Case Title: Stoddard v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Stoddard v. State1985 WY 170707 P.2d 176Case Number: 85-65Decided: 10/17/1985IVAN L. STODDARD, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
IVAN 
L. STODDARD, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v. 

THE 
STATE OFWYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, PlatteCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

 
 
Wyoming Public 
Defender Program, Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, 
Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne, and K. Leslie Delk, Asst. Public Defender, Laramie, 
for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal results 
from a penitentiary sentence after appellant pled guilty to conversion by a 
bailee. The single issue on appeal is whether the sentence imposed was "an abuse 
of the sentencing court's discretion."

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     During his professional 
career appellant Ivan L. Stoddard was in the business of selling insurance and 
investing money for individuals. In December of 1979, appellant received 
approximately $86,000 from Emily Reeves for the ostensible purpose of investing 
it for her. Rather than investing the money for the benefit of Mrs. Reeves, 
appellant diverted the money for his own purposes. Before December 1984 
appellant returned about $25,000 to Mrs. Reeves on demand, and paid her some 
interest.

[¶4.]     In an amended 
information dated December 17, 1984, appellant was charged with conversion by a 
bailee, conduct proscribed by § 6-3-402(b), (c)(i), W.S. 1977, (June 1983 
Replacement).1 On January 31, 1985, appellant pled 
guilty as charged in the amended information. He was subsequently sentenced to 
three to five years at the Wyoming State Penitentiary and ordered to make 
restitution in the sum of $61,000.

[¶5.]     In support of his 
contention that the court abused its discretion in imposing a penitentiary 
sentence, appellant points out that he is 64 years old, has no prior criminal 
record, and produced three witnesses at the sentencing hearing who vouched for 
his honesty. Appellant complains about the presentence investigation report. The 
court gave him an opportunity at the sentencing hearing to correct any errors. 
Appellant did not point out any specific errors, but complained that the report 
was "not totally accurate" and that the probation officer took statements made 
by him out of context and slanted them to create a highly prejudicial report. 
Appellant also took offense at the way the probation officer characterized 
him.

[¶6.]     Appellant has never 
contended that there was not a factual basis for his plea of guilty; however, in 
the sentencing hearing and on appeal he maintains that he never intended to 
defraud Mrs. Reeves, nor did he divert monies entrusted to him for his own 
personal use. Appellant's reasoning is specious; he admits that he took Mrs. 
Reeves' money, put it in an account with Boettcher & Co. under the name of 
Stoddard Agency, Inc., and used the money to pay company accounts. Also, some 
Reeves' money went to appellant's niece in some kind of a transaction that is 
not clearly explained in the record. Under § 6-3-402 a defendant is guilty if he 
either "converts the property (money) to his own or another's 
use."

[¶7.]     Appellant contends that 
under the facts of this case it was an abuse of discretion not to give him 
probation. We disagree. This court has previously held 
that

"a trial judge must give 
consideration to the application [for probation] and grant or deny the same in 
the exercise of a sound legal discretion. The refusal of the application must 
not be based upon mere whim or caprice nor upon any ground not sanctioned by the 
law. [Citation.]" Sanchez v. State, 
Wyo., 592 P.2d 1130, 1137 (1979).

[¶8.]     In this case the trial 
court ordered a presentence investigation and considered two plans for 
restitution. These plans were part of a probation scheme and considered at the 
sentencing hearing. The court listened to testimony in support of probation. We 
do not believe that it is of any consequence that the trial court did not use 
some magic words to say affirmatively that it considered probation. The actions 
of the court before and at sentencing clearly indicate that consideration was 
given to probation.

[¶9.]     In Beaulieu v. State, Wyo., 608 P.2d 275 
(1980), this court said:

"* * * The fact that 
probation was requested and the appearance of a probation plan in the 
presentence report can lead to no conclusion but that the court could not avoid 
giving it consideration. No particular amount of consideration is required. 
There need be no specific entry into the record of reasons why probation is 
denied nor does the word `probation' even need be mentioned by the court if it 
can be determined from the proceedings that it has been considered, however 
slightly. [Citation.]"

See also, Kenney v. State, Wyo. 605 P.2d 811 
(1980).

[¶10.]  In Robinson v. State, Wyo., 678 P.2d 374 (1984), we cited Wyoming cases tracing the 
history of abuse of discretion problems in sentencing.

"In Wright v. State, Wyo., 670 P.2d 1090, 1093 
(1983), we said:

"`* * * [I]t is generally 
recognized that a sentence is imposed for one or more of four purposes: (1) 
rehabilitation, (2) punishment (specific deterrence and retribution), (3) 
example to others (general deterrence), and (4) removal from society 
(incapacitation or protection of the public.)'"

"`There is no decision in 
the criminal process that is as complicated and difficult as the one made by the 
sentencing judge. A sentence prescribes punishment, but it also should be the 
foundation of an attempt to rehabilitate the offender, to insure that he does 
not endanger the community, and to deter others from similar crimes in the 
future. Often these objectives are mutually inconsistent, and the sentencing 
judge must choose one at the expense of the other. * * *'" Ventling v. State, Wyo., 676 P.2d 573, 576 
(1984), quoting 4 Wharton's Criminal Procedure, § 609, p. 207, n. 14 (12th ed. 
1976).

[¶11.]  This court has previously discussed the 
definition of "abuse of discretion" which is to be applied in sentence review 
cases:

"`A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. * * *'" Wright v. State, supra, at 1092, quoting 
Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980).

[¶12.]  The victim of the crime here is an older 
woman in need of several operations, and was stripped of her life savings. The 
record reveals that the sentencing judge executed a sentencing information 
instrument, and listed two aggravating factors pertaining to the crime, 
including "the victim was particularly vulnerable." The judge found no 
mitigating factors. He stated that his purposes in sentencing the appellant 
were:

"The punishment of this 
offender is necessary to help deter others from committing 
crime;

"There is undue risk that 
if a lesser sentence were imposed, the offender would continue to commit 
criminal offenses;

"The offender is in need 
of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by the sentence 
imposed."

[¶13.]  In the comment portion of the information 
instrument the judge indicated that appellant had preyed on "other vulnerable 
older people." Appellant asked the sentencing court and this court to consider 
the nature of the offense. Such consideration does not afford appellant any 
succor. In the crime here the appellant was twice culpable - once for stealing 
money, and additionally for violating a trust.

[¶14.]  The purposes of the sentence here, as 
indicated by the sentencing judge, are in accord with the purposes of sentencing 
set out in the Wright case. Furthermore, the action of the sentencing judge did 
not exceed "the bounds of reason" and the sentencing court "could reasonably 
conclude as it did." Wright v. State, 
supra.

[¶15.]  Affirmed.

1

"(b) A bailee or any 
person entrusted with the control, care or custody of any money or other 
property, excluding public servants subject to W.S. 6-5-109, who, with intent to 
steal or to deprive the owner of the property, converts the property to his own 
or another's use is guilty of larceny.

"(c) Larceny 
is:

"(i) A felony punishable 
by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is two 
thousand dollars ($2,000.00) or more."