Case Title: Worthington City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision

Citation: 2009-Ohio-5932

Docket Number: 20082365

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Worthington City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2009-
Ohio-5932.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-5932 
WORTHINGTON CITY SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLEE, v. 
FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES; BOB-O-LINK 
GOLF COURSE, LTD., N.K.A. WEBER SISTERS ENTERPRISES, LTD., APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Worthington City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5932.] 
Taxation — Real property valuation — Board of Tax Appeals must give full 
consideration to whether sale of property was recent with respect to the 
tax years involved. 
(No. 2008-2365 — Submitted August 25, 2009 — Decided November 17, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2006-H-381. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Bob-O-Link Golf Course, Ltd., n.k.a. Weber Sisters 
Enterprises, Ltd. (“Weber Sisters”), appeals from a decision of the Board of Tax 
Appeals (“BTA”) in which the BTA determined that the May 2003 sale price of a 
four-acre commercial parcel constituted the value of the property for tax years 
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2004 and 2005.  The auditor originally valued the property for tax year 2004 at 
$2,680,000, and the Board of Education of the Worthington City Schools (“school 
district”) filed a complaint against that valuation on February 18, 2005.  The 
school district presented the May 2003 deed and conveyance-fee statement 
showing sale of the property for $4,175,000, and urged that the sale price 
constituted the value of the property.  The Franklin County Board of Revision, 
after hearing the evidence presented by Weber Sisters, rejected the sale price and 
reverted to the auditor’s valuation of the property. 
{¶ 2} The school district appealed to the BTA.  The owner did not 
appear at the BTA hearing, but the school board and the county did.  The school 
board presented a purchase contract that it had obtained through discovery to 
bolster its contention that the BTA should use the sale price to value the property.  
On November 12, 2008, the BTA issued its decision, which adopted the sale price 
as the value of the property. 
{¶ 3} On appeal, Weber Sisters argues that the school district failed to 
discharge its burden of proof as the appellant from the BOR’s rejection of the sale 
price, and that the BTA’s findings are not supported by the evidence.  In one 
respect, we agree.  The BTA failed to give full consideration to whether the sale 
was “recent” with respect to the lien dates for tax year 2004 and tax year 2005.  
We therefore vacate and remand. 
Facts 
{¶ 4} On February 18, 2005, the school board filed its complaint against 
the valuation of Weber Sisters’ property, asking that the BOR adopt the May 2003 
sale price of $4,175,000 as the value of the property.  Weber Sisters filed a 
countercomplaint on April 15, 2005, which asked that the auditor’s valuation of 
$2,680,000 be retained because the complaint constituted a second filing within 
the same triennial period.  The parcel consists of four acres and is improved with 
two buildings. 
January Term, 2009 
3 
 
{¶ 5} On February 22, 2006, the BOR held a hearing.  Weber Sisters 
presented the testimony of Sally Marrell and Jodie Govenar, principals of Weber 
Sisters, along with exhibits that included a rent roll and an appraisal that was 
offered not as direct evidence of value, but rather as documentation of Weber 
Sisters’ vain attempt to sell the property. 
{¶ 6} The testimony indicated that Weber Sisters’ purchase was 
predicated on the seller’s leasing most of the space in the two buildings, each of 
which comprised 7,500 square feet of commercial space.  Ms. Marrell stated that 
the “price we paid was for totally occupied units,” meaning in this case that the 
sale would occur with leases in place for 11,740 of the 15,000 total square feet.  
But immediately after the May 2003 sale it became clear that two tenants slated to 
occupy the largest portions of the buildings – Boston Market and Fiesta Fresh – 
would not take possession.  The former initially honored rent obligations; the 
latter did not. 
{¶ 7} During 2004, Cold Stone Creamery began paying less and less, and 
ultimately vacated its leased premises during 2005 and defaulted on its lease 
obligations.  Another tenant, Mark Pi, experienced financial difficulty and 
negotiated a rent reduction of approximately one-third.  An Indian restaurant 
stopped paying rent as of November 2005.  Another tenant, Robeck’s Juice, 
subleased to Quizno’s at a reduced rent while itself continuing to pay full rent.  
Only one tenant, a Starbucks, retained possession at the stated rent.  “We are 
operating at a total loss” as of the February 2006 hearing date, according to 
Marrell. 
{¶ 8} The testimony also confirmed that Weber Sisters acquired the 
property as part of a like-kind exchange pursuant to Section 1031, Title 25, U.S. 
Code.  “The concept behind a 1031 exchange is that, when a property owner sells 
a property and reinvests its proceeds into another property, any economic gain has 
not been realized in a way that generates funds to pay any tax.”  Bd. of Edn. of 
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Hilliard City Schools v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (Jan. 13, 2009), 2006-T-
1804, at 7.  Accordingly, the Internal Revenue Code defers the taxation of any 
gain from the sale of the property in this situation.  Id. at 6.  In the present case the 
consideration for the property acquired by the Weber Sisters was a golf course 
worth approximately $2.4 million.  Weber Sisters borrowed the difference 
between the value of the golf course and the $4,175,000 sale price. 
{¶ 9} In 2005, Weber Sisters attempted to sell the property at issue.  It 
received an offer of $3.9 million but after the purchaser’s appraisal indicated a 
value of only $3 to $3.2 million, the purchaser backed out of the deal.  At that 
point, Weber Sisters obtained a written appraisal from Koenig and Associates that 
opined a value of $3,200,000 as of September 12, 2005.  That appraisal was 
performed before problems emerged with the Indian restaurant and Cold Stone 
Creamery and Mark Pi’s rent reduction. 
{¶ 10} The testimony also indicated that the principals of Weber Sisters 
had no knowledge and received poor advice concerning commercial property 
development in central Ohio. 
{¶ 11} In making its decision, the BOR first disposed of a jurisdictional 
objection raised by Weber Sisters.  The owner contended that the school board’s 
complaint violated R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) because the complaint was the second 
within a three-year period.  The BOR noted that the May 2003 sale occurred after 
the lien date for tax year 2003, which was the subject of the first complaint, and 
held that the timing brought the current case within a statutory exception.  On the 
merits, the BOR stated that the principals of Weber Sisters were “not necessarily 
knowledgeable buyers” and “not familiar with the Franklin County commercial 
market.”  Additionally, the BOR noted a “significant loss of tenants in calendar 
year 2003,” and the owner’s subsequent inability to sell the property.  Based on 
these findings, the BOR rejected use of the May 2003 sale price as constituting 
January Term, 2009 
5 
 
the value of the property for tax year 2004 and 2005.  The BOR adopted the value 
of $2,680,000 that had been assigned by the auditor. 
{¶ 12} The school board appealed to the BTA.  The school board served a 
written discovery request that, after the BTA issued an order compelling 
discovery, led to production of the purchase contract.  On July 11, 2007, the BTA 
held a hearing at which the school board and the county appeared but the property 
owner did not.  The purchase contract obtained through discovery was made an 
evidentiary exhibit. 
{¶ 13} The BTA issued a decision on November 21, 2007.  In that 
decision, the BTA ordered that the sale price be adopted as the value of the 
property.  Weber Sisters filed a motion for reconsideration that reasserted its 
jurisdictional objection:  Weber Sisters reiterated its argument that the BOR had 
lacked jurisdiction because the tax-year 2004 complaint was the second complaint 
that the school board had filed within the triennium.  On December 10, 2007, the 
BTA issued an order vacating the November 21 decision and requiring the school 
board to show cause why the matter should not be remanded to the BOR with the 
instruction that the case should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.  The 
school board filed a response, and on May 20, 2008, the BTA issued an order 
finding that the school board’s complaint for tax year 2004 was not barred by 
R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) because the auditor changed the value from tax year 2003 to 
tax year 2004.  The BTA also scheduled a second merits hearing in the case, 
which the parties waived. 
{¶ 14} On November 12, 2008, the BTA issued its decision.  The BTA 
found that Weber Sisters “presented no competent or probative evidence 
challenging the arm’s-length nature of the May 2003 sale * * * to rebut the 
presumption that the sale price is the best evidence of value.”  Bd. of Edn. of 
Worthington City Schools v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (Nov. 12, 2008), BTA 
No. 2006-H-381, at 5.  As for the recency of the sale, the BTA confined itself to 
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stating in a footnote that a sale eight months before the lien date for tax year 2004 
qualified as recent.  Accordingly, the BTA adopted the $4,175,000 sale price as 
the value of the property for tax years 2004 and 2005.  Weber Sisters appealed to 
this court. 
Analysis 
{¶ 15} Under our cases, the BTA is responsible for determining factual 
issues, but this court “ ‘will not hesitate to reverse a BTA decision that is based on 
an incorrect legal conclusion.’ ”  Satullo v. Wilkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 399, 2006-
Ohio-5856, 856 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 14, quoting Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. 
Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 232, 754 N.E.2d 789.  Weber 
Sisters presents several legal issues, and we consider each in turn. 
R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) does not bar the school board’s complaint  
for tax year 2004 
{¶ 16} In its notice of appeal, Weber Sisters characterizes the present case 
as a “second filing within the same triennium and therefore prohibited by section 
5715.19 O.R.C.”  In Weber Sisters’ brief, however, the second-filing issue is 
mentioned at most in passing, is not specifically argued, and is not the subject of a 
proposition of law.  Under these circumstances we would ordinarily regard the 
issue as abandoned.  E. Liverpool v. Columbiana Cty. Budget Comm., 116 Ohio 
St.3d 1201, 2007-Ohio-5505, 876 N.E.2d 575, ¶ 3. 
{¶ 17} But we have consistently treated full compliance with R.C. 
5715.19 as an indispensible prerequisite for the exercise of jurisdiction by a board 
of revision.  See Stanjim Co. v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Revision (1974), 38 Ohio 
St.2d 233, 235, 67 O.O.2d 296, 313 N.E.2d 14; Cardinal Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 13, 73 O.O.2d 83, 336 
N.E.2d 433, paragraph one of the syllabus.  An issue that pertains to the BTA’s 
jurisdiction to hear the merits of an appeal thereby pertains derivatively to our 
own jurisdiction, and we have held that we possess authority to consider such 
January Term, 2009 
7 
 
jurisdictional issues in spite of a failure to specify the theory in its notice of 
appeal.  Elyria v. Lorain Cty. Budget Comm., 117 Ohio St.3d 403, 2008-Ohio-
940, 884 N.E.2d 553, ¶ 13.  Accordingly, we consider whether R.C. 
5715.19(A)(2) barred the complaint the school board filed for tax year 2004. 
{¶ 18} R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) limits how often an owner or a school board 
may challenge the valuation of a parcel:  subject to four enumerated exceptions, a 
person may file only one complaint within a three-year “interim period.”  The 
statutory limitation ties the interim period to the sexennial revaluation of property 
and the triennial update required by law.  R.C. 5713.01(B) and 5715.24(A); Ohio 
Admin.Code 5703-25-06(B) and 5703-25-06(D).  If “ ‘a person, board, or officer’ 
files a complaint in an interim period it may not file another complaint in the 
same interim period, unless one or more of the four statutory circumstances listed 
* * * is alleged.”  Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
96 Ohio St.3d 170, 2002-Ohio-4032, 772 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 11, quoting R.C. 
5715.19(A)(2). 
{¶ 19} In the present case, the jurisdictional issue arises because the 
school board presented the May 2003 purchase price in a complaint that 
challenged the auditor’s valuation for tax year 2003.  Subsequently, the school 
board initiated the present case by filing a complaint seeking an increase for tax 
year 2004 on the basis of the May 2003 sale.  The interim period in Franklin 
County encompassed tax years 2003 and 2004.  Bd. of Edn. of Worthington City 
Schools v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (May 20, 2008), BTA No. 2006-H-381, 
at 3.  Under the pronouncement of Specialty Restaurants, R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) bars 
the complaint in this case unless one (or more) of the four exceptions applies.  As 
an initial matter, we note that the school board complied with the language of 
R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) by indicating on the complaint that the first of the four 
exceptions applied. 
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{¶ 20} We hold that two of the four exceptions applied.  R.C. 
5715.19(A)(2)(a) provides that a complaint asking for a change in value based on 
the sale of the property in an arm’s-length transaction is not barred so long as (1) 
the sale occurred after the tax lien date for the tax year for which the prior 
complaint was filed – in this case, 2003 – and (2) the effect of the sale on value 
was “not taken into consideration with respect to the prior complaint.”  In this 
case, the sale took place in May 2003 – after the January 1, 2003 lien date to 
which the earlier complaint related.  Moreover, although the May 2003 sale 
formed the basis for the tax-year-2003 complaint, the BOR set the value for 2003 
without regard to the sale price because the buildings at issue were only partially 
completed as of January 1, 2003.  Because the record shows that the construction 
was fully completed by January 1, 2004, and because the May 2003 sale 
culminated a January 2003 purchase contract that contemplated completed 
construction, the effect of the May 2003 sale price on value was “not taken into 
consideration” under the statute for tax year 2003.  Thus, the complaint is 
permitted under the exception at R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(a). 
{¶ 21} R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(c) furnishes an additional source of 
jurisdiction.  In essence, the valuation complaint presently before the court asserts 
that the sale price should be considered to be the value of the property on January 
1, 2004 – the 2004 lien date – because the buildings, which constitute a 
“substantial improvement” for purposes of R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(c), were 
completed after the 2003 lien date and before the 2004 lien date.  As a result, R.C. 
5715.19(A)(2)(c) applied to the present situation and permitted the filing of the 
tax-year 2004 complaint. 
{¶ 22} In sum, the tax-year-2004 complaint is not barred by the filing of 
the tax-year-2003 complaint because (1) the tax-year-2004 complaint relies on a 
sale that occurred after the lien date of the 2003, the tax year that was the subject 
of the earlier complaint, and (2) the effect of the sale on the property’s value was 
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9 
 
not considered previously because the construction on the property was 
incomplete. 
Collateral estoppel does not bar the school board’s complaint 
{¶ 23} Weber Sisters also contends that the BOR’s decision not to use the 
May 2003 sale price to determine the value of the property for tax year 2003 
estops the school board from litigating the use of the sale price to value the 
property for tax year 2004.  Our review of the record persuades us that Weber 
Sisters failed to establish the existence of an estoppel. 
{¶ 24} The scope of collateral estoppel in tax proceedings is limited.  We 
have acknowledged that the determination of a discrete issue as to one tax year 
may estop a party from relitigating the same issue in the context of a later 
valuation complaint.  Olmsted Falls Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
122 Ohio St.3d 134, 2009-Ohio-2461, 909 N.E.2d 597, ¶ 17, citing Columbus Bd. 
of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (Dec. 28, 1993), Franklin App. 92AP-
1715.  On the other hand, the ultimate issue of value for one tax year does not 
constitute the “same issue” for purposes of collateral estoppel as the ultimate issue 
of value for a later tax year.  Id.  Given these precepts, it is incumbent upon the 
party that asserts collateral estoppel to prove the identity between the issue 
currently presented and the issue previously decided.  Goodson v. McDonough 
Power Equip., Inc. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 198, 2 OBR 732, 443 N.E.2d 978; 
see also Dublin School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Limbach (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 255, 
257-258, 631 N.E.2d 604; Beatrice Foods Co., Inc. v. Lindley (1982), 70 Ohio 
St.2d 29, 35, 24 O.O.3d 68, 434 N.E.2d 727. 
{¶ 25} In the present case some evidence was offered at the BTA 
concerning the BOR’s disposition of the tax-year-2003 complaint.  That evidence 
indicates that the BOR declined to regard the May 2003 sale price as indicative of 
value for tax year 2003 because the two buildings were still under construction on 
January 1, 2003.  But the evidence also indicates that the buildings were complete 
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by January 1, 2004.  As a result, Weber Sisters has fallen well short of proving an 
identity of issues, because the question whether to use the sale price for 2004 does 
not involve the same issue whether to use the sale price for 2003.  Accordingly, 
the BOR’s disposition of the tax-year-2003 complaint has no collateral-estoppel 
effect on the later complaint. 
The BTA erred by failing to give full consideration  
to whether Weber Sisters had proven that the sale was not “recent”  
as to the lien dates for 2004 and 2005 
{¶ 26} The gravamen of the Weber Sisters’ appeal lies in its contentions 
that the BTA’s decision lacks evidentiary support and that the BTA failed to hold 
the school board to its burden of proof. 
{¶ 27} As an initial matter, Weber Sisters’ argument relies on well-settled 
legal principles.  We have held that the BTA’s findings must be supported by 
evidence; indeed, when the evidence does not support those findings, they must 
be set aside on appeal.  E.g., NFI Metro Ctr. II Assoc. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Revision (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 105, 107, 676 N.E.2d 881; Gen. Motors Corp. v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 513, 515-516, 660 N.E.2d 
440.  Moreover, when “cases are appealed from a board of revision to the BTA, 
the burden of proof is on the appellant, whether it be a taxpayer or a board of 
education, to prove its right to an increase or decrease from the value determined 
by the board of revision.”  Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin 
Cty. Bd. of Revision (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 564, 566, 740 N.E.2d 276.  That 
burden requires the appellant to “present competent and probative evidence to 
make its case; it is not entitled to a reduction or an increase in valuation merely 
because no evidence is presented against its claim.”  Id., citing Hibschman v. Bd. 
of Tax Appeals (1943), 142 Ohio St. 47, 26 O.O. 239, 49 N.E.2d 949.  
Additionally, when hearing has been waived before the BTA, the BTA has the 
duty to “make its own independent judgment based on its weighing of the 
January Term, 2009 
11 
 
evidence contained in [the] transcript” of the proceedings before the BOR.  
Columbus Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 13, 
15, 665 N.E.2d 1098. 
{¶ 28} Turning to the school board’s burden of proof at the BTA, we 
conclude that the BTA was justified in viewing the conveyance-fee statement and 
the deed that the school board had presented to the BOR as constituting a prima 
facie showing of value.  Id. at 16, 665 N.E.2d 1098 (because the school board had 
introduced into evidence of a copy of a deed and a conveyance-fee statement as 
proof of a recent, arm’s-length sale, the burden to prove a lesser value shifted to 
the property owner).  In the present case, the school board additionally presented 
to the BTA a purchase agreement that it had obtained through discovery.  The 
troika of deed, conveyance-fee statement, and purchase agreement formed an 
adequate basis for the BTA to find a recent arm’s-length sale, subject to rebuttal 
by the Weber Sisters. 
{¶ 29} As we stated in Cummins Property Servs., L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. 
Bd. of Revision, 117 Ohio St.3d 516, 2008-Ohio-1473, 885 N.E.2d 222, ¶ 13, a 
recent arm’s-length sale price must ordinarily be considered to be the value of the 
property.  Usually the “only rebuttal” of the sale price “lies in challenging 
whether the elements of recency and arm’s-length character between a willing 
seller and a willing buyer are genuinely present for that particular sale.”  Id. 
{¶ 30} For its part, the BTA relied on its holding that the evidence did not 
impugn the arm’s-length character of the sale.  Specifically, the BTA 
acknowledged that Weber Sisters had pointed to several factors in challenging the 
arm’s-length character of the sale:  the like-kind exchange facet of the sale, their 
own lack of knowledge of the local market, their inability to resell, or their loss of 
tenants.  But the BTA found that the owner had failed to show the significance of 
those factors for purposes of determining the question of arm’s-length character.  
Weber Sisters has not pointed to any distinctly legal error in the BTA’s discussion 
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of the arm’s-length character, and accordingly we will defer to the BTA’s finding 
that the May 2003 sale was at arm’s length.  Am. Natl. Can Co. v. Tracy (1995), 
72 Ohio St.3d 150, 152, 648 N.E.2d 483 (“The BTA is responsible for 
determining factual issues and, if the record contains reliable and probative 
support for these BTA determinations, we will affirm”). 1   
{¶ 31} The BTA’s treatment of the issue of recency is another matter.  
That issue the BTA relegated to a footnote, where the board stated that a “sale 
within eight months of the 2004 tax lien date is sufficiently recent for tax 
valuation purposes.”  Worthington City Schools Bd. of Edn. (Nov. 12, 2008), BTA 
No. 2006-H-381, at 4, fn. 3.  But the BOR, in rejecting the sale price, had 
explicitly relied on several pieces of evidence that potentially bear on the issue of 
recency:  the immediate loss of tenants, the subsequent failure to sell the property, 
and the lower values reflected by later appraisals.  The BOR appeared to regard 
such factors as establishing a change in circumstances that made it inappropriate 
to use the May 2003 sale price to value the property as of January 1, 2004, and 
January 1, 2005. 
{¶ 32} As noted, the BTA found the sale was recent based solely on the 
temporal proximity of the sale date to the lien date.  But under our case law such 
proximity is not the sole factor affecting recency.  See Cummins, 117 Ohio St.3d 
516, 2008-Ohio-1473, 885 N.E.2d 222, ¶ 35 (recency “encompasses all factors 
that would, by changing with the passage of time, affect the value of the 
property”); New Winchester Gardens, Ltd. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision 
(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 36, 44, 684 N.E.2d 312 (recency factors include “changes 
                                                 
1.  Weber Sisters’ contention that the sale was not at arm’s length because the property was not 
sold on the “open market” does not state a claim of legal error.  We have held that the opponent of 
using the sale price to determine value must shoulder the burden to show that the sale did not 
occur in the market that is relevant in the particular case – here, the Section 1031 like-kind 
exchange market. See AEI Net Lease Income & Growth Fund v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Revision, 119 
Ohio St.3d 563, 2008-Ohio-5203, 895 N.E.2d 830, ¶ 22, 23.  Weber Sisters has made no such 
showing. 
January Term, 2009 
13 
 
that have occurred in the market”).  Before the BTA, Weber Sisters specifically 
argued not only that the evidence presented to the BOR negated the arm’s-length 
character of the sale, but also that “market changes and other factors make the 
sale price unreliable” on the record of this case.  Yet the BTA did not address this 
aspect of Weber Sisters’ argument.  It follows that the BTA erred by not 
considering the evidence upon which the BOR relied when it made its finding as 
to the recency of the May 2003 sale.  See Columbus Bd. of Edn., 76 Ohio St.3d at 
15, 665 N.E.2d 1098. 
{¶ 33} Before this court, Weber Sisters renews its argument that the BOR 
transcript clearly showed “change in the property” and “market changes and other 
factors that [make] the sale price unreliable.”  We have stated that the burden lay 
on Weber Sisters to rebut the presumptive recency of the sale, but it is evident that 
the BOR found such a rebuttal in the record before it.  The BTA did not identify 
any error in the BOR’s reasoning and, if the evidence that Weber Sisters 
presented to the BOR did tend to negate recency, then the school board acquired 
the burden of rebutting the probative force of that evidence.  See Mentor 
Exempted Village Bd. of Edn. v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Revision (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 
318, 319, 526 N.E.2d 64. 
{¶ 34} Although the BTA’s latitude in weighing evidence is broad, we 
have held that the BTA “has the duty to state what evidence it considered relevant 
in reaching its determination.”  HealthSouth Corp. v. Levin, 121 Ohio St.3d 282, 
2009-Ohio-584, 903 N.E.2d 1179, ¶ 34.  While we accord deference to the BTA’s 
explicit determination that Weber Sisters had not impugned the arm’s-length 
character of the sale, we hold that the BTA did not perform the required review 
with respect to whether the May 2003 sale met the criteria of recency as of 
January 1, 2004, and January 1, 2005.  Accordingly, we vacate the BTA’s 
decision and remand for a determination whether the May 2003 sale was “recent” 
as to tax years 2004 and 2005 in light of the entire record.  As in HealthSouth, the 
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parties have had ample opportunity to present evidence, so the BTA shall not take 
additional evidence on remand. 
{¶ 35} We emphasize that we do not prejudge the outcome of the BTA’s 
analysis on remand.  The BTA will have the duty to weigh the significance of the 
purchase contract, the other documentation of sale, and the testimony and 
documentation presented to the BOR to make its determination. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 36} For the reasons set forth, we vacate the BTA’s decision and 
remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
Decision vacated 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Rich & Gillis Law Group, L.L.C., Jeffrey A. Rich, and Mark H. Gillis, for 
appellee Worthington City Schools Board of Education. 
 
Wayne E. Petkovic, for appellant. 
______________________