Case Title: Gates v. Richardson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84-21

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Gates v. Richardson1986 WY 111719 P.2d 193Case Number: 84-21Decided: 05/08/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Johnny Lee 
GATES, Kristina Gates, and Joseph Gates, infants, by their next friend and 
natural guardian, Stewart L. Gates, Peggy Merryman, and John Merryman, 
Appellants (Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
Kelly D. 
RICHARDSON, Appellee (Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from District Court, Sweetwater County, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

 
 
William J. 
Flynn (argued), Green River, and E. James Burke of Hanes, Gage & Burke, 
P.C., Cheyenne, for 
appellants.

 
 
Ford T. 
Bussart (argued), and Lisa A. Botham, Rock Springs, for appellee.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROSE,** ROONEY,*** BROWN 
and CARDINE, JJ.

 
 
** Retired 
November 1, 1986.

 
 
*** 
Retired November 30, 1986.

 
 

CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This case arose from an 
accident when an automobile being driven by Kelly Richardson collided with a 
bicycle being ridden by six-year-old Johnny Gates. Although Johnny survived the 
accident, he is left with massive brain injuries from which he is unlikely to 
recover. In addition to Johnny's claim for medical expenses, pain and suffering, 
future lost wages and permanent disability, Johnny's mother, sister and brother 
sought damages from Richardson for the emotional distress they suffered from 
observing Johnny's severe injury at the scene of the accident. Johnny's father 
sought damages for loss of Johnny's future companionship, and his stepfather 
sought damages for loss of consortium with Johnny's mother stemming from her 
emotional injuries. The district court dismissed all counts, except Johnny's 
claim for personal injuries, on grounds that they failed to state claims upon 
which relief could be granted. We must decide whether the tort of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress and whether the claims for loss of consortium 
and companionship are actionable in Wyoming. We affirm in part and reverse in 
part.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
"When 
considering a motion to dismiss a complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), 
W.R.C.P., on the ground that it fails to state a claim on which relief can be 
granted, the facts alleged in the complaint are admitted and the allegations 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs." Moxley v. Laramie 
Builders, Inc., Wyo., 600 P.2d 733, 734 (1979).

 
 
Our 
statement of facts is drawn directly from the complaint.

 
 

[¶2.]     On September 2, 1982, 
Johnny Gates was riding his bicycle in a school zone in Green River, Wyoming. As 
Johnny crossed the street, he was struck by Kelly Richardson's vehicle, was 
carried forward seventy-one feet, and knocked to the pavement. Johnny suffered 
massive brain injury resulting in a traumatic coma and loss of sight and 
hearing. When his complaint was filed in May of 1983, Johnny was still in a 
coma.

 
 

[¶3.]     Johnny's brother 
Joseph, who was seven years old at the time, witnessed the accident. Johnny's 
mother, Peggy Merryman, and his thirteen-year-old sister, Kristina, did not 
actually see the accident, but they arrived moments after it occurred - in time 
to find Johnny in the street, severely injured and bleeding. Although these 
three family members were never in the zone of danger, their presence at the 
accident scene caused them all profound emotional shock, and at least one of 
them, Johnny's mother, expended $250 for medical services to cope with the 
shock. Neither Johnny's father, Stewart Gates, nor his stepfather, John 
Merryman, witnessed the accident or its immediate aftermath. But Mr. Gates and 
his former wife, Peggy Merryman, incurred over $100,000 in medical expenses as a 
result of their son's severe injuries. And Mr. Merryman lost the "society, 
companionship, consortium and services of his wife" because of her emotional 
distress.

 
 
NEGLIGENT 
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

 
 

[¶4.]     Compensation for 
emotional distress is not a new concept in Wyoming. We have permitted recovery 
for emotional harm caused by false imprisonment, Waters v. Brand, Wyo., 497 P.2d 875, 877-878 (1972), malicious prosecution, Cates v. Eddy, Wyo., 669 P.2d 912, 
921 (1983), and work-related stress, Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, Wyo., 
678 P.2d 874 (1984); Graves v. Utah Power & Light Company, Wyo., 713 P.2d 187 (1986). We have discussed intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
have neither accepted nor rejected it as a tort. Spurlock v. Ely, Wyo., 707 P.2d 188, 192 (1985). This is the first case in which an action for damages resulting 
from negligent infliction of emotional distress has been directly presented to 
this court.

 
 

[¶5.]     Traditionally a 
plaintiff could not recover for mental injuries unless they were linked to an 
actual or threatened physical impact caused by the defendant. W. Keeton, Prosser 
and Keeton on Torts § 54 at 362-364 (1984). The rule meant that a duty was 
imposed upon a defendant to avoid negligent impacts and threats of impact upon 
another, and he had to pay damages for both mental and physical harm if there 
was a breach of that duty. There was no duty with respect to negligent acts 
which caused purely mental harm where there was no impact or threat of impact 
upon someone in the zone of danger.

 
 

[¶6.]     The "impact" and "zone 
of danger" rules were held no longer necessary to state a claim for recovery for 
mental trauma in the state of California when its supreme court, in 1968, 
decided the case of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912, 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 (1968). The court held that a mother, who saw her infant 
child run down by a negligent motorist, could recover from the motorist for her 
emotional harm. The motorist's duty of care extended to the mother even though 
she was neither physically impacted nor within the zone of danger. In the 
eighteen years since Dillon, many state courts have accepted the proposition 
that a defendant's duty of care should extend to at least some plaintiffs who 
suffer purely mental injuries.1 Before we can join these courts in 
extending a limited duty of care to persons who suffer mental distress, we must 
balance the interests of the injured parties against the view that a negligent 
act should have some end to its legal consequences. Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wn.2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096, 1102 (1976).

