Case Title: State v. Flamm

Citation: 351 N.W.2d 108

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1984-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
351 N.W.2d 108 (1984) STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. John FLAMM, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. No. 968. Supreme Court of North Dakota. June 28, 1984. Kent A. Reierson, State's Atty., Williston, for plaintiff and appellee. Anseth & Zander, Williston, for defendant and appellant; argued by Janet Holter Zander, Williston. PEDERSON, Justice. John Michael Flamm appeals from the judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of the crime of criminal facilitation. We reverse and remand for a new trial. John was charged with criminal facilitation for his alleged participation in a series of negotiations which ultimately resulted in the sale of controlled substances by Donald Flamm, Jr., and Cornelius Riedl to a special agent of the North Dakota Drug Enforcement Unit.[1] Donald, John's brother, was subpoenaed and called as a witness for the State. During his examination of Donald, the State's Attorney introduced a letter *109 Donald had received from Dennis Keeney relating a conversation which had purportedly occurred between Keeney and John.[2] The letter stated in pertinent part: The letter was admitted into evidence over John's objection. John asserts on appeal that the letter constituted inadmissible hearsay, that its introduction prejudiced his right to a fair trial, and that the introduction of the letter without calling Keeney to testify violated his right to confront the witnesses against him. Because we deem the Confrontation Clause issue to be dispositive, it is unnecessary to address John's other issues. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: The Confrontation Clause has been made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2537, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 605 (1980); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 353 (1974); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 1068, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923, 926 (1965). In Ohio v. Roberts, supra, the Supreme Court delineated the protections afforded by the Confrontation Clause: Thus, the Court has adopted a two-part inquiry for determining admissibility of out-of-court statements by a person not produced as a witness at trial: the State must demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable to testify and the statement must bear "indicia of reliability" establishing its trustworthiness. Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S. Ct. at 2539, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 608. The Court has set forth the following standard for Sixth Amendment unavailability: A witness is not unavailable for purposes of the exception to the confrontation requirement unless the State has made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial. Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at 74, 100 S. Ct. at 2543, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 613; Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 1322, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255, 260 (1968); see State v. Erickson, 241 N.W.2d 854, 862-863 (N.D.1976). For a general discussion of Sixth Amendment unavailability, see Note, The Unavailability Requirements of Rule 804(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 56 N.D.L.Rev. 387, 412-417 (1980). *110 In this case, the State made absolutely no attempt to produce Dennis Keeney to testify at trial. At oral argument, the State's Attorney candidly admitted that he could have "easily" called Keeney to testify, because at the time of John's trial Keeney was still being held in the Williams County jail. Therefore, this case falls directly within the ambit of the Court's holding in Barber v. Page, supra, 390 U.S. at 724-725, 88 S. Ct. at 1322, 20 L.Ed.2d at 260: We hold that John's Sixth Amendment rights were clearly violated by the failure to afford him the opportunity to cross-examine Keeney regarding the letter. See State v. Garvey, 283 N.W.2d 153, 155-157 (N.D.1979). The State asserts that, even if the letter was inadmissible, its admission was harmless error under Rule 52(a), NDRCrimP. In construing Rule 52(a), we have adopted the test enunciated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967), to determine whether federal constitutional errors are harmless. Under the Chapman test, federal constitutional errors do not automatically require reversal if it is shown that they were harmless, but "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Schneider, 270 N.W.2d 787, 792 (N.D.1978); State v. Carmody, 253 N.W.2d 415, 418 (N.D.1977); State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164, 172 (N.D.1974); see Rule 52(a) NDRCrimP, Explanatory Note. The State has the heavy burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. Schneider, supra, 270 N.W.2d at 792; Carmody, supra, 253 N.W.2d at 418. The State contends that admission of the letter in this case was harmless because it does not provide direct evidence against John, but was merely used to impeach Donald's testimony. Although the letter does not contain specific evidence establishing commission of the crime by John, the statement attributed to John that Donald might have to perjure himself to "get him off" carries an inference that John is admitting commission of the offense. We have reviewed the entire record and are unable to say that the erroneous admission of the letter was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and GIERKE, SAND and VANDE WALLE, JJ., concur. [1] Cornelius Riedl and Donald Flamm, Jr., were charged and convicted for their participation in the drug sales. We affirmed Donald's conviction in State v. Flamm, 338 N.W.2d 826 (N.D. 1983). [2] Keeney and Donald met while they were both inmates at the State Penitentiary. Keeney was subsequently incarcerated in the Williams County jail, where he met John. Keeney then sent the letter to Donald at the State Penitentiary.