Case Title: Gordon J. Grube v. John L. Daun

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-2353 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Gordon J. Grube and Julie Grube, 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
John L. Daun, Louis Achter and Secura Insurance, 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 13, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 9, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Calumet 
 
JUDGE: 
Eugene F. McEssey 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs by 
Robert W. Lutz, Gary Jahn and Lutz, Burnett, McDermott, Jahn & 
King, Chilton and oral argument by Robert W. Lutz. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, John L. Daun, there 
was a brief by William F. Fale and Fale, Fale & Hemsing Law 
Offices, Sheboygan and oral argument by William F. Fale. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Louis Achter, there 
was a brief by Michael S. Siddall, Richard T. Elrod and Herrling, 
Clark, Hartzheim & Siddall, Ltd., Appleton and oral argument by 
Michael S. Siddall. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Secura Insurance 
Company, there was a brief by Ronald G. Pezze, Jr. And Peterson, 
Johnson & Murray, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by Ronald G. 
Pezze, Jr. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by John M. Van 
Lieshout, Colleen D. Ball, and Reinhart, Boerner, Van Deuren, 
Norris & Rieselbach, S.C., Milwaukee for the Firstar Corporation. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Susan R. Tyndall and 
Hinshaw & Culbertson, Milwaukee for the Civil Trial counsel of 
Wisconsin. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Lawrence E. 
Classen, Madison for the Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc.  
 
No. 95-2353 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-2353 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Gordon J. Grube and Julie Grube, 
 
  
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v. 
 
John L. Daun, Louis Achter and Secura 
Insurance, 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 13, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court.  
Affirmed. 
¶1 
JON 
P. 
WILCOX, 
J.  This 
case 
is 
on 
certification from the court of appeals following a 
jury trial in the Circuit Court for Calumet County, 
Eugene F. McEssey, Reserve Judge.  Gordon and Julie 
Grube brought suit against the defendants, John Daun, 
Louis 
Achter, 
and 
Secura 
Insurance, 
for 
misrepresentation and negligence.  The circuit court 
did 
not 
allow 
the 
Grubes 
to 
introduce 
evidence 
regarding Achter's alleged violation of Wis. Stat. § 
144.76.  The jury found that the defendants were not 
negligent, but did not consider the misrepresentation 
claims.  We affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
No. 95-2353 
 
2 
¶2 
We accepted two issues from the court of 
appeals on certification: (1) whether Subchapter IV of 
Chapter 144 of the Wisconsin Statutes creates a private 
cause of action for individuals who suffer damages from 
hazardous substance discharges, and (2) whether Wis. 
Stat. § 144.76 is a safety statute, violation of which 
is negligence per se.
1  We hold that  Subchapter IV of 
Chapter 144 does not create a private right of action 
and that Wis. Stat. § 144.76 is not a safety statute. 
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  In 
1974, Louis Achter bought a farm in Calumet County from 
his father.  While either Achter or his father owned 
the property, an underground storage tank was installed 
to store gasoline for the farm.  In 1978, Achter 
noticed that the underground storage tank was leaking. 
 He had the remaining gasoline pumped out and did not 
use the tank again.  Achter did not notify the 
Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") of the leak. 
¶4 
In 1984, Achter sold his farm to John Daun.  
Daun subdivided the land to create a parcel that 
consisted of a farmhouse, outbuildings and three acres. 
 Daun then offered the parcel with the farmhouse for 
                     
1 As the court of appeals stated in its request 
for certification, while additional issues were raised 
on 
appeal, 
those 
issues 
are 
controlled 
by 
our 
determination of the two certified issues.  At oral 
argument, the parties focused on the two certified 
issues and a third issue concerning the effect of an 
"as is" clause in the offer to purchase.  Due to our 
holding on the two certified issues, we do not 
consider what effect the "as is" clause has under 
these circumstances.  
No. 95-2353 
 
3 
sale.  This land, which included the underground 
storage tank, was purchased by Gordon and Julie Grube. 
¶5 
About three years after moving onto the 
property, 
the 
Grubes 
became 
aware 
of 
gasoline 
contamination while working on a well.  They reported 
the contamination to the DNR and were informed that, as 
the 
current 
owners 
of 
the 
property, 
they 
were 
responsible for taking remedial action. 
¶6 
In December of 1988, the Grubes filed suit 
against Daun, and later added Achter and his insurance 
carrier, Secura, as additional defendants.  The Grubes 
alleged 
negligent 
misrepresentation, 
breach 
of 
warranties, negligence by Achter in allowing the leak, 
negligence by Achter in failing to inform anyone of the 
leak, breach by Achter of his duty to keep the land 
environmentally safe for others, and strict liability 
for Achter's abnormally dangerous actions.  Daun filed 
a cross-claim against Achter.  Achter filed a third-
party complaint against Secura demanding that he be 
provided with both a defense and insurance coverage 
under his farmowners policy.  The defendants filed 
motions for summary judgment, and the circuit court 
dismissed a number of the Grubes' claims.  The Grubes 
appealed that decision, and the court of appeals 
reversed in part the decision of the circuit court, 
reinstating some of the Grubes' claims.  See Grube v. 
Daun, 173 Wis. 2d 30, 496 N.W.2d 106 (Ct. App. 1992).  
A petition for review was denied by this court. 
No. 95-2353 
 
4 
¶7 
The case was tried to a jury in March of 
1995. 
 
The 
Grubes 
sought 
to 
introduce 
evidence 
concerning the Achter's alleged violation of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 144.76(2) and (3)(1993-94).
2 Those sections provided 
in relevant part: 
 
(2) NOTICE 
OF DISCHARGE. (a) A person who 
possesses or controls a hazardous substance 
or who causes the discharge of a hazardous 
substance 
shall 
notify 
the 
department
3 
immediately of any discharge not exempted 
under sub. (9). 
(b) Notification received under this section 
or information obtained in a notification 
received under this section may not be used 
against 
the 
person 
making 
such 
a 
notification in any criminal proceedings. 
 
(c) The department shall designate a 24-hour 
statewide toll free or collect telephone 
number 
whereby 
notice 
of 
any 
hazardous 
discharge may be made. 
. . . 
(3) RESPONSIBILITY. A person who possesses or 
controls a hazardous substance which is 
discharged or who causes the discharge of a 
hazardous substance shall take the actions 
necessary to restore the environment to the 
extent practicable and minimize the harmful 
effects from the discharge to the air, lands 
or waters of this state.
4 
The Grubes asked the circuit court to hold that § 
144.76 was a safety statute and that Achter's alleged 
                     
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all future statutory 
references are to the 1993-94 volume. 
3 The department as used in this section refers to 
the Department of Natural Resources.  Wis. Stat. § 
144.01(2). 
4 Chapter 144 has been recodified, effective 
January 1, 1997.  See 1995 Wis. Act 227, § 1047. 
No. 95-2353 
 
5 
violation of the statute constituted negligence as a 
matter of law.  The circuit court held that the Grubes 
could not use § 144.76 as a standard of care and 
prohibited the Grubes from questioning witnesses about 
§ 144.76.  The court also refused to instruct the jury 
as to Achter's alleged violation of the statute and 
refused to give a that the special verdict question on 
Achter's violation.  The jury found defendants were not 
negligent. 
¶8 
Although the Grubes have been identified by 
the DNR as a potentially responsible party, they have 
not yet been required to remediate the property or to 
incur any expenses.  In addition, Achter has been 
notified in a letter from the DNR that he is 
responsible for remediation.  The letter further 
requested 
that 
Achter 
retain 
an 
environmental 
consultant to conduct an investigation. 
 
I. 
¶9 
The first issue we consider is whether 
Subchapter IV of Chapter 144 creates a private cause 
of action for individuals who suffer damages from 
hazardous substance spills.  Our resolution of this 
issue is dependent on our interpretation of Chapter 
144.  Issues involving statutory interpretation are 
questions of law that this court reviews de novo.  
Wagner Mobil, Inc. v. City of Madison, 190 Wis. 2d 
585, 591-92, 527 N.W.2d 301 (1995); Braatz v. LIRC, 
No. 95-2353 
 
6 
174 
Wis. 
2d 
286, 
293, 
496 
N.W.2d 
597 
(1993).  
Accordingly, we owe no deference to the decision of 
the circuit court.  Colby v. Columbia County, 202 Wis. 
2d 342, 349, 550 N.W.2d 124 (1996). 
 
¶10 The respondents assert that the language of 
Wis. Stat. § 144.76 and the structure of Chapter 144 
lack the legislative intent necessary to create a 
private right of action.  They contend that the court 
of appeals' case of Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics Co., 
164 Wis. 2d 639, 476 N.W.2d 593 (Ct. App. 1991), 
supports their position.  The Grubes maintain that 
Fortier is not relevant to our determination because 
that case concerned different sections of Chapter 144 
than those at issue here.  The Grubes further argue 
that Subchapter IV implicitly creates a private right 
of action. 
 
¶11 We first consider whether the court of 
appeals' decision in Fortier is applicable to our 
decision.  In Fortier, the court of appeals concluded 
that Wis. Stat. §§ 144.43 and 144.44 did not create a 
private right of action.  Pursuant to these sections of 
Chapter 144, the DNR had adopted an administrative rule 
regulating 
the 
disposal 
of 
hazardous 
waste 
at 
landfills.  The defendants violated that disposal rule 
by disposing of hazardous waste at an unlicensed 
landfill.  The court held that the statutes in question 
did not create a private right of action because they 
did not contain an expression of legislative intention 
No. 95-2353 
 
7 
to do so: "We infer from these provisions that the 
legislature intended that the violation of the DNR's 
solid waste disposal regulations is a public rather 
than a private wrong."  Fortier, 164 Wis. 2d at 661.  
Although the court of appeals' holding is pertinent to 
this case, as it dealt with different sections of 
Chapter 144 we must independently determine whether 
Subchapter IV of Chapter 144 creates a private right of 
action. 
 
¶12 A determination of whether a statute creates 
a private right of action is dependent on whether there 
is a clear indication of the legislature's intent to 
create such a right. Kranzush, 103 Wis. 2d at 79-80 
("the touchstone in the determination of [whether a 
private right of action is created] is the presence of 
an expression of legislative intent specifically to 
create such a right . . ."); McNeill, 55 Wis. 2d at 
258.  In McNeill we stated: 
 
The legislative intent to grant or withhold a 
private right of action for the violation of 
a statute, or the failure to perform a 
statutory duty, is determined primarily from 
the form or language of the statute.  The 
nature of the evil sought to be remedied, and 
the purpose it was intended to accomplish, 
may also be taken into consideration.  In 
this respect, the general rule is that a 
statute which does not purport to establish a 
civil liability, but merely makes provision 
to secure the safety or welfare of the public 
as 
an 
entity, 
is 
not 
subject 
to 
a 
construction establishing a civil liability. 
Id. at 258-59 (citation omitted); see also Kranzush, 
103 Wis. 2d at 74-75.  Accordingly, a private right of 
No. 95-2353 
 
8 
action is only created when (1) the language or the 
form of the statute evinces the legislature's intent to 
create a private right of action, and (2) the statute 
establishes private civil liability rather than merely 
providing for protection of the public.  The language 
and form of Chapter 144 do not suggest that the 
legislature intended to create a private right of 
action, but instead illustrate that this chapter was 
designed to provide general protection to the public.   
 
¶13 The hazardous substance spill at issue in 
this case is governed by Subchapter IV of Chapter 144 
which is entitled "Solid Waste, Hazardous Waste and 
Refuse."  Wis. Stat. § 144.76 is part of the hazardous 
waste provisions of Subchapter IV.  Thus, we begin our 
search 
for 
legislative 
intent 
by 
examining 
the 
declaration of policy for hazardous waste management 
contained in Wis. Stat. § 144.60(2): 
 
(2) DECLARATION OF POLICY.  The legislature finds 
that hazardous wastes, when mismanaged, pose 
a substantial danger to the environment and 
public health and safety.  To ensure that 
hazardous wastes are properly managed within 
this state, the legislature declares that a 
state-administered 
regulatory 
program 
is 
needed . . .     
It is indeed rare to find such a clear expression of 
the legislature's intent.  This section unequivocally 
illustrates that the intent of the hazardous waste 
management provisions was to protect the public in 
general.  Additional evidence of this intent is found 
in Wis. Stat. § 144.62 which establishes the powers and 
No. 95-2353 
 
9 
duties of the department.  Wis. Stat. § 144.62(3) 
provides: 
  
(3) The department may, by rule, prohibit 
particular methods of treatment or disposal 
of 
particular 
hazardous 
wastes, 
upon 
a 
finding that restrictions on treatment or 
disposal methods are necessary to protect 
public health and safety or the environment. 
 
¶14 The absence of a legislative intention to 
create a private right of action is also illustrated by 
provisions providing for enforcement by the state.  For 
example, Wis. Stat. § 144.98 (1987-88) provided: 
 
144.98 Enforcement; duty of department of 
justice; expenses.  The attorney general 
shall enforce this chapter and all rules, 
special orders, licenses, plan approvals and 
permits of the department. . . . For purposes 
of this proceeding where this chapter or the 
rule, special order, license, plan approval 
or permit prohibits in whole or in part any 
pollution, a violation is deemed a public 
nuisance. . . . 
In addition, Wis. Stat. § 144.442(9)(d) and (f) empower 
the state to seek reimbursement from responsible 
persons for the cost of environmental remediation.  
Wis. Stat. § 144.76 makes provision for the state to 
perform remediation and seek contribution from a 
responsible person, § 144.76(7)(a) and (b), or pursuant 
to § 144.76(7)(c) the state may force a responsible 
person to fulfill their duty under § 144.76(3).  
Section 144.76(7)(c) provides in relevant part: 
 
(c) The department, for the protection of 
public health, safety or welfare, may issue 
an emergency order or a special order to the 
person possessing, controlling or responsible 
for the discharge of hazardous substances to 
fulfill the duty imposed by sub. (3).  
No. 95-2353 
 
10
Such 
clear 
provisions 
for 
state 
action 
without 
corresponding provisions for private action are strong 
evidence of the absence of legislative intent to create 
a private right of action.
5 
 
¶15  In light of the overwhelming evidence that 
Subchapter IV of Chapter 144 was designed to provide 
general 
protection 
to 
the 
public, 
the 
explicit 
provisions providing for enforcement of Chapter 144 by 
the state, and the absence of any indication that the 
legislature intended to create a private right of 
action, we find that Subchapter IV of Chapter 144 does 
not create a private right of action.   
 
II. 
                     
5 
This 
court 
came 
to 
a 
similar 
conclusion 
concerning the intent of Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) in 
State v. Mauthe, 123 Wis. 2d 288, 366 N.W.2d 871 
(1985).  
In 
considering 
whether 
the 
legislature 
intended an owner of property containing contaminated 
soil to take remedial action, this court stated: 
Aldo 
Leopold, 
the 
great 
Wisconsin 
conservationist in his well-known work, A 
Sand County Almanac, (1948) at page 203 
said: 
 
"Individual 
thinkers 
since 
the 
days 
of 
Ezekiel and Isaiah have asserted that the 
despoliation of land is not only inexpedient 
but wrong." 
 
The 
statutes 
under 
consideration 
are 
a 
legislative recognition that the discharge 
of hazardous substances is one form of 
despoliation.  The legislature has enacted 
this law to correct that wrong. 
 
Id. at 303. 
No. 95-2353 
 
11
 
¶16 We next consider whether Wis. Stat. § 144.76 
is a safety statute, the violation of which is 
negligence per se.  The Grubes maintain that Chapter 
144 establishes a standard of care for the protection 
of the environment and is intended to protect Wisconsin 
residents 
from 
the 
dangers 
of 
environmental 
contamination.  The respondents contend that the 
statutory 
language 
does 
not 
indicate 
that 
the 
legislature intended § 144.76 to be a safety statute. 
¶17 Resolution of this issue is based on the 
interpretation of a statute which is a question of law 
that we review de novo.  Wagner, 190 Wis. at 591-92; 
Braatz, 174 Wis. 2d at 293.  Accordingly, we do not 
owe any deference to the decision of the circuit 
court. Colby, 202 Wis. 2d at 349.  A statute should 
not be construed as changing the common law unless the 
intent to cause such a change is clearly expressed in 
the statute.  Kranzush v. Badger State Mutual Casualty 
Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 74, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981). 
 
¶18 Accordingly, we must first determine whether 
Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) is a safety statute.  Safety 
statutes are those legislative enactments that are 
designed to protect a certain class of persons from a 
particular type of harm.  Bennett v. Larsen Co., 118 
Wis. 2d 681, 693-94, 348 N.W.2d 540 (1984); Walker v. 
Bignell, 100 Wis. 2d 256, 268, 301 N.W.2d 447 (1981).  
A statute is not a safety statute if the legislature 
merely intended to protect the general public.  See In 
No. 95-2353 
 
12
re Estate of Drab, 143 Wis. 2d 568, 570, 422 N.W.2d 144 
(Ct. App. 1988). 
 
¶19 Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) provides that a person 
who possesses a hazardous substance that is spilled 
"shall 
take 
actions 
necessary 
to 
restore 
the 
environment to the extent practicable and minimize the 
harmful effects from the discharge to the air, lands, 
or 
waters 
of 
this 
state." 
 
In 
addition, 
the 
declaration of policy for hazardous waste management, 
found in Wis. Stat. § 144.60(2), provides in relevant 
part: "The legislature finds that hazardous wastes, 
when mismanaged, pose a substantial danger to the 
environment and public health and safety."  From this 
language, it appears that the statute was designed to 
protect the public in general rather than a certain 
class of persons.  Therefore, we conclude that Wis. 
Stat. § 144.76(3) is not a safety statute. 
 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court 
is affirmed. 
 
No. 95-2353 
 
1 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-2353 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Gordon J. Grube and Julie Grube, 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
John L. Daun, Louis Achter and Secura Insurance, 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Previously Reported at:  210 Wis. 2d 682, 
 
563 N.W.2d 523  (1997). 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
November 12, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
No.  95-2353 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-2353 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Gordon J. Grube and Julie Grube, 
 
  
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v. 
 
John L. Daun, Louis Achter and Secura 
Insurance, 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 12, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
¶20 PER CURIAM  This case is again before the court in 
response to the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of our 
decision in Grube v. Daun, 210 Wis. 2d 682, 563 N.W.2d 523 
(1997).  In that opinion, upon certification from the court of 
appeals, this court affirmed the decision of the circuit court
6 
and rejected the plaintiffs' contentions that a private right of 
action existed under subchapter IV of Wis. Stat. ch. 144 (1993-
94).
7  We similarly rejected the plaintiffs' claims that 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 144.76, 
a 
nonsafety 
statute, 
constituted negligence per se. 
                     
6 Circuit Court for Calumet County, Eugene F. McEssey, 
Judge.  
7 Unless 
otherwise 
indicated, 
all 
future 
statutory 
references are to the 1993-94 volume.  
No.  95-2353 
 
2 
¶21 The plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration does not 
ask this court to revisit the two issues previously resolved.  
Instead, the plaintiffs ask this court to resolve eight 
additional issues raised before the court of appeals.  Since the 
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration does not challenge our 
resolution of the two certified issues, we deny the motion for 
reconsideration.  However, because the additional eight issues 
raised by the plaintiffs in the court of appeals were not 
controlled by our decision on the two certified issues, we 
determine that the plaintiffs are entitled to appellate review 
of those eight additional issues.  Accordingly, we deny the 
motion for reconsideration and address the additional issues.  
Upon review, we affirm the circuit court's disposition of these 
matters. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶22 This dispute arises from the sale of a parcel of land 
contaminated by a leaking underground storage tank ("UST").  
Defendant Louis Achter ("Achter"), who had lived on his family's 
farm in Calumet County all of his life, purchased the farm from 
his mother in 1974.  To facilitate farm operations, Achter, at 
some point in the early 1970s, had installed an underground tank 
to store gasoline for use by farm machinery.  In 1978, after 
refilling the UST and noticing a decreasing gas level, Achter 
discovered that gasoline was leaking from the tank.  Achter then 
had the remaining gasoline pumped out of the tank and placed in 
a new above-ground tank.  The old tank remained buried.  Achter 
continued to live on the property after the leak.  His family 
No.  95-2353 
 
3 
and livestock also subsequently relied on drinking water from 
one of several wells situated on the property. 
¶23 Defendant John Daun ("Daun"), also a farmer, purchased 
the 124-acre farm "as is" from Achter in early 1985.  Daun then 
subdivided the land to create a "farmette."  He offered the 
small parcel containing the farm buildings, three wells and the 
UST for sale.  Plaintiffs Julie and Gordon Grube purchased the 
parcel, also on an "as is" basis, from Daun in December 1985, 
with the expressed intention of making extensive renovations. 
¶24 Three 
years 
later, 
in 
the 
course 
of 
properly 
abandoning what was previously thought to be a dry well, the 
Grubes discovered groundwater gasoline contamination.  The 
Grubes reported the contamination to the Wisconsin Department of 
Natural Resources ("DNR") on the advice of counsel.  The DNR 
investigated the contamination and then responded by notifying 
the Grubes on October 3, 1988, and, later, defendant Achter, of 
their potential responsibility for the remediation costs of 
cleaning up the gasoline contamination. 
¶25 The Grubes filed suit against Daun on December 16, 
1988.  Daun responded by filing a third-party complaint against 
Achter.  The Grubes then amended their complaint several times 
to include Achter and his insurance company, Secura Insurance 
("Secura"), as defendants and to ask, in the alternative, that 
their purchase agreement with Daun be rescinded due to mutual 
mistake in the formation of the contract.  The Grubes alleged 
negligent 
misrepresentation, 
intentional 
misrepresentation, 
strict responsibility for misrepresentation, breach of warranty, 
No.  95-2353 
 
4 
negligence by Achter in allowing the leak, negligence by Achter 
for not reporting the leak to the DNR, breach of Achter's duty 
to keep the land safe, violation of Wis. Stat. § 100.18 which 
prohibits fraudulent misrepresentations, and strict liability 
for conducting an abnormally dangerous activity.
8 
¶26 Daun cross-claimed against Achter, while Achter filed 
a third-party complaint against Secura demanding that Secura 
provide him with a defense and cover any judgments against him. 
  The defendants also filed motions for summary judgment, which 
the circuit court granted in part, thereby dismissing many of 
the plaintiffs' claims.  The plaintiffs appealed the circuit 
court's orders.  The court of appeals reinstated some of the 
Grubes' claims.  See Grube v. Daun, 173 Wis. 2d 30, 496 N.W.2d 
106 (Ct. App. 1992).  The circuit court then dismissed the 
plaintiffs' claims for strict liability at a pretrial motion 
hearing in February 1995.  Responding to further objections, the 
circuit court dismissed the Grubes' claims for rescission on the 
first day of trial on the grounds that the Grubes had waived 
that form of relief by affirming the contract.  Finally, at a 
pre-verdict 
conference, 
the 
circuit 
court 
dismissed 
the 
misrepresentation claims due to a stipulation of counsel. 
¶27 Ultimately, the jury only considered claims based on 
the negligence of Achter and Thiel.  Because the plaintiffs' 
remaining misrepresentation claims against Daun were dependent 
                     
8 In a separate lawsuit, the Grubes sued Daun's real estate 
agent, Jerry Thiel.  The actions were later consolidated.  
No.  95-2353 
 
5 
on agency principles, the parties agreed to determine Daun's 
vicarious liability through post-verdict motions if Thiel were 
found negligent. 
¶28 The negligence claims were tried to the jury and the 
jury found Achter and Thiel not negligent.  The jury also found 
that the Grubes were negligent in their purchase of the 
property.  Post-verdict motions for relief were denied, with the 
circuit court expressly affirming the jury's verdict.  The 
Grubes appealed the circuit court proceedings on ten grounds.   
¶29 The court of appeals certified the private right of 
action and negligence per se questions to this court.  See Grube 
v. Daun, 210 Wis. 2d 682 (1997).  The court of appeals also 
noted in its certification to this court that all additional 
issues raised on appeal would be controlled by our resolution of 
the two certified questions.  While this court accepted the 
appeal on all matters before the court of appeals, and the 
plaintiffs relied on and supplemented their briefs before the 
court of appeals, our previous opinion addressed only the two 
certified questions. 
II.  MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION  
¶30 The plaintiffs do not seek reconsideration of the two 
issues resolved by this court in Grube v. Daun, 210 Wis. 2d 682, 
563 N.W.2d 523 (1997).  Rather, the plaintiffs point to this 
court's acceptance of certification to hear all issues raised 
before the court of appeals.  The plaintiffs also assert that 
the court of appeals' statement that the remaining eight 
No.  95-2353 
 
6 
appellate issues would be controlled by our decision on the 
certified issues was in error. 
¶31 This court will change a decision on reconsideration 
"only when the court has overlooked controlling legal precedent 
or 
important 
policy 
considerations 
or 
has 
overlooked 
or 
misconstrued a controlling or significant fact appearing in the 
record."  Wisconsin Supreme Court Operating Procedures, II J.  
Since the plaintiffs do not challenge this court's resolution of 
the 
two 
issues 
disposed 
of 
in 
our 
earlier 
decision, 
reconsideration is not an appropriate remedy. 
¶32 However, we determine that our reliance on the court 
of appeals' certification, stating that all other issues would 
be controlled by the two certified issues, was misplaced.  The 
additional eight issues raised by the plaintiffs in the court of 
appeals were not controlled by our prior decision.  We further 
determine that footnote 1 in Grube v. Daun, 210 Wis. 2d 682, 685 
n. 1, 563 N.W.2d 523 (1997) should be withdrawn
9 and that the 
plaintiffs are entitled to appellate review of those eight 
additional 
issues. 
 
Accordingly, 
we 
respond 
now 
to 
the 
plaintiffs' initial appeal on these issues.  
 
III. EVIDENCE OF COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE 
                     
9 In footnote 1 of Grube v. Daun, 210 Wis. 2d 682, we 
expressly declined to address the remaining issues based on the 
assertion that those issues were controlled by our resolution of 
the certified questions.  
No.  95-2353 
 
7 
¶33 The plaintiffs' most vigorous challenge on appeal 
attacks the circuit court's repeated refusal to allow evidence 
of Achter's violation of Wis. Stat. § 144.76
10 to be admitted as 
evidence of a standard of care for common law negligence 
purposes.  Evidentiary questions are properly resolved at the 
circuit court's discretion.  See State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 
334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983).  Where this court is asked to 
review such rulings, we look not to see if we agree with the 
circuit court's determination, but rather whether "the trial 
court exercised its discretion in accordance with accepted legal 
standards and in accordance with the facts of record."  State v. 
Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 342 (quoting State v. Wollman, 86 Wis. 2d 
459, 464, 273 N.W.2d 225 (1979)).  If a reasonable basis for the 
circuit court's ruling exists, we will not disturb it.  See 
State v. Harris, 123 Wis. 2d 231, 365 N.W.2d 922 (Ct. App. 
1985).  Our review of the trial record indicates that the 
circuit court properly exercised its discretion. 
¶34 At trial, plaintiffs' counsel repeatedly insisted that 
it was the plaintiffs' "right" to enter evidence of Achter's 
                     
10 Wis. Stat § 144.76(2) states in pertinent part: 
NOTICE OF DISCHARGE. (a) A person who possesses or 
controls a hazardous substance or who causes the 
discharge of a hazardous substance shall notify the 
department immediately of any discharge not exempted 
under sub. (9). 
 
(b) 
Notification received 
under 
this 
section or 
information obtained in a notification received under 
this section may not be used against the person making 
such a notification in any criminal proceedings. 
No.  95-2353 
 
8 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 144.76 to show a standard of care for 
common law negligence since the statute was "the law of the 
land."  However, absent a safety statute or an established 
private right of action, this court has never held that parties 
have an absolute right to admit evidence of violation of a civil 
statute to show a standard of care.  Even were this court 
inclined to adopt the plaintiffs' position that a violation of a 
civil statute can be generally admitted for such purposes, a 
question we decline to address on this appeal, the circuit 
court's discretionary refusal to admit the evidence in this case 
had a rational basis in the law and facts of the case. 
¶35 The record reflects that counsel for the defendants 
strongly objected to admission of Wis. Stat. § 144.76 as a 
standard of care.  Counsel based his objection on the grounds 
that application of Wis. Stat. § 144.76, a mandatory DNR 
reporting requirement, was irrelevant to a third-party common 
law action based on Achter's possession and control of a UST.  
Counsel further objected to admission of the statute on the 
grounds that the plaintiffs effectively sought to use the 
statute to create a back door private right of action or 
negligence per se claim – a result unduly prejudicial to the 
defense. 
¶36 Responding to defense counsel's objections, after 
hearing oral arguments on the issue at least seven times prior 
to and during the course of the trial, the circuit court barred 
evidence pertaining to the existence or violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 144.76.  In doing so, we believe the circuit court properly 
No.  95-2353 
 
9 
exercised its discretion to bar evidence with questionable 
relevancy that might also be unduly prejudicial under the facts 
of this case. See Wis. Stat. § 904.03. 
IV.  DISMISSAL OF MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM 
¶37 The 
plaintiffs 
submit 
a 
one-paragraph 
argument 
appealing the circuit court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' 
claims based on misrepresentation against defendant Daun.  In 
making this argument, the plaintiffs rely only on the bald 
assertion 
that 
they 
presented 
evidence 
concerning 
the 
misrepresentation claim at trial.  Relying on Ollerman v. 
O'Rourke Co., Inc., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 24, 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980), the 
plaintiffs assert that a claim should not be dismissed unless 
"it is quite clear that under no conditions can the plaintiff 
recover."  
¶38 In addressing this claim, we note that the record 
relating to this issue is incomplete.  Material discussions 
relating to the positions taken by parties as to the disposition 
of the misrepresentation claims were conducted off the record.  
In addition, and more importantly for our purposes, the 
plaintiffs' appeal from the circuit court's dismissal of the 
misrepresentation claims is undeveloped.  This court declines to 
address issues raised on appeal that are inadequately briefed.  
See McEvoy v. GHC, No. 96-0908, op. at 20 n.10 (S. Ct. November 
12, 1997); State v. Flynn, 190 Wis. 2d 31, 58, 527 N.W.2d 343 
(Ct. App. 1994).  Accordingly, the circuit court's decision on 
this claim is affirmed. 
No.  95-2353 
 
10
V. DISMISSAL OF STRICT LIABILITY CLAIM AGAINST ACHTER 
¶39 The plaintiffs next allege that "the leakage of [the 
underground 
storage] 
tank 
and 
the 
resulting 
substantial 
environmental contamination, combined with Achter's failure to 
take any action to minimize the damage, remediate it, or at 
least report it to authorities" constitutes an "abnormally 
dangerous activity" that subjects Achter to strict liability.  
See Brief of Pet. at 43-44.  Looking 
to 
the 
definition 
of 
abnormally dangerous activities present in Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, §§ 519-20 (1977), adopted by this court in Bennett v. 
Larsen Co., 118 Wis. 2d 681, 703, 348 N.W.2d 540 (1984), the 
circuit court dismissed the plaintiffs' strict liability claims 
against Achter.  Upon review, where the facts are undisputed, 
whether an activity is abnormally dangerous "is to be determined 
by the court, upon consideration of all the factors listed in 
sec. 520, and the weight given to each that it merits upon the 
facts in evidence."  Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics Co., 164 Wis. 
2d 639, 668, 476 N.W.2d 593 (Ct. App. 1991).  Thus, a question 
of law is presented which we review de novo. 
¶40 Restatement (Second) § 520 lists six factors for 
determining if an activity is abnormally dangerous: 
 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to 
the person, land or chattels of others; 
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will 
be great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of 
reasonable care; 
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of 
common usage; 
No.  95-2353 
 
11
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place 
where it is carried on; and  
(f) extent to which its value to the community is 
outweighed by its dangerous attributes. 
These factors are interrelated and should be considered as a 
whole, with weight being apportioned by the court in accordance 
with the facts in evidence.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
§ 520 cmt.1 (1977). 
¶41 As an initial matter, we reject the plaintiffs' 
assertion 
that 
the 
leakage 
and 
resulting 
contamination 
attributable to a UST is the appropriate activity to be analyzed 
under the Restatement.  The contamination is the resulting harm, 
not the alleged ultrahazardous activity itself.  Thus, we 
instead examine whether Achter's installation and use of a UST 
on a farm in the 1970s, without more, constitutes an abnormally 
dangerous activity that requires the imposition of strict 
liability in the event of harm to others.  We conclude based on 
the facts of this case that Achter's use of a UST did not 
constitute an abnormally dangerous activity.  Cf. Fortier, 164 
Wis. 2d at 675 (holding that deposit of VOC contaminated waste 
in landfill was not an abnormally dangerous activity); Arlington 
Forest Assocs. v. Exxon Corp., 774 F. Supp. 387 (E.D. Va. 
1991)(holding that storage and removal of gasoline from UST does 
not constitute an abnormally dangerous activity under Virginia 
law). 
¶42 USTs, 
while 
admittedly 
disfavored 
under 
today's 
environmental laws, are not inherently dangerous.  Absent 
negligence or application of an outside force, use of a UST does 
No.  95-2353 
 
12
not create a high degree of risk of harm to the person, land or 
chattels of another.  Moreover, those risks that do exist can be 
minimized by the exercise of reasonable care by the owner or 
possessor of the tank.  As one court has noted:  
 
If an activity can be performed safely with ordinary 
care, negligence serves both as an adequate remedy for 
 injury and a sufficient deterrent to carelessness.  
Strict liability is reserved for selected uncommon and 
extraordinarily 
dangerous 
activities 
for 
which 
negligence is an inadequate deterrent or remedy. 
Arlington, 774 F. Supp. at 390. 
¶43 While USTs are not as popular today as they once were, 
as the testimony of Daun and Achter indicates, use of USTs on 
farms in the 1970s was a common occurrence.  Such storage tanks 
were commonly placed near farm buildings, and thus near wells, 
to facilitate ready access by farm implements.  All of these 
factors weigh against imposition of strict liability in this 
case. 
¶44 We acknowledge in hindsight that the likelihood of 
harm resulting from use of a UST that leaks is significant and 
that such harm may today in certain circumstances outweigh the 
utility of using USTs.  However, at the time the allegedly 
hazardous activity took place, the value to the community of 
having USTs was believed to outweigh any danger from their use. 
 Cf. Fortier, 164 Wis. 2d at 674-75. Both the general community 
and the DNR were operating under the mistaken impression that 
the introduction of petroleum products into soil presented no 
threat.  Accordingly, because the Restatement factors are to be 
considered as a whole, based on the facts at hand, we reject 
No.  95-2353 
 
13
application of strict liability in this case and affirm the 
circuit court's dismissal of the strict liability claim. 
No.  95-2353 
 
14
VI.  ABSENCE OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE 
¶45 The plaintiffs attack the jury verdict for the 
defendants as lacking any "credible evidence."  Jury verdicts 
will be sustained on appeal if there is any "credible evidence" 
to support the verdict.  See Meurer v. ITT General Controls, 90 
Wis. 2d 438, 449, 280 N.W.2d 156 (1979).  Upon review, appellate 
courts must look for evidence to support the verdict, while 
"accepting any reasonable inferences favorable to the verdict 
that the jury could have drawn from that evidence."  Staehler v. 
Beuthin, 206 Wis. 2d 609, 616, 557 N.W.2d 487 (Ct. App. 1996).  
Our presumption in favor of the jury verdict is particularly 
applicable where the circuit court has indicated its agreement 
with the verdict.  See Herro v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 67 
Wis. 2d 407, 413, 227 N.W.2d 456 (1975); McGuire v. Stein's Gift 
and Garden Center, Inc., 178 Wis. 2d 379, 397, 504 N.W.2d 385 
(Ct. App. 1993). 
¶46 The trial record indicates that the parties presented 
conflicting evidence on the issue of Achter's negligence in 
allowing the gasoline leak to occur and in failing to report the 
offending leak to the DNR.  Achter presented evidence that he 
installed the gas tank following the regular procedures of the 
time and that he consulted with several members of the farming 
community who had previously installed similar USTs.  He 
testified that he regularly checked the level of gasoline in the 
underground storage tank.  When he discovered the leak, Achter 
arranged to have the tank emptied.  He further presented 
evidence that other farmers and the DNR operated under the 
No.  95-2353 
 
15
belief (now known to be mistaken) that there was no danger of 
groundwater contamination arising from petroleum products being 
introduced into the soil. 
¶47 Based on the evidence reflected above, we find that 
there was sufficient credible evidence to support the jury's 
finding that Achter was "not negligent."  In so doing, we also 
acknowledge the added weight to be given to the verdict in light 
of the circuit court's finding in this case that: 
 
I think there's ample evidence from the jury to 
support the findings of the verdict, particularly as 
in question one, was Louis Achter negligent in 
respect, possession of an underground gasoline tank, 
they answered that no . . . . The jury could easily 
find that Louis Achter was not negligent and the Court 
so upholds. 
See Herro, 67 Wis. 2d at 413.  Accordingly, we sustain the jury 
verdict. 
VII.  ERRONEOUS EXERCISE OF DISCRETION BY USE OF 
WIS JICIVIL 1019 
¶48 The plaintiffs appeal the circuit court's use of a 
modified version of Wisconsin Jury Instruction—Civil 1019 in 
instructing the jury on the "custom" of Wisconsin farmers.  
Specifically, the circuit court instructed the jury: 
 
Evidence has been received as to the custom regarding 
the practice of farmers regarding use of underground 
storage tanks in the 1970's.  This evidence will be 
weighed and examined by you as it may bear upon 
whether the conduct of Mr. Achter measures up to the 
standard of ordinary care.  This evidence of practice 
is not conclusive as to what meets the standard for 
ordinary care.  What is generally done by farmers 
engaged in a similar activity has some bearing on what 
an ordinary prudent person would do under the same or 
like circumstances.  A practice which is obviously 
No.  95-2353 
 
16
unreasonable cannot serve to excuse a person from 
responsibility for carelessness. 
¶49 The plaintiffs label this instruction an erroneous 
exercise of the circuit court's discretion.  They claim 
impropriety because the testimony concerning custom was of 
insufficient weight.  They assert that any custom instruction 
given to the jury should have been focused on the custom of 
maintaining a leaking UST.  They argue that the allegedly 
misleading 
instruction 
confused 
the 
jury. 
 
Finally, 
the 
plaintiffs argue that the circuit court erroneously based its 
decision to give the instruction in part on its own knowledge 
and judgment.  
¶50 Circuit 
courts 
have 
significant 
discretion 
when 
conveying instructions to the jury so long as the trial court 
"fully and fairly informs the jury of the rules and principles 
of law applicable to the particular case."  Nowatske v. 
Osterloh, 198 Wis. 2d 419, 428, 543 N.W.2d 265 (1996)(citing 
Peplinski v. Fobe's Roofing, Inc., 193 Wis. 2d 6, 24, 531 N.W.2d 
597 (1995)).  The circuit court must instruct the jury with due 
regard to the facts of the case.  See Nowatske, 198 Wis. 2d at 
428.  The instruction should not be unduly unfavorable to any 
party.  See id.  Appellate courts must consider the challenged 
jury instruction as a whole to determine if the instruction was 
erroneous.  See id. at 429.  Finally, when a circuit court has 
given an erroneous instruction or has erroneously refused to 
give an instruction, a new trial is not warranted unless the 
error is prejudicial.  See id. 
No.  95-2353 
 
17
¶51 We find that the circuit court properly tailored the 
standard jury instruction, Wis JICivil 1019, to the facts and 
claims of this case.  The Grubes' sole remaining claim against 
Achter at trial centered on Achter's common law negligence in 
maintaining a UST on his farm in the 1970s.  Custom is a valid 
indicator of a standard of care in common law negligence cases 
and circuit courts should not hesitate in appropriate cases to 
tailor standard jury instructions to the facts of the cases 
before them.  See Buel v. LaCrosse Transit Co., 77 Wis. 2d 480, 
492, 253 N.W.2d 232 (1977).  Moreover, the plaintiffs' assertion 
that the custom instruction should have related to the custom of 
maintaining a "leaking" UST is inapposite.  This argument is 
similar to the one we rejected in the plaintiffs' strict 
liability appeal.  The relevant standard of care is the care an 
ordinary person would take under similar circumstances to 
maintain a UST in working order.  Thus, the instruction given 
adequately covers the law and the facts and is not an erroneous 
exercise of the circuit court's discretion.  
VIII. RESCISSION CLAIM 
¶52 The plaintiffs' original complaint, filed in December 
of 1988, asked only for contract damages.  Seven months later, 
in late July 1989, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to 
include a request, in the alternative, that the real estate sale 
contract with Daun be rescinded based on mutual mistake.  On the 
first day of trial, defendant Secura objected to the alternative 
request for relief on the grounds that the Grubes had unduly 
delayed in asking for rescission, that the Grubes had affirmed 
No.  95-2353 
 
18
the contract by filing their initial suit only in damages, and 
that the Grubes had affirmed the sales contract by performing it 
and continuing to make renovations to the property after 
discovering the contamination. 
¶53 In Wisconsin, a party damaged by a sales contract 
entered through fraud or mistake may choose between the 
alternative remedies of contract damages or rescission of that 
contract.  See Weinhagen v. Hayes, 174 Wis. 233, 249, 178 N.W. 
780 (1920).  However, that party's right to chose between these 
remedies is waived if the party "unreasonably delays in 
asserting that right or affirms the agreement after learning of 
the fraud or mistake giving rise to the right of rescission."  
Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 115 Wis. 2d 289, 319, 340 
N.W.2d 704 (1983)(following Restatement of Restitution, §§ 64, 
68 (1937)).  Where the facts of a case are "practically 
undisputed," the question of waiver is one of law that this 
court can review independently.  See Thompson, 115 Wis. 2d at 
289 (citing Weinhagen 174 Wis. at 249).  Upon review of the 
record we find that the Grubes unequivocally affirmed the 
contract of sale through their actions after discovering the 
contamination that they assert constitutes the mutual mistake 
entitling them to rescission. 
¶54 The Grubes purchased the property in 1985.  They did 
not discover the underground contamination until late August 
1988.  They obtained counsel in September 1988, and notified the 
DNR of the contamination that same month.  The Grubes then filed 
their initial complaint against the defendant Daun in December 
No.  95-2353 
 
19
1988, asking only for contract damages.
11  The record reflects 
that after discovering the groundwater contamination, and after 
obtaining the advice of counsel, the Grubes continued to live on 
and make extensive improvements to the contaminated parcel of 
land.   
¶55 Gordon 
Grube 
testified 
at 
his 
deposition 
that 
additional plumbing work was completed on the property in 
September 1988.  In October and November, Grube purchased 
materials for and fixed the chimney on the home and replaced 
some of the windows and blinds.  In January of the following 
year, more than four months after discovering the contamination, 
the Grubes continued to remodel the plumbing system.  In May 
1989, 
Gordon 
Grube 
purchased 
materials 
to 
landscape 
the 
curtilage of the property and poured a cement slab.  In August 
1989, Gordon Grube purchased and began replacing shingles that 
had blown off the house and other buildings.  In October 1989, 
the Grubes installed an 8-foot by 24-foot cement patio along the 
edge of the kitchen porch they had built previously.  Finally, 
we note that the Grubes did not abandon the property until four 
years after discovering the offending contamination.  Even if we 
assume that there was a mutual mistake of fact that would have 
allowed the contract to be rescinded, we find the actions 
described above to be an affirmance of that contract, thus 
                     
11 Because we determine that the Grubes affirmed the 
contract through their actions after discovering the groundwater 
contamination, we do not reach the question of the effect of the 
Grubes' failure to plead rescission until their Third Amended 
Complaint.  
No.  95-2353 
 
20
precluding relief based on rescission.  The circuit court 
correctly dismissed the request for relief on that basis. 
IX.  NEW TRIAL IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 
¶56 The plaintiffs assert that the circuit court erred in 
not granting a new trial in the "interests of justice."  This 
court has inherent and express authority under Wis. Stat. 
§ 751.06 (1995-96) to reverse a judgment if it appears that "the 
real controversy has not been fully tried, or that it is 
probable that justice has for any reason miscarried."  Stivarius 
v. DiVall, 121 Wis. 2d 145, 151, 358 N.W.2d 530 (1984).  Under 
this authority, we grant a new trial only with "reluctance and 
great caution."  Id.  
¶57 This appellate claim is raised by the plaintiffs as a 
sort of "catch-all" claim.  Because we deny relief to the 
plaintiffs on each of their other appellate questions, and 
because we find it unlikely that a new trial under "optimum 
circumstances will produce a different result," Garcia v. State, 
73 Wis. 2d 651, 654, 245 N.W.2d 654 (1976), we deny the 
plaintiffs' request for a new trial in the interests of justice. 
X.  TAXABLE COSTS 
¶58 Lastly, the plaintiffs appeal the circuit court's 
assessment of taxable costs.  The plaintiffs allege that the 
defendants failed to itemize properly their bills of cost under 
Wis. Stat. § 814.10(2)
12 and that the circuit court taxed the 
                     
12 Wis. Stat. § 814.10(2) provides:  "Cost Bill, Service.  
All bills of costs shall be itemized and served with the notice 
of taxation." 
No.  95-2353 
 
21
costs prematurely, in violation of the procedures laid out in 
Wis. Stat. § 814.10(4).
13  Awards of costs are a matter of 
discretion for the circuit court, and will not be disturbed 
absent an erroneous exercise of discretion.  See Hughes v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 188 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 523 N.W.2d 197 (Ct. 
App. 1994). 
¶59 The record indicates that the defendants sufficiently 
itemized their costs by category for purposes of application of 
§ 814.10(2).  The circuit court examined the itemized bills of 
cost and found that, after seven years of litigation, the costs 
incurred were reasonable.  We do not believe the court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in this matter. 
¶60 Finally, the circuit court explicitly acknowledged 
that its grant of taxable costs at the July 28, 1995, motion 
hearing disregarded the procedural requirements present in Wis. 
Stat. § 814.10.  We note that the defendants correctly filed 
their bills of costs with the clerk and that the plaintiffs 
responded by filing their objections, all pursuant to statute.  
The circuit court then took up the matter of some of the bills 
                     
13 Wis. Stat. § 814.10(4) states:  
 
Court Review.  The clerk shall note on the bill 
all items disallowed, and all items allowed, to which 
objections have been made.  This action may be 
reviewed by the court on motion of the party aggrieved 
made and served within 10 days after taxation.  The 
review shall be founded on the bill of costs and the 
objections and proof on file in respect to the bill of 
costs.  No objection shall be entertained on review 
which was not made before the clerk, except to prevent 
great hardship or manifest injustice.  Motions under 
this subsection may be heard under s. 807.13. 
No.  95-2353 
 
22
of costs at a post-verdict motion hearing on July 28, 1995.  
Based on the written objections of the plaintiffs, and on oral 
arguments on the issue presented by counsel at that hearing, the 
circuit court denied the objection.  The plaintiffs only then 
objected to the circuit court's failure to wait for their motion 
bringing their objections before the court within 10 days of 
taxation of the costs by the clerk.  Because we find the circuit 
court's actions to be a mere technical violation of the statute 
that did not prejudice the plaintiffs in any way, the circuit 
court's actions were harmless error.  See Helmbrecht v. St. Paul 
Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 94, 131, 362 N.W.2d 118, 137 (1985). 
¶61 Accordingly, 
the 
plaintiffs' 
motion 
for 
reconsideration is denied.  After withdrawing footnote 1 in 
Grube v. Daun, 210 Wis. 2d 682, 563 N.W.2d 523 (1997), we affirm 
the remaining decisions of the circuit court.