Case Title: LISA LYNN SEATON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING HIGHWAY COMMISSION, DISTRICT NO. 1

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-12-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
LISA LYNN SEATON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING HIGHWAY COMMISSION, DISTRICT NO. 11989 WY 216784 P.2d 197Case Number: 88-284Decided: 12/07/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
LISA LYNN SEATON, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING 
HIGHWAY COMMISSION, DISTRICT NO. 1, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, John T. Langdon, J. 

Charles E. 
Graves and Jane A. Villemez of Graves, Santini & Villemez, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

Bruce A. 
Salzburg and Elizabeth Z. Smith of Herschler, Freudenthal, Salzburg, Bonds & Rideout, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and 
GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Lisa Lynn 
Seaton (Seaton) presents herself as a passenger on a motorcycle who sued the 
driver and the Wyoming State Highway Commission (Highway Department) for 
extremely serious injuries sustained when the motorcycle skidded through loose 
gravel on the highway and battered her against a sign post. On appeal, following 
her favorable jury verdict against the driver, an unfavorable verdict favoring 
the Highway Department, Seaton presents trial error contentions of the exclusion 
of an investigating officer's report, denied re-redirect examination, erroneous 
standard of care instruction and improper defense counsel final argument 
relating to the effect of joint and several liability. We examine each of the 
contentions of error and affirm the jury verdict favoring that 
defendant.

I. 
Issues

[¶2.]     Seaton stated as her 
appellate issues whether:

1. * * * the notes taken 
at the accident scene by Deputy Van Alyne, in his capacity as an investigative 
law enforcement officer for Laramie County, should have been admitted into 
evidence by the trial court pursuant to Rule 803(8)(C) of the Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence.

2. * * * the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying Appellant re-redirect examination of her expert 
witness to explain computations elicited for the first time on re-cross 
examination.

3. * * * Instruction No. 
9 misstates Wyoming law by conditioning the state's liability for a defective 
highway condition upon notice to the state of the condition and the risk 
involved and upon absence of such notice to highway users. 

4. * * * defense 
counsel's comments in closing argument on the effect of joint and several 
liability substantially prejudiced Appellant's right to a fair 
trial.

Additionally and 
almost parenthetically, Seaton also raises what she characterizes as an issue of 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's determination that the 
Highway Department was entirely without fault. That characterization, however, 
is perhaps misapplied. The thrust of Seaton's argument, rather than sufficiency, 
seems to address harmless error concepts to be applied if we should determine 
she is correct regarding any one of her assignments of 
error.

II. 
Facts

[¶3.]     At approximately 1:30 
a.m. on July 6, 1985, Seaton accepted a ride home from the Cheyenne Club on a 
borrowed motorcycle driven by an acquaintance, Edward Riekens, Jr. (Riekens). 
Both she and Riekens had been drinking at the downtown Cheyenne bar since 11:00 
that evening. They proceeded to a parking lot a few blocks away where they met 
some friends and made plans to go to a party south of town. During this time, 
Seaton developed some concerns regarding the driver's ability to handle the 
motorcycle.

[¶4.]     As the group from the 
parking lot headed south on South Greeley Highway, approaching the intersection 
with Interstate 80, Riekens accelerated to nearly sixty miles per hour, moving 
into the left-hand lane and back into the right-hand lane on a gently curving 
upgrade. The posted speed limit on that section of highway is forty miles per 
hour. While maneuvering into the right-hand lane, Riekens glanced over his right 
shoulder to see where his friends were. Facing forward again, he found himself 
skidding off the right edge of the travel lane and encountered gravel laying 
three feet from the gutter beyond the turn lane to the Interstate 80 westbound 
approach ramp. The motorcycle slid into the curb, became airborne and came to 
rest against the concrete abutment of the Interstate 80 
overpass.

[¶5.]     After the vehicle 
struck the curb, Seaton's extended right leg hit a post, stripping her from the 
motorcycle and her inertia carried her into a second post. She fractured every 
major bone in her right leg and both her leg and lower abdomen were seriously 
wounded. She continues to suffer eighty-five percent impairment of her right 
leg. Seaton filed suit, naming as defendants the Wyoming State Highway 
Commission for its failure to correct the dangerous condition created by the 
accumulation of gravel at the edge of the highway, Riekens and two of his 
friends who allegedly had been drag racing with him at the time of the accident. 
Prior to trial, Seaton settled her claims against Riekens' two friends and the 
matter went to trial to determine the negligence of Riekens and the Highway 
Department. The jury found 100% against Riekens, 0% against the Highway 
Department and awarded $390,000 in damages for the serious injuries, extensive 
medical expenses and permanent disability which resulted. Seaton appeals from 
the no-fault Highway Department verdict. Riekens did not 
appeal.

