Case Title: Giacchino v. Estate of Stalkup

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95-20

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Giacchino v. Estate of Stalkup1995 WY 214908 P.2d 983Case Number: 95-20Decided: 12/29/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Damian B. 
GIACCHINO,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

ESTATE OF Lance F. 
STALKUP, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from The District 
Court, Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J.

Donald A. Cole 
and Bernard E. Cole of Cole & Cole Law Firm, Cheyenne, for 
Appellant.

Franklin D. 
Bayless of Bayless, Slater & Macy, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
Appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., THOMAS, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ., and BROWN, J., 
Retired.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Our sole task in 
this case is to evaluate the allegations of the complaint filed by Damian B. 
Giacchino (Giacchino) to determine whether the facts alleged encompass a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. Apparently referring to two separate 
agreements between himself and Lance F. Stalkup (Stalkup) relating to the 
purchase and sale of an automobile, Giacchino seeks recovery on theories of 
wrongful repossession; breach of contract for sale of the automobile; malicious, 
willful, and wanton conduct justifying punitive damages; the infliction of 
mental distress; and the retention of Giacchino's personal property. Taking as 
true, as we must, the facts alleged by Giacchino, we agree with the conclusion 
of the district court that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. We affirm the order approving the motion to dismiss 
plaintiff's complaint entered by the trial court.

[¶2]      The issues stated 
in the Brief of the Appellant, filed on behalf of Giacchino, 
are:

What is the standard for 
review in the granting of a motion to dismiss, particularly in accordance with 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure? 

Can a complaint state 
alternative or independent claims based upon tort or contract 
theories?

Can the Appellee be held 
liable under the Uniform Commercial Code for wrongful repossession of 
collateral?

In the Brief of 
Appellee, filed for Stalkup (now deceased), this rather cryptic statement of the 
issues appears:

I. What is the standard 
for review in the granting of a motion to dismiss, in accordance with Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure?

II. Did the Appellant 
fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure?

Count 
I

Count 
II

Count 
III

Count 
IV

Count 
V

[¶3]      Giacchino's 
complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to WYO.R.CIV.P. 
12(b)(6). We must accept as true the factual allegations in Giacchino's 
complaint and view those facts in the light most favorable to Giacchino. Feltner 
v. Casey Family Program, 902 P.2d 206 (Wyo. 1995); Martinez v. Associates Fin. 
Services Co. of Colorado, Inc., 891 P.2d 785 (Wyo. 1995); May v. Southeast 
Wyoming Mental Health Ctr., 866 P.2d 732 (Wyo. 1993); Osborn v. Emporium Videos, 
870 P.2d 382 (Wyo. 1994); Herrig v. Herrig, 844 P.2d 487 (Wyo. 1992); Moxley v. 
Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979). A complaint may include 
alternative, independent claims based upon tort or contract theories, such as 
Giacchino alleged, as long as the factual allegations articulate the essential 
elements of the claims. See WYO.R.CIV.P. 18; Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 
716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986). Conclusional statements or opinions in a complaint, in 
lieu of facts, are not adequate to satisfy the burden of alleging the essential 
elements. Jones Land & Livestock Co. v. Fed. Land Bank of Omaha, 733 P.2d 258 (Wyo. 1987); Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶4]      An analysis of 
the factual allegations, as distinguished from the theories alleged in 
Giacchino's complaint, reveals he relied upon an arrangement to purchase a 1970 
Dodge Challenger. In some respects, Giacchino alleges too much or not enough. 
Initially, he alleges he and Stalkup entered into a security agreement pursuant 
to which he purchased the vehicle for $4,200. He also alleges a verbal agreement 
whereby Giacchino would work on vehicles owned by Stalkup and would take care of 
Stalkup for an unspecified salary. The salary was to be applied toward the 
amount owed on the security agreement.

[¶5]      Giacchino alleges 
he worked on the vehicle he was purchasing and invested more than $4,050 in 
parts. He alleges that, on September 20, 1994, Stalkup applied the sum of 
$1,000, attributable to Giacchino's labor, toward the purchase of the vehicle. 
On the same day, they entered into an agreement in which it was acknowledged 
Giacchino had paid $1,000 in labor as a down payment on the vehicle, and he 
agreed to pay the balance at the rate of $150 per month. He alleges a payment on 
October 1, 1994 and the tender of a payment in November. The complaint states a 
copy of the September 20, 1994 agreement is attached to the complaint, but it is 
not.

[¶6]      Giacchino 
includes an allegation that, on September 9, 1994, Stalkup had unlawfully 
repossessed the vehicle from Giacchino. He states that, three days later, 
Stalkup told the repossessing agency to release the car because Giacchino was 
not in default, and it then was returned to his possession. Giacchino alleges he 
has never been in default, but on October 26, 1994, Stalkup authorized his agent 
to repossess the vehicle. He alleges the circumstances of the repossession, 
which he contends were threatening to him. He alleges Stalkup retained his 
personal property in addition to the vehicle, but he never identifies the 
personal property.

[¶7]      Giacchino then 
proceeds to state his several claims. His first cause of action is for wrongful 
repossession of the vehicle by force and intimidation, without notice and 
without his consent. In his second cause of action, he alleges breach of the 
agreement by Stalkup because of its repossession when he was current on his 
payments. In the third cause, he asserts Stalkup's actions and conduct were 
malicious, willful, and wanton, justifying punitive damages. In his fourth cause 
of action, he alleges the infliction of great mental distress; and, finally, he 
alleges the retention of his personal property. Giacchino seeks damages on all 
claims.

[¶8]      The complaint was 
met with a motion to dismiss, which is somewhat mysterious. The contention is 
that Giacchino could not state claims based on contract while alleging damages 
founded in tort. The motion to dismiss also asserts that, upon default, the 
secured party can repossess collateral and no claim can be filed against Stalkup 
based upon the actions of a third party. Giacchino filed a resistance to the 
motion to dismiss, but the court entered an order approving the motion to 
dismiss plaintiff's complaint on December 19, 1994. Giacchino has appealed that 
dismissal.

[¶9]      It would be 
easier to address this appeal had the agreement alluded to in the complaint 
actually been attached and made a part of the pleading. Since it was not, the 
pleading must state facts sufficient to allege the essentials of the several 
claims.

[¶10]   The initial premise for recovery is 
that Giacchino and Stalkup "entered into a Security Agreement whereby the 
Plaintiff purchased a 1970 Dodge Challenger from Defendant for the sum of 
$4,200." Such an allegation is a legal impossibility. In Wyoming's version of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, WYO. STAT. §§ 34.1-1-101 to -10-104 (1991) (UCC), 
"`[s]ecurity agreement' means an agreement which creates or provides for a 
security interest * * *." WYO. STAT. § 34.1-9-105(a)(xii). The statute later 
provides, however, that even though a transaction is subject to the article on 
secured transactions, it is also subject to the laws pertaining to certificates 
of title to motor vehicles. WYO. STAT. § 34.1-9-203(d). While we have held that 
the priority of lien claims with respect to motor vehicles is governed by the 
UCC (Franklin v. First Nat'l Bank of Morrill, Nebraska, 848 P.2d 775 (Wyo. 
1993)), we have not addressed whether a motor vehicle may be transferred other 
than pursuant to the provisions of WYO. STAT. § 31-2-104 (1994). That statute 
requires the owner of a vehicle who sells or transfers his interest to endorse 
an assignment and warranty of title upon the certificate of title with a 
statement of all liens and encumbrances, which is to be dated and delivered to 
the transferee at the time of the transaction. Giacchino's complaint is silent 
concerning compliance with this statute.

[¶11]   Furthermore, if we accept as true 
the allegation that Giacchino was credited with a $1,000 down payment, and the 
balance was to be paid at $150 per month, the payments would run for a period of 
more than twenty-one months. Giacchino alleges a contract that could not be 
completed within one year. WYO. STAT. § 1-23-105 (1988) provides in pertinent 
part:

(a) In the following 
cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some note or 
memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith:

(i) Every agreement that 
by its terms is not to be performed within one (1) year from the making thereof; 
* * *.

Since the 
contract which is alluded to was not attached to the complaint, Giacchino was 
required to allege facts demonstrating compliance with the statute of frauds. 
Giacchino did not do so. The statute of frauds found in the UCC under the 
article relating to sales, WYO. STAT. § 34.1-2-201, leads to the same 
conclusion. Giacchino has alleged a contract for a price of $500 or more, which 
is required to be supported by a writing signed by the party against whom 
enforcement is sought. Those allegations are absent from Giacchino's complaint. 
While there are statutory exceptions to this requirement, Giacchino has alleged 
no facts bringing him within the exceptions.

[¶12]   In view of Giacchino's failure to 
successfully allege the contract between Stalkup and himself, it is apparent his 
claim for breach of contract must fail. The claim for wrongful repossession also 
fails because we find no allegation of facts leading to the conclusion Giacchino 
ever was entitled to possession of the vehicle. The claim relating to infliction 
of emotional distress is closely tied to the claims concerning wrongful 
repossession and breach of contract. In Wyoming, Giacchino had the burden of 
alleging facts demonstrating a duty, breach of duty, and damages in order to 
state a claim for mental or emotional distress. The duty under these 
circumstances would be for Stalkup to refrain from conduct he had no right to 
pursue. The logical application of the concept, however, leads to the conclusion 
that the complaint fails to allege facts demonstrating Stalkup had no right to 
recover his automobile. In the absence of facts showing a duty on the part of 
Stalkup not to repossess the vehicle, which is the event Giacchino focuses upon 
in asserting his claim for mental distress, the complaint fails to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. See Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶13]   The final claim is the wrongful 
retention of Giacchino's personal property. One must read between the lines to 
offer any conclusion as to the property's identity. Probably, it consisted of 
parts Giacchino installed in the vehicle. From that point, we are completely in 
the dark because, if there were a contract or a security agreement, we do not 
know whether it furnished Stalkup's security in accessions. Consequently, we 
hold the count asserting damages for wrongful retention of personal property is 
so vague it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.

[¶14]   The order approving the motion to 
dismiss plaintiff's complaint is affirmed.