Case Title: People v. Mendez

Citation: 

Docket Number: S129501

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2019-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JULIAN ALEJANDRO MENDEZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S129501 
 
Riverside County Superior Court 
RIF090811 
 
 
July 1, 2019 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
S129501 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
This case concerns the murders of Michael Faria and 
Jessica Salazar.  The People charged three members of a gang 
called North Side Colton with murdering Faria after he claimed 
allegiance to a rival gang called West Side Verdugo, and with 
murdering Salazar after she witnessed Faria’s killing.  The 
three gang members charged here were Joe “Gato” Rodriguez, 
Daniel “Huero” Lopez, and Defendant Julian Alejandro “Midget” 
Mendez.  Mendez was tried jointly with Rodriguez and Lopez, 
but by a separate jury.  Mendez was convicted and sentenced to 
death.  This automatic appeal concerns him alone.  We affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Among the most crucial evidence presented against 
Mendez at trial was testimony from two people:  a friend of the 
accused, Samuel “Devil” Redmond, who pleaded guilty to first 
degree murder to avoid the death penalty; and a friend of the 
victims, Sergio Lizarraga.  The following description of the 
crimes relies primarily on accounts from these two witnesses. 
A.  The Murder of Michael Faria 
Redmond and Mendez had been friends since childhood 
and shared an apartment in Colton, California.  At trial, 
Redmond testified about what happened on the night of the 
killings.  He and Mendez drank alcohol and smoked 
methamphetamine in their apartment with Lopez, Mendez’s 
eventual codefendant.  The three men then set out in Redmond’s 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
SUV, a black Nissan Pathfinder, to meet up with friends living 
at a nearby Four Seasons apartment complex.  There, they 
encountered Mendez’s other eventual codefendant, Rodriguez, 
who suggested they meet some fellow North Side Colton gang 
members 
— 
specifically, 
Art 
“Rascal” 
Luna 
and 
his 
brothers — at their house on Michigan Street in Colton.  When 
the four of them arrived, they saw Luna in a car with a “bunch 
of kids.”  And walking along the street was another group of 
kids, whom Redmond estimated were 15 or 16 years old. 
Among this latter group were the murder victims in this 
case:  Michael Faria and Jessica Salazar.  With them were 
Lizarraga, Greg Frias, and David Flores.  Lizarraga later 
provided the most detailed witness account of Faria’s death.  
According to Lizarraga’s testimony, he and his four companions 
saw a black SUV park across the street.  The man who appeared 
to have been the driver emerged from the car and walked to the 
house.  Two other men exited the SUV and struck up a 
conversation with Salazar.  Faria and Flores were standing 
nearby.  When Lizarraga beckoned them, they started to walk 
away.  Then one of the two men said to Salazar, “I think I know 
you.”  She turned around and started talking to him again. 
At that moment, the man who appeared to have been 
driving the SUV walked up to Lizarraga and Faria.  Faria asked 
him, “Where are you from?”  Without answering, the man put 
the question back to Faria.  Faria answered, “I back[] up the 
West.”  The man retorted, “Fuck the Westside.  North [S]ide 
Colton.”  That worried Lizarraga, who interpreted the back-and-
forth as an escalating gang challenge.  Seeking to calm the 
situation, Lizarraga tried to get between the man and Faria, 
telling the latter, “It’s cool.  Just chill out, walk away.”  Then, as 
Lizarraga turned around, the man punched him in the face.   
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
Lizarraga persisted in trying to de-escalate the situation.  
Moments later, he saw Flores being chased.  At that point, Faria 
was still standing next to Lizarraga.  But then a group of people 
descended on Faria and beat him to the ground.  Lizarraga, 
having backed away, started running towards Faria.  Someone 
grabbed Lizarraga by the shirt.  Salazar intervened and told 
Lizarraga’s would-be assailant, “No he’s cool.  He’s not from the 
West.”  The man let go.  But before Lizarraga could do anything 
else, someone shot Faria.  Lizarraga would later tell law 
enforcement that he was 75 percent sure Rodriguez shot Faria, 
but at trial he could not “remember any faces from that night.” 
Redmond testified that, after he alighted from the SUV, 
he saw Mendez, Rodriguez, and Lopez talking to Salazar.  
Redmond and Lopez began to walk towards Luna’s house across 
the street, leaving Mendez and Rodriguez with Salazar and her 
friends.  Moments later, Redmond heard an argument.  Then, 
standing with Lopez and Luna, Redmond saw a fight break out 
and a crowd gathering.  A chase involving Mendez and 
Rodriguez ensued.  Redmond stayed put, but Lopez and Luna, 
the latter of whom had just been handed a gun by his younger 
brother, started walking towards the fray.  Lopez quickly turned 
around and sprinted back.  He told Redmond, “Hurry up.  Let’s 
go get Midget.”  So the two men ran back to the SUV and started 
driving.  Soon after, they saw Mendez and Rodriguez racing 
their way.  Mendez was holding a gun. 
B.  The Murder of Jessica Salazar 
Redmond also testified about the next few minutes, which 
resulted in a second killing.  Once he, Lopez, Rodriguez, and 
Mendez were back in Redmond’s SUV, they saw Salazar on the 
sidewalk “going hysterical,” “crying,” and “not knowing where to 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
go.”  Mendez directed Rodriguez to tell Salazar that she should 
get into the SUV, since they knew each other.  Rodriguez did so, 
and she complied.  Mendez told Redmond, “Drive.  Get [us] out 
of here.”  After stopping back at the Four Seasons, they entered 
the freeway and drove.  Salazar, meanwhile, was “going nuts,” 
crying, and asking repeatedly, “Why did you do that?” 
With fuel running low, Redmond pulled into a gas station.  
Although at trial his memory of what happened next was 
“foggy,” Redmond recalled going to the bathroom with Mendez.  
Either Lopez or Rodriguez joined them, and the other stayed 
near the car with Salazar.  Mendez said, “She’s gotta die.” 
 
From there, they got back in the SUV and started driving 
again.  Redmond drove for 20 to 30 minutes before coming upon 
a dirt road.  They took it.  Eventually, someone said, “I gotta 
take a piss.”  Redmond pulled over, and the four men got out.  
The area was dark and deserted.  “She’s gotta die.  She’s gotta 
die,” Mendez repeated.  He urged Rodriguez to kill Salazar, 
saying, “You know her” and “[s]he’s going to identify you.”  
Rodriguez refused.  But when Mendez told him to “drag her out,” 
Rodriguez pulled Salazar from the SUV.  She panicked, crying, 
“Stop it” and “Don’t.”  Rodriguez got back in the SUV, leaving 
Mendez and Redmond alone with Salazar.  Mendez was holding 
a gun, and Salazar was pleading for her life.  Mendez told 
Redmond to hold her.  But Salazar tripped.  She fell, started to 
get up, raised her hands — and Mendez shot her. 
 
Moments later, someone saw a car approaching and said, 
“Come on, let’s go.”  Mendez responded, “No, I have to put two 
in her head.”  He tried to shoot Salazar again, but the gun 
jammed.  Seeing this, and wary of the oncoming car, Redmond 
said, “I’m leaving.”  Mendez gave up on trying to clear the jam 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
and got into the car with Redmond, Lopez, and Rodriguez.  They 
drove off into the night. 
C.  Aftermath 
Redmond further testified about what happened after he, 
Rodriguez, Lopez, and Mendez departed from the scene of 
Salazar’s killing.  They set out for Redmond and Mendez’s 
apartment.  During the drive, Mendez suggested burning the 
SUV to get rid of the vehicle, saying he wanted to ensure they 
“[c]an’t tie it back to me.”  Redmond responded, “You’re fucking 
crazy.  It’s my truck.  I paid for it.”  
When they arrived at the apartment, Mendez directed 
Redmond not to park in front of the building.  Once inside, 
Mendez took everyone’s shoes and clothing and put them in a 
bag.  He also walked them through setting up alibis.  Mendez 
suggested that Redmond and Lopez say that they were at a 
motel the whole night with two female friends.  Mendez planned 
to say he was with his girlfriend at the apartment.  It is unclear 
whether Rodriguez crafted an alibi.  Several days later, 
Mendez’s older brother told Redmond to switch the tires on his 
SUV with those from a white Isuzu Rodeo — an SUV similarly 
sized to Redmond’s Nissan Pathfinder — which Redmond did.  
Mendez was later arrested driving the Rodeo, and its tires 
matched the tracks found near Salazar’s body. 
D.  Trial 
At the guilt phase of his trial, a jury found Mendez guilty 
of first degree murder for the killings of both Faria and Salazar.  
It also found true two special circumstances:  that Mendez 
committed multiple murders under Penal Code section 190.2, 
subdivision (a)(3) and, as to the Salazar murder, that he killed 
a witness to prevent her testimony in a criminal proceeding 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(10).1  Finally, the jury found 
three enhancements to be true.  It found that Mendez personally 
discharged a firearm causing the deaths of both Faria and 
Salazar, within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d); 
that he personally discharged a firearm causing the deaths of 
both Faria and Salazar for the benefit of, at the direction of, or 
in association with a criminal street gang, within the meaning 
of sections 12022.53, subdivision (e), and 186.22, subdivision 
(b)(1); and that he committed both murders for the benefit of, at 
the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, 
within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1).   
 
At the penalty phase, the jury returned a death sentence 
against Mendez on the two counts of first degree murder, which 
the trial court imposed.  The trial court also sentenced Mendez 
to 56 years to life in prison on the enhancements. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Mendez mounts multiple challenges to his convictions and 
death sentence, which we consider in turn.  None warrants 
reversal. 
A.  The Gang Expert’s Testimony 
A law enforcement gang expert named Jack Underhill 
testified at Mendez’s trial.  His testimony addressed gang 
culture, the rivalry between the two gangs involved in this case, 
and Mendez’s prior contacts with law enforcement.  Mendez 
argues that the trial court erred by permitting Underhill’s 
testimony about Mendez’s prior contacts with police, as well as 
his testimony about two other gang-related shootings.  Mendez 
                                        
1  
All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise noted. 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
argues that these portions of Underhill’s testimony were 
improper for two reasons.  First, he argues they were irrelevant 
or, at the very least, substantially more unfairly prejudicial than 
probative.  (See Evid. Code, §§ 350, 352.)  Second, he contends 
they contained testimonial hearsay that, under our decision in 
People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez), was 
inadmissible.   
 
We begin by describing Underhill’s testimony in some 
detail.  Then we analyze the portion of his testimony chronicling 
Mendez’s prior police contacts.  On this record, we conclude the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding this testimony 
relevant and its probative value not substantially outweighed 
by the risk of unfair prejudice.  We further conclude Mendez 
failed to preserve his claim of Sanchez error arising from this 
portion of Underhill’s testimony.  As for Underhill’s testimony 
about two other gang-related shootings, any error in admitting 
it was harmless under any standard. 
1.  Facts 
Mendez and his codefendants stipulated that North Side 
Colton “is a criminal street gang . . . whose members have 
engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, including, but not 
limited to, murder, attempt[ed] murder, drive-by shooting, 
robberies, carjackings and witness intimidation.”  They further 
stipulated that they “are, and were at all relevant times, 
members” of that gang.  At trial, the People called Underhill as 
an expert witness on criminal gangs.  Underhill was a 10-year 
veteran of the Colton Police Department possessing extensive 
experience with local gangs, including North Side Colton and 
West Side Verdugo. 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
Underhill described how he and other officers tracked 
gang activity in the area.  Specifically, he told the jury that 
officers 
regularly 
fill 
out 
reports 
called 
“S.M.A.S.H. 
cards” — which stands for “San Bernardino County Movement 
Against Street Hoodlums.”  Whenever they contact gang 
members or suspected gang members, officers “briefly talk with 
them and try to find out exactly what their involvement” with 
the gang is.  They also take a photo if necessary.  Officers record 
the information on S.M.A.S.H. cards, which the police 
department collects and maintains.  But Underhill admitted 
that anyone reading a S.M.A.S.H. card is “at the mercy” of 
whichever officer filled it out in terms of accuracy. 
 
Underhill also described various aspects of gang culture.  
He explained how gangs often have characteristic hand signs 
and tattoos that members use to identify themselves.  They also 
induct new members through various forms of initiation.  
Underhill further explained that gangs tend to establish 
themselves in certain geographic areas — what gang 
investigators call “turf.”  Given this emphasis on turf, simply 
asking, “Where are you from” is a direct challenge in gang 
culture.  Because gangs are particularly concerned with earning 
“respect” — which, according to Underhill, is more about 
instilling fear — such challenges demand an immediate reply.  
And violent acts committed by one gang against another 
demand an even more violent response. 
 
Underhill then chronicled for the jury the longstanding 
rivalry between Mendez and his codefendants’ gang (North Side 
Colton) and Faria’s gang (West Side Verdugo).  Underhill 
explained that those two gangs shared “a well-known hatred 
that’s been going on for years due to numerous incidents.”  One 
of those incidents was the 1994 murder of North Side Colton 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
member Jesse “Sinner” Garcia.  Another such incident was the 
July 1998 murder of Cindy Rodriguez — the mother of Mendez’s 
codefendant, Joe “Gato” Rodriguez. 
Faria — the first victim in this case — was killed on 
February 4, 2000.  After confirming that Underhill had heard 
Lizarraga’s testimony about the Faria killing, the People asked 
Underhill to evaluate Lizarraga’s description of what was said 
at the start of the fatal encounter.  In Underhill’s opinion, the 
back-and-forth that ensued after Faria asked “Where are you 
from” meant that “the situation [wa]s escalating” and getting 
“[m]ore and more dangerous.”  Killing Faria would “build[] a 
reputation in the gang world that North Side Colton will do this 
kind of thing . . . in hopes that other gangs will fear them.”  For 
that reason, Underhill agreed that the Faria shooting was 
“committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, [and/or] in 
association with . . . members of North Side Colton.”  Underhill 
further opined that there was “no doubt in [his] opinion that 
[Salazar] was killed because she could identify” the gang 
members who shot Faria, basing that view in part on Redmond’s 
testimony “that Mendez said the girl had to die.”  So the Salazar 
shooting was also, in Underhill’s opinion, committed for the 
benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with members 
of North Side Colton. 
Underhill went on to chronicle five contacts Mendez had 
with police in the years before the Faria and Salazar murders.  
Those contacts were documented on a “gang board” displayed to 
the jury.  Underhill was not present for those contacts, and the 
officers who were present did not testify at trial.  The People 
first asked Underhill whether officers from his department 
encountered Mendez on May 1, 1994 while investigating the 
shotgun killing of a rival gang member John Rojas.  Underhill 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
told the jury that Mendez was present for the murder and that 
detectives questioned him about it.  Mendez allegedly admitted 
the following to the investigating officers:  he “heard two or three 
shotgun blasts,” “saw the victim on the ground,” and fled the 
scene in a car with the alleged shooter — Art Luna’s brother, 
Daniel “Chato” Luna.  
Four days later, Underhill continued, a police officer 
stopped a car with Mendez inside.  Also in the car were Daniel 
Luna (Rojas’s alleged killer), Jesse Garcia (who would be gunned 
down just weeks later), and a third member of North Side 
Colton.  Seven days after that, Underhill asserted Mendez was 
found by other officers “riding in a stolen [car] after a long 
high-speed chase” that ended with the car crashing into a police 
vehicle.  Two other members of North Side Colton were in the 
stolen car with Mendez.  The investigating officer filled out a 
S.M.A.S.H. card about the incident, on which Mendez 
purportedly drew gang graffiti and admitted being a member of 
North Side Colton with the gang moniker “Midget.”  According 
to Underhill, “Daniel Luna was charged with the murder of 
Rojas,” but Mendez “was not charged with any crime in any way 
relating to the shooting of Rojas.”  Underhill further asserted 
that law enforcement never made a connection between the 
Rojas and Garcia killings. 
 
Underhill next relayed to the jury a fellow officer’s account 
of an alleged drive-by shooting that occurred on December 7, 
1995.  That officer heard multiple gunshots and saw a car in the 
“immediate vicinity driving ten miles per hour.”  The officer 
pulled the car over.  A member of North Side Colton was driving, 
and Mendez was in the passenger seat.  Inside the car, Underhill 
continued, the officer found “a fully-loaded .22 caliber handgun 
in the center console,” along with a “fully loaded M1 .30 caliber 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
carbine, a loaded SKS 7.62 high-powered rifle, a loaded 12-
gauge shotgun and a .38 caliber revolver” in the trunk.  The 
barrel of the shotgun, according to Underhill’s description of the 
officer’s account, “was still warm to the touch.”  The officer 
patted down Mendez and found a live .22-caliber round in 
Mendez’s pants pocket, along with two more such rounds on the 
ground nearby. 
Finally, Underhill told the jury about another contact 
Mendez had with police on a street corner in October 1996.  
Mendez, according to Underhill, told the officers on scene that 
he was a member of North Side Colton. 
2.  Analysis of the Gang Expert’s Testimony 
Chronicling Mendez’s Prior Police Contacts 
On this record, the trial court did not commit reversible 
error by letting Underhill tell the jury that other officers had 
previously:  (1) questioned Mendez after Rojas’s murder and 
obtained an admission that he fled the scene in the same car as 
the alleged killer, a fellow North Side Colton member; 
(2) stopped a car in which Mendez was again riding with Rojas’s 
alleged killer; (3) found Mendez with North Side Colton 
members in a stolen car that crashed into a police vehicle after 
a high-speed chase; (4) stopped Mendez and a fellow North Side 
Colton member driving suspiciously near an apparent drive-by 
shooting and discovered an arsenal of guns inside the car; and 
(5) had a conversation with Mendez during which he admitted 
being a member of North Side Colton.  
Testimony about these five prior police contacts was 
relevant, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
declining to find that the probative value of this testimony was 
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.  (See 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
Evid. Code, §§ 350, 352.)  By showing Mendez’s “commitment to” 
North Side Colton, this testimony was relevant to proving the 
charged gang enhancements and, relatedly, to explaining 
Mendez’s motive for committing the murders.  (People v. Valdez 
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 131.)  We recognize that gang-related 
evidence “creates a risk the jury will improperly infer the 
defendant has a criminal disposition” and that such evidence 
should therefore “be carefully scrutinized by trial courts.”  
(People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1194 (Carter).)  But on 
this record, Mendez’s prior police contacts had considerable 
probative value.  Taken together, they tended to show Mendez 
actively involved himself in the gang’s criminal activities, rather 
than just passively claimed the gang among his peers.  What’s 
more, the trial court “properly instructed the jury on the limited 
purposes for which it was admitting the gang evidence.”  (Id. at 
p. 1196.)  So under our precedents, we cannot say the trial court 
abused its discretion.  (See, e.g., ibid.; People v. Williams (1997) 
16 Cal.4th 153, 192 [holding that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting gang evidence, including testimony 
that the defendant led a meeting between two gangs where they 
planned to kill rival gang members]; People v. Gutierrez (2009) 
45 Cal.4th 789, 819-820 [holding that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting gang evidence, including notes 
to fellow gang members recovered in defendant’s cell that 
contemplated the intimidation and murder of prosecution 
witnesses].)   
 
Mendez makes, and we reject, another argument about 
Underhill’s testimony.  Mendez contends that, under our 
decision in Sanchez, the trial court erred by letting Underhill 
testify about Mendez’s prior police contacts.  Like this case, 
Sanchez involved testimony from a gang expert.  (Sanchez, 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 670.)  What we recognized in Sanchez is 
that an expert witness may rely on hearsay in explaining the 
basis for his or her “general knowledge” about “matters ‘beyond 
the common experience of an ordinary juror.’ ”  (Id. at p. 676, 
quoting People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 429.)  An 
expert may also “rely on information within [his or her] personal 
knowledge” and “give an opinion based on a hypothetical 
including case-specific facts that are properly proven” by other 
admissible evidence.  (Sanchez, at p. 685.)  “What an expert 
cannot do,” we held in Sanchez, “is relate as true case-specific 
facts asserted in hearsay statements, unless they are 
independently proven by competent evidence or are covered by 
a hearsay exception.”  (Id. at p. 686.)  And if, in a criminal case, 
a prosecution expert “seeks to relate testimonial hearsay, there 
is a confrontation clause violation unless (1) there is a showing 
of unavailability and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination, or forfeited that right by wrongdoing.”  
(Ibid.)   
The People concede that much of Underhill’s testimony 
about Mendez’s prior police contacts amounted to testimonial 
hearsay under Sanchez.  But given the specific circumstances of 
this case, we conclude Mendez failed to preserve his claim of 
Sanchez error as to that portion of Underhill’s testimony.   
The relevant facts are as follows.  Counsel for Mendez’s 
codefendant (Lopez) lodged a hearsay objection to Underhill’s 
proposed testimony about Lopez’s prior police contacts.  Those 
contacts were documented on a gang board similar to the one 
used in connection with Underhill’s testimony about Mendez.  
This led the trial court to acknowledge that Lopez’s attorney had 
“a good point about the hearsay,” and to indicate that it would 
allow this aspect of Underhill’s testimony only with “proper 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
14 
foundation.”  In response, the prosecutor represented to the 
court and the defendants that “every one of those officers is 
available to be called as a witness” if need be — but suggested 
they “allow the gang expert to testify essentially to what’s [on 
the gang boards] rather than have a parade of uniforms come in 
here one after the other.”  In light of that representation, the 
trial court informed Lopez’s attorney that whether the 
percipient-witness officers would testify was thus “your choice.”  
Mendez’s counsel was present throughout this discussion.  But 
he elected not to make a hearsay or confrontation clause 
objection. 
 
At a subsequent hearing, Mendez’s attorney went through 
his client’s gang board with the trial court.  He reiterated for the 
record “a general objection to the board,” but then clarified that 
his “objection [wa]s that it’s highly prejudicial” — not that the 
information, if admitted only through the expert, would be 
inadmissible hearsay.  Mendez’s attorney and the trial court 
then went through each police contact documented on Mendez’s 
gang board one by one.  The prosecutor again represented that 
the on-scene officers were under subpoena and available to 
testify.  At no point did Mendez’s attorney make a hearsay or 
confrontation clause objection.   
 
After Mendez’s attorney left the courtroom because of 
another obligation, Lopez’s attorney informed the trial court he 
would stipulate to foundation and allow Underhill to testify 
about his client’s prior police contacts.  Lopez’s attorney agreed 
that having the expert testify about the contents of the board 
“would avoid having the [on-scene officer] come forward and 
bring in some more juicy details like they always do.”  The trial 
court described that as a “tactical reason” for not persisting in 
making a hearsay objection.  
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
15 
 
Later in the proceedings, the trial court noted that it had 
“allowed hearsay” and “[n]obody has objected to anything on the 
[gang] boards.”  Mendez’s attorney was present for that remark 
but did not challenge the trial court’s assertion.  Nor did he 
attempt to lodge a hearsay or confrontation clause objection. 
So even though we did not decide Sanchez until well after 
Mendez’s trial, the trial court made clear it would sustain a 
hearsay objection to Underhill’s testimony about Mendez and 
his codefendants’ prior police contacts.  And the prosecutor 
represented that, if such an objection were made, the officers 
with firsthand knowledge of those contacts were available to 
take the stand.  That matters.  Those officers could (at the very 
least) have testified as percipient witnesses to their own 
observations and relayed to the jury Mendez’s own out-of-court 
admissions.  (See Evid. Code, § 702 [allowing lay witnesses to 
testify only to matters about which they have personal 
knowledge]; id., § 1220 [allowing out-of-court admissions by an 
opposing party to be admitted for their truth].)  But as the trial 
court itself noted, insisting on testimony from the on-scene 
officers risked intensifying the focus on these encounters and 
eliciting more damaging details about them.   
Instead, Mendez chose to let Underhill testify to hearsay 
accounts of his prior police contacts.  In doing so, Mendez agreed 
to let Underhill testify not just to facts regarding the 
circumstances of those contacts, but also to the fact that 
Mendez’s companions during several of those encounters were 
fellow North Side Colton members.  It’s unclear on this record 
what options the People had available to establish the gang 
membership of Mendez’s companions.  It’s at least possible the 
People could have established this fact based on what the 
on-scene officers themselves observed or what Mendez himself 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
16 
said (or some other admissible evidence), rather than by relying 
on what Mendez’s companions may have said out of court 
(statements which themselves could potentially have been 
admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule and 
consistent with the confrontation clause).  But ultimately, what 
makes the record inscrutable on this issue is that Mendez 
assented to having Underhill testify that Mendez’s companions 
were North Side Colton members.  (See People v. Romero and 
Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 24 (Romero and Self) [observing that 
contemporaneous objections enable trial courts to create a 
record for appeal and correct errors in the first instance]; People 
v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 857 [similar].)  So we cannot 
fault the trial court for permitting Underhill’s testimony about 
Mendez’s police contacts under the circumstances that it did. 
We reiterate that our analysis of Mendez’s claim of 
Sanchez error is grounded in the unique facts of this case:  the 
trial court expressly indicated that it would sustain a hearsay 
objection, and the prosecutor expressly represented that the 
on-scene officers were available to testify — yet Mendez chose 
to let Underhill testify about Mendez’s prior police contacts.  In 
another case pending before us, we granted review to decide 
whether a defendant’s failure to object at trial before we decided 
Sanchez forfeits a claim of Sanchez error subsequently advanced 
on appeal.  (See People v. Perez, review granted July 18, 2018, 
S248730.)  We express no view on that question as presented on 
the facts of Perez.   
3.  Analysis of the Gang Expert’s Testimony About 
Two Other Gang-related Shootings 
Mendez also maintains that Underhill’s testimony about 
the killings of Cindy Rodriguez and Jesse Garcia was 
inadmissible.  We decline to address the merits of those 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
17 
arguments, for any error in allowing Underhill to testify about 
those killings was harmless under any standard. 
 
Underhill’s testimony describing Cindy Rodriguez’s 
murder at the hands of West Side Verdugo members could only 
have helped Mendez.  Cindy Rodriguez was, after all, the mother 
of his codefendant, Joe Rodriguez.  So that portion of Underhill’s 
testimony suggested Rodriguez, not Mendez, had the more 
powerful motive to shoot Faria for having claimed allegiance to 
West Side Verdugo.  Which is precisely what Mendez urged in 
his closing argument at the guilt phase.  And even though the 
jury found true the allegation that Mendez pulled the trigger in 
the Faria killing, Underhill’s testimony about Cindy Rodriguez’s 
murder left room for lingering doubt that could only have helped 
Mendez’s case at the penalty phase. 
 
We also do not see how Underhill’s testimony describing 
the killing of Mendez’s fellow North Side Colton member Jesse 
Garcia — and Mendez’s attendance at his funeral — could have 
affected the verdicts at either phase of the trial.  True:  Underhill 
opined that Mendez attended Garcia’s funeral with North Side 
Colton members, suggesting that Mendez too was a gang 
member.  But Mendez stipulated that he and his codefendants 
“are, and were at all relevant times,” gang members.  Also true:  
Underhill’s testimony about Garcia’s murder provided an 
example explaining the bitter rivalry between North Side Colton 
and West Side Verdugo.  But even assuming, without deciding, 
that the Garcia example was improper, Underhill could still 
testify in general terms about the bitter rivalry between those 
two gangs based on his “background information and knowledge 
in the area” of local gangs.  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 
p. 685.)  That’s what made him a gang expert in the first place.  
(See ibid.)   
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
18 
Furthermore, Underhill properly offered an expert opinion 
about the gang implications of the back-and-forth involving 
Faria based on Lizarraga’s testimony; case-specific gang 
evidence was first “admitted through an appropriate witness” 
(Lizarraga), and then an expert (Underhill) “assume[d] its truth 
in a properly worded hypothetical question in the traditional 
manner.”  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 684; see also People 
v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1048 [observing that gang 
experts may, “based on hypothetical questions that track[]” the 
evidence, offer an opinion on whether a crime, if committed by 
the defendant, was done “for a gang purpose”].)  That testimony 
about what happened in the moments before Faria’s 
murder — not testimony about Garcia’s murder six years 
earlier — was what the People urged was critical for the jury to 
understand at the guilt phase.   
As to the penalty phase, we are confident the jury would 
have returned the same verdict against someone it convicted of 
twice taking a life even if it hadn’t been told that, years earlier, 
he once attended a funeral.  In some ways, in fact, Garcia’s 
murder at the hands of a rival gang aided Mendez’s attempt to 
mitigate his culpability by painting a picture for the jury of his 
gang- and violence-infested surroundings.  That the trial court 
admitted a photograph of Garcia lying in an open casket 
(without any visible wounds) does not alter our conclusion. 
B.  Mendez’s Jailhouse Conversation with Bakotich 
Mendez argues that two portions of a jailhouse 
conversation he had with a friend — Nicole Bakotich — should 
have been excluded.  First, Mendez asserts that unlawful police 
interrogations tainted a statement he later made to Bakotich 
admitting to being near Salazar when she was killed.  Second, 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
19 
Mendez maintains that letting the jury hear him repeat to 
Bakotich incriminating statements made by Rodriguez violated 
his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him.  
Neither argument is persuasive.  Here too we begin with the 
relevant facts and then analyze Mendez’s contentions in turn. 
1.  Facts 
After his arrest, Mendez was questioned by Detective 
Christopher Brown on February 24, 2000.  Brown advised 
Mendez of his Miranda rights, which Mendez agreed to waive.  
Questioning proceeded from there.  Mendez denied being a gang 
member and denied knowing anything about “a shooting over at 
the Luna house.”  But later on, after Brown accused Mendez of 
“not telling . . . the truth on a lot of things,” Mendez said, “I’ll 
just have my attorney present sir.”  Brown nevertheless 
persisted with questioning, telling Mendez, “I know you know 
more tha[n] what you read in the paper.”  Mendez relented and 
admitted hearing that “some guys” had “rolled up” on a boy and 
killed him because “they thought that he was somebody else or 
something.”  They took a short break, then Mendez said that he 
couldn’t talk more because he was “not even thinking straight” 
and was “tired.”  The interrogation ended shortly afterwards.  
On April 8, 2000 — about six weeks later — Mendez was 
interrogated about the murders again, this time by Sheriff’s 
Investigator John Del Valle.  The interrogation started just after 
8:00 p.m.  Del Valle advised Mendez of his Miranda rights, and 
Mendez agreed to waive his rights and talk.  Del Valle then 
explained that his investigation had uncovered witnesses and 
physical evidence.  He showed Mendez a collection of tapes, 
suggesting that they were statements from other witnesses, but 
told Mendez that he didn’t “want to put you in a position where 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
20 
you wind up getting stabbed.”  Del Valle appeared to dangle 
those tapes as something that Mendez was “not supposed to 
see,” perhaps because of the risk of retaliation.  Del Valle also 
said he had “talked to everyone” involved other than Mendez.  
Del Valle told Mendez the tires on Redmond’s truck belonged to 
the Isuzu Rodeo Mendez had been driving when he was 
arrested.  Furthermore, Del Valle played tapes of multiple 
witnesses.  He stressed that they had identified Mendez as 
having personally pulled the trigger, at least for the Salazar 
murder.  He also asked Mendez, “What is the most a person can 
get for two shootings” — to which Mendez responded, “The death 
penalty.” 
Mendez repeatedly denied shooting Salazar.  But a few 
minutes after 11:00 p.m., he admitted to being just feet away 
from Salazar when she was killed.  Moments before that 
admission, however, Mendez said, “If I had an attorney right 
here right now I would answer your question.”  And two hours 
earlier, Mendez had said, “I think I should do this with an 
attorney” — but Del Valle had pressed on, responding, “Well, 
hold on, hold on, hold on . . . do you wanna listen to [a tape] right 
now?” and then playing a tape of another witness.  Still, Mendez 
agreed that Del Valle had not yelled at, disrespected, or been 
mean to him.  Del Valle also allowed Mendez to use the restroom 
during the interrogation and offered him food. 
The next morning, Bakotich visited Mendez in jail.  They 
talked, and their conversation was recorded.  Mendez explained 
the gravity of his situation.  He told Bakotich, “I got a little bit 
of [a] chance if they can prove I didn’t kill [Salazar],” which 
might “get it down from the death penalty.”  But Mendez was 
worried about the tapes the police had shown him.  He said, 
“They showed me videotapes of [Redmond], then they showed a 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
21 
fuckin’ tape of [Rodriguez]” saying “[h]e heard shots” and saw 
“me standing over” Faria.  Redmond, Mendez went on, “said that 
I grabbed [Salazar] and that I put the gun to her head and 
snuffed her.”  Mendez said, “I got myself into this trouble.”  
Mendez next told Bakotich, “I didn’t do the shooting.”  
“[W]e all know [Redmond] did ’em,” he continued, so “I told 
[Luna] to tell the guys, just [f]uck it, say Sam did it.”  Bakotich 
asked if the police had “a weapon or anything.”  Mendez 
responded, “No, but they don’t need it” because they “got guys 
saying that I was there and I was the shooter.”  Bakotich tried 
to reassure Mendez with an anecdote about someone who 
escaped conviction because the police never recovered a murder 
weapon. 
Mendez recounted admitting to Del Valle that he was 
standing six feet away from Salazar when she was killed.  
Mendez then told Bakotich, “If I could get out of [the Salazar 
murder] I can probably get . . . self-defense on [the Faria 
shooting] because they fuckin’ started it.”  He added that the 
Faria murder happened “in front of [Art Luna’s] house” and 
confirmed that he was “going to try self-defense” on that charge.  
But Mendez reiterated, “I didn’t kill the girl, fuck.” 
Later on, Mendez remarked to Bakotich, “If they would 
have kept their mouths shut . . . [f]uckin’ everything would have 
been cool and shit” but “they are fuckin’ saying that I was the 
fuckin’ shooter.”  He recapped being shown a tape of Redmond’s 
reenactment of the Salazar murder.  Mendez explained that Del 
Valle had said he had “another one of Joe Rodriguez” and that 
Rodriguez reenacted the Faria murder.  Mendez then described 
for Bakotich the subsequent back-and-forth between him and 
Del Valle:  “He’s all but there was a confrontation that made you 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
22 
guys, you kill this guy,” and “I’m like I didn’t kill [Faria].”  
Finally, Mendez told Bakotich they should “[g]o with the truth,” 
which was “[t]hat Sam [Redmond] did it.” 
Once the case was underway, Mendez moved to exclude 
his statements made during the second interrogation, claiming 
that he repeatedly invoked his right to counsel during both 
interrogations but was repeatedly ignored in violation the 
protections afforded by Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 
and Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 (Edwards).  The 
People were concerned enough about the Miranda/Edwards 
issue to agree, “as a tactical consideration,” not to introduce in 
its 
case-in-chief 
anything 
Mendez 
said 
during 
either 
interrogation.  The prosecution did, however, seek to introduce 
the recording of Mendez’s conversation with Bakotich.  The trial 
court admitted the recording over Mendez’s objection. 
2.  Analysis of Statement Recounting Admission About 
Salazar Murder  
The trial court did not err in admitting Mendez’s 
statement to Bakotich about being six feet away from Salazar 
when she was killed.  This statement was admissible 
notwithstanding the alleged problems with the custodial 
interrogations that preceded it. 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution bars the admission of “any 
involuntary statement obtained by a law enforcement officer 
from a criminal suspect by coercion.”  (People v. Neal (2003) 31 
Cal.4th 63, 79 (Neal).)  So when the police obtain a suspect’s 
statements “by ‘techniques and methods offensive to due 
process’ . . . or under circumstances in which the suspect clearly 
had no opportunity to exercise ‘a free and unconstrained will,’ ” 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
23 
the statements are inadmissible.  (Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 
U.S. 298, 304 (Elstad), citation omitted, quoting Haynes v. 
Washington (1963) 373 U.S. 503, 514.) 
In Miranda, the U.S. Supreme Court went further.  It 
adopted prophylactic protections that “required suppression of 
many statements that would have been admissible under 
traditional due process analysis by presuming that statements 
made while in custody and without adequate warnings were 
protected by the Fifth Amendment.”  (Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at 
p. 304.)  Among these protections is a suspect’s right under 
Edwards to terminate questioning by “express[ing] his desire to 
deal with the police only through counsel” and to be left alone 
thereafter until an attorney is present or he reinitiates 
questioning on his own accord.  (Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at 
p. 484.)  Mendez asserts the trial court should have excluded his 
statement during the second interrogation that he was just feet 
away from Salazar when she was killed because it was 
“involuntary” and, at the very least, obtained in violation of the 
Edwards prophylactic rule.  That being so, Mendez argues that 
his statements to Bakotich parroting that admission were fruits 
of the poisonous tree.  
Mendez’s argument hinges on the allegedly unlawful 
nature of his second interrogation –– so that’s where we begin.  
We assume, but need not decide, that the police obtained 
Mendez’s “six feet away” statement during his second 
interrogation by violating the Edwards rule.  But we conclude 
the statement was nonetheless voluntary.  (See People v. 
Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1039 [observing that 
“continued interrogation after a defendant has invoked his right 
to counsel, or an Edwards violation,” does not “inherently 
constitute coercion”].)   
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
24 
Our 
voluntariness 
determination 
rests 
on 
an 
“independent” consideration of the entire record, including “ ‘the 
characteristics of the accused and the details of the 
[encounter].’ ”  (Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 80, quoting People 
v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 779.)  Mendez was 21 years old 
at the time of the interrogation and had experience with the 
criminal justice system.  It was not his first police interrogation.  
And although Mendez’s education level was not high, he has not 
argued he was intellectually disabled or of low intelligence.  As 
for the interrogation itself, it started just after 8:00 p.m. and 
concluded shortly after 11:00 p.m.  During that period, Mendez 
was allowed to use the restroom and offered food.  He also said 
himself that Del Valle had not yelled at, disrespected, or been 
mean to him.  And contrary to Mendez’s assertions, Del Valle 
did not threaten him.  Yes, Del Valle suggested there was a risk 
that Mendez might be retaliated against in prison — especially 
if he saw tapes of statements of others cooperating with police.  
But Del Valle did not threaten to exacerbate that risk if Mendez 
didn’t talk or suggest that talking was the only way to avoid it.  
And yes, Del Valle asked Mendez to consider the possible 
punishment he could face — to which Mendez responded, “The 
death penalty.”  But Del Valle left it at that, and we have already 
held that a comparable back-and-forth is not an unlawful threat.  
(See People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 169-170.)  So 
even assuming there was an Edwards violation here, the totality 
of the circumstances does not suggest that Mendez’s “free will 
was overborne by state compulsion.”  (People v. Storm (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 1007, 1035 (Storm) [holding similarly].) 
This analysis fits our decision in Neal.  The record in that 
case — “from beginning to end” — showed the defendant’s 
intelligence “was quite low.”  (Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 84.)  
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
25 
His experience with the criminal justice system was also “hardly 
extensive.”  (Ibid.)  What makes Neal even more obviously 
distinguishable, though, are the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation in that case.  The defendant in Neal was 
interrogated once, then “placed in a cell without a toilet or a 
sink” without being “taken to a bathroom or given any water 
until the next morning.”  (Ibid.)  Before getting any food, he was 
interrogated again, and then a third time.  (Ibid.)  He was 
confined in isolation for 24 hours.  (Ibid.)  The interrogating 
officer also made clear that the defendant was at his mercy, with 
little choice but to talk.  The officer instructed the defendant to 
“make believe that I am driving the bus and you want to get off 
the bus” and that the officer could either drop the defendant 
“closer to home” or take him “all the way to Timbuktu.”  (Id. at 
p. 81.)  The officer later made the threat explicit, saying, “[I]f 
you don’t try and cooperate,” then “the system is going to stick 
it to you as hard as they can.”  (Ibid.)  The Edwards violation in 
Neal was also particularly severe.  There, the defendant did not 
initially waive his Miranda rights and later invoked his right to 
counsel nine times.  (Neal, at p. 78.)  So despite acknowledging 
there was no physical coercion in Neal, we said the 
interrogation’s “harshness cannot be ignored.”  (Id., at p. 84.)  
The same cannot be said of the interrogation at issue here. 
So we are unpersuaded by Mendez’s claim of error.  At 
worst, what we have before us is a statement obtained during 
interrogation in violation of Edwards but “ ‘unaccompanied by 
any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to 
undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will.’ ”  
(Storm, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1033, quoting Elstad, supra, 470 
U.S. at p. 309.)  The admissibility of Mendez’s subsequent 
statement to Bakotich thus turns solely on whether that 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
26 
subsequent statement “was itself voluntary and obtained 
without a Miranda violation.”  (Storm, at p. 1030.)   
It was.  Mendez does not suggest he should have received 
a Miranda warning before talking to Bakotich, and such an 
argument would be meritless at any rate.  (See People v. 
Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1401-1402 [holding that 
jailhouse conversations with visitors do not constitute 
interrogation and thus do not require Miranda warnings].)  Nor 
does Mendez assert that he was compelled to talk to 
Bakotich — only that his conversation with her “came fast on 
the heels” of his interrogation the night before and was thus “the 
indirect product or fruit thereof.”  But because we have already 
concluded that Mendez’s statement during the interrogation 
was voluntary, it follows a fortiori that his statement to 
Bakotich was too:  something “cannot be ‘fruit of the poisonous 
tree’ if the tree itself is not poisonous.”  (Colorado v. Spring 
(1987) 479 U.S. 564, 571-572.)  The trial court therefore did not 
err in admitting Mendez’s statement to Bakotich about being six 
feet away from Salazar when she was killed. 
3.  Analysis of Statement Recounting Rodriguez’s 
Accusations 
Nor did the trial court err in admitting Mendez’s 
statements to Bakotich about being told by the police that 
Rodriguez had accused him of shooting Faria.  Mendez argues 
that doing so violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront 
witnesses against him, as Rodriguez did not testify at trial and 
thus was not subject to cross-examination.  But because a 
reasonable 
jury 
could 
conclude 
that 
Mendez 
adopted 
Rodriguez’s statements as his own, there was no confrontation 
clause violation here.  (See, e.g., People v. Jennings (2010) 50 
Cal.4th 616, 660-661 (Jennings).)  
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
27 
The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him . . . .”  (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.)  As the 
U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Bruton v. United States 
(1968) 391 U.S. 123, and as we recognized in People v. Aranda 
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, admitting in a joint trial out-of-court 
statements made by a nontestifying codefendant that 
incriminate the defendant poses a severe “hazard” to the 
defendant’s confrontation rights.  (Bruton, at p. 137.)  For that 
reason, courts “cannot accept limiting instructions as an 
adequate substitute for [the] constitutional right of cross-
examination.”  (Ibid.)   
But we have also held that incriminating statements 
made by another become the defendant’s “ ‘own admissions’ ” 
when the defendant has “expressly or impliedly adopted” them.  
(Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 661, quoting People v. 
Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 672.)  The witness against the 
defendant in those circumstances is “ ‘the defendant himself, not 
the actual declarant,’ ” so there is no confrontation clause 
problem.  (Jennings, at p. 662, quoting United States v. 
Allen (7th Cir. 1993) 10 F.3d 405, 413.)  Evidence Code section 
1221 sets forth the standard for adoptive admissions:  “Evidence 
of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible 
by the hearsay rule if the statement is one of which the party, 
with knowledge of the content thereof, has by words or other 
conduct manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth.”   
For the defendant to have adopted the statement of a 
codefendant, two things must be true.  (People v. Combs (2004) 
34 Cal.4th 821, 843.)  First, the defendant must know the 
content of the codefendant’s hearsay statement.  (Ibid.)  Second, 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
28 
the defendant must suggest in some way that he believes the 
codefendant’s statement to be true.  (Ibid.)  Whether the 
defendant actually adopted the statements of the codefendant, 
however, is a question for the jury.  (People v. Riel (2000) 22 
Cal.4th 1153, 1189-1190.)  A court thus decides only whether a 
reasonable jury could so conclude on the facts before it.  (Id. at 
p. 1189; see also People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 535 
[observing that the court’s decision turns on “whether there is 
evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that” the defendant 
adopted the statement].)  
People do not admit everything they merely recount to 
someone else.  (See People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 
1258.)  But here a reasonable jury could have concluded that 
Mendez indeed adopted — rather than just recounted — 
Rodriguez’s statements naming Mendez as the person who shot 
Faria.  Consider how Mendez responded to Rodriguez’s 
accusation that he shot Faria compared to Redmond’s 
accusation that he shot Salazar.  Mendez told Bakotich he was 
“going to try self-defense” with respect to the Faria shooting 
“because they fuckin’ started it,” arguably admitting he pulled 
the trigger.  Yet in the same breath Mendez categorically denied 
shooting Salazar:  he declared to Bakotich, “I didn’t kill the girl, 
fuck.”  A reasonable jury could take that exchange as showing 
that Mendez, while denying Redmond’s accusation as to the 
Salazar murder, adopted Rodriguez’s accusation as to the Faria 
murder.2   
                                        
2  
Mendez does not challenge on confrontation clause 
grounds the trial court’s decision to admit his recounting of 
Redmond’s accusations to Bakotich.  Nor could he, as Redmond 
was subject to cross-examination at trial. 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
29 
That is enough.  To the extent Mendez might have denied 
shooting Faria at other points in his conversation with Bakotich, 
even “contradictory statements” are admissible under the 
adoptive admission rule.  (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 959, 1020; see also People v. Whitehorn (1963) 60 Cal.2d 
256, 262 [holding that “if a denial is coupled with other conduct 
of the accused which is of evidentiary importance, such as where 
false and evasive replies are made together with a denial, the 
evidence may be received”].)  So the trial court did not err by 
admitting portions of the Bakotich conversation where Mendez 
recounted Rodriguez’s accusation. 
Nor can we fault the trial court for giving the standard 
instruction on admissions in general (CALJIC No. 2.71) but not 
the standard instruction on adoptive admissions in particular 
(CALJIC No. 2.71.5).  There is no sua sponte duty to give the 
latter instruction.  (See People v. Carter, supra, 30 Cal.4th at 
p. 1198.)  And especially when paired with the trial court’s oral 
admonition that the Bakotich conversation was “only to be 
considered” with respect to Mendez’s “state of mind or to the 
extent he adopts these things,” the standard written instruction 
given at trial was sufficient for the jury to understand its role. 
C.  Sufficiency of the Evidence as to the Faria 
Murder 
Contrary to Mendez’s contentions, there was sufficient 
evidence to support a finding that Mendez shot Faria — the 
conduct supporting Mendez’s conviction for that murder, as well 
as the multiple-murder special circumstance and the firearms 
enhancements.  When we assess the sufficiency of the evidence, 
we must view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the 
existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
30 
from the evidence” to see if “a reasonable trier of fact could find 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (People v. 
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357 (Zamudio).)   
A reasonable jury could find that Mendez adopted by 
implication Rodriguez’s accusation that he shot Faria, and for 
present purposes we must presume the jury so found.  From 
there, we have little trouble concluding there was sufficient 
evidence to support a finding that Mendez shot Faria.  Mendez’s 
adopted admission, though powerful in its own right, was not 
the only evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that 
he shot Faria.  Redmond testified he saw Mendez running with 
a gun in his hand mere moments after Faria was shot.  Redmond 
further testified that Mendez instructed Rodriguez to grab 
Salazar and that Mendez later said, “She’s gotta die” — 
suggesting he was determined to cover up evidence of the Faria 
murder to save his own skin.  Nothing more is required.  In this 
posture, we may “ ‘resolve neither credibility issues nor 
evidentiary conflicts.’ ”  (Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357, 
quoting People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.)  So it 
makes no difference that Redmond arguably had credibility 
problems or that Lizarraga originally identified Rodriguez as 
the person who shot Faria. 
D.  Cross-examination of Redmond 
Mendez also maintains the trial court should have 
permitted Redmond to be cross-examined about:  (1) whether he 
told the prosecution that its exhibit listing him as a gang 
member was inaccurate, and (2) whether his final meeting with 
law enforcement before pleading guilty was “sheer coincidence.”  
But because the trial court had “wide latitude insofar as the 
Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits” 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
31 
on questioning, and because Mendez has not shown that either 
prohibited question would have left the jury with “a significantly 
different impression of [Redmond]’s credibility,” the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of 
Redmond.  (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679-
680 (Van Arsdall); see also People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 
393, 455-456 (Pearson) [reviewing for abuse of discretion]; 
People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 372-374 [same].) 
1.  Questioning Redmond About His Reaction to the 
People’s Gang Exhibit 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting 
questioning about whether Redmond told the prosecution that 
its exhibit was mistaken to list him as a gang member.  Such 
questioning would have injected an issue that risked taking up 
considerable time and confusing the jury — and which possessed 
little probative value.   
During their opening statement, the People told the jury 
that it would “hear the testimony of Sam Redmond,” a man 
“with the moniker or gang name of Devil.”  Fitting with that 
description, a prosecution exhibit listed Redmond as a gang 
member.  That exhibit was displayed behind Redmond during 
his testimony.  Redmond denied being a gang member at trial.  
During cross-examination, an attorney for Mendez’s 
codefendant, Rodriguez, asked Redmond when he first saw the 
People’s exhibit listing him as a gang member.  Redmond said 
he first saw it on the “first day” of his trial testimony.  
Rodriguez’s attorney then asked Redmond, “Did you tell the 
district attorney the information under your name was 
incorrect?”  The People objected, and the trial court sustained 
the objection under Evidence Code section 352. 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
32 
Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court discussed 
the matter further with the parties.  It said to Rodriguez’s 
attorney, “I’m sure you were going to ask him as to when you 
saw the information on that diagram why didn’t you bring it to 
the attention of the district attorney,” then asked for 
confirmation if that was true.  Rodriguez’s counsel responded, 
“I’m not going to ask him why, I’m going to ask him if he did.”  
At that point, the trial court explained why it didn’t allow the 
question, saying that “under Evidence Code [s]ection 352 if he 
did or if he didn’t, I think it’s so equivocal and has little 
probative value.”  “Whether [Redmond] told the district 
attorney” that the exhibit was incorrect, the trial court 
continued, “add[ed] little” to other available avenues of 
impeaching Redmond’s denial of being a gang member.  
Furthermore, the trial court said that it wanted to avoid a “long 
philosophical discussion” as to what would be expected of 
Redmond under the circumstances. 
Even if we assume that Mendez preserved this claim of 
error and that he may object to limitations on cross-examination 
conducted by someone other than his own attorney, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion.  Evidence Code section 352 
grants a trial court discretion to “exclude evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability 
that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of 
time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of 
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”  We have 
recognized, moreover, that excluding “ ‘evidence of marginal 
impeachment value’ ” under Evidence Code section 352 
“ ‘generally does not contravene a defendant’s constitutional 
right[] to confrontation.’ ”  (Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 455, 
quoting People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 545.)   
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
33 
This case is no exception.  Getting into whether Redmond 
impliedly adopted the exhibit’s representation that he was a 
gang member would have risked wasting time and creating 
confusion — all without much benefit.  Such questioning would 
have raised the vexing question whether Redmond manifested 
a belief in the truth of the exhibit by not immediately pointing 
out its inaccuracies while on the stand.  (See Evid. Code, § 1221.)  
That, in turn, would have required time-consuming litigation 
about the precise circumstances under which Redmond first saw 
the exhibit, whether those circumstances afforded him a way of 
communicating with the prosecution, whether doing so would 
have been practical under the circumstances, and so on.   
And for what?  Not much.  As the trial court noted, there 
were more effective, less problematic ways to impeach 
Redmond’s denial of being a gang member.  For example, 
Redmond asserted on cross-examination that he could “step in 
and out of [the gang] lifestyle” and freely associate with 
numerous gang members while “stay[ing] above involvement in 
the gangs” — even though he admitted living with North Side 
Colton members, frequently driving North Side Colton members 
around, storing guns in a safe only he and an admitted North 
Side Colton member (Mendez) could unlock, and being arrested 
with North Side Colton members while in possession of a gun.  
Redmond also claimed that he adopted the gang moniker “Devil” 
six months after his late March 2000 arrest in this case, but that 
he got a tattoo of a devil embracing a young girl before the 
Salazar killing.  He stood by that story despite documentation 
from an earlier unrelated arrest on February 20, 2000 that cast 
doubt on it.  That documentation indicated that Redmond’s gang 
moniker was “Devil” and that he had a clown tattoo on one leg 
— but did not mention a devil tattoo on his other leg.  Then, of 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
34 
course, there is the reality that the People’s own exhibit listed 
Redmond as a gang member.   
So even assuming Redmond had a reasonable opportunity 
to inform the prosecution that its exhibit was wrong at the start 
of his testimony, it’s highly unlikely this would have made any 
difference.  The mere fact he did not do so before expressly 
denying gang membership throughout his testimony would have 
had little impeachment value beyond that available through 
other lines of questioning.  Accordingly, the question was 
permissibly barred under Evidence Code section 352 — and 
prohibiting it did not produce “a significantly different 
impression of [Redmond]’s credibility” in violation of the 
Confrontation Clause.  (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680; 
see also Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 455-456.) 
2.  Questioning Redmond About His Final Meeting 
with Law Enforcement Before Cooperating 
The trial court did not violate the confrontation clause by 
preventing Mendez’s attorney from asking Redmond whether it 
was “sheer coincidence” that he met with law enforcement just 
before signing his plea agreement.   
To escape the death penalty, Redmond pleaded guilty on 
August 29, 2003, pursuant to a cooperation agreement with the 
People.  That agreement provided in all caps that Redmond’s 
“MOST IMPORTANT OBLIGATION IS TO TELL THE TRUTH 
AND TELL ONLY THE TRUTH.”  A week or two before signing 
the agreement, Redmond took a polygraph test during which he 
denied shooting anyone.  Redmond passed the polygraph test, 
and the People cut him a deal.  
Evidence Code section 351.1 provides in relevant part:  
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
35 
polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or 
any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a 
polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence in 
any criminal proceeding . . . .”  During proceedings outside the 
presence of the jury, the People acknowledged that, under this 
provision, it “obviously [could not] refer to [Redmond] offering to 
take a poly[graph] or [make] any mention at all of a 
poly[graph].”  To ensure defense counsel could still cross-
examine Redmond about his final meeting with law enforcement 
before signing his plea agreement, the People suggested the 
parties refer to that final pre-plea meeting as simply “the DOJ 
[Department of Justice] interview.”  The People also 
admonished 
Redmond 
not 
to 
mention 
his 
polygraph 
examination.  Mendez’s attorney agreed with those measures. 
At trial, Mendez’s attorney cross-examined Redmond 
about whether his plea agreement was conditioned on his not 
being the shooter, or merely his telling the truth at trial.  
Redmond first agreed that his plea agreement required that he 
was “not a shooter” but moments later agreed that his plea 
agreement required that he merely “tell the truth.”  And just 
after that, Redmond agreed that he would get his deal, so long 
as he was “not a killer.”  Then, after consulting with his 
attorney, Redmond said that he “had to tell the truth in order to 
get all the benefits” of cooperating. 
The next day, Mendez’s attorney picked up the same line 
of questioning during a second round of cross-examination.  The 
attorney elicited that the prosecution talked to Redmond after 
his earlier testimony and told him that the deal was contingent 
only on his telling the truth.  Redmond confirmed that he 
understood his plea agreement to require only that he tell the 
truth at trial.  Mendez’s attorney responded by confronting 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
36 
Redmond with the portions of his earlier testimony where 
Redmond agreed that his deal hinged “on the fact the [he was] 
not a shooter or a killer.”  Redmond claimed he had been 
confused. 
Questioning turned to the meetings Redmond had with 
law enforcement before signing his plea agreement.  Redmond 
confirmed that, during the first meeting on February 20, 2000, 
he “lied about having any knowledge about the killings of Mr. 
Faria and Ms. Salazar.”  Redmond then confirmed that, at the 
second meeting about a month later, he initially lied again but 
ultimately came clean.  At that point, Redmond continued, he 
was charged with murder. 
Mendez’s attorney also elicited that, three years later, 
Redmond had a fourth meeting with law enforcement:  the DOJ 
interview.  Redmond confirmed that he signed his plea 
agreement “about a week or two” after the DOJ interview.  
Mendez’s attorney asked Redmond if it “was just a sheer 
coincidence that [he] had another interview a week and a half 
before [he] signed [his] plea agreement?”  The People objected, 
and the trial court called for a sidebar. 
Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court remarked 
that if Mendez was “going to suggest” that the DOJ interview 
was “a coincidence,” then the prosecution “could bring out” the 
reason for that meeting:  that Redmond’s deal “was conditioned 
upon him passing a polygraph.”  Mendez’s attorney responded, 
“I will abandon those questions if that’s how the Court feels.”  
After further discussion, the trial court suggested a line of 
questioning to which Mendez’s attorney agreed.  Specifically, 
after the jury returned, Mendez’s attorney asked Redmond 
whether he was “given a deal based on [his] version of the events 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
37 
that [he was] not a shooter and [he was] not a killer.”  Redmond 
answered, “Yes.”  Mendez’s counsel next asked if the People had 
“accepted [that] version of things as being the truth” such that, 
if Redmond testified at trial, “I’m the shooter,” the People would 
have “problems with that.”  Redmond agreed with that 
description of his situation. 
On appeal, Mendez argues that the trial court’s 
“polygraph threat” curtailed his ability to cross-examine 
Redmond in violation of his confrontation rights.  No such 
violation occurred. 
 
Mendez represents on appeal that the disputed line of 
questioning was meant to establish that “Redmond told 
authorities during ‘the DOJ interview’ exactly what they wanted 
to hear” and that under his plea agreement Redmond “was not 
free to testify [at trial] that he had murdered Salazar even if” 
that was true.  Mendez got what he sought.  The alternative line 
of questioning allowed by the trial court established as much:  
Redmond confirmed that he was “given a deal based on [his] 
version of the events that [he was] not a shooter” and that the 
People had “accepted [that] version of things as being the truth.”  
Redmond further confirmed that, if he changed his story and 
admitting to being a shooter at trial, the People would have 
“problems with that.”  Redmond was boxed in, and the jury knew 
it.  So this prohibited cross-examination would not have 
produced “a significantly different impression of [Redmond]’s 
credibility” in violation of the confrontation clause.  (Van 
Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680; see also Pearson, supra, 56 
Cal.4th at pp. 455-456.) 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
38 
E.  Photograph Depicting Faria’s Body 
Mendez challenges the trial court’s decision to admit a 
photograph depicting Faria’s body just before an autopsy was 
conducted.  Such a photograph may be admitted if:  (1) the 
photograph is relevant, and (2) its probative valued is not 
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.  (See 
People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 453 (Ramirez); see also 
Evid. Code, §§ 350, 352.)  We review the trial court’s 
determination of each issue for abuse of discretion.  (People v. 
Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 14, 18; accord People v. Mills (2010) 
48 Cal.4th 158, 191.)  We see no abuse in this case.  
Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court discussed 
with the parties whether to admit two photographs of Faria’s 
body — what became People’s exhibits 42 and 45.  Mendez and 
his codefendants originally objected to both photographs but, 
after the People agreed to crop exhibit 45 to allay the 
codefendants’ concerns about that photograph, persisted only in 
objecting to exhibit 42.  The trial court overruled that objection, 
reasoning that exhibit 42 “would be helpful to the pathologist” 
who performed the autopsy in explaining to the jury “what he 
was provided with,” “how he examined the body,” and the fact 
“that he found other injuries [on Faria’s body] as well, but they 
were not all involved with the bullets that killed [him].”  The 
trial court also noted that the photograph was not “all that 
prejudicial” compared to photographs it had seen in other cases.  
In short, the trial court concluded that exhibit 42 was relevant 
and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed 
by the risk of unfair prejudice. 
On appeal, Mendez argues the trial court was wrong on 
both fronts and thus should have excluded exhibit 42.  We 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
39 
disagree.  First, as to relevance, photographs like this one are 
relevant if they help clarify testimony from a medical examiner.  
(Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 454; see also People v. 
Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 524 [collecting cases].)  That is 
what the trial court concluded here, and we see no error in that 
determination.  Second, as to whether exhibit 42’s probative 
value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair 
prejudice, even “gruesome” and “disturbing” photographs may 
be admitted if they do not “sensationalize an alleged crime” and 
are not “unnecessarily gruesome.”  (Ramirez, at p. 454, italics 
added.)  Plus, if the record demonstrates the trial court was 
“aware of [its] duty to weigh the prejudicial effect of the 
photographs against their probative value” and performed that 
duty “carefully,” that too weighs against finding an abuse of 
discretion.  (Ibid.)   
We have examined exhibit 42 and conclude that it neither 
sensationalizes Faria’s killing nor contains unnecessary gore.  
The photograph depicts Faria’s body lying on a table with his 
abdomen cut open, but — as the jury was told — that was the 
result of surgery performed to save Faria’s life, not shots fired 
to end it.  We have seen, and approved the admission of, far 
worse.  (See, e.g., Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 409, 454. 
[affirming admission of photograph depicting a murder victim 
with her eyes cut out not by medical personnel, but by the 
murderer].)  Furthermore, the record demonstrates that the 
trial court carefully exercised its duty to weigh the probative 
value of potentially inflammatory photographs against the risk 
of unfair prejudice.  The trial court heard the parties’ arguments 
on that issue at some length, explained its ruling on the record, 
and — with respect to exhibit 45 — guided the parties towards 
a compromise to minimize the risk of unfair prejudice.  
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
40 
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting exhibit 42. 
F.  References to “Guilt/Innocence” Dichotomy 
Mendez asserts the trial court prejudicially erred by giving 
the jury two instructions using the word “innocent” rather than 
“not guilty.”  These instructions and several similarly phrased 
comments made by the trial court during voir dire, Mendez 
argues, created a “guilt/innocence” dichotomy impermissibly 
diluting the reasonable doubt standard.  Yet Mendez concedes 
we have consistently rejected arguments just like the one he 
advances here.  (See, e.g., People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 
554; People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1059 (Brasure); 
People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 847-848.)  He offers us no 
persuasive reason to depart from those decisions, and we decline 
to reconsider them. 
G.  Victim Impact Evidence 
Contrary to Mendez’s contentions, the victim impact 
evidence admitted in this case was within the bounds of what 
our precedents permit. 
1.  Facts 
The People called six witnesses to offer victim impact 
testimony at the penalty phase of Mendez’s trial, three for Faria 
and three for Salazar.   
Faria’s father testified first.  He told the jury that Faria 
“cared about other people, cared about his mom, cared about his 
sisters and brother, cared about me.”  Faria’s father also said it 
was a “shock” to hear that his son had claimed allegiance to a 
gang, explaining that Faria “never gave us any clue or any kind 
of thought that he was going to be a gang member.”  Faria’s 
father also described his experience on the night of his son’s 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
41 
killing.  He told the jury how Faria said, “I love you” on his way 
out the door, which was “the one time” Faria’s father could 
remember his son doing that — and also “the last time.”  Upon 
hearing his son had been shot, Faria’s father rushed to the 
hospital.  Despite initially hoping “the bullet in [Faria’s] brain 
would be able to be removed,” the hospital staff eventually 
concluded that it was “too swelled up” and that Faria was “not 
going to make it.”  Faria’s dad then chronicled the toll his son’s 
death had on their family:  he and his wife divorced but they and 
their children were “surviving.”  The emotional impact was 
especially severe, Faria’s father continued, because his son died 
a “tragic, sickening, evil, disgusting death.” 
Faria’s sister testified next.  She was 13 years old when 
she took the stand.  She described to the jury how Faria would 
“protect [her] from boys” at school and, on one occasion, saved 
her life by pulling her from a burning car.  She also detailed her 
experience on the night Faria was shot.  After rushing to the 
hospital with family members, she saw her brother “lying on [a] 
bed all bloody.”  When he passed away, she was “[s]cared, crying, 
hurt.”  At the close of her testimony, the People asked Faria’s 
sister to describe childhood photographs of her, Faria, and their 
other sister.  These and other childhood photographs of the 
victims were shown to the jury throughout the penalty phase. 
The People’s final witness who testified about the toll of 
Faria’s death was his mother.  She described her son as “very 
energetic,” “very playful,” and “very cheerful.”  When asked 
where she was when she heard about the shooting, Faria’s 
mother told the jury, “I was sleeping and I was having a 
nightmare . . . that I had got shot, and I s[aw] the bullet go 
through my face, and that startled me to wake up.”  At that 
moment, she continued, two detectives knocked on the door and 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
42 
told her Faria had been shot.  The detectives searched Faria’s 
room for evidence of gang involvement, a possibility that 
“shocked” Faria’s mother.  She then went to the hospital, where 
she saw her son — who had just had emergency surgery — and 
observed that “[a]ll his insides were out” and that “blood was 
dripping from the bed.”  At the hospital, she told her remaining 
children that their brother was going to die.  His death took its 
toll on the family.  Faria’s mother explained that she and Faria’s 
father divorced.  Their daughter began claiming allegiance to 
West Side Verdugo, feeling “that if her brother died for 
something . . . she’s going to be claiming that too.”  And Faria’s 
mother herself fell into a five-month period of drug abuse. 
The proceedings turned to Salazar.  The first two 
witnesses to testify about the impact of Salazar’s death were her 
cousins.  One described Salazar as someone who “liked to make 
everybody laugh” and detailed the pain she felt upon hearing 
from a newspaper article that Salazar had been “executed” with 
a shot to the head.  Salazar’s other cousin similarly described 
her as someone who “always put a smile on everybody’s face” 
and who “had the intelligence to do anything that she wanted to 
do,” like become “a doctor” or “a lawyer.”  He also testified that 
Salazar’s death created “a hole in the heart of everybody that’s 
loved her” that “[n]othing could ever fill.” 
Salazar’s mother was the final witness to testify at the 
penalty phase.  She broke down shortly after taking the stand, 
spurring the trial court to call a brief recess.  When trial 
resumed, the People asked Salazar’s mother to read a poem 
Salazar had written as a fifth grader.  That poem, entitled 
“Jessica’s Cry,” read as follows: 
Most of us don’t want to die, but, anyway, in our 
coffin there we lie. 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
43 
You could have been stabbed, or shot, or took an 
overdose of pot. 
No one cares anymore; people are getting shot to 
the floor. 
There are screams everywhere; people are running 
here and there. 
There is someone on the ground; when they are 
found, everyone’s crying. 
The truth is everyone is dying. 
We pray to God every night, but the next day begin 
to fight. 
Everyone is killing each other, not knowing all the 
pain and hurt they’re going to make or all the souls 
they are going to take. 
I don’t know about you, but I’ve had enough. 
They’re taking innocent lives. 
It could be your brothers, your sisters, your wives, 
or maybe even you. 
Once she finished reading the poem, Salazar’s mother narrated 
the occasions on which “about eight” childhood photos of Salazar 
were taken.  As she did so, she elaborated on how the murder 
had left her son’s life “in shambles.”  Salazar’s mother said her 
son was “not the same boy as before.”  He became “very angry” 
and 
even 
contemplated 
suicide, 
causing 
him 
to 
be 
institutionalized multiple times.  After discussing the remaining 
childhood photographs of her deceased daughter, Salazar’s 
mother told the jury that her “world stopped” the day her 
daughter was killed and that the way in which she died made 
the pain even more intense.  The prosecution then showed 
portions of a home video depicting Salazar’s sixth grade 
graduation — followed by a photo of Salazar’s gravestone. 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
44 
2.  Analysis 
Although the victim impact evidence admitted at the 
penalty phase of Mendez’s trial was powerful, we cannot say it 
was improper under our precedents.  Witnesses, we have said, 
“are permitted to share with jurors the harm that a capital crime 
caused in their lives.”  (People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 461-
462.)  That is because “the effects of a capital crime are 
relevant . . . as a circumstance of the crime.”  (Id. at p. 462; see 
also § 190.3, subd. (a).)  And so long as victim impact evidence 
does not invite the jury to respond in a purely irrational way, it 
is admissible.  (Perez, at p. 462.)  
As an initial matter, the trial court did not, as Mendez 
contends, permit a “flood” of victim impact evidence.  To the 
contrary, permitting victim impact testimony from six witnesses 
regarding two victims — that is, three per victim — is 
comparable to what we have permitted in other cases.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 511, citing 
People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 573 (Brady) [allowing 
victim impact testimony from three witnesses for one victim and 
observing that this court has in the past permitted testimony 
from nine such witnesses for one victim]; People v. Simon (2016) 
1 Cal.5th 98, 140 [collecting cases].)  Admitting some 13 photos 
of Salazar and fewer of Faria likewise was not excessive under 
our cases.3  (See, e.g., Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 46 
                                        
3  
We acknowledge that the photographs admitted here 
depicted Faria and Salazar as children.  The admission of 
childhood photographs may be improper in some cases, 
particularly where they depict the victim at a substantially 
younger age than at the time of death.  But in this case, there 
was no error.  Faria and Salazar “were, after all, still young 
 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
45 
[allowing admission of twelve photos of one victim]; People v. 
Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1240-1241 [allowing admission 
of video montage depicting approximately 20 photographs of one 
victim].) 
What this victim impact evidence showed was also in line 
with what we have allowed in the past:  the witnesses testified 
“about 
their 
relationship 
with” 
the 
victims, 
“how 
they learned about” the victims’ deaths, and how the murders 
“affected their lives.”  (People v. Spencer (2018) 5 Cal.5th 642, 
677.)  The details of that testimony were not materially more 
emotionally 
inflammatory 
than 
that 
approved 
by 
our 
precedents.  Yes, Faria’s family members described rushing to 
the hospital and seeing him lying there, bleeding and dying.  But 
in Brady we permitted fellow police officers to “testif[y] 
extensively about how they learned of the shooting, their initial 
reactions to learning that the downed officer was their friend,” 
and “the efforts to save his life both at the scene and at the 
hospital.”  (Brady, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 574.)  And yes, Faria’s 
father testified that his son said, “I love you” before leaving the 
night he was killed and Faria’s mother described having a 
nightmare about being shot just before learning her son had 
suffered that same fate — testimony which Mendez challenges 
as “supernaturally tinged.”  But we saw no error in the victim 
impact testimony presented in People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 
Cal.4th 263 (Verdugo), even though there the victim’s mother 
described how her daughter had said, “I love you” before leaving 
                                        
when [Mendez] killed them.”  (People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 
141, 191 (Booker).)  Furthermore, we have repeatedly upheld the 
admission of gravesite photographs, and we do so again here.  
(See Brady, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 580 [collecting cases].) 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
46 
the night she was killed, and even though another witness 
described how, after a murder, the victim’s young goddaughter 
reported seeing the victim’s ghost.  (Id. at pp. 297-299.) 
Further aspects of the victim impact testimony in this case 
mirror those we have permitted in other cases.  We have allowed 
victim impact testimony detailing severe effects on family 
members, including a grieving mother’s suicide attempts and 
hospitalizations.  (Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 193.)  So the 
testimony in this case suggesting that the murders contributed 
to suicide attempts and hospitalizations — not to mention 
divorce, drug addiction, and gang activity — among the victims’ 
family members “was relevant victim impact evidence,” too.  
(Ibid.)  We have also permitted victim impact witnesses to 
describe how they “imagined” their loved ones’ final moments, 
reasoning that it is “obvious” to a jury “that family members of 
murder victims might imagine the victims’ horror.”  (People v. 
Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 485; see also People v. 
Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1182 [approving victim impact 
testimony about frequently “imagining the suffering of [the 
victims’] final minutes”].)  It is equally obvious that a parent 
would describe the murder of a child as a “tragic, sickening, evil, 
disgusting death,” as Faria’s father did.  And, relatedly, we have 
said it is “a normal human response to the loss of a child” for 
such a parent to break down on the stand, as Salazar’s mother 
did.  (Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 298.)  
Mendez further argues the trial court prejudicially erred 
by admitting portions of the home video depicting Salazar’s 
sixth grade graduation and allowing her mother to read the 
poem she wrote in fifth grade.  We disagree.  In People v. 
Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, we upheld a trial court’s decision 
to admit the entirety of an “eight-minute videotape” depicting 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
47 
the victim — who was murdered at age nine — “and family 
members preparing for and enjoying a trip to Disneyland.”  (Id. 
at pp. 783-785.)  And in Brady we allowed “a four-minute, edited 
videotape depicting” a slain police officer “celebrating 
Christmas, two days before his murder, with his family.”  
(Brady, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 579.)  If those videos were okay, 
so was this one.   
As for the poem, we have on at least two occasions allowed 
an immediate family member to read a poem penned by the 
victim.  (See People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184, 1227; People 
v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1076.)  To be sure, that Salazar’s 
poem bemoaned gang violence may have injected a cruel irony 
into the proceedings.  But we fail to see how, under our 
precedents, that irony invited an irrational response from the 
jury.  For one, we have upheld a trial court’s decision to admit a 
cassette containing songs all about “losing someone, leaving 
someone, [and] having to say goodbye” that a murder victim 
coincidentally gave her father shortly before her death.  
(Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 297-299.)  For another, 
although we did not describe the content of the poem at issue in 
Parker, we noted that the poem at issue in Suff was about the 
victim “stumbling and going through hell, but rejecting Satan” 
— and we held that this “contributed to the picture of the victim 
who was taken from the family.”  (Suff, at p. 1076.)  So too here.  
The poem at issue in this case showed that, young as she was, 
Salazar was aware of, and reflected on, the dangerous world in 
which she lived. 
For all these reasons, and because we decline to revisit our 
prior cases, we hold that the trial court did not err in admitting 
victim impact evidence at the penalty phase of Mendez’s trial. 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
48 
H.  Failure to Reinstruct at the Penalty Phase 
At the start of the penalty phase, the trial court instructed 
the jury to “[d]isregard all other instructions given to you in 
other phases of this trial” but failed to reinstruct the jury on 
several general principles of law relevant to the penalty phase.  
Although we have held that similar oversights may constitute 
error, we have consistently deemed such error harmless under 
any standard.  (See, e.g., People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 
714-717 (Boyce); People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1276-
1277; People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 803-804; People v. 
Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 35-39; Carter, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 
1218-1222.)  Here too any error was harmless.   
Mendez asserts prejudice resulted from the trial court’s 
failure at the penalty phase to repeat the model instruction 
making clear that statements by attorneys are not evidence.  
(See CALJIC No. 1.02.)  Specifically, he argues we must 
presume that without reinstruction the jury disregarded the 
guilt phase instruction to that effect.  By failing to reinstruct, 
Mendez contends, the trial court essentially told the jury it could 
now consider the prosecutor’s argument as evidence at the 
penalty phase.   
We disagree.  The trial court drew a clear line between 
evidence and argument at the penalty phase.  It instructed the 
jury to make its penalty determination “[a]fter having heard all 
of the evidence, and after having heard and considered the 
arguments of counsel.”  (Italics added.)  The upshot was obvious:  
evidence and argument are two different things.  Any 
reasonable jury would have understood as much.  Crediting 
Mendez’s contrary argument would require us to “assume that 
jurors acted contrary to common sense simply on the basis of a 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
49 
general direction to disregard the guilt phase instructions.”  
(Brasure, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1073.)  That is an assumption 
we have declined to indulge in prior cases, and an assumption 
we decline to indulge in this one.  (See, e.g., ibid.; Boyce, supra, 
59 Cal.4th at p. 716.) 
I.  Failure to Orally Impose Judgment on 
Enhancements 
Mendez asserts that, because the trial court neglected to 
orally impose judgment on several enhancements, they must be 
stricken.  We disagree.   
At trial, the jury found the following enhancements to be 
true: 
• Mendez personally discharged a firearm causing 
the deaths of both Faria and Salazar within the 
meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d).  Those 
enhancements, as they then existed, were 
mandatory.  (See § 12022.53, former subd. (h), 
amended by Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 
2018 [“Notwithstanding Section 1385 or any other 
provision of law, the court shall not strike an 
allegation under this section or a finding bringing a 
person within the provisions of this section.”].) 
• Mendez personally discharged a firearm causing 
the deaths of both Faria and Salazar for the benefit 
of, at the direction of, or in association with a 
criminal street gang, within the meaning of 
sections 12022.53, subdivision (e), and 186.22, 
subdivision (b)(1).  Those enhancements were also 
mandatory.  (See § 12022.53, former subd. (h).) 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
50 
• Mendez committed both murders for the benefit of, 
at the direction of, or in association with a criminal 
street gang, within the meaning of section 186.22, 
subdivision (b)(1).  Those enhancements could only 
be stricken “in an unusual case where the interests 
of justice would be best served, if the court specifies 
on the record and enters into the minutes the 
circumstances indicating that the interests of 
justice would be best served by that disposition.”  
(§ 186.22, former subd. (d).) 
At sentencing, the trial court said on the record, “It is the 
judgment and sentence of this Court that for the offense of 
murder as charged” as to both the Faria and Salazar killings 
“that [Mendez] shall suffer the death penalty.”  The trial court 
did not orally impose sentence on the above enhancements.   
Instead, off the record, the trial court imposed two 
consecutive 25-years-to-life sentences for the section 12022.53, 
subdivision (d) enhancements to run concurrently with two 
consecutive 25-years-to-life sentences on the section 12022.53, 
subdivision (e) enhancements, as well as two consecutive three-
year sentences for the section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) 
enhancements to run consecutively with the sentences on the 
other two sets of enhancements.  All told, then, the trial court 
belatedly imposed a 56-year-to-life sentence on the foregoing 
three sets of enhancements that was not part of the judgment it 
pronounced orally. 
Nevertheless, we decline Mendez’s request to strike those 
three sets of enhancements.  The first two sets of enhancements 
were mandatory.  So the oral sentence failing to impose them 
was “unauthorized” and thus “subject to judicial correction 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
51 
whenever the error c[ame] to the attention” of a court.  (People 
v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6 [holding on appeal 
that sentence enhancements must be imposed even though the 
People had not asked the trial court to impose them below].)  
Similarly, as we have explained, the trial court could not decline 
to impose the third set of enhancements unless it found that 
justice required leniency and explained its reasoning on the 
record.  But the trial court made no such finding and gave no 
such explanation; to the contrary, by later endeavoring to 
impose this third set of enhancements, the trial court indicated 
it saw no reason for leniency.  So here too the sentence 
pronounced orally was unauthorized and subject to judicial 
correction at any time.  (See ibid.) 
 
That conclusion accords with People v. Mesa (1975) 14 
Cal.3d 466 and In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702.  In both of 
those cases, we presumed that the trial court’s silence about a 
prior conviction enhancement in its orally pronounced sentence 
indicated “ ‘that the omission was an act of leniency by the trial 
court.’ ”  (Mesa, at p. 471, quoting Candelario, at p. 706.)  But 
again, unlike in Mesa and Candelario, the trial court in this case 
had no ability to perform by silence any acts of leniency with 
respect to the enhancements.  So here, unlike in those cases, the 
trial court’s oversight resulted in an unauthorized sentence 
subject to subsequent judicial correction. 
J.  Constitutional Challenges to California’s Death 
Penalty Scheme 
Mendez mounts several constitutional challenges to 
California’s death penalty scheme.  We have rejected each of 
them in prior cases, and Mendez has given us no persuasive 
reason to reconsider those decisions in this case.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 294-296 [holding that 
PEOPLE v. MENDEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
52 
(i) the special circumstances listed in section 190.2 are not so 
broad as to violate the Eighth Amendment; (ii) application of 
section 190, subdivision (a) is constitutional; (iii) the jury need 
not make written findings of aggravating and mitigating factors, 
agree unanimously that a particular aggravating circumstance 
exists, find all aggravating factors proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating 
factors outweigh the mitigating factors, or conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate penalty; (iv) the 
Constitution does not require inter-case proportionality review; 
and (v) California’s death penalty law does not deny capital 
defendants equal protection or violate the Constitution by 
operation of international law or by an accumulation of 
deficiencies]; People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 570 [holding 
that (i) the use of the adjectives “extreme” and “substantial” in 
section 190.3, subdivisions (d) and (g) is constitutional; (ii) the 
trial court need not identify mitigating factors as such; and (iii) 
reliance on unadjudicated criminal activity at the penalty phase 
is constitutional].) 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
We Concur: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
KRUGER, J. 
 
GROBAN, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Mendez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S129501 
Date Filed: July 1, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Riverside 
Judge: Edward D. Webster 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Randall Bookout, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Julie L. Garland and Ronald S. Matthias, Assistant Attorneys General, Holly 
D. Wilkens, Meagan J. Beale, Michael T. Murphy, Ronald A. Jakob and Christine Y. Friedman, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Randall Bookout 
Post Office Box 211377 
Chula Vista, CA  91921 
(619) 857-4432 
 
Christine Y. Friedman 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 738-9050