Case Title: In re Joseph V.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 172

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 172 
Docket: 
And-17-148 
Submitted 
On Briefs: July 19, 2017 
Decided: 
August 1, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE JOSEPH V. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  The parents of Joseph V. appeal from a judgment of the District 
Court (Lewiston, Dow, J.) terminating their parental rights to the child 
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii) (2016).  
Specifically, they allege that there is insufficient evidence in the record to 
support the court’s finding of parental unfitness by clear and convincing 
evidence.  See id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).  They also argue that the court 
abused its discretion in concluding that termination of their parental rights 
was in the child’s best interest.  See id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).  We affirm the 
judgment.   
 
[¶2]  After a two-day hearing, the court issued a judgment terminating 
the parents’ rights to the child upon finding, inter alia, that the parents are 
unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child or protect him from 
jeopardy within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet his needs.  See 
 
2 
id § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).  In its written judgment, the court found the 
following facts, which are supported by competent record evidence.  See In re 
Charles G., 2001 ME 3, ¶ 5, 763 A.2d 1163.   
 
The parents’ unwillingness or inability to follow through 
with things they acknowledge they need to do was a recurring 
theme across the spectrum of evidence presented by the 
Department and the [guardian ad litem].  The Court finds that the 
parents each failed to attend two CODE evaluation sessions. 
. . .  The parents usually failed to bring diapers and wipes to the 
visits.  They often failed to bring toys and activities to the visits.  
They failed to get [the child] evaluated by CDS when he was still in 
their home.   
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
[The child] spent his first 26 months, prior to his removal in 
April, 2015, without much opportunity to walk.  Due in large part 
to the squalor and dangerous conditions in the parents’ home, 
[the child] spent most of his time in a Pack & Play playpen, then in 
the gated living room, where there was a mattress and a 
television.   
 
 
[The child] needs [physical therapy] due to his foot-ankle 
musculoskeletal alignment, poor muscle tone, and poor core 
strength.  He favors his left side.  The physical therapy helps him 
to build both his stationary and locomotion skills as well as his 
strength.  He sees [a physical therapist] at Rumford Hospital once 
per week.  For many months, the reunification effort has included 
the expectation that the parents ‘attend appointments and or 
meet with providers’ . . . .  There have been 34 [physical therapy] 
sessions since then.  The father has attended 17 sessions; the 
mother has attended 7 sessions. . . . 
 
 
Beyond mere showing up, there is a lack of follow-through 
that is well-established. . . . 
 
3 
 
 
[¶3]  The court’s findings detailed above illustrate the parents’ 
unwillingness or inability to follow through with the services the child 
requires to meet his most basic needs.  See In re Jeffrey E., 557 A.2d 954, 956 
(Me. 1989) (“In order for a court to take into account the special medical 
needs of a child, a present medical emergency need not exist, nor does such a 
medical emergency have to be imminent or even certain to recur.”).  Given 
these and other factual findings, the court could reasonably have been 
persuaded that the factual bases supporting its finding of parental unfitness as 
to both parents were proved to be highly probable.  See In re Michaela C., 
2002 ME 159, ¶ 17, 809 A.2d 1245.  
 
[¶4]  The parents also contend that the court abused its discretion in 
concluding that termination of their parental rights was in the child’s best 
interest.  22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (2) (2016); In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 
123, ¶ 16, 889 A.2d 297.  Regarding his best interest, the court noted that: 
 
. . . In addition, [the child] is well-bonded and attached with 
his foster parents . . . with whom he has lived for his entire stay in 
foster care. . . .  [The child] has made tremendous strides in their 
care.  [The child] benefits from the attention and support of the 
foster parents’ extended families, who live in and around 
Rumford.  The [foster parents] are very good at requiring [the 
child] to do his physical therapy exercises, at treating his asthma, 
and meeting all of his needs.  They are good advocates for him.   
 
 
4 
Viewing these facts “and the weight to be given them[] through the trial 
court’s lens,” it cannot be said that the court’s conclusion that termination of 
the parents’ rights to the child constituted an abuse of discretion.  In re M.B., 
2013 ME 46, ¶ 37, 65 A.3d 1260 (quotation marks omitted); see In re Jacob B., 
2008 ME 168, ¶ 18, 959 A.2d 734 (“Many factors can combine to support a 
best interest determination . . . .”).   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erika Bristol, Esq., Lewiston, for appellant mother  
 
Jason R. Ranger, Esq, Lewiston, for appellant father 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Lewiston District Court docket number PC-2014-50 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY