Case Title: In re Cure Eighteen-month suspension video

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2019-05-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 120,518 
 
In the Matter of KEVIN T. CURE, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed May 10, 2019. Eighteen-month suspension. 
 
Matthew J. Vogelsberg, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Stanton A. Hazlett, 
Disciplinary Administrator, was with him on the formal complaint for the petitioner. 
 
Stephen B. Angermayer, of Fern & Angermayer, L.L.C., of Pittsburg, argued the cause, and Kevin 
T. Cure, respondent, argued the cause pro se. 
 
PER CURIAM:  This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Kevin T. Cure, of Joplin, Missouri, an 
attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1991. 
 
 
On July 31, 2018, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct (KRPC). The respondent did not file an answer; he filed a proposed probation 
plan on September 7, 2018. A joint stipulation signed by respondent and the office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator was filed September 18, 2018. A hearing was held on the 
complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys on September 
21, 2018, where the respondent was personally present and represented by counsel. The 
hearing panel determined that respondent violated KRPC 8.4(b) (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 
387) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer's honesty, 
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trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer); 8.4(d) (misconduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice); 8.4(g) (misconduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice law); and Supreme Court Rule 203(c)(1) (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 240) 
(failure to report felony charge). 
 
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this court: 
 
"Findings of Fact 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"9. 
The Missouri Supreme Court admitted the respondent to the practice of 
law in the State of Missouri in October, 1990. The Kansas Supreme Court admitted the 
respondent to the practice of law in the State of Kansas in April, 1991. 
 
 
"10. 
In 2014, the respondent was arrested for driving while intoxicated. On 
September 18, 2014, the respondent entered a plea of guilty, the court suspended the 
imposition of the sentence, and the court placed the respondent on probation. 
 
 
"11. 
In 2016, the respondent served as the city attorney for Galena, Kansas. 
 
 
"12. 
On March 11, 2016, the respondent was scheduled to appear in 
municipal court as the municipal prosecutor. The respondent drove to the courthouse 
while intoxicated. The municipal court judge, a defense attorney, the mayor, and the 
police chief all witnessed the respondent's demeanor and concluded he was intoxicated. 
 
 
"13. 
After the mayor and the police chief spoke with the respondent, they 
confirmed that he was impaired. The respondent did not enter the courtroom. Because of 
the respondent's impairment, he did not appear in court on behalf of the city that day. The 
mayor drove the respondent back to his home. 
 
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"14. 
The judge and a defense attorney filed disciplinary complaints against 
respondent for coming to the courthouse intoxicated and for being unable to represent the 
city in court as scheduled that day. 
 
 
"15. 
On March 29, 2016, the respondent was arrested in Joplin, Missouri, for 
driving while intoxicated. At the time of his arrest, the respondent remained on probation 
for the 2014 driving while intoxicated conviction. 
 
 
"16. 
Following the respondent's March 29, 2016, arrest, the respondent 
resigned as the Galena city attorney. 
 
 
"17. 
On March 30, 2016, with the assistance of KALAP, the respondent 
entered treatment at Valley Hope. 
 
 
"18. 
In the respondent's written response to the complaints filed by the judge 
and a defense attorney, the respondent admitted to being intoxicated when he arrived at 
Municipal Court on March 11, 2016. The respondent also acknowledged his March 29, 
2016, arrest for driving while intoxicated. 
 
 
"19. 
On July 27, 2016, the respondent was arrested in Joplin, Missouri, for 
driving while intoxicated and driving with a revoked or suspended driver's license. 
Again, the respondent remained under court supervision for the 2014 driving while 
intoxicated case at the time of this arrest. Additionally, the respondent was on bond for 
the March, 2016, arrest. 
 
 
"20. 
The respondent was scheduled to appear before Cherokee County 
District Magistrate Judge Samuel J. Marsh, on behalf of 10 clients on July 28, 2016, for a 
docket involving juvenile offender and child-in-need-of-care cases. Because the 
respondent remained incarcerated from his arrest the previous night, the respondent did 
not appear before Judge Marsh on behalf of his clients. 
 
 
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"21. 
On August 1, 2016, Judge Marsh forwarded a complaint against the 
respondent for his failure to appear on behalf of his 10 clients on July 28, 2016. In his 
letter, Judge Marsh noted that the respondent failed to contact the court to explain the 
reason for his absence. Judge Marsh, however, was aware of the respondent's July 27, 
2016, arrest for driving while intoxicated and assumed that respondent's incarceration 
was the reason for his failure to appear in court. 
 
 
"22. 
On August 11, 2016, the respondent was convicted of driving while 
intoxicated based on the March 29, 2016, arrest in Joplin, Missouri. The court sentenced 
the respondent to 30 days in jail, suspended the execution of the sentence, and placed the 
respondent on probation. As part of the probation order, the court required the respondent 
to refrain from violating the law. 
 
 
"23. 
On September 7, 2016, the respondent entered treatment with Bradford 
Health Services. 
 
 
"24. 
On September 21, 2017, the respondent was arrested for driving while 
intoxicated in Jasper County, Missouri. Based on respondent's prior history, he was 
charged as a persistent offender, a class E felony. A persistent offender is defined under 
Missouri law as a person who has been found guilty of 'two or more intoxication-related 
offenses committed on separate occasions.' Mo. Rev. State. § 577.001(18)(a). At the time 
of the respondent's September, 2017, arrest, he was on probation for the conviction 
stemming from the March, 2016, arrest. Also, the respondent was on bond for the July, 
2016, arrest. 
 
 
"25. 
Rule 203(a)(1) requires Kansas attorneys to report felony charges to the 
disciplinary administrator within 14 days. The respondent failed to report the felony 
charge within 14 days as required. 
 
 
"26. 
On October 11, 2017, the disciplinary administrator became aware of the 
respondent's felony charge. On November 7, 2017, the respondent admitted to driving 
while intoxicated on September 21, 2017. 
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"27. 
On February 21, 2018, the respondent was convicted of driving while 
intoxicated based on the July 27, 2016, arrest. The court sentenced the respondent to 12 
months in jail, suspended the execution of the sentence, and placed the respondent on 
probation. As part of the probation, the court ordered the respondent to successfully 
complete the court's DWI program. 
 
 
"28. 
On June 26, 2018, respondent was convicted of driving while 
intoxicated, persistent offender, a class E felony, based on the September 21, 2017, arrest 
in Jasper County, Missouri. The court sentenced to [sic] the respondent to two years in 
prison, placed respondent on probation for five years, and ordered the respondent to 
participate in the court's DWI program. The respondent remains on probation for the 
felony conviction. As of September 13, 2018, the respondent was in compliance with the 
terms of probation. 
 
 
"29. 
On July 3, 2018, the Missouri Supreme Court issued an order indefinitely 
suspending the respondent's license to practice law in Missouri. The respondent is not 
eligible to apply for reinstatement in Missouri for at least six months. 
 
 
"30. 
On July 9, 2018, counsel for the respondent notified the disciplinary 
administrator of the respondent's felony conviction for driving while intoxicated, 
persistent offender, a class E felony, in Jasper County[,] Missouri. Based on the 
respondent's felony conviction, on July 13, 2018, the Kansas Supreme Court issued an 
order temporarily suspending the respondent's license to practice law in Kansas. 
 
 
"31. 
On July 23, 2018, the respondent obtained a substance abuse evaluation. 
Subsequently, the respondent entered intensive outpatient treatment at the Ozark Center. 
As of September 12, 2018, the respondent had completed 29 of the 75 required hours. 
The respondent has been attending AA meetings. 
 
 
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"32. 
On August 29, 2018, the respondent entered into a voluntary monitoring 
agreement through KALAP. While evidence was presented that the respondent had been 
working with KALAP earlier, the only monitoring agreement offered into evidence was 
dated August 29, 2018. 
 
 
"33. 
In preparation of the hearing on the formal complaint, the respondent 
requested that colleagues write letters to the hearing panel regarding their impressions of 
the respondent. At the request of the respondent, the letter writers sent their letters 
directly to the hearing panel. 
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
 
"34. 
Based upon the respondent's stipulation to violating KRPC 8.4 as well as 
the above findings of fact, the hearing panel concludes as a matter of law that the 
respondent violated KRPC 8.4(b) (misconduct involving the commission of a criminal 
act), 8.4(d) (misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 8.4(g) (misconduct 
that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law) and 203(c)(1) (failure to 
report felony charge), as detailed below. 
 
"KRPC 8.4(b) 
 
 
"35. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal act 
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects.' KRPC 8.4(b). The respondent has been convicted of driving while 
intoxicated in Missouri on four occasions. The respondent's last conviction was classified 
as a class E felony. The respondent's convictions adversely reflect on the respondent's 
fitness as a lawyer. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated 
KRPC 8.4(b). 
 
 
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"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
 
"36. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that 
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent engaged in 
conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice when he went to the 
municipal courthouse on March 11, 2016, while intoxicated and was unable to represent 
the city at the scheduled hearings. Additionally, the respondent engaged in conduct that 
was prejudicial to the administration of justice when he failed to appear in court as 
scheduled on July 28, 2016, in 10 juvenile offender and child-in-need-of-care cases. As 
such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(d). 
 
"KRPC 8.4(g) 
 
 
"37. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in any other 
conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.' KRPC 8.4(g). The 
respondent engaged in other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice 
when he drove after his license was revoked and when he violated the terms of probation 
and bond. Thus, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(g). 
 
"Rule 203(c)(1) 
 
 
"38. 
Rule 203(c)(1) requires an attorney charged with a felony to notify the 
disciplinary administrator of the charge within 14 days. On September 21, 2017, the 
respondent was arrested and charged with a class E felony for driving while intoxicated, 
persistent offender. The respondent, however, failed to notify the disciplinary 
administrator of the charge as required by Rule 203(c)(1). Accordingly, the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent violated Rule 203(c)(1). 
 
 
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"American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
 
"39. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors. 
 
 
"40. 
Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to the legal profession to 
refrain from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice and his 
duty to the public to maintain his personal integrity. 
 
 
"41. 
Mental State. The respondent knowingly violated his duties. 
 
 
"42. 
Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 
actual injury to the administration of justice. 
 
 
"43. 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. Aggravating circumstances are any 
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be 
imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, 
found the following aggravating factors present: 
 
 
a. 
A Pattern of Misconduct. The respondent engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct by repeatedly driving while intoxicated, violating the terms of 
probation, and violating the terms of bond. 
 
 
b. 
Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Missouri 
Supreme Court admitted the respondent to the practice of law in the State of 
Missouri in 1990. The Kansas Supreme Court admitted the respondent to practice 
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law in the State of Kansas in 1991. At the time the misconduct began, the 
respondent had been practicing law for approximately 24 years. 
 
 
c. 
Illegal Conduct, Including that Involving the Use of Controlled 
Substances. The respondent engaged in illegal conduct by repeatedly driving 
while intoxicated. As a result, the respondent has been convicted of driving while 
intoxicated on four occasions. The respondent's fourth conviction was a felony 
conviction. 
 
 
"44. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
mitigating circumstances present: 
 
 
a. 
Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record. The respondent has not 
previously been disciplined. 
 
 
b. 
Absence of a Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The respondent's 
misconduct does not appear to have been motivated by dishonesty or selfishness. 
 
 
c. 
Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes Have 
Contributed to Violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. The 
respondent suffers from alcoholism. It is clear that the respondent's alcoholism 
contributed to the misconduct. 
 
 
d. 
The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His 
or Her Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free 
Acknowledgment of the Transgressions. The respondent fully cooperated with 
the disciplinary process. Additionally, the respondent admitted the facts that gave 
rise to the violations. 
 
 
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e. 
Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community 
Including Any Letters from Clients, Friends, and Lawyers in Support of the 
Character and General Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent is an active 
and productive member of the bar of Southeast Kansas. The respondent also 
enjoys the respect of his peers and generally possesses a good character and 
reputation as evidenced by several letters received by the hearing panel. 
 
 
f. 
Imposition of Other Penalties or Sanctions. The respondent has 
experienced other sanctions for his conduct. The respondent was convicted of the 
crimes, served time in jail, paid fines, and remains on probation. 
 
 
g. 
Remorse. At the hearing on this matter, the respondent expressed 
genuine remorse for having engaged in the misconduct. 
 
 
"45. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards: 
 
'5.12 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
engages in criminal conduct which does not contain the elements 
listed in Standard 5.11 and that seriously adversely reflects on 
the lawyer's fitness to practice. 
 
'7.2 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a 
professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the 
public, or the legal system.' 
 
"Recommendation 
 
 
"46. 
The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent's 
license be indefinitely suspended and that the date of the suspension be made retroactive 
to the date of the temporary suspension, July 13, 2018. The disciplinary administrator 
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argued that if the hearing panel concluded that a definite suspension was appropriate, 
then the hearing panel should also recommend that the respondent undergo a 
reinstatement hearing under Rule 219 prior to reinstatement. 
 
 
"47. 
The respondent recommended that the temporary suspension be lifted 
and that he be allowed to resume the practice of law, subject to the terms of the proposed 
plan of probation. 
 
 
"48. 
Based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the Standards 
listed above, the hearing panel unanimously recommends that the respondent's license to 
practice law be suspended for a period of 18 months. The hearing panel further 
recommends that the date of suspension be made retroactive to the date of the temporary 
suspension, July 13, 2018. Finally, the hearing panel recommends that the respondent be 
required to undergo a reinstatement hearing under Rule 219 prior to the consideration of a 
petition for reinstatement. At the reinstatement hearing, the respondent should be 
required to present evidence that he successfully completed the court's DWI program and 
that he has fully complied with all the terms of the KALAP monitoring agreement. 
 
 
"49. 
Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator." 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 
disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of 
KRPC exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 
258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 257). Clear 
and convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the truth 
of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 610 
(2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]). 
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Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint to which he did not 
file an answer; he entered into a joint stipulation with the office of the Disciplinary 
Administrator. Respondent was also given adequate notice of the hearing before the panel 
and the hearing before this court. He filed no exceptions to the hearing panel's final 
hearing report. With no exceptions before us, the panel's findings of fact are deemed 
admitted. Supreme Court Rule 212(c), (d) (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 261). Furthermore, the 
facts before the hearing panel establish by clear and convincing evidence the charged 
misconduct in violation of KRPC 8.4(b) (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 387) (commission of a 
criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a 
lawyer); 8.4(d) (misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); 8.4(g) 
(misconduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law); and Supreme 
Court Rule 203(c)(1) (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 240) (failure to report felony charge). The 
evidence also supports the panel's conclusions of law. We therefore adopt the panel's 
findings and conclusions. 
 
The only remaining issue before us is the appropriate discipline for respondent's 
violations. The hearing panel recommended that respondent be suspended from the 
practice of law for a period of 18 months, retroactive to July 13, 2018, the date 
respondent was temporarily suspended. The hearing panel also recommended that 
respondent be required to undergo a reinstatement hearing under Rule 219 (2019 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. 270). At the hearing before this court, at which the respondent appeared, the office 
of the Disciplinary Administrator recommended that the respondent be indefinitely 
suspended. The respondent requested a temporary suspension, that the suspension be 
suspended, and that he be allowed to practice under the terms of his proposed plan of 
probation. 
 
It is clear to all on the court that respondent has made significant strides to address 
the ethical lapses in his life that led to the violations. Those violations, however, were 
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serious in nature. Though every disciplinary case is unique and will turn on its specific 
facts, we are informed by our prior decisions addressing similar circumstances.  
 
 
Although a felony DUI conviction is not a breach of professional duty to a client, 
it violates KRPC 8.4(b) because it is a violation of the attorney's "primary duty to the 
court and the bar, and it erodes the public confidence in the judicial system." In re 
Laskowski, 282 Kan. 710, 713-14, 147 P.3d 135 (2006). It is expected that the "trust and 
confidence placed on those that practice law also requires compliance with the law." In re 
Frahm, 291 Kan. 520, 527, 241 P.3d 1010 (2010). And when noncompliance with the 
law results in a felony DUI conviction, this court has imposed sanctions varying from 
indefinite suspension to a two-year suspension from practicing law. See, e.g., Laskowski, 
282 Kan. at 713-14 (suspending attorney from the practice of law indefinitely after 
receiving a felony DUI); In re Johns, 291 Kan. 638, 644, 243 P.3d 1101 (2010) 
(suspending attorney for two years after receiving a felony DUI conviction).  
 
The varying sanctions imposed by this court result from a careful consideration of 
mitigating and aggravating facts in each case. This court has imposed less serious 
sanctions where the respondent has shown accountability by self-reporting their criminal 
conviction to the office of the Disciplinary Administrator, entering into a monitoring 
agreement with the Kansas Lawyers Assistance Program, and attending AA meetings. 
Johns, 291 Kan. at 639. And when respondents fail to show this accountability, this court 
has imposed more severe sanctions. See, e.g., Frahm, 291 Kan. at 521, 531 (suspending 
attorney for three years after conviction of felony DUI and two counts of aggravated 
battery where respondent left the scene of an accident to avoid prosecution); In re 
O'Neill, 285 Kan. 474, 483-84, 172 P.3d 1179 (2007) (suspending attorney indefinitely 
for felony DUI conviction and attorney's failure to disclose five arrests in attorney's 
application for admission to the Kansas bar); Laskowski, 282 Kan. at 711, 714 
(suspending attorney from the practice of law indefinitely after receiving a felony DUI 
14 
 
 
 
when the evidence showed respondent continued to consume alcohol following his 
arrest). 
 
In consideration of all the facts and circumstances, we adopt the recommendation 
of the panel. See In re Holmes, 307 Kan. 871, 901, 416 P.3d 143 (2018) (giving 
deference to the panel that heard the evidence before it when the severity of the sanction 
depended on the facts and circumstances of the case). A minority of the court would 
impose a lesser discipline. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Kevin T. Cure be and he is hereby disciplined by a 
term of 18 months suspension beginning on the date of his temporary suspension, July 
13, 2018. Before reinstatement following his suspension, respondent must undergo a Rule 
219 hearing. See Supreme Court Rule 219(a)(3) (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 270). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports. 
 
 
LUCKERT, J., and BEIER, J., not participating. 
 
MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned.1 
KATHLEEN SLOAN, District Judge, assigned.2 
                                                 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Senior Judge Malone was appointed to hear case No. 120,518 
vice Justice Luckert under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 20-2616. 
 
2REPORTER'S NOTE:  District Judge Sloan was appointed to hear case No. 120,518 
vice Justice Beier under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by art. 3, § 6(f) of the 
Kansas Constitution