Case Title: E. Canton Edn. Assn. v. McIntosh

Citation: 1999-Ohio-282

Docket Number: 19972039

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-05-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as E. Canton Edn. Assn. v. McIntosh, 85 Ohio St.3d 465, 1999-Ohio-282.] 
 
 
 
 
 
EAST CANTON EDUCATION ASSOCIATION ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. MCINTOSH, 
APPELLEE; OSNABURG LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL., 
APPELLANTS. 
THE STATE EX REL. MCINTOSH, APPELLEE, v. OSNABURG LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as E. Canton Edn. Assn. v. McIntosh (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 465.] 
Schools — Teachers — Attainment of continuing service status by an eligible 
teacher is not dependent upon a written contract of employment between 
teacher and board of education — R.C. 3319.08 and 3319.11(B), construed 
— Torts — Defamation — Public school principal is not a public official for 
purposes of defamation law. 
1. 
The attainment of continuing service status by an eligible teacher is not 
dependent upon a written contract of employment between the teacher and a 
board of education.  If, after a teacher attains continuing service status, the 
board adopts a motion or resolution to employ the teacher under a 
continuing contract of employment, the teacher will be considered to be 
employed and serving under a continuing contract of employment.  (R.C. 
3319.08 and 3319.11[B], construed.) 
2. 
A public school principal is not a public official for purposes of defamation 
law. 
(Nos. 97-2039 and 98-834 — Submitted January 12, 1999 — Decided May 19, 
1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 96-CA-0293. 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, Nos. 97-CA-50, 97-CA-56 
and 97-CA-60. 
 
 
2
 
These appeals arise from complex, convoluted, and questionable procedures.  
Nevertheless, the precise procedural details of each case are largely irrelevant.  We 
accepted jurisdiction and consolidated the cases to consider (1) whether appellee 
John R. McIntosh had attained continuing service status as a teacher with the 
Marlington Local School Board of Education (“Marlington”), and (2) whether the 
Fifth Appellate District correctly concluded in its decisions that McIntosh was 
neither a public official nor a public figure for purposes of his defamation claims.1  
The supporting facts and procedural postures of the cases relevant to a proper 
determination of these issues are as follows. 
 
Beginning in 1966, McIntosh was hired by Marlington as a seventh grade 
social studies teacher under a limited contract of employment.  From the 1971-
1972 through the 1975-1976 school years, McIntosh was assigned guidance 
counselor duties, and he also performed some teaching functions in the district.  On 
April 8, 1975, Marlington voted to grant McIntosh a continuing contract of 
employment.  McIntosh does not recall if a written contract was ever entered into.  
In June 1975, McIntosh accepted an administrative position as an assistant 
principal with Marlington.  From the 1975-1976 through the 1980-1981 school 
years, McIntosh was employed by Marlington as an assistant principal, and, from 
the 1981-1982 through the 1986-1987 school years, he served as a principal in the 
district. 
 
Following his employment with Marlington, McIntosh was hired by 
appellant Osnaburg Local School Board of Education (“Osnaburg” or “board”).  
From the 1987-1988 through the 1989-1990 school years, McIntosh was employed 
by Osnaburg as the East Canton High School assistant principal, and, from the 
1990-1991 through the 1994-1995 school years, he served as the high school 
principal. 
 
 
3
 
In February 1995, McIntosh met with Osnaburg to discuss his employment 
status for the coming school year.  The board informed him that it intended not to 
renew his administrative contract, which was set to expire on July 31, 1995.  The 
board proposed to McIntosh that he resign his position as principal and that he 
could become an employee of the Stark County Department of Education.  
McIntosh refused to resign.  He advised the board that he was a tenured teacher 
and that he was entitled to reemployment within the district. 
 
In March 1995, Osnaburg notified McIntosh of its intention not to reemploy 
him.  Students became aware of the board’s intentions, and some began wearing 
“Keep Mac” ribbons.  The media also became involved.  On March 9, 1995, 
appellant Dr. George McGuire, the school superintendent, in the presence of two 
police officers, ordered McIntosh to vacate the school building, and he was placed 
on home assignment.  McGuire warned McIntosh that if he returned to the school, 
he would be considered a trespasser and that appropriate action would be taken 
against him.  Numerous students showed further support for McIntosh by not 
reporting to school, by leaving school during school hours, and by making signs.  
Some students held demonstrations outside the school building. 
 
In a letter dated March 10, 1995, McGuire informed McIntosh that he 
(McGuire) 
was 
going 
to 
recommend to 
the board 
that 
McIntosh’s 
“teaching/administrative contract(s) with the District be suspended and/or 
terminated” for, among other things, “gross inefficiency,” “immorality,” “willful 
and persistent violations of reasonable regulations of the Board of Education,” 
“ineffectiveness in maintaining appropriate student discipline,” “student safety,” 
and “condoning and/or promoting student unrest.”  McIntosh was also advised that 
he could appear before the board on March 13, 1995 “to show cause why your 
contract(s) should not be suspended and/or terminated.” 
 
 
4
 
Additionally, on March 10, 1995, appellant Sharon E. Griffith met with 
members of appellant East Canton Education Association (“ECEA”).  Griffith was 
president of ECEA.  According to Griffith, ECEA members voted at the March 10 
meeting “to issue a public statement addressing McIntosh’s actions.”  The “public 
statement” was written by appellant Mary Jo Slick, a labor relations consultant for 
appellant Ohio Education Association (“OEA”), and it was read by Griffith at the 
March 13, 1995 board meeting.2 
 
At the March 13 meeting, the board voted to suspend McIntosh and not to 
reemploy him at the expiration of his administrative contract.  Thereafter, the 
board held another meeting and, ultimately, did not renew McIntosh’s 
administrative contract.  The board concluded that he did not have a right to 
employment as a teacher in the school district.  Events surrounding McIntosh’s 
nonrenewal received considerable media attention. 
 
On March 17, 1995, McIntosh filed a complaint in the Stark County Court of 
Common Pleas (case No. 1995-CV-475), naming, as defendants, Osnaburg, the 
individual members of the board, and McGuire.  McIntosh sought a declaratory 
judgment, a writ of mandamus, an injunction, and monetary damages.  McIntosh 
alleged that he was a tenured teacher, that he should be afforded all rights and 
privileges pertaining to that status, and that he was entitled to continuing service 
status as a teacher with Osnaburg.  McIntosh also advanced, among other claims, 
allegations of defamation.  Specifically, McIntosh alleged that the charge of 
immorality and other statements made by McGuire and ratified by the board and its 
members were false and actionable. 
 
On December 22, 1995, ECEA filed a declaratory judgment action in the 
trial court (case No. 1995-CV-2208-1), seeking a determination that McIntosh had 
not attained continuing service status with Marlington.  ECEA also requested, in 
the alternative, that if the court should find that McIntosh had attained tenure status 
 
 
5
with Marlington, then he should not be allowed to displace or cause the layoff of 
any member of ECEA in the Osnaburg school district.  By amended complaint, the 
board was also made a party defendant in the case. 
 
On February 9, 1996, McIntosh responded to ECEA’s declaratory judgment 
action.  He filed an answer and a counterclaim against ECEA and a third-party 
complaint against Slick, Griffith, and OEA.  McIntosh’s third-party complaint 
against Slick and Griffith was brought against them in both their individual and 
representative capacities.  In his counterclaim and third-party complaint, McIntosh 
advanced various causes of action, including claims for defamation.  His 
defamation claims were predicated on passages contained in the statement 
prepared by Slick and read by Giffith at the March 13, 1995 board meeting. 
 
On August 22, 1996, Judge James S. Gwin, the trial judge assigned to case 
No. 1995-CV-2208-1, granted summary judgment in favor of ECEA, Slick, 
Griffith, and OEA, regarding all actions brought by McIntosh in his counterclaim 
and third-party complaint.  With respect to McIntosh’s defamation claims, Judge 
Gwin held that Slick and Griffith were not personally liable to McIntosh for any 
actions taken by them on behalf of the associations they represented, that McIntosh 
was a public figure, and that the statement prepared by Slick and read by Griffith at 
the March 13, 1995 board meeting did not contain defamatory language. 
 
On appeal, a panel of judges from the Ninth Appellate District sitting by 
assignment in the Fifth District Court of Appeals (case No. 96-CA-293) reversed 
the judgment of the trial court in part and affirmed it in part, and remanded the 
cause for further proceedings.  The court held, inter alia, that McIntosh was neither 
a public official nor a public figure and that genuine issues of material fact existed 
as to whether certain passages contained in the statement read by Griffith at the 
March 13, 1995 board meeting were defamatory. 
 
 
6
 
ECEA’s declaratory judgment action, case No. 1995-CV-2208-1, had been 
consolidated with McIntosh’s complaint, case No. 1995-CV-475.  (ECEA became 
a party in case No. 1995-CV-475 upon the consolidation of the cases.)  
Subsequently, on January 23, 1997, Judge John F. Boggins, the trial judge assigned 
to case No. 1995-CV-475, decided all the claims remaining in both cases and 
issued two judgment entries.  In one entry, Judge Boggins concluded that McIntosh 
had attained continuing service status as a teacher with Marlington and that he was 
entitled to employment as a teacher in the Osnaburg school district.  With respect 
to McIntosh’s other claims, including the claims for defamation, Judge Boggins, in 
the other entry, granted summary judgment in favor of the board, its members, and 
McGuire. 
 
On appeal, a panel of judges from the Seventh Appellate District sitting by 
assignment in the Fifth District Court of Appeals (case Nos. 97-CA-50, 97-CA-56 
and 97-CA-60) affirmed the judgment of the trial court in part, modified it in part, 
reversed it in part, and remanded the cause for further proceedings.  The court held 
that McIntosh had attained continuing service status with Marlington, that his 
tenure rights transferred from Marlington to Osnaburg, and that McIntosh was 
entitled to employment as a teacher in the Osnaburg school district.  The court also 
determined, among other things, that the trial court erred in dismissing McIntosh’s 
defamation claims against the board, its members, and McGuire. 
 
Each cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Green, Haines, Sgambati, Murphy & Macala Co., L.P.A., and Ronald G. 
Macala, for appellants East Canton Education Association, Ohio Education 
Association, Mary Jo Slick, and Sharon Griffith in case Nos. 97-2039 and 98-834. 
 
 
7
 
Brian L. Zimmerman; Allen Schulman & Associates Co., L.P.A., Allen 
Schulman, Jr., and Christopher J. Van Blargan, for appellee McIntosh in case Nos. 
97-2039 and 98-834. 
 
Michael J. Spetrino; Means, Bichimer, Burkholder & Baker Co., L.P.A., and 
Richard W. Ross, for appellants Osnaburg Local School Board of Education, and 
members of the board David D. Haubert, Phil A. Bushey, Francis Aquino, Betsy 
Ketchum, Reed C. Varian, and George McGuire, Superintendent of Osnaburg 
Local School District, in case Nos. 97-2039 and 98-834. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J. 
I 
 
ECEA, McIntosh, and the board filed stipulations with the trial court in case 
No. 1995-CV-2208-1.  In paragraph five they agreed that “[a]t its regular meeting 
of April 8, 1975, the Marlington Local School District Board of Education voted to 
grant Defendant McIntosh a continuing contract of employment.”  In paragraph six 
they stated further that “[a]lthough the Marlington Local School District Board of 
Education took such action at its April 8, 1975 meeting, Defendant McIntosh has 
no recollection that a continuing contract of employment was ever physically 
issued to, or executed by him.” 
 
ECEA correctly states that if McIntosh had attained continuing contract 
status as a teacher with Marlington in 1975, then he would be “entitled to a 
continuing contract [as a teacher] upon the non-renewal of his subsequent 
administrative employment” with Osnaburg.  This conclusion is supported by R.C. 
3319.11(B), which provides that “[t]eachers eligible for continuing service status 
in any * * * school district shall be those teachers qualified as described in division 
(B)(1) or (2) of section 3319.08 of the Revised Code, who within the last five years 
have taught for at least three years in the district, and those teachers who having 
 
 
8
attained continuing contract status elsewhere, have served two years in the district 
* * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  Moreover, in State ex rel. Kelley v. Clearcreek Local 
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 93, 556 N.E.2d 173, this court held 
that “[a] certified teacher who has attained continuing service status in one school 
district, and who has served at least two years as an administrator in a second 
school district, is entitled to a continuing service contract as a teacher in the second 
school district if the administrative contract is not renewed.”  Id. at syllabus. 
 
ECEA contends, however, that Osnaburg was justified in not reemploying 
McIntosh as a teacher in the district because McIntosh failed to establish that he 
actually attained continuing service status with Marlington.  ECEA points out that 
the record does not contain a written continuing contract of employment between 
McIntosh and Marlington.  Therefore, according to ECEA, in order to establish 
that he is entitled to continuing service status as a teacher with Osnaburg, 
McIntosh was required to comply with R.C. 3319.08, which he failed to do. 
 
R.C. 3319.08 states that “[t]he board of education of each * * * school 
district * * * shall enter into written contracts for the employment and 
reemployment of all teachers.”  (Emphasis added.)  However, entitlement to 
continuing service status as a teacher is not dependent upon a written contract of 
employment between the teacher and the board.  R.C. 3319.08 also provides that 
“[i]f the board adopts a motion or resolution to employ a teacher under a limited or 
continuing contract and the teacher accepts such employment, the failure of such 
parties to execute a written contract shall not void such employment contract.”  
(Emphasis added.)  See, also, State ex rel. Smith v. Etheridge (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 
501, 505, 605 N.E.2d 59, 62 (“Ordinarily, R.C. 3319.08 will validate a contract 
where the board does not put such contract in writing but the employee performs 
his or her duties as though a written contract were present.”). 
 
 
9
 
Specifically, ECEA points to the language “the teacher accepts such 
employment” in R.C. 3319.08, and asserts that, in the absence of a written contract 
between the teacher and the board, the teacher claiming continuing service status 
must present affirmative evidence that he or she had in fact accepted a continuing 
contract offer of employment.  In this regard, ECEA claims that McIntosh “has 
not, and cannot, establish such acceptance.”  ECEA states that “[t]here is no 
evidence in the record that [McIntosh] ever responded to the continuing contract 
offer; and, he did not commence performance pursuant to that offer of a continuing 
contract.  Rather, [McIntosh] expressly accepted the [Marlington] Board’s 
subsequent offer of a limited (one-year) administrative contract of re-employment 
for the 1975-1976 school year and executed a written contract evidencing that 
acceptance.  Plainly, the parties’ express and written agreement that [McIntosh] 
would be employed pursuant to a limited administrative contract for the 1975-1976 
school year precludes a contemporaneous finding that [McIntosh] was employed 
during that year under a continuing teaching contract.” 
 
We disagree.  ECEA misinterprets the statute.  In order to accept ECEA’s 
interpretation of R.C. 3319.08, we would have to add language to the statute that 
simply does not exist.  By its very terms, R.C. 3319.08 does not contain language 
that places an affirmative duty on the teacher to establish that he or she had in fact 
accepted a continuing contract of employment.  Rather, R.C. 3319.08, when read 
in conjunction with R.C. 3319.11(B)(1), supports a finding that the attainment of 
continuing service status by an eligible teacher is not dependent upon a written 
contract of employment between the teacher and a board of education.  If, after a 
teacher attains continuing service status, the board adopts a motion or resolution to 
employ the teacher under a continuing contract of employment, the teacher will be 
considered to be employed and serving under a continuing contract of 
employment.  In fact, the only qualifying condition precedent found in R.C. 
 
 
10
3319.11(B)(1) is if the board, by a three-fourths vote, refuses to reemploy the 
teacher.  Here, the board voted to grant McIntosh a continuing contract.  In such a 
case, the teacher will have attained continuing contract status.  Thus, we agree with 
the conclusions reached by the trial court and the panel of judges from the Seventh 
Appellate District sitting by assignment in the Fifth Appellate District that 
McIntosh had attained continuing service status as a teacher with Marlington in 
1975. 
 
We also reject ECEA’s assertion that McIntosh’s acceptance of the 
administrative contract, subsequent to Marlington’s vote to offer him a continuing 
contract of employment, served as a rejection of that offer, thereby waiving his 
continuing contract status.  R.C. 3319.02(C)3 expressly allows a teacher to accept 
an administrative position without jeopardizing his or her continuing service status 
as a teacher.  See, also, Kelley, supra.  Therefore, McIntosh did not waive his 
continuing teaching status upon subsequently accepting the administrative position 
with Marlington. 
II 
 
In case No. 96-CA-293, a panel of judges from the Ninth Appellate District 
sitting for the Fifth District Court of Appeals thoroughly reviewed relevant 
decisions from this court and the United States Supreme Court and concluded that 
McIntosh was neither a public official nor a public figure for purposes of his 
defamation claims.  This ruling regarding McIntosh’s status was, also, 
subsequently adopted by the panel of judges from the Seventh Appellate District 
sitting for the Fifth Appellate District in case Nos. 97-CA-50, 97-CA-56 and 97-
CA-60, “[s]o as to assure a consistent application of law within the context of the 
separate defamation claims.” 
 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 
L.Ed.2d 686, the United States Supreme Court held that the constitutional 
 
 
11
protections afforded by the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit a public 
official from recovering damages for alleged defamatory statements relating to his 
or her conduct unless the official can establish that the statement was made with 
actual malice.  The court declined, however, to determine “how far down into the 
lower ranks of government employees the ‘public official’ designation would 
extend for purposes of [the actual malice] rule, or otherwise to specify categories 
of persons who would or would not be included.”  Id., 376 U.S. at 283, 84 S.Ct. at 
727, 11 L.Ed.2d at 708, fn. 23.  However, guidance was provided later in 
Rosenblatt v. Baer (1966), 383 U.S. 75, 85, 86 S.Ct. 669, 676, 15 L.Ed.2d 597, 
605, where the court determined that “the ‘public official’ designation applies at 
the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or 
appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the 
conduct of governmental affairs.”  The court in Rosenblatt also observed that the 
New York Times rule is specifically applicable “[w]here a position in government 
has such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the 
qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general 
public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government 
employees.”  Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86, 86 S.Ct. at 676, 15 L.Ed.2d at 606.  And 
“[t]he employee’s position must be one which would invite public scrutiny and 
discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion 
occasioned by the particular charges in controversy.”  Id. at 87, 86 S.Ct. at 676, 15 
L.Ed.2d at 606, fn. 13. 
 
This court has not considered the issue whether a public high school 
principal is a public official for purposes of defamation law.  We have, however, in 
accordance with the Rosenblatt guidelines, considered the status of a high school 
superintendent and a high school teacher/wrestling coach.  In Scott v. The News-
Herald (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 243, 25 OBR 302, 496 N.E.2d 699, paragraph two of 
 
 
12
the syllabus, we held that a public school superintendent is a public official.  In 
Milkovich v. The News-Herald (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 292, 15 OBR 424, 473 
N.E.2d 1191, reversed in part on other grounds by Scott, supra, we determined that 
an individual is not a public official for purposes of applying the New York Times 
rule in a defamation action by virtue of his employment as a public high school 
teacher and head wrestling coach. 
 
Courts in other jurisdictions are divided whether public school principals 
should be accorded public official status.  Annotation, Who is “Public Official” for 
Purposes of Defamation Action (1996), 44 A.L.R.5d 193, 318-323, Section 30.  
However, we believe that the better view is that principals are not public officials 
for purposes of defamation law.  See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Moran (1981), 99 
Ill.App.3d 421, 424, 54 Ill.Dec. 913, 425 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (“The relationship a 
public school teacher or principal has with the conduct of government is far too 
remote, in our minds, to justify exposing these individuals to a qualified privileged 
assault upon his or her reputation.”); and Ellerbee v. Mills (1992), 262 Ga. 516, 
517, 422 S.E.2d 539, 540 (“[U]nder normal circumstances, a principal simply does 
not have the relationship with government to warrant ‘public official’ status under 
New York Times.  Principals, in general, are removed from the general conduct of 
government, and are not policymakers at the level intended by the New York Times 
designation of public official.”). 
 
Accordingly, we hold that a public school principal is not a public official 
for purposes of defamation law.  We affirm the findings of the Fifth Appellate 
District in this regard. 
 
We also agree with the Fifth Appellate District that, under the circumstances 
here, McIntosh is not a “public figure” as defined by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 
(1974), 418 U.S. 323, 345, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3009, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 808.  
 
 
13
Specifically, the Fifth District Court of Appeals, in case No. 96-CA-293, aptly 
observed and held: 
 
“As a high school principal, McIntosh did not assume a role of special 
prominence in the affairs of society.  He did not occupy a position of such 
persuasive power and influence that he can be deemed a public figure for all 
purposes as required by Gertz.  Nor did he thrust himself to the forefront of the 
public controversy that may have developed concerning his termination.  
According to the record before us, McIntosh left the high school on March 9, 1995, 
when ordered to do so by the Superintendent and armed police officers.  There is 
no evidence linking McIntosh to the actions of the students and parents who 
protested his termination.  Nor is there any evidence that McIntosh sought out the 
media to trumpet his cause.  Accordingly, the trial court erred in finding that 
McIntosh was a public figure and requiring that he be held to the New York Times 
standard of proving actual malice.” 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the Fifth Appellate 
District with respect to case Nos. 97-2039 and 98-834.  The causes are remanded 
to the Stark County Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
Judgments affirmed 
and causes remanded. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissents. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
The appellants in these consolidated cases have set forth additional issues for 
our consideration.  However, our holdings today are specifically confined to the 
 
 
14
issues considered, and we make no comment regarding the merits of any other 
issues addressed by the courts below or raised by the parties on appeal in this 
court. 
2. 
The statement written by Slick and read by Griffith at the March 13, 1995 
board meeting provides: 
 
“My name is Sharon Griffith and I am President of the East Canton 
Educators’ [sic] Association.  I am here tonight specifically authorized by our 
membership to address you on their behalf and to express their views on the recent 
events in our district.  In fact, the vote of our teachers was overwhelming — only 4 
no votes from the entire staff. 
 
“It is with great sadness that the staff here tonight felt it necessary to take the 
unusual step of publicly entering this debate.  Let there be no doubt, the ECEA 
supports the recommendation of the Superintendent and urges this Board to do the 
same. 
 
“This issue never was, and should not have become, one that was 
personalized around one individual.  Mr. McIntosh IS NOT the issue here tonight.  
Rather, the issue is whether or not representative democracy is alive and well in 
this district or shall we be governed hereafter by mob rule. 
 
“The people here tonight DO NOT represent the East Canton community.  
They can only represent themselves.  While they are certainly entitled to their 
opinions, they are elected by no one and accountable to no one.  On the other hand, 
this Board was elected by the entire community and is accountable at the ballot 
box.  That is the democratic process that has made this country great and protected 
the silent majority from small vocal self-interest groups such as those here tonight. 
 
“The proper function of any school board is to develop a philosophy of 
education that will guide the district and then to hire the very best Superintendent 
to lead the school team.  As in any team undertaking, there can only be one leader 
 
 
15
— one quarterback.  Otherwise, what you have is chaos.  This Board has selected 
its leader — Dr. McGuire. 
 
“Who in this room tonight is trained, experienced and authorized by law to 
evaluate John McIntosh?  Only Dr. McGuire.  Who in this room tonight knows 
ALL the facts and circumstances surrounding the performance of this principal, not 
just what he has chosen to share?  Dr. McGuire and the Board.  On what basis 
could the group of people here tonight possibly substitute their judgment for that of 
the Superintendent and the Board?  If the Board surrenders to making personnel 
decisions to those who show up and yell the loudest, they and this community can 
plan on this type of disruptive spectacle at every Board meeting.  And worst of all, 
what type of lessons are we teaching our children about respect for authority and 
process? 
 
“As I said a minute ago, this issue should never have been personalized.  
However, Mr. McIntosh has chosen to do so.  When discussing the Board’s charge 
that he had problems with disciplining students, he was quoted in the newspaper as 
blaming ‘weak teachers.’  I have personally reviewed every evaluation of each 
high school teacher.  There is not one criticism of any of the teachers, by Mr. 
McIntosh or any other evaluator, regarding student discipline. 
 
“For Mr. McIntosh to attempt to blame our high school staff for his alleged 
inadequacies is unconscionable.  The major job of a principal should be to properly 
and fairly evaluate teachers.  If the staff in this district was ‘weak in discipline’, it 
was Mr. McIntosh’s job to evaluate, record and deal with the problem.  He either 
failed to do so, or was less than honest when he made his statement to the press.  
How could this Board or community ever expect our staff to work for Mr. McIntosh 
as their supervisor or even with him as a fellow teacher after such a self-serving 
attack? 
 
 
16
 
“There are laws in this State that provide Mr. McIntosh or any school 
employee with certain due process rights.  The Association supports such a 
procedure.  If, in fact, he has truly been treated unfairly or illegally, why then did 
Mr. McIntosh not use the proper process?  It is just plain wrong for one person to 
exploit students and to allow a community to be torn apart with the circus-like 
atmosphere that has existed in this district. 
 
“Tonight it is this Board of Education that will be the teacher.  By your 
actions and decisions what shall you teach us?  Shall this community, staff and 
students learn from you that protest signs, name-calling, manipulation of the media 
and students, and angry crowds shall define the decision-making process for the 
Osnaburg Local School District. 
 
“Rather, the professional staff of the East Canton School District hopes that 
the lesson we learn from you tonight is that in a civilized society, the silent 
majority, representative democracy, accountability, and the proper process are 
important.  We owe our children no less.  Please support the process — please 
allow this Superintendent to do the job for which you hired him.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
3. 
R.C. 3319.02(C) states, “When a teacher with continuing service status 
becomes an assistant superintendent, principal, assistant principal, or other 
administrator with the district or service center with which the teacher holds 
continuing service status, the teacher retains such status in the teacher’s 
nonadministrative position as provided in sections 3319.08 and 3319.09 of the 
Revised Code.” 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I agree with the 
majority that McIntosh’s status as high school principal did not make him a public 
official for defamation purposes.  I do not believe, however, that either R.C. 
3319.08 or 3319.11(B)(1) supports the majority’s conclusion that a teacher eligible 
 
 
17
for continuing contract status can be presumed to have attained that status just by 
virtue of having been offered it by a school board.  Instead, the statutes require that 
the teacher without a written contract offer proof of continuing contract status plus 
acceptance through continued employment with the district. 
 
R.C. 3319.08 pertains to all teaching contracts.  It states the general rule that 
boards of education “shall enter into written contracts for the employment and 
reemployment of all teachers.”  (Emphasis added.)  It provides only one exception 
to this rule: “If a board adopts a motion or resolution to employ a teacher under a 
limited or continuing contract and the teacher accepts such employment, the 
failure of such parties to execute a written contract shall not void such employment 
contract.”  (Emphasis added.)  Any party seeking to enforce an unwritten contract 
under this exception, then, must demonstrate that (1) the board adopted the 
resolution, and (2) the teacher accepted it.  Failure to demonstrate these elements 
will render the unwritten contract void. 
 
The majority concludes that R.C. 3319.08 places no affirmative duty on 
McIntosh to establish acceptance of the contract.  It states that such a requirement 
would “add language to the statute that simply does not exist.”  But in State ex rel. 
Smith v. Etheridge (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 501, 505, 605 N.E.2d 59, 62, this court 
recognized that R.C. 3319.08 will validate an unwritten contract where the 
employee can show acceptance by “perform[ing] his or her duties as though a 
written contract were present.”  Thus, this court has previously acknowledged that 
evidence of acceptance is required.  To read the statute otherwise is to disregard 
the statutory phrase “and the teacher accepts such employment.” 
 
The majority also relies on R.C. 3319.11(B)(1) in concluding that a 
continuing contract presumptively exists here.  This statute provides that “[u]pon 
the recommendation of the superintendent that a teacher eligible for continuing 
service status be reemployed, a continuing contract shall be entered into between 
 
 
18
the board and the teacher unless the board * * * rejects the recommendation * * *.”  
The majority reads this to say that a contract automatically exists if the board does 
not reject the recommendation.  But to interpret the statute this way presumes that 
teachers do not decline offers and move on to other employment. Instead, R.C. 
3319.11(B)(1) must be read as providing for a second step after a recommendation, 
i.e., that a contract shall be entered into — a step whereby the board and the 
teacher become parties to a written contract, as required by R.C. 3319.08.  
Moreover, R.C. 3319.11(B)(1) details exceptions where existence of an unwritten 
contract will be presumed, and none of those exceptions applies here. 
 
Reading R.C. 3319.08 and 3319.11(B)(1) together, these statutes require a 
written contract between the board and the teacher unless one of the few specific 
exceptions applies.  There was no written contract between McIntosh and the 
Marlington board, and none of the R.C. 3319.11(B)(1) exceptions applies.  
Therefore, the only statutorily permissible means of establishing this contract is by 
demonstrating board approval and acceptance by the teacher, pursuant to R.C. 
3319.08.  It is undisputed that Marlington approved McIntosh for a continuing 
contract.  McIntosh, as the party seeking to enforce the unwritten contract, must 
then present some evidence of his acceptance of it in accordance with R.C. 
3319.08.  The evidence shows that McIntosh accepted and began performing an 
administrative contract with the Marlington district immediately after the 
Marlington board approved his continuing teaching contract.  Thus, McIntosh has 
not demonstrated acceptance of the teaching contract and, therefore, has not 
established his tenured teacher status through his Marlington employment. 
 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and judgment 
on this issue. 
 
 
19
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing opinion 
except to the extent that it concludes that John McIntosh was not a public official 
for purposes of defamation law. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  The majority has, in my view, made two 
erroneous findings: it has found John McIntosh to be entitled to continuing 
contract status as a teacher and it has found him to be a private figure for purposes 
of constitutional defamation law. 
 
It should also be observed that the majority has failed to address significant 
issues presented in these appeals, thereby depriving the courts, on remand, of 
guidance needed to reach a final resolution of this case.  Those issues include (1) 
whether, assuming McIntosh should be deemed a tenured teacher, he should also 
be deemed a member of the bargaining unit governed by the collective bargaining 
agreement existing between the Osnaburg Local Board of Education and the East 
Canton Education Association; (2) whether McIntosh failed to establish, prima 
facie, the elements of the torts upon which he bases his claims; (3) whether the 
appellants established the elements of common-law immunity defenses warranting 
entry of summary judgments in their favor; and (4) whether appellants’ speech is 
protected by Section 11, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, independently of the 
protection provided by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. 
 
I write separately to express my view on the first of the omitted issues and to 
express my opinion regarding the issues decided by the majority. 
I 
Continuing Contract Status 
 
I do not disagree with the law stated by the majority in the first paragraph of 
the syllabus.  However, adoption of the syllabus does not mandate the conclusion 
 
 
20
that John McIntosh should be deemed entitled to tenure as a teacher in the 
Osnaburg Local School District.  McIntosh simply never obtained continuing 
contract status as a teacher in the Marlington Local School District.  Therefore, 
continuing contract status could not remain with him when be became employed in 
the Osnaburg school district. 
 
Where parties have jointly stipulated to facts, the sole function of the court is 
to apply the law to the facts placed before it.  Cunningham v. J.A. Myers Co. 
(1964), 176 Ohio St. 410, 27 O.O.2d 379, 200 N.E.2d 305.  In the case at bar, the 
parties have stipulated that McIntosh taught under limited (not continuing) 
teaching contracts through the 1971-1972 school year and that he thereafter served 
primarily as a guidance counselor under additional limited teaching contracts.  
Thus, it follows from the express stipulations of the parties that, when the 
Marlington school board authorized issuance of a continuing contract for the 1975-
1976 school year to McIntosh, that authorization was for McIntosh’s first 
continuing teacher’s contract, with duties to begin in the fall of 1975 and 
continuing through the spring of 1976. 
 
In June 1975, however, the Marlington school board offered McIntosh a 
one-year administrative contract to serve as an assistant principal in the Marlington 
system for the 1975-1976 school year.  McIntosh chose to accept the school 
board’s offer of an administrative contract and served as an assistant principal, 
rather than a teacher, during the 1975-1976 school year.  By choosing to serve as 
an administrator, McIntosh abandoned any rights he may otherwise have had to 
insist on the execution of a written continuing teacher’s contract for the 1975-1976 
school year, or the right to teach that year.  One cannot accept employment to 
simultaneously be both a full-time teacher and a full-time administrator. 
 
The school board’s action in June offering to hire McIntosh as an 
administrator thus did not occur “after [McIntosh] attain[ed] continuing service 
 
 
21
status.”  The first paragraph of the syllabus does not apply to the facts of this case 
because McIntosh never accepted the offer of a continuing teacher’s contract and 
never obtained that status.  The syllabus describes consequences that follow after a 
teacher has attained continuing service status by both having been offered, and 
having accepted, a continuing contract. 
 
R.C. 3319.11 indeed creates presumptions that a teacher has accepted 
employment actually offered, or statutorily required to be offered, by a board of 
education “unless [the teacher] notifies the board in writing to the contrary on or 
before the first day of June” preceding the school year to be covered in the 
contract.  R.C. 3319.11(B)(1), (C)(2), (C)(3), (D), and (E).  I would hold that any 
such statutory presumption of acceptance is overcome where, as here, an employee 
offered both a contract to teach and a contract to serve as an administrator for the 
same school year chooses to accept the administrator position before having 
undertaken any teaching activities pursuant to the offered teaching contract.  Even 
though it might otherwise be presumed that acceptance of the school board’s offer 
to employ McIntosh as a teacher for the 1975-1976 school year occurred on June 1, 
1975, that presumption is clearly rebutted by the stipulations of the parties as to 
McIntosh’s subsequent actions in failing to undertake tenured teaching 
responsibilities pursuant to the offered teaching contract in favor of undertaking 
untenured administrative duties. 
II 
Bargaining Unit Membership 
 
In failing to address the parties’ conflicting arguments as to whether 
McIntosh is subject to the collective bargaining unit governing teachers at East 
Canton High School, the majority has presumably left undisturbed the decisions of 
the appellate courts that he is not a part of the East Canton Education Association 
bargaining unit.  Assuming, as does the majority, that McIntosh is entitled to be 
 
 
22
recognized as a tenured teacher, I cannot accept the premise that he is not included 
within that bargaining unit, which is defined as “all certificated personnel 
employed by the District [excluding] * * * casual substitutes who work less than 
(60) days in the same position, and those management, confidential and 
supervisory employees excluded under 4117 ORC.” 
 
If McIntosh is deemed to be a tenured teacher, he falls within this definition.  
His right, if any, to legally opt out of membership in the union does not affect his 
inclusion in the bargaining unit.  The conclusions of the appellate court to the 
contrary are clear error and should be recognized by the majority as such. 
III 
Constitutional Issues 
 
Since New York Times v. Sullivan, the law has recognized  “a federal rule 
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood 
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 
‘actual malice’ — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 
376 U.S. 254, 279-280, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 706.  Since 1974, the 
New York Times “actual malice” requirement has applied to plaintiffs found to be 
public figures as well as public officials.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), 418 
U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789. 
 
The majority concludes that John McIntosh was neither a public official nor a 
public figure as to the controversy surrounding the appellant school board’s efforts to 
terminate him from his position as principal of East Canton High School, a school of 
approximately three hundred twenty students in a comparatively small community.  
The legal consequence of such a conclusion is that McIntosh may recover damages 
if, on remand, he is able to prove that false and defamatory statements concerning 
him were made by the defendant school administrators and union representatives and 
 
 
23
that the making of those false statements resulted from mere negligence rather than 
actual malice, i.e., knowledge that the statements were false or with reckless 
disregard as to whether they were false or not.  New York Times v. Sullivan, supra. 
 
A review of the record and the law causes me to conclude, as did both trial 
courts in this consolidated case, that John McIntosh was both a public official and a 
public figure for purposes of his defamation claims and that his failure to proffer 
proof that appellants acted with actual malice entitles the appellants to summary 
judgments in their favor as to those claims. 
A 
Private Figure/Public Official Status 
 
I do not concur in paragraph two of the syllabus.  In adopting the sweeping 
rule that “[a] public school principal is not a public official for purposes of 
defamation law,” the majority has diminished the likelihood of open, free, and 
vigorous public debate concerning the operation of public schools and has 
contradicted this court’s prior recognition that “ ‘debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’ ”  Seven Hills v. Aryan Nations (1996), 76 
Ohio St.3d 304, 306, 667 N.E.2d 942, 946, quoting New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270, 84 S.Ct. at 721, 11 L.Ed.2d at 701.  I am not unmindful 
of the reality that school administrators as well as school board members are, at 
times, subjected to harsh and unfair criticism.  However, I believe that vigorous 
debate is indispensable to achieving the goal of improvement of the public schools 
and ultimately to the vitality of our democratic system. 
 
Public officials include “at the very least * * * those among the hierarchy of 
government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial 
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.”  Rosenblatt v. 
Baer (1966), 383 U.S. 75, 85, 86 S.Ct. 669, 676, 15 L.Ed.2d 597, 605.  In 
determining whether any particular government employee is a public official for 
 
 
24
purposes of a New York Times analysis, the test is whether that employee holds a 
“position in government [that] has such apparent importance that the public has an 
independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, 
beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all 
government employees.”  Rosenblatt at 86, 86 S.Ct. at 676, 15 L.Ed.2d at 606.  
Following a comprehensive review of cases, Professor Smolla has concluded that 
“there are relatively few examples of government-related defamation plaintiffs who 
are held not to be public officials subject to the New York Times standard * * * 
usually [those who] have a peripheral or transient connection to governmental 
activity, or are extremely low in the organizational hierarchy.”  (Emphasis sic.)  
Smolla, Law of Defamation (1998) 2-89 to 2-90, at Section 2.25[1]. 
 
The naming of a public school principal, particularly a high school principal, is 
an event widely published and discussed in many communities, as is the conduct of 
such individuals once they undertake the duties of their position.  This is particularly 
true in small communities the size of East Canton, where only one high school serves 
the entire community.  Principals in such communities are perceived to have 
significant influence over the schools they administer and are frequently deemed by 
the members of the community to be largely responsible for the educational quality 
of those schools.  In light of the generally held perception that high school principals 
exercise both responsibility and control over their schools, and because the provision 
of public education is a governmental function, I believe that many, if not all, public 
school principals will be found to meet the Rosenblatt test.  I further believe that the 
facts demonstrated by the record before us clearly justify the conclusion that 
McIntosh should be deemed a public official for purposes of resolving the 
defamation claims made by him, which clearly were related to McIntosh’s 
continuation in his public position. 
 
 
25
 
In Scott v. The News-Herald (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 243, 25 OBR 302, 496 
N.E.2d 699, this court held, as syllabus law, that a school superintendent is a public 
official for purposes of defamation law.  I cannot, nor does the majority attempt to, 
distinguish a school superintendent from a high school principal for purposes of 
determining public official status.  Both are school administrators.  Both are 
responsible for implementing the policies adopted by a local school board.  Both are 
expected to serve as public role models for students.  Both exercise supervisory 
authority over those who have more direct contact with the children of the 
community.  Many of these individuals assume active roles in the life of their greater 
communities.  As did the superintendent in Scott, high school principal McIntosh 
held a position in the community of East Canton in which “[p]ublic scrutiny of [his] 
official conduct, as well as those aspects of his private life which relate to his 
suitability for his position, was an inconvenience which he no doubt endured.”  Scott, 
25 Ohio St.3d at 256-257, 25 OBR at 313, 496 N.E.2d at 711 (Douglas, J., 
concurring).  Both school superintendents and principals hold positions which invite 
public scrutiny and discussion concerning them, based solely on the basis of the 
positions they hold.  Cf. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86-87, 86 S.Ct. at 676, 15 L.Ed.2d at 
606, fn. 13. 
 
In observing that we have previously rejected the contention that a high school 
wrestling coach was a public official, the majority fails to acknowledge that the 
Milkovich classification of a high school wrestling coach as a private figure was 
subsequently effectively overruled in Scott. (“ ‘To say that Milkovich [the wrestling 
coach] nevertheless was not a public figure for purposes of discussion about the 
controversy is simply nonsense.’  * * * Accordingly, we overrule Milkovich in its 
restrictive view of public officials and hold a public school superintendent is a public 
official for purposes of defamation law.” [Emphasis added.])  Scott, 25 Ohio St.3d at 
247-248, 25 OBR at 306, 496 N.E.2d at 704, quoting Justice Brennan, dissenting, 
 
 
26
Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich [1985], 474 U.S. 953, 964, 106 S.Ct. 322, 330, 88 
L.Ed.2d 305, 313-314. 
 
The majority cites as “the better view” two cases in which courts in other 
jurisdictions have refused to find public school principals to be public officials for 
purposes of defamation law.  I cannot agree, nor have the courts that ruled to the 
contrary in the following cases agreed: Johnson v. Robbinsdale Indep. School Dist. 
No. 281 (D.Minn.1993), 827 F.Supp. 1439; Kapiloff v. Dunn (1975), 27 Md.App. 
514, 343 A.2d 251; Palmer v. Bennington School Dist. (1992), 159 Vt. 31, 615 A.2d 
498 (elementary school principal); State v. Defley (La.1981), 395 So.2d 759, 761. 
 
The facts of a specific case might warrant a finding that a particular public 
school principal is not required to meet the New York Times actual-malice standard 
in a defamation action even though he or she is deemed to be a public official.  
This might occur where, for example, the claimed defamatory statement 
concerning the principal related to purely personal conduct unrelated to either the 
principal’s performance in, or fitness for, his or her position.  See New York Times 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283, 84 S.Ct. at 727-728, 11 L.Ed.2d at 708, fn. 23; Smolla, 
supra, at 2-100, Section 2.27[2]. Such a result would properly be grounded, however, 
not on a conclusion that the principal was not a public official, but rather on a failure 
of the defendant to demonstrate the second prong of the New York Times test, i.e., 
that the alleged defamatory statement “related to” the official conduct of the public 
official. 
 
I would not hold to a general rule that all public school principals necessarily 
should be deemed public officials, although I believe that in most cases they will 
qualify as such.  I believe instead that, ultimately, the determination of public 
official status should be determined on the basis of the particular facts surrounding 
the alleged defamation.  For the same reason, this court should not adopt a broad 
general rule of syllabus law precluding a finding of public official status as to all 
 
 
27
public school principals irrespective of the circumstances from which the alleged 
defamation arises. 
B 
Private Figure/Public Figure Status 
 
Assuming, arguendo, that John McIntosh is not a public official by virtue of 
holding the position of principal of East Canton High School, his conduct and the 
circumstances of the dispute in which he was engaged clearly justify the alternate 
conclusion that he had become a limited public figure at the time the alleged 
defamations occurred. 
 
Public figures “enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective 
communication” and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false 
statements than private individuals normally enjoy.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344, 94 
S.Ct. at 3009, 41 L.Ed.2d at 808.  Any person, regardless of his or her status as a 
government employee, may become a limited public figure (as opposed to persons 
who are public figures for all purposes by virtue of their having obtained great 
power or influence) as to public issues or controversies into which he or she injects 
himself.  Limited public figures are persons who have invited attention and 
comment by “thrust[ing] themselves to the forefront of particular public 
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.”  Gertz, 
418 U.S. at 345, 94 S.Ct. at 3009, 41 L.Ed.2d at 808. 
 
McIntosh brought legal claims of defamation against two groups of 
defendants.  In State ex rel. McIntosh v. Osnaburg Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 
McIntosh claimed that the superintendent of the local school district, the school 
board, and the individual members of the school board had defamed him in a written 
notice delivered to him on March 10, 1995 by the superintendent.  The notice stated 
that his termination was being contemplated based on McIntosh’s alleged acts of, 
inter alia, immorality, child endangerment, promoting student unrest, and causing a 
 
 
28
student boycott of classes.  In ECEA v. McIntosh, McIntosh asserted that 
representatives of the school district’s teachers’ union had defamed him in statements 
issued to the public on March 13, following a school board discussion of his 
proposed termination.  This discussion occurred in a closed executive session, despite 
McIntosh’s urgings that the meeting be held in public. 
 
McIntosh had earlier, in February, been told by the school board, meeting in 
executive session, that the board was unanimous in its determination that he should 
be terminated as principal.  He was at that time asked to submit his resignation, 
which he refused to do.  Appellants convincingly argue that McIntosh knew that 
his position could be salvaged only if the greater community demanded it. 
 
The majority accepts McIntosh’s characterization of himself as a private 
figure as to the controversy that erupted thereafter when his proposed firing 
became publicly known.  It reaches this conclusion despite the fact that McIntosh 
repeatedly met with members of the press, provided them with comments 
concerning the public debate surrounding his termination, and allowed a reporter 
and photographer access to his home, where his photograph was taken, and the 
photograph published in a March 11 article.  McIntosh not only was actively 
involved in the controversy — described in a newspaper editorial as one that had 
“consumed the community” — but also his personal future was at its very center. 
 
The majority accepts the premise that McIntosh remained a private figure, 
even though he shared the contents of the allegedly defamatory termination notice 
with a news reporter after receiving it. The majority affords McIntosh the 
protection provided by private figure status despite the fact that McIntosh spoke 
with members of the press one day after the meeting at which the allegedly 
defamatory statement was read by the union’s representative, and McIntosh was 
quoted as saying, “I think I have a responsibility to speak out, share my views and 
get things rectified.” 
 
 
29
 
McIntosh clearly attempted to influence the resolution of the public 
controversy that revolved around him. He acknowledged that shortly after he was 
told of the board’s decision not to renew his contract, it became “public knowledge” 
that his job as principal was in jeopardy.  He not only had access to media channels 
of communication but effectively utilized them by affirmatively cooperating with the 
press.  Rather than seeking to protect his privacy regarding his firing, he instructed 
his attorney to request that the school board’s discussions concerning his termination 
occur in open, rather than executive, session.  His attorney accordingly requested the 
school board, in writing, that “all matters relating to the employment status of Mr. 
John Richard McIntosh with the Osnaburg Local School District be held in a public 
hearing.” 
 
Having himself participated in the public arena in an attempt to save his job, 
he must “accept the heat of the fire as part of the price of entering the kitchen.” 
Smolla, supra, at 2-22, Section 2.06.  Whether he was linked to the actions of 
students and parents who supported him by participating in civil demonstrations, 
including student boycotts and ribbon campaigns, is simply not determinative. 
 
The facts surrounding the events at issue in this case cannot logically support 
the conclusion that McIntosh was a private figure for purposes of a Gertz First 
Amendment analysis.  He is a limited public figure as a matter of law.  Because 
McIntosh did not demonstrate that the appellants acted with actual malice in making 
the alleged defamatory statements, appellants are entitled to reinstatement of the 
summary judgments awarded them by the trial courts. 
 
I therefore dissent to the second paragraph of the syllabus, and to the 
judgment. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
 
30
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  I join in Justice Cook’s separate 
opinion and Chief Justice Moyer’s dissent, which conclude that R.C. 3319.08 and 
3319.11(B) require that the teacher without a written contract offer proof of 
continuing contract status and proof of acceptance through continued employment 
with the district.  I also join in Chief Justice Moyer’s dissent that a public school 
principal should be found to be a public official for purposes of defamation law. 
 
However, I write separately to address several issues raised regarding the 
written statement prepared by the representatives of the East Canton Education 
Association (“ECEA”).  For the reasons that follow, I would find, as the trial court 
did, that the statements were qualified or conditionally privileged communications 
under the Ohio and federal Constitutions.  Further, as such, I would find that 
Griffith and Slick, as representatives of ECEA, were acting within the scope of 
their employment and therefore are not individually liable for damages, and the 
privileged communication did not constitute intentional interference with the 
employment contract. 
Privileged Communication 
 
Section 11, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides,  “Every citizen may 
freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for 
the abuse of the right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty 
of speech, or of the press.”  This case presents the court with the task of balancing 
the free speech rights of Griffith and Slick with the protections afforded McIntosh 
against defamation. 
 
Slick and Griffith asserted the defense of privilege.  “A privileged 
communication is one which, except for the occasion on which or the 
circumstances under which it is made, would be defamatory, and actionable.  The 
defense of privilege is a matter of public policy in furtherance of the right of free 
 
 
31
speech.”  Costanzo v. Gaul (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 106, 108, 16 O.O.3d 134, 135, 
403 N.E.2d 979, 981-982. 
 
Further, 
“[t]he 
essential 
elements 
of 
a 
conditionally 
privileged 
communication” are (1) “good faith,” (2) “an interest to be upheld,” (3) “a 
statement limited in its scope to this purpose,” (4) “a proper occasion,” and (5) 
“publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only.”  Hahn v. Kotten 
(1975), 43 Ohio St.2d 237, 246, 72 O.O.2d 134, 139, 331 N.E.2d 713, 719, quoting 
33 American Jurisprudence (1941) 124-125, Libel and Slander, Section 126.  
McIntosh appears to dispute only whether the publication was made to proper 
parties.  McIntosh notes that Slick and Griffith published their statement not only 
to the school board, but also to hundreds of citizens and numerous news reporters 
who attended the public meeting.  The ECEA presented their statement only to the 
employer board of education.  However, McIntosh requested this public forum and 
insisted that the media had a legitimate interest in the proceedings, so he cannot be 
heard to complain of the consequences. 
 
I would find that the ECEA representative, Slick, made this statement in 
good faith and with a common interest to be upheld, i.e., the consequences to 
ECEA from McIntosh’s employment dispute and from McIntosh’s failure to 
adhere to the process bargained for by the union in contract disputes.  Further, the 
statement was limited in its scope to this purpose.  I would also find that the forum, 
called by McIntosh, was a proper occasion, and the publication was in a proper 
manner and to proper parties only. 
 
Accordingly, I believe that the statement made on behalf of the teacher 
employees of the board of education was a qualified or conditionally privileged 
communication under the Ohio and federal Constitutions.  As such, in the absence 
of ill motive or malice, the privileged statements are protected.  See 50 American 
Jurisprudence 2d (1995) 694-695, Libel and Slander, Section 365.  Therefore, I 
 
 
32
would find that the appellate court erred in concluding that a question of material 
fact remained as to whether ECEA’s statement was protected by qualified privilege 
such that McIntosh was required to establish actual malice in his defamation 
claims. Because McIntosh failed to prove actual malice, I would find that the trial 
court’s summary judgment should have been upheld. 
Acting Within the Scope of Employment 
 
Further, I would find that the ECEA representatives were acting within the 
scope of their employment and therefore are not individually liable for damages.  
R.C. 1745.02 provides, “A money judgment against [an] unincorporated 
association shall be enforced only against the association as an entity and shall not 
be enforceable against the property of an individual member of such association.”  
(Emphasis added.)  The ECEA is an unincorporated association.  Therefore, the 
court of appeals acknowledged that a judgment rendered against ECEA is against 
ECEA alone.  However, the court of appeals found that the record provided 
conflicting testimony as to whether Griffith and Slick were acting within the scope 
of their employment when they prepared and delivered a statement that McIntosh 
claims was beyond that which was authorized by the members.  I disagree. 
 
“An act of an agent is the act of the principal within the course of the 
employment when the act can fairly and reasonably be deemed to be an ordinary 
and natural incident or attribute of the service to be rendered, or a natural, direct, 
and logical result of it.”  Posin v. A.B.C. Motor Court Hotel (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 
271, 278, 74 O.O.2d 427, 431, 344 N.E.2d 334, 339, citing Tarlecka v. Morgan 
(1932), 125 Ohio St. 319, 181 N.E. 450. 
 
The ECEA, as the sole voice of those it represents, see In re SERB v. 
Worthington Classified Assn. (June 7, 1996), SERB No. 96-009, unreported, 
authorized Griffith and Slick to make a “neutral” statement supporting the process 
of “nonrenewing a principal’s contract.”  In my view, the statements made by Slick 
 
 
33
on behalf of the ECEA were just that, supportive of the process employed by the 
school board.  As such, I would find that Griffith and Slick were acting within the 
scope of their employment and they cannot therefore be held individually liable in 
a defamation action. 
No Intentional Interference with Contract 
 
Finally, I would find that the privileged communication did not constitute 
intentional interference with the employment contract.  “In order to recover for a 
claim of intentional interference with a contract, one must prove (1) the existence 
of a contract, (2) the wrongdoer’s knowledge of the contract, (3) the wrongdoer’s 
intentional procurement of the contract’s breach, (4) the lack of justification, and 
(5) resulting damages.”  Kenty v. Transamerica Premium Ins. Co. (1995), 72 Ohio 
St.3d 415, 650 N.E.2d 863, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
Because I would find that the communication made by the representatives on 
behalf of ECEA was privileged, the justification prong of Kenty is not established.  
Therefore, I would find that because Griffith and Slick were privileged in making 
the statement to the board of education, this constitutes justification sufficient to 
foreclose a tortious-interference claim by McIntosh. 
 
In addition, to the extent that McIntosh argues that the statement to the board 
of education tortiously interfered with his contract to teach, I would find no 
interference because, as noted earlier, I join in Justice Cook’s dissent finding that 
McIntosh has not demonstrated acceptance of the teaching contract, and, therefore, 
has not established his teacher tenure status through his Marlington employment. 
 
Accordingly, I join Chief Justice Moyer’s dissent from the majority opinion 
that a public school principal is not a public official for purposes of defamation 
law; I also join in Justice Cook’s separate opinion and Chief Justice Moyer’s 
dissent on the contract status issue; and I dissent separately and would reverse the 
portions of the judgment that held that summary judgment on the issue of personal 
 
 
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liability for Griffith and Slick was improper, and that the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment as to all claims of tortious interference with contract. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.