Case Title: Tibbets v. P & M Petroleum Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1987-10-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Tibbets v. P & M Petroleum Co.1987 WY 140744 P.2d 651Case Number: 87-117Decided: 10/28/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARIE P. TIBBETS, A 
WIDOW, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 
P & M PETROLEUM 
COMPANY, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

 
 
Charles E. Graves and 
Jane A. Villemez of Charles E. Graves & Associates, Cheyenne, for appellant.

 
 
Richard M. Davis, Jr. and 
Rebecca W. Thomson of Burgess & Davis, Sheridan, for appellee.

 
 
Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

 
 

BROWN, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     In this case we are 
concerned with the interpretation of a road easement agreement between appellant 
Marie P. Tibbets and her husband Coyne C. Tibbets, deceased, as grantors, and 
appellee P & M Petroleum Company's predecessor in interest, Texaco, Inc., as 
grantee. Mrs. Tibbets appeals from the order and judgment of the trial court 
directing a verdict against her on her claim for trespass and from the court's 
order denying a new trial.

 
 

[¶2.]     On appeal, Mrs. Tibbets 
urges the following issue, with which P & M essentially 
agrees:

 
 
"Whether the evidence 
adduced at trial of the contracting parties' intent precluded the court from 
directing a verdict in this contract-interpretation case."

 
 

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

 
 

[¶4.]     Mrs. Tibbets is the 
owner of a ranch located approximately twenty-five miles north of Leiter, Wyoming. A private roadway traverses the ranch 
property for approximately one and one-quarter miles to the Fence Creek Oil 
Field located outside the ranch. In the mid-1960's, oil companies began using 
this private road to reach this oil field.

 
 

[¶5.]     In 1971, Texaco, Inc., 
mailed a road easement to the Tibbets for their signatures offering to 
compensate the Tibbets for its use of the road. The Tibbets, however, found the 
agreement they received from Texaco, Inc., unfair, and to alleviate their 
concerns deleted portions of the agreement and inserted handwritten additions. 
In the agreement's first paragraph, the Tibbets deleted the words granting 
Texaco "the unconditional right and authority" to use the roadway, and inserted 
language requiring mutual agreement for such use as 
follows:

 
 
"[T]he undersigned * * * 
grants unto TEXACO, Inc., a Delaware corporation, its legal representatives, 
successors or assigns, with mutual 
agreement to build, maintain and use a roadway across any part of the 
following described land in Sheridan County, State of Wyoming * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
The Tibbets further 
altered the agreement to permit building, construction and maintenance of the 
roadway by Texaco "with mutual consent" rather than "at its election." It 
read:

 
 
"It is understood and 
agreed that the said TEXACO, Inc. will construct and maintain all necessary 
cattle guards and may, with mutual 
consent, perform any other building, construction and maintenance of the 
road and bridges across the above described land considered by it to be 
necessary for free and clear passage across and upon said land. * * *" (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
Finally, the Tibbets 
increased the minimum consideration for use of the roadway from $93.75 to 
$187.50 per year. The Tibbets then signed the altered road easement agreement on 
June 17, 1971, and returned it to Texaco, which accepted and also signed the 
agreement without change and began paying the specified 
consideration.

 
 

[¶6.]     In 1977, P & M 
purchased Texaco's interest in the Fence Creek Oil Field and its interest in the 
road easement agreement with the Tibbets. In 1981, the Tibbets and P & M 
renegotiated the annual use fee, and P & M began paying the Tibbets $375 per 
year to use the roadway.

 
 

[¶7.]     In 1983, Mrs. Tibbets 
sought to renegotiate the annual use fee to bring the payments in line with the 
higher fees paid by other oil companies to neighboring ranchers for use of the 
same roadway. P & M, however, did not agree to the increase in the annual 
easement fee requested by Mrs. Tibbets. She then placed "No Trespassing" signs 
on the road and notified P & M that unless the parties satisfactorily 
resolved the easement arrangement by September 1, 1985, continued use of the 
road by P & M would constitute trespass subject to a trespass fee of $100 
per day. Following receipt of this notice, P & M continued to use the 
roadway easement without contacting Mrs. Tibbets, and she elected to bring an 
action in trespass for damages.

 
 

[¶8.]     On January 22, 1987, a 
jury trial commenced, and at the close of the case, P & M moved for a 
directed verdict on Mrs. Tibbets' claim for trespass. On February 13, 1987, the 
court entered judgment in favor of P & M stating:

 
 
"* * * [N]o reasonable 
person could disagree that the intent of the interlineation was solely to 
control the road and not the annual payment and that a directed verdict should 
be entered in favor of the Defendant on Plaintiff's claim for trespass; the 
Court further finds that the Agreement dated June 17, 1971, is a valid and 
binding agreement, and the terms `mutual consent' and `mutual agreement' as 
interlineated by the Tibbets do not mean that the consideration payable by 
Defendant to the Plaintiff is negotiable annually."

 
 
The trial court also 
ordered that P & M pay Mrs. Tibbets $560 for each of the years 1983, 1984, 
1985 and 1986, and dismissed P & M's counterclaim for damages.1 The trial court also denied Mrs. 
Tibbets' motion for new trial on March 17, 1987. This appeal 
followed.

 
 

[¶9.]     We have often stated 
that when we construe a written agreement, we must derive the meaning of the 
instrument from its language if the terms are clear and unambiguous. Wyoming Recreation Commission v. Hagar, Wyo., 711 P.2d 402 (1985). When the language 
is clear, we look no further than the four corners of a contract to determine 
the intent of the parties. Holst v. Guynn, Wyo., 
696 P.2d 632 (1985). If the terms are clear, then it falls within the province 
of the court to construe the instrument as a matter of law. Nelson v. Nelson, 
Wyo., 740 P.2d 939 (1987); and Wyoming Recreation Commission v. Hagar, 
supra.

 
 

[¶10.]  Based on these standards, we hold the 
easement agreement to be clear and unambiguous, and that the directed verdict 
was proper. The easement agreement does not provide that the consideration 
payable by P & M to Mrs. Tibbets is negotiable annually. P & M was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

 
 

[¶11.]  We also note that the trial court allowed 
Mrs. Tibbets to testify in order that she might have the opportunity to fully 
develop her theory of the case. She now asserts that the trial court, in effect, 
determined that the agreement was ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence was 
necessary and admissible for proper interpretation. She relies on language in 
Wangler v. Federer, 
Wyo., 714 P.2d 1209, 1212 (1986), 
where we stated:

 
 
"`* * * Ambiguous 
contracts are agreements which, because of the language used, are obscure in 
their meaning. [Citations.] If upon a reading of the questioned agreement, we 
perceive an ambiguity, then resort to extrinsic evidence is proper in order to 
fully determine the intent of the contracting parties. * * * [W]ith an ambiguous 
agreement we will look to all of the surrounding circumstances and extrinsic 
evidence introduced with respect to intent. * * *' Rouse v. Munroe, Wyo., 658 P.2d 74, 77-78 
(1983)."

 
 
Mrs. Tibbets contends 
that her testimony, taken in a light most favorable to her, raises a factual 
question as to the intent of the parties to create an agreement that is subject 
to renegotiation by the parties upon the request of either party. Consequently, 
she argues that a final decision in this matter should have been left solely to 
the jury's determination. We cannot agree.

 
 

[¶12.]  The agreement presented here is not 
ambiguous. There was no need to hear any additional testimony in order to 
determine "intent." "* * * Generally, the question of intent is one of law, and 
fact questions only arise when the language utilized is not clear on its face. 
[Citation.]" Rouse v. Munroe, Wyo., 
658 P.2d 74, 78 (1983). Mrs. Tibbets' testimony in fact strengthens the trial 
court's determination that the original intent at the time the agreement was entered 
into did not include an intent that the yearly fee be negotiable annually or 
at any time when either party felt it necessary. If any such intent did arise, 
it was unilateral and arose after the making of the road easement 
agreement.

 
 

[¶13.]  We hold that the road easement agreement 
dated June 17, 1971, is a valid, unambiguous and binding agreement. 
Specifically, we hold that the terms "mutual consent" and "mutual agreement" do 
not mean that the consideration payable by P & M to Mrs. Tibbets is 
negotiable annually. The trial court was correct in denying her motion for a new 
trial.

 
 

[¶14.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 
This portion of the judgment was not appealed.