Case Title: Mark Vidal and Jerome Tork v. Labor and Industry Review Commission

Citation: 2002 WI 72

Docket Number: 2000AP003548

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 72 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-3548 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Mark Vidal and Jerome Tork d/b/a Buena Vista 
Berries and Commercial Union Insurance Company,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
Labor and Industry Review Commission,  
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
William Guden,  
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 25, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 6, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Steven D. Ebert   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs by Daniel 
L. Zitzer, Joseph Berger and Otjen, Van Ert, Lieb & Weir, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Daniel L. Zitzer. 
 
For the defendant-respondent the cause was argued by 
Stephen M. Sobota, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 72 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-3548  
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 1372) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Mark Vidal and Jerome Tork d/b/a Buena  
Vista Berries and Commercial Union  
Insurance Company,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
William Guden,  
 
          Defendant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 25, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Dane 
County, Steven Ebert, Circuit Court Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Appellants Mark Vidal and 
Jerome Tork d/b/a Buena Vista Berries and Commercial Union 
Insurance Company (collectively "Buena Vista") appeal a circuit 
court decision that held that, within the state's worker's 
compensation system, only those orders granting or denying 
compensation are subject to judicial review.  The orders from 
which Buena Vista appealed did not grant or deny compensation.  
No. 
00-3548   
 
2 
 
Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed Buena Vista's action 
seeking judicial review.   
¶2 
We 
affirm. 
 
Under 
Wis. Stat. § 102.23(1)(a)(1999-
2000),1 judicial review is available only from an order or award 
                                                 
1 This statute states in relevant part:   
102.23 Judicial review.  (1) (a) The findings of fact 
made by the commission acting within its powers shall, 
in the absence of fraud, be conclusive.  The order or 
award 
granting 
or 
denying 
compensation, 
either 
interlocutory or final, whether judgment has been 
rendered on it or not, is subject to review only as 
provided in this section and not under ch. 227 or s. 
801.02.  Within 30 days after the date of an order or 
award made by the commission either originally or 
after the filing of a petition for review with the 
department under s. 102.18 any party aggrieved thereby 
may . . . commence, in circuit court, an action 
against the commission for the review of the order or 
award, in which action the adverse party shall also be 
made a defendant.  
. . . . 
(e) Upon such hearing, the court may confirm or 
set aside such order or award; and any judgment which 
may theretofore have been rendered thereon; but the 
same shall be set aside only upon the following 
grounds: 
1. 
That the commission acted without or in 
excess of its powers. 
2. 
That the order or award was procured by 
fraud. 
3. 
That the findings of fact by the commission 
do not support the order or award. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
 
No. 
00-3548   
 
3 
 
granting or denying compensation.  Judicial review by common law 
certiorari is not available for Buena Vista in this case 
because, as we discuss below, Buena Vista is not foreclosed from 
obtaining future judicial review of its claim that the Labor and 
Industry Review Commission (LIRC) failed to act within the 
statutory time limitations.  This claim may be reviewed in a 
circuit court action seeking judicial review of any subsequent 
order or award granting or denying compensation in this case.  
This method provides adequate review.   
I 
¶3 
William Guden (Guden) sustained a back injury while 
working for Buena Vista, a cranberry grower in Wisconsin Rapids.  
Guden subsequently filed an application for a hearing with the 
Worker's Compensation Division of the Wisconsin Department of 
Workforce Development.  After a hearing, an administrative law 
judge (ALJ) issued a decision and order on the application.  The 
ALJ concluded that Guden sustained a compensable back injury, 
that Guden was temporarily and totally disabled from April 7 to 
July 
29, 
1995, 
and 
received 
all 
temporary 
disability 
compensation to which he was entitled, that Guden did not 
sustain any permanent disability as a result of that injury, and 
that various medical expenses incurred by Guden on or prior to 
August 22, 1995, were reasonable and necessary.   
¶4 
After this decision, Guden filed a petition for review 
with LIRC.  He argued that the ALJ erred by failing to find that 
he incurred a permanent partial disability, by failing to find 
that he incurred a vocational impairment, and by failing to 
No. 
00-3548   
 
4 
 
order payment of additional medical and chiropractic expenses 
incurred by the applicant.   
¶5 
On March 5, 1999, LIRC affirmed and adopted the ALJ's 
findings and order.   
¶6 
Nearly a year later, on Friday, March 3, 2000, at 4:38 
p.m., Guden transmitted to LIRC by facsimile a "Petition to Set 
Aside Previous Decision."  It stated in part: 
[A] new record of treatment from the University of 
Wisconsin Hospital and Clinic shows objective trauma, 
injury 
and 
significant 
treatment, 
culminating 
in 
spinal surgery in November of 1999.  Attached hereto 
and incorporated herein is a partial record of UW 
Hospital and Clinics establishing the opinion of Dr. 
James W. Leonard, D.O. which establishes that Mr. 
Guden has a pre-existing L5 spondylolysis. . . .  
Based upon this opinion, a L4-S1 anterior spinal 
fusion was performed by Dr. Clifford B. Tribus. 
Based upon this information, applicant petitions 
the commission to set aside the previous orders and 
remand this matter for further proceedings.    
¶7 
On Monday, March 6, 2000, LIRC received Guden's 
petition by first class mail.  On that same date, LIRC issued a 
decision, setting aside, on a provisional basis, its March 5, 
1999 decision.  The decision stated in full: 
On March 5, 1999, the commission issued a decision in 
this matter affirming the October 2, 1998 decision of 
an administrative law judge for the department of 
workforce development.  At 4:38 p.m. on Friday, March 
3, 2000, the applicant transmitted a "petition to set 
aside previous decision," which the commission also 
received by first class mail on March 6, 2000. 
Under Wis. Stat. § 102.18(4), the commission may set 
aside any final order within one year from the date 
No. 
00-3548   
 
5 
 
thereof upon grounds of mistake or newly discovered 
evidence, pending further consideration.2   
Given the constraints of time, the commission believes 
the 
fairest 
way 
to 
deal 
with 
the 
applicant's 
submission is to note its probable jurisdiction on the 
grounds of newly discovered evidence and set aside its 
previous decision.  The commission reserves the right, 
however, to reinstate its decision, if upon further 
consideration, 
it 
determines 
the 
applicant's 
submission 
in 
fact 
does 
not 
constitute 
newly 
discovered evidence, or if it does not warrant further 
consideration under Wis. Stat. § 102.18(4).   
¶8 
On March 17, 2000, Buena Vista requested that LIRC 
reinstate the March 5, 1999 order affirming the hearing 
examiner's decision.3   
                                                 
2 This statute states in relevant part: 
102.18 Findings, orders and awards. 
. . . . 
(4)(c) On its own motion, for reasons it deems 
sufficient, the commission may set aside any final 
order or award of the commission or examiner within 
one year after the date of the order or award, upon 
grounds of mistake or newly discovered evidence, and, 
after further consideration, do any of the following: 
1. 
Affirm, reverse or modify, in whole or in 
part, the order or award. 
2. 
Reinstate the previous order or award. 
3. 
Remand the 
case 
to 
the 
department for 
further proceedings. 
3 A March 17, 2000 letter from Buena Vista argued in part: 
The Administrative Law Judge and the Commission 
have had the benefit of the hearing transcript, copies 
of all the previous filed exhibits, and there is no 
new evidence presented here, other than the fact that 
a physician chooses to perform surgery while numerous 
other physicians believe the applicant either was not 
No. 
00-3548   
 
6 
 
¶9 
LIRC subsequently issued a decision on April 28, 2000, 
concluding that the evidence put forth by Guden in his petition 
constituted newly discovered evidence.  It therefore ordered its 
March 5, 1999 decision to remain set aside and remanded the 
matter to the Division of Worker's Compensation for further 
hearings.   
¶10 In response, Buena Vista filed a complaint against 
LIRC and Guden in the Dane County Circuit Court, seeking relief 
under two causes of action.  First, it asked the court to review 
and set aside LIRC's March 6, 2000 and April 28, 2000 orders 
based on Wis. Stat. § 102.23.  It asserted that LIRC "acted 
without or in excess of its powers (a) in finding that it had 
jurisdiction to set aside the previous order of the Commission 
dated March 5, 1999, and (b) in finding there existed newly 
discovered evidence such that the order of March 5, 1999 was set 
aside pursuant to § 102.18(4)(c) Stats."  Second, it asked the 
court to review and set aside LIRC's orders based on common law 
certiorari.  It asserted that LIRC "acted without or in excess 
of its jurisdictional authority granted by the legislature and 
in violation of the provisions of Chapter 102, Stats., by 
                                                                                                                                                             
a 
surgical 
candidate, 
or 
that 
he 
was 
simply 
malingering for purposes of secondary gain.   
. . . . 
Therefore, respondents respectfully request that 
the Labor & Industry Review Commission reinstate its 
previous decision of March 5, 1999, and once and for 
all close the books on this case. 
No. 
00-3548   
 
