Case Title: FRANK REAVES AND SARAH REAVES v. RICHARD D. RILEY AND BARBARA F. RILEY, and BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-81

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-11-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
FRANK REAVES AND SARAH REAVES v. RICHARD D. RILEY AND BARBARA F. RILEY, and BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS1989 WY 208782 P.2d 1136Case Number: 89-81Decided: 11/27/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
FRANK REAVES AND SARAH 
REAVES, APPELLANTS (PETITIONERS),

v.

RICHARD D. RILEY AND 
BARBARA F. RILEY, APPELLEES (RESPONDENTS), BOARD OF COUNTYCOMMISSIONERS, 
(RESPONDENT).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

W.H. Vines of 
Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, for appellants.

Rex E. Johnson, 
Sherard, Sherard & Johnson, Wheatland, for appellees.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Frank and Sarah Reaves 
appeal from a district court order affirming the Board of County Commissioners' 
denial of the Reaves' application for a private road. Appellants state the issue 
as:

"Whether, based on the 
facts and the applicable law, the Albany County Commissioners correctly 
determined that granting a private road to the Applicants was not necessary 
pursuant to Wyoming Statute 1977, § 24-9-101."

FACTS

[¶2.]     In 1987, Frank Reaves 
purchased property in the northern part of Albany 
county, close to the Platte county line. There 
was an existing road which connected the property with a county road to the east 
in Platte county. After purchasing the property 
Reaves learned that the portion of this road which crossed the property of 
Richard and Barbara Riley was a private road. Reaves was unable to obtain an 
easement from the Rileys to use this road. In order to have access to his 
property, Reaves entered into a month-to-month lease with an adjoining landowner 
who had an easement across the Riley property. As lessee, Reaves has the right 
to cross the Riley property, which in turn allows him to reach his own 
property.

[¶3.]     To assure permanent 
access, Reaves also filed an application pursuant to W.S. 24-9-101 seeking to 
establish a private road to his property along the existing road. The Board of 
County Commissioners of AlbanyCounty denied the application, concluding 
that a private road was not necessary because Reaves has access to his property 
by the lease of the adjoining property. The denial was affirmed by the district 
court, and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

[¶4.]     The statute involved 
here, W.S. 24-9-101, provides that "[a]ny person whose land has no outlet to, 
nor connection with a public road" may apply for a private road to connect his 
premises to a convenient public road. The legal question in this case is whether 
property access obtained incident to a month-to-month lease of adjoining 
property constitutes either an "outlet to" or a "connection with" a public road 
within the meaning of W.S. 24-9-101.

[¶5.]     In McGuire v. McGuire, 
608 P.2d 1278, 1286 (Wyo. 1980) we held that the "no outlet to, nor 
connection with" language means "no legally enforceable, existing outlet to nor 
connection with a public road." Walton v. Dana, 609 P.2d 461, 463 n. 1 
(Wyo. 1980). 
While appellants may have a legal right to cross the Riley's property, this is 
not the "outlet" contemplated by W.S. 24-9-101.

[¶6.]     The statute is rooted 
in the concept of a private way of necessity as stated in Section 32 of Article 
1 of the Wyoming Constitution:

"Private property shall 
not be taken for private use unless by consent of the owner, except for private 
ways of necessity * * *."

Snell v. 
Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042 (Wyo. 1975); see also Meyer v. Colorado Cent. 
Coal Co., 39 Wyo. 355, 271 P. 212 (1928) (recognizing that 
the legislature can establish procedure for creating a private way). In 
McIlquham v. Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Co., 18 Wyo. 53, 104 P. 20 
(1909), we said that the purpose of a way of necessity was to allow for the use 
and enjoyment of one's land. We also said that the right to a way "is an 
incorporeal right appurtenant to the estate granted, and not a personal right or 
one incident to personal property." McIlquham, 18 Wyo. at 63, 104 P.  at 22. 
While that case did not directly involve a statutory private road provision, the 
same principle applies in the instant case. Since the common purpose of either a 
common law way of necessity or a statutory private road is to allow the use and 
enjoyment of specific property, it logically follows that the right to either is 
incident to the ownership of the property.

[¶7.]     This conclusion is 
buttressed by the language of the statute itself which indicates that the outlet 
or connection relates to the land itself, not to personal rights of the property 
owner. "Any person whose land has no 
outlet to, nor connection with * * *." (emphasis added) W.S. 24-9-101. Reaves 
may have a legally enforceable right to use the road crossing the Riley 
property, but the right is not one which is appurtenant to the Reaves property. 
The access incident to the lease, therefore, does not constitute an outlet or 
connection within the purview of the statute.

[¶8.]     When reviewing agency 
action, we are not bound by conclusions of the district court, and we review the 
appeal as if it came directly to this court from the agency. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 662 P.2d 878 (Wyo. 1983). Our scope of 
review of agency orders is defined by W.S. 16-3-114(c), which in pertinent part 
states: 

"(c) To the extent 
necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action. * * * The reviewing court shall:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

"(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law."

We hold, as a 
matter of law, that access to property under the lease of adjoining property 
does not constitute either an outlet to or a connection with a convenient public 
road as those terms are used in W.S. 24-9-101. Accordingly, the order affirming 
the Commissioners' decision is reversed, and this case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.