Case Title: Leon M. Reyes v. Greatway Insurance Company

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1997AP001587

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1999-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1587 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Leon M. Reyes,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
v. 
Greatway Insurance Company, a domestic insurance 
corporation,  
 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Aaron S. Rothering,  
 
Defendant-Co-Appellant, 
Cheryl L. Rothering, State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Company, a foreign insurance corporation, Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, a foreign 
insurance corporation, and Wisconsin Department 
of Health and Social Services,  
 
Defendants.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  220 Wis. 2d 285, 582 N.W.2d 480 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 1, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 2, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis J. Flynn/Stephen A. Simanek 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by Chris G. Halverson and Schoone, Fortune, Leuck, 
Kelly & Pitts, S.C., Racine and oral argument by Timothy S. 
Knurr. 
 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
Arthur P. Simpson and Simpson & Deardorff, Milwaukee and oral 
argument by Arthur P. Simpson. 
 
  
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1587  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Leon M. Reyes,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Greatway Insurance Company, a domestic  
insurance corporation,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
Aaron S. Rothering,  
 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant, 
 
Cheryl L. Rothering, State Farm Fire &  
Casualty Company, a foreign insurance  
corporation, Farm Mutual Automobile  
Insurance Company, a foreign insurance  
corporation, and Wisconsin Department of  
Health and Social Services,  
 
          Defendants.  
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   Cheryl Rothering (Cheryl) 
sponsored her minor son Aaron when he applied for his driver's 
license.  A year or so later, while driving his car, Aaron fired 
a shotgun in the direction of Leon Reyes (Reyes), hitting Reyes 
in the face, neck, left hand, right shoulder, and ribs, and 
causing permanent blindness in his left eye.  The issue 
presented in this case is whether Cheryl Rothering is liable 
No. 97-1587  
 
2 
under Wis. Stat. § 343.15(2)(b) (1993-94)1 for the personal 
injuries to Reyes caused by her 17-year-old son shooting the 
victim when he was operating a motor vehicle upon a highway.  
The court of appeals reversed the ruling of the circuit court on 
this issue and held that Cheryl Rothering was not liable under 
the Wisconsin sponsorship statute.2  We affirm.  
FACTS 
¶2 
The principal events in this case occurred October 6, 
1993, on Prospect Street in Racine.  Aaron Rothering (Aaron), 
17, and his friend Marlon Jamison (Jamison) had been together 
most of the day, beginning in the afternoon.  They had visited a 
friend, played video games, "shot some guns in the back yard," 
consumed malt liquor, and driven around town in Aaron's 1988 
Nissan automobile purchased for him by his mother, Cheryl.  In 
the evening, Aaron and Jamison drove around with two shotguns in 
the trunk of the car.  They spotted a group of young people 
congregating on Prospect Street.  They passed the group several 
times in the belief that they had identified members of a rival 
gang.  The two stopped the car some distance away so that they 
could retrieve their shotguns from the trunk.  Then, about 11:15 
p.m., with Aaron driving the car, the two made their way back to 
Prospect Street with the headlights off. 
                     
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-
94 version unless otherwise noted.  
2 Reyes v. Greatway Ins. Co., 220 Wis. 2d 285, 582 N.W.2d 
480 (Ct. App. 1998).  
No. 97-1587  
 
3 
¶3 
Leon Reyes was among the group standing on the 
passenger side of the car when Aaron and Jamison opened fire.  
Three shots were fired, including two from Aaron, at point blank 
range.  Reyes was hit and lay seriously wounded as the Rothering 
car sped away. 
¶4 
Eventually, Aaron Rothering pled guilty as a party to 
the crime of First Degree Reckless Injury3 and six other felony 
charges.  He was sentenced to 27 years in prison for his role in 
the crime.4 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 
Reyes suffered numerous injuries, including total loss 
of vision in his left eye.  On April 18, 1995, he filed suit 
against Aaron Rothering, Cheryl Rothering, three insurance 
companies (Greatway Insurance Company, State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Company, and Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company), 
and the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services.  
Several of his claims were settled or dismissed.5  This case 
                     
