Case Title: State v. Robert J. Pallone

Citation: 2000 WI 77

Docket Number: 1998AP000896-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 77 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0896-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Robert J. Pallone,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  228 Wis. 2d 272, 596 N.W.2d 882 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 30, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
April 7, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert J. Kennedy 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BABLITCH and BRADLEY, J.J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Steven J. Watson and Steven J. Watson Law Office, 
Elkhorn, and oral argument by Steven J. Watson. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Jennifer E. Nashold, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2000 WI 77 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No.  98-0896-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert J. Pallone,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.  Robert J. Pallone (Pallone) 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals, 
State v. Pallone, 228 Wis. 2d 272, 596 N.W.2d 882 (Ct. App. 
1999).  The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the 
Circuit Court for Walworth County, Robert J. Kennedy, Judge, 
denying Pallone's motion to suppress evidence obtained when 
police arrested the driver of the vehicle in which Pallone was a 
passenger and searched a duffel bag belonging to Pallone.  The 
circuit court concluded that the search was proper because it 
was conducted incident to an arrest. 
¶2 
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the search 
of the duffel bag was valid pursuant to the decision of the 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
2 
United States Supreme Court in Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 
(1999).  Under Houghton, officers with probable cause to search 
a motor vehicle also can inspect passenger belongings that are 
capable of containing the object of the search.  The court of 
appeals distinguished a case upon which Pallone relied, Knowles 
v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998).  In Knowles, the Supreme Court 
held that police may not search a vehicle during a traffic stop 
when the driver receives a citation but is not arrested.  The 
court of appeals underscored that in this case, the search was 
incident to an arrest, and therefore the Knowles prohibition did 
not apply to Pallone.   
¶3 
The issue before the court is whether police may 
conduct a warrantless search of the belongings in a motor 
vehicle when the driver of this vehicle is under arrest but 
police do not have probable cause to arrest or detain the 
passenger.  We hold that the search of Pallone's duffel bag was 
constitutionally sound, on the facts presented, for two reasons. 
 First, the search was valid under the "search incident to 
arrest" exception to the warrant requirements set forth in 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. I, 
§ 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Second, the search was 
proper because police had probable cause to search the passenger 
compartment of Riff's truck and any containers capable of 
concealing the object of the search.  We therefore conclude the 
search of the duffel bag was valid, and the evidence obtained 
from the search was admissible at trial.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
3 
FACTS 
¶4 
Some of the facts in this case are in dispute.  On 
June 27, 1997, James P. Riff (Riff) and his schoolmate, Pallone, 
embarked on a Friday-night drive from Illinois to Wisconsin in 
Riff's black Ford pickup truck.  They were planning to meet a 
friend at a local roadhouse.  Riff had consumed one alcoholic 
drink at his Barrington home before he and Pallone set off on 
the trip.  At approximately 11:20 p.m., Riff and Pallone pulled 
into Municipal Parking Lot #1 in the Village of Fontana in 
Walworth County.  They had with them a 12 pack of beer, which 
had been ripped open and contained both empty and full bottles. 
 There is a dispute whether the 12 pack lay on the bench seat 
inside the pickup cab next to the driver, Riff, or whether it 
lay in the bed of the truck near the cab.1  What is undisputed is 
that Riff grabbed a 12-ounce, short-neck bottle of Budweiser out 
of the pack as he was pulling into the lot, opened it, drank 
half of it, and stepped out of the truck with the bottle in his 
hand.  
¶5 
Village of Fontana Police Officer Jeff Recknagel was 
on duty that summer night and had parked his marked squad car in 
the same parking lot.  Recknagel was standing at the north end 
of the lot with a fellow officer when he saw Riff pull in and 
park in a stall about 20 feet from the two uniformed officers.  
                     
1 Riff testified that the 12 pack was in the cab, on the 
bench seat, of the truck.  Officer Recknagel stated that he 
found the beer at the front of the truck bed and explained that 
he did not find any beer inside the cab.  
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
4 
Riff exited the pickup holding the Budweiser, and he took two 
drinks as Recknagel approached the truck and pointed his 
flashlight on Riff.  In Fontana, separate village ordinances 
prohibit open intoxicants in public and in motor vehicles.  
Seeing Riff exit the truck, Recknagel was concerned that Riff 
possessed open intoxicants in the truck.  
¶6 
Recknagel directed Riff to hand over the bottle.  Riff 
complied, and Recknagel noticed that the bottle still contained 
about one inch of liquid.  Officer Recknagel remarked, "I got 
you," or words to that effect, and the two men walked to the 
back 
of 
the 
pickup, 
where 
Recknagel 
asked 
Riff 
for 
identification.  While standing at the rear of the truck, 
Recknagel inquired whether there were any open beer bottles in 
the truck, and Riff replied in the affirmative.  Officer 
Recknagel asked if he "could go and get it," or "take a look," 
and Riff answered, "Go right ahead."2  The exchange between Riff 
and Recknagel was comfortable, polite, even relaxed.  
¶7 
Officer Recknagel explained that he then told Riff 
that he was under arrest.  Recknagel believed Riff had violated 
the ordinance prohibiting open intoxicants in a motor vehicle.  
Riff, on the other hand, testified at the suppression hearing 
that Officer Recknagel did not state he was under arrest, did 
                     
2 The State does not contend that Riff's statement, "Go 
right ahead" constituted a consent under the "consent to search" 
exception to the Fourth Amendment.  Consent is one of the 
established exceptions to the warrant requirement.  See State v. 
Douglas, 123 Wis. 2d 13, 18, 365 N.W.2d 580 (1985). 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
5 
not handcuff him, and did not read Riff his Miranda rights.3  
Rather, Riff presumed he only would be getting a "ticket" or 
citation for public consumption, not a "ticket" for possession 
of open alcohol in a vehicle.  As a result, Riff thought he 
would only pay a fine and not be taken to the police station.  
¶8 
Passenger Pallone had stepped out of the pickup at the 
same time as Riff.  While Recknagel and the other officer seated 
Riff in the squad car, Pallone stood unguarded between the squad 
car and the truck.  Recknagel testified that at this point, no 
specific facts led him to believe that either Riff or Pallone 
posed a danger.  Indeed, nothing about the situation made 
Recknagel believe that a pat-down search of either man was 
necessary.  
¶9 
As 
Recknagel 
reapproached 
Riff's 
pickup 
on 
the 
driver's side to conduct a search, he noticed that Pallone 
followed him by walking parallel to Recknagel along the opposite 
side of the vehicle.  Pallone then stood by the passenger door.  
¶10 Pallone put his hands on a zippered, blue-green duffel 
bag that rested on the middle of the truck cab's front bench 
seat.  To Officer Recknagel, Pallone appeared nervous:  He spoke 
in short sentences and kept looking up and down at the officer 
and the duffel bag.  Pallone commented that he wished to remove 
                     
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Based on Officer 
Recknagel's testimony, the court made a finding of fact that at 
this point, Recknagel did tell Riff that he was under arrest.  
The circuit court found Officer Recknagel reliable, observing 
that he "didn't make his case look stronger, but he testified 
very frankly."  
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
6 
the duffel bag.  Recknagel directed him to leave the bag alone, 
adding that he planned to search the duffel bag because it was 
situated inside the vehicle.  Recknagel later testified that 
Pallone's behavior, which suggested to the officer that the 
duffel bag contained something he "wasn't supposed to know about 
[ ] or see," caused concern for his own safety:  "I didn't know 
what was inside of that bag, if there was a weapon possibly 
inside the bag, or maybe there could have been more open 
containers of alcohol inside the bag."  Recknagel indicated that 
police are trained to assume that there is a potential for harm 
in similar encounters.  When he saw Pallone reach for the duffel 
bag, Recknagel suspected Pallone might be reaching for a weapon.  
¶11 Recknagel instructed Pallone to walk back to the rear 
of the truck, where the other officer kept an eye on Pallone 
while Recknagel searched the vehicle.  Recknagel looked through 
the cab, in the glove compartment, and under the seats.  During 
the course of the search, he found the ripped open, 12 pack of 
beer, with two or three bottles missing from it.  Riff testified 
that Recknagel found the 12 pack of beer with open and full 
bottles at this point and placed it in the back of the pickup 
truck.  Recknagel's testimony does not clarify what he did with 
the beer.   
 
¶12 Officer Recknagel saw two airline luggage tags that 
identified Pallone as the duffel bag's owner.  Recknagel then 
searched the duffel bag.  He testified that he was looking for 
weapons and evidence relating to the open intoxicants charge.  
Upon opening the duffel bag, Officer Recknagel saw a number of 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
7 
personal items, including clothing, shoes, and hair care 
products.  When he lifted up the clothing, Recknagel noticed 
that enough room remained in the two-and-one-half foot long 
duffel bag to conceal an open container of beer or, he reasoned, 
"[a]ny type of a knife, a handgun, any type of a weapon that 
could be used to hurt us."  
¶13 Underneath the clothing, Recknagel also found an open, 
150-count, box of clear sandwich bags.  Although Recknagel 
testified that, based on his training and experience, plastic 
baggies usually are associated with narcotics or controlled 
substances, he also explained that the box, approximately eight 
to 10 inches long, potentially could contain a weapon.   
¶14 In the open baggie box, a four-ounce, white plastic 
bottle 
labeled 
"Inositol 
Powder" 
caught 
Recknagel's 
eye.4  
Officer Recknagel opened the bottle and saw that it was full, 
containing a large amount of white powder.  Thinking the powder 
might be cocaine, Recknagel examined the inside of the baggie 
box.  He testified that at this stage, he knew the baggie box 
did not contain a beer bottle and he was not looking inside the 
box for a weapon.  
¶15 Recknagel noticed a plastic baggie tied into a knot 
next to the "Inositol Powder" bottle.  The baggie contained a 
                     
4 According to the criminal complaint, inositol is a common 
cutting agent for cocaine.  Although Officer Recknagel testified 
that he read the word "inositol" on the bottle label, the 
circuit court found that Recknagel never stated that it was a 
cutting agent for cocaine or that he knew the presence of 
inositol might implicate drug activity.  
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
8 
hard white ball, about one inch in diameter, comprised of a 
white powder.  Assuming the ball to be cocaine, Recknagel seized 
the baggie, the bottle, and the duffel bag.  Recknagel placed 
Pallone under arrest and transported him and Riff to the Fontana 
Police Department.  
¶16 At the station, Pallone read the Miranda warnings from 
a police department form.  Nonetheless, Pallone agreed to answer 
some questions, and he spoke with Officer Recknagel for 15 to 20 
minutes.  Pallone stated that the duffel bag belonged to him, 
adding that he used inositol as a laxative.  Although he would 
not address the precise nature of the white ball, Pallone told 
Recknagel he had purchased the substance from a middleman in 
Chicago and conceded that it was wrong to possess it.  According 
to Officer Recknagel, at that point Pallone said that he did not 
want more trouble by making incriminating statements. 
 
¶17 After a laboratory analysis revealed that the white 
ball consisted of 5.85 grams of cocaine,5 the Walworth County 
Assistant District Attorney filed a Criminal Complaint on 
September 15, 1997.  The complaint charged Pallone with 
possession of more than five grams but not more than 15 grams of 
cocaine or cocaine base with intent to deliver, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 961.41(1m)(cm)2 (1995-96).6  
                     
5 Laboratory analysis also indicated that the white powder 
in the plastic bottle labeled "Inositol Powder" was, in fact, 
inositol.   
6 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-
96 volumes unless indicated otherwise.  
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
9 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶18 On December 2, 1997, Pallone submitted a motion to 
suppress, arguing that police obtained the cocaine evidence 
during an unlawful search and seizure of his duffel bag.7  
Officer Recknagel and Riff testified at a suppression hearing on 
February 26, 1998.  
 
¶19 The circuit court denied Pallone's motion to suppress 
on March 13, 1998, concluding that the search was valid as 
incident to Riff's arrest.  After highlighting the exceptionally 
candid manner in which Officer Recknagel testified, the circuit 
court made a finding of fact that Recknagel told Riff he was 
"under arrest" before the search of the vehicle occurred.  Once 
Riff was under arrest, police were entitled to continue 
searching for more beer.  The court agreed that beer normally 
does not constitute contraband but nonetheless concluded that 
presence of beer in a vehicle can be evidence of an offense, 
even if only an offense contrary to an ordinance.  
¶20 Although the circuit court expressed discomfort with 
the notion that the belongings of a presumably innocent 
passenger can be searched incident to the driver's arrest, the 
court 
explained 
that 
case 
law 
expressly 
authorizes 
such 
searches. 
 
Officer 
Recknagel, 
the 
court 
observed, 
was 
                     
7 Pallone 
initially 
also 
challenged 
admission 
of 
the 
statements he made to Officer Recknagel at the Village of 
Fontana Department.  He did not challenge the admissibility of 
that evidence in his appeal either to the court of appeals or to 
this court.  State v. Pallone, 228 Wis. 2d 272, 275 n.1, 596 
N.W.2d 882 (Ct. App. 1999). 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
10
justifiably concerned that Pallone might grab a weapon from the 
duffel bag.8  The search of the duffel bag for weapons led 
Recknagel to see the "Inositol Powder" bottle and the plastic 
baggie laying next to it.  Once the officer saw those items, the 
court reasoned, he was entitled to extend the search in its 
"logical direction" because there was probable cause to believe 
that the bottle and baggie contained controlled substances.  
¶21 After the circuit court denied Pallone's motion to 
suppress, the district attorney amended the information to 
                     
8 Judge Kennedy remarked: 
My conclusion from the facts seemed to be that, [ ] 
before 
the 
man 
reached 
for 
the 
bag, 
[Officer 
Recknagel] had no intention to search itI'm not even 
sure he had an intention to search the carbut that 
when [Pallone] reached for and tried to take that bag 
out, the instincts of the officer took over with, 
[whoa], 
he's 
trying 
to 
hide 
something. 
 
I'm 
interested.  What is he trying to hide?  I want to 
know what it is.  
 
 . . .  
 
And I realize the defendant in this case tried to 
remove his duffel bag.  Certainly indicated he was 
going to.  But I think the officer was perfectly 
justified at that particular point when saying, "No, 
stop."  Why?  Because of the danger of weapons.  
Admittedly, he wasn't too afraid; but it was a 
matteran item of concern of [mind].  And besides 
that, objectively, he better be concerned.  If he 
wasn't really very concerned, he should have been at 
that point when someone all of a sudden wants to reach 
in and grab this bag and pull it out.  As an officer 
who wants to protect himself, you better be concerned. 
 So I think he had every right also in that case to 
search [the duffel bag] for weapons for his protection 
even though he wasn't particularly concerned about it. 
 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
11
allege that Pallone possessed five grams or less of cocaine or 
cocaine base with intent to deliver in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(1m)(cm)1.  On March 26, 1998, Pallone pled guilty to 
this reduced charge pursuant to a plea agreement.  The circuit 
court withheld Pallone's sentence and placed him on probation 
for three years with conditions, including a four-month period 
of incarceration in the county jail.  Pallone then appealed the 
denial of his suppression motion.  Pallone, 228 Wis. 2d at 273. 
 
¶22 The court of appeals affirmed.  Pallone, 228 Wis. 2d 
at 273.  The court harmonized Knowles, 525 U.S. 113, and 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, two decisions issued by the United 
States Supreme Court after the circuit court made its ruling in 
the motion to suppress.  Pallone, 228 Wis. 2d at 276-79.   
 
¶23 The court of appeals distinguished this case from 
Knowles, 525 U.S. 113, a case in which the Supreme Court held 
that a warrantless search incident to the issuance of a traffic 
citation violated the Fourth Amendment.  The issuance of a 
citation without an arrest does not give rise to authority to 
search 
under 
an 
exception 
to 
the 
constitutional 
warrant 
requirement because a routine traffic stop poses fewer threats 
to officer safety and does not compromise the discovery and 
preservation of evidence.  Pallone, 228 Wis. 2d at 276-77 
(citing Knowles, 525 U.S. at 116-17).  By contrast, the search 
of the duffel bag was incident to a valid arrest that "triggered 
the heightened concern for the safety of the officer."  Id. at 
278. 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
12
 
¶24 Finding that the Knowles decision did not apply to the 
search of Pallone's duffel bag, the court of appeals instead 
relied on Houghton, in which the Supreme Court determined that 
the search of a pocketbook belonging to an automobile passenger 
was proper because police had probable cause to search the 
vehicle for evidence.  526 U.S. at 302, 307.  The Court turned 
to its earlier decision in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 
(1982), in which it had held that if probable cause justifies a 
search, police may inspect every part of the vehicle passenger 
compartment and its contents capable of concealing the object of 
the search.  Pallone, 228 Wis. 2d at 279 (citing Houghton, 526 
U.S. at 301).  In Houghton, the Court applied the Ross rule to 
passenger belongings, concluding that the validity of a search 
does not hinge on whether the owner of the property is suspected 
of a crime, but rather whether there is reasonable cause to 
believe that the area to be searched will yield the object of 
the search.  Id. (citing Houghton, 526 U.S. at 302).  
¶25 The court of appeals emphasized that the Houghton rule 
requires only probable cause to search, not probable cause to 
arrest.  Id. at 280.  The court determined that the search of 
the duffel bag was proper because Officer Recknagel had probable 
cause to arrest Riff and therefore to search the truck and its 
contents for evidence relating to the arrest.  Id. at 280-81.  
The court concluded that once Recknagel found the "Inositol 
Powder" and the baggie box, he could not be expected to overlook 
the incriminating evidence simply because it was not the same 
item, beer, for which he initially had searched.  Id. at 281. 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
13
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶26 The issue in this case is whether the search of 
Pallone's duffel bag was proper under the search and seizure 
provisions 
of 
both 
the 
United 
States 
and 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions.  The application of constitutional principles to 
a set of evidentiary or historical facts poses a question of 
constitutional fact.  State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶17, 231 
Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552. 
 
¶27 This court engages in a two-step inquiry when it 
analyzes issues of constitutional fact.  Id. at ¶16.  First, in 
reviewing a motion to suppress, this court applies a deferential 
standard to the circuit court's findings of evidentiary, 
historical facts.  Id. at ¶18.  We thus affirm the circuit 
court's findings of fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.; State v. Harris, 206 
Wis. 2d 243, 249-50, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996).  Second, we review 
the circuit court's application of constitutional principles to 
the evidentiary facts.  Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶17.  This second 
step presents a question of law that we review independently.  
Id. at ¶18; State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 137-38, 456 
N.W.2d 830 (1990). 
ANALYSIS 
 
¶28 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution9 
and art. I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution10 both protect 
                     
9 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
14
citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.  This court 
historically follows the interpretations of the United States 
Supreme 
Court 
when 
it 
construes 
the 
search 
and 
seizure 
provisions of both constitutions.  State v. Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 
201, 208-09, 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999).  By interpreting these 
provisions in a manner that is consistent with the precedent 
established by the Supreme Court, we ensure consistency in the 
application of constitutional principles.  State v. Fry, 131 
Wis. 2d 153, 173-74, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986). 
¶29 A warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless one 
of 
the 
"few 
specifically 
established 
and 
well-delineated 
exceptions" justifies the search.  State v. Phillips, 218 
Wis. 2d 180, 196, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998) (citing Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971)); Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).  The State bears the burden of proving 
                                                                  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
 
10 Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized.  
 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
15
that a warrantless search falls under one of the established 
exceptions.  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
¶30 The law now recognizes multiple exceptions to the 
general proscription against warrantless searches.  State v. 
Milashoski, 159 Wis. 2d 99, 111-12, 464 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 
1990), aff'd, 163 Wis. 2d 72, 471 N.W.2d 42 (1991) (listing 10 
exceptions and controlling authority for each); see also Ross, 
456 U.S. at 806-09.  One of these exceptions allows warrantless 
searches if the search is conducted "incident to a lawful 
arrest."  Wis. Stat. § 968.11;11 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 
217 (1960); Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153.  A second allows law 
enforcement officers to search a motor vehicle without a warrant 
if the officers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle 
contains the object of the search.  Ross, 456 U.S. at 806-08.  
Both exceptions derive from distinct precedential strains and 
reflect unique rationales and requirements.  We therefore 
discuss each in turn. 
1. Search Incident to Arrest 
                     
11  Wisconsin Stat. § 968.11 provides: 
Scope of search incident to lawful arrest.  When a 
lawful arrest is made, a law enforcement officer may 
reasonably search the person arrested and an area 
within such person's 
immediate presence 
for the 
purpose of: 
 
(1) Protecting the officer from attack; 
(2) Preventing the person from escaping; 
(3) Discovering and seizing the fruits of the crime; 
or 
(4) Discovering and seizing any instruments, articles 
or things which may have been used in the commission 
of, or which may constitute evidence of, the offense. 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
16
 
¶31 We first consider whether Officer Recknagel's search 
of the duffel bag was permissible under the "search incident to 
arrest" exception to the warrant requirements.  The search 
incident to arrest exception permits the warrantless search of 
the passenger compartment of a vehicle and any containers 
situated in that compartment if the search is incident to a 
lawful arrest.  New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).   
¶32 For the search incident to arrest exception to apply, 
there must be an arrest.  Knowles, 525 U.S. at 117-18.  The 
requirement of an arrest is a "bright line rule."  Id. at 118  
(quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).  
Because the "fact of the lawful arrest" establishes the 
authority to search, Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, this exception 
does not require a showing that the police officer had probable 
cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband.  See 
generally id. at 234-35.  The fact that there is an arrest gives 
rise to two heightened concerns that justify a warrantless 
search: (1) the need to ensure officer safety, and (2) the need 
to discover and preserve evidence.  Knowles, 525 U.S. at 116-18. 
 
¶33 Under Wis. Stat. § 968.11 and the decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752 (1969), the search incident to arrest exception allows 
police officers to search those areas of a vehicle within the 
"immediate control" of the person under arrest.  Fry, 131 
Wis. 2d at 165.  This exception to the warrant requirement 
acknowledges that in arrest situations, it is reasonable for the 
officer to search the area into which "an arrestee might reach 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
17
in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items."  Chimel, 395 
U.S. at 763; see also Fry, 131 Wis. 2d at 164. Chimel recognized 
that warrantless searches may be necessary to guarantee officer 
safety and to discover evidence.  See Fry, 131 Wis. 2d at 165. 
 
¶34 The Supreme Court refined the meaning of which areas 
of a vehicle are within an arrestee's "immediate control" in 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454. The Court recognized that the "immediate 
control" terminology adopted in Chimel did not provide a 
workable standard for calibrating the scope of a valid search.  
Id. at 460.  The Court therefore extended the rule of Chimel to 
include the passenger compartment.  Id.  Belton permits the 
search of a passenger compartment when an occupant of the 
vehicle is under arrest.  Id. 
¶35 The 
Belton 
Court 
also 
expressly 
permitted 
the 
inspection 
of 
any 
containers 
found 
within 
the 
passenger 
compartment, whether open or closed.  Id. at 460-61.  The Court 
determined 
that 
a 
lawful 
custodial 
arrest 
justifies 
the 
infringement of privacy interests.  Id. at 461.  Based on the 
Belton holding, this court held that a search incident to arrest 
extends to the glove compartment of a vehicle.  Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 
153, 180.  The search was lawful even though both defendants in 
Fry were handcuffed, confined in separate squad cars, and 
guarded by officers at the time of the search.  Id. at 186 n.1 
(Bablitch, J., dissenting).  The Fry decision thus did not gauge 
whether the defendant actually had access to the interior of the 
vehicle.  See State v. Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d 217, 233, 455 N.W.2d 
618 (1990). 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
18
¶36 In the years since Belton, the United States Supreme 
Court revisited the "bright-line rule" underpinning the search 
incident to arrest exception:  A warrantless search under the 
exception requires an actual arrest.  Knowles, 525 U.S. 118.  
Warrantless searches are not permitted under this exception when 
a driver receives a traffic citation but is not placed under 
arrest.  Id. 
 
¶37 In Knowles, an Iowa police officer pulled over a 
vehicle during a routine traffic stop because the driver, 
Knowles, was traveling 43 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour 
zone.  Id. at 114.  Although Iowa law gave officers the 
discretion to arrest drivers for traffic violations, the police 
officer in Knowles only issued a traffic citation.  Id. at 114-
15.  After its issuance, the officer engaged in a full search of 
the car and found a marijuana bag and a "pot pipe."  Id. at 114. 
 The officer arrested Knowles, who later was charged with a 
violation of Iowa's controlled substance laws.  Id.   
¶38 Knowles sought to suppress the evidence, arguing that 
the search incident to arrest exception did not apply because he 
was not under arrest.  Id. at 114-15.  The trial court denied 
his suppression motion.  Id.  The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court, reasoning that a "search incident to citation" 
exception can be applied to the Fourth Amendment when the 
arresting officer has probable cause to arrest the driver.  Id. 
at 115-16 (citing State v. Knowles, 569 N.W.2d 601, 620 (Iowa 
1997), rev'd, 525 U.S. 113 (1998)). 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
19
 
¶39 In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search 
violated the Fourth Amendment.  The Court's holding underscored 
the two historical rationales that justify the search incident 
to arrest exception:  (1) the heightened threat to officer 
safety implicit in an arrest, and (2) the need to discover and 
preserve evidence that later can be used at trial.  See id. at 
116-17. 
 
¶40 The Knowles Court explained that these two rationales 
for the exception are not implicated during the issuance of a 
speeding citation.  First, danger to an officer "flows from the 
fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and 
uncertainty."  Id. at 117.  The issuance of a citation for a 
minor traffic violation, by contrast, does not place the officer 
in any extended exposure with the driver.  Id.  Rather, a 
citation usually is the product of a brief encounter, during 
which it is less likely that a person will be hostile.  Id.  
Second, the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial 
does not arise when the driver receives a speeding citation.  In 
most instances, once police issue a citation, "all the evidence 
necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained."  Id. at 
118.  For instance, under the facts of Knowles, "[n]o further 
evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the 
person . . . or in the passenger compartment."  Id.  
¶41 Commentators agree that in Knowles, the Supreme Court 
clarified that "a search incident to arrest really means what it 
saysif something other than an arrest occurs, one should look 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
20
beyond this justification to justify the search."12  Thus, even 
if the exception might not apply to the issuance of a traffic 
citation, "officers have other, independent bases to search for 
weapons and protect themselves from danger."  Id. at 117.  Those 
bases may include the other recognized exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment, including the probable cause to search exception that 
we examine below.  See id. 
 
¶42 Having explored the scope and rationale underlying the 
search incident to arrest exception, we next explain how it 
applies to Pallone.  Under this exception, we consider: (1) 
whether there was an arrest as the bright-line rule of Knowles 
requires, and (2) whether a heightened threat to officer safety 
or a need to discover or preserve evidence justified the 
warrantless search.  If these requirements are met, then Belton 
and Fry authorize a warrantless search of the passenger 
compartment and any containers, open or closed, located in that 
compartment.   
 
¶43 In this case, the search incident to arrest exception 
applies because Riff was under arrest.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 800.02(6) provides that, "A person may be arrested without a 
warrant for the violation of a municipal ordinance."  Moreover, 
arrests for civil forfeitures are not per se unconstitutional.  
Fry, 131 Wis. 2d at 158-66.  Consequently, the Fourth Amendment 
                     
12  Honorable Daniel T. Gillespie, Bright-Line Rules: 
Development of the Law of Search and Seizure During Traffic 
Stops, 31 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1, 26 (1999) (quoting Major Walter 
M. Hudson, A Few New Developments in the Fourth Amendment, 1999-
APR Army Law. 25, 35). 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
21
does not preclude searches incident to arrests for noncriminal 
violations.  State v. King, 142 Wis. 2d 207, 210-11, 418 N.W.2d 
11 (Ct. App. 1987) (citing Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 
265 (1973); Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153; State v. Mabra, 61 Wis. 2d 
613, 623-24, 213 N.W.2d 545 (1974)).  For a search incident to 
arrest to be valid, there must be an actual arrest, not just a 
reasonable likelihood that a suspect will be arrested. 
¶44 At oral 
argument, 
Pallone 
proposed 
that whether 
someone is under arrest presents a question of law, and he 
therefore asks this court to make its own independent finding 
that Riff was not under arrest.  Pallone's understanding of the 
standard for reviewing an arrest is only partially correct.  
Whether someone is "under arrest" or in "custody" is a question 
of law in those cases in which the facts are undisputed.  State 
v. Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 445, 475 N.W.2d 148 (1991).  To the 
extent that facts are disputed in a suppression matter, however, 
this court deferentially accepts the factual findings of the 
circuit court unless they are clearly erroneous.  See State v. 
Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d 663, 671, 407 N.W.2d 548 (1987).13   
 
¶45 The question of Riff's arrest was in dispute at the 
suppression hearing and is in dispute in this appeal.  The 
circuit court made an express finding of fact.  Based upon 
Officer Recknagel's testimony, the circuit court found that Riff 
                     
13 Even if the circuit court does not make an explicit 
factual finding, we assume that the court made the finding in a 
manner that supports its final decision.  Sohns v. Jensen, 11 
Wis. 2d 449, 453, 105 N.W.2d 818, 820 (1960).  
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
22
was under arrest.  The court praised the particularly frank 
qualities of the testimony, noting with gratification that 
Recknagel did not exaggerate or otherwise color his rendition of 
the events.  We accept these findings because it is the role of 
the fact finder listening to live testimony, not an appellate 
court relying on a written transcript, to gauge the credibility 
of witnesses.  State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶2 n.1, 233 Wis. 2d 
280, 670 N.W.2d 621. 
 
¶46 Because this was a search incident to an arrest, not a 
search incident to the issuance of a traffic citation with no 
arrest, the Knowles rule does not apply to this case.   
 
¶47 We next explore whether the particular circumstances 
of this case gave rise to either of the two historical 
justifications for the search incident to arrest exception.  We 
first consider whether this situation posed a heightened threat 
to officer safety.  The facts of this case are more compelling 
than those analyzed in Fry.  This was not a scenario in which 
both occupants of a vehicle were guarded by the police, 
handcuffed, and confined to a squad car.  Here, it was 
conceivable that Pallone, who stood unguarded, could have seized 
a weapon from the duffel bag when he followed Officer Recknagel 
back to the truck cab.  An occupant, no less than an arrestee, 
can pose a danger to officer safety, see Robinson, 414 U.S. at 
228, and a passenger, no less than an arrestee, can seize 
weapons or objects to assault an officer or effect an escape. 
 
¶48 The threat to officer safety during an arrest "flows 
from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
23
stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest."  
Knowles, 525 U.S. at 117.  In this case, the danger to Officer 
Recknagel flowed from the proximity and uncertainty Pallone 
posed once Riff was under arrest.   
¶49 At first, the exchange between Recknagel and Riff was 
not hostile but rather polite and relaxed.  Pallone posed no 
apparent threat; in fact, he stood unguarded between the squad 
car and the truck.  "Police safety is of paramount importance in 
fourth amendment jurisprudence."  State v. Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d 
217, 237, 455 N.W.2d 618 (1990) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).  
Here, the atmosphere altered once Riff sat in the squad car and 
Officer Recknagel reapproached the truck.  Pallone paralleled 
the officer's steps along the passenger side, and he appeared 
nervous as he reached for the duffel bag.  Officer Recknagel 
suspected Pallone might be reaching for a weapon, and he 
testified that his training and instinct punctuated his concern. 
 The duffel bag had sufficient room to conceal a weapon, and the 
baggie box was large enough to contain a weapon.  As the circuit 
court aptly stated, if Recknagel "wasn't really very concerned, 
he should have been at that point" and had reason to search for 
weapons.  We agree with the circuit court that the totality of 
the circumstances presented a potential for harm to the 
officers. 
 
¶50 We now turn to the second historical justification for 
the search incident to arrest exception, the discovery and 
preservation of evidence.  This was not a Knowles situation in 
which the issuance of a citation for speeding gave the officers 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
24
all the evidence necessary to prosecute the offense.  Here, 
further evidence, namely open bottles of beer, were likely to be 
found in the passenger compartment.  
¶51 When Riff stepped out of the truck holding an open 
beer bottle, Officer Recknagel had reason to suspect that there 
were more open bottles of beer in the motor vehicle in violation 
of the Village of Fontana ordinance.  More important, Riff told 
Recknagel that the truck contained open bottles, and he told 
Recknagel to "go right ahead" and look.  In an arrest situation, 
we cannot expect an officer to stop looking for further evidence 
of the offense.  Although Officer Recknagel confiscated the one 
open bottle Riff held, it was within the scope of his 
investigation to discover and preserve additional evidence of 
open beer bottles.  Admittedly, it is unlikely that occupants of 
a truck would store spillable, open bottles of beer in a duffel 
bag while the vehicle is in motion.  But it is conceivable that 
they might conceal the open bottles in a zippered duffel bag 
once they pull into a parking lot and step out. 
 
¶52 Pallone asks this court to adopt the reasoning set 
forth by the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Parker, 987 
P.2d 73 (Wash. 1999).  In Parker, the court consolidated three 
cases in which police searched passenger belongings incident to 
the arrest of the drivers.  Id. at 76.  We decline to apply the 
Parker holding because those cases are not, as Pallone contends, 
factually similar to this one.  Parker did not implicate the two 
rationales 
that 
buttress 
the 
search 
incident 
to 
arrest 
exception.  In Parker, police had no suspicion that the 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
25
passengers were armed, dangerous, or had concealed evidence.  
Id. at 82.  Moreover, the drivers in Parker were arrested for 
traffic violations, for which, much as in Knowles, there was no 
further tangible evidence to be lost.  Id.   
 
¶53 Although Pallone himself was not under arrest, the 
search incident to arrest exception applies in this case, unlike 
in Parker or Knowles, because the circumstances here gave rise 
to both of the two historical rationales at the heart of the 
exception, namely the safety of the arresting officer and the 
need to discover and preserve evidence.   
 
¶54 The warrantless search of Pallone's duffel bag was a 
legal search incident to an arrest.  Under Belton and Fry, 
Officer Recknagel was authorized to conduct a search of the 
passenger compartment of the truck and any containers situated 
in that compartment.  That search, according to Fry, was 
appropriate even though Riff was sitting in the squad car.  Its 
legitimacy was strengthened here because Pallone was standing at 
arm's length from the duffel bag.  The authority to search 
incident to arrest is broad, Robinson, 414 U.S. at 232-33, and 
so it remains under the facts of this case. 
¶55 We decline to exclude passenger property from the 
search incident to arrest exception under the facts of this 
case.  Police may search the passenger compartment of a motor 
vehicle when an "occupant" is under arrest.  Belton, 453 U.S. at 
460.  Together, Belton and Fry allow the search of "any 
containers" situated in the compartment. Id.; Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 
at 176-77.   
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
26
¶56 A contrary rule would overlook the reality that 
weapons and evidence can reside in passenger property just as 
easily as they can in arrestee belongings.14  If this court were 
to adopt such a rule, we would provide vehicle occupants with 
the 
incentive 
to 
sabotage 
an 
otherwise 
legal 
search 
by 
concealing weapons or evidence in areas that remain within an 
occupant's easy reach.  In this case, the danger to Recknagel 
was not diminished by the fact that Riff's arrest had been 
consummated and because the duffel bag was within Pallone's 
reach. 
 
¶57 We therefore conclude that the warrantless search of 
the duffel bag was proper under the incident to arrest exception 
to the warrant requirements of to the Fourth Amendment and art. 
I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
2. Probable Cause to Search a Motor Vehicle 
 
¶58 We next consider whether Officer Recknagel's search 
was constitutional because there was probable cause.  This 
exception permits the warrantless search of a vehicle or any 
containers within the passenger compartment if there is probable 
cause to believe that the vehicle or the containers hold the 
object of the search.  Ross, 456 U.S. at 824.  This rule extends 
to vehicles stopped in parking lots.  California v. Carney, 471 
U.S. 386, 392-93 (1985).  The exception also applies to 
                     
14 This principle is of even greater consequence, as we 
outline below, under the exception that allows a warrantless 
search when police have probable cause to search a motor 
vehicle.  See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303-06 (1999).  
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
27
passenger belongings capable of containing the object of the 
search.  Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307.  We again emphasize that the 
rationales and requirements for this exception differ from those 
that satisfy the search incident to arrest exception.  One key 
distinction is that this exception requires an overriding 
standard of probable cause. 
 
¶59 Warrantless 
searches 
of 
homes 
are 
"presumptively 
unreasonable;" searches of vehicles are not.  See Welsh v. 
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984).  During the course of the 
last 75 years, the Supreme Court has recognized that the unique 
nature of automobiles sets them apart from other areas protected 
from warrantless searches under the Fourth Amendment.  See 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). 
¶60 This probable cause exception for automobiles is built 
on two key factors that distinguish motor vehicles from other 
areas to be searched.  First, the "ready mobility" of a vehicle 
makes it more likely that contraband or evidence of a crime will 
vanish during the period necessary to secure a valid warrant.  
Houghton, 526 U.S. at 304 (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 390); 
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.  Second, persons have reduced privacy 
expectations 
in 
motor 
vehicles, 
an 
expectation 
that 
"is 
significantly less than that relating to one's home or office." 
 Carney, 471 U.S. at 391.  For instance, people are accustomed 
to 
the 
"pervasive 
scheme 
of 
regulation" 
governing 
their 
automobiles.  Id. at 392.  Moreover, vehicles, unlike homes, are 
not devices for storing personal effects, and they move about 
the roadways with their occupants and contents in full view.  
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
28
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).  Even when a 
vehicle is not in motion, its ability to be readily mobile will 
justify a warrantless search, provided that the overriding 
standard of probable cause is met.  Carney, 471 U.S. at 391-92; 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).  Thus, the 
exception can arise even if the vehicle is "found stationary in 
a place" like a parking lot.  Carney, 471 U.S. at 388, 392 
(probable cause to search a parked motor home). 
 
¶61 At first, the Supreme Court did not extend this 
exception to containers located within a vehicle.  For instance, 
in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977), the Court 
reasoned that luggage implicates a higher expectation of 
privacy.  Chadwick held that police violated the Fourth 
Amendment when they searched a footlocker, even though probable 
cause existed to believe that the footlocker, although not the 
vehicle itself, contained marijuana.  Id. at 13-14.  Similarly, 
in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763-64 (1979), the Court 
observed that the reduced privacy expectations upon which this 
exception is based do not extend to luggage, even if probable 
causes exists to believe a suitcase holds marijuana. 
 
¶62 Both the Chadwick and Sanders decisions prohibited the 
warrantless search of luggage, not other generic containers in 
vehicles, 
because 
luggage 
implicates 
enhanced 
privacy 
expectations.  In Sanders, the Supreme Court implied that some 
containers, unlike luggage, may not trigger the same privacy 
protections, suggesting that the outward appearance of a 
container might determine whether the Fourth Amendment applies. 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
29
 Id. at 765 n.13.  This observation foreshadowed the difficulty 
of predicting the degree to which the appearance of a container 
connotes privacy and which appearances invoke Fourth Amendment 
protections. 
¶63 The "outward appearance" standard proved unworkable, 
as the Court's plurality opinion in Robbins v. California, 453 
U.S. 420 (1981), showed.  In Robbins, the divided Court found 
that officers may not search containers based on outward 
appearance alone.  Id. at 425.  Justice Stewart, writing for the 
plurality, rejected the notion that luggage is constitutionally 
distinguishable from "less worthy" containers.  Id.  Robbins 
thereby precluded the warrantless search of a plastic bag 
because some people, after all, use plastic bags as luggage.  
Id. at 426-27.   
¶64 Against this background, the Court suggested that a 
test that "balanc[es] the multifarious circumstances presented 
by different cases" under the probable cause threshold offers 
little with which to guide police officers engaged in the "often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."  Dunaway v. New 
York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979).  One standard was essential 
for measuring the reasonableness of probable cause to search, 
id., 
and 
the 
Court 
eventually 
created 
one 
standard 
for 
containers situated in vehicles.  In Ross, 456 U.S. at 800, the 
Supreme Court held that when law enforcement officers have 
probable cause to search a vehicle without a warrant, they also 
may conduct a warrantless search of all containers found inside 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
30
the vehicle capable of containing the object of the search.  See 
also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576 (1991). 
¶65 The Ross Court reached this conclusion for two 
reasons.  First, the Court distinguished both Chadwick and 
Sanders, finding that those decisions explored situations in 
which police did not have probable cause to search the vehicle 
itself, only the luggage within it.  Ross, 456 U.S. at 814.  In 
Ross, by contrast, probable cause existed to believe that the 
automobile contained contraband.  Id. at 820, 824.  The Court 
stressed that the "object of the search," not the "nature of the 
containers," defines the parameters of a legal search.  Id. at 
824.  Second, the Court recognized the practical benefits of a 
rule that extends the probable standard to all containers.  Id. 
at 820, 822.  Noting that "[c]ontraband goods rarely are strewn 
across the trunk or floor of a car," the Court declined to 
burden law enforcement with a rule that would require officers 
to halt an otherwise permissible search if they encountered a 
container that required warrant.  Id. at 820. 
¶66 The Ross Court drew no distinction between containers 
in the possession of the driver and containers belonging to 
passengers.  See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 301-02.  In Houghton, a 
six-to-three decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Court 
reasoned that "if the rule of law that Ross announced were 
limited to contents belonging to the driver, or contents other 
than those belonging to passengers, one would have expected that 
substantial limitation to be expressed."  Id. at 301.  Houghton 
therefore applied the Ross rule to passenger belongings, holding 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
31
that officers with probable cause to search a motor vehicle also 
may inspect those containers capable of concealing the object of 
the search.  Id. at 307. 
 
¶67 In Houghton, a Wyoming Highway Patrol officer pulled 
over an automobile for speeding and displaying a faulty break 
light during a routine traffic stop.  Houghton, 526 U.S. at 297. 
 The driver and two passengers occupied the vehicle.  Id. at 
297-98.  As the officer questioned the driver, he noticed a 
hypodermic syringe in the driver's shirt pocket.  The driver 
conceded "that he used it to take drugs."  Id. 
¶68 Following this admission, backup officers directed the 
two passengers out of the vehicle and searched the passenger 
compartment for contraband.  Officers found a pocketbook 
belonging to one of the passengers, Houghton, on the backseat.  
Upon searching the pocketbook, officers discovered a pouch and 
wallet-like object containing a syringe, drug paraphernalia, and 
methamphetamine.  Id.  Houghton sought to suppress the evidence, 
the trial court denied the motion to suppress, and Houghton was 
convicted.  Id. at 299. 
 
¶69 The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the conviction, 
holding that the search violated the constitution because the 
officer "knew or should have known that the purse did not belong 
to the driver."  Id. (quoting Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d 363, 
372 (Wyo. 1998), rev'd, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)).  The court 
reasoned that passenger property exceeds the scope of a valid 
search "unless someone had the opportunity to conceal the 
contraband within the personal effect to avoid detection" and 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
32
officers have probable cause to believe that contraband has been 
placed within the passenger property.  Id.   
 
¶70 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "police 
officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect 
passengers' belongings found in the car that are capable of 
concealing the object of the search."  Id. at 307.  The Court 
determined that the inquiry turns not on whether "the owner of 
the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable 
cause to believe that the specific 'things' to be searched for 
and seized are located" therein.  Id. at 302.   
¶71 Relying on Ross, 456 U.S. at 825, the Houghton Court 
reasoned that every container within a vehicle and its contents 
may contain contraband.  Houghton, 526 U.S. at 301-02.  The 
Court explicitly declined to create an exception for containers 
that are passenger property.  Id. at 304.  Excluding passenger 
property from the scope of a valid search would impair effective 
law enforcement because passengers "often [ ] engage[ ] in a 
common enterprise with the driver," sharing the same interest of 
concealing contraband.15  Id. at 304.  Moreover, a "passenger 
property exception" would preclude the discovery of contraband a 
driver might conceal in passenger belongings, even without the 
passenger's consent or knowledge.  Id. at 305.  
                     
15  
In 
making 
this 
observation, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
distinguished the "common enterprise" often present between 
drivers and passengers from other situations in which complicity 
cannot be inferred as easily.  Houghton, 526 U.S. at 304 
(distinguishing passenger Houghton from "the unwitting tavern 
patron in" Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979)). 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
33
¶72 This court has recognized that passengers and drivers 
share expectations to privacy.  Harris, 206 Wis. 2d at 255.  
These expectations, however, are not unlimited.  Passengers, 
like drivers, have reduced expectations of privacy for items 
that they transport in motor vehicles.16  Houghton, 526 U.S. at 
303.  In addition, a search of passenger property is less 
intrusive than the search of a passenger's person.  Searches of 
property implicate fewer traumatic consequences and do not 
invoke the heightened protection inherent in searches of a 
person.  Id. at 303; id. at 307-08 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948)).17  Police 
examination of belongings does not deprive an individual of the 
freedom of movement.  See Harris, 206 Wis. 2d at 256-57 (citing 
                     
16 Pallone directs our attention to a recent United States 
Supreme Court decision, Bond v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 120 
S. Ct. 1462 (2000), which held that the search of a duffel bag 
belonging to a bus passenger violated the Fourth Amendment.  The 
Bond case is distinguishable.  The Bond Court analyzed the 
"plain view" or "public observation" exception under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 1464.  That exception implicates a different 
inquiry than the automobile exception, examining whether an 
individual had an actual expectation of privacy and whether that 
expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.  By contrast, the automobile exception historically 
has recognized the reduced expectations of privacy inherent in 
automobile travel. 
17 In 
his 
concurrence, 
Justice 
Breyer 
suggested 
that 
pocketbooks usually contain "especially personal items that 
people generally like to keep with them at all times" and added 
that if passenger Houghton were wearing the pocketbook, it 
"might 
then 
amount 
to 
a 
kind 
of 
'outer 
clothing' 
which . . . would 
properly 
receive 
increased 
protection."  
Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307-08 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968)).  
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
34
Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d at 674-75) (same standard of seizure of person 
applies to drivers and passengers). 
 
¶73 Although the Houghton Court, not unlike the Knowles 
Court before it, appeared to draw another "bright line" in the 
sand of Fourth Amendment analysis, Houghton, like other cases 
under this exception, still requires a threshold showing of the 
overriding standard of probable cause.  See Carney, 471 U.S. at 
392.  Before police can conduct a warrantless search, they must 
have probable cause to believe that a passenger compartment 
holds the particular object of the search.  This requirement 
distinguishes this exception from the search incident to an 
arrest exception. 
 
¶74 To complete our examination of this exception, we 
therefore briefly turn to the standards that measure probable 
cause.  Probable cause does not require a uniform degree of 
proof.  County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 304, 603 
N.W.2d 
541 
(1999). 
 
Depending 
upon 
the 
type 
of 
proceedingwhether an investigative stop, the issuance of a 
search warrant, the issuance of an arrest warrant, or the filing 
of a criminal complaintvarying and sometimes indistinguishable 
degrees of proof apply.  Id. at 319-20 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring).  In the warrantless search context, the proof 
necessary to establish probable cause is a "fair probability" 
that law enforcement authorities will find evidence in a 
particular place.  Hughes, 2000 WI 24 at ¶21 (citing Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).  Under Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
35
courts invoke a totality of the circumstances test to determine 
whether fair probability exists. 
 
¶75 We now apply the probable-cause-to-search-a-motor-
vehicle exception to this case.  Pallone argues that beer does 
not constitute "contraband" and therefore contends that the 
search of his duffel bag was improper.  Pallone asks us to 
restrict the meaning of contraband to illegal or prohibited 
substances, or property that is unlawful to produce or possess. 
 In Wisconsin, beer is not contraband per se, except under 
circumstances in which its mere possession would be unlawful.18  
See, 
e.g., 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 346.93 
and 
346.935 
(1997-98).  
Nonetheless, beer receptacles and beer can be evidence of a 
crime.  The case law does not exclusively address "contraband" 
per se as the legitimate target of a warrantless search.  
Rather, police may search passenger belongings capable of 
concealing evidence, "the object of the search."  Houghton, 526 
U.S. at 307.   
¶76 Open containers of beer were the object of Officer 
Recknagel's search for evidence.  Two Village of Fontana 
ordinances made it illegal to possess open containers of alcohol 
in public or in motor vehicles.  The beer may not have been 
"contraband" per se, but the possibility that open containers of 
beer were situated in the truck rendered beer the object of the 
                     
18 An adult may not possess an open or unsealed bottle or 
receptacle containing alcoholic beverages in a privately owned 
motor vehicle.  Wis. Stat. § 346.935(2) and (3). 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
36
search.19  Were this court to limit the meaning of "contraband" 
to the parameters that Pallone crafts, evidence vital to many 
proceedings might be excluded. 
¶77 We agree with the court of appeals that Recknagel had 
probable cause to carry out a full search of the truck and its 
contents for additional containers of open beer.  See Pallone, 
228 Wis. 2d at 280.  When Riff stepped out of the truck holding 
an open bottle and then told Recknagel there were more open 
bottles in the truck, there was more than a fair probability 
that the vehicle contained additional evidence.  Recknagel had 
probable cause to search the truck cab, and it was reasonable 
for him to search the "fairly large duffel bag, about twelve 
inches high, twelve inches wide, and maybe two, two-and-a-half 
feet long" that was situated on the bench in the cab.  This 
spacious container had the capacity to hold additional open or 
closed bottles of beer, evidence that would support Riff's 
arrest and perhaps lead to an additional charge.  Recknagel 
explained that he planned to search the duffel bag because it 
was located inside the vehicle.  Recknagel thus apparently 
followed Ross, 456 U.S. at 825, which authorizes the search of 
every part of the vehicle and its content that may conceal the 
object of the search.  When Pallone reached for the bag, he 
upgraded the cause for Recknagel's search.  Recknagel testified 
                     
19 Similarly, money can constitute "contraband" when it is 
used as evidence.  Jones v. State, 226 Wis. 2d 565, 592, 594, 
594 N.W.2d 738 (1999).  
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
37
that when he searched the duffel bag, he was looking both for 
weapons and evidence relating to the open intoxicants charge. 
¶78 Under Houghton, the search was not rendered improper 
because the duffel bag belonged to Pallone.  The inquiry turned 
not on whether Pallone or Riff owned the duffel bag, but whether 
open containers of beerthe specific thing for which Recknagel 
searchedmight be in the duffel bag.  Houghton, 526 U.S. at 302. 
¶79 After Officer Recknagel inspected the duffel bag and 
came upon the baggie box, he candidly stated that he no longer 
was looking for beer or for a weapon.  But there was probable 
cause to believe that the "Inositol Powder" bottle and the 
baggie box contained narcotics or controlled substances.  We 
therefore agree with the circuit court that Recknagel had a 
basis for extending the search to its logical direction.  If 
authorities discover evidence of a more serious crime during a 
lawful search, they need not halt their inspection.  Mabra, 61 
Wis. 2d at 623 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. 218; Gustafson, 414 
U.S. 260).  As the court of appeals determined, it would defy 
common sense to require an officer to overlook incriminating 
evidence because the evidence did not relate to the initial 
purpose of the search.  Pallone, 228 Wis. 2d at 281; see also 
Ross, 456 U.S. at 823-25. 
¶80 Finally, we address Pallone's contention that the 
search violated his expectation of privacy.  Under Houghton, 
passenger 
Pallone 
and 
driver 
Riff 
shared 
a 
diminished 
expectation of privacy.  Searching the duffel bag was not a 
traumatically intrusive search and seizure of his person.  
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
38
¶81 Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution affords 
individuals no greater privacy expectations than those provided 
under the Fourth Amendment.  Wisconsin, in this respect, is 
different from some other states, like Washington.  In Parker, 
987 P.2d 73, the Washington Supreme Court afforded passengers 
enhanced privacy protections.  The court premised its conclusion 
on long-standing state case law that grants individuals greater 
privacy protections than the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 78.  
Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides, 
"No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his 
home invaded, without authority of law."  Id.  
¶82 The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
contains 
no 
similar 
"private affairs" clause.  On the contrary, the language of art. 
I, § 11 is virtually identical to that of the Fourth Amendment. 
 Consequently, this court "has refused to interpret Wisconsin's 
search and seizure provision differently than the Supreme 
Court," and has not afforded heightened privacy protections 
under the state constitution than under the Fourth Amendment.  
There is nothing in this case that tempts us to depart from this 
seasoned approach.  We thus follow the interpretation set forth 
by the Supreme Court in Houghton, which entitles motor vehicle 
passengers to no greater privacy expectations than drivers.  
Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303-04. 
 
¶83 We therefore hold that the warrantless search of 
Pallone's duffel bag was valid under the exception that allows 
warrantless searches when authorities have probable cause to 
believe that a vehicle contains the object of the search. 
No. 
98-0896-CR  
 
 
39
CONCLUSION 
¶84 We conclude that the search of the duffel bag was 
proper under both the search incident to arrest exception and 
the probable-cause-to-search-a-motor-vehicle exception to the 
constitutional warrant requirements.  The search fulfilled the 
requirements of the search incident to arrest exception because 
it was incident to a valid arrest, the situation posed a 
heightened threat of danger, and there was a need to discover 
and preserve evidence.  The warrantless search also was 
permissible because the officer had probable cause to believe 
that the vehicle contained the object of the search, and the 
duffel bag was a container capable of containing the object of 
the search.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 98-0896-CR.ssa 
 
1 
¶85 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  In 
a refrain that has become all too familiar, the majority opinion 
dutifully repeats the principle that a "warrantless search is 
per se unreasonable unless one of the 'few specifically 
established 
and 
well-delineated 
exceptions' 
justifies 
the 
search,"20 and then proceeds to find yet another exception.  I 
agree with U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia that the 
warrant requirement "has become so riddled with exceptions that 
it [has become] basically unrecognizable."21  Because the 
majority opinion recognizes another exception to the warrant 
requirement, I dissent. 
¶86 This began as a civil case, a traffic violation.  The 
initial 
encounter 
with 
the 
police 
involved 
the 
driver's 
violation of a municipal ordinance prohibiting drinking or 
possessing an open container of an alcoholic beverage in a motor 
vehicle.22  Here the beverage was beer.  The driver was arrested 
                     
20 Majority op. at ¶ 29 (quoting State v. Phillips, 218 
Wis. 2d 180, 196, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998)).  
Despite espousing this principle clearly at ¶ 29, the 
majority confusingly suggests differently at ¶ 59. 
21 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, 
J., concurring).  
22 The Wisconsin statutes also prohibit such conduct and 
provide for a civil forfeiture of not more than $100.  Wisconsin 
Stat. §§ 346.935 and 346.95(2m) (1997-98). 
No. 98-0896-CR.ssa 
 
2 
for violating the ordinance, a civil offense.23  No misdemeanor 
or felony was alleged or suspected at the time of the driver's 
arrest. 
I 
¶87 The majority holds that the search by law enforcement 
of the passenger's (the defendant's) duffel bag was justified 
because it was a search incidental to the driver's arrest.  The 
majority concludes that a "heightened threat to officer safety 
or a need to discover or preserve evidence justif[ied] the 
warrantless search" in this case.  Majority op. at ¶ 42. 
¶88 Although 
the 
passenger's 
duffel 
bag 
might 
have 
contained a weapon dangerous to the officer, which might have 
justified a search, no weapon was found.  No alcoholic beverages 
were found during the search either.  Nevertheless, the search 
of the duffel bag continued, proceeding beyond looking for a 
weapon or evidence of an open container of an alcoholic 
beverage.  The officer saw a box of plastic bags and when the 
officer looked inside the box he saw plastic bags containing 
white powder.  Because the officer exceeded the lawful grounds 
                     
23 No one challenged the validity of the arrest, and I do 
not address this issue.  See Atwater v. Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242 
(5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, ___ S. Ct. ___ (Mem), 68 USLW 
3566, 2000 WL 248718 (U.S., June 26, 2000) (certiorari granted 
to review whether Fourth Amendment allows custodial arrest for a 
"misdemeanor traffic offense" under Texas law punishable only by 
a fine).  Cf. State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 342-45, 321 
N.W.2d 245 (1982) (Shirley S. Abrahamson, J., dissenting, 
expressing doubts about constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 345.22 
(1977), authorizing warrantless arrest for a civil traffic 
offense committed outside the presence of an officer). 
No. 98-0896-CR.ssa 
 
3 
of the search, the evidence should not be admissible under the 
"search incident to arrest" rule of the Belton24 case as set 
forth by the majority opinion.  
¶89 The 
majority 
opinion's 
lengthy 
discussion 
and 
attempted justification of its decision is puzzling given the 
majority's conclusion that "Belton25 and Fry26 allow the search of 
'any containers' situated in the compartment [of the car]."  
Majority op. at ¶ 55.  The majority opinion's discussion and 
justification suggest that the Belton/Fry rule permitting the 
search of any container in a vehicle is troubling.  Indeed it 
is. 
¶90 The U. S. Supreme Court's holding in Belton has been 
widely criticized.  Professor Wayne R. LaFave, whose endorsement 
of bright-line rules to guide police officers in resolving 
Fourth 
Amendment 
issues 
the 
Belton 
majority 
quoted 
with 
approval,27 concludes that Belton mistakenly allows automobile 
searches not based on probable cause, and thus creates the risk 
that "police will make custodial arrests which they otherwise 
would not make as a cover for a search which the Fourth 
Amendment otherwise prohibits."28  A similar point was made by 
                     
24 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
25 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). 
26 State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 176-77, 388 N.W.2d 565 
(1986). 
27 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981).  
28 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the 
Fourth Amendment, § 7.1(c) at 457 (3d ed. 1996). 
No. 98-0896-CR.ssa 
 
4 
Justice William A. Bablitch in his dissent to Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 
153, 187, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986), which I joined, and by U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens in his dissent in 
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 452 (1981). 
¶91 The U.S. Supreme Court, in both civil liberties and 
other areas of law, is espousing a new federalism, with 
diminishing national powers and increasing state influence and 
importance.29  In keeping with this new federalism, a significant 
                                                                  
A recent newspaper article quoted a Wisconsin state trooper 
as explaining his high number of drug seizures by saying that 
"[t]he secret is going beyond the traffic stop."  Another 
trooper was quoted as saying that, in the search for drugs, the 
state police are "looking for any and all [traffic] violations. 
 A bad headlight might turn into an arrest of a drunk driver, a 
drug dealer or a drug user."  A third trooper was quoted as 
saying "I stopped them for not having a working trunk latch."  
Drug Busts Start as Traffic Stops, Wisconsin State Journal, June 
26, 2000, at 3B. 
Other academic commentators have also criticized the Belton 
rule.  For a lengthy discussion of the rule and its critics, see 
State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 955-58 (N.J. 1994); Commonwealth 
v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 907-08 (Pa. 1995) (Montemuro, J., 
concurring). 
29 For cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court reminded state 
courts that they are free to interpret their own constitutions 
as granting more protections to individuals than does the U.S. 
Constitution, see, e.g, California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 
(1988) (Fourth Amendment); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, 
Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982) (First Amendment and vagueness); 
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) 
(First Amendment and property rights). 
No. 98-0896-CR.ssa 
 
5 
number of state courts have refused to adopt Belton, holding 
that such a rule is inconsistent with their respective state 
constitutional guarantees.30  This court should follow these 
                                                                  
For recent cases invalidating federal statutes as beyond 
Congress's powers, see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 120 
S.Ct. 1740 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Gun-Free School Zones Act).  See 
also Sandra Day O'Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1984-85); Sandra Day O'Connor, Trends in 
the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from the 
Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 801, 
803-804 (1981); William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the 
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 
(1977). 
30 See, e.g., State v. Brown, 588 N.E.2d 113, 114-16 (Ohio 
1992) (declining to follow Belton if Belton means that an arrest 
for a traffic offense automatically authorizes detailed search 
of arrestee's vehicle); State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 956, 959-
60 (N.J. 1994) (declining to apply Belton to warrantless arrests 
for motor-vehicle offenses; discussing other state cases); 
Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 902 (Pa. 1995) (rejecting 
Belton rule and adhering to earlier decision limiting the 
warrantless search of a vehicle incident to an arrest to 
clothing and areas immediately accessible to the arrestee; see 
also concurrence at 906-08, discussing other cases).  
No. 98-0896-CR.ssa 
 
6 
states 
and 
refuse 
to 
adhere 
to 
Belton 
as 
a 
correct 
interpretation of the Wisconsin Constitution.31 
¶92 This court has a long history of recognizing the 
vitality 
of 
the 
Declaration 
of 
Rights 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution (article I) and of interpreting article I, § 11.32  
We should continue our traditional approach of examining our own 
                     
31 I note that the defendant has a strong argument, not 
addressed by the majority opinion, that because the police did 
not initiate contact with the driver of the car until he was 
outside of the car, the Chimel "immediate control" test should 
apply rather than the Belton/Fry bright-line rule.  Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).  Under Chimel the search would 
not be reasonable because the search occurred after the driver 
had already been placed in the squad car.  Therefore the 
arrestee did not have access to the interior of the car.  Many 
courts have held that the Chimel "immediate control" test 
applies when the police do not initiate contact with the person 
arrested until he or she is already outside of the vehicle.  
See, e.g., United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155, 159 (6th Cir. 
1993) (because defendant was approximately thirty feet from his 
vehicle when arrested, Belton inapplicable and the Chimel test 
governs; the passenger compartment of the vehicle was not within 
defendant's "immediate control" at the time of the arrest and 
thus "suppression is proper"); State v. Foster, 905 P.2d 1032, 
1037-39 (Idaho 1995) (holding that Belton rule only applies when 
the defendant is arrested or the police at least make initial 
contact with the defendant in the vehicle; collecting a number 
of cases which apply this rule); Lewis v. United States, 632 
A.2d 383 (D.C. App. 1983) (the Belton rule allowing search of 
vehicle upon arrest of occupant is confined to cases where the 
police confront, or at least signal confrontation, while the 
person is an occupant of a vehicle).  See also Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 7.1(a) 
at 436-37 and n.26 (3d ed. 1996) (citing cases).  
32 See Jack Stark, The Wisconsin Constitution at 58 (1997) 
(discussing this court's interpretation of article I, § 3); 
Joseph A. Ranney, Trusting Nothing to Providence at 513-515 
(1999) (Wisconsin was among the most innovative of states 
interpreting constitutional rights of criminal defendants). 
No. 98-0896-CR.ssa 
 
7 
constitution and our own precedents.33  In drafting the Wisconsin 
Constitution the framers relied on the bills of rights of other 
state constitutions, not on the federal bill of rights, to 
protect Wisconsin citizens against governmental invasion of 
individual rights.  Justice Abram Smith's statement in 1855 
urging the Wisconsin supreme court to look to the Wisconsin 
Constitution should be heeded by this court today: 
 
The people then made this constitution, and adopted it 
as their primary law.  The people of other states made 
for themselves respectively, constitutions which are 
construed by their own appropriate functionaries.  Let 
them construe theirs — let us construe, and stand by 
ours.  Attorney General ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow, 4 
Wis. 567 [*785](1855). 
 
¶93 It is unfortunate that instead the majority follows 
the erratic course that the U.S. Supreme Court has set in the 
field of searches and seizures. 
II 
¶94 The majority opinion also holds that the search of the 
passenger's duffel bag was constitutionally permissible because 
the police had probable cause to believe that they would find 
the object of their search.  Majority op. at ¶¶ 75-77.  This 
                     
33 See, e.g., Jokosh v. State, 181 Wis. 160, 163, 193 N.W. 
976 (1923); Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 417, 193 N.W. 89 
(1923).  See also John Sundquist, Construction of the Wisconsin 
Constitution — Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 62 Marq. L. 
Rev. 531 (1979); Comment, The Independent Application of State 
Constitutional Provisions to Questions of Criminal Procedure, 62 
Marq. L. Rev. 596 (1979); Comment, Rediscovering the Wisconsin 
Constitution: Presentation of Constitutional Questions in State 
Courts, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 483; Joseph A. Ranney, Trusting 
Nothing to Providence at 499-500 (1999). 
No. 98-0896-CR.ssa 
 
8 
holding is not necessary to the opinion, and I disagree with 
this dictum. 
¶95 While the police may have had probable cause to 
believe that open containers of an alcoholic beverage would be 
found in the vehicle itself, the search of the passenger's 
duffel bag was unreasonable as a matter of constitutional law 
and common sense.  According to the majority, the proper inquiry 
is whether "there is reasonable cause to believe that the 
specific things to be searched for and seized are located" 
within the container being searched.  Majority op. at ¶ 70, 
quoting 
Wyoming 
v. 
Houghton, 
526 
U.S. 
295, 
302 
(1999).  
Similarly, Professor LaFave emphasizes that "for a warrantless 
search of a container inside a vehicle to be lawful, the 
probable cause to search the vehicle must be as to objects 
which . . . could be concealed in the container opened."34 
¶96 The circumstances of the present case do not meet the 
test the majority opinion and Professor LaFave put forth.  The 
officer had already found the remnants of a twelve-pack of beer 
in the vehicle, containing both open and closed bottles.  
Majority op. at ¶ 11.  It is simply not reasonable to expect to 
                     
34 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the 
Fourth Amendment, § 7.2(d) at 506 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), and United States v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)).  See also LaFave, 1999 Supp. 
§ 7.2 at 63 (noting that U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999), does not change 
this analysis, as Houghton only allows searches of those 
passengers' belongings "capable of containing the object of the 
search"). 
No. 98-0896-CR.ssa 
 
9 
find open bottles of beer inside a duffel bag.  The majority 
opinion concedes at ¶ 51 that it is "unlikely" that the 
defendant "would store spillable open bottles of beer in a 
duffel bag as the vehicle is in motion."  The majority opinion's 
candor in this admission is diminished by its subsequent 
assertion that it was "conceivable" that the defendant put open 
bottles of beer in the duffel bag once the car was parked.  Why 
would the defendant put open bottles of beer in a duffel bag 
while leaving a twelve-pack containing open and closed bottles 
of beer out in plain view in the vehicle?  The mind boggles at 
the idea. 
¶97 Try as the majority opinion will, its reasoning that 
the officer was looking for further evidence of the civil 
offense is not persuasive.  The civil offense was completed when 
the officers found the open containers of alcoholic beverages.  
There is no showing that multiple containers constitute multiple 
offenses or increase the penalty.  I conclude that the officer 
lacked probable cause to search the duffel bag and that the 
search cannot be justified as a search for further evidence of 
the original offense. 
III 
¶98 Today's opinion, together with the decisions in State 
v. Fry35 and State v. King36, means that any violation of a civil 
                     
35 Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986).  
36 State v. King, 142 Wis. 2d 207, 418 N.W.2d 11 (Ct. App. 
1987).  
No. 98-0896-CR.ssa 
 
10
state or municipal traffic law, no matter how minor, can result 
in a driver's arrest and the search of every piece of luggage 
and any container in a car, no matter to whom it belongs and no 
matter whether there is any reason to believe such a container 
holds a weapon or evidence.   
¶99 I doubt that any member of this court would find it 
reasonable for a police officer to arrest him or her for a civil 
traffic offense and then search the entire passenger compartment 
and all the briefcases and luggage therein.  The law relating to 
the scope of warrantless automobile searches has reached a 
shockingly low standard and is inconsistent with the principle 
espoused recently by this court in State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72 
at ¶ 70, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, that "an individual 
traveling in an automobile does not lose all legitimate 
expectations of privacy." 
¶100 For the reasons stated, I dissent. 
¶101 I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent.