Case Title: EDWARD A. KING and JANICE C. KING v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF FREMONT and HANSEN'S NORTH FORK RANCH, LLLP v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0227

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
EDWARD A. KING and JANICE C. KING v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF FREMONT and HANSEN'S NORTH FORK RANCH, LLLP v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF FREMONT2010 WY 154Case Number: No. S-09-0227, S-09-0228Decided: 11/30/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
EDWARD 
A. KING and JANICE C. KING,Appellants (Plaintiffs),v.BOARD 
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF FREMONT,Appellee (Defendant).

and

 HANSEN'S 
NORTH FORK RANCH, LLLP,Appellant (Intervening 
Plaintiff)v.BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF 
FREMONT,Appellee (Defendant),

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County

 
 
 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

Jason 
A. Neville and Keith J. Dodson, Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., 
Casper, WY for Edward & Janice King; and Steven F. Freudenthal of 
Freudenthal, Salzburg & Bonds, Cheyenne, WY for Hanson's North Fork 
Ranch.  Argument by Messrs. 
Freudenthal and Dodson.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Jodi 
A. Darrough, Deputy Fremont County Attorney, Lander, WY.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

HILL, 
J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; BURKE, J., files an opinion concurring 
in part and dissenting in part, in which VOIGT, J., 
joins.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The Appellants in 
Case No. S-09-0227 are Edward A. and Janice C. King (Kings).  They seek review of a partial summary 
judgment order, as well as a second order which then dismissed the remainder of 
the Kings' complaint.  The Appellant 
in Case No. S-09-0228 is Hansen's North Fork Ranch (Hansen).  Hansen was an intervening plaintiff in 
the proceedings below and its pleadings raised much the same issues as did the 
Kings.  These appeals arise from the 
district court's determination of the status of a county road, known as "Bunker 
Road," which fell under the jurisdiction of the Appellee, Board of County 
Commissioners of the County of Fremont (Commission).  The Kings alleged that the records 
concerning the existence of that road were not properly recorded or stored by 
Fremont County and, hence, Bunker Road had never been created as contemplated by 
the governing statutes.  In 
addition, both Appellants contended the road had been vacated or abandoned.  The district court determined that the 
Appellants were incorrect on both points.  
As a matter of undisputed fact and law, the district court held Bunker 
Road had been created and further, that as a matter of law it still existed 
because it had not forthrightly and officially been vacated or abandoned by the 
Commission.  We will affirm the 
district court's orders.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The Kings raise 
these issues:

 
 
A.  Whether 
the district court's April 23, 2008 entry of summary judgment to [the 
Commission] based upon its finding that Bunker Road was properly established in 
1913 was in error.

 
 
B.  Whether 
the district court erred when it dismissed the case in reliance on State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. 
Meeker, 294 P.2d 603 (Wyo. 1956).

 
 
C.  Whether 
[Kings] were bona fide subsequent purchasers, and thus purchased their land 
without Bunker Road clouding the title.

 
 
The 
Commission's statement of the issues is the same as that presented by the 
Kings.  However, in its brief the 
Commission also contends that neither the Kings nor Hansen may challenge the 
partial summary judgment order because neither filed a timely notice of appeal 
after the entry of that order.  Both 
the Kings and Hansen contest that point in their reply briefs.  Hansen's statement of the issues mirrors 
Issues A and B set out above by the Kings.

 
 
BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      The Kings filed 
their complaint on December 14, 2005, after their efforts to obtain a ruling 
from the Commission that Bunker Road had been abandoned or vacated had 
failed.  The documentation prepared 
at the time Bunker Road was created satisfied the Commission that the statutory 
requirements for the creation of a road, such as Bunker Road (County Road 111), 
had been fulfilled.  The Kings' 
claim that the creation of Bunker Road had not been perfected relied almost 
entirely on the circumstance that it was not "recorded" in a manner contemplated 
by Wyoming's "first in time, first in right" recording 
statute.

 
 
[¶4]      In 1999, the 
Kings purchased property which Bunker Road burdened in a way that damaged their 
plan to subdivide it, and which had been unknown to them at the time of 
purchase, even though a traditional title search was completed.  The Kings alleged that the information 
which described that road and its encroachment on the land that the Kings 
ultimately purchased was never "recorded" in the county clerk's office, although 
that documentation may have been filed there originally and may have been stored 
in the county courthouse for a time.  
However, the Kings averred that a county road map located in the county 
clerk's office did not show it as a county road.  In addition, the Kings averred that the 
Commission had not created Bunker Road in the manner required by Wyoming law 
because a copy of the plat and notes of the survey were never filed in the 
"office of the county clerk."  This 
allegation was supported in part by a letter dated February 18, 2000, from 
Fremont County Director of Planning Ray Price (Price) to Jim Freeman (Freeman), 
in which Price stated that the road would be "difficult or even impossible to 
find or even negotiate, except on foot."  
However, Price also indicated in that same letter that the road easement 
in question had "been established" and that he did "not have any evidence that 
this road easement was ever abandoned by Fremont County."  In a memo dated April 24, 2002, from 
Price to the Commission, Price wrote:

 
 
Bunker 
Road has not been used by the general public or maintained by Fremont County for 
quite some time.  However, the road 
can be found on the ground and could be traveled.  Sometime within the last five to seven 
years a new access road was constructed by private individuals in a location 
that, over much of its route, uses the old county road right-of-way.  Mr. Freeman has been denied permission 
to use the portion of the new access road between the place where it leaves 
Baldwin Creek Road and where it connects with the old right-of-way of Bunker 
Road.  I believe that Mr. [Sam] 
Dunlap and Mr. Freeman will ask that Bunker Road be 
re-opened.

 
 
[¶5]      The Kings' 
complaint continued:

 
 
23.  The 
Board of County Commissioners of the County of Fremont, on October 4, 2005, took 
action to determine that "upon examination of public records and testimony 
associated with Bunker Road that:  
1) it is a county road; and 2) it is not in the public interest to vacate 
said Road and to decline to adopt a resolution to formally vacate and abandon 
the Fremont County Road known as Bunker Road."  This action was unnecessary as Bunker 
Road was never properly established as a County Road.

24.  The 
Board of County Commissioners of Fremont County, Wyoming never properly recorded 
Bunker Road as a public road or highway pursuant to applicable law and roads not 
properly recorded pursuant to statute were considered vacated as public 
roads.  Yeager v. Forbes, 2003 WY 134, ¶ 32, 78 P.3d 241, [255].

25.  Upon 
information and belief it is alleged that sometime between the years of 1987 and 
1993 the Fremont County Commissioners authorized the Fremont County Road 
Superintendent to place signs along Bunker Road indicating that the road had 
been abandon[ed] and was so designated by posted signs indicating the road was 
closed to traffic.

26.  Based 
upon the Wyoming Supreme Court ruling in Yeager v. Forbes, 2003 WY 134, 78 P.3d 241 there is no public road or highway along this track referred to as Bunker 
Road.

27.  A 
controversy exists between [Kings] and the [Commission] concerning whether 
Bunker Road is a public road.  
[Kings] believe [] that the Yeager decision and the application of 
the applicable law to this controversy clearly demonstrate that Bunker Road is 
not a county road.

28.  A 
justifiable controversy exists between [Kings] and [the Commission], and such 
controversy is of a kind and nature as to be adjudicated in a declaratory 
judgment action.  Bunker Road is not 
a public road of any kind, and [the Commission] has no right to prevent [Kings] 
from denying access to the use of Bunker Road as [they] deem [] appropriate to 
protect [their] property.

 
 
[¶6]      On February 13, 
2006, Hansen filed its motion to intervene.  Hansen's complaint is, more or less, 
identical to that of the Kings, except for the description of the lands 
affected.  Hansen asserted a 
"special interest" in the outcome of this matter because, of the approximate 
two-mile length of Bunker Road, one-half of that length is located on Hansen's 
land.

 
 
[¶7]      The Commission 
answered both complaints generally denying the allegations of those complaints 
and asserting a variety of defenses, including that if the district court were 
to grant the relief on the bases asserted by the Kings and Hansen, then it would 
"eventually necessitate the Court also declaring all other county roads 
established according to the proper statutory procedure invalid as 
well."

 
 
[¶8]      On June 15, 2007, 
Kings and Hansen filed a consolidated motion for summary judgment, as well as a 
memorandum in support of that motion.  
The Commission also filed a motion for summary judgment, as well as a 
response to Kings' and Hansen's competing motions for summary 
judgment.

 
 
[¶9]      In an order 
entered of record on April 23, 2008, the district court denied Kings' and 
Hansen's motions for a summary judgment in part, and granted the Commission's 
motion for summary judgment in part.  
The district court concluded that, as a matter of law, Bunker Road was 
duly established in 1913 by the Commission pursuant to its statutory 
authority.  The district court 
described the remaining two issues to be tried as:  (1) whether or not the Appellants had 
actual notice of Bunker Road, and (2) whether or not they are bona fide 
purchasers of the property they now own which may be subject to the Commission's 
interest in Bunker Road.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Was 
Notice of Appeal Timely as to Partial Summary Judgment

 
 
[¶10]   W.R.A.P 2.01 requires that a notice 
of appeal be filed within 30 days from entry of the "appealable order."  W.R.A.P. 1.05 
provides:

 
 
An 
appealable order is:

            
(a)  An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when 
such order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment; 
or

            
(b)  An order affecting a substantial right made in a special 
proceeding; or

            
(c)  An order made upon a summary application in an action 
after judgment; or

            
(d)  An order, including a conditional order, granting a new 
trial on the grounds stated in Rule 59(a)(4) and (5), Wyo. R. Civ. P.; if an 
appeal is taken from such an order, the judgment shall remain final and in 
effect for the purposes of appeal by another party; or

            
(e)  Interlocutory orders and decrees of the district courts 
which:

                        
(1)  Grant, continue, or modify injunctions, or dissolve 
injunctions, or refuse to dissolve or modify injunctions; 
or

                        
(2)  Appoint receivers, or issue orders to wind up 
receiverships, or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as 
directing sales or other disposition of property.

 
 
            
(See Rule 13 for additional guidance on review of interlocutory 
orders.)

 
 
[¶11]   W.R.C.P. 54(b) allows a district 
court to certify orders that adjudicate fewer than all claims upon an express 
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon the express 
direction for the entry of judgment.  
No such determination was sought or granted in this case, and the Kings 
and Hansen were not required to appeal the partial summary judgment until the 
remaining issues were decided.  
Thus, we will consider both issues raised by the 
Appellants.

 
 
Creation 
of Bunker Road

 
 
[¶12]   The district court issued its 
partial summary judgment order on April 23, 2008.  The subject of the partial summary 
judgment was limited to whether or not the Commission's actions in 1912-13 were 
sufficiently in compliance with governing statutes so as to have actually 
created Bunker Road.  The Kings and 
Hansen contend that the process was flawed and, therefore, Bunker Road never was 
created.  The standard of review to 
be applied is this:

 
 
[W]e 
examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion and give that party the benefit of all the favorable inferences which 
may be fairly drawn.  Castleberry v. Phelan, 2004 WY 151, 
¶ 8, 101 P.3d 460, 462 (Wyo. 2004).  
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Id.

 
 

Wilson 
v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 
2007 WY 42, ¶ 12, 153 P.3d 917, 922 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶13]   The statutes in effect at that time 
are found in Wyoming Compiled Statutes 1910, §§ 2513-2531.  Section 2523 requires that a survey and 
record of the road "be filed in the office of the county clerk."  The Kings and Hansen contend that this 
step was not perfected, although the documentation required to be assembled by 
the governing statutes was in the possession of Fremont County at the time this 
action arose, as well as at all times in the interim between 1913 and the 
present day.  However, it is not 
disputed that the grantor/grantee index did not provide those examining property 
titles any information about the road.  
Further, unless a title examiner inquired of a county clerk employee 
about the existence and actual location of the records pertaining to county 
roads, then whether or not a particular parcel of land was burdened by a county 
road would not be evident.  It is 
this flaw that is the mainstay of the Appellants' contentions herein and on that 
basis, it is contended that the road should be declared not to have ever come 
into existence.  With respect to 
this particular matter, the district court concluded thus:  "However, it is not the physical 
location of these records that create the ultimate issue in this case but 
whether or not they were made of record for purposes of providing constructive 
notice."

 
 

[¶14]   The district court relied in 
significant part on the case of Lakewood 
v. Mavromatis, 817 P.2d 90 (Colo. 1991) in deciding to grant a partial 
summary judgment in favor of the Commission with respect to the validity, ab initio, of Bunker Road.  Although that case differs from the 
present case on the facts because a road was never built on the tract of land in 
question, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that placing the road petition 
and incorporated plat in the road book in the office of the county clerk was 
adequate to dedicate the tract as a public highway, but it did not provide constructive 
notice to bona fide subsequent purchasers of the governmental entity's interest 
in the disputed parcel of land.  Id., 817 P.2d  at 98.  The entirety of that case is instructive 
with respect to issues such as those raised here, but its significance with 
respect to the instant case is limited to that noted above.  Based on that case, the district court 
concluded that the remaining issues would be required to be tried; to wit:  (1) whether or not Kings and Hansen had 
actual notice of Bunker Road, and (2) whether or not they are bona fide 
subsequent purchasers of the property they now own that may be subject to the 
Commission's interest in Bunker Road.  
The 
district court concluded that the Wyoming Legislature also intended to require 
the recording of the Bunker Road Petition in compliance with the Wyoming 
Recording Act.  "However, failure to 
do so did not void the establish[ed] Bunker Road, especially with regard to the 
parties in the initial road proceedings because they had actual notice of the 
road."  The district court indicated 
that this case was complicated because it was unclear if Bunker Road was ever 
established on the ground.  
Moreover, while there was evidence that at least a faint "track" of 
Bunker Road could be found on the ground for most of its distance, it had been 
fenced over in places, it had been washed out in places, it was blocked by 
vegetation in places, a wellhead was in its course, and a building had been 
placed along its course so that Bunker Road disappeared into, and then 
re-emerged on the other end of, the building.

 
 
[¶15]   However, based on the totality of 
the circumstances set out above, we agree with the district court that there 
were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Bunker Road had been 
created in the first instance.

 
 
Actual 
Notice  Bona Fide Purchasers

 
 
[¶16]   On August 18, 2009, the Commission 
filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that once a county road has been created, 
it can only be extinguished through formal vacation proceedings.  Prior to a trial, the district court 
reconsidered its previous ruling in light of the case State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. 
Meeker, 294 P.2d 603-8 (Wyo. 1956) (emphasis added), wherein this Court held 
as follows:

 
 
This 
is an action brought by the State of Wyoming on the relation of the State 
Highway Commission of Wyoming as plaintiff against Stanley Meeker as defendant 
to enjoin the latter from interfering with its right of way for highway purposes 
over lands hereinafter mentioned.

 
 
The 
Board of County Commissioners of Laramie County, Wyoming, at the behest of the 
State Highway Commission, as provided by § 48-303, W.C.S.1945, commenced 
condemnation proceedings to acquire a right of way for highway purposes over the 
lands hereinafter mentioned. These condemnation proceedings were completed on 
June 7, 1950. Damages in the amount of $1,652 were paid to Nell Fowler, the then 
owner of the property. The State Highway Commission did not immediately take 
possession of the right of way thus acquired, but did let a contract for the 
construction of a highway over and along the acquired right of way in December 
1953 and immediately thereafter the construction of the highway was commenced 
and at the time of the trial of this case was substantially 
completed.

 
 
Defendant 
claims to be the owner of the land over which the right of way runs and that he 
bought the land for $25.25 per acre in 1952. He claims he went all over the 
land, had an abstract of title prepared which did not show any right of way over 
the land; that he did not notice any signs of any purported highway; that he did 
not know of the interest of the State of Wyoming acquired by reason of the 
condemnation proceedings and found no instrument of record in the office of the 
county clerk showing the highway. The case was tried to the court without a 
jury. After the trial of the case, the court found in favor of the defendant 
Meeker and against the plaintiff but left in force the temporary injunction 
theretofore issued during the appeal of the case to this court. The plaintiff 
has duly perfected the appeal and it has been argued in this court. A motion to 
dismiss the appeal was filed, but the plaintiff and appellant complied with our 
order in connection therewith, so we shall not consider it 
further.

 
 
At 
the trial of the case, the parties entered into a stipulation.  [Stipulation 
omitted.]

 
 

. 
. . .

 
 
I.  Counsel for the defendant in attempting 
to uphold the judgment of the trial court relies on the provisions of §§ 66-119, 
66-124, W.C.S.1945, reading as follows:

 
 
66-119. 
Every conveyance of real estate within this state, hereafter made, which shall 
not be recorded as required by law, shall be void, as against any subsequent 
purchaser or purchasers in good faith and for a valuable consideration of the 
same real estate or any portion thereof, whose conveyance shall be first duly 
recorded.'

 
 
66-124. 
The term conveyance,' as used in this Act (§§ 66-101-66-134), shall be 
construed to embrace every instrument in writing by which any estate or interest 
in real estate is created, alienated, mortgaged, or assigned, or by which the 
title to any real estate may be affected in law or in equity, except wills, 
leases for a term not exceeding three (3) years, executory contracts for the 
sale or purchase of lands, and certificates which show that the purchaser has 
paid the consideration and is entitled to a deed for the lands, and contain a 
promise or agreement to furnish said deed at some future 
time.'

 
 
The 
transfer of title by eminent domain is not a conveyance within the meaning of 
the sections above mentioned. It is a transfer of title in invitum, that is to 
say, against the consent of the owner. At common law in England, there was no 
system of registration or recording, and the rule between claimants of the same 
title was found in the maxim prior in tempore potior est in jure,' which means, 
he who is first in time has the better right. 45 Am.Jur. 435; 23 R.C.L. 170; 2 
Merrill on Notice § 921. That is still the law except as abrogated by statute. 
Thus it is said in 2 Merrill on Notice § 921 as follows:

 
 
So 
thoroughly has the recording office entered into our legal system that lawyers 
and judges alike tend to refer to notice by record as though it were a common 
law principal without reference to the statutes upon which it rests. Yet because 
the foundation is statutory, and because difference in phraseology may involve 
variance in interpretation and application, we need to remember constantly that 
the necessity for recordation, as well as its effect, is a creature of 
ordinance, and that without the command of our omnisapient representatives in 
legislature assembled no one is required to place his title upon record in order 
to preserve it. In a number of instances statutes which merely authorize or 
permit the recording of particular instruments have been construed not to make 
such recording essential to the protection of property interests arising 
thereunder.'

 
 
Numerous 
cases are cited. So it is said in 45 Am.Jur. § 155, p. 
515:

 
 
The 
failure to record an instrument which is not required to be recorded does not 
affect or vitiate the instrument as to anyone, and it is valid not only between 
the parties thereto, but also to subsequent purchasers and 
encumbrancers.'

 
 
That 
rule is applicable in the case at bar. Until 1953 we had no statute which 
required the transfer of title by eminent domain to be recorded in the ordinary 
and regular books of record kept for the transfer of property by conveyances. 
Hence it is quite clear that the title the State acquired under the condemnation 
proceedings in 1950 is valid and good against any subsequent purchaser of the 
same property. The former owner of that property then had nothing further to 
convey. The trial court herein decided this case immediately after the end of 
the trial without looking up the authorities and apparently held that the 
transfer of title under eminent domain proceedings which has not been recorded 
in the regular and ordinary books kept for the purpose is void as against 
subsequent innocent purchasers for value. That, as we have seen above, clearly 
is not the law.

 
 

II. 
We reach the same result by considering this case from other standpoints. The 
right of eminent domain is an inherent, sovereign power, and can be exercised by 
the legislature in any manner it sees fit, subject only to the constitutional 
provision that compensation must be made to the owner. 1 Lewis Eminent Domain § 
367. The exercise of that power is, in a case like that before us, legislative 
in character. 29 
C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 87, p. 878. The 
legislature itself may exercise that power assuming that no constitutional 
provisions forbid it to do so directly. 29 
C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 88, p. 880. It 
may delegate the power as it has done in the case at bar. 29 
C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 89, p. 881. If 
the legislature had itself condemned the right of way in question, everyone 
including subsequent innocent purchasers would have been compelled to take 
notice thereof. There is no valid reason why that same rule should not apply to 
the agent of the legislature. Ample provision for notice has been made. 
According to § 48-316, W.C.S.1945, notice of the proposed exercise of eminent 
domain is given to all persons who have or claim to have an interest in the 
land. The meetings of the board of county commissioners are public. § 27-807, 
W.C.S.1945. Notice of the proceedings of the board of county commissioners must 
be published. § 27-821, W.C.S.1945. We presume that has been done in the case at 
bar. The right of way is surveyed and the land entered for that purpose. Viewers 
are appointed to assess the damages and presumably enter upon the land assessing 
the land. Defendant Meeker was in possession of the land in question as lessee 
during all of the time the eminent domain proceedings were taking place and must 
have had notice thereof or at least he is presumed to have had notice thereof. 
It is said in 18 Am.Jur. 956:

 
 
In 
some jurisdictions the actual taking or condemnation of land for certain public 
purposes may be effected by the vote or resolution of some administrative 
board.'

 
 

In 
20 
C.J.S., Counties, § 91, p. 863, it is 
said:

 
 
County 
boards are usually required to keep a record of their proceedings * * *. Their 
proceedings are matters of public record of which electors are presumed to have 
notice.'

 
 
In 
Collins v. City of Detroit, 195 Mich. 
330, 161 N.W. 905, 906, the court stated:

 
 

The 
board of supervisors is the legislative body of the county, and its proceedings 
are matter of public record of which the electors are presumed to have 
notice.   People 
[ex rel. 
Speed] v. 
Hartwell, 
12 
Mich. 508, 86 Am. Dec. 70.'

 
 
In 
Corwin v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. 
Co., 51 Kan. 451, 33 P. 99, 103, a party purchased property after 
condemnation proceedings and after damages had been paid to the owner. The 
court, holding that the subsequent purchaser acquired no title as against the 
eminent domain proceedings, stated as follows:

 
 
In 
Challiss v. [Atchison, T. & S. F.] Railroad Co., 16 Kan. 117, 129, it is 
said: Now, as to such proceedings, a party may not trust entirely to the 
records of the office of register of deeds, but must take notice of whatever 
appears upon the records of every office or tribunal having jurisdiction of such 
proceedings.' * * * Under the condemnation proceedings, all of which were of 
record in the public offices of Sedgwick County, Woodman, the purchaser from 
Mrs. Sanders, and the plaintiffs, who hold under Woodman, had constructive 
notice that an easement over and upon all the lots which they purchased had been 
legally appropriated for railroad purposes. For some reason, they never examined 
the public records. Had they made an examination of the report on file in the 
office of the register of deeds, they would have had actual notice of the 
appropriation of all of the lots. The condemnation proceedings appearing upon 
the public records are as conclusive as to them as to Mrs. 
Sanders.'

 
 
In 
Horton v. Okanogan County, 98 Wash. 626, 168 P. 479, 482, it seems that one Storch and one Patterson owned certain 
lands. They gave a right of way of the lands to the county. The county accepted 
this grant and proceeded to establish a road. Thereafter Storch and Patterson 
conveyed the land to the plaintiffs without saying anything about the right of 
way for a road. The court held that the ownership for road was paramount to the 
subsequent sale to the plaintiffs. The court in that connection stated as 
follows:

 
 
Have 
these dedications become binding upon the plaintiffs who have become the owners 
of the strip of land in controversy by mesne conveyances from Patterson and 
Storch? These plaintiffs, as such grantees, acquired their title to the 
adjoining land on each side of the strip in controversy through deeds describing 
land including the strip, at a time when the petition for the establishing of 
the road and presumably the blueprint showing the location of one of the roads 
over the strip was on file in the office of the clerk of the board of county 
commissioners, and after the action of that board was had purporting to grant 
the petition, as shown in the records of the minutes of the board, above quoted. 
This we think, was enough to suggest inquiry on their part, which, had it been 
made, would have led to the discovery of these dedicatory grants which were then 
in the hands of the county authorities either the clerk of the board of county 
commissioners or the county engineer, though the grants were not recorded as 
conveyances in the office of the auditor of the county.'

 
 
See 
also National Railway Co. v. Easton & 
Amboy R. Co., 36 N.J.L. 181.

 
 
III. 
Section 48-322, W.C.S.1945, as it read prior to 1953, provides as 
follows:

 
 
If, 
upon considering and acting upon the report of the viewers or otherwise, the 
board of county commissioners shall decide to lay out or alter any road, they 
shall cause the county surveyor to make an accurate survey thereof, if such 
survey is necessary, and to plat the same in books to be provided by the county 
for such purpose, and the county clerk shall record in the same books opposite 
or near to such plat so that the same may be easily ascertained to be concerning 
the platted road, the proceeding of the said board in relation to the location, 
establishment or alteration of said road, in order to keep in a separate book a 
record of all the county roads of that county.'

 
 
It 
accordingly seems that while the transfer of title was not noted upon the 
regular and ordinary recording books of the county, it was noted upon the road 
book in the county clerk's office and reference was made to the proceedings of 
the county commissioners in regard to the condemnation proceedings. Counsel for 
defendant Meeker claim that was no notice at all. It may be noted however that 
the statutes made it mandatory to comply with the provision of the section just 
mentioned. The legislature has not specifically provided that the proceedings of 
the board shall be constructive notice. However, it is stated in 2 Merrill on Notice § 919 that: A similar reading 
usually is given to statutes which require certain instruments to be recorded, 
unless it clearly is apparent that the requirement has some other object.' The 
application of that rule is clearly seen in those cases which deal with 
acquisition of railroad companies under the public domain. It is held that when 
the railroad company files the records in the local registry office as required 
by statute, the title of the railroad company is then complete against all 
public settlors. In Great Northern Ry. 
Co. v. Steinke, 261 U.S. 119, 43 S. Ct. 316, 318, 67 L. Ed. 564, it is 
said:

 
 

There 
is no provision in the act for the issue of a patent, but this does not detract 
from the efficacy of the grant. The approved map is intended to be the 
equivalent of a patent defining the grant conformably to the intendment of the 
act (Noble v. Union River Logging R. 
Co., 147 U.S. 165, 13 S. Ct. 271, 37 L.Ed. 123), and to relate back, as 
against intervening claims, to the date when the map was filed in the local land 
office for transmission through the General Land Office to the Secretary of 
Interior (Stalker v. Oregon Short Line R. 
Co., 225 U.S. 142, 32 S. Ct. 636, 56 L.Ed. 1027).'

 
 
See 
also Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. 
Stalker, 14 Idaho 362, 94 P. 56.

 
 
The 
Revised Statutes of Massachusetts 1835, Ch. 39, § 75, provide as 
follows:

 
 
Every 
railroad corporation shall, in all cases, file the location of their road within 
one year, with the commissioners of each county through which the same passes, 
defining the courses, distances, and boundaries of such portion thereof, as lies 
within each county, respectively.'

 
 
That 
provision came under consideration in the case of Brock v. Old Colony R. Co., 146 Mass. 
194, 15 N.E. 555, 557. The late Justice Holmes, then a justice of the appellate 
court of Massachusetts, succinctly, as was his wont, stated as 
follows:

 
 
The 
location identified the land, and therefore satisfied Rev.St. c. 39, § 75. 
Filing it was sufficient notice of the taking.'

 
 
In 
the case of Houston v. Paterson & 
State Line Traction Co., 69 N.J.L. 168, 54 A. 403, the syllabus reads as 
follows:

 
 

In 
proceedings brought to condemn lands within the filed route of a traction 
railway company under and pursuant to the traction act of 1893 (P.L. p. 302; 3 
Gen.St. p. 3235 [N.J.S.A. 
48:15-6 et seq.]), a conveyance of the 
lands by the owner, at any time after the application is made and notice given 
to the owner as directed by the order of the justice, will not defeat the 
proceedings nor require notice thereof to be given to the 
grantee.'

 
 
In 
Page v. Lane, 120 Colo. 416, 211 P.2d 549, 550, a recording of a plat and dedication of some avenues was held to give 
public notice. The court said in part:

 
 
By 
the recording of the plat and the dedication, all subsequent purchasers were 
charged with notice of the existence of the easements, which were appurtenances 
to plaintiffs' tracts as well as all others; this appurtenance was a grant from 
the original owner, and all subsequent purchasers had notice of the rights of 
others to the beneficial enjoyment of the properties involved. This right 
inhered in the land and concerned the premises and pertained to its enjoyment 
and possession and followed with the transfer of the 
land.'

 
 
See 
also United States v. Sandlass, D.C., 
34 F. Supp. 81, 6 Nichols on Eminent Domain, p. 85.

 
 
It 
follows from what has been said that the judgment of the trial court must be and 
is reversed with direction to enter judgment for the plaintiff as 
prayed.

 
 
[¶17]   Based on that case, the wording of 
the statutes in place in 1913, the fact that the road had never been "formally 
vacated," and the circumstance that the County Road Book gave constructive 
notice of the road had inquiry been made of the county clerk, the district court 
held that the motion to dismiss should be granted.

 
 
[¶18]   The heart of the controversy in 
this case lies in the tension between Wyoming's long-standing "unrecorded 
conveyance" statute and those statutes that deal with the creation of county 
roads.

 
 
[¶19]   Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 3654 (1910) 
provided:

 
 
            
§ 3654.  Unrecorded 
conveyance void as to subsequent purchasers.  Every conveyance of real estate within 
this state, hereafter made, which shall not be recorded as required by law, 
shall be void, as against any subsequent purchaser or purchasers in good faith 
and for a valuable consideration of the same real estate or any portion thereof, 
whose conveyance shall be first recorded.

 
 
[¶20]   At the time Bunker Road was 
created, Wyo. Comp. Stat. §§ 2513 and 2514 (1910) 
provided:

 
 
            
§ 2513.  Public roads 
defined.  All roads within this 
state shall be public highways which have been or may be declared by law to be 
national, state, territorial or county roads.  All roads that have been designated or 
marked as highways on government maps or plats in the record of any land office 
of the United States within this state, and which have been publicly used as 
traveled highways, and which have not been closed or vacated by order of the 
board of the county commissioners of the county wherein the same are located, 
are declared to be public highways until the same are closed or vacated by order 
of the board of county commissioners of the county wherein the same are located, 
and the board or officer charged by law with such duty shall keep the same open 
and in repair the same as in the case of roads regularly laid out and opened by 
order of the board of county commissioners.

 
 
            
§ 2514.  County 
commissioners to control roads.  
All county roads shall be under the supervision, management and control 
of the board of county commissioners of the county wherein such roads are 
located, and no county road shall hereafter be established, altered or vacated 
in any county in this state, except by authority of the board of county 
commissioners of the county wherein such road is located except as is otherwise 
provided by law.

 
 
[¶21]   Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 2531 (1910) 
provided for the procedures to be followed for the establishment or alteration 
of any road.  That statute also 
provided for the keeping of records of all such roads:

 
 
§ 
2531.  Duties of county board.

. 
. . If, upon considering and acting upon the report of the viewers or otherwise, 
the board of county commissioners shall decide to lay out or alter any road, 
they shall cause the county surveyor to make an accurate survey thereof, if such 
survey is necessary, and to plat the same in books to be provided by the county 
for such purpose, and the county clerk 
shall record in the same books opposite or near to such plat so that the same 
may be easily ascertained to be concerning the platted road, the proceeding of 
the said board in relation to the location, establishment or alteration of said 
road, in order to keep in a separate book a record of all the county 
roads of that county.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
[¶22]   1919 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 112, § 1, 
amended § 2513 as follows:

 
 
            
Section 2513.  Public Roads Defined.  On and after January 1st, 1922, all roads within this State shall be 
highways, which have been or may be declared by law to be national, state, 
territorial or county roads or highways.  
It shall be the duty of the several Boards of County Commissioners, 
within their respective counties, prior to said date, to determine what if any 
such roads now or heretofore travelled but not heretofore officially established 
and recorded, are necessary or important for the public use as permanent roads, 
and to cause such roads to be recorded, or if need be laid out, established and 
recorded and all roads recorded as aforesaid, shall be highways.  No other roads shall be highways unless 
and until lawfully established as such by official authority.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶23]   The records of Bunker Road were 
maintained in the manner mandated by these statutes.  Eventually, the "recorded" documents 
with respect to county roads were moved to the county planning office and later 
to the county roads/transportation department.  However, at all times the records were 
available to the public had inquiry been made about them to the county clerk or 
to other county departments.  
Moreover, county roads, as noted above, cannot be vacated except by 
official action of the county commissioners of a county.

 
 
[¶24]   The Commission also relies in part 
upon a decision of this Court in Board of 
County Comm'rs v. State, 369 P.2d 537, 540-43 (Wyo. 
1962):

 
 
At 
the inception we note that the defendant board in its answer admitted, at least 
tacitly, the establishment of road 212 and in the brief stated, We do not deem 
it necessary to comment upon the sufficiency of the evidence introduced for the 
establishment of Road No. 212, since this case need not turn upon the 
technicalities of establishing a county road, but upon principles more broad and 
fundamental * * *.'  Notwithstanding 
the position thus taken the defendant board here urges The first question that 
comes to the Commissioners' minds is * * * simple and crucial * * *:  Where is Road 212?' thereby implying 
that the establishment was invalid for uncertainty.  No consideration will be given to this 
contention since defendants are bound by their pleadings.  State ex rel. Tibbals v. District Court of 
Ninth Judicial Dist. in and for Fremont County, 42 Wyo. 417, 295 P. 916; Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23, 
20 L.R.A. 199, 62 Am. St. Rep. 17; and see 1 Bancroft, Code Pleading, § 
429.  Moreover, even where a defense 
contains both an admission and a denial respecting the same fact the admission 
will prevail, Strom v. Felton, 76 
Wyo. 370, 302 P.2d 917.

 
 
The 
defendants argue that before a writ of mandamus will lie a relator must show a 
clear legal right to which he is entitled, which is withheld or threatened to be 
withheld  from him, and that there 
is a corresponding duty on the part of the respondent to perform, which duty can 
only be enforced by means of the right, and cite State ex rel. R. R. Crow & Co. v. 
Copenhaver, 64 Wyo. 1, 184 P.2d 594, and State ex rel. Sullivan v. Schnitger, 16 
Wyo. 479, 95 P. 698.  They urge that 
mandamus will not generally be granted to coerce discretionary action upon the 
part of a public official or board or to require a legal right which is not 
clear or complete, citing State ex rel. 
Van Patten v. Ellis, 37 Wyo. 124, 259 P. 812, 263 P. 105.  They say that although plaintiffs' 
petition alleged that the board's clear duty was set out in § 18-149, W.S.1957, 
and § 24-5, W.S.1957, the former merely enumerates the powers of the board, 
including its right to lay out, alter, or discontinue any road running through 
the county, and the latter simply states that all county roads shall be under 
the management and supervision of the board and that no county road shall be 
established, altered, or vacated except by its authority.

 
 
Plaintiffs, 
without contesting the rule that mandamus will issue only to enforce the 
performance of a clear duty, now rely upon the existence of a statute not 
mentioned in their pleading, namely, § 24-66, W.S.1957, which 
reads:

 
 
Whenever 
a public road is ordered to be established or altered, according to the 
provisions of this act, which shall pass through, or on enclosed lands, the road 
overseer, or other proper officer, shall give the owner, agent or occupant of 
such lands, notice in writing to remove the fences thereon, and if such owner, 
agent or occupant shall not move his fence, within thirty days thereafter, the 
same may be removed by the proper officer, and the road opened and worked; and 
such owner shall forfeit and pay twenty dollars for each day he shall permit his 
fence to remain after said thirty days, and shall pay all necessary cost of 
removal, to be collected by the proper officer, in any court of competent 
jurisdiction, for the use and benefit of the general county road 
fund.'

 
 
            
Plaintiffs contend that the board's obligation under this section was 
clear and definite, especially in the light of its previous recognition of the 
existence of the road, and cite a case from the neighboring jurisdiction of 
Nebraska, State ex rel. Draper v. 
Freese, 147 Neb. 147, 22 N.W.2d 556.  
In that case certain persons sought mandamus against county 
commissioners, requiring them to reopen and repair a certain public 
highway.  The evidence disclosed 
that some seventy years previously steps had been taken to establish the road, 
that no work had been done on it at public expense, although it had not been 
vacated, and that from the beginning there had been some travel on a trail which 
in some places varied from the location of the road as laid out.  The petition was dismissed by the trial 
court and on appeal the supreme court reversed and directed that the proper 
parties proceed to open and work the road to make it usable by the public.  Although other aspects were of 
importance in the decision, the court significantly stated that mandamus was 
generally recognized as the proper remedy to compel public officers to perform 
their duty to take care of and keep in repair public highways whenever the 
refusal to act was a determination not to discharge a plain 
duty.

 
 
Our 
research indicates that the doctrine enunciated in the Freese case has not been altered in 
Nebraska, and the case of Burkhardt v. 
Cihlar, 149 Neb. 712, 32 N.W.2d 197, cited by plaintiffs, is authority for 
the fact that an injunction will not there lie to prevent property owners from 
maintaining fences across a road since mandamus is a proper 
remedy.

 
 
In 
passing, it may be noted that statutes in existence at the time of the Freese decision included § 39-103, 
R.S.Neb.1943:

 
 
'The 
county board has a general supervision over the public roads of the county, with 
power to establish and maintain them as herein provided, and to see that the 
laws in relation to them are carried into effect.'

 
 
Similar 
in many respects to our § 24-5, and § 39-116, 
R.S.Neb.1943:

 
 
After 
the road has been finally established, the plat of the road must be recorded and 
platted by the county surveyor in the road plat book of the county with a proper 
reference to the files in the county clerk's office where the papers relating to 
the same may be found.  The county 
clerk must record the petition, damage claims, field notes, and all other papers 
relating to the road.  The clerk 
must direct the road overseers to have the same opened and worked; but when 
crops have been planted or sowed before the road is finally established, the 
opening thereof shall be delayed until the crop is 
harvested.'

 
 
Although 
the provision in this statute regarding the opening and working of the road is 
perhaps more obligatory in nature than the corresponding provision in § 24-66, 
W.S.1957, the distinction is not of importance under these circumstances in view 
of the rule stated in People ex rel. 
Brokaw v. Commissioners of Highways, 130 Ill. 482, 22 N.E. 596, 598, 6 
L.R.A. 161, and approved by this court in Burnham Hotel Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 
30 Wyo. 458, 222 P. 1:

 
 
* 
* * The word 'may' in a statute will be construed to mean shall' whenever the 
rights of the public or of third persons depend upon the exercise of the power 
of the performance of the duty to which it refers, and such is its meaning in 
all cases where the public interests and rights are concerned, or a public duty 
is imposed upon public officers, and the public or third persons have a claim de jure that the power shall be 
exercised.  * * 
*'

 
 
Since 
the Nebraska and Wyoming statutes are substantially similar in many respects, 
the doctrine enunciated in the Freese 
case is persuasive.

 
 
The 
contention which the board here makes that it does not know where the 
established road is fails to convince because the surveyor who purported to show 
the obscurities did not employ all of the recorded data.  Moreover, the order of the trial court 
must be construed in the light of the undisputed rule applicable in situations 
relating to the maintenance of public highways, i.e., mandamus is recognized as 
a proper remedy to compel public officers to take care of and keep in repair 
public highways only when the exercise is so apparent and obvious that the 
refusal to act is the result of a determination not to discharge a plain 
duty.  See 34 Am.Jur. Mandamus § 
193; 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 177; and Annotation, 46 A.L.R. 257.  Thereunder, the obligation to work the 
road depends upon the exercise of sound discretion by the board, considering the 
best interests of Fremont County as a whole, taking into consideration the 
extent of the road's anticipated use, its importance in relation to other roads, 
the practicability of maintenance, and the availability of county finances for 
that purpose.  Had the board which 
established the road in 1921 or any successor considered the highway impractical 
or without benefit to the public, there was clear authority for alteration or 
vacation, § 24-43, W.S.1957.

 
 
Plaintiffs 
did not plead that any road existed by prescription and specifically disclaimed 
any such position in the argument here.  
Therefore, the trial court did not purport to try title to any property 
but merely ordered the board to take steps regarding the road which had been 
established.  Defendants' 
contentions regarding the error of the court in this regard are without 
merit.  Likewise, defendants' 
argument that there was a failure to demand performance is invalid because the 
testimony is clear that plaintiffs at different times consulted with the board 
and requested action to be taken for the removal of the obstructions.  This demand was 
sufficient.

 
 
From 
what we have said, it follows that the order of the trial court must be 
affirmed.  Subsequent 
interpretations of such order shall be in accord with the views herein 
expressed.

 
 
[¶25]   In the case Board of County Comm'rs v. White, 547 P.2d 1195, 1198-1201 (Wyo. 1976), we held:

 
 
The 
trial court was in error, however, in holding that appellant had no legal or 
equitable right, title or interest' in or to the lands covered by that 
instrument entitled Right-of-Way Easement' executed by Lee E. and Loretta Irene 
McQuay on June 23, 1965, and recorded in the office of the county clerk June 24, 
1965, which conveyed an easement to Carbon County.  Since the McQuays were the then owners 
of the lands across which this easement was granted, the Board of County 
Commissioners of Carbon County (having accepted and recorded the same) had no 
right or authority to reconvey this right-of-way or to surrender the public's 
right thereunder by virtue of the quitclaim deed dated June 4, 1968.  It seems evident that the traveling 
public has a vested right to the use of public roads, and earlier this court 
recognized such right in the public and that a road could not be vacated except 
by official act of the board of county commissioners, Board of Com'rs of Sheridan County v. 
Patrick, 18 Wyo. 130, 104 P. 531, 532, rehearing denied 107 P. 748.  Although the board is given very general 
powers to manage and control county roads, § 24-5, W.S.1957, this must be 
exercised in a lawful manner and the statutes governing the actions of the board 
with reference thereto must be construed in pari materia.  Section 24-43, W.S.1957, has since its 
enactment provided the procedure for the establishment, vacation or alteration' 
of county roads, and the significant portion thereof is as 
follows:

 
 
* 
* * The course and the point of termination of said road to be established, 
altered or vacated, as the case may be, and thereafter following out the 
provisions of article 2, chapter 52, Wyoming Revised Statutes, 1931, not 
inconsistent therewith.'  (Emphasis 
supplied.)

 
 
            
Section 24-52, W.S.1957, C.1967, was included in Art. 2, Ch. 52 of the 
1931 Revised Statutes therein mentioned and is the principal procedural statute 
contained therein.  Although this 
section itself omits any reference to vacation, any such proposed vacation must 
proceed with proper notice to those interested, including the traveling public 
in this instance.  This court has 
earlier suggested that the provisions of this section be utilized to alter or 
vacate such roads, Board of County 
Commissioners of County of Fremont v. State, Wyo., 369 P.2d 537, 542.  In the instant case once there was a 
dedication to the public use by the McQuays' grant of an easement, its 
acceptance and recording by this board, and general use by the public, this road 
had been established.

 
 
            
We consider the case of Board of 
County Commissioners of County of Fremont v. State, Wyo., 369 P.2d 537, 
quite persuasive in this matter; and although it involved a mandamus 
application, in that case the court held that absent any proper vacation a writ 
would lie to compel the county commissioners to keep an established road open 
and remove from the right-of-way any fences or obstructions.  There is, however, other abundant 
authority applicable to this case, as exemplified by the annotations appearing 
in 175 A.L.R. 760, and particularly pp. 762 and 765, which set out the rule as 
follows:

 
 
While 
some limitations to its application are to be found, the rule appears to be 
quite general that where the procedure for the vacation, discontinuance or 
alteration of a public street or highway by direct action of public authorities 
is prescribed by statute, it is necessary to adhere to such procedure in order 
that the vacation or alteration may be effective; such a result may not be 
accomplished by contract (see infra, § 3) nor are the public authorities 
precluded by principles of estoppel from denying the termination of the 
existence, or alteration, of the public way in the absence of substantial 
compliance with the statutory procedure.  
This is evidenced by the many cases in which it is stated, either 
expressly or by strong implication, that such procedure is exclusive, or that it 
must be strictly followed.'  (p. 
762)

 
 
Applying 
the rule that the procedure prescribed by statute for vacating, discontinuing, 
or relocating streets or highways must be substantially followed in order to 
terminate the existence, or change the route, of a public way, the courts in a 
number of cases have held or recognized that the execution of a contract or 
agreement contemplating such a termination or change was ineffectual to obtain 
such a result, where the statute had not been complied with.'  (p. 765)

 
 
See 
also 39 C.J.S. Highways, §§ 117 and 118, pp. 1053-54.

 
 
            
A case bearing considerable similarity to our instant problem is San Diego County v. California Water & 
Telephone Co., 30 Cal. 2d 817, 186 P.2d 124, 175 A.L.R. 747, involving an 
action by the county to enjoin the flooding of a county road because of 
impounding of water in a reservoir.  
The defendant claimed, and it was a fact, that the county had entered 
into agreements with the defendant whereby the defendants granted temporary 
rights-of-way to the county for roads to circumvent the area to be flooded and 
the county waived any damages to it resulting from the flooding.  The court, 186 P.2d  at 128-129, 
determined that the cases are uniform that:

 
 
* 
* * if the Legislature has provided a method by which a county or city may 
abandon or vacate roads, that method is exclusive. (Citing cases.)  An analogous line of decisions holds 
that a municipality must follow the statutory procedure prescribed for the sale 
of public property, and an attempt to dispose of the property by contract will 
not be enforced.  (Citing cases.) * 
* *  Specifically, it has been held 
that an agreement by local officials to abandon, vacate, or sell a road is 
void.  (Citing cases.) * * 
*.'

 
 
            
The California court held that the county was not estopped by its 
agreements and the doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked where the statutory 
procedure is the measure of the power to act, particularly where it would 
operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the 
public.  The various statutory 
procedures exist to protect citizens and taxpayers from the loss of its 
property.

 
 
            
Another case of interest is Ercanbrack v. Judd, Utah, 524 P.2d 595.  There the county commissioners 
entered upon their records the fact that an established county road was 
abandoned and gave permission to a landowner to put up a notice that the road 
was closed.  The landowner did so 
and placed a gate and lock to prevent access.  Under very similar statutes that court 
summarized succinctly the rule, 524 P.2d at 597:

 
 
Since 
there was no notice given to either the abutting landowners or the general 
public, the motion of the commissioner as approved was and is a nullity, and the 
public road will continue to be such until it is abandoned in accordance with 
the statutes.'

 
 
We 
hold that the agreements of June 4, 1968, and May 25, 1971, are null and void as 
an attempt to vacate an established county road by methods other than those by 
statute provided.  We further hold 
that any deed to the McQuay lands, executed by the county commissioners to the 
appellees, is of no force and effect.

 
 
There 
is little force in appellant's last contention because the record definitely 
shows that when White in 1968 determined to build a reservoir which would flood 
certain portions of the road, a part of which at least lay within the boundaries 
of the right-of-way easement, he made a proposal to the board of commissioners 
that for a term of not to exceed four years or until Interstate 80 be 
constructed the county could build a road around the water which would extend 
over the then county road at a mutually agreeable location.  The board accepted such proposal on June 
4, 1968.  On May 25, 1971, in 
contemplation of the expiration of the earlier permission, Bryan White again 
submitted to the commissioners a proposal, reciting among other things 
that:

 
 
* 
* * It is understood and agreed that said Interstate 80 has now been constructed 
and the heretofore right-of-way easement for road purposes has terminated.  That by reason of said termination the 
undersigned, Bryan White, has closed said right-of-way and road to said public 
at large.  That the undersigned 
Bryan White does hereby agree to reinstate said right-of-way easement for road 
purposes only across the hereinafter described lands until project SC-CSM-6-13 
(McFadden-Arlington Road) in Carbon County, Wyoming, is completed or until 
January 1, 1974, whichever period of time is shorter.  In consideration thereof, the 
undersigned, agrees to open said road forthwith so that Carbon County, Wyoming, 
can enter and make certain improvements to said road for the benefit of the 
traveling public.  It is agreed upon 
the part of Carbon County, Wyoming, that any and all improvements to said road 
shall revert to and become the property of the land owner upon the termination 
of this right-of-way easement as described aforesaid.  And it is further agreed that the 
instrument executed June 4, 1968 by the parties hereto is made a part hereof and 
a photo copy of the same is attached to this instrument.  * * *'

 
 
It 
is upon this basis that appellant has asserted its third claim, which falls from 
its own weight by its clear recognition of the temporary status thereof and 
indicates quite the contrary to appellant's contentions.  The temporary status of this arrangement 
was also recognized in the testimony of Korkow, a road supervisor employed by 
the Carbon County Road and Bridge Department.  It is to be remembered, however, we do 
not find that these agreements in any manner operate to deprive the county of 
its claim and interest in and to the lands covered by the original McQuay 
easement for public use.  We are 
unable to understand why appellant has since 1960 temporized in this matter and 
failed to complete any proper proceedings which would establish this as a public 
road.  If the so-called 
McFadden-Arlington Road is necessary and should be established for the public 
use, the board of commissioners should proceed to institute and complete the 
necessary proceedings to effect that purpose.  We hold the proceedings of 1960 and 1963 
abandoned by the intervening conduct of the parties and the passage of 
time.  Any claim of prescriptive 
right must be made in any new proceeding for the establishment of the road, as 
must the appellees' claim for damages.

 
 
            
The case is therefore remanded to the district court with directions to 
correct its finding that appellant has no right, title or claim in or to the 
lands and the road covered by the right-of-way easement executed by the McQuays 
and to enjoin the appellees from in any manner interfering with the public use 
thereof.

 
 
[¶26]   Kings and Hansen participated in an 
effort to vacate Bunker Road, but that was unsuccessful.  In addition, we have recognized that the 
filing of a plat and survey notes filed in the office of the county clerk serves 
to establish a county road, although that was perhaps only dicta in that case 
because the affected county was not a party.  Kern v. Deerwood Ranch, 528 P.2d 910, 
911-12 (Wyo. 1974).

 
 
[¶27]   In 1987, the legislature enacted 
the following statutes on this subject:

 
 
§ 
24-3-201. Purpose of procedure.

 
 
            
The legislature finds that due to inaccurate and inconsistent records, 
there exist roads which are seldom used, not maintained and are not identified 
as or believed by the public to be county roads but are, in fact, county 
roads.  Recognizing the numerous 
difficulties resulting from the existence of such county roads, the legislature 
finds it in the best interest of the public to create a procedure to identify 
county roads, thereby altering and vacating these abandoned or unnecessary 
county roads without survey.

 
 
§ 
24-3-202. Definitions.

 
 
            
(a)  As used in this act:

                        
(i)  "Board" means the board of county commissioners of any 
county;

                        
(ii)  "This act" means W.S. 24-3-201 through 
24-3-206.

 
 
§ 
24-3-203. Board may identify county roads through specified procedure; 
resolution; terms; limited to not more than 1 per 
area.

 
 
            
(a)  Notwithstanding W.S. 24-1-102 and 24-3-101 through 
24-3-127, when it finds the public interest so requires, the board may initiate 
the identification procedure under this act for county roads in the county by 
adopting a resolution to which maps shall be incorporated by reference which 
shall indicate a general description of all county roads in the area described 
in the map which shall be unaffected by identification under the 
resolution.  No county road shall be 
listed as unaffected by a resolution under this act unless it was established 
under other law.  No map 
incorporated into the resolution shall describe an area of less than six hundred 
forty (640) acres.

            
(b)  The board shall not adopt more than one (1) resolution 
identifying county roads under this act in any area of the 
county.

            
(c)  No road shall be vacated or altered under this act if it 
is currently identified and maintained as a county road.  The identification procedure under this 
act shall not be used to establish a county road which was not previously 
established under other law.

 
 
§ 
24-3-204. Notice of identification to be published.

 
 
            
(a)  Prior to adoption of a resolution identifying county roads 
in any area in the county, notice of the proposed identification shall be 
published for four (4) successive weeks in four (4) successive issues in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the county in substantially the following 
form:

 
 
NOTICE 
OF IDENTIFICATION OF COUNTY ROADS

UNDER 
W.S. 24-3-201 THROUGH 24-3-206

 
 
TO 
WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:  The Board of 
County Commissioners intends to identify county roads in the following areas 
of.... (name of county) county under the identification procedure contained in 
W.S. 24-3-201 through 24-3-206:  
(general description of areas described in the map, i.e. USGS Quad map, 
section, township, range, etc.)

 
 
      The only county 
roads in the township which shall exist after this identification procedure are 
described as follows:

 
 
(Road 
name, road number or petition number)

 
 
      All other county 
roads within the area identified in the map which are not described above shall 
be accordingly vacated upon adoption of the resolution for identification.  All objections to or claims for damage 
by reason of this identification procedure shall be filed in writing with the 
county clerk of this county before 12:00 noon [12:00 p.m.] on the.... day of.... 
(not less than thirty (30) days after publication of the fourth notice) or the 
county roads will be vacated as indicated without reference to the objections or 
claims.

 
 
            
(b)  The notice shall include a map of each area affected 
indicating the approximate location of county roads which shall exist after the 
proposed identification action.

 
 
§ 
24-3-205. Objections and claims for damages; when filed; when barred; procedure 
for considering.

 
 
            
(a)  If the board initiates identification of county roads 
under this act, the board shall establish a date not less than thirty (30) days 
after the fourth notice is published, by which all objections to and claims for 
damages by reason of the identification shall be filed with the county 
clerk.

            
(b)  Objections to or claims for damages by reason of 
identification under this act filed after 12:00 noon [12:00 p.m.] on the date 
established in subsection (a) of this section shall not be considered by the 
board and are deemed waived.

            
(c)  If claims for damage are filed under this section, the 
claims shall be considered in the same manner as provided under W.S. 24-3-114 
through 24-3-121.

 
 
§ 
24-3-206. Effect of identification.

 
 
            
If the board identifies roads under this act, the roads designated as 
county roads in the identification action shall be the only county roads within 
the area identified and all other county roads within the area identified are 
accordingly altered or vacated.  The 
board shall direct the county clerk to and the county clerk shall record the 
identification as an entry in the abstract of lands books as if it were a 
conveyance of rights from the county to the lands affected.  Roads identified as county roads under 
this act, shall not be county roads unless the county has a valid title or 
recorded easement to the right-of-way.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. §§ 24-3-201 through 206 (Michie 1987).  Also see Yeager v. Forbes, 2003 WY 134, ¶¶ 31-32, 
78 P.3d 241, 255 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶28]   The statutes recited above 
authorize a county to remedy a problem such as the one that has arisen 
here.  However, these statutes do 
not mandate action on the part of counties and are not determinative of the 
issues raised herein.  The existing 
statutes, as well as our cases interpreting them over the years, track closely 
with common law principles that have long played a key role in issues such as 
this.  Two of the most important of 
those are:  "Once a road, always a 
road;" and, where a road is created by a statutory procedure such as that in 
play here, such a road cannot be abandoned, vacated, or disestablished without 
there being clear action on the part of the governmental entity that created the 
road to vacate, abandon, or disestablish it.  See generally 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways, Streets, and Bridges §§ 
148-189 (2008).

 
 
[¶29]   For these reasons, we conclude that 
the district court was correct that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether Bunker Road had been created.  In addition, we agree with the district 
court that Bunker Road has not been vacated, abandoned, or disestablished by 
Fremont County and, therefore, it is still a county road as a matter of 
law.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶30]   The district court's partial 
summary judgment order is affirmed.  
The district court's order dismissing the further claims of the Kings and 
Hansen is also affirmed.

  

BURKE, 
Justice, concurring 
in part and dissenting in part, with whom VOIGT, Justice, joins. 

 
 

[¶31]   I respectfully dissent from that 
part of the majority's decision affirming the dismissal of the Kings' and 
Hansen's claims.  Like the majority, 
I agree with the 
district court's decision to grant summary judgment to the Kings and Hansen on 
the question of whether the easement for Bunker Road was of public record, and 
to set for trial the question of whether they were bona fide purchasers for value without 
notice of the Bunker Road easement.  
I disagree, however, with the district court's subsequent decision to 
dismiss their claims in reliance on State 
Highway Comm'n v. Meeker, 75 Wyo. 210, 294 P.2d 603 (Wyo. 
1956).

 
 

[¶32]   Mr. 
Meeker challenged the county's ownership of a highway right-of-way across his 
property on the basis that there was "no instrument of record in the office of 
the county clerk showing the highway."  
Id. at 215, 294 P.2d  at 
604.  The right-of-way had been 
acquired through eminent domain, however, and the Court found "no statute which 
required the transfer of title by eminent domain to be recorded" in the public 
record.  Id. at 218, 294 P.2d  at 605.  The Court said that "failure to record 
an instrument which is not required to be recorded does not affect or vitiate 
the instrument as to anyone, and it is valid not only between the parties 
thereto, but also to subsequent purchasers."  Id.  "Hence," the Court wrote, "it is quite 
clear that the title the State acquired under the condemnation proceedings in 
1950 is valid and good against any subsequent purchaser of the same 
property."  Id.  Because Bunker Road had been established 
through eminent domain, the district court applied the ruling of the Meeker case and dismissed the Kings' and 
Hansen's claims.

 
 

[¶33]   Meeker 
detours from a long line of Wyoming cases emphasizing that county road easements 
must be placed on the public record.  
George W. Condon Co. v. Board of 
County Comm'rs of Natrona County, 56 Wyo. 38, 54, 103 P.2d 401, 407 (1940) 
(statute "indicates a policy that roads should be shown on the records"); Nixon v. Edwards, 72 Wyo. 274, 293, 264 P.2d 287, 294 (1953) (Statutes dating from 1877, 1886, 1919, and 1921, all 
demonstrate "how thoroughly the legislature was convinced that all rural public 
roads should be shown on the public records."); Rocky Mountain Sheep Co. v. Board of County 
Comm'rs of Carbon County, 73 Wyo. 11, 269 P.2d 314 (1954); Ruby v. Schuett, 360 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 
1961); Kern v. Deerwood Ranch, 528 P.2d 910 (Wyo. 1974); Yeager 
v. Forbes, 
2003 WY 134, 78 P.3d 241 (Wyo. 2003).  
Each of these cases is factually distinguishable from the case before us 
now, but taken together, they establish that the Wyoming Legislature and this 
Court have consistently, with the exception of Meeker, said that county roads must be 
placed on the public record.

 
 
[¶34]   This policy extends not to county 
roads only, but to all real property conveyances.  "Public policy requires that subsequent 
purchasers be able to rely on the title shown in public records."  Grose v. Sauvageau, 942 P.2d 398, 403 
(Wyo. 1997).  Applying Meeker to the case at hand, however, 
means that neither the Kings nor Hansen can rely on their title as shown in the 
Fremont County Clerk's property records.  
That seriously undermines "the purpose of our recording statutes, which 
entitle one to rely on public records and determine whether or not a certain 
property is subject to liens, prior encumbrances or other outstanding 
claims."  Wyoming Dep't of Revenue & 
Taxation-Excise Tax Div. v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A.-Kemmerer, 718 P.2d 31, 35 (Wyo. 1986).

 
 
[¶35]   The Court in Meeker indicated that the proceedings of 
the Board of County Commissioners gave Mr. Meeker constructive notice of the 
Commissioners' decision to acquire the highway right-of-way.  As stated in a droll but persuasive 
argument offered by Hansen, if the ruling in Meeker is controlling in this case, 
then

 
 
every 
conveyance of land would have to be accompanied by a review of all proceedings 
of the county commissioners back to 1890.  
With the greatest respect to the important and critical functions 
performed by each board of county commissioners, the inordinate cost and 
agonizing boredom of such an exercise is readily apparent.

 
 

[¶36]   Because 
of its anomalous nature and impracticable result, the decision in Meeker should be limited to its peculiar 
facts.  By the time of trial in the 
Meeker case, "construction of the 
highway was commenced and . . . substantially completed."  Meeker, 75 Wyo. at 214, 294 P.2d  at 
604.  That is not true of Bunker 
Road.  In addition, Mr. Meeker 
"was in possession of the land in question as lessee during all of the time the 
eminent domain proceedings were taking place and must have had notice 
thereof."  Id. at 219, 294 P.2d  at 606.  Hansen and the Kings were not in 
possession of the land in question in 1913 when the County Commissioners 
undertook to establish Bunker Road. 

 
 

[¶37]   More 
significantly, Meeker is 
distinguishable on legal grounds.  
That decision rested on the Court's finding "no statute which required 
the transfer of title by eminent domain to be recorded" in the public 
record.  Id. at 218, 294 P.2d  at 605.  In the case before us now, there is at 
least one statute requiring the Bunker Road easement to be recorded.  In 1919, the Wyoming Legislature enacted 
this statute: 

 
 
On 
and after January 1st, 1922, all roads within this State shall be highways, 
which have been or may be declared by law to be national, state, territorial or 
county roads or highways.  It shall 
be the duty of the several Boards of County Commissioners, within their 
respective counties, prior to said date, to determine what if any such roads now 
or heretofore travelled but not heretofore officially established and recorded, 
are necessary or important for the public use as permanent roads, and to cause 
such roads to be recorded, or if need be laid out, established and recorded, and 
all roads recorded as aforesaid, shall be highways.  No other roads shall be highways unless 
and until lawfully established as such by official 
authority.

 
 

1919 
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 112, § 1.  In 
1921, this statute was amended to change the deadline date to January 1, 
1924.  1921 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 100, 
§ 1.  With that alteration, the 
statute remains in effect today.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-1-101(a) (LexisNexis 2009).  The County Commissioners undertook to 
establish Bunker Road in 1913, but failed to record it.  This statute imposed upon them the duty 
of rectifying that failure.   
Notably, this statute makes no distinction between roads 
acquired by eminent domain and those acquired by other means.  Because this statute required the Bunker 
Road easement to be recorded, 
the ruling in Meeker is not 
controlling here.1  

 
 

[¶38]   Accordingly, 
I would reverse the district court's decision to dismiss the claims raised by 
the Kings and Hansen.  I would 
remand to the district court with instructions to proceed to trial on the 
question of whether the Kings and Hansen are bona fide subsequent purchasers for 
value who took title to their properties without notice of the Bunker Road 
easement.

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The Meeker decision does not discuss this 
statute.