Case Title: Altman v. Altman

Citation: 169 Vt. 562, 730 A.2d 583

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1999-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Altman v. Altman  (98-485); 169 Vt. 562; 730 A.2d 583

[Filed 5-Mar-1999]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 96-485

                            SEPTEMBER TERM, 1998

Robert Altman	                }	APPEALED FROM:
                                }
                                }
     v.	                        }	Windham Superior Court
                                }	
Jonathan Altman, Carol S. Berry	}
and Putney Pasta Co., Inc.	}	DOCKET NO. S281-6-94 WmCv	

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff Robert Altman appeals from a superior court order denying
  his V.R.C.P. 60(b) motion  to set aside an earlier judgment dismissing his
  complaint against defendants Jonathan Altman,  Carol S. Berry, and Putney
  Pasta Company.  Plaintiff contends the court erred in: (1) failing to  hold
  an evidentiary hearing; and (2) denying the motion.  We affirm.

       The material facts are largely undisputed.  Plaintiff, a resident of
  New York City, is the father  of defendant Jonathan Altman.  Jonathan
  Altman is married to defendant Carol S. Berry, and both  are officers of
  defendant Putney Pasta Company.  In June 1994, plaintiff filed a complaint
  against  defendants, seeking a declaration as to the ownership of stock in
  the defendant corporation, an  accounting of monies loaned to the
  corporation, and repayment of loans to defendant Jonathan  Altman. 
  Defendants filed an answer denying liability and a counterclaim alleging
  that plaintiff  had breached certain fiduciary duties that he owed as
  trustee of a testamentary trust allegedly  established by plaintiff's
  deceased spouse.  Plaintiff filed an answer denying the counterclaim, and 
  subsequently moved to dismiss it on the ground that it was not brought
  against an opposing party,  but rather against plaintiff in his capacity as
  executor and trustee.  The court initially granted the  motion, but
  subsequently reconsidered its ruling and reinstated the counterclaim.

       In June 1995, plaintiff's counsel moved to withdraw.  Counsel's motion
  stated that plaintiff had  agreed to the withdrawal and intended to enter
  his appearance pro se.  In July, plaintiff filed a  notice with the court
  stating that, effective immediately, he had chosen to represent himself.  
  Plaintiff listed his address on the notice as 900 Park Avenue, New York
  City, New York.  Later  that month, defendants' attorney sent plaintiff a
  letter at the stated address containing a proposed  discovery schedule. 
  When he did not receive a response, counsel sent plaintiff another letter
  in  August concerning the proposed schedule.  Failing again to receive a
  response, defendants'  counsel requested the court to schedule a discovery
  conference.  The court sent plaintiff a notice  on October 6 directing him
  to appear at a status conference on October 18.  Plaintiff failed to 
  appear at the scheduled conference.  Defendants' attorney thereupon moved
  to dismiss plaintiff's  action for failure to prosecute under V.R.C.P.
  41(b)(2).  The court granted the motion and, on  October 31, issued an
  order dismissing plaintiff's action with prejudice.  Notice of the
  dismissal  was mailed to plaintiff the next day. 

 

       On November 29, 1995, plaintiff faxed a request to the superior court
  clerk to reinstate the action.  Plaintiff stated in the request that he had
  attempted to settle the matter "before the 30 days that  you told me I
  had," that his attempt had been unsuccessful, and that he was requesting a 
  reinstatement "to play it safe."  In his request, plaintiff made no mention
  of the October 18  hearing.  Around the same time, plaintiff consulted an
  attorney to consider his options.  In March  1996, the court, treating
  plaintiff's fax as a filed motion to reopen, denied the same.  In July, 
  some four months later, plaintiff, having now retained an attorney, moved
  to strike the October  18 dismissal order pursuant to V.R.C.P. 60(b)(1),
  which authorizes relief from a final judgment  or order because of
  "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" if made within a 
  reasonable time.  Plaintiff's affidavit in support of the motion stated for
  the first time that he had  not received actual notice of the October 18
  conference and speculated that the notice had been  sent to his former
  address at 911 Park Avenue.(FN1)  Plaintiff also stated that he had not
  learned  of the dismissal until November, that he had given "the matter
  considerable thought" since then,  and that while he did not "relish"
  litigation among family members he had concluded that he  wanted to have
  his case heard on the merits. 

       In opposition to the motion, defendant Carol Berry filed an affidavit
  stating that plaintiff had been  aware of the scheduled October 18
  conference, which she inferred from the fact that plaintiff had  called her
  to discuss the litigation the day after the conference, and that he had not
  spoken with  her for years prior to the call.  She also stated that the
  mail carrier routinely rerouted and  delivered to plaintiff any mail
  addressed to him at his old address.  

       In a detailed entry order, the court denied the motion, noting that
  plaintiff had the assistance of  counsel in initially formulating and
  litigating his claim, had voluntarily determined to proceed pro  se, had
  stated no reason for his failure to appear in his original request to
  reopen, and by his own  admission had delayed for four months while he
  considered his options, before filing the 60(b)  motion.  Accordingly, the
  court ruled that the delay had been unreasonable, and that plaintiff was 
  therefore not entitled to relief.  This appeal followed.

       We first note that the court's dismissal of plaintiff's lawsuit under
  Rule 41(b)(2) is not before this  Court.  It is the superior court's denial
  of plaintiff's 60(b) motion that we consider.  See R. Brown  & Sons, Inc.
  v. International Harvester Corp., 142 Vt. 140, 142,