Case Title: State v. Kilburn

Citation: 231 N.W.2d 61

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1975-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
231 N.W.2d 61 (1975) STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. John William KILBURN, Appellant. No. 44136. Supreme Court of Minnesota. May 23, 1975. C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Jack S. Nordby, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant. Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Robert W. Johnson, County Atty., and Edward W. Bearse, Asst. County Atty., Anoka, for respondent. Considered and decided by the court without oral argument. SCOTT, Justice. Defendant was found guilty by a district court jury of first-degree murder, Minn.St. 609.185(1), and sentenced by the presiding judge to a term of life imprisonment as provided by law. Defendant contends, on this appeal from the judgment of conviction, that the trial court erred in refusing to permit him to waive his right to trial by jury. We affirm. Around midnight on April 27, 1972, Mrs. Shirley Harrison of Blaine informed the police that her 15-year-old daughter, Connie, for the first time had not returned home when expected. On April 28, Blaine *62 police detective Jack Sunnarborg, after learning that defendant was the last person with whom Connie had been seen, contacted defendant at his place of employment, a sod field in Blaine. Defendant stated that he had met Connie at a party at the Raygor residence the previous evening and that he had given her a ride home at 10:30 p. m., dropping her off a short distance from her home because she did not want her parents to know that she had been out with defendant. On the afternoon of April 30 Connie's nude body was discovered in a water-filled ditch on a little-used road in Ham Lake Township. A pathological examination revealed the cause of death as a compound fracture of the skull with deep cerebral lacerations resulting from multiple blows to the head with a straight instrument. Additionally, the examination revealed bruising of the opening of the vagina and some sign of squeezing of the neck. Tests to determine the presence of sperm were inconclusive. On May 1, 1972, following the discovery of the body, Detective Thomas J. Anderson of the Anoka County sheriff's office, in the company of defendant's friend, Detective Melde of Coon Rapids, interrogated defendant at the Coon Rapids Police Department, defendant voluntarily submitting to questioning. At the start of the session defendant stated that after dropping Connie off he had driven to a secluded spot, fallen asleep, and awakened to find Connie's nude body in his trunk. He stated that he transported her body to where it was found rather than to the police because he did not want to be blamed for her death. Having obtained this story from defendant but no confession that he actually killed Connie, Detective Anderson, thinking that Melde's presence was inhibiting defendant, asked Melde to leave the room. A short time later defendant confessed to the killing. At first defendant was vague about what had happened but later, after more interrogation, gave a more detailed statement. Detective Anderson summarized this statement in his testimony at the trial. In substance, he said that defendant had picked the victim up that night at the Raygor residence and asked her if she wanted to go out and see the place where he worked in the sod field. He said they then drove out to the end of the sod field to a spot where he had previously told the detective that he had hit her with the tire jack. He said that he had kissed her, and that the conversation got around to sex. He said that the victim told him she was a virgin, and he said, "Maybe now is the time to change this." He said that he had talked her into having intercourse with him, and inserted his penis inside her vagina. He said when she told him that it hurt and to stop it, that he did. He said that he stood outside the car pulling his pants up, then, he said, "I grabbed her by the neck, I shook her, pushed her up against the car and threw her on the ground." According to Detective Anderson's testimony, defendant said, "At this time she was moaning. * * I told her to get up. You're not hurt. Get up, you're not hurt." He then told Detective Anderson that he "got scared" that she was going to go home and tell her folks or the police that he had tried to rape her, and at this time he decided to kill her. He went back to the trunk of the car, unlocked it, got the jack out, came to where she was lying, and started to strike her on the head with the jack. He said after this he decided that he would have to get rid of her, and he loaded her into the trunk of the car and drove to the spot where the body was found. A large number of exhibits were introduced by the prosecution. Among the more significant were two pieces of Miss Harrison's torn brassiere and other blood-stained clothing; a blood-stained toolbox belonging to defendant; a piece of blue rubber molding shown to be from defendant's car; and defendant's boots, which were of the type which could have made the two prints found near the body. A criminologist testified *63 that the blood stains on the car and on the various other items were of Miss Harrison's blood type, and not defendant's. Defendant did not testify, but produced four witnesses, former employers and neighbors, who knew defendant and gave their opinion that he was not a violent person. Defendant, before trial, moved the court for a waiver of a jury trial or, in the alternative, a demand for a change of venue: After hearing arguments on both sides, the court responded as follows: The following exchange between defendant's counsel and the court then occurred: After a finding of guilty, and before sentencing, the defense counsel stated as follows: The only issue raised in this appeal is, under all the circumstances, did the trial court err in refusing to allow the defendant to waive a jury trial and have the case tried by the court. The leading United States Supreme Court case dealing with waiver of trial by jury is Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 S. Ct. 783, 13 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1965). In that case, the Court held that restrictions on waiver of a jury trial in Rule 23(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedurewhich permits a defendant to waive a jury trial "with the approval of the court and the consent of the government", did not violate the United States Constitution. Rule 26.01, subd. 1, of the new Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, to be effective July 1, 1975, provides in part as follows: The comment accompanying Rule 26 states in part: It is clear that the procedures provided in Rule 23(a) are not binding upon the states. Further, the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure will not take effect until July 1, 1975. However, we are inclined to agree with the foregoing comment made by the advisory committee[1] and feel ample study was given to protect the constitutional rights of an accused. We therefore reject defendant's suggestion that we construe Minn.St. 631.01 as creating an absolute right to waive a jury trial. We previously expressed these views in State v. Hoskins, 292 Minn. 111, 118, 193 N.W.2d 802, 808 (1972), by stating: The point was raised, which is tangential in effect, that an impartial trial by jury was unlikely or impossible. It has already been indicated above that no evidence was produced that passions were aroused or that any prejudice would result to deny the availability of impartial jurors. The trial court was apprised only of defendant's statement that there would be prejudice because of the facts and circumstances of the case and the racial characteristics of defendant and the victim. There was no showing of pretrial publicity or prejudice, and, as indicated by defense counsel, no showing of prejudice during the trial or by the jury's actions. The court was not trying to avoid a disagreeable case, as indicated above by his denial of the motion. The jury was questioned thoroughly on these matters, and the defense was satisfied as indicated. We addressed this problem in Gaulke v. State, 289 Minn. 354, 360, 184 N.W.2d 599, 602 (1971), when we said: As in Gaulke, we hold that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion, and that defendant has not been prejudiced. Affirmed. KNUTSON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. PETERSON, Justice (concurring specially). I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Scott, writing for the majority of the court. I would add this word concerning our decision in State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242, 170 N.W.2d 104 (1969), upon which the trial court relied in stating that "in this situation I think the interest of the Defendant would best be served by a jury trial." The comparative situation in Boyce and the instant case is such that the order of the trial court denying the request for a nonjury trial is fully understandable. The central ingredient in both cases is the concern that a verdict of guilt or innocence not be infected by latent racial prejudice. The defendants in both cases were black. The deceased persons in both cases were white. The defendants in each case undertook to waive a jury trial; the waiver was allowed in Boyce, denied in the instant case. A difference in the two cases was that in Boyce we had "grave doubts as to defendant's guilt," 284 Minn. 261, 170 N.W.2d 116, whereas in the instant case there is no such apprehension. The pointed suggestion in Boyce that the defendant, on a retrial, should "elect to submit the issues to a jury for decision rather than to waive his right to a jury trial" was neither casual nor "random." The first numbered paragraph in the Boyce opinion set the stage in these deliberate words (284 Minn. 253, 170 N.W.2d 111): The opinion thereafter concluded, as it had begun, with the quoted statement effectively advising the defendant not to waive a jury trial. The defendant in Boyce providently accepted the advice of this court as to his best interests, for on retrial he was acquitted by a jury. The trial bench may well be confused were we now to hold in this case that a trial court's denial of a request to waive a jury trial constitutes an abuse of judicial discretion.[1] MacLAUGHLIN, Justice (concurring specially). I concur in the result only because it appears from the record and the statement made by the trial attorney for defendant that defendant received a fair trial; there was little prejudicial pretrial publicity shown; and it appears that the result was just. However, as to the general principles of law involved, I am in agreement with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Otis. In the absence of substantial reasons why the defendant should not be allowed to waive a *67 jury trial, I would hold that a defendant's knowing and voluntary request to waive a jury should be controlling and that such a request should be granted by the trial court. Further, I believe that this position is consistent with Rule 26.01 of the prospectively adopted Rules of Criminal Procedure. OTIS, Justice (dissenting). Because I believe there were compelling reasons why the trial court should have decided defendant's guilt or innocence without a jury, I dissent. The question is not whether defendant had an absolute right to waive a jury but whether the trial court exercised its discretion properly in refusing to decide the case without a jury. The record presents the anomalous situation of a court's insisting that defendant's interests would be better served by a jury trial, while defendant and his counsel protest with equal vigor that defendant's chance for a fair trial is enhanced by waiving a jury. At the outset, therefore, it would appear that the court was preempting the exclusive function of defense counsel in advising what trial tactics would be most beneficial to defendant. I submit that on its face that is a fundamental decision which only the defendant after consulting with counsel should be permitted to make, since it bears directly on the right to an impartial hearing. Had the trial court advanced some compelling reason for refusing to try the case without a jury, the questions presented might be more difficult. For a full understanding of the issues, it is essential to examine more completely the colloquies between the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the court, referred to in the majority opinion. On July 7, 1972, defense counsel made the following statement: After some preliminary discussion, the prosecutor responded as follows: Later, in the argument to the court, defense counsel concluded with these remarks: In denying the motion to waive a jury, the court stated, among other things, as follows: It is unfortunate, to say the least, that the prosecutor invited the court to shirk its duty by reminding the court of the adverse public reaction to the court's acquittal of the defendant in State v. Ulferts, tried in the same district without a jury. For the prosecutor to inject the suggestion that the "hue and cry from the citizenry" is to determine whether a defendant is entitled to be heard by an impartial judge, in my opinion taints the subsequent proceedings, however conscientious the judge may have been. The reliance by the court and prosecutor on State v. Boyce[1] as authority for requiring a jury trial is misplaced. That case had been tried fairly by an impartial judge free from error, as we said, but the question of guilt was extremely close, and in the interests of justice we remanded for a new trial. Our suggestion that the second trial be conducted with a jury had nothing to do with the merits of our decision. It was a casual afterthought prompted by our concern that even the most conscientious judge may suffer from a subconscious reluctance to overrule or second-guess a colleague on the same court who has heard the same evidence. It was to avert that possibility and out of an abundance of caution to guarantee the defendant a trial completely free from any such influence that we suggested he consider a jury trial on the remand. *69 At the commencement of the trial in the instant case, defendant again renewed his motion to waive a jury and it was again denied. At that time the court repeated his reliance on the Boyce case by stating: For the reasons I have indicated, it seems apparent that the trial court was misled by our random remark in the Boyce case which the court construed to be a decision that "the interests of the Defendant are best served by a trial to a jury." Thereafter defense counsel made a final plea to waive a jury by arguing to the court: In response, the court stated: Notwithstanding the protestations of the trial court that the jurors were not prejudiced, the court immediately questioned the propriety of defense counsel interrogating the jurors on that issue, stating as its reason: As an alternative, the court proposed a question which would excuse any juror who would be influenced for or against a defendant who was black. This is a classic case where, in my judgment, prejudice against a defendant, whatever his race, color, or ethnic background, is inevitable. The killing of a 15-year-old white girl by an adult black in the course of a sexual encounter is the most inflammatory and volatile set of circumstances imaginable. In my opinion, it is one which requires the judiciary to utilize every legitimate safeguard against the "hue and cry" of an aroused citizenry. In all of Anoka County, the record indicates there are only a handful of blacks. To me it is wholly unrealistic to believe that the trial court's decision to have a jury trial was in the best interests of this defendant. The only issue was the degree of homicide of which defendant was guilty. In the absence of the court's articulating any purpose for a jury trial other than his belief "that the Supreme Court feels the interests of the Defendant are best served by a trial to a jury," I submit that it was the court's duty to try the matter without a jury. In dealing with the critically important issues of this case, we are, for practical purposes, writing on a clean slate. Gaulke v. State, 289 Minn. 354, 360, 184 N.W.2d 599, 603 (1971), sustained the denial of a trial without a jury because the question was not raised until the postconviction proceedings. There, however, by way of dictum, we did stress the principle that in determining the issue of granting a jury trial, the court was obliged to exercise sound discretion. In Gaulke, we cited with approval People v. Spegal, 5 Ill. 2d 211, 221, 125 N.E.2d 468, 473, 51 A.L.R.2d 1337, 1345 (1955); People *70 v. Duchin, 12 N.Y.2d 351, 239 N.Y.S.2d 670, 190 N.E.2d 17 (1963); and People ex rel. Rohrlich v. Follette, 20 N.Y.2d 297, 282 N.Y.S.2d 729, 229 N.E.2d 419 (1967). The Spegal decision, written by Mr. Justice Schaefer, reversed a judgment of conviction because the trial court failed to grant defendant's petition for a trial without a jury. The Duchin and Follette cases in New York, under constitutional and statutory provisions similar to our own, adopted the rule that those provisions are designed for the benefit of the defendant and that Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37, 85 S. Ct. 783, 791, 13 L. Ed. 2d 630, 639, recognizes that In that case, however, the only reason given by defendant for waiving a jury trial was to save time. Here, however, the reasons are compelling. Neither Minn.Const. art. 1, § 4, nor Minn.St. 631.01, attaches any conditions to the defendant's right to waive a jury.[2] We have prospectively adopted Rule 26.01, Rules of Criminal Procedure, permitting the waiver of a jury trial with the court's approval. With that rule I do not quarrel. I would, however, apply the dictum in Gaulke to which reference has been made, and follow the principles enunciated by the New York court in the Duchin and Follette cases and the rule adopted in A. B. A. Standards for Criminal Justice, Fair Trial and Free Press (Approved Draft, 1968) § 3.3, as follows: The comment to A. B. A. Standards for Criminal Justice, Trial by Jury (Approved Draft, 1968) § 1.2(a), states in part (p. 36): In the instant case the defendant's showing that potentially prejudicial material had been disseminated was not strong. Nevertheless, in my opinion, and in accordance with the philosophy of the A. B. A. comment, I would hold that the defendant's decision to waive a jury was well-founded and consequently should govern where the court has assigned no valid countervailing reasons to justify its refusal to waive the jury. Accordingly, I would remand for a new trial. ROGOSHESKE, Justice (dissenting). I join my brother Otis and also dissent because I share his views concerning: (1) The underlying basis for our suggestion in State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242, 170 N.W.2d 104 (1969), of a preference for submission to a jury on retrial; (2) our limitations in reviewing the trial judge's denial of defendant's request to waive a jury now rather than at the time it was made; (3) defense counsel's recital of the compelling reasons for defendant's knowledgeable request, especially those peculiar to the likely composition of a jury impaneled in Anoka County; and (4) the reasons expressed by the trial judge for the rejection of defendant's requested waiver. In my opinion, the recorded reasons for rejection neither responsively answered the grounds upon which defendant's request was based nor revealed an adequate understanding or appreciation of the role and function of defense counsel in pursuit of his efforts to adhere to the principles embodied in the A. B. A. Standards cited by my brother Otis which defense counsel, with admirable skill and faithfulness, sought to follow in protecting defendant's legitimate interests, presumably without regard at the time for his personal views of defendant's probable culpability or his subsequent reaction to the fairness of the trial or the propriety of the jury's verdict. However debatable among members of the bench and bar the benefits of jury trials may be, I believe that granting defendant a retrial in this case will do no disservice to the efficient administration of criminal justice by encouraging trial judges to try criminal cases without a jury when requested by an accused with defense counsel's approval. [1] The advisory committee was appointed by the Minnesota Supreme Court pursuant to Minn.St. 480.059, subd. 2, on July 1, 1971. [1] I would not retreat from our considered dictum in Gaulke v. State, 289 Minn. 354, 184 N.W.2d 599 (1971), but this is not, in my view, the extraordinary kind of case that we there contemplated as constitutionally overriding the applicable statute. [1] State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242, 170 N.W.2d 104 (1969). [2] Minn.Const. art. 1, § 4, provides: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy. A jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by law. The legislature may provide that the agreement of five-sixths of a jury in a civil action or proceeding, after not less than six hours' deliberation, is a sufficient verdict." Minn.St. 631.01 provides: "An issue of fact arises upon a plea of not guilty, or upon a plea of former conviction or acquittal of the same offense. Except where defendant waives a jury trial, every issue of fact shall be tried by a jury of the county in which the indictment was found or information filed, unless the action shall have been removed by order of court as provided in sections 627.01 to 627.04. If the defendant shall waive a jury trial, such waiver shall be in writing signed by him in open court after he has been arraigned and has had opportunity to consult with counsel and shall be filed with the clerk. Such waiver may be withdrawn by the defendant at any time before the commencement of the trial. If the charge against the accused be a misdemeanor, the trial may be had in the absence of the defendant, if he shall appear by counsel; but, if it be for a felony or gross misdemeanor, he shall be personally present."