Case Title: GERTRUDE A. LEWIS; BETTY M. DesROSIERS; RICHARD L. LEWIS; GRACE W. LEWIS; ROLAND B. LEWIS; RELTA K. COX; DAVID M. NELSON AND CONSTANCE NELSON, Husband and Wife; RUDOLPH GUNTER; AND JULIAN LAND & LIVESTOCK CO., A Wyoming Corporation v. STATE BOARD OF CONTROL, An Agency of the State of Wyoming (GEORGE CHRISTOPULOS, President; PAUL SCHWIEGER, Ex-Officio Secretary; FRANCIS CARR, Adjudication Officer; EARL MICHAEL, Superintendent WATER DIVISION NO. I; PAUL KAWULOK, Superintendent WATER DIVISION NO. II; CRAIG COOPER, Superintendent WATER DIVISION NO. III; AND JOHN TEICHERT, Superintendent WATER DIVISION NO. IV; in their official capacity); R.S. PETERSON & SONS, INC., A Wyoming Corporation; BEN WESTON; MARIE WESTON; DALE WESTON; ROBERT A. FADDIS; JOHN H. FADDIS; HUBERT FADDIS; FRED ALLEN FELLER; IRENE FELLER; UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, A Utah Corporation; JOHN SEDEY and CLARA SEDEY, Husband and Wife

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
GERTRUDE A. LEWIS; BETTY M. DesROSIERS; RICHARD L. LEWIS; GRACE W. LEWIS; ROLAND B. LEWIS; RELTA K. COX; DAVID M. NELSON AND CONSTANCE NELSON, Husband and Wife; RUDOLPH GUNTER; AND JULIAN LAND & LIVESTOCK CO., A Wyoming Corporation v. STATE BOARD OF CONTROL, An Agency of the State of Wyoming (GEORGE CHRISTOPULOS, President; PAUL SCHWIEGER, Ex-Officio Secretary; FRANCIS CARR, Adjudication Officer; EARL MICHAEL, Superintendent WATER DIVISION NO. I; PAUL KAWULOK, Superintendent WATER DIVISION NO. II; CRAIG COOPER, Superintendent WATER DIVISION NO. III; AND JOHN TEICHERT, Superintendent WATER DIVISION NO. IV; in their official capacity); R.S. PETERSON & SONS, INC., A Wyoming Corporation; BEN WESTON; MARIE WESTON; DALE WESTON; ROBERT A. FADDIS; JOHN H. FADDIS; HUBERT FADDIS; FRED ALLEN FELLER; IRENE FELLER; UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, A Utah Corporation; JOHN SEDEY and CLARA SEDEY, Husband and Wife1985 WY 63699 P.2d 822Case Number: 84-161Decided: 05/17/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
GERTRUDE A. LEWIS; BETTY 
M. DesROSIERS; RICHARD L. LEWIS; GRACE W. LEWIS; ROLAND B. LEWIS; RELTA K. COX; 
DAVID M. NELSON AND CONSTANCE NELSON, HUSBAND AND WIFE; RUDOLPH GUNTER; AND 
JULIAN LAND & LIVESTOCK CO., A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLANTS 
(PLAINTIFFS/PETITIONERS), 

v. 

STATE BOARD OF CONTROL, 
AN AGENCY OF THE STATE OF WYOMING (GEORGE CHRISTOPULOS, PRESIDENT; PAUL 
SCHWIEGER, EX-OFFICIO SECRETARY; FRANCIS CARR, ADJUDICATION OFFICER; EARL 
MICHAEL, SUPERINTENDENT WATER DIVISION NO. I; PAUL KAWULOK, SUPERINTENDENT WATER 
DIVISION NO. II; CRAIG COOPER, SUPERINTENDENT WATER DIVISION NO. III; AND JOHN 
TEICHERT, SUPERINTENDENT WATER DIVISION NO. IV; IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY); 
R.S. PETERSON & SONS, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION; BEN WESTON; MARIE WESTON; 
DALE WESTON; ROBERT A. FADDIS; JOHN H. FADDIS; HUBERT FADDIS; FRED ALLEN FELLER; 
IRENE FELLER; UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, A UTAH CORPORATION; JOHN SEDEY AND 
CLARA SEDEY, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LincolnCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

 
 
Timothy O. 
Beppler and Roy A. Jacobson, Jr. of Vehar, 
Lehman, Beppler and Jacobson, P.C., Evanston and Kemmerer, for appellants.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., and John D. Erdmann, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee State 
Bd. of Control.

Harry L. Harris 
and Mark W. Harris, Evanston, for remaining 
appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a decision of the district court dismissing appellants' claims based on adverse 
possession and affirming the State Board of Control's order denying appellants' 
petition for abandonment of water rights.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellants state the 
issues as follows:

"I. WHETHER A WATER USER 
MAY ACQUIRE A JUDICIALLY DECLARED RIGHT TO WATER, ALREADY APPROPRIATE[D] BY 
ANOTHER, THROUGH APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ADVERSE 
POSSESSION?

"II. WHETHER THE DOCTRINE 
OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL CAN BE APPLIED TO PRECLUDE THE STATE AND SENIOR WATER 
APPROPRIATORS FROM ENFORCING OR ASSERTING WATER APPROPRIATION 
PRIORITIES?

"III. WHETHER THE ORDER 
OF THE STATE BOARD OF CONTROL CONCERNING ABANDONMENT OF WATER RIGHTS WAS 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
LAW?"

[¶4.]     On March 13, 1981, 
appellants petitioned the State Board of Control for a declaration of 
abandonment of water rights pursuant to § 41-3-401, W.S. 1977. Appellants, 
contestants below, include persons who hold water rights to several streams 
which are tributary to Twin Creek. Contestees below were the owners of the 
downstream Beckwith Quinn & Company appropriation (BQ appropriation) from 
Twin Creek, which appropriation is the most senior in the Twin Creek drainage 
area. An administrative hearing was held, and the State Board of Control denied 
the petition for abandonment.

[¶5.]     Thereafter, contestants 
(then plaintiffs) filed a petition in district court for judicial review of 
agency action pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, § 16-3-114, 
W.S. 1977 (October 1982 Pamphlet)1 and Rule 12 of the Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure.2 In addition, contestants joined 
with the petition a complaint seeking a determination of their ownership in the 
water rights by virtue of adverse possession. This "Complaint/Petition" prayed 
for several things, including: (1) an order setting aside the order of the State 
Board of Control, (2) a declaration that defendants' (contestees') appropriation 
rights "be declared abandoned and subordinated to Plaintiffs' respective 
appropriation rights on the Clear Creek, South Fork and North Hartley Creek," 
and (3) "[i]n the alternative, that the Court enter its judgment granting 
Plaintiffs a prescriptive water appropriation right over the BQ appropriation 
rights of record" on the Twin Creek drainage area.

[¶6.]     Contestants claim that 
for lengthy and successive periods of time, ranging from 27 years, on South 
Fork, to 50 years, on Clear Creek, they have used the water from the subject 
tributaries to the detriment of the BQ appropriators' priorities. Further, 
contestants claim that their use has been open, visible, notorious and adverse 
to the BQ appropriators, and that the adverse use has been continuous, 
uninterrupted and exclusive for the statutory period of ten 
years.

[¶7.]     Contestants admit that 
at various times during the above-mentioned time periods, the BQ appropriators 
have sought regulation of the junior water rights by officials of the State. 
However, the State failed to regulate these tributaries so that the BQ 
appropriators could receive their priority. Contestants thus claim that the BQ 
appropriators failed to exhaust their administrative and legal remedies to 
enforce such regulation.

[¶8.]     The trial court 
dismissed contestants' claim of adverse possession, based on failure to state a 
claim on which relief could be granted. Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P. In reviewing a 
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), this court will only sustain such dismissal if 
the complaint shows on its face that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. Johnson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 
of Hartford, Conn., Wyo., 608 P.2d 1299 (1980), appeal after remand 630 P.2d 514, cert. denied 454 U.S. 1118, 102 S. Ct. 961, 71 L. Ed. 2d 105 (1981), reh. 
denied 455 U.S. 1039, 102 S. Ct. 1743, 72 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1982). Therefore, we treat as true all the allegations of contestants' 
complaint. Moxley v. Laramie Builders, 
Inc., Wyo., 600 P.2d 733 
(1979).

[¶9.]     Even with this generous 
standard of review, we find that the trial court was correct in dismissing 
contestants' claim based on adverse possession for the simple reason that we 
here hold that water rights may not be acquired by adverse possession or 
prescription in this state.3

[¶10.]  The question of whether or not rights to 
water may be acquired through adverse possession has never, until now, been 
answered in Wyoming. The question was considered in Campbell v. Wyoming Development Co., 55 
Wyo. 347, 100 P.2d 124, reh. denied with opinion 55 Wyo. 347, 102 P.2d 745 (1940). There 
plaintiffs sought, based on a claim of prescription, to quiet title to certain 
water rights of the Little Laramie River, which had been used by plaintiffs for 
over 50 years. The plaintiffs had adjudicated water rights to appropriate from 
the Little Laramie River, which was a tributary to the Big Laramie River, on 
which the defendant had adjudicated water rights. This court held that the 
plaintiffs had failed to show that their use of the water was adverse. We went 
on to say "no claim of a prescriptive right can be set up by plaintiffs, at 
least up to the time of the adjudication of the waters of Little Laramie River 
in 1892." Id., 
100 P.2d  at 138. "The only possible question is as to prescription since that 
time, if a prescriptive title may be obtained at all in this state, which we 
refused to decide." Id., 102 P.2d  at 748. We also noted some of 
the things that a plaintiff would have to show in order to prove adverse 
possession, such as an invasion, in a substantial manner, of the rights of the 
defendant and the extent of that invasion during a continuous prescriptive 
period, and that all of this must be done with the knowledge and acquiescence of 
the defendant and in an open and notorious manner. We then 
said:

"* * * Hence arises the 
question whether under our laws, a prescriptive right should be able to be 
acquired when its basis lies in the fact that public officials have failed to do 
their duty. It is readily seen that if it can be, a water commissioner, in 
office long enough, may easily enable another to acquire such title. * * * It 
may be necessary in the future to answer the points above suggested. We do not 
think that we are called on to do so now * * *." Id., 102 P.2d  at 750.

[¶11.]  Once again we find it unnecessary to 
determine whether or not the elements of adverse possession are present inasmuch 
as we hold it impossible to acquire water rights by adverse possession. We base 
this holding on the Wyoming Constitution and the Wyoming statutes. The relevant constitutional 
provisions are as follows:

[¶12.]  Article 8, § 1, Wyoming 
Constitution:

"The water of all natural 
streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within the 
boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be the property of the 
state."

[¶13.]  Article 8, § 2, Wyoming 
Constitution:

"There shall be 
constituted a board of control, to be composed of the state engineer and 
superintendents of the water divisions; which shall, under such regulations as 
may be prescribed by law, have the supervision of the waters of the state and of 
their appropriation, distribution and diversion, and of the various officers 
connected therewith. Its decisions to be subject to review by the courts of the 
state."

[¶14.]  Article 8, § 3, Wyoming 
Constitution:

"Priority of 
appropriation for beneficial uses shall give the better right. No appropriation 
shall be denied except when such denial is demanded by the public 
interests."

[¶15.]  These provisions establish the doctrine 
of appropriation for beneficial use as the law in this state. The statutes go on 
to set up the procedures for appropriating water. Section 41-3-101, W.S. 1977, 
Cum.Supp. 1984, defines the nature of water rights and beneficial 
use:

"A water right is a right 
to use the water of the state, when such use has been acquired by the beneficial 
application of water under the laws of the state relating thereto, and in 
conformity with the rules and regulations dependent thereon. Beneficial use 
shall be the basis, the measure and limit of the right to use water at all 
times, not exceeding the statutory limit * * *."

Section 41-4-501 
et seq., W.S. 1977, explain the procedure for obtaining a water right, 
i.e.:

"Any person, association 
or corporation hereafter intending to acquire the right to the beneficial use of 
the public water of the state of Wyoming shall, before commencing * * * make an 
application to the state engineer for a permit to make such appropriation. * * 
*" Section 41-4-501, W.S. 1977.

[¶16.]  We have held that the only way to acquire 
a water right is through a permit granted by the State. Wyoming Hereford 
Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., 33 Wyo. 14, 236 P. 764 (1925). In Laramie Rivers Co. v. Le Vasseur, 65 
Wyo. 414, 202 P.2d 680, 686 (1949), we said

"* * * that no water 
right may be initiated under our present laws except pursuant to a permit; that 
hence the requirement of such permit is mandatory. * * *"

Contestants do 
not disagree with this, but argue that that holding does not apply to them 
because they are not initiating a 
water right from the State, but rather taking over a water right which was 
initiated through the required permit process. In other words, contestants claim 
they are not bound by the permit process because they are not appropriating 
water from the State, but rather stepping into the shoes of a legitimate 
appropriator from the State.

[¶17.]  This argument is faulty. If adopted, it 
would cripple the permit procedure, negate the doctrine of prior appropriation, 
and make impossible the efficient administration of water. The purpose for the 
permit procedure is discussed at length in Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing 
Co., supra, 236 P. at 770:

"In determining the 
meaning of a written law, it is proper to consider the evils sought to be 
remedied. The laws of the territory had permitted the diversion of water without 
any state supervision of the works and without any adequate notice and record of 
the amount, purpose, and date of the appropriation. Defective and badly located 
diversion works often made the use of water wasteful. No right became definite 
until it was adjudicated in court, and adjudications were often long delayed and 
then made on inaccurate testimony and without any disinterested measurements of 
the ditches or of the lands irrigated. Until such an adjudication, no subsequent 
appropriation could be made with safety, for no one could tell the amount of 
unappropriated water in the stream. The evils attendant on such a system, and 
the importance of providing a different system that would give the state the 
unquestioned right of control, had become well recognized at the time the 
Constitution was framed. See 2 Annual Rep.Terr. Eng.Wyo. (1889) pp. 3, 12, 16, 
37, 41, 58, 69, and 98. To correct these defects in the old system, it was 
provided by the Constitution not only that the waters of the state are the 
property of the state but also that those waters, and their appropriation, distribution, and 
diversion, shall be under the supervision of a state board of control. This 
supervision, it was hoped, would cure many of the evils of the old system, and 
we think that hope has been justified by the later events. The constitutional 
declaration that priority of appropriation for beneficial uses shall give the 
better right was not intended to prevent the Legislature from prescribing 
reasonable conditions that must be complied with before a lawful appropriation 
could be made. Their power in this respect is both recognized and limited by the 
further provision of the Constitution, carried into the statutes, that `no 
appropriation shall be denied except when such denial is demanded by the public 
interests.' In interpreting this language, we must give consideration to the 
contemporaneous recognition not only of the importance of state supervision of 
the diversion of waters, but also of the fact that such supervision could not be 
effective, nor intelligently exercised, without accurate and complete 
information of proposed appropriations. The Legislature has decided that the 
public interests demand that such information shall be given to the state board 
by an application for a permit, and that until such an application is approved, 
no appropriation can be lawfully made. We believe these requirements are 
reasonable in so far at least as they are questioned in this case. 

"As already stated, we 
believe the intent of the Legislature appears plainly from the statute. The 
statute must, of course, be construed in the light of the Constitution. The 
pertinent constitutional provisions do not require any different construction of 
the statute, nor do they render it invalid. This view accords with that of the 
members of the constitutional convention, the Legislature, the administrative 
officers of the state, and is agreeable to the opinions of this court in so far 
as they have been heretofore expressed without having the question for decision. 
We may say further that we believe the people of the state generally have 
cheerfully accepted the same view, and that water users have been satisfied to 
act accordingly for the past 35 years." (Emphasis added.)

These words are 
as valid today as when they were written. Accordingly, it is clear that 
prescriptive acquisition of water rights was not contemplated by the framers of 
the constitution, nor is it allowed by the statutes of this state. The district 
court correctly dismissed this claim.

EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL

[¶18.]  Contestants claim that appellees, both 
the BQ appropriators and the State Board of Control, should be equitably 
estopped from now attempting to regulate the three tributaries of Twin Creek 
because of their failure in the past to effectively regulate said tributaries. 
The testimony adduced before the State Board of Control included the following: 
The BQ appropriators testified that over the years, when Twin Creek failed to 
provide their 16.5 c.f.s. of water, they contacted a State official and 
requested the regulation of junior appropriators upstream. One junior 
appropriator, not a party to this action, testified that whenever her 
appropriation was regulated, she demanded that the water appropriations to which 
she was senior be regulated before her water was shut off. A water official 
testified that he had been requested by the BQ appropriators numerous times over 
the years to regulate the contestants. There was also testimony that the 
contestants, when regulation was attempted, ignored it. One violation of such 
regulation by contestants resulted in criminal prosecution for illegally 
tampering with the control structure.

[¶19.]  Contestants admit that the BQ 
appropriators requested regulation by water officials at various times, and 
admit that they were not abiding by such regulation, but contend that the BQ 
appropriators knew that the water officials were not effectively regulating the 
water and knew that contestants were ignoring the little regulation that was 
attempted. Contestants state that:

"There can be little 
doubt that both the State and the BQ appropriators voluntarily, and for a long 
period of time, decided to forego regulation of Appellants' use of water 
out-of-priority. The State apparently made a conscious decision not to regulate, 
and the BQ appropriators - although dissatisfied with the State's failure to 
regulate - apparently made a conscious decision not to pursue legal remedies 
available to them to rectify the situation."

[¶20.]  One of the basic tenants of equity is 
that he who seeks equity must come into the court with clean hands. Walker v. Board of CountyCommissioners, Albany County, Wyo., 644 P.2d 772 (1982). Also, he who seeks equity must 
do equity.

"`* * * [N]o party, 
whatever may be his interests or legal rights, can have relief in a court of 
equity, unless his claim is founded on the basis of good faith and justice. * * 
*'" Vogel v. Shaw, 42 Wyo. 333, 349, 294 P. 687, 693 (1930), quoting from Fay v. 
Valentine, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 40, 22 Am.Dec. 
397.

Equitable 
estoppel rests largely on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. 
Vogel v. Shaw, supra, 294 P.  at 694. 
The contestants in this case do not make the grade. Noting that this holding is 
limited to the facts of this particular case, we hold that contestants are not 
entitled to equitable estoppel. We expressly withhold for future decision 
whether equitable estoppel can ever apply to effectively circumvent the permit 
requirements of water appropriation.4 We cannot, in all equity, allow 
contestants to benefit from their continued and illegal violations of the 
attempted regulation of their water rights which are junior to the rights of the 
BQ appropriators.

JURISDICTION

[¶21.]  AppelleeState Board of Control takes issue with 
the jurisdiction of the district court to hear any matter relating to water 
rights except on review from an order of the State Board of Control. In its 
brief, the State Board of Control states:

"The Contestants' 
independent claims for relief in the District Court have no basis in law, and 
there exists no jurisdiction by the District Court or this Court [the Supreme 
Court] to entertain them."

[¶22.]  The State Board of Control cites Rule 
12.09, W.R.A.P., Cum.Supp. 1984,5 as the extent of review of an 
administrative ruling and § 41-3-401(b) as giving the State Board of Control 
"exclusive original jurisdiction in water right abandonment proceedings." 
Inasmuch as we hold that contestants are not entitled to equitable estoppel or 
adverse possession, we need not consider this contention.

ABANDONMENT

[¶23.]  Contestants' original claim before the 
State Board of Control was for an abandonment or partial abandonment. However, 
this claim is also premised on an adverse possession theory. In its Findings of 
Fact, the State Board of Control stated:

"5. THAT the Contestants' 
presentation was unusual for an abandonment proceeding in that it was not 
directed toward the facts of use or non-use of the challenged appropriation as 
such. There was no testimony presented concerning acreage not irrigated, 
inoperable diversion works, etc. Rather, the Contestants' theory was based upon 
the concept of acquisition of rights by prescription. * * 
*"

[¶24.]  The Findings of Fact continue by saying 
that the "uncontroverted and unrebutted" testimony of the BQ appropriators' 
witnesses show that there has been no abandonment of that appropriation; that 
Beckwith Quinn & Company has, for the five years last past, diverted and 
used for irrigation all the water available at its point of diversion; and that 
the water diverted has not always been 16.5 c.f.s. because the flow in Twin 
Creek has not always been of sufficient quantity at the point of diversion to 
completely satisfy the full right. There was also note made of the fact that 
requested regulation of the Twin Creek watershed was not completely successful 
"because some of the Contestants * * * refused to abide by the regulation of the 
Water Commissioner and Division Superintendent."

[¶25.]  The State Board of Control concluded in 
part:

"3. THAT the Beckwith 
Quinn & Company appropriation which was contested in this action has not 
been abandoned by its owners. The available water was diverted and used during 
the five years last past. * * *

"4. THAT the only basis 
for the State Board of Control to declare an abandonment of water rights is the 
fact of non-use for five consecutive years when water was available as is stated 
in W.S. 41-3-401. No other reason is given in the 
statute."

 

[¶26.]  The district court held that the State 
Board of Control "did not act in excess of its statutory jurisdiction, authority 
or limitations," and affirmed its decision. In reviewing the district court on 
this issue, we are bound to review the whole record to determine if there is 
substantial evidence to support the findings of the State Board of Control. 
Section 16-3-114(c), W.S. 1977 (October 1982 Pamphlet); Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Public 
Service Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 662 P.2d 878 (1983); Board of Trustees of School District No. 4, 
Big Horn County v. Colwell, Wyo., 611 P.2d 427 (1980).

[¶27.]  We note that a review such as this is 
unlike that which we conduct of a district court decision where it is sitting as 
a court of general jurisdiction. Here the district court is sitting in a role 
similar to that of an intermediate court of appeals. Therefore, on subsequent 
appeal to this court, we afford no special deference to the decision of the 
district court, but rather review the matter independently, using the same 
materials and the same standards as used by that court. Matter of North Laramie Land Company, 
Wyo., 605 P.2d 367 (1980).

[¶28.]  Section 41-3-401(a) sets out the 
requirements for a declaration of abandonment. It is, by its terms, very clear 
and concise. It reads, in part:

"(a) Where the holder of 
an appropriation of water from a surface, underground or reservoir water source 
fails, either intentionally or unintentionally, to use the water therefrom for 
the beneficial purposes for which it was appropriated, whether under an 
adjudicated or unadjudicated right, during any five (5) successive years, he is 
considered as having abandoned the water right and shall forfeit all water 
rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. * * *"

[¶29.]  We have held that when the facts fit the 
mandate, subsection (a) amounts to a forfeiture by statute. The statute allows 
for no leeway; the only way to avoid an abandonment is by applying water to 
beneficial use. Wheatland Irrigation 
District v. Laramie Rivers Company, Wyo., 659 P.2d 561 (1983).6 We have also held that before a 
forfeiture, or abandonment, becomes operative, there must be a formal 
declaration thereof. Horse Creek 
Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co., 54 Wyo. 320, 92 P.2d 572 
(1939).

[¶30.]  In reviewing the whole record, we find 
that contestants failed to prove an abandonment. The petition for abandonment 
was filed on March 13, 1981. Contestants make much ado about the use of water on 
the three tributaries for the past 50, 27 and 38 consecutive years, depending on 
the tributary. We are, however, only concerned with the five years immediately 
preceding the filing of the petition. The parties all concede that in 1977 there 
was a total absence of water in the subject tributaries, and so that year is 
properly excluded from computation in the five-year period. Section 41-3-401(b), 
W.S. 1977.

[¶31.]  Notwithstanding 1977, the evidence is 
clear that the BQ appropriators utilized all the water that was available to 
them. In times when less than 16.5 c.f.s. were available, they consistently 
diverted the full amount that was available, and contacted a water official for 
administrative regulation. It is the duty of the officers charged with 
regulating water to make distribution in accordance with established priorities. 
Quinn v. John Whitaker Ranch Co., 54 
Wyo. 367, 92 P.2d 568 (1939). The BQ appropriators had the right to rely on the water 
officials to do their jobs. If said officials were not effective in their 
regulation, that alone will not work to effect a water abandonment, considering 
the facts herein that (1) the BQ appropriators consistently called for 
regulation when the flow of water in Twin Creek fell below 16.5 c.f.s.; (2) such 
regulation was attempted; and (3) such regulation failed primarily due to the 
refusal of contestants to abide by the lawful orders of the water 
officials.

[¶32.]  We find that there was more than 
substantial evidence in the record to uphold the decisions of the State Board of 
Control and the district court that an abandonment was not 
proven.

[¶33.]  Our holding makes it unnecessary to 
consider the issue raised by appelleeState Board of Control relative to the 
standing of contestants to petition for an abandonment.

[¶34.]  Affirmed.

1 Section 16-3-114 
authorizes judicial review for "any person aggrieved or adversely affected in 
fact by a final decision of an agency in a contested case, or by other agency 
action or inaction, or any person affected in fact by a rule adopted by an 
agency" under the procedure there set forth.

2 Rule 12, W.R.A.P., 
designates the specific procedure for judicial review of administrative action 
as is directed by § 16-3-114.

3 The State Board of 
Control concedes that title to land may be acquired by adverse possession 
pursuant to § 1-3-103, W.S. 1977; if water rights are appurtenant to such land, 
then the title to the water passes with the title to the land. We do not mean, 
by this opinion, to foreclose this possible exception to the general rule that 
water rights cannot be acquired by adverse possession. We leave this question 
open for another day.

4 We doubt, however, 
whether State officials can be estopped from regulating water rights in 
accordance with established priorities. We have repeatedly held that it is the 
duty of the officers charged with superintendence of the diversion of water to 
make distribution in accordance with priorities as determined or adjudicated. Quinn v. John Whitaker Ranch Co., 54 
Wyo. 367, 92 P.2d 568 (1939).

5 Rule 12.09, W.R.A.P., 
Cum.Supp. 1984, provides in pertinent part:

"The review shall be 
conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record as 
supplemented pursuant to Rule 12.08, W.R.A.P., and to the issues raised before 
the agency. The court's review shall be limited to a determination of the 
matters specified in § 16-3-114(c)."

6 We do note 
that:

"* * * The total absence 
of water to divert during an irrigation season precludes the inclusion of any 
such period of nonuse resulting therefrom in the computation of the successive 
five (5) year period." Section 41-3-401(b), W.S. 1977.