Case Title: State v. Richard A. Brown

Citation: 2005 WI 29

Docket Number: 2003AP001419

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 29 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-1419 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Richard A. Brown: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard A. Brown,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 33 
Reported at:  269 Wis. 2d 750, 676 N.W.2d 555 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 22, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 13, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Franke   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and CROOKS, J.J., join the dissent.  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Steven P. Weiss, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by Sally 
L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2005 WI 29 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-1419  
(L.C. No. 
95 CF 950507) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Richard A. Brown: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard A. Brown,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 22, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals affirming an order of 
the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, John Franke, Judge.1   
¶2 
The circuit court's order denied Richard A. Brown's 
petition for supervised release under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4) 
                                                 
1 State v. Brown, 2004 WI App 33, 269 Wis. 2d 750, 676 
N.W.2d 555. 
No. 
03-1419   
 
2 
 
(2001-02).2  Brown had been committed as a sexually violent 
person pursuant to chapter 980 in 1998.   
¶3 
The circuit court concluded that the State proved by 
clear and convincing evidence that "it remains much more likely 
than not that [Brown] would reoffend at some point over the 
course of the rest of his life even while supervised in the 
community."  
¶4 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
order denying Brown's petition for supervised release.3 
¶5 
Two issues are presented.  First, what standard of 
appellate court review applies to a circuit court's order 
denying a petition for supervised release under Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.08(4)?  We conclude that a reviewing court undertakes 
independent review of the record under the sufficiency of the 
evidence standard of review.  
¶6 
Second, is the circuit court order denying Brown's 
petition for supervised release supported by the evidence?  We 
conclude, as a matter of law, that the circuit court order 
denying Brown's petition for supervised release is not supported 
by evidence sufficient to meet the clear and convincing evidence 
standard that it is much more likely than not that Brown will 
engage in acts of sexual violence if he is not continued in 
institutional care.   We therefore reverse the decision of the 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Brown, 269 Wis. 2d 750, ¶16. 
No. 
03-1419   
 
3 
 
court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court with 
instructions to notify the Department of Health and Family 
Services that it should submit to the circuit court, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(5), a plan for Brown's supervised release.4      
I 
¶7 
In determining the validity of the circuit court order 
denying Brown's petition for supervised release, we must first 
establish the appropriate standard of appellate review of such a 
circuit court order.  The three standards of appellate review of 
circuit court decisions have been stated numerous times, 
although case law has articulated sub-principles and different 
ways of stating the standards of review:  (1) A reviewing court 
will not overturn findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.  
(2) A reviewing court will sustain a discretionary decision that 
is the product of a rational mental process by which the facts 
of record and law relied upon are stated and are considered 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.08(5) reads in part as follows: 
If the court finds that the person is appropriate for 
supervised 
release, 
the 
court 
shall 
notify 
the 
department.  The department shall make its best effort 
to 
arrange 
for 
placement 
of 
the 
person 
in 
a 
residential facility or dwelling that is in the 
person's county of residence . . . .  The department 
and the county department . . . in the county of 
residence of the person shall prepare a plan that 
identifies the treatment and services, if any, that 
the person will receive in the community.  The plan 
shall 
address 
the 
person's 
need, 
if 
any, 
for 
supervision, counseling, medication, community support 
services, residential services, vocational services, 
and alcohol . . . treatment. . . . 
No. 
03-1419   
 
4 
 
together for the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable 
determination.  (3) A reviewing court will decide questions of 
law independently of the circuit court but benefiting from its 
analysis.   
¶8 
The issue presented by the parties in the instant case 
is whether a circuit court's denial of a chapter 980 petition 
for supervised release should be classified as a determination 
of a question of law or as an exercise of circuit court 
discretion.  Whether a person is much more likely than not to 
engage in acts of sexual violence if the person is not continued 
in institutional care is a question of fact.  The very question 
of the appropriate standard of review is a question of law which 
this court decides independently of the circuit court and court 
of appeals but benefiting from the analyses of these courts.  
¶9 
We look first to Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4), the statute 
at issue, to determine whether it sets forth a standard of 
appellate review.  It does not.   
¶10 In the absence of an explicitly stated statutory 
standard of review, we examine the statute governing the circuit 
court's decisionmaking in the instant case.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 980.08(4) sets forth the circuit court's role in deciding a 
petition for supervised release as follows: 
The court shall grant the petition unless the state 
proves by clear and convincing evidence that the 
person is still a sexually violent person and that it 
is still substantially probable that the person will 
engage in acts of sexual violence if the person is not 
continued in institutional care.  In making a decision 
under this subsection, the court may consider, without 
No. 
03-1419   
 
5 
 
limitation because of enumeration, the nature and 
circumstances of the behavior that was the basis of 
the 
allegation 
in 
the 
[initial 
commitment] 
petition . . . , 
the 
person's 
mental 
history 
and 
present mental condition, where the person will live, 
how the person will support himself or herself and 
what arrangements are available to ensure that the 
person has access to and will participate in necessary 
treatment . . . .   
¶11 According to Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4), the circuit court 
starts in the position of having to grant a petition for 
supervised release.  The circuit court does not have to grant 
the petition if the State proves by clear and convincing 
evidence that the person is still a sexually violent person and 
that it is substantially probable that the person will engage in 
acts of sexual violence if the person is not continued in 
institutional care.  "Substantially probable" means "much more 
likely than not."5  The statute also sets forth four factors a 
circuit court may consider, along with other factors, in making 
its determination.   
¶12 Thus, if the circuit court decides that the State has 
failed to meet its burden, the circuit court does not have any 
option: It "shall" grant Brown's petition for supervised 
release.  If the circuit court decides, however, that the 
evidence is sufficient to prove the State's case by clear and 
convincing evidence, then the circuit court must deny Brown's 
petition.     
                                                 
5 State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 395, 415, 597 N.W.2d 697 
(1999). 
No. 
03-1419   
 
6 
 
¶13 Having reviewed 
the 
applicable statute, we 
next 
examine case law for guidance on the applicable standard of  
review in the instant case.   
¶14 The court of appeals in the instant case characterized 
the circuit court's order under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4) as a 
discretionary decision to be upheld "if it was based on a 
logical interpretation of the facts and a correct application of 
the proper legal standards."6     
¶15 The State agrees with the court of appeals, arguing 
that the discretionary standard of review is consistent with the 
evaluative and predictive nature of the assessment the circuit 
court must make.  
¶16 Brown contends, however, that the mandatory language 
of Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4), directing that the court "shall" 
grant supervised release unless the State meets its burden of 
proof, is irreconcilable with the notion that a circuit court 
exercise its discretion when it rules on a petition for 
supervised release.  Brown urges that the standard of review is 
an independent review of a question of law.  The State 
acknowledges that the standard of review might very well be 
review of a question of law.   
¶17 Although several cases have some bearing on our 
decision about the proper standard of review in the present 
case, the cases do not provide careful analysis and in some 
                                                 
6 Brown, 269 Wis. 2d 750, ¶16 (citing State v. Seibert, 220 
Wis. 2d 308, 314, 582 N.W.2d 745 (Ct. App. 1998)). 
No. 
03-1419   
 
7 
 
cases the announced standard of review is not applied.  We shall 
examine each of the cases.  
¶18 In holding in the present case that a circuit court's 
denial of a chapter 980 petition for supervised release is a 
discretionary decision and is to be reviewed as such, the court 
of appeals relied solely on State v. Seibert, 220 Wis. 2d 308, 
314, 582 N.W.2d 745 (Ct. App. 1998).  Seibert, like the instant 
case, involves appellate review of a circuit court order denying 
a chapter 980 petition for supervised release.  The court of 
appeals did not analyze or discuss the Seibert decision.   
¶19 On examination of Seibert, we conclude that it is not 
persuasive authority for the use of a discretionary standard of 
review in the instant case. 
In Seibert the court of appeals 
announced that the standard of review for a circuit court order 
denying a chapter 980 petition for supervised release is the 
same as that for a circuit court's initial determination of 
placement in a secure mental health facility or other facility 
or supervised release under Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(b) (1995-96).  
¶20 The sole rationale in the Seibert case is that both 
§§ 980.06(2)(b) and 980.08(4) direct the circuit court to 
consider enumerated statutory factors in determining placement.  
¶21 The Seibert court picked up on the similar wording of 
the two statutes but missed the difference.  Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.06(2)(b), after a circuit court or jury determines that 
the person is a sexually violent person under chapter 980, the 
circuit court determines whether the person shall be placed in 
institutional care in a secure mental health unit or facility or 
No. 
03-1419   
 
8 
 
other facility or on supervised release.  The statute enumerates 
various factors that might affect the circuit court's choice of 
placement.  The statute does not establish a burden of proof for 
either the State or the chapter 980 person. 
¶22 In contrast, under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4), the statute 
directs the circuit court to grant the petition for supervised 
release.  The statute places a burden on the State to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court should deny 
the petition.  If the State fails to carry its burden, the 
petition is granted.  While consideration of the various 
enumerated factors plays a role in the circuit court's decision 
whether to grant supervised release, the question for a circuit 
court and a reviewing court is whether the State has carried its 
statutory burden of proof.   
¶23 Seibert in turn relies on State v. Keding, 214 
Wis. 2d 363, 367, 571 N.W.2d 450 (Ct. App. 1997), an initial 
chapter 
980 
placement 
case, 
for 
the 
proposition 
that 
a 
determination of the appropriate placement under Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.06(2) is discretionary because it involves consideration 
of interrelated statutory factors. 
¶24 Keding in turn merely cited, without any discussion, 
State v. Cook, 66 Wis. 2d 25, 224 N.W.2d 194 (1974), as support 
for its holding that a determination of the appropriate 
placement under Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2) is discretionary because 
it involved consideration of interrelated statutory factors.   
¶25 State v. Cook is not a chapter 980 case.  In Cook, the 
applicable statute provided that after being found not guilty by 
No. 
03-1419   
 
9 
 
reason of mental disease or defect the defendant had the burden 
to prove he may be safely discharged or released without danger 
to himself or others, and that if the circuit court is so 
satisfied the circuit court shall order discharge or release on 
conditions as the court determines to be necessary.   
¶26 Although the statute at issue in Cook placed a burden 
on the defendant to prove that he may safely be discharged or 
released without danger to himself or others,7 the Cook court did 
not accept the defendant's argument that the circuit court's 
decision must be supported by the great weight and clear 
preponderance of the evidence.8   
¶27 Rather, the Cook court analogized the circuit court's 
decision under the statute to a circuit court's decision in 
sentencing and declared the decision to be a discretionary one.  
In both instances, stated the Cook court, the decision involves 
determining whether the defendant is a danger to himself or 
others.9    
¶28 The statutes in the present case and Seibert, which 
relied on Cook, are different than the Cook statute.  The Cook 
court considered it very significant that the statute in Cook 
                                                 
7 State v. Cook, 66 Wis. 2d 25, 27 n.2, 224 N.W.2d 194 
(1974). 
8 Id. at 28. 
9 Id. at 29.  According to Cook, a reviewing court will 
sustain a circuit court's exercise of discretion if, "on the 
basis of the record and the rationale expressed, we can conclude 
that a judge could arrive at the decision in fact reached."  
Id. at 30. 
No. 
03-1419   
 
10 
 
used the word "satisfied," that is, the statute stated that the 
circuit court must be "satisfied" that the defendant may be 
safely released.  It viewed the legislature as intending the 
circuit court's decision about safe release to be subjective and 
inherently discretionary.10  Neither the word "satisfied" nor any 
other "subjective" word or phrase appears in § 980.08(4) 
governing the instant case and Seibert.  
¶29 Unlike the not-guilty-by-reason-of-mental-disease-or-
defect statute in Cook, which speaks of satisfying the circuit 
court, Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4) speaks of the State meeting its 
burden of proof.  Whether a party has met its burden of proof 
appears to be a question of law.       
¶30 The court of appeals decision in the instant case is 
not the only example of a court of appeals' citing to Seibert 
without examination of the underlying cases.  In a recent court 
of appeals case, State v. Wenk, 2001 WI App 268, ¶6, 248 
Wis. 2d 714, 637 N.W.2d 417, the court of appeals declared that 
the applicable standard of review for a circuit court's order 
denying a chapter 980 petition for conditional release of a not-
guilty-by-reason-of-insanity committee is unclear.  After citing 
                                                 
10 Id. at 29-30. 
No. 
03-1419   
 
11 
 
several cases (but not Cook),11 the court of appeals simply 
announced, in conclusory fashion and without explanation, that 
it would "reaffirm the standard of review recently set forth in 
State v. Seibert," namely a discretionary standard of review.12    
¶31 In sum, the case law is a cross-pollenated mish-mash. 
Seibert declares that the standard of review for a circuit 
court's order denying a chapter 980 petition for supervised 
release is erroneous exercise of discretion.  Seibert relies on 
Keding, which, without discussion, relies on Cook.  Cook loses 
its significance when Wenk, interpreting a Cook-like statute, 
acknowledges confusion about the standard of review, fails to 
cite Cook, and turns to Seibert as authority.  Yet Seibert in 
effect relies on Cook.  Under these circumstances the efficacy 
of Seibert, Keding, Cook, and Wenk as precedential or persuasive 
authority that the standard of review in the instant case is 
erroneous exercise of discretion is limited.       
¶32 Brown challenges the erroneous exercise of discretion 
standard of review and argues for independent appellate court 
review.  Brown relies on two different lines of cases, claiming 
that 
both 
support 
his 
position 
that 
a 
reviewing 
court 
                                                 
11 The State's brief in Wenk pointed out that State v. 
Gladney, 120 Wis. 2d 486, 355 N.W.2d 547 (Ct. App. 1984), and 
State v. Gebarski, 90 Wis. 2d 754, 280 N.W.2d 672 (1979), 
require a sufficiency of the evidence standard of review, and 
that Cook and Keding require an erroneous exercise of discretion 
standard of review. The court of appeals merely acknowledged 
confusion in the cases and cited to the former cases.  State v. 
Wenk, 2001 WI App 268, ¶6, 248 Wis. 2d 714, 637 N.W.2d 417.   
12 State v. Wenk, 248 Wis. 2d 714, ¶6. 
No. 
03-1419   
 
12 
 
independently examines as a question of law whether the State 
has met its legislatively imposed burden of proof that it is 
substantially probable that the chapter 980 person will engage 
in acts of sexual violence if the person is not continued in 
institutional care.  Brown does not explain whether he views the 
lines of cases as requiring different analyses. 
¶33 One line of cases is represented by In re Guardianship 
of Cheryl F., 170 Wis. 2d 420, 489 N.W.2d 636 (Ct. App. 1992).  
Cheryl disputed the circuit court's appointment of a guardian of 
her person.  The statute placed the burden on the county to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that Cheryl was 
incompetent.13  Incompetency was defined by statute to mean 
substantially incapable of managing her property or caring for 
herself, as determined by the circuit court.14   
¶34 The court of appeals concluded in Cheryl F. that 
whether the evidence fufills a particular legal standard, namely 
incompetency in that case, is a question of law, citing 
Nottelson v. DILHR, 94 Wis. 2d 106, 116, 287 N.W.2d 763 (1980), 
and that questions of law are determined by a reviewing court 
without deference to the circuit court, citing First National 
Leasing Corp. v. City of Madison, 81 Wis. 2d 205, 208, 260 
                                                 
13 In re Guardianship of Cheryl F., 170 Wis. 2d 420, 425, 
489 N.W.2d 636 (Ct. App. 1992). 
14 Cheryl F., 170 Wis. 2d at 425. 
No. 
03-1419   
 
13 
 
N.W.2d 251 (1977).15  Both of these principles of law (and the 
cases cited to support them) have been oft-repeated and are well 
accepted.   
¶35 Although the court of appeals in Cheryl F. declared 
the question of the person's incompetency a question of law in a 
petition for guardianship proceedings, it seems to have treated 
the question as involving sufficiency of evidence.16  The court 
of appeals declared that the testimony of the witnesses was 
clear and competent evidence that Cheryl could not care for 
herself or manage her property and that this evidence supported 
the circuit court's conclusion that she was incompetent.17     
¶36  Brown 
also 
relies 
on 
State 
v. 
Watson, 
227 
Wis. 2d 167, 
595 
N.W.2d 403 
(1999), 
in 
which 
the 
court 
concluded, as it had in Cheryl F., that it would make an 
independent determination, as a matter of law, whether the facts 
met the statutory standard.  In Watson, the statutory standard 
was probable cause that the person's offense was sexually 
motivated under chapter 980.  The court concluded that the same 
standard of review applies in chapter 980 probable cause 
proceedings 
as 
in 
a 
criminal 
probable 
cause 
preliminary 
examination proceeding: An appellate court will accept the 
                                                 
15 Cheryl F., 170 Wis. 2d at 425.  See also Coston v. Joseph 
P., 222 Wis. 2d 1, 23, 586 N.W.2d 52 (Ct. App. 1998)(whether 
evidence 
satisfies 
legal 
standard 
of 
incompetency 
for 
guardianship is question of law). 
16 Cheryl F., 170 Wis. 2d at 426.   
17 See also Coston v. Joseph P., 222 Wis. 2d at 26.  
No. 
03-1419   
 
14 
 
circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous but will review de novo whether the facts meet the 
statutory legal standard of probable cause.18   
¶37 The second line of cases upon which Brown relies holds 
that a reviewing court should independently examine the record 
under a sufficiency of evidence standard to determine whether a 
party has met its burden of proof.19  Whether a party has met its 
burden of proof is a question of law a reviewing court examines 
without giving deference to the circuit court's conclusion.20  
The State acknowledges that the traditional sufficiency of 
evidence standard of review "is not inappropriate."21  The 
State's position is that irrespective of the standard of review, 
the circuit court's order should be affirmed.     
                                                 
18 State 
v. 
Watson, 
227 
Wis. 2d 167, 
196, 
212, 
595 
N.W.2d 403 (1999). 
19 Brown cites Poluk v. J.N. Manson Agency, Inc., 2002 WI 
App 286, ¶24, 258 Wis. 2d 725, 653 N.W.2d 905, and State v. 
Wanta, 224 Wis. 2d 679, 688, 592 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1999), for 
the sufficiency of the evidence standard of review.   
 
20 Return of Property in State v. Jones, 226 Wis. 2d 565, 
596-97, 594 N.W.2d 738 (1999); Seraphine v. Hardiman, 44 
Wis. 2d 60, 65, 170 N.W. 739 (1969); Hallin v. Hallin, 228 
Wis. 2d 250, 258, 596 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1999). 
21 Brief of Petitioner-Respondent at 38.  The State cites 
State v. Forster, 2003 WI App 29, ¶2, 260 Wis. 2d 149, 659 
N.W.2d 144, and State v. Lalor, 2003 WI App 68, ¶¶11-14, 261 
Wis. 2d 614, 661 N.W.2d 898, for the sufficiency of the evidence 
standard of review. 
Although the court of appeals did not adopt the sufficiency 
of the evidence standard, it referred to "sufficiency of 
evidence." 
No. 
03-1419   
 
15 
 
¶38 We next look to State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 597 
N.W.2d 697 (1999), a chapter 980 case, for the sufficiency of 
evidence standard of review.  Among other challenges, Curiel 
challenged the circuit court's determination that he was a 
chapter 980 sexually violent person.  To commit a person under 
chapter 980, the State has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the person is dangerous to others because 
the person's mental disorder creates a substantial probability 
that he or she will engage in future acts of violence, that is, 
the State must prove that because of the person's mental 
disorder, it is much more likely than not that the person will 
engage in future acts of sexual violence.   
¶39 In Curiel, the court declared that the standard of 
review appropriate to commitment under ch. 980 is the standard 
used to review criminal convictions to determine the sufficiency 
of evidence.22  This standard of review of criminal convictions 
has been set forth as follows:  An appellate court may not 
reverse a conviction unless the evidence, viewed most favorably 
to the State and conviction, is so insufficient in probative 
value and force that it can be said as a matter of law that no 
trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.23    
                                                 
22 See also State v. Kienitz, 227 Wis. 2d 423, ¶20, 597 
N.W.2d 712 (1999) (relying on Curiel). 
23 Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d at 416 (quoting State v. Poellinger, 
153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990)).  See also State v. 
Watkins, 2002 WI 101, ¶68, 255 Wis. 2d 265, 647 N.W.2d 244 
(same). 
No. 
03-1419   
 
16 
 
¶40 In other words, the test for the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the order denying Brown supervised release, 
according to the State and at least certain parts of Brown's 
brief, is not whether a reviewing court is convinced by clear 
and convincing evidence that a person's petition for supervised 
release should be denied, but whether a circuit court, acting 
reasonably, could be so convinced by evidence it has a right to 
believe and accept as true.  The credibility of the witnesses 
and the weight of the evidence are for the circuit court; a 
reviewing court views the evidence most favorable to the circuit 
court's order.  If more than one reasonable inference can be 
drawn from the evidence, the inference that supports the circuit 
court's order is the one that a reviewing court adopts.  The 
circuit court's ultimate decision on whether a person is much 
more likely than not to engage in acts of sexual violence if not 
continued in institutional care must be supported by evidence 
sufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard.24         
¶41 The Curiel court rejected Curiel's position that the 
standard of review should be a two-tiered question of fact and 
law, with findings of fact not overturned unless clearly 
erroneous and the application of the facts to a statutory 
                                                 
24 Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d at 418-19 (quoting Gauthier v. State, 
28 Wis. 2d 412, 415-16, 137 N.W.2d 101 (1965)).  See also 
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 504 (citing Johnson v. State, 55 
Wis. 2d 144, 147, 197 N.W.2d 760 (1972), quoting Bautista v. 
State, 53 Wis. 2d 218, 223, 191 N.W.2d 725 (1971)). 
No. 
03-1419   
 
17 
 
concept a question of law determined independently from a 
circuit court's conclusion.25   
¶42 Although Curiel involved a petition for the commitment 
of a sexual predator as opposed to a chapter 980 petition for 
supervised release, and the procedures used in a petition for 
commitment and in a petition for supervised release are 
different, we conclude that the Curiel standard of independent 
review of the circuit court's decision on the basis of the 
sufficiency of evidence, rather than a review for erroneous 
exercise of discretion, is appropriate in the instant case.  
¶43 The choice of a standard of appellate review depends 
in 
large 
extent 
on 
a 
determination 
of 
the 
comparative 
institutional strengths of appellate courts and circuit courts 
in making particular decisions and the need for consistency and 
uniformity in circuit court decisions across the state.  
¶44 The sufficiency of evidence standard of independent 
appellate review gives deference to the circuit court's strength 
in determining the credibility of witnesses and in evaluating 
the evidence and recognizes the evaluative aspects involved in a 
circuit court's denial of a petition for supervised release.  
Circuit courts are better able than appellate courts to 
determine 
the 
credibility 
of 
witnesses 
and 
evaluate 
the 
evidence.  In making a determination about the sufficiency of 
evidence, a reviewing court may draw not only on a circuit 
                                                 
25 Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d at 415-17.   
No. 
03-1419   
 
18 
 
court's observational advantage, but also on the circuit court's 
reasoning. 
¶45 Because the sufficiency of evidence standard provides 
independent 
appellate 
review, 
it 
fosters 
consistency 
and 
uniformity in circuit court decision making.  A published 
appellate decision on a legal issue serves to guide courts in 
applying facts to statutory principles and fosters consistency 
and uniformity in circuit courts' case-by-case evaluation of 
petitions for supervised release.     
¶46 Uniformity of application of facts to law, respect for 
circuit courts' reasoning, and recognition of circuit courts' 
observational advantage in evaluating evidence are desirable 
goals with respect to orders on chapter 980 petitions for 
supervised release.  These goals are more likely to be achieved 
with the sufficiency of the evidence standard of review than 
with an erroneous exercise of discretion standard of review.  
Accordingly, we adopt the sufficiency of evidence standard of 
review when reviewing a circuit court's order denying a petition 
for supervised release under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4). 
¶47 We now apply this standard of review to this case.  
II 
 
¶48 Applying the sufficiency of evidence standard of 
review to the circuit court order denying Brown's petition for 
supervised release, we conclude that the evidence adduced at the 
hearing was not sufficient to meet the State's statutory burden 
imposed by Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4).     
No. 
03-1419   
 
19 
 
¶49 We agree with the court of appeals that "the [circuit] 
court struggled to articulate the exact basis on which it 
reaches this apparently close call."  On our review of the 
evidence we conclude that the circuit court's decision that 
Brown is much more likely than not to engage in acts of sexual 
violence if he is not continued in institutional care is not 
supported 
by 
evidence 
sufficient 
to 
meet 
the 
clear 
and 
convincing standard. 
¶50 We first set forth the procedural posture of the case.  
We then examine the circuit court's review of the evidence and 
reasoning.  Lastly, we examine the record under the sufficiency 
of evidence standard of review.  
A 
¶51 In 1988, a then 16-year-old Brown was adjudicated 
delinquent for sexually assaulting two girls.  He was placed at 
a residential treatment center where he remained until March 
1990.  In 1993 he was convicted of second-degree sexual assault 
of a child and incest with a child and sentenced to forty months 
in prison.  In 1995, Brown was convicted of a sexual assault 
that occurred in 1990.   
¶52 On November 5, 1998 Brown was formally committed under 
chapter 980 and moved to Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center.  
¶53 In April 2002, Brown filed his first petition for 
supervised release.  The circuit court appointed Dr. Michael 
Kotkin, a psychologist, to examine Brown and file a report as 
No. 
03-1419   
 
20 
 
required by Wis. Stat. § 980.08(3).26  Dr. Kotkin examined Brown 
on May 15, 2002, and prepared a report on August 2, 2002, 
indicating that although Brown had made treatment progress, he 
was not yet ready for supervised release.  In September 2002, 
after receiving a copy of the report directly from Dr. Kotkin, 
Brown withdrew his petition for supervised release. 
¶54 On October 24, 2002, Dr. David Warner, a psychologist, 
filed a re-examination report with the circuit court pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 980.07, which requires periodic assessments.  The 
report did not recommend Brown's outright discharge, but it 
stated that "Mr. Brown has reduced his risk for sexually violent 
behavior to the point that he could be considered for a 
supervised release."  Brown then petitioned for supervised 
release.  The circuit court ordered the Department of Health and 
Family Services to provide an updated report explicitly stating 
whether 
the 
department 
did 
or 
did 
not 
actually 
support 
supervised release for Brown.   
                                                 
26 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.08(3) provides in relevant part: 
Within 20 days after receipt of the petition, the 
court shall appoint one or more examiners having the 
specialized knowledge determined by the court to be 
appropriate, who shall examine the person and furnish 
a written report of the examination to the court 
within 20 days after appointment. . . . If any such 
examiner believed that the person is appropriate for 
supervised release under the criterion specified in 
sub. (4), the examiner shall report on the type of 
treatment and services that the person may need while 
in the community on supervised release. 
 
No. 
03-1419   
 
21 
 
¶55 On December 30, 2002, the department filed the updated 
report, supporting supervised release.  The report stated that 
Brown "ha[d] completed sufficient treatment at [Sand Ridge] to 
reduce his risk for sexually violent behavior to the point that 
he has become an appropriate subject for supervised release."   
¶56 On January 20, 2003, the circuit court held a hearing 
on Brown's petition for supervised release.  Dr. Kotkin was not 
called as a witness, but the circuit court allowed his report to 
be introduced in evidence.  Dr. Kotkin had failed to file the 
report with the circuit court as required by statute and, at the 
State's request, shortly before the hearing in issue in the 
instant case, the circuit court ordered Dr. Kotkin to file his 
report. 
¶57 The parties agree that Dr. Kotkin's report was hearsay 
but 
disagree 
whether 
the 
report 
was 
admissible 
under 
a 
recognized 
exception 
to 
hearsay. 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
determined that Dr. Kotkin's report was admissible under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.02 because it was required to be filed with the 
court under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(3).  The State argues that the 
report is admissible under the reasoning of the court of 
appeals, or as a record of regularly conducted activity 
(§ 908.03(6)), or as residual hearsay (§ 908.03(24)).  Brown 
disagrees with the reasoning of the court of appeals and the 
State on whether the report falls under any hearsay exception. 
¶58 The parties also disagree whether the admission of Dr. 
Kotkin's report resulted in violation of Brown's constitutional 
right to confrontation or his statutory right under Wis. Stat. 
No. 
03-1419   
 
22 
 
§ 980.03(2)(c) to "[p]resent and cross-examine witnesses."  The 
court of appeals did not consider Brown's confrontation argument 
because it considered the argument amorphous and insufficiently 
developed.   
¶59 The larger issue of the nature of the hearing under  
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4) and the applicability of rules of 
evidence was not fully considered by the parties, and we do not 
address it.  We need not and do not address the hearsay and 
confrontation issues, because Dr. Kotkin's report does not 
affect the ultimate decision.  We agree with the circuit court 
that the report had limited value because it was based on an 
interview with Brown several months prior to the hearing.  By 
its very terms, Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4) evinces the need for a 
timely report, presumably to give the court an accurate picture 
of the petitioner's condition.  The statute provides that "the 
court, without a jury, shall hear the petition within 30 days 
after 
the 
report 
of 
the 
court-appointed 
examiner 
is 
filed . . . ." 
 
With 
or 
without 
Dr. 
Kotkin's 
report 
as 
admissible evidence, the record is insufficient as a matter of 
law to support the circuit court's order.     
¶60 Dr. Warner was the only witness called at the hearing.  
Dr. Warner reiterated the opinion stated in his report that 
Brown was ready for supervised release.  Dr. Warner's in-court 
testimony supplemented the report.  Dr. Warner opined that any 
supervised release program for Brown should have restrictions, 
including "residence in a supervised setting, anti-depressant 
medication, 
continued 
sex 
offender 
and 
substance 
abuse 
No. 
03-1419   
 
23 
 
treatment, 
and 
regular 
monitoring 
with 
drug 
testing 
and 
polygraph examinations."27 
¶61 We turn now to the circuit court's review of the 
evidence and reasoning. 
B 
¶62 We set forth the circuit court's review of the 
evidence and reasoning in great detail in light of the court of 
appeals' characterization of the circuit court's reasoning as a 
struggle "to articulate the exact basis on which it reaches this 
apparently close call."    
¶63 The circuit court explained its decision on the 
record.  The circuit court made no express findings of fact and 
did not explicitly make reference to the factors enumerated in 
§ 980.08(4) as factors a circuit court may consider, namely: 
(1) The nature and circumstances of the behavior that was 
the basis of the allegation in the commitment petition;  
(2) 
The 
person's 
mental 
history 
and 
present 
mental 
condition; 
(3) Where the person will live; 
(4) How the person will support himself; and  
(5) What arrangements are available to ensure that the 
person has access to and will participate in necessary 
treatment.  
                                                 
27 Brown, 269 Wis. 2d 750, ¶6. 
No. 
03-1419   
 
24 
 
¶64 It is, however, evident from the transcript that the 
circuit court had these factors in mind and considered the 
State's statutory clear and convincing evidence burden of proof. 
¶65 The circuit court began by recognizing the difficulty 
of predicting a person's future behavior.  The circuit court 
then reviewed Brown's past sexual misbehavior in the community 
(both while supervised and unsupervised) as somewhat predictive 
of future behavior.  The circuit court characterized Brown as 
having "a rather frightening track record" from ages 15 to 20. 
The circuit court summarized Brown's track record as follows: 
Unfortunately, the only track record we have for 
[Brown] while out in the community, both supervised 
and not supervised, goes back about ten years.  That's 
a standard problem in sexual——in Chapter 980 cases.  
But the ten year period is more of a problem with a 
thirty-year-old than it might be with a fifty-year-old 
because not only has there been a ten year period, but 
it's a larger segment of the respondent's life, and it 
means that the time frame that we can look back to is 
a time when he was a juvenile or a very young 
adult. . . .  R.110:33. 
¶66 The circuit court went on to note that Brown's pre-
incarceration period involved a number of sexual assaults that 
"involved a material degree of force and violence" and that at 
least some of the assaults took place after Brown had been 
placed in a residential treatment center for juveniles.  
¶67 The circuit court acknowledged that Brown's offenses 
did not involve considerable development and grooming of his 
victims.  The circuit court viewed this factor as significant 
because 
"common 
sense" 
informed 
the 
circuit 
court 
that 
supervision is more effective in protecting the community 
No. 
03-1419   
 
25 
 
against a chapter 980 person if the person's offenses involved 
"considerable 
grooming 
and 
planning 
and 
preparation 
and 
thought."  
¶68 Yet the circuit court also acknowledged that Brown's 
behavior is not of someone who has pulled up in a car and 
abducted and assaulted children.   
¶69 Brown's voluntary use of Zoloft was a concern for the 
circuit court.  At the hearing, Dr. Warner explained that the 
Zoloft was prescribed to reduce and manage Brown's sex drive.  
The circuit court believed that the drug may be masking "certain 
problems" and that Brown could stop taking the drug at any time.  
Zoloft had both positive and negative aspects for the circuit 
court: "And the concern is to some extent the positive 
developments here may be related to something that he may choose 
not 
to 
continue 
to 
do, 
although 
it 
also 
serves 
as 
a 
consideration to suggest that is something that could reduce the 
risks in the future."   
¶70 The circuit court focused on Brown's family history, 
"a source of considerable sadness and sorrow and realization 
that the roots . . . of the difficulties and problems and crimes 
here, may to a large respect be things that were outside of Mr. 
Brown's own person and outside of his own control . . . ."  
Although the circuit court did not elaborate on the family 
history, the family history is in the record.  Brown's eldest 
sister was the product of an incestuous relationship between 
Brown's mother and the mother's biological father. Brown's 
maternal grandfather sexually molested Brown between the ages of 
No. 
03-1419   
 
26 
 
11 and 13.  As Brown's parole agent aptly summarized, "His 
pathological family, limited learning ability and the sexual 
assaults of his grandfather have made a negative impact on his 
development."  The family history, according to the circuit 
court, "tends to suggest reasons why these things happen and 
reasons why he continues to present a significant risk to the 
community as we look down the road." 
¶71 The circuit court viewed the actuarial instruments, 
that is, the tests done at Brown's initial commitment in 1998, 
as putting Brown "on the edge here . . . [but] the instruments 
themselves do not suggest that this defendant is much more 
likely than not going to re-offend."   
¶72 The 
circuit 
court 
recognized 
Brown's 
favorable 
response to treatment, stating that Brown has "over the past 
years addressed treatment in a responsible and apparently 
healthy way, and that appears to be the principal basis for Dr. 
Warner's opinion that he is now ready, and the treatment and 
[Brown's] investment in treatment has brought this prediction of 
risk below the level of much more likely than not."    
¶73 The circuit court also considered the report Dr. 
Kotkin had prepared several months previously, in which Dr. 
Kotkin opined, according to the circuit court, that Brown "is 
not quite ready but is moving toward readiness and may be ready 
in the near future."  The circuit court explicitly discounted 
the value of Dr. Kotkin's report, declaring that "[b]ecause of 
the several months that have gone by since that evaluation and 
No. 
03-1419   
 
27 
 
report, it is not very helpful in deciding where Mr. Brown is 
today . . . ."   
¶74 The 
circuit 
court 
recognized 
that 
evidence 
demonstrated that "Mr. Brown is on a different track, that he 
had 
matured . . . and 
that 
he 
has 
invested 
himself 
more 
responsibly in treatment with some occasional and understandable 
setbacks." 
¶75 After these comments generally weighing the evidence 
as favorable to Brown, the circuit court nevertheless concluded 
that "by clear and convincing evidence," Brown "is not yet a 
proper candidate for release and that, at this time, given those 
considerations, it remains much more likely than not that he 
would re-offend at some point over the course of the rest of his 
life even while supervised in the community."   
¶76 The 
circuit 
court 
further 
elaborated 
on 
this 
conclusion, summarizing the extent of supervision Brown would 
need in the community.  The circuit court's concluding words 
were as follows: 
I make this finding positing what I believe is the 
reasonable level of supervision that can be expected, 
and it should be expected of the community, and which 
includes transitional placements either in a group 
home or a closely supervised setting and which 
includes regular treatment and regular supervision of 
[Brown's] activities and whereabouts.  I don't posit a 
level of supervision that requires a 24-hour partner.  
If someone needs that, then they are not ready for 
supervised release, they need to be ready to move to a 
setting that involves some periods of freedom and some 
periods where there isn't direct supervision, and I 
find that [Brown] is not ready for that.  So the 
petition for supervised release is denied. 
No. 
03-1419   
 
28 
 
¶77 In sum, the circuit court stated that it considered 
Brown's precommitment criminal behavior, his family history, Dr. 
Warner's testimony, the two psychologists' reports, Brown's use 
of Zoloft, and the suggested conditions of supervised release.   
¶78 If this court were to examine only the circuit court's 
evaluation of the evidence and reasoning, it would conclude that 
the evidence, viewed most favorably to the State and the circuit 
court's order, is insufficient in probative value as a matter of 
law.  The circuit court's ultimate conclusion seemed like a 
surprise ending to its marshaling of the evidence and reasoning.  
C 
¶79 The State urges this court to examine the entire 
record and not limit itself to the evidence summarized by the 
circuit court.     
¶80 The State points out that Dr. Warner's report and 
addendum, which were admitted as evidence and considered by the 
circuit court, classified Brown as suffering from pedophilia, 
alcohol abuse, and personality disorder NOS (not otherwise 
specified) with antisocial features.  Dr. Warner explained that 
"[r]esearch has demonstrated that persons who develop deviant 
sexual arousal patterns in adolescence or early adulthood are 
likely to retain these patterns throughout most of their lives."  
The State asserts that the circuit court could reasonably view 
the fact that Brown was an adolescent or young adult when he 
committed his sexually violent conduct as a factor that 
increased, rather than reduced, Brown's risk to the community.  
No. 
03-1419   
 
29 
 
The risk is further exacerbated, according to the State, because 
the assaults involved both family members and strangers.   
¶81 Brown's criminal behavior ending 12 years ago in 1992 
is troublesome and is accorded weight, as the State correctly 
argues, in determining whether the State has met its burden.28  
Yet this evidence cannot be the sole basis upon which to ground 
an order denying a petition for supervised release, for if it 
were, then no individual confined under Chapter 980 would ever 
be eligible for supervised release, regardless of how stellar 
his or her treatment progress.29 
¶82 The State asks this court to consider a telephone 
conversation Brown had with his youngest half sister, whom he 
had sexually assaulted during her childhood.  She had offered to 
introduce Brown to young adult women when he returned to the 
community.  Brown refused the offer.  Dr. Warner saw Brown's 
                                                 
28 See Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4). 
29 For both initial commitment and discharge under ch. 980, 
evidence of past sexually violent offenses before the commission 
of the offense that led to the initial commitment petition is 
not sufficient to establish that the committee has a mental 
disorder.  See Wis. Stat. § 980.05(4) (initial commitment 
trial); Wis JI——Criminal 2506 (for discharge petitions under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.09) (emphasis added): 
 
Evidence has been submitted that (name) committed 
other sexually violent offenses before committing 
(identify offense on which the petition is based).  
This evidence is not sufficient to establish that 
(name) has a mental disorder.  Before you may find 
that (name) has a mental disorder, you must be so 
satisfied to a reasonable certainty by evidence that 
is clear and convincing. 
No. 
03-1419   
 
30 
 
rejection of the offer as positive.30  The State argues that this 
conversation can be viewed by the circuit court as inappropriate 
and as grounds for denial of Brown's petition.  
¶83 The State also asserts that Brown's lack of family 
support when on supervised release would pose problems.  In 
addition to the alleged phone call from Brown's half sister, 
Brown stated that his first stepfather (the biological father of 
Brown's two younger half sisters) wants Brown locked up for the 
rest of his life.  This lack of support, contends the State, 
poses a risk of reoffense. 
¶84 The State argues that Dr. Warner's testimony about the 
actuarials taken at Brown's initial commitment supports the 
circuit court's order.  Actuarials assessed Brown at commitment 
to be in the low-medium to high range of risk to reoffend.  Dr. 
Warner testified that the actuarials measured only Brown's risk 
at the time of commitment and were of no use in evaluating his 
current risk of reoffense.  The circuit court acknowledged that 
the instruments themselves do not suggest that Brown is much 
more likely than not to reoffend. 
¶85 The 
State's brief 
reviews 
the various 
treatment 
programs in which Brown participated, including those in which 
his participation in prior years was inadequate, and emphasizes 
that Dr. Warner opined that Brown is capable of further 
progress, 
that 
he 
has 
not 
yet 
exhausted 
the 
treatment 
                                                 
30 Dr. Warner suggested that supervised release include a 
provision allowing Brown only supervised visits with his family. 
No. 
03-1419   
 
31 
 
opportunities available in the institution, and that the 
research literature is not clear that further treatment in a 
secure setting will further reduce the risk of recidivism.  Dr. 
Warner opined that Brown would benefit from treatment programs 
in a secure setting or in the community.  The State views this 
testimony as evidence supporting the circuit court order denying 
Brown supervisory release.   
¶86 
The 
State 
stresses 
that 
despite 
Dr. 
Warner's 
conclusions favorable to Brown, the psychologist did detail 
problems.  Brown was, for example, resistant to group therapy in 
the early years of his commitment.  But Dr. Warner traced 
Brown's successful treatment progress in the two years preceding 
the filing of the petition for supervised release at issue in 
the instant case, and the circuit court acknowledged Brown's 
treatment progress. 
¶87 The State urges us to focus on those aspects that are 
negative to Brown's supervised release, totally ignoring those 
matters favorable to Brown that the circuit court noted.   
¶88 In contrast, Brown urges us to focus on Dr. Warner's 
favorable report.  But courts are not rubber stamps for expert 
testimony.  Neither a circuit court nor a reviewing court is 
required to accept an expert's ultimate conclusion.  
¶89 The 
circuit 
court 
may 
accept 
or 
reject 
expert 
testimony,31 but in the instant case the extent to which the 
                                                 
31 State v. Kienitz, 227 Wis. 2d 423 438, 597 N.W.2d 712 
(1999). 
No. 
03-1419   
 
32 
 
circuit court weighed one expert's opinion over the other and 
weighed parts of each expert's reports is not at issue.  Under 
any variation of acceptance or rejection of the two experts' 
opinions and factual matters described therein in the instant 
case, the available evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom 
do not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence that 
Brown is much more likely than not to engage in acts of sexual 
violence if not continued in institutional care.  
¶90 Brown also urges us to focus on the recommendation of 
the Department of Health and Family Services that Brown be 
granted supervised release, although the department did not file 
a petition on Brown's behalf pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.08(1). 
¶91 But courts are not rubber stamps for the department. 
Neither a circuit court nor a reviewing court is required to 
accept the recommendation of the department.   
¶92 On the other hand, a court should not lightly dismiss 
a recommendation of the department.  This court has explained 
that the legislature has charged the department with the custody 
and control of sexually violent persons and thus views the 
department as being in the best position to evaluate the various 
risks and benefits of placing a committed individual on 
supervised release.  The court explained the role of the 
department in State v. Morford, 2004 WI 5, ¶¶53-54, 268 
Wis. 2d 300, 674 N.W.2d 349, as follows: 
The department is an integral part of the procedural 
protections provided to a chapter 980 committee in 
Wis. Stat. chapter 980.  The department is charged 
with the "custody and control" of a sexually violent 
No. 
03-1419   
 
33 
 
person, 
whether 
the 
chapter 
980 
committee 
is 
institutionalized 
or 
on 
supervised 
release. 
The 
legislature thus views the department as being in the 
best position to evaluate the various risks and 
benefits 
of 
placing 
a 
committed 
individual 
on 
supervised release or revoking supervised release. 
It is the department that has sufficient experience 
dealing with sexually violent persons, as well as 
experience with the particular individual who has been 
committed, 
to 
make 
a 
sound, 
dispassionate, 
and 
unbiased 
decision 
regarding 
a 
committed 
person's 
condition. 
¶93 We have reviewed the record and the parties' arguments 
and analyses of the evidence.  The State's brief marshaled the 
evidence unfavorable to Brown's supervised release, and we 
carefully considered this evidence as well as the evidence 
favorable to Brown and accepted by the circuit court.  Simply 
put, we conclude as a matter of law that the circuit court's 
order denying Brown's petition for supervised release is not 
supported 
by 
evidence 
sufficient 
to 
meet 
the 
clear 
and 
convincing evidence standard.  
¶94 For the reasons set forth, the decision of the court 
of appeals is reversed, and we remand the cause to the circuit 
court with instructions to notify the Department of Health and 
Family Services that it should submit to the circuit court, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(5), 
a 
plan 
for 
Brown's 
supervised release.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
No.  03-1419.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶95 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  I join the 
mandate and all but ¶59 of the majority opinion in this matter.  
While I agree with the majority that Dr. Kotkin's report does 
not affect our ultimate decision, I write separately because I 
would reach the larger issue of the applicability of chapters 
901 to 911, otherwise known as the rules of evidence,32 at a 
hearing under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4). 
¶96 As Justice Roggensack points out in her dissent, we 
agree that as a general rule, hearsay evidence is not admitted 
over an objection unless there is an exception that permits its 
admission.  Roggensack, J., dissenting, ¶114.  She notes that 
exceptions to the general rule may be established by statute.  
Id.  She points out that "the usual place to look for such 
exceptions is Wis. Stat. Ch. 908," which governs the basic 
evidentiary rules regarding hearsay evidence.  Id.  She 
indicates that there are other statutes that provide that the 
rules 
of 
evidence 
do 
not 
apply, 
thereby 
affording 
the 
opportunity to have hearsay evidence admitted.  Id.  On these 
points, we agree.  I would begin the inquiry, however, by 
looking first at the applicability and scope of the rules of 
evidence, in order to determine whether an exception exists with 
respect to Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4). 
¶97 Wisconsin Stat. § 901.01 provides the scope of the 
rules of evidence in general, and specifies that chapters 901 to 
911 "govern proceedings in the courts of the state of Wisconsin 
except as provided in ss. 911.01 and 972.11."  Section 911.01(1) 
                                                 
32 See Wis. Stat. § 911.02. 
No.  03-1419.lbb 
 
2 
 
clearly states that the rules of evidence "apply to the courts 
of the state of Wisconsin . . . in the proceedings and to the 
extent hereinafter set forth except as provided in s. 972.11."  
Section 911.01(2) provides that the rules of evidence "apply 
generally to proceedings in civil and criminal actions."  
Section 
911.01(4) 
lists 
when 
the 
rules 
of 
evidence 
are 
inapplicable.33  Unless specified there, exceptions to the 
applicability of the rules of evidence do not exist unless 
clearly set forth elsewhere in the statutes. 
¶98 Nothing 
in 
chapters 
901 
to 
911 
exempts 
the 
applicability of the rules of evidence in ch. 980 proceedings.  
The 
rules 
of 
evidence 
include 
the 
rules 
governing 
the 
                                                 
33 (4) RULES OF EVIDENCE INAPPLICABLE.  Chapters 
901 to 911, other than ch. 905 with respect to 
privileges or s. 901.05 with respect to admissibility, 
do not apply in the following situations:  
(a) 
Preliminary 
questions 
of 
fact. 
 
The 
determination of questions of fact preliminary to 
admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be 
determined by a judge under s. 901.14(1). 
(b) 
Grand 
Jury: 
John 
Doe 
proceedings.  
Proceedings 
before 
grand 
juries 
or 
a 
John 
Doe 
proceeding. 
(c) Miscellaneous proceedings.  Proceedings for 
extradition or rendition; sentencing, or granting or 
revoking 
probation, 
issuance 
of 
arrest 
warrants, 
criminal summonses and search warrants; proceedings 
under s. 971.14(1)(c); proceedings with respect to 
pretrial release under ch. 969 except where habeas 
corpus is utilized with respect to release on bail or 
as otherwise provided in ch. 969. 
(d) Small claims actions.  Proceedings under ch. 
799, except jury trials.  
No.  03-1419.lbb 
 
3 
 
admissibility of hearsay evidence.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 908.  
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by chapter 908 or 
by 
other 
rules 
adopted 
by 
this 
court 
or 
by 
statute.  
Wis. Stat. § 908.02(2).  Hearsay exceptions are identified in 
Wis. Stat. §§ 908.03-908.045.  The dissent has not pointed to 
any hearsay exceptions that would allow for the admissibility of 
Dr. Kotkin's report.  Thus, unless chapter 980 creates an 
exception to the general rule regarding the applicability of the 
rules of evidence, the rules of evidence apply and govern the 
proceedings. 
¶99 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.03(2) states that at any hearing 
under this chapter, except as provided in §§ 980.09(2)(a) and 
980.10, and without limitation by enumeration, the person who is 
the subject of a sexually violent person petition has the right 
to counsel, including appointed counsel, the right to remain 
silent, the right to present and cross-examine witnesses, and 
the right to have the hearing recorded by a court reporter.  The 
exceptions 
provided 
govern 
discharge 
proceedings, 
not 
proceedings 
for 
supervised 
release 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08.   
¶100 At a proceeding for supervised release, the court 
shall grant the petition for release unless the state "proves by 
clear and convincing evidence" that the person is still sexually 
violent and that it is still substantially probable that the 
person 
will 
engage 
in 
acts 
of 
sexual 
violence 
if 
not 
institutionalized.  Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4).  In other words, 
evidence must be produced by the state, which must meet its 
No.  03-1419.lbb 
 
4 
 
burden, and the person retains the right to cross-examine the 
witnesses.  Inadmissible hearsay cannot be used to circumvent 
the person's right to cross-examine witnesses against him.  
There is nothing in Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4) that renders the 
rules of evidence inapplicable at this proceeding, and nothing 
that would suggest or create any hearsay exception for Dr. 
Kotkin's report.   
¶101 The court of appeals and the dissent each suggest that 
because 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.08(3) 
requires 
the 
licensed 
professional to furnish a written report of the examination to 
the court, it would be absurd to conclude that admissibility was 
not provided by the statute.  Compare State v. Brown, 2004 WI 
App 33, 269 Wis. 2d 750, ¶¶13-14, 676 N.W.2d 555; with 
Roggensack, J., dissenting, ¶¶115-16.  I respectfully disagree.  
Section 980.08(3) 
merely 
discusses 
the 
procedure 
for 
the 
appointment of court experts and the filing of their reports 
with the court.  That section does not set forth, nor exempt, 
the rules of evidence to be applied at the proceeding.  While 
the court "may consider . . . the person's mental history and 
present mental condition,"34 it does so subject to the procedure 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 980.03(2) and, because nothing in 
chapter 980 indicates otherwise, the rules of evidence.  As no 
hearsay exception exists that would allow Dr. Kotkin's report to 
be admitted, and because the rules of evidence apply during 
proceedings involving a petition for supervised release, the 
                                                 
34 Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4)(emphasis added). 
No.  03-1419.lbb 
 
5 
 
trial court should not have considered the report absent Dr. 
Kotkin's testimony. 
¶102  For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.           
 
 
 
 
No.  03-1419.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶103 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (dissenting).   I write 
separately, in part, because I conclude that the trial court 
properly admitted and considered the report of Dr. Michael S. 
Kotkin, even though Kotkin was not present to testify at Richard 
A. Brown's ch. 980 hearing.  I also write separately because I 
dissent from the majority opinion's reversal of the court of 
appeals decision that affirmed the finding of the circuit court 
that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that 
Brown is still a sexually violent person and that it is still 
substantially probable that he will engage in acts of sexual 
violence if he is not continued in institutional care. 
I.  BACKGROUND35 
¶104 Brown, who was born on March 23, 1972, has a long 
history of sexual assaults that have been perpetrated by force 
on young victims.  He was first convicted in 1988 of sexually 
assaulting a 10-year-old girl, when he was 16 years old.  
Apparently, prior to that conviction, in 1986 and 1987 when he 
was 14 and 15 years old, he repeatedly sexually assaulted his 
three stepsisters, and though his mother knew of the assaults, 
she did not appropriately intervene.  In 1990 at 18 years of 
age, he was convicted of sexually assaulting his 13-year-old 
stepsister, who is mentally retarded.   
¶105 Court intervention that provided treatment for Brown's 
aggressive sexual behavior followed the 1990 assault on his 
                                                 
35 The facts below are taken from the record and were 
available to the circuit court for its consideration in deciding 
whether the State had met its burden by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
No.  03-1419.pdr 
 
2 
 
stepsister.  However, in 1993 when he was 21 years of age, he 
raped a 13-year-old runaway; again, this sexual assault was 
perpetrated with the use of force.  He was sentenced to prison 
subsequent to that conviction.  In 1998, following his mandatory 
release date from prison, he was tried and committed to the 
Wisconsin Resource Center as a sexually violent person.  He was 
later transferred to Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center (Sand 
Ridge).  This case arises out of one of Brown's petitions for 
supervised release, which he filed under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4) 
(2001-02).36 
¶106 Prior 
to 
the 
hearing 
on 
Brown's 
petition, 
his 
propensity to commit acts of sexual violence upon release was 
assessed.  Two of those assessments were used as evidence in 
response to Brown's petition for supervised release:  that of 
Dr. Michael S. Kotkin and that of Dr. David E. Warner.  Both 
psychologists 
completed 
written 
reports 
after 
personal 
interviews with Brown.  Kotkin's report is dated August 2, 2002, 
and Warner's is dated October 2, 2002, with an update as of 
December 27, 2002.  Kotkin's report was ordered by the court to 
assist in deciding on a petition for supervised release that 
Brown filed in April of 2002.  It was prepared under the 
statutory directive of Wis. Stat. § 980.08(3).  Brown withdrew 
that petition for supervised release after receiving Kotkin's 
report and then promptly filed the petition now under review.  
During the course of the proceedings on Brown's second petition, 
                                                 
36 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  03-1419.pdr 
 
3 
 
the circuit court ruled that Kotkin's report could be filed, and 
the court considered it as relevant evidence, over Brown's 
hearsay objection.  Warner's report and testimony came in 
without objection. 
¶107 The reports and testimony were in agreement in 
demonstrating that Brown has had a consistent diagnosis of 
pedophilia that involves, "'recurrent, intense sexually arousing 
fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving sexual activity 
with a prepubescent child' . . . that are present for at least 
six months."  Brown also has had a consistent diagnosis of 
personality 
disorder. 
This 
mental 
illness 
has 
antisocial 
features that were described as "'an enduring pattern of inner 
experience 
and 
behavior 
that 
deviates 
markedly 
from 
the 
expectations of the individual's culture'" of "'long duration' 
. . . and [that are] pervasive across a broad range of personal 
and social situations."  These diagnoses have been in place and 
reaffirmed 
at 
every 
evaluation, 
beginning 
with 
the 
1998 
evaluation done prior to Brown's trial upon the State's petition 
to commit him as a sexually violent person. 
¶108 As part of Warner's October 2002 assessment, he 
administered three actuarial risk assessment tests.37  Wagner 
found that Brown rated in the "high-risk category for sexual re-
offending" on the MnSOST-R diagnostic test.  Warner's report 
explained that at least 70% of those who scored in the range 
                                                 
37 An explanation of these testing devices can be found in:  
Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial 
Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and 
Accountability, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1443 (2003).  
No.  03-1419.pdr 
 
4 
 
that Brown scored on the MnSOST-R would reoffend within six 
years of release from a secured setting.  The other two tests 
Warner conducted showed that Brown was in a lower range for 
propensity to reoffend than did the MnSOST-R.  However, Warner's 
report also stated that "[r]ecent research has demonstrated that 
actuarial instruments are sensitive to different types of sexual 
offending, with the MnSOST-R identifying offenders that have 
committed forceful sexual assaults on related or unrelated 
victims across a range of ages." (Emphasis added.)  Warner's 
report also states that "[r]esearch has demonstrated that 
persons 
who 
develop 
deviant 
sexual 
arousal 
patterns 
in 
adolescence or early adulthood are likely to retain these 
patterns throughout most of their lives.  Mr. Brown's diagnosis 
of pedophilia, by definition, indicates that he is likely to 
have an ongoing deviant sexual interest in prepubescent and 
pubescent 
girls." 
 
However, 
notwithstanding 
the 
negative 
comments I have reported above, Warner also opined that "it 
would be possible to manage Mr. Brown's risk for sex offense 
recidivism safely in the community with the supervision and 
treatment resources currently available in Milwaukee County." 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶109 Kotkin reviewed much the same information as Warner, 
but he came to a very different conclusion.  Although he was 
encouraged by Brown's beginning to get involved in treatment 
that he had earlier shunned, Kotkin noted that as late as 
March 7, 2002 "Richard's lack of participation in group process 
continues to be identified as an ongoing problem."  He also 
No.  03-1419.pdr 
 
5 
 
weighed Brown's mental history and ongoing problems with his 
family as factors that caused him to conclude that Brown was not 
ready for supervised release.   
¶110 The circuit court heard all of the testimony, reviewed 
the reports available to it, considered the nature of Brown's 
pedophilia, and the length of time over which Brown had 
exhibited sexually deviant behavior.  The court also reviewed 
Brown's recent treatment with the prescription drug, Zoloft, 
which apparently had caused him to shift some of his thinking 
from sexually oriented matters to other concerns, and the fact 
that Brown could choose to discontinue Zoloft at any time.  The 
court noted that Brown had not yet completed all the treatment 
that was available to him at Sand Ridge.  The court also noted 
that Warner had conditioned his opinion that supervised release 
was appropriate on extensive, detailed conditions.  The court 
then found that the State had proven by clear and convincing 
evidence that Brown was still a sexually violent person and that 
it was still substantially probable that he would engage in acts 
of sexual violence if he did not remain in institutional care. 
II.  SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
A. 
Standard of review 
¶111 Whether an item of evidence that has been objected to 
as hearsay was properly admitted is a question of law that we 
review without deference to the circuit court.  State v. Joyner, 
2002 WI App 250, ¶16, 258 Wis. 2d 249, 653 N.W.2d 290.  
¶112 We review the sufficiency of the evidence for the 
circuit court's finding that Brown was still a sexually violent 
No.  03-1419.pdr 
 
6 
 
person and that it was still substantially probable that he 
would engage in acts of sexual violence under the same standard 
we use to review the sufficiency of evidence for a criminal 
conviction.  State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 417, 597 N.W.2d 
697 (1999).  As we have explained, we are not required to be 
convinced that the proof was sufficient, only that a reasonable 
trier of fact could find the proof sufficient.  Id. at 418-19.   
B. 
Review of trial court decision 
1. Admission of Kotkin report 
¶113 Brown objected to the admission of the Kotkin report 
as hearsay.  The circuit court overruled his objection because 
of the statutory scheme set out by the legislature for ch. 980 
proceedings.  The court of appeals also analyzed the report in 
terms of legislative directives that are applicable to petitions 
for supervised release conducted under Wis. Stat. § 980.08.  In 
my view, that is the correct analysis and therefore, the report 
was properly admitted. 
¶114 All agree that as a general rule, hearsay evidence is 
not admitted over an objection, unless there is an exception 
that permits its admission.  Exceptions to the inadmissibility 
of hearsay may be established by statute.  See R.S. v. Milwaukee 
County, 162 Wis. 2d 197, 204-07, 470 N.W.2d 260 (1991).  The 
usual place to look for such exceptions is Wis. Stat. ch. 908, 
which defines and explains the basic evidentiary rules relating 
to the admission of hearsay.  However, that chapter is not the 
only place where statutory exceptions to the usual hearsay rules 
are found.  There are many other statutes that provide that the 
No.  03-1419.pdr 
 
