Case Title: Sheboygan County Department of Human Services v. Neal J. G.

Citation: 2003 WI 11

Docket Number: 2002AP000574

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 11 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-0574 & 02-0575 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights to 
Arianna R.G., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Sheboygan County Department of Human Services,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Neal J.G.,  
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights to 
Hunter D.G., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Sheboygan County Department of Human Services,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Neal J.G.,  
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 5, 2003 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 7, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan   
 
JUDGE: 
John B. Murphy   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs (in the 
court of appeals) by Timothy A. Provis, Madison, and oral 
argument by Timothy A. Provis. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief (in the 
court of appeals) by Mary T. Wagner, assistant district 
 
 
2
attorney, and Robert J. Wells, Jr., district attorney, and oral 
argument by Mary T. Wagner. 
 
2003 WI 11 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-0574, 02-0575  
(L.C. No. 
01 TP 23 and 01 TP 24) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Arianna R.G., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Sheboygan County Department of Human  
Services,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Neal J.G.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 5, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Hunter D.G., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Sheboygan County Department of Human  
Services,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Neal J.G.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Sheboygan 
County, John B. Murphy, Judge.  Affirmed.   
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
2 
 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case comes before us on a 
petition 
to 
bypass 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) 
§ 809.60 
(1999-2000). 
 
Neal J.G. 
(Neal) 
appeals 
an 
order 
of 
the 
Sheboygan 
County 
circuit 
court 
terminating his parental rights to his two children.1  He claims 
that the circuit court erred in failing to comply with the 
notice requirement of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).2 
¶2 
We conclude that the information before the circuit 
court was too vague for the court to have reason to know that 
each of Neal's children met the definition of "Indian child" 
under the ICWA.  Because the information was insufficient to 
show that the ICWA applied in this case, no notice was required.  
Accordingly, albeit with different rationale, we affirm the 
order of the circuit court terminating Neal's parental rights to 
his children. 
I 
¶3 
The Sheboygan County Department of Health and Human 
Services (the department) filed petitions with the Sheboygan 
County circuit court to terminate involuntarily Neal's parental 
rights to his two children.  On July 23, 2001, Neal filed a 
motion with the circuit court requesting that either (a) the 
proceedings be dismissed because of the department's failure to 
                                                 
1 Neal J.G. appeals from an order of the Circuit Court for 
Sheboygan County, John B. Murphy, Judge. 
2 Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 
(2002). 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
3 
 
comply with the ICWA or (b) the proceedings be suspended in 
order to comply with the ICWA by "providing notice of the 
proceedings to the Ojibwa Tribe in Marinette, Wisconsin."  The 
motion stated that the children had an Indian ancestry: 
[Neal] asserts that he has Indian heritage, both on 
his mother's side of the family and his father's side 
of the family.  Specifically, [Neal's mother] is aware 
that her Indian ancestry stems from the Ojibwa Tribe 
in Marinette, Wisconsin.  [The children's great-great-
grandmother] is/was a member of the Ojibwa Tribe. 
¶4 
At a hearing on August 3, 2001, the circuit court 
addressed this motion.  The court initiated further inquiry and 
requested 
that 
Neal's 
mother 
provide 
additional 
details 
regarding the children's heritage that might indicate that they 
were eligible for any tribal membership. 
¶5 
By letter dated August 3, 2001, the assistant district 
attorney of Sheboygan County sent a notice to the U.S. 
Department of the Interior describing the possible Indian child 
status of the children.  The letter noted information apparently 
obtained as a result of the additional inquiry requested by the 
circuit court.  It stated that the children's grandmother 
indicated that her grandmother was born on an Indian reservation 
somewhere in Canada around 1880 and later moved to Marinette, 
Wisconsin.  Neal's motion was attached to the letter. 
 
¶6 
The acting director of the Office of Tribal Services 
responded with a letter dated August 22, 2001, explaining that 
the information was insufficient to make a determination 
regarding the Indian child status of the children: 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
4 
 
We are unable to determine Indian ancestry due to 
insufficient information on tribal affiliation.  The 
Bureau 
of 
Indian 
Affairs 
does 
not 
maintain 
comprehensive list [sic] of persons possessing Indian 
blood.  This kind of information can be obtained from 
the Tribe itself, if tribal affiliation can be 
determined. 
. . . Pursuant to the [ICWA], it is incumbent upon the 
agency responsible for the action such as child 
custody 
proceedings 
involving 
Indian 
children 
to 
notify the appropriate tribe(s) directly of their 
right to intervene in proceedings involving their 
tribal 
children. 
 
Accordingly, 
if 
additional 
information 
on 
tribal 
affiliation 
becomes 
available . . . 
you 
are 
advised 
to 
notify 
the 
appropriate tribe(s) 
directly 
of 
their 
right to 
intervene in the above proceedings. 
¶7 
On September 14, 2001, Neal filed a motion that "the 
prosecution be compelled to provide notice of these proceedings 
to the Ojibwa Tribe in Marinette, Wisconsin, as previously and 
specifically requested, in compliance with the Indian Child 
Welfare Act."  At a hearing on September 20, 2001, the following 
discussion occurred: 
 
THE COURT:  . . . Item number 2 then is notice to 
the Ojibwa Tribe in Marinette, Wisconsin, under the 
Indian Child Welfare Act.  Attorney Spoerl, on that 
issue?   
 
ATTORNEY SPOERL:  This was a follow-up to a 
motion that I filed or that was heard last time we 
were in court.  After that motion hearing, my client's 
mother went down to the District Attorney's Office and 
provided, I believe, as much information as she had 
concerning the tribal connection that she has through 
her family. 
 
Specifically, in my earlier motion, I mentioned 
the Ojibwa Tribe in Marinette, Wisconsin.  I'm sure my 
client's mother explained why she believed that the 
Ojibwa Tribe was a connection . . . 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
5 
 
 
For some reason, notice was not sent specifically 
to the Ojibwa Tribe in Marinette.  I don't know why. 
 
THE COURT:  Mr. Van Akkeren, on notice to the 
Ojibwa Tribe? 
 
ATTORNEY 
VAN 
AKKEREN: 
 
Your 
honor, 
to 
my 
knowledge, there is no Ojibwa Tribe in Marinette, 
Wisconsin.  One of the -– I provided to the Court the 
letter we sent to the Secretary of the Interior, and I 
provided the Court the response. 
 
An additional effort to try to find an Ojibwa 
Tribe in Marinette, Wisconsin, I searched the internet 
for any reference to them.  Ms. Erdmier contacted the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, the local office in Fort 
Snelling, Minnesota.  They do not list any Ojibwa 
Tribe in Marinette, Wisconsin. 
 
I reviewed a juvenile court handbook which I use 
which discusses the various, juvenile court handbook 
concerning 
Wisconsin, 
lists 
Indian 
tribes 
within 
Wisconsin, and there is no Ojibwa Tribe listed in 
Marinette, Wisconsin.  We have no way of notifying any 
Ojibwa Tribe in Marinette, Wisconsin. 
 
THE COURT:  I don't know either.  I'm fairly 
familiar 
with 
Marinette, 
Wisconsin, 
having 
some 
property in Marinette County.  There certainly are 
Chippewas, which is another name for the Ojibwa.3  It's 
the more anglicized name in Wisconsin, obviously, at 
various observations [sic] of Red Cliff and other 
places.  I certainly don't know of any in Marinette.  
If the Bureau of Indian Affairs knows of none, I guess 
there won't be any. 
 
ATTORNEY VAN AKKEREN:  I searched under Chippewa 
because I knew that was the anglicized version. 
. . . . 
 
