Case Title: Wayne G. Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1995AP002928

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-2928 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Wayne G. Tatge,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Chambers & Owen, Inc.,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 
210 Wis. 2d 51, 565 N.W.2d 150 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-PUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 19, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 3, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Rock 
 
JUDGE: 
James P. Daley 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Abrahamson, C.J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Bradley, J., joins 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-cross respondent 
petitioner there were briefs by Richard R. Grant and Consigny, 
Andrews, Hemming & Grant, S.C., Janesville and oral argument by 
Richard R. Grant. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-cross appellant 
there was a brief by Fred Gants, Lauri D. Morris and Quarles & 
Brady, Madison and oral argument by Fred Gants. 
 
No.  95-2928 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 95-2928  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Wayne G. Tatge,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Chambers & Owen, Inc.,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross- 
          Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JUN 19, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, 
Inc., 210 Wis. 2d 51, 565 N.W.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1997), which 
affirmed a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court for Rock 
County, James P. Daley, Judge.  The circuit court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant Chambers & Owen, Inc. 
(Chambers & Owen) and thereby dismissed the plaintiff Wayne 
Tatge's (Tatge) claim for wrongful discharge.  The circuit court 
also entered a judgment granting Chambers & Owen's post-verdict 
motion to dismiss Tatge's claim for negligent misrepresentation. 
¶2 
There are two issues before us on review: (1) whether 
a cause of action for breach of an employment contract is 
actionable in tort for misrepresentation under Wisconsin law; 
and (2) whether the narrow cause of action for wrongful 
No.  95-2928 
 
2 
discharge established in Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 
Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983), encompasses the discharge of 
an at-will employee for failing to sign a non-disclosure and 
non-compete agreement.  We hold that a breach of an employment 
contract is not actionable in tort.  We also hold that a 
contract cause of action for wrongful discharge may not be 
maintained under Brockmeyer where an at-will employee is 
terminated for failing to sign a non-disclosure/non-compete 
agreement.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  In 1981, Tatge 
became an employee of Chambers & Owen.  In late 1990, Chambers & 
Owen issued an Employee Handbook to its employees.  Tatge signed 
the 
Handbook 
receipt 
on 
December 
18, 
1990, 
whereby 
he 
acknowledged that his employment with Chambers & Owen was "at-
will, terminable at any time by the company at its sole 
discretion with or without cause and with or without notice."  
The receipt further explained that "such employment is not 
contractual, and remains as such unless and until a written 
contract expressly authorized by the Board of Directors is 
entered into and executed in writing by me and Chambers & Owen, 
Inc. . . ." 
¶4 
In early 1993, after several changes to Tatge's job 
duties and compensation arrangement, Chambers & Owen asked Tatge 
to sign a "Management Agreement" (the agreement).  Paragraph 1 
of the agreement contains a non-disclosure provision that 
states: 
No.  95-2928 
 
3 
 
Employee recognizes and acknowledges that the customer 
data, 
programs, 
and 
business 
practices 
used 
or 
employed by Employer embody and involve the use of 
information of a confidential nature which represents 
an asset of substantial value.  Employee will not, 
without prior authorization, during or after the term 
of employment with Employer, disclose such information 
to any person, firm, corporation, association, or 
other entity for any reason or purpose whatever. 
¶5 
Paragraph 2 of the agreement contains a covenant not 
to compete that provides: 
 
Covenant Not to Compete.  Employee shall not, for a 
period of six (6) months after termination of his/her 
employment with Employer for any reason whatsoever, 
with or without cause on behalf of him/herself or any 
other person, firm, corporation, association, or other 
entity, directly or indirectly, engage in, assist in, 
or 
be 
connected 
in 
any 
manner 
with 
the 
sale, 
distribution, procurement of products or knowledge of 
those 
functions 
competitive 
with 
those 
sold 
by 
Employer under this Agreement to any person, firm, 
corporation, association, or other entity located 
within the Employers [sic] geographic service area 
during the six (6) months prior to said termination. 
¶6 
Beginning in April 1993, Tatge expressed his objection 
to the agreement and discussed it with the company's president, 
John Owen (Owen).  At trial, Tatge testified that he had asked 
Owen what would happen if Tatge refused to sign the agreement 
and that Owen replied, "Nothing."  Tatge also discussed job 
security with Owen and testified that Owen told him his 
employment would be ongoing and terminable only for what 
amounted to good cause. 
¶7 
At a final meeting on April 5, 1993, after Tatge was 
given the weekend to "think it over," Tatge again stated that he 
would not sign the agreement.  Tatge told Owen that he had more 
No.  95-2928 
 
4 
market value than his current compensation package provided for. 
 Because Tatge would not sign the agreement, Chambers & Owen 
told Tatge that he would be terminated.  That same day, Owen 
sent a letter to Tatge confirming his dismissal because he would 
not sign the agreement.  The letter stated in pertinent part: 
 
This 
letter 
is 
intended 
to 
confirm 
our 
conversation today. 
 
As you know, we have requested our key employees 
to sign non-competitive agreements. . . . 
 
We have had different conversations on this 
issue.  Today you informed me of your final decision 
not to sign the agreement.  As a result, we are left 
with no alternative but to terminate your employment. 
. . . 
¶8 
On April 27, 1994, Tatge commenced suit against 
Chambers & Owen claiming wrongful discharge, breach of contract 
and three forms of fraudulent misrepresentation, including 
negligent, strict liability and intentional misrepresentation. 
¶9 
Both parties moved for summary judgment.  On February 
17, 1995, the circuit court denied Tatge's motion for partial 
summary 
judgment, 
and 
dismissed 
his 
claim 
for 
wrongful 
discharge.  The circuit court reasoned that the agreement did 
not violate Wisconsin's restrictive covenant statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465 (1991-92).1  The circuit court also denied Chambers & 
                     
1 All future statutory references are to the 1991-92 version 
of the statutes unless otherwise noted. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 103.465 provides: 
103.465 
 
Restrictive 
covenants 
in 
employment 
contracts.  A covenant by an assistant, servant or 
agent not to compete with his employer or principal 
No.  95-2928 
 
5 
Owen's motion to dismiss Tatge's breach of contract and 
misrepresentation claims, concluding that the latter should be 
tried only as to the alleged statements that Tatge's employment 
would be ongoing and that he could only be fired for cause. 
¶10 The subsequent trial was bifurcated.  At the end of 
the first phase, the jury found insufficient evidence of a 
contract other than at-will employment, but determined that 
Chambers & Owen made a representation of fact that Tatge was 
entitled to ongoing employment and termination only for cause.  
During the second phase, the circuit court granted Chambers & 
Owen's motion to dismiss both the intentional and strict 
liability misrepresentation claims.  The circuit court allowed 
the negligent misrepresentation claim to proceed to trial. 
¶11 The 
jury 
found 
for 
Tatge 
on 
the 
negligent 
misrepresentation claim, assessed his damages at $250,000 and 
found him 40% contributorily negligent.  Upon Chambers & Owen's 
post-verdict motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
to change answers and for directed verdict, the circuit court 
dismissed Tatge's negligent misrepresentation claim.  Tatge 
appealed. 
                                                                  
during the term of the employment or agency, or 
thereafter, within a specified territory and during a 
specified time is lawful and enforceable only if the 
restrictions imposed are reasonably necessary for the 
protection of the employer or principal.  Any such 
restrictive 
covenant 
imposing 
an 
unreasonable 
restraint is illegal, void and unenforceable even as 
to so much of the covenant or performance as would be 
a reasonable restraint. 
No.  95-2928 
 
6 
¶12 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
order and judgment by concluding: (1) that an employer's 
discharge 
of 
an 
employee 
for 
failing 
to 
sign 
a 
non-
disclosure/non-compete agreement does not give rise to a 
wrongful discharge claim; and (2) that a breach of an employment 
contract is not actionable in tort for misrepresentation.  On 
September 18, 1997, we granted Tatge's petition for review. 
I. 
¶13 The first issue we consider is whether a cause of 
action for breach of an employment contract is actionable in 
tort for misrepresentation under Wisconsin law.  This presents a 
question of law which we review de novo, without deference to 
the conclusions of the circuit court or the court of appeals.  
See Kara B. v. Dane County, 205 Wis. 2d 140, 145-46, 555 N.W.2d 
630 (1996). 
¶14 Before 
considering 
the 
viability 
of 
a 
misrepresentation claim in a breach of contract action, we first 
shed light on the jury's determination that Tatge's employment 
contract was a contract for at-will employment only.  As we have 
stated, the jury found insufficient evidence that Chambers & 
Owen had entered into a contract with Tatge to provide him with 
ongoing employment, terminable only for good cause.2 
                     
2 Specifically, the special verdict form in this case 
illustrates that the following questions were presented to the 
jury: 
Question 1: 
Did Chambers & Owen, Inc., enter into a 
contract to provide Wayne Tatge with 
ongoing employment? 
No.  95-2928 
 
7 
¶15 Despite the jury's finding, the circuit court allowed 
the misrepresentation claim to proceed to trial.  Then, at the 
hearing for the post-verdict motions, the circuit court, relying 
on Brockmeyer, stated: 
 
The jury found that there was no contract.  That was 
the first verdict found that there was no contract for 
ongoing employment.  There was no contract for 
termination.  And based upon that, I believe that ends 
it as it relates to the termination.  As a result, I 
have, as indicated, dismissed the cause of action. 
Record on Appeal at 94:6 (Hearing Transcript August 29, 1995). 
¶16 Rather than challenge the jury's verdict that he was 
an employee-at-will, Tatge contests the circuit court's post-
verdict 
grant 
of 
judgment 
notwithstanding 
the 
verdict.  
Accordingly, Tatge argues that misrepresentation by an employer 
is a valid tort in Wisconsin as presented to and determined by 
the jury.  More specifically, Tatge argues that Chambers & Owen 
misrepresented 
that 
his 
employment 
would 
be 
ongoing 
and 
terminable only for cause, and that Chambers & Owen thereafter 
terminated him without cause.  Tatge then asks this court to 
address his misrepresentation claim under tort law—not as a 
                                                                  
 
ANSWER: 
No. 
 
Question 2: 
Did Chambers 
& 
Owen 
enter 
into 
a 
contract 
to 
provide 
Wayne 
Tatge 
employment with termination only for 
good cause? 
 
ANSWER: 
No. 
 
Record on Appeal at 54:1 (Special Verdict June 28, 1995)  
No.  95-2928 
 
8 
wrongful discharge or breach of contract claim under contract 
law.  He advocates this approach by arguing that employers have 
an 
independent 
duty 
to 
their 
employees 
to 
refrain 
from 
misrepresentation. 
¶17 We decline to give our blessing to such an irreverent 
marriage of tort and contract law.  As we explain below, the 
circuit court was correct to grant Chambers & Owen's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
¶18 "[T]here must be a duty existing independently of the 
performance of the contract for a cause of action in tort to 
exist."  Landwehr v. Citizens Trust Co., 110 Wis. 2d 716, 723, 
329 N.W.2d 411 (1983).  We cannot overlook the fact that Tatge's 
misrepresentation claim finds its lifeline in the improper 
performance of an employment contract.  In other words, Tatge 
argues that Chambers & Owen's alleged representation that Tatge 
would be terminable only for good cause tainted his subsequent 
termination from employment without good cause. 
¶19 The breach of an employment contract is not actionable 
in tort.  See Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 574-76 (holding that 
the breach of an at-will employment contract is not actionable 
in tort);3 Dvorak v. Pluswood Wisconsin, Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 218, 
                     
3 As the court of appeals stated, "We recognize that Tatge's 
misrepresentation claim does not depend upon the public policy 
rationale articulated in Brockmeyer."  Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, 
Inc., 210 Wis. 2d 51, 59, 565 N.W.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1997).  
Nevertheless, a plain reading of Brockmeyer illustrates that any 
claim which is dependent upon a wrongful termination from at-
will employment is not actionable in tort.  See generally 
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 
(1983). 
No.  95-2928 
 
9 
220, 358 N.W.2d 544 (Ct. App. 1984) (reaching the same 
conclusion regarding a term employment contract).  In this case, 
no duty to refrain from misrepresentation exists independently 
of the performance of the at-will employment contract.  In fact, 
Tatge's request for damages in this case illustrates that his 
misrepresentation claim is dependent upon his termination from 
employment: "Plaintiff, but for the misrepresentation, would 
have changed his position on signing and remained employed, 
earning $250,000 more in wages and benefits after mitigation."  
See Tatge Brief at 46.4 
¶20 Because it is tied inextricably to his termination 
from employment, Tatge's misrepresentation claim was properly 
dismissed by the circuit court. 
 
