Case Title: Amrein v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-08-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Amrein v. State1992 WY 98836 P.2d 862Case Number: 91-30Decided: 08/18/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Terrence 
AMREIN,

 Petitioner,

v.

STATE of Wyoming, 

Respondent.

Appeal from District 
Court, Sublette County, Elizabeth A. Kail, J.

Gerald M. 
Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, Laramie, for 
petitioner.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Jennifer L. Gimbel, and Larry M. 
Donovan, Sr. Asst. Attys. Gen., Prosecution Assistance Program: Theodore E. 
Lauer, Director, Sean P. Durrant, Student Intern, Cheyenne, for 
respondent.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at the 
time of oral argument. 

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      In a jury trial 
presided over by a nonlawyer justice of the peace, petitioner Terrence Amrein 
was convicted of eight counts of cruelty to animals. Sentenced to serve eight 
consecutive jail terms of six months each and ordered to pay eight fines of $750 
each, the petitioner appealed to the district court. That court affirmed. 
Petitioner then filed with this court his petition for a writ of certiorari 
seeking a review of issues concerning right to counsel, double jeopardy, and 
lack of jurisdiction. This court issued its order granting the petition for the 
purpose of considering three issues:

1. Was appellant denied 
his right to counsel because the presiding judge was a nonlawyer justice of the 
peace?

2. Was appellant's right 
against double jeopardy violated when he was convicted and sentenced on multiple 
counts of cruelty to animals which resulted from a single continuous criminal 
act or transaction?

3. Did the justice of the 
peace lack jurisdiction to impose eight (8) consecutive six (6) month jail erms 
and eight (8) consecutive $750.00 fines?

[¶2]      We consider these 
issues in the context of the following factual background. Following the 
sheriff's investigation of allegations that forty horses and forty-five cows in 
the petitioner's custody had been deprived of food, water, and shelter, the 
deputy county and prosecuting attorney of Sublette County filed an information 
against petitioner in the justice of the peace court charging him with 
forty-four counts of cruelty to animals in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-203(b) 
(June 1988).

[¶3]      After the 
prosecution amended the information several times, petitioner went to trial 
before a jury on nine counts. Common to all the counts in the amended 
information was the prosecutor's averment that on April 1, 1989, Amrein had 
unnecessarily failed to provide each animal with proper food. Of the nine 
counts, six referred to horses and three to cows. A nonlawyer justice of the 
peace presided over the trial. Petitioner was represented by appointed counsel. 
The jury found petitioner guilty of eight of the nine counts. The justice of the 
peace sentenced petitioner to serve six months in jail and ordered him to pay a 
fine of $750 on each of the eight counts, the jail sentences to run 
consecutively. Consequently, petitioner faces four years in jail and a fine 
totaling $6,000. The jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court in criminal 
cases is defined:

     Justice of the peace 
courts have jurisdiction in all criminal cases amounting to misdemeanor 
[misdemeanors] for which the punishment prescribed by law does not exceed 
imprisonment for more than six (6) months and a fine of not more than seven 
hundred fifty dollars ($750.00). Jurisdiction shall also include those criminal 
cases in which the defendant is placed on probation for a period exceeding the 
maximum six (6) months imprisonment sentence under Wyo. Stat. 
31-5-233(d).

Wyo. Stat. § 
5-4-116 (Supp. 1991).

[¶4]      We hold that 
petitioner was not denied his right to counsel because a nonlawyer justice of 
the peace presided over the petitioner's jury trial. We hold, however, that 
petitioner's right against double jeopardy was violated when he was convicted 
and sentenced on multiple counts of cruelty to animals that resulted from a 
single continuous criminal transaction. Accordingly, we reverse all but one of 
the convictions, sentences and fines, and affirm the petitioner's conviction, 
sentence, and fine on one count of cruelty to animals. In light of this 
disposition, we do not address the question whether the justice of the peace 
court lacked jurisdiction to impose eight consecutive jail terms and fines in 
this case.

DISCUSSION

1. Right to 
counsel.

[¶5]      Petitioner states 
in his brief, "the principal thrust of petitioner's argument is that a jury 
trial before a lay justice of the peace is per se violative of due process, and 
more specifically the right to counsel * * *." Petitioner seems to be claiming 
that, considering the complications of a jury trial and evidentiary problems, 
the right to counsel, as guaranteed under both the sixth amendment, U.S. Const. 
and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10, requires "a judge trained to understand legal 
arguments."

[¶6]      In Canaday v. 
State, 687 P.2d 897 (Wyo. 1984), we held that an accused's due process rights 
were not violated by a trial presided over by a nonlawyer justice of the peace. 
Canaday differs from petitioner's specific claim here in that we did not decide 
that an accused's lawyer cannot function effectively before a nonlawyer judge. 
We agree with the state's assessment here that the reasoning that underlies 
Canaday supports the conclusion in the instant case that the performance of an 
accused's lawyer is not per se impaired when a nonlawyer judge presides over the 
accused's misdemeanor trial.

[¶7]      Although 
petitioner rhetorically asserts that his trial was "a disorderly, if not 
lawless, free-for-all with little regard for (or consistency in application of) 
the rules of evidence * * *," he eschews the assignment of specific trial errors 
for the purpose of establishing reversible error. Despite the petitioner's 
rhetoric, he fails to present evidence, legal authority, or cogent argument to 
support his claim that lay judges are so inherently unable to communicate with 
lawyers that an accused is denied effective assistance of counsel when a 
nonlawyer judge presides over an accused's trial. We note that the petitioner's 
concern about a nonlawyer justice of the peace's training is not well-founded in 
Wyoming. In this state a justice of the peace must attend a training school 
after election or appointment to office and must continue to attend such 
training while in office. We reject petitioner's assignment of error on this 
point.

2. Double 
jeopardy.

[¶8]      In Vigil v. 
State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1350 (Wyo. 1977), this court recognized that although the 
double jeopardy clauses found in Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 11, and in the fifth 
amendment, U.S. Const. "are dissimilar in language, they have the same meaning 
and are coextensive in application." That being so, we shall apply our state's 
double jeopardy clause to answer the second issue presented. This clause 
provides an accused three protections. It protects the accused who has been 
acquitted against a second prosecution for the same offense; it protects the 
accused who has been convicted against a second prosecution for the same 
offense; and it protects the accused against multiple punishments of the same 
offense. Birr v. State, 744 P.2d 1117, 1119, (Wyo. 1987), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 940, 110 S. Ct. 3224, 110 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1990). In this case we are concerned with 
the third protection, and the issue is whether petitioner was convicted and 
punished on multiple counts of cruelty to animals which resulted from a single 
criminal transaction.

[¶9]      Since consecutive 
sentences and multiple fines were imposed at a single trial, petitioner 
correctly points out that "the role of the [double jeopardy clause] is limited 
to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by 
imposing multiple punishments for the same offense." Birr, 744 P.2d  at 1119 
(quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187, 
194 (1977)). Thus, the problem is one of determining the legislative intent 
underlying § 6-3-203(b), proscribing cruelty to animals. We recognized in Vigil 
that statutory construction and legislative intent will control the 
determination whether, when there are multiple victims from a single act or 
course of conduct, there is only one crime or as many crimes as there are 
victims. Vigil, 563 P.2d  at 1352-53. In Vigil we noted a difference in crimes 
against persons in contrast to crimes against property. We said, "As a general 
proposition, with few exceptions, in crimes against the person, when contrasted 
with crimes against property, there are as many offenses as individuals 
affected." Id. at 1352.

[¶10]   Applicable general principles of 
statutory construction include: if the language is clear and unambiguous, we 
must abide by the plain meaning of the statute; if a statute is ambiguous, we 
may resort to general principles of construction; an ambiguous statute is one 
whose meaning is uncertain and susceptible of more than one meaning; and in a 
criminal statute, an ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. Story v. 
State, 755 P.2d 228, 231 (Wyo. 1988). See also, Capwell v. State, 686 P.2d 1148 
1152-53 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶11]   With the above and foregoing 
propositions and principles in mind, we turn to the language of the criminal 
statute in question:

     A person commits 
cruelty to animals if he has the charge and custody of any animal 
and unnecessarily fails to provide it with the proper food, drink or 
protection from the weather, or cruelly abandons the animal.

Wyo. Stat. § 
6-3-203(b) (emphasis added).

[¶12]   The state emphasizes the 
legislature's use of the singular noun and pronoun in the provision, i.e., "any 
animal," "it," and "the animal." Further, the state traces the humanitarian 
effort in the late stages of the last century which contributed to the enactment 
of cruelty to animal statutes. Claiming that this humanitarian impulse is 
concerned with the pain and suffering which each mistreated animal must endure, 
the state argues that the legislative intent was to protect individual animals, 
which individually feel pain and suffering.

[¶13]   On the other hand, petitioner 
maintains the statutory provision is susceptible to an interpretation that the 
"unit of prosecution" is determined by the accused's conduct of failing to 
provide it or them proper food, drink or protection from weather. In support of 
this view, petitioner points to the legislature's use of the plural "animals" in 
the opening clause and the modifier "any" when referring to "animal." Relying on 
the apparent ambiguity of the statutory provision, petitioner invokes the rule 
of lenity and asks us to decide in his favor on this point.

[¶14]   Apart from considering the 
competing contentions of the prosecution and the petitioner, we have also 
considered this court's double jeopardy discussion in Jerskey v. State, 546 P.2d 173, 183-87 (Wyo. 1976). In the course of that opinion the court discussed the 
concept of merger of separate criminal offenses. Id. at 186. We noted that 
separate charges could be brought in the same complaint under the theory that 
both are of the same character or are based on the same transaction constituting 
part of a common scheme or plan. Id. at 186-87. In Jerskey, which involved 
possession with intent to deliver marijuana, we found only one transaction, not 
different transactions which would support multiple convictions. We 
held:

     There was but one 
transaction - one common scheme or plan - and, because one offense was merged 
with another, the convictions may not be stacked because the result would be to 
have twice placed the defendant in jeopardy in that he would have received 
multiple punishment for the same offense at one trial.

     It was therefore 
prejudicial error for the court to enter judgment and sentence for more than one 
of the alleged crimes.

Id. at 
187.

[¶15]   In the instant case, the amended 
information charged Amrein with cruelty to nine animals on April 1, 1989, by 
failing unnecessarily to provide them with food. Considering the ambiguity of 
the statutory provision, as petitioner points out, and the prosecutor's 
identification of one transaction in the information, as well as the rule of 
lenity which comes into play when ambiguities exist, we are constrained in this 
close case to hold that Amrein's cruelty to animals on April 1, 1989, 
constituted but one offense. We further hold that the convictions may not be 
stacked because the result would be to have placed Amrein in jeopardy multiple 
times in that he would have received multiple punishments for the same 
offense.

[¶16]   We hold it was prejudicial error 
for the trial court to enter judgment and sentence for more than one conviction 
of cruelty to animals. We vacate all but one of Amrein's convictions and enter 
judgment and sentence on that one conviction of cruelty to animals with the 
punishment to be six months in jail and a fine of $750. As our resolution of 
this issue disposes of the case, we need not address the third issue presented 
in this court's order granting the petition. 

URBIGKIT, 
J., 
filed an opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

THOMAS, 
J., 
filed a dissenting opinion.

URBIGKIT, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶17]   I agree that seven of the eight 
convictions in this case should be reversed. My disagreement with the majority 
is that I think we should further find that the eighth conviction should also be 
reversed to provide a fair and proper retrial to Terrence Amrein.

[¶18]   In general wisdom, it is 
appropriately critiqued that the proof of the pudding is in the eating. The 
character and conduct of the trial can similarly be discerned from reading the 
evidentiary transcript. The characterization by Amrein's appellate counsel of 
this proceeding of nine multiple charges presenting an exposure to Amrein of a 
possible maximum four and one-half years in the county jail, nine consecutive 
sentences of six months each, thoughtfully describes what the record reveals. 
Originally beginning with forty-four separate counts in the justice of the peace 
court for inadequately feeding his livestock and following several amended 
informations resulting in nine counts, Amrein was convicted of eight crimes for 
which the lay justice of the peace provided misdemeanor crime sentences 
totalling four years in the county jail. The total, by consecutive sentencing, 
was the absolute maximum that could be conglomerated.

[¶19]   This "pudding," to be found by 
mixing metaphors in this case, is described by Amrein in appellate 
brief:

     At the outset, we may 
never know the extent of prejudice in this case, limited as we are to the 
available record. The transcript recites that jury selection was "not 
transcribed at request of counsel." * * * Nor were opening statements. * * * 
Closing arguments are also absent from this record. * * * Admittedly Rule 4.01, 
W.R.A.P. was not in effect at the time of trial, but this court has held in 
Bearpaw v. State, 803 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1990) that the unavailability of an adequate 
record for review requires reversal. (The present case was tried after the 
Bearpaw trial, but before the Supreme Court decision.)

     The available 
transcript indicates a disorderly, if not lawless, free-for-all with little 
regard for (or consistency in application of) the rules of evidence, 
particularly those dealing with hearsay and relevance.

[¶20]   I would also assert, considering 
all of the circumstances, that Amrein's appellate brief accurately recognizes a 
record that justifies the position of Amrein "that he was denied due process by 
a trial before a non lawyer justice [of the peace]." For a case that touches the 
non-indigency, denied appointment of counsel, which developed here in a very 
unsatisfactory form, and multiplied misdemeanors at the same time, see State ex 
rel. Barth v. Burke, 24 Wis.2d 82, 128 N.W.2d 422 (1964).

[¶21]   I concur with the majority that the 
multiple offenses in this case all related to a single offense for which double 
jeopardy would require limitation to one jurisdictionally limited sentence for 
the justice of the peace court.1 Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
11.

[¶22]   In addition to reversal of the 
multiple counts for one offense, I would reverse the conviction and remand for a 
proper trial to provide Amrein some reasonable exposure to equal protection and 
due process. The Bearpaw issue (adequacy of appellate record, Bearpaw v. State, 
803 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1990)) is not actually presented, but this court is not 
properly provided with a sufficient record for complete appellate review since 
voir dire, which was critically important, like opening and final argument, is 
omitted. 

[¶23]   The statutory jurisdiction of the 
justice of the peace court permits a maximum sentence of six months 
incarceration. Wyo. Stat. § 5-4-116 (1992). Here, however, the presiding jurist 
undertook to try this case in a proceeding where the entire charged criminal 
conduct multiplied to permit incarceration for a potential four-and-one-half 
years and resulted in a sentence of four years in county jail. That monumental 
leap over jurisdictional limitation has surely never been attempted by any other 
justice of the peace in the history of territorial and state government in 
Wyoming.

[¶24]   To provide a perspective regarding 
the continued use of justice of the peace courts in lesser populated Wyoming 
counties, some historical reference is informative. Initially, that court system 
was constitutionally based. There was a reason for the constitutional amendment, 
Original Senate Joint Resolution No. 1, 1965 Wyo. Sess. Laws at 518. The sponsor 
was Senate Judiciary Chairman Dick Tobin, a legislative statesman and 
exceptional Wyoming citizen in local affairs and American Bar Association 
leadership. A statement, included in submission of the constitutional amendment 
to the electorate, recognized the need to eliminate the constitutional status of 
the justice of the peace courts and to move forward to modernization of the 
Wyoming judicial system:

     The following 
statement shall be endorsed on the foregoing proposed amendment by the Secretary 
of State of the State of Wyoming:

     Our state constitution 
establishes and prescribes the jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts; 
also, it gives the legislature authority to establish municipal and arbitration 
courts. This proposed amendment, if adopted, would eliminate all such courts 
from the constitution and, instead, would give the legislature the authority to 
establish the subordinate courts it deems best suited to our modern needs and 
provide for their jurisdiction and manner of functioning. In the meantime, the 
present system would continue in effect under existing statutes until changed by 
the legislature.

Id. at 
519.

[¶25]   The joint resolution passed in the 
1965 Wyoming legislative session without a dissenting vote in the State Senate 
and fifty-five to six in the House of Representatives with strong support from 
membership of the Wyoming State Bar including, specifically, this writer. The 
amendment passed handily in the 1966 general election.

[¶26]   History does have some relevance in 
analysis of constitutional principles. See Schad v. Arizona, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2505, 115 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1991), Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment. The 1965 legislature and the electorate in the 1966 
election, directed attention to a desire to provide for the development of an 
improved state judiciary. Elimination of the justice of the peace/lay judge 
system then constitutionally emplaced was indispensable to accomplish that 
result.

[¶27]   Passage of the constitutional 
amendment followed not only by a gradual development of the county court system 
to now serve two-thirds of the population of the state of Wyoming, but initially 
to require that the remaining justice of the peace officeholders would be 
lawyers, if available. Unfortunately, as the county court system progressed, the 
trained lawyer/judge requirement was subjected to an unremitting attack by rural 
area legislators and finally came to be removed from Wyoming law by 1979 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 42, which became law without the Governor's signature on February 
16, 1979.

[¶28]   This course of events came to 
establish unequal justice to be the Wyoming level of legislative aspiration. I 
cannot accept that result, either constitutionally or logically. Unfortunately, 
this court participated in and cooperated with the acceptance of inequality as a 
justice system standard by the politically appropriate and constitutionally 
infirm resolution found in Canaday v. State, 687 P.2d 897 (Wyo. 1984). I will 
not endorse a lesser but acceptable precept and precedent instead of our 
aspirations to have competent, qualified, and legally-trained judiciary. Gordon 
v. Justice Court for Yuba Judicial Dist. of Sutter County, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632, 525 P.2d 72 (1974). See Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation, 
Constitutional Restrictions on Nonattorney Acting as Judge in Criminal 
Proceeding, 71 A.L.R.3d 562 (1976). See also North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 96 S. Ct. 2709, 49 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1976), where a retrial de novo was available on 
appeal.2

[¶29]   The simple fact of the matter is 
that experienced practice and basic developed skills provide opportunity for 
better performance. That is true regarding the professional football player, the 
heart surgeon, and the military commander. In current time, expertise, training, 
and skill in execution provided the overwhelming difference in the Persian Gulf 
War between this nation and the vanquished Iraqi military forces.

[¶30]   So it is likewise with the 
profession of judging. Due process in general, hearsay and relevancy in 
specificity, with requirements for technical knowledge and experienced 
application, determine that neither the plumber nor the heart surgeon are 
competent, generally, to make judicial decisions; even like the plumber, with an 
equality of skill of the fingers, would not be a thoughtful person's choice to 
operate on a heart when life or death is at stake. Lay judges are equally not 
competent in the same way that law-trained judges would likely not equivalently 
perform with expertise the professions or occupations from which the lay judge's 
economic career was developed.

[¶31]   Simply stated as an operational 
fact, where knowledge and expertise is a criteria of performance, lay judges do 
not provide equal justice and the part-time justice of the peace system cannot, 
in general, provide a system of expertise equal to that provided in counties 
where the full-time, law-trained county judges are provided. It seems to me that 
"adequate even if unequal" as a justification is remarkably similar to "separate 
but equal", and, in a small way, has an equivalent capacity to provide similar 
societal harm. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 
(1896) and Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954). I cannot accept the separate but unequal 
(equivalent but unfair) concept of Canaday, 687 P.2d 897, nor the equivalency 
suggested in this case that Amrein, charged with an extremely serious offense in 
a rural area, was provided equal opportunity to justice. The record provided in 
the transcript of these proceedings categorically speaks to the validity of this 
conclusion. There certainly is expertise in ranching or accounting and without 
which many, if not most, lawyers will themselves be ill-prepared to profitably 
practice as their lifetime profession. Legal training, like ranching expertise, 
has its validity in competent management.

[¶32]   Each person in Wyoming, when taken 
to the bar of justice to face a criminal charge that could result in jail 
incarceration, should be entitled to expect not only a fair judge, but also a 
judge trained and proficient in the adjudicative profession which requires legal 
training.

[¶33]   If this court is intent on 
retaining the differentiated justice standard of Canaday, I would go even 
further for the purposes of the particular facts in this case and determine if 
we are directed to retain part-time, untrained adjudicators in some counties, 
then we surely must carefully confine the system to what the legislative 
intendment does provide. I would limit single trial jurisdiction to what is 
provided by the legislature so that the justice of the peace cannot try a 
combination of claims in one prosecution from which the justice of the peace 
would have the capacity to provide a sentence in excess of what is statutorily 
provided of six months incarceration. I would reverse this case on all counts, 
because the justice of the peace was trying a case involving potential 
confinement in excess of a year. In other words, this case was tried in a 
justice of the peace court like a felony prosecution for which the sentence 
imposed was equal or greater to sentences for other significantly serious felony 
offenses. This is no different from augmenting the separate incidents to achieve 
a felony offense. In re Watkins, 64 Cal. 2d 866, 51 Cal. Rptr. 917, 415 P.2d 805 
(1966).

[¶34]   It is recognized that the result of 
the majority decision is to reduce this case to a proper misdemeanor status, but 
it does not do so on a jurisdictional basis. It avoids that issue, with which I 
am in disagreement. In my perception, the resolution on double jeopardy leaves 
unresolved the basic jurisdictional question that was clearly presented. I would 
hold that the justice of the peace loses jurisdiction of any criminal case when 
the combined charges included in one prosecution relating to one general course 
of events can be extended in conviction so that the sentence given would exceed 
six months of incarceration. If the prosecution wants to pursue separate charges 
raising the possibility of consecutive sentences such as occurred here, then the 
jurisdiction can be provided for the proceedings only by utilization of the 
constitutionally mandated court - the district court. Houtz v. Board of Com'rs 
of County of Uinta, 11 Wyo. 152, 70 P. 840 (1902); State v. Bouche, 485 So. 2d 950 (La. App. 1986).

[¶35]   It is axiomatic that a trial of an 
accused person in a court which has no jurisdiction over the matter cannot 
result in a valid determination of his guilt or innocence of the offense for 
which he is charged. Denver County Court v. Lee, 165 Colo. 455, 439 P.2d 737 
(1968); Grodis v. Burns, 37 Conn. Sup. 844, 440 A.2d 315 (1981); State v. 
Bullis, 93 Idaho 749, 472 P.2d 315 (1970); Baldwin v. Anderson, 51 Idaho 614, 8 P.2d 461 (1932); State v. Yoes, 271 N.C. 616, 157 S.E.2d 386 (1967); Bourne v. 
Graham, 260 S.C. 554, 197 S.E.2d 674 (1973).

[¶36]   Furthermore, I find violation in 
this proceeding of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 9 in using a six-member jury, since the 
potential penalty of four years of confinement is surely not the misdemeanor 
result for which the constitutional guarantee of a twelve-member jury is 
provided by the Wyoming Constitution. It is discerned that if we should set sail 
again on the Sargasso Sea that the constitutional standard of twelve jurors 
provided for felony convictions should be provided as crew members. See Bouche, 
485 So. 2d 950. See also State v. Williams, 404 So. 2d 954 (La. 1981) (the 
aggregate punishment which may be imposed determines whether the right to a jury 
trial exists if two or more charges are found in a guilty assessment at trial). 
The Williams court found that if the aggregate totaled more than six months, 
there was a right to a jury. Here, since the aggregate totaled more than a year, 
the right to a twelve-member jury should, likewise, be protected. See similarly, 
regarding aggregated offenses in refusal of a right to a jury trial, United 
States v. Potvin, 481 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973) and State v. Owens, 54 N.J. 153, 
254 A.2d 97 (1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 1021, 90 S. Ct. 593, 24 L. Ed. 2d 514 
(1970). The sequential contempt charges in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 94 S. Ct. 2687, 41 L. Ed. 2d 912 (1974), in regard to jury entitlement with 
consecutive sentences, should be emphatically decisive in application of the 
United States Constitution on the issue.

[¶37]   I remain persuaded that when an 
individual is faced with a criminal charge where the confinement punishment 
could be extended from a period of six months to a total of four-and-one-half 
years, not only is the individual entitled to a "proper" jury - twelve members 
in Wyoming, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 
(1968); Wyo. Const. art. 1 § 9; competent counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963); a speedy and public trial, Klopfer 
v. State of North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S. Ct. 988, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1967); In 
re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S. Ct. 499, 92 L. Ed. 682 (1948); confrontation, 
Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965); 
and compulsory process, Washington v. State of Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1967); Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10; but, 
in addition, the individual is also entitled to a competent and properly 
trained judge to conduct the jury trial. Cf. North, 427 U.S. 328, 96 S. Ct. 2709. 
As United States Supreme Court Justice White stated, certainly "no offense can 
be deemed `petty' for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment 
for more than six months is authorized." Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69, 
90 S. Ct. 1886, 1888, 26 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1970). See likewise, in a status of similar 
augmentation of separate counts, United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 
1972).

[¶38]   Finally, this court should not 
accept the editorializing relative to the operation of the legislature by 
utilizing book publishers' insertions in statutory compilations as proper 
replacement for legislative action. The Wyoming State Legislature, in the 
enactment of the justice of the peace jurisdiction statute, 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 147, § 1, and repeated verbatim in 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 39, § 1, 
provided for the singular misdemeanor, not the plural misdemeanors inserted by 
the statutory publisher. Application of plain meaning, Allied-Signal, Inc. v. 
Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214 (Wyo. 1991), see, however, 
Anthony D'Amato, Counterintuitive Consequences of "Plain Meaning," 33 
Ariz.L.Rev. 529 (1991), teaches that the Wyoming State Legislature was careful 
following re-authentication of the lay justice of the peace to confine criminal 
trial authority to one charge in one prosecution.

[¶39]   At issue is the jurisdictional 
question of whether the legislature has provided jurisdiction to courts to stack 
claims in criminal complaints providing a mathematical expansion of ultimate 
authority. If this is true, the stated limitation in the statute is meaningless 
where limited by the vagaries of double jeopardy. Consider, for example, Birr v. 
State, 744 P.2d 1117 (Wyo. 1987), cert. denied 496 U.S. 940, 110 S. Ct. 3224, 110 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1990) versus Schultz v. State, 751 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1988). If the 
legislature, by enactment, used the singular misdemeanor and applied the 
limitation of six months incarceration, we completely rewrite plain meaning. 
Allied-Signal, Inc., 813 P.2d 214. We change that limitation into a plural 
concept and delete the maximum penal limitation that has existed in Wyoming law, 
at least since 1876, see Compiled Statutes, ch. 71, § 1, at 430 (1876). 
Furthermore, the monumental difference, first provided by early Wyoming law and 
continued for many years until recent time, came from the opportunity for a new 
trial in the district court. Id. at § 39.

[¶40]   When the justice of the peace in 
Sublette County, Wyoming undertook the trial where he obviously expected that 
the penalty exposure would be more than six months in one proceeding, I would 
apply the specific words of the statute and deny jurisdiction to proceed. In 
considering the stacking question regarding criminal offenses and jurisdictional 
limitations, there is a comparable principle to be found which is decisively 
resolved in civil cases that the total amount claimed in multi-claim pleading 
determines the maximum amount for that court's jurisdiction. Miami Copper Co. v. 
State, 17 Ariz. 179, 149 P. 758 (1915); Hammell v. Superior Court In and For Los 
Angeles County, 217 Cal. 5, 17 P.2d 101 (1932); Phillips v. Snowden Placer Co., 
40 Nev. 66, 160 P. 786 (1916); Salitan v. Dashney, 219 Or. 553, 347 P.2d 974 
(1959). Aggregate amounts and separate counts unite to exceed statutory amount 
and the justice of the peace is without jurisdiction. Filtsch v. Strong, 158 Okla. 303, 13 P.2d 163 (1932). To the same effect, but with a different result, 
see Bourgoyne v. York, 28 Conn. Sup. 424, 265 A.2d 344 (1968) (citing United 
States v. Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48, 62, 14 S. Ct. 746, 751, 38 L. Ed. 631 (1894)), 
where the jurisdictional limit for multi-counts was enforced, but only to result 
in a reduced sentence.

[¶41]   Many years ago, this court 
addressed the results where a justice of the peace court undertook to try a case 
when the scope of possible punishment exceeded jurisdiction. Houtz, 11 Wyo. 152, 
70 P. 840. Our predecessors, as jurists on this court, then said the statutory 
sentencing potential for the misdemeanor offense was in excess of justice of the 
peace jurisdiction:

     It is certain that the 
justice was acting in excess of his jurisdiction in pronouncing sentence upon 
the parties before him. His only authority in the premises was to sit as an 
examining magistrate, and upon ordering the accused to be held to answer in the 
District Court upon the charge preferred against him, to take a satisfactory 
recognizance for his appearance before such court, or in default thereof to 
commit him to the jail of the county until discharged by due course of law. The 
jurisdiction of justices of the peace to try and determine public offenses, and 
impose punishment, is limited by statute to cases in which the punishment 
prescribed by law does not exceed a fine of one hundred dollars and imprisonment 
for six months in the county jail.

Houtz, 11 Wyo. 
at 169-70, 70 P.  at 842.

[¶42]   Houtz has a similarity to the 
present case since it also involved a livestock offense when, instead of 
incarceration, the presiding justice of the peace entered a fine within the 
statute but beyond the jurisdiction provided by statute for his court. I concur 
in reducing the sentence imposed on Amrein for contended improper feeding of his 
animals to a single crime on the basis of double jeopardy. Additionally, 
however, we should reverse the conviction of the remaining offense and remand 
for trial as a misdemeanor in a proceeding where due process and equal 
protection will be provided. We should confine the justice of the peace court 
jurisdiction to a total misdemeanor punishment limitation.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶43]   I dissent from the disposition of 
this case according to the majority opinion. I am not necessarily dissatisfied 
with the result but, in my view, this case is one that would best be disposed of 
by applying the doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing. This court has 
acknowledged that the prohibition against double jeopardy found in both the 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and in Article 1, 
Section 11 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming affords three distinct 
protections to the accused. Among those, is the protection against multiple 
punishments for the same offense in a single trial. E.g., Lauthern v. State, 769 P.2d 350 (Wyo. 1989); Schultz v. State, 751 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1988); Birr v. State, 
744 P.2d 1117 (Wyo. 1987), cert. denied 496 U.S. 940, 110 S. Ct. 3224, 110 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1990); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 
(1977). 

[¶44]   In Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344 
(Wyo. 1977), we discussed the filing of multiple charges and the separate 
verdicts on those charges that were returned by the jury. The court introduced 
the subject in this way:

     There are here 
separate crimes that have been charged and proven. All arise from the same event 
but each involves a separate victim and courts are protective of the individual 
citizen subjected to the criminal conduct of another. We have compiled cases in 
which there were separate charges, entangling more than one citizen victim, 
arising out of one occurrence in which courts have held there to be no double 
jeopardy and imposed multiple punishments, in some cases concurrent and in 
others consecutive or by combinations of those sentencing techniques. The 
precise question is addressed to the asserted error of failure of the trial 
court to dismiss all or part of the counts on the grounds of double jeopardy and 
fair trial. Vigil, 563 P.2d  at 1351.

Dismissal of all 
or part of the counts is precisely the disposition made by the majority opinion 
in this case and favored by the other dissenting justice. Yet, in Vigil, this 
court went on to hold that no prejudice attached to charging, trying, submitting 
to the jury, and receiving the five verdicts. The third protection afforded by 
the constitutional prohibition was not reached because the trial court in Vigil 
had imposed only one sentence.

[¶45]   I am satisfied, in this instance, 
that no error occurred in the trial court because of the failure to dismiss all 
or part of the counts on the grounds of double jeopardy and fair trial. 
Certainly, the evidence was adequate to justify a conviction on any one of the 
counts as is appropriately demonstrated by the arbitrary selection of one 
unidentified count to be sustained and the vacation of all of the other 
convictions. (I have some concern about the ultimate result under the majority 
opinion if the selected count should somehow be reversed on post-conviction 
review.) I would maintain the validity of each conviction, but would permit the 
justice of the peace court to impose only one sentence by holding that these 
offenses merged for purposes of punishment.

[¶46]   A very lucid description of the 
doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing is found in Commonwealth v. 
Whetstine, 344 Pa. Super. 246, 496 A.2d 777 (1985), as that doctrine has 
developed in Pennsylvania.

In deciding whether 
offenses merge, the question is whether the offenses charged "necessarily 
involve" one another, or whether any additional facts are needed to prove 
additional offenses once the primary offense has been proven. In deciding merger 
questions, we focus not only on the similarity of the elements of the crimes, 
but also, and primarily, on the facts proved at trial, for the question is 
whether those facts show that in practical effect the defendant committed but a 
single criminal act.

     Additionally, we note 
that analysis of merger claims traditionally has revolved around the concept of 
injury to the sovereign; in order to support the imposition of more than one 
sentence, it must be found that the defendant's conduct constituted more than 
one injury to the Commonwealth.

Whetstine, 496 A.2d  at 779-80 (citations omitted).

[¶47]   Applying that approach, I would 
analyze this case as one in which we are concerned about the concept of injury 
to the sovereign. The majority opinion quotes from the statute in question, Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-3-203(b) (1988), and I note that it defines the offense as cruelty to 
animals, in the plural. It follows that the injury to the sovereign is cruelty 
to animals. The evidence for the several counts is substantially identical 
except that it did establish that more than one animal was involved. The 
doctrine of merger, applied in light of common sense in this instance, and 
analyzing the "unique facts" of this case, achieves the appropriate 
result.

[¶48]   As the majority notes, the 
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court in a criminal case is limited to 
punishment for not more than six months and a fine of not more than $750. The 
application of the doctrine of merger for sentencing recognizes this limitation 
upon the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court, and the single sentence 
for the merged offenses does not exceed that jurisdiction.

[¶49]   In In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 284, 7 S. Ct. 556, 30 L. Ed. 658 (1887), the court quoted Lord Mansfield writing in 
Crepps v. Durden, Cowper 640:

There can be but one 
entire offence on one and the same day. And this is a much stronger case than 
that which has been alluded to, of killing more hares than one on the same day. 
Killing a single hare is an offence; but the killing ten more on the same day 
will not multiply the offence, or the penalty imposed by the statute for killing 
one.

It seems to me 
Lord Mansfield's comment is peculiarly applicable to this instance and, while it 
might lead to a conclusion that it supports the majority resolution, I conclude 
the holding in Vigil, which is cited by the majority, demands the convictions be 
sustained, but that the single penalty be imposed.

[¶50]   Recognizing that the "bottom line" 
according to the majority opinion and according to my suggestion is identical, I 
am satisfied that we better support our precedent articulated in Vigil, and 
perhaps maintain a better posture of the law in Wyoming, by acknowledging the 
validity of the separate charges and the separate convictions. At the same time, 
we protect the constitutional rights of Amrein by limiting the imposition of 
punishment to a single sentence that is clearly within the jurisdiction of the 
justice of the peace court in a single case.

 FOOTNOTES

1 I will not accept Birr 
v. State, 744 P.2d 1117 (Wyo. 1987), cert. denied 496 U.S. 940, 110 S. Ct. 3224, 
110 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1990) as the justified authority. See, however, Garcia v. 
State, 774 P.2d 623 (Wyo. 1989) and Schultz v. State, 751 P.2d 367, 371 (Wyo. 
1988), Urbigkit, J., specially concurring, both of which properly recognized 
double jeopardy principles within Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 11 and the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Furthermore, Birr is not, but 
Garcia and Schultz are, consistent with Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977).

2 Clearly, as now 
demonstrated by the abrasive and abusive facts of this present case and 
resulting four-year county jail sentence, Justice Rose was correct in his 
analysis and constitutional rights perception in dissent in Canaday, 687 P.2d  at 
901.

Furthermore, I do not 
accept trial de novo guilty plea and acquittal cases to be present persuasive 
authority for due process and equal protection construction of either Wyoming or 
federal law. See North, 427 U.S. 328, 96 S. Ct. 2709 (de novo trial); Treiman v. 
State ex rel. Miner, 343 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1977) (untrained judge denied right to 
conduct trial); People v. Sabri, 47 Ill. App.3d 962, 6 Ill.Dec. 104, 362 N.E.2d 739 (1977) (intermediate appellate court, no objection to the judge and no jail 
sentence entered); Tsiosdia v. Rainaldi, 89 N.M. 70, 547 P.2d 553 (1976) (trial 
de novo on appeal before a legally trained judge); State v. Duncan, 269 S.C. 
510, 238 S.E.2d 205 (1977) (guilty plea); Ex parte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 214 
(Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 1018, 96 S. Ct. 454, 46 L. Ed. 2d 390 (1975) 
(guilty plea); and Shelmidine v. Jones, 550 P.2d 207 (Utah 1976) (justice of the 
peace was constitutional, but the statute enforced granting litigant the right 
to require a legally trained judge). See also Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772 
(Ky. 1972), dismissed on other grounds 414 U.S. 885, 94 S. Ct. 219, 38 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1973) (de novo appeal to a legally trained judge); State v. Haar, 100 N.M. 
609, 673 P.2d 1342 (1983); People v. Skrynski, 42 N.Y.2d 218, 397 N.Y.S.2d 707, 
366 N.E.2d 797 (1977) (alternative right to trial before a law-trained trial 
judge); and Young v. Konz, 91 Wn.2d 532, 588 P.2d 1360 (1979) (guilty plea, 
otherwise de novo trial before law-trained judge).

I 
have another concern which is created by the majority's reliance on the 
obligation of the non-lawyer justice of the peace to obtain additional training 
as a responsibility of his position. Rules for Justice of the Peace Courts - 
Administrative Rules, Rule 2(f) states in part: "Must agree to attend, and 
attend the first available training school after election or appointment and 
each training school held annually thereafter while in office, or be subject to 
disciplinary action to be imposed by the Wyoming Supreme Court." We are not led 
by the State's appellate brief to any record evidence in this case that the 
office holder who conducted this trial did, originally upon appointment or 
regularly thereafter, attend any legal training programs sponsored by either the 
Wyoming Supreme Court or otherwise. Since we rely on the competency of the 
presiding judge, who performed this significant judicial responsibility without 
training in the law, some measure of documentary indication of compliance with 
the training requirement should be provided before comfort can be taken 
regarding compliance with the requirement as an indication of competence to 
provide a properly conducted trial.