Case Title: State v. Quincy Ferguson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1994AP002639-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1996-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-2639-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Quincy Ferguson, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 JUN 26, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                
   
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Ferguson, 195 Wis. 2d 
174, 536 N.W.2d 116 (Ct. App. 1995), affirming an order of the 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Lee E. Wells, Judge.  The 
circuit court convicted Quincy Ferguson (the defendant) of 
possession of cocaine base with intent to deliver, while armed, 
within 1000 feet of a park; possession of THC (marijuana) with 
intent to deliver, while armed; and bail jumping.  The defendant 
contests that portion of his sentence requiring that he pay $105 
 
No. 94-2639-CR 
 
 
 
2 
to the State Crime Laboratory for testing related to the 
controlled substances found in his possession.   
 
The sole issue presented for our review is the validity of 
the circuit court order requiring the defendant to pay State Crime 
Laboratory expenses as an item of costs under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.06(1)(c).  We hold that Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c) does not 
authorize the assessment of lab expenses against the defendant for 
testing controlled substances found in his possession.  We 
therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand 
the cause to the circuit court. 
 
I. 
 
For the purposes of this review, the facts are not in 
dispute.  The defendant's three convictions grew out of charges 
that on July 28, 1993, the Milwaukee police found "30 corner cut 
bags" of crack cocaine, 6 bags of marijuana and a .32-caliber 
revolver under the front seat of his car, which was parked within 
1000 feet of Washington Park in Milwaukee.  The defendant was out 
on bond in another criminal case at the time. 
 
Following a two-day bench trial in October 1993, the circuit 
court found the defendant guilty on three of the four counts with 
which he had been charged, as stated above.1  The circuit court 
sentenced the defendant to a three-year prison term without parole 
on the cocaine base charge, a one-year concurrent term on the 
                     
     1  A fourth count, charging the defendant with the failure to 
pay a controlled substance tax, was dismissed. 
 
No. 94-2639-CR 
 
 
 
3 
marijuana charge, and a 49-day concurrent term, reflecting time 
already served, on the bail jumping charge.  In relation to the 
cocaine base charge, the circuit court also imposed a $1000 fine, 
suspended the defendant's driver's license for six months, ordered 
that $615 (the cash found on the defendant when he was arrested) 
be given to the DARE program of the Milwaukee Metropolitan Drug 
Enforcement Unit, and required the defendant to pay "costs, 
assessments and surcharges and restitution" as a condition of his 
sentence. At sentencing the prosecutor specifically asked for 
"restitution of $105 to the state crime lab."   
 
Alleging that the lab expenses could not be assessed either 
as restitution or as costs under Wis. Stat. § 973.06, the 
defendant filed a post-conviction motion pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.30 seeking to vacate that part of his sentence 
holding him responsible for paying $105 to the State Crime 
Laboratory.  At the defendant's post-conviction motion hearing, 
the circuit court denied the defendant's motion, reasoning that 
the payment of the $105 was sustainable either under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.06(1)(c) or as an exercise of the court's inherent power to 
impose conditions of a prison sentence.  At the post-conviction 
hearing, the circuit court explained its reliance on Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.06(1)(c) as follows: 
Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c) which deals with disbursements for 
expert witnesses would include the costs of testing 
those materials by the State Crime Laboratory.  They 
have to do this in this case.  They have to be prepared 
to come into court and testify to that extent, that that 
kind of, if you want, time allocation and cost is 
 
No. 94-2639-CR 
 
 
 
4 
something that should be reimbursable to that expert.  
You don't just bring that expert in and say, now, what 
do you think from looking at that substance.  They would 
have to actually perform this test; and so, the Court, 
if they hadn't performed the test, would have required 
them to complete this test, and I think that they're 
entitled to be reimbursed for cost of completing that 
test.  It's a standardized cost in most cases.  
 
The defendant appealed the circuit court's order and the 
court of appeals affirmed, relying on Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c).  
The defendant then petitioned the court for review. 
 
II. 
 
We turn now to the question of whether the defendant could be 
assessed lab expenses as costs under Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c).  
Interpretation of a statute is a matter of law which we review de 
novo, benefitting from the analyses of the circuit court and the 
court of appeals.  Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund v. Wisconsin 
Health Care Liab. Ins. Plan, 200 Wis. 2d 599, ___ N.W.2d ___ 
(1996); Waste Mgmt. v. Kenosha Co. Rev. Bd., 184 Wis. 2d 541, 554, 
516 N.W.2d 695 (1994). 
 
The pertinent statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.06 (1993-94),2 limits 
the costs taxable against a defendant to those set forth therein. 
 It provides as follows: 
 
973.06  Costs.  (1) Except as provided in s.93.20, the 
costs taxable against the defendant shall consist of the 
following items and no others: 
 
 
(a)  The necessary disbursements and fees of officers 
allowed by law and incurred in connection with the 
arrest, preliminary examination and trial of the 
                     
     2  Unless otherwise noted, all further references are to the 
1993-94 volume of the Wisconsin Statutes. 
 
No. 94-2639-CR 
 
 
 
5 
defendant, including, in the discretion of the court, 
the fees, and disbursements of the agent appointed to 
return a defendant from another state or country. 
 
 
(b)  Fees and travel allowance of witnesses for the 
state at the preliminary examination and the trial. 
 
 
(c)  Fees and disbursements allowed by the court to 
expert witnesses.  Section 814.04(2) shall not apply in 
criminal cases.3 
 
 
(d)  Fees and travel allowance of witnesses for the 
defense incurred by the county at the request of the 
defendant, at the preliminary hearing and the trial. 
 
 
(e)  Attorney fees payable to the defense attorney by 
the county or the state.  If the court determines at the 
time of sentencing that the defendant's financial 
circumstances are changed, the court may adjust the 
amount in accordance with s.977.07(1)(a) and (2)(a). 
 
 
(f)  An amount determined by the court to make a 
reasonable 
contribution 
to 
a 
crime 
prevention 
organization, if the court determines that the person 
has the financial ability to make the contribution and 
the contribution is appropriate.   
 
 
(g)  An amount equal to 10% of any restitution ordered 
under s.973.20, payable to the county treasurer for use 
by the county. 
 
 
(h)  The cost of performance of a test under s.968.38, 
if ordered by the court.  
Emphasis added.4 
 
By its plain language, then, the costs taxable against a 
defendant under Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c) are limited to the items 
                     
     3  Wis. Stat. § 814.04(2) provides for witness fees not 
exceeding #200 for each expert witness who testifies. 
     4  The legislature has recently revised Wis. Stat. § 973.06, 
expanding the number of items that might be assessed against the 
defendant as costs.  See 1995 Wis. Act 53.  The 1995 Act is not 
before this court. 
 
No. 94-2639-CR 
 
 
 
6 
enumerated therein.  The State argues that the lab expenses fall 
within Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c), which refers to fees and 
disbursements allowed to expert witnesses.  The State has not 
suggested that the defendant might be taxed costs for the lab 
expenses under any other statutory provision.   
 
At the outset of the defendant's trial, the prosecutor 
submitted a witness list including "Gregory Popovich," describing 
him as "a chemical analyst for the Regional Crime Lab."  Popovich 
was prepared to testify regarding his findings that the substances 
found in the defendant's possession contained cocaine base and THC 
(marijuana).5  Because Popovich was an expert witness, argues the 
State, the expenses he incurred in analyzing these substances 
could properly be taxed against the defendant as costs under Wis. 
Stat. § 973.06(1)(c). 
 
The defendant contends that the expenses incurred by the 
State Crime Laboratory in testing the controlled substances found 
in his possession were neither fees nor disbursements as those 
terms are used in Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c).   
 
In support of his position, the defendant cites State v. 
Peterson, 163 Wis. 2d 800, 804, 472 N.W.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1991).  
In Peterson, the court of appeals held that general and 
                     
     5  Because the defense stipulated to Popovich's testimony, he 
did not testify.  The parties dispute whether one who does not 
testify can be considered an expert witness under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.06(1)(c).  Because we conclude on other grounds that the lab 
expenses are neither fees nor disbursements as those words are 
used in Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c), we do not address this issue. 
 
No. 94-2639-CR 
 
 
 
7 
unspecified law enforcement expenses of "approximately $200" 
incurred by the Shawano County Sheriff's Department while using an 
electronic wire surveillance device were not among those expenses 
that might be included under Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(a) as 
"disbursements and fees of officers allowed by law."  Peterson, 
163 Wis. 2d at 802.  The Peterson court reasoned that "[a] fee is 
'a 
fixed 
charge' 
(e.g., 
for 
a 
professional 
service) 
and 
disbursement means 'funds paid out.'  Both terms contemplate the 
payment of funds to another.  Neither term encompasses general 
internal operating expenses."  Id. at 804.  The court of appeals 
concluded that because the "approximately $200" in expenses 
incurred by the county was neither a fee nor a disbursement, it 
could not be taxed as costs under Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(a).  Id. 
 "While 
law 
enforcement 
departments 
expend 
money 
in 
the 
investigation of criminal offenses and in discharging other 
responsibilities that our society assigns to law enforcement 
officers," wrote the court of appeals, "the statute does not 
authorize imposition of these expenses on the defendant."  Id.  
 
Analogizing the lab expenses at issue in this case to the 
sheriff's wiretap expenses at issue in Peterson, the defendant 
argues that the monies spent in conducting lab tests are operating 
expenses internal to the State Crime Laboratory and are associated 
with the investigation and prosecution of drug cases.  Accordingly 
the defendant insists that such lab expenses are neither fees nor 
disbursements allowed to expert witnesses as those terms are used 
 
No. 94-2639-CR 
 
 
 
8 
in Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c) and are therefore not costs that can 
be taxed against him.  The defendant is apparently asserting that 
because the State Crime Laboratory does not bill the district 
attorney's office, the county or a local law enforcement agency 
for the expenses of drug analyses, because the Laboratory did not 
pay out funds to another entity to conduct such analyses, and 
because the prosecutor did not pay out funds to the Laboratory, 
the expenses incurred by the Laboratory in conducting its drug 
analyses are not fixed charges (fees) or disbursements under 
§ 973.06(1)(c). 
 
The State suggests, however, that the defendant's reading of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c) assigns the meaning of "monies paid out" 
to both fees and disbursements.  If fees must be monies paid out 
to another, the State contends, then they are also disbursements 
and the statute need not have used both terms.  Therefore, claims 
the State, the fact that Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c) refers to "fees 
and disbursements" suggests that fees must refer to something 
other than disbursements because a "construction of a statute that 
would result in any portion of the statute being superfluous 
should be avoided wherever possible."  Ann M.M. v. Rob S., 176 
Wis. 2d 673, 680, 500 N.W.2d 649 (1993) (citation omitted).   
 
While we agree with the State that the words "fees" and 
"disbursements" must be given different meanings, we nevertheless 
conclude that as used in Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c), fees and 
disbursements do not include lab expenses.  The word "fees" in 
 
No. 94-2639-CR 
 
 
 
9 
§ 973.06(1)(c) describes a fixed charge for a professional service 
rendered by an expert witness, a sum which is ordinarily charged 
to and payable by another.  The word "disbursements" in 
§ 973.06(1)(c) 
describes 
those 
incidental 
and 
out-of-pocket 
expenses which an expert witness may incur in the course of 
providing professional services; again, such out of pocket 
expenses are ordinarily charged to and payable by another.  
 
In short, the issue for the court is how to characterize the 
lab expenses at issue in this case under § 973.06(1)(c).  Should 
the lab expenses be characterized as fixed charges for the 
professional services of an expert witness (fees) or out-of-pocket 
expenses (disbursements) paid by the State Crime Laboratory in the 
course of providing the professional services of an expert 
witness?  Conversely, should the lab expenses be characterized as 
internal operating expenses of the State Crime Laboratory itself? 
 
In its brief to the court, the State contends that because 
the lab expenses at issue are fixed, they are fees under Wis. 
Stat. § 973.06(1)(c).6  We disagree with the State's argument.  
The fact that the cost of performing a governmental service can be 
established (fixed) does not ipso facto make the cost of 
                     
     6  Both parties agree that the record leaves unclear how the 
sum of $105 was determined.  The State submits that the State 
Crime Laboratory has established fixed charges of $30 for 
marijuana analysis and $75 for cocaine analysis, and the defendant 
does not dispute this fact.  We hold that even assuming arguendo 
that the expenses at issue are "fixed" by the State Crime 
Laboratory, they are not fees under Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c).   
 
No. 94-2639-CR 
 
 
 
10 
performing that service a fee under Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c).  To 
constitute a fee under § 973.06(1)(c), the cost of performing a 
service must be more than an internal operating expense of a 
governmental unit which has been prorated or costed out; it must 
be chargeable to and payable by another. 
 
The legislature did not intend that the lab expenses be paid 
by another.  As the State pointed out both in its brief and during 
oral argument before the court, from 1955 to 1969 the State Crime 
Laboratory was required by statute to estimate the cost of and fix 
charges for its services, which were then collected annually from 
local units of government at the rate of fifty percent of the cost 
of services performed.  Wis. Stat. § 165.01(8) (1955-56).  From 
1969 to 1973, the statute itself fixed these charges.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 165.76(3) (1971-72).  However, the legislature subsequently 
repealed this provision, Laws of 1971, ch. 215, § 131.  Therefore 
the State Crime Laboratory no longer bills local units of 
government for the services that it provides, apparently absorbing 
the cost of such services as internal operating expenses.   
 
We fail to see how what have become routine operating 
expenses incurred by the State Crime Laboratory during the course 
of criminal investigations can now be transformed into fees or 
disbursements.  Those expenses, regardless of whether they are 
fixed or represent estimates, have not been charged to or paid by 
another unit of government since 1973.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that the expenses incurred by the State Crime Laboratory in the 
 
No. 94-2639-CR 
 
 
 
11 
course of a criminal investigation are not fees or disbursements 
under Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c), and the State may not assess 
these lab expenses as costs.   
 
Were we to accept the State's argument that these lab 
expenses are fees taxable against defendants as costs under § 
973.06(1)(c), a whole panoply of expenses for services rendered by 
expert witnesses who are state employees, including expenses for 
polygraph tests, blood tests, handwriting analyses, and physical 
and mental examinations might also be construed as fees and taxed 
against defendants.  
 
We are not aware that any of these expenses are now being 
viewed as costs taxable against defendants.  Under the State's 
interpretation of the statute, all of them might be.  Neither the 
language nor the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c) 
indicates that the legislature intended defendants to bear a pro 
rata share of the operating expenses of the State Crime Laboratory 
or any other law enforcement unit.  Nor has the legislature 
indicated that the cost statute allows the State to recover 
investigative or litigation expenses.  State v. Amato, 126 Wis. 2d 
212, 215, 375 N.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1985) (the imposition of special 
prosecutor fees as an item of costs under Wis. Stat. § 973.06 "is 
clearly prohibited").  This court has long held that "in this 
state costs are regulated exclusively by statute as a matter of 
legislative discretion."  State ex rel. Korne v. Wolke, 79 Wis. 2d 
22, 24-25, 255 N.W.2d 446 (1977) (quoting Milwaukee v. Leschke, 57 
 
No. 94-2639-CR 
 
 
 
12 
Wis. 2d 159, 161, 203 N.W.2d 669 (1973)).  The legislature has 
given no indication that it intended to exercise this discretion 
to impose the costs sought by the State, and we will not exercise 
this discretion on the legislature's behalf.  
 
For the reasons set forth, we hold that the expenses of the 
State Crime Laboratory at issue in this case do not constitute 
fees or disbursements allowed to an expert witness under Wis. 
Stat. § 973.06(1)(c).  Accordingly we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.7 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded.  
                     
     7  The defendant attempts to bolster his argument with 
citations to two recent decisions of the court of appeals that 
reversed circuit court orders assessing costs against a defendant 
for lab expenses.  See State v. Aukes, 192 Wis. 2d 338, 531 N.W.2d 
382 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Evans, 181 Wis. 2d 978, 512 N.W.2d 
259 (Ct. App. 1994).  Because both decisions are primarily 
concerned with other issues while neither decision offers any 
analysis regarding the issue before us today, we conclude that 
they 
are 
not 
persuasive 
or 
controlling 
regarding 
the 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c). 
 
No. 94-2639-CR 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-2639-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
        Plaintiff-Respondent,  
 
 
         v.  
 
 
 
Quincy Ferguson,   
 
 
        Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  195 Wis. 2d 174, 536 N.W.2d 116 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
  
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
June 26, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 31, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
LEE E. WELLS 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there was a 
brief and oral argument by Marla J. Stephens, first assistant 
state public defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by James M. 
Freimuth, assistant attorney general, and James E. Doyle, attorney 
general, with oral argument by Warren Weinstein, assistant 
attorney general.