Case Title: Sample v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 54/19

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
State of Maryland v. Hayes Sample, No. 54, September Term, 2019 
 
MARYLAND RULE 5-901(a) AND (b)(4) – AUTHENTICATING SOCIAL MEDIA 
EVIDENCE THROUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE – “REASONABLE 
JUROR” TEST – Court of Appeals held that trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting Facebook-related evidence, as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence under 
Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) for reasonable juror to find that Facebook profiles belonged to 
defendant, Hayes Sample, and to defendant’s alleged accomplice, Claude Mayo, and to 
find that defendant unfriended accomplice on Facebook day after attempted armed robbery, 
in which accomplice was fatally shot. 
 
Court of Appeals reaffirmed holding in Sublet v. State, 442 Md. 632, 678, 113 A.3d 695, 
722 (2015), and concluded that, to authenticate social media evidence, there must be proof 
from which reasonable juror could find that it is more likely than not that evidence is what 
proponent purports it to be.  Court of Appeals concluded State was not required to eliminate 
all possibilities that were inconsistent with authenticity, or prove beyond any question that 
defendant was one who used Facebook profile to unfriend accomplice’s Facebook profile. 
 
Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence under Maryland 
Rule 5-901(b)(4) for trial court to conclude that reasonable juror could find that it was more 
likely than not that “SoLo Haze” Facebook profile belonged to Sample and that 
“claude.mayo.5” Facebook profile belonged to Mayo.  Evidence indicating that SoLo Haze 
profile belonged to Sample and claude.mayo.5 profile belonged to Mayo supported 
conclusion that Sample used SoLo Haze profile to unfriend claude.mayo.5 profile.  Court 
of Appeals determined that, moreover, additional evidence supporting conclusion that 
more likely than not Sample used SoLo Haze profile to unfriend claude.mayo.5 profile 
included temporal proximity of unfriending to attempted armed robbery, Sample had 
motive to distance himself from Mayo, and during seventeen-day period after attempted 
armed robbery, claude.mayo.5 Facebook profile was only profile that was unfriended from 
SoLo Haze Facebook profile.  All of these circumstances were sufficient for trial court to 
allow Facebook-related evidence to be presented to jury. 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County 
Case No. 03-K-16-000108 
Argued: March 9, 2020 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 54 
 
September Term, 2019 
 
 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
HAYES SAMPLE 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Biran, 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
Opinion by Watts, J. 
 
 
 
Filed: May 11, 2020
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
Suzanne Johnson
2020-08-19 12:56-04:00
It is axiomatic that for a trial court to admit evidence, there must be sufficient indicia 
that the evidence is authentic—i.e., that the evidence “is what its proponent claims.” Md. 
R. 5-901(a).   A party can sufficiently authenticate evidence through “[c]ircumstantial 
evidence, such as appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, location, or other 
distinctive characteristics, that the offered evidence is what it is claimed to be.” Md. R. 5- 
901(b)(4). 
 
On two prior occasions, this Court has addressed authenticating social media1 
 
evidence through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4). In Griffin v. 
 
State, 419 Md. 343, 357, 19 A.3d 415, 423-24 (2011), this Court held that a trial court 
 
abused its discretion in admitting alleged printouts of the defendant’s girlfriend’s MySpace 
profile, as the same had not been sufficiently authenticated through circumstantial evidence 
under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) as belonging to the girlfriend.  In Sublet v. State, 442 
 
Md.  632,  672-73,  675-77,  113  A.3d  695,  719,  720-22  (2015),  in  an  opinion  that 
 
 
 
 
 
1“Social media” are “forms of electronic communication (such as websites for social 
networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to share 
information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (such as videos)[.]” Social Media, 
Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20media [https: 
//perma.cc/P25R-66L2].   In turn, on a social networking website, “people create and 
maintain interpersonal relationships[.]” Social Network, Merriam-Webster, https://www. 
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20network [https://perma.cc/WS6M-S25L]. On 
a  microblogging website,  people  engage  in  “blogging  []  with  severe  space  or  size 
constraints[,] typically by posting frequent brief messages about personal activities[.]” 
Microblogging, 
Merriam-Webster, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
microblogging [https://perma.cc/27ZZ-GMHX]. Facebook and MySpace are examples of 
social networking websites, while Twitter (on which postings are known as “tweets”) is an 
example of a microblogging website.  Benjamin Fryer, Esq., Moore & Van Allen, The 
Board, The Boss and Facebook, 25 No. 14 Westlaw Journal Employment 1, at *1 (Feb. 8, 
2011).
- 2 - 
 
consolidated three cases, this Court applied Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) and held that the 
trial courts did not abuse their discretion in admitting or excluding certain social media 
evidence.  This Court concluded that, to admit social media evidence, a trial court “must 
determine that there is proof from which a reasonable juror could find that the evidence is 
what the proponent claims[.]” Id. at 678, 113 A.3d at 722. 
 
This case requires us to apply Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) and the “reasonable juror” 
test to determine whether a trial court abused its discretion in allowing a detective to testify 
that, the day after a defendant and his accomplice allegedly participated in an attempted 
armed robbery—during which the defendant’s accomplice was fatally shot—the defendant 
unfriended2 his accomplice on Facebook. 
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the State, Petitioner, charged Hayes 
Sample, Respondent, with attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon and other crimes. 
At trial, the State offered evidence that Sample and his accomplice, Claude Mayo, using 
guns, attempted to rob a liquor store.  The liquor store’s owner had a gun too, and used it 
to shoot Mayo, who died a short distance outside the liquor store.  Sample fled the scene. 
While investigating the attempted armed robbery, a detective searched Facebook for 
a profile associated with the name Claude Mayo. Ultimately, the detective requested from 
Facebook, and received, “Facebook Business Records” regarding two Facebook profiles— 
 
 
 
2Both “unfriend” and “defriend” mean “to remove (someone) from a list of 
designated friends on  a  person’s social networking website[.]”   Unfriend, Merriam- 
Webster, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unfriend 
[https://perma.cc/ 
R6BM-EV7C]; 
Defriend, 
Merriam-Webster, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/defriend [https://perma.cc/9M5G-QFGZ].
- 3 - 
 
"claude.mayo.5”3 and “SoLo Haze”— as well as a “Certificate of Authenticity of Domestic 
Records of Regularly Conducted Activity[.]”  The Facebook Business Records regarding 
the 
SoLo 
Haze 
Facebook 
profile 
indicated 
that 
the 
e-mail 
address 
“mrsample2015@gmail.com” was registered to that profile.  The SoLo Haze Facebook 
profile identified Baltimore as the “current city,” and listed Edmondson-Westside High 
School and Towson University as the user’s “[c]onnections[.]”  The owner of the SoLo 
Haze Facebook profile was friends with the owner of a Facebook profile named “Skky 
DaLimit Lynn[.]”  Prior to trial, Sample’s counsel advised the circuit court that a Skkyla 
Lynn would be called as a defense witness. 
The Facebook Business Records regarding the claude.mayo.5 Facebook profile also 
listed Baltimore as the “current city,” and listed Patterson High School as the user’s 
“[c]onnection[.]” The owner of the claude.mayo.5 Facebook profile was friends with the 
owner of a Facebook profile named “Shantell Richardson[.]”   Shantell Richardson is 
Mayo’s mother’s name. 
Significantly, the Facebook Business Records regarding the SoLo Haze profile 
indicate that, the day after Sample and Mayo allegedly attempted to rob the liquor store 
and Mayo was fatally shot, the claude.mayo.5 profile was unfriended from the SoLo Haze 
profile.   During the  seventeen-day period to  which the  Facebook Business Records 
pertained, the claude.mayo.5 profile was the only one, of 175 profiles with which the SoLo 
 
 
 
3In the Facebook Business Records, the name associated with the Facebook service 
is Claude Mayo and the “vanity name” is identified as “claude.mayo.5[.]”  We will refer 
to this Facebook profile as the “claude.mayo.5” Facebook profile.
- 4 - 
 
Haze profile was friends, to have been unfriended. 
 
In the circuit court, Sample filed a motion in limine and a memorandum in support 
thereof, contending that the State would not be able to sufficiently authenticate the 
Facebook Business Records. The circuit court denied the motion. At trial, over Sample’s 
counsel’s objection, the  prosecutor elicited  testimony from the  detective concerning 
information from the Facebook Business Records, including the circumstance that the 
Facebook Business Records regarding the SoLo Haze Facebook profile showed that, the 
day after the attempted armed robbery, the claude.mayo.5 Facebook profile had been 
unfriended. 
The jury found Sample guilty of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon and 
other crimes. Sample appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals reversed the convictions 
and remanded the case for a new trial, reasoning that the circuit court abused its discretion 
in admitting the Facebook-related testimony. See Hayes Sample v. State, No. 1715, Sept. 
 
Term, 2017, 2019 WL 3451812, at *4-5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 31, 2019).  The State 
 
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted. See State v. Sample, 466 
 
Md. 310, 219 A.3d 526 (2019). 
 
Before us, the State contends that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for a 
reasonable juror to find that the SoLo Haze Facebook profile belonged to Sample, that the 
claude.mayo.5 Facebook profile belonged to Mayo, and that Sample used his profile to 
unfriend the claude.mayo.5 profile.   According to the State, Sample had a motive to 
distance himself from Mayo immediately after the crime and did so before his status as a 
suspect in the attempted armed robbery became publicly known.  Sample responds that,
- 5 - 
 
despite there being evidence that he created the SoLo Haze Facebook profile, there was 
insufficient evidence that he was the person who used the profile to unfriend the 
claude.mayo.5 profile. 
We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Facebook- 
related evidence, as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5- 
901(b)(4) for a reasonable juror to find that the SoLo Haze Facebook profile belonged to 
Sample, that the claude.mayo.5 Facebook profile belonged to Mayo, and that Sample used 
the SoLo Haze profile to unfriend the claude.mayo.5 profile the day after the shooting. We 
conclude that  the  standard of  proof  for  authenticating social  media evidence is  the 
preponderance of evidence standard, i.e., there must be sufficient circumstantial evidence 
for a reasonable juror to find that it is more likely than not that the social media evidence 
is what it is purported to be.  Here, the circumstantial evidence supporting the conclusion 
that the profiles belonged to Sample and Mayo consists of evidence that the SoLo Haze 
and claude.mayo.5 Facebook profiles listed Baltimore City as their current cities and the 
connections listed in the profiles included schools in Baltimore City and the Towson area. 
The profiles’ lists of friends included people who were either a friend or relative of Sample 
and Mayo.  Moreover, the SoLo Haze Facebook profile name consists of a homophone of 
Sample’s first name “Hayes,” the “mrsample2015@gmail.com” e-mail address registered 
for the SoLo Haze Facebook profile contains Sample’s last name, and the SoLo Haze 
profile had been identified as a friend on the claude.mayo.5 profile.  Without more, the 
evidence indicating that the SoLo Haze profile belonged to Sample and the claude.mayo.5 
profile belonged to Mayo indicates that Sample used the SoLo Haze profile to unfriend the
- 6 - 
 
claude.mayo.5 profile. 
 
There are, moreover, additional circumstances surrounding the unfriending that 
establish that a reasonable juror could find more likely than not that Sample was the person 
who unfriended the claude.mayo.5 profile.   Those circumstances include the temporal 
proximity of the attempted armed robbery to the unfriending, and that Sample had a motive 
to distance himself from Mayo.  Indicative of a motive to distance himself from Mayo, 
while speaking with detectives, Sample did not acknowledge being friends with Mayo 
despite surveillance video that showed Sample and Mayo walking together approximately 
fourteen minutes before the crime occurred and cellular telephone records that showed that 
there was a call made by Sample to Mayo approximately an hour before the crime.  And, 
importantly, during the seventeen-day period after the attempted armed robbery, of 175 
Facebook profiles listed as friends on the SoLo Haze Facebook profile, the claude.mayo.5 
profile was the only one that was unfriended. 
BACKGROUND 
Opposition to Facebook Evidence 
On July 24, 2017, Sample raised his opposition to the Facebook evidence during a 
pretrial hearing.  During the hearing, Sample’s counsel advised that he had provided the 
circuit court with a copy of a letter in which he had informed the prosecutor that he planned 
to object to certain Facebook-related evidence based on foundation.  Sample’s counsel 
stated that the letter included requests that the prosecutor provide additional information 
about the Facebook-related evidence and call an employee of Facebook as a witness at trial. 
The circuit court and Sample’s counsel discussed whether the request for the prosecutor to
- 7 - 
 
call a Facebook employee as a witness at trial was timely.  Sample’s counsel contended 
that the Facebook-related evidence included irrelevant hearsay that was not covered by the 
business records certification that the prosecutor had provided.  The circuit court denied 
Sample’s counsel’s request to require the State to call a Facebook witness at trial, finding 
that  Sample’s counsel’s request was untimely, and  not  related to  authenticating the 
Facebook-related evidence. 
Motion in Limine 
 
On August 3, 2017, Sample filed a “Motion in Limine to Exclude Facebook 
Evidence[,]” a memorandum in support of the motion, and Exhibits A through C.  (Some 
capitalization omitted). Exhibits A and B consist of numbered pages, all of which have the 
heading “Facebook Business Record[,]” and Exhibit C is a “Certificate of Authenticity of 
Domestic Records of Regularly Conducted Activity[.]”  In the motion in limine and the 
memorandum in support thereof, Sample contended that the Facebook Business Records 
were inadmissible on multiple grounds.   Among other things, Sample argued that the 
Certificate of Authenticity of Domestic Records of Regularly Conducted Activity did not 
sufficiently authenticate the Facebook Business Records because it did not establish who 
authored the Facebook Business Records’ contents.   In the memorandum, as to 
authentication, Sample contended that the State would be unable to authenticate the 
Facebook Business Records using any of the methods for authenticating social media 
evidence that this Court set forth in Sublet, 442 Md. at 663, 113 A.3d at 713. 
 
Exhibit A – Facebook Business Records for the SoLo Haze Profile 
 
In Exhibit A, which pertains to the SoLo Haze profile, page 29 states in pertinent
- 8 - 
 
part: 
 
Target                     100009404335910 
Generated               2015-12-17 19:40:24 UTC[4] 
Date Range             2015-12-01  00:00:00  UTC  to  2015-12-17  23:59:59 
UTC 
 
 
* * * 
 
Name[5]                              First             SoLo 
Middle 
Last              Haze 
 
Registered              100009404335910@facebook.com 
E[-]mail                  mrsample2015@gmail.com 
Addresses 
 
Vanity Name 
 
* * * 
 
 
Current City          Baltimore, Maryland (112438218775062) 
Page 36 of Exhibit A states in pertinent part: 
Connections           Zodiac Signs (1616634441885213) 
 
 
4“UTC” stands for “Coordinated Universal Time[,]” which is “the time scale [that 
is] maintained through the General Conference of Weights and Measures[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 
261(b).  At trial, Special Agent Mathew Wilde of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, an 
expert in the field of historical cellular record analysis, explained that certain businesses 
that “span[] multiple time zones[,]” such as Facebook and phone companies, use UTC as 
“a [] standard time.”  The Court of Special Appeals and other courts have observed that 
UTC is five hours ahead of Eastern Standard Time (“EST”), and four hours ahead of 
Eastern Daylight Time (“EDT”).  
See, e.g., Holt v. State, 236 Md. App. 604, 610 n.4, 182 
A.3d 322, 325 n.4 (2018); Airplanes of Boca, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Fed. Aviation Admin., 
254 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1307 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Zinn v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 2d 
1280, 1287 & n.3 (S.D. Fla. 2011).  Pursuant to federal law, each year, on the second 
Sunday of March, EST ends and EDT begins, and, on the first Sunday of November, EDT 
ends and EST begins. See 15 U.S.C. § 260a(a). 
5“Facebook prompts new users to supply their name, e-mail address, . . . any high 
schools, colleges, or universities [that the user] attended[, and] the user’s current city[,]” 
among other things. Griffin, 419 Md. at 353 n.9, 19 A.3d at 421 n.9 (citation omitted).
- 9 - 
 
Edmondson-Westside                High                 School 
(230382833645773) 
Towson University (33627530544) 
 
Page 37 states in pertinent part: 
 
Removed 
User 
Claude Mayo (100009340905913) 
Friends 
 
 
 
Time 
2015-12-09 02:36:22 UTC 
Removed By 100009404335910 
 
Below the “Removed Friends” entry on page 37 is the word “Friends[.]” Starting next to 
that word, and continuing through page 40, there is a list of 174 names and ID numbers. 
Neither the name “Claude Mayo,” nor the ID number “100009340905913,” appears in the 
Friends list. The name “Skky DaLimit Lynn” is included in the Friends list. 
Exhibit B – Facebook Business Records for the claude.mayo.5 Profile 
 
In Exhibit B, which pertains to the claude.mayo.5 profile, page 36 states in pertinent 
part: 
Target                     100009340905913 
Generated               2015-12-08 16:42:21 UTC 
 
 
* * * 
 
Name                       First             Claude 
Middle 
Last              Mayo 
 
Registered              +14438898253 
E[-]mail 
Addresses 
 
Vanity Name          claude.mayo.5 
 
* * * 
 
 
Current City          Baltimore, Maryland (112438218775062)
- 10 - 
 
 
Page 37 of Exhibit B states in pertinent part: 
 
IP Address[6]                2607:fb90:136e:b2a:0:9:3f63:4d01 
Time                        2015-12-08 16:06:42 UTC 
Action                     login_attempt_success 
 
 
IP Address              2607:fb90:136e:b2a:0:9:3f63:4d01 
Time                        2015-12-08 16:06:41 UTC 
Action                     login_bruteforce_protection_delta_not_vetted 
 
IP Address              2607:fb90:136e:b2a:0:9:3f63:4d01 
Time                        2015-12-08 16:06:41 UTC 
Action                     password_check 
 
IP Address              2607:fb90:136e:b2a:0:9:3f63:4d01 
Time                        2015-12-08 16:06:41UTC 
Action                     login_attempt 
 
The above language is the only instance in which Exhibit B includes the words “attempt,” 
 
“password,” and “protection.” 
 
Page 38 includes the word “Connections” near the following: “Patterson High 
School (Baltimore) (407178879346337)[.]”   Below that, page  38  includes the  word 
“Friends[.]”  Starting next to that word, and continuing through page 41, there is a list of 
several names and ID numbers.   “SoLo Haze (100009404335910)” and “Shantell 
Richardson” appear in that list. 
Page 18 states in pertinent part: 
 
 
Target                     100009340905913 
Generated               2015-12-17 19:40:23 UTC 
 
 
 
6The term “IP address” is derived from the phrase “Internet protocol[,]” and means 
“the numeric address of a computer on the Internet[.]”  IP Address, Merriam-Webster, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/IP%20address 
[https://perma.cc/2C7G- 
TX4Q].
- 11 - 
 
Page 18 includes all of the above-quoted language on page 36, including the name “Claude 
Mayo,” the phone number 14438898253, the vanity name “claude.mayo.5,” and the 
reference to Baltimore City as the “Current City[.]”   Like page 38, page 19 refers to 
Patterson High School in Baltimore as a “Connection[.]” 
Page 20 of Exhibit B includes the word “Friends[.]” Starting next to that word, and 
continuing through the page 23, there is a list of several names and ID numbers.  Neither 
the name “SoLo Haze,” nor the ID number “100009404335910,” appears in that list. 
Page 31 includes a photograph of a male individual.  Below the photograph, pages 
 
31 and 32 state in pertinent part: 
 
 
Title 
Damn rest easy to my lil cuz toot.  Now u can live it up with 
KC.  God wanted you, so I can’t be mad at that.  I’m praying 
for ALL my family. Gotta be strong for each other. 
 
* * * 
 
Uploaded     2015-12-08 14:39:52 UTC 
Tags[7]                Subject Id               100009340905913 
Subject Name         Claude Mayo 
 
 
* * * 
 
Comments User 
Text 
Time 
Cash Capo (100008817046384) 
Damn smh I remember our Lakeland days 
2015-12-08 15:12:16 UTC 
 
 
User 
Text 
 
Sharon Patterson (100000468265896) 
Sorry to hear of ya love one, sending prayer and may 
God give you strength 
7Facebook allows users to “upload photographs[] and . . . ‘tag’ their friends in the 
[photographs].  Tagging creates a link in the individual’s profile from the photograph, 
making users easily identifiable, even when the viewer of the photograph is not ‘friends’ 
with the photograph’s subjects.”  
Griffin, 419 Md. at 353 n.9, 19 A.3d at 421 n.9 (cleaned 
up).
- 12 - 
 
Time  2015-12-08 18:39:53 UTC 
 
Page 25 of Exhibit B includes a different photograph of a male individual, with text 
superimposed on the photograph.  Within the copy of the page that is part of the record, 
some of the text on the photograph is not visible because both the text and part of the 
photograph appear white. The visible text on the photograph reads: 
t Candle 
t Visual 
be held 
orrow 
F        m 5:30pm 
On lafayette 
ave & 
Arlington @t 
The Park 
 
Below the photograph, pages 25 and 26 state in pertinent part: 
 
 
Title 
EVERYBODY PLEASE COME OUT TO SUPPORT MY 
BRO TELL YOUR FRIENDS 
 
* * * 
 
Uploaded     2015-12-11 06:49:17 UTC 
Tags 
Comments   User   Jessica Yayosister Powell (100008547643889) 
Text   R.I.P baby ily always and forever ...fly high baby 
Time  2015-12-11 07:44:43 UTC 
 
(Ellipsis in original). 
 
Page 27 of Exhibit B includes two different photographs, each of which is of a male 
individual. Below the photographs, page 27 states in pertinent part: 
Title 
N[****] can’t sleep without thinking bout y’all two only god 
know how I feel thug n peace my ▯▯▯▯▯▯▯▯Angels
- 13 - 
 
stay watching my back cuz #longlive #Toot #Kc[8] 
 
* * * 
 
Uploaded     2015-12-14 18:01:50 UTC 
Tags             Subject Id               100009340905913 
Subject Name         Claude Mayo 
 
Exhibit C – Certificate of Authenticity of Domestic Records of Regularly Conducted 
Activity 
 
Exhibit C  is  a  Certificate of  Authenticity of  Domestic Records of  Regularly 
 
Conducted Activity. The certificate states in its entirety: 
 
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 902(11),[9] I[,]    Sarah Propeck     , certify: 
 
1. 
I am employed by Facebook, Inc., headquartered in Menlo Park, 
California.   I am a duly authorized custodian of records for 
Facebook[,] and am qualified to certify Facebook’s domestic records 
of regularly conducted activity. 
 
2. 
I have reviewed the records produced by Facebook in this matter. The 
records include search results for basic subscriber [i]nformation, IP 
logs, messages, photo[graph]s, [and] other content and records for 
100009404335910 and claude.mayo.5. 
 
3. 
The records [that are] provided were made and kept by the automated 
systems of Facebook in the course of regularly conducted activity as 
a regular practice of Facebook. The records were made at or near the 
time [that] the information was transmitted by the Facebook user[s]. 
 
 
 
8The three preceding terms are known as “hashtags.”  A “hashtag” is “a word or 
phrase [that is] preceded by the symbol # that classifies or categorizes the accompanying 
text (such as a tweet)[.]” Hashtag, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/hashtag [https://perma.cc/M4ZP-ZJNC]. 
9Federal Rule of Evidence 902(11) states in pertinent part: “The following items of 
evidence are self-authenticating; they require no extrinsic evidence of authenticity in order 
to be admitted: . . . The original or a copy of a domestic record . . . , as shown by a 
certification of the custodian[.]”  Like Federal Rule of Evidence 902(11), Maryland Rule 
5-902(b)(1)   provides   for   self-authentication   of   business   records   under   certain 
circumstances.
- 14 - 
 
4. 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the 
foregoing certification is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. 
 
Propeck’s name and signature, as well as the date November 3, 2016, appear below the 
body of the certificate. 
Hearing on the Motion in Limine 
 
On August 7, 2017, the day that trial was scheduled to begin, Sample, his counsel, 
and the prosecutor appeared before the circuit court.  The circuit court asked Sample’s 
counsel whether, in the motion in limine, she had made any arguments that were not already 
made at the motions hearing.  Sample’s counsel clarified that, at the motions hearing, she 
had requested that the circuit court require the State to call as a witness the custodian of 
records from Facebook, whereas, in the motion in limine, she had requested that the circuit 
court require the State to call an expert witness.  Sample’s counsel and the circuit court 
discussed whether Sample had waived the contentions in the motion in limine by not raising 
them at the motions hearing. 
Sample’s counsel contended that the Facebook Business Records were inadmissible 
because no witness would testify that the records pertained to Sample.  Sample’s counsel 
argued that this Court has indicated that extrinsic evidence is necessary to connect social 
media evidence with the person to whom the social media profile allegedly belongs. 
Sample’s counsel asserted that the State needed to prove that Sample had exclusive access 
to the SoLo Haze Facebook profile, and that he used it to unfriend the claude.mayo.5 
Facebook profile. 
 
The prosecutor explained that the State would offer the Facebook Business Records
- 15 - 
 
to prove that Sample and Mayo had been friends on Facebook, and that, after Mayo died, 
Sample unfriended him on Facebook.   The State argued that there were sufficient 
identifying characteristics in the Facebook Business Records, including the name “SoLo 
Haze,” the e-mail address with “mrsample” in it, and the “Connections” to Towson 
University, which is in Baltimore County, and Edmondson-Westside High School, which 
is in Baltimore City, for a reasonable juror to find that the SoLo Haze profile belonged to 
Sample. 
The circuit court indicated that it would review Griffin, 419 Md. 343, 19 A.3d 415, 
 
and Sublet, 442 Md. 632, 113 A.3d 695, and rule on the motion in limine the following 
 
morning. The next day, Sample, his counsel, and the prosecutor appeared before the circuit 
court, and the court denied the motion in limine. The circuit court concluded that Sample 
had waived the contention as to authentication by failing to raise it in a timely motion in 
limine.10   As to the merits, the circuit court held that a reasonable juror could find that the 
SoLo Haze Facebook profile and the claude.mayo.5 Facebook profile belonged to Sample 
and Mayo, respectively.   The circuit court addressed the Facebook Business Records 
regarding the SoLo Haze profile as follows: 
[The] first name [is “]SoLo[.” The] last name [is “]Haze[.”   I]t actually 
provides an e[-]mail [address] of m[]rsample2015@[g]mail.com. 
 
* * * 
 
 
 
10In the petition for a writ of certiorari, the State did not present a question as to 
whether the circuit court correctly concluded that Sample had waived the issue as to 
authentication.  Accordingly, we do not address the matter, aside from observing that, to 
the extent that Sample may have waived the issue, we exercise our discretion under 
Maryland Rule 8-131(a) to reach the merits.
- 16 - 
 
It gives the [“C]urrent [C]ity[”] as Baltimore.   It also gives 
[“C]onnections[” to] Edmondson-Westside High School and Towson 
University. 
In these particular [Facebook Business R]ecords[ --] I note that the 
attempted  robbery  was  December  the  7th,  [2015,]  and  the  [Facebook 
Business R]ecords [regarding the SoLo Haze Facebook profile] indicate that 
[] Mayo was removed as a friend just a few days later.[11] 
Also[,] importantly, I note that . . . Skky [DaLimit] Lynn is listed as a 
friend of [] Sample’s, and I was told yesterday that Skkyla Lynn was going 
to be called as a witness.  I don’t know -- and her name [ha]s two Ks.  We 
had a talk about that.  So S-K-K-Y is obviously not at all common[,] and is 
a friend of [] Sample’s. 
So[,] I find that there is sufficient proof from which a reasonable juror 
could find that [the Facebook Business Records regarding the SoLo Haze 
Facebook profile are] what [they] purport[] to be. 
 
The  circuit  court  addressed  the  Facebook  Business  Records  regarding  the 
claude.mayo.5 Facebook profile as follows: 
[T]here aren’t  that  many people  named  Claude.    I  know  two:  Claude 
Debussy, the . . . composer. . . . And one other person. 
There aren’t that many Claude Mayos.  The [“C]onnection[”] is [to] 
Patterson High School.  There are [photograph]s of Claude Mayo, and there 
are numerous posts about [his] passing, so it’s not a different Claude Mayo[,] 
because there’s only one Claude Mayo in this area who passed away at the 
time that all the posts were lodged regarding his passing. 
I also noted that in [] Mayo’s friend list is Shantell Richardson, and 
that is his mother.  And I know this because[,] last week[,] I signed a body 
attachment for her,[12] and[,] this morning[,] the deputies brought me word 
that  []  Richardson had  been  picked  up.    So[,] there is  [an]  additional 
connection.  It’s not just any Claude Mayo[.  I]t’s not the wrong Claude 
Mayo[. I]t’s the Claude Mayo connection who’s friends with his mother. 
So[,] this is -- there is certainly a foundation laid, and there is certainly 
 
 
11The circuit court stated that the unfriending occurred “just a few days later”—i.e., 
a few days after December 7, 2015.  The Facebook Business Records regarding the SoLo 
Haze Facebook profile indicate that the unfriending occurred at 02:36 UTC on December 
9, 2015.   At trial, Special Agent Wilde testified that the Facebook Business Records 
regarding the SoLo Haze Facebook profile indicated that the unfriending occurred at 9:36 
p.m. EST on December 8, 2015. 
12According to a docket entry, on August 3, 2017, the circuit court issued a body 
attachment for Richardson. At trial, the State called Richardson as a witness.
- 17 - 
 
the distinct possibility, rather strong possibility, that there’s -- there is proof 
that  a  reasonable  juror  can  find  that  [the  Facebook  Business  Records 
regarding the “claude.mayo.5” Facebook profile are] exactly what [they] 
purport[] to be. 
That doesn’t foreclose [Sample’s counsel] from arguing otherwise. 
The issue of ultimate reliability is left to the jury, so this is one of those times 
when it goes to the weight, not to the admissibility. 
 
* * * 
 
I do understand, and [Griffin, 419 Md. at 352, 19 A.3d at 421, and 
Sublet, 442 Md. at 662, 113 A.3d at 713,] talk about the fact, that anyone can 
create a fictitious [profile], and people can gain access to [other] people’s 
[profile]s, and[,] in the case of [the “claude.mayo.5” Facebook profile], 
somebody did gain access after his passing. 
What’s interesting about that is [that] they tried to get in a couple 
times[,] and didn’t get in easily, so I think [that] that person went on -- [it’s] 
certainly reasonable to suggest [that] that person went online to send a 
message to all of [] Mayo’s friends to tell them about the vigil that [had been] 
scheduled. 
 
Trial 
 
At trial, as a witness for the State, Douglas Marcus testified that he owned Towson 
Wines and Spirits at 6 West Pennsylvania Avenue in Towson.  On December 7, 2015, 
Marcus worked at the store by himself during the day.  At 6:50 p.m., Marcus had finished 
counting cash from the cash register, and Samantha Twist, the store’s night manager, 
arrived. Around that time, two individuals wearing black clothing, including black masks, 
came into the store.  Both individuals pulled their masks down and pulled out revolvers. 
While testifying, Marcus referred to one of the men as Mayo, and referred to the other man 
as “the Defendant”—i.e., Sample.  According to Marcus, Sample approached Twist, put 
an arm around her neck, and put his revolver to her neck. Mayo came behind the counter, 
put his revolver to Marcus’s head, grabbed his left arm, and tried to pull him away from
- 18 - 
 
the cash register.  Marcus reached into a drawer, pulled out a revolver, and shot Mayo. 
Sample approached Marcus, who shot Mayo again.  Sample and Mayo left the store.  The 
testimony of other State’s witnesses established that Mayo died of gunshot wounds outside 
of the Elks Lodge, which is next door to Towson Wines and Spirits. 
As a witness for the State, Detective Christopher Smith of the Baltimore County 
Police Department testified that, while investigating the attempted armed robbery, he and 
other detectives reviewed a recording from a surveillance camera at Z-Burger, a restaurant 
on Allegheny Avenue.  The recording showed two individuals in the area of Z-Burger 
shortly before the attempted armed robbery.  One of those two individuals was the person 
who had died outside of the Elks Lodge. Detective Smith and other detectives determined 
that the decedent’s name was Claude Mayo.  In the early morning hours of December 8, 
2015, Detective Smith searched for any Facebook profiles associated with the name Claude 
Mayo.   Detective Smith found one, which indicated that its user had connections to 
Baltimore.13    The Facebook profile included a photograph of an individual who looked 
“very similar, if not identical[,]” to Mayo. The Mayo Facebook profile was friends with a 
profile named “SoLo Haze[,]” and the SoLo Haze profile included a photograph of an 
individual whose physical characteristics were “very similar” to those of the individual 
who had been walking with Mayo in the area of Z-Burger. Detective Smith observed that 
the  e-mail  address  that  was  registered  with  the   second  Facebook  profile  was 
 
 
 
 
 
13At this point, Sample’s counsel raised the first of several objections, all of which 
the circuit court overruled.  Sample’s counsel requested, and the circuit court granted, a 
continuing objection to the Facebook-related evidence.
- 19 - 
 
“m[]rsample[]2015@[g]mail.com.”  Detective Smith took screenshots of both Facebook 
profiles, and requested records related to both profiles from Facebook.  Over Sample’s 
counsel’s objection, the circuit court admitted the screenshots of the Facebook profiles into 
evidence. 
Detective Smith  testified that  photographs in  the  Facebook Business Records 
concerning the claude.mayo.5 Facebook profile appeared to be photographs of Mayo. 
Detective Smith testified that the Facebook Business Records of the SoLo Haze profile 
indicated that, on the night of December 8, 2015, that profile was used to unfriend the 
claude.mayo.5 profile.14   Detective Smith testified that, on the night of December 7, 2015 
or the early morning hours of December 8, 2015, he identified Sample as a suspect in the 
attempted armed robbery.  Detective Smith testified that, at the time, Sample’s status as a 
suspect was not yet public.  Almost a week later, on December 14, 2015, a warrant for 
Sample’s arrest was served. 
On cross-examination, Detective Smith testified that he had seen a Facebook profile 
with the vanity name “claude.mayo.3[,]” and that the profile included photographs that 
might have looked similar to those on the claude.mayo.5 profile. Detective Smith testified 
that there were other Facebook profiles under the name “Claude Mayo.” Detective Smith 
acknowledged   that   he   did   not   request   records   from   Facebook   regarding   the 
“claude.mayo.3” Facebook profile, or any Facebook profile under the name “Claude 
 
 
 
 
 
14Detective Smith testified that the unfriending occurred at 10:36 p.m. EST on 
December 8, 2015.  Special Agent Wilde testified that the unfriending occurred at 9:36 
p.m. EST on December 8, 2015.
- 20 - 
 
Mayo” other than the claude.mayo.5 profile.   Detective Smith testified that the 
claude.mayo.5 profile contained postings that were made after Mayo died on December 7, 
2015, and that meant that someone other than Mayo used the claude.mayo.5 profile after 
Mayo’s death. Detective Smith acknowledged that people can have access to profiles that 
they did not create and be Facebook friends with someone that they have never met. 
Detective Smith testified that there were other Facebook profiles under the name “SoLo 
Haze,” and that, other than what the Facebook Business Records show, he did not know 
whether Sample’s nickname was “SoLo Haze.” 
During Detective Smith’s redirect examination, the prosecutor elicited that the 
claude.mayo.5 profile was friends with a Facebook profile under the name “Shantell 
Richardson[,]” who is Mayo’s mother.   The prosecutor elicited that, unlike the 
claude.mayo.5 profile—which included an image announcing a candlelight vigil—the 
“claude.mayo.3” Facebook  profile  did  not  include  any  references  to  Mayo’s  death. 
Detective Smith testified that he requested records from Facebook regarding the 
claude.mayo.5 profile, rather than the “claude.mayo.3” Facebook profile, because he 
believed that there was “a stronger connection” between Mayo and the claude.mayo.5 
profile.    The prosecutor elicited that, to Detective Smith’s knowledge, the 
“[m]r[s]ample2015@gmail.com” e-mail address was registered with only one Facebook 
profile under the name “SoLo Haze[.]” The prosecutor elicited that the Facebook Business 
Records indicated that the claude.mayo.5 profile was the only one unfriended from the 
SoLo Haze profile during the dates to which the Facebook Business Records pertained. 
As a witness for the State, Detective Robert Caskey of the Baltimore County Police
- 21 - 
 
Department testified that, on December 14, 2015, he and Detective Smith met with Sample 
in an interview room at a police station. Detective Caskey acknowledged that no recording 
of his and Detective Smith’s interview of Sample was available. Detective Caskey testified 
that Sample waived his Miranda rights and agreed to provide a statement.  One of the 
 
detectives asked Sample whether he was in the Towson area during the time of the 
attempted armed robbery. Sample responded in the negative, and said that, at the time, he 
was in Baltimore City at the residence of Skkyla Lynn, who is the mother of his child. 
Detective Caskey asked Sample whether he had known Mayo, and he responded in the 
negative. 
As a witness for the State, Detective Gary Childs of the Baltimore County Police 
Department testified that, on December 7, 2015, at approximately 10:30 or 11 p.m., he 
learned that a woman had been calling several hospitals and asking about her son, who she 
believed had been involved in the attempted armed robbery. Detective Childs learned that 
the woman was Richardson, and that her son was Mayo.   Detective Childs met with 
Richardson, and, before informing her of Mayo’s death, asked her what phone numbers 
Mayo had used.  Richardson provided the number 443-707-6420.  Detective Childs also 
spoke to a man named Wilkins, who knew Sample and provided the phone number 443- 
403-9522. Detective Childs sought and received phone records for the two numbers. The 
phone records, which the circuit court admitted into evidence, indicated that, on December 
7, 2015, in the afternoon and early evening, the two phone numbers called each other 
several times. 
As a witness for the State, Special Agent Mathew Wilde of the Federal Bureau of
- 22 - 
 
Investigation testified that he was a member of its Cellular Analysis Survey Team.  The 
circuit court admitted Special Agent Wilde as an expert in the field of historical cellular 
record analysis. Special Agent Wilde testified that he analyzed cell phone records for the 
number 443-403-9522 to determine the location of the cell phone on December 7, 2015. 
Special Agent Wilde explained that he could determine the location of the cell phone only 
at the times when it made or took calls.  Special Agent Wilde testified that, on December 
7, 2015, at 5:22 p.m., the cell phone was used to call 443-707-6420 from the area of Hollins 
Market, and that was the last contact between the two numbers. At 6:04 p.m., and at 6:21 
p.m., the cell phone was in the area of 6 West Pennsylvania Avenue in Towson. 
During  closing  argument,  Sample’s  counsel  addressed  the  Facebook-related 
evidence as follows: 
The Facebook[-related] evidence was fascinating, and I submit that 
those records just aren’t reliable. It’s the nature of the medium itself and who 
can post information, who can open an account, who can take down 
information.  It’s not that secure, and I think it came out that . . . anybody 
could open up a Facebook page under any name[,] and there is no checkup, 
just none. 
Could go so far as to [P]hoto[]shop[15]  someone’s face on[]to your 
body and post that picture on [Facebook], and there is no check on that. So, 
under those circumstances, unless they can tell you specifically who, when[,] 
and what device was used, and tie that device to a specific individual at a 
certain time, they’re speculating. The lack of reliability alone should raise a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
The jury found Sample guilty of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, first- 
 
 
 
 
 
15When  used  as  a  verb,  “Photoshop” means  “to  alter  (a  digital  image)  with 
Photoshop software or other image-editing software[,] especially in a way that distorts 
reality (as for deliberately deceptive purposes)[.]”  Photoshop, Merriam-Webster, https:// 
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/photoshop [https://perma.cc/3K6E-6MKD].
- 23 - 
 
degree assault, possession of a handgun after conviction of a disqualifying crime, and two 
counts of use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence. The circuit 
court sentenced Sample to twenty years of imprisonment for attempted robbery with a 
dangerous weapon, five years concurrent (without the possibility of parole) for one count 
of use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, twenty-five years consecutive 
for first-degree assault, five years concurrent (without the possibility of parole) for the 
other count of use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, and five years 
consecutive for possession of a firearm after conviction of a disqualifying crime. 
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals 
 
Sample appealed.   On July 31,  2019, the  Court of  Special Appeals reversed 
 
Sample’s convictions and remanded for a new trial.  See Sample, 2019 WL 3451812, at 
 
*5.   The Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court abused its discretion in 
admitting information related to  the  Facebook Business Records  because  there  was 
insufficient evidence to show that Sample used the SoLo Haze Facebook profile to unfriend 
the claude.mayo.5 Facebook profile. See id. at *4. The Court of Special Appeals reasoned: 
 
Although there may have been enough evidence for a juror to conclude that 
the [SoLo Haze Facebook profile] was created by [Sample], the State failed 
to proffer any evidence to show that [Sample unfriended] the [claude.mayo.5 
Facebook profile].  Unlike the consolidated cases in Sublet, [442 Md. 632, 
113 A.3d 695,] there was effectively no evidence that [Sample] took the 
action at issue. 
The State stresses that relatively few people would have known of the 
shooting at the time [the ]So[L]o Haze [Facebook profile un]friended [the 
c]laude[.m]ayo[.]5[  Facebook  profile].    There  is,  however,  insufficient 
evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that [Sample] was the person who 
took that action.  Another person within the same social circle could have 
heard of the shooting in the more than twenty-four hours after the shooting, 
accessed the So[L]o Haze [Facebook profile], and removed Mayo as a friend
- 24 - 
 
of the profile.   That possibility is demonstrated by the fact that someone 
logged into the [c]laude[.m]ayo[.]5 profile after Mayo’s death and posted a 
fl[y]er for Mayo’s [candlelight vigil].   Without evidence of [Sample] 
controlling the profile (such as evidence linking the profile to [Sample]’s 
phone or computer), a reasonable juror could only speculate that [Sample] 
took the action at issue. By admitting the action [that had been] taken on the 
“So[L]o Haze” Facebook p[rofile] without a showing that [Sample] took that 
action, the circuit court abused its discretion. 
 
Sample, 2019 WL 3451812, at *4 (cleaned up).16 
 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
 
On September 20, 2019, the State petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the 
following issue: “Did the Court of Special Appeals err by holding that the mere abstract 
possibility of unauthorized access to Sample’s Facebook account barred any reasonable 
juror from finding that  [Sample] was  responsible for  the  account entry in  question 
([unfriending the claude.mayo.5 Facebook profile)]?”  On November 6, 2019, this Court 
granted the petition. See Sample, 466 Md. 310, 219 A.3d 526. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The Parties’ Contentions 
 
 
The State contends that the circuit court determined, and the Court of Special 
Appeals did not dispute, that a reasonable juror could have found that the SoLo Haze 
Facebook profile belonged to Sample. The State argues that the Court of Special Appeals’s 
theory that another person in Sample’s social circle may have used the SoLo Haze profile 
 
 
 
16Because the Court of Special Appeals agreed with Sample that the circuit court 
abused its discretion in admitting the Facebook-related evidence, the Court did not address 
Sample’s other contentions, see Sample, 2019 WL 3451812, at *5 n.1—namely, that the 
circuit court erred in denying motions for a mistrial, see id. at *1.
- 25 - 
 
to unfriend the claude.mayo.5 profile is not grounded in evidence.  The State asserts that, 
without more, the evidence that the SoLo Haze profile belonged to Sample would allow a 
reasonable juror to find that he used that profile to unfriend the claude.mayo.5 profile. The 
State maintains that such a finding would be supported by other circumstances, including 
that Sample was one of “select [f]ew people” with a motive to sever ties with Mayo the 
day after the attempted armed robbery and Mayo’s death, and that Sample’s and Mayo’s 
cell phones called each other multiple times in the hours leading up to the crime, but 
Sample denied knowing Mayo during an interview with detectives. 
The State contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred in reasoning that, 
because it was possible that someone other than Sample used the SoLo Haze Facebook 
profile to unfriend the claude.mayo.5 Facebook profile, no reasonable juror could find that 
Sample was the one who did so. The State argues that such a possibility went to the weight, 
not the admissibility, of the Facebook-related evidence. The State asserts that, contrary to 
the Court of Special Appeals’s reasoning, the circumstance that someone logged into the 
claude.mayo.5 profile after Mayo’s death did not establish that no reasonable juror could 
find that Sample used the SoLo Haze profile to unfriend the claude.mayo.5 profile. 
Sample responds that, although there was evidence that he had created the SoLo 
Haze Facebook profile, the State failed to meet the burden of offering evidence sufficient 
to demonstrate that he used the SoLo Haze profile to unfriend the claude.mayo.5 profile. 
Sample points out that there was not any technical evidence, such as testimony regarding 
research of his phone or computer, linking him to the unfriending of the claude.mayo.5 
profile. Sample argues that, without more, the act of unfriending the claude.mayo.5 profile
- 26 - 
 
did not reveal who did so.  Sample asserts that the circumstance that someone logged into 
the claude.mayo.5 profile after Mayo’s death shows that it was not farfetched to infer that 
someone other than him could have used the SoLo Haze profile to unfriend the 
claude.mayo.5 profile. 
Standard of Review 
An appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court’s determination that 
social media evidence was sufficiently authenticated.  See Sublet, 442 Md. at 676, 113 
 
A.3d at 721; Griffin, 419 Md. at 357, 19 A.3d at 423. 
 
Authenticating Social Media Evidence 
 
Maryland Rule 5-901 governs authentication and states in pertinent part: 
(a) General Provision 
The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. 
 
(b) Illustrations 
 
 
By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the 
following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with 
the requirements of this Rule: 
 
(1) Testimony of Witness With Knowledge 
 
Testimony  of  a  witness  with  knowledge  that  the  offered 
evidence is what it is claimed to be. 
 
* * * 
(4) Circumstantial Evidence 
Circumstantial   evidence,   such   as   appearance,   contents, 
substance,    internal    patterns,    location,    or    other    distinctive
- 27 - 
 
characteristics, that the offered evidence is what it is claimed to be. 
(Cross reference omitted). 
In Griffin, 419 Md. at 347, 357, 19 A.3d at 418, 423-24, a case involving a murder 
 
prosecution, this Court held that a trial court abused its discretion in admitting, at the State’s 
request, alleged printouts of the defendant’s girlfriend’s MySpace profile, as the same had 
not been sufficiently authenticated under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4).  At trial, the State 
sought to introduce printouts of the defendant’s girlfriend’s MySpace profile to prove that, 
prior to trial, the girlfriend allegedly threatened a State’s witness.  See id. at 348, 19 A.3d 
 
at 418.  The printouts, which were of a MySpace profile named “Sistasouljah,” indicated 
 
that the profile belonged to a twenty-three-year-old woman who lived in Port Deposit, and 
 
listed October 2, 1983 as the woman’s date of birth.  
See id. at 348, 19 A.3d at 418.  The 
 
printouts included the following “blurb”:17  “FREE BOOZY!!!!   JUST REMEMBER 
 
SNITCHES GET STITCHES!!  U KNOW WHO YOU ARE!!”  
Griffin, 419 Md. at 348, 
 
19 A.3d at 418.  “Boozy” was allegedly the defendant’s nickname.  Id. at 350, 19 A.3d at 
 
419. 
 
The State called the defendant’s girlfriend as a witness, but the prosecutor did not 
 
question her about the printouts.  See id. at 348, 19 A.3d at 418.  Rather, the State sought 
 
to authenticate the printouts through the testimony of the lead investigator. See id. at 348, 
 
 
 
 
 
17This Court explained “blurbs” on MySpace profiles as follows: “MySpace profiles 
contain several informational sections, known as ‘blurbs.’  These include two standard 
blurbs: ‘About Me’ and ‘Who I’d Like to Meet.’ Users may supplement those blurbs with 
additional sections about their interests, general additional details, and other personal 
information.” Griffin, 419 Md. at 351, 19 A.3d at 420 (citation omitted).
- 28 - 
 
19 A.3d at 418.   The defendant’s counsel objected to the admission of the printouts, 
contending that there was insufficient evidence of a connection between the defendant’s 
girlfriend and the “Sistasouljah” MySpace profile as well as the blurb.  See id. at 348, 19 
 
A.3d at 418. During voir dire outside of the presence of the jury, in response to a question 
as to how he knew that the “Sistasouljah” MySpace profile belonged to the defendant’s 
girlfriend, the lead investigator testified that the “Sistasouljah” MySpace profile listed the 
defendant’s girlfriend’s date of birth, that the blurb referred to “Boozy,” and that there was 
a photograph of “Boozy” and the woman.  Id. at 349, 19 A.3d at 418.  The trial court 
 
observed that the woman looked like the defendant’s girlfriend.  
See id. at 349, 19 A.3d at 
 
418-19. 
 
The trial court indicated that it would permit the detective to testify about a redacted 
version of the printouts, which contained the photograph of the person who looked like the 
girlfriend, the description of the woman as a twenty-three-year-old woman from Port 
Deposit, and the blurb about snitches getting stitches. See id. at 350, 19 A.3d at 419. The 
 
defendant’s counsel objected to the admission of the investigator’s testimony about the 
 
printouts, but joined a stipulation that was read to the jury. See id. at 350, 19 A.3d at 419. 
 
The stipulation advised that the lead investigator would have testified that he made the 
printouts, that he recognized the woman in the photograph as the defendant’s girlfriend, 
and that she told him her date of birth was October 2, 1983. See id. at 350, 19 A.3d at 419. 
 
The jury found the defendant guilty. See id. at 346, 19 A.3d at 417. The defendant 
 
appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. See id. at 346, 19 A.3d at 417. The 
 
defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted. See id. at 346,
- 29 - 
 
19 A.3d at 417.  This Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.  See id. at 347-48, 19 
 
A.3d at 418.  This Court observed that the prosecutor did not attempt to authenticate the 
printouts through the testimony of a witness with knowledge under Maryland Rule 5- 
901(b)(1), as the prosecutor did not ask the defendant’s girlfriend about the printouts. See 
 
id. at 355 & n.11, 19 A.3d at 422 & n.11.  This Court determined that the prosecutor did 
 
not sufficiently authenticate the printouts through circumstantial evidence under Maryland 
Rule 5-901(b)(4), as the printouts’ inclusion of the defendant’s girlfriend’s date of birth, 
the town in which she lived, and the photograph of her did not sufficiently indicate that she 
created the “Sistasouljah” MySpace profile and wrote the blurb. See id. at 357, 19 A.3d at 
 
423-24. This Court explained: 
 
 
The potential for abuse and manipulation of a social networking [web]site by 
someone other than its purported creator and/or user leads to our conclusion 
that a printout of an image from such a [web]site requires a greater degree of 
authentication than merely identifying the date of birth of the creator and her 
visage in a photograph on the [“Sistasouljah” MySpace profile] to reflect that 
[the defendant’s girlfriend] was its creator and the author of the [blurb]. 
 
Id. at 357-58, 19 A.3d at 424 (footnote omitted). 
 
We cautioned that the holding did not mean “that printouts from social networking 
[web]sites should never be admitted[,]” and we suggested methods for authenticating the 
same.  Id. at 363, 19 A.3d at 427.  We suggested that the proponent of the social media 
 
evidence could authenticate the evidence through the testimony of a person with 
knowledge under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1) by asking the person to whom the social 
networking profile allegedly belongs whether that person created the profile and authored 
the posting in question. See id. at 363, 19 A.3d at 427. Another option would be to search
- 30 - 
 
the device of the person who allegedly created the profile or posting at issue and examine 
the device’s internet history and hard drive to determine whether the device was used to 
create the social networking profile and posting.  See id. at 363, 19 A.3d at 427.  A third 
 
option would be to “obtain information directly from the social networking website that 
links the establishment of the profile to the person who allegedly created it[,] and also links 
the posting sought to be introduced to the person who initiated it.”  
Id. at 364, 19 A.3d at 
 
428. 
 
In a dissenting opinion that the Honorable Joseph F. Murphy, Jr. joined, the 
Honorable Glenn T. Harrell, Jr. stated that he would adopt the test for authentication that 
nearly all United States Courts of Appeals, including the Second Circuit, had embraced. 
See id. at 366, 19 A.3d at 429 (Harrell, J., dissenting).  Under that test, “‘a document is 
 
properly authenticated if a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity.’” Id. at 366, 
 
19 A.3d at 429 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 
 
151 (2d Cir. 2007)) (cleaned up).   Applying the “reasonable juror” test, Judge Harrell 
concluded that, in light of the circumstantial evidence, a reasonable juror could have found 
that the defendant’s girlfriend was the one who wrote the blurb.  See Griffin, 419 Md. at 
 
367, 19 A.3d at 429 (Harrell, J., dissenting). 
 
Four years after Griffin, in 2015, in Sublet, 442 Md. at 678, 113 A.3d at 722, in an 
 
opinion that consolidated three cases, this Court held that, to authenticate social media 
evidence, there must be proof from which a reasonable juror could find that the evidence 
is what it purports to be.  Utilizing this standard in each of the three cases, this Court 
affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  
See id. at 678, 113 A.3d at 722.  This Court observed
- 31 - 
 
that, in Griffin, 419 Md. at 363-64, 19 A.3d at 427-28, we had “suggested . . . three non- 
 
exclusive”  methods  of  sufficiently  authenticating  printouts  from  social  networking 
 
websites. Sublet, 442 Md. at 663, 113 A.3d at 713 (emphasis omitted). 
 
This Court observed that, in United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014), 
 
which involved facts that were analogous to Griffin’s, the Second Circuit, quoting Federal 
 
Rule  of  Evidence  901,  stated  that,  “to  satisfy the  requirement  of  authenticating or 
 
identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support 
 
a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”  Sublet, 442 Md. at 664, 666, 
 
113 A.3d at 714, 715.  The Second Circuit instructed that “this requirement is satisfied if 
sufficient proof has been introduced so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of 
authenticity or identification.”  
Sublet, 442 Md. at 666, 113 A.3d at 715 (quoting Vayner, 
 
769 F.3d at 129-30) (cleaned up).  We quoted the following language from Vayner, 769 
 
F.3d at 130: “[T]he proponent [of social media evidence] need not rule out all possibilities 
 
[that are] inconsistent with authenticity, or prove beyond any doubt that the [social media] 
 
evidence is what it purports to be[.]”  Sublet, 442 Md. at 666, 113 A.3d at 715 (cleaned 
 
up). Again, quoting Vayner, 769 F.3d at 131, we stated: 
 
[A]uthentication[,] of course[,] merely renders evidence admissible, leaving 
the issue of its ultimate reliability to the jury.  Thus, after the proponent of 
the evidence has adduced sufficient evidence to support a finding that the 
proffered evidence is what it is claimed to be, the opposing party remains 
free to challenge the reliability of the evidence, to minimize its importance, 
or to argue alternative interpretations of its meaning, but these and similar 
other challenges go to the weight of the evidence—not to its admissibility. 
 
Sublet, 442 Md. at 668-69, 113 A.3d at 716-17 (cleaned up).  Consistent with the Second 
 
Circuit’s opinion in Vayner and the dissent in Griffin, 419 Md. at 366, 19 A.3d at 429
- 32 - 
 
(Harrell, J., dissenting), for purposes of social media evidence, this Court adopted the 
 
“reasonable juror” test used by most United States Courts of Appeals, including the Second 
 
Circuit. See Sublet, 442 Md. at 671, 113 A.3d at 718. We held that, to admit social media 
 
evidence, a trial court “must determine that there is proof from which a reasonable juror 
 
 
could find that the evidence is what the proponent claims[.]” Id. at 678, 113 A.3d at 722. 
 
In the first of the consolidated cases, Sublet v. State, where, during an assault trial, 
 
the defendant’s counsel sought to introduce into evidence printouts of a conversation on a 
Facebook page indicating that the defendant had not been the aggressor, this Court 
concluded that two of the entries on the Facebook page were not sufficiently authenticated, 
as there was testimony that the owner of the Facebook page (the person who was alleged 
to have made the entries) permitted others to use her username and password. See Sublet, 
 
442 Md. at 638-39, 672, 113 A.3d at 698-99, 718-19. The owner of the page testified that 
she had shared her Facebook username and password with others, and that other people 
could presumably access her Facebook page and input information.  See id. at 672, 113 
 
A.3d at 719.  We held that no reasonable juror could have found that the owner of the 
 
Facebook page made the postings at issue.  See id. at 672-73, 113 A.3d at 718-19.  We 
 
observed that  the  defendant’s counsel did  not  authenticate the  postings through the 
testimony of a witness with knowledge under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1), as the owner of 
the Facebook page expressly denied making the postings. See id. at 672, 113 A.3d at 718- 
 
19. 
 
This Court determined that the defendant’s counsel did not sufficiently authenticate 
 
the postings through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), as the
- 33 - 
 
postings “were devoid of unique characteristics” indicating authenticity. Id. at 672-73, 113 
 
A.3d at 719.   This Court noted that the two postings at issue in the Facebook profile 
 
printouts  “ma[d]e  no  reference  to  the  circumstances  underlying”  the  case,  were 
 
“disconnected entirely” from the previous postings by that profile, and did “not refer to 
 
 
[]or answer any of the previous” postings by other profiles.  Id. at 673, 113 A.3d at 719. 
 
This Court pointed out that, apart from unauthenticated handwritten notations, the printouts 
 
did not make clear the dates on which any of the postings occurred. See id. at 673 & n.42, 
 
113 A.3d at 719 & n.42. This Court explained that the owner’s testimony that other people 
knew her Facebook username and password, and had used her Facebook profile to make 
postings, undermined the owner’s authorship of the postings. Id. at 672, 113 A.3d at 719. 
 
In the second case, Harris v. State, where, during an attempted murder trial, the State 
 
sought to introduce testimony concerning direct messages sent by Twitter to another person 
from the defendant’s iPhone and tweets obtained from the defendant’s Android phone, 
indicating that he planned to shoot one of the victims in the case in retaliation for an earlier 
altercation, this Court determined that a reasonable juror could find that the direct messages 
and tweets were authentic.  See Sublet, 442 Md. at 645-46, 675-76, 113 A.3d at 702-03, 
 
720-21.  The State argued that a witness had identified the name on the Twitter account 
“TheyLovingTC” as the defendant’s Twitter name, and photographs accompanying the 
messages were of the defendant.  See id. at 674, 113 A.3d at 720.  The State pointed out 
 
that the content of the direct messages indicated that the author knew in advance of the 
 
planned retaliatory shooting. See id. at 674, 113 A.3d at 720.  This Court agreed with the 
 
State that there were sufficient distinctive characteristics concerning the direct messages
- 34 - 
 
and tweets “from which the trial [court] could determine that a reasonable juror could find 
 
the ‘direct messages’ and tweets [to be] authentic[.]” Id. at 674, 113 A.3d at 720. 
 
In  determining that  the  direct  messages had  been  properly authenticated, we 
observed that the circumstance that the planned shooting occurred the day after the direct 
messages were sent indicated that the messages were written by someone with knowledge 
of the plan, and a witness had testified that only seven people, including the defendant, 
heard the conversation about the plan for revenge that was later relayed over social media 
in the direct messages.  See id. at 674-75, 113 A.3d at 720.   We noted that the direct 
 
messages referenced a plan for retaliation that had “been created in response to events 
 
occurring that same day.”  
Id. at 674, 113 A.3d at 720.  We observed that there had been 
 
testimony that the “TheyLovingTc” Twitter profile belonged to the defendant.  See id. at 
 
674-75, 113 A.3d at 720. We concluded that, based on the temporal proximity of the tweets 
(which were authored within ten minutes of the direct messages) to the direct messages, 
and the circumstance that the direct messages had been sufficiently authenticated, a 
reasonable juror could also have found that the tweets were authentic.  See id. at 675-76, 
 
113 A.3d at 720-21.  In other words, this Court determined that a reasonable juror could 
determine that the defendant used the “TheyLovingTc” Twitter profile to write the direct 
messages as well as tweets. See id. at 675-76, 113 A.3d at 720-21. 
 
In the third case, Monge-Martinez v. State, during an attempted murder trial in 
 
which  the  defendant,  Carlos  Monge-Martinez, was  accused  of  stabbing  his  former 
girlfriend, the State sought to introduce Facebook messages allegedly sent on the same day 
of the stabbing by the defendant from a Facebook profile named “Carlos Monge” to his
- 35 - 
 
former girlfriend indicating remorse for his actions.  See Sublet, 442 Md. at 652-53, 113 
 
A.3d at 707.   The State argued that there was sufficient evidence to authenticate the 
messages because the former girlfriend testified that the defendant wrote the messages, the 
date and time stamps on the messages indicated that they were sent on the same day of the 
stabbing, and the messages were written in Spanish, the defendant’s native language, and 
referenced the stabbing.  See id. at 676-77, 113 A.3d at 721.  We agreed.  See id. at 676, 
 
113 A.3d at 721. 
We determined that the State sufficiently authenticated the messages through 
circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4). See id. at 677, 113 A.3d at 721. 
 
We concluded that the question of whether the defendant authored the Facebook messages 
 
could be determined by the distinctive characteristics of the messages. See id. at 677, 113 
 
A.3d at 721.  We observed that the messages were received on the day of the stabbing, 
when the defendant was among few people who knew about it, that the messages contained 
expressions of remorse, and that the defendant began telephoning his former girlfriend 
shortly after the messages were sent.  See id. at 677 & n.46, 113 A.3d at 721-22 & n.46. 
 
We noted that the messages were in Spanish, the defendant’s first language, as was a note 
that was left in the former girlfriend’s residence on the date of the stabbing, as well as a 
letter that the former girlfriend received the following month in which the defendant sought 
forgiveness.  See id. at 677, 113 A.3d at 721-22.  We held that it was not dispositive that 
 
the messages did not include any of the defendant’s biographical information, such as his 
 
date of birth. See id. at 676, 113 A.3d at 721. In sum, we concluded that a reasonable juror 
 
could determine that the defendant used the “Carlos Monge” Facebook profile to send the
- 36 - 
 
messages at issue to his former girlfriend. See id. at 677, 113 A.3d at 722. 
 
Analysis 
 
Here, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 
Facebook-related evidence, as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence under Maryland 
Rule 5-901(b)(4) for a reasonable juror to find that the SoLo Haze Facebook profile 
belonged to Sample, that the claude.mayo.5 Facebook profile belonged to Mayo, and that 
Sample used the SoLo Haze profile to unfriend the claude.mayo.5 profile. 
We begin by explaining the standard of proof for authentication of social media 
evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(a), which states that a party can sufficiently 
authenticate a piece of evidence through “evidence [that is] sufficient to support a finding 
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” As discussed, in Sublet, 442 Md. 
 
at 671, 678, 113 A.3d at 718, 722, this Court adopted the “reasonable juror” test from 
 
federal case law for authentication of social media evidence. Although this Court did not 
 
mention the term “preponderance of the evidence” in its discussion in Sublet, this Court’s 
 
adoption of the “reasonable juror” test necessarily means that, for a trial court to admit 
social media evidence, there must be sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that 
the social media evidence is authentic by a preponderance of the evidence. 
In Griffin, 419 Md. at 358 n.12, 19 A.3d at 424 n.12, we observed that the 
 
“reasonable juror” test is derived from Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b).  The Advisory 
Committee Notes as to Federal Rule of Evidence 901, which pertains to authentication, 
state that the “requirement of showing authenticity . . . falls in the category of relevancy 
dependent upon fulfillment of a condition of fact[,] and is governed by the procedure set
- 37 - 
 
forth in [Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 104(b).”18   Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) states: 
“When the  relevance of  evidence depends on  whether a  fact  exists, proof  must be 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist.” The Supreme Court has 
explained that, under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b), the question is whether a “jury 
could reasonably find the conditional fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence.” 
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988) (citation omitted).19  In other words, 
 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b), the issue is whether “a reasonable jury [could] find 
 
the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence[.]”  United States v. Balthazard, 
 
360 F.3d 309, 313 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689-90).  As such,  in 
 
United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403, 413 (3d Cir. 2016), the Third Circuit held that “the 
 
Government provided more than adequate extrinsic evidence to support that [certain] 
Facebook records reflected online conversations that took place between [the defendant, 
another person, and] minors, such that the jury could reasonably find the authenticity of 
the records by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Cleaned up). 
In sum, by adopting the “reasonable juror” test in Sublet, 442 Md. at 671, 113 A.3d 
 
at 718, this Court concurrently adopted the “preponderance of the evidence” standard of 
 
 
 
18Similarly, Maryland Rule 5-901(a) includes a cross-reference to Maryland Rule 5- 
104(b), which states: “When the relevance of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a 
condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence 
sufficient to support a finding by the trier of fact that the condition has been fulfilled.” 
19Similarly, this Court has stated that the “preponderance of the evidence” standard 
of proof applies to determinations by trial courts under Maryland Rule 5-104(a), which 
provides in pertinent part: “Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person 
to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be 
determined by the court, subject to the provisions of [Maryland Rule 5-104](b).” Crane v. 
Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 92, 854 A.2d 1180, 1185 (2004) (citation omitted).
- 38 - 
 
proof that goes with the test.  For a trial court to admit social media evidence, there must 
be sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that the social media is authentic by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  “[P]reponderance of the evidence” means “more likely 
than not[.]”  
Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 60 n.15, 862 A.2d 419, 426 n.15 (2004) (citations 
 
omitted).  Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Sublet, 442 Md. at 678, 113 A.3d at 
 
722, and conclude that, where there is an issue as to authenticating social media evidence, 
the question is whether there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that it is 
more likely than not that the social media evidence is what the proponent of the evidence 
purports it to be.20 
Where a party attempts to authenticate social media evidence through circumstantial 
evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), “the inquiry is context-specific[,]” and the 
presence or absence of certain biographical information—such as the relevant person’s date 
of birth—is not necessarily dispositive. Sublet, 442 Md. at 676-77, 113 A.3d at 721. When 
 
attempting  to  sufficiently authenticate  social  media  evidence  through  circumstantial 
evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), the party “need not rule out all possibilities 
[that are] inconsistent with authenticity, or prove beyond any doubt that the [social media] 
 
 
 
20We are not the first State court to apply the “reasonable juror” test and the 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof to authenticating electronic evidence. 
In Commonwealth v. Purdy, 945 N.E.2d 372, 379 (Mass. 2011), the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts explained: “The role of the trial [court] in jury cases is to determine 
whether there is evidence sufficient, if believed, to convince the jury[,] by a preponderance 
of the evidence[,] that the item in question is what the proponent claims[.]” (Cleaned up). 
The Court went on to hold that there were “confirming circumstances [that were] sufficient 
for a reasonable jury to find[,] by a preponderance of the evidence[,] that the defendant 
authored [certain] e-mails.” Id. at 381 (cleaned up).
- 39 - 
 
evidence is what it purports to be[.]”  Id. at 666, 113 A.3d at 715 (quoting Vayner, 769 
 
F.3d at 130) (cleaned up). 
 
Here, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) 
for the circuit court to conclude that a reasonable juror could find that it was more likely 
than not that the SoLo Haze Facebook profile belonged to Sample. Part of the name of the 
Facebook profile, “Haze,” is a homophone of “Hayes,” Sample’s first name.  Only two e- 
mail addresses were registered with the “SoLo Haze” Facebook profile: a “facebook.com” 
e-mail address, and “mrsample2015@gmail.com[.]” The “mrsample2015@gmail.com” e- 
mail address includes not only Sample’s last name, but also the title “mr[,]” which indicates 
that the e-mail address most likely belongs to a man with the last name “Sample.” The list 
of “Friends” for the “SoLo Haze” Facebook profile includes a Facebook profile under the 
name “Skky DaLimit Lynn[.]”  At the hearing on the motion in limine, Sample’s counsel 
informed the circuit court that Sample would call Skkyla Lynn as a witness. When ruling 
on the motion in limine, the circuit court observed that Sample was calling as a witness a 
person with a name that was similar to the “Skyy DaLimit Lynn” profile, which was listed 
as a friend of the SoLo Haze profile.21   The “Current City” for the SoLo Haze profile is 
listed as Baltimore, and the list of “Connections” for the profile includes Edmondson- 
Westside High School and Towson University.   The references to Baltimore City and 
Towson indicate that the Facebook profile is connected to someone in the Baltimore area, 
 
 
 
 
 
21At trial, Detective Caskey testified that Sample told detectives that Skkyla Lynn 
was the mother of his child, and that he was at her residence during the attempted armed 
robbery.
- 40 - 
 
as opposed to someone in a different or unknown location. In other words, the SoLo Haze 
profile contained sufficient distinctive characteristics from which the circuit court could 
determine that a reasonable juror could find that Sample was the owner of the profile. See 
 
Sublet, 442 Md. at 674, 113 A.3d at 720.  In any event, Sample does not deny and indeed 
 
acknowledges that there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that the 
SoLo Haze profile belongs to him; rather, Sample merely contends that his ownership of 
the account does not establish that he used the account to unfriend the Mayo profile. 
There was also sufficient circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) 
for the circuit court to conclude that a reasonable juror could find it was more likely than 
not that the claude.mayo.5 Facebook profile belonged to Mayo. The claude.mayo.5 profile 
was under the name “Claude Mayo,” which was Mayo’s name.  The list of “Friends” for 
the claude.mayo.5 profile includes a Facebook profile under the name “Shantell 
Richardson[,]” which was Mayo’s mother’s name.  Indeed, when ruling on the motion in 
limine, the circuit court observed that Shantell Richardson was Mayo’s mother and that the 
court had issued a body attachment for her in the case.  The Facebook Business Records 
show that, at one point, the claude.mayo.5 profile listed the SoLo Haze profile as a friend. 
And, the Facebook Business Records regarding the claude.mayo.5 profile include multiple 
photographs that, according to the circuit court, are of Mayo, and contain references to his 
death. 
In addition to observing that the claude.mayo.5 profile contained Mayo’s name and 
was friends with a profile with Mayo’s mother’s name, the circuit court concluded that 
information in the claude.mayo.5 profile consisting of posts about Mayo’s death indicated
- 41 - 
 
that the profile belonged to Mayo.  The circuit court observed that the Facebook Business 
Records regarding the claude.mayo.5 profile indicate that, on December 8, 2015, someone 
tried to log into that profile twice, and only the second attempt was successful.   On 
December 8, 2015, someone uploaded a photograph of a male individual to the 
claude.mayo.5 profile, “tagged” it to indicate that it was a photograph of Mayo, and 
included the phrases “rest easy[,]” “God wanted you,” and “I’m praying for ALL my 
family” in the “Title[.]”  On the same day, a Facebook profile under the name “Sharon 
Patterson” added the following comment to the photograph: “Sorry to hear of ya love one, 
sending prayer and may God give you strength[.]”   On December 11, 2015, someone 
uploaded a different photograph of a male individual to the claude.mayo.5 profile, with 
text superimposed on the photograph that included the words “Candle” and “Visual[,]” as 
well as a reference to the park near the intersection of Lafayette and Arlington streets. The 
circuit court interpreted the text as an announcement of a candlelight vigil in response to 
Mayo’s death.  On the same day, a Facebook profile under the name “Jessica Yayosister 
Powell” added the following comment to the photograph: “R.I.P baby ily always and 
forever ...fly high baby[.]”   (Ellipses in original).   All of these occurrences constitute 
circumstantial evidence that, before his death, Mayo was the owner of the claude.mayo.5 
profile.  Put simply, the profile contained sufficient distinctive characteristics from which 
the circuit court could conclude that a reasonable juror could find that the claude.mayo.5 
profile belonged to Mayo. 
We are satisfied that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence under Maryland 
 
Rule 5-901(b)(4) for a reasonable juror to find it was more likely than not that Sample used
- 42 - 
 
the SoLo Haze Facebook profile to unfriend the claude.mayo.5 Facebook profile.22  In and 
of itself, the ample evidence that the SoLo Haze profile belonged to Sample constitutes 
strong evidence that he was responsible for the unfriending. In concluding that there was 
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that the SoLo Haze profile 
belonged to Sample and that the claude.mayo.5 profile belonged to Mayo, the circuit court 
did not abuse its discretion in permitting Detective Smith to testify that Sample unfriended 
Mayo.   The circumstances that surrounded the unfriending more than support the 
conclusion that a reasonable juror could find that Sample unfriended the Mayo profile. In 
the seventeen-day period to which the Facebook Business Records pertain (from 7:00 p.m. 
EST on November 30, 2015 through 6:59 p.m. EST on December 17, 2015), of the 175 
Facebook profiles with which the SoLo Haze Facebook profile was friends, the 
claude.mayo.5 Facebook profile was the only one unfriended by the SoLo Haze Facebook 
profile. The Facebook Business Records demonstrate that the unfriending occurred at 9:36 
p.m. EST on December 8, 2015 (based on UTC).  That was the day after Mayo’s death, 
which occurred near the scene of the attempted armed robbery on December 7, 2015. 
Given that there was evidence that Sample was the surviving attempted robber, i.e., 
Mayo’s accomplice, Sample had a motive to sever ties with Mayo after the attempted 
armed robbery.  At the hearing on the motion in limine, the State argued that surveillance 
 
 
 
 
 
22Although the circuit court did not make a specific finding regarding Sample having 
used the SoLo Haze profile to unfriend the claude.mayo.5 profile, the record demonstrates 
that the State argued at the hearing on the motion in limine that the State’s purpose in 
introducing the Facebook Business Records was to show that, after Mayo’s death, Sample 
unfriended him.
- 43 - 
 
video showed the two men walking together about fourteen minutes before the crime 
occurred. The State also argued that cell phone records showed that there was a phone call 
made by Sample to Mayo about an hour before the crime occurred. And significantly, the 
State pointed out that, during an interview with detectives, Sample denied knowing 
Mayo.23   Sample’s denial of knowing Mayo during the interview was consistent with the 
act of unfriending the claude.mayo.5 profile from the Solo Haze profile—both were 
attempts by Sample to separate himself from Mayo. 
These circumstances indicate that Sample was not a mere bystander or potential 
eyewitness to the attempted armed robbery.   To the contrary, if believed, the State’s 
argument at the hearing on the motion in limine demonstrated that Sample was Mayo’s 
accomplice, and  had  reason to  distance himself from Mayo  by unfriending him on 
Facebook.   These circumstances, coupled with the evidence of Sample’s and Mayo’s 
ownership of the Facebook profiles, were more than sufficient for a reasonable juror to find 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23Testimony at trial established that the State’s argument was correct. According to 
Detective Childs, phone records indicated that, on December 7, 2015, in the afternoon and 
early evening, Sample’s cell phone and Mayo’s cell phone called each other several times. 
Special Agent Wilde’s testimony indicated that, on December 7, 2015, at 5:22 p.m., 
Sample’s cell phone was used to call Mayo’s cell phone from the area of Hollins Market. 
At 6:04 p.m., and at 6:21 p.m., Sample’s cell phone was in the area of Towson Wines and 
Spirits, where the attempted armed robbery occurred around 6:50 p.m.  Detective Smith’s 
testimony indicated that a recording from a surveillance camera showed two individuals in 
the area of Z-Burger, a restaurant in Towson, shortly before the attempted armed robbery. 
Detective Smith opined that the individuals appeared to be Sample and Mayo.  And, days 
after the attempted armed robbery and Mayo’s death, Detective Caskey asked Sample 
whether he had known Mayo, and he answered in the negative.
- 44 - 
 
that it was more likely than not that Sample was responsible for the unfriending.24 
 
This case is comparable to Harris and Monge-Martinez, cases in which this Court 
 
held that the State sufficiently authenticated social media evidence.  See Sublet, 442 Md. 
 
at 678, 113 A.3d at 722.  Just as this Court concluded that the content and timing of the 
 
 
Twitter messages in Harris were circumstances from which a trial court could determine 
 
that a reasonable juror could have found that the Twitter messages were authored by the 
 
defendant, see  id.  at  674-76, 113  A.3d  at  720-21, here,  the  circumstances that  the 
 
unfriending occurred the very next day after the attempted armed robbery, that Sample had 
incentive to distance himself from Mayo, and that circumstantial evidence demonstrated 
that the SoLo Haze profile belonged to Sample and the claude.mayo.5 profile belonged to 
Mayo lead to the same conclusion, i.e., a reasonable juror could have found the unfriending 
was done by Sample. Similarly, just as it was material in Monge-Martinez that the stabbing 
 
and the Facebook messages occurred on the same day, at a time when not many people 
 
knew of the crime, and that the defendant’s name was similar to the “Carlos Monge” 
 
 
 
 
 
24The State’s evidence demonstrated that, when the unfriending occurred, Sample 
was aware of the attempted armed robbery, Mayo’s death, and of the potential evidence of 
his connections to Mayo—in person (at or near the scene of the crime), via cell phone, and 
on Facebook.   The requirement of Maryland Rule 5-901(a) is that, for authentication, 
evidence must be sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its 
proponent claims.  Maryland Rule 5-901(b) gives, “[b]y way of illustration only, and not 
by way of limitation,” examples of methods of authentication.  While the circumstances 
concerning Sample’s knowledge of the attempted armed robbery and Mayo’s death, and 
Sample’s connections to Mayo, were not all contained in the Facebook Business Records, 
they were circumstances argued by the State at the hearing on the motion in limine and 
supported by the evidence.  These circumstances, combined with Mayo’s and Sample’s 
ownership of the profiles, satisfied the requirement of authentication under Maryland Rule 
5-901(a).
- 45 - 
 
Facebook profile name, see id. at 677, 113 A.3d at 721-22, here, it is significant that the 
 
unfriending occurred the very next day after the attempted armed robbery, and that 
Sample’s name is similar to the SoLo Haze Facebook profile name and the 
“mrsample2015@gmail.com” e-mail address associated with the profile. Moreover, as in 
Monge-Martinez, in this case, the action that Sample allegedly took on Facebook— 
 
unfriending the claude.mayo.5 profile—was indicative of consciousness of guilt, which 
constituted circumstantial evidence that he was the one who used the Facebook profile at 
issue. See id. at 652-53, 113 A.3d at 707. 
 
Just as the circumstances of this case are similar to those of Harris and Monge- 
 
Martinez, they are distinguishable from Sublet, id. at 678, 113 A.3d at 722, a case in which 
 
this Court held that the defendant failed to sufficiently authenticate social media evidence. 
 
 
Here, in contrast to Sublet, 442 Md. at 672, 113 A.3d at 719, there is no evidence that 
 
Sample ever gave the SoLo Haze Facebook profile’s password and username to others. 
We are aware that Sample contends that, because someone accessed the claude.mayo.5 
Facebook profile after Mayo’s death and posted information about the death, someone 
other than him may have accessed the SoLo Haze Facebook profile and unfriended Mayo. 
But, as the State contends, this is speculation not grounded in evidence. Put simply, there 
is no evidence that anyone other than Sample ever had access to the SoLo Haze profile, 
much less that someone other than him used that profile to unfriend the claude.mayo.5 
profile. 
Requiring the State to somehow conclusively disprove that someone other than 
 
Sample was responsible for the unfriending would establish too high a standard for
- 46 - 
 
authenticating social  media  evidence.    The  State  was  not  required  to  eliminate  all 
possibilities that were inconsistent with authenticity, or prove beyond any question that 
Sample  was  the  one  who  used  the  SoLo  Haze  Facebook  profile  to  unfriend  the 
claude.mayo.5 Facebook profile.  See Sublet, 442 Md. at 666, 113 A.3d at 715.  Instead, 
 
the State needed to prove only that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to 
find by a preponderance of evidence, i.e., that it was more likely than not, that Sample was 
responsible for the unfriending.  See id. at 678, 113 A.3d at 722.  We conclude that the 
 
State met that requirement. As explained above, there was ample circumstantial evidence 
for the circuit court to conclude that a reasonable juror could find that the SoLo Haze 
Facebook  profile  belonged  to  Sample  and  that  the  claude.mayo.5 Facebook  profile 
belonged to Mayo, and that—combined with the circumstances surrounding the 
unfriending—was sufficient for the circuit court to allow the social media evidence to be 
presented to the jury. 
For the above reasons, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 
Facebook-related evidence.  We reverse and remand to the Court of Special Appeals for 
that Court to address the other issues raised by Sample on appeal.  See Sample, 2019 WL 
 
3451812, at *1, *5 n.1. 
 
 
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL 
APPEALS VACATED.   CASE REMANDED TO 
THAT 
COURT 
WITH 
INSTRUCTION 
TO 
ADDRESS THE REMAINING ISSUES THAT 
RESPONDENT 
RAISED 
ON 
APPEAL. 
RESPONDENT TO PAY COSTS. 
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here:  
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/coa/54a19cn.pdf