3 Wis. Stat. § 940.23(1). 
4 Marlon Jamison received a lengthy prison sentence for his 
part in the shooting.  Reyes, 220 Wis. 2d at 292 n.1. 
5 State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company, and Cheryl Rothering entered into 
a pretrial settlement agreement and were dismissed from the 
action.  In the Release and Settlement Agreement, the parties 
agreed that Reyes' dismissal of the claims against Cheryl, State 
Farm Fire & Casualty Company, and State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company would not compromise Reyes' right to proceed 
against Greatway and/or Aaron to the extent that Cheryl may have 
had liability insurance coverage under the Greatway policy 
issued to Aaron. 
No. 97-1587  
 
4 
concerns Cheryl's alleged imputed liability under the Wisconsin 
sponsorship statute.  Wis. Stat. § 343.15(2)(b). 
¶6 
Greatway Insurance Company (Greatway) issued a policy 
to Aaron.  Reyes asserted that the Greatway policy covered both 
Aaron and his mother as insured persons and that Greatway was 
responsible for covering Cheryl's liability if her son's "wilful 
misconduct" when operating a motor vehicle upon the highway was 
imputed to her under the Wisconsin sponsorship statute. 
¶7 
Greatway moved for summary judgment on four grounds.  
First, Greatway claimed that using a vehicle in a drive-by 
shooting was not a "use" of the vehicle under the policy.  
Second, coverage was excluded because the drive-by shooting was 
an "intentional act by an insured person under the policy."  
Third, sound public policy prevented finding coverage under the 
policy.  Fourth, Cheryl was not "an insured person" under the 
policy. 
¶8 
The circuit court of Racine County, Dennis J. Flynn, 
Judge, denied Greatway's motion.  It held that the policy was 
not ambiguous so that it had to be enforced by the court.  Judge 
Flynn then made several findings about the insurance policy 
coverage.  First, Judge Flynn found that Aaron was "using" the 
car that was insured by Greatway.  Second, he found that there 
were issues of material fact as to Aaron's intent in shooting.  
Third, he found that Cheryl was an insured under the policy, the 
                                                                  
The Wisconsin Department of Health & Social Services 
determined that it was not subrogated to the rights of Reyes, so 
that the department was dismissed from the action. 
No. 97-1587  
 
5 
sponsorship statute, and the omnibus statute.6  Fourth, he 
determined that the intentional acts exclusion in the policy did 
not apply to claims against Cheryl based on her sponsorship of 
Aaron.  Fifth, he held that Wisconsin's omnibus statute required 
the policy to insure Cheryl for Aaron's use of the car.  
Finally, he ruled that Cheryl and Aaron were members of the same 
household, though the facts were in dispute.  Based on these 
findings, Judge Flynn concluded that the Greatway policy covered 
Cheryl for her liability to Reyes. 
¶9 
Reyes moved for summary judgment on the issue of 
Cheryl's liability under the sponsorship statute.  Judge Flynn 
denied his motion, finding an issue of fact as to whether Cheryl 
had canceled her sponsorship.7 
¶10 At this point, the case was assigned to Circuit Judge 
Stephen A. Simanek as a result of judicial rotation.  Cheryl 
moved to be dismissed from the case pursuant to the Release and 
Settlement Agreement.  Judge Simanek dismissed Cheryl, leaving 
Aaron and Greatway as the remaining defendants.  The order for 
dismissal stated that Greatway remained only to the extent of 
liability coverage afforded to Cheryl for the allegations 
against Cheryl and Greatway. 
                     
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(3)(b), states:  "Coverage extends 
to any person legally responsible for the use of the motor 
vehicle." 
7 The court of appeals correctly recognized that "Implicit 
in the trial court's finding is the assumption that the 
sponsorship statute imposed liability on Cheryl for Aaron's 
conduct."  Reyes, 220 Wis. 2d at 292-93 n.3.  
No. 97-1587  
 
6 
¶11 Thereupon, Greatway moved for reconsideration of Judge 
Flynn's order denying Greatway's summary judgment motion.  Judge 
Simanek denied the motion without stating any reasons and the 
case was tried before a jury. 
¶12 The jury found that Aaron had committed an intentional 
tort and awarded Reyes approximately $450,000 plus costs.8  From 
this amount Greatway was ordered to pay $25,000, plus interest 
and costs, a total of $34,432.26, for Cheryl's imputed liability 
in the shooting. 
¶13 Greatway filed motions after verdict seeking several 
orders dismissing the claims against Greatway.  Among other 
things, it reasserted that Aaron's conduct was not "operating a 
motor vehicle upon the highways" under the sponsorship statute. 
 Judge Simanek denied these motions and entered judgment in 
favor of Reyes.  Judge Simanek stated that he did not want to 
review the rulings that his predecessor had made.  In view of 
the rotation system used in Racine County, Judge Simanek 
believed that if the judges were to second guess the preliminary 
rulings of preceding judges, every ruling would continually be 
reconsidered. 
¶14 Greatway appealed.  In an opinion by Judge Richard S. 
Brown, the court of appeals disagreed with both circuit judges 
and reversed, finding no liability for Cheryl Rothering under 
                     
8 The jury unanimously determined that Reyes was entitled to 
damages in the following amounts:  $50,000 for future medical 
expenses; $250,000 for pain and suffering (past and future); and 
$100,000 as punitive damages.  Further, the court found that 
Reyes was entitled to $48,757.81 to cover past medical expenses. 
No. 97-1587  
 
7 
the sponsorship statute for the drive-by shooting of her son.  
Reyes, 220 Wis. 2d at 298.  The court of appeals stated that 
Aaron's liability was not premised on the operation of an 
automobile but on the distinct act of shooting a shotgun into a 
group of people, and thus the conduct fell outside the ambit of 
the sponsorship statute and liability was not imputed to Cheryl. 
 Id. 
¶15 We accepted Reyes' petition for review to determine 
whether a minor's discharge of a gun toward a group of 
pedestrians "when operating a motor vehicle" triggers parental 
liability under Wis. Stat. § 343.15(2)(b). 
ANALYSIS 
¶16 This 
case 
involves 
a 
question 
of 
statutory 
interpretation.  We are called upon to interpret the purpose and 
scope of Wis. Stat. § 343.15, the Wisconsin sponsorship statute, 
to determine whether it reaches a minor operator's drive-by 
shooting.  Statutory interpretation and the application of a set 
of facts to the statute are both questions of law this court 
reviews de novo.  State v. Bodoh, No. 97-0495-CR, op.  at 4  (S. 
Ct. June 18, 1999); Manor v. Hanson, 123 Wis.2d 524, 533, 368 
N.W.2d 41, 45 (1985). 
¶17 The purpose of statutory interpretation is to discern 
the intent of the legislature.  Doe v. American Nat. Red Cross, 
176 Wis. 2d 610, 616, 500 N.W.2d 264 (1993).  To determine this 
intent, the court must first look to the plain language of the 
statute.  Kelley Co., Inc. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 247, 
493 N.W.2d 68 (1992).  If the language of the statute clearly 
No. 97-1587  
 
8 
and unambiguously sets forth the legislative intent, it is the 
duty of the court to apply that intent to the case at hand and 
not look beyond the statutory language to ascertain its meaning. 
 Id.  If the language of the statute does not clearly and 
unambiguously set forth the legislative intent, the court will 
resort to judicial construction.  Id. at 247-48.  Where one of 
several interpretations is possible, the court must ascertain 
the legislative intent from the language of the statute in 
relation to a number of extrinsic factors including the 
legislative object intended to be accomplished.  Kelly Co., 172 
Wis. 2d at 248; Terry v. Mangin Ins. Agency, 105 Wis. 2d 575, 
584, 314 N.W.2d 349 (1982).   
¶18 A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being 
understood by a reasonably well-informed person in either of two 
senses.  Kryshak v. Strigel, 208 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 559 N.W.2d 256 
(1997); Robinson v. Kunach, 76 Wis. 2d 436, 444, 251 N.W.2d 449 
(1977).  Depending on the facts of a case, the same statute may 
be found ambiguous in one setting and unambiguous in another.  
Sauer v. Reliance Ins. Co., 152 Wis. 2d 234, 241, 448 N.W.2d 256 
(Ct. App. 1989); Brandt v. LIRC, 160 Wis. 2d 353, 368, 466 
N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1991). 
¶19 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 343.15(2)(b) 
is 
ambiguous 
in 
relation to the facts of this case.  Section 343.15(2)(b) reads 
as follows: 
 
Any negligence or wilful misconduct of a person under 
the age of 18 years when operating a motor vehicle 
upon the highways is imputed to the parents where both 
have custody and either parent signed as sponsor, 
No. 97-1587  
 
9 
otherwise, it is imputed to the adult sponsor who 
signed the application for such person's license.  The 
parents or the adult sponsor is jointly and severally 
liable with such operator for any damages caused by 
such negligent or wilful misconduct. 
In short, a parent is liable for a minor child's "negligence or 
wilful misconduct . . . when operating a motor vehicle." 
 
¶20 In oral argument before this court, counsel for both 
parties argued that the statute was not ambiguous.  We disagree, 
with respect to these facts. 
¶21 The operative phrase is "when operating a motor 
vehicle."  This phrase may be interpreted to apply only to the 
operation of a motor vehicle, or it may be interpreted to apply 
to conduct that occurs during the operation of a motor vehicle. 
 One 
is 
a narrow 
interpretation; 
the 
other 
is a 
broad 
interpretation. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
adopted 
the 
broad 
interpretation.  The court of appeals settled on the narrow 
interpretation. 
 
A 
reasonably 
well-informed 
person 
could 
understand the statute in either sense.  That demonstrates the 
ambiguity. 
¶22 When statutory language is found to be ambiguous this 
court examines the scope, history, context, subject matter, and 
object of the statute to discern the intent of the legislature. 
 Swatek v. County of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 47, 58, 531 N.W.2d 45 
(1995).  We must therefore look beyond the plain language of the 
statute. 
HISTORY OF § 343.15(2)(b) 
¶23 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.15(2)(b) has its roots in the 
Uniform Motor Vehicle Operators' and Chauffeurs' License Act 
No. 97-1587  
 
10
which was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws in 1926.  Section 9 of the Uniform Act 
provided that a state motor vehicle licensing agency should "not 
grant the application of any minor under the age of eighteen 
years for an operator's license unless such application is 
signed by the father of the applicant" or some other sponsor.  
Section 22 of the Act further provided: 
 
SECTION 22.  [When Parent, Guardian or Employer Liable 
for Negligence of Minor.] 
 
 
Any negligence of a minor under the age of 
eighteen years licensed upon application signed as 
provided in Section 9, when driving any motor vehicle 
upon a highway, shall be imputed to the person who 
shall have signed the application of such minor for 
said license, which person shall be jointly and 
severally liable, with such minor, for any damages 
caused by such negligence. (Emphasis supplied). 
¶24 Wisconsin first passed a sponsorship statute at a 
special session of the legislature in March of 1928.  Ch. 1, 2nd 
Spl. S. 1928.  The legislature did not adopt the Uniform Act per 
se but incorporated some of its principles.  The law authorized 
the issuance of automobile driver's licenses to children less 
than sixteen but above fourteen years of age.  The law permitted 
a minor to drive during daylight hours in an automobile 
belonging to the minor's parent or guardian.  Then it said:  
"The parent or guardian shall at all times be responsible for 
any and all damages growing out of the negligent operation of a 
motor vehicle by any such child."  Wis. Stat. § 85.08(1a) (1929) 
(emphasis supplied). 
No. 97-1587  
 
11
¶25 The Uniform Motor Vehicle Operators' and Chauffeurs' 
License Act was eventually adopted by 18 states.  But in 1943, 
the Act was withdrawn as obsolete.  At its annual meeting, the 
National Conference said "It is apparent that conditions and 
safeguards relative to the automobile and its use, as well as 
conditions governing traffic on the highways, have changed 
materially since 1926."  Handbook of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings of the 
Fifty-Third Annual Conference (1943) at p. 69. 
¶26 The other reason the Act was withdrawn was that the 
Bureau of Roads of the United States Department of Agriculture 
had revised the language of the Act and issued a new draft in 
its place.9  This new code, containing many similarities to the 
old Act, was adopted by Wisconsin in 1941.10  The section that is 
relevant to this case was taken nearly verbatim from the federal 
model.  After the change, Wis. Stat. § 85.08(9)(b) (1941-42) 
read: 
                     
