Case Title: State v. Nimmer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020AP000878-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2022-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
2022 WI 47 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP878-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Avan Rondell Nimmer, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 395 Wis. 2d 769, 954 N.W.2d 753 
(2021 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 23, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 25, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Glenn H. Yamahiro   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court with respect to all parts except ¶¶28, 29 n.12, and 
39–58, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined, and an opinion with respect to ¶¶28, 29 n.12, and 39–58, 
in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined.  DALLET, J., 
filed a concurring opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring 
opinion.   
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Sarah L. Burgundy, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There 
was an oral argument by Sarah L. Burgundy.  
 
 
 
2 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Mark S. Rosen and Rosen and Holzman, Waukesha. There was an oral 
argument by Mark S. Rosen.  
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 47 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP878-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2019CF2611) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Avan Rondell Nimmer, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 23, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court with respect to all parts except ¶¶28, 29 n.12, and 
39–58, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined, and an opinion with respect to ¶¶28, 29 n.12, and 39–58, 
in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined.  DALLET, J., 
filed a concurring opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring 
opinion.   
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   This case concerns police 
officers' ability to respond to concededly reliable reports of 
gunfire generated in near real-time.  Two Milwaukee officers 
received such a report via a technology known as ShotSpotter.  
The officers arrived on scene no more than one minute after 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
2 
 
receiving the report, seeing only one person there:  Avan R. 
Nimmer.  After noticing the squad car, Nimmer accelerated his 
pace away from it.  He also dug around his left side with his 
left hand.  Officer Anthony Milone stepped out of the squad car 
and walked toward Nimmer, who "bladed" his left side away from 
Milone while continuing to dig around his left side.1  The 
officers considered these movements suspicious because they were 
consistent with actions a person may take in attempting to 
conceal a weapon.  The officers stopped Nimmer to investigate 
whether he was involved in the shooting.  Concerned for their 
safety, Milone frisked Nimmer and found a handgun.   
¶2 
Because Nimmer was a felon, the State charged him with 
being a felon in possession, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.29(1m)(a) (2019–20).2  Nimmer moved to suppress any 
evidence obtained as a result of the investigative stop, 
including the handgun, arguing the stop violated his Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable seizure.  The circuit court 
denied Nimmer's motion.3  The court of appeals reversed in an 
unpublished 
per 
curiam 
decision. 
 
State 
v. 
Nimmer, 
                                                 
1 "Blading" is a technique used to conceal a weapon.  "[A] 
person carrying a gun . . . turn[s] 90 degrees away from the 
person observing or approaching, placing his body between the 
gun and the other person."  Nathan C. Meehan & Christopher 
Strange, Behavioral Indicators of Legal and Illegal Gun Carrying 
7 (2015).   
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019–20 version. 
3 The Honorable Glenn H. Yamahiro, Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, presided. 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
3 
 
No. 2020AP878-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 
2020) (per curiam). 
¶3 
We hold the officers had reasonable suspicion, based 
on the totality of the circumstances, to believe Nimmer was 
involved in criminal activity.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  ShotSpotter 
¶4 
This case involves a relatively new technology, 
ShotSpotter.  At the suppression hearing, Officer Milone 
testified ShotSpotter is a "gunshot location system."  He 
explained it uses "acoustic sensors" to "record sounds to try to 
locate . . . gunfire."  More specifically, "when the acoustic 
sensors pick-up the sounds of gunfire, [they] send[] an alert to 
an office in California.  There is somebody standing by in the 
office who listens to the audio and . . . if it sounds like 
actual gunshots, they will send the alert[.]"4  Nimmer has not 
argued the time that elapses between ShotSpotter detecting 
gunfire and notifying officers is sufficiently long to be a 
material fact. 
¶5 
Nimmer does not dispute ShotSpotter's reliability.  
Officer Milone testified at the suppression hearing, "I [have] 
responded to . . . over a thousand [ShotSpotter reports]. . . .  
                                                 
4 Officer Milone indicated Milwaukee employs ShotSpotter at 
several locations:  "There is ShotSpotters in multiple cities.  
So we get dealings for all of Milwaukee including not just 
District Five, but all of Milwaukee." 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
4 
 
In my experience, [ShotSpotter] is pretty accurate."  During 
oral argument before this court, when asked whether Nimmer was 
"challenging the reliability of ShotSpotter," Nimmer's attorney 
responded: 
No, . . . we are not. . . .  [T]he thing is I think 
it's pretty clear about ShotSpotter technology, is I 
think it can say when and where.  I think now it's 
gotten to the point where it can say what.  It can 
distinguish between firecrackers.  I think that's 
pretty clear.  I'm not disputing that. 
Despite ShotSpotter's reliability, Nimmer argues the officers 
lacked reasonable suspicion to believe he was involved in 
criminal activity. 
B.  The Shooting Investigation 
¶6 
In the summer of 2019, Officer Milone and his partner 
were on patrol when, at approximately 10:06 p.m., they received 
a computerized ShotSpotter report in their squad car.  It stated 
four shots had been fired about three blocks away from the 
officers' location.  Nimmer described the reported location as 
"highly 
residential." 
 
The 
officers 
drove 
there 
without 
activating their squad car's siren or flashing red and blue 
lights. 
 
¶7 
Officer Milone had responded to many similar reports 
in the past.  He was a nine-year police veteran assigned to the 
Violent Crimes Saturation Unit, and his "typical[]" duties 
included "respond[ing] to calls like ShotSpotter, shots fired, 
subject with gun, armed robbery, calls of that nature involving 
gun and gun violence."  He testified when he responds to a 
ShotSpotter report, he looks for "[a]nybody who is shot, any 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
5 
 
people who are shot, any potential suspects, anybody walking 
around still shooting, [and] any witnesses[.]"  When he sees 
individuals near the reported location, he explained he "tr[ies] 
to see what their response is upon sight of police, see if they 
are shot, see if they take off running, see if they start 
grabbing any part of their clothing, any part of their body."  
Effectively, he watches for evasive or nervous behavior. 
¶8 
The officers arrived on scene no more than one minute 
after receiving the ShotSpotter report and encountered Nimmer.  
Officer Milone testified Nimmer was at "basically the exact 
location where the ShotSpotter came in."  He further testified 
the officers did not see anyone else——only Nimmer. 
 
¶9 
Nimmer 
observed 
the 
squad 
car 
and 
immediately 
accelerated his pace away from it——in fact, he doubled his pace, 
according to Officer Milone.  Milone worried Nimmer was trying 
to distance himself from the squad car because he was 
considering fleeing.  Milone testified, "I have observed many 
times somebody begins to accelerate their walking pace right 
before going into a run from police."  He also testified Nimmer 
"began digging around his left side with his left hand."  
¶10 Officer Milone then stepped out of the squad car and 
approached Nimmer.  Milone testified: 
As I was approaching him behind him, he began turning 
his left side away from me.  So at that point his left 
side was more forward and I could only really see his 
right side.  I could observe his left arm was still 
digging around.  I was directly behind him on the 
sidewalk and his right hand was within view, but his 
left hand was not. 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
6 
 
Milone used "blading" as shorthand for Nimmer's turning motion 
at other points in his testimony.  When asked to define blading, 
he said, "[b]lading [i]s the term I use when I talk about 
[Nimmer] moving his left side away from me where I could only 
see his right side.  That would have been the part where he was 
blading his body."  From Nimmer's blading, Milone inferred, 
based on his training and experience, "[Nimmer] did not want me 
to be able to see his left side." 
¶11 The officers then stopped Nimmer to investigate 
whether he had been involved in the shooting.  Officer Milone 
testified he "conducted a pat-down of [Nimmer] for officer 
safety for any weapons."  As Milone began, Nimmer said, "[t]he 
gun is in my waistband[.]"  Milone then felt Nimmer's waistband, 
and on Nimmer's left side, concealed under his shirt, was a .40 
caliber Smith & Wesson semiautomatic pistol.5   
¶12 The State charged Nimmer with being a felon in 
possession.  He had been previously convicted of possession with 
intent 
to 
deliver 
THC, 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.41(1m)(h)1.   
C.  Nimmer's Suppression Motion 
¶13 Nimmer moved to suppress any evidence obtained as a 
result of the investigative stop, including the handgun, arguing 
the stop was unsupported by reasonable suspicion that he was 
involved in criminal activity.  He asserted the officers stopped 
                                                 
5 The officers later found a .40 caliber casing nearby; 
however, because they located it after stopping Nimmer, the 
casing cannot enter into the reasonable suspicion analysis. 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
7 
 
him because of his "mere presence" in the same "neighborhood" as 
the gunfire's reported location.  Offering an alternative 
explanation for his presence at the scene, Nimmer argued he 
could have been an innocent "pedestrian" out for a walk "on the 
street."  Emphasizing the limits of ShotSpotter, Nimmer noted 
ShotSpotter does not provide a description of the shooter.  It 
tells officers what, when, and where, but not who.  Nimmer also 
asserted "even if" he made furtive movements, "standing alone" 
his acceleration away from the officers and his blading and 
digging could not give rise to reasonable suspicion.  He also 
suggested these movements were not suspicious because "Nimmer 
couldn't have known necessarily that the squad car was a police 
car.  It didn't have its red and blue lights on or the siren 
going. 
 
It 
was 
dark 
outside. 
 
The 
lights 
would 
prevent . . . Nimmer from being able to identify the squad as a 
squad car[.]" 
¶14 The State countered the officers had reasonable 
suspicion because:  (1) the officers arrived on scene almost 
immediately following the ShotSpotter report; (2) Nimmer was "in 
the close proximity of this call;" (3) the officers did not see 
anyone else near the reported location; and (4) Nimmer acted 
suspiciously once he noticed the officers. 
¶15 The circuit court denied Nimmer's motion, agreeing 
with the State's argument.  The court explained the "key" was 
"the timing" of events.  It indicated its decision would be 
different if ShotSpotter did not work in near real-time and the 
officers arrived "10 or 15 minutes" after the reported shooting; 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
8 
 
however, because only a nominal amount of time had passed, the 
court reasoned the officers could be suspicious of people at the 
scene.  It found Nimmer was "very close" to the gunfire's 
reported location, and Nimmer was the only person the officers 
saw.  Additionally, the court found Nimmer made furtive 
movements upon noticing the officers, which were "consistent 
with . . . trying to conceal a weapon."  Viewing all of these 
facts together, the court concluded the officers reasonably 
suspected Nimmer of criminal activity. 
D.  The Appeal 
¶16 Nimmer entered into a plea agreement, pled guilty, and 
was sentenced to two years of initial confinement followed by 
two years of extended supervision.  Nimmer appealed.6  The court 
of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the 
case to the circuit court, directing it to enter an order 
granting Nimmer's motion to suppress.  Nimmer, No. 2020AP878-CR, 
¶30.   
¶17 The court of appeals reasoned Nimmer's "mere presence" 
near "an area where criminal activity [was] suspected" was 
insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion that he was 
involved in criminal activity.  Id., ¶27 (citations omitted).  
The court reached this conclusion by analogizing to four cases, 
only one of which involved a police response to reported 
                                                 
6 Generally, a criminal defendant waives his right to appeal 
by pleading guilty; however, a narrow exception exists under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10) for appeals challenging "[a]n order 
denying a motion to suppress evidence[.]" 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
9 
 
gunfire.  Those cases generally concern the weight a court may 
give to a person's presence at a location associated with 
criminal activity.  State v. Gordon is illustrative.  Id., ¶17 
(quoting 
State 
v. 
Gordon, 
2014 
WI 
App 
44, 
¶¶3–4, 
353 
Wis. 2d 468, 846 N.W.2d 483).  Officers stopped a suspect 
because he was walking in "one of the more dangerous areas of 
the 
district" 
and 
had 
been 
observed 
making 
a 
"security 
adjustment," i.e., a movement indicating he was carrying a 
weapon.  Id. (quoting Gordon, 353 Wis. 2d 468, ¶¶3–4).  The 
court of appeals concluded the officers lacked reasonable 
suspicion because a person's presence in a "high crime area" 
cannot be the primary fact supporting an investigative stop.7  
Id., ¶18 (quoting Gordon, 353 Wis. 2d 468, ¶18).  By relying on 
Gordon and other like cases, the court of appeals ignored the 
timing of the officers' response to the report of gunfire, 
treating this case as if the officers merely noticed Nimmer in 
an area where they knew shootings often occurred instead of an 
area where a shooting reportedly just occurred. 
¶18 Next, the court of appeals characterized Officer 
Milone's testimony about Nimmer's furtive movements as of an 
"indeterminate nature" seeming to question whether Milone's 
testimony was even truthful.  Id., ¶28.  Specifically, the court 
                                                 
7 The other three cases cited by the court of appeals were:  
(1) State v. Pugh, 2013 WI App 12, 345 Wis. 2d 832, 826 
N.W.2d 418; (2) State v. Washington, 2005 WI App 123, 284 
Wis. 2d 456, 
700 
N.W.2d 305; 
and 
(3) 
State 
v. 
Lewis, 
No. 2017AP234-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 25, 
2017). 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
10 
 
speculated: 
 
"[W]e 
cannot 
help 
but 
wonder——even 
while 
recognizing 
that 
police 
officers 
must 
make 
split-second 
decisions under circumstances where all factors may not be 
known——whether . . . officers 
have 
sought 
to 
find 
'magic' 
language for their articulated facts to describe a person's 
behavior to [justify an investigative stop]."  Id., ¶26. 
¶19  The court of appeals concluded Nimmer's presence near 
the gunfire's reported location, "even taken together" with 
Officer Milone's testimony regarding Nimmer's furtive movements, 
was insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion.  Id., 
¶30.  While the court stated it considered the facts "together," 
it never analyzed the totality of the circumstances, instead 
addressing each fact in isolation.8  The State filed a petition 
for review, which we granted. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶20 This case presents a question of constitutional fact.  
See State v. Brown, 2020 WI 63, ¶8, 392 Wis. 2d 454, 945 
N.W.2d 584 (citing 
State v. Smith, 2018 WI 2, ¶9, 379 
Wis. 2d 86, 905 N.W.2d 353).  We review the circuit court's 
findings of historical fact for clear error.  Id. (quoting 
Smith, 379 Wis. 2d 86, ¶9).  We independently apply the Fourth 
Amendment to the historical facts to determine whether the 
                                                 
8 At oral argument, Nimmer's attorney acknowledged, while 
the court of appeals purported to consider the facts together, 
it "didn't explain anything further," i.e., it did not analyze 
the totality of the circumstances. 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
11 
 
investigative stop was constitutional.9  Id. (quoting Smith, 379 
Wis. 2d 86, ¶9). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Fourth Amendment Principles & Terry Stops 
 
¶21 "The Fourth Amendment is 'indispensable to the full 
enjoyment of the rights of personal security, personal liberty, 
and private property.'"  
Id., ¶9 (quoting 3 J. Story, 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1895 
(1833)).  It states:   
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.   
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  "As the text makes clear, 'the Fourth 
Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and 
seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.'"  
State v. Coffee, 2020 WI 53, ¶22, 391 Wis. 2d 831, 943 
N.W.2d 845 (lead opinion) (quoting State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 
134, ¶29, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120); see also Brown, 392 
                                                 
9 The circuit court made a sweeping statement toward the end 
of its remarks:  "Really, anyone that [the officers] encountered 
within a minute or two of receiving the alert should have been 
investigated if they were within a couple of blocks of the 
alleged shots being fired."  The court of appeals concluded this 
statement was "simply too broad to fit within the confines of 
Fourth Amendment law regarding stop and frisk procedures."  
State v. Nimmer, No. 2020AP878-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶30 
(Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2020) (per curiam).  We agree; however, 
notwithstanding this single stray comment, the circuit court 
gave a thorough and well-reasoned explanation for its ruling. 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
12 
 
Wis. 2d 454, ¶9 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 
(2014)) 
("[T]he 
[United 
States] 
Supreme 
Court 
repeatedly 
characterizes the reasonableness of searches and seizures as 
[the Fourth Amendment's] 'ultimate touchstone.'").   
¶22 Generally, a search or seizure conducted without a 
warrant is "per se unreasonable[.]"  Brown, 392 Wis. 2d 454, ¶10 
(quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009)); State v. 
Matejka, 2001 WI 5, ¶17, 241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891 
(citations 
omitted). 
 
However, 
ever 
since 
this 
nation's 
founding, there have been exceptions.  Akhil Reed Amar, Terry 
and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 St. John's L. 
Rev. 1097, 1106 (1998) ("[A] large number of historical examples 
give the lie to the idea that warrants were always required at 
the 
Founding——warrantless 
arrests, 
searches 
incident 
to 
warrantless arrest, searches of ships, searches of liquor store-
houses, border searches, successful seizures of contraband and 
stolen goods, and on and on."). 
¶23 An officer may briefly stop an individual, without a 
warrant, if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe the 
individual is involved in criminal activity.  State v. Genous, 
2021 WI 50, ¶7, 397 Wis. 2d 293, 961 N.W.2d 41 (quoting State v. 
Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶20, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729); State v. 
Anderson (Anderson I), 2019 WI 97, ¶32, 389 Wis. 2d 106, 935 
N.W.2d 285.  A short investigative stop is often called a "Terry 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
13 
 
stop" based upon the United States Supreme Court decision Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which sanctioned them.10 
¶24 Reasonable suspicion depends on the "totality of the 
circumstances."  Genous, 397 Wis. 2d 293, ¶9 (citing State v. 
Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶18, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634).  Just 
last term, we emphasized that "[w]e focus not on isolated, 
independent facts, but on 'the whole picture' viewed together."  
Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 
(1981)).  "Indeed, Terry itself involved a series of acts, each 
of them perhaps innocent if viewed separately, but which taken 
together warranted further investigation."  Id. (quoting United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1989)).  In this case, the 
court of appeals erred by utilizing a "divide-and-conquer 
analysis."  See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. __, 138 
S. Ct. 577, 588 (2018) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 
U.S. 266, 274 (2002)). 
¶25 Reasonable suspicion is "a low bar[.]"  Genous, 397 
Wis. 2d 293, ¶8 (citing Young, 294 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21; State v. 
Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶19, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625); see 
also Anderson I, 389 Wis. 2d 106, ¶33 ("Reasonable suspicion is 
a fairly low standard to meet."  (citing Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 
                                                 
10 An officer may frisk a person during a Terry stop if the 
officer "reasonably believes" the individual is armed and poses 
a safety risk.  State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶55, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 
717 N.W.2d 729 (citations omitted).  Nimmer argues the officers 
lacked reasonable suspicion to believe he was involved in 
criminal activity, but does not challenge the legality of the 
search following the stop. 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
14 
 
