Case Title: Ely v. Kirk

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ely v. Kirk1985 WY 138707 P.2d 706Case Number: 85-32Decided: 09/12/1985RON ELY AND ABC UTILITIES, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), 

PAUL K. ELY AND DELMA J. ELY, SAGEBRUSH DEVELOPMENT, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION; CLOW CORPORATION, A DELAWARE CORPORATION; MADERA PACIFIC, INC., A SOUTH DAKOTA CORPORATION, D/B/A KNECHT BUILDING SUPPLY; AND R & P RENTALS, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, DEFENDANTS, 

v. 

SHARON KIRK, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
RON ELY AND ABC 
UTILITIES, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), 

PAUL K. ELY AND DELMA J. 
ELY, SAGEBRUSH DEVELOPMENT, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION; CLOW CORPORATION, A 
DELAWARE CORPORATION; MADERA PACIFIC, INC., A SOUTH DAKOTA CORPORATION, D/B/A 
KNECHT BUILDING SUPPLY; AND R & P RENTALS, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, 
DEFENDANTS, 

v. 

SHARON KIRK, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 

Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

 
 

James W. Owens 
of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for appellants.

Thomas E. 
Lubnau, II, Gillette, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellants appeal from 
a judgment finding them negligent in the operation of a sewage system by 
allowing it to back up into the basement of appellee's home on a number of 
occasions. Appellants contend that negligence was not established at trial, that 
damages were not properly determined, and that damages should not be assessed in 
any event against appellant Ron Ely inasmuch as the utility was operated as a 
corporate entity.

[¶2.]     We affirm the judgment 
as it pertains to the issues on negligence and on Ron Ely's liability, and we 
reverse on the issue of damages to real property and remand for a trial only on 
the issue of damages to real property.1

[¶3.]     Insofar as the issues 
require us to determine whether or not the evidence is sufficient to sustain the 
trial court, we assume the evidence in favor of the successful party to be true, 
disregarding entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict 
therewith, and give to the evidence of the successful party every favorable 
inference which may reasonably and fairly be drawn from it. Pine Creek Canal No. 1 v. Stadler, Wyo., 685 P.2d 13, 17 (1984); Anderson v. Bauer, 
Wyo., 681 P.2d 1316, 1319 (1984); Yost v. Harpel Oil Company, Wyo., 674 P.2d 712, 716 
(1983).

NEGLIGENCE

[¶4.]     Appellants are 
successor owners and operators of the sewage system for Rawhide Village, a 
subdivision in Campbell County, which was the subject of concern in Sagebrush Development, Inc. v. Moehrke, 
Wyo., 604 P.2d 198 (1979). Appellee owned a home in the subdivision and 
finished the basement of it into a family room, a large bedroom and a second 
bathroom. On July 24, 1982, appellee found raw human sewage backing up into the 
basement with such force as to fountain six inches above the toilet seat. It 
filled the basement to the level of eight inches. Thereafter, it again backed up 
into the basement on July 25, 1982, August 11, 1982, August 15, 1982, January 
1983, and August 1983. Three of these backups were due to infiltration of storm 
water into the sewer system; one was caused by power failure in the sewage 
treatment plant; one was caused by power failure and/or power fluctuations in 
the sewage treatment plant; and one was caused by failure of an air control 
valve in the compressor part of the sewer system.

[¶5.]     Both parties recognize 
the necessary elements of negligence: Duty or standard of care on the part of 
the defendant, and a failure to perform the duty, proximately causing damage to 
plaintiff. ABC Builders, Inc. v. 
Phillips, Wyo., 632 P.2d 925, 931 (1981); Danculovich v. Brown, Wyo., 593 P.2d 187, 195 
(1979). The determination of the standard of care or duty is a matter of law and 
not the province of the jury. Medlock v. 
Van Wagner, Wyo., 625 P.2d 207, 208 (1981); Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry 
Company, Wyo., 527 P.2d 832, 835 (1974).

[¶6.]     Appellants argue that 
the duty was not evidenced and, in any event, the incidents were "Acts of God" 
and therefore were not proximately caused by appellants.

[¶7.]     The duty or standard of 
care required of one to avoid risk of injury to another is that which is 
required of a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances. Cervelli v. Graves, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1032, 1036 (1983); Vassos v. Roussalis, Wyo., 
625 P.2d 768, 772 (1981). It is:

"`* * * [an] obligation, recognized by the law, 
requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the 
protection of others against unreasonable risks.'" (Emphasis in original.) 
ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, supra, 632 P.2d  at 930.

[¶8.]     Appellants complain 
that the evidence did not contain a showing of Environmental Protection Agency 
requirements or other standards for operating a sewage disposal system and, 
thus, appellants' duty relative thereto was not established. A standard of care 
may be established by administrative regulations, but such may be otherwise 
established. The Restatement of Torts (Second) § 285 (1965), reads:

"§ 285. How Standard of 
Conduct is Determined.

"The standard of conduct 
of a reasonable man may be

"(a) established by a 
legislative enactment or administrative regulation which so provides, 
or

"(b) adopted by the court 
from a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation which does not so 
provide, or

"(c) established by 
judicial decision, or

"(d) applied to the facts 
of the case by the trial judge or the jury, if there is no such enactment, 
regulation, or decision."

See Distad v. Cubin, Wyo., 633 P.2d 167, 
171-172 (1981). In Vassos v. 
Roussalis, supra, 625 P.2d  at 772, we noted:

"* * * Some circumstances 
have acquired particular legal significance which make it possible for the court 
to fix a more specific standard, * * *"

and, we gave as 
examples, owners or occupiers of land, handling and dealing with a dangerous 
agency, and malpractice.

[¶9.]     There is nothing in the 
operation of a sewage disposal plant that would require a standard of duty other 
than is required of a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances. 
The duty may be a duty to act or a duty not to act. Failure to comprehend or 
recognize danger may, in itself, constitute negligence. Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532, 535 
(1979). We are not here concerned with a single back up of sewage. There was 
evidence in this case of such backups prior to those listed above. See Sagebrush Development, Inc. v. Moehrke, 
supra. The question is whether or not a reasonable person would take available 
means to avoid such backups under the circumstances. Would a reasonable man seal 
the sewer system from storm water? Would he provide a generator to back up power 
failure? Would he provide surge protectors to maintain steady power? Would he 
install one-way flow valves to prevent backward flow into residences? Under the 
circumstances of this case - the repeated backups and the serious nature of the 
resulting pollution - a reasonable person would take action to make the system 
effective from the standpoint of accomplishing its purpose, i.e., delivering 
sewage to the disposal plant and not to the basements of residences. Appellants 
did not do so.

[¶10.]  In ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, supra, 
632 P.2d  at 937, we quoted the following from 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 
58:

"`The probability of 
injury by one to the legally protected interests of another is the basis for the 
law's creation of a duty to avoid such injury, and foresight of harm lies at the 
foundation of the duty to use care and therefore of negligence. The broad test 
of negligence is what a reasonably prudent person would foresee and would do in 
the light of this foresight under the circumstances. Negligence is clearly 
relative in reference to the knowledge of the risk of injury to be apprehended. 
* * * The most common test of negligence, therefore, is whether the consequences 
of the alleged wrongful act were reasonably to be foreseen as injurious to 
others coming within the range of such acts.'"

The reasonably 
foreseen consequences of the failure to prevent regular sewer backups into 
appellee's residence are obvious. Raw human sewage in appellee's basement 
injured her in the enjoyment of her home, in the cost of removal of the sewage, 
and in its effect on the value of the property.

[¶11.]  Additionally, the contract referred to 
and quoted from in Sagebrush Development, 
Inc. v. Moehrke, supra, was an exhibit in this case, and appellants had 
taken on the obligations thereof. The contract required appellants 
to

"* * * provide at all 
times for each of the * * * residences * * * sewerage service adequate for safe 
and sanitary collection, treatment and disposal of all domestic sewage * * 
*"

and 
to

"* * * operate and 
maintain the sewerage system * * * in a manner so as not to pollute the ground, 
air, or water in, under, or around said areas or subdivisions with improperly or 
inadequately treated sewage * * *."

[¶12.]  A contract may create a relationship from 
which arises a duty to exercise care. Brubaker v. Glenrock Lodge International 
Order of Odd Fellows, Wyo., 526 P.2d 52, 59 (1974). In this 
instance, a violation of the contract, itself, occurred. As in Sagebrush Development, Inc. v. Moehrke, 
supra, a review of the record under the standard by which we determine whether 
or not the evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial court reflects ample 
grounds to find that appellants did not provide sewage service adequate for safe 
and sanitary collection, treatment and disposal of the sewage, and that they did 
not operate and maintain the sewage in a manner so as not to cause pollution 
with improperly or inadequately treated sewage as required by the contract under 
which appellee was a third-party beneficiary. 

[¶13.]  On appeal, we must affirm a judgment if 
it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory appearing in the record. Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration 
Corporation, Wyo., 665 P.2d 452, 456 (1983); Agar v. Kysar, Wyo., 628 P.2d 1350, 1352 
(1981); Wightman v. American National 
Bank of Wheatland, Wyo., 610 P.2d 1001, 1003 (1980); White v. Wheatland Irrigation District, 
Wyo., 413 P.2d 252, 257 (1966).

[¶14.]  Appellants argued that the injury 
resulted from an "Act of God" and that they were not responsible for it, 
wherefore, "the proximate cause element of negligence was never proven." We 
defined an act of God in Sky Aviation 
Corporation v. Colt, Wyo., 475 P.2d 301, 304 (1970) as any 
accident, "due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human 
intervention and which could not have been prevented." And, we there noted that 
there can be no combination of an act of God and fault of man; and that for the 
act of God defense to be available, the act of God must be the sole cause of the 
injury. In Cox v. Vernieuw, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1353, 1359 (1980), we 
said:

"* * * [W]e would expand 
the issue to the end that we would hold that the Act of God defense should not 
be applied in a case brought upon a theory of negligence. As our foregoing 
analysis demonstrates, an Act of God is no more than another way of saying that 
the defendants were not negligent. While this defense unquestionably has 
rhetorical glamour, particularly for purposes of arguing a case to the jury, it 
is our conclusion that better jurisprudence would foreclose the application of 
the theory in a negligence case. If the defendant must be found non-negligent in 
order to apply the Act of God defense, and this is the way we have expressed the 
rule, then the case really ends with the finding of no negligence and any 
finding with respect to an Act of God is superfluous. * * *"

[¶15.]  Since appellants had a duty to prevent 
the injury to appellee, the violation of that duty together with a breach of the 
contract to provide safe, sanitary and unpolluted sewer service is obvious from 
the fact that the backups occurred because of storm water entering the system, 
power outages and surges, and mechanical failure of the disposal plant. Half of 
the backups had nothing to do with the weather. Acts of God are obviously not 
the sole cause of the injury, and the defense is not properly available in this 
case.

[¶16.]  Proximate cause is a question of fact to 
be determined by the trier of facts unless only one conclusion can be drawn from 
the evidence. Caterpillar Tractor Company 
v. Donahue, Wyo., 674 P.2d 1276, 1283 (1983); Dallason v. Buckmeier, 74 Wyo. 125, 284 P.2d 386, 390 (1955).

"If the clogging of 
defendant's sewer caused the damage to plaintiffs - and that is undisputed - and 
if the jury found negligence of the sewer district led to or contributed to the 
clogging, it would follow as a matter of course that such negligence was a 
proximate cause of the injury. Or at least, the jury would be entitled to find 
that such negligence was a proximate cause.

"Here again, it requires 
no citation of authority for the proposition that the question of proximate 
cause is for the jury. * * *"

South Cheyenne Water and 
Sewer District v. Stundon, Wyo., 
483 P.2d 240, 243 (1971).

[¶17.]  The trier of facts in this case found 
generally for appellee and against the appellants. The court said:

"I find that they were 
negligent in the operation of this sewage system by allowing the sewage to back 
up in the basement of the plaintiff on several occasions."

There was 
evidence in the record to support the finding. In South Cheyenne Water and Sewer District v. 
Stundon, supra, the evidence of negligence consisted of failure to inspect 
for a faulty manhole ring and from a partially open manhole cover together with 
failure to prevent such conditions. We held this to be sufficient for the jury 
to find negligence.

RON ELY'S 
LIABILITY

[¶18.]  The trial court said:

"I think there's 
sufficient evidence in the mortgages and otherwise that Mr. Ron Ely does 
business under several names, there's an intertwining, I think ABC Utilities and 
Ron Ely are the same."

