Case Title: In Re Clark

Citation: 663 P.2d 1339, 99 Wash. 2d 702

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1983-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
99 Wn.2d 702 (1983) 663 P.2d 1339 In the Matter of the Disciplinary Proceeding Against DEL H. CLARK, an Attorney at Law. No. C.D. 7398. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. June 2, 1983. As amended by Order June 23, 1983. Robert T. Farrell, for Bar Association. *703 [As amended by order of the Supreme Court June 23, 1983.] DIMMICK, J. In this disciplinary action we determine the proper sanction for an attorney's failure to cooperate with the Washington State Bar Association during the investigation of a complaint, when such misconduct is the sole basis for disciplinary action. In view of all the circumstances of this case, including the seriousness and frequency of Mr. Clark's prior discipline, we depart from the Disciplinary Board's recommendation of a 20-day suspension and suspend Del H. Clark from the practice of law for 60 days. Mr. Clark was admitted to practice law in this state in 1972. We know nothing about his background, for possible mitigation consideration, as he did not file a brief in this matter or appear before us for oral argument. His bar association files, although sketchy, are before us as exhibits in this proceeding and disclose the following: 1. On December 7, 1974, Mr. Clark received a letter of admonishment regarding his lack of cooperation in the investigation of a complaint filed by a client, Mrs. Jack MacKenzie. The letter stated in part as follows: This letter of admonishment was introduced to show that Mr. Clark knew of his duty to cooperate and thus his failure to later comply with that duty was willful. 2. On January 21, 1977, Mr. Clark received a reprimand as a result of a complaint by a Mr. Brinkman. Mr. Clark stipulated to the receipt of the reprimand and admitted he neglected a legal matter in failing to perfect that client's appeal. *704 3. On March 8, 1979, Mr. Clark received a letter of censure as a result of neglecting a legal matter for a Mr. Gulermovich. Mr. Clark also stipulated to this discipline and admitted that his client had a valid and meritorious defense to an action. Mr. Clark agreed that he had failed to answer or defend the matter on behalf of his client resulting in a default judgment against the client. On December 10, 1980, as a result of a complaint by a Mr. Lopez, a letter was sent to Mr. Clark enclosing the complaint and requesting a written response. What followed thereafter is the course of conduct, or rather lack thereof, which gave rise to the present disciplinary action. The course of events is carefully laid out in the unchallenged findings of fact made by a hearing panel officer (HPO) after a hearing on June 10, 1982, at which Mr. Clark was present. Those findings are: Mr. Clark has filed no objections to these findings either before the Disciplinary Board or before this court and the transcript of the hearing clearly supports them. From these findings of fact, the HPO concluded that in failing to timely provide bar counsel with the requested *706 material for the investigation of the Lopez complaint, Mr. Clark violated DRA 1.1(j) in that he willfully violated DRA 2.6. The HPO also concluded that in failing to appear for the scheduled deposition, Mr. Clark violated DRA 1.1(j) in that he willfully disregarded a subpoena issued by bar counsel. The findings of fact support these conclusions. [1] Pursuant to the Discipline Rules for Attorneys complaints are to be investigated to determine whether the rules of professional conduct have been violated. If it is determined that such violations have occurred, a formal complaint is prepared and filed. During the investigation, bar counsel, if deemed necessary, may issue a subpoena requiring the attorney to appear at a deposition and produce documents. DRA 2.5(b)(2). Pursuant to DRA 2.6 an attorney has certain responsibilities during this entire process. Those responsibilities are: An attorney is subject to disciplinary sanctions if he willfully disregards a subpoena issued by bar counsel or willfully violates DRA 2.6. DRA 1.1(j). There can be no question that Mr. Clark violated DRA 2.6 and DRA 1.1(j). He failed to cooperate with the bar counsel as requested. He responded to the client's complaint only after receiving numerous letters and being served with a subpoena. Thereafter he continued to ignore requests for information which resulted in a second subpoena being issued. Even then, he failed to appear at the time and place designated and sent his wife in his stead. *707 Accordingly, Mr. Clark is subject to disciplinary sanction. The only question is the appropriate sanction. Washington is one of 29 states with an integrated bar. All lawyers of the state must be members of the Washington State Bar Association. Conformity to that organization's rules is a condition for practicing law. It is unquestioned that In re Case, 59 Wn.2d 181, 184, 367 P.2d 121 (1961). Thus, compliance with DRA 2.6 and 1.1(j) is a condition of every lawyer's practice in this state. Compliance with these rules is vital. The practice of law has been a profession of the highest order since its inception and it must continue to be so. Internal investigation and self-discipline are at the very heart of a profession, as distinguished from a trade or business. The bar association's investigation of a complaint is an integral part of the machinery for handling charges regarding the ethics and conduct of the attorneys admitted to practice before this court. Public confidence in the legal profession, and the deterrence of misconduct, require prompt, complete investigations. The process of investigating complaints depends to a great extent upon an individual attorney's cooperation. Without that cooperation, the bar association is deprived of information necessary to determine whether the lawyer should continue to be certified to the public as fit. Obviously, unless attorneys cooperate in the process, the system fails and public confidence in the legal profession is undermined. If the members of our profession do not take the process of internal discipline seriously, we cannot expect the public to do so and the very basis of our professionalism *708 erodes. Accordingly, an attorney who disregards his professional duty to cooperate with the bar association must be subject to severe sanctions. Moreover, unless noncooperation brings such sanctions, attorneys who are guilty of unprofessional conduct might be tempted to stonewall to prevent serious violations coming to light. [2] The Disciplinary Board recommended that Mr. Clark be suspended for 20 days. Although we give great weight to the Board's recommendation, we are the sole arbiters of the ultimate discipline to be meted out to members of the bar. The discipline we impose is to implement the basic purposes of attorney discipline: protection of the public and preservation of confidence in the legal profession. In re Smith, 83 Wn.2d 659, 521 P.2d 212 (1974). The sanction which furthers these purposes depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In re Kumbera, 91 Wn.2d 401, 588 P.2d 1167 (1979). [3] Initially, we find the fact that the underlying complaint filed by Mr. Lopez was dismissed is of no consequence. The gravamen of Mr. Clark's misconduct was preventing the bar association from investigating the complaint and making that determination in a timely manner. Mr. Clark's failure to cooperate with an investigation over a period of months is not an isolated lapse of judgment. Rather, it indicates a consistent and deliberate course of action. Superimpose this on Mr. Clark's previously established record of unprofessional conduct, including two disciplines for neglect of legal matters, and the conclusion to be drawn is that Mr. Clark has established a serious pattern of neglecting his professional duties. Since a letter of admonishment, a censure and a reprimand have failed to prevail those duties upon him, more severe action must be taken to impress upon Mr. Clark the seriousness of his continued pattern of neglect. We are of the opinion that under the facts and circumstances of this case a significant suspension is warranted. Therefore, we order that Del H. Clark be suspended from *709 the practice of law for 60 days from the date of filing this opinion. Costs of $213.58 are approved. WILLIAMS, C.J., and ROSELLINI, STAFFORD, BRACHTENBACH, DOLLIVER, DORE, and PEARSON, JJ., concur. UTTER, J. I would prefer to see 30 days of the 60-day suspension suspended. Otherwise, I concur.