Case Title: Sprick v. Beach

Citation: 188 Kan. 296, 362 P.2d 24

Docket Number: 42,287

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1961-05-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
188 Kan. 296 (1961)
362 P.2d 24
TOM SPRICK, Appellee and Cross Appellant,
v.
MABEL I. BEACH, Appellant.
No. 42,287

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 13, 1961.
George P. Nellans, of Norton, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellant.
A.W. Relihan, T.D. Relihan, and Terry E. Relihan, all of Smith Center, were on the briefs for the appellee and cross appellant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROBB, J.:
This is an appeal from the trial court's judgment in a declaratory judgment action where the facts were uncontroverted.
On June 2, 1949, Arthur G. Stockman by warranty deed conveyed to his daughter, Mabel I. Stockman, later Mabel I. Beach, the 240 acres of land in question reserving a life estate to himself.
On August 11, 1959, Arthur, while living with his only other *297 child, Stella Sprick, and her husband, conveyed his life estate to Stella's husband, plaintiff herein. In September, 1959, plaintiff actively engaged in farming the land. He entered the premises and using his own labor, equipment and seed, and preparing the land, planted fifty acres of wheat and seven acres of winter barley.
On February 22, 1960, Arthur died and on March 25, 1960, defendant notified plaintiff he had no further right to enter the land. She claimed full right and ownership to the growing crops. In July, 1960, the wheat and barley crops in controversy were harvested by plaintiff.
The trial court's judgment was stated as follows in its formal journal entry:
Hence this appeal and cross appeal which present the question of who owns the growing crops as between the grantee of a life estate and the remainderman, when the life tenant and grantor of the life estate dies.
Authorities are scarce on the point as to the protection afforded the remainderman after a life estate (Kimberlin v. Hicks, 150 Kan. 449, 455, 94 P.2d 335) and this appears to be especially true in our jurisdiction because plaintiff challenges the applicability of the cases mentioned by defendant which we find are somewhat difficult to harmonize or apply. Furthermore, our research has produced no past decisions of this court that are particularly helpful in answering the question before us.
Defendant's first mentioned case is Wyandt v. Merrill, 107 Kan. 661, 193 Pac. 366, where we find plain and unambiguous rules announced. However, in the second case defendant cites (Snodgrass v. Carlson et al., 117 Kan. 80, 230 Pac. 83), a rule was announced which at that time was not considered by the court to overrule entirely the pronouncements in the Wyandt case because of this language:
*298 Defendant's last cited case is Cooper v. Cyr, 141 Kan. 236, 40 P.2d 375, where this court quoted that which we have just quoted above from the Snodgrass case, and added,
Deleting reference to the Wyandt case, the opinion in the Cooper case stated,
The judgment in the Cooper case was accordingly reversed and the cause remanded with directions to apportion the rental in accordance with the rules expressed in the Snodgrass case. The trial court in our case apparently was trying to follow the apportioning theory of the Cooper case.
The cases defendant cites are different from our case because they involved leases and not outright sales. It appears a more definite rule than a theory of apportionment should be established for deciding these cases.
The doctrine of emblements pertaining to corn, wheat or other annually produced crops of the earth is of common law origin, and is one yardstick to be used in determining rights of the remainder interests as against assignees, lessees, grantees, personal representatives, etc., of the holder of a life estate at the time of the death of such life tenant. The following statements may be helpful:
*299 And further:
In connection herewith, see, also, 31 C.J.S., Estates, § 40, p. 47.
Plaintiff seeks to have us apply and use the doctrine of emblements and cites Bradley v. Bailey, 56 Conn. 374, 15 Atl. 746, where it was held:
We believe that the foregoing is the most practical rule and adopt it for this jurisdiction. Anything stated in Cooper v. Cyr, supra, contrary to the views herein expressed is disapproved.
Applying the doctrine of emblements to our present case, we conclude that upon the death of the holder of the life estate, Arthur G. Stockman, after he had conveyed his life estate to plaintiff, plaintiff owned and had the right of entry to the land to harvest the mature wheat, barley and straw which had been planted prior to the death of Stockman.
The judgment is reversed and remanded with directions to enter judgment for plaintiff according to the views expressed herein.
Reversed and remanded with directions.