Case Title: In re Doe, born 07/03/95 and 10/18/96. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 01/27/2006 [pdf].

Citation: 109 Haw. 399

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
‘+#*FOR PUBLICATION®**

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T

 

00"

 

 

IN THE INTEREST OF g

JOHN DOE, Born on July 3, 1995
JOHN DOE, Born on October 18, 1996

 

 

No. 27115

APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(EC-S No. 99-06260)

JANUARY 26, 2006
NOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.

We hold in this appeal by Father-Appellant (Father) and
Mother-Appellant (Mother) [collectively Appellants] from the
January 16, 2008 findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order
Genying Appellants’ motion to intervene and further relief of the
family court of the first circuit! (the court), and the January
18, 2008 order denying Appellants’ notion for reconsideration,
that because Appellants retained residual interests in the
visitation of their minor children, (1) Appellants may seek
Judicial review of a decision by the children’s permanent
custodian, Thomas A.K. Haia, Esq., (Appellee) to deny them

visitation, (2) Section 587-2! of the Hawai'i Revised Statutes

saith presided.

 

‘the Honoeable Marilyn

+ the relevant provisions of section 587-2 of the Hawai'i Revised
Statutes are discussed and produces intsa.

 
**4FOR PUBLICATION***

(HRS) and Rule 24(a)? of the Hawai'i Family Court Rules (HECR)
are not in conflict with regard to the subject of visitation
during the time permanent custody is in effect, and (3) it was an
abuse of discretion for the court to deny Appellants’ motion to
intervene, We therefore vacate the aforesaid orders and remand
for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
1

on October 28, 1999, the Department of Hunan Services
(Dis) filed a Petition for Family Supervision with the court over
Appellants’ minor children, John Doe 1, born on July 3, 1995, and
John Doe 2, born October 18, 1996 [collectively, the children},*

pursuant to HRS § 587-21 (1993 & Supp. 2004)* and HRS § 587-2

>the relevant provision of Hawai'i Femily Court Rules (HFCR) Rule
24 Ae reproduced intra.

«am addition to John Dee 1 and John Doe 2, Mother has three other
children, J.A.Q, Med-Qey and FAALB.

+ ng § $67-21 provides, in pertinent part, the preliminary measure:
tthe DiS shall take in oraer to protect persone below the age of eianeecn

(ag ving report that a chi
femme jah_invest sation 6

ade Ss it deens to be ancropriate.

ibj ipdn satistying itself as to the course of action
which should be pursued to best accord with the purpose of
this chapter, the department shal

 

(1) Resolve the matter in such informal fashion
appropriate under the circumstances;
(2) Seek $0 enter inte a service plan, without

Seils's fently snd other authorizes acency a8

‘The decartnent eens necessary to she succeaa of
he eervice blan, including but not limites to,
the nenber oF member's of the child's family who
have legel custody of the child. The service
Tently to voluntarily place the cnild-in the.
fester custody of the departnent or other
ar :

Teontinued...)
 

(1993 & Supp. 2004).*
on October 29, 1999, the children were taken into

police protective custody,” released to DHS, and placed in a

 

continued)
necessary members of the child's tantly under
he fan = eth
SUnsr authorized agency: provided that if «
Service plan ie not successfully completed
Githin stx months, the Separtment shall file @
Petition or ensure that a petition is filed by
Snother appropriate authorized agency in court
Unger thie chapter and the case shall be
feviewed ac ie required by federal law:

fursuant to-section S8-24cs) and Tile =
Petition with the court under this chapter
Mitnin three working days, excluding Saturdays,
Sundays, and holidays, after the date of the
Separtment's assumption of temporary foster
Suetady of the esllal-]

(emphases added.)

 

“panily" is defined by HRS § 587-2 (1993) as

feach legal parent, the natural mother, the natural father,
the adjadicstes, presumed, cr concerned natural father ss
Gefined uncer section S76-2, each parent's spouse, or former
spouses, each sibling or person related by consanguinity or
Barriage, each person residing in the same dwelling unit,
Gna any Other person who or legal entity which is 8 child's
Legal or physical custodian or guardian, or who is otherwise
responsible for the child's care, cther than an authorized
gency which assunes such 2 legal status or relationship
with the child under this chapter.

 

‘ups $ 387-2 (2993) provides an authorized agency the following

duties and rights upon creation of “family supervision” status under HRS
§ 587-21 (6) (2)

a) tom vise thi “

  

(Bephases added.)

> wns § $87-2 (1993) defines “protective custedy” as “the legel
statue of a child unose physical custody is retained by a police officer under
this chapter in orser to protect such child from imminent harm

 

3
4**FOR PUBLICATION***

 

foster home.

On November 3, 1999, DHS filed an Amended Petition for
‘Temporary Foster Custody of the children. A service plan was
proposed to the court pursuant to HRS § $87-26 (1993)." On the
same date, Appellee was appointed guardian ad litem’ (GAL) for
the children. On November 23, 1999, the court awarded DHS foster
custody" over the children.

From December 17, 1999 to May 17, 2001, seven review

hearings were held and, in each instance, foster custody to DiS

+ as $5 587-2618) & (b) provide the definition and scope of 2
service plan:

[a)_ A service plan is a specific written plan
prepared by an authorized agency and chiia’ s family
Presented to such members of the chile's family as the
Sppropriate authorized agency deens to be necessary to the
success of the plat, including, But not limited to, the
onber or menbere of the child's fanily who have legal
Costedy, guardianship, cr persanent custody of the child at
the time that the service plan is being formulated or
Tevised under this chapter:

b) The service plan shall set forth:

(0) “The steps that will be necessary to facilitate
the return of the child toa safe family home,
Lf the proposed placenent of the child is in,
foster care under foster custody;

(2) The steps thet will be necessary for the child
tovrensin inva safe family hone with the
assistance of a service plan, if the proposed
Blacenent of the chil ip in's family home under
family supervision; and

ill be necessary to make the
fe fanily home and to terminate
the appropriate authorized agency's intervention
into the family and eliminate, if possible, the
necessity for the filing of @ petition with the
Court under thie chapter.

 

 

 

 

o>

    

 

+ A “guardian ag liten” is defined as “a person appointed by the
court under Section $6734 whose role is to protect and promote the needs and
interests of tne child or a party.” RRS § 587-2. (1993)

 

© wgoster custody,” ae referred to in HRS § $87-211b), means “the
Lega status created (by HRS § $67-21(b)(2)), ox by an order of court after
the court hae determined that the chile's family s¢ not willing and able to
provide the child with a safe family hone, even with the assistance of a
Service plan.” HRS § 587-2 (2993)

 

 

 
‘***FOR PUBLICATION®**

was retained.

on June &, 2001, the children were returned to
Appellants’ care under family supervision. On August 8, 2001,
the court ordered continuation of family supervision.

on September 21, 2001, the children were removed from
Appellants’ care by DHS and placed in foster custody after
(2) Appellants failed to provide the children with treatment,
(2) the children were found to have been emotionally, physically,
and psychologically harmed since their return to Appellants’
care, and (3) Appellants failed to obtain proper medical care for
the children’s half-sister who was injured by 9 pick axe.

on Novenber €, 2001, DHS filed a Motion for Order
Awarding Permanent Custody and Establishing a Permanent Plan
pursuant to HRS § 587-2." Permanent plan hearings were held on

under BRE § 587-2, “permanent custody
custodian several rights and duties previously
and fonily senber

” provides a permanent
ved for iegel custodians

 

 

 

“permanent custody” means the Legal status created
under thie chapter sy order of the court after the court has
Considered the criteria set forth in section S€7-73(a) oF
{el and determined by clear and convincing evidence that it
in'the best interests of the child to order « permanent
Blan concerning the child.
a

 

Eermanent custody divests {rom each Leal
Etstedignend-faniiy nesper sno has been

 

 

rr fan, each of

eal iz
St

Ta} sto determine where and with whom the chilé
Shall Live; proviced that the child shall
hot be placed outeide the State without
Beicr order of the courts

() Fo assure thet the child is provided in 3
Timely manner with adequate food,
clothing, shelter, psychological care,
physical care, medical care, supervision,

eontinued...)

 

 

 

 
‘+*4FOR PUBLICATION***

Noverber 15 and 16, 2001." On September 16, 2001, the court
entered an Order Awarding Permanent Custody (permanent custody
order) finding that, by “clear and convincing evidence,”

Appellants were not “presently willing and able to provide the

 

(.. seont inved)
and other necessities:
(C) To moniter the provision to the child of
appropriate education:

(0) Peerevs hat are reauires
healch or welfare, including, but ne
favcholoaital. eaucttionsl. caplevment

pana to

provide sll consents for any other medical
Sr peyenological care of treatment,
Snetuding, but not limited to, surgery:

e) To provide coneent to adoption, change of
name pursuant to section 74-5, or te
marriage:

(=) To'provide the court with information
Concerning the child that the court nay
Eequire st sny tine, and to submit written
Feports to the court stating the
then-current situation end ether
Hignificant information concerning the
Ghild at intervals not to exceed one Year,
Gnless otherwise orserea by the court; and

(c) Te the child resides without the hone of
the permanent custodian for 2 period of
Seven consecutive days, to eubmit a
ritten report to the court stating the
Thenscurrent situation of the child on or
before the tenth consecutive day or the
next working day after the date(.)

 

 

 

‘This court has previously said thet the primary purpose of
permanent plan hearing 1s as follows:

(Tihe focus of a permenent plan hearing conducted pursvant
folks § $87°73(a) ie nether the child's “nother” or
Sfather” can provide safe fenily hone. If not, the focus
shifts to whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the
Chile's Smother" or “father” will become walling and able to
provide a safe fanily hone within a reasonable period of
Eine, Only after the family court has founs, by clear and
Convincing evidence, that neither criteria has bees
establishes, does the court then consider whether the
proposed goal of the permanent plan is in the best interests
Gf the child.

 

Lake Doe, 95 Hawai's 183, 194, 20 P.34 616, 627 (2001) (internal citations
‘ositteal-
‘***FOR PUBLICATION*#*
child(ren) with a safe family home, even with the assistance of a
service plan.” The permanent custody order (1) divested
Appellants of their parental rights pursuant to HRS §§ 587-2 and
587-73 (1993 & Supp. 1998), (2) appointed the DHS Director as
permanent custodian of the children with the duties and rights
get forth under HRS § 587-2 and as stated in the Letters of
Permanent Custody, (3) excluded Appellants, pursuant to HRS
§ 587-3(b) (4) (1993), “from participating in adoption or other
subsequent proceedings,” (4) provided that Appellants would not
be given notice of future hearings, and (5) excluded Appellants
from future hearings unless Appellants receive further legal
notice requiring their appearance.

In support of the permanent custody order, the court
made the following findings of fact:

A. The child(xen)’s legal mother, legal father,
acjudicates, presuned of concerned father 2s defined under
ke Chapter S7€ are not presently willing and able to
provide the child(ren) with a safe family home, even with
fhe assistance of # service plant

B, ie is not reesonably foreseeable that the
chila(zen)'s legal mother, legal f2tner, adjudscated,
Presumed or concerned father as defined under HRS Chapter
Soe will become willing and able to provide the child(ren)
With's safe family hone, even with the assistance of 2
Service plan, within s reasonable period of tines

C.. The proposed permanent plan attached hereto as

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Emphasis added.)
As indicated, the permanent custody order incorporated

a Permanent Plan, marked Exhibit "A", dated November 5, 2001.

 

RS § $87-731b) (4) (1993) sets fortn the authority for the court
to issue further orders which it deems £0 be "in the best interests of the
child including, bot not Limited to, restricting or excluding unnecessary
Strcles"ficn petticipsting in adoption or ether subsequent proseessnge|-]”

 

 

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‘***FOR PUBLICATION***

Under section III of the permanent plan, Objectives Prior to
Adoption or] Guardianship, subsection £ provided that the birth
family objective was to “[mJaintain the sibling relationships

between 7.A.B., J-A.Q., M.J.Q., (the children), and their birth

 

parents.”

With respect to visitation, the court ordered the
Letters of Permanent Custody dated Novenber 16, 2001, to take
effect. The Letters sets forth that

[a] family member may be permitted visitation with the
childiren) at the discretion of the permanent custodian/s;

rovided that the exercise ol retion say be
euiexed by the [clout and the [cleurt may ofcer that a

1 rr
‘Antenest of the chilgizen).

(Emphasis added) .

On Novenber 28, 2001, each Appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration. Hoth motions were denied on December 7, 2001.
Subsequently, on Decenber 21, 2001, Mother filed a Notice of
Appeal, and on Decenber 31, 2001, Father likewise filed a Notice
of Appeal. On February 12, 2003, this court affirmed by sunmary
Gisposition order the court’s Novenber 16, 2001 order awarding
Permanent custody and the December 7, 2001 order denying
reconsideration. Inxe Doe Children, 101 Hawai'i 96, 63 P.3d 404
(2003) .

on January 4, 2002, Appellee withdrew as the children’s
GAL and was subsequently appointed as the DHS-licensed foster
Parent on or about Janvary 6, 2002. On February 1, 2002, Leland

Look was appointed as the substitute GAL for the children
‘+*4FOR PUBLICATION***

Pursuant to HRS § 587-73, 2 permanent plan review
hearing* was held on April 25, 2002. Permanent custody was
continued in DHS and a revised permanent plan dated April 22,

2002 was ordered by the court. The language of Section III.. of

 

My “permanent plan review hearing” is defined as “any hearin:
subsequent £0 e court ordered permenent plan, held pursuant to section 227-
73(e) "HRS § S87=2 (1993),

   

HRS § 567-73{b) (1993) provides the court with the authority to
enter orders pursuant to a permanent plan review hearing including:

(2) That an appropriate permanent plan be
Implemented concerning the child whereby the
child wil
(A) Be adopted pursuant to chapter 578;
Provides thet the court shall presume that
Ee'Le*in the best Interests of the child
fo be adopted, unless the child is or will
be in the hone of family of a person who
hae becone ae fonily and who for good
Cause ie unwilling or unable to adopt. thi
child bur is conmitted to and 1s capab
Sf being the child's guardian or permanent

(p) Ee placed under uerdianship pursuant te
chapter 560) 9¢

(c) Hamain in permanent custody until the
Child is subsequently adopted, placed
Gnder a guardianship, or reaches the age
of majoricy, and that such status shall
fot be subject to modification or
Fevocation except upon @ showing of
extraordinary circumstances to the court

(4) That such further orders as the court deems to

bein_the best interests of the child.
Ecluging. bot aot Tinited to, restricting or

 

 

 

‘in-adeption of other subsequent proceadings, be
eoereg: and

ts) Breit adoption or guardianship is ordered, that
each case be set fer a permanent plan review
hooting not later than one year after the date
that a permanent plan is ordered by the court,
or sooner if required by federsi law, and
thereafter, that subsequent permanent plan
Feview hearings be set not leter than ezch year,
of sooner if required by federal lew; provided

h pemmanent 21

‘Sour shall revjeu the existing permanant olan
Sno enter such turther orders af are deenea to
be in the best interests of the child.

(Gephases added.)
‘*4*FOR PUBLICATION*++

 

that plan contained identical language to the permanent plan
dated Novenber 5, 2001 with respect to birth family
relationships, stating the objective to be to “[mJaintain the
sibling relationships between [the children and their siblings]
and their birth parents.” The order further provided that “[a}ll
prior consistent orders shall remain in full force and effect
until further order of the [c]ourt.”

on June 25, 2002, Father filed a Motion for Inediate
Review for Post Decree Relief requesting @ new permanent custody
trial. The motion was denied on June 28, 2002.

on October 11, 2002, following a permanent plan review

ring, the court continued permanent custody in DHS and the

 

permanent plan dated October 7, 2002 was ordered. With respect
to birth family relationships, the DHS did not reconmend any

visits between the children and their siblings and stated that
they “would not recommend visite between the children and their

awarded and visits would

 

parents because permanent custody w
only confuse and upset the children." The order provided
identical language insofar as the effect of prior consistent
orders are concerned.

At the permanent plan review hearing on March 21, 2003,
permanent custody was continued in DHS and DlS’s permanent plan
dated March 11, 2003 was ordered. This time 2 different
objective was set with respect to birth family relationships.

The new objective was to “[mJaintain the relationship between

10
**FOR PUBLICATION***

 

[the children] and their birth family as assessed and deemed in
their best interest by DHS, in consultation with the GAL.” The
permanent plan further noted under this objective that “it
appears that [the children] really miss their mother, as they
becone tearful and upset when she is discussed or issues of
adoption are brought up.” Again, prior consistent orders
remained in full force and effect.

At the permanent plan review hearing on September 5,
2003, pexmanent custody in DHS was continued and DHS’s permanent
plan dated August 22, 2003 was ordered. With regard to birth
family visitation, the permanent plan contained identical
language as the previous, March 11, 2003 permanent plan, stating
as its objective, “(maintenance of] the relationship between (the
children} and their birth family as assessed and deened in their
best interest by DHS, in consultation with the GAL.” Within this
purpose, the permanent plan noted that “(the children) continue
to miss their mother, although they do not talk about her as much
as they used to.”

on Mach 12, 2004, at @ permanent plan review hearing,

the court granted GAL's oral motion to “revoke” permanent custody

in DHS and awarded permanent custody to Appellee." In its

 

Appellants state that on June ¢, 2004, the Honorable Frances 0.F
hong, Senior Judge of the Firet Circuit Family Court, issued @ menorancim
stating that, "As a general rule, children under the court's jurisdiction
Pursuant to Chapters S71 and/or S67 shall not be placed with any Judge,
Sttorney, guardian ad litem, or court staff who have hed direct invelvenent
ith the child and of the child's family.” The menarandun provided that the
General rule applied prospectively. Although Appellants mention this in their
Spening Briefe, they donot directly challenge the appointnent of Appellee oi

[cont ince

  

a
***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

findings, the court stated that Appellee “reported that he would
follow the recommendations of the (children’s) therapist
regarding visits with parents whose parental rights were
terminated, and upon hearing this DHS had no objection to GAL's
motion.” DHS was then dismissed as a party. The permanent plan
“dated August 29, 2003" [sic] was ordered continued by the court.
Prior consistent orders were also ordered to remain in full force
and effect.

on March 30, 2004, an Amended Order Awarding Permanent
Custody was filed and Amended Letters of Permanent Custody were
issued. The Amended Letters of Permanent Custody contained
identical language as the Letters of Permanent Custody dated
Novenber 16, 2001 with respect to birth family relationships, in
that visitation by a family menber was permitted at the permanent
custodian’s discretion subject to review by the court.

Sometime in December 2003, Appellants sought visitation
with the children from Appellee but Appellee allegedly failed to
respond, On May 10, 2004, Appellants filed a Motion to Enforce

Permanent Plan seeking visitation and asserting that such

 

visitation was mandated by the permanent plan dated Novenber 5,
2001. In opposition to their motion, Appellee, through counsel,
maintained that (1) Appellants lacked standing by virtue of the

Permanent custody order, which operated to terminate Appellants’

 

*(.. .continved)
permanent custodian in this appeal

12
++#P0R PUBLICATION*#*

status as parties, (2) Appellants could not, as a matter of law,
move to enforce a previous permanent plan that had been
superseded, and (3) visitation between Appellants and the
children was not in the children’s best interest. The court
denied Appellants’ motion on July 13, 2004, on the basis that
Appellants lacked standing and party status.

At a permanent plan review hearing on August 18, 2004,
permanent custody remained with Appellee and the Permanent Plan
dated July 20, 2004 was ordered by the court. With regard to
birth family relationships the plan stated that “[a]t the
recommendation of the children’s therapist, contact with the
children’s birth family is not recommended. Contact may be
initiated at the discretion of the permanent custodian, in
consultation with the children’s [GAL], and therapist.”
(Emphasis in original.) The court did not issue any new Letters
of Permanent Custody. Again, prior consistent orders were
ordered to remain in full force and effect.

On Septenber 17, 2004, Appellants filed a Motion to
Intervene and for Further Relief. In support of their motion,
Appellants asserted that “[w)hether visitation is in (the)
children's best interest or whether there has been any abuse of
discretion in approving or denying visitation is a question that
can be fairly addressed only after allowing [Appellants] to
intervene.” Appellants urged the court, in its assessment of the

propriety of visitation, to consider evidence of their respective

3B
+**F0R PUBLICATION*#*

psychological evaluations, the fact that the children have not
been placed after permanent custody had been ordered, and the
existence of strong ties between the children and their birth
family. The court orally denied Appellants’ motion on
Decenber 14, 2004.

Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
January 3, 2005, followed by an Anended Motion for
Reconsideration on January 14, 2005. Appellants alleged that
“[i]t was improper for the court to deny their Motion to
Intervene based on considerations regarding the best interest of
the children since such considerations are premature.”
Appellants contended that the court should have first decided the
question of intervention before deciding the merits of whether
visitation was appropriate. Appellants further argued that it
was improper for the court to consider the GAL’ s recommendations
because he never met his wards, and to consider the children’s
therapist’s declaration because it vas based on outdated
assessments. The court denied Appellants’ amended motion for
reconsideration on January 18, 2005, and entered its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Motion to Intervene
and for Further Relief. The court’s findings with regard to
Appellants’ motion to intervene and the issue of visitation

stated as follow:

 

2. The Order Awarding Fermanent Custody stated that
"Iplursuant to HRS 587-73(b) (4), [appellants] are excluded
from participating in adoption Gr other subsequent
proceedings and he/she/they shall not be noticed of future
earings end he/she/they shall not appear at future hearings
Unless he/she/they receive further legal notice requiring

  

u
‘++#POR PUBLICATION***

such appearance.”

Beefn making ite order awarding permanent custody,
tthe (court found by clear and convincing evidence that
[appellants] were not presently wiliing and able to provide
the subject children with e safe family home, even with the
aesistence of a service plan. The [e)oure siso found by
Clear and convincing evidence that it was not reasonably
foreseeable thet [Appellants] would become willing end able
to provide the subject children with a safe family home,
even with the sssistance of a service plan, within &

le pericd of tine.

En December 7, 2001, [Appellants*) respective motions
for reconsiderstion of the order awarding permanent custody were
Senses.

5. On February 12, 2003, the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed
tthe court's ordere auarding permanent custody and oenying motions
Yor reconsideration.

 

 

 

   

3." tins) chapter $87 48 to be Léberatly construed to
serve the best interests of the children who have been
harmed or have been threatened with harm.

10, "the subject children were harmed and/or were
threateriod with hers by (Appellants). Asa result, these
children becene less likely than other children to realize
their educstionsl, vocational, and emotional potential, end
Becone law-abiding, productive, self-sufficient citizens,
and they Decene nore likely to become involved with the
Rental health system, the Juvenile justice system, or the
Criminal justice system, al Well as become an economic
Burden on the State

air “She subject children deserve and require
conpetent, responsitie parenting anda safe, secure, loving,
‘nd nurturing hone.

12. There is no reasonable basis for determining
thet (Appellee) hae failed to provide the subject children
with competent, responsible parenting

TS. There is no reasonable basis for determining
thet (Appellee) has failed to provide the subject chilaren
with # safe, secure, loving, ang nurturing home.

36. “reeis in the subject children’s b
thet they be placea in s timely manner

Ter she "(seve of vieitacione between the subject
children end their birth family rests within the sound
Giecretion of [Appellee], the children's permanent
‘custodian

16. There is no reasonable besis for determining
that (Appellee) has abused hit discretion on the issue of
Visitations between the subject children and their birth
family.

i? To permit (Appellants) to intervene in this
matter snd to litigate the issue of birch family visitations
Would not be in the subject children's best interest.

 

 

 

 

f interest

 

‘The court also concluded that, with respect to Appellants’ Motion
to Intervene, “[n]o good cause exists to support (Appellants’]

Motion to Intervene and for Further Relief.”

1s
‘+#*FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

Appeal.

on February 9, 2005, Appellants filed their Notice of

on March 18, 2005, the court, sua sponte, issued its

Supplemental Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law. With respect

to the issue of visitation, the court's supplemental findings

found:

2, The children are currently undergoing therapy te
help thom cope with the extensive istues resulting from the
hom they suftered in che custody of [appeliantel
(Appeliee] nas repeatedly placed on the record

yment with family visitation when the children’s
‘Sdvises it is in the children's best interest

Currently the therapist has interned (Appell
that st'ie not in the chilaren's best interesteto nave
family visitation until such tine as the children are
stabilized in their placement.

5. The (GAL), appointed to protect end promote the
needs ahd interests of the children, agreed that,
Gurrently(,] visitation te the parents was not in’ his wards’

6." "ALi reports and evidence reviewed over the
interim indicate that the children are healthy and thriving,
physically, enotionally, and academically in ¢ loving and
Stable environment.

 

     

 

 

  

 

In addition, as to the issue of visitation, the court also

entered the following supplemental conclusions of law:

1. Absent a. showing of abuse of discretion by
[appetiee) per Hike Section S87-2 "Permanent Costody"
subsecticn} (3)[,) the (clourt may refuse to review the
exercise of that discretion,

2. “a clear record thet family visitstion is
currentiy not in the best interest of the children sustas
this" [e]oure'e declining to review the permanent custodsan’ =
Genial of visitation

301 "No good cause existe to support [Appellante’)
Notion to Intervene and for further relief

m.

 

On appeal, Appellants maintain the family court “denied

Appellants due process and equal protection of the laws based on

their constitutionally-protected liberty interest in birth family

visitation with the children{]” insofar as it (1) “den[ied)

ae
***FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

Appellants’ Motion to Enforce the Permanent Plan{,]”
(2) “den[ied] Appellants’ Motion to Intervene[,]” (3) “den[ied)
Appellants’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Motion to
Intervene[,]” (4) “conclud[ed) as a matter of law, that *{a)
clear record that family visitation currently not in the best
interest of the children sustains (the clourt’s declining to
review the permanent custodian’s denial of visitation[,]'"

(5) “den{ied] Appellants the right to intervene and yet [found]
that ‘[t]o permit appellants to intervene in this matter and to
litigate the issue of birth family visitations would not be in
the subject children’s best interests[,]’” (brackets omitted)

(6) “conclud{ed) as a matter of law that ‘{n]o good cause exists
to support Appellants’ Motion to Intervene and for Further
Relief{,]‘" (7) “den[ied] Appellants the right to intervene and
yet conclud{ed] as a matter of law that{,] ‘[aJbsent a showing of
abuse of discretion by the permanent custodian per HRS Section
587-2 “Permanent Custody” [subsection] (3)[,] . . . the [cJourt
may refuse to review the exercise of that discretion{,]'”

(8) “coneludted) that “{1]t

 

it certainly would be, after
permanent custody, ridiculous if parents could continue to come
in and make motions for visitation, for sibling visitation, and

for all other kinds of things that parents have when they haven't

 

had their rights terminated.’” Appellants request that this

court “reverse the {court’s) decision” and they be “allow(ed)
- . to intervene . . . [to] seek appropriate visitation with

their children and so that discretionary decisions made by the

ct
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

permanent custodians that affect Appellants can be reviewed for
abuse of discretion.”
mr

The standards of review applicable to this case are
correctly set out by Appellants. A finding of fact “is clearly
erroneous when (1) the record lacks substantial evidence to
support the finding, or (2) despite substantial evidence in
support of the finding, the appellate [c]ourt is nonetheless left
with a definite and firm conviction that = mistake has been
nade.” State v. Okumura, 78 Hawai'i 3€3, 392, 694 P.2d 80, 89
(1995) (citations omitted). ‘Substantial evidence’ . . . is
credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative
value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a
conclusion.” Inte Doe, 64 Hawai'i 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888
(1996) (citations omitted). An order denying an application for
intervention by right under HFCR Rule 24(a) (2) is final and
appealable and is reviewed under the right or wrong standard of
review. “The interpretation of a statute . . . is a question of
law reviewable de nove.” State vy, Arceo, 64 Hawai's 1, 10, 928
P.2d 843, B52 (1996) (citations omitted).

Ww.

In his first argument, Appellee asserts that

“Appellants never filed a motion for reconsideration (as to the

motion to enforce the permanent plan) as required by HRS § 571-54

18
‘**FOR PUBLICATION***

 

(2993), and Appellants completely failed te mention said
order in their Notice of Appeal as required by Rule 3(c) (2) of
the Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure.” In response,
Appellants state that “[e]ven if the Family Court’s Order was not
attached” “to the Notice of Appeal,” this “[clourt has broad
latitude to consider an{d) overturn the Family Court's improper
ruling,” quoting Correa v. Waiakes Will Co., 30 Haw. 340, 343
(1928), for the proposition that “*[i]f for any reason that
appears from the record and that is properly brought to our

attention, the ruling upon which the judgment of this court is

HRS § 571-88 entitied “Appeal,” states in relevant part as
follows:

An interested party aggrieved by any order or decree
of she court may appeal fo the supreme court for Feview of
guestions of Tow and fact

in’ ofder or decree entered in a proceeding based upon
section §71-11(2), (21, (6), of (8) shail be subject to
appeal to the supreme court only as follows:

within tent:

The motion and any supporting affidavit shall set
forth the grounds on which  reconsiderstion Le requested
and shall be sworn to by the evant or the movant’ s
Fepresentative. ‘The Judge shall hold @ hearing on the
notion, sffording to all parties concerned the full right of
Fepresentation by counsel and presentation of re
evidence. The findings of the judge upon the hearing of the
fmotion and the judge's determination and disposition of the
Case thereafter, and any decision, judgment, order, oF
decree affecting the child and entered as a result of the
hearing on the notion shall be set forth in writing and
Signed by the jodge. Any party deeming oneself agarieved by
any auch findings, judgnent, order, or decree shail have the
Fight to appeal therefrom to the supreme court upon the sane
terns and conditions as in other cases in the circuit court
and review shall be governed by chapter 602; provided that
no such notion for reconsideration shall operate as a stay
SE any such findings, judgnent, order, or decree unless the
Sosge of the family court so orders; provided further thst
ino informality or technical isregulerity dn the proceedings
prior to the hearing on the motion for reconsideration shall
Eonstituce grounds for the reversal of any such fincings,
Sucoment, order, or decree by the appellate court.

 

entry of any

 
  
 

 

 

   

 

 

 

     

as
***FOR PUBLICATION #*

 

sought should be reversed, we would be remiss in our duty if we
ignored it,/" Citing Jordan v. Hamada, 62 Haw. 444, 616 P.2d
1368 (1980), Appellants further note that this “[c]ourt has an
express policy to liberally construe rules on appellate
procedure."

‘This court has since held thet “(bly the plain language
of [HRS § S71-54], @ party desiring to appeal from an order
entered in @ proceeding governed by [the statute] is required to
file a motion for reconsideration.” In xe Doe Children, 94
Hawai'i 485, 486, 17 P.3d 217, 218 (2001) (citation omitted).
However, inasmuch as Appellants’ motion to intervene meets the
“requisite degree of finality of an appealable order,” In re Dos,
96 Hawai'i 272, 283, 30 P.3d 878, 889 (2001), because the January
18, 2005 order finally decided the visitation rights of the birth
parents, we have jurisdiction to review the denials of
Appellants’ motion to intervene and subsequent motion for
reconsideration.

v.

Inasmuch as we believe the constitutionally sound
Provisions of HRS chapter 587 are dispositive of the instant
appeal, Appellants’ arguments challenging the constitutionality
of the court's orders fall of their own weight. See In re Jane
Doe, 96 Hawai'i 73, 81, 26 P.3d $62, 570 (2001) (stating that,
“where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of

which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise, and by

20
+**FOR PUBLICATION **

 

the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is adopt
the latter”). When interpreting statutes, this court has
previously held that “(t]he fundamental starting point is the
language of the statute itself.” In re Doe, 90 Hawai'i 246, 252,
978 P.2d 684, 690 (1999), Moreover, “where there is no ambiguity
in the language of the statute, and the literal application of
‘the language would not produce an absurd or unjust result clearly
inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute, there
Ag no room for judicial construction and interpretation, and the
statute must be given effect according to its plain and obvious
meaning.” Id, at 253, 978 P.2d 691.

vi.

As previously mentioned, the provisions of HRS § 578-2
authorize a permanent custodian to exercise the rights and duties
of legal custodians and family members whose rights have been
judicially terminated. Under HRS § 587-73(b) (4), see supra note
14, the court is authorized to issue further orders “in the best

interests of the child,” including the power to bar “unne:

 

sary
parties from participating in adoption or other subsequent
proceedings [.]"

However, HRS § $78-2 also defines, in pertinent part,
the residual rights and obligations of legal custodians and
family members at the time permanent custody is in effect,

including the qualified right to visitation of childrer

 

(2) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a child's
family nenber shell retain, to the extent that the
family member possessed the responsibility prior to

 

2
*4*FOR PUBLICATION***

the transter of permanent custody, the continuing
Fesponsibility fer support of the child, sneluding,
but not limited to, repayment for the cost of any and
Sil cave, trestment, of any other service supplied or
Provides by the permanent custodian, any subsequent
Bermenent Custodian, other authorized agency, or che
Eourt for the child's benefit:
nenber may be x wi

 

 

 

he child?

(4) Rrvorder of pernenent custody entered under this
Chapter shall not operate to terminate the mutual
Eights of inheritance of the child and the child's
Eanlly members of any other benefit to which the child
ay be entitled, unless and until the child has been
Tegaily adopted{.)

(Emphasis added.)
In its permanent custody order, the court specified
that Appellants’ parental rights were divested pursuant to HRS

$$ 587-2 and 587-73. The permanent custody order granted the

 

permanent custodian “each of the parental and custodial rights
are set forth in HRS 587-2," until the children reached the age
of eighteen or were adopted, prohibited Appellants from receiving
notice of, and participating in, adoption or other subsequent
proceedings, and excluded Appellants from future hearings unless
required by the court. The court further ordered implenentation
of Letters of Permanent Custody which provided that visitation by
Appellants is at the discretion of the permanent custodian,
subject to review by the court. The Letters, as noted before,
was subsequently superseded by the Anended Letters of Permanent
Custody containing the sane language.

In their opening brief, Appellants cite HFCR Rule 24(a)

in support of their position that Appellants should have been

22
‘***FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

allowed to intervene in order to protect their right to birth
family visitation. HFCR Rule 24(a) states:

(a) Intervention of right. Upon timely application
anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:

(i)vunen a statute confers on unconditional right to

Anterveney of (2) when the applicant claims an interest

Eelating to the property, transaction oF custody oF

Visitation of 3 minor chil whieh ie the susject of the

Action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition

Of the action nay se 2 practical matter inpsir or impede the

Spplicant’s absiity to protect that interest, unlese the

applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing

parties
Appellants argue that any apparent conflict between HRS § 587-2
and Rule 24(a) must be construed to avoid inconsistency,
contradiction, and illogical outcome.

Although Appellants do not specify how these provisions
are to be construed, they assert that “[t]he correct
interpretation and only logical outcome is that Appellants should
have been allowed to intervene.” On the other hand, Appellee
maintains that “Rule 24(a) seems to mandate allowing Appellants
to intervene and an opportunity to litigate the visitation issue.
+ ++ [When a statute(, ise., HRS § 587-2,] and a rule conflict,
the statute prevails. In re Doe Children, 94 Hawai'i [at] 486,

17 P.3d [at] 218{.]” Thus, Appellee argues, “the (cjourt’s

 

actions were . . . proper.”
vit.
In interpreting 2 court rule in comparison with a
statute, this court has said:
(ilews in part materia should be construed in reference to
one ancther “[W)here there is a ‘plainly
Lrreconcilable’ ‘conflict between a general ands specitic

statute concerning the sane subject matter, the specific
WHIT be favored. However, where the statutes simply overlap

 

 

23
‘*4¢FOR PUBLICATION***

 

in these spplication, effect will be eiven to both if
Rostible, s© repeai by implication 1s disfavored.”

Chock v. Gov't Emplovees Ins, Co., 103 Hawai'i 263, 269, 81 P.3d
1178, 1184 (2003) (quoting Richardson v, City 4 County of
Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i 46, 55, 868 P.2d 1193, 1202 (1994)

 

(emphasis in original), But it does not appear that a “plainly
irreconcilable conflict” between HRS § 587-2 and HFCR Rule 24
existe,

The parties do not dispute that both provisions pertain
to the same subject matter, ive., visitation. HRS § $87-2
specifically provides that visitation is within the discretion of
the permanent custodian subject to discretionary review by the
court of the custodian’s grant or denial of visitation. On the
other hand, HFCR Rule 24 is generally worded to mandate
intervention when an applicant meets four elements, namely
(1) the application to intervene is timely, (2) the applicant
claims an interest relating to the property, transaction or
custody or visitation of a minor child which is the subject of
the action, (3) the applicant is so situated that the disposition
of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the
applicant's ability to protect that interest, and (4) the
applicant’s interest is represented inadequately by the existing
parties to the suit. HFCR Rule 24.

Appellants correctly maintain that they retain specific
residual interests under HRS § 587-2. Under HRS § 587-2,

permanent custody does not completely divest family members of

24
‘++#P0R PUBLICATION*#*
their rights and interests. Appellants were legally bound to
continuing responsibility for support of the children, and the
children retain the right to inherit from birth family members.
HRS § 587-2. By the terms of HRS § 587-2, such rights and
interests terminate on the condition the children are adopted or
reach the age of eighteen. Here, the children have not been
adopted or attained adult status. Secause the court is empowered
to enter further orders it deems to be in the best interest of
the children, such orders may recognize residual interests in the
birth parents.

Appellants’ interests in visitation was acknowledged in
the Anended Letters of Permanent Custody, stating that visitation
was permissible, and was consistent with the July 20, 2004
permanent plan that “[cJontact may be initiated” at Appellee’s
discretion, in consultation with the children’s GAL and
therapist. Thus, Appellants maintain that they should be granted
intervenor status because “(intervention pursuant to Rule 24(a)
was the appropriate procedural vehicle to afford a hearing to
enforce their visitation rights{.]" Although Appellants appear
to mistakenly argue that the right of visitation is absolute, the
Language of the HRS § $87-2 and the permanent custody documents
preserve an interest in visitation in the Appellants. To
reiterate, HRS § 587-2 and the March 30, 2004 Amended Letters of
Permanent Custody provide that “a family menber may be permitted

visitation with the children at the discretion of the permanent

25
+**FOR PUBLICATION*#*
SSS
custodian[.]" Although Appellee is given the discretion to grent

or deny visitation, such discretion must be exercised in a manner
consistent with the best interests of the children. See HRS

§ 587-1 (Supp. 2004) (stating that chapter 587 “shall be
Liberally construed to serve the best interests of the children
and the purposes set out in this chapter”).

Because Appellante’ interest in visitation is directly
affected by Appellee’s decision, Appellants must be given the
opportunity to protect that interest.” Under the circumstances
of this case, intervention is the sole vehicle for Appellants to
seek judicial review of whether Appellee abused his discretion
in denying visitation. For following termination of parental
rights by permanent custody, Appellants are “so situated that the
Gisposition of the action{, ises, denial of visitation,) may as a
practical matter impair or impede [their] ability to protect that
interest.” HECR Rule 24. Where the provisions of HRS § 587-2
and HECR Rule 24 “simply overlap,” Chock, 103 Hawai'i at 269, @
P.3d at 1184, effect may be given to both. Hence, intervention

An this

   

Je must be grante
virt.
‘Although the court decided to deny Appellants’ motion

to intervene, it proceeded to adjudicate whether Appellee abused

 

lke need not decide, in this appeal, the frequency with which
Appellants may seek review of Appellee’ denial of visitation inasmuch as no
objection ie raised on this ground to Appellants’ intervention motion, Suck
Gn issue would seem resolvable on @ case by case basis dependent on specific
and particular

 

 

26
‘**4FOR PUBLICATION***
his discretion in denying Appellants’ requests to visit the

children. In the main, the

fenily court possesses wide discretion in making its
Gecisions and those decisions will not be set aside unless
there ie a manifest abuse of discretion. Thus, we will not
Gisturb the fansly court's decisions on appeal unless the
family court dssregarded rules or principles of law or
Proctice to the surstantial detriment of a party litigant
rt [and ste) decision clearly exceed(ed} the bounds of

In re Doe, 95 Hawai'i 183, 189-90, 20 P.3d 616, 622-23 (2001)

   

 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (brackets in
original).

However, in light of HRS § 587-2 and the August 23,
2003 permanent plan objective to “(mJaintain the relationship
between [the children] and their birth family,” and the express
provisions of the March 30, 2004 Amended Letters of Permanent
custody, Appellants correctly contend that the court should have
granted Appellants leave to intervene, before deciding on the
merits of whether visitation was consistent with the best
interests of the children.

Where the best interests of a child is of paramount
importance, consideration of all relevant evidence becomes =
critical duty of the court in making a decision regarding custody
and visitation. See, e.a., Inre Dils, Arle, 603 S.E.2d 376, 382
(W.C.Ct. App. 2004) (stating that “(w)henever the trial court is
determining the best interest of a child, any evidence which is
competent and relevant to a showing of the best interest of that

child must be heard and considered by the trial court, subject to

27
***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

the discretionary powers of the trial court” (emphasis in
original)); In xe Thornton, 493 N.E.2d 977, 980 (Ohio App. 1985)
(holding that, in a grandparent visitation case, failure of the
trial court to fully adduce all relevant evidence on the
visitation issue and thereby make a determination that visitation
is in the child's best interests is error); cf. Doe v. Doe, 98
Hawai‘ 144, 152, 44 P.3d 1085, 1093 (2002) (opining that “the
court's administrative interest in enforcing the limits on trials
should not supersede the court's obligation to consider relevant
evidence to determine the best interests of the child in a
custody hearing”); Sabol v. Sabol, 2 Haw. App. 24, 27, 624 P.2d
1378, 1382 (1981) (holding in custedy case that “if [courts]
Limit the inquiry only to such legally competent evidence as the
parties are able to and choose to present, then the award will be
determined more on a comparison of the presentations than on the
best interests of the child”). As such, it was an abuse of
Giscretion for the court to deny Appellants the opportunity to
present evidence to show that visitation was in the best interest
of the children and, on remand, Appellants must be given that

opportunity.
Ix,
In accordance with this opinion, (1) the court's
January 18, 2008 findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order
denying motion to intervene and for further relief and

(2) January 18, 2005 orders concerning child protective act

28
‘+*#FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

denying Appellants’ motion for reconsideration are hereby
vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings in

accordance with this opinion.

on the briefs:
Maile Shimabukuro, Di

M. Nalai Fujimori .

(Legal Aid Society of Bitar Pe Zercoe—
Hawai'i); Derek R.

Kobayashi, and Mihoko E. :

ob Biveun bo Nesttee plore

(Goodsill Anderson
Quinn & Stifel), for

Father-Appellant and
Mother-Appellant

Kevin S. Adaniya for ame Baby bre
Permanent Custodian-
Appellee

29