Case Title: Warner Jackson v. John T. Benson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-0270 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Warner Jackson, Jennifer Evans, Wendell Harris, 
The Reverend Andrew Kennedy, Rabbi Isaac 
Serotta, Ceil  Ann Libber, Father Thomas J. 
Mueller, Reverend John N. Gregg, Diane Brewer, 
Colleen Beaman, Mary Morris, Penny Morse, 
Kathleen Jones and Philip Jones,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, Department of Public Instruction 
and James E. Doyle,  
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners,  
Marquelle Miller, Cynthia Miller, Angela Gray, 
Zachery Gray, Shon Richardson, George 
Richardson, Latrisha Henry, Faye Henry, Reigne 
Barrett, Valerie Barrett, Candice Williams, 
Senton Williams, Clintrai Giles, Sharon Giles,  
 
Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants, 
Parents For School Choice, Pilar Gonzalez, Dinah 
Cooley, Julie Vogel, Kate Helsper, Blong Yang, 
Gail Crockett, Yolanda Lassiter and Jeanine 
Knox,  
 
Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants-
 
Petitioners. 
__________________________________ 
Milwaukee Teachers' Education Association, by 
its President, M. Charles Howard, Michael 
Lengyel, Donald Lucier, Tracy Adams, Milwaukee 
Public Schools Administrators and Supervisors 
Council, Inc., by its Executive Director, Carl 
A. Gobel, People for the American Way, by its 
Executive Vice President and Legal Director, 
Elliott M. Minceberg, John Drew, Susan Endress, 
Richard Riley, Jeanette Robertson, Vincent Knox, 
Bertha Zamudio, James Johnson, Robert Ullman and 
Sally F. Mills,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, Department of Public Instruction 
and James E. Doyle,  
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Marquelle Miller, Cynthia Miller, Angela Gray, 
Zachery Gray, Shon Richardson, George 
Richardson, Latrisha Henry, Faye Henry, Reigne 
Barrett, Valerie Barrett, Candice Williams, 
Senton Williams, Clintrai Giles, Sharon Giles,  
 
Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants, 
Parents For School Choice, Pilar Gonzalez, Dinah 
Cooley, Julie Vogel, Kate Helsper, Blong Yang, 
Gail Crockett, Yolanda Lassiter and Jeanine 
Knox,  
 
Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants-
 
Petitioners. 
__________________________________ 
National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, Felmers O. Chaney, Lois Parker, 
on behalf of herself and her minor child, 
Rashaan Hobbs, Derrick D. Scott, on behalf of 
himself and his minor children, Deresia C.A. 
Scott and Desmond L.J. Scott, Constance J. 
Cherry, on behalf of herself and her minor 
children, Monique J. Branch, Monica S. Branch, 
and William A. Branch,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction of Wisconsin, in his official 
capacity,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 
213 Wis. 2d 1, 570 N.W.2d 407 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-PUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 10, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 4, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Paul B. Higginbotham 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Bablitch, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J., joins 
 
Not Participating: Bradley, J., did not participate  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners, John 
T. Benson, et al., there were briefs by Edward S. Marion and 
Murphy & Desmond, S.C., Madison  and Kenneth W. Starr, Jay P. 
Lefkowitz, Theodore W. Ullyot and Kirkland & Ellis, Washington, 
D.C., and oral argument by Jay P. Lefkowitz. 
 
 
For the intervenors-defendants-appellants-
petitioners, parents for school choice, et al., there were briefs 
by Steve P. Hurley and Hurley, Burish & Milliken, S.C., Madison; 
William H. Mellor, III, Clint Bolick, Nicole S. Garnett and 
Institute for Justice, Washington, D,C, and Michael D. Dean, 
Waukesha and oral argument by Clint Bolick. 
 
 
For the intervenors-defendants-appellants, 
Marquelle Millter, et al., there were briefs by Kevin Potter and 
Brennan Steil, Madison and Richard P. Hutchison and Landmark 
Legal Foundation, Kansas City, MO and oral argument by Richard P. 
Hutchison. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents, Warner Jackson, 
et al., there was a brief by Jeffrey J. Kassel, Melanie E. Cohen 
and LaFollette & Sinykin, Madison; Peter M. Koneazny and American 
Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation, Inc.,, Milwaukee; 
Steven R. Shapiro and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, 
New York, NY and Steven K. Green and Americans United for 
Separation of Church & State, Washington, D.C., and oral argument 
by Jeffrey J. Kassel. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents, there was a brief 
by Robert H. Chanin, John M. West and Bredhoff & Kaiser, 
P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C.; Richard Perry, Richard Saks and 
Perry, Lerner & Quindel, Milwaukee; Bruce Meredith, Chris Galinat 
and Wisconsin Education Association, Madison; Elliot M. Mincberg, 
Judith Schaeffer, Washington, D.C. and Timothy Hawks and 
Schneidman, Myers, Dowling & Blumenfield, Milwaukee and oral 
argument by Robert H. Chanin. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents, NAACP, et al., 
there was a brief by William H. Lynch and Law Offices of William 
H. Lynch, Milwaukee and James H. Hall, Jr., and Hall, Patterson & 
Charne, Milwaukee and oral argument by James H. Hall, Jr. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by K. Scott Wagner and 
Hale & Lein, S.C., Milwaukee and James C. Geoly, Kevin R. 
Gustafson and Burke, Warren, MacKay & Serritella, P.C., Chicago, 
IL for the Center for Education Reform, American Legislative 
Exchange, CEO America, CEO Central Florida, CEO Connecticut, 
Putting Children First, James Madison Institute for Public Policy 
Studies, Jewish Policy Center, “I Have a Dream” Foundation 
(Washington, D.C. Chapter), Institute for Public Affairs, Liberty 
Counsel, Maine School Choice Coalition, Pennsylvania 
Manufacturers Association, Reach Alliance, Arkansas Policy 
Foundation, North Carolina Education Reform Foundation, Texas 
Justice Foundation, Minnesota Business Partnership, Minnesotans 
for School Choice, Toussaint Institute, South Carolina Policy 
Counsel, and United New Yorkers for Choice in Education. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Ralph I. Thomas, 
Madison; Steven T. McFarland, Kimberlee W. Colby and Christian 
Legal Society, Annandale, VA and of counsel, Thomas C. Berg and 
Cumberland Law School, Birmingham, AL for The Christian Legal 
Society, Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern 
Baptist Convention, Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod and the 
National Association of Evangelicals. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by David R. Riemer, 
Milwaukee for Howard L. Fuller, John O. Norquist, Steven M. Foti, 
Alberta Darling, Margaret A. Farrow, Joseph Leean, John S. 
Gardner, Warren D. Braun, Bruce R. Thompson, Jeanette Mitchell 
and David Lucey. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Daniel Kelly and 
McLario, Helm & Bertling, S.C., Menomonee Falls for the Family 
Research Institute, Christian Defense Fund, Center for Public 
Justice, Family Research Council, Toward Tradition, Liberty 
Counsel and Focus on the Family. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Bradden C. Backer and 
Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Milwaukee and Robert L. Gordon and Weiss, 
Berzowski, Brady & Donahue, Milwaukee for The Milwaukee Jewish 
Council for Community Relations and The Wisconsin Jewish 
Conference. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Marc D. Stern, Lois C. 
Waldmani and American Jewish Congress, New York, NY for the 
American Jewish Congress. 
 
 
 
 
No.  97-0270 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-0270 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Warner Jackson, Jennifer Evans, Wendell  
Harris, The Reverend Andrew Kennedy,  
Rabbi Isaac Serotta, Ceil Ann Libber,  
Father Thomas J. Mueller, Reverend John  
N. Gregg, Diane Brewer, Colleen Beaman,  
Mary Morris, Penny Morse, Kathleen Jones  
and Philip Jones,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public  
Instruction, Department of Public  
Instruction and James E. Doyle,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Marquelle Miller, Cynthia Miller, Angela  
Gray, Zachery Gray, Shon Richardson,  
George Richardson, Latrisha Henry, Faye  
Henry, Reigne Barrett, Valerie Barrett,  
Candice Williams, Senton Williams,  
Clintrai Giles, Sharon Giles,  
 
          Intervenors-Defendants- 
          Appellants, 
 
Parents For School Choice, Pilar  
Gonzalez, Dinah Cooley, Julie Vogel, Kate  
Helsper, Blong Yang, Gail Crockett,  
Yolanda Lassiter and Jeanine Knox,  
 
          Intervenors-Defendants- 
          Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
__________________________________ 
Milwaukee Teachers' Education  
Association, by its President, M. Charles  
FILED 
 
JUN 10, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
No.  97-0270 
 
2 
Howard, Michael Lengyel, Donald Lucier,  
Tracy Adams, Milwaukee Public Schools  
Administrators and Supervisors Council,  
Inc., by its Executive Director, Carl A.  
Gobel, People for the American Way, by  
its Executive Vice President and Legal  
Director, Elliott M. Mincberg, John  
Drew, Susan Endress, Richard Riley,  
Jeanette Robertson, Vincent Knox, Bertha  
Zamudio, James Johnson, Robert Ullman and  
Sally F. Mills,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public  
Instruction, Department of Public  
Instruction and James E. Doyle,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Marquelle Miller, Cynthia Miller, Angela  
Gray, Zachery Gray, Shon Richardson,  
George Richardson, Latrisha Henry, Faye  
Henry, Reigne Barrett, Valerie Barrett,  
Candice Williams, Senton Williams,  
Clintrai Giles, Sharon Giles,  
 
          Intervenors-Defendants- 
          Appellants, 
 
Parents For School Choice, Pilar  
Gonzalez, Dinah Cooley, Julie Vogel, Kate  
Helsper, Blong Yang, Gail Crockett,  
Yolanda Lassiter and Jeanine Knox,  
 
          Intervenors-Defendants- 
          Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
__________________________________ 
National Association for the Advancement  
of Colored People, Felmers O. Chaney,  
Lois Parker, on behalf of herself and her  
minor child, Rashaan Hobbs, Derrick D.  
Scott, on behalf of himself and his minor  
children, Deresia C.A. Scott and Desmond  
L.J. Scott, Constance J. Cherry, on  
behalf of herself and her minor children,  
Monique J. Branch, Monica S. Branch, and  
No.  97-0270 
 
3 
William A. Branch,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public  
Instruction of Wisconsin, in his official  
capacity,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded with directions. 
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.   This case raises a number of 
issues for review:   
(1) Does the amended Milwaukee Parental Choice Program 
(amended MPCP) violate the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution?  Neither the court 
of appeals nor the circuit court reached this issue.  We 
conclude that it does not. 
(2) Does 
the 
amended 
MPCP 
violate 
the 
religious 
establishment provisions of Wisconsin Constitution art. I, § 18? 
In a divided opinion, the court of appeals held that it does.  
We conclude that it does not. 
(3) Is the amended MPCP a private or local bill enacted in 
violation of the procedural requirements mandated by Wis. Const. 
art. IV, § 18?  The court of appeals did not reach this 
question, and the circuit court held it is.  We conclude that it 
is not.   
(4) Does the amended MPCP violate the uniformity provision 
of Wis. Const. art. X, § 3?  The court of appeals did not reach 
this issue, and the circuit court concluded that the amended 
No.  97-0270 
 
4 
MPCP does not violate the uniformity clause.  We also conclude 
that it does not. 
(5) Does the amended MPCP violate Wisconsin's public 
purpose doctrine, which requires that public funds be spent only 
for public purposes?  The court of appeals did not reach this 
issue, and the circuit court concluded that the amended MPCP 
does violate the public purpose doctrine.  We conclude that it 
does not.   
(6) Should children who were eligible for the amended MPCP 
when this court's injunction issued on August 25, 1995, and who 
subsequently enrolled in private schools, be eligible for the 
program if the injunction is lifted?  Neither court below 
addressed this issue.  We conclude that they should. 
¶2 
This case is before the court on petition for review 
of a published decision of the court of appeals, Jackson v. 
Benson, 213 Wis. 2d 1, 570 N.W.2d 407 (Ct. App. 1997).  The 
court of appeals, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed an order of the 
Circuit Court for Dane County, Paul B. Higginbotham, Judge, 
granting the Respondents' motion for summary judgment.  The 
majority of the court of appeals concluded that the Milwaukee 
Parental Choice Program, Wis. Stat. § 119.23, as amended by 1995 
Wis. Act 27, §§ 4002-4009 (amended MPCP), was invalid under 
Article I, § 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution because it directs 
payments of money from the state treasury for the benefit of 
religious seminaries.  The majority of the court of appeals 
declined to decide whether the amended MPCP violates the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment or other provisions 
No.  97-0270 
 
5 
of the Wisconsin Constitution.  In dissent, Judge Roggensack 
concluded that the amended MPCP did not violate either the 
federal or state constitution.  The State appealed from the 
decision of the court of appeals.  We granted the State's 
petition for review and now reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals.  We also conclude that the amended MPCP does not 
violate the Establishment Clause or the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶3 
We 
are 
once 
again 
asked 
to 
review 
the 
constitutionality of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program 
provided in Wis. Stat. § 119.23 (1995-96).1  The Wisconsin 
legislature enacted the original Milwaukee Parental Choice 
Program (original MPCP) in 1989.  See 1989 Wis. Act 336.  As 
amended in 1993, the original MPCP permitted up to 1.5 percent 
of the student membership of the Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) 
to attend at no cost to the student any private nonsectarian 
school located in the City of Milwaukee, subject to certain 
eligibility requirements. 
¶4 
Under the original MPCP, the legislature limited the 
students eligible for participation in the original program.  To 
be eligible for the original MPCP, a student (1) had to be a 
student in kindergarten through twelfth grade; (2) had to be 
from a family whose income did not exceed 1.75 times the federal 
poverty level; and (3) had to be either enrolled in a public 
school in Milwaukee, attending a private school under this 
                     
1 Unless otherwise stated, all references to Wis. Stats. are 
to the 1995-96 version of the statutes.  
No.  97-0270 
 
6 
program, or not enrolled in school during the previous year.  
See Wis. Stat. § 119.23(2)(a)(1)-(2)(1993-94). 
¶5 
The legislature also placed a variety of qualification 
and reporting requirements on private schools choosing to 
participate in the original MPCP.  To be eligible to participate 
in the original MPCP, a private school had to comply with the 
anti-discrimination provisions imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000d2 and 
all health and safety laws or codes that apply to Wisconsin 
public schools. See id. at § 119.23(2)(a)(4)-(5). The school 
additionally had to meet on an annual basis defined performance 
criteria and had to submit to the State certain financial and 
performance audits.  See id. at § 119.23(7), (9). 
¶6 
Under the original MPCP, the State Superintendent of 
Public 
Instruction 
was 
required 
to 
perform 
a 
number 
of 
supervisory and reporting tasks.  The legislature required the 
State Superintendent to submit an annual report regarding 
student 
achievement, 
attendance, 
discipline, 
and 
parental 
involvement for students in the program compared to students 
enrolled in MPS in general.  See id. at § 119.23(5)(d).  The 
original MPCP further required the State Superintendent to 
monitor the performance of students participating in the 
program, and it empowered him or her to conduct one or more 
                     
2  42 U.S.C. § 2000d provides: "No person in the United 
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, 
be excluded from participating in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance." 
No.  97-0270 
 
7 
financial and performance audits of the program.  See id. at 
§ 119.23(7)(b), (9)(a). 
¶7 
Under the original MPCP, the State provided public 
funds directly to participating private schools.  For each 
student attending a private school under the program, the State 
paid to each participating private school an amount equal to the 
state aid per student to which MPS would have been entitled 
under state aid distribution formulas.  See id. at § 119.23(4). 
 In the 1994-95 school year, this amount was approximately 
$2,500 per participating student.  The amount of state aid MPS 
received each year was reduced by the amount the State paid to 
private schools participating in the original program.  See id. 
at § 119.23(5)(a). 
¶8 
The 
original 
MPCP 
withstood 
a 
number 
of 
state 
constitutional challenges in Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 
480 N.W.2d 460 (1992).  In Davis, this court first held that the 
original program, when enacted, was not a private or local bill 
and therefore was not subject to the prohibitions of Wis. Const. 
art. IV, § 18.  See id. at 537.  The court then held that the 
program did not violate the uniformity clause in Wis. Const. 
art. X, § 3 because the private schools did not constitute 
"district schools" simply by participating in the program.  See 
id. at 540.  The court finally held that the program, although 
it applied only to MPS, served a sufficient public purpose and 
therefore did not violate the public purpose doctrine.  See id. 
at 546. 
No.  97-0270 
 
8 
¶9 
During the 1994-95 school year, approximately 800 
students attended approximately 12 nonsectarian private schools 
under the original program.  For the 1995-96 school year, the 
number of participating students increased to approximately 
1,600 and the number of participating nonsectarian private 
schools increased to 17. 
¶10 In 1995, as part of the biennial budget bill, the 
legislature amended in a number of ways the original MPCP.  See 
1995 Wis. Act 27, §§ 4002-4009.  First, the legislature removed 
from Wis. Stat. § 119.23(2)(a) the limitation that participating 
private schools be "nonsectarian."  See 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 
4002.  Second, the legislature increased to 15 percent in the 
1996-97 school year the total percentage of MPS membership 
allowed to participate in the program.  See id. at § 4003.  
Third, the legislature deleted the requirement that the State 
Superintendent conduct annual performance evaluations and report 
to the legislature, and it eliminated the Superintendent's 
authority to conduct financial or performance evaluation audits 
of the program.  See id. at §§ 4007m and 4008m. 
¶11 Fourth, the legislature amended the original MPCP so 
that the State, rather than paying participating schools 
directly, is required to pay the aid to each participating 
student's parent or guardian.  Under the amended MPCP, the State 
shall "send the check to the private school," and the parent or 
guardian shall "restrictively endorse the check for the use of 
the private school."  Id. at § 4006m.  Fifth, the amended MPCP 
places an additional limitation on the amount the State will pay 
No.  97-0270 
 
9 
to each parent or guardian.  Under the amended MPCP, the State 
will pay the lesser of the MPS per student state aid under Wis. 
Stat. § 121.08 or the private school's "operating and debt 
service 
cost 
per 
pupil 
that 
is 
related 
to 
educational 
programming" as determined by the State.  See id.  The amended 
MPCP does not restrict the uses to which the private schools can 
put the state aid.  Sixth, the legislature repealed the 
limitation that no more than 65 percent of a private school's 
enrollment consist of program participants.  See id. at § 4003. 
 Finally, 
the 
legislature 
added 
an 
"opt-out" 
provision 
prohibiting a private school from requiring "a student attending 
the private school under this section to participate in any 
religious activity if the pupil's parent or guardian submits to 
the teacher or the private school's principal a written request 
that the pupil be exempt from such activities."  Id. at § 4008e.3 
¶12 The Respondents, Warner Jackson, et al. and Milwaukee 
Teachers Education Association (MTEA), et al. filed two original 
actions in August 1995.  Together the lawsuits challenged the 
amended MPCP under the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment; Wis. Const. art. I, § 18; art. X, § 3; art. IV, § 18; 
and the Wisconsin public purpose doctrine.  On August 15, 1996, 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) filed a separate lawsuit, alleging the same claims as 
                     
3 The expansion of the program was set to commence in the 
1995-96 school year.  By the time of the injunction, more than 
4,000 children previously enrolled in Milwaukee Public Schools 
(MPS) had applied and over 3,400 had been admitted to private 
schools under the amended choice program.    
No.  97-0270 
 
10
the first two lawsuits and adding a claim that, on its face, the 
amended MPCP violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Wis. Const. art. I, § 1.  The NAACP 
then filed a motion to consolidate the lawsuits.  The circuit 
court consolidated the cases, but bifurcated the proceedings so 
that the equal protection claims would be heard only if the 
amended MPCP was upheld. 
¶13 The State filed, under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.70, a 
petition for leave to commence an original action, seeking from 
this 
court 
a 
declaration 
that 
the 
amended 
MPCP 
was 
constitutional.  This court accepted original jurisdiction and 
entered a preliminary injunction staying the implementation of 
the amended program, specifying that the pre-1995 provisions of 
the original program were unaffected.  Following oral argument, 
this court split three-to-three on the constitutional issues, 
dismissed the petition, and effectively remanded the case to the 
circuit court for further proceedings.  See State ex rel. 
Thompson v. Jackson, 199 Wis. 2d 714, 720, 546 N.W.2d 140 
(1996)(per curiam). 
¶14 Following remand, the circuit court partially lifted 
the preliminary injunction, thereby allowing the State to 
implement all of the 1995 amendments except the amendment 
allowing participation by sectarian private schools.  In January 
1997, the circuit court granted the Plaintiffs' motions for 
summary 
judgment, 
denied 
the 
State's 
motion 
for 
summary 
judgment, and invalidated the amendments to the MCPC.  The 
circuit court held that the amended MPCP violates the religious 
No.  97-0270 
 
11
benefits and compelled support clauses of Wis. Const. art. I, § 
18, the public or local bill prohibitions of Wis. Const. art. 
IV, § 18, and the public purpose doctrine as the program applied 
to sectarian schools.  The circuit court also found that the 
amended program did not violate the uniformity clause in Wis. 
Const. art. X, § 3 or the public purpose doctrine as it applied 
to the nonsectarian private schools.  Because the circuit court 
invalidated the amended MPCP on state constitutional grounds, 
the court did not address the question whether the program 
violates the Establishment Clause.  The State appealed from the 
circuit court's order, and the court of appeals, with Judge 
Roggensack dissenting, affirmed. 
¶15 A majority of the court of appeals held that the 
amended MPCP violates the prohibition against state expenditures 
for the benefit of religious societies or seminaries contained 
in Wis. Const. art. I, § 18.  The court of appeals, therefore, 
struck the amended MPCP in its entirety and found it unnecessary 
to reach the other state and the federal constitutional issues. 
 The State appealed to this court, and we granted the State's 
petition for review. 
¶16 In the circuit court, the Respondents challenged the 
amended MPCP under the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment; Wis. Const. art. I, § 18; art. X, § 3; art. IV, § 18; 
and the Wisconsin public purpose doctrine.  We address each 
issue in turn. 
¶17 Before we begin our analysis of the amended MPCP, we 
pause to clarify the issues not before this court.  In their 
No.  97-0270 
 
12
briefs and at oral argument, the parties presented information 
and testimony expressing positions pro and con bearing on the 
merits of this type of school choice program.  This debate 
largely concerns the wisdom of the amended MPCP, its efficiency 
from 
an 
educational 
point 
of 
view, 
and 
the 
political 
considerations which motivated its adoption.  We do not stop to 
summarize these arguments, nor to burden this opinion with an 
analysis of them, for they involve considerations not germane to 
the narrow constitutional issues presented in this case.  In the 
absence of a constitutional violation, the desirability and 
efficacy of school choice are matters to be resolved through the 
political process.  This program may be wise or unwise, 
provident or improvident from an educational or public policy 
viewpoint.  Our individual preferences, however, are not the 
constitutional standard. 
Standard of Review 
¶18 Procedurally, this case is before the court pursuant 
to the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the 
Plaintiffs-Respondents.  We independently review a grant of 
summary judgment, see Burkes v. Klauser, 185 Wis. 2d 308, 327, 
517 N.W.2d 503 (1994), applying the same methodology as that 
used by the circuit court.  See, e.g., Kafka v. Pope, 194 Wis. 
2d 234, 240, 533 N.W.2d 491 (1995); Voss v. City of Middleton, 
162 Wis. 2d 737, 748, 470 N.W.2d 625 (1991).  A motion for 
summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  The underlying 
No.  97-0270 
 
13
issue in this case is the constitutionality of the amended MPCP. 
 The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law which 
we review independently, without giving deference to the 
decisions of the circuit court and the court of appeals.  See 
State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 301, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995); 
State v. Migliorino, 150 Wis. 2d 513, 524, 442 N.W.2d 36 (1989). 
¶19 Like any other duly enacted statute, the amended MPCP 
enjoys 
a 
strong 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality. 
 
All 
legislative 
acts 
are 
presumed 
constitutional, 
and 
every 
presumption must be indulged to sustain the law.  See State v. 
Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 824, 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995); State ex 
rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 47, 205 
N.W.2d 784 (1973).  Accordingly, "[it] is not enough that 
respondent[s] establish doubt as to the act's constitutionality 
nor 
is 
it 
sufficient 
that 
respondent[s] 
establish 
the 
unconstitutionality 
of 
the 
act 
as 
a 
probability.  
Unconstitutionality of the act must be demonstrated beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  La Plante, 58 Wis. 2d at 46; see also State 
v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 129, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989); Quinn 
v. Town of Dodgeville, 122 Wis. 2d 570, 577, 364 N.W.2d 149 
(1985). 
I. Establishment Clause 
¶20 The first issue we address is whether the amended MPCP 
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  Neither the circuit court nor the 
court of appeals reached this issue.  Upon review we conclude 
that the amended MPCP does not violate the Establishment Clause 
No.  97-0270 
 
14
because it has a secular purpose, it will not have the primary 
effect of advancing religion, and it will not lead to excessive 
entanglement between the State and participating sectarian 
private schools.4 
¶21 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof."  This mandate applies equally to state legislatures by 
virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Holy 
Trinity Community Sch. v. Kahl, 82 Wis. 2d 139, 150, 262 N.W.2d 
                     
4 Citing the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the Petitioners 
argue that since the Respondents challenge the amended Milwaukee 
Parental Choice Program (MPCP) as facially unconstitutional, as 
opposed to unconstitutional as applied to a set of particular 
facts, the Respondents' federal claims must fail unless they can 
show 
that 
under 
all 
circumstances 
the 
amended 
MPCP 
is 
unconstitutional.  In Salerno, the Court noted that to succeed 
with a facial challenge, a party must "establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid." 
 Id. at 745. The Court has not directly held that the Salerno 
standard 
applies 
to 
facial 
challenges 
raised 
under 
the 
Establishment Clause.  Nor has the  Court consistently applied 
the Salerno standard in other contexts.  See Janklow v. Planned 
Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175-76 n.1 
(1996)(Mem.)(citing cases in which Court did not apply Salerno 
language).  In Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), decided 
just one year after Salerno, the Court considered a facial 
challenge 
to 
the 
Adolescent 
Family 
Life 
Act 
under 
the 
Establishment Clause.  Although it upheld the federal program, 
the Bowen Court did not cite to or apply the "no set of 
circumstances" language from Salerno.  See id. at 627 n.1 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).  We decline to apply the Salerno 
standard here.  We leave to the Court the decision whether to 
apply the Salerno standard to facial challenges raised under the 
Establishment Clause. 
No.  97-0270 
 
15
210 (1978).  The Establishment Clause, therefore, prohibits 
state governments from passing laws which have either the 
purpose or effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.  See 
Agostini v. Felton, __ U.S. __, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2010 (1997). 
¶22 When assessing any First Amendment challenge to a 
state statute, we are bound by the results and interpretations 
given that amendment by the decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court.  See State ex rel. Holt v. Thompson, 66 Wis. 2d 
659, 663, 225 N.W.2d 678 (1975).  "Ours [is] not to reason why; 
ours [is] but to review and apply."  State ex rel. Warren v. 
Nusbaum, (Nusbaum I), 55 Wis. 2d 316, 322, 198 N.W.2d 650 
(1972).  Our limited role is not aided by the Supreme Court's 
candid admission that in applying the Establishment Clause, it 
has "sacrifice[d] clarity and predictability for flexibility."  
Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 
U.S. 646, 662 (1980).  
¶23 The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the 
Establishment Clause raises difficult issues of interpretation, 
and cases arising under it "have presented some of the most 
perplexing questions to come before [the] Court."  Committee for 
Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 
(1973);  see, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 392 (1983); 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).  We are therefore 
cognizant of the Court's warnings that: 
 
There are always risks in treating criteria 
discussed by the Court from time to time as 'tests' in 
any 
limiting 
sense 
of 
that 
term. Constitutional 
adjudication does not lend itself to the absolutes of 
No.  97-0270 
 
16
the physical sciences or mathematics . . .  [C]andor 
compels the acknowledgment that we can only dimly 
perceive the boundaries of permissible government 
activity in this sensitive area of constitutional 
adjudication. 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971); see also 
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 393; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
¶24 In an attempt to focus on the three main evils from 
which 
the 
Establishment 
Clause 
was 
intended 
to 
afford 
protection: 
sponsorship, 
financial 
support, 
and 
active 
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity, see Walz v. 
Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970), the Court has 
promulgated a three-pronged test to determine whether a statute 
complies with the Establishment Clause.  See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 
612.  Under this test, a statute does not violate the 
Establishment Clause if (1) it has a secular legislative 
purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect neither advances 
nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not create excessive 
entanglement between government and religion.  See id. at 612-
No.  97-0270 
 
17
13.  We must apply this three-part test to determine the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 119.23.5 
a. 
First Prong - Secular Purpose 
¶25 Under the first prong of the Lemon test, we examine 
whether the purpose of the state legislation is secular in 
nature.  Our analysis of the amended MPCP under this prong of 
the 
Lemon 
test 
is 
straightforward. 
 
Courts 
have 
been 
"reluctan[t] to attribute 
unconstitutional 
motives to the 
states, particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the 
state's program may be discerned from the face of the statute." 
 Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394-95. 
¶26 As the court of appeals recognized, the secular 
purpose of the amended MPCP, as in many Establishment Clause 
cases, is virtually conceded.  See Jackson, 213 Wis. 2d at 29.  
The purpose of the program is to provide low-income parents with 
an opportunity to have their children educated outside of the 
embattled Milwaukee Public School system.  The propriety of 
                     
5 While the continued authority of the test established in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), is uncertain, we have no 
choice but to apply it in this case.  We recognize that five 
current United States Supreme Court Justices have questioned the 
continued use of the Lemon test.  See Lamb's Chapel v. Center 
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)(Scalia, 
J., concurring).  Until a majority of the Supreme Court directly 
holds otherwise, however, we continue to apply the Lemon test.  
See Agostini v. Felton, __ U.S. __, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2017 
(1997)(stating that other courts should leave to the Supreme 
Court "the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.").  
Unlike the Supreme Court, we cannot command this "ghoul" to 
return to its tomb when we wish it to do so.  See Lamb's Chapel, 
508 U.S. at 398-99 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
No.  97-0270 
 
18
providing 
educational 
opportunities 
for 
children 
of 
poor 
families in the state goes without question: 
 
A 
State's 
decision 
to 
defray 
the 
cost 
of 
educational expenses incurred by parents—regardless of 
the type of schools their children attend—evidences a 
purpose that is both secular and understandable.  An 
educated populace is essential to the political and 
economic health of any community, and a State's 
efforts to assist parents in meeting the rising cost 
of educational expenses plainly serves this secular 
purpose of ensuring that the State's citizenry is 
well-educated.   
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 395.  The propriety of such legislative 
purpose, however, does not immunize the amended MPCP from 
further constitutional challenge.  See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773-
74.  If the amended MPCP either has a primary effect that 
advances religion or if it fosters excessive entanglements 
between church and state, then the program is constitutionally 
infirm and must be struck down.  See id. at 774. 
b. 
Second Prong - Primary Effect of Advancing Religion 
¶27 Analysis of the amended program under the second prong 
of the Lemon test is more difficult.  While the first prong of 
Lemon examines the legislative purpose of the challenged 
statute, the second prong focuses on its likely effect.  A law 
violates the Establishment Clause if its principal or primary 
effect either advances or inhibits religion.  See Lemon, 403 
U.S. at 612; see also Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2010; Mueller, 463 
U.S. at 396. 
¶28 This does not mean that the Establishment Clause is 
violated every time money previously in the possession of a 
No.  97-0270 
 
19
state is conveyed to a religious institution.  See Witters v. 
Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486 
(1986).  "The simplistic argument that every form of financial 
aid to church-sponsored activity violates the Religion Clauses 
was rejected long ago . . . ."  Tilton, 403 U.S. at 679; see 
Nusbaum I, 55 Wis. 2d at 321 n.4.  The constitutional standard 
is the separation of church and state.  See Zorach v. Clauson 
343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).  "The problem, like many problems in 
constitutional law, is one of degree."  Id.  
¶29 We begin our analysis under the second prong of the 
Lemon 
test 
by 
first 
considering 
the 
cumulative 
criteria 
developed over the years and applying to a wide range of 
educational assistance programs challenged as violative of the 
Establishment Clause.  See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 677-78.  Although 
the lines with which the Court has sketched the broad contours 
of this inquiry are fine and not absolutely straight, the 
Court's decisions generally can be distilled to establish an 
No.  97-0270 
 
20
underlying theory based on neutrality6 and indirection:7 state 
programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational 
assistance directly to citizens in a class defined without 
reference to religion do not have the primary effect of 
advancing religion.  The Court has explained: 
 
Given that a contrary rule would lead to such absurd 
results, we have consistently held that government 
programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad 
class 
of 
citizens 
defined 
without 
reference 
to 
religion are not readily subject to an Establishment 
                     
6 The Supreme Court has historically looked to whether a 
program 
is 
neutral 
toward 
religion 
in 
defining 
its 
beneficiaries. See, e.g., Bowen, 487 U.S. 589 (rejecting 
challenge to federal program neutrally providing public funds to 
sectarian or purely secular institutions for services relating 
to adolescent sexuality and pregnancy to institutions); Roemer 
v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976)(upholding 
Maryland statute that provided annual subsidies directly to 
qualifying colleges and universities in the state, including 
religiously affiliated institutions; Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 
734 
(1973)(rejecting 
challenge 
to 
South 
Carolina 
statute 
providing certain benefits to all institutions of higher 
education in South Carolina, whether or not having a religious 
affiliation); 
Tilton 
v. 
Richardson, 
403 
U.S. 
672 
(1971)(approving Federal Higher Educational Facilities Act, 
providing grants to "all colleges and universities regardless of 
any affiliation with or sponsorship by a religious body); Board 
of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)(upholding state 
provision of secular textbooks for both public and private 
schools); 
Everson 
v. 
Board 
of 
Education, 
330 
U.S. 
1 
(1947)(approving busing services equally available to both 
public and private school children). 
7 The Court has also focused on whether public aid that 
flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of 
"genuinely 
independent 
and 
private 
choices 
of 
the 
aid 
recipients." Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for Blind, 
474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986); see, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and 
Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 842-43 (1995); 
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398 (1983); Allen, 392 U.S. at 
243-44; Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18.  
No.  97-0270 
 
21
Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions 
may also receive an attenuated financial benefit. 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993). 
¶30 The Court's general principle under the Establishment 
Clause has, since its decision in Everson, been one of 
neutrality and indirection.8  Writing for the majority in 
Everson, Justice Black set out the view of the Establishment 
Clause that still guides the Court's thinking today.  The 
Everson Court explained that "the clause against establishment 
of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation 
between Church and State.'"  Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (quoting 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).  The Court 
tempered 
its 
statement, 
however, 
by 
cautioning 
that 
in 
maintaining this wall of separation, courts must "be sure that 
[they] do not inadvertently prohibit [the government] from 
                     
8 The concept of neutrality has developed as a necessary 
result of the interplay between the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, "both of which are cast 
in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical 
extreme, would clash with the other."  Walz v. Tax Commission, 
397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).  The Court in Walz explained: 
The 
general 
principle 
deducible 
from 
the 
First 
Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is 
this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally 
established religion or governmental interference with 
religion. 
 
Short 
of 
those 
expressly 
proscribed 
governmental acts there is room for play in the joints 
productive of a benevolent neutrality which will 
permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship 
and without interference. 
 
Id. at 669. 
 
 
No.  97-0270 
 
22
extending its general State law benefits to all its citizens 
without regard to their religious belief."  Id. at 16.  Under 
this reasoning, the Court held that the Establishment Clause 
does not prohibit New Jersey from spending tax-raised funds to 
reimburse parents directly for the bus fares of parochial school 
pupils as a part of a general program under which the State pays 
the fares of pupils attending public and other schools.  See id. 
at 17. 
¶31 In Nyquist, the Court struck down on Establishment 
Clause grounds a New York program that, inter alia, provided 
tuition grants to parents of children attending private schools. 
 Under the program, New York sought to assure that participating 
parents would continue to send their children to religion-
oriented schools by relieving their financial burdens.  See 
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783.  Before striking the tuition grants, 
the Court distinguished on two grounds the New York statute from 
the New Jersey statute reviewed in Everson: (1) unlike the 
statute in Everson, the New York statute was non-neutral because 
it provided benefits solely to private schools and parents with 
children in private schools, see id. at 782 n.38; and (2) the 
New York statute provided financial assistance rather than bus 
rides, see id. at 781-82.  The Court concluded that the fact 
that aid was distributed directly to parents rather than the 
schools, although a factor in its analysis, did not save the 
statute 
because 
the 
effect 
of 
New 
York's 
program 
was 
"unmistakably 
to 
provide 
desired 
financial 
support 
for 
nonpublic, sectarian institutions."  Id. at 783. 
No.  97-0270 
 
23
¶32 Significant to the case now before us, however, the 
Court in Nyquist specifically reserved the issue whether an 
educational assistance program that was both neutral and 
indirect would survive an Establishment Clause challenge: 
 
Because of the manner in which we have resolved the 
tuition grant issue, we need not decide whether the 
significantly religious character of the statute's 
beneficiaries might differentiate the present cases 
from a case involving some form of public assistance 
(e.g., scholarships) made available generally without 
regard 
to 
the 
sectarian-nonsectarian, 
or 
public-
nonpublic nature of the institution benefited. 
Id. at 782 n.38.  In cases following its decision in Nyquist, 
the Court has piecemeal answered this question as it has arisen 
in varying fact situations.  See, e.g., Mueller, 463 U.S. 388; 
Witters, 474 U.S. 481; Zobrest, 509 U.S. 1; Rosenberger v. 
Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819; 
Agostini, 117 S. Ct. 1997.9 
                     
9 We reject the Respondents' argument that this case is 
controlled by Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist, 
413 
U.S. 
756 
(1973). 
 
Although 
the 
tuition 
reimbursement program in Nyquist closely parallels the amended 
MPCP, there are significant distinctions.  In Nyquist, each of 
the facets of the challenged program directed aid exclusively to 
private schools and their students.  The MPCP, by contrast, 
provides a neutral benefit to qualifying parents of school-age 
children in Milwaukee Public Schools.  Unlike the program in 
Nyquist, 
the 
only 
financially-qualified 
Milwaukee 
students 
excluded from participation in the amended MPCP are those in the 
fourth grade or higher who are already attending private 
schools.  The amended MPCP, viewed in its surrounding context, 
merely adds religious schools to a range of pre-existing 
educational choices available to MPS children.  This seminal 
fact takes the amended MPCP out of the Nyquist construct and 
places it within the framework of neutral education assistance 
programs.  
No.  97-0270 
 
24
¶33 In Mueller, the Court rejected an Establishment Clause 
challenge to a Minnesota statute allowing taxpayers to deduct 
certain educational expenses in computing their state income 
tax, even though a majority of those deductions went to parents 
whose children attended sectarian schools.  See Mueller, 463 
U.S. 
at 
401-02.  
"Two 
factors, 
aside from 
the States' 
traditionally broad taxing authority, informed [the Mueller 
Court's] decision."  Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 9.  First, the Court 
noted that, unlike the statute in Nyquist, the Minnesota law 
"permits all parents—whether their children attend public school 
or private—to deduct their children's educational expenses."  
Mueller, 436 U.S. at 398.  Second, the Court emphasized that 
under Minnesota's tax deduction scheme, public funds become 
available to sectarian schools "only as a result of numerous 
private choices of individual parents of school-age children," 
thus distinguishing Mueller from other cases involving "the 
direct transmission of assistance from the state to the schools 
themselves."  Id. at 399.  The Court concluded: 
 
The historic purposes of the clause simply do not 
encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit, 
ultimately 
controlled 
by 
the private 
choices of 
individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial 
schools from the neutrally available tax benefit at 
issue in this case. 
Id. at 400.  Mueller makes clear that "state programs that are 
wholly neutral in offering educational assistance to a class 
defined without reference to religion do not violate the second 
part of the [Lemon] test, because any aid to religion results 
from the private choices of individual beneficiaries."  Witters, 
No.  97-0270 
 
25
474 
U.S. 
at 
490-91 
(Powell, 
J. 
concurring)(footnote 
and 
citations omitted).10 
¶34 The Court reaffirmed the dual importance of neutrality 
and indirect aid in Witters. See Witters, 474 U.S. 481.  In 
Witters, the Court unanimously held that the Establishment 
Clause did not bar a state from issuing a vocational tuition 
grant to a blind person who intended to use the grant to attend 
a Christian college and become a pastor, missionary, or youth 
director.11  The Court focused first on the program's indirect 
aid, finding that because the aid was paid to the student rather 
than the institution "[a]ny aid provided under Washington's 
program that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so 
only as a result of genuinely independent and private choices of 
aid recipients."  Id. at 487. 
                     
10 As to its discussion of the importance of Mueller, 463 
U.S. 
388, 
in 
Establishment 
Clause 
jurisprudence, 
Justice 
Powell's concurring opinion in Witters, 474 U.S. at 490-91, drew 
the support of five members of the Court.  Chief Justice Burger 
and Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Powell's concurrence, while 
Justices White and O'Connor wrote separately, but agreed with 
Justice Powell's opinion with respect to the relevance of 
Mueller.  See Witters, 474 U.S. at 490 (White, J. concurring); 
id. at 493 (O'Connor, J. concurring). 
11 On its face, the Washington educational aid program 
upheld in Witters was in all significant aspects similar to the 
amended MPCP.  The public aid was in the form of tuition grants 
and was made available to disadvantaged students generally 
without 
regard 
to 
the 
sectarian-nonsectarian, 
or 
public-
nonpublic nature of the institution benefited, see Witters, 474 
U.S. at 488; student eligibility for the aid was based on 
nonsectarian criteria, see id. at 482 n.2, and the aid was paid 
directly to the student who then could transmit it to the school 
of his or her choice, see id. at 488. 
No.  97-0270 
 
26
¶35 As in Mueller, the Witters Court then emphasized the 
neutrality of the program, finding that "Washington's program is 
'made available generally without regard to the sectarian-
nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution 
benefited,'" and therefore "creates no financial incentive for 
students to undertake sectarian education."  Id. at 487-88 
(quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782-83 n.38).  In light of these 
factors,12 the Court held that Washington's program—even as 
applied to a student who sought state assistance so that he 
could become a pastor—would not advance religion in a manner 
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.13  See id. at 489. 
                     
12 The Court in Witters further distinguished the Washington 
program from the tuition grants in Nyquist by noting that in 
application no "significant portion of the aid expended under 
the Washington program as a whole will end up flowing to 
religious education."  Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.  The Court's 
consideration of the percentage of students who would likely 
transmit program aid to sectarian institutions is inconsistent 
with its prior decision in Mueller, where the Court specifically 
rejected any statistical analysis showing that in application 
parents of children in sectarian private schools would take the 
bulk of the benefits available under the program.  See Mueller, 
463 U.S. at 401.  The Mueller Court explained: "We would be 
loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a 
facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to 
which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under 
the law."  Id.  The Court recently reaffirmed the position it 
took in Mueller.  See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2013. 
13 In Witters, the Court limited its analysis to the first 
two prongs of the Lemon test.  The Court held that the 
Washington program had a secular purpose and that it did not 
have the primary effect of advancing religion.  See Witters, 474 
U.S. at 485-86, 488-89.  The Court declined to address the 
entanglement issue and remanded the case for further analysis.  
See id. at 489 n.5, 490.  
No.  97-0270 
 
27
¶36 The Supreme Court applied the same logic in Zobrest, 
where it held that the Establishment Clause did not prohibit a 
school district from providing to a deaf student a sign-language 
 interpreter under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (IDEA), even though the interpreter would be a mouthpiece 
for religious instruction.  See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13-14.  The 
Zobrest Court, basing its reasoning upon Mueller and Witters, 
again looked to neutrality and indirection as its guiding 
principles.  Specifically focusing on the general availability 
of the statute, the Court found that the "service at issue in 
this case is part of a general government program that 
distributes benefits neutrally to any child . . . without regard 
to the . . . 'nature' of the school the child attends."  Id. at 
10. 
¶37 The Zobrest Court then looked to whether the aid was 
direct or indirect, explaining that "[b]y according parents 
freedom to select a school of their choice, the statute ensures 
that a government-paid interpreter will be present in a 
sectarian school only as result of the private decision of 
individual parents."  Id.  Based on these two findings, the 
Court concluded: "When the government offers a neutral service 
on the premises of a sectarian school as part of a general 
program that 'is in no way skewed towards religion,' it follows 
under our prior decisions that provision of that service does 
not offend the Establishment Clause."  Id. (quoting Witters, 474 
U.S. at 488). 
No.  97-0270 
 
28
¶38 In Rosenberger, the Supreme Court held that the 
Establishment Clause did not prohibit the university from 
funding a student organization, which otherwise would have been 
entitled to publication funds, merely because it published a 
newspaper with a Christian point of view.  The Court clarified 
that the critical aspect of the analysis was whether the state 
conferred a benefit which neither inhibited nor promoted 
religion.  See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839.  As long as the 
benefit was neutral with respect to religion, what the student 
did with that benefit, even if it was to spend all of it on 
religion-related expenditures, was irrelevant for purposes of 
analyzing whether the law or policy violated the Establishment 
Clause.  Id. at 842-43. 
¶39 Finally, in Agostini, the Supreme Court held that a 
federally 
funded 
program 
providing 
supplemental, 
remedial 
instruction on a neutral basis to disadvantaged children at 
sectarian schools is not invalid under the Establishment Clause 
when sufficient safeguards exist.14  See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 
2016.  The Court explained that while the general principles 
used to evaluate Establishment Clause cases have remained 
                     
14 Unlike the amended MPCP, the education assistance program 
reviewed in Agostini was federally funded under Title I of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 
et seq.  See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003.  The program, 
however, was designed and implemented by a local educational 
agency, the Board of Education of the City of New York.  See id. 
at 2003-05.  Although New York City's Title I program was 
federally funded, we find the Agostini Court's analysis of that 
program relevant to our review of the State funded amended MPCP. 
No.  97-0270 
 
29
unchanged, the Court's "understanding of the criteria used to 
assess" the inquiry has changed in recent years.  Id. at 2010.15 
 The Court reiterated that the unchanged principle under the 
Establishment Clause remains neutrality, and that the Court will 
continue to ask whether the government acts with the purpose or 
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.  See id.  Writing 
for the Court, Justice O'Connor set out three criteria the Court 
has in recent years used to evaluate whether an impermissible 
effect exists.  The aid must "not result in governmental 
indoctrination; define its recipients by reference to religion; 
or create an excessive entanglement."  Id. at 2016. 
¶40 After considering these three criteria, the Court held 
that the program did not have the primary effect of advancing 
religion.  The Court first concluded that placing full-time 
employees on parochial school campuses under this program did 
not result in advancing religion through indoctrination.  See 
id. at 2014.  The Court then considered whether the criteria by 
which the program identified beneficiaries created a financial 
incentive to undertake religious indoctrination.  The Court, 
synthesizing 
the 
central 
establishment 
clause 
principle, 
concluded that no such incentive existed under the program: 
"[t]his incentive is not present, however, where the aid is 
allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither 
                     
15 In upholding New York City's Title I program, the Supreme 
Court in Agostini directly overruled its decision in Aguilar v. 
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), as well as a portion of its 
decision in School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 
(1985).   
No.  97-0270 
 
30
favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both 
religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory 
basis."  Id.  The Court also concluded that the federal program 
did not result in an excessive entanglement between church and 
state.  See id. at 2015-16. 
¶41 The Supreme Court, in cases culminating in Agostini, 
has established the general principle that state educational 
assistance programs do not have the primary effect of advancing 
religion if those programs provide public aid to both sectarian 
and nonsectarian institutions (1) on the basis of neutral, 
secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion; and 
(2) only as a result of numerous private choices of the 
individual parents of school-age children.  The amended MPCP is 
precisely such a program.  Applying to the amended MPCP the 
criteria the Court has developed from Everson to Agostini, we 
conclude that the program does not have the primary effect of 
advancing religion. 
¶42 First, eligibility for benefits under the amended MPCP 
is determined by "neutral, secular criteria that neither favor 
nor disfavor religion," and aid "is made available to both 
religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory 
basis."  Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2014.  Pupils are eligible 
under the amended MPCP if they reside in Milwaukee, attend 
public schools (or private schools in grades K-3) and meet 
certain income requirements.  Beneficiaries are then selected on 
a random basis from all those pupils who apply and meet these 
religious-neutral criteria.  Participating private schools are 
No.  97-0270 
 
31
also selected on a religious-neutral basis and may be sectarian 
or nonsectarian.  The participating private schools must select 
on a random basis the students attending their schools under the 
amended program, except that they may give preference to 
siblings already accepted in the school.  In addition, under the 
new "opt-out" provision, the private schools cannot require the 
students participating in the program to participate in any 
religious activity provided at that school. 
¶43 Under the amended MPCP, beneficiaries are eligible for 
an equal share of per pupil public aid regardless of the school 
they choose to attend.  To those eligible pupils and parents who 
participate, the amended MPCP provides a religious-neutral 
benefit—the opportunity "to choose the educational opportunities 
that they deem best for their children."  Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 
532.  The amended MPCP, in conjunction with existing state 
educational programs, gives participating parents the choice to 
send their children to a neighborhood public school, a different 
public school within the district, a specialized public school, 
No.  97-0270 
 
32
a private nonsectarian school, or a private sectarian school.16  
As a result, the amended program is in no way "skewed towards 
religion."  Witters, 474 U.S. at 488. 
¶44 The amended MPCP therefore satisfies the principle of 
neutrality required by the Establishment Clause. As Justice 
Jackson explained in Everson: 
 
A policeman protects a Catholic, of course—but not 
because he is a Catholic; it is because he . . . is a 
member of our society.  The fireman protects the 
Church school—but not because it is a Church school; 
it is because it is property, part of the assets of 
our society.  Neither the fireman nor the policeman 
has to ask before he renders aid 'Is this man or 
building identified with the Catholic Church.'  
Everson, 330 U.S. at 25 (Jackson, J., dissenting).  The amended 
MPCP works in much the same way.  A student qualifies for 
benefits under the amended MPCP not because he or she is a 
Catholic, a Jew, a Moslem, or an atheist; it is because he or 
she is from a poor family and is a student in the embattled 
                     
16 Our inquiry into the constitutionality of the amended 
MPCP must encompass "the nature and consequences of the program 
viewed as a whole."  Witters, 474 U.S. at 492 (Powell, J., 
concurring).  According to the stipulated facts in this case, 
the State's system of per-pupil school financing, in which 
public funds follow each child, now encompasses a wide range of 
school choices—mainly public, but some private or religious.  
Numerous 
programs 
have 
amended 
the 
number 
and 
type 
of 
educational 
options 
available 
to 
public 
school 
students.  
Qualifying public school students may choose from among the 
Milwaukee public district schools, magnet schools, charter 
schools, 
suburban 
public 
schools, 
trade 
schools, 
schools 
developed for students with exceptional needs, and now sectarian 
or nonsectarian private schools participating in the amended 
MPCP.  In each case, the programs let state funds follow 
students to the districts and schools their parents have chosen. 
No.  97-0270 
 
33
Milwaukee Public Schools.  To qualify under the amended MPCP, 
the student is never asked his or her religious affiliation or 
beliefs; nor is he or she asked whether the aid will be used at 
a sectarian or nonsectarian private school.  Because it provides 
a neutral benefit to beneficiaries selected on religious-neutral 
criteria, 
the 
amended 
MPCP 
neither 
leads 
to 
"religious 
indoctrination," Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2014, nor "creates [a] 
financial 
incentive 
for 
students 
to 
undertake 
sectarian 
education."  Witters, 474 U.S. at 488; Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10. 
 As Judge Roggensack concluded, "[t]he benefit neither promotes 
religion nor is hostile to it.  Rather, it promotes the 
opportunity for increased learning by those currently having the 
greatest difficulty with educational achievement."  Jackson, 213 
Wis. 2d at 61. 
¶45 Second, under the amended MPCP public aid flows to 
sectarian private schools only as a result of numerous private 
choices of the individual parents of school-age children.  Under 
the 
original 
MPCP, 
the 
State 
paid 
grants 
directly 
to 
participating private schools.  As explained above, the program 
was amended so that the State will now provide the aid by 
individual checks made payable to the parents of each pupil 
attending a private school under the program.  Each check is 
sent to the parents' choice of schools and can be cashed only 
for the cost of the student's tuition.  Any aid provided under 
the amended MPCP that ultimately flows to sectarian private 
schools, therefore, does so "only as a result of genuinely 
No.  97-0270 
 
34
independent and private choices of aid recipients."  Witters, 
474 U.S. at 487. 
¶46 We recognize that under the amended MPCP the State 
sends the checks directly to the participating private school 
and the parents must restrictively endorse the checks to the 
private 
schools. 
 
Nevertheless, 
we 
do 
not 
view 
these 
precautionary provisions as amounting to some type of "sham" to 
funnel public funds to sectarian private schools.  In our 
assessment, the importance of our inquiry here is not to 
ascertain the path upon which public funds travel under the 
amended program, but rather to determine who ultimately chooses 
that path.  As with the programs in Mueller and Witters, not one 
cent flows from the State to a sectarian private school under 
the amended MPCP except as a result of the necessary and 
intervening choices of individual parents.  As a result, "[n]o 
reasonable observer is likely to draw from [these facts] an 
inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious 
practice or belief."  Witters, 474 U.S. at 493 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring); see also Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 9-10. 
¶47 The amended MPCP, therefore, places on equal footing 
options of public and private school choice, and vests power in 
the hands of parents to choose where to direct the funds 
allocated for their children's benefit.  We are satisfied that 
No.  97-0270 
 
35
the implementation of the provisions of the amended MPCP will 
not have the primary effect of advancing religion.17  
c. 
Third Prong - Excessive Government Entanglement 
¶48 The final question for us to determine under the Lemon 
test is whether the amended MPCP would result in an excessive 
governmental entanglement with religion.18  Stated another way, 
it is necessary to determine whether "[a] comprehensive, 
discriminating, 
and 
continuing 
state 
surveillance 
will 
inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions 
[against the inculcation of religious tenets] are obeyed and the 
First Amendment otherwise respected."  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619. 
                     
17 The Respondents also argue that the amended MPCP has the 
primary effect of advancing religion because a substantial 
percent of the program's aid will flow to sectarian schools.  
They point out that of the 122 private schools eligible to 
participate in the amended program 89 are sectarian.  We find 
this argument unpersuasive.  The Supreme Court has warned 
against "focusing on the money that is undoubtedly expended by 
the government rather than on the nature of the benefit received 
by the recipient."  Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 843.  "We would be 
loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a 
facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to 
which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under 
the law."  Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401.  The percent of program 
funds eventually paid to sectarian private schools is irrelevant 
to our inquiry.  
18 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
considered 
entanglement both in the course of assessing whether an aid 
program has an impermissible effect of advancing religion and as 
an independent factor under the Lemon test.  See Agostini, 117 
S. Ct. at 2015. Regardless of how the Court has characterized 
the analysis, whether a government aid program results in such 
entanglement 
has 
consistently 
been 
an 
aspect 
of 
its 
Establishment Clause analysis.  See id. 
No.  97-0270 
 
36
¶49 Not all entanglements have the effect of advancing or 
inhibiting religion.  The Court's prior holdings illustrate that 
total separation between church and state is not possible in an 
absolute sense.  "Judicial caveats against entanglement must 
recognize that the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' 
is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all 
the circumstances of a particular relationship."  Lemon, 403 
U.S. at 614.  Some relationship between the State and religious 
organizations is inevitable.  See id. (citing Zorach, 343 U.S. 
at 312).  "Entanglement must be 'excessive' before it runs afoul 
of the Establishment Clause."  See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2015. 
¶50 The 
amended 
MPCP 
will 
not 
create 
an 
excessive 
entanglement between the State and religion.  Under the amended 
program, the State need not, and in fact is not given the 
authority 
to 
impose a "comprehensive, 
discriminating, and 
continuing state surveillance" over the participating sectarian 
private schools.  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.  Participating private 
schools are subject to performance, reporting, and auditing 
requirements, 
as well 
as 
to applicable nondiscrimination, 
health, and safety obligations.  Enforcement of these minimal 
standards will require the State Superintendent to monitor the 
quality 
of 
secular 
education 
at 
the 
sectarian 
schools 
participating in the plan.  But this oversight already exists.  
In the course of his existing duties, the Superintendent 
currently monitors the quality of education at all sectarian 
private schools. 
No.  97-0270 
 
37
¶51 These oversight activities relating to conformity with 
existing law do not create excessive entanglement merely because 
they are part of the amended MPCP's requirements.  See, e.g., 
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403.  As the Court held in Hernandez v. 
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1989):   
 
[R]outine regulatory interaction which involves no 
inquiries into religious doctrine, no delegation of 
state power to a religious body, and no 'detailed 
monitoring and close administrative contact' between 
secular and religious bodies, does not of itself 
violate the nonentanglement command. 
(citations omitted); accord, Agostini, 117 S.Ct. at 2014-16; 
Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 
U.S. 226, 253 (1990); Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973 (6th Cir. 
1995).  The program does not involve the State in any way with 
the schools' governance, curriculum, or day-to-day affairs.  The 
State's regulation of participating private schools, while 
designed to ensure that the program's educational purposes are 
fulfilled, does not approach the level of constitutionally 
impermissible involvement. 
¶52 In short, we hold that the amended MPCP, which 
provides a neutral benefit directly to children of economically 
disadvantaged families on a religious-neutral basis, does not 
run afoul of any of the three primary criteria the Court has 
traditionally used to evaluate whether a state educational 
assistance program has the purpose or effect of advancing 
religion.  Since the amended MPCP has a secular purpose, does 
not have the primary effect of advancing religion, and does not 
No.  97-0270 
 
38
create an excessive entanglement, it is not invalid under the 
Establishment Clause.19 
II. State Establishment Clause 
¶53 The next question presented in this case is whether 
the amended MPCP violates art. I, § 18 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.20  The Respondents argue, and the court of appeals 
concluded, that the amended MPCP violates both the "benefits 
clause" and the "compelled support clause" of art. I, § 18.  
Upon review, we conclude that the amended MPCP violates neither 
provision. 
¶54 The "benefits clause" of art. I, § 18 provides: "nor 
shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of 
religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries."  
This is Wisconsin's equivalent of the Establishment Clause of 
                     
19 Since we conclude that the amended MPCP does not violate 
the Establishment Clause, we need not address the issue, raised 
by Petitioners Marquelle Miller, et al., whether excluding 
sectarian private schools from the program violates the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 
20 Wis. Const. art. I, § 18 provides as follows: 
The right of every person to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates of conscience shall never be 
infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to 
attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to 
maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall any 
control of, or interference with, the rights of 
conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by 
law to any religious establishments or modes of 
worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the 
treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or 
religious or theological seminaries. 
  
No.  97-0270 
 
39
the First Amendment.  See King v. Village of Waunakee, 185 
Wis. 2d 25, 52, 517 N.W.2d 671 (1994); Holt, 66 Wis. 2d at 676. 
 This court has remarked that the language of art. I, § 18, 
while "more specific than the terser" clauses of the First 
Amendment, carries the same import, Holt, 66 Wis. 2d at 676; 
both provisions "are intended and operate to serve the same dual 
purpose of prohibiting the 'establishment' of religion and 
protecting the 'free exercise' of religion."  See State ex rel. 
Warren v. Nusbaum (Nusbaum II), 64 Wis. 2d 314, 327-28, 219 
N.W.2d 577 (1974)(quoting Nusbaum I, 55 Wis. 2d at 332).  
Although art. I, § 18 is not subsumed by the First Amendment, 
see State v. Miller, 202 Wis. 2d 56, 63, 549 N.W.2d 235 (1996), 
we interpret and apply the benefits clause of art. I, § 18 in 
light of the United States Supreme Court cases interpreting the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  See King, 185 
Wis. 2d at 55; American Motors Corp. v. DILHR, 93 Wis. 2d 14, 
29, 286 N.W.2d 847 (1979); State ex rel. Wisconsin Health 
Facilities Auth. v. Lindner, 91 Wis. 2d 145, 163-64, 280 N.W.2d 
773 (1979).21 
                     
21 Citing our decision in State v. Miller, 202 Wis. 2d 56, 
549 N.W.2d 235 (1996), the Respondents assert that we are 
precluded 
from 
looking 
to 
federal 
establishment 
clause 
jurisprudence in analyzing the amended MPCP under the "benefits 
clause" of Wis. Const. art. I, § 18.  We disagree.    In Miller, 
we correctly stated that some questions arising under art. I, § 
18 "cannot be fully illuminated by the light of federal 
jurisprudence alone, but may require examination according to 
the dictates of the more expansive protections envisioned by our 
state constitution."  Id. at 64.  In Miller, however, we 
interpreted and applied the "freedom of conscience" clause, and 
not the benefits clause, of art. I, § 18.  See id. at 63, 65-66. 
 This court has traditionally looked to federal establishment 
No.  97-0270 
 
40
¶55 Unlike the court of appeals, which focused on whether 
sectarian private schools were "religious seminaries" under art. 
I, § 18, we focus our inquiry on whether the aid provided by the 
amended 
MPCP 
is 
"for 
the 
benefit 
of" 
such 
religious 
institutions.22  We have explained that the language "for the 
benefit of" in art. I, § 18 "is not to be read as requiring that 
some 
shadow 
of 
incidental 
benefit 
to 
a 
church-related 
institution brings a state grant or contract to purchase within 
the prohibition of the section."  Nusbaum I, 55 Wis. 2d at 333. 
 Furthermore, we have stated that the language of art. I, § 18 
cannot be read as being "so prohibitive as not to encompass the 
primary-effect test."  State ex rel. Warren v. Reuter, 44 
Wis. 2d 201, 227, 170 N.W.2d 790 (1969).  The crucial question, 
under art. I, §18, as under the Establishment Clause, is "not 
whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution as a 
                                                                  
clause jurisprudence, and in particular the primary effects 
test, when interpreting the "for the benefit of" language in the 
benefits clause of art. I, § 18.  See, e.g., King v. Village of 
Waunakee, 185 Wis. 2d 25, 51, 517 N.W.2d 671 (1994); State ex 
rel. Wisconsin Health Facilities Auth. v. Lindner, 91 Wis. 2d 
145, 163-64, 280 N.W.2d 773 (1979); State ex rel. Warren v. 
Nusbaum, 55 Wis. 2d 316, 333, 198 N.W.2d 650 (1972) State ex 
rel. Warren v. Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d 201, 227, 170 N.W.2d 790 
(1969).  We continue to do so in this case. 
22 This court has construed "religious societies" to be 
synonymous with religious organizations.  At the time of the 
adoption of our constitution in 1848, the word "seminaries" was 
synonymous with academies or schools.  See State ex rel. Weiss 
v. District Board, 76 Wis. 177, 215, 44 N.W. 967 (1890).  
Sectarian private schools, therefore, constitute "religious 
seminaries" within the meaning of art. I, § 18.  See State ex 
rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 156, 115 N.W.2d 761 
(1962).  
No.  97-0270 
 
41
consequence 
of 
the 
legislative 
program, 
but 
whether 
its 
principal or primary effect advances religion."  Nusbaum I, 55 
Wis. 2d at 333 (quoting Tilton, 403 U.S. at 679). 
¶56 Applying the primary effect test developed by the 
Supreme Court, we have concluded above that the primary effect 
of the amended MPCP is not the advancement of a religion.  We 
find the Supreme Court's primary effect test, focusing on the 
neutrality and indirection of state aid, is well reasoned and 
provides the appropriate line of demarcation for considering the 
constitutionality of neutral educational assistance programs 
such as the amended MPCP.  Since the amended MPCP does not 
transgress the primary effect test employed in Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, we also conclude that the statute is 
constitutionally inviolate under the benefits clause of art. I, 
§ 18. 
¶57 This conclusion is not inconsistent with Wisconsin 
tradition or with past precedent of this court.  Wisconsin has 
traditionally accorded parents the primary role in decisions 
regarding the education and upbringing of their children.  See, 
e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Wisconsin Indus. 
Sch. for Girls v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651, 79 N.W.2d 422 
(1899); accord Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).  This court has 
embraced this principle for nearly a century, recognizing that: 
"parents as the natural guardians of their children [are] the 
persons under natural conditions having the most effective 
motives and inclinations and being in the best position and 
No.  97-0270 
 
42
under the strongest obligations to give to such children proper 
nurture, education, and training."  Wisconsin Indus. Sch. for 
Girls, 103 Wis. at 668-69. 
¶58 In this context, this court has held that public funds 
may be placed at the disposal of third parties so long as the 
program 
on 
its 
face 
is 
neutral 
between 
sectarian 
and 
nonsectarian alternatives and the transmission of funds is 
guided by the independent decisions of third parties, see, e.g., 
State ex rel. Atwood v. Johnson, 170 Wis. 218, 175 N.W.2d 589 
(1919), and that public funds generally may be provided to 
sectarian educational institutions so long as steps are taken 
not to subsidize religious functions, see, e.g., Nusbaum II, 64 
Wis. 2d 314. 
¶59 In Nusbaum II, this court upheld a state program that 
provided educational benefits without charge to students with 
exceptional educational needs.  Where public resources were 
inadequate to attend to a student's exceptional needs, the State 
could under the program directly contract with private sectarian 
institutions to provide the necessary services.  See Nusbaum II, 
64 Wis. 2d at 320-21.  Reviewing the program, the Nusbaum II 
court emphasized the neutral process by which students were 
chosen to participate in the program, see id. at 320, and the 
great lengths to which the legislature had gone to make sure 
that the inculcation of religious tenets did not take place, see 
id. at 325.  Applying the primary effect test of Lemon, the 
court 
concluded 
that 
the 
program 
violated 
neither 
the 
Establishment Clause nor art. I, § 18.  See id. at 322, 329. 
No.  97-0270 
 
43
¶60 In Atwood, 170 Wis. 218, this court upheld a program, 
much like the amended MPCP, that provided neutral educational 
assistance.  The Atwood court considered the constitutionality 
of educational benefits for returning veterans that encompassed 
paying the cost of schooling, at any high school or college, 
including religious schools.  Under that program, a student 
could choose a school, and the State directly paid to the 
schools the actual increased cost of operation attributed to the 
additional students.  Upholding the program under art. I, § 18, 
the court concluded: 
 
The contention that financial benefit accrues to 
religious schools from [this program] is equally 
untenable.  Only actual increased cost to such schools 
occasioned by the attendance of beneficiaries is to be 
reimbursed.   They are not enriched by the service 
they render.  Mere reimbursement is not aid.   
Id. at 263-64. 
¶61 In concluding that the amended MPCP violated art. I, § 
18, the court of appeals relied heavily on this court's 
decisions in State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board, 76 Wis. 177, 
44 N.W. 967 (1890) and State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 
Wis. 2d 148, 156, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962).  We find the court's 
reliance was misplaced. 
¶62 In Weiss, the court held that reading of the King 
James version of the Bible by students attending public school 
violated the religious benefits clause of art. I, § 18.  
Although the court's reasoning in Weiss may have differed from 
ours, its holding is entirely consistent with the primary 
effects test the Supreme Court has developed and we apply today. 
No.  97-0270 
 
44
 Requiring public school students to read from the Bible is 
neither neutral nor indirect.  The Edgerton schools reviewed in 
Weiss were directly supported by public funds, and the reading 
of the Bible was anything but religious-neutral.  The program 
considered in Weiss is far different from the neutral and 
indirect aid provided under the amended MPCP.  The holding in 
Weiss, therefore, does not control our inquiry in this case. 
¶63 In Reynolds, 17 Wis. 2d 148, the court struck down a 
publicly supported transportation program it perceived was 
designed to benefit parochial schools.  In reaching its 
conclusion, the Reynolds court applied a stricter standard under 
art. I, § 18 than that used by the Supreme Court under the 
Establishment Clause.  See id. at 165.  This court has since 
rejected applying this stricter standard in cases arising under 
the benefits clause of art. I, § 18.  See, e.g., Lindner, 91 
Wis. 2d at 163-64; Nusbaum II, 64 Wis. 2d at 328; Reuter, 44 
Wis. 2d at 227.  The court's analysis and conclusion in Reynolds 
are therefore not dispositive in our inquiry here. 
¶64 The Respondents additionally argue that the amended 
MPCP violates the "compelled support clause" of art. I, § 18.  
The compelled support clause provides "nor shall any person be 
compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or 
to 
maintain 
any 
ministry 
without 
consent 
. . . ." 
 
The 
Respondents assert that since public funds eventually flow to 
religious institutions under the amended MPCP, taxpayers are 
compelled to support places of worship against their consent.  
This argument is identical to the Respondents' argument under 
No.  97-0270 
 
45
the benefits clause.  We will not interpret the compelled 
support clause as prohibiting the same acts as those prohibited 
by the benefits clause.  Rather we look for an interpretation of 
these two related provisions that avoids such redundancy.  See 
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988).   
¶65 In Holt, 66 Wis. 2d 659, this court interpreted the 
compelled support provision and applied it to a state program 
under which public school children were released from school so 
that 
they 
could 
attend 
religious 
centers 
for 
religious 
instruction.  See id. at 676-77.  In the context provided in 
Holt, the court interpreted the compelled support clause to 
prohibit the state from forcing or requiring students to attend 
or participate in religious instruction. See id. at 676.  Under 
this interpretation, the court upheld the program, finding that 
the children participating in the program did so only by choice 
and that, although proof of attendance at the religious 
instruction was required, 
the 
program's requirements 
were 
directed 
at 
preventing 
deception 
rather 
than 
compelling 
attendance.  See id.  "Compulsion to attend is not, initially or 
subsequently, a part of the program."  Id. at 677.  The court 
therefore rejected the compelled support challenge. 
¶66 Applying in this case the interpretation of the 
compelled support clause provided in Holt, we conclude that the 
amended MPCP does not violate that constitutional provision.  
Like the program in Holt, the amended MPCP does not require a 
single student to attend class at a sectarian private school.  A 
qualifying student only attends a sectarian private school under 
No.  97-0270 
 
46
the program if the student's parent so chooses.  Nor does the 
amended MPCP force participation in religious activities.  On 
the contrary, the program prohibits a sectarian private school 
from 
requiring 
students 
attending 
under 
the 
program 
to 
participate in religious activities offered at such school.  The 
choice to participate in religious activities is also left to 
the students' parents.  Since the amended MPCP neither compels 
students to attend sectarian private schools nor requires them 
to participate in religious activities, the program does not 
violate the compelled support clause of art. I, § 18. 
¶67 In assessing whether the amended MPCP violates Wis. 
Const. art. IV, § 18, art. X, §3, or the Wisconsin public 
purpose 
doctrine, 
we 
rely 
heavily 
on 
our 
analyses 
and 
conclusions in Davis, 166 Wis. 2d 501.  In Davis, the school 
choice opponents attacked the original MPCP under a barrage of 
arguments similar to those raised by the Respondents in this 
case.  Specifically, we concluded in Davis that the original 
MPCP did not violate art. IV, § 18, art. X, § 3, or the public 
purpose doctrine.  In this case, we limit our analysis to 
determining whether the amendments made to the original MPCP 
change either the analyses we relied upon or the conclusions we 
reached in Davis.  Upon review we conclude that they do not. 
III.  Private or Local Bill 
¶68 The third issue presented in this case is whether the 
amended MPCP is a private or local bill which was enacted in 
violation of the procedural requirements mandated by Wis. Const. 
art. IV, § 18. 
No.  97-0270 
 
47
¶69 Article IV, § 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution states 
in full: "No private or local bill which may be passed by the 
legislature shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall 
be expressed in the title."  This constitutional provision 
addresses the form in which private or local legislation is 
enacted and not the substance of that legislation.  See Davis, 
166 Wis. 2d at 526.  As we have explained, art. IV, § 18 serves 
three underlying purposes: 
 
1) to encourage the legislature to devote its time to 
the state at large, its primary responsibility; 2) to 
avoid the specter of favoritism and discrimination, a 
potential which is inherent in laws of limited 
applicability; and 3) to alert the public through its 
elected representatives to the real nature and subject 
matter of legislation under consideration. 
Milwaukee Brewers v. DHSS, 130 Wis. 2d 79, 107-08, 387 N.W.2d 
254 (1986).  "The requirements of art. IV, § 18 are prescribed 
to ensure accountability of the legislature to the public and to 
'guard against the danger of legislation, affecting private or 
local interests, being smuggled through the legislature.'"  
Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 519 (quoting Milwaukee County v. Isenring, 
109 Wis. 9, 23, 85 N.W. 131 (1901).  The question here is 
whether the amended MPCP comes within the purview of art. IV, § 
18. 
¶70 In Davis, we set forth a two-fold analysis for 
assessing whether a bill or statute violates Wis. Const. art. 
IV, § 18: 
 
We must first address whether the process in which the 
bill 
was 
enacted 
deserves 
a 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality.  Second, we must address whether 
No.  97-0270 
 
48
the bill is private or local.  If the bill is found to 
be private or local, then the requirements of art. IV, 
§ 18 apply; namely, that the legislation must be a 
single subject bill and the title of the bill must 
clearly reflect the subject. 
Id. at 520.  We review the amended MPCP under this two-fold 
analysis. 
¶71 Thus, our first inquiry is whether the process by 
which the amended MPCP was enacted deserves the presumption of 
constitutionality.  Where the legislature is alleged to have 
violated a constitutional provision mandating the procedure by 
which bills must pass, we will not indulge in a presumption of 
constitutionality, "for to do so would make a mockery of the 
procedural constitutional requirement."  City of Brookfield v. 
Milwaukee Sewerage Comm'n, 144 Wis. 2d 896, 912-13 n.5, 426 
N.W.2d 591 (1988); see City of Oak Creek v. DNR, 185 Wis. 2d 
424, 437, 518 N.W.2d 276 (Ct. App. 1994).  "Nonetheless, this 
court may indulge the presumption of constitutionality where it 
is evident that the legislature did adequately consider or 
discuss the legislation in question, even where such legislation 
was passed as part of a voluminous bill."  Oak Creek, 185 
Wis. 2d at 437; see Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 521-23. 
¶72 We find no evidence in this case that the amended MPCP 
was smuggled or logrolled through the legislature.  On the 
contrary, 
the 
record 
establishes 
that 
the 
legislature 
"intelligently participate[d] in considering" the amended MPCP. 
 Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 523 (quoting Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 
912 n.5).  According to the Agreed Upon Statement of Facts in 
this case, the amendments to the original MPCP were proposed by 
No.  97-0270 
 
49
the Governor as a portion of the 1995-1997 biennial budget bill, 
which was referred to the Joint Committee on Finance.  During 
the spring of 1995, the proposed amendments to the original 
MPCP, along with other aspects of the biennial budget, were 
discussed at public hearings throughout the state.23  The 
proposed amendments were then debated, specifically amended, and 
in June 1995, adopted by the Joint Committee on Finance.  The 
Assembly then debated, specifically amended, held a public 
hearing on, and passed the proposed amendments as part of the 
biennial budget bill.  The biennial budget bill was then 
referred to the Senate.  The Senate held public hearings on, 
debated, and concurred in the proposed amendments to the 
original MPCP.  On July 26, 1995, the amended MPCP was enacted 
as a portion of the 1995-97 State of Wisconsin Biennial Budget, 
1995 Wis. Act 27. 
¶73 Under the stipulated facts of this case, we find it 
evident that the amended MPCP was not smuggled through the 
legislature, but rather was forged in the deliberative kiln of 
public debate.  The legislature adequately considered and 
discussed the amended MPCP, even though the proposed amendments 
were ultimately enacted as part of a multi-subject bill.  We 
therefore 
find 
it 
proper 
to 
apply 
a 
presumption 
of 
                     
23 Public hearings on the proposed amendments to the 
original MPCP and other aspects of the biennial budget bill were 
held in the City of Milwaukee on April 3, 1995, in Cedarburg on 
March 21, 1995, in Madison on March 27, 1995, in Portage on 
March 23, 1995, and in River Falls on March 30, 1995.  See 
Record Document 211A at 7.  
No.  97-0270 
 
50
constitutionality to the process in which the amended MPCP was 
enacted into law. 
¶74 Our next line of inquiry is whether the amended 
program is "private or local" legislation.  See Davis, 166 
Wis. 2d at 524.  The term "private or local" is not defined in 
the constitution.  Legislation that is geographically specific 
will not automatically be considered private or local where the 
general subject matter of the legislation relates to a state 
responsibility, that is when "the subject thereof is such that 
the state itself has an interest therein as proprietor, or as 
trustee, or in its governmental capacity, for the benefit or in 
the interest of the general public."  Milwaukee Brewers, 130 
Wis. 2d at 111 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
¶75 To assess whether the amended MPCP is private or local 
legislation, we apply the test this court created in Brookfield. 
 See Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 527.24  The Brookfield test comprises 
five elements: 
 
First, the classification employed by the legislature 
must be based on substantial distinctions which make 
one class really different from another. 
  
Second, the classification adopted must be germane to 
the purpose of the law. 
                     
24 In assessing whether the amended MPCP is private or local 
legislation, we apply the five-factor test created in City of 
Brookfield v. Milwaukee Sewerage Dist., 144 Wis. 2d 896, 426 
N.W.2d 591 (1988), because the amended MPCP is not specific on 
its face, involves classifications, does not violate Wis. Const. 
art. IV, § 31, but allegedly runs afoul of art. IV, § 18.  See 
id. at 912; see also Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 525, 480 
N.W.2d 460 (1992). 
No.  97-0270 
 
51
 
Third, the classification must not be based on 
existing 
circumstances 
only. 
 
Instead, 
the 
classification must be subject to being open, such 
that other cities could join the class. 
 
Fourth, when a law applies to a class, it must apply 
equally to all members of the class. 
 
. . . [F]ifth, 
the 
characteristics 
of 
each 
class 
should be so far different from those of the other 
classes so as to reasonably suggest at least the 
propriety, having regard to the public good, of 
substantially different legislation. 
Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 526 (quoting Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 
907-09).   
¶76 In Davis, we held that the original MPCP satisfied all 
five elements of the Brookfield test and therefore was not 
private 
or 
local 
legislation 
subject 
to 
the 
procedural 
requirements in art. IV, § 18.  See Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 537. 
The 1995 amendments to the original MPCP did not change the 
program in any way that would alter our analyses or conclusions 
in Davis as to the first, third, fourth, and fifth elements of 
the Brookfield test.25  In this case, the Respondents assert only 
that, as a result of the changes made to the program since 
                     
25  In all aspects relevant to the first, third, fourth, and 
fifth elements of the Brookfield test, the amended MPCP is 
identical to the original MPCP upheld in Davis.  First, like the 
original program, the amended MPCP involves a classification 
recognized and accepted by this court:  cities of the first 
class.  Second, since other cities can join this class, the 
classification is subject to being open.  Third, the amended 
MPCP, by its terms, applies equally to all qualifying cities.  
Finally, the characteristics of cities of the first class are 
sufficiently different from those of other classes of cities so 
to suggest at least the propriety of substantially different 
legislation.  See Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 526-37. 
No.  97-0270 
 
52
Davis, the classification imposed by the amended MPCP does not 
satisfy the second element of the Brookfield test.  We therefore 
limit our discussion to the second element of the Brookfield 
test.  
¶77 The second element of the Brookfield test requires 
that "the classification adopted must be germane to the purpose 
of the law."  Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 907, 917-20.  In Davis, 
we concluded that the original MPCP satisfied this element 
because it was "an experiment intended to address a perceived 
problem 
of 
inadequate 
educational 
opportunities 
for 
disadvantaged children."  Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 530, 535.  We 
there explained: 
 
[T]he classification of first class cities is germane 
to the purpose of the law.  Clearly, improving the 
quality of education and educational opportunities in 
Wisconsin is a matter of statewide importance.  The 
best location to experiment with legislation aimed at 
improving the quality of education is in a first class 
city, a large urban area where the socio-economic and 
educational disparities are greatest and the private 
educational choices are most abundant. 
Id. at 535. 
¶78 The Respondents contend that our holding in Davis does 
not control the determination in this case because the amended 
MPCP is no longer experimental in nature and therefore the 
classification of cities of the first class is no longer germane 
to the purpose of that law.  We disagree.  Despite some 
amendments, the program has retained its experimental character. 
 In 
concluding 
that 
the 
original 
MPCP 
was 
experimental 
legislation, the Davis court focused on two characteristics of 
No.  97-0270 
 
53
the program:  its limited participation (one percent of MPS 
membership) and its data compilation and reporting provisions.  
See id. at 533-34.  The amended MPCP has retained these two 
characteristics. 
¶79 First, like the original program, the amended MPCP is 
not an abandonment of the public school system.  With the 1995 
amendments, the legislature expanded the program by increasing 
to 15 percent of total MPS membership the number of financially 
disadvantaged students eligible to attend private schools under 
the amended MPCP.  Even though this represents a substantial 
increase 
in 
the 
total 
number 
of 
students 
eligible 
to 
participate, the program still affects only a small portion of 
MPS membership.  No less than 85 percent of the MPS membership 
will be unaffected by the amended MPCP.  Although it provides a 
somewhat larger view, the amended MPCP still provides but a 
"window 
of 
opportunity 
to 
test 
the 
effectiveness 
of 
an 
alternative to the MPS."  Id. at 533.26 
¶80 Second, like the original program, the amended MPCP 
continues to allow the State to measure the effects of choice 
and competition on education.  See Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 533.  
With the 1995 amendments, the legislature deleted some of the 
                     
26 Rather than destroying the program's experimental nature, 
the expansion of the program to a larger sample of students may 
make it easier for researchers to measure the effectiveness of 
this experiment in education.  See Jay P. Greene, Paul E. 
Peterson, & Jiangtao Du, The Effectiveness of School Choice in 
Milwaukee: A Secondary Analysis of Data From The Program's 
Evaluation, at 26-27.  
No.  97-0270 
 
54
monitoring requirements from the original plan.  Specifically, 
the 
legislature 
deleted 
the 
requirement 
that 
the 
State 
Superintendent conduct annual performance evaluations and report 
to the legislature, and it eliminated the Superintendent's 
authority to conduct financial or performance evaluation audits 
of the program.  See 1995 Wis. Act 27 at §§ 4007m and 4008m.  
The amended MPCP, however, requires the Legislative Audit Bureau 
to conduct a financial and performance evaluation of the program 
and to submit it to each house of the legislature by January 15, 
2000.  See id. at § 4008s. 
¶81 The mere fact that the legislature has chosen to 
conduct one evaluation in the year 2000 rather than on an annual 
basis does not destroy the experimental nature of the amended 
MPCP.  As we explained in Davis, "[t]his experiment tests a 
theory of education."  Id. at 534.  The effects of this 
experiment will be measured not only by the test scores or 
graduation rates of those students to whom "life preservers" 
have been thrown,27 but also by the education those students who 
remain in MPS receive.  Nor will the success or failure of this 
experiment be measured by focusing solely on those students 
participating in the program, but also by considering whether 
parental choice spurs competitiveness and innovation within the 
public education system.  The legislature has provided a 
                     
27 See Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 547 (Ceci, J., concurring)("The 
Wisconsin legislature . . . has attempted to throw a life 
preserver to those Milwaukee children caught in the cruel 
riptide of a school system floundering upon the shoals of 
poverty, status-quo thinking, and despair.").  
No.  97-0270 
 
55
reasonable process by which to review the effects of the amended 
MPCP.  Article IV, § 18 does not dictate a particular timetable 
for such review.  We therefore express no opinion whether yearly 
evaluations or one evaluation at the end of four years will 
provide a more accurate or more cost-effective measure of the 
amended MPCP's effects. 
¶82 In short, we conclude that the amended MPCP, like the 
original 
program, 
is experimental 
legislation 
intended to 
address a perceived problem in the quality of education and 
educational opportunities in Wisconsin.  The best location to 
experiment with such a program is in a city of the first class, 
where "socio-economic and educational disparities . . . are most 
abundant."  Id. at 535.  The amended MPCP's classification of 
cities of the first class is therefore germane to the purpose of 
the law.  The second element of the Brookfield test is 
satisfied.  Accordingly, we hold that the amended MPCP is not a 
private or local bill within the meaning of Wis. Const. art. IV, 
§ 18, and thus not subject to its procedural requirements. 
IV.  Uniformity Clause 
¶83 The fourth issue presented in this case is whether the 
amended MPCP violates the uniformity provision of Wis. Const. 
art. X, § 3.  The court of appeals did not reach this issue, and 
the circuit court concluded that the amended program does not 
violate the uniformity clause. 
¶84 Wisconsin Constitution art. X, § 3 states: 
 
The legislature shall provide by law for the 
establishment of district schools, which shall be as 
No.  97-0270 
 
56
nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools shall 
be free and without charge for tuition to all children 
between the ages of 4 and 20 years; and no sectarian 
instruction shall be allowed therein; . . . . 
¶85 The Respondents first argue that the amendments to the 
program, primarily the removal of funding limits that prevented 
a private school from operating solely on public funds, 
effectively transforms private schools participating in the 
amended MPCP into district schools subject to the nonsectarian 
clause of art. X, § 3.  As in Davis, the key to this argument is 
whether private schools, by participating in the amended MPCP, 
become "district schools" for the purposes of the uniformity 
clause.  We conclude that they do not. 
¶86 Relying 
on 
the 
classification 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 115.01(1) and on the fact that a private school could receive 
100 percent of its tuition from public funds, the Respondents 
contend that private schools participating in the amended MPCP 
will become "public schools" because they will be "elementary 
and high schools supported by public taxation."  In Davis this 
court squarely rejected the argument that private schools 
receiving state funds under the original MPCP were "district 
schools" to which the uniformity requirement applies.  See 
Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 538.  The court noted that the original 
MPCP explicitly referred to participating schools as "private 
schools" and observed that "[i]n no case have we held that the 
mere appropriation of public monies to a private school 
transforms that school into a public school."  Id. at 539-40.   
No.  97-0270 
 
57
¶87 We apply the same reasoning in this case.  Like the 
original 
MPCP, 
the 
amended 
program 
expressly 
refers 
to 
participating schools as "private schools."  The term "private 
school" 
is 
defined 
by 
statute 
to 
include 
those 
private 
institutions satisfying the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 118.165 
or determined to be a private school by the State Superintendent 
under Wis. Stat. § 118.167.  See Wis. Stat. § 115.001(3r).  "We 
assume that the legislature was aware of this statutory meaning 
and intended to use 'private school' . . . as a statutory term 
of art."  Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 538.  As in Davis, we conclude 
that the mere appropriation of public monies to a private school 
does not transform that school into a district school under art. 
X, § 3.  This conclusion is not affected by the amount of public 
funds a private school receives. 
¶88 The Respondents also argue that art. X, § 3 prohibits 
the State from diverting students and funds away from the public 
school system.  Article X, § 3, the Respondents contend, 
requires that the district schools be the only system of state-
supported 
education. 
 
This 
argument 
too 
was 
raised 
and 
specifically rejected in Davis.  See Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 538-
40. 
¶89 In Davis, the choice opponents argued that the 
explicit requirement in art. X, § 3 that the State establish 
public district schools implicitly prohibits the legislature 
from spending public funds to support any schools other than 
district schools.  As a dissenting opinion argued: "the 
constitutional system of public education was intended to be the 
No.  97-0270 
 
58
only general school instruction to be supported by taxation."  
Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 558 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).  The 
court, relying on precedent of this court, rejected that 
contention.  See id. at 537-38 (citing State ex rel. Comstock v. 
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, 65 Wis. 631, 636-37, 27 N.W. 829 (1886) 
and Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 496-97, 436 N.W.2d 568 
(1989)); accord Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 565, 247 N.W.2d 
141 (1976); Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d at 221; City of Manitowoc v. Town 
of Manitowoc Rapids, 231 Wis. 94, 98, 285 N.W. 403 (1939).  
Applying the reasoning of Comstock and Kukor, the court 
concluded that art. X, § 3 provides not a ceiling but a floor 
upon which the legislature can build additional opportunities 
for school children in Wisconsin: 
 
The uniformity clause clearly was intended to assure 
certain minimal educational opportunities for the 
children of Wisconsin.  It does not require the 
legislature to ensure that all of the children in 
Wisconsin receive a free uniform basic education.  
Rather, the uniformity clause requires the legislature 
to provide the opportunity for all children in 
Wisconsin to receive a free uniform basic education. 
Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 539. 
 ¶90 Similar to the original MPCP upheld in Davis, the 
amended MPCP in no way deprives any student of the opportunity 
to attend a public school with a uniform character of education. 
 By enacting the amended MPCP, the State has merely allowed 
certain disadvantaged children to take advantage of alternative 
educational opportunities in addition to those provided by the 
State under art. X, § 3.  The students participating in the 
No.  97-0270 
 
59
amended MPCP do so by choice and may withdraw at any time and 
return to a public school.  "[W]hen the legislature has provided 
for each [] child the privileges of a district school, which he 
or she may freely enjoy, the constitutional requirement in that 
behalf is complied with."  Comstock, 65 Wis. at 636-37.  As in 
Davis, we conclude that the legislature has done so here.  The 
amended MPCP merely reflects a legislative desire to do more 
than that which is constitutionally mandated. 
¶91 We therefore hold that the sectarian private schools 
participating in the MPCP do not constitute "district schools" 
for the purposes of the uniformity clause.  We also reaffirm the 
position that the legislature has fulfilled its constitutional 
duty to provide for the basic education of our children.  The 
State's experimental attempts to improve upon that foundation in 
no way deny any student the opportunity to receive the basic 
education in the public school system.  See Davis, 166 Wis. 2d 
at 539. 
V. Public Purpose Doctrine 
¶92 The fifth issue presented in this case is whether the 
amended MPCP violates Wisconsin's public purpose doctrine.  The 
court of appeals did not reach this issue, and the circuit court 
concluded that it does. 
¶93 The public purpose doctrine, although not recited in 
any specific clause in the state constitution, is a well-
established constitutional doctrine.  See Hopper v. City of 
Madison, 79 Wis. 2d 120, 128, 256 N.W.2d 139 (1977).  As this 
court stated in State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 
No.  97-0270 
 
60
414, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973), "[p]ublic funds may be expended for 
only public purposes.  An expenditure of public funds for other 
than a public purpose would be abhorrent to the constitution of 
Wisconsin." 
¶94 Under the public purpose doctrine, "[w]e are not 
concerned with the 'wisdom, merits or practicability of the 
legislature's enactment.'  Rather we are to determine whether a 
'public purpose can be conceived which might reasonably be 
deemed to justify or serve as a basis for the expenditure.'"  
Millers Nat'l Ins. v. City of Milwaukee, 184 Wis. 2d 155, 175-
76, 516 N.W.2d 376 (1994)(quoting Hopper, 79 Wis. 2d at 
129)(internal citation omitted).  "A court can conclude that no 
public purpose exists only if it is 'clear and palpable' that 
there can be no benefit to the public." La Plante, 58 Wis. 2d at 
56 (citation omitted). 
¶95 No party disputes that education constitutes a valid 
public purpose, or that private schools may be employed to 
further that purpose.  Education ranks at the apex of a state's 
function.  See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213; Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).  This court has long 
recognized 
that 
equal 
educational 
opportunities 
are 
a 
fundamental right, see, e.g., Buse, 74 Wis. 2d 550, and that the 
State has broad discretion to determine how best to ensure such 
opportunities.  See Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 541-44; Kukor, 148 
Wis. 2d 492-94; Atwood, 170 Wis. at 263-64. 
¶96 The parties in this case dispute only whether the 
private schools participating in the amended program are under 
No.  97-0270 
 
61
proper governmental control and supervision, as required by 
Wisconsin Industrial School for Girls, 103 Wis. at 668.  See 
Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 541-42; Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d at 216.  The 
Respondents allege that the amended MPCP lacks sufficient 
control and accountability to secure a public interest.  They 
note that some of the reporting requirements in the original 
MPCP upon which the court in Davis focused have been eliminated 
by amendment. 
¶97 The control and accountability requirements imposed 
under the public policy doctrine are not demanding.  See Reuter, 
at 216.  In Davis we explained: 
 
To test the propriety of expending public monies to a 
private institution for public purposes, this court 
must determine whether the private institution is 
under 
reasonable 
regulations 
for 
control 
and 
accountability to secure public interests.  'Only such 
control and accountability as is reasonably necessary 
under the circumstances to attain the public purpose 
is required.' 
Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 542 (quoting Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d at 
216)(internal citation omitted).  We therefore must determine 
only 
whether 
the 
amended 
MPCP 
includes 
control 
and 
accountability requirements reasonably necessary to secure the 
public purpose to which it is directed. 
¶98 The control and accountability arguments raised by the 
Respondents in this case were largely handled by this court in 
Davis.  See id. at 541-45.  In Davis, we upheld the original 
MPCP under a public purpose doctrine challenge.  As in this 
case, the choice opponents in Davis argued that the controls in 
No.  97-0270 
 
62
the original MPCP were woefully inadequate.  We there concluded 
that the statutory controls applicable to private schools 
coupled with parental choice sufficed to ensure that the public 
purpose was met.  See id. at 546. 
¶99 Similarly, in Reuter this court held that public 
appropriations to a private medical school did not violate the 
public purpose doctrine where the circumstances presented "no 
frivolous pretext for giving money to a private school but the 
using of a private school to attain a public purpose."  Reuter, 
44 Wis. 2d at 214.  The court noted that the private school was 
not regulated to the same extent as public schools, but it 
concluded that:   
 
A private agency cannot and should not be controlled 
as two-fistedly as a government agency. . . . A 
private agency is selected to aid the government 
because it can perform the service as well or better 
than the government.  We should not bog down private 
agencies with unnecessary government control. . . . We 
do not think it is necessary or required by the 
constitution that the state must legally be able to 
control the agency corporation in order to find 
sufficient regulations for control and accountability. 
 The state is not interested in controlling the day-
to-day operation of the medical school but in its end 
product.   
Id. at 217. 
¶100 In light of the standard applied in Davis and Reuter, 
we conclude that control and accountability safeguards in the 
amended MPCP are sufficient to ensure that the program fulfills 
its purpose of promoting education.  First, the private schools 
participating in the amended MPCP continue to be subject to the 
instruction, curriculum, and attendance regulations that govern 
No.  97-0270 
 
63
all private schools.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 118.165(1) and 118.167; 
Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 543.  Second, the amended MPCP continues 
to require an annual financial audit by the State Superintendent 
and provides for an additional review by the Legislative Audit 
Bureau covering both financial and performance evaluations of 
the plan.  See Wis. Stat. § 119.23(7)(am), (9).  Finally, as in 
Davis, the schools participating in the amended MPCP are also 
subject to the additional checks inherent in the notion of 
school choice.  "Control is also fashioned with the [plan] in 
the form of parental choice. . . . If the private school does 
not meet the parents' expectations, the parents may remove the 
child from the school and go elsewhere."  Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 
544.  These combined elements of the amended MPCP are more than 
sufficient control and accountability measures to ensure that 
the program serves the public purpose to which it is directed. 
¶101 The Respondents additionally argue that the amended 
MPCP violates the public purpose doctrine because it funds 
religious education and other religious activities that are not 
public purposes.  The Respondents argue, and the circuit court 
held, that because public funds flow to religious private 
schools, the program does not serve a public purpose.  We find 
this argument unfounded.  We have never interpreted the public 
purpose doctrine to incorporate an anti-establishment principle. 
That the State has chosen to include sectarian private schools 
in the amended MPCP does not render the program's public purpose 
invalid.  Whether the State may adopt such an approach is an 
issue we resolve under the provisions of art. I, § 18. 
No.  97-0270 
 
64
¶102 We therefore hold that the amended MPCP does not 
violate the public purpose doctrine because it fulfills a valid 
public purpose, and it contains sufficient and reasonable 
controls to attain its public purpose. 
VI.  NAACP's Equal Protection Claim 
¶103 In 
addition 
to 
the 
challenges 
raised 
by 
the 
Respondents, the NAACP alleges that the amended MPCP violates 
the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and art. I, § 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.28  Although this issue was not addressed by the 
circuit court or the court of appeals, it was briefed and argued 
before this court by the NAACP.  Upon review, we conclude that 
the NAACP's facial equal protection claim must fail as a matter 
of law. 
¶104 It is the often repeated rule in this state that 
issues not considered by the circuit court will not be 
                     
28 The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution provides "nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws."  The functional equivalent of this clause is found in 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 1: "All people are born equally free and 
independent, and have certain inherent rights; among  these are 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these 
rights, governments are instituted, deriving their just powers 
from the consent of the governed."  As we noted in State ex rel. 
Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 49-50, 132 N.W.2d 249 
(1965) even though art. I, § 1 is based on the Declaration of 
Independence, "there is no substantial difference" between its 
equal protection and due process provisions and that of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Thus, in our analysis of the NAACP's 
equal protection argument, the two constitutional provisions are 
treated as equivalent.  See id. at 50.  
No.  97-0270 
 
65
considered for the first time on appeal.  See Binder v. City of 
Madison, 72 Wis. 2d 613, 618, 241 N.W.2d 613 (1976); Wirth v. 
Ehly, 93 Wis. 2d 433, 443, 287 N.W.2d 140 (1980).  This rule is 
not absolute, however, and exceptions are made.  See Binder, 72 
Wis. 2d at 618; Cords v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 42, 54, 214 N.W.2d 
405 (1974).  In this case, all the issues raised are legal 
questions that can be disposed of "based upon a consideration of 
the record."  State v. Conway, 34 Wis. 2d 76, 83, 148 N.W.2d 721 
(1967); see Smith v. Katz, No. 96-1998, op. at 9 (S. Ct. June 2, 
1998); Wirth, 93 Wis. 2d at 443-44.  In the interests of 
judicial economy and the finality of this decision, we exercise 
our discretion to decide the entire case while it is before us. 
 See Carlson & Erickson Builders v. Lampert Yards, 190 Wis. 2d 
650, 656, 529 N.W.2d 905 (1995); Burger v. Burger, 144 Wis. 2d 
514, 518, 424 N.W.2d 691 (1988); Wirth, 93 Wis. 2d at 444.  We 
therefore proceed to address the NAACP's equal protection claim. 
¶105 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection 
provides "a right to be free from invidious discrimination in 
statutory classifications and other governmental activity."  
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980).  The central purpose 
of the Equal Protection Clause is to prevent "official conduct 
discriminating on the basis of race."  Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229, 239 (1976).  To show racial discrimination in 
violation of this guarantee, a plaintiff must show that a 
statute was enacted with a purpose or intent to discriminate.  
See id. at 242; see also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-265 (1977).  The 
No.  97-0270 
 
66
Supreme 
Court 
has 
adhered 
to 
this 
principle 
in 
school 
desegregation cases: "that there are both predominately black 
and predominately white schools in a community is not alone 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause."  Davis, 426 U.S. at 
240 (citing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S 189 (1973)).  
Even accepting the NAACP's allegations as true and construing 
them liberally, see Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d 
663, 669, 292 N.W.2d 816 (1980), we conclude that the NAACP's 
allegations do not support a claim of a violation of equal 
protection. 
¶106 In its facial challenge, the NAACP has not alleged, 
and we cannot reasonably infer, that the State acted with an 
intent to discriminate on the basis of race when the State 
enacted the amended MPCP.  Although the NAACP generally 
concludes that the purposes of the MPCP were expanded to include 
segregation of the races in the MPS, the NAACP does not allege 
that the State enacted the amended MPCP with the intent to 
discriminate based on race.  Nor does the NAACP allege that the 
private schools participating in the amended program have 
No.  97-0270 
 
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excluded students on the basis of race or have in any other way 
intentionally discriminated against students based on race.29 
¶107 We note that, on its face, the amended MPCP is race-
neutral.  As we have explained, the amended MPCP allows a group 
of students, chosen without regard to race, to attend schools of 
their 
choice. 
 
Furthermore, 
the 
amended 
MPCP 
requires 
participating schools to comply with the anti-discrimination 
provisions 
of 
42 
U.S.C. 
§ 
2000d. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 119.23(2)(a)4.  In addition, the participating schools are 
required to select program students on a random basis.  See id. 
at § 119.23(3)(a). 
¶108 None of the facts presented by the NAACP support a 
claim that the State enacted the amended MPCP with an intent or 
purpose to discriminate based on race.  Relying solely on the 
racial makeup of the MPS and of the private schools likely to 
participate in the amended MPCP, the NAACP alleges that the 
                     
29 In its brief and at oral argument, the NAACP relied 
heavily on Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).  The claims 
made in Norwood are distinguishable from those made by the NAACP 
in this case.  First, the plaintiffs in Norwood did not raise a 
facial challenge to the Mississippi textbook program, but rather 
challenged the program as it applied to particular private 
schools.  See id. at 457.  Second, unlike the NAACP in this 
case, the plaintiffs in Norwood alleged that the private schools 
receiving benefits under the textbook program had racially 
discriminatory policies and had excluded students on the basis 
of race.  See id.  Third, the plaintiffs in Norwood alleged that 
the State lent textbooks to private schools without regard to 
whether any of those schools had racially discriminatory 
policies.  See id. at 456.  In contrast to the program in 
Norwood, the amended MPCP requires that all participating 
schools comply with the anti-discrimination provisions of 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d.  See Wis. Stat. § 119.23(2)(a)4. 
No.  97-0270 
 
68
program violates equal protection because its likely effect will 
be to further segregate the MPS.  We recognize that an invidious 
discriminatory purpose may be inferred from the totality of the 
relevant facts, including the fact that a challenged law may, in 
effect, bear more heavily on one race than another.  See Davis, 
426 U.S. at 242.  We, however, can make no such inference in 
this case.  In its facial challenge, the NAACP cannot establish 
facts sufficient to show that the amended MPCP has had a 
disproportionate impact on one race or that its provisions have 
been applied so as to invidiously discriminate on the basis of 
race.  The NAACP's current facial challenge and our review in 
this case is limited to the statute on its face and to the 
stipulated facts.  From the record before us, we conclude that 
the NAACP has not sufficiently alleged that the State enacted 
the amended MPCP with the discriminatory intent necessary to 
establish an equal protection claim.  See Davis, 426 U.S. at 
238-48. 
¶109 While we accept as true the facts pled, we are not 
required to assume as true the legal conclusions pled by the 
NAACP.  See State v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 91 Wis. 2d 702, 720, 
284 N.W.2d 41 (1979).  We find that there are no circumstances 
under which the NAACP can prevail in its facial equal protection 
challenge to the amended MPCP.  We therefore conclude that the 
NAACP's claim must be dismissed as a matter of law for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  See Voss, 
162 Wis. 2d at 748; Evans v. Cameron, 121 Wis. 2d 421, 426, 360 
N.W.2d 25 (1985). 
No.  97-0270 
 
69
VII.  Severability 
¶110 Since 
we 
find 
that 
the 
amended 
MPCP 
passes 
constitutional scrutiny in all the issues presented before this 
court, we need not consider whether individual provisions are 
severable from Wis. Stat. § 119.23. 
VIII.  Injunction 
¶111 On August 25, 1995, this court granted an injunction 
enjoining implementation of all portions of the amended MPCP.  
After further proceedings, the circuit court dissolved this 
injunction for all portions of the amended program except with 
respect to the participation of sectarian private schools.  
Since we now conclude that the amended program is constitutional 
in its entirety, we order the circuit court to dissolve the 
injunction for all portions of the amended MPCP. 
¶112 When 
the 
injunction 
first 
issued 
against 
implementation of the amended MPCP, thousands of children who 
were eligible for full tuition under the program already had 
enrolled in or begun attending their new private schools.  Faced 
with having to remove their children from their chosen schools, 
many parents accepted private assistance to keep their children 
in those schools.  When the injunction is lifted, many of these 
students no longer will be eligible to participate in the 
amended MPCP because they are already attending private schools. 
 See Wis. Stat. § 119.23(2)(a)2.  Their ineligibility is no 
fault of their own, but instead is solely a consequence of this 
litigation.  Those children certainly are among the intended 
beneficiaries of this program.  To require them to return to MPS 
No.  97-0270 
 
70
for a year to reestablish eligibility would be manifestly 
inequitable and disruptive to the public schools, to the private 
schools, and most importantly, to the children themselves. 
¶113 In dissolving the injunction, we therefore remove the 
disability that the injunction placed on the school children, so 
that with respect to educational status, eligibility under the 
amended MPCP is determined on the date the injunction was 
issued. 
IX.  Conclusion 
¶114 In conclusion, based upon our review of both the 
statute now before us and the stipulated facts, we conclude that 
the amended MPCP does not violate the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment; Wis. Const. art. I, § 18; art. IV, § 18; 
art. X, § 3; or the Wisconsin public purpose doctrine.  We 
therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand the matter to the circuit court with directions to grant 
the State's motion for summary judgment, to dismiss the NAACP's 
facial equal protection claim, and to dissolve the injunction 
barring the implementation of the amended MPCP. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
 
¶115 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. did not participate.   
No. 97-0270.wab 
 
1 
¶116 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (dissenting).   I conclude, as 
did a majority of the court of appeals, see Jackson v. Benson 
213 Wis. 2d 1, 570 N.W.2d 407 (Ct. App. 1997), that the amended 
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program violates the prohibition 
contained 
in 
Wis. 
Const. 
art. 
I, 
§ 18, 
against 
state 
expenditures 
for 
the 
benefit 
of 
religious 
societies 
or 
seminaries.  For the reasons recited therein, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶117 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson joins in this dissent.