Case Title: Mumford v. DCSE/Clements

Citation: 

Docket Number: 152, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DANIEL MUMFORD, 
 
Respondent Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DCSE/BARBARA CLEMENTS, 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 152, 2003 
§ 
§  Court Below: Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  File Nos. CS95-04504 and  
§    CS93-5044 
§  Petition Nos. 02-32772 and  
§    02-33301 
§   
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 20, 2003 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
March 31, 2003 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 31st day of March 2003, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Daniel Mumford, has filed a notice of appeal 
from a Family Court Commissioner’s order, dated February 20, 2003, which 
found him in contempt for failure to pay child support.  The Commissioner 
committed Mumford to the custody of the Department of Correction at 
supervision Level IV Work Release or, alternatively, ordered him to pay 
$2000 to the Division of Child Support Enforcement to purge the contempt.   
 
2 
(2) 
This Court does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal directly 
from a Commissioner’s order.1  A party’s right of review from a 
Commissioner’s order is to a judge of the Family Court in the first instance.2  
In this case, Mumford should have filed his appeal to a judge of the Family 
Court within ten days of the Commissioner’s order.3  If Mumford filed his 
appeal to a Family Court judge now, it would be untimely and therefore 
would not be considered on its merits.  Nonetheless, for the reasons set forth 
more fully below, we conclude that a Family Court judge should consider 
the merits of Mumford’s appeal notwithstanding its untimeliness under the 
rules. 
(3) 
It appears that, after the State of Delaware Division of Child 
Support Enforcement initiated contempt proceedings against Mumford for 
failing to pay child support, Mumford responded by filing a motion to be 
declared a pauper and to have counsel appointed to represent him.  A Family 
Court Commissioner denied Mumford’s motion on December 27, 2002.  
Mumford sought review of the Commissioner’s December 2002 order by 
filing a notice of appeal to a judge of the Family Court.  On January 29, 
2003, the Family Court judge held that review of the Commissioner’s 
                                                 
1 See Redden v. McGill, 549 A.2d 695 (Del. 1988). 
2 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 915(d).  
3 DEL. FAM. CT. CIV. R. 53.1(b). 
 
3 
December 2002 order was not available under Family Court Civil Rule 
53.1(a) because the December 2002 order was neither “[a]n interim or final 
order” as required by Rule 53.1.4   
(4) 
Although Mumford did not file an appeal to this Court from the 
Family Court’s January 29, 2003 order, the interests of justice nevertheless 
require us to note the error in the Family Court’s holding.  Family Court 
Civil Rule 53.1(a) provides, “An interim or final order of a commissioner 
may be appealed to a judge of the Court by any party, except a party in 
default of appearance before such commissioner.”  The Family Court 
rejected 
Mumford’s 
appeal 
because, 
in 
the 
judge’s 
view, 
the 
Commissioner’s order was neither interim nor final.  In our view, this is a 
logical impossibility.  The word “interim,” as used in Rule 53.1(a), means 
“not final.”  Thus, the phrase “interim or final order” connotes the entire 
universe of possible orders, such that an order must fall into either category.  
In other words, any order entered by a Commissioner, whether it is final or 
not final (i.e., interim), may be appealed to a judge of the Family Court.   
(5) 
The Family Court’s refusal to review the Commissioner’s order 
denying counsel to Mumford not only was erroneous but potentially had a 
                                                 
4 The judge noted, however, that the Commissioner’s order denying counsel had 
failed to set forth any reasons for the denial and encouraged the Commissioner to give 
reasons for her decision in the event of a later appeal. 
 
 
4 
substantive impact on the outcome of the contempt proceedings, which 
ultimately resulted in Mumford’s commitment to the Department of 
Correction.5  Moreover, the Family Court judge’s erroneous refusal to 
consider Mumford’s appeal from the Commissioner’s order denying counsel 
most likely contributed to Mumford’s failure to properly appeal the 
Commissioner’s contempt order to a Family Court judge instead of 
improperly filing his appeal directly to this Court.   
(5) 
Although we must dismiss Mumford’s appeal to this Court for 
lack of jurisdiction, we conclude, in the interests of justice, that our 
dismissal must include instructions to the Family Court to conduct further 
proceedings in this matter.  Under the circumstances, we find it appropriate 
for the Family Court to excuse the untimeliness of Mumford’s appeal and to 
consider, on a priority basis, the merits of his appeal from the 
Commissioner’s contempt order as well as the Commissioner’s order 
denying the appointment of counsel.6  
                                                 
5 See Black v. DCSE, 686 A.2d 164 (Del. 1996) (holding that an indigent 
defendant is presumed to have a right to court-appointed counsel when faced with 
possible incarceration for failure to pay court-ordered child support).  See also Walt v. 
State, 727 A.2d 836 (Del. 1999) (holding, in part, that a sentence to be served in a Level 
IV halfway house constitutes a sentence of imprisonment). 
6 See Riggs v. Riggs, 539 A.2d 163, 164 (Del. 1988) (holding that the 
jurisdictional defect created by an untimely appeal may be waived if the defect is 
attributable to court personnel). 
 
5 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the within appeal is 
DISMISSED with directions for the Family Court to conduct further 
proceedings, on a priority basis, consistent with this Order.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice