Case Title: IN RE: Request of the Trustees of the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection for an Advisory Opinion

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2020-10-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
IN RE:  REQUEST OF THE 
TRUSTEES OF THE LAWYERS’ 
FUND FOR CLIENT 
PROTECTION FOR AN 
ADVISORY OPINION 
§ 
§   
§  No. 327, 2020 
§ 
§   
 
Submitted: September 4, 2020 
Decided: 
October 12, 2020 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, VAUGHN, TRAYNOR, and 
MONTGOMERY-REEVES Justices. 
 
The trustees of the Delaware Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection (the 
“LFCP”) have requested an advisory opinion, in accordance with Supreme Court 
Rule 66(h)(iii),1 regarding whether the trustees have discretion to consider paying 
claims involving misconduct by attorneys who were not members of the Delaware 
bar, but who were admitted pro hac vice or who had in the past received limited 
permission to practice.  The question arises from the language of Supreme Court 
Rule 66(a)(ii), which states that the purpose of the trust fund is to address “losses 
caused to the public by defalcations of members of the Bar;” subsections 1 and 2 of 
Rule 4(1) of the LFCP Rules, which provide that the Trustees will consider for 
reimbursement from the fund certain claims involving “a member of the Delaware 
                                                 
1 See DEL. SUP. CT. R. 66(h)(iii) (“The trustees may apply to this Court for interpretation of this 
rule, and for advice as to their powers and as to the proper administration of the trust.  Any final 
order issued by this Court in response to any such application shall finally bind and determine all 
rights with respect to the matters covered therein.”).  This matter is subject to confidential 
treatment as provided in Rule 8 of the Rules of the Trustees of the Lawyers’ Fund for Client 
Protection of the Supreme Court of Delaware (the “LFCP Rules”). 
 
2 
Bar;” and subsection 3 of Rule 4(1) of the LFCP Rules, which provides that the 
trustees will consider for reimbursement certain claims involving a “member of the 
Bar.”  For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the trustees’ discretion is 
not limited to paying claims for reimbursement involving an attorney who was a 
member of the Delaware bar at the time of the defalcation that gave rise to the claim. 
Factual Context 
 
The trustees requested our opinion on the following question:   
Is the discretion of the Trustees limited to paying claims only involving 
attorneys who are or were at the time of their defalcation full members 
of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware? 
 
They informed us that they are investigating two claims involving attorneys who 
were not members of the Delaware bar at the time of the conduct for which a claim 
for reimbursement has been made. 
The first claim involves an attorney who was admitted to practice in 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey.  He was admitted pro hac vice in a postconviction 
proceeding in the Delaware Superior Court.  He retained advanced fees without 
meeting his obligations concerning representation. 
The second involves an attorney who was admitted to practice in New York 
and Pennsylvania.  He received limited permission to practice in Delaware under 
Rule 55, which authorizes limited permission to practice in certain public programs, 
such as legal-aid and government agencies.  That permission was later revoked or 
 
3 
rescinded.  Thereafter, the attorney was residing in Delaware and apparently held 
himself out as available to assist with legal matters.  A Delaware resident contacted 
him in Delaware about a legal matter relating to a real estate development project in 
New York.  The attorney accepted the representation in Delaware.  In the course of 
handling the matter, the attorney allegedly stole a significant amount of client funds.  
The client has made claims to the New York and Pennsylvania client-protection 
funds; Pennsylvania paid part of the claim, and the New York claim is pending. 
Rules Governing the Trustees’ Discretion 
Delaware Supreme Court Rule 66 governs the LFCP.  Rule 66(a)(ii) states 
that the purpose of the trust fund is to address “losses caused to the public by 
defalcations of members of the Bar.”2  Rule 66(g) broadly vests the trustees with 
“the power, which they shall exercise at their sole discretion, to determine whether 
a claim merits reimbursement from the trust fund, and, if so, the amount of such 
reimbursement, the time, place and manner of its payment, the conditions upon 
which payment shall be made, and the order in which payments shall be made.”3 
The LFCP Rules provide for the governance of the LFCP.  LFCP Rule 4(1) 
establishes the types of claims that the trustees will consider for reimbursement from 
the fund.  That rule provides as follows: 
                                                 
2 DEL. SUP. CT. R. 66(a)(ii) (emphasis added). 
3 Id. R. 66(g)(i). 
 
4 
The Trustees will receive and consider for reimbursement from 
the Fund:  (1) Claims for losses due to the defalcations(s) or dishonesty 
of a member of the Delaware Bar within the practice of the member’s 
profession or acting as a fiduciary who has resigned, died, been 
adjudged insane, been disbarred, suspended or otherwise disciplined, 
been convicted of embezzlement or misappropriation of money or other 
property of the member’s clients or whose whereabouts is unknown; 
(2) claims certified to the Trustees by the Board on Professional 
Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Delaware as appropriate cases 
for consideration because the loss was caused by the defalcation(s) or 
dishonest conduct of a member of the Delaware Bar, or (3) or any other 
claims for losses due to the defalcation(s) or dishonesty of a member of 
the Bar which the Trustees, in the exercise of their discretion pursuant 
to paragraph (g) of Rule 66 of the Supreme Court, deem appropriate for 
consideration in that such consideration will advance the purpose of the 
Fund.  Claims duly presented will be considered by the Trustees as 
fairly, fully and equitably as possible under the circumstances.4 
 
Discussion 
The text of LFCP Rule 4(1) refers both to claims involving a “member of the 
Delaware Bar” and to claims involving a “member of the Bar.”  As a matter of 
statutory construction,5 where a drafter “includes particular language in one section 
of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed 
that [the drafter] acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.”6  Applying that principle, in isolation, to the text of LFCP Rule 4(1) leads 
                                                 
4 LFCP Rule 4(1) (emphasis added). 
5 See generally Gentile v. Singlepoint Fin., Inc., 788 A.2d 111, 113 (Del. 2001) (suggesting that 
similar principles of interpretation apply to construction of statutes, contracts, and “other written 
instruments”); Jackson v. State, 654 A.2d 829, 832 (Del. 1995) (suggesting that similar principles 
of interpretation apply to construction of a rule and a statute). 
6 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983), cited in In re Verizon Ins. Coverage Appeals, 
222 A.3d 566, 578 n.77 (Del. 2019) (discussing principle in context of interpretation of an 
insurance policy, and stating that “referring to the common law elsewhere in the policy 
 
5 
to the preliminary conclusion that the drafters of the rule intended subsection 3 to 
allow consideration of claims involving any member of the bar, and not just those 
involving a member of the Delaware bar, to which subsections 1 and 2 are limited.  
This expansive reading of subsection 3 is supported by that subsection’s reference 
to Supreme Court Rule 66(g), which vests the trustees with broad discretion to 
determine whether a claim merits reimbursement.7  The expansive reading of 
subsection 3 of LFCP Rule 4(1) is further supported by that subsection’s reference 
to the advancement of the purpose of the Fund, which, as set forth in Supreme Court 
Rule 66(a)(ii), is not limited to addressing wrongdoing by members of the 
“Delaware” bar but by its terms extends to “members of the Bar.”8 
But another principle of statutory construction is that a court “will read each 
section of the statute in light of all the others to produce a harmonious whole.”9  
Moreover, the Delaware Supreme Court’s “duty in interpreting our rules, like that 
of statutory construction, is to reject a result producing an unreasonable 
                                                 
demonstrates that the parties knew how to expressly provide for coverage of common law claims 
when that was intended”).   
7 See DEL. SUP. CT. R. 66(g) (vesting the trustees with “the power, which they shall exercise at 
their sole discretion, to determine whether a claim merits reimbursement from the trust fund, and, 
if so, the amount of such reimbursement, the time, place and manner of its payment, the conditions 
upon which payment shall be made, and the order in which payments shall be made”). 
8 See id. R. 66(a)(ii) (stating that the purpose of the trust fund is to address “losses caused to the 
public by defalcations of members of the Bar”). 
9 Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Mohr, 47 A.3d 492, 496 (Del. 2012) (internal quotations and alteration 
omitted). 
 
6 
consequence, and to adopt an interpretation which gives a sensible and practical 
meaning to the rule and the purpose for which it was intended.”10 
When one considers the Supreme Court rules as a whole and with a view 
toward reasonable interpretation, it is clear that the terms “members of the bar” and 
“members of the Delaware bar” have not been used consistently and intentionally to 
refer to different groups of people.  Put another way, it appears that the phrase 
“members of the bar” sometimes has been used where the rules are addressing 
matters pertaining only to members of the Delaware bar.  For example: 
 
Supreme Court Rule 51(a) provides that the Board of Bar 
Examiners shall consist of “such number of members of the Bar as the 
Court shall determine.”  Although not specified, the most reasonable 
understanding of this provision is that it is intended to be limited to 
members of the Delaware bar.  In contrast, Supreme Court Rule 62(a) 
provides for membership on the Board on Professional Responsibility 
of a number of “members of the Delaware Bar.” 
 
 
Supreme Court Rule 52 governs “admission to the Bar” 
and can only reasonably be understood to mean admission to the 
Delaware bar.   
 
 
Supreme Court Rule 66 itself provides that the trustees of 
the LFCP “shall consist of 7 persons who shall be members of the Bar 
and 2 persons who shall be public members who are not members of 
the Delaware Bar.”11  It would probably surprise many people to 
interpret this to mean that the seven lawyers could be lawyers who are 
not members of the Delaware bar (and perhaps that the two public 
members could be lawyers at all). 
                                                 
10 In re Petition of Nenno, 472 A.2d 815, 819 (Del. 1983).  See also Jackson, 654 A.2d at 832 
(“Where ambiguity exists, a rule, like a statute, must be interpreted to avoid mischievous or absurd 
results.”).   
11 DEL. SUP. CT. R. 66(b)(i). 
 
7 
 
 
Rule 69(a) establishes the categories of “members of the 
Bar of this Court,” while Rule 69(c) provides that “[a]ll members of the 
Bar who are not inactive, judicial, retired or emeritus members are 
active members.”  Rule 69(c) can only reasonably be understood to 
refer to members of the Delaware bar. 
 
Thus, an interpretation of Supreme Court Rule 66(a)(ii) and LFCP Rule 4(1) that 
turned solely on a distinction between the use of “members of the Bar” and “member 
of the Delaware Bar” in those provisions would be inconsistent with a reasonable 
reading of the use of that language throughout the rules. 
In an effort to reconcile the competing conclusions that result from applying 
general principles of construction to the language of the rules, we have also 
considered whether public policy and the purposes for which the LFCP was created 
support a broader or narrower understanding of the trustees’ discretion.  As noted 
above, the purpose of the LFCP is “to establish, as far as practicable, the collective 
responsibility of the profession in respect to losses caused to the public by 
defalcations of members of the Bar, acting either as attorneys or as fiduciaries.”12  
That purpose is focused on protecting the public from attorney wrongdoing.  In our 
view, carrying out that purpose can extend to considering claims involving attorneys 
who are not members of the Delaware bar where there is some nexus between the 
                                                 
12 Id. R. 66(a)(ii).   
 
8 
matter and Delaware and where the client reasonably believed that the attorney’s 
conduct was subject to some oversight in Delaware.13 
In comparison to the Delaware LFCP Rules, the ABA’s Model Rules for 
Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection (the “Model Rules”) more clearly establish a 
scope of coverage that includes misconduct by attorneys who are not members of 
the bar of the state at issue, but are “otherwise authorized to practice” in the state.  
Model Rule 1(A) provides that the purpose of a client-protection fund “is to promote 
public confidence in the administration of justice and the integrity of the legal 
profession by reimbursing losses caused by the dishonest conduct of lawyers 
licensed or otherwise authorized to practice law in the courts of this jurisdiction 
occurring in the course of the client-lawyer or other fiduciary relationship between 
the lawyer and the claimant.”14  That language alone arguably could allow 
consideration of claims involving counsel who are admitted pro hac vice and those 
who are authorized to engage in limited practice under Rule 55.  The Model Rules 
go further, however, to expressly apply to certain individuals who are not members 
of the bar of the applicable state.  Model Rule 1(B) defines “lawyer” for purposes of 
                                                 
13 See generally In re Lassen, 672 A.2d 988, 1002 (Del. 1996) (stating that “public confidence in 
the profession . . . traditionally has been built on trust and self-regulation”). 
14 ABA Model Rules for Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection R. 1(A) (emphasis added).  For the 
historical background of the Model Rules, see https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_ 
responsibility/resources/client_protection/history/.  For information regarding the first twenty-five 
years of Delaware’s LFCP, see https://courts.delaware.gov/lfcp/anniv.aspx.  
 
9 
the client-protection fund rules to include a person “(1) licensed to practice law in 
this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct occurs”; “(2) admitted as 
in-house counsel”; “(3) admitted pro hac vice”; “(4) admitted as a foreign legal 
consultant”; “(5) admitted only in a non-United States jurisdiction who is authorized 
to practice law in this jurisdiction”; or “(6) recently suspended or disbarred whom 
clients reasonably believed to be licensed to practice law when the dishonest 
conduct occurred.”15    
Thus, the Model Rules expressly include counsel admitted pro hac vice—as 
well as those permitted to engage in certain types of limited practice, though not the 
specific public-interest limited practice at issue in the facts presented by the 
trustees—in the definition of “lawyer” for the purpose of the client-protection rules.  
Moreover, subsection 6 of Model Rule 1(B) makes clear that the scope of covered 
claims is not limited to those involving current members of the bar, but extends to 
the misconduct of lawyers who were recently suspended or disbarred but were 
reasonably believed to be licensed to practice law. 
As a matter of interpretation of the Delaware rules, the fact that the Model 
Rules expressly address these issues and the Delaware rules do not suggests that the 
Delaware rules are narrower than the Model Rules and apply only to lawyers 
admitted to the Delaware bar.  Indeed, the current language of Model Rule 1 appears 
                                                 
15 Model Rules R. 1(B) (emphasis added). 
 
10 
to have been in place since at least 2006, and Delaware could have adopted that 
language but has not.  But as a matter of policy, the fact that the Model Rules are not 
limited to lawyers who are admitted to the bar of the applicable state supports a 
finding that the trustees have broad discretion to consider claims involving attorneys 
admitted pro hac vice or authorized to engage in limited practice. 
The commentary to the Model Rules draws a parallel between the scope of 
the claims that are covered and the scope of those lawyers who are required to pay 
into the fund.  Comment 2 to Model Rule 1 notes that “[l]awyers admitted as in-
house counsel, pro hac vice, or as foreign legal consultants should both pay into the 
Fund as provided under Rule 3 and have their conduct covered by the Fund.”16  And 
Comment 4 states: 
It is particularly equitable to require that this Fund, into which lawyers 
have paid annual assessments, have the primary responsibility to 
compensate clients who have suffered losses.  Such lawyers would 
include those admitted as in-house counsel, by pro hac vice admission 
and foreign legal consultants.  Lawyers admitted only in a non-United 
States jurisdiction may have their conduct covered by the Fund because 
the highest court in this jurisdiction has authorized them to provide 
legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction.17 
                                                 
16 Model Rules R. 1, cmt. 2. 
17 Id. R. 1, cmt. 4.  Professor Stephen Gillers has noted similar considerations when discussing the 
regulation of multijurisdictional practice: 
 
Many states now have client protection funds, which will reimburse clients whose 
lawyers cheat them for some or all of their loss.  Contributors to those funds are the 
state’s lawyers.  What if a host state client is cheated by an out-of-state lawyer 
engaged in cross-border practice? 
We have to make some choices when an out-of-state lawyer cheats a host 
state resident.  We can say that the host state client has no recourse to the host 
 
11 
The Delaware LFCP is funded by assessments against “active members of the 
Bar of this Court.”18  Lawyers who are admitted pro hac vice pay an assessment that 
does not include an earmark for the LFCP; rather, the assessments for pro hac vice 
admission are “to be deposited in the registration fund of the Delaware Supreme 
Court for the purpose of the governance of the Bar and the administration of justice 
and to be distributed pursuant to approval of a majority of the members of the 
Supreme Court.”19  The rules also do not impose any assessment on a person who is 
                                                 
state’s client protection fund.  We can authorize any fund in the lawyer’s home state 
to compensate the client.  We can authorize the host state fund to compensate the 
client even though only in-state lawyers contribute to it.  If so, we can also require 
out-of-state lawyers to contribute to the fund as a condition of cross-border practice.  
If we are going to create a contribution scheme to cover the added potential cost of 
disciplining lawyers who utilize more generous cross-border practice rules, then we 
can build into that tariff an appropriate additional amount to safeguard the 
jurisdiction's client protection fund.  After all, if a lawyer is going to represent a 
client in a host state, it is equitable to ask him or her to contribute to a fund that 
protects the lawyer's clients in the host state. 
 
Stephen Gillers, Lessons from the Multijurisdictional Practice Commission:  The Art of Making 
Change, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 685, 701 (2002) (footnotes omitted). 
18 DEL. SUP. CT. R. 66(e).  See also LFCP Rule 3 (“The Trust Fund shall be funded from 
assessments, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 66(e), made annually against active members of the 
Bar of the Supreme Court.  As a condition of continuing active membership in the Bar of the 
Supreme Court, every active member, except judges disqualified from practicing law, shall pay to 
the Supreme Court an annual assessment as determined by the Supreme Court in the Annual 
Registration Statement pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 69.”). 
19 DEL. SUP. CT. R. 71(b)(vi).  See generally Tom Lininger, Deregulating Public Interest Law, 88 
TULANE L. REV. 727, 759 n.133 (2014) (“The requirement of pro hac vice admission apparently 
has little to do with client protection. The host state simply checks the existing public records to 
see if the attorney applying for temporary admission has any black marks on their bar record.  No 
state requires an out-of-state attorney to pass an exam that assesses familiarity with the host state’s 
laws.  There is no evidence that any state earmarks the fees from pro hac vice admission to 
subsidize particular programs that protect in-state clients from the threat posed by out-of-state 
attorneys admitted on a short-term basis.  Indeed, Rule 5.5’s restrictions on practice by out-of-state 
attorneys seem to place a higher priority on benefiting local lawyers than on benefiting local 
clients.”). 
 
12 
authorized to engage in limited practice under Rule 55.  Therefore, if the coverage 
of the Delaware LFCP were intended to parallel the source of contributions to the 
fund, then the fund would not cover claims relating to misconduct by attorneys who 
are admitted pro hac vice or authorized to engage in limited practice.  Moreover, 
determining that the trustees have discretion to pay claims involving such attorneys 
could have significant effects on the number of claims made and the viability of the 
fund, especially where those categories of individuals do not contribute to the 
LFCP.20  This is especially so given the significant level of pro hac vice participation 
in corporate and commercial litigation in Delaware. 
Nevertheless, we conclude that the central purpose underlying the creation of 
the LFCP—protection of the public—supports a finding that it is within the trustees’ 
discretion to consider claims for reimbursement for losses caused by the wrongdoing 
of attorneys who are admitted pro hac vice or authorized to engaged in limited 
practice under Supreme Court Rule 55.  To the extent that public policy is reflected 
on the face of the Delaware rules, Rule 66(a)(ii), addressing the purpose of the fund, 
                                                 
20 See generally Laurie Diefenbach, Clients’ Security Fund, 13-Jun. NEV. LAW. 30, 31 (2005) 
(“Finally, the task force has been charged with developing possible sources of funding for the 
Clients’ Security Fund, other than raising dues for active members of the Bar.  One untapped 
source, that grows every year and actually is at risk for generating more claims, is the pro hac vice 
applications.  Each year, several hundred lawyers who are licensed to practice law in states other 
than Nevada apply for permission to appear as counsel of record in Nevada.  Thus far, none of 
these pro hac vice lawyers have generated a claim.  However, as more and more come in, the 
exposure for such a claim increases.  A portion of the fee they pay for the privilege of practicing 
in Nevada is suggested to augment the Clients’ Security Fund balance, and perhaps even create a 
reserve to use for catastrophic losses.”). 
 
13 
focuses on protection of the public and does not limit the scope of protection to 
claims involving only full members of the Delaware bar.  Because the trustees are 
vested with the duty to carry out that purpose, and because Supreme Court Rule 
66(a)(ii) and LFCP Rule 4(1) on their face do not limit the trustees’ discretion to 
considering only claims that involve defalcation by members of the Delaware bar, 
the trustees have discretion to consider claims involving attorneys who were 
admitted pro hac vice or who were authorized to engage in limited practice.  In order 
to ensure the continuing viability of the Fund, especially where the sources of 
contributions to the Fund do not fully correspond to the sources of potentially 
covered claims, other components of the trustees’ discretion serve as a back stop.  
Specifically, when determining whether to pay a claim, the trustees have the 
discretion to take into account a wide variety of considerations, including the effect 
of paying the claim on the availability of funds for other claims, the degree of 
hardship imposed on the claimant, and the reasonableness of the claimant’s belief 
that the attorney was authorized to engage in the representation. 
With respect to the facts presented by the trustees, we note that the situation 
involving an attorney whose Rule 55 authorization was revoked or rescinded 
presents a rather attenuated connection to Delaware and raises questions regarding 
whether a reasonable member of the public would have believed that the attorney 
was authorized to practice in Delaware or was subject to oversight in Delaware.  As 
 
14 
a general policy consideration, the purpose of Rule 55 is to increase the availability 
of counsel to represent Delaware’s most vulnerable clients.  To the extent that 
someone authorized to engage in Rule 55 limited practice misappropriated client 
funds within the scope of that representation, it would promote the client-protection 
goals of the LFCP to allow the trustees to consider a claim for reimbursement.  In 
the facts presented by the trustees, however, the attorney’s limited practice 
authorization had been revoked or rescinded but the person was holding himself out 
in Delaware as available to assist with legal matters and accepted a representation 
concerning a New York real estate project—the misappropriation did not occur 
within the scope of the limited-practice representation.   
Thus, although we conclude that the trustees’ discretion extends to 
considering claims involving attorneys who are admitted pro hac vice or have 
authorization to engage in limited practice, we trust that the trustees will take into 
consideration the specific facts of the particular case—such as the revocation of the 
limited-practice authorization, the nexus to Delaware, and the reasonableness of the 
client’s belief that the attorney was authorized to practice in Delaware—when 
exercising their broad discretion to determine whether the claim merits 
reimbursement from the fund.21  Moreover, given that a claim has also been 
                                                 
21 See DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 66(g)(i) (providing that the trustees “are invested with the power, which 
they shall exercise at their sole discretion, to determine whether a claim merits reimbursement 
from the trust fund, and, if so, the amount of such reimbursement, the time, place and manner of 
 
15 
submitted to the New York client-protection fund, and that the matter appears to 
involve a significantly greater nexus to New York, the trustees might also consider 
deferring a final determination of whether to pay any portion of the claim until after 
the New York fund makes its determination.22 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
/s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr. 
Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Tamika R. Montgomery-Reeves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
its payment, the conditions upon which payment shall be made, and the order in which payments 
shall be made”); id. R. 66(g)(iii) (providing a nonexclusive list of factors that the trustees may 
consider when exercising their discretion to determine whether a claim merits reimbursement, 
including the “amounts available and likely to become available to the trust fund for payment of 
claims,” the “size and number of claims which are likely to be presented in the future,” the “amount 
of the claimant’s loss as compared with the amount of the losses sustained by others who may 
merit reimbursement from the trust fund,” the “degree of hardship the claimant has suffered by the 
loss,” and “[a]ny negligence of the claimant which may have contributed to the loss”). 
22 See LFCP Rules R. 4(3) (allowing the trustees to defer decision on a claim if further 
investigation is required, and allowing unpaid portions of allowed claims to carry forward to 
succeeding years).