Case Title: Preisler v. Kuettel's Septic Serv., LLC

Citation: 2014 WI 135

Docket Number: 2012AP002521

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 135 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2521 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Tina L. Preisler and Frederick W. Preisler, 
          Plaintiffs-Co-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
General Casualty Insurance Company, Regent 
Insurance  
Company, Hastings Mutual Insurance Company and 
Secura  
Insurance, a mutual company, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
Kuettel's Septic Service, LLC, 4-DK Farm, Duke 
Kuettel,  
Doug Kuettel, Dale Kuettel and Cheryl Kuettel, 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
Tina L. Preisler and Frederick W. Preisler, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Chartis Specialty Insurance Company f/k/a 
American  
International Specialty Lines Insurance Company, 
          Defendant, 
Rural Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
Phil's Pumping and Fab, Inc., 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
(Reported at 352 Wis. 2d 754, 843, N.W.2d 710) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 30, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 12, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Outagamie 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael W. Gage 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents. (Opinion filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
 
 
2 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by Michael C. Menghini and Herrling Clark Law Firm Ltd., 
Appleton, and oral argument by Michael C. Menghini. 
 
For 
the 
defendant-co-appellant-petitioner, 
there 
were 
briefs by Winston A. Ostrow, Jonathan T. Smies, and Godfrey & 
Kahn, S.C., Green Bay, and oral argument by Jonathan T. Smies. 
 
For the plaintiffs-co-appellants-petitioners, there were 
briefs by James A. Olson, P. Scott Hassett, Kathryn A. Harrell, 
Daniel S. Lenz, and Lawton & Cates, S.C., Madison, and oral 
argument by James A. Olson. 
 
For defendant-respondent Rural Insurance Company, there was 
a brief by Christine M. Rice, Matthew J. Van Keulen, and Simpson 
& Deardorff, S.C., Chicago. Oral argument by Christine M. Rice. 
 
For defendant-respondent Hastings Mutual Insurance Company, 
there was a brief by William R. Wick, Ryan R. Graff, Katelyn P. 
Sandfort, 
and 
Nash, 
Spindler, 
Grimstad 
& 
McCracken 
LLP, 
Manitowoc, and oral argument by Ryan R. Graff. 
 
For defendants-respondents General Casualty Company of 
Wisconsin and Regent Insurance Company, there was a brief and 
oral argument by Jeffrey A. Evans and von Briesen & Roper, S.C., 
Milwaukee. 
 
For defendant-respondent Secura Insurance, there was a 
brief and oral argument by Todd Joseph Koback, John P. Runde, 
and Davczyk & Varline, LLC, Wausau. 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 135
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP2521 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV2601 & 2011CV706) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Tina L. Preisler and Frederick W. Preisler, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Co-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
General Casualty Insurance Company, Regent 
Insurance Company, Hastings Mutual Insurance 
Company and Secura Insurance, a mutual company, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Kuettel's Septic Service, LLC, 4-DK Farm, Duke 
Kuettel, Doug Kuettel, Dale Kuettel and Cheryl 
Kuettel, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
Tina L. Preisler and Frederick W. Preisler, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Chartis Specialty Insurance Company f/k/a 
American International Specialty Lines 
Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant, 
 
Rural Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 30, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
2 
 
Phil's Pumping and Fab, Inc., 
 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 affirming an order of the circuit court2 
that granted summary judgment to Rural Mutual Insurance Company, 
Regent Insurance Company and General Casualty Company of 
Wisconsin.  Our review focuses on the interpretation of 
pollution exclusion clauses in commercial and contractor general 
liability insurance policies.   
¶2 
We conclude that a reasonable insured would understand 
that decomposing septage is a "contaminant" and therefore, a 
"pollutant" as defined in the policies when it has decomposed 
and seeps into a water supply.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals, which granted summary judgment 
upon 
its 
conclusion 
that 
the 
pollution 
exclusion 
clause 
precluded coverage for harm resulting from the Preislers' water 
supply's contamination.   
                                                 
1 Preisler v. Kuettel's Septic Serv., LLC, No. 2012AP2521, 
unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2014).  
2 The Honorable Michael W. Gage of Outagamie County 
presided. 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
3 
 
¶3 
We also conclude that the petitioners failed to 
petition this court for review of the court of appeals dismissal 
of their claims against Hastings Mutual Insurance Company and 
Secura Insurance Company on alternative grounds.  We decline to 
consider issues not raised in petitions for review.  State v. 
Bodoh, 226 Wis. 2d 718, 737, 595 N.W.2d 330 (1999); Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.62 (2011-12).3  Accordingly, those dismissals are not 
before us. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
This review involves an insurance coverage dispute 
concerning a pollution exclusion clause commonly found in 
commercial general liability (CGL) policies.  The historic facts 
are not in dispute. 
¶5 
Fred and Tina Preisler operate a dairy farm and raise 
cattle.  A well drilled in 1972 supplied water for the 
Preislers' household and farm uses until 2008.   
¶6 
Duke, Doug, Dale, and Cheryl Kuettel live on a farm 
across the road from the Preislers' farm.  From that property, 
the Kuettels run a farming operation, 4-DK Farm, and a septic 
pumping service, Kuettel's Septic Service, LLC.  Kuettel's 
Septic hauls, stores, and disposes of the waste it pumps from 
customers' septic tanks.  Kuettel's Septic also collects waste 
from grease traps, floor pits, and car washes, which it combines 
with the human waste from septic tanks.  Kuettel's Septic 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
4 
 
periodically hired Phil's Pumping and Fab, Inc. to dispose of 
septage.4 
¶7 
Septage is primarily composed of human urine and fecal 
material, as well as other materials disposed of in septic 
tanks, grease interceptors and portable restrooms.  See Wis. 
Admin. Code § NR 113.03(55) (Feb. 2014) (defining septage).  
Septage contains nitrogen, and when septage is introduced into 
soil, it decomposes.  During that biological process nitrates 
are formed.  Mike O'Leary et al., Understanding Nitrogen in 
Soils, 
Univ. 
of 
Minn. 
(2002) 
http://www.extension.umn.edu/agriculture/nutrient-
management/nitrogen/understanding-nitrogen-in-soils/.   
¶8 
When nitrates are created in excess of what plants are 
able to use, nitrates can leach into water supplies.  Id.  The 
presence of nitrates in water supplies is a concern for human 
health as it may cause health problems in infants and may be 
implicated as a risk factor associated with chronic health and 
reproductive problems.  Nonpoint Source Pollution Abatement 
Program Redesign, Nitrate in Groundwater - A Continuing Issue 
for Wisconsin Citizens 3 (1999).  Additionally, high nitrate 
                                                 
