Case Title: Cattlemen's Steakhouse, Inc. v. Waldenville

Citation: 

Docket Number: 111562

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2013-11-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
CATTLEMEN'S STEAKHOUSE, INC. v. WALDENVILLE2013 OK 95Case Number: 111562Decided: 11/12/2013IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

CATTLEMEN'S STEAKHOUSE, INC., and STARNET INSURANCE CO., 
Petitioners,v.JOHN DAVID WALDENVILLE, OKLAHOMA COUNTY SHERIFF'S 
DEPARTMENT, OKLAHOMA COUNTY (OWN RISK #14772), and THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
COURT, Respondents.
PROCEEDING TO REVIEW AN ORDEROF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
COURT
¶0 The respondent, John David Waldenville (Waldenville/claimant/employee), 
was injured in an employment-related incident on May 21, 2011, while acting as a 
security guard for the petitioner, Cattlemen's Steakhouse, Inc. 
(Cattlemen's/employer). Initially, Cattlemen's contended that Waldenville was an 
independent contractor but later conceded that it had workers' compensation 
coverage for the claimant through their insurer. Nevertheless, the employer 
continued to assert that Waldenville was an employee of the respondent, Oklahoma 
County Sheriff's Department (Oklahoma County/Sheriff's Department), when 
injured. The trial court determined that: Cattlemen's was the employing entity 
when the employment-related injury occurred; Oklahoma County should be dismissed 
pursuant to 85 O.S. 2001 
§2b(G); Cattlemen's was estopped to dispute employee status based on the 
payment of workers' compensation premiums associated with Waldenville's 
employment; no evidence existed indicating that the employee was acting in his 
official capacity as a Deputy Sheriff at the time of the incident; and because 
the duties that Waldenville was carrying out at the time of his injury were the 
same or similar to those he executed as a Deputy Sheriff, the claimant's 
salaries were to be combined for establishment of weekly rates. Having retained 
this cause, we hold that: 1) the plain, clear, unmistakable, unambiguous, 
mandatory, and unequivocal language of 85 O.S. 2011 §313(G) mandates that private 
employers, hiring off-duty municipal employees, alone shall be responsible for 
the payment of workers' compensation benefits arising from incidents occurring 
during the hours of actual employment by the private employer; and 2) under the 
facts of this case, both the clear weight of the evidence and the overwhelming 
majority of extant jurisprudence support a determination that the claimant was 
engaged in the same, or substantially similar, employment to that of his 
profession as a Major with the Oklahoma County Sheriff's Department when he was 
injured, warranting the combination of salaries for purposes of determining 
workers' compensation benefits.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT'S ORDERIS SUSTAINED.
Jeffrey D. Nachimson, PIERCE, COUCH, HENDRICKSON, BAYSINGER & GREEN, LLP, 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for petitioners.Bruce V. Winston, James C. 
Ferguson, WALKER FERGUSON & FERGUSON, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 
respondent, Oklahoma County.W.C. Doty, THE BELL LAW FIRM, Norman, Oklahoma, 
for respondent, John David Waldenville.
WATT, J.:
¶1 We retained this cause to address two issues. The first is whether a 
political-subdivision employer may be required to provide workers' compensation 
benefits to an off-duty employee injured while providing services to a private 
entity. Second, we are asked whether, under the facts presented, the claimant's 
salaries from his full-time employment as a deputy sheriff and his part-time job 
as a security officer may be combined when determining the amount of benefits to 
which the employee is entitled.1
¶2 The answer to the first question is controlled by the plain, clear, 
unmistakable, unambiguous, mandatory, and unequivocal language of 
85 O.S. 2011 §313(G)2 providing that private 
employers, hiring off-duty municipal employees, alone shall be responsible for 
the payment of workers' compensation benefits arising from incidents occurring 
during the hours of actual employment by the private employer. The second issue 
requires that we determine whether the claimant's private sector employment was 
the same or similar to that of his duties as a deputy sheriff.3 Here, the employee drove 
an official cruiser to the job site, was dressed in uniform, and was carrying 
his badge and personal sidearm while engaged in transporting, on foot, his 
employer's money to a local night depository. Waldenville was shot in the head 
and so severely injured that he could not give chase. Under these unique facts, 
we determine that the employee's two salaries should be combined for the purpose 
of determining benefits. The clear weight of the evidence and the overwhelming 
majority of extant jurisprudence support the conclusion that, while acting as a 
security guard for the employer, the claimant was engaged in an employment 
substantially the same or similar to his duties as a Deputy Sheriff.
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 On May 21, 2011, Waldenville was delivering a night deposit to UMB Bank 
for Cattlemen's when he was ambushed, shot in the head, and robbed of two (2) 
money bags. At the time, Waldenville was employed full-time as a Major with the 
Oklahoma County Sheriff's Department and was working part-time for the employer 
as a security guard hired and paid by Cattlemen's. His regular duties as a 
Deputy were with the Administrative Bureau as Chief Financial Officer for the 
Sheriff's Office. Waldenville was also over the training division. Previously, 
he had been part of the SWAT team tactical unit. On the evening of the injury, 
the employee had permission from the Sheriff's Office to act as a security guard 
for Cattlemen's and other private employers. 
¶4 When shot, Waldenville was being paid for his services by Cattlemen's and 
was conducting business as the employer's part-time security guard. 
Nevertheless, with the permission of Oklahoma County, he was wearing his Deputy 
Sheriff's uniform, carrying his personal sidearm, and was utilizing a County 
police vehicle as transportation. Waldenville's regular duties for Cattlemen's 
involved providing security, i.e. protecting vehicles from vandalism in 
the parking lot, ensuring that transients did not interfere with customers, 
escorting employees from the place of business to their cars, and making the 
nightly deposit at the stockyard's bank. On occasion, during the hours of his 
employment with the employer, Waldenville issued tickets in the area for 
speeding and considered himself to be an active, on-duty Deputy Sheriff with the 
Oklahoma County Sheriff's Department at all times.
¶5 On June 7, 2011, a form 3 was filed in the Workers' Compensation Court 
alleging Waldenville suffered an accidental personal injury arising out of his 
employment with Cattlemen's. When Cattlemen's denied that Waldenville was their 
employee, the trial court allowed the joinder of the Oklahoma County Sheriff's 
Department. Initially, Cattlemen's denied that they had workers' compensation 
insurance coverage on the employee and asserted that he was an independent 
contractor. On February 13, 2013, the day of trial, Cattlemen's formally 
acknowledged that premiums were paid to the insurance carrier based on 
Waldenville's salary.4 A week later, the trial court issued an order finding 
that the claimant was entitled to compensation, dismissing Oklahoma County, and 
combining the claimant's wages from his two employments for the purpose of 
determining benefits. 
¶6 Cattlemen's filed its petition for review on March 11, 2013. The motion to 
retain was granted on June 26th. The briefing cycle was 
completed with the filing of the petitioner's reply. The record was provided to 
this Court on July 25, 2013.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7 To the extent that we are called upon to construe the statutory language 
at issue herein, we are presented with a pure question of law subject to our 
de novo review without deference to the workers' compensation court.5 The evidentiary standard 
of "against the clear weight of the evidence," having been in effect on the date 
of injury, is applicable here.6
¶8 a) The plain, clear, unmistakable, unambiguous, mandatory, 
and unequivocal language of 85 O.S. 2011 §313(G)mandates that 
private employers, hiring off-dutycounty employees, alone shall be 
responsiblefor the payment of workers' compensation benefitsarising from 
incidents occurring during the hoursof actual employment by the private 
employer.
¶9 Cattlemen's contends that it is not liable for payment of workers' 
compensation to Waldenville because the employee was not an "off-duty" municipal 
employee for whom it would be liable to pay workers' compensation benefits 
pursuant to 85 O.S. 2011 
§313(G).7 Rather, the employer insists, the employee was 
operating in his capacity as a police officer when he was shot while 
safeguarding money for the night deposit. Oklahoma County argues that the 
employee was acting purely in his capacity as a part-time security guard for 
Cattlemen's and was not performing the duties of a Deputy for the Sheriff's 
Department. Waldenville asserts that the trial court was correct in ruling that 
Cattlemen's was solely liable for compensation for the injuries he sustained. We 
agree with both Oklahoma County's and the employee's positions.
¶10 The employer relies primarily on two decisions from sister jurisdictions 
for support of its arguments. The first, City of Hialeah v. 
Weber, 492 So. 2d 1204 (D.C.Fla. 1986), involved a situation where a 
police officer was seeking workers' compensation benefits from the City for 
injuries incurred by an off-duty policeman who was providing his part-time 
employer with security services. The Weber Court determined that the City 
was responsible for workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained by the 
off-duty policeman. It did so on grounds that the actions the officer undertook, 
i.e. attempting to arrest individuals committing acts of vandalism 
outside the employer's private club, were such that he was performing his job as 
a police officer for the City when injured.
¶11 The second case upon which Cattlemen's relies is State v. 