[¶19.]  Whether or not the corporate veil is 
pierced is a factual determination. Yost 
v. Harpel Oil Company, supra. The mortgages referred to by the trial court 
are by Ron Ely, in his personal capacity, mortgaging the sewer system to the 
bank. A purchase agreement was received in evidence which reflected that 
Sagebrush Development, Inc. and Paul K. Ely and Delma Ely transferred and sold 
the sewer system to appellant Ron Ely on October 19, 1981. Such evidence 
reflects that there is no corporate veil to pierce. But if the sewer system and 
its operation have a corporate shell, these factors, plus the fact that Ron Ely 
represents to customers, to Campbell County officials, and to others that he is 
the owner and operator of the system, are sufficient for the factual finding 
made by the trial court in this respect.

DAMAGES

[¶20.]  Before examining the propriety of the 
damages allowed by the trial court, we address appellants' contention that 
testimony by an owner of the property is not, per se, admissible. In Sagebrush Development, Inc. v. Moehrke, 
supra, we noted that the opinion of an owner of property as to value is proper 
inasmuch as he is presumed to have special knowledge of it, citing Town of Douglas v. Nielsen, Wyo., 409 P.2d 240, 242 (1965); Adams v. 
Erickson, 394 F.2d 171, 173 (10th Cir. 1968). See Continental Pipe Line Company v. Irwin 
Livestock Company, Wyo., 625 P.2d 214, 217, 25 A.L.R.4th 607 
(1981). The owner, however, cannot simply give a figure as an opinion of the 
amount of damages, which figure cannot be supported on knowledge gained as an 
incident of ownership, e.g., purchase price of it or similar property, 
attributes good and bad of the particular property, or circumstances in the 
neighborhood or area having an effect on its value, etc. He need not qualify 
otherwise as an expert appraiser or as one having special knowledge of general 
valuations, but the figure given by him must be something more than that for 
which the property is worth to him. Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. v. 
Mackey, Wyo., 650 P.2d 1152, 1156 (1982), appeal after remand 674 P.2d 744 (1984); Coronado Oil Company v. 
Grieves, Wyo., 642 P.2d 423, 434 (1982). Whether or not 
a witness has sufficient knowledge or special experience to testify as to his 
opinion on valuation is within the discretion of the trial court and will be 
disturbed on appeal only if clearly and prejudicially erroneous and then only in 
extreme cases. Herman v. Speed King 
Manufacturing Company, Wyo., 675 P.2d 1271, 
1278 (1984); Coronado Oil Company v. 
Grieves, supra; Ferris v. Myers, 
Wyo., 625 P.2d 199, 204 (1981).

[¶21.]  Opinion evidence usually involves 
hearsay. Rule 703, W.R.E., provides that:

"The facts or data in the 
particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those 
perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence."

And Rule 705, 
W.R.E., provides:

"The expert may testify 
in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor without prior 
disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. 
The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data 
on cross-examination."

[¶22.]  Although the owner of property is not an 
expert witness in the technical sense, he can give his opinion as having 
specialized knowledge concerning the property which will be of assistance to the 
trier of fact. Rule 702, W.R.E., allows one with such knowledge to testify in 
the form of an opinion:

"If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."

[¶23.]  In this case, the trial was to the court, 
and the court had the duty to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to 
weigh the evidence. Herman v. Speed King 
Manufacturing Company, supra; Crompton v. Bruce, Wyo., 669 P.2d 930, 
933 (1983); Madrid v. Norton, Wyo., 
596 P.2d 1108, 1117 (1979). The basis for appellee's opinion was the knowledge 
of purchase price, sales of other property in the subdivision - or the lack 
thereof, and the condition in which the personal property was left after the 
backups. Such was sufficient for the manner in which the trial court exercised 
its discretion in allowing appellee's opinion testimony.

[¶24.]  The trial court awarded $977.49 for 
damage to the personal property in the basement and for miscellaneous expenses 
during cleanup, $13,000.00 for decrease in value of the house, and $5,700.00 to 
restore the basement.

