Case Title: In Re Conduct of Bell

Citation: 294 Or. 202, 655 P.2d 569

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1982-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
655 P.2d 569 (1982)
294 Or. 202
In re Complaint As to the CONDUCT OF Neal H. BELL, Accused.
SC 28670.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted September 8, 1982.
Decided December 15, 1982.
Richard W. Butler, Eugene, argued the cause for accused. With him on the brief was Atherly, Butler & Burgott, Eugene.
John W. Hitchcock, McMinnville, argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar.
PER CURIAM.
The issue is the appropriate sanction for a violation of DR 7-110(B), which forbids a lawyer to communicate as to the merits of a case with a judge before whom the case is pending except in circumstances not pertinent to the circumstances of this case.
The following statement of facts is drawn from the accused's brief insofar as that statement has been accepted by the Oregon State Bar in its brief. Facts not drawn from the accused's brief are those which we find from our own review of the record.
Raymond Silbernagel was the purchaser at sheriff's sale of certain real property. Margaret Scott was a judgment creditor of the debtor whose property had been sold to Silbernagel. Scott's lawyer, knowing that the accused owned nearby property, called the accused to inquire whether there might be some financial advantage to the exercise of Scott's redemption rights. The accused opined that the property had been "bid in" too cheaply.
Scott and the accused entered into an agreement whereby the accused and his law partners would "put up" approximately $130,000 to permit Scott to exercise her rights of redemption. The accused and his partners took an option on the purchase of Scott's right of redemption. Scott was to be paid $750 for the option. The expectation of Scott, her lawyer, and the accused and his partners was that if Scott redeemed, the property would be re-redeemed, and the profits would be divided.[1]
Scott's redemption right was exercised. Shortly thereafter, Scott's deed and her assignment of her certificate of redemption running to the accused and his partners were recorded.
Silbernagel then filed suit to set aside the redemption sale and prevailed in the trial court. Upon appeal by Scott and the sheriff (Goin), the judgment was reversed on November 7, 1977, Silbernagel v. Goin, 31 Or. App. 545, 570 P.2d 1011 (1978), and review *570 was denied in this court on February 7, 1978. The cause was then remanded to the trial court for "further proceedings pursuant to law and this Court's [the Court of Appeals] decision."
The accused and at least one of his partners were aware that Silbernagel's counsel contemplated filing an amended complaint and pursuing the cause further in the trial court. The accused and one of his partners discussed the matter and the partner told the accused that "they were getting no place with [Silbernagel's counsel] and maybe they should go ahead and submit the decree." This referred to a form of proposed decree which had been prepared and was so drawn as to terminate the suit in favor of defendants Scott and Goin. A copy of that form of proposed decree had not been submitted to Silbernagel's counsel.
On the day of that conversation, February 17, 1978, the accused took the proposed decree to the county courthouse with the intention of leaving it with the trial judge's secretary. The accused had no intention of presenting the form directly to the trial judge. The accused was aware that Silbernagel's counsel did not agree with the accused's law firm as to the proper interpretation and effect of the Court of Appeals decision and opposed the submission of a decree.
At the courthouse, the accused encountered the trial judge on an interior staircase. The judge inquired, more or less as a pleasantry, what brought the accused to the courthouse, and the accused responded that he had something to leave for signature. The judge put out his hand for it, and the accused surrendered it to the judge. The judge glanced through it and commented that he remembered that this was the case where there was a narrow issue as to whether a copy of the judgment or a copy of the docket of the judgment must be presented upon a proceeding to redeem. The accused testified as follows as to what then occurred:
On cross examination, the accused further testified:
Before the Trial Board the trial judge testified that he had no recollection of the conversation but that it was not his normal practice to sign a decree or order when advised that some portion of it was in dispute without first giving the opportunity for a hearing on the dispute.
The accused promptly mailed to Silbernagel's counsel a conformed copy of the decree. Thereafter, Silbernagel's motion to set aside the decree was denied, and Silbernagel appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, making it clear that the court did not consider its first decision as being a final determination of the merits of the cause. Silbernagel v. Goin, 41 Or. App. 269, 597 P.2d 1287 (1979).[2]
The Trial Board found the accused guilty of the charge made in these proceedings and recommended that he be administered a public reprimand. The Trial Board wrote:
The Disciplinary Review Board substantially agreed with the Trial Board as to the facts and concluded:
The Disciplinary Review Board recommended that the accused receive a public reprimand, but three of the seven members of that board dissented from that recommendation, taking the position that a thirty-day suspension from practice was a more appropriate sanction.
The accused petitioned this court to adopt the recommendation of the Disciplinary Review Board with respect to the imposition of a public reprimand. His brief concludes:
In this court the Bar argues for some discipline greater than a public reprimand. The Bar takes the position that the accused had not been forthright with either the trial court or the Court of Appeals regarding his interest in the property. We agree that is so, and it is reasonable to infer that the trial judge might have been more cautious in inquiring into the matter of possible opposition to the decree had he been aware of the accused's interest. Moreover, the Bar notes the further consequence of the forbidden ex parte communication, which necessitated the appeal and "financial loss" in that respect to Silbernagel.
In oral argument before this court, the accused's counsel summed up the accused's position upon final submission to this court as follows:
A judge must be able to rely upon the candor, integrity and honesty of lawyers in handling ex parte matters. Experience teaches us that a large volume of judicial business is handled expeditiously and well upon an ex parte basis. A place for such business is regularly reserved upon court calendars. In order to process matters upon that basis, the judge must be able to rely upon the candor, honesty and integrity of the lawyer who presents a matter ex parte. Should the courts have to abandon the system of considering many matters ex parte upon the representation of the appearing counsel, the administration of justice would be seriously affected. See In re Greene, 290 Or. 291, 297, 620 P.2d 1379 (1980). The public must be protected from erosion of the administration of justice, and one of the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public and to demonstrate that the violation of the obligation to act ethically is a serious matter. See In re English, 290 Or. 113, 125, 618 P.2d 1275 (1980).
We find the appropriate sanction to be a short suspension from the privilege to practice law. We order that the accused be suspended from practicing law for a period of thirty days beginning with the effective date of this decision. See Oregon Rules of Appellate Procedure, 11.03(4). The Oregon State Bar is awarded its actual and necessary costs and disbursements. ORS 9.535(4).
[1]  As it turned out, there was no re-redemption, and the accused and his partners still owned the property at the time this matter was before the Trial Board.
[2]  The opinion expressly criticizes the conduct of the accused and his firm in failing to apprise any court concerned with this litigation of the interest of that firm in the outcome of the proceedings.