Case Title: Loney v. McPhillips

Citation: 521 P.2d 340

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1974-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
521 P.2d 340 (1974)
Stanley F. LONEY, Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert Loney, Deceased, Appellant,
v.
B.A. McPhillips, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted November 6, 1973.
Decided April 18, 1974.
Wesley A. Franklin, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Franklin, Bennett, Ofelt, DesBrisay & Jolles, Portland.
Douglas E. Kaufman, Tillamook, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were McMinimee & Kaufman, Tillamook.
BRYSON, Justice.
This is an action to recover damages for the wrongful death of a 13-year-old boy who drowned while trespassing on defendant's property at Cape Kiwanda on the Oregon coast. Plaintiff's complaint alleged the following material facts:
Plaintiff further alleged that defendant was negligent in failing to erect warning signs and fences at the highway or at the edge of the cove.
Defendant demurred to the complaint on the grounds that it failed to state a cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrer and plaintiff declined to plead further. The court entered an order dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff appeals from that order. We accept the allegations of the complaint as true.
The plaintiff contends that a possessor of land is subject to tort liability for injuries suffered by a child trespasser due to a natural dangerous condition of the land.
The law of this state concerning the special duty of a land possessor to children is set forth in 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 (1965):
See Karoblis v. Liebert, 263 Or. 64, 69, 501 P.2d 315 (1972).
The caveat to section 339 provides that "[t]he Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the rule stated in this Section may not apply to natural conditions of the land." This caveat is explained in comment p to section 339:
*342 Plaintiff contends that "other Courts have now abandoned any distinction between natural and artificial conditions," but only two cases are cited  Martinez v. Louis Lyster, General Contractor, Inc., 75 N.M. 639, 409 P.2d 493 (1965), and Lyshak v. City of Detroit, 351 Mich. 30, 88 N.W.2d 596 (1958). These cases do not involve injury due to natural conditions of the land. In Martinez, a seven-year-old boy was injured when he fell while playing on culvert pipes stacked in pyramid fashion. In Lyshak, a seven-year-old boy was injured when struck by a golf ball while he was trespassing on the golf course. The court stated, "[i]n the interests of accuracy, it should be pointed out that the case before us does not involve injury from the mere physical condition of the premises, whether natural or artificial * * *." In the later case of Swanson v. City of Marquette, 357 Mich. 424, 98 N.W.2d 574, 576-577 (1959), involving injury to a trespassing child from high voltage wires, "a static condition, artificially created," the Michigan court adopted 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339.
Several writers have urged the courts to abandon the distinction between artificial and natural conditions in relation to this special duty to children. See Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 Calif.L.Rev. 427, 446-47 (1959); Rubin, Torts: Attractive Nuisance Doctrine: Applicability to Natural Conditions, 2 Okl.L.Rev. 537 (1949); and Batson, Trespassing Children: A Study in Expanding Liability, 20 Van.L. Rev. 139, 152-53 (1966), wherein it is stated:
Other writers and the courts require an affirmative arrangement of the dangerous condition by some non-natural agency. See 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts 1452-1453 (1956); Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility in Tort, 21 Mich.L.Rev. 495, 520-21, n. 104b (1923); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 1254, § 33 (1949); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 63(82) (1966) and cases there cited. We find no cases wherein the court has extended the landowner's duty to children under the so-called "attractive nuisance" doctrine to include natural conditions.[1]
In Pocholec v. Giustina et al., 224 Or. 245, 251-252, 355 P.2d 1104 (1960), we approved the language in 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339, and Dean Prosser's summary of the law, Trespassing Children, 47 Calif.L.Rev. 427 (1959), which makes no distinction between artificial and natural conditions of the possessor's land. However, in Pocholec the distinction between an artificial and a natural dangerous condition of the land was not before the court. In that case, a nine-year-old boy drowned in an artificial log pond constructed solely for storage of logs at the defendant's mill. We affirmed a judgment entered upon a jury verdict for defendant.
The distinction between artificial and natural conditions of land has been rationalized on several grounds: that children are presumed to appreciate conditions which occur in nature;[2] that an extension *343 of liability for natural conditions would impose on the land occupier an affirmative duty in favor of a mere trespasser, which the law is reluctant to do;[3] that as to "`common dangers existing in the order of nature, it is the duty of parents to guard and warn their children, and, failing to do so, they should not expect to hold others responsible for their own want of care;'"[4] and that "* * * the burden of improving land in a state of natural condition in order to make it safe for trespassing children would be disproportionately heavy * * *."[5]
Without passing on the validity of these rationales, we believe the distinction between artificial and natural conditions of land, as to trespassing children, can and should be continued in Oregon on the basis of public policy.
The Oregon Blue Book for 1973-74 states, at 160-61:
The State of Oregon also administers 232 state parks which encompass 88,300 acres of land near Oregon's numerous mountains, valleys, lakes, rivers, and the Pacific Ocean. See Oregon Blue Book at 164-65.
A large portion of the acreage now owned or managed by governmental agencies is preserved in its natural state.[6] In addition, private individuals and corporations in the timber, agriculture, livestock and private utility industries own additional millions of acres of land in its natural state, a large portion of which is open to the public for recreational purposes.
To encourage private owners to make their land available to the public for recreational purposes, the 1971 legislature adopted ORS 105.655 to 105.680 inclusive, which provide in part as follows:
ORS 105.655 to 105.680 inclusive were affirmed and amended by Chapter 732, Oregon Laws 1973 but with no significance to this case.
In Bilbao v. Pacific Power & Light, 257 Or. 360, 363, 479 P.2d 226 (1971), a case involving injury to plaintiff while on defendant's property in the State of Washington devoted to public recreation, we held that the defendant's duty to the plaintiff was defined by a similar statute in the State of Washington, RCW 4.24.210.
The need for preservation of and access by the public to the state's land and open space resources is further recognized by the following legislative policy enactments:
A rule such as proposed by plaintiff would tend toward the closure of private open-space land and would work adversely to the public policy of Oregon as declared by the Oregon Legislature.
Public policy compels the conclusion that the duty of care of a land occupier to trespassing children should not be extended to natural dangerous conditions on the land.
Plaintiff further requests that this court reverse the trial court by abolishing the traditional legal distinctions between trespassers, licensees, and invitees. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968). Nothing would be served in this case by adopting the *345 "straight negligence" rule of Rowland v. Christian, supra because we now apply general negligence principles of law in determining the landowner's duty of care to children. Pocholec v. Giustina et al., supra; Bosin v. Oak Lodge San Dist., 251 Or. 554, 559, 447 P.2d 285, 287 (1968); Karoblis v. Liebert, supra.
We conclude that the trial court properly sustained defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's complaint.
Affirmed.
O'CONNELL, Chief Justice (dissenting).
The majority opinion concludes that the attractive nuisance doctrine "should not be extended to natural dangerous conditions on the land" because it "would tend toward the closure of private open-space land and would work adversely to the public policy of Oregon as declared by the Oregon legislature."
Admittedly, the legislature has declared that it is in the interest of the public to provide outdoor recreation areas. But the legislature did not say that this public interest is to be served by insulating from liability landowners who expose children to unreasonable risks which could be avoided without undue or disproportionate expense to the landowner. As Dean Prosser has observed:
The extension of the attractive nuisance doctrine to natural conditions which are dangerous to children will not impose upon a defendant any greater burden to protect them than he has where the condition is created by him. In either case, the landowner has the burden only of taking reasonable precautions against exposing the child to danger and in either case, as Prosser points out, "* * * [i]f nothing effective can be done to protect him without undue and disproportionate trouble and expense to the defendant, there is no liability even for a clearly recognizable risk, demonstrated by past experience, that children may get into trouble, so long as the risk is not too extreme." (Id. at 465.)
I would reverse.
[1]  Corporation of the City of Glasgow v. Taylor, (1922), 1 App.Cas. 44 (Scot.), 29 A.L.R. 846, has been cited for the proposition that the origin of the dangerous condition is of no consequence under the attractive nuisance doctrine. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts 367, n. 59 (4th ed. 1971). Glasgow v. Taylor involved a child eating some poisonous berries which had been planted and which were, therefore, not a natural condition of the land. For this reason, the case affords no support to plaintiff's position.
[2]  Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co., 228 Ind. 518, 92 N.E.2d 632 (1950) (artificial pond which merely reproduced the risk created by a natural pond, a risk of which children are presumed to be aware).
[3]  See 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts §§ 27.3, 27.5 at 1452 (1956). See generally, McNiece & Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 Yale L.J. 1272 (1949).
[4]  Tavis v. Kansas City, 89 Kan. 547, 553, 132 P. 185, 187 (1913).
[5]  2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 (1965), Comment p.
[6]  Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 2671-2678, 2680 (1952), the tort liability of the United States is governed by the law of the state where the tortious conduct took place. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 S. Ct. 585, 7 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1962). See Annot., 7 L. Ed. 2d 994 (1962). The Oregon Tort Claims Act is set forth at ORS 30.260 et seq. and is discussed in Henke, Oregon's Governmental Tort Liability Law From a National Perspective, 48 Or.L.Rev. 95 (1968). A decision favorable to plaintiff in this case would have the effect of broadening governmental tort liability under each of these statutes.