Case Title: HOBLYN v. JOHNSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
HOBLYN v. JOHNSON2002 WY 15255 P.3d 1219Case Number: 01-169Decided: 10/09/2002
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2002

 

GARY HOBLYN and MICHELLE HOBLYN,

Appellants(Plaintiffs),                

                                                                                    

                                    
v.                                              
                       

                                                                                    

MARGURETTE JOHNSON, CHUCK                 

JOHNSON, MATTHEW WAYNE DAVIS,            

LOUCIN 
PORT DAVIS, OFFICER                         

CRUMPTON, GREG BYBEE, KEN              

PETERSON, THE 
LARAMIE COUNTY  

SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT and                          

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,                           

                                                                                    

  
Appellees  
(Defendants).                       

Appeal from the 
District Court of Laramie County

The Honorable Nicholas G. 
Kalokathis, Judge

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Bernard Q. Phelan of Phelan-Watson Law Office, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming 

Representing Appellees 
Johnson:

Misha E. Westby and Ryan T. Schelhaas of Hirst & 
Applegate, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming 

Representing Appellees 
Davis:

Curtis B. Buchhammer and Loretta R. Green of 
Buchhammer & Kehl, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming 

Representing Appellees Crumpton, Bybee, and State of 
Wyoming:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; and 
John D. Rossetti, Senior Assistant Attorney General

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument

            
KITE, Justice.

[¶1]      The teenage daughter 
of Appellants Gary and Michelle Hoblyn (the parents) accused her father of 
abuse. While the charges were being investigated, the parents took the daughter 
to stay temporarily with her grandparents in Nebraska but would not permit her to take 
her horse. The daughter undertook efforts, with the assistance of a state brand 
inspector, to obtain possession of her horse. Though the father was later found 
not guilty of abuse, the daughter did not return home. The parents sued the 
grandparents, the neighbors, the brand inspector, the Laramie County sheriff's department, and others 
for various conspiracy and individual claims including tortious interference 
with the parent-child relationship, deprivation of constitutional rights under 
color of state law, intentional infliction of emotional distress, larceny, 
trespass, harassment, and defamation. The district court dismissed the tortuous 
interference claim against the grandparents for lack of jurisdiction, and it 
dismissed the remainder of the claims by summary judgment. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      We rephrase the issues 
as follows:

I.  Under the facts of this case, should 
Wyoming adopt the cause of action for 
intentional interference with the parental relationship?

II.  Did the district court err in granting the 
grandparents' motion to dismiss the parents' claim of intentional interference 
with the parental relationship for lack of in 
personam jurisdiction?

III.  Did the state brand inspector, assisted by 
deputies of the Laramie County sheriff's department, violate 
the parents' Fourth Amendment rights by entering their property without a 
warrant to inspect and transfer the daughter's horse to a new owner?

IV.  Must a person seek psychological care or 
submit expert testimony to prove severe emotional distress?

V.  May a tort action be premised on statutory 
criminal larceny? 

VI.  In Wyoming, is a civil action for 
harassment provided by statute?

VII.  How is the jurisdictional amount in 
controversy to be determined?

VIII.  Was the neighbor's comment, reported by the 
newspaper, that the parents were "not nice people" sufficient by itself to 
establish a prima facie case of defamation? 

FACTS

[¶3]      Pursuant to our 
standard of review for summary judgments, we consider the facts from the vantage 
point most favorable to the parents, as the party opposing the motions, awarding 
them all the favorable inferences which may be drawn from those facts. S & G Investors, LLC v. Blackley, 994 P.2d 941, 943 
(Wyo. 2000). 

[¶4]      In October 1998, the 
sixteen-year-old daughter accused her father of physical abuse. The Department 
of Family Services (DFS) suggested a "cooling off" period, and the parents took 
the daughter from Cheyenne to North 
Platte, 
Nebraska, to stay approximately one month 
with her paternal grandmother, Margurette Johnson, and step-grandfather, Chuck 
Johnson (the grandparents). The grandmother asked the parents to allow the 
daughter to have her horse while she stayed in Nebraska. They refused though the 
daughter was the horse's legal owner. The daughter contacted Matthew Davis, her 
neighbor from Cheyenne, for advice. Mr. Davis spoke 
with Greg Bybee, a state brand inspector, who apparently later contacted the 
daughter. On November 13, 
1998, the 
grandparents drove the daughter to a truck stop near Burns, Wyoming, so she could meet with the 
brand inspector. Although the grandparents and Mr. Davis and his wife (the 
neighbors) were present at the truck stop, the daughter met with the brand 
inspector alone at a separate table. During the meeting, the daughter signed 
papers transferring ownership of her horse to Ken Peterson.

[¶5]      At seven o'clock the next morning, the brand 
inspector and Deputies Fanning and Crumpton from the Laramie County sheriff's department went to the 
parents' Cheyenne home. The brand inspector had 
requested assistance from the sheriff's department, and the deputies were sent 
in response. Mr. Peterson also went to the parents' home with a pickup truck and 
a horse trailer. While everyone else waited on the county road off the property, 
Deputy Fanning knocked on the front door of the residence. No one answered, and 
Deputy Fanning joined the others on the county road to wait and see if anyone 
would appear. After approximately twenty to thirty minutes, the brand inspector 
entered the property from behind the residence and went to a fenced area with 
some outbuildings. He opened a wire gate, entered an enclosure, and identified a 
horse he found there as being the same horse the daughter had transferred to Mr. 
Peterson the night before. The brand inspector led the horse off the property 
and loaded it into the horse trailer, and Mr. Peterson drove away. Later that 
day, the brand inspector met Mr. Peterson at a welding shop and completed the 
paperwork transferring ownership of the horse back to the daughter. The 
neighbors then took the horse to the daughter in Nebraska.

[¶6]      The father was 
criminally charged for allegedly hitting the daughter and found not guilty after 
a March 1999 jury trial.1 
The neighbors kept in contact with the daughter and grandparents through 
personal visits, letters, and telephone calls. The grandparents brought the 
daughter to Cheyenne on several occasions to visit 
the neighbors and did not advise the parents. The daughter bought a truck from 
the neighbors, and the grandparents helped her purchase a horse trailer. 

[¶7]      The grandparents 
started temporary guardianship proceedings in Nebraska as required by the school 
district where the daughter was enrolled. The parents reportedly did not show up 
at the hearing, and the matter was not pursued further. 

[¶8]      At the time of the 
father's trial, the mother gave the daughter a necklace as a birthday gift which 
the daughter returned to her after the trial. A short time later, the 
grandmother and the daughter obtained protective orders from the District Court 
of Lincoln County, Nebraska to preclude all contact by the parents. Instead of 
returning home, the daughter remained with her grandparents, completed high 
school, and obtained a job as a horse trainer. 

[¶9]      From the record, it 
appears the parents never reported the daughter's horse was stolen nor made any 
larceny or trespass complaints. Further, they filed no legal action in either 
Nebraska or Wyoming to regain custody of their 
daughter from the grandparents, nor did they appear in the Nebraska district court to contest the 
protective orders. 

[¶10]   In January 2000, the parents filed a 
civil complaint, subsequently amended, alleging various causes of action against 
the grandparents, the neighbors, Deputy Crumpton, the brand inspector, Ken 
Peterson, and the Laramie County sheriff's department. The combined damages were 
alleged to be "in excess of $500,000.00 plus punitive damages in an amount 
sufficient to deter the defendants and others."2 The parents appeal the district 
court's order by which all the causes of action were dismissed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶11]   

The 
standard of review applied by this Court in reviewing the granting of summary 
judgment is well-settled. "When a motion for summary judgment is before the 
supreme court, we have exactly the same duty as the district judge; and, if 
there is a complete record before us, we have exactly the same material as did 
he. We must follow the same standards. The propriety of granting a motion for 
summary judgment depends upon the correctness of a court's dual findings that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This court looks at the record from 
the viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving to him all 
favorable inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in affidavits, 
depositions and other proper material appearing in the record. We separate the 
formal and pretended from the genuine and substantial so only the latter may be 
considered in eliminating the burden of a formal trial if only questions of law 
are left to decide; there must be no issue of material fact to decide. A 
material fact, expressed in various ways, is one having legal significance which 
would in a given case control the legal relations of the parties; one upon which 
the outcome of the litigation depends in whole or in part; one on which the 
controversy may be determined; one which will affect the result or outcome of 
the case depending upon its resolution; or one which constitutes a part of the 
plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's defense. Summary judgment affords 
an opportunity for prompt disposition of a lawsuit in its early stages, 
permitting an end to unfounded claims and avoiding the expense of a full-fledged 
trial to both litigants and the state's judicial machinery." Reno Livestock Corp. v. Sun Oil Co. (Delaware), 638 P.2d 147, 150-51 (Wyo. 1981) [(citations omitted)].

McLean v. Hyland Enterprises, Inc., 2001 WY 111, ¶14, 34 P.3d 1262, 
¶14 (Wyo. 2001). If we can uphold summary 
judgment on the record presented under any proper legal theory, we will. Hulse v. First Interstate Bank of Commerce-Gillette, 994 P.2d 957, 959 (Wyo. 2000).

 
DISCUSSION

A.        
Intentional Interference with the Parental Rights

[¶12]   In the first cause of action, the 
parents claimed the grandparents individually, and in conspiracy with the 
neighbors, interfered with their parent-child relationship by harboring the 
daughter and inducing her to remain out of their custody. The district court 
dismissed this count on the grandparents' motion claiming lack of in personam jurisdiction. It granted the neighbors' 
motions for summary judgment because the cause of action is not recognized in 
Wyoming. 

[¶13]   The Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
entitled "Causing Minor Child to Leave or not to Return Home," provides: "One 
who, with knowledge that the parent does not consent, abducts or otherwise 
compels or induces a minor child to leave a parent legally entitled to its 
custody or not to return to the parent after it has been left him, is subject to 
liability to the parent." 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700 at 505 
(1977).

[¶14]   In Stone v. 
Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1999), the Florida Supreme Court 
reviewed the history of the action and thoughtfully analyzed the effects of 
recognizing the tort. We acknowledge, as referenced by the Stone court, that the majority of states has recognized 
this tort and Wyoming is not yet one of them. Stone, 734 So. 2d  at 1042 n.6.3 

[¶15]   In Cosner v. 
Ridinger, 882 P.2d 1243 (Wyo. 1994), we declined to recognize 
the tort when a noncustodial parent asserted it alleging deprivation of 
visitation. This court reviewed the Wyoming statutes which give priority to 
the child's best interests as well as the public policy behind those statutes 
and concluded recognition of the cause of action in the context of custody and 
visitation could negatively impact children by encouraging more litigation in 
already volatile family circumstances. Our reasoning was greatly influenced by 
the policy considerations raised in Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1990), as follows:

"For 
the good of our children, the law should seek to promote such harmony as is 
possible in families . . . . At a minimum, the law should not 
provide a means of escalating intrafamily warfare. . . .

            
"It is clear that this tort would be used as a new weapon in such 
disputes. . . . The interest in compensation should not 
outweigh the effects of bitter accusations on . . . 
children. . . .

            
"Creating this tort would create a new wrong. It would place innocent 
children in the middle of a vigorous, probably vicious, lawsuit 
. . . ."

Cosner, 882 P.2d  at 1247 (quoting Larson, 460 N.W.2d  at 45-46 (citations omitted)).

[¶16]   The intentional interference with 
parental rights cause of action is commonly referenced in divorce situations 
where the noncustodial parent, with or without collusion with relatives, 
absconds with the children and hides from the custodial parent. See Marshak v. Marshak, 628 A.2d 964 (Conn. 1993); Weirich v. Weirich, 796 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App. 1990). The elements of the 
tort include compelling or inducing a child to leave the parents and refusing to 
return the child. Those elements are not present in this case, which more 
closely resembles a voluntary foster care placement.

[¶17]   The father's affidavit reflects, at the 
time of the daughter's abuse accusations against him, the DFS suggested a 
"cooling off" period during which the daughter would be temporarily placed 
outside the home. The parents asked the paternal grandmother and 
step-grandfather to take their daughter to live with them for approximately one 
month, and the grandparents agreed. At a minimum, the placement effected de facto custody in the grandparents, implicitly giving 
them the necessary authority to address the daughter's day-to-day needs. Such a 
voluntary placement agreement usually remains in effect until revoked because, 
generally speaking, the voluntary transfer of parental rights is only effective 
due to the parental consent and is, therefore, revocable at will. 3 Donald T. 
Kramer, Legal Rights of Children § 29.02 (2d ed. 1994). Thus, the daughter must 
be returned to the parents, if the parents request, unless there is some 
authority to continue custody under the state's juvenile law. Id. 

[¶18]   The evidence submitted in response to 
the motions for dismissal and summary judgment does not indicate the parents 
ever revoked their grant of temporary custody or requested that their daughter 
be returned. The father stated in his affidavit, "[d]uring the trial, I, of 
course, was not allowed contact with my daughter as a condition of my release on 
bond." We can reasonably infer that the contact prohibition was not limited to 
just the period of the trial but actually began when the father was released on 
bond and remained in place through the conclusion of the trial. Therefore, we 
can further infer that, during this time frame, the daughter could not return to 
the family home unless the father left. 

[¶19]   However, nothing in the record suggests, 
after the father's acquittal, the parents ever revoked the grant of temporary 
custody or demanded the daughter's return or the grandparents ignored or 
rebuffed requests of this nature. In fact, the only evidence of the parents even 
asking to visit their daughter was the mother's purported request for the 
daughter to come home for the 1998 Thanksgiving holiday. Even though the 
grandmother allegedly refused to permit this visitation, the parents did not 
respond at any time thereafter by revoking the voluntary placement or taking 
legal action to regain physical custody of their daughter.

[¶20]   The father contends, after he was 
acquitted, he went to Nebraska to see his daughter only to have 
the daughter and the grandparents call the police to intervene and prevent 
contact. The record reflects that the District Court of Lincoln County, Nebraska 
issued ex parte domestic abuse protection orders on 
March 23, 
1999, 
precluding the parents from contacting or communicating with the grandmother and 
the daughter. These orders stated, as provided in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-925 
(1998),4 
that a respondent has the right to file a request for a show cause hearing to 
demonstrate why the order should not remain in effect. The Nebraska statute requires the court to 
hold the hearing within thirty days of receipt of the request, if timely made. 
Section 42-925.5 
The parents do not contend they were not properly served with the orders. 
However, despite the parents' alleged emotional distress caused by separation 
from their daughter and the prohibition of contact with her, the record contains 
no request for such a hearing or evidence of an attempt to contest the issuance 
of the orders and gain access to their daughter. 

[¶21]   Likewise, the parents failed to 
demonstrate an effort to utilize the Wyoming court system to regain custody 
of their daughter before she turned eighteen years of age. They filed no legal 
action in either Nebraska or Wyoming for her physical return 
subsequent to the March 1999 abuse trial. Instead, they waited until January of 
2000 to file this lawsuit to seek money damages alleging the grandparents, whom 
they had asked to care for the daughter, in conspiracy with the neighbors, 
intentionally interfered with their parental authority. The primary goal of this 
lawsuit does not appear to be the daughter's best interests. Instead, it appears 
to be a means for the parents to vindicate themselves and retaliate against the 
grandparents, the neighbors, and others who assisted the daughter while she was 
placed out of her home. See Politte v. Politte, 727 S.W.2d 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). 

[¶22]   The parents' evidence fails to persuade 
this court that recognition of the intentional interference with parental rights 
tort in these circumstances will advance the best interests of children and 
families. Even if we were inclined to recognize the tort now, the parents have 
failed to establish a prima facie case that the elements of the cause of action 
were present. 

[¶23]   The district court also concluded it had 
no in personam jurisdiction over the grandparents 
regarding this claim. We need not address the jurisdictional issue as we decline 
to apply the cause of action in these circumstances. 

[¶24]   We affirm the district court's dismissal 
of this claim against the grandparents and its grant of summary judgment to the 
neighbors. This holding does not necessarily preclude future recognition of the 
cause of action under different circumstances. 

B.        Claims 
Related to Ownership and Possession of the Horse 

[¶25]   The parents claim the grandparents, Mr. 
Peterson, Deputy Crumpton, and the brand inspector, under color of state law, 
unlawfully acted individually and in conspiracy with each other by express and 
implied agreement with regard to the daughter's horse to deprive the parents of 
their constitutional rights provided by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The district court granted summary 
judgment to all defendants holding the horse was subject to the brand 
inspector's jurisdiction, the brand inspection statutes diminish the expectation 
of privacy, and therefore there was no Fourth Amendment claim.

[¶26]   The parents also alleged the same 
defendants conspired to commit larceny by taking or leading away propertythe 
horsein their lawful possession. The district court dismissed this count with 
prejudice because the daughter owned the horse and was denied possession; 
therefore, no claim of larceny could be maintained for the taking of the horse 
from the parents' property. The district court further found larceny does not 
exist in civil law and conversion was the appropriate civil remedy, which was 
not pleaded. 

[¶27]   In a further related allegation, the 
parents accused the same defendants of conspiring to enter their real property 
without consent and against their will and, in the course of the trespass, 
causing damages. The district court found a question of material fact existed as 
to whether a trespass occurred. However, it dismissed the cause of action with 
prejudice because, even if the issue was resolved in favor of the parents, the 
damages evidence did not meet the court's minimum jurisdictional limits. 

[¶28]   Pursuant to a different legal analysis, 
we reach the same resolution as the district court on these causes of action. 

[¶29]   The dispute over the daughter's horse is 
at the heart of these actions. The parents concede the horse was legally the 
daughter's and titled in her name. However, they also contend, as parental 
custodians of the animal, they could refuse to permit the daughter to take the 
animal to Nebraska where they had voluntarily 
placed her. We believe their contention is unfounded.6 

"As a 
general rule any property acquired by the child in any way except by its own 
labor or services belongs to the child, and not to the parent." [46 C. C. 
1314]. . . . It furthermore goes without saying that a 
parent cannot deprive a child of its property except pursuant to law (31 C. J. 
1011), and the fact that in this instance the father had the property in 
question assessed as his property could not affect the title of the children. In 
Banks v. Conant, 14 Allen (Mass.) 497, it was said: 
"In consideration of the duty which the law imposes on a father to furnish 
adequate support to his child during infancy, the services of the child during 
that period are due to the father, and, if they are rendered to a third person, 
the right of the father to recover the value thereof is clear and indisputable. 
But this is the extent of the father's right. He has no title to the property of 
the child, nor is the capacity or right of the latter to take property or 
receive money by grant, gift or otherwise, except as a compensation for 
services, in any degree qualified or limited during minority. Whatever therefore an infant acquires 
which does not come to him as a compensation for services rendered, belongs 
absolutely to him, and his father cannot interpose any claim to it, either as 
against the child, or as against third persons who claim title or possession 
from or under the infant."

Kreigh v. Cogswell, 45 Wyo. 531, 21 P.2d 831, 833 (1933) 
(emphasis added). Though issued almost seventy years ago, this opinion still 
provides an accurate statement of the law. See also 1 
Donald T. Kramer, Legal Rights of Children §§ 8.01-8.03 (2d ed. 1994); Fare v. Scott K., 595 P.2d 105, 110-11 
(Cal. 1979);7 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 113 (1978). 

[¶30]   Despite the general rule, parents do 
retain property rights in certain items they provide their children for the 
purpose of support, maintenance, or education such as clothing and books. 1 
Kramer, Legal Rights of Children, supra at § 8.12; 
67A C.J.S. Parent and Child, supra at § 119. It is 
uncontroverted the daughter's paternal grandfather8 gave the horse to her as a gift, 
the horse was titled in her name, and it was not necessary for her support or 
maintenance. As a matter of law, the horse belonged to the daughter, and the 
parents had no implied authority over it simply because of their proprietary 
interest in the premises on which it was located. 

[¶31]   The parents do not dispute the daughter 
wanted her horse returned to her personal possession and had not appointed them 
to act as agents for her in any capacity. The parents' agency on behalf of the 
daughter cannot be inferred from the mere existence of the family relationship. 
Rather, the daughter must duly authorize the parents to act as her agent. 67A 
C.J.S. Parent and Child, supra at § 119; Angus v. London, 206 P.2d 869, 870 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1949). In effect, an involuntary bailment was created when the parents took the 
daughter to live elsewhere and kept her horse.

            
A constructive or 
involuntary bailment arises where the person having possession of a chattel 
holds it under such circumstances that the law imposes on him the obligation of 
delivering it to another, where a person has lawfully acquired possession of 
personal property of another otherwise than by a mutual contract of bailment, or 
where a person has lawfully acquired the possession of personal property of 
another and holds it under circumstances whereby he should, on principles of 
justice, keep it safely and restore it or deliver it to the owner. 

8 
C.J.S. Bailments § 15 at 237 (1988).

[¶32]   Such a bailment was at issue in Moore v. Moore, 835 P.2d 1148 (Wyo. 1992), a divorce 
case in which the wife left her horses on the ranch awarded to the husband 
because she had no place to keep them. See also Horn v. State, 556 P.2d 925 (Wyo. 1976). The Moore facts are different from those 
in this case to the extent the husband had no say regarding the animals 
remaining on his property. In the instant case, the horse was on the property to 
begin with, the parents took the owner elsewhere to live, and they did not 
permit the horse to go with her. These distinctions do not change the 
involuntary character of the bailment, and, as we noted in Moore, the involuntary bailee has an absolute duty to return the 
property. Moore, 835 P.2d  at 1153.

"Where 
the person in possession has committed no independent act of conversion, a 
rightful possession in him continues as such until it is transformed into a 
wrongful detention by a demand for the property and a refusal to deliver it." 
[65 C.J. 43-45.]

            
. . . . And it is generally held that ordinarily a 
demand should be made by a bailor upon the bailee for the return of his goods 
before an action for conversion against the bailee will lie.

Vissenberg v. Bresnahen, 65 Wyo. 367, 202 P.2d 663, 669-70 
(1949).

[¶33]   Viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to the parents, we will assume they did nothing inconsistent with 
their daughter's ownership interests in the horse until they refused her request 
to return it. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:

            
(1)  Except as otherwise agreed, a conditional vendor or lessor 
of a thing who is entitled to immediate possession thereof, or a successor to 
his legal interest in the thing, is privileged, at a reasonable time and in a 
reasonable manner, to enter land in the possession of the vendee or lessee, for 
the purpose of taking possession of the thing and removing it from the land.

            
. . . .

            
(3)  The privileges stated in Subsection[] (1) . . . 
are also available to 

                        
. . .

            
(c)  a bailor of a thing who by reason of the termination of 
the bailment is entitled to the immediate possession of the thing.

1 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 183 at 332 (1965). As noted in the comments, 
absent an express agreement, the law infers consent of the bailee to entry by 
the bailor who is entitled to possession of the thing by reason of the 
termination of the bailment. Id., § 183 at 333. The Restatement (Second) of Torts likewise 
extends a privilege to the bailor to retrieve the property:

(1) One 
is privileged to enter land in the possession of another, at a reasonable time 
and in a reasonable manner, for the purpose of removing a chattel to the 
immediate possession of which the actor is entitled, and which has come upon the 
land otherwise than with the actor's consent or by his tortious conduct or 
contributory negligence.

1 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 198 at 361. 
Comment a of this subsection explains that application of § 198 is limited to 
those situations where the actor, as against all persons, is entitled to 
immediate possession of the chattel both at the time when the chattel is placed 
on the land and when the actor seeks to enter and reclaim it. See Salisbury Livestock Company v. Colorado Central Credit 
Union, 793 P.2d 470 (Wyo. 1990); see also Sammons v. American Automobile Association, 912 P.2d 1103 (Wyo. 1996). It follows that, once the parents refused the daughter's 
request for the return of her horse, she was privileged to enter their real 
property at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner to take the horse. No 
reason exists why she could not accomplish the same through an agent.

[¶34]   The daughter also had the right to 
transfer her bailed property, and the parents' arguments to the contrary are 
unfounded.

It must 
not be overlooked that minors have . . . the capacity to take, 
but their capacity to give is limited. They have capacity to contract, at least 
when of sufficient age to understand what they are doing; but, in general, they 
have the right to repudiate their contracts. Thus they may contract 
. . . but the contract is, ordinarily, voidable at their 
election. 

Novosel v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 49 Wyo. 422, 55 P.2d 302, 305-06 
(1936); see also Jankovsky v. Halladay Motors, 482 P.2d 129 (Wyo. 1971). The parents place significant emphasis on the appearance 
of the sale as a sham. Even if we assume this is true, it has absolutely no 
bearing on the resolution of this appeal. The daughter had the ability to sell 
her horse, and, with the brand inspector's assistance, she completed the 
paperwork to accomplish the transfer of the title. 

[¶35]   With regard to the claims against the 
brand inspector, his actions were consistent with his statutory authority. 
Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-20-203 (LEXIS 1999)9 (amended 2001), Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 11-20-205(a) (LexisNexis 2001),10 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-20-214(a) 
(LexisNexis 2001),11 
and 1 Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 211 at 
398,12 
the brand inspector had authority to enter the parents' land to retrieve the 
daughter's horse for transfer to Mr. Peterson. His actions constituted neither 
trespass13 
nor larceny.14 

[¶36]   The claims against Officer Crumpton are 
also specious in light of the uncontested facts because he never entered the 
parents' property. Though Officer Fanning did enter the property, he did so in a 
reasonable way in order to notify the parents that the brand inspector was there 
to secure the horse. Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 11-18-11215 
and 18-3-60616 
(LexisNexis 2001) and 1 Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra at § 211, these actions were reasonable; legally 
authorized; and, again, constituted neither trespass nor larceny. 

[¶37]   The parents also allege the 
grandparents, the neighbors, and Mr. Peterson were part of a conspiracy to 
trespass and commit larceny. These causes of action fail for the same reasons 
the underlying claims against the brand inspector and Officer Crumpton failed. 
It is ironic, albeit immaterial, that the parents' actions appear to better fit 
the statutory larceny by bailee definition than the actions of any of the 
parties they have accused.           
 

C.        
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress/Proof of Severity 

[¶38]   In their third cause of action, the 
parents alleged the grandparents and neighbors had, individually and in 
conspiracy with one another, subjected them to severe emotional harm by their 
outrageous conduct. The district court granted summary judgment holding there 
was no evidence the parents' emotional distress was severe and they failed in 
their burden to establish a genuine issue of material fact. On appeal, the 
parents contend the district court dismissed their allegations because they did 
not seek psychological care or submit expert testimony to prove the severity of 
their injuries. This portrayal of the district court's action is inaccurate. The 
district court actually concluded:

8.  In order to make a prima facie showing of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress the [parents] must show severe 
emotional distress. The [parents] have asserted emotional distress but have no 
evidence that such distress is severe. There is no evidence that [they] have 
sought professional help, only that they are pained by these events. A party 
moving for summary judgment carries the burden of dispelling the existence of 
material fact thereby shifting the burden to the nonmoving party to produce 
evidence raising a genuine question of material fact. The record contains only 
bald statements that they have suffered severe emotional distress with no 
supporting evidence. Therefore, Count II[I] of the amended complaint is 
dismissed with prejudice.

[¶39]   This court recognized intentional 
infliction of emotional distress as a cause of action in Leithead v. American Colloid Company, 721 P.2d 1059, 
1065-67 (Wyo. 1986), which explained:

            
Section 46 of the Restatement, Second, Torts (1965), places several 
limits on the action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. It 
provides:

"Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress

"(1) 
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes 
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional 
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily 
harm."

            
Outrageous conduct is defined in comment "d" of the Restatement as 
conduct which goes beyond all possible bounds of decency, is regarded as 
atrocious, and is utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Severe emotional 
distress is defined in comment "j" as distress which is so severe that no 
reasonable man could be expected to endure it.

. . . . Comment "h" to § 46 of the 
Restatement, Second, Torts (1965) states:

"Court 
and jury. It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the 
defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as 
to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may 
differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine 
whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and 
outrageous to result in liability."

                                    
. . . .

. . . "The actor is never liable 
. . . where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal 
rights in a permissible way, even though he is well aware that such insistence 
is certain to cause emotional distress." Restatement, Second, Torts § 46, 
comment "g." . . . .

            
 

            
. . . .

. . . Comment "j" of § 46 of the Restatement, 
Second, Torts states:

                        
. . . .

"It is 
for the court to determine whether on the evidence severe emotional distress can 
be found; it is for the jury to determine whether, on the evidence, it has in 
fact existed."

See also Worley v. Wyoming Bottling Company, 
Inc., 1 P.3d 615, 628 (Wyo. 2000). The father's affidavit provides the only evidence of the 
severity, and he simply maintains they experienced uncomfortable and unpleasant 
feelings of various descriptions.17 There is no evidence of the 
impact of this alleged distress on their lives such as missed work, inability to 
sleep or engage in hobbies and activities previously enjoyed, diminished ability 
to socialize or handle the necessary functions of everyday life, or memory loss. 
Certainly, the need for professional counseling could be evidence of the 
severity of the emotional distress, but it is not a required element. Contrary 
to the parents' representation, the district court did not find their proof 
failed because they did not seek treatment from mental health professionals. 
Instead, the court found the parents' statements that they experienced offensive 
feelings and emotions without further evidence of the effect on their lives were 
insufficient to establish a prima facie case of severe emotional distress. This 
decision is squarely within the district court's gatekeeping function, and we 
affirm.

D.        Civil 
Harassment Cause of Action Based on Criminal Stalking Statute

[¶40]   The parents also claimed the right to 
pursue a civil harassment cause of action against the neighbors founded on the 
criminal stalking provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506 (LexisNexis 2001) as 
referenced in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-126 (LexisNexis 2001). The district court 
dismissed this cause on two alternative grounds: (1) The claim as pleaded under 
§ 6-2-506 was not actionable in Wyoming; and, (2) even if it was actionable, 
like the intentional infliction of emotional distress count, it lacked merit 
because there was no evidence of substantial emotional distress. We affirm the 
district court's dismissal of this claim based upon a failure of proof of 
substantial emotional distress. Consequently, we need not address whether a 
harassment cause of action can be pursued under the stalking statute§§ 6-2-506 
and 1-1-126. 

E.        
Defamation

[¶41]   Finally, the parents contend they were 
defamed when a comment made by their neighbor, Mrs. Davis, that they were "not 
nice people" was reported in a newspaper article. The 
district court, without additional explanation and citing Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211 
(Wyo. 1994), dismissed this cause of action holding the statement did not rise 
to the level of defamation. We conclude this was the correct result because the 
statement did not constitute defamation per se; therefore, proof of special 
damages was required, and the parents failed to carry this burden.

            
"A defamatory communication is one which tends to hold the plaintiff up 
to hatred, contempt, ridicule or scorn or which causes him to be shunned or 
avoided; one that tends to injure his reputation as to diminish the esteem, 
respect, goodwill or confidence in which he is held." Tschirgi v. Lander Wyoming State Journal, 706 P.2d 1116, 
1119 (Wyo. 1985). Accord Century Ready-Mix Co. v. 
Campbell County School Dist., 816 P.2d 795, 799 (Wyo. 1991).

Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 224. Defamation per se means "a statement 
which is defamatory on its face and, therefore, actionable without proof of 
special damages." 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 
134 at 430 (1995). The only statements classified as defamatory per se or 
damaging on their face, and which therefore do not require proof of special 
harm, are those which impute (1) a criminal offense; (2) a loathsome disease; 
(3) a matter incompatible with business, trade, profession, or office; or (4) 
serious sexual misconduct. 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra at §§ 570, 575. It is apparent Mrs. Davis' 
statement does not fall into any of these per se categories. 

[¶42]   The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
provides: "One who publishes a slander that, although not actionable per se, is 
the legal cause of special harm to the person defamed, is subject to liability 
to him." 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 
575 at 197. In comment b of § 575, special harm is defined as "loss of something 
having economic or pecuniary value." The parents provided no proof of special 
harm or special damages. The record contains no prima facie showing of economic 
or pecuniary damage caused by the "not nice people" statement. 

[¶43]   Because the statement was not considered 
defamation per se and no economic damages were shown, the district court 
properly determined there was no defamation. This is consistent with Wilder in which we concluded, although the statements 
complained of might be disparaging and offensive, they were not actionable as 
defamation per se because they were not defamation per se and no damages were 
shown. We affirm the dismissal.

[¶44]   For the reasons expounded above, we 
conclude the district court properly dismissed all the parents' claims. 

[¶45]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1It is unclear from the record precisely what offense was 
charged against the father and whether it was a misdemeanor or a felony. 
However, because the father was found not guilty, this information is of minimal 
significance.

2The original complaint set out damages in excess of $100,000 
plus punitive damages. The amended complaint added the harassment and defamation 
claims and increased the damages request to $500,000.

3Footnote six reads:

            
Sixteen state supreme courts have recognized the tort of intentional 
interference with the custodial relationship or abduction: Anonymous v. Anonymous, 672 So. 2d 787 (Ala. 1995); Borer v. American Airlines, 19 Cal. 3d 441, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858, 865 n. 3 (1977); D & D 
Fuller CATV Constr., Inc. v. Pace, 780 P.2d 520 (Colo. 1989); Shields v. Martin, 109 Idaho 132, 706 P.2d 21 (1985); Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 161 N.E. 251 (1928); 
Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 123 (Iowa 1983); Murphy v. I.S.K. Con. of New England, Inc., 409 Mass. 
842, 571 N.E.2d 340 (1991); Brown v. Brown, 338 Mich. 
492, 61 N.W.2d 656 (1953); Plante v. Engel, 124 N.H. 
213, 469 A.2d 1299 (1983); Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 
283, 78 S.E. 222 (1913); Pickle v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650 (1930); Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 
299 (1877); McBride v. Magnuson, 282 Or. 433, 578 P.2d 1259 (1978); Bedard v. Notre Dame Hosp., 89 R.I. 
195, 151 A.2d 690 (1959); Silcott v. Oglesby, 721 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1986); Kessel v. Leavitt, 204 W. Va. 
95, 511 S.E.2d 720 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. 
___, 119 S. Ct. 1035, 143 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1999). Two other state supreme courts have 
implied that they would have recognized this cause of action if the question 
were properly before them. See Marshak v. Marshak, 
226 Conn. 652, 628 A.2d 964 (1993); Finn v. Lipman, 
526 A.2d 1380 (Me. 1987). In addition, an intermediate appellate court in at 
least two other states [has] approved the tort: Mathews 
v. Murray, 101 Ga. App. 216, 113 S.E.2d 232 (1960); Spencer v. Terebelo, 373 So. 2d 200 (La. Ct. App. 1979); 
see also Kristin A. Wentzel, Note, In the Best Interests of the Child? Minnesota's Refusal to 
Recognize the Tort of Intentional Interference with Custodial Rights, 14 
Hamline L. Rev. 257, 265 n. 83 (1990) (courts in 23 states and the District of 
Columbia have recognized this tort).

            
 Two 
state supreme courts have refused to recognize a claim for tortious interference 
with the custodial parent-child relationship based upon their concern that tort 
recovery and its accompanying litigation would be detrimental to the best 
interests of the child. See Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1990); Zaharias v. Gammill, 844 P.2d 137 (Okla. 1992); see also Cosner v. Ridinger, 882 P.2d 1243 (Wyo. 1994) (implying 
that it would reject tort if it were properly before the court). In two other 
states, Illinois and Missouri, there is a split in authority in the 
intermediate-level appellate courts regarding whether the cause of action should 
be recognized. Compare Whitehorse v. Critchfield, 144 
Ill. App.3d 192, 98 Ill. Dec. 621, 494 N.E.2d 743 (1986) with Dymek v. Nyquist, 128 
Ill. App.3d 859, 83 Ill. Dec. 52, 469 N.E.2d 659 (1984); compare Politte v. Politte, 
727 S.W.2d 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) with Kramer v. Leineweber, 642 S.W.2d 364 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1982).

4Section 42-925 provides in part:

If such ex parte order is issued to the respondent, the 
court shall forthwith cause notice of the petition and order to be given the 
respondent stating that, upon service on the respondent, the order shall remain 
in effect for a period of one year and, if the order grants temporary custody, 
that such custody shall not exceed the number of days specified by the court 
unless the respondent shows cause why the order should not remain in effect. The 
court shall also cause to be served upon the respondent a form with which to 
request a show-cause hearing. If the respondent wishes to appear and show cause 
why the order should not remain in effect, he or she shall affix his or her 
current address, telephone number, and signature to the form and return it to 
the clerk of the district court within five days after service upon him or her. 
Upon receipt of the request for a show-cause hearing, the court shall 
immediately schedule a show-cause hearing to be held within thirty days after 
the receipt of the request for a show-cause hearing and shall notify the 
petitioner and respondent of the hearing date.

5Section 42-925 directs the request be made within five days 
after service of the show cause form on the respondent.

6Issues of alleged parental conversion of property or other 
torts against the child are not raised in this appeal, nor are issues raised of 
the proper role of parental discipline or the common law defense of parental 
authority and discretion. See Dellapenta v. 
Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153 (Wyo. 1992); Keser v. 
State, 706 P.2d 263 (Wyo. 1985). On appeal, we do not consider issues not 
raised in the district court except for those issues which are jurisdictional or 
fundamental in nature. Simek v. Rocky Mountain, Inc., 
977 P.2d 687, 689 (Wyo. 1999).

7 

Common authority over personal property may not be implied 
from the father's proprietary interest in the premises. Neither may it be 
premised on the nature of the parent-child relation.

Juveniles are entitled "to acquire and hold property, real 
and personal," (Estate of Yano (1922) 188 Cal. 645, 
649, 206 P. 995, 997); and "a minor child's property 
is his own . . . not that of his parents" (Emery v. 
Emery (1955) 45 Cal. 2d 421, 432, 289 P.2d 218, 225.

(Some citations omitted.)

8The daughter was given the horse by her paternal biological 
grandfather, not by Chuck Johnson, her paternal step-grandfather. 

9 

            
(a)  Except as hereafter provided, it is unlawful for any 
person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association to sell and deliver or to 
remove or cause to be removed in any way from any county in Wyoming to any other 
county, state or country, any livestock unless each animal has been inspected 
for brands and ownership at the time of delivery or removal by an authorized 
Wyoming brand inspector and a proper certificate of inspection or clearance has 
been issued.

            
(b)  Transporting livestock across state lines without first 
having had such inspection and having obtained such certificates is prima facie 
evidence of intent to avoid inspection and to steal, take and carry away the 
animals and is punishable as provided in W.S. 6-3-402. 

10 

            
(a)  Except as otherwise provided, before removing any 
livestock from any county of Wyoming, the person selling or intending to cause 
removal shall notify the inspector of the date of the intended removal and the 
time and place when and where the required inspection for brands and ownership 
can be made. The inspection shall be made within a reasonable time prior to 
shipment. The person in charge of the livestock shall hold the livestock at the 
place designated until the livestock have been inspected and an official 
certificate of inspection is issued. The person in charge shall render the 
inspecting officer such assistance as is practicable while the required 
inspection is being made.

11 

            
(a)  A brand inspector may inspect livestock being transported, 
trailed, pastured or confined at his discretion, to determine ownership, without 
an inspection fee.

12 

A duty or authority imposed or created by legislative 
enactment carries with it the privilege to enter land in the possession of 
another for the purpose of performing or exercising such duty or authority in so 
far as the entry is reasonably necessary to such performance or exercise, if, 
but only if, all the requirements of the enactment are fulfilled.

13 

            
(a)  A person is guilty of criminal trespass if he enters or 
remains on or in the land or premises of another person, knowing he is not 
authorized to do so, or after being notified to depart or to not trespass. For 
purposes of this section, notice is given by:

(i)  Personal communication to the person by the 
owner or occupant, or his agent, or by a peace officer; or

(ii) Posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the 
attention of intruders.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-303(a) (LexisNexis 2001).

14 

            
(a)  A person who steals, takes and carries, leads or drives 
away property of another with intent to deprive the owner or lawful possessor is 
guilty of larceny.

            
(b)  A bailee, a public servant as defined by W.S. 
6-5-101(a)(vi) or any person entrusted with the control, care or custody of any 
money or other property who, with intent to steal or to deprive the owner of the 
property, converts the property to his own or another's use is guilty of 
larceny.

            
. . . .

            
(d)  Conduct denoted larceny in this section constitutes a 
single offense embracing the separate crimes formerly known as larceny, larceny 
by bailee or embezzlement.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(a), (b), (d) (LexisNexis 
2001).

15 

            
All federal authorities authorized, and the various inspectors of this 
state, may call upon any sheriff or peace officer in any county in this state to 
assist them in the discharge of their duties and those peace officers shall 
assist them when so requested. The federal inspector has the same power to 
enforce the laws of this state as the various inspectors of the state when 
authorized as aforesaid and engaged in the discharge of their official duties. 
Any person refusing to comply with the orders of such officer or federal 
inspector shall be punished as provided in W.S. 11-1-103. 

16 

            
Each county sheriff and deputy shall preserve the peace in the respective 
counties and suppress all affrays, riots, unlawful assemblies and insurrections. 
Each sheriff or deputy sheriff may call upon any person to assist in performing 
these duties or for the service of process in civil and criminal cases or for 
the apprehension or securing of any person for felony or breach of peace.

17By way of illustration, the affidavit refers in part to: 
anger, fear, sadness, hatred, remorse, obsession, depression.