Case Title: Anderson v. Foothill Industrial Bank

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-01-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Anderson v. Foothill Industrial Bank1984 WY 2674 P.2d 232Case Number: 83-80Decided: 01/05/1984GLEN M. ANDERSON AND MARLENE B. ANDERSON, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

FOOTHILL INDUSTRIAL BANK, A COLORADO FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION, AND ROBERT STEVENS, A COLORADO RESIDENT, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
GLEN M. ANDERSON AND 
MARLENE B. ANDERSON, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

FOOTHILL INDUSTRIAL BANK, 
A COLORADO FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION, AND ROBERT 
STEVENS, A COLORADO RESIDENT, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

ARE NOT AN 
OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] 

Kenneth R. 
Marken, Casper, 
for 
appellants.

J.N. Murdock and 
W.W. Reeves, Vlastos, Reeves, Murdock & Brooks, Casper, for appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., THOMAS, ROSE and BROWN, JJ., 
and RAPER, J., Ret.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In an action against 
appellees, appellants sought the following relief: (1) return of all principal 
and loan finance charges (totaling $31,512.28) paid by appellants to appellee 
Foothill Industrial Bank to retire a loan; (2) refund of excess amount paid on 
prepayment of said loan ($1,449.68) plus a penalty of not more than the loan 
finance charge, by virtue of appellee Foothill Industrial Bank's failure to make 
such a refund within a reasonable time after demand; (3) statutory penalty 
damages ($1,000.00) for various violations of federal and state disclosure laws; 
and (4) attorney fees.

[¶2.]     Appellants appeal from 
a judgment rendered on a jury verdict which awarded them damages in the amount 
of $2,032.36 against which the trial court offset appellees' costs for failure 
on the part of appellants to accept appellees' prior offer of judgment,1 leaving a net judgment of only 
$1,186.36. Error is alleged in assessment of damages, inadequate damages 
resulting from passion and prejudice and/or misleading instructions; error in 
awarding costs to appellees and denying costs and attorney fees to appellants; 
and error in granting appellees' motion for directed verdict on appellants' 
cause of action in deceit.

[¶3.]     We 
affirm.

[¶4.]     In early September of 
1980, appellants contracted with the United States Postal Service to deliver 
mail on a route from Casper to Rawlins, Wyoming, starting on or about September 20, 
1980. In order to fulfill this contract, appellants needed a loan to purchase a 
truck to be used in the mail route, and a trailer home for appellant Glen 
Anderson to stay in overnight in Rawlins. Appellants discussed their finances 
with various financial institutions in Casper, and ultimately arranged with appellee 
Foothill Industrial Bank to borrow $27,500.00. The proceeds of this loan were 
used to satisfy a previous second mortgage on appellants' residence in the 
amount of $14,882.26, to lease and operate a truck and a trailer for use in the 
mail-delivery route and for start-up expenses. Approximately five months later, 
appellant refinanced the loan with another financial institution to acquire 
funding for a replacement truck, and in the process of refinancing and prepaying 
the original loan to appellee Foothill Industrial Bank, this lawsuit 
arose.

[¶5.]     Appellants alleged at 
trial that appellee Foothill Industrial Bank had failed to comply with Wyoming's 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U.C.C.C.)2 and the federal Truth in Lending 
Act by failing to have authorization from the Wyoming State Examiner's office to 
make supervised loans, by assessing an unlawfully high amount of accrued 
interest charges upon prepayment of the loan, by serving appellants with a 
deficient disclosure statement upon the making of the loan, by charging them an 
unlawful amount of finance charges, and by misrepresenting the annual percentage 
rate of the loan.

[¶6.]     These allegations of 
appellants are premised on the fact of the loan being a consumer loan and not a 
commercial loan. The U.C.C.C. applies only to consumer loans and not to 
commercial loans. A consumer loan is defined in § 40-14-304, W.S. 1977, as 
follows:

"(a) Except with respect 
to a loan primarily secured by an interest in land (section 3-105 [§ 
40-14-305]), `consumer loan' is a loan made by a person regularly engaged in the 
business of making loans in which:

"(i) The debtor is a 
person other than an organization;

"(ii) The debt is 
incurred primarily for a personal, family, household or agricultural 
purpose;

"(iii) Whether the debt 
is payable in installments or a loan finance charge is made; 
and

"(iv) Either the 
principal does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00) or the debt 
is secured by an interest in land."

[¶7.]     Before determining the 
nature of this loan as a consumer or commercial loan, the manner in which we 
consider the evidence is pertinent. We have often recognized the proposition as 
stated in Distad v. Cubin, Wyo., 633 P.2d 167, 180 
(1981):

"* * * On appeal we 
assume the evidence in favor of the successful party is true and leave out of 
consideration entirely the evidence presented by the unsuccessful party in 
conflict therewith, and we give the evidence of the successful party every 
reasonable inference that may be reasonably drawn from it. * * *" Citing, Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532 
(1979).

Appellants seem 
to contend that the proposition should be applied to acceptance, etc., of the 
evidence in their favor since the verdict awarded damages in their favor, albeit 
only in a small fractional amount of that requested. However, inasmuch as 
appellants, through their appeal, assert that the judgment was adverse to their 
entitlement, they are not the prevailing party. We said in Louth v. Kaser, Wyo., 
405 P.2d 276, 278 (1965):

"Appellant contends that 
under previous holding of this court we must assume the evidence in favor of 
Louth is true, leaving out of consideration entirely the evidence of the Kasers 
in conflict therewith and give Louth's evidence every favorable inference which 
may be reasonably and fairly drawn, referring us to Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 403, 49 P.2d 670, rehearing denied 49 Wyo. 296, 54 P.2d 814. But appellant mistakes Louth's 
position in this appeal. Here Louth in this appeal is asking this court for 
additur, the effect of which is to contend the award of $600 to Louth was 
adverse to his entitlement. This places Louth in the position of a defeated and 
unsuccessful party. Therefore, we must consider only the evidence most favorable 
to the Kasers in passing upon the correctness of the jury's verdict and the 
court's judgment."

[¶8.]     With reference to the 
judgment, we have held that:

"* * * In addition to the 
facts specially found, the trial court is assumed to have found those consistent 
facts which support the judgment, and the trial court's findings are entitled to 
benefit of all reasonable inferences in support thereof. Hanna State & Savings Bank v. Matson, 53 Wyo. 1, 77 P.2d 621 (1938); Seibel v. Bath, 5 Wyo. 409, 40 P. 756 (1895)." Starrett v. Shepard, Wyo., 
606 P.2d 1247, 1249 (1980).

[¶9.]     Considering the 
evidence in this case in accordance with the foregoing, we find that it 
established the loan to be a commercial loan and not a consumer loan as a matter 
of fact. Appellant Glen Anderson inquired of three lendors in an attempt to 
secure the money for his mail route business. He told the loan officer at 
Person-to-Person that the money was to be used to "buy a mail route." At First 
Wyoming Bank, he said that it was to be used to operate a truck or otherwise 
engage in the mail route. He told the representative of appellee Foothill 
Industrial Bank that it was for a down payment on a truck and for start-up 
expenses. He did not require a loan until he decided to go into the mail route 
business. The debt was not "incurred primarily for a personal, family, household 
* * * purpose" as required by § 40-14-304, W.S. 1977, supra. Although part of 
the proceeds of the loan were used to pay off that due on a second mortgage on 
appellants' residence, the testimony was that prudent lending practice would 
require such pay off with transfer of the collateral if the loan were made for 
the purpose of financing another enterprise. The thrust of all of the evidence 
was that the debt was "incurred primarily" for the purpose of entering a 
mail route business and not for a personal, family or household purpose. It was 
not a consumer loan.

[¶10.]  Turning, then, to the issues as framed by 
appellants:

DID THE JURY 
AND/OR THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN THE ASSESSMENT OF APPELLANTS' 
DAMAGES?

[¶11.]  Appellants' argument relative to this 
issue is premised on the assumption that the loan was a consumer loan and that 
the amount of damages allowed by the jury was inconsistent therewith. Appellants 
consider themselves as the prevailing party in making this assumption and 
conclude that the jury award of some money carries with it the assumption that 
the jury found the loan to be a consumer loan. As noted, supra, appellants were 
not the prevailing party and the assumptions are to the 
contrary.

[¶12.]  Appellants argue that the award of 
damages to them was inconsistent with a jury finding that the loan was not a 
consumer loan. Before appellate relief can be sought on this basis, the 
contentions must be brought to the attention of the trial court before the jury 
is discharged. Appellants did not do so. It is a well established proposition in 
this state that any objection to a claimed inconsistency of a jury verdict must 
be objected to before the jury is discharged, so that the jury can be further 
instructed and can correct any deficiencies. Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. v. 
Admiral Beverage Corp., Wyo., 638 P.2d 1272, 1274 (1982); Pure Gas and Chemical Company v. Cook, 
Wyo., 526 P.2d 986, 988-989 (1974); Smith v. Blair, Wyo., 521 P.2d 581 
(1974); DeWitty v. Decker, Wyo., 383 P.2d 734, 738-740 (1963).

[¶13.]  As we said in DeWitty, at 
739-740:

"* * * [W]e do not think 
it harsh or unreasonable to require a litigant, when an opportunity is afforded 
during the trial, timely to bring a matter such as here to the attention of the 
trial court in order that it might be corrected, and failing in this that he 
shall not be heard here to complain. To hold otherwise would seem unfair to the 
jury, to the trial court, and to the other litigants, to say nothing of the 
unnecessary loss of time and expense."

[¶14.]  The inconsistency in the verdict, if 
there is one, could also have been attacked by appellees. They could contend 
that the award of any damages was improper in view of the obvious jury finding 
that the loan was not a consumer loan. They have not cross-appealed on that 
basis. Nor could they without first objecting when the verdict was returned, 
thus giving the trial court an opportunity to consider the 
issue.

TO THE EXTENT 
APPELLANTS' DAMAGES MAY NOT BE MODIFIED AS A MATTER OF LAW, WERE THE DAMAGES 
AWARDED BY THE JURY INADEQUATE AS A RESULT OF PASSION, PREJUDICE, AND/OR 
CONFUSING AND MISLEADING INSTRUCTIONS BY THE TRIAL COURT?

[¶15.]  In arguing this issue, appellants contend 
that evidence of an offer of compromise and statements made in compromise 
negotiations were erroneously admitted and that the jury instructions were 
needlessly complicated and confusing. 

[¶16.]  The contention relative to compromise 
evidence is directed to the testimony of Mr. Grebenar, an attorney for appellee 
Foothill Industrial Bank. As an element of appellants' case, they alleged that 
appellee Foothill Industrial Bank failed to refund an overcharge made on the 
loan within a reasonable time after 
demand, such being a violation of the U.C.C.C. which carries a substantial 
penalty.

[¶17.]  The trial court expressly limited Mr. 
Grebenar's testimony to the response made to the demand for refund of the 
overcharge. The testimony, as so limited, was admissible under Rule 408, W.R.E. 
Such rule reads:

"Evidence of (1) 
furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or 
promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to 
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not 
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. 
Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise 
not admissible. This rule does not 
require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as 
proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, 
or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution." 
(Emphasis added.)

The emphasized 
portion of this rule is directly on point in support of the trial court's 
ruling.

[¶18.]  Any prejudice which appellants may 
complain of was the result of exhibits offered by appellants themselves during 
cross-examination of Mr. Grebenar. Appellants offered letters exchanged between 
the parties, which were part of the actual settlement negotiations. Appellees, 
on direct examination, did not enter the realm of the negotiations. That was 
done by appellants on cross-examination. Appellants cannot now complain of 
something which they themselves introduced at trial. "[A]ppellant cannot 
predicate error on its admission at his own behest and without objection by 
appellee," Coulter, Inc. v. Allen, 
Wyo., 624 P.2d 1199, 1202 (1981).

[¶19.]  With reference to appellants' contention 
that the jury instructions were needlessly complicated and confusing, such 
contention falls far short in meeting the requirement of Rule 51, W.R.C.P. As we 
said in Pure Gas and Chemical Company v. 
Cook, supra, 526 P.2d  at 990, an objection to an 
instruction:

"`* * * as being 
superfluous and not adding anything to the statement of the law and tends toward 
confusion in the understanding of the instruction.'

"* * * is not one 
`stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his 
objection,' Rule 51, W.R.C.P., and does not indicate `with definiteness and 
particularity the error asserted,' Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Company v. Robles, Wyo., 511 P.2d 963, 968, and authorities 
cited; and in the absence of cited authorities or cogent argument we will not 
consider the same, Joly v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc., Wyo., 502 P.2d 362, 365."

[¶20.]  Appellants acknowledge that the 
instructions were in the language of the statutes and they do not contend such 
to be error. Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta donec probetur in 
contrarium (all things are presumed to have been rightly and duly performed 
until it is proved to the contrary). Appellants did not designate in what manner 
or form the instructions should have been given as an improvement upon the 
statutory language.

[¶21.]  In addition, appellants argue that the 
trial court erred in failing to use a special verdict form offered by 
appellants.

"* * * The submission or 
failure to submit a form of special verdict with answers to interrogatories is 
in the sound discretion of the trial judge. * * *" Rissler & McMurry Company v. Atlantic 
Richfield Company, Wyo., 559 P.2d 25, 30 (1977). And see North Central Gas Company v. Bloem, 
Wyo., 376 P.2d 382, 385 (1962).

"* * * We hold that the 
jury was adequately instructed, understood the issues and acted upon the basis 
of substantial evidence." Rissler, 
supra, 559 P.2d  at 31.

It follows that 
no abuse of the discretion afforded the trial court in choosing not to utilize a 
special verdict form can be found under these 
circumstances.

DID THE TRIAL 
COURT ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW AND/OR ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANTS' 
MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS, AND IN AWARDING TO APPELLEES THEIR COSTS 
AS A SETOFF AGAINST APPELLANTS' JUDGMENT?

[¶22.]  Again, appellants' argument on this issue 
is premised upon the assumption that the loan was a consumer loan and not a 
commercial loan. The jury found to the contrary.

[¶23.]  Rule 68, W.R.C.P., provides, in pertinent 
part:

"* * * If the judgment 
finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the 
offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. * * 
*"

[¶24.]  Prior to trial, appellees made a 
settlement offer of approximately $16,500.00. The judgment for appellants was 
for $2,032.36; this is considerably less than the amount of the offer of 
settlement. The trial court properly awarded costs to the appellees and denied 
them to appellants under Rule 68.

DID THE TRIAL 
COURT ERR IN GRANTING APPELLEES' MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AS TO APPELLANTS' 
CAUSE OF ACTION IN DECEIT?

[¶25.]  Consistently, appellants premise their 
argument on this issue on the incorrect presumption that the loan was a consumer 
loan and not a commercial loan. The fraud and deceit count of appellants' 
complaint is the only one which involves appellee Stevens, an employee of 
appellee Foothill Industrial Bank.

[¶26.]  As we said in Vassos v. Roussalis, Wyo., 658 P.2d 1284, 1286 (1983), in reviewing the district court's decision to grant a 
directed verdict we will consider all the evidence favorable to the party 
against whom the motion is directed, together with all reasonable and legitimate 
inferences which may be drawn therefrom. Accord, Carey v. Jackson, Wyo., 603 P.2d 868, 877 (1979); Town of Jackson v. Shaw, Wyo., 
569 P.2d 1246, 1250 (1977). When determining the question of sufficiency of the 
evidence on a motion for a directed verdict, we must, without weighing the 
credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the 
evidence, determine whether there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict 
that reasonable jurors could have reached. Vassos v. Roussalis, 
supra; Carey v. Jackson, supra; Town of Jackson v. Shaw, supra; Barnes v. Fernandez, Wyo., 526 P.2d 983, 
985 (1974).

"In determining whether a 
verdict should have been directed, the appellate court applies the same standard 
as does the trial court in passing on the motion originally. * * * Whether a 
verdict should be directed is a question of law and on those questions litigants 
are entitled to full review by the appellate court without special deference to 
the views of the trial court." 9 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Civil, § 2536, p. 595, and § 2524, pp. 541-542.

The elements in 
a cause of action of fraud are a false representation by a defendant which is 
relied upon by a plaintiff to his damage. Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 542 P.2d 867, 872 (1975); Davis v. Schiess, Wyo., 
417 P.2d 19, 21 (1966). Further, the asserted false representation must be one 
which is made to induce action, and must be reasonably believed by the plaintiff 
to be true. Johnson v. Soulis, supra; First National Bank v. Swan, 3 
Wyo. 356, 23 P. 743 (1890). Thus, in order for the appellant to prove a prima facie case of 
fraud and deceit, he must prove that the appellee made a material false 
representation, with intent to induce action on the part of appellant and which 
was reasonably relied upon by appellant to his detriment. Schepps v. Howe, Wyo., 
665 P.2d 504 (1983). 

[¶27.]  Appellants allege that a prima facie case 
of fraud and deceit is shown by the overcharge upon the loan's prepayment, and 
by the decision of appellants to forego financing with Person-to-Person. But 
neither of these actions induced the appellants to take out the loan. The 
overcharge occurred when the loan was paid - not when it was 
incurred.

[¶28.]  The testimony of appellant, Glen 
Anderson, was that at the time the loan was obtained, he had already quit his 
job and had ten days in which to begin the postal mail route. The personnel at 
Person-to-Person told appellant that it would take from ten days to three or 
four weeks to determine if the loan would be made, to process the loan 
application and to distribute the funds. Appellant Glen Anderson was then in the 
uncomfortable position of having already quit his job and was committed to 
another business, but needed a loan quickly in order to start up the business. 
He decided to forego the possibility of a loan with Person-to-Person. At this 
point in time, he had not discussed any of the terms of the loan with appellee 
Stevens. It is clear that appellants did not meet the burden of proof that the 
alleged misrepresentations were either material, or relied upon. By the time the 
terms of the loan were actually discussed, appellants were desperate for a loan, 
from anyone, to meet their mail contract. Appellants had already foregone the 
loan with Person-to-Person, and they were willing to take any loan that would 
allow monthly repayment in the amount of $500.00.

[¶29.]  The directed verdict was 
proper.

[¶30.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellees filed an Offer 
of Judgment prior to trial, in the amount of $10,000 plus satisfaction of a 
judgment held against appellants by Foothill Industrial Bank's sister 
corporation, valued at approximately $6,000.

2 Sections 40-14-101 to 
40-14-702, W.S. 1977.