Case Title: Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis

Citation: 2003-Ohio-5849

Docket Number: 20020932

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849.] 
 
 
 
WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY v. GALATIS ET AL., APPELLANTS; AETNA CASUALTY 
& SURETY COMPANY, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849.] 
Stare decisis — Prior decision of Supreme Court may be overruled, when — Automobile 
liability insurance — Uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage — Employer’s 
commercial automobile liability policy covers loss sustained by employee only if 
the loss occurs within the course and scope of employment — Scott-Pontzer v. 
Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., limited — Designation of “family members” of the 
named insured as other insureds does not extend insurance to a family member of 
an employee of a corporation — Ezawa v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Am., 
overruled. 
(No. 2002-0932 — Submitted March 26, 2003 — Decided November 5, 2003.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 20784, 2002-Ohio-1502. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  A prior decision of the Supreme Court may be overruled where (1) the decision was 
wrongly decided at that time, or changes in circumstances no longer justify 
continued adherence to the decision, (2) the decision defies practical workability, 
and (3) abandoning the precedent would not create an undue hardship for those 
who have relied upon it. 
2.  Absent specific language to the contrary, a policy of insurance that names a 
corporation as an insured for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage covers 
a loss sustained by an employee of the corporation only if the loss occurs within 
the course and scope of employment.  (King v. Nationwide Ins. Co. [1988], 35 
Ohio St.3d 208, 519 N.E.2d 1380, applied; Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co. [1999], 85 Ohio St.3d 660, 710 N.E.2d 1116, limited.) 
3.  Where a policy of insurance designates a corporation as a named insured, the 
designation of “family members” of the named insured as other insureds does not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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extend insurance coverage to a family member of an employee of the corporation, 
unless that employee is also a named insured. (Ezawa v. Yasuda Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co. of Am. [1999], 86 Ohio St.3d 557, 715 N.E.2d 1142, overruled.) 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} Stare decisis is the bedrock of the American judicial system.  Well-
reasoned opinions become controlling precedent, thus creating stability and predictability 
in our legal system.  It is only with great solemnity and with the assurance that the newly 
chosen course for the law is a significant improvement over the current course that we 
should depart from precedent. 
{¶ 2} Mindful of these principles, we now examine Ohio’s law regarding 
whether uninsured and underinsured motorist insurance issued to a corporation may 
compensate an individual for a loss that was unrelated to the insured corporation.  This 
examination results in the limitation of Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1999), 
85 Ohio St.3d 660, 710 N.E.2d 1116, by restricting the application of uninsured and 
underinsured motorist coverage issued to a corporation to employees only while they are 
acting within the course and scope of their employment, unless otherwise specifically 
agreed.  It also requires overruling Ezawa v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Am. 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 557, 715 N.E.2d 1142. 
I 
{¶ 3} Jason Galatis died on September 24, 1994, as a passenger in a vehicle 
negligently operated by Shawn Butler.  Galatis’s estate settled its claim against Butler for 
$75,000 and released him from liability on September 1, 1995.  The estate next settled an 
underinsured motorist claim against Grange Insurance Company, Galatis’s parents’ 
insurer, on December 5, 1995. 
{¶ 4} The matter was resurrected on May 8, 2000, when the estate presented 
claims under the business auto policy and the general liability portion of a commercial 
insurance policy that Westfield Insurance Company (“Westfield”) had issued to Oliver 
Printing Company, the employer of Galatis’s father and uncle. 
{¶ 5} Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (“Aetna”) was notified of claims 
arising from Galatis’s death on August 15, 2000.  The claims against Aetna were made 
January Term, 2003 
 
 
 
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under a master insurance policy issued to Quagliata’s Restaurants, Inc., the employer of 
Galatis’s mother.  This policy was in effect at the time of the accident that caused 
Galatis’s death.  The estate asserted claims for coverage under the business auto and 
commercial general liability parts of the combined policy. 
{¶ 6} The trial court ruled that both Westfield insurance policies and both parts 
of the Aetna policy provided underinsured motorist coverage to certain members of the 
Galatis family.  However, the court also ruled that the estate had destroyed the insurers’ 
subrogation rights and had failed to give prompt notice of the claims, resulting in loss of 
coverage under the policies. 
{¶ 7} All parties appealed.  Before the court of appeals issued its opinion, the 
estate settled with Westfield, removing it from the case.  The court of appeals affirmed 
the judgment in favor of Aetna on the grounds that an endorsement that listed seven 
specific individuals as insureds precluded the kind of ambiguity found in Scott-Pontzer as 
to who is insured under the uninsured motorist endorsement to the policy. 
{¶ 8} The case is before us as a certified conflict. 
II 
{¶ 9} An insurance policy is a contract.  The freedom to contract and the 
attendant benefits and responsibilities of the parties to a contract are integral to the liberty 
of the citizenry, so much so that the United States Constitution specifically protects 
against state encroachment upon contracts.  Clause 1, Section 10, Article I, United States 
Constitution.1  In order to protect the integrity of contracts, the United States Constitution 
gives the United States Supreme Court the authority to overrule a state supreme court’s 
interpretation of a state statute that infringes upon the right to contract.  Piqua Branch of 
State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop (1853), 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 14 L.Ed. 977.  In Piqua, the 
United States Supreme Court found our interpretation of a bank charter unconstitutional.  
It wrote, “We have power only to deal with contracts under the tenth section of the first 
article of the Constitution, whether made by a State or an individual; if such contract be 
impaired by an act of the State such act is void, as the power is prohibited to the State.”  
Id. at 391, 14 L.Ed. 977. 
                                                 
1. 
“No State shall * * * pass any * * * Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts * * *.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 10} The Ohio Constitution also protects the freedom of contract.  “The general 
assembly shall have no power to pass * * * laws impairing the obligation of contracts; but 
may, by general laws, authorize courts to carry into effect, upon such terms as shall be 
just and equitable, the manifest intentions of parties * * * by curing omissions, defects, 
and errors, in instruments * * *, arising out of their want of conformity with the laws of 
this state.”  Section 28, Article II, Ohio Constitution.  The Ohio constitutional protection 
of contracts is coextensive with that of the federal Constitution.  See State ex rel. Horvath 
v. State Teachers Retirement Bd. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 67, 76, 697 N.E.2d 644. 
{¶ 11} When confronted with an issue of contractual interpretation, the role of a 
court is to give effect to the intent of the parties to the agreement.  Hamilton Ins. Serv., 
Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Cos. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 270, 273, 714 N.E.2d 898, citing 
Employers’ Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Roehm (1919), 99 Ohio St. 343, 124 N.E. 223, syllabus.  
See, also, Section 28, Article II, Ohio Constitution.  We examine the insurance contract 
as a whole and presume that the intent of the parties is reflected in the language used in 
the policy.  Kelly v. Med. Life Ins. Co. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 130, 31 OBR 289, 509 
N.E.2d 411, paragraph one of the syllabus.  We look to the plain and ordinary meaning of 
the language used in the policy unless another meaning is clearly apparent from the 
contents of the policy.  Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co. (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 7 
O.O.3d 403, 374 N.E.2d 146, paragraph two of the syllabus.  When the language of a 
written contract is clear, a court may look no further than the writing itself to find the 
intent of the parties.  Id.  As a matter of law, a contract is unambiguous if it can be given 
a definite legal meaning.  Gulf Ins. Co. v. Burns Motors, Inc. (Tex.2000), 22 S.W.3d 417, 
423. 
{¶ 12} On the other hand, where a contract is ambiguous, a court may consider 
extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’ intent.  Shifrin v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. 
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 635, 597 N.E.2d 499.  A court, however, is not permitted to alter a 
lawful contract by imputing an intent contrary to that expressed by the parties.  Id.; 
Blosser v. Enderlin (1925), 113 Ohio St. 121, 148 N.E. 393, paragraph one of the 
syllabus (“there can be no intendment or implication inconsistent with the express terms 
[of a written contract]”). 
January Term, 2003 
 
