Case Title: CHARLES WALDROP v. LARRY WEAVER AND PATRICIA WEAVER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84-205

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
CHARLES WALDROP v. LARRY WEAVER AND PATRICIA WEAVER1985 WY 88702 P.2d 1291Case Number: 84-205Decided: 07/11/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
CHARLES WALDROP, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

LARRY WEAVER AND PATRICIA 
WEAVER, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Paul T. Liamos, Jr., 
J.

 
 
Robert T. 
Moxley, Wheatland, for 
appellant.

H.W. Rasmussen 
and Clay B. Jenkins of Badley & Rasmussen, P.C., Sheridan, for appellee Patricia 
Weaver.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a dismissal with prejudice of appellant's action for eviction as a sanction for 
a failure to attend a scheduled deposition. We reverse.

[¶2.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues:

"I. The Discovery Sought 
By The Appellee-Defendants Was Unnecessary As There Was No Material Issue of 
Fact.

"II. The Court Abused Its 
Discretion In Dismissing The Appellant's Lawsuit With 
Prejudice."

Appellees raise 
the additional argument that appellant lacks standing because he is not the real 
party in interest. Since a trustee in bankruptcy has been appointed for 
appellant and has made an appearance in the appeal, the question of standing is 
moot.

[¶3.]     Appellant and appellees 
contracted for the sale and purchase of a mobile home court in Gillette. The 
mobile home park was located on land leased by appellant. On March 16, 1982, 
appellant Waldrop sold the mobile home park to appellees who executed a 
promissory note providing for a down payment and monthly installments. On August 
2, 1982, appellees Weavers commenced suit against Waldrop seeking an offset 
against the purchase price because the premises were not in compliance with 
electrical and sanitation codes as required by their agreement. Waldrop 
counterclaimed asserting that an oral agreement of the parties placed 
responsibility for repair upon the Weavers. The Weavers moved for summary 
judgment which was granted; however, Waldrop was allowed to file an amended 
answer. Before the counterclaim could be judicially resolved, the parties moved 
for dismissal stipulating that the above matter "has been fully settled for 
valuable consideration and that the same should be dismissed with 
prejudice."

[¶4.]     The parties had 
previously placed the documents pertaining to the trailer court sale into escrow 
with a local bank; after settlement, they wrote the bank explaining the 
newly-agreed-upon terms and stated that:

"The below parties 
certify that the foregoing signifies their agreement for settlement of all 
disputes between them, including any unresolved legal action, whether 
counterclaims or direct claims, and specifically any action pending under Cause 
No. 12039, Campbell County, State of Wyoming."

The settlement 
was effected May 5, 1983, and dismissal with prejudice entered on June 14, 
1983.

[¶5.]     On February 2, 1984, 
Waldrop brought a complaint for eviction alleging that the Weavers had, since 
the May 5, 1983 settlement, paid only two of the required monthly payments. The 
Weavers counterclaimed contending that they had discovered defects in the 
premises which were not in compliance with the terms of the original lease 
agreement or their settlement with Waldrop. Appellant's deposition was scheduled 
for April 25, 1984. He had moved to limit discovery and did not appear for the 
deposition. A hearing was held on a motion for default judgment and motion for 
summary judgment on May 3, 1984. The court entered an order 
stating:

"[T]he court finds that 
the matters asserted in the counterclaim of the defendants are res judicata. 
They are matters that should have been taken care of at the time of settling of 
No. 12039. Nothing further was done until a counterclaim to this suit. Their 
rights weren't asserted until this counterclaim. I think the letter is broad, 
signifying all claims are being settled. This was a lawsuit begun on August 2, 
1982. It was pending for some ten months. All types of pleadings and pretrials, 
et cetera, affidavits, opportunity for discovery. I don't think these parties 
can keep litigating and relitigating and relitigating.

"So I'm going to grant 
the summary judgment against the counterclaim.

"Now, Mr. Waldrop has 
filed his complaint for eviction and he has failed to appear in the forum that 
he has chosen, for whatever reasons. Specifically asked for postponement of that 
deposition and that was specifically denied. He did not 
appear.

"The court is going to 
dismiss with prejudice his complaint filed in this 
action."

Appellant 
brought this appeal from that order.

[¶6.]     Dismissal with 
prejudice is one of the authorized sanctions permitted under Rule 37, W.R.C.P. 
The rule provides in part that the judge may make such orders in regard to the 
findings to comply with discovery "as are just," which include an order 
"dismissing the action or proceeding on any part thereof" with prejudice. We 
have previously held that the trial judge is given broad discretion with regard 
to Rule 37, W.R.C.P. sanctions even to the point of dismissing the action. Matter of Mora's Estate, Wyo., 611 P.2d 842 
(1980). The question we must decide is whether the trial judge abused his 
discretion in dismissing appellant's claim with prejudice.

"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances." Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980).

An abuse of 
discretion is that which shocks the conscience of the court and appears so 
unfair and inequitable that a reasonable person could not abide it. Paul v. Paul, Wyo., 
616 P.2d 707 (1980). The decision of the trial judge will not be reversed unless 
there is a firm conviction that a clear error of judgment was committed. 
United 
States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Insurance 
Company, Ltd., 617 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1980).

"The Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure were designed to allow ample discovery. The rationale for this 
is that justice can be better served when the element of surprise is removed 
from a trial. * * * Little sympathy will be shown those who undermine the 
principles of discovery." Caterpillar 
Tractor Company v. Donahue, Wyo., 
674 P.2d 1276, 1285 (1983).

We have 
heretofore upheld entry of default for failure to answer interrogatories. Zweifel v. State, ex rel. Brimmer, 
Wyo., 517 P.2d 493 (1974). See, Satterfield v. Sunny Day 
Resources, Inc., Wyo., 581 P.2d 1386 (1978). In the latter case 
the court concluded that there was no prejudice to the appellant because the 
evidence submitted to the court covered the material issues as to which default 
had been entered. The former case is like cases from other jurisdictions which 
have affirmed dismissals of actions for a failure to comply with proper 
discovery requests. In Charter House 
Insurance Brokers, Ltd. v. New Hampshire Insurance Company, 667 F.2d 600 
(7th Cir. 1981), the court stated that although the judge must have considerable 
latitude in ordering sanctions, it was a well-settled rule that the court should 
tailor the chosen sanctions to the severity of the misconduct. In Mestas v. Peters, 280 Or. 447, 571 P.2d 888 (1977), the court affirmed a dismissal stating that the sanction was not too 
severe because everyone had bent over backwards to accommodate a plaintiff who 
would not be accommodated. See also, Temora Trading Company, Ltd. v. Perry, 
98 Nev. 229, 
645 P.2d 436 (1982). As a general rule, willful noncompliance must be shown 
before the case will be dismissed. Oaks 
v. Rojcewicz, Alaska, 409 P.2d 839 
(1966).

[¶7.]     The drastic nature of 
the remedy of dismissal has led courts to employ this sanction only on a 
clearest showing that such action is required, Dunbar v. United States, 502 F.2d 506 
(5th Cir. 1974). In Poppell v. United 
States, 418 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1969), the case was dismissed because of a 
failure to answer interrogatories. The Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of 
the case holding that a failure to answer interrogatories on subjects which were 
moot did not require dismissal of the action. The trial judge should not go 
beyond the necessities of the situation to foreclose trial on the merits merely 
as punishment for general misbehavior. Dorsey v. Academy Moving & Storage, 
Inc., 423 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970).

[¶8.]     In the case at bar, 
appellant's failure to attend was willful. The sanction appropriate for a Rule 
37 violation must still be appropriate to the circumstances of the case and be 
"just." In the present case appellant claimed that he should prevail as a matter 
of law because the issues had been resolved in the previous litigation and 
settlement. The trial court seemingly accepted this claim when it dismissed 
appellees' counterclaim as having been adjudicated and barred by the settlement. 
It is obvious that appellees' proposed discovery concerning additional defects 
in the premises after the settlement could not be relevant to the issue 
remaining before the court, i.e., whether appellees were in default in the 
payments due appellant. Appellees were not surprised nor prejudiced by their 
inability to depose appellant. They were not hampered in structuring a defense; 
any information gained would not have been helpful.

"[Rule 7, W.R.C.P.] 
grants the court discretionary authority to impose the sanctions mentioned. It 
is true that where the authority to perform a proposed action rests within the 
discretion of the court we must allow considerable latitude in which he may 
exercise his judgment. But this does not mean that the court has unrestrained 
power to act in an arbitrary manner. Fundamental to the concept of the rule of 
law is the principle that reason and justice shall prevail over the arbitrary 
and uncontrolled will of any one person; and that this applies to all men in 
every status: to courts and judges, as well as to autocrats or bureaucrats. The 
meaning of the term `discretion' itself imports that the action should be taken 
within reason and good conscience in the interest of protecting the rights of 
both parties and serving the ends of justice. It has always been the policy of 
our law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in 
court on the merits of a controversy." Carman v. Slavens, Utah, 
546 P.2d 601, 603 (1976).

Here the trial 
court decided for appellant on the merits as to appellees' counterclaim; it then 
dismissed his claim to recover payments due on the purchase of the trailer court 
for noncompliance with requirements for discovery when discovery, as a matter of 
law, would not have been helpful. Under these circumstances, we find an abuse of 
discretion in dismissing appellant's claim with prejudice. Having found an abuse 
of discretion, we do not address the constitutional limits of a dismissal with 
prejudice as a sanction.

[¶9.]     The decision of the 
trial court is, therefore, reversed.