Case Title: Stalb v. Stalb

Citation: 171 Vt. 630, 768 A.2d 1269

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2000-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Stalb v. Stalb (2000-042); 171 Vt. 630; 768 A.2d 1269 

[Filed 21-Dec-2000]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2000-042

                             DECEMBER TERM, 2000

Alan Stalb	                       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	Washington Family Court
                                       }	
Aglaia Stalb	                       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 356-8-94 WnDmd

                                                Trial Judge: Mary Miles Teachout

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant appeals from a family court order finding defendant in
  contempt for conduct  committed in the course of a master's hearing to
  deliver and/or determine the value of certain  property awarded to
  plaintiff by paragraph two of the amended final divorce order.  Plaintiff
  cross-appeals from the court's approval of the value set by the master for
  the missing property.  We affirm  the master's valuation, but reverse the
  family court's finding of contempt.  

       In this extremely contentious divorce, plaintiff was awarded certain
  property in the possession  of defendant, which was itemized on defendant's
  trial exhibit V.  Paragraph two of the amended final  divorce order
  required the parties to arrange for the delivery of these items, and for
  defendant to pay  plaintiff the reasonable value of items that could not be
  delivered.  Any dispute regarding the value  of items not delivered was to
  be determined by a master appointed by the court.  The order of  reference
  for the master stated:

         Matter referred to Property Master pursuant to paragraph #2
    of  Amended Final Order filed 8/26/97.  Each party shall have 1 hr
    to present  evidence and the Master shall be paid for 2 additional
    hours to prepare  report.  Plaintiff shall pay 20% of the cost and
    defendant shall pay 80%.

       Needless to say, the implementation of paragraph two did not go
  smoothly.  Prior to the  hearing of the master, there was general confusion
  between the parties about delivery of the subject  property and most of the
  attempts to deliver appear to have been unsuccessful because of a lack of 
  communication.  Thus, when the master scheduled a hearing, it was unclear
  whether most of the  items were still in defendant's possession at the
  marital residence, the Northfield Inn, had been  delivered to plaintiff via
  depositing them in the Inn garage, or had vanished.  Upon this uncertain 
  territory, the master attempted to implement paragraph 2.

       Plaintiff's counsel requested that the hearing be held at the
  Northfield Inn to allow 

 

  identification of property at the Inn that defendant had not delivered to
  him.  Defendant objected on  the grounds that the amended final order,
  paragraph 10, prohibited either party from going to the  other's place of
  business or residence.  The master inquired of the court whether he should
  refer the  matter to the court or decide the issue on his own.  The court
  told the master, through the court clerk,  that it was within the master's
  authority to set the time and place of the hearing, and the master  decided
  to hold the hearing at the Inn.  When the parties arrived, defendant and
  her counsel refused  access to the Inn to plaintiff, except to use the
  bathroom.  Access was permitted to plaintiff's counsel  and the master. 
  The hearing proceeded outside, and the master set a value of $3,000 on the 
  undelivered personal property.  

       Plaintiff then filed an objection to the value set by the master as
  well as a motion for sanctions  and contempt.  The court upheld the
  master's valuation and held defendant in contempt for refusing  plaintiff
  access to the Inn to identify his personal property.  In light of the
  hostile relationship  between the parties, the court reasoned that the
  master had implicit authority through the order of  reference to hold the
  hearing at the Inn and to permit plaintiff to enter defendant's  residence,
  because  he could not rely on the representations of defendant about
  whether or not property had been turned  over.  Notwithstanding paragraph
  10 of the amended final divorce order, the court found that it was 
  unreasonable to refuse access to plaintiff to allow him to identify items
  that were listed on exhibit V  and awarded to him, and that access to the
  Inn by plaintiff's counsel was insufficient to allow  plaintiff to identify
  his property.   

       On appeal, defendant presents several reasons for her contention that
  the court erred by  holding her in contempt for refusing to allow plaintiff
  into the Inn.  We reach only one of her claims  because we find it
  dispositive.   Defendant contends that she was never served with any
  written order  requiring her to allow plaintiff into the Inn, and that the
  only written order on the subject prohibits  plaintiff from entering her
  premises without her written consent.  The general rule is that "before a 
  person may be held in contempt for violating a court order, the order
  should inform him in definite  terms as to the duties imposed upon him." 
  State v. Pownal Tanning Co., 142 Vt. 601, 605,