¶21 Tatge cites Hartwig v. Bitter, 29 Wis. 2d 653, 139 
N.W.2d 644 (1966), for the proposition that employees may 
maintain a tort claim of misrepresentation against an employer 
who misrepresents the nature of their employment with the 
employer. 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
held 
that 
Hartwig 
is 
distinguishable, see Tatge, 210 Wis. 2d at 58-59, and we agree. 
 In Hartwig, the employer persuaded two real estate agents to 
                     
4 We do not mean to suggest that litigants may circumvent 
the holding of this court simply by pleading damages which 
somehow 
do 
not 
arise 
solely 
from 
one's 
termination 
of 
employment.  As we have said, a duty must exist independently 
from the performance of the employment contract in order to 
maintain a cause of action in tort.  See Landwehr v. Citizens 
Trust Co., 110 Wis. 2d 716, 723, 329 N.W.2d 411 (1983).  The 
discussion regarding Tatge's asserted damages is relevant only 
to make clear that his tort claim is dependent upon his 
termination from employment. 
No.  95-2928 
 
10
work for him by misrepresenting, among other things, that he had 
a list of "prospects" who were interested in buying or selling 
business enterprises; that the agents would earn a lot of money 
by selling to these "prospects"; and that he, the employer, was 
closing sales "right along."  See Hartwig, 29 Wis. 2d at 655. 
¶22 When the agents brought suit against the employer, 
alleging 
that 
they 
were 
damaged 
by 
the 
employer's 
misrepresentations, the employer moved to dismiss the complaint 
by arguing that the facts alleged did not constitute a cause of 
action.  See id. at 655-56.  We held that a viable cause of 
action for misrepresentation had been pleaded.  See id. at 658-
59. 
¶23 As the court of appeals noted, the agents were not 
employees at the time of the misrepresentation.  See Tatge, 210 
Wis. 2d at 59.  Because no employment relationship existed at 
the time of the misrepresentations, any duty to refrain from 
misrepresentation must have existed independently from the 
performance of an employment contract.  Therefore, Hartwig is 
inapposite,5 and we are left with but one issue for our 
                     
5 Tatge's attempt to utilize Hausman v. St. Croix Care 
Center, Inc. 207 Wis. 2d 402, 558 N.W.2d 893 (Ct. App. 1996), 
rev'd 214 Wis. 2d 654, 571 N.W.2d 393 (1997), and Wausau Medical 
Center, S.C. v. Asplund, 182 Wis. 2d 274, 514 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. 
App. 1994) is no more persuasive.  Although the court of appeals 
in 
Hausman 
briefly 
"entertained" 
the 
employees' 
misrepresentation claim against their employer, the alleged 
misrepresentation was not dependent upon a breach of their 
employment contract.  Rather, the employees claimed that they 
would have been statutorily protected from termination had the 
employer not made the misrepresentation.  See Hausman, 207 
Wis. 2d at 410-11. 
No.  95-2928 
 
11
determination: whether Tatge has a viable contract cause of 
action for wrongful discharge in accordance with our decision in 
Brockmeyer. 
II. 
¶24 We next consider whether the narrow cause of action 
for wrongful discharge established in Brockmeyer encompasses the 
discharge of an at-will employee for failing to sign a non-
disclosure/non-compete agreement.  Our consideration of this 
issue requires us to determine whether as a matter of law, Tatge 
has identified a fundamental and well-defined public policy in 
Wis. Stat. § 103.465 so as to trigger the Brockmeyer exception 
to the employment-at-will doctrine.  Thus, we are presented with 
a question of law which this court reviews de novo, without 
deference to the conclusions of the circuit court or the court 
of appeals.  See Kempfer v. Automated Finishing, Inc., 211 
Wis. 2d 100, 107-08, 564 N.W.2d 692 (1997); Brockmeyer, 113 
Wis. 2d at 574.  In addition, we review the circuit court's 
summary judgment ruling on this question de novo, and apply the 
same methodology as the circuit court.  See Wisconsin Dep't of 
                                                                  
In Wausau Medical, the alleged misrepresentation, as in 
Hartwig, occurred at a time when no employment relationship 
existed between the parties—that is, the misrepresentation 
induced the employee to enter into the employment relationship. 
 See Wausau Medical, 182 Wis. 2d at 290-91.  For a discussion of 
such "truth-in-hiring" claims, see Sandra J. Mullings, Truth-in-
Hiring Claims and the At-Will Rule: Should an Employer Have a 
License to Lie?, 1997 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 105, 131 (concluding 
that "the right to terminate employment at will is not a license 
to lie in order to bring about that employment."). 
No.  95-2928 
 