4 We will subsequently refer to Fred and Tina Preisler as 
"the Preislers."  We will refer to Kuettel's Septic, 4-DK Farm, 
the individual Kuettels, and Phil's Pumping collectively as "the 
Kuettels."  We will refer to the insurance companies either 
collectively as "the insurers" or individually as "Regent" or 
"Rural." 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
5 
 
levels may cause poor appetite or acute nitrogen poisoning in 
livestock.  Id. 
¶9 
Fred Preisler and Duke Kuettel discussed applying 
septage on the Preislers' farm as fertilizer.  Kuettel's Septic 
received permission from the Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR) to apply it.  Kuettel's Septic applied septage 
to the Preislers' farm fields for several years. 
¶10 In 2008, the Preislers experienced problems with their 
well water.  The Preislers' cattle that drank the water began to 
die at an uncharacteristic rate.  The Preislers further noted a 
decrease in milk production.  August 2008 testing showed the 
Preislers' well water contained elevated levels of nitrates, 
which are produced as septage decomposes.  The cattle deaths 
subsided later in 2008 after the Preislers drilled a new well. 
¶11 The Preislers sued Kuettel's Septic in 2010 and Phil's 
Pumping in 2011.  The cases were consolidated and 4-DK Farm and 
the individual Kuettels were added.  The Preislers alleged 
negligence in storing and in applying septage resulting in 
nuisance and trespass.  They also alleged the Kuettels were 
strictly liable for engaging in an abnormally dangerous activity 
and that Duke Kuettel violated Wis. Stat. § 100.18 by promising 
compliance with DNR regulations, failing to follow through, and 
falsifying DNR reports. 
¶12 The Preislers added the parties' insurers to the suit.  
Hastings insured Kuettel's Septic under a CGL policy between 
1999 and 2005, after which Regent insured Kuettel's Septic 
(General Casualty Insurance Company did not insure any party, 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
6 
 
but is affiliated with Regent).  Hastings also insured 4-DK Farm 
under a CGL policy until 2007, after which Secura insured 4-DK 
Farms.  Secura also provided homeowners insurance to individual 
Kuettels.5  Rural insured Phil's Pumping under a CGL policy 
between 2002 and 2013. 
¶13 The Rural and Regent policies include similarly worded 
pollution exclusion clauses.  They exclude harm "arising out of 
the 
actual, 
alleged, 
or 
threatened 
discharge, 
dispersal, 
seepage, migration, release or escape of 'pollutants'. . . ."  
The Rural and Regent policies also define "pollutants" similarly 
as:  "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or 
contaminant, 
including 
smoke, 
vapor, 
soot, 
fumes, 
acids, 
alkalis, chemicals and waste.  Waste includes materials to be 
recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed."   
                                                 
5 The homeowners policies are not at issue in this appeal.  
They do not include pollution exclusion clauses, and the circuit 
court determined another exclusion applied.  The parties do not 
challenge this determination, and we do not address it.  See 
Waushara Cnty. v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d 442, 451, 480 N.W.2d 16 
(1992) 
(appellate 
courts 
need 
not 
consider 
issues 
not 
specifically raised on appeal). 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
7 
 
¶14 The 
insurers 
moved 
for 
summary 
and 
declaratory 
judgment.6  The circuit court agreed that the pollution exclusion 
clause applies to preclude coverage for alleged losses arising 
out of storage of septage and application of septage to farm 
fields that is alleged to have caused contamination of the water 
supply resulting in harm to the Preislers.  The Preislers and 
Kuettels appealed, arguing septage is not a pollutant and 
therefore, the exclusion does not preclude coverage.  The court 
of appeals affirmed. 
¶15 On April 17, 2014 we granted the Preislers' and 
Kuettels' petitions for review.  On May 21, 2014, Secura filed a 
motion for summary disposition in this court on the alternative 
basis of a limited liability endorsement.  Initially, we held 
the motion in abeyance.  We need not address Secura's motion as 
Secura's liability is not before us as we explain below. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶16 The Preislers and Kuettels ask the court to review the 
applicability of the pollution exclusion clause, upon which the 
                                                 
6 Rural and Regent moved for summary judgment.  Hastings and 
Secura moved for summary and declaratory judgment.  All insurers 
argued they had no duty to defend or indemnify the various 
insureds.  The policies we address are Regent's Contractors 
General Liability Coverage policy for Kuettel's Septic, LLC and 
Rural's Commercial General Liability Coverage policy for Phil's 
Pumping and Fab, Inc.  We do not discuss the pollution exclusion 
clauses in Hastings' and Secura's policies because the parties 
did not petition for review of the court of appeals' dismissal 
of claims against Hastings and Secura, on alternative grounds.   
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
8 
 
circuit court and the court of appeals relied to grant summary 
judgment dismissing Rural and Regent from this lawsuit.  When we 
review summary judgment, we independently apply the same 
methodology as the circuit court and the court of appeals.  The 
standards set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08 are our guides.  
Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 20, ¶20, 338 Wis. 2d 
761, 809 N.W.2d 529 (reviewing summary judgment denying coverage 
for property harm from accumulation of bat guano); Siebert v. 
Wis. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 WI 35, ¶27, 333 Wis. 2d 546, 797 
N.W.2d 484 (reviewing summary judgment denying coverage in 
negligent entrustment claim); Peace v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co., 228 
Wis. 2d 106, 119-20, 596 N.W.2d 429 (1999) (reviewing summary 
judgment denying coverage for claims arising from ingestion of 
lead); Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 224, 
229-30, 564 N.W.2d 728 (1997) (reviewing summary judgment 
denying coverage for injuries resulting from buildup of carbon 
dioxide).  Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  § 802.08(2). 
¶17 The parties do not dispute the material facts giving 
rise to the Preislers' loss.7  Rather, the sole issue is whether 
the pollution exclusion clause in the insurance policies 
                                                 
7 See Preisler, No. 2012AP2521, unpublished slip op., ¶12.   
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
9 
 
excludes coverage for harm the Preislers allege they sustained 
due to contamination of their water supply by decomposing 
septage.  The interpretation of an insurance policy is a 
question of law that we review independently.  Siebert, 333 
Wis. 2d 546, ¶28. 
B.  Policy Interpretation 
¶18 This case requires us to interpret the pollution 
exclusion clause as it applies to decomposing septage that 
entered a water supply.  We must determine whether it is a 
pollutant within the meaning of the pollution exclusion clause 
of the insurance policies.  The primary task in contract 
interpretation is to determine and carry out the parties' 
intentions.  Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶22; Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶23, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 
N.W.2d 65.  We interpret insurance policy language according to 
its plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a reasonable 
insured.  Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶22; Peace, 228 Wis. 2d 
at 120-21. 
¶19 Terms, words, or phrases in an insurance policy are 
ambiguous rather than plain if they are "fairly susceptible to 
more than one reasonable interpretation."  Hirschhorn, 338 
Wis. 2d 761, ¶23; accord Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 121.  Policy 
language 
is 
not 
ambiguous 
merely 
because 
more 
than 
one 
dictionary definition exists or the parties disagree about its 
meaning.  Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶23; Peace, 228 Wis. 2d 
at 136.  Policy language also is not ambiguous because different 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
10 
 
courts have come to differing interpretations.  Peace, 228 
Wis. 2d at 136.   
¶20 Policy language is ambiguous when a reasonable insured 
would read the policy to provide coverage and the language is 
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.  See 
Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 235.  If coverage is ambiguous, the 
court's 
construction 
is 
constrained 
and 
ambiguities 
are 
construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage.  
Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶23; Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 121; 
Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 230. 
1.  Initial grant of coverage 
¶21 The insurers, in disputing the policies' grant of 
coverage to the Kuettels, are disputing their duties to defend 
and indemnify.  We determine an insurer's duty to defend "by 
comparing the allegations of the complaint to the terms of the 
insurance policy."  Estate of Sustache v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 2008 WI 87, ¶20, 311 Wis. 2d 548, 751 N.W.2d 845.  
"[A]llegations 
contained 
within 
the 
four 
corners 
of 
the 
complaint" trigger the duty to defend.  Id.  We focus on the 
nature, rather than the merits, of the claim.  Id.  The duty to 
defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, "insofar as the 
former implicates arguable, as opposed to actual, coverage."  
Id.  We construe allegations in the complaint liberally and 
assume all reasonable inferences.  Id., ¶21.  The Preislers' 
complaint includes allegations of negligent septage application 
and storage by the Kuettels. 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
11 
 
¶22 Our procedure for determining whether coverage exists 
under an insurance policy follows three steps.  First, we 
examine the facts of the insured's claim to decide whether the 
policy makes an initial grant of coverage for the claim set out 
in the complaint.  Am. Girl, 268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶24.  The analysis 
ends there if the policy clearly does not cover the claim.  Id.  
However, if the claim set out in the complaint triggers a 
potential grant of coverage, we secondly examine whether any of 
the policy's exclusions preclude coverage for that claim.  Id.  
Third, if an exclusion precludes coverage, we analyze exceptions 
to the exclusion to determine whether any exception reinstates 
coverage.  Id. 
¶23 The parties did not argue the Preislers' claims fall 
outside the policies' grant of coverage.  The court of appeals 
assumed 
without 
deciding 
that 
the 
policies 
at 
issue 
affirmatively grant coverage.8  However, we nevertheless consider 
whether there is a potential grant of coverage because it aids 
in our evaluation of the historic facts in the context of the 
pollution exclusion. 
¶24 Coverage is triggered by an occurrence.  Regent's and 
Rural's policies provide that they "appl[y] to 'bodily injury' 
and 'property damage' only if:  (1) The 'bodily injury' or 
'property damage' is caused by an occurrence."  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
The 
policies 
define 
"occurrence" 
identically:  
                                                 
8 Preisler, No. 2012AP2521, unpublished slip op., ¶15.   
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
12 
 
"'[o]ccurrence' means an accident, including continuous or 
repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful 
conditions."  We interpret policy language according to its 
plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a reasonable 
insured.  Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶22; Peace, 228 Wis. 2d 
at 120-21.   
¶25 We turn to Couch on Insurance for its description of 
"occurrence" in pollution exclusion cases: 
Due to the fact that most policies define an 
"occurrence" to mean an "accident," the pollution 
coverage issue often turns upon the intent of the 
insured.  In making this determination, jurisdictions 
have focused on different aspects of the polluting 
process to assess the mindset of the insured.  Most 
courts have focused on the damage caused by the 
pollution 
and 
have 
concluded 
that 
there 
is 
an 
occurrence when the insured did not expect or intend 
the resultant damage. 
9 Steven Plitt et al., Couch on Insurance § 127.4 (2008). 
¶26 We have interpreted whether certain circumstances fall 
within policy definitions of "occurrence."  In American Girl, we 
determined that soil settlement that occurred because of faulty 
site-preparation advice of a soil engineer was an "occurrence."  
Am. Girl, 268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶38.  The policy's definition of 
"occurrence" was the same as here, and we focused on defining 
"accident."  Id., ¶37.  We looked to a dictionary definition: 
"'The word "accident," in accident policies, means an event 
which takes place without one's foresight or expectation.  A 
result, though unexpected, is not an accident; the means or 
cause must be accidental.'"  Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
13 
 
15 (7th ed. 1999)).  We considered two causes of property 
damage, both the inadequate site-preparation advice and the 
actual settling of the soil, and found neither was intended, 
anticipated, or expected.  Id., ¶38.  We therefore held the 
accidental circumstances underlying the claim constituted an 
"occurrence" within the policy's definition.  Id. 
¶27 Interpreting American Girl, the court of appeals has 
held accidental soil contamination was an "occurrence," where 
the policy provided no definition.  United Coop. v. Frontier FS 
Coop., 2007 WI App 197, ¶¶12, 15, 304 Wis. 2d 750, 738 N.W.2d 
578.  The court acknowledged that American Girl required focus 
on the "event or series of events that allegedly caused the 
alleged bodily injury or property damage."  Id., ¶16.  United 
Coop. lacked any specific facts on how the soil contamination 
occurred, but nevertheless concluded that the contamination was 
an 
"occurrence" 
because 
it 
caused 
property 
damage 
to 
groundwater.  Id., ¶¶20, 35.   
¶28 As with American Girl and United Coop., the facts of 
this case, if proved, present an "occurrence" triggering an 
initial grant of coverage.  Here, the "accident" was the seepage 
of decomposing septage into the Preislers' water supply.  
Seepage into the water supply was not "intended, anticipated, or 
expected."  Am. Girl, 268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶38.  Seepage of 
decomposing septage into the water supply is an occurrence, as 
was 
the 
settling 
soil 
in 
American 
Girl 
and 
the 
soil 
contamination in United Coop.  Id.; United Coop., 304 Wis. 2d 
750, ¶20.  Here, the resulting harm is water with elevated 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
14 
 
nitrate levels.  See United Coop., 304 Wis. 2d 750, ¶35 (stating 
an occurrence caused property damage to groundwater). 
2.  Pollution exclusion 
¶29 Next, we examine whether either of the policies' 
exclusions preclude coverage at the time of the occurrence.  See 
Am. Girl, 268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶24.  Typically, to resolve whether a 
pollution exclusion applies, we first determine whether the 
substance in question falls unambiguously within the policy's 
definition of pollutants.  Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶25 
(determining whether bat guano is unambiguously a pollutant); 
Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 119 (determining whether lead present in 
paint is unambiguously a pollutant); Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 
229 (determining whether exhaled carbon dioxide is unambiguously 
a pollutant).  Then, if the substance fits within the policy's 
definition of pollutants, we determine whether the alleged loss 
resulted from the "discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, 
release or escape" of the substance under the plain terms of the 
policy's pollution exclusion clause.  Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 
761, ¶25; Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 119; Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 
229.   
¶30 However, the parties do not appeal the circuit court's 
ruling that the Preislers' alleged damage resulted from the 
"discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of" 
decomposing septage within the meaning of the terms in the 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
15 
 
pollution exclusion clause.9  Therefore, we are presented with 
the sole inquiry of whether, at the time of the occurrence that 
triggered coverage, the decomposing septage is a pollutant 
within the policies' definition. 
a.  limited inquiry 
¶31 We need to determine only whether decomposing septage 
is a pollutant as it seeped into the Preislers' water supply.  
There is no occurrence until that seepage into the water supply 
takes place.  Our approach of construing whether a substance is 
a pollutant at the point it harms the interests of another is 
consistent with our previous pollution exclusion decisions.  As 
we explain below, those decisions focused on the event giving 
rise to the alleged harm at issue, rather than on an initial 
event that may have involved a beneficial use of the substance.  
Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 126; U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ace Baking Co., 
164 Wis. 2d 499, 501, 476 N.W.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1991). 
¶32 Peace and Ace Baking are particularly instructive.  In 
Peace, harm resulted from the release of lead paint chips, 
flakes, and dust into a home painted with lead paint.  Peace, 
228 Wis. 2d at 111.  We focused not on lead intentionally used 
in paint for a beneficial purpose, but rather on release of lead 
from the paint on the walls into the air or onto the floor as 
the substance that gave rise to an occurrence under the language 
                                                 