 
 

[¶7.]     There is no magic 
formula which will tell us whether a defendant's duty should extend beyond the 
limits of the impact rule.

 
 
"The 
statement that there is or is not a duty begs the essential question - whether 
the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the 
defendant's conduct. * * * `[D]uty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an 
expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law 
to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection." (Footnote omitted.) W. 
Keeton, supra, § 54 at 357-358.

 
 

[¶8.]     Some of the key policy 
factors to be considered are: (1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, 
(2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the 
injury suffered, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, 
(4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, (5) the policy of 
preventing future harm, (6) the extent of the burden upon the defendant, (7) the 
consequences to the community and the court system, and (8) the availability, 
cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. Tarasoff v. Regents of 
University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 342, 
83 A.L.R.3d 1166 (1976).

 
 

[¶9.]     The first factor, 
foreseeability, has for many years been urged as the exclusive test of legal 
duty. A classic formulation of the test was offered in the 1932 English case 
Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 A.C. 562, quoted in W. Keeton, supra, § 54 at 
358-359 and n. 20:

 
 
"`You must 
take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee 
would be likely to injure your neighbor. Who, then, in law is my neighbor? The 
answer seems to be - persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act 
that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when 
I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in 
question.'"

 
 
Unfortunately 
this test is so vague that it has little practical value. Could defendant 
Richardson reasonably foresee that if he drove negligently he might run down a 
young boy on a bicycle and cause him severe physical harm? And could he also 
reasonably foresee that the boy's brother, mother and sister might come upon the 
scene shortly after the accident and suffer mental shock? Most people would 
probably agree that this mental shock is foreseeable to some 
extent.

 
 
"[W]hen a 
child is endangered, it is not beyond contemplation that its mother will be 
somewhere in the vicinity, and thus may suffer serious shock." W. Keeton, supra, 
§ 54 at 366.

 
 
But 
whether it is reasonably foreseeable is an entirely different question. The 
reasonableness qualification permits the courts to limit legal duties for policy 
reasons "while maintaining the illusion that a duty can be `found' through a 
scientific legal test." W. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 U.Mich.L. Rev. 1, 19 
(1953). Instead of perpetuating the illusion, we prefer to set forth the legal 
duty and outline the policy principles which persuade us to recognize the legal 
duty and its limitations.

 
 

[¶10.]  The second factor, the closeness of the 
connection between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's injury, is the flip 
side of the forseeability coin and is equally useless as an analytical tool. 
Thus we say that the more removed the injury from the defendant's act the less 
foreseeable it is that mental harm will result. But when we say the harm to the 
plaintiff is too remote to fall within a legal duty owed by the defendant, we 
are stating a conclusion, not applying a test.

 
 

[¶11.]  The third factor, the certainty that an 
injury was really suffered, is worth pursuing. The district court held that the 
negligent infliction of mental distress did not state a claim in Wyoming because 
it would result in fraudulent claims and "extortionary litigation." In the 
worker's compensation context, we have recently reaffirmed our view that mental 
distress is more easily feigned than physical injury. Graves v. Utah Power & 
Light Company, supra, 713 P.2d 187. But this does not mean that all mental 
injuries are equally suspect.

 
 
"`Where a 
mental injury occurs rapidly and can be readily traced to a specific event * * * 
there is a sufficient badge of reliability to assuage the Court's 
apprehension.'" Id. at 192, quoting Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Public Safety, 
Me., 404 A.2d 1014, 1018 (1979).

 
 

[¶12.]  It is hard to imagine a mental injury 
that is more believable than one suffered by a person who witnesses the serious 
injury or death of a family member. As the relationship between the victim and 
the person witnessing the accident becomes more attenuated, the mental harm to 
that person becomes less plausible. But instead of barring recovery for all 
persons who witness the accident, we suggest the better solution is to 
distinguish between them. Dillon v. Legg, supra, 69 Cal. Rptr.  at 77, 441 P.2d  at 
917-918. As we pointed out in Nehring v. Russell, Wyo., 582 P.2d 67, 79 (1978), 
doing away with an entire class of negligence action solely because some of the 
actions may be tainted by mischief is like "employing a cannon to kill a flea." 
Later in this opinion we will draw what we think is a reasonable line between 
the proper and improper plaintiffs to these actions.

 
 

[¶13.]  We can envision cases where moral blame 
is an important factor in deciding whether a new legal duty is to be imposed. 
But this is not one of them. We think there is plenty of moral blame flowing 
from a tortfeasor who negligently injures or kills another to justify recovery 
by a family member who witnesses the event in horror.

 
 
"All 
ordinary human feelings are in favor of [a mother's] action against the 
negligent defendant [who kills her child]." W. Keeton, supra, § 54 at 
366.

 
 

[¶14.]  In its opinion letter, the district court 
refused to adopt the plaintiffs' cause of action because "[s]uch actions will 
result in a burden to the individual defendant" and "[i]mpose upon the public 
the unwarranted economic burden of increased insurance premiums to fund 
insurers' costs in paying and litigating such claims." According to the court, 
"[n]ot every loss can be made compensable in money damages, and legal causation 
must terminate somewhere." While all of these observations are true, they do not 
take analysis very far. Any time a defendant must pay for his wrongs he is 
burdened. And any time he passes that liability on to his insurer, as 
anticipated in his contract with the insurer, the loss is felt by persons other 
than the defendant. Insurance is a loss spreading device by design. Increased 
insurance premiums are "unwarranted" only when we decide that a loss should fall 
on the innocent victim rather than the guilty tortfeasor, his insurer, and the 
public. Finally, the fact that legal causation must terminate somewhere does not 
mean it must terminate short of mental injuries.

 
 

[¶15.]  The burden that most worries us is the 
burden that an overbroad liability would impose on our court system. The 
district court mentioned several administrative concerns in its opinion letter 
including the "[p]ossibility of multiplicity of suits" and the burden "to our 
court system because litigation will be increased." We do not see the 
multiplicity of suits as an overwhelming problem because if suits for emotional 
injury are limited to those injuries that arise from severe physical injury or 
death to another, the suits will most often be joined with the underlying 
actions based on the primary victims' physical injury - just as in this case. 
And, if the only purpose of our law was to unburden the court system, then we 
would reach the zenith of judicial achievement simply by closing the district 
courts to all litigants and allowing all wrongs to come to rest on innocent 
victims. In the state of Wyoming, the constitution guarantees that 

 
 
"[a]ll 
courts shall be open and every person for an injury done to person, reputation 
or property shall have justice administered without sale, denial or delay." 
Wyoming Constitution, Art. 1 § 8.

 
 

[¶16.]  Our decision to impose limitations on 
this new tort action encourages us to adopt the action in the first instance. 
The district court held that adoption of the tort would

 
 
"[l]ead to 
further extensions of tort liability as plaintiffs with other relationships to 
the injured person [would] seek recognition of their 
losses."

 
 
That will 
not occur. We are perfectly capable of fixing limits and applying them when 
necessary. See Dillon v. Legg, supra, 69 Cal. Rptr. 82, 441 P.2d 922. We suspect 
recovery will not occur often in these cases; and when that does happen, it will 
ordinarily be minimal in amount. Given the relatively minor impact that 
recoveries in these cases would have on the defendants, the insurance industry, 
and the public, and given our general policy in favor of imposing the loss on 
the negligent tortfeasor rather than the innocent victim, we conclude that the 
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress is actionable in Wyoming 
under the limitations which we will now discuss.

 
 
LIMITATIONS 
ON THE TORT

 
 
The Proper 
Plaintiff

 
 

[¶17.]  Some courts have set only minimal limits 
on the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Molien v. Kaiser 
Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal. 3d 916, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813, 16 
A.L.R.4th 518 (1980); Kelley v. Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd., 56 Haw. 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975). They emphasize that juries can ferret out fraudulent claims. 
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 167 Cal. Rptr.  at 839, 616 P.2d  at 
821. We agree that juries can recognize the frauds, but we also realize that the 
longer a nuisance suit survives the greater the illegitimate settlement value it 
acquires. If every bystander who sees a serious accident can bring a suit that 
survives summary judgment, a plague of nuisance suits could ensue despite the 
competence of our juries. Perhaps a limitation on the class of plaintiffs will 
prevent some persons with real mental injuries from recovering. That is a price 
we are willing to pay to prevent nuisance suits by the majority of bystanders 
who suffer no serious mental harms.

 
 

[¶18.]  While we do not expect everyone to easily 
overcome the sight of violent injury or death to a loved one, we expect them to 
cope with the sight of violent injury or death to acquaintances or strangers. As 
the Court of Appeals of New Jersey stated when adopting this 
tort:

 
 
"[T]he 
interest assertedly injured is more than a general interest in emotional 
tranquility. It is the profound and abiding sentiment of parental love. The 
knowledge that loved ones are safe and whole is the deepest well-spring of 
emotional welfare. Against that reassuring background, the flashes of anxiety 
and disappointment that mar our lives take on softer hues." Portee v. Jaffee, 84 
N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521, 526 (1980).

 
 

[¶19.]  Some limitation on the class of 
plaintiffs is also justified by the potential burden on economic activity that 
an unlimited class could impose. W. Keeton, supra, § 54 at 366. A timely example 
is the space shuttle disaster. If every person who witnessed that catastrophic 
event and suffered mental harm could recover, the courts would be overwhelmed 
and such projects as the space shuttle would be laden with insuperable risk. As 
a society, we must tell most of those who observed the disaster and may have 
suffered because of it, that it is a suffering that is not compensable. In this 
we recognize that part of living involves some unhappy and disagreeable emotions 
with which we must cope without recovery of damages.

 
 

[¶20.]  Having concluded that the class of 
plaintiffs must be restricted, we must set a rational and workable limit. The 
wrongful death statute, § 1-38-102, W.S. 1977, Cum. Supp. 1985, which we 
interpreted in Wetering v. Eisele, Wyo., 682 P.2d 1055, 1061-1062 (1984), 
supplies such a limit. The legislature has expressed the community's policy that 
spouses, children, parents, and siblings may recover for wrongful death. 
Wetering v. Eisele, supra, at 1061-1062, § 1-38-102, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985, 
and § 2-4-101, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985. Others may suffer because of the death 
of a business partner or a friend. The legislature has said they may not 
recover. We think the limitation is reasonable, and its rationale applies with 
equal force to actions for negligent infliction of emotional harm. We hold, 
therefore, that the class of plaintiffs who may bring an action for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress consists of those who are permitted to bring 
wrongful death actions.

 
 
The Scene 
of the Accident or its Aftermath

 
 

[¶21.]  Many of the courts that permit an action 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress limit it by the manner in which 
plaintiff perceived the harm to his loved one. The New Mexico Supreme Court 
requires that the plaintiff's shock

 
 
"result 
from a direct emotional impact * * * caused by the contemporaneous sensory 
perception of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident by means 
other than contemporaneous sensory perception, or by learning of the accident 
after its occurrence." Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822, 825-826 
(1983).

 
 
Massachusetts 
has a somewhat broader rule allowing recovery when the 
plaintiff

 
 
"either 
witnesses the accident or soon comes on the scene while the [victim] is still 
there." Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 
(1978).

 
 
We think 
the Massachusetts rule is most consistent with the limitation's rationale, and 
it is hereby adopted.

 
 

[¶22.]  The essence of the tort is the shock 
caused by the perception of an especially horrendous event. Yandrich v. Radic, 
495 Pa. 243, 433 A.2d 459, 461 (1981). It is more than the shock one suffers 
when he learns of the death or injury of a child, sibling or parent over the 
phone, from a witness, or at the hospital. It is more than bad news. The kind of 
shock the tort requires is the result of the immediate aftermath of an accident. 
It may be the crushed body, the bleeding, the cries of pain, and, in some cases, 
the dying words which are really a continuation of the event. The immediate 
aftermath may be more shocking than the actual impact. Therefore, we hold that 
the plaintiff can recover if he observed the infliction of serious bodily harm 
or death, or if he observed the serious bodily harm or death shortly after its 
occurrence but without material change in the condition and location of the 
victim. Comment, Dillon Revisited, 43 Ohio State L.Rev. 931, 948 
(1982).

 
 
The 
Severity of the Injury to the Primary Victim

 
 

[¶23.]  As an assurance of genuine shock, the 
courts that have adopted the tort have generally agreed that the person claiming 
emotional harm must witness a serious accident or its aftermath. The primary 
victim must, in fact, be seriously injured or killed and the claimant must 
realize, at the time he witnesses the event, that the injuries are serious. 
E.g., Versland v. Caron Transport, Mont., 671 P.2d 583 (1983); Comment, Dillon 
Revisited, supra, at 948. Serious injury is the same as "serious bodily injury" 
as defined in the Wyoming Criminal Code. It means

 
 
"bodily 
injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes miscarriage, 
severe disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any 
bodily member or organ." Section 6-1-104(a)(x), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 
1985.

 
 
We base 
this limitation on the common sense notion that people recover from serious 
shock quickly if it turns out to be a false alarm. See Comment, Negligently 
Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 Georgetown 
L.Rev. 1237, 1249-1251 (1971), for a discussion of this common sense idea in 
medical terms.

 
 
Damages

 
 

[¶24.]  Among the courts that recognize the cause 
of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, there is a great deal 
of variation in the damages they allow. Some permit recovery for both special 
and general damages caused by emotional distress without any minimum showing of 
severity. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758, 767, 94 A.L.R.3d 471 
(1974). Others allow both general and special damages only if the emotional harm 
is serious, Barnhill v. Davis, Iowa, 300 N.W.2d 104, 108 (1981), or only if it 
is accompanied by objective physical symptoms. Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 
406 A.2d 300, 308 (1979); Hunsley v. Giard, supra, 553 P.2d  at 1103. One court 
has permitted recovery only for substantial physical harm caused by the 
plaintiff's severe mental distress. Dziokonski v. Babineau, supra, 380 N.E.2d  at 
1302. Finally, it has been suggested that plaintiffs recover only their tangible 
economic losses stemming from their emotional harm. Miller, Emotional Distress 
Liability, 1979 U. Hawaii L.Rev. 1, 39.

 
 

[¶25.]  The difficulty with these limited 
approaches is that they were often adopted as a guard against questionable 
claims in jurisdictions which liberally permit this cause of action. For 
instance, the Washington Supreme Court held in Hunsley v. Giard, supra, 553 P.2d  
at 1103, that the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
was limited only by basic negligence concepts. The court did not restrict the 
class of plaintiffs, did not require that the primary victim suffer serious 
injury, and did not require that the plaintiff witness the accident or its 
immediate aftermath. To make up for this lack of restrictions, the court drew 
what it admitted was an artificial line and held that the plaintiff had to show 
mental suffering "manifested by objective symptomatology." 
Id.

 
 

[¶26.]  The same balancing act characterizes the 
suggestion that the mentally harmed plaintiff recover only economic losses. The 
commentator who suggested this limitation was discussing the tort as it had 
developed in Hawaii, where the only restriction is that the plaintiff be located 
within a reasonable distance of the accident. Kelley v. Kokua Sales and Supply, 
Ltd., supra, 532 P.2d  at 676.

 
 

[¶27.]  One purpose of a damage limitation is the 
prevention of fraudulent claims. But, given the restrictions that we have 
imposed upon the cause of action, we do not perceive a need for further 
limitation upon damages. If the first three limitations are satisfied, we can be 
quite sure that the cause of action is within the realm of legitimacy. A further 
limit on damages is more likely to hurt a deserving plaintiff than it is to 
defeat a meritless claim. The rule we adopt provides that once an injured party 
has established duty, breach and proximate cause, he will be compensated for his 
entire damage so that he is made whole. Hollon v. McComb, Wyo., 636 P.2d 513, 
516 (1981).

 
 

[¶28.]  In its letter opinion the district court 
raised the possibility that juries will be unable to cope with the question of 
damages in these cases because they are too speculative. If that is true, then 
we should not allow damages for an emotional harm that is parasitic to physical 
injuries, that is suffered by persons in the zone of danger, or that arises in 
false imprisonment and malicious prosecution cases. In all of these cases we 
trust the jury to assess reasonable damages for emotional harm. Juries that are 
influenced by passion and prejudice can be controlled by the courts. Cates v. 
Eddy, supra, 669 P.2d 912, 920-921 (1983).

 
 

[¶29.]  We hold that a plaintiff's damages for 
emotional harm should not be limited by vague phrases such as "serious emotional 
harm" or "objectively determinable." As in any other negligence case, the 
plaintiff has the burden of proving damages. In many cases, the plaintiff will 
have to produce expert testimony to establish both causation and damages, but 
such testimony is not always necessary. See Leong v. Takasaki, supra, 520 P.2d  
at 767.

 
 

[¶30.]  To summarize all of our limitations on 
this tort, we hold that the class of plaintiffs who may bring an action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress consists of those who could bring, at 
least under some set of circumstances, a wrongful death action for the primary 
victim's death. The primary victim must die, or suffer serious bodily injury as 
that term is defined in the Wyoming Criminal Code. The plaintiff must observe 
either the infliction of the fatal or harmful blow or observe the results of the 
blow after its occurrence without material change in the condition and location 
of the victim. Once these conditions are satisfied, the case can go forward 
under normal negligence principles. The defendant must have been negligent and 
his negligence must be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's mental 
injuries.

 
 

[¶31.]  Johnny's mother, sister and brother are 
all members of the class of permissible plaintiffs. See Wetering v. Eisele, 
supra, 682 P.2d  at 1061-1062. According to the complaint, they either witnessed 
Johnny's injury or observed the immediate aftermath without a material change in 
Johnny's condition or location. Johnny suffered serious bodily injuries which 
caused him protracted impairment of brain function. All three plaintiffs alleged 
damages for their mental harms. Their claims should not have been dismissed 
under Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P.

 
 
LOSS OF 
CONSORTIUM

 
 

[¶32.]  John Merryman, as husband of Johnny's 
mother, claims loss of marital consortium. He alleges that he has been deprived 
of his wife's society and companionship as a result of Richardson's negligence. 
The trial court dismissed the claim because it held that Peggy Merryman's 
underlying cause of action for emotional injury was invalid. Since we recognize 
an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, we reverse the trial 
court's dismissal of John Merryman's claim for loss of consortium. The law is 
well settled that a husband may maintain an action for loss of his wife's 
society, comfort and services resulting from injuries inflicted by a third 
person's negligence. Druley v. Houdesheldt, 75 Wyo. 155, 294 P.2d 351 (1956). 
Emotional injuries can support a claim for loss of consortium. Molien v. Kaiser 
Foundation Hospitals, supra, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813.

 
 
LOSS OF 
COMPANIONSHIP

 
 

[¶33.]  Johnny's mother, Peggy Merryman, and his 
natural father, Stewart Gates, filed claims for loss of filial companionship, 
alleging that Richardson's negligence deprived them of the comfort and 
companionship of their son. Most courts hold that a parent cannot recover for 
the loss of a child's companionship, and we agree. See 67A C.J.S. Parent and 
Child § 152; Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 553. The district court's dismissal of the 
claims for loss of filial companionship is affirmed.

 
 
THE 
DISSENTING OPINION

 
 

[¶34.]  The dissent states that there was a 
"change in law occasioned by the majority opinion," 
because

 
 
"there may 
have been many other cases decided in Wyoming and not appealed to this Court 
[the supreme court] in which was applied the common law requiring impact or 
threat of impact before fright or mental injury could be considered as an 
element of damage."

 
 
The 
premise is faulty for there may not have been such cases, and the common law is 
not settled as is suggested. In any 
event, we are not changing law or overriding any precedent, but merely 
pronouncing what has always been the law in Wyoming. Because the initial premise 
is invalid, further response to the dissenting opinion is 
unnecessary.

 
 

[¶35.]  In summary, we reverse the trial court's 
dismissal of the claims for emotional injury to Peggy Merryman, Kristina Gates 
and Joseph Gates, and John Merryman's claim for loss of consortium. We affirm 
the dismissal of the claims for filial companionship filed by Stewart Gates and 
Peggy Merryman. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 The impact rule has 
been abolished in the following states: Alabama: Alabama Fuel & Iron Company 
v. Baladoni, Ala. Ct. App., 73 So. 205 (1916); Arizona: City of Tucson v. 
Wondergem, 105 Ariz. 429, 466 P.2d 383 (1970); California: Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912, 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 (1968); Colorado: 
Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978); Connecticut: Orlo v. 
Connecticut Company, 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Delaware: Robb v. 
Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 8 Storey 454, 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965); 
Georgia: Goddard v. Watters, 147 Ga. App. 722, 82 S.E. 304 (1914); Hawaii: 
Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 52 Haw. 283, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); Illinois: 
Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 98 Ill. 2d 546, 75 Ill. Dec. 211, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983); Iowa: Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, 89 N.W. 1068 (1902); Kansas: 
Clemm v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Company, 126 Kan. 181, 268 P. 103 
(1928); Louisiana: Stewart v. Arkansas S.R.R. Company, 112 La. 764, 36 So. 676 
(1904); Maine: Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., Me., 269 A.2d 117 
(1970), overruled on other grounds, Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 
Me., 444 A.2d 433 (1982); Maryland: Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Company, 111 
Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909); Massachusetts: Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 
380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Michigan: Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 
(1970); Minnesota: Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Company, 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); Mississippi: First National Bank v. Langley, Miss., 314 So. 2d 324, 
77 A.L.R.3d 570 (1975); Missouri: Bass v. Nooney Company, Mo., 646 S.W.2d 765 
(1983); Nebraska: Rasmussen v. Benson, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N.W. 890, 122 A.L.R. 
1468 (1938); New Hampshire: Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 
329, 150 A. 540 (1930); New Jersey: Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 
(1965); New York: Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961); North Carolina: Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778 
(1906); North Dakota: Whetham v. Bismarck Hospital, N.D., 197 N.W.2d 678 (1972); 
Ohio: Schultz v. Barberton Glass Company, 4 Ohio St.3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 
(1983); Oklahoma: St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Company v. Keiffer, 48 Okla. 434, 150 P. 1026 (1915); Oregon: Salmi v. Columbia & N.R.R. Company, Or., 146 P. 819 
(1915); Pennsylvania: Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970); 
Rhode Island: Simone v. Rhode Island Company, 28 R.I. 186, 66 A. 202 (1907); 
South Carolina: Mack v. South-Bound R. Company, 52 S.C. 323, 29 S.E. 905 (1898); 
South Dakota: Sternhagen v. Kozel, 40 S.D. 396, 167 N.W. 398 (1918); Tennessee: 
Memphis St. Ry. Company v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn. 637, 194 S.W. 902 (1917); Texas: 
Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890); Vermont: Savard v. Cody 
Chevrolet, Inc., 126 Vt. 405, 234 A.2d 656 (1963); Virginia: Hughes v. Moore, 
214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973); Washington: Frazee v. Western Dairy Products, 
182 Wn. 578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935); West Virginia: Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 
124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924); Wisconsin: Pankopf v. Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146, 123 N.W. 625 (1909).

 
 

ROONEY, Justice, 
dissenting in the result and otherwise concurring in part and dissenting in 
part.

 
 

[¶36.]  I dissent in the result, because I 
believe the change in law occasioned by the majority opinion should operate 
prospectively only. I concur in the change in law reflected in the majority 
opinion to allow recovery for negligently inflicted damages consisting only of 
mental injury or fright in the circumstances of this case, but I would restrict 
such recovery to spouses, parents, and children of the person who was seriously 
physically injured or killed, as held in Saffels v. Bennett, Wyo., 630 P.2d 505 
(1981), and I would allow recovery by them only if they were at the scene of the 
incident to witness its occurrence.

 
 
RETROSPECTIVE 
APPLICATION

 
 

[¶37.]  Although it may be, as said in the 
majority opinion, that this is the first case

 
 
"* * * in 
which an action for damages resulting from negligent infliction of [only] 
emotional distress has been directly presented to this 
court,"

 
 
there may 
have been many other cases decided in Wyoming and not appealed to this Court in 
which was applied the common law requiring impact or threat of impact before 
fright or mental injury could be considered as an element of damages. Applying 
that set forth by Justice Cardine in Adkins v. Sky Blue, Inc., Wyo., 701 P.2d 549 (1985), I believe the result in this case should be governed by the impact 
rule in effect at the time of the incident. In Adkins, Justice Cardine wrote in 
part at pages 551 and 552:

 
 
"The 
common law has served us well because it is flexible, able to grow and meet the 
requirements of changing conditions and a different society. There are times 
when change is necessary; but the doctrine of stare decisis is also important in 
an organized society. Change, therefore, should occur slowly, deliberately after 
much experience, and if possible so as not to affect vested rights or things in 
the past. Thus, it is said that:

 
 
"`[T]he 
courts may apply or effectuate common law principles in the light of altered or 
new conditions, and when the circumstances and conditions are different, in that 
the common law principles are unsuitable to new circumstances or conditions, the 
needs of society, or in conflict with public policy, the courts may make such 
changes or modifications as the situation requires.' (Footnotes omitted.) 15A 
C.J.S. Common Law § 13. See, Irwin v. Coluccio, 32 Wn. App. 510, 648 P.2d 458 
(1982).

 
 
"Acknowledging 
that there ought to be an extreme reluctance to change the common law and 
recognizing the obvious benefits of the doctrine of stare decisis, yet on 
occasion it does become eminently clear that society has long passed beyond the 
point where an ancient doctrine remains viable. * * *

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"Initially 
it was held that a court issuing an overruling decision had merely discovered 
and announced existing law; since the overruling case did not create new law, 
but merely recognized what had always been the law, such law would operate both 
retrospectively and prospectively:

 
 
"`"[B]ut 
the modern decisions, taking a more pragmatic view of the judicial function, 
have recognized the power of a court to hold that an overruling decision is 
operative prospectively only and is not even operative upon the rights of the 
parties to the overruling case. As a matter of constitutional law, retroactive 
operation of an overruling decision is neither required nor prohibited."' Thome 
v. City of Newton, 229 Kan. 375, 624 P.2d 454, 458 (1981) (quoting from Anno., 
Comment Note - Prospective or Retroactive Operation of Overruling Decision, 10 
A.L.R.3d 1371, 1378 (1966)).

 
 
"We have 
held that

 
 
"`[t]here 
is no distinction drawn between civil and criminal litigation; a ruling may be 
prospective only and it may apply to the invalidity of statutes as well as to the effect of a decision 
overturning long-established common-law rules; the constitution neither 
prohibits nor requires retrospective effect and the federal Constitution has no 
voice upon the subject; and, the accepted rule today is that in appropriate 
cases in the interests of justice, a court may make its decision prospective.' 
(Emphasis and footnote in original omitted; our emphasis added.) Ostwald v. 
State, Wyo., 538 P.2d 1298, 1303 (1975).

 
 
"Where an 
overruling decision announces a change in the common law, some guidelines are 
set forth in Chevron Oil Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S. Ct. 349, 30 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1971), for whether its operation should be retrospective or prospective 
only:

 
 
"`In our 
cases dealing with the nonretroactivity question, we have generally considered 
three separate factors. First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must 
establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on 
which litigants may have relied, see e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe 
Machinery Corp., supra, 392 U.S. [481], at 496, 88 S.Ct. [2224], at 2233, [20 L. Ed. 2d 1231 (1968)], or by deciding an issue of first impression whose 
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed, see, e.g., Allen v. State Board of 
Elections, supra, 393 U.S. [544], at 572, 89 S.Ct. [817], at 835, [22 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1969)]. Second, it has been stressed that "we must * * * weigh the merits and 
demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, 
its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or 
retard its operation." Linkletter v. Walker, supra, 381 U.S. [618], at 629, 85 
S.Ct. [1731], at 1738, [14 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1965)]. Finally, we have weighed the 
inequity imposed by retroactive application, for "[w]here a decision of this 
Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, 
there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the `injustice or hardship' by a 
holding of nonretroactivity."' Id., 92 S. Ct.  at 355.

 
 
"This 
court has on several occasions considered whether a change in law should operate 
retrospectively or prospectively. In Nehring v. Russell, Wyo., 582 P.2d 67, 80 
(1978), we stated that

 
 
"`* * * 
the determination is ours to make, [and] we conclude that in consideration of 
all the factors and any prior reliances involved, our holding should be applied 
prospectively only, i.e., to this action and all causes of action accruing after 
30 days following the date of this decision.'" (Emphasis in 
original.)

 
 

[¶38.]  In this state, the impact rule was the 
common law applicable to incidents similar to that in this case at the time of 
such incident. Section 8-1-101, W.S. 1977 (August 1978 Replacement), 
provides:

 
 
"The 
common law of England as modified by judicial decisions, so far as the same is 
of a general nature and not inapplicable, and all declaratory or remedial acts 
or statutes made in aid of, or to supply the defects of the common law prior to 
the fourth year of James the First (excepting the second section of the sixth 
chapter of forty-third Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of thirteenth Elizabeth and 
ninth chapter of thirty-seventh Henry Eighth) and which are of a general nature 
and not local to England, are the rule of decision in this state when not 
inconsistent with the laws thereof, and are considered as of full force until 
repealed by legislative authority."

 
 
We have 
often applied the common law, e.g., Goldsmith v. Cheney, Wyo., 468 P.2d 813 
(1970); McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943); State v. Foster, 
5 Wyo. 199, 38 P. 926 (1895). We have recognized that the common law is not 
exactly as it was in 1607, but it encompasses changes by judicial decisions 
since that time, including English decisions and other common-law decisions in 
United States courts. Snell v. Ruppert, Wyo., 541 P.2d 1042 (1975); Krug v. 
Reissig, Wyo., 488 P.2d 150, 52 A.L.R.3d 748 (1971); Naab v. Smith, 55 Wyo. 181, 
97 P.2d 677 (1940). As said in Choman v. Epperley, Wyo., 592 P.2d 714, 716 
(1979): 

 
 
"The 
adoption of common law by Wyoming was not an adoption of a set code of law. * * 
* Nor was the adoption one of static and nonchanging law. * * 
*"

 
 
And as 
said in Johnston v. Laird, 48 Wyo. 532, 538, 52 P.2d 1219 
(1935):

 
 
"* * * 
[W]e must decide this case in accordance with the decisions subsequent to the 
time of James I, in so far as not inconsistent with the laws of this state, and 
the decisions which must govern us, to the extent mentioned, are not only the 
English decisions * * *, but other decisions as well, comparatively recent 
though they may be * * *."

 
 

[¶39.]  In Victorian Railways Commissioners v. 
Coultas, 13 A.C. 222, 226 (1888), the judicial committee of the Privy Council 
refused damages to the plaintiff caused by the defendant's negligence in absence 
of proof of actual impact. The judgment, speaking through Sir Richard Couch, 
noted that precedent had not been previously established in a similar action. In 
the same year, recovery was denied for physical injuries due to fright in Lehmon 
v. Brooklyn City R. Co., N.Y., 47 Hun 355 at 356 (1888), Justice Dykman also 
noting that there was no principle or authority "found or referred to for such 
action." Thus was started the impact rule.

 
 

[¶40.]  The impact rule has been changed in many 
respects by this Court and most courts since 1888. But it is necessary to 
distinguish the situations in which it has been changed and which have no 
pertinency to this case. We are not here concerned with tort injuries caused by 
other than negligence. False imprisonment, trespass, intentional acts, worker's 
compensation acts, et cetera are subject to different standards and results. Nor 
are we concerned with mental injuries which result in physical damage. The 
situation wherein the plaintiff is the direct victim1 of the defendant's negligence must 
be distinguished from cases, such as this, in which the plaintiff is a bystander 
or is one even further removed from being a direct victim of the defendant's 
negligence. Requirements for liability for injuries resulting from one of these 
circumstances are not necessarily appropriate in gauging liability in the 
others. This is a bystander case, and, as noted in the majority opinion, it is 
the first case in this state for consideration of a change from the common-law 
impact rule in such cases. The impact rule was generally considered to be the 
common-law rule. See McCormick on Damages § 89 (1935); Prosser, Law of Torts, §§ 
12, 53 and 54 (1971); 38 Am.Jur.2d, Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance §§ 1, 
3 and 36 (1968).

 
 

[¶41.]  The trial court's ruling was proper under 
the law at the time of the ruling and at the time of the incident. We should not 
overrule it retroactively. I would affirm the trial court on this 
basis.

 
 
PROSPECTIVE 
APPLICATION

 
 

[¶42.]  Medical science has advanced a great deal 
since the adoption of the impact rule. Diagnostic techniques, research tools, 
and educational advancement are of sufficient magnitude as compared with those 
of 1888 to allow, under certain 
circumstances, the proof of mental injury and its causal connection with an 
incident occasioned by the defendant's negligence, and to reduce, not eliminate, 
the probability of specious or fraudulent claims. Accordingly, I believe it is 
necessary to carefully designate the circumstances under which an action will 
lie prospectively.

 
 

[¶43.]  The majority opinion has attempted to do 
this. Noting that this is a bystander case and that said herein concerns only 
such cases, my disagreement with prospective application of the majority 
opinion, as stated supra, is with its extension of those allowed to recover 
beyond spouses, parents, and children of the person seriously injured or killed 
and with its extension of allowing such recovery by them if they come upon the 
scene of the incident after its occurrence and before there is a material change 
in the condition and location of the victim.

 
 

[¶44.]  With reference to the necessary 
relationship between the primary victim and the bystander, I agree that the 
policy set by the legislature in the wrongful death act is a proper place to 
draw the line. I do not agree that the interpretation of the wrongful death act 
phrase, "every person for whose benefit such action is brought," by the Court in 
Wetering v. Eisele, Wyo., 682 P.2d 1055, 1060 (1984), was proper. In fact, the 
interpretation in that case was that such phrase included persons identified in 
the statute providing for intestate distribution - persons in addition to those 
defined in the majority opinion and who could be far more removed in 
relationship than parents, children, spouses, and siblings. Technically, it 
would include the paper boy.

 
 

[¶45.]  I believe the proper interpretation of 
the phrase was that made in Jordan v. Delta Drilling Company, Wyo., 541 P.2d 39, 
78 A.L.R.3d 1215 (1975), and Saffels v. Bennett, supra - i.e., parents, spouses, 
and children. My dissent in Wetering v. Eisele, joined by Justice Brown, 
reflected the common sense difficulty with the problem in that relationship does 
not always indicate the extent of the loss. A very close friend, perhaps working 
and living with the deceased for several years, may be closer to the deceased 
than a brother who has not seen the deceased or kept in touch with him for many 
years. Nevertheless, the practical necessity of drawing the line at a reasonable 
place dictates that it be done on the legislatively declared policy as 
interpreted by the Court in Saffels v. Bennett and Jordan v. Delta Drilling 
Company. If a case similar to this one occurred prospectively, the mother, 
brother, and sister would qualify as plaintiffs from the relationship standpoint 
under the majority opinion and under my analysis - although the result would be 
reached in a different fashion in each instance.

 
 

[¶46.]  With reference of a plaintiff's proximity 
to the incident as a qualification of a proper party plaintiff, I would not 
allow a proper plaintiff status unless the party were at the location of the 
incident at the time it occurred. Again, it is a question as to where the line 
should be drawn. A death can occur on a highway, several days before it is 
discovered. And, if it is the sight of the injuries which causes the damage, 
such can occur upon viewing the victim hours later in the morgue or hospital. In 
other words, I would extend the position of the Restatement, Second, Torts only 
slightly. Section 436A thereof provides:

 
 
"Negligence 
Resulting in Emotional Disturbance Alone

 
 
"If the 
actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either 
bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such 
emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable damage, 
the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance."

 
 
Restatement, 
Second, Torts § 436 reflects the existence of liability if the negligent conduct 
subjects the plaintiff to fright or emotional disturbance, which in turn causes bodily harm, and 
subsection (3) thereof applies the rule when the bodily harm results from "shock 
or fright at harm or peril to a member of his immediate family occurring in his 
presence."

 
 

[¶47.]  Restatement, Second, Torts § 46 concerns 
recovery for severe emotional distress occasioned by "extreme and outrageous 
conduct intentionally or recklessly" causing severe emotional 
distress.

 
 

[¶48.]  The circumstances of this case do not 
fall within that set forth in Restatement, Second, Torts § 436 or § 46, but the 
provisions thereof reflect a reasoning which I can carry to the circumstances of 
this case and thus go further than that provided in § 436A and allow recovery as 
set forth supra - i.e., if a case similar to this occurs prospectively, only 
Johnny's brother would be a proper plaintiff. 

 
 
CONSORTIUM

 
 

[¶49.]  Since the mother would not be a proper 
plaintiff, not having been at the scene when the incident occurred, her husband, 
Johnny's stepfather, could not recover for loss of 
consortium.

 
 

[¶50.]  Additionally, since loss of consortium 
has been held to be a form of mental injury, Scott v. St. Louis-San Francisco 
Railway Company, 39 Tenn. App. 534, 286 S.W.2d 347 (1954), Johnny's stepfather 
should not be a proper plaintiff even under the criteria of the majority 
opinion. He was not at the scene at the time of the incident and did not arrive 
before there was a material change in it, and he was not Johnny's 
father.

 
 
INSURANCE

 
 

[¶51.]  The majority opinion refers to the effect 
of insurance upon the issue. I believe courts should determine cases on the 
merits without any consideration of insurance one way or the other. The 
decisions should be founded on the relative rights of the parties without any 
knowledge or consideration on our part of their insured 
status.

 
 

[¶52.]  I would reverse.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Cases involving a 
"direct victim" are those in which the damages result from the plaintiff's fear 
for his or her own safety as a result of the defendant's actions directed 
against the plaintiff; e.g., handling of dead bodies, negligence of common 
carriers, or in telecommunications, et cetera.