Case Title: TRANSAMERICA INS CO v ROYLE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 82-187

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1983-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
N o . 82-187 I N THE SUPREME COURT O F T H E STATE OF M O N T A N A 1983 TPANSAMERICA INSURANCE CO., a f o r e i g n corporation, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, VS. WILLIAM D. ROYLE, a s Conservator of Mary Kay Haines, a Protected Person; BYRON D. HAINES and JOYCE WILSON HAINES, Defendants and Respondents. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING : Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Keefer, Roybal, Hanson, Stacey & J a r u s s i , B i l l i n g s , Dlon t a n a Gene J a r u s s i argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondents: C h r i s t i a n , McCurdy & Wold, Polson, Montana Douglas Wold argued and Jean Turnage argued, Polson, Montana For Amicus Curiae: Tim D. H a l l argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: November 1 2 , 1982 Decided: January 1 2 , 1983 _ .*- d & 4 Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . T h i s case comes from t h e F e d e r a l D i s t r i c t Court by way of c e r t i f i c a t i o n p u r s u a n t to Rule 1 of t h e r u l e s of t h i s C o u r t . A t i s s u e is an i n s u r a n c e company's o b l i g a t i o n to defend or p r o v i d e coverage f o r p a r e n t s who are being sued by t h e i r d a u g h t e r . Judge R u s s e l l Smith h a s c e r t i f i e d t h e f o l l o w i n g t w o i s s u e s : 1. " I s t h e 'household e x c l u s i o n ' i n a p o l i c y [of a u t o i n s u r a n c e ] , n o t c e r t i f i e d under t h e Motor V e h i c l e S a f e t y R e s p o n s i b i l i t y A c t , v a l i d ? " 2. " I s a p a r e n t immune from a c t i o n i n t o r t b r o u g h t a g a i n s t him by h i s c h i l d r e n under t h e age of emancipation?" On November 1 4 , 1980, Mary Kay Haines was i n j u r e d i n an a u t o a c c i d e n t . She was a p a s s e n g e r i n a car i n which h e r mother w a s d r i v i n g . A s a r e s u l t of h e r i n j u r i e s , Mary Kay is now a q u a d r i p l e g i c . The car was owned by Mary Kay's f a t h e r , Reverend Byron Haines , and was i n s u r e d by Transamerica I n s u r a n c e Company. The i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y c o n t a i n e d a "household e x c l u s i o n c l a u s e " which e x c l u d e s coverage f o r " b o d i l y i n j u r y to any p e r s o n who is r e l a t e d by blood, m a r r i a g e , or a d o p t i o n to [ t h e i n s u r e d ] , i f t h a t p e r s o n r e s i d e s i n [ t h e i n s u r e d ' s ] household a t t h e t i m e of l o s s . " M r . Royle, as c o n s e r v a t o r f o r Mary Kay, f i l e d a n a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e Haines i n S t a t e Court i n Lake County to r e c o v e r dama- g e s . The Haines demanded t h a t Transamerica assume t h e i r d e f e n s e and p r o v i d e coverage. Transamerica r e f u s e d and f i l e d an a c t i o n i n F e d e r a l District Court c l a i m i n g it had no o b l i g a t i o n under t h e i n s u r a n c e c o n t r a c t . The p a r e n t s t h e n s o u g h t a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment i n s t a t e c o u r t a s k i n g t h a t t h e "household e x c l u s i o n c l a u s e " be d e c l a r e d i n v a l i d . That a c t i o n w a s removed to F e d e r a l C o u r t and c o n s o l i d a t e d w i t h t h e Transamerica a c t i o n . On May 6 , 1982, Judge R u s s e l l Smith c e r t i f i e d t h e two i s s u e s to t h i s Court. I n p l a i n t i f f I s view t h e f i r s t i s s u e b o i l s down to whether or n o t s e c t i o n 61-6-301(1) MCA, p r o h i b i t s a f a m i l y e x c l u s i o n c l a u s e i n an automobile i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y . I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , t h e above c i t e d s e c t i o n r e a d s : "Every owner of a motor v e h i c l e . . . s h a l l c o n t i n u o u s l y p r o v i d e i n s u r a n c e - a g a i n s t - - . - - -- loss - - - r e s u l t i n g - -- - - - from - - - l i a b i - . . .- - . - l i t y - - imposed - - . -- . by - . l a w - f o r b o d i l y i n j u r y or d e a t h or damage to pro- s u f f e r e d by any p e r s o n . . ." p e r t y -- - (Emphasis added. ) P l a i n t i f f a r g u e s s i m p l y t h a t t h e s t a t u t e does not void t h e f a m i l y e x c l u s i o n c l a u s e because t h e s t a t u t e o n l y r e q u i r e s c o v e r a g e f o r " l i a b i l i t y imposed by law." I n o t h e r words, i f Montana r e c o g n i z e s p a r e n t a l immunity from s u i t by t h e i r c h i l d r e n t h e n M r . and Mrs. Haines cannot be l i a b l e ; and s i n c e t h e r e would n o t be " l i a b i l i t y imposed by law" t h e f a m i l y e x c l u s i o n c l a u s e would be v a l i d . Although n o t s t a t e d by p l a i n t i f f , it f o l l o w s from t h e i r view t h a t t h e f i r s t q u e s t i o n to be decided by t h i s C o u r t is t h e p a r e n t - c h i l d immunity q u e s t i o n . W e a g r e e . Our d e c i s i o n on i s s u e number t w o w i l l c o n t r o l o u r d e c i s i o n on i s s u e number one. I n o t h e r words, i f we r e c o g n i z e p a r e n t a l immunity, t h e n t h e e x c l u s i o n c l a u s e is v a l i d ; and v i c e v e r s a , i f p a r e n t - c h i l d immunity does n o t e x i s t , then t h e e x c l u s i o n c l a u s e must be i n v a l i d by v i r t u e of s e c t i o n 61-6-301(1), MCA. A s is d i s c u s s e d later, we f i n d t h a t a c h i l d may m a i n t a i n an a c t i o n a g a i n s t h i s p a r e n t f o r n e g l i g e n c e a r i s i n g o u t of t h e o p e r a t i o n of a motor v e h i c l e . Thus, t h e e x c l u s i o n c l a u s e is i n v a l i d . Before r e a c h i n g t h e immunity q u e s t i o n , we must d i s p e l con£ u s i o n concerning i s s u e number one. P r i o r t o 1979, Montana l a w r e q u i r e d o n l y c e r t a i n p e r s o n s to d e m o n s t r a t e and m a i n t a i n f i n a n c i a l s e c u r i t y . T h a t l a w , which is s t i l l on t h e books, is c a l l e d t h e Motor V e h i c l e S a f e t y R e s p o n s i b i l i t y A c t . ( S e c t i o n s 61-6-101, e t seq. ) Only t h o s e who had t h e i r d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e revoked due to a c o n v i c t i o n o r for- f e i t u r e of b a i l of c e r t a i n motor v e h i c l e laws were r e q u i r e d to d e m o n s t r a t e f i n a n c i a l s e c u r i t y , i.e., o b t a i n a l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y . See s e c t i o n s 61-6-131(1) and 61-6-132(1) ( a ) , MCA. Thus, o n l y "bad d r i v e r s " were r e q u i r e d to c a r r y l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e , and l i a b i l i t y of t h e i n s u r e r under t h o s e p o l i c i e s was " a b s o l u t e ." S e c t i o n 61-6-103(6) ( a ) , MCA. I n o t h e r words, such a p o l i c y could n o t c o n t a i n e x c l u s i o n s . The i n s u r a n c e company would t h e n c e r t i f y t h a t it had i n s u r e d t h e "bad d r i v e r , " s e c t i o n 61-6-133, MCA. Only then could t h e bad d r i v e r r e g a i n d r i v i n g p r i v i l e g e s . T h i s C o u r t , i n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e S a f e t y R e s p o n s i b i l i t y A c t h e l d t h a t o r d i n a r y p o l i c i e s , or t h o s e p o l i c i e s not r e q u i r e d under t h e A c t , could c o n t a i n e x c l u s i o n s . B o l d t v. S t a t e Farm Mutual (1968) 1 5 1 Mont. 337, 443 P.2d 33; Northern Assurance Company v . Truck I n s u r a n c e Exchange ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 132, 439 P.2d 760. S p e c i f i c a l l y , o r d i n a r y p o l i c i e s could c o n t a i n a f a m i l y e x c l u s i o n c l a u s e , Mid Century I n s u r a n c e Co. v . American C a s u a l t y Company ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 152 Mont. 328, 449 P.2d 679. I n summary, p o l i c i e s to be c e r t i f i e d under t h e A c t could n o t c o n t a i n e x c l u s i o n s ; whereas, p o l i c i e s not t o be c e r t i f i e d under t h e A c t ( p o l i c i e s of good d r i v e r s ) could c o n t a i n e x c l u s i o n s . However, i n 1979 t h e l e g i s l a t u r e mandated l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e . Every v e h i c l e owner is now r e q u i r e d t o c e r t i f y to t h e c o u n t y t r e a s u r e r t h a t he p o s s e s s e s a n automobile l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y . It a p p e a r s from t h e b r i e f s t h a t " i n t h e i n s t a n t case, t h e s u b j e c t i n s u r a n c e P o l i c y was I c e r t i f i e d ' b y t h e owner of t h e v e h i c l e [ t h e Haines] as proof of having complied w i t h t h e l a w r e q u i r i n g i n s u r a n c e f o r b o d i l y i n j u r y s u f f e r e d by any p e r s o n . ' " Thus, t h e p o l i c y was c e r t i f i e d under t h e l a w r e q u i r i n g mandatory l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e b u t was n o t c e r t i f i e d under t h e Motor V e h i c l e S a f e t y R e s p o n s i b i l i t y A c t . Had t h e p o l i c y been c e r t i f i e d under t h e S a f e t y R e s p o n s i b i l i t y A c t , B o l d t and Northern Assurance would c o n t r o l and t h e r e s u l t would be t h a t t h e e x c l u s i o n is i n v a l i d . When Judge Smith framed t h e i s s u e , he w a s o n l y s a y i n g t h a t t h i s case does not i n v o l v e a c e r t i f i c a t i o n under P a r t 1 of T i t l e 61, Chapter 6 , MCA; t h e S a f e t y R e s p o n s i b i l i t y A c t . I n s t e a d , t h i s case arises under P a r t 3 of t h e same t i t l e and c h a p t e r , t h e law r e q u i r i n g mandatory l i a b i l i t y p r o t e c t i o n . The t w o p a r t s are independent. S e c t i o n 61-6-136 , MCA, p r e c l u d e s any r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e t w o p a r t s . That s e c t i o n states i n p a r t : " [ t l h i s p a r t s h a l l n o t be h e l d t o a p p l y t o or a f f e c t p o l i c i e s of automobile i n s u r a n c e a g a i n s t l i a b i l i t y which may now o r h e r e a f t e r be r e q u i r e d by any o t h e r l a w of t h i s s t a t e . . ." O t h e r a u t h o r i t y e x i s t s to show t h a t p a r t 1 and p a r t 3 are independent. See S t a t e Farm v. Queen (1981) 1 F.Supp. , 38 St.Rep. 608. See 7 Arn.Jur.2d Automobile I n s u r a n c e , S e c t i o n 20 (1980 ) . I n c o n c l u s i o n , p a r t 1 of t i t l e 6 1 c h a p t e r 6 and t h e cases of B o l d t and Northern Assurance are n o t c o n t r o l l i n g to t h e f i r s t -- - i s s u e . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e s t a t u t o r y restrict i o n s on i n s u r a n c e p o l i c i e s c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 61-6-103 d o n o t a p p l y t o p o l i c i e s purchased to f u l f i l l t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of P a r t 3 , Man- d a t o r y L i a b i l i t y P r o t e c t i o n . The e f f e c t of t h e langauge of t h e Mandatory I n s u r a n c e Law r e q u i r e s t h e l i a b i l i t y p o l i c y to p r o t e c t a g a i n s t b o d i l y i n j u r y and p r o p e r t y damage to "any person." I n so p r o v i d i n g , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a s e x p r e s s l y outlawed t h e "household e x c l u s i o n ." I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d ; w h e t h e r or n o t a c h i l d can s u e h e r p a r e n t , w e have reviewed t h e v a s t amount of w r i t i n g s done on t h e s u b j e c t by c o u r t s , writers and o t h e r s and f i n d t h a t f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n would s e r v e no u s e f u l p u r p o s e . The i s s u e is one of f i r s t impression i n t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n and we do n o t b e l i e v e o u r case should be determined b y t h e number of a u t h o r i t i e s which s u p p o r t one r u l e or t h e o t h e r , anymore t h a n t h a t a j u r y should r e s o l v e i s s u e s a c c o r d i n g to t h e number of w i t - n e s s e s who a p p e a r on one s i d e or t h e o t h e r . A comprehensive a n n o t a t i o n g i v i n g t h e h i s t o r i c background of t h e d o c t r i n e is a v a i l a b l e under t h e t i t l e " L i a b i l i t y of P a r e n t f o r I n j u r y to Unemancipated C h i l d Caused by P a r e n t ' s Negligence - Modern Cases" i n 6 A.L.R.4th 1066. The cases c i t e d a g r e e t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e is a c r e a t u r e of American j u r i s p r u d e n c e . P r o s s e r , Law of T o r t s , S e c t . 1 2 2 ( 4 t h Ed. 1 9 7 1 ) s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e r e is no r e a s o n to t h i n k t h a t t h e E n g l i s h law would n o t p e r m i t a c t i o n s f o r p e r s o n a l t o r t s a s w e l l as d i s p u t e s i n v o l v i n g p r o p e r t y r i g h t s be- tween c h i l d and p a r e n t . H e n o t e s t h a t t h e r e a r e d e c i s i o n s i n Canada and S c o t l a n d p e r m i t t i n g such act i o n s . Reading b o t h P r o s s e r , and Harper and James, Law of T o r t s , Vol. 1, S e c t . 8.11 ( 1 9 5 6 ) , t h e concurrence is t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e h a s no f o u n d a t i o n i n E n g l i s h law. The d o c t r i n e of p a r e n t a l immunity is a j u d i c i a l l y c r e a t e d d o c t r i n e a r i s i n g o u t of a case from t h e S t a t e of M i s s i s s i p p i , Hewellette v. George ( 1 8 9 1 ) , 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885. The case cites no case a u t h o r i t y f o r its h o l d i n g y e t w i t h i n a few s h o r t y e a r s , o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s adopted it w i t h o u t q u e s t i o n i n g its a n c e s t r y . Long af ter t h e d o c t r i n e became l e g i t i m i z e d t h i n k i n g , c o u r t s and s c h o l a r s began to c r i t i c i z e t h e d o c t r i n e due to t h e i n j u s t i c e s c r e a t e d i n many f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n s . S e e , P r o s s e r , S e c t . 122 a t 864; 1 Harper & James, Law of T o r t s , S e c t . 8.11 a t 650; Nocktonick v. Nocktonick ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 227 Kan. 758 , 6 1 1 P.2d 135. A s noted i n t h e Nocktonick case, s u p r a , t h e s e criticisms r e s u l t e d i n a number of j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s which have eroded t h e d o c t r i n e by c r e a t i n g numerous e x c e p t i o n s . A s a r e s u l t , t h e r e are few j u r i s d i c t i o n s , i f any, r e c o g n i z i n g p a r e n t a l immunity i n its o r i g i n a l form. Some e i g h t e x c e p t i o n s to t h e d o c t r i n e have evolved t h e s e p a s t few y e a r s . Nocktonick, 611 P.2d a t 138. I t is to t h e e i g h t h e x c e p t i o n , a l l o w i n g a c h i l d t o s u e h i s p a r e n t s f o r i n j u r i e s caused by t h e n e g l i g e n t o p e r a t i o n of a motor v e h i c l e t h a t w e d i r e c t o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The p r i n c i p l e r e a s o n relied on by t h e c o u r t s f o r a l l o w i n g an a c t i o n by a c h i l d a g a i n s t t h e i r p a r e n t i n an automobile a c c i d e n t case is t h e p r e v a l e n c e of automobile l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e . "While c o u r t s concede t h e e x i s t e n c e of automobile i n s u r a n c e cannot create a l i a b i l i t y where none b e f o r e e x i s t e d , t h e p r e v a l e n c e of l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e h a s been h e l d t o be a p r o p e r f a c t o r to con- s i d e r i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h e p a r e n t a l immunity. " Nocktonick, 611 P.2d a t 138-39. The c o u r t s which have recognized t h i s e x c e p t i o n have reasoned t h a t t h e p o l i c y r e a s o n s which o r i g i - n a l l y supported p a r e n t a l immunity no l o n g e r are a p p l i c a b l e . The e x i s t e n c e of l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e p r e v e n t s f a m i l y d i s c o r d and d e p l e t i o n of f a m i l y assets i n automobile n e g l i g e n c e cases; c o n t r a r y to t h e o r i g i n a l p o l i c i e s . Sorenson v. Sorenson ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907; and G o l l e r v. White ( 1 9 6 3 ) r 20 P r o b a b l y t h e most p e r s u a s i v e argument a g a i n s t a b r o g a t i o n of p a r e n t - c h i l d immunity is t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of f r a u d and c o l l u s i o n . Unscrupulous f a m i l i e s may a t t e m p t t o r e c o v e r u n j u s t i f i e d awards from i n s u r a n c e companies. While w e r e c o g n i z e t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , w e do n o t b e l i e v e it j u s t i f i e s d e n i a l of m e r i t o r i o u s claims. W e a g r e e w i t h t h e Supreme Court of Kansas which s a i d : " [ t l h e p o s s i b i l i t y of c o l l u s i o n e x i s t s to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t i n any case. Every day w e depend on j u r i e s and t r i a l judges to s i f t evi- d e n c e i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e t h e f a c t s and a r r i v e a t p r o p e r v e r d i c t s . Experience h a s shown t h a t t h e c o u r t s a r e q u i t e a d e q u a t e f o r t h i s t a s k . I n l i t i g a t i o n between p a r e n t and c h i l d , judges and j u r i e s would n a t u r a l l y be m i n d f u l of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p and would be even more on t h e a l e r t f o r improper conduct ." 611 P.2d a t 142. W e have been asked to d e c i d e which r u l e b e s t s e r v e s t h e needs o f j u s t i c e i n t h i s state. I n s e t t i n g Montana's r u l e , we must r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e more r e c e n t d e c i s i o n s r e j e c t i n g p a r e n t a l immu- n i t y are i n d i c a t i v e of a "growing j u d i c i a l d i s t a s t e f o r a r u l e of l a w which i n one sweep d i s q u a l i f i e d an e n t i r e c l a s s of i n j u r e d minors." Gibson v. Gibson ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 3 Cal.3d 914, 479 p.2d 648, 650. W e b e l i e v e t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t i e s which f a v o r a b r o g a t i o n of t h e p a r e n t a l immunity d o c t r i n e s t a t e t h e proper approach i n l i g h t o f modern c o n d i t i o n s and c o n c e p t i o n of what is good p u b l i c p o l i c y . W e see no r e a s o n why c h i l d r e n should not e n j o y t h e same r i g h t or p r o t e c t i o n and t h e same l e g a l r e d r e s s f o r wrongs done them as o t h e r s e n j o y . Due to t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s is a case of f i r s t impression i n Montana and t h e f a c t t h a t we are not encum- b e r e d by p r e v i o u s d e c i s i o n s , o u r t a s k is made e a s i e r t h a n o t h e r states who have had to q u a l i f y t h e r u l e i n s e a r c h of j u s t i c e . The p r i n c i p l e t h a t an unemancipated minor may n o t sue a p a r e n t i n t o r t is a "man-made r u l e ," and it is t h e d u t y of t h e j u d i c i a r y i n examining it t o make such r u l e as j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s when t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a s n o t chosen t o act. Our h o l d i n g is l i m i t e d to t h e i s s u e s c e r t i f i e d to u s by t h e F e d e r a l C o u r t ; " i s a p a r e n t immune from a c t i o n i n tort b r o u g h t a g a i n s t him by h i s c h i l d r e n under t h e age of emancipation?" While t h e i s s u e c e r t i f i e d to u s by t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t a s k s " i s a p a r e n t . . . i n -- t o r t . . .;" o u r h o l d i n g is l i m i t e d to a c t i o n s b r o u g h t a g a i n s t a p a r e n t by a c h i l d under t h e age of e m a n c i p a t i o n i n j u r e d i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of a motor v e h i c l e . To allow such an a c t i o n does n o t undermine p a r e n t a l a u t h o r i t y and d i s c i p l i n e , n o r d o e s it t h r e a t e n t o s u b s t i t u t e j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n f o r p a r e n t a l d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e care and r e a r i n g of minor c h i l d r e n . W e must r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e r e may be p a r e n t a l e x e r c i s e s of d i s c r e t i o n and a u t h o r i t y which would d e s e r v e s p e c i a l p r o t e c t i o n i n a c o u r t of l a w . Here, we m e r e l y remove any b a r r i e r to t h e enforcement of l i a b i l i t y i n an automobile a c c i d e n t case brought by an uneman- c i p a t e d minor a g a i n s t a p a r e n t . When c o n f r o n t e d w i t h o t h e r cases i n v o l v i n g claimed p a r e n t a l immunity, we w i l l a t t h a t t i m e d e t e r - mine to what e x t e n t t h e d o c t r i n e or p r i v i l e g e s h o u l d be r e c o g n i z e d . I n a d d i t i o n , we hold t h a t t h e household e x c l u s i o n c l a u s e is i n v a l i d due to its f a i l u r e to "honor t h e r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n s " o f t h e p u r c h a s e r of t h e p o l i c y . See Keeton, I n s u r a n c e R i g h t s a t V a r i a n c e w i t h P o l i c y P r o v i s i o n s , 8 3 Harvard Law Rev. 961, 967 ( 1 9 7 0 ) . P r o f e s s o r Keeton sets f o r t h t h i s p r i n c i p l e as f o l l o w s : "The o b j e c t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n s of a p p l i c a n t s and intended b e n e f i c i a r i e s r e g a r d i n g t h e terms of i n s u r a n c e c o n t r a c t s w i l l be honored even though p a i n s t a k i n g s t u d y o f t h e p o l i c y p r o v i s i o n s would have negated t h o s e e x p e c t a t i o n s ." T h i s p o l i c y is an a d h e s i o n c o n t r a c t t h a t j u s t i f i e s t h i s C o u r t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e consumer approach. W e h o l d t h a t a p a r e n t is not immune from s u i t b r o u g h t by h i s c h i l d under t h e age of emancipation i n c a s e s i n v o l v i n g p a r e n t a l n e g l i g e n c e i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of a motor v e h i c l e . Consequently, we must hold t h a t a f a m i l y e x c l u s i o n c l a u s e is void and unenfor- c e a b l e because s e c t i o n 61-6-301 ( 1) , MCA, r e q u i r e s motorists to c a r r y i n s u r a n c e a g a i n s t loss r e s u l t i n g from l i a b i l i t y imposed by l a w f o r i n j u r y s u f f e r e d by any p e r s o n . We concur: i I 3 4 Ch*f J u s t i c e t wdl1& D i s t p i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n place of Ydr. J u s t i c e F r a ~ k B. :Piorrison, J r . M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea s p e c i a l l y c o n c u r r i n g . I j o i n t h e m a j o r i t y on t h e i s s u e of t h e "household e x c l u s i o n " i n t h e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y . I would go a n o t h e r s t e p , however, on t h e q u e s t i o n of p a r e n t a l immunity and simply d e c l a r e t h a t t h i s Court d o e s n o t r e c o g n i z e t h e d o c t r i n e and i f it is to be r e c o g n i z e d , it is a q u e s t i o n f o r t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , not f o r t h e c o u r t s . The m a j o r i t y c o n f i n e s t h e a b o l i t i o n of p a r e n t a l immunity to " a c t i o n s brought a g a i n s t a p a r e n t by a c h i l d under t h e age of emancipation i n j u r e d i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of a motor v e h i c l e ." But, a s long a s t h i s Court has now r e f u s e d to r e c o g n i z e t h i s d o c t r i n e , w e should n o t d e c i d e t h a t p o s s i b l y we may r e c o g n i z e it i n a n o t h e r c o n t e x t t h a n t h a t which has been p r e s e n t e d h e r e . I f p a r e n t a l immunity is t o be recognized completely, or i n any l i m i t e d form, it seems t o m e t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e is t h e p r o p e r p l a c e to d e t e r - mine t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which it should o r should not be so r e c o g n i z e d . These are p u b l i c p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s better l e f t to t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ; we a r e i l l - e q u i p p e d to u n d e r t a k e t h a t t a s k .