7 
 
setting aside its order dated March 5, 1999 in a period of time 
in excess of one year after the date of the Order."   
¶11 LIRC moved to dismiss the complaint.  It argued in 
part that, in view of Wis. Stat. § 102.23(1)(a), Buena Vista's 
complaint must be dismissed because LIRC's April 28, 2000 order 
did not constitute an order "granting or denying compensation," 
as required under the statute.  The parties subsequently entered 
into a stipulation and order that dismissed Buena Vista's claim 
under § 102.23.  The common law certiorari claim remained.4   
¶12 Soon thereafter, the circuit court, the Honorable 
Steven Ebert presiding, issued a decision dismissing the common 
law certiorari claim.  Noting that judicial review was provided 
                                                 
4 In this stipulation, the circuit court ordered as follows: 
 
Upon 
reading 
and 
filing 
of 
the 
foregoing 
Stipulation, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
1. 
Because the Orders of the Labor & Industry 
Review Commission dated March 6, 2000 and April 28, 
2000 are not Orders which grant or deny compensation, 
they are not appealable orders under the provisions of 
§ 102.23, Wis. Stats.   
2. 
The plaintiffs do not have and never had a 
right to appeal the Orders of the Labor & Industry 
Review Commission dated March 6, 2000 and April 28, 
2000 under the provisions of § 102.23, Wis. Stats.   
3. 
The 
plaintiffs 
first 
claim 
for 
relief . . . is hereby dismissed, on the merits, and 
without costs to any party. 
4. 
This Order has no effect on the plaintiff's 
second 
claim 
for 
relief, 
for 
Review 
of 
the 
Administrative Action of the Labor & Industry Review 
Commission by common law certiorari.   
No. 
00-3548   
 
8 
 
for LIRC decisions under Wis. Stat. § 102.23(1)(a), the court 
addressed "whether this statutory remedy is indeed exclusive, or 
whether common-law certiorari is available as an extraordinary 
remedy for review."  The court concluded that common law 
certiorari was not available to Buena Vista in this instance.  
It stated that "§ 102.23, Wis. Stats., clearly indicates what 
type of order may be reviewed by this court [that is, one that 
grants or denies compensation].  And the orders of LIRC in this 
case do not meet that requirement."  As a result, the court 
concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review 
LIRC's March 6, 2000 and April 28, 2000 orders, and therefore, 
it granted LIRC's motion to dismiss.  Buena Vista appealed. 
¶13 The court of appeals certified the appeal to this 
court.  The court presented the following certified issue:  
"[w]hether common law certiorari is available to review a claim 
that the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) had no 
jurisdiction to enter an order when there is no right to review 
provided by statute."  The court stated its reasons for 
certification as follows:   
We conclude that the resolution of whether the 
LIRC's order may be reviewed by common law certiorari 
turns 
on 
policy 
considerations 
as 
much 
as 
on 
reconciling arguably conflicting precedents.  Some 
policy reasons may be cited in favor of prohibiting 
judicial review of certain administrative orders.  
Prohibiting judicial review may be said to foster 
effective administrative agencies, provide a system of 
speedy justice for compensation claims, ensure the 
finality of agency determinations, help establish 
orderly 
judicial 
processes, 
avoid 
protracted 
litigation and conserve judicial resources.  However, 
there are also significant policy considerations that 
No. 
00-3548   
 
9 
 
would favor allowing judicial review by certiorari in 
extraordinary cases.  Doing so promotes fairness and 
provides a judicial "check" on the LIRC when it is 
alleged to have exceeded its statutory powers.  
Because 
there 
are 
compelling 
policy 
reasons 
supporting both positions in this appeal, and because 
the precedents are arguably in conflict, we conclude 
the supreme court is the most appropriate forum in 
which to resolve the issues raised in this appeal. 
II 
¶14 We restate the certified issue.  The issue presented 
is whether common law certiorari may be utilized in this case to 
obtain judicial review of two LIRC orders——which collectively 
set aside and remanded a compensation order——when it is alleged 
that LIRC failed to properly issue these orders within the time 
limitations set by statute.  Whether the circuit court may 
review such orders by common law certiorari is a question of the 
circuit court's jurisdiction, which is a question of law that we 
decide de novo.  See Gomez v. LIRC, 153 Wis. 2d 686, 689, 451 
N.W.2d 475 (Ct. App. 1989).  We conclude that Buena Vista may 
not utilize common law certiorari to gain judicial review of the 
orders at issue in this case.  
¶15 "The circuit court has only such power to review 
orders and awards of the commission as are conferred by 
provisions in the compensation act; and unless an authorized 
action is commenced within the time and in the manner prescribed 
by the act, no jurisdiction is acquired by the circuit court."  
Rathjen v. Indus. Comm'n, 233 Wis. 452, 457-58, 289 N.W. 618 
(1940) (citations omitted); see also Wichman v. Indus. Comm'n, 
237 Wis. 13, 14, 296 N.W. 78 (1941); Albion v. Indus. Comm'n, 
No. 
00-3548   
 
10 
 
202 Wis. 15, 19, 231 N.W. 249 (1930); Booth Fisheries Co. v. 
Indus. Comm'n, 185 Wis. 127, 134, 200 N.W. 775 (1924).  In other 
words, the circuit court only has jurisdiction to review LIRC 
orders and awards as authorized by statute, and any review 
sought must be commenced according to statute.  We look to 
Wis. Stat. § 102.23(1)(a), which provides that orders or awards 
granting or denying compensation are subject to review through a 
circuit court action, following the procedure under the statute.  
¶16 Here, Buena Vista seeks review of two LIRC orders, 
which, 
following 
Wis. Stat. § 102.18(4)(c), 
set 
aside 
a 
compensation order and remanded the case for further hearings.  
There is no dispute that the orders are not orders "granting or 
denying compensation."  Therefore, they are not subject to 
review as provided under Wis. Stat. § 102.23(1)(a).     
¶17 In its action, however, Buena Vista's claims are based 
on the contention that LIRC acted outside of its jurisdiction by 
failing to issue the set aside and remand order "within one 
year," as required under Wis. Stat. § 102.18(4).  Buena Vista 
contends that LIRC issued the March 6, 2000 order one day too 
late because the compensation order was issued on March 5, 1999.  
In addition, it alleges that, under the March 6, 2000 order, 
LIRC illegally extended the one-year time limitation under 
§ 102.18(4) by provisionally, rather than conclusively, setting 
aside the compensation order within the one-year time period.  
Buena Vista argues that LIRC did not make an actual decision to 
set aside the compensation order until April 28, 2000——well 
after the one-year deadline had expired.  It now asserts that it 
No. 
00-3548   
 
11 
 
will never be able to obtain review of such jurisdictional 
issues if it cannot obtain immediate review of this order in the 
circuit court.  We conclude otherwise.   
¶18 Our conclusion is based primarily on the holding and 
reasoning 
in 
Schneider 
Fuel 
& 
Supply 
Co. 
v. 
Industrial 
Commission, 224 Wis. 298, 272 N.W. 25 (1937), where this court 
held that an objection to the timeliness of a set aside order 
could be reviewed, but this review would occur in an action 
brought on a subsequent award or denial of compensation in the 
case.  In Schneider Fuel, after affirming a compensation order 
issued by the examiner, the commission set aside the order and 
ordered the matter to be scheduled for further hearings based on 
the finding that a mistake had been made.  Id. at 299-300.  
Before the hearing occurred, the employer commenced an action in 
circuit court, raising two objections:  "(1) that the commission 
was without jurisdiction to enter the order . . . because more 
than twenty days had elapsed subsequent to the date of the 
examiners' findings and award, sec. 102.18(4), Stats. and (2) 
that under the provisions of section 102.18(4) the commission 
had no authority to set aside its order, findings, or award 
unless within twenty days from the date thereof it discovered an 
actual mistake in its findings or award."  Id. at 300.  The 
court 
denied 
review 
of 
the 
claims, 
concluding 
that 
the 
employer's commencement of the action was premature.  Id.  It 
stated that "the orderly and proper course to pursue, and that 
which the legislature intended should be pursued, is not to 
bring an action to review an order setting aside an award until 
No. 
00-3548   
 
12 
 
further hearing is had and an order or award is made.  Such an 
order may then be reviewed."  Id. at 301-02 (emphasis added).   
¶19 This language was overturned as obiter dictum in Berg 
v. Industrial Commission, 236 Wis. 172, 294 N.W. 506 (1940).  In 
Berg, the applicant's claim was initially dismissed by a hearing 
examiner.  Id. at 174.  The applicant sought review with the 
commission.  Id.  The commission set aside the hearing 
examiner's order and ordered the matter scheduled for a further 
hearing.  Id.  After additional testimony was taken, the 
commission made findings of fact and ultimately ordered benefits 
to the applicant.  Id.  On review, the circuit court affirmed 
the award, and the applicant appealed.  Id.  On appeal, the 
applicant argued that the commission erred when it set aside and 
remanded the hearing examiner's order because it failed to 
properly review evidence in making its decision as required by 
statute.  Id. at 179.  The court rejected this argument and 
concluded that the commission had in fact reviewed the evidence 
before issuing the order.  Id.  The court did not, however, base 
its ultimate decision on this finding.  Instead, the court 
denied 
relief 
based 
on 
its 
conclusion 
that 
it 
lacked 
jurisdiction 
to 
review 
the 
set 
aside 
and 
remand 
order 
altogether.  Id.  Citing Schneider Fuel, the court concluded as 
follows: 
As we held in Schneider Fuel & Supply Co. v. 
Industrial Comm. 224 Wis. 298, 301, 272 N. W. 25, no 
action to review such an order setting aside an 
examiner's findings and award and ordering the matter 
scheduled for further hearing is authorized by the 
compensation act; and the only purpose for which an 
No. 
00-3548   
 
13 
 
action can be maintained under sec. 102.23(1), Stats., 
is to review either an award of compensation or an 
order which denies compensation.  Likewise, because 
there is no statutory provision authorizing judicial 
review at any other time of such an intermediate 
order, there can be no review of the commission's 
order of July 1, 1938.  In this respect we must 
withdraw the obiter dictum statement in the Schneider 
Fuel & Supply Co, Case, supra, that such an order may 
be 
reviewed 
in 
an 
action 
brought 
to 
review 
a 
subsequent award or an order denying compensation.   
Id. at 179-80 (emphasis added).  Thus, the court concluded that 
set aside and remand orders, and the issues contained therein, 
were never reviewable because the statutes do not specifically 
provide review for such orders.   
¶20 Despite this language from Berg, we conclude that 
Schneider Fuel provided the appropriate rule of law as it 
relates to review of set aside and remand orders, like the ones 
at issue in this case, which are challenged based on LIRC's 
failure to issue these orders within the time limitations set by 
statute.  Any language to the contrary in Berg is specifically 
overruled.  As noted in Schneider Fuel, review of such orders in 
a subsequent action on the award or order granting or denying 
compensation is consistent with the legislative intent behind 
the statute.  Wisconsin Stat. § 102.23(1)(a) specifies that an 
action may be commenced in the circuit court seeking review only 
after "[t]he order or award granting or denying compensation, 
either interlocutory or final" is issued.  However, section 
102.23(1)(e) contemplates that, during this review, the court is 
not limited to only reviewing those issues raised by the order 
or award granting or denying compensation.  Such timeliness 
No. 
00-3548   
 
14 
 
issues affecting the court's jurisdiction can always be raised 
during this review.  Indeed, providing review of such issues 
during the review of the merits of the compensation order is 
consistent with the objectives of judicial economy and finality.  
In 
short, 
it 
ensures 
review 
to 
these 
determinative 
jurisdictional issues raised in the course of the proceeding but 
permits review only after an order or award granting or denying 
compensation is issued. 
¶21 Providing such review is consistent with our holding 
in 
Pasch 
v. 
Department 
of 
Revenue, 
58 
Wis. 2d 346, 
206 
N.W.2d 157 (1973).  In Pasch, a taxpayer sought an abatement of 
an assessment of additional income taxes on him.  Id. at 348.  
After his application was denied, he petitioned for review with 
the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission.  Id. at 349.  Before any 
hearing on this petition, he moved to quash the assessment, 
arguing that the department failed to act within the statutory 
time limits in denying his abatement application.  Id.  He also 
sought dismissal of any further proceedings with the commission.  
Id.  The commission denied the motion.  Id. at 350.  The 
taxpayer then filed a petition for review in the circuit court.  
Id.  The department moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that 
the order did not directly affect the legal rights, duties, or 
privileges of the taxpayer and was therefore not a reviewable 
order under chapter 227 of the Wisconsin statutes.  Id.  The 
Pasch court agreed, but concluded that this issue could be 
reviewed after a final order was issued.  Id. at 357.  The court 
stated: 
No. 
00-3548   
 
15 
 
The order of the commission finding jurisdiction in 
the commission to proceed to a hearing upon merits of 
the controversy does not directly affect the legal 
rights, duties or privileges of the appellant.  As 
provided in sec. 227.20, Stats., the jurisdiction of 
the commission may be challenged upon review from the 
final decision of the commission upon the merits of 
the controversy.  Appellant argues that the issue of 
the 
commission's 
jurisdiction 
should 
be 
finally 
determined before appellant is put to the expense and 
inconvenience of a lengthy proceeding before the 
commission to determine the accuracy of the additional 
assessment of taxes.  We are mindful of the fact that 
much time and expense might be saved if the courts 
would decide at this time that the commission had 
exceeded its jurisdiction; however, this consideration 
is outweighed by the resultant delay that would 
accompany review of these agency determinations and 
the disruption of the agency's orderly process of 
adjudication in reaching its ultimate determination.   
Id. (emphasis added).  The claims raised by Buena Vista are 
entitled to the same type of review.  These claims do not relate 
to the ultimate merits of the case, but instead to the 
timeliness of the agency's actions.  LIRC's failure to act 
according to the statutory time requirements removes its 
jurisdiction.   
¶22 In this respect, Berg is distinguishable on its facts.  
The Berg court denied review to a set aside order that was 
challenged based on the commission's failure to follow a statute 
requiring it to properly review evidence before setting aside an 
order.  Such a challenge, if presented in a subsequent action 
seeking 
judicial 
review, 
would 
not 
implicate 
LIRC's 
No. 
00-3548   
 
16 
 
jurisdiction, and accordingly, the Berg court was correct in 
denying any future review to the claim.5   
¶23   In light of the above considerations, we conclude 
that denying review of the set aside and remand orders at issue 
in this case is consistent with the appropriate rule of law.  
Review of the orders at issue in this case is permitted in a 
subsequent action on an award or order granting or denying 
compensation.  Accordingly, Buena Vista's assertion that its 
claims will never be afforded review is incorrect.   
¶24 In light of our conclusion that Buena Vista will be 
afforded review of the issues in the set aside and remand orders 
in this case, we must determine whether judicial review of the 
orders is available by common law certiorari.  We have stated 
that, in general, where "no appeal from [an administrative 
agency's] conclusions be provided, the question whether it has 
acted within or exceeded its jurisdiction is always open to the 
examination and decision of the proper court by writ of 
                                                 
5 Other cases that have cited Berg v. Industrial Commission, 
236 Wis. 172, 294 N.W. 506 (1940), have not relied on its 
holding that set aside orders are not reviewable in a subsequent 
action on an order or award granting or denying compensation.  
See F.F. Mengel Co. v. Check, 147 Wis. 2d 666, 433 N.W.2d 651 
(Ct. App. 1988) (the court held that the commission's order 
remanding the case for further hearings was not immediately 
reviewable in circuit court; the court cited and relied on Berg, 
but the court did not reach the issue of whether the 
intermediate order would be reviewable in an action to review a 
subsequent award) and Meyer v. Indust. Comm'n, 13 Wis. 2d 377, 
108 N.W.2d 556 (1961) (the court held that a compromise 
agreement was not subject to review; the court cited Berg, but 
relied on it only insofar as it held that some orders from the 
commission are unreviewable). 
No. 
00-3548   
 
17 
 
certiorari."  Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 359, 133 
N.W. 209 (1911) (first emphasis added).  However, we have 
already determined that review for such issues is available.  
Nevertheless, Buena Vista contends that review through common 
law 
certiorari 
should 
still 
be 
permitted 
because 
such 
jurisdictional issues are issues that need immediate review.  
The issues, it argues, are not merely procedural or evidentiary 
matters for which there is no harm in reviewing such issues at 
the end of the proceedings.  If it is not afforded such review, 
Buena Vista asserts that it will then be severely prejudiced 
because it will have to incur additional costs and expenses to 
defend itself in the worker's compensation system.   
¶25 Buena Vista relies on Chevrolet Division, General 
Motors Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 31 Wis. 2d  481, 143 
N.W.2d 532 (1966), to support its argument that review is 
available through common law certiorari.  In Chevrolet Division, 
the applicant filed a petition for review with the commission, 
but the petition was denied as untimely.  Id. at 484.  The 
applicant then filed a writ of mandamus in the circuit court to 
compel the commission to accept and review the petition.  Id.  
The court concluded that a writ of mandamus was available as a 
remedy because judicial review of the commission's refusal to 
consider 
the 
petition 
was 
unavailable 
under 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.23(1)(a) to the applicant.  Id. at 484-86.  Buena Vista 
contends that, because the writ of mandamus was permitted in 
Chevrolet Division, review by common law certiorari should be 
allowed in this case.   
No. 
00-3548   
 
18 
 
¶26 In a subsequent case, however, State ex rel. First 
National Bank v. M&I Peoples Bank, 82 Wis. 2d 529, 546, 263 
N.W.2d 196 (1978), we upheld the dismissal of a bank's complaint 
in quo warranto because we determined that the statutory method 
of review for the agency's determination was adequate to address 
the issues raised by the bank.  In reaching this conclusion, we 
stated:   
We discussed previously this court's adoption of 
the general principle that where a method of review is 
prescribed 
by 
statute, 
the prescribed 
method is 
exclusive.  It is difficult to quarrel with a rule 
which requires the timely execution of prescribed 
procedures.  Nonetheless, our cases demonstrate that 
the door is not entirely closed to the possibility 
that a petition seeking judicial relief by a method 
other 
than 
that 
prescribed 
by 
statute 
may 
be 
sustained.  We noted this possibility in Perkins v. 
Peacock, [263 Wis. 644, 658, 58 N.W.2d 536 (1953)], 
where we stated that whether a statutory remedy of 
appeal is exclusive depends upon "whether such right 
of appeal is adequate to permit review" of the matters 
raised, and in Underwood v. Karns, [21 Wis. 2d 175, 
180, 124 Wis. 2d 116 (1963)], where we stated that the 
prescribed method of review is generally regarded as 
exclusive where that method is "plain, speedy, and 
adequate."  In Langland v. Joint County School Comm., 
12 Wis. 2d 557, 559, 107 N.W.2d 503 (1961) we said 
that "in all but 'exceptional' cases, the appeal was 
to be the exclusive remedy."   
Id. at 542.   
¶27 We do not regard Buena Vista's case as an exceptional 
case where we need to provide for an immediate alternative 
method of review.  The statutory review method is adequate.  We 
recognize that, in some cases, a party may endure some hardship 
by having to participate in additional hearings when LIRC 
erroneously sets aside an order or award granting or denying 
No. 
00-3548   
 
19 
 
compensation and remands the case for additional hearings.  
However, we conclude that the statutory scheme still permits 
review of the issues in this case in a timely manner, and at the 
same time, it preserves judicial economy by allowing these 
issues to be determined only after an order or award granting or 
denying compensation is issued.  For these reasons, we conclude 
that review by common law certiorari is unavailable to Buena 
Vista in this case.   
III 
¶28 In conclusion, we affirm the circuit court's decision 
dismissing Buena Vista's action.  No review by common law 
certiorari is warranted in this case.  Buena Vista may still 
seek review of the disputed timeliness issues in the set aside 
and remand orders in a circuit court action on a subsequent 
order or award granting or denying compensation.  This method of 
review is adequate for Buena Vista in this case.   
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
No. 
00-3548   
 
 
 
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