Case Title: SCHEND v THORSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-05-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Yo. 13166 I N rHE 3UPKdME I:OUK'.C ilF THE STkrE OF P l O N T A N A 1976 r i a i n t i f f and Appellant, J O H N M. THORSON, Mayor, of t h e C i t y of Whitefish, Xontana, Defendant and Respondent. :jppeal from; ')is trict Court o f t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert Keller, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record : For Appellant : A s t l e and Astle, K a l i s p e l l , Montana V i l l i a m A s t l e argued, K a l i s p e l l , Montana F o r Respondent: Leo F i s h e r argued, Whitefish, Montana Submitted: March 3, 1976 ~ e c ided : MAY 7 !g)g M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This is an appeal from an o r d e r issued i n t h e eleventh j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , Flathead County, dismissing p e t i t i o n e r ' s r e q u e s t f o r w r i t of mandamus made pursuant t o s e c t i o n 93-9102, R.C.M. 1947. A t t h e time t h e p e t i t i o n w a s f i l e d , a p p e l l a n t Terry Schend was a probationary f u l l - t i m e p o l i c e o f f i c e r f o r t h e c i t y of Whitefish, and respondent John M. Thorson w a s t h e mayor. The matter was heard i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t on A p r i l 17, 1975, and judgment f o r t h e respondent was entered s e v e r a l months l a t e r . I n l i e u of a t r a n s c r i p t , t h e record on appeal has been transmitted t o t h e Court a s an "Agreed Statement of Evidence" i n accordance with Rule 9 ( c ) , Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure. From t h i s document, it appears t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t w a s appointed t o t h e p o s i t i o n of p o l i c e o f f i c e r f o r t h e c i t y of Whitefish on October 8, 1974. The c i t y of Whitefish is a t h i r d c l a s s c i t y i n t h e s t a t e of Montana within t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 11-1824 e t seq., R.C.M. 1947, t h e "Metropolitan P o l i c e Law." A s such, and pursuant t o t h e a u t h o r i t y contained t h e r e i n , t h e com- munity of Whitefish has placed i t s e l f w i t h i n t h e purview of t h e Metropolitan P o l i c e Law through t h e adoption of Chapter 2.44.010, Whitefish Municipal Code, which provides as follows: "From and a f t e r t h e passage and approval of t h e ordinance c o d i f i e d herein, and from and a f t e r t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e ordinance a s c o d i f i e d herein, and t h e p o l i c e department of t h e c i t y , s h a l l be under and within t h e provisions of t h e Metropolitan P o l i c e Law of t h e s t a t e . The p o l i c e department of t h e c i t y s h a l l be organized, managed, conducted and c o n t r o l l e d a s i n t h e s t a t e l a w and t h i s chapter provided." Chapter 2.44.040 of t h e Whitefish Municipal Code, provides t h a t a l l a p p l i c a n t s f o r t h e p o s i t i o n of p o l i c e o f f i c e r must be appoint- ed by t h e mayor and confirmed by t h e c i t y council, b u t only a f t e r t h e a p p l i c a n t has s u c c e s s f u l l y passed a n examination, and a c e r t i f i c a t e of q u a l i f i c a t i o n has been f i l e d with t h e mayor. The a p p l i c a n t is then e l i g i b l e t o serve a "probationary period" a s a p o l i c e o f f i c e r which may not exceed s i x months. Chapter 2.44.040 a l s o provides t h e means by which an appointment may be revoked by t h e mayor: " * * * A t any t i m e before t h e end of such pro- bationary period t h e mayor may revoke such appoint- ment. After t h e end of such probationary period, and within t h i r t y days t h e r e a f t e r , t h e appoint- ment of such a p p l i c a n t must be submitted t o t h e c i t y council, and i f such appointment i s confirmed by t h e c i t y council, such a p p l i c a n t becomes a member of t h e p o l i c e f o r c e of t h e c i t y , and s h a l l hold such p o s i t i o n during good behavior, u n l e s s suspended o r discharged a s provided by law." The above-cited s e c t i o n is almost i d e n t i c a l t o s e c t i o n 11-1803, R.C.M. 1947, except t h a t t h e state law was amended i n 1973 t o extend t h e maximum p o s s i b l e probationary term from s i x months t o one year. The p a r t i e s are i n complete agreement t h a t under t h e s t a t u t e and code s e c t i o n c i t e d above, and under t h e r u l e followed by a majority of j u r i s d i c t i o n s , t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e may v a l i d l y a u t h o r i z e t h e removal of a probationary p u b l i c em- ployee o r o f f i c e r i n a summary fashion, without n e c e s s i t y of cause o r hearing. S t a t e ex rel. Nagle v. Sullivan, 98 Mont. 425, 40 P.2d 995. O n February 28, 1975, almost f i v e months s i n c e h i s appointment, Schend received a letter from respondent Thorson placing him on n o t i c e t h a t h i s appointment t o t h e p o l i c e f o r c e would be revoked as of March 15, 1975. The l e t t e r a l s o contained c e r t a i n statements regarding t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s performance a s a p o l i c e o f f i c e r : "Due t o your performance of duty, a t t i t u d e towards and l a c k of d e s i r e t o cooperate with those i n charge * * * your s e r v i c e s w i l l no longer be re- quired o r d e s i r e d i n your c a p a c i t y as a member of t h e Whitefish P o l i c e Department." The a p p e l l a n t , pursuant t o s e c t i o n 11-1806, R.C.M. 1947, requested a hearing before t h e Whitefish P o l i c e Commission. This request was denied. From this summary of stipulated facts emerges but one single issue of constitutional law. Does the mayor of a city, which is subject to the provisions of a Metropolitan Police Law, and which grants the authority to discharge a police officer summarily during his period of probation, violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when the notice of termination is accompanied by a statement of reasons for letting him go and no opportunity to dispute this statement is provided? We answer this question negatively. A similar question has been treated by the United States Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570, 573, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L ed 548. The court held in that case that the claimed right of a state teacher to a hearing prior to the nonrenewal of his employment agreement did not come with- in the purview of the concept of due process when that teacher has not achieved the status of tenure. In rendering its decision, the United States Supreme Court devoted a considerable portion of its opinion to discussing what frame of reference is properly employed in determining issues of procedural due process. In Roth, the federal district court committed error when it reduced the issue to a mere balancing or weighing of the interests involved --that is the employer's interest in denying reemployment sum- marily, as opposed to the employee's interest in reemployment. The court was careful to point out that while the balancing pro- cess is essential to the determination of what form a required hearing must take in a particular situation, the question of whether or not due process requirements are applicable at all demands a different type of analysis: " * * * But, to determine whether due process re- quirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake. * * * We must look to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed, 113. This essential distinction in analysis is one which cannot be ignored by this Court in light of the ques- tion presented. The due process right to hearing was intended to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate only those claims to which they are legitimately entitled. In Roth, the United States Supreme Court could not sustain the teacher's Fourteenth Amendment claim, because he failed to show how the decision not to rehire, deprived him of an interest in "liberty" despite his lack of tenure or formal contract. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed. 570. In doing so, however, the court, in Roth, left no doubt as to the possibility that such a showing could be made in a future case: "The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community. * * * Had it done so, this would be a different case. For '[wlhere a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.' [Citing cases.] In such a case, due process would accord an opportunity to refute the charge before University officials. * * *" (Emphasis added.) We take judicial notice that there is no substantial dif- ference between the status of a nontenured teacher and that of a probationary police officer. Due process adjudication involves typically two analyti- cally distinct issues--whether the right of due process is appli- cable in the first instance; and if so, what specific procedures are "due" in each case. The right itself only becomes applicable where ones "property" or "liberty" interests within the meaning of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment are at stake. Whether an individual's "entitlement to employment" is sufficient to give rise to a Constitution's claim becames the threshhold question in these types of cases. In Roth, the court held: " * * * To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of prop- erty to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to pro- vide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims. "Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law--rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. * * *" Here the nature of the interest is the right to a job as a policeman. Can this be said to be encompassed within the terms "liberty" or "property"? We think not. The very nature of the concept of property is not and was not intended to be static. Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, (procedural due process as extended beyond the actual ownership of real estate, chattels or money); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L ed 2d9OI(driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L ed 2d 287 (welfare benefits); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 91 S.Ct. 1772, 29 L ed 2d 418, (public emp1oyment);and Stanford v. Gas Service Company, 346 F.Supp. 717, (Kan. 1972) (utility services) . HOW- ever, the guide furnished by Roth clearly indicates that it is only a vested right which cannot be taken away except by due 16 Am Jur 2d, 8365, p. 694. process of law,/ A probationary police officer under Montana law enjoys no property or vested right. His status is that of a temporary employee and until confirmation he has no possible property i n t e r e s t . M r . J u s t i c e Holmes wrote i n McAuliffe v. Mayor, Etc. of City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 2 1 6 , 29 N.E. 517: " * * * There a r e few employments f o r h i r e i n which t h e servant does not agree t o suspend h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of f r e e speech a s w e l l a s of i d l e n e s s by t h e implied t e r m s of h i s c o n t r a c t . The servant cannot complain, a s he t a k e s t h e employment on t h e t e r m s which a r e o f f e r e d him. O n t h e same p r i n c i p l e t h e c i t y may impose any reasonable condition upon holding o f f i c e s within i t s c o n t r o l . * * *" See 4 1 U. of Chicago Law Review 297; 26 Stanford Law Review 335. Federal c a s e s have recognized t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between probation and nonprobation employees. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 4 0 L ed 2d 15; Sampson v. Murray, 415 U . S . 61, 94 S.Ct. 937, 39 L ed 2d 166. Here t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s i n t e r e s t i s more one of expectancy of employment than any property i n t e r e s t . Leek v. Theis, 217 Kan. 784, 539 P.2d 304; Wheeler v . School D i s t r i c t # 2 0 , i n County of E l Paso, (Colo. 1975), 535 P.2d 206; Tupper v. Fairview Hospital & Training C t r . , M.H.D., (0re.App. 1975), 540 P.2d 401; Turner v. Board of Trustees, Calexico U. Sch. D i s t . , 121 Cal.Rptr. 715, 535 P.2d 1171. Therefore, because t h e c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e gave t h e Mayor t h e r i g h t t o terminate t h e probationary o f f i c e r without cause and without a hearing w e f i n d no v i o l a t i o n of any accused r i g h t of such p r o h i b i t i n g p o l i c i e s and no v i o l a t i o n of due process. / - - - ' . . \ - ' . ' - i J u s t i c e W e concur: ./ .................................... Justices sitting in place of Mr. Chief Justice James T. Harrison. M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly dissenting: I dissent. The appellant-officer appeals from an adverse r u l i n g of the d i s t r i c t court and h i s principal issue on appeal i s that the " ~ e t r o p o l i t a n Police ~ a w " establishes h i s r i g h t t o a hearing, a s a probationary full-time o f f i c e r , when charges have been made against him. As a secondary consideration appellant argues t h a t these charges r e f l e c t on h i s good name and reputation, e t c . , i n the community and therefore he i s e n t i t l e d t o a hearing a s a matter of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amend- ment t o the Constitution of the United States. H e does not declare t h a t the City published the charges but t h a t i n seeking employment thereafter he w i l l be subject t o publication of the alleged mis- conduct which has never been explained. I t Respondent argues t h a t the mayor gave reasons" not I I chargecupon dismissal. This i s not t o be argued before t h i s Court a s t h e matter comes t o us without a record upon an "Agreed Statement of ~vidence". In the agreed statement of evidence in two separate places i t i s agreed that these a r e "charges" against the o f f i c e r . Somehow the majority has completely avoided any t r e a t - ment of the principal issue raised by appellant. Then it has through some s y l l o g i s t i c method, not disclosed, arrived a t the I I conclusion t h a t from the f a c t s emerges but one single issue of constitutional law." From there the majority gets i n t o a jungle I I of "vested rights" attached t o "liberty" o r property" and declares none e x i s t . The authority being the Roth case, supra, which holds t h a t a "property right" i s created from s t a t e laws not the Constitution and a hearing i s e s s e n t i a l when "good name, reputa- t i o n , honor or i n t e g r i t y i s a t stake because of what the government i s doing t o him+< 9 : 9:. " -- Roth does support the principal argument on the s t a t u t e made by the appellant, who draws h i s constitutional and property r i g h t from the State law. The language of section 11-1806(1), R.C.M. 1947, i s c l e a r and unambiguous; the police commission s h a l l hear, t r y and decide a l l charges brought by any person against any member o r o f f i c e r of the police department. The three f a c t o r s (1) charges,(2) brought by any person, and (3) against an o f f i c e r , e x i s t i n appellant's case. The d i s t r i c t court found i n i t s order of May 29, 1975, t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s p e t i t i o n "paragraphs I through X a r e a f a i r r e c i t a t i o n of t h e f a c t s i n t h i s case +i * +<.I1 Paragraphs I, 1 1 1 and V I I I of p l a i n t i f f ' s p e t i t i o n s e t f o r t h t h a t Officer Schend was a "full-time Police Officer a t the time of h i s removal" and t h a t the mayor alleged "charges" against Officer Schend concerning Officer ~ c h e n d ' s "performance of duty, a t t i t u d e towards h i s superiors and lack of cooperation with h i s superiors". In addition, the f a c t t h a t appellant was a "full-time Police officer", and t h a t the mayor alleged "charges", i s part of the agreed statement of evidence before t h i s Court. Clearly, appellant i n h i s capacity a s an o f f i c e r , was accused of charges by the mayor. O n the b a s i s of t h i s c o u r t ' s decision i n S t a t e ex r e l . 0 ' ~ e i I I . v . Mayor of City of Butte, 96 Mont. 403, 30 P.2d 819, wherein the Court held t h a t the mayor has the authority during the probationary period t o terminate the o f f i c e r , without cause o r hearing, the d i s t r i c t court here reasoned t h a t u n t i l once confirmed by the c i t y councel a s required by section 11-1803, R.C.M. 1947, the probationary appointee i s not a member of t h e police force. Thus, concluded the d i s t r i c t court i n the memorandum t o i t s order of May 29, 1975, the mayor had t h e authoricy t o terminate the employment of Officer Schend a s he had no standing o r protection under the provisions of section 11-1806, R.C.M. 1947, requiring a hearing. Therein the d i s t r i c t court erred. There i s no c o n f l i c t i n the s t a t u t e s a s found by t h e d i s t r i c t court. The mayor can a t any time during an o f f i c e r ' s probationary period terminate the appointment. However, when the mayor o r anyone e l s e s e l e c t s t o f i l e charges against "any o f f i c e r o r member of the police department", the police commission not only has "jurisdiction" but a "duty" imposed by s t a t u t e t o hear, t r y and decide " a l l charges". The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t court should be reversed; the officer-appellant reinstated t o h i s position on the police force.