Case Title: STATE v DAHL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 80-117 I N T H E SUPREME COURT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1980 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- WILLIAM S . DAHL, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Yellowstone, The Honorable William J. Speare, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For Appellant: Michael J. Whalen, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold IIanser, County Attorney, Missoula, Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : J u l y 11, 1980 Filed: Mr. J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant William Dahl a p p e a l s from a judgment of t h e Yellowstone County D i s t r i c t Court, e n t e r e d f o l l o w i n g a j u r y t r i a l , c o n v i c t i n g him of robbery. H e a l s o a p p e a l s from t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s o r d e r d e s i g n a t i n g him a s a dangerous o f f e n d e r f o r p u r p o s e s o f p a r o l e e l i g i b i l i t y . W e a f f i r m t h e c o n v i c t i o n b u t remand f o r r e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of s t a t u s f o r p a r o l e e l i g i b i l i t y . Defendant r a i s e s t h r e e i s s u e s . H e f i r s t c h a l l e n g e s t h e o r d e r of t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e f u s i n g t o s u p p r e s s evidence r e l a t i n g t o p r e t r i a l photographic l i n e - u p procedures. H e n e x t c h a l l e n g e s t h e r e f u s a l of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y t h a t "mere p r e s e n c e a t o r about t h e scene where a crime is committed does n o t make one a p a r t y t o t h e crime." L a s t , he contends t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n concluding t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-404, MCA, r e q u i r e d d e f e n d a n t t o b e c l a s s i f i e d a s a dangerous o f f e n d e r f o r p a r o l e e l i g i b i l i t y . The robbery charge stems from a robbery of a B i l l i n g s S u p e r a m e r i c a g a s s t a t i o n and c o n v e n i e n c e s t o r e on t h e evening of August 30, 1979. Two men e n t e r e d t h e s t o r e , w a i t e d u n t i l a l l t h e c u s t o m e r s w e r e g o n e , and t h e n approached t h e c l e r k , Robert Heimer , and demanded t h e money from t h e cash r e g i s t e r . One of t h e men, l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s t h e d e f e n d a n t , grabbed him by h i s s h i r t c o l l a r , p u l l e d him t o t h e c o u n t e r , and p u t t i n g a k n i f e t o h i s t h r o a t , t o l d him t o h u r r y up. While t h e c l e r k g a t h e r e d t h e money, t h e man h e l d him w i t h a k n i f e t o t h e c l e r k ' s t h r o a t . The c l e r k p l a c e d t h e money i n a sack and gave it t o one of t h e men. The men a l s o took a c a s h drawer and t h e n f l e d . The c l e r k immediately r e p o r t e d t h e robbery t o t h e p o l i c e and gave them a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e men--one of t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s f i t t i n g t h a t of t h e d e f e n d a n t . Two w i t n e s s e s saw t h e men f l e e t h e s t o r e and g e t i n t o a c a r , and t h e y r e l a y e d t h e c a r ' s d e s c r i p t i o n t o t h e c l e r k who i n t u r n gave t h e d e s c r i p t i o n t o t h e p o l i c e . A few minutes l a t e r , t h e p o l i c e n o t i c e d a v e h i c l e near t h e Superamerica s t o r e which matched t h e d e s c r i p t i o n g i v e n t o them, and t h e y gave chase. They followed t h e v e h i c l e f o r a s h o r t d i s t a n c e b e f o r e t h e v e h i c l e was d r i v e n i n t o an a l l e y and abandoned, t h e occupants f l e e i n g on f o o t . The p o l i c e gave chase on f o o t . Sometime l a t e r , another o f f i c e r found t h e d e f e n d a n t h i d i n g under a nearby c a r and a r r e s t e d him. The cash drawer and money s t o l e n from Superamerica were found near t h e abandoned c a r , and p o l i c e a l s o found nearby a paper bag s i m i l a r t o t h e o n e s u s e d a t S u p e r a m e r i c a - - b e a r i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s f i n g e r p r i n t . L a t e r t h a t evening, w h i l e a t t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n , one of t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s i d e n t i f i e d d e f e n d a n t a s being t h e d r i v e r of t h e c a r t o which t h e o f f i c e r s gave chase. The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s began a f t e r t h e d e f e n d a n t was a r r e s t e d . H e was taken t o t h e Superamerica s t a t i o n i n t h e back s e a t of a p o l i c e c a r . The s t o r e c l e r k could n o t t h e n make a p o s i t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e s u s p e c t , a p p a r e n t l y due t o poor l i g h t i n g i n t h e c a r and s t a t i o n a r e a , and because defendant was slouched over and exposed o n l y h i s p r o f i l e . But t h e s t o r e c l e r k went down t o t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n l a t e r on t h e same evening and gave a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e man who t h r e a t e n e d him w i t h t h e k n i f e , which d e s c r i p t i o n v e r y c l o s e l y matched d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t u a l appearance. He a l s o s t a t e d t o t h e p o l i c e while g i v i n g t h e d e s c r i p t i o n , t h a t he was f a i r l y c e r t a i n t h a t t h e man brought t o t h e Superamerica s t a t i o n e a r l i e r t h a t n i g h t had been one of t h e robbers. The n e x t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s took p l a c e some e i g h t days a f t e r t h e robbery, a f t e r t h e d e f e n d a n t had been i n custody, and a f t e r counsel had been appointed. The s t o r e c l e r k came t o t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n t o look a t a photographic line-up f o r purposes of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . The p o l i c e showed him s i x photographs of p e r s o n s resembling t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e man he had p r e v i o u s l y g i v e n t o t h e p o l i c e , and t h e c l e r k immediately i d e n t i f i e d t h e d e f e n d a n t a s t h a t man. Defendant was i n custody a t t h e time b u t was n o t p r e s e n t f o r t h i s photographic line-up. D e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l was n o t p r e s e n t . Defendant moved t o s u p p r e s s t h e photographic i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and t h u s p r e v e n t t h e robbery v i c t i m from t e s t i f y i n g i n c o u r t t h a t he had i d e n t i f i e d d e f e n d a n t through a p h o t o g r a p h i c l i n e - u p p r e s e n t e d t o him by t h e p o l i c e . Both t h e robbery v i c t i m and t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r who a r r a n g e d t h e p h o t o g r a p h i c l i n e - u p , t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e photographs showed both a f u l l f a c e view and a p r o f i l e view of t h e s u b j e c t s involved. The p o l i c e o f f i c e r t e s t i f i e d , however, t h a t he a l s o possessed a P o l a r o i d p i c t u r e of t h e d e f e n d a n t showing o n l y a f a c e view. H e agreed t h a t it was p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e robbery v i c t i m had s e e n t h e P o l a r o i d p i c t u r e b e f o r e he made t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n from t h e photo- g r a p h i c line-up, b u t s t a t e d he had no knowledge t h a t t h i s was so. Defense c o u n s e l a t no time asked t h e robbery v i c t i m i f he had been shown t h e P o l a r o i d p i c t u r e b e f o r e making t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n from t h e photographic line-up. D e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s w a s b a s e d on t h e c o n t e n t i o n s t h a t t h e robbery v i c t i m ' s a b i l i t y t o i d e n t i f y him a s t h e man who h e l d t h e k n i f e t o h i s t h r o a t was t a i n t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t he had s e e n t h e d e f e n d a n t s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e robbery when he was i n p o l i c e c u s t o d y , and t h a t t h e robbery v i c t i m may have seen t h e P o l a r o i d p i c t u r e b e f o r e making t h e photographic line-up identification. The trial court denied this motion to suppress, and defendant now urges this as his first appeal contention. At trial the robbery victim positively identified defendant as the man who had held the knife to his throat. Defendant testified in his own behalf and admitted that he was at the Superamerica station in his automobile when the robbery occurred, but denied that he was directly involved. His story is that he was giving two friends a ride in his car, and one of them asked him to stop at the Superamerica store to get some beer. He states he did not know of any plans for a robbery, or of any robbery, until his friends returned to his car. He claims his friends committed the crime without his knowledge. The jury convicted defendant of robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison, also designating him, pursuant to section 46-18-404, MCA, as a dangerous offender for purposes of parole eligibility. Defendant contends that the pretrial photographic identification process was so suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of misidentification. He also argues that his right to counsel was denied him because counsel was not present at the photographic line-up session. The touchstone of a denial of due process emanating from a photographic identification process is whether the process was so suggestive as to present a "substantial likelihood of misidentification." State v. Pendergrass (19801, Mont. , 615 P.2d 201, 37 St.Rep. 1370; Manson v. Brathwaite (1977), 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140; Neil v. Biggers (1972), 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401. See, for example, State v. Lara (1978) I Mont . , 587 P.2d 930, 35 St.Rep. 1699; State v. Oppelt (1978), 176 Mont. 499, 580 P.2d 110; where we have applied the rules set forth by the United States Supreme Court. An in-cour t identification of the defendant is permitted if it is determined that the pretrial identification process did not violate these rules. Here the robbery victim was in an excellent position to view the robber. They were very close to each other in a well-lit location for at least thirty seconds. His first description of the man who held the knife to his throat was a fair description of the defendant. Eight days later, when he chose the defendant from the photo-array line-up, he did so immediately and with assurance. This eight-day lapse between the robbery and the photo-identification was not, under the circumstances here, sufficient to purge from the victim's mind a reasonably precise picture of the attacker's identity. Nor, of course, can we ignore the testimony which clearly placed the defendant in the car which sped away from the Superamerica station after the robbery. The fact that his car was identified as belonging to the defendant, and that defendant had abandoned his car in an alley a few blocks away from the Superamerica station and was found by the police hiding under another car, is more than a little indicative of his involvement in the robbery. Nor can we ignore the fact that the cash drawer and money stolen from the Superamerica were found abandoned near the car from which defendant had fled, and that defendant's fingerprint was found on a paper sack near the car which was similar to paper sacks used at Superamerica. These factors must be considered along with the identification process, and when so considered, they do not point to a substantial chance of misidentification. Rather, they point straight at defendant's guilt. W e do n o t f i n d e r r o r i n t h e f a i l u r e t o have d e f e n s e counsel p r e s e n t a t t h e photo-array i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s . The United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n U.S. v. Ash ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 413 U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619, h a s held t h a t t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n c l a u s e i s n o t v i o l a t e d by a p h o t o - a r r a y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s , and t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e r i g h t t o c o u n s e l does n o t a t t a c h . W e have followed - Ash, and have r e f u s e d p r e s e n t l y t o adopt a s t r i c t e r r u l e under our own c o n s t i t u t i o n . See S t a t e v. S t r a i n and Young, Cause No. 14863, Decided October 22, 1980. D e f e n d a n t n e x t c o n t e n d s t h a t b e c a u s e h i s d e f e n s e involved an admission of being a t t h e scene of t h e crime b u t of n o t being involved e x c e p t a f t e r t h e f a c t , t h a t he was e n t i t l e d t o an i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t "mere p r e s e n c e a t o r about t h e scene where a crime is committed d o e s n o t make one a p a r t y t o a crime." He o f f e r s no a u t h o r i t y f o r t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n , and n e i t h e r was he p r e j u d i c e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o g i v e t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n . H e r e , t h e i n s t r u c t i o n f a i r l y covered t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d . The c h a r g e of robbery, p l u s t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e j u r y f i n d n o t o n l y t h a t d e f e n d a n t was p r e s e n t a t t h e s c e n e b u t t h a t he was t h e person who h e l d t h e k n i f e t o t h e s t o r e c l e r k ' s t h r o a t . Thus, t h e j u r y was f u l l y aware t h a t mere p r e s e n c e a t t h e scene of a crime is n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o prove c r i m i n a l involvement. The j u r y b e l i e v e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t committed t h e crime by h o l d i n g t h e k n i f e t o t h e s t o r e c l e r k ' s t h r o a t , and t h e evidence is c l e a r l y s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n t h i s b e l i e f . W e a g r e e , however, w i t h d e f e n d a n t ' s f i n a l c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r o n e o u s l y determined t h a t under s e c t i o n 46-18-404, MCA, he was r e q u i r e d a s a m a t t e r of law t o d e s i g n a t e defendant a s a dangerous o f f e n d e r f o r purposes of p a r o l e e l i g i b i l i t y . Defendant had been p r e v i o u s l y been c o n v i c t e d of a f e l o n y . i n Wyoming less t h a n f i v e y e a r s preceding t h e commission of t h e crime involved i n t h i s c a s e . A t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g t h e p r o s e c u t o r urged t h e c o u r t t o s e n t e n c e d e f e n d a n t t o impose a twenty-year p r i s o n s e n t e n c e and t o d e s i g n a t e d e f e n d a n t a s a dangerous o f f e n d e r . Defense counsel urged t h e c o u r t t o impose no more t h a n a ten-year p r i s o n s e n t e n c e and t o d e s i g n a t e d e f e n d a n t a s a n o n d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r . I n r e s p o n s e t o t h e s e recommendations, t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t "I am going t o d e s i g n a t e him ( t h e d e f e n d a n t ) dangerous, because I f e e l I have no o p t i o n under t h e s t a t u t e . " The c o u r t s e n t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t t o f i f t e e n y e a r s i n p r i s o n and d e s i g n a t e d him a s a dangerous o f f e n d e r f o r purposes of p a r o l e e l i g i b i l i t y . D e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n is t h a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t was n o t s t a t u t o r i l y r e q u i r e d t o d e s i g n a t e him a s a dangerous o f f e n d e r , and t h u s , had he chosen t o do s o , c o u l d have d e s i g n a t e d him a s nondangerous. The S t a t e , on t h e o t h e r hand, a r g u e s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e l e a v e s no d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t , and t h a t under t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e t h e d u t y of t h e c o u r t t o d e s i g n a t e d e f e n d a n t a s a dangerous o f f e n d e r was mandatory. For purposes of a n a l y s i s , we f i r s t s e t f o r t h t h e s t a t u t e i n its e n t i r e t y . S e c t i o n 46-18-404, MCA, p r o v i d e s : " D e s i g n a t i o n a s n o n d a n q e r o u s ------------- o f f e n d e r f o r p u r p o s e s --- o f p a r o l e --- e l i g i b i l i t y . ----- (1) The s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t s h a l l d e s i g n a t e an o f f e n d e r a n o n d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r f o r p u r p o s e s o f e l i g i b i l i t y f o r p a r o l e u n d e r p a r t 2 o f c h a p t e r 23 i f : " ( a ) d u r i n g t h e 5 y e a r s p r e c e d i n g t h e commission o f t h e o f f e n s e f o r which t h e o f f e n d e r is being s e n t e n c e d , t h e o f f e n d e r was n e i t h e r c o n v i c t e d of nor i n c a r c e r a t e d f o r an o f f e n s e committed i n t h i s s t a t e o r any o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n f o r which a s e n t e n c e t o a term of imprisonment i n e x c e s s of 1 y e a r could have been imposed; and " ( b ) t h e c o u r t has determined, based on any p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t and t h e evidence p r e s e n t e d a t t h e t r i a l and t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , t h a t t h e o f f e n d e r does n o t r e p r e s e n t a s u b s t a n t i a l danger t o o t h e r p e r s o n s or s o c i e t y . " ( 2 ) A c o n v i c t i o n o r i n c a r c e r a t i o n may n o t be considered under s u b s e c t i o n (1) ( a ) i f : " ( a ) t h e o f f e n d e r was l e s s t h a n 18 y e a r s of age a t t h e t i m e of t h e commission of t h e p r e s e n t o f f e n s e ; o r " ( b ) t h e o f f e n d e r h a s been pardoned f o r t h e p r e v i o u s o f f e n s e on t h e grounds of innocence o r t h e c o n v i c t i o n f o r such o f f e n s e h a s been s e t a s i d e i n a p o s t c o n v i c t i o n h e a r i n g . " ( 3 I f t h e c o u r t d e t e r m i n e s t h a t a n o f f e n d e r is n o t e l i g i b l e t o be d e s i g n a t e d a s a nondangerous o f f e n d e r , it s h a l l make t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n a p a r t of t h e s e n t e n c e imposed and s h a l l s t a t e t h e d e t e r m i n a t o n i n t h e judgment. Whenever t h e s e n t e n c e and judgment do n o t c o n t a i n such a d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e o f f e n d e r is c o n s i d e r e d t o h a v e been d e s i g n a t e d a s a nondangerous of f e n d e r f o r p a r o l e . " Although t h i s s t a t u t e is n o t a model of c l a r i t y , we conclude t h a t it is mandatory o n l y where t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e q u i r e t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t t o s e n t e n c e o n e a s a nondangerous o f f e n d e r . The s t a t u t e imposes l i m i t a t i o n s on a s e n t e n c i n g judge i n t h r e e s i t u a t i o n s : F i r s t , i f t h e judge f i n d s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was n o t c o n v i c t e d o f f e l o n y w i t h i n 5 y e a r s immediately preceding t h e o f f e n s e i n q u e s t i o n , and a l s o f i n d s " t h a t t h e o f f e n d e r does n o t r e p r e s e n t a s u b s t a n t i a l danger t o o t h e r p e r s o n s o r s o c i e t y , " t h e d e f e n d a n t must be d e s i g n a t e d a s a n o n d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r . S e c t i o n 46-18-404(1)(a) and ( b ) , s u p r a . T h i s p a r t of t h e s t a t u t e d o e s n o t r e q u i r e t h e judge t o d e s i g n a t e one a s dangerous; r a t h e r , it s e t s f o r t h t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s under which t h e d e f e n d a n t must be d e s i g n a t e d a s nondangerous. Second, s u b s e c t i o n s ( 2 ) ( a ) and ( b ) , s e t f o r t h t h e c i r - cumstances under which a c o n v i c t i o n cannot be c o n s i d e r e d f o r purposes of t r i g g e r i n g a p o s s i b l e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t one is 'a dangerous o f f e n d e r . I f t h e o f f e n d e r was l e s s t h a n e i g h t e e n y e a r s of age a t t h e time of t h e " p r e s e n t o f f e n s e " , t h e p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n cannot be used a s a b a s i s t o t r i g g e r a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t is dangerous. Or, i f t h e o f f e n d e r had e i t h e r been p a r d o n e d on t h e g r o u n d s o f innocence f o r t h e p r e v i o u s o f f e n s e , o r had t h e p r e v i o u s o f f e n s e set a s i d e i n a p o s t c o n v i c t i o n h e a r i n g , t h e p r e v i o u s o f f e n s e cannot be c o n s i d e r e d a s a b a s i s t o t r i g g e r a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t is dangerous. W e n o t e h e r e , t h a t d e f e n d a n t makes no c l a i m t o come u n d e r any o f t h e s e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e s t a t u t e . The t h i r d s i t u a t i o n , however, is d e t e r m i n a t i v e of t h e i s s u e here. S e c t i o n 46-18-404 ( 3 ) , s u p r a , s e t s f o r t h t h e requirements f o r t h e judgment i n o r d e r t h a t a d e s i g n a t i o n of dangerousness t a k e e f f e c t . The f i r s t s e n t e n c e r e q u i r e s t h a t i f t h e c o u r t d e s i g n a t e s one a s a dangerous o f f e n d e r , t h e c o u r t must "make t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n a p a r t of t h e s e n t e n c e imposed and s h a l l s t a t e t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n t h e judgment." But t h e second s e n t e n c e of t h i s s u b s e c t i o n r e q u i r e s t h a t a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t a t t a c h i f t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t e i t h e r r e f u s e s or f a i l s t o make t h a t d e s i g n a t i o n i n t h e judgment. I t s t a t e s : "Whenever t h e s e n t e n c e and judgment do n o t c o n t a i n such a d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e o f f e n d e r is c o n s i d e r e d t o h a v e been d e s i g n a t e d a s a n o n d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r f o r p u r p o s e s o f e l i g i b i l i t y f o r p a r o l e . " S e c t i o n 46-18- 4 0 4 ( 3 ) , MCA. W e cannot i g n o r e t h i s s e n t e n c e . To d e c l a r e a d e f e n d a n t i n e l i g i b l e f o r p a r o l e e l i g i b i l i t y , t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t is s t a t u t o r i l y r e q u i r e d t o d e s i g n a t e him a s dangerous f o r t h a t purpose. C l e a r l y , by f a i l i n g t o make such d e s i g n a t i o n p a r t of t h e judgment, e i t h e r by o v e r s i g h t o r by an e x e r c i s e of s e n t e n c i n g d i s c r e t i o n , t h e s t a t u t e d e c l a r e s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t involved is t o be "designated a s a nondangerous o f f e n d e r f o r purposes of p a r o l e e l i g i b i l i t y . " Although t h e r e is a d e s i g n a t i o n i n t h e judgment t h a t t h e "defendant be punished a s a dangerous o f f e n d e r , by imprisonment a t hard l a b o r . . . f o r t h e term of FIFTEEN ( 1 5 ) YEARS," t h e u n d e r l y i n g assumption of t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t when such judgment was e n t e r e d is t h a t t h e s t a t u t e r e q u i r e d t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t t o d e s i g n a t e d e f e n d a n t a s a d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r . B u t , a s we h a v e r e a s o n e d , t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t was n o t r e q u i r e d by s t a t u t e t o make t h i s d e s i g n a t i o n . By merely f a i l i n g t o make any d e s i g n a t i o n i n t h e judgment a s t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t u s , t h e d e f e n d a n t would be s t a t u t o r i l y d e c l a r e d nondangerous. The s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t d i d n o t c o n s i d e r t h i s o p t i o n when it sentenced t h e d e f e n d a n t . The judgment of c o n v i c t i o n is a f f i r m e d . W e remand t h i s cause t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r r e s e n t e n c i n g . W e Concur: ........................... Chief J u s t i c e p-":-*--- J u s t i c e s M r . C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I. H a s w e l l , c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t and d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t : I w o u l d a f f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t and s e n t e n c e i n i t s e n t i r e t y . I c o n c u r i n a f f i r m i n g t h e j u d g m e n t o f c o n v i c t i o n f o r t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d i n t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n . I d i s s e n t f r o m t h e m a j o r i t y c o n s t r u c t i o n o f s e c t i o n 4 6 - 1 8 - 4 0 4 , MCA and r e m a n d i n g t h e c a u s e t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r r e s e n t e n c i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t . A l t h o u g h t h e s t a t u t e i s i n a r t f u l l y d r a f t e d , i t i m p l i e s , a t l e a s t , t h a t a c o n v i c t e d o f f e n d e r i s i n e l e g i b l e f o r d e s i g n a t i o n as a n o n d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r i f he was c o n v i c t e d o r i n c a r c e r a t e d i n a n y j u r i s d i c t i o n f o r a f e l o n y d u r i n g t h e p r e c e d i n g f i v e y e a r s . S e c t i o n 4 6 - 1 8 - 4 0 4 ( 1 ) ( a ) , MCA. I n t h i s case d e f e n d a n t was con- v i c t e d o f b u r g l a r y on A u g u s t 2 5 , 1 9 7 6 , i n t h e S t a t e o f Wyoming. S u b s e c t i o n ( 3 ) o f t h e s t a t u t e s i m p l y p r o v i d e s a c a t c h a l l f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t i n c a s e s w h e r e t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t n e g l e c t s t o i n c o r p o r a t e d e f e n d a n t ' s none1 i g i b i l i t y f o r non- d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r s t a t u s i n t h e j u d g m e n t . I d o n o t c o n s t r u e s u b s e c t i o n ( 3 ) a s a d i s c r e t i o n a r y g r a n t o f a u t h o r i t y t o t h e sen- t e n c i n g c o u r t t o c o n f e r n o n d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r s t a t u s t o a con- v i c t e d f e l o n who has a p r i o r f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n w i t h i n f i v e y e a r s . C h i e f J u s t i c e