12
Corrections v. Kliesmet, 211 Wis. 2d 254, 259, 564 N.W.2d 742 
(1997). 
A. 
¶25 Before 
addressing 
the 
Brockmeyer 
public 
policy 
exception to employment-at-will, we first respond to Chambers & 
Owen's argument that Tatge's claim should fail because Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465 is inapplicable to the facts of this case.  This 
argument is based on the following exchange between the parties. 
¶26 Tatge 
asserts 
that 
the 
non-disclosure 
provision 
(paragraph 1 of the agreement)—not the non-compete provision 
(paragraph 2)—is unreasonable within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465.  In particular, Tatge contends that since there are 
no time or geographic limitations set forth in the non-
disclosure 
paragraph, 
the 
non-disclosure 
provision 
is 
an 
unreasonable restraint of trade under § 103.465 and this court's 
decision in Gary Van Zeeland Talent, Inc. v. Sandas, 84 Wis. 2d 
202, 267 N.W.2d 242 (1978). 
¶27 Chambers & Owen responds by arguing that Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465 does not apply to non-disclosure provisions, but "by 
its terms" applies only to covenants not to compete.  Because 
§ 103.465 is inapposite, Chambers & Owen asserts that a 
Brockmeyer wrongful discharge claim may not be sustained by 
relying on public policy evidenced by that statute.  We 
disagree. 
No.  95-2928 
 
13
¶28 Leaving aside the question whether the non-disclosure 
provision satisfies the commands of Wis. Stat. § 103.465,6 we 
conclude that § 103.465 applies to the non-disclosure provision 
in this case.  We need look no further than Van Zeeland to reach 
this conclusion.  The Van Zeeland court applied § 103.465 to a 
non-disclosure agreement containing virtually the same language 
as the paragraph involved here, see Van Zeeland, 84 Wis. 2d at 
208, 218-220, because "[i]t is apparent that what [the employer] 
seeks in this action is the restraint of competition . . . ."  
Id. at 209. 
¶29 As in Van Zeeland, it is clear that Chambers & Owen 
seeks to restrain competition through use of the non-disclosure 
provision.  It seeks to shield its customer data, programs, and 
business practices from competitors' eyes because it "represents 
an asset of substantial value."  This is the essence of a trade 
restraint; it would be an exercise in semantics to overlook Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465 merely because paragraph 1 of the agreement is 
not labeled a "covenant not to compete."  Therefore, we proceed 
to analyze Tatge's wrongful discharge claim under Brockmeyer. 
B. 
¶30 In Brockmeyer, we traced the history and evolution of 
the employment-at-will doctrine.  Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 
566-68.  We need not repeat that discussion here; Wisconsin 
                     
6 Because we conclude that Tatge has not identified a 
fundamental and well-defined public policy in Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465 sufficient to trigger the Brockmeyer exception to 
employment-at-will, we need not determine whether the non-
disclosure provision is indeed unreasonable.  
No.  95-2928 
 
14
first recognized the doctrine in Prentiss v. Ledyard, 28 Wis. 
131, 133 (1871), and it is now a stable fixture in Wisconsin 
law.  See, e.g., Hausman v. St. Croix Care Center, Inc., 214 
Wis. 2d 654, 662, 571 N.W.2d 393 (1997) ("The employment-at-will 
doctrine is an established general tenet of workplace relations 
in this 
jurisdiction."). 
 
The employment-at-will doctrine 
dictates that where employment is for an indefinite term, an 
employer may discharge an employee "for good cause, for no 
cause, or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby 
guilty of legal wrong."  Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 567 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
¶31 Despite statutory modification of the at-will doctrine 
"to curb harsh applications and abuse of the rule," we 
recognized, as have other state courts, "the need to protect 
workers who are wrongfully discharged under circumstances not 
covered by any legislation or whose job security is not 
safeguarded by a collective bargaining agreement or civil 
service regulations."  Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 567-68.  
Therefore, we adopted a "narrow public policy exception" to the 
employment-at-will doctrine.  That exception provides that "an 
employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the 
discharge is contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public 
policy as evidenced by existing law."  Id. at 572-73.7 
                     
7 "Existing law" was originally limited to constitutional or 
statutory provisions, see Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 576, but 
has since been expanded to include administrative rules.  See 
generally Winkelman v. Beloit Memorial Hosp., 168 Wis. 2d 12, 
483 N.W.2d 211 (1992). 
No.  95-2928 
 
15
¶32 We have since modified the public policy exception to 
the employment-at-will doctrine in several ways.  In Wandry v. 
Bull's Eye Credit Union, 129 Wis. 2d 37, 46-47, 384 N.W.2d 325 
(1986), we extended Brockmeyer's wrongful discharge rule to 
include the spirit, as well as the letter of a statutory 
provision.  See also Schultz v. Production Stamping, 148 Wis. 2d 
17, 22, 434 N.W.2d 780 (1989); Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 134 
Wis. 2d 136, 143-44, 396 N.W.2d 167 (1986).  In Bushko, we 
expressly limited the scope of the public policy exception to 
situations where the employee is terminated for refusing a 
command, instruction, or request of the employer to violate 
public policy as established by existing law.  See Bushko, 134 
Wis. 2d at 142; see also Kempfer, 211 Wis. 2d at 110-111, 115. 
¶33 Finally, 
we recently 
expanded the 
public 
policy 
exception to include situations where an employee is terminated 
for his or her compliance with an affirmative obligation under 
law.  See Hausman, 214 Wis. 2d at 668.  In Hausman we stated: 
 
Where the law imposes an affirmative obligation upon 
an employee to prevent abuse or neglect of nursing 
home 
residents 
and 
the 
employee 
fulfills 
that 
obligation by reporting the abuse, an employer's 
termination of employment for fulfillment of the legal 
obligation 
exposes 
the 
employer 
to 
a 
wrongful 
termination action.  In such instances, the employee 
may pursue a wrongful termination suit under the 
public policy exception regardless of whether the 
employer has made an initial request, command, or 
instruction that the reporting obligation be violated. 
Id. 
C. 
No.  95-2928 
 
16
¶34 
Citing several of these cases, Tatge argues that Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465 articulates a fundamental and well-defined 
public policy that unreasonable restraints of trade will not be 
placed upon employees.  According to Tatge, the nature of this 
public policy is evidenced by three cases: Streiff v. American 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 602, 348 N.W.2d 505 (1984); 
Van Zeeland, 84 Wis. 2d 202; and General Medical Corp. v. Kobs, 
179 Wis. 2d 422, 507 N.W.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1993). 
¶35 
We need not address these cases in detail because we 
agree that Wis. Stat. § 103.465 evidences a strong public policy 
against the enforcement of trade restraints which are determined 
to be unreasonable upon all employees, including those employed 
at will.  We do not agree, however, that § 103.465 evidences a 
public policy contrary to an employer's requirement that its 
employee sign a non-disclosure/non-compete agreement which that 
employee considers to be unreasonable within the meaning of 
§ 103.465.8  None of these cases illustrate, or even suggest, 
that such a policy is evidenced by the statute. 
¶36 
We have often repeated that the Brockmeyer public 
policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is a narrow 
one.  See, e.g., Kempfer, 211 Wis. 2d at 113 ("Thus, the 
Wisconsin 
public policy 
exception 
to 
the 
employee-at-will 
doctrine is very narrow."); Bushko, 134 Wis. 2d at 146 ("The 
                     
8 This is the practical effect of Tatge's argument that Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465 prohibits the "imposition" of an unreasonable 
restrictive covenant.  According to Tatge, the "imposition" of a 
restrictive covenant occurs "at the time that [Tatge] signs it." 
 Oral argument transcript.  
No.  95-2928 
 
17
public policy exception of Brockmeyer must be reflected clearly 
in existing law . . . ."); Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 578-79 
(illustrating that a statute must contain a "clearly defined 
mandate of public policy against discharging an employee" for 
engaging in the employer-proscribed conduct).  A plain reading 
of Wis. Stat. § 103.465 reveals that Tatge has not identified 
such a clear and well-defined public policy. 
¶37 
The statute states that covenants not to compete are 
"lawful and enforceable only if the restrictions imposed are 
reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer or 
principal."  Wis. Stat. § 103.465.  It then indicates that 
"[a]ny such restrictive 
covenant 
imposing 
an 
unreasonable 
restraint is illegal, void and unenforceable even as to so much 
of the covenant or performance as would be a reasonable 
restraint."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶38 
The clear public policy manifested by Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465 is to protect the employee from compliance with the 
terms of an "unreasonable" restrictive covenant by rendering 
that covenant void and unenforceable.  As the court of appeals 
stated, "[w]hen a restrictive covenant is unreasonable, the 
public policy of Wisconsin is not to create a cause of action, 
but to void the covenant."  Tatge, 210 Wis. 2d at 57.  The 
public policy remains the same regardless of whether the 
agreement is reasonable within the meaning of § 103.465.  
Therefore, although § 103.465 evinces clear public policy for 
this jurisdiction, Tatge has not identified a fundamental and 
No.  95-2928 
 
18
well-defined public policy sufficient to trigger the Brockmeyer 
exception to employment-at-will.9 
¶39 
Neither the spirit nor the letter of Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465 establishes a well-defined public policy in Wisconsin 
against an employee's signing a covenant not to compete that he 
or she presumes to be unreasonable—and with good reason.  We 
have previously held that the validity of a restrictive covenant 
is 
to 
be 
established 
by 
examination 
of 
the 
particular 
circumstances which surround it.  See Rollins Burdick Hunter of 
Wisconsin, Inc. v. Hamilton, 101 Wis. 2d 460, 468, 304 N.W.2d 
752 (1981) ("[W]hat is reasonable varies from case to case, and 
what may be unreasonable in one instance may be very reasonable 
in another.").  
¶40 In Rollins, we made clear that the task of determining 
the "reasonableness" of a restrictive covenant within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 103.465 is not to be undertaken without 
a thorough examination of the facts of each individual case.  In 
particular, we noted that the following factors would have to be 
considered in order to make such a determination: (1) the extent 
to which the information sought to be protected is vital to the 
                     
9 The dissent's position is perplexing.  According to the 
dissent, an employer enforces a non-disclosure agreement when 
the employer terminates its employee for failing to sign that 
agreement.  See Dissent at 1.  Ordinarily, one would assume that 
enforcement of a non-disclosure agreement could only occur 
after: (1) the parties actually agreed to its terms; (2) the 
employee sought to disclose allegedly confidential information; 
and (3) the employer attempted to prevent the disclosure of that 
information by calling upon the agreement.  The dissent's 
reasoning to the contrary is unfounded. 
No.  95-2928 
 
19
employer's ability to conduct its business; (2) the extent to 
which the employee actually had access to that information; and 
(3) the extent to which such information could be obtained 
through other sources.  See id. at 470. 
¶41 We also stated: 
 
As to whether the restraint is unreasonable to the 
employee, we do not see how such a determination could 
be made without considering additionally the extent to 
which the restraint on competition actually inhibits 
the employee's ability to pursue a livelihood in that 
enterprise, 
as 
well 
as 
the 
particular 
skills, 
abilities, and experience of the employee sought to be 
restrained.  These, of course, are not exhaustive, 
since the very essence of what is reasonable involves 
the totality of the circumstances. 
Id. 
¶42 Were we to apply the Brockmeyer exception to the facts 
of this case, at-will employees could indiscriminately decline 
to sign non-disclosure/non-compete agreements which in their own 
minds are "unreasonable," and subsequently bring a wrongful 
discharge claim if terminated for doing so.10  As the court of 
appeals stated, "all restrictive covenant cases would become 
wrongful discharge cases."  Tatge, 210 Wis. 2d at 56-57.  Not 
                     
10 At-will 
employees 
might 
even 
refuse 
to 
sign 
non-
disclosure/non-compete 
agreements 
in 
bad 
faith, 
or 
when 
motivated by purely self-serving desires.  For example, an at-
will employee who is terminated for refusing to sign a non-
disclosure/non-compete agreement under the guise that it is 
"unreasonable" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 103.465, but 
who truthfully intended to use the agreement as a bargaining 
tool for obtaining a pay increase or other work-related benefits 
could maintain a wrongful discharge action against the employer. 
 We decline to promote such disingenuous tactics. 
No.  95-2928 
 
20
surprisingly, Wis. Stat. § 103.465 is devoid of any suggestion 
that the legislature intended such an anomalous result. 
¶43 Once the wrongful discharge claim is filed, Tatge's 
approach would base the claim on hypothetical facts, before an 
employer has even sought to enforce the allegedly unreasonable 
agreement.  Courts would be required to engage in fact-intensive 
inquiries to determine whether an employer has a protectable 
interest and whether it is reasonable as to the employee without 
actual facts regarding the specific information sought to be 
protected, the length of employment and the nature of the 
competition. 
¶44 We decline to adopt such a dubious and unpredictable 
approach, regardless of whether the agreement was enforceable.  
Therefore, we hold that Tatge has not identified a fundamental 
and 
well-defined 
public 
policy 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 103.465 
sufficient to trigger the Brockmeyer exception to employment-at-
will.11 
                     
11 In concluding that Wis. Stat. § 103.465 evinces a 
Brockmeyer-worthy public policy exception to employment-at-will, 
the dissent spends most of its time discussing the injustices 
produced when employees are compelled by the hand of "superior 
bargaining power" to shoulder the burden of "ominous covenants" 
which "loom over the employee" and have an "in terrorem effect." 
 See generally Dissent.  See also Streiff v. American Family 
Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 602, 614, 348 N.W.2d 505 (1984).  In 
our assessment, this ignores the real issue presented for our 
review: does § 103.465 evidence a clear and well-defined public 
policy contrary to an employer's requirement that its employee 
sign a non-disclosure/non-compete agreement?  We reject the 
dissent's approach, which apparently would extend the narrow 
Brockmeyer exception to all situations which ring of some 
perceived unfairness, even if the statute says nothing about it. 
No.  95-2928 
 
21
D. 
¶45 
Our decisions in Hausman, Kempfer and Wandry are 
consistent with the conclusion we reach today.  In Hausman, we 
determined that Wis. Stat. § 940.295(3) (1993-94) evidences a 
strong public policy of protecting nursing home residents, such 
that the narrow Brockmeyer exception should be expanded to 
include an employee's actions which comply with an affirmative 
obligation to act to prevent suspected abuse or neglect of 
nursing home residents.  See Hausman, 214 Wis. 2d at 665-67. 
¶46 
Wisconsin Stat. § 940.295(3) (1993-94) states clearly 
that 
persons 
who 
"knowingly 
permit[] 
another 
person 
to" 
intentionally or recklessly abuse or neglect a patient/resident 
of a nursing home would be guilty of up to a Class D felony for 
their failure to act.  See § 940.295(3) (1993-94) (quoted in 
Hausman, 214 Wis. 2d at 658-59 n.3).  We therefore concluded 
that employers who terminated their employees for fulfilling 
their legal obligation would expose themselves to a wrongful 
discharge suit.  See Hausman, 214 Wis. 2d at 668.  We are 
presented with no affirmative legal obligation in this case. 
¶47 
Kempfer also provides a clear example of a statutory 
statement of public policy that is sufficient to trigger the 
Brockmeyer exception to employment-at-will.  In that case, 
Kempfer's employer asked him to drive a truck with full 
knowledge that Kempfer did not have the required license.  See 
Kempfer, 211 Wis. 2d at 106-107.  The applicable statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 343.05(2)(a) (1993-94), provided that no person may 
operate a commercial motor vehicle upon the state's highways 
No.  95-2928 
 
22
unless the person has a valid commercial driver's license.  See 
id. at 113 n.2. 
¶48 
We held that Kempfer had identified a public policy to 
promote highway safety through the use of regulations and 
penalties—a policy so fundamental and well-established as to 
trigger the Brockmeyer exception to employment-at-will.  See id. 
at 113-14.  We are not presented with such a clear statement of 
public policy in this case. 
¶49 In Wandry, we held that Wis. Stat. § 103.455 (1983-84) 
"articulates a fundamental 
and well-defined 
public 
policy 
proscribing economic coercion by an employer upon an employee to 
bear the burden of a work-related loss when the employee has no 
opportunity to show that the loss was not caused by the 
employee's carelessness, negligence, or wilful misconduct."  
Wandry, 129 Wis. 2d at 47.  Citing similar language between Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465 and Wis. Stat. § 103.455 (1983-84), Tatge argues 
that Wandry's interpretation of the latter statute commands a 
different result in this case.12 
                     
12 The statute at issue in Wandry provided in pertinent 
part: 
103.455  Deductions for Faulty Workmanship, Loss, 
Theft or Damage: No employer shall make any deductions 
from the wages due or earned by any employee . . . for 
defective 
or 
faulty 
workmanship, 
lost 
or 
stolen 
property or damage to property, unless the employee 
authorizes the employer in writing to make such 
deductions or unless the employer and a representative 
designated by the employee shall determine that such 
defective or faulty work, loss or theft, or damages 
are due to the worker's negligence, carelessness, or 
wilful and intentional conduct on the part of such 
employee . . . .  Any agreement entered into by 
No.  95-2928 
 
23
¶50 Specifically, Tatge cites the language which provided, 
"[a]ny agreement entered into by employer and employee contrary 
to this section shall be void and of no force and effect."  Wis. 
Stat. § 103.455 (1983-84).  According to Tatge, if the public 
policy of Wis. Stat. § 103.465 is merely to void the covenant, 
so too must the public policy of Wis. Stat. § 103.455 (1983-84) 
be to void the agreement—a result directly at odds with our 
holding in Wandry.  We disagree. 
¶51 
Wisconsin Stat. § 103.455 (1983-84) contained a clear 
expression of public policy by explicitly barring an employer 
from making deductions from its employee's wages unless certain 
conditions had been met.  As an additional statement of public 
policy, 
the 
statute 
indicates 
that 
any 
agreement 
which 
contravenes that command would be void.  In this case, the sole 
expression of public policy revealed by Wis. Stat. § 103.465 is 
to render void and unenforceable an unreasonable restrictive 
covenant.  There is no clear expression of public policy which 
explicitly 
bars 
an 
employer's 
practice 
of 
requiring 
its 
employees to sign allegedly unreasonable restrictive covenants. 
E. 
¶52 Finally, we note briefly that our decision is also 
consistent with the conclusion reached by the Vermont Supreme 
Court in a nearly identical case.  See Madden v. Omega Optical, 
Inc., 683 A.2d 386 (Vt. 1996).  In Madden, the plaintiffs 
refused 
to 
sign 
a 
Confidentiality, 
Disclosure, 
and 
                                                                  
employer and employee contrary to this section shall 
be void and of no force and effect. . . .  
No.  95-2928 
 
24
Noncompetition Agreement and were terminated as a result.  See 
id. at 388.  In their subsequent suit for breach of contract, 
wrongful discharge, and promissory estoppel, the plaintiffs 
argued in part that their termination for refusing to sign the 
agreement constituted a wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy.  See id. at 391. 
¶53 The Vermont Supreme Court held that, regardless of 
whether 
the 
agreement 
was 
enforceable, 
the 
plaintiffs' 
termination for refusing to sign it did not violate public 
policy.13  See id.  In reaching this conclusion, the court noted 
that "[i]f the Agreement is unenforceable, plaintiffs took no 
risk by signing it because they could later challenge the 
Agreement when defendant sought to enforce it."  Id. 
¶54 The same reasoning applies here.  Tatge gambles little 
by signing the agreement; in the event that Chambers & Owen 
later sought to enforce the agreement, Tatge could challenge it 
as unenforceable at that time.  Upon such a challenge, Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465 imposes a heavy burden on the employer who seeks 
to enforce a covenant not to compete.  The statute renders the 
entire 
covenant 
void 
if 
any 
portion 
of 
it 
is 
deemed 
"unreasonable."  See Wis. Stat. § 103.465; see generally George 
A. Richards, Drafting and Enforcing Restrictive Covenants Not to 
Compete, 55 Marq. L. Rev. 241 (1972).  This burden was 
                     
13 The Vermont Supreme Court's decision was based not upon 
principles 
of 
public 
policy 
evidenced 
by 
statutory 
or 
constitutional law, but upon general and societal notions of 
public policy.  See Madden v. Omega Optical, Inc., 683 A.2d 386, 
391 (Vt. 1996). 
No.  95-2928 
 
25
specifically imposed so that "employers possessing bargaining 
power superior to that of the employees" would not be encouraged 
"to insist upon unreasonable and excessive restrictions, secure 
in the knowledge that the promise will be upheld in part, if not 
in full."  Streiff, 118 Wis. 2d at 608-609. 
III. 
¶55 Because the breach of an employment contract is not 
actionable in tort, Tatge's claim for misrepresentation fails as 
a matter of law.  Furthermore, since Tatge has not identified a 
fundamental and well-defined public policy in Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465 sufficient to trigger the Brockmeyer exception to 
employment-at-will, there remains no genuine issue of fact for 
trial, and summary judgment was properly granted on his claim 
for wrongful discharge. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 95-2928.ssa 
 
1 
¶56 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (Dissenting).   
Under the majority opinion, Wisconsin employers are now free to 
present the following ultimatum to their at-will employees:  
sign a nondisclosure agreement (regardless of its legality), or 
you're fired.  I conclude that the court should recognize the 
right of an employee-at-will who claims that a nondisclosure 
agreement is void under Wis. Stat. § 103.465 to sue for wrongful 
discharge.  For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶57 I agree with the majority opinion that "§ 103.465 
evidences a strong public policy against the enforcement" of 
unreasonable trade restraints and that § 103.465 is applicable 
to the nondisclosure clause in this case.  Majority op. at 16.  
What the majority opinion fails to see, however, is that when an 
employer terminates an at-will employee for refusing to sign an 
illegal nondisclosure agreement, the employer is enforcing the 
illegal agreement. 
¶58 Contrary 
to 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
assertion, 
enforcement of a nondisclosure agreement does not start when an 
employer attempts to prevent an employee from violating the 
agreement.  Rather enforcement of a nondisclosure agreement 
starts when an employee is asked to sign the agreement.  The 
language and the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 103.465 
make clear that § 103.465 was designed to govern the employer 
and employee in entering a covenant not to compete.  The 
language of the statute refers to covenants governing the 
duration of employment and thereafter.   
No. 95-2928.ssa 
 
2 
¶59 The drafting record of Wis. Stat. § 103.465 includes a 
letter by Representative Richard E. Peterson of Waupaca County 
to 
the 
legislative 
reference 
library 
giving 
drafting 
instructions for § 103.465.  Representative Peterson explained 
that he wanted a bill drafted to reverse Fullerton Lumber Co. v. 
Torberg, 270 Wis. 133, 70 N.W.2d 585 (1955), in which the court 
enforced the reasonable aspects of an invalid covenant not to 
compete.  Representative Peterson explained his concerns about 
Fullerton as follows:  "[a]t the time the contract was entered 
into, the bargaining position of the two contractors appears to 
me to be relatively unequal in that the party seeking employment 
must, if he desires employment with the contracting party, 
consent to almost any restrictive covenant imposed.  The effect 
[of the Fullerton decision] is to give to the employer complete 
latitude" in setting forth the terms of the agreement, including 
the geographical and time limits imposed.14 
¶60 Representative Peterson wanted the bill drafted to put 
the two contracting parties in more equal bargaining positions 
and to avoid giving "a green light" to employers in writing 
agreements not to compete.15  The reasoning and result of the 
                     
14 See Representative Richard Peterson's letter to Mr. M.G. 
Toepel, Legislative Reference Library, Feb. 26, 1957, in 
Legislative 
Drafting 
File, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 103.465; 
Stewart 
Macaulay, 
Supplementary 
Comments 
in 
Richard 
Danzig, 
The 
Capability Problem in Contract Law:  Further Readings on Well-
Known Cases, at 61 (1978). 
15 See Representative Richard Peterson's letter to Mr. M. G. 
Toepel, Legislative Reference Library, Feb. 26, 1957, in 
Legislative Drafting File, Wis. Stat. § 103.465. 
No. 95-2928.ssa 
 
3 
majority opinion are contrary to the legislative purpose of Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465. 
¶61 With this background, I turn to the facts of this 
case. 
I 
¶62 One implication of the majority opinion is that the 
nondisclosure agreement in this case is void and hence illegal. 
 The majority opinion concedes that the nondisclosure provision 
drafted by the employer in this case "contains virtually the 
same language," majority op. at 13, as the nondisclosure 
agreement in Gary Van Zeeland Talent, Inc. v. Sandas, 84 Wis. 2d 
202, 267 N.W.2d 242 (1978).  The Van Zeeland court struck down 
the nondisclosure agreement under Wis. Stat. § 103.465 because 
it contained no geographic or time limits.  See Van Zeeland, 84 
Wis. 2d at 218. 
¶63 The nondisclosure agreement in this case, like the 
nondisclosure agreement in Van Zeeland, is unreasonable and void 
under Wis. Stat. § 103.465.  But under the majority opinion, 
employers may force at-will employees to sign such illegal 
nondisclosure 
agreements 
under 
threat 
of 
termination 
of 
employment.  Thus the majority opinion "tends to encourage 
employers possessing bargaining power superior to that of the 
employees 
to 
insist 
upon 
unreasonable 
and 
excessive 
restrictions . . . ."  Streiff v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
118 Wis. 2d 602, 608-09, 348 N.W.2d 505 (1984).  I know of no 
other court, other than the court of appeals in this case, that 
has condoned the signing of an illegal nondisclosure agreement. 
No. 95-2928.ssa 
 
4 
¶64 Although the nondisclosure agreement in this case 
appears to be illegal, in many instances the validity of a 
nondisclosure agreement is uncertain until a court makes a 
determination.16  Under the majority opinion an at-will employee 
who is uncertain about whether an agreement is legal has only 
one way to test the validity of the agreement:  sign the 
agreement, breach the agreement, and wait until the employer 
sues to enforce it.  This method is not risk-free as an employee 
may be liable in damages for breaching the agreement should a 
court later find the nondisclosure agreement to be valid. 
¶65 Under the majority opinion, if an employee refuses to 
sign the agreement (regardless of its legality), the employee 
can be discharged.  If an employee brings a declaratory judgment 
action to determine the validity of the agreement, the employee 
can be discharged. 
II 
¶66 The majority opinion puts employers in a win-win 
situation.  If an employee refuses to sign a nondisclosure 
agreement (even if it is illegal), the employer can discharge 
the employee without liability for wrongful discharge.  If the 
employee signs the agreement, the terms of the agreement loom 
                     
16 Even in this case there may be some doubt about the 
legality of the nondisclosure agreement.  Some commentators have 
criticized the reasoning of the Van Zeeland court, arguing that 
imposing territorial or time limits defeats the purpose of 
nondisclosure agreements.  See III State Bar of Wis., Wis. 
Employment Law, § 15.75, at 15-78 to 15-79 (1994).  
No. 95-2928.ssa 
 
5 
over the employee both during the course of employment and 
afterwards. 
¶67 The majority opinion justifies its holding by claiming 
that an employee "gambles little by signing the agreement."  
Majority op. at 24.  What the majority opinion fails to 
recognize is that an employee presented with a nondisclosure 
agreement (regardless of its legality), incurs significant risks 
by refusing to sign or by signing the agreement.  Representative 
Peterson apparently understood these facts of life when he 
proposed Wis. Stat. § 103.465. 
¶68 An employee presented with a nondisclosure agreement 
is forced into a lose-lose situation.  If the employee refuses 
to sign the agreement, the employee risks termination without 
any right to sue for wrongful discharge.  If the employee signs 
the agreement, the employee risks a lawsuit and litigation 
expenses when he or she chooses to violate the agreement.  
Alternatively, the employee who signs the agreement may feel 
compelled 
to 
respect 
his 
or 
her 
contractual 
obligations 
(regardless of the legality of the agreement), thereby forgoing 
other employment opportunities in order to avoid litigation 
expenses.  Moreover, prospective employers may refuse to hire an 
employee who has signed a nondisclosure agreement, regardless of 
their assessment of the legality of the agreement, for fear of 
buying themselves a lawsuit.17  
                     
17 See General Med. Corp. v. Kobs, 179 Wis. 2d 422, 425, 507 
N.W.2d 
381 
(Ct. 
App. 
1993) 
(plaintiff 
alleged 
tortious 
interference against competitor that hired ex-employee to work 
in violation of terms of restrictive covenant).  
No. 95-2928.ssa 
 
6 
¶69 As this court has recognized, "[a] principal argument 
against giving effect to reasonable aspects of a restraint is 
that the employer can fashion ominous covenants which affect the 
mobility of employees because of their in terrorem effect on 
employees who respect contractual obligations and their effect 
on competitors who do not wish to risk legal difficulties."  
Streiff, 118 Wis. 2d at 614 (citing Harlan M. Blake, Employee 
Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 682 (1960)).  
The Streiff decision relied on the legislative history of Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465, including Representative Peterson's letter.  
The majority opinion ignores this legislative history.  
¶70 The majority opinion places all the risk on an 
employee 
when 
an 
employer 
asks the 
employee 
to sign a 
nondisclosure agreement even though the employer has drafted the 
agreement and has the superior bargaining power.  It seems to me 
that the fairness considerations set forth in the language and 
legislative history to Wis. Stat. § 103.465 require that some of 
the risks relating to the legality of the agreement should be 
placed on the employer who drafted the agreement and seeks to 
impose it.  Ensuring that the employer and the employee share 
the risk comports with the legislature's instruction "as to the 
equities between the parties."  Streiff, 118 Wis. 2d at 614.   
¶71 Thus I conclude that the public policy of this state 
as reflected in Wis. Stat. § 103.465 requires that an employer 
who terminates employment of an at-will employee based on the 
employee's refusal to sign a nondisclosure agreement is liable 
for wrongful discharge if a court decides the agreement is void. 
No. 95-2928.ssa 
 
7 
¶72 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶73 I am authorized to state that Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley joins this dissent. 
 
No. 95-2928.ssa 
 
1