Case Title: In re Adoption of I.B.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 82S05-1502-AD-63

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
Steven E. Ripstra 
Melissa Jo Haley 
Ripstra Law Office 
Jasper, Indiana 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF 
CHILD SERVICES 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Robert J. Henke 
Christina D. Pace 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES 
B.C. AND J.L. 
Julie Fox 
Matthew W. Lutz 
Fox & Lutz, LLC 
Evansville, Indiana 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
 
No. 82S05-1502-AD-63 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF MINOR CHILDREN: I.B. AND W.B.: 
 
B.B., 
 
Appellant (Cross-Petitioner/Intervenor),  
 
V. 
 
B.C. AND J.L., 
Appellees (Adoptive Parents/Petitioners), 
 
AND 
 
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, 
Co-Appellee (Wardship of I.B. and W.B.). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Vanderburgh Superior Court, Nos. 82D07-1302-AD-22 and 82D07-1302-AD-23 
The Honorable Renée Allen Ferguson, Magistrate 
The Honorable Brett J. Niemeier, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 82A05-1402-AD-65 
_________________________________ 
 
June 11, 2015 
Rush, Chief Justice. 
After I.B. and W.B. were removed from their parents, both grandmothers petitioned to adopt 
them. The trial court permitted the maternal grandmother and her fiancé to adopt the children—even 
Jun 11 2015, 2:32 pm
 
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though the maternal grandmother has a prior felony conviction that statutorily disqualifies her from 
adopting—and the paternal grandmother appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the statu-
tory disqualification unconstitutional as applied because it created an “irrebuttable presumption” 
that blocked consideration of the children’s best interests. 
We disagree with that analysis. The United States Supreme Court has left its “irrebuttable 
presumption” cases lying dormant for several decades. And under its more recent “classification” 
analysis, the statute’s regrettable consequences under the facts of this case establish no as-applied 
constitutional violation. We therefore reverse the trial court and remand to reconsider both adoption 
petitions to the extent they are statutorily permissible, receiving supplemental evidence if it chooses. 
Facts and Procedural History 
In May of 2011, toddler W.B. and newborn I.B.—and also their early adolescent half-brothers 
J.C. and G.C.—were removed from their home because I.B. tested positive at birth for marijuana 
and the mother tested positive for methamphetamine. I.B. also has extensive special medical needs, 
including cerebral palsy and a gastrostomy tube (“G-tube”), and was hospitalized for the first six 
months of his life. All four were eventually adjudicated to be children in need of services (CHINS). 
From May until October of 2011, the three oldest children were placed in the home of their 
maternal grandmother, B.C. (“Maternal Grandmother”), and her fiancé, J.L. (“Fiancé”), while I.B. 
stayed in the hospital. But then Maternal Grandmother and Fiancé tested positive for marijuana and 
were initially uncooperative with services, so W.B. was briefly placed with his paternal grandmother, 
Appellant B.B. (“Paternal Grandmother”). Around Thanksgiving 2011, I.B. was released from the 
hospital, and all four children were returned to their mother and W.T.B. (W.B. and I.B.’s father) for 
a trial home visit. But the trial home visit failed, and the children went to two different foster 
homes—the older children in one, and W.B. and I.B. in another.  
Then in mid-2012, the children—first the older two, then W.B., and finally I.B.—transitioned 
back to Maternal Grandmother and Fiancé, who petitioned to adopt all four of them with the mother’s 
consent.1 The older boys’ adoption was uncontested and was granted in early October 2013. But 
Paternal Grandmother cross-petitioned to adopt W.B. and I.B., and the court heard testimony in a 
                                                 
1 The older boys’ father is deceased, and the trial court found W.T.B.’s consent was not required under 
Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8(a) (2008). 
 
