Case Title: Stewart v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 115149

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2019-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 115,149 
 
REGINALD STEWART, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
If a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 presents substantial questions of law or triable 
issues of fact and the movant is indigent, the district court shall appoint counsel to assist 
the indigent movant. If a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 presents a potentially substantial 
question of law or triable issue of fact, the district court has the statutory power to 
appoint counsel for movant in the exercise of its judicial discretion. 
 
2. 
Even in circumstances where a K.S.A. 60-1507 movant is not statutorily entitled 
to the appointment of counsel, if the court conducts a hearing at which the State will be 
represented by counsel, due process of law requires that the movant be represented by 
counsel unless the movant waives that right to counsel. 
 
3. 
 
The State is permitted to file a written response to a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. The 
district court's consideration of the State's response, standing alone, does not constitute a 
hearing for purposes of determining whether due process of law requires the movant to be 
represented by counsel. 
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4. 
When a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and the files and records of the case, including 
any response to the motion from the State, conclusively show that the movant is entitled 
to no relief under that motion, the district court may summarily deny the motion without 
appointing counsel for the movant. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed July 7, 2017. 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JAMES R. FLEETWOOD, judge. Opinion filed July 12, 2019. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
Michael P. Whalen, of Law Office of Michael P. Whalen, of Wichita, argued the cause, and 
Krystle M. S. Dalke, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for appellant.  
 
Boyd K. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Lesley A. Isherwood, 
assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with 
him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
JOHNSON, J.:  Reginald Stewart petitions this court for review of the Court of 
Appeals' decision affirming the district court's summary denial of his K.S.A. 60-1507 
motion. Stewart agrees with the Court of Appeals' holding that the district court erred in 
reviewing and relying upon the State attorney's written response to Stewart's pro se 
motion without first appointing counsel for Stewart. Stewart's challenge on review is to 
the panel's determination that the district court's error was harmless because the motion, 
files, and record—exclusive of the State's written response—conclusively established that 
Stewart was not entitled to relief. Stewart claims that there were facts missing from the 
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record that required an evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel. We conclude that 
summary denial of the 60-1507 motion was appropriate in this case. 
 
The State cross-petitions, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that 
"the district court may not invite the State to respond to the [60-1507] motion or review 
an unsolicited written response from the State until or unless the movant is represented by 
a lawyer." Stewart v. State, No. 115,149, 2017 WL 2901146, at *5 (Kan. App. 2017) 
(unpublished opinion) (Stewart II). We agree with the State that its filing of a written 
response, standing alone, did not trigger Stewart's statutory right to counsel. Ultimately, 
we affirm the district court's summary denial of the motion. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW 
 
After two trials resulted in a hung jury, a third jury convicted Stewart of 
aggravated robbery. The 2011 incident giving rise to the conviction involved three men 
who accosted a pedestrian walking home from work on a dimly lit street. The assailants 
battered the victim before removing $8, some cigarettes, and a white lighter from his 
pockets. The victim flagged down a patrol officer who apprehended two fleeing 
individuals, Gerard Sillemon and Stewart. Sillemon had $8 in his pocket, and the white 
lighter lay on the ground between the two men. The victim identified Stewart—both at 
the crime scene and at trial—as being one of the robbers. 
 
At trial, Sillemon testified that he pled guilty because he was the only person 
involved in robbing the victim. Stewart testified that he was in the vicinity and observed 
the crime, but that he was not involved in the robbery in any way. He claimed that the 
victim had misidentified him. Nevertheless, the jury convicted Stewart of aggravated 
robbery. 
 
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On direct appeal, Stewart raised three jury instruction challenges and a cumulative 
error argument. One of Stewart's jury instruction challenges argued that the eyewitness 
identification instruction was clearly erroneous for including "degree of certainty" as a 
factor for the jury to consider. The Court of Appeals held this instruction was erroneous 
but fell short of clear error. State v. Stewart, No. 107,723, 2013 WL 3455788 (Kan. App.) 
(unpublished opinion), rev. denied 298 Kan. 1207 (2013) (Stewart I).  
 
 
Subsequently, Stewart timely filed the pro se K.S.A. 60-1507 motion that is now 
before this court. The motion alleged error by the trial judge, ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel, wrongful failure to disclose a transcript by the State, discriminatory 
collusion between the prosecutor and the accuser, and conspiracy to convict Stewart on 
the basis of race by the Sedgwick County Public Defender's Office.  
 
Almost a year later, the State, acting through counsel, filed a response to Stewart's 
motion, addressing Stewart's claims and arguing no evidentiary hearing was needed to 
resolve them. The record is not clear as to whether the district court ordered the State to 
respond or whether the State responded on its own volition. The district court's motion 
minutes sheet adopting the "authorities and arguments of the State . . . as persuasive" and 
denying Stewart's motion without a hearing is dated the same day as the State filed its 
response, albeit the motions sheet was file-stamped a week later.  
 
 
Stewart appealed the summary denial to the Court of Appeals. He alleged that the 
district court violated his due process rights by failing to appoint counsel to represent him 
before it considered the State attorney's written response to the pro se motion. He also 
asserted that there are facts absent from the record regarding trial counsel's representation 
that require an evidentiary hearing, rendering the summary denial erroneous.  
 
 
The Court of Appeals held that the district court materially erred in considering 
the State's response to Stewart's pro se motion without appointing counsel for Stewart or 
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providing him with an opportunity to argue beyond the face of his original motion. 
Stewart II, 2017 WL 2901146, at *5. But the panel held that even though Stewart was 
improperly deprived of the opportunity to be heard through counsel, the error was 
harmless. The panel considered Stewart's 60-1507 motion without referring to the State's 
response and opined that the motion had presented no viable claims, thereby rendering 
harmless the district court's procedural error. 2017 WL 2901146, at *2-4, 6. 
 
 
Stewart petitioned this court for review, arguing that the district court and Court of 
Appeals erred by not granting him an evidentiary hearing. The State cross-petitioned, 
arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Stewart should have been 
appointed counsel upon the State filing a written response to the motion. 
 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL FOR 60-1507 MOVANT 
 
In addressing Stewart's procedural challenge to the manner in which the district 
court handled the 60-1507 motion, the Court of Appeals noted the procedure set forth in 
K.S.A. 60-1507(b); the statutory right to counsel provided by K.S.A. 22-4506(b); and our 
restatement of the statutory mandates in Supreme Court Rule 183 (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 
222). 2017 WL 2901146, at *5. The panel summarized our caselaw establishing three 
options for a district court upon receiving a 60-1507 motion as follows: 
 
"The district court can summarily dismiss the motion after reviewing it and the contents 
of the case file. Bellamy v. State, 285 Kan. 346, 353-54, 172 P. 3d 10 (2007). Otherwise, 
the district court has two choices. It can conduct a preliminary hearing during which 
lawyers for the State and for the defendant present legal argument and otherwise address 
whether the circumstances call for a full evidentiary hearing. A limited amount of 
evidence may be received at that preliminary hearing. Bellamy, 285 Kan. at 354. Or the 
district court can appoint a lawyer for the movant, bypass the preliminary hearing, and set 
the motion for a full evidentiary hearing. See 285 Kan. at 353-54." 2017 WL 2901146, at 
*5. 
6 
 
 
 
The panel determined that the options do not include the circumstance in which 
the district court considers the arguments contained in a written response filed by the 
State, "without affording the movant the equivalent opportunity to be heard through a 
lawyer." 2017 WL 2901146, at *5. Our task is to determine whether that interpretation of 
the statutory right to counsel is correct. 
 
Standard of Review  
 
 
The extent of Stewart's statutory right to counsel during a K.S.A. 60-1507 
proceeding is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review. See Mundy v. 
State, 307 Kan. 280, 294, 408 P.3d 965 (2018) (quoting Robertson v. State, 288 Kan. 217, 
227, 201 P.3d 691 [2009]); see also Bellamy v. State, 285 Kan. 346, 355, 172 P.3d 10 
(2007) (disapproving application of the abuse of discretion standard for reviewing the 
results of K.S.A. 60-1507 motions without specifically discussing K.S.A. 22-4506). But 
cf. State v. Sharkey, 299 Kan. 87, 95, 322 P.3d 325 (2014) ("The determination of 
whether the motion presents substantial questions of law justifying the appointment of 
counsel '"rests within the sound discretion of the trial court."'").  
 
In addition, resolution of this issue requires interpretation of K.S.A. 60-1507, 
K.S.A. 22-4506, and Supreme Court Rule 183 (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 228). "Interpretation 
of statutes and Supreme Court rules raises questions of law reviewable de novo." 
Thompson v. State, 293 Kan. 704, 710, 270 P.3d 1089 (2011).  
 
Stewart also argued before the Court of Appeals that the district court's failure to 
appoint counsel resulted in a due process violation. "The issue of whether due process has 
been afforded is a question of law over which [this court has] unlimited review." Hogue 
v. Bruce, 279 Kan. 848, 850, 113 P.3d 234 (2005).  
 
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Analysis  
 
 
Stewart's due process claim is based upon the notion that a response by the State 
triggers a pro se 60-1507 movant's right to be appointed counsel. He points to the 
decisions in State v. Hemphill, 286 Kan. 583, 596, 186 P.3d 777 (2008); Alford v. State, 
42 Kan. App. 2d 392, 402, 212 P.3d 250 (2009); Oliver v. State, No. 113,035, 2016 WL 
1391757, at *3 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion); and Stevenson v. State, No. 
96,082, 2007 WL 438745, at *2 (Kan. App. 2007) (unpublished opinion), as supporting 
that contention. The State counters that these cases are clearly distinguishable because 
their due process holdings were based upon the district court holding a hearing at which 
the State was represented by counsel but the movant was not. Moreover, the State 
contests Stewart's contention that, when a court considers a written response, it is 
tantamount to the court conducting an in-court hearing. We agree with the State on these 
points. 
 
 
Our analysis of the procedural due process claim looks first to see whether the 
State has deprived the claimant of life, liberty, or property. If so, the focus is on the 
extent and nature of the process which was due the claimant. Hogue, 279 Kan. at 850-51; 
see also State v. Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 548, 132 P.3d 934 (2006) ("[B]asic elements of 
procedural due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner."). The first step is satisfied because the very nature of a 60-
1507 motion involves the movant's liberty interest, to-wit:  "A prisoner in custody under 
sentence of a court of general jurisdiction claiming the right to be released." K.S.A. 60-
1507(a). The second inquiry—the nature and extent of the process to which a 60-1507 
movant is due—involves a more nuanced analysis.  
 
We begin by looking at the source of Stewart's right to an attorney, if any. 
Although Stewart makes no claim that either the federal or state constitution provides 
him with the right to be appointed an attorney to pursue a postconviction collateral attack, 
8 
 
it is helpful to keep in mind that neither constitution provides that right. The United 
States Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 95 
L. Ed. 2d 539 (1987), declined to extend an indigent person's Fourteenth Amendment 
right to counsel on direct appeal to a collateral attack, stating "[o]ur cases establish that 
the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further." See 
also Davila v. Davis, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2062, 198 L. Ed. 2d 603 (2017) 
("prisoner does not have a constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction 
proceedings").  
 
Likewise, this court has held that "[t]here is no constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel in an action pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507." Robertson, 288 Kan. at 
228; see also In re Care & Treatment of Ontiberos, 295 Kan. 10, 21, 287 P.3d 855 (2012) 
(noting that a prisoner in a K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding has already been afforded exercise 
of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel at trial and their direct appeal); Brown v. State, 
278 Kan. 481, 483, 101 P.3d 1201 (2004) ("We acknowledge that there is no 
constitutional right to effective assistance of legal counsel on collateral attacks because 
they are civil, not criminal, actions."). Nevertheless, "Kansas does under some 
circumstances 'provide a statutory right to counsel on collateral attack.'" Mundy, 307 
Kan. at 295 (quoting Brown, 278 Kan. at 483). 
 
 
K.S.A. 60-1507, the statute in the Code of Civil Procedure that establishes the 
procedure for prisoners to file a motion seeking postconviction relief, does not mention 
any right to counsel for the movant. But K.S.A. 22-4506, a statute in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, provides for the appointment of counsel for an indigent 60-1507 
movant. Specifically, it provides:   
 
"(a) Whenever any person who is in custody under a sentence of imprisonment 
upon conviction of a felony files a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion 
attacking sentence under K.S.A. 60-1507 and files with such petition or motion such 
9 
 
person's affidavit stating that the petition or motion is filed in good faith and that such 
person is financially unable to pay the costs of such action and to employ counsel 
therefor, the court shall make a preliminary examination of the petition or motion and the 
supporting papers. 
 
"(b) If the court finds that the petition or motion presents substantial questions of 
law or triable issues of fact and if the petitioner or movant has been or is thereafter 
determined to be an indigent person as provided in K.S.A. 22-4504, and amendments 
thereto, the court shall appoint counsel from the panel for indigents' defense services or 
otherwise in accordance with the applicable system for providing legal defense services 
for indigent persons prescribed by the state board of indigents' defense services, to assist 
such person and authorize the action to be filed without a deposit of security for costs. If 
the petition or motion in such case raises questions shown by the trial record, the court 
shall order that the petitioner or movant be supplied with a transcript of the trial 
proceedings, or so much thereof as may be necessary to present the issue, without cost to 
such person." K.S.A. 22-4506. 
 
 
In short, a district court has a statutory duty to appoint an attorney to represent an 
indigent 60-1507 movant whenever the motion presents substantial questions of law or 
triable issues of fact. Reiterating that concept is Supreme Court Rule 183(i) (2019 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. 230), which directs:  "If a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence presents 
a substantial question of law or triable issue of fact, the court must appoint counsel to 
represent an indigent movant." Moreover, this court has said that "[t]here is no statutory 
right to counsel at the district court level stage for indigent K.S.A. 60-1507 movants until 
they meet the threshold showing of substantial legal issues or triable issues of fact." 
Guillory v. State, 285 Kan. 223, 228, 170 P.3d 403 (2007); see also Albright v. State, 292 
Kan. 193, 199, 251 P.2d 52 (2011) ("K.S.A. 22-4506[b] limits the right to appointed 
counsel to those cases in which the district court finds that the 60-1507 motion 'presents 
substantial questions of law or triable issues of fact and if the petitioner or movant has 
been or is thereafter determined to be an indigent person.'"); State v. Andrews, 228 Kan. 
368, 374-75, 614 P.2d 447 (1980) ("It is clear that when an indigent defendant wishes to 
10 
 
pursue a writ of habeas corpus or a motion attacking sentence pursuant to K.S.A. 60-
1507, the district court is to examine the merits of the motion or petition and then make a 
decision as to whether the appointment of counsel is necessary."); Robinson v. State, 218 
Kan. 1, 5, 542 P.2d 305 (1975) ("It is only when a district court determines a 60-1507 
motion presents substantial questions of law or triable issues of fact that it appoints 
counsel to assist an indigent petitioner.").  
 
 
Stewart's contention—that the potential for triable issues of fact is sufficient to 
trigger the statutory right to counsel in a 60-1507 proceeding—most likely emanates from 
an expansive reading of the following recitation from the oft-cited case of Lujan v. State, 
270 Kan. 163, 14 P.3d 424 (2000). Lujan outlined three avenues a district court can take 
upon receiving a 60-1507 motion, to-wit:   
 
"First, it may determine that the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively show 
that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, in which case it will summarily deny the 
petitioner's motion. Second, the court may determine from the motion, files, and record 
that a substantial issue or issues are presented, requiring a full evidentiary hearing with 
the presence of the petitioner. Third, the court may determine that a potentially 
substantial issue or issues of fact are raised in the motion, supported by the files and 
record, and hold a preliminary hearing after appointment of counsel to determine whether 
in fact the issues in the motion are substantial. In the event the court determines that the 
issue or issues are not substantial, the court may move to a final decision without the 
presence of the petitioner. If the issue or issues are substantial, involving events in which 
the petitioner participated, the court must proceed with a hearing involving the presence 
of the petitioner." (Emphasis added.) 270 Kan. at 170-71.  
 
The actual question being addressed in Lujan, however, was whether the 60-1507 
movant had the right to be present at a full evidentiary hearing under the second avenue 
described above, i.e., after the district court had determined the motion, files, and record 
presented a substantial issue. The Lujan court did not need to establish the point in the 
proceedings at which the statutory right to counsel became effective because Lujan did, 
11 
 
in fact, have an attorney representing him at the evidentiary hearing; movant's complaint 
was that he was not personally present to help his attorney prosecute his motion. 
 
Moreover, the questions of when a movant is entitled to the appointment of 
counsel and when the movant is entitled to be present at a court hearing on the motion are 
separate inquiries. For instance, K.S.A. 60-1507(b) separates the right to a hearing from 
the right to be present at the hearing. It first directs the district court to "grant a prompt 
hearing" on a 60-1507 motion to "determine the issues and make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law," except when "the motion and the files and records of the case 
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." K.S.A. 60-1507(b). But then 
K.S.A. 60-1507(b) goes on to provide that "[t]he court may entertain and determine such 
motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing." Likewise, 
Supreme Court Rule 183 separates the right to counsel and the right to be present:  Rule 
183(h) provides that an imprisoned movant "must be produced at the hearing on a motion 
. . . if there are substantial issues of fact regarding events in which the movant 
participated"; whereas Rule 183(i), as noted above, states that, if a motion "presents a 
substantial question of law or triable issue of fact, the court must appoint counsel to 
represent an indigent movant." Supreme Court Rule 183(h), (i) (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 230).  
 
Consequently, Lujan's dicta about the third avenue of approach available to a 
district court should not be read so expansively as to make the court's discernment of a 
potential substantial issue the event that triggers the statutory requirement to appoint 
counsel for an indigent movant. We intimated as much in Mundy when we noted that this 
court had previously "implicitly recognized the district court [has] the statutory power to 
exercise discretion and appoint counsel . . . where the motion presents a potentially 
substantial question of law or triable issue of fact. Cf. Supreme Court Rule 183(i) (2017 
Kan. S. Ct. R. 222) (court must appoint counsel if 60-1507 motion presents a substantial 
question of law or triable issue of fact)." 307 Kan. at 295. In other words, the district 
court may, but is not required to, appoint an indigent 60-1507 movant an attorney during 
12 
 
the period the court is making its determination of whether the motion, files, and record 
present a substantial question of law or triable issue of fact. 
 
Nevertheless, Lujan's reference to the appointment of counsel under its third 
avenue of approach was not incorrect. Rather, the event in that circumstance that gives 
rise to the need to appoint counsel for the movant is the district court's determination to 
"hold a preliminary hearing," at which the State will be represented by an attorney. 270 
Kan. at 171. As noted above, the cases cited by Stewart declaring that due process had 
required the appointment of counsel for the postconviction movant involved a court 
hearing at which the State appeared by counsel. For example, in Hemphill we 
"emphasize[d] . . . that even though a court need not automatically hold a hearing or 
appoint counsel in all postconviction matters, when a hearing is held 'at which the State 
will be represented, then due process of law does require that the defendant be 
represented unless the defendant waives the right to counsel.'" 286 Kan. at 596 (citing 
State v. Pierce, 246 Kan. 183, 199, 787 P.2d 1189 [1990]; State v. Buckland, 245 Kan. 
132, 142, 777 P.2d 745 [1989]). Pointedly, the State does not challenge that precedent. 
 
The next step, then, is to look at what constitutes a hearing at which due process 
requires an attorney for a 60-1507 movant. At one end of the spectrum, K.S.A. 60-
1507(b) requires the district court to notify the county attorney and grant a prompt 
hearing "unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that 
the prisoner is entitled to no relief." If the district court has made that determination—that 
the motion, files, and records do not conclusively show the movant is entitled to no 
relief—and ordered the statutorily required hearing, it has necessarily determined the 
presence of substantial questions of law or triable issues of fact. Consequently, that 
determination invokes the movant's statutory right to counsel, and the district court must 
appoint counsel for an indigent movant, without regard to whether the State is 
represented by an attorney at the hearing. 
 
13 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, when the district court determines on its own that 
the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively show that movant is entitled to no 
relief, the motion can be summarily denied, i.e., without hearing and without appointed 
counsel. In-between—when the district court exercises its discretion to order a 
preliminary hearing to assist in making the determination of whether the motion, files, 
and records present substantial questions of law or triable issues of fact—our due process 
jurisprudence dictates that the district court appoint an attorney to represent an indigent 
movant if the State appears in court at that preliminary hearing through an attorney.  
 
That leads us to Stewart's contention that the district court's consideration of a 
written response by an attorney for the State is the functional equivalent of an in-court 
preliminary hearing. He adopts the Court of Appeals' opinion in this case that declares 
that a district court's summary denial of a 60-1507 motion can be "based only on the 
motion and the record in the underlying criminal case," and that the district court may not 
look at a written response by the State "until or unless the movant is represented by a 
lawyer." Stewart II, 2017 WL 2901146, at *5. For authority, the panel relied on an 
unpublished decision by another Court of Appeals panel in Jones v. State, No. 114,601, 
2016 WL 7494363, at *3 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion), which the Stewart II 
panel found to have "legally indistinguishable facts." Stewart II, 2017 WL 2901146, at 
*5. 
 
 
The State counters that the Stewart II panel created a new test for determining 
when counsel must be appointed in a 60-1507 proceeding that contravenes statutory 
provisions, Supreme Court Rules, and established caselaw and that treats the process as if 
it were intended to be an ex parte proceeding. Contrary to the panel's notion that a State 
response to a 60-1507 motion triggers a right to counsel for the movant, the State 
contends that the well-established existing test requires the appointment of counsel only 
when movant has raised substantial issues or when the court conducts an actual hearing 
at which the State is represented. The State argues that it is a party in the 60-1507 
14 
 
proceedings and that there is nothing in our statutes or rules precluding it from 
responding as it would to any other civil motion. Cf. Pabst v. State, 287 Kan. 1, 24, 192 
P.3d 630 (2008) ("nothing in [K.S.A. 60-1507] or our rules makes it impermissible for 
the State to file a responsive pleading"); see Supreme Court Rule 183(a)(2) (2019 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. 228) (procedure on 60-1507 motion governed by rules of civil procedure to the 
extent applicable). 
 
 
Further, the State challenges the Stewart II panel's assessment that the factual 
distinctions in Jones have no legal significance. In that case, the district court reviewed 
the motion, files, and records and summarily denied relief on all issues except one. Then 
the court ordered the State to submit a brief on the one remaining issue, but the court did 
not permit the movant to brief the issue or respond to the State's brief. Further, the court 
did not appoint counsel for the movant. The State contends that the briefing order makes 
Jones factually distinguishable.  
 
 
Nevertheless, as the State points out, the Stewart II panel ignored the rationale of 
other Court of Appeals panels that have rejected the argument that, for due process 
purposes, the district court's review of the State's written response was the same as the 
court conducting a preliminary hearing at which the State was represented by an attorney. 
See, e.g., Noyce v. State, No. 114,971, 2017 WL 3112821, at *4-5 (Kan. App.) 
(unpublished opinion), rev. granted 307 Kan. 987 (2017); Littlejohn v. State, No. 
115,904, 2017 WL 2833312, at *3-4 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. granted 307 
Kan. 987 (2017); Thuko v. State, No. 115,662, 2017 WL 2709779, at *3 (Kan. App.) 
(unpublished opinion), rev. granted 307 Kan. 994 (2017); Hill v. State, No. 115,723, 
2017 WL 2001615, at *3 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 306 Kan. 1317 
(2017); Dawson v. State, 115,129, 2017 WL 262027, at *1-2 (Kan. App.) (unpublished 
opinion), rev. granted 307 Kan. 986 (2017); State v. Roberts, No. 114,726, 2016 WL 
6829472, at *4-5 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. granted 307 Kan. 992 (2017). 
For instance, the Thuko panel suggested that a judge reviewing a motion and response 
15 
 
does not fit within our common understanding of a "hearing," which Black's Law 
Dictionary describes as:  "A judicial session, [usually] open to the public, held for the 
purpose of deciding issues of fact or of law, sometimes with witnesses testifying." Thuko, 
2017 WL 2709779, at *3; Black's Law Dictionary 836 (10th ed. 2014). There is simply 
no indication here that a judge held a hearing. 
 
 
In short, the Stewart II panel expanded upon the process that the Hemphill court 
held was due to a postconviction movant with respect to appointed counsel. We decline 
to make that expansion; rather, it is when the district court conducts an actual hearing 
with the State represented that due process dictates a movant's right to counsel.  
 
 
As we observed in State v. Nunn, 247 Kan. 576, 584, 802 P.2d 547 (1990), "it 
would simplify matters for all courts and litigants if we were to adopt a bright-line rule 
that counsel be appointed for all post-trial motions." But, like the Nunn court, we realize 
that "such a rule would not appear to be feasible or justified." 247 Kan. at 584. Given that 
constraint, the unfairness that bothered the Stewart II panel—having a layperson pitted 
against an attorney on legal issues—is present regardless of whether the State files a 
response. Ordinarily, an indigent layperson must prepare and file his or her own 60-1507 
motion, in which the nonlawyer movant must state why he or she is legally entitled to 
relief. Thereupon, a law-trained judge reviews the motion and can summarily deny it as 
being legally infirm and conclusively showing no entitlement to relief. In other words, 
any unfairness caused by a disparity in legal knowledge begins with the preparation of 
the motion, not at the point of the State's response. 
 
 
With respect to the statutory right to counsel, the Stewart II panel creatively 
interpreted K.S.A. 60-1507(b). It declared that, without appointing an attorney for a 
movant, a district "can summarily deny relief based only on the motion and the record in 
the underlying criminal case," and it "may not entertain argument from the State" 
contained in a written response. Stewart II, 2017 WL 2901146, at *5. But, of course, the 
16 
 
statute does not actually say that. To reiterate, it refers to "the motion and the files and 
records of the case." K.S.A. 60-1507(b). The panel did not explain why a response to a 
60-1507 motion would not then become part of the case files, subject to the district 
court's review, and we decline to construe K.S.A. 60-1507(b) so narrowly. 
 
 
In sum, an indigent 60-1507 movant has a statutory right to counsel if the district 
court finds that the motion presents substantial questions of law or triable issues of fact. 
That did not occur in this case. Further, as a matter of procedural due process, a movant 
has the right to counsel when the court holds a hearing at which the State is represented 
by counsel. There was no hearing in this case; the State's filing of a response to the 
motion, standing alone, did not constitute a hearing. The Court of Appeals holding to the 
contrary is overruled. 
 
SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 
 
 
Although we disagree with the Court of Appeals' resolution of the right to counsel 
issue, we agree with the Court of Appeals' resolution of Stewart's substantive claims. The 
Court of Appeals reviewed each of the substantive claims Stewart raised in his 60-1507 
motion and explained why each did not warrant relief. On review, defense counsel 
focuses on the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an eyewitness 
identification expert to testify and refute the victim's identification of Stewart as one of 
the robbers. We begin with that claim. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
"When the district court summarily denies a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, an appellate 
court conducts de novo review to determine whether the motion, files, and records of the 
case conclusively establish that the movant is not entitled to any relief." Wimbley v. State, 
292 Kan. 796, 804, 275 P.3d 35 (2011). 
17 
 
 
Analysis  
 
With respect to Stewart's claims that his trial counsel was ineffective, he must 
establish:   
 
"[T]hat counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, which requires a showing 
that counsel made errors so serious that his or her performance was less than that 
guaranteed to the defendant by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a 
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial." 
Trotter v. State, 288 Kan. 112, 132-33, 200 P.3d 1236 (2009).  
 
As the panel noted, at the time of Stewart's trial, "the Kansas Supreme Court had 
consistently ruled that expert testimony could not be admitted regarding potential 
weaknesses in eyewitness identification. State v. Gaines, 260 Kan. 752, 763, 926 P.2d 
641 (1996); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 395, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981)." Stewart II, 2017 
WL 2901146, at *3. It would be more than two years before this court would overrule 
that precedent and allow expert testimony on eyewitness identification under certain 
circumstances. State v. Carr, 300 Kan. 1, 222-26, 331 P.3d 544 (2014). Consequently, we 
agree with the panel's determination that a defense counsel's failure "to advocate for a 
dramatic reversal of well-settled Kansas law" is not constitutionally deficient 
performance. Stewart II, 2017 WL 2901146, at *4. 
 
Granted, Laymon v. State, 280 Kan. 430, 439-40, 122 P.3d 326 (2005), recognized 
that "a lawyer's failure to foresee a change in the law may lead to 60-1507 relief if the 
failure was not objectively reasonable." But Laymon involved the unique circumstance 
that the defense counsel who failed to preserve the change-in-law issue practiced out of 
the same office in which other attorneys were actively advocating for, and ultimately 
obtained, that particular change in the law. In Barr v. State, 287 Kan. 190, 197, 196 P.3d 
18 
 
357 (2008), we declined to extend Laymon beyond its "'inside baseball' analysis." This 
case fits squarely within Laymon's caveat that the "Sixth Amendment requires 
competence, not omniscience." Laymon, 280 Kan. at 440 (discussing Starnes v. State, No. 
88,225, 2003 WL 22764417, at *3 [Kan. App. 2003] [unpublished opinion]). In short, 
summary denial of this claim was appropriate. 
 
With respect to the other issues addressed by the panel, counsel in the petition for 
review does not provide argument as to why the panel was wrong on the merits. Instead, 
counsel simply inquires:  "Similarly with the other issues made by Mr. Stewart, would 
not the opportunity to have counsel available and able to review the petition and the 
State's response potentially have made a difference in how the arguments and issues were 
raised and framed before the district court?" While the answer to that question may be 
yes, the issue is whether the arguments and issues that are actually contained in the 
motion, files, and records conclusively show that Stewart is entitled to no relief. And on 
that issue, the panel adequately addressed and correctly decided each claim.  
 
On Stewart's claim that his trial counsel failed to challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence, the panel pointed out that trial counsel moved for judgment of acquittal at the 
close of evidence and renewed the motion in written form after the jury's verdict. In other 
words, the claim is factually flawed. Counsel did all that he could at the trial level to 
challenge sufficiency. 
 
With regard to Stewart's claim that trial counsel was deficient in failing to call the 
arresting officer as a witness at the third trial, the panel noted the absence of any 
explanation as to how the outcome of the case could have been different if defense 
counsel had done so. Likewise, we are not provided with that explanation and the claim 
lacks merit. 
 
19 
 
On Stewart's remaining three claims, the panel opined that they were "so 
conclusory and lacking in any factual anchors that we cannot meaningfully review them." 
Nothing we have received on review refutes the panel's determination that the remaining 
claims "all fail to set forth intelligible grounds for relief." Stewart II, 2017 WL 2901146, 
at *4.  
 
Stewart's counsel would have us remand for an evidentiary hearing to permit a 
fishing expedition in the hopes that the 60-1507 movant might catch a fact that could lead 
to something favorable. To the contrary, it is incumbent upon the movant to show that a 
triable issue of fact already exists and is identifiable at the time of the motion. Summary 
denial was appropriate here. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The Court of Appeals' determination to affirm the district court's summary denial 
of Stewart's 60-1507 motion on the merits of his claims is affirmed.  
 
 
The panel's determination that the district court materially erred when it 
considered the State's written response to Stewart's 60-1507 motion without appointing 
Stewart an attorney is overruled. Because the district court correctly found that the 
motion did not present substantial questions of law or triable issues of fact, Stewart's 
statutory right to counsel did not arise. Because the district court did not conduct a 
hearing at which the State was represented by counsel, Stewart's due process right to 
counsel was not implicated or impaired. 
 
Affirmed.