9 See Preisler, No. 2012AP2521, unpublished slip op., ¶39 
(failing to challenge the circuit court's conclusion at the 
court of appeals).   
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
16 
 
of the policy.  See id. at 126 ("Conceptually, we view the lead 
not as contaminating the paint but as giving the paint the 
potential to contaminate air, water, and the human body when it 
disperses.").  Therefore, although lead had a beneficial use in 
the paint when it was applied to the walls, our evaluation of 
whether lead was a pollutant was made when harm occurred.   
¶33 In Ace Baking, fabric softener and ice cream cones 
were stored in the same warehouse, and a fragrance additive to 
the fabric softener spread to the ice cream cones, making them 
taste like soap.  Ace Baking, 164 Wis. 2d at 500.  The court of 
appeals determined that the fragrance in the fabric softener 
became a pollutant when it spread to the ice cream cones stored 
in the same warehouse, even though the court would not have 
considered it a pollutant if it had stayed in the fabric 
softener.  Id. at 505.  The court said, "it is a rare substance 
indeed that is always a pollutant; the most noxious of materials 
have their appropriate and non-polluting uses."  Id.  Peace and 
Ace Baking support our conclusion that we apply the definition 
of pollutant at the time of the occurrence, i.e., when 
decomposing septage entered Preislers' well, rather than the 
allegedly negligent application of septage to fields. 
b.  reasonable insured 
¶34 The 
pollution 
exclusion 
clause 
provides, 
"[t]his 
insurance does not apply to:  . . . 'Bodily injury' or 'property 
damage' arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened 
discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of 
'pollutants'."  Each policy defines "pollutants" as "any solid, 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
17 
 
liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including 
smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.  
Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or 
reclaimed."  The policy does not further define contaminant. 
¶35 We construe these terms according to their plain and 
ordinary meanings as understood by a reasonable person in the 
position of the insured.  Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶22; 
Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 120-21.  Our decisions in Donaldson, Peace 
and Hirschhorn are instructive in determining the meaning of 
contaminant and therefore, pollutant.  Furthermore, the limiting 
principles 
applied 
in 
Donaldson 
and 
Langone 
aid 
us 
in 
determining a reasonable insured's understanding of the meaning 
of pollutant and contaminant.  Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 232; 
Langone v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI App 121, ¶22, 300 
Wis. 2d 742, 731 N.W.2d 334. 
¶36 First, in Donaldson, we held that the pollution 
exclusion clause did not preclude coverage for personal injury 
claims stemming from inadequate ventilation of exhaled carbon 
dioxide in an office building.  Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 235.  
We concluded a reasonable insured would not understand exhaled 
carbon dioxide to fall within the policy's definition of 
pollutants.  Id. at 231-32.  We recognized the pollutant 
definition was broad:  "'irritant' and 'contaminant,' when 
viewed in isolation, are virtually boundless, for there is 
virtually no substance or chemical in existence that would not 
irritate or damage some person or property."  Id. at 232 
(quoting Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
18 
 
Co., 976 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1992)).  Therefore, we warned that 
"[t]he 
reach 
of 
the 
pollution 
exclusion 
clause 
must 
be 
circumscribed by reasonableness, lest the contractual promise of 
coverage be reduced to a dead letter."  Id. at 233.  We 
concluded that the plaintiffs' injuries resulted from an 
everyday activity "gone slightly, but not surprisingly, awry."  
Id. (quoting Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1043-44).  We explained it 
was significant that exhaled carbon dioxide is "universally 
present and generally harmless in all but the most unusual 
instances" and that exhaled carbon dioxide is a necessary and 
natural part of life.  Id. at 234.  Accordingly, we held that 
"the pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous because [the 
insured] could reasonably expect coverage on the facts of this 
case."  Id. at 233. 
¶37 Two years later, in Peace, we held that a pollution 
exclusion clause excluded coverage for personal injury claims 
arising out of a minor's ingestion of lead-based paint chips, 
flakes, and dust present in the insured's apartment.  Peace, 228 
Wis. 2d at 110-11.  We concluded once the previously contained 
pollutant, lead, "begins to disperse, discharge, or escape from 
the containment of the painted surface, it falls within the 
plain language of the pollution exclusion clause."  Id. at 130.   
¶38 Before coming to our conclusion, we consulted a non-
legal dictionary to define contaminant and irritant.  Id. at 
122.  We applied these common definitions to the plaintiff's 
claims and concluded there was "little doubt that lead derived 
from lead paint chips, flakes, or dust is an irritant or serious 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
19 
 
contaminant."  Id. at 125.  We noted the physical consequences 
of lead paint used in a home were well-documented.  Id. at 123-
24.  "Lead poisoning from paint at residential properties is 
generally caused by the inhalation of lead-contaminated dust 
particles or toxic lead fumes through respiration or the 
ingestion of lead-based paint chips by mouth.  The consequences 
can be disastrous for children."  Id.  We distinguished 
Donaldson because lead paint chips, flakes and dust "are widely, 
if not universally, understood to be dangerous," while carbon 
dioxide is not.  Id. at 137.  Therefore, "[r]easonable owners of 
rental property[, the insureds,] understand their obligation to 
deal with the problem of lead paint."  Id. at 138. 
¶39 Most recently, in Hirschhorn, we held bat guano 
unambiguously falls within the term, "pollutants," as defined by 
the insurance policy because it constituted an irritant and a 
contaminant.  Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶¶33-34.  We referred 
both 
to 
dictionary 
definitions 
of 
the 
terms 
and 
health 
consequences of human proximity to bat guano.  Id., ¶33.  We 
concluded a reasonable insured would consider bat guano to be 
waste, referencing the dictionary definition of the term.  Id., 
¶34. 
¶40 In the instant case, the issue is whether a reasonable 
insured would consider decomposing septage to be a pollutant 
when it seeps into a water supply.  Again, we interpret policy 
language according to its plain and ordinary meaning as 
understood by a reasonable insured.  Id., ¶22; Peace, 228 
Wis. 2d at 120-21.  When determining the ordinary meaning of 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
20 
 
words not defined in an insurance policy, it is appropriate to 
look to the definitions in a non-legal dictionary.  Weimer v. 
Country Mut. Ins. Co., 216 Wis. 2d 705, 723, 575 N.W.2d 466 
(1998); Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis. 2d 737, 745, 
456 N.W.2d 570 (1990).   
¶41 As explained above, we accepted a non-legal dictionary 
definition of contaminant in Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 122.  We 
determined the ordinary meaning of contaminant is one that 
contaminates, and contaminate means "'[t]o make impure or 
unclean by contact or mixture.'"  Id. at 122 (quoting American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 406 (3d ed. 1992)           
[hereinafter American Heritage Dictionary]).   
¶42 In determining whether a substance is a contaminant 
and therefore a pollutant, the focus is on the event causing 
harm because that is the occurrence triggering coverage.  Id. at 
126.  Here, the event causing harm is decomposing septage 
seeping into the water supply.  A reasonable insured would 
understand decomposing septage to be a contaminant when it seeps 
into a water supply.   
¶43 Handling, storing, and applying septage are activities 
regulated by both the DNR and the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency.  See generally 40 C.F.R. § 503 (2013) 
(federal regulation of domestic septage); Wis. Admin. Code §§ NR 
113-114 (Feb. 2014) (state regulation of septage).  Publications 
produced to guide septage haulers and storers recognize septage 
may be harmful and have the potential to affect health of humans 
and livestock.  EPA, A Plain English Guide to the EPA Part 503 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
21 
 
Biosolids 
Rule 
2 
(1994), 
available 
at 
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/wastetech/biosolids/503pe_index.cfm
; Wis. DNR, Septage Operator Servicing Handbook and Study Guide 
8-9 
(2013), 
available 
at 
http://dnr.wi.gov/regulations/opcert/documents/septagestudyguide
.pdf [hereinafter "WDNR Septage Handbook"].  The government's 
regulation of septage contributes to reasonable insureds' 
awareness of the health risks of septage hauling, storing, and 
application.  See Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 150 (Bradley, J., 
concurring) (noting regulatory restriction of lead use and 
pollutant status despite intentional application). 
¶44 Limiting principles that consider the nature of the 
substance ensure that our construction of a pollution exclusion 
clause is consistent with the understanding of a reasonable 
insured.  Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 232 (citing Pipefitters, 976 
F.2d at 1043); Langone, 300 Wis. 2d 742, ¶22.  These principles 
apply to aid in the overarching reasonable insured analysis.  
See Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶30 (tying the limiting 
principle back to a reasonable insured's understanding); Peace, 
228 Wis. 2d at 136-38 (addressing limiting principle within the 
understanding of a reasonable insured); Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d 
at 
233-34 
(placing 
limiting 
principles 
in 
context 
of 
a 
reasonable 
insured); 
Langone, 
300 
Wis. 2d 
742, 
¶¶17-18 
(discussing limiting principle in context of a reasonable 
insured). 
¶45 One such limiting principle applies whenever the 
substance is "universally present and generally harmless in all 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
22 
 
but the most unusual instances."  Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 234.  
In those instances, we are hesitant to conclude that such a 
substance is a pollutant.  Id.  Both Donaldson and Langone 
considered the gasses at issue to be "universally present and 
generally harmless in all but the most unusual instances."  Id.; 
see also Langone, 300 Wis. 2d 742, ¶19 ("Like carbon dioxide, 
carbon monoxide is colorless, odorless, and present in the air 
around us.").   
¶46 Individual 
components 
of 
septage 
are 
common.10   
Septage is a waste product with use as a farm fertilizer.  
Application of septage comes with risks to water supplies 
because decomposing septage can release high levels of nitrates, 
which can be dangerous to humans and cattle if they reach water 
supplies.  WDNR Septage Handbook at 8-9.  Septage is not 
generally harmless nor is it the type of pervasive substance 
considered in Donaldson and Langone.  See Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d 
at 234; Langone, 300 Wis. 2d 742, ¶19.   
¶47 A second limiting principle is that if the harm 
results from "everyday activities gone slightly, but not 
surprisingly, awry," a reasonable insured would not necessarily 
understand the substance to be a pollutant.  Pipefitters, 976 
                                                 
10 In Guenther v. City of Onalaska, 223 Wis. 2d 206, 588 
N.W.2d 375 (Ct. App. 1998), the court of appeals held the 
pollution exclusion clause did not apply to the occurrence of a 
domestic 
sewer 
backup. 
 
Id. 
at 
208. 
 
Guenther 
is 
distinguishable, as there the court concluded the policy covered 
damage resulting from the liquid, non-toxic nature of the sewage 
backup.  Id. 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
23 
 
F.2d at 1043-44; accord Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 158; Donaldson, 
211 Wis. 2d at 233.  Exposure of decomposing septage to the 
Preislers' water supply is not "an everyday activity 'gone 
slightly, but not surprisingly, awry.'"  See Donaldson, 211 
Wis. 2d at 233 (quoting Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1043-44); 
Langone, 300 Wis. 2d 742, ¶19.   
¶48 To explain further, in Langone, a gas-burning boiler 
caused an excess of carbon monoxide and caused the harm at 
issue.  Langone, 300 Wis. 2d 742, ¶¶2-3.  The court of appeals 
noted the common exposure of individuals to some carbon monoxide 
in homes, especially in the presence of stoves with gas burners.  
Id., ¶19.  However, the exposure of water supplies to 
decomposing septage is not an everyday activity, as evidenced by 
the protective regulatory mechanisms surrounding the hauling, 
storing, and application of septage that are designed to prevent 
invasion of water supplies.  40 C.F.R. § 503 (2013); Wis. Admin. 
Code §§ NR 113-114 (Feb. 2014).   
¶49 Additionally, we have already rejected an attempt to 
equate 
application 
of 
a 
contaminant 
to 
the 
surrounding 
environment with exhalation of an omnipresent gas.  Peace, 228 
Wis. 2d at 137-38 (differentiating release of lead paint from 
exhaling carbon dioxide).  A reasonable insured would not 
understand exposure of water supplies to decomposing septage as 
"an everyday activity 'gone slightly, but not surprisingly, 
awry.'"  See Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 233 (quoting Pipefitters, 
976 F.2d at 1043-44); Langone, 300 Wis. 2d 742, ¶19. 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
24 
 
¶50 Furthermore, that septage fits the ordinary meaning of 
waste, which the policies expressly list as a pollutant, 
supports our conclusion that septage is a pollutant when it 
seeps into a water supply.  Septage is primarily composed of 
human urine and feces.  The ordinary meanings of feces and urine 
are, respectively, "'[w]aste matter eliminated from the bowels; 
excrement,'" 
and 
"'[t]he 
waste 
product 
secreted 
by 
the 
kidneys.'"  Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶34 (quoting The 
American Heritage Dictionary 1965).  The ordinary meaning of 
waste includes, among other things, "'[t]he undigested residue 
of food eliminated from the body; excrement.'"  Id. (quoting 
American Heritage Dictionary 2016).  In Hirschhorn, these 
definitions of waste, urine, and feces supported our conclusion 
that bat guano——which consists of bat urine and feces——was a 
pollutant when it infiltrated a home.  Id., ¶¶34-36.  Likewise, 
in the present case, these definitions support our conclusion 
that decomposing septage is a pollutant when it seeps into a 
water supply. 
¶51 The 
policies' 
use 
of 
"contaminant" 
in 
defining 
"pollutant" should have been clear notice to the Kuettels that 
their policies would not cover claims involving decomposing 
septage's seepage into water supplies.11  Stated otherwise, a 
                                                 
11 One could wonder what conversation transpired between the 
insurance agent and the Kuettels yielding insurance policies 
that do not cover harm caused in the course of their chosen 
business.  However, the actions of the insurers and their agents 
are not before us.   
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
25 
 
reasonable insured would conclude that the policies would not 
provide coverage on these facts.  The key terms of the policies 
are unambiguous.  See Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 136.   
¶52 Typically, we would proceed to determine whether 
spraying or injecting septage on farmland constitutes the 
"discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of 
'pollutants'."  See Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 228.  However, the 
parties do not appeal the circuit court's ruling that the 
Preislers' alleged loss resulted from the "discharge, dispersal, 
seepage, migration, release or escape of" septage within the 
meaning of the terms in the pollution exclusion clause of the 
insurance policy.12  Accordingly, we conclude that the insureds' 
claims fall within the unambiguous terms of the pollution 
exclusion clauses.13 
C.  Summary Judgment Granted to Hastings and Secura 
¶53 A final issue is whether the Preislers and Kuettels 
have waived consideration of the court of appeals' grant of 
summary judgment to Hastings and Secura.  Secura and Hastings 
                                                 
12 See Preisler, No. 2012AP2521, unpublished slip op., ¶39 
(failing to challenge the circuit court's conclusion at the 
court of appeals).   
13 Typically, our third step is to analyze exceptions to the 
exclusion to determine whether any reinstates coverage.  Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶24, 268 
Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65.  The parties did not argue an 
exception to the pollution exclusion applies; therefore, we need 
not reach this step. 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
26 
 
argued alternative grounds for summary judgment to the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.14  
¶54 The circuit court did not address Hastings' and 
Secura's alternative grounds for summary judgment.  The only 
responses to Hastings' and Secura's arguments to the court of 
appeals were the Preislers' assertions in two reply brief 
footnotes that Hastings and Secura were required to file cross-
appeals to raise alternative grounds for summary judgment.  The 
court of appeals held Preislers' response insufficient and 
separately dismissed claims against Hastings and Secura on their 
alternative grounds.  See Preisler v. Kuettel's Septic Serv., 
LLC, No. 2012AP2521, unpublished slip op., ¶¶40-42 (Ct. App. 
Jan. 14, 2014).   
¶55 By supreme court rule, "[i]f a petition [for review] 
is granted, the parties cannot raise or argue issues not set 
forth in the petition unless ordered otherwise by the supreme 
court."  Wis. Stat. § 809.62(6).  In their petitions for review, 
the Preislers, the Kuettels, and Phil's Pumping framed the issue 
as whether septage falls within the pollutant definition for 
purposes of the pollution exclusion clause.   
¶56 None of the petitioners petitioned the supreme court 
to review summary judgments granted to Hastings and Secura on 
alternative grounds.  Hastings' dismissal was based on the 
                                                 
14 Brief for Secura at 24-30, Preisler, No. 2012AP2421, 
unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2014); Brief for 
Hastings at 33-36, Preisler, No. 2012AP2421, unpublished slip 
op. (Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2014). 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
27 
 
conclusion that the harm did not occur during the policy period.  
Secura's dismissal was based on the conclusion that the harm did 
not occur to the covered premises.  In granting the petition, we 
did not instruct the parties to brief or argue any additional 
issues pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.62(6).  Because the 
alternative grounds for summary judgment in favor of Hastings 
and Secura were not raised as an issue on petition to us, the 
Preislers, the Kuettels, and Phil's Pumping have waived our 
consideration of those grounds for summary judgment.  See Doyle 
v. Engelke, 219 Wis. 2d 277, 294, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998) 
(concluding that issues omitted from petitions for review may be 
waived 
if 
we 
do 
not 
direct 
that 
they 
be 
addressed).  
Accordingly, these dismissals by the court of appeals become the 
law of the case for further proceedings on Preislers' claims.  
State v. Moeck, 2005 WI 57, ¶18, 280 Wis. 2d 277, 695 N.W.2d 
783.   
¶57 While we retain the inherent power to consider issues 
beyond those raised in the petitions, we decline to do so in 
this matter.  See Univest Corp. v. Gen. Split Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 
29, 37, 435 N.W.2d 234 (1989).   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶58 We conclude that a reasonable insured would understand 
that decomposing septage is a "contaminant" and therefore, a 
"pollutant" as defined in the policies when it has decomposed 
and seeps into a water supply.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals, which granted summary judgment 
upon 
its 
conclusion 
that 
the 
pollution 
exclusion 
clause 
No. 
2012AP2521   
 
28 
 
precluded coverage for harm resulting from the Preislers' water 
supply's contamination.   
¶59 We also conclude that the petitioners failed to 
petition this court for review of summary judgments of dismissal 
of their claims against Hastings and Secura.  We decline to 
consider issues not raised in petitions for review.  Bodoh, 226 
Wis. 2d at 737; Wis. Stat. § 809.62.  Accordingly, those 
dismissals are not before us. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2012AP2521.awb 
 
1 
 
¶60 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  Although I 
agree with the majority's conclusion that septage is a pollutant 
here, I part ways with the majority when it undertakes an 
analysis of "occurrence."  Not only is the analysis unclear, it 
is unnecessary to the decision, and inconsistent with Wilson 
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Falk, 2014 WI 136, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d 
__, a case decided on the same day, on the same issue. 
¶61 It is unclear whether the majority is embarking on a 
cause 
approach 
or 
damage 
approach 
in 
determining 
what 
constitutes an occurrence.  It quotes a leading authority on 
insurance law, Couch on Insurance, for the premise that "[m]ost 
courts have focused on the damage caused by the pollution and 
have concluded that there is an occurrence when the insured did 
not expect or intend the resultant damage."  Majority op., ¶25 
(quoting 9 Steven Plitt et al., Couch on Insurance § 127.4 
(2008)).  It then discusses Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. 
Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶38, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65, which 
looked at both cause and damage in its discussion of occurrence.  
Id., ¶26.   
¶62 Yet, after discussing these authorities, the majority 
cites United Coop. v. Frontier FS Coop., 2007 WI App 197, ¶¶12, 
15, 304 Wis. 2d 750, 738 N.W.2d 578, for the premise that the 
focus in an occurrence determination is on "the event or series 
of events that allegedly caused the alleged bodily injury or 
property damage."  Id., ¶27.  The majority then concludes that 
the occurrence in this case was the "[s]eepage of decomposing 
septage into the water supply" and "the resulting harm is water 
No.  2012AP2521.awb 
 
2 
 
with elevated nitrate levels."  Id., ¶28.  By including its 
statement that the resulting harm was something other than the 
occurrence, the majority suggests it is taking the cause 
approach. 
 
Without 
a 
definite 
statement, 
however, 
the 
juxtaposition 
of 
this 
conclusion 
with 
the 
conflicting 
authorities renders the majority's analysis unclear.  
¶63 Not 
only 
is 
the 
majority's 
analysis 
of 
what 
constitutes an occurrence unclear, but it is also unnecessary.   
What constitutes an occurrence was not addressed in the 
arguments presented by the parties.  This issue was neither 
briefed nor argued, and none of the leading cases on pollution 
exclusions discuss it.  See Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 
2012 WI 20, 338 Wis. 2d 761, 809 N.W.2d 529; Peace v. 
Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 228 Wis. 2d 106, 596 N.W.2d 429 
(1999); Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, 211 Wis. 2d 224, 564 
N.W.2d 728 (1997); Langone v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI 
App 121, 300 Wis. 2d 742; 731 N.W.2d 334; United States Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Ace Baking Co., 164 Wis. 2d 499, 476 N.W.2d 280 (Ct. 
App. 1991).   
¶64 Lastly, if the majority is going to address what 
constitutes an occurrence, it should do so in a consistent 
manner.  As noted above, the majority appears to take a cause 
approach to occurrence.  This conflicts with the apparent 
approach embraced in Wilson Mutual, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶32, which we 
also release today.  Wilson Mutual acknowledges that "Wisconsin 
is in the jurisdictional majority in defining an occurrence as 
No.  2012AP2521.awb 
 
3 
 
unexpected or unintended resultant damage."  Which precedent 
should future attorneys follow? 
¶65 Overall, 
the 
majority's 
occurrence 
discussion 
is 
problematic.  By creating unclear, unnecessary, and inconsistent 
precedent, the court does not live up to its obligation to 
provide a clear and concise articulation of a legal standard.  
Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
 
   
 
No.  2012AP2521.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶66 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I would 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶67 This case requires us to interpret the standard 
pollution exclusion clauses in a commercial general liability 
policy and a contractors' general liability policy. 
¶68 The majority opinion frames the question presented in 
this case as "whether decomposing septage is a pollutant as it 
seeped into the Preislers' water supply."1  The majority opinion 
then holds that "a reasonable insured would conclude that the 
policies would not provide coverage on these facts."2 
¶69 The majority opinion's approach to the pollution 
exclusion clauses in the instant case unnecessarily departs from 
precedent, undercuts the limiting principles our prior cases 
have applied to pollution exclusion clauses, and further 
confuses this murky area of the law. 
¶70 The 
majority 
opinion 
needlessly 
decides 
what 
"occurrence" triggered coverage in the instant case and further 
complicates the law in this area.  The question of what 
constitutes an occurrence need not be decided to resolve the 
question presented.  The occurrence issue was neither raised nor 
briefed by the parties and was not ruled on by the circuit court 
or the court of appeals.  The issue is complex.3  The court 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶31. 
2 Id., ¶51. 
3 Steven Plitt et al., 9 Couch on Insurance § 126:27 (1997) 
("Whether there has been an accident or occurrence to trigger 
insurance coverage has been a much litigated issue."). 
No.  2012AP2521.ssa 
 
2 
 
should not delve into it without the benefit of briefs or 
argument. 
¶71 Furthermore, the majority opinion's discussions of 
what constitutes an occurrence and of whether a substance is a 
pollutant are inconsistent with the court's approach to those 
issues in Wilson Mutual v. Falk, 2014 WI 136, ¶38, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  I write on substantially similar 
issues in my dissent in Wilson Mutual.  My dissents in Wilson 
Mutual and in the instant case should be read together. 
¶72 I conclude that a reasonable person in the position of 
the insureds, two companies in the business of hauling, storing, 
and disposing of septage, would not consider septage a pollutant 
under the pollution exclusion clause of general liability 
policies they purchased to cover liability for damage caused by 
their septic business operations. 
¶73 If the majority is unwilling to honor the reasonable 
expectations of these insured septic companies, then I conclude 
the case should be remanded to the circuit court to allow the 
parties to present evidence regarding the insureds' expectations 
of 
coverage 
and 
the 
objective 
reasonableness 
of 
those 
expectations.4 
¶74 Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
                                                 
4 See majority op., ¶51 n.11 ("One could wonder what 
conversation transpired between the insurance agent and the 
Kuettels yielding insurance policies that do not cover harm 
caused in the course of their chosen business.  However, the 
actions of the insurers and their agents are not before us."). 
No.  2012AP2521.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶75 The present case involves two insured companies and 
two insurance policies.5 
¶76 Kuettel's Septic Service, LLC (Kuettel's) is a company 
that hauls, stores, and disposes of septage.  Kuettel's 
sometimes disposes of septage by spreading it as fertilizer on 
farmland.  Kuettel's has periodically hired Phil's Pumping and 
Fab, Inc. (Phil's Pumping) to dispose of septage.  Phil's 
Pumping sometimes disposes of the septage by spreading it as 
fertilizer on farmland.   
¶77 These septic companies purchased general liability 
policies to insure their business operations, that is, they 
purchased insurance policies to cover damage they might cause in 
the ordinary course of their hauling, storing, and disposing of 
septage. 
¶78 Kuettel's purchased a contractors' general liability 
policy from Regent Insurance Company.  The Regent policy 
contains the following provisions: 
B. EXCLUSIONS 
1. Applicable to Contractors Liability Coverage 
This insurance does not apply to: 
 . . . . 
f. Pollution 
(1) "Bodily injury" or "property damage" 
arising out of the actual, alleged or 
                                                 
5 As the majority opinion points out, there were other 
insurers and other insurance contracts involved at earlier 
stages of the litigation. 
No.  2012AP2521.ssa 
 
4 
 
threatened 
discharge, 
dispersal, 
seepage, migration, release or escape 
of "pollutants" . . . . 
F. LIABILITY AND MEDICAL EXPENSES DEFINITIONS 
 . . . . 
14. "Occurrence" 
means 
an 
accident, 
including 
continuous 
or 
repeated 
exposure 
to 
substantially 
the 
same 
general 
harmful 
conditions. 
 . . . . 
16. "Pollutants" means any solid, liquid, gaseous 
or thermal irritant or contaminant, including 
smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, 
chemicals and waste.  Waste includes materials 
to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed. 
¶79 Phil's 
Pumping 
purchased 
a 
commercial 
general 
liability policy from Rural Mutual Insurance Company.  The Rural 
Mutual policy contains the following provisions: 
2. Exclusions 
This insurance does not apply to: 
 . . . . 
f. Pollution 
(1) "Bodily 
injury" 
or 
"property 
damage," 
arising out of the actual, alleged, or 
threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, 
migration, 
release 
or 
escape 
of 
"pollutants" . . . . 
SECTION V - DEFINITIONS 
 . . . . 
13. "Occurrence" 
means 
an 
accident, 
including 
continuous 
or 
repeated 
exposure 
to 
substantially 
the 
same 
general 
harmful 
conditions. 
 . . . . 
No.  2012AP2521.ssa 
 
5 
 
15. "Pollutants" mean any solid, liquid, gaseous or 
thermal 
irritant 
or 
contaminant, 
including 
smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, 
chemicals and waste.  Waste includes materials 
to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed. 
¶80 For several years, Kuettel's and Phil's Pumping spread 
septage on Fred and Tina Preisler's farmland.  In 2008, when the 
Regent and Rural Mutual insurance policies described above were 
in effect, the Preislers discovered that septage had seeped into 
their well and contaminated their water supply, causing cattle 
loss and other problems on their farm. 
¶81 The Preislers sued Kuettel's and Phil's Pumping, 
alleging that the companies negligently stored and spread 
septage, resulting in nuisance and trespass.  Kuettel's and 
Phil's Pumping contend that septage is not a pollutant under the 
pollution exclusion clauses at issue and thus that Regent and 
Rural Mutual should defend and indemnify under the policies. 
II 
¶82 Applying the court's general principles of insurance 
contract interpretation6 to the facts of the present case, I 
conclude that a reasonable person in the position of these 
insured septic companies would not consider septage a pollutant 
under the pollution exclusion clause of a general liability 
policy purchased to cover liability for damage caused by their 
septic business operations. 
                                                 
6 See Frost ex rel. Anderson v. Whitbeck, 2002 WI 129, ¶¶15-
22, 257 Wis. 2d 80, 654 N.W.2d 225.  I set forth these 
principles at length in Wilson Mutual Insurance Co. v. Falk, 
2014 WI 136, ¶___, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, 
C.J., dissenting). 
No.  2012AP2521.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶83 Excrement may be waste, an irritant, or a contaminant, 
but septage is a valuable product.  It is a fertilizer used to 
enrich the soil.  When it is used to enrich the soil, it is no 
longer waste, an irritant, or a contaminant. 
¶84 Because we construe insurance contract provisions as 
would a reasonable insured, we have held that pollution 
exclusion clauses do not apply when "injuries result[] from 
everyday activities gone slightly, but not surprisingly, awry" 
or 
when 
a 
reasonable 
policyholder 
"would 
not 
characterize . . . [the] incident[] as pollution."7 
¶85 To septic companies like Kuettel's and Phil's Pumping, 
storing 
and 
spreading 
septage 
are 
indisputably 
everyday 
activities.  Septic companies store septage and often spread 
septage on farmland.  Seepage is the whole point of spreading 
septage on farmland.  If the seepage of septage into the 
Preislers' well resulted from the storage of septage or the 
spreading of septage on farmland, then it clearly resulted from 
an everyday activity "gone slightly, but not surprisingly, 
awry."8 
¶86 A court keeps the underlying purpose of the insurance 
in mind when construing policy provisions.9  Kuettel's and Phil's 
                                                 
7 Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 224, 
233, 564 N.W.2d 728 (1997). 
8 Id. 
9 Frost, 257 Wis. 2d 80, ¶22 ("[I]n construing an insurance 
policy as it is understood by a reasonable person in the 
position of the insured, a court may consider the purpose or 
subject matter of the insurance, the situation of the parties, 
and the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract."). 
No.  2012AP2521.ssa 
 
7 
 
Pumping purchased these general liability policies to insure 
their septic business operations.  The insurance companies knew 
the nature of the business these companies are engaged in from 
their company names and probably from information submitted in 
their insurance policy applications.  "Certainly an insured who 
purchases [commercial general liability] insurance expects to be 
covered for ordinary negligence in the course of its insured 
operations."10 
¶87 The fact that "[h]auling, storing, and applying 
septage are activities regulated by both the DNR and the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency" further supports my 
conclusion that Kuettel's and Phil's Pumping were aware of the 
risks of working with septage and thus purchased general 
liability insurance policies to cover their liability for damage 
caused by their septic business operations when an everyday 
activity went slightly but not surprisingly awry.11 
¶88 Thus, a reasonable person in the position of these 
insured septic companies would expect coverage for damage caused 
by septage under a general liability policy it purchased 
precisely in order to cover damage caused by its septic business 
operations.  An insured's reasonable expectations of coverage 
must be honored.  I would not bar coverage. 
                                                 
10 Keggi v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 13 P.3d 785, 
¶29 (Ariz. 2000). 
11 Majority op., ¶43. 
No.  2012AP2521.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶89 The majority opinion is problematic for several 
reasons.   
¶90 First, as I stated previously, the majority opinion 
has an unnecessary discussion of occurrence, an issue that is 
not relevant and was not briefed or argued by the parties.  
¶91 Second, the majority's discussion of occurrence is 
inconsistent with the discussion of occurrence in Wilson Mutual.  
It remains unclear whether this court considers the cause of the 
damage or the damage itself to be the occurrence. 
¶92 The majority opinion suggests that it is taking the 
cause approach.12  The Preislers' complaint alleges negligence in 
the storing and spreading of septage.  Couldn't the causal 
event, and thus the accident for which the insureds seek 
coverage, be the negligent storing or spreading of septage, 
rather than seepage? 
¶93 In her concurring opinion in the instant case, Justice 
Bradley persuasively explains that the majority opinion's 
discussion 
of 
occurrence 
is 
unnecessary, 
internally 
contradictory,13 and inconsistent with Wilson Mutual v. Falk, 
2014 WI 136, ¶32, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  I join 
Justice Bradley's criticism of the majority opinion's discussion 
of "occurrence." 
                                                 
12 Majority op., ¶28. 
13 "It is unclear whether the majority is embarking on a 
cause 
approach 
or 
damage 
approach 
in 
determining 
what 
constitutes an occurrence."  Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶61. 
No.  2012AP2521.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶94 Third, the essence of the majority's analysis is that 
septage becomes a pollutant under the policy when it pollutes.  
Under this reasoning, every substance that pollutes is a 
pollutant.  This reasoning simply begs the question. 
¶95 By contending that a substance becomes a pollutant 
under the policy at the moment the substance contaminates, the 
majority opinion allows the pollution exclusion clause to extend 
far beyond the limited scope we have permitted in our prior 
cases, leading to absurd results. 
¶96 The majority's approach ignores the fact that "there 
is virtually no substance or chemical in existence that would 
not irritate or damage some person or property."14  As this court 
has said again and again, "[t]he reach of the pollution 
exclusion clause must be circumscribed by reasonableness, lest 
the contractual promise of coverage be reduced to a dead 
letter."15 
¶97 Fourth, Wilson Mutual and the instant opinion are 
inconsistent in their test for whether a substance is a 
pollutant under a standard pollution exclusion clause, although 
both look to whether a reasonable person in the position of the 
insured would consider the substance a pollutant. 
                                                 
14 Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 232 (quoting Pipefitters 
Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 
1043 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
15 Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 233. 
No.  2012AP2521.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶98 The instant case simply asks "whether a reasonable 
insured would consider decomposing septage to be a pollutant 
when it seeps into a water supply."16   
¶99 Wilson Mutual sets forth the following two-part test 
for whether a reasonable insured would consider a substance a 
pollutant: 
[A] reasonable insured would consider a substance to 
be a pollutant if (1) the substance is largely 
undesirable and not universally present in the context 
of the occurrence that the insured seeks coverage for; 
and (2) a reasonable insured would consider the 
substance causing the harm involved in the occurrence 
to be a pollutant.17 
¶100 Does the Wilson Mutual two-part test survive the 
opinion in the present case? 
¶101 Fifth, as I have noted, the parties in the instant 
case are here on summary judgment.  If the majority is unwilling 
to 
adhere 
to 
our 
longstanding 
practice 
of 
honoring 
the 
expectations of the reasonable insured, then I would remand the 
case to the circuit court so the parties can produce evidence 
regarding the insureds' expectations of coverage and the 
objective 
reasonableness 
of 
those 
expectations. 
 
Summary 
judgment should not be granted before the parties have that 
opportunity. 
¶102 In sum, I conclude that a reasonable person in the 
position of the insureds, two companies in the business of 
                                                 
16 Majority op., ¶40. 
17 Wilson Mutual v. Falk, 2014 WI 136, ¶38, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___. 
No.  2012AP2521.ssa 
 
11 
 
hauling, storing, and disposing of septage, would not consider 
septage a pollutant under the pollution exclusion clause of 
general liability policies they purchased to cover liability for 
damage caused by their septic business operations. 
¶103 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
No.  2012AP2521.ssa 
 
1