Case Title: New Jersey v. Green

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2018-11-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the
Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.

                        State v. Carlos B. Green (A-39-17) (080274)

Argued September 26, 2018 -- Decided November 28, 2018

SOLOMON, J., writing for the Court.

        This case comes to the Court on interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s
determination, affirmed by the Appellate Division, that the State could not present evidence
of defendant Carlos B. Green’s two prior driving while intoxicated (DWI) convictions in this
current prosecution for vehicular homicide while intoxicated. The State sought to introduce
the prior convictions as state of mind evidence -- evidence that defendant acted recklessly by
“consciously disregard[ing the] substantial and unjustifiable risk” of causing harm by driving
while intoxicated. See  N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3).

        On a late December night in 2014, Green struck and killed Billy Ray Dudley
(Dudley), who was lying in the road. A toxicology lab determined Green’s blood alcohol
concentration (BAC) to be 0.210% at the time of the accident. Pursuant to  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50,
a person who operates a motor vehicle with a BAC of 0.08% or more is guilty of driving
while intoxicated. Green had two prior DWI convictions in 1998 and 2009, for which his
sentences each required completion of an educational course at the Intoxicated Driving
Resource Center (IDRC). As a result of Dudley’s death, Green was charged with first-degree
vehicular homicide while intoxicated and within 1,000 feet of a school. Before trial, the
State moved in limine to introduce Green’s two prior DWI convictions, which the State
argued were relevant to the issue of recklessness. According to the State, the prior
convictions demonstrated that Green “had knowledge of the substantial and unjustifiable
risks associated with driving while intoxicated.”

       The trial court denied the State’s motion. Applying the factors established in State v.
Cofield,  127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992), the trial judge ruled that the evidence was unduly
prejudicial because a jury might use the prior convictions as evidence that Green acted in
conformity with that behavior in this instance.

        The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court, noting that “[d]riving while
intoxicated may alone satisfy the recklessness required by the death by auto statute.”  452 N.J. Super. 323, 325-26 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting State v. Jamerson,  153 N.J. 318, 335
(1998)). Applying the Cofield factors, the panel concluded that the trial judge did not abuse
his discretion in excluding Green’s two prior DWI convictions. Id. at 328-29.

       The State sought leave to appeal, which was granted.  232 N.J. 97 (2018).
                                               1
HELD: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendant’s two prior DWI
convictions here. Although the Court imposes no per se exclusion of prior DWI convictions
in a prosecution for vehicular homicide while intoxicated, this case does not present the rare
circumstances that would render their admission appropriate.

1. Rule 404(b) bars “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts” when used “to show that [a]
person acted in conformity therewith.” N.J.R.E. 404(b). However, evidence of prior
“crimes, wrongs, or acts” may be used to show “intent, . . . knowledge, . . . or absence of
mistake or accident.” Id. Because evidence of a defendant’s other crimes has a unique
tendency to prejudice the jury, other-crimes evidence proffered under Rule 404(b) must pass
a rigorous test. In Cofield,  127 N.J. at 338, the Court adopted a four-part test to determine
the admissibility of other-crimes evidence: “(1) The evidence of the other crime must be
admissible as relevant to a material issue; (2) It must be similar in kind and reasonably close
in time to the offense charged; (3) The evidence of the other crime must be clear and
convincing; and (4) The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its
apparent prejudice.” Trial courts must apply that test on a case-by-case basis “in order to
avoid the over-use of extrinsic evidence of other crimes or wrongs.” Ibid. (pp. 8-9)

2. To satisfy the first prong of the Cofield test, the proffered evidence must be relevant to a
material issue genuinely in dispute. Here, as a result of his DWI convictions, Green was
required to take courses at the IDRC, where he learned of the dangers of driving while
intoxicated. As such, the proffered evidence supports the State’s contention that Green knew
of and consciously disregarded the risks of driving while intoxicated. Thus, Green’s
previous DWI convictions and compulsory IDRC participation were relevant to a material
issue at trial, namely Green’s recklessness. (pp. 9-10)

3. Although relevant in Cofield, similarity and temporality are not applicable in every case.
As a result, Cofield’s second prong may be eliminated where it serves no beneficial purpose.
That is the case here. (p. 10)

4. Under the third Cofield prong, the prosecution must establish that the other crime actually
happened by clear and convincing evidence. Here, the State offered judgments of
conviction. Therefore, the evidence satisfies Cofield’s third prong. (p. 11)

5. Because of the damaging nature of other crimes evidence, the fourth Cofield prong --
“[t]he probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice,”
 127 N.J. at 338 -- is the most difficult to overcome. That prong requires an inquiry distinct
from the familiar balancing required under N.J.R.E. 403: the trial court must determine only
whether the probative value of such evidence is outweighed by its potential for undue
prejudice, not whether it is substantially outweighed by that potential as in the application of
Rule 403. If other less prejudicial evidence may be presented to establish the same issue, the
balance in the weighing process will tip in favor of exclusion. Therefore, Rule 404(b) is
viewed as a rule of exclusion rather than a rule of inclusion. To reduce the inherent prejudice
in the admission of other-crimes evidence, trial courts are required to sanitize the evidence
when appropriate, and a carefully crafted limiting instruction must be provided. (pp. 11-13)
                                               2
6. The crux of this case is Cofield’s fourth prong. Green’s two prior DWI convictions and
subsequent IDRC participation tend to show that Green was aware of, but consciously
disregarded, the risks of driving while intoxicated, a mental state that is a material element of
vehicular homicide. Nevertheless, other considerations diminish the probative value of the
evidence at issue. For example, Green’s prior DWI convictions were from 1998 and 2009 --
many years before this fatal accident. Turning to prejudice, while Green was indeed
intoxicated on the night of the accident, Dudley was lying in the middle of a dark roadway
when he was struck by Green’s vehicle. Even with the most carefully crafted limiting
instruction, admission of Green’s two prior DWI convictions could result in the jury’s
conflating recklessness and causation. Additionally, Green had a BAC of 0.210% at the time
of the incident. Therefore, the State has at its disposal probative and far less inflammatory
evidence of Green’s reckless state of mind. In light of the circumstances present in this case,
the risk that a jury would convict Green based on his propensity to drive while intoxicated
outweighs the probative value of his more than five-year-old DWI convictions. Therefore,
balancing the probative value against the prejudice of admitting defendant’s prior DWI
convictions and IDRC program participation under Rule 404(b) favors exclusion of the
evidence. (pp. 13-15)

7. Here, the trial court and Appellate Division were correct to exclude defendant’s prior
DWI convictions. However, as in State v. Bakka,  176 N.J. 533 (2003), the Court recognizes
that there may be a situation in which prior DWI convictions of a defendant charged with
vehicular homicide while intoxicated would be admissible under Rule 404(b) as evidence of
recklessness, despite the statutory inference of recklessness arising from evidence that the
defendant drove with a BAC over 0.08%. The probative value of prior DWI convictions
close in time to the incident charged may, only in the rare case, outweigh the potential for
undue prejudice. The Court therefore encourages trial judges to perform a thorough Cofield
analysis and not presume a per se exclusion of such evidence. The admissibility of Rule
404(b) evidence must be considered on a case-by-case basis by analyzing the evidence
proffered and the circumstances of the case. See Bakka,  176 N.J. at 547. (pp. 15-17)

       AFFIRMED.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON,
FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’S opinion.

                                               3
       SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
             A-
39 September Term 2017
                       080274

                State of New Jersey,

                Plaintiff-Appellant,

                         v.

                  Carlos B. Green,

              Defendant-Respondent.

         On appeal from the Superior Court,
   Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at
        452 N.J. Super. 323 (App. Div. 2017).

      Argued                      Decided
 September 26, 2018           November 28, 2018

Stephen A. Pogany, Special Deputy Attorney General,
Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for
appellant (Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex
County Prosecutor, attorney; Stephen A. Pogany, of
counsel and on the briefs).

Molly O’Donnell Meng, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E.
Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Molly O’Donnell
Meng, of counsel and on the briefs).

Jennifer E. Kmieciak, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General
of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General,
attorney; Jennifer E. Kmieciak, of counsel and on the
brief).

                          1
           JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court.

      This case comes to us on interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s

determination, affirmed by the Appellate Division, that the State could not

present evidence of defendant Carlos B. Green’s two prior driving while

intoxicated (DWI) convictions in this current prosecution for vehicular

homicide while intoxicated. The State sought to introduce the prior

convictions as state of mind evidence -- evidence that defendant acted

recklessly by “consciously disregard[ing the] substantial and unjustifiable

risk” of causing harm by driving while intoxicated. See  N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3).

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding

defendant’s two prior DWI convictions here. Although we impose no per se

exclusion of prior DWI convictions in a prosecution for vehicular homicide

while intoxicated, this case does not present the rare circumstances that would

render their admission appropriate.

                                        I.

      On a late December night in 2014, defendant Carlos B. Green (Green)

struck and killed Billy Ray Dudley (Dudley), who was lying in the road. A

toxicology lab determined Green’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) to be

0.210% at the time of the accident. Pursuant to  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, a person

                                        2
who operates a motor vehicle with a BAC of 0.08% or more is guilty of

driving while intoxicated.

      Green had two prior DWI convictions in 1998 and 2009, for which his

sentences each required completion of an educational course at the Intoxicated

Driving Resource Center (IDRC). The IDRC conducts a post-conviction

intervention program for those convicted of an alcohol or drug-related traffic

offense. The program is designed to educate participants about alcohol and its

effects on motor vehicle safety. At the IDRC, participants attend a series of

educational sessions and discussions in order to successfully complete the

course.

      As a result of Dudley’s death, Green was charged in a grand jury

indictment with first-degree vehicular homicide while intoxicated and within

1,000 feet of a school, contrary to  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5(b)(3)(a). Before trial, the

State moved in limine to introduce Green’s two prior DWI convictions, which

the State argued were relevant to the issue of recklessness. According to the

State, the prior convictions demonstrated that Green “had knowledge of the

substantial and unjustifiable risks associated with driving while intoxicated.”

      The trial court denied the State’s motion. Applying the factors

established by this Court in State v. Cofield,  127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992), the trial

judge ruled that the evidence was unduly prejudicial because a jury might use

                                        3
the prior convictions as evidence that Green acted in conformity with that

behavior in this instance. Quoting United States v. Rutherford,