Case Title: State ex rel. Fifth Third Mortgage Co. v. Russo

Citation: 2011-Ohio-3177

Docket Number: 20101579

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Fifth Third Mtge. Co. v. Russo, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-3177.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-3177 
THE STATE EX REL. FIFTH THIRD MORTGAGE COMPANY, APPELLEE AND 
CROSS-APPELLANT, v. RUSSO, JUDGE, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Fifth Third Mtge. Co. v. Russo,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-3177.] 
Mandamus — Prohibition — Civ.R. 41(A) voluntary dismissal — Writ of 
prohibition will issue to prevent judge from proceeding in case that was 
voluntarily dismissed — Mandamus will issue to compel judge to vacate 
order striking plaintiff’s notice of voluntary dismissal — First voluntary 
dismissal forecloses any further action in dismissed case except for 
collateral matters such as contempt — Prohibition will not lie to prevent 
judge from proceeding on issue of contempt. 
(No. 2010-1579 — Submitted May 10, 2011 — Decided July 6, 2011.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
Nos. 94816, 94817, and 94818, 2010-Ohio-3734. 
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment granting writs of mandamus and 
prohibition against appellant and cross-appellee, Cuyahoga County Court of 
Common Pleas Judge Nancy Margaret Russo.  The writ of mandamus directed 
Judge Russo to vacate the portion of her order striking the notice of appellee and 
cross-appellant, Fifth Third Mortgage Company (“Fifth Third”), voluntarily 
dismissing its foreclosure action without prejudice.  The writ of prohibition 
ordered Judge Russo not to proceed on Fifth Third’s dismissed claim.  In addition, 
Fifth Third cross-appealed from the portion of the judgment denying a writ of 
prohibition to prevent Judge Russo from conducting a contempt proceeding in the 
dismissed case.  Because the court of appeals ruled properly in the underlying writ 
case, we affirm the judgment. 
Facts 
Fifth Third Mortgage Co. v. Markus, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV 09 704576 
{¶ 2} Fifth Third operates and does business as a mortgage company and 
provides residential and commercial loans throughout Ohio.  In September 2009, 
Fifth Third filed a foreclosure action against Steven Markus in the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas.  Judge Russo issued an order that provided: 
{¶ 3} “If a forbearance agreement or payment plan is in effect in this 
case, the court hereby orders [Fifth Third] to notify the court within seven days of 
said agreement or plan.  Failure to comply will result in a show cause hearing.” 
{¶ 4} The parties in the foreclosure case then negotiated a loan-
modification agreement in which the original mortgage amount was increased 
from $87,550 to $102,590.47, and other terms of the loan were changed.  In the 
agreement, Markus acknowledged that the agreement did not release his 
obligations under the parties’ original note and security instrument: 
{¶ 5} “Nothing in this Agreement shall be understood or construed to be 
a satisfaction or release in whole or in part of the Note or Security Instrument.  
January Term, 2011 
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Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement, the Note and 
Security Instrument will remain in full force and effect and unchanged, and 
Borrower(s) and Lender will be bound by, and comply with, all of the terms and 
provisions thereof, as amended by this Agreement.” 
{¶ 6} On March 2, 2010, Fifth Third filed a notice pursuant to Civ.R. 
41(A) voluntarily dismissing its complaint, without prejudice, in the foreclosure 
case.  No counterclaims had been asserted, and no trial had been scheduled in the 
case.  The next day, Markus filed notice of the parties’ loan-modification 
agreement with the court. 
{¶ 7} On March 4, 2010, Judge Russo issued an entry striking Fifth 
Third’s notice of dismissal because “[Civ.R.] 41(A) voluntary dismissal is not 
appropriate when the parties have reached a settlement.”  In the same entry, Judge 
Russo ordered a hearing for Fifth Third and its attorney to “show cause why they 
should not be held in contempt for filing a notice of dismissal when the case in 
actuality was settled via loan modification.”  Judge Russo later issued an entry 
clarifying her order by stating that “[u]sing Civ.R. 41(A) to reserve the right to 
refile the case on the original mortgage is improper.” 
Writ Cases 
{¶ 8} On March 15, 2010, Fifth Third filed complaints in the Court of 
Appeals for Cuyahoga County for writs of mandamus and prohibition and for an 
expedited alternative writ.  Fifth Third requested a writ of mandamus to compel 
Judge Russo to vacate her March 4, 2010 order striking Fifth Third’s notice of 
voluntary dismissal without prejudice, a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge 
Russo from proceeding in the foreclosure case, including the show-cause 
contempt hearing, and an expedited alternative writ of prohibition to prevent 
Judge Russo from proceeding.  The court of appeals consolidated the cases and 
granted an alternative writ staying further proceedings in the foreclosure case. 
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{¶ 9} Judge Russo filed motions for summary judgment and to dissolve 
the alternative writ, and Fifth Third filed a response.  The court of appeals 
subsequently granted a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Russo to vacate the 
portion of the March 4, 2010 entry striking Fifth Third’s notice of voluntary 
dismissal without prejudice.  State ex rel. Fifth Third Mortgage Co. v. Russo, 
Cuyahoga App. Nos. 94816, 94817, and 94818, 2010-Ohio-3734, 2010 WL 
3171460.  The court of appeals also granted a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge 
Russo from proceeding on the claim asserted by Fifth Third in the foreclosure 
case, but denied a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from proceeding on the 
show-cause contempt matter.  Id. 
{¶ 10} This cause is now before the court upon Judge Russo’s appeal as of 
right and Fifth Third’s cross-appeal. 
Analysis 
Appeal 
{¶ 11} In her appeal as of right, Judge Russo asserts that the court of 
appeals erred in granting writs of mandamus and prohibition to compel her to 
vacate her order striking Fifth Third’s notice of voluntary dismissal without 
prejudice in the foreclosure action and to prevent her from proceeding on Fifth 
Third’s claim in that case. 
{¶ 12} “If a lower court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to 
proceed in a cause, prohibition and mandamus will issue to prevent any future 
unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior 
jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.”  State ex rel. Mayer v. Henson, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 12; State ex rel. Powell v. Markus, 
115 Ohio St.3d 219, 2007-Ohio-4793, 874 N.E.2d 775, ¶ 7.  “[I]n general, when a 
trial court unconditionally dismisses a case or a case has been voluntarily 
dismissed under Civ.R. 41(A)(1), the trial court patently and unambiguously lacks 
jurisdiction to proceed, and a writ * * * will issue to prevent the exercise of 
January Term, 2011 
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jurisdiction.”  State ex rel. Hummel v. Sadler, 96 Ohio St.3d 84, 2002-Ohio-3605, 
771 N.E.2d 853, ¶ 22; State ex rel. Benbow v. Runyan, 99 Ohio St.3d 410, 2003-
Ohio-4127, 792 N.E.2d 1124, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 13} There are exceptions to this general rule, most notably that despite 
a voluntary dismissal, a trial court may consider collateral issues not related to the 
merits of the action, e.g., sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, R.C. 2323.51, and 
Civ.R. 45(E), and criminal contempt.  See Hummel at ¶ 23-24, and cases cited 
therein. 
{¶ 14} The portion of the foreclosure case at issue in Judge Russo’s 
appeal, however, directly relates to the merits of the foreclosure claim.  That is, 
Judge Russo held that Fifth Third’s Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) notice voluntarily 
dismissing without prejudice the foreclosure case was improper because the claim 
had been effectively extinguished by the parties’ loan-modification agreement. 
{¶ 15} Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) provides that subject to certain provisions that 
are inapplicable here, “a plaintiff, without order of court, may dismiss all claims 
asserted by that plaintiff against a defendant by * * * filing a notice of dismissal at 
any time before the commencement of trial unless a counterclaim which cannot 
remain pending for independent adjudication by the court has been served by that 
defendant.”  “Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the 
dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits of any claim that the plaintiff has once dismissed in 
any court.”  Civ.R. 41(A)(1).  There was no counterclaim filed in the foreclosure 
case, and no trial had commenced. 
{¶ 16} “To interpret court rules, this court applies general principles of 
statutory construction.  * * * Therefore, we must read undefined words or phrases 
in context and then construe them according to rules of grammar and common 
usage.”  State ex rel. Law Office of Montgomery Cty. Public Defender v. 
Rosencrans, 111 Ohio St.3d 338, 2006-Ohio-5793, 856 N.E.2d 250, ¶ 23.  “If a 
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court rule is unambiguous, we apply it as written.”  Erwin v. Bryan, 125 Ohio 
St.3d 519, 2010-Ohio-2202, 929 N.E.2d 1019, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 17} The plain import of Civ.R. 41(A)(1) is that once a plaintiff 
voluntarily dismisses all claims against a defendant, the court is divested of 
jurisdiction over those claims.  “It is axiomatic that such dismissal deprives the 
trial court of jurisdiction over the matter dismissed.  After its voluntary dismissal, 
an action is treated as if it had never been commenced.”  Zimmie v. Zimmie 
(1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 94, 95, 11 OBR 396, 464 N.E.2d 142.  The notice of 
voluntary dismissal is self-executing and completely terminates the possibility of 
further action on the merits of the case upon its mere filing, without the necessity 
of court intervention.  See, e.g., Selker & Furber v. Brightman (2000), 138 Ohio 
App.3d 710, 714, 742 N.E.2d 203; Payton v. Rehberg (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 
183, 191-192, 694 N.E.2d 1379. 
{¶ 18} And under the unambiguous text of the rule, the dismissal is 
without prejudice “[u]nless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal * * *, 
except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits of 
any claim that the plaintiff has once dismissed in any court.”  Civ.R. 41(A)(1).  
Because the notice filed by Fifth Third in the underlying foreclosure case stated 
that the dismissal was without prejudice, and Fifth Third had not previously 
dismissed the same foreclosure claim in any previous action, the dismissal 
without prejudice was effective once it was filed.  No further court action was 
required. 
{¶ 19} Judge Russo, however, argues that the parties’ loan-modification 
agreement represented a settlement of Fifth Third’s original foreclosure claim, 
which barred its right to recover on that claim.  Yet the judge ignores the explicit 
language of the parties’ agreement that it did not constitute a satisfaction or 
release of the note and security agreement. 
January Term, 2011 
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{¶ 20} Moreover, even were the judge correct, Civ.R. 41(A)(1) does not 
recognize any exception for purportedly settled claims that have not been 
formally dismissed before the plaintiff files a notice of dismissal pursuant to the 
rule.  Notably, Judge Russo cites no case that so holds.  Instead, she cites cases in 
which the court held that settlement barred subsequent litigation based on the 
same claim, see Maitland v. Ford Motor Co., 103 Ohio St.3d 463, 2004-Ohio-
5717, 816 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 20, and that a third foreclosure action following the 
lender’s voluntary dismissal of two previous foreclosure actions based on the 
same promissory note and mortgage was barred by the double-dismissal rule of 
Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a).  U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Gullotta, 120 Ohio St.3d 399, 2008-
Ohio-6268, 899 N.E.2d 987, ¶ 25-28.  Neither case controls the circumstances 
here, which involve Fifth Third’s absolute right under Civ.R. 41(A)(1) to dismiss 
its foreclosure action once without prejudice.  Thus, Fifth Third properly 
dismissed its case without prejudice. 
{¶ 21} “When a case has been properly dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 
41(A)(1), the court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed and 
a writ of prohibition will issue to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction.”  State ex 
rel. Fogle v. Steiner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 161, 656 N.E.2d 1288; State ex 
rel. Hunt v. Thompson (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 182, 183, 586 N.E.2d 107. 
{¶ 22} Therefore, the court of appeals properly granted the requested 
extraordinary relief in mandamus and prohibition to compel Judge Russo to 
vacate that portion of the March 4, 2010 entry striking Fifth Third’s notice of 
voluntary dismissal without prejudice of its foreclosure case and to prevent Fifth 
Third from proceeding on its foreclosure claim. 
Cross-Appeal 
{¶ 23} In its cross-appeal, Fifth Third asserts that the court of appeals 
erred in denying the writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Russo from proceeding 
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to determine whether Fifth Third should be held in contempt for filing a notice of 
dismissal. 
{¶ 24} As noted previously, “[t]rial courts may consider collateral issues 
like criminal contempt * * * despite a dismissal.”  State ex rel. Ahmed v. Costine, 
100 Ohio St.3d 36, 2003-Ohio-4776, 795 N.E.2d 672, ¶ 5.  The mere fact that the 
contempt issue was raised after Fifth Third voluntarily dismissed its foreclosure 
claim does not necessitate a finding that the trial court patently and 
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to raise that issue.  Insofar as Fifth Third might 
be found in contempt in those ongoing proceedings, it has an adequate remedy by 
appeal following any such order.  State ex rel. Mason v. Burnside, 117 Ohio St.3d 
1, 2007-Ohio-6754, 881 N.E.2d 224, ¶ 15; State ex rel Mancino v. Campbell 
(1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 217, 220, 611 N.E.2d 319 (“appealing a contempt order is 
an adequate remedy at law which will result in denial of the writ”). 
{¶ 25} Consequently, the court of appeals correctly denied the requested 
extraordinary relief in prohibition to prevent the contempt proceeding. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 26} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals did not err in its 
judgment.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur in part and dissent 
in part. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 27} I concur with the decision to grant a writ of mandamus and 
prohibition to compel Judge Russo to vacate the March 4, 2010 entry striking 
Fifth Third’s notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice and to prevent Fifth 
January Term, 2011 
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Third from proceeding on its foreclosure case.  I respectfully dissent from the 
decision denying Fifth Third relief in prohibition to prevent Judge Russo from 
conducting the contempt proceeding.  I believe that Judge Russo patently and 
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to conduct the contempt proceeding and that an 
appeal is not an adequate remedy at law for Fifth Third. 
{¶ 28} Fifth Third was not in contempt of a court order in the underlying 
case when Judge Russo issued a show-cause order on March 4, 2010.  The 
underlying case had already been dismissed and no longer existed.  As the 
majority opinion states, “the dismissal without prejudice was effective once it was 
filed.  No further court action was required.”  Thus, it follows that the judge 
patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction following dismissal to issue the 
show-cause order.  The parties had settled the matter, and Fifth Third had filed a 
Civ.R. 41(A) voluntary dismissal on March 2, 2010.  Judge Russo does not allege 
that Fifth Third disobeyed a court order, but instead, she alleged that Fifth Third 
was in contempt for filing a notice of dismissal following settlement.  Although a 
court may consider a collateral issue of criminal contempt after the underlying 
action is no longer pending, see State ex rel. Corn v. Russo (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 
551, 556, 740 N.E.2d 265, the criminal contempt allegations here did not arise 
prior to dismissal.  Judge Russo’s allegations relate to the actual notice of 
dismissal and to the merits of the underlying action – they are not collateral 
issues.  Consequently, I believe that Judge Russo lacked jurisdiction to proceed 
following Fifth Third’s dismissal. 
{¶ 29} Fifth Third’s remedy by appeal, in the unlikely event it is found in 
contempt, is not adequate.  An adequate legal remedy must be practical and 
efficient and promptly administer justice.  Mid-America Tire, Inc. v. PTZ Trading 
Ltd., 95 Ohio St.3d 367, 2002-Ohio-2427,  768 N.E.2d 619, ¶ 81.  It is illogical to 
require Fifth Third to appear and defend in a contempt action under these 
circumstances, as well as time-consuming and costly to Fifth Third and the 
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judicial system.  In the unlikely event that Fifth Third does not prevail in the 
contempt proceeding, an appeal is not as efficient as a writ of prohibition would 
be if we granted it now.  Thus, I believe that an appeal is an inefficient and 
inadequate remedy, and I would grant a writ of prohibition to prohibit Judge 
Russo from proceeding on the contempt hearing. 
{¶ 30} I respectfully dissent from the resolution of the cross-appeal. 
 
MCGEE BROWN, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Graydon, Head & Ritchey, L.L.P., John C. Greiner, Harry W. Cappel, and 
Katherine M. Lasher, for appellee and cross-appellant. 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles 
E. Hannan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant and cross-appellee. 
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