Case Title: Nunnally v. Hilderman

Citation: 373 P.2d 940

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1962-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
373 P.2d 940 (1962) Shelia Mather NUNNALLY, formerly Shelia Ann Mather, and Katherine Mather Colburn, formerly Katherine Elizabeth Mather, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Al HILDERMAN, Jr., Defendant in Error. No. 19824. Supreme Court of Colorado. In Department. July 2, 1962. Rehearing Denied August 27, 1962. William H. Allen, William C. Stover, Eugene E. Mitchell, Fort Collins, for plaintiff in error. Houtchens & Houtchens, John J. Dooley, Greeley, for defendant in error. McWILLIAMS, Justice. The trial court held that Nunnally and Colburn authorized the Poudre Valley National Bank (hereafter referred to as the *941 Bank) as "their agent to sell" for $6,000 approximately 160 acres of farm land jointly owned by them and situate in Larimer County, the purchaser to receive the 1959 soil bank payment in the amount of $720 as well as "any and all minerals" owned by Nunnally and Colburn; that the Bank as agent for Nunnally and Colburn did thereafter enter into a valid and binding contract with one Hilderman to sell the property for $6,000, and under these circumstances decreed that Hilderman was entitled to specific performance of the contract. By writ of error Nunnally and Colburn seek reversal of the judgment, contending that the record does not support the findings and that the decree calling for specific performance is erroneous as a matter of law. For reasons set forth below, we conclude that this judgment is erroneous and must be reversed. C.R.S. '53, 59-1-9 provides that "every instrument required to be subscribed by any party under 59-1-8 may be subscribed by the agent of such party, lawfully authorized by writing." (Emphasis supplied.) In Stark v. Rogers, 69 Colo. 98, 169 P. 146 this Court in clear and unequivocal language declared that: To like effect, in Johnson v. Lennox, 55 Colo. 125, 133 P. 744 it is stated: Finally, in Springer v. City Bank & Trust Co., 59 Colo. 376, 149 P. 253 it was said: In the instant case the trial court held that the Bank was authorized by Nunnally and Colburn "as their agent to sell" their property, and under the authorities above cited the court of necessity must have found that this authority embraced more than to merely find a ready, willing and able purchaser, but was in fact a specific authorization, in writing, empowering the Bank "to enter into a contract binding the owner to convey the title." What is the evidence that would support such a finding? Hilderman argues that the *942 following synopsized facts adduced upon trial fully justify this conclusion: We now hold that these evidentiary matters are insufficient to take this case out from under the rule announced in Stark v. Rogers, supra, and as a matter of law do not constitute specific authorization in writing empowering the Bank to enter into a contract with Hilderman which would be binding on Nunnally and Colburn. Rather it simply empowered the Bank to find a ready, willing and able purchaser and to then transmit his offer to Nunnally and Colburn for their consideration and possible acceptance. Hilderman alternatively argues that even if it be decided that the Bank had only the authority to locate a purchaser and did not have authority to accept an offer of purchase in behalf of Nunnally and Colburn that nonetheless Nunnally and Colburn ratified the contract of sale which, according to Hilderman, was entered into by himself and the Bank as agent for Nunnally and Colburn on June 6, 1959. According to Hilderman, and his testimony at this stage of the proceedings must be accepted as correct, he and the trust officer for the Bank verbally agreed on June 6, 1959 that he would buy the Nunnally-Colburn property for $6,000 and that he would be entitled to the 1959 soil bank payment and "any and all mineral rights" owned by Nunnally and Colburn. On this occasion Hilderman delivered to the Bank's trust officer his personal check in the amount of $1,000, this check being made payable to the Bank, and on the face of the check he wrote the following: The trial court specifically found that "Nunnally and Colburn by separate acts ratified the above described agreement, Nunnally by a telephone conversation with the plaintiff and Colburn by plaintiff's exhibit I." (It is parenthetically noted that it is believed the court inadvertently referred to plaintiff's exhibit I, when in fact it intended to refer to plaintiff's exhibit B.) It is hornbook law that "ratification" as that word is used in the law of principal and agent is the "adoption and confirmation by one person with knowledge of all material facts, of an act or contract performed or entered into in his behalf by another who at the time assumed without authority to act as his agent." (Emphasis supplied) See Black's Law Dictionary, De Luxe Fourth Edition. Hilderman contends that "ratification occurred by acceptance of benefits, orally by telephone calls and in writing through plaintiff's exhibit B." Let us examine the evidence which, according to Hilderman, would support such a conclusion. Plaintiff's exhibit B is a letter written by Colburn's Kentucky counsel several weeks after Hilderman instituted the present action. This letter was addressed to Hilderman's attorney with copies thereof being thoughtfully sent to the trial court and the *943 Bank. In this letter Colburn through her Kentucky attorney stated "that a sales price of $6,000 was agreeable with her". However, this same letter goes on to state, inter alia, the following: The contents of plaintiff's exhibit B have been set forth in some detail because Hilderman's argument for ratification is primarily based on this document, which is somehow supposed to prove "ratification" not only by Colburn but by Nunnally as well. Instead of showing ratification, plaintiff's exhibit B actually shows an utter lack of ratification, and clearly demonstrates that Colburn did not have full and complete "knowledge of all material facts". Hence her request to learn "the contents of the agreement entered into between Mr. Beatty * * * with * * * Mr. Hilderman." We conclude that plaintiff's exhibit B does not, as a matter of law, constitute "ratification." Very shortly after June 6, 1959 Hilderman called or caused to be called via long distance telephone both Nunnally and Colburn, and it is his position that each approved the sale to him of this land for $6,000. Even assuming that there could be "ratification by parol", which is contrary to the rule announced in People's Mining & Milling Company v. Central Consolidated Mines Corporation, 20 Colo.App. 561, 80 P. 479, the evidence again fails to affirmatively show that either Nunnally or Colburn had full and complete knowledge of all facts relating to the terms of the alleged contract. One additional fact of no doubt some importance was that apparently neither Nunnally nor Colburn at the time of these telephone calls knew that on or about June 8, 1959 one Kane made an offer to the Bank of $7,200 for this same property. We conclude that this testimony also as a matter of law falls far short of establishing ratification. Finally, it is urged that Nunnally and Colburn ratified by accepting the $1,000 "down payment" made by Hilderman. In this respect the evidence discloses that the Bank cashed this check, kept the proceeds in its escrow account and eventually returned the money by its check to Hilderman, which check Hilderman has declined to cash. In Castner v. Richardson, 18 Colo. 496, 33 P. 163 it was held that a down payment on the purchase price of realty made by a prospective purchaser to one claiming to be the representative of the seller is not binding on the seller in the absence of written authority in the agent to convey. In short, accepting Hilderman's version of the acts claimed to establish ratification as true and correct, we conclude that they are insufficient as a matter of law to constitute ratification. Our resolution of this controversy on the grounds that the Bank did not have the authority to accept on behalf of Nunnally and *944 Colburn the offer of purchase made by Hilderman, and that Nunnally and Colburn did not subsequently ratify the alleged contract between Hilderman and the Bank, should not be interpreted as indicating that in other respects Hilderman has sustained his burden of proof. There is substantial doubt as to whether there was a "meeting of minds" on the part of Hilderman and the Bank as to all of the essential and material elements of the purported agreement. Also there is genuine doubt as to whether there was a sufficient written memorandum to comply with the requirement of the Statute of Frauds, C.R.S. '53, 59-1-8. However, in view of our disposition of the matter these questions need not be considered. The net result is that Nunnally and Colburn as the owners of realty may still sell to whomever they choose, even to the highest bidder, since as a matter of law they have not obligated themselves to sell to Hilderman. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of Nunnally and Colburn. DAY, C. J., and FRANTZ, J., concur.