Case Title: Commonwealth v. Pond

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13309

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2023-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13309 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DAVID J. POND. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 5, 2023. - July 31, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Practice, Criminal, Discovery, Interlocutory appeal. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on July 1, 2022. 
 
The case was considered by Gaziano, J. 
 
 
Konstantin Tretyakov, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Christopher DeMayo for the defendant. 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  The Commonwealth appeals from a judgment of a 
single justice of this court denying its petition for relief 
under G. L. c. 211, § 3, asking that the single justice reverse 
an order from a judge in the Superior Court granting the 
defendant limited access to the alleged victim's apartment in 
2 
preparation for trial.1  Discerning no abuse of discretion or 
error of law, we affirm the single justice's order denying the 
Commonwealth's petition without reaching its merits. 
 
Background.  A grand jury returned several indictments 
against the defendant on December 8, 2021, the most serious 
charge being attempted murder in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 16, arising from allegations that the defendant, Daniel J. 
Pond, strangled and beat the alleged victim in their shared 
apartment in Watertown.2  At the defendant's arraignment on 
January 21, 2022, the Commonwealth provided the defendant with 
some preliminary discovery, which included twenty-six color 
photographs of the alleged victim's apartment depicting the 
front door, driveway, entryway, kitchen, and dining room.  The 
defendant subsequently filed a motion for access to the crime 
scene, requesting that the judge order that defense counsel and 
her investigator be granted access to the apartment to take 
 
1 Although the Commonwealth commenced this action by filing 
a petition in the county court, for convenience we refer to the 
respondent as the "defendant." 
 
2 The grand jury also returned indictments for strangulation 
or suffocation, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15D (b); assault 
and battery on a person age sixty or older, in violation of 
G. L. c. 265, § 13K (a 1/2); threat to commit a crime (to kill), 
in violation of G. L. c. 275, § 2; and assault and battery on a 
person age sixty or older by means of a dangerous weapon (a 
wall) causing serious bodily injury, in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 15A (c) (i).  The serious bodily injury portion of the 
last charge was dismissed by agreement at a pretrial hearing. 
3 
additional photographs and measurements inside, in order to 
capture details the defendant asserted were exculpatory and 
necessary to corroborate portions of his narrative contesting 
the allegations. 
A Superior Court judge heard from both parties at a 
nonevidentiary hearing on May 19, 2022, and allowed the 
defendant's motion, but restricted access to the apartment to 
one hour with a police escort.3  The defendant's motion did not 
identify specific rooms but simply requested access to "the 
residence," which the judge allowed without limitation.  In 
granting the motion, the judge noted that "there is really 
nothing that can substitute for the [d]efense [c]ounsel's eyes 
on a crime scene," a point she reiterated when denying the 
Commonwealth's subsequent motion for reconsideration on June 7. 
On June 16, 2022, accompanied by a police escort and a 
representative from the Watertown housing authority, defense 
counsel and her investigator visited the apartment to complete a 
walk-through of the crime scene.  The alleged victim, however, 
was present at the apartment and denied access to two bedrooms 
and the bathroom.  That same day, the defendant filed a second 
motion, this time specifically requesting that the judge order 
 
3 The Commonwealth represented to the motion judge that the 
alleged victim opposed the defendant's request but did not wish 
to be heard. 
4 
access to the three rooms to which his attorney and investigator 
were denied entry, asserting that those areas were relevant to 
specific allegations of the defendant's prior bad acts.  After 
another nonevidentiary hearing on June 28, the same motion 
judge, over the Commonwealth's opposition, granted the defendant 
access to "all" rooms of the apartment and the home's curtilage, 
again limited to one hour with a police escort.  As with the 
first motion, the Commonwealth represented to the motion judge 
that the alleged victim was aware of the defendant's second 
request and joined the Commonwealth's opposition but did not 
wish to be heard.  The judge stated that she appreciated and 
regretted the "further intrusion" into the alleged victim's home 
but noted that her intent in allowing the first motion had been 
to permit access to the entire apartment, because the breadth of 
the defendant's request -- and thus the scope of the motion 
judge's order -- was "really no different than seeing the scene 
of any other crime.  So, if it happened on the street and the 
[d]efendant was going there to inspect and photograph that area, 
he would not be limited to that street.  He would be able to see 
the street that's parallel to it, the street that crosses it, 
what else is in the area.  This is essentially akin to that." 
The Commonwealth then petitioned a single justice of this 
court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking reversal of the 
motion judge's allowance of the second motion to inspect the 
5 
apartment.  The single justice denied the petition without 
reaching the merits, and the Commonwealth appealed.  The 
Commonwealth filed a preliminary memorandum and appendix 
pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001).4  
Concluding that the Commonwealth demonstrated that it was 
without alternative means to pursue appellate review, we 
permitted the matter to proceed to full briefing and, in our 
discretion, oral argument. 
Discussion.  In cases such as this, where the single 
justice exercised his discretion to deny the petition without 
reaching the merits, review by the full court is "strictly 
limited" to a review of that precise ruling.  Commonwealth v. 
Samuels, 456 Mass. 1025, 1027 n.1 (2010).  To accomplish this 
narrow task, we consider whether the single justice abused his 
discretion or made a clear error of law in concluding that "the 
subject of the petition is not sufficiently important and 
extraordinary" requiring the court's intervention.  Commonwealth 
v. Rodriguez, 484 Mass. 1047, 1049 (2020), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 24 (2019). 
 
4 Rule 2:21 applies "[w]hen a single justice denies relief 
from a challenged interlocutory ruling in the trial court."  
S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (1).  Among other things, it requires the 
appealing party to file a memorandum "set[ting] forth the 
reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately 
be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the 
trial court or by other available means."  S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2). 
6 
The Commonwealth argues that the Superior Court judge 
abused her discretion in permitting defense counsel to enter and 
inspect the alleged victim's apartment a second time because the 
access sought by the defendant was not relevant to the case, and 
because the judge failed to consider properly the alleged 
victim's privacy concerns.  The Commonwealth contends that this 
erroneous ruling raises systemic concerns, because the motion 
judge created a "new categorical rule" in assessing the 
defendant's request that will create a chilling effect on future 
prosecutions and cause irreparable harm to individuals who are 
victims of a crime in their home. 
Although the privacy of alleged crime victims is an 
important interest, the mere fact that an important interest is 
implicated in a trial court ruling does not automatically give 
rise to the type of exceptional circumstances warranting the 
exercise of the court's extraordinary superintendence powers.  
See Commonwealth v. Richardson, 454 Mass. 1005, 1006 (2009) 
(interest in protecting jurors from unwarranted postconviction 
risk to their safety, although important, did not give rise to 
"exceptional circumstances" warranting exercise of 
superintendence power).  Here, the Commonwealth does not 
articulate how the motion judge's discretionary ruling 
permitting some additional discovery to the defendant in this 
case amounts to an exceptional circumstance.  Contrast Fontanez, 
7 
482 Mass. at 26 (exceptional circumstances present where motion 
judge's pretrial ruling "effectively foreclose[d] the 
Commonwealth's ability to prosecute a serious crime").  And 
although we offer no opinion on the merits of the Commonwealth's 
petition, insomuch as the Commonwealth suggests that the motion 
judge created a systemic risk by erring on the law, that claim 
is likewise unsupported where the record reflects that the 
motion judge applied the long-standing framework for evaluating 
a defendant's request to inspect the crime scene, see 
Commonwealth v. Matis, 446 Mass. 632, 635 (2006), as opposed to 
fashioning a "new categorical rule."5  In sum, the Commonwealth 
fails to demonstrate that this matter presents an exceptional 
circumstance, as opposed to a singular grievance from "a 
relatively routine trial court ruling."  Richardson, supra.  The 
extraordinary powers vested in this court under G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, are not a means for "second guessing" a trial judge's 
routine relevance determinations.  Commonwealth v. Yelle, 390 
Mass. 678, 687 (1984). 
Conclusion.  The Commonwealth's petition for interlocutory 
relief presents no systemic or otherwise exceptional 
circumstances warranting an exercise of this court's 
 
5 To the contrary, it is the Commonwealth that proposes we 
adopt a new rule governing requests for pretrial access to crime 
scenes controlled by a third party.  We decline to do so. 
8 
extraordinary powers of superintendence under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  
Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law 
in the single justice's order denying the Commonwealth's 
petition without reaching its merits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.
CYPHER, J. (concurring).  I agree with the court that the 
single justice did not abuse his discretion or commit an error 
of law in declining to reach the merits of the Commonwealth's 
petition.  Were I to examine the merits, however, I would rule 
differently.  I take this opportunity to recognize the 
potentially unjust impact on victims in allowing a criminal 
defendant's discovery request in these circumstances.  Victims, 
alleged or proven, generally have limited rights in a criminal 
trial, as they are not parties.  Whatever interests they do have 
should be protected, as the Legislature has recognized their 
interests by passing the victims' bill of rights.  See G. L. 
c. 258B.  The Commonwealth has no other remedy, and this case 
presents "a systemic issue that will have an effect not just on 
the current case but on numerous other cases."  Commonwealth v. 
Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 26 (2019). 
In its brief, the Commonwealth enunciated three reasons 
exceptional circumstances demand extraordinary intervention:  
(1) the motion judge's ruling "would allow defendants to inspect 
the entirety of the residence of their victims, regardless of 
necessity or even a showing of relevance to their case"; (2) 
this ruling, and the judge's reasoning1 used to support it, 
 
1 The motion judge reasoned: 
 
 
2 
 
"would have a chilling effect on crime victims who are 
unfortunate [enough] to have had crimes committed upon them in 
their residences"; and (3) if the ruling were allowed to stand, 
"the Commonwealth would no longer be able to protect victims 
from undue harassment."  These concerns merit an examination of 
the facts and the ruling. 
The area the defendant seeks to inspect, with which the 
Commonwealth takes issue on appeal (two bedrooms and a bathroom 
in the victim's home), are not the locations where the charged 
crimes are alleged to have occurred.  Where the defendant seeks 
discovery under Mass. R. Crim. P. 17 (a) (2), 378 Mass. 885 
(1979), 
"the defendant must show (1) that the object (here, the 
crime scene) is evidentiary and relevant, (2) that it is 
not otherwise accessible in advance of trial by exercise of 
due diligence, (3) that he cannot properly prepare for 
 
"I understand that there are particular parts of the home 
in which certain conduct is alleged to have happened.  
However, this is part of trial preparation and seeing the 
scene of this alleged crime is really no different than 
seeing the scene of any other crime.  So, if it happened on 
the street and the [d]efendant was going there to inspect 
and photograph that area, he would not be limited to that 
street.  He would be able to see the street that's parallel 
to it, the street that crosses it, what else is in the 
area.  This is essentially akin to that." 
 
The motion judge is incorrect that allowing the defense to 
examine the private areas of a victim's home is "no different" 
from examining the areas surrounding a street where a crime 
occurred.  "In view of the 'sanctity of the home,' 'all details 
[in the home] are intimate details . . .'" (emphasis in 
original).  Commonwealth v. Porter P., 456 Mass. 254, 260 
(2010), quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001). 
3 
 
trial without access, and the failure to obtain advance 
access may tend unreasonably to delay the trial, and (4) 
that the motion is made in good faith and is not intended 
as a general 'fishing expedition.'" 
 
Commonwealth v. Matis, 446 Mass. 632, 635 (2006), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 269 (2004).  Because the 
evidence sought in the defendant's second motion, access to two 
bedrooms and a bathroom, is not evidentiary and relevant, the 
defendant fails to meet the first prong to obtain such evidence. 
 
The allegations surround an argument between the defendant 
and the victim that ensued in the kitchen of their formerly 
shared home, during which the defendant pulled the victim's hair 
and struck her head against a wall.  According to the 
Commonwealth's opposition to the defendant's second motion, when 
the victim then attempted to run out of the home, the defendant 
dragged her back to the kitchen and strangled her, threatened to 
kill her, and again struck her head against the wall.  During 
this beating, the victim urinated on herself and was able to 
"play[] dead" until the defendant walked away.  The victim then 
ran out of her home and drove to a police station, where police 
observed injuries and bloodstains on the victim.2 
 
In his second motion, the defendant requested access to the 
three rooms, alleging that the defendant's "narrative of what 
 
2 They also observed bloodstains on the defendant's right 
hand and his shirt, and he admitted to arguing with the victim. 
4 
 
happened is different from the alleged victim."  He also stated 
in his request that "[t]he narratives [of the victim] include 
allegations that [the defendant] literally 'pulled her off the 
toilet' in the bathroom and [that the victim] was abused by [the 
defendant] in her bedroom."  This does not support the request, 
however, as these allegations regarded abuse "at some point in 
the past," not in the presently charged conduct.  The 
Commonwealth specifically has stated that it does not intend to 
introduce these prior bad acts at trial.3 
The defendant did not suggest that he intended to introduce 
his prior alleged abuse of the victim.  Assuming that the 
defendant would not introduce evidence of his alleged past abuse 
of the victim, the examination of these three rooms is not 
 
3 Defense counsel admitted as much at each motion hearing.  
At the first motion hearing, defense counsel stated that she 
needed "access to the kitchen, the pantry, the hallways, the 
doorways, the driveway. . . .  I need to take a look at his 
room, but I don't really need to go into it."  Counsel stated, 
"[J]ust to be clear, I need access to the kitchen, hallway, 
pan-, the kitchen area, hallways, dining room, living room, all 
the doorways, I need to look at the doors, and the doorways, 
front, back, and all the doorways, and the driveway."  Despite 
indicating at the first motion hearing that she did not need to 
enter the bedroom, in the second motion, defense counsel 
requested that she be permitted to "take pictures and 
measurements" of the bedrooms and bathroom.  At the second 
motion hearing, defense counsel argued that "while nothing that 
happened on [the date of the charged offenses] occurred in those 
rooms, this is part of [the victim's] story.  She . . . has 
asserted that [the defendant] was abusive throughout their 
relationship and she has specific instances that she uses to 
document, or explain, or describe the abuse.  And . . . those 
events occurred in these rooms." 
5 
 
relevant to his charged conduct or any issues that may arise 
during his trial.  The judge's order allows a defendant the 
right to inspect a victim's entire home on any occasion that a 
crime is committed against the victim in part of his or her 
home.  Contrast Matis, 446 Mass. at 635 (interior of home and 
positions and acoustics of relevant rooms "bear directly on 
whether the crime could have occurred without anyone present in 
the house at the time being aware of the acts alleged"). 
 
The privacy interests of the victim should be considered 
when ruling on a motion to inspect the victim's home.  See State 
in the Interest of A.B., 219 N.J. 542, 560 (2014) (in exercising 
discretion whether to allow defendant to inspect victim's home 
as crime scene, "a court must weigh the accused's need for a 
particular species of discovery against the impact the discovery 
request may have on the privacy and lives of . . . alleged 
victims").  Defendants should not be permitted to use discovery 
as a method of inflicting further abuse on a victim, 
particularly in the victim's own home.  "[V]ictims have a right 
'[t]o be free from intimidation, harassment, or abuse.' . . .  
Any discovery request that has as its objective causing 
intimidation, harassment, or abuse of an alleged victim is 
wholly illegitimate and must be denied."  Id. at 562. 
 
Our Legislature has recognized the importance of protecting 
the interests of victims in criminal prosecutions.  General Laws 
6 
 
c. 258B was enacted in 1983 to give crime victims certain 
rights.  Del Gallo v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 
488 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2021).  One of those rights is "to be 
provided with information by the prosecutor as to the level of 
protection available and to receive protection from the local 
law enforcement agencies from harm and threats of harm arising 
out of their cooperation with law enforcement and prosecution 
efforts."  G. L. c. 258B, § 3 (d).  Particularly in the area of 
domestic violence, this Commonwealth has a public policy and 
numerous statutes focusing on "[p]reservation of the fundamental 
human right to be protected from the devastating impact of 
family violence."  Vittone v. Clairmont, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 479, 
484 (2005), quoting Mitchell v. Mitchell, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 769, 
772-773 (2005).  See Champagne v. Champagne, 429 Mass. 324, 327 
(1999). 
 
Not only is it the job of a prosecutor and law enforcement 
to protect a victim from adverse consequences stemming from his 
or her participation in a criminal prosecution, but "[j]udges, 
as well, have a role to play in assuring that victims are 
afforded their rights under [G. L. c. 258B]."  Del Gallo, 488 
Mass. at 1009.  The allowance of a motion by the defendant to 
inspect the most intimate areas of a victim's home, where those 
areas are not relevant to the charged conduct or issues to be 
presented at trial, is an injustice that demands some 
7 
 
acknowledgement.  Contrast State in the Interest of A.B., 219 
N.J. at 562 ("when the defense has made a legitimate request to 
inspect a crime scene that is an alleged victim's home and has 
articulated a reasonable basis to believe the inspection will 
lead to relevant evidence on a material issue, then, subject to 
appropriate time, place, and manner restrictions intended to 
protect the privacy interests of the alleged victim . . . , the 
discovery should be granted").  I write out of concern for the 
many crime victims who may be retraumatized as the result of 
such an order, particularly one that lacks adequate foundation 
in the law.