Case Title: WHITNEY, JR. v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
WHITNEY, JR. v. STATE2004 WY 11899 P.3d 457Case Number: 03-34Decided: 10/21/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

HAROLD 
ROBERT WHITNEY, JR.,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; 
and Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Dee Morgan, 
Assistant Attorney General.
 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Harold Robert 
Whitney, Jr. (the appellant) appeals his convictions for aggravated homicide by 
vehicle, a felony, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(i) (LexisNexis 
2003), and several misdemeanors.  On 
appeal, the appellant contends that he was denied a speedy trial, the 
prosecution suppressed or failed to preserve exculpatory evidence, a crime scene 
photograph was improperly admitted into evidence, and the prosecutor committed 
misconduct during opening statement and closing argument.  We affirm.

 

 

            
1.         
Whether the appellant was denied a speedy trial pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
48(b) or the United States or Wyoming Constitutions?

 

            
2.         
Whether the prosecution suppressed or failed to preserve exculpatory 
evidence?

 

            
3.         
Whether a photograph of the deceased victim's body at the crime scene was 
improperly admitted into evidence?

 

            
4.         
Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct during opening statement and 
closing argument?

 

 

[¶2]      At about 2:00 
a.m. on September 29, 2001, Officer Michael Vranish of the Evanston police 
department encountered a green Pontiac minivan (the minivan) at an intersection 
controlled by a flashing red stoplight.  
The minivan stopped once it had entered the intersection entirely, 
remained stopped in the intersection for at least ten seconds, proceeded through 
the intersection, drove well below the posted speed limit for a brief period of 
time, and failed to signal its turns.  
Officer Vranish, suspecting that the minivan's driver might be impaired, 
initiated a traffic stop shortly thereafter.  Officer Vranish requested that the 
minivan's driver, who the officer identified at trial as the appellant, produce 
his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance.  The appellant produced a plastic "Hertz 
Car Sales" "club card entitling the holder to certain [VIP] benefits" bearing 
the name "Bobbie Decker."1

 

[¶3]      Officer Vranish 
testified that he smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage on the appellant's 
breath, the appellant had bloodshot eyes, appeared "really tired," did not 
communicate or respond well, and was slow and deliberate in attempting to 
produce the requested documentation (which documentation he ultimately failed to 
produce).  Officer Vranish returned 
to his patrol vehicle in order "to find out who [he] was dealing with" and did 
not consider the appellant to be a flight risk at that 
time.

 

[¶4]      The minivan then 
suddenly pulled away from the scene of the traffic stop, failed to stop at a 
stop sign, and began to exceed the posted speed limit.2  Officer Vranish pursued the minivan and 
from a point approximately six hundred feet behind the minivan, Officer Vranish 
saw "a cloud of dust" as the minivan lost control and traveled off the side of 
the road.  The appellant exited the 
minivan, looked at Officer Vranish, ignored the officer's order to "get on the 
ground," and took off running.  
While Officer Vranish and another police officer subdued the appellant, 
Evanston police officer Chris Brackin walked to the front of the minivan, looked 
through a hole in the windshield, and saw a male body positioned with his head 
near the passenger seat and his lower body near the windshield opening.  The body, later identified as Donald 
Walker (the victim), had no pulse.  
According to Officer Vranish, the entire pursuit lasted about a 
minute.

 

[¶5]      Wyoming Highway 
Patrol Trooper Richard Lewis investigated the crime scene with the assistance of 
David Lankford, a Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper at the time.  Trooper Lewis determined that the 
minivan the appellant was driving during the pursuit jumped the curb on a curve 
in the roadway, struck the victim (who was walking on the sidewalk) 229 feet 
later, struck a light pole, impacted a traffic island, and came to rest in the 
roadway approximately 629 feet from the point it jumped the curb.  The minivan struck the victim with such 
force that it "knocked" the victim "out of his shoes" and the victim's severed 
left foot came to rest against a fence about 270 feet from the point of 
impact.  Trooper Lankford opined 
that the appellant's response to the curve in the roadway was "late.  He started into the turn but it wasn't 
until after the turn had already started, so he was going straight and then 
started his turn too late, which caused him to go off the roadway and on to the 
sidewalk."  According to Trooper 
Lankford, the minivan's minimum speed when it jumped the curb was seventy miles 
per hour and the average speed during the pursuit was seventy-five miles per 
hour.

 

[¶6]      A blood sample 
was obtained from the appellant on September 29, 2001, which sample contained an 
alcohol content of .27%.  Officer 
Vranish and Trooper Lewis testified that the appellant, who was from Elko, 
Nevada, stated that after he was unable to locate some friends in Evanston, he 
went out drinking at two establishments and was driving back into town when 
Officer Vranish stopped him.

 

[¶7]      At trial, the 
appellant's defense focused on:  (1) 
Officer Vranish's actions in returning to his patrol vehicle to attempt to 
identify the appellant instead of taking steps to control the appellant and/or 
the minivan and prevent the appellant from driving;3 and (2) the possibility that 
Officer Vranish, perhaps via a "pit maneuver,"4 forced the appellant off the road 
during the pursuit prior to the minivan striking and killing the victim.5  The appellant contended at trial that 
these actions amounted to extreme and outrageous conduct, and therefore 
proximately caused the victim's death.

 

[¶8]      The appellant was 
ultimately charged in an Amended Information with aggravated homicide by 
vehicle, a felony, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(i), and eluding, 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-225 (LexisNexis 2003), reckless driving, 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-229 (LexisNexis 2003), driving while 
under the influence, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b)(ii)(A) 
(LexisNexis 2001), two counts of interference with a peace officer, in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(a) (LexisNexis 2003), and driving while license 
suspended or revoked, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-134(a) (LexisNexis 
2003), all misdemeanors.  On April 
22, 2002, the State moved to dismiss the reckless driving charge without 
prejudice, which motion was granted.  
On October 11, 2002, a Uinta County jury found the appellant guilty of 
the remaining charges.  The district 
court sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for eight to twelve years for 
aggravated homicide by vehicle, and also imposed sentence for several of the 
misdemeanor convictions.6  The appellant appeals from the district 
court's judgment and sentence.

 

 

 

[¶9]      The appellant was 
arrested on September 29, 2001, and the public defender was appointed to 
represent him on October 1, 2001.  
On October 1, 2001, the prosecution filed an Information in the circuit 
court charging the appellant, followed by an Amended Information on October 17, 
2001.  A preliminary hearing was 
held on October 11, 2001, and the appellant was bound over to the district court 
for further proceedings.  The 
appellant was arraigned in the district court on October 31, 2001, where he pled 
not guilty, and following several trial continuances, a jury trial was held 
October 8-11, 2002.

 

[¶10]   The appellant argues that he was 
denied a speedy trial under W.R.Cr.P. 48, Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10, and the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  "We review a speedy trial claim 
according to the mandates of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) and, where necessary, the four-part 
constitutional test articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972)."  
Vlahos v. State, 2003 WY 103, ¶ 12, 75 P.3d 628, 632 (Wyo. 
2003).  "W.R.Cr.P. 48 governs the time period 
between arraignment and trial; however, delays between the time of charge and 
the time of trial are subject to the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution."  Walters v. 
State, 2004 WY 37, ¶ 9, 87 P.3d 793, 795 (Wyo. 2004).  We note that on appeal, the appellant 
does not contend that his trial counsel was ineffective at any time during the 
trial court proceedings.

 

            
Continuances of January 30, 2002, and April 3, 2002, Trial 
Dates

 

[¶11]   In an order filed November 14, 
2001, the district court set the case for a jury trial beginning January 30, 
2002.  Based on his preliminary 
discussions with the appellant in October 2001, and "on Mr. Whitney's demand," 
the appellant's trial counsel (trial counsel) developed a theory that Officer 
Vranish improperly focused on ascertaining the appellant's identity during the 
traffic stop, rather than on removing the appellant from the minivan or 
otherwise disabling the minivan.  
According to this theory, Officer Vranish's conduct was extreme and 
outrageous and therefore proximately caused the victim's death.  Trial counsel informed the appellant 
that this was a "difficult" defense, but the appellant insisted on "pushing this 
defense on" trial counsel.  In 
mid-December, trial counsel considered consulting an expert on driving while 
under the influence arrest procedures and contacted Robert LaPier.  The two discussed Mr. LaPier's fees, and 
trial counsel submitted case materials to Mr. LaPier for his 
review.

