Case Title: Mohn v. Posegate

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84627

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mohn v. Posegate, 
No. 84627 (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 84627-Agenda 23-September 
1998.
Opinion filed December 17, 1998.
JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the 
court:
In this case appellants ask us to consider but one issue: 
whether, following a jury trial, a party must raise in a post-trial motion any 
issue concerning the pretrial entry of summary judgment as to part of the cause 
of action in order to preserve that issue for review.
In the circuit court of Macon County, the plaintiff, Steven 
Mohn, filed a 12-count complaint in February 1991 against, among others, Dr. 
Robert Posegate, an ophthalmologist, and Sangamon Eye Associates, Ltd. 
(Sangamon). In November 1994, plaintiff filed his second amended complaint in 
two counts, count I being directed against Dr. Posegate and count II being 
directed against Sangamon. Plaintiff alleged that each defendant was guilty of 
one or more of approximately 16 negligent acts or omissions. In April 1995, Dr. 
Posegate moved for summary judgment as to count I of plaintiff's second amended 
complaint, and Sangamon moved for partial summary judgment as to count II. 
Following a hearing on June 6, 1995, the trial court allowed the motions of both 
defendants, entering summary judgment in favor of Dr. Posegate on count I and 
partial summary judgment in favor of Sangamon on count II.
The trial court took under advisement an oral motion by the 
defendants for a finding pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 
304(a)). Thereafter, defendants withdrew their oral motion for a Rule 304(a) 
finding. In a written objection to the "Rule 304(a) Motion," 
plaintiff
On December 20, 1995, following a hearing, 
the trial court denied the plaintiff's petition to reconsider its decision 
announced June 6, 1995, with respect to the defendants' motions for summary 
judgment and partial summary judgment. The trial court found that "there is no 
legal basis upon which the Court can make any findings or judgment different 
from the original order entered" and confirmed the prior orders granting summary 
judgment and partial summary judgment.
The case proceeded to trial by jury against the defendant 
Sangamon on the three allegations of negligence remaining, those set forth in 
subparagraphs (m), (n), and (o) of paragraph 14 of count II. The jury rendered a 
verdict in favor of the defendant Sangamon and against plaintiff. Following a 
hearing, the trial court denied the plaintiff's post-trial motion.
Plaintiff appealed, presenting a number of issues for 
review, among them, whether the trial court had erred by granting Dr. Posegate's 
motion for summary judgment and Sangamon's motion for partial summary judgment 
because both counts of the second amended complaint presented genuine issues of 
material fact. Both Dr. Posegate and Sangamon responded that plaintiff had 
waived this argument by having failed to raise it in his post-trial motion. In 
reliance upon Mt. Zion State Bank & Trust v. Central Illinois Annual 
Conference of the United Methodist Church, 198 Ill. App. 3d 881 (1990), the 
appellate court rejected the defendants' claim of waiver.
The appellate court agreed with Dr. Posegate and Sangamon 
that plaintiff's claims concerning Dr. Posegate's initial examination of him in 
August 1977 are barred by the statute of repose, and it concluded that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists whether Dr. Posegate personally provided 
negligent treatment to plaintiff after his initial examination of him in August 
of 1977. However, the appellate court agreed with plaintiff that a genuine issue 
of material fact exists with respect to count I of the second amended complaint 
as to whether Dr. Posegate properly monitored and supervised the care and 
treatment of plaintiff by an optometrist, Dr. Larry Williams. In count II 
plaintiff alleged that Sangamon, through its agents and employees, inter 
alia, failed to perform a complete eye examination upon plaintiff; failed 
to advise or warn plaintiff or his parents of any dangers associated with 
plaintiff's participation in athletic activities or the need for plaintiff to 
wear protective eyewear during athletic activity; failed to inform plaintiff and 
his parents of certain signs of retinal detachment; failed to use proper 
diagnostic methods or techniques to diagnose the condition known as lattice 
degeneration in plaintiff's eyes; and failed to diagnose that condition in 
plaintiff's eyes in a timely fashion. Plaintiff alleged that he was injured when 
he was struck by a thrown ball while preparing to play a baseball game in July 
1983, while he was a minor. The appellate court determined that genuine issues 
of material fact exist whether Sangamon, through the optometrist, conducted 
incomplete follow-up examinations until plaintiff's treatment ended in April 
1983; failed to diagnose lattice degeneration; failed to inform plaintiff of the 
signs and symptoms of retinal detachment; and failed to warn plaintiff and his 
parents of the dangers associated with participation in sports 
activities.
In summary, the appellate court held that the trial court 
did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Posegate and Sangamon 
as to claims against Dr. Posegate arising out of the examination in August 1977, 
but that the trial court did err by granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. 
Posegate and Sangamon as to the remainder of plaintiff's cause of action. The 
appellate court considered as well issues concerning purported error at trial, 
deciding them adversely to the plaintiff's contentions. In its order issued 
according to Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23), the appellate court 
affirmed the judgment of the trial court in part and reversed it in part. No. 
4-96-0865 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 315 (166 Ill. 2d R. 315), we allowed both defendants leave to appeal. 
Defendants contend that "where a litigant fails to raise an issue in a 
post-trial motion following a jury trial, that issue has been waived, regardless 
of whether the claim of error arose before the jury was impaneled."
Section 2-1202(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 
ILCS 5/2-1202(b) (West 1996)) provides that relief desired after trial in jury 
cases must be sought in a single post-trial motion and that the post-trial 
motion must contain the points relied upon, particularly specifying the grounds 
in support thereof, and must state the relief desired, as for example, the entry 
of a judgment, the granting of a new trial or other appropriate relief. 
Moreover, Supreme Court Rule 366(b)(2)(iii) (155 Ill. 2d R. 366(b)(2)(iii)) 
states that in jury cases "[a] party may not urge as error on review of the 
ruling on the party's post-trial motion any point, ground, or relief not 
specified in the motion." However, Supreme Court Rule 366(b)(3)(ii) (155 Ill. 2d 
R. 366(b)(3)(ii)) provides that in nonjury cases "[n]either the filing of nor 
the failure to file a post-judgment motion limits the scope of 
review."
In Mt. Zion State Bank & Trust the plaintiff 
claimed error not in the judgment on the jury verdict but in the prior entry of 
summary judgment. The defendant, Central Illinois Annual Conference of the 
United Methodist Church, maintained that any error by the trial court in 
allowing its motion for summary judgment on certain counts was waived because 
the plaintiff had filed no post-judgment motion seeking to set aside the summary 
judgment. In holding that no post-trial judgment motion by plaintiff was 
necessary to preserve error in its cross-appeal, the appellate court 
reasoned,
In Keen v. Davis, 38 Ill. 2d 280, 
281-82 (1967), this court held that a post-trial motion need not be filed 
following a directed verdict as a prerequisite to appeal and concluded that the 
appellate court had properly denied the motion to dismiss the appeal, reasoning 
as follows:
When summary judgment is sought, it "shall 
be rendered without delay if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1996). Furthermore,
We see no more reason to require the filing 
of a post-trial motion following the entry of summary judgment as to one or more 
issues in a case, prior to trial of the case upon the remaining undetermined 
issues, than there is to require the filing of a post-trial motion following an 
order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict. As this court said 
in Robbins v. Professional Construction Co., 72 Ill. 2d 215, 224 
(1978), a directed verdict is a complete removal of an issue from the province 
of the jury. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is 
effective without any assent of the jury (134 Ill. 2d R. 240). Similarly, 
summary judgment is rendered if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact; where the court finds that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact as to one or more, but less than all, of the major issues in the 
case, the court shall draw an order specifying the major issue or issues that 
appear without substantial controversy, and upon the trial of the case as to the 
remaining undetermined issues, the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established. In the same way that the jury does not determine the verdict when 
it is directed, the jury makes no factual determination concerning the issue or 
issues disposed of by entry of summary judgment before trial of the case upon 
the remaining undetermined issues. Thus, we conclude that, as in a nonjury case 
in which a post-judgment motion need not be filed, a party need not raise in a 
post-trial motion any issue concerning the pretrial entry of summary judgment as 
to part of a cause of action in order to preserve the issue for review. We note 
that in this case, pursuant to plaintiff's petition for reconsideration, the 
trial court had an opportunity to reexamine its decision as to the entry of 
summary judgment in favor of Dr. Posegate and partial summary judgment in favor 
of Sangamon.
The judgment of the appellate court is 
affirmed.
Appellate court judgment 
affirmed.
JUSTICE MILLER took no part in the consideration or decision 
of this case.