Case Title: Bolte and Bolte

Citation: 

Docket Number: S058330

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: December 2, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Marriage of
JOHN PATRICK BOLTE,
Petitioner on Review,
and
MARY ELIZABETH BOLTE,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 0730310; CA A139055; SC S058330)
En Banc
On respondent on review's petition for attorney
fees and costs filed July 20, 2010; considered and under advisement on August
10, 2010.
Pamela S. Hediger, Evashevski, Elliott, Cihak
& Hediger, P.C., Corvallis, filed the petition for attorney fees for respondent
on review.
J. Michael Alexander, Swanson, Lathen,
Alexander, McCann & Prestwich, P.C., Salem, filed the objection to the
petition for attorney fees.
DURHAM, J.
Costs allowed to respondent on review in the sum
of $8.40.  The petition for attorney fees is denied.
DURHAM, J.
This matter is
before the court on the petition for attorney fees and cost bill filed by
respondent on review (wife).  Petitioner on review (husband) objects, asserting
that this court lacks authority to award attorney fees and costs to wife and
that, even if such authority exists, the court should decline to those award
attorney fees and costs.  For the reasons set out below, we allow costs to wife
and deny the petition for attorney fees.
This is a marriage
dissolution proceeding.  Wife appealed the trial court judgment and argued for
increased spousal support.  The Court of Appeals modified the support amount
and otherwise affirmed.  Bolte and Bolte, 233 Or App 565, 226 P3d 116
(2010).  Husband petitioned this court for review of the Court of Appeals decision. 
Wife filed a response to the petition.  This court denied review.  Bolte and
Bolte, 348 Or 523, 236 P3d 151 (2010).
Wife now petitions
this court for an award of attorney fees in the amount of $1,890, representing
the expense of filing her response to the petition for review, and costs in the
amount of $8.40.  Because husband's objections challenge this court's authority
to award attorney fees or costs in any amount, we first examine this court's
authority in the circumstances, beginning with wife's cost bill.
ORS 20.310(1) provides:
"In any appeal to the Court of Appeals or
review by the Supreme Court, the court shall allow costs and disbursements to
the prevailing party, unless a statute provides that in the particular case
costs and disbursements shall not be allowed to the prevailing party or shall
be allowed to some other party, or unless the court directs otherwise.  If,
under a special provision of any statute, a party has a right to recover costs,
such party shall also have a right to recover disbursements.  On the same
terms and conditions, when the Supreme Court denies a petition for review, the
respondent on review is entitled to costs and disbursements reasonably incurred
in connection with the petition for review."
(Emphasis added.)  Petitioner does not
challenge the amount of costs requested by wife.  Because ORS 20.310(1) authorizes
this court to award costs in this context, we allow wife's cost bill in the
amount of $8.40.
Wife bases her
petition for attorney fees on review on ORS 107.105(5), which provides:
"If an appeal is taken from the judgment or
other appealable order in a suit for * * * dissolution of a marriage * * * and
the appellate court awards costs and disbursements to a party, the court may
also award to that party, as part of the costs, such additional sum of money as
it may adjudge reasonable as an attorney fee on the appeal."(1)
The phrase "the appellate court"
in that statute is broad enough to embrace both the Court of Appeals and this
court.  However, the statutory grant of discretionary authority to award
attorney fees applies only in the context of "an appeal" and only for
attorney fees reasonably incurred "on the appeal."  The statutory
term "appeal" unquestionably includes an appellate proceeding before
the Court of Appeals.  The question here, however, is whether the term
"appeal" in ORS 107.105(5) refers to a proceeding before this court
in which the court denies a petition for review.  Although the text of the
statute does not explicitly address that matter, an examination of the
enactment history of the statute and this court's case law answers that
question.
Before 1970, this
court had exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from decrees in suits for
dissolution of marriage.  At that time, this court was Oregon's only appellate
court; the Court of Appeals did not yet exist.  The pertinent statute at the
time, ORS 107.100(3) (1967), provided:
"If an appeal is taken from the decree or
other appealable order in a suit for dissolution or annulment of the marriage contract,
and the Supreme Court awards costs and disbursements to the prevailing party,
it may also award to that party, as part of the costs, such additional sum of
money as it may adjudge reasonable as an attorney fee on the appeal."
Effective July 1, 1970,
the legislature created the Court of Appeals and gave it exclusive jurisdiction
over, among other matters, "[a]ppeals from judgments, as defined in ORS
19.005, of circuit courts:  (A) In suits for divorce * * *[.]"  ORS
2.510(2)(d) (1969) (codifying Or Laws 1969, ch 198, § 1).  The legislature also provided for discretionary review in this
court of final judgments of the Court of Appeals by means of a petition for
review process.  Or Laws 1969, ch 198, § 2 (codified as ORS 2.520 (1969)).  In
1977, the legislature expanded the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals to "all appeals."  Or Laws 1977, ch 158, § 2 (codified at ORS
2.516 (1977)).
The legislature in
1969 also amended the statute authorizing an award of attorney fees on appeal
in marital dissolution cases by striking the words "Supreme Court"
and inserting the words "appellate court."(2)  Or Laws 1969, ch 591, §
283.  The amended version of ORS 107.100(3) (1969) provided:
"If an appeal is taken from the decree or
other appealable order in a suit for dissolution or annulment of the marriage
contract, and the appellate court awards costs and disbursements to the
prevailing party, it may also award to that party, as part of the costs, such
additional sum of money as it may adjudge reasonable as an attorney fee on the
appeal."
The creation of the
Court of Appeals, with exclusive jurisdiction over "all appeals," and
the replacement of this court's former jurisdiction over appeals with authority
over a discretionary petition for review process have altered the nature of
this court's function in considering claims of error.  This court explained
that change in 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Bd. of Co. Comm., 284 Or 41,
44-45, 584 P2d 1371 (1978):
"The function of this court is no longer to
afford every losing litigant a forum to review errors said to have been
committed at trial or in an administrative hearing.  That function is now
placed in the Court of Appeals.  Similarly, a party asserting that the Court of
Appeals, in turn, has erred cannot for that reason alone expect further review
in this court.  The process must stop somewhere, and for most purposes this is
at the first level of appeal.  However, since this court will not grant review
whenever it appears that the Court of Appeals reached a questionable decision,
it follows that a denial of review carries no implication that the decision or
the opinion of the Court of Appeals was correct.
"* * * * *
"* * * [I]t is plain that denial of review
in this or any other case may not be taken as expressing even a slight sign
that this court approves the decision or the opinion of the Court of
Appeals."
The change in this
court's function on review, noted above, has a procedural consequence that goes
beyond the neutrality point discussed in 1000 Friends of Oregon.  In U-Cart
Concrete v. Farmers Ins., 290 Or 151, 619 P2d 882 (1980), this court
explained that a denial of review by this court signifies that the court has
declined to entertain an appeal; that denial in no way represents a decision on
an appeal because there is no appeal before the court.  Addressing a statute
that entitled a prevailing party to recover costs "on an appeal," 
the court stated:
"When a petition for review is denied, the
respondent has not prevailed 'on an appeal' in this court.  Rather, the court
has chosen not to entertain an 'appeal.'  There is no basis for awarding costs
'on an appeal.'
"With respect to the matter before us,
therefore, we find there is no judgment of this court to support an award of
costs and there is no appeal before the court.  We hold that there is no basis
for an award of costs under the statutes."
Id. at
154-55.  Even though U-Cart addressed a claim for costs "on an appeal,"
this court has determined that the analysis in U-Cart applies with equal
force to a petition for attorney fees on "appeal."  Polacek and
Polacek, 349 Or ___, ___ P3d ___ (2010) (decided this date) (slip op at 10).
We conclude from the
foregoing that, because this court denied the petition for review, wife cannot
satisfy the requirement that the attorney fees that she seeks pertain to
"an appeal" within the meaning of ORS 107.105(5).  As U-Cart
explained, when this court denies a petition for review, the court has declined
to entertain an appeal and there is no appeal before the court.  290 Or at
154-55.  Thus, this case presents no occasion for the exercise of judicial
discretion to decide whether to allow attorney fees and there is no reason to
consider the criteria in ORS 20.075(1) that typically inform such a
discretionary choice.(3)
We add one
additional comment.  As already noted, we have concluded that ORS 20.310(1)
authorizes this court to award "costs" to the respondent on review
when this court denies a petition for review.  ORS 107.105(5) provides that, if
the appellate court in a dissolution of marriage proceeding awards costs to a
party, the court also may award that party an attorney fee "as part of the
costs[.]"  Do those statutes, when read together, supply this court with
authority to award an attorney fee to wife upon the denial of husband's
petition for review and the allowance of costs to wife?  The answer is no. 
Nothing in ORS 20.310(1) provides authority to any court to award an attorney
fee.  The phrase, "as part of the costs," in ORS 107.105(5) indicates
the procedural context in which an appellant court may award an attorney fee on
appeal, but it does not transform an appellate attorney fee into an item of
"costs" on appeal.  Despite the reference to "costs" in ORS
20.310(1) and ORS 107.105(5), this court may award an attorney fee in this
context only if the legislature has authorized it to do so.  That authority
does not currently exist.
Costs allowed to
respondent on review in the sum of $8.40.  The petition for attorney fees is
denied.
1. ORS
107.105(5) expressly authorizes "the appellate court" to award
attorney fees in an "appeal" from a judgment regarding dissolution of
marriage.  We note that ORS 19.440 creates a rule of interpretation supporting
court authority to award attorney fees "on an appeal," if the
attorney fee statute that pertains to the claim or proceeding does not expressly
authorize or require an award of attorney fees on appeal.  Because ORS
107.105(5) expressly authorizes an award of attorney fees on an appeal, the
interpretive rule in ORS 19.440 plays no role in our analysis of this court's
authority to award attorney fees in the context of this case.
ORS 19.440 provides:
"Any statute law of this state that
authorizes or requires the award or allowance of attorney fees to a party in a
civil action or proceeding, but does not expressly authorize or require that
award or allowance on an appeal in the action or proceeding and does not
expressly prohibit that award or allowance on an appeal, shall be construed as
authorizing or requiring that award or allowance on an appeal in the action or
proceeding."
2. ORS
107.105(5), the attorney fee statute under review, has undergone several other
amendments to produce the statutory wording in its present form.  First, in
1971, the legislature repealed ORS 107.100 and reenacted the attorney fee
statute as ORS 107.105(3).  Or Laws 1971, ch 280, §§ 13, 28.  The legislature
renumbered ORS 107.105(3) (1971) as ORS 107.105(4) in 1977, and renumbered the
statute again as ORS 107.105(5) in 1981.  Or Laws 1977, ch 847, § 2; Or Laws
1981, ch 775, § 1.  Second, in 1983, the legislature eliminated the requirement
that the party receiving an award of attorney fees be the prevailing party.  Or
Laws 1983, ch 728, § 2.  Third, in 2003, the legislature substituted the term
"judgment" for the term "decree" to conform to other amendments
to other statutes describing the procedure for appeals.  Or Laws 2003, ch 576,
§ 109.  Those changes are not material to our examination of this court's
authority under that statute to award attorney fees when it denies a petition
for review.  We note them here, however, to describe the statute's history
completely.
3. ORS
20.075(1) provides:
"A court shall consider the following
factors in determining whether to award attorney fees in any case in which an
award of attorney fees is authorized by statute and in which the court has
discretion to decide whether to award attorney fees[.]"
The statute then lists eight factors that the court must
consider in deciding, in its discretion, whether to award attorney fees.