Case Title: Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd.

Citation: 2015 WI 65

Docket Number: 2013AP001532

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2015-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 WI 65 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP1532 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Ash Park, LLC, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 
          Defendant, 
Re/Max Select, LLC, 
          Intervening-Defendant-Appellant, 
Ash Investors, LLC, 
          Intervenor. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 356 Wis. 2d 249, 853 N.W.2d 618) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No. 2014 WI App 87 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 4, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Brown 
 
JUDGE: 
William M. Atkinson 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, C. J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J. did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, briefs were filed 
by George Burnett and the Law Firm of Conway, Olejniczak & 
Jerry, S.C., Green Bay, and oral argument by George Burnett. 
 
For the intervening-defendant-appellant, briefs were filed 
by Michael O. Marquette and Marquette Law-Attorneys, S.C., Green 
Bay, and oral argument by Michael O. Marquette. 
 
For the intervenor, there was a brief by Bridget M. Hubing 
and Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren, S.C., Waukesha, and oral 
argument by J. Bushnell Nielsen. 
 
 
2
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Debra P. Conrad for the 
Wisconsin Realtors Association, Madison.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 65
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP1532 
(L.C. No. 
2007CV2832) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Ash Park, LLC,  
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Alexander & Bishop, Ltd.,   
 
 
Defendant, 
 
Re/Max Select, LLC, 
 
Intervening-Defendant-Appellant, 
 
Ash Investors, LLC, 
 
Intervenor. 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.  This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals.1  The sole question 
presented is whether Ash Park, LLC (the seller of a parcel of 
vacant land) is liable to pay a broker's commission to Re/Max 
Select, LLC (the broker for the land). 
                                                 
1 Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 2014 WI App 87, 
356 Wis. 2d 249, 853 N.W.2d 618. 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The one-party listing contract between Ash Park and 
Re/Max provides in relevant part that Ash Park shall pay a 
broker's commission to Re/Max if Ash Park enters into an 
"enforceable contract" for the sale of the land.  Ash Park 
entered into a contract for the sale of the land with Alexander 
& Bishop, Ltd.  Whether Re/Max is entitled to a broker's 
commission turns on whether the purchase contract between Ash 
Park 
and 
Alexander 
& 
Bishop 
constitutes 
an 
"enforceable 
contract" within the meaning of the listing contract between Ash 
Park and Re/Max, even though Alexander & Bishop breached and the 
sale of the land was never consummated. 
¶3 
The Circuit Court for Brown County, William M. 
Atkinson, Judge, granted summary judgment to Ash Park, declaring 
that Ash Park owed no broker's commission to Re/Max.  The 
circuit court ordered Re/Max's broker lien discharged from the 
property. 
¶4 
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
summary judgment and remanded the cause to the circuit court 
with instructions to determine and award Re/Max its broker's 
commission, 
prejudgment 
interest, 
costs, 
and 
reasonable 
attorney's fees.  The court of appeals further instructed the 
circuit court to determine whether Re/Max's broker lien should 
be reinstated. 
¶5 
This court granted review of the sole issue presented 
by Ash Park in its petition for review: 
Is a vacant land offer to purchase an "enforceable 
contract" so as to require a seller to pay three 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
3 
 
hundred seventy-eight thousand dollars ($378,000) in 
commission under a real estate listing contract when 
the seller obtained a judicial order for specific 
performance, but the buyer (who the realtor found) 
lacked the funds to purchase and could not be 
compelled to honor that order? 
¶6 
We did not grant review of the issue of whether 
Re/Max's broker lien should be reinstated.2 
¶7 
We now affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  
We conclude that the purchase contract between Ash Park and 
Alexander & Bishop constitutes an "enforceable contract" within 
the meaning of the listing contract between Ash Park and Re/Max.  
Re/Max is therefore entitled to a broker's commission from Ash 
Park even though Alexander & Bishop breached the purchase 
contract and the sale was never consummated. 
I 
¶8 
The facts are undisputed for purposes of this review. 
¶9 
Ash Park wished to sell a parcel of vacant land 
located 
in 
the 
Village 
of 
Ashwaubenon 
in 
Brown 
County, 
Wisconsin. 
¶10 On March 12, 2007, Ash Park and Re/Max entered into a 
one-party listing contract.  Ash Park and Re/Max used a standard 
form contract (titled "WB-3 VACANT LAND LISTING CONTRACT") 
approved 
by 
the 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Regulation 
and 
Licensing. 
                                                 
2 Because this court did not grant review of the broker lien 
issue, the court of appeals' decision on that issue still 
stands.  Whether the broker lien should be reinstated must be 
determined by the circuit court on remand. 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
4 
 
¶11 The listing contract provided that the list price 
would be $6.2 million and that the listing would be for 
Alexander & Bishop only.  It further provided that Re/Max would 
be entitled to a broker's commission equal to six percent of the 
purchase price if, during the term of the listing, Ash Park 
"sells or accepts an offer which creates an enforceable contract 
for the sale of all or any part of the Property." 
¶12 During the term of the listing, Alexander & Bishop 
offered to purchase Ash Park's land for $6.3 million ($100,000 
more than the list price).  Ash Park accepted the offer. 
¶13 Alexander & Bishop's offer to purchase Ash Park's land 
did not include a financing contingency.  It did, however, 
include a lease contingency.  The lease contingency provided 
that the "Offer is contingent upon the Buyer negotiating a lease 
[o]r leases for the subject property with terms and conditions 
acceptable 
to 
the 
Buyer . . . within 
[120] 
days 
of 
[the 
seller's] acceptance" of the offer.  The lease contingency 
further provided that if Alexander & Bishop were "unable to 
negotiate a lease or leases," Alexander & Bishop could terminate 
the offer. 
¶14 Because Alexander & Bishop was unable to negotiate an 
acceptable lease within the specified timeframe, it exercised 
its right to terminate the offer. 
¶15 Later on, however, Ash Park and Alexander & Bishop 
signed an agreement to reinstate the offer. 
¶16 Alexander & Bishop did not exercise its right to 
terminate the reinstated offer.  Alexander & Bishop's offer to 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
5 
 
purchase Ash Park's land ripened into a binding purchase 
contract on September 20, 2007. 
¶17 On October 9, 2007, Alexander & Bishop informed Ash 
Park that the party with whom it had been negotiating a lease 
was 
not 
interested 
in 
immediately 
leasing 
the 
property.  
Accordingly, Ash Park and Alexander & Bishop discussed potential 
modifications to the purchase contract.  Their negotiations were 
unsuccessful. 
¶18 The closing of the sale, which had been scheduled for 
December 14, 2007, did not take place.  Alexander & Bishop 
failed to purchase the property. 
¶19 Shortly after the date that had been set for closing, 
Ash Park sued Alexander & Bishop, seeking specific performance 
of the purchase contract.  Ash Park prevailed in the circuit 
court, in the court of appeals,3 and in this court.4 
¶20 Despite the specific performance judgment against it, 
Alexander & Bishop failed to pay for or acquire the property. 
¶21 In December 2010, after protracted litigation and 
after Alexander & Bishop had threatened bankruptcy, Ash Park and 
Alexander & Bishop agreed to settle their dispute.  Alexander & 
Bishop paid Ash Park $1.5 million.  This sum was equivalent to 
Ash Park's holding costs, that is, the interest and other 
                                                 
3 Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 2009 WI App 71, 
317 Wis. 2d 772, 767 N.W.2d 614. 
4 Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 2010 WI 44, 324 
Wis. 2d 703, 783 N.W.2d 294. 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
6 
 
charges Ash Park had paid while it unsuccessfully sought to 
compel Alexander & Bishop to purchase the property.5 
¶22 On January 12, 2011, prior to final adjudication of 
the lawsuit between Ash Park and Alexander & Bishop, Re/Max 
filed a motion to intervene. 
¶23 Re/Max argued that Ash Park had entered into an 
"enforceable contract for the sale of all or any part of the 
Property" and thus that under the listing contract, Re/Max had 
earned a six-percent broker's commission.  Re/Max sought to 
claim its commission, along with prejudgment interests, costs, 
and attorney fees.  Re/Max also sought to enforce a broker lien 
it had recorded on the property. 
¶24 Ash Park asserted various affirmative defenses and 
moved for summary judgment.  Re/Max opposed Ash Park's motion 
for summary judgment and filed its own motion for summary 
judgment. 
¶25 The circuit court granted Ash Park's motion for 
summary judgment and ordered Re/Max's broker lien discharged 
from the property.  The circuit court concluded that the 
purchase contract between Ash Park and Alexander & Bishop does 
not constitute an "enforceable contract" within the meaning of 
                                                 
5 Ash Park did not share any portion of this settlement with 
Re/Max, and Re/Max does not assert that it is entitled to any 
portion of this settlement.  Re/Max acknowledges that the 
listing contract grants Re/Max the right to six percent of the 
purchase price.  Explicitly excluded from the purchase price are 
"holding costs."  As explained above, the settlement paid by 
Alexander & Bishop amounts to holding costs. 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
7 
 
the listing contract between Ash Park and Re/Max.  Accordingly, 
the circuit court determined that Re/Max had not earned a 
broker's commission. 
¶26 The circuit court explained its reasoning as follows: 
This contract is not enforceable.  Now, perhaps we 
don't do a good enough job of defining "enforceable."  
Maybe we should have a phrase called "enforceable in 
law," and maybe that would make sense because I found 
it was enforceable in law, that the case could proceed 
through the court system, but it clearly wasn't 
enforceable in fact.  If it was enforceable in fact, 
Alexander & Bishop would [have bought the land] and 
the realtor would have his commission.  Everybody 
would end up happy. . . .  
. . . . 
The reality of it is the realtor brought to these 
sellers a buyer who couldn't afford to buy the 
property. . . . [H]e couldn't get financing for it, he 
didn't have enough money in a bank account, he didn't 
have a deep enough pocket to go to, he couldn't do it.  
In the end this contract was not enforceable in fact 
and that's why the contract between these parties 
required it actually be enforceable in fact. 
¶27 After the circuit court issued its decision, Ash Park 
sold the land to Ash Investors, LLC.6 
¶28 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
summary judgment, holding that the purchase contract between Ash 
Park 
and 
Alexander 
& 
Bishop 
constitutes 
an 
"enforceable 
                                                 
6 Ash Investors, the company that purchased Ash Park's land 
after Ash Park settled its dispute with Alexander & Bishop, 
filed a motion to intervene (or, in the alternative, to file a 
non-party brief) in this court.  The court granted Ash 
Investors' motion to intervene, permitting Ash Investors to file 
a brief in this court but only on the issue the court had 
accepted for review. 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
8 
 
contract" within the meaning of the listing contract between Ash 
Park and Re/Max.  The court of appeals reasoned as follows: 
We conclude the term "enforceable contract" is plain 
and unambiguous.  Given the dictionary definition of 
"enforce" and the principle that an "enforceable 
contract" is one that provides a remedy for a breach, 
it is clear that an "enforceable contract" is one 
where an individual can compel observance of the 
contract by seeking a remedy for a breach.  In this 
case, the contract between Ash Park and Alexander & 
Bishop was enforceable——the contract recognized Ash 
Park's rights under the contract and provided various 
remedies for Ash Park based on Alexander & Bishop's 
breach.7 
¶29 The court of appeals cited the "law of the case" 
doctrine as an additional rationale for its conclusion that the 
purchase contract between Ash Park and Alexander & Bishop is 
enforceable.  According to the court of appeals, this court's 
prior decision that specific performance was a permissible 
remedy for Alexander & Bishop's breach of the purchase contract 
settled the issue of the contract's enforceability.  The court 
of appeals explained its reasoning as follows: 
[W]e conclude the law of the case doctrine applies to 
prevent Ash Park from arguing the contract it had with 
Alexander & Bishop was unenforceable.  "The law of the 
case doctrine is a 'longstanding rule that a decision 
on a legal issue by an appellate court establishes the 
law of the case, which must be followed in all 
subsequent proceedings in the trial court or on later 
appeal.'" . . . . 
. . .  
                                                 
7 Ash Park, 356 Wis. 2d 249, ¶15. 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
9 
 
[T]he specific performance remedy Ash Park sought and 
received for Alexander & Bishop's breach in this case 
was available only if the parties had an enforceable 
contract.  Based on the specific performance judgment 
Ash Park sought and received in this case, Ash Park 
cannot now argue its contract with Alexander & Bishop 
was unenforceable.8 
¶30 We granted Ash Park's petition for review of the court 
of appeals' decision, limiting our review to the question of 
whether the purchase contract between Ash Park and Alexander & 
Bishop constitutes an "enforceable contract" under the listing 
contract between Ash Park and Re/Max, such that Re/Max is 
entitled to a broker's commission. 
II 
¶31 This 
court 
reviews 
summary 
judgment 
decisions 
independently, applying the same standards and methods as the 
circuit court.9  Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.10 
¶32 In the instant case, the parties do not dispute the 
facts.  Rather, the parties dispute whether as a matter of law 
Re/Max is entitled to a broker's commission.  This issue turns 
on whether the purchase contract between Ash Park and Alexander 
                                                 
8 Id., ¶¶19-20 (citations omitted). 
9 Roehl Transport, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2010 WI 
49, ¶25, 325 Wis. 2d 56, 784 N.W.2d 542. 
10 Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 802.08(2) 
(2011-12). 
 
All 
subsequent 
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-12 version 
unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
10 
 
& Bishop constitutes an "enforceable contract" within the 
meaning of the listing contract between Ash Park and Re/Max.  
The interpretation of a contract presents a question of law that 
this court decides independently of the circuit court and court 
of appeals but benefiting from their analyses.11 
III 
¶33 To decide whether Re/Max is entitled to a broker's 
commission under the listing contract between Ash Park and 
Re/Max, we must interpret the phrase "enforceable contract" in 
the listing contract.  Thus, we begin by reviewing the 
principles of contract interpretation that govern our analysis.  
We then apply those interpretive principles to the phrase 
"enforceable contract" in the listing contract.  We conclude 
that the purchase contract between Ash Park and Alexander & 
Bishop constitutes an "enforceable contract" within the meaning 
of the listing contract.  Ash Park's arguments to the contrary 
are not convincing. 
A 
¶34 The court's goal in interpreting a contract is to give 
effect to the parties' intentions.12  However, "subjective intent 
                                                 
11 Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality, LLC, 2013 WI 62, ¶22, 348 
Wis. 2d 631, 833 N.W.2d 586; Ehlinger v. Hauser, 2010 WI 54, 
¶47, 325 Wis. 2d 287, 785 N.W.2d 328. 
12 Seitzinger v. Cmty. Health Network, 2004 WI 28, ¶22, 270 
Wis. 2d 1, 676 N.W.2d 426. 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
11 
 
is not the be-all and end-all."13  The language of the contract 
controls the court's interpretation.14 
¶35 When 
the 
terms 
of 
a 
contract 
are 
clear 
and 
unambiguous, we construe the contract's language according to 
its literal meaning.15  "We presume the parties' intent is 
evidenced by the words they choose, if those words are 
unambiguous."16 
¶36 When the terms of a contract are ambiguous, however, 
evidence extrinsic to the contract itself may be used to 
determine the parties' intent, and any remaining ambiguities 
will be construed against the drafter.17  "A contract provision 
is ambiguous if it is fairly susceptible of more than one 
construction."18 
¶37 Contract language is construed according to its plain 
or ordinary meaning,19 consistent with "what a reasonable person 
                                                 
13 Kernz v. J.L. French Corp., 2003 WI App 140, ¶9, 266 
Wis. 2d 124, 667 N.W.2d 751. 
14 Seitzinger, 270 Wis. 2d 1, ¶22.   
15 Maryland Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶23, 
326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 (quoting Gorton v. Hostak, Henzl 
& Bichler, S.C., 217 Wis. 2d 493, 506, 577 N.W.2d 617 (1998)). 
16 Kernz, 266 Wis. 2d 124, ¶9. 
17 Maryland Arms, 326 Wis. 2d 300, ¶23. 
18 Mgm't Computer Servs., Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & 
Co., 206 Wis. 2d 158, 177, 557 N.W.2d 67 (1996). 
19 Huml v. Vlazny, 2006 WI 87, ¶52, 293 Wis. 2d 169, 716 
N.W.2d 807. 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
12 
 
would understand the words to mean under the circumstances."20 
Language in a business contract is construed in the manner in 
which it would be understood "by persons in the business to 
which the contract relates."21  Interpretations that give 
reasonable meaning to each provision in the contract are 
preferred over interpretations that render a portion of the 
contract superfluous.22 
¶38 Ultimately, 
the 
court's 
role 
"is 
not 
to 
make 
contracts or reform them but to determine what the parties 
contracted to do."23  "It is not the function of the court to 
relieve a party to a freely negotiated contract of the burdens 
                                                 
20 Seitzinger, 270 Wis. 2d 1, ¶22. 
21 Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wis. Gas Co., 2003 WI 38, ¶12, 
261 Wis. 2d 70, 661 N.W.2d 776. 
22 Sonday v. Dave Kohel Agency, Inc., 2006 WI 92, ¶21, 293 
Wis. 2d 458, 718 N.W.2d 631. 
23 Marion v. Orson's Camera Centers, Inc., 29 Wis. 2d 339, 
345, 138 N.W.2d 733 (1966) (quoting Wis. Marine & Fire Ins. Co. 
Bank v. Wilkin, 95 Wis. 111, 115, 69 N.W. 354 (1896)).   
See also 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 32:2 
(4th ed. 2002) ("Courts often recite that they cannot make a new 
contract for the parties, but can only enforce the contract to 
which the parties themselves have agreed, and if the contract 
contains unambiguous language, the parties are bound by its 
plain meaning."). 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
13 
 
of a provision which becomes more onerous than had originally 
been anticipated."24 
¶39 We now apply these interpretive principles to the 
contract language at issue. 
B 
¶40 The section of the listing contract between Ash Park 
and Re/Max that discusses the seller's obligation to pay a 
broker's commission contains five clauses that delineate the 
circumstances 
under 
which 
Ash 
Park 
shall 
pay 
Re/Max 
a 
commission.  It provides the following alternative conditions 
under which a commission shall be earned: 
COMMSSION: Seller shall pay Broker's commission, which 
shall be earned if, during the term of this Listing: 
1) Seller sells or accepts an offer which creates an 
enforceable contract for the sale of all or any part 
of the Property; 
2) Seller grants an option to purchase all or any part 
of the Property which is subsequently exercised; 
3) Seller exchanges or enters into a binding exchange 
agreement on all or any part of the Property; 
4) A transaction occurs which causes an effective 
change in ownership or control of all or any part of 
the Property; or 
                                                 
24 25 Lord, supra note 23, § 1:1.  See also E. Allan 
Farnsworth, 2 Farnsworth on Contracts § 5.1, at 1 (3rd ed. 2004) 
("[F]reedom of contract rests on the premise that it is in the 
public interest to accord individuals broad powers to order 
their affairs through legally enforceable agreements.  In 
general, therefore, parties are free to make such agreements as 
they wish, and courts will enforce them without passing on their 
substance."). 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
14 
 
5) A purchaser is procured for the Property by Broker, 
by Seller, or by any other person, at the price and on 
substantially the same terms set forth in this Listing 
and in the standard provisions of the current WB-13 
VACANT LAND OFFER TO PURCHASE, even if Seller does not 
accept this purchaser's offer. . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶41 The listing contract goes on to define "procured" for 
purposes of the fifth clause set forth above: 
A purchaser is procured when a valid and binding 
contract of sale is entered into between the Seller 
and the purchaser or when a ready, willing and able 
purchaser submits a written offer at the price and on 
substantially the terms specified in this listing.  
(Emphasis added). 
¶42 The listing contact does not define the phrase 
"enforceable contract," which appears in the first clause, and 
the parties dispute its meaning.   
¶43 Our 
interpretation 
of 
the 
phrase 
"enforceable 
contract" begins, as it must, with the ordinary meaning of the 
phrase.   
¶44 In everyday language, "enforceable" means capable of 
being enforced.  A contract is "enforceable" if it can be 
enforced. 
¶45 A party seeks to "enforce" a contract by going to 
court to obtain a remedy for the contract's breach.  A court 
"enforces" a contract by issuing a judgment that grants a remedy 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
15 
 
for the contract's breach.25  Consequently, a reasonable person 
would consider a contract "enforceable" so long as a party to 
the contract can go to court and obtain a remedy for the 
contract's breach. 
¶46 This 
ordinary 
interpretation 
of 
the 
phrase 
"enforceable contract" comports with the phrase's legal meaning.  
"Enforceable contracts are those for which the law recognizes 
the parties' rights and protects those rights by providing a 
remedy for breach, usually either some measure of damages or 
specific performance."26  Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 
explains that a contract is said to be enforceable "[w]hen a 
promisee is entitled to either a money judgment, an injunction 
or specific performance because of a breach [by the promisor]."27 
¶47 The converse is also true: "Unenforceable contracts 
are those that, because of some valid defense . . . , lack the 
remedy of specific performance or damages in the event of 
                                                 
25 "In most contract cases, what is sought is enforcement of 
a contract.  Enforcement usually takes the form of an award of a 
sum of money due under the contract or as damages. . . .  A 
court may also enforce a promise by ordering that it be 
specifically performed or, in the alternative, by enjoining its 
non-performance."  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 345, cmt. 
b (1981).  See also 1 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on 
Contracts § 1.1, at 4 (3d ed. 2004) (explaining that a contract 
is "a promise, or a set of promises, that the law will 
enforce"). 
26 1 Michael B. Apfeld et al., Contract Law in Wisconsin 
§ 1.22 (4th ed. 2013). 
27 Joseph M. Perillo, Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 
§ 1:8(b) (7th ed. 2014). 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
16 
 
breach . . . ."28 Put more simply, "[a]n unenforceable contract 
is one for the breach of which neither the remedy of damages nor 
the remedy of specific performance is available . . . ."29 
¶48 Nothing 
in 
the 
record 
reveals 
that 
the 
phrase 
"enforceable contract" has a meaning in the real estate business 
that is different from its ordinary and legal meaning. 
¶49 As we explained previously, Alexander & Bishop failed 
to purchase Ash Park's land as it had contracted to do, and Ash 
Park sought the remedy of specific performance for Alexander & 
Bishop's 
breach. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
issued 
a 
specific 
performance judgment against Alexander & Bishop that was upheld 
by the court of appeals30 and by this court.31 
¶50 Because Ash Park was indisputably able to compel 
observance of the purchase contract it entered into with 
Alexander & Bishop by seeking a remedy (namely specific 
performance) for a breach, the purchase contract falls within 
the ordinary and legal meaning of the phrase "enforceable 
contract."  Indeed, in upholding the specific performance 
                                                 
28 1 Apfeld et al., supra note 26, § 1.22. 
29 25 Lord, supra note 23, § 1:21.  See also Perillo, supra 
note 27, § 1:8(b) ("Unenforceable contracts are those which have 
some legal consequences but which may not be enforced in an 
action for damages or specific performance in the face of 
certain defenses . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)).  
30 Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 2009 WI App 
71, 317 Wis. 2d 772, 767 N.W.2d 614. 
31 Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 2010 WI 44, 
324 Wis. 2d 703, 783 N.W.2d 294. 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
17 
 
judgment against Alexander & Bishop, this court made clear that 
the purchase contract between Ash Park and Alexander & Bishop is 
enforceable.32 
¶51 In the instant case, Ash Park asks the court to 
interpret 
the 
phrase 
"enforceable 
contract" 
in 
a 
manner 
inconsistent with the phrase's ordinary and legal meaning and 
inconsistent with this court's previous decision to enforce the 
purchase contract between Ash Park and Alexander & Bishop.  We 
decline to accept this invitation. 
¶52 We conclude that the purchase contract between Ash 
Park 
and 
Alexander 
& 
Bishop 
constitutes 
an 
"enforceable 
contract" within the meaning of the listing contract between Ash 
Park and Re/Max.  It has already been enforced. 
C 
¶53 Ash Park sets forth two primary counterarguments: (1) 
because Alexander & Bishop was not compelled to satisfy the 
specific performance judgment against it, the purchase contract 
is, as a matter of fact, not enforceable; and (2) requiring Ash 
Park to pay a broker's commission when the sale to Alexander & 
Bishop was never consummated would be contrary to public policy. 
                                                 
32 In upholding the specific performance judgment against 
Alexander & Bishop, this court distinguished Henrikson v. 
Henrikson, 143 Wis. 314, 127 N.W. 962 (1910), in which "there 
was no valid and enforceable contract to transfer land."  Ash 
Park, 324 Wis. 2d 703, ¶44.  The court explained that Henrikson 
was not controlling in the Ash Park case because Henrikson "does 
not address the remedies available to a seller when the buyer 
breaches an enforceable contract for the sale of land."  Id., 
¶44. 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
18 
 
¶54 We address these counterarguments in turn. 
(1) 
¶55 First, Ash Park contends that the court system's 
inability 
to 
successfully 
compel 
Alexander 
& 
Bishop's 
performance means the purchase contract between Ash Park and 
Alexander & Bishop is not enforceable.  Ash Park grounds this 
argument on an unconvincing interpretation of the phrase 
"enforceable contract" and on a comparison of the first and 
fifth clauses of the listing contract's commission section. 
¶56 Relying on the reasoning of the circuit court, Ash 
Park argues that the phrase "enforceable contract" in the 
listing contract is ambiguous. 
¶57 According to Ash Park, one meaning of "enforceable 
contract" is a contract enforceable "in fact."  Under this 
interpretation of the phrase, a contract is enforceable only if 
a breaching party can be forced to perform. 
¶58 Another meaning of "enforceable contract," says Ash 
Park, 
is 
a 
contract 
enforceable 
"in 
law." 
 
Under 
this 
interpretation of the phrase, a contract is enforceable if a 
remedy is available for a breach. 
¶59 Ash Park contends that the former interpretation 
(under which a contract is "enforceable" only if it is 
enforceable "in fact") is the better one.  Ash Park reminds the 
court that ambiguities in a contract are construed against the 
drafter (here, Re/Max). 
¶60 Ash 
Park 
also 
contends 
that 
its 
preferred 
interpretation comports with the expectations of a reasonable 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
19 
 
seller.  In Ash Park's view, a reasonable seller who signs a 
listing contract never intends to incur an obligation to pay a 
broker's commission when the listed property is not actually 
sold, that is, when the seller does not receive the purchase 
price from a buyer.  A seller who enters into a listing contract 
does not intend to be in debt for a commission when no transfer 
of the property has taken place. 
¶61 Next, Ash Park asserts that construing the phrase 
"enforceable contract" to mean a contract that is enforceable 
"in law" would render the fifth clause of the commission section 
of the listing contract superfluous. 
¶62 The fifth clause of the commission section of the 
listing contract entitles Re/Max to a commission if Ash Park 
enters a "valid and binding contract" for the sale of the land.  
According to Ash Park, if the court interprets "enforceable 
contract" to mean a contract enforceable "in law," then no 
difference exists between the phrases "valid and binding 
contract" and "enforceable contract."  To give meaning to both 
the first and fifth clauses of the commission section of the 
listing contract, Ash Park asserts that the court should 
interpret the phrase "enforceable contract" to mean a contract 
enforceable "in fact." 
¶63 We 
decline 
to 
adopt 
Ash 
Park's 
proffered 
interpretation of the phrase "enforceable contract." 
¶64 Ash Park's argument that the phrase "enforceable 
contract" is ambiguous confuses the issue of enforceability of a 
contract with the concept of satisfaction of a judgment.  The 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
20 
 
enforceability of a contract turns on whether there is a remedy 
available for a breach, not on whether a judgment issued in 
response to a breach is satisfied. 
¶65 There is no distinction in the law or in ordinary 
language between the enforceability of a contract "in law" and 
"in fact."  Nor does the listing contract draw such a 
distinction:  The listing contract states that Ash Park shall 
pay Re/Max a broker's commission if Ash Park enters into an 
enforceable 
contract 
for 
the 
sale 
of the 
land, 
not 
an 
enforceable in fact contract for the sale of the land. 
¶66 We will not read words into the contract that the 
parties opted not to include.  Rather, we apply contractual 
language as it is written.  This court's role, after all, is 
"not to make [the] contract[] . . . but to determine what the 
parties contracted to do."33 
¶67 Further, 
despite 
Ash 
Park's 
protestations, 
interpreting the phrase "enforceable contract" to mean a 
contract enforceable "in law" does not render the fifth clause 
of 
the 
commission 
section 
of 
the 
listing 
contract 
mere 
surplusage. 
¶68 The phrases "valid and binding" and "enforceable" have 
been interpreted in varied and sometimes overlapping ways in 
                                                 
33 Tufail, 348 Wis. 2d 631, ¶29. 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
21 
 
contract law.34 Nevertheless, the phrases are not synonymous in 
the legal literature. 
¶69 As one commentator has explained, a contract is "valid 
and binding" if "all of the elements of contract formation have 
been satisfied and there are no fundamental defenses to the 
enforcement of the contract, such as the statute of frauds."35  
Because the phrase "'valid and binding' relates to contract 
formation, [] 'enforceable' must mean something else. Most 
lawyers 
believe 
that 
the 
term 
'enforceable' 
implies 
the 
existence of a remedy for breach, such as an action at law for 
damages."36 
¶70 In sum, our interpretation of the phrase "enforceable 
contract" within the listing contract——the issue raised in the 
petition for review——comports with the phrase's ordinary and 
legal meaning and does not render the "valid and binding" 
portion of the listing contract superfluous.  We therefore 
reject Ash Park's alternative interpretation of the contractual 
language and conclude that the failure of Ash Park and the 
courts to successfully compel Alexander & Bishop's performance 
                                                 
34 "Some authorities distinguish among the concepts of 
legal, valid, binding, and enforceable."  Gregory G. Gosfield, A 
Primer in Real Estate Options, 35 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 129, 
137 n.10 (2000) (discussing the differences between these 
words). 
35 Laurence G. Preble, The Remedies Opinion Revisited: A 
Primer for Real Estate Lawyers, 33 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 63, 
68 (1998). 
36 Id., 70-71. 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
22 
 
does not mean the purchase contract between Ash Park and 
Alexander & Bishop was not enforceable. 
(2) 
¶71 Ash Park's second primary counterargument to the 
determination of the court of appeals and this court that Re/Max 
is entitled to a commission is that requiring Ash Park to pay a 
commission when the sale to Alexander & Bishop was never 
consummated would be contrary to public policy.  There are two 
components to this argument. 
¶72 First, Ash Park urges the court to recognize the 
practical 
consequences 
of 
requiring 
it 
to 
pay 
Re/Max's 
commission in the instant case.  Ash Park did not profit from 
the purchase contract it entered into with Alexander & Bishop 
despite its attempts to enforce that contract,37 and Ash Park 
will now pay $378,000 out of pocket to Re/Max as a commission.  
Had Ash Park declined to enforce the purchase contract, it would 
have retained a portion of the earnest money and would not be 
paying $378,000 out of pocket.38 
                                                 
37 Ash Park did not earn a profit by settling with Alexander 
& Bishop.  As previously explained, the $1.5 million settlement 
Alexander & Bishop paid to Ash Park reflected Ash Park's costs 
for maintaining the property during the time the purchase 
contract was being litigated. 
38 The earnest money provision of the listing contract 
provides that if the sale "fails to close and the earnest money 
is disbursed to Seller, then . . . the earnest money shall be 
paid first to reimburse Broker for cash advances . . . and one 
half of the balance, but not in excess of the agreed commission, 
shall be paid to Broker as Broker's full commission . . . ." 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
23 
 
¶73 Thus, 
Ash 
Park 
contends 
that 
"[t]he 
natural 
consequence of this decision is that innocent sellers face a 
Hobson's choice: try to enforce the contract as the law allows 
or abdicate these legal rights lest the realtor claim hundreds 
of thousands of dollars in commission." 
¶74 Second, 
Ash 
Park 
contends 
that 
this 
court's 
interpretation of the phrase "enforceable contract" defies the 
purpose of the listing contract, which is to effectuate a sale 
of the property by employing a broker to locate a buyer.39  Ash 
Park states: "Suddenly the realtor is no longer the servant of 
the seller; the seller becomes the servant of the realtor. 
Nothing in this contract discloses such a counterintuitive 
understanding." 
¶75 Ash Park's frustration is understandable.  Ash Park 
has done its best to effectuate the sale of its land to 
Alexander & Bishop.  Ash Park agrees that had Alexander & Bishop 
paid for the property (as it was required by law to do), then 
Re/Max would be entitled to a broker's commission.  But 
Alexander & Bishop did not pay, and Ash Park did not receive the 
benefit of its purchase contract.  If Ash Park is required to 
pay a commission to Re/Max under these circumstances, what will 
it be paying for?  In Ash Park's view, Re/Max procured "a buyer 
                                                 
39 Harvey 
L. 
Temkin 
et 
al., 
Commercial 
Real 
Estate 
Transactions in Wisconsin, § 2.3 (2010) (explaining that under a 
listing contract, "a seller hires a broker to find a buyer"). 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
24 
 
unable 
to 
perform" 
and 
thus 
"supplie[d] 
nothing 
of 
value . . . ." 
¶76 The result in the instant case does seem harsh to Ash 
Park.  But the result would be harsh to Re/Max were we to hold 
in Ash Park's favor. 
¶77 Re/Max did what it agreed to do under the listing 
contract.  Upon Re/Max's listing the property, Alexander & 
Bishop made an offer for more than the listing price and Ash 
Park accepted that offer, creating an enforceable contract for 
the sale of the property.  Because an enforceable contract for 
the sale of the property was created, Re/Max earned a commission 
under the listing contract.  Declining to order Ash Park to pay 
Re/Max its commission is not only contrary to the contract 
language; it is also unfair to Re/Max, which expended efforts to 
locate a buyer. 
¶78 By asking the court to disregard the contract language 
to achieve what it views as a fairer result, Ash Park in effect 
asks us to relieve "a party to a freely negotiated contract of 
the burdens of a provision which becomes more onerous than had 
originally been anticipated."40  As we explained previously, this 
is not the court's role.41 
                                                 
40 25 Lord, supra note 23, § 1:1. 
41 The court's role "is not to make contracts or reform them 
but [rather] to determine what the parties contracted to do."  
Marion v. Orson's Camera Ctrs., Inc., 29 Wis. 2d 339, 345, 138 
N.W.2d 733 (1966) (quoting Wis. Marine & Fire Ins. Co. Bank v. 
Wilkin, 95 Wis. 111, 115, 69 N.W. 354 (1897)). 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
25 
 
¶79 Ash Park also overlooks the fact that it had the power 
to condition Re/Max's right to receive a commission upon 
consummation of the sale. 
¶80 Ash Park and Re/Max used the listing contract prepared 
and approved by Wisconsin's Real Estate Examining Board (REEB).42  
REEB-approved listing contracts can be modified; their terms are 
not set in stone.  Existing provisions can be changed or deleted 
and additional provisions can be appended.43 
¶81 Ash Park could have negotiated with Re/Max to modify 
the terms of the commission section of the listing contract by 
conditioning Re/Max's right to a commission on consummation of 
the sale.  Indeed, one commentator has advised: "To avoid 
incurring a commission without a closing, the seller's lawyer 
should consider modifying the language in [the listing contract] 
so that the commission is not earned until the conveyance of the 
property actually closes and title passes."44 
¶82 This court cannot disregard contract terms that Ash 
Park belatedly decides are unacceptable. 
¶83 Finally, 
Wisconsin 
case 
law 
demonstrates 
that 
a 
broker's commission is not ordinarily contingent upon the sale's 
consummation. 
                                                 
42 Wis. Admin. Code § REEB 16.03 (May 2014) ("Approved 
forms"). 
43 Wis. Admin. Code § REEB 16.06 (May 2014) ("How to use 
prepared forms"). 
44 See Temkin et al., supra note 39, § 2.20. 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
26 
 
¶84 This court has previously declared that a broker is 
entitled to a commission if the broker identifies a buyer and 
the buyer and seller enter into an enforceable contract for the 
sale of the property, even if the sale fails to close.45 
¶85 In Wauwatosa Realty Co. v. Paar, 274 Wis. 7, 79 
N.W.2d 125 (1956), a buyer procured by the broker entered into a 
purchase contract with the seller.  The buyer refused to 
purchase the property.  The listing contract did not condition 
payment of the broker's commission on final consummation of the 
transaction.  Accordingly, the Wauwatosa Realty court stated 
that the broker was entitled to its commission despite the 
buyer's default:  "[T]he broker's right to his commission is not 
defeated by a subsequent default on the [buyer's] part unless 
                                                 
45 Scott C. Minter & Debra Peterson Conrad, Wisconsin Real 
Estate Law 5-19 (2014); John L. Horwich et al., Real Estate 
Transactions System § 1.8c (5th ed. 2011).  See also Winston v. 
Minkin, 63 Wis. 2d 46, 51, 216 N.W.2d 38 (1974); Wauwatosa 
Realty Co. v. Paar, 274 Wis. 7, 14-15, 79 N.W.2d 125 (1956); 
McDermott v. Mahoney, 115 N.W. 32, 36-37 (1908). 
See Minter & Conrad, supra, at 5-17. 
The listing contract can provide that the broker will not 
earn a commission unless the sale closes.  See, e.g., Mansfield 
v. Smith, 88 Wis. 2d 575, 586-89, 277 N.W.2d 740 (1979) (general 
rule that seller owes broker commission if seller enters 
contract with buyer, even if buyer later defaults, was not 
applicable per a liquidated damages clause); Walter Kassuba, 
Inc. v. Bauch, 38 Wis. 2d 648, 158 N.W.2d 387 (1968) (listing 
contract provided for payment of a broker's commission if the 
property "is sold," which in the circuit court's view meant the 
sale had to be completed; this court remanded the cause to the 
circuit court to determine what the parties intended the words 
"is sold" to mean in the case at hand). 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
27 
 
[the seller's] promise to the broker is expressed to be 
conditioned upon such actual performance by the [buyer]. . . ."46 
¶86  The court reached a similar conclusion in Kruger v. 
Wesner, 274 Wis. 40, 44, 79 N.W.2d 354 (1956).  In Kruger, the 
contract between the seller and the broker provided that the 
broker would procure a buyer.  The broker procured a buyer, and 
the buyer and seller entered into a purchase contract.  The 
buyer breached the purchase contract.  Because the sale was not 
consummated, the seller refused to pay the broker's commission.   
¶87 The Kruger court, like the Wauwatosa Realty court, 
determined that the broker was entitled to a commission 
notwithstanding the buyer's breach.  The Kruger court explained:  
The courts are practically unanimous in holding that a 
broker employed to sell [] lands earns his commission, 
unless the contract [between the broker and seller] 
contains a stipulation to the contrary, when a [buyer] 
and the [seller] enter into a valid and binding 
contract for the sale . . . of [the] lands.47 
                                                 
46 Wauwatosa Realty Co. v. Paar, 274 Wis. 7, 13-15, 15-16, 
79 N.W.2d 125 (1956) (quoting Restatement (First) of Agency 
§ 445 (1933)). 
47 Kruger v. Wesner, 274 Wis. 40, 44, 79 N.W.2d 354 (1956).  
Kruger followed the reasoning of the Oregon Supreme Court in 
Oregon Home Builders v. Montgomery Investment Co., 184 P. 487, 
492 (1919), which held as follows: 
[T]he literally overwhelming weight of authority is 
that, unless the [seller] and broker have stipulated 
to the contrary, the broker has fully earned his 
commission when the [buyer] and [seller] enter into a 
valid and binding contract for the sale or exchange of 
lands, and the broker's right to recover a commission 
is not, in the absence of bad faith upon his part, 
defeated or even affected by the fact that it 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
28 
 
¶88 Subsequent cases have repeated the rule set forth in 
Wauwatosa Realty and Kruger.48 
¶89 With this precedent in mind, a commentator has written 
that it is settled law in Wisconsin "that if the buyer's valid 
written offer is accepted so as to constitute an enforceable 
contract, then the owner must pay [the] commission even if the 
buyer later defaults."49 
¶90 The 
result 
in 
the 
instant 
case 
comports 
with 
precedent. 
¶91 In sum, Ash Park's counterarguments do not persuade us 
to depart from the ordinary and legal meaning of the phrase 
"enforceable contract" in the listing contract between Ash Park 
and Re/Max.  Under the listing contract, a contract is 
"enforceable" if a remedy is available for a breach.  Thus, to 
determine whether the purchase contract between Ash Park and 
Alexander & Bishop is an "enforceable contract," we need 
determine only whether a remedy is available for a breach. 
                                                                                                                                                             
subsequently develops that the [buyer] is unable to 
complete his contract to buy on account of financial 
inability or is unable to complete the contract to 
exchange on account of inability to transfer a 
merchantable title. 
48 See, e.g., Mansfield v. Smith, 88 Wis. 2d 575, 585-87, 
277 N.W.2d 740 (1979); Winston v. Minkin, 63 Wis. 2d 46, 52, 216 
N.W.2d 38 (1974).  See also Hercules v. Robedeaux, Inc., 110 
Wis. 2d 369, 374-76, 329 N.W.2d 240 (Ct. App. 1982). 
49 Minter & Conrad, supra note 45, at 5-19. 
No. 
2013AP1532   
 
29 
 
¶92 A remedy is indisputably available for a breach of the 
purchase contract between Ash Park and Alexander & Bishop.  
Indeed, Ash Park has already obtained the remedy of specific 
performance for Alexander & Bishop's breach. 
¶93 In response to the sole issue presented for our 
review, we therefore conclude that the purchase contract between 
Ash Park and Alexander & Bishop constitutes an "enforceable 
contract" within the meaning of the listing contract between Ash 
Park and Re/Max.  Re/Max is entitled to a broker's commission 
from Ash Park even though Alexander & Bishop breached the 
purchase contract and the sale was never consummated. 
¶94 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.  The cause is remanded to the circuit court for entry 
of summary judgment in favor of Re/Max; for a determination and 
award of Re/Max's prejudgment interest, costs, and attorney's 
fees; and for a determination of whether Re/Max's broker lien 
should be reinstated. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶95 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
No.  2013AP1532.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶96 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J. (concurring).   The 
majority opinion sets the question upon which Re/Max Select, 
LLC's entitlement to a broker's commission turns as:  "whether 
the purchase contract between Ash Park and Alexander & Bishop 
constitutes an 'enforceable contract' within the meaning of the 
listing contract."1  I would phrase the question to be decided as 
follows:  whether the listing contract between Re/Max and Ash 
Park, LLC, two sophisticated business entities, demonstrates 
that they agreed that closing on a sale of the listed property 
was not required before the right to a realtor's commission 
arose.  I answer that question, "yes."  However, because I have 
grave concerns about the majority opinion being erroneously 
employed to shift the burden to investigate the financial 
ability 
of 
a 
proposed 
purchaser 
from 
the 
broker 
to 
an 
unsophisticated seller, I write in concurrence to the majority 
opinion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶97 The majority opinion fully sets out the facts that 
underlie the dispute before us.  Therefore, I will not repeat 
them. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶98 This review centers on interpreting and applying a 
single party listing contract for the sale of vacant land.  
Interpretation of a written contract is a question of law that 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶32. 
No.  2013AP1532.pdr 
 
2 
 
we review independently of the court of appeals and the circuit 
court while benefitting from their discussions.  Anthony 
Gagliano & Co. v. Openfirst, LLC, 2014 WI 65, ¶32, 355 Wis. 2d 
258, 850 N.W.2d 845.  
B.  Listing Contract Principles 
¶99 There are two lines of cases that run on somewhat 
parallel, but different, tracks when the right to a commission 
is alleged to arise out of a real estate listing contract.  One 
line of cases conditions the right to a commission on the broker 
procuring a purchaser who is "ready, willing, and able to 
purchase upon the terms specified by the owner in the brokerage 
contract."  Grinde v. Chipman, 175 Wis. 376, 377, 185 N.W. 288 
(1921).  "Able" includes the purchaser's "financial ability to 
proceed."  Peter M. Chalik & Assocs. v. Hermes, 56 Wis. 2d 151, 
160, 201 N.W.2d 514 (1972).  We have reasoned that:  
Generally speaking, a purchaser is financially 
ready and able to buy:  (1) If he has the needed cash 
in hand, or (2) if he is personally possessed of 
assets——which in part may consist of the property to 
be purchased——and a credit rating which enable him 
with reasonable certainty to command the requisite 
funds at the required time, or (3) if he has 
definitely arranged to raise the necessary money——or 
as much thereof as he is unable to supply personally——
by obtaining a binding commitment for a loan to him 
for that purpose by a financially able third party, 
irrespective of whether such loan be secured in part 
by the property to be purchased. 
Id. at 162 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
¶100 Therefore, not just any purchaser who signs an offer 
to purchase on terms acceptable to the seller will fulfill the 
criteria necessary for a broker to earn a commission.  Stated 
No.  2013AP1532.pdr 
 
3 
 
otherwise, when a purchaser is unable to perform financially, 
the seller has a defense to payment of a commission.  Id. at 
162-63.  
¶101 The other line of cases is cited in the majority 
opinion.  Those cases generally conclude that the right to a 
commission turns on whether the realtor provided a party who 
entered into a binding contract to purchase the real estate.  
For example, in  Wauwatosa Realty Co. v. Paar, 274 Wis. 7, 79 
N.W.2d 125 (1956), we upheld the right to a commission for the 
broker even though the sale of the real estate never closed.  We 
reasoned that: 
The right of a broker to compensation accrues on 
completion of negotiations and on a meeting of the 
minds of the principal and the customer procured by 
the broker; but, unless provided otherwise in the 
contract of employment, it is not dependent on the 
final 
consummation 
of 
the 
transaction 
or 
the 
performance of the agreement entered into between the 
principal and the customer. 
Id. at 14-15. 
¶102 The above quote from Wauwatosa Realty is interesting 
because we began our discussion in Wauwatosa Realty by saying 
that, "[t]he question involved on this appeal is whether the 
plaintiff 
real-estate 
broker 
procured 
a 
purchaser 
ready, 
willing, and able to purchase the defendants' real estate 
pursuant to the terms of its listing contract so as to entitle 
the plaintiff to a broker's commission."  Id. at 10.  However, 
we never assessed whether the purchaser had the financial 
ability to complete the purchase contract.   
No.  2013AP1532.pdr 
 
4 
 
¶103 In Kruger v. Wesner, 274 Wis. 40, 79 N.W.2d 354 
(1956), where no sale occurred, we concluded that the realtor 
was due a commission, and we opined that: 
It may be generally stated that when a real-
estate broker procures a purchaser who is accepted by 
the owner, and a valid contract is drawn up between 
them, the commission for finding such purchaser is 
earned, although the purchaser later defaults for no 
known 
reason 
. . .; 
or 
because 
the 
purchaser 
deliberately refuses to consummate the contract . . .; 
or because of financial inability of purchaser to 
comply with the contract. 
Id. at 44 (emphasis added).   
¶104 The 
emphasized 
part 
of 
the 
above 
quote 
is 
a 
significant departure from the line of cases that requires a 
purchaser to be financially "able" to complete the sale before a 
commission is due the broker.  See, e.g., Chalik, 56 Wis. 2d at 
163.  Yet, in Kruger, we gave no indication that we were intent 
on changing prior law.  Rather, Kruger appears to be an 
extension of Wauwatosa Realty upon which Kruger says that it 
relies.2  Kruger, 274 Wis. at 44.   
¶105 In Winston v. Minkin, 63 Wis. 2d 46, 216 N.W.2d 38 
(1974), we set out the dispositive issue as, "[w]hether the 
plaintiff procured a buyer ready, willing and able to purchase 
upon the terms specified by the owner in the listing contract or 
acceptable to him."  Id. at 49.  However, once again, 
notwithstanding our statement of the issue, we reasoned that 
                                                 
2 I note that Justice Steinle wrote both the opinion in 
Wauwatosa Realty Co. v. Paar, 274 Wis. 7, 79 N.W.2d 125 (1956) 
and the opinion in Kruger v. Wesner, 274 Wis. 40, 79 N.W.2d 354 
(1956). 
No.  2013AP1532.pdr 
 
5 
 
"when a real estate broker procures a purchaser and a valid and 
enforceable contract is entered into between them the commission 
for procuring a purchaser is earned, even though the purchaser 
may later default."  Id. at 51.  Accordingly, we followed the 
change noted above in Kruger, even though we continued to give 
lip service to the "ready, willing and able" language of the 
earlier cases.  Stated otherwise, Winston continued to shift the 
responsibility to investigate the financial ability of the 
proposed purchaser from the broker to the seller. 
¶106 Why did we make this change?  It appears that in 
Kruger, 
we 
concluded 
that 
the 
seller 
had 
a 
"reasonable 
opportunity to investigate" the purchaser's financial ability to 
proceed, and if the seller needed additional assurances of the 
purchaser being "able" to close on the sale, it was the seller's 
obligation to obtain whatever assurances he needed before 
entering into a binding contract with him.  See Kruger, 274 Wis. 
at 45.   
¶107 Imposing 
the 
responsibility 
to 
investigate 
the 
financial ability of a proposed purchaser onto a sophisticated 
seller may have been a sufficient reason for this shift of 
responsibility from the broker to the seller.  However, I have 
grave doubts that this shift in responsibility is fair to the 
unsophisticated seller of real estate, who signs a standard form 
listing contract believing he or she will pay any commission due 
under the listing contract from the proceeds of a sale that the 
broker facilitates.    
No.  2013AP1532.pdr 
 
6 
 
C.  Re/Max–Ash Park Listing Contract 
¶108 Re/Max's claim comes from the listing contract that 
Ash Park signed.  In regard to Re/Max's right to a commission, 
the listing contract provides in relevant part:  
COMMISSION:  Seller shall pay Broker's commission, 
which shall be earned if, during the term of this 
Listing: 
1) Seller sells or accepts an offer which creates an 
enforceable contract for the sale of all or any part 
of the Property; 
. . . .  
5) A purchaser is procured for the Property by Broker, 
by Seller, or by any other person, at the price and on 
substantially the same terms set forth in this Listing 
and in the standard provisions of the current WB-13 
VACANT LAND OFFER TO PURCHASE, even if Seller does not 
accept this purchaser's offer. 
. . . .  
PROCURE:  A purchaser is procured when a valid and 
binding contract of sale is entered into between the 
Seller and the purchaser or when a ready, willing and 
able purchaser submits a written offer at the price 
and on substantially the terms specified in this 
Listing.  A purchaser is ready, willing and able when 
the purchaser submitting the written offer has the 
ability to complete the purchaser's obligations under 
the written offer.  
(emphasis added). 
¶109 Re/Max asserts that pursuant to the listing contract, 
the Ash Park—Alexander & Bishop contract is an enforceable 
contract entitling it to a commission under conditions 1 and 5 
above, and that it has "procured" a purchaser because Ash Park 
and Alexander & Bishop entered into a binding contract for the 
purchase of the listed real estate.  The listing contract's 
No.  2013AP1532.pdr 
 
7 
 
definition of "procuring," which includes providing a purchaser 
who is "ready, willing and able" to complete the sale is an 
alternative to, not an addition to, entering into an enforceable 
contract.  Therefore, under the listing contract, the right to a 
commission ripens when an enforceable contract is entered into, 
even if the purchaser is financially unable to complete the 
purchase.  In sum, the listing contract sets a condition for 
earning a commission as follows:  whether Ash Park and Alexander 
& Bishop entered into an enforceable contract.  
¶110 By our decision affirming an order of specific 
performance of the Ash Park-Alexander & Bishop sales contract, 
we previously concluded that their contract is an enforceable 
contract.  Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 2010 WI 
44, ¶96, 324 Wis. 2d 703, 783 N.W.2d 294.  Accordingly, I have 
no 
trouble 
concluding 
that 
the 
same 
contract 
remains 
"enforceable" when we are interpreting the listing contract.  
However, I have concerns about having the enforceability of the 
purchase contract be the end of our discussion.   
¶111 Those concerns arise here because of the circuit 
court's finding that Alexander & Bishop was financially unable 
No.  2013AP1532.pdr 
 
8 
 
to perform,3 and because of representations that Ash Park settled 
its lawsuit against Alexander & Bishop because of Alexander & 
Bishop's insolvency.4  However, of greater concern to me is the 
unsophisticated seller of real estate who may not understand the 
import of the provisions of the WB-13 listing contract as it 
affects his or her obligation to pay a real estate commission.  
¶112 Here, Ash Park is a sophisticated business entity, 
represented by able counsel, with the ability and knowledge 
needed to investigate the financial wherewithal of Alexander & 
Bishop or to request modification of a listing contract to 
require closing on a sale before the right to a commission 
arises.  That weighs in favor of affirming the court of appeals.   
                                                 
3 "The reality of it is the realtor brought to these 
sellers a buyer who couldn't afford to buy the 
property.  And in the end it was the buyer's inability 
to be able to buy the property, he couldn't get 
financing for it, he didn't have enough money in a 
bank account, he didn't have a deep enough pocket to 
go to, he couldn't do it."  
Transcript of Motion Hearing at 14, Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & 
Bishop, Ltd., No. 07CV2832 (Brown Cnty. Cir. Ct., June 13, 
2011).  
4 Alexander & Bishop represented:  "Ash Park and its 
principal is aware that Alexander & Bishop has no liquid assets 
in which to specifically perform——that is why it accepted the 
settlement agreement which called for a $1.2 million dollar 
payment to be made by the way of a loan.  []  It also received 
numerous letters from Banks demonstrating that they would not be 
willing to loan money to Alexander & Bishop to buy the 
property." 
Brief in Opposition of Motions for Contempt and Appointment of a 
Receiver and in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement at 6-7, Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., No. 
07CV2832 (Brown Cnty. Cir. Ct., Feb. 14, 2011).   
No.  2013AP1532.pdr 
 
9 
 
¶113 However, because I have concerns for the residential 
homeowner who lists his or her property using a standard form 
listing contract, without the aid of an attorney, and is unaware 
that he or she may be incurring an obligation to pay a 
commission when no sale occurs, I write in concurrence to draw 
attention to the potential hardship our decision is capable of 
producing if it is erroneously applied in a different context to 
an unsophisticated seller of real estate.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶114 Because the question to be decided occurs in the 
context of a listing contract between two sophisticated business 
entities, Re/Max and Ash Park, I conclude that the listing 
contract demonstrates that they agreed that closing on a sale of 
the listed property was not required before the right to a 
realtor's commission arose.  However, I have grave concerns 
about the majority opinion being erroneously employed to shift 
the burden to investigate the financial ability of a proposed 
purchaser 
from 
the 
broker 
to 
an 
unsophisticated 
seller.  
Therefore, I write in concurrence to the majority opinion.   
 
 
No.  2013AP1532.pdr 
 
 
 
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