Case Title: Williams v. Morgan State University

Citation: 

Docket Number: 9m/22

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2023-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Michele Williams v. Morgan State University, et al., Misc. No. 9, September Term, 2022.  
Opinion by Eaves, J. 
 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY — WAIVER — MARYLAND TORT CLAIMS ACT — 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified a question of law to the 
Supreme Court of Maryland.  The Court reformulated the question as follows: Does 
Maryland’s waiver of sovereign immunity for a tort action under the Maryland Tort Claims 
Act extend to federal statutory claims?  The Court answered the certified question in the 
negative. 
 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit 
Case No.: 21-1918 
Argued: February 2, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT  
OF MARYLAND* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Misc. No. 9 
September Term, 2022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MICHELE WILLIAMS 
 
v. 
 
MORGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fader, C.J., 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
Gould, 
Eaves, 
 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Eaves, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: August 14, 2023 
 
* At the November 8, 2022, general election, the 
voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional 
amendment changing the name of the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of 
Maryland.  The name change took effect on 
December 14, 2022. 
 
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials 
Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this 
document is authentic. 
 
Gregory Hilton, Clerk 
2023-08-14 13:33-04:00
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is an “ancient” concept.1  It is the long-
established view that a sovereign, such as a state, is “infallible,”2 and, thus, immune from 
suit “absent the State’s consent.”3  The General Assembly provided such consent in the 
Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), Md. Code Ann. State Gov’t (“SG”) (1984, 2021 
Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.) § 12-104(a)(1), which waives the State’s immunity as to a “tort 
action in a court of the State[.]”  In this case, we must determine whether the MTCA’s 
waiver of sovereign immunity as to “a tort action” extends to federal statutory claims. 
Although this case comes to us as a certified question from the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, it originated in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  
Michele Williams, Appellant, filed a complaint against her former employer, Morgan State 
University (“MSU”), and her former supervisor, Dean DeWayne Wickham, in his personal 
capacity (collectively “Appellees”) regarding her termination from the University.  In an 
amended complaint, Appellant added claims alleging retaliation in violation of the National 
Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”), 41 U.S.C. § 4712, and the American Recovery and 
 
1 United States v. Nordic Vil., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 42 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the doctrine has an “ancient lineage”); see Godwin v. Cnty. Comm’rs of St. 
Mary’s Cnty., 256 Md. 326, 330–31 (1970) (“No suit or action, even in civil matters can 
be brought against the king, because no court can have jurisdiction over him.  Authority to 
try would be in vain, without authority to redress; the sentence of a court would be 
contemptible, where it could not enforce execution, and who shall command the king?  His 
person is sacred, even though his measures be tyrannical and arbitrary, for no jurisdiction 
can try him in a criminal manner, much less condemn him to punishment.” (quoting 
Browne’s Blackstone’s Commentaries at 77)). 
 
2 ARA Health Servs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 344 Md. 85, 91 
(1996). 
 
3 Id. at 92 (citing Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 58–59 (1986)). 
 
2 
 
Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”), Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1553, 123 Stat. 115, 297 (2009).  
Appellees timely removed the suit to the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland.   
As to her federal claims against MSU, Appellant alleges that her termination by 
MSU was impermissible retaliation for disclosing that the University, primarily Dean 
Wickham, had overstated “the University’s operating costs to the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting and the United States Department of Education and . . . attempted to influence 
the 2016 Baltimore mayoral race by violating FCC regulation[s].”  Eventually, the Fourth 
Circuit certified a question of law to this Court, which we have slightly rephrased: Does 
Maryland’s waiver of sovereign immunity for “a tort action” under the MTCA extend to 
federal statutory claims?4  For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the General 
Assembly did not waive the State’s sovereign immunity for such claims. 
I 
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The General Assembly has granted this Court the authority to “answer a question of 
law certified to it by a court of the United States . . . if the answer may be determinative of 
an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling appellate 
decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this State.”  Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. 
 
4 The Fourth Circuit’s original question was: “Does the waiver of sovereign 
immunity for ‘tort action[s]’ under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Md. Code Ann., State 
Gov’t § 12-104(a)(1), extend to federal statutory claims, including those where the alleged 
harm is wrongful termination in retaliation for whistleblowing?”  As acknowledged by the 
Fourth Circuit, however, this Court has the power to “reformulate [the] question of law 
certified to it.”  Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJP”) (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.) § 12-
604. 
 
3 
 
Proc. (“CJP”) (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.) § 12-603.  The certifying court must “issue a 
certification order and forward it” to this Court.  Id. § 12-605.  That certification order must 
contain, among other things, the question of law to be answered and the relevant facts.  Id. 
§ 12-606.  This Court accepted the Fourth Circuit’s certified question of law.  See id. § 12-
607. 
When answering a certified question, “this Court accepts the facts provided by the 
certifying court[,]” United Bank v. Buckingham, 472 Md. 407, 413 (2021) (citing Price v. 
Murdy, 462 Md. 145, 147 (2018)), and cabins its “legal analysis and final determinations 
of Maryland law to the question[] certified[,]” Dickson v. United States, 478 Md. 255, 260 
(2022) (citing Buckingham, 472 Md. at 421).  Because certified questions can encompass 
only legal questions, “our analysis necessarily is de novo.”  Id. 
II 
BACKGROUND 
To place this certified question in proper context, we first discuss the facts as 
provided by the Fourth Circuit, the relevant procedural history, and the MTCA. 
A. 
Factual Background 
Appellant worked from 2014 to 2017 as MSU’s Director of Broadcast Operations 
where she oversaw and managed MSU’s radio and television stations.  Before Baltimore 
City’s 2016 mayoral election, Appellant organized a debate among all candidates.  Then-
incumbent Catherine Pugh, the Democratic Party candidate, was unable to attend the 
debate, so, according to Appellant, Dean Wickham instructed Appellant to cancel the 
debate at Mayor Pugh’s behest.  Adhering to prior guidance that candidates be provided 
 
4 
 
on-air interviews to compensate for cancelled debate time, Appellant granted requests for 
interviews from Republican and Green Party candidates.  Dean Wickham disapproved of 
Appellant’s grants for interviews, stating that things would “not end well for her.”  
Appellant complained to MSU that she believed Dean Wickham’s actions violated various 
federal and state laws and regulations.  Appellant also voiced concern to Dean Wickham 
and other MSU leaders that she believed that MSU intentionally was inflating expenses in 
reports submitted to state and federal agencies to secure larger grants.  Appellant believes 
that her complaints resulted in her improper termination in 2017. 
B. 
Procedural History 
Appellant filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against MSU for 
wrongful termination in violation of a clear mandate of public policy (Count I), and against 
Dean Wickham for defamation (Count II).  The operative first amended complaint, filed in 
December 2018, sought to “recover civil damages under Maryland common law torts and 
federal law” by adding to the initial complaint’s common law tort counts a claim against 
both defendants for retaliation under the NDAA and the ARRA (Count III).5  Appellees 
removed the suit to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, which 
dismissed the action with prejudice. 
Appellant appealed, and the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order 
dismissing Appellant’s federal statutory claims and remanded the case to the district court 
 
5 Appellant’s additional claim against Appellees was for discrimination and 
retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count IV), but she later withdrew that 
allegation. 
 
5 
 
to address whether Maryland has waived state sovereign immunity against federal 
whistleblower claims by enacting the MTCA.  Following remand and supplemental 
briefing by the parties, on July 26, 2021, the district court granted Appellees’ renewed 
motion to dismiss on the ground that the MTCA does not waive the State’s sovereign 
immunity with respect to such claims.  Appellant again appealed from the district court’s 
judgment dismissing her action.  After briefing and oral argument, the Fourth Circuit 
certified the question of law to this Court, which we accepted.  
C. 
The MTCA’s Statutory Framework 
 
The MTCA is codified under the State Government Article as Subtitle 1 of Title 12.  
“The MTCA was enacted in 1981 as a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity for tortious 
acts or omissions committed within the scope of the public duties of ‘state personnel’ and 
committed without malice or gross negligence.”  Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 173 (2007).  
Under the MTCA, a party injured by the negligent act or omission of a state officer or 
employee within the scope of the officer’s or employee’s public duties may obtain 
compensation for that injury from the State.  
 
SG § 12-104 states in pertinent part: 
(a)(1) Subject to the exclusions and limitations in this subtitle and 
notwithstanding any other provision of the law, the immunity of the State and 
its units is waived as to a tort action, in a court of the State, to the extent 
provided under paragraph (2) of this subsection.   
 
(2)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, the liability 
of the state and its units may not exceed $400,000 to a single claimant for 
injuries arising from a single incident or occurrence.   
 
* 
* 
* 
 
 
6 
 
(b) Immunity is not waived under this section as described under § 5-522(a) 
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  
 
(Emphasis added).  By its plain terms, SG § 12-104(b) provides that the scope of the State’s 
waiver of sovereign immunity is established by the interplay between subsection (a) and 
CJP § 5-522(a).  That section provides that the State’s immunity is not waived for, among 
other things, “[a]ny tortious act or omission of State personnel that: (i) [i]s not within the 
scope of the public duties of the State personnel; or (ii) [i]s made with malice or gross 
negligence[.]”  CJP § 5-522(a)(4).   
 
The other central component of the MTCA, in addition to its waiver of the State’s 
sovereign immunity for tortious acts or omissions by State personnel, is a corresponding 
immunity from suit and from liability in tort for State personnel.  See SG § 12-105 (“State 
personnel shall have the immunity from liability described under § 5-522(b) of the Courts 
and Judicial Proceedings Article.”); CJP § 5-522(b) (providing that State Personnel as 
defined under the MTCA are “immune from suit in courts of the State and from liability in 
tort for a tortious act or omission that is within the scope of the public duties of the State 
personnel and is made without malice or gross negligence, and for which the State or its 
units have waived immunity” under SG § 12-104, “even if the damages exceed the limits 
of that waiver.”). 
 
