Case Title: State ex rel. Seaton v. Holmes

Citation: 2003-Ohio-5897

Docket Number: 20030841

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Seaton v. Holmes, 100 Ohio St.3d 265, 2003-Ohio-5897.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. SEATON v. HOLMES, JUDGE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Seaton v. Holmes, 100 Ohio St.3d 265, 2003-Ohio-5897.] 
Prohibition — Writ sought to prohibit common pleas court judge from 
proceeding on relator’s ex-husband’s postdivorce motions — Both 
parties moved to Missouri by the time original divorce decree was 
entered — Writ granted when court lacks jurisdiction. 
(No. 2003-0841 — Submitted September 16, 2003 — Decided November 19, 
2003.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
In 1998, relator, Rachelle R. Seaton, and Aaron L. Courtright were 
married in Ohio.  Their minor child, Ryan, was born in Ohio on September 12, 
1999.  During an April 10, 2002 divorce proceeding before respondent, Ross 
County Common Pleas Court Judge Nicholas H. Holmes Jr., Rachelle and Aaron 
specified that they were going to immediately, but separately, relocate to 
Missouri.  On April 16, 2002, Rachelle, Aaron, and Ryan moved to Missouri.  In 
Missouri, Rachelle and Ryan lived separately from Aaron. 
{¶2} 
On May 15, 2002, Judge Holmes issued Rachelle and Aaron a 
divorce decree that incorporated a shared parenting plan and awarded primary 
custody of Ryan to Rachelle.  The decree did not specify that Ohio would have 
continuing jurisdiction.  It authorized both parents’ relocation to Missouri and 
refers to the parents’ intention to compute child support based on their income in 
that state.  On August 19, 2002, Rachelle registered the Ohio divorce decree in 
Missouri. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶3} 
On September 27, 2002, when Aaron, Rachelle, and Ryan were 
living in Missouri, Aaron filed in respondent’s court a motion for contempt and 
termination of shared parenting.  In response, Rachelle filed a motion asking the 
Ohio court to dismiss Aaron’s action, claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction.  
Aaron moved back to Ohio on November 3, 2002. 
{¶4} 
On November 20, 2002, Judge Holmes denied Rachelle’s motion 
to dismiss.  Judge Holmes concluded that the Ohio court had continuing 
jurisdiction under Civ.R. 75(J) and R.C. 3109.22(A)(1) and (2).  On January 13, 
2003, Judge Holmes denied Rachelle’s motion for an evidentiary hearing 
concerning her jurisdictional claim. 
{¶5} 
Rachelle appealed, and the Court of Appeals for Ross County 
dismissed the appeal for lack of a final appealable order. 
{¶6} 
In February 2003, Rachelle filed a motion pertaining to custody in 
a Missouri court.  Proceedings on that motion are continuing, and, in that case, 
Aaron and Rachelle have been scheduled to begin mediation.  Judge Holmes 
ordered Rachelle to deliver Ryan to the Ohio court on May 21 and July 24 for 
hearings on Aaron’s motions. 
{¶7} 
On May 9, 2003, Rachelle filed this action for a writ of prohibition 
to prevent Judge Holmes from proceeding on Aaron’s postdivorce motions.  
Rachelle also moved for an alternative writ to prevent Judge Holmes from 
conducting the May 21 and July 24 hearings.  On May 16, 2003, Judge Holmes 
stayed the underlying proceedings during the pendency of this prohibition case.  
We granted an alternative writ sua sponte.  State ex rel. Seaton v. Holmes, 99 
Ohio St.3d 1457, 2003-Ohio-3514, 790 N.E.2d 1220. 
{¶8} 
For the following reasons, Rachelle is entitled to the requested writ 
of prohibition. 
{¶9} 
“Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act [“UCCJA”], 
R.C. 3109.21 et seq., and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act [“PKPA”], 
January Term, 2003 
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Section 1738A, Title 28, U.S.Code, a state court that has rendered an initial 
custody decree has exclusive jurisdiction over the ongoing custody dispute if that 
state has continuing jurisdiction.”  (Emphasis added.)  Justis v. Justis (1998), 81 
Ohio St.3d 312, 691 N.E.2d 264, syllabus. 
{¶10} Section 1738A(d) of the PKPA provides that the state court that 
has made the initial child custody determination retains jurisdiction only if that 
state remains the residence of the child or any contestant: 
{¶11} “The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child 
custody or visitation determination consistently with the provisions of this section 
continues as long as [that court had jurisdiction under its state’s laws] and such 
State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶12} Judge Holmes lacks jurisdiction over Aaron’s postdivorce motions 
because Aaron, Rachelle, and Ryan had all moved to Missouri by the time the 
original divorce decree was entered.  Both parents and the child were living in 
Missouri when Aaron filed his first postdecree motions in September 2002. 
{¶13} The word “remains” in Section 1738A(d) of the PKPA “is defined 
by the dictionary.”  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pedowitz (1986), 179 Cal.App.3d 
992, 1001, 225 Cal.Rptr. 186.  See, also, Maxie v. Fernandez (E.D.Va. 1986), 649 
F.Supp. 627, 631; cf. Campus Bus Serv. v. Zaino, 98 Ohio St.3d 463, 2003-Ohio-
1915, 786 N.E.2d 889, ¶ 21 (court construes undefined statutory language 
according to rules of grammar and common usage by consistently using 
dictionary definitions).  After applying the applicable rules of construction, we 
determine that the word “remain” means “to stay in the same place” and “to 
continue unchanged in form, condition, status, or quantity.”  Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary (1971) 1919. 
{¶14} Ohio was the residence of both parents and the child when they 
agreed to terms that were subsequently incorporated into the original divorce 
decree.  But all of them moved to Missouri.  Although Aaron later moved back to 
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Ohio, he did not thereby confer continuing jurisdiction on the Ohio court.  His 
status as an Ohio resident did not “continue unchanged” from the issuance of the 
divorce decree until the present.  In fact, according to Rachelle’s uncontroverted 
affidavit, Aaron has expressed his intent to continue residence in Missouri and 
doubts the likelihood of further proceedings in Ohio. 
{¶15} Therefore, under the PKPA, Ohio lacks jurisdiction over Aaron’s 
postdecree motions.  In other words, “[i]f the party attempting to ‘continue’ 
jurisdiction in the original court leaves that jurisdiction, establishes residence 
elsewhere, and subsequently attempts to reestablish residence in the original 
court, then that party does not satisfy the requirement of subsection (d) that the 
state or district ‘remains the residence’ of that party.”  Maxie, 649 F.Supp. at 631; 
see, also, In re Marriage of Pedowitz, 179 Cal.App.3d at 1001, 225 Cal.Rptr. 186 
(“whether [father] remained or continued as a resident of California until he filed 
his petition to modify depends upon whether he was temporarily absent with the 
intention of returning to California, his home, or if he moved from California and 
stayed in Florida during the 11 months with the intention of making Florida his 
residence and his home”); Shook v. Shook (Ala.Civ.App. 1994), 651 So.2d 6, 8 
(“under the PKPA, one of the contestants must remain a resident of the state that 
issued the original custody determination for that state to retain continuing 
jurisdiction over the dispute”); see, generally, Annotation, Child Custody:  When 
Does State that Issued Previous Custody Determination Have Continuing 
Jurisdiction Under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS §1738A (1991), 83 A.L.R. 4th 
742, 752, Section 2[b]. 
{¶16} Judge Holmes’s citation of the UCCJA and Civ.R. 75(J) in support 
of his exercise of continuing jurisdiction in the underlying case does not warrant a 
contrary conclusion.  Insofar as the Ohio version of the UCCJA conflicts with the 
PKPA, the PKPA prevails.  Justis, 81 Ohio St.3d at 317, 691 N.E.2d 264; see, 
January Term, 2003 
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also, Barclay v. Eckert, 2000 ME 10, 743 A.2d 1259, ¶ 8 (“In the event of a 
conflict, the PKPA preempts the UCCJA”); Fuerstenberg v. Fuerstenberg 
(S.D.1999), 591 N.W.2d 798, 805 (“the PKPA preempts conflicting state law”); 
Nadeau v. Nadeau (R.I.1998), 716 A.2d 717, 721; Moore v. Richardson (1998), 
332 Ark. 255, 263, 964 S.W.2d 377; Michalik v. Michalik (1993), 172 Wis.2d 
640, 649, 494 N.W.2d 391.  In fact, R.C. 3109.22(A)(1) requires, comparably to 
the PKPA, that “a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this state” 
before an Ohio court can exercise jurisdiction.  (Emphasis added.)  And the 
provisions of Civ.R. 75 pertaining to continuing jurisdiction do not confer 
jurisdiction in Ohio over postdecree matters when jurisdiction is otherwise 
lacking under the PKPA or the UCCJA.  See Mayor v. Mayor (1991), 71 Ohio 
App.3d 789, 792, 595 N.E.2d 436. 
{¶17} Moreover, this result is consistent with the preeminent purposes of 
the UCCJA, which are “avoiding ‘jurisdictional competition and conflict with the 
courts of other states and assur[ing] that the state with the optimum access to the 
relevant facts makes the custody determination, thus protecting the best interests 
of the child.’ ”  Justis, 81 Ohio St.3d at 318, 691 N.E.2d 264, quoting In re 
Guardianship of Wonderly (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 178, 180, 21 O.O.3d 111, 423 
N.E.2d 420.  Missouri is the state with the optimum access to the pertinent facts 
here. 
{¶18} Based on the foregoing, Judge Holmes and the Ohio common pleas 
court patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over Aaron’s postdecree 
motions.  Therefore, we grant Rachelle Seaton a writ of prohibition preventing 
Judge Holmes from exercising further jurisdiction in the underlying case. 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Katherine Hine, for relator. 
 
Scott W. Nusbaum, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Matthew S. 
Schmidt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
__________________