Case Title: Jackson v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 030749

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
KENT JERMAINE JACKSON 
 
v.  Record Nos. 030749 & 030750          OPINION BY 
 
 
                        JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
   October 31, 2003 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
Verbena M. Askew, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we review the capital murder conviction 
and death penalty imposed on Kent Jermaine Jackson, along with 
his convictions of robbery, felony stabbing, and statutory 
burglary. 
FACTS
 
In accord with established principles of appellate 
review, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the party prevailing below.  Commonwealth v. 
Bower, 264 Va. 41, 43, 563 S.E.2d 736, 737 (2002). 
 
On April 18, 2000, the body of Beulah Mae Kaiser, 79 
years of age, was found in her apartment.  According to the 
medical examiner, Mrs. Kaiser died from a combination of a 
stab wound to her jugular vein, a fractured skull, and 
asphyxia caused by blockage of her airway by her tongue.  Any 
one of these injuries could have been fatal.  In addition to 
these injuries, Mrs. Kaiser suffered two black eyes, a broken 
nose, and multiple abrasions, lacerations, and bruises.  She 
had five stab wounds to her head and neck, including the wound 
to her jugular vein.  The medical examiner also testified that 
Mrs. Kaiser had been anally sodomized with her walking cane 
and that the cane then had been driven into her mouth with 
such violence that it knocked out most of her teeth, tore her 
tongue and forced it into her airway, fractured her jaw, and 
penetrated the left side of her face. 
 
When Mrs. Kaiser's body was found, her apartment was in 
disarray.  Personal items were strewn throughout the 
apartment, blood spatters were on the surfaces of the 
apartment, and the contents of Mrs. Kaiser's purse had been 
dumped on the floor.  The police were unable, however, to find 
a weapon or any fingerprints of value. 
 
The crime went unsolved for over 16 months until DNA 
testing of saliva on a cigarette butt found in the apartment 
implicated an individual named Cary Gaskins.  An interview 
with Gaskins led the police to Joseph M. Dorsett and Jackson, 
who had been roommates in an apartment across the hall from 
Mrs. Kaiser's apartment at the time of her death.  Following 
an interview with Dorsett, Newport News police arrested 
Dorsett, charging him with Mrs. Kaiser's murder, and obtained 
a warrant for Jackson's arrest. 
 
Police arrested Jackson at a girlfriend's home in King 
George County around 4:00 a.m. on August 29, 2001.  During an 
interview with Newport News police detectives at the King 
 
2
George County jail that afternoon, Jackson confessed to the 
murder of Mrs. Kaiser. 
PROCEEDINGS
 
On January 14, 2002, Jackson was indicted by a Newport 
News grand jury for the capital murder of Beulah Mae Kaiser in 
the commission of a robbery or attempted robbery, robbery, 
felony stabbing, statutory burglary, and object sexual 
penetration, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-31, 18.2-58, 18.2-
53, 18.2-90, and 18.2-67.2, respectively. 
 
Prior to trial, Jackson filed motions seeking a change of 
venue, suppression of his confession, a bill of particulars, 
and additional peremptory strikes.  The trial court denied 
these motions and rejected Jackson's arguments that Virginia's 
capital murder statutes are unconstitutional.  Following a 
six-day trial, a jury convicted Jackson of all charges except 
object sexual penetration.  In a subsequent sentencing 
proceeding, the jury found the aggravating factor of vileness 
and fixed a sentence of death for the capital murder 
conviction and fixed sentences totaling life imprisonment plus 
25 years and a $100,000 fine for the remaining convictions.  
During a post-verdict hearing, the trial court considered the 
pre-sentence report, further evidence presented by Jackson, 
and the arguments of counsel.  In its final judgment, the 
trial court imposed the sentences fixed by the jury. 
 
3
 
We have consolidated the automatic review of Jackson's 
death sentence with his appeal of the capital murder 
conviction in Record No. 030749 and have given them priority 
on the docket.  Code §§ 17.1-313(A), (F), and (G).  We have 
also certified Jackson's appeal of his non-capital convictions 
from the Court of Appeals of Virginia, Record No. 030750, and 
have consolidated the two records for consideration. 
ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED
Jackson raises fifteen assignments of error, four of 
which contain arguments that this Court has rejected in 
previous cases.  Since Jackson presents no new arguments on 
these questions, we adhere to our previous holdings and affirm 
the rulings of the trial court: 
(1)  denying the defendant's motion for a bill of 
particulars seeking a narrowing construction of the 
vileness aggravator and identification of the evidence on 
which the Commonwealth intended to rely when seeking the 
death penalty.  See Green v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81, 
107, 580 S.E.2d 834, 849 (2003); Goins v. Commonwealth, 
251 Va. 442, 454, 470 S.E.2d 114, 123 (1996); Strickler 
v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 490, 404 S.E.2d 227, 233 
(1991). 
(2)  refusing to declare Virginia's capital murder 
statutes unconstitutional because (a) they do not 
 
4
adequately instruct the jury on the weight it should 
assign to aggravating and mitigating factors, Satcher v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 228, 421 S.E.2d 821, 826 
(1992), (b) do not require aggravating factors to 
outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, 
Mickens v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 395, 403, 442 S.E.2d 
678, 684 (1994), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 
513 U.S. 922 (1994); (c) are unconstitutionally vague in 
defining "vileness" and "future dangerousness," Id.; (d) 
allow evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct in the 
sentencing phase, Satcher, 244 Va. at 228, 421 S.E.2d at 
826; (e) constitute cruel and unusual punishment, Spencer 
v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 280-81, 384 S.E.2d 775, 
777-78 (1989), and are contrary to "evolving standards of 
decency" under Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958), 
Satcher, 244 Va. at 228, 412 S.E.2d at 826; (f) do not 
require the court to set aside the death penalty on 
showing of good cause, Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 
68, 76, 445 S.E.2d 670, 675-76 (1994); (g) allow the 
court to consider hearsay evidence in its post-sentencing 
report, O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 701-02, 364 
S.E.2d 491, 507-08 (1988); and (h) fail to provide 
meaningful appellate review, Satcher, 244 Va. at 228, 421 
 
5
S.E.2d at 826.  See generally Breard, 248 Va. at 75-76, 
445 S.E.2d at 675. 
(3)  denying the defendant's motion for additional 
peremptory challenges.  See Green, 266 Va. at 107, 580 
S.E.2d at 849; Spencer, 240 Va. at 84, 393 S.E.2d at 613; 
Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 405, 384 S.E.2d 
757, 767 (1989); O'Dell, 234 Va. at 690, 364 S.E.2d at 
501. 
(4)  refusing the defendant's request to use a juror 
questionnaire.  See Green, 266 Va. at 95-96, 580 S.E.2d 
at 842-43; Strickler, 241 Va. at 492-93, 404 S.E.2d at 
234. 
ISSUES NOT PRESERVED
A.  Change of Venue 
Jackson, in his second assignment of error, charges that 
the trial court erroneously denied his motion for change of 
venue.  The Commonwealth argues that Jackson has waived this 
assignment of error because he neither renewed the motion at 
the time the jury was selected nor objected to the seating of 
the panel. 
In Green, we stated that when a change of venue motion is 
taken under advisement or continued until the jury is 
empaneled, it is incumbent on the party seeking a change of 
venue to renew the motion or otherwise bring it to the court's 
 
6
attention.  Green, 266 Va. at 94-95, 580 S.E.2d at 842.  
Failure to do so implies acquiescence in the jury panel and is 
tantamount to waiver of the motion for change of venue.  Id. 
In this case, the trial court denied Jackson's motion for 
a change of venue in a pre-trial hearing but stated that the 
motion was "a continuing motion as we go through this 
process."  Jackson did not seek a ruling on this "continuing 
motion," did not bring the matter to the trial court's 
attention, and made no objection based on venue before the 
trial court empaneled the jury.  Accordingly, Jackson has 
waived this assignment of error, and we will not address his 
claims that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his 
motion for a change of venue.  Id.; Rule 5:25. 
B.  Admission of Photographs
Jackson's eighth assignment of error challenges the trial 
court's refusal to limit the presentation of crime scene and 
autopsy photographs of the decedent.  Jackson argues here that 
the gruesome content of the photographs served merely to shock 
and inflame the jury, and, because Jackson had stipulated to 
an autopsy report and diagrams indicating the manner of Mrs. 
Kaiser's death, the fourteen photographs introduced by the 
Commonwealth were cumulative and had no probative value.  The 
Commonwealth argues that Jackson has waived this claim because 
 
7
he did not object to the admission of the photographs at 
trial. 
In a pre-trial motion, Jackson sought to limit the number 
of photographs depicting the condition of the decedent that 
could be introduced at trial, arguing that the photographs 
were cumulative.  The trial court agreed that it would not 
admit cumulative evidence but denied Jackson's motion as 
premature because the Commonwealth had not yet determined 
which photographs it would introduce at trial.  When the 
Commonwealth introduced all fourteen photographs as evidence, 
Jackson did not object.  Jackson's failure to renew his 
objection at that time precludes him from raising this issue 
on appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
C.  Trial Court's Proportionality Review
Jackson asserts that the trial court erred in not 
examining whether the jury's verdict imposing the penalty of 
death was based on passion or prejudice and whether the 
punishment was disproportionate in this case pursuant to Code 
§ 17.1-313.  While we note that Code § 17.1-313 does not 
require such a review by the trial court, Green, 266 Va. at 
107, 580 S.E.2d at 849, Jackson neither asked the trial court 
to conduct such a review nor addressed such review by the 
trial court on brief or in oral argument in this Court.  
 
8
Accordingly, Jackson has waived this assignment of error.  
Rule 5:25. 
PRE-TRIAL 
A.  Motion to Suppress
 
In his first assignment of error, Jackson asserts that 
the trial court erred in failing to suppress the confession 
Jackson made to the Newport News police officers while 
detained in the King George County Jail.  Jackson asserts that 
the confession should have been suppressed because he did not 
knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional rights to 
counsel and against self-incrimination and because the 
confession itself was not given voluntarily. 
Longstanding principles of federal constitutional law 
require that a suspect be informed of his constitutional 
rights to the assistance of counsel and against self-
incrimination.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).  
These rights can be waived by the suspect if the waiver is 
made knowingly and intelligently.  Id. at 475.  The 
Commonwealth bears the burden of showing a knowing and 
intelligent waiver.  Id.  Whether the waiver was made 
knowingly and intelligently is a question of fact that will 
not be set aside on appeal unless plainly wrong.  Harrison v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 581, 423 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1992). 
 
9
At the suppression hearing, Detective Larry P. Rilee 
testified that he informed Jackson of his Miranda rights when 
he began questioning Jackson at the King George County Jail 
around 2:50 p.m. on August 29 and that Jackson orally waived 
those rights at that time.  Detective Rilee began taping the 
interrogation about 25 minutes later.  The transcript of the 
taped portion of the interrogation recites that Detective 
Rilee stated, "We've advised you of your Miranda Rights, you 
understood those is that correct?"  Jackson responded, "That's 
correct."  Following this exchange, Jackson made a statement 
confessing to the murder of Mrs. Kaiser. 
Jackson asserts that because Detective Rilee did not use 
a written waiver of rights form and did not repeat the 
elements of the Miranda warning during the taped portion of 
the interrogation, the record is insufficient to show that 
Jackson intelligently and knowingly waived his Miranda rights.  
We disagree. 
A valid waiver of Miranda rights does not require the 
waiver to be in writing.  Harrison, 244 Va. at 583, 423 S.E.2d  
at 163.  Detective Rilee's testimony and the transcript of the 
interrogation support the trial court's factual determination 
that Jackson was informed of his Miranda rights and that he 
knowingly and intelligently waived those rights. 
 
10
Jackson also contends that his confession was not 
voluntary because it was not the product of his free and 
unconstrained will.  Whether a confession was voluntary is a 
legal question to be resolved by the court, considering all 
the circumstances.  Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 341, 
468 S.E.2d 98, 108 (1996). 
Jackson maintains that the officers conducting the 
interrogation overbore his will.  The police officers, 
according to Jackson, applied psychological pressure and 
engaged in trickery, and lied to him about the evidence 
connecting him with Mrs. Kaiser's death.  These actions along 
with his conditions of confinement resulted in a confession 
that, he argues, he did not voluntarily make.  We disagree 
with Jackson. 
Jackson recites a number of factors that, he argues, 
rendered his statement involuntary.  Prior to and during his 
interrogation, he was tired, hungry, and kept in a "freezing" 
cell.  According to his court-appointed expert psychologist, 
Dr. Stephen C. Ganderson, the verbal performance component of 
Jackson's IQ was below average although his overall IQ was in 
the normal range.  Jackson further maintains that he was told 
that if he made a statement he could call his mother, and he 
stated that the promise was the reason he gave the statement 
confessing to the murder. 
 
11
We agree with the trial court that neither the expert 
testimony nor the adverse conditions Jackson alleged 
constituted sufficient evidence that Jackson suffered from an 
impaired ability to understand what he was doing or saying, or 
that his ability to decide whether to give a statement of his 
own free will was overcome.  As noted by the trial court, the 
degree of detail in Jackson's confession belies his assertion 
that he only gave the statement to secure the right to 
telephone his mother. 
The interrogation methods used by the officers in this 
case do not render this confession involuntary per se.  Smith 
v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 470, 248 S.E.2d 135, 144-45  
(1978).  Furthermore, the record shows that Jackson did not 
cite police trickery or deceit as a ground for suppressing his 
confession in the trial court.  Jackson has not preserved that 
argument for consideration here.  Rule 5:25. 
Based on our review of the record, we hold that Jackson 
confessed voluntarily and that the trial court did not err in 
concluding that Jackson knowingly and intelligently waived his 
Miranda rights. 
B.  Polling Jurors
 
In a pre-trial motion, Jackson asked that, if the jury 
imposed the death sentence based on the aggravating factor of 
vileness, the jury be polled as to "which statutory element(s) 
 
12
established vileness, specifying at the time of polling one or 
more of torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery."  To 
that end, Jackson requested jury instructions and a verdict 
form that required unanimity on one or more vileness elements.  
Relying on Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999), 
Jackson argues that when imposing the death sentence, due 
process requires unanimity not only as to the aggravating 
factor of vileness but also to one or more of its composite 
elements. 
This Court has rejected the proposition that the jury 
must identify the element or elements of the vileness factor 
upon which it based its decision.  Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 
Va. 201, 213, 257 S.E.2d 784, 791 (1979).  The Supreme Court's 
decision in Richardson does not require us to revisit our 
decision in Clark. 
Richardson involved a prosecution for engaging in a 
continuing criminal enterprise.  As relevant here, conviction 
required proof that the defendant committed a specific federal 
offense and that the offense was part of a "continuing series" 
of offenses undertaken by the defendant in concert with five 
or more other persons.  The trial court instructed the jury 
that it had to find unanimously that the defendant committed 
at least three federal narcotics offenses but did not have to 
agree as to the particular three offenses.  The Supreme Court 
 
13
reversed, holding that the several violations required for 
conviction were an element of the offense and thus the jury 
had to agree on the same three violations.  Richardson, 526 
U.S. at 819-20, 824. 
The Supreme Court explained in Richardson that, for 
example, the jury must unanimously find force as an element of 
the crime of robbery, but whether the force is created by the 
use of a gun or a knife is not an element of the crime and 
therefore does not require jury unanimity.  Id. at 817.  In 
this case, the element the jury was required to find 
unanimously to impose the death sentence was the aggravating 
factor of vileness, which requires the defendant's actions be 
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman."  Code 
§ 19.2-264.2.  Depravity of mind, aggravated battery, and 
torture are not discrete elements of vileness that would 
require separate proof but rather are "several possible sets 
of underlying facts [that] make up [the] particular element."  
Richardson, 526 U.S. at 817.  Neither Clark nor Richardson, 
therefore, requires juror unanimity on these points. 
 
Accordingly, we reject this assignment of error.  
GUILT PHASE 
A.  Juror Disqualification
 
Jackson charges that the trial court erred in not 
striking Sandra Peiffer from the jury panel for cause. 
 
14
 
Absent manifest error, we will not disturb the trial 
court's judgment whether to strike a potential juror for 
cause.  Green, 266 Va. at 98, 580 S.E.2d at 844; Clagett v. 
Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 90, 472 S.E.2d 263, 269 (1996).  The 
law does not require that a juror be ignorant of all facts, 
only that jurors be impartial.  Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 
Va. 297, 300, 227 S.E.2d 734, 736 (1976). 
 
During voir dire, Peiffer volunteered that she had read 
newspaper accounts about the case and remembered that the 
person charged with the crime had made some comments to the 
newspaper earlier.  Peiffer did not remember the name of the 
person.  She went on to say, however, that she had not formed 
an opinion on the defendant's guilt and repeated that she 
would decide the case based on the evidence produced at trial. 
 
Because the person interviewed by the media was Dorsett 
and not Jackson, Jackson maintained that Peiffer could not be 
impartial and would taint the jury if she told them her 
recollections of the newspaper account.  The trial court 
refused to strike Peiffer for cause, finding that the juror 
was "very, very emphatic" about her ability to decide the case 
solely on the law and on the evidence. 
 
Peiffer's statements, taken as a whole, demonstrate that 
she would be impartial in deciding the case.  We find no error 
in the trial court's decision not to strike Peiffer for cause. 
 
15
B.  Batson Challenge
 
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986), the United 
States Supreme Court held that excluding a potential juror 
solely on the basis of the juror's race is purposeful 
discrimination and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  
In his tenth assignment of error, Jackson claims that the 
trial court erred in rejecting his claim that the Commonwealth 
violated the rule in Batson because the Commonwealth exercised 
all five of its peremptory strikes against African-Americans. 
 
When a defendant raises a challenge based on Batson, he 
must make a prima facie showing that the peremptory strike was 
made on racial grounds.  At that point, the burden shifts to 
the prosecution to produce race-neutral explanations for 
striking the juror.  The defendant may then provide reasons 
why the prosecution's explanations were pretextual and the 
strikes were discriminatory regardless of the prosecution's 
stated explanations.  Whether the defendant has carried his 
burden of proving purposeful discrimination in the selection 
of the jury is then a matter to be decided by the trial court.  
The trial court's findings will be reversed only if they are 
clearly erroneous.  Buck v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 449, 450-51, 
443 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1994). 
 
16
 
In this case, the Commonwealth offered the following 
explanations for the exercise of its peremptory strikes 
against five African-Americans: 
 
(1)  The Commonwealth struck Charles Blanco because 
he was previously represented by one of the defense 
attorneys and would be more likely to believe that 
attorney.  Mr. Blanco also was concerned about the 
impact of the trial on his responsibility to take 
care of his children who had special needs. 
 
 
(2)  Amy Leggett was struck because she answered 
that she did not believe in the death penalty and 
even though she said she could apply it, "she would 
have a very, very hard time in applying the laws and 
evidence." 
 
 
(3)  Vento Carter, according to the Commonwealth, 
changed his position throughout his voir dire, 
stating initially he would impose a higher standard 
of proof on the Commonwealth but then stating that 
he could nevertheless listen to the instructions of 
the court on the Commonwealth's burden.  Carter also 
changed his position with regard to the necessity of 
the defendant testifying.  The Commonwealth stated 
it had no "faith" in Carter's final answers. 
 
 
(4)  The Commonwealth struck Geraldine Thomas 
because she stated that she would have to have "no 
doubt" as to the guilt of the defendant before 
imposing the death penalty regardless of what the 
court said. 
 
 
(5)  Christopher Sledge testified that he would hold 
the Commonwealth to a higher standard even though he 
supposed he could follow the court's instructions.  
Sledge also stated that he "didn't like" the death 
penalty. 
 
 
17
The trial court concluded that these explanations were race-
neutral and rejected Jackson's Batson challenge.1
On appellate review, the trial court's conclusion 
regarding whether reasons given for the strikes are race-
neutral is entitled to great deference, and that determination 
will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.  
Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177, 186, 427 S.E.2d 379, 386 
(1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 572 U.S. 1217 
(1994). 
The trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the 
demeanor and credibility of potential jurors during voir dire, 
and the record supports the Commonwealth's characterization of 
the statements made by the potential jurors in question.  
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial 
court's ruling on Jackson's Batson challenge was not clearly 
erroneous. 
C.  Question Regarding Failure to Cooperate
 
Jackson complains that the trial court improperly allowed 
the Commonwealth to cross-examine his court-appointed DNA 
expert, Shawn Weiss, regarding the witness' refusal to meet 
with the Commonwealth's DNA expert. 
                     
