Case Title: Bull v. Pinkham Engineering Assocs.

Citation: 170 Vt. 450, 752 A.2d 26

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bull v. Pinkham Engineering Assocs. (98-431); 170 Vt. 450; 752 A.2d 26

[Filed 21-Apr-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as  formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the  Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 98-431

John W. and Melinda H. Bull	                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         Addison Superior Court

Pinkham Engineering Assoc. Inc.	                 September Term, 1999

Michael S. Kupersmith, J.

James W. Runcie of Ouimette & Runcie, Vergennes, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Michael B. Clapp, Burlington, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       SKOGLUND, J.  This appeal concerns a lawsuit in which landowners
  allege that the  engineering firm they hired breached its duty to properly
  survey their proposed residential  subdivision, thereby causing them to
  incur legal fees in a related lawsuit and to lose an  opportunity to
  develop a portion of their property.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the 
  superior court awarded plaintiffs John Bull and Melinda Hinsdale (formerly
  Bull) $55,000 in lost  profits and $15,391 in attorney's fees and expenses
  for defending the prior related claim.   Defendant Pinkham Engineering
  Associates, Inc. appeals that judgment, arguing that (1) plaintiffs' 
  claims are barred by the three-year statute of limitations governing
  actions seeking compensation  for damages to personal property; (2) the
  record does not support the trial court's findings  concerning the
  contractual duty owed by defendant to plaintiffs and the amount of damages 
  caused by defendant's conduct; and (3) the doctrine of collateral estoppel
  bars plaintiffs from  claiming that defendant's survey was incorrect.  On
  cross-appeal, plaintiffs claim that they are  entitled to prejudgment
  interest on their damage awards.  We affirm the trial court's decision, 
  except that we grant plaintiffs' request for prejudgment interest on the
  award of attorney's fees.

 

       The trial court made the following findings.  In 1986, plaintiffs
  bought a farm in  Ferrisburgh, Vermont.  Shortly thereafter, they began to
  look into the possibility of subdividing  a portion of the farm for the
  development of residential lots.  They enlisted the help of Mrs. Bull's 
  brother, Clark Hinsdale, a licensed real-estate broker who had experience
  in subdividing and  developing property.  They decided to develop
  thirty-five acres located on the westerly portion  of the farm, a woodland
  area with little or no agricultural value.  Mr. Hinsdale prepared a 
  preliminary sketch laying out fifteen lots for a subdivision to be called
  Steeplewood.  The sketch,  which was based on the Ferrisburgh tax map, 
  indicated that the southern boundary of the  subdivision coincided with the
  southern boundary of plaintiffs' property; however, the tax map  (and
  therefore the sketch) incorrectly located the southern boundary of
  plaintiffs' land a few  hundred feet to the north of the actual boundary.

       Upon Mr. Hinsdale's recommendation, plaintiffs hired defendant to do
  the surveying and  engineering work for the subdivision.  When Mr. Young,
  defendant's chief of surveying, indicated  that it would helpful to be able
  to refer to surveys of adjoining lands, Mr. Hinsdale provided  defendant
  with copies of the surveys of properties to the west owned by Cutting and
  to the north  owned by Pickett.  Mr. Hinsdale told Mr. Young that there was
  no need for defendant to re-survey the property lines between the Bull
  property and the Cutting or Picket properties.  Mr.  Hinsdale never asked
  defendant to complete a perimeter survey of the Bull property.

       In preparing its survey of the Steeplewood subdivision, defendant
  based all of the bearing  references on references in the Pickett and
  Cutting surveys, yet did not indicate on the  Steeplewood survey that it
  had done so.  Nor did defendant independently verify the accuracy  of the
  bearings contained in the prior surveys, even though it would have taken
  only a matter of  minutes to do so.  As a result, all of the bearings on
  the Steeplewood survey were off by  approximately eight and one-half
  degrees.

       Nor did defendant survey the southern boundary of the proposed
  subdivision to  determine whether the sketch taken from the Ferrisburgh tax
  map accurately depicted the  location of that

 

  boundary.  In fact, as noted, the tax map and sketch inaccurately depicted
  the southern boundary  of the subdivision (and plaintiffs' property) a few
  hundred feet to the north of the actual  boundary.

       Plaintiffs and Mr. Hinsdale proceeded to implement the subdivision
  plan in three phases.  In late 1989 or early 1990, after the first two
  phases were complete, plaintiffs decided to go ahead  with phase three,
  which involved the preparation and sale of lots five, seven, and eight.  In
  April  1990, Mr. Hinsdale asked defendant to stake out the center line of
  an east-west road running  through the subdivision and set the corner pins
  for the phase three lots.  Contrary to what it had  done  in the two
  earlier phases of the development, defendant set only the corner pins
  adjacent  to the road and did not mark the rear corners of the lots.  Nor
  did defendant inform plaintiffs or  Mr. Hinsdale that the rear corner pins
  for the three lots had not been set.

       In the spring of 1991, Mr. Hinsdale discovered that defendant had
  still not set the rear  corner pins of the phase three lots.   After
  advising Mr. Young that the pins had not been set, Mr.  Hinsdale reasonably
  expected defendant to do so.  In July 1991, plaintiffs sold lot five to
  William  and Geraldine Burke.  After purchasing the lot, Mr. Burke notified
  plaintiffs that he could not  find the pin marking its northeastern corner. 
  Mr. Bull and Mr. Hinsdale spent three hours trying  to locate the pin by
  compass, but were unable to do so.  Mr. Hinsdale then telephoned defendant 
  to report that he could not locate the pin.  When Mr. Hinsdale was informed
  that the pin had not  been placed yet, he requested that it be set
  immediately.

       Some time before September 11, 1991, the date defendant finally set
  the pin, Christopher  Hastings, the contractor hired by the Burkes to build
  their home, poured a foundation for the  house.  Because the northeastern
  corner marker had not been set, Mr. Hastings attempted to  locate the
  easterly boundary by taking a bearing from the southeastern corner of the
  lot.  Because  defendant's survey was off by eight and one-half degrees,
  the line the contractor determined for  the eastern boundary was incorrect,
  and part of the foundation was located beyond the boundary  line separating
  lots five and seven.  After  discovering the error, the Burkes halted
  construction  of the house, which was never completed.

 

       In December 1991, the Burkes filed suit against plaintiffs, Mr.
  Hastings, and defendant.  They alleged that (1) plaintiffs were negligent
  in failing to cause the  northeastern boundary pin  to be put in place in a
  timely manner; (2)  the incorrect compass bearing in their warranty deed 
  for lot five constituted a breach of warranty; (3) defendant negligently
  identified an incorrect  compass bearing on the eastern boundary of lot
  five; and (4) Mr. Hastings negligently placed the  foundation of their
  house.  After a jury trial, the superior court directed a verdict for all 
  defendants on all counts.  The court ruled that the first count failed as a
  matter of law because no  testimony was presented as to the cost of repair
  or the diminution in value of the property.  The  court held that the
  second count also failed as a matter of law because the compass bearings
  for  the subdivision were internally consistent and thus correct for
  purposes of conveying the title to  lot five.  A three-justice panel of
  this Court affirmed the decision.  See Burke v. Bull, No. 94-432  (August
  4, 1995) (mem.).

       In February 1996, plaintiffs brought suit against defendant, seeking
  to recover the legal  costs they incurred in defending against the Burke
  complaint, and the damages resulting from  their lost opportunity to
  include within the Steeplewood subdivision their land located to the  south
  of the southern boundary of the subdivision as depicted on defendant's
  survey.  Following  an evidentiary hearing, the superior court awarded
  plaintiffs $15,391 for legal costs associated with  defending the Burke
  complaint and $55,000 for lost development opportunities.  Defendant 
  appeals, raising several issues, and plaintiffs cross-appeal, arguing that
  the court erred in failing to  grant prejudgment interest on their damage
  awards.

       As an initial matter, we emphasize our standard of review.  We will
  not set aside the trial  court's findings unless they are clearly
  erroneous, and we will uphold the court's conclusions as  long as they are
  reasonably supported by the findings.  See Morgan v. Kroupa, 167 Vt. 99,
  104,