Case Title: Barber v. City of Douglas

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-43

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Barber v. City of Douglas1997 WY 16931 P.2d 948Case Number: 96-43, 96-42Decided: 01/30/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

William 
E. BARBER and Edna Barber, Husband and Wife, Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

v.

The CITY OF DOUGLAS, Wyoming, a Wyoming Municipal 
Corporation, Appellee (Defendant).

 

The CITY OF

DOUGLAS, Wyoming, a Wyoming Municipal Corporation, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

William E. BARBER and Edna Barber, 
Husband

and Wife, Appellees 
(Plaintiffs).

 

 

Appeal from District Court, 
Converse County, Keith G. Kautz, J.

 

William W. Harden, Casper, for William E. Barber 
and Edna Barber.

 Thomas E. Campbell, of Hand & Campbell, P.C., 
Douglas, for City of Douglas.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

 [¶1]      At issue in this 
case is a district court ruling that there was no justiciable controversy 
presented in a declaratory judgment sought by William E. Barber and Edna Barber 
(Barbers), and a counterclaim for declaratory judgment by the Town of Douglas1 (Douglas), regarding the right to 
use water from Little Box Elder Spring. The water rights had previously been 
adjudicated to Douglas by an Order of the State Board of Control. The Barbers 
were seeking a judgment declaring their right to use water pursuant to contracts 
with Douglas. The district court ruled that the Barbers had no permit or right 
to the water and dismissed the declaratory judgment action including the 
counterclaim for a declaratory judgment by Douglas. The issue pressed by 
Douglas, assuming a justiciable controversy existed, was its right to a summary 
judgment upholding the sale and storage of water in accordance with its 
practice.  We hold that the district 
court was in error in ruling that there was no justiciable controversy presented 
by the Barbers' Complaint.  The 
Barbers clearly sought a declaration of their contractual rights to water from 
Little Box Elder Spring. We reverse and remand the case for the district court 
to address the contractual claims, and we make no ruling on the right of Douglas 
to a summary judgment because that issue should first be resolved by the 
district court.

 

[¶2]      In the Brief of 
Appellants William E. Barber and Edna Barber, the Barbers describe the issues 
before the Court as:

 

1. Whether or not the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment by finding Appellants (hereinafter referred to as "Barbers") 
acquired no contractual rights to the use of water by virtue of the State Board 
of Control Order dated April 12, 1994 [sic], or the October 12, 1954 
Right-of-Way Agreement between the parties.

 

2. Whether or not Barbers are entitled to a reversal 
and order granting summary judgment on the uncontested facts as a matter of 
law.

 

The Brief of City of 
Douglas, answering the Barbers, and setting forth the issue raised by Douglas in 
its cross appeal, states the issues as:

 

1. Whether the Barbers' lack of any water right in 
the Little Box Elder Spring requires dismissal of their claims for lack of a 
justiciable controversy.

 

2. If the Court determines there is a justiciable 
controversy, whether the City is nevertheless entitled to summary 
judgment.

 

a. 
Whether the right-of-way, dated October 12, 1954, clearly and unambiguously 
allows the City of Douglas to use the water from the Little Box Elder Spring for 
its water customers, whether such customers are located within or without the 
actual city limits of the City of Douglas.

 

b. 
Whether the Barbers are barred by the doctrines of estoppel, latches or waiver 
from bringing their claim.

 

c. Whether the Barbers have suffered any loss or 
damage.

 

[¶3]      In 1923, the Town 
of Douglas purchased the land surrounding and the water rights attached to 
Little Box Elder Spring. A reservation from that grant provided, "grantee 
[Douglas] agrees to furnish grantors, its assigns or successors, water for stock 
and garden purposes to be delivered through a two inch pipe controlled by ball 
and cock valves, said pipe to be installed by grantee herein, but maintained and 
repaired at all times by grantor, its assigns or successors * * *." The grantor 
in that conveyance was a predecessor in interest of the 
Barbers.

 

[¶4]      Douglas proceeded 
to secure the water right, and by an order of the State Board of Control, 
entered on April 12, 1924, the water appropriations that had been sold to the 
town were "detached from the lands and purposes for which said appropriations 
were originally granted, and changed to a preferred use for municipal purposes 
for and within the Town of Douglas, Wyoming * * *." The point of diversion for 
that water right was changed to the intake of the Douglas Pipe Line, and it then 
was conducted across the land now owned by Barbers through a wooden stave 
pipeline.

 

[¶5]      In 1954, Douglas 
obtained a new right-of-way across land owned by the Barbers for the 
installation of a new pipeline. The right of way document, dated October 12, 
1954, includes the following in the statement of 
consideration:

 

As a further and additional consideration, First and 
Second Parties [Joseph Garst and R.C. Maurer, Co-Executors of the estate of Orsa 
D. Ferguson, Jr. - First Party, and the Barbers - Second Party] covenant and 
agree that Third Party [Douglas] is not limited in the use of water as purchased 
from the prior grantors * * * for domestic and municipal use in the Town of 
Douglas, Wyoming, but may meter, sell or utilize such water as may be necessary 
for domestic purposes for persons, ranches or families who live or own land on 
which the new water line crosses between the spring and the Town of Douglas, 
Wyoming. All water sold shall be subject to the direct control and regulation of 
Third Party.

 

Other consideration provided 
in that document is articulated in this way:

 

As an additional consideration to First and Second 
Parties [Joseph Garst and R.C. Maurer, Co-Executors of the estate of Orsa D. 
Ferguson, Jr. - First Party, and the Barbers - Second Party] in granting this 
right-of-way and easement, Third Party [Town of Douglas] 
agrees:

 

a. That any surplus water not needed by the Town of 
Douglas to provide water for the water customers of the Town of Douglas and not 
needed as an emergency supply, shall be turned into the creek at either the 
turn-out at the springs or at the turn-out on Saw Mill Creek so that the same 
may be made available for use by First and Second Parties, all of which is 
provided under the terms of the original agreement of sale of said water 
rights.

 

[¶6]      There is no 
dispute here that Douglas owns, and has had adjudicated to it, all of the water 
rights attributable to Little Box Elder Spring, and that the Barbers claim for 
water exists only under the language of the 1923 conveyance of the land and 
water rights and the 1954 right-of-way agreement. The contention of the Barbers 
is that the contracts limit Douglas to providing service within its city limits 
and to those over whose land the "spring" pipeline passes. The Barbers assert 
that any other use is, by definition, surplus water to be turned back into the 
creek. The Barbers brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment with 
respect to the agreements and injunctive relief to limit the use of water by 
Douglas in accordance with the agreements. Douglas claims that it consistently 
has interpreted the contracts with the Barbers to the end that it can provide 
service to all of its customers, whether they reside within or without the city 
limits. Douglas counterclaimed against the Barbers seeking declaratory relief 
incorporating its construction of the contracts. Both of the parties moved for 
summary judgment.

 

[¶7]      In ruling on the 
case the district court held, without regard to the contracts, that the Barbers 
had no right by virtue of an appropriation or permit to use water from Little 
Box Elder Spring. The district court held, in effect, that without such a 
legally cognizable interest in the water the Barbers had no standing to seek the 
declaratory judgment. The district court then found there was no justiciable 
controversy and dismissed the Complaint of the Barbers and the Counterclaim of 
Douglas. The Barbers appealed the ruling against them, and Douglas appealed the 
ruling against it.

 

[¶8]      A district 
court's rulings of law are reviewable de-novo on appeal. Garaman, Inc. v. 
Williams, 912 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Wyo. 1996). On the record, the parties clearly 
were seeking an adjudication of their contractual rights; they were not 
disputing in any way the water right of Douglas; and, the case was one of 
contract construction not the construction of any right to use water under the 
permit and appropriation system. We hold the district court erred in denying 
standing to the Barbers, and we reverse and remand to the district court for a determination of the contract rights of 
the parties.

 

[¶9]      Article 5, 
Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming confers original 
jurisdiction upon the district court over "such special cases and proceedings as 
are not otherwise provided for." The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act has been 
adopted by Wyoming, and the statute justifies our trial courts in determining 
and declaring the interests of contracted parties. WYO STAT. §§ 1-37-102, 103 
(1988). Cotton v. Brow, 903 P.2d 530, 532 (Wyo. 1995). To accomplish its 
purpose, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is to be "liberally construed and 
administered." Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 577 (Wyo. 1974) (begrudging 
availability of declaratory judgment is inconsistent with its purpose); Reiman 
Corp. v. City of Cheyenne., 838 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Wyo. 1992). The right to seek a 
declaratory judgment is limited to those persons "interested under a deed, will, 
written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, 
status or other legal relations are affected by the Wyoming constitution or by a 
statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise * * *." WYO STAT. § 1-37-103 
(1988). This requirement of an "interest" captures the basic doctrine that there 
must be a justiciable controversy before relief will be granted. Brimmer, 521 P.2d  at 576; Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Hallmark Ins. Co., 
561 P.2d 706, 709 (Wyo. 1977).

 

[¶10]   In Reiman Corp., 838 P.2d  at 1186, 
we reiterated from Brimmer, 521 P.2d  at 578, the elements of a justiciable 
controversy:

 

The jurisprudential principles underlying the 
standing, ripeness, and mootness doctrines are embodied in the definition of a 
justiciable controversy adopted in Brimmer. The Brimmer court identified the 
following four elements as being necessary to establish a justiciable 
controversy under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act:

 

1. 
The parties must have existing and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, 
rights or interests.

 

2. 
The controversy must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively 
operate, as distinguished from a debate or argument evoking a purely political, 
administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion.

 

3. 
It must be a controversy the judicial determination of which will have the force 
and effect of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, 
status or other legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in 
interest, or, wanting these qualities to be of such great and overriding public 
moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of 
them.

 

4. 
The proceedings must be genuinely adversary in character and not a mere 
disputation, but advanced with sufficient militancy to engender a thorough 
research and analysis of the major issues.

 

[¶11]   Applying these criteria, there is 
no question that a justiciable controversy was present between the Barbers and 
Douglas at the time the Complaint seeking declaratory judgment was filed in the 
district court. The purpose of the Barbers' claim, and Douglas' counterclaim, 
for declaratory judgment is to settle their rights under the contracts in 
accordance with the laws of the state of Wyoming. Neither party at any point 
asserted the controversy involved or related to water law or the water rights 
held by Douglas.  The district court 
injected that factor when it came to the conclusion that, indisputably, the 
Barbers had no certificate of appropriation or permit for use of the "spring" 
water. Based on that conclusion the court ruled that the Barbers had no valid 
interest to be determined and for that reason they lacked standing. The court 
also concluded, relying upon Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., that 
without standing in the Barbers there no longer were two interested parties and 
a determination regarding the language of the 1923 and the 1954 documents would 
be meaningless.

 

[¶12]   In support of this ruling the 
district court cited Lewis v. State Bd. of Control, 699 P.2d 822, 827 (Wyo. 
1985), for the proposition that water rights cannot be established by use, and 
the only way to acquire water rights is through an appropriation or permit 
granted by the state. The Lewis case involved a situation in which the parties 
were seeking to establish water rights by virtue of the doctrine of adverse 
possession or prescription. We held that water rights cannot be acquired in that 
fashion, and abandonment cannot be demonstrated by showing adverse use. We did not 
address a contract to sell water in any way, nor did we hold that under Wyoming 
law the holder of a water right could not sell or contract for the use of that 
water. Indeed such a holding would ultimately require every municipal water user 
to seek approval from the State Board of Control for the right to use household 
water.

 

[¶13]   The Barbers point out in their 
brief that Article 13, Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming 
justifies the right of Douglas to contract to obtain a water 
right:

 

Municipal corporations shall have the same right as 
individuals to acquire rights by prior appropriation and otherwise to the use of 
water for domestic and municipal purposes, and the legislature shall provide by 
law for the exercise upon the part of incorporated cities, towns and villages of 
the right of eminent domain for the purpose of acquiring from prior 
appropriators upon the payment of just compensation, such water as may be 
necessary for the well being thereof and for domestic 
uses.

 

The Legislature granted 
broad authority to cities for the development of public improvements. WYO. STAT. 
§ 15-7-101(a)(ii) and (iii) (1992). Cities and towns are granted authority to 
extend water systems, to contract within and outside the corporate limits of the 
town, and to purchase water. WYO. STAT. § 15-7-601 to -605 (1992). Specifically, 
WYO. STAT. § 15-7-605 (emphasis added) provides that "any city or town may 
purchase water from outside its corporate limits upon terms and conditions 
agreed upon by the parties."

 

[¶14]   The agreements involving the 
Barbers and Douglas appear to be recognized as lawful in this state. They invest 
the parties with "existing and genuine" rights and interests. A judgment of the 
court will effectively resolve the controversy and identify the rights of the 
parties. The Barbers and Douglas clearly are adversaries presenting positions 
"advanced with sufficient militancy to engender a thorough research and analysis 
of the major issues." We hold that the district court erred when it shifted the 
case away from the contractual issues raised by the parties to one of 
interpretation of a right to use water, and then found that a justiciable 
controversy was not present.

 

[¶15]   We do not address the issue raised 
by the cross appeal of Douglas. The rights of the parties pursuant to the 1923 
and 1954 documents, and the validity of those agreements in the context of the 
1924 Order of the State Board of Control, are questions that should be 
determined in the trial court. Consequently, we refrain from addressing the 
contractual questions and limit our decision to a ruling that a justiciable 
controversy over contractual rights was presented to the district 
court.

 

[¶16]   The Order Dismissing Complaint and 
Counterclaim entered in the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded 
to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Douglas 
is a city now, but the contractual documents refer to it as the Town of Douglas 
as did the District Court in its decision letter and the Order Dismissing 
Complaint and Counterclaim.