Case Title: Board of County Com'rs, Albany County v. Federer Development Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-233

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Board of County Com'rs, Albany County v. Federer Development Co.1984 WY 59682 P.2d 1062Case Number: 83-233Decided: 06/15/1984THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, ALBANY COUNTY, WYOMING, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

FEDERER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
THE BOARD OF 
COUNTYCOMMISSIONERS, ALBANY COUNTY, WYOMING, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

FEDERER DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

Karen Maurer, 
AlbanyCounty and Prosecuting Atty., Laramie, signed the brief 
on behalf of appellant; appellant's 
case was submitted on the brief.

Carole Shotwell, 
of Urbigkit, Whitehead, Zunker & Davidson, P.C., Cheyenne, signed the brief 
and appeared in oral argument on behalf 
of appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant refused to 
approve appellee's preliminary plat for a proposed subdivision to be located 
about fifteen miles east of Laramie for the reason that appellee failed to show 
two "adequate" legally enforceable ingress-egress roads to the subdivision as 
required under the Albany County Land Use Management System Regulations. On 
appeal, the district court ordered appellant to approve the plat, finding that 
the existence of the two roads had been demonstrated by substantial evidence. 
Appellant now appeals from the decision of the district 
court.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     There is no contention 
that the subdivision is other than a "mountain subdivision" and that Section 13 
of Chapter VIII of the Albany County Land Use Management System Regulations 
relative to Mountain Subdivisions is the regulation under which appellant 
refused approval of appellee's plat. It reads: 

"Access. All subdivisions shall be 
platted so as to provide two (2) or more access roads for separate, multiple 
ingress-egress. Loop drives, with one entrance 
point, do not satisfy this need."

[¶4.]     The single question, 
then, is whether or not substantial evidence exists in the record to reflect 
that ingress-egress access to the proposed subdivision will be provided by two 
separate roads. Stated another way, it is whether or not there is substantial 
evidence to support appellant's finding that such access was not 
provided.

"* * * In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error. The reviewing court shall:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and 
conclusions found to be:

* * * * * 
*

"(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute." (Emphasis added.) Section 16-3-114(c), W.S. 1977 (October 
1982 Replacement).

See Board of Trustees of School District No. 4, 
Big HornCounty v. Colwell, Wyo., 
611 P.2d 427 
(1980).

[¶5.]     The evidence in this 
case consisted of testimony from three of appellee's witnesses and several 
documentary exhibits of appellee. Appellant did not present evidence other than 
that resulting from cross-examination of appellee's 
witnesses.

[¶6.]     The proposed 680-acre 
subdivision is generally in the shape of a right triangle, with the hypotenuse 
being the southwest side and bordering on U.S. Highway Interstate 80. The north 
and east sides border on Medicine Bow National Forest Service land. As said by 
Judge Hanscum in his opinion-decision:

"* * * At issue in the 
present case are basically two roads that have been proposed by the Appellant to 
provide adequate access to the property; namely, the Blair Separation 
Interchange (hereinafter referred to as the `Blair Road') and the Vedauwoo 
Interchange (hereinafter referred to as the `Vedauwoo Access'). There is present 
access to the property by way of Blair Road; however, the Forest Service has 
indicated they would require an application for a special use permit to be filed 
with the Forest Service for increased use of the Blair Road in the 
event the subdivision was approved. Access to the property by way of the 
Vedauwoo Access would require a minor degree of construction by the developer if 
the plat was approved by the CountyCommissioners." (Transcript reference 
omitted.)

[¶7.]     In his well written and 
well researched opinion-decision, District Judge Hanscum summarized the evidence 
with reference to the Blair 
Road as follows:

"The hearing officer 
found no legally enforceable means of access to the property even by way of 
Blair Road; however, taking the testimony given at the hearing as a whole, it 
appears that this is not the case.

"At the hearing John 
Anderson, a registered professional engineer and a registered land surveyor, 
testified that when the highway was constructed over the Etchepare (the previous 
owner before Federer Development Company) lands, the Blair Road relocation was 
`constructed by the Highway Department via a permit which I think was granted 
using a special road in the lands owned by the U.S. Forest Service.' The 
Blair 
Road was originally constructed with the intention of 
providing permanent use of public access. Mr. Etchepare, the previous owner of 
the land in question, testified that the Blair Road was originally given by him to 
the United States Forest Service for easement rhough [sic] his land to Forest 
Service lands. It seems incongruous then at this point for the County 
Commissioners to rule that there is no legally enforceable means of access to 
the property when the Blair Road was originally given by the owners of that same 
property to the Forest Service to not only gain permanent public access to 
private lands but to the Forest Service lands as well. Furthermore, Ranger Terry 
Hoffman testified that there is existing access to the property via Blair Road and that 
the Forest Service would cooperate on a maintenance agreement for the road 
should the CountyCommissioners approve the 
use of the plat.

"It is further 
interesting to note that John Anderson, the professional engineer, testified 
that Blair 
Road actually provides two means of access to the 
property since it passes directly through the property and connects to other 
roads that are designated as all-weather roads within the forest region. The 
AlbanyCounty subdivision 
regulations do not define what is meant by the term `access.' Therefore, it 
might be concluded that the Blair 
Road actually provides the required two accesses to 
the subdivision." (Transcript references omitted.)

[¶8.]     We agree that 
Blair 
Road does supply two accesses to the subdivision. As 
indicated, infra, the two accesses are also legally enforceable. Appellant 
argues that the subdivision regulation requires two "access roads" and not merely two accesses. It 
contends Blair 
Road is a single road giving access to the subdivision. 
This argument fails when the meaning of the regulation is determined from the 
whole regulation and its purpose.

[¶9.]     The most obvious 
purpose of the two-access requirement is to provide an alternate means of 
ingress and egress in the event one means is blocked for whatever reason. The 
regulation, in effect, says so. After setting forth the requirement for "two (2) 
or more access roads," it indicates the purpose, i.e., "for separate, multiple 
ingress-egress." Appellant may have been troubled by the fact that Blair Road runs only 
along the north leg of the triangle. The eastern acreage can access it only 
through other subdivision roads. However, such is not unusual in subdivisions, 
and it meets the regulation requirement.

[¶10.]  The word "separate" in the regulation has 
pertinency. We mention it so that our holding here will not be unduly broadened 
in subsequent cases. If the two accesses were within a few feet of each other, 
it could be said that they were not "separate." Of course, other distances 
between the two accesses make the issue one of relativity. With the two accesses 
on Blair 
Road being about a mile apart, the conclusion that 
they are "separate" is obvious without more.

[¶11.]  But appellant questions the legal 
enforceability of such accesses and of the access from the Vedauwoo Access. It 
argues that the Blair accesses

"[are] limited and 
increased use by commercial or subdivision activities would require an 
additional, cooperative maintenance agreement between the Forest Service and 
subdivider. * * * Appellee has a right of access from its land from the Blair 
Road, but its application to the Forest Service for a use permit specifically 
addressing its increased subdivision needs has not been acted upon by the Forest 
Service. * * *"

[¶12.]  Appellant also emphasizes the fact that 
action by the Forest Service on the special use permit application for the 
Vedauwoo Access has not yet been taken. Accordingly, it argues that the legally 
enforceable access has not been "provided" as required by the regulation, and 
that such must be "provided" before the plat can be 
approved.

[¶13.]  On the other hand, appellee points to the 
commitments made by the Forest Service and to its policies with reference to 
such permits as sufficient to satisfy the regulation requirement that the 
"subdivision shall be platted so as 
to provide two (2) or more access roads * * *." Additionally, appellee contends 
that the Forest Service must provide access to the subdivision pursuant to 
law.

[¶14.]  Again, we approve and adopt that said by 
Judge Hanscum in this respect:

"Mr. Anderson * * * 
testified that when Interstate 80 was built, two facilities were constructed to 
provide access to the land north of the road, these being the Blair Road and the 
Vedauwoo Interchange.

"As for the proposed 
Vedauwoo Access, there is presently an access trail from the Vedauwoo Road to the 
property line which is roughly 1,650 feet in length. To make the trail into a 
permanent access to the property suitable for all types of vehicular travel 
would require a minor degree of construction. Apparently, the present Vedauwoo 
Access trails to the property are suitable for vehicular travel as there was 
testimony to the effect that cars, as well as trucks, may use the present road. 
Indeed, Mr. Anderson testified that the access trails are being presently used 
for access to private lands as well as access to Forest Service 
facilities.

"Furthermore, Ranger 
Terry Hoffman testified that a special use permit would be granted by the Forest 
Service once approval was given to the plat by the Board. He also testified that 
the special use permit would not, and indeed could not, be revoked by the Forest 
Service without due cause shown, i.e., that the road was not being maintained as 
per the permit agreement.

"Ranger Hoffman further 
testified that the chance of revoking a road permit at the end of 25 years is 
very remote. He went on to testify that he agreed that there was no less 
likelihood of discontinuing a special use permit for access than discontinuing 
an easement granted to a public agency. Therefore, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the proposed Vedauwood [sic] Access road would be approved by the 
Forest Service by way of a special use permit once the CountyCommissioners approved the plat and such 
permit would have a very remote chance of ever being 
revoked.

"The issue of access to 
private lands surrounded by public lands was considered in Montana Wilderness Association v. U.S. 
Forest Service, 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981). In that case, suit was brought 
by the Montana Wilderness Association to prevent the Burlington Northern 
Railroad from constructing a logging road across national forest lands to the 
railroad's private property." (Record and transcript references 
omitted.)

[¶15.]  After analyzing that decision in detail 
and noting that it held that the railroad had a right of access across federal 
lands to its holdings of timberland inasmuch as the Alaska National Interest 
Lands Conservation Act section providing for access to nonfederally owned lands 
surrounded by certain kinds of federal lands is not limited in its application 
to the state of Alaska, but has nationwide application, Judge Hanscum 
said:

"The Montana case is at 
present the controlling law in the country regarding access to private lands 
surrounded by public lands as certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme 
Court [455 U.S. 989] 102 S. Ct. 1612 [71 L. Ed. 2d 848]. Therefore, it seems clear 
that Federer Development Company has a right of access across United States 
Forest Service lands on the authority of the Montana Wilderness case to gain 
access to its private land." (Footnote omitted.)

[¶16.]  Appellant questions the applicability of 
such law to this case. It argues that such law is with reference only to 
isolated parcels of land not already having access. To sustain this argument, it 
acknowledges the existence of access by means of Blair Road. It 
says:

"* * * Wyoming Statutes § 
18-5-306 adopt subdivision regulations that do not allow developments on 
landlocked property - there must be access. Elkhorn Subdivision lands are 
surrounded by the properties of others, but do not lack access, and are not 
landlocked."1

It then goes on 
to contend that the Blair 
Road provides such access.

[¶17.]  Inasmuch as Blair Road traverses 
the subdivision, it supplies the required accesses (see supra). Beyond that, 
Judge Hanscum properly recognized the isolated nature of the 
subdivision:

"The hearing officer 
found that the Elkhorn Subdivision was not an isolated tract although he 
specifically found in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that `[t]he 
proposed Elkhorn Subdivision is bounded on all sides by the Medicine Bow 
National Forest except where it is bounded by Interstate 
80.'

"One authority defines an 
isolated or landlocked tract of land as follows: `LANDLOCKED. An expression 
sometimes applied to a piece of land belonging to one person and surrounded by 
land belonging to other persons, so that it cannot be approached except over 
their land.' Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition (1968); Words and Phrases, 
`Landlocked' (1966).

"From the above 
definition, it appears that the Elkhorn Subdivision is an isolated or landlocked 
tract of land by virtue of the fact that it is bounded on all sides by the 
MedicineBowNational 
Forest except where it is bounded by Interstate 80, 
as the hearing officer also found. To obtain access to the property, one must 
cross land belonging to other persons; namely, the Forest Service or the public 
highway. Indeed, United States Forest Ranger Terry Hoffman testified at the 
hearing that the proposed subdivision was originally part of a private section 
of land which was divided when the highway was constructed, thus making the 
tract an isolated one. Therefore, it appears from the foregoing that the land in 
question meets the definition of isolated or landlocked tract and should be 
dealt with as such." (Record and transcript references 
omitted.)

In any event, 
the only evidence is to the effect that the Forest Service will supply any 
needed permits.

Appellant's 
contention that future assurance of legally enforceable accesses does not amount 
to "providing" of such accesses as required in the regulation overlooks the 
wording of the regulation which reflects that the "subdivision shall be platted so as to provide * * 
*." The submitted plats do so.

[¶18.]  Again, Judge Hanscum properly adjudged 
the situation:

"The evidence submitted 
at the hearing before the CountyCommissioners clearly indicted that 
there is present access to the property via the Blair Road and that 
further access can be provided by the Vedauwoo Access roads which will be 
approved by the Forest Service once the CountyCommissioners have approved the plat. The 
circumstances of the case are such that there is a catch-22 or circuitry of 
action situation presented in that the CountyCommissioners will not approve the plat 
until proper access has been shown. In the CountyCommissioners' opinion, proper access 
cannot be shown until the Forest Service has approved the special use permits 
for the access roads to the property. The United States Forest Service will not 
grant the special use permits until the CountyCommissioners have approved the plat. 
Therefore, it seems the CountyCommissioners are relying in part on an 
arbitrary basis for their decision in denying the subdivision permit in that the 
Forest Service has given all indication that they will approve the permits for 
the access roads if the plat is approved by the CountyCommissioners."

[¶19.]  There was substantial evidence that 
appellee's subdivision plat met the access requirement of Albany County Land Use 
Management System Regulations, and that appellant's holding to the contrary was 
not supported by substantial evidence.

[¶20.]  The decision of the district court is 
affirmed, and the case is remanded to the agency for further action in 
accordance therewith.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 18-5-306, W.S. 
1977, provides in pertinent part:

"(a) The board shall 
require the following information to be submitted with each application for a 
subdivision permit:

* * * * * 
*

"(viii) Evidence 
satisfactory to the board that adequate access has been provided * * 
*."