Case Title: State ex rel. Tivol Plaza, Inc. v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC95758, SC95759

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2017-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. 
) 
TIVOL PLAZA, INC., 
 
) 
) 
Appellant, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC95758 
) 
MISSOURI COMMISSION ON 
) 
HUMAN RIGHTS, ET AL., 
) 
) 
Respondents. 
) 
and 
STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. 
) 
CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT  
) 
OPERATING CO., INC., ET AL., 
) 
) 
Appellants, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC95759 
) 
MISSOURI COMMISSION ON 
 
) 
HUMAN RIGHTS, ET AL., 
) 
) 
Respondents. 
) 
Appeals from the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri 
The Honorable Patricia S. Joyce, Judge 
Tivol Plaza, Inc. appeals the dismissal of its writ of mandamus petition against the 
Missouri Commission on Human Rights (MCHR).  The circuit court rejected Tivol’s 
argument that the MCHR was required to first determine whether Tivol’s employee’s 
Opinion issued August 22, 2017
2 
 
complaint of discrimination was filed timely with the MCHR before the MCHR had 
authority to issue the employee a right-to-sue letter.   
 
In a separate appeal of an entirely separate case, Caesars Entertainment Operating 
Co., Inc., also appeals the dismissal of a writ of mandamus petition it similarly filed against 
the MCHR.  The circuit court similarly rejected Caesars’ identical argument that the 
MCHR was required first to determine whether Caesars’ employee’s complaint of 
discrimination was filed timely with the MCHR before the MCHR had authority to issue 
the employee a right-to-sue letter.  While the two cases are not related, because each turns 
on identical legal issues, the two cases are addressed together in this opinion. 
This Court affirms the circuit court’s dismissal of the employers’ petitions for writs 
of mandamus.  To the extent cases decided by the court of appeals have interpreted Farrow 
v. St. Francis Medical Center, 407 S.W.3d 579 (Mo. banc 2013), as permitting an employer 
to seek a writ of mandamus to force the MCHR to determine the timeliness of an employee 
complaint even after 180 days have passed and the employee has requested and been issued 
a right-to-sue letter, they are incorrect.  Farrow involved a case in which 180 days had not 
yet passed before the right-to-sue letter issued.  Farrow’s suggestion in dicta that a 
mandamus action might be appropriate in such a case has no application here.   
Section 213.111.1, RSMo Supp. 2013,1 of the Missouri Human Rights Act 
(MHRA), requires the MCHR to issue a right-to-sue letter and terminate all proceedings 
related to a complaint if 180 days have elapsed and the employee has made a written request 
                                              
1 All statutory citations are to RSMo Supp. 2013, unless otherwise indicated. 
3 
 
for a right-to-sue letter.  That is what occurred in each of these cases.  Accordingly, the 
MCHR lost authority to continue processing the charges and was required to issue the right-
to-sue letters.  The circuit court had no authority to direct the MCHR to perform an act the 
MHRA prohibits, and it properly refused to issue writs directing the MCHR to do so.  
I. 
BACKGROUND  
A. 
Tivol 
 
On December 18, 2013, Karen Norton filed complaints with the MCHR and with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against her former employer, 
Tivol.  In her complaint to the MCHR, Ms. Norton alleged retaliation, sex discrimination, 
age discrimination, and a hostile work environment.  Ms. Norton claimed Tivol subjected 
her to a hostile work environment as well as sex and age-based harassment and 
discrimination during her employment beginning April 1, 2012.  She further claimed Tivol 
discriminated and retaliated against her by firing her November 18, 2013. 
Tivol sent a letter to the MCHR alleging: 
any allegations occurring before June 21, 2013 (i.e., the 180th day occurring 
before December 18, 2013) are untimely and must be dismissed by the 
Commission.  The Commission has no authority to take any action – 
including no authority to issue a right to sue – on any untimely aspects of the 
Charge.  Instead, the Commission must dismiss the untimely aspects of the 
Charge.  
 
It cited section 213.075.1.  On June 30, 2014, more than 180 days later, at Ms. 
Norton’s request, the MCHR issued Ms. Norton a right-to-sue letter, stating in part:  
The Missouri Commission on Human Rights (MCHR) is terminating its 
proceedings and issuing this notice of your right to sue under the Missouri 
Human Rights Act because you have requested a notice of your right to sue.  
You are hereby notified that you have the right to bring a civil action within 
4 
 
90 days of the date of this letter …. You are also notified that the Executive 
Director is administratively closing this case and terminating all MCHR 
proceedings relating to your complaint …. This notice of right to sue is being 
issued as required by Section 213.111.1, RSMo, because it has been 
requested in writing 180 days after filing of the complaint.  Please note that 
administrative processing of this complaint, including determinations of 
jurisdiction, has not been completed.  
 
(Emphasis in original). 
 
Tivol filed a petition for writ of mandamus asking the circuit court to vacate the 
right-to-sue letter and determine whether the MCHR had jurisdiction over Ms. Norton’s 
claims.  Tivol claimed the MCHR had a statutory duty to determine the timeliness of 
Ms. Norton’s complaint and the MCHR lacked the authority to issue a right-to-sue letter if 
her claims were not timely filed.  The circuit court issued summonses, rather than a 
preliminary writ of mandamus, to Ms. Norton, the MCHR, and its director, requesting they 
appear, file a “pleading to the petition,” and serve the pleading on Tivol.   
 
The MCHR moved to dismiss Tivol’s mandamus petition for failure to state a claim.  
The MCHR addressed the merits of Tivol’s petition, arguing it could not “establish either 
that the Commission was required to determine its jurisdiction over the complaint prior to 
issuing the right to sue letter or that [Tivol] was prejudiced by the issuance of the letter.”  
The MCHR argued Ms. Norton requested the right-to-sue letter more than 180 days after 
filing her complaint, the MCHR had a duty under section 213.111.1 to stop the 
administrative proceedings, and it was not required or permitted to delay issuing the letter 
until it determined whether the complaint was timely.   
 
The circuit court sustained the MCHR’s motion to dismiss, finding section 
213.111.1 required the MCHR to issue Ms. Norton a right-to-sue letter and terminate all 
5 
 
administrative proceedings relating to her case because 180 days had lapsed because 
Ms. Norton had filed her complaint and she had requested a right-to-sue letter be issued.  
The circuit court also found, because Tivol raised the timeliness issue in its written position 
statement to the MCHR, Tivol had preserved the right to raise the issue in the civil action 
and did not need to bring an action for writ of mandamus.  Tivol appealed.  This Court 
granted transfer after opinion by the court of appeals.  Mo. Const. art. V, § 10.  
 
B. 
Caesars 
On November 27, 2013, Rebecca Gleason filed complaints with the MCHR and the 
EEOC against her former employer, Caesars Entertainment Operating Co., Inc.  In her 
complaint to the MCHR, Ms. Gleason alleged sex discrimination and retaliation in 
violation of the MHRA.  §§ 213.010-213.137.  Ms. Gleason claimed Caesars subjected her 
to sex-based harassment and discrimination during her employment in 2011 and 2012 and 
discriminated against her after she complained about that discrimination by firing her 
November 1, 2012.  She also claimed this harassment and discrimination contributed to 
Caesars’ opposition to her requests for unemployment benefits in June 2013.  
In response to the charge, Caesars sent a letter to the MCHR alleging the MCHR 
“does not have jurisdiction over any alleged discrimination or retaliation occurring prior to 
May 31, 2013, and does not have the authority to issue a right to sue letter related to any 
alleged discrimination or retaliation occurring prior to May 31, 2013” under section 
213.075.1. 2  It also objected to the issuance of a right-to-sue letter relating to any untimely 
                                              
2 Although Caesars said the MCHR lacked jurisdiction, it actually argued only the MCHR 
did not have authority to investigate incidents occurring prior to May 31, 2013, because 
6 
 
claims.  On June 19, 2014, more than 180 days later, at Ms. Gleason’s request, the MCHR 
issued a right-to-sue letter, stating in part: 
This letter indicates your right to bring a civil action within 90 days of this 
notice … Upon issuing of this notice, the MCHR is terminating all 
proceedings relating to the complaint …. You are also notified that the 
Executive Director is hereby administratively closing this case and 
terminating all MCHR proceedings relating to it …. This notice of right to 
sue is being issued as required by Section 213.111.1, RSMo, because it has 
been requested in writing 180 days after filing of the complaint …. Please 
note that administrative processing of this complaint, including 
determinations of jurisdiction, has not been completed.    
 
