Case Title: Archuleta v. City of Rawlins

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Archuleta v. City of Rawlins1997 WY 90942 P.2d 404Case Number: 96-211Decided: 07/17/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

Jean 
J. ARCHULETA and Art Archuleta, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

The CITY OF RAWLINS, a Municipal Corporation, 
Appellee (Defendant).

 

                   
              

Appeal from District Court, Carbon County, Kenneth 
Stebner, J.

  

 

    Juan Leo DeHerrera, Rawlins, 
for Appellants.

     
Craig Kirkwood of Kirkwood & Nelson, Laramie, for 
Appellee.

 

    Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

    LEHMAN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]          Appellants (Archuleta) 
appeal the grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee City of Rawlins 
(City). We affirm.

 

[¶2]          Archuleta articulates the 
issue:

 

Can the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel be asserted as 
a bar to the Statute of Limitations contained in the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act?

 

  The City phrases the 
issues:

 

            Is 
equitable estoppel available to plaintiffs as an exception to the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act?

 

            Did 
the district court abuse its discretion in finding that no basis existed to 
establish an equitable estoppel in 
this case?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]          Archuleta was injured in an 
automobile accident when her car was rear-ended by a vehicle operated by a city 
employee in the employee's course of employment. The Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act, § 113, requires an injured party to 
present a claim to the government entity within two years; § 114 bars actions 
against a government entity unless the claimant commences an action within one 
year after the date the claim is filed. W.S. 1-39-101 through 
-120.

 

[¶4]          Archuleta filed a claim with 
the city manager on April 7, 1994.  
No further contact was made with the City until mid-February and early 
March 1995. In each instance the City Attorney requested that Archuleta delay 
filing her complaint until he could review the claim. With one week remaining 
before the statute of limitations expired, Archuleta's attorney again contacted 
the City Attorney. Conceding that he still had not yet reviewed the case for settlement, he again requested 
that Archuleta delay in filing the complaint. On April 10, 1995, three days 
after the statute of limitations had run, the City Attorney informed Archuleta's 
counsel that the insurance company would not make a settlement offer, that the 
Local Government Insurance Pool would 
handle her case, and that Archuleta should file her 
complaint.

 

[¶5]          Archuleta proceeded to file 
her complaint, whereupon the City filed a motion to dismiss asserting the 
statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. The district court conducted 
an unreported hearing; and, unwilling to convert the City's motion to dismiss to 
a motion for summary judgment based upon the proceedings up to that point, the court entered an 
order denying the City's motion. The City filed a motion to reconsider on which 
the court held another unreported hearing. The court then entered an Order 
Granting Summary Judgment in favor of the City. This timely appeal 
follows.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶6]          We accord no deference to 
the district court in our review of summary judgment. See, e.g., Loghry v. 
Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706, 709 (Wyo. 1996). The movant has the burden of 
demonstrating that no genuine issues as 
to any material fact exist and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Id. Summary judgment is improper where a material issue of fact 
exists as to whether equitable estoppel applies. Olson v. A.H. Robins Co., 696 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Wyo. 1985). However, we have stated that

 

            
[w]hile a finding of equitable estoppel which would prevent resort to a 
statute of limitations will, in most cases, involve questions of fact, it is apparent 
that in certain cases this determination will become a matter for the courts. This is particularly true 
when there is no promise of settlement, or where there is conduct not ostensibly relied 
on.

 

Turner v. Turner, 582 P.2d 600, 602-03 (Wyo. 1978) (citations omitted).

 

[¶7]          In granting summary judgment 
in favor of the City, the district court found that the facts of this case did 
not meet the elements of equitable estoppel and that no basis existed for 
applying equitable estoppel to the governmental claims act. It is 
well-established that we may affirm a correct judgment of the district court for 
any reason which the law justifies. See, e.g., Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 719 P.2d 234, 241 (Wyo. 1986).  Accordingly, we address only whether the facts of 
this case establish a basis for equitable estoppel.

 

[¶8]          In order to establish 
equitable estoppel, "[t]he delay in filing the action must be induced by the 
defendant; the defendant must have misled the plaintiff; and the plaintiff must 
have acted on the misinformation in good faith to the extent that he failed to 
pursue his action in a timely manner." Taylor, 719 P.2d  at 240 (citing Turner v. Turner, 582 P.2d 600, 602 (Wyo. 
1978)).  See also Cranston v. Weston 
County Weed & Pest Bd., 826 P.2d 251, 256 (Wyo. 1992). We have further 
explained that "[w]here the defendant has superior knowledge of the facts 
necessary to make out a cause of action and fraudulently conceals those facts or 
misrepresents them to the detriment of 
the plaintiff, equitable estoppel applies to prevent the statute of limitations 
from being a defense." Olson, 696 P.2d  at 1299.

 

[¶9]          The facts in this case are 
insufficient to establish estoppel because, while Archuleta may have been 
induced by the City Attorney's request for delay in filing, the City Attorney in 
no way misled Archuleta or concealed facts to her detriment. See Cranston, 826 P.2d  at 256-57. The City Attorney's requests to delay filing were admittedly based on his failure to 
attend to the claim. He did not have superior knowledge of the facts necessary 
to make out Archuleta's claim. Archuleta's counsel asserts that he believed that 
the City Attorney was representing the insurance company when he requested that 
Archuleta delay filing. Even assuming arguendo that this assertion is correct, 
the City Attorney made neither a promise of settlement nor a promise not to assert the statute of limitations as 
an affirmative defense. See Turner, 582 P.2d  at 602-03. Thus, given these facts, 
no basis for equitable estoppel exists.

 

[¶10]       
Affirmed.