7 
 
rules 
of 
evidence 
do 
not 
apply, 
thereby 
affording 
the 
opportunity to have hearsay evidence admitted.38  Accordingly, it 
is reasonable to examine Wis. Stat. § 980.08 to see if it 
provides an exception to the usual rules regarding the admission 
of hearsay, as well. 
¶115 Kotkin prepared the report at issue here at the 
directive of the court.  By filing a petition for supervised 
release, Brown set in motion the statutory directives that 
resulted in Kotkin's report and its filing with the court.  
Stated otherwise, once a petition for supervised release is 
filed, a circuit court is required to "appoint one or more 
examiners having the specialized knowledge" to conduct an 
examination of the petitioner to assess the petitioner's 
propensity to reoffend.  Wis. Stat. § 980.08(3).  When the 
examination is completed, the examiner is required to "furnish a 
written report of the examination to the court."  Id.  When the 
circuit court rules on the petition, it is directed by statute 
to consider all evidence that makes up the petitioner's mental 
history.  Section 980.08(4).  The report prepared under 
§ 980.08(3) is referred to as having been "filed with the court" 
in § 980.08(4).  Once the report is filed, it is a part of a 
                                                 
38 For example, the rules of evidence do not apply in small 
claims actions, Wis. Stat. § 799.209(2) (2003-04), in contested 
case hearings under ch. 227, Wis. Stat. § 227.45(1) (2003-04), 
or in proceedings before a condemnation commission, Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.08(6)(a) (2003-04), and in a hearing to grant, reduce, 
increase 
or 
revoke 
a 
condition 
of 
supervised 
release, 
information offered need not conform to the rules of evidence.  
Wis. Stat. § 969.08(8) (2003-04).  
No.  03-1419.pdr 
 
8 
 
petitioner's mental history that the court is to consider.  See 
id. 
¶116 In my view, the statutory scheme set out in regard to 
conducting an examination, preparing such a report and filing it 
with the court, when combined with the court's obligation to 
consider a petitioner's mental history, causes Kotkin's report 
to be an exception to 
the 
general 
rules 
regarding the 
admissibility of hearsay.  To then conclude that the court 
cannot use the very report it is required to obtain and the 
examiner is required to furnish to the court, makes no sense.  
While some may say that the law and common sense are not 
necessarily synonyms, in my view, they should not be strangers.  
Accordingly, I conclude the Kotkin report was properly admitted, 
pursuant to the statutory exception provided for in Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.08(3) and (4).   
2. 
Evidence submitted 
¶117 A 
petition 
for 
supervised 
release 
is 
reviewed 
according to whether the proof was sufficient under the terms 
established by the legislature in Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4).39  It 
provides: 
(4) The court, without a jury, shall hear the 
petition . . . [and] shall grant the petition unless 
the state proves by clear and convincing evidence that 
the person is still a sexually violent person and that 
                                                 
39 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.08(4) was revised in the 2003-04 
statutes so that the State is required to prove only that "it is 
still likely that the person will engage in acts of sexual 
violence if the person is not continued in institutional care," 
rather than it being substantially probable that the person will 
so act unless his or her institutionalization is continued.  
2003 Wis. Act 187, § 4. 
No.  03-1419.pdr 
 
9 
 
it is still substantially probable that the person 
will engage in acts of sexual violence if the person 
is not continued in institutional care.  In making a 
decision 
under 
this 
subsection, 
the 
court 
may 
consider, without limitation because of enumeration, 
the nature and circumstances of the behavior that was 
the basis of the allegation in the petition under 
s. 980.02(2)(a), 
the 
person's 
mental 
history 
and 
present mental condition, where the person will live, 
how the person will support himself or herself and 
what arrangements are available to ensure that the 
person has access to and will participate in necessary 
treatment, including pharmacological treatment using 
an antiandrogen or the chemical equivalent of an 
antiandrogen if the person is a serious child sex 
offender.  A decision under this subsection on a 
petition filed by a person who is a serious child sex 
offender may not be made based on the fact that the 
person 
is 
a 
proper 
subject 
for 
pharmacological 
treatment 
using an 
antiandrogen 
or the 
chemical 
equivalent of an antiandrogen or on the fact that the 
person is willing to participate in pharmacological 
treatment 
using an 
antiandrogen 
or the 
chemical 
equivalent of an antiandrogen. 
¶118 On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, all 
evidence that was before the circuit court for its decision is 
reviewed in the light most favorable to the State.  See State v. 
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).  In 
Curiel, we specifically rejected a de novo standard of review 
and stated that a determination of whether it was "substantially 
probable" that the proposed committee would reoffend is a 
question of fact for the trier of fact to determine.  Curiel, 
227 Wis. 2d at 418 n.9.  We also explained that when testing the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we must affirm the decision of the 
circuit court unless no finder of fact, acting reasonably, could 
find that the defendant was substantially probable to commit 
future acts of sexual violence.  Id. at 418-19. 
No.  03-1419.pdr 
 
10 
 
¶119 It is not the volume of testimony in one direction or 
another that determines whether the evidence was sufficient.  
See id. at 419-20.  Accordingly, when examining the sufficiency 
of the evidence, we do not reweigh the probative value of 
various pieces of evidence; rather, it is only when the evidence 
supporting the trier of fact's decision is "'inherently or 
patently incredible'" that we will substitute our judgment for 
that of the trier of fact.  Id. at 420 (quoting Gauthier v. 
State, 
28 
Wis. 2d 
412, 
416, 
137 
N.W.2d 
101 
(1965)).  
Additionally, we have explained that "inherently or patently 
incredible evidence is that type of evidence which conflicts 
with nature or fully established or conceded facts."  Curiel, 
227 Wis. 2d at 418-19 (citing Day v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 392, 400, 
284 N.W.2d 666 (1979)). 
¶120 The majority opinion agrees that Curiel sets the 
standard, yet it ignores all the directives of Curiel and does a 
de novo review wherein it reweighs the evidence and comes up 
with its own finding of fact.  Majority op., ¶93.  For example, 
nowhere in the record is it stated, or even implied, that 
Brown's diagnosis of pedophilia has been changed or that his 
long history of sexual violence has no reliability in predicting 
his propensity to commit acts of sexual violence in the future.  
Instead, the majority says that it "is troublesome and is 
accorded weight."  Majority op., ¶81.  The majority opinion 
ignores Brown's score on the MnSOST-R, the diagnostic test that 
most accurately predicts future acts of sexual violence by those 
persons who have used violence in their sexual assaults, as 
No.  03-1419.pdr 
 
11 
 
Brown has.  Brown's test result showed that there is a 70% 
probability that Brown would reoffend upon release.  Instead, 
the majority opinion ignores these test results and relies on 
Brown's scores on two tests that are less reliable for violent 
sex offenders like Brown.  Majority op., ¶84.  The majority 
opinion does not concern itself with the testimony of Kotkin, 
who advised against releasing Brown.  Majority op., ¶59.  It 
also ignores most of Warner's report, except that portion where 
he says it is "possible" that Brown could be maintained in 
supervised release.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶121 And finally, the majority opinion does not conclude 
that the circuit court relied on inherently or patently 
incredible evidence.  Yet, that is the test we have established 
for overturning the finding of a circuit court in a ch. 980 
proceeding.  Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d at 418-20.  As this court 
stated in State v. Kienitz, 227 Wis. 2d 423, 434-35, 597 N.W.2d 
712 (1999), 
"If any possibility exists that the trier of fact 
could have drawn the appropriate inferences from the 
evidence adduced at trial to find [that the defendant 
is a sexually violent person], an appellate court may 
not overturn a verdict even if it believes the trier 
of fact should not have found [the defendant to be a 
sexually violent person] based on the evidence before 
it." 
(Quoting Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 507.)  This record is chock 
full of evidence that supports the circuit court's decision.  
See supra ¶¶107-10.  In addition, it was Warner's view that 
Brown's "medium-low and medium-high risk scores on the RRASOR 
and Static-99 do not negate his high risk MnSOST score."  Brown 
No.  03-1419.pdr 
 
12 
 
is a sexually violent person, and the class of offenders to 
which he belongs has a 70% probability of reoffending upon 
release from a secured treatment facility. 
¶122 The basis for the majority opinion is not found in the 
law.  Rather, the majority opinion simply reflects its view that 
it is time for Brown to get out.  That is not what the 
legislature decided when it enacted ch. 980 and set specific 
standards for the courts to apply.  It also is not what we 
decided in Curiel and Kienitz regarding an appellate court's 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding 
of the circuit court in a ch. 980 proceeding.   
¶123 Therefore, because I would affirm the court of appeals 
and the circuit court, I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion.   
¶124 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this dissent. 
 
No.  03-1419.pdr 
 
 
 
1