Case Title: Jim Bishop Chevrolet-Buick-Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. Burden

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1141231

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:05/06/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1141231
____________________
Jim Bishop Chevrolet-Buick-Pontiac-GMC, Inc.
v.
Michael Andy Burden and Tina Burden
Appeal from Colbert Circuit Court
(CV-12-132)
BOLIN, Justice.
Jim 
Bishop 
Chevrolet-Buick-Pontiac-GMC, 
Inc. 
("Jim
Bishop"), appeals from a judgment entered on jury verdicts in 
favor of Michael Andy Burden ("Burden") and his wife Tina
Burden in the amount of $132,500.
1141231
Facts and Procedural History
On July 17, 2012, the Burdens sued General Motors, LLC,
Jim Bishop, and Lynn Layton Chevrolet, Inc. ("Lynn Layton"),
seeking to recover damages for injuries they allegedly
sustained as the result of a fire that occurred in a truck
they had purchased from an automobile dealership owned and
operated by Jim Bishop ("the Jim Bishop dealership").  The
Burdens asserted various claims against various defendants in
their complaint, including a products-liability claim under
the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine ("the
AEMLD"); a claim asserting negligence and wantonness in the
design and manufacture of the truck; breach of express and
implied warranties; a claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.; and a claim alleging that the
defendants had negligently and wantonly failed to repair the
truck and to warn of the inherent danger in operating the
truck.  Tina asserted a loss-of-consortium claim. 
On August 21, 2012, General Motors filed its answer
generally denying the allegations contained in the complaint
and asserting certain affirmative defenses.  On October 3,
2012, Lynn Layton filed its answer also generally denying the
2
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allegations contained in the complaint and asserting certain
affirmative defenses. On November 11, 2012, Jim Bishop filed
its answer also generally denying the allegations 
contained in
the complaint and asserting certain affirmative defenses.  
Jim
Bishop further asserted a cross-claim against General Motors
pursuant to § 8-20-4(3)(o), Ala. Code 1975, alleging it had
refused to indemnify Jim Bishop.
On August 20, 2013, General Motors moved the trial court
for a summary judgment as to the AEMLD and negligent and
wanton design and manufacture claims asserted against it by
the Burdens.  General Motors argued that the Burdens had
failed to provide information regarding the expert witnesses
who would be testifying in support of those claims before the
expiration of the trial court's scheduling deadline for
providing that information. See Rule 26, Ala. R. Civ. P. 
Therefore, 
General 
Motors 
contended, 
the 
Burdens' 
claims 
under
the AEMLD and their negligent and wanton design and
manufacture claim were not sustainable because those claims
required the presentation of expert testimony.  Both Jim
Bishop and Lynn Layton moved the trial court for a summary
judgment as to the AEMLD claim and the negligent and wanton
3
1141231
design and manufacture claim, adopting General Motors' motion
for a summary judgment. 
On September 9, 2013, the Burdens filed a response to the
defendants' motions for a summary judgment as to the AEMLD 
and the negligent and wanton design and manufacture claims,
stating that they did not "object to deleting the causes of
action which require an expert finding of the specific cause
and origin of the fire."  On September 11, 2013, the trial
court entered an order dismissing both the AEMLD and negligent
and wanton design and manufacture claims. 
Thereafter, 
the 
Burdens 
entered 
into 
pro 
tanto
settlements with General Motors, which agreed to pay them 
$20,000, and Lynn Layton, which agreed to pay them $32,000, as
to the respective claims asserted by the Burdens against those
defendants. The settlement with General Motors resolved the
breach-of-warranty claims and the Magnuson-Moss claim.  The
trial court dismissed the Burdens' claims against 
both General
Motors and Lynn Layton pursuant to joint stipulations of
dismissal filed by those parties.  
On July 29, 2014, Jim Bishop moved the trial court for a
summary judgment on the Burdens' remaining claims against it,
4
1141231
contending, among other things, that it was entitled to a
summary judgment on the Burdens' negligent-failure-to-repair
and failure-to-warn claims, arguing that it had 
not 
undertaken
a duty to repair the vehicle; that expert testimony was
necessary to establish the cause of the fire that destroyed
the truck; and that the Burdens had previously admitted that
expert testimony establishing the cause of the fire is not
available.  On August 6, 2014, the Burdens filed a response in
opposition to Jim Bishop's summary-judgment motion. On
September 25, 2014, the trial court entered an order denying
Jim Bishop's summary-judgment motion.  
On May 26, 2015, General Motors moved the trial court to 
sever, pursuant to Rule 21, Ala. R. Civ. P., Jim Bishop's
cross-claim against it seeking indemnification.  On May 27,
2015, the trial court entered an order granting General
Motors' motion to sever Jim Bishop's cross-claim.
The case proceeded to trial on the Burdens' claims
against Jim Bishop alleging negligent repair and failure to
warn of the hazardous condition of the truck and Tina's loss-
of-consortium claim. Jim Bishop moved the trial court for a
preverdict judgment as a matter of law ("JML") at the close of
5
1141231
the Burdens' evidence and then again at the close of all the
evidence.  The trial court denied both motions. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of Burden for $100,000 and a
verdict in favor of Tina for $32,500. On June 15, 2015, the
trial court entered a judgment for $132,500 in favor of the
Burdens based on the jury's verdicts.  On July 6, 2015, Jim
Bishop moved the trial court for a postverdict JML or, in the
alternative, for a new trial.  On August 12, 2015, the trial
court denied Jim Bishop's postjudgment motion.  Jim Bishop
appeals. 
The evidence presented at trial indicates the following.
On September 11, 2009, Burden purchased a new Chevrolet
Silverado 1500 pickup truck from Jim Bishop.  Before that
purchase, Burden had purchased a number of vehicles from Jim
Bishop.  After purchasing the truck, Burden began noticing a
"distinct" smell in the cabin of the truck that would "come
and go" when he was driving it.  Burden, an experienced
electrician employed at a local paper mill, described the
smell as a "smoke-ish type burning" odor. He explained that
there was never a consistent pattern to the odor and that it
would just come and go, lasting in duration anywhere from a
6
1141231
few seconds to 10 minutes. Burden stated that he experienced
the burning odor approximately 100 times while he had the
truck and had on occasion lifted the hood of the truck and
inspected the engine compartment himself trying to find the
source of the odor. 
On January 6, 2010, Burden took the truck to the "quick
lube lane" at the Jim Bishop dealership to have the oil in the
truck changed.   Burden testified that he asked the employee
1
who changed his oil if he could see anything under the truck
that might be causing the odor.  The oil-change technician
told Burden that he did not see anything under the truck that
could be causing the odor. 
Later, on that same date, Burden was traveling to
Huntsville in the truck to visit his father when the "service
engine light" came on and he again noticed the burning odor. 
Burden testified that at that time the odor was prominent and
smelled like something was "hot" or was "going to burn." 
The Jim Bishop dealership has an express oil-change lane
1
that serves to expedite oil changes and other similar vehicle 
servicing. The express oil-change lane is separate from the
service department, which actually diagnoses and repairs any
mechanical problems a vehicle may be experiencing. The Jim
Bishop employees who work in the express oil-change lane are
not mechanics. 
7
1141231
Burden decided to have the truck inspected at a Chevrolet
dealership operated by Lynn Layton, which was on the way to
Burden's Huntsville destination.  Burden explained to the
service-department 
employee 
at 
the 
Lynn 
Layton 
dealership 
that
he smelled something "hot" or something "burning" in the
truck. The service department reprogrammed the "powertrain
control module" and informed Burden that the 
technicians 
could
not find anything causing the odor.  Burden stated that an
employee in the service department at the Lynn Layton
dealership told him that he was "possibly smelling the new
burning off the truck." 