9 The 
1943 
Handbook 
of 
the 
National 
Conference 
of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws refers to the activities of 
the Bureau of Roads on page 69.  The drafting files for Assembly 
Bill 457, which led to the 1941 law, contain the following note: 
 "This measure was prepared in tentative draft form before the 
session by C.N. Maurer of the highway safety division, Motor 
Vehicle Department.  The draft is based on the Uniform Motor 
Vehicle Operators' and Chauffeurs' License Act (1939) and 
Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (1934) prepared 
and recommended by the Bureau of Roads, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture."  The text of the pertinent section is taken from 
section 14(b) of this Uniform Motor Vehicle Operators' and 
Chauffeurs' License Act.  
10 Ch. 206, Laws of 1941.    
No. 97-1587  
 
12
 
Any negligence or wilful misconduct of a person under 
the age of 16 years when operating a motor vehicle 
upon the highways shall be imputed to the person who 
signed the application of such person for a permit or 
license, which person shall be jointly and severally 
liable for such operator for any damages caused by 
such negligent or wilful misconduct. . . .  (emphasis 
supplied). 
 
¶27 The operative phrase in the present statute"when 
operating a motor vehicle upon the highway"has been part of our 
law since 1941 and is very similar to the phrase in the original 
Uniform Act from 1926"when driving any motor vehicle upon a 
highway." 
¶28 This statutory history shows several things.  First, 
Wisconsin clearly limited the imputed liability of a parent to a 
minor's negligent "operation of a motor vehicle" when the law 
was enacted in 1928.  Second, when the law was changed in 1941, 
the legislature adopted language suggested by the federal Bureau 
of Roads as part of a revision of our statute.  The legislature 
did not itself set out to alter fundamental policy.  There is no 
evidence that the slight change in language that resulted from 
the revision was intended to expand the scope of the statute to 
cover criminal conduct incidental to the operation of a motor 
vehicle.  Third, the language being construed was included in 
the statutes of other states.  We have not found authority from 
other jurisdictions supporting the broad interpretation of the 
language suggested by Reyes.  See David B. Sweet, Annotation, 
Construction 
and 
Effect 
of 
Statutes 
Which 
Make 
Parent, 
Custodian, or Other Person Signing Minor's Application For 
No. 97-1587  
 
13
Vehicle Operator's License Liable For Licensee's Negligence or 
Willful Misconduct, 45 A.L.R.4th 87 (1986). 
PARENTAL LIABILITY AT COMMON LAW 
 
¶29 At common law, parents were not liable for the torts 
of their children.  Bankert v. Threshermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 110 
Wis. 2d 469, 473, 329 N.W.2d 150 (1983); Kumba v. Gilham, 103 
Wis. 312, 315, 79 N.W. 325 (1899); Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 
1971), sec. 123; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and Child § 130 (1971).11 
 This court has often said that statutes enacted in derogation 
of the common law should be strictly construed.  State ex rel. 
Chain O'Lakes P. Asso. V. Moses, 53 Wis. 2d 579, 583, 193 N.W.2d 
708 (1972); Leach v. Leach, 261 Wis. 350, 357, 52 N.W.2d 896 
(1952). 
 
¶30 When Reyes brought suit against Cheryl Rothering, he 
sought claims under both the sponsorship statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.15(2)(b), and Wis. Stat. § 895.035, two parental liability 
statutes in derogation of the common law. 
                     
11 "There is no common-law liability of a parent or other 
custodian of a minor for the negligence or wilful misconduct of 
the latter while driving a motor vehicle."  L. S. Tellier, 
Annotation, Construction and Effect of Statutes Which Make 
Parent, Custodian, or Other Person Signing Minor's Application 
for Vehicle Operator's License Liable for Licensee's Negligence 
or Wilful Misconduct, 26 A.L.R.2d 1320, 1321 (1952).  See also 
David B. Sweet, Annotation, Construction and Effect of Statutes 
Which Make Parent, Custodian, or Other Person Signing Minor's 
Application For Vehicle Operator's License Liable For Licensee's 
Negligence or Willful Misconduct, 45 A.L.R.4th 87, 96 (1986) 
("At common law, parents are not generally liable for the torts 
of their minor children . . ."). 
No. 97-1587  
 
14
 
¶31 Wisconsin Stat. §  895.035(2) makes parents liable for 
personal injury and property damage caused by their minor 
children in any circumstances in which the parents or the 
children would not be liable at common law.  This court reviewed 
that statute in N.E.M. v. Strigel, 208 Wis. 2d 1, 6-7, 559 
N.W.2d 
256 
(1997), 
saying 
"We 
must 
strictly 
construe 
§ 895.035(4) because it is in derogation of the common law." 
 
