Case Title: Childers v. Schaecher Lbr. Co.

Citation: 234 Or. 230, 380 P.2d 993

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1963-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Affirmed May 1, 1963.
*231 Joe B. Richards, Eugene, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Luvaas, Cobb & Richards.
Duane Vergeer, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Vergeer & Samuels and Frederic P. Roehr.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, SLOAN, GOODWIN and LUSK, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
LUSK, J.
Plaintiff brought this third-party action, based on negligence, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained while he was engaged with an employee of the defendants in dumping logs on premises owned by the defendants. Plaintiff and his employer and defendants and their employee were subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act. The defendants filed a supplemental answer pursuant to ORS 656.324(3) by which they challenged the right of the plaintiff to maintain the action in view of the provisions of ORS 656.154.[1]
*232 The case was put at issue and after a trial the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and a judgment of dismissal. Plaintiff appeals.
The court found that the defendants employed Ivan Warthen as a scaler and as an operator of machinery for unloading logs at its log dump; that the plaintiff was a truck driver employed by A.L. Irvine, who was a log trucker engaged in the hauling of logs to the defendants' mill; and that the defendants and the plaintiff's employer were employers subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act. The findings continued as follows:
It is not contended that the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence.
The conclusions of law were to the effect that the plaintiff and his employer and the defendants and their employee were engaged in the furtherance of a common enterprise and exercising joint supervision and control over the premises where the injury occurred and that, since all persons concerned were under the Workmen's Compensation Act, plaintiff's action was barred.
Substantially, the question is the same as that decided adversely to the plaintiff in Boling v. Nork, 232 Or 461, 375 P2d 548, in which we construed subdivision (3) of ORS 656.154 providing that "[n]o person engaged in pickup or delivery of any goods, wares or merchandise to or from the premises of any employer other than his own shall be deemed to have joint supervision or control over the premises of a third party employer." The plaintiff in that case was a truck *234 driver, who was engaged in loading logs when he was injured. We held that the "pickup or delivery" provision of the statute was not applicable and that the action was barred because of the provisions of ORS 656.324 (1) and (2). Plaintiff here does not ask us to reconsider this decision, but argues that it does not apply to the other end of the total operation of log hauling. Evidence in the transcript is pointed to which shows that in the logging industry in Lane county contracts normally call for "delivery" of logs into the pond. This, plaintiff says, is the activity in which he was engaged at the time he was injured.
The argument misconceives the scope of the decision in the Boling case. "Delivery" in a contract may mean one thing; in a statute concerning workmen's remedies for injury, something quite different. The Boling case, construing the words of the statute in context, held that they did not cover logging operations, whether loading or unloading. We quote from the opinion:
We adhere to the views thus expressed. The judgment is affirmed.
*235 SLOAN, J., dissenting.
Boling v. Nork, 1962, 232 Or 461, 375 P2d 548, was incorrectly decided and should not be adhered to.
It seems strange to say that the size of the article being delivered or the equipment that may be required to load or unload it, should be the basis for a definition of "pickup and delivery." In this day, when virtually all movement of "goods, wares or merchandise" is by mechanical process, it is incongruous, to say the least, to decide these cases on the basis of the complexity of the machinery engaged in the movement of goods. Such a basis for decision ignores that ever larger containers, machinery, equipment and other goods are constantly in the flow of commerce. Nor does the "massing of men and machinery" provide an answer. In the instant case there were only two men engaged in the work, a fairly typical situation.
In future cases will we decide what is "pickup and delivery" by the size of the container being handled or by the nature of the goods within the container? Will the delivery of large cartons of paper supplies be within the statute and the delivery of large rolls of newspaper print excluded? Logs delivered to a mill are now excluded from the statute. Will heavy timbers being taken from a mill be treated the same? One can only speculate as to a decision involving the delivery of heavy structural steel and similar materials of countless variety.
The court has established a test which will cause the trial courts to exercise considerable guesswork in deciding these cases. Instead the court should follow what the legislature intended and hold that every delivery of property from one place to another is "pickup and delivery."
[1]  ORS 656.154 (1) If the injury to a workman is due to the negligence or wrong of a third person not in the same employ, the injured workman, or if death results from the injury, his widow, children or other dependents, as the case may be, may elect to seek a remedy against such third person. However, no action shall be brought against any such third person if he or his workman causing the injury was, at the time of the injury, on premises over which he had joint supervision and control with the employer of the injured workman and was an employer subject to ORS 656.002 to 656.590.

(2) As used in this section, "premises" means the place where the employer, or his workman causing the injury, and the employer of the injured workman, are engaged in the furtherance of a common enterprise or the accomplishment of the same or related purposes in operation.
(3) No person engaged in pickup or delivery of any goods, wares or merchandise to or from the premises of any employer other than his own shall be deemed to have joint supervision or control over the premises of a third party employer.