Case Title: State v. Shantell T. Harbor

Citation: 2011 WI 28

Docket Number: 2009AP001252-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2011-05-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 WI 28 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP1252-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Shantell T. Harbor, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2010 WI App 42 
Reported at: 324 Wis. 2d 584, 785 N.W.2d 688 
(Ct. App. 2010 – Unpublished) 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 10, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 01, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis P. Moroney 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Joseph E. Redding, Glojek Limited, 
Milwaukee. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2011 WI 28
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP1252-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2008CF1113) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Shantell T. Harbor, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 10, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Shuntell T. 
Harbor,1 seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals affirming a circuit court order denying Harbor's 
postconviction motion.2  Harbor contends that previously unknown 
                                                 
1 Although the criminal complaint and the court caption 
spell the defendant's name "Shantell," her attorney indicated 
that the proper spelling is "Shuntell."  Throughout this 
opinion, we use the spelling that the defendant indicates is 
proper. 
2 State v. Harbor, No. 2009AP1252-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App., Mar. 30, 2010), affirming a judgment and order 
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Dennis P. Moroney, 
Judge. 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
2 
 
information about her mental health, her addiction issues, and 
her traumatic upbringing constitute new factors that justify 
modification of her sentence.  In the alternative, she asserts 
that she received ineffective assistance of counsel when her 
attorney failed to investigate or present these factors to the 
circuit court during sentencing.   
¶2 
We conclude that Harbor has not presented any new 
factor that justifies modification of her sentence.  The facts 
related to Harbor's mental health do not constitute a new factor 
because Harbor's mental health issues were known to the circuit 
court and taken into consideration at the time the court imposed 
sentence.  Further, the circuit court appropriately exercised 
its discretion when it concluded that facts related to Harbor's 
addiction issues and her traumatic upbringing did not justify 
sentence modification.    
¶3 
We further determine that Harbor has not demonstrated 
that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because she 
has not shown that her attorney's alleged shortcomings were 
prejudicial.  She has failed to show "a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome."3  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
                                                 
3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
3 
 
¶4 
The facts of this case are undisputed.  Based on three 
separate incidents that occurred in February of 2008, Shuntell 
Harbor was charged with three counts: attempted robbery with 
threat of force, attempted armed robbery with threat of force, 
and armed robbery with threat of force.  Brief descriptions of 
each incident are taken from the criminal complaint.     
¶5 
The attempted robbery charge is based on the statement 
made by a teller at Community Financial, a check cashing 
service.  According to the statement, Harbor approached the 
window and handed the teller a note demanding money.  The note 
also suggested that Harbor would shoot if the teller said 
anything.  After the teller pressed the alarm, Harbor fled. 
¶6 
Later the same day, Harbor entered another branch 
location of Community Financial and approached the lead teller.  
The attempted armed robbery charge is based on the statement 
made by that teller.  According to the statement, Harbor passed 
the teller a piece of paper, but the writing was illegible.  
After the teller told her to rewrite the message, Harbor became 
angry.  Ultimately, the teller could make out the words "money" 
and "shoot," and she determined that Harbor was attempting to 
stage a robbery.  When the teller failed to give her any money, 
Harbor put her hand in her pocket in a threatening manner as if 
she had a gun and stated, "Oh, you're not afraid of this?"  The 
teller left the window and Harbor left the business.     
¶7 
The armed robbery charge is based on an incident that 
occurred 10 days later at a Hallmark store.  The store's cashier 
told the police that Harbor approached the counter, asked the 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
4 
 
cashier for money, and then pulled out a butcher knife and 
pointed it directly at the cashier.  The cashier gave Harbor 
money from both registers and from her wallet, totaling 
approximately $100. 
¶8 
Harbor was picked up when she jaywalked in front of a 
police officer.  The officer observed that Harbor was carrying a 
butcher knife in her jacket pocket, and she was placed in 
custody for carrying a concealed weapon.  Harbor made statements 
implicating herself in all three crimes.  Because she was on 
probation at the time that these offenses were committed, her 
probation was revoked.   
¶9 
Harbor 
waived 
her 
preliminary 
hearing. 
 
After 
acknowledging that she was facing a maximum punishment of 67.5 
years incarceration and a $170,000 fine on the three charges, 
she pled guilty to all three counts.    
¶10 During the plea colloquy, the court circuit expressed 
an awareness that Harbor was taking medication: 
The Court: Have you had any drugs, medication or 
alcohol prior to coming to Court today?  
The Defendant: No. 
The Court: According to this you did, or at least 
you're receiving some treatment. 
The Defendant: Medication, yeah.  
¶11 The court confirmed that Harbor's medication was not 
affecting her ability to understand and appreciate what was 
happening in court or her ability to make decisions about the 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
5 
 
case.  Ultimately, it accepted Harbor's guilty plea.  It did not 
order a presentence investigation report (PSI).4   
¶12 Throughout the plea hearing and the sentencing phase 
of the proceedings, Harbor was represented by Attorney Gregory 
Parr.  Although Attorney Parr had the opportunity to present a 
sentencing memorandum at the sentencing hearing, he did not do 
so.   
¶13 During sentencing, the prosecutor focused on Harbor's 
prior convictions: a 1992 conviction for robbery and theft, a 
1993 conviction for armed robbery, and a 2006 escape conviction.  
He argued that Harbor had been in and out of prison for years 
due to probation revocations, and that she had been released 
from Taycheedah Correctional Institution only four months prior 
to committing the three offenses for which she was being 
sentenced.  He contended that the three offenses were themselves 
serious incidents, and "it's just made more serious by the fact 
that 
the 
defendant 
does 
have 
a 
prior 
criminal 
record."  
Ultimately, the prosecutor recommended "a substantial prison 
sentence . . . consecutive 
to 
any 
other 
sentence 
she 
is 
currently serving," plus restitution.      
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.15 permits a court to order a PSI.  
Its "primary purpose . . . is to provide the sentencing court 
with accurate and relevant information upon which to base its 
sentencing decision."  Wis. Admin. Code DOC § 328.27.  A PSI 
authored by agents of the Department of Corrections will contain 
information related to the present offense, the defendant's 
prior criminal record and prior correctional institution record, 
the victim's statement, the defendant's family information and 
personal history, as well as the defendant's present situation 
and needs and the agent's sentencing recommendation.  Id.   
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
6 
 
¶14 By contrast, Harbor's attorney recommended "a global 
sentence for these three offenses of ten years in the Wisconsin 
State prison" consisting of five years of initial confinement 
and five years extended supervision.  He told the court that 
Harbor's "record is as indicated by the district attorney.  It's 
not the most extensive."  He argued that Harbor had employment 
history that "is substantial, covering a period of approximately 
seven years of employment."   
¶15 Defense counsel asserted that Harbor's mental health 
was a mitigating factor.  He contended that Harbor was "really 
an inept robber" and "[i]t's almost like she was asking to be 
caught.  And that may be not too surprising" because she suffers 
"from both bipolar disorder and fairly severe depression."  "In 
2007 alone," defense counsel explained, Harbor was "treated as 
an in-patient at the Milwaukee County Mental Health Complex on 
three different occasions.  She takes medication for her bipolar 
disorder and her depression."5     
¶16 Defense counsel argued that Harbor's mental health 
background "goes someway towards explaining" the offenses.  He 
contended 
that 
the 
sentence 
he 
had 
recommended 
was 
"an 
appropriate one because of her psychological problems" and 
because of other mitigating factors.  He noted that Harbor fully 
                                                 
5 It was explained that Harbor was taking Effexor, Depacote, 
and Seraquil.  The court inquired whether any of the medications 
affected her ability to understand or appreciate what was 
happening in court, and Harbor responded that she understood and 
that the medications were not affecting her decisionmaking in 
the case. 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
7 
 
cooperated with the police when arrested, that she gave police 
complete statements about the crimes, that she promptly accepted 
responsibility, 
and 
that 
she 
pled 
guilty 
at 
an 
early 
opportunity.  
¶17 In determining the sentence, the court filled out a 
sentencing worksheet.  The worksheet indicates that the court 
considered some factors to be aggravating and others mitigating.  
The 
court 
considered 
Harbor's 
criminal 
record 
and 
the 
characteristics of the offenses to be among the aggravating 
factors.  It considered other factors, including Harbor's 
attitude and her mental health problems to be mitigating.6      
¶18 The court acknowledged that Harbor's mental health was 
a 
mitigating 
factor. 
 
However, 
it 
concluded 
that 
her 
psychological issues could be controlled through medication and 
that Harbor was responsible for her failure to do so:    
Now, I grant you, you may have some issues with your 
mental health.  But you know, when you have issues 
with mental health, most of these things, including 
your type of manic-depressive disorder or whatever it 
is, it's very much controllable by medications . . . .  
And I'm not talking as if I'm Dr. Moroney because I'm 
not.  But I do know that it's controllable.  And then 
you go ahead and you lead a productive socially 
oriented and appropriate lifestyle.   
                                                 
6 Of note, the court checked a box indicating that it 
considered factors related to "alcohol and drug abuse" to be 
mitigating.  It is not clear from the worksheet whether the 
court was aware of Harbor's addiction to cocaine and considered 
it to be a mitigating factor, or whether the court considered 
the lack of evidence of any drug use to be a mitigating factor.  
There was no evidence related to drug and alcohol abuse 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
8 
 
For whatever reason, you have not done that.  And I 
can't tell you why.  I don't know if you've gone off 
your medications and you tried to control your 
situation with other controlled substances which then 
do 
nothing 
more 
than 
exacerbate 
or 
worsen 
the 
situation. . . . You've got a very precarious chemical 
makeup in your body, more so than most people because 
of this disorder. . . .  
And what that means is there's very little tolerance 
that you have that when you go out of whack that you 
can stay within that appropriate level to be able to 
function 
in 
a 
law-abiding 
and 
reasonable 
way. 
 . . . You better understand that.  You better start 
functioning within your limitations and then hopefully 
follow the treatment regimens that are going to be 
given to you, because if you don't, we're not going to 
be tolerating this type of behavior . . . .   
¶19 The court considered Harbor's failure to abide by the 
law after having been convicted of similar crimes in her youth 
to be an aggravating factor that made her a risk to the public: 
The fact of the matter is that you've returned to your 
days of being a foolish youth . . . .  [W]hen you are 
34 
years 
of 
age 
and 
you've 
had 
the 
multiple 
experiences in life that you've had . . . you should 
have learned some things . . . .  You could have 
learned obviously you never wanted to go back to 
prison. . . .                 
But unfortunately, when it gets down to going back 
into a life of criminal activity such as you did here, 
similar to what you did as a youth, it raises a lot of 
fears for the Court.  Why?  Because my job is to 
protect society.  Sure it's to rehabilitate you too to 
the extent possible.  But if the experiences of life, 
both the good and the bad, haven't given you some 
insight as to what's the appropriate thing to do or 
how to do it, you know, then I have a real protection 
of society issue for the court to deal with[.]  
¶20 The court explained to Harbor that its responsibility 
was "to protect society first off" and also to "punish you 
sufficiently so you're deterred from ever thinking about doing 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
9 
 
something as foolish as this again."  It factored Harbor's 
"willingness or ability to follow the rules of law" and her 
history of revoked probations into its consideration of her 
character and rehabilitative needs:   
[W]e don't want to be playing, you know, tag with you 
as far as bringing you in and out of prison or the 
like.  We want you to do your time . . . and then come 
out and hopefully adjust your life so then you start 
being reintroduced back into society and you start 
getting it again and you start doing the right thing.  
¶21 Ultimately, the court concluded that overall the facts 
were "aggravated but medium risk only." He explained, "I believe 
you have the basic intellectual capacity to do better which 
makes me not want to throw away the key.  But you're going to be 
under supervision for a long time.  You need it."  On the 
sentencing worksheet, a sentence in the aggravated medium risk 
range called for 8-15 years of confinement.  The court imposed 
three consecutive sentences totaling 24 years, consisting of 12 
years of confinement and 12 years of extended supervision.7   
                                                 
7 Specifically, the court sentenced Harbor to ten years, 
five incarceration and five on extended supervision for armed 
robbery.  It sentenced Harbor to eight years, four incarceration 
and four on extended supervision, for attempted armed robbery.  
Finally, it sentenced her to six years, three incarceration and 
three on extended supervision, for attempted robbery.  The court 
ordered that the sentences be served consecutively with each 
other and also with the sentence she was currently serving. 
As conditions of extended supervision on all three counts, 
the court ordered Harbor to have a mental health evaluation and 
AODA assessment and to follow whatever treatment is necessary.  
It ordered cognitive intervention counseling and parenting 
counseling.  Among other conditions, the court ordered Harbor to 
refrain from consuming controlled substances and alcohol.    
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
10 
 
¶22 Harbor was appointed postconviction counsel.  Her new 
attorney requested an evaluation from Cedar Creek Family 
Counseling, Inc. (the Cedar Creek Report).  In compiling the 
Report, a social worker relied on interviews with Harbor and her 
mother, mental health records from Taycheedah Correctional 
Institution, and discovery material provided by the defense.    
¶23 The Cedar Creek Report, which is discussed more 
thoroughly below, detailed Harbor's severe depression and other 
mental health issues; her on-and-off dependency on cocaine; and 
traumatic issues from Harbor's childhood.  The report concluded: 
"It appears quite likely that Ms. Harbor's mental heath issues 
and severe drug dependency problems are at the core of her 
criminal behavior."   
¶24 Relying on the information from the Cedar Creek 
Report, Harbor's postconviction counsel filed a motion posing 
two issues: (1) whether the report prepared by Cedar Creek, 
which presents previously unknown information about Harbor's 
mental health status, her addiction issues, and her traumatic 
upbringing, constitutes a new factor justifying modification of 
her sentence; and (2) whether Harbor was denied the assistance 
of counsel when her sentencing attorney failed to investigate or 
present those mitigating factors.    
¶25 Harbor argued that her sentence should be modified 
because of the new factors presented in the Cedar Creek  
Report.  If the information in the Report had been presented to 
the sentencing court, she asserted, "the offense level would 
have been reduced from aggravated to intermediate."  "Rather 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
11 
 
than locking Harbor up to punish her and protect society," she 
argued, the sentence "should be structured to help her deal with 
her mental health issues, her addiction issues, and her 
traumatic childhood.  She is deserving of less punishment, and 
asks that her sentence be modified to reflect such."       
¶26 In addition, Harbor argued that Attorney Parr had been 
ineffective for failing to investigate and present the facts 
uncovered in the Cedar Creek Report.  With her motion, Harbor 
filed an affidavit making the following assertions: that she had 
informed Attorney Parr about her medications and mental health 
concerns, but that to her knowledge, he made no further 
investigation; that Attorney Parr never asked her about any 
potential mitigating factors; and that "during the course of 
this case, from the filing of the criminal complaint until 
sentencing, I only spoke to Attorney Parr in the bullpen jail on 
the day I was scheduled to go to court, immediately before I 
went to court."   
¶27 The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Harbor's 
motion 
for 
postconviction relief in a written order without holding a 
hearing.  Regarding Harbor's mental health issues, the court 
said: "The sentencing transcript reveals that the defendant's 
mental health issues were addressed, discussed and considered by 
this court at the time of sentencing.  Although the information 
may not have been as extensive as a report would have detailed, 
the court was cognizant of the problems facing the defendant."  
It concluded that "[f]amiliarity with a more extensive analysis 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
12 
 
of the defendant's mental health problems would not have caused 
the court to impose a lesser sentence in this case."        
¶28 The court then turned to address Harbor's addiction to 
cocaine and history of drug use.  It acknowledged that "a drug 
addiction was never mentioned at the time of sentencing to 
account for the defendant's behavior[.]"  Nevertheless, it 
determined that "even if the court had been aware of it, a 
lesser sentence would not have been imposed."  According to the 
Cedar Creek Report, the court explained, Harbor continually 
returned to drug use after receiving treatment.  The court 
concluded that "[t]his repeated behavior which she demonstrated 
over the years would have been a major aggravating factor in the 
sentence she received" because her "recurring drug usage would 
cause her to continue to be a substantial risk to society."   
¶29 Finally, in addressing her traumatic upbringing, the 
court found "no connection between the defendant's state of mind 
when she was twelve and the offenses she committed when she was 
35."  It concluded that "[t]his circumstance would not have 
altered the court's sentence." 
¶30 The 
court 
then 
turned 
to 
Harbor's 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  Because it determined that it 
would not have sentenced Harbor any differently had the 
information in the Report been presented during sentencing, the 
court concluded that Harbor's case had not been prejudiced by 
the absence of a presentence report.  
¶31 In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the court of 
appeals affirmed.  Quoting State v. Michels, 150 Wis. 2d 94, 99, 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
13 
 
441 N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1989), the court asserted that a new 
factor is "an event or development that frustrates the purpose 
of the original sentence."  State v. Harbor, 2009AP1252-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶2 (Wis. Ct. App., Mar. 30, 2010).  It 
concluded that the information presented by Harbor did not bear 
on the circuit court's primary concern in imposing sentence, 
public safety, and was therefore not a new factor: 
The circuit court's major focus at sentencing was the 
need to protect the public.  The information in the 
Cedar Creek Counseling sentencing report sheds light 
on the difficulties Harbor has faced in the past and 
currently faces, but does not address the circuit 
court's overriding concern in framing its sentence——
the need to protect the public.  Since the information 
in the report does not bear on the circuit court's 
primary concern in imposing sentence, it is not 
"highly relevant to the imposition of the original 
sentence," and thus is not a new factor.   
Id., ¶3. 
¶32 The court of appeals also determined that Harbor's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim was unavailing because 
she could not show that she had been prejudiced by her counsel's 
claimed ineffectiveness: "[T]he mitigating information would not 
have undercut the circuit court's primary concern——that Harbor 
is currently a danger to the public."  Id., ¶5. 
II 
¶33 We are asked to determine whether Harbor's motion 
presents a new factor justifying sentence modification.  Whether 
a fact or set of facts presented by the defendant constitutes a 
"new factor" is a question of law.  State v. Hegwood, 113 
Wis. 2d 544, 547, 335 N.W.2d 399 (1983).  We review questions of 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
14 
 
law independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  Id.  The determination of 
whether that new factor justifies sentence modification is 
committed to the discretion of the circuit court, and we review 
such decisions for erroneous exercise of discretion.  Id. at 
546.  
¶34 We are also asked to determine whether Harbor received 
ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.  Our review of 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question 
of fact and law.  State v. Maloney, 2005 WI 74, ¶15, 281 
Wis. 2d 595, 698 N.W.2d 583.  We will not disturb the circuit 
court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but 
the ultimate determinations of whether an attorney's performance 
fell below constitutional standards and whether the defendant 
was prejudiced as a result are questions of law.  Id. 
III 
¶35 Within certain constraints, Wisconsin circuit courts 
have inherent authority to modify criminal sentences.  Hegwood, 
113 Wis. 2d at 546.  A court cannot base a sentence modification 
on reflection and second thoughts alone.  State v. Wuensch, 69 
Wis. 2d 467, 474, 480, 230 N.W.2d 665 (1975).  However, it may 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
15 
 
base a sentence modification upon the defendant's showing of a 
"new factor."8  Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d at 546. 
¶36 Deciding a motion for sentence modification based on a 
new factor is a two-step inquiry.  The defendant has the burden 
to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence the existence of 
a new factor.  State v. Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d 1, 8-9, 434 
N.W.2d 609 (1989).  Whether the fact or set of facts put forth 
by the defendant constitutes a "new factor" is a question of 
law.  Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d at 547.  The requirement that the 
defendant demonstrate the existence of a new factor prevents a 
court from modifying a sentence based on second thoughts and 
reflection alone.      
¶37 The existence of a new factor does not automatically 
entitle the defendant to sentence modification.  Hegwood, 113 
Wis. 2d at 546; State v. Verstoppen, 185 Wis. 2d 728, 740-42, 
519 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1994).  Rather, if a new factor is 
present, the circuit court determines whether that new factor 
justifies 
modification 
of 
the 
sentence. 
 
Franklin, 
148 
Wis. 2d at 8.  In making that determination, the circuit court 
                                                 
8 Under other circumstances, a circuit court has authority 
to modify a sentence even though no new factor is presented, 
such as when the court determines that the sentence is illegal 
or void, State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, ¶12, 273 Wis. 2d 57, 
681 N.W.2d 524, or when the court determines that the sentence 
is unduly harsh or unconscionable, id.; State v. Wuensch, 69 
Wis. 2d 467, 
230 
N.W.2d 665 
(1975); 
State 
v. 
Ralph, 
156 
Wis. 2d 433, 438, 456 N.W.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1990).  A court also 
has authority to vacate a sentence and resentence the defendant 
if the court relied on inaccurate information when originally 
sentencing the defendant.  State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, 291 
Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1.     
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
16 
 
exercises 
its 
discretion. 
 