¶32 We 
think 
the 
same 
principle 
applies 
to 
§ 343.15(2)(b).12  A statute imputing a minor's negligence or 
wilful misconduct to a parent should be strictly construed, not 
to negate any manifest purpose of the legislature in enacting 
the statute but rather to honor the specific purpose of the 
legislature in enacting the statute.  Construing § 343.15(2)(b) 
to reach a drive-by shooting would not be a strict construction 
of the statute. 
LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE 
 
¶33 The legislative purpose of the sponsorship statute has 
been discussed in a number of Wisconsin cases.  From the outset 
in 1928, the statute has required a minor driver to secure an 
adult sponsor before obtaining a license.  The legislature "was 
concerned with the hazards of negligently operated motor 
vehicles and with the desirability of imposing liability on a 
dependable adult who could pay for damages caused by a negligent 
                     
12 In Bilsten v. Porter, 516 P.2d 656, 657 (Col. Ct. App. 
1973), the court said a similar Colorado statute was "in 
derogation of common law, and is therefore to be strictly 
construed."  
No. 97-1587  
 
15
minor driver."  Swanigan v. State Farm Ins. Co., 99 Wis. 2d 179, 
192, 299 N.W.2d 234 (1980).  To "protect the public from damage 
caused by the negligent operation of vehicles by youthful 
drivers,"  Employers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Haucke, 267 Wis. 72, 
75, 64 N.W.2d 426 (1954), the legislature thought it was 
important to look for security in persons other than the minor. 
 Ynocenio v. Fesko, 114 Wis. 2d 391, 398-99, 338 N.W.2d 461 
(1983).13  Parents are generally the people in the best position 
to have personal knowledge of a minor's characteristics as well 
as the opportunity to exercise some degree of control over a 
minor's driving.  Mikaelian v. Woyak, 121 Wis. 2d 581, 594-95, 
360 N.W.2d 706 (Ct. App. 1984).  Presumably, parents are in a 
position to act quickly to withdraw their sponsorship if a minor 
child shows signs of irresponsibility.  They have an incentive 
to do so because the liability imputed to them is very strict, 
and there is no limit on the liability imposed.  Id. at 598. 
 
¶34 Wisconsin Stat. §  343.15(2)(b) has been part of the 
licensing portion of the motor vehicle code for seven decades.  
The scope of the statute has been discussed in two previous 
cases.  In the Haucke case, a minor driver stole a vehicle and 
wrecked it while attempting to escape capture.  This court was 
asked whether the fact that the alleged negligent acts and 
wilful misconduct happened during the commission of a crime 
absolved the sponsor from liability under the sponsorship 
                     
13 Juveniles "generally lack adequate finances to cover any 
potential damage they may cause."  Mikaelian v. Woyak, 121 Wis. 
2d 581, 594, 360 N.W.2d 706 (Ct. App. 1984).  
No. 97-1587  
 
16
statute.  The court recognized that the action was based not on 
the theft of the vehicle but on the negligent operation of a 
vehicle which resulted in damage.  Haucke, 267 Wis. at 74.  We 
also stated: 
 
There is no imputation of criminal conduct to the 
father in holding him liable for his son's negligence 
when the damage results from that negligence while the 
son is driving a stolen car.  The statute merely 
imputes to the father the negligence and wilful 
misconduct of the minor driver.  Had the legislature 
intended 
that 
there 
should be 
no responsibility 
because of criminal acts, it could have said that.  
Not having done so, it seems plain that the negligent 
acts of the minor must be imputed to the sponsor in 
claims arising out of such negligent acts, regardless 
of whether the automobile is stolen or is being 
operated with consent. 
Id. at 75. 
¶35 In Mikaelian, a 17-year-old minor driver and his adult 
brother engaged in a drag race on the highway.  Both ran a stop 
sign and collided with another vehicle, killing an adult and 
child and causing severe injuries to others in the struck 
vehicle.  Both brothers were found negligent, and since one was 
a minor, the minor's parents were held vicariously liable under 
§ 343.15(2).  The minor's parents challenged the sponsorship 
statute on constitutional grounds and filed other objections to 
the verdict.  The court stated: 
 
The legislature's reluctance to allow juveniles to 
drive is understandable.  Operation of a motor vehicle 
is a skill involving mental discretion as well as 
physical dexterity.  We take notice of the Wisconsin 
motor 
vehicle 
statistics 
in 
the 
past 
years 
to 
underline the point that juveniles generally do not 
possess mental discretion to the same degree as an 
No. 97-1587  
 
17
adult and, consequently, present a greater risk on 
Wisconsin highways. 
Mikaelian, 121 Wis. 2d at 594. 
 
¶36 The author of the court of appeals decision in Reyes, 
Judge Richard S. Brown, was also the author of the opinion in 
Mikaelian.  In Reyes, Judge Brown reconciled the two cases and 
set out a logical rationale for the statute.  Under the 
sponsorship statute, if parents believe their children can 
shoulder the responsibility of driving sensibly, then they must 
assume the risk of their decision being wrong.  Reyes, 220 Wis. 
2d at 295.  The parents or parent sign a legal document of 
sponsorship.  This is the conduct upon which potential liability 
is predicatedthe parents' voluntary conduct in allowing their 
children to drive.  Id.  Citing the Haucke case, Judge Brown 
noted that under the sponsorship statute, "liability does not 
depend on either consent of the owner or knowledge of the 
parents with respect to the operation of an automobile by a 
minor."  Id. at 296.  The father's liability in Haucke was 
"based not on the theft" of the car by his son "but on the 
child's negligent operation of the car."  Id.  In Reyes: 
 
Aaron's operation of the motor vehicle on the highway 
did not cause any damage.  We are not confronted with 
a case in which Aaron's negligent or reckless driving 
injured others.  Nor are we faced with a circumstance 
where a minor intentionally or willfully used a car as 
a weapon to injure another person or another person's 
property.  Instead, Aaron's liability is predicated on 
his 
distinct 
act 
of 
intentionally 
discharging 
a 
shotgun into a group of people, thereby injuring 
Reyes. 
 
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This factual distinction between the case at bar and 
[Haucke] and Mikaelian is important because it defines 
the scope of parental (or a sponsor's) liability under 
the 
sponsorship 
statute. 
. 
. 
. 
 
[U]nder 
the 
sponsorship statute, if parents allow their children 
to drive, the risk they assume is that the child's 
driving will cause damage, and, as a consequence, they 
are liable for the child's negligent or intentionally 
reckless driving. . . .  Therefore, in [the two cases 
cited], the children's conduct fell within the scope 
of parental liability under the statute because it was 
their negligent or reckless operation of an automobile 
that caused the damage. 
Id. at 296-97 (citation omitted). 
 
¶37 The decisions in Haucke and Mikaelian are entirely 
consistent with a legislative purpose to protect the public from 
damages caused by a minor's operation of a motor vehicle.  This 
was the problem contemplated by the legislature.  This was the 
risk assumed by the sponsors.  Construing the statute to cover 
damages from intentional criminal activity unrelated to driving 
but committed while a minor is operating a motor vehicle, goes 
well 
beyond 
the 
scope 
of 
the 
statute 
intended 
by 
the 
legislature. 
 
¶38 Reyes points to a line of cases that arguably suggest 
a different result.  He cites Thompson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 161 Wis. 2d 450, 468 N.W.2d 436 (1991), and Kemp v. 
Feltz, 174 Wis. 2d 406, 497 N.W.2d 751 (Ct. App. 1993), two 
cases involving deer hunters who fired their weapons from motor 
vehicles. 
 
¶39 In the Thompson case, a man named Yndestad owned a 
pickup truck.  Yndestad was a hunter with a physical disability. 
 During hunting season, he parked his truck near an open field, 
No. 97-1587  
 
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left his cab, and sat on the floor of the bed of the truck.  
When he saw deer, he fired two rifle shots, one of which 
traveled some 500 yards, past the deer and on to a state highway 
where it killed Lester Thompson.  Yndestad had automobile 
insurance and Thompson had automobile insurance.  Yndestad's 
insurance was not sufficient to cover Thompson's damages.  The 
issue, as defined by the court, was this:  Did the accidental 
shooting of a passing motorist by a disabled deer hunter sitting 
in the bed of his pickup truck and possessing a permit under 
state law which authorized him to shoot or hunt from a 
stationary vehicle, "arise out of" the "use" of the truck, as 
required in the insurance policy?  Thompson, 161 Wis. 2d at 452.  
 
¶40 In Kemp v. Feltz, two hunters, Feltz and Hudspeth, 
jumped into a pickup truck to pursue several deer.  They 
illegally fired shots from the truck at the deer who were 
running in a field along the highway.  Kemp was in the field 
dressed in blaze orange.  The hunters did not see him.  One of 
their stray bullets struck Kemp.  The issue was whether the 
automobile insurance policy for the pickup truck covered the 
illegal "use" of the truck which caused injury to Kemp.  Kemp, 
174 Wis. 2d at 410-11. 
 
¶41 Both cases involved insurance policies.  Both cases 
involved an adult policy holder who was either a perpetrator or 
a victim of tragic negligence.  Neither case made any reference 
to Wis. Stat. § 343.15(2).  Insurance contracts are broadly 
worded and are usually construed liberally in favor of coverage. 
 The construction is different for statutes that are enacted in 
No. 97-1587  
 
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derogation of the common law.  Because we construe § 343.15(2) 
narrowly, we find the two deer cases inapposite to the present 
facts. 
ABSURD RESULTS 
 
¶42 Courts are obligated to construe statutes in a manner 
that avoids absurd results.  Peters v. Menard, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 
174, 189, 589 N.W.2d 395 (1999); Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper 
Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 636, 547 N.W.2d 602 (1996); Swatek, 192 
Wis. 2d at 58; Ann M.M. v. Rob S., 176 Wis. 2d 673, 679, 500 
N.W.2d 649 (1993). 
 
¶43 If we adopted Reyes' interpretation of the statute, it 
could lead to absurd results.  If the statute were interpreted 
to include crimes committed "when operating a motor vehicle upon 
the highways"i.e., crimes committed while a minor is operating 
the motor vehiclethere is almost no limit to the scope of the 
statute.  One can think of hypotheticals involving sexual 
assault, kidnapping, arson, robbery, bomb threats, fraud, and 
disorderly conduct by car phone while a minor is operating a 
motor vehicle, partly because the "operating" can mean as little 
as sitting in the driver's seat with the engine running.  For 
instance, a minor boy can commit a sexual assault on an underage 
girl in an automobile, even in a relatively public place like a 
drive-in movie.  A lot of controlled substances are sold out of 
cars with the engines running, leading to unpredictable results, 
even death. 
 
¶44 Counsel for Reyes candidly recognized that bizarre 
situations could fall within his interpretation of the statute. 
No. 97-1587  
 
21
 Hence, he asked us to impose a limiting construction to 
foreclose absurd consequences.  Yet, courts begin to construe 
statutes only when they are ambiguous.  This is opposite of 
counsel's contention that the statute is not ambiguous. 
 
¶45 Reyes depends in his argument on a particular literal 
reading of the sponsorship statute.  He contends that the 
statute imputes the wilful misconduct of a minor (such as a 
shooting) to parents "when [the minor is] operating a motor 
vehicle upon the highways."  In that situation, parental 
liability could amount to hundreds of thousands of dollars.  
However, if the minor driver stopped the car, turned off the 
ignition, and got out of the car before shooting, then 
apparently the parent would be liable under Wis. Stat. § 895.035 
onlyand the liability would be limited to the amount attainable 
in a small claims action. § 895.035(4).  As public policy, this 
makes no sense. 
CONCLUSION 
¶46 In sum, 
based 
on 
strict 
construction, 
statutory 
history, prior case law defining the legislative purpose of Wis. 
Stat. § 343.15(2), and the maxim that a court should avoid 
absurd results when interpreting a statute, we conclude that 
when a minor discharges a firearm toward a group of pedestrians 
while driving a motor vehicle on the highway, the minor's 
conduct 
does 
not 
fall 
within 
the 
terms 
of 
Wisconsin's 
sponsorship statute.  Wisconsin's sponsorship statute was not 
meant 
to 
impose 
liability 
on 
parents 
for 
their 
child's 
No. 97-1587  
 
22
participation in a drive-by shooting.  Therefore, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
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