Case Title: Maynard v. Brandon

Citation: 

Docket Number: S114829

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 7/11/05 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
JAMES N. MAYNARD, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S114829 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/2 E031430 
LOUISE BRANDON et al., 
) 
 
) 
Riverside County 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. RIC331910 
___________________________________ ) 
 
This case presents the issue of whether relief under Code of Civil Procedure 
section 473, subdivision (b)1 is available when a party files an untimely request for 
a trial following an arbitration conducted pursuant to the mandatory fee arbitration 
act, Business and Professions Code section 6200 et seq. (the MFAA).  Section 
473, subdivision (b) authorizes a court to relieve a party from a “judgment, 
dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”  Section 473, subdivision 
(b) also requires a court to grant relief from a default, default judgment, or 
dismissal resulting from a mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect attested to by 
an attorney in a supporting affidavit.  Here, defendants demanded arbitration under 
the MFAA in response to a lawsuit initiated by plaintiff, defendants’ former 
                                              
1  
All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure 
unless otherwise indicated.   
 
 
2
attorney, seeking attorney fees.  After an arbitration panel issued an award in 
plaintiff’s favor, defendants demanded a trial following arbitration, as allowed by 
the MFAA.  Due to miscommunication between defendants’ attorney and his 
secretary, however, the request for a trial following arbitration was filed with the 
court after the applicable statutory deadline.  Defendants then sought relief under 
section 473, subdivision (b) on the ground that their failure to timely file the 
request resulted from their attorney’s excusable error.  The trial court denied relief, 
holding that section 473, subdivision (b) did not apply under the circumstances.  
The Court of Appeal disagreed and reversed.   
We conclude that section 473, subdivision (b) cannot remedy a failure to 
meet the 30-day deadline for seeking a trial following arbitration under the 
MFAA.  In allowing parties to seek a trial de novo after fee arbitration, the MFAA 
incorporates a procedure analogous for present purposes to a conventional appeal.  
As a general rule, section 473, subdivision (b) cannot extend the period in which a 
party must file a notice of appeal.  No persuasive justification exists for departing 
from this well-established principle here, as the MFAA’s terms, policy goals, and 
legislative history all indicate that the Legislature did not intend for the 30-day 
deadline for seeking a trial after fee arbitration to be subject to extension through 
invocation of section 473, subdivision (b).  Accordingly, we reverse the Court of 
Appeal. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The parties agree that these are the relevant facts.  On August 23, 1999, 
plaintiff James N. Maynard, an attorney, sued defendants Louise Brandon; 
Satyananda Apaji Tagra also known as Frederick Saylor; Lakoo Kriya Church, 
successor organization to the Joy Life Church; and the Institute of Spiritual 
Education and Evolution in Riverside County Superior Court.  With his lawsuit, 
plaintiff sought to recover legal fees allegedly owed him for his work in a dispute 
 
 
3
involving a trust.  Instead of answering the complaint, defendants invoked their 
right under the MFAA to compel arbitration of the dispute.  Plaintiff’s suit was 
stayed pending completion of the arbitration.   
 
After a hearing on the merits, the arbitration panel awarded plaintiff 
$101,000, an amount representing some, though not all, of the fees he sought.  The 
panel mailed the notice of award to plaintiff and to defendants’ prior counsel on 
August 27, 2001.  Defendants retained new counsel on September 12, 2001.   
 
An arbitration award becomes binding under the MFAA 30 days after the 
mailing of the notice of award, unless a party has within that time filed a request 
for a de novo trial after arbitration with an appropriate court.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§§ 6203, subd. (b), 6204, subds. (b), (c).)  On September 24, 2001, defendants’ 
new counsel mailed a “rejection of arbitration award” to plaintiff.  However, the 
rejection was not filed with the Riverside County Superior Court until October 2, 
2001, by which time the 30-day period for seeking a trial following arbitration 
already had expired.   
 
Defendants subsequently filed a request for relief under section 473, 
subdivision (b).  Defendants’ request for relief claimed that the arbitration award 
had become binding only due to their attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect in failing to timely file the request for a trial following 
arbitration.  In a declaration filed in connection with the request for relief, 
defendants’ counsel attributed the late filing to his secretary’s unforeseen 
departure from work due to a death in her family.   
 
After finding that defendants had improperly noticed their request for relief, 
on December 4, 2001, the trial court granted plaintiff’s petition to confirm the 
arbitration award.  On January 28, 2002, the trial court denied defendants’ noticed 
motion for relief under section 473, subdivision (b) from the order confirming the 
award.  In denying the motion, the trial court concluded that the MFAA’s deadline 
 
 
4
for seeking a trial following arbitration was not amenable to section 473, 
subdivision (b) relief.  Three days later, the court issued a judgment for plaintiff in 
the amount of $101,000.   
 
Defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment.  The 
Court of Appeal likened the procedure for a trial after MFAA arbitration — at 
least in situations where the arbitration is commenced after an attorney initiates a 
lawsuit seeking recovery of fees — to the right to a trial de novo following judicial 
arbitration.  (§ 1141.20; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1616(a).)  As the judicial 
arbitration statute and California Rules of Court both expressly authorize section 
473, subdivision (b) relief in connection with a party’s failure to timely seek a trial 
de novo following judicial arbitration (§ 1141.23; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
1615(d)(1)), the Court of Appeal reasoned that the same relief should be available 
here.   
 
In so holding, the decision below recognized the long-standing 
disagreement between the Courts of Appeal regarding the availability of section 
473, subdivision (b) relief upon a failure to comply with the 30-day deadline for 
seeking a trial following arbitration under the MFAA, with Simpson v. Williams 
(1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 285, 290-291 (Simpson) holding that such relief is 
authorized, and Shiver, McGrane & Martin v. Littell (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1041, 
1047-1049 holding to the contrary.  We granted review to resolve this conflict.2      
                                              
2  
Following briefing but before oral argument, the parties notified the court 
that they had settled their dispute, thus rendering the appeal moot as to the parties.  
Since this case “raises issues of continuing public importance,” we have elected to 
retain jurisdiction in order to decide the issue presented.  (Lundquist v. Reusser 
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1193, 1202, fn. 8.)   
 
 
5
DISCUSSION  
 
The present dispute concerns the interplay between section 473, subdivision 
(b) and the MFAA’s 30-day deadline for seeking a trial after fee arbitration.  
Defendants argue that upon a showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect, section 473, subdivision (b) allows a court to relieve a party in 
their position from the consequences of a failure to meet this deadline.  Plaintiff, 
for his part, contends that the 30-day deadline is mandatory and jurisdictional and 
that section 473, subdivision (b) therefore does not apply.     
 
Section 473, subdivision (b) provides in pertinent part that “[t]he court 
may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal 
representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against 
him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect,” provided relief is sought “within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding 
six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.”  In 
addition to authorizing discretionary relief, section 473, subdivision (b) requires a 
court to vacate a default, default judgment, or dismissal resulting from attorney 
“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect” where the culpable attorney timely 
files a sworn affidavit attesting to his or her error.  
 
“ ‘[T]he provisions of section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure are to be 
liberally construed and sound policy favors the determination of actions on their 
merits.’  [Citation.]”  (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 249, 256.)  “[B]ecause the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the 
merits, any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party 
seeking relief from default.”  (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 
233.)  
 
 The term “proceeding,” as used in section 473, subdivision (b), 
incorporates “ ‘[a]ll the steps or measures adopted in the prosecution or defense of 
 
 
6
an action.’  [Citation.]”  (Zellerino v. Brown (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1097, 1105.)  
Accordingly, section 473, subdivision (b) may afford parties relief from the 
consequences of a wide variety of procedural errors committed in the course of an 
action.  Errors held to be amenable to section 473, subdivision (b) relief include 
the issuance of untimely demands for expert witness disclosures (Zellerino at 
pp. 1107, 1109), erroneous offers to compromise (Zamora v. Clayborn 
Contracting Group, Inc., supra, 28 Cal.4th 249, 256), inadvertent dismissals 
(Palace Hardware Co. v. Smith (1901) 134 Cal. 381, 384), failures to timely 
respond to requests for admissions under section 2033 (Elston v. City of Turlock, 
supra, 38 Cal.3d 227, 234), and the untimely filing of cost bills (Soda v. Marriott 
(1933) 130 Cal.App. 589, 594), just to name a few.    
 
Notwithstanding the broad construction afforded section 473, subdivision 
(b), the statute does not offer relief from mandatory deadlines deemed 
jurisdictional in nature.  (Estate of Simmons (1914) 168 Cal. 390, 396; 8 Witkin, 
Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 155, p. 657.)  
Thus section 473, subdivision (b) cannot extend the time in which a party must 
move for a new trial, since this time limit is considered jurisdictional.  (Union 
Collection Co. v. Oliver (1912) 162 Cal. 755, 756-757; Kisling v. Otani (1962) 
201 Cal.App.2d 62, 68.)  Nor does section 473, subdivision (b) generally apply to 
dismissals attributable to a party’s failure to comply with the applicable limitations 
period in which to institute an action, whether by complaint (Castro v. Sacramento 
County Fire Protection Dist. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 927, 933; Hanooka v. Pivko 
(1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1553, 1563) or by writ petition (Kupka v. Board of 
Administration (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 791, 794-795).  
 
Furthermore, except as authorized by statute, section 473, subdivision (b) 
may not excuse the untimely filing of a notice of appeal.  (Pressler v. Donald L. 
Bren Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 831, 834 fn. 5 (Pressler).)  “The requirement as to the 
 
 
7
time for taking an appeal is mandatory, and the court is without jurisdiction to 
consider one which has been taken subsequent to the expiration of the statutory 
period.  In the absence of statutory authorization, neither the trial nor appellate 
courts may extend or shorten the time for appeal, even to relieve against mistake, 
inadvertence, accident, or misfortune.”  (Stuart Whitman, Inc. v. Cataldo (1986) 
180 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1113.)     
 
With these principles in mind, we turn to the MFAA’s provisions regarding 
the arbitration of fee disputes.  Arbitration under the MFAA is limited to disputes 
concerning legal fees, costs, or both.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6200, subd. (a).)  In 
the absence of written consent to arbitration, only one party to a fee dispute — the 
client — can compel submission of the controversy to an MFAA arbitration panel.  
(Id., subd. (c).)  Attorneys may invite, but cannot require, clients to participate in 
MFAA arbitration.  (Ibid.)  Fee arbitration may occur either before an attorney 
files a complaint seeking recovery of fees, or after such an action has been 
initiated but before the client files an answer.  (Id., § 6201, subd. (b).)3  The filing 
and service of a request for arbitration automatically stays a pending lawsuit 
pertaining to fees, which remains stayed until the arbitrators issue their decision or 
the arbitration is otherwise terminated.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6201, subd. (c).)  
An MFAA arbitration award is not binding unless the parties agree otherwise.  
(Id., § 6204, subd. (a).)  Yet the MFAA also provides that “[e]ven if the parties to 
the arbitration have not agreed in writing to be bound, the arbitration award shall 
become binding upon the passage of 30 days after mailing of notice of the award, 
                                              
3    
A client waives the right to MFAA arbitration upon commencing an action 
or filing a pleading that seeks judicial resolution of a fee dispute or that requests 
affirmative relief against the responsible attorney for malpractice or professional 
misconduct.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6201, subd. (d); Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 
Cal.4th 974, 987.) 
 
 
8
unless a party has, within the 30 days, sought a trial after arbitration . . . .”  (Id., 
§ 6203, subd. (b).)  This trial after arbitration is conducted de novo, essentially as 
if no arbitration had occurred.  (Id., § 6204, subd. (e); Aguilar v. Lerner, supra, 32 
Cal.4th at p. 985.)   
 
The MFAA’s provisions for trial after arbitration were incorporated into the 
statute in response to attorney concerns that compulsory arbitration would 
otherwise deny them a jury trial on their claims relating to fees.  (Special Com. on 
Resolution of Attorney Fee Disputes, letter to Bd. of Governors, State Bar of Cal., 
Apr. 29, 1976, p. 7.)  Absent stipulation to binding fee arbitration, “either party 
shall be entitled to a trial after arbitration if sought within 30 days” after mailing 
of notice of the arbitration award.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6204, subd. (a).)  As 
explained by the chairman of the State Bar committee that proposed what would 
become the MFAA, “If a trial de novo is desired, the party seeking the trial de 
novo must do so within thirty days of the mailing of notice of the arbitration 
award.”  (Frank E. Farella, letter to Hon. Peter M. Behr re Senate Bill No. 1351 
(1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 28, 1978, p. 2.)  “If there is an action pending, the 
trial after arbitration shall be initiated by filing a rejection of arbitration award and 
request for trial after arbitration in that action within 30 days after mailing of 
notice of the award.”  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6204, subd. (b).)  “If no action is 
pending, the trial after arbitration shall be initiated by the commencement of an 
action in the court having jurisdiction over the amount of money in controversy 
within 30 days after mailing of notice of the award.”  (Id., subd. (c).)4   
                                              
4  
If there is no request for a trial following arbitration, the arbitration award 
may be confirmed, corrected, or vacated in the manner provided by the California 
Arbitration Act (§ 1280 et seq.).  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6203, subd. (b).)  
 
 
9
 
In addressing a party’s right to seek a trial de novo, “courts have 
historically applied the rules governing conventional appeals.”  (Sinnamon v. 
McKay (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 847, 852.)  And upon inspection, a trial following 
arbitration under the MFAA resembles a conventional appeal in a number of 
respects.  An appeal is “[a] proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered 
by bringing it to a higher authority.”  (Black’s Law Dict. (7th ed. 1999) p. 94, 
col. 1.)  The MFAA’s procedure for trial after arbitration resembles a conventional 
appeal in that it allows a court to entertain a dispute previously presented to and 
decided by another tribunal, in this case an MFAA arbitration panel.  And just as 
filing a notice of appeal constitutes a prerequisite to appellate review (Pressler, 
supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 835), only the filing of a request for a trial after arbitration 
authorizes the trial court to try a fee dispute de novo (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6203, 
subd. (b), 6204, subd. (a)).  But a trial following fee arbitration differs from a 
traditional appeal in other respects.  Whereas most conventional appeals are taken 
from judgments entered by a trial court, a request for a trial after arbitration 
nullifies an award issued by an arbitration panel.  And unlike the limited review 
typically conducted by appellate courts, for the most part a trial following fee 
arbitration proceeds in the trial court as if there had been no arbitration at all.   
 
 
The relevant question thus becomes whether the rule prohibiting section 
473, subdivision (b) relief in connection with an untimely appeal applies here 
notwithstanding the differences between a traditional appeal and a trial following 
MFAA arbitration.  In Pressler, supra, 32 Cal.3d 831, we considered whether a 
deadline for seeking de novo judicial review of an administrative decision could 
be extended due to a party’s mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.  The 
court in Shiver, McGrane & Martin v. Littell, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at pages 
1048-1049, relied on Pressler in concluding that section 473, subdivision (b) 
cannot excuse a failure to meet the MFAA’s 30-day deadline for requesting a trial 
 
 
10
following fee arbitration, and we agree that Pressler’s analysis applies to the 
situation before us.    
 
In Pressler, supra, 32 Cal.3d 831, we addressed Labor Code provisions that 
specify the procedure for taking an appeal from an order, decision, or award issued 
by the Labor Commissioner in a wage dispute.  Under the Labor Code, a party to a 
wage dispute heard by the Labor Commissioner may, within 10 days after service 
of the Labor Commissioner’s order, decision, or award, appeal the outcome to the 
superior court, where the matter is heard de novo.  (Lab. Code, § 98.2, subd. (a).)5  
The employer in Pressler filed its notice of appeal three days after the 10-day 
statutory deadline had passed.  (Pressler at p. 833.)  Pressler held that neither 
section 4736 nor equitable grounds could excuse the untimely filing.  (Pressler at 
pp. 834-838.)   
 
Pressler likened the procedure for appealing a decision by the Labor 
Commissioner to a conventional appeal, even though appeals in these wage 
disputes are taken after administrative proceedings and are heard de novo by the 
trial court.  (Pressler, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 835-836.)  These differences were 
immaterial, Pressler concluded, because the relevant Labor Code provisions 
manifested the Legislature’s intent to immunize the 10-day limit from extension.  
Pressler held, “In this case, the statutory framework established by the Legislature 
                                              
5  
In 1988 the statute was amended so that in computing the Labor Code’s 10-
day deadline, the extensions for service by mail, express mail, or facsimile 
transmission set forth in section 1013 now apply.  (Stats. 1988, ch. 96, § 3, pp. 
414-415.)    
6  
Pressler, supra, 32 Cal.3d 831 was decided before section 473 was divided 
into subdivisions in 1996.  (Stats. 1996, ch. 60, § 1, pp. 261-262.)  As appropriate, 
references to section 473 made in connection with the text’s discussion of Pressler 
and other authority predating this amendment should be read as pertaining to the 
relief provisions now found within section 473, subdivision (b).   
 
 
11
for the administrative resolution of wage disputes clearly demonstrates the 
mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the requirement that a party notice his or 
her appeal within 10 days.”  (Id. at p. 836.)  In pertinent part, the Labor Code 
provides that a failure to timely file a notice of appeal from an order, decision, or 
award issued by the Labor Commissioner “shall result in the decision or award 
becoming final.”  (Lab. Code, § 98.1, subd. (a).)  Once an order, decision, or 
award becomes final, a conforming judgment is to be entered by the clerk of the 
appropriate court.  (Id., § 98.2, former subd. (d), now subd. (e).)  Pressler held that 
“[t]he import of these provisions is clear.  The time for filing a notice of appeal 
from a decision of the Labor Commissioner is mandatory and jurisdictional.  A 
late filing may not be excused on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence or 
excusable neglect.  This conclusion is in harmony with the Legislature’s purpose 
in providing an administrative forum for the resolution of wage disputes.  [¶]  The 
policy underlying this process is sound for it ensures the expedition of the 
collection of wages which are due but unpaid.  [Citation.]  Public policy has long 
favored the ‘full and prompt payment of wages due an employee.’  [Citation.]  . . . 
Requiring strict adherence to the time requirement governing appeals from 
decisions of the Labor Commissioner can only help to assure the achievement of 
this overriding goal.”  (Pressler at p. 837.)  
 
Like the Labor Code provisions involved in Pressler, the MFAA frames the 
30-day deadline for seeking a trial following fee arbitration in uncompromising 
language, stating that “the arbitration award shall become binding upon the 
passage of 30 days after mailing of notice of the award, unless a party has, within 
the 30 days, sought a trial after arbitration.”  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6203, subd. 
(b), italics added.)  The MFAA thus envisions the deadline for seeking a trial 
following fee arbitration as injecting a measure of finality into a dispute.  A party 
who fails to timely request a trial de novo normally may be presumed to have 
 
 
12
acquiesced in the result reached through arbitration.  Consistent with Pressler, the 
significant consequences attendant to a failure to timely seek a trial after MFAA 
arbitration indicate that the right to seek a trial following fee arbitration should be 
treated like a conventional appeal for purposes of determining the availability of 
relief under section 473, subdivision (b).    
 
And as in Pressler, excluding the possibility of section 473, subdivision (b) 
relief here would promote the MFAA’s underlying policies.  “The policy behind 
the mandatory fee arbitration statutes is somewhat more specific” than the general 
policy favoring arbitration.  (Manatt, Phelps, Rothenberg & Tunney v. Lawrence 
(1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 1165, 1174.)  “The MFAA was first proposed by the 
Board of Governors of the State Bar of California in 1976 when, finding that 
disputes concerning legal fees were the most serious problem between members of 
the bar and the public, the board sought to create a mechanism for arbitrating 
disputes over legal fees and costs.  Recognizing the ‘disparity in bargaining power 
in attorney fee matters which favors the attorney in dealings with infrequent 
consumers of legal services’ [citation], that many clients could not afford hiring 
additional counsel to litigate fee disputes in the civil courts [citation], and that 
previous schemes that called for voluntary arbitration were ineffective [citation], 
the Legislature enacted the MFAA.”  (Aguilar v. Lerner, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 
983; see also Hargarten & Ardisson, Fine Tuning California’s Mandatory 
Attorney Fee Arbitration Statute (1982) 16 U.S.F. L.Rev. 411, 415 (Hargarten & 
Ardisson).)   The MFAA thus makes available an arbitration mechanism designed 
to “alleviate the disparity in bargaining power in attorney fee matters which favors 
the attorney by providing an effective, inexpensive remedy to a client which does 
not necessitate the hiring of a second attorney.”  (Manatt, Phelps, Rothenberg & 
Tunney v. Lawrence, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 1174.) 
 
 
13
 
Just as strict enforcement of the deadline for challenging a decision by the 
Labor Commissioner serves the policy goal of ensuring prompt payment of wages 
due employees, rigid adherence to the MFAA’s deadline for seeking a trial 
following arbitration advances the statute’s goal of ensuring clients an efficient 
and effective procedure for resolving fee disputes that minimizes the disparities in 
bargaining power that necessarily arise whenever the court system is implicated in 
a fee dispute.  “In order to comply with the purpose of expeditious resolution of 
disputes through arbitration, time limits in which to challenge arbitration awards 
must be strictly enforced.”  (Knass v. Blue Cross of California (1991) 228 
Cal.App.3d 390, 395.)  Authorizing section 473, subdivision (b) relief here would 
undermine the finality of binding fee awards, lead to additional reliance on the 
courts for resolving fee disputes, require more clients to hire counsel to represent 
them in litigating section 473, subdivision (b) motions and in subsequent 
proceedings, and worsen the disparity in bargaining power between clients and 
attorneys.  These results would conflict with the Legislature’s design in enacting 
the MFAA.   
 
The MFAA’s legislative history also supports the conclusion that section 
473, subdivision (b) relief is unavailable here.  In describing what would become 
the MFAA, the statute’s crafters stated that the right to a trial following arbitration 
is “similar to the right of a trial de novo following a small claims judgment.”  
(Special Com. on Resolution of Attorney Fee Disputes, letter to Bd. of Governors, 
State Bar of Cal., supra, p. 7.)  It already was established by the time of the 
MFAA’s genesis that section 473 cannot extend the period for taking an appeal 
from a judgment by a small claims court.  (Mills v. Superior Court (1969) 
2 Cal.App.3d 214, 216, fn. 3.)  It follows from the above that section 473, 
subdivision (b) does not apply in the present circumstances.  
 
 
14
 
In summary, the terms, goals, and legislative history of the MFAA all direct 
us toward the conclusion that section 473, subdivision (b) cannot relieve a party 
from the consequences of a failure to meet the 30-day deadline for seeking a trial 
following MFAA arbitration, and we so hold.  The Court of Appeal below and 
Simpson, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d 285 reached the contrary result, however, by 
analogizing arbitration under the MFAA to judicial arbitration, under which 
section 473, subdivision (b) relief is available.  This analogy to judicial arbitration 
is superficially attractive, but ultimately provides an insufficient basis upon which 
to find relief available here.      
 
The judicial arbitration statute provides for court-ordered arbitration of 
disputes with limited amounts in controversy.  (§§ 1141.11, 1141.12, subd. (b).)7  
The judicial arbitration statute and the California Rules of Court promulgated 
thereunder authorize a party to seek a trial de novo following judicial arbitration, 
provided they do so within 30 days after the filing of the arbitration award.  
(§ 1141.20; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1616(a).)  The judicial arbitration statute and 
California Rules of Court also provide that a party who fails to comply with the 
30-day deadline for requesting a trial following judicial arbitration may seek relief 
under section 473 from the judgment that is entered automatically upon such 
default.  (§ 1141.23; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1615(d)(1).)  
 
The Court of Appeal concluded that under the present circumstances, in 
which defendants sought arbitration following plaintiff’s institution of a civil 
action seeking fees, MFAA arbitration was analogous to judicial arbitration and 
section 473, subdivision (b) relief therefore should be available to defendants.  The 
Court of Appeal distinguished Pressler, holding that at the time defendants here 
                                              
7  
Regardless of the amount in controversy, the parties to a dispute may 
stipulate to judicial arbitration.  (§ 1141.12, subd. (a).) 
 
 
15
compelled arbitration “jurisdiction had already vested in the trial court [with the 
filing of plaintiff’s complaint].  As with a judicial arbitration, the trial court did not 
lose jurisdiction over the instant case while the fee dispute was being arbitrated 
but continued to monitor its progress, further distinguishing it from administrative 
review cases where the trial court has no jurisdiction until the appeal is filed.”  In 
likening MFAA arbitration to judicial arbitration, the Court of Appeal followed 
Simpson, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d 285, which had concluded that “[s]ection 473 
relief is available in the context of judicial arbitration.  We can see no justification 
to deny it ” in connection with arbitration under the MFAA.  (Id. at p. 291.) 
 
Although similarities exist between judicial arbitration and arbitration 
under the MFAA, there are significant differences as well.  Most obviously, the 
judicial arbitration statute and California Rules of Court expressly authorize 
section 473 relief from a judgment entered following judicial arbitration 
(§ 1141.23; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1615(d)(1)), while the MFAA makes no 
mention of section 473, subdivision (b).  Simpson, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d 285 
attempted to explain away this difference by noting that, as first adopted, rule 
1615(d) of the California Rules of Court (which predated the present § 1141.23, 
and the relevant provisions of which are now contained within rule 1615(d)(1)) 
limited the grounds upon which a judgment following judicial arbitration could be 
attacked or set aside to those expressly discussed in the rule, which did not 
mention section 473.  (Simpson at p. 290.)8  Given this proscription, an explicit 
                                              
8  
Rule 1615(d) of the California Rules of Court was originally promulgated 
in 1976.  The previous year, the Legislature had enacted a statute requiring the 
Judicial Council to provide by rule a uniform system of arbitration for certain 
causes in the superior courts.  (Former § 1141.10, added by Stats. 1975, ch. 1006, 
§ 1, p. 2364, and repealed by Stats. 1978, ch. 743, § 1, p. 2303.)  This arbitration 
was voluntary for both parties, except that if a plaintiff stipulated that the 
arbitration award would not exceed $7,500 the defendant could be compelled to 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
16
reference to section 473 had to be added to rule 1615(d) in order to make section 
473 relief available.  (Simpson at pp. 290-291.)9  Simpson noted that the relevant 
provisions of the MFAA contain no comparable “limiting language.”  (Simpson at 
p. 290.)  Simpson inferred from this distinction that section 473 relief was not 
prohibited under the MFAA.  (Simpson at p. 291.)  In effect, in Simpson’s view 
section 473, subdivision (b) relief is available unless a statute or California Rule of 
Court specifically precludes it. 
 
While this principle may hold true with regard to interim procedural 
deadlines, it does not apply to deadlines for acts analogous to the filing of a notice 
of appeal, such as the filing of a request for a trial following arbitration under the 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
arbitrate the dispute.  (Ibid.)  As initially adopted, rule 1615(d) specified the 
circumstances upon which a judgment entered following judicial arbitration could 
be attacked or set aside, and the grounds stated did not include mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.  In 1978, the Legislature enacted a 
new statute that made judicial arbitration mandatory for certain civil actions with 
an amount in controversy of $15,000 or less per plaintiff (now $50,000 or less) 
and spelled out the arbitration procedure in greater detail.  (Stats. 1978, ch. 743, 
§ 2, pp. 2303-2307.)  This statute also incorporated rule 1615(d)’s limitation of the 
grounds upon which a judgment entered after arbitration could be attacked or set 
aside.  (Stats. 1978, ch. 743, § 2, pp. 2306-2307.)  In 1982, the statute was 
amended to allow parties to seek relief under section 473 from a judgment entered 
following arbitration.  (Stats. 1982, ch. 621, § 1, p. 2612.)  Rule 1615(d) then was 
revised, effective January 1, 1983, to conform with this amendment. 
9  
We observe that in the same session in which it amended the judicial 
arbitration statute to add a reference to section 473, the Legislature also made 
minor changes to the MFAA’s provisions relating to a trial following arbitration.  
(Stats. 1982, ch. 979, §§ 3-4, pp. 3559-3560.)  While both the amendments to the 
MFAA and the amendments to the judicial arbitration statute proceeded through 
the Senate and Assembly Judiciary Committees, the pertinent legislative history 
provides no indication that the Legislature ever seriously considered engrafting 
section 473 relief onto the MFAA, as it did with the judicial arbitration statute. 
 
 
17
MFAA.  To the contrary, the rule has long been the reverse:  “In the absence of an 
express authorization in the statute itself a court has no power to extend the time 
for taking an appeal, or to relieve an appellant from the effect of misfortune, 
accident, surprise, or mistake.”  (Williams v. Long (1900) 130 Cal. 58, 59; see also 
Estate of Hanley (1943) 23 Cal.2d 120, 122-124; Lawson v. Guild (1932) 215 Cal. 
378, 380; Henry v. Merguire (1896) 111 Cal. 1, 2; Witkin, New California Rules 
on Appeal (1944) 17 So.Cal. L.Rev. 79, 91-92.)10 
 
Other differences between judicial arbitration and MFAA arbitration are 
also relevant.  Unlike judicial arbitration, MFAA arbitration seeks to resolve 
disputes without reference to the judicial system.  As one court has described an 
MFAA arbitration, “[t]he arbitration proceedings here were not carried out before 
the court; they were not initiated on any order of the court, nor was any 
supervision of the court sought or provided . . . .  The court proceedings, in fact, 
ceased pending outcome of the independent and extrajudicial arbitration 
hearing. . . . [¶] . . . [C]onsensual arbitration involves a forum ‘alternative to, and 
independent of, the judicial . . . .’  [Citation.]  We believe this conclusion applies 
as well to arbitration elected by the client under Business and Professions Code, 
section 6200.  The purpose of arbitration is to provide a nonjudicial alternative to 
dispute resolution.  This nonjudicial nature is retained whether the arbitration 
occurs before a lawsuit is filed . . . or whether, as here, a lawsuit is stayed, or 
ceased, so that arbitration can be had.”  (Reisman v. Shahverdian (1984) 153 
Cal.App.3d 1074, 1091.)11    
                                              
10  
Accordingly, we disapprove of Simpson v. Williams, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d 
285, to the extent it is inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion.   
11  
Citing MJM, Inc. v. Tootoo (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 598 (MJM) defendants 
argue that relief under section 473, subdivision (b) is available in connection with 
arbitrations generally.  MJM is inapposite, however, as it did not address the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
18
 
“Judicial arbitration, by contrast, is an adjunct to litigation.  It is mandatory 
in certain cases, and it occurs only when an action has been filed.”  (Blanton v. 
Womancare, Inc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 396, 402, fn. 5.)  “Unlike contractual 
arbitration, judicial arbitration takes place within the judicial arena and is 
necessarily followed by court action, consisting of either a trial de novo [citation] 
or entry of judgment on the award [citation].”  (Joyce v. Black (1990) 217 
Cal.App.3d 318, 322.)  In other words, while arbitration under the MFAA need not 
begin or end in the courts and may take place without reference to the judicial 
system, from the initial reference to arbitration to the ultimate filing of a judgment 
judicial arbitration operates under the auspices of the court.  The deadline for 
seeking a trial de novo following judicial arbitration, therefore, is more readily 
likened to an interim procedural deadline of the type typically amenable to section 
473, subdivision (b) relief than is the time limit for seeking a trial after MFAA 
arbitration.   
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
MFAA, a failure to timely seek a trial following arbitration, or any deadline 
analogous to the time for filing a notice of appeal.  MJM involved the attempted 
confirmation of a contractual arbitration award.  (MJM at p. 601.)  The opposition 
to the petition for confirmation argued that the petitioner had obtained the award 
through “undue means” that amounted to “mistake, inadvertence, surprise and 
excusable neglect” justifying relief in the form of denying confirmation of the 
award.  (Ibid.)  After stating that it saw “no reason to deny the availability of 
section 473 relief in nonjudicial arbitration proceedings,” MJM affirmed the trial 
court’s denial of the petition to confirm the award.  (Id. at p. 604.)  Even assuming 
that MJM correctly interpreted and applied the law in light of the facts before it, 
those facts are sufficiently distinct from those involved here that MJM’s view as to 
the applicability of section 473 in the circumstances before it has no bearing on the 
issue presently before us.  
 
 
19
 
In addition to this distinction between the two arbitration schemes, fee 
arbitration and judicial arbitration serve different policy goals.  “Several 
considerations are unique to attorney’s fee arbitration, including the importance of 
public confidence in the attorney-client relationship, ‘the difficulty which clients 
of limited income may have in procuring an attorney to represent them against 
another attorney, and the vulnerability of clients when litigating against their 
former lawyers.’ ”  (Nodvin v. State Bar of Georgia (Ga. 2001) 544 S.E.2d 142, 
146, quoting A. Fred Miller v. Purvis (Alaska 1996) 921 P.2d 610, 618; see also In 
re LiVolsi (N.J. 1981) 428 A.2d 1268, 1281.)  As discussed, the MFAA was 
enacted to address a disparity in bargaining power between clients and attorneys 
involved in fee disputes.  Because “[a]ny requirement that mandates use of the 
judicial system places a client in a more disadvantageous situation than an 
attorney” (Hargarten & Ardisson, supra, at p. 441), in this particular context the 
right to a trial following arbitration should be construed relatively narrowly to 
keep with the MFAA’s goals.  Judicial arbitration, meanwhile, primarily seeks to 
alleviate court congestion.  (See § 1141.10, subd. (a).)  Although limiting a party’s 
ability to challenge a judicial arbitration award might promote the goal of reducing 
court congestion, this end is sufficiently distinct from the MFAA’s more narrow 
objective that the Legislature readily could have concluded that section 473, 
subdivision (b) relief should be available in one context but not the other.  (Cf. 
Hattersley v. American Nucleonics Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 397, 402 [“Court 
congestion is not a valid basis for denying a litigant his or her day in court.”].) 
 
Moreover, it is significant that arbitration under the MFAA is always 
optional for the client, who is the disadvantaged party in a fee dispute.  When 
judicial arbitration was voluntary for plaintiffs (former § 1141.10, added by Stats. 
1975, ch. 1006, § 1, p. 2364, and repealed by Stats. 1978, ch. 743, § 1, p. 2303), 
rule 1615(d) the California Rules of Court barred section 473 relief from a 
 
 
20
judgment entered following a failure to timely seek a trial de novo after judicial 
arbitration.  (See Martinez v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 557, 
560-561 [discussing rule 1615(d) as promulgated in 1976]; Usher v. Soltz (1981) 
123 Cal.App.3d 692, 695-696 [same]; but see Alvarado v. City of Port Hueneme 
(1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 695, 703-704 [holding that in limiting grounds upon which 
a judgment following arbitration could be ‘attacked or set aside’ or ‘vacated,’ rule 
1615(d) and § 1141.23 did not also limit grounds upon which a party could be 
relieved from a judgment].)  It was only after judicial arbitration became 
compulsory for both parties in certain types of cases (Stats. 1978, ch. 743, § 2, pp. 
2303-2304) that the Legislature amended the judicial arbitration statute to 
authorize section 473 relief (Stats. 1982, ch. 621, § 1, p. 2612), with a conforming 
amendment later being made to the California Rules of Court.  This development 
suggests a greater inclination to allow section 473, subdivision (b) relief in the 
context of statutory schemes that require both parties to participate in arbitration 
than in connection with arbitration programs that are optional for one or both 
parties. 
 
The Court of Appeal below also fails to persuade with its distinction 
between fee arbitrations conducted after an attorney has filed an action seeking 
recovery of fees and those undertaken before any such lawsuit has been filed.  The 
Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court had authority to consider 
defendants’ motion for section 473, subdivision (b) relief on its merits because, in 
the Court of Appeal’s view, the trial court possessed jurisdiction over the parties’ 
dispute once plaintiff filed his complaint and retained jurisdiction both during 
arbitration and afterward.  The Court of Appeal’s approach begs the question of 
why the Legislature would intend for fee arbitration awards issued before the 
initiation of a lawsuit to be any more binding and final than awards issued after a 
complaint has been filed.  Nothing in the MFAA or its legislative history signifies 
 
 
21
any such intention.  Indeed, common sense counsels against premising the 
availability of section 473, subdivision (b) relief on whether attorneys race to 
courthouses with complaints faster than their clients proceed to the State Bar with 
demands for arbitration.  (See Rules Proc. of State Bar, Fee Arbitrations and 
Enforcement of Awards by State Bar, rule 14.1 [providing that fee arbitration is 
initiated by filing a request for arbitration with the State Bar].)     
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the availability of section 473, 
subdivision (b) relief in connection with judicial arbitration does not alter the 
inflexible nature of the 30-day time limit for seeking a trial following fee 
arbitration under the MFAA.  The conclusion that section 473, subdivision (b) 
relief is unavailable under these circumstances may impose a hardship on clients 
who do not timely seek a trial following fee arbitration.  We believe, however, that 
the Legislature has determined that, in the long run, clients benefit from an 
arbitration system that produces a binding result if the parties do not invoke the 
judicial process within a fixed period following issuance of an award. 
DISPOSITION 
 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and remand this matter 
with instructions to reinstate the trial court’s judgment.   
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Maynard v. Brandon 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 2/25/03 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S114829 
Date Filed: July 11, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Riverside 
Judge: Gloria Trask 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Law Offices of Rodger A. Maynes and Rodger A. Maynes for Defendants and Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
James N. Maynard, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Rodger A. Maynes 
Law Offices of Rodger A. Maynes 
325 W. Hospitality Lane, Suite 110 
San Bernardino, CA  92408 
(909) 890-1920 
 
James N. Maynard 
Law Offices of James N. Maynard 
4024 Ibis Street, Suite B-1 
San Diego, CA  92103 
(619) 294-8011