 
 
5 
{¶ 13} It is generally the role of the finder of fact to resolve ambiguity.  See, e.g., 
Davis v. Loopco Industries, Inc. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 64, 609 N.E.2d 144.  However, 
where the written contract is standardized and between parties of unequal bargaining 
power, an ambiguity in the writing will be interpreted strictly against the drafter and in 
favor of the nondrafting party. Cent. Realty Co. v. Clutter (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 411, 
413, 16 O.O.3d 441, 406 N.E.2d 515.  In the insurance context, the insurer customarily 
drafts the contract.  Thus, an ambiguity in an insurance contract is ordinarily interpreted 
against the insurer and in favor of the insured.  King v. Nationwide Ins. Co. (1988), 35 
Ohio St.3d 208, 519 N.E.2d 1380, syllabus. 
{¶ 14} There are limitations to the preceding rule.  “Although, as a rule, a policy 
of insurance that is reasonably open to different interpretations will be construed most 
favorably for the insured, that rule will not be applied so as to provide an unreasonable 
interpretation of the words of the policy.”  Morfoot v. Stake (1963), 174 Ohio St. 506, 23 
O.O.2d 144, 190 N.E.2d 573, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Likewise, where “the 
plaintiff is not a party to [the] contract of insurance * * *, [the plaintiff] is not in a 
position to urge, as one of the parties, that the contract be construed strictly against the 
other party.”  Cook v. Kozell (1964), 176 Ohio St. 332, 336, 27 O.O.2d 275, 199 N.E.2d 
566.  This rings especially true where expanding coverage beyond a policyholder’s needs 
will increase the policyholder’s premiums.  Id. 
A. 
Uninsured Motorist Coverage 
 
1. 
The Scott-Pontzer Decision 
{¶ 15} The insurance industry customarily uses standardized forms promulgated 
by the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (“ISO”).  The ISO forms are generically written to 
provide for the insurance needs of a wide range of policyholders.  Combinations of the 
various standardized forms are used to create a customized policy for each policyholder.  
This is accomplished by using base forms such as Commercial Auto, Personal Auto, 
Personal Umbrella, or Commercial General Liability, which are supplemented by state-
specific endorsements that expand or limit the extent of insurance coverage in accordance 
with the desire of the parties and with each state’s laws. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 16} The ISO identifies the “Ohio Uninsured Motorist Coverage” endorsement 
as form CA 2133.  Form CA 2133 is routinely included in policies issued to individuals, 
partnerships, corporations, and government entities.  This form is part of the Aetna policy 
sub judice and was at issue in Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1999), 85 Ohio 
St.3d 660, 710 N.E.2d 1116. 
{¶ 17} Since Scott-Pontzer, this court has been asked to decide a number of cases 
that center on the term “you” in form CA 2133.  Form CA 2133 delineates four classes of 
“who is an insured” for uninsured motorist coverage.  The first class is “you”; however, 
“you,” is not defined in Form CA 2133.  Form CA 2133 is merely a modification of the 
main policy form, in this case “Business Auto Coverage Form” (Form CA 0001), which 
defines “you” as “the Named Insured shown in the Declarations.”  The Aetna policy 
identifies the named insured, i.e., policyholder, as Quagliata’s Restaurants, Inc. 
{¶ 18} In Scott-Pontzer, this court relied upon King to find “you” to be 
ambiguous because it referred to a corporation, which “cannot occupy an automobile, 
suffer bodily injury or death, or operate a motor vehicle.”  85 Ohio St.3d at 664, 710 
N.E.2d 1116.  This court opined that “naming the corporation as the insured is 
meaningless unless the coverage extends to some person or persons—including to the 
corporation’s employees.”  Id.  This court stated, “[L]anguage in a contract of insurance 
reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning will be construed liberally in favor of 
the insured and strictly against the insurer.  Accordingly, we conclude that Pontzer, at the 
time of his death, was an insured under the * * * policy for purposes of underinsured 
motorist coverage.”  Id. at 665, 710 N.E.2d 1116 (internal citation and quotation 
omitted). 
 
2. 
Other Jurisdictions and Scott-Pontzer 
{¶ 19} Our reasoning in Scott-Pontzer has been questioned.  See, e.g., Seaco Ins. 
Co. v. Davis-Irish (C.A.1, 2002), 300 F.3d 84, 87 (labeling Scott-Pontzer as anomalous 
for consciously departing from the tenet that the intent of the parties controls the 
interpretation of a contract); Gibson v. New Hampshire Ins. Co. (S.D.Ohio 2001), 178 
F.Supp.2d 921, 922, fn. 2, 3 (referring to Scott-Pontzer’s reasoning as a “mystery” and its 
conclusion as “preposterous”); Szabo v. CGU Internatl. Ins., PLC (S.D.Ohio 2002), 227 
F.Supp.2d 820, 830, 833-834, fn.15 (citing “distracting internal inconsistencies” in Scott-
January Term, 2003 
 
 
 
7 
Pontzer and classifying portions of it as “beguiling”); Lawler v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. 
(N.D.Ohio 2001), 163 F.Supp.2d 841, 842, 843 (strongly disagreeing with Scott-Pontzer 
and referring to the resulting “mess” and to the Ohio Supreme Court’s “distortion” of the 
law).  Further, the Scott-Pontzer rationale stands in stark contrast with decisions of the 
vast majority of states that have considered similar issues.  See, e.g., Concrete Services, 
Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1998), 331 S.C. 506, 498 S.E.2d 865; Grain 
Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKee (Tex.1997), 943 S.W.2d 455; Buckner v. Motor Vehicle 
Acc. Indemn. Corp. (1985), 66 N.Y.2d 211, 495 N.Y.S.2d 952, 486 N.E.2d 810; Foote v. 
Royal Ins. Co. of Am. (1998), 88 Hawaii 122, 962 P.2d 1004; Am. States Ins. Co. v. C & 
G Contracting, Inc. (1996), 186 Ariz. 421, 924 P.2d 111; Michigan Twp. Participating 
Plan v. Pavolich (1998), 232 Mich.App. 378, 591 N.W.2d 325; Younger v. Reliance Ins. 
Co. (Tenn.App.1993), 884 S.W.2d 453. Although not controlling, this broad-based 
disagreement with and criticism of Scott-Pontzer support our decision to revisit the 
subject. 
 
3. 
The Intention of the Parties to the Contract 
{¶ 20} The general intent of a motor vehicle insurance policy issued to a 
corporation is to insure the corporation as a legal entity against liability arising from the 
use of motor vehicles.  King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St.3d at 211, 519 N.E.2d 
1380.  It is settled law in Ohio that a motor vehicle operated by an employee of a 
corporation in the course and scope of employment is operated by and for the corporation 
and that an employee, under such circumstances, might reasonably be entitled to 
uninsured motorist coverage under a motor vehicle insurance policy issued to his 
employer.  Id. at 213, 519 N.E.2d 1380.  See, also, Selander v. Erie Ins. Group (1999), 85 
Ohio St.3d 541, 709 N.E.2d 1161.  However, an employee’s activities outside the scope 
of employment are not of any direct consequence to the employer as a legal entity.  An 
employer does not risk legal or financial liability from an employee’s operation of a non-
business-owned motor vehicle outside the scope of employment.  Consequently, 
uninsured motorist coverage for an employee outside the scope of employment is 
extraneous to the general intent of a commercial auto policy. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 21} Nevertheless, in Scott-Pontzer, this court held that an uninsured motorist 
endorsement that identifies “you” as the named insured where “you” refers to a 
corporation must extend coverage to an employee outside the course and scope of 
employment.  Soon thereafter, this court expanded upon Scott-Pontzer by holding that the 
same policy form also provides uninsured motorist coverage to a resident relative of an 
employee of a corporate policyholder.  Ezawa v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Am. 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 557, 715 N.E.2d 1142. 
{¶ 22} Throughout this process, this court did not reconcile construing the 
contractual language to provide insurance to off-duty employees, and to the family 
members of those employees, with the absence of any benefit to the policyholder, i.e., the 
corporation.  In due course, we will turn to these questions.  First, we examine the 
purported ambiguity. 
 
4. 
Ambiguity and the Corporate Entity 
{¶ 23} The UM/UIM endorsement language before us is: 
{¶ 24}  “B. 
WHO IS AN INSURED” 
{¶ 25}  “1. 
You. 
{¶ 26}  “2. 
If you are an individual, any ‘family member.’ 
{¶ 27}  “3. 
Anyone else ‘occupying’ a covered ‘auto’ or a temporary 
substitute for a covered ‘auto.’  The covered ‘auto’ must be out of service because of its 
breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction. 
{¶ 28}  “4. 
Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to recover because of 
`bodily injury’ sustained by another ‘insured.’ ” 
{¶ 29} The first class of who is insured—“you”—readily applies where the 
policyholder is an individual.  Its application is ambiguous where the policyholder is a 
corporation.  King v. Nationwide, 35 Ohio St.3d 208, 519 N.E.2d 1380.  In King, we 
analyzed an earlier version of the Ohio Uninsured Motorist Endorsement that contained a 
different formulation of who is an insured.  King held that a motor vehicle operated by an 
employee in the scope of his employment was operated by and for the corporation, 
thereby equating the employee to the corporation for the purpose of work-related 
activities and injuries.  Id. at 213, 519 N.E.2d 1380.  We then held that because the 
employee occupied the vehicle operated by the corporation, the employee was within the 
January Term, 2003 
 
 
 
9 
class of “ ‘anyone else’ * * * occupying * * * any other motor vehicle while it is being 
operated by you.”  Id. 
{¶ 30} Our reasoning in King took an unnecessary step.  We found coverage for 
the employee as an occupant of the vehicle that was operated by the corporation.  
However, the vehicle was operated by the corporation through the very employee we 
found to be “anyone else.”  Although this logic is valid, it is tenuous to classify an 
individual as both “you” and “anyone else” at the same instant. 
{¶ 31} The employee in King acted on behalf of the corporation while operating 
the vehicle.  This is why we found the employee to be “you.”  Further analysis was 
unnecessary.  Because the employee qualifies as “you” while operating a motor vehicle 
on behalf of the corporation, he is entitled to uninsured motorist coverage.  Accordingly, 
we follow Scott-Pontzer to the extent that it held that an employee in the scope of 
employment qualifies as “you” as used in CA 2133, and thus, is entitled to uninsured 
motorist coverage. 
{¶ 32} We cannot, however, extend this coverage to an employee outside the 
scope of employment.  As previously discussed, King found that an employee was 
insured for uninsured motorist coverage as an occupant of a vehicle operated by the 
corporation where the employee was within the scope of employment.  The Scott-Pontzer 
court properly focused on the term “you,” but in so doing confused the employee’s status 
as an individual with the employee’s status as an agent of the corporation.  The court held 
that where “you” is defined as a corporation for the purposes of insuring against bodily 
injury sustained by “you,” the term must be read to extend insurance coverage to each 
employee regardless of whether he was acting within the course and scope of 
employment.  In this manner, Scott-Pontzer dramatically departed from King’s sound 
rationale that an employee qualifies as “you” under a policy issued to a corporation only 
when within the scope of employment. 
{¶ 33} In Scott-Pontzer, this court reasoned that “naming the corporation as the 
insured is meaningless unless the coverage extends to some person or persons—including 
to the corporation’s employees.” 85 Ohio St.3d at 664, 710 N.E.2d 1116.  However, this 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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statement does not support the untenable extension of insured status to employees outside 
the scope of employment. 
 
5. 
Construing Ambiguity in Favor of the Policyholder 
{¶ 34} As discussed above, contract law requires that, where parties to a contract 
have unequal bargaining power, ambiguities be construed in favor of the nondrafting 
party.  In the insurance context, we have assumed that the insurer, as the drafter of the 
policy, is always in a stronger bargaining position than is the insured.  Thus, ambiguities 
are construed in favor of the insured.  A claimant, however, is not necessarily an insured. 
{¶ 35} An insured can be the policyholder or another who is entitled to insurance 
coverage under the terms of the policy.  When a court decides whether a claimant is 
insured under a policy, ambiguities are construed in favor of the policyholder, not the 
claimant.  Cook v. Kozell, supra; West v. McNamara (1953), 159 Ohio St. 187, 197, 50 
O.O. 229, 111 N.E.2d 909 (“The universal rule that insurance policies are to be construed 
strictly in favor of the insured operates in favor of such insured persons as are covered by 
the policy, and * * * is not applicable to extend the coverage of the policy to absurd 
lengths so as to provide a right of action * * *”).  In Scott-Pontzer, we failed to analyze 
how ruling that an employee is insured outside the course and scope of employment 
favors the policyholder.  Rather, we asked which construction favored the claimant.  
While an ambiguity is construed in favor of one who has been determined to be insured, 
an ambiguity in the preliminary question of whether a claimant is insured is construed in 
favor of the policyholder.  Id.  Accord Inland Rivers Serv. Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 
(1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 32, 34, 20 O.O.3d 20, 418 N.E.2d 1381 (“It is undisputed that one 
seeking to recover on an insurance policy generally has the burden of * * * demonstrating 
coverage under the policy”).  If the policyholder’s interest is not considered at this initial 
phase, we risk construing the policy against the policyholder.  Grant Thornton v. Windsor 
House, Inc. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 158, 161, 566 N.E.2d 1220 (“Only a party to a contract 
or an intended third-party beneficiary of a contract may bring an action on a contract in 
Ohio”).  Scott-Pontzer concluded otherwise. 
{¶ 36} In resolving this alleged ambiguity, the proper question is whether 
interpreting the policy to cover all employees of the policyholder, regardless of whether 
January Term, 2003 
 
 
 
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the employee is acting within the course and scope of employment—and all family 
members of the employees—favors the policyholder. 
{¶ 37} The purpose of a commercial auto policy is to protect the policyholder.  
King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., supra.  Providing uninsured motorist coverage to employees 
who are not at work or, for that matter, to every employee’s family members is 
detrimental to the policyholder’s interests.  See Cook v. Kozell, 176 Ohio St. at 336, 27 
O.O.2d 275, 199 N.E.2d 566. 
{¶ 38} King held that the use of a vehicle “by and for” the corporate policyholder 
precipitated coverage.  This holding is reasonable because it arguably benefits the 
policyholder to insure against losses sustained by those operating vehicles on its behalf.  
This point was lost in Scott-Pontzer, which did not focus upon the critical inquiry of 
whether the loss occurred within the scope of employment—a necessary factor for the 
establishment of insurance coverage in King. 
{¶ 39} Scott-Pontzer ignored the intent of the parties to the contract.  Absent 
contractual language to the contrary, it is doubtful that either an insurer or a corporate 
policyholder ever conceived of contracting for coverage for off-duty employees 
occupying noncovered autos, let alone the family members of the employees.  The Scott-
Pontzer court construed the contract in favor of neither party to the contract, preferring 
instead to favor an unintended third party.  The Scott-Pontzer court even acknowledged 
that the expansion of coverage for an employee outside the course and scope of 
employment “may be viewed by some as a result that was not intended by the parties to 
the insurance contracts at issue.”  85 Ohio St.3d at 666, 710 N.E.2d 1116. The United 
States Supreme Court has not shied away from overturning state court decisions that 
unreasonably contort a contract.  Piqua, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 391-392, 14 L.E.2d 977 
(“The decision of the Supreme Court of the State [of Ohio] is before us for revision, and 
if their construction of the contract in question impairs its obligation, we are required to 
reverse their judgment.  To follow the construction of a State court in such a case, would 
be to surrender one of the most important provisions in the federal Constitution”).  See, 
also, Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus (1978), 438 U.S. 234, 244, 98 S.Ct. 2716, 57 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
L.Ed.2d 727 (the sovereignty of a state “has limits when its exercise effects substantial 
modifications of private contracts” [internal quotations and citations omitted]). 
B. 
Insurance Coverage for Family Members 
{¶ 40} In Ezawa, we relied upon the Scott-Pontzer definition of “you” to find that 
the second class of insureds on Form CA 2133—“if you are an individual, any family 
member”—extends uninsured motorist coverage to a family member of an employee.  In 
addition to relying upon the logic of Scott-Pontzer, Ezawa also erred by not interpreting 
the second class of insureds as a nullity.  Insurance policies are no longer written in 
manuscript for each policyholder, but rather are standard forms designed to insure a 
variety of entities, including individuals.  “There is nothing sinister about an insurer’s use 
of a ‘one size fits all’ policy form.”  Seaco Ins. Co. v. Davis-Irish, 300 F.3d at 87. 
{¶ 41} The second class of insureds applies when the policyholder is an 
individual.  It is simply inapposite when the policyholder is a corporation, just as it is 
inapposite where an individual policyholder resides alone, and as the fourth class is 
inapposite where no one is entitled to recover for another’s bodily injury.  One who 
argues a contorted use of an inapposite section of a standard form “confuses superfluity 
with inapplicability.”  Id.  It is unnecessary for each of the four classifications to apply to 
every insurance policy as long as the parties to the insurance policy agree upon whether a 
particular claimant is intended to be insured.2 
{¶ 42} In hindsight we see the problems inherent in our earlier opinions.  This 
court, however, follows the doctrine of stare decisis and will abandon a previous holding 
only when it is incumbent upon us to do so. 
III 
{¶ 43} The doctrine of stare decisis is designed to provide continuity and 
predictability in our legal system.  We adhere to stare decisis as a means of thwarting the 
arbitrary administration of justice as well as providing a clear rule of law by which the 
citizenry can organize their affairs.  Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1989), 43 
Ohio St.3d 1, 4-5, 539 N.E.2d 103.  Those affected by the law come to rely upon its 
consistency.  Helvering v. Hallock (1940), 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604.  
                                                 
2. 
It may be argued that this statement supports the overruling of King.  However, King stands strong 
under the stare decisis test articulated below. 
January Term, 2003 
 
 
 
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Accordingly, stare decisis is long revered.  See, e.g., 1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England (1765) 70 (“precedents and rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd 
or unjust * * *”).  However, a supreme court not only has the right, but is entrusted with 
the duty to examine its former decisions and, when reconciliation is impossible, to 
discard its former errors.  State v. Jenkins (2000), 93 Hawaii 87, 112, 997 P.2d 13; see, 
also, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. (1974), 416 U.S. 600, 627-628, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 40 
L.Ed.2d 406. 
{¶ 44} “[T]he doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of 
law.  Like the United States Supreme Court, we recognize that our precedents are not 
sacrosanct, for we have overruled prior decisions where the necessity and propriety of 
doing so has been established.  But any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis 
demands special justification.”  Wampler v. Higgins (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 111, 120, 752 
N.E.2d 962 (Internal citations and quotations omitted).  This principle is universally 
accepted and unquestioned.  Reasonable disagreement may arise only over which 
circumstances constitute “special justification.” 
{¶ 45} Although this court is no stranger to overruling precedent,3 we have not 
adopted a standard by which to judge whether a past decision should be abandoned.  
Justice Frankfurter opined that stare decisis should be abandoned only “when such 
adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, 
intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.”  Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. at 119, 
60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604.  Justice Scalia takes a pragmatic approach, believing that a 
precedent should be abandoned where the rule is “wrong in principle,” “unstable in 
application,” and undermined by various exceptions and contradictions.  United States v. 
Dixon (1993), 509 U.S. 688, 709-711, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556. 
                                                 
3. 
In the field of insurance law, see, e.g., Ferrando v. Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Ohio St.3d 186, 
2002-Ohio-7217, 781 N.E.2d 927, overruling portions of Bogan v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (1988), 36 
Ohio St. 3d 22, 521 N.E.2d 447; Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 552, 644 N.E.3d 397, 
overruling Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Said (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 690, 590 N.E.2d 1228; and Savoie v. 
Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 620 N.E.2d 809, overruling Burris v. Grange Mut. Cos. 
(1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 84, 545 N.E.2d 83. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
{¶ 46} Other state supreme courts have opined as to when stare decisis should be 
abandoned.4  Under any of these standards, Scott-Pontzer would be justly overturned. 
{¶ 47} The Supreme Court of Michigan has formulated a standard that 
incorporates factors used by other states: (1) whether the decision was wrongly decided, 
(2) whether the decision defies practical workability, (3) whether reliance interests would 
cause an undue hardship, and (4) whether changes in the law or facts no longer justify the 
questioned decision.  Pohutski v. Allen Park (2002), 465 Mich. 675, 694, 641 N.W.2d 
219.  The Michigan court created a well-structured method of ensuring a disciplined 
approach to deciding whether to abandon a precedent.  Accordingly, we adopt a modified 
version of it here. 
{¶ 48} The first and fourth Michigan factors operate as alternatives—a decision 
either must have been wrong at the time it was decided, or was initially correct, but the 
passage of time has rendered it obsolete.  Thus, in Ohio, a prior decision of the Supreme 
Court may be overruled where (1) the decision was wrongly decided at that time, or 
changes in circumstances no longer justify continued adherence to the decision, (2) the 
decision defies practical workability, and (3) abandoning the precedent would not create 
an undue hardship for those who have relied upon it.5  We now apply this test to Scott-
Pontzer. 
A. 
Scott-Pontzer was Erroneously Decided 
                                                 
4. 
The Idaho Supreme Court will reverse itself when a decision has proven over time to be unjust or 
unwise.  State v. Humpherys (2000), 134 Idaho 457, 660, 8 P.3d 652.  Maine abandons precedent that 
“lacks vitality and the capacity to serve the interests of justice.” State v. Rees (Me.2000), 748 A.2d 976, 
977.  Arkansas will break from precedent where adherence to the rule would cause great injury or injustice.  
Aka v. Jefferson Hosp. Assn, Inc. (2001), 344 Ark. 627, 641, 42 S.W.3d 508.  Many states will part from 
cases that were wrong when decided.  Ex Parte State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (Ala.2000), 764 So.2d 543, 
545-546; State Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm. v. Carlson (Alaska 2003), 65 P.3d 851, 859; 
Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue (Mo.2002), 94 S.W.3d 388, 390-391; Shoup v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Or.2003), 335 Ore. 164, 174, 61 P.3d 928; State v. Mauchley (Utah 2003), 67 P.3d 
477, 481. Others will not follow past decisions that are unworkable or poorly reasoned.  J&M Land Co. v. 
First Union Natl. Bank (2001), 166 N.J. 493, 521, 766 A.2d 1110;  Riney v. State (Tex. Crim. App.2000), 
28 S.W.3d 561, 565; see, also, Payne v. Tenn. (1991), 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720. 
5. 
Subsequent to the initial drafting of this opinion, the United States Supreme Court utilized a 
similar trifold stare decisis test in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), 539 U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2482-2483.  
The test was synthesized by a dissenting justice:   “Today’s approach to stare decisis invites us to overrule 
an erroneously decided precedent * * * if: (1) its foundations have been ‘eroded’ by subsequent decisions, 
ante, at 2482; (2) it has been subject to ‘substantial and continuing’ criticism, ibid.; and (3) it has not 
induced ‘individual or societal reliance’ that counsels against overturning, ante, at 2483.” Id. at 2489 
(emphasis sic) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
January Term, 2003 
 
 
 
15 
{¶ 49} As previously discussed, Scott-Pontzer was wrongly decided.  See Section 
II, above.  Whether someone is insured under an insurance policy should not be 
interpreted in favor of one who was not a party to the contract.  This was the law in Ohio 
long before Scott-Pontzer.  Cook v. Kozell, 176 Ohio St. at 336, 27 O.O.2d 275, 199 
N.E.2d 566 (the plaintiff who is not a party to the insurance contract is not in a position to 
urge a construction of the contract that would be detrimental to both parties to the 
contract); West v. McNamara, supra.  We should have followed this well-settled and 
intrinsically sound precedent, which is verified by experience.  Instead, we ventured to a 
point where the definition of “you” became immaterial to its meaning and the intention of 
the parties was ignored. 
B. 
The Unworkable Nature of Scott-Pontzer 
 
1. 
Scott-Pontzer Has Caused Chaos in the Courts 
{¶ 50} Scott-Pontzer and its progeny defy practical workability.  The multitude of 
post-Scott-Pontzer issues before this court,6 the widespread criticism of the decision from 
other jurisdictions,7 and the numerous conflicts emanating from the lower courts8 indicate 
that the decision muddied the waters of insurance coverage litigation, converted simple 
liability suits into complex multiparty litigation, and created massive and widespread 
confusion—the antithesis of what a decision of this court should do.  Attorneys are forced 
to file briefs and appendixes that are several inches thick in an attempt to form a coherent 
picture out of the post-Scott-Pontzer morass. 
{¶ 51} This chaos resulted from this court’s failure to explain why the intent of 
the parties was not controlling.  The Scott-Pontzer court also failed to acknowledge or 
explain its departure from precedent.  To uphold Scott-Pontzer is to summarily reject the 
well-reasoned precedents of Cook and West.  This we must not do. 
 
2. 
Exceptions and Contradictions to Scott-Pontzer. 
                                                 
6. 
See, e.g., Bagnoli v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 314, 715 N.E.2d 
125; Linko v. Indemn. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 445, 739 N.E.2d 338;  Kemper v. Michigan 
Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Ohio St.3d 162, 2002-Ohio-7101, 781 N.E.2d 196; and  Ferrando v. Auto-Owners 
Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Ohio St.3d 186, 2002-Ohio-7217, 781 N.E.2d 927. 
7. 
Ante, ¶ 19. 
8. 
For example, there are currently 23 cases before this court that await this opinion. All told, there 
are over 90 Scott-Pontzer-related cases pending before this court. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
{¶ 52} As previously discussed, the courts of Ohio are deluged by cases arising 
from Scott-Pontzer and its progeny.  If we allow the objectionable aspects of Scott-
Pontzer to stand, a patchwork of exceptions to, and limitations of, Scott-Pontzer would be 
the likely result. 
{¶ 53} The case before us asks whether the addition of an endorsement entitled 
“Drive Other Car Coverage—Broadened Coverage for Named Individuals” to the 
commercial motor vehicle policy prevents the Scott-Pontzer ambiguity from being read 
into the policy.  A broadened-coverage endorsement extends a commercial motor vehicle 
insurance policy’s coverage to a list of specific individuals when those individuals or 
their spouses use vehicles not otherwise covered under the policy. 
{¶ 54} The broadened-coverage endorsement can be seen as altering the Scott-
Pontzer analysis in two ways.  First, Aetna argues that the inclusion of these individuals 
prevents any ambiguity from forming because “you” must be read to mean the specific 
individuals listed in the broadened-coverage endorsement.  Thus, because there is 
uninsured motorist coverage provided for individuals, the term “you” is not rendered 
ambiguous.  Second, Aetna invokes expressio unius to argue that by expressly covering 
the individuals listed in the broadened-coverage endorsement, the contract shows that the 
parties did not intend to extend uninsured motorist coverage to every employee and 
employee’s family member. 
{¶ 55} Aetna’s second argument carries great weight, for the intent of the parties 
is paramount.  Here, Quagliata’s Restaurants paid $881 to have seven individuals covered 
under the broadened-coverage endorsement.  Of that amount, $565 was for uninsured 
motorist premiums.  It is clear that the parties thought this to be an expansion of 
uninsured motorist coverage. However, ruling that including individuals on a broadened-
coverage endorsement prevents “you” from being ambiguous would not be without its 
problems. That ruling would require that paying an additional premium actually reduces 
the coverage available under the policy.  This is neither a just result nor a logical 
consistency. 
January Term, 2003 
 
 
 
17 
{¶ 56} Besides the broadened-coverage issue presented in this case, additional 
exceptions to Scott-Pontzer are sought in cases currently pending before this court.9  
Creating exceptions to Scott-Pontzer would add to the confusion and arbitrariness, not 
lessen them. 
{¶ 57} The rationale of Scott-Pontzer does not withstand scrutiny.  If we were to 
slowly create a patchwork of exceptions and limitations, we would abandon certainty in 
the law and contribute to the continuing morass of litigation.  Maintaining Scott-Pontzer 
as precedent, while eviscerating it with exceptions, would not respect the principle of 
stare decisis but mock it, and would continue the chaos in our insurance jurisprudence.  
See United States v. Dixon at 711, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556. 
C. 
Reliance Interests 
{¶ 58} The final part of our test is whether undue hardship would be visited upon 
those who have relied on Scott-Pontzer.  “[T]he Court must ask whether the previous 
decision has become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone’s 
expectations that to change it would produce not just readjustments, but practical real-
world dislocations.”  Robinson v. Detroit (2000), 462 Mich. 439, 466, 613 N.W.2d 307.  
If overruling a precedent would cause chaos, it should be upheld even if wrongly decided. 
{¶ 59} No reliance interest will be jeopardized by limiting Scott-Pontzer.  First, 
Scott-Pontzer cannot be relied upon when policyholders purchase uninsured motorist 
coverage.  The General Assembly has enacted changes to R.C. 3937.18 expressly to 
supersede Scott-Pontzer.  Section 3, 2001 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 97 (eff. Oct. 31, 2001).  
Second, the overwhelming majority of Scott-Pontzer cases are resurrected claims from 
the years prior to the Scott-Pontzer decision.10  Because no one was aware of this form of 
uninsured motorist coverage before it was created by that decision, no one could have 
relied upon it.  Finally, the potential that anyone would have reduced his personal 
uninsured motorist coverage based upon the belief that his employer’s insurer, or his 
family member’s employer’s insurer, would provide this coverage is practically 
                                                 
9. 
Some of the pending issues are whether Scott-Pontzer applies to policies issued to partnerships, 
schools, or collectively to a business and an individual; to fronting policies; or where the terms and 
conditions of coverage have been violated. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
nonexistent.  Thus, there is no individual or societal reliance upon Scott-Pontzer outside 
of the courtroom. 
{¶ 60} Limiting Scott-Pontzer will restore order to our legal system by returning 
to the fundamental principles of insurance contract interpretation.  “It does no violence to 
the legal doctrine of stare decisis to right that which is clearly wrong.  It serves no valid 
public purpose to allow incorrect opinions to remain in the body of our law.” State ex rel. 
Lake Cty. Bd. of Comms. v. Zupancic (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 297, 300, 581 N.E.2d 1086. 
IV 
{¶ 61} For the foregoing reasons, we hereby limit Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. 
Fire Ins. Co. to apply only where an employee is within the course and scope of 
employment.  We overrule Ezawa v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Am.  “Since 
neither experience nor reason and justice support the rule[s], but in fact militate against 
[them], this court would be doing less than its duty, even giving due and careful 
consideration to the rule of stare decisis, to perpetuate [them] or add yet another 
ramification or exception.”  Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. Eblen (1958), 167 Ohio St. 189, 
207, 4 O.O.2d 256,147 N.E.2d 486. 
{¶ 62} Absent specific language to the contrary, a policy of insurance that names 
a corporation as an insured for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage covers a loss 
sustained by an employee of the corporation only if the loss occurs within the course and 
scope of employment.  Additionally, where a policy of insurance designates a corporation 
as a named insured, the designation of “family members” of the named insured as “other 
insureds” does not extend insurance coverage to a family member of an employee of the 
corporation, unless that employee is also a named insured. 
{¶ 63} In this case, Jason Galatis’s death was unrelated to his mother’s 
employment with Quagliata’s Restaurants.  Therefore, the Aetna insurance policy issued 
to Quagliata’s Restaurants does not provide coverage here.  Accordingly, the judgment of 
the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
MOYER, C.J., DEGENARO and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
                                                                                                                                                 
10. 
This is due to Ohio’s 15-year statute of limitations on contract claims, R.C. 2305.06, and partially 
because insurers acted quickly to modify their policies after the Scott-Pontzer decision. 
January Term, 2003 
 
 
 
19 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur separately. 
RESNICK, J., dissents. 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
MARY DEGENARO, J., of the Seventh Appellate District, sitting for Cook, J. 
__________________ 
MOYER, C. J., concurring. 
{¶ 64} This court has recently accepted jurisdiction over several cases, including 
the one at bar, in which a party has affirmatively requested that we overrule Scott-Pontzer 
v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 660, 710 N.E.2d 1116. Having 
accepted this issue for review,11 the court today stands at a crossroads. The court may 
follow the doctrine of stare decisis and attempt to minimize the impact of Scott-Pontzer 
by creating a patchwork of exceptions to and limitations of the holding therein. 
Alternatively, the court may depart from a rigid application of the doctrine and, in a 
single pronouncement, right that which is clearly wrong. See State ex rel. Lake Cty. Bd. 
of Comms. v. Zupancic (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 297, 300, 581 N.E.2d 1086. For the reasons 
stated in the majority opinion, I believe that the latter charts the better course toward 
restoring order to insurance law in Ohio. 
{¶ 65} As a staunch and consistent advocate of stare decisis, I concur in the 
majority opinion only after considerable deliberation. I joined Justice Cook’s dissent in 
Scott-Pontzer because I believed that neither the commercial policy nor the excess policy 
should be construed to provide UIM coverage to an off-duty employee driving his 
spouse’s car. Under most circumstances, I would not vote to overrule a precedent 
established by the majority of this court. The doctrine of stare decisis, as I observed in 
Gallimore v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 244, 257, 617 N.E.2d 
1052, embodies “a fundamental element of American jurisprudence—consistency and 
predictability.” (Moyer, C.J., dissenting.) My dissent in Gallimore, however, also 
                                                 
11. 
See, e.g., Monroe Guar. Ins. Co. v. Kuba, case No. 2003-0213, 98 Ohio St.3d 1564, 2003-Ohio-
2242, 787 N.E.2d 1229; Sekula v. Hartford Ins. Co., case No. 2003-0729, 99 Ohio St.3d 1510, 2003-Ohio-
3957, 792 N.E.2d 198; McNeeley v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., case No. 2003-1302, 100 Ohio St.3d 1437, 
2003-Ohio-5513, 797 N.E.2d 515. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
recognized that “ ‘stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of 
adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence 
involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, 
and verified by experience.’ ” Id., quoting Helvering v. Hallock (1940), 309 U.S. 106, 
119, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604. 
{¶ 66} The majority opinion refines this principle and, in so doing, sets forth a 
tripartite standard that honors stare decisis by preventing arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement of the law while relieving courts of the obligation to apply stare decisis with 
“petrifying rigidity.” Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr. (1994), 68 Ohio 
St.3d 435, 438, 628 N.E.2d 46. We serve the bench and the bar by adopting a cogent, 
clear standard by which to test claims that our precedents should not be followed. There 
can be little doubt that Scott-Pontzer should be limited under this standard. 
{¶ 67} Our decision today does not mark a change in my belief in the importance 
of the predictability and consistency produced by stare decisis. No one should assume 
that our decision heralds a new era in which prior cases of this court will be routinely or 
arbitrarily overruled. Our decision, rather, is a narrow response to a decision widely 
recognized as an error of law, which, if left uncorrected, would have continued to 
produce consequences that even the majority in Scott-Pontzer could not have foreseen. 
To that end, I am reminded of this court’s assertion over four decades ago:  
{¶ 68}  “ ‘[C]ases and situations arise in which the need for a change is imminent. 
This becomes acutely apparent when a rule with dubious beginnings hangs on tenaciously 
in the face of a much needed change. Case after case will display the death throes of the 
old rule and at the same time the reluctance of the judges to overrule it.’ ” Gibbon v. 
Young Women’s Christian Assn. of Hamilton (1960), 170 Ohio St. 280, 289, 10 O.O.2d 
334, 164 N.E.2d 563, quoting Feather, The Immunity of Charitable Institutions from Tort 
Liability (1959), 11 Baylor L.Rev. 86, 106. 
{¶ 69} This observation could be no more prophetic than here: case after case 
before us reveals the impracticality of Scott-Pontzer and thus gives rise to the question of 
whether the reluctance of judges to overrule it will prevail in the face of a much needed 
change. I join the majority today as we create and apply a standard that will serve this 
court and all who are bound by its decision. 
January Term, 2003 
 
 
 
21 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion. 
__________________ 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 70} This case comes to us through a certified conflict on the following issue, 
as stated by the court of appeals:  “Whether the inclusion of a ‘Broadened Coverage 
Endorsement,’ adding individual named insureds to a commercial motor vehicle liability 
policy, eliminates any ambiguity over the use of the term ‘you’ therein.”  The court of 
appeals certified its decision on this issue as in conflict with the decisions of the Fifth 
District Court of Appeals in Burkhart v. CNA Ins. Co. (Feb. 25, 2002), Stark App. No. 
2001CA00265, 2002 WL 316224; and Still v. Indiana Ins. Co. (Feb. 25, 2002), Stark 
App. No. 2001CA00300, 2002 WL 358652.  This court determined that a conflict exists 
and ordered the parties to brief the issue as stated.  96 Ohio St.3d 1446, 2002-Ohio-3512, 
771 N.E.2d 260.  When the court accepts a certified-conflict case for review, it issues an 
order “identifying those issues raised in the case that will be considered by the Supreme 
Court on appeal.”  S.Ct.Prac.R. IV(2)(C).  Our order identified only the issue stated in the 
certification order. 
{¶ 71} Rather than confining itself to deciding the certified issue, the majority 
expands the scope of this appeal on the merits by drastically “limiting” the holding of 
Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 660, 710 N.E.2d 1116, 
and overruling Ezawa v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Am. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 
557, 715 N.E.2d 1142.  In the process of reaching those conclusions, the majority 
expands the reach of its opinion to yet another level by propounding as syllabus law a 
general, supposedly objective, test to be applied whenever this court considers whether 
stare decisis should be rejected and a previous decision of this court overruled. 
{¶ 72} Appellee conceded the validity of Scott-Pontzer in both the trial court and 
the court of appeals below, and proceeded at both levels on the theory that it should 
prevail on other grounds.  The trial court found that Scott-Pontzer applied but further 
found that coverage pursuant to that decision was unavailable because appellants failed to 
comply with notice and subrogation provisions in the insurance policy.  Appellants 
appealed from that decision, and Aetna cross-appealed.  As one of its points, Aetna 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
argued that the policy at issue in this case differs from the policy at issue in Scott-Pontzer 
because the broadened-coverage endorsement in the Aetna policy removes the ambiguity 
over the word “you” and therefore distinguishes this case from Scott-Pontzer.  This 
argument had been raised by Aetna in the trial court, but by ruling that coverage was 
potentially available under Scott-Pontzer, the trial court obviously did not accept Aetna’s 
argument.  Notably, appellee never raised any argument in the court of appeals 
challenging the rationale underlying Scott-Pontzer.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
trial court’s judgment solely on the broadened-coverage-endorsement grounds urged by 
Aetna.  The court of appeals then certified a conflict on that issue to this court for review. 
{¶ 73} In its brief filed here, appellee uses seven pages of its brief to respond to 
appellants’ arguments relating to the impact of the broadened-coverage endorsement.  
Appellee then expounds for 28 pages on why Scott-Pontzer should be overruled, going to 
great lengths to argue a position that was never raised below and that was not in any way 
responsive to appellants’ brief on the merits.  Appellee’s position is inconsistent with all 
of its arguments below premised on an acceptance of Scott-Pontzer and could not have 
been anticipated by appellants.  Under S.Ct.Prac.R. VI(4)(A), appellants were allowed 
only 20 pages for their reply brief, which ordinarily should be enough to counter the 
points in a typical appellee brief, but which were not nearly enough to reply to this 
ambush. 
{¶ 74} Given all of the above considerations, this case is not the appropriate 
vehicle for the majority to accomplish its goals.  This case is about broadened-coverage 
endorsements and nothing more.  As a certified-conflict case that should be confined to a 
narrow issue, it is certainly not about whether Scott-Pontzer should have continuing 
validity.  Because the majority’s reach exceeds the limits inherent in this appeal, I 
dissent. 
__________________ 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J., dissenting. 
{¶ 75} Today the majority considers extraneous arguments to reach a result more 
palatable to them than the existing law.  In so doing, they ignore our rules of practice and 
well-established precedents and unnecessarily modify stare decisis, a long-standing 
principle of American jurisprudence.  For these reasons, I dissent. 
January Term, 2003 
 
 
 
23 
{¶ 76} First, this case comes before us as a certified question.  The Supreme 
Court Rule of Practice governing this procedure, S.Ct.Prac.R. IV (3)(B), provides:  “In 
their merit briefs, the parties shall brief the issues identified in the order of the Supreme 
Court as issues to be considered on appeal.”  The case was certified to settle a 
disagreement among the appellate districts on the effects of the broadened-coverage 
endorsement in a UIM/UM insurance provision.  While Aetna gives lip service to the 
certified issue, the main thrust of its brief is to convince the court to overrule and limit 
established case law on different issues.  These issues are not properly before the court, 
and, therefore, the majority should not decide them. 
{¶ 77} Not only were these issues not properly certified, none of the arguments 
on them was raised by Aetna during summary judgment proceedings or during its appeal 
to the Ninth District Court of Appeals.  Aetna did not challenge the viability of Scott-
Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 660, 710 N.E.2d 1116; or 
Ezawa v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Am. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 557, 715 N.E.2d 
1142, until after the case was certified and after it appeared that the composition of this 
court would change.  We have always held that issues not raised below are waived. 
Goldfuss v. Davidson (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099.  The majority 
ignores this well-established principle. 
{¶ 78} Moreover, in deciding to reexamine Scott-Pontzer, the majority fails to 
abide by the long-standing rule of stare decisis.  Stare decisis is the policy that a court 
will follow its past decisions.  The significance of this rule cannot be overstated.  Without 
it, litigants may try to challenge precedent every time there is a change in the composition 
of the court.  If this is allowed, issues will never be resolved as long as one side believes 
that a new court will save the day in another case. 
{¶ 79} In State ex rel. Allison v. Jones (1960), 170 Ohio St. 323, 10 O.O.2d 417, 
164 N.E.2d 417, a new justice was faced with the chance to overrule a recent decision by 
the old court.  In refusing to do so, he had this to say: 
{¶ 80} “On another occasion, each of my six colleagues was privileged to 
consider a situation identical to that here presented and to arrive at his individual 
conclusion unfettered by established and existing law.  Alone of the seven members of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
this court, I have not had the opportunity of passing upon the issue * * * without the 
restriction of a controlling decision of this court directly in point.  Exercising judgment in 
the enviable aura of unrestricted choice, three of my colleagues chose each of the two 
divergent courses * * *, and each now adheres to his position so adopted.  I enjoy no such 
freedom of choice and consider myself bound to follow what has now been established as 
the law of this state.  Whether I find the result to be palatable is of concern only to 
myself.”  Id. at 324, 10 O.O.2d 417, 164 N.E.2d 417 (Peck, J., concurring). 
{¶ 81} Justice Peck further recognized: 
{¶ 82}  “Such a change in the pronounced law can only result from an 
abandonment of a doctrine which may well be considered the heart and core of Anglo-
Saxon jurisprudence.  That doctrine is referred to as stare decisis, a phrase which is an 
abbreviation of a maxim adjuring the courts ‘to stand by precedent, and not to disturb 
settled points.’ ”  Id. at 325, 10 O.O.2d 417, 164 N.E.2d 417, quoting Ballard Cty. v. 
Kentucky Cty. Debt Comm. (1942), 290 Ky. 770, 772-773, 162 S.W.2d 771. 
{¶ 83} I quote Justice Peck because he was faced with precisely the same 
situation that faces this new court, but he chose a different outcome because he felt duty-
bound to follow established case law.  His guidance, in the name of stare decisis, should 
be heeded. 
{¶ 84} Adherence to precedent has several laudatory goals, including certainty, 
equality, efficiency, and the appearance of justice.  Padden, Note, Overruling Decisions 
in the Supreme Court:  The Role of a Decision’s Vote, Age, and Subject Matter in the 
Application of Stare Decisis After Payne v. Tennessee (1994), 82 Geo.L.J. 1689.  The 
goal of certainty is promoted “by allowing individuals to arrange their affairs with 
confidence, assured in the knowledge that the law that will be applied to them in the 
future will be the same as currently applied.”  Id. at 1691.  Equality is accomplished “by 
treating like cases alike.”  Id. at 1692.  Efficiency is promoted because “[o]nce a previous 
court has addressed difficult policy questions, subsequent courts need not expend time 
and resources to readdress those issues, but can rely on the wisdom of the previous 
court.”  Id.  The last reason is the appearance of justice.  This goal “conforms to the 
public’s notion that Supreme Court Justices should be making impartial rules of law and 
not * * * law based on personal biases.”  Id. at 1693. 
January Term, 2003 
 
 
 
25 
{¶ 85} Traditionally, courts have accepted three circumstances under which it is 
proper to overrule precedent:  “when there has been an intervening development of law, 
when the rule it promulgated has proved unworkable, or when its underlying reasoning is 
outdated or inconsistent with contemporary values.”  Id. at 1694.  Although these reasons 
have withstood the test of time, the majority feels compelled to craft new rationale in 
syllabus law.  This is done despite the long-held view that any discussion of stare decisis 
is dicta.  Id. at 1690, fn. 6.  “Dicta” is defined as “[e]xpressions in court’s opinions which 
go beyond the facts before court and therefore are * * * not binding in subsequent cases 
as legal precedent.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990) 454. 
{¶ 86} I am especially troubled by the first and third reasons espoused by the 
majority in the syllabus.  As to the first reason (that the prior decision was wrongly 
decided), I ask, Who decides whether a decision was wrongly decided?  In Scott-Pontzer, 
we were examining specific UIM policy language that had not previously been examined 
by the court.  In reaching our decision, we did not overrule any prior decision.  In fact, we 
followed the established law that when ambiguous policies permit more than one 
reasonable interpretation, the one that favors the insured must prevail.  This time-tested 
principle encourages precise policy language, protects insureds who rely upon their 
reasonable understanding of the policies, and precludes insurers from profiting from their 
sloppy draftsmanship.  If our interpretations in these cases contravened the intent of the 
insurance companies, it was the obligation of the insurance companies to rewrite their 
policies.  Indeed, this is what happened after Scott-Pontzer.  In response to the 
ambiguities, insurance companies rewrote their contracts to better describe the scope of 
coverage provided. See majority opinion, fn. 10. 
{¶ 87} Perhaps even more troubling is the third new ground for overruling 
precedent (that overruling will not impose an undue hardship for those who have relied 
upon the decision).  How can this factor be met here?  Even the majority concedes that 
many pending cases raise Scott-Pontzer issues.  These cases involve individual litigants 
who have devoted much time and money in pursuing their claims. Therefore, how can the 
majority even suggest that no undue hardship is created by this decision?  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
{¶ 88} Thus, even though recent cases are not immune to being overruled, a 
change in court composition is not a sufficient reason for abandoning precedent.  Padden, 
Overruling Decisions, supra, 82 Geo.L.J. at 1719.  Instead, I believe that the majority 
should recognize that prior rulings of this court are still valid and binding even after a 
member of the majority has left the bench. 
{¶ 89} Moreover, I believe that the majority commits error in adopting new 
rationale for overruling precedent.  There is no reason to abandon the time-tested 
principles for applying stare decisis. 
{¶ 90} For all these reasons, I dissent. 
RESNICK, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 91} The fallout from this court’s decision in Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire 
Ins. Co. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 660, 710 N.E.2d 1116, has resulted not from a failure of 
legal analysis but from a failure in insurance policy drafting.  The majority today tries to 
fix that problem.  It focuses its criticism on this court’s decision in Scott-Pontzer, but, in 
the end, it is the insurance policy language that is rewritten.  The majority does not 
overrule Scott-Pontzer—it just makes it more affordable. 
{¶ 92} The central dilemma in Scott-Pontzer was who is “You” in a corporate 
UM/UIM policy listing “You” as an insured?  If “You” is the corporation, the coverage is 
illusory—a corporation is not capable of suffering physical or emotional damage, or even 
of shedding a tear.  To find that “You” was the corporation would have meant that 
insurers had collected premiums for coverage that applied to no one.  Certainly, no 
insurance company would purposely do that. 
{¶ 93} The other possibility was that the “You” meant actual human beings—
employees—capable of suffering injury.  Was “You” someone or was it no one?  The 
majority in Scott-Pontzer opted for the interpretation that the policy language had 
meaning and that coverage was available. 
{¶ 94} Who constituted “You” was the sole ambiguity we needed to resolve in 
Scott-Pontzer.  We followed our universal and longstanding precedent to construe 
ambiguities against the drafter of the contract, in this case, the insurer.  From there, the 
January Term, 2003 
 
 
 
27 
rest of the policy language took over.  There were no “in the workplace” or “in the scope 
of employment” limitations to the coverage.  There were no ambiguities to resolve, 
because there was no limiting language even to consider. 
{¶ 95} Today, the majority determines, as did the majority in Scott-Pontzer, that 
the answer to the question “Who is ‘You?’ ” is “employees.”  It arrives at the same basic 
conclusion as the Scott-Pontzer majority, while pillorying that earlier decision.  As in 
Scott-Pontzer, the majority here rejects outright the insurers’ argument that, at best, the 
“You” means only employees driving covered automobiles. 
{¶ 96} Resolving the ambiguity of “You” the same way the Scott-Pontzer 
majority did, the majority here has found a way for that interpretation not to harm 
insurers.  It creates some new limitations of coverage for the corporate employees that it 
has determined are the actual insureds.  Although insurers did not include these 
limitations in their policies, the majority reasons that they meant to.  Despite the fact that 
the insurers in both Scott-Pontzer and in this case argued that being on the job for the 
employer was not sufficient for an employee driving a personally owned vehicle to 
qualify for UM/UIM coverage, the majority divines that an employee who is simply 
acting within the scope of his employment is covered.  Apparently, this court knows the 
intent of the insurers better than the insurers do. 
{¶ 97} This court in Scott-Pontzer determined what the policy said; today, this 
court determines what the policy should have said.  By deciding that UM/UIM policies 
apply to employees acting within the scope of their employment, the majority 
acknowledges that coverage is actually far broader than the insurers were willing to 
concede.  But by limiting the employees covered to include only those on the job, the 
majority has effectively swept away the bulk of Scott-Pontzer claimants, and saved the 
insurers from their own policy language. 
{¶ 98} The decision in Scott-Pontzer has little precedential value—the insurance 
contract language it interpreted has been revised and is no longer in use.  The majority is 
not fixing a hole in our jurisprudence that is going to adversely affect any future 
transactions. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
{¶ 99} But let us review what this court does accomplish today: (1) overrules a 
four-year-old case, (2) achieves that by adopting the central tenet of the case this court 
attacks, and (3) writes in new coverage limitations to an insurance contract that is no 
longer in use. 
{¶ 100} 
The three sitting justices who are in the majority have all been 
applauded as practitioners of judicial restraint.  As to that restraint, I am reminded of the 
words of the character Inigo Montoya from the movie “The Princess Bride”: 
{¶ 101} 
 “You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think 
it means.” 
__________________ 
 
Bashein & Bashein Co., L.P.A., and W. Craig Bashein; Paul W. Flowers Co., 
L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, for appellants. 
 
Davis & Young, Henry A. Hentemann and Richard M. Garner, for appellee. 
 
Boyk & Crossmock, L.L.C., and Steven L. Crossmock, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
__________________