The Legislature has created a comprehensive statutory scheme, where the waiver of 
the State’s sovereign immunity for tort actions corresponds precisely with immunity from 
suit and liability for State personnel.  In lieu of recovery from the negligent State personnel, 
the party may obtain compensation for that injury from the State.  Barbre, 402 Md. at 173–
 
7 
 
74.  “In other words, liability of the State and liability of individual State personnel are 
mutually exclusive.  If the State is liable, the individual is immune; if the individual is 
liable, the State is immune.”  Newell v. Runnels, 407 Md. 578, 635 (2009).  “In effect, the 
MTCA substitutes the State for the State personnel as the appropriate defendant in such an 
action.”  Rodriguez v. Cooper, 458 Md. 425, 451–52 (2018).  
 
The MTCA also contains certain limitations on the scope of the waiver of the State’s 
sovereign immunity beyond those that are dependent on the actions of the State personnel.  
Among those limitations are that the State has not waived immunity from claims for 
punitive damages or pre-judgment interest; its liability may not exceed $400,000 to a single 
claimant for injuries from a single incident or occurrence; and the MTCA does not waive 
any right or defense of the State, including any defense that is available under the Eleventh 
Amendment.  SG §§ 12-103(2), 12-104(a)(2), (b); CJP § 5-522(a).   
III 
ANALYSIS 
 
We hold today that the MTCA does not waive the State’s sovereign immunity for 
federal statutory claims.  In deciding this issue, we employ our traditional canons of 
statutory interpretation.  We demonstrate how the MTCA’s plain language, statutory 
framework, and historical amendments reflect that the General Assembly did not intend to 
include federal statutory claims under the MTCA’s limited waiver.  We then illustrate 
along the way how that holding comports with the purposes of the MTCA and why 
 
8 
 
adopting Appellant’s interpretation would produce results at odds with the MTCA’s 
framework and purpose. 
A. 
The Parties’ Contentions 
 
Appellant alleges that the term “tort action” as used in SG § 12-104 is broad and 
was intended to include all federal statutory claims.  She asserts that we must—in 
accordance with the MTCA’s mandate—construe the MTCA broadly to ensure a remedy 
for the injured party, which necessitates holding that the General Assembly waived the 
State’s sovereign immunity for federal statutory claims.  Appellant argues that, in other 
contexts, this Court has held that a “tort” encompasses all civil wrongs, including those 
based in statute, not just those recognized at common law.  Appellant further argues that 
the historical amendments to the MTCA evince the General Assembly’s intent to include 
federal statutory claims under “a tort action.”6  
 
For their part, Appellees argue that neither the statutory text nor the legislative 
history of the MTCA indicates that the General Assembly intended to waive the State’s 
immunity for federal statutory claims.  Appellees also assert that the phrase “tort action” 
 
6 Appellant also presents two ancillary arguments: (1) excluding from the MTCA’s 
waiver of sovereign immunity federal statutory claims analogous to state law claims that 
would qualify under the MTCA’s waiver would violate the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution by discriminating against an individual’s federal rights and (2) the 
phrase “a tort action” includes statutory employment claims.  The first argument goes 
beyond the scope of this certified question.  Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United 
States, in rejecting a claim of “discriminat[ion] against federal rights by claiming sovereign 
immunity from” a federal statutory claim, already has held that if a state “has chosen to 
consent to certain classes of suits while maintaining its immunity from others, it has done 
no more than exercise a privilege of sovereignty concomitant to its constitutional immunity 
from suit.”  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999).  Given our holding that the MTCA’s 
waiver does not include federal statutory claims, we need not address the second argument. 
 
9 
 
must be read within the overall context of the State’s immunity waiver provisions and 
corresponding grant of immunity provisions for State personnel, which work in tandem.  
Appellees assert that it would be illogical for the State to have waived their immunity for 
federal statutory claims under the MTCA because it could not provide a corresponding 
grant of immunity to State personnel. 
B. 
Discussion  
There is no question that MSU is an instrumentality of the State, sharing in its 
sovereign immunity.  See Md. Code Ann., Educ. (1978, 2022 Repl. Vol.) § 14-101(a)(2) 
(noting that MSU “is an instrumentality of the State and a public corporation”); Proctor v. 
Washington Metro. Area Trans. Auth., 412 Md. 691, 709 (2010) (noting that the State’s 
sovereign immunity “is applicable not only to the State itself, but also to its agencies and 
instrumentalities, unless the General Assembly has waived the immunity either directly or 
by necessary implication” (quoting Katz v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 284 
Md. 503, 507–08 (1979))).  Answering the certified question of law from the Fourth Circuit 
is an exercise in statutory interpretation, so we turn next to the principles used in such an 
exercise. 
1. Canons of Statutory Interpretation: Generally and for Waivers of 
Sovereign Immunity 
In this case, we must determine whether the MTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity 
for a “tort action” includes federal statutory claims.  As we recently stated: 
Pursuant to the well-established principles of statutory construction, our goal 
is to ascertain and effectuate the actual intent of the General Assembly.  We 
first examine the plain meaning of the statutory language and, if the language 
is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, 
 
10 
 
our inquiry generally ceases at that point and we apply the statute as written.  
In other words, we interpret the plain meaning of a statute to give effect to 
the unambiguous language (if, indeed, the language is unambiguous) and 
need not resort to a review of the legislative history. 
 
Thornton Mellon, LLC v. Adrienne Dennis Exempt Trust, 478 Md. 280, 313–14 (2022) 
(citations and quotation marks omitted).  When tasked with interpreting one section of a 
larger statutory scheme, we avoid interpreting that section in isolation; instead, we “analyze 
the statutory scheme as a whole considering the ‘purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting 
body[.]’”  Proctor, 412 Md. at 714 (quoting Ray v. State, 410 Md. 384, 405 (2009)).  
Throughout this process, we are mindful that a statute “must be given a reasonable 
interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense.”  
Comptroller of Md. v. FC-GEN Operations Invs. LLC, 482 Md. 343, 380 (2022) (quoting 
Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP, 473 Md. 356, 377 (2021)). 
When interpreting waivers of the State’s immunity, we employ the “traditional rules 
of statutory interpretation, remaining mindful of the policies underlying governmental 
immunity.”  Bd. of Educ. of Balt. Cnty. v. Zimmer-Rubert, 409 Md. 200, 214 (2009).  Those 
policies are to “protect[] the State from burdensome interference with its governmental 
functions and preserve its control over State agencies and funds.”  Id. at 211 (quoting Katz, 
284 Md. at 507).  Thus, we “strictly construe[]” any waiver of the State’s immunity “in 
favor of the sovereign[,]” id. at 212, because “dilution of the doctrine [of sovereign 
immunity] should not be accomplished by ‘judicial fiat[,]’” id. (quoting ARA Health Servs., 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 344 Md. 85, 92 (1996)).  We recently reaffirmed 
this long-standing principle when we stated that “waivers of sovereign immunity, which 
 
11 
 
are in derogation of the common law, are strictly construed in favor of the State.”  Brawner 
Builders, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 476 Md. 15, 32 (2021) (citing Proctor, 412 Md. at 
709; Zimmer-Rubert, 409 Md. at 212). 
2. The Plain Language and Statutory Context 
 
Starting with the plain text, the MTCA does not define the term “tort action.”  In 
support of her position that “tort action,” as used in the MTCA, encompasses federal 
statutory claims, Appellant contends that three decisions of this Court “broaden[ed] the 
definition of ‘tort’” beyond common law tort actions:  Green v. N.B.S., Inc., 409 Md. 528 
(2009); Espina v. Jackson, 442 Md. 311 (2015); and Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245 (2004).7  
None of those decisions supports Appellant’s contention that the MTCA waiver extends 
generally even to state statutory claims, much less federal statutory claims. 
 
In Green, this Court considered whether to apply Maryland’s cap on noneconomic 
damages set forth in CJP § 11-108 to damages for a violation of the Maryland Consumer 
 
 
7 At oral argument, Appellant directly claimed support from our decision in Hansen 
v. City of Laurel, 420 Md. 670 (2011), and, in her brief, she cites to unreported decisions 
of other courts that discuss that decision.  Hansen, like the other cases on which Appellant 
relies, does not bolster her position.  There, we held that a plaintiff bringing a claim for 
employment discrimination against a local government entity must provide notice as 
required by the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”) and plead compliance with 
that requirement.  420 Md. at 672–73.  Our decision in Hansen concerned compliance with 
notice and pleading requirements.  It did not address waiver or the meaning of “tort action” 
or any similar phrase.  Indeed, the notice requirement at issue in Hansen requires a claimant 
to provide notice of any “action for unliquidated damages,” not just tort actions, “brought 
against a local government or its employees.”  Id. at 676 n.4 (quoting the then-applicable 
version of CJP § 5-304(b)(1)).  We began our discussion by noting the “longstanding 
principle of Maryland jurisprudence that the LGTCA notice provision is a condition 
precedent to maintaining an action”—not just a tort action—“directly against a local 
government or its employees.”  Id. at 682.  Hansen, therefore, is inapposite. 
 
12 
 
Protection Act (“MCPA”).  409 Md. at 541–42.  The plaintiff in that case had brought 
claims for common law negligence and violation of the MCPA arising from exposure to 
lead-based paint.  Id. at 534.  The jury awarded damages that were not differentiated 
between those two claims.  Id. at 535.  Affirming the Appellate Court of Maryland,8 we 
held that those damages were subject to the cap imposed by CJP § 11-108 on “damages for 
personal injury” applicable “to each direct victim of tortious conduct[.]”  Id. at 539–40.  In 
our analysis, we quoted with approval several portions of the Appellate Court’s opinion.  
In one of those portions, the Appellate Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the cap 
could not apply because the MCPA “is a statutory cause of action and not a tort.”  Id. at 
542.  The Appellate Court observed that Black’s Law Dictionary defined “tort” in part as 
a “civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained,” but did not limit it to “wrongs that 
were recognized as a civil wrong at common law.”  Id. at 542 (quoting Green v. N.B.S., 
Inc., 180 Md. App. 639, 646–47 (2008)).  In another portion, which we quoted immediately 
before stating our agreement with the Appellate Court’s analysis, the intermediate appellate 
court reviewed the history of CJP § 11-108 and concluded that the General Assembly 
intended it to apply to “all actions for personal injuries,” regardless of their legal basis.  Id. 
at 544 (quoting Green, 180 Md. App. at 659–60).  Our holding in Green, however, was not 
that the plaintiff’s MCPA claim was a “tort action,” but that it was “a personal injury 
action” to which CJP § 11-108 applied.  Id. at 541. 
 
8 At the November 8, 2022, general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a 
constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
to the Appellate Court of Maryland.  The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. 
 
13 
 
 
Espina fares no better.  The sole portion of our opinion in Espina on which Ms. 
Williams relies is its brief discussion of our opinion in Green.  The issue in Espina was 
whether the General Assembly exceeded its authority when it capped the exposure of local 
governments to constitutional torts under the Local Government Tort Claims Act 
(“LGTCA”).  442 Md. at 316–17.  Espina did not concern either the MTCA specifically or 
statutory claims in general.  Nonetheless, in reviewing caselaw shedding light on the 
meaning of the phrase “tortious acts or omissions” in the LGTCA, we discussed our 
opinion and holding in Green.  Espina is not otherwise relevant to the issues presented in 
this case. 
 
In Lee, we concluded that the MTCA applies to State constitutional torts.  384 Md. 
at 255.  Our opinion in Lee does not even mention statutory claims.  Rather, that opinion 
was based on a straightforward interpretation of the plain text of the MTCA’s application 
to “a tort action,” which we concluded “plainly appears to cover intentional torts and 
constitutional torts as long as they were committed within the scope of state employment 
and without malice or gross negligence.”  Id. at 256.  Although it is certainly correct that 
our opinion in Lee stands for the proposition that “tort action” in the MTCA is not limited 
only to common law torts, see, e.g., Green, 409 Md. at 542 (observing that our opinion in 
Lee “at least suggests that the term ‘tortious conduct’ includes more than conduct that 
constituted a tort at common law” (quoting Green, 180 Md. App. at 649)), it provides no 
support for Appellant’s contention that the phrase extends to statutory claims. 
 
None of the cases on which Appellant relies is apposite.  In Green, we adopted an 
analysis that was based primarily on the conclusion that in expanding the scope of the CJP 
 
14 
 
§ 11-108 cap to cover wrongful death actions, the General Assembly had not intended to 
narrow the statute’s application, which previously reached all personal injury actions, so 
that it was limited only to common law torts.  409 Md. at 543–44.  The broad definition of 
“tort” in Black’s Law Dictionary was not dispositive.  In Espina, we briefly discussed our 
holding in Green.  And in Lee, we considered the application of the MTCA to constitutional 
torts.  None of these cases purported to “broaden[] the definition of ‘tort’” either generally 
for all statutes or for purposes of the MTCA specifically. 
 
There are several textual and contextual reasons that cause us to conclude that the 
General Assembly did not intend the phrase “tort action” to extend to statutory claims 
generally, and especially not to federal statutory claims.  First, and most notably, the plain 
text of the MTCA’s waiver provision does not contain any indication that it applies to 
federal statutory claims.  As discussed above, we construe waivers of the State’s sovereign 
immunity in favor of retaining that immunity.  Given that rule, we would expect the 
General Assembly to speak plainly if it intended to subject the State to suit under any and 
all statutes that might exist or be enacted in the future, especially statutes that might be 
enacted by the United States Congress, a separate legislative body over which the General 
Assembly exercises no control.  There is no express language in the MTCA extending the 
sovereign immunity waiver to such claims. 
 
Second, this Court has never held that “tort action” or any similar phrase, either as 
used in the MTCA or in any other statute, applies generally to State statutory claims.  As 
discussed above, our holding in Green was premised on our analysis of the General 
Assembly’s intent in enacting, and later amending, CJP § 11-108.  That opinion sheds no 
 
15 
 
light on the General Assembly’s intent with respect to the scope of the waiver of sovereign 
immunity under the MTCA.  Were we to accept Appellant’s interpretation of Green, then 
we would need to conclude that the General Assembly, sub silentio, has waived the State’s 
sovereign immunity to claims under the MCPA and all other state statutes that contain a 
private right of action and sound in tort.  To the contrary, our holding in Green was limited 
to the scope of CJP § 11-108.9 
 
Third, while the MTCA’s waiver is contained in SG § 12-104, we do not construe 
isolated statutes in a vacuum; rather, we construe the statutory scheme as a whole.  See 
Proctor, 412 Md. at 714.  As noted above, the General Assembly’s waiver of sovereign 
immunity under the MTCA operates in tandem with the General Assembly’s grant of 
immunity to State Personnel where the State’s waiver is triggered.  See SG § 12-105; CJP 
§ 5-552(b).  In other words, where the General Assembly has waived the State’s sovereign 
immunity for tortious conduct in certain situations, it has concomitantly provided immunity 
to its State personnel for the same conduct.  See Lee, 384 Md. at 255 (observing that the 
“immunity granted to [S]tate personnel by the Maryland Tort Claims Act is generally co-
extensive with the coverage of the statute”).  Indeed, “[t]he purpose of the [MTCA]’s 
immunity is to insulate state employees generally from tort liability if their actions are 
 
9 Nothing we say in this opinion should be construed as opining on the application 
of the MTCA to any other state statutory claim.  We discuss the MTCA as it relates to state 
statutory claims to both provide broader context and discuss Appellant’s contention that 
our precedent has expanded the phrase “tort action” to encompass all federal statutory 
claims.  Because, as we explained above, none of our precedent stands for the proposition 
that the MTCA applies to all state statutory claims, then surely it would be illogical to 
conclude that it applies to all federal statutory claims. 
 
16 
 
within the scope of employment and without malice or gross negligence.”  Id. at 261.  That 
purpose is satisfied for state common law and constitutional torts by substituting the State’s 
liability for that of State personnel who would otherwise be liable.  For State statutory 
claims, however, the imposition and scope of liability is a legislative choice made by the 
General Assembly.  In other words, unlike in the case of common law and constitutional 
torts, in crafting a State statute containing a private right of action, the General Assembly 
has the ability to place liability where it chooses.  It would be unnecessary to resort to a 
separate statutory scheme, like the MTCA, to allocate liability for State statutory claims. 
Further, unlike State statutory claims, which the General Assembly has the ability 
to craft as it sees fit, that body has no control over the scope of federal statutory claims and 
no ability to insulate the State’s personnel from individual liability.  See Howlett ex rel. 
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375 (1990) (“The elements of, and the defenses to, a federal 
cause of action are defined by federal law.”); Sales v. Grant, 224 F.3d 293, 297–98 (4th 
Cir. 2000) (holding, specific to a promise of indemnification, that a state “cannot invest 
government[] officers, sued in their individual capacities, with sovereign immunity that 
they would not otherwise enjoy”); see also U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2 (“Th[e] Constitution, 
and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”).  Adopting 
Appellant’s expansive definition of “a tort action,” thus, would eliminate the General 
Assembly’s exercise of control in defining the scope of the State’s liability. 
Fourth, when the General Assembly has intended to waive the State’s sovereign 
immunity for purposes of a State statutory claim, it generally has done so directly within 
the specific statutory scheme at issue.  See SG §§ 20-601–20-611 (describing unlawful 
 
17 
 
discrimination practices in employment), § 20-903 (“The State, its officers, and its units 
may not raise sovereign immunity as a defense against an award in an employment 
discrimination case under this title.”); State Pers. & Pens. (“P&P”) §§ 5-301–5-314 (laying 
out the provisions of the Maryland Whistleblower Law, which is under Division I of the 
State Personnel and Pensions Article), § 14-103 (discussing that the State may not raise 
sovereign immunity as a defense in any “administrative, arbitration, or judicial proceeding 
involving an employee grievance or hearing that is held under” “this Division I or a 
regulation adopted under it” or “a personnel policy or regulation that governs classified 
employees of . . . [MSU]”).  Indeed, we previously have held that when the General 
Assembly enacts a waiver of the State’s immunity within a specific statutory scheme, the 
MTCA—as a gap-filler provision—does not apply.  See Proctor, 412 Md. at 712 
(interpreting SG § 12-103(1)(i) to evince the General Assembly’s intent that the “MTCA 
serve as a ‘gap-filler’ to waive the immunity of State agencies in tort when no other statute 
expressly waived the agency’s immunity” (emphases added)). 
 
Furthermore, these statute-specific waivers usually carry with them various 
procedural or administrative requirements before a claimant can file suit.  See, e.g., SG § 
20-1013 (allowing an individual to file a civil action pending, among other requirements, 
that the claimant has “filed a timely administrative charge or complaint under federal, State, 
or local law alleging an unlawful employment practice”); P&P Title 12 (outlining 
administrative grievance procedures for State employees).  The General Assembly’s 
separate waivers of sovereign immunity for specific State statutory claims makes us 
 
18 
 
especially reticent to conclude that it intended the waiver in the MTCA to apply to statutory 
claims generally, much less federal statutory claims. 
 
Finally, the General Assembly has demonstrated that it knows how to waive 
sovereign immunity to federal claims when that is its intent.  The MTCA does not include 
the sort of expansive language the General Assembly has used to do so in other contexts.  
For example, CJP § 5-518 waives the sovereign immunity of county boards of education 
from federal claims by stating that “[a] county board of education may not raise the defense 
of sovereign immunity to any claim” of or below a specified dollar amount.  (Emphasis 
added).  In Zimmer-Rubert, we held that CJP § 5-518(c) waived the board’s state sovereign 
immunity to suits under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act and its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court.  409 Md. at 203–07, 213–15.  In 
doing so, we held that the phrase “any claim” in § 5-518(c) constituted by its plain language 
a “broad and unambiguous” waiver of both immunities, contrasting that language with the 
much narrower language “in a court of the State,” which of course is used in the MTCA.  
Id. at 213–15.  In short, the phrase “any claims” was so broad that it could not have 
“preserve[d] the defense of sovereign immunity”; rather, it extended the defense of 
sovereign immunity to “all claims” up to the specified dollar amount.  Id. at 215–17.  The 
General Assembly did not use such expansive language in the MTCA. 
For the reasons we have discussed above, we conclude that the MTCA’s limited 
waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity for “a tort action,” does not extend to federal 
statutory causes of action.  Ultimately, we need not decide whether the MTCA waives 
 
19 
 
sovereign immunity generally for state statutory claims that sound in tort.10  If it does, such 
a waiver would necessarily be limited to state statutory claims that are not covered by 
another waiver of sovereign immunity specific to the scheme.  See, e.g., Proctor, 412 Md. 
at 720 (stating that the MTCA applies only “when no other preexisting waiver of sovereign 
immunity exists”).  Regardless, based on the plain language of the MTCA and its statutory 
context, we conclude that it does not extend generally to all federal statutory claims, 
including to those brought pursuant to the ARRA and the NDAA.11  As discussed next, our 
interpretation is also consistent with the statute’s purpose and legislative history. 
3. Purpose and Historical Context 
 
Although we conclude that the text of the MTCA is unambiguous, we note that our 
interpretation of its waiver provision is consistent with the Act’s purpose and historical 
context.  As noted above, the MTCA states that it “shall be construed broadly, to ensure 
that injured parties have a remedy.”  SG § 12–102.  But a broad construction of the MTCA 
 
 
10 We recognize that we have previously made statements suggesting that the MTCA 
did abrogate the State’s sovereign immunity with respect to at least some statutory tort 
claims.  See Lopez v. Md. State Highway Admin., 327 Md. 486, 489 (1992) (“When the 
legislature passed the MTCA and abrogated the State’s sovereign immunity, it imposed 
certain procedural requirements that must be met in order to maintain a common law or 
statutory tort claim against the State.” (emphasis added)).  But neither party has pointed us 
to a decision that has held that the MTCA abrogated the State’s sovereign immunity with 
respect to all state statutory tort claims. 
 
 
11 We do not foreclose the possibility that there might be some federal statutory 
claim that might be considered a “tort action” for purposes of the MTCA.  There is no need 
to do so here.  Instead, we hold only that the MTCA does not generally waive the State’s 
sovereign immunity for federal statutory claims, and that nothing presented to us suggests 
that claims pursuant to either of the federal statutes at issue in this appeal are exceptions to 
that general rule. 
 
20 
 
is not necessarily an open invitation for any injured party to file a claim.  The MTCA 
constitutes a limited waiver of the State’s immunity, and we cannot expand it beyond the 
words the General Assembly enacted.  See Wheeling, 473 Md. at 376–77 (“‘[W]e neither 
add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and 
unambiguous language of the statute, and we do not construe a statute ‘with forced or subtle 
interpretations’ that limit or extend its application.’” (quoting Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 
Md. 257, 275 (2010))).  “Tort action[s]” does not expressly or by necessary implication 
encompass federal statutory claims. 
The historical context of the MTCA also is instructive.  As originally enacted, the 
MTCA waived the State’s immunity for only six specified causes of action.12  1981 Md. 
Laws, Ch. 298 (“S.B. 585”) at 1611–12; see Litz v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, 446 Md. 254, 
279 (2016).  Excluded from the State’s original waiver of sovereign immunity were 
punitive damages, prejudgment interest, individual claims in excess of $100,000, an 
aggregate of claims arising from the same occurrence in excess of $500,000, claims arising 
out of activities of the State militia during a state of emergency, and any cause of action 
prohibited by law.  S.B. 585 at 1612. 
 
12 Those actions were to recover damages caused by: (1) negligent maintenance or 
operation of a motor vehicle by a State employee; (2) negligence of a healthcare employee 
of a state facility or institution or by a doctor, nurse, dentist, or related healthcare personnel 
employed by the State; (3) patently dangerous condition of a building, structure, or other 
public improvement owned and controlled by the State; (4) negligent use or maintenance 
of State property by a State employee; (5) a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of 
any street, alley, sidewalk, or highway owned and controlled by the State if constructive or 
actual notice of the condition existed; and (6) negligent failure of a State officer or 
employee to properly supervise an activity at a State park or recreation facility. 
 
21 
 
Four years later, the General Assembly amended the MTCA and reorganized it as 
part of the State Government Article.  Among the many changes produced by the 1985 
amendment, we highlight three.  First, it eliminated the six categories of torts for which an 
individual could recover.  1985 Md. Laws, Ch. 538 (“S.B. 380”) at 2683–84.  Instead, the 
1985 amendment expanded the Act’s reach to “a tort action[.]”  Id. at 2683.  Second, the 
General Assembly added to the State’s original reservation of immunity any tortious act or 
omission of State personnel that (1) is not conducted within the scope of public duties or 
(2) is made with malice or gross negligence.  Id. at 2684.  Third, the amendment created a 
new § 12-105, which granted immunity to State employees for acts committed within the 
scope of their duties and made without malice or gross negligence.  Id. at 2685. 
Between 1986 and 2021, the General Assembly amended the MTCA seven times.  
None of those amendments have any substantive implications for this case. 
The enactment of, and 1985 amendment to, the MTCA displays no intent by the 
General Assembly to include federal statutory claims under the MTCA’s limited waiver of 
sovereign immunity.  As originally enacted, the General Assembly waived the State’s 
sovereign immunity in only six discrete instances.  The 1985 amendment abandoned those 
limitations and extended the State’s waiver to “a tort action,” but in exchange provided 
immunity to the State personnel who would otherwise have been liable in such an action.  
The amendment contains no express indication, as our interpretative canons for immunity 
waivers require, that “a tort action” extended to federal statutory claims.  The purpose 
 
22 
 
paragraph13 to S.B. 380 states that a goal of the 1985 amendment was to provide “State 
personnel . . . immun[ity] from certain tort suits[.]”  S.B. 380 at 2682 (emphasis added).  
Recalling that the State’s and a State employee’s liability under the MTCA are mutually 
exclusive, see Newell, 407 Md. at 635, if State employees were granted immunity from 
only “certain tort suits[,]” then it naturally follows that the State could be liable only in 
those very same “certain tort suits” where the State employee is immune.  Thus, the General 
Assembly’s expansion in 1985 of the scope of the claims covered by the MTCA’s waiver 
to “a tort claim” does not reflect an intention for that expansion to apply to federal statutory 
claims.  If it did, then there would be an incongruity between the State’s and a State 
employee’s immunity because, as previously noted, the State cannot immunize State 
employees against federal causes of action.  See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 375.  To hold as 
Appellant urges us would, thus, be inconsistent with one of the MTCA’s main purposes. 
As we have outlined, the General Assembly did not intend for “a tort action” under 
the MTCA to include federal statutory causes of action.  The MTCA’s waiver provision 
contains no express language indicating such a result, and the General Assembly knows 
how to waive effectively the State’s immunity, if that is its goal.  Furthermore, extending 
the scope of the waiver provision to federal statutory claims is inconsistent with both the 
 
13 We discuss the text of S.B. 380’s purpose paragraph because, as we stated earlier 
this term, “this Court may use the bill title, purpose, amendments, and earlier and 
subsequent litigation as tools in reaching the correct statutory construction.”  Elsberry v. 
Stanley Martin Cos., LLC, 482 Md. 159, 187 (2022) (citing Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Lytle, 
374 Md. 37, 57 (2003)).  We then noted that “the bill title and purpose are part of the 
statutory text—not the legislative history—even if both are used in service of ascertaining 
the intent of the General Assembly.”  Id. 
 
23 
 
key, neighboring provisions concerning the interplay between the State and a State 
employee’s immunity in certain suits, as well as the MTCA’s role as a gap-filler scheme.14 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
The certified question posed by the Fourth Circuit, and slightly rephrased by us, is 
whether “a tort action” under the MTCA includes federal statutory claims.  Our answer is 
no.  We hold as such because, after assessing the plain language of the MTCA, there is no 
evidence that the General Assembly intended to include federal statutory claims within the 
 
14 Notably, the 1985 amendment retained the State’s immunity for torts of State 
employees acting outside the scope of their duties or with malice or gross negligence; 
required that a claimant file a claim with the Treasurer for damages as a condition precedent 
to filing a suit for damages; limited the waiver to exclude damages arising out of a single 
claim or occurrence in excess of state insurance coverage for tort claims, as provided in the 
budget; retained the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit; and added a new 
provision that the more expanded waiver “[did] not affect other waivers [of sovereign 
immunity] made by the Legislature in other sections of the Code.”  Proctor, 412 Md. at 
713 (citations omitted). 
The legislative history of the 1985 amendment also confirms our interpretation.  
Indeed, testifying in support of the amendment, State Treasurer William S. James explained 
that the 1985 amendments were intended to “remedy the defects in the Maryland Tort 
Claims Act by eliminating the six categories” and substituting “broader coverage to the 
extent that insurance can be purchased with appropriations.”  “In the event a successful 
plaintiff obtained a judgment in excess of the policy coverage, the State and its employee 
would be protected by sovereign immunity.  However, upon recommendation of the 
Attorney General in worthy cases, the Board of Public Works could award additional 
compensation to injured parties.”  See Sen. Jud. Proc. Comm., Bill Analysis 1 (explaining 
that while the 1981 law limited the State’s waiver to “specified kinds of torts,” Senate Bill 
380 “waives the State’s immunity to liability in all types of tort actions.  Under S.B. 380, 
the State may be sued for damages arising from all types of tortious acts or omissions and 
not merely from those specified in the statute.”). 
There ultimately is nothing in the legislative history that supports Appellant’s 
interpretation of the MTCA. 
 
24 
 
scope of the MTCA.  Furthermore, adopting Appellant’s approach would produce results 
that are inconsistent with one of the MTCA’s main purposes. 
 
CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW 
ANSWERED AS SET FORTH ABOVE.  
COSTS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES.