Case Title: JS v. MB

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0200

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
JS v. MB2010 WY 114237 P.3d 974Case Number: S-09-0200Decided: 08/10/2010
 
 
 
 
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

JS,Appellant(Petitioner),v.MB,Appellee(Respondent)

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Donna 
Sheen, Cheyenne, WY

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Richard 
L. Harden, Casper, WY

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 
HILL, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; KITE, C.J., files a specially concurring 
opinion.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, JS 
("Father"), challenges the district court's order requiring the parties to 
exchange child visitation on a weekly basis when the child reaches age five in 
2013.  We affirm the district 
court.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Father lists one 
issue:

 
 
Was 
the district court's Order Regarding 
Custody, Visitation, and Support ordering the parties to alternate weeks 
with the child beginning at age 5, an abuse of discretion that does not serve 
the child's best interests?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In 2007, 
Appellee, MB ("Mother"), and Father were involved in a relationship and 
conceived a child.  During Mother's 
pregnancy, the relationship ended.  
The parties' son was born in 2008.  
On August 12, 2008, Father filed an action to establish paternity and 
sought custody of his son.

 
 
[¶4]      A two-day trial 
was held, the first day on March 12, 2009, and the second on May 22, 2009.  After the first day, the court entered 
an order establishing paternity and giving temporary custody to Mother.  After the second day, the court awarded 
Father "primary legal and physical custody" of the parties' son.  Mother was awarded visitation, which 
begins every Saturday at 9 a.m. and ends on Tuesdays at 6 p.m.  The order provided that, "[w]hen the 
child attains 5 years of age, the mother and father shall alternate weeks with 
the mother and father exchanging the child on Sundays at 5:00 p.m."  Father appealed, challenging only this 
provision of the order.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      We review a 
district court's custody determination according to the following standards: 

 

 
Child 
custody decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial court. 


It 
has been our consistent principle that in custody matters, 
the welfare and needs of the children are to be given paramount consideration. 
The determination of the best interests of the child is a question for the trier 
of fact. We do not overturn the decision of the trial court unless we are 
persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of a violation of some legal 
principle. 

Resor 
v. Resor, 
987 P.2d 146, 148 (Wyo. 1999), 
quoting Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 1998).

 
 

Testerman 
v. Testerman, 
2008 WY 112, ¶ 8, 193 P.3d 1141, 1144 (Wyo. 
2008).

 

 
A 
court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances. Our review entails evaluation of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the district court's decision. . . . 
Findings of fact not supported by the evidence, contrary to the evidence, or 
against the great weight of the evidence cannot be sustained. Similarly, an 
abuse of discretion is present "when a material factor deserving significant 
weight is ignored.'"

 
 

Eickbush 
v. Eickbush, 
2007 WY 179, ¶ 9, 171 P.3d 509, 511 (Wyo. 2007) 
(citations omitted).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      In his only 
issue, Father argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering 
what amounts to shared custody, although each party sought primary custody.1  Father complains that the district court 
erred in ordering the arrangement, which is to take place in 2013, without a 
separate hearing to determine the child's best interests at that time.  Father also submits that because of 
their inability to communicate, the parties have not demonstrated the ability to 
succeed in a shared custody arrangement.

 
 
[¶7]      In response, 
Mother contends that there was no abuse of discretion and disagrees that this is 
a shared custody case because Father was awarded primary legal and physical 
custody.  Mother asserts that the 
district court provided detailed findings and reasoning for its decision - for 
instance, that Mother was the primary caregiver throughout the child's life, the 
age of the child, the fact that the child has a half-brother, and the fact that 
in 2013, the child will be school-aged.  
Mother also argues that the parties' inability to communicate is 
accounted for by the order of structured visitation.

 
 
[¶8]      Although Father 
does technically hold primary custody of the parties' child, the schedule set by 
the district court does amount to sharing the time of the child almost 
equally.2  The visitation awarded to Mother is 
indeed liberal.  There is statutory 
discretion for a district court to order visitation, "in enough detail to 
promote understanding and compliance," as "it deems in the best interests of 
each child."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-202(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2009).

 
 

[¶9]      In this case, as 
per the court order, the sharing is of visitation, not of custody.  Undeniably, however, the parties must 
operate in terms of visitation as they might if the court had ordered shared 
custody.  In Buttle v. Buttle, 2008 WY 
135, 196 P.3d 174 (Wyo. 2008) 
we 
restated our shared custody precedent:

 
 
We 
have repeatedly said that divided or shared custody is not 
favored by this Court absent good reason therefore." Eickbush, ¶ 11, 
171 P.3d  at 512.  We have explained 
that "stability in a child's environment is of utmost importance to the child's 
well-being,"  Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 432, while "a measure of instability is inherent" in joint custody 
arrangements. [Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55 (Wyo. 1995)].  We have emphasized that the "success of a 
joint or shared custody arrangement hinges on the extent to which the parents 
are able to communicate and agree on the matters relevant to the children's 
welfare.  Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 
433.

 
 

Id. 
¶ 31, 196 P.3d  at 181-184.

 
 

[¶10]   When 
a district court's exercise of discretion in custody matters involves splitting 
custody of children between parents or other unconventional custody approaches, 
such as liberal visitation that amounts to equally splitting the child's time, 
we have said that it must provide an explanation of its reasoning and place its 
findings on the record so that, upon review, this Court can be certain that a 
comprehensive evaluation of all relevant factors occurred prior to determining 
custody. Pace v. Pace, 2001 
WY 43, ¶ 17, 22 P.3d 861, 867 (Wyo. 2001).  In this 
case, the district court found as follows:

 
 
            
4(a).  Regarding the quality of the relationship the child has 
with each parent: the Court finds that the minor child has a good relationship 
with his mother.  The relationship 
with the father has been limited, not because of the father's unwillingness or 
inability but simply a lack of access to the child.

            
4(b).  Regarding the ability of each parent to provide adequate 
care for the child throughout each period of responsibility, including arranging 
for the child's care by others as needed, it would appear both parents are able 
to provide adequate care for the child throughout the period of responsibility 
and arrange for the care by others as needed.  There is some concern as to some of the 
choices that the mother has made in terms of individuals that have cared for the 
child at times.

            
4(c).  Regarding the relative competency and fitness of each 
parent, both parents appear competent and fit.

            
4(d).  Regarding each parent's willingness to accept all 
responsibilities of parenting, including a willingness to accept care for the 
child at specified times and to relinquish care of the minor child to the other 
parent at specified times, it would appear that the father has accepted 
responsibility at all times he has been able to care for the child.  The mother, for the most part, has 
accepted responsibility for parenting, but there have been times when, she is 
engaged in her own activities to the detriment of the child.  As to the component to relinquish care 
to the other parent at specified times, mother was resist[ant] to and unwilling 
to allow the father to provide care for the child.  Based upon the cumulative testimony, 
there was some control and some reluctance to allow the father to be a father to 
this child by the mother.  It is in 
the best interests of the child to have a relationship with both 
parents.

            
4(e).  Regarding how the parents and each child can best 
maintain and strengthen a relationship with each other, the child can best 
maintain and strengthen a relationship with each parent by spending as much time 
as appropriate and in the best interest of the child to have that time with the 
child.  4(f).  Regarding 
how the parents and child interact and communicate with each other, and how such 
interaction and communication can be improved, this Court ordered structured 
visitation and the evidence is that the parties were able to communicate with 
each other in doing that.  However, 
in looking at how the parties operate outside this Court's orders, it appears 
that some of the communications that the mother has engaged in were troubling 
and less than mature individuals engaging in the terms of communications.  For the most part, there's been some 
communication and some lack of communication as to doctor's appointments.  The mother, at times, did not 
communicate with the father as to those visits and treatment of the child and to 
a certain extent did not want the father to know some of the circumstances 
regarding the child.  This weighs 
slightly in favor of the father.

            
4(g).  Regarding the ability and willingness of each parent to 
allow the other to provide care without intrusion, respect the other parent's 
rights and responsibilities, including the right to privacy; with the exception 
of one visit with the child, the mother has not been very willing to allow the 
father to provide care without intrusion.  
There were some actions by the father that showed he was persistent in 
terms of reviewing and seeing what was going on with the child but, to a certain 
extent, that was attributable to the lack of communication by the mother and the 
lack of her giving the father access to the child.  This weighs slightly in favor of the 
father.

            
4(h).  Regarding the geographic distance between the parents' 
residences; both parents reside in the Casper [area] so this is not at issue at 
this time.

            
4(i).  Regarding the current physical and mental ability of 
each parent to care for the child; there is no indication as to any current 
physical or mental inability of either parent or limitation or other physical or 
mental ability.

4(j).  Regarding 
other factors the Court deems necessary and relevant; the Court considered the 
structure and the support this child has in terms of other family members and 
their involvement.  The gravest 
concern in determining the custody and the placement included the people mother 
has chosen to associate with.  In 
determining the primary physical and legal custody the Court considered which 
parent would allow the other parent to have an opportunity to be involved with 
this child and respect that right and avoid using this child as a pawn in their 
scheme.

 
 
[¶11]   Our assessment of the order is that 
it explains the district court's reasoning behind the custody arrangement in 
full.  The record also reflects the 
court's analysis.  Along with the 
district court's explanation of its ruling, this Court has also said that 
another important factor for our consideration "is the extent to which the 
parents are able to communicate and work together to promote the child's best 
interest."  Buttle, ¶ 39, 196 P.3d  at 183.  In our view, this is the primary concern 
in this case.  The parties clearly 
have a history of a tenuous relationship.  
Although there is nothing in the record to reflect a pattern of violence 
or abuse, we have stated the importance of general amiability among 
parents:

 
 
The 
premise of the joint custody order is the parents' ability to resolve between 
themselves the custodial details.  
There can be little question that joint custody requires sincere 
dedication on the part of each parent to safeguard the security and stability 
vital to a child's best interest.  
When the parents are unable to make this cooperative arrangement work, a 
change of circumstances justifying judicial reexamination of the original joint 
custody order is demonstrated.

 
 

Gurney 
v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55 (Wyo. 1995). 

 
 

[¶12]   Father points to Buttle 
in 
support of his argument.  In Buttle, the parties admitted they were unable 
to get along and physically "fought."  
This Court determined that the parties had no history of effective 
communication or cooperative decision making, and that shared custody was 
inappropriate when the parties have demonstrated an inability to 
communicate.

 
 
[¶13]   As noted, these parties do have a 
history of struggle within their relationship.  Mother testified that she did not think 
Father was capable of caring for the child.  Furthermore, Mother tried to control 
Father's access to the child by requiring that he exercise visitation only under 
her supervision.  Mother also 
claimed that overnight visitation was unavailable because of the child being 
breastfed.  However, in our view, 
this case is different than Buttle, 
in that Father has and will retain full primary physical and legal custody 
of the child, placing all primary decision-making authority regarding the 
child's health and well-being with Father.  
This significantly reduces opportunities to disagree.  Significantly, Father is only appealing 
the portion of the custody arrangement that takes effect when the child attains 
the age of five in 2013.  The 
custody arrangement from now until 2013 and beyond, remains the same, with each 
party getting the child approximately half of the time.  The only thing the parents must agree 
upon is to exchange the child at the court-ordered times.  Some degree of communication and 
cooperation will be necessary in that endeavor.

 
 
[¶14]   Furthermore, the district court in 
this case, unlike Buttle, provided 
sufficient findings in its order to justify the custody arrangement, not the 
least of which is that the child has a half-brother on Mother's side.  This Court is strongly in favor of 
preserving sibling relationships, whether they are full sibling, half sibling, 
or step siblings.  Aragon v. Aragon, 2005 WY 5, ¶ 26, 104 P.3d 756, 764 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 
[¶15]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion in ordering the parties 
to alternate weeks with the child beginning at age five.  In ordering as it did, the court simply 
modified the current visitation arrangement to accommodate the growing child, 
which is routinely done in long-term custody and visitation 
plans.

 
 
[¶16]   We affirm the district court's Order Regarding Custody, Visitation, and 
Support, and conclude that there 
was no abuse of discretion by the district court in ordering the visitation 
modification in 2013.

 
 

KITE, 
Chief Justice, specially 
concurring.

 
 
[¶17]   While I concur in the majority 
opinion and its reasoning, I write separately to point out that our 
jurisprudence provides divided custody is not favored and should not be imposed 
simply because both parents are equally qualified to be awarded 
custody.

 
 
[¶18]   We have repeatedly stated that 
divided custody is not favored by this Court.  Martin v. Martin, 798 P.2d 321, 322 (Wyo. 1990); Feaster v. Feaster, 721 P.2d 1095, 1098 
(Wyo. 1986); Fink v. Fink, 685 P.2d 34, 36 n.1 (Wyo. 1984); Forbes v. Forbes, 672 P.2d 428, 430 (Wyo. 1983); Ayling v. Ayling, 661 P.2d 1054, 1055 
n.3 (Wyo. 1983).  There are several 
reasons for our reluctance to embrace the concept, but first and foremost is the 
recognition that stability in a child's environment is of utmost importance to 
the child's well-being, and divided custody places the stability of a child's 
environment at risk.  Whether termed 
"divided," "shared," or "joint" physical custody, "a measure of instability is 
inherent" in the arrangement.  Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55 (Wyo. 1995).  We do not dispute that there may be 
cases where joint or shared physical custody may approximate the former family 
relationships more closely than other custodial arrangements, or for other good 
reason may be in the best interests of the children.  However, "divided physical custody may 
not be indiscriminately substituted for an award of sole custody to one parent 
in order to appease one party."  Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 432 (Wyo. 
1998).

 
 
[¶19]   In this case, it appears that the 
district court had concerns about the mother's ability to communicate with and 
be supportive of the father as a co-parent.  While the district court provided 
findings that are detailed and thorough and address all of the statutory 
criteria, it did not explain why divided custody was required in this situation 
other than a child benefits from having a strong relationship with both 
parents.  That is true in all 
cases.  

 
 
[¶20]   I concur in the majority opinion 
because our standard of review allows reversal only if the district court abused 
its discretion and the district court obviously made an effort to consider all 
appropriate factors and to articulate its reasoning.  However, I do not believe this case 
should be relied upon as indicating a deviation from our long line of cases 
disfavoring divided custody and requiring exceptional 
circumstances.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

1Father actually was awarded primary legal and physical 
custody.

 
 

2Mother 
gets child from Saturdays at 9 a.m. to Tuesdays at 6 p.m..  Father gets child from Tuesdays at 6 
p.m. to Saturdays at 9 a.m.  Each 
parent takes half of every week.  
When the child attains five years of age, the parents will switch weeks, 
exchanging the child at 5 p.m. every Sunday.