Case Title: Yvette M. Maurin v. Gordon Hall, M.D.

Citation: 2004 WI 100

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 100 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-0072 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Yvette M. Maurin, as Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Shay Leigh Maurin, deceased,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross- 
          Appellant, 
 
Yvette M. Maurin,, Individually and as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Shay Leigh 
Maurin, and Joseph Maurin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
Quad/Graphics, Inc.,  
          Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Gordon Hall, M.D., Physicians Insurance Company 
of Wisconsin, Inc., and Patients Compensation 
Fund,  
          Defendants-Appellants-Cross- 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 7, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washington   
 
JUDGE: 
Lawrence F. Waddick   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and CROOKS, J., concur (joint 
opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
PROSSER and SYKES, J.J., join concurrence. 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants-cross respondents there were 
briefs by Michael B. Van Sicklen, Roberta F. Howell and Foley & 
 
 
2
Lardner, Madison; Mark E. Larson and Gutglass, Erickson, 
Bonville, Seibel & Falkner, S.C., Milwaukee; Steven P. Sager and 
Sager, Colwin, Samuelson & Associates, Fond du Lac; John S. 
Skilton and Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe, LLP, Madison, and 
oral argument by Roberta F. Howell, Mark E. Larson and Steven P. 
Sager. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-cross appellant there were 
briefs by J. Michael End, Jerome A. Hierseman, Lora A. Kaelber 
and Gray & End, L.L.P., Milwaukee, and oral argument by J. 
Michael End and Jerome A. Hierseman. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy J. Muldowney, 
Jennifer L. Peterson and LaFollette Godfrey & Kahn, Madison; 
Lana J. Leitch, Madison; and Mark L. Adams and Melanie Cohen, 
Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Medical Society, The 
American 
Medical 
Association, 
and 
The 
Wisconsin 
Hospital 
Association, Inc. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, 
III and Law Offices of William Gleisner, Milwaukee; Edward E. 
Robinson and Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., Brookfield; David M. 
Skoglind and Aiken & Scoptur, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
 
 
2004 WI 100 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-0072   
(L.C. No. 
98 CV 229) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Yvette M. Maurin, as Personal  
Representative of the Estate of Shay  
Leigh Maurin, deceased,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross- 
          Appellant, 
 
Yvette M. Maurin, Individually and as  
Personal Representative of the Estate of  
Shay Leigh Maurin, and Joseph Maurin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
Quad/Graphics, Inc.,  
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Gordon Hall, M.D., Physicians Insurance  
Company of Wisconsin, Inc., and Patients  
Compensation Fund,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants-Cross- 
          Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Washington 
County, Lawrence F. Waddick, Judge.  Reversed and cause 
remanded.   
 
No. 00-0072  
 
2 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case comes before us on 
certification 
from 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2001-02).1  Yvette Maurin, individually and 
in her capacity as personal representative of her daughter's 
estate, and Joseph Maurin, in his individual capacity, brought 
this lawsuit to recover for medical malpractice and wrongful 
death of their five-year-old daughter, Shay Maurin.   
¶2 
The issues certified for our review relate to damage 
awards for medical malpractice that results in death.  We 
restate the two issues certified by the court of appeals and 
pose a third issue presented by the parties:   
¶3 
First, may the plaintiffs in a medical malpractice 
action, where there is a death caused by medical negligence, 
recover the limit on noneconomic damages for both medical 
negligence and wrongful death?  
¶4 
Second, is the limit on noneconomic damages in a 
medical malpractice wrongful death case constitutional?  
¶5 
Third, did the circuit court erroneously exercise its 
discretion in ordering a remittitur of the verdict in favor of 
the estate for pre-death pain and suffering, from $550,000 to 
$100,000.   
¶6 
We conclude that there is a single cap on noneconomic 
damages recoverable from health care providers for medical 
malpractice when a patient dies.  The cap is the dollar amount 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-
96 edition unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 00-0072  
 
3 
 
listed for the deceased patient in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4).  
Claimants eligible to make a wrongful death claim under 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007 are entitled to make separate claims for 
the amount listed in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) for a death that 
occurred during the period from May 25, 1995, through April 27, 
1998, because of this court's decisions in Rineck v. Johnson, 
155 Wis. 2d 659, 456 N.W.2d 336 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 
Chang v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 549, 514 
N.W.2d 399 (1994), and Jelinek v. St. Paul Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 
182 Wis. 2d 1, 512 N.W.2d 764 (1994). 
¶7 
We also conclude that the limit on noneconomic damages 
in a medical malpractice wrongful death case is constitutional. 
¶8 
Our answers to the first two questions make it 
unnecessary to address the close question of remittitur in this 
case.  Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is 
reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶9 
This is a tragic case.  Shay Leigh Maurin died on 
March 8, 1996, of acute diabetic ketoacidosis.  The five-year-
old daughter of Yvette and Joseph Maurin had appeared to be a 
healthy child, free of serious illness, until the week before 
her death.  Her parents were unaware that their daughter 
suffered from diabetes mellitus.  If diabetes mellitus is 
untreated, it can lead to diabetic ketoacidosis and death.   
¶10 During the first few days of March 1996, Shay had not 
been feeling well.  She was lethargic, drinking fluids all day 
No. 00-0072  
 
4 
 
and eating poorly.  Yvette Maurin took her daughter to the 
General Clinic of West Bend on March 5, 1996.  Physician 
Assistant Randy Purcell diagnosed Shay with an ear infection and 
prescribed antibiotics.  Purcell also advised that Shay should 
have a fingerstick blood test——used to check for diabetes——if 
her symptoms did not improve.   
¶11 Shay's condition worsened rapidly over the next 24 
hours.  She was unable to eat, she vomited and dry-heaved, and 
the fruity odor of her breath led her mother to fear she might 
have diabetes.  The mother brought Shay to Hartford Memorial 
Hospital late in the evening of March 6.  By this point, Shay's 
diabetes had progressed to acute diabetic ketoacidosis.  Dr. 
Gordon Hall attended to Shay, but failed to make the diagnosis 
of diabetes mellitus or acute diabetic ketoacidosis.   
¶12 The next morning, on March 7, Shay returned to 
Hartford Memorial Hospital in serious pain.  Dr. David Madenberg 
diagnosed 
the 
acute 
diabetic 
ketoacidosis 
and 
attempted 
treatment before transferring Shay to Children's Hospital of 
Wisconsin.  Shay lost consciousness during the ambulance ride to 
the new hospital and died the next day.   
¶13 In 1999 a Washington County jury found that Dr. Hall 
was negligent in his care of Shay Maurin and that his negligence 
caused her death.  The jury awarded Shay's estate $550,000 for 
her pre-death pain and suffering and $2,500,000 to her parents 
as wrongful death damages for their loss of society and 
companionship.   
No. 00-0072  
 
5 
 
 
¶14 In post-verdict 
motions, 
the 
parents sought and 
obtained from the Washington County Circuit Court, Lawrence F. 
Waddick, 
Judge, 
a 
ruling 
that 
the 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) 
wrongful death cap was unconstitutional because it deprived 
litigants of the basic right to a jury trial, violated the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the constitution, and 
usurped the power of the judiciary.  The parents also sought but 
failed to obtain a ruling that an increased wrongful death cap 
could apply retroactively to deaths that occurred before the 
effective date of the statutory increase.  Dr. Hall sought and 
obtained remittitur with respect to the estate's verdict for 
pain and suffering, reducing the damages from $550,000 to 
$100,000. 
¶15 Dr. Hall appealed the circuit court's decision holding 
the wrongful death cap unconstitutional and also raised on 
appeal the issue of whether the estate and the parents were each 
entitled to noneconomic damages up to the respective limits for 
medical malpractice and wrongful death.   
¶16 The court of appeals held the case pending decisions 
in three relevant cases:  Neiman v. Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Co., 
2000 
WI 
83, 
236 
Wis. 2d 411, 
613 
N.W.2d 160 
(holding 
unconstitutional retroactive application of an increased cap on 
noneconomic damages in wrongful death actions to claims that 
accrued before the effective date of the new cap); Guzman v. St. 
Francis Hosp., Inc., 2001 WI App 21, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 623 
N.W.2d 776 (holding constitutional a cap on noneconomic damages 
in medical malpractice actions); and Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 
No. 00-0072  
 
6 
 
125, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 N.W.2d 266 (applying Neiman to all 
cases 
involving 
the 
retroactive 
increase 
of 
the 
cap 
on 
noneconomic damages in wrongful death cases). 
¶17 After these decisions, the parents agreed that the 
issue of retroactive application of the increased wrongful death 
cap had been determined against them, and that issue is no 
longer in the case.   
ANALYSIS 
A. 
Limitation on Noneconomic Damages From Medical Malpractice 
Resulting in Wrongful Death 
 
¶18 The first issue to be determined is what limit or 
limits apply to noneconomic damages in medical malpractice 
wrongful death.  There are three possibilities: 
1. 
Dr. Hall contends that the parents' recovery 
for loss of society and companionship is limited to a 
total of $150,000 and that the entire award of 
noneconomic damages (including the parents' wrongful 
death award and any conscious pain and suffering award 
to 
the 
estate) 
cannot 
exceed 
the 
limit 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d), 
which, 
adjusted 
for 
inflation, is $381,428.   
2. 
The parents contend that the estate may 
recover noneconomic 
damages for 
Shay's 
pain and 
suffering before death up to the limit set for medical 
malpractice under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) and the 
parents 
may 
recover 
for 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship up to the limit set for wrongful death 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f), 
which 
references 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4). 
 
Absent 
the 
issue 
of 
remittitur, the effect of this theory would produce 
damages of $381,428 plus $150,000, for a total of 
$531,428. 
3. 
A third interpretation is that, in a medical 
malpractice case, there is a single cap on noneconomic 
damages. The amount of the cap is determined by 
No. 00-0072  
 
7 
 
whether the patient 
survives the 
malpractice or 
whether the patient dies.  When the patient survives 
the medical malpractice, the cap is contained in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d).  When the patient dies, the 
cap is contained in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4).  In cases 
where medical malpractice leads to death, the wrongful 
death cap applies in lieu of——not in addition to——the 
medical malpractice cap.   
¶19 We conclude that the third interpretation constitutes 
the correct reading of the statutes.  However, our decisions in 
Rineck, 155 Wis. 2d 659, and Jelinek, 182 Wis. 2d 1, cause us to 
add separate awards for the two parents to equal $300,000.  As 
will be explained, this is a temporary phenomenon for claims 
arising between May 25, 1995, and April 27, 1998.   
¶20 As this is a case of statutory interpretation, our 
analysis should begin with the plain language of the statutory 
text.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
2004 WI 58, ¶¶44-45, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; see also 
Czapinski v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 2000 WI 80, ¶17, 236 Wis. 
2d 316, 613 N.W.2d 120.  The language of Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4) 
is to be read in context, taking into account the section at 
issue and the entire statutory scheme.  Kalal, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
¶46.  The scope and purpose of the statutes are relevant so long 
as the scope and purpose are ascertainable from statutory 
language.  Id., ¶48.   
¶21 Based upon our review of the relevant text, the 
applicable statutes should be interpreted as follows.   
¶22 There is a single cap for noneconomic damages in 
medical malpractice cases as noted in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(b) 
which provides: 
No. 00-0072  
 
8 
 
The total noneconomic damages recoverable for 
bodily injury or death, including any action or 
proceeding based on contribution or indemnification, 
may not exceed the limit under par. (d) for each 
occurrence on or after May 25, 1995, from all health 
care providers and all employes of health care 
providers acting within the scope of their employment 
and providing health care services who are found 
negligent and from the patients compensation fund.  
(Emphasis added). 
¶23 Several words in this statute are of paramount 
importance.  The words "total" and "for each occurrence" reveal 
that the legislature intended a single recovery for each 
incident or "occurrence" involving malpractice.  The words "or 
death" show that the legislature intended to provide a single 
recovery even if the medical malpractice resulted in a wrongful 
death.2 
¶24 Other paragraphs in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4) address 
various scenarios resulting from medical malpractice.  When a 
patient survives medical malpractice, the cap on noneconomic 
damages 
is 
contained 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d), 
which 
provides: 
                                                 
2 The concurrence contends that "The majority goes astray 
when it equates the word 'death' with a cause of action for 
wrongful death."  Concurrence, ¶137.  However, the concurrence 
simply disregards the language in Wis. Stat. § 655.007 that any 
"parent . . . having 
a 
derivative 
claim 
for . . . death 
on 
account of malpractice is subject to this chapter."  See ¶30, 
infra, 
for 
the 
linkage 
between 
Wis. Stat. 
ch. 
655 
and 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d). 
In this opinion, all references to the "concurrence" are 
intended to refer to the concurrence of Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson and Justice N. Patrick Crooks. 
No. 00-0072  
 
9 
 
The limit on total noneconomic damages for each 
occurrence under par. (b) on or after May 25, 1995, 
shall be $350,000 and shall be adjusted by the 
director of state courts to reflect changes in the 
consumer price index . . . .  (Emphasis added). 
¶25 When 
a 
patient 
dies 
as 
a 
result 
of 
medical 
malpractice, the cap on noneconomic damages is transferred to 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4), which provides: 
Judgment 
for 
damages 
for 
pecuniary 
injury 
from 
wrongful death may be awarded to any person entitled 
to bring a wrongful death action.  Additional damages 
not to exceed $150,000 for loss of society and 
companionship may be awarded to the spouse, children 
or parents of the deceased.  (Emphasis added). 
¶26 The bridge taking a medical malpractice claim in a 
death 
case 
from 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) 
is 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f), 
which 
provides: 
Notwithstanding the limits on noneconomic damages 
under this subsection, damages recoverable against 
health care providers and an employe of a health care 
provider, acting within the scope of his or her 
employment and providing health care services, for 
wrongful death are subject to the limit under s. 
895.04(4).  (Emphasis added). 
¶27 It should be noted that economic damages in a medical 
malpractice wrongful death case are not capped.  "Economic 
damages" 
are 
alluded 
to 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(e), 
§ 893.55(5) and (6), and § 895.04.  Economic damages include 
"loss of earnings or earning capacity" and "other economic 
injuries and damages."  Wis. Stat. § 893.55(5).  Consequently, 
beyond issues of proof, damage disputes in medical malpractice 
No. 00-0072  
 
10 
 
cases tend to involve noneconomic damages, which are defined in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(a): 
In this subsection, "noneconomic damages" means moneys 
intended 
to 
compensate 
for 
pain 
and 
suffering; 
humiliation; embarrassment; worry; mental distress; 
noneconomic effects of disability including loss of 
enjoyment of the normal activities, benefits and 
pleasures of life and loss of mental or physical 
health, well-being or 
bodily 
functions; 
loss of 
consortium, society and companionship; or loss of love 
and affection.   
¶28 "Loss of society and companionship" is included in the 
definition of "noneconomic damages."  Loss of society and 
companionship is the basis for noneconomic damages in a wrongful 
death claim.  Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4).  As a result, the damages 
for loss of society and companionship in § 895.04(4) are 
included within "total noneconomic damages recoverable" for 
death in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(b).3 
¶29 The parents in this case seek recovery for the death 
of a minor child resulting from medical malpractice.  Every 
patient, patient's representative, and health care provider 
"shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted to be bound by" 
Wis. Stat. ch. 655.  Wis. Stat. § 655.006(1).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 655.007 
provides 
that 
"any 
patient 
or 
the 
patient's 
representative having a claim or any . . . , parent . . .  of 
                                                 
3 The concurrence acknowledges that the definition of "loss 
of society and companionship" in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(a) is 
broad enough to encompass "loss of society and companionship" 
under the wrongful death statute.  It contends, however, that 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) exempts wrongful death damages from 
the cap under § 893.55(4)(d). 
No. 00-0072  
 
11 
 
the patient having a derivative claim for . . . death on account 
of malpractice is subject to" Chapter 655 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes.  (Emphasis added).  A parent's claim for the loss of 
society and companionship of a minor child is a derivative 
claim.  Korth v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d 326, 331, 340 
N.W.2d 494 
(1983); 
Giese 
v. 
Montgomery 
Ward, 
Inc., 
111 
Wis. 2d 392, 405, 331 N.W.2d 585 (1983); see also White v. 
Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d 563, 574, 225 N.W.2d 442 (1975).   
¶30 Wisconsin Stat. § 655.017, 
entitled 
"Limitation 
on 
noneconomic 
damages," 
links 
Chapter 
655 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d).  It reads: 
The amount of noneconomic damages recoverable by a 
claimant or plaintiff under this chapter for acts or 
omissions of a health care provider if the act or 
omission occurs on or after May 25, 1995, and for acts 
or omissions of an employee of a health care provider, 
acting within the scope of his or her employment and 
providing health care services, for acts or omissions 
occurring on or after May 25, 1995, is subject to the 
limits under s. 893.55(4)(d) and (f).   
¶31 The conclusion is inescapable that derivative wrongful 
death claims resulting from medical malpractice are covered by 
the limitations outlined in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4).   
¶32 This brings us to the question of how noneconomic 
damages in wrongful death cases are limited. 
¶33 If Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) stood alone because there 
were no subsection (4)(f), then subsection (4)(d) would cap 
total noneconomic damages, including damages for loss of society 
and companionship under § 895.04(4).  This was the unanimous 
decision of this court in Rineck, 155 Wis. 2d at 665-69.  If 
No. 00-0072  
 
12 
 
there were no caps at all in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d), then 
there would be no limits on noneconomic damages in wrongful 
death.  That was the unanimous decision of the court in Jelinek, 
182 Wis. 2d at 14.   
¶34 Against this background, why did the legislature 
create Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f)?  The paragraph reads in part: 
(f) Notwithstanding the limits on noneconomic damages 
under this subsection, damages recoverable against 
health care providers . . . for wrongful death are 
subject to the limit under s. 895.04(4).   
¶35 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) was created by 1995 
Wisconsin Act 10.  This act did not amend § 895.04, the wrongful 
death statute.  Consequently we can conceive of no purpose for 
creating § 893.55(4)(f) if the legislature intended to retain 
the single cap in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) to cover total 
noneconomic damages in a wrongful death case involving medical 
malpractice.  The same result would have been achieved without 
creating the new paragraph.  This leads us to reject Dr. Hall's 
interpretation of the statute.4   
¶36 Thus, the case turns on the meaning of the phrase 
"Notwithstanding the limits on noneconomic damages under this 
subsection."  The court interprets the word "notwithstanding" to 
                                                 
4 The 
concurrence 
notes 
that 
the 
limit 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) is less than the present limit in 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4).  Thus, if the cap in § 893.55(4)(d) 
superseded the cap in § 895.04(4), it would not be possible to 
collect $500,000 in damages for the loss of society and 
companionship of a minor child until the § 893.55(4)(d) cap, 
indexed for inflation, caught up to the $500,000 figure.  This 
analysis is correct.  However, under our view of the law, the 
limits in § 895.04(4) are available immediately. 
No. 00-0072  
 
13 
 
mean, in effect: "In lieu of the limits on noneconomic damages 
under this subsection, damages recoverable against a health care 
provider . . . for wrongful death are subject to the limit under 
§ 895.04(4)."  By contrast, the concurrence interprets the word 
to mean, in effect: "In addition to the limits on noneconomic 
damages under this subsection, damages recoverable against a 
health care provider . . . for wrongful death are subject to the 
limit under s. 895.04(4)." 
¶37 We acknowledge that the meaning of "notwithstanding" 
by itself is not clear.  According to The American Heritage 
Dictionary 
of 
the 
English 
Language 
1238 
(3d 
ed. 
1992), 
"notwithstanding" means "in spite of."  Turning to Black's Law 
Dictionary, "notwithstanding" 
is listed as 
a 
preposition: 
"Despite, in spite of ."  Black's Law Dictionary 1091 (7th ed. 1999).  In A 
Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, "notwithstanding" is described 
as "an interesting word.  In DRAFTING, it commonly means 
'despite,' 'in spite of,' or 'although' and appears in sentences 
such as this one: 'Notwithstanding the limitations contained in 
§ 3.5, Mondraff will be offered the first option to quote 
competitive terms and conditions to Nuboil.'"  Bryan A. Garner, 
A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 600 (2d ed. 1995).   
¶38 If we substitute "in spite of" for "notwithstanding," 
the clause would read: "In spite of the limits on noneconomic 
damages under this subsection, damages recoverable against 
health care providers . . . for wrongful death are subject to 
No. 00-0072  
 
14 
 
the limit under § 895.04(4)."  (Emphasis added).  A natural 
reading of this language is closer to "in lieu of" than "in 
addition to."  One limit appears to supersede another. 
¶39 The Legislative Reference Bureau's drafting manual in 
effect at the time the 1995 legislation was enacted directs 
drafters to "[a]void overbroad preemption provisions" such as 
"'notwithstanding any other law to the contrary.' . . . Instead, 
find the statutes that conflict with the new provision and refer 
to them specifically."  State of Wisconsin Legislative Reference 
Bureau, Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual § 9.05(5) (1994-95).   
Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) 
refers 
specifically 
to 
"the 
limits on noneconomic damages under this subsection," suggesting 
that subsection 4(f) preempts subsection 4(d).   
¶40 The preemptive use of "notwithstanding" can be seen in 
Wis. Stat. § 655.23(4)(c)1. 
and 
2. 
(2001-02);5 
and 
Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) (2001-02).6 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 655.23(4)(c)1. and 2. (2001-02) provide: 
1.  Except as provided in subd. 2., self-insurance 
shall be in amounts of at least $200,000 for each 
occurrence and $600,000 for all occurrences in any one 
policy year for occurrences before July 1, 1987, 
$300,000 for each occurrence and $900,000 for all 
occurrences in any one policy year for occurrences on 
or after July 1, 1987, and before July 1, 1988, 
$400,000 for each occurrence and $1,000,000 for all 
occurrences in any one policy year for occurrences on 
or after July 1, 1988, and before July 1, 1997, and 
$1,000,000 for each occurrence and $3,000,000 for all 
occurrences in any one policy year for occurrences on 
or after July 1, 1997. 
2.  Notwithstanding subd. 1., in the discretion of a 
self-insured health care provider, self-insurance may 
No. 00-0072  
 
15 
 
¶41 It would be easy enough to collect cases interpreting 
the word "notwithstanding."  See, e.g., Liberty Mar. Corp. v. 
United States, 928 F.2d 413, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (suggesting 
that a phrase preceded by notwithstanding should overcome any 
conflicting provision).  But the better practice is to follow 
the advice in Conoco, Inc. v. Skinner, 970 F.2d 1206, 1224 (3d 
Cir. 
1992), 
that 
"courts 
must 
discern 
the 
meaning 
of 
'notwithstanding' from the legislative history, purpose, and 
structure of the entire statute."  In this regard, a court must 
confront the principal declaration in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) 
that 
"damages 
recoverable 
against 
health 
care 
providers . . . for wrongful death are subject to the limit 
under s. 895.04(4)." (Emphasis added).  This declaration added 
nothing to the statute if it did not reduce "total noneconomic 
damages recoverable for . . . death."  Moreover, the careful 
reader cannot fail to observe the similarity between the phrase 
"are subject to the limit under § 895.04(4)" in subsection 
                                                                                                                                                             
be in an amount that is less than $1,000,000 but not 
less than $600,000 for each occurrence on or after 
July 1, 1997, and before July 1, 1999, and less than 
$1,000,000 but not less than $800,000 for each 
occurrence on or after July 1, 1999, and before July 
1, 2001.  (Emphasis added). 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.045(2) (2001-02) provides: 
(2) Concerted action.  Notwithstanding sub. (1), if 2 
or more parties act in accordance with a common scheme 
or plan, those parties are jointly and severally 
liable for all damages resulting from that action, 
except as provided in s. 895.85 (5).  (Emphasis 
added). 
No. 00-0072  
 
16 
 
(4)(f) and the phrase "is subject to the limits under s. 
893.55(4)(d) and (f)."  "Subject to" suggests that damages are 
dependent upon the limit in the enumerated statutes.   
¶42 Our interpretation of subsection (4)(f) is consistent 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(b), 
which 
provides 
for 
"total 
noneconomic damages recoverable" per occurrence even if the 
occurrence leads to death.  The concurrence's interpretation of 
subsection (4)(f) makes § 893.55(4)(b) superfluous.  There is 
nothing in the text of the statute that signals a complete shift 
in policy away from a single cap for noneconomic damages to two 
separate caps that can be stacked one on top of the other.   
¶43 The single cap interpretation is also consistent with 
the 1998 amendments to the wrongful death statute.  A $500,000 
cap on loss of society and companionship for the death of a 
minor child represents a 333.3% increase in the statutory cap.  
A $500,000 cap on top of the medical malpractice cap, as the 
concurrence would have it, would appear to be at odds with the 
purpose of the statute.   
¶44 We conclude that noneconomic damages in a medical 
malpractice wrongful death case are capped by the limitation in 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4).  They are capped to limit the liability 
of health care providers by requiring that any noneconomic 
damages 
that 
would 
have 
been 
subject 
to 
the 
cap 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) and awarded to the deceased personally 
if he or she had lived, are instead subject to the limit in 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) and shared by survivors who are normally 
No. 00-0072  
 
17 
 
the plaintiffs in a wrongful death action.  That limit is now 
$500,000 for a minor and $350,000 for an adult.   
¶45 The 
concurrence 
makes two 
major 
arguments 
using 
statutory construction.  First, it points to the language of 
Wis. Stat. § 655.017: 
"The 
amount 
of 
noneconomic 
damages 
recoverable 
by 
a 
claimant 
or 
plaintiff 
under 
this 
chapter . . . is subject to the limits under s. 893.55(4)(d) and 
(f)."  According to the concurrence, "The text of § 655.017 does 
not limit recovery to the lesser of either the § 893.55(4)(d) 
limit for medical malpractice or the § 893.55(4)(f) limit for 
wrongful 
death. 
 
Rather, 
§ 655.017 
directs 
us 
to 
both 
§§ 893.55(4)(d) and (f) to assess the limits on damages imposed 
in cases of medical malpractice causing wrongful death."  
Concurrence, ¶181.  "Had the legislature intended to limit 
recovery to either the § 893.55(4)(d) or the § 893.55(4)(f) 
limit depending on whether the patient died, it would have used 
different language."  Id., ¶182.  The response to this argument 
is that § 655.017 does little more than direct the reader to the 
binding limits in § 893.55(4).  The word "and" between (d) and 
(f) indicates that there are two limits in subsection (4).  Both 
must be considered.  The word "and" does not imply that a 
claimant collects both limits.  Clearly, a surviving victim of 
malpractice who collects under (4)(d) does not also collect for 
loss of society and companionship under (4)(f).  Hence, the word 
"and" in § 655.017 does not imply a result in this case. 
¶46 Second, the concurrence stresses the phrase "for 
wrongful death" in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) and asserts that 
No. 00-0072  
 
18 
 
use of that phrase means that "the limits contained in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4) (the medical malpractice cap) do not 
apply."  Concurrence, ¶139.  "[D]amages recoverable against 
health care providers for wrongful death, that is, for loss of 
society and companionship, are subject to the limit under 
§ 895.04(4)."  Id., ¶140.  In response, the jury in this case 
found medical negligence, leading to death.  Consequently, this 
is a wrongful death case, taking the case out from under one cap 
and placing it under another.  If the legislature had wanted to 
create separate damages for loss of society and companionship 
under § 895.04(4), it could easily have said so with different 
language. 
¶47 In a case such as this, it is appropriate to consult 
legislative history to confirm our interpretation of the 
statute.  See Kalal, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶51 (citing Seider v. 
O'Connell, 
2000 
WI 
76, 
¶¶51-52, 
236 
Wis. 2d 211, 
612 
N.W.2d 659).  
¶48 Over 
the 
past 
30 
years, 
the 
legislature 
has 
demonstrated an abiding interest in controlling the costs of 
health care, including the costs related to medical malpractice.  
The legislature has shown a consistent pattern of funneling and 
restricting medical malpractice actions to control costs.  It 
has incrementally 
circumscribed the 
procedures 
for 
filing 
medical malpractice actions and limited the noneconomic damages 
available in such actions.    
¶49 In 1975 the legislature made its first effort to 
address "Health Care Liability and Patients Compensation" by 
No. 00-0072  
 
19 
 
creating Chapter 37, Laws of 1975.  At the beginning of the 
chapter, the legislature made extensive findings that we have 
relied upon in past decisions.  Aicher v. Wisconsin Patients 
Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶22, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849; 
Czapinski, 236 Wis. 2d 316, ¶14; State ex rel. Strykowski v. 
Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 508, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).  These 
findings are presented as an Appendix to this opinion. 
¶50 In Strykowski, the court summarized the legislative 
findings and acknowledged that the legislation "was enacted in 
response to a perceived economic and social crisis."  81 
Wis. 2d at 509.  Among its many provisions, the 1975 legislation 
created a Patients Compensation Fund to pay medical malpractice 
awards above certain limits.  Id. at 500.  The legislation also 
"established an exclusive procedure for the prosecution of 
malpractice claims against a '[h]ealth care provider.'"  Id. at 
499 (emphasis added).  This can be seen in two sections, 
Wis. Stat. §§ 655.005 and 655.007: 
 
655.005 
Remedy. 
(1)(a) 
 
On 
and 
after 
the 
effective date of this act [1975], every patient, 
every patient's representative and every health care 
provider 
shall be 
conclusively presumed 
to 
have 
accepted to be bound by this chapter. 
 
. . . .  
 
655.007 Patients' claims.  On and after the 
effective date of this act [1975], any patient or the 
patient's representative, having a claim for injury or 
death on account of malpractice is subject to this 
chapter. 
¶51 The 
1975 
legislation 
created 
a 
procedure 
for 
addressing medical malpractice, but it did not limit the damage 
No. 00-0072  
 
20 
 
awards arising out of medical malpractice.  See Martin v. 
Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995). 
¶52 In 1984 the legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 655.007 
to read: "On and after July 24, 1975, any patient or patient's 
representative having a claim or any spouse, parent or child of 
the patient having a derivative claim for injury or death on 
account of malpractice is subject to this chapter."  1983 Wis. 
Act 
253 
(emphasis 
added 
to 
show 
amendments). 
 
Current 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007 continues to cover derivative claims for 
medical malpractice, including derivative claims for death.  
Even before this 1984 amendment, the Strykowski court stated 
that: 
Medical malpractice actions are substantially distinct 
from other tort actions.  The classification is 
plainly germane to the act's purposes.  The law 
applies to all victims of health care providers as 
described therein.  The legislature declares that the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
medical 
malpractice 
litigation and insurance required the enactment of the 
legislation. 
Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d at 509 (emphasis added). 
¶53 The 1975 legislation was not successful in controlling 
health care costs.  Consequently, in 1985 the legislature 
attempted to place a global cap on all recovery in a medical 
malpractice case.  It considered 1985 Senate Bill 328, which was 
the product of the Legislative Council's Special Committee on 
Medical Malpractice.  Senate Bill 328 attempted to impose a 
$3,300,000 cap on "total damages recoverable" in a Chapter 655 
No. 00-0072  
 
21 
 
medical malpractice action.  The relevant portion of the Senate 
Bill provided: 
The total damages recoverable under ch. 655 for 
bodily injury or death, including any action or 
proceeding based on contribution or indemnification, 
may not exceed $3,300,000 for each occurrence from all 
health care providers and all employes of health care 
providers acting within the scope of their employment 
and providing health care services who are found 
negligent and from the patients compensation fund for 
any act or omission occurring on or after the 
effective date of this subsection. 
1985 S.B. 328. 
¶54 The Legislative Council note explaining this proposed 
section stated: "This [$3,300,000] limitation applies to any 
person bringing a medical malpractice claim, whether a patient 
or a family member of a patient having a derivative claim.  The 
limitation applies to the total amount recoverable by the 
claimant or claimants . . . ."  (Analysis by the Legislative 
Council of 1985 S.B. 328) (emphasis added).  Once again, a 
wrongful death claim qualifies as a "derivative claim" by a 
family member.  Hence the phrase "total damages recoverable" 
indicated that the Senate Bill intended a single cap to apply 
when medical malpractice resulted in death. 
¶55 1985 Senate Bill 328 did not pass, but it is 
significant in understanding current law because it contained 
two provisions that were carried over to the legislation that 
did pass in 1986.  See 1985 Wis. Act 340. 
No. 00-0072  
 
22 
 
¶56 First, both the 1985 bill and the 1986 legislation 
contained a section 655.017.  The provision in 1985 Senate Bill 
328 read in part: 
655.017 Limitation on Recovery.  The amount of damages 
recoverable by a claimant under this chapter for acts 
or omissions 
of a 
health care 
provider . . . is 
subject to the limitation under s. 893.55(4). 
1985 S.B. 328. 
¶57 The provision in the 1986 legislation read: 
655.017 Limitation on Noneconomic Damages.  The amount 
of noneconomic damages recoverable by a claimant or 
plaintiff under this chapter for acts or omissions of 
a health care provider . . . is subject to the limit 
under s. 893.55(4). 
May 1986 Special Session Assembly Bill 4. 
¶58 Section 
655.017 
from 
the 
1986 
legislation 
tied 
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice claims under Chapter 
655, 
including 
derivative 
claims, 
to 
the 
limit 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4). 
¶59 Second, both the 1985 bill and the 1986 legislation 
contained a provision creating a section 893.55(4).  The 
provision in 1985 Senate Bill 328 pertaining to "total damages 
recoverable" is quoted in ¶53 above.  The equivalent provisions 
in May 1986 Special Session Assembly Bill 4 read: 
893.55(4)(b) The total noneconomic damages recoverable 
under ch. 655 for . . .  death . . . may not exceed 
the limit under par. (d) for each occurrence from all 
health care providers. 
. . . .  
893.55(4)(d) The limit on total noneconomic damages 
for each occurrence under par. (b) shall be $1,000,000 
No. 00-0072  
 
23 
 
for actions filed on or after the effective date of 
this paragraph . . . and shall be adjusted by the 
director of state courts to reflect changes in the 
consumer price index. 
1986 A.B. 4. (emphasis added). 
¶60 The 1986 legislation was obviously different from the 
1985 bill.  The dollar cap was reduced from $3,300,000 to 
$1,000,000, with the latter amount indexed.  But this limit 
applied to "total noneconomic damages recoverable" instead of 
"total damages recoverable," leaving economic damages uncapped.  
The newly created subsection 893.55(4) was also broken into 
several paragraphs.   
¶61 Interestingly, the first draft of May 1986 Special 
Session Assembly Bill 4 did not contain the word "total" to 
modify "noneconomic damages."  Legislative Reference Bureau 
Drafting File for May 1986 A.B. 4 (LRB 5441/1).  However, the 
drafter added the modifier "total" in the second draft, and the 
legislature 
ultimately 
enacted 
the 
bill 
in 
that 
form.  
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(b).  It is logical to assume that when 
the drafter inserted the word "total" into the bill between 
drafts, someone believed the word was so important that it had 
to be made part of the final bill.  The word "total" reveals an 
intention to limit noneconomic damages in malpractice suits to a 
single cap, either the one in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) or, 
conceivably, the one in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) (pertaining to 
wrongful death).   
¶62 This was the key issue in Rineck, 155 Wis. 2d at 661.  
In Rineck, the court interpreted Wis. Stat. § 893.55 to mean 
No. 00-0072  
 
24 
 
that when medical malpractice resulted in wrongful death, the 
$1,000,000 
statutory 
limit 
on 
noneconomic 
damages 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) superseded the cap on noneconomic 
damages under the wrongful death statute.  The court said: "We 
conclude that in a medical malpractice action involving death, 
the $1,000,000 limitation on recovery for total noneconomic 
damages 
imposed 
by 
the 
specific 
statutes 
applicable 
to 
malpractice actions supersedes the $50,000 limitation contained 
in the wrongful death statutes."  Id. 
¶63 The court carefully traced the history of the medical 
malpractice statutes and decided the issue using statutory 
construction.  Had it decided the issue differently, there would 
have 
been 
a 
$950,000 
gap 
between 
a 
medical 
malpractice 
noneconomic damages award under § 893.55(4)(d) and a medical 
malpractice wrongful death award under § 895.04(4).  The court 
made 
it 
very 
clear that 
one cap 
superseded 
the 
other: 
"Significantly, ch. 655, Stats., does not state that damages 
recoverable in medical malpractice cases are also subject to the 
$50,000 limitation under the general wrongful death provisions 
of sec. 895.04(4)."  Id. at 666 (emphasis added).  The court 
chose one cap and applied it to the claim, saying that the 
wrongful death cap was "inapplicable."  Id. at 668.   
¶64 On January 1, 1991, the cap on noneconomic damages in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4) was "sunset," meaning that it no longer 
limited recovery of noneconomic damages in medical malpractice 
cases.  This court recognized as much in Jelinek, saying: 
"Although the cap on non-economic damages in medical malpractice 
No. 00-0072  
 
25 
 
claims has expired, [ ] two legislative objectives for enacting 
ch. 655, Stats.——to set tort claims resulting from medical 
malpractice apart from other tort claims and to treat medical 
malpractice claims for injury and death in exactly the same 
manner——remain valid."  182 Wis. 2d at 11.  The court also noted 
that multiple claimants could maintain separate causes of action 
to recover noneconomic damages when a wrongful death occurs.  
Id. at 
13-14.  
The Rineck 
approach 
of 
setting medical 
malpractice wrongful death cases apart from general wrongful 
death cases continued to apply.  See also Dziadosz v. Zirneski, 
177 Wis. 2d 59, 63, 501 N.W.2d 828 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing 
Rineck). 
¶65 Our 
holdings 
in 
Rineck 
and 
Jelinek 
caused 
consternation within the medical community.7  Doctors lamented 
rising costs for health care in general and malpractice 
insurance in particular.  See note 7, supra, and accompanying 
                                                 
7 The 
health 
care community exerted pressure on the 
legislature to put available noneconomic damages in medical 
malpractice wrongful death claims back on the same footing as 
general wrongful death claims.  See, e.g., Testimony relating to 
medical malpractice reform before the Assembly Committee on 
Insurance, Securities and Corporate Policy, (Jan. 19, 1995) 
(statement 
by 
Peter 
Farrow, 
Executive 
Assistant 
to 
the 
Commissioner of Insurance) (noting the unsustainable draining 
effect of the unlimited caps on the Patients Compensation Fund); 
Letter from Dr. John Wegenke to Members of the Assembly 
Insurance, Securities and Corporate Policy Committee 2 (Jan. 19, 
1995) (attacking distinction between wrongful death caused by 
medical malpractice and other forms of wrongful death); Letter 
from Dr. Richard Roberts, President, State Medical Society, to 
Members of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate 
Committee on Insurance 1 (Feb. 22, 1995) (supporting medical 
malpractice reform legislation). 
No. 00-0072  
 
26 
 
citations.  They decried the Jelinek holding that available 
noneconomic damages for wrongful death caused by medical 
malpractice were far greater than available noneconomic damages 
for other types of wrongful death.  See id.   
¶66 In mid-1994 a Special Committee of the Wisconsin 
Patients Compensation Fund recommended "that a cap of $250,000 
be imposed on noneconomic damages," believing that such an 
amendment "would address an elemental and necessary change in 
the tort system for resolving medical malpractice claims."  
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, Report to the Joint 
Legislative Audit Committee 3 (1994). 
¶67 In 1995 the legislature acted to restore limits on 
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions.  It passed 
1995 Wisconsin Act 10, which established a new $350,000 limit 
for noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases and 
simultaneously created Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f).   
¶68 Subsection (4)(f), of course, is central to our 
analysis because it addresses noneconomic damage limits when 
medical 
malpractice 
causes 
death. 
 
It 
provides 
that 
"Notwithstanding the limits on noneconomic damages under this 
subsection, 
damages 
recoverable 
against 
health 
care 
providers . . . for wrongful death are subject to the limit 
under s. 895.04(4)."  (Emphasis added). 
¶69 In effect, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) was another step 
in the legislature's unbroken pattern of narrowing the scope of 
noneconomic damages flowing from medical malpractice claims in 
order to control costs.  It addressed the medical community's 
No. 00-0072  
 
27 
 
concerns in the wake of Rineck and Jelinek by placing medical 
malpractice wrongful death claims on the same footing as other 
wrongful death claims.8  It did this by referencing the $150,000 
limit in the wrongful death statute.  That statute allowed 
claimants up to $150,000 in noneconomic damages for loss of 
society 
and 
companionship. 
 
Significantly, 
however, 
§ 893.55(4)(f) does not speak to how much plaintiffs may 
recover.  It limits the "damages recoverable against health care 
providers."  (Emphasis added).   
¶70 At the time of the 1995 legislation, there were no 
limits at all on noneconomic damages for a wrongful death 
resulting from medical malpractice.  The legislature changed the 
law by incorporating the limit under the existing wrongful death 
statute. 
¶71 There 
are 
several 
plausible 
reasons 
why 
the 
legislature substituted a $150,000 limit for a $350,000 indexed 
cap in wrongful death cases.   
¶72 First, the legislature may not have had an answer for 
why the limit on wrongful death in a medical malpractice case 
                                                 
8 The 
archival 
records 
of 
Representative 
Mark 
Green, 
principal author of the 1995 legislation that became Act 10, 
reveal the legislature's concern over our holding in Jelinek 
that medical malpractice wrongful death actions were not subject 
to the damage limits in the general wrongful death statute.  See 
Jelinek v. St. Paul Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 1, 512 
N.W.2d 764 (1994); Undated notes of Representative Mark Green 
(on 
file 
with 
Wisconsin 
State 
Historical 
Society).  
Representative Green's archival records refer only to restoring 
the limits in the wrongful death statute, not creating stackable 
caps. 
No. 00-0072  
 
28 
 
was far greater than the limit on wrongful death in other cases.  
The absence of any limit on either economic or noneconomic 
damages 
for 
wrongful 
death 
in 
medical 
malpractice 
cases 
increased insurance premiums for health care providers and 
increased assessments on providers to maintain the solvency of 
the Patients Compensation Fund.  Legislative Audit Bureau, 01-11 
"An Audit of the Patients Compensation Fund" 15 (June 2001).  
The fact that the law was treating persons responsible for 
homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle far more 
favorably than it was treating brain surgeons, pediatricians, 
and emergency room doctors may have been viewed as requiring a 
move toward parity in the noneconomic damage limit for wrongful 
death. 
¶73 Second, the private notes of Representative Mark 
Green, principal author of the 1995 legislation, make repeated 
references to the $250,000 cap on medical malpractice damages 
involving physicians working at the University of Wisconsin 
Hospital in Madison (as well as other state employees).  
Representative Green alluded to Wis. Stat. § 893.82 entitled 
"Claims against state employees; notice of claim; limitation of 
damages."  One purpose of this section is to place a limit on 
the amounts recoverable in civil actions or civil proceedings 
against any state employee.  Wis. Stat. § 893.82(1)(c).  In 
1995, the section included the following provisions: 
(5m) With regard to a claim to recover damages for 
medical malpractice, the time periods under subs. (3) 
and (4) shall be 180 days after discovery of the 
injury. . . .  
No. 00-0072  
 
29 
 
(6) The amount recoverable by any person or entity 
for any damages, injuries or death in any civil action 
or 
civil 
proceeding 
against 
a 
state . . . employe . . . including any such action or 
proceeding based on contribution or indemnification, 
shall not exceed $250,000.  No punitive damages may be 
allowed or recoverable in any such action. (Emphasis 
added).   
¶74 Legislators 
may 
have 
recognized 
that 
while 
Wis. Stat. § 893.82 did not create a global cap against all 
health care providers, it did cap both economic and noneconomic 
damages against a single provider.   
¶75 Third, the legislature was aware of this court's 
decisions in Rineck and Jelinek.  The legislature is presumed to 
act with knowledge of the existing case law.  Reiter v. Dyken, 
95 Wis. 2d 461, 471, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980).  In Rineck, the 
court concluded that a minor child has a separate cause of 
action for loss of society and companionship when medical 
malpractice causes the death of one parent and the decedent is 
survived by his or her spouse.  155 Wis. 2d at 661-62.  The 
court reasoned that: 
[The minor child's] claim originates under ch. 655 
rather than the general wrongful death statutes.  
Chapter 655 controls all claims "for injury or death 
on account of medical malpractice."  Section 655.007.  
As 
stated 
previously, 
by 
singling 
out 
medical 
malpractice claims in such a manner, the legislature 
intended to set medical malpractice cases involving 
death apart from other death cases to which the 
general wrongful death statute applies.  Therefore, 
sec. 895.04(2) does not prevent a minor child from 
maintaining a cause of action for loss of society and 
companionship when medical malpractice causes the 
death of a parent. 
Id. at 671. 
No. 00-0072  
 
30 
 
¶76 In Jelinek, the court stated the pertinent issue as 
follows: "In a medical malpractice action involving death that 
is commenced after January 1, 1991, may the minor children of 
the patient who dies as a result of the malpractice maintain 
separate causes of action for loss of society and companionship 
when the patient is survived by a spouse who also brings a claim 
for loss of society and companionship?"  Id. at 5.  The court 
answered "yes."  The Jelinek case featured claims by a surviving 
spouse and three minor children, each of whom was awarded 
damages of $50,000 for loss of society and companionship, 
although the cap at that time in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) was only 
$50,000. 
¶77 The Jelinek case was decided at a time when there was 
no cap on medical malpractice noneconomic damages.  As a result, 
its application to cases after the 1995 legislation is not 
completely clear.  Nonetheless, the view of professional 
legislative staff was that "arguably, the $150,000 limit applies 
to each cause of action individually, not in the aggregate."  
Staff Memorandum to Rep. Mark Green from Don Dyke, Senior Staff 
Attorney, Wisconsin Legislative Council 2 (Sept. 5, 1997).  This 
view was supported by the fact that the 1995 legislation did not 
change the law by amending the wrongful death statute.  Thus, a 
legislator who adopted this view in 1995 would have believed 
that the cap on loss of society and companionship for two 
parents whose child died as a result of medical malpractice was 
$300,000, 
consisting 
of 
two 
potential 
$150,000 
claims.  
Transposing the facts in Jelinek to a post-1995 Act 10 claim, 
No. 00-0072  
 
31 
 
the limit would have been $600,000 for a parent and three minor 
children, each with a separate claim. 
¶78 These rationales put the 1995 legislation on the 
wrongful death cap in perspective. 
¶79 In 1997 the legislature acted again to narrow the 
funnel.  Acting on the assumption that our holding in Jelinek 
still applied, the legislature added the words "per occurrence" 
to the wrongful death damage cap in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4).  See 
1997 Wis. Act 89.9  The legislature added the phrase "per 
occurrence" to make it clear that "in wrongful death medical 
malpractice actions, the limit is a total limit and does not 
apply individually to each person who may bring an action for 
loss of society and companionship."  Memorandum from Don Dyke, 
Senior Staff Attorney, Wisconsin Legislative Council 2 (Apr. 21, 
1998) (on file with Wisconsin Legislative Council).10   
¶80 The amendment was necessary because the legislature 
increased the cap on noneconomic damages recoverable in actions 
                                                 
9 The amendment to add the words "per occurrence" to 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) was sponsored by Senator Robert Jauch, 
who worked closely with Senator Alice Clausing to develop an 
acceptable compromise on 1997 Senate Bill 148.  See Senate 
Amendment 1 to Senate Substitute Amendment 3 to 1997 Senate Bill 
148. 
10 Because this alteration to the statute was enacted after 
the Maurins brought their claim, each parent has a separate 
cause of action for wrongful death under the rule of Jelinek.   
No. 00-0072  
 
32 
 
alleging the wrongful death of a minor child to $500,000.11  It 
raised the cap for the death of an adult to $350,000.  Id.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) (1997-98).  The legislature responded to 
the pleas of an aggrieved parent, Barbara Schultz, who argued: 
"There's no way to police the medical profession 
anymore," Schultz said, pointing out that she can be 
sued for up to $1 million if she damages a patron's 
hair in her hair salon, but doctors can only be sued 
for $150,000 in a wrongful death case.  "They should 
be as responsible as anyone else," Schultz said. 
                                                 
11 Although the 1995 legislation capping noneconomic damages 
mollified 
the 
medical 
community, 
it 
infuriated 
groups 
representing victims of medical malpractice, especially parents 
who had lost children.  They bombarded legislators with letters 
and phone calls asking for the elimination of, or at least an 
increase in, the new caps.  See, e.g., Steve Wideman, Bereaved 
Parents Seek Accountability, The Post-Crescent, Sept. 8, 1997, 
at B1; John Nichols, Two Moms Take on Medical Lobby, The 
Shepherd 
Express, 
July 
3, 
1997; 
Ed 
Culhane, 
Victims 
of 
Malpractice Demand Their Day in Court, The Post-Crescent, June 
8, 1997, at B8.  The efforts of these groups ultimately resulted 
in the "Justin-Lindsey Bill" referenced by the concurrence.  
Concurrence, ¶173.  These groups believed that the 1995 
legislation restoring damage caps limited their recovery to 
$150,000——not $150,000 for wrongful death plus $350,000 for 
medical malpractice.  See, e.g., Letter from Barbara Schultz to 
Senator Alice Clausing (Jan. 22, 1997) (on file with Wisconsin 
State Historical Society) ("With the $150,000 cap, it is making 
it very hard for cases to even get to court.  Why?  Medical 
malpractice cases are very expensive.  Attorneys sometimes turn 
down cases.  The reason is, the experts testimonies, which are 
usually from Doctors, also must be paid."). 
In another indication that the caps were not stackable, 
victims' groups pointed out the "scary thought" that "the 
legislators put a cap on medical negligence of $350,000 if you 
are alive and if you are killed only $150,000.  In other words 
it is cheaper to kill a patient than to keep that person alive."  
Letter from Barbara Schultz to senators and representatives, 
(undated) (on file with Wisconsin State Historical Society) 
(emphasis added). 
No. 00-0072  
 
33 
 
"Families: Wisconsin Wrongful Death Lawsuit Cap is Wrong," Dunn 
County News (undated), reprinted in The Verdict at 16-17 (Spring 
1997).  Schultz's equity argument served as an effective 
counterpoint to the argument made by the health care community 
in the mid-1990s.  
¶81 We 
think 
it 
is 
improbable, 
however, 
that 
the 
legislature would have adjusted the wrongful death cap twice 
within a span of three years12 if it thought claimants had access 
to the $350,000 indexed medical malpractice damage cap in 
 § 893.55(4)(d), plus the $500,000/$350,000 wrongful death cap.13 
¶82 The majority's single cap theory is supported by a 
series of court decisions. 
¶83 "It is now firmly established that Chapter 655 
constitutes the exclusive procedure and remedy for medical 
malpractice in Wisconsin."  Finnegan v. Patients Comp. Fund, 
                                                 
12 The 1995 legislation restored the limit on noneconomic 
damages in medical malpractice wrongful death cases to $150,000 
(the limit provided in § 895.04(4)) and the 1997 legislation 
increased 
the 
limit 
on 
noneconomic 
damages 
in 
medical 
malpractice wrongful death cases to $500,000 (assuming the 
medical malpractice resulted in the wrongful death of a minor 
child.).   
13 In a written statement to a legislative committee, 
Barbara Schultz wrote: "Two children died in a medical wrongful 
death and the [doctors] returned to work as usual.  The families 
on the other hand do not have the same option.  Our lives have 
been shattered.  Then we find out there is a $150,000 cap on 
wrongful death.  In May of 1995, the legislators put a cap on 
medical negligence of $350,000 if you are alive and if you are 
killed only $150,000.  In other words it is cheaper to kill a 
patient than to keep that person alive.  What a scary thought."  
Letter from Barbara Schultz to senators and representatives, 
(undated) (on file with Wisconsin State Historical Society). 
No. 00-0072  
 
34 
 
2003 WI 98, ¶22, 263 Wis. 2d 574, 666 N.W.2d 797 (citing 
Czapinski, 236 Wis. 2d 316, ¶14; Rineck, 155 Wis. 2d at 665; 
Strykowski; 81 Wis. 2d at 499; Ziulkowski v. Nierengarten, 210 
Wis. 2d 98, 102, 565 N.W.2d 164 (Ct. App. 1997)); see also 
Jelinek, 182 Wis. 2d at 9.   
¶84 The Jelinek court said that Chapter 655 had "set tort 
claims resulting from medical malpractice apart from other tort 
claims."  182 Wis. 2d at 11.  This is the complete answer to the 
otherwise 
legitimate 
argument 
that 
negligence 
claims 
and 
wrongful death claims are separate and distinct causes of 
action.  See Concurrence, ¶129.  The premise stated in Jelinek 
has been a pillar of medical malpractice law since 1975.  "If 
the legislature did not intend to change the common law as to 
the damages that may be recovered in malpractice actions, there 
would have been no need for the legislature to enact the 
provision."  Lund v. Kokemoor, 195 Wis. 2d 727, 736-37, 537 
N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1995). 
¶85 Lund v. Kokemoor applied this principle to exclude 
punitive damages from medical malpractice claims.  Hegarty v. 
Beauchaine used it to establish the statute of limitations on a 
wrongful death claim for medical malpractice.  2001 WI App 300, 
249 Wis. 2d 142, 638 N.W.2d 355.  The court held that "wrongful 
death claims that are the result of medical malpractice are 
subject to § 893.55."  Id., ¶21.  
¶86 There are several passages in Czapinski that bear on 
the issue:   
No. 00-0072  
 
35 
 
[W]e 
hold 
that 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) makes applicable to medical 
malpractice death cases only the limit on damages, and 
does not incorporate the wrongful death classification 
of claimants entitled to bring such an action. 
236 Wis. 2d 316, ¶2. 
Statutory language along with legislative history and 
precedent lead us to hold that the intent of the 
legislature 
was 
to 
make 
applicable 
to 
medical 
malpractice 
death 
cases 
only 
the 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) limit on damages. 
Id., ¶13; see also ¶¶16-17.   
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) uses the language, "damages 
recoverable . . . are subject to the limit under s. 
895.04(4)."  (Emphasis added).  This shows that the 
legislature intended to extend to medical malpractice 
suits the wrongful death limit on damages. 
Id., ¶21.  The court noted that the repeated references to 
§ 895.04(4) in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) "connect 'limit' to 
damages."  Id., ¶20.   
 
¶87 Although the Czapinski case involved a question about 
the eligibility of adult children or claimants for the wrongful 
death from medical malpractice in regard to their mother, the 
court's analysis accurately describes the operation of the 
statutes.  
¶88 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
purpose 
and 
effect 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) was to limit the noneconomic damages 
recoverable against health care providers for wrongful death in 
medical malpractice cases to the dollar amount listed in 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4).  The limit in the latter statute 
supersedes the limit in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) that would 
have applied but for the shift to a different limit.   
No. 00-0072  
 
36 
 
¶89 In the immediate aftermath of the 1995 legislation, 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) 
appears 
to 
combine 
the 
noneconomic 
damages from medical malpractice and the loss of society and 
companionship damages from wrongful death at a relatively modest 
level of $150,000.  However, the evidence is compelling that key 
legislators 
understood 
that 
any 
eligible 
claimant 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007 was entitled to make a separate claim for 
wrongful death damages in accord with out Rineck and Jelinek 
decisions.  As previously noted, the legislature is presumed to 
act with knowledge of existing case law.  As this court said in 
Reiter v. Dyken, "the presumption of legislative adoption or 
ratification of a judicial construction of a statute is entitled 
to less weight when the court's construction is followed by 
nearly complete inaction on the part of the legislature with 
respect to the statute construed," 95 Wis. 2d at 471, but the 
presumption is strong when the legislature takes specific 
responsive action to change a construction.  The private 
memoranda from the Legislative Council to Rep. Mark Green, 
followed by the legislature's action inserting the words "per 
occurrence" into Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) at the time the limits 
in § 895.04(4) were raised, is persuasive evidence that the 
legislature understood that the single cap in § 895.04(4) could 
be multiplied by the number of eligible claimants, before that 
amendment.   
¶90 As a result, we believe the limit on noneconomic 
damages in this case is $300,000.   
No. 00-0072  
 
37 
 
B. 
Constitutionality 
of 
the 
Limit 
on 
Wrongful 
Death 
Noneconomic Damages Arising Out of Medical Malpractice. 
 
¶91 We now turn to the second certified question regarding 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
limit 
on 
the 
recovery 
of 
noneconomic damages in wrongful death actions contained in 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4).   
 
¶92 Above, we concluded that the cap on noneconomic 
damages under § 895.04(4) limits the total noneconomic damages 
when the cause of a wrongful death is medical malpractice.  In 
practical terms, the global cap on total noneconomic damages 
intended by the legislature when medical malpractice causes 
death limits both wrongful death and medical malpractice 
simultaneously. 
 
The 
parents 
do 
not 
argue 
that 
it 
is 
unconstitutional to cap medical malpractice damages.  See 
Guzman, 240 Wis. 2d 559.  Thus, although we address it in a 
slightly different context, the certified question——whether the 
cap 
on 
wrongful 
death 
damages 
under 
§ 895.04(4) 
is 
constitutional——is still relevant.   
 
¶93 The constitutionality of a statute is a question of 
law that we review de novo.  Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶18 (citing 
Riccitelli v. Broekhuizen, 227 Wis. 2d 100, 119, 595 N.W.2d 392 
(1999)).  Because statutes embody the economic, social, and 
political decisions entrusted to the legislature, we afford 
statutes a strong presumption of constitutionality.  Id., ¶20 
(citing State ex rel. Carnation Milk Prods. Co. v. Emery, 178 
Wis. 147, 160, 189 N.W. 564 (1922)).  Accordingly, we uphold the 
constitutionality of a statute unless the party challenging the 
No. 00-0072  
 
38 
 
statute demonstrates that it is unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id., ¶19.14   
¶94 For 
many 
years, 
"the 
legislature 
[has] 
made 
a 
deliberate judgment regarding what maximum amount could be 
awarded by statute for the loss of society and companionship."  
Neiman 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶26.15  The present action provides this 
court an opportunity to either validate the legislature's 
authority in this area or shatter the long held understanding of 
legislative power.    
¶95 The constitutional arguments presented by the parents 
challenge the constitutionality of the cap in four respects.  
First, 
they 
assert 
that 
the 
cap 
nullifies 
the 
state 
constitutional right to have a jury assess damages under Wis. 
Const. Art. I, § 5.  Second, they contend that § 895.04(4)'s cap 
violates separation of powers principles by blurring the 
boundaries between judicial and legislative branches.  Third, 
they assert that the classifications dictated by § 895.04(4) 
violate constitutional equal protection guarantees.  Finally, 
the 
parents 
posit 
that 
their 
constitutional 
rights 
to 
                                                 
14 In Guzman v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 2001 WI App 21, 
240 
Wis. 2d 559, 
623 
N.W.2d 776, 
the 
court 
provides 
an 
exceptionally valuable and insightful discussion of the meaning 
and origin of this formulation.  Id., ¶4 n.3.   
15 See Neiman v. Am. Nat. Prop. & Cas. Co., 2000 WI 83, ¶26 
n.6, 236 Wis. 2d 411, 613 N.W.2d 160. The legislature has 
increased the statutory cap in a wrongful death claim on many 
occasions: § 1, ch. 548, Wis. Laws 1949; ch. 194, Wis. Laws 
1959; ch. 436, Wis. Laws 1969; ch. 287, Wis. Laws 1975; ch. 166, 
Wis. Laws 1979; 1983 Wis. Act 315; 1991 Wis. Act 308; 1997 Wis. 
Act 89.   
No. 00-0072  
 
39 
 
substantive due process have been violated by the creation of an 
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable cap.  Each of these 
arguments will be addressed in turn.16   
                                                 
16 The concurrence concludes that the $300,000 limitation we 
have recognized in this case is unconstitutional.  Yet, in 
Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 N.W.2d 266, 
this court rejected the retroactive application of a $500,000 
cap on wrongful death, thereby limiting the plaintiffs to a 
recovery of $150,000.  The court considered the result "harsh," 
257 Wis. 2d 19, ¶38, but there was no hint that the $150,000 cap 
was unconstitutional. 
The 
concurrence 
is 
internally 
inconsistent. 
 
The 
concurrence insists that the wrongful death limitation, like a 
wrongful death claim, is distinct and separate from the 
limitation on noneconomic damages for medical malpractice.  If 
we accept this premise, we would examine the effect of the 
wrongful death cap in isolation.  The concurrence assumes that 
the limitation for wrongful death damages is $150,000.  The jury 
awarded the parents $2.5 million.  Consequently, by reducing the 
award from $2.5 million to $150,000, the overall reduction is 
$2,350,000, or 94 percent.  Under our holding, the damage award 
is reduced from $3,050,000 ($2,500,000 + $550,000) to $300,000, 
a reduction of 90.2 percent.  Given its analysis, it is not 
clear how the concurrence could uphold the $150,000 cap in 
isolation, and it is not clear why it eschews a 90.2 percent 
reduction but supports a 94 percent reduction.  In the 
concurrence, 
nothing 
is 
clear 
about 
what 
limits 
are 
constitutional and what limits are not. 
This sort of highly subjective analysis runs contrary to 
established procedure.  "Courts are not equipped or empowered to 
make investigations into the financial resources of various 
public bodies in Wisconsin; the coverage, policy limits and 
costs of available liability insurance; or the number of victims 
of . . . tortfeasors and a profile of the losses they have 
suffered."  Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 Wis. 2d 823, 844, 280 
N.W.2d 711 (1979).  The court in Stanhope was "unwilling to say 
that the legislature has no rational basis to fear that full 
monetary responsibility entails the risk of insolvency or 
intolerable tax burdens," id. at 842, but the concurrence is 
apparently willing to say that there is no rational basis here. 
No. 00-0072  
 
40 
 
 
1. 
Trial by Jury 
 
¶96 Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides in part that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard 
to the amount in controversy."  According to the parents, 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) infringes upon this right by nullifying 
the jury's damage-finding function.  The parents correctly point 
out that the right to trial by jury includes the right to have 
"a jury trial on all issues of fact, including that of damages."  
See Jennings v. Safeguard Ins. Co., 13 Wis. 2d 427, 431, 109 
N.W.2d 90 (1961).   
 
¶97 The parents develop an interesting, though ultimately 
irrelevant, historical argument.  They assert that wrongful 
death actions are not statutory creations but existed at common 
law, thereby giving the right to jury trial in wrongful death 
actions constitutional imprimatur.  Yet, even if we assume a 
constitutional right to a jury trial arising out of the common 
law status of wrongful death actions,17 that right has not been 
deprived in this case. 
¶98 There can be no claim that the parents' constitutional 
right to a trial by jury was directly infringed in this case 
                                                 
17 Even if wrongful death is an action that existed at 
common law, this would not preclude the legislature from 
altering the common law.  See Wis. Const. art. XIV, § 13.  
Article XIV, section 13 provides that the common law "in force" 
at statehood "shall be and continue part of law of this state 
until altered or suspended by the legislature."  In other words, 
the Wisconsin Constitution allows the legislature to alter or 
suspend claims based on the common law.   
No. 00-0072  
 
41 
 
because the case was tried to a jury, and the jury in fact 
decided the issue of damages.  Rather the parents' argument 
relies upon an attenuated "infringement."  In their view, by 
reining 
in 
the 
jury's 
discretion 
to 
award 
damages, 
the 
legislature has impermissibly trampled upon the jury's sacred 
domain.  
¶99 However, "[e]ven when a defendant has a right to trial 
by jury he has no vested right to the manner or time in which 
that right may be exercised."  State ex rel. Murphy v. Voss, 34 
Wis. 2d 501, 509, 149 N.W.2d 595 (1967) (citing State ex rel. 
Sowle v. Brittich, 7 Wis. 2d 353, 96 N.W.2d 337 (1959)).  As the 
court of appeals ably explained in the Guzman case, Article I, 
Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution distinguishes the 
respective roles of judge and jury.  Guzman, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 
¶10.  It does not curtail the legislative prerogative to limit 
actions temporally, see Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, or monetarily, 
see Guzman, 240 Wis. 2d 559.   The cap on noneconomic wrongful 
death damages is an appropriate exercise of the "legislature's 
best judgment . . . as to what maximum amount of damages fully 
No. 00-0072  
 
42 
 
compensates for loss of society and companionship."  Neiman, 236 
Wis. 2d 411, ¶26.18      
¶100 We do not find that legislative suspension of damages 
above and beyond a certain limit infringes upon the right to a 
jury trial when, in wrongful death actions, a jury still 
determines liability and assesses damages.  The parents have 
failed to demonstrate that § 895.04(4) violates our federal or 
state constitutional provisions beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
2. 
Separation of Powers 
¶101 The parents also advance the position that the 
legislature has seized judicial power by enacting legislation 
that curtails the judicial power of remittitur and additur.  The 
parents contend that the cap on noneconomic damages in wrongful 
death cases has superseded the judicial power to add or remit 
damages.  As a result, the legislature has usurped judicial 
power. 
                                                 
18 The parents have not briefed the question whether the 
limitation on wrongful death claims violates Art. I, § 9 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  The concurrence relies heavily on this 
section, repainting an old train in an attempt to lure new 
passengers.  Article I, § 9, singly or in combination with 
Article I, § 5, does not bar the legislature from making 
rationally-based determinations about causes of action related 
to health care in Wisconsin.  Limitations on noneconomic damages 
are not wholly different from prohibitions on punitive damages, 
periods of limitation on claims, and restrictions on claimants.  
Article 
I, 
§ 9, 
"though 
of 
great 
importance 
in 
our 
jurisprudence, is primarily addressed to the right of persons to 
have access to the courts and to obtain justice on the basis of 
the law as it in fact exists.  No legal rights are conferred by 
this portion of the constitution."  Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland 
Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 189, 290 N.W.2d 276 (1980).  Article I, 
§ 9 cannot be used to enlarge a restricted cause of action.   
No. 00-0072  
 
43 
 
¶102 In assessing whether the cap in § 895.04(4) violates 
separation of powers in this case, our first task is to 
determine whether the alleged usurpation invades a core power of 
the judicial branch or whether the power is one shared by the 
branches.  See Flynn v. Dep't of Admin., 216 Wis. 2d 521, 545-
46, 576 N.W.2d 245 (1998).  If the power is a core power of one 
branch, then other branches may not intrude upon that power.  
Id.  If, on the other hand, the power is one that is shared 
between or among branches, then one branch may not unduly burden 
or substantially interfere with the other branch's exercise of 
that power.  Id.  As we understand the parents' argument, 
remittitur and additur are core judicial powers.  We disagree.   
¶103 When it comes to creating, limiting, and suspending 
causes of action, the legislature shares power with the 
judiciary.  See e.g., Wisconsin Stat. ch. 102 (Worker's 
Compensation Act); Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 
209 (1911).  We have noted in the past that the legislature is 
specifically authorized to act in the context of wrongful death.  
See Rineck, 155 Wis. 2d at 669 ("As an element of common law, 
the doctrine permitting recovery for loss of society and 
companionship was initially created and developed by courts of 
law. . . . Thus, this is an area where either this court or the 
legislature may act." (emphasis added)).  The legislature's 
authority flows from its power to alter or suspend the common 
law.  Wis. Const. Art. XIV, § 13; see also State v. Picotte, 
2003 WI 42, ¶10, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381.   Accordingly, 
the appropriate separation of powers inquiry is whether the 
No. 00-0072  
 
44 
 
legislature has unduly burdened or substantially interfered with 
judicial power.    
¶104 The limit on noneconomic damages for wrongful death 
does not prevent a circuit court from exercising the powers of 
remittitur and additur.  See Guzman, 240 Wis. 2d 559, ¶13 
(holding that despite cap on noneconomic damages in medical 
malpractice 
cases, 
"a 
trial 
court 
retains 
the 
discretion . . . to order a remittitur").  In all, the burden on 
the court's remittitur and additur powers is minimal and is 
insufficient to demonstrate that the statute violates the 
separation of powers beyond a reasonable doubt. 
3. 
Equal Protection 
¶105 The parents argue that § 895.04(4) violates equal 
protection under a strict scrutiny standard and under a rational 
basis test.  As an initial matter, we note that strict scrutiny 
is not appropriate in this context.  Strict scrutiny applies if 
the statute implicates a fundamental right or creates a non-
favored 
class 
of 
people 
who 
have 
immutable 
personal 
characteristics or have experienced a historical pattern of 
discrimination and political powerlessness.  Czapinski, 236 
Wis. 2d 316, ¶28.  Capping noneconomic wrongful death damages 
does not violate any fundamental right possessed by the parents.  
Section 895.04(4) does not deny claimants access to the courts 
or an opportunity for a jury trial to recover wrongful death 
damages.  Neither does the statute create classifications based 
on 
immutable 
personal 
characteristics 
or 
a 
history 
of 
discrimination or political powerlessness.   
No. 00-0072  
 
45 
 
¶106 Thus, we review the parents equal protection challenge 
under the rational basis test.  A statute will be held 
constitutional "if the legislature's distinction among groups of 
persons is rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose."  Doering v. WEA Ins. Group, 193 Wis. 2d 118, 131, 532 
N.W.2d 432 
(1995). 
 
Conversely, 
a 
statute 
will 
be 
held 
unconstitutional under the rational basis test if the statute is 
shown to be "patently arbitrary" with "no rational relationship 
to a legitimate government interest."  State v. Dennis H., 2002 
WI 104, ¶32; 255 Wis. 2d 359; 647 N.W.2d 851 (quoting State v. 
McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 131, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989)).  
¶107 First, we set forth the legislative classification 
created by § 895.04(4).  Doering, 193 Wis. 2d at 137.  The 
noneconomic damages cap for wrongful death creates two classes 
of victims——those that die and those that survive——and two 
classes of tortfeasors——those whose actions cause death and 
those whose actions do not cause death.  These classifications 
are not irrational.  In fact, they produce varying results in 
relation to the cap on noneconomic damages for wrongful death, 
depending upon the circumstances. 
¶108 Next, we identify the objectives of the cap on 
noneconomic wrongful death damages.19  Id.  The cap on 
                                                 
19 We note that the legislative objective supporting the 
existence of a wrongful death cause of action is to provide 
"compensation to designated beneficiaries for their loss of 
relational interest with the deceased person."  Harris v. 
Kelley, 70 Wis. 2d 242, 253, 234 N.W.2d 628 (1975) (citing 
Wurtzinger v. Jacobs, 33 Wis. 2d 703, 148 N.W.2d 86 (1967)). 
No. 00-0072  
 
46 
 
noneconomic 
wrongful 
death 
damages 
under 
§ 895.04(4) 
was 
implemented to assuage fears "that passion would run high where 
the wrongdoer causes death and that huge damage awards would be 
imposed on the wrongdoer."  Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 
Wis. 2d 260, 
314, 
294 
N.W.2d 437 
(1980). 
 
The 
Wisconsin 
legislature concluded, after taking into account economic, 
social, 
and 
political 
considerations, 
see 
Aicher, 
237 
Wis. 2d 99, ¶20, that a fair and equitable system considers not 
only the victim's survivors but also the overall cost of 
wrongful death awards on the system of health care providers 
that is vital to the people of Wisconsin.  This determination is 
buttressed 
by 
the 
legislative 
findings 
presented 
in 
the 
Appendix.  The legislature has pursued a legitimate objective in 
its quest to balance important considerations.   
¶109 Finally, 
we 
consider 
whether 
the 
legislative 
classification is rationally related to the achievement of an 
appropriate legislative objective.  Doering, 193 Wis. 2d at 137-
38.   In this instance, capping noneconomic wrongful death 
damages is undeniably related to the legitimate legislative 
objective sought to be accomplished by the cap.  Indeed, it is 
hard to conceive a more rational means of assuaging the fear of 
huge damage awards and reining in insurance costs in the case of 
a victim's death than by limiting noneconomic wrongful death 
damages.  Given the presumption of constitutionality, this 
statute does not run afoul of our federal and state equal 
protection guarantees beyond a reasonable doubt.   
4. 
Substantive Due Process 
No. 00-0072  
 
47 
 
¶110 Finally, the parents argue that the cap on wrongful 
death damages violates federal and state substantive due 
process, because it is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  
See State v. Radke, 2003 WI 7, ¶12, 259 Wis. 2d 13, 657 
N.W.2d 66.  The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. I, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
coextensively guarantee due process of law.  See Dowhower v. 
West Bend Mutual Ins. Co., 2000 WI 73, ¶12, 236 Wis. 2d 113, 613 
N.W.2d 557.  Due process constitutes more than just a guarantee 
of fair process, but also encompasses substantive protections 
that bar "certain government actions regardless of the fairness 
of the procedures used to implement them."  Id., ¶13 (quoting 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998)).   
¶111 The 
parents 
claim 
that, 
over 
the 
years, 
the 
legislature has changed the cap in a random and arbitrary 
manner.  According to the parents, "[t]hese continual amendments 
show that the cap has no basis in fact and is completely 
arbitrary."  Certainly the legislature has adjusted the cap on 
noneconomic wrongful death damages from time to time.  This does 
not lead inexorably to the conclusion that such changes did not 
reflect the legislature's considered judgment.  The periodic 
changes to the cap noted by the parents suggest legislative 
attention and thoughtfulness, not arbitrary action.  It is the 
legislature's role to seek an equitable level of compensation, 
and occasional reassessment and alteration of the cap on 
noneconomic wrongful damages demonstrates the legislature's 
attempts to reach that goal.   
No. 00-0072  
 
48 
 
¶112 We conclude that the limit on noneconomic damages for 
medical 
malpractice 
wrongful 
death, 
as 
set 
out 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4), is not unconstitutional. 
C. 
Remittitur 
 
¶113 The jury awarded $550,000 to Shay Maurin's estate for 
her pre-death pain and suffering.  The circuit court remitted 
this amount to $100,000.  The parties dispute whether the court 
erroneously exercised its discretion.   
 
¶114 The jury also awarded the parents $2,500,00 as 
wrongful 
death 
damages 
for 
their 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship.  This amount must be reduced to $300,000 to 
comply with the limit set out in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4).   
 
¶115 Under our decision, the total amount of allowable 
noneconomic damages for the parents and the estate is $300,000.  
Consequently, whether the estate's verdict of $550,000 is 
reduced to $381,428 by law or $100,000 by remittitur will have 
no bearing on the ultimate award.  Consequently, we decline to 
review the issue.   
CONCLUSION 
¶116 We uphold the constitutionality of the noneconomic 
damage limit in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) as the limit on total 
noneconomic damages recoverable from health care providers in a 
medical malpractice wrongful death case.  This limit combines 
the damages available for medical malpractice and wrongful 
death.  In this case, for the reasons explained in our decision, 
the 
plaintiffs 
are 
entitled 
to 
recovery 
of 
$300,000.  
No. 00-0072  
 
49 
 
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is reversed and 
the cause remanded for action consistent with this decision.   
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
No. 00-0072  
 
50 
 
APPENDIX 
Section 1. Legislative findings. (1) The legislature 
finds that: 
 
(a) The number of suits and claims for damages 
arising from professional patient care has increased 
tremendously in the past several years and the size of 
judgments and settlements in connection therewith has 
increased even more substantially; 
 
(b) The 
effect 
of 
such 
judgments 
and 
settlements, based frequently on newly emerging legal 
precedents, has been to cause the insurance industry 
to uniformly and substantially increase the cost and 
limit 
the 
availability 
of 
professional 
liability 
insurance coverage; 
 
(c) These increased insurance costs are being 
passed on to patients in the form of higher charges 
for health care services and facilities; 
 
(d) The increased costs of providing health care 
services, the increased incidents of claims and suits 
against health care providers and the size of such 
claims 
and 
judgments 
has 
caused 
many 
liability 
insurance companies to withdraw completely from the 
insuring of health care providers; 
 
(e) The rising number of suits and claims is 
forcing both individual and institutional health care 
providers to practice defensively, to the detriment of 
the health care provider and the patient; 
 
(f) As a result of the current impact of such 
suits and claims, health care providers are often 
required, 
for 
their 
own 
protection, 
to 
employ 
extensive diagnostic procedures for their patients, 
thereby increasing the cost of patient care; 
 
(g) As another effect of the increase of such 
suits and claims and the costs thereof, health care 
providers are reluctant to and may decline to provide 
certain health care services which might be helpful, 
but in themselves entail some risk of patient injury; 
No. 00-0072  
 
51 
 
 
(h) The cost and the difficulty in obtaining 
insurance for health care providers discourages and 
has discouraged young physicians from entering into 
the practice of medicine in this state; 
 
(i) Inability to obtain, and the high cost of 
obtaining, such insurance has affected and is likely 
to further affect 
medical and 
hospital 
services 
available in this state to the detriment of patients, 
the public and health care providers; 
 
(j) Some health care providers have curtailed or 
ceased, or may further curtail or cease, their 
practices because of the nonavailability or high cost 
of professional liability insurance; and 
 
(k) It therefore appears that the entire effect 
of such suits and claims is working to the detriment 
of the health care provider, the patient and the 
public in general. 
§ 1, ch. 37, Laws of 1975. 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
1 
 
¶117 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. 
(concurring).  This is a statutory interpretation case that 
affects the entire health care community and everyone in the 
state because we all have been or will be patients.  The 
plaintiffs and amicus urge one interpretation of the statutes; 
the defendants and amicus urge another.  The majority opinion 
adopts neither.   
¶118 Rather, the majority has heard a different drumbeat 
and follows it, adopting an interpretation of the statutes 
totally different from any argued or briefed here or in the 
court of appeals.   
¶119 Some 
justices proceed to 
make decisions without 
benefit of arguments or briefs by the parties.  Others prefer 
more restraint.  Some justices apparently perceive that the rule 
of law is advanced by a sua sponte approach.  We do not.   
¶120 This case should not be decided without asking the 
parties to brief the majority opinion's novel interpretation of 
the statutes and to reargue the case.  We urge the majority to 
seek supplemental briefs from the parties before promulgating 
its novel interpretation of the statutes.  The rule of law is 
generally best developed when matters are tested by the fire of 
adversarial briefs and oral arguments.20 
                                                 
20 "The fundamental premise of the adversary process is that 
these advocates will uncover and present more useful information 
and arguments to the decision maker than would be developed by a 
judicial officer acting on his own in an inquisitorial system." 
Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look 
at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 
245, 247 (2002) (citing United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 
246 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
2 
 
¶121 This 
court 
has 
emphasized 
its 
"preference 
for 
requesting briefs whenever they might aid the court"21 and has 
acknowledged that "statutory interpretation is an area in which 
the 
courts 
usually 
should 
be 
willing 
to 
delay 
their 
determination until they have the assistance of briefs."22  
Indeed, a court's sua sponte determination of an issue may raise 
due process considerations:  A court may be depriving parties of 
their right to a meaningful appeal, to due process notice, and 
                                                 
21 Bartus v. DHSS, 176 Wis. 2d 1063, 1073, 501 N.W.2d 419 
(1993).  
22 Id.  
See also Allan D. Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in 
Appellate Review, 27 Ford. L. Rev. 477, 493-94 (1958-59): 
When the appellate court considers a matter sua sponte 
for the first time it means that the litigants have 
not been given an opportunity to consider the matter 
and urge arguments in support of and against the 
position adopted by the reviewing court.  If the 
question 
had 
been 
raised 
there 
is 
at 
least 
a 
possibility that other facts or other authorities 
might have been presented which might have changed the 
court's attitude on the matter.  But this opportunity 
is not given to the losing party. 
When considered sua sponte both parties are taken 
completely by surprise and the court decides the 
matter on grounds not urged by either.  Neither has 
had any opportunity to consider the matter, and both 
are 
now 
bound 
by 
res 
judicata 
grounded 
on 
considerations 
which 
represent 
not 
well 
reasoned 
positions for the litigants, but rather only the 
fortuitous decision of a wayward court.  
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
3 
 
to adversary counsel.23  If there ever was a case that cried out 
for briefs from adversarial parties to assist the court, this 
statutory interpretation case is it.  We are at a loss to 
understand why the majority refuses to call for additional 
briefs.   
¶122 The majority opinion derives its interpretation of the 
statutes by piecing together (in a convoluted manner) selected 
parts of the statutory texts, the medical malpractice "crisis," 
statutory history, legislative history of enacted laws and 
defeated bills (including private communications between a 
legislator and staff), arguments of proponents and opponents in 
lobbying for bills, and case law interpreting earlier statutes. 
¶123 We rely on the briefs and oral argument for our 
discussion 
of 
the 
proper 
statutory 
interpretation 
and 
remittitur.  Notwithstanding the lack of briefing on the 
constitutionality issue the majority's novel interpretation 
raises, and recognizing that we, like the majority, would 
benefit by hearing from the litigants, we nevertheless explore 
the unconstitutionality of the majority's novel interpretation 
using the information we now have.   
¶124 We agree with the majority opinion that the judgment 
of the circuit court must be reversed and remanded.     
                                                 
23 Cf. Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 120, 111 S. Ct. 1723 
(1991) (invalidating a death penalty on due process grounds 
because "the silent judge was the only person in the courtroom 
who knew that the real issue that they [counsel] should have 
been debating was the choice between life and death").  
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
4 
 
¶125 The majority opinion and this concurrence vigorously 
disagree about the interpretation of the applicable statutes.  
On remand, the defendants' liability and the plaintiffs' 
recovery are significantly different under the majority opinion 
and this concurrence.   
¶126 The majority opinion and this concurrence focus on the 
limits on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions 
resulting in death and the cap on loss of society and 
companionship in wrongful death actions.  Economic damages are 
not capped in medical malpractice actions24 and pecuniary damages 
are not capped in wrongful death actions.25  We therefore do not 
focus on these damages.   
¶127 We present the concurrence as follows:  We first 
discuss the fundamental legal flaw underlying the majority's 
reasoning and analyze the majority's statutory interpretation in 
light of this flaw.  We then set forth our own interpretation of 
the statutes, an interpretation that coincides with that of the 
plaintiffs. 
 
Finally, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
majority's 
interpretation of the statutes is unconstitutional and that the 
remittitur was an erroneous exercise of discretion.       
I 
¶128 A fundamental legal flaw pervades the majority's 
concocted interpretation of Wisconsin's medical malpractice and 
wrongful death statutes.  It permeates and distorts the 
majority's view of the statutes.  
                                                 
24 Majority op., ¶27.  
25 Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
5 
 
¶129 The flaw:  The majority opinion fails to recognize the 
simple yet well-established distinction between a survival 
action and an action for wrongful death.26  This distinction has 
been recognized repeatedly in Wisconsin.27   
                                                 
26 At common law, upon the death of a person injured by 
the fault of another, any action brought for the 
injury and any right of action brought for the injury 
and any right of action therefor died with the person.  
By statutes adopted in most states, this rule has been 
changed, and the action for the injuries sustained up 
until the time of death may be maintained by the 
personal representative.  These are known as Survival 
Acts. 
By another common-law rule, neither the members of the 
family 
of 
the 
injured 
person 
nor 
his 
personal 
representatives had any cause of action for the loss 
occasioned by his death.  This also has been changed, 
in all the states, by statutes, which are modeled upon 
Lord Campbell's Act adopted in England in 1846, and 
are known as Death Acts. 
Charles T. McCormick, Damages 335 (1935). 
27 Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 312, 294, 
N.W.2d 437 (1980) (estate's award for child's pain a suffering 
and beneficiaries' recovery for wrongful death "is not a double 
recovery, but a recovery for a double wrong"); Estate of Merrill 
ex rel. Mortenson v. Jerrick, 231 Wis. 2d 546, 549, 605 
N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1999) ("A survival action is distinct from 
a wrongful death action."); Miller v. Luther, 170 Wis. 2d 429, 
435-36, 489 N.W.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1992) ("A wrongful death action 
is a cause of action for the benefit of certain designated 
classes of surviving relatives, enabling them by statute to 
recover their own damages caused by the wrongful death of the 
decedent . . . It is not an action that survives the decedent's 
death; it is a new action brought for the benefit of the 
statutory beneficiaries."); Jaeger v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 610 
F. Supp. 784, 786 (E.D. Wis. 1985) ("The survival action and the 
wrongful death action are distinct under Wisconsin law.  The 
survival action is brought by the decedent's estate for the 
injury to the decedent; the wrongful death action belongs to the 
named beneficiaries for their injury.  '[T]he latter action 
begins where the former ends'" (citations omitted)). 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
6 
 
¶130 Let us illustrate the distinction.  When a victim 
dies, some claims are for pre-death noneconomic damages suffered 
by the victim (e.g., pain and suffering) and others are for pre-
death noneconomic damages suffered by family members of the 
victim (e.g., a spouse's loss of consortium).  These are 
generally referred to as survival actions.28   
¶131 In contrast, damages for post-death injuries fall 
within the wrongful death statute.  The wrongful death statute 
limits noneconomic damages to loss of society and companionship 
and caps these damages.  Wrongful death claims do not encompass 
other types of noneconomic damages.29   
¶132 In ordinary tort actions, the victim and the family 
recover unlimited "survival" damages, and the family recovers 
the capped "loss of society and companionship" damages.30   
¶133 Yet according to the majority opinion, in medical 
malpractice actions when death results, both types of damages, 
survival damages and wrongful death damages, are limited to the 
cap set forth in the wrongful death statute even though the 
wrongful death statute addresses only damages for loss of 
society and companionship.31  This conclusion is surprising in 
light of the fact that the majority can point to no evidence 
anywhere to show that anyone at any time has interpreted the cap 
                                                 
28 2 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 295.  See, e.g., Wis 
JI——Civil 1815, 1855. 
29 Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4). 
30 Id. 
31 Majority op., ¶31.   
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
7 
 
for wrongful death damages to encompass anything else besides 
damages for loss of society and companionship.  The whole focus 
of legislative activity was to limit recovery for loss of 
society and companionship, not to limit recovery for other 
noneconomic 
damages 
suffered 
in 
wrongful 
death 
medical 
malpractice cases.  Furthermore, neither the text of the statute 
nor the majority opinion instructs the parties or courts on how 
to 
allocate 
noneconomic 
damages 
when, 
as 
in 
this 
case, 
noneconomic damages for the survival action and the wrongful 
death action exceed the wrongful death cap on loss of society 
and companionship, or how comparative negligence applies to each 
type of action.32 
¶134 The majority argues that the plain words of the 
statute and its interpretation of the legislative history compel 
it to override this basic legal principle differentiating 
between survival actions and wrongful death actions.  However, 
neither the text nor the legislative history nor the legislative 
objective nor the case law compels this strange reading. 
¶135 For 
example, 
the 
majority 
cites 
the 
following 
statutory language in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(b), emphasizing 
"total," "or death," and "for each occurrence" in support of its 
theory: 
The total noneconomic damages recoverable for bodily 
injury or death, including any action or proceeding 
based on contribution or indemnification, may not 
exceed the limit under par. (d) for each occurrence on 
or after May 25, 1995, from all health care providers 
                                                 
32 Compare 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(5) 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.04(7). 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
8 
 
and all employees of health care providers acting 
within the scope of their employment and providing 
health care services who are found negligent and from 
the patients compensation fund.33 
 
¶136 The majority concludes that the words "total" and "for 
each occurrence" reveal that the legislature intended a single 
recovery for each incident or "occurrence" involving medical 
malpractice.34  Furthermore, the majority concludes that the 
words "or death" show that the legislature intended to provide a 
single recovery even when the medical malpractice resulted in a 
wrongful death.35   
¶137 The majority goes astray when it equates the word 
"death" with a cause of action for wrongful death.  In the 
Rineck case, the court interpreted "bodily injury or death" in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(b).36  The court held that the wrongful 
death statute had no application to medical malpractice as the 
statutes were then drafted.  The words "bodily injury or death" 
in § 893.55(4)(b) were the only words that could be construed as 
applying 
to 
medical 
malpractice 
personal 
injury 
actions, 
survival actions, and wrongful death actions.   
¶138 The words "bodily injury or death" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(4)(b) have to be interpreted in light of the addition 
of § 893.55(4)(f), relating to wrongful death.  The addition of 
§ 893.55(4)(f) was probably prompted by the Rineck decision.  
                                                 
33 Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(b). 
34 Majority op., ¶23. 
35 Id. 
36 Rineck v. Johnson, 155 Wis. 2d 659, 456 N.W.2d 336 
(1990). 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
9 
 
The adoption of § 893.55(4)(f) was meant to undo Rineck so that 
the 
word 
"death" 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(b) 
no 
longer 
references a cause of action for "wrongful death."  As a result 
of the adoption of § 893.55(4)(f), § 893.55(4)(b) governs the 
cap for noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions 
except that § 895.04(4) governs the cap on loss of society and 
companionship in medical malpractice wrongful death actions.     
¶139 In fact, when the term "wrongful death" is used in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f), the applicable statutory language 
states that the limits contained in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4) (the 
medical malpractice cap) do not apply.  Section 893.55(4)(f) 
reads as follows: 
Notwithstanding the limits on noneconomic damages 
under 
this 
subsection 
[§ 893.55(4)], 
damages 
recoverable against health care providers . . . for 
wrongful death are subject to the limit under s. 
895.04(4)(emphasis added).37 
 
¶140 The majority argues that we interpret the word 
"notwithstanding" to mean "in addition to" instead of "in spite 
of."38  Nonsense!  To the contrary, we read the statute as 
follows: In spite of the limits set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(4) relating to noneconomic damages (statutorily defined 
to include a long list of noneconomic damages),39 damages 
                                                 
37 Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f). 
38 Majority op., ¶36. 
39 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(4)(a) states: 
In this subsection, "noneconomic damages" means moneys 
intended 
to 
compensate 
for 
pain 
and 
suffering; 
humiliation; embarrassment; worry; mental distress; 
noneconomic effects of disability including loss of 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
10 
 
recoverable against health care providers for wrongful death, 
that is, for loss of society and companionship, are subject to 
the limit under § 895.04(4).  The only noneconomic damages for 
wrongful 
death 
are 
damages 
for 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship. 
 
¶141 In contrast, the majority rewrites paragraph (4)(f) of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55 to state that when death is caused by 
medical malpractice, the limit on all noneconomic damages 
defined in § 893.55(4)(a) is no longer governed by § 893.55(4); 
instead all noneconomic damages in medical malpractice are 
limited to whatever the limit is set forth for the loss of 
society and companionship in wrongful death actions.  But of 
course that is not what the text of the statute says.   
 
¶142 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) specifically identifies 
damages for wrongful death (the only such damages being damages 
for loss of society and companionship) and directs us toward 
that wrongful death statute to determine the applicable limits 
on damages for wrongful death.  The statute does not read, as 
the majority would have it read, that in the event of a 
patient's death, the cap set forth in the wrongful death statute 
for loss of society and companionship applies to all noneconomic 
damages listed in the medical malpractice statute.  If the 
legislature intended to so provide, the statute would have been 
                                                                                                                                                             
enjoyment of the normal activities, benefits and 
pleasures of life and loss of mental or physical 
health, well—being or 
bodily 
functions; 
loss of 
consortium, society and companionship; or loss of love 
and affection. 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
11 
 
drafted to read simply as follows:  "Notwithstanding the limits 
on noneconomic damages under this subsection, in the event of 
the death of a patient caused by medical malpractice, all 
noneconomic 
damages 
recoverable 
against 
health 
care 
providers . . . would 
be 
subject 
to 
the 
limit 
under 
s. 
895.04(4)." 
 
¶143 The majority opinion fails to distinguish between the 
phrase "noneconomic damages" broadly defined in the medical 
malpractice statute (Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(a)) and damages for 
loss of society and companionship, the only noneconomic damages 
recoverable in wrongful death actions.  The majority opinion 
just ignores the difference and conflates the two.40 
¶144 The majority opinion does this in spite of the fact 
that the prefatory note to the bill that created Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(4)(f) (an explanatory note in plain language required 
by statute to be printed and to accompany a bill when 
introduced)41 explains that claims for loss of society and 
companionship in medical malpractice wrongful death would be 
treated in the same manner as claims in other civil actions 
involving death, meaning that the award would be for loss of 
society and companionship: 
The bill limits the damages for loss of society and 
companionship that may be recoverable in medical 
malpractice cases involving death to the $150,000 
                                                 
40 See, e.g., majority op., ¶69. 
41 Wis. Stat. § 13.92(1)(b)2. 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
12 
 
maximum currently established for other civil actions 
involving death (emphasis added).42  
¶145 We should assume that a subsection that specifically 
references wrongful death, as does Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f), 
should govern how damages for wrongful death, that is, damages 
for loss of society and companionship, are calculated with 
regard to that specific cause of action, irrespective of the 
limits on other causes of action contained in § 893.55(4).  And 
this is certainly the case when preemptory language such as 
"notwithstanding" is used to separate that statutory provision 
from the rest of the subsection, as is the case here. 
 
¶146 The majority also finds it significant that "loss of 
society and companionship" is contained in the definition of 
noneconomic damages set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(a), 
quoted at note 20 of this concurrence.  However, the majority 
fails to recognize that a cause of action for loss of society 
and companionship can be raised for the period of time in which 
a patient was incapacitated before death and does not refer 
exclusively to post-death loss of society and companionship, 
damages that are covered in wrongful death actions.43  For 
damages for loss of society and companionship in wrongful death, 
the more specific statute is Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f), and that 
statute should govern here, notwithstanding (that is, in spite 
                                                 
42 Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of 1995 Assembly 
Bill 36. 
43 See Wis JI——Civil 1815 (loss of consortium includes 
"companionship and society"); see also Fitzgerald v. Meissner & 
Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 157 N.W.2d 595 (1968). 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
13 
 
of) any provision contained in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4) governing 
other noneconomic damages.44 
 
¶147 The majority's fundamental failure to recognize the 
distinction between survival actions and actions in wrongful 
death also permeates its interpretation of the legislative 
history.  The majority argues that by enacting Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(4)(f), the legislature, reacting to our decisions in 
Rineck45 
and 
Jelinek,46 
intended 
merely 
to 
place 
medical 
malpractice wrongful death claims "on the same footing" as other 
wrongful death claims.47  Absolutely.  We agree with the 
majority. 
¶148 Ironically, the majority's own interpretation of the 
statutes is inconsistent with the very legislative purpose the 
majority 
proffers.48 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
defeats 
the 
legislature's attempt to attain parity between wrongful death 
claims in tort cases generally and wrongful death claims in 
medical malpractice cases.    
                                                 
44 See State ex rel. Hensley v. Endicott, 2001 WI 105, ¶21, 
245 Wis. 2d 607, 627, 629 N.W.2d 686 (citing Martineau v. State 
Conservation Comm'n, 46 Wis. 2d 443, 449, 175 N.W.2d 206 (1970)) 
(that a specific statute controls over a general statute "is 
especially true when the specific statute is enacted after the 
general statute"). 
45 Rineck v. Johnson, 155 Wis. 2d 659, 456 N.W.2d 336 
(1990). 
46 Jelinek v. St. Paul Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 1, 
512 N.W.2d 764 (1994). 
47 Majority op., ¶69. 
48 Id. 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
14 
 
 
¶149 Under the majority's interpretation, the wrongful 
death cap for loss of society and companionship supersedes the 
medical malpractice cap for all noneconomic damages if the 
patient dies.  Wrongful death claimants are thus forced to share 
their limited recovery with those entitled to recover damages 
under survival actions.  In this sense, wrongful death claims in 
medical malpractice actions are not "on the same footing" as 
other wrongful death claims in other tort actions.  Recoveries 
for wrongful death claimants in medical malpractice cases are 
more severely limited.   
¶150 This result is apparent in the case before us today.  
The parents will be forced to relinquish either their full 
wrongful death award or the estate's award for pre-death pain 
and suffering because the total recovery for all damages exceeds 
$300,000, even though the statute specifically states that the 
caps on damages for wrongful death (loss of society and 
companionship) 
are 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) 
notwithstanding the limits contained in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4).49  
¶151 The majority's reliance on case law also falls well 
short of the mark.  The majority opinion snips language from 
                                                 
49 Parity is attained in the interpretation we adopt: 
In tort actions involving death, except medical malpractice 
actions, noneconomic pre-death damages are not limited; wrongful 
death damages are limited to damages for loss of society and 
companionship and capped at $150,000. 
In medical malpractice tort actions, noneconomic pre-death 
damages are capped at $350,000; wrongful death damages are 
limited to damages for loss of society and companionship and 
capped at $150,000.   
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
15 
 
various court decisions and quotes passages out of context to 
support its theory.50  It starts with Jelinek,51 which is 
inapplicable to our case because it was decided when no caps 
existed in medical malpractice cases and before Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(4)(f) was enacted. 
¶152 The 
majority 
then 
lifts 
language 
from 
Lund 
v. 
Kokemoor.52  But Lund had to do with whether punitive damages 
were recoverable in medical malpractice lawsuits.  The language 
lifted from Lund is of no value here. 
¶153 The majority cites Hegarty v. Beauchaine53 in support 
of its theory.  Hegarty is inapplicable, however, because it 
involved a dispute over which statute of limitations applied in 
a medical malpractice case involving wrongful death.  Since 
there is no similar provision to Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) 
directing us away from the medical malpractice statute in order 
to determine the appropriate statute of limitations in a medical 
malpractice action for wrongful death, the Hegarty decision also 
is of no value here. 
¶154 Finally, the majority's reliance on Czapinski54 also is 
misplaced.  First of all, Czapinski merely acknowledges that the 
                                                 
50 Majority op., ¶¶83-87. 
51 Jelinek v. St. Paul Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 1, 
512 N.W.2d 764 (1994). 
52 Lund v. Kokemoor, 195 Wis. 2d 727, 537 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. 
App. 1995). 
53 Hegarty v. Beauchaine, 2001 WI App 300, 249 Wis. 2d 142, 
638 N.W.2d 355. 
54 Czapinski v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 2000 WI 80, 236 
Wis. 2d 316, 613 N.W.2d 120. 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
16 
 
wrongful death cap is applicable to medical malpractice cases, 
and says nothing about how the cap applies.  Czapinski had to do 
with determining who was eligible to bring a cause of action for 
wrongful death in a medical malpractice case, and not with the 
amount of damages those claimants could recover.  Thus, 
Czapinski also is of no value here.   
¶155 We prefer to rely on authority that is directly on 
point rather than quoting passages from prior case law out of 
context.  When we follow this steadfast principle it is apparent 
that nobody has ever interpreted the wrongful death cap as 
encompassing anything other than damages for loss of society and 
companionship, even in medical malpractice cases.  Indeed, the 
well-respected 
treatise 
on 
damage 
law 
in 
Wisconsin 
has 
interpreted the statutes as exempting wrongful death damages for 
loss of society and companionship from the medical malpractice 
cap for noneconomic damages, writing as follows: 
The legislature has limited an injured plaintiff's 
right to recover damages for pain and suffering in 
claims against health care providers.  A $350,000 cap 
(to be adjusted at least annually by the director of 
state courts to reflect changes in the consumer price 
index) was imposed, effective May 25, 1995, on non-
economic 
damages, 
defined 
to 
include 
pain 
and 
suffering, in medical negligence cases in which the 
claim accrued on or after the statute's effective 
date. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 893.55(4)(a),(d); 
655.017.  
Wrongful death claims are excepted from this non-
economic 
loss 
cap. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(4)(f) 
(emphasis added).55  
                                                 
55 1 The Law of Damages in Wisconsin § 5.5, at 3 n.1 
(Russell M. Ware ed., 3d ed. 2003). 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
17 
 
¶156 The majority's misinterpretation of the law also is 
evident in its surprising holding that each parent may collect 
the full amount under the wrongful death cap for loss of society 
and companionship. 
¶157 In a possible attempt to save face and avoid the 
absurd result compelled by its interpretation of the medical 
malpractice and wrongful death statutes that the total recovery 
available for the survival actions and the wrongful death action 
is a mere $150,000, the majority conjures up an interpretation 
of the wrongful death statute that allows each parent in this 
case to recover a full $150,000 under the wrongful death 
statute.   
¶158 The majority cannot produce any evidence that anyone 
has ever applied the wrongful death cap in tort actions 
generally or in medical malpractice actions specifically in the 
way they interpret Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f), that is, that the 
wrongful death cap applies to each parent's claim rather than 
both parents' claims in the aggregate.  
 
¶159 In support of its argument the majority offers us 
nothing except two private communications between a member of 
the legislative council staff and one legislator, Mark Green, 
identified by the majority as "key legislators."56  The private 
memoranda cited by the majority fail to provide any evidence, 
let alone "compelling" evidence (as the majority opinion 
characterizes the memoranda)57 that in wrongful death actions 
                                                 
56 Majority op., ¶89. 
57 Id. 
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00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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arising from medical malpractice in the case of a minor child, 
each parent can recover the full amount of the cap.  Nor does 
the majority ever show that "key legislators understood that any 
eligible claimant under Wis. Stat. § 655.007 was entitled to 
make a separate claim for wrongful death damages . . . ."58   
¶160 In fact, one private memorandum cited by the majority 
to justify its reading of the statute states only that: 
It is arguable that the causes of action for loss of 
society 
and 
companionship 
in 
medical 
malpractice 
actions for wrongful death are separate and the 
current $150,000 limit applies to each cause of action 
individually, not in the aggregate. [Jelinek v. St. 
Paul Fire and Casualty Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 1, 512 
N.W.2d 764 (1994).] (emphasis added).59 
¶161 This same memorandum states that: 
Presumably, reference is made to "per occurrence" [in 
1997 Wis. Act 89] to provide that in wrongful death 
medical malpractice actions, the limit is a total 
limit and does not apply individually to each person 
who may bring an action for loss of society and 
companionship (emphasis added).60 
                                                 
58 Id. 
59 Memorandum from Don Dyke, Senior Staff Attorney, Wis. 
Legis. 
Council 
(Apr. 
21, 
1998) 
(on 
file 
with 
Wisconsin 
Legislative Council). 
60 The 1998 memo states in full in pertinent part: 
1.  Limitation on Recovery of Damages for Loss of 
Society and Companionship 
Act 89 replaces the current $150,000 limit on damages 
for loss of society and companionship in wrongful 
death actions with a $500,000 limit per occurrence in 
the 
case 
of 
a 
deceased 
minor 
or 
$350,000 
per 
occurrence in the case of a deceased adult.  The new 
limits apply both to wrongful death actions involving 
medical malpractice and 
to other 
wrongful 
death 
actions.  Presumably, reference is made to "per 
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¶162 The earlier private memorandum cited by the majority 
merely states as follows: 
The causes of action [for loss of society and 
companionship in a medical malpractice action for 
wrongful death] appear to be separate——each surviving 
person allowed to bring an action may do so——and, 
arguably, the $150,000 limit applies to each cause of 
action individually, not in the aggregate. [Jelinek v. 
St. Paul Fire and Casualty Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 1, 
512 N.W.2d 764 (1994).] (emphasis added).61 
                                                                                                                                                             
occurrence" to provide that in wrongful death medical 
malpractice actions, the limit is a total limit and 
does not apply individually to each person who may 
bring an action for loss of society and companionship.  
(As noted above, in wrongful death actions not 
involving medical malpractice, s. 895.04(4), Stats., 
has already been interpreted as applying the current 
$150,000 limit in the aggregate. 
61 Memorandum from Don Dyke, Senior Staff Attorney, Wis. 
Legis. 
Council 
(Sept. 
5, 
1997) 
(on 
file 
with 
Wisconsin 
Legislative Council). 
The 1997 memo states in pertinent part: 
2.  Medical Malpractice Actions 
In a 
medical 
malpractice 
wrongful death 
action, 
damages for loss of society and companionship, are 
also subject to the $150,00 limit.  [ss. 893.55(4)(f) 
and 
895.04(4), 
Stats.] 
 
However, 
in 
a 
medical 
malpractice action for wrongful death, who may recover 
damages for loss of society and companionship and how 
the limit is applied may differ from wrongful death 
actions generally. 
It appears that an action for loss of society and 
companionship in a medical malpractice action for 
wrongful death may be brought:  (a) by a surviving 
spouse; (b) by a minor child of a deceased parent; and 
(c) by a parent of a deceased minor child.  [See, for 
example, Dziadosz v. Zirneski, 177 Wis. 2d 59, 501 
N.W.2d 828 (Ct. App. 1993).]  The causes of action 
appear to be separate—each surviving person allowed to 
bring an action may do so and, arguably, the $150,000 
limit applies to each cause of action individually, 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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¶163 It is for good reason that the staff member chose the 
words "arguable," "presumably," "appear," and "arguably" with 
the reference to the Jelinek decision.  When Jelinek was 
decided, no limits existed on noneconomic damages in medical 
malpractice actions.  Rineck had previously decided that the 
wrongful death limits did not apply in medical malpractice.  
Jelinek affirmed that conclusion.  Thus, before the enactment of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(4)(f), 
each 
claimant 
in 
a 
medical 
malpractice action was allowed to recover for his or her own 
loss of society and companionship as a separate action under the 
medical malpractice statute governing all noneconomic damages, 
not under the wrongful death statute.62 
 
¶164 Interestingly 
enough, 
in 
its 
rush 
to 
present 
"compelling evidence" that "key legislators understood that any 
eligible claimant under Wis. Stat. § 655.007 was entitled to 
make a separate claim for wrongful death damages,"63 the majority 
unwittingly provides us with compelling evidence supporting our 
                                                                                                                                                             
not in the aggregate.  [Jelinek v. St. Paul Fire and 
Casualty Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 1, 512 N.W.2d 764 
(1994).] 
Note that while 1995 Wisconsin Act 10 clearly applied 
the 
$150,000 
limit 
on 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship in wrongful death actions to medical 
malpractice actions, it arguably did not change the 
above-cited differences in who may recover loss of 
society 
and 
companionship 
damages 
in 
medical 
malpractice wrongful death actions and whether the 
limit is applied individually or in the aggregate. 
(emphasis in original). 
62 See Jelinek, 182 Wis. 2d at 8-9. 
63 Majority op., ¶___. 
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00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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interpretation of the statutes.  The majority overlooks the fact 
that the analysis provided to Rep. Green by the staff member 
centers only on "damages for loss of society and companionship" 
and reflects an understanding that the cap on wrongful death 
damages, even in cases of medical malpractice, consists only of 
damages 
for 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship.64 
 
This 
fundamental legal principle that damages for wrongful death 
consist only of damages for loss of society and companionship, 
which was apparent to Rep. Green and a staff member, is lost on 
the majority of this court. 
 
¶165 While Rep. Green might have been interested in putting 
an end to any uncertainty about the continued vitality of 
Jelinek and Rineck by inserting the language "per occurrence," 
this does not mean that anyone has ever, before today, 
interpreted the wrongful death statute to allow each parent to 
collect the full amount under the cap.   
¶166 In fact, the prefatory note to the bill that created 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) (an explanatory note in plain language 
required by statute to be printed and to accompany a bill when 
introduced)65 explains that claims for loss of society and 
companionship in medical malpractice wrongful death would be 
treated in the same manner as claims other civil actions 
involving death, meaning that the award would be available in 
the aggregate, not individually: 
                                                 
64 See notes Error! Bookmark not defined., 61, supra.  
65 Wis. Stat. § 13.92(1)(b)2. 
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The bill limits the damages for loss of society and 
companionship that may be recoverable in medical 
malpractice cases involving death to the $150,000 
maximum currently established for other civil actions 
involving death (emphasis added).66 
¶167 Such an explanation of the bill, which was available 
to the entire legislature before enactment of the law, is a much 
more compelling indicator of what the legislation meant than 
private communications with a legislator speculating about what 
existing legislation "arguably" or "presumably" meant in light 
of a case interpreting a totally different statute. 
¶168 Additionally, 
a 
case 
cited 
and 
quoted 
in 
both 
memoranda that the majority submits in support of its theory 
holds to the contrary.  In York v. National Continental Ins. 
Co., the plaintiffs contended that each parent was entitled to 
recover damages for loss of society and companionship up to the 
statutory limit.  The court rejected this argument and held that 
under the wrongful death statute, recovery was limited by 
statute and the statutory sum was to be divided among members of 
the statutorily defined class of claimants: 
We hold that the sec. 895.04(4), Stats., limit of 
$50,000 for loss of society and companionship in a 
wrongful death action is recoverable by the spouse of 
the person deceased, or if no spouse is living by the 
class of children of the person deceased as defined in 
sec. 895.04(2), or if no children are living by the 
class of parents of the person deceased (emphasis 
added).67  
                                                 
66 Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of 1995 Assembly 
Bill 36. 
67 York v. Nat'l Cont'l Ins. Co., 158 Wis. 2d 486, 499, 463 
N.W.2d 364 (Ct.App. 1990). 
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00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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¶169 Moreover, the cases this court has heard involving 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) and the increased limits for wrongful 
death in medical malpractice cases demonstrate that those who 
were most involved with the issues understood that the $150,000 
cap applied to both parents in aggregate in medical malpractice 
wrongful death cases. 
 
¶170 For example, in Schultz v. Natwick,68 the parties 
treated the limit for wrongful death claims under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(4)(f) as encompassing the claims for loss of society 
and companionship of both surviving parents, both before and 
after the "per occurrence" language was added.69  See also Neiman 
v. American National Property and Casualty Company,70 in which 
the parties litigated their case with the understanding that the 
caps for wrongful death applied to the parents in aggregate, not 
separately.71 
 
¶171 The Schultzes' understanding of the application of the 
cap is important because Barbara Schultz was one of the key 
advocates for the increased caps in wrongful death in medical 
malpractice cases.  The Schultzes' only noneconomic claim was 
                                                 
68 Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 
N.W.2d 266. 
69 See Brief for Respondent at App. 141; Schultz v. Natwick, 
2002 WI 125, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 N.W.2d 266.  See also Brief for 
Appellant at 7. 
70 Neiman v. Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Co., 2000 WI 83, 236 
Wis. 2d 411, 613 N.W.2d 160. 
71 See Brief for Appellant at 6, Neiman v. Am. Nat'l Prop. & 
Cas. Co., 2000 WI 83, 236 Wis. 2d 411, 613 N.W.2d 160.  See also 
Brief for Respondent at 17. 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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for their loss of society and companionship of their young child 
who tragically died as a result of medical malpractice.  Ms. 
Schultz's comments about wrongful death and medical malpractice, 
quoted by the majority, have to be read in this context.  
Ignoring the context of the Schultzes' claims, the majority 
opinion distorts Ms. Schultz's comments to support its reading 
of the statute.  The majority now mocks the Schultzes' efforts 
by interpreting their law to reduce awards for the death of 
victims of medical malpractice.      
 ¶172 
Forgetting 
the 
victims 
of 
malpractice, 
the 
majority errs in its interpretation because its total and sole 
concern is for health care providers and the cost of insurance 
premiums.  The majority cynically attributes this attitude to 
the legislature and the strength of the health care providers' 
lobby.   
¶173 The 
majority's 
interpretation 
ignores 
the 
legislature's and governor's concern for the welfare of the 
people evident in the Justin Sky Millar——Lindsey Brooke Schultz 
law increasing damages for loss of society and companionship in 
wrongful death actions to $350,000 and $500,000. Governor 
Thompson expressed this concern for the victims and their 
families as follows when he signed the law: 
The legislation I am signing today is named the 
"Justin-Lindsey Bill" for two families who tragically 
lost children and fought courageously to raise the 
limits on compensation.  Lindsey Brooke Schultz died 
at age 13 during a routine appendectomy when a hole 
was punctured in her abdominal aorta.  Justin Sky 
Millar died at age 11 from an allergy shot.  These are 
two tragedies.  Today we make sure that families like 
Lindsey's and Justin's have the opportunity to pursue 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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fair compensation for their losses.  So it is in 
memory of Justin and Lindsey that I sign this 
legislation into law.72  
¶174 The majority opinion has lost sight of the welfare of 
the victims in its interpretation.  Too bad for the people of 
the 
state! 
 
The 
legislature 
can 
correct 
the 
majority's 
misinterpretation of a law.  The families of the state will have 
to make their voices heard again.     
II 
¶175 We would answer the three questions posed by the 
majority opinion as follows:  
(1) The plaintiffs in an action in which death is caused 
by medical malpractice may recover the limits of 
noneconomic damages for both medical negligence and 
wrongful death. 
(2) The wrongful death limit is unconstitutional under the 
majority's interpretation of the statutes.   
(3) The circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
in ordering remittitur of the verdict in favor of the 
estate for pre-death pain and suffering, reducing the 
award from $550,000 to $100,000. 
¶176 We set forth our reasoning in full even though the 
discussion may to some extent overlap or repeat arguments made 
earlier in our criticism of the majority opinion.  We do so in 
order to illustrate the logical simplicity with which our 
interpretation applies to the facts of this case, and so that 
the reader may contrast this approach with the convoluted way in 
                                                 
72 Governor Thompson's Press Release, Resp. Supp. App. 330.  
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00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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which the majority stretches, and reaches beyond, the bounds of 
accepted legal principles in order to reach its desired result. 
(1) 
¶177 We determine that the limits on noneconomic damages 
set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(4)(d) and (4)(f) serve as two 
separate and distinct recoveries when medical malpractice causes 
wrongful death.   
¶178 The 
issue 
presented 
is 
one 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, a question of law that this court determines 
independently of the circuit court and court of appeals, 
benefiting from the analysis of those courts.  
¶179 We begin our journey through the statutes with chapter 
655. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 655.017 
states 
that 
in 
medical 
malpractice 
actions, 
"the 
amount 
of 
non-economic 
damages 
recoverable by a claimant or plaintiff . . . for acts or 
omissions of a health care provider . . . is subject to the 
limits under §§ 893.55(4)(d) and (f)" (emphasis added).   
¶180 Section 655.017 provides as follows: 
The amount of noneconomic damages recoverable by a 
claimant or plaintiff under this chapter for acts or 
omissions of a health care provider if the act or 
omission occurs on or after May 25, 1995, and for acts 
or omissions of an employe of a health care provider, 
acting within the scope of his or her employment and 
providing health care services, for acts or omissions 
occurring on or after May 25, 1995, is subject to the 
limits under s. 893.55(4)(d) and (f) (emphasis added). 
¶181 The text of § 655.017 does not limit recovery to the 
lesser 
of 
either 
the 
§ 893.55(4)(d) 
limit 
for 
medical 
malpractice or the § 893.55(4)(f) limit for wrongful death.  
Rather, § 655.017 directs us to both §§ 893.55(4)(d) and (f) to 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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assess the limits on damages imposed in cases of medical 
malpractice causing wrongful death. 
¶182 Section 655.017 recognizes that both the limit on 
noneconomic damages under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) and the 
limit on wrongful death damages under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) 
are applicable in medical malpractice actions.  Had the 
legislature 
intended 
to 
limit 
recovery 
to 
either 
the 
§ 893.55(4)(d) limit or the § 893.55(4)(f) limit depending on 
whether the patient died, it would have used different language.   
¶183 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) sets the limit on 
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions for each 
occurrence at $350,000 (adjusted for inflation).  Section 
893.55(4)(d) states in full as follows: 
The limit on total noneconomic damages for each 
occurrence under par. (b) on or after May 25, 1995, 
shall be $350,000 and shall be adjusted by the 
director of state courts to reflect changes in the 
consumer price index for all urban consumers, U.S. 
city average, as determined by the U.S. department of 
labor, at least annually thereafter, with the adjusted 
limit 
to 
apply 
to 
awards 
subsequent 
to 
such 
adjustments. 
¶184 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(4)(f) 
states 
that 
"notwithstanding the limits 
on noneconomic 
damages" 
under 
§ 893.55(4) (namely $350,000), "damages recoverable against 
health care providers . . . for wrongful death are subject to 
the limit under § 895.04(4)."  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(4)(f), 
which we set forth again, provides as follows:  
Notwithstanding the limits on noneconomic damages 
under this subsection, damages recoverable against 
health care providers and an employe of a health care 
provider, acting within the scope of his or her 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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employment and providing health care services, for 
wrongful death are subject to the limit under s. 
895.04(4).  If damages in excess of the limit under s. 
895.04(4) 
are 
found, 
the 
court 
shall 
make 
any 
reduction required under s. 895.045 and shall award 
the lesser of the reduced amount or the limit under s. 
895.04(4).   
¶185 Because 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(4)(f) 
refers 
to 
§ 895.04(4), which governs the limit on damages for loss of 
society and companionship in wrongful death actions regardless 
of whether these damages arise in medical malpractice cases or 
other torts, we turn to § 895.04(4).  Section 895.04(4) governs 
limits on loss of society and companionship damages in wrongful 
death actions both in medical malpractice and in other torts.  
The limit on damages for loss of society and companionship set 
by § 895.05(4), the wrongful death statute, was $150,000 in this 
case.  Section 895.04(4) provides as follows:  
Judgment 
for 
damages 
for 
pecuniary 
injury 
from 
wrongful death may be awarded to any person entitled 
to bring a wrongful death action.  Additional damages 
not to exceed $150,000 for loss of society and 
companionship may be awarded to the spouse, children 
or parents of the deceased.     
¶186 In support of his argument that the statutes create a 
"global cap" of $350,000, Dr. Hall directs us to Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(4)(b).73  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(4)(b) states that the 
                                                 
73 For the reader's convenience we again quote Wisconsin 
Stat. § 893.55(4)(b): 
The total noneconomic damages recoverable for bodily 
injury or death, including any action or proceeding 
based on contribution or indemnification, may not 
exceed the limit under par. (d) for each occurrence on 
or after May 25, 1995, from all health care providers 
and all employes of health care providers acting 
within the scope of their employment and providing 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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"total noneconomic damages recoverable for bodily injury or 
death" 
arising 
from 
medical 
malpractice "may 
not 
exceed" 
$350,000.  Dr. Hall argues that the legislature's use of the 
word "death" demonstrates its intent to include wrongful death 
claims within the "total noneconomic damages recoverable" under 
the medical malpractice damage cap.  
¶187 Interpreting 
Wis. Stat. §  893.55(4)(b) 
to 
include 
wrongful death as part of "total noneconomic damages" would, 
however, render paragraph (f) superfluous.  Paragraph (f) states 
that "[n]otwithstanding the limits on noneconomic damages" under 
§ 893.55(4) ($350,000), "damages recoverable against health care 
providers . . . for wrongful death are subject to the limit 
under § 895.04(4)" (emphasis added).  On its face, the 
"notwithstanding" 
phrase 
points 
us 
away 
from 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(4) (the $350,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medical 
malpractice) and toward § 895.04(4) (establishing the $150,000 
cap on loss of society and companionship in wrongful death 
actions) to determine the recovery limits available in a 
wrongful death action.     
¶188 Dr. 
Hall 
attempts 
to sidestep this 
inconvenient 
"notwithstanding" phrase by arguing that paragraph (f) means 
that recovery for wrongful death is limited to the amount set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) ($150,000) even if the "total 
noneconomic damages" are further limited by § 893.55(4)(d) 
($350,000).   
                                                                                                                                                             
health care services who are found negligent and from 
the patients compensation fund. 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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¶189 We agree with the parents that the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(4)(f) means that wrongful death actions are separated 
from the various provisions of Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4) (medical 
malpractice) and that notwithstanding any other limits on 
damages contained in the medical malpractice statute, the 
statute on wrongful death retains its integrity even in a case 
involving medical malpractice.  The legislature's phrasing 
"notwithstanding the limits 
on noneconomic 
damages" 
under 
§ 893.55(4) ($350,000) specifically directs us to the cap in the 
wrongful death statute in evaluating the award for noneconomic 
damages (that is, the loss of society and companionship) in a 
wrongful death action.  To read the statute otherwise would 
render the language "notwithstanding" superfluous, something we 
cannot do if we are to be true to the legislative text. 
¶190 Our reading of the statute is consistent with the 
history of Wis. Stat. §§ 655.017 and 893.55(4).  Upon original 
passage, chapter 655 did not include a cap on noneconomic 
damages in medical malpractice cases.  Nor did chapter 655 refer 
to wrongful death damages.  It was not until 1986 that the 
legislature created a cap on noneconomic damages in medical 
malpractice actions; the cap was $1,000,000.  Section 655.017 
was amended to read that "the amount of noneconomic damages 
recoverable by a claimant under this chapter [governing medical 
malpractice]. . . is subject to the limit" (singular) under 
section 893.55(4).74  Chapter 655 contained no explicit reference 
to a separate cap for wrongful death actions. 
                                                 
74 1985 Wis. Act 340, § 30; Wis. Stat. § 655.017 (1987-88).   
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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¶191 Because chapter 655 did not expressly state that 
damages recoverable in medical malpractice actions (the loss of 
society and companionship) were subject to the limitation under 
the general wrongful death provisions of Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4), 
this court held in Rineck v. Johnson that the wrongful death 
limit on noneconomic damages was superseded by the higher 
noneconomic damage cap in medical malpractice cases.75  According 
to the Rineck court, § 893.55(4)(b), the cap governing medical 
malpractice, not § 895.04, applied to wrongful death claims 
caused by medical malpractice. 
¶192 One year after our decision in Rineck, the provisions 
of Wis. Stat. § 655.017 and its companion § 893.55(4) were 
sunset.  Therefore, from 1991 to 1995 no cap existed at all on 
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases.  In Jelinek v. 
St. Paul Fire and Casualty Ins. Co.,76 the court held that after 
January 1, 1991, noneconomic damages for medical malpractice 
actions involving death were not limited.     
¶193 Possibly as a response to our decisions in these 
cases, in 1995 the legislature amended the statutes and chapter 
655 to create Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f).77  Section 893.55(4)(f) 
originated in 1995 Assembly Bill 3678 and in effect undoes Rineck 
by 
making 
the 
wrongful 
death 
limitation 
in 
§ 895.04(4) 
                                                 
75 Rineck, 155 Wis. 2d at 665-68. 
76 Jelinek v. St. Paul Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 1, 
9, 512 N.W.2d 764 (1994). 
77 See Czapinski, 236 Wis. 2d 316, ¶16. 
78 1995 Wis. Act 10. 
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00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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applicable to medical malpractice actions.79  The Legislative 
Reference Bureau's analysis of the bill quoted in part earlier80 
demonstrates that the bill creates two separate statutory 
limits, one on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases 
and one on damages for wrongful death (loss of society and 
companionship) arising from medical malpractice.81     
¶194 Finally, imposing Dr. Hall's "global cap" leads to 
absurd consequences.  Under the present statute, the wrongful 
death cap for minor children ($500,000) is higher than the 
"total 
noneconomic 
damages 
cap" 
for 
medical 
malpractice 
($350,000 adjusted for inflation).  Interpreting the statute as 
Dr. Hall asserts means the bigger cap is forced to fit within a 
smaller cap.  Also, the new $500,000 cap on wrongful death 
claims would not be realized in a medical malpractice claim 
because the new cap exceeds the limit for noneconomic damages in 
medical malpractice. 
   
¶195 Dr. Hall argues that since the $350,000 limit under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4) is adjusted for inflation and therefore 
eventually will be greater than the $500,000 limit under 
§ 895.04(4), his interpretation is valid.  We disagree.  Nothing 
                                                 
79 See Czapinski, 236 Wis. 2d 316, ¶16.  
80 See ¶144, supra. 
81 While we must be wary of relying too heavily on rejected 
amendments 
as 
evidence 
of 
legislative 
intent, 
there 
is 
historical evidence that the creation of a "global cap" of 
$500,000 for all noneconomic damages regardless of death was 
considered by the legislature and rejected.  See amendment to 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4)(f) submitted by Senator Joanne Huelsman 
in 1997 providing a "cap within a cap."  See Senate Substitute 
Amendment 2 to 1997 Senate Bill 148. 
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00-0072ssa, npc   
 
33 
 
in text of the new $500,000 wrongful death cap or its history 
gives any indication that the new cap would have to await the 
inflation index.  
¶196 For the reasons set forth we conclude that the limits 
on noneconomic damages set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(4)(d) 
and (4)(f) relating to medical malpractice and wrongful death 
serve as two separate and distinct recoveries when medical 
malpractice causes wrongful death.   
(2) 
¶197 The jury in this case awarded $2,500,000 to Shay's 
parents as wrongful death damages for their loss of society and 
companionship.  In addition, the jury awarded $550,000 to Shay's 
estate for her pre-death pain and suffering.  The majority would 
reduce the wrongful death damages from $2,500,000 to $300,000 as 
the total amount of noneconomic damages that is recoverable by 
her parents.82  Because the majority concludes that $300,000 is 
the most that may be recovered, it declines to address the 
remittitur of the $550,000 award of the jury to the estate for 
pain and suffering.  Given the link between Article I, 
Section 583 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 9 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
                                                 
82 Majority op., ¶114.   
83 Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states, in relevant part, as follows: 
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and 
shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the 
amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived 
by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed 
by law.  Provided, however, that the legislature may, 
from time to time, by statute provide that a valid 
verdict, in civil cases, may be based on the votes of 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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Constitution, the majority reaches an untenable conclusion.  
Such a low cap on noneconomic damages effectively denies 
plaintiffs the constitutional right to trial by jury under 
Article I, Section 5 and, in turn, to a remedy as guaranteed by 
Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution.84  Moreover, 
the majority's conclusion is violative of equal protection 
principles 
embodied 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
and 
United 
States 
Constitutions.85 
¶198 We turn first to decisions from other states that have 
addressed 
caps 
on 
noneconomic 
damages 
in 
relation 
to 
                                                                                                                                                             
a specified number of the jury, not less than five-
sixths thereof. 
84 We conclude that the global cap on damages manufactured 
by the majority is unconstitutional on the basis of Article I, 
Section 5 and Article I, Section 9 interpreted together, as well 
as on equal protection grounds.  Since we rest our conclusion of 
unconstitutionality on those grounds, there is no need to 
discuss the separation of powers and substantive due process 
issues. 
85 Amendment 
XIV, 
Section 1 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution states, in relevant part, as follows:  "No State 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution states, 
in relevant part, as follows:  "All people are born equally free 
and independent, and have certain inherent rights; among these 
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these 
rights, governments are instituted, deriving their just powers 
from the consent of the governed." 
"This court applies the same interpretation to the state 
Equal Protection Clause as that given to the equivalent federal 
provision.  Compare Wis. Const. Art. I, § 1 with U.S. Const. 
Amend. XIV, § 1."  Castellani v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 261, 
578 N.W.2d 166 (1998) (citations omitted). 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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constitutional provisions protecting the rights to trial by jury 
and to a remedy for injuries or wrongs.  In Smith v. Department 
of Insurance,86 the Florida Supreme Court concluded that a 
$500,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases 
violated Florida's Constitution.  Article I, § 21 of the Florida 
Constitution stated the following:  "The courts shall be open to 
every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be 
administered without sale, denial or delay."87  In a previous 
case, Kluger v. White,88 involving the setting of a floor for 
noneconomic damages in which a plaintiff would not be entitled 
to sue if the plaintiff's damages were below a specified amount, 
the Florida Supreme Court noted the unconstitutionality of such 
a provision, since it would hinder a party's access to the 
courts.  Noting that its holding in Kluger was directly 
controlling in Smith, the court stated: 
[W]here a right of access to the courts for redress 
for a particular injury has been provided by statutory 
law predating the adoption of the Declaration of 
Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida, or 
where such right has become a part of the common law 
of the State pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 2.01, F.S.A., 
the Legislature is without power to abolish such a 
right without providing a reasonable alternative to 
protect the rights of the people of the State to 
redress for injuries, unless the Legislature can show 
an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment 
                                                 
86 Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 
1987). 
87 Smith, 507 So. 2d 1082, 1087 (quoting Florida Const. Art. 
I, § 21).   
88 Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). 
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00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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of such right, and no alternative method of meeting 
such public necessity can be shown.89 
¶199 The court in Smith rejected the appellees' arguments 
that medical malpractice plaintiffs were not denied access to 
the courts, since the legislature had merely capped damages and 
not completely abolished a cause of action.90  In rejecting this 
argument, the court recognized the link between constitutional 
provisions concerning trial by jury and right to a remedy 
through access to courts, when the court stated the following: 
This reasoning focuses on the title to article I, 
section 21, "Access to courts," and overlooks the 
contents which must be read in conjunction with 
section 22, "Trial by jury."  Access to courts is 
granted for the purpose of redressing injuries.  A 
plaintiff who receives a jury verdict for, e.g., 
$1,000,000, has not received a constitutional redress 
of injuries if the 
legislature 
statutorily, and 
arbitrarily, caps the recovery at $450,000.  Nor, we 
add, because the jury verdict is being arbitrarily 
capped, is the plaintiff receiving the constitutional 
benefit of a jury trial as we have heretofore 
understood that right.  Further, if the legislature 
may constitutionally cap recovery at $450,000, there 
is no discernible reason why it could not cap the 
recovery at some other figure, perhaps $50,000, or 
$1,000, or even $1.91 
¶200 The Smith court further noted that the court would 
reach the issue of whether there was a rational basis for the 
                                                 
89 Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1088 (quoting Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 
4 (Fla. 1973)).   
90 Id.   
91 Id. at 1088-89.  See also Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 
385, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980) (recognizing that a restrictive 
statutory provision in the Health Care Services Malpractice Act 
impermissibly infringes on the constitutional right to trial by 
jury). 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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cap only when "the legislature provides an alternative remedy or 
abrogates or restricts the right based on a showing of 
overpowering public necessity and that no alternative method of 
meeting that necessity exists."92  The court noted that the 
legislature had failed to provide alternate remedies, and the 
appellees failed to argue that the damages cap was based on 
public necessity and another such remedy was unavailable.93   
¶201 In Lucas v. United States,94 the court concluded that a 
statutory damages cap unconstitutionally limited a litigant's 
"right of access to the courts for a 'remedy by due course of 
law.'"95  First, the court noted that the legislature failed to 
provide Lucas with any alternative means by which he could seek 
redress.96  The court acknowledged the legislature's concern with 
liability insurance rates and its desire to see a decrease in 
those rates.97  Nevertheless, the court stated that "Texas 
Constitution article I, section 13, guarantees meaningful access 
to the courts whether or not liability rates are high."98  
Drawing from the reasoning set forth in Smith, Lucas rejected 
the defendant's argument that the applicable statutory cap did 
                                                 
92 Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1089.   
93 Id. 
94 Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690  (Tex. 1988). 
95 Id. (citation omitted). 
96 Id. at 690.   
97 Id. at 691.   
98 Id.   
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00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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not abolish a cause of action and, therefore, the plaintiff was 
not denied access to the courts.99  The court in Lucas cited with 
approval the language in Smith that stated that a plaintiff is 
denied the constitutional right to a jury trial when a jury 
verdict is arbitrarily capped.100  Citing with approval reasoning 
from the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the court stated the 
following:  "'It is simply unfair and unreasonable to impose the 
burden of supporting the medical care industry solely upon those 
persons who are most severely injured and therefore most in need 
of compensation.'"101   
¶202 The issue of lowering a statutory cap on damages so 
drastically that it could be deemed unreasonable and result in a 
denial of the constitutional right to trial by jury and denial 
of the right to a remedy, has also been raised and decided in 
Maine.  In Peters v. Saft,102 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
noted that "it is conceivable that a statute could limit the 
measure of tort damages so drastically that it would result in a 
denial of the right to trial by jury and the denial of a 
remedy . . . ."103 
                                                 
99 Id. at 691-92.   
100 Id. at 692.   
101 Id. (quoting Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (N.H. 
1980)).      
102 Peters v. Saft, 597 A.2d 50, 53 (Me. 1991). 
103 See also State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Mem'l Hosp. for 
Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979) (recognizing 
that restrictive statutory provisions in regard to medical 
malpractice claims were unconstitutional as a violation of the 
constitutional right to open courts and a certain remedy). 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
39 
 
¶203 In Wisconsin, we have long recognized the importance 
of a litigant's right to a remedy. 
A suitor, therefore, may properly insist upon a 
complete 
remedy 
and 
is 
clearly 
within 
his 
constitutional rights in refusing, for any reason, to 
waive any part of his just demand or defense.  That in 
obtaining such relief the amount involved is far less 
than the cost to the state or community in awarding it 
to him is not and should not be permitted to influence 
trial courts and juries in considering the merits of 
the issue.104 
¶204 Moreover, we have discussed this right to a remedy in 
reference to Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
If we recur to our own organic state law we find the 
fundamental provision that "Every person is entitled 
to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or 
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or 
character; he ought to obtain justice freely and 
without being obliged to purchase it, completely and 
without 
denial, 
promptly 
and 
without 
delay, 
conformably to the laws."  Sec. 9, art. I, Const.  
This is a basic and valuable guaranty that the courts 
of the state should be open to all persons who in good 
faith and upon probable cause believe they have 
suffered wrongs.  Is it not against public policy to 
permit one person to deprive another from asserting 
his rights in court?105   
¶205 In Stanhope v. Brown County,106 this court discussed 
Article I, Section 9 in relation to statutory damages caps.  The 
court noted that Article I, Section 9 provides that 
                                                 
104 Knickerbocker v. Beaudette Garage Co., 190 Wis. 474, 
480-81, 209 N.W.2d 763 (1926). 
105 In re Keenan's Will, 188 Wis. 163, 176, 205 N.W.2d 1001 
(1925). 
106 Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 Wis. 2d 823, 280 N.W.2d 711 
(1979). 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
40 
 
[e]very person is entitled to a certain remedy in the 
laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive 
in his person, property, or character; he ought to 
obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to 
purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly 
and without delay, conformably to the laws.107   
¶206 In Stanhope, we further noted our decision in McCoy v. 
Kenosha County,108 where we stated that "the phrase 'injuries and 
wrongs' in the 'certain remedy' clause were [sic] to be 
understood with reference to those injuries and wrongs for which 
remedies were available at common law when the constitution was 
adopted in 1848."109  In McCoy, we noted that "[t]his court has 
recently and frequently asserted the importance and value to the 
individual of this very provision, sec. 9, art. I, Const., and 
that it is not to be slighted or minimized . . . ."110 
                                                 
107 Stanhope, 90 Wis. 2d at 844 (quoting Wis. Const. Art. I, 
§ 9). 
108 McCoy v. Kenosha County, 195 Wis. 273, 218 N.W. 348, 57 
A.L.R. 412 (1928). 
109 Stanhope, 90 Wis. 2d at 845 (citing McCoy, 195 Wis. 
273).  In Stanhope, we examined the statutory limit to determine 
whether it represented an unreasonably low recovery amount such 
that it rendered the statute invalid.  Stanhope, 90 Wis. 2d at 
844.  See also Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 367, 
293 N.W.2d 504 (1980).   
110 McCoy, 195 Wis. at 283 (1928) (citation omitted).  See 
also Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 
78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1309, 1312 (2003) (Phillips, the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court of Texas, recognized that "[i]n the medical 
malpractice area, courts have struck down statutes capping 
noneconomic 
damages 
for 
medical 
malpractice 
victims 
and 
requiring medical malpractice claims to be screened by experts 
before filing" (footnote omitted).). 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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¶207 Though the decision was later reversed, in Estate of 
Makos v. Masons Health Care Fund,111 the lead opinion concluded 
that a statute of repose violated the plaintiffs constitutional 
right to a remedy under Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, since it closed the courtroom doors before the 
plaintiff 
even discovered 
that she 
was injured.  
In a 
concurrence written by Justice Crooks, the history behind and 
the implications of Article I, Section 9 were rather fully 
explored.112  While Article I, Section 9 does not confer any 
rights itself, it does guarantee a remedy when an injury results 
from an infringement of a legal right.113  Under the common law, 
apparently 
existing 
prior 
to 
adoption 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, individuals in Wisconsin had a right to bring 
medical malpractice actions.114  With the establishment of ch. 
655 in 1975, this right became legislatively recognized.115  The 
concurrence ultimately concluded  
that 
courts should 
consider 
the 
following 
three 
principles, along with the nature of the cause of 
action, in determining whether an individual has been 
denied the right to a remedy in violation of art. I, 
§ 9 through the legislature's modification, reduction, 
or elimination of a right to bring a cause of action:  
(1) whether the legislature modified, reduced, or 
eliminated 
a 
post-constitutional 
cause 
of 
action 
                                                 
111 Estate of Makos v. Masons Health Care Fund, 211 
Wis. 2d 41, 54, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997). 
112 Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 60-67 (Crooks, J., concurring). 
113 Id. at 62 (Crooks, J., concurring).   
114 Id. at 63 (Crooks, J., concurring).   
115 Id.  
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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created by the legislature itself; (2) whether the 
legislature modified, reduced, or eliminated a common 
law or pre-constitutional statutory cause of action 
and 
provided 
a 
reasonable 
alternative; 
and 
(3) 
whether, 
if 
the 
legislature 
did 
not 
provide 
a 
reasonable alternative, it has established that an 
overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of 
such right exists, and that no reasonable alternative 
exists.116 
¶208 While Article I, Section 9 on its own would not result 
in a conclusion of unconstitutionality here, when linked with 
the right to trial by jury, however, we conclude that the 
majority's interpretation of the medical malpractice statutes is 
unconstitutional.117  More specifically, it is unreasonable and 
unconstitutional to manufacture, out of whole cloth, a global 
cap covering the parent's damages for wrongful death and the 
estate's damages for pain and suffering.118  Such a cap offends 
                                                 
116 Id. at 67 (Crooks, J., concurring). 
117 The majority opinion states that "Article I, § 9, singly 
or in combination with Article I, § 5, does not bar the 
legislature from making rationally-based determinations about 
causes of action related to health care in Wisconsin."  Majority 
op., ¶99 n.20.  However, the majority's interpretation of the 
applicable statutes is not, in our opinion, rationally based.  
The majority conflates the wrongful death and survivorship 
claims, and, in doing so, arrives at an unreasonable and 
unconstitutional global cap on damages. 
118 In Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 311-15, 294 
N.W.2d 437 (1980), we explained that cause of action for 
wrongful death differed from a survival action for pain and 
suffering.  We stated: 
The cause of action for the child's pain and suffering 
which, as we discussed earlier, passes to a decedent's 
estate, is separate and distinct from this wrongful 
death action.  The estate's action is for the wrong to 
the injured person; the wrongful death action belongs 
to named beneficiaries for their pecuniary loss; the 
latter action begins where the former ends.  "It is 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
43 
 
the parent's right to trial by jury under Article I, Section 5 
as linked to the right to a remedy under Article I, Section 9.  
We 
emphasize 
that 
we 
are 
not 
taking 
issue 
with 
the 
constitutionality of statutory damages caps in general.  Rather, 
we conclude that the majority's interpretation of the statutes 
as requiring such a reduced global cap on noneconomic damages is 
unconstitutional.   
¶209 The majority's action in conflating wrongful death and 
survivorship actions and in interpreting the statutes as 
imposing a global cap (here $300,000 for both actions) paints 
the legislature as a body that has reduced common law and pre-
constitutional causes of action, which are now statutory, 
without providing a reasonable alternative.  We do not believe 
that this is what the Wisconsin Legislature did, but rather it 
is what the majority now does by its interpretation of the 
statutes involved.  Certainly, the plaintiffs in this case will 
be adversely affected by the majority's arbitrary decision.  
Moreover, it is indisputable that this decision will have a 
negative impact well beyond the parties in this case.  As 
Barbara Schultz, an aggrieved parent, told legislators and the 
public:  "With the $150,000 cap, it is making it very hard for 
cases to even get to court.  Why?  Medical malpractice cases are 
very expensive.  Attorneys sometimes turn down cases.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
not a double recovery, but a recovery for a double 
wrong." 
Id. at 312 (citations omitted). 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
44 
 
reason is, the expert testimonies, which are usually from 
Doctors, also must be paid."119   
¶210 Finally, we again turn for guidance to decisions from 
other states, and we conclude that the majority's interpretation 
is violative of equal protection principles.  In Arneson v. 
Olson,120 the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that a statute 
                                                 
119 See majority op., ¶80 n.8.  See also Five Dangerous 
Myths 
About 
California's 
Medical 
Malpractice 
Restrictions, 
available 
at 
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/healthcare/fs/fs003009.php3 
and 
Hype Outraces Facts in Malpractice Debate (March 5, 2003), 
available 
at 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2003-03-04-
malpractice-cover_x.htm, for discussions regarding the refusal 
of California lawyers to handle medical malpractice cases given 
the $250,000 noneconomic damages cap that, in effect, has 
resulted in a denial of a remedy to many potential medical 
malpractice plaintiffs.  Robert C. Baker, then president of the 
American Board of Trial Advocates (ABOTA), testified before the 
House Judiciary Committee in 1994 and stated the following:   
As a result of the caps on damages, most of the 
exceedingly 
competent 
plaintiff's 
lawyers 
in 
California simply will not handle a malpractice case.   
There are entire categories of cases that have been 
eliminated since malpractice reform was implemented in 
California.  The victims of cases that have a value 
between $50,000 and $150,000 are basically without 
representation.  As an example, incidents of failure 
to diagnose appendicitis still occur, but suits are 
not filed to any extent in California.  
Five Dangerous Myths About California's Medical Malpractice 
Restrictions, 
available 
at 
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/healthcare/fs/fs003009.php3. 
It is worth noting that ABOTA's membership roster is 
comprised of half plaintiffs' attorneys and half defense 
attorneys.  Baker's major clients, the HMO Kaiser Permanente and 
the malpractice insurer The Doctor's Company, fired him soon 
after he testified. 
120 Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135 (N.D. 1978). 
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00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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capping 
medical 
malpractice 
damages 
violated 
the 
equal 
protection rights of injured victims of medical malpractice 
negligence in violation of the North Dakota Constitution.  The 
court in Arneson stated the following: 
At the beginning of this opinion we quoted the 
preamble of the statute, containing its legislative 
purposes.  These include assurance of availability of 
competent medical and hospital services at reasonable 
cost, 
elimination 
of 
the 
expense 
involved 
in 
nonmeritorious 
malpractice 
claims, 
provision 
of 
adequate compensation to patients with meritorious 
claims, and the encouragement of physicians to enter 
into practice in North Dakota and remain in such 
practice so long as they are qualified to do so. 
Does the limitation of recovery of seriously damaged 
or injured victims of medical negligence promote these 
aims?  We hold that it does not and that it violates 
the Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution.  
Certainly the limitation of recovery does not provide 
adequate compensation to patients with meritorious 
claims; on the contrary, it does just the opposite for 
the most seriously injured claimants.  It does nothing 
toward 
the 
elimination 
of 
nonmeritorious 
claims.  
Restrictions on recovery may encourage physicians to 
enter into practice and remain in practice, but do so 
only at the expense of claimants with meritorious 
claims.121 
 
¶211 Similarly, the majority's interpretation in this case 
fails to provide adequate compensation for the claimants here 
and does nothing to deter the filing of nonmeritorious claims.  
The 
majority's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
medical 
malpractice 
statutes seeks to "impose the burden of supporting the medical 
care industry solely upon those persons who are most severely 
injured, and therefore most in need of compensation" by 
effectively writing pain and suffering out of the equation when 
                                                 
121 Id. at 135-36. 
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00-0072ssa, npc   
 
46 
 
a patient dies.122  In Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (N.H. 
1980), the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that a $250,000 
limit on noneconomic damages denied the plaintiffs in medical 
malpractice cases equal protection under the New Hampshire 
Constitution.123  The court in Carson rejected the defendants' 
arguments that the cap on noneconomic damages was constitutional 
because 
the 
defendants 
were 
not 
limited 
in 
the 
amount 
recoverable for economic loss.  The court aptly noted that an 
award for economic loss does not provide the same remedy as that 
provided by a recovery for noneconomic damages.124  The court 
stated: 
It is clear, however, that a tort victim "gains" 
nothing from the jury's award for economic loss, since 
that money replaces that which he has actually lost.  
It is only the award above the out-of-pocket loss that 
is available to compensate in some way for the pain, 
suffering, physical impairment or disfigurement that 
the victim must endure until death.125 
 
¶212 Wisconsin courts interpret the Wisconsin and United 
States constitutional provisions governing equal protection 
identically.126  Parties bringing an equal protection claim must 
prove that a statute treats similarly situated members of a 
                                                 
122 Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (N.H. 1980) 
(citation omitted).   
123 Id. at 838.   
124 Id. at 837.   
125 Id. 
126 Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶55 
n.14, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849 (citation omitted).   
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
47 
 
class differently.127  Since a fundamental right is not involved 
in a medical malpractice claim, we conclude that a rational 
basis  standard is applicable in this case.128  In general, we 
"uphold a statute under equal protection principles if we find 
that 
a 
rational 
basis 
supports 
the 
legislative 
classification."129  We must "determine whether a classification 
scheme rationally advances a legislative objective.  In so 
doing, we are obligated to locate or, in the alternative, 
construct a rationale that might have influenced the legislative 
determination."130   
 
¶213 Here, the majority adopts a rationale that fails to 
advance the Legislature's objective and unfairly assigns the 
burden of maintaining the financial well-being of the medical 
care industry to injured plaintiffs. 
¶214 We conclude that the majority's new formula for 
configuring noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases is 
violative of the equal protection clause in the Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
since 
it unduly burdens 
medical 
malpractice 
claimants 
without 
a 
rational 
basis 
that 
justifies 
its 
interpretation of the medical malpractice statutes. 
 
¶215 In sum, the majority's tortured interpretation of the 
statutes, which results in the concoction of a global cap 
                                                 
127 Id., ¶56.   
128 Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 2001 WI App 21, ¶20, 
240 Wis. 2d 559, 623 N.W.2d 776.   
129 Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶56 (citations omitted).   
130 Id., ¶57. 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
48 
 
applicable to both wrongful death and survivorship actions, does 
violence 
to the plaintiffs' 
rights 
to a 
jury 
trial in 
conjunction with their right to a remedy, and, further, is 
violative of their right to equal protection.  
(3) 
¶216 We turn now to the issue of remittitur.  The majority 
does not discuss whether the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion in ordering remittitur of the jury's award of 
pre-death 
pain 
and 
suffering. 
It 
concludes 
that 
such 
a 
discussion is unnecessary because the verdict for pain and 
suffering has no effect on the recovery in the present case.  
The majority assumes that the parents share equally in the 
child's estate, but because each parent can recover only 
$150,000, the damages for the child's pain and suffering are 
irrelevant.  As we stated previously, the majority opinion 
leaves open the question of how to allocate damages when 
different claimants are entitled to damages for survival actions 
and to damages for wrongful death.     
¶217 We decide the remittitur issue to complete discussion 
and give full consideration to the parties' arguments.  The jury 
awarded damages to the Estate for Shay's pain and suffering 
prior to her death in the amount of $550,000.  The circuit court 
granted remittitur, reducing the award to $100,000. 
¶218 Before we can decide this issue, we must first decide 
whether the parents have standing to raise the issue of 
remittitur on cross-appeal.  Whether a person has standing is a 
question of law that this court determines independently of the 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
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circuit court, benefiting from the analysis of the circuit 
court.    
¶219 Dr. Hall contends that the parents are precluded from 
raising the remittitur issue because they accepted the order of 
remittitur instead of seeking a new trial.  In support of his 
argument, Dr. Hall cites Burmek v. Miller Brewing Co., in which 
the court held that when a plaintiff is given an option to 
accept a reduced amount of damages or a new trial limited to 
damages, acceptance of the reduced damages precludes appellate 
review of the circuit court's determination of the damage 
issue.131 
¶220 The parents counter that subsequently, in Plesko v. 
City of Milwaukee, the court modified the Burmek rule.132  Plesko 
states that "the rule in the Burmek case should be limited to 
the situation where the party awarded damages appeals" and that 
when an opposing party appeals, the party who has accepted the 
option to take judgment for such a reduced amount of damages may 
nevertheless have a review on appeal of the circuit court's 
determination of the damage issue.133 
¶221 Because Dr. Hall initiated the appeal, the rationale 
undergirding the Burmek rule is not present in this case.  The 
                                                 
131 Burmek v. Miller Brewing Co., 12 Wis. 2d 405, 107 N.W.2d 
583 (1961). 
132 Plesko v. City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 2d 210, 120 N.W.2d 
130 (1963). 
133 Plesko, 19 Wis. 2d at 221.   
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
50 
 
Plesko court explained its reasoning behind the modification of 
Burmek as follows: 
The objective underlying the recommended procedure for 
granting an option to accept judgment for a reduced 
amount of damages in lieu of having a new trial, where 
the damages awarded by the jury are determined by the 
trial court to be excessive, is to avoid the delay and 
expense of an appeal or a new trial.  In most 
situations, it is likely that the party will accept 
judgment for such reduced damages rather than undergo 
the expense, delay, and uncertainty of an appeal or 
new trial.  Nevertheless, if a party found liable to 
pay damages appeals the judgment resulting from the 
other party's accepting such reduced damages, this 
objective has been negatived.  When plaintiff is 
forced to undergo an appeal by the action of an 
opposing party, after plaintiff has accepted judgment 
for such reduced damages, it seems unfair to prevent 
his having a review of the trial court's determination 
leading to the reduction in damages, especially if 
plaintiff has accepted same only to avoid the delay 
and expense attending an appeal.134   
¶222 We conclude that the parents have standing to raise 
the remittitur issue on cross-appeal.  An appeal on any grounds 
constitutes the kind of "new proceeding" that Burmek was meant 
to discourage.  The cross-appeal on the damages issue does not 
cause any more delay or expense than Dr. Hall's appeal already 
has.  It is the identity of the party raising the appeal that is 
determinative under Plesko.135     
                                                 
134 Id. 
135 For other cases confirming the right to cross appeal an 
order of remittitur, see, e.g., Bash v. Employers Mut. Liab. 
Ins. Co., 38 Wis. 2d 440, 455, 157 N.W.2d 634 (1968) (cross-
appeal on remittitur appropriate when the opposing party 
appealed a separate issue); Merlino v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 
23 
Wis. 2d 571, 
585-86, 
127 
N.W.2d 741 
(1964) 
(plaintiff 
accepted the option to take judgment for a reduced amount rather 
than have a new trial on the damage issues; plaintiff has this 
right where the opposing party, as here, appeals). 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
51 
 
¶223 Having reached the conclusion that the parents have 
standing, we further conclude that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in ordering remittitur of the jury's 
pre-death pain and suffering award. 
¶224 The standard applicable for review of a circuit 
court's reduction of damages is well-settled.  When a circuit 
court "states its reasons for finding the jury's award of 
damages excessive and for reducing the award," the reviewing 
court will reverse the circuit court's determination only if 
"the reviewing court concludes there has been an erroneous 
exercise of discretion."136  When a circuit court fails to 
analyze the evidence or to set forth the reasons supporting its 
decision, the reviewing court should give no deference to the 
circuit court's decision.137  Conclusory statements regarding the 
excessiveness 
of 
an 
award 
are 
insufficient 
to 
establish 
appropriate exercise of discretion when contemplating a damage 
award.138   
¶225 The parents contend that the circuit court failed to 
state the reason for the reduction of damages with the requisite 
particularity and that therefore no deference is owed to the 
                                                 
136 Fahrenberg v. Tangel, 96 Wis. 2d 211, 229-230, 291 
N.W.2d 516 (1980).  See also Carlson & Erickson Builders, Inc. 
v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 190 Wis. 2d 650, 669-70, 529 N.W.2d 905 
(1995).   
137 Carlson & Erickson, 190 Wis. 2d at 669; Fahrenberg, 96 
Wis. 2d 211, 229-230, 291 N.W.2d 516, 525 (1980).   
138 Mgmt. Computer Servs. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 206 
Wis. 2d 158, 557 N.W.2d 67 (1996).   
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
52 
 
circuit court's determination that the jury award was excessive.  
We agree with them. 
¶226 The circuit court reduced the $550,000 jury verdict to 
$100,000, concluding a discussion of the difficulty of comparing 
the pain and suffering of different people, with the following 
statement: 
[T]here was a limited period of time in which this 
young child unfortunately had to endure conscious pain 
and suffering. . . . and I think it's in a case like 
this, it's not what figure a jury should have come up 
with, but rather, I think, at what point that point is 
of being excessive.  There is no doubt in my mind that 
$550,000 for what had been the evidence in this case 
was excessive.  The difficulty is where was the point 
where it became so. . . . [C]onsidering all of those 
factors, I believe that the plaintiff ought to be 
given 
the 
option . . . of 
accepting 
a 
sum 
of 
$100,000 . . . . 
¶227 The circuit court did mention that Shay Maurin was 
"very sick, very very sick," that she had a "troubled night," 
and that there was "no question that she had" suffered. The 
depth and scope of Shay's suffering, however, are absent from 
the circuit court's discussion.  
¶228 As the circuit court saw it, the limiting factor was 
time.  The circuit court emphasized that the duration of Shay's 
pain and suffering was less than two full days.  The circuit 
court did not state what other factors it considered when it 
reduced the award.  The circuit court did not enunciate a 
rationale for substituting an award of $100,000 in place of the 
figure reached by the jury.    
¶229 Under these circumstances a reviewing court must 
review the entire record and determine whether the jury award is 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
53 
 
excessive.139  In conducting its analysis a reviewing court must 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party 
prevailing with the jury.140 
¶230 The progression of Shay's symptoms in the last two 
days of her life was horrific.  Expert physicians informed the 
jury about the throes of diabetic ketoacidosis.  Treating nurses 
and doctors described her condition spiraling downward.  Shay 
suffered 
frequent 
urination, 
insatiable 
thirst, 
lethargy, 
nausea, dry heaves, restless nights, vomiting brown and black 
substances, panting, fatigue, and exhaustion. 
¶231 Shay Maurin was a sick girl before she saw Dr. Hall.  
On March 5 she went to the General Clinic of West Bend because 
she was lethargic, continually drinking fluids, and not eating 
well.  The next day, she had no energy to eat anything.  When 
she did try to eat, she would gag.  When her mother tried to put 
her to bed, she began vomiting.  Her mother took her to the 
bathroom, where Shay urinated and dry heaved simultaneously.  
Shay's mother took her daughter to Hartford Memorial Hospital 
just before midnight on March 6, 1996.  Dr. Hall attended to her 
but misdiagnosed her. 
¶232 The next day Shay was tired and miserable.  Shay 
stayed with her aunt, who called Yvette Maurin to report that 
Shay was vomiting "brown, tobaccoy-looking stuff."  The girl was 
lying on the floor and could not get up, so Yvette Maurin had to 
carry her into the clinic.  She reported to the doctor that Shay 
                                                 
139 Carlson & Erickson, 190 Wis. 2d at 669.  
140 Id. at 669-70. 
No. 
00-0072ssa, npc   
 
54 
 
was dry heaving, urinating, and drinking more.  Yvette Maurin 
carried her daughter to the hospital, where Dr. Madenberg 
diagnosed that Shay was in acute diabetic ketoacidosis.  Shay 
called out to her mother while Yvette conferred with the doctor 
about what to do.  Ms. Maurin decided to send Shay to the 
Children's Hospital of Wisconsin.  Shay fell unconscious on the 
way to the children's hospital and never woke up; she died the 
next day. 
¶233 Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff and the jury verdict, we conclude that the circuit 
court erred and further conclude that the record supports the 
jury's pain and suffering award to the Estate.  We would 
therefore remand the cause to the circuit court with directions 
to vacate the circuit court's order of remittitur and cap the 
damages 
for 
pain 
and 
suffering 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(4)(d). 
*   *   *   * 
¶234 For the reasons set forth, we write separately first 
to object to the majority's sua sponte interpretation of the 
statutes and its failure to give the parties an opportunity to 
brief and argue the issue.  We further conclude that the 
majority has misinterpreted the statutes and invalidated the 
limits imposed in the medical malpractice statutes.  
 
 
 
 
No.  00-0072.jpw 
 
1 
 
 
¶235 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring).  I join the majority 
opinion in all respects but write separately to address the 
remittitur issue discussed by the concurrence of Chief Justice 
Abrahamson and Justice Crooks.141  The concurrence concludes that 
"the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in 
ordering remittitur of the jury's pre-death pain and suffering 
award."  Concurrence, ¶223.  However, the record here clearly 
indicates that the circuit court considered the appropriate 
evidence and set forth a logical, rational basis for its 
decision.  As such, the concurrence misapplies the "erroneous 
exercise of discretion" standard of review.  Rather than 
deferring 
to 
the 
circuit 
court's 
proper 
discretionary 
determination, the concurrence would have this court substitute 
its own judgment for that of the circuit court.  Thus, I write 
separately to restate the "erroneous exercise of discretion" 
standard of review and to emphasize the importance or deferring 
to discretionary determinations of the circuit court when the 
circuit court has provided a logical, on-the-record, rationale 
for its decision.   
¶236 The concurrence concludes that "the circuit court 
failed to state the reason for the reduction of damages with the 
requisite particularity and therefore no deference is owed to 
                                                 
141 We refer to the concurrence of Chief Justice Abrahamson 
and Justice Crooks simply as "the concurrence." 
No.  00-0072.jpw 
 
2 
 
the circuit court's determination that the jury award was 
excessive."  Concurrence, ¶225.  After setting forth only a 
small portion of the circuit court's rationale behind its 
remittitur decision, the concurrence faults the circuit court 
for supposedly mentioning only one basis for reducing the damage 
award and failing to consider other appropriate factors.  
Concurrence, ¶¶227-28.  The concurrence then undertakes an 
independent review of the record and determines ab initio that 
the record supports the jury's damage award.  Concurrence, 
¶¶229-33.  As will be demonstrated below, the concurrence is 
both wrong on the law and wrong on the facts. 
¶237 It is well established that a circuit court may remit 
the jury's damage award where it determines that the award "'is 
too large to be supported by the evidence.'"  Wester v. 
Bruggink, 190 Wis. 2d 308, 326, 527 N.W.2d 373 (Ct. App. 
1994)(quoting Makowski v. Ehlenbach, 11 Wis. 2d 38, 42, 103 
N.W.2d 907 (1960)).  See also Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 
209 Wis. 2d 605, 626, 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997) ("Notwithstanding 
the jury’s broad discretion, the circuit court has the power to 
reduce the amount of . . . damages to an amount that it 
determines is fair and reasonable.").  The power of the circuit 
court to order remittitur was established in Powers v. Allstate 
No.  00-0072.jpw 
 
3 
 
Ins. Co., 10 Wis. 2d 78, 91-92, 102 N.W.2d 393 (1960).142  In 
Management Computer Services, Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & 
Co., 206 Wis. 2d 158, 190-91, 557 N.W.2d 67 (1996), this court 
reaffirmed the Powers rule and confirmed that the circuit 
court's decision to order remittitur is a discretionary act and, 
as such, is reviewed on appeal under the "erroneous exercise of 
discretion" standard.  Under this standard,  
[a] reviewing court will not reverse a circuit court's 
discretionary determination if the record shows that 
discretion was in fact exercised and there exists a 
reasonable basis for the circuit court's determination 
after resolving any direct conflicts in the testimony 
in favor of the prevailing party, even if the 
reviewing 
court 
would 
have 
reached 
a 
different 
conclusion than the circuit court.   
Carlson & Erickson Builders, Inc. v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 190 
Wis. 2d 650, 669, 529 N.W.2d 905 (1995)(emphasis added).  As is 
true when reviewing any discretionary act, "[i]n any instance 
where the exercise of discretion has been demonstrated, this 
                                                 
142 The rule in Powers v. Allstate Insurance Co., 10 
Wis. 2d 78, 91-92, 102 N.W.2d 393 (1960), is now codified in 
Wis. Stat. § 805.15(6)(1995-96), which provides: 
If a trial court determines that a verdict is 
excessive or inadequate, not due to perversity or 
prejudice or as a result of error during trial (other 
than an error due to damages), the court shall 
determine the amount which as a matter of law is 
reasonable, and shall order a new trial on the issue 
of damages, unless within 10 days the party to whom 
the option is offered elects to accept judgment in the 
charged amount.  If the option is not accepted, the 
time period for petitioning the court of appeals for 
leave to appeal the order for a new trial under ss. 
808.03(2) and 809.50 commences on the last day of the 
option period.   
No.  00-0072.jpw 
 
4 
 
court 
follows 
a 
consistent 
and 
strong 
policy 
against 
interference with the discretion of the trial court . . . ."  
McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 281, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971).143   
¶238 Thus, an appellate court's review of a circuit court's 
decision to order remittitur is limited to two inquiries:  1) 
determining whether the circuit court considered the appropriate 
evidence and 2) examining whether the bases that the circuit 
court identified for its decision are reasonable.  See Mgmt. 
Computer Servs., 206 Wis. 2d at 191.  Under this standard, a 
reviewing court may not review the record ab initio or reverse a 
circuit court's remittitur order if the circuit court's decision 
satisfies both of these requirements.  Id. at 191-92; Carlson & 
Erickson Builders, 190 Wis. 2d at 669.  Applying these standards 
to the case at bar, the record clearly indicates that the 
circuit court analyzed the relevant evidence on the record and 
provided a reasonable basis for its decision.   
¶239 First, we must examine whether the record indicates 
that the circuit court analyzed the relevant evidence.  See 
McCleary 49 Wis. 2d at 277 ("In the first place, there must be 
evidence that discretion was in fact exercised.").  The 
concurrence concludes that an ab initio standard of review is 
                                                 
143 Although 
McCleary 
v. 
State, 
49 
Wis. 2d 263, 
182 
N.W.2d 512 (1971), was the seminal case regarding a circuit 
court's sentencing discretion, reliance on this decision in the 
present context is particularly appropriate in light of the fact 
that the McCleary court explicitly derived the standards for 
reviewing a sentencing determination from the standards used 
when reviewing remittitur decisions in civil cases.  Id. at 277-
78.  As this court recognized in McCleary, "all discretionary 
acts are to be reviewed" "in the same manner."  Id. at 277.  
No.  00-0072.jpw 
 
5 
 
appropriate because the circuit court failed to state what 
factors it considered other than the length of time the deceased 
suffered.  Concurrence, ¶¶228-29.  Particularly, the concurrence 
faults the circuit court for not considering the "depth and 
scope" 
of 
the 
deceased's 
suffering. 
 
Concurrence, 
¶227.  
However, the record clearly demonstrates that the circuit court 
considered all aspects of the deceased's pain and suffering, 
including the scope and depth thereof.   
¶240 While the concurrence sets forth but a brief excerpt 
of the circuit court's remittitur decision, concurrence, ¶226, 
in fact, the circuit court's discussion of the relevant facts 
underlying its decision was quite extensive:  
In this case, we had a young child that became 
ill and progressively so.  The Court’s consideration 
of question eight and that of the jury must be as to 
conscious pain and suffering.  We have a young child, 
we do not have an adult.  We did not have somebody 
that was able, as an adult might, to express what they 
were going through in those moments, in those last 
days of her life.   
All we can do is perceive what she was by either 
the physical indicators, whether it was the vomiting, 
whether it was apparent worry.  The last words that 
were spoken by her were related we can read several 
meanings into that, an expression of love, perhaps, an 
expression of contemplated death.  We don’t know.  We 
certainly know that the last day or more of her life 
was one of trauma until she got down to Children’s 
Hospital.  We know at that point she was not 
conscious.   
She was conscious at least to the placement——into 
the placement of that ambulance, perhaps during that 
trip, and for hours before.  She got up that morning, 
or I should say she awoke or was aware in the early 
hours of that morning that she was very sick, very, 
very sick.  She had a troubled night and that was part 
of the progression of which was spoken.  True, there 
No.  00-0072.jpw 
 
6 
 
was not acute distress in the early stages but there 
certainly was progressive deteriorating distress of 
which there was conscious pain and suffering.   
It is difficult for both the jury, I believe as 
well as myself, to sit and put some dollar sign which 
is the only measure of how much pain and suffering 
consciously there was.  But that is the job that they 
were given and that I have.  A court should not 
disturb their judgment unless it is clearly apparent 
that they went beyond some point.  What is that point?  
It is not written in books.  It is written nowhere 
except in discretion and judgment.   
 . . . . 
In this case I believe the limitations are not 
that a young girl had suffered.  No, there’s no 
question that she had.  And the question is not how 
much—in this question is not how much her parents had 
suffered because it was a mess.  It was how much she 
suffered consciously.  And we can——it’s so difficult 
for human beings to place a number.  We cannot wear 
the shoes of another person, be it a five year-old 
child or 60 year-old adult.  It is so difficult to 
compare pain 
and 
suffering, 
whether somebody is 
suffering from third-degree burns on 43 percent of 
their body, and I’ve seen those cases, how tragic they 
are.  I can’t compare that to a five year-old girl who 
may very well know that she is not ever going to see 
her parents again and never going to live her life 
expectancy, or just the worry and concern of will she 
get through this day, does she know that, or why does 
it hurt so bad.  Those are the very, very difficult 
things that went through the minds of a jury and go 
through mine.  
The limiting factor here is time.  And there is 
no number, nor is it right and proper as our Appellate 
Courts have reiterated to put——it would be reversible 
error, as we know, to have——if Mr. End had argued 
minutes of pain and suffering.  We are prohibited from 
doing so.  But the reality is that there was a limited 
period of time in which this young child unfortunately 
had to endure conscious pain and suffering.  And I 
believe that——and I think it’s in a case like this, 
its not what figure a jury should have come up with 
but rather, I think, at what point that point is of 
being excessive.  There is no doubt in my mind that 
No.  00-0072.jpw 
 
7 
 
$550,000 for what had been the evidence in this case 
was excessive.  The difficulty is where was the point 
where it became so.   
I do not believe that this jury verdict in it’s 
[sic] entirety was perverse, nor necessarily that 
their answer to question eight was perverse, or solely 
the result of passion, emotion that one cannot erase 
in a case like this.  
Considering all the factors, I believe that the 
plaintiff ought be given an option under the Powers 
rule of accepting a sum of $100,000 for conscious pain 
and suffering and answer question eight or be given 
the option under that rule of having a new trial on 
damages.   
(Emphasis added.) 
¶241 Thus, while the circuit court did not discuss the 
gruesome particulars of the deceased's journey towards death, 
the circuit court indicated that it was well aware that the 
deceased experienced a great deal of conscious pain and 
suffering that continued to progress before she passed away.  
The 
court 
specifically 
mentioned 
that 
it 
considered 
the 
deceased's progressive trauma, vomiting, and other "physical 
indicators" of pain and suffering during the last hours of her 
life.  The court demonstrated it considered the nature and scope 
of the deceased's suffering by noting that although "there was 
not acute distress in the early stages[,] . . .  there certainly 
was progressive deteriorating distress of which there was 
conscious pain and suffering."  In addition, the court indicated 
that it was aware of the fear and anxiety the deceased must have 
experienced in not knowing what was wrong with her and not 
knowing whether she would be with her parents or die.   
No.  00-0072.jpw 
 
8 
 
¶242 The record plainly indicates that the circuit court 
considered the scope and depth of the deceased's conscious 
suffering in light of her physical symptoms, anxiety, and the 
actual amount of time she consciously suffered.  As such, the 
first 
prong 
of 
the 
discretionary 
standard 
is 
satisfied.  
Therefore, this is not a case where the "circuit court fail[ed] 
to analyze the evidence or set forth the reasons supporting its 
decision, [such that] the reviewing court should give no 
deference to the circuit court's decision."  Mgmt. Computer 
Servs., 206 Wis. 2d at 191. 
¶243 Next, we must determine whether the circuit court 
provided a reasonable explanation for its remittitur decision.  
McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 277 (discretion "contemplates a process 
of reasoning").  As the passage above indicates, the circuit 
court 
reasoned 
that 
despite 
the 
serious 
nature 
of 
the 
progressive 
suffering 
the 
deceased 
experienced, 
the 
main 
limiting factor was the amount of time the deceased consciously 
suffered.  The court noted that the deceased lost consciousness 
sometime after she entered the ambulance as she was being 
transported to Children's Hospital.  This was roughly two days 
after she first began feeling ill.  However, contrary to the 
assertion of the concurrence, this was not the only factor the 
court relied upon in ordering remittitur.  Concurrence, ¶228.  
The court also explained that because the deceased was a child, 
it was difficult to determine the full extent of what she 
consciously experienced, as the record did not contain any 
verbalizations of her suffering.   
No.  00-0072.jpw 
 
9 
 
¶244 Under the erroneous exercise of discretion standard, 
even if this court does not agree with the factors or bases 
identified by the circuit court as supporting its decision, we 
must nevertheless defer to the circuit court's judgment and 
uphold its determination if the bases for its decision are 
reasonable.  Wester, 190 Wis. 2d at 327.  While the concurrence 
faults the circuit court for unduly emphasizing the time factor, 
"[g]iving 
consideration 
to 
various 
relevant 
factors . . . involve[s] a weighing and balancing operation, but 
the weight to be given to a particular factor in a particular 
case is for the trial court, not this court, to determine."  
Cunningham v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 277, 282, 251 N.W.2d 65 (1977).  
As has been stated in the context of reviewing a circuit court's 
discretionary sentencing determination, "[t]he weight given to 
each . . . factor, however, is left to the trial court's broad 
discretion."  State v. Thompson, 172 Wis. 2d 257, 264, 493 
N.W.2d 729 (Ct. App. 1992).   
¶245 Under this deferential standard of review, the circuit 
court's explanation for its decision is not unreasonable.  See 
Wester, 190 Wis. 2d at 327.  The lack of testimonial evidence 
from the victim as to her pain and suffering and the limited 
amount of time the evidence indicated she consciously suffered 
are certainly logical, relevant factors that legitimately bear 
upon the amount of damages the estate should reasonably recover.  
As such, the second requirement for a proper discretionary act 
is satisfied because the circuit court's conclusion is "based on 
a logical rationale."  McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 281. 
No.  00-0072.jpw 
 
10 
 
¶246 Thus, the record clearly demonstrates that the circuit 
court 1) considered the relevant evidence and 2) provided a 
logical, rational basis for its decision.  Therefore, the 
concurrence errs in asserting that it would be appropriate in 
this case to review the record de novo, and substitute  our own 
judgment for that of the circuit court.  See McCleary, 49 
Wis. 2d at 281 ("An appellate court should not supplant the 
predilections of a trial judge with its own.").  As we have 
previously stated, if the record demonstrates that the circuit 
court considered the evidence and articulated a reasonable basis 
for its decision, this court "must not find an erroneous 
exercise of discretion."  Mgmt. Computer Servs., 206 Wis. 2d at 
191. 
¶247 Finally, this court has recognized that "[i]n applying 
the Powers rule, the [circuit] court must set the amount of 
damages at a figure which it considers to be the most reasonable 
in view of the evidence, and since reasonable men may differ, 
the trial court's determination will be upheld if it falls 
within a range of reasonableness."  Lewandowski v. Preferred 
Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 69, 78, 146 N.W.2d 505 (1966).  
Thus, even if this court is of the opinion that the jury's award 
of damages was not excessive, we must nonetheless defer to the 
circuit court's determination, so long as it properly exercised 
its discretion in rendering its decision.  See Matosian v. 
Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 257 Wis. 599, 603, 44 N.W.2d 555 
(1950).  Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff, the circuit court's decision to order 
No.  00-0072.jpw 
 
11 
 
remittitur of the estate's damages for pre-death pain and 
suffering from $550,000 to $100,000 is not unreasonable, given 
the record in this case and the circuit court's reasonable 
explanation.    
¶248 In sum, the record here clearly indicates that the 
circuit 
court 
considered 
the 
appropriate 
evidence 
and 
articulated a logical, rational basis for its decision.  As 
such, the concurrence misapplies the "erroneous exercise of 
discretion" standard of review.  Rather than following this 
court's strong policy of deferring to the circuit court's proper 
discretionary determination, the concurrence would have this 
court substitute its own predilections for the judgment of the 
circuit court.   
¶249 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER 
and 
DIANE 
S. 
SYKES 
join 
in 
this 
concurrence.
No.  00-0072.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶250 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) is jeopardized by 
the extreme interpretation advanced by the majority.  It is with 
good cause that no party or amici argued such an interpretation.  
No one argued it because it is clearly wrong.  Moreover, the 
defense bar does not want to jeopardize the constitutionality of 
the caps. 
¶251 Although I join the above concurrence as to the issues 
of statutory interpretation and remittitur, I write separately 
because I am not prepared to join its constitutional discussion.  
The concurrence correctly notes the impediment it faces in 
addressing the constitutional implications of the majority's 
position:  the briefs and arguments in this case were framed to 
address a less radical approach.  The concurrence offers a 
discussion of the constitutional implications of the majority's 
decisions and reviews authority from other jurisdictions.  It 
recognizes that the discussion of constitutionality is being 
offered without the benefit of briefs.  I prefer to wait until 
the arguments are fully developed and briefed before I address 
the constitutional questions.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
concur. 
 
No.  00-0072.awb 
 
 
 
1