III. The Van Alyne 
Notes

[¶6.]     Deputy Robert Van Alyne 
of the Laramie County Sheriff's Department was one of the first law enforcement 
officers to arrive at the scene of the accident. He delivered his investigative 
notes which identified witnesses and mapped out the location of various items of 
physical evidence to the chief investigative officer, Wyoming Highway Patrolman 
Robert Kotzbacher. Included in those handwritten notes was the following 
controversial entry which, Seaton contends, represents Van Alyne's evaluation of 
the cause of the accident:

Initial point of contact 
with gravel, causing accident: 192' 10" No. of So. curbline westbound on Ramp 
I-80 2' 9" E. of W. curbline I-180.

Unfortunately, 
the parties were precluded from exploring this contention with Van Alyne by his 
untimely death less than a month later.1 Pursuing her theory that Van 
Alyne's recitation supported the Highway Department's liability, Seaton 
attempted to introduce the Van Alyne notes during the direct examination of 
Patrolman Kotzbacher.

[¶7.]     In response to the 
Highway Department's hearsay objection, Seaton pointed to Kotzbacher's testimony 
that Van Alyne had taken the notes pursuant to his duties as a Deputy Sheriff 
and that the notes had been incorporated into the Highway Patrol's investigative 
file on the accident. She asserted those notes were admissible under the "public 
records" exception to the hearsay rule as set forth in W.R.E. 803(8)(C).2 The trial court, following argument 
on the issue, determined the notes contained Van Alyne's opinion on an ultimate 
question of fact and were properly excluded under this court's holdings in 
Harmon v. Town of Afton, 745 P.2d 889 (Wyo. 1987) and Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235 (Wyo. 1982). Furthermore, the trial court concluded the challenged notes 
did not conform to the "official record" exception to the hearsay rule despite 
their incorporation in the records of the Highway Patrol. We agree with the 
exclusion on the latter basis.

[¶8.]     There is no doubt that 
W.R.E. 803(8) permits the admission of certain out-of-court assertions of an 
investigative officer to prove the truth of the matters asserted. Subsections 
(B) and (C) of the rule specifically permit the introduction of the first-hand 
observations and derivative factual findings of a reporting officer. The problem 
in the present case is the portion of the Highway Patrol's records which Seaton 
sought to admit was not a declaration of Patrolman Kotzbacher's first-hand 
knowledge nor did that portion contain the factual findings of his 
investigation. At most, it contained certain factual assertions by a witness 
upon which Patrolman Kotzbacher's findings may, or may not, have been based. 
Such assertions may be admitted solely to establish the fact they were made. 
They are not admissible to prove the truth of the declarations of that third 
party because they are out-of-court declarations of someone other than the 
reporting officer whose records are under consideration. Stated succinctly, 
those assertions of a witness other than the investigating officer who prepared 
the report are "hearsay within hearsay."3 

[¶9.]     It is clear from the 
record in the present case that, at the time Seaton sought to introduce the Van 
Alyne notes, Patrolman Kotzbacher had not as yet given any testimony regarding 
either the measurements he took at the scene or his opinion regarding the cause 
of the accident. The contents of the Van Alyne notes could then serve no 
impeachment purpose. Seaton clearly sought the introduction of those notes 
solely to prove the truth of what she construed the Van Alyne comments to 
determine. Within the context of Patrolman Kotzbacher's official report, those 
notes cannot be said to have set forth either the first-hand knowledge or 
factual findings of a Highway Patrolman who made his own investigation and filed 
the official report. Thus, the notes were merely the hearsay of an outsider to 
the agency whose report was under consideration and were only admissible for 
Seaton's intended purpose if they could, independent of their inclusion in 
Patrolman Kotzbacher's report, satisfy a recognized hearsay exception.4 Seaton failed to lay any foundation 
to convince the trial court or this court that such might have been the case. We 
therefore affirm the trial court's decision to exclude the Van Alyne 
notes.

IV. The Re-Redirect of 
Dr. Limpert

[¶10.]  Seaton called Dr. Rudolph Limpert as an 
expert in accident reconstruction to prove the gravel on the highway contributed 
substantially to the occurrence of the accident. During redirect examination of 
Dr. Limpert, Seaton's counsel posed a hypothetical question designed to show 
Riekens could have maintained control over the motorcycle, avoided the curb and 
negotiated the gentle curve on South Greeley Highway had the gravel not been 
present. Counsel for Seaton, having elicited an opinion of the speed of the 
motorcycle just prior to the accident, had Dr. Limpert compute the distance 
required for one to move the motorcycle three feet to the left, the distance 
hypothetically required to avoid the accident, both on clear pavement and gravel 
strewn pavement. Dr. Limpert stated the maneuver could be completed within 
eighty-two feet on a clear highway, but 234 feet would be required on gravel. 
Examination went from cross-examination to redirect.

[¶11.]  Finally then on recross by the Highway 
Department, Dr. Limpert admitted those figures represented only the distance 
needed to complete the avoidance maneuver, without considering the distance 
which the motorcycle would travel between the initial recognition of danger and 
the beginning of the maneuver. He estimated that during this "reaction time," 
the motorcycle would travel an additional 102 feet, thereby requiring a driver 
to have 184 feet within which to recognize the danger and move three feet to the 
left on dry pavement. On further examination, Dr. Limpert placed the motorcycle 
at a point less than 184 feet from the first point of contact with the curb at 
the point where Riekens claimed to have turned around from glancing over his 
shoulder and to have first seen the gravel, thereby indicating Riekens could not 
have avoided the accident even without gravel.

[¶12.]  Counsel for Seaton, apparently in front 
of the jury, requested an opportunity for the third round or re-redirect 
examination. Seaton's counsel argued a necessity to correct the misleading 
impression created during cross-examination that Riekens needed to move three 
feet to avoid the curb. Counsel asserted Riekens would only have been required 
to miss the curb by six inches to avoid the accident and Seaton should be 
permitted to have Dr. Limpert compute the distance required to perform that less 
drastic maneuver. The trial court denied that request. Seaton now attacks that 
denial as an abuse of the trial court's discretion.5

[¶13.]  The usual function of redirect 
examination is to allow a party to explain testimony elicited by an adversary's 
cross-examination of a witness. Sanville v. State, 593 P.2d 1340, 1344 
(Wyo. 1979). 
However, we have held the manner in which the examination of witnesses is 
conducted rests largely within the discretion of the trial court. Before we 
reverse a verdict on such grounds, the trial court must have flagrantly abused 
that discretion. Benham Const. Co. v. Rentz, 69 Wyo. 176, 238 P.2d 927, 933 (1951). 
Furthermore, W.R.E. 611(a)6 requires the trial court to 
exercise reasonable control over the presentation of evidence to avoid needless 
consumption of time and to maintain efficiency and order in the proceedings. In 
conjunction with W.R.E. 403, which permits the court to exclude evidence for 
reasons of undue delay or waste of time, or because the evidence is cumulative 
or might confuse the jury, W.R.E. 611(a) vests the trial court with considerable 
discretion. McCabe v. R.A. Manning Const. Co., Inc., 674 P.2d 699, 712 
(Wyo. 1983). A 
trial court does not abuse its discretion with respect to a decision concerning 
the manner of examining witnesses if that decision was reasonable; that is, if 
the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did. Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 814 (Wyo. 
1980).

[¶14.]  We discern Dr. Limpert's response to 
Seaton's original hypothetical, when combined with her comment that somewhat 
less than a three foot change from the motorcycle's path may have been needed to 
avoid the accident, was sufficient to apprise the jury of the possible effect of 
the gravel on Riekens' ability to control the vehicle. Nothing elicited on 
recross examination can be said to have detracted from or confused the point the 
litigant was trying to make. Nor were any new issues raised as to which she was 
denied the opportunity for response. Counsel for the Highway Department merely 
reiterated a point made during cross-examination that Riekens never had 
sufficient time to recognize the danger, react to it and avoid it, regardless of 
the distance needed to complete an avoidance maneuver. A large part of the 
redirect and recross examinations consisted of efforts to restate testimony Dr. 
Limpert had given earlier. Neither the trial court nor the jury were required to 
sit through a third round of the same witness evidence. Even in the second 
round, redirect examination is discretionary. 3 F. Busch, Law and Tactics in 
Jury Trials § 433 at 930 (1960); 3 
F. Lane, Goldstein Trial Technique § 12.04 (3rd ed. 
1986). The unusual circumstance where re-redirect examination could be justified 
or even required within the exercise of discretion by the trial court is not 
presented here. Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894 (Wyo. 1986).

V. Jury Instruction No. 
9

[¶15.]  The trial court refused Seaton's proposed 
instruction concerning the liability of the Highway Department and, over proper 
objection, gave the one presented by the Highway Department. The rejected 
instruction read:

The accident in this case 
occurred on a public highway owned and maintained by the State of Wyoming. The State of 
Wyoming owes a 
duty to the traveling public to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably 
safe condition, and is therefore liable for damages for injuries which result 
from its failure to use reasonable care in keeping them in a reasonably safe 
condition for public travel.

While the jury 
instruction given as Instruction No. 9 provided:

The accident in this case 
occurred on a public highway owned and maintained by the State of Wyoming. The State has a 
duty to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe condition, and therefore the 
State is liable for harm caused to users of the highway, by a condition existing 
on the highway if, but only if. . . .

(a) the State knows or 
has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to highway users, and should expect that they will not 
discover or realize the danger, and

(b) the State fails to 
exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the users of the 
highway of the condition and the risk involved, and

(c) the users do not know 
or have reason to know of the condition and the risk 
involved.

Seaton objected 
to Instruction No. 9 on the grounds it impermissibly conditioned the Highway 
Department's liability on whether the Highway Department knew or had reason to 
know of the dangerous condition. Seaton contended that, while the requirement of 
scienter on the State's behalf might appropriately condition its liability as a 
landowner to its invitees, its duty to maintain the state's highways was greater 
and could not be so limited. We disagree and hold the duty of the State of 
Wyoming, with 
respect to the maintenance of its highways for the safety of those who use them, 
was conditioned by an element of scienter, identical to that which conditions 
the liability of a landowner to his invitees.7

[¶16.]  Our analysis of this issue is impeded at 
the outset, however, by the manner in which the parties to this appeal have 
raised it. Both parties agree Instruction No. 9 was derived from Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 342 (1965), dealing with the duties of a possessor of land. 
Both parties, however, seem to suffer from the misapprehension that Section 342 
speaks of such duties with reference to the possessor's invitees.8 That is not the case. Section 342 
states:

A possessor of land is 
subject to liability for physical harm caused to licensees by a condition on the 
land if, but only if,

(a) the possessor knows 
or has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should expect that they 
will not discover or realize the danger, and

(b) he fails to exercise 
reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the licensees of the condition and the risk 
involved, and

(c) the licensees do not know or have reason to 
know of the condition and the risk involved.

(Emphasis 
added.) Compare Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 343 (emphasis added), 
which says:

A possessor of land is 
subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on 
the land if, but only if, he

(a) knows or by the 
exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize 
that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and

(b) should expect that 
they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves 
against it, and

(c) fails to exercise 
reasonable care to protect them against the danger.

[¶17.]  Were we to apply the Restatement 
formulation of the law to the present case, it is clear Section 343 would be the 
more appropriate of these two sections. Seaton was not "privileged to enter or 
remain on [the highway] only by virtue of the possessor's consent;" that is, she 
was not a licensee as the term is defined by Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
supra, § 330. Rather, she would more appropriately be described as a person 
"invited to enter or remain on [the highway] as a member of the public for a 
purpose for which the [highway] is held open to the public;" a public invitee 
under Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 332(2). Thus, Section 343 would 
more aptly describe the duty owed to Seaton.9

[¶18.]  Upon examination of subsections (a) of 
both Sections 342 and 343, we note the language used to describe the scienter 
necessary to render a landowner liable to licensees differs from that used to 
frame the respective duties toward invitees. With regard to licensees, the 
landowner must know or have reason to know of a dangerous condition before 
liability attaches. As to invitees, the landowner is not liable unless he or she 
knows of the condition or would have discovered the condition through the 
exercise of reasonable care. One must wonder, however, whether the distinction 
between a person having a "reason to know" and a person who would "know through 
the exercise of reasonable care" is not lost on those who, like the jury in the 
present case, have not been exposed to commentary in the Restatement which 
distinguishes that language based on the imposition of an additional duty 
towards the invitee to conduct a reasonable investigation for dangers. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 342 comment d and § 343 comment b. We 
suspect such academic niceties could have had no effect on the jury's perception 
of the correct legal principles to be applied in this case. As we implied 
earlier, this court has not adopted, and needs not now adopt, the precise 
formulae for landowner liability offered by the Restatement. Therefore, it does 
not matter that an instruction on the duty of a landowner to an invitee is 
presented through language which the authors of the Restatement have deemed to 
be more appropriate to the landowner's duty to licensees. What is crucial is 
that the instruction correctly embraced the duty towards an invitee as that duty 
has been formulated in Wyoming. Furthermore, because Seaton 
frequently explored without objection the Highway Department's practices 
concerning the inspection of highways and its concomitant efforts to remove road 
hazards, we think the jury clearly could have had in mind the broadest possible 
definition of the Highway Department's "reason to know."

[¶19.]  The question remains though whether 
Instruction No. 9, as we believe the jury would have understood it, correctly 
states the law in Wyoming. We turn therefore to an examination 
of the contested scienter requirement as previously expounded by this court in 
Buttrey Food Stores Division v. Coulson, 620 P.2d 549 (Wyo. 1980). In that case, 
we held a landowner had a duty to invitees, the public, to use reasonable care 
in making the premises reasonably safe to visit. The landowner must protect 
those individuals as invitees against known dangers and dangers discoverable 
through the exercise of reasonable care. Id. at 552. We also held, however, that the 
scienter required to render a landowner liable could exist despite lack of 
actual notice of the dangerous condition and despite the absence of any 
longstanding danger that might imply constructive notice. This court held such 
liability could attach where either the landowner's operating methods or other 
circumstances were such as to create a "reasonable probability" that a dangerous 
condition would occur. We observed that, since the question of negligence 
remained with a jury charged with distributing fault based on comparative 
negligence principles, such a liberal scienter requirement would not serve to 
make the landowner an insurer of the invitees' safety. Id. at 
552-53.

[¶20.]  We do not think the instructions given in 
the present case significantly alter the Buttrey Food Stores Division 
formulation. A common sense reading by the jury of the "know or has reason to 
know" language of Instruction No. 9, without further definitional qualification 
by the trial court, can be said to embrace not only those situations where the 
landowner has created the danger or has constructive knowledge of the danger, 
but to also embrace those situations where circumstances have created a 
reasonable probability for the occurrence of a dangerous condition. We conclude 
Instruction No. 9 presented the jury with a correct statement of the scienter 
necessary to establish the Highway Department's liability. The key to the 
creation of a duty to the invitee on the premises is foreseeability. Allen v. 
Slim Pickens Enterprises, 777 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1989). The actual instruction given is 
compatible with the broadly based instruction and standard adopted in Idaho before an immunity 
change occurred.

In considering the 
standard of care required of the State Highway Department it is our opinion that 
the standard should be similar to that owed by a private individual who is the 
owner or possessor of land to an invitee. We therefore hold that the State 
Highway Department is subject to liability for harm caused to persons lawfully 
using the highways for the purposes intended when the State Highway Department 
creates or maintains a dangerous condition on the highway if the State Highway 
Department:

(1) knows of or by the 
exercise of reasonable care would discover such condition, 
and

(2) should realize that 
the condition involves an unreasonable risk of harm to those using the highways, 
and

(3) should expect that 
persons using the highway will not discover or realize the danger, 
and

(4) fails to exercise 
reasonable care to make the condition safe or to adequately warn of the 
condition and the risk involved, and,

(5) the persons using the 
highway do not know or have reason to know of the condition and attendant 
risks.

Smith v. State, 
93 Idaho 795, 
473 P.2d 937, 946 (1970). See also Johnson v. State, 636 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1981); State v. Kallio, 92 Nev. 665, 557 P.2d 705 
(1976); and State Dept. of Highways and Public Transp. v. Bacon, 754 S.W.2d 279 
(Tex. App. 1988). Cf.State v. Juengel, 15 Ariz. App. 495, 489 P.2d 869 (1971) and Phipps v. City of 
McGill, 97 Nev. 233, 627 P.2d 401 (1981), which appear to 
require actual notice.

[¶21.]  On appeal, Seaton seeks to take further 
issue with Instruction No. 9, contending subsection (c) of the instruction, by 
conditioning the Highway Department's liability on the driving public's lack of 
knowledge of the dangerous condition, erroneously revives the "obvious danger 
rule" as a bar to that liability, contrary to Wyoming's adoption of comparative negligence. 
See O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 
(Wyo. 1985); cf. Radosevich v. Board of 
CountyCom'rs of County of Sweetwater, 776 P.2d 747 (Wyo. 1989). See also 
Allen, 777 P.2d 79. Our review of the record in this case suggests Riekens' and 
Seaton's lack of knowledge of the gravel deposits on South Greeley 
Highway was taken for granted; no evidence or 
argument appears to have been presented on this issue. We fail to see how it 
could have had the effect at trial which Seaton proposes. We additionally note 
that, ignoring the implications contained in questions posed to various 
witnesses by counsel for Seaton, there was no evidence presented to indicate the 
gravel had accumulated at the edge of the highway by anything other than natural 
means. Such being the case, subsection (c) of the instruction was at least 
arguably a correct statement of the law under our decision in O'Donnell, 696 P.2d 1278.10

[¶22.]  We need not determine this issue, 
however, because Seaton did not state that objection at trial. W.R.C.P. 51 
states "[n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an 
instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its 
verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of 
his objection." The purpose of that rule is to apprise the trial court of any 
objections so it can correct an improper instruction prior to submitting it to 
the jury. Alberts v. State, 642 P.2d 447, 453 (Wyo. 1982). Although an appealing party may 
claim the submission of a particular instruction was erroneous for a multitude 
of reasons, in the absence of plain error this court will only consider claims 
of error relating to those portions of the instruction to which the party 
offered a proper objection at trial. Id.; Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Robles, 511 P.2d 963, 968-69 (Wyo. 1973). There was no 
plain error in this case.

[¶23.]  The trial court is afforded considerable 
latitude to tailor instructions to the particular facts of a case. We will not 
declare an instruction erroneous if, viewing the instructions as a whole and in 
the context of the entire trial, we determine it fairly and adequately presents 
the issues for the jury's consideration. Clarke v. Vandermeer, 740 P.2d 921, 926 
(Wyo. 1987); Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 
1053 (Wyo. 
1987) Instruction No. 9 satisfies this test and, accordingly, its submission to 
the jury is approved.

VI. Closing 
Argument

[¶24.]  In closing argument, counsel for the 
Highway Department made the following statement:

Mr. Graves explained to 
you about 50/50 splits in negligence on the verdict form. What he said was 
correct, but he didn't say enough. If you say in your verdict that Ed Riekens 
was 99 percent at fault and that the Highway Department was 1 percent at fault, 
the Highway Department is going to pay the judgment, and the Highway Department 
will then have an opportunity, if it can, to collect the 99 percent back from 
Mr. Riekens. I will suggest to you that that's why the Highway Department is in 
this case at all. Mr. Graves is contending for 1 percent on behalf of his 
client. That's all he needs. That's all he wants. I have to contend for zero 
percent for my client, and I need to ask you to put the blame where the blame 
lies.

Seaton asks us 
to find that such commentary improperly, if only implicitly, asked the jury to 
decide questions of fault based on the respective wealth of the defendants and 
appealed to the jurors interest, as taxpayers, in placing the burden for the 
total prospective judgment on a party other than the Highway 
Department.

[¶25.]  Counsel's closing argument does not 
differ substantially from that approved in Coryell v. Town of Pinedale, 745 P.2d 883 (Wyo. 1987) and Harmon, 745 P.2d 889. There, as 
in the present case, counsel for a governmental entity sought to explain which 
party was likely to shoulder the monetary burden of a verdict adverse to both 
that entity and its co-defendant under the court's instruction on joint and 
several liability. We held that, unless he misstates the law, counsel may 
properly comment during his closing argument on any instructions given by the 
court. Harmon, 745 P.2d  at 893. Seaton suggests no good reason, except those 
already considered in Harmon, why the result in this case should be different. 
We therefore find no error in permitting the contested commentary.11

VII. Sufficiency of The 
Evidence

[¶26.]  The contention which Seaton presented as 
a sufficiency of the evidence argument appears instead to be an assertion that 
any error we might find in the trial proceedings could not be deemed harmless. 
Seaton does not argue the trial evidence, in itself, was insufficient to support 
a finding Riekens was the sole negligent party. Rather, she contends, given the 
particular balance between favorable and unfavorable evidence, such a finding 
could not have occurred in the absence of any one of the designated errors. 
Notwithstanding the fact that we have found no errors in the proceedings below, 
Seaton's claims regarding the balance of evidence in this case simply do not 
survive even casual scrutiny within our normal rules of appellate review on 
sufficiency contentions after jury verdict.

"[W]e assume the evidence 
in favor of the successful party to be true, leaving out of consideration 
entirely the evidence in conflict, and assigning every favorable inference to 
the evidence of the successful party that can be reasonably and fairly drawn 
from it. In addition, when reviewing a jury verdict, we leave to the jury the 
duty of ascertaining the facts, reconciling conflicts therein and drawing its 
own inferences if more than one inference is permissible. Also, when the facts 
permit the drawing of more than one inference, then it is for the jury to choose 
which one will be utilized and, if supported by substantial evidence, the jury's 
choice will be held by us to be conclusive."

Reese v. Dow 
Chemical Co., 728 P.2d 1118, 1120 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting Crown Cork & Seal 
Co., Inc. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 638 P.2d 1272, 1274-75 (Wyo. 1982)). See 
also Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532 (Wyo. 1979).

[¶27.]  Even if the jury had been convinced the 
gravel had accumulated at the scene of the accident due to the breach of some 
duty by Highway Department employees for a sweeping program on median areas, 
there remained the strong evidence that Riekens alone had caused the accident 
and the resulting injuries to Seaton. It is clear Riekens had been drinking on 
the evening of the accident and exhibited difficulty in operating the borrowed 
motorcycle. As he approached a gentle curve to the left on South Greeley 
Highway at nearly sixty miles per hour, he was in the 
process of negotiating a change from the left hand to the right hand lane of 
that highway. He turned to look over his right shoulder for his companions. 
Facing forward again, he found he had crossed both travel lanes of the highway 
and a sufficient portion of the turn lane for the Interstate 80 entrance ramp to 
bring him in contact with some gravel off the travel lane for this road system 
at a point only slightly more than three feet from the curb he eventually 
struck. It is not unrealistic for the jury to have perceived that Riekens was, 
during this time, not in control of the motorcycle which he was driving, after 
drinking, at night and at an excessive speed. The gravel's contribution, if any, 
to his continued failure to control the vehicle once he had overshot the curve 
to cross the turn lane and move into the median was to a great extent 
debateable. Debated it was, and ably so. Seaton lost the debate by jury 
decision.

[¶28.]  The decision of the trial court is 
affirmed in all respects.

FOOTNOTES

1 Van Alyne lost his life 
in a Cheyenne, Wyoming flood while attempting to save the 
lives of stranded motorists.

2 W.R.E. 803(8) provides 
that the following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, notwithstanding the 
availability of the declarant at trial:

Public records and 
reports. 
- Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public 
offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, 
or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters 
there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters 
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil 
actions and proceedings and against the state in criminal cases, factual 
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by 
law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness.

3 This problem is perhaps 
most clearly described by the following excerpts from 4 D. Louisell & C. 
Mueller, Federal Evidence § 455 at 730-40 (1980 & Supp. 1988) (footnotes 
omitted), discussing F.R.E. 803(8):

To use once again the 
example of an accident report, it seems clear that the report is double hearsay 
which cannot be within clause (B) insofar as it rests upon interviews by the 
investigating officer with the participants, and which cannot be used to prove 
the truth of statements made by the participants. A report within clause (B) 
can, however, be used to prove that an outsider made a statement, where this 
fact is itself significant.

The one clear exception 
to the pattern described above arises where the outsider's statement is itself 
within a hearsay exception or is "not hearsay" within the meaning of Rule 
801(d)(2). Where the outsider's statement amounts to an admission, an excited 
utterance, a dying declaration, or even qualifies under the business records 
exception, a public record offered under Rule 803(8)(B) is competent to prove 
the truth of that statement, assuming that the other requirements of the latter 
provision are satisfied.

* * * * * 
*

A great advantage of 
clause (C) is that it embraces records based upon statements or testimony by 
outsiders to government, so there is no need to show that the source was an 
official with personal knowledge. Some pre-Rules authority refused to go so far. 
Like records within clause (A), those within clause (C) should be considered to 
satisfy foundation requirements if properly authenticated as public records, and 
in effect it is assumed that responsible persons within the agency gathered the 
information (ultimately from the best sources available), carefully analyzed it 
and drew "factual" (as opposed to hypothetical or speculative) conclusions from 
it.

* * * * * 
*

While clause (C) may 
properly be invoked in connection with findings which rest upon statements by 
outsider, probably it remains improper even under clause (C) to introduce those 
very statements, where the purpose is to establish the matter asserted in them. 
It may seem a paradox to permit a public report to be introduced as proof of 
official findings resting upon statements by outsiders, but not to permit the 
report as proof of the statements themselves, and of what they assert. But the 
official findings at least reflect the expertise of the agency involved, in 
effect filtering out those external statements which it finds unbelievable or 
for some reason inaccurate or unreliable. And where the outsiders' statements 
would be subject to a hearsay objection if reported in court by the live 
testimony of a witness, there is no reason to treat such statements differently 
when embodied in an official report.

Of course the point made 
about outsiders' statements in connection with clause (B) is true here as well. 
If such statements fit within their own hearsay exception, the truth of what 
they assert may properly be proved by a public record offered under clause (C). 
And a report within clause (C) is competent to prove that such a statement was 
made.

4 The comment contained in 
the Van Alyne notes is in itself less than definite. (To the extent of the 
insufficiency of any proper foundation for introduction, we could agree with the 
special concurrence.) See Cornelison v. Aggregate Haulers, Inc., 777 S.W.2d 542 
(Tex. App. 
1989). The accident scene at this point consisted of two wide lanes for 
south-bound travel with a general curve to the left or the east (where Riekens 
should have been driving) and a third lane for a vehicle to turn west for access 
on to Interstate 80 as an upgrade merger intersection for interstate highway 
connection. The gravel was not located on any regular lane for travel, but was 
scattered west of the turn lane on a portion of the area of the north/south 
parking median on the west side of Interstate 80 just before that paved median 
merged into the lane for travel to enter the Interstate 80 interchange. Not only 
is the intersection a very familiar connector within the Cheyenne metropolitan 
area highway system, but also large diagrams and extensive photographs of the 
scene were provided for jury review, including an aerial photograph taken 
shortly after the accident.

5 The third round or 
re-redirect examination is not a normal attribute of Wyoming trials. Reference 
is made in the reporter to only one case. MacLaird v. State, 718 P.2d 41 
(Wyo. 1986). A 
national Westlaw search revealed only two other cases where a re-redirect 
examination was noted. In none of the three cases was it an issue for decision 
presented by the third inquiry exercise. See United States v. Sorrentino, 726 F.2d 876 (1st 
Cir. 1984) (tax evasion case) and United States v. Cole, 334 F. Supp. 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (also a tax evasion case). This court said in MacLaird, 718 P.2d  at 46 that "[b]oth counsel tried to have the last word, and it was 
difficult for the attorneys to let go of appellant. Defense counsel pursued what 
might loosely be called re-redirect examination. The prosecutor did not try 
re-recross examination."

6 W.R.E. 611(a) 
provides:

The court shall exercise 
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and 
presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation 
effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of 
time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue 
embarrassment.

7 The legislature has 
since applied immunity insulation to road condition claims of the character 
presented here.

8 Seaton consistently, at 
trial and on appeal, referred to Instruction No. 9 as detailing the duty to an 
invitee. The State, on the other hand, plainly notes in its brief that the 
instruction and Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 342 set out a 
landowner's duty to a licensee, but then cites presumably supporting authority 
for the proposition that a state's duty of care with respect to highway 
maintenance is the same as a landowner's duty to an 
invitee.

9 The variegated history 
of Wyoming 
public agency liability for road conditions has been based upon a character of 
scienter when escaping the immunity defense. O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1985). See Opitz v. Town of City of 
Newcastle, 35 Wyo. 358, 249 P. 799 (1926), which recognized 
the city had knowledge that the bridge was out.

10 In O'Donnell, we held 
the "obvious danger rule" only served to relieve a landowner of liability where 
the dangerous condition causing injury to the invitee was created by nature, as 
would be the case with accumulations of snow or ice. As to non-natural "obvious 
dangers", we held the landowner would not be relieved of liability except to the 
extent permitted by the application of comparative negligence principles. In 
that case, we refused to absolutely absolve the City of Casper from liability 
under the "obvious danger rule" because it was clear the gravel, allegedly 
causing O'Donnell's motorcycle accident, had been placed on the highway by the 
city's road resurfacing operations. O'Donnell, 696 P.2d  at 1283-84. See also 
Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc., 718 P.2d 890, 897-98 (Wyo. 1986).

11 This writer, except for 
the force of stare decisis and even then not philosophically, would not 
willingly recede from his views stated in Coryell and Harmon. However, the joint 
and several law which existed in Coryell, Harmon and also for this accident was 
repealed and replaced by totally different provisions in 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 24, § 1, W.S. 1-1-109 (1977). This challenged argument for any accident that 
occurred after the effective date of the change of June 11, 1986 would 
consequently be both legally wrong and procedurally 
unacceptable.

GOLDEN, Justice, specially 
concurring, in which CARDINE, Chief 
Justice, joins.

[¶29.]  I concur in the result in this case, but 
disagree with the analysis in Part III, The Van Alyne Notes. I believe that 
Deputy Van Alyne's notes were properly excluded as evidence only because there 
is a foundation problem with the trustworthiness of the statement offered, and 
not because the investigative notes of a cooperating law enforcement officer are 
inadmissible hearsay within hearsay. Treating the investigative notes of all 
participating officers other than the one who ultimately files the report as 
hearsay outside an exception unnecessarily excludes evidence "with special 
trustworthiness * * * by virtue of the declarant's official duty and the 
probability that the duty has been accurately performed." Combined Insurance 
Company of America v. 
Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034, 1046 (Wyo. 1978). Investigative notes contributed by 
a cooperating officer are more accurately characterized as a public report 
within a public report. In this light they are competent evidence under W.R.E. 
805, since both the notes and the report they are incorporated into conform to 
the W.R.E. 803(8)(C) exception.

[¶30.]  Investigative notes, though the product 
of an outsider, should generally be admissible so long as the foundation 
requirement of trustworthiness is met. Usually an adequate foundation may be 
laid with a showing that the notes were prepared by a trained law enforcement 
officer in the performance of his duties. In this case, however, a 
trustworthiness problem arises from the structure and content of Deputy Van 
Alyne's notes.

[¶31.]  Deputy Van Alyne provided Patrolman 
Kotzbacher with a diagram of the accident scene and five pages of notes. The 
first page lists names, addresses and telephone numbers of two witnesses. The 
remaining four pages record measurements made by Deputy Van Alyne. The first of 
these measurements, on the page immediately following the one listing witnesses, 
states:

Initial point of contact 
with gravel causing accident: 192'10" No. of So. curbline

west bound on ramp I-80 
2'9" E. of W. curbline I-80

Because this 
statement about causation appears just after the witness identification and 
there are no other comments on causation, it is not possible to establish with 
any certainty whether the statement is a factual finding by Deputy Van Alyne, or 
the statement of one of the witnesses he contacted.

[¶32.]  Although a factual finding resting in 
part upon the statements of outsiders is properly admissible under W.R.E. 
803(8)(C), an outsider's statement found in a public report is hearsay unless it 
is itself within an exception and may not be offered for its truth. 4 D. 
Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 455 at 739 (1977). Because the 
statement in Deputy Van Alyne's notes may itself be that of an outsider, one of 
the witnesses, it fails to meet the W.R.E. 803(8)(C) foundation requirement of 
sufficient trustworthiness that is otherwise normally present in the 
investigative notes of a law enforcement officer.

[¶33.]  It is neither desirable, nor necessary to 
a sound result, to sweep so much competent evidence aside. Notes of a 
cooperating officer may address aspects of an investigation not observed or 
recorded by the reporting officer that will be helpful to the trier of fact. If 
there is no reason to question their trustworthiness, they should be admissible 
under the W.R.E. 805 hearsay exception as a public report within a public 
report. In this case the disputed statement of causation in Deputy Van Alyne's 
report was properly excluded as lacking in 
trustworthiness.