Case Title: Boyd-Davis v. Baker

Citation: 

Docket Number: 40438

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2014-12-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 40438-2012 
 
TERRI BOYD-DAVIS,  
 
       Plaintiff-Counterdefendant- 
       Respondent-Cross Appellant, 
 
and 
 
BRIAN F. DAVIS and JEAN L. COLEMAN, 
an individual, 
 
       Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants- 
       Respondents, 
 
v. 
 
TIMOTHY BAKER and CAROL BAKER, 
husband and wife, 
 
       Defendants-Counterclaimants- 
       Appellants-Cross Respondents, 
 
and 
 
MARY PANDREA, an individual; JOHN 
PANDREA, an individual; and DOES 1-50, 
inclusive, 
 
       Defendants, 
 
and 
 
JAMES 
GILBERTSON 
and 
NELLIE 
GILBERTSON, husband and wife, 
 
       Defendants-Counterclaimants. 
 
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Moscow, September 2014 Term 
 
2014 Opinion No. 126 
 
Filed: December 2, 2014 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for Bonner County.  Hon. Steve C. Verby, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is reversed in part and affirmed in part. 
 
 
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D. Toby McLaughlin, Berg & McLaughlin Chtd., Sandpoint, argued for 
appellants. 
 
Terri Boyd-Davis, Hayden, argued in her own behalf. 
 
Jean L. Coleman and Brian F. Davis appeared at oral argument, but did not argue 
nor did they file a brief on appeal. 
 
 
 
EISMANN, Justice. 
 
This is an appeal out of Bonner County from a judgment determining the boundary 
between two adjoining parcels of real property.  We reverse the judgment in part and affirm it in 
part. 
 
I. 
Factual Background. 
 
 
Harry and Edith Clark owned substantial real property in Bonner County.  In 1966, they 
conveyed a parcel of their real property to their daughter, Jean Coleman, and in 1970, they 
conveyed to her another parcel of real property adjoining the southern boundary of the parcel 
conveyed in 1966.  Both parcels are herein called the “Coleman Property.”  The Coleman 
Property was bordered on the north and east by the Pack River Road and on the west and south 
by other property that the Clarks owned.  In 2009, Jean Coleman conveyed an undivided interest 
in the Coleman Property to Brian Davis and Terry Boyd-Davis. 
 
In 1974, the Clarks conveyed to Clifford and Joan Johnson a parcel of property bordering 
the southern boundary of the parcel conveyed to Jean Coleman in 1970.  In 2007, the Johnsons 
conveyed this property to Timothy and Carol Baker, and it is herein called the “Baker Property.”  
The issue in this case is the boundary between the Coleman Property and the Baker Property. 
 
Harry Clark had prepared the legal descriptions of deeds by which the Clarks conveyed 
the parcels of real property.  In 2009, the Bakers had their property surveyed, and they 
discovered that there was an ambiguity in the 1970 deed to Jean Coleman which created 
uncertainty as to the boundary between their property and the Coleman Property. 
 
On April 19, 2010, the Plaintiffs filed this action to determine the boundary between the 
two properties and to assert other claims against the Bakers and others.  The Bakers answered 
 
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and counterclaimed.  In 1971, Clifford Johnson had constructed a fence near the northern 
boundary of his property and the southern boundary of the Coleman Property.  The Plaintiffs 
contended, among other things, that the fence was the boundary line between the two properties, 
because that was the boundary intended by the Clarks in 1970 and because it constituted a 
boundary by agreement with the Johnsons after the fence was constructed in 1971. 
 
The matter was tried to the district court.  It concluded that the 1970 deed was 
ambiguous; that the Clarks and Jean Coleman intended the southern boundary in the deed to be 
where the fence was constructed by Mr. Johnson in 1971; and that the Plaintiffs had not proved 
that the fence marked a boundary by agreement.  The court entered a partial judgment quieting 
the Plaintiffs’ title in the disputed parcel of property and certified that partial judgment as final 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a).  The Bakers appealed and Boyd-Davis cross-
appealed. 
 
II. 
Analysis. 
 
A.  Standard of review.  “A trial court’s findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal 
unless they are clearly erroneous.”  Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 855, 55 
P.3d 304, 309 (2002).  In applying that principle, the appellate court cannot reweigh the 
evidence, judge the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute its view of the facts for that of the 
trial court.  Argosy Trust ex rel. Andrews v. Wininger, 141 Idaho 570, 572, 114 P.3d 128, 130 
(2005).  It is the responsibility of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses and weigh 
conflicting evidence.  Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 367, 79 P.3d 723, 726 (2003).  The 
appellate court’s role is simply to determine whether there is evidence in the record that a 
reasonable trier of fact could accept and rely upon in making the factual finding that is 
challenged on appeal.  Miller v. Callear, 140 Idaho 213, 216, 91 P.3d 1117, 1120 (2004). 
B.  The district court’s construction of the deeds.  The parties agree that the 1966 and 
1970 deeds are ambiguous as to the point of beginning for the legal description of the respective 
properties.  The point of beginning of the legal description in the 1966 deed was described as “a 
point 1250 feet North and 25 feet East” of a specified quarter corner.  From that point, the legal 
description was “thence 40 feet East; thence 200 feet Southeasterly along the West boundary of 
Highway 130; thence 130 feet West; thence 180 feet North to the place of beginning.”  In 1966, 
 
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this portion of Highway 130 was known as Pack River Road, and it was an unpaved, muddy, dirt 
road.  Thereafter, it had washed out numerous times and had been widened, paved, and 
realigned.  However, the district court found that the point of beginning described in the deed 
would be on the north side of where the Pack River Road was at the time of the execution of the 
deed in 1966.  If the point of beginning was on the north side of the road, the land described 
would include a section of the road. 
The real point of beginning in the 1970 deed was the point at which the legal description 
in the 1966 deed turned west from the west boundary of the Pack River Road.  From that point, 
the legal description was “hence 450 feet Southeasterly along the West boundary of Highway 
130; thence 225 feet West; thence Northwesterly to a point 130 feet West of said Highway; 
thence 130 feet East to the true point of beginning.”  The 1970 deed was intended to describe a 
parcel adjoining the southern boundary of the parcel conveyed in the 1966 deed, but because it 
was based upon the legal description in the 1966 deed, there was the same ambiguity. 
Jean Coleman testified that her father showed her the boundaries of the property that was 
conveyed to her by the 1970 deed.  Her parents did not testify because they had both died before 
this lawsuit was commenced.  In determining the intent of Mr. and Mrs. Clark, the district court 
relied upon several facts.  In 1971, Mr. Clark moved a cabin onto the Coleman Property.  The 
court concluded that he would not have moved it where it sat on the boundary line.  Much of the 
property north and west of the cabin was wet.  The court concluded that the Clarks would have 
wanted their daughter to receive property that was not wet.  In 1971, Mr. Johnson built a fence 
near the boundary line of the two properties, and, although Jean Coleman did not know precisely 
where the boundary was, she accepted the fence as the boundary.  There was a good relationship 
between the Clarks and the Johnsons, and the Johnsons did not use the property north of the 
fence. 
The court accepted a diagram by a surveyor named Robert Stratton as being most 
consistent with the intent of the Clarks when they deeded the property to Jean Coleman in 1970.  
He did not survey the property, but considered the existing surveys and other information to 
prepare a diagram showing how, by, in essence, rotating the legal descriptions of both parcels 23 
degrees counterclockwise, the southern boundary of the 1970 deed could basically correspond to 
the location of the fence erected by Mr. Johnson in 1971.  He testified that he “rotated it based on 
the fence,” although he agreed that there was no call to the fence in either the 1966 or the 1970 
 
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deed.  Both deeds referred to the boundary of the Pack River Road, and his rotation would have 
the eastern boundary generally be thirty feet from the centerline of the current location of the 
road.  Mr. Clark drafted the legal description of the east boundary of the properties as being 
“along the West boundary of Highway 130.”  Mr. Stratton admitted that he did not know whether 
Mr. Clark understood the boundary to be the physical edge of the road or the edge of the right-
of-way.  He testified that he arbitrarily picked 30 feet from the centerline.  He also admitted that, 
to some extent, the southern boundary of the parcel conveyed in 1970 fits the fence because he 
“held a point arbitrarily on the fence line.” 
The litigation in this case was not between the grantors and grantee of the two deeds.  It 
was between the grantee and subsequent purchasers of real property adjoining the grantee’s 
property.  In an attempt to determine the intent of the parties when the conveyance was made, the 
court must keep in mind the effect of the recording statutes.  Idaho Code section 55-811 provides 
that a properly recorded deed “is constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent 
purchasers.”  Idaho Code section 55-812 provides that “[e]very conveyance of real property . . . 
is void as against any subsequent purchaser . . . of the same property, or any part thereof, in good 
faith and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded.” 
“In construing a deed, physical features existing upon the ground and referred to in the 
description must be considered.”  Miller, 140 Idaho at 216, 91 P.3d at 1120 (emphasis added).  
The fence was not referred to in either the 1966 or the 1970 deed.  Indeed, it was not constructed 
until after the deeds were recorded.   
The direction of the calls for the courses of the southern boundaries of both deeds was 
described as “West.”  The calls were west for a specified distance; they were not calls to a 
monument.  There was no ambiguity with respect to the directions of the calls.  In construing the 
deeds, the court could not simply change the direction of the calls to west, 23 degrees south, in 
order to make the deeds fit the fence, thereby taking property included within the legal 
description of the subsequent grantees.  Because the 1970 deed was recorded before the deed to 
the Johnsons, it takes precedence.  However, the ambiguity was the real point of beginning, not 
the call of the southern boundary.  “When construing a deed description, effect must be given, if 
possible, to all of the language contained in the description.”  Sun Valley Shamrock Res., Inc. v. 
Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 119, 794 P.2d 1389, 1392 (1990).  “In ascertaining a 
disputed boundary, the calls in the respective deeds cannot be disregarded if they can be applied 
 
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and harmonized in any reasonable manner . . . .”  12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries § 56 (2009).  The 
district court’s construction of the deeds changed all of the calls in both deeds.  That is not a 
reasonable construction of the deeds.  It does not matter whether the Clarks intended to give Jean 
Coleman more land than was reasonably contained within the legal descriptions of her deeds.  
Changing the calls, particularly the call of the southern boundary of the 1970 deed, takes land 
that under our recording statutes was deeded to the Bakers.  We therefore reverse the partial 
judgment of the district court.  Because we have reversed the partial judgment, we need not 
consider the other issue raised by the Bakers on appeal.  
C.  Boundary by agreement.  The district court announced its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on April 28, 2011.  On July 13, 2012, the court entered a memorandum 
decision and order to address other issues raised by the Plaintiffs, which were initially considered 
by the court to be moot based upon its decision construing the deeds according to the intents of 
the Clarks and Jean Coleman regarding the 1970 conveyance.  In its decision and order, the court 
set forth an alternative order if its original decision was reversed on appeal.  The court stated as 
follows: 
This Court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and announced 
them on April 28, 2011.  In this alternative decision, which would be effective 
only if the earlier decision was reversed on appeal, the Court holds that:  (1) The 
legal descriptions of the Coleman and Baker parcels overlap, as depicted in 
Plaintiffs’ Trial Exhibit 23 [an undated plat of survey by Tucker Engineering done 
in the late 1970’s], and the “overlap” portion of the disputed property was 
adversely possessed by the plaintiffs under a written claim of title.  Further, all of 
the material elements necessary to establish a claim of adverse possession 
involving the area of overlap were proven with clear and convincing evidence; (2) 
The remaining portion of the disputed property that extends to the fence line was 
not adversely possessed by the plaintiffs, as the plaintiffs failed to prove that they 
paid taxes on that portion of the disputed property during the requisite time 
period; and (3) The plaintiffs did not prove their claim of boundary by 
agreement/acquiescence by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
On September 13, 2012, the court entered a partial judgment quieting title to the Plaintiffs 
in the disputed property.  On the same date, it entered a separate document titled “Rule 54(b) 
Certificate,” but that document was ineffective to make the partial judgment a final judgment.  
Rule 54(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the court “execute a certificate 
which shall immediately follow the court’s signature on the judgment.”  After resolving an issue 
raised by the Plaintiffs regarding an easement across the Bakers’ property, the court entered a 
 
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partial judgment on November 29, 2012, that both quieted their title in the disputed property and 
granted them the easement.  The court properly certified that judgment as final pursuant to Rule 
54(b). 
The Plaintiffs cross-appealed the judgment, but only raised the issue of whether the court 
erred in its alternative decision and order in holding that they had failed to prove that the fence 
marked a boundary by agreement.  Rule 11(a)(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules states that appeals 
can be taken to this Court from “[j]udgments made pursuant to a partial judgment certified by the 
trial court to be final as provided by Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P.”  “Once a final judgment is appealed, 
the appeal is deemed to include all interlocutory judgments and orders entered prior to the 
judgment from which the appeal was taken.”  Flying A Ranch, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for 
Fremont County, 156 Idaho 449, 457, 328 P.3d 429, 437 (2014).  The district court’s alternative 
decision involves matters directly related to the title to the real property adjudicated in the partial 
judgment.  Therefore, we will consider the Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal of the denial of their claim of 
a boundary by agreement. 
“Boundary by agreement or acquiescence has two elements:  (1) there must be an 
uncertain or disputed boundary and (2) a subsequent agreement fixing the boundary.”  Luce v. 
Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 271, 127 P.3d 167, 174 (2005).  “Idaho case law demonstrates that an 
agreement, either express or implied, must exist to establish a boundary by agreement or 
acquiescence.”  Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492, 495, 50 P.3d 987, 990 (2002).  “A long period of 
acquiescence by one party to another party’s use of the disputed property provides a factual basis 
from which an agreement can be inferred.”  Griffel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397, 400, 34 P.3d 
1080, 1083 (2001).  “Acquiescence, by itself, does not constitute a boundary by agreement.  As 
we explained in Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37, 794 P.2d 626 (1990), ‘boundary by 
acquiescence’ is simply another name attached to the doctrine of boundary by agreement; it is 
not a separate legal theory.”  Downey v. Vavold, 144 Idaho 592, 595-96, 166 P.3d 382, 385-86 
(2007). 
The fence that the Plaintiffs contended marked a boundary by agreement was constructed 
by Mr. Johnson in 1971.  He testified that his purpose for erecting the fence was to contain his 
horses.  In its memorandum decision entered on July 13, 2012, the district court held that the 
Plaintiffs had failed to prove a boundary by agreement.  The court found that based upon Mr. 
Johnson’s testimony and the lack of corroboration that there was any agreement to treat the fence 
 
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line as the boundary, the Plaintiffs had failed to prove a boundary by agreement.  The Plaintiffs 
filed a motion for reconsideration, and in its decision entered on November 29, 2012, the court 
again addressed the issue.  It summarized Mr. Johnson’s testimony as follows: 
Here, Clifford Johnson testified at trial that the fence was erected to 
contain horses and the shape of the fence was based upon the topography of the 
land, which contained a gully.  He also testified that the fence was never intended 
to mark a boundary line.  This evidence as to the manner and circumstances of the 
fence’s original location is the only testimony addressing the purpose of the fence. 
 
The court found this portion of Mr. Johnson’s testimony credible and concluded:  “It was 
the plaintiffs’ burden of proof to establish all of the material elements of a boundary by 
agreement.  They did not sustain the required burden that there was a boundary by agreement 
according to Idaho law.” 
On their cross-appeal, the Plaintiffs argue that even though there was no express 
agreement that the fence marked the boundary line, the district court erred in failing to find that 
there was an implied agreement based upon the surrounding circumstances and the long period 
of acquiescence in the fence marking the boundary.  “Acquiescence is merely regarded as 
competent evidence of the agreement.”  Griffel, 136 Idaho at 400, 34 P.3d at 1083.  “Although an 
agreement can be inferred from a long period of acquiescence, the trial court is not required to 
draw that inference.”  Downey, 144 Idaho at 596, 166 P.3d at 386.  This case is very similar to 
Cox in which we affirmed the finding that the plaintiffs had failed to prove a boundary by 
agreement where the alleged boundary fence was erected to contain cattle.  137 at 495, 50 P.3d at 
990.  As we stated: 
[A] previous owner, Nina, provided evidence of the circumstances surrounding 
the erection of the fence, which demonstrated that the fence was hastily put up to 
contain cattle.  Her testimony showed that the purpose of the fence was not to 
establish a boundary between the properties.  She stated that no agreement existed 
between the Anderson family and the neighboring landowners to treat the fence 
line as the boundary. 
 
Id.  
In this case, the district court was the trier of fact.  On appeal, we will not substitute our 
opinion for that of the trier of fact with respect to the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be 
given their testimony and other evidence, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
 
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evidence.  Phillips v. Erhart, 151 Idaho 100, 106-07, 254 P.3d 1, 7-8 (2011).  The decision of the 
district court is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
 
The Plaintiffs did not appeal the alternative decision and order entered by the district 
court.  Therefore, this case is remanded to the district court to enter a judgment consistent with 
that order. 
 
 
 
 
III. 
Conclusion. 
 
 
The partial judgment is reversed, and this case is remanded for entry of a partial judgment 
consistent with the district court’s memorandum decision and order entered on July 13, 2012.  
We award appellants costs on appeal. 
 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices J. JONES, HORTON and Senior Justice Pro Tem 
WALTERS CONCUR.