¶19)).  "Although a mere hunch does not create reasonable 
suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is 
considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of 
the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable 
cause[.]"  Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) 
(internal citations and quotation marks removed).  "[O]fficers 
are not required to rule out the possibility of innocent 
behavior before initiating a [Terry] stop."  Genous, 397 
Wis. 2d 293, ¶8 (quoting State v. Anderson (Anderson II), 155 
Wis. 2d 77, 84, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990)). 
¶26 We must "consider everything observed by and known to 
the officer[s.]"   Id., ¶10.  Taking all of that information 
into account, we then determine whether the officers had "a 
particularized and objective basis" to reasonably suspect Nimmer 
of criminal activity.  Brown, 392 Wis. 2d 454, ¶10 (quoting 
Navarette, 572 U.S. at 396).  In other words, we must determine 
whether the officers had more than a "mere hunch" that Nimmer 
was involved in the shooting.  Navarette, 572 U.S. at 397 
(internal quotation removed). 
B.  Application 
¶27 Several facts known to the officers and accepted by 
the circuit court collectively give rise to reasonable suspicion 
that Nimmer was involved in criminal activity:  (1) ShotSpotter 
generates reliable reports of gunfire in near real-time; (2) 
within a minute of receiving the ShotSpotter report, the 
officers arrived on scene; (3) Nimmer was at nearly the exact 
location where ShotSpotter reported gunfire; (4) Nimmer was the 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
15 
 
only person the officers saw; and (5) Nimmer made furtive 
movements upon noticing the officers.   
¶28 In addition, the criminal activity being investigated—
—a shooting in a highly residential area——supplemented the 
reasonableness 
of 
the 
officers' 
actions. 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, ¶26, 241 Wis. 2d 729, 623 N.W.2d 516  
("[E]xigency 
can 
in 
some 
circumstances 
supplement 
the 
reliability of an informant's tip in order to form the basis for 
an investigative stop."  (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); 
id., ¶35 ("In light of the potential for imminent danger that 
drunk drivers present, the informant's allegations suggesting 
that Rutzinski may have been intoxicated supplemented the 
reliability of the tip, and further justified Officer Sardina's 
investigative stop."  (emphasis added)). 
¶29 As the circuit court noted, the timing of events is 
key.  The officers arrived shortly after receiving a reliable 
report of gunfire that was generated in near real-time, from 
which they could infer the shooter was likely nearby.  Other 
courts have also concluded a relatively short period of time 
between officers receiving a ShotSpotter report and their 
arrival at the scene supports reasonable suspicion to stop and 
question those present.  In United States v. Jones, officers 
arrived on scene within a minute and a half of receiving a 
dispatch that ShotSpotter had reported gunfire.  1 F.4th 50, 53 
(D.C. Cir. 2021).  After observing Jones walking quickly on an 
otherwise deserted block, the officers stopped him.  The D.C. 
Circuit concluded reasonable suspicion to do so existed in large 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
16 
 
part because the officers' rapid response significantly reduced 
the probability that the shooter had fled.11  Id.  In another 
analogous case, the Seventh Circuit concluded even five-and-a-
half minutes was not "[a]s both a matter of fact and 
law . . . unduly long."  United States v. Rickmon, 952 F.3d 876, 
883 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2505 (2021).  The 
Seventh Circuit determined reasonable suspicion exists to stop 
those present in the area within this timeframe because 
"[c]ommon sense counsels that a person may take minutes rather 
than seconds to flee for any number of reasons, including the 
destruction of evidence, an injury sustained in the shooting, or 
a need to hide in place."12  Id.  Relying on Rickmon, the Ohio 
                                                 
11 The ShotSpotter report in United States v. Jones was not 
sent directly to the officers.  The D.C. Circuit noted the 
record did not indicate how much time elapsed between the 
generation of the ShotSpotter report and its relay to officers.  
1 F.4th 50, 53 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2021).  Contrary to Justice 
Dallet's assertion, the period of time necessary to generate a 
ShotSpotter report has not played a significant role in most 
cases discussing ShotSpotter.  See Justice Dallet's Concurrence, 
¶66 & n.6. 
12 In United States v. Rickmon, officers received two 
ShotSpotter reports and two dispatches reporting gunfire, which 
were based on 911 calls.  952 F.3d 876, 882 (7th Cir. 2020), 
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2505 (2021).  The Seventh Circuit 
reasoned a ShotSpotter report is at least as reliable as an 
anonymous tip.  See id. at 879 n.2, 882.  It then noted the 
"anonymous tip from ShotSpotter" was "independently confirmed" 
by the 911 calls relayed through the dispatches.  Id. at 882.  
Analogizing a ShotSpotter report to an anonymous tip is part of 
the analysis, not a "sidetrack" from it.  See Justice Dallet's 
Concurrence, ¶71 ("The majority/lead opinion gets similarly 
sidetracked by focusing on cases that have relaxed the usual 
corroboration requirements for anonymous tips when the police 
are responding to a potential emergency."). 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
17 
 
Court of Appeals recently concluded reasonable suspicion existed 
in an analogous case involving approximately a four-minute 
police response time.  State v. Carter, 183 N.E.3d 611, 629 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2022). 
¶30 The reasoning of Jones and Rickmon applies to this 
case.  Given the officers' quick response and in light of their 
observations upon arrival, they could reasonably suspect Nimmer 
was the shooter and that he had not left the scene for any 
                                                                                                                                                             
In this case, the lack of a 911 call is of little 
importance, for multiple reasons.  See State v. Carter, 183 
N.E.3d 611, 629 (Ohio Ct. App. 2022) ("While there were no 
separate 
911 
calls 
reporting 
gunfire 
or 
any 
additional 
information in terms of a suspect, [Officers] Erwin and 
Gallagher were responding to an alert of shots fired, an 
inherently dangerous circumstance beyond general criminality.  
In their experience, they had recovered weapons in response to 
ShotSpotter alerts.").  First, Nimmer concedes the reliability 
of ShotSpotter.  Second, the officers arrived on scene no more 
than a minute after receiving the ShotSpotter report, which 
presumably issued shortly after the shots were detected.  
Whether a 911 call can be placed and relayed to officers within 
such a short period of time is questionable.  See Marc L. Miller 
et al., Criminal Procedures:  Cases, Statutes, and Executive 
Materials 428 (6th ed. 2019).  Lastly, people do not always call 
911 after hearing gunfire such that the lack of a 911 call 
discredits the ShotSpotter report.  See Alexandra S. Gecas, 
Note, Gunfire Game Changer or Big Brother's Hidden Ears?:  
Fourth Amendment and Admissibility Quandaries Relating to 
ShotSpotter Technology, 2016 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1073, 1084 
("ShotSpotter enables the police to catch perpetrators without 
people 
fearing 
they 
are 
'snitching' 
on 
their 
neighbors. . . .  ShotSpotter highlights just how prevalent 
unreported gunfire is on city streets. . . .  [C]ommunities that 
frequently experience gunfire are the least likely to report 
gunshots to the police."); Amanda Busljeta, Comment, How an 
Acoustic Sensor Can Catch a Gunman, 32 J. Marshall J. Info. 
Tech. & Privacy L. 211, 218 (2015) (explaining people who live 
in high crime areas are sometimes so desensitized to gun 
violence that they decline to call 911 when they hear gunfire). 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
18 
 
number of reasons.  See Rickmon, 952 F.3d at 883.  While Nimmer 
could have been a random pedestrian out for a walk, the officers 
were not required to rule out any alternative explanation for 
his presence at the scene.  Genous, 397 Wis. 2d 293, ¶8 (quoting 
Anderson II, 155 Wis. 2d at 84); see also Jones, 1 F.4th at 54.  
Additionally, common sense counsels that innocent pedestrians do 
not normally gather immediately near the location of gunfire, 
particularly late at night.  See Rickmon, 952 F.3d at 884 
(noting few vehicles are out at 4:45 a.m.).   
¶31 The timing of the stop is particularly persuasive in 
light of Nimmer's close proximity to the exact location reported 
by ShotSpotter.  Contrary to the court of appeals' analysis, 
this case is not about the extent to which a person's presence 
in a "high crime area" can contribute to reasonable suspicion.  
See 
Nimmer, 
No. 2020AP878-CR, 
¶18 
(quoting 
Gordon, 
353 
Wis. 2d 468, ¶18).  For Fourth Amendment purposes, there is a 
difference between a person's presence at a location generally 
known for criminal activity and his presence at a location 
precisely pinpointed for gunfire by a reliable report in near 
real-time.  See generally United States v. Holloway, No. 20-CR-
00381, slip op., 2021 WL 5882147 *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2021) 
(explaining a suspect's presence in a high crime area is less 
valuable in a reasonable suspicion analysis than a suspect's 
presence near a location reported by ShotSpotter). 
¶32 Officer Milone testified Nimmer was at "basically the 
exact location where the ShotSpotter came in."  Consistent with 
this testimony, the circuit court found Nimmer was "very close" 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
19 
 
to the reported location.  Nimmer's "close proximity," both 
"temporally" and "spatially," to that location of gunfire weighs 
heavily in favor of reasonable suspicion.  Commonwealth v. 
Raglin, 178 A.3d 868, 873 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2018); see also 
Commonwealth v. Ford, 182 N.E.3d 1013, 1018 (Mass. Ct. App. 
2022) ("The seizure of a suspect in geographical and temporal 
proximity to the scene of the crime appropriately may be 
considered as a factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis.  It 
is particularly relevant where, as here, the officer encountered 
the defendant less than a minute after the last reported 
ShotSpotter 
alert, 
at 
the 
location 
where 
the 
trail 
of 
ShotSpotter alerts ended." (quotation marks and quoted source 
omitted)); Carter, 183 N.E.3d at 629 ("Carter was observed 
within four minutes of the officers receiving the alert within 
the specific area of the alert.  In other words, as in Rickmon, 
the stop had temporal and physical proximity to the gunfire."); 
Funderburk v. United States, 260 A.3d 652, 660 (D.C. 2021) 
(noting "spatial and temporal proximity" to the location 
reported by ShotSpotter contributed to reasonable suspicion); 
Rickmon, 952 F.3d at 884 (concluding "the [Terry] stop's 
temporal 
and 
physical 
proximity 
to 
the 
shots" 
supported 
reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. Holness, 101 N.E.3d 310, 
315 (Mass. Ct. App. 2018) ("The physical appearance of the 
Jaguar, and its proximity to the location of the ShotSpotter 
activation and broken glass, as well as the temporal proximity 
between the activation and recent motor vehicle accident, 
occurring in or around 4:00 A.M. on Christmas morning, when few 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
20 
 
other vehicles were likely on the road, provided a sufficient 
nexus between the incriminating evidence in plain view and the 
accident scene."). 
¶33 Nimmer was also the only person the officers observed 
temporally and spatially proximate to the scene.  The absence of 
anyone 
else 
nearby 
strongly 
particularized 
the 
officers' 
suspicion.  See Funderburk, 260 A.3d at 660–61; see also Ford, 
182 N.E.3d at 1018; Carter, 183 N.E.3d at 629.  The officers 
knew what (gunfire), when (a minute or two ago), and where (the 
reported address).  While they did not know who fired the gun, 
they knew the shooter was likely near the reported location.  
Accordingly, 
"[t]he 
officers . . . limited 
the 
universe 
of 
potential suspects to those at a particular location" shortly 
after a serious crime occurred there.  See Funderburk, 260 
A.3d at 657.  Because no one else was in the vicinity, this 
"universe" was "small enough that no description at all [was] 
required to justify [the Terry stop]."  Id. (quoting In re 
T.L.L., 729 A.2d 334, 341 (D.C. 1999)); see also State v. 
Hairston, 126 N.E.3d 1132, 1137 (Ohio 2019) ("[T]he officers did 
exactly what one would expect reasonable and prudent police 
officers to do in their situation.  Upon hearing gunshots, they 
proceeded immediately to the location they believed the shots to 
be coming from to investigate.  Finding only Hairston in the 
area[,] . . . the 
officers 
were 
not 
required 
to 
ignore 
Hairston's presence[.]"); Rickmon, 952 F.3d at 884 (explaining 
the lack of a description of a suspect vehicle made little 
difference because officers observed only one vehicle temporally 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
21 
 
and 
spatially 
proximate 
to 
the 
location 
reported 
by 
ShotSpotter). 
¶34 Contributing to the totality of the circumstances 
supporting reasonable suspicion, Nimmer made furtive movements.  
Officer Milone testified, upon noticing the officers, Nimmer:  
(1) doubled his pace away from the officers; (2) dug around his 
left side with his left hand; and (3) bladed the left side of 
his body away from them.  Notably, Nimmer's blading did not 
occur until Milone began approaching Nimmer on foot, and the 
closer the officers got to Nimmer, the more evasive his behavior 
became.  Milone further testified, based on his training and 
experience, Nimmer's movements indicated he was considering 
fleeing and did not want the officers to see his left side.  See 
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 ("[A] trained officer draws inferences 
and makes deductions . . . that might well elude an untrained 
person.").   
¶35 Contrary to the court of appeals' characterization of 
Officer Milone's testimony, it was not "indeterminate" nor did 
he use "magic" words.  The court of appeals erred by suggesting 
otherwise.  See Nimmer, No. 2020AP878-CR, ¶¶26, 28.  In fact, 
Milone's testimony was exacting.13  He did not merely say Nimmer 
began walking faster——he said Nimmer doubled his pace.  He did 
not simply say Nimmer began digging in a pocket——he said Nimmer 
dug around his left side with his left hand.  He did not just 
                                                 
13 We do not opine on the extent to which less exacting 
testimony from Officer Milone would have been sufficient. 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
22 
 
say Nimmer bladed——he said, "[Nimmer] began turning his left 
side away from me.  So at that point his left side was more 
forward and I could only really see his right side. . . .  I was 
directly behind him on the sidewalk and his right hand was 
within view, but his left hand was not."  Milone even mentioned 
Nimmer continued digging with his left arm as he bladed, 
although he could not see Nimmer's left hand.  Milone further 
described when each of these movements occurred, and the 
particular inferences he drew from them.  This case is not about 
conclusory or jargon-ridden testimony by an officer.  The 
circuit 
court 
found 
Milone 
credible 
and 
had 
no 
trouble 
understanding what Milone meant.  Nothing in the record 
indicates the circuit court erred——let alone clearly erred——by 
crediting Milone's testimony.  See Brown, 392 Wis. 2d 454, ¶8 
(quoting Smith, 379 Wis. 2d 86, ¶9); see also Carter, 183 
N.E.3d at 629 ("We do not agree, as Carter suggests, that the 
officers used 'magic' words or language in testifying to 
establish reasonable suspicion.  The court clearly found the 
officers' testimony to be credible, and we defer to the court's 
credibility assessment."). 
¶36 Contrary to his argument, Nimmer's furtive movements 
were not "standing alone;" these movements combined with other 
facts to solidify the officers' particularized suspicion of 
Nimmer.  See Anderson I, 389 Wis. 2d 106, ¶50 ("When combined 
with the information known to Officer Seeger about Anderson's 
history, Anderson's behavior creates reasonable suspicion that 
criminal activity was afoot.  Anderson's movements after he 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
23 
 
noticed Officer Seeger give rise to a reasonable inference that 
Anderson was trying to conceal something from the officer."); 
United States v. Diaz, No. 20-cr-176 (LAK), slip op., 2020 WL 
6083404 *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2020), appeal filed ("The 
defendants argue that a ShotSpotter report, 'standing on its 
own,' cannot be the basis of 'individualized suspicion.'  But 
the 
ShotSpotter 
reports 
are 
only 
two 
pieces 
of 
the 
calculus. . . .  [B]oth officers testified that they observed 
the defendants engage in 'nervous, evasive' behavior as they 
exited:  the officers saw Diaz turn his body slightly and 
Hawkins 
pivot 
and 
hurry 
as 
their 
police 
car 
passed.  
Subsequently, Officer Bonczyk observed Diaz, whom Officer Lopez 
recognized from a prior arrest for assaulting an officer, 
creating tension with his sweatshirt that revealed a bulge that 
Officer Bonczyk thought was a gun.  These observations provided 
the officers with reasonable suspicion that, of all the people 
coming and going from the area that night, Diaz and Hawkins were 
particularly suspect."). 
¶37 In the course of responding within one minute after 
receiving a ShotSpotter report of gunfire in a residential 
neighborhood, the officers saw a single suspect near the scene 
make furtive movements suggesting concealment of a handgun.  
Looking at "the whole picture," as the officers were required to 
do, they made a well-informed and reasonable inference that 
Nimmer might be the shooter.  See Genous, 397 Wis. 2d 293, ¶9 
(quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417–18).  They did not act on a 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
24 
 
"mere hunch[.]"  See Navarette, 572 U.S. at 397 (internal 
quotation marks removed). 
¶38 Although this is the first occasion for this court to 
evaluate reasonable suspicion in the context of a ShotSpotter 
report, our court of appeals has considered whether the 
proximity of a person's presence shortly after shots were fired 
satisfies reasonable suspicion.  For example, in State v. 
Norton, No. 2019AP1796-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶14, 17 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2020), the court of appeals concluded the 
totality 
of 
analogous 
circumstances 
constituted 
reasonable 
suspicion to stop and investigate the defendant:   
The officers were investigating a report of shots 
fired, for which they had very little information 
besides the general vicinity of the incident. . . .   
Norton's presence in that area was not "standing 
alone"——it was accompanied by the information that 
there had been shots fired in the area, which the 
officers here were investigating.  Furthermore, when 
they 
illuminated 
the 
vehicle 
with 
their 
squad 
spotlight, 
they 
saw 
Norton 
make 
"furtive 
movements[,]" . . . which 
caused 
the 
officers 
to 
become concerned that he may have been trying to 
conceal a firearm, due to the nature of the call they 
were investigating. 
(Quoted source omitted).  The court of appeals in that case 
persuasively emphasized the nature of the crime the officers 
were investigating——shots fired, which obviously is linked to 
criminal activity.  Id., ¶20. 
 
¶39 As part of the reasonable suspicion analysis, multiple 
courts have emphasized the nature of the criminal activity the 
officers were investigating.  E.g., Trott v. State, 249 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
25 
 
A.3d 833, 848 (Md. 2021), cert. denied sub nom., Trott v. 
Maryland, 142 S. Ct. 240 ("Additionally, in determining that the 
investigatory stop was reasonable under the circumstances, we 
also 
consider 
the 
gravity 
of 
the 
risk 
of 
public 
harm. . . .  Balancing the public's interest in safety against 
the minimal intrusion occasioned by the brief investigatory stop 
here, and considering the totality of the facts presented to 
Officer Cooper in this case, we conclude that the scales of 
justice tilt in favor of the stop.").  This court has recognized 
that when officers are aware of "an imminent threat to the 
public safety" the Fourth Amendment "do[es] not require the 
police to idly stand by in hopes that their observations reveal 
suspicious behavior before the imminent threat comes to its 
fruition."  Rutzinski, 241 Wis. 2d 729, ¶26.  "[T]he Fourth 
Amendment . . . appreciates the distinction between officers who 
illegitimately invoke Terry to stop someone who ran a red light 
six[] months ago and legitimately use it to stop someone who 
assaulted a spouse in the past half hour."  United States v. 
Jones, 953 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2020). 
¶40 "[T]he amount of permissible intrusion is a function 
not only of the likelihood of turning up contraband or evidence 
of 
crime 
but 
also 
of 
the 
gravity 
of 
the 
crime 
being 
investigated."  United States v. Goodwin, 449 F.3d 766, 769 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).  Applying this common sense 
principle, the Seventh Circuit uses a "'sliding scale' approach" 
to determine the requisite quantum of suspicion:  "if the crime 
being investigated is grave enough, the police can stop and 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
26 
 
frisk without as much suspicion as would be required in a less 
serious criminal case."  Id.  The Seventh Circuit employed this 
approach in Rickmon, twice emphasizing "the dangerousness of the 
crime," 952 F.3d at 881–82, 884, and noting, "[w]e have 
repeatedly emphasized in our decisions that the inherent danger 
of gun violence sets shootings apart from other criminal 
activity."  Id. at 883 (citing United States v. Burgess, 759 
F.3d 708, 710–11 (7th Cir. 2014)).  Similarly, in Burgess, the 
Seventh Circuit stated: 
At the outset we observe the dangerousness of the 
situation 
facing 
the 
officers 
and 
the 
public. . . .  Multiple callers reported shots fired 
in 
the 
same 
general 
area, 
creating 
heightened 
suspicion of a serious crime, and for all the officers 
knew as they approached the area just minutes later, 
more than one shooting location was involved.  The 
threat to public safety was serious, and the officers 
had to assume that it was continuing in process.   
Against the background of this ongoing threat, a 
number of considerations supported stopping Burgess's 
car in particular. . . .   
All told, the circumstances here——the dangerousness of 
the crime, the short lapse of time between the 
dispatches and the stop, the stop's proximity to the 
reported shots, the car's color, and the light traffic 
late 
at 
night——provided 
ample 
justification 
for 
stopping Burgess's car. 
759 F.3d at 710–11; see also Commonwealth v. Meneus, 66 
N.E.3d 1019, 1026 (Mass. 2017) (holding "the fact that the crime 
under investigation was a shooting, with implications for public 
safety" is relevant to determining the reasonableness of a Terry 
stop). 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
27 
 
 
¶41 As Rickmon and Burgess illustrate, in Terry stop cases 
involving 
reported 
unlawful 
firearm 
use, 
"[t]here 
is 
a 
consistent theme[:] . . . if the police reasonably perceive 
danger to themselves or to members of the public, they have a 
duty 
to 
investigate[.]" 
 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Campbell, 
867 
N.E.2d 759, 763 (Mass. Ct. App. 2007) (quoted source omitted); 
see also Carter, 183 N.E.3d at 629 ("[Officers] Erwin and 
Gallagher were responding to an alert of shots fired, an 
inherently dangerous circumstance beyond general criminality.").  
"The unique dangers presented to law officers and law-abiding 
citizens by firearms are well chronicled."  United States v. 
Bold, 19 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).  The 
unlawful use of a firearm presents an "imminent danger," see 
United States v. Harrell, 268 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(Meskill, J., concurring), which may be considered in "the 
totality-of-the-circumstances test for determining reasonable 
suspicion" because of "the government's need for a prompt 
investigation."  See Bold, 19 F.3d at 104 (citation omitted).   
¶42 In this case, ShotSpotter reported four gunshots in a 
highly residential neighborhood.  Officer Milone testified he 
was looking for "[a]nybody who is shot, any people who are shot, 
any potential suspects, anybody walking around still shooting, 
[and] any witnesses[.]"  His testimony confirms the obvious:  
the officers had reason to believe lives were in danger.   
¶43 The court of appeals erred in this case by relying too 
heavily on cases involving investigations of substantially less 
serious criminal activity——specifically, drug crimes——rather 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
28 
 
than cases involving shots fired.  See State v. Pugh, 2013 WI 
App 12, 345 Wis. 2d 832, 826 N.W.2d 418 (investigating a 
suspected drug crime); State v. Washington, 2005 WI App 123, 284 
Wis. 2d 456, 700 N.W.2d 305 (investigating a complaint of 
loitering and drug sales).14  "Th[e] element of imminent danger 
distinguishes a gun tip from one involving possession of drugs."  
United States v. Serrano, 598 F. App'x 72, 78 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(quoting United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 81 n.4 (3d Cir. 
1996)) (modification in the original).   
¶44 ShotSpotter's detection of gunfire is comparable to an 
officer hearing it himself.  See Amanda Busljeta, Comment, How 
an Acoustic Sensor Can Catch a Gunman, 32 J. Marshall J. Info. 
Tech. & Privacy L. 211, 219 (2015) ("With the acoustic sensors 
implemented in cities, police can feel a sense of reassurance 
that there is always a second pair of ears acting as backup.").  
When an officer hears gunfire, he has a duty to the public to 
react.  If he arrives at the scene almost immediately after 
gunfire and sees only a few people——or in this case, one person—
—the officer may reasonably suspect criminal activity if any of 
them make furtive movements.   
¶45 The 
only 
case 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
considered 
involving reported gunfire was State v. Lewis, No. 2017AP234-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 25, 2017).  In that 
                                                 
14 The error rests in relying on four cases, supra ¶17 & 
n.7, none of which were analogous, none of which were Wisconsin 
Supreme Court decisions, one of which was an unpublished court 
of appeals decision, and only one of which (the unpublished 
court of appeals decision) even involved shots fired. 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
29 
 
case, officers were dispatched to investigate shots fired in a 
high crime area.  Id., ¶¶2, 8.  They were looking for three 
fleeing suspects, but they had a description of only one.  Id., 
¶2.  The officers observed Travail L. Lewis in an alley "a few 
blocks from where the complaint was made" but Lewis did not 
match the description.  Id., ¶1.  Positioned behind Lewis, the 
officers noticed him holding the waistband of his pants.  Id., 
¶2.  The officers conducted a Terry stop, and Lewis admitted he 
was carrying a concealed weapon.  Id.  The State "concede[d]" 
the "officers stopped Lewis simply based on the fact that he was 
walking in a high crime area shortly after [they] receiv[ed] an 
alert of 'shots fired'" and was "touch[ing] his waistband."  
Id., ¶8.  The court of appeals accepted the State's concession 
and concluded the officers lacked reasonable suspicion.  Id.   
¶46 We do not consider whether the court of appeals 
correctly decided Lewis.  Regardless, it is inapposite for 
multiple reasons.  First, Lewis does not disclose the officers' 
response time——just that they arrived "shortly" after receiving 
the report.  Id.  The decision says Lewis was "a few blocks from 
where the complaint was made," id., ¶1, leaving Lewis' temporal 
and spatial proximity to the gunfire indeterminate.  Finally, 
Lewis did not react to the officers, who saw him from behind and 
noticed him "holding the waistband of his pants."  Id., ¶2.  
Whether Lewis even saw the officers before they ordered him to 
stop is unclear.15 
                                                 
15 The court of appeals in this case could have considered 
another factually analogous opinion from its own court, State v. 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
30 
 
¶47 In this case, the officers expeditiously responded to 
a reliable report of gunfire, generated in near real-time.  Upon 
arrival, they saw one person, Nimmer, who made furtive movements 
that, based on the officers' training and experience, indicated 
he was concealing a handgun.  The officers reasonably suspected 
Nimmer was involved in criminal activity, specifically, the 
shooting.  The officers' seizure of Nimmer accordingly complied 
with the Fourth Amendment. 
IV.  JUSTICE DALLET'S CONCURRENCE 
¶48 "The straw man was easily enough knocked over by 
the critic who set him up."   
L.T. Hobhouse, The Theory of Knowledge 59 (New & Chapter Issue 
1905). 
 
¶49 Justice 
Dallet's 
concurrence 
mischaracterizes 
the 
court's opinion and the precedent it applies, creating a cloud 
of obfuscation over the opinion so that it will be read to mean 
something it doesn't actually say.  In common parlance, Justice 
Dallet creates a "straw man," meaning "a weak or imaginary 
opposition (such as an argument or adversary)," who is "set up 
                                                                                                                                                             
Tally-Clayborne, No. 2016AP1912-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶10 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2017) ("[Officer] Dillman traveled in 
the direction of the gunshots and within twenty to twenty-five 
seconds, Dillman saw Tally-Clayborne and two other individuals.  
Dillman did not see anyone else.  Given the potential safety 
risk, . . . the fact that Tally-Clayborne and his companions 
were the only individuals visibly present in the area of the 
shooting, and the fact that Tally-Clayborne attempted to walk 
away from the officers patting down his companions while 
reaching for his waistband, Dillman could reasonably suspect 
that Tally-Clayborne was involved in some sort of criminal 
activity."). 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
31 
 
only to be easily confuted."  Straw man, Merriam-Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2014).  By creating this straw 
man, Justice Dallet handily knocks down a weak argument of her 
own creation rather than address the legal principles actually 
propounded by the court.  For this reason, judges and parties 
should exercise caution when citing statements in separate 
writings that purport to summarize or paraphrase the majority 
opinion, particularly when the author of the writing has not 
joined the majority opinion.      
 
¶50 For starters, Justice Dallet attempts to distort the 
holding 
in 
this 
case, 
suggesting 
this 
court 
sanctions 
ShotSpotter being "used as a dragnet to justify warrantless 
searches of everyone the police find near a recently reported 
gunshot."16  Nothing in this opinion suggests anything of the 
kind. 
 
As 
exhaustively 
explained, 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances obviously matters and it is the totality of the 
facts in this case which supports reasonable suspicion.  See, 
e.g., supra ¶¶3, 24-30, 34, 36-37, 44, 47.  The officers' 
arrival on the scene no more than one minute after the 
ShotSpotter report, where they found only Nimmer, was but one of 
multiple facts supporting reasonable suspicion.   
                                                 
16 Justice Dallet's Concurrence, ¶67.  In misstating the 
holding in this case, Justice Dallet analogizes it to the 
circuit court's conclusion that the police should investigate 
anyone in the vicinity within a minute or two of the ShotSpotter 
alert.  Id., ¶67 n.7.  Contrary to Justice Dallet's insinuation, 
we agreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that this 
statement exceeds the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment.  See 
supra ¶20 n.9. 
 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
32 
 
 
¶51 Justice Dallet further misrepresents the majority 
opinion as advancing "the novel suggestion 'that the quantum of 
suspicion necessary to conduct an investigatory stop is lower 
for the type of criminal investigation that occurred here.'"17  
The majority opinion does not say this; Justice Brian Hagedorn’s 
concurrence does.  Citing Rutzinski, the State argued "[o]ne 
additional factor supports reasonable suspicion here:  police 
were investigating a shots-fired report, which implicated 
immediate 
public-safety 
concerns." 
 
Although 
the 
State 
thoroughly briefed the issue, the defendant did not respond.  
Like the defendant, Justice Dallet never analyzes Rutzinski, 
even though it debunks her classification of the analysis as 
novel.   
 
¶52 Justice Dallet lapses into the same error made by the 
court of appeals in this case:  evaluating the facts in 
isolation rather than as part of the "whole picture."  For 
example, she says "there is nothing especially suspicious about 
finding someone alone on a residential street just after 10:00 
PM on a Saturday night in the summertime."18  This is true, but 
no one suggests otherwise.  Justice Dallet also says, "the 
possibility that a crime has been committed in a certain 
neighborhood doesn't cast suspicion over everyone there."19  
Again, no one claims it does.  Next, Justice Dallet says the 
                                                 
17 Justice Dallet's Concurrence, ¶61 n.1. 
 
18 Id., ¶64. 
 
 
19 Id. 
 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
33 
 
police "could not assume that Nimmer was responsible for the 
reported gunshots simply because he was the only person they saw 
when they showed up in his neighborhood."20  They didn't; it was 
his solitary presence at the location of recent gunfire, 
combined with his furtive movements, which gave rise to 
reasonable suspicion, as Justice Dallet ultimately concedes.21       
 
¶53 Justice Dallet, however, does not seem to think the 
nature of the criminal activity being investigated matters much 
when determining the reasonableness of a stop, characterizing 
the consideration of gun violence as going beyond "a standard 
Terry analysis."22  She similarly dismisses the seriousness of 
                                                 
 
20 Id. 
 
21 Justice Dallet also says, "Nimmer's case is unlike many 
of those cited by the majority/lead opinion, where courts held 
that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the only people 
they found at the scene of reported gunfire late at night, in an 
alleyway or dead-end street where shots were heard recently, or 
both."  Id. (emphasis added).  She then cites three cases on 
which we have relied:  Jones, Rickmon, and Funderburk.  Justice 
Dallet draws a distinction bearing no difference under the 
Fourth Amendment.   
In Jones, officers stopped the suspect "in a residential 
neighborhood in Washington D.C."  1 F.4th at 51.  In Rickmon, 
officers stopped a suspect in a residential area of Peoria, 
Illinois, which, while not as urbanized as Washington, D.C., is 
hardly a rural community.  952 F.3d at 879; see also id. at 886 
(Wood, J., dissenting) (describing the residential nature of the 
area).  Indeed, the court noted when one officer arrived on 
scene, he "observed a crowd of about 15-20 people at the 
street's dead end, approximately 300 feet from him."  Id. at 879 
(majority op.).  In Funderburk, "two police officers heard 
gunshots and commotion coming from a nearby alley in a 
residential neighborhood."  Funderburk v. United States, 260 
A.3d 652, 654 (D.C. 2021). 
 
22 Justice Dallet's Concurrence, ¶¶70, 72. 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
34 
 
the crime as a factor in the analysis of a tip's reliability.  
This is not the law; the Court in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 
(2000) and this court as well as other courts applying its 
holding have already rejected the premise of Justice Dallet's 
concurrence. 
 
¶54 In J.L., police received an anonymous tip that a 
person at a bus stop was concealing——not shooting——a firearm.  
Id. at 268, 273 n.*.  The tip had little to no indicia of 
reliability and "[a]part from the tip, the officers had no 
reason to suspect . . . illegal conduct.  The officers did not 
see a firearm, and J.L. made no threatening or otherwise unusual 
movements."  Id. at 268 (emphasis added).  Under these facts, 
the Court concluded the officers unlawfully executed a Terry 
stop, expressly disavowing "an automatic firearm exception to 
our established reliability analysis"23 because it would "enable 
any person seeking to harass another to set in motion an 
intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person 
simply by placing an anonymous call falsely reporting the 
target's unlawful carriage of a gun."  Id. at 272 (emphasis 
added).  The Court's holding was limited to an uncorroborated 
tip of someone carrying a gun: 
The facts of this case do not require us to speculate 
about the circumstances under which the danger alleged 
in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a 
search even without a showing of reliability.  We do 
                                                 
23 While the nature of the criminal activity is relevant 
under our analysis, it is not dispositive.  See Commonwealth v. 
Meneus, 66 N.E.3d 1019, 1026 (Mass. 2017). 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
35 
 
not say, for example, that a report of a person 
carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability 
we demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm 
before the police can constitutionally conduct a 
frisk. 
Id. at 273–74.  Relying on this limitation, this court and lower 
courts have factored the nature of the suspected criminal 
activity into their reasonable suspicion analyses in exactly the 
same manner we do in this case. 
 
¶55 In Rutzinski, this court held: 
[W]hen assessing whether a stop is constitutionally 
reasonable, 
a 
reviewing 
court 
must 
balance 
the 
interests of the individual being stopped against the 
interests of the State to effectively root out crime.  
Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228, 105 S.Ct. 675; McGill, 2000 
WI 38, at ¶ 18, 234 Wis.2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795; 
Waldner, 
206 
Wis.2d 
at 
56, 
556 
N.W.2d 
681. . . .  [W]here the allegations in the tip suggest 
an imminent threat to the public safety or other 
exigency 
that 
warrants 
immediate 
police 
investigation. . . .  the Fourth Amendment and Article 
I, Section 11 do not require the police to idly stand 
by in hopes that their observations reveal suspicious 
behavior before the imminent threat comes to its 
fruition.  Rather, it may be reasonable for an officer 
in such a situation to conclude that the potential for 
danger caused by a delay in immediate action justifies 
stopping the suspect without any further observation.  
Thus, exigency can in some circumstances supplement 
the reliability of an informant's tip in order to form 
the basis for an investigative stop.  Cf. City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, ––––, 121 S.Ct. 
447, 
455, 
148 
L.Ed.2d 
333 
(2000) 
(noting 
that 
exigencies of some scenarios likely would outweigh the 
individual's right to be free from an investigative 
traffic stop). 
241 Wis. 2d 729, ¶26 (emphasis added).  This court noted the 
limited reach of J.L., explaining "the Court implicitly affirmed 
that there are circumstances in which exigency can supplement——
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
36 
 
or, 
in 
very 
extreme 
circumstances, 
possibly 
supplant——
the . . . reliability analysis."  Id., ¶29 n.6.   
 
¶56 Throughout 
our opinion in 
Rutzinski, this court 
repeatedly emphasized that imminent danger is a factor to be 
considered in determining the reasonableness of a Terry stop.  
Id., ¶26 ("[E]xigency can in some circumstances supplement the 
reliability of an informant's tip in order to form the basis for 
an investigative stop."  (citing City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 
531 U.S. 32, 42–43, 121 S. Ct. 447, 455 (2000))); id., ¶34 
("[U]nlike the tip in J.L., the tip in the present case 
suggested that Rutzinski posed an imminent threat to the 
public's safety."); id., ¶35 ("In light of the potential for 
imminent danger that drunk drivers present, the informant's 
allegations suggesting that Rutzinski may have been intoxicated 
supplemented the reliability of the tip, and further justified 
Officer Sardina's investigative stop."); id., ¶36 ("Because 
drunk driving is an extraordinary danger, we cannot adopt 
Rutzinski's position that the police must dismiss allegations of 
possible drunk driving when assessing whether an informant's tip 
justifies a traffic stop.  While such allegations cannot form 
the sole basis for an investigative stop, they certainly must be 
considered when examining the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding particular police conduct."  (emphasis added)); id., 
¶37 ("Unlike the tip in J.L., the informant's tip in this case 
contained sufficient indicia of reliability and alleged a 
potential 
imminent 
danger 
to 
public 
safety." 
 
(emphasis 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
37 
 
added)).24  Far from being "unnecessary" digressions, a report of 
serious criminal activity "must be considered" as part of the 
reasonable suspicion analysis.   
 
¶57 Notwithstanding this precedent, Justice Dallet fails 
to acknowledge the seriousness of gunfire in a residential area, 
asserting this court's "analysis places too much weight on some 
of these facts, including the residential setting" and "puts too 
much emphasis on the officers' reliance on ShotSpotter."25  
Although Justice Dallet does not quantify the weight she would 
give to these facts (if any), to suggest a shooting in a highly 
                                                 
 
24 Consideration of the nature of a reported crime is not restricted to tips involving guns; 
as Chief Justice John Roberts has noted, "the especially grave and imminent dangers posed by 
drunk driving" have prompted "[t]he majority of courts examining the question" to uphold 
"investigative stops of allegedly drunk or erratic drivers, even when the police did not personally 
witness any traffic violations before conducting the stops."  Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 11 
(2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  In doing so, "[t]hese courts have 
typically distinguished J.L.'s general rule" in part based on the "grave and imminent dangers" 
drunk driving presents.  Id.  Notably, one of the cases Chief Justice Roberts cited for the 
proposition was Rutzinski.  See also Trott v. State, 249 A.3d 833, 848 (Md. 2021), cert. denied 
sub nom., Trott v. Maryland, 142 S. Ct. 240 ("Unlike crimes involving possessory offenses, such 
as carrying an illegal gun or possessing drugs, the crime of drunk driving poses a significant and 
potentially imminent public danger."); Andrew J. Sheehan, Comment, Getting Drunk Drivers off 
Illinois Roadways:  Addressing the Split of Authority Regarding 911 Tips & Investigatory 
Traffic Stops, 39 S. Ill. U. L.J. 537, 551 (2015) ("Arguably the most widely-accepted 
justification for adopting a drunk driving exception is the very unique and imminent danger an 
intoxicated person behind the wheel poses to the general public."). 
 
25 Justice Dallet's Concurrence, ¶¶64, 65.  Doubling down on 
the misguided notion that gunfire in a residential area is not a 
reliable 
indicator 
of 
criminal 
activity, 
Justice 
Dallet 
maintains a ShotSpotter report could not affect the reasonable 
suspicion analysis because even "[a] reliable tip will justify 
an investigative stop only if it creates reasonable suspicion 
that 'criminal activity may be afoot.'" Id., ¶71 (citing 
Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 401 (2014) (quoting Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968))).  
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
38 
 
residential area should not be considered as part of the 
totality of circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion is an 
extraordinary misjudgment of the risk to the community.  A 
shooter is not entitled to "one free shot," (at least when that 
shot signals gun violence is afoot) Justice Dallet's theory 
notwithstanding.  Cf. Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 12 
(2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
("The effect of the rule below will be to grant drunk drivers 
'one free swerve' before they can legally be pulled over by 
police.  It will be difficult for an officer to explain to the 
family of a motorist killed by that swerve that the police had a 
tip that the driver of the other car was drunk, but that they 
were powerless to pull him over, even for a quick check.").  
While believing a report of shots fired in a residential 
neighborhood deserves less "emphasis" in the analysis, Justice 
Dallet seems to give greater weight to Nimmer's furtive 
movements, but she does not explain why.  If Justice Dallet's 
focus on Nimmer's "digging around his left side" and "turning 
and walking away after seeing the police" were all the Fourth 
Amendment requires for reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect, 
her conception of the law could ensnare many more people in the 
"dragnet" she ostensibly rejects.26   
 
¶58 While she may deem unreasonable the decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court, federal appellate courts, and this 
                                                 
26 Justice Dallet's Concurrence, ¶¶67-69.  We do not mean to 
suggest that furtive movements cannot, in some circumstances, be 
highly indicative of criminal activity. 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
39 
 
court regarding what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, 
our opinion is in line with precedent and Justice Dallet's 
analysis is an outlier.  In Goodwin, Judge Richard Posner, 
writing for a unanimous Seventh Circuit panel, explained: 
[I]n Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273–74, 120 S.Ct. 
1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000), [the Court] said that 
"we do not say, for example, that a report of a person 
carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability 
we demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm 
before the police can constitutionally conduct a 
frisk." 
 
In 
other 
words, 
if 
the 
crime 
being 
investigated is grave enough, the police can stop and 
frisk without as much suspicion as would be required 
in a less serious criminal case. 
449 F.3d at 769 (emphasis added).  Judge Posner interpreted J.L. 
to permit a "'sliding scale' approach[.]"  See id.  Post-J.L., 
the Seventh Circuit, aligned with many other courts, has relied 
on the inherent danger of gun violence as a factor supporting 
the constitutionality of a Terry stop, including in ShotSpotter 
cases.  E.g., Rickmon, 952 F.3d at 883 ("We have repeatedly 
emphasized in our decisions that the inherent danger of gun 
violence sets shootings apart from other criminal activity."  
(citation omitted)).  Gun violence, obviously, is not the same 
thing as mere "carriage of a gun," which is all that was 
reported in J.L.  529 U.S. at 272.  Although the concurrence 
disregards this stark difference, it matters for purposes of the 
reasonable suspicion analysis.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶59 The Fourth Amendment guarantees the inherent right of 
the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and 
No. 
2020AP878-CR   
 
40 
 
seizures.  We recognize "the police are not infallible[.]"  
Smith, 379 Wis. 2d 86, ¶36.  In exercising their duty to 
investigate 
crime, 
officers 
sometimes 
violate 
people's 
constitutional rights.  Id.  When that happens, "it is the duty 
of this court to impose consequences[.]"  Id. (citation 
omitted).  "Likewise, when the police abide by the rules and act 
reasonably, the Fourth Amendment is not violated and we must 
uphold convictions."  Id. 
¶60 This case represents a reasonable seizure.  The 
officers did not violate Nimmer's Fourth Amendment right.  Based 
on the totality of the circumstances, they reasonably suspected 
Nimmer was involved in criminal activity presenting an imminent 
threat to public safety.  Nimmer's conviction stands. 
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2020AP878-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶61 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority/lead opinion's1 holding that the police had 
particularized reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Nimmer.  I 
write separately, however, because I am concerned that the 
majority/lead opinion's analysis of certain facts may cause 
lower courts to read our decision too broadly.  I also worry 
that the majority/lead opinion over-complicates its analysis by 
importing Fourth Amendment principles from other contexts, even 
though this case requires only a straightforward application of 
Terry.2  Therefore, I respectfully concur.   
¶62 In order to justify a Terry stop, the police must have 
"reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is 
afoot."  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).  
Reasonable suspicion must be founded on concrete, particularized 
facts 
warranting 
suspicion 
of 
a 
certain 
individual, 
not 
"'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion[s] or hunch[es].'"  
Id. at 124 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).  We assess 
reasonable 
suspicion 
in 
light 
of 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances; that is, the facts officers knew at the time of 
                                                 
1 I refer to Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's opinion as the 
"majority/lead opinion" because a majority of the court has not 
joined the opinion in its entirety.  Specifically, a majority 
did not join the portions of the opinion that respond to this 
concurrence (majority/lead op., ¶¶48-58 & 29 n.12), and those 
that contain the novel suggestion "that the quantum of suspicion 
necessary to conduct an investigatory stop is lower for the type 
of criminal investigation that occurred here" (majority/lead 
op., ¶¶28 and 39-47).  See Justice Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶74.   
2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).   
No.  2020AP878-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
the stop.  See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 
(1981).   
¶63 This is what the police knew when they stopped Nimmer:  
 On 
Saturday, 
June 
15, 
2019, 
they 
received 
a 
ShotSpotter report at 10:06 PM indicating that four 
shots may have been fired near the intersection of 
21st and Townsend Streets on the North Side of 
Milwaukee.   
 They reached that location about one minute after they 
received the ShotSpotter report.   
 Nimmer was walking on the sidewalk "in very close 
proximity" to that location and no one else was 
present. 
 After noticing their arrival, Nimmer accelerated his 
pace 
and 
turned 
his 
left 
side 
away 
from 
the 
approaching 
officer 
("blading," 
in 
one 
officer's 
words) while "digging around his left side with his 
left hand."3 
                                                 
3 These facts, with the exception of Nimmer digging around 
his left side, are taken from the circuit court's findings of 
fact after a suppression hearing, and were not challenged on 
appeal.  The circuit court did not make a finding that Nimmer 
was digging around his left side.  Nonetheless, it was a part of 
one of the officers' uncontroverted testimony at the suppression 
hearing, and is therefore appropriate to consider in the 
reasonable-suspicion analysis.  See State v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, 
¶24, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795.    
It appears from testimony at the suppression hearing that 
there is body-camera footage of the officers' encounter with 
Nimmer.  Although this footage might have been useful in 
determining what happened, it was not introduced at the 
suppression hearing or otherwise made a part of the record.   
No.  2020AP878-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
Relying on these facts, officers stopped Nimmer, searched him, 
and found a handgun in his left waistband.   
¶64 Although the majority/lead opinion correctly concludes 
that officers had particularized reasonable suspicion to stop 
Nimmer, its analysis places too much weight on some of these 
facts, including the residential setting.  To be sure, the 
residential setting is part of the totality of the circumstances 
informing 
our 
reasonable-suspicion 
analysis. 
 
But 
the 
possibility that a crime has been committed in a certain 
neighborhood doesn't cast suspicion over everyone there.  See 
United States v. Bohman, 683 F.3d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 2012) (the 
"mere suspicion of illegal activity at a particular place is not 
enough to transfer that suspicion to anyone" nearby).  Moreover, 
there is nothing especially suspicious about finding someone 
alone on a residential street just after 10:00 PM on a Saturday 
night in the summertime.4  See id.  In this respect, Nimmer's 
case is unlike many of those cited by the majority/lead opinion, 
where courts held that the police had reasonable suspicion to 
stop the only people they found at the scene of reported gunfire 
late at night, in an alleyway or dead-end street where shots 
were heard recently, or both.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Jones, 1 F.4th 50, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (reasonable suspicion to 
stop the only person on the street walking quickly away from the 
location of a late-night ShotSpotter alert and reaching for his 
waistband); United States v. Rickmon, 952 F.3d 876, 882-84 (7th 
                                                 
4 Indeed, although the officers didn't know it at the time, 
Nimmer was walking near his house when the officers arrived.   
No.  2020AP878-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
Cir. 2020) (reasonable suspicion to stop the only car driving 
down a two-block dead-end street away from the location of two 
ShotSpotter reports and two 9-1-1 calls at 4:45 AM); Funderburk 
v. United States, 260 A.3d 652, 660-61 (D.C. 2021) (reasonable 
suspicion to stop four people in an alleyway at 2:20 AM on a 
weeknight after officers heard gunshots).  Thus, even though the 
officers didn't have to rule out all innocent explanations 
before stopping Nimmer, they also could not assume that Nimmer 
was responsible for the reported gunshots simply because he was 
the 
only 
person 
they 
saw 
when 
they 
showed 
up 
in 
his 
neighborhood.  See State v. Genous, 2021 WI 50, ¶8, 397 
Wis. 2d 293, 961 N.W.2d 41.   
¶65 The majority/lead opinion similarly puts too much 
emphasis on the officers' reliance on ShotSpotter, stressing 
both Nimmer's counsel's concession that it is reliable and the 
officers' quick response to the system's report.  Majority/lead 
op., ¶¶4, 29-30.  But when it comes to assessing whether the 
police had reasonable suspicion that a particular person may 
No.  2020AP878-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
have 
fired 
the 
shots, 
ShotSpotter 
has 
limitations.5 
 
A 
ShotSpotter report doesn't tell the police whether there is one 
shooter or several, what those individuals look like, what they 
are wearing, whether they remained on the scene or fled 
immediately, whether they got into a car or left on foot, or 
even if they were indoors or outdoors.  All a ShotSpotter report 
tells the police is that shots may have been fired near a 
particular place; it doesn't provide reasonable suspicion that 
any particular person fired them.  See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.  
Obviously, this is not to say that the police shouldn't swiftly 
investigate a ShotSpotter alert in a residential neighborhood; 
only that they do so with full knowledge of the system's 
limitations. 
                                                 
5 Despite counsel's concession that ShotSpotter is reliable, 
there are good reasons to doubt its reliability and to be 
concerned about the other Fourth Amendment issues raised by the 
technology.  For example, an exhaustive review of the Chicago 
Police Department's use of ShotSpotter revealed that in more 
than 90% of cases where the police responded to a ShotSpotter 
report, they found no evidence of a gun-related crime.  See City 
of Chicago Office of Inspector General, The Chicago Police 
Department's Use of ShotSpotter Technology, at 2-3 (Aug. 2021), 
available at https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Ch
icago-Police-Departments-Use-of-ShotSpotter-Technology.pdf. 
Additionally, the report found that officers were, in some 
cases, using the total number of ShotSpotter reports in a given 
area as a reason to conduct more investigatory stops and pat-
downs.  See id. at 19.  Another study found that ShotSpotter has 
no significant impact in reducing gun crimes.  See generally 
Mitchell L. Doucette, et al., Impact of ShotSpotter Technology 
on Firearm Homicides and Arrests Among Large Metropolitan 
Counties: A Longitudinal Analysis, 1999–2016, 98 J. Urban Health 
609 (2021).  Nevertheless, because Nimmer's counsel did not 
challenge ShotSpotter's reliability or raise any of these other 
issues, I leave them for another day.   
No.  2020AP878-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
¶66 The majority/lead opinion's analysis of the officers' 
response time also rests on a consequential assumption.  The 
record doesn't reveal how much time passed between the time 
shots were fired and when the officers arrived on the scene; 
only how quickly the officers responded after receiving the 
ShotSpotter alert from dispatch.  Before a ShotSpotter report 
reaches the officers, a person at ShotSpotter's offices in 
California listens to a recording flagged by the system and 
decides if it sounds like gunshots.  Once that person confirms 
the sound is likely gunfire, then police dispatch is alerted, 
which in turn alerts nearby officers.  Thus, even though 
officers arrived at 21st and Townsend one minute after receiving 
the report from a dispatcher, that does not mean they arrived 
within one minute of shots being fired.  This is not a trivial 
issue; it may be the difference between whether or not an 
officer's suspicion of a person on the scene is particularized 
and reasonable.6   
¶67 No matter how accurate ShotSpotter is or how quickly 
officers respond to a ShotSpotter alert, it cannot be used as a 
dragnet to justify warrantless searches of everyone the police 
                                                 
6 This timing difference is what distinguishes Nimmer's case 
from those relied on by the majority/lead opinion in which 
officers responded within seconds to the sound of gunshots they 
heard.  See, e.g., State v. Hairston, 126 N.E.3d 1132, 1136-37 
(Ohio 2019) (reasonable suspicion to stop the only person 
officers saw near a school after hearing shots 30 to 60 seconds 
before); 
State 
v. 
Tally-Clayborne, 
No. 
2016AP1912-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶10 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2017) 
(reasonable suspicion to stop a person reaching for his 
waistband and walking away from an area where officers heard 
shooting less than thirty seconds before).   
No.  2020AP878-CR.rfd 
 
7 
 
find near a recently reported gunshot.7  See Bohman, 683 F.3d 
at 864 (explaining that suspecting a crime occurred in a 
particular place does not mean that everyone leaving that place 
is suspicious).  At its best, ShotSpotter gives officers only a 
reason to go to a particular place, but it's what they find 
there that is most relevant to the analysis of whether they had 
particularized, 
reasonable 
suspicion. 
 
See 
Genous, 
397 
Wis. 2d 293, ¶8 ("Reasonable suspicion must be supported by 
specific and articulable facts.").     
¶68 Collectively, 
the 
facts 
the 
officers 
observed, 
together with the ShotSpotter alert, are sufficient to establish 
reasonable suspicion——even though each fact alone would not 
clear that bar.  See id., ¶9.  When the officers arrived at the 
location of the ShotSpotter alert, Nimmer saw their marked squad 
car and started walking faster.  When one of the officers got 
out of the car and started to walk toward him, Nimmer turned the 
left side of his body away and started digging around his left 
                                                 
7 This is why the circuit court was wrong to suggest that 
"anyone that [the police] encountered within a minute or two of 
receiving the [ShotSpotter] alert should have been investigated 
if they were within a couple of blocks of the alleged shots 
being fired." The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized, however, 
that simply being present "in an area of expected criminal 
activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, 
particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime."  
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.  The reason for that is simple:  
Knowledge that someone committed a crime in a particular place 
is not a particularized reason to suspect that everyone at or 
near that place committed a crime.  To conclude otherwise would 
undermine the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is 
prohibiting 
general 
warrants 
that 
grant 
the 
police 
the 
"unchecked power" to search anywhere for anyone or any thing.  
See State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 2015 
WI 85, ¶90, 363 Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 165.   
No.  2020AP878-CR.rfd 
 
8 
 
side with his left hand.  As the court of appeals rightly 
explained, turning and walking away after seeing the police is 
not enough to give rise to reasonable suspicion.  See State v. 
Nimmer, No. 2020AP878-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶16-17, 19-20 
(Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2020).  Absent reasonable suspicion or a 
lawful order to the contrary, people are free to walk (even 
quickly) away from the police officers.  
See State v. 
Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶73, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729.  And law-
abiding citizens may not want to interact with the police for 
all kinds of reasons.  The fact that Nimmer turned his body away 
from the officers does not make his walking away suspicious.  
After all, "how does a person walk away from another (as 
[Nimmer] had the right to do) without turning his . . . body to 
some degree?"  See State v. Pugh, 2013 WI App 12, ¶12, 345 
Wis. 2d 832, 826 N.W.2d 418.  Calling Nimmer's turn "blading," 
as an officer did in this case, "adds nothing to the calculus 
except a false patina of objectivity."  Id.   
¶69 The totality of the circumstances also includes the 
fact, undisputed yet unaddressed by the court of appeals, that 
while Nimmer was walking away from the police and turning his 
body, he was also "digging" around his left side.  Of course, 
"many 
folks, 
most 
innocent 
of 
any 
nefarious 
purpose, . . . occasionally pat the outside of their clothing to 
ensure that they have not lost their possessions."  State v. 
Gordon, 2014 WI App 44, ¶17, 353 Wis. 2d 468, 846 N.W.2d 483.  
But an isolated pat of the pants pocket or touch of the 
waistband is not the same thing as "digging around" one's left 
No.  2020AP878-CR.rfd 
 
9 
 
side while walking quickly away from the police in a place where 
officers had reason to believe shots were recently fired.  Cf. 
State v. Lewis, No. 2017AP234-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶7-8 
(Wis. Ct. App. July 25, 2017) (concluding that there was no 
reasonable suspicion to stop someone who "was not looking over 
his shoulder for police" and did not match the description of a 
suspect just because he was "walking in a high crime area" 
shortly after a report of shots fired and "touched his 
waistband").  Thus, despite my differences with parts of the 
majority/lead opinion's analysis, I agree that the totality of 
these circumstances meets the Terry threshold.  
¶70 That straightforward application of Terry is all 
that's needed to resolve this case.  The majority/lead opinion, 
however, unnecessarily goes further, discussing how the type of 
crime being investigated may affect the Terry analysis.  At 
times, that discussion seems to endorse a "sliding-scale 
approach" to reasonable suspicion that the Seventh Circuit 
cobbled together from Fourth Amendment principles in dissimilar 
contexts, such as traffic stops, dog-sniff drug searches, and 
highway roadblocks.  See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 449 
F.3d 766, 769-70 (7th Cir. 2006).  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
admonished courts against taking such a mix-and-match approach, 
even when applying general Fourth Amendment principles.  See 
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004).  And we have 
never adopted the Seventh Circuit's approach, likely because it 
is an awkward fit with Terry.  After all, Terry already 
"responds to" the dangers of firearms and "the serious threat 
No.  2020AP878-CR.rfd 
 
10 
 
that armed criminals pose to public safety" by authorizing 
limited searches and seizures upon less than probable cause.  
See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000).   
¶71 The majority/lead opinion gets similarly sidetracked 
by focusing on cases that have relaxed the usual corroboration 
requirements for anonymous tips when the police are responding 
to a potential emergency.  See majority/lead op., ¶¶39, 53-58 & 
n.24-25.  But corroboration is not an issue here, and even if it 
were, the same Terry reasonable-suspicion standard would apply.  
See Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 401 (2014) ("[A] 
reliable tip will justify an investigative stop only if it 
creates reasonable suspicion that 'criminal activity may be 
afoot.'" (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30)). 
¶72 Because a standard Terry analysis resolves this case, 
I 
would 
stop 
there. 
 
Accordingly, 
I 
concur 
with 
the 
majority/lead opinion's ultimate conclusion that the officers 
had reasonable suspicion to stop Nimmer.  I emphasize, though, 
that the totality of the circumstances in every case will be 
unique and that lower courts should not give too much weight to 
any individual fact. 
¶73 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this concurrence. 
No.  2020AP878-CR.bh 
 
1 
 
¶74 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  I agree with the 
court's determination that reasonable suspicion supported the 
stop.  However, portions of the court's opinion go farther than 
necessary.  In particular, the opinion suggests——for what 
appears to be the first time in the Wisconsin reports——that the 
quantum of suspicion necessary to conduct an investigatory stop 
is lower for the type of criminal investigation that occurred 
here.  I do not believe this issue was developed in a 
sufficiently meaningful way for me to opine on it, and resolving 
it is unnecessary to decide this case.  Therefore, I concur and 
join the court's opinion only in part.1 
                                                 
1 I join the opinion except for ¶28, ¶29 n.12, and ¶¶39-58. 
No.  2020AP878-CR.bh 
 
 
 
1