Case Title: TL ex rel. TL v. CS

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-98-1

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
TL ex rel. TL v. CS1999 WY 41975 P.2d 1065Case Number: C-98-1Decided: 04/09/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
TL, 
by his guardians and conservators, TL and CL, Appellants (Petitioners),

v.

CS, n/k/a CI, TS and JI, 
Appellees (Respondents).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Sweetwater County, Honorable John D. Troughton, 
Judge.

Turner A. Rouse 
of Buchhammer and Kehl, Cheyenne, Wyoming; John M. Scorsine, Burns, Wyoming. 
Argument by Mr. Scorsine, representing appellants.

William L. 
Combs, Evanston, Wyoming, representing appellees.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* retired November 2, 
1998.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The primary issue 
in this establishment-of-paternity case concerns how we shall resolve the 
apparent conflict between the statutory paternity presumption arising in favor 
of a man who receives a minor child into his home and openly holds out the child 
as his natural child, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-102(a)(iv) (Michie 1997), and the 
statutory paternity presumption arising in favor of another man whom genetic 
testing evidence reveals to be the biological father of the minor child in 
question, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-109 (Michie 1997). We first saw this case in 
Matter of Paternity of TS, 917 P.2d 183 (Wyo. 1996). There, we reversed the 
district court's order of summary judgment in favor of TL, who received TS into 
his home and openly held out TS as his natural child, and remanded for trial the 
issue of paternity. The jury decided that the genetic testing evidence in favor 
of JI revealing a 99.99+ percent probability of biological paternity did not 
rebut the statutory presumption arising in favor of TL, and held in TL's favor. 
The district court overturned the jury's verdict and entered judgment as a 
matter of law in JI's favor. The court also awarded costs and attorney fees 
against TL.

[¶2]      We hold that the 
particular circumstances of this case required TL to prove that the results of 
the genetic testing were inaccurate or somehow deficient, the district court 
correctly ruled that he did not present any such evidence, and JI was, 
therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents these issues for our review:

I. Did the 
District Court err when it chose to disregard the jury's verdict and entered a 
judgment as a matter of law?

II. Is the 
assessment of costs and attorney fees against the Appellant 
proper?

III. Does the 
judgment of the Court remove from the Appellant any meaningful opportunity for 
appeal to this court?

[¶4]      Appellees 
rephrase the issues as:

I: Whether the 
District Court erred by entering judgment as a matter of law, notwithstanding 
the jury verdict regarding paternity.

II: Whether the 
trial court's award of attorney fees and costs against appellants was 
proper.

III: Whether 
appellants were deprived of meaningful appeal.

FACTS

[¶5]      The mother (CI) 
of TS lived with TL intermittently from the time of the child's birth in 1991 
through 1992. Genetic testing, however, established that a 99.99+ percent 
probability existed that JI was the biological father of TS. Matter of Paternity 
of TS, 917 P.2d  at 184-85. Our previous decision in the paternity action 
regarding this child held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether TL could be considered a presumed father under the statute by virtue of 
having held the child out as his own. Id. at 185. That issue was remanded for 
trial. Additionally, we remanded to determine whether any clear and convincing 
evidence rebutted the presumption of paternity created by the genetic testing. 
Id. at 185-86.

[¶6]      A jury trial was 
held to determine the paternity of TL, whether TL suffered any damages as a 
result of the alleged fraudulent actions of CI, and whether TL was entitled to 
custody and visitation with the child in the event the jury did not find that he 
was the natural father of the child. The jury concluded that TL was the natural 
father of the child and that CI did not commit fraud but was guilty of willful 
and wanton misconduct. CI and JI and the coguardians ad litem for TS filed a 
motion for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative for new trial. The 
trial court granted judgment as a matter of law, finding that TL did not 
introduce any evidence which contradicted the genetic testing and, as a matter 
of law, should not have been found to be the natural father of TS. That order 
declared JI the natural father of TS, denied TL custody and any right of 
visitation with the child, and ordered TL to pay the attorney fees of JI and the 
fees and costs of the co-guardians ad litem. The order also conditionally 
granted a new trial to the child on the issue of damages incurred by him because 
of TL's, JI's, and CI's deception regarding the identity of his natural father, 
and conditionally granted a new trial to TL on his claim for deceit against 
CI.

DISCUSSION

Standard of 
Review

[¶7]      On an appeal of 
the grant of a judgment as a matter of law, we review the record without 
deference to the views of the trial court to determine whether the evidence is 
such that without weighing the credibility of the witnesses, or otherwise 
considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion 
reasonable persons could have reached. Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Shirley, 958 P.2d 1040, 1053 (Wyo. 1998); Ames v. Sundance State Bank, 850 P.2d 607, 608-09 
(Wyo. 1993). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party 
against whom the motion for judgment as a matter of law is directed, giving all 
reasonable and legitimate inferences to such evidence. Ames, 850 P.2d  at 
608-09.

Presumptive 
Father Determination

[¶8]      TL's contentions 
on appeal can be summarized as assertions that Wyoming's Parentage Act 
recognizes that a non-biological father can demonstrate a sufficiently 
established father-child relationship warranting a jury verdict in his favor 
and, therefore, the district court erred in overturning the jury verdict. JI 
contends that these arguments and the evidence presented by TL at trial were a 
demonstration that declaring TL the natural father was in the best interests of 
the child, a factor this Court ruled irrelevant in our previous decision in this 
case. Matter of Paternity of TS, 917 P.2d  at 186.

[¶9]      Wyoming has 
adopted a slightly modified version of the Uniform Parentage Act1 in order to achieve a basic purpose 
of protecting the father-child relationship. Matter of Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Wyo. 1991). Generally, this Court has long recognized the 
strong state policy in legitimacy to avoid disruption of family relationships. 
Matter of Paternity of SDM, 882 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Wyo. 1994); LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374, 380 (Wyo. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994). The legislature's 
intent to insure children born during wedlock will not be considered 
illegitimate is expressed in the statutory presumption of paternity accorded to 
a man married to the mother at the time of the child's birth. Matter of 
Paternity of TS, 917 P.2d  at 186. Although TL was never married to CI, the Act 
recognizes TL's presumptive legal relationship:

§ 14-2-102. 
Presumption of paternity; rebuttal thereof.

(a) A man is 
presumed to be the natural father of a child if:

* * * 
*

(iv) While the 
child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home and 
openly holds out the child as his natural child.

(b) A 
presumption under subsection (a) of this section may be rebutted in an 
appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence. If two (2) or more 
presumptions under subsection (a) of this section arise which conflict with each 
other, the presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier 
considerations of policy and logic controls. A presumption under subsection (a) 
of this section is rebutted by a court decree establishing paternity of the 
child by another man.

* * * 
*

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-2-102 (Michie 1997).

[¶10]   JI's presumptive legal relationship 
can be established as provided by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-109(e)(iv) (Michie 
1997):

If the experts 
conclude that the genetic tests show that the alleged parent is not excluded and 
that the probability of the alleged parent's parentage is ninety-seven percent 
(97%) or higher, the alleged parent is presumed to be the parent and this 
evidence shall be admitted. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and 
convincing evidence.

Section 
14-2-102(b) provides the standard by which conflicting presumptions arising 
under it are to be resolved. The presumption "founded on the weightier 
considerations of policy and logic controls." The Act does not, however, 
establish a standard to resolve conflicting presumptions arising under these two 
different sections of the paternity act as has occurred in this case. TL's 
contention that he can be declared the natural father raises the question 
whether the purpose of the Act is to determine the biological father or whether 
its purpose is to preserve the presumptive father-child relationship which is in 
the best interests of the child.

[¶11]   Ordinarily, such a question would 
require that we apply our statutory interpretation analysis and determine the 
legislative intent; however, our previous decisions have answered this question. 
In Matter of SAJ, 781 P.2d 528 (Wyo. 1989), we held that the best interests of 
the child standard was not relevant in an action purely to establish paternity. 
Id. at 530. In that action, no other presumed father was involved. Id. at 529. 
In MAK-M and DMM v. SM, 854 P.2d 64 (Wyo. 1993), we ruled that the ex-husband 
was the presumptive father where he and the mother were married soon after the 
child's birth and lived together for a time, although he was mistakenly named as 
the child's biological father on the child's birth certificate. Id. at 67. After 
their divorce, father was granted the care and custody of the child, and mother 
brought an action to determine the nonexistence of paternity and for custody. 
Id. at 66. We upheld the lower court's determination that the best interests of 
the child were served by sustaining the father's presumptive parenthood and held 
that the best interests of the child are not always served by a paternity 
determination of his or her biological father. Id. at 67.

[¶12]   In contrast, in the first action in 
this particular case, we held that a trial was necessary to determine if there 
is any clear and convincing evidence which rebuts the presumption established by 
genetic testing, and the best interests of the child analysis was not necessary. 
Our ruling was essentially a decision that the circumstances required that 
genetic testing resolve any conflict between statutory presumptions. Matter of 
Paternity of TS, 917 P.2d  at 186. In this particular case, JI alleged that he 
was the natural father of TS in January of 1994. The Act permits any man 
alleging that he is the natural father of a child having a presumed father under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-102 to bring the action within six months of the child's 
birth or on or before December 31, 1994, whichever is later. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-104(c) (Michie 1997). In summary, there are circumstances where the best 
interests of the child is at issue; however, in this particular case, that 
analysis was unnecessary, primarily because the statute permitted the action, 
the child was born out-of-wedlock, and the mother and biological father 
married.

[¶13]   We can foresee circumstances 
arising where a biological father should not be permitted to allege paternity 
and disrupt an established, presumptive father-child relationship, and we assume 
that there are any endless variety of scenarios regarding paternity which can 
arise and that will have to be carefully considered by a district court before 
permitting a paternity determination. However, the district court in this case 
properly interpreted our ruling to mean that the genetic testing was the 
prevailing presumption and could only be rebutted by clear and convincing 
evidence attacking the accuracy of the testing results. We affirm the order 
directing judment as a matter of law for JI and CI.

Attorney 
Fees

[¶14]   TL contends the district court sent 
a letter before trial that it would award attorney fees against TL if CI and JI 
prevailed at trial. He contends this indicated prejudgment and the award of 
attorney fees is an abuse of discretion. The Act states:

If a man 
alleging paternity fails to establish his paternity, the court shall order him 
to pay all court costs and reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing 
party.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-2-104(c) (Michie 1997).

The court may 
order reasonable fees of counsel, experts and the child's guardian ad litem, and 
other costs of the action and pretrial proceedings including genetic tests, to 
be paid by the parties in proportions and at times determined by the 
court.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-2-114 (Michie 1997).

[¶15]   This Court's reversal of the 
summary judgment in favor of TL and its remand for trial to determine if there 
was any clear and convincing evidence rebutting the results of the genetic 
testing informed TL that this particular aspect was the only paternity question 
at issue for trial. TL did not present any evidence on this issue at trial, yet 
he continued to contest paternity. The trial did address other important issues, 
but TL continued to allege paternity, he did not prevail, and under the plain 
wording of the statute, the district court was entitled to order him to pay all 
of the court costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party. Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-2-104(c) (Michie 1997).

[¶16]   A denial or award of attorney fees 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-114 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. LC v. 
TL, 870 P.2d  at 381. The district court did not give any reasons for awarding 
costs to the co-guardians ad litem; however, it could reasonably have concluded 
that TL should pay these costs for continuing to improperly contest paternity 
and because he did not prevail on the issues involving paternity, custody, and 
visitation. TL's broad accusations that the court prejudged the case simply have 
no bearing on the issue of awarding these kinds of costs and do not persuade us 
there was an abuse of discretion. Without any other reason advanced as to why 
this award of costs was an abuse of discretion, we will uphold this portion of 
the order.

Meaningful 
Appeal

[¶17]   TL contends that the district court 
intended to deny him an effective appeal or remedy when it ruled 
that:

[TS] is hereby 
granted a new trial on the issue of damages incurred by said minor child on 
account of [TLs] and Respondents deceiving him as to the identity of his natural 
father. This cause of action was not pleaded on behalf of [TS]. The grant of a 
new trial is therefore conditioned on an appeal of the judgment, order for a new 
trial on appeal and appropriate amendments to the pleadings; or on the filing of 
a motion for new trial by [TL]. . . .

[TL] . . . shall 
be granted a new trial on his claim for deceit against Respondent [CI]. The 
grounds for conditionally granting a new trial to [TL] on this issue are that 
judgment is being entered against [TL] notwithstanding the jury verdict. . . 
.

[T]he 
alternative motion for new trial made by Respondents [JI and CI] is hereby 
granted. This grant of a new trial is conditioned on vacation or reversal of the 
paternity ruling on appeal. . . .

[¶18]   His precise concern appears to be 
with that part of the ruling stating "[t]he grant of a new trial is therefore 
conditioned on an appeal of the judgment." JI and CI contend that the district 
court merely complied with W.R.C.P. 50(c)(1) which mandates that it set out any 
conditions which must occur before a new trial is granted. That rule 
provides:

(c) Granting 
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law; conditional rulings; new trial 
motion.

(1) If the 
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is granted, the court shall also 
rule on the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be 
granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the 
grounds for granting or denying the motion for new trial. If the motion for a 
new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon does not affect the 
finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new trial has been 
conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on appeal, the new trial 
shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the 
motion for a new trial has been conditionally denied, the appellee on appeal may 
assert error in that denial; and if the judgment is reversed on appeal, 
subsequent proceedings shall be in accordance with the order of the appellate 
court.

JI and CI 
further state that TL has not been affected by the conditions because he did not 
file a motion for a new trial. We disagree with TL's contention that the order 
automatically results in a new trial to allow TS to sue TL for damages if TL 
appeals. We read the order as attempting to anticipate the issues which might be 
raised if a new trial were to be granted following appeal. Whether or not the 
district court could properly order a new trial under Rule 50 on the basis of 
TL's filing an appeal is not an issue before us, and we do not address it. From 
the record before us, we do not see an intent by the district court to include 
this wording in the order as a financially punitive measure aimed at 
discouraging TL from appealing.

[¶19]   We affirm the order granting 
judgment as a matter of law.

Footnotes

1 The other 
states adopting some version of the Uniform Parentage Act are: Alaska, 
California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, and 
Washington.