Case Title: Anthony v. Virginia State Bar

Citation: 

Docket Number: 050948

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, JJ., and 
Russell, S.J. 
 
JOSEPH LEATH ANTHONY 
             OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
v.  Record No. 050948  
         November 4, 2005 
 
VIRGINIA STATE BAR, ex rel.  
NINTH DISTRICT COMMITTEE 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 
Marc Jacobson, Robert M.D. Turk, and Herman A. Whisenant, Jr., 
Judges Designate 
 
 
 
This is an appeal of right from the decision of a three-
judge court imposing a public reprimand upon an attorney for 
professional misconduct. 
Proceedings 
 
Joseph Leath Anthony is an attorney licensed to practice 
law in Virginia.  In January 2004, the Virginia State Bar 
filed a complaint against him alleging professional 
misconduct.  Anthony demanded trial by a three-judge court and 
the Chief Justice of this Court entered an order appointing a 
three-judge panel to hear the case, pursuant to Code § 54.1-
3935.  The trial court heard the evidence and arguments of 
counsel on November 30, 2004, and found Anthony guilty of 
violating Rule 8.2 of the Virginia Rules of Professional 
Conduct, which provides:  “A lawyer shall not make a statement 
that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard 
as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or 
 
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integrity of a judge or other judicial officer.”  The court 
imposed a public reprimand with terms.1 
Facts2 
 
Anthony was found in violation of Rule 8.2, which became 
effective on January 1, 2000, when the present Rules of 
Professional Conduct replaced the former Code of Professional 
Responsibility.  Accordingly, the evidence supporting the 
trial court’s decision necessarily relates to Anthony’s 
conduct after that date.  Because that evidence consists 
chiefly of post-2000 reiterations and republications by 
Anthony of statements he made in the 1990’s, we must 
necessarily examine his earlier conduct. 
 
In 1994 and 1995, an appeal of a legal malpractice case 
was pending in this Court styled Snyder-Falkinham v. 
Stockburger (the Stockburger case).  Although Anthony was not 
counsel of record in that case, he represented one of the 
parties in other matters.  He testified that he received a 
telephone call from an unidentified person who spoke in a 
“distortion of voice or a whisper” and that the anonymous 
                     
1 The terms imposed were as follows: “1) Respondent shall 
not file any action in any court, state or federal, without 
first associating co-counsel experienced in litigation; and 2) 
Respondent shall abstain from contacting any judge by letter 
in any proceeding in which he is involved as counsel.” 
 
 
3
caller, whom he called “Deep Throat,” told him that there had 
been ex parte communication between parties in the Stockburger 
case and Justices of this Court.  “Deep Throat” said that the 
improper communication had consisted of an anonymous letter, 
signed only “A Grateful Wife,” mailed to the Justices during 
pendency of the Stockburger appeal. 
Anthony wrote to the clerk of this Court on November 7, 
1994 and again on May 1, 1995, stating that he had information 
that an ex parte communication had been sent to this Court 
and, in the second letter, requesting that “the ex parte 
communications, if any, be disclosed.”  There followed four 
more letters from Anthony to the clerk’s office, seeking 
production of the “Grateful Wife” letter.  Anthony then sent a 
series of five additional letters to the same effect, 
addressed to then Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico, in which he 
said that the letter he sought had been dated September 5, 
1994.  In one of Anthony’s letters, dated July 13, 1995, 
Anthony stated, “it is logical to assume that the non-response 
from any Justice is a combined decision by all of the 
Justices, indicating an extreme desire/need to protect some 
                                                                
2 Although the record is voluminous, Anthony concedes on 
appeal that “[t]here is little, if any, contest concerning the 
facts themselves.” 
 
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group and/or person.”3  Anthony ultimately sent a copy of the 
“Grateful Wife” letter to the Court.  He testified that he had 
not seen it until he had appealed to “Deep Throat” to produce 
it and that thereafter his client had found a copy taped to 
her door. 
Anthony thereafter, as counsel for the plaintiff in the 
Stockburger case, signed and filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia 
against the party and lawyers who had opposed his client in 
the Stockburger case, alleging civil rights and state law 
violations.  In the complaint, Anthony alleged that there was 
a “conspiracy” between the Justices of this Court and the 
Stockburger case defendants to deny his client her civil 
rights and that the Justices had “corruptly” denied a petition 
for rehearing in that case. 
                     
3 David B. Beach, then Clerk of this Court, replied to 
Anthony on July 26, 1995:  “I am instructed to advise you that 
the members of the Court have a vague recollection of 
receiving what may have been a copy of the letter dated 
September 5, 1994, to which you refer.  Some remember reading 
only a part of the letter, others remember reading it through.  
As the members recall, the letter was anonymous, and some who 
read it deemed it incomprehensible.  No member gave it any 
consideration, and it had no influence upon the subsequent 
decision of any member of the Court in your client’s appeal. 
Instead, the members threw their copies in the waste basket, 
deeming it to be another unsolicited writing often sent to the 
Justices by litigants, convicts, and others who are either 
pleased or displeased with a decision of the Court.” 
 
5
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss.  United States 
District Judge Samuel Wilson heard the motion and, in a 
memorandum opinion, commented that “[t]he action is based on 
an alleged anonymous tip and has all the grace and charm of a 
drive-by shooting.”  The court dismissed the complaint and 
pursuant to Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ordered 
sanctions against Anthony, his client, and Michael A. 
Richardson, a Tennessee  lawyer who had also signed the 
complaint.  The court continued the case for hearing on the 
quantum of sanctions to be imposed. 
Anthony responded by filing a 16-page “Protective Motion 
To Reconsider, Rehear, Vacate, Amend, Certify, Extend, And/Or 
Stay” in which he accused Judge Wilson of displaying an 
“aggressive, hostile attitude” toward him and 
“unprofessionally” attacking him.  After this, Judge Wilson 
entered an order transferring the case to United States 
District Judge William L. Osteen, Sr. of the Middle District 
of North Carolina, who was designated to hold court in the 
Western District of Virginia. 
Judge Osteen conducted a sanctions hearing on September 
23, 1996, at which Anthony and his co-counsel testified that 
the sole basis of their federal complaint had been the 
anonymous “Grateful Wife” letter and telephone calls from the 
anonymous “Deep Throat.”  For reasons not revealed in the 
 
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record, Judge Osteen did not enter an order disposing of the 
case until June 7, 2002, when he held that the “harsh and 
incredible allegations are unsupported by even a scintilla of 
competent evidence.”  Judge Osteen’s order made findings that 
Anthony and Richardson had made unfounded attacks upon the 
Virginia trial judge in the Stockburger case, the Justices of 
this Court and Judge Wilson.  He concluded that “[s]uch 
conduct is abhorrent to our system of justice and cannot be 
tolerated.”  Judge Osteen noted that Richardson had no prior 
record of discipline, while Anthony had on two prior occasions 
accused two judges, one state and one federal, of bias and 
inability to understand decisions.  Anthony had also been 
found in direct violation of a court order in the Western 
District of Virginia in another case, under which he was 
prohibited from filing motions.  Ultimately, the court imposed 
sanctions upon Richardson of $7,500 and upon Anthony of 
$14,000. 
Anthony’s journey had only begun.  He filed a “Motion to 
Supplement the Record” in the federal district court in which 
he made various charges against Judge Osteen.  Anthony then 
appealed the dismissal of his federal case to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, where, in 
2002, he filed a “Docketing Statement” in which he said that 
Judge Wilson “had not ‘one scintilla of evidence’ – (credible, 
 
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competent, admissible, or otherwise) to support this libelous, 
harsh and incredible legal finding of fact.”  He also accused 
Judge Osteen of making false accusations against him which, if 
not contained in an order, “would be libelous.”  Anthony 
renewed his charges against the members of this Court. 
Referring to the “Grateful Wife” letter, Anthony wrote:  “The 
letter is credible, not due to who did or did not author it 
and competent because it was clandestinely received by all of 
the justices who wrongfully decided to treat it as 
confidential when it was not, presumably to keep from having 
to file it in the record. . . .”  Anthony’s “Docketing 
Statement” also referred to “the fact that the Supreme Court 
of Virginia had received, had concealed, had mischaracterized 
and had destroyed the eight originals of the Grateful Wife’s 
Letter, which likely contained, inter alia, the DNA of the 
author. . . .” 
Anthony’s appeal to the Fourth Circuit was unsuccessful. 
He then wrote a letter, dated February 18, 2003, to Chief 
Judge William W. Wilkins of the Fourth Circuit, accusing 
federal judges of placing “false and defamatory information 
into public records, – apparently to cover up the documented 
wrongful judicial conduct of state court judges and/or to 
punish and defame the individuals who dared to question that 
state judicial conduct.  Each of these Judges 
 
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manufactured/fabricated evidence. . . .”  In his letter to 
Judge Wilkins, Anthony also accused the judges of the Fourth 
Circuit of “corruptly” entering orders “because the Fourth 
Circuit judges knowingly allowed false and defamatory 
information to remain in public records. . . .” 
On April 25, 2003, Anthony filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States.  In his 
petition, he wrote:  “This case presents a situation in which 
the lower courts were unable to police themselves to avoid 
misuse of judicial power.”  He further wrote that an 
“investigation” had “revealed that the justices of the 
Virginia Supreme Court had received ex parte communication, 
concealed it, wrongfully declared it confidential, 
mischaracterized it and ultimately destroyed it after a copy 
was requested.” 
Anthony’s petition for certiorari was denied.  He then 
filed a petition for rehearing in which he referred to 
“material judicial misconduct,” “major fabrications of 
evidence by the Federal District Court,” “obvious 
creation/manufacturing of evidence by judges,” a 
“determination that was made on a fraudulent basis,” a 
“corruption of the judicial process” and “a complete 
abdication of judicial integrity.”  Anthony’s petition for 
rehearing was denied. 
 
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At Anthony’s hearing before the three-judge court, he 
admitted making all of the previous statements, but stated 
that he was exercising his “First Amendment rights” in making 
them.  At many points in the proceedings, Anthony was asked 
what factual basis he had for his statements.  His replies 
were either “the underlying record” or references to his 
anonymous telephone calls from “Deep Throat” and the anonymous 
“Grateful Wife” letter.  Anthony offered no other 
justification for the numerous attacks he had made upon the 
qualifications and integrity of the several judges, state and 
federal, maligned by his statements. 
Discussion 
At the hearing before the three-judge court, Anthony made 
numerous jurisdictional objections and filed a plea in bar, a 
motion to dismiss, a motion for the production of exculpatory 
evidence, and a motion to strike the Bar’s evidence.  The 
trial court overruled or denied all of the foregoing.  
Anthony, on appeal, assigns error to each of those rulings.  
We find no merit in any of Anthony’s assignments of error, 
only two of which require discussion. 
A. The Legal Standard 
Anthony argued at his hearing and on appeal that the Bar, 
in order to establish a violation of Rule 8.2, had the burden 
of proving that his various statements concerning judges were 
 
10
in fact false.  That contention ignores the simple language of 
the rule.  We held, in Pilli v. Virginia State Bar, 269 Va. 
391, 611 S.E.2d 389 (2005), that the Bar has the burden of 
establishing two elements to prove a violation of Rule 8.2: 
“First, the Bar must establish that a lawyer made a statement 
about a judge or other judicial officer involving his or her 
qualifications or integrity.  Second, the Bar must prove that 
the statement was made with reckless disregard of its truth or 
falsity or with knowledge that the statement was false.”  Id., 
at 396, 611 S.E.2d at 391. 
The standard of review we apply to the decision of a 
three-judge court in a Bar disciplinary proceeding is the same 
as the standard applicable to decisions of the Disciplinary 
Board.  We conduct an independent examination of the entire 
record.  We consider the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Bar, the prevailing party in the trial 
court.  We accord the trial court’s factual findings 
substantial weight and view those findings as prima facie 
correct.  Although we do not give the trial court’s 
conclusions the weight of a jury verdict, we will sustain 
those conclusions unless it appears that they are not 
justified by a reasonable view of the evidence or are contrary 
to law.  See Pilli, 269 Va. at 396, 611 S.E.2d at 391. 
 
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Applying the standard set forth in Pilli, the trial court 
found, by clear and convincing evidence, indeed by unrefuted 
evidence, that Anthony had made statements about a number of 
judges involving their qualifications and integrity and that 
he made those statements with reckless disregard of their 
truth or falsity.  Anthony's explanation that his statements 
impugning the integrity of various judges were based only upon 
anonymous telephone calls, an anonymous letter, and “the 
underlying record,” were in themselves sufficient to support 
the trial court’s conclusion that those statements were made 
with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity.  Our 
independent review of the record supports the trial court’s 
findings. 
B. Freedom of Speech 
 
Finally, Anthony argues that even if his statements 
violated Rule 8.2, they fall within the category of speech 
protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and Article I, Section 12, of the Constitution 
of Virginia.  Anthony cites criminal and criminal contempt 
cases, and cases involving statements published by news media, 
to support his arguments.  He argues that state law may not 
regulate speech unless it is shown that the speech constitutes 
a “clear and present danger” of causing substantive evils that 
the state has a right to prevent. 
 
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We do not agree.  The Supreme Court of the United States 
has made it clear that the speech of lawyers in pending cases 
may be regulated under a less demanding standard than the 
“clear and present danger” standard established for the 
regulation of the press.  A lawyer’s right to free speech is 
“extremely circumscribed” in the courtroom and, in a pending 
case, is limited outside the courtroom as well, to a degree 
that would not apply to an ordinary citizen.  Gentile v. State 
Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991).  Those limitations 
on lawyers’ rights of free speech are based upon a lawyer’s 
obligation to abstain from public debate that will obstruct 
the administration of justice.  Id. at 1074.  Because lawyers 
have special access to information within the judicial system, 
their statements may pose a threat to the fairness of a 
pending proceeding, such statements being likely perceived as 
especially authoritative.  Id. 
 
An appropriate test for balancing a lawyer’s free speech 
rights against the restrictions imposed by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct is:  Whether the conduct in question 
creates a “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” to 
the administration of justice.  Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074-75.  
That is the test we adopted in Pilli, where we said:  
“Finally, we observe that these written statements by a member 
of the bar of this Commonwealth, published in the form of a 
 
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“pleading” filed with a court, are more than a troubling 
reflection of the author’s lack of professionalism.  Such 
statements also may have the undeserved effect of diminishing 
the public’s perception of the numerous lawyers and judges who 
so ably serve the citizens of this Commonwealth.”  269 Va. at 
397, 611 S.E.2d at 392.4 
 
Judges are no more immune from criticism in the public 
forum than are any other public office-holders, although their 
ability to reply to it is extremely limited.  A judge's errors 
are subject to correction on appeal, and judicial misconduct 
is subject to discipline by independent bodies created by 
statute.  Judges are subject to removal or impeachment for 
wrongdoing pursuant to constitutional provisions, and they are 
responsible for violations of the law as are all other 
citizens.  The judicial branch of government, however, is 
uniquely dependent upon the trust of the people for the 
effective performance of its work.  It commands no armies and 
does not control the public purse.  It is especially 
                     
4 The Supreme Court, in Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1068, 
observed that Virginia had adopted the “clear and present 
danger” standard in these circumstances.  That was true in 
1991, when Gentile was decided, because former Disciplinary 
Rule 7-106, then in effect, expressly adopted that standard. 
Present Rule 8.2 is silent as to the balancing test to be 
applied.  Its companion Rule 3.6, however, relating to trial 
publicity, expresses a standard parallel to that which we 
apply here:  “a substantial likelihood of interfering with the 
fairness of the trial.” 
 
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vulnerable to unfounded attacks that undermine public 
confidence in its integrity.  Reckless attacks by lawyers are 
especially damaging, for the reasons discussed above. 
 
We hold that a derogatory statement concerning the 
qualifications or integrity of a judge, made by a lawyer with 
knowing falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth or 
falsity, tends to diminish the public perception of the 
qualifications or integrity of the judge.  Such a statement 
creates a substantial likelihood of material prejudice to the 
administration of justice as a matter of law and is not, 
therefore, constitutionally protected speech. 
Conclusion 
 
Because the record supports the finding of the three-
judge court that Anthony’s statements violated Rule 8.2, and 
because his statements lacked constitutional protection, we 
will affirm that court’s order. 
Affirmed.