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two-day-long contested hearing. We summarize that evidence in the light most favorable to the trial 
court’s findings and judgment. 
Maternal Grandmother’s and Fiancé’s Home and Relationship with the Children 
The Department of Child Services (DCS) and Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) 
recommended adoption by Maternal Grandmother and Fiancé instead of Paternal Grandmother. 
Maternal Grandmother and Fiancé had proactively sought out G-tube training early in the case. And 
they also (along with the older siblings) use playtime to reinforce aspects of I.B.’s physical therapy, 
so that I.B.’s mobility and speech have far exceeded providers’ expectations. The success Maternal 
Grandmother and Fiancé had in handling I.B.’s special needs echoes their similar success in helping 
his half-brother J.C. manage his special emotional needs through anger-management strategies and 
seeking out appropriate inpatient treatment when it was warranted. 
Furthermore, all four siblings are closely bonded with each other—especially I.B. with G.C., 
and W.B. with J.C. Likewise, W.B. and I.B. (like the older two) are strongly bonded with Maternal 
Grandmother and Fiancé. For example, even with I.B.’s limited speech, he enthusiastically greets 
Fiancé as “Buddy.” Their home has three bedrooms. And because Maternal Grandmother and Fiancé 
work different schedules, they need third-party childcare only three half-days per week, and both 
their employers offer significant flexibility for accommodating I.B.’s frequent doctor appointments. 
Finally, DCS and CASA in their recommendations emphasized the importance of preserving the 
sibling relationship between the four children, believing it would be detrimental to all four children 
if I.B. and W.B. were separated from the older boys. 
Maternal Grandmother and Fiancé both testified candidly about their prior marijuana use 
and initial hostility to cooperating with DCS after the children’s removal—as well as their change 
of heart and renewed focus on providing what the children needed. At first, when Maternal Grand-
mother tested positive for marijuana, Fiancé refused to consent to testing until several weeks later, 
and both were initially uncooperative with services offered by DCS. But they relented, and each 
began substance-abuse counseling as referred by DCS. After counseling identified no dependency 
on illegal substances, however, they both declined further services because the sessions were 
expensive. At the hearing, both Maternal Grandmother and Fiancé admitted they had occasionally 
used marijuana (Fiancé more frequently), but had stopped using and had been drug-free for nearly 
two years, confirmed by random testing. Their conduct had persuaded the family case manager 
that “they turned their mindsets around . . . that they needed to be in this for the children.” 
 
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Paternal Grandmother’s Home and Relationship with the Children  
By contrast, even though Paternal Grandmother undisputedly had a good relationship with 
I.B. and W.B., DCS and CASA had reservations about her as an adoptive parent. The trial court’s 
findings reflect that she had been passive and disengaged during the CHINS case, never obtaining 
G-tube training, nor attempting to do so until it became an issue in the case. As a working single 
parent, she would need to rely heavily on third-party childcare, but had not adequately investigated 
her options—even though childcare would be particularly challenging because any provider would 
also need G-tube training. She had struggled to meet J.C.’s special needs during the brief time the 
children were in her home, and at least once had lacked adequate food. And her home and her work 
schedule are generally less-suited to raising children—her home has only two bedrooms, her ability 
to take even important phone calls at work is restricted, and her schedule is rigid (with only five days’ 
paid leave per year) so that accommodating I.B.’s frequent medical appointments would be difficult.  
But the trial court’s greatest concern, reflected three times in its findings, was with Paternal 
Grandmother’s poor judgment about her son W.T.B.—I.B. and W.B.’s father and the other children’s 
stepfather. The record amply supports the court’s concern: J.C.’s special emotional needs stem from 
witnessing W.T.B.’s domestic violence against the children’s mother. In particular, in the fall of 
2012, W.T.B. had beaten her so severely she could barely breathe and needed emergency medical 
care. Afterward, Paternal Grandmother arrived at the scene of the beating (a motel where the parents 
were living together despite a no-contact order), but did not call the police. As she testified, “It 
never crossed my mind. Didn’t think about it. They both had been drinking and I just wanted the 
situation to become peaceful.” Rather, Maternal Grandmother and Fiancé reported the beating to 
authorities, after the mother showed up severely injured at their home and they took her to the 
hospital. Once before that, as well, Paternal Grandmother had briefly allowed the parents to live 
together with her despite her knowledge of the protective order. The court’s findings reflect 
concern that she would permit the children to have detrimental contact with the father, while failing 
to preserve their relationship with Maternal Grandmother and Fiancé. 
Maternal Grandmother’s and Fiancé’s Criminal History 
Complicating the trial court’s best-interests analysis, both Maternal Grandmother and 
Fiancé had felony convictions from fifteen or more years prior. In 1989, Fiancé was convicted of 
armed robbery in Iowa, and had also been convicted of burglary twice in Illinois, serving prison 
 
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time in both states. And in 1997, Maternal Grandmother had pleaded guilty to Class D felony 
neglect of a dependent, resulting in a two-year suspended sentence, for failing to report her ex-
husband’s molestation of her daughter (the children’s mother). DCS and CASA were aware of those 
convictions but had no concerns about how well either of them could raise the children—and indeed, 
DCS had formally waived any disqualifying effect of Fiancé’s convictions. But as DCS’s written 
report acknowledged, Maternal Grandmother’s neglect conviction was disqualifying by statute and 
could not be waived. See Ind. Code § 31-19-11-1(c)(15) (2008). Both Maternal Grandmother and 
Fiancé testified on direct and cross-examination about their criminal histories, but none of the parties 
specifically argued (nor included in their proposed orders) that Maternal Grandmother’s conviction 
was an absolute bar. 
Trial Court’s Order 
The trial court entered sua sponte findings of fact and conclusions of law. In essence, it found 
that it was in the best interests of I.B. and W.B. for Maternal Grandmother and Fiancé to adopt them, 
based partly on their success in working with I.B.’s special needs and the desirability of keeping 
all four siblings in the same home. One of its conclusions of law specifically addressed Maternal 
Grandmother’s neglect conviction: 
The Court concludes that [Maternal Grandmother]’s criminal 
history is not dispositive of her ability to care for children. That is 
not to say the Court cast this evidence aside. There was testimony 
from [Maternal Grandmother] and [the family case manager] 
regarding this issue and the documentation pertaining to the 1997 
conviction was made a part of the record. The explanation given by 
[Maternal Grandmother] regarding the conviction and the 
overwhelming amount of confidence the [case managers] and the 
CASA have in [Maternal Grandmother]’s suitability as a caregiver 
cannot be overlooked in consideration of this evidence. Nor can [the 
mother]’s consent for [Maternal Grandmother] to adopt, as she was 
the alleged victim in that case. 
The court accordingly granted adoption to Maternal Grandmother and Fiancé, and denied Paternal 
Grandmother’s petition. Paternal Grandmother appealed. 
Court of Appeals Disposition 
In the Court of Appeals, Paternal Grandmother for the first time directly argued that under 
Indiana Code section 31-19-11-1(c)(15), Maternal Grandmother and Fiancé are barred from adopting 
 
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because of their disqualifying felony convictions. In response, Maternal Grandmother and Fiancé 
argued that the best-interests analysis favored them, that Fiancé’s convictions were not an absolute 
bar because they were more than five years old, and that the court specifically determined that 
Maternal Grandmother’s conviction was not dispositive. DCS also filed a response brief, arguing 
that the statutory bar on Maternal Grandmother’s adoption constituted an “irrebuttable presumption” 
that, as applied, would violate the due process rights of Maternal Grandmother, Fiancé, and the 
children, and would also frustrate the overall best-interests purposes of the adoption statutes. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a unanimous published opinion. In re Adoption of I.B. 
and W.B., 19 N.E.3d 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Echoing DCS’s argument, the Court held the statute 
unconstitutional as applied, amounting to an irrebuttable presumption in violation of due process. 
Id. at 790–91 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656–57 (1972) and In re Adoption of Jonee, 
695 N.Y.S.2d 920 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1999)). Upholding the trial court’s determination that adoption 
by Maternal Grandmother and Fiancé was in the children’s best interests, the Court affirmed the 
adoption.  
Paternal Grandmother sought transfer, which we granted, thus vacating the Court of Appeals 
opinion. We now hold the statute constitutional, despite its harsh consequences under these facts, 
and remand to the trial court to reconsider the petitions in view of the absolute statutory bar. 
Standard of Review 
Because neither party filed a written request for findings and conclusions, see Ind. Trial Rule 
52(A), the trial court’s findings are controlling only as to issues they cover. Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 
N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997). We limit our review of those matters to whether the evidence 
supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment, reversing the findings only 
if they are clearly erroneous. Id. On all other matters, the general-judgment standard applies, and we 
will affirm on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Id. But the trial court’s conclusions of law, 
Johnson v. Johnson, 999 N.E.2d 56, 59 (Ind. 2013)—and any constitutional challenges, Lock v. 
State, 971 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind. 2012)—are reviewed de novo.  
Discussion 
Our as-applied constitutional analysis of Indiana Code section 31-19-11-1(c) begins “with 
a strong presumption of constitutionality,” so that “every doubt must be resolved in favor of [the 
 
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statute’s] validity.” Girl Scouts of S. Ill. v. Vincennes Ind. Girls, Inc., 988 N.E.2d 250, 255 (Ind. 
2013). The party challenging the statute must clearly overcome that presumption by a contrary 
showing. Hubbard v. State, 849 N.E.2d 1165, 1169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. And as dis-
cussed below the challengers have not carried that burden. 
I. Indiana Code Section 31-19-11-1 Is Constitutional Because Its Prohibitions Are 
Rationally Related to the Classifications They Draw. 
The Court of Appeals characterized the statutory bar on adoptions by certain convicted 
felons as an “irrebuttable presumption” that infringes on the children’s “cognizable and substantial 
. . . liberty interest in preserving the integrity and stability of their existing familial relationship.” 
I.B., 19 N.E.3d at 790–91 (citing Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 and Jonee, 695 N.Y.S.2d 920). In reaching 
that conclusion, the Court quoted Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973) that “‘[s]tatutes 
creating permanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.’” I.B., 19 N.E.3d at 790 (alteration in original). 
The Court of Appeals “recognize[d] that the Supreme Court has retreated to some extent from the 
irrebuttable presumption doctrine since Vlandis and Stanley,” but held it is “still . . . applicable to 
interests that enjoy constitutionally protected status.” Id. at 790 n.5 (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 
U.S. 749 (1975)). On that basis, it “conclude[d] that I.B. and W.B. were entitled to an individualized 
determination of their best interests” before being removed from Maternal Grandmother and 
Fiancé, rendering the statute unconstitutional as applied to them—relying on Jonee and other New 
York cases reaching a similar conclusion. Id. at 791 & n.6 (collecting New York cases). The Court 
of Appeals’ inclination to keep the siblings together in the only long-term home they have ever 
known is eminently understandable, but its rationale cannot be squared with controlling Supreme 
Court precedent.  
First, even if an “irrebuttable presumption” analysis is “still . . . applicable to interests that 
enjoy constitutionally protected status” as the Court of Appeals concluded, id. at 790 n.5, “the Due 
Process Clause affords only those protections so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people 
as to be ranked as fundamental.” Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality 
opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). And so in Stanley, the high Court invalidated a statute 
that specifically singled-out the father-child relationship, 405 U.S. at 657–59, which certainly 
“rank[s] as fundamental,” Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122. But the statute here does not target a 
“fundamental” right—rather, the complaint is that it lacks a generalized best-interests exception, 
and therefore interferes as-applied with the boys’ sibling and family relationship. Of course, the 
 
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children’s best interests are paramount in any adoption, and sibling relationships, especially here, 
are extraordinarily valuable and a weighty best-interests factor. But declaring that the statute’s lack 
of an ad hoc best-interests exception violates Due Process would effectively elevate best interests, 
and each of its infinite factual variations, into a constitutional doctrine. That is a step we are 
unwilling to take. 
And more fundamentally, the United States Supreme Court has tacitly abandoned2 the “irre-
buttable presumption” doctrine, which “was a strange hybrid of ‘procedural’ due process and equal 
protection invented by the Supreme Court in the early 1970s, and laid to rest soon after.” Brennan 
v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1258 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Vlandis as “applying the doctrine” and 
Weinberger, 422 U.S. 749 as “effectively overruling” Vlandis). Instead, as the high Court 
explained in Michael H., “‘irrebuttable presumption’ cases must ultimately be analyzed as calling 
into question not the adequacy of procedures but—like our cases involving classifications framed 
in other terms—the adequacy of the ‘fit’ between the classification and the policy that the 
classification serves.” 491 U.S. at 121 (citations omitted). 
Under that “classification” analysis, there is no constitutional defect in barring adoptions by 
petitioners with felony child-neglect convictions. I.C. § 31-19-11-1(c)(15). Statutory classifications 
that neither violate a fundamental right nor discriminate against a suspect class are reviewed only 
for “whether the statute is rationally related to legitimate legislative goals.” Lindley for Lindley v. 
Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 132 (7th Cir. 1989). But “there is no fundamental right to adopt” because the 
adoption process depends on so many variables, id. at 131—and convicted felons are not a protected 
class, Baker v. State, 747 N.E.2d 633, 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Distinguishing between 
convicted child-neglect felons and non-felons is rationally related to the legitimate legislative goal 
of ensuring that children will not be adopted into a neglectful home—and so the consequences of 
that distinction here, though regrettable, are not unconstitutional.3  
                                                 
2 Though the Supreme Court has never expressly overruled Vlandis, it has not invalidated a statute under 
Vlandis since United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Muerry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973), over forty years ago. People 
v. Wildman, 858 N.Y.S.2d 504, 509 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2008). So while we would follow Vlandis or Stanley if 
they were directly controlling, we will not expand them when the high Court has conspicuously declined to 
do so. 
3 Accordingly, we do not find Jonee, 695 N.Y.S. at 923–25, or other similar New York cases to be 
persuasive. See I.B., 19 N.E.3d at 790–91 & n.6 (collecting New York cases). 
 
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A final point warrants mention. We recognize I.B.’s and W.B.’s crucial interest in remaining 
in the same home as their older brothers, preserving their sibling bond as fully as possible. But that 
relationship is jeopardized here only because the older children’s adoption, though uncontested, also 
violated this statute. In other words, the siblings’ dilemma is caused not by enforcing the statute now, 
but by disregarding it previously. That irregularity has now caused serious collateral consequences 
for I.B. and W.B.—but it does not give them a due process right to be adopted in violation of the 
same statute. Rather, it demonstrates why, even in unopposed proceedings, courts must be vigilant 
not to overlook any controlling law. 
II. The Trial Court Must Reconsider the Children’s Best Interests in Light of Indiana Code 
Section 31-19-11-1’s Restrictions. 
Having determined that Indiana Code section 31-19-11-1(c) is not unconstitutional as 
applied, and therefore bars Maternal Grandmother from adopting the children, we must determine 
the appropriate remedy. Paternal Grandmother argues that even apart from the statutory violation, 
the evidence did not support granting Maternal Grandmother’s and Fiancé’s petition, and that instead 
her own petition should be granted on appeal. In response, Maternal Grandmother and Fiancé argue 
that the adoption may be affirmed as to Fiancé even if it is reversed as to her. But instead, we vacate 
the trial court’s rulings on both petitions and remand to give the trial court the first opportunity to 
reconsider which of those alternatives—if any—is in the children’s best interests. 
First, even though the evidence presented could have supported a conclusion in Paternal 
Grandmother’s favor, by no means did it compel that result. To the contrary, apart from the 
statutory bar, there would have been ample evidence for us to affirm that adoption by Maternal 
Grandmother and Fiancé was in the children’s best interests. Some of those considerations, such 
as keeping the siblings together and the larger home, would also hold true for Fiancé individually—
and certainly there was substantial evidence that all of the children, especially I.B., have a closely 
bonded relationship with him. But on the other hand, the children’s mother consented to adoption 
by Maternal Grandmother and Fiancé, and might not have consented to Fiancé adopting alone with 
no legal bond between him and Maternal Grandmother. In sum, we simply cannot know how the 
trial court might have weighed those considerations if it knew its choices were limited to either 
Fiancé alone or else to Paternal Grandmother.  
Indeed, the trial court did not face an either-or choice—we must also consider that it might 
have denied both petitions. Though the permanency of adoption is usually in a child’s best interests, 
 
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the risk of separating the siblings might have persuaded the court that under these circumstances, a 
non-adoptive placement would better serve the children’s best interests. For example, it might have 
encouraged Maternal Grandmother and Fiancé to pursue a joint guardianship4 since a joint adoption 
was statutorily impermissible. See In re Adoption of J.L.S., 908 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) 
(trial court found adoption was barred by Indiana Code section 31-19-11-1, but awarded custody for 
60 days to prospective adoptive parents, and requested that they file a guardianship petition; Court 
of Appeals reversed on grounds that the parent had not been “convicted” of a disqualifying 
offense). It is only proper to remand for the trial court to make the first choice among its many 
options. 
Finally, we note that the trial court on remand need not limit itself to the evidence it heard a 
year and a half ago. If, for example, either family’s housing or employment circumstances—both of 
which were significant factors in the trial court’s decision—have changed, it would be appropriate 
to consider new evidence in that regard. Likewise, even Maternal Grandmother’s disqualifying 
felony conviction is not necessarily etched in stone, since it may be possible (though we express no 
legal opinion) for her to expunge it under Indiana Code 35-38-9 (2014), convert it to a misdemeanor 
under Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7(d),5 or otherwise seek some form of post-conviction relief—
any of which could potentially “re-qualify” her to adopt. We are therefore unwilling to declare 
what is in the children’s best interests today on the basis of a dry record developed in 2013. To ensure 
the trial court can fully reconsider I.B.’s and W.B.’s best interests in light of this opinion, we reverse 
and remand the trial court’s orders on both adoption petitions. On remand, the trial court shall 
reconsider the cross-petitions consistent with this opinion, including whether a non-adoptive 
placement may currently be in the children’s best interests and by receiving supplemental evidence 
if the trial court chooses to do so. 
Conclusion  
Under the circumstances of this case, Indiana Code section 31-19-11-1(c) regrettably bars 
an adoption that, to all appearances, would otherwise be in I.B. and W.B.’s best interests. But that 
                                                 
4 Maternal Grandmother’s neglect conviction is not a bar to guardianship; instead, only certain sex-crime 
convictions (of which she has none) are disqualifiers for guardianship. I.C. § 29-3-7-7 (Supp. 2014). 
5 Just as Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7(c) gives criminal courts discretion at sentencing to enter an A-
misdemeanor conviction on what would otherwise be a Class D felony, part (d) of the statute gives them 
discretion to do so retroactively. The conversion is not mandatory—but any relief granted under this statute 
would eliminate Maternal Grandmother’s statutory disqualification. 
 
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does not make the statute unconstitutional as applied, because its prohibitions are rationally related 
to a legitimate legislative purpose and do not discriminate against a suspect class. We therefore 
reverse the trial court’s judgment on both adoption petitions and remand with instructions to vacate 
the adoption decree within thirty days of this Court’s opinion being certified and reconsider both 
adoptions to the extent they are not barred by the statute, including by considering whether a non-
adoptive placement such as guardianship may be in the children’s best interests and by receiving 
additional evidence if the trial court so chooses.6 
Dickson, Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur. 
                                                 
6 We also note that the findings and conclusions were signed by the magistrate, but not by the court. 
Magistrates may enter final orders in criminal cases, I.C. §§ 33-23-5-5(14), -9(b), but otherwise “may not 
enter a final appealable order unless sitting as a judge pro tempore or a special judge.” I.C. § 33-23-5-8(2). 
Instead, they may only “report findings,” while “[t]he court shall enter the final order.” I.C. § 33-23-5-9(a). 
Effective July 1, 2015, Indiana Code section 33-23-5-5 has been amended to expand magistrates’ authority to 
approve and accept plea agreements, civil settlement agreements, and agreements in domestic-relations and 
paternity actions, see P.L. 173-2015, § 4—but that newfound authority does not extend to issuing an adoption 
decree. We trust the court will observe this necessity on remand.  
Nevertheless, “it has been the long-standing policy of this court to view the authority of the officer 
appointed to try a case not as affecting the jurisdiction of the court”—and so “the failure of a party to object 
at trial to the authority of a court officer to enter a final appealable order waives the issue for appeal.” Floyd 
v. State, 650 N.E.2d 28, 32 (Ind. 1994). The issue is thus waived here, since neither party has raised it.