Case Title: Garcia v. Uniwyo Fed. Credit Union

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95-86

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Garcia v. Uniwyo Fed. Credit Union1996 WY 84920 P.2d 642Case Number: 95-86Decided: 06/25/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Linda GARCIA,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

UNIWYO FEDERAL CREDIT 
UNION,

 Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from The District 
Court, Albany County, Arthur T. Hanscum, J.

Michael 
Schilling, Laramie, for appellant.

C.M. Aron and 
James R. Clark of Aron and Hennig, Laramie, for appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

TAYLOR, Justice.

[¶1]      Linda Garcia was 
employed by UniWyo Federal Credit Union for just over six months before being 
terminated without expression of cause. Asserting a variety of bases, Garcia 
sued UniWyo for damages stemming from her termination. Concluding that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact with respect to Garcia being an at will 
employee, we affirm the district court's entry of summary judgment for 
UniWyo.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant, Linda 
Garcia (Garcia), consolidates various arguments in her statement of a single 
issue:

Are there genuine issues 
of material fact which preclude summary judgment in favor of the appellee on 
appellant's claims for breach of implied employment contract, breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and promissory estoppel?

[¶3]      Appellee, UniWyo 
Federal Credit Union (UniWyo), states the issues:

I.          
Was appellant an at will employee, subject to discharge at any time for 
any reason?

II.          
Is the at will presumption eliminated for all employees if the employer 
assigns its manager the responsibility, among others, to discharge employees for 
cause?

III.         Can a 
new employee create a Wilder special relationship by performing a pre-existing 
duty as "separate consideration"?

IV.        Can an 
employee impose a promissory estoppel obligation on the employer merely by 
reporting "concerns" about "management style"?

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      Garcia was hired 
by UniWyo to manage its loan department without any express contract of 
employment. UniWyo's President, Karen Stapp (Stapp), hired and supervised 
Garcia.

[¶5]      During Garcia's 
employment with UniWyo, an incomplete collection of general "Personnel Policies" 
existed which were adopted piecemeal between August of 1982 and March of 1993. 
The personnel policies vest broad discretionary powers in a "Manager," a 
reference to UniWyo's President.

[¶6]      UniWyo's 
Personnel Policy P-3, adopted August 20, 1987, reads, in pertinent 
part:

The Manager is 
responsible for hiring employees, prescribing their duties and work hours, 
fixing wages, approving leave, suspending, demoting or discharging for cause all 
within limitations prescribed by the Board of Directors.

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

All new employees shall 
be on a 6-month probationary status. During this period, the employee shall be 
informed of his/her progress.

UniWyo's 
Personnel Policy P-3 also classifies UniWyo employees as permanent full-time, 
permanent part-time, and temporary.

[¶7]      Six months and a 
few days after being hired, Garcia was terminated without expression of cause. 
Garcia filed suit, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
UniWyo, concluding Garcia had no legitimate expectation of anything other than 
at will employment.

III. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶8]      Where no material 
facts are at issue, summary judgment is a desirable means of expeditiously 
confronting underlying questions of law. Verschoor v. Mountain West Farm Bureau 
Mut. Ins. Co., 907 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Wyo. 1995). If issues of material fact 
persist, summary judgment is improper. Hanna v. Cloud 9, Inc., 889 P.2d 529, 532 
(Wyo. 1995). A fact is material if its proof tends to establish or refute any 
element of a cause of action or an asserted defense. Wilder v. Cody Country 
Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 216 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶9]      Appellate 
scrutiny of summary judgments entails a de novo review of the same 
materials available to the district court, affording that court's findings no 
particular deference. Daily v. Bone, 906 P.2d 1039, 1042 (Wyo. 1995). Every 
indulgence is reserved for the party opposing summary judgment, granting that 
party's position all favorable inferences fairly to be drawn from the record. 
Tidwell v. HOM, Inc., 896 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶10]   Establishment of a prima facie case 
for summary judgment obliges the party resisting to marshall admissible 
evidence, rather than general or conclusory allegations, manifesting existence 
of issues of fact. Hanna, 889 P.2d  at 534. The bare assertion that questions of 
fact remain, absent evidentiary support, will not deflect a prima facie case 
for summary judgment. Verschoor, 907 P.2d  at 1297.

IV. 
DISCUSSION

A. IMPLIED IN FACT 
CONTRACT

[¶11]   Garcia claims that UniWyo's 
Personnel Policy P-3, by distinguishing probationary from permanent employees 
and giving the Manager responsibility for "discharging [employees] for cause[,]" 
afforded her a legitimate expectation of permanent employment from which she 
might only be discharged for cause. At the very least, Garcia argues that the 
personnel policy constituted an ambiguous contract. Such ambiguity, she 
contends, makes interpretation of the contract a mixed question of fact and law, 
leaving the case inappropriate for summary judgment.

[¶12]   Employment contracts are presumed 
to be at will in Wyoming and, absent more, discharge may occur without cause. 
Alexander v. Phillips Oil Co., 707 P.2d 1385, 1386 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting Siebken 
v. Town of Wheatland, 700 P.2d 1236, 1237 (Wyo. 1985)). However, personnel 
policies or an employee handbook may rebut that presumption, giving employees 
contractual rights founded upon consideration flowing to the employer in the 
form of a more orderly, cooperative and loyal work force. Leithead v. American 
Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1062-63 (Wyo. 1986) (citing Mobil Coal Producing, 
Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 707 (Wyo. 1985)).

[¶13]   Recognition of such implied in fact 
contracts of employment occasions no need for departure from our usual rules of 
contract interpretation. McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 820 P.2d 986, 
988 (Wyo. 1991) (McDonald II). Summary judgment remains appropriate when the 
contract in question is unambiguous. Martin v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 894 P.2d 618, 620 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶14]   Whether a contract is ambiguous 
constitutes a question of law. Prudential Preferred Properties v. J and J 
Ventures, Inc., 859 P.2d 1267, 1271 (Wyo. 1993). Absent ambiguity, 
interpretation of implied in fact contracts is a question of law. Feather v. 
State Farm Fire and Cas., 872 P.2d 1177, 1180 (Wyo. 1994). We search for 
objective manifestations sufficient to create reasonable reliance by the party 
claiming benefit. McDonald II, 820 P.2d  at 990. UniWyo's personnel policies 
constitute a contract and will be read as a whole. Alexander, 707 P.2d  at 1389. 
Each provision is read in light of the others to find the plain meaning of the 
document. Martin, 894 P.2d  at 620. We also look past specific terms to the 
general tenor of employee handbooks. Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 1063.

[¶15]   UniWyo's personnel policies are 
general statements on policy, fragmented in nature, adopted in piecemeal fashion 
on increasingly remote occasions. Both parties argue that many of the personnel 
policies are observed principally in the breach.

[¶16]   The question is whether the 
personnel policies' denomination of probationary and permanent employees, taken 
with the Manager's prerogative to discharge employees for cause, engender a 
legitimate expectation of permanent employment on Garcia's part. The first hint 
of an answer comes in the generally unavailing search for a distinction between 
permanent and probationary employees. 

[¶17]   Probationary employees are 
evaluated at the end of six months while permanent employees are evaluated once 
a year. Permanent employees may earn leave time while probationary employees may 
not. Significantly, the Manager's prerogative to discharge for cause fails to 
discriminate between probationary and permanent employees.

[¶18]   Personnel policy assignment of 
managerial responsibility, inter alia, for "discharging [employees] for 
cause * * * within limitations prescribed by the Board of Directors" creates no 
implied in fact contract. We have consistently required something more of 
handbooks, be it clarification of what constitutes cause or a progressive 
discipline schedule. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Wackenhut Corp., 867 P.2d 701, 703 
(Wyo. 1994) and cases cited therein. Neither is present in UniWyo's personnel 
policies.

[¶19]   UniWyo made a prima facie case for 
summary judgment, obliging Garcia to muster competent, admissible evidence to 
the contrary. Garcia's rejoinder: "I just feel like there needs to be a 
cause[.]" Such feelings create no material issue of fact. Summary judgment on 
the implied in fact contractual claim was proper.

B. THE WILDER SPECIAL 
RELATIONSHIP

[¶20]   Three days prior to her 
termination, Garcia and another employee asked for a meeting with at least one 
member of UniWyo's Board of Directors and some members of the Supervisory 
Committee, a panel serving an oversight function. See 12 U.S.C. § 1761. 
According to Garcia, the purpose of that meeting was "to discuss [her] own and 
the staff's experiences with and concerns about [UniWyo's President] Karen 
Stapp." Garcia wanted that meeting to be kept a secret from Stapp and asked for 
such assurances from those present. Other employees present at the meeting 
recall some assurance of confidentiality, but could neither reiterate the exact 
nature of the pledge nor identify the maker. According to Garcia, "[t]hey 
weren't supposed to go to Karen [Stapp] and to tell Karen what [we] were 
doing."

[¶21]   A Board member present at the 
meeting later informed the Board's President, who then briefed Stapp on the 
identity of those present as well as what had been discussed. One day later, 
Stapp terminated Garcia.

[¶22]   All contracts of employment in 
Wyoming contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but we limit 
actions upon such covenants to those rare and exceptional cases where a special 
relationship has been demonstrated between employer and employee. Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 220-22. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may, upon 
demonstration of a special relationship, serve to redress the inherent imbalance 
between corporations and individual employees. Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 221; 
McCullough v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶23]   Usually, the special relationship 
giving employees an action on the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing stems from a long term employment relationship coupled with a discharge 
calculated to avoid employer responsibilities to the employee, e.g., benefits or 
commissions. See Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (1977); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 732 P.2d 1364, 1366-69 
(1987). The duration of an employment relationship over a period of years is not 
sufficient, alone, to give rise to a special relationship. We are aware, 
however, of no case in which such a special relationship has ripened over a 
period of mere months. See, e.g., D'Angelo v. Gardner, 107 Nev. 704, 819 P.2d 206, 215 (1991).

[¶24]   Employed for just over six months 
prior to termination, Garcia could hardly leverage a self-initiated coffee 
klatsch with sundry Board and Supervisory Committee members into the basis of a 
special relationship. Further, there is no evidence that UniWyo used Garcia's 
termination to avoid benefits earned under the contract of employment. Wilder, 
868 P.2d  at 222.

C. PROMISSORY 
ESTOPPEL

[¶25]   Finally, fortified by dictum from 
Ware v. Converse County School Dist. No. 2, 789 P.2d 872, 875 (Wyo. 1990), 
Garcia would parlay her secret meeting with various Board and Supervisory 
Committee members into a case for promissory estoppel. Promissory estoppel, as a 
cause of action in employment cases, first appeared in McDonald v. Mobil Coal 
Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1990), reh'g granted 820 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 
1991) (McDonald I). Ware, published the same day as McDonald I, relied upon the 
latter with respect to promissory estoppel. Whatever precedential value McDonald 
I may have conveyed was extinguished, following rehearing, by McDonald II, 820 P.2d 986, which superseded McDonald I.

[¶26]   We have, then, yet to definitively 
rule on the availability of promissory estoppel in the employment context. This 
case affords no opportunity for such a ruling. Even were promissory estoppel 
available, Garcia's inability to sustain a factual issue as to the authority of 
anyone present at the secret meeting to bind UniWyo would doom her opposition to 
summary judgment. Lavoie v. Safecare Health Service, Inc., 840 P.2d 239, 251 
(Wyo. 1992) (citing United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in City of 
Cheyenne, Laramie County, Wyo., 141 F. Supp. 300, 309 (D.Wyo. 
1956)).

V. 
CONCLUSION

[¶27]   Disregard for chain of command may 
be required to combat illegality, but going over a supervisor's head merely to 
critique management style is an unlikely path to tenure. When Garcia reached the 
six month anniversary of her employment, her supervisor, Stapp, had been 
UniWyo's Manager/President for the preceding fifteen years. It was then, at 
best, a curious decision for Garcia to request a meeting with Stapp's superiors 
to criticize her management style. Whether or not Garcia's actions hastened her 
termination, she could scarcely have expected they would enhance her job 
security.

[¶28]   Only total disregard of Wyoming's 
at will presumption might elevate UniWyo's ragtag personnel policies into 
something arguably approaching an implied in fact contract of permanent 
employment. In the absence of competent, admissible evidence to the contrary, 
Garcia is presumed to have been terminable at will. Summary judgment for UniWyo 
is affirmed.

MACY, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶29]   I must dissent from the majority's 
holding in this case because I am not convinced that we can ignore UniWyo's 
Personnel Policy P-3. That policy expressly rebutted the presumption that Garcia 
was an "at-will" employee by stating that all new employees serve a six-month 
probationary period and by specifically declaring that an employee's discharge 
would be for cause. See, e.g., Loghry v. Unicover Corporation, 878 P.2d 510 
(Wyo. 1994); Lincoln v. Wackenhut Corporation, 867 P.2d 701 (Wyo. 1994). 
Questions of fact, therefore, remain as to whether or not UniWyo had just cause 
to terminate Garcia's employment. The summary judgment which the district court 
granted in favor of UniWyo should be reversed, and the case should be remanded 
for further proceedings.