Case Title: Thoma v. Village of Slinger

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016AP002528, 2015AP001970

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-05-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 45 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Donald J. Thoma and Polk Properties LLC, 
          Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Village of Slinger, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(2015AP1970) AND ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF 
APPEALS (2016AP2528) 
Reported at 373 Wis. 2d 766, 895 N.W.2d 854 
(2017 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 10, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 21, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Washington 
 
JUDGE: 
Andrew T. Gonring 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., dissents, joined by ZIEGLER, 
J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: KELLY, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
petitioners-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Erik S. Olsen, Andrew D. Weininger, and Eminent 
Domain Services, LLC, Madison. There was an oral argument by 
Erik S. Olsen. 
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Dustin T. Woehl, Thomas A. Cabush, and Kasdorf Lewis & Swietlik, 
SC, Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument by Thomas A. Cabush. 
 
There was an amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of 
Wisconsin Farm Bureau Federation by H. Dale Peterson, John J. 
 
 
2 
Laubmeier, and Stroud, Willink, & Howard, LLC, Madison.  There 
was an oral argument by H. Dale Peterson. 
 
There was an amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of the 
Wisconsin REALTORS Association, Wisconsin Builders Association, 
and NAIOP-WI by Thomas D. Larson and Wisconsin REALTORS 
Association, Madison. 
 
 
 
2018 WI 45
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528 
(L.C. No. 
2014CV700) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Donald J. Thoma and Polk Properties LLC, 
 
          Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Village of Slinger, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 10, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals and APPEAL 
from an order of the Circuit Court for Washington County, Andrew 
T. Gonring, Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   We accepted review in 
these cases1 to decide whether an injunction prohibiting 
                                                 
1 This is a consolidated review of two cases:  The first 
case, 2015AP1970, came to us via a petition for review of Thoma 
v. Village of Slinger, No. 2015AP1970, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2017), and the second case, 2016AP2528, 
came to us via a petition to bypass the court of appeals' review 
of the Hon. Andrew T. Gonring's order denying a Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07 motion to vacate.  These two cases share the same 
circuit court case number as they both arise from the same 
underlying matter. 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
2 
 
agricultural use of a residentially-zoned property controls the 
property's tax assessment classification.  As it turns out, all 
parties agree that the classification of real property for tax 
purposes is based on the actual use of the property, and that an 
injunction obtained based on a restrictive covenant does not 
control tax assessment classification.  This is in fact the law 
in Wisconsin.  See Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(a) (2013-14).2 
¶2 
What remains to be determined in this consolidated 
appeal is:  (1) whether Donald J. Thoma and Polk Properties LLC 
(Thoma) presented sufficient evidence to the Village of Slinger 
Board of Review to overturn the 2014 tax assessment, and (2) 
whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
when it denied Thoma's Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) motion asking 
the circuit court to vacate its original order affirming the 
Board's decision and remand to the Board for a new hearing.  
Because the record before the Board contains no evidence that 
Thoma used the property agriculturally within the meaning of 
Wisconsin tax law, we hold the Board's decision upholding the 
tax assessment was lawful, supported by a reasonable view of the 
evidence, and therefore cannot be disturbed.  We further hold 
that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion when it denied Thoma's request to vacate the original 
order.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
3 
 
appeals in 2015AP1970, and we affirm the order of the circuit 
court in 2016AP2528. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
¶3 
This case centers on Thoma's challenge to the 
Village of Slinger's 2014 property tax assessment for property 
he purchased in 2004 and has attempted to develop into a 
residential 
subdivision 
known 
as 
Pleasant 
Farm 
Estates.    
Before Thoma purchased the land, it operated as a farm and 
received an agricultural classification for tax assessment 
purposes.  The Village of Slinger continued to classify Thoma's 
property as agricultural until the 2014 assessment. 
¶4 
In attempting to develop Pleasant Farm Estates, Thoma 
worked with the Village of Slinger to rezone the area to 
residential so individual lots could be sold for construction of 
single family homes.  Other lots were intended for construction 
of condominiums.  Thoma and the Village of Slinger entered into 
a Developer's Agreement, which set forth three phases of 
development. 
 
The 
Agreement 
also 
contained 
restrictive 
covenants, one of which prohibited Thoma from using the land for 
agriculture——Thoma's use had to be residential.3  Only two lots 
were actually sold and the property remains mostly vacant land.  
                                                 
3 The exact language of the restrictive covenant is unknown 
because this document is not in the record.  Nevertheless, for 
purposes of our review, there is no dispute that the Village of 
Slinger obtained an injunction based on a restrictive covenant 
requiring Thoma to limit the property to residential use and 
cease engaging in any agricultural activity on the property. 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
4 
 
The vacant land has ground cover, which is maintained by regular 
mowing. 
¶5 
In 2011, the Village of Slinger filed suit against 
Thoma 
to 
enforce 
the 
restrictive 
covenant 
and 
in 
2012 
successfully obtained an injunction prohibiting Thoma from using 
the land for agricultural purposes.  See Vill. of Slinger v. 
Polk Prop. LLC, Washington Cty. Circuit Ct. Case No. 2011CV1224.  
The injunction lawsuit occurred contemporaneously with Thoma's 
tax assessment challenge, and Thoma's appeal in the injunction 
lawsuit is currently pending in the court of appeals.  See Vill. 
of Slinger v. Polk Prop. LLC, 2017AP2244 (Record transmitted to 
court of appeals on Feb. 27, 2018). 
¶6 
In order to contest his 2014 tax assessment, Thoma and 
his counsel appeared before the Village of Slinger Board of 
Review for a hearing in June 2014.  Three witnesses were sworn 
to testify:  Thoma; his counsel; and the Village of Slinger's 
assessor, Michael Grota.  Thoma testified that he thought the 
property should be classified as agricultural because that was 
the classification it carried the prior year.  Thoma contended 
the 62 acres had zero value.  Thoma urged the Board to apply the 
agricultural classification because nothing had changed on the 
property from the previous year, he maintained ground cover on 
the vacant land, and he was having trouble selling the lots.  He 
shared with the Board vague information about a few other 
residential development projects that were also struggling and 
claimed that market value for these projects had dropped 
substantially.  Thoma did not present any documentation to 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
5 
 
support these statements, and he offered no testimony or 
evidence that the property was being used for farming or that he 
was harvesting crops for food or fiber.  Although Thoma left the 
hearing early to attend a funeral, his counsel remained and 
reaffirmed several times that Thoma was not farming the 
property; rather, he was "just maintaining the ground cover," as 
well as "maintain[ing] the property, to try to sell the lots,"  
and "keeping the ground cover maintained and – and making sure 
that they're appropriate for – for sale . . . it's not farming, 
it's just kind of maintaining the – the property." 
¶7 
Assessor Grota testified that he changed the use 
classification from agricultural to residential because it was 
his 
understanding 
that 
the 
injunction 
prohibiting 
any 
agricultural use on the property required the property to be 
classified as residential for tax assessment purposes.  Grota 
said his opinion was based on his conversation with Patrick 
Chaneske, "the Regional Supervisor for the Department of 
Revenue, in charge of Equalization in Southeastern Wisconsin."  
Grota submitted comparable sales of similar properties to 
support the numbers he used to reach his assessment. 
¶8 
The Board's attorney advised the Board members that 
maintaining ground cover was not sufficient to obtain an 
agricultural use classification:  "Well, let me clarify.  If it 
is simply maintaining ground cover, it's not an ag[ricutural] 
use."  Ultimately, the Board voted 2-1 to uphold the assessor's 
assessment because Thoma failed to submit sufficient evidence to 
prove the assessor's number (or classification) was wrong:  
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
6 
 
"There's a motion on the table to uphold the assessor's 
assessment of the property values.  Since the objector did not 
provide adequate evidence in rebuttal and we will now take a 
roll 
call 
vote." 
 
Two 
of 
the 
Board's 
members 
voted 
affirmatively.  The third Board member voted against the motion 
because she believed, based on her personal observation, that 
Thoma was using the property for what she believed qualified as 
agricultural use——"I've seen the guy on the tractor with the 
bailer."4 
                                                 
4 This court is troubled by the peculiarities in the Board 
of Review's record in this matter.  First, the Board of Review's 
Transcript notes that only two documents were marked:  The 
"Developer's Agreement" was marked as Exhibit 31 and the 
"Assessor's Presentation" was marked as Exhibit 51.  The 
transcript 
contains 
testimony 
regarding 
the 
Developer's 
Agreement.  Yet, the record the Board sent with the return of 
the Writ does not contain any exhibit marked 31 or 51.  The 
Board's record does contain a CD marked as "Exhibit 7" which 
contains "Polk Property Assessor's records" but does not contain 
anything purporting to be the Developer's Agreement.  There is a 
nine-page document labeled "Amended Developers' Agreement for 
Pleasant Farm Estates," but only page one of this document is 
part of the Developer's Agreement.  Disturbingly, the second 
page of this record item is from an entirely different and 
unrelated case, and the other pages are not the Developers' 
Agreement.  Second, the parties stipulated to the removal of 
Exhibit 7 from the record, and the circuit court so ordered its 
removal; the reason for its removal is absent from the record.  
Third, a DVD-R disk marked "Exhibit 1" and "Slinger BOR June 23, 
2014," is not an audio recording of the Board hearing even 
though, according to the Village of Slinger's Treasurer/Deputy 
Clerk's sworn "Return on Writ of Certiorari," it is supposed to 
be.  This exhibit instead contains 96 pictures of a dilapidated 
home taken on September 2, 2013, which has nothing to do with 
Thoma's case.  Fourth, the document the Board holds out to be 
its "Findings of Fact, Determinations and Decision dated June 
23, 2014" is a form document partially filled in with only the 
number "1" circled in the "Decision" section and no further 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
7 
 
¶9 
Thoma petitioned for a writ of certiorari pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13), and the circuit court affirmed the 
decision of the Board in July 2015.5  Thoma appealed to the court 
of appeals, which also affirmed the decision of the Board.  
Thoma v. Village of Slinger, No. 2015AP1970, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2017).  In October 2016, while 
Thoma's appeal was pending in 2015AP1970, he filed a motion in 
the circuit court to vacate the circuit court's first decision 
affirming the Board, claiming that Assessor Grota gave faulty 
testimony at the Board of Review Hearing.  Specifically, Thoma 
claimed that Grota misrepresented to the Board that the 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue required him to classify Thoma's 
property as residential because of the injunction.  Thoma 
asserted that the Board's decision erroneously relied on Grota's 
faulty testimony; therefore, Thoma argued, the circuit court 
should vacate its original order affirming the Board and send it 
back for a new Board hearing.  The circuit court entered an 
order denying Thoma's motion to vacate.  Thoma filed a new 
appeal, 2016AP2528, and petitioned this court to bypass the 
                                                                                                                                                             
explanation given as to the Board's decision outside of the 
hearing transcript.  We remind the Village of Slinger that its 
Board 
of 
Review 
is 
a 
quasi-judicial 
body 
bearing 
the 
responsibility to keep accurate records, in part so that courts 
can engage in a meaningful and complete review of the 
proceedings.  See Darcel, Inc. v. City of Manitowoc Bd. of Rev., 
137 Wis. 2d 623, 626, 405 N.W.2d 344 (1987). 
5 We note that the circuit's order refers to the Village of 
Slinger Board of Review as the "Board of Appeals."  This 
scrivener's error does not affect our analysis. 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
8 
 
court of appeals so that review of this circuit court order 
could be consolidated with review of the court of appeals 
decision.  We granted Thoma's bypass petition and consolidated 
these cases.6 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶10 In certiorari review under Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13), we 
review the Board of Review's decision, not the decisions of the 
circuit court or court of appeals, although we benefit from 
their analyses.  See Sausen v. Town of Black Creek Bd. of Rev., 
2014 WI 9, ¶¶4-5, 352 Wis. 2d 576, 843 N.W.2d 39.  Review is 
limited to "the record made before the board of review."  Saddle 
Ridge Corp. v. Bd. of Rev., 2010 WI 47, ¶36, 325 Wis. 2d 29, 784 
N.W.2d 527.  Our review is confined to deciding "whether the 
board's actions were:  (1) within its jurisdiction; (2) 
according to law; (3) arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and 
represented its will and not its judgment; and (4) supported by 
evidence such that the board might reasonably make the order or 
determination in question."  Sausen, 352 Wis. 2d 576, ¶6 
(footnote omitted).  The taxpayer challenging an assessment 
based on improper classification bears the burden of proving the 
classification is erroneous.  Id., ¶10.  If the taxpayer does 
not meet his burden of proof and "the board's determination to 
                                                 
6 The document Thoma filed with this court was labeled a 
"Motion to Consolidate."  We construed it as a petition to 
bypass. 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
9 
 
maintain the assessment is supported by a reasonable view of the 
evidence," we will affirm the Board's decision.  Id. 
¶11 In reviewing a circuit court's order denying relief 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h), we apply the erroneous exercise 
of discretion standard.  See Miller v. Hanover Ins. Co., 2010 WI 
75, ¶29, 326 Wis. 2d 640, 785 N.W.2d 493.  If the circuit court 
based its decision on the pertinent facts in the record, applied 
the 
correct 
legal 
standard, 
and 
reached 
a 
reasonable 
determination, it properly exercised its discretion and we will 
uphold its decision.  See Larry v. Harris, 2008 WI 81, ¶15, 311 
Wis. 2d 326, 752 N.W.2d 279. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
¶12 Thoma wants his land classified as agricultural for 
tax assessment purposes.  His arguments before this court rest 
on three basic propositions:  (1) Thoma and Grota previously 
agreed that ground cover counted as agricultural use; (2) 
Grota's testimony that the injunction controlled over actual use 
caused the Board to reach the wrong decision; and (3) the hay 
and alfalfa being cut on his property falls under subsector 111, 
Crop Production, of the North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS), which satisfies the legal tax definition of 
agricultural use.7 
                                                 
7 Thoma also argued that public policy supports maintaining 
an agriculture classification for land undergoing economic 
development.  The Wisconsin Farm Bureau Federation submitted an 
amicus brief refuting Thoma's claim.  The court appreciates the 
Farm Bureau's thoughtful recitation explaining the history of 
the 
use-value 
assessment 
legislation 
enacted 
to 
protect 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
10 
 
¶13 Our review is limited both by the applicable standard 
of review in certiorari actions and by the evidence presented to 
the Board at the hearing "no matter how incomplete or inadequate 
it may be."  See State ex el. Hemker v. Huggett, 114 
Wis. 2d 320, 323, 338 N.W.2d 335 (Ct. App. 1983).  These two 
constraints lead us to a simple conclusion:  Thoma did not 
present 
sufficient 
evidence 
to 
the 
Board 
to 
support 
an 
agricultural classification of his property under the tax 
assessment law.  To the contrary, the evidence presented to the 
Board supports the assessor's residential classification.  Thus, 
we must affirm the Board's decision upholding the assessment.  
See Dempze Cranberry Co., Inc. v. Bd. of Rev., 143 Wis. 2d 879, 
884, 422 N.W.2d 902 (Ct. App. 1988); Northland Whitehall Apts. 
Ltd. P'ship v. City of Whitehall Bd. of Rev., 2006 WI App 60, 
¶24, 290 Wis. 2d 488, 713 N.W.2d 646.  We must affirm even if 
Thoma and Grota wrongly believed that ground cover qualified as 
agricultural use and even if Grota classified the property as 
residential based on the injunction, because our decision 
depends on the evidence before the Board and what the law is, 
not 
on 
off-the-record 
conversations 
or 
an 
assessor's 
misunderstanding of the law.  Although Grota erred both in 
basing 
his 
classification 
solely 
on 
the 
injunction 
and 
testifying 
that 
the 
injunction 
determined 
classification, 
neither error impacts our conclusion.  Thoma's failure to submit 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wisconsin's farmland. 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
11 
 
any evidence to prove agricultural activity was taking place on 
his property leaves the residential classification unrebutted, 
supported by the evidence, consistent with applicable law, and 
therefore correct. 
A. 
Tax Assessment Agricultural Classification 
¶14 Before addressing the merits of this case, we set 
forth the law applicable to tax assessment and the requirements 
for land to receive classification as agricultural.  A property 
is assessed according to its classification, which is determined 
by its use.  Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(a).  There are eight classes 
of property, including residential and agricultural.8  Id.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 70.32 specifically cross-references "ch. Tax 
18 Wis. Adm. Code," which provides that an assessor "shall 
classify as agricultural land devoted primarily to agricultural 
use."  Wis. Admin. Code DOR § Tax 18.06(1).  "'Land devoted 
primarily to agricultural use' means land in an agricultural use 
for the production season of the prior year, and not in a use 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.32(2)(a) lists eight possible use 
classifications as: 
1. Residential. 
2. Commercial. 
3. Manufacturing. 
4. Agricultural forest.  
5. Undeveloped.  
5m. Agricultural. 
6. Productive forest land. 
7. Other. 
 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
12 
 
that is incompatible with agricultural use on January 1 of the 
assessment year."  Wis. Admin. Code DOR § Tax 18.05(4).9 
¶15 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.32 also provides:  "'Agricultural 
land' means land, exclusive of buildings and improvements and 
the land necessary for their location and convenience, that is 
devoted 
primarily 
to 
agricultural 
use." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.32(2)(c)(1g); and "'Agricultural use' means agricultural 
use as defined by the department of revenue by rule and includes 
the growing of short rotation woody crops, including poplars and 
willows, 
using 
agronomic 
practices." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.32(2)(c)(1i). 
¶16 The Department of Revenue defines "agricultural use" 
to mean "[a]ctivities included in subsector 111 Crop Production, 
set forth in the North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS)."  Wis. Admin. Code DOR § Tax 18.05(1)(a).10  The NAICS 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Admin. Code DOR § TAX 18.06(1) provides: 
Land devoted primarily to agricultural use shall 
typically bear physical evidence of agricultural use, 
such 
as 
furrow, 
crops, 
fencing, 
or 
livestock, 
appropriate to the production season.  If physical 
evidence of agricultural use is not sufficient to 
determine agricultural use, the assessor may request 
of the owner . . . such information as is necessary to 
determine 
if 
the 
land 
is 
devoted 
primarily 
to 
agricultural use. 
10 Wisconsin Admin. Code DOR § Tax 18.05(1)(b)-(d) also 
defines "agricultural use" to mean activities relating to 
"subsector 112 Animal Production," "[g]rowing Christmas trees or 
ginseng," and "[l]and without improvements subject to a federal 
or state easement . . . ." 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
13 
 
is reproduced in full in the Wisconsin Property Assessment 
Manual (WPAM).  The NAICS explains that "[i]ndustries in the 
crop production subsector grow crops mainly for food and fiber," 
and the "production process is typically completed when the raw 
product or commodity grown reaches the 'farm gate' for market."  
WPAM, ch. 11, App. A-13.  It further describes "Crop Production" 
"establishments" "as farms, orchards, groves, greenhouses, and 
nurseries, primarily engaged in growing crops, plants, vines, or 
trees and their seeds."  Id. 
¶17 We emphasize what is clear under applicable law and 
undisputed by the parties:  classification of real property for 
tax assessments is based on how the property is being used.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2); Wis. Admin. Code DOR § Tax 18.05(1).  
Zoning, injunctions, ordinances, and contracts do not trump 
actual use for tax assessment purposes.  See Fee v. Bd. of Rev., 
2003 
WI 
App 
17, 
¶12, 
259 
Wis. 2d 868, 
657 
N.W.2d 112; Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)(1g); 
https://www.revenue.wi.gov/Pages/FAQS/slf-useassmt.aspx 
(last 
visited Feb. 28, 2018).  Although an injunction, contract, or 
ordinance may be presented to argue how the property is supposed 
to be used, none can be the decisive factor for tax assessment 
purposes.  Actual use controls whether property qualifies for 
agricultural or any other classification for tax assessment 
purposes.  In order to obtain agricultural use classification, 
the property owner must meet the definition of agricultural use 
set forth in the statutes and tax code. 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
14 
 
¶18 Property falls under a residential classification if 
it is a "parcel or part of a parcel of untilled land that is not 
suitable for the production of row crops, on which a dwelling or 
other form of human abode is located and which is not otherwise 
classified under this subsection."  Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)3.  
In determining "whether vacant land should be classified as 
residential" the following questions are considered: 
 "Are the actions of the owner(s) consistent with an 
intent for residential use?"; 
 "Is the size of the parcel typical of residential or 
developing residential parcels in the area?"; 
 "Is the parcel zoned residential or is residential 
zoning likely to be allowed?"; 
 "Is 
the 
parcel 
located 
in 
a 
residential 
plat, 
subdivision, 
CSM 
or 
near 
other 
residential 
development?"; 
 "Does the parcel's topography or physical features 
allow for residential use?"; 
 "Is the parcel located in an urban or rapidly changing 
to urban area, as contrasted with a location distant 
from much residential activity?"; 
 "Are there any other factors affecting the parcel 
which would indicate residential use is reasonably 
likely or imminent?". 
Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 12-1 (Rev. 12/2017). 
B.  Thoma's Burden & Presentation at the Board Hearing 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
15 
 
¶19 In property tax assessment challenges, the taxpayer 
bears the burden of proving the assessment is wrong.  See 
Sausen, 352 Wis. 2d 576, ¶37.  If the taxpayer fails to meet his 
burden of justifying a change in the assessment, then the 
Board's only option is to accept the assessor's assessment.  
This is so because a presumption attaches to the assessor's 
valuation, Wis. Stat. § 70.47(8)(i),11 and unless the taxpayer 
presents information proving the assessor's classification or 
valuation is wrong, the taxpayer is stuck with the assessment.  
See Woller v. DOT, 35 Wis. 2d 227, 232, 151 N.W.2d 170 (1967) 
("When the assessment is disputed, as here, the burden of proof 
is on the taxpayer to show error."); State ex rel. Giroux v. 
Lien, 108 Wis. 316, 318, 84 N.W. 422 (1900) ("The assessment 
needs no support by evidence in the first instance, but must 
stand, unless shown to be incorrect by reasonably direct and 
unambiguous evidence."). 
¶20 Thoma challenged his 2014 tax assessment because he 
believed the classification was wrong.  The assessor based the 
2014 assessment on the residential classification and Thoma 
believed 
the 
property 
should 
have 
been 
classified 
as 
agricultural.  Thus, Thoma had the burden to prove to the Board 
that his property was being used for agricultural use as defined 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.47(8)(i) provides:  "The board shall 
presume that the assessor's valuation is correct.  That 
presumption may be rebutted by a sufficient showing by the 
objector that the valuation is incorrect." 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
16 
 
in the tax code.  As noted, "agricultural use" bears a very 
specific meaning for tax assessment purposes. 
¶21 Thoma did not present any such evidence.  Rather, 
Thoma and his attorney repeatedly denied that any farming was 
taking place.  Thoma and his attorney testified only that he was 
growing ground cover to maintain the property, hoping the lots 
could be sold for residential construction.  This dooms Thoma's 
case. 
¶22 Thoma's erroneous belief that growing ground cover 
qualified the property for agricultural classification has no 
impact on the analysis, nor does his contention that he and 
Assessor Grota privately agreed that ground cover constitutes 
agricultural use.  We must apply the law as it exists, not how a 
party or an assessor mistakes it to be.  The law does not permit 
agricultural classification for the use Thoma told the Board 
existed at the time of the Board hearing.  Because Thoma 
admitted he was using the property only for maintaining ground 
cover, and ground cover does not fall within the statutory 
definition of agricultural use, the Board had no choice but to 
uphold the assessment.  In so doing, it acted within its 
jurisdiction, according to law, in a reasonable manner, and with 
evidentiary support. 
¶23 Further, Thoma's claim on appeal that he was also 
growing and harvesting hay and alfalfa does not alter our 
decision.  We are bound by the record before the Board.  See 
Saddle Ridge Corp., 325 Wis. 2d 29, ¶36; Hemker, 114 Wis. 2d at 
323.  Neither Thoma nor his attorney presented any testimony to 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
17 
 
the Board that the property was being operated as a hay and 
alfalfa farm or that any crop was being grown on the property to 
be sold for food or fiber.  Instead, both adamantly denied any 
farming took place at all on the land and insisted that Thoma 
was maintaining ground cover only.  The only reference to hay at 
the Board hearing came from the Board's attorney who explained 
that if a property owner is cutting and bailing hay and using it 
to feed livestock, then the property qualifies for agricultural 
use classification.  The dissenting Board member's comments 
could potentially be construed to support a bailing hay use,12 
but no one testified that hay or alfalfa was being grown, 
bailed, or sold for food or fiber.  The Board attorney was 
simply giving a hypothetical that hay bailing would be an 
agricultural use——not that this actually occurred on Thoma's 
property.  The dissenting Board member believed something was 
being grown and bailed on the property but said nothing about it 
being sold or used for food or fiber.  Regardless, neither the 
Board attorney nor the dissenting Board member were sworn 
witnesses.  In short, Thoma failed to present any evidence that 
his use qualified as agricultural for tax assessment purposes. 
                                                 
12 The 
dissenting 
Board 
member's 
comments 
included 
a 
response to the Board attorney's explanation about the hay, 
"That's why I'm confused.  I – I was out there and I saw there 
was that going on," [sic] and a desire to classify Thoma's 
property as agricultural because the dissenting Board member 
"drove in there every day from the first house that was there, 
from '08 or whatever it was, and I've seen the guy on the 
tractor with the bailer and no zero turn was out there cutting 
grass as a residential maintenance." 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
18 
 
¶24 We are unpersuaded by Thoma's attorney's attempt 
during oral argument to establish proof of agricultural use by 
linking three statements from the hearing:  (1) a Board member's 
personal observation of hay growing on the property in the past; 
(2) Assessor Grota's testimony that the property's past use was 
agricultural; and (3) Thoma's testimony that its use had not 
changed.  A Board member's personal observation is not testimony 
or evidence and the referenced testimony by Grota and Thoma does 
not change the fact that ground cover does not constitute 
agricultural use for tax assessment purposes. 
¶25 We also reject Thoma's argument that Grota's erroneous 
view of the effect of the injunction on classification requires 
a reversal for a new Board hearing.  It is troubling that the 
Village of Slinger's assessor presented his incorrect belief to 
the Board about the impact of the injunction.  We expect 
assessors to know, understand, and apply the correct tax 
assessment laws.  Nevertheless, we are bound by the record.  The 
transcript of the proceedings does not demonstrate that the 
Board denied Thoma's challenge based on Grota's mistaken 
"injunction-controls" 
belief. 
 
Rather, 
the 
transcript 
establishes that the Board denied Thoma's challenge because the 
evidence indicated Thoma was maintaining ground cover on his 
land, 
which 
does 
not 
constitute 
a 
statutorily 
defined 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
19 
 
agricultural use.13  Additionally, even though the assessor 
adduced 
the 
wrong 
basis 
for 
selecting 
residential 
classification, this property did in fact qualify as residential 
according to the statutory definition of residential use.  It 
was untilled land not suitable for production or row crops and 
was "not otherwise classified."  See Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)3.  
And, there can be no dispute that the property was properly 
classified as residential since each of WPAM's inquiries for 
determining 
whether 
vacant 
land 
should 
be 
classified 
as 
residential would be answered affirmatively. 
C.  Circuit Court Order Denying Thoma's Motion to Vacate 
¶26 Thoma next contends the circuit court should have 
vacated its original order affirming the Board's decision to 
uphold the assessor's assessment of his property.  He claims the 
circuit court should have granted his request for a new Board 
hearing because of Grota's "false" testimony at the hearing that 
                                                 
13 Thoma contends the "Minutes" of the Board prepared after 
the hearing are incorporated into its Findings of Fact, 
Determinations and Decision because that Decision said "see 
attached minutes."  We reject this contention.  First, the 
Decision says "see attached minutes" but only with regard to 
"Tax Key Number."  Thus, only the tax key number is incorporated 
into the Decision.  Second, although the Minutes were sent to 
the circuit court, there is nothing in the record documenting 
how the Minutes were prepared or if the three-member Board 
approved them.  Moreover, in sending the Decision itself to the 
circuit court, the Village of Slinger's Treasurer/Deputy Clerk 
did not append the Minutes to the Decision.  To be sure, nothing 
in the Minutes alters our determination that Thoma failed to 
present sufficient evidence to warrant a change in his 2014 tax 
assessment. 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
20 
 
the injunction controlled the tax classification.  Because the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when 
it denied Thoma's motion to vacate, we reject Thoma's claim and 
affirm the circuit court's order. 
¶27 After the circuit court affirmed the Board's decision 
and dismissed the writ for certiorari, and while Thoma's appeal 
was pending, he filed another lawsuit directly against Assessor 
Grota.  See Polk Prop., LLC v. Grota Appraisals, LLC, Waukesha 
Cty. Circuit Ct., 2016CV63.  Pursuant to that lawsuit, sometime 
in 2016, Thoma's counsel deposed Grota and Wisconsin Department 
of Revenue employee Patrick Chaneske.14  In September 2016, 
Chaneske testified at his deposition that he never told Grota an 
injunction prohibiting agricultural use required Grota to change 
the classification of Thoma's property from agricultural to 
residential.  Rather, Chaneske testified he advised Grota that 
actual use of the property controls classification. 
¶28 Shortly after Chaneske's deposition, in October 2016, 
Thoma filed a motion asking the circuit court to exercise its 
discretionary authority under Wis. Stat. § 806.0715 to vacate its 
                                                 
14 Patrick Chaneske worked at the Wisconsin Department of 
Revenue and at the time of the events in this matter served as 
the equalization supervisor for the Milwaukee District Office to 
review and equalize assessments submitted by nine counties in 
the southeastern part of Wisconsin.  As pertinent here, in 2014, 
Grota and Chaneske had telephone conversations to discuss the 
effect of the injunction on classification of Thoma's property 
for the 2014 property tax assessment. 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.07 provides: 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
21 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Relief from judgment or order.  (1) On motion and upon 
such terms as are just, the court, subject to subs. 
(2) 
and 
(3), 
may 
relieve 
a 
party 
or 
legal 
representative from a judgment, order or stipulation 
for the following reasons: 
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; 
(b) Newly-discovered evidence which entitles a party 
to a new trial under s. 805.15 (3); 
(c) Fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of 
an adverse party; 
(d) The judgment is void; 
(e) The judgment has been satisfied, released or 
discharged; 
(f) A prior judgment upon which the judgment is based 
has been reversed or otherwise vacated; 
(g) It is no longer equitable that the judgment should 
have prospective application; or 
(h) Any other reasons justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. 
(2) The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, 
and, if based on sub. (1) (a) or (c), not more than 
one year after the judgment was entered or the order 
or stipulation was made. A motion based on sub. (1) 
(b) shall be made within the time provided in s. 
805.16. A motion under this section does not affect 
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. 
This section does not limit the power of a court to 
entertain an independent action to relieve a party 
from judgment, order, or proceeding, or to set aside a 
judgment for fraud on the court. 
(3) A motion under this section may not be made by an 
adoptive parent to relieve the adoptive parent from a 
judgment or order under s. 48.91 (3) granting adoption 
of a child. A petition for termination of parental 
rights under s. 48.42 and an appeal to the court of 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
22 
 
original 
order 
affirming 
the 
Board's 
decision. 
 
Section 
806.07(1)(h) allows circuit courts to relieve a party from a 
judgment or order for "[a]ny other reasons justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment."  Id.  Thoma claimed 
Chaneske's deposition proved Grota presented faulty testimony to 
the Board and the Board relied on the faulty testimony; 
consequently, Thoma argued, an injustice occurred that could be 
undone by vacating the original order affirming the Board's 
decision and sending the matter back to the Board for a new 
hearing. 
¶29 The circuit court disagreed.  It refused to exercise 
its discretion to vacate the original order because:  (1) Thoma 
failed "to show extraordinary and unusual circumstances that 
justify that relief" under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h); (2) when 
the circuit court reviewed the Board hearing transcript, it "was 
struck by the lack of evidence presented by" Thoma as he 
"supplied no proof whatsoever as to why the property should 
remain agricultural";  (3) regardless of Chaneske's testimony, 
the injunction prevented any agricultural use on the property; 
(4) the circuit court is limited to "the record made at the 
Board of Review hearing," and (5) "[t]here is something to be 
                                                                                                                                                             
appeals shall be the exclusive remedies for an 
adoptive parent who wishes to end his or her parental 
relationship with his or her adoptive child. 
 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
23 
 
said for the finality of judgments" particularly when the 
decision being challenged "was more than two years ago." 
¶30 In deciding a Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) motion, the 
circuit court should "examine the allegations accompanying the 
motion," assume they are true, and determine whether they 
present "extraordinary or unique" facts justifying relief under 
paragraph (1)(h).  Sukala v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 2005 WI 83, 
¶10, 282 Wis. 2d 46, 698 N.W.2d 610.  "[T]he circuit court 
should consider whether unique or extraordinary facts exist that 
are relevant to the competing interests of finality of judgments 
and relief from unjust judgments."  Id., ¶11.  If the circuit 
court finds extraordinary or unique facts from its review of the 
motion materials, it should hold a hearing to decide "the truth 
or falsity of the allegations."  Id., ¶10.  We conclude the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion. 
¶31 As a preliminary matter, we note that because Thoma's 
motion was made more than two years after the Board's decision 
and more than a year after the circuit court's order affirming 
the Board's decision, Thoma's only avenue for relief was under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h)——the catchall "justice" provision.  
Thoma could not seek relief under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a)'s 
"mistake, 
inadvertence, 
surprise, 
or 
excusable 
neglect" 
paragraph; (1)(b)'s "newly-discovered evidence" paragraph; or 
(1)(c)'s 
"fraud, 
misrepresentation 
or 
other 
misconduct" 
paragraph because Wis. Stat. § 806.07(2) requires such claims be 
filed within one year of the judgment or order. 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
24 
 
¶32 Our review shows the circuit court examined the 
relevant facts and applied the pertinent law to reach a 
reasonable determination.  The circuit court acknowledged the 
allegations Thoma made in his motion materials, but did not find 
the 
allegations 
presented 
extraordinary 
or 
unique 
facts 
warranting relief.  The circuit court recounted that the record 
showed Thoma failed to present any evidence that he was using 
the property for an agricultural use that satisfied Wisconsin's 
tax law definition.  The circuit court concluded Thoma's 
allegations did not present extraordinary or unique facts 
because Chaneske's deposition testimony revealing Grota's error 
did not alter Thoma's absolute failure to satisfy his burden of 
proof at the Board hearing.  The circuit court also expressed 
concern about the finality of the order at issue given the 
substantial amount of time that had passed since the Board 
decided the case.  Although the circuit court improperly 
included the injunction as a basis, the circuit court's main 
reason for denying the motion rested on Thoma's failure to 
present any evidence to support agricultural use.  Accordingly, 
the circuit court's decision was proper. 
¶33 This court acknowledges that Chaneske's deposition 
certainly suggests Grota misunderstood Chaneske during their 
phone conversations about the injunction, and, as a result, 
Grota gave the Board incorrect information about the effect of 
the injunction.  But the fact remains that the transcript from 
the Board hearing reveals Thoma did not submit any evidence to 
prove agricultural use and the Board's decision was based on 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
25 
 
Thoma's failure to meet his burden, not on Grota's incorrect 
testimony.16  We recognize that at first retrospective glance, 
the Board's decision may appear unfair because the assessor 
selected a tax classification based on his misconception that an 
injunction controlled it.  A Board decision based on such 
incorrect information certainly raises a specter of injustice. 
But the record here dispels such concerns.  If the record 
established that Thoma had presented evidence to the Board that 
his use was agricultural as defined by the tax law, and the 
Board nevertheless rejected his proof in reliance on Grota's 
erroneous testimony that the injunction trumps use, we would 
agree with Thoma that the circuit court should have granted him 
relief.  But the hearing transcript uncovers no such evidence. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶34 In this consolidated case, we conclude that Thoma 
failed to prove he was using his property for agricultural use 
as that term is statutorily defined for tax assessment purposes.  
The Village of Slinger's assessor testified, mistakenly, that an 
injunction 
controls 
a 
property's 
classification 
for 
tax 
assessment purposes, but his misapprehension of the law did not 
supply the basis for the Board's decision to uphold the 
                                                 
16 Thoma characterizes Grota's testimony as false.  It was 
certainly incorrect, but there is nothing in this record 
suggesting that Grota lied to the Board. 
No. 
2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528   
 
26 
 
assessment.17  Rather, the lack of any evidence to show the 
property fit an agricultural classification occasioned the 
Board's decision, which is supported by a reasonable view of the 
evidence.  We further conclude the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in denying Thoma's motion to 
vacate the original order affirming the Board's decision.  Thus, 
we affirm the decision of the court of appeals in 2015AP1970, 
and we affirm the order of the circuit court in 2016AP2528.18 
¶35 DANIEL KELLY, J. did not participate. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed, and the order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Because our review is of the Board's decision, we need 
not specifically discuss or correct any statements by the 
circuit court or the court of appeals that could be construed to 
mean the injunction controls tax classification.  Neither 
opinion is published or precedential. 
18 After briefing was complete, the parties filed a series 
of motions in the weeks leading up to oral argument.  In a 
February 20, 2018 order, this court decided one motion and left 
the others to be addressed during oral argument.  None of these 
pending motions were discussed during oral argument, and we 
decline to address them further as our disposition does not 
require it.  Any outstanding motions are denied. 
No.  2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶36 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (dissenting).  Land 
must be classified as agricultural if its use is agricultural.  
Fee v. Bd. of Review for Town of Florence, 2003 WI App 17, ¶12, 
259 Wis. 2d 868, 657 N.W.2d 112.  For the reasons I address more 
fully below, the Board of Review did not make any findings in 
regard to Mr. Thoma's use of his land.  Instead, the erroneous 
legal instructions of the Board's attorney drove their decision 
to affirm the appraisal of Mr. Thoma's property.  The Board's 
attorney said that due to an injunction in another case between 
the Village of Slinger and Mr. Thoma that concerns the same 
property as does the case now before the court, the Board could 
no longer classify Mr. Thoma's vacant farm land as agricultural 
because it was zoned residential and the injunction enforced 
that zoning.  The majority errs because it ignored the erroneous 
advice given to the Board by its attorney and also because it 
ignored the undisputed factual testimony of Assessor Grota that 
Mr. Thoma's use qualified as agricultural use under taxation 
laws, but that he was precluded from classifying it as 
agricultural due to the circuit court injunction that prohibited 
agricultural use of Mr. Thoma's property.   
¶37 Because the Board of Review was given erroneous legal 
advice from its attorney, and because the undisputed testimony 
shows that Mr. Thoma's use qualified as an agricultural use, 
Mr. Thoma has rebutted the presumption of correctness that is 
accorded to an assessor's appraisal.  Therefore, I would reverse 
the Board of Review's classification decision and remand it to 
No.  2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528.pdr 
 
2 
 
the Board to reconsider its classification decision consistent 
with Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(a) and Wis. Adm. Code § Tax 
18.06(2)(d) (June 2015), and further testimony from Assessor 
Grota.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion.1    
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶38 Mr. Thoma purchased 62 acres of vacant farm land in 
2004 and 2005.  It was part of the Melius Farm.  He then entered 
into a development agreement with the Village of Slinger to 
create Pleasant Farm Estates.  At the June 23, 2014, Board of 
Review hearing, Mr. Thoma explained that the parcel has been 
classified as agricultural for taxation purposes, even though 
all lots in the proposed development were zoned residential in 
2007 or 2008.2  He said that taxation was "based on the use" 
until 
2014 
when 
the 
assessor 
changed 
to 
residential 
classification.3 
¶39 At the hearing, Mr. Thoma explained the development 
agreement with the Village.  He said that the proposed 
development had three phases.  The Village required that 50% of 
the lots in Phase I be sold before any lots in Phase II or Phase 
III could be sold.  There are 17 lots in Phase I and only two 
                                                 
1 My dissent addresses the majority opinion's decision on 
certiorari review of the Board of Review's decision.  I do not 
address the majority opinion's affirmance of the circuit court's 
order denying Mr. Thoma's motion for reconsideration because my 
decision on certiorari review obviates the need to do so.   
2 Hearing Tr. 37.   
3 Id.  
No.  2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528.pdr 
 
3 
 
lots have been sold.4  Therefore, all lots in the proposed 
development are not eligible to be purchased.  
¶40 Mr. Thoma was asked why he believed that the tax 
status had changed.  He said, "We were taxed on agricultural use 
and now we're taxed on a residential use."5   
¶41 Assessor Grota was asked, "why the change from the 
2013 where it's assessed at ag to the 2014 present?"6  Assessor 
Grota responded, "I guess two things.  One, . . . the Department 
of Revenue's opinion was that use trumps requirements, so if the 
land was being used in an acceptable agricultural manner, even 
if there was a restriction that the property couldn't be used 
for agriculture, I had to extend that.  In – per Department of 
Revenue opinion, the court order – or with a cease and desist 
statement within it, would trump that use ability.  As Pat 
Janeske, 
the 
Regional 
Supervisor 
for 
the 
Department 
of 
Revenue, . . . rendered that opinion in conference call."7  
¶42 A Board member then asked, "So basically the change in 
assessment was due to the Department of Revenue's decision?"8  
The Board's attorney then inserted himself into the hearing and 
answered the question that had been directed to Assessor Grota.  
The attorney said, "What the assessor is saying that the 
                                                 
4 Id. at 30.  
5 Id. at 34.   
6 Id. at 58.   
7 Id. at 58-59.   
8 Id. at 60.   
No.  2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528.pdr 
 
4 
 
Department of Revenue has understood that – if a municipality 
goes and gets a court order, they've satisfied – you know, 
they've done all they can.  If crop is still there and it's in 
defiance of a court order, the municipality's done all they can 
and – and the assessment will revert to the underlying zoning 
rather than the – the ag[ricultural] use."9 
¶43 The 2013 appraisal of Mr. Thoma's property had been 
based on Assessor Grota's opinion that its use was agricultural.  
However, in 2014, Assessor Grota believed that he could no 
longer classify Thoma's property based on its use because the 
injunction that affected his property prohibited agricultural 
use of the land.  Therefore, he appraised the property as 
individual residential lots.   
¶44 This change significantly affected the tax assessments 
of all of the lots.  To give a few examples, the 2013 appraisal 
of $300 for tax parcel number V5-0815-001 increased to $48,300 
for 2014.10  The 2013 appraisal of $100 for tax parcel number  
V5-0815-057-008 increased to $35,400 for 2014.11  Of course the 
new 
appraisals 
dramatically 
increased 
Mr. 
Thoma's 
tax 
obligation. 
¶45 When Board members continued to be concerned about 
ignoring agricultural use because they understood that changing 
the classification caused taxes to increase, the Board's 
                                                 
9 Id. at 60-61. 
10 June 23, 2014 Hearing Ex. 4.   
11 June 23, 2014 Hearing Ex. 3.  
No.  2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528.pdr 
 
5 
 
attorney doubled down on his erroneous instructions to the Board 
and his explanation of Assessor Grota's appraisal.  He said, 
"Because there's a court order here, the state has told the 
assessor that he can assess it as it is zoned and as it is 
available for purchase, not as it is used."12  To which 
explanation, Assessor Grota responded, "Exactly."13  However, 
Mr. Thoma's attorney said "he's continued to maintain the ground 
cover which is an ag[ricultural] use."14 
¶46 As the Board's attorney was attempting to wind up the 
hearing, again, a Board member wanted to be sure that she 
understood Assessor Grota's opinion.  "Are you saying then that 
you feel that that was being used as agriculture, not just 
ground cover maintenance?"15  To which Assessor Grota said, "I 
believe that within Chapter Tax 18, which is what we should 
follow as well as the guide put out by the Department of Revenue 
for use – use value, that it had previous – well, it - it had 
previously met those two burdens . . . to be assessed as 
agricultural."16  As a further explanation, Assessor Grota said, 
"Now the court order changed – changed the precedent then from 
use to use didn't matter because it was being used illegally."17 
                                                 
12 Hearing Tr. 68.   
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 69  
15 Id. at 70. 
16 Id.   
17 Id. (emphasis added).  
No.  2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528.pdr 
 
6 
 
¶47 The Board of Review voted 2 to 1 to accept Assessor 
Grota's appraisal that classified all 62 acres as residential 
property.18  Mr. Thoma appealed the Board's decision by 
petitioning the circuit court for certiorari review.  The 
circuit court affirmed the Board of Review, as did the court of 
appeals. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶48 This case presents procedurally as a certiorari review 
of the Board of Review's decision pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(13).  As such, we review the record from the Board of 
Review.  Wood v. City of Madison, 2003 WI 24, ¶12, 260 Wis. 2d 
71, 659 N.W.2d 31.  Where the factual basis for a board's 
decision is unclear, the case should be remanded to the board 
for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Edmonds 
v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 66 Wis. 2d 337, 346-48, 224 
N.W.2d 575 (1975). 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶49 Certiorari 
review 
is 
limited 
to 
four 
issues:  
(1) whether 
the 
tribunal 
stayed 
within 
its 
jurisdiction; 
(2) whether the tribunal proceeded under a correct theory of 
law; 
(3) whether 
the 
tribunal's 
action 
was 
arbitrary, 
oppressive, or unreasonable, representing its will and not its 
judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was such that it might 
                                                 
18 At the commencement of the hearing, Mr. Thoma's lawyer 
asked that the matter be adjourned, due to a recent death 
causing Mr. Thoma to be in attendance at a funeral that 
afternoon.  The Board's lawyer said, "I think this matter has to 
proceed now."  The Board then denied the request to reschedule. 
No.  2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528.pdr 
 
7 
 
reasonably have made the determination that it made.  FAS, LLC 
v. Town of Bass Lake, 2007 WI 73, ¶8, 301 Wis. 2d 321, 733 
N.W.2d 287.  Whether a tribunal proceeded under a correct theory 
of law is subject to our independent review.  State ex rel 
Ziervogel v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 23, ¶14, 
269 Wis. 2d 549, 676 N.W.2d 401.  It is only this second 
component of certiorari review that is relevant to the case 
before us.    
B.  Correct Theory of Law 
¶50 The Board of Review must make its decision based on a 
correct theory of law.  If it does not, a reviewing court shall 
set aside its decision.  State ex rel Kesselman v. Bd. of Review 
for Vill. of Sturtevant, 133 Wis. 2d 122, 127-28, 394 N.W.2d 745 
(1986) (citing State ex rel Park Plaza Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. 
Bd. of Review, 61 Wis. 2d 469, 475, 213 N.W.2d 27 (1973)).  
Failing to make an appraisal on the statutory basis is an error 
of law correctable on certiorari review.  State ex rel Boostrom 
v. Bd. of Review, 42 Wis. 2d 149, 156, 166 N.W.2d 184 (1969).   
¶51 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.32(2)(a) states: 
The assessor shall segregate into the following 
classes on the basis of use . . . 1. Residential. 
2. Commercial. 
3. Manufacturing. 
4. Agricultural. 
5. Undeveloped. 5m. Agricultural forest. 6. Productive 
forest land.  7. Other.  
(Emphasis added).  Section Tax 18.06(2) also helps focus the 
inquiry for tax assessments.  It provides: 
For each legal description of property that 
includes a parcel of agricultural land, the assessor 
shall indicate on the property record card, by 
acreage, 
the 
category 
of 
agricultural 
land.  
Categories of agricultural land are the following: 
No.  2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528.pdr 
 
8 
 
 
(a) First grade tillable cropland. 
 
(b) Second grade tillable cropland. 
 
(c) Third grade tillable cropland. 
 
(d) Pasture. 
 
(e) Specialty land.   
The Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual (WPAM), a statutorily 
incorporated guide to appraisal of real estate, directs that the 
"[d]etermination of agricultural status is based solely on 
whether use of the parcel is agricultural in nature."  WPAM at 
11-10 (2014).   
C.  Erroneous Legal Instructions 
¶52 Both Assessor Grota and the Board of Review's attorney 
told the Board that use no longer mattered for tax appraisals.  
For example, Assessor Grota told the Board that he "believe[d] 
that within Chapter Tax 18, which is what we should follow as 
well as the guide set out by the Department of Revenue for use – 
use value, that it had previous – well, it - had previously met 
those two burdens . . . to be assessed as agricultural.  Now the 
court order changed – changed the precedent then from use to use 
didn't 
matter 
because 
it 
was 
being 
used 
illegally."19  
Mr. Thoma's attorney had already said that "he's continued to 
maintain the ground cover which is an ag[ricultural] use."20   
¶53 The Board of Review's attorney also erroneously 
instructed the Board on the law applicable to tax appraisals.  
                                                 
19 Hearing Tr. 70 (emphasis added). 
20 Id. at 69. 
No.  2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528.pdr 
 
9 
 
He said, "Because there's a court order here, the state has told 
the assessor that he can assess it as it is zoned as it is 
available for purchase, not as it is used."21   
¶54 Property Records for Village of Slinger, Washington 
County, hearing exhibits 4 and 5, showed examples of Mr. Thoma's 
property classified as "1st grade tillable" from 2008 until 
2014, when it was changed to "residential."  As one of the Board 
members said, she drives by Mr. Thoma's property every day and 
she has seen bailers bailing the hay that grew there and had 
been cut.22   
¶55 Therefore, at the Board of Review hearing, all were in 
agreement that Mr. Thoma's use of the property was agricultural.  
However, according to the instructions on the law from the 
Board's attorney and according to Assessor Grota's opinion, use 
no longer mattered.  Zoning controlled classification.  The 
Board made no findings or conclusions in regard to use.  That is 
because use was not the focus of the Board of Review hearing, 
although one would think that it were, to read the majority 
opinion.23   
¶56 Furthermore, how Mr. Thoma used the property was not 
an issue for the Board of Review to decide because agricultural 
use had been proved for this exact property in another case in 
which the Village of Slinger and Mr. Thoma were parties.  It was 
                                                 
21 Id. at 68.   
22 Id. at 72.  
23 Majority op., ¶¶2, 6, 8, 13, 21, passim. 
No.  2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528.pdr 
 
10 
 
proof of agricultural use that had resulted in the injunction 
that everyone referred to at the hearing before the Board of 
Review.  The injunction prohibited further agricultural use of 
this same property, and it was that same injunction and its 
effect on Assessor Grota's appraisal that drove the decision of 
the Board of Review.  It did so because both the Board of 
Review's attorney and Assessor Grota believed that zoning 
trumped use, due to the injunction that the Village had obtained 
to stop Mr. Thoma from using his property for agriculture. 
¶57 That use was not an issue for the Board of Review is 
clear from this exchange: 
CHAIR GRUDZINSKI:  I just have one for Mr. Grota.  
Are you saying then that you feel that that was being 
used 
as 
agriculture, 
not 
just 
ground 
cover 
maintenance? 
VILLAGE ASSESSOR GROTA:  I believe that within 
Chapter Tax 18, which is what we should follow as well 
as the guide put out by the Department of Revenue for 
use – use value, that it had previous – well, it – it 
had previously met those two burdens – you know, to be 
assessed as agricultural.  Now the court order changed 
– changed the precedent then from use to use didn't 
matter because it was being used illegally in that – 
you know, as part of that court order, so that changed 
what would be normally use trumps.[24]     
¶58 The Board of Review conscientiously followed the 
instructions of its attorney and of Assessor Grota, who told 
them that use didn't matter because there was an injunction that 
prohibited agricultural use of Mr. Thoma's property and required 
that the property be classified as residential.  The advice they 
                                                 
24 Hearing Tr. 70.   
No.  2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528.pdr 
 
11 
 
were given was erroneous and caused the Board to operate on an 
incorrect theory of law.   
¶59 Use controls the classification of real estate for 
purposes of taxation.  Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(a).  And, as Fee 
explained, when a property should have been classified as 
agricultural based on its use, but was not, the Board of Review 
errs.  Fee, 259 Wis. 2d 868, ¶1.  Therefore, the Board's 
decision must be reversed and the matter remanded to the Board 
for further proceedings based on the legal principles that 
actually control classification, i.e., the use of the property. 
§ 70.32(2)(a).  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶60 The Board of Review was given erroneous legal advice 
on which it based its decision.  Accordingly, I would reverse 
and remand the matter to the Board of Review to give the Board 
the opportunity to consider Mr. Thoma's appeal under the correct 
theory of law:  use trumps zoning for tax appraisals.  Wis. 
Stat. § 70.32(2)(a). 
¶61 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this dissent. 
No.  2015AP1970 & 2016AP2528.pdr 
 
 
 
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