Case Title: Clouser v. Marie

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89, 2022

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2022-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JEFFREY CLOUSER, 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
LISA MARIE, 
 
Defendant Below, Appellee. 
 
§ 
§  No. 89, 2022 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  C.A. No. N21C-03-166 
§   
§    
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  August 12, 2022  
 
 
 
 
  Decided:  October 4, 2022 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Jeffrey Clouser, appeals from the Superior Court’s 
February 14, 2022 order dismissing Clouser’s amended complaint asserting breach 
of contract and other claims against the appellee, Lisa Marie.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(2) 
Clouser filed the operative, amended complaint in April 2021 in the 
Superior Court.  The amended complaint alleged that on Friday March 13, 2020, 
Clouser contacted Marie, who is a real estate agent, to inquire about viewing two 
houses that were for sale on Murphy Road in North Wilmington.  Clouser and Marie 
met that afternoon to tour those properties, and Marie suggested that Clouser might 
be interested in touring another nearby home that was also for sale.  Clouser and 
Marie then toured that property, 227 Murphy Road, after which Clouser indicated 
2 
 
that he was interested in purchasing that property because it was ideally located for 
his transition to a home-based business.  The amended complaint alleged that Marie 
orally agreed to represent Clouser in potentially purchasing the property.  Clouser 
stated that he would like his wife to see the property, and Marie indicated that she 
would fit a second tour of the property into her weekend schedule.   
(3) 
The amended complaint alleged that Marie did not contact Clouser to 
arrange a second tour during that weekend.  Clouser therefore sent a text message to 
Marie on Monday March 16, 2020, asking when she would be in North Wilmington.  
On Thursday March 19, 2020, Marie responded by text, apologizing for the delay in 
her response and indicating that a family emergency had arisen but that she would 
be back at work the following day.  Clouser expressed sympathy and asked Marie to 
contact him again when things settled down for her.  That same day, Thursday March 
19, 2020, the Governor ordered the closure of many businesses because of the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  The amended complaint alleged no further contact between 
the parties following their text exchange on March 19.  The property at 227 Murphy 
Road sold to another purchaser approximately two months later.   
(4) 
The amended complaint alleged that the parties formed an oral contract 
for Marie to represent Clouser in purchasing 227 Murphy Road.  It asserted six 
counts for which he sought relief: (i) breach of contract; (ii) fraudulent 
misrepresentation; (iii) tortious interference with prospective business relations; (iv) 
3 
 
slander per se; (v) “personal injury of mental suffering and emotional distress;” and 
(vi) “identifying unknown defendant.”  Marie moved to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim or, alternatively, for judgment on the pleadings.  On February 14, 2022, the 
Superior Court issued a memorandum opinion granting Marie’s motion to dismiss.1  
The court held that the amended complaint failed to state a claim for breach of 
contract because the facts alleged did not support a reasonable inference that Clouser 
and Marie entered into a binding contract or that Clouser suffered damages.2  The 
court held that the amended complaint also failed to state a claim as to the other 
causes of action.3   
(5) 
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to dismiss a 
complaint for failure to state a claim or to grant judgment on the pleadings.4  “A 
motion for judgment on the pleadings may be granted only when no material issue 
of fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”5  “In 
deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a trial court must accept as true 
all well-pled allegations of fact and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s 
 
1 Clouser v. Marie, 2022 WL 453551 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2022). 
2 Id. at *3-4. 
3 Id. at *3. 
4 See Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 166 A.3d 912, 925 (Del. 2017) (“This 
Court reviews de novo the Court of Chancery’s grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings.”); 
VLIW Tech., LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 840 A.2d 606, 610 (Del. 2003) (stating that the Supreme 
Court reviews de novo a trial court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim). 
5 Chicago Bridge, 166 A.3d at 925. 
4 
 
favor, but a court is not required to accept every strained interpretation proposed by 
the plaintiff.”6 
(6) 
On appeal, Clouser argues that the Superior Court erred by holding that 
the amended complaint did not sufficiently allege that the parties entered into a 
binding oral or implied-in-fact contract.7  The Superior Court determined that the 
amended complaint did not allege sufficiently definite contract terms to support a 
conclusion that the parties entered into a binding contract.8  We agree.  “[I]n general, 
‘the formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of 
mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.’”9  “In other words, there must 
be a ‘meeting of the minds’ that there is a contract supported by consideration.”10  
The amended complaint did not allege facts that support a reasonable inference that 
a “meeting of the minds” occurred here.  In particular, as the Superior Court correctly 
concluded, the amended complaint did not allege sufficiently definite contract 
terms—specifically, the type or amount of consideration that Clouser would provide 
 
6 Caspian Alpha Long Credit Fund, L.P. v. GS Mezzanine Partners 2006, L.P., 93 A.3d 1203, 1205 
(Del. 2014). 
7 See Clouser, 2022 WL 453551, at *3-4 (explaining the differing factual circumstances that lead 
to the formation of an implied-in-fact contract and an oral contract). 
8 Id. at *4. 
9 Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v. Campbell, 187 A.3d 1209, 1212 (Del. 2018) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981)). 
10 Id. 
5 
 
to Marie for her services—to suggest that the parties formed an enforceable 
contract.11 
(7) 
Clouser also argues that the Superior Court erroneously held that “there 
was no consideration for the putative oral contract, not even the speculative 
consideration Clouser claims Marie would have received if he were able to buy” 227 
Murphy Road, because under 24 Del. C. § 2930(a) “Clouser had no obligation to pay 
compensation to Marie absent a written contract.”12  Because we agree with the 
Superior Court’s determination that the amended complaint did not allege facts 
sufficient to infer that the parties agreed to—or even discussed—the consideration 
that Clouser would provide for Marie’s services, we need not consider whether the 
absence of a written brokerage agreement under Section 2930 prevented the parties 
from forming an enforceable contract.  For the same reason, we need not reach 
Clouser’s contention that the Superior Court erred by concluding that the amended 
complaint failed to state a claim for breach of contract because it did not sufficiently 
allege damages.   
 
11 Id. at 1232 (“A contract is sufficiently definite and certain to be enforceable if the court can—
based upon the agreement’s terms and applying proper rules of construction and principles of 
equity—ascertain what the parties have agreed to do.”). 
12 Clouser, 2022 WL 453551, at *4.  Title 24, Section 2930(a) of the Delaware Code provides, in 
part:  “Nothing in this chapter obligates a buyer, tenant, seller or landlord to pay compensation to 
a broker or brokerage organization unless that party has entered into a written brokerage agreement 
with the broker or brokerage organization specifying the compensation terms.”  24 Del. C. § 
2930(a). 
6 
 
(8) 
Finally, Clouser contends that the Superior Court erred by considering 
Marie’s “arguments from outside the Answer” when deciding the motion to dismiss 
or for judgment on the pleadings.  Clouser has not sufficiently articulated this claim 
of error to enable this Court to review it.13  In any event, for the reasons discussed 
above, we conclude that the Superior Court appropriately applied the applicable 
standards when deciding the motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that judgment of the Superior Court 
is AFFIRMED.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Chief Justice 
 
13 See DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 14(b)(vi)(3) (“The merits of any argument that is not raised in the body 
of the opening brief shall be deemed waived and will not be considered by the Court on appeal.”).