Case Title: BROOKS A. BURKHARDT V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-111

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
BROOKS A. BURKHARDT V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 96117 P.3d 1219Case Number: 04-111Decided: 08/18/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
BROOKS 
A. BURKHARDT,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofGoshenCounty

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
Ken 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and 
Marion Yoder, 
Senior Assistant Public Defender

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; and D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
 
 

HILL, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Brooks 
Burkhardt (Burkhardt), disputes his March 4, 2004 conviction for burglary of a 
vehicle.1  Burkhardt asserts that there was not 
sufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain his conviction, that his 
theory of the case instruction was erroneously refused by the trial court, and 
that the trial court took into account improper information in imposing 
sentence.  We will 
affirm.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Burkhardt brings 
forward these issues:

 
 
            
I.          
Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict [Burkhardt] of 
burglary.

 
 
            
II.          
Whether the jury was properly instructed.

 
 
            
III.         
Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it took into account 
unproved factors about [Burkhardt's] "attitude" and "lack of self discipline" 
and imposed a sentence in conflict with Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).

 
 
The 
State's brief essentially mirrors the issues posed by 
Burkhardt.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The operative 
facts of the crime at issue in this case take place in a compressed period of 
time of about 30 minutes, between 1:20 p.m. and 1:50 p.m., give or take a few 
minutes.  Nonetheless, the telling 
of the story will take up quite a bit of print space.  At about 1:20 p.m., on June 6, 2003, Joe 
Spears (Spears) stopped at the Smoker Friendly Gasamat in Torrington to buy 
cigars.  Spears pulled into the 
Gasamat and parked his pickup truck near the building.  He went into the store, leaving his 
pickup unlocked.  His purchase took 
longer than expected ("an extra minute or so" because the cigars he wanted to 
buy were priced incorrectly).  He 
knew the correct price because he often bought them at a Gasamat, where his 
girlfriend worked, in Scottsbluff, Nebraska.  As he was making his purchase, he could 
see out the window and noticed three boys standing near his truck.  He noticed that one of them opened his 
passenger-side door and that the interior lights were engaged.  He observed that a blond-haired boy 
(Burkhardt), wearing a blue shirt, leaned into the passenger door of the pickup, 
and appeared to take something from the truck.  The other two boys (Nathan Douglass and 
Matthew Douglass) had dark hair and were not in a position to reach into the 
pickup.  This occurred just about 
the time Spears was coming out the front door of the Gasamat, and he watches as 
Burkhardt "spooks and flees."  As 
Burkhardt left, it appeared that he was concealing something in his right 
hand.  Spears positively identified 
Burkhardt as the individual who had reached into his pickup.  Burkhardt and the Douglass brothers were 
all from Scottsbluff-Gering, Nebraska area and were visiting Torrington for the 
day.

 
 
[¶4]      At first, Spears 
worried that Burkhardt might have taken his cell phone because he had left it in 
a visible spot on the hump between the two front seats.  However, when he got to his pickup the 
phone was there and he did not notice anything else as missing.  However, as he started his pickup, he 
noticed that the interior lights would not go off, and he had to get out and 
shut his passenger side door.  At 
that point, he was even more certain that someone had been inside his 
pickup.  He confronted the boys 
about having been inside his pickup, telling them that, "You better hope there 
is not anything missing, because, you know, I will have his license 
number."  As he left the Gasamat, 
Spears decided to call his girlfriend at the Gasamat in Scottsbluff, and have 
her call the manager of the Gasamat in Torrington and ask her to get the license plate 
number of the pickup Burkhardt was in, as well as to warn her that the boys were 
there and might be up to something.

 
 
[¶5]      As the events 
described above were nearing their conclusion, Adalita Esquibel and her family 
arrived at the Gasamat.  Both Spears 
and Burkhardt and his companions were still there.  She saw and heard Spears having words 
with the boys, and she watched Spears leave.  Immediately after Spears left, she 
observed Burkhardt pull a checkbook out of a trash can.  At trial, Esquibel identified the person 
who retrieved the checkbook from the trash can as Burkhardt.  Esquibel and her fiancé made a decision 
that the police should be called and such a call was placed to the Torrington 
police.

 
 
[¶6]      At this point, 
Burkhardt and his companions were still at the Gasamat, but were unable to get 
their vehicle started.  They then 
pushed it away from the gas pumps and to a position away from the Gasamat 
building, but still on the grounds of that business.  The location of that vehicle was now 
near a dumpster that serviced the Gasamat.  
The investigating police officer was dispatched to the Gasamat at 1:53 
p.m.  When he arrived there, he 
talked to the manager of the Gasamat and Esquibel, and then talked to Burkhardt 
and the Douglass brothers.  The 
police officer also identified Burkhardt as being present at the Gasamat.  The police officer asked about the brown 
checkbook that Esquibel had described, and all three boys denied any knowledge 
of it.  The police officer did not 
see the checkbook when he looked through their vehicle after the boys consented 
to a search of the vehicle.  At that 
point, the police officer allowed the boys to leave.

 
 
[¶7]      After again 
discussing with Esquibel her observations of Burkhardt and the checkbook, the 
police officer then asked the manager of the Gasamat to contact Spears and ask 
if he was missing his wallet or checkbook.  
She did so.  Spears knew that 
he had his wallet but inspected the cab of his pickup and discovered that his 
checkbook was missing.  The police 
officer then conducted a further search of the area and found Spears' checkbook 
in the dumpster near where the boys had parked their disabled vehicle while they 
got it started.  The police found 
the boys still in Torrington and brought them in for further 
questioning.  Burkhardt denied any 
involvement in taking Spears' checkbook, as did the Douglass 
brothers.

 
 
[¶8]      At trial, Nathan 
Douglass testified that he, his brother, and Burkhardt were at the Gasamat on 
the date and at the time when the events described above occurred.  Nathan denied any involvement in taking 
Spears' checkbook.  After the group 
had been questioned at the Gasamat, Nathan asked Burkhardt what had happened to 
the checkbook and Burkhardt responded it "had been thrown in the dumpster."  After the second round of questioning at 
the police station was completed, Burkhardt asked the Douglass brothers to go 
back to the alley by the Gasamat, "to see if he could find the checkbook."  Once there, Burkhardt told Nathan to 
leave because "he had seen somebody staring down the alley."  The group then left Torrington and returned to 
Scottsbluff.  On the way back to 
Scottsbluff, Burkhardt commented to Nathan that, "There ain't any evidence or 
proof of anything, of anything being taken."  Matthew Douglass also testified and 
stated that he did not remove a checkbook from a vehicle at the Gasamat on the 
date and time in question.  
Burkhardt chose not to testify or present any other 
evidence.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶9]      In addressing a 
claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether or not any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  When 
considering a claim of the sufficiency of the evidence, we review that evidence 
with the assumption that the evidence of the prevailing party is true, disregard 
the evidence favoring the unsuccessful party, and give the prevailing party the 
benefit of every favorable inference that we may reasonably draw from the 
evidence.  We will not reweigh the 
evidence nor will we re-examine the credibility of the witnesses.  Pacheco v. State, 2004 WY 160, ¶6, 102 P.2d 887, ¶6 (Wyo. 2004) (citing Mascarenas v. State, 2003 WY 124, ¶4, 76 P.3d 1258, ¶4 (Wyo.2003); also see Leyo 
v. State, 2005 WY 92, ¶¶12-17, --- P.3d ---, ¶¶12-17 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 
[¶10]   With specific reference to the 
sufficiency of evidence in a burglary case, we have said:

 
 
When 
sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in burglary convictions, this Court 
examines the record, in a light most favorable to the State, to see if there is 
slight corroborative evidence, other than possession of stolen goods, which 
connects the appellant with the burglary.  
King v. State, 718 P.2d 452, 
453 (Wyo.1986).  We have stated that 
the possession of stolen goods alone is not sufficient evidence to convict for 
burglary.  Id. (quoting Newell v. State, 548 P.2d 8, 13 
(Wyo.1976)).  However, we have also 
concluded with regard to burglary that, " '[t]he most significant and material 
evidence of defendant's guilt is his possession of the stolen property.  Possession is a strong circumstance 
tending to show guilt and only slight corroborative evidence of other 
inculpatory circumstances is required'" to convict.  Sutherland v. State, 944 P.2d 1157, 1161 
(Wyo.1997) (quoting Newell, 548 P.2d 
at 13).

 
 

McGarvey 
v. State, 2002 
WY 149, ¶14, 55 P.3d 703, ¶14 (Wyo. 2002); also see Wells v. State, 613 P.2d 201, 
203 (Wyo. 1980) ("A defendant need not be found in possession of stolen property 
as long as he may be found by evidence closely related to its disappearance by 
some connecting evidence.").

 
 
[¶11]   We have set out the evidence 
admitted at trial in detail.  Our 
conclusion that this evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction readily 
follows from the consideration of that evidence.  Each and every element of the crime was 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and Burkhardt's contention that he was merely 
present, but did not participate in the larceny of Spears' checkbook, finds no 
support in the evidence admitted at trial.  
Spears identified Burkhardt as the only person who could have taken the 
checkbook from his pickup.  Esquibel 
identified Burkhardt as the person who retrieved a checkbook from a trash 
can.  The checkbook was found in a 
dumpster near where the initial larceny took place.  Burkhardt made statements that 
incriminated him in the larceny of the checkbook.  That evidence is sufficient to sustain 
the jury's verdict and the trial court's judgment of 
guilt.

 
 
Theory 
of the Case Instruction

 
 
[¶12]   The applicable standard of review 
is well-established:  Jury 
instructions should inform the jurors concerning the applicable law so that they 
can apply that law to their findings with respect to the material facts; 
instructions should be written with the particular facts and legal theories of 
each case in mind and often differ from case to case since any one of several 
instructional options may be legally correct; a failure to give an instruction 
on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental error, as is a 
confusing or misleading instruction; and the test of whether a jury has been 
properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the 
instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be 
found to have been committed.  Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶9, 36 P.3d 1151, ¶9 (Wyo.2001).  With 
specific regard to a defendant's "theory of the case" instruction we have held 
that:

 
 
            
Due process requires the trial court to give a correct instruction to the 
jury that details the defendant's theory of the case.  Blakely v. State, 474 P.2d 127, 129 
(Wyo.1970).  The instruction must 
sufficiently inform the court of the defendant's theory and must be supported by 
competent evidence.  Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 490 
(Wyo.1992).  A theory of the case is 
more than a comment on the evidence that tells the jury how to consider the 
evidence.  Ellifritz v. State, 704 P.2d 1300 
(Wyo.1985).  Fundamentally, the 
instruction must in the first instance be a proper theory of the case, or theory 
of defense, instruction.  That is, 
the offered instruction must present a defense recognized by statute or case law 
in this jurisdiction.  Bouwkamp, 833 P.2d  at 
490.

 
 
            
As Bouwkamp explained, 
"[t]heory of defense instructions are to be derived from and address criminal 
defenses provided for by statute or acknowledged by this court."  Id. 
It further noted "common-law defenses are retained unless otherwise provided by 
this act."  Id. (quoting 
Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 6-1-102(b)).  Additionally, this Court has discussed 
acceptable defenses, notably in Keser v. 
State, 706 P.2d 263, 269 (Wyo.1985).  
See also 1 Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 21, at 70 n. 1 
(1984); 1 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 39 (15th 
ed.1993).

 
 
            
Any competent evidence is sufficient to establish a defense theory even 
if it consists only of testimony of the defendant.  Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739, 745 
(Wyo.1987).  We view the evidence in 
a light favorable to the accused and the accused's testimony must be taken as 
entirely true to determine if the evidence is competent.  Duckett v. State, 966 P.2d 941, 944 
(Wyo.1998).  Even if the court deems 
the evidence to be weak, or unworthy of belief, the instruction must be given if 
a jury could reasonably conclude the evidence supports the defendant's 
position.  Id. The refusal 
to allow an instruction requested by the defendant when due process requires the 
defendant's instruction be given is reversible error per se.  Id.

 
 

Wheaton 
v. State, 2003 
WY 56, ¶20, 68 P.3d 1167, ¶20 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Holloman v. State, 2002 WY 117, 
¶¶15-17, 51 P.3d 214, ¶¶15-17 (Wyo.2002)); also see Chavez-Becerra v. State, 924 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Wyo. 1996) (An obvious concept, such as simply that defendant is 
not guilty, cannot be elevated to a theory of defense and necessitate a special 
instruction.).

 
 
[¶13]   Burkhardt challenges the district 
court's refusal to give what he identified as a theory of the case 
instruction.  That instruction was a 
modification of Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 7.01C (2004), which 
provides:

 
 
7.01C ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT  MERE PRESENCE AT 
THE SCENE OF THE CRIME INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT

 
 
            
Merely being present at the scene of a crime or merely knowing that a 
crime is being committed or is about to be committed is not sufficient conduct 
for the jury to find that the defendant was an accessory before the fact to that 
crime.  The State must prove that 
the defendant knowingly associated himself with the crime in some way as a 
participant  someone who wanted the crime to be committed  and not as a mere 
spectator.

 
 
[¶14]   As offered by Burkhardt, the 
instruction looked like this:

7.01C ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT  MERE PRESENCE AT 
THE SCENE OF THE CRIME INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT

 
 
            
Merely being present at the scene of a crime or merely knowing that a 
crime is being committed or is about to be committed is not sufficient conduct 
for the jury to find that the defendant was an accessory before the fact to 
that crime IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.  The State must prove that the defendant 
knowingly associated himself with the crime in some way as a participant  
someone who wanted the crime to be committed  and not as a mere 
spectator.

 
 
[¶15]   At the instructions conference, the 
district court's reasoning for refusing the instruction was 
this:

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Well, first of 
all, it's not presented as a theory of defense instruction.  I haven't received any instruction that 
says "the defense claims," or this is the defense's theory; although, you have 
argued that well, and I am sure you will again.

            
Secondly, although this shows up in the pattern, it is not a statement of 
law.  It's an argument.  That's all it is.  It's a principle that if the elements 
are not proven beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is not guilty.  That's the law.  If being present is all there is, just 
being there and absolutely nothing else, circumstantial or otherwise, then I am 
sure you are going to go argue that, and there will be a finding of not 
guilty.

            
Frankly, I think it's misleading and confusing.  I think that some of the  some of the 
language is designed about an accessory situation where several people are 
together and someone is claiming, well, I didn't know what was going on, and 
someone else says, well, you have to have, or you participated somehow; but, at 
any rate, I don't think you lose anything by us leaving it out; and I think we 
adequately cover the law by saying the state has to prove the elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, each and every one of them; so you are sure going to be able 
to argue this.

            
I will put it in the court file that you offered it and the Court 
rejected it.

 
 
[¶16]   We agree with the district court's 
reasoning and conclude that there was no error in refusing the offered 
instruction under the circumstances of this case because Burkhardt's rather 
simple contention that he was merely present does not merit a special 
instruction, as well as because the evidence adduced at trial did not warrant 
the instruction.

 
 
[¶17]   Burkhardt also contends that his 
attorney was ineffective for not crafting some other "theory of defense" 
instruction in light of the district court's offer to consider a revised 
instruction.  This contention is not 
supported by cogent argument (e.g., what other instruction defense counsel might 
have offered under these circumstances) or pertinent authority (e.g., a case 
where failure to offer a theory of defense instruction constitutes plain 
error).

 
 
Other 
Instruction Issues

 
 
[¶18]   The instruction issues discussed 
below were not raised in the district court in the form of offered 
instructions.  Therefore, they are 
subject to our general standard of review with respect to instructions, as well 
as the application of the plain error rule.  The plain error rule requires that an 
appellate court make a series of findings: (1) the record must clearly present 
the incident; (2) defendant must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule 
of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way; and (3) 
that defendant was denied a substantial right resulting in material prejudice to 
him.  Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶24, 29 P.3d 76, ¶24 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
[¶19]   Relying on Brett v. State, 961 P.2d 385, 389-91 
(Wyo. 1998), 
Burkhardt contends that the district court erred in failing to provide the jury 
with the statutory definition of the word "deprive."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-401(a)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2005) provides:

 
 
(ii)  "Deprive" 
means:

            
(A)  To withhold property of another permanently or for so 
extended a period as to appropriate a major portion of its economic value or 
with intent to restore only upon payment of reward or other compensation; 
or

            
(B)  To dispose of the property so as to make it unlikely that 
the owner will recover it.

 
 
However, 
§ 6-3-401(a) and (a)(iii) provides that that definition applies to "this 
article," and by "this article" the statute means "W.S. 6-3-401 through 
6-3-411."  Burglary is, of course, 
not in the same article as larceny.  
Burkhardt also contends that the "larceny" he committed wasn't a "felony" 
because there was no proof that the value of the property exceeded $500.00. 
 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(c) 
(LexisNexis 2003) (since amended to $1,000, § 6-3-402(c) (LexisNexis 
2005)).  However, burglary does not 
have a dollar limit akin to that of the larceny statute (see footnote 
1).

 
 
[¶20]   The other instruction issues raised 
by Burkhardt do not constitute error, much less plain 
error.

 
 
Abuse of 
Discretion in Sentencing

 
 
[¶21]   Our standard of review in this 
regard is well known:

 
 
            
When imposing sentence, the trial court is given broad discretion to 
consider a wide variety of factors about the defendant and his crimes.  Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1115 
(Wyo.1993); Griebel v. State, 763 P.2d 475, 477 (Wyo.1988).  We will 
not disturb a sentencing decision absent a clear abuse of discretion.  Jones v. State, 771 P.2d 368, 371 
(Wyo.1989).  In sentencing, due 
process provides a right to be sentenced only on accurate information.  Mehring, 860 P.2d at 1117;  Clouse v. State, 776 P.2d 1011, 1014 
(Wyo.1989).  On appeal, the 
defendant must demonstrate that the trial court relied upon the statements in 
sentencing to prevail.  Mehring, at 1115.  "However, when no objection is made 
concerning the consideration of a particular factor, review is necessarily 
confined to a search for plain error.  
Plain error, as we have often stated, occurs when the record clearly 
shows an error that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law which 
adversely affected a substantial right."  
Hornecker v. State, 977 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Wyo.1999);  see also Craver v. State, 942 P.2d 1110, 
1115 (Wyo.1997).  Victim impact 
information about other crimes or convictions unrelated to the particular crime 
for which sentence is about to be imposed is permissible.  Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1116-17.  "W.R.Cr.P. 32(a) specifically permits 
information about the prior criminal record of the defendant and his 
characteristics to be considered by the trial court before imposing 
sentence.  In evaluating character, 
the trial court, in exercising its discretion, may consider a broad range of 
reports and information."  
Id.; see also Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Wyo.1987).  Evidence 
of prior criminal activity is "highly relevant to the sentencing decision" and 
may be considered by the sentencing court despite the fact that no prosecution 
or conviction may have resulted.  Mehring, at 1117.

 
 

Manes v. 
State, 2004 WY 
70, ¶9, 92 P.3d 289, ¶9 (Wyo. 2004); also 
see Bitz v. State, 2003 WY 140, 
¶7, 78 P.3d 257, ¶7 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶22]   Burkhardt objected to the district 
court considering information to the effect that the jail had informed the 
prosecutor that they could not handle Burkhardt in the local jail and did not 
want him to receive a split sentence.  
The prosecutor also argued that Burkhardt had not taken responsibility 
for his behavior; called the district court's attention to Burkhardt's prior 
criminal record with accuracy; referred to Burkhardt as a "petulant child" who 
"has had everyone wait on him"; and characterized Burkhardt as a person who 
"when things don't go his way, he pouts, he acts out, and he apparently violates 
the law."

 
 
[¶23]   After Burkhardt was permitted to 
address the presiding judge at length, the district court pronounced sentence, 
which included these remarks:

 
 
            
Mr. Burkhardt, the Court finds, and even listening to your statement now, 
I find that your life to this point is characterized by a significant lack of 
self discipline and by an attitude that many of your problems were created by 
other people than yourself; and until you cross those gaps and understand that 
it's your own lack of self discipline that creates a problem and that you need 
to be self disciplined, I don't have any hope that probation would be successful 
at all in your case.

            
I recognize that you are young and that this is a fairly minor property 
crime.  Of course, it wasn't minor 
to the victim or to the community or to law enforcement officers or to that 
witness who spoke up.

            
I also recognize, however, that the Court needs to craft a sentence that 
is sufficient to give you an incentive to develop that self discipline I talked 
about, and so that's exactly what I am going to do.

            
It's the judgment and sentence of the Court that you serve a term in the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary of three to seven years.  I am going to recommend to the warden 
that you participate in the boot camp.

            
If you can fully complete the boot camp, I will reduce your 
sentence.  You won't serve the rest 
of your time.  But you have a great 
deal of incentive to successfully complete the boot camp.  If you don't successfully complete boot 
camp, then you will just serve your sentence.

 
 
[¶24]   That sentence was entered by the 
district court on March 1, 2004.  On 
September 22, 2004, based upon Burkhardt's successful completion of boot camp, 
the district court reduced his sentence, suspending the remainder of his prison 
term and placing him on probation for five years.

 
 
[¶25]   In his brief, Burkhardt relies in 
significant part on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004) (applying rule expressed in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000)).  In Blakely, the Supreme Court held that the 
rule announced in Apprendi applied to 
Blakely's case because the trial court made a factual finding that the defendant 
acted with "deliberate cruelty."   
Based on that finding, the trial court imposed an enhanced sentence.  In Blakely, the Supreme Court iterated that 
fact-finding with respect to such sentence enhancements must be made by a jury 
under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.  For much the same reasons as those set 
out in Blakeman v. State, 2005 WY 13, 
¶5, 105 P.3d 472, ¶5 (Wyo. 2005) and Brown v. State, 2004 WY 119, ¶¶9-15, 99 P.3d 489, ¶¶9-15 (Wyo. 2004), we conclude that Blakely and Apprendi have no application to the 
circumstances of this case because the district court did not enhance 
Burkhardt's sentence beyond that provided for in the operative criminal 
statute.

 
 
[¶26]   Beyond that, Burkhardt's 
contentions that the district court took into account improper information in 
imposing sentence (e.g., Burkhardt's "attitude" and "lack of self discipline") 
are not supported by cogent argument or pertinent authority.  It is apparent to this Court, based on a 
complete review of the record, that the district court did not have before it, 
or otherwise consider, improper information when it imposed the 
sentence.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶27]   The evidence was sufficient to 
sustain the conviction.  The 
district court's refusal of the instruction offered by Burkhardt was not error, 
and the jury was otherwise properly instructed.  The district court's sentence was within 
its sound discretion and was based on information properly before the 
court.  Therefore, the judgment and 
sentence of the district court are affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

   1§ 6-3-301. 
Burglary; aggravated burglary; penalties.

 
 
            
(a)  A person is guilty of burglary if, without authority, 
he enters or remains in a building, occupied structure or vehicle, 
or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a 
felony therein.

            
(b)  Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, 
burglary is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) 
years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or 
both.

            
(c)  Aggravated burglary is a felony punishable by imprisonment 
for not less than five (5) years nor more than twenty-five (25) years, a fine of 
not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), or both, if, in the course of 
committing the crime of burglary, the person:

                        
(i)  Is or becomes armed with or uses a deadly weapon or a 
simulated deadly weapon;

                        
(ii)  Knowingly or recklessly inflicts bodily injury on 
anyone;  
or

                        
(iii)  Attempts to inflict bodily injury on 
anyone.

            
(d)  As used in this section "in the course of committing the 
crime" includes the time during which an attempt to commit the crime or in which 
flight after the attempt or commission occurred.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301 
(LexisNexis 2005).