Case Title: State ex rel. Records v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 1996-Ohio-129

Docket Number: 19940975

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State ex rel. Records, Appellant, v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 
1 
Appellee. 
2 
[Cite as State ex rel. Records v. Indus. Comm. (1996), _____ Ohio St. 3d 
3 
_____.] 
4 
Workers’ compensation -- Application for permanent total disability 
5 
compensation -- Industrial Commission’s denial of application not 
6 
an abuse of discretion when the explanation of the commission’s 
7 
reasoning is not perfect but is based upon evidence in the record 
8 
and does give some explanation for its conclusion. 
9 
 
(No. 94-975--Submitted October 24, 1996--Decided January 10, 
10 
1996.) 
11 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 
12 
93APD03-443. 
13 
 
14 
 
Appellant-claimant, Anthony P. Records, was injured in the course of 
15 
and arising from his employment with Schneider Sheet Metal, Inc.  His 
16 
workers’ compensation claim was allowed for back and neck injuries.  
17 
Claimant eventually moved appellee, Industrial Commission of Ohio, for 
18 
permanent total disability compensation.  Among the evidence before the 
19 
 
2
commission was the report of Dr. Bernard B. Bacevich.  He assessed a 
1 
fifteen percent permanent partial impairment for the allowed back 
2 
conditions and assigned the same value to claimant’s allowed neck 
3 
conditions.  He stated claimant could not do bending or lifting over ten 
4 
pounds.  He opined that claimant could do “light gainful sustained 
5 
remunerative employment.” 
6 
 
Dr. Clarence J. Louis felt claimant could do sedentary work and 
7 
found a twenty percent permanent partial impairment attributable to the 
8 
allowed conditions.  Dr. Paul H. Dillahunt, in a combined effects review, 
9 
concurred with Louis’ assessment of claimant’s work capacities and 
10 
reported a forty percent combined effects permanent partial impairment. 
11 
 
The commission on January 13, 1993, denied permanent total 
12 
disability compensation, writing: 
13 
 
“*** [C]laimant is not permanently and totally disabled for the reason 
14 
that the disability is not total; that is, that claimant is able to perform 
15 
sustained remunerative employment ***. 
16 
 
“The reports of Doctor(s) Vocational Expert Riccio, Vocational 
17 
expert Tosi, Kelly, Bacevich, Forso, Braddom, Louis and Dillahunt were 
18 
 
3
reviewed and evaluated.  The order is based particularly upon the reports of 
1 
Doctor(s) Bacevich, Louis and Dillahunt, the evidence in the file and/or 
2 
evidence adduced that the hearing. 
3 
 
“The medical evidence found persuasive includes the reports of Drs. 
4 
Bacevich, Louis and Dillahunt.  Dr. Bacevich, Commission Orthopedist, 
5 
calculated a 15% impairment for claimant’s back and a 15% impairment for 
6 
his neck.  Dr. Bacevich opined that the allowed conditions do not preclude 
7 
sedentary and light work.  Dr. Louis, Commission Neurologist, found a 20% 
8 
impairment and stated that claimant can perform sedentary work.  Dr. 
9 
Dillahunt, Commission Combined Effects Reviewer, found a total 
10 
impairment of only 40% [and] opined that claimant can perform sedentary 
11 
employment.  Claimant is 56 years old, has obtained a GED and has work 
12 
experience as a sheet metal worker and sheet metal worker supervisor.  
13 
Claimant does hold a trade license as a journeyman sheet metal worker.  It is 
14 
noted that claimant suffers from the following unrelated medical conditions:  
15 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, diabetes mellitus and coronary 
16 
artery disease.  The Commission finds that the allowed conditions do not 
17 
render claimant permanently and totally disabled.  Relying upon the reports 
18 
 
4
of Drs. Bacevich, Louis and Dillahunt, the Commission finds that the 
1 
allowed conditions do not preclude sedentary employment.  Considering 
2 
claimant’s work experience and especially his position as a supervisor, the 
3 
Commission finds that claimant possesses some skills for sedentary work.  
4 
Any inability to physically perform sedentary work would not be related to 
5 
the allowed conditions in this claim.  It is noted that the Commission 
6 
Vocational Report of Dr. Tosi is not relied upon for the reason that 
7 
claimant’s unrelated medical conditions were considered in assessing 
8 
claimant’s ability to obtain sustained remunerative employment.” 
9 
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
10 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in 
11 
denying permanent total disability compensation.  The appellate court 
12 
disagreed and denied the writ.  This cause is now before this court upon an 
13 
appeal as of right. 
14 
 
15 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. 
16 
Jaffy, for appellant. 
17 
 
5
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Yolanda L. Barnes, 
1 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
2 
 
3 
 
Per Curiam.  Claimant seeks to compel the award of permanent total 
4 
disability compensation pursuant to State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm (1994), 68 
5 
Ohio St.3d 315, 626 N.E. 2d 666.  The commission seeks to uphold its order 
6 
as is.  Because review favors the latter, we affirm the judgment of the court 
7 
of appeals. 
8 
 
Most of the claimant’s propositions of law can be summarily disposed 
9 
of: 
10 
 
1.  Proposition of Law II(A).  Contrary to claimant’s contention, the 
11 
commission did specifically state why claimant was not entitled to 
12 
permanent total disability compensation as directed by State ex rel. Hartung 
13 
v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 257, 560 N.E. 2d 196.  The order 
14 
expressly found claimant capable of sustained remunerative employment.   
15 
 
2.  Propositions of Law II(B) and (C).  We hold that the commission 
16 
used the proper standard -- inability to perform sustained remunerative 
17 
employment -- in evaluating permanent total disability compensation. 
18 
 
6
 
3.  Proposition of Law II(D).  Contrary to appellant’s contention, the 
1 
commission did not deny compensation because claimant has nonallowed 
2 
health problems; it merely noted their presence. 
3 
 
4.  Proposition of Law IV.  It is not the case that the commission 
4 
ignored Riccio’s vocational report. The order specifically indicated the 
5 
report was considered. 
6 
 
5.  Proposition of Law V.  We have previously held that a lack of 
7 
commission permanent total disability compensation guidelines does not 
8 
constitute a due-process violation.  State ex rel. Blake v. Indus. Comm. 
9 
(1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 453, 605 N.E. 2d 23.  Appellant’s argument otherwise 
10 
thus lacks merit. 
11 
 
Claimant’s remaining propositions of law are attacks on the 
12 
commission’s interpretation of the nonmedical evidence on which the 
13 
success of claimant’s application for compensation hinges.  As to the 
14 
medical evidence, claimant does not seriously dispute the commission’s 
15 
conclusion that he can do sedentary labor.  Claimant, however, views his 
16 
age (fifty-six when permanent total disability compensation was denied), 
17 
education (GED) and work experience negatively.  The commission 
18 
 
7
disagreed.  The commission also viewed claimant’s supervisory tenure at 
1 
the plant as an asset, whereas the claimant dismisses this factor as 
2 
insignificant. 
3 
 
Gay relief is appropriate only where the evidence compels but one 
4 
conclusion.  That is not the case here.  Claimant’s age and education are not 
5 
inherently employment-obstructive.  As to the claimant’s work history, it 
6 
was the commission’s prerogative to assign a higher value to claimant’s 
7 
supervisory experience than did claimant.  The commission is the ultimate 
8 
evaluator of both disability and evidentiary weight and credibility.  State ex 
9 
rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 31 OBR 369, 
10 
509 N.E. 2d 946; State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio 
11 
St.3d 18, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E. 2d 936. 
12 
 
As the appellate court observed, although the commission’s 
13 
explanation of its reasoning is not perfect, it is “one that is based upon 
14 
evidence in the record and one that does give some explanation for its 
15 
conclusion.”  We, therefore, find that the commission complied with 
16 
Stephenson, Burley, and State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 57 Ohio 
17 
St.3d 203, 567 N.E. 2d 245. 
18 
 
8
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is hereby affirmed. 
1 
Judgment affirmed. 
2 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER 
3 
and COOK, JJ., CONCUR. 
4 
 
5