 

[¶12]   Trial counsel also stated that even 
before he was "assigned the case" (and certainly before the October 11, 2001, 
preliminary hearing), he "heard rumors in the general community and one of the 
rumors was that the police officers h ad actually bumped . . . the [appellant's] 
vehicle and had bumped the vehicle off the road, causing it to run into the 
pedestrian."  Recognizing "the 
seriousness of the allegations" and "the seriousness of the rumor," trial 
counsel preliminarily developed another theory that the police "bumped" the 
appellant's vehicle during the pursuit.  
Trial counsel contacted an investigator, who went to the crime scene, 
obtained and examined the police reports, interviewed people who worked in the 
area, and according to trial counsel, even talked to "the police."  The police told the 
investigator

 

that 
they were inspecting their vehicles and they were taking photos and those photos 
could be made available to him.  
Honestly, I don't know if [the investigator] told [trial counsel] that or 
not, that there were  I believe he told me that he had talked with the police 
and there was no damage to the vehicles.  
I don't know if he transmitted to me the idea that there were actual 
photos of the police vehicles.

 

Neither 
trial counsel, nor the investigator, examined the minivan at that time.  Based on this investigation, the 
investigator concluded that there was "simply no evidence of any kind of contact 
between the police vehicle and the [appellant's] vehicle" and trial counsel 
concluded that there was not "a scintilla of evidence to suggest that the police 
officer's vehicle had come into contact" with the minivan and "dropped that 
defense strategy" in October or November of 2001.7

 

[¶13]   Just prior to Christmas, the public 
defender's office authorized trial counsel to retain Mr. LaPier, and trial 
counsel relayed that information to the appellant.  Trial counsel felt that "it was likely 
we would have to request a continuance of the January 30 trial date" and stated 
that the appellant did not appear "happy with that."  In early January 2002, trial counsel 
also requested, and participated in, a discovery meeting with the prosecution, 
where he met with law enforcement officers from several agencies, received 
documents, and listed additional discovery items to be provided by the 
prosecution.  To that point, trial 
counsel felt that the prosecution had "complied with discovery.  Everything I've requested of them has 
been provided to me and I've been satisfied with what I've received from the 
State."

 

[¶14]   On January 17, 2002, a "Joint 
Motion For Continuance" was filed by the appellant, "through his attorney," and 
the prosecutor.  The motion, signed 
by trial counsel and the prosecutor, stated that the appellant had "acquired the 
services of an expert witness, who is not available to testify on the date 
presently set for trial," that the "parties" needed additional time to "complete 
discovery," and requested that the trial be continued until after March 15, 
2002, "to allow sufficient time for the parties to complete the discovery 
process."  Trial counsel stated, 
however, that he

 

felt 
it was in [the appellant's] best interest to request a continuance and I 
requested a continuance.  I got with 
[the prosecutor].  I asked if he had 
any problem with the continuance of the January 30 case.  I told him why and he had no 
objection.  I made it a joint 
motion.  We filed it with the 
Court.

 

The 
district court, finding "just cause" for the motion, vacated the January 
30th trial setting and reset the matter for trial on April 3, 
2002.  According to trial counsel, 
the district court did not consult trial counsel prior to issuing this trial 
setting.  Upon receiving the 
setting, trial counsel immediately called Mr. LaPier and discovered that he was 
not available to testify during the April 3, 2002, 
setting.

 

[¶15]   On March 12, 2002, trial counsel 
and the prosecutor filed a second "Joint Motion To Continue Jury Trial."  The motion, signed by trial counsel and 
the prosecutor, stated that the appellant's expert witness, Mr. LaPier, was not 
available to testify during the April 3rd trial setting, but would be 
available to testify if the trial were rescheduled for April 24, 2002.8  The district court continued the April 
3rd trial setting and reset the trial for April 24, 
2002.

 

[¶16]   The relationship between the 
appellant and trial counsel had admittedly become "strained," and according to 
counsel, the appellant "wasn't communicating with me."  This is evident in the record, as the 
appellant began filing ex parte, pro se motions with the district court 
complaining about the appellant's relationship with trial counsel and also in 
response to the above-described motions to continue the 
trial.

 

[¶17]   On February 21, 2002, the appellant 
filed several documents with the district court.  In a handwritten letter, styled as a 
"Motion To Appeal Continuance," the appellant stated that trial counsel was 
"acting on his own behalf" in requesting the January 17th 
continuance, that the appellant had "never waived" his right to a speedy trial 
and "I want my right to a speedy trial," and that trial counsel had "been given 
sufficient amount of time to prepare himself for my 
defense."

 

[¶18]   On March 28, 2002, the appellant 
filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel, wherein he requested that the 
district court remove "conflicted" trial counsel.  In an affidavit attached to the motion, 
the appellant stated that his "right to a fast and speedy trial was waived 
solely by [the public defender]" and the appellant did not "consent freely to 
this waiver" because trial counsel informed the appellant that the continuance 
"was required due to the fact that my counsel needed extra time to prepare an 
expert witness in my defense" and a local newspaper article stated that it was 
the prosecution's expert witness, not the appellant's, that needed "extra time 
to prepare."  In a February 27, 
2002, letter, Lois Whitney (the appellant's mother) stated that in addition to 
this newspaper article, she spoke with a private attorney regarding the case and 
he "related" that the "expert witness was for the prosecution."  According to trial counsel, 
however,

 

I 
would note that I did not speak to the newspaper when they ran the article.  I don't believe even [the prosecutor] 
spoke to the newspaper but, somehow, the newspaper made it sound like it was a 
prosecutor's request for continuance.  
I've explained on more than one occasion that that was not the case, that 
the continuance was due to the fact that we were hiring Mr. LaPier as the 
Defense's expert witness.

 

            
And so at this point in time, on this motion, . . . what they're saying 
is I was working in collusion with [the prosecutor]; and I will categorically 
deny that.  The only thing I was 
working with [the prosecutor] on was getting this on the Court's docket in a 
timely manner.

 

[¶19]   On April 4, 2002, the appellant 
filed a Motion to Appeal Continuance that was actually dated February 19, 2002, 
which motion mirrored his February 21, 2002, filing.  On April 5, 2002, the appellant filed a 
Motion for Discovery requesting the "police record of Officer Vranish and any 
and all records pertaining to the patrol car that is identified as in pursuit of 
the Defendant on September 29, 2001" and a hearing on his pending 
motions.

 

[¶20]   On April 22, 2002, the appellant 
filed a motion to dismiss because the prosecution allegedly allowed the minivan 
"to be lost improperly concealed and/or destroyed."  According to the motion, "damage to the 
rear end side to the vehicle and markings on the vehicle can only indicate that 
[the] vehicle was struck from behind, prior to striking the victim," and without 
the minivan the appellant could "not defend himself against the charges . . 
.."

 

[¶21]   At some point, due to these 
filings, trial counsel sought his supervisor's assessment of the circumstances, 
and co-counsel was appointed.  Trial 
counsel stated that he had a "total lack of communication" with the appellant as 
early as March 2002, and the appellant was "angry," "wouldn't speak to me 
completely," and "got up and left the room and wouldn't prepare for trial, 
basically."  There is some 
indication in the record that the situation began to improve once co-counsel was 
appointed.

 

            
Continuance of April 24, 2002, Trial Date

 

[¶22]   The district court held a hearing 
April 23, 2002, to address the appellant's pending motions and determined at the 
outset that the appellant was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs and 
did not suffer from any mental impairment that would interfere with his ability 
to understand the proceedings.  The 
appellant informed the district court that within the "past two weeks," the 
appellant discovered that the minivan had been "destroyed," photographs of the 
minivan "were never looked into," there were "rumors that the police knocked me 
off the road, causing me to strike the pedestrian" and the police department had 
investigated those rumors.  The 
appellant stated that this information "wasn't brought out to 
me."

