Case Title: Clermont v. State

Citation: 348 Md. 419

Docket Number: 115/96

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1998-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jean Alex Clermont v. State of Maryland, No. 115, September Term, 1996.
[Capital Murder - Death sentence imposed - Issues concerning evidence, victim impact, and
allocution decided.]
Circuit Court for Prince George's
County Case # 96-1388X
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 115
September Term, 1996
_________________________________________
JEAN ALEX CLERMONT
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
_________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Karwacki, Robert L.
 (retired, specially assigned), 
JJ. 
_________________________________________
Opinion by Rodowsky, J.
Bell, C.J., dissents
_________________________________________
Filed:  January 20, 1998
     The victim's name is incorrectly spelled "McMullin" in the autopsy report and throughout
1
the transcript.
     Sean is at times spelled "Shawn" in the record.  
2
     Mutu is at times spelled "Mootoo" in the record.
3
This is a capital murder case.  Appellant, Jean Alex Clermont (Clermont), was
convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County of premeditated and
felony murder, robbery with a deadly weapon, kidnapping, and other offenses.  The death
sentence was imposed by the jury.  
The murder was committed about 3:00 a.m. on September 19, 1995.  John E.
McMullen, III (McMullen), age twenty-eight, was the victim.   Participating in the crimes
1
with Clermont, then age twenty-three, were three companions with whom Clermont played
basketball at the Knollwood Recreation Center and Neighborhood Park at 10400 Edgefield
Drive in Prince George's County:  Sean Bonner (Bonner),  Mark Mutu (Mutu),  and Rawle
2
3
White (White).  The State's direct proof that Clermont was the principal in the first degree
to the murder is found in the testimony of White, who had plea bargained with the State. 
After midnight of September 18-19, 1995, Clermont was driving his three friends in
his Sterling automobile.  While returning home from the District of Columbia via Georgia
Avenue, they saw a 1995 Black BMW in the vicinity of the Penthouse Club.  Clermont
parked his Sterling nearby so that the four young men could admire the BMW, which had
been leased by McMullen one week before.  McMullen was waiting for his friend, Patience
Odina (Odina), to get off from work at the Club.  Shortly after closing time McMullen,
driving his BMW, and Odina, driving a separate car, proceeded northbound on Georgia
-2-
Avenue.  Clermont et al. followed.  They watched as McMullen and Odina stopped for
gasoline for which McMullen paid in cash.  Clermont et al. followed the two cars to the
Capital Beltway, to Interstate 95, and to the apartment complex in Laurel where McMullen
resided.  In the course of that trip Clermont and his companions agreed that they would rob
the couple, steal the BMW, and take it to a chop shop in New York.  In preparation Clermont
placed a .38 caliber handgun on his lap, put on a latex glove, and he and Bonner covered
their faces with bandannas.  
When McMullen and Odina had parked their cars outside of McMullen's residence
and while Mutu remained in the Sterling as getaway driver, the other three felons, with
Clermont wielding the handgun, forced McMullen and Odina to lie prone and robbed them.
The robbers took McMullen's wallet, which contained $19 in cash, a bank withdrawal card,
and credit cards.  Among the contents taken from the cars of the two robbery victims was
McMullen's cellular telephone.  Bonner and Clermont then forced McMullen into the trunk
of the BMW and slammed the lid closed.  With Mutu driving White and Clermont in the
Sterling, and with Bonner following in the BMW while McMullen was locked in the trunk,
the felons fled.  Odina called the police.  
Clermont directed Mutu to drive to the park at the Knollwood Recreation Center.  Its
parking lot is unlighted and has only one opening for vehicular ingress and egress.  There
Clermont pounded on the trunk of the BMW with the barrel of his handgun, cursed
McMullen, and threatened to kill him in an effort to get the latter to divulge the PIN number
or numbers for his bank and credit cards.  When McMullen did not comply, Clermont drove
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the BMW rapidly in tight circles, and apparently over curbs or parking space blocks, with
McMullen in the trunk.  McMullen then disclosed a PIN number that he said was good for
all of the cards in his wallet.  
White testified that while McMullen was revealing the PIN number, White was
approximately ten yards away, relieving himself.  He heard a gunshot and immediately
turned in the direction of the shot.  He saw Clermont pointing his handgun against the trunk
lid.  The postmortem examination revealed that McMullen had been killed by a single
gunshot wound that passed through his right wrist, grazed his face, and then entered the left
chest wall, lacerating major blood vessels.  
The felons left the park in the Sterling and went to an ATM machine at Colesville
Road and University Boulevard.  Mutu tried to withdraw $200 from McMullen's checking
account and then from his savings account, but the number that McMullen had given them
was not the authorized PIN.
At some point after the murder and before the attempt to make an ATM withdrawal,
White asked Clermont why Clermont had shot McMullen.  Clermont replied, "He made me
impatient."
Over the next day or two the felons, using McMullen's identification at a bank's drive-
in window, were able to cash a check made payable to McMullen, and they successfully used
McMullen's credit card to make purchases at a shopping center.  They had also been using
McMullen's cellular phone.  Working with the addresses of the places principally telephoned
on McMullen's phone after his death, the police arrested Clermont on September 22 at 3:40
-4-
p.m. while he was carrying the phone.  Arrests of the other felons followed swiftly.  A search
under warrant of Clermont's bedroom produced a .38 caliber handgun, a set of latex gloves,
and a bandanna.  Firearms identification testing subsequently revealed the .38 semi-
automatic handgun seized at Clermont's home to be the murder weapon.  
At the sentencing phase of Clermont's trial the jury found, as aggravating factors, that
the victim was taken in the course of a kidnapping and that Clermont committed the murder
while committing robbery.  As a mitigating factor the jury unanimously found that Clermont
had not previously been convicted of a crime of violence.  Further, one or more, but less than
all, of the jurors found to be mitigating that Clermont was the father of a small child.  
In this Court, Clermont presents the following issues which we have renumbered to
their sequence at trial. 
I.
The trial court impermissibly restricted the cross-examination of the principal
State's witness;
II.
 The trial court erred in instructing the jury that appellant was presumed to be
not guilty, and in failing to instruct that he was presumed to be innocent;
III.
The court erred in admitting a written victim impact statement since it was not
a part of the presentence investigation report in the sense that the statute contemplates;
IV.
 The trial court erred in admitting as part of the presentence investigation report
appellant's prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine;
V.
 The trial court erred in permitting the State to cross-examine a defense witness
concerning statements allegedly made by appellant to the witness;
-5-
VI.
 The court erred in overruling defense counsel's objection to the State's use of
grand jury testimony to impeach a defense witness at the sentencing hearing;
VII.
The trial court erred in excluding evidence offered in mitigation of punishment;
VIII.
 The trial court erred in refusing to permit appellant to exercise his right of
allocution after the State's final closing argument;
IX.
 The court committed plain error in failing to curtail the prosecutor's improper
closing argument and in failing to give a curative instruction; and
X.
The Maryland death penalty law is unconstitutional.
Additional facts will be presented, as required, in the discussion of these issues.
I.  Cross-Examination of Rawle White  
The defense attacked White's credibility by cross-examining him regarding the plea
bargain that he had made with the State.  White pled guilty to first-degree murder and agreed
to testify against Clermont in exchange for a life sentence with all but thirty years suspended.
Clermont claims that the portion, set forth below, of his cross-examination of White was
erroneously limited.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]  Q.  You went down to the police station.
"[WHITE]  A.  Yes, sir.
"Q.
In fact, what happened, Detective Rositch is the one who
questioned you, is that correct?
"A.
I guess.  I can't remember his name, it's been so long.
"Q.
And he said to you, I believe that [Clermont] is lying and trying
to save himself, and [Bonner] is telling the truth.  
-6-
"Is that what he said to you?
"A.
No, sir.
"Q.
He didn't say that to you?
"A.
He came at me and said Alex Clermont claimed that I pulled the
trigger that night.
"Q.
And so you claim that Alex Clermont pulled the trigger that
night.
"[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Objection.  Move to strike.
"THE COURT:  Sustained.  Grant the motion to strike.
"Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the last statement is stricken
from the record, and is not to be used by you in your deliberations." 
Clermont submits that "[i]t was without question proper on cross-examination to
explore the very real possibility that White was motivated to implicate Mr. Clermont because
he had been told by a detective (truly or falsely) that Mr. Clermont had implicated him."
Every aspect of the record, however, indicates that the sentence spoken by defense
counsel that is last quoted above was a declarative sentence, asserting something as a fact,
and not an interrogative sentence, asking a question.  Had the sentence been spoken with a
rising tone, the court reporter should have ended the sentence with a question mark, but the
reporter used a period.  It is clear that the State's Attorney interpreted defense counsel's
sentence as a statement asserting a fact.  Not only did the State object, but it moved to strike,
even though White had not given any answer to the question.  The object of the motion to
strike, which is usually accompanied by a request for an instruction to the jury to disregard
-7-
certain evidence, is to remove matters which have not been properly admitted as evidence
from the jury's consideration.  McCormick on Evidence § 52, at 201 (4th ed. 1992).  In the
instant matter defense counsel's statement of an asserted fact was not evidence and was
properly the object of the motion to strike.  
The record also clearly reflects that the trial court had the same understanding of
defense counsel's statement as did the court reporter and the State's Attorney.  The court
sustained the objection, granted the motion to strike, and, without the need for an express
request from the State, instructed the jury to disregard "the last statement."  
The cross-examination as a whole supports the foregoing analysis.  Upon taking over
White on cross, defense counsel went immediately to the plea bargain.  The examination then
proceeded as follows:
"Q.
And if you don't come here and testify, you are going to spend
the rest of your life in prison, is that correct?
"A.
Supposedly, sir.
"Q.
So you are going to come here and tell the ladies and gentlemen
of the jury everything you want them to know, is that correct?
"A.
No, sir.  I am going to tell them the truth, sir.
"Q.
Okay.  That's fine.
"So are you going to tell me and you are going to admit to them
that when you spoke to the police, you lied.
"A.
Lied about what, sir?
"Q.
About what happened?
-8-
"A.
No, I didn't.
"Q.
You told the police what happened just like you told the ladies
and gentlemen of the jury, is that correct?
"A.
That is correct, sir." 
(Emphasis added).
Defense counsel then developed details that were included in White's testimony to the
jury but that were not included in a written statement that White had given to the police on
September 22, 1995.  In substance, the police had questioned White about, and White
included in his statement, only the events up to and including the killing, while details
included in White's testimony at trial included what the felons had done with the property
taken in the robberies.  The latter details had been first elicited in the prosecutor's pretrial
interviews of White.  
Then, immediately prior to the segment of the cross-examination that is at issue on
this appeal, the following transpired.
"Q.
Anything else you wish to add to this statement?
"What was your answer?
"A.
No.
"Q.
It was no.
"But in exchange for 30 years, you will tell us anything, won't
you?
"A.
No, sir.  I will tell you the truth, and the truth only.
"Q.
Like you did with the police?
-9-
"A.
I got down to the station and they asked me to write a report of
what happened that night.  That is what they asked me, what happened that
night, and that is what I wrote out.  What happened that night.
"They never asked me what happened afterwards.
"Q.
You went down to the police station.
"A.
Yes, sir."
(Emphasis added).
These passages reflect that when defense counsel asked, as questions, whether White
had lied to the police, the court reporter transcribed them as questions, the State did not
object, and the court did not strike the questions.  Further, after twice suggesting to the jury
by direct questions to White that White was lying, and having twice gotten a flat denial of
that accusation, defense counsel had no reasonable expectation of getting White to agree on
a third try that White lied to the police.  Thus, even if defense counsel used a rising tone to
indicate a question, the trial court could, under the circumstances, consider that defense
counsel was not really seeking an answer, but that defense counsel was simply indulging in
a tactic to focus the jury on the legal issue that would be affected if the jury believed that
White was lying.
In any event, if we treat the sentence in issue as a question, it is at best an
argumentative one.  An argumentative question is one which incorporates by assumption a
fact otherwise not in evidence.  See ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 340 Md. 334, 415, 667 A.2d
116, 155 (1995).  Wigmore states that "[a] question which assumes a fact that may be in
controversy ... may become improper on cross-examination, because it may by implication
-10-
put into the mouth of an unwilling witness, a statement which he never intended to make, and
thus incorrectly attribute to him testimony which is not his."  3 Wigmore, Evidence § 780,
at 171 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).  McCormick writes that one danger of the argumentative
question is that "the answer is likely to be misleading.  Oftentimes, the question will be so
separate from the assumption that if the witness answers the question without mentioning the
assumption, it is impossible to ascertain whether the assumption was ignored or affirmed."
McCormick on Evidence § 7, at 22-23 (4th ed. 1992).  
Here, if we view defense counsel's sentence as a question, the question is:   "And so,
you claim that Alex Clermont pulled the trigger that night?"  That question carries
considerable baggage in the introductory "And so."  The full inference from "And so" is
"Because you are motivated to retaliate against Clermont because of his false accusation
against you."  Thus, if the State had not protected the witness by the timely objection, and
White had answered, "Yes," to the "question" in the form in which it was asked, the jurors
would not be able to  tell whether White was agreeing only that he claimed that Clermont
pulled the trigger, or whether he was also agreeing with the baggage concerning his
motivation for that claim.  Thus, the objection was properly sustained, and the jury was
properly instructed, in effect, not to consider that the motivation attributed by counsel was
in evidence.
II.  Jury Instructions
Clermont submits that the trial court misdirected the jury in the guilt or innocence trial
by instructing that he was presumed to be "not guilty" rather than presumed to be
-11-
     The instruction reads as follows:  "The defendant in this case, Mr. Clermont, is presumed
4
to be not guilty of the charges.  This presumption remains with him throughout every stage
of the trial and is not overcome unless you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he
is guilty."  (Emphasis added). 
In his instruction as to motive, the trial court did use the word "innocence," instructing
the jury that "you may consider the motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in this case.
Presence of motive may suggest guilt.  Absence of motive may suggest innocence.  You
should give the presence or absence of motive, as the case may be, the weight you believe
it deserves."  (Emphasis added).
"innocent."  Clermont concedes that no objection was raised to this instruction at the time
4
it was given so that the issue is not preserved for appellate review.  Nevertheless, Clermont
urges us to apply the plain error doctrine.  In Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 602 A.2d 677
(1992), we defined plain error as one which "vitally affects a defendant's right to a fair and
impartial trial."  Id. at 588, 602 A.2d at 694 (citing State v. Daughton, 321 Md. 206, 210-11,
582 A.2d 521, 523 (1990)).
On the facts of the instant case, the error, if any, in using the words "not guilty" to
describe the presumption of innocence does not rise to the level necessary to constitute plain
error.  
In Bruce v. State, 328 Md. 594, 616 A.2d 392 (1992), this Court emphasized that the
trial judge's instructions to the jury must accurately convey the concept of reasonable doubt
but need not use any particular language.  Id. at 616, 616 A.2d at 403.  More recently,
Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 697 A.2d 432 (1997), held that "the law does not
enshrine any particular form of the reasonable doubt instruction.  ... '[S]o long as the [trial]
court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proven beyond a
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reasonable doubt, ... the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be
used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof.'"  Id. at 400, 697 A.2d at
436-37 (citing Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1243, 127 L. Ed. 2d 583,
590 (1994)).
Here, the trial court accurately set forth the State's burden of proof.  The jury was told
that the defendant "is not required to prove his innocence," and that if the State did not prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt then the defendant must be found not guilty.  Taken
together, these instructions accurately and completely convey the burden of proof and the
defendant's presumption of innocence.  The mere use of the words "not guilty" instead of
"innocent" at one point in the charge may well be error, but it is not plain error in the context
of the charge as a whole.
III.  Victim Impact Statement
Article 27, § 781(a) provides in relevant part:
"A presentence investigation that is completed by the Division of Parole and
Probation under Article 41, § 4-609 of the Code shall include a victim impact
statement, if:
(1)
The defendant, in committing a felony, caused physical ... injury
to the victim[.]"
Md. Code (1957, 1997 Repl. Vol.), Art. 41, § 4-609(d) reads:
"In any case in which the death penalty ... is requested under Article 27, § 412,
a presentence investigation, including a victim impact statement as provided
under Article 27, § 781 of the Code, shall be completed by the Division of
Parole and Probation, and shall be considered by the court or jury before
whom the separate sentencing proceeding is conducted under Article 27, § 412
or § 413."
-13-
     For at least three generations the McMullens have lived in Darian, Georgia.
5
Here, Clermont contends that the sole victim impact statement that was admitted at
sentencing was not included in the presentence investigation report (PSI) in the manner
required by Article 41, § 4-609.  The contention is that a victim impact statement must first
be filtered through an investigator of the Department of Parole and Probation whose
responsibility, for example, would be to exclude known false information or that furnished
by the mentally ill and delusional.  Where the victim impact statements are collected by the
prosecutor, as we shall assume happened here, Clermont submits there is a danger that the
prosecutor may influence, even unwittingly, the content of the statement.
Under the circumstances of the instant matter, there was no error.  In the instant case
court and counsel had met well in advance of trial to discuss the PSI and the victim impact
letters that were going to be submitted from out of state.   It was agreed that the letters would
5
be prepared, addressed to the court, and the prosecutor would furnish a copy of each letter
to Clermont's counsel.  In accordance with the arrangement the court also ordered Parole and
Probation to prepare a "bare bones" PSI.  These materials would then be reviewed and
objections considered.
These materials were considered on October 22, 1996, the day before the court
commenced hearing evidence in the sentencing phase.  Defense counsel had previously
received a PSI to which they had objections,  and they had received that morning a "stack"
of victim impact statements.  Clermont argued that the statements could not be used because
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they were not included in, or incorporated as part of, the PSI prepared by Parole and
Probation.  The court stated that it could correct that deficiency by having Parole and
Probation include the victim impact statements in the PSI before the sentencing hearing
began the next day.  In the course of the hearing the court sent for the probation officer who,
upon arrival, remained available in chambers to revise the PSI in accordance with the rulings
that the court made at the hearing.
The court then addressed Clermont's objections to the content of the victim impact
statements and of the PSI.  As a result of its rulings the court ordered the probation officer
to delete from the PSI, as considered at the hearing, everything to which Clermont had
objected.  The court also excluded all of the proposed victim impact statements except a two-
paragraph letter, dated February 12, 1996, from McMullen's sister, a resident of Georgia,
addressed to the trial judge.  During the review of the proposed victim impact statements,
defense counsel told the court that the letter from the decedent's sister was "the only
appropriate statement."   Clermont's counsel further stated, "I think this is the only one that
should be allowed to be submitted to the jury."  The PSI, with the victim's sister's letter
attached, that was put in evidence on October 23, 1996, was signed by the probation officer
and by her supervisor on October 22, 1996.
Here, a PSI was introduced at the sentencing hearing, that PSI included a victim
impact statement, and the victim impact statement included in the PSI was the only victim
impact statement introduced.  Consequently, the requirements of § 4-609(d) were satisfied.
See Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19, ____, 702 A.2d 699, ____ (1997) [slip opinion at 46-48].
-15-
"Neither § 4-609(d) nor our opinion in Williams [v. State, 342 Md. 724, 679 A.2d 1106
(1996)] dictates any particular person or agency as the responsible party for procuring the
victim impact statements that ultimately become a part of the PSI."  Id. at ____, 702 A.2d
at ____ [slip opinion at 47].   
Further, any error is necessarily harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Clermont
acknowledged that the content of the only letter incorporated by attachment as part of the PSI
was appropriate as a victim impact statement, and we agree with that conclusion.
IV.  PSI Inclusion of Prior Conviction
for Non-Violent Crime
The PSI referred to Clermont's conviction in Prince George's County on June 16,
1992, for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.  Under Clermont's analysis of Scott
v. State, 297 Md. 235, 465 A.2d 1126 (1983), any evidence of a prior non-violent offense,
even if evidenced by a judgment of conviction, is inadmissible in a death penalty case.
This issue has not been preserved.  When the PSI was introduced defense counsel
stated that they had no objection, because at the prior day's hearing, the court ordered
removed from the PSI everything to which the defense had objected.  At that hearing
Clermont's counsel had told the court "any detainer comes out [of the proposed PSI], but the
June 16th possession with intent to distribute cocaine stays in.  We agree that that stays in."
In any event, there is no merit to Clermont's contention.  The argument now advanced
was rejected in Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525, 571-72, 693 A.2d 781, 803-04 (1997).  There
Conyers argued that Scott "'restricts the type of evidence relating to other crimes that is
-16-
admissible ... to evidence of crimes of violence for which there has been a conviction.'
(Emphasis added)."  Id. at 571, 693 A.2d at 803.  We said that such an argument "considered
a  lone phrase out of context," and that it "misconstrued Scott's discussion of [Article 27,]
§ 413(g)."  Id.  Accordingly, in Conyers, we held that six or seven findings of delinquency
in Conyers's juvenile record, that was included as part of the PSI, were properly admitted in
evidence against him.  It was "of no consequence that [Conyers's] adjudicated charges are
not definable as crimes of violence."  Id. at 572, 693 A.2d at 804.
V.  Cross-Examination By State 
Of Mitigation Witness 
At the sentencing phase Veronica Shields (Shields), then age twenty, was called as
a witness by Clermont.  Clermont is the father of her son who was born in September 1994.
The relationship between the witness and Clermont had ended in June of 1995.  On direct
examination Shields described the relationship between Clermont and his son.
On cross-examination, when the State began to question Shields about conversations
that she had had with Clermont while he was confined prior to the subject trial, Clermont
objected on the ground that the examination was beyond the scope of direct and that it was
cumulative.  The court overruled the objection, stating that it would limit cross-examination
to principalship in the first degree and the two aggravating factors.  The State volunteered
to "go with the aggravating factors and not the issue of first degree."  Thereupon, the State
quickly developed by leading questions that Clermont had told Shields that he and the three
others were involved in a robbery, that they had put a man in the trunk of his car and taken
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the car to a park, and that Mutu had attempted to use ATM cards at a bank machine.  The
following then transpired.
"Q.
And that the gun was his, the .380 that was used in this
homicide?
"A.
No.
"Q.
He didn't tell you that?
"A.
No.
"Q.
He didn't tell you he had a gun?
"A.
He said he had a gun, but it wasn't his.
"Q.
And he said that was the gun that went off, is that correct?
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
And that he had that gun?
"A.
No.
"Q.
It was his gun?
"A.
It wasn't his gun.  It was a cousin's gun.
"Q.
But he had that gun?
"A.
Yes."
That concluded the cross-examination.
On redirect, defense counsel immediately elicited the following:
"Q.
Did he tell you that he shot Mr. McMullen?
"A.
No, he didn't.
-18-
"Q.
Did he tell you anything about that?
"A.
Yes, he did.
"Q.
Can you tell the court what he told you.
"A.
He said that it was an accidental shooting.  That he didn't do it.
That another person did it, and he was trying to stop him from the gun going
off, and the gun fell to the ground and he picked it up."
One witness (whose testimony comprises six pages of transcript) testified after Shields
and was immediately followed to the stand by Clermont, whose testimony at the sentencing
phase comprises sixty-three pages of transcript.  Clermont testified that the handgun that he
was carrying that night was owned by his cousin.  Clermont testified that, at the time of the
shooting, he was holding the handgun by the handle in his right hand with his index finger
on the side of the weapon when Bonner grabbed the gun and that Bonner's finger was on the
trigger when the handgun fired. 
In this Court Clermont argues that the trial court erred in permitting the cross-
examination of Shields to extend beyond the scope of her direct examination.  Maryland
Rule 5-611(b)(1), in relevant part, provides:
"[C]ross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct
examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness.  ... [T]he court
may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if
on direct examination."
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting cross-examination to exceed the
scope of direct.  The court limited the expanded scope of the cross-examination to the
threshold factual propositions, relevant to sentencing, that the State was required to prove.
-19-
After the trial court had enlarged the scope of cross-examination, the State examined
by leading questions, but there was no objection to the form of the questions.  The lack of
any objection to the form of the questions may simply indicate defense counsel's willingness
to let the witness be led over points that were not disputed.  Even on the disputed issue of
who was the principal in the first degree, Shields literally said no more in response to the
leading questions than that the gun that went off was owned by Clermont's cousin but in
Clermont's possession.  Any indefiniteness in the witness's recital of what Clermont said
about when Clermont had the handgun in his possession, in relation to the time when the
weapon fired,  was cleared up on redirect in a manner favorable to Clermont.
In any event, the error in proceeding by leading questions in the expanded cross-
examination of Shields, if preserved, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The responses
by Shields were generally consistent with Clermont's own description of how the shooting
came about, and were certainly not more prejudicial to Clermont than Clermont's own
version of the events.
VI.  Alleged Discovery Violation
During the State's cross-examination of Shields the prosecutor attempted to impeach
Shields with a statement made by Shields in her grand jury testimony.  On her direct
examination Shields testified that Clermont took care of their child from age six weeks to age
six months, when Clermont returned to work.  On cross-examination she gave the child's
birth date as September 8, 1994, which would have meant that Clermont returned to work
in March 1995.  On cross-examination she acknowledged testifying before the grand jury
-20-
that December 19, 1994, was "the last time [Shields] knew [Clermont] to work."  At trial she
said that, before the grand jury, she forgot about Clermont's going back to work.
Clermont objected on the ground that the grand jury testimony of Shields should have
been furnished in open file discovery, but had not been, so that there was a discovery
violation.  The prosecutor represented to the court that he had informed defense counsel
"before we started" that Shields had testified before the grand jury.  The trial court stated that
it would have been a violation of law for the prosecutor to have given the grand jury
testimony to defense counsel without a court order.  Clermont's request that the subject
portion of the cross-examination be stricken was denied.  
In this Court Clermont submits that the trial court committed "decisional process
error."  The argument is that the ruling of the trial court should be interpreted as premised
on the belief that the trial court had no power to deal with the discovery violation in the
absence of an order authorizing disclosure of the grand jury information.  This erroneous
assumption led the trial court, so the argument goes, to fail to realize that it had the power
to remedy the discovery violation by striking the testimony.  As a further embellishment on
that position, Clermont argues that the trial court failed to perform the analysis applicable
to the choice of remedy for a discovery violation that is described in Taliaferro v. State, 295
Md. 376, 390-91, 546 A.2d 29, 37, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 948, 103 S. Ct. 2114, 77 L. Ed.
2d 1307 (1983). 
There was no discovery violation.  Open file discovery is simply a substitute for
formal discovery under Maryland Rule 4-263, dealing with discovery in criminal causes
-21-
pending in the circuit courts.  Shields was a witness called by the defense.  Rule 4-263 does
not require material potentially impeaching of a defense witness to be produced by the State
in discovery.  Nor was the material required to be produced under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).  Consequently, Clermont had no right to
expect the material to be produced in open file discovery.
VII.  Exclusion of Evidence Offered in Mitigation
Clermont raises as error rulings at the sentencing phase that sustained objections by
the State during the direct examination of two different witnesses in Clermont's case.  One
witness was Clermont, and the other was Catherine Miller (Miller).  As explained below,
each ruling was within the trial court's discretion.  
A
For the ten years preceding trial Miller was the vice principal of the high school
attended by Clermont.  Clermont graduated in the spring of 1992 at age twenty.  During his
last year in high school, in September 1991, Clermont had been charged with possession of
cocaine with the intent to distribute and, at some point, convicted.  Miller had made great
efforts to enable Clermont to graduate before he went to jail.  After his graduation he was
sentenced on June 16, 1992, to three years confinement with all but ten months suspended.
Miller testified that, throughout his high school matriculation, Clermont's attendance
was good, his grades were average, and he behaved in school.  The ruling at issue then arose
in the following context:
"Q.
Did you ever know [Clermont] to get into a fight?
-22-
"A.
No, not as far as I can remember.  I don't remember him ever
being in a fight in that school.
"Q.
Do you know Alex as a violent person?
"A.
No.  I don't.
"Q.
Do you feel safe around Alex?
"[PROSECUTOR]:  Objection.  
"THE COURT:
Sustained."
There was no error in the ruling.  The questioning had progressed, without objection,
from the fact that Miller did not recall Clermont's ever being involved in a fight to what
could be construed as an opinion based on those facts, namely, that Clermont was not a
violent person.  Defense counsel came back to the well again, inquiring whether Miller felt
safe around Clermont.  The questioning thereby moved from what was,  arguably, objectively
determinable to subjective opinions or feelings.
Miller's feelings were of little, if any, relevance.  Indeed, the trial court had alerted
counsel during the guilt or innocence phase as to how it would rule on questions about a
witness's feelings.  On redirect examination by the State, White had been asked:  "How do
you feel about coming in here and testifying against Mr. Clermont?"  Clermont objected and
the court sustained the objection.  Further, there is no evidence that Miller had had any
contact with Clermont after his graduation and imprisonment.  Thus, the distance in time and
difference in circumstances further reduced any relevance of Miller's feelings.  Indeed,
inasmuch as her feelings, so far as the record shows, were based on the contacts with
-23-
Clermont that she described in her testimony, her subjective feelings can be viewed as
cumulative.
For all these reasons the trial court did not abuse its discretion in closing off inquiry
into Miller's feelings.
B
As the reason why the jury should not impose a death sentence Clermont testified that
he had made a promise to his son when the child was born that Clermont would always be
there for him and be a father to him, because Clermont's father had not been a father to
Clermont.  His counsel then asked, "[W]hat type of father do you believe you could be to
your son?"  The prosecutor objected, and the court sustained the objection.  Defense counsel
thereupon concluded the direct examination of Clermont, without making any proffer.  
Clermont argues, citing Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33, 327 A.2d 3 (1987), vacated on
other grounds, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1988), that the anticipated
answer is apparent from the tenor of the question, so that the absence of a proffer does not
defeat appellate review.  Mills recognized an exception to the requirement for a proffer
"'where the tenor of the questions and the replies they were designed to elicit is clear ....'"
Id. at 46, 327 A.2d at 9 (quoting Peregoy v. Western Maryland RR. Co., 202 Md. 203, 209,
95 A.2d 867, 870 (1953)).  Here, the question, viewed precisely, sought Clermont's
subjective belief concerning a future course of conduct and, responsively to the question, that
belief could have been expressed in qualitative terms, such as "excellent," "loving," or
"caring."     A   response   of   that   nature   would  have  been  of  such  minimal,  if  any,
-24-
relevance, under the circumstances of the instant matter that the court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding an answer.  
Inasmuch as Clermont had already testified to his desire to maintain a close
relationship with his son if Clermont's life were spared, we shall assume, by a liberal
application of the Mills exception, that the question put to Clermont sought an explanation
of how Clermont would maintain that relationship if his life were spared.  That explanation
had already been given in evidence by the child's mother, Shields.  
Shields testified that "for a man his age [Clermont] was an excellent father."  She said
that Clermont took care of the child, while Shields was working, from age six weeks until
age six months, when Shields was laid off and when Clermont "got his job back at Maryland
University."  In July of 1995 Shields had a night job, and Clermont cared for the child
twenty-four hours a day during the work week.  
Shields further testified that, since Clermont had been confined, he tried to telephone
Shields's home every other night in order to talk to the child.  Someone, presumably
primarily Shields, takes the child to visit Clermont every weekend.  She said that the visits
are difficult for both father and son because the child is used to having Clermont pick him
up and play with him.  She said that during the prison visits the child "sits at the window and
bangs against it, because he is frustrated, because he can't touch [Clermont]."  
-25-
     Appellate counsel suggest that Clermont might have said that his confinement would be
6
a continuing reminder to his son of the consequences of criminal behavior.  That spin on a
life sentence could have been argued without the need for any testimony to that effect.  
Thus, even by a liberal application of the Mills exception, we divine no answer to the
question put to Clermont that would not be cumulative.  
6
VIII.  Defendant's Right of Allocution
Clermont contends that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing his
request to allocute after the State's rebuttal closing argument.  The issue arose as set forth
below:
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I have a question.
"What is your understanding of when he allocutes?
"My understanding is that he is going to testify, and he still has the right
to allocute after argument.
"THE COURT:  No, I disagree with that.  The State has the last say
here.  Now, I think it can either be after the State's first argument and before
your argument, or after your argument, but it is clearly before the State's
Attorney comes in for rebuttal.
* * *
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Two issues, if I may, Your Honor.
"The first issue is the issue of allocution.  I think we both agree that the
defendant has an absolute right to allocute, which is in addition to any
argument made by counsel for the State or counsel for the defense.
"It is my position and my request that after closing argument by counsel
the defendant address the jury by allocution.  I think historically in our
jurisprudence system, before sentence is imposed the last person that the
sentencing authority hears from is the defendant.
-26-
     In its entirety Clermont's allocution reads as follows:
7
"First of all, I would like to apologize to the family and the loved ones,
because I am very sorry for the part that I took in this drama, and there is
nothing that I can do to bring his life back, but I feel right now, I have taken
responsibility for my part in taking Mr. McMullen's life, and I want to
apologize to the family, and tell them that I am very sorry, and I would like to
ask the jurors for mercy."
"In a normal proceeding the court would say to the defendant, do you
have anything to say before sentence is imposed?
"THE COURT:  Do you have any authority other than what you have
just given me as to how — the order for that in a death penalty proceeding?
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  There is no authority.
* * *
"THE COURT:  I will deny that request.  I believe that since the State
has the burden of proof in this trial that the State will have the last argument
to the jury.
"Mr. Clermont has an absolute right to allocute, and that can either be
after the State's first argument and before the defense argument, or after the
defense argument and before the State's rebuttal argument, and I will review
that tactical decision."
Clermont allocuted immediately following the State's closing argument in chief, and
before defense counsel gave closing argument on his behalf.   
7
Clermont's position in the trial court was that he had an unqualified right to have the
last word.  In this Court his position is that the defendant in a capital case "should, upon
request, be afforded the valuable right of the final word to the sentencer, absent some
compelling reason for a contrary result."  Brief of Appellant at 15.  The State takes the
-27-
     In Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 507 A.2d 1098 (1986), we described the proceedings of
8
(continued...)
position that, because it bears the ultimate burden of persuasion, it has the last word at a
capital sentencing proceeding.  For the reasons that we set forth below we hold that the rule
governing the timing of allocution is the converse of that for which Clermont contends in this
Court, that is, absent some compelling reason for a contrary result, the State has the last word
before the jury in a capital sentencing.  It necessarily follows that any allocution by the
capital defendant almost universally must precede, at some point, the State's rebuttal closing
argument.  
Maryland Rule 4-343, since July 1, 1984, expressly has provided for allocution in
capital cases.  The provision, presently Rule 4-343(f), reads:  "Before sentence is determined,
the court shall afford the defendant the opportunity, personally and through counsel, to make
a statement."  The rule does not specify when, "[b]efore sentence is determined," the
allocution may or must be made.  A rule dealing with capital sentencing proceedings [former
Maryland Rule 772A] had been adopted effective January 1, 1979, but that rule did not
contain an allocution provision.  Consequently, between January 1, 1979, and July 1, 1984,
allocution in capital cases was governed by common law.  Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 353,
509 A.2d 120, 124 (1986) (Harris IV).   Minutes of the Rules Committee's consideration of
the provision for allocution in Rule 4-343 do not state any intention to create an unqualified
or presumptive right in the capital defendant for the absolute last say before the jury by way
of allocution.8
-28-
     (...continued)
8
the Rules Committee at its meeting of October 15/16, 1982, when the allocution provision
for Rule 4-343 was considered.  See id. at 197-98, 507 A.2d at 1111.  The portion of the
minutes specifically dealing with the timing of the allocution reads as follows:
"[The Chief of the Criminal Division of the Attorney General's Office]
asked whether the right of allocution, if permitted in capital cases, should be
limited to being exercised before final arguments are made.  The Chairman
suggested that the timing of allocution ought to be left to judicial discretion.
[The Criminal Division Chief] noted that she anticipates concern in the State's
Attorney[s'] office[s] about unsworn statements being made by the defendant
immediately prior to the jury's retiring to consider its verdict."
In Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 507 A.2d 1098 (1986), we described the somewhat
hybrid nature of allocution in capital cases, saying:
"The obvious purpose of Rule 4-343[(f)] is to afford the death penalty
eligible, convicted murderer the opportunity to make an unsworn statement in
mitigation of the death penalty without being subject to cross-examination.  In
this respect the statement is similar to closing argument, but it is not
completely analogous to closing argument because the factual content of the
allocution is not limited, in general, to the record in the case, inferences
therefrom, and matters of common human experience.  In that allocution is
unsworn and is not subject to cross-examination, it is not testimony in the
conventional sense.  Nevertheless allocution may be considered by the
sentencing authority."
Id. at 198, 507 A.2d at 1111.  Viewing allocution as argument would not assist Clermont's
submission.  In Harris v. State, 312 Md. 225, 539 A.2d 637 (1988) (Harris V), we held:  
"The short of it is that in a capital sentencing proceeding the State has
the ultimate burden of persuading the jury to impose a death sentence.  ...
Thus, under the normal Maryland rule, the State was entitled to open and
close."
-29-
     Maryland Rule 4-343(e) now provides for a verdict form under which any statutory or
9
non-statutory mitigating circumstance may be found by one or more but fewer than all twelve
of the jurors, after a reasonable period of deliberation.
Id. at 257, 539 A.2d at 652.  Judge McAuliffe dissented on other grounds from that portion
of the opinion in Harris V, but he agreed that "because the State bears the ultimate burden
of proof in a capital sentencing proceeding, it is appropriate to afford the State the right to
open and close in final argument."  Id. at 265, 539 A.2d at 656-67.
Similarly, in Harris IV, we considered whether allocution was "argument" within the
meaning of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 413(c)(2), providing that
"[t]he State and the defendant or his counsel may present argument for or against the
sentence of death."  There the trial court had prevented the defendant from both allocuting
and having his counsel present a closing argument to the jury.  We held that the trial court
erred "[s]ince allocution is neither synonymous with nor encompassed by the term
'argument.'"  306 Md. at 352, 509 A.2d at 124.
Although allocution is unsworn and not subject to cross-examination, our cases have
emphasized allocution's testimonial aspects.  The most important of these is that information
that comes to the jury only in the form of allocution may be used by the jury, if it so finds,
in determining the existence of one or more mitigating circumstances.  We made this clear
early on in Booth (using language that antedated Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S. Ct.
1860, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1988) ):
9
"Under Md. Code ... Art. 27, § 413(g)(8) the sentencing authority may find by
the preponderance test '[a]ny other facts which the [sentencing authority]
-30-
specifically sets forth in writing that it finds as mitigating circumstances in the
case.'  In Booth's case, after the jury had found the aggravating circumstance
of murder in the course of robbery, the jury was free to find as a mitigating
circumstance such aspect of the content of Booth's allocution on which the
jury could unanimously agree, simply by specifically setting it forth on the
sentencing form.  Further, if the jury found any such mitigating circumstance
in the allocution the jury was obliged to weigh that mitigating factor in
determining whether the sentence should be life or death."
Id. at 198-99, 507 A.2d at 1111-12.  See also Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 435, 583 A.2d 218,
241 (1990) ("The jury may consider the allocution and find the existence of a mitigating
factor based upon it."); Harris IV, 306 Md. at 358, 509 A.2d at 127 ("Although evidence of
mitigating circumstances ... can be introduced by means other than allocution, the allocutory
process provides a unique opportunity for the defendant himself to face the sentencing body
....").
We have relied on the testimonial nature of allocution in holding, in a case in which
the convicted murderer did not testify as a sworn witness at the capital sentencing
proceeding, but did allocute, that there was no violation of the defendant's right against self-
incrimination when the State in its summation argued that the allocution was not under oath,
not subject to cross-examination, and should not be believed.  See Booth, 306 Md. at
194-210, 507 A.2d at 1110-18.  See also Hunt v. State, 321 Md. at 436, 583 A.2d at 241
("[T]he prosecutor is free to tell the jury that they should not consider the defendant's
allocution; however, the prosecutor is not free to tell the jury that they could not consider the
allocution."). 
-31-
We have also held that it was error to include in a jury instruction on allocution that
the statement in allocution is not evidence or testimony.  Hunt v. State, 321 Md. at 440-41,
583 A.2d at 244.  In Hunt, the error was rendered harmless because the court explicitly told
the jury that it could consider the allocution which "'may be a basis for establishing
mitigating circumstances in imposing a life sentence.'"  Id.
Finally, the testimonial character of allocution is perhaps most forcefully illustrated
by Harris V where we held that it was reversible error to instruct the jury that allocution was
not evidence and at the same time to instruct the jury that it may consider only the evidence
in the case in deciding upon the sentence.  Harris V, 312 Md. at 254-55, 539 A.2d at 651.
The decisions of this Court, reviewed above, strongly indicate that, for purposes of
timing, allocution logically should be classified with testimony. 
Nor is it helpful to analogize to the practice, if any uniform practice there be, in the
timing of allocution at sentencings in non-capital cases.  "'Today the most practical rationale
underlying allocution is that it provides an opportunity for the offender and defense counsel
to contest any disputed factual basis for the sentence and to persuade the judge to impose a
sentence favored by the offender.'"  Shifflett v. State, 315 Md. 382, 387, 554 A.2d 814, 817
(1989) (quoting A.W. Campbell, Law of Sentencing § 72, at 232 (1978)).  In the capital
sentencing proceeding, the mechanism for contesting disputed facts relevant to sentencing
and for persuading the sentencer to impose a favorable sentence is enlarged beyond
allocution to a full trial.  In addition, our cases permit the convicted murderer to place
mitigating information, including the murderer's version of disputed facts, before the
-32-
sentencing authority at that full trial without being subject to cross-examination.  This
sentencing trial which includes the right to allocute, sufficiently satisfies "the most practical
rationale underlying allocution," as drawn from the non-capital context.  There is no need
to go to the extreme of preventing the State from fairly commenting on any allocution by
ruling that the State's rebuttal summation to a jury must precede the allocution.  
Clermont relies upon Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 622 A.2d 727 (1993), as support
for his claimed right to have the last word in a jury capital sentencing.  Thanos was a capital
sentencing proceeding before the court, sitting without a jury.  Id. at 82, 622 A.2d at 729.
Thanos had attempted suicide numerous times while in prison.  Id.  His trial counsel feared
that Thanos would make inappropriate remarks in allocution.  Trial counsel therefore urged
that Thanos allocute early in the defense testimony phase of the sentencing proceeding, so
that the sting of the anticipated remarks would be lessened by the time of actual sentencing
and so that defense psychiatric witnesses could observe Thanos allocuting and take those
observations into account in their opinions.  Thanos, however, insisted on speaking at the end
of the proceedings.  The trial court deferred to Thanos's desire.  "True to [trial] counsel's
fears, after closing arguments, Thanos offered an inappropriate allocution ...."  Id. at 87, 622
A.2d at 732.  Before this Court Thanos's appellate counsel argued that the timing of
allocution was a tactical decision for trial counsel.  We said that "'the defendant ordinarily
has the ultimate decision when the issue at hand involves a choice that will inevitably have
important personal consequences for [the defendant] and when the choice is one a competent
defendant is capable of making.'"  Id. at 89-90, 622 A.2d at 733 (quoting Treece v. State, 313
-33-
     The term "rebuttal" as used in the above-quoted excerpt from Thanos means, in the
10
context of that opinion, to refute or explain.  It does not mean the right to close.  Immediately
prior to the quoted language in Thanos, the court had quoted from Shifflett v. State, 315 Md.
382, 554 A.2d 814 (1989).  Shifflett was a court sentencing in a non-capital case.  There,
after defense counsel's presentation, the defendant waived allocution.  The court then called
upon the prosecutor for a sentencing recommendation (thus indicating that allocution is not
the "last word" in all non-capital cases).  The prosecutor recommended a sentence higher
than one under the sentencing guidelines, contending that this was justified because the
defendant had lied to the probation officer.  The defendant sought to answer the accusation,
but the court refused to hear the explanation.  We held that the trial court had abused its
discretion because "[t]he ability to speak in mitigation of punishment under the
circumstances of this case necessarily entailed the opportunity to respond to the new
substantive remarks of the prosecutor."  Id. at 388, 554 A.2d at 817.  In the case now before
us no new matter was injected by the prosecutor in the State's rebuttal summation.
Md. 665, 674, 547 A.2d 1054, 1058-59 (1988)).  We then held that "[t]he decision whether
and when to allocute ... is such a choice."  Id. at 90, 622 A.2d at 733.  We observed that we
would "not now countenance defense counsel's effort to deny Thanos this precious
opportunity for rebuttal merely because he failed effectively to seize it."  Id.10
Thanos differs materially from the instant case.  First, in Thanos, the trial court was
the sentencing authority.  Second, the issue in Thanos was who, between the defendant and
trial counsel, made the decision as to the timing of allocution.  But the choices open to
counsel or client were within a range set by the court.  The holding in Thanos that the
defendant makes the decision is not the same as saying that the defendant controls the timing
of allocution in either a court or jury sentencing to the exclusion of the judge.  In the court
sentencing in Thanos the judge decided to permit Thanos to allocute after closing arguments.
Thanos sought to allocute at that point in the proceedings, but it was the judge who decided
whether or not to grant the request.  
-34-
Similarly, in the jury capital sentencing context, should a conflict between the
defendant and trial counsel emerge over when allocution will be made, the holding from
Thanos that the decision is ordinarily that of the defendant will be transportable to the jury
context.  But, in that context, the court's discretion in establishing the defendant's range of
options is additionally subject to the constraints of a jury proceeding.  In a jury capital
sentencing, the later any allocution is postponed in the proceedings, the greater is the
opportunity for sandbagging and for confusing the jury.  Concern for the integrity of the
verdict underlies the comments of the Supreme Court of New Jersey on the Maryland
allocution rule, as exemplified by Booth.  That court said:
"Maryland now permits allocution by a defendant before capital sentencing.
... The capital Maryland procedure would permit more than we contemplate
in that it seemingly would allow the defendant to deny the killing.  That would
be more than a plea for mercy and should expose the defendant to
impeachment."
State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 430, 548 A.2d 1022, 1045-46 (1988).  As the jury capital
sentencing cases reviewed above make clear, "[w]hile denied the opportunity to cross-
examine the defendant, the prosecutor may comment upon the allocution."  Hunt, 321 Md.
at 435, 583 A.2d at 241.  That cannot be done if the defendant has the last word.
In sum, allocution has heavy testimonial overtones and is logically treated as part of
the testimony in a capital sentencing.  The trial court has discretion to postpone allocution
to immediately following the State's summation in chief, to immediately preceding the State's
summation rebuttal, or, in a court capital sentencing, until after the State's rebuttal
summation.  Moreover, in a jury capital sentencing, however, the trial court, under
-35-
compelling circumstances, may permit allocution to be postponed until after the State's
rebuttal summation.  No compelling circumstances are presented here.  Accordingly, the trial
court did not err in denying Clermont's request to allocute after the State's rebuttal
summation.
IX.  Prosecutor's Summation
Set forth below in italics are three portions of the summation in chief by the State at
the sentencing phase.  Clermont contends that the italicized portions of the argument are so
improper that the trial court committed plain error by failing, on its own initiative, to
intervene and cut off the arguments or, similarly on its own initiative, to give a curative
instruction.  
In its summation in chief the State initially reviewed the evidence that described the
victim and his character.  The State then reviewed the crimes step by step, from the robberies
through the kidnapping to the murder.  At each step in the narrative the State urged the jury
to consider what was going through McMullen's mind.  The State argued that nothing in
Clermont's conduct that evening mitigated the murder.  Then the prosecutor undertook to
persuade the jury that death, and not life without parole, was the appropriate sentence for so
horrible a crime.  In that context, the prosecutor said:
"You see, what we end up doing, as we go through this, as we create
this horribleness, everyday as we hear more and more graphic things as more
ghastly deeds come to our attention, and we think about what penalty should
be imposed, we say that deserves the death sentence.  How bad can it be?
"If you can envision something worse, maybe this case doesn't deserve
it?
-36-
"Again, the easy answer is life without parole, but I say to you this is
about more than that.  This is about crime, and this is about punishment.
"Will it make a difference?
"I don't know.
"Will it change the way things are?
"Probably not.
"But to look at it any other ways would be to demean and diminish what
happened in this case, and to diminish the life of one man.
"He stands before you and asks for mercy.  John asked for mercy, too.
John also asked for his life.  And he did nothing to deserve what he got.  There
was no reason for any of this having to happen.  There was no reason for that
killing to happen.
*  *  *
"[The victim was] [s]omebody who dared to resist, somebody who was
not giving him what he wanted, and so he did it.  He did it without so much as
a thought.  No sentencing form, no instructions, no signature.  He put that gun
down and pulled the trigger, and he takes the stand during this proceeding to
let you see a human side of him.
"I am not a cold-blooded killer.  I care about things, is what he said.
Spare my life and give me an opportunity.
"He forfeited that and a claim to humanity when he did what he did.
You give this man life, and what you are giving him is all the things he chose
to deny to Mr. McMullen.
"You give him life, you give him a place to stay.  You give him a bed to
be comfortable in, you give him clothes to wear, you give him soap to clean
himself.  You give him a shower a day, you give him an exercise room.  You
give him --
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection.
-37-
"THE COURT:  Sustained.
"[PROSECUTOR]:  You give him a voice to hear and a place to go
when he is sick.  That is what you are giving him, and there are times when the
crime and the punishment must equal each other."
Clermont's blanket contention is that at a capital sentencing proceeding the State's
final argument, other than addressing issues related to principalship in the first degree, is
limited to aggravating circumstances, mitigating circumstances, and whether the former
outweigh the latter.  Encompassed, however, within the generality of those issues is the
burden of the State to persuade the sentencing authority that the aggravating factors
preponderate and that the circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant
justify the sentence, either death or life without parole, that the State seeks.  In the instant
matter the prosecutor sought those objectives within the bounds of permissible argument.
Clermont submits that the statement that life without parole would "diminish the life"
of McMullen is an appeal to "eye for eye" justice.  In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96
S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976), the opinion announcing judgment said:  "'Retribution
is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law,' Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
248, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 1084, 93 L. Ed. 1337[, 1343] (1949), but neither is it a forbidden
objective nor one inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men."  Gregg, 428 U.S. at
183, 96 S. Ct. at 2930, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 880.  This Court cited and relied on the passage in
Gregg from which the preceding quotation is taken in rejecting a contention in a capital case
that it was improper for the State indirectly to appeal to the jurors to give the victim's family
vengeance.  Colvin-el v. State, 332 Md. 144, 175-76, 630 A.2d 725, 741 (1993).  See also
-38-
Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387, 425, 478 A.2d 1143, 1162-63 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
2030, 105 S. Ct. 1231, 84 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1985) (quoting approvingly the same passage from
Gregg in rejecting challenge on cruel and unusual punishment grounds to the imposition of
a capital sentence).  
The first italicized section, when placed into its proper context, cannot plausibly be
read as advocating retribution beyond the level deemed appropriate in Gregg.  The
prosecutor specifically discussed the verdict sheet in both his initial closing argument and
in his rebuttal summation, exhorting the jurors to "follow the form as it is before you."  The
State's argument, in its entirety, did not encourage the jury to deviate from the sentencing
procedure required by Maryland statute and the Constitution.
In the second italicized quote, "No sentencing form, no instructions, no signature,"
Clermont discerns an appeal for the jurors to deny Clermont due process.  Clermont's
argument to us illustrates "oratorical conceit or flourish."  Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404,
413, 326 A.2d 707, 714 (1974).  We, however, read the State's argument as properly directed
to the lack of regard for human life shown by Clermont.  
In the third italicized portion there was a defense objection to the State's argument that
the court sustained, most probably because there was no evidence that Clermont would be
given an exercise room if he were sentenced to life without parole.  Clermont's argument
seems to be that the trial court, sua sponte, should have cut off the line of argument.  We
hold that the State was entitled to attempt to persuade the jury that death was the appropriate
-39-
sentence as contrasted with life in prison, by referring to the food, shelter, clothing, and
health care aspects of prison life.
In any event, Clermont relies on plain error for relief with respect to each of the
claimed improprieties in the State's argument.  There is no basis for reversal because none
of the alleged errors vitally affected Clermont's right to a fair and impartial trial.  Rubin v.
State, 325 Md. at 588, 602 A.2d at 694.
X.  Constitutional Arguments
For preservation purposes Clermont argues that the Maryland death penalty law is
unconstitutional because (1) it requires the defendant to establish mitigating circumstances,
(2) it requires defendants to establish that non-enumerated mitigating circumstances are, in
fact, mitigating, and (3) it requires the State to prove that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances by only a preponderance of the evidence, rather than
by a more reliable standard rising at least to the level of clear and convincing evidence.  This
Court has previously considered and rejected these contentions.  See Burch v. State, 346 Md.
253, 299, 696 A.2d 443, 446 (1997); Conyers, 345 Md. at 576, 693 A.2d at 805-06; Perry
v. State, 344 Md. 204, 247-48, 686 A.2d 274, 295 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 117
S. Ct. 1318, 127 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1997); Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 82-83, 665 A.2d 223,
249 (1995), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 116 S. Ct. 1021, 134 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1996);
Wiggins v. State, 324 Md. 551, 582-83, 597 A.2d 1359, 1374 (1991).  See also Grandison
v. State, 341 Md. 175, 670 A.2d 398 (1995).
-40-
XI.  Other Considerations
In addition to considering the arguments advanced by Clermont on this appeal, we
have also considered the imposition of the death sentence from the standpoint of the factors
set forth in Article 27, § 414(e), and we make the following determinations:
1.
The sentence of death was not imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor;
2.
The evidence supports the jury's findings of statutory aggravating
circumstances under § 413(d); and 
3.
The evidence supports the jury's finding that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J.:
The majority holds that the trial court did not err either in  limiting the appellant’s
cross-examination of the State’s principal witness or in requiring the appellant to allocute
before the State’s rebuttal closing argument.   I respectfully dissent.  Because  I believe that
the trial court’s limitation of the appellant’s cross-examination was in violation of the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment  to the United States Constitution and Article
21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, that to treat allocution, which is neither argument
nor testimony, differently in a capital case than in a non-capital one, is  impermissible, thus
-41-
error, and that neither error is harmless, inasmuch as their effect, both separately and in
combination, denied the appellant a fair trial, I would reverse the appellant’s convictions and
remand this case for a new trial. 
I
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee a criminal defendant the
right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.  See Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md.
391, 411-12, 697 A.2d 432, 442 (1997); Marshall v. State, 346 Md.  186, 192, 695 A.2d 184,
187 (1997).  See also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678, 106 S.Ct.  1431, 1435,
89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct.  1105, 1110, 39
L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1974); State v. Gray, 344 Md.  417, 420, 687 A.2d 660, 662 (1997); Ebb
v. State, 341 Md.  578, 587, 671 A.2d 974, 979 (1996).  Encompassed in this right is a
defendant’s opportunity to test the State’s case by cross-examining the State’s witnesses on
matters likely to affect their credibility, including bias, prejudice, or ulterior motive. See
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-04, 85 S.Ct 1065, 1068, 13 L.Ed.2d. 923, 926 (1965);
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131, 88 S.Ct. 748, 749, 19 L.Ed.2d 956, 956-59 (1968).
“The exposure of a witness’s motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of
the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-17, 94
S.Ct.  at 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d at 354.  See also Smallwood v. State, 320 Md.  300, 306, 577
A.2d 356, 359 (1990).  Such information is necessary  if jurors are to test properly the weight
and credibility of a witness’s testimony.  See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90
-1-
S.Ct. 1930, 1935, 26 L.Ed.2d 489, 497 (1973); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-
43, 15 S.Ct.  337, 339, 39 L.Ed 409, 410-11 (1895). 
Rawle White, an admitted participant in the crimes with which the appellant was
charged and tried, testified for the State, as its principal witness.  He did so in exchange for
a reduced sentence — one that, in effect, amounted to thirty years — for his own murder
conviction.   On direct-examination, White identified the appellant as the principal in the first
degree, i.e.,  the one who pulled the trigger.  On cross-examination, the appellant sought to
discredit White by showing  both his bias and “that [he] was motivated to implicate [the
appellant] because he had been told by a detective (truly or falsely) that [the appellant] had
implicated him.”   The latter attempt is reflected in the following colloquy (emphasis added):
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL] Q.
You went down to the police station.
“[WHITE] A.
Yes, sir.
“Q.
In fact, what happened, Detective Rositch
is the one who questioned you, is that
correct?
“A.
I guess.  I can’t remember his name, its
been so long.
“Q.
And he said to you, I believe that
[Clermont] is lying and trying to save
himself, and [Bonner] is telling the truth.
“Is that what he said to you?
“A.
No, sir.
“Q.
He didn’t say that to you?
-2-
“A.
He came at me and said Alex Clermont
claimed that I  pulled the trigger that night.
“Q.
And so you claim that Alex Clermont
pulled the trigger that night.
“[STATE’S ATTORNEY]:
Objection.  Move to strike.
“THE COURT:
Sustained.  Grant the motion to strike.
“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the last statement is stricken from
the record, and is not to be used by you in your deliberations.”
Reading the sentence — “And so you claim that Alex Clermont pulled the trigger that
night” — as a declarative, rather than an interrogative, sentence, the majority upholds the
trial court’s limitation of the appellant’s attempt to explore, on cross-examination,  the
witness’s motivation.  It reasons:
“Every aspect of the record . . . indicates that the sentence spoken by
defense counsel that is last quoted above was a declarative sentence, asserting
something as a fact, and not  an interrogative sentence, asking a question.  Had
the sentence been spoken with a rising tone, the court reporter should have
ended the sentence with a question mark, but the reporter used a period.  It is
clear that the State’s Attorney interpreted defense counsel’s sentence as a
statement asserting a fact.  Not only did the State object, but it moved to strike,
even though White had not given any answer to the question.   The object of
the motion to strike, which is usually accompanied by a request for an
instruction to the jury to disregard certain evidence, is to remove matters
which have not been properly admitted as evidence from the jury’s
consideration . . . .   In the instant matter defense counsel’s statement of an
asserted fact was not evidence and was properly the object of the motion to
strike.
“The record also clearly reflects that the trial court had the same
understanding of defense counsel’s statement as did the court reporter and the
State’s Attorney.  The court sustained the objection, granted the motion to
strike, and, without the need for an express request from the State, instructed
the jury to disregard ‘the last statement.’”
-3-
___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (1998) [slip op. at 6-7].   More than that, however, the
majority states that, “even if defense counsel used a rising tone to indicate a question, the
trial court could, under the circumstances, consider that defense counsel was not really
seeking an answer, but that defense counsel was simply indulging in a tactic to focus the jury
on the legal issue that would be affected if the jury believed that White was lying.”  Id. at
___, ___ A.2d ___ [slip op. at 9-10].  The majority concludes that,  “if we treat the sentence
in issue as a question, it is at best an argumentative one,” that carries considerable baggage,
requiring the State to object and thereby protect its witness on cross-examination.  Id. [slip
op.  at 10].  I disagree.
The majority relies on the fact that the court reporter ended the sentence with a period
rather than a question mark.    In so doing, it  places undue emphasis on a court reporter’s
typographical notes and not enough  on the context in which the sentence appears, which,
in turn and by the way, has everything to do with the point the appellant sought to make and
the manner in which he sought to make it.   In other words, neither the interpretation given
the sentence by the court reporter — how he or she chose to report it — nor any other court
actor, including the court or the prosecutor, nor the punctuation that the court reporter may
have used in connection with it is,  and, indeed, should not be, dispositive.   
Certainly, the appellant had every right to ask the State’s principal witness whether
he was testifying that the appellant pulled the trigger because he had been told that the
appellant had accused him of being the trigger man.   Whatever the witness’s response, the
accused is entitled to elicit it because the witness’s demeanor as he answered the question
-4-
     I am aware that the majority seeks to justify its conclusion that the subject sentence is
1
a declarative sentence by analyzing the appellant’s cross-examination as a whole.   I am not
persuaded.  Only a cursory review of the transcript reveals the fallacy of  that assertion.  Just
prior to the disputed sentence, the appellant’s counsel stated, “He didn’t say that to you.”
The court reporter interpreted it as a question, as reflected by the question mark appended
to it.   Like the disputed sentence, however, it was not phrased as questions traditionally are.
 Similarly, “Like you did with the police,” at another point in the cross-examination of
White, was interpreted  as a question.   Again, the court reporter’s interpretation ought not,
as here,  be dispositive. 
bears on the witness’s credibility; the jury’s opportunity of seeing and assessing how the
witness answers the question is extremely relevant.   In fact, having the benefit of that
opportunity may well be critical in that regard.    Had the transcript shown, with regard to
the sentence at issue,  a question mark instead of a period, I wonder if the majority would be
taking the position that it has taken in this case.   A matter as important as this - a man’s life
is at stake -  ought not depend on the interpretation that a court reporter may give a particular
sentence or phrase.  Context and purpose should prevail.   And when the meaning of a
1
sentence, or whether the sentence is a question, is ambiguous, the benefit of the doubt, as is
the case with the interpretation of ambiguous statutes, must be given to the accused. 
Reading the sentence in question in the context of the appellant’s cross-examination
of White, the particular focus being on White’s  motivation for implicating the appellant,
clearly shows that counsel was posing a leading question,  not making a rhetorical or
declarative statement.  A leading question, one of the most effective tools of a cross-
examiner, is “one that suggests to the witness the answer desired by the examiner.”
McCormick on Evidence, §6 at 17 (4  Ed.1992).  
th
-5-
“The question which contains a phase like, ‘did he not?’ is obviously and
invariably leading, but almost any other type of question may be leading or
not, depending upon the content and context.  It is sometimes supposed that
a question which can be answered yes or no is by that fact marked as leading.”
Id.   In this case, the question —  “And so you claim that Alex Clermont pulled the trigger
that night” — suggests the answer the appellant sought  and it could be answered yes or no.
See Harward v. Harward, 173 Md.  339, 350, 196 A.2d 318, 323 (1938); 3 Wigmore,
Evidence, §773 at 165 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (“[I]t is well settled that on cross examination
of an opponent’s witness, ordinarily no question can be improper as leading.”).
At trial, the court determines what evidence is material and relevant, and the extent
to which a witness may be cross-examined for the purpose of showing bias or, in this case,
more accurately, ulterior motive.  Ebb, 341 Md.  at 587, 671 A.2d at 978; Bruce v. State, 328
Md.  594, 624, 616 A.2d 392, 407 (1992), cert denied, 508 U.S. 963, 113 S.Ct.  296, 124
L.Ed.2d 686 (1993); Shields v. State, 257 Md.  384, 392, 263 A,2d 565, 569 (1970).  “The
trial judge retains discretion to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination to protect
witness safety or to prevent harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, or inquiry that
is repetitive or marginally relevant.” Marshall, 346 Md. at 193, 695 A.2d at 187.  That
discretion, however, may not be exercised “until the constitutionally required threshold level
of inquiry has been afforded the defendant.” Id.  A cross-examiner must be given wide
latitude in attempting to establish a witness’s bias or motivation to testify falsely.  Ebb, 341
Md. at 587, 671 A.2d at 978; Smallwood v. State, 320 Md.  300, 307-08, 577 A.2d 356, 359
(1990).  No such latitude was given the appellant in this case.   Indeed, considering that
-6-
     Allocution, or allocutus, is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as follows:
2
“[The] [f]ormality of court's inquiry of defendant as to whether he has any
legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him on
verdict of conviction; or, whether he would like to make [a] statement on his
behalf and present any information in mitigation of sentence.”
Black's Law Dictionary, at 76 (6  Ed.  1990).
th
White was the State’s principal witness who fingered the appellant as the trigger person, I
believe that the trial court’s limitation of the cross-examination of White prevented the
appellant from reaching his “constitutionally required threshold level of inquiry.”   This  is
evident by the trial court’s decision to not only sustain the State’s objection, but also to strike
the question from the record and not permit defense counsel to rephrase the question.
II
The traditional timing of allocution   is as follows:  
2
“The trial is over, the jury has reached a verdict and the accused is guilty of
the crime with which he was charged. Now he stands at the bar of justice, a
prisoner, and the judgment of the law is to be pronounced.  But, before the
court decrees the inexorable legal consequences which necessarily follow the
finding of guilt, the court formally addresses the prisoner, informs him of the
jury’s verdict and directly puts the interrogatory, ‘Do you know of any reason
why judgment should not be pronounced upon you?’” 
Paul W. Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo. L. Rev. 115 (1944).  In response to this invitation,
defendants often express remorse, take responsibility for their crimes, or, as is more often
the case, beg for forgiveness and present information in mitigation of sentence.  
During the penalty phase of appellant’s trial, the following exchange took place
between defense counsel and the trial court:
-7-
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Two issues, if I may Your Honor.
“The first issue is the issue of allocution.  I think we both agree that the
defendant has an absolute right to allocute, which is in addition to any
argument made by counsel for the State or counsel for the defense. 
 
“It is my position and my request that after closing argument by counsel the
defendant address the jury by allocution.  I think historically in our
jurisprudence system, before sentence is imposed the last person that the
sentencing authority hears from is the defendant.
“In a normal proceeding the court would say to the defendant, do you have
anything to say before sentencing is imposed?
“THE COURT:
Do you have any authority other than what you have just
given me as to how — the order for that in a death penalty proceeding?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: There is no authority.
*  *  *  *
“THE COURT:
I will deny that request.  I believe that since the State has
the burden of proof in this trial that the State will have the last argument to the
jury.
“[The appellant] has an absolute right to allocute, and that can either be after
the State's first argument and before the defense argument, or after the defense
argument and before the [S]tate[']s rebuttal argument, and I will review that
tactical decision.”
Thus, defense counsel requested that the trial court permit the appellant to allocute at the
time customary in non-capital cases, just prior to the sentence being determined.  Because,
in capital cases, sentencing may be, and in this case was, done by a jury,  that meant that  the
appellant be permitted to allocute after closing arguments.  The trial court refused the
request, however, ruling, and the majority agrees, that,  because the State bears the ultimate
-8-
burden of proof and is entitled to open and close arguments during a jury capital sentencing,
the appellant is required to allocute to the jury before the State’s rebuttal closing argument.
Agreeing with the trial court's ruling and rationale, the majority holds that "absent
some compelling reason for a contrary result, the State has the last word before the jury in
a capital sentencing," and that "any allocution by the capital defendant almost universally
must precede, at some point, the State's rebuttal closing argument." ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d
at ___ [slip op. at 28]. This holding creates, unnecessarily and without good reason, a
procedural difference in capital cases where the jury, rather than the court, is the sentencing
authority.  Moreover, it does not comport with fundamental fairness. 
Maryland Rule 4-342(e) applies in non-capital cases.    It provides:
“(e) Allocution and Information in Mitigation. — Before imposing sentence,
the court shall afford the defendant the opportunity, personally and through
counsel, to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of
punishment.”
Maryland Rule 4-343(d), pertaining to capital cases, similarly provides:
“(d) Allocution. — Before sentence is determined, the court shall afford the
defendant the opportunity, personally and through counsel, to make a
statement.”
It is perhaps of some interest that in non-capital cases, allocution is coupled with
“information in mitigation of punishment.”   This is perhaps because in capital cases, the
rules provide for the production of mitigation evidence and that process is a more formal one
than in non-capital cases. See Md. Rule 4-343 (b); Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art.
27, § 413.  
-9-
     A note discussing this Court’s decision in Thanos v. State, 330 Md.  77, 622 A.2d 727
3
(1993) chronicles the common law and statutory history of the right of allocution in
Maryland, as follows:
“The Court of Appeals first addressed the right of allocution in 1914.  In
Dutton v. State, the court endorsed the practice of providing the defendant
with an opportunity to address the court in all cases in which the sentence of
death or imprisonment could be imposed.  In 1962, the judiciary adopted rule
761, which applied to both capital and noncapital cases and provided that
‘before imposing sentence the court shall afford an accused or his counsel an
opportunity to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of
punishment.’  Rule 761 was subsequently rescinded and replaced by rule 722,
which like its predecessor, applied to both capital and noncapital cases . . . .
In 1979, the Court of Appeals amended rule 772 to apply only to noncapital
cases and adopted rule 772A for application in capital cases.  Rule 772A did
not address a defendant's right to allocution and remained the law in Maryland
until the adoption of rule 4-343 in 1984. Rule 4-343(d) . . . governs the right
of allocution in Maryland courts today.”   
   
Daniel L Owel, Clarifying Trial Court's Obligation to Conduct Sua Sponte Inquiries Into A
Defendant's Competence to Stand Trial and Defendants' Right to Allocution, 53 Md. L. Rev
(continued...)
Although the majority acknowledges that “[R]ule [4-343(d)] does not specify when,
‘[b]efore sentence is determined,’ the allocution may or must be made,” ___ Md at ___, ___
A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 28], the majority interprets the Rule in such a way as to force
defendants, in jury capital sentencing proceedings, to allocute prior to the State's rebuttal
closing argument.  In contrast, in non-jury capital sentencing proceedings, and in non-capital
cases generally, that may not be the timing; the defendant may  be permitted to decide
whether to allocute before, during, or even after closing arguments, as is customarily done.
In 1982, when the Rules Committee of this Court considered the present rules
governing allocution in non-capital and capital cases,  Md.  Rules 4-342(e) and 4-343(d),
3
-10-
     (...continued)
3
793, 798 (1994)(footnotes omitted).
respectively, there was discussion concerning defendants allocuting after final arguments,
and in the case of jury capital sentencing, immediately before the jury retires.  The Minutes
of the October 15/16 1982 meeting of the Rules Committee provides, in pertinent part: 
“[Chairman of the Criminal Rules subcommittee] recommended that [Rule 4-
703, the non-capital sentencing rule,] and Rule 4-704[, the capital sentencing
rule,] should be revised so as not to make the right of allocution, set forth in
section (d) of Rule 4-703, limited exclusively to non-capital cases.  Judge
McAuliffe concurred with this recommendation noting that there are hybrid
cases where both capital and non-capital sentences are imposed.  In such cases
the defendant will want to allocute at least as to the non-capital sentence,
especially in light of the fact that the capital sentence may be subsequently
reversed on appeal.  Judge McAuliffe  further suggested that the defendant
might want, and should have the opportunity, to make a statement in favor of
imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment as opposed to death.”
*   *   *   *
“[The Chief of the Criminal Division of the Attorney General’s Office] asked
whether the right of allocution, if permitted in capital cases, should be limited
to being exercised before final arguments are made.  The Chairman suggested
that the timing of allocution ought to be left to judicial discretion.  [The
Criminal Division Chief] noted that she anticipates concern in the State’s
Attorney’s office about unsworn statements being made by the defendant
immediately prior to the jury’s retiring to consider its verdict.
“[The Chairman] proposed that section (d) of Rule 4-703 be amended to
simply provide that the court shall afford the defendant the opportunity
personally or through counsel to make a statement in mitigation of
punishment.  The simplified version of the section could then be added to Rule
4-704.” 
As we observed in Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 507 A.2d 1098 (1986), “[t]he Rules
Committee then voted to recommend to this Court that the rule applicable to noncapital cases
-11-
be amended" and "make the amended allocution rule applicable to capital cases."  306 Md.
at 197-98, 507 A.2d at 1111.  In short, the Rules Committee addressed the concern of a
defendant allocuting after the State’s rebuttal closing argument, and it decided to treat
allocution in jury and non-jury cases similarly, to wit, the decision of when a defendant
chooses to allocute would not, as the majority now holds, be “subject to the constraints of
a jury proceeding.”  Instead, all criminal defendants would be afforded the same benefits of
allocution. This Court accepted the Rules Committee’s recommendation to adopt a rule
governing allocution in capital sentencing.  That recommendation is now Rule 4-343(d).
The Court's decisions subsequent to the adoption of Rule 4-343(d) reveal the manner
in which allocution has been treated in Maryland.   In Harris v State, 306 Md. 344, 509 A.2d
120 (1986), for example, a trial court ruled that the defendant should not be permitted to
allocute before the jury in addition to defense counsel's closing argument because "allocution
was nothing more than a form of argument." We remanded for resentencing, holding that
allocution was separate from and not synonymous to the term "argument," as the allocutory
process, unlike closing arguments, provides the defendant with a unique opportunity to
confront the sentencing authority. Id. at 358, 509 A.2d at 127("Section 413(c)(1)(i) states that
any evidence relating to any mitigating circumstances is admissible at the capital sentencing
proceeding.  These statutory provisions reflect a strong public policy of providing the
sentencing body in capital cases with the broadest possible range of relevant information that
may counsel leniency.").  See also Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 90, 622 A.2d 727, 733
(1993)(defendant has ultimate decision whether and when to allocute); Shifflett v. State, 315
-12-
Md. 382, 388, 554 A.2d 814, 817 (1989)(“The ability to speak in mitigation of punishment
under the circumstances of this case necessarily entailed the opportunity to respond to the
new substantive remarks of the prosecutor.”).
 
Other than allocution, there is no other point at which the difference between the role
of the court and the jury, as sentencing authorities in capital sentencing proceedings, is so
pronounced. The majority’s sole justification for this difference is stated as follows:
“[I]n the jury capital sentencing context, should a conflict between the
defendant and trial counsel emerge over when allocution will be made, the
holding from Thanos that the decision is ordinarily that of the defendant will
be transportable to the jury context.  But, in that context, the court's discretion
in establishing the defendant's range of options is additionally subject to the
constraints of a jury proceeding.  In a jury capital sentencing, the later any
allocution is postponed in the proceeding, the greater is the opportunity for
sandbagging and for confusing the jury.”   
___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 35].   The majority’s concern with the jury being
sandbagged and confused can be readily cured with an appropriate jury instruction
explaining the nature and purpose of allocution.    
 
The instant case is not a case where the capital defendant used allocution as an
opportunity "to contest a disputed factual basis for the sentence," present new factual or legal
arguments, and, in effect, make a surrebuttal to the State's closing rebuttal argument.  To the
contrary, in the instant case, the appellant used his allocution simply to plead for mercy: 
“First of all, I would like to apologize to the family and the loved ones,
because I am sorry for the part that I took in this drama, and there is nothing
that I can do to bring his life back, but I feel right now, I have taken
responsibility for my part in taking Mr. McMullen's life, and I want to
apologize to the family, and tell them that I am sorry, and I would like to ask
the jurors for mercy.”
-13-
This plea was appellant’s last cry for mercy, pleading for the jury to impose a life sentence
and spare his life.  Allocution is one of the humanizing features of a death penalty
proceeding and it is a right of the capital defendant that should not be abridged without good
cause.  See Caren Myers, Encouraging Allocution at Capital Sentencing: A Proposal for Use
Immunity, 97 Columbia L. Rev. 787 (1997).  Nor in my view ought it to be unduly burdened
or diluted as to be largely meaningless.   Treating allocution as what we have clearly said it
is not, argument or evidence, and subjecting it to the strictures applicable to those forms of
address to the jury  has that effect and, for that reason, is fundamentally unfair.