[¶25.]  The evidence to establish the $977.49 
award could have been more explicit, but it was sufficient under the 
circumstances of this case. It consisted of appellee's testimony supported by 
Exhibit 4, which listed the personal property, date of acquisition, whether 
acquired new or used, the price paid, the value ascribed before the backup and 
that ascribed afterwards with resulting loss. The trial court awarded the amount 
testified to and contained in the exhibit. A break down of the allowed expenses 
attributed $282.49 to (1) plugging off the bathroom, taking up the carpet, rent 
of a wet-dry vacuum cleaner and payment to "Chandler/Jankin" for labor; (2) 
$50.00 for cleaning the upstairs living room carpet; and (3) $370.00 for loss of 
meat in a freezer, two fans, bathroom supplies and storage room material. On 
each of these items, the valuation was based upon the "price paid" and a before 
value was listed with an after value of zero. The "before and after" rule for 
determining damages is applicable only when there is a partial injury to the 
property. If the property is completely destroyed or taken in entirety by 
eminent domain, the "before and after" rule is unnecessary. The market value of 
the property is the measure of damages. Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. v. 
Mackey, supra; Continental Pipe Line 
Company v. Irwin Livestock Company, supra; Belle Fourche Pipeline Company v. Elmore 
Livestock Company, Wyo., 669 P.2d 505, 511 (1983); Rocky Mountain Packing Co. v. Branney, 
Wyo., 393 P.2d 131, 134 (1964); Redwine 
v. Fitzhugh, 78 Wyo. 407, 329 P.2d 257, 263, 72 A.L.R.2d 664 (1958). 
Although a before and after valuation was listed on the exhibit, it is obvious 
that the loss was determined by market value since the property was considered 
completely destroyed.

[¶26.]  Appellee's opinion was based upon the 
amount paid for cleanup expenses and for the articles destroyed. Obviously, the 
type of property involved (electric fan motors, toilet paper, frozen meat, etc.) 
would have no value after being in human sewage. The purchase price of such 
articles and their present worth are within that for which the owner would have 
knowledge. The testimony was not founded upon a special value to the 
owner.

[¶27.]  The balance included in the $977.49 
allowed by the court for damage to personal property was $275.00 for injury to 
couch and chairs. Appellee's exhibit reflected the new value to be $500.00, the 
value before the backup to be $200.00 and the value after the backup to be 
$25.00. The amount allowed by the court is obviously a mistake in computation. 
Two hundred dollars less $25.00 is $175.00 and not $275.00. The court noted in 
its discussion of damages to personal property that its "arithmetic is subject 
to correction." Accordingly, we can affirm the amount of judgment for damage to 
personal property reduced by the $100.00 error in arithmetic. The couch and 
chairs are the only items of personal property listed on the exhibit which were 
contended to have some value after the backup. The only other item of personal 
property on the exhibit is "damage to washer/dryer" for which appellee listed 
the amount of loss to be questionable and for which appellee was not awarded 
damages by the court.

[¶28.]  In reviewing the $977.49 award for damage 
to personal property under the standard set out above, we cannot say that there 
was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding (except for the $100.00 
error in arithmetic) or that such evidence was improperly admitted in this trial 
to the court. Accordingly, we affirm the award of $877.49 ($977.49 less 
arithmetic correction of $100.00) for damage to personal property.

[¶29.]  The $13,000.00 allowed by the court for 
decrease in the value of the house and the $5,700.00 allowed to restore the 
basement are not double recovery of damages in a single incident as contended by 
appellants, but the method used to measure these damages is not that normally 
used and approved by this court. Further, should we want to approve such 
method2, we would be unable to determine 
from the record in this case any evidence upon which the figure of $5,700.00 was 
based.

[¶30.]  Although appellee placed a market value 
for the property before the backups at $66,000.00 and after the backups at 
$48,000.00, with a loss of $18,000.003, the trial court obviously accepted 
the appraisal made by witness Williams. His written appraisal was admitted into 
evidence, and he testified thereto. He appraised the property with a basement of 
full utility without a sewer problem as having a fair market value of 
$61,000.00, and he appraised it without any basement at all at $48,000.00. The 
difference is $13,000.00, the amount allowed by the court.

[¶31.]  Having valued the house as one without a 
basement, the trial court recognized that the house had a value much less than 
another house without a basement since it had a basement which was a detriment 
to it. The trial court said:

"Now, I understand the 
testimony of the expert witness that this house would have to be sold the same 
as a house without a basement, and that lowered it by $13,000. If it were left 
in the shape and condition it is now it would even be worse than a house without 
a basement. It's a house with a smelly basement, it's unsightly, and it has to 
be repaired."

The court then 
allowed $5,700.00 for the additional injury.

[¶32.]  As stated, even should we accept the 
court's method of computing damages, there was no evidence to support the figure 
of $5,700.00 or any other figure representing the difference in value between a 
house in which living is over a basement containing sewage on the one hand, and 
a house without a basement on the other hand - other than evidence that the 
house with a sewage filled basement has no value at all; and the trial court's 
figure of $5,700.00 was obviously not an adjustment from the "no value at all" 
testimony.4

[¶33.]  Finally, for the purpose reflected in 
footnote 1, we consider appellants' contention that witness Williams' appraisal 
should not have been considered since it purported to establish the market value 
as of January 4, 1984, a time not immediately before and after the backups, 
i.e., July 1982 through August 1983, as required by the "before and after" rule. 
It is unusual that it is appellants who are contending that the court erred in 
not using the times immediately after the incidents.5 If the trial court had done so, the 
testimony placed no value at all on the property immediately after the injuries, 
and the judgment against appellants would have been much larger. Appellee 
testified:

"A That if I need or want 
to sell my home there is no way I could sell it. And the homes out there right 
now that have been for sale for many, many months are still for 
sale.

* * * * * *

* * * * * *

"Q And why is it, in your 
opinion as the owner of the property, that people are reluctant to buy in 
Rawhide Village?

"A Well, with all the 
publicity about the sewer problems, and now the rate increase that they're 
trying to get out there, I just don't think people are going to buy out 
there."

[¶34.]  Witness Williams, whose written appraisal 
was received into evidence reflecting a determination of fair market value as of 
January 4, 1984, testified that:

"A * * * [T]he actual 
market of somebody going in and looking at this house and knowing there was 
sewage backups in it would probably eliminate the saleability of the 
house.

* * * * * *

"Q And what would be the 
impact upon the value of this home of exposing the defects from which it suffers 
in terms of value?

"A No sale."

And it is only 
common sense that the market value of a house immediately after its sewer backed 
up and when there was eight inches of human sewage in the basement would be 
almost nothing.

[¶35.]  In any event, the time at which the 
before and after market value should be fixed will again be an issue in the 
retrial of damages in this case. We have already noted that the before and after 
rule is applicable only when the damage is partial. If the real property was 
reduced to no value at all, it should be valued by ascertaining the market value 
as of the time immediately before the destruction. This is not probable inasmuch 
as the land should have some value even if the house is not usable. The house 
itself should have some salvage value. Accordingly, the real property should be 
valued on the "before and after" basis as of the time it was partially 
damaged.

[¶36.]  The question, then, is when was it 
partially damaged? Each backup or series of backups, as the court may determine, 
results from a negligent act. The testimony as to value would be based on the 
time immediately before and after each backup. Obviously, a single backup may 
have an after value greater than that which follows a series of backups from 
which the bad reputation becomes more widespread. An example which might be 
evidence of valuations is: For backup number 1, before $100,000.00, and after 
$90,000.00. For backup number 2, before $93,000.00 (after value of number 1 
considered together with inflation, depreciation, improvements, etc.) and after 
value of $77,000.00. For backup number 3, before $65,000.00 and after value of 
$35,000.00. If the lawsuit is not instituted until after the third backup, the 
appraisal would substantiate all of these figures.

[¶37.]  The proper "before and after" valuations 
were not here used, and the lack of evidentiary basis for the $5,700.00 figure 
used by the trial court precludes us from considering the alternate method of 
valuation here undertaken. 

[¶38.]  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of 
the trial court as it pertains to liability and as it pertains to damages to 
personal property after decreasing the same $100.00 for the error in arithmetic, 
and we reverse the decision as it pertains to damages to the real property, 
remanding the case for a new trial on such issue.

1 It is proper for us to 
decide incidental questions on appeal which are bound to arise again in the 
case. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas 
Association v. State, Wyo., 645 P.2d 1163, 1167 (1982); McGuire v. McGuire, Wyo., 608 P.2d 1278, 
1286 (1980); Chicago and N.W. Ry. Co. v. 
City of Riverton, 70 Wyo. 119, 247 P.2d 660, 663 (1952).

2 "* * * [T]here are so 
many different situations possible that we do not think the before-and-after 
rule should be rigidly applied to the exclusion of all other considerations. * * 
*" Wheatland Irrigation District v. 
McGuire, Wyo., 562 P.2d 287, 299 (1977).

