Case Title: Rager v. Superior Coach Sales & Serv. of Arizona

Citation: 111 Ariz. 204, 526 P.2d 1056

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1974-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
111 Ariz. 204 (1974) 526 P.2d 1056 William J. RAGER, Appellant, v. SUPERIOR COACH SALES AND SERVICE OF ARIZONA, a corporation, and Automotive Sales Company, a corporation, Appellees. No. 11080-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. September 30, 1974. *205 Carson, Messinger, Elliott, Laughlin & Ragan by Robert W. Holland, Phoenix, for appellant. Udall, Shumway, Blackhurst, Allen, Bentley & Lyons by John H. Lyons, Mesa, for appellee Superior Coach Sales. Daughton, Feinstein & Wilson by Donald Daughton, Phoenix, for appellee Automotive Sales Co. *206 CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the granting of a motion for directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case in favor of the defendant Automotive Sales Company, and from the granting of a motion for directed verdict at the close of defendants' case in favor of the defendant Superior Coach Sales and Service of Arizona, Inc. The jury awarded the plaintiff a verdict against the defendant Wilson School District in the amount of $10,000 plus costs. This amount was paid in return for a covenant not to sue or execute. For procedural problems and questions concerning the effect of the covenant see Rager v. Superior Coach Sales and Service, 110 Ariz. 188, 516 P.2d 324 (1973). Admitting the truth of whatever competent evidence the opposing party has introduced, including reasonable inferences therefrom, E.L. Jones Construction Company v. Noland, 105 Ariz. 446, 466 P.2d 740 (1970), and viewing these facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the party against whom the directed verdict was granted, the appellant in this case, Hlavaty v. Song, 107 Ariz. 606, 491 P.2d 460 (1971); Brand v. J.H. Rose Trucking Co., 102 Ariz. 201, 427 P.2d 519 (1967), we must answer the following questions on appeal: The record indicates that Wilson School District No. 7 located in Maricopa County, Phoenix, Arizona, pursuant to bid, obtained delivery in February of 1968 the school bus in question. Superior Coach Sales and Service of Arizona provided the following warranty: At the time the bus was delivered, it contained three braking systems. One was an airbrake system otherwise known as a service brake system operated by a brake foot pedal. The second was a parking brake system independent of the service brake system. In addition to these two systems, there was, though not required by the specifications, a spring brake system designed to be automatically activated whenever the air pressure fell below a certain minimum. In May of 1969 Wilson School District No. 7 brought the bus in question into Superior Coach Sales and Service of Arizona for repair of a defective leaking brake valve on the dashboard. Superior Coach Sales referred the bus to Automotive Sales for work on the brake. Mr. Gulley of Superior Coach testified that his verbal instructions to Automotive Sales were to check the brakes and "do whatever is necessary." Automotive Sales replaced a worn airline from the frame to the right rear brake chamber, replaced bolts which fasten the rear brake chamber to the vehicle, and checked the system for leaks. The mechanic who repaired the bus for Automotive Sales personally disliked the automatic spring brake systems. Therefore while working on the bus he elected to replace the emergency dash control valve, taking out a pressure line resulting in a spring brake system which could only function when the valve on the dashboard of the bus was pulled by the driver. Thus when the air pressure fell below the point at which the brake would not respond to the brake foot pedal, the driver would have *207 to manually pull the control valve on the dashboard before the spring brake system could be activated. The mechanic testified: No one at Automotive Sales Company told the school district or Superior Coach that the brake system had been modified to eliminate its capacity to function automatically upon reduction of air pressure. The bill from Automotive Sales to Superior Coach, which was paid by Automotive Sales under Automotive's warranty agreement with Wilson School District, does not indicate that the automatic spring brake system valve had been replaced. The statement on the bill reads as follows: Ray Vasquez, mechanic for Wilson School District, testified as follows: And: On the morning of 14 January 1970, the school bus was in operation and had operated properly that morning. As it approach the intersection of 24th Street and Washington in the city of Phoenix, approximately 50 feet from the intersection, the air brake foot pedal was depressed with the result of no air sensation on the foot brake. The driver testified: The driver, concluding that a collision was inevitable, elected to change lanes by turning the bus to his right in order to avoid striking any stationary objects which would endanger his passengers. An automobile occupied by a man named Earl was struck in the rear, spinning the Earl car forward into the intersection where it struck the vehicle of the plaintiff William Rager as it approached the intersection from the north. Subsequent to the collision it was discovered that the service air brake system was impaired by a punctured diaphragm in the brake chamber at the right rear wheel, as the result of a screw coming loose in the system and following the line to the diaphragm. The testimony indicated that this was the cause of the loss of air but was indefinite as to when this occurred. Paul G. Young, a consulting engineer, testified as follows: Since the accident occurred in January of 1970 and the bus was in Automotive's shop during May of 1969, it had been over 7 months between the repairs and the accident. Shortly after the accident, the brake system was inspected by the mechanic for Automotive Sales who had altered the spring brake system from automatic to manual and by some other experts as well. There was no evidence the bus' braking system had been altered between the time Automotive Sales had repaired the bus and the accident. WAS THERE NEGLIGENCE? Our Court of Appeals has stated: Whether or not there is a duty on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from the injury of which he complains is based on foreseeability. City of Scottsdale v. Kokaska, 17 Ariz. App. 120, 495 P.2d 1327 (1972). "Negligence is based on foreseeability." Boozer v. Arizona Country Club, 102 Ariz. 544, 547, 434 P.2d 630, 633 (1968). A review of the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff leads to the conclusion that it was foreseeable that person might be injured as the result of the driver of the school bus relying on the original automatic braking system. Such foreseeable risk of harm created a duty on the part of the mechanic for Automotive Sales to notify the authorities of Wilson School District of the change in the braking system. Based upon the facts before us, we cannot say that negligence in this case is based upon the replacement of the brake itself standing alone. We can say, however, that the replacement of the automatic braking device coupled with the failure to properly notify the people of the change made in the braking system of the bus was a breach of duty owed to Wilson School District for the protection not only of Wilson School District and the pupils riding the bus, but to third parties such as plaintiff. Had the driver known that the spring brake was not activated automatically with the loss of air pressure, it is reasonable to believe that he may have acted differently. We have no difficulty then in finding that there was sufficient evidence that such breach of duty was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. We believe, then, that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case to Automotive Sales. Because the mechanic at Automotive Sales did not inspect the brake drums in each wheel at the time the bus was in the shop, it is the contention of the plaintiff that this also was actionable negligence assuming that inspection of the wheels would have revealed the defect in the brake drum or at least sufficient evidence from which the jury could so find. While conceding that a duty to inspect each wheel may have existed, a reading of the record before us does not indicate that the plaintiff has shown that had the wheels been inspected at the time the bus was in the shop the defective diaphragm would have been discovered. To the contrary, the testimony of the consulting engineer indicated that this was of more recent origin and less than the seven months between the time the bus was in the shop and the accident. We *211 therefore do not address ourselves to this contention of the plaintiff although on retrial the evidence may be presented which could make this an issue for the jury. DELEGATION OF RESPONSIBILITY At the close of the evidence of both the plaintiff and the defendants Wilson School District and Superior Coach Sales, the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendant, Superior Coach Sales. It was the contention of Superior Coach Sales that any negligence was the responsibility of Automotive Sales alone and not Superior Coach. We disagree. Service to the bus was performed under warranty by Superior Coach. Because repair of brakes on heavy vehicles is an undertaking which creates a high degree of risk of serious bodily harm, Nichols v. Baker, 101 Ariz. 151, 416 P.2d 584 (1966), we believe that this is a non-delegable duty and Superior Coach Sales having selected Automotive Sales to do this work, Superior Coach Sales must also respond in damages. We adopt Rule 423 of the Restatement of Torts Second which states as follows: Motions for directed verdict are set aside and the matter remanded for new trial. STRUCKMEYER and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur.