing of the jury.  The
questioning of the new panel spans almost 200 pages of transcript.  Without some
indication by Johnson that he renewed his earlier challenge or that he accepted the
jury subject to the earlier challenge, "[i]t is reasonable to conclude that events
occurring subsequent to his [challenge] caused him to be satisfied with the jury
about to be sworn."  Joiner, 618 So. 2d at 176; see also Williams v. State, 619 So.
2d 487, 490 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (trial counsel preserved for appeal issue of denial
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of peremptory challenges by indicating to court that jury panel was acceptable
other than the strikes disallowed by the court).
In issue five, Johnson claims that the court erred in failing to submit special
verdict forms to the jury regarding the alternate theories of felony first-degree
murder and premeditated first-degree murder.  We have repeatedly held that a
special verdict form demonstrating which theory the jury based its verdict on is not
required.  See, e.g., Bedford v. State, 589 So.2d 245, 252 (Fla. 1991); Young v.
State, 579 So.2d 721, 724 (Fla. 1991); Buford v. State, 492 So.2d 355 (Fla.1986). 
Moreover, in this case there is evidence to support the jury's verdict of first-degree
murder on either theory.  Johnson was engaged in a robbery at the time Barker was
killed.  Section 782.04(1)(a)2.d., Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), provides that "[t]he
unlawful killing of a human being [w]hen committed by a person engaged in the
perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate any [r]obbery is murder in the first
degree and constitutes a capital felony."  Cooper's girlfriend Blount also testified
that she overheard Cooper and Johnson discuss their plans to rob the pawnshop and
shoot the owner prior to the incident.  According to Blount, Cooper told Johnson
that he would hold the owner and Johnson should shoot him.  Cooper also stated
his intent to "splat" the owner and Johnson voiced no opposition.  Johnson and
Cooper were armed when they entered Barker's pawnshop.  This evidence supports
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Johnson's conviction for premeditated first-degree murder.  Thus, we find no merit
to issue five.
Although not raised by Johnson, we find sufficient evidence to support his
convictions for first-degree murder, armed burglary, and armed robbery.  Finding
no reversible error as to the guilt phase of Johnson's trial, we affirm his
convictions.
Penalty Phase
Johnson raises five penalty phase issues, but we find issue eight to be
dispositive in this case.  We agree with Johnson that his absence during a critical
stage of the penalty phase without a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to
be present resulted in an unfair penalty phase proceeding.
A defendant "has a constitutional right to be present at all crucial stages of
his trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings."  Garcia
v. State, 492 So.2d 360, 363 (Fla. 1986).  As provided by Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.180(a)(5), "[i]n all prosecutions for crime the defendant shall be
present . . . at all proceedings before the court when the jury is present."  The State
contends that Johnson was not absent for any of the proceedings of his penalty
phase proceeding because Cooper's presentation of mitigating evidence was not a
critical stage of Johnson's trial.  We find this argument unpersuasive in light of the
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nature of the penalty phase proceedings in this case.  One jury heard the evidence
as to both Cooper and Johnson and made sentencing recommendations as to both
defendants.  The State presented evidence and testimony relating to the aggravating
circumstances as to both defendants and defense counsel for both were permitted to
cross-examine these witnesses.  However, when Cooper presented his evidence and
witnesses in mitigation, Johnson and his counsel were excused from the courtroom. 
Cooper's mitigating evidence included claims that Johnson psychologically
manipulated and dominated Cooper and that Johnson had lured Cooper into drug
use.  One of Johnson's attorneys was present during Cooper's penalty phase closing
argument when Cooper's counsel reiterated these claims against Johnson. 
Johnson's counsel immediately objected to this closing argument, renewed
Johnson's motion for severance, and requested access to the record to review the
evidence presented in Johnson's absence.  The trial court denied all of these
motions.  Under these circumstances, we agree with Johnson that Cooper's
presentation of mitigating evidence and witnesses constituted a critical stage of
Johnson's penalty phase proceeding.
While a capital defendant is free to waive his or her presence at a crucial
stage of the trial, the waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.   See
Amazon v. State, 487 So.2d 8, 11 (Fla. 1986).  An on-the-record waiver by the
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defendant is necessary for "those rights which go to the very heart of the
adjudicatory process such as the right to a lawyer, the right to a jury trial, or the
right to be present at a critical stage in the proceeding."  Mack v. State, 537 So.2d
109, 110 (Fla. 1989) (Grimes, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis added);
see also Francis v. State, 413 So. 2d 1175, 1178 (Fla. 1982) (finding that record did
not affirmatively demonstrate that defendant made a knowing and intelligent
waiver of his right to be present during critical stage of exercising peremptory
challenges to prospective jurors or that he acquiesced or ratified the action taken by
his counsel during his absence).
In the instant case, there is no record evidence of any inquiry into Johnson's
understanding of his right to be present during Cooper's presentation of mitigating
evidence.  In fact, in a sidebar conference the court made the following concession
of error as to the process employed here:
I made a mistake in this case.  I should have had the sentencing together,
everybody present at the same time, all of the facts brought out, let them
deliberate rate [sic] at the same time.  This type of procedure, which
everybody agreed to and everybody wanted, that we held separate sentencing
hearings, is just, I think, illegally and morally wrong.  But that's where we
are and that's where we are going to continue.
The court chose to remedy the "error" by not publishing the jury's verdict as to
Cooper's sentence until the jury completed its deliberations as to Johnson's
5 Our disposition of this issue renders moot Johnson's remaining penalty phase issues.
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sentence.  In response, Johnson's counsel moved for mistrial and asked the court to
impanel a new jury to deliberate on Johnson's sentence.  The court denied the
motion for a mistrial and proceeded with Johnson's penalty phase.  Johnson then
presented his mitigating evidence to the same jury that had already heard Cooper's
mitigating evidence and closing argument.  Under these circumstances, we find that
Johnson's absence without a knowing waiver constituted error.
In situations involving violations of rule 3.180, "it is the constitutional
question of whether fundamental fairness has been thwarted which determines
whether the error is reversible."  Pomeranz v. State, 703 So.2d 465, 471 (Fla. 1997)
(quoting Garcia v. State, 492 So.2d 360, 364 (Fla. 1986)).  We agree with trial
counsel that Johnson was prejudiced by his inability "to rebut the improper
comments of [Cooper's counsel]" and that the tactics employed by Cooper's
attorney "essentially creat[ed] two prosecutors against Mr. Johnson."  Thus, we
find Johnson's absence requires a new penalty phase proceeding before a new jury.5
Finally, we find that the court erred in imposing consecutive three-year
minimum mandatory sentences for the armed burglary and armed robbery which
occurred as part of a single criminal episode.  Where several offenses are
committed in a single criminal episode involving a single victim, consecutive
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minimum mandatory sentences for the possession of a firearm may not be imposed.
 See Palmer v. State, 438 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1983) (finding that imposition of thirteen
consecutive three-year minimum mandatory sentences for each of Palmer's thirteen
robbery convictions constituted reversible error where the robbery convictions
arose from a single criminal transaction).  Thus, we hereby vacate Johnson's
minimum mandatory sentences.  On remand, the trial court is directed that the
three-year minimum mandatory sentences must run concurrently.  See id. at 4.
For the reasons expressed above, we affirm Johnson's convictions, but vacate
his death sentence and remand for a new penalty phase proceeding before a new
jury.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., SHAW and WELLS, JJ., and OVERTON, Senior Justice, concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Dade County,
Arthur I. Snyder, Judge - Case No. F91-21601AB
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Christina A. Spaulding and Brent E.
Newton, Assistant Public Defenders, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida,
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for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Randall Sutton, Assistant Attorney
General, Miami, Florida,
for Appellee