(Emphasis in original).   
Caesars filed a petition for writ of mandamus asking the circuit court to compel “the 
MCHR and Director to withdraw and vacate the [right-to-sue letter] with respect to any 
claims based upon alleged MHRA violations occurring before May 31, 2013,” although 
Caesars admitted Ms. Gleason’s claims alleging discrimination in opposing her request for 
unemployment benefits were timely.  
The circuit court issued summonses, rather than a preliminary writ of mandamus, to 
the MCHR and its director, requesting both to appear before the circuit court, file a 
“pleading to the petition,” and serve the pleading on Caesars.   
On October 3, 2014, the MCHR moved to dismiss Caesars’ petition for writ of 
mandamus for failure to state a claim.  The MCHR addressed the merits of Caesars’ 
petition, arguing it could not “establish either that the Commission was required to 
determine its jurisdiction over specific claims prior to issuing the right to sue letter or that 
                                              
Ms. Gleason had been fired in November 2012 and did not file her complaint until 
November 27, 2013.   
7 
 
[Caesars was] prejudiced by the issuance of the letter.”  The MCHR argued once 
Ms. Gleason requested the right-to-sue letter more than 180 days after filing her complaint, 
the MCHR had a statutory duty under section 213.111.1 to stop the administrative 
proceedings and was not required or permitted to delay issuing the letter until it determined 
whether the complaint was timely. 
The circuit court sustained the MCHR’s motion to dismiss, finding section 
213.111.1 required the MCHR to issue Ms. Gleason a right-to-sue letter and terminate all 
administrative proceedings relating to her case because 180 days had lapsed because 
Ms. Gleason had filed her complaint and she had requested a right-to-sue letter be issued.  
It also found, because Caesars raised the timeliness issue in its written position statement 
to the MCHR, Caesars had properly “preserved [its] right to raise the issue in any 
subsequent civil action … and [did] not need to challenge the Commission’s issuance of a 
right to sue notice by bringing an action for writ of mandamus.”  Caesars appealed, and 
this Court granted transfer after opinion by the court of appeals.  Mo. Const. art. V, § 10. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court held in United States Department of Veterans Affairs v. Boresi, 396 
S.W.3d 356, 358-59 (Mo. banc 2013): 
An appeal will lie from the denial of a writ petition when a lower court has 
issued a preliminary order in mandamus but then denies a permanent writ.  
Likewise, when the lower court issues a summons, the functional equivalent 
of a preliminary order, and then denies a permanent writ, appellate review is 
available.  To be entitled to a writ, “a litigant asking relief by mandamus must 
allege and prove that he has a clear, unequivocal, specific right to a thing 
claimed.”  An appellate court reviews the denial of a petition for a writ of 
mandamus for an abuse of discretion.  An abuse of discretion in denying a 
writ occurs when the circuit court misapplies the applicable statutes.  
8 
 
 
(Citations omitted).  Our review is de novo of the legal question whether the relevant statute 
permits the circuit court to direct the MCHR to continue to process the complaint once it 
has issued a right-to-sue letter after 180 days have passed.  See Laut v. City of Arnold, 491 
S.W.3d 191, 196 (Mo. banc 2016) (questions of law reviewed de novo); Lemay Fire Prot. 
Dist. v. St. Louis Cnty., 340 S.W.3d 292, 294 (Mo. App. 2011). 
III. 
THE CIRCUIT COURT’S SUMMONSES WERE THE FUNCTIONAL 
EQUIVALENT OF PRELIMINARY WRITS  
 
 
In each case, the circuit court improperly issued a summons rather than a 
preliminary writ of mandamus, in contravention of the clear language of Rule 94.04, which 
requires, “If the court is of the opinion that the preliminary order in mandamus should be 
granted, such order shall be issued.”  Rule 94.04.  This was error.   
As the majority opinion in Boresi made clear, “the … practice of issuing a summons 
in lieu of a preliminary writ is not authorized by Rule 94.  Writs are extraordinary remedies, 
and their procedures differ from normal civil actions. … The practice of issuing a summons 
rather than a preliminary order fails to acknowledge the nature of the remedy.”  396 S.W.3d 
at 359 n.1.  Boresi exercised “its discretion to consider the matter on the merits and issue 
the writ because the parties, who already have litigated the matter fully, were not at fault 
and should not be required to initiate a new writ proceeding due to the circuit court’s failure 
to follow the procedure prescribed by the rules.”  Id.  But Boresi noted, “This Court is not 
required to exercise its discretion in like manner in the future.”  Id.   
  In Bartlett v. Missouri Department of Insurance, No. SC96212, ___ S.W.3d ____ 
(Mo banc. Aug.22, 2017), also handed down this date, this Court declined to exercise its 
9 
 
discretion to treat the summons as a preliminary order, for in that case the plaintiff told the 
clerk to issue a summons rather than treat the matter as a writ and repeatedly declined to 
follow the procedure applicable to writs despite numerous motions by the State requesting 
the court order the plaintiff to do so.  Id.  
Here, however, as in Boresi, the parties have litigated this case as if the circuit court 
had issued a preliminary order in mandamus and then denied the permanent writ.  The 
motion to dismiss addressed the merits of whether the circuit court could mandate the 
MCHR to consider the timeliness of the complaint even though the 180-day period had 
passed and the MCHR had issued a right-to-sue letter.  The parties and the circuit court 
thereby treated the summons in a manner that can be fairly characterized as granting “the 
functional equivalent of a preliminary order.”  The circuit court then denied a permanent 
writ on the merits.  See Boresi, 396 S.W.3d. at 359; see also R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV 
Sch. Dist. 477 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Mo. App. 2015).   
As in Boresi, in these particular circumstances, this Court chooses to exercise its 
discretion to treat the summonses as preliminary orders, given the lack of fault on the part 
of the parties in proceeding by summons and in light of the importance of the issues 
presented in these cases and in the more than 100 other mandamus actions the parties 
indicate have been filed raising this same issue concerning the MCHR’s authority to act 
once it issues a right-to-sue letter and the appropriate method for an employer to raise the 
timeliness issue.  Parties should not expect unending tolerance from the appellate courts 
for such failures to follow Rule 94.04, however, particularly when the question is not of 
such general interest or when the parties were made aware of the failure to follow Rule 94, 
10 
 
as in Bartlett.3 
IV. 
SECTION 213.111.1 REQUIRES THE MCHR TO ISSUE EMPLOYEES  
RIGHT-TO-SUE LETTERS AND TERMINATE ALL PROCEEDINGS 
RELATED TO THE COMPLAINTS  
 
The MHRA authorizes the MCHR “[t]o receive, investigate, and pass upon 
complaints alleging discrimination.”  § 213.030.1(7).  “Any person claiming to be 
aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice may make, sign and file with the 
commission a verified complaint in writing, within one hundred eighty days of the alleged 
act of discrimination.”  § 213.075.1.  After receiving the complaint, the agency shall 
“promptly investigate the complaint” to determine whether “probable cause exists for 
crediting the allegations of the complaint.”  § 213.075.3.   
“[I]f the director determines after the investigation that probable cause exists for 
crediting the allegations of the complaint, the executive director shall immediately 
endeavor to eliminate the unlawful discriminatory practice.”  Id.  If the executive director 
fails to eliminate the discriminatory practice as found in the investigation, the chairperson 
of the MCHR may decide to hold a hearing on the complaint.  § 213.075.5.  “A complaint 
                                              
3 It is important to note an appellate court does not have discretionary jurisdiction; either it 
has jurisdiction of an appeal, or it does not.  Denial of a petition for writ without issuing a 
preliminary writ is not appealable.  See R.M.A., 477 S.W.3d at 188.  Rather, the party 
seeking the writ must file the petition in the next higher court.  Rule 84.22.  Only if the 
circuit court issues a preliminary writ and then denies or quashes it on the merits, or grants 
the writ, can the losing party appeal.  In Boresi, the petitioner could appeal only because 
this Court in its discretion treated the summons as a preliminary writ because it was the 
functional equivalent of a preliminary writ.  396 S.W.3d at 356.  Had this Court not so 
exercised its discretion, then it would not have had jurisdiction of the appeal and the 
petitioning party would have had to file a new petition for writ in this Court rather than 
appeal the lower court’s denial of mandamus to this Court. 
11 
 
may be administratively closed … prior to setting the case for public hearing … [f]or lack 
of jurisdiction.”  8 CSR 60-2.025(7)(B)(3).   
 
If, however, the MCHR has not completed administrative processing of the 
complaint within 180 days from the date it was filed, section 213.111.1 allows the 
employee the option to request a right-to-sue letter and then file suit in court:  
If, after one hundred eighty days from the filing of a complaint alleging an 
unlawful discriminatory practice … the commission has not completed its 
administrative processing and the person aggrieved so requests in writing, 
the commission shall issue to the person claiming to be aggrieved a letter 
indicating his or her right to bring a civil action within ninety days of such 
notice against the respondent named in the complaint. 
 
See also State ex rel. Martin-Erb v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, 77 S.W.3d 600, 604 
(Mo. banc 2002).  See also 8 CSR 60-2.025(7)(B)(6).  The MHRA also provides once the 
right-to-sue letter is issued, the MCHR loses all authority to further process the complaint:  
Upon issuance of this notice, the commission shall terminate all proceedings 
relating to the complaint ….  Any action brought in court under this section 
shall be filed within ninety days from the date of the commission's 
notification letter to the individual but no later than two years after the 
alleged cause occurred or its reasonable discovery by the alleged injured 
party. 
 
§ 213.111.1.   In Farrow, this Court applied these statutory provisions and held filing a 
timely complaint with the MCHR is not a condition precedent to filing a civil action in the 
circuit court because: 
[T]he only requirements imposed by section 213.111 to file a claim under the 
MHRA are that: (1) an employee file a charge with the Commission prior to 
filing a state court action; (2) the Commission issue a right to sue letter; and 
(3) the state court action be filed within ninety days of the issuance of the 
right to sue letter but no later than two years after the alleged cause occurred 
or its reasonable discovery by the alleged injured party. The statute does not 
read, “If, after one hundred eighty days from the filing of a timely complaint. 
12 
 
...” This Court will not read such a requirement into the plain statutory 
language. 
 
407 S.W.3d at 591.   
In the instant cases, the employers argue that although the MCHR did issue the right-
to-sue letters, it had no authority to do so with respect to any untimely claims.  The 
employers argue the MCHR was required to first determine whether it had jurisdiction over 
the employees’ claims and dismiss any untimely claims before issuing a right-to-sue letter.  
This Court disagrees. 
If 180 days have passed since the complaint was filed without the MCHR 
completing its administrative processing, and the employee requests a right-to-sue letter, 
section 213.111.1 expressly requires the MCHR to issue the letter.  At that point, section 
213.111.1 is explicit:  “Upon issuance of this notice, the commission shall terminate all 
proceedings relating to the complaint.” 
That is what happened here.  In both cases, more than 180 days after they were filed, 
the employees’ complaints were still pending and each requested a right-to-sue letter.  In 
compliance with section 213.111.1, the MCHR immediately stopped processing the 
complaints and issued right-to-sue letters although it had not yet determined whether it had 
jurisdiction over some or all of the claims.4  The statute is explicit that the MCHR had no 
authority to process these employees’ complaints further.  § 213.111.1. 
The employers nonetheless argue Farrow required the MCHR to determine whether 
                                              
4 While not required by statute, we note in both cases the MCHR provided further 
information to the parties, stating in the right-to-sue letters, the “administrative processing 
of this complaint, including determinations of jurisdiction, ha[d] not been completed.” 
13 
 
the complaints were timely before it could issue the right-to-sue letters even though 180 
days had passed and the letters had been requested.  Had Farrow so held, it would have 
been incorrect, for this Court also is prohibited from telling the MCHR to act beyond its 
jurisdiction.  But Farrow should not be read so broadly.  In Farrow, the MCHR issued the 
employee, Farrow, a right-to-sue letter only 145 days after she filed her complaint.  Id. at 
586.  Nothing requires the MCHR to issue a right-to-sue letter before the end of the 180-
day period.  It was in this narrow factual circumstance that Farrow held the MCHR still 
was able to “close or dismiss Farrow’s complaint for want of jurisdiction,” but it instead 
“exercised its authority to issue the right to sue letter, thus implicitly finding Farrow’s claim 
was timely.”  The Court stated : 
The proper forum to file a writ of mandamus was with the circuit court 
pursuant to section 536.150 … challenging the Commission’s jurisdiction to 
issue the right to sue letter based on its belief Farrow’s claim was untimely.   
 
Id. at 589, 590;5 Martin-Erb, 77 S.W.3d at 608 (“If [the employee] makes specific 
allegations as to how the executive director failed to follow those rules, then section 
536.150 gives her the right to file a mandamus action to determine whether the executive 
director’s actions “accomplished under prescribed procedures and were lawful’”); see also 
Walker v. Personnel Advisory Bd. of Mo., 670 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo. banc 1984).  
“Judicial decisions must be construed with reference to the facts and issues of the 
particular case, and … the authority of the decision as a precedent is limited to those points 
                                              
5 No one has suggested the MCHR did not have authority to determine its jurisdiction and 
issue a right-to-sue letter sua sponte prior to the end of the 180-day period.  See Igoe v. 
Dep’t. of Labor and Indus. Relations, 152 S.W.3d 284, 287 n. 5 (Mo. banc 2005).   
14 
 
of law which are raised by the record, considered by the court, and necessary to the 
decision.”  Byrne & Jones Enter. v. Monroe City R-1 Sch. Dist. 493 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Mo. 
banc 2016).  In the instant cases, unlike in Farrow, 180 days had elapsed, and, as discussed 
above, the MCHR was required to issue the right-to-sue letters to the employees and 
terminate all proceedings related to their complaints pursuant to section 213.111.1.  The 
MCHR was required to do so regardless of where it was in its administrative processing – 
here the records show, based on language the MCHR chose to include in its letters, it had 
not yet determined its jurisdiction in either case.  
Whether Farrow was correct in regard to the authority to mandate that the MCHR 
determine its jurisdiction in this narrow circumstance is not before the Court today, nor 
was it before the Court in Farrow, as the employer had not preserved the timeliness issue 
by raising it at the MCHR level, and therefore it was waived.  407 S.W.3d at 590.6   
In any event, in the instant cases, unlike in Farrow, 180 days had elapsed, and, as 
discussed above, the MCHR was required to issue the right-to-sue letters to the employees 
and terminate all proceedings related to their complaints pursuant to section 213.111.1 even 
though it had not yet determined its jurisdiction.  At that point, the MCHR had no statutory 
authority to make any findings of fact related to the complaints, implicitly or otherwise, 
including whether they had been timely filed.  The circuit court, therefore, properly 
dismissed the petitions filed by Caesars and Tivol. 
                                              
6 Even had that not been the case, it would have been difficult to have obtained a writ before 
the 180 days had passed.  As this Court stated in Martin-Erb, the most the writ could do 
would be to direct the MCHR to continue applying its statutory process.  77 S.W.3d at 608. 
15 
 
The employers’ confusion as to the application of Farrow’s dicta to right-to-sue 
letters issued after 180 days at the request of the employee is not unique; since Farrow was 
decided, the parties indicate, more than 100 petitions for writs of mandamus have been 
filed in circuit courts across the state challenging the timeliness of the complaint filed with 
the MCHR in each of those cases.  To the extent dicta in Farrow has been interpreted to 
permit the employer to raise this issue by filing a petition for writ of mandamus in the 
circuit court after the MCHR has issued a right-to-sue letter following the 180-day period, 
it has been misinterpreted.  These cases are governed by the provisions of section 
213.111.1, which required the MCHR to cease all action on employees’ complaints and 
issue a right-to-sue letter once that letter was requested more than 180 days after employees 
filed their complaints.   
V. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons noted above, this Court affirms the circuit court judgments denying 
the employers’ requests for permanent writs of mandamus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE 
 
Draper, Wilson, Russell and Breckenridge, JJ.,  
concur; Fischer, C.J., dissents in separate opinion  
filed. Powell, J., not participating. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. 
 
 
) 
TIVOL PLAZA, INC., 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC95758 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
MISSOURI COMMISSION ON   
 
) 
HUMAN RIGHTS, et al.,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondents.  
 
 
 
) 
 
and 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. 
 
 
) 
CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT   
 
) 
OPERATING CO., INC., et al., 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellants,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC95759 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
MISSOURI COMMISSION ON  
 
) 
HUMAN RIGHTS, et al.,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondents.  
 
 
 
) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
I write separately because there is no compelling reason to depart from this Court's 
clear admonition and declaration of law expressed in United States Department of 
 
2 
Veterans Affairs v. Boresi, 396 S.W.3d 356, 359 n.1 (Mo. banc 2013), that a circuit 
court's 
practice of issuing a summons in lieu of a preliminary writ is not 
authorized by Rule 94.  Writs are extraordinary remedies, and their 
procedures differ from normal civil actions.  The practice of issuing a 
summons rather than a preliminary order fails to acknowledge the nature of 
the remedy.  Additionally, it requires a response from the respondent 
without regard to the merits of the petition. 
 
(Emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).  Although this Court in Boresi chose to 
exercis[e] its discretion to consider the matter on the merits and issue the 
writ because the parties, who already have litigated the matter fully, were 
not at fault and should not be required to initiate a new writ proceeding due 
to the circuit court's failure to follow the procedure proscribed by the 
rules[,]  
 
id., this Court cautioned that it was "not required to exercise its discretion in like manner 
in the future."  Id.  Despite this Court's admonition in Boresi, and despite the circuit court 
in each case being on notice of Boresi,1 the principal opinion continues to sanction the 
issuance of a summons in lieu of a preliminary order even though such a procedure is not 
authorized by Rule 94.  See id. at 365 (Fischer, J., concurring); see also Bartlett v. Mo. 
Dep't of Ins., No. SC96212, ___ S.W.3d ____ (Mo. banc Aug. 22, 2017) (slip op. at 1) 
(refusing to treat summonses as a preliminary order).  As previously explained in Boresi: 
The general rule is that no appeal lies from the failure to issue a preliminary 
order.  The remedy in such a case is a direct petition for writ of mandamus 
in a higher court.  Conversely, if a preliminary order in mandamus issues, 
the remedy is to seek review in a higher court by appeal.  State ex rel. 
                                              
1  Boresi was handed down in April 2013.  Glaringly apparent from these records, both petitions 
were filed in July 2014, and the circuit court in each case issued the summonses that same 
month.  The principal opinion suggests the parties were not at fault, but this statement is not 
accurate because both parties and the circuit court have an obligation to ensure compliance with 
Rule 94. 
 
3 
Ashby Road Partners, LLC v. State Tax Com'n, 297 S.W.3d 80, 83 (Mo. 
banc 2009). 
 
396 S.W.3d at 363–64 (Fischer, J., concurring).   
The principal opinion in Boresi chose to "exercis[e] its discretion to consider the 
matter on the merits and issue the writ[,]" id. at 359 n.1; it did not exercise appellate 
jurisdiction.2  This Court may exercise its discretion to "issue and determine original 
remedial writs[,]" Mo. Const. art. V, § 4.1, or grant transfer from the court of appeals if 
the case presents a question of general interest or importance.  Mo. Const. art. V, § 10.  
Here, I would not exercise discretion to issue a writ to consider the legal issues presented 
because, in my view, this Court has an overriding responsibility to follow and enforce its 
rules.  See Boresi, 396 S.W.3d at 364 n.5 (Fischer, J., concurring) (noting "compliance 
with Rule 94 or Rule 97 . . . should be required by circuit courts, court of appeals, and 
this Court").  This Court's rules bind all courts of this state, litigants and their attorneys, 
and "it is th[is] [C]ourt's duty to enforce them."  Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 268 
(Mo. banc 2012). 
Enforcing our rules will encourage the court of appeals—as it did in these cases 
prior to transfer—and the circuit courts to follow this Court's rules.  For instance, prior to 
this Court granting transfer, the court of appeals for the Western District in Tivol 
dismissed the appeal, stating it 
                                              
2  Indeed, the principal opinion readily concedes that "an appellate court does not have 
discretionary jurisdiction; either it has jurisdiction of an appeal or it does not.  Where a writ is 
concerned, denial of a petition for writ without issuing a preliminary writ is not appealable.  
Rather, the party seeking the writ must file the petition in the next higher court."  Slip Op. at n.3 
(internal citation omitted).  To be clear, where I depart from the principal opinion is the concept 
that this Court can declare a summons to be a preliminary writ to create appellate jurisdiction. 
 
4 
refuse[s] to perpetuate a procedural process . . . not authorized by Rule 94.  
"The rules of civil procedure are rules of practice and procedure to promote 
the orderly administration of justice."  Sitelines, LLC v. Pentstar Corp., 213 
S.W.3d 703, 707 (Mo. App. 2007) (quoting Mello v. Williams, 73 S.W.3d 
681, 685 (Mo. App. 2002)). . . . The courts, litigants, and counsel were 
clearly put on notice that the practice of issuing a summons in lieu of a 
preliminary writ is not authorized by Rule 94.  And, although the Boresi 
court said that appellate review is available when a lower court issues a 
summons and denies a permanent writ, the court clearly stated that it was 
not required to exercise its discretion in the future. . . . [T]he Missouri 
Supreme Court was signaling that, in future cases, it was highly unlikely 
that courts would exercise their discretion to hear appeals on the merits 
where the circuit court issued a summons, rather than a preliminary order.  
Indeed, if the Supreme Court Rules are truly binding on courts, litigants, 
and counsel as case law declares, then courts, litigants, and counsel must be 
bound by the procedures set forth in Rule 94, especially since Boresi put 
them on notice of the obligation to comply with those procedures almost 
three years ago.  Thus, while we have the discretion to hear appeals on the 
merits in cases in which the circuit court issues a summons rather than a 
preliminary order, as an intermediate appellate court charged with the duty 
to enforce the Supreme Court Rules, we do not believe it is our place to 
continually excuse compliance with the procedural rules written by the 
Missouri Supreme Court.  We find this especially true given that Tivol's 
recourse in this case is simple—Tivol merely needs to file its writ in a 
higher court. 
 
Further, we note that, even if we felt compelled to exercise our discretion to 
hear Tivol's appeal in this case, we would deny the writ because this is not a 
proper mandamus case.  "The purpose of the extraordinary writ of 
mandamus is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty that one 
charged with the duty has refused to perform."  Furlong Companies, Inc. v. 
City of Kansas City, 189 S.W.3d 157, 165 (Mo. banc 2006).  "A litigant 
asking relief by mandamus must allege and prove that he has a clear, 
unequivocal, specific right to a thing claimed.  He must show himself 
possessed of a clear and legal right to the remedy."  Id. at 166.  Mandamus 
is not used "to establish a legal right; it may only be used to compel 
performance of a right that already exists.  The writ's purpose is to execute, 
not to adjudicate."  Lemay v. Fire Protection Dist., 340 S.W.3d 292, 295 
(Mo. App. 2011) (citations omitted).  There is nothing ministerial about the 
determination concerning timeliness in this case.  Timeliness is an issue 
that can require extensive investigation that may not be concluded within 
180 days because it is subject to "the principles of waiver, estoppel, and 
equitable tolling, including the continuing violation theory exception."  
Tisch v. DST, Sys., Inc., 368 S.W.3d 245, 252 (Mo. App. 2012).  These are 
 
5 
not matters that the Commission can necessarily decide on the face of the 
discrimination charge alone. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we decline to exercise our discretion to hear Tivol's 
appeal on the merits.  Because the circuit court denied Tivol's petition for 
writ of mandamus without issuing a preliminary order, Tivol's proper 
course was to file its writ in a higher court.  We, therefore, dismiss Tivol's 
appeal. 
 
State ex rel. Tivol Plaza v. Mo. Comm'n on Human Rights, No. WD 78477, 2016 WL 
1435970, at *4–5 (Mo. App. Apr. 12, 2016) (en banc) (footnote omitted) (internal 
citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), transfer granted, No. SC95758 
(Mo. banc Aug. 23, 2016); see also State ex rel. Caesars Entm't Operating Co. v. Mo. 
Comm'n on Human Rights, No. WD 78693, 2016 WL 1579082, at *2 (Mo. App. Apr. 19, 
2016) (per curiam), transfer granted, No. SC95759 (Mo. banc Aug. 23, 2016); R.M.A. v. 
Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 477 S.W.3d 185, 190 n.10 (Mo. App. 2015). 
Indeed, after Boresi, the court of appeals for the Eastern District in Banks v. Slay 
predictably held: 
Rather than perpetuate a procedural process that is not authorized by Rule 
94 and is disfavored by the Supreme Court of Missouri, instead of stating 
that the judgment is affirmed, this court denies the writ without prejudice to 
seeking an original writ in the Supreme Court of Missouri.  In the future, 
our circuit courts should follow the procedure set out in Rule 94 rather than 
issue a summons. 
 
410 S.W.3d 767, 771 (Mo. App. 2013) (per curiam).  As demonstrated by its decision in 
WMAC 2013, LLC v. McBride, 493 S.W.3d 44, 47 (Mo. App. 2016), the Eastern District 
has remained consistent. 
Failure to enforce our own rules perpetuates uncertainty as to when this Court will 
rationalize an excuse to follow proper procedure.  In my view, it is not good policy for 
 
6 
this Court not to follow its own rules.  The resolution of the extremely narrow legal issue 
presented in these two cases does not justify litigants' and circuit courts' decisions to not 
follow the rules of civil procedure.  In fact, it could be argued that if there are numerous 
pending cases raising the same legal issue, those litigants and circuit courts that followed 
proper procedure should be entitled to prompt resolution, as opposed to those litigants 
and circuit courts that did not follow proper procedure. 
I continue to condemn the practice of permitting a circuit court—on its own or at 
the request of an attorney—to issue a summons in lieu of a preliminary order when 
seeking an extraordinary writ.  Furthermore, when the court of appeals dismisses an 
appeal for failure to follow the procedural rules for seeking an extraordinary writ, this 
Court should not grant transfer of the cases.  Should a litigant believe it is entitled to an 
extraordinary writ, the proper procedure would be for the litigant to seek a writ in this 
Court and then this Court could determine whether to exercise its discretion to issue or 
not issue the writ. 
Because the circuit court in both of these cases did not issue a preliminary order, I 
would not have granted transfer of these cases after the court of appeals dismissed them 
for failure to comply with this Court's rules.  The prudential reasons for this Court to 
refuse to exercise its discretion to not consider these cases on the merits are well set out 
in the cases cited above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Chief Justice