Wilen, 4 Neb.App. 132, 539 N.W.2d 650 (1995). Wilen did not 
involve a claim for workers' compensation. Rather, the issue presented was 
whether an off-duty police officer, being paid by a private entity, was acting 
in her official capacity so as to support criminal charges against an individual 
driving his automobile toward the officer at a high rate of speed. The Nebraska 
Court determined that the officer was conducting herself in her official 
capacity and that the charge would stand.
¶12 Neither Weber nor Wilen support Cattlemen's contentions. 
Wilen did not involve any issue related to the payment of workers' 
compensation benefits, nor was the Nebraska Court called upon to distinguish 
between the status of the employee as either "on" or "off" duty. Rather, it 
recognized that the duties the officer performed for the restaurant were 
supplemental to her primary duties of law enforcement on behalf of the general 
public. 
¶13 Weber is of little help. Although its facts are similar enough to 
appear persuasive on the employment issue, the cause does not indicate that 
Florida has a statute resembling 85 O.S. §313(G) providing in pertinent part:
"Where a person who is employed by the state, a municipality, a 
county, or by any political subdivisions thereof, and who, while 
off-duty from the employment, is employed by a private employer, the 
private employer alone shall be liable for compensation under the Workers' 
Compensation Act for any injury or death of the person arising out of and in 
the course of employment which occurs during the hours of actual employment 
by the private employer. . . ." [Emphasis provided.]
¶14 The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and, if 
possible, give effect to the intention and purpose of the Legislature as 
expressed by the statutory language.8 Intent is ascertained from the whole act in light of 
its general purpose and objective9 considering relevant provisions together to give full 
force and effect to each.10 The Court presumes that the Legislature expressed its 
intent and that it intended what it expressed.11 Statutes are interpreted to attain that purpose and 
end12 championing the broad public policy purposes underlying 
them.13 Only where the legislative intent cannot be ascertained 
from the statutory language, i.e. in cases of ambiguity or conflict, are 
rules of statutory construction employed.14 If the language is plain and clearly expresses the 
legislative will, further inquiry is unnecessary.15
¶15 Title 85 O.S. 2011 
§313(G) is the Legislature's pronouncement on Oklahoma's public policy16 regarding a private employer's hiring of a county 
employee during off-duty hours from employment with the governmental employer. 
Utilizing mandatory language,17 it provides that private employers hiring off-duty 
county employees shall "alone"18 be responsible for any workers' compensation benefits 
payable for injuries occurring during the hours of actual employment with the 
private entity.
¶16 The plain, clear, unmistakable, unambiguous, and unequivocal language of 
85 O.S. 2011 §313(G),19 providing that private employers, hiring off-duty 
county employees, alone shall be responsible for the payment of workers' 
compensation benefits arising from incidents occurring during the hours of 
actual employment by the private employer governs this cause. We determine that, 
pursuant to the Legislature's pronouncement, Cattlemen's alone is responsible 
for payment of the off-duty municipal employee's workers' compensation 
benefits.
¶17 b) Under the facts presented, both the clear weight 
of the evidenceand the overwhelming majority of extant jurisprudence support 
adetermination that the claimant was engaged in the same, or 
substantiallysimilar, employment to that of his profession as a Major with 
theOklahoma County Sheriff's Department when he was injured,warranting 
the combination of salaries for purposes of determiningworkers' compensation 
benefits.
¶18 Having determined that Cattlemen's is responsible for payment of the 
claimant's compensation, we now address how the award should be computed. While 
there is a difference of opinion on whether the claimant's employment as a Major 
with the Sheriff's Department and as a security guard are combinable for a 
determination of compensation, the employer and employee agree that 
85 O.S. 2001 §2120 is the applicable statutory provision. The discord 
between Cattlemen's and Waldenville comes with their arguments of whether the 
two employments can be considered "the same or similar" within the meaning of 
the statute and the salaries combined for the purpose of determining the correct 
rate of compensation. 
¶19 Title 85 O.S. 
2001§21 provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this act, the average weekly wages of the 
injured employee at the time of the injury shall be taken as the basis upon 
which to compute compensation and shall be determined as follows:
(1) If the injured employee shall have worked in the employment in which he 
was working at the time of the accident whether for the same employer or not, 
during substantially the whole of the year immediately preceding his injury, his 
average annual earnings shall consist of two hundred sixty times the average 
daily wage or salary which he shall have earned in such employment during the 
days when so employed.
(2) If the injured employee shall not have worked in such employment during 
substantially the whole of such year, his average annual earnings shall consist 
of two hundred sixty times the average daily wage or salary which an employee of 
the same class working substantially the whole of such immediately preceding 
year in the same or in a similar employment in the same or a neighboring 
place shall have earned in such employment during the days when so employed.
(3) If either of the foregoing methods of arriving at the annual average 
earnings of an injured employee cannot reasonably and fairly be applied, such 
annual earnings shall be such sum as, having regard to the previous earnings of 
the injured employee and of other employees of the same or most similar class, 
working in the same or most similar employment in the same or neighboring 
locality, shall reasonably represent the annual earning capacity of the injured 
employee in the employment in which he was working at the time of the accident. 
. . . [Emphasis supplied.]
¶20 This statute provides the exclusive method for calculating a claimant's 
compensation rate. It is to be applied in the order designated by the 
Legislature.21 Subsection 3 of §21 is utilized when neither 
subsections 1 nor 2 can be fairly and reasonably applied.22 Subsection 3 has been utilized when, as here, part-time 
or irregular employment is involved.23 In such situations, utilization of subsection 3 allows 
for consideration of the employee's annual earning capacity. This calculation is 
fair to the employer, its insurer, and the claimant.24 Subsection 3 is meant to provide a broad method by 
which the "earning capacity" of an injured employee may be determined.25
¶21 Considering a statute almost identical to the one at issue here in 
Geneva-Pearl Oil & Gas Co. v. 
Hickman, 1931 OK 
74, 296 P. 954, the Court determined that the Legislature intended to make the 
average weekly wages of an injured employee at the time of the injury the 
basis upon which compensation should be paid. It is the "occupation" of the 
employee which is the defining factor for determining the benefits to be 
awarded under Hickman. In that case, the employee was acting as a pumper 
in both of his positions and the salaries from both employers were held 
combinable for purposes of the award of benefits. In Fox Bldg. 
Supply Co. v. Bond, 1979 OK 175, 604 P.2d 859, the Court considered Hickman along 
with other Oklahoma cases concerning the combination of wages for purposes of 
calculating workers' compensation benefits and determined that employments 
must be identical or substantially similar before a claimant will be permitted 
to combine the wages paid by two employers for purposes of determining a 
claimant's award. 
¶22 The employee's regular duties while engaged in his part-time employment 
with Cattlemen's required him to patrol the employer's parking lot to prevent 
vehicles from being vandalized and to ensure the safety of patrons from 
transients as they entered and exited the premises. At times, Waldenville was 
called upon to escort servers to and from their cars when leaving with their tip 
monies at the end of the evening. He was also expected to make the nightly 
deposit. On occasion, while on duty as a security guard, the claimant issued 
tickets or warnings to protect the safety of customers and citizens parking 
across the street from the restaurant. At all times, Waldenville considered 
himself to be an active, on-duty Deputy Sheriff with the Oklahoma County 
Sheriff's Department.26 
¶23 Waldenville was attacked while attempting to deliver his employer's 
property to the night depository. It cannot be denied that the protection of 
both public and private property falls within the ambit of a police officer's 
duties.27 Undoubtedly, the claimant looked like a police 
officer when he was shot. He was in uniform, wearing a badge, and carrying his 
service weapon. The employee arrived at Cattlemen's to start his shift in a 
clearly marked police vehicle equipped with a police radio and mobile data 
computer for the running of information. Title 11 O.S. 2011 §34-101(A) provides in mandatory 
language that a "municipal police officer shall at all times have the power to 
make or order an arrest for any offense against the laws of this state or the 
ordinances of the municipality."28 There is little doubt that, given the opportunity, 
Waldenville would have exercised his statutory authority to make an arrest of 
his assailants had he not been blind-sided by the attack and rendered immobile. 
In a situation not involving a workers' compensation claim but rather the 
Governmental Tort Claims Act, this Court held that an off-duty police officer 
executing an arrest was entitled to indemnification for legal costs from the 
employing municipality as he was "acting within the scope of his employment" 
when the arrest was made.29 
¶24 The facts of this case are largely undisputed. The overwhelming majority 
of sister courts faced with similar situations have determined that police 
officers, acting as security guards, were engaged in the performance of the job 
of a police officer.30 Where the workers' compensation court's determination 
that the employments are the same or similar can be reasonably applied and the 
clear weight of the evidence supports the same, we will not disturb such 
findings.31 The clear weight of the evidence and the majority of 
extant jurisprudence support the conclusion that, while acting as a security 
guard for the employer, the claimant was engaged in an employment substantially 
the same or similar to his duties as a Deputy Sheriff. Under the unique facts 
presented, we determine that the employee's two salaries should be combined for 
the purpose of determining benefits.
CONCLUSION
¶25 The language of 85 O.S. 2011 §313(G)32 is unambiguous and not subject to interpretation. The 
Legislature has spoken. The plain, clear, unmistakable, unambiguous, mandatory, 
and unequivocal language of the statute mandates that private employers, hiring 
off-duty county employees, shall be responsible for the payment of workers' 
compensation benefits arising from incidents occurring during the hours of 
actual employment.
¶26 We stress that Oklahoma police officers have an ever present, 
statutorily-imposed responsibility to stop crime. However, this opinion should 
not be read to conclude that an officer, employed as private security, may 
always be considered to be acting in his official capacity for all purposes. 
Nevertheless, here, the claimant looked like a police officer and had all an 
officer's trappings, including a badge, a gun, and a fully equipped cruiser. 
More importantly, he was engaged in the protection of property as he walked to 
make Cattlemen's night deposit. Finally, had Waldenville not been ambushed and 
put out of commission, there is little doubt that his training as a Deputy 
Sheriff would have surfaced and he would have done his best to stop the robbers 
and to effect their arrest. Under these unique facts, the duties the claimant 
was performing were identical or sufficiently similar to his full time 
profession as a police officer to warrant the combination of his wages for the 
purpose of determining the amount of compensation to which he is 
entitled.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT'S ORDERIS SUSTAINED.
COLBERT, C.J., REIF, V.C.J., WATT, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, TAYLOR, COMBS, 
GURICH, JJ. - CONCUR
KAUGER, J. - NOT PARTICIPATING 
FOOTNOTES
1 This Court does not issue 
advisory opinions or answer hypothetical questions. Ball v. 
Wilshire Ins. Co., 2007 OK 80, fn. 3, 184 P.3d 463; Scott v. Peterson, 
2005 OK 84, ¶27, 126 P.3d 1232. Therefore, we decline the petitioners' 
invitation to issue an advisory opinion addressing a constitutional issue 
neither raised until the filing of the Petitioners' Brief-In-Chief in this cause 
nor relevant to its resolution, i.e. whether the Legislature is 
prohibited from changing the standard of review in workers' compensation cases. 
See, WestOak Industries, Inc. v. DeLeon, 
2013 OK CIV APP 32, 299 P.3d 878 [Holding that workers' compensation 
statute directing application of a standard of review violated the separation of 
powers doctrine.] and Harvey v. Auto Plus of 
Woodward, 2012 OK CIV APP 
92, 287 P.3d 410 [Holding that statutorily prescribed standard of review did not violate 
separation of powers doctrine.]. Both employer and employee agree that the 
applicable standard of review is against the clear weight of the evidence while 
Oklahoma County asserts that it is immaterial what standard applies as it is 
statutorily exempt from the payment of any award. We do note that the cases 
cited by petitioner were promulgated by the Court of Civil Appeals and neither 
were presented to this Court for certiorari review. [Opinions released for 
publication by order of the Court of Civil Appeals are persuasive only and lack 
precedential effect. Rule 1.200, Supreme Court Rules, 12 O.S. 2011, Ch. 5, App. 
1; 20 O.S. 2011 
§§30.5 and 30.14.] In Williams Companies, Inc. v. 
Dunkelgod, 2012 OK 96, 295 P.3d 1107, we held that constitutional guarantees 
mandated that the statutory standard of review in effect on the date of injury 
be applied in the workers' compensation setting. 
We also need not address the employee's proposition of error concerning the 
trial court's exclusion of certain text messages offered to demonstrate that the 
Oklahoma County Sheriff had guaranteed payment of certain workers' compensation 
benefits. See, State ex rel. State Ins. Fund 
v. JOA, Inc., 2003 OK 82, ¶¶ 7 and 23, 78 P.3d 534 [No state official, counsel for a state 
official, or counsel for a non-state party possesses the authority to create an 
estoppel, concession, or stipulation of law so as to subtract from the State's 
sovereign power.]; Strong v. State ex rel. Oklahoma 
Police Pension & Retirement Bd., 
2005 OK 45, ¶14, 115 P.3d 889 [The general rule is that estoppel will 
not lie against the government.]. 
2 Title 85 O.S. 2011 §313(G) providing:
"Where a person who is employed by the state, a municipality, a county, or by 
any political subdivisions thereof, and who, while off-duty from the employment, 
is employed by a private employer, the private employer alone shall be liable 
for compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act for any injury or death of 
the person arising out of and in the course of employment which occurs during 
the hours of actual employment by the private employer. . . ."
The current version of the workers' compensation statute, being substantially 
similar to §2(b)(G), in effect at the time of Waldenville's injury, is referred 
to herein. We make no comment on the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act, 
85A O.S. Supp. 2014 
§1, et seq., scheduled to become effective February 1, 2014. 
3 Title 85 O.S. 2011 §21, see note 20, infra. 
4 Initially, Cattlemen's denied all liability for 
workers' compensation to the employee based on his status as an independent 
contractor. Although the employer continued to argue Waldenville's status as an 
employee versus independent contractor in testimony before the trial court, 
Cattlemen's attorney stipulated that Cattlemen's paid premiums to the insurance 
carrier on amounts of money paid to Waldenville and was, therefore, estopped 
from denying liability. See, 85 O.S. 2011 §357 providing:
"Every employer and insurance carrier who schedules any employee as a person 
employed by the employer for the purpose of paying or collecting insurance 
premiums on a workers' compensation insurance policy or who pays, receives or 
collects any premiums upon any insurance policy covering the liability of such 
employer under the workers' compensation law by reason of or upon the basis of 
employment of any such employee shall be estopped to deny that such employee was 
employed by the employer." 
5 W.R. Allison Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Compsource Oklahoma, 2013 OK 24, ¶10, 301 P.3d 407; Arrow Tool & 
Gauge v. Mead, 2000 OK 86, ¶6, 16 P.3d 1120. 
6 Under 85 O.S. 2011 §340(D), the Court may modify, 
reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the order or award where: "The order 
or award is against the clear weight of the evidence." 
7 Title 85 O.S. 2011 §313(G), see note 2, supra. 

8 White v. Lim, 2009 OK 79, ¶12, 224 P.3d 679; Head v. McCracken, 
2004 OK 84, ¶13, 102 P.3d 670; Balfour v. Nelson, 
1994 OK 149, ¶8, 890 P.2d 916, 39 A.L.R.5th 935. 
9 Keating v. Edmondson, 2001 OK 110, ¶8, 37 P.3d 882; McSorley v. Hertz 
Corp., 1994 OK 
120, ¶6, 885 P.2d 1343; Oglesby v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
1992 OK 61, ¶8, 832 P.2d 834. 
10 Haney v. State, 1993 OK 41, ¶5, 850 P.2d 1087; Public Serv. Co. 
of Oklahoma v. State ex rel. Corp. 
Comm'n, 1992 OK 
153, ¶8, 842 P.2d 750. 
11 Minie v. Hudson, 1997 OK 26, ¶7, 934 P.2d 1082; Fuller v. Odom, 
1987 OK 64, ¶4, 741 P.2d 449; Darnell v. Chrysler 
Corp., 1984 OK 
57, ¶5, 687 P.2d 132. 
12 Oklahoma Ass'n for 
Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma 
City, 1995 OK 
62, ¶5, 901 P.2d 800, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1029, 116 S. Ct. 674, 133 L. Ed. 2d 523 
(1995); Wilson v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. 
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 1979 OK 62, ¶5, 594 P.2d 1210. 
13 Haggard v. Haggard, 1998 OK 124, ¶1, 975 P.2d 439; Price v. Southwestern 
Bell Tel. Co., 1991 OK 50, ¶7, 812 P.2d 1355. 
14 State ex rel. Dept. of 
Human Serv. v. Colclazier, 1997 OK 134, ¶9, 950 P.2d 824; Matter of Estate 
of Flowers, 1993 OK 19, ¶11, 848 P.2d 1146. 
15 White v. Lim, see note 8, supra; 
Rout v. Crescent Public Works Auth., 
1994 OK 85, ¶10, 878 P.2d 1045. 
16 The Legislature defines Oklahoma's public policy 
through its statutory enactments. See, State ex rel. 
Hendrickson v. State ex rel. Corp. 
Comm'n, 2001 OK 
89, ¶13, 37 P.3d 835; Todd v. Frank's Tong Serv., Inc., 
1989 OK 121, ¶12, 784 P. 21d 47; 
Mobbs v. City of Lehigh, 1982 OK 149, ¶16, 655 P.2d 547, 31 A.L.R.4th 1. 
17 Generally, the use of "shall" signifies a command. 
City of Midwest City v. House of 
Realty, Inc., 2008 OK 28, fn. 5, 198 P.3d 886, cert. denied, ___U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2434, 174 L. Ed. 2d 228 (2009); Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 
2006 OK 98, ¶7, 152 P.3d 861; Cox v. State ex rel. 
Oklahoma Dept. of Human Servs., 
2004 OK 17,, ¶21, 87 P.3d 607. Nevertheless, there may be times when the 
term is permissive in nature. City of Midwest City 
v. House of Realty, Inc., this note, supra; 
Minie v. Hudson, see note 11, supra; Texaco, Inc. v. 
City of Oklahoma City, 1980 OK 169, ¶9, 619 P.2d 869. 
18 Considering definitions from two different 
dictionaries, sister courts have determined the usage of the term "alone" to be 
singular and synonymous with "solely," "without any other," or "exclusively." 
See, Rico v. Judson Lofts, Ltd., 404 S.W.3d 762 
(Tx.App. 2013) [Relying on the Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary (6th ed. 2007); Schenewerk v. Mid-Century 
Ins. Co., 263 S.W.3d 660 (Mo.App. 2008) [Relying on The 
Random House Dictionary of The English 
Language (2nd ed. 1987). 
19 Title 85 O.S. 2011 §313(G), see note 2, supra. 

20 Title 85 O.S. 2001§21 providing in pertinent part:
". . . (1)If the injured employee shall have worked in the employment in 
which he was working at the time of the accident whether for the same employer 
or not, during substantially the whole of the year immediately preceding his 
injury, his average annual earnings shall consist of two hundred sixty times the 
average daily wage or salary which he shall have earned in such employment 
during the days when so employed.
(2) If the injured employee shall not have worked in such employment during 
substantially the whole of such year, his average annual earnings shall consist 
of two hundred sixty times the average daily wage or salary which an employee of 
the same class working substantially the whole of such immediately preceding 
year in the same or in a similar employment in the same or a neighboring place 
shall have earned in such employment during the days when so employed.
(3) If either of the foregoing methods of arriving at the annual average 
earnings of an injured employee cannot reasonably and fairly be applied, such 
annual earnings shall be such sum as, having regard to the previous earnings of 
the injured employee and of other employees of the same or most similar class, 
working in the same or most similar employment in the same or neighboring 
locality, shall reasonably represent the annual earning capacity of the injured 
employee in the employment in which he was working at the time of the accident. 
. . ."
Title 85 O.S. 2011 
§331, which replaced §21, this note supra, retained the "same or similar" 
designation, providing in pertinent part:
"Except as otherwise provided in this act, the average weekly wages of the 
injured employee at the time of the injury shall be taken as the basis upon 
which to compute compensation and shall be determined as follows:
. . . 3. If either of the foregoing methods of arriving at the annual average 
earnings of an injured employee cannot reasonably and fairly be applied, the 
Workers' Compensation Court may consider average wages in the same or similar 
employment in the same area of the state where the injury occurred . . ."
Again, we do not comment on the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act, see 
note 2, supra. 
21 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Switch, 1994 OK 
59, ¶3, 878 P.2d 357; Eagle Picher Mining & Smelting 
Co. v. Lamkin, 1941 OK 132, ¶5, 117 P.2d 519. 
22 Id. 
23 Winrock Farms v. Eldred, 
1968 OK 149, ¶14, 446 P.2d 265. 
24 The Court in Winrock Farms v. 
Eldred, see note 23, supra, quoting from Safeway Stores v. 
Mauk, 1954 OK 
287, 275 P.2d 987. 
25 Eagle Picher Mining & 
Smelting Corp. v. Lamkin, see note 21, supra. 
26 Transcript of Proceedings, February 13, 2013, John 
David Waldenville testifying in pertinent part at pp. 15-16:
". . . Q. What were your duties at Cattlemen's?
A. Duties at Cattlemen's would be to watch the parking lot to make sure 
vehicles were not vandalized, to make sure that transients did not interfere 
with the customers coming and going and also coming within Cattlemen's itself, 
and to make the nightly deposit which would go over to the stockyard's bank 
which is one block to the north.
Q. During the time that you worked for Cattlemen's, had you ever given out 
any tickets or warning tickets to anybody in the area?
A. Yes, sir. Most generally seems like most of them were warnings. There 
would be individuals that would be driving excessive rate, either coming down 
Exchange or Agnew, I guess, were the streets there to the north or to the east 
just for the safety of the citizens that were parking across the street.
Q. When you were at Cattlemen's doing this security work, did you consider 
yourself to be an active, on-duty deputy sheriff of the Oklahoma County 
Sheriff's Department?
A. Yes, sir. . . ." 
27 The following definition appears in 11 O.S. 2011 §50-101(5), referring to parties 
who may be considered "officers" for the purpose of the Municipal Police Pension 
and Retirement System. It provides:
"'Officer' means any duly appointed and sworn full-time officer of the 
regular police department of a municipality whose duties are to preserve the 
public peace, protect life and property, prevent crime, serve warrants, enforce 
all laws and municipal ordinances of this state, and any political subdivision 
thereof, and who is authorized to bear arms in the execution of such duties." 

28 Title 11 O.S. 2011 §34-101 providing in pertinent 
part:
"A. A municipal police officer shall at all times have the power to make or 
order an arrest for any offense against the laws of this state or the ordinances 
of the municipality. The officer shall have such other powers, duties and 
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. . . ."
See also, 22 O.S. 2011 
§37.1 providing:
"An 'off-duty' law enforcement officer in official uniform in attendance at a 
public function, event or assemblage of people shall have the same powers and 
obligations as when he is 'on-duty'.
Nothing herein shall impose liability upon the governmental entity, by whom 
the law enforcement officer is employed, for actions of the said officer in the 
course of his employment by a nongovernmental entity." 
29 Groseclose v. City of 
Tulsa, 1998 OK 
112, ¶¶21-22, 990 P.2d 828. 
30 State v. Phillips, 205 W.Va. 673, 520 S.E.2d 670 (1999) [Off-duty, uniformed police officer working as security guard 
when assaulted was acting in his "official capacity."]; State v. 
Graham, 130 Wash. 2d 711, 927 P.2d 227, 65 A.L.R.5th 773 (1996) 
[Off-duty police officer working as private security guard acts in role of 
police officer when attempting arrest.]; Leach v. Board of 
Police Comm'rs of Kansas City, 118 S.W.3d 646 
(Mo.App. 2003) [Off-duty police officer was performing duties "the same or 
closely related" to those of on-duty officer.]; Cooper v. City 
of Dayton, 120 Ohio App.3d 34, 696 N.E.2d 640 (1997), appeal 
not allowed, 80 Ohio St.3d 1415, 84 N.E.2d 640 (1997) [Off-duty police 
officer injured while attempting to arrest shoplifter was entitled to benefits 
as city employee.]; Harris County Sheriff's Office 
v. Negrete, 03 FCDR 726, 578 S.E.2d 579 [Off-duty deputy sheriff injured 
in automobile accident while driving patrol car to his part-time job as security 
guard was injured in course of employment as deputy sheriff.]; State 
of Nebraska v. Wilen, 4 Neb.App. 132, 539 N.W.2d 650 (1995) 
[Off-duty police officer was working in official capacity for purposes of 
assault statute.]; Blackwell v. Harris County, 909 S.W.2d 135 (Tex.App. 1995) [Privately employed, off-duty deputy, was acting as deputy 
while directing traffic for funeral procession.]; Domanoski v. 
Borough of Fanwood, 237 N.J.Super. 452, 568 A.2d 123 (1989) 
[Off-duty police officer arresting shoplifter while acting as security guard 
acting in capacity as peace keeper.]; City of Hialeah v. 
Weber, 491 So. 2d 1204 (Fla.App. 1986) [Off-duty police officer, 
attempting to stop the slashing of tires in parking lot where he was acting as 
security guard, determined to be performing his duty as a police officer.]. 
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. City 
of Atlanta, 135 Ga.App. 390, 217 S.E.2d 647 (1975) [Off-duty 
police officer who, with permission of city functioned as private security 
guard, was killed while attempting to control disturbance was performing police 
function.]. See also, Brooks v. State, 1977 OK CR 96, 561 P.2d 137 [Holding that a police officer, whether in 
uniform or not, taking it upon himself to enforce law acts as police officer in 
performance of his duties.]; A. Larson & L. Larson, Larson's 
Workers' Compensation Law, §9303(1)(g) [Workers' 
compensation is intended to compensate an employee fairly for a lost earning 
capacity. If an employee works two jobs concurrently and a workplace injury 
disables that employee from working both jobs, compensating the employee based 
on only the earnings from one employer effectively leaves the employee 
uncompensated for the loss of the other set of earnings.]; P. Golla, Performance 
of Public Duty by Off-Duty Police Officer Acting as Private Security Guard, 65 
A.L.R.5th 623 (1999). But see, Lane County v. Tadlock, 131 
Or.App. 282, 884 P.2d 875 (1994) [No workers' compensation coverage for off-duty 
deputy where no duty imposed to act while off-duty.]; Mount Sinai 
Hosp. v. City of Miami Beach, 523 So. 2d 722 
(Fla.App. 1988) [Off-duty police officer falling while exiting hospital was not 
acting as police officer at time of injury.]. 
31 See, Friendship Farmer's 
Co-Operative Gin v. Allred, 1945 OK 350, ¶0, 165 P.2dc 838. 
32 Title 85 O.S. 2011 §313(G), see note 2, 
supra.