Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Roger G. Merry

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2022AP000035-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2024-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
2024 WI 16 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2022AP35-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Roger G. Merry, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Roger G. Merry, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MERRY  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 24, 2024   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Per curiam. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring opinion, in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, KAROFSKY, and PROTASIEWICZ, 
JJ., joined.   
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2024 WI 16 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2022AP35-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Roger G. Merry, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Roger G. Merry, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 24, 2024 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
revoked.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report of Referee Edward 
E. Leineweber, issued after an evidentiary hearing, in which he 
concludes that Attorney Roger G. Merry committed two counts of 
professional misconduct as alleged by the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR).  Referee Leineweber recommends that the court 
suspend Attorney Merry's license for a period of one year and 
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
2 
 
that we order Attorney Merry to pay the full costs of this 
disciplinary proceeding. 
¶2 
Neither party has appealed from the referee's report 
so we review this matter pursuant to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 
22.17(2).1  After completing our review, we approve the referee's 
findings and conclusions.  With respect to the discipline to be 
imposed, we consider the recommended one-year suspension to be 
too light a sanction.  Revocation is in order for Attorney 
Merry's egregious misconduct.  We order Attorney Merry to pay 
the full costs of this proceeding.  We accede to the OLR's 
conclusion that restitution is not warranted. 
¶3 
Attorney Merry was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1981.  He has a lengthy disciplinary history.  In 
1990, Attorney Merry was privately reprimanded for engaging in a 
conflict of interest.  Private Reprimand, No. 1990–26.2  In 1993, 
Attorney Merry was publicly reprimanded for client fund and 
trust account violations, as well as making at least six 
intentional misrepresentations to the former Board of Attorneys 
Professional Responsibility, the OLR's predecessor.  Public 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) provides:  "If no appeal is filed timely, the 
supreme court shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject 
or modify the referee's findings and conclusions or remand the 
matter to the referee for additional findings; and determine and 
impose appropriate discipline.  The court, on its own motion, 
may order the parties to file briefs in the matter." 
2 Electronic version not available. 
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
3 
 
Reprimand of Roger G. Merry, No. 1993–3.3  In 1994, Attorney 
Merry was privately reprimanded for failing to keep a client 
reasonably informed about the status of a matter.  Private 
Reprimand, No. 1994–8.4  In 1999, Attorney Merry was publicly 
reprimanded for engaging in a conflict of interest.  Public 
Reprimand of Roger G. Merry, No. 1999–1.5  In 2008, Attorney 
Merry was publicly reprimanded for making a false statement to a 
tribunal; offering false evidence; and engaging in conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation.  
Public Reprimand of Roger G. Merry, No. 2008–9.6  Attorney 
Merry's 
law 
license 
is 
also 
subject 
to 
administrative 
suspensions for failure to pay Wisconsin State Bar dues and 
failure to file a trust account certification. 
¶4 
This disciplinary matter concerns Attorney Merry's 
publication of a book regarding his former client, M.S.  This 
matter began with three counts, one of which the referee 
dismissed before the evidentiary hearing at the OLR's request.  
                                                 
3 Electronic 
version 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/51417a2b8d566b1c706f83303424
783b34565c38.continue.  
4 Electronic version not available. 
5 Electronic 
version 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/12575b0f2a8b1a496c420a41151a
8e486b127922.continue.  
6 Electronic 
version 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/334e1203175d7659478d85166513
148f3883286a.continue.  
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
4 
 
The 
referee's 
report 
and 
the 
exhibits 
received 
at 
the 
evidentiary hearing may be summarized as follows. 
¶5 
Attorney Merry served as M.S.'s defense attorney in 
her 2006 trial on charges including first-degree intentional 
homicide.  M.S. was convicted and sentenced and remains in 
prison to this day. 
¶6 
In November 2013, Attorney Merry sent M.S. a letter, 
received into evidence at the evidentiary hearing, stating the 
following: 
There remains a debt for my representation of you 
of approximately $19,000.00.  I am willing to call it 
even if you would sign a release so the public 
defender could give me their copy of the transcript, 
and also sign a waiver of attorney/client privilege.   
The reason I am willing to write off the bill in 
exchange for the above, is I am planning on publishing 
a book about the case. 
If you are unwilling to sign these two documents, 
I will have no choice but to sue your grandparents for 
the balance of the fee.  Accordingly, if this meets 
with your approval, please sign both originals before 
a witness, have the witness sign it, and return it to 
me in the enclosed, self-addressed stamped envelope.  
The extra copies are for your file. 
¶7 
Attorney 
Merry 
enclosed 
with 
this 
letter 
an 
"Authorization for Release of Transcripts" from the State Public 
Defender's Office (SPD) to him, as well as a "Waiver of 
Attorney-Client Privilege," which called for M.S. to "waive all 
attorney-client privilege" and to "authorize my former attorney, 
Roger Merry, to publish any and all information he has regarding 
me, including, but not limited to, everything I have said to him 
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
5 
 
which 
might 
have 
been 
privileged 
by 
the 
attorney-client 
relationship."  M.S. did not sign either document. 
¶8 
In March 2015, Attorney Merry sent the SPD's Office a 
letter, received into evidence at the evidentiary hearing, 
stating that he knew the SPD's Office considered transcripts to 
be the property of its clients; that he wanted a copy of M.S.'s 
trial transcripts; that she "did not consent to give me a copy 
since I obtained a judgment against her in [circuit court] for 
$18,000"; and that he was "hoping to execute the judgment and 
obtain a copy or the original of the transcripts."  He asked 
where the transcripts might be, and whether the SPD's Office 
"had a preferred method of delivery to me pursuant to an 
execution."  Attorney Merry copied M.S. on this letter.   
¶9 
The SPD's Office responded with a letter, received 
into evidence at the evidentiary hearing, informing Attorney 
Merry that it could not send documents from M.S.'s file without 
her permission.   
¶10 Ultimately, in August 2020, Attorney Merry self-
published a book about his representation of M.S.  The book was 
available at public libraries and for purchase at a local book 
store and an online book retailer.  Attorney Merry used 
information relating to his representation of M.S. to write the 
book.  To provide details about the case in the book, Attorney 
Merry drew from his own review of court records located at the 
circuit courthouse, as well as from his own recollection of 
events, chambers discussions or sidebars, and discussions with 
the 
prosecutor, 
other 
attorneys, 
experts, 
or 
private 
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
6 
 
individuals——some of which might have occurred in the presence 
of others, but were not made in open court or in media coverage 
of the case at the time of the prosecution or its immediate 
aftermath.7 
¶11 While 
the 
crime 
and 
the 
subsequent 
criminal 
prosecution had generated much publicity and discussion within 
the local community, it had generally subsided in the 14 years 
between 
those 
events 
and 
the 
publication 
of 
the 
book.  
Publication of the book revived public discussion of the events 
surrounding the crime and M.S.'s criminal prosecution. 
¶12 M.S. suffered psychological harm from Attorney Merry's 
unsuccessful attempt to obtain her consent to his use of 
information concerning her case, as well as from his publication 
of the book about her case without her consent.  The effects of 
the publication of the book included: 
 damage to her relationships with her children, mother, 
siblings, and other family members who, previous to the 
publication of the book, were supportive of her; 
 fear that the book would be available in the prison 
library and be read and discussed by prison staff and 
                                                 
7 We note that excerpts of Attorney Merry's book were 
received into evidence at the evidentiary hearing.  In the 
"Acknowledgements" section of his book, Attorney Merry wrote 
that "[a]ll matters in this book not derived from my own 
observation were taken from over five thousand pages of police 
reports and over two thousand five hundred pages of court 
reporter transcripts.  All statements made by myself and others 
were made in anticipation of litigation." 
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
7 
 
fellow inmates, disrupting her relationships in the 
institution and undermining her well-being there; 
 revelation of intimate private details of her personal 
and family history; 
 reviving the stress of events from the commission of the 
crime through her trial, conviction, and sentencing; 
 concern that the book would circulate in her home 
community and subject her children and family to social 
ostracism or abuse; and 
 concern that the publication of the book would adversely 
affect her chances of eventually obtaining some form of 
relief through further court proceedings. 
¶13 M.S. sought and received psychological treatment to 
address the emotional trauma caused by the contacts from 
Attorney Merry prior to publication and from circulation of the 
book in the community following the publication. 
¶14 As pertinent here, the OLR's complaint alleges that: 
 by using information to write and publish a book relating 
to his representation of M.S. that was not generally 
known, Attorney Merry violated SCR 20:1.9(c)(1) (Count 
1); and  
 by revealing in the book information relating to his 
representation of M.S. without her permission, Attorney 
Merry violated SCR 20:1.9(c)(2) (Count 2).   
¶15 After holding an evidentiary hearing, the referee 
determined that the OLR had proven the misconduct alleged in 
both counts.  The applicable Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule is SCR 
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
8 
 
20:1.9, "Duties to former clients."  That rule reads, in 
pertinent part: 
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a 
client in a matter or whose present or former firm has 
formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter: 
(1) 
use 
information 
relating 
to 
the 
representation to the disadvantage of the former 
client except as these rules would permit or require 
with respect to a client, or when the information has 
become generally known; or 
(2) 
reveal 
information 
relating 
to 
the 
representation except as these rules would permit or 
require with respect to a client. 
¶16 In disputing the claimed SCR 20:1.9(c)(1) violation 
alleged in Count 1 before the referee, Attorney Merry argued 
that the information relating to the representation of M.S. that 
he relied upon in writing his book had become "generally known," 
and therefore fell outside the scope of the rule.  The referee 
disagreed, noting that in Wisconsin Formal Ethics Opinion EF-20-
02,8 the State Bar Professional Ethics Committee explained that 
information is "generally known" for purposes of the rule only 
if widely recognized by members of the public in the relevant 
geographic 
area 
or 
within 
the 
former 
client's 
industry, 
profession, or trade.  Id. at 6 (citing American Bar Association 
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
Formal Opinion 479).  The referee wrote that "[a]t best the 
                                                 
8 Full text of the Wisconsin Formal Ethics Opinion EF-20-02 
is 
found 
here:  
https://www.wisbar.org/formembers/ethics/Ethics%20Opinions/EF-
20-02%20Former%20Client%20Cross%20Examination%20-%20FINAL.pdf.  
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
9 
 
record in this matter might demonstrate that some of the 
personal information and detail [used by Attorney Merry in the 
book] was previously known by some others, but it does not 
support a finding that it was 'generally known.'" 
¶17 The referee additionally rejected Attorney Merry's 
argument 
that 
his 
use 
of 
information 
relating 
to 
the 
representation of M.S. in his book did not "disadvantage" M.S., 
as is required for an SCR 20:1.9(c)(1) violation, because the 
book asserted her innocence of the underlying crimes, and 
because she allegedly suffered from mental health issues prior 
to publication of the book.  The referee reasoned that, 
regardless of the particulars of Attorney Merry's account of the 
crimes in the book or the status of M.S.'s mental health prior 
to publication of the book, M.S. was disadvantaged by the 
psychological harm she suffered from his use of information 
relating to his representation of her.   
¶18 The referee also rejected Attorney Merry's claim that 
he neither used nor revealed former-client confidences under SCR 
20:1.9(c) in that the information related to his representation 
of M.S. in his book fell outside the scope of the attorney-
client privilege.  The referee disagreed, reasoning that an 
attorney's ethical duty to keep client confidences is broader 
than the evidentiary concern of attorney-client privilege. 
¶19 Ultimately, the referee recommended that a one-year 
suspension of Attorney Merry's law license is merited based on 
his disciplinary history, the "egregious facts of this case," 
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
10 
 
the precedent cited by OLR in its briefing to the referee, and 
the court's policy of progressive discipline. 
¶20 Attorney Merry has not appealed the referee's report 
and recommendation.  Accordingly, this court reviews the matter 
pursuant to SCR 22.17(2), which provides that if no appeal is 
timely filed, the court shall review the referee's report; 
adopt, reject, or modify the referee's findings and conclusions 
or remand the matter to the referee for additional findings; and 
determine and impose appropriate discipline.   
¶21 When we review a referee's report, we will affirm a 
referee's findings of fact unless they are found to be clearly 
erroneous, but we review the referee's conclusions of law on a 
de novo basis.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 
2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We determine 
the appropriate level of discipline to impose given the 
particular facts of each case, independent of the referee's 
recommendation, but benefiting from it.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 
N.W.2d 686. 
¶22 Upon careful review of the matter, we adopt the 
referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Attorney 
Merry has not contested the facts found by the referee, and 
after reviewing the record ourselves, we find no basis in the 
record to conclude that the referee's findings are clearly 
erroneous.  And for the reasons set forth below, we agree with 
the conclusions of law that flow from the referee's findings of 
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
11 
 
fact; namely, that the OLR established by clear and convincing 
evidence that Attorney Merry violated SCR 20:1.9(c)(1) and (2).   
¶23 Our ethical rules make clear that attorneys owe a duty 
of confidentiality to both current and former clients.  Supreme 
Court Rule 20:1.6, titled "Confidentiality," prohibits a lawyer 
from revealing information relating to the representation of a 
client unless the client gives informed consent, or the 
disclosures 
are 
impliedly 
authorized 
to 
carry 
out 
the 
representation, or the disclosures are authorized by SCR 
20:1.6(b)9 or (c).10  Supreme Court Rule 20:1.9, quoted above, 
                                                 
9 SCR 
20:1.6(b) 
provides: 
 
"A 
lawyer 
shall 
reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the 
client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the 
lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or 
substantial bodily harm or in substantial injury to the 
financial interest or property of another." 
10 SCR 20:1.6(c) provides:   
(c) A lawyer may reveal information relating to 
the representation of a client to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) 
to 
prevent 
reasonably 
likely 
death 
or 
substantial bodily harm;  
(2) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial 
injury to the financial interests or property of 
another that is reasonably certain to result or has 
resulted from the client's commission of a crime or 
fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the 
lawyer's services;  
(3) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's 
conduct under these rules; 
(4) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of 
the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the 
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
12 
 
extends 
this 
duty 
of 
confidentiality 
to 
former-clients' 
confidential information. 
¶24 Supreme Court Rule 20:1.9(c)(1) governs an attorney's 
use of former clients' confidential information.  It prohibits 
an 
attorney 
from 
using 
information 
relating 
to 
the 
representation of a former client "to the disadvantage of the 
former client except as these rules would permit or require with 
respect to a client, or when the information has become 
generally known."   
¶25 Supreme Court Rule 20:1.9(c)(2) governs an attorney's 
revelation of a former client's confidential information.  It 
prohibits an attorney from revealing information relating to the 
representation of a former client "except as these rules would 
permit or require with respect to a client."   
¶26 Applying these provisions to the referee's well-
supported factual findings, it is clear that Attorney Merry both 
revealed M.S.'s confidential information and used it to her 
disadvantage.  He did the latter when he drafted a book 
containing M.S.'s confidences after she refused to assist him in 
                                                                                                                                                             
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or 
civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in 
which the client was involved, or to respond to 
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's 
representation of the client;  
(5) to comply with other law or a court order; or  
(6) to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, 
but only if the revealed information would not 
compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise 
prejudice the client. 
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
13 
 
the endeavor, causing her psychological harm.  As for the 
former, he revealed the confidential information when he made 
the book available for public distribution and purchase. 
¶27 It is further clear, based on the referee's well-
supported factual findings, that none of the exceptions to the 
duty of former-client confidentiality apply.  M.S. never 
provided informed consent to Attorney Merry's use or revelation 
of 
her 
confidential 
information. 
 
The 
"generally 
known" 
exception allowing use of confidential information does not 
apply given that, as found by the referee, the information used 
by Attorney Merry was not widely recognized by members of the 
public in the relevant geographical area.  See State Bar of 
Wisconsin Professional Ethics Committee, Formal Opinion EF-20-02 
(June 25, 2020).  There has been no claim that any of the 
exceptions contained within SCR 20:1.6(b) and (c) apply.  See 
n.9-10.  And the referee correctly observed that the scope of 
information protected by the ethical duty of confidentiality is 
broader than that protected by the evidentiary doctrine of 
attorney-client privilege.11  Thus, Attorney Merry's insistence 
                                                 
11 See SCR 20:1.6, cmt. 3, which explains, in pertinent 
part:   
The 
attorney-client 
privilege 
and 
work-product 
doctrine apply in judicial and other proceedings in 
which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise 
required to produce evidence concerning a client.  The 
rule 
of 
client-lawyer 
confidentiality 
applies 
in 
situations other than those where evidence is sought 
from the lawyer through compulsion of law.  The 
confidentiality rule, for example, applies not only to 
matters communicated in confidence by the client but 
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
14 
 
to the referee that he never violated the attorney-client 
privilege, even if true, does not prove that he satisfied his 
more robust ethical duty of confidentiality. 
¶28 We 
therefore 
conclude 
that 
this 
record 
clearly 
establishes 
that 
Attorney 
Merry 
committed 
the 
charged 
misconduct.  Our rules prohibited him from revealing M.S.'s 
confidential information or using it to her disadvantage (he did 
both) unless special circumstances apply (none do).   
¶29 We turn now to the appropriate level of discipline to 
impose. 
 
Sources 
of 
guidance 
in 
determining 
appropriate 
sanctions include prior case law, the American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and aggravating and 
mitigating factors.  See Matter of Disciplinary Proc. Against 
DeLadurantey, 2023 WI 17, ¶52, 406 Wis. 2d 62, 985 N.W.2d 788.   
¶30 Turning first to our own prior case law, we discover 
that the misconduct here is in a league of its own.  In In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harman, 2001 WI 71, 244 Wis. 2d 
438, 628 N.W.2d 351, we imposed a six-month suspension on an 
attorney for eight counts of misconduct that included revealing 
his client's medical records to a prosecutor who was prosecuting 
the client's cohabitant; we found a violation of the duty of 
client confidentiality even though the records had been publicly 
filed in a prior lawsuit.  The attorney had been reprimanded 
three times previously.  In In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
                                                                                                                                                             
also 
to 
all 
information 
relating 
to 
the 
representation, whatever its source. 
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
15 
 
Against Marick, 204 Wis. 2d 280, 554 N.W.2d 204 (1996), we 
imposed a nine-month suspension, as reciprocal discipline 
identical to that imposed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, for an 
attorney's use of confidential information concerning a client's 
proposed business acquisition to profit in the stock market.  
The attorney had no prior discipline.  Finally, in In re Peshek, 
2011 WI 47, 334 Wis.2d 373, 798 N.W.2d 879, 881, we imposed a 
60-day suspension, as reciprocal discipline identical to that 
imposed by the Illinois Supreme Court, for an attorney's 
misconduct that included writing blog posts about her job that 
contained confidential information about her clients, whose 
identities she made inadequate efforts to conceal.  The attorney 
had no prior discipline. 
¶31 Here, Attorney Merry's conduct is considerably more 
serious, 
and 
his 
disciplinary 
history 
considerably 
more 
troubling, than that involved in Harman, Marick, and Peshek.  It 
is bad indeed for an attorney to share a client's confidential 
medical information with another attorney (Harman), or to use a 
client's confidential business information to profit from a 
stock transaction (Marick), or to expose client confidences in 
personal blog posts (Peshek).  But it is hard to imagine a more 
flagrant violation of 20:1.9(c)(1) and (2) than an attorney 
attempting to both publicize and profit from his client's 
confidences against the client's express wishes, as Attorney 
Merry did here.  Such actions destroy the trust that is vital to 
the client-lawyer relationship and erode public confidence in 
the integrity of the legal profession.  And Attorney Merry's 
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
16 
 
disciplinary history——which at five previous reprimands is more 
extensive than any of those involved in the above cases——clearly 
shows 
that 
his 
misbehavior 
was 
not 
a 
one-off 
incident.  
Considerably more discipline is therefore merited than what we 
imposed in Harman, Marick, and Peshek.   
¶32 We turn next to the American Bar Association Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("ABA Standards").  Although these 
standards are in no way binding on this court, they provide 
helpful 
direction 
in 
assigning 
an 
appropriate 
sanction.  
Standard 4.21 applies here.  It reads: 
4.21 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a 
lawyer, with the intent to benefit the lawyer or 
another, knowingly reveals information relating to 
representation of a client not otherwise lawfully 
permitted to be disclosed, and this disclosure causes 
injury or potential injury to a client. 
Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 4.21 
(Ellyn S. Rosen ed., 2nd ed. 2019).  The Annotation to ABA 
Standard 4.21 explains that disbarment is warranted when a 
lawyer "knowingly abuses" the client's trust and "knowingly 
reveals confidential client information improperly with the 
intent of achieving personal benefit and causing injury or 
potential injury to the client." 
 
¶33 That is precisely what happened here.  Attorney Merry 
improperly revealed M.S.'s confidential information and used it 
to her disadvantage, causing her extensive psychological harm——
all so that he could self-publish and sell a book devoted to his 
musings about the case in which he represented her.  This was an 
intentional, self-benefitting violation of client confidences 
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
17 
 
within the meaning of the standard.  We therefore make an 
initial determination that revocation12 is the appropriate 
sanction in this case, subject to modification as a result of 
aggravating or mitigating factors. 
 
¶34 Several aggravating factors are present.  As noted 
above, Attorney Merry has a considerable disciplinary history.  
See ABA Standard 9.22(a).  His motivation was selfish; he 
prioritized his interest in self-publishing a book above M.S.'s 
confidentiality interest and his ethical duty to protect it.  
See ABA Standard 9.22(b).  He has not acknowledged the wrongful 
nature of his conduct, see ABA Standard 9.22(g); to the 
contrary, he portrayed himself to the referee as a past and 
present victim of an unfair disciplinary system and insisted 
that "I don't care what the likes of OLR or judges or lawyers 
say about me and my ethics because they're wrong.  It's 
motivated for improper purposes, and it doesn't add to the 
discussion.  And it, in fact, disgraces the practice of law."  
M.S., as an inmate, was a vulnerable victim.  See ABA Standard 
9.22(h).  Finally, Attorney Merry had decades of experience in 
the practice of law, and thus should have known better than to 
act as he did.  See ABA Standard 9.22(i).   
 
¶35 There is little on the mitigating side of the scale.  
Attorney Merry appears to have generally cooperated with the OLR 
during this disciplinary process.  See ABA Standard 9.32(e).  
                                                 
12 The ABA Standards use the term "disbarment"; Wisconsin 
uses the term "revocation."  See SCR 21.16(1m)(a).  
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
18 
 
And his disciplinary history is relatively remote in time.  See 
ABA Standard 9.32(m). 
 
¶36 Although there is no mathematical formula for weighing 
these factors, we conclude that the many aggravating factors 
outweigh the few mitigating factors present in this case.  We 
therefore conclude that revocation is appropriate under the 
facts of this case.  
¶37 We note that this result is consistent with that 
reached in an out-of-state case with reasonably analogous facts.  
In In re Smith, 991 N.E.2d 106 (Ind. 2013), the Indiana Supreme 
Court disbarred an attorney who wrote a book that purported to 
be a true account of his personal and professional relationship 
with a former client, who was active in politics and at one 
point held a high-level job in the federal government.  See id. 
at 107.  The attorney's professed motivation for writing the 
book was at least in part to recoup legal fees the former client 
owed him and money the former client had obtained from him over 
the years.  Id.  The Indiana Supreme Court determined that the 
attorney committed multiple ethical violations in writing the 
book, including the improper disclosure of details of his 
representation of the former client.  The court wrote: 
In the book, Respondent revealed personal and 
sensitive information about [the former client] that 
was obtained in confidence as her attorney, and its 
revelation had the potential of causing her public 
embarrassment and other injury, such as impairment of 
her employment opportunities.  Respondent's selfish 
motivation in deliberately attempting to reveal this 
confidential information to a wide audience for 
monetary gain, his false statements in the book and in 
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
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this disciplinary matter, and his lack of any remorse 
lead 
us 
to 
conclude 
that 
that 
disbarment 
is 
appropriate for Respondent's misconduct. 
The court cited ABA Standard 4.21, discussed above, as support 
for this result.  Id. at 110. 
¶38 We acknowledge that all of Attorney Merry's previous 
disciplinary 
matters 
resulted 
in 
reprimands, 
not 
license 
suspensions.  Under different facts, a suspension, rather than 
revocation, might be considered a reasonable next step in the 
progressive discipline process.  But when the circumstances have 
called for it, we have revoked an attorney's law license for 
misconduct even where (quite unlike here) the attorney had no 
prior disciplinary history.  In In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Wright, 180 Wis. 2d 492, 509 N.W.2d 290 (1994), for 
example, we concluded that an attorney's conversion of client 
funds warranted license revocation, even though the attorney had 
never 
been 
disciplined 
before. 
 
Here, 
Attorney 
Merry's 
misconduct was arguably far more serious than that involved in 
Wright:  client funds can be replaced, but the harm caused by 
Attorney Merry's improper use and very public revelation of 
M.S.'s confidences cannot be undone;  that bell cannot be 
unrung.  We therefore impose revocation as the next disciplinary 
step for Attorney Merry. 
¶39 We turn now to the issue of costs, which total 
$16,853.92 as of December 20, 2023.  Attorney Merry does not 
dispute them.  As is our normal practice, we deem it appropriate 
to impose the full costs of this proceeding on him.  See SCR 
22.24(1m). 
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
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¶40 We note that the OLR does not seek restitution.  None 
is ordered. 
¶41 Finally, we note that, on August 3, 2022, several 
months after the OLR filed its disciplinary complaint against 
him, Attorney Merry filed a petition to voluntarily surrender 
his law license.  The court has not yet taken action on this 
petition.  We hereby deny it.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Snyder, 127 Wis. 2d 446, 380 N.W.2d 367 
(1986) (voluntary resignation is an inappropriate disposition of 
a disciplinary proceeding). 
¶42 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Roger G. Merry is 
revoked, effective the date of this order.   
¶43 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Roger G. Merry's August 3, 
2022 petition to voluntarily surrender his law license is 
denied.  
¶44 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Roger G. Merry must pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding totaling $16,853.92. 
¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Roger G. Merry shall comply 
with the requirements of SCR 22.26 pertaining to the duties of a 
person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
revoked. 
¶46 IT 
IS 
FURTHER 
ORDERED 
that 
the 
administrative 
suspensions of Roger G. Merry to practice law in Wisconsin for 
failure to pay Wisconsin State Bar dues and failure to file a 
trust account certification will remain in effect until each 
No. 
2022AP35-D   
 
21 
 
reason for the administrative suspension has been rectified, 
pursuant to SCR 22.28(1). 
 
No.  2022AP35-D.akz 
 
1 
 
¶47 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (concurring).  I 
concur in the court's order revoking Attorney Merry's license to 
practice law in Wisconsin.  I write separately to point out that 
in Wisconsin the "revocation" of an attorney's law license is 
not truly revocation because the attorney may petition for 
reinstatement after a period of five years.  See SCR 22.29(2).  
I believe that when it comes to lawyer discipline, courts should 
say what they mean and mean what they say.  We should not be 
creating false perceptions to both the public and to the lawyer 
seeking to practice law again.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Moodie, 2020 WI 39, 391 Wis. 2d 196, 942 
N.W.2d 302 (Ziegler, J., dissenting).  And, as I stated in my 
dissent to this court's order denying Rule Petition 19-10, In 
the Matter of Amending Supreme Court Rules Pertaining to 
Permanent Revocation of a License to Practice Law in Attorney 
Disciplinary Proceedings, I believe there may be rare and 
unusual cases that would warrant the permanent revocation of an 
attorney's license to practice law.  See S. Ct. Order 19-10 
(issued Dec. 18, 2019) (Ziegler, J., dissenting). 
¶48 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, BRIAN HAGEDORN, JILL J. KAROFSKY, and JANET C. 
PROTASIEWICZ join this concurrence. 
 
 
 
No.  2022AP35-D.akz 
 
1