Case Title: STATE v CAIN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-548

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1986-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 8 5 - 5 4 8 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 6 STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , -vs- PATRICK CAIN, D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of the S e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of D a w s o n , T h e H o n o r a b l e R. C. M c D o n o u g h , Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: F o r A p p e l l a n t : L a r r y M a n s c h , M i s s o u l a , Montana F o r R e s p o n d e n t : Hon. M i k e G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , M o n t a n a D o r o t h y M c C a r t e r , A s s t . A t t y . G e n e r a l , H e l e n a R i c h a r d A. S i m o n t o n , C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , G l e n d i v e , Montana; M a r v i n L. Howe, D e p u t y C o u n t y A t t o r n e y S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : M a r c h 2 1 , 1 9 8 6 D e c i d e d : May 1 5 , 1 9 8 6 .MAY I t 1386 Filed. M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr. d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant, P a t r i c k Cain, appeals h i s conviction of t h e offense of t h e f t following a jury t r i a l i n t h e Seventh Judi- c i a l D i s t r i c t Court, County of Dawson. W e a f f i r m t h e conviction. O n November 15, 1984, defendant and Burl Keith Hunter were a r r e s t e d and charged with t h e t h e f t of approximately $19,000 worth of d r i l l i n g b i t s from Security B i t s of Glendive, Montana. Hunter pled g u i l t y . Cain pled n o t g u i l t y , claiming t h a t he was unaware of any criminal wrongdoing. Hunter was t h e s t a t e ' s key witness a t Cain's t r i a l . H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had known defendant f o r t h r e e o r four years. He came t o Miles City i n November of 1984 t o v i s i t with defendant and t o "party". While i n Miles C i t y , Hunter drove a three-quarter t o n Ford pickup truck belonging t o Eastman Whipstock, an o i l f i e l d company located i n Casper, Wyoming. Hunter f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t on November 7 , 1984, a f t e r drinking heavily, he and Cain attempted t o s t e a l some d r i l l - i n g b i t s from various d r i l l i n g r i g s . The plan f a i l e d . The next day t h e two went t o Glendive, Montana, c a l l e d Security B i t s and arranged t o meet i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a t t h e shop i n order t o procure some b i t s . Allan Swenson, s a l e s manager f o r Security B i t s , was o u t of town f o r t h e weekend. Melvin McDanold had agreed t o be "on c a l l " f o r Swenson i n t h e event someone wished t o make a purchase from t h e shop. McDanold and a f r i e n d , Danny Grigsby, met Hunter and defendant a t t h e shop. Hunter t e s t i - f i e d t h a t he then "took charge". H e t o l d McDanold t h a t h i s name was Wayne Harther, he worked f o r an o i l company out-of-state and he needed t o purchase c e r t a i n d r i l l b i t s . Eight b i t s were then s e l e c t e d and loaded i n t o Hunter's truck. Hunter signed an invoice f o r t h e b i t s using h i s assumed name, Wayne Harther. Thereafter, according t o Hunter, he and defendant went t o Gettysburg, South Dakota, where they s o l d t h e e i g h t d r i l l b i t s f o r $1900. The money was divided equal- l y between t h e two and they returned t o Miles City. Other witnesses f o r t h e S t a t e s u b s t a n t i a t e d most of Hunter's testimony. McDanold t e s t i f i e d t h a t a "Wayne Harther" (Hunter) had c a l l e d November 8 , 1984, and s t a t e d he worked a t Coastal O i l and Gas and needed some d r i l l i n g b i t s . Hunter and a second i n d i v i d u a l (defendant) m e t McDanold a t t h e shop. Hunter introduced himself a s Wayne Harther. McDanold was unsure whether defendant was present a t t h e t i m e of t h e introduction b u t was f a i r l y c e r t a i n defendant could have heard t h e introduction. Hunter was d e f i n i t e l y i n charge. Defendant was l1 j u s t there". A f t e r t h e b i t s were located, Hunter signed t h e invoice a s Wayne Harther and departed. Grigsby, McDanoldls f r i e n d who accompanied him t o t h e shop, t e s t i f i e d t h a t he and defendant had primarily stood around and t a l k e d while Hunter and McDanold searched f o r t h e b i t s . Hunter appeared t o be i n charge. Grigsby a l s o s t a t e d t h a t he was unsure whether defendant had heard Hunter i n t r o - duce himself a s Harther a s defendant might have s t i l l been i n t h e truck. A f t e r Hunter s t a t e d he was from Casper, Grigsby inquired of defendant whether he knew some of Grigsby's f r i e n d s i n Casper. Defendant s t a t e d t h a t he had j u s t moved from Oklahoma. and d i d not know anyone. The remainder of t h e r e l e v a n t testimony came from a law o f f i c e r . Highway Patrolman Warren S c h i f f e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r stopping Hunter on November 10, 1984, f o r a speeding v i o l a t i o n , he discovered t h e t r u c k had been reported s t o l e n by Eastman Whipstock. Hunter and defendant w e r e both arrested. Defendant was subsequently released. At the time of arrest, Hunter had six $100 bills on his person and defen- dant had large bills totaling at least $250. At the close of the State's case-in-chief, defendant's attorney moved for a directed verdict on two grounds: 1) the State failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt; and insufficient corroboration of the accomplice, Hunter testimony. The motion was denied and the trial continued. Defendant was convicted of theft and received an eight-year suspended sentence. On appeal, defendant raises the following issue: Whether the trial judge erred, pursuant to § 46-16-213, MCA, in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case? Section 46-16-213, MCA, states: Testimony of person legally accountable. A convic- tion cannot be had on the testimony of one respon- sible or legally accountable for the same offense, as defined in 45-2-301, unless the testimony is corroborated by other evidence which in itself and without the aid of the testimony of the one respon- sible or legally accountable for the same offense tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. The corroboration is not suffi- cient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof. Whether evidence is sufficient to corroborate the testi- mony of an accomplice is a question of law. The evidence must show more than the fact that a crime was committed. It must raise more than a suspicion concerning defendant's involvement in the crime. However, it need not be suffi- cient, on its face, to support a prima facie case against defendant. State v. Kemp (19791, 182 Mont. 383, 386 - 3871 597 P.2d 96, 99. The evidence need only "tend to connect" defendant with the crime. State v. Mitchell (Mont. 1981), the evidence may be circumstantial and it may come from the defendant or his witnesses. Kemp, 182 Mont. at 387, 597 P.2d at 99. Hunter's testimony implicating defendant was corroborat- ed by testimony indicating that defendant knew Hunter was using an alias and testimony suggesting that defendant told Grigsby he was residing in Casper, Wyoming. Further, it is undisputed that defendant was at Security Bits at the time the bits were stolen. Finally, defendant was arrested with over $200 cash in his pocket on the road between South Dakota and Miles City two days after the theft. This is consistent with Hunter's testimony that he and defendant sold the drill bits in South Dakota for $1900 cash. The testimony against defendant is circumstantial. But, as a matter of law, it is not insufficient to corroborate the accomplice's testimony. The testimony might also be, as defendant contends, consistent with innocent conduct on the part of defendant. Defendant ' s mother might have provided him with money for a job-hunting expedition to South Dakota. Defendant might not have heard Hunter introduce himself as Wayne Harther. However, these are factual questions, proper- ly resolved by the jury. State v. Anderson (1982), 197 Mont. 374, 378, 643 P.2d 564, 566. The trial judge did not err when he refused to grant defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Affirmed. We concur: /y'j - / u w , . ghief Justice L