 

[¶23]   In order to receive further 
information from trial counsel on the issue, the district court excluded 
everyone except the appellant, trial counsel and co-counsel, the bailiff, and 
the court reporter, from the hearing.  
At this point, trial counsel detailed his understanding of what had 
occurred throughout the case, including the evolution of the defense's trial 
strategy.  Much of what trial 
counsel stated is contained in our prior discussion of the facts leading up to 
this point in the proceedings.

 

[¶24]   With respect to the minivan 
specifically, trial counsel stated that he had received the crime scene 
photographs of the minivan, but did not notice the rear end damage ("scrape 
marks" on the minivan's right rear quarter panel) depicted in the photographs 
until the appellant "brought it to my attention within the last couple of 
weeks."  Counsel noted that "what I 
saw [in the photographs], your Honor, is not consistent with what I, as a lay 
person, believe would be consistent with a vehicle being bumped in the right, 
quarter panel."

 

[¶25]   Trial counsel began looking into 
the matter further.  He spoke with 
Lieutenant Mitch Allmaras and Chief Russell Harvey of the Evanston police 
department and learned that they had investigated a rumor that one of the police 
vehicles involved in the pursuit had forced the appellant off the road.  The officers inspected Officer Vranish's 
patrol vehicle within days after the incident and did not observe any physical 
damage to the vehicle.  They also 
then had all of the patrol vehicles that were present during the pursuit 
photographed, and informed trial counsel that no physical damage to the vehicles 
was (or would be) evident in the photographs.  The photographs apparently had not been 
developed, but trial counsel was assured that the photographs would be developed 
and provided to trial counsel.  At 
the April 23, 2002, hearing, trial counsel added that he had been "working on 
trial preparation" and had not "had time to run over and get" the photographs 
from the police department.

 

[¶26]   Trial counsel also demanded in 
writing that the prosecution produce the minivan.  The minivan had been released from the 
prosecution's possession, but the prosecution located the minivan at a salvage 
yard in Nebraska.  Trial counsel 
informed the district court that as a result, the minivan had been "produced" 
and was "available."  He was even 
provided a digital photograph of the minivan situated at the salvage yard, and 
the "strafe mark" at issue was visible in the photograph.  According to trial counsel, as of the 
April 23, 2002, hearing:

 

We're 
to the point now, if Mr. Whitney wants to include this as part of his defense, 
we're ready, willing and able to include it as part of his [defense.]  We're ready, willing and able to go to 
[Nebraska,] if we have to, load the van back on a flat bed, bring it back to 
Wyoming.  . . .  But, in essence, have someone look at 
not only those scrapes but look at the van for any other indications that it had 
been bumped[.]  Quite frankly, I 
haven't done it before because there hadn't been a scintilla of evidence to 
suggest that, your Honor.

 

[¶27]   The district court responded as 
follows:

 

            
The reason I'm saying that, the fact that it's not discovered or whatever 
until later on, doesn't mean you're ineffective.  That happens all the time.  But the question now comes at this 
point, as I can see it is . . . we're going to be starting a trial 
tomorrow.  You've located the 
van.  It would appear to me that at 
least to, as best you can, put your client's mind at ease, that the Defense, 
maybe, ought to have their own accident reconstruction expert review the reports 
and go look at the van, itself, and see if [Mr. Lankford] is right, you know, 
whether it looks like it's scraped by a building or whether it, in fact, was  
and there may be tests that can be made on the scrapes to find out whether it's 
paint or cinder blocks or whatever else.

 

. 
. .

 

. 
. .  But the problem we've got is 
we're here on the eve of trial now, Mr. Whitney, and this is where I'm at.  You can  in a sense, here's where you 
are.  I mean, sometimes  the speedy 
trial right is primarily your right to have the case brought to a speedy 
conclusion, so you don't have the anxiety and the uncertainty of the charges 
hanging over your head.  Now, 
you're, in a sense, sitting here, kind of on the horns of a 
dilemma.

 

            
One, if you want a continuance for sufficient time to allow an 
examination of this stuff by a defense expert that may help you in trial, I'll 
grant it, you know, so that you can come to trial 
prepared.

 

            
On the other hand, you may have concluded that your best defense is to 
whine about the quality of your defense attorney, thinking that you are just 
going to be convicted so you would rather start out doing that.  But if you want to really try to defend 
your case, I'll grant a motion for a continuance, but you've got to ask for 
it.  I'm not going to order it 
because you have a right to a speedy trial.

 

Trial 
counsel noted that he had informed the appellant that in order to pursue the 
matter further, it would entail a trial delay, and the appellant "refused, 
basically, to direct me to do that."  
The appellant then stated that he "just want[ed] a fair trial.  I want my evidence brought up to my 
trial so I can see it."  The 
following transpired:

 

THE 
COURT:  . . . But it appears to me 
given where we are, at least with regard to the  you have a question in your 
own mind, at least, with regard to these scrapes, whether or not they are caused 
by a collision or whether or not they're caused by scraping a building.  And I think in fairness to you, in terms 
of where it is, you  that should be investigated by someone independent of the 
State's expert.

 

            
Again, here's where I'm at, though.  
If you were arraigned on October  what was it, the 
29th?

 

[TRIAL 
COUNSEL]:  31st, your 
Honor.

 

. 
. .

 

[TRIAL 
COUNSEL]:  April 30 would be the 
180th day, your Honor.

 

THE 
COURT:  And that's really where 
we're at.  You can't have both.  You can't have a speedy trial and be 
able to get the investigation done.

 

DEFENDANT 
WHITNEY:      Yes, your Honor, I understand that.  And based on that fact, you know, I 
wrote [trial counsel] . . and I explained to him on January 30 and prior to 
January 30 that I wanted to go to trial.  
I wanted to get this investigation done.  He said the case was being delayed 
because of an expert witness and because we needed the documents.  . . .

 

THE 
COURT:  Well, wait a minute.  You're back, pointing your finger at 
your lawyer.

 

. 
. .

 

THE 
COURT:  You're here, faced with a 
trial tomorrow, and you're not going to be able to present any evidence or do 
anything about that scrape other than have the photograph saying "Here's a 
scrape on this." 

 

. 
. .

 

THE 
COURT:  Now, let me finish.  It's time for you to fish or cut 
bait.  Whatever happened, I'm 
offering an opportunity to at least remedy part of what you're complaining 
about.

 

DEFENDANT 
WHITNEY:      Okay.

 

. 
. .

 

THE 
COURT:  All right.  Mr. Whitney, I want to just explain one 
thing to you here.  Your attorney 
has requested a continuance to have an expert review, essentially, your theory 
of defense; and it appears to me your most plausible theory of defense.  . . .

 

. 
. .

 

THE 
COURT:  Well, how much time, [trial 
counsel], are you going to need to have your expert review  examine the 
vehicle, review the photographs, review the reports of the other  the State's 
expert?

 

[TRIAL 
COUNSEL]:  A minimum of sixty days, 
your Honor.  . . 
.

 

. 
. .

 

THE 
COURT:  Well, let me tell you one 
other thing, Mr. Whitney.  You filed 
a motion to dismiss.  I could grant 
that but it would be without prejudice.  
The State would refile again and start the whole process again.  Do you understand what I'm 
saying?

 

DEFENDANT 
WHITNEY:      Yes, your Honor.  I do understand.

 

THE 
COURT:  So denying that, I'm at 
least keeping the thing on.  Either 
way, you're likely to be held in  you know, under the current bail 
situation.  I think the best thing 
is just to move things along in terms of where we are.

 

. 
. .

 

THE 
COURT:  . . . I just want to get one 
other matter, at least, with regard to him.

 

Given 
where we are, do you have any objection to  yourself, to us continuing the 
trial so that this investigation can be completed?

 

DEFENDANT 
WHITNEY:    No, your Honor, I don't, just for the 
fact that my evidence can be brought into court.  But the only objection I really have is 
the time of incarceration.  . . . I 
still cannot come up with the money, your Honor.  I have been in the 
jail.

 

The 
prosecutor was allowed back into the hearing, at which time the district court 
informed him that the appellant needed "about sixