Case Title: State v. John Lee Laxton

Citation: 2002 WI 82

Docket Number: 1999AP003164

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 82 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
99-3164 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Commitment of John Lee Laxton: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
John Lee Laxton,  
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 1, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
May 30, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Mel Flanagan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Margaret A. Maroney, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by 
Eileen W. Pray, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 82 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  99-3164  
(L.C. No. 
98-C1-13) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Commitment of John Lee Laxton: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
John Lee Laxton,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case involves a 
constitutional challenge to Wis. Stat. ch. 980 (1997-98)1, the 
sexually violent person commitment law.  Petitioner John Lee 
Laxton, who was involuntarily committed to institutional care 
under ch. 980, argues that the statute is unconstitutional 
because it violates substantive due process guarantees in the 
United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  Specifically, Laxton 
argues that ch. 980 is unconstitutional because, in determining 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
99-3164   
 
2 
 
that an individual is sexually violent and subject to civil 
commitment, the provisions of the chapter do not require a jury 
to determine that the person has a mental disorder that involves 
serious difficulty in controlling his or her behavior.  While he 
no longer argues for a separate finding on the control issue, 
Laxton claims that the requisite link or nexus is missing.2 
¶2 
We conclude that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 is constitutional.  
Based on recent precedent addressing due process challenges to 
ch. 980, and particularly the United States Supreme Court's 
guidance in Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S. Ct. 867 
(2002), which addressed a similar due process issue, we conclude 
that such a civil commitment does not require a separate finding 
that 
the 
individual's 
mental 
disorder 
involves 
serious 
difficulty for such person to control his or her behavior.  The 
requisite proof of lack of control is established when the nexus 
between such person's mental disorder and dangerousness has been 
established.  Specifically, we conclude that evidence showing 
that the person's mental disorder predisposes such individual to 
engage in acts of sexual violence, and evidence establishing a 
substantial probability that such person will again commit such 
acts, necessarily and implicitly includes proof that such 
                                                 
2 We note that originally Laxton argued in his brief that 
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002), requires a 
separate factual finding that the subject of the petition has a 
mental disorder that makes it "seriously difficult" to control 
his or her behavior.  At oral argument Laxton's counsel 
clarified that she was no longer arguing, on Laxton's behalf, 
that a separate factual determination is required.  
No. 
99-3164   
 
3 
 
person's 
mental 
disorder 
involves 
serious 
difficulty 
in 
controlling his or her behavior.  Such evidence distinguishes 
such a person from the dangerous but typical recidivist.  We 
further conclude that the jury instructions at Laxton's trial 
were proper and did not deprive him of due process of law, and 
we reject his argument requesting a new trial on the basis that 
the real controversy was not fully and fairly tried. 
I 
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  In 1987, John 
Lee Laxton was convicted of three counts of second-degree sexual 
assault and two counts of child abduction3 in Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court.4  He was sentenced to eleven years in prison, 
where he remained until he was paroled in May of 1994.  Five 
months later, in October of 1994, Laxton was arrested for window 
peeping at two young girls.  As a result, Laxton's parole was 
revoked and he was convicted of disorderly conduct. 
¶4 
On September 11, 1998, shortly before Laxton would be 
released from prison, the State filed a petition seeking to 
commit Laxton as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 
980.  A jury trial was held in Milwaukee County Circuit Court on 
                                                 
3 Former Wis. Stat. § 940.32 (1985-1986) related to child 
abduction and was repealed effective July 1, 1989.  See 1987 Act 
332, § 36. 
4 It is not necessary to discuss the factual basis of these 
convictions in detail.  We note, however, that the victims were 
two 12 year-old girls, and that the assaults occurred in two 
separate incidents on the same morning, approximately thirty 
minutes apart. 
No. 
99-3164   
 
4 
 
July 19 through 22, 1999.  During trial, several experts 
testified to diagnosing Laxton with pedophilia, voyeurism, 
and/or paraphilia, not otherwise specified.5  When giving the 
jury instructions, the circuit court judge, the Honorable Mel 
Flanagan, presiding, explained that in order to find that Laxton 
is a sexually violent person, the State must prove three facts 
beyond a reasonable doubt:  (1) "[Laxton] has been convicted of 
a sexually violent offense;" (2) "[Laxton] has a mental 
disorder;" and (3) "[Laxton] is dangerous to others because he 
has a mental disorder which creates a substantial probability 
that he will engage in acts of sexual violence."  With regard to 
the last fact, the circuit court judge also instructed, "A 
substantial probability means much more likely than not."  The 
court further instructed the jury on the meaning of acts of 
sexual violence:  "Acts of sexual violence means acts which 
would constitute sexually violent offenses.  Acts of window 
peeping or exposure of the penis, absent any other behavior 
toward another person, do not alone constitute sexually violent 
offenses under chapter 980."  Laxton's counsel did not object to 
the circuit court's final jury instructions.  The jury found 
that Laxton was a sexually violent person.   
¶5 
After the verdict, Laxton filed a postconviction 
motion, arguing in part that the jury was improperly instructed 
                                                 
5 We recognize that not all of the experts agreed as to 
Laxton's diagnoses, specifically, pedophilia.  The State's two 
experts, Dr. Timothy McGuire and Dr. Sheila Fields, both 
testified that Laxton's mental disorders affected his emotional 
and volitional capacity. 
No. 
99-3164   
 
5 
 
on the meaning of sexually violent offenses.  The circuit court 
denied Laxton's postconviction motion, entered judgment on the 
jury's verdict, and Laxton was then committed to the Wisconsin 
Resource Center pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)6. 
¶6 
Laxton appealed from the judgment and order of 
commitment, arguing that the jury instruction was inappropriate 
and that in the interest of justice he should receive a new 
trial.  The Court of Appeals, District I, summarily affirmed the 
circuit court's decision.  The court concluded that Laxton 
failed to preserve his objection to the jury instruction at 
trial, and that no grounds exist for a discretionary reversal. 
¶7 
Laxton now seeks review in this court.  In addition to 
reviewing the court of appeals' decision, however, we instructed 
the parties "to address whether [Laxton's] due process rights 
were violated because there was no jury determination regarding 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.06(2)(a) states: 
The court shall enter an initial commitment order 
under this section pursuant to a hearing held as soon 
as practicable after the judgment that the person who 
is the subject of a petition under s. 980.02 is a 
sexually violent person is entered.  If the court 
lacks sufficient information to make the determination 
required by par. (b) immediately after trial, it may 
adjourn the hearing and order the department to 
conduct 
a 
predisposition 
investigation 
using 
the 
procedure in s. 972.15 or a supplementary mental 
examination, or both, to assist the court in framing 
the 
commitment 
order. 
 
A 
supplementary 
mental 
examination under this paragraph shall be conducted in 
accordance with s. 971.17(2)(b) to (f). 
No. 
99-3164   
 
6 
 
his level of volitional control."  State v. Laxton, No. 99-3164 
(order dated January 29, 2002). 
II 
¶8 
We first address Laxton's constitutional challenge to 
Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  The constitutionality of a statute is a 
question of law that this court addresses independently, while 
benefiting from the analyses of the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 301, 541 N.W.2d 115 
(1995). 
 
We 
presume 
all 
legislative 
enactments 
are 
constitutional, 
and 
resolve 
doubts 
in 
favor 
of 
the 
constitutionality of the statute at issue.  State v. Randall, 
192 Wis. 2d 800, 824, 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995).  The challenger 
bears the burden of proving the statute unconstitutional beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  Id.   
¶9 
In order to commit an individual under Wis. Stat. ch. 
980, a jury must find that the individual is a sexually violent 
person. 
"Sexually violent person" means a person who has been 
convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been 
adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, 
or has been found not guilty of or not responsible for 
a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity or 
mental 
disease, 
defect 
or 
illness, 
and 
who 
is 
dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental 
disorder that makes it substantially probable that the 
person will engage in acts of sexual violence. 
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).  
Further, ch. 
980 defines "mental 
disorder" as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the 
emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to 
engage in acts of sexual violence."  § 980.01(2).   
No. 
99-3164   
 
7 
 
¶10 Laxton asserts that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 violates 
substantive 
due 
process 
guarantees 
in 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, 
Amendment 
V 
and 
XIV, 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, Article I, § 8.7  This case does not present the 
                                                 
7Although Laxton relies on both the United States and 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions, 
he 
does 
not 
explain 
how 
the 
constitutional protections differ.  The United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions provide similar due process guarantees; 
therefore, we do not distinguish between the constitutional 
protections in this case. 
Amendment V to the United States Constitution states in 
relevant part: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, 
nor 
be 
deprived 
of 
life, 
liberty, 
or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
Amendment XIV to the United States Constitution states in 
relevant part: 
Section 1.  All persons born or naturalized in the 
United 
States, 
and 
subject 
to 
the 
jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside.  No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
No. 
99-3164   
 
8 
 
first due process challenge to ch. 980 or a similar sexually 
violent person commitment law.  Since both parties rely heavily 
on a handful of Wisconsin cases that have previously addressed 
constitutional challenges to ch. 980, and United States Supreme 
Court cases addressing the constitutionality of a similar 
statute in Kansas, we first use those cases to provide the 
context within which this substantive due process challenge will 
be reviewed.8 
¶11 This court first addressed substantive due process 
challenges to Wis. Stat. ch. 980 in State v. Post, 197 
                                                                                                                                                             
Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution states 
in relevant part:  "No person may be held to answer for a 
criminal offense without due process of law, and no person for 
the same offense may be put twice in jeopardy of punishment, nor 
may be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself or herself." 
8 The Due Process Clauses of the United States and Wisconsin 
Constitutions 
protect both 
substantive 
and 
procedural due 
process rights.  Substantive due process prevents the government 
from engaging in conduct that "shocks the conscience."  United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).  "Governmental 
action violates 'substantive due process' when the action in 
question, while adhering to the forms of law, unjustifiably 
abridges the Constitution's fundamental constraints upon the 
content of what government may do to people under the guise of 
the law."  Reginald D. v. State, 193 Wis. 2d 299, 307, 533 
N.W.2d 181 (1995).  Procedural due process further requires that 
even though "government action depriving a person of life, 
liberty, or property survives substantive due process scrutiny, 
it must still be implemented in a fair manner."  Salerno, 481 
U.S. at 746.  Here, Laxton argues that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
violates substantive due process. 
No. 
99-3164   
 
9 
 
Wis. 2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).9  We looked at several 
characteristics of ch. 980 and concluded that the statute was 
constitutional.  Id. at 303.  First, we concluded that the 
definition and use of the term "mental disorder" is sufficiently 
tailored to satisfy the mental condition component required by 
substantive due process.  Id.  The key to constitutionality is 
that the definition of mental disorder requires a nexus:  
"[P]ersons will not fall within chapter 980's reach unless they 
are diagnosed with a disorder that has the specific effect of 
predisposing them to engage in acts of sexual violence."  Id. at 
306.  Second, we concluded that treatment is a bona fide 
objective and goal of ch. 980.  Id. at 311.  Third, we concluded 
that the statute's definition of dangerousness——that a mental 
disorder makes it substantially probable that the person will 
engage in acts of sexual violence——is constitutionally sound.  
Id. at 313.  Finally, we concluded that the nature and duration 
of commitment is consistent with the legislature's purposes of 
protecting the community and providing treatment for persons 
                                                 
9 The companion case, State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 
541 N.W.2d 105 (1995), addressed whether Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
violated the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses of the 
United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  We concluded that 
ch. 980 did not violate either constitutional provision because 
the statute was intended primarily to protect the public and 
provide 
concentrated 
treatment 
rather 
than 
punishment.  
Furthermore, we note that in State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 541 
N.W.2d 115 (1995), the court also concluded that ch. 980 does 
not violate equal protection guarantees. 
 
No. 
99-3164   
 
10 
 
suffering from mental disorders that predispose them to commit 
sexually violent acts.  Id. 
¶12 After Post, Wis. Stat. ch. 980 was amended, see 1999 
Wis. Act 9, §§ 3216d-3239d, and in an opinion of today's date, 
we again uphold the constitutionality of ch. 980 in the face of 
due process challenges to the revised statute.  State v. Rachel, 
2002 WI 81, ¶70, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.10  The 
amendments largely focused on limiting a ch. 980 respondent's 
ability to seek supervised release as an alternative to 
institutional commitment.  Id. at ¶7.  We conclude in Rachel 
that ch. 980, as amended, continues to serve the legitimate and 
compelling state interests of providing treatment to the 
dangerously mentally ill and protecting the public from the 
dangerously mentally ill; therefore, it is still narrowly 
tailored 
to 
meet 
those 
interests 
and 
does 
not 
violate 
substantive due process.  Id. at ¶68.  
¶13 In addition to Post and Rachel, two United States 
Supreme Court cases upholding the constitutionality of the 
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02 
(1994) (hereinafter the Kansas Act), help to frame Laxton's 
substantive due process challenge here.  The Kansas Act 
establishes procedures for the civil commitment of persons who, 
                                                 
10 We note that like Post, State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, addresses double jeopardy and ex 
post facto challenges in addition to the substantive due process 
challenge. 
No. 
99-3164   
 
11 
 
due to a mental abnormality or a personality disorder, are 
likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.   
¶14 In Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), the 
United States Supreme Court concluded that the Kansas Act's 
definition of "mental abnormality"11 satisfies due process 
requirements.  The Court rejected Hendricks' argument that a 
finding of "mental illness" is a prerequisite for commitment, 
noting that the Court "ha[s] never required state legislatures 
to 
adopt 
any 
particular 
nomenclature 
in 
drafting 
civil 
commitment statutes."  Id. at 359.  Significantly, commitment 
under the Kansas Act requires the state to prove dangerousness, 
coupled with proof of a mental abnormality, which the Court 
concluded is sufficient for due process purposes.  Id. at 360.  
The Court also noted that in the case at hand, Hendricks was 
diagnosed 
as 
a 
pedophile, 
which 
qualifies 
as 
a 
mental 
abnormality, and that Hendricks conceded a lack of volitional 
control.  Id. 
¶15 Recently, the United States Supreme Court revisited 
the Kansas Act in Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S. Ct. 867 
(2002).  The Court, again, upheld the Kansas Act under a due 
                                                 
11 A "mental abnormality" was defined, in turn, as a 
"congenital 
or 
acquired 
condition 
affecting 
the 
emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the 
person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree 
constituting such person a menace to the health and 
safety of others." 
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 352 (1997) (quoting Kan. 
Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02(b)). 
No. 
99-3164   
 
12 
 
process challenge, focusing largely on the requisite proof of 
lack of volitional control required for civil commitment of a 
sexually 
violent 
person. 
 
The 
Kansas 
Supreme 
Court 
had 
interpreted Hendricks as constitutionally requiring a finding 
that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior.  In re 
Crane, 7 P.3d 285 (Kan. 2000).  On review, the Court vacated 
that decision and concluded that "lack of control" is not given 
a narrow or technical meaning.  Crane, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. 
Ct. at 870.  Instead, the focus is on the nexus between the 
mental abnormality and the level of dangerousness, and whether 
those requirements are sufficient to distinguish a dangerous 
sexual offender from the dangerous but typical recidivist. 
[W]e recognize that in cases where lack of control is 
at issue, "inability to control behavior" will not be 
demonstrable with mathematical precision.  It is 
enough to say that there must be proof of serious 
difficulty in controlling behavior.  And this, when 
viewed in light of such features of the case as the 
nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity 
of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient 
to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose 
serious 
mental 
illness, 
abnormality, 
or 
disorder 
subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous 
but 
typical recidivist 
convicted 
in an 
ordinary 
criminal case. 
Id. (emphasis added).  The Court noted that in Hendricks, and as 
required under the Kansas Act, the presence of a mental 
disorder——under 
which 
a 
"critical 
distinguishing 
feature" 
consisted of a serious lack of ability to control behavior——
draws the line between a dangerous sexual offender subject to 
civil commitment and the typical recidivist.  Id. 
No. 
99-3164   
 
13 
 
¶16 In drawing this conclusion, the Court specifically 
rejected an "absolutist approach" and commented that the Court 
provides constitutional guidance but not bright-line rules in 
the area of mental illness.  Id.  The court agreed that 
Hendricks does not set forth a requirement of "total or complete 
lack of control," but also that a dangerous sexual offender 
cannot be committed "without any lack-of-control determination."  
Id. (emphasis in original).  Furthermore, the Court reinforced 
the 
conclusion 
that 
in 
the 
area 
of 
mental 
illness, 
constitutional safeguards are "not always best enforced through 
precise bright-line rules."  Id. at 871.  The Court noted, 
"States retain considerable leeway in defining the mental 
abnormalities and personality disorders that make an individual 
eligible for commitment."  Id. (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 
359; id. at 374-375 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).  Moreover, the 
Court commented that in providing constitutional guidance in the 
area of mental illness, the Court has done so "by proceeding 
deliberately and contextually, elaborating generally stated 
constitutional 
standards 
and 
objectives 
as 
specific 
circumstances require."  Crane, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S.Ct. at 
871. 
III 
¶17 We now turn to Laxton's argument that ch. 980 violates 
his right to the due process of law.  Laxton asserts that under 
Crane, involuntary civil commitment requires proof that the 
subject of the petition has serious difficulty in controlling 
his behavior, and that as written, ch. 980 falls short of that 
No. 
99-3164   
 
14 
 
constitutional substantive due process requirement.  To state 
this another way, Laxton claims that ch. 980 is unconstitutional 
because it fails to narrow the class of persons eligible for 
commitment to those who have serious difficulty in controlling 
their dangerousness in a manner distinct from the typical 
recidivist.   
¶18 Although Laxton does not argue that a jury is required 
to make a separate factual finding regarding the individual's 
lack of volitional control, he asserts that the statutory 
definitions of "mental disorder" and "sexually violent person" 
in Wis. Stat. ch. 980 fail to contain the requisite link to an 
individual's serious difficulty in controlling behavior.  He 
argues that "mental disorder," as defined, does not require a 
link between the mental disorder and the person's behavioral 
control.  With regard to the definition of sexually violent 
person, Laxton claims that finding a mental disorder that makes 
it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of 
sexual violence is not the equivalent of a determination that 
the individual has serious difficulty controlling behavior.12  
                                                 
12 Laxton argues that "substantial probability" is not 
constitutionally sufficient because the finding of dangerousness 
is not directed to the person's present serious difficulty in 
controlling behavior.  We reject this argument.  Wisconsin ch. 
980 focuses on such person's present mental disorder and links 
the mental disorder with the requisite level of dangerousness——a 
substantial probability that he or she will engage in acts of 
sexual violence.  
Consequently, dangerous 
individuals are 
subject to civil commitment under ch. 980 because of a present 
mental disorder involving serious difficulty controlling his or 
her behavior. 
No. 
99-3164   
 
15 
 
Moreover, even if substantial probability and serious difficulty 
could be equated, Laxton asserts that nothing in the statute 
requires a link between the danger of re-offending to the 
person's serious difficulty in controlling behavior. 
¶19 Finally, Laxton argues that the court should not 
interpret ch. 980 as implicitly containing a "serious difficulty 
requirement."  Rather, Laxton contends that the statute could be 
easily 
cured 
of 
the 
constitutional 
error 
by 
explicitly 
incorporating "serious difficulty in controlling behavior" into 
the definition of mental disorder or sexually violent person, 
but it is the role of the legislature, not the court, to do so. 
¶20 The State disagrees with Laxton and argues that Wis. 
Stat. ch. 980, as written, implicitly requires proof that the 
respondent has serious difficulty controlling his behavior.  
According to the State, due process guarantees are satisfied 
because, based on the proof required for a jury to determine 
that 
an 
individual 
is 
a 
sexually 
violent 
person 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7), the State necessarily must prove that 
the person's control is sufficiently impaired to justify 
involuntary commitment.  Pursuant to the definitions of "mental 
disorder" and "sexually violent person," ch. 980 requires proof 
that the person has a qualifying mental condition, that the 
mental condition affects his volitional or emotional capacity, 
and that the person's mental disorder makes it substantially 
probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence.  
The State contends that it is evident from the proof required to 
establish that an individual is sexually violent, that the 
No. 
99-3164   
 
16 
 
statutory terms necessarily include serious difficulty in the 
ability to control dangerous behavior.  Simply stated, the State 
argues that the concept of control is necessarily encompassed by 
the statutory criteria of a mental disorder and dangerousness. 
¶21 We agree.  Civil commitment under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
does not require a separate factual finding regarding the 
individual's serious difficulty in controlling behavior.  In 
Crane, the United States Supreme Court rejected an absolutist 
approach, stating that "the Constitution's safeguards of human 
liberty in the area of mental illness and the law are not always 
best enforced through precise bright-line rules."  534 U.S. at 
___, 122 S. Ct. at 871.  Crane holds that there must be proof of 
a mental disorder and a link between the mental disorder and the 
individual's lack of control.  Significantly, however, the Court 
recognized that lack of control is not "demonstrable with 
mathematical precision."  534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 870.  
"It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious 
difficulty in controlling behavior."  Id.  We conclude that the 
required proof of lack of control, therefore, may be established 
by evidence of the individual's mental disorder and requisite 
level of dangerousness, which together distinguish a dangerous 
No. 
99-3164   
 
17 
 
sexual offender who has serious difficulty controlling his or 
her behavior from a dangerous but typical recidivist.13   
¶22 Wisconsin 
ch. 
980 
satisfies 
this 
due 
process 
requirement because the statute requires a nexus between the 
mental disorder and the individual's dangerousness.  Proof of 
this nexus necessarily and implicitly involves proof that the 
person's mental disorder involves serious difficulty for the 
person to control his or her behavior.  The definition of a 
sexually violent person requires, in part, that the individual 
is "dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder 
that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage 
in acts of sexual violence."  Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) (emphasis 
added).  As we recognized in Post, these statutory requirements 
do not sweep too broadly.  The nexus——linking a mental disorder 
                                                 
13 Our 
interpretation 
of 
Crane 
is 
consistent 
with 
interpretations from other jurisdictions.  See People v. 
Ghilotti, 44 P.3d 949 (Cal. 2002) (interpreting the link between 
mental disorder and dangerousness as satisfying Crane because 
the particular form of dangerousness, a mental disorder, not the 
particular degree of dangerousness, distinguishes individuals 
subject to commitment from the typical recidivist); People v. 
Hancock, No. 4-01-0678, 2002 Ill. App. LEXIS 314 (Ill. App. Ct. 
Apr. 23, 2002) (interpreting Crane as not requiring a specific 
determination of lack of volitional control because the nature 
and severity of the mental disorder distinguish individuals 
subject to commitment from the typical recidivist); In re Dutil, 
No. SJC-08524, 2002 Mass. LEXIS 299 (Mass. May 17, 2002) 
(interpreting the sexually violent person commitment law as 
implicitly requiring a mental condition even if specific terms 
are not used and interpreting the "general lack of power to 
control" requirement as consistent with Crane); but see Thomas 
v. Missouri, Nos. SC83186, SC84245, 2002 WL 987997 (Mo. May 14, 
2002) (interpreting Crane as requiring a jury instruction to 
include that the degree to which the person cannot control his 
or her behavior is serious difficulty).  
No. 
99-3164   
 
18 
 
with dangerousness by requiring that the mental disorder 
predispose the individual to engage in acts of sexual violence——
narrowly tailors the scope of ch. 980 to those most dangerous 
sexual offenders whose mental condition predisposes them to re-
offend.   
¶23 We conclude that the same nexus between the mental 
disorder and the substantial probability that the person will 
engage in acts of sexual violence, necessarily and implicitly 
requires proof that the person's mental disorder involves 
serious difficulty for such person in controlling his or her 
behavior.  It is settled law that "substantially probable" means 
"much more likely than not."  State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 
406, 597 N.W.2d 697 (1999).  Thus, proof that due to a mental 
disorder it is substantially probable that the person will 
engage in acts of sexual violence necessarily and implicitly 
includes proof that such person's mental disorder involves 
serious difficulty in controlling his or her sexually dangerous 
behavior.  Chapter 980, therefore, satisfies due process 
requirements. 
 
Proof 
that 
a 
person 
is 
sexually 
violent 
necessarily and implicitly includes proof that the person's 
mental disorder includes serious difficulty in controlling his 
or her behavior, and this requisite proof distinguishes a 
dangerous sexual offender who has serious difficulty controlling 
his or her behavior from a dangerous but typical recidivist.  
chapter 980 is narrowly tailored to meet compelling state 
interests. 
IV 
No. 
99-3164   
 
19 
 
¶24 Laxton next argues that the jury instructions in his 
case14 violate substantive due process because the instructions 
did not contain a requirement of proof that he has a mental 
disorder that involves serious difficulty for him in controlling 
his dangerous behavior.  Laxton asserts that he was deprived of 
due process of law because the State did not prove, and the jury 
did not find, that he has a mental disorder involving serious 
difficulty for him in controlling his behavior. 
¶25 The court of appeals rejected Laxton's arguments 
relating to the validity of the jury instructions because 
Laxton's counsel did not object to the final instruction.15  
                                                 
14 We 
recognize 
that 
after 
Crane, 
Wisconsin 
Jury 
Instruction-Criminal 2502 was revised to add language linking 
the mental disorder to the person's difficulty in controlling 
behavior.  The revised jury instruction reads, in part:   
"Mental disorder" means a condition affecting the 
emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a 
person to engage in acts of sexual violence and causes 
serious difficulty in controlling behavior. . . . Not 
all persons with a mental disorder are predisposed to 
commit sexually violent offenses or have serious 
difficulty in controlling behavior.   
Wis JI——Criminal 2502 (Special Release 2/2002) 
(footnotes 
omitted).  The revised language was not used in Laxton's trial.  
Thus, we do not discuss the impact of the revised language, nor 
do we comment with either approval or disapproval of the revised 
language. 
15 We recognize that in the court of appeals, Laxton's 
argument was based on whether the jury was properly instructed 
regarding what constitutes acts of sexual violence.  As noted, 
we agree with the court of appeals that Laxton waived his 
objections to the jury instructions.  Nevertheless, we address 
the "acts of sexual violence" instruction in Part V of this 
opinion where Laxton argues for a discretionary reversal. 
No. 
99-3164   
 
20 
 
Thus, under Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3)16, the court of appeals 
concluded that Laxton waived his objection.   
¶26 We, too, conclude that Laxton waived his objection to 
the jury instructions by failing to object to the final 
instructions at trial.  Pursuant to our broad discretionary 
authority, however, we review, on the merits, Laxton's jury 
instruction argument regarding a requirement of proof of his 
lack of volitional control.  See State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, 
¶13, 243 Wis. 2d 141, 626 N.W.2d 762 (noting statutory authority 
and inherent authority to review a waived alleged error); Apex 
Elecs. Corp. v. Gee, 217 Wis. 2d 378, 384, 577 N.W.2d 23 (1998) 
(rule of waiver does not relate to appellate court jurisdiction 
and is not absolute).  Laxton's argument is closely linked to 
the due process issue that we asked the parties to address in 
this case.  We discussed Laxton's due process argument regarding 
the statutory requirements in Part III; thus, we now address 
Laxton's due process argument in the context of the jury 
instructions. 
¶27 We reject Laxton's argument that the circuit court's 
instructions to the jury denied him due process of law.  We have 
already concluded that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 satisfies due process 
requirements because proof that a person is sexually violent 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.13(3) states in relevant part:  
"Counsel may object to the proposed instructions or verdict on 
the grounds of incompleteness or other error, stating the 
grounds for objection with particularity on the record.  Failure 
to object at the conference constitutes a waiver of any error in 
the proposed instructions or verdict." 
No. 
99-3164   
 
21 
 
necessarily and implicitly includes proof that the person's 
mental disorder involves serious difficulty in controlling his 
or her behavior.  Here, the jury instructions virtually tracked 
the definitions of "mental disorder" and "sexually violent 
person" in Wis. Stat. § 980.01.  The circuit court instructed 
the jury, in part: 
The second fact that must be established is that the 
respondent has a mental disorder.  Mental disorder 
means a congenital or acquired condition affecting the 
emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the 
person to engage in acts of sexual violence. 
 . . . . 
The third fact that must be established is that the 
respondent is dangerous to others because he has a 
mental 
disorder 
which 
creates 
a 
substantial 
probability that he will engage in acts of sexual 
violence.  A substantial probability means much more 
likely than not. 
By concluding that Laxton has a mental disorder and that his 
mental disorder creates a substantial probability that he will 
engage in acts of sexual violence, the jury had to conclude that 
Laxton's mental disorder involved serious difficulty for him in 
controlling his behavior.  This nexus between the mental 
disorder and the level of dangerousness distinguishes Laxton as 
a 
dangerous 
sexual 
offender 
who 
has 
serious 
difficulty 
controlling his behavior, from the dangerous but typical 
recidivist.  We conclude, therefore, that the jury was properly 
instructed and that the jury instructions did not violate 
substantive due process. 
V 
No. 
99-3164   
 
22 
 
¶28 Finally, Laxton argues that he is entitled to a new 
trial in order to remedy a miscarriage of justice.  Laxton 
contends that the real controversy——whether he has a mental 
disorder that involves serious difficulty for him in controlling 
his dangerous sexual behavior——was not fully and fairly tried.  
Specifically, Laxton points to the court's instruction regarding 
"acts of sexual violence."  The court instructed the jury, in 
part:  "Acts of sexual violence means acts which constitute 
sexually violent offenses.  Acts of window peeping or exposure 
of the penis, absent any other behavior toward another person, 
do not alone constitute sexually violent offenses under chapter 
980."  Laxton claims that this instruction is erroneous because 
the jury should have been instructed that acts of exhibitionism 
and voyeurism are not sexually violent.  According to Laxton, 
"absent any other behavior toward another person" is an 
impermissibly vague jury instruction.  Laxton therefore asks 
this court to exercise discretion under Wis. Stat. § 751.0617 and 
grant a new trial.   
                                                 
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 751.06 states: 
Discretionary reversal.  In an appeal in the supreme 
court, if it appears from the record that the real 
controversy has not been fully tried, or that it is 
probable that justice has for any reason miscarried, 
the court may reverse the judgment or order appealed 
from, regardless of whether the proper motion or 
objection appears in the record, and may direct the 
entry of the proper judgment or remit the case to the 
trial court for the entry of the proper judgment or 
for a new trial, and direct the making of such 
amendments in the pleadings and the adoption of such 
procedure 
in 
that 
court, 
not 
inconsistent 
with 
No. 
99-3164   
 
23 
 
¶29 We do not find Laxton's arguments persuasive.  The 
circuit court is afforded great latitude when giving jury 
instructions.  State v. Pletz, 2000 WI App 221, ¶17, 239 
Wis. 2d 49, 619 N.W.2d 97.  Only if the jury instructions, as a 
whole, misled the jury or communicated an incorrect statement of 
law will we reverse and order a new trial.  Fischer v. Ganju, 
168 Wis. 2d 834, 849, 485 N.W.2d 10 (1992).  "If the overall 
meaning communicated by the instructions was a correct statement 
of the law, no grounds for reversal exist."  Id. at 850.  
Laxton's complaint is based on one sentence in the jury 
instructions relating to acts of exhibitionism and voyeurism, 
and ignores the fact that the circuit court specifically 
instructed the jury:  "Acts of sexual violence means acts which 
constitute 
sexually 
violent 
offenses." 
 
Furthermore, 
the 
instructions given were virtually identical to the Wisconsin 
pattern jury instruction, Wis JI——Criminal 2502.  We conclude, 
therefore, 
that 
the 
overall 
meaning 
communicated 
by 
the 
instructions given in this case correctly stated the law 
regarding "acts of sexual violence" and "sexually violent 
offenses."  The instructions did not mislead the jury or 
communicate an incorrect statement of the law.  Accordingly, we 
decline to grant a new trial.  The real controversy was fully 
and fairly tried. 
VI 
                                                                                                                                                             
statutes or rules, as are necessary to accomplish the 
ends of justice. 
No. 
99-3164   
 
24 
 
¶30 In summary, we have concluded that civil commitment 
under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 does not require a separate factual 
finding that an individual's mental disorder involves serious 
difficulty for such person in controlling his or her behavior.  
The requisite proof of lack of control is established by proving 
the 
nexus 
between 
the 
person's 
mental 
disorder 
and 
dangerousness.  Specifically, we have concluded that proof that 
the person's mental disorder predisposes such individual to 
engage in acts of sexual violence and establishes a substantial 
probability that such person will again commit such acts, 
necessarily and implicitly includes proof that the person's 
mental disorder involves serious difficulty in controlling his 
or her behavior. 
¶31 We further have concluded that at Laxton's trial the 
jury was properly instructed and that the jury instructions did 
not deprive Laxton of due process of law.  The instructions were 
nearly identical to the statutory language in Wis. Stat. ch. 
980, which we have concluded satisfies the requirements of due 
process.  Accordingly, by concluding that Laxton has a mental 
disorder and that his mental disorder creates a substantial 
probability that he will again engage in acts of sexual 
violence, the jury necessarily and implicitly concluded that 
Laxton's mental disorder involved serious difficulty for him in 
controlling his behavior. 
¶32 Finally, we have rejected Laxton's argument that the 
real controversy was not fully and fairly tried and, therefore, 
have declined to grant a new trial. 
No. 
99-3164   
 
25 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶33 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  99-3164.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶34 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
Assuming chapter 980 is constitutional,18 I conclude that the 
jury instruction in the present case is prejudicial error.   
¶35 The State acknowledges, as it must, that this case is 
governed by Kansas v. Crane, in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
concluded that "there must be proof of serious difficulty in 
controlling behavior."19  The State concedes, therefore, that in 
order to commit a person under chapter 980, the State must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the person has serious difficulty 
in controlling his or her behavior.   
¶36 The majority opinion concludes that chapter 980 is 
constitutional because the statute implicitly requires the 
mental disorder to cause the individual serious difficulty in 
controlling behavior.20  I accept that the majority can, if it 
                                                 
18 State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___, also released today. 
19 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867, 870 (2002). 
20 The majority opinion further concludes that the State met 
its burden of proof because "proof that due to a mental disorder 
it is substantially probable that the person will engage in acts 
of sexual violence necessarily and implicitly includes proof 
that such person's mental disorder involves serious difficulty 
in 
controlling 
his 
or 
her 
sexually 
dangerous 
behavior."  
Majority op. at ¶23. 
I have reviewed the record.  At least one witness gave 
expert testimony that Laxton had difficulty in controlling his 
behavior.  
No.  99-3164.ssa 
 
2 
 
wishes, apply a "saving construction" to the statute in this 
manner to render it constitutional.21 
¶37 The 
issue 
before 
us 
then 
is 
whether 
the 
jury 
instructions in the present case correctly advised the jury that 
it must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Laxton had 
serious difficulty in controlling his behavior.  The jury 
instructions do not explicitly state that the jury must be so 
persuaded.  The jury instructions never use the phrase "has 
serious difficulty in controlling his behavior."   
¶38 The jury instructions are set forth at ¶27 of the 
majority opinion.  The jury was instructed in relevant part that 
it must determine the following: 
(A) whether Laxton has a mental disorder.  "Mental 
disorder means a congenital or acquired condition 
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that 
predisposes the person to engage in acts of sexual 
violence"; and   
(B) whether Laxton "is dangerous to others because he 
has a mental disorder which creates a substantial 
probability that he will engage in acts of sexual 
violence.  A substantial probability means much more 
likely than not." 
¶39 The majority opinion concludes, without explanation, 
that the jury instructions correctly instructed the jury.  
Essentially the majority opinion holds that "[b]y concluding 
that Laxton has a mental disorder and that his mental disorder 
creates a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of 
sexual violence, the jury had to conclude that Laxton's mental 
                                                 
21 State v. Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 116, 139, 589 N.W.2d 370 
(1999); State v. Hall, 207 Wis. 2d 54, 82, 557 N.W.2d 778 
(1997). 
No.  99-3164.ssa 
 
3 
 
disorder involved serious difficulty for him in controlling his 
behavior."  Majority op. at ¶27.  Accordingly, the majority 
opinion concludes that the jury instructions are correct and do 
not violate substantive due process.   
¶40 The majority opinion's linkage or nexus analysis of 
the jury instructions adopts Justice Scalia's dissenting view in 
Crane. 
 
According 
to 
Justice 
Scalia, 
"proof 
of 
serious 
difficulty in controlling behavior," as required by the Crane 
majority, is totally unnecessary because the "very existence of 
a mental abnormality or personality disorder that causes a 
likelihood of repeat sexual violence in itself establishes the 
requisite 'difficulty if not impossibility' of control."22   
¶41 The court is obliged to follow the majority opinion in 
Crane, not the dissent.   
¶42 Rather than read into the jury instructions the 
constitutional gloss that the court has read into chapter 980, I 
apply the body of law the court has developed for reviewing 
alleged erroneous jury instructions.   
¶43 Wisconsin case law instructs this court to review jury 
instructions with the following principles in mind:  The 
validity of the jury determination depends on the correctness of 
the instructions.  A proper jury instruction is a crucial 
component of the fact-finding process.  A jury instruction must 
fully and fairly inform the jury of the principles of law it 
should apply.  A court must consider the jury instructions as a 
whole.  The test for determining the correctness of the jury 
                                                 
22 Crane, 122 S.Ct. at 874 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
No.  99-3164.ssa 
 
4 
 
instructions is to ask how a reasonable jury would interpret the 
instructions.23   
¶44 I conclude that the jury instructions in the present 
case, when taken as a whole, did not inform a reasonable jury 
that it must determine whether Laxton had serious difficulty in 
controlling his behavior.   
¶45 A 
statute 
is 
interpreted 
by 
lawyers, 
but 
jury 
instructions are directed to and interpreted by non-lawyer 
jurors.  Thus, although lawyers and judges might read words or 
meaning into a statute to render the statute constitutional, 
reasonable non-lawyers serving on a jury might not read "a 
constitutionally required judicial gloss" into jury instructions 
that adhere to the original words of the statute now subject to 
the interpretive gloss.  Although the words of chapter 980 might 
be interpreted by lawyers and judges to include a link between 
the mental disorder and a serious difficulty in controlling 
behavior, the jury instructions based directly on the language 
of chapter 980 do not set forth this link for non-lawyers.   
¶46 To 
a 
jury, 
a 
mental 
disorder 
"affect[ing] 
an 
individual's emotional or volitional capacity," as the jury 
instruction states, does not equate to a mental disorder that 
causes serious difficulty in controlling behavior.  To a jury, a 
"mental disorder that . . . predisposes the person to engage in 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 2000 WI 46 ¶¶41-46, 243 
Wis. 2d 141, 626 N.W.2d 762; State v. Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d 65, 
87, 580 N.W.2d 181 (1998); State v. Paulson, 106 Wis. 2d 96, 
108, 315 N.W.2d 350 (1982); State v. Schulz, 102 Wis. 2d 423, 
426-427, 307 N.W.2d 151 (1981). 
No.  99-3164.ssa 
 
5 
 
acts of sexual violence," as the jury instruction states, means 
a tendency, a predilection, or a susceptibility to commit an act 
of sexual violence, not an interference with free will, not a 
"serious difficulty" in controlling behavior.  To a jury, "a 
mental disorder which creates a substantial probability that he 
will engage in acts of sexual violence," as the jury instruction 
states, does not require the jury, as Crane directs, to 
"distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental 
illness, 
abnormality, 
or 
disorder 
subjects 
him 
to 
civil 
commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted 
in an ordinary criminal case."24    
¶47 I conclude that the instruction misstates the law 
under Crane, misleads the jury, violates Laxton's substantive 
due process rights, and constitutes prejudicial error.25   
¶48 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶49 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion.   
  
                                                 
24 Crane, 122 S.Ct. at 870. 
25 Brown v. Dibbell, 227 Wis. 2d 28, 54, 595 N.W.2d 358 
(1999); Lemberger v. Koehring Co., 63 Wis. 2d 210, 225, 216 
N.W.2d 542 (1974); Bokelkamp v. Olson, 254 Wis. 240, 244, 36 
N.W.2d 93 (1949).   
No.  99-3164.ssa 
 
 
 
1