Case Title: Granada Lakes Villas Condo. Ass'n v. MetroDade Invs. Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC11-2590

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2013-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-2590 
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GRANADA LAKES VILLAS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
METRO-DADE INVESTMENTS CO., et al.,  
Respondents. 
 
[October 31, 2013] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Granada Lakes Villas Condominium Association (“Granada”) argues that 
the Second District Court of Appeal in Metro-Dade Investments, Co. v. Granada 
Lakes Villas Condominium, Inc., 74 So. 3d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), erred because 
sections 617.1432, 718.117, and 718.1124, Florida Statutes (2010), restrict a trial 
court’s inherent, equitable authority to appoint a receiver in an action involving a 
condominium association.1
                                         
 
1.  We have jurisdiction based on express and direct conflict with the Third 
District Court of Appeal’s decision in All Seasons Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Busca, 8 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
  For the reasons expressed below, we approve the 
 
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Second District’s holding that these statutes do not restrict a trial court’s equitable 
authority to appoint a receiver.  
I.  FACTS 
 
Metro-Dade Investments Company (“Metro-Dade”) was the developer of 
Granada Lakes Villas, which is a subdivision of a larger condominium complex 
known as Santa Barbara Landings in Collier County, Florida.  Metro-Dade, 74 So. 
3d at 594.  Metro-Dade still owns several of the condominium units in the 
complex.  Id.  Owners of the condominium units must pay fees and assessments to 
both the master association, Santa Barbara Landings Property Owner’s Association 
(“Santa Barbara”), and the condominium association, Granada.  See id.  Initially, it 
was agreed that Granada would collect all of the fees and assessments and then pay 
Metro-Dade and Santa Barbara the related expenses for the common areas.  See id.  
However, a financial dispute arose, and in 2009, Metro-Dade and Santa Barbara 
filed an amended complaint for damages and other relief against Granada and other 
individuals associated with Granada, alleging that Granada failed to pay Metro-
Dade and Santa Barbara the related expenses after collecting the joint fees and 
assessments.  See id. at 593-94.  According to the complaint, as a result of 
Granada’s failure to pay, Metro-Dade and Santa Barbara were unable to pay for 
utilities and maintenance expenses for the common areas of Granada Lakes Villas, 
which has resulted in ongoing health nuisances on the property.   
 
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Subsequently, in 2010, Metro-Dade filed an emergency motion for the 
appointment of a receiver over Granada in order to facilitate the collection of the 
fees and assessments from the unit owners and to perform a proper accounting.  Id. 
at 594.  Initially, the trial court orally granted the motion to appoint a receiver.  Id.  
However, upon rehearing, the trial court determined that it lacked the statutory 
authority to appoint a receiver in this case.  Id.  Specifically, the trial court 
acknowledged that it “has been unable, [despite] the fact that this case was filed in 
2009[,] to have an accounting produced by [Granada]” and “a receiver would be of 
great assistance to both the [c]ourt and the parties[,]” but held that “[t]here is no 
statutory basis which authorizes the [c]ourt to appoint a receiver.”  “Florida Statute 
718 specifically defines the circumstances upon which the [c]ourt may appoint a 
receiver[, and t]he circumstances that confront this [c]ourt are not enumerated.”   
On appeal, the Second District reversed and remanded for the trial court to 
exercise its discretion on whether to appoint a receiver because “the trial court 
erred as a matter of law because its right to appoint a receiver in this instance is 
inherent in a court of equity, not a statutorily created right.”  Id. at 595.  
Specifically, the Second District found that sections 617.1432, 718.117, and 
718.1124 do not “restrict a trial court’s broad, equitable authority to appoint a 
 
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receiver; rather, the statutes merely cite to specific instances when a receiver may 
be appointed.”  Id.  We approve the Second District’s decision.2
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
A receiver is “[a] disinterested person appointed by a court, or by a 
corporation or other person, for the protection or collection of property that is the 
subject of diverse claims.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1383 (9th ed. 2009).  The 
power to appoint a receiver has long been recognized as one that is inherent in a 
court of equity, which “lies in the sound discretion of the chancellor to be granted 
or withheld according to the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”  Ins. 
Mgmt., Inc. v. McLeod, 194 So. 2d 16, 17 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); see also Lehman v. 
Trust Co. of Am., 49 So. 502, 503-04 (Fla. 1909) (acknowledging that the power to 
appoint a receiver lies in the court’s discretion and listing certain principles that a 
court should consider when exercising its equitable power to appoint a receiver); 
Edenfield v. Crisp, 186 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (“The power to 
appoint a receiver is always one that is inherent in a [c]ourt of equity.”).   
Equitable receiverships are a creation of common law, which this Court has 
stated should be reserved for cases involving fraud, self-dealing, or waste.  See 
                                         
 
2.  We review pure questions of law de novo.  S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc. 
v. Welker, 908 So. 2d 317, 319 (Fla. 2005). 
 
 
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McAllister Hotel v. Schatzberg, 40 So. 2d 201, 202-03 (Fla. 1949); Apalachicola 
N. R. Co. v. Sommers, 85 So. 361, 362 (Fla. 1920) (explaining that appointment of 
a receiver is proper to prevent fraud, destruction or loss of property, or self-
dealing).   
On the other hand, a statute can authorize the appointment of a receiver, and 
statutory receiverships may serve a different role or purpose than an equitable 
receivership.  For instance, the Florida Statutes authorize the appointment of a 
receiver in several situations that do not involve any of the common law grounds 
of fraud, self-dealing, or waste for the appointment of an equitable receiver.  See, 
e.g., § 393.0678, Fla. Stat. (2012) (authorizing the appointment of a receiver for a 
“residential habilitation center or a group home facility owned and operated by a 
corporation or partnership” under certain circumstances); § 607.1432, Fla. Stat. 
(2012) (authorizing the appointment of a receiver for the purpose of winding up 
and liquidating a corporation); § 658.79, Fla. Stat. (2012) (authorizing the 
appointment of a receiver for an insolvent bank for the purpose of taking charge of 
the assets and affairs of the bank).  
 
In this case, Granada contends that the court’s power to appoint a receiver in 
cases involving a non-profit condominium association like Granada is limited to 
the enumerated circumstances set forth in sections 617.1432, 718.117, and 
718.1124, Florida Statutes.  Specifically, section 718.1124(1) provides that a unit 
 
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owner may petition the court for the appointment of a receiver to manage the 
affairs of the condominium association if the “association fails to fill vacancies on 
the board of administration sufficient to constitute a quorum.”  Section 
718.117(7)(a) provides that if there is a natural disaster and members of the 
condominium association’s board of directors cannot be found, fail to act, or are 
unable or refuse to act, any interested person can file a petition “to determine the 
identity of the directors or . . . to appoint a receiver to conclude the affairs of the 
association.”  And section 617.1432 provides that a receiver may be appointed for 
the purpose of liquidating and winding up the affairs of a non-profit corporation.  
However, nothing in the statutory language of these sections expressly prohibits or 
even implies that these enumerated circumstances are the only instances in which a 
court may appoint a receiver in cases involving a non-profit condominium 
association.  Rather, instead of restricting a court’s power to appoint a receiver, 
these statutory provisions authorize a court to appoint a receiver under certain 
enumerated circumstances that do not involve any of the common law grounds for 
the appointment of an equitable receiver.   
Furthermore, this conclusion is supported by the fact that there are multiple 
cases in which a receiver has been appointed over a condominium association in 
circumstances that do not fall within those enumerated in sections 617.1432, 
718.117, and 718.1124.  See, e.g., Inverrary Gardens Condo. I Ass’n, Inc. v. 
 
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Spender, 939 So. 2d 1159, 1160 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (explaining that a receiver 
was appointed to manage the affairs of a condominium association due to 
allegations that “under Spender’s management [the condominium association] was 
engaged in acts of gross mismanagement, neglect, fraud, and dishonesty”); 
Buckley Towers Condo., Inc. v. Buchwald, 340 So. 2d 1206, 1207-09 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1976) (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a 
receiver to manage and distribute funds held by the association because the 
association continued to refuse to pay the monies owed to the appellee despite a 
court order instructing it to do so).   
Accordingly, we find that a court’s inherent equitable power to appoint a 
receiver over a non-profit condominium association like Granada is not limited to 
the enumerated categories set forth in sections 617.1432, 718.117, 718.1124. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons explained above, we approve the decision of the Second 
District in Metro-Dade, and disapprove the Third District’s decision in All Seasons 
to any extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
It is so ordered.  
 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Second District – Case No. 2D11-1188 
 
(Collier County) 
  
John S. Penton, Jr. and Katie Merwin of Cole Scott Kissane, West Palm Beach, 
Florida;  Kristen A. Tajak, Cole Scott & Kissane, P.A., Miami, Florida,  
 
for Petitioner 
 
Denise V. Powers of Denise V. Powers, P.A., Coral Gables, Florida; Jeffrey P. 
Shapiro, Miami, Florida; Jose Maria Herrera, Miami, Florida; and Eric Michael 
Glazer, Glazer & Associates, P.A., Hollywood, Florida,  
 
for Respondents