Hegwood, 
113 
Wis. 2d at 
546; 
Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d at 8; State v. Paske, 163 Wis. 2d 52, 60, 
471 N.W.2d 55 (1991).   
¶38 Thus, to prevail, the defendant must demonstrate both 
the existence of a new factor and that the new factor justifies 
modification of the sentence.  State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, 
¶24, 273 Wis. 2d 57, 681 N.W.2d 524.  Accordingly, if a court 
determines that the facts do not constitute a new factor as a 
matter of law, "it need go no further in its analysis" to decide 
the defendant's motion.  Id.  That is, it need not determine 
whether, in the exercise of its discretion, the sentence should 
be modified.  Id.  Alternatively, if the court determines that 
in the exercise of its discretion, the alleged new factor would 
not justify sentence modification, the court need not determine 
whether the facts asserted by the defendant constitute a new 
factor as a matter of law.  Id.   
¶39 Due to inconsistencies in our case law, we begin by 
clarifying the definition of a "new factor" in the context of a 
motion 
for 
sentence 
modification. 
 
We 
then 
address 
the 
defendant's arguments and determine whether the circuit court 
properly denied Harbor's request for sentence modification.    
A 
¶40 The definition of a "new factor" is set forth in 
Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 288, 234 N.W.2d 69 (1975) as 
follows: "a fact or set of facts highly relevant to the 
imposition of sentence, but not known to the trial judge at the 
time of original sentencing, either because it was not then in 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
17 
 
existence or because, even though it was then in existence, it 
was unknowingly overlooked by all of the parties."       
¶41 This definition from Rosado is one of long-standing.  
Nevertheless, 
in 
State 
v. 
Michels, 
150 
Wis. 2d 94, 
441 
N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1989), the court of appeals appeared to 
modify the Rosado new factor test by adding an additional 
requirement.  Citing Hegwood, Krueger, and Sepulveda,9 the 
Michels court concluded that "the case law since Rosado has 
limited the 'new factor' standard to situations where the new 
factor frustrates the purpose of the original sentencing."  150 
Wis. 2d at 97.     
¶42 It 
should 
be 
noted 
that 
the 
Michels 
court's 
modification of the Rosado definition found no support in the 
existing law at the time.  Neither Hegwood nor Krueger use the 
phrase 
"frustrate 
the 
purpose" 
when 
discussing 
sentence 
modification based on a new factor.  These cases do not support 
the Michels court's assertion that "a new factor [must] 
frustrate[] the purpose of the original sentencing."   
¶43 Furthermore, although State v. Sepulveda does address 
frustration of purpose in its discussion, 119 Wis. 2d 546, 557, 
350 N.W.2d 96 (1984), the issue before the Sepulveda court did 
not involve the circuit court's inherent authority to modify a 
sentence based on a new factor.  Rather, the issue was whether 
                                                 
9 State v. Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d 544, 335 N.W.2d 399 (1983); 
State v. Krueger, 119 Wis. 2d 327, 351 N.W.2d 738 (Ct. App. 
1984); State v. Sepulveda, 119 Wis. 2d 546, 350 N.W.2d 96 
(1984). 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
18 
 
the circuit court exceeded its statutory authority to modify 
probation under Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) by increasing the 
defendant's punishment and effectively revoking probation. 
¶44 In Sepulveda, the circuit court had imposed a stayed 
prison sentence and conditioned probation upon the defendant 
voluntarily admitting himself to the Mendota Mental Health 
Institute.  Id. at 549.  The court later learned that this 
condition could not be met because the defendant was denied 
admission.  Id.  Upon a motion by the State, the court 
"modif[ied] the defendant's probation from institutionalization 
at a mental hospital to incarceration in a state prison."  Id. 
at 551.   
¶45 The defendant argued that the circuit court was 
without the authority under Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) to 
effectively 
revoke 
probation 
because 
doing 
so 
would 
impermissibly infringe upon the authority of the department of 
health and social services.  Id. at 553.  Ultimately, the 
Sepulveda court held that a circuit court had the authority to 
modify the terms of probation as it had, but that authority 
"should only be utilized by the courts in cases . . . where the 
judge's intent behind the grant of probation is completely 
frustrated due to the failure of a primary condition" of 
probation.  Id. at 557.     
¶46 The Michels court appended this limitation on a 
circuit court's statutory authority to modify probation to the 
definition of new factor set forth in Rosado.  Yet, Wisconsin 
courts have not consistently embraced the Michels court's 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
19 
 
addendum to the Rosado definition.  As a result, there are now 
two divergent lines of cases in our state jurisprudence.   
¶47 One 
line 
of 
cases 
simply 
sets 
forth 
Rosado's 
definition of a "new factor."10  The other line of cases cites 
the Rosado definition of "new factor" but then sets forth 
frustration of the purpose of the original sentencing as an 
additional requirement.11  This second line of cases could be 
read to hold that a fact asserted by the defendant is not a new 
factor unless the Rosado test is satisfied and the fact also 
frustrates the purpose of the original sentence.  See, e.g., 
State v. Delaney, 2006 WI App 37, ¶8, 289 Wis. 2d 714, 712 
N.W.2d 368 ("The effect of the 'new factor' must frustrate the 
purpose of the original sentencing.").  
                                                 
10 State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 423-24, 576 N.W.2d 912 
(1998); State v. Smet, 186 Wis. 2d 24, 27, 519 N.W.2d 697 
(1994); State v. Kluck, 210 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 563 N.W.2d 468 (1997); 
State v. Crockett, 2001 WI App 235, ¶13, 248 Wis. 2d 120, 635 
N.W.2d 673; State 
v. Nickel, 2010 WI App 161, ¶8, 330 
Wis. 2d 750, 
754 
N.W.2d 765; 
Ralph, 
156 
Wis. 2d at 
436; 
Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d at 8; Cresci v. State, 89 Wis. 2d 495, 
503, 278 N.W.2d 850 (1979); State v. Macemon, 113 Wis. 2d 662, 
668, 335 N.W.2d 402 (1983); Krueger, 119 Wis. 2d at 333; 
Sepulveda, 119 Wis. 2d at 550 n.1. 
11 See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 158 Wis. 2d 458, 466, 463 
N.W.2d 352 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Champion, 2002 WI App 267, 
¶4, 258 Wis. 2d 781, 654 N.W.2d 242; State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 
78, ¶12, 273 Wis. 2d 57, 681 N.W.2d 524; State v. Trujillo, 2005 
WI 45, ¶13, 279 Wis. 2d 712, 694 N.W.2d 933; State v. Delaney, 
2006 WI App 37, 289 Wis. 2d 714, 712 N.W.2d 368; State v. 
Schladweiler, 2009 WI App 177, ¶7, 322 Wis. 2d 642, 777 
N.W.2d 114; see also State v. Carter, 208 Wis. 2d 142, 146, 560 
N.W.2d 256 (1997) ("[t]he purpose of sentence modification is to 
allow a court to correct a sentence when new factors frustrate 
the purpose of the sentencing court").   
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
20 
 
¶48 We take this opportunity to clarify the law.  We 
conclude that frustration of the purpose of the original 
sentence is not an independent requirement when determining 
whether a fact or set of facts alleged by a defendant 
constitutes a new factor.   
¶49 The purposes underlying a sentence "include, but are 
not limited to, the protection of the community, punishment of 
the defendant, rehabilitation of the defendant, and deterrence 
to others."  State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶40, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 
678 N.W.2d 197.  Certainly, a fact that frustrates the purpose 
of the original sentence likely satisfies the Rosado test, 
provided that the fact was also unknown to the circuit court at 
the time of the sentencing.  Any fact that frustrates the 
purpose of the original sentence would generally be a new fact 
that is "highly relevant to the imposition of sentence."  
¶50 Yet, the converse may not always be true.  A circuit 
court might conclude that its entire approach to sentencing 
would have been different had it been aware of a fact that is 
"highly relevant to the imposition of sentence."  Even so, the 
court may not be able to conclude that the new fact, which would 
have changed its entire approach to sentencing, necessarily 
frustrates the purpose of the original sentence it imposed.   
¶51 The requirements for sentence modification are meant 
to "promote[] the policy of finality of judgments [while at the 
same time] satisf[ying] the purpose of sentence modification, 
which is the correction of unjust sentences."  Franklin, 148 
Wis. 2d at 9.  During oral argument, the State appeared to 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
21 
 
concede that strictly applying the Michels language would unduly 
constrain 
the 
circuit 
court's 
exercise 
of 
discretion 
in 
correcting unjust sentences:  
I do not know that I would want to argue that in the 
exercise of its discretion the court could not say 
well, this does not really frustrate what I was doing.  
However, with this new information that I did not have 
at sentencing, I would have had the same purpose but I 
might have changed the sentence slightly.  I would not 
say that a court could not do that since this is a 
discretionary standard.      
Requiring the court to conclude that the purpose of the original 
sentencing was frustrated would undercut the purpose underlying 
sentence modification, which is to allow a circuit court 
discretion to modify sentences in an appropriate case.   
¶52 Accordingly, we conclude that the definition set forth 
in Rosado is the correct definition of a "new factor" for 
purposes of sentence modification.  We withdraw any language 
from Michels and the cases following Michels that suggests an 
additional requirement that an alleged new factor must also 
frustrate the purpose of the original sentence.  
B 
¶53 Harbor asserts that there are three categories of new 
factors that justify modification of her sentence: her mental 
health, her addiction issues, and her traumatic childhood.  We 
address each category in turn.    
¶54 The Cedar Creek Report provided a detailed narrative 
of Harbor's struggles with mental health issues.  According to 
the Report, Harbor was first prescribed antidepressants when she 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
22 
 
was 
incarcerated 
at 
Taycheedah, 
and 
she 
has 
taken 
antidepressants on and off for years.  Sometime around 2001, 
when she became pregnant with her only child, Harbor fell into a 
deep state of depression that was ultimately stabilized through 
medication.  When she was living in the community, however, she 
often neglected to take her medication.   
¶55 Shortly after her release from Taycheedah in 2007, 
Harbor attempted suicide.  She was admitted to a mental health 
complex and diagnosed with bipolar disorder.  She reported 
difficulty taking the medication that was prescribed for the 
disorder because it gave her nightmares.   
¶56 The Report concludes that Harbor is most successful 
when she is engaged in full-time employment and intensive 
alcohol, drug, and mental health therapy.  During her current 
incarceration, Harbor has attended individual and group therapy 
sessions and is adhering to her medication regimen. 
¶57 A new factor is one that was "not known to the trial 
judge at the time of original sentencing, either because it was 
not then in existence or because, even though it was then in 
existence, it was unknowingly overlooked by all of the parties."  
Rosado, 70 Wis. 2d at 288.  Therefore, any fact that was known 
to the court at the time of sentencing does not constitute a new 
factor.  See State v. Ralph, 156 Wis. 2d 433, 456 N.W.2d 657 
(Ct. 
App. 
1990) 
(concluding 
that 
the 
fact 
that 
Ralph's 
accomplice received a lesser sentence than Ralph was not a new 
factor because the circuit court judge had been informed at the 
time of Ralph's sentencing that a lesser sentence had been 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
23 
 
recommended 
for 
the 
accomplice); 
State 
v. 
Krueger, 
119 
Wis. 2d 327, 335, 351 N.W.2d 738 (Ct. App. 1984) (concluding 
that there was no new factor because "the so-called 'new factor' 
was, in fact, known to the trial judge at the time of 
sentencing). 
¶58 Like the circuit court, we observe that Harbor's 
"mental health issues were addressed, discussed and considered" 
during sentencing and that "the court was cognizant of the 
problems facing the defendant."  The court was informed that 
Harbor had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and severe 
depression, that she had been hospitalized for mental health 
issues, and that she had been prescribed medication to control 
her symptoms.  We conclude as a matter of law that the facts 
related to Harbor's mental health do not constitute a new 
factor.12    
¶59 We turn next to the facts in the Cedar Creek Report 
that relate to Harbor's use of and addiction to cocaine and 
other substances.  The Report explains that Harbor began 
drinking alcohol when she was 15 years old, that she started 
smoking marijuana when she was 16 years old, and she first tried 
                                                 
12 We note that the circuit court relied on State v. 
Michels, 150 Wis. 2d 94, 99, 441 N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1989) in 
determining that Harbor's mental health was not a new factor.  
Quoting Michels, the court said that "[t]he purpose of the 
sentence is not frustrated by additional and more expansive 
knowledge of the defendant's mental health issues in this case."   
Although we have stated that this language from Michels does not 
set forth an additional requirement for a new factor, we agree 
with the circuit court's ultimate determination that Harbor's 
mental health is not a new factor.    
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
24 
 
cocaine after graduating from high school.  Harbor believes that 
she became addicted to cocaine within two months of trying it 
for the first time. 
¶60 In 1992 and 1993, Harbor committed robberies to get 
money to buy drugs.  Ultimately, she was sentenced to seven 
years incarceration and eight years of probation.  While 
incarcerated, Harbor participated in alcohol and drug treatment.  
Upon her release, she initially stayed clean.  After a couple of 
months, however, she started using cocaine again and ultimately 
returned to daily use.  As a result, her probation was revoked.   
¶61 The same pattern of behavior was repeated several 
times before Harbor was arrested for the current offenses.  
Harbor would quit using cocaine during her incarceration, and 
upon release, she would initially stay clean.  However, she 
would ultimately fall into her old habits and start using 
cocaine again, leading to the revocation of her probation.   
¶62 The circuit court did not expressly determine whether 
Harbor's history of addiction to cocaine constituted a new 
factor.  Rather, in exercising its discretion, the court 
concluded that had it known about Harbor's "recurring drug use," 
"a lesser sentence would not have been imposed."  The court 
determined that "[t]his repeated behavior which she demonstrated 
over the years would have been a major aggravating factor in the 
sentence she received" because her "recurring drug usage would 
cause her to continue to be a substantial risk to society."   
¶63 We conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion.  It made no error of law, and it 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
25 
 
explained its reason for concluding that the facts Harbor 
presented did not justify modification of her sentence.         
¶64 Finally, we turn to the facts in the Cedar Creek 
Report that relate to Harbor's childhood.  According to the 
Report, Harbor's mother was only 15 years old when she became 
pregnant, and Harbor's father was not involved in her life.  
When Harbor was young, her mother drank and used cocaine.  Her 
mother's abusive boyfriend raped Harbor on two occasions.  
Ultimately, when Harbor was 14 years old, Harbor's mother left 
her boyfriend, and later, she quit abusing drugs and alcohol.   
¶65 Again, the circuit court did not expressly determine 
whether the facts about Harbor's childhood constituted a new 
factor.  Rather, in exercising its discretion, the court 
indicated that it did not find the facts to be mitigating.  It 
explained that it found "no connection between the defendant's 
state of mind when she was twelve and the offenses she committed 
when she was 35."  This conclusion does not demonstrate an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.   
¶66 We conclude that Harbor has not presented any new 
factor that justifies modification of her sentence.  The facts 
related to Harbor's mental health do not constitute a new factor 
because Harbor's mental health issues were known to the circuit 
court and taken into consideration at the time the court imposed 
sentence.  Further, the circuit court appropriately exercised 
its discretion when it concluded that facts related to Harbor's 
addiction issues and her traumatic upbringing did not justify 
sentence modification.      
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
26 
 