On May 3, 2010, Burden brought his truck into the service
department at the Jim Bishop dealership, again complaining of
the burning odor and of a "popping" noise.  Burden testified
that he explained to the service-department employee that an
employee in the service department at the Lynn Layton
dealership had told him that the burning odor he was smelling
was the "new burning off."  Burden stated that the Jim Bishop
employee responded, "[Y]eah, it could be possible."  The
service department at the Jim Bishop dealership eventually 
discovered that the rack and pinion steering was leaking fluid
8
1141231
and determined that the rack and pinion steering needed to be
replaced. At that time, the  service department added rack and
pinion steering fluid and ordered the parts necessary to
replace the rack and pinion steering. 
Burden testified that he continued to smell the burning
odor intermittently when he would drive the truck. On May 19,
2010, Burden returned to the service department at the Jim
Bishop dealership to have the new rack and pinion steering
installed.  Burden testified that he again complained to the
service department about the burning odor.  Burden stated that
the service-department employee told him that "they 
would 
look
into it."  After examining the truck for the cause of the
odor, the service department informed Burden that it "did not
find anything wrong with it."  The service department
installed the rack and pinion steering on the truck at this
time.
Burden testified that he subsequently returned to the
service department at the Jim Bishop dealership 
complaining 
of
the burning odor emanating from the truck.  Burden stated that
the service department examined the truck for the source of
the burning odor and again informed him that it "could not
9
1141231
find anything wrong."  Burden further testified that the
service-department employee told him, if he could, to bring
the truck back in while the burning odor was actively
emanating from the truck.
Burden testified that on July 22, 2010, at approximately
1:00 p.m., he began smelling the burning odor. Burden
proceeded immediately to the service department at the Jim
Bishop dealership as he had been asked to do by the service-
department employee. Burden stated that he telephoned the
service department to notify it that he was coming in with the
truck. Burden stated that when he arrived at the service
department he left the truck running and informed the service-
department employee that the burning odor was emanating from
the truck.  Burden stated that he was told by the service-
department employee that "we don't have time to look at it." 
Burden testified that he could not wait for the service
department to get to his truck because he had to be at work at
2:30 p.m.   Burden stated that he offered to leave the truck
if the service department could provide him with a "loaner"
vehicle and that he was told by the service-department
employee that the Jim Bishop dealership no longer provided
10
1141231
"loaner" vehicles.   Burden also testified that he inquired
2
about renting a vehicle and that the service-department
employee told him that he would schedule a service appointment
for Burden. The service-department employee scheduled a
service appointment for Burden for the following Monday, July
26, 2010.  Burden stated that he did not inquire of the
service-department employee if the truck was safe to drive.  
Burden left the service department and drove directly to
his job.  After working his shift at the paper mill, Burden
clocked out at approximately 2:00 a.m. on the morning of July
23, 2010, and headed home.  Burden testified that as he drove
home he began to smell the burning odor in the truck. He
stated that the odor became more intense and that smoke
started coming from the dashboard.  Burden testified that the
hazard lights on the truck started blinking, that the horn
started blowing, that he lost power steering, and that when he
tried to stop the truck he realized that he had lost the
function of the brakes.  Burden testified that, as the smoke
and heat became more intense in the cabin of the truck, he
The record indicates that the Jim Bishop dealership had
2
indeed previously canceled its "loaner" program for financial
reasons. 
11
1141231
tried to open the truck door so that he could "bail out," but
that the doors of the truck would not open.  Burden stated
that he began to choke on the smoke and started to panic.  He
testified that he tried to break the driver's side window by
hitting it with his arm but was unsuccessful. Burden estimated
his speed to be approximately 30 to 35 m.p.h. at that time.
Burden testified that he finally put the transmission of the
truck in park and the truck began to slow down. He stated
that, when he put the transmission in park, the door locks
opened, allowing him to open the door and "bail out" of the
truck onto the road.  Burden telephoned E-911 and his wife to
notify them of the accident.  
The first responders found Burden sitting on the ground
approximately 100 feet behind the truck, which was now
burning.  Burden initially stated that he "felt fine" and that
he did not want to be transported to the hospital.  However,
the paramedic on the scene noticed that Burden's breathing was
labored and that he was in a "state of shock." Burden was
transported to the hospital for treatment and was released
approximately four hours later. Burden testified that his
12
1141231
memory of the events occurring that morning after he bailed
out of the truck was vague.  
The truck was completely engulfed by fire and was a total
loss.  Both Jim Bishop and Cotton States Insurance Company,
Burden's 
insurer, 
had 
certified 
fire 
investigators 
examine 
the
vehicle to determine the cause of the fire.  Although it was
determined that the fire started in the left side of the
engine compartment, the actual cause of the fire was
undeterminable because of the extensive damage to the truck. 
Cotton States indemnified Burden for the loss of the truck.
James E. Bishop testified on behalf of Jim Bishop. Bishop
was the former owner of Jim Bishop and the Jim Bishop
dealership, having sold both to his son in 2007.  Bishop
testified that the service department cannot diagnose every
problem presented to it, that several things can cause a new
vehicle to smell, and that electrical problems are among some
of the more difficult issues to diagnose.  Bishop stated that
if a dealership is unable to diagnose a problem "then you get
[General Motors] involved."  Bishop testified that, if a
technician at the Jim Bishop dealership cannot identify a
particular problem, then the Jim Bishop dealership would
13
1141231
contact the  technical representative at General Motors, who
would work to diagnose the problem via a computer or actually
come to the service department to address the issue. Bishop
further stated that the customers are also able to contact
General Motors directly concerning a problem.  He stated that,
if contacted by a customer, General Motors would diagnose the
problem and then contact the dealership to give it a
description of the problem.  The dealership would then contact
the customer and have the customer come in so that the
dealership could make the necessary repairs. 
On cross-examination, Bishop was asked by counsel for the
Burdens whether the Jim Bishop dealership had in place a
policy or procedure for dealing with vehicles that come into
the service department that are too dangerous to drive. 
Bishop stated that he was unaware of any such  policy or
procedure the Jim Bishop dealership had in place and that in
such a case he would think that the customer should "park" the
vehicle and "put it in the shop."  He stated that if the
service department could not identify a problem with the
vehicle he would not think there was a problem with the
vehicle and that it would be safe to drive. Counsel for the
14
1141231
Burdens then asked Bishop whether it was reasonable for the
service department to allow Burden to leave the service
department with the truck after the service department had
failed on several occasions to diagnose the source of the
burning odor; had not contacted the General Motors technical-
assistance representative for assistance in diagnosing the
source of the burning odor; and had told Burden to bring the
truck in the next time it was emanating the burning odor,
which Burden  had done.  Bishop responded that if the service
department was full the customer would either leave the
vehicle at the Jim Bishop dealership or take the vehicle with
him or her and that which course to take, based on safety
concerns, would be the decision of the service-department
representative.    
Standard of Review
The standard of review for a ruling on a motion for a JML
is as follows:
"'When reviewing a ruling on a motion
for a JML, this Court uses the same
standard the trial court used initially in
deciding whether to grant or deny the
motion for a JML. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc.
v. Crawford, 689 So. 2d 3 (Ala. 1997).
Regarding questions of fact, the ultimate
question is whether the nonmovant has
15
1141231
presented sufficient evidence to allow the
case to be submitted to the jury for a
factual resolution. Carter v. Henderson,
598 So. 2d 1350 (Ala. 1992). The nonmovant
must 
have 
presented 
substantial 
evidence 
in
order to withstand a motion for a JML. See
§ 12–21–12, Ala. Code 1975; West v.
Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547
So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989). A reviewing
court must determine whether the party who
bears the burden of proof has produced
substantial evidence creating a factual
dispute requiring resolution by the jury.
Carter, 598 So. 2d at 1353. In reviewing a
ruling on a motion for a JML, this Court
views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant and entertains
such reasonable inferences as the jury
would have been free to draw. Id. Regarding
a question of law, however, this Court
indulges no presumption of correctness as
to the trial court's ruling. Ricwil, Inc.
v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So. 2d 1126 (Ala.
1992).'
"Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins.
Co., 875 So. 2d 1143, 1152 (Ala. 2003)."
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Miller, 46 So. 3d 434, 450–51 (Ala.
2010).
Discussion
Jim Bishop argues, among other things, that the trial
court erred in denying its motion for a JML and submitting the
Burdens' claims against it to the jury because, it says, the
Burdens failed to establish that there was a breach of a duty
16
1141231
owed them that proximately resulted in the fire. The Burdens
contend that Jim Bishop breached the duty to discover and to
repair a dangerous condition within the truck 
that proximately
caused the fire. Specifically, the Burdens contend that Jim
Bishop did not "seriously consider" Burden's complaints
regarding the burning odor emanating from the truck and did
not adequately 
"undertake to discover and correct" 
a 
dangerous
condition that existed within the truck. 
In order to recover on a negligence claim, a plaintiff
must establish the existence of (1) a duty; (2) a breach of
that duty; (3) proximate causation; and (4) an injury. Alfa
Life Ins. Corp. v. Colza, 159 So. 3d 1240, 1248 (Ala. 2014).
Jim Bishop relies upon Brooks v. Colonial Chevrolet-
Buick, Inc., 579 So. 2d 1328 (Ala. 1991), in support of its
argument that the Burdens failed to establish, by expert
testimony, a breach of duty.  In Brooks, the Brookses
purchased a vehicle from Colonial that was manufactured by
General Motors.  On January 14, 1987, as Ms. Brooks was
driving the vehicle out of the driveway, the brakes failed,
causing the vehicle to collide with a fence, injuring Ms.
Brooks. The following day, the Brookses took the vehicle to
17
1141231
Colonial, complaining that the brakes had failed and
requesting that Colonial inspect and repair the brakes. At
that time, Colonial inspected the brake system and its
component parts by removing  the front and rear wheels to see
if there was something causing a sticking or binding with the
brakes; inspecting the brake drums to verify that there was no
overheating; sanding  and cleaning the brake drums; and
bleeding and flushing the brake system to be certain that
there was no air in the system that could be causing a
problem. Colonial's service manager stated that, although the
inspection revealed no problem with the brakes or the brake
system, it undertook those steps as a precautionary measure to
convince itself that there was no problem with the brakes or
the brake system. 
The Brookses continued to experience problems with the
brakes as they drove the vehicle. On February 12, 1987, the
Brookses 
returned 
to 
Colonial 
for 
inspection, 
maintenance, 
and
repair of the brakes. Colonial again thoroughly tested and
inspected the brakes and the brake system and concluded that
there was no problem with the brake system. On February 16,
1987, the Brookses returned to Colonial, again complaining of
18
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brake problems. Colonial took the vehicle to  an independent
repair facility for a follow-up inspection to ascertain if
there was a problem Colonial had not found, but those findings
indicated that there was nothing wrong with the brakes or the
brake system. 
The Brookses continued to complain of problems with the
brakes.  On March 2, 1987, Colonial's service manager, along
with another employee from Colonial, picked up the vehicle
from the Brookses' house and drove it to the dealership.  As
the service manager drove the vehicle back to Colonial, he
attempted to simulate the problems the Brookses 
had 
complained
of, but the brakes worked perfectly. Even though the service
manager had experienced no actual problem with the brakes,
when the vehicle was in the repair shop, as a further
precautionary measure and at the suggestion of a General
Motors representative, Colonial replaced the master cylinder,
a part of the braking system. Subsequently, on March 23, 1987,
the brakes failed as the Brookses were driving down an
incline.  The Brookses suffered injuries when they jumped from
the vehicle before it collided with an embankment and caught
fire.
19
1141231
The Brookses sued General Motors asserting a claim under
the AEMLD alleging defective design of the brakes.  The
Brookses also asserted a claim against Colonial alleging 
negligent repair of the brakes. The trial court entered a
summary judgment in favor of General Motors and Colonial on
the claims asserted against them by the Brookses.  
On appeal, this Court determined that, as to the
negligent-repair 
claim 
asserted 
against 
Colonial, 
there 
was 
no
evidence presented to support that claim "other than the fact
of the accident itself."  Brooks, 579 So. 2d at 1334.  This
Court stated:
"In order to present a prima facie case of
negligent repair on Colonial's part, the Brookses
had the burden of presenting substantial evidence
that, taking into account all of the attendant
circumstances, Colonial did something or failed to
do something that would violate the proper standard
of care one must observe in repairing a brake
system. The Brookses presented no expert testimony;
in fact, the Brookses presented no evidence whatever
regarding the quality of the repair work performed
by Colonial when it attempted to substantiate and to
correct the problems the Brookses alleged they had
experienced with the brakes." 
Brooks, 579 So. 2d at 1334.  
In this case, other than casually mentioning the burning
odor to the oil-change technicians at the Jim Bishop
20
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dealership, 
who 
Burden 
acknowledged 
were 
not 
repair
technicians, the evidence suggests that the Jim Bishop
dealership actually retained the truck on three occasions in
an attempt to diagnose the source of the burning odor. On May
3, 2010, Burden brought the truck into the service department 
complaining of the burning odor and of a "popping" noise.  The
service department determined at that time that the rack and
pinion steering was leaking fluid and needed to be replaced.
On May 19, 2010, Burden returned to the service department at
the Jim Bishop dealership to have the new rack and pinion
steering installed.  Burden again complained to the service
department at that time about the burning odor emanating from
the truck and was told by the service-department employee that
"they would look into it."  After examining the truck to
determine the cause of the burning odor, the service
department informed Burden that it "did not find anything
wrong with it."  Additionally, Burden stated that at some
subsequent point in time he returned to the service department
at the Jim Bishop dealership again complaining of the burning
order emanating from the truck.  The service department
21
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examined the truck for the source of the burning odor and
again informed Burden that it "could not find anything wrong." 
To the extent that the Burdens claim that Jim Bishop was
negligent in failing to identify and repair the source of the
burning odor, we note that the Burdens were required to 
present substantial evidence establishing that the Jim Bishop
dealership either did something, or failed to do something, on
the three occasions that the Jim Bishop dealership undertook
to diagnose the source of the burning odor that would violate 
the standard of care a service department must adhere to in
diagnosing an intermittent burning odor emanating from a
mechanically complex and sophisticated vehicle.  However, the
Burdens failed to present any expert testimony, or any
evidence whatsoever, of the appropriate standard of care to be
adhered to when a service department undertakes to diagnose
the cause of such an intermittent burning odor.  No evidence,
expert or otherwise, was presented indicating what procedures
or techniques were undertaken by the Jim Bishop dealership on
the occasions that it retained the truck to diagnose the cause
of the intermittent burning odor and whether those procedures
or techniques were sufficient or of the kind and quality
22
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reasonably necessary to diagnose the cause of 
the 
intermittent
burning odor.
The Burdens also contend that Jim Bishop breached the
duty owed to them on the occasion that Burden was "turned
away" by the Jim Bishop dealership less than 24 hours before
the vehicle fire and was allowed to drive the truck -- that
they claim was in a dangerous condition -- away from the
service department after he had been asked by a service-
department employee to bring the truck in when the burning
odor was actively emanating from the truck.  The circumstances
attending that occasion were that the Jim Bishop dealership
had failed on three prior occasions to diagnose the source of
the burning odor; that the Jim Bishop dealership had not
contacted 
the 
technical 
representative 
at 
General 
Motors; 
that
Burden had driven the truck for approximately 10 months
without an incident, other than the odor and "popping" noise;
that Burden was asked to bring the truck to the service
department when the burning odor was actively emanating from
the truck; that the service department was backed up and could
not "get to" Burden's truck when he arrived at the Jim Bishop
dealership; that he was asked to leave the truck but chose not
23
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to because he had to be at work; that Burden was allowed to
drive the truck away when the Jim Bishop dealership was unable
to provide Burden with a "loaner"; and that the Jim Bishop
dealership scheduled a service appointment for Burden for the
following Monday. 
Again the Burdens failed to present any evidence, expert
or otherwise, as to how the actions taken by Jim Bishop under
the attendant circumstances constituted a breach of duty owed
them that proximately resulted in the vehicle fire.  The
Burdens presented no expert testimony as to the appropriate
standard of care owed by Jim Bishop under the attendant
circumstances and how the actions taken, or not taken, by the
service department of the Jim Bishop dealership on that
occasion were unreasonable and proximately resulted in the
mechanically complex and sophisticated vehicle catching fire
the following day.  Although counsel for the Burdens
questioned Bishop, who was not qualified as an expert, on the
topic of the reasonableness of the service department's
"turning [Burden] away," he offered only that in such a
situation the customer would have the opportunity to either
leave the vehicle with the service department or leave the
24
1141231
service 
department 
with 
the 
vehicle 
and 
that 
that
determination 
was 
left 
to 
the 
service-department
representative. Accordingly, we conclude that the Burdens
failed to establish a breach of a duty owed them.
As to the Burdens' claim that Jim Bishop breached  a duty
to warn of a hazardous condition within the truck and allowed
Burden to drive the truck away from the Jim Bishop dealership
on the day before the fire, we note that this contention
presumes that a hazardous condition existed within the truck
of which Jim Bishop was aware when Burden drove away from the
Jim Bishop dealership. The lack of expert testimony as to the
existence 
of 
a 
dangerous 
condition 
in 
the 
truck
notwithstanding, 
the 
circumstances 
existing 
at 
the 
time 
Burden
drove the truck away from the Jim Bishop dealership, as set
forth above, indicate that Jim Bishop knew only of a
previously undiagnosed intermittent burning odor emanating
from the truck.  The Burdens presented no expert testimony
demonstrating how Jim Bishop breached its duty in failing to
recognize that a hazardous condition existed within the truck
and failed to warn Burden of the condition under the
circumstances that existed when Burden left the Jim Bishop
25
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dealership in the truck.  Accordingly, we conclude that the
Burdens failed to establish a breach of a duty to warn owed to
the Burdens.     
In this case, as in Brooks, the only evidence presented
to support the Burdens' claims that Jim Bishop was negligent
in failing to identify and repair the source of the burning
odor and to warn of a hazardous condition is the fact that the
Burdens had taken the truck to the Jim Bishop dealership on
several occasions complaining of the burning odor, that the
Jim Bishop dealership could not identify the source of the
odor, and that the truck subsequently caught fire.  The
failure to identify and repair the source of the burning odor,
standing alone, is insufficient to establish a prima facie
case of negligent repair.  Brooks, supra.  Tina's loss-of-
consortium claim, which is dependent on Burden's claims,
likewise fails.  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
erred in failing to grant Jim Bishop's motion for a JML and in
submitting the case to the jury.  Therefore, we reverse the
judgment entered in favor of the Burdens on the jury's
verdicts and render a judgment for Jim Bishop. 
REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED.
26
1141231
Stuart, Parker, Murdock, Shaw, Main, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.
Moore, C.J., dissents.
27