 
1 Jackson did not assert that these answers were pre-
textual. 
 
 
18
 
In his direct testimony, Weiss testified that he did not 
conduct independent testing of the DNA samples but questioned 
the Commonwealth's testing results in a number of areas.  
During cross-examination, Weiss acknowledged that the 
Commonwealth had attempted to set up a meeting between Weiss 
and the Commonwealth's DNA experts to "talk about" and "look 
at each other's calculations."  The Commonwealth then asked 
Weiss why he had not agreed to the meeting.  Weiss replied 
that he was "under the direction of the person that hired 
[him]."  The Commonwealth went on to ask if Weiss knew that 
the Commonwealth had "just opened everything up, showed it, no 
requests having been made."  At this point Jackson objected, 
saying that the Commonwealth's questioning implied that 
"somehow we weren't following the rules."  The trial court 
overruled the objection. 
 
Jackson argues here that the Commonwealth's questioning 
misled the jury because it implied that Jackson did not adhere 
to the rules of discovery.2  The Commonwealth responds, that by 
asking the reasons for Weiss' refusal to meet with the 
Commonwealth's DNA experts, it was exploring Weiss' 
credibility, potential bias and the basis of his opinions. 
                     
2 Jackson also asserts that the exchange violated his 
constitutional rights of due process.  He did not make this 
argument in the trial court and we do not consider it here.  
Rule 5:25. 
 
19
 
Cross-examination of a witness to establish or explore 
the bias of that witness based on a relationship to a party in 
the case is proper.  Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 465, 
470 S.E.2d 114, 129 (1996).  Furthermore, limitation of cross-
examination is within the trial court's discretion.  Norfolk & 
Western Railway Co. v. Sonney, 236 Va. 482, 488, 374 S.E.2d 
71, 74 (1988).  In this case Weiss' statement that he refused 
to meet with the Commonwealth's DNA experts because of his 
relationship to the defense could have reflected bias.  
Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court erred in 
overruling Jackson's objection to the Commonwealth's question. 
D.  Expert Testimony on False Confessions
 
Jackson argues in his fourteenth assignment of error that 
the trial court incorrectly barred Jackson from asking his 
expert witness, Dr. Steven C. Ganderson, "a hypothetical 
question about false confessions."3  While the trial court was 
willing to permit Dr. Ganderson to testify generally regarding 
circumstances that could lead to false confessions, it forbade 
Dr. Ganderson from testifying about the truth or falsity of 
Jackson's statement.  We find no error in the trial court's 
ruling. 
                     
3 Jackson does not isolate any specific question in his 
brief. 
 
20
 
The physical and psychological environment surrounding a 
confession can be very relevant in determining whether a 
confession is reliable, and expert witnesses may testify "to a 
witness's or defendant's mental disorder and the hypothetical 
effect of that disorder." Pritchett v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 
182, 187, 557 S.E.2d 205, 208 (2002).  Expert witnesses may 
not, however, render an opinion on the defendant's veracity or 
reliability of a confession because whether a confession is 
reliable is a matter in the jury's exclusive province.  Id.
 
During voir dire, the trial court accepted Dr. Ganderson 
as an expert on psychology and sexual-psychological issues.  
Jackson elicited testimony from the doctor on the factors that 
contribute to "transference," a phenomenon in which a subject 
becomes more prone to suggestion and may say things which are 
untrue in an attempt to gain approval from an authority 
figure.  Dr. Ganderson also testified about antecedents and 
objective goals of a defendant that could affect the 
reliability of a defendant's statements.  While the trial 
court permitted this questioning, it sustained the 
Commonwealth's objection when Dr. Ganderson questioned the 
veracity of Jackson's statement based on transference theory.  
The trial court, relying on our decision in Pritchett, ruled 
that Dr. Ganderson could testify regarding the circumstances 
surrounding Jackson's confession but not about its truth: 
 
21
Now, I still think in terms out of what he can't 
say, that's a false confession.  I think the jury 
still has to make those kinds of conclusions.  Those 
are factual conclusions, but he can testify about 
the surroundings and what he believes the impact has 
on this defendant with his mental capacity as well 
as the surroundings of the circumstances out of 
which the confession was taken. 
 
There is no error in this holding. 
 
E.  Negative Evidence of Reputation
 
Jackson asserts that the trial court erred in "preventing 
Jackson from presenting certain so-called 'negative' evidence 
of good character."  Jackson refers specifically to the 
testimony of two individuals he called as character witnesses.  
Jackson asked the witnesses if they were aware of or had heard 
that Jackson had a reputation in the community for being 
violent.  The Commonwealth objected, stating that before 
asking a question of this sort, Jackson had to establish that 
the witness was aware of Jackson's reputation in the 
community.  The trial court sustained the objections. 
This assignment of error is without merit.  Jackson was 
not prohibited from presenting negative evidence of good 
character.  Negative evidence of good character is based on 
the theory that a person has a good reputation if that 
reputation has not been questioned.  Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 
189 Va. 862, 871-72, 55 S.E.2d 24, 29-30 (1949).  It is 
admissible, as is other reputation evidence, if the proper 
 
22
foundation is established.  See Barlow v. Commonwealth, 224 
Va. 338, 340-41, 297 S.E.2d 645, 646 (1982).  Thus, a witness 
must be aware of the party's reputation in the community 
before he may testify as to the lack of any reputation for a 
particular characteristic. 
Jackson did not establish that either witness had 
knowledge of Jackson's reputation in the community before 
asking the type of question recited above.  Accordingly, the 
trial court not only was correct in sustaining the 
Commonwealth's objection to the questions, but nothing in the 
record shows that Jackson was prevented from introducing 
negative evidence of reputation.  In fact, the record shows 
that in at least one instance, Jackson proceeded to establish 
that the witness had the requisite knowledge of Jackson's 
reputation in the community and then testified that he never 
"heard anything from anybody of [Jackson] doing any wrongdoing 
to anybody."  We find no error in the ruling of the trial 
court. 
F.  Motion to Strike
 
Jackson asserts that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence.  He argues that 
the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions 
because his confession was not reliable, the forensic testing 
 
23
was inadequate, and no other evidence connected him to the 
crime scene. 
In reviewing the record to determine whether the evidence 
was sufficient to support the convictions, we consider the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and 
give the Commonwealth all inferences fairly deducible from 
that evidence.  Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 313-14, 
541 S.E.2d 872, 878 (2001). 
 
Jackson argues that his confession was not reliable for 
two reasons:  his will was overborne by the deception of the 
officers and the confession was false.  We have already held 
that Jackson's will was not overborne, and, therefore, we 
reject that argument as a basis for finding his confession 
unreliable. 
 
Jackson also bases his assertion that his confession was 
false on the alleged deception of the officers during his 
interrogation.  Jackson does not offer, and we cannot find, 
any rationale or evidence supporting the conclusion that the 
tactics utilized by the officers during his interrogation 
caused Jackson's confession to be false. 
 
The forensic testing was inadequate, according to 
Jackson, because the DNA testing of the blood mixture on the 
toe of a sock found at the crime scene involved only eight 
loci.  Jackson's DNA loci matched six of the eight loci.  The 
 
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standard procedure of the state laboratory is to test 13 or 16 
loci.  Shawn Weiss, Jackson's expert in DNA testing, testified 
that, had 13 or 16 loci been tested, there was a "possibility" 
that other suspects may have had more loci matches than 
Jackson. 
 
Jackson's criticism of the Commonwealth's forensic 
testing does not change the fact that some of the loci matched 
his DNA.  Under these circumstances, as his own expert 
testified, "Kent Jackson cannot be excluded as a minor 
contributor." 
 
Finally, the lack of other forensic evidence connecting 
Jackson to the crime scene does not support the conclusion 
that the evidence was insufficient to prove Jackson's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson's detailed confession, 
corroborated by evidence of the injuries Mrs. Kaiser suffered, 
was sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The trial court did not err in denying Jackson's 
motion to strike.  Clozza v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 124, 133, 
321 S.E.2d 273, 279 (1984). 
STATUTORY REVIEW 
Under Code § 17.1-313(C)(1), we must inquire whether 
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor affected the 
sentencing decision.  Jackson contends that "numerous horrific 
photographs of the decendant" inflamed the jury and improperly 
 
25
influenced its sentencing decision.  Jackson's argument is 
not, and cannot be, that allowing the pictures to be seen by 
the jury was error.  As discussed above, he did not object to 
their introduction during the guilt phase of the trial.  Thus, 
whether the pictures were properly or improperly admitted is 
not the issue before us in this statutory review.  We do 
however, consider the potential impact these pictures may have 
had on the decision to impose the death sentence.  Emmett v. 
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 364, 371, 569 S.E.2d 39, 44 (2002). 
The pictures at issue, while gruesome, accurately 
depicted the condition of the victim and were relevant to the 
"motive, intent, method, malice, premeditation and the 
atrociousness of the crime."  Id. at 372, 569 S.E.2d at 45.  
In this context, the jury was entitled to use the photographs 
to make an informed decision on the defendant's guilt and the 
appropriate sentence thereafter.  The record contains ample 
evidence supporting the imposition of the death sentence, and 
nothing in the record suggests that passion or prejudice 
played any part in that decision. 
 
Code § 17.1-313(C)(2) requires us to determine whether 
the sentence in this case is "excessive or disproportionate to 
the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the 
crime and the defendant."  Our examination seeks "to reach a 
reasoned judgment regarding what cases justify the imposition 
 
26
of the death penalty."  Orbe v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 
405, 519 S.E.2d 808, 817 (1999). 
We have examined the capital murder cases where robbery 
was the predicate offense and where the Commonwealth sought 
the death penalty based on the aggravating factor of vileness.  
Our review encompassed both cases where the jury fixed the 
death penalty and where it fixed life imprisonment.  Based on 
that review, we find that defendant's sentence was not 
excessive or disproportionate to sentences imposed in capital 
murder cases similar to the instant case.  See Bennett v. 
Commonwealth, 236 Va. 448, 374 S.E.2d 303 (1988) (defendant 
bound, beat, and stabbed victim); Boggs v. Commonwealth, 229 
Va. 501, 331 S.E.2d 407 (1985) (defendant beat his 87-year-old 
neighbor with a piece of steel and then stabbed her); Bunch v. 
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 304 S.E.2d 271 (1983)(defendant 
shot his lover in the head, ransacked her house, and hung her 
from a doorknob); LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 304 
S.E.2d 644 (1983) (defendant beat victim and stabbed her with 
a carving fork and ice pick); Whitley v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 
66, 286 S.E.2d 162 (1982) (defendant strangled victim, cut her 
throat, and inserted umbrellas into her anus and vagina post-
mortem); Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 257 S.E.2d 797 
(1979) (defendant entered house with co-conspirators, robbed 
victim, and then choked and beat her to death). 
 
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At oral argument, Jackson's counsel argued that the death 
penalty should not be imposed in this case because Jackson 
himself did not commit some of the more heinous acts involved 
in the murder of Mrs. Kaiser, but rather primarily assumed the 
role of a bystander and only stabbed Mrs. Kaiser with a knife.  
Counsel asked this Court to set aside the death penalty and 
impose a penalty of life pursuant to the provisions of Code 
§ 17.1-313(D)(2). 
We reject this request.  Beulah Mae Kaiser suffered a 
brutal, vicious, and painful death at Kent Jermaine Jackson's 
hands.  The record indicates that Jackson agreed to the plan 
to enter Mrs. Kaiser's apartment and rob her and that he 
kicked her and held her down while Dorsett punched, kicked, 
and stabbed her.  Jackson stabbed Mrs. Kaiser and he handed 
Dorsett the cane that ultimately was shoved through her face.  
For the above reasons we affirm the conviction for 
capital murder and the imposition of the death penalty entered 
in Case No. 030749 and affirm the non-capital convictions in  
Case No. 030750. 
Record No. 030749 - Affirmed.
Record No. 030750 - Affirmed.
 
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