Case Title: Ready-Mix Concrete Co v. Truck Drivers & Helpers L. Un.

Citation: 195 Kan. 154, 403 P.2d 191

Docket Number: 44,222

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1965-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
195 Kan. 154 (1965)
403 P.2d 191
THE READY-MIX CONCRETE COMPANY OF LAWRENCE, KANSAS, a corporation, Appellant,
v.
TRUCK DRIVERS & HELPERS LOCAL UNION No. 696, affiliated with INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN & HELPERS OF AMERICA, INDEPENDENT, et al., Appellees.
No. 44,222

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 12, 1965.
William G. Haynes, of Topeka, argued the cause, and O.B. Eidson, Philip H. Lewis, James W. Porter, Charles S. Fisher, Jr., Peter F. Caldwell, Roscoe E. Long, R. Austin Nothern and Brock R. Snyder, all of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
W.L. Dean Parker, Jr., of Topeka, argued the cause, and George McCullough, Robert Wareheim, Reginald LaBunker and James Rose, all of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This was an action to enjoin the defendants from continuing their ambulatory picketing at plaintiff's customers' locations while plaintiff's trucks were delivering ready-mixed concrete.
The defendants, Truck Drivers & Helpers Union Local No. 696, commenced following plaintiff's ready-mixed trucks to customer locations in July of 1962, and while patrolling back and forth in front of these locations displayed to the public and to plaintiff's customers a sign publicizing that plaintiff refused to negotiate or bargain with the union.
*155 An individual stationed himself in an automobile outside plaintiff's ready-mix plant in Lawrence, Kansas at about 7:30 or 8:00 A.M. each morning and as plaintiff's ready-mix trucks left the plant the individual followed them to various job sites. As soon as the trucks arrived at the job site the individual got out of his automobile with a banner and proceeded to walk in front of the project. After December 24, 1963, the legend on the banner was changed to read:
As a result of the picketing plaintiff's contracts were terminated by many of its regular customers and its bids were refused.
The trial court concluded:
*156 The plaintiff has appealed from the judgment denying the injunction.
The first question for determination is whether Congress has pre-empted jurisdiction over the activity involved by placing exclusive jurisdiction in the National Labor Relations Board.
The appellant contends that its business does not fall within the Board's self-imposed interstate commerce jurisdictional requirements for non-retail establishments. The appellant suggests that during the twelve months preceding the trial of the case its out of state purchases were only $32,274.53 while the Board has fixed $50,000.00 as its proposed non-retail jurisdictional standard.
We do not believe it necessary to become involved in a discussion of dollar volume or whether the Board will consider all commerce involved for jurisdictional purposes where the labor dispute affects secondary employers. (Jemcon Broadcasting Co., 135 N.L.R.B. No. 48.) It is not disputed that the Board had assumed jurisdiction over appellant's labor disputes in the past. We do not believe the Board will surrender jurisdiction because during one annual period the employer's out of state business fell below $50,000.00, particularly where the evidence is to the effect that the employer's business during such period was materially reduced because of a dispute with labor.
The record also discloses that during the year 1962, and again in 1963, the appellant submitted this labor dispute to the National Labor Relations Board alleging:
The appellant having requested the Board to take jurisdiction is not now in position to deny the Board's jurisdiction. In Stieben v. Local Union No. 685, 181 Kan. 832, 317 P.2d 436, we stated beginning on page 837:
What has been said applies with equal force to appellant's contention that the practice complained of is not arguably protected by *157 section 7 of the Act nor arguably prohibited by section 8, and is therefore open to state regulation.
The United States Supreme Court set forth the following mandate in San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245, 79 S. Ct. 773, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775, on the question of pre-emption and exclusive jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B.:
The appellant recognizes the mandate as expressed by the supreme court but contends:
..............
The appellants have misconstrued the ruling of the Board. The Board did not dismiss the complaints for lack of jurisdiction, rather it took jurisdiction and refused to grant relief because of insufficient evidence of any violation. The regional director in denying relief stated:
On appeal the Board stated:
If the appellant seriously believed that the Board would decline jurisdiction it could have asked the Board for an advisory opinion rather than requesting it to exercise jurisdiction and grant relief. (National Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations, Series 8, 102.98.)
Section 2 (9) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 152 (9) defines "labor dispute" as follows:
The appellee suggests that the dispute has been going on since 1962, and that the union's activity, consisting of picketing to advise the public that appellant is paying substandard wages, is justified under the above definition of a "labor dispute" because:
Whether or not the activity involved does constitute a "labor dispute" and whether the activity is protected under the act may be subject to argument and debate. The very fact that the question is arguable places jurisdiction in the Board rather than the courts.
The appellant suggests that because there is no employee-employer *159 relationship section 7 does not apply. Under section 2 (3) of the Act: "The term `employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer...."
That the protection of the Act is not limited to employees of a particular employer cannot be seriously disputed. The necessity to protect employee activity which transcends the employer-employee relationship was settled in A.F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 326, 61 S. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855. In that case the plaintiffs sought to enjoin picketing on grounds that there was no dispute between the employer picketed and his own employees. The issue was whether or not the state could enjoin peaceful picketing where there was no employer-employee relationship. The court said:
In Asphalt Paving v. Local Union, 181 Kan. 775, 317 P.2d 349, at page 781, this court listed many of the practices which state courts may enjoin as follows:
These activities do not partake of the nature of the activity now being considered.
Appellants call our attention to Binder v. Local Union No. 685, 181 Kan. 799, 317 P.2d 371. The case is of no assistance in the determination of the specific question before us. It was specifically found in the Binder case that there was no evidence that interstate commerce was affected.
*160 Appellants relies on Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 77 S. Ct. 1166, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1347; Binder v. Local Union No. 685, 181 Kan. 799, 317 P.2d 371 and Continental Slip Form Builders v. Labor Local, 193 Kan. 459, 393 P.2d 1004 and argues that the picketing should be enjoined. The appellant's facts do not bring the present case within those decisions.
In the Vogt case the Supreme Court of the United States held that picketing which was for organizational purposes was not protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, hence the state might find such to be against public policy and grant relief accordingly. Following the Vogt case, this court in the Binder case held that organizational picketing contravenes this state's public policy and may be enjoined. This was followed in the Continental Slip form case which is presently before this court on rehearing. In both the Binder and Continental Slip Form cases there were factual findings that the picketing was for the object of organizing the employer's employees. Here there was no evidence which even inferentially supports the contention that the defendant has an organizational aim. On the other hand, the defendant's business agent testified without contradiction that the purpose of the picketing was to equalize wage rates so that the defendant can obtain better benefits for those employees whom it does represent.
We are forced to conclude that the state courts are without jurisdiction over the controversy.
The appellant last contends that the trial court erred in sustaining objections to certain testimony as hearsay; in sustaining motions to quash the subpoenas duces tecum for the production of documents, and in allowing testimony of the contents of collective bargaining agreements contrary to the best evidence rule.
The matters to which the objections are addressed might be of material importance if jurisdiction were established and the question of granting an injunction was before the court. However, they were not necessary nor material to the determination of the question of jurisdiction. The ruling could not therefore be prejudicial.
This court will not consider questions not material to the determination of the controlling issue. (Watkins v. City of El Dorado, 183 Kan. 363, 327 P.2d 877; Rodriguez v. Cascade Laundry Co., 185 Kan. 766, 347 P.2d 455.)
The judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.