IV 
¶67 We 
examine 
next 
Harbor's 
claim 
of 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel and evaluate it under the analysis set 
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  To 
prevail, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient, 
and 
(2) 
the 
deficiency 
was 
prejudicial.  Id. at 687.  We need not address both components 
of the inquiry if the defendant fails to make an adequate 
showing on one.  Id. at 697. 
¶68 In all cases, and especially in a case involving a 
maximum sentence of almost 70 years, it behooves an attorney to 
investigate possible mitigating factors and to bring them to the 
attention of the court.  Doing so may involve requesting the 
court to order a PSI, commissioning a sentencing memorandum, or 
defense attorneys conducting their own investigation.   
¶69 We have commented that, given the abolition of parole 
boards which had served as a check on a sentencing court's 
exercise of discretion, "judges have an enhanced need for more 
complete information upfront, at the time of sentencing."  
Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶¶33-34.    It is better for a judge 
to arrive at "a conclusion that is based on more complete and 
accurate information and reached by an organized framework for 
the exercise of discretion."  Id., ¶36.   
¶70 We agree with Harbor that an attorney's failure to 
investigate possible mitigating factors and present them at 
sentencing 
may, 
in 
some 
cases, 
constitute 
deficient 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
27 
 
performance.13  See  State v. Pote, 2003 WI App 31, ¶34, 260 
Wis. 2d 426, 659 N.W.2d 82; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 
(2003).  In this case, however, we do not decide whether 
Attorney Parr's performance was deficient.   
¶71 An attorney's performance should be judged based on 
the facts of the particular case as they existed at the time.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  Here, the circuit court did not 
make any findings of fact regarding Attorney Parr's performance.  
As a result of its determination about prejudice, the circuit 
court did not conduct a Machner hearing and we do not have the 
benefit of testimony from Attorney Parr about any investigation 
he may have undertaken and any strategic decisions he may have 
made.14      
                                                 
13 In other cases, an attorney might persuasively argue that 
the failure to bring potentially aggravating circumstances to 
the court's attention was a sound strategic decision.   
14 Under State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 
(Ct. App. 1979), a hearing may be held when a criminal 
defendant's attorney is challenged for allegedly providing 
ineffective assistance.  At the hearing, the defendant's 
attorney testifies as to his or her reasoning on the challenged 
action or inaction, and that testimony provides a basis for the 
court's determination of whether the attorney's actions were the 
result of deliberate trial strategy or deficient performance.  
Id. at 804.       
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
28 
 
¶72 Like the circuit court and the court of appeals, we 
focus our analysis on whether Harbor was prejudiced by Attorney 
Parr's alleged deficiency.  To prove prejudice, Harbor must show 
that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694.   
¶73 Harbor argues that "with the mitigating factors, the 
sentencing guidelines would change" because Harbor would be seen 
"not as a clever, greedy sociopath, but a person struggling with 
past demons, resulting in addictions and mental health issues, 
for which rehabilitation or treatment, not punishment, is 
necessary."  She asserts that with this knowledge, the court 
would have placed her "in the Medium/Intermediate category, with 
a suggested confinement of 5-10 years."   
¶74 Harbor's argument regarding prejudice fails to account 
for the fact that the circuit court did not consider the 
information 
presented 
in 
the 
Cedar 
Creek 
Report 
to 
be 
                                                                                                                                                             
We note that Wisconsin courts appear to use the terms 
"strategic" and "tactical" interchangeably.  See, e.g., State v. 
Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 502, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983) ("The 
prudent-lawyer standard requires that strategic or tactical 
decisions must be based upon rationality founded on the facts 
and the law.  If tactical or strategic decisions are made on 
such a basis, this court will not find that those decisions 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel . . . .").  We do 
not perceive any substantive difference between these terms in 
the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
29 
 
mitigating.  Rather, the Court considered many of the facts to 
be aggravating and others to be irrelevant.   
¶75 Although the Report paints a more complete picture of 
Harbor and contains some sympathetic facts, the information 
presented demonstrates that Harbor struggled to abstain from 
using cocaine while on probation and that she repeatedly 
relapsed into cocaine use when she was living in the community.  
The circuit court focused on Harbor's demonstrated difficulty to 
stay sober even when under supervision by the department of 
corrections.  It emphasized that safety of the public was of 
paramount importance here and concluded that the new factors 
asserted by Harbor would not have made any difference in its 
sentencing decision.  Accordingly, we determine that Harbor has 
failed to demonstrate that her attorney's alleged shortcomings 
were prejudicial.   
¶76 In sum, we conclude that Harbor has not presented any 
new factor that justifies modification of her sentence.  The 
facts related to Harbor's mental health do not constitute a new 
factor because Harbor's mental health issues were known to the 
circuit court and taken into consideration at the time the court 
imposed sentence.  Further, the circuit court appropriately 
exercised its discretion when it concluded that facts related to 
Harbor's addiction issues and her traumatic upbringing did not 
justify sentence modification.    
¶77 We further determine that Harbor has not demonstrated 
that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because she 
has not shown that her attorney's alleged shortcomings were 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
30 
 
prejudicial.  She has failed to show "a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome."  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2009AP1252-CR   
 
 
 
1