THE 
COURT:  . 
. 
. Based 
on the 
sketchy 
information provided by [Neal's] mom, I don't think 
                                                 
3 The terms "Ojibwa" and "Chippewa" are synonymous.  See The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 334, 1258 
(3d ed. 1992). 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
6 
 
the Department or Public is in any position to do 
anything further than it has done.  I'm satisfied that 
under the circumstances the provisions of the Indian 
Child Welfare Act have been met. 
¶8 
A jury returned a verdict finding grounds to terminate 
Neal's parental rights and the circuit court ordered Neal's 
parental rights terminated.  Neal appealed on the issue of 
compliance with the notice requirement in 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).  
He asserted that notice should have been sent to the six 
Chippewa tribes in Wisconsin listed by the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs as Indian tribes recognized to receive services from the 
Secretary of the Interior.4  This court granted the department's 
petition to bypass the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
(Rule) § 809.60 (1999-2000).   
II 
¶9 
This case provides us with an opportunity to review 
when and under what circumstances a court has reason to know 
that a child involved in a termination of parental rights 
proceeding 
is 
an 
"Indian 
child" 
under 
the 
ICWA 
thereby 
triggering the notice requirement.  This issue is essentially 
one of statutory interpretation which presents a question of law 
subject to independent appellate review.  In re D.S.P., 166 Wis. 
2d 464, 471, 480 N.W.2d 234 (1992).  In reaching our 
                                                 
4 The Bureau of Indian Affairs' list of Indian tribes 
recognized and eligible to receive services contains sixteen 
tribes with "Chippewa" in the tribal name -– six in Wisconsin, 
six in Michigan, two in Minnesota, one in North Dakota and one 
in Montana.  67 Fed.Reg. 46328 (July 11, 2002).  At the time of 
the circuit court's action in this case, the then current list 
contained the same "Chippewa" tribes. 65 Fed.Reg. 13298 (March 
13, 2000). 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
7 
 
determination, we first briefly discuss the background and 
objectives of the ICWA.  We then analyze the notice requirement 
of 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).  Finally, we apply our analysis of the 
notice requirement to the circuit court proceedings and conclude 
that the information before the circuit court was too vague for 
the court to have reason to know that each of Neal's children 
met the definition of "Indian child" under the ICWA.  Because 
the information was insufficient to show that the ICWA applied 
in this case, no notice was required. 
III 
¶10 An understanding of the background and objectives of 
the ICWA is essential to our analysis.  The ICWA was enacted in 
1978 in response to mounting evidence of abusive child welfare 
practices that were separating large numbers of Indian children 
from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care 
placement, usually to non-Indian homes.  See Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989) (detailing 
background to the ICWA).  In describing the state of affairs 
that led to the ICWA, a House Report noted that the "wholesale 
separation of Indian children from their families is perhaps the 
most tragic and destructive aspect of American Indian life 
today" and the "disparity in placement rates for Indians and 
non-Indians is shocking."  H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7531.   
¶11 The Congressional findings in the ICWA recognized 
that: (a) Indian children are essential to the continued 
existence and integrity of Indian tribes, (b) Indian families 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
8 
 
are often broken up by the unwarranted removal of children with 
an alarmingly high percentage of these children being placed in 
non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions, and 
(c) state agencies and judicial bodies often fail to recognize 
the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural 
and social standards of Indian communities and families.5 
 
¶12 Consistent with the Congressional findings, the ICWA 
declares a policy of protecting the best interests of Indian 
children and promoting the stability and security of Indian 
tribes and families: 
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of 
this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian 
children and to promote the stability and security of 
Indian tribes and families by the establishment of 
minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian 
children from their families and the placement of such 
children in foster or adoptive homes which will 
reflect the unique values of Indian culture, and by 
providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the 
operation of child and family service programs.6 
¶13 The U.S. Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian 
Affairs has issued guidelines to state courts to further 
compliance with the ICWA (Guidelines).7  The Guidelines do not 
                                                 
5 25 U.S.C. § 1901. 
6 Id. § 1902. 
7 Guidelines 
for 
State 
Courts; 
Indian 
Child 
Custody 
Proceedings, Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(Guidelines), 44 Fed. Reg. 67584, 67586 (1979). 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
9 
 
have binding effect,8 but courts generally consider them to be 
helpful in interpreting the ICWA.  In re D.S.P., 166 Wis. 2d at 
477; Brown Co. v. Marcella G., 2001 WI App 194, ¶8, 247 
Wis. 2d 158, 634 N.W.2d 140.  According to the Guidelines, the 
ICWA expresses a "clear preference for keeping Indian children 
with their families, deferring to tribal judgment on matters 
concerning the custody of tribal children, and placing Indian 
children who must be removed from their homes within their own 
families or Indian tribes."9  The Guidelines state that the ICWA 
and the Guidelines "shall be liberally construed in favor of a 
result that is consistent with these preferences."10 
IV 
¶14 The 
ICWA 
contains 
procedural 
and 
substantive 
provisions for involuntary child custody proceedings when an 
"Indian child" is involved.  Among the procedural provisions is 
the notice requirement in 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) which provides 
that in "any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the 
court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is 
involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or 
                                                 
8 Id. at 67584 (The Guidelines "are not intended to have 
binding legislative effect."  State courts "are free to act 
contrary to what the Department has said if they are convinced 
that the Department guidelines are not required by the statute 
itself."). 
 
9 Id. at 67585-67586. 
10 Id. at 67586. 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
10 
 
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify 
the 
parent 
or 
Indian 
custodian 
and 
the 
Indian 
child's 
tribe . . . of 
the 
proceedings 
and 
of 
their 
right 
of 
intervention." 
¶15 One of the purposes of the notice requirement is to 
enable an Indian tribe to participate in determining whether the 
child involved in the proceeding is an "Indian child."  See In 
re Jeffrey A., 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 317 (Cal.App. 2002).11  A 
tribe cannot participate in determining tribal membership unless 
the tribe is aware of the proceeding.  The notice requirement 
recognizes that Indian tribes have an interest in Indian child 
welfare proceedings apart from the parties and that the 
information supplied by the parties regarding the "Indian child" 
status of the child may be incomplete.  In re M.C.P., 571 A.2d 
627, 633 (Vt. 1989).  Thus, the ICWA creates the notice 
requirement and uses the "reason to know" threshold as the basis 
for when notice is required.   
¶16 The threshold is satisfied when the court has "reason 
to know" that the child is an "Indian child" -- a term defined 
by the ICWA as meaning something more specific than merely 
having Native American ancestors.  The ICWA defines "Indian 
                                                 
11 See Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67586 ("[T]he best source 
of information on whether a particular child is Indian is the 
tribe itself.  It is the tribe's prerogative to determine 
membership criteria and to decide who meets those criteria."); 
Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 20 (R. Strickland 
et al. eds., 1982 ed.) ("The courts have consistently recognized 
that one of an Indian tribe's most basic powers is the authority 
to determine questions of its own membership."). 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
11 
 
child" as "any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is 
either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for 
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a 
member of an Indian tribe."  25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).  Both 
definitions of an "Indian child" require analysis of a person's 
membership in an "Indian tribe" -- another term defined by the 
ICWA.  "Indian tribe" means "any Indian tribe, band, nation, or 
other organized group or community of Indians recognized as 
eligible for the services provided to Indians by the Secretary 
[of the Interior] because of their status as Indians . . . ."  
Id. § 1903(8).  Therefore, the analysis involves determining 
whether the applicable tribe is eligible for services provided 
by the U.S. Secretary of the Interior.  See In re J.T. and C.T., 
693 A.2d 283, 289 (Vt. 1997). 
¶17 When dealing with an unidentified tribe, it is 
difficult to make assumptions regarding whether a person is 
likely to be a member of the tribe because tribes use a wide 
range of membership criteria.12  For example, many tribes require 
a person to register or enroll in order to be considered a 
member of the tribe, but some do not and automatically include a 
person as a member if the person is descended from a tribal 
                                                 
12 See American Indian Policy Review Comm'n, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. Final Report 108-109 (Comm. Print 1977) ("Many tribal 
provisions call for one-fourth degree of blood of the particular 
tribe but tribal provisions vary widely.  A few tribes require 
as much as one-half degree of tribal blood and a small number 
permit any descendant of a tribal member to be enrolled, 
regardless of blood quantum.").  See also Felix S. Cohen's 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law at 22-23. 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
12 
 
member who was listed on the tribal rolls as of a specific 
date.13  Accordingly, the absence of enrollment alone may not 
necessarily be determinative of whether a person is a member of 
a tribe. 
¶18 The 
issue 
then 
becomes 
when 
and 
under 
what 
circumstances does a court have "reason to know" that a child is 
an "Indian child" under the ICWA.  The Guidelines are helpful in 
addressing this issue.14 
                                                 
13 See U.S. v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (1979) 
("Enrollment is the common evidentiary standard for establishing 
Indian status, but it is not the only means nor is it 
necessarily determinative.").  Examples of Chippewa tribal 
provisions that require registration or enrollment include: 
(a) Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution and Bylaws of the 
Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians in the State of 
Wisconsin, 
at 
http://www.narf.org/nill/Constitutions/ 
RedCliffConst/redcliffconsttoc.htm 
(December 2, 
2002); 
(b) Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution of the Grand 
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians of Michigan, at 
http://thorpe.ou.edu/consitution/GTBcons3.html 
(December 2, 
2001); and (c) Article II, Section 1 of the Revised Constitution 
and 
Bylaws 
of 
the 
Minnesota 
Chippewa 
Tribe, 
at 
http://thorpe.ou.edu/constitution/chippewa/index.html 
(December 
2, 2002).  An example of a Chippewa tribal provision that does 
not require registration or enrollment is Article II, Section 
1(b) of the Constitution and Bylaws of the Turtle Mountain Band 
of 
Chippewa 
Indians 
of 
Belcourt, 
North 
Dakota, 
at 
http://thorpe.ou.edu/constitution/Turtlemtn/TMconst.html 
(December 2, 2002) (defining tribal membership to include all 
"descendants of persons whose names appear on the [tribe's 1943 
roll], provided that such descendants possess one-fourth or more 
Indian blood, and provided further that such descendants are not 
domiciled in Canada."). 
14  See In re D.S.P., 166 Wis. 2d 464, 477, 480 N.W.2d 234 
(1992) ("While the [Guidelines] are not themselves binding upon 
courts, we find that they are helpful and should be considered 
when deciding whether a witness is a qualified expert under the 
ICWA."). 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
13 
 
¶19 According to the Guidelines, in "any involuntary child 
custody proceeding, a state court shall make inquiries to 
determine if the child involved is a member of an Indian tribe 
or if a parent of the child is a member of an Indian tribe and 
the child is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe."15  
After such inquiry, if "a state court has reason to believe a 
child involved in a child custody proceeding is an Indian, the 
court shall seek verification of the child's status from either 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the child's tribe."16 
 
¶20 The Guidelines describe the following circumstances 
under which a state court has reason to believe a child involved 
in a child custody proceeding is an Indian child: 
 
(i)  Any party to the case, Indian tribe, Indian 
organization or public or private agency informs the 
court that the child is an Indian child. 
 
(ii)  Any public or state-licensed agency involved in 
child 
protection services 
or family support had 
discovered information which suggests that the child 
is an Indian child. 
 
(iii)  The child who is the subject of the proceeding 
gives the court reason to believe he or she is an 
Indian child. 
 
(iv)  The residence or domicile of the child, his or 
her biological parents, or the Indian custodian is 
known by the court to be or is shown to be a 
predominantly Indian community. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
15 Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67588. 
16 Id. at 67586. 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
14 
 
(v)  An officer of the court involved in the 
proceeding has knowledge that the child may be an 
Indian child.17 
¶21 In this case, circumstance (v) of the Guidelines 
arguably is implicated because Neal's attorney, an officer of 
the court, asserted that the children have Indian ancestry.  
Neal claims that his children may be Indian children.  However, 
as we discuss below, we conclude that the information available 
to the court was too vague for the court to have reason to know 
that each of Neal's children is an "Indian child" as defined by 
the ICWA.18 
 
V 
¶22 Although the ICWA provides broad protections, there 
are limits to its applicability.  Before the notice requirement 
of the ICWA can be invoked, the circuit court must first 
determine if it has reason to know the child is an "Indian 
child" as defined by the ICWA. 
¶23 As noted above, the ICWA defines "Indian child" as 
"any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either 
(a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for 
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a 
member of an Indian tribe."  25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).  Additionally, 
a tribe is defined as "any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other 
                                                 
17 Id. 
18 We note that the ICWA uses the phrase "reason to know" 
and the Guidelines, without explanation, use the phrase "reason 
to believe."  Because the Guidelines are not binding, we use the 
phraseology of the ICWA. 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
15 
 
organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible 
for the services provided to Indians by the Secretary [of the 
Interior] because of their status as Indians . . . ." Id. 
§ 1903(8). 
¶24 Neal has never asserted that the children are members 
of a federally recognized tribe or that they are eligible for 
membership in a federally recognized tribe and are biological 
children of a tribe member.  He has never stated that he has 
tribal membership. 
¶25 Rather, the record establishes that at the first 
motion hearing Neal averred that his children have "Indian 
heritage" and asserted that through the children's great-great- 
grandmother their "ancestry stems from the Ojibwa Tribe in 
Marinette, Wisconsin."  The court initiated further inquiry in 
an attempt to identify and clarify tribal membership.  
¶26 Additional information obtained from the children's 
grandmother indicates that her grandmother was born on an 
unspecified Indian reservation somewhere in Canada around 1880, 
and that she later moved to Wisconsin.  She did not claim that 
her grandmother had been a member of a federally recognized 
tribe while in Canada or that she retained or sought tribal 
membership while in Wisconsin. 
¶27 The 
record reflects 
that 
the assistant district 
attorney sent a letter to the Department of the Interior 
containing all of the known information regarding the children's 
Native American ancestry.  The Department of the Interior 
responded that it was "unable to determine Indian ancestry due 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
16 
 
to insufficient information on tribal affiliation. . . .  
Accordingly, if additional information on tribal affiliation 
becomes available . . . you are advised to notify the 
appropriate tribe(s) directly of their right to intervene in the 
above proceedings." 
¶28 At the second motion hearing, Neal's attorney informed 
the circuit court that the children's grandmother provided the 
District Attorney's office with "as much information as she had 
concerning the tribal connection."  The assistant district 
attorney advised the court that in addition to sending a letter 
to the Department of the Interior, other attempts were made to 
locate an Ojibwa Tribe in Marinette, Wisconsin.  The local 
office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs was contacted and it did 
not have any listing of an Ojibwa Tribe in Marinette.  A 
juvenile court handbook was reviewed which lists Indian tribes 
within Wisconsin, and there was no Ojibwa Tribe listed in 
Marinette.  Finally, a search of the internet was conducted for 
any reference to an Ojibwa tribe in Marinette.  None was found.  
The assistant district attorney stated that the search was also 
done for a Chippewa tribe in Marinette because he "knew that was 
the anglicized version."  They were unable to locate a Chippewa 
tribe in Marinette. 
 
¶29 The circuit court echoed the Department of the 
Interior's conclusion that the information was "insufficient."  
The court concluded that the information was too "sketchy" to 
require further notice under the ICWA and that under these 
circumstances the notification provisions of the ICWA had been 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
17 
 
met.  Like the Department of the Interior and the circuit court, 
we also find the information in this case to be inadequate.  
However, unlike the circuit court, we determine that because the 
information was insufficient to show that the ICWA notice 
provisions even applied in this case, no notice was required. 
¶30 Our conclusion is supported by decisions of other 
courts that have wrestled with this issue.  In In re A.L. and 
J.L., 623 N.W.2d 418 (N.D. 2001), the North Dakota Supreme Court 
held that information that children may be American Indian was 
insufficient to invoke the ICWA.  The court noted the dearth of 
information available to the lower court in assessing whether 
the children met the definition of an "Indian child" under the 
ICWA.  It concluded that "(n)othing in this record suggests the 
children were members of an Indian tribe, or eligible for 
membership in an Indian tribe, and counsel's unsupported and 
vague statements were insufficient to suggest 'Indian child' 
status."  Id. at 422. 
¶31 Likewise, in In re Johanson, 402 N.W.2d 13 (Mich.App. 
1987), the court emphasized that the ICWA requires an initial 
determination regarding the Indian child status of the child.  
The court noted that nothing in the record indicated that the 
trial court knew or should have known that the child was an 
Indian child.  Although the record contained references to the 
Saginaw Tribe of Chippewa Indians, it appeared those references 
concerned the fact that at one time the mother rented a home on 
the Chippewa reservation.  She readily acknowledged that she was 
not 
a 
member 
of 
the 
tribe 
and 
that 
at 
one 
time 
she 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
18 
 
unsuccessfully attempted to obtain membership.  The court stated 
that just because the child may have Indian heritage does not 
qualify him as an Indian child as defined by the ICWA.  The 
court concluded that the trial court did not know and had no 
reason to know that the child was an Indian child.  Id. at 16. 
¶32 In 
In 
re 
Guardianship 
of 
J.O., 
743 
A.2d 
341 
(N.J.Super. 2000), the New Jersey appeals court found that an 
amorphous statement of possible Indian ancestry made by the 
mother's attorney provided insufficient information to trigger 
the application of the ICWA.  Citing to 25 C.F.R. § 23.11(d) 
(1994), the court noted that the regulation requires that the 
notice contain, in part, the name of the Indian tribe in which 
the child is enrolled or may be eligible for enrollment, and the 
names and addresses of the Indian child's parents, grandparents, 
and great-grandparents, together with their birthdates, places 
of birth and death, and tribal affiliation numbers.  Not even a 
small fraction of the requested information had been provided 
and the family's background did not suggest Indian heritage.  
Id. at 347.  As a result, the court concluded that "vague and 
casual reference to Indian ancestry made by [the mother's 
counsel] 
was 
insufficient 
to 
trigger 
the 
Act's 
notice 
requirement."  Id. 
¶33 We acknowledge that other courts struggling with this 
issue have concluded that the information before them was 
sufficient to trigger the notice requirement.  However, the 
assertions in those cases provided more specific information and 
reason to know that the children met the definition of "Indian 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
19 
 
child" under the ICWA or focused on what constitutes sufficient 
notice.  For example, in In re Colnar, 757 P.2d 534 (Wash.App. 
1988), the mother alleged that she was one-quarter Apache, 
claiming that made her eligible for membership in an Indian 
tribe.  The Department of Social and Health Services contacted 
the Apache Nation for the purposes of researching the bloodline 
of the mother's maternal grandmother.  The case worker asked 
specific questions about the mother, her mother and grandmother 
and then filed an affidavit indicating that the child was not 
qualified to be enrolled in a tribe.  Relying on the affidavit, 
the trial court found that the ICWA did not apply.  The 
appellate court remanded the case concluding that the contact by 
the social worker did not constitute proper notice and that the 
State thus failed to give notice to the Apache tribe or the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs as required under the ICWA. 
¶34 Similarly in In re Junious, 144 Cal.App.3d 786 (1983), 
the California appellate court concluded that notice was 
required.  There, the initial evidence before the trial court 
indicated that the child was potentially affiliated with an 
Indian tribe in Canada through the child's great-grandfather.  
However, later inquiry revealed that the tribe was in fact an 
American tribe.  It was undisputed that the mother's mother was 
an enrolled member of the Nooksack tribe.  It was also 
undisputed that the mother had one-half degree Indian blood.  
The mother interpreted the relevant Nooksack constitutional 
provisions to grant membership if she was born to an enrolled 
member who has one-half degree Indian blood.  The Department of 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
20 
 
Social Services countered with a different interpretation of the 
provisions arguing that membership does not automatically follow 
from eligibility.  The trial court accepted the interpretation 
of the department and concluded that the ICWA was not applicable 
since the child was not an "Indian child." 
¶35 The appellate court determined that the trial court 
erred in approaching resolution of the issue in this manner.  It 
noted that "the statutory definition of Indian child, taken 
together with the Nooksack constitutional provisions, resulted 
in an ambiguity which was not easily resolved."  Id. at 796.  It 
concluded that it was for the tribe to resolve any ambiguity 
regarding membership and that notice to the tribe should have 
been provided.  Unlike the unidentified Ojibwa tribe in the case 
before us, Junious involved a tribe that had been specifically 
identified, could be located, and was clearly an "Indian tribe" 
under the ICWA. 
¶36 As the above cases illustrate, courts which have 
struggled with determining when information is sufficient to 
trigger the provisions of the ICWA have reached differing 
conclusions.  All of the cases recognize the importance of 
advancing the objectives of the ICWA.  The decisions in the 
cases tend to be fact sensitive.  Our facts are more akin to 
those which have concluded that the information before the court 
was insufficient to show that the ICWA applied.   
¶37 We acknowledge that the circuit court applied a 
different analysis in addressing compliance with the notice 
requirement 
of 
25 
U.S.C. 
§ 1912(a). 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
21 
 
terminated the parental rights and determined that the notice 
requirements of the ICWA had been met.  We determine that there 
was insufficient information before the court to apply the ICWA 
and trigger its notice provisions.  However, we will not reverse 
a circuit court's order if the facts of the record applied to 
the proper legal standard support the circuit court's ultimate 
determination.  In re Paternity of Stephanie R.N., 174 Wis. 2d 
745, 767, 498 N.W.2d 235 (1993).  
¶38 We compliment the circuit court in proceeding with 
caution and giving notice to the Secretary of the Interior even 
when 
the 
paucity 
of 
information 
before 
the 
court 
was 
insufficient to invoke the ICWA.  We likewise urge other circuit 
courts to proceed with caution and to initiate further inquiry 
when confronted with vague assertions of Indian heritage.  
Proceeding with caution and initiating further inquiry advance 
the ICWA's key objectives of protecting the best interests of 
Indian children and promoting the security, survival, and 
stability of Indian families and tribes.  The importance of 
these objectives is undeniable.  Accordingly, courts must make 
every effort to ensure compliance with the ICWA, including 
ensuring that Indian tribes are properly notified. 
¶39 In sum, we affirm the order of the circuit court 
because we conclude that the information before the circuit 
court was too vague for the court to have reason to know that 
each of Neal's children met the definition of Indian child under 
the ICWA.  Because the information was insufficient to show that 
the ICWA applied in this case, no notice was required.  
No. 
02-0574, 02-0575   
 
22 
 
Accordingly, but with different rationale, we affirm the order 
of the circuit court terminating Neal's parental rights to his 
children. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
No.  02-0574, 02-0575.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶40 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
I disagree with the majority opinion's conclusion that the 
information before the circuit court was insufficient to trigger 
the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).  
I conclude, as did the circuit court, that the limited 
information at the circuit court's disposal gave it reason to 
know that an Indian child might be involved and that notice was 
therefore required under the ICWA.   
¶41 I join the majority opinion in urging circuit courts 
"to proceed with caution and to initiate further inquiry when 
confronted with vague assertions of Indian heritage."19  I write 
because I believe the majority opinion undermines this caution 
and the objectives of the ICWA by concluding that the vague 
assertions in the present case did not trigger the ICWA. 
¶42 The statutorily required notice is designed to enable 
a tribe to determine whether the child involved in the 
proceeding is an "Indian child" and whether the tribe should 
intervene in the proceedings.  Without notice, a tribe has no 
opportunity to intervene.  The consequences of lack of notice 
are serious:  the proceedings may be invalid.20   
¶43 In the present case the circuit court should be 
commended for its efforts.  The circuit court properly concluded 
that there was reason to know that an Indian child might be 
involved in the proceeding and that notice was required.  The 
                                                 
19 Majority op., ¶38. 
20 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (2001). 
No.  02-0574, 02-0575.ssa 
 
2 
 
harder question is whether reasonable effort was made to 
identify and notify the appropriate tribe.  I am reluctant to 
second-guess the circuit court that acted so responsibly in the 
present case.  I am nevertheless convinced, in light of the 
purpose of the ICWA, that a reasonable effort in the present 
case should have included notice to the list of Chippewa bands 
provided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.   
¶44 I would therefore remand the cause to the circuit 
court for furnishing additional notice.  If after additional 
notice is given the circuit court determines that the ICWA does 
not apply, the original circuit court order terminating parental 
rights would stand.21 
¶45 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.  
 
 
                                                 
21 For courts providing such a remedy, see, e.g., In re 
J.T., 693 A.2d 283, 289 (Vt. 1997), and In re C.H., 510 
N.W.2d 119, 124 (S.D. 1993). 
 
No.  02-0574, 02-0575.ssa 
 
 
 
1