Case Title: MD Reclamation v. Harford Cty.

Citation: 342 Md. 476

Docket Number: 48/94

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 48, September Term, 1995
In Re: Adoption/Guardianship No. 10935 
In The Circuit Court For Montgomery County, Maryland
[Concerns The Standard Which A Court Should Apply In Considering A
Petition To Resign As Guardian Of The Person Of A Minor]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 48
September Term, 1995
________________________________________
IN RE: ADOPTION/GUARDIANSHIP
NO. 10935 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND
________________________________________
Murphy, C. J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
   Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker,
    
            JJ.
________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
________________________________________
        Filed:  July 25, 1996
       Charles's last name was changed from Geiger to Fountain by
1
a court order entered on July 6, 1989.
This case involves a petition to resign as co-guardian of
the persons of three minors.  The issue before us concerns the
standard which a court should apply in considering a petition to
resign as guardian of the person of a minor.
I.
Carl and Mavis Bauer were married on August 21, 1979.  At
the time, Mavis had three children from a previous marriage, and
Carl had one.  Steven Fountain is Mavis's son from her prior
marriage.  Steven married Annie Marie in 1979 in North Carolina,
and their first child, James Ellis Fountain, was born in December
1979.  
In 1981, Steven, Annie Marie, and James Ellis Fountain moved
to Maryland.  Steven and Annie Marie divorced in early 1982, and
Annie Marie married John Keith Geiger.  Later in 1982, Annie Marie
and John Keith Geiger had a son who was initially named Charles
Keith Geiger and subsequently named Charles Keith Fountain.1
Sometime later, Annie Marie and John Keith Geiger apparently
separated, and Annie Marie and Steven apparently resumed co-
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habitation.  On March 12, 1984, Annie Marie and Steven had their
second child together, Daniel Carl Fountain.  Shortly thereafter,
Annie Marie moved back to North Carolina, leaving all three boys in
Steven's custody.
On November 19, 1985, Steven filed in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County a complaint for custody of his two sons, James
and Daniel, as well as for custody of Charles Keith Geiger.  Both
Annie Marie, who lived in North Carolina, and Charles's natural
father, John Keith Geiger, who still resided in Maryland, signed
documents consenting to the appointment of Steven "as guardian and
legal custodian" of the boys.  The circuit court ordered that
Steven be granted custody of all three boys.
About three years later, in early 1989, Carl and Mavis filed
three virtually identical petitions in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County requesting that the circuit court name them
guardians of the persons of the three children, James, Charles and
Daniel.  Each of the petitions stated that Carl and Mavis sought
"the appointment of a guardian of the person of the minor so that
the minor can be covered under Petitioners' health insurance
policy, provide schooling for the child and perform all other acts
necessary to the raising of the child."  The petitions indicated
that the three boys had resided with Mavis and Carl for most of the
time since 1984.  Each petition also stated that Carl and Mavis
"are fully able to support the minor child.  In addition, Steven
Anthony Fountain has agreed to pay the Petitioners the sum of One
- 3 -
Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per month as child support."  Steven,
John Keith Geiger who had moved to Pennsylvania, and Annie Marie
who continued to reside in North Carolina and had apparently
remarried, all signed documents consenting to the appointment of
Carl and Mavis as guardians for the boys.  On June 16, 1989, the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County appointed Carl Bauer and Mavis
Bauer as guardians of the person for all three boys.
According to Mavis, Carl moved out of the family home on
May 9, 1994.  Mavis filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, on July 19, 1994, a complaint which, as amended, sought a
limited divorce from Carl on the ground of abandonment, alimony,
and child support.  That action is presently pending in the circuit
court.
On October 5, 1994, Carl instituted the present action by
filing in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County a petition to
resign as co-guardian of James, Charles and Daniel.  Carl submitted
his petition to resign pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 1991 Repl.
Vol.), §§ 13-220 and 221 of the Estates and Trusts Article and
Maryland Rule V81.  In his petition, Carl advised the circuit court
that his resignation as co-guardian would not terminate the
guardianship; instead, it would leave Mavis as the sole guardian.
Mavis filed an opposition to Carl's petition to resign, and
thereafter both sides filed memoranda, affidavits, and answers to
interrogatories.
In opposing Carl's petition, Mavis pointed out that the
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statutes invoked by Carl, §§ 13-220 and 221 of the Estates and
Trusts Article, related to guardians of property, and that § 13-702
of the Estates and Trust Article was the statute relating to
guardians of the person of minors.  Mavis further asserted that it
was not in the best interests of the minor children to allow Carl
Bauer to resign as co-guardian.  She specifically contended that
"Carl asked for, and was granted, full parental authority and
responsibility for all three children [and the] Court cannot allow
him to simply walk away from his responsibilities and obligations,"
that "by agreement of the natural parents, all three children have
spent the majority of their lives with, and have been raised and
supported by, Mavis and Carl," that Carl "desired that he and Mavis
become guardians of the children in order to provide them with the
support, stability and security they needed," that Carl had agreed
in the guardianship petition "to provide schooling for the children
and perform all other acts necessary to the raising of the
children," that Carl "promised" that he and Mavis were "fully able
to support" the children, that the children considered Carl as
their father, that Carl had been acting as their father, taking
them to "father-son prayer breakfasts," attending parent-teacher
conferences, etc., and that Carl "often reassured [the children]
that he would always `be there' for them."  
Mavis argued that, in light of all of the circumstances,
Carl had a duty to support the three boys based on "equitable
estoppel and contract."  Mavis stated that Carl had induced the
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       Steven was convicted of murdering his girlfriend in 1993
2
and is serving a sentence of life imprisonment.
children, their natural parents, and Mavis to rely upon his
"representations that he would provide for their support and would
`always be there for the children.'"   Mavis's position was that
"Carl Bauer must not be allowed to breach his agreement to support
the children" by being permitted to resign as co-guardian.
In reply, Carl disputed several of Mavis's factual asser-
tions, and denied that he had agreed to or assumed the role of
father to the three boys.  Carl asserted that Steven had lived with
Carl, Mavis and the children during a majority of the time, and
that Steven had performed the role of parent to the children until
he became incarcerated in 1993.   Carl claimed that the "cumulative
2
stress of Mavis's persistent pressure and efforts to support her
adult children and grandchildren," and the "stress" brought on by
"Steven's murder of his girlfriend of five years," have left Carl
with "severe depression" for which he was receiving psychiatric
treatment and which "has resulted in [Carl's] inability to function
as a guardian."  Carl also pointed out that he no longer resided in
the family home with the children, that he has "been forced to
avoid the . . . house because of Mavis's aggressive behavior and
emotional abuse," and that he lived alone in an apartment.
Finally, Carl denied that he had contractually undertaken to
support the children or that he had a duty to support them under
principles of equitable estoppel.  
- 6 -
       With regard to the propriety of a trial court's rendering
3
summary judgment when no motion for summary judgment was filed, see
Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn, 335 Md. 135, 142-147, 642 A.2d 219,
223-225 (1994).  In the instant case, however, the parties in
substance sought to have the case disposed of by summary judgment.
Furthermore, neither side in this Court argues that the circuit
court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing.
Neither side filed an express motion for summary judgment,
although in one of her memoranda Mavis asserted that Carl's
"Petition To Resign As Guardian should be treated as a Motion For
Summary Judgment and should be denied."  When the case was called
for hearing in the circuit court, although Mavis's counsel had
brought numerous witnesses for a full evidentiary trial on the
disputed factual issues, her counsel nevertheless suggested to the
court that "it is my position, after continuing to reflect on the
matter, that it is a question of law."  The court agreed, decided
to resolve the matter as a summary judgment proceeding, and neither
side objected.3
During the argument before the circuit court, counsel for
Mavis agreed with the court's comment that, ordinarily, the
question of whether one should remain as guardian of the person of
a minor, and the question of whether one has a duty to support the
minor, were entirely separate and distinct issues, and that "being
appointed as a guardian does not carry with it the duty of support
in and of itself."  Counsel for Mavis also did not disagree that,
except for the alleged duty of support, the petition to resign
should be granted.  Nevertheless, Mavis's position was that, under
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the circumstances here, Carl had a duty to support the three
children under principles of contract and/or equitable estoppel,
and that this assumption of the duty to support the minors
warranted a denial of the petition in this case.  
The trial judge agreed that the issue before the court was
"whether or not [Carl] has any duty of support."  The judge then
held, based on the facts relied upon by Mavis, that Carl had no
duty to support the children under principles of contract or
equitable estoppel.  The court concluded that, because "there is,
in the court's opinion, no legal basis to require him to support
these children," the court "will grant the request of Carl Bauer to
resign as co-guardian of these three children."  Subsequently the
court signed an order which, after referring to the documents and
arguments by the parties, granted the petition to resign as co-
guardian.
Mavis appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and, prior
to any further proceedings in that court, we issued a writ of
certiorari.
Both sides, in their briefs and oral arguments before this
Court, deal entirely with the question of whether Carl had a duty
to support the three boys.  Mavis argues that Carl had a duty to
support the children under principles of "equitable estoppel" and,
alternatively, that he "is contractually obligated to continue
supporting the minor children."  For this reason, according to
Mavis, the circuit court's order should be reversed.  Carl argues
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that the circuit court correctly held that he had no duty of
support, and that, therefore, the order should be affirmed.  Carl
principally relies upon this Court's opinion in Knill v. Knill, 306
Md. 527, 510 A.2d 546 (1986).  Both sides construe the circuit
court's order as an adjudication of the support issue.  According
to counsel, Carl has argued in the pending divorce action that the
circuit court's order in this case is preclusive with regard to the
child support issue raised in the divorce action.
II.
A.
The provisions of the Estates and Trusts Article of the
Maryland Code governing guardianships separately classify guardians
of property and guardians of the person.  Title 13, subtitle 2,
consisting of sections 13-201 through 13-222, which include the
provisions initially relied on in Carl's petition to resign, relate
to guardians of property.  The record discloses that the three
wards had no assets and that Carl was appointed only as co-guardian
of their persons.  Therefore, §§ 13-201 through 13-222 are not
directly applicable to this case.
Title 13, subtitle 7, of the Estates and Trusts Article,
consisting of §§ 13-701 through 13-710, entitled "Guardian of the
Person," contains the statutory provisions relating to guardians of
the person.  Section 13-701 deals with the testamentary appointment
of a guardian, and §§ 13-704 through 13-710 concern guardians of
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       Section 13-703 is applicable to appointments made under
4
either § 13-701 (testamentary appointment) or § 13-702, and states
as follows:
"§ 13-703. Bond; accounting; compensation.
The guardian of the person of a minor shall
not be required to post any bond or to file
any accounts.  Unless otherwise provided by
(continued...)
disabled persons; consequently, these sections do not apply here.
Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 293 Md. 685, 700-701, 447 A.2d
1244, 1252-1253 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147, 103 S.Ct. 790,
74 L.Ed.2d 995 (1983).
The pertinent statutory section is § 13-702, which provides
as follows:
"§ 13-702. Court appointment of guardian of a
minor.
(a) General rule. - If neither parent is
serving as guardian of the person and no
testamentary appointment has been made, on
petition by any person interested in the
welfare of the minor, and after notice and
hearing, the court may appoint a guardian of
the person of an unmarried minor.  If the
minor has attained his 14th birthday, and if
the person otherwise is qualified, the court
shall appoint a person designated by the
minor, unless the decision is not in the best
interests of the minor.  This section may not
be construed to require court appointment of a
guardian of the person of a minor if there is
no good reason, such as a dispute, for a court
appointment.
(b) Venue and procedure. Venue in proceed-
ings under this subtitle shall be as pre-
scribed by the Maryland Rules.  The contents
of the petition and the manner of giving
notice of the hearing on the petition shall be
as prescribed by Maryland Rules."4
- 10 -
     (...continued)
4
the will appointing a guardian of the person,
he shall not be entitled to any compensation
for serving as guardian of the person."
Section 13-702 contains no language expressly permitting a resigna-
tion by a guardian of the person.  In fact, § 13-702 is very
general, and specifically deals with only a few matters in
connection with the appointment of a guardian of the person of a
minor.  In Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., supra, 293 Md. at 701-
702, 447 A.2d at 1252, Chief Judge Murphy for the Court explained
the legislative purpose underlying § 13-702 as follows:
"In enacting § 13-702, expressly recognizing
the authority of circuit courts to appoint a
guardian of the person of a minor, but without
delineating the guardian's powers and duties,
the legislature intended that circuit courts
would exercise their inherent equitable juris-
diction over guardianship matters pertaining
to minors, adopting standards with respect
thereto as would be consistent with and in
furtherance of the incompetent ward's best
interests.
* * *
"It is a fundamental common law concept that
the jurisdiction of courts of equity over such
persons is plenary so as to afford whatever
relief may be necessary to protect the
- 11 -
       See Crain v. Barnes, 1 Md. Ch. 151, 153 (1847) ("The
5
relation of guardian and ward constituting, as Mr. Justice Story
says, the most important and delicate of trusts, . . . this
relation and the rights and obligations which grow out of it, are
peculiarly within the jurisdiction of this court"); Corrie's Case
2 Bland 488, 489 (1830).
[minor's] best interests."5
Thus, with respect to the many issues which may come before a court
in connection with a guardianship under § 13-702, the general
overall standard guiding the court is the best interests of the
minor.  See also, e.g., Sudler v. Sudler, 121 Md. 46, 56, 88 A. 26,
30 (1913) ("the best interests of [the] ward" is the governing
standard); Compton v. Compton, 2 Gill 241 (1844) ("interests . . .
of the infant" guide a court in appointing a guardian). 
B.
Although this Court has not previously dealt with a request
to resign as a guardian of the person of a minor, the historical
evolution of the issue, culminating in decisions by courts in our
sister states, confirms that a petition to resign as guardian
should be granted if it is in the best interests of the minor.
In England, the general rule at an earlier period of the
common law was that guardians could not resign.  Spencer v.
Chesterfield, 27 Eng. Rep. 94, 94-95 (Ch. 1752); Shaftsbury v.
Shaftsbury, 25 Eng. Rep. 121, 124 (Ch. 1725); Macpherson On Infants
at 26-27, 98 (1843); 1 Schouler, Domestic Relations, § 854 (6th ed.
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       A guardian in socage, at common law, "was a species of
6
guardian who had the custody of lands coming to the infant by
descent, as also of the infant's person, until the latter reached
the age of fourteen.  Such guardian was always `the next of kin to
whom the inheritance cannot possibly descend.'"  Blacks Law
Dictionary at 707 (6th ed. 1990).  
1921).  This rule was especially strict for guardians in socage.6
As the court explained in Shaftsbury v. Shaftsbury, supra, 25 Eng.
Rep. at 124, "the Guardian in Socage has no Interest of Profit; it
is an Interest of Honour, and for the Honour of the Family
committed to his next of Kin, and therefore is inherent to the
Blood, and can't be assignable."  
The rule that guardians could not resign was apparently less
rigid when applied to testamentary guardians as long as special
circumstances existed.  In Spencer v. Chesterfield, supra, 27 Eng.
Rep. at 95, the Lord Chancellor initially ruled against a petition
to resign, announcing that testamentary guardians could not resign
and that the court would compel the guardians to act.  Upon
reconsideration of a revised petition, this time submitted by the
ward himself and with his mother's consent, the Lord Chancellor
ruled that the guardians could resign because of the special
circumstances of this case.  In so ruling, the Lord Chancellor
commented that "in general he would not comply with such [a]
petition [to resign], nor should this case be drawn into
precedent."
Schouler, in his treatise on Domestic Relations, explained
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why courts would not permit a guardian to resign at an earlier
period of the common law (1 Schouler, Domestic Relations, supra,
§ 854 at 957-958): 
"The office of a guardian was regarded as
something so honorable at the common law that
it could not be easily refused, much less
resigned.  Natural guardians, of necessity,
could not resign.  We have seen, in another
connection, how far the natural guardian may
practically surrender his children's custody,
by allowing others to adopt them, by placing
them in a charitable institution, and the
like; which is the only sense in which this
guardianship may be considered as voluntarily
transferred.  So guardians in socage, being
designated by the law, could not in strictness
resign; if they could shift their authority at
all, it must have been by assignment.  There
is reason to believe that, before the statute
of Marlbridge, they could assign, but only to
the extent of placing the ward's body in
custody of another.  In later times, no
assignment whatever has been permitted.  For
as Lord Commissioner Gilbert observed, guard-
ianship in socage is an interest, not of
profit, but of honor, committed to the next of
kin, inherent in the blood; and therefore not
assignable.
"The resignation of a testamentary guardian
is not, as a rule, permitted. . . .  Though
this was [only the rule for] testamentary
guardianship, we presume the rule to be
equally strict, or nearly so, in case of
chancery guardian."
In this country, the general rule developed that, in the
absence of a statute authorizing the resignation of guardians,
there is no absolute right to resign.  See, e.g., Wackerle v.
People, 168 Ill. 250, 254, 48 N.E. 123, 124 (1897); Young v.
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Lorain, 11 Ill. 624, 633 (1850); Evans v. Johnson, 39 W. Va. 299,
306, 19 S.E. 623, 625 (1894).  The majority of cases, however, take
the position that a guardian's petition to resign should be granted
if the resignation is for good cause or is in the best interests of
the ward.  See, e.g., Wackerle v. People, supra, 168 Ill. at 254,
48 N.E. at 124; Ex parte Crumb, 2 Johns Ch. 439 (N.Y. Ch. 1817); In
re Wachter, 299 Pa. 153, 149 A. 315 (1930); In re Dixon's Estate,
9 Pa. D. & C. 79, 80 (1927), G. W. Field, The Legal Relations of
Infants, Parent and Child, and Guardian and Ward, § 140 (1988).
See also Jain v. Priest, 30 Idaho 273, 283, 164 P. 364, 367 (1917);
Brown v. Huntsman, 32 Minn. 466, 467-468, 21 N.W. 555, 556 (1884);
Nicoll v. Trustees of Huntington, 1 Johns. Ch. 166, 173 (N.Y. Ch.
1814).  But cf. Evans v. Johnson, supra, 39 W. Va. at 306, 19 S.E.
at 625 (following the early English common law principle that
ordinarily a guardian cannot resign).
Moreover, the authorities, as well as common sense, support
the position that ordinarily it is in the best interests of the
minor to permit a guardian to resign when the guardian is unwilling
to continue serving in that capacity.  Commenting upon a case where
the co-guardians submitted their resignations because they did not
wish to supervise their ward who planned to travel abroad, one
commentator noted: "as it can never be for the infant's benefit to
continue him in the care of a negligent or reluctant guardian, it
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is difficult to see how the court could avoid transferring the
custody to another."  Macpherson On Infants, supra, at 128.
Another commentator observed (1 Schouler, Domestic Relations,
supra, § 854 at 958-959):
"[N]umerous unforeseen emergencies may arise,
so as to render the continuance of the trust
improper; as if the guardian should become a
confirmed invalid, or make himself obnoxious
to the ward and his relations, or display a
want of prudence in managing the estate not
inconsistent with good intentions nor suffi-
ciently gross to justify removing him.  He
might be fully aware of the advantage of a
change to all parties concerned, and might
desire to be relieved, provided he could with-
draw with honor, and without submitting to a
humiliating investigation of petty and insuf-
ficient grounds of complaint.  This oppor-
tunity is afforded in allowing him to resign.
So, too, the guardian's convenience, apart
from all other considerations, might lead him
to withdraw."
C.
Although the authorities support the view that a court
appointed guardian's petition to resign should be granted if there
is good cause or if such action is in the best interests of the
minor, the parties in the present case have cited no authority, and
we are aware of none, holding or suggesting that acceptance of a
court appointed guardian's resignation should depend upon whether
the guardian has a duty to support the minor.
When one is not a natural guardian of a minor (i.e., a
parent), and is court appointed simply as a guardian of the person,
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there is no necessary correlation between the guardianship and the
duty to support.  One who is not a guardian may have contractually
assumed the duty of child support.  See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 287
Md. 273, 412 A.2d 396 (1980) (stepfather, upon divorce from child's
mother, had by contract assumed the duty to pay a weekly sum for
child support).  On the other hand, one may be appointed guardian
of the person of a minor simply for the purpose of making a
particular type of decision for that minor.  See, e.g., Wentzel v.
Montgomery Gen. Hosp., supra (petition for appointment as guardians
of a mentally retarded minor for the purpose of consenting to a
proposed surgical procedure).  
A court order appointing someone in Carl's position as
guardian of the person of a minor does not, without more, impose a
duty of support upon the guardian.  On the other hand, under
circumstances where a court appointed guardian of the person of a
minor may have contractually assumed a duty to support the minor,
an order merely allowing the appointee to resign as guardian, or an
order removing the appointee as guardian, would not necessarily
relieve the former guardian of any contractual obligations which he
or she might have assumed with regard to child support.
In sum, the petition by a court appointed guardian of the
person of a minor to resign as guardian should be granted if there
is good cause or if the resignation is in the best interests of the
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       Because "good cause" and "best interests of the minor" are
7
largely overlapping concepts, this standard is not markedly
different from the statutory standard governing the resignation of
a guardian of property.  Under § 13-220(d) of the Estates and
Trusts Article and Maryland Rule V81, a petition to resign as
guardian of property should be granted unless "good cause" is shown
why such resignation should not be accepted by the court.
minor.   Furthermore, it is ordinarily in the best interests of the
7
minor to permit the resignation of a court appointed guardian who
is no longer willing to serve in that capacity.  Finally, whether
a court appointed guardian of the person of a minor should be
allowed to resign does not depend upon whether the guardian might
also have a duty to support the minor.
D.
Applying the above-summarized principles to the facts of
this case, it is clear that the parties and the circuit court erred
in taking the position that the grant or denial of Carl's petition
to resign should depend upon whether he had a duty to support the
three boys under principles of equitable estoppel or contract.  The
grant or denial of Carl's petition in no way depended upon whether
he may have assumed a duty to support the children.  The question
of child support was an issue in the previously filed and still
pending divorce action, and it should be adjudicated in that
action.  Since the grant of Carl's petition in this case rested
upon the circuit court's conclusion with regard to the child
support issue, the circuit court applied an improper standard.  The
correct standard was whether there existed good cause for Carl's
- 18 -
resignation or whether that resignation was in the best interests
of the children.
Ordinarily when a trial court's judgment is grounded upon an
erroneous standard, we vacate the order and remand the case for the
trial judge to decide the matter using the proper standard.  See,
e.g., Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 49-50, 622 A.2d 121, 127
(1993); Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 773-777, 621 A.2d 898, 905-
907 (1993); Robinson v. Robinson, 328 Md. 507, 513, 615 A.2d 1190,
1193 (1992); Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 126, 372 A.2d 231, 234,
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 939, 98 S.Ct. 430, 54 L.#d.2d 299 (1977).
In addition, issues of "good cause" or "best interests of the
children" should normally be resolved in the first instance by the
trial court and not initially by an appellate court.  See, e.g.,
Fairbanks v. McCarter, supra, 330 Md. at 49-50, 622 A.2d at 126-
127; Monroe v. Monroe, supra, 329 Md. at 777, 621 A.2d at 907;
Domingues v. Johnson, 323 Md. 486, 498-503, 593 A.2d 1133, 1139-
1141 (1991).  Finally, the circuit court in effect granted summary
judgment in this case, and "an appellate court ordinarily may
uphold the grant of a summary judgment only on the grounds relied
on by the trial court."  Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 80, 660 A.2d
447, 452 (1995), and cases there cited.
Application of the general rules concerning appellate
review, set forth above, would require that we vacate the circuit
court's order and remand the case for the circuit to rule upon the
- 19 -
petition under the appropriate standards.  Nevertheless, this case
is somewhat unusual.  Both in the circuit court and in oral
argument before this Court, Mavis agreed that, except for the
alleged duty of support, the petition to resign should be granted.
Mavis's counsel specifically conceded in oral argument before us
that, ordinarily, a court should not force an individual to remain
as a co-guardian against his or her wishes.  Thus, the only dispute
in this case relates to a matter which was not properly an issue,
namely the duty of support.  Moreover, under the circumstances -
particularly Carl's unwillingness to continue serving as co-
guardian and Mavis's willingness to continue as guardian - it seems
clear that good cause and the best interests of the children
required the granting of the petition.
In light of the unusual circumstances, we shall affirm the
circuit court's order granting the petition to resign as co-
guardian.  Nevertheless, because of the reference to the parties'
submissions in the order, coupled with the parties' interpretation
of that order, we shall modify the order to make it clear that the
order does not represent any adjudication whatsoever with respect
to the duty of support.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
MONTGOMERY COUNTY MODIFIED AS SET
FORTH IN THIS OPINION, AND, AS
MODIFIED, AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE
EQUALLY DIVIDED.