Case Title: Marks v. Super. Ct.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S085224

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 1/28/02
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
DELANEY GERAL MARKS,
)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
S085224
v.
)
)
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
)
Alameda County
ALAMEDA COUNTY,
)
Super. Ct. No. 109184
)
Respondent;
)
__________________________________ )
)
THE PEOPLE,
)
)
Real Party in Interest.
)
__________________________________ )
Appeal from a judgment of death is automatic.  (Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b).)  If, as in most cases, the defendant is indigent, this court will appoint
counsel to prosecute the appeal.  (Id., § 1240.1.)  Until 1998, appointed counsel’s
obligations also included “a duty to investigate factual and legal grounds for the
filing of a petition for writ of habeas corpus.”  (Cal. Supreme Ct., Policies
Regarding Cases Arising from Judgments of Death, policy 3, former std. 1-1; see
In re Sanders (1999) 21 Cal.4th 697, 717-718; see also In re Anderson (1968) 69
Cal.2d 613.)  Since 1998, the court’s policies have alternatively provided for the
appointment of separate counsel to represent death penalty defendants on direct
appeal and in habeas corpus/executive clemency proceedings.  We issued an order
to show cause in this matter to clarify the authority of habeas corpus counsel to
2
participate in the correction, augmentation, and settlement of the record on appeal.
Having assessed considerations of both policy and practicality, we conclude that,
should the timing of the appointment permit, habeas corpus counsel may submit to
appellate counsel suggestions for correction, augmentation, and settlement.
Appellate counsel, however, retains ultimate and plenary control of the record
correction process1 on the defendant’s behalf, bearing in mind the obligation to
“consult with and work cooperatively with habeas corpus counsel.”  (Cal.
Supreme Ct., Policies Regarding Cases Arising from Judgments of Death, policy
3, std. 1-1 (Supreme Court Policies).)
Accordingly, respondent court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
permit petitioner’s habeas corpus counsel to participate in record correction.  We
further conclude, however, that the procedures utilized for settling the statement
on appeal substantially failed to conform to rules 7 and 36(b) of the California
Rules of Court.2  In the interests of judicial economy since the matter is currently
before us, we will exercise our inherent authority to direct resettlement in
conformance with the prescribed procedure.  (Cf. People v. Wright (1990) 52
Cal.3d 367, 401, fn. 6.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner Delaney Geral Marks was sentenced to death on June 3, 1994.
On September 22, 1998, this court appointed Richard Power (Power; appellate
counsel) to represent him on direct appeal.  On March 18, 1999, the court
                                                
1 
In general, references to “record correction” and “record correction
process” throughout this opinion will include correction and augmentation of the
record and settlement of the statement on appeal.
2 
Hereafter, all references to rule or rules are to the California Rules of Court.
3
appointed the Habeas Corpus Resource Center (HCRC; habeas corpus counsel) to
represent him in habeas corpus and executive clemency proceedings.
On June 3, 1999, Power filed “Appellant’s Request for Correction of
Record, Augmentation of Record, Viewing and Distribution of Sealed Record,
Preparation of Settled Statement” (Appellant’s Request for Correction).
Thereafter, the HCRC electronically transmitted to Power four documents
containing suggested additional record corrections for his review.  These
documents also identified several apparently unreported proceedings and
unreported comments by defendant in open court.  Power had no objection to the
additional requests, which did not duplicate any he had already submitted; but he
did not formally incorporate any of the HCRC’s documents in his previously filed
request.
At a record correction hearing held July 23, 1999, before respondent
superior court (Judge Jeffrey Horner), both appellate and habeas corpus counsel
appeared as did Albert Thews, who had represented petitioner at trial, and Judge
Kenneth Burr, who had been the deputy district attorney.  Also present was
Assistant District Attorney James Anderson, who had been the prosecutor during a
Penal Code section 1368 competency hearing.  Neither Deputy Public Defender
Susan Sawyer, who had represented petitioner at that hearing, nor Judge Michael
Ballachey, who had presided, was present.
Neither the court nor any other participant objected to the HCRC’s
presence, and habeas corpus counsel actively participated.  Power apprised
respondent of the HCRC’s suggestions for correction and augmentation of the
record and distributed printed copies of the HCRC’s documents to the court clerk
and the district attorney.  The HCRC explained these documents were drafts for
appellate counsel’s review and requested permission to file a finalized pleading as
an addendum to Appellant’s Request for Correction, a request Power seconded.
4
The HCRC subsequently filed its documents as “Addendum to Appellant’s
Request for Correction of Record, Augmentation of Record, Viewing and
Distribution of Sealed Record, Preparation of Settled Statement Filed June 3,
1999” (Addendum).
In the course of the hearing, numerous gaps in the recorded proceedings
appeared, which would require contacting several other parties, including those
involved in petitioner’s competency hearing, to determine appropriate settlement.
The HCRC expressed a willingness to assist in this effort.  While respondent did
not expressly authorize the HCRC’s involvement in this regard, neither did it
reject the offer.  Respondent continued the hearing to November 12, 1999.
In the meantime, the HCRC continued to review additional portions of the
record, including four boxes of juror questionnaires, to determine whether
additional correction or augmentation was needed.3  Based on this review, the
HCRC sent to appellate counsel on November 1, 1999, a draft of further record
correction requests for his consideration and comment.  Although he had no
objection to any of the requests, Power declined to amend his original motion
because in his view these requests were not relevant to petitioner’s appeal.
Instead, he suggested the HCRC file a motion directly with respondent court,
which the HCRC did on November 9, 1999, as “Defendant’s Supplemental
Request for Correction of Record, Augmentation of Record, Viewing and
Distribution of Sealed Record, Preparation of Settled Statement” (Supplemental
Request).
                                                
3 
Power had previously indicated he did not need to have the juror
questionnaires provided to him.
5
At the November 12 hearing, appellate counsel and the HCRC again
appeared on behalf of petitioner.4  When the hearing commenced and without
prior notice, Anderson stated that on behalf of both the Attorney General and the
district attorney he objected to further participation by the HCRC in the record
correction process.  Respondent then ruled the HCRC lacked “standing” to appear
or submit pleadings or other documents on behalf of petitioner in the current
proceedings.5  Respondent based this ruling, at least in part, on its belief that the
Addendum had substantially duplicated Appellant’s Request for Correction
resulting in considerable extra effort in reviewing the requests.  It was later
discovered that the court had inadvertently compared the draft and finalized
versions of the same HCRC documents, copies of the former having been
provided to the court clerk by Power on July 23, 1999.  The court further
determined petitioner’s Supplemental Request was untimely and declined to file it
on that basis rather than lack of standing.
Following its rulings, respondent distributed the “Court’s Settled Statement
Re:  Suggested Corrections to Reporter’s Transcript/Unreported Chambers
                                                
4 
Shortly prior to the hearing, habeas corpus counsel observed Anderson
enter the courtroom from Judge Horner’s chambers.  In support of the brief in
opposition, the Attorney General has submitted a declaration by Anderson
acknowledging he had an in camera ex parte discussion with Judge Horner prior to
the November 12 hearing, but denying the discussion concerned any matter
relating to the hearing except that Anderson would be representing the Attorney
General’s Office as well as the district attorney.  Petitioner has submitted no
evidence to the contrary.
5 
The court also ruled HCRC could no longer independently view or copy
court files or exhibits; appellate counsel must accompany anyone conducting such
review.  Apparently, the Alameda County Superior Court does not generally
restrict access to superior court files; the only restriction is that an exhibit
technician must accompany anyone viewing exhibits.  Accordingly, the Attorney
General “agrees that habeas counsel should be allowed [whatever] access [is]
afforded under the county’s procedures . . . .”
6
Discussions – Guilt and Penalty Trials in Department 13 Before Judge Horner”
(Court’s Settled Statement) and ordered that it be the final settled statement for all
settlement requests relating to those phases of petitioner’s trial.
A third record correction hearing was held December 10, 1999, at which
time the HCRC submitted a “Motion To Reconsider the Court’s Ruling of
November 12, 1999” (Motion To Reconsider) seeking reconsideration of (1) the
ruling on “standing,” (2) the preparation and filing of the Court’s Settled
Statement as contrary to the rules, and (3) the refusal to file petitioner’s
Supplemental Request.  Anderson reiterated opposition to the HCRC’s
participation in record correction.  Power took no position other than to defer to
the HCRC.  Respondent denied the Motion To Reconsider in its entirety.
The court then indicated it was prepared to settle those portions of the
record regarding the competency hearing referenced in the Addendum.  In addition
to Anderson, Sawyer was present, but Judge Ballachey was not.  Based on
counsel’s recollections or lack thereof, respondent settled the statement and then
certified the record on appeal.
Petitioner now seeks review of the denial of his Motion To Reconsider.
DISCUSSION
I.
At the second record correction hearing, both respondent court and
appellate counsel noted that recent changes in this court’s procedures for
appointment of counsel following a judgment of death had given rise to some
procedural uncertainty in the correction process.  As respondent expressed the
point, “cooperation between [habeas corpus and appellate counsel] doesn’t
necessarily mean that everyone gets to file a separate brief, everyone gets to file a
separate request. . . .  The fact that I was responding to a multiplicity of moving
papers, requests, certification notices resulted in multiplying my time by a factor
7
far greater than two, and that is something that I know that the Supreme Court and
the Judicial Council are all very concerned with, the expenditure of the Court’s
time.”
For some perspective on the issue, a brief ov
erview of the historical context
is helpful.
Prior to 1998, all death penalty appointments were dual, i.e., were for both
the direct appeal and habeas corpus/executive clemency proceedings.  (See
generally Supreme Ct. Policies, policy 3, former std. 1-1, as adopted June 6, 1989;
Cal. Supreme Ct., former Guidelines for Fixed Fee Appointments, on Optional
Basis, to Automatic Appeals and Related Habeas Corpus Proceedings in the
California Supreme Court, as amended Feb. 4, 1998; Cal. Supreme Ct., former
Payment Guidelines for Appointed Counsel Representing Indigent Criminal
Appellants in the California Supreme Court, as amended Feb. 4, 1998.)6  With
respect to the appeal, counsel’s responsibilities included record review and
correction.  (See Cal. Supreme Ct., Guidelines for Fixed Fee Appointments, on
Optional Basis, to Automatic Appeals and Related Habeas Corpus Proceedings in
the California Supreme Court, guideline 5 (Fixed Fee Guidelines); Cal. Supreme
Ct., Payment Guidelines for Appointed Counsel Representing Indigent Criminal
Appellants in the California Supreme Court, guideline II.I (Payment Guidelines).)
Policy 3 further provided that “[a]ppellate counsel . . . shall have a duty to
investigate factual and legal grounds for filing of a petition for writ of habeas
corpus.  The duty to investigate is limited to investigating potentially meritorious
                                                
6 
This case does not raise any question governed by a previous version of the
applicable statutes, court rules, or Supreme Court Policies and Fixed Fee and
Payment Guidelines.  Therefore, unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent
references are to the current provisions.
8
grounds for relief that have come to counsel’s attention in the course of preparing
the appeal.”  (Supreme Ct. Policies, policy 3, former std. 1-1, as adopted June 6,
1989.)
Beginning in 1998, this court modified its policies and the guidelines for
payment of counsel in response to certain state and federal statutory changes
intended to expedite review in death penalty cases.  (In re Robbins (1998) 18
Cal.4th 770, 792, fn. 13; see, e.g., Gov. Code, former § 68650 et seq., added by
Stats. 1997, ch. 869, § 3, and renumbered § 68660 et seq. by Stats. 1998, ch. 485,
§ 95; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132
(Apr. 24, 1996) 110 Stat. 1214; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254.)  The Supreme Court
Policies, Fixed Fee Guidelines, and Payment Guidelines now provide for the
option of appointing separate counsel to represent death penalty defendants on
direct appeal and in habeas corpus/clemency proceedings.  In such case,
“appointment of habeas corpus counsel for a person under a sentence of death
shall be made simultaneously with appointment of appellate counsel or at the
earliest practicable time thereafter.”  (Supreme Ct. Policies, policy 3, std. 2-1.)
With respect to the appointment of habeas corpus counsel, the Legislature
has established the HCRC, which is authorized “[t]o employ up to 30 attorneys
who may be appointed by the Supreme Court to represent any person convicted
and sentenced to death in this state . . . for the purpose of instituting and
prosecuting postconviction actions in the state and federal courts, challenging the
legality of the judgment or sentence imposed against that person, and preparing
petitions for executive clemency.  Any such appointment may be concurrent with
the appointment of the State Public Defender or other counsel for purposes of
direct appeal under Section 11 of Article VI of the California Constitution.”  (Gov.
Code, § 68661, subd. (a).)
9
In the case of bifurcated appointments, the Supreme Court Policies impose
on appellate counsel the duty to “take and maintain detailed, understandable and
computerized transcript notes and . . . compile and maintain a detailed list of
potentially meritorious habeas corpus issues that have come to appellate counsel’s
attention” in the course of preparing the appeal.  (Supreme Ct. Policies, policy 3,
std. 1-1.)  Until the appointment of habeas corpus counsel, he or she also has the
duty to “preserve evidence that comes to the attention of appellate counsel if that
evidence appears relevant to a potential habeas corpus investigation.”  (Ibid.)
Upon appointment of habeas corpus counsel, “appellate counsel shall deliver . . .
copies of the list of potentially meritorious habeas corpus issues, copies of the
transcript notes, and any preserved evidence relevant to a potential habeas corpus
investigation, and thereafter shall update the issues list and transcript notes as
warranted.”  (Ibid.)
Separate habeas corpus counsel “shall have a duty to investigate factual and
legal grounds for the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  The duty to
investigate is limited to investigating potentially meritorious grounds for relief that
come to counsel’s attention in the course of reviewing appellate counsel’s list of
potentially meritorious habeas corpus issues, the transcript notes prepared by
appellate counsel, the appellate record, trial counsel’s existing case files, and the
appellate briefs, and in the course of making reasonable efforts to discuss the case
with the defendant, trial counsel and appellate counsel.”  (Supreme Ct. Policies,
policy 3, std. 1-1.)  As noted in In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 792,
footnote 13, this language “merely clarifies the previously imposed duty, and
accounts for the involvement, under the recent legislation, of separate direct
appeal and habeas corpus counsel.  The amendment effects no substantive change
in the scope of counsel’s duty to conduct a habeas corpus investigation.”  In this
regard, the Supreme Court Policies anticipate that appellate counsel “shall consult
10
with and work cooperatively with habeas corpus counsel to facilitate timely
investigation, and timely preparation and filing (if warranted) of a habeas corpus
petition by habeas corpus counsel.”  (Supreme Ct. Policies, policy 3, std. 1-1.)
II.
A.
Having described the legal and historical background against which this
case arises, we turn to the threshold issue of respondent’s ruling that the HCRC
did not have standing to participate in the record correction process.
The legal concept of standing arises in a variety of contexts.  (See, e.g.,
Klopstock v. Superior Court (1941) 17 Cal.2d 13, 17-19 [distinguishing between
lack of capacity to sue and lack of right to sue corporation by legatee, rather than
personal representative, of deceased shareholder]; Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439
U.S. 128, 139 [defendant’s challenge to unlawful search or seizure depends upon
whether he “is asserting his own legal rights and interests rather than basing his
claim for relief upon the rights of third parties”].)  In whatever context, however, it
generally does not concern the authority of an attorney to appear in court in a
representative capacity.  (Cf. People ex rel. Tyler v. Pratt (1866) 30 Cal. 223.)
Clearly, petitioner as a party to the appeal had standing to participate in record
correction proceedings.  Equally clearly, Power, as appellate counsel, had
authority to and did appear on his behalf.  (See rules 35(c), 36(b); Supreme Ct.
Policies, policy 3, std. 2-1; Fixed Fee Guidelines, guideline 5; see also Pen. Code,
§ 190.8, subd. (g); rule 39.55(b).)  The only question is whether the HCRC, as
habeas corpus counsel, could separately appear and participate.
Characterizing the HCRC as “cocounsel,” petitioner argues habeas corpus
counsel has essentially the same authority to appear as appellate counsel, albeit for
a different purpose.  If not inaccurate, this description is at least inexact, since
habeas corpus counsel and appellate counsel are appointed independently to
11
discharge distinct and essentially unrelated functions on behalf of a death penalty
defendant.  (See Supreme Ct. Policies, policy 3, std. 2-1; Fixed Fee Guidelines,
guideline 5; Payment Guidelines, guideline II.I; see also Pen. Code, § 1473.)
Petitioner also characterizes respondent’s action as “curtailing petitioner’s right to
habeas corpus counsel” and in effect removing his attorney.  This begs the
question, however, since the scope of habeas corpus counsel’s authority to
participate in record correction is the very issue now before this court, and in any
event petitioner was not without representation by the attorney principally charged
with these responsibilities.  (Cf. Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications
(1975) 14 Cal.3d 678, 697 [trial court’s action improper in abruptly removing
deputy public defenders and replacing them with unprepared substitute counsel in
ongoing proceedings].)
We conclude the scope of authority to participate should reflect the purpose
and attendant duties of the separate appointments.  This court’s policies and
guidelines, as well as the court rules and statutes, both explicitly and implicitly
contemplate appellate counsel will assume primary, if not exclusive, control of
record correction on behalf of a death penalty defendant.  Accordingly, habeas
corpus counsel should have no direct or active role in that process.
As relevant here, Supreme Court Policies, policy 3, standard 2-1, states,
“This court’s appointment of appellate counsel for a person under a sentence of
death is for the following:  (i) pleadings and proceedings related to preparation and
certification of the appellate record; (ii) representation in the direct appeal before
the California Supreme Court . . . .”  (See Fixed Fee Guidelines, guideline 5
[progress payment made following submission of “a draft first request for
correction of the record (and, if appropriate, any motion for augmentation and/or
settled statement)”; additional payment due “after certification of the record”]; see
also Payment Guidelines, guideline II.I.)  No comparable duty devolves to habeas
12
corpus counsel, nor does habeas corpus counsel receive payment for completing
these tasks.  (See Supreme Ct. Policies, policy 3, std. 2-1; Fixed Fee Guidelines,
guideline 5; Payment Guidelines, guideline II.I.)
By contrast, “[t]he appointment of habeas corpus counsel is for the
following:  (i) investigation, and preparation and filing (if warranted), of a habeas
corpus petition in the California Supreme Court, including any informal briefing
and evidentiary hearing ordered by the court and any petition to exhaust state
remedies . . . .”  (Supreme Ct. Policies, policy 3, std. 2-1; see Fixed Fee
Guidelines, guideline 5; Payment Guidelines, guideline II.I.)  To that end,
“[h]abeas corpus counsel should expeditiously investigate potentially meritorious
bases for filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  If the timing of separate
appointments permits, this investigation should be done concurrently with
appellate counsel’s review of the appellate record and briefing on appeal . . . .”
(Supreme Ct. Policies, policy 3, std. 2-2.)  Thus, notwithstanding that potentially
meritorious claims may appear in the record on appeal (see In re Robbins, supra,
18 Cal.4th at p. 793, fn. 15), the terms of the policies do not contemplate habeas
corpus counsel’s participation in the correction process.
Neither does any statutory authority or the rules.  Penal Code section 190.6,
subdivision (a), articulates the Legislature’s finding “that the sentence in all capital
cases should be imposed expeditiously.”  Section 190.8 of the Penal Code sets
forth the procedure and timing for prompt certification of the record on appeal for
completeness and accuracy; rules 39.50 through 39.57 implement its directives.
Although these provisions apply only to cases in which trial commenced after
January 1, 1997 (rule 39.53(b)), they inform our determination of the question
presented.
Pursuant to Penal Code section 190.8, subdivision (b), the clerk and court
reporter are to begin preparation of the trial transcripts within 30 days of the
13
imposition of death.  Certification occurs “in two stages, the first for completeness
and the second for accuracy . . . .”  (Id., subd. (a).)  Under rule 39.54, the
transcripts are delivered to defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney, who
must submit declarations either stating that they have determined the transcripts
are complete or requesting the inclusion of additional materials or the correction of
errors.  (Rule 39.54(c).)  The trial court may not certify the record as complete
except upon the submission of such declarations.  (Rule 39.54(e); see also Pen.
Code, § 190.8, subd. (e).)
Rule 39.55 governs certification of the record for accuracy.  (See also Pen.
Code, § 190.8, subd. (g).)  Following delivery of the record, “[a]ppellate counsel
shall file any request for corrections or additional transcripts” within a specified
time.  (Rule 39.55(b).)  This rule applies to both defense counsel and the
prosecutor.  (See Pen. Code, § 190.8, subd. (i).)  The trial court then holds a
hearing “to address the completeness and accuracy of the record, in accordance
with the procedures and timeliness set out in rule 39.54(d)” (rule 39.55(c)); orders
any necessary corrections or additions; and certifies the record as accurate (rule
39.55(d)).
Although rule 35 governs petitioner’s case (see rule 39.53(b)) and its
procedures differ somewhat in detail and time limits from rules 39.50 through
39.57, for present purposes it describes essentially the same process for correction
and augmentation of the record.  Rule 35(c)(3) provides that upon completion of
the clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts, “a copy shall be delivered to counsel on
appeal . . . .”  Thereafter, “any party may serve and file a request for correction of
these transcripts . . . .  The trial judge shall determine whether the requested
corrections shall be made . . . .  After corrections have been made, the judge shall
certify that all objections have been determined, and that the transcripts have been
14
corrected in accordance with such determination, and shall redeliver the transcripts
to the clerk.”  (Rule 35(c)(4).)
None of the foregoing assigns any role to habeas corpus counsel in record
correction.  Nevertheless, the question remains whether this court should, in the
exercise of its inherent authority in these matters, authorize habeas corpus
counsel’s involvement and, if so, under what circumstances and to what extent.
Petitioner asserts the “HCRC’s participation in the record correction phase
of this case is directly and intrinsically related to the ultimate preparation of
habeas corpus claims.”  We reject this argument for several reasons.
First, petitioner submits no particulars in which the record as certified may
be deficient for the purpose of preparing habeas corpus claims on his behalf.  As
discussed more fully below, the appellate record does not provide the basis for
raising such claims but only for developing them based on matters outside the
record.  Petitioner identifies no potential claim that the HCRC’s exclusion from
record correction will prevent him from adequately developing.
Second, to the extent the argument implies habeas corpus claims derive
principally from the record on appeal, it conflicts with the rule that collateral
review by habeas corpus is not a reiteration of or substitute for an appeal.  (See In
re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 225 [court will not consider merits of claim
previously raised and rejected on appeal]; In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759
[court will not consider claims that could have been but were not raised on
appeal].)  Thus, while the appellate record may be a starting point for developing
habeas corpus claims, it is not the primary basis for asserting them.  (In re
Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 793, fn. 15 [“duty to investigate . . . may arise
based on triggering facts that appear on the face of the record”]; see Supreme Ct.
Policies, policy 3, std. 1-1.)  As we have stated, “a duty to investigate . . . also may
arise based upon triggering facts that appear nowhere on the face of the record”;
15
and this court has expressly declined to limit the availability of habeas corpus
investigation funds “to ‘claims that are discoverable by reference to the four
corners of the appellate record’ or claims that are ‘revealed by the record.’
[Citation.]”  (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 793, fn. 15.)
Third, we have no reason to anticipate the record correction performed by
appellate counsel will be inadequate for purposes of discovering or substantiating
habeas corpus claims.  The Supreme Court Policies provide that “[a]ppellate
counsel shall consult with and work cooperatively with habeas corpus counsel to
facilitate timely investigation, and timely preparation and filing (if warranted) of a
habeas corpus petition.”  (Supreme Ct. Policies, policy 3, std. 1-1.)  As it relates to
record correction, this directive contemplates appellate counsel’s consideration of
any timely suggestions habeas corpus counsel may offer for correction,
augmentation, or settlement of the record, particularly as they relate to potential
habeas corpus claims.
In addition, recent statutory changes should minimize the need for any but
minor record correction.  Penal Code section 190.9, subdivision (a)(1), requires,
“In any case in which a death sentence may be imposed, all proceedings conducted
in the municipal and superior courts, including all conferences and proceedings,
whether in open court, in conference in the courtroom, or in chambers, shall be
conducted on the record with a court reporter present.  The court reporter shall
prepare and certify a daily transcript of all proceedings commencing with the
preliminary hearing.  Proceedings prior to the preliminary hearing shall be
reported [and transcribed when the municipal or superior court receives notice that
the death penalty is being sought].”  (See rule 39.52.)  Moreover, “[d]uring the
course of the trial in which the death penalty is being sought, trial counsel shall
alert the court’s attention to any errors in the transcripts incidentally discovered by
counsel while reviewing them in the ordinary course of trial preparation.  The
16
court shall periodically request that trial counsel provide a list of errors in the trial
transcript during the course of trial and may hold hearings in connection
therewith.”  (Pen. Code, § 190.8, subd. (c).)
With respect to proceedings in the municipal court, rule 39.52(g) requires
trial counsel to “(1) review the docket sheets to ensure that transcripts of all
proceedings have been made;  [¶]  (2) examine the municipal court file to
determine whether it is complete;  [¶]  (3) review the reporter’s transcript; and  [¶]
(4) consult with opposing counsel to determine whether all other discussions have
been properly transcribed.”  (See also rule 39.52(h) [declaration that counsel has
performed tasks required by rule 39.52(g)].)  As to superior court proceedings,
trial counsel is required to review the record for completeness (rule 39.54(b)) and,
if necessary, file “a request for any additional materials to be included in the
record and any corrections of errors that have come to the attorney’s attention.”
(Rule 39.54(c)(2).)
Pursuant to Penal Code section 190.7, subdivision (a)(1), the record on
appeal in a capital case consists of not only all the reporter’s transcripts but a
clerk’s transcript as well.  (See rule 39.51(a).)  “The clerk’s transcript shall include
all documents filed or lodged in the municipal and superior court files in the case,
including all items listed in rule 33(a) and juror questionnaires of all potential
jurors, regardless of whether the jurors were selected to sit on the case.”  (Rule
39.51(a)(1).)  The statute also requires the inclusion of “[a] copy of any other
paper or record on file or lodged with the superior or municipal court and a
transcript of any other oral proceeding reported in the superior or municipal court
pertaining to the trial of the cause.”  (Pen. Code, § 190.7, subd. (a)(1).)
Additionally, “[a]ll documents filed confidentially under Penal Code section 987.9
or 987.3 shall be sealed and copies provided only to the reviewing court and to
counsel for the defendant to whom the documents relate.  All transcripts of in
17
camera proceedings shall be sealed and copies provided only to the reviewing
court and to counsel for those parties present at the proceedings.”  (Rule 39.51(b).)
Scrupulous attention to these preparation and review procedures by both the
trial court and counsel will substantially reduce the need for correction and
augmentation or settled statements to ensure a complete and accurate record on
appeal.  Moreover, these dictates make clear, and we emphasize, neither the trial
court nor counsel may decline to include any portion of the proceedings in the
record on appeal.
Finally, according habeas corpus counsel an independent or active
cocounsel role in record correction proceedings raises the potential for serious
logistical complications and delays in certification, contrary to legislative intent
that the record correction process proceed expeditiously.  (See Pen. Code, § 190.8;
rule 39.50 et seq.; see also Pen. Code, § 190.6.)  Because, as here, appointment of
separate appellate and habeas corpus counsel may not occur simultaneously,
habeas corpus counsel’s requests for correction, augmentation, or settlement may
fall well outside the time frame imposed by statute and rules (see, e.g., rule 39.55)
even if submitted as soon as reasonably possible after review of the record.7
Petitioner also contends he is disadvantaged by the appointment of separate
counsel when a dual appointment would allow his habeas corpus counsel to act on
his behalf during record correction.  He offers no basis, however, for assuming
separate appellate counsel will not proceed with adequate record correction.  (See
ante, at pp. 15-17.)  Petitioner further suggests an element of judicial economy
supports counsel’s early involvement:  “If habeas corpus counsel must wait for
                                                
7 
To date, this court has simultaneously appointed appellate and habeas
corpus counsel in only three cases, and the delay in appointment of habeas corpus
counsel has varied from a few months to more than a year.
18
record correction to end for the opportunity to correct deficiencies in the record,
these remedies will be limited to making requests to this Court, rather than to the
trial court, or raising the matter as a potential habeas corpus claim.”  The function
of the record, however, is principally to facilitate meaningful appellate review.
Moreover, if habeas corpus counsel are in a position to seek relief in this court
allowing for correction of the record (cf. rule 12(b)) or if the matter can be raised
on habeas corpus, then petitioner is not without a remedy.
We do not intend the foregoing discussion to be read as foreclosing habeas
corpus counsel from having input in record correction, only as subordinating any
role to that of appellate counsel.  This secondary role accommodates both the
assignment of responsibility for record correction to appellate counsel and the duty
imposed by the Supreme Court Policies that habeas corpus counsel’s investigation
of potentially meritorious claims, including review of the appellate record and
briefing on appeal, “should be done . . . , in any event, in cooperation with
appellate counsel.”  (Supreme Ct. Policies, policy 3, std. 2-2.)
Habeas corpus counsel may therefore proffer suggestions for correction,
augmentation, or settlement of the record for appellate counsel’s consideration, but
with the latter making the ultimate determination whether to include any or all in
the defendant’s formal request to the trial court.  At the same time, we reiterate
that appellate counsel has no authority to limit the record on appeal to less than the
“entire record” designated by statute and the rules.  (Pen. Code, § 190.7; rule
39.51.)  Furthermore, submission of habeas corpus counsel’s suggestions cannot
delay or interfere with the timely processing of the record.  The statutes and rules
impose definite outside time limits on the correction process.  Appellate counsel
and the trial court must work expeditiously to meet them.  (See Pen. Code,
§§ 190.6, 190.8, subds. (b), (d), (g); rules 39.50(b), 39.52(g)-(i), (l), 39.54; see also
rule 35(a)-(c).)  Coordinating belated requests would put an undue burden on both.
19
For the same reasons, habeas corpus counsel also may not challenge during the
correction process appellate counsel’s decision not to adopt any or all suggestions.
Our discussion nevertheless should not be read to prevent appellate counsel
from designating habeas corpus counsel as the defendant’s representative in record
correction if circumstances warrant.  In that event, however, the appearance would
not be by habeas corpus counsel qua habeas corpus counsel but as appellate
counsel’s designee.
Accordingly, we conclude respondent did not abuse its discretion in
precluding the HCRC from participating in record correction or in denying
petitioner’s Motion To Reconsider.  (See also Bloniarz v. Roloson (1969) 70
Cal.2d 143, 147-148 [“every court of record has powers requisite to its proper
functioning as an independent constitutional department of government”].)
As to petitioner’s Supplemental Request, the court based its ruling on
timeliness grounds, not standing; and it appears the court did not abuse its
discretion in that regard either.  Requests for correction and augmentation must be
filed no later than “90 days after the date the record was delivered to appellate
counsel . . . .”  (Rule 35(c)(4); see rule 39.55(b) [same].)  Accordingly, we decline
to remand the matter for Power to consider whether to request any additional
record correction based on that document, particularly in light of the fact he has
filed the appellant’s opening brief without requesting further augmentation,
correction, or settlement.
B.
Petitioner’s Motion To Reconsider also raised a claim concerning
settlement of the record, asserting the procedures adopted by respondent court
failed to conform to the rules.
The record on appeal in a capital case “includes, but is not limited to, the
following:  [¶]  (1)  The normal and additional record prescribed in the rules
20
adopted by the Judicial Council pertaining to an appeal taken by the defendant
from a judgment of conviction.  [¶]  (2)  A copy of any other paper or record on
file or lodged with the superior or municipal court and a transcript of any other
oral proceeding reported in the superior or municipal court pertaining to the trial
of the cause.”  (Pen. Code, § 190.7, subd. (a)(1), (2).)  “In any case in which a
death sentence may be imposed, all proceedings conducted in the municipal and
superior courts, including all conferences and proceedings, whether in open court,
in conference in the courtroom, or in chambers, shall be conducted on the record
with a court reporter present.”  (Id., § 190.9, subd. (a)(1).)
Nevertheless, as here, gaps in the record may occur, in which case the rules
provide a procedure for filling them in.
In criminal cases, the process is governed by rules 7 and 36(b).  (See also
rule 39.50(a) [rules governing criminal appeals apply to appeals from death
penalty judgments].)  That process may be divided into nine steps:
First, the appellant shall “serve and file an application for permission to
prepare a settled statement,” which “shall be verified and shall contain a statement
of the facts or a certificate of the clerk showing that a reporter’s transcript cannot
be obtained.”  (Rule 36(b); see also rule 4(e).)
Second, the judge “shall decide the application . . . , and, if the showing is
sufficient, shall make an order permitting the preparation of a settled statement” of
the oral proceedings in question.  (Rule 36(b).)
Third, upon such an order, the appellant must “serve and file a condensed
statement [thereof] in narrative form . . . .”  (Rule 7(b); see rule 36(b).)  While it is
unclear precisely what this contemplates, the rule does provide that “[i]f necessary
for accuracy, clarity, or convenience, portions of the evidence may be set forth by
question and answer, subject to the approval of the court in settling the statement.”
(Rule 7(b).)  We may thus infer that verbatim statements would be the exception.
21
(See, e.g., Sweet v. Markwart (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 735, 743 [finding the
appellant’s “chronological recitation of occurrences during the trial” and “ ‘Partial
Transcript by Question and Answer’ ” “not a proper way to prepare a narrative
statement”]; cf. People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 585 [“The settlement,
augmentation, and correction process does not allow parties to create proceedings,
make records, or litigate issues which they neglected to pursue earlier”].)
Fourth, the respondent may “serve and file proposed amendments” to the
proposed settled statement.  (Rule 7(b).)
Fifth, the superior court’s clerk “shall set a time . . . for settlement of the
statement” and “give . . . notice to all parties of the time set . . . .”  (Rule 7(d).)
Sixth, at this hearing “the judge who tried the case” “shall settle the
statement and fix the time within which the appellant shall engross it as settled.”
(Rule 7(d).)
Seventh, “the appellant shall engross the statement in accordance with the
order of the judge,” and “serve and file the engrossed statement.”  (Rule 7(d).)
Eighth, if the respondent thereafter serves and files timely objections, the
judge must determine whether the statement was prepared in accordance with the
order; if not, changes are required.  (Rule 7(d).)
Finally, once the statement is determined to conform to the order, the judge
then certifies it.  (Rule 7(d).)
In sum, these rules contemplate that the appellant will review the record for
any apparent omissions in the recording of the proceedings and seek the court’s
permission to include a settled statement of those proceedings.  Counsel must
verify the application for permission and either explain its factual basis or include
the clerk’s certification that the proceedings were not recorded.  If the court grants
permission to proceed by settled statement, the appellant files a narrative
description without unnecessary detail of the subject proceedings.  Once the
22
appellant has drafted and served the narrative statement, the respondent may
propose any amendments.  At a subsequent hearing after notice to the parties, the
trial judge who presided resolves the differences and directs the appellant to
engross the statement, i.e., to incorporate any changes from the original
submission.  Absent any objection by the respondent, the judge then certifies the
statement as settled.
For various reasons, the settled statements in this case failed to conform to
the foregoing procedures.
As previously noted, Judge Horner presided at the guilt and penalty phases
of the trial, petitioner was represented by Attorneys Thews and Weis (now
deceased), and the prosecutor was Deputy District Attorney (now Judge) Burr.  At
the Penal Code section 1368 competency hearing, Judge Ballachey presided,
Deputy Public Defender Sawyer appeared on behalf of petitioner, and the
prosecution was represented by Assistant District Attorney Anderson.
Both Appellant’s Request for Corrections and the HCRC’s Addendum
identified apparently unrecorded portions of the trial and competency hearing.
However, neither document nor any subsequent filing contained an application
with verification or court clerk certification as required by rule 36(b); nor did
either set forth “a condensed statement in narrative form of . . . the oral
proceedings . . . .”  (Rule 7(b).)  Instead of directing compliance with rule 7 at the
July 23, 1999, hearing, respondent (Judge Horner) indicated—as to the trial
proceedings—“I’ll need to review this with both Mr. Thews and Judge Burr,”
neither of whom was present at that point.  Later, the court elaborated, “And I
indicated that I would pursue this matter by reading the appropriate pages in the
transcript, and I would discuss the matter with Judge Burr, who was then the trial
deputy district attorney, and Mr. Thews, after I’ve had the opportunity to make
those references and would be prepared to – presumably to address this subject at
23
our next meeting.”  It then designated September 17, 1999, as the date for these
trial counsel to be present to review the transcript and provide input.  The record is
silent as to whether this meeting occurred as scheduled.  (Cf. rule 7(d).)  It is clear,
however, that respondent did not direct petitioner, as appellant, to engross any
statement as settled; nor did it certify such a statement.  (See rule 7(d).)  Rather, it
ordered the filing of the Court’s Settled Statement and stated, “This is my settled
statement.  This is not proposed.  I’m not negotiating this.  This is my settled
statement.”
In deciding whether to remand the matter for compliance with rule 7, we
note that the scant decisional authority construing settlement procedures suggests
courts generally will not elevate form over substance if the statement as settled
fully and accurately reflects the omitted oral proceedings.  “The rules confer full
power over such a record in the trial judge.  As long as the trial judge does not act
in an arbitrary fashion he has full and complete power over such a record.”  (St.
George v. Superior Court (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 815, 817; cf. Sweet v. Markwart,
supra, 115 Cal.App.2d at p. 743 [“While appellant here ought to have obeyed
these rules, nevertheless, if his statement as proposed actually contained those
portions of the oral proceedings which he deemed material to the determination of
his points on appeal, the court could not strike it out, but must proceed to settle
it”]; Williams v. Goldberg (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 40, 45-46 [although procedure
adopted by the trial court “was not in accord with the procedure provided by the
Rules on Appeal,” the record was clear as to what statement the court intended to
settle].)
Nevertheless, “under the rules it is the duty of the trial court to settle a
proposed statement, not to make one.”  (Stevens v. Superior Court (1958) 160
Cal.App.2d 264, 269.)  Here, the procedures completely short-circuited the
established format and effectively eliminated the role of the parties in the process.
24
Substantial departures from established procedures marked settlement of
the statement with respect to the Penal Code section 1368 proceedings as well.
Respondent court solicited input regarding unrecorded discussions from Assistant
District Attorney Anderson at the July 23 hearing but noted, “Obviously, Miss
Sawyer is not here, Judge Ballachey is not here, and I wasn’t present, so I would
suggest that perhaps if appellate counsel wants to inquire of Miss Sawyer, for
example, to see if her recollection differs [from Anderson’s] or if she has any
additional recollection.  If not, at our next hearing I’d be prepared to settle that as a
statement of what just was discussed at the bench, but I want to give you the
opportunity to check with the other parties if you wish to do that.”  Habeas corpus
counsel also volunteered to “assist Mr. Power in picking the brains of the
individuals who participated in any unreported proceedings and draft up a
proposed settled statement.”
Despite the opportunity, no such draft document was submitted.  At the
November 12, 1999, hearing, Anderson placed on the record his best recollection
as to the substance of unreported proceedings during the competency hearing.
Deputy Public Defender Sawyer appeared at the December 17, 1999, hearing.  In
general, she either deferred to or confirmed Anderson’s rendition or gave her own
similar version of what had transpired.  In the latter circumstance, respondent
indicated without objection from appellate counsel, “What I will propose here and
invite comment is to accept both Mr. Anderson’s statement and Ms. Sawyer’s
statement, and together they will be the settled statement of what occurred on that
occasion.  In other words, I’m not believing – I’m not disbelieving either attorney.
I’m accepting both their statements, and that will be what the Appellate Court will
review.”  As to those proceedings Anderson could not recall, Sawyer was
generally able to provide her own recollection.  In one instance, however, neither
could remember; and respondent stated, “Then the ‘no recollection’ by both
25
parties, that will constitute the settled statement with respect to that particular
entry.”  Apparently neither appellate nor habeas corpus counsel contacted or
sought input from Judge Ballachey; respondent certified the statement for the
competency hearing without doing so as well.
In terms of prescribed procedure, the foregoing initially runs afoul of the
provision that “the judge who tried the case” settles the statement.  (Rule 7(d);
cf. rule 51 [providing for substitution of another judge when “any act is required
[by the rules] to be done by the judge who tried the case, and such judge is
unavailable or unable to act at the time fixed therefor”].)  A primary reason for this
requirement lies in the concern for resolving conflicts between the appellant and
respondent as to the proper contents of the statement.  (See rule 7(b).)  “Once
settlement is ordered, the court has broad discretion to accept or reject counsel’s
representations in accordance with its assessment of their credibility.  [Citations.]
However, it cannot refuse to make that assessment.  It may decline to settle a
statement only if, after resort to all available aids, including the judge’s own
memory and those of the participants, it is affirmatively convinced of its inability
to do so.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Gzikowski (1982) 32 Cal.3d 580, 585, fn. 2; see
Burns v. Brown (1946) 27 Cal.2d 631, 636 [trial judge’s “familiarity with the trial
and knowledge of what took place there make him uniquely qualified to determine
what the evidence was and whether it has been correctly stated”]; Sidebotham v.
Superior Court (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 624, 628.)
Settlement of the competency hearing statement also failed to comply with
the requirement for verification or certification and for a condensed narrative by
the appellant and proposed amendments by the respondent.  The court did not
direct preparation of an engrossed settled statement; the People had no opportunity
to register any objections; and no such statement was certified as accurate.
26
Strict compliance with rule 7 assumes particular significance in capital
cases by avoiding questions as to the sufficiency of the appellate record (see, e.g.,
People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 63; cf. Gardner v. Florida (1977) 430
U.S. 349, 360-361) and obviating delays if insufficiencies arise after briefing.
(See, e.g., People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 401, fn. 6.)  Collaterally, proper
settlement of the record also preserves a death penalty defendant’s interests with
respect to the investigation of potentially meritorious habeas corpus claims.  (See
Supreme Ct. Policies, policy 3, std. 1-1; see also In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750,
783-784.)  Although we have concluded respondent court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding the HCRC from participating in record correction and thus
deny petitioner relief on that basis, we nevertheless retain inherent authority to
direct the trial court to conduct proceedings necessary to supplement gaps in the
record.  (See, e.g., People v. Hawthorne, supra, at pp. 62-63; People v. Wright,
supra, at p. 401, fn. 6; cf. rule 12(b), (c) [authorizing the reviewing court to direct
correction and augmentation on its own motion].)  Given the substantial deviations
from the required procedures in settling the statement on appeal for both the guilt
and penalty phase trials and the competency hearing and in the interests of judicial
economy, we deem it prudent to remand the matter for proper settlement in
compliance with the applicable rules.
27
DISPOSITION
The order to show cause is discharged.  The matter is remanded to the
superior court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion including
resettlement of the statements on appeal relating to the guilt and penalty trials and
the Penal Code section 1368 hearing.  (See also ante, fn. 5.)
BROWN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
28
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Marks v. Superior Court
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding XXX
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S085224
Date Filed: January 28, 2002
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Alameda
Judge: Jeffrey W. Horner
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Michael Lawrence, Gary Sowards and Mary Jane Mona for Petitioner.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for  Respondent:
No appearance for Respondent.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass,
Assistant Attorney General, Thomas A. Brady, Laurence K. Sullivan and Sharon Wooden, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest.
29
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Mary Jane Mona
Habeas Corpus Research Center
50 Fremont Street, Suite 1800
San Francisco, CA  94105
(415) 348-3800
Sharon Wooden
Deputy Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA  94102
(415) 703-5966