3 Other values placed in 
evidence reflected purchase price of $47,000.00 in 1979; cost to finish basement 
into family room, bedroom and bath, $12,000.00 financed partly by a second 
mortgage of $8,000.00 requiring monthly payments of $236.46; cost of carpet, 
$1,600.00; owner's opinion on loss of use of basement since July 24, 1982, at 
mortgage monthly payments of $236.46; and "basic estimate" for restoring 
basement, $4,100.00.

4 Appellee's Exhibit 4 
reflected a loss of use figure at $236.46 per month (the amount of payment on 
the loan obtained to finish the basement originally) for loss of use. If the 
court had allowed it, double damages would have resulted since loss of use is 
equivalent to a house without a basement.

5 This is particularly 
true since appellants claim the sewage system was completely renovated in the 
fall of 1983 and the problem corrected.

ROSE, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶39.]  I concur in the disposition of this 
appeal by the majority with respect to the proof of appellants' negligence, the 
personal liability of Ron Ely, and the propriety of the damages award. I cannot 
agree, however, that the Wyoming Rules of Evidence concerning expert testimony 
govern the valuation testimony of a property owner who qualifies to give an 
opinion solely by reason of his ownership of the property evaluated. In my 
judgment, Rule 701, W.R.E. controls the receipt of opinion testimony from a 
property owner who lacks the specialized knowledge of an expert:

"If the witness is not 
testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is 
limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the 
perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his 
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue."

[¶40.]  In Weathers v. State, Wyo., 652 P.2d 970 
(1982), we reviewed the law pertaining to opinion testimony by a property owner 
and held that the owner's familiarity with the property permits him to give an 
opinion as to its value even though he may not possess sufficient knowledge or 
skill to testify as an expert on the subject:

"This court, in a long 
line of cases, has adopted that generally accepted view that owners are presumed 
to have a special knowledge of the value of their property and are qualified to 
express their opinion concerning it. Sagebrush Development, Inc. v. Moehrke, 
Wyo., 604 P.2d 198 (1979); Town of 
Douglas v. Nielsen, Wyo., 409 P.2d 240 (1965); Blessing v. Pittman, 70 Wyo. 416, 251 P.2d 243 (1952); Shikany v. Salt Creek 
Trans. Co., 48 Wyo. 190, 45 P.2d 645 (1935). In Shikany, id., a case where the issue of 
competency was similar to the one before us, this court, after an exhaustive 
discussion of the policy behind allowing such opinion evidence, concluded that 
the owner of a chattel could testify as to its value without demonstrating 
special expertise. * * * Therefore, an owner can testify as to his opinion of 
market value without having a particular expertise; the weight given to such 
testimony is left to the jury." 652 P.2d  at 973.

[¶41.]  Accordingly, the criteria established by 
Rule 701 govern the admissibility of a property owner's valuation testimony. 
Such testimony must be based on the owner's perceptions of the property rather 
than on hearsay or other inadmissible evidence which may support the opinion 
testimony of an expert witness.1 This condition does not unduly 
restrict the admissibility of lay opinion testimony, however, since trial courts 
are directed to construe Rule 701 liberally to permit such testimony. Brockett v. Prater, Wyo., 675 P.2d 638 (1984); McCabe v. R.A. Manning Construction Co., 
Inc., Wyo., 674 P.2d 699 (1983). Gaps in the lay 
witness' knowledge or understanding of the subject go to the weight to be 
accorded the testimony, not to its admissibility. Brockett v. Prater, supra.

[¶42.]  Given the nature of valuation testimony 
offered by a property owner and the distinctions made by the Rules of Evidence 
with respect to lay and expert opinion testimony, the property owner should be 
treated as a lay witness whose opinions, to be admissible, must assist the trier 
of fact and derive from the witness' perceptions of the property, including its 
purchase price. In the case at bar, appellee's opinions of the value of her 
house and personal property were based primarily on her knowledge of their 
purchase price and condition. Her testimony based on incompetent evidence has 
been disregarded by this court in reversing the judgment pertaining to damages 
to real property. Since the court's decision does not depend on a conclusion 
that the property owner qualifies as an expert witness, I join in the 
disposition of this appeal.

1 Rule 703, W.R.E., 
pertains to expert opinion testimony and provides:

"The facts or data in the 
particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those 
perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence."