Case Title: Pacific Indemnity Company v. Run-A-Ford Company

Citation: 161 So. 2d 789

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1964-03-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
161 So. 2d 789 (1964)
PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY
v.
RUN-A-FORD COMPANY, Inc., et al.
6 Div. 712.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 12, 1964.
Mudd, Baker & McDaniel and London, Yancey, Clark & Allen, Birmingham, for appellant.
Corretti & Newsom, Birmingham, for Run-A-Ford Co.
Hobart McWhorter, Jr., White, Bradley, Arant, All & Rose, Birmingham, for Porter Clothing Co.
COLEMAN, Justice.
This is an appeal by an automobile liability insurer from a decree declaring that insurer is obligated, by the terms of its policy, (1) to defend an action for personal injury which an injured party, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, had brought against insured, and (2) to pay, up to the policy limits, any final judgment which might be rendered in favor of plaintiff and against insured in said action.
The complainant in this suit for declaratory decree is a corporation engaged in the business of delivering packages for various merchants. The respondent, Porter, operates a department store. Complainant, in accord with its contract with Porter, undertook to deliver a package of clothing to the residence of plaintiff.
We outline the pertinent facts as we understand them to be shown by evidence presented and facts stipulated on the trial of the declaratory suit. The dimensions of the package were 17 by 12 by 2 inches. An employee of complainant carried the package in the insured delivery truck to plaintiff's residence where the employee *790 removed the package from the truck, walked to the front door of plaintiff's house, and, after ringing the door bell and finding no one at home, entered the screened-in porch and placed the package on the floor of the porch in front of the front door. From the time the employee removed the package from the truck until he placed the package on the floor in front of the door, the package did not leave the grasp of the employee's hands. After placing the package on the floor, the employee drove away in the truck and did not return to plaintiff's residence.
Thirty or more minutes after the employee drove off, plaintiff returned home. Before she left home, plaintiff had noticed a hand bill or paper in the screen door which opened onto the front porch. On returning home, plaintiff entered at the rear of the house and went to the front. As she started out the wooden door of the living room onto the front porch a package was leaning against the door. As plaintiff opened the door and started out, the package blocked the opening and caused plaintiff to fall and be injured.
To recover for her injury, plaintiff commenced an action at law against complainant and Porter. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that an employee of complainant left the package in the doorway in such a manner that the doorway was blocked, and that her injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of complainant's employee in so leaving the package in plaintiff's doorway.
Complainant commenced the instant suit to obtain a declaration of insurer's obligations under the policy of insurance it had issued to complainant. As we understand the briefs, there is no controversy as to whether complainant, Porter, and complainant's employee were insured under the policy. We understand that all three were covered. We may sometimes refer to them separately or collectively as the insured.
In pertinent part the policy recites:
"Occupation of the named insured is Package Delivery." (Emphasis Supplied.)
Insurer "Agrees ... To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile."
Insurer first contends that the injury suffered by plaintiff is not an injury arising out of the use or unloading of the insured truck and, therefore, that insurer is not obligated to pay such sums as insured may become legally obligated to pay as damages because of plaintiff's injury; and that the court erred in holding that insurer is obligated to pay such sums.
A comprehensive annotation on the loading and unloading clause appears in 160 A.L.R. 1259, where pertinent cases are cited and discussed.
Insurer relies strongly on Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 272 Ala. 357, 131 So. 2d 182, where this court held that the loading clause did not cover the injury when an automobile door was closed on a child's hand by a person who had placed certain plants in the automobile. This court saw "no occasion to adopt either" of the so-called theories into which cases on loading and unloading have been classified. The court said:
In the case at bar, the injury was allegedly caused by the negligent placing of the parcel. The cases seem to agree that the process of unloading includes at least the entire operation during which the article is lifted and removed from the vehicle up to the moment when the article has actually come to a place of rest outside the vehicle and the connection of the vehicle with the process of unloading has ceased. In the case at bar, we think unloading began, when the insured lifted the parcel from the truck, and ended when insured placed the parcel in front of plaintiff's door. The causative negligence charged is negligence which occurred during the unloading of the truck. In that respect, the instant case differs from Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., supra, where the causative negligence occurred during "an independent act entirely outside the act of loading." The difference is sufficient to prevent the last cited case from controlling here.
Other cases cited by appellant may be distinguished or are not in point, as we understand them, and will not be discussed, except American Casualty Co. v. Fisher, 195 Ga. 136, 23 S.E.2d 395, 144 A.L.R. 533, where the court held that the unloading clause did not cover an injury which occurred when insured removed an adding machine from a table on which he had placed another adding machine, which he was delivering. The injury allegedly resulted from the negligence of insured in removing the machine from the table.
There are two statements in the Fisher opinion which lead us to the view that Fisher should not be followed in the instant case. In the first statement, with reference to policy provisions similar to those here considered, the Supreme Court of Georgia quoted from Zurich &c. Co. v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 118 N.J.L. 317, 192 A. 387: "These words are plain and unambiguous, and delimit with understandable certainty the liability imposed upon the insurer." We incline to the view that the phrase, "loading and unloading," is ambiguous. That view has been stated as follows:
The second statement in Fisher to which we refer is:
The rule in Alabama has been stated to be that insurance policies will be construed most strongly against the insurer. Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Wills, 273 Ala. 648, 650, 143 So. 2d 846. The second statement quoted from the Fisher case does not seem to be in accord with the Alabama rule. We therefore conclude that we should not follow the rule of the Fisher case.
By the instant policy, insurer agreed to pay on behalf of insured sums which insured shall become legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury "arising out of" the use, including unloading, of the truck.
*792 ". . . The words `arising out of involve the idea of causal relationship between the employment (unloading) and the injury, while the term `in the course of relates more particularly to the time, place and circumstances under which the injury occurred. The phrases are not synonymous; ..." (Par. Supplied.) Wooten v. Roden, 260 Ala. 606, 610, 71 So. 2d 802, 805. The instant policy does not require that the injury occur during or in the course of the unloading. The insurer did not so limit its liability.
Plaintiff's injury here allegedly resulted from negligent placing of the package. The placing of the package was part of the unloading. We are of opinion that the injury thus allegedly arose out of the unloading, and that, because the policy covered injuries arising out of the unloading, the policy covered insured's liability to pay for the injury here. It will be understood, of course, that insured's liability to pay is not being determined in the instant stant, and that insured will be liable to pay for plaintiff's injury only if the evidence, presented on the trial of plaintiff's action against insured, shows that the negligent placing of the package occurred as alleged and proximately caused plaintiff's injury.
At least two cases support this view. In Raffel v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 141 Conn. 389, 106 A.2d 716, insured delivered to plaintiff's home a roll of linoleum and left it standing upright at the door. Later the linoleum fell on and injured plaintiff. In holding the insurer liable under an automobile liability policy, which provided that use included loading and unloading, the court said:
In American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Master Bldg. Supply & Lbr. Co., D.C., 179 F. Supp. 699, an action for declaratory judgment, insured delivered nine pieces of sheetrock and placed it on edge in the basement of plaintiff's home. About four hours later, while plaintiff was standing near the sheetrock, it fell on her and injured her leg. Plaintiff sued and alleged that "`. . . because of its negligent and unsafe stacking, the sheet rock toppled and fell upon'" her.
The court noted that insurer contended that the automobile policy would afford no coverage because the accident did not occur during the unloading operation, but occurred several hours after the truck had left the scene. With reference to Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 7 Cir., 251 F.2d 761, the court said:
*793 "The key words arising out of were not discussed." The opinion continues:
The court noted the Maryland rule that ambiguous terms of an insurance policy are to be construed most favorably to the insured and concluded that the policy covered the sheetrock injury, saying:
For the reasons which we have undertaken to state, we are of opinion that the court in the case at bar did not err in holding that insurer is obligated to pay, within policy limits, any judgment rendered for plaintiff and against insured in the action at law.
Insurer's second contention is that the court erred in declaring that insurer is obligated to defend plaintiff's action at law against insured.
Insurer argues that the correct rule, for determining whether or not insurer is obligated to defend, is as follows:
Insurer says that, in the instant case, the allegations of the complaint filed by plaintiff in the action at law against insurer, do not show that plaintiff's injury resulted from the use or unloading of the insured truck, and, therefore, under the correct rule, insurer is not obligated to defend the action.
The policy in the case at bar provides as follows:
We have not found, in the complaint in the action at law against insured involved in the instant case, any reference to a vehicle of any sort. The negligence charged is negligence in leaving the package in the doorway. The complaint does not disclose whether or not any truck of insured was used in making delivery of the package. Facts not alleged in the complaint must be looked to in order to prove that plaintiff's injury was an injury arising out of the unloading of the insured truck.
Insurer's contention, as we understand it, is that before insurer is obligated to defend plaintiff's action against insured, insurer's obligation to defend must appear from the naked allegations of plaintiff's complaint, and that facts not alleged in the complaint cannot be looked to in order to impose on insurer the duty to defend.
In support of its contention insurer cites American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Agricola Furnace Co., 236 Ala. 535, 183 So. 677, which was a suit for declaratory decree to determine the liability of an insurer to defend an action against the insured. This court affirmed the decree which declared that the provisions of the contract of insurance made it the duty of insurer to defend the action brought against the insured.
Examination of the record filed in this court in the Agricola case, supra, discloses that no evidence, other than certain letters, was taken and that the cause was submitted on the original bill of complaint, the answer of insurer, the answer of plaintiff, and the letters which do not appear to state facts on which the cause of action was based. This court appears to have considered also, in addition to the facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint in the action at law, the facts alleged in the bill of complaint in the suit in equity for declaratory decree, because the opinion states:
It is certain that the trial court, in Agricola, considered facts in addition to those alleged in the complaint in the action at law because the decree of the trial court states:
We are of opinion that Agricola is not authority for the proposition that insurer's duty to defend must be determined solely from the facts alleged in the complaint in the action against insured. Facts not alleged in the complaint against insured appear to have been considered by both the trial court and this court in deciding that insurer owed the duty to defend. This court said:
In the case at bar, insurer, by its policy, agreed, "With respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy for bodily injury liability," to defend "any suit against insured *795 alleging such injury." We have undertaken to show that the complaint in the action at law, with respect to the insurance afforded by the instant policy, does allege "such injury." We are of opinion that in deciding whether a complaint alleges such injury, the court is not limited to the bare allegations of the complaint in the action against insured but may also look to facts which may be proved by admissible evidence in a suit for declaratory relief such as the instant case.
That conclusion is reached by the following reasoning. The question is: Is insurer's agreement, to defend any suit "alleging such injury," to be construed as an agreement to defend only a suit in which the complaint, in itself and without the aid of other facts, contains allegations sufficient to establish the conclusion that the injury alleged is covered by the policy; or, is the agreement to be construed as one to defend a suit in which the complaint alleges an injury which is within the policy coverage but can be shown to be within the coverage only when facts, which do exist but are not alleged in the complaint, are taken into consideration? The policy does not provide which construction shall be adopted. Under the rule that the policy must be liberally construed in favor of the insured, the latter construction must be adopted. Under the latter construction, facts not alleged in the complaint may be considered.
In the case at bar, the trial court considered facts not alleged in the complaint. We are of opinion that this was not error.
The facts shown on the trial of the instant declaratory suit, are sufficient, as we have undertaken to show, to support the conclusion that plaintiff's action at law is an action alleging an injury covered by the policy. It follows then, that the court did not err in declaring that insurer is obligated to defend plaintiff's action against insured in the instant case.
There is authority which supports insurer's contention that the bare allegations of the complaint in the action for damages determine insurer's duty to defend. See Wilson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 377 Pa. 588, 105 A.2d 304, 50 A.L.R. 2d 449, and other cases discussed in the annotation.
The annotator also cited cases which support our conclusion, among them, London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. White & Bros., 188 Va. 195, 49 S.E.2d 254, where the court, in holding insurer liable to defend said:
In Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Hilderbrandt, 10 Cir., 119 F.2d 291, 299, 300, the court held insurer liable to defend and said:
We are of opinion that the two cases last cited rest on the better reasons and that the court did not err in declaring insurer liable to defend, on behalf of insured, the action brought by plaintiff against insured in the case at bar.
Affirmed.
SIMPSON, GOODWYN, MERRILL, and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.