Case Title: Idaho v. Barr

Citation: 

Docket Number: 46094

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2020-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 46094 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
      Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
BRITIAN LEE BARR, 
 
     Defendant-Appellant. 
 
  
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Boise, November 2019 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: May 14, 2020 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, Ada County.  Samuel A. Hoagland, District Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Eric D. Fredericksen, Idaho State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, 
attorney for Appellant. Kimberly A. Coster argued. 
 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for 
Respondent. Kale D. Gans argued. 
 
 
BEVAN, Justice 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is about whether a district court has any sentencing discretion under Idaho 
Code section 19-2520G, a statute which provides for a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen 
years for repeat violations of certain sex offenses. Britain Lee Barr pleaded guilty to five counts 
of sexual exploitation of a child and to being a repeat sex offender. The district court sentenced 
Barr to five, fifteen-year fixed sentences, to run consecutively to each other, for an aggregate 
determinate term of seventy-five years, reasoning that section 19-2520G left it no discretion to 
sentence Barr to anything less severe. On appeal Barr argues that the district court abused its 
discretion when it failed to perceive that it had discretion to: (1) designate indeterminate and 
determinate portions of the mandatory fifteen-year sentences; and (2) run the sentences 
concurrently with one another rather than consecutively. Barr also claims that if the legislature 
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intended section 19-2520G to deprive the court of its traditional power to decide whether to run 
sentences consecutively or concurrently, the statute is unconstitutional.  
Even so, Barr never took a position below on whether the district court had discretion to 
impose a lesser sentence, nor did he raise an issue over section 19-2520G’s constitutionality; 
thus, Barr’s arguments were not properly preserved for appeal. We therefore affirm. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In March 2017, detectives found hundreds of photos and videos of child pornography on 
Barr’s laptop, cell phones, and computer storage devices. Barr admitted to officers he had been 
downloading child pornography. Based on the recovered videos, Barr was charged by 
Information with five felony counts of sexual exploitation of a child. The State also filed an 
Information Part II alleging that Barr had been convicted of possessing child pornography, he 
was a repeat sex offender, and thus was subject to the mandatory minimum sentence provisions 
in Idaho Code section 19-2520G. The State later filed a second case charging Barr with more 
counts of possession of child pornography, and the two cases were consolidated for trial.  
At a pretrial hearing the parties proffered a proposed Rule 11 plea agreement to the 
district court. Both parties agreed, in exchange for Barr’s guilty plea to the initial five counts 
filed against him, the State would dismiss the remaining charges in the latter case. The parties 
also agreed to a unified sentence of fifty years, with twenty years fixed. The district court raised 
concerns about the plea agreement, mainly regarding whether the submitted sentence was illegal 
because it called for the sentences to run concurrently, rather than consecutively, as required 
under section 19-2520G. The parties both agreed there was some case law that referred to how 
the sentences for each count needed to run consecutively, but even so, they believed that their 
proposed sentence was not an illegal one. The district court declined to make any findings or 
determinations at that point, but continued the hearing for three weeks to explore whether the 
parties were proposing an illegal sentence as it had been described. 
Barr eventually rejected the twenty-year fixed sentence in the proposed Rule 11 plea 
agreement and the case went to trial. On the second day of trial Barr changed his mind and his 
counsel informed the court that Barr wanted to plead guilty to five counts of sexual exploitation 
of a child and the repeat sex offender enhancement, which required “a minimum mandatory 15 
years for a total of 75 years minimum for all five counts.” In exchange the State agreed to 
dismiss the second case. 
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After hearing the terms of the plea bargain the district court emphasized that if Barr chose 
to proceed and plead guilty, each count required a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years, 
to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of seventy-five years fixed. The judge explained 
that he “virtually would have no discretion in the final sentence because of the Information Part 
Two” and he lacked the ability to “reduce the sentence or make it run concurrently or anything 
like that.” Barr stated that he understood.  
With the consent of both parties, the district court dispensed with ordering an updated 
presentence investigation report, a psychosexual evaluation, mental health evaluation, or any 
other evaluation, again stating its belief that it had no sentencing discretion here, and proceeded 
directly to sentencing. The State requested the seventy-five years spelled out by Idaho Code 
section 19-2520G. Defense counsel did not object and recognized Barr was “going to prison for 
essentially the rest of his life” but expressed how remorseful Barr was, stating “not having the 
ability to argue for less or anything like that, I think he just wanted that out in the open.”  
Ultimately, the district court sentenced Barr to five fifteen-year fixed sentences to be 
served consecutively, leading to a final sentence of seventy-five years fixed imprisonment. The 
district court stated: 
The sentence in this case – I do not think it would be possible for me to 
fashion a sentence that was not as severe if I had the discretion to do so, but I 
don’t have that discretion and I can only assume by virtue that the law that we 
have is based upon a fundamental finding that Mr. Barr and other defendants in 
similar circumstance are a danger to the community and must be imprisoned for 
the safety of the community and/or to serve the objectives of punishment or 
retribution. And finally to whatever effect it might have to that general deterrence; 
that is, sending a message to others that this is what could happen.  
Barr signed a guilty plea advisory form acknowledging that he was subject to a fifteen-year 
mandatory minimum sentence on each count for seventy-five years determinate, and the district 
court entered a judgment of conviction to that effect. Barr timely appealed. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Sentencing decisions are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. 
McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016). When this Court reviews an alleged abuse 
of discretion, the inquiry requires consideration of four essentials to determine whether the trial 
court: 
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(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by 
the exercise of reason. 
State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 113, 426 P.3d 461, 464 (2018) (quoting Lunneborg v. My Fun 
Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). When a district court does “not recognize 
the scope of its discretion,” Idaho’s appellate courts have “remand[ed] to allow the district court 
to reconsider the motion to correct the illegal sentences with knowledge of the full scope of its 
discretion. State v. Villavicencio, 159 Idaho 430, 437, 362 P.3d 1, 8 (Ct. App. 2015). 
This Court exercises free review over statutory interpretation because it is a question of 
law. State v. Lantis, 165 Idaho 427, 429, 447 P.3d 875, 877 (2019) (citing State v. Dunlap, 155 
Idaho 345, 361, 313 P.3d 1, 17 (2013)). 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Barr Failed To Preserve His Arguments For Appeal. 
On appeal, Barr argues that the district court misinterpreted Idaho Code section 19-
2520G and abused its discretion by failing to perceive that it had discretion to: (1) order 
indeterminate and determinate portions of Barr’s five fifteen-year sentences, and (2) run his 
sentences concurrently with one another. Barr also asserts that if the legislature intended section 
19-2520G(3) to deprive the court of its traditional power to determine whether to run a sentence 
consecutively, then the statute is unconstitutional.  
The State counters that if any error occurred below, Barr invited it by inducing and 
acquiescing in the district court’s conclusion that the five fifteen-year sentences had to be 
consecutive and fixed. As a result, the State argues that Barr’s claims on appeal are estopped by 
the invited error doctrine. “The invited error doctrine precludes a criminal defendant from 
‘consciously’ inviting district court action and then successfully claiming those actions are 
erroneous on appeal.” State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 771, 419 P.3d 1042, 1069 (2018) (quoting 
State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 420, 348 P.3d 1, 35 (2015)).  
The State’s position is in the right vicinity, but ultimately misses the mark. The purpose 
of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who caused or played an important role in 
prompting a trial court to take action, from later challenging that decision on appeal. See State v. 
Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999) (“the invited error doctrine is to prevent a 
party who caused or played an important role in prompting a trial court to give or not give an 
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instruction from later challenging that decision on appeal.”). A review of the record reveals that 
Barr never took a position one way or the other on whether the district court had discretion to 
impose a lesser sentence or run the sentences concurrently; thus, he did not urge the court to take 
action, nor did he play an important role in prompting the court to give the sentence it did. 
Simply acquiescing in the district court’s stated conclusion regarding the statute is not enough to 
preclude Barr from asserting his challenge to the sentence based on invited error.  
That said, both before and during sentencing the district court made several comments 
that it believed it lacked discretion to impose a lesser sentence, providing Barr with several 
opportunities to raise any issues related to the district court’s conclusion. But, Barr never made, 
nor did the district court rule on, any motion or objection about its sentencing discretion—or lack 
thereof—under section 19-2520G. To have properly preserved the issue for appeal, Barr had to 
take a position with respect to whether the district court had discretion to impose a lesser 
sentence. To state an arguable claim on appeal, “both the issue and the party’s position on the 
issue must be raised before the trial court for it to be properly preserved . . . .” State v. Gonzalez, 
165 Idaho 95, 99, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019). “[A]n appellant may polish an argument made at 
the district court as long as he is putting forth the same legal issue and same position on the 
issue. State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 584, 448 P.3d 1005, 1012 (2019). Barr had an 
obligation to take a legal position in order to preserve this issue for appeal. He failed to do so. 
We thus hold that Barr is precluded from now arguing the district court had discretion to impose 
a lesser sentence.  
Barr also argues on appeal that the judiciary has inherent, exclusive discretion to 
determine whether a sentence will run consecutively or concurrently; as such, if the legislature 
intended section 19-2520G(3) to deprive the court of these traditional powers by requiring 
sentences be served consecutively, then this Court should conclude that the statute exceeds the 
legislature’s limited constitutional authority. However, once again, Barr did not argue that 
section 19-2520G is unconstitutional before the district court. In general, constitutional issues 
will not be considered if raised for the first time on appeal. Roell v. Boise City, 134 Idaho 214, 
216, 999 P.2d 251, 253 (2000) (citing State v. Fox, 130 Idaho 385, 387, 941 P.2d 357, 359 
(1997)). “Failure to properly raise such an issue below is a waiver of the right to raise the issue 
on appeal.” Id. However, “[o]n occasion we have allowed an issue that was not formally raised 
below to be considered on appeal when the issue was implicitly before the lower tribunal, and 
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was considered and passed on by that tribunal.” Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351, 357, 
787 P.2d 1159, 1165 (1990) (quoting Manookian v. Blaine County, 112 Idaho 697, 700, 735 P.2d 
1008, 1011 (1987)); see also State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998) 
(citing Northcutt for the proposition that this Court has recognized that an exception to the 
waiver rule exists when the issue has been ruled on by the trial court, even if not expressly raised 
by the parties). 
Barr claims that his constitutional separation of powers argument is properly before us 
because the issue was raised and decided by the district court during sentencing based on the 
following statements the court made about mandatory minimum sentencing laws: 
Those laws are passed by the legislature to essentially usurp the court’s ability to 
impose a sentence that fits both the crime and the criminal. The legislature with a 
sweeping statute has decided that everybody convicted of the same offenses 
should be given the same punishment without allowing the judges to weigh the 
pros and cons, the benefits and detriments, the costs in all regards and in all 
respects. I personally I [sic] think that’s a violation of constitutional power of 
judges and the judicial branch of government, but I think those issues have been 
litigated and the judiciary at higher levels have concluded that mandatory 
minimum sentencing laws are not a violation of the power – separation of powers 
doctrine within our constitutions.   
While the district judge expressed his personal opinions and frustrations with mandatory 
minimum sentencing laws, the issue was not before the district court; it never heard arguments 
from the parties or issued a ruling on whether section 19-2520G was unconstitutional1. Even if 
these comments constituted a ruling, Barr did not raise the issue or take the position that section 
19-2520G was unconstitutional. Therefore, the exception does not apply. As discussed above, 
“both the issue and the party’s position on the issue must be raised before the trial court for it to 
be properly preserved for appeal.” Gonzalez, 165 Idaho at 99, 439 P.3d at 1271. Thus, we will 
not consider Barr’s constitutional argument on appeal.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Given the foregoing, the decision of the district court is affirmed.  
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices BRODY, STEGNER and MOELLER, CONCUR. 
                                                 
1 Nothing in this opinion should be construed to limit Barr’s right to challenge the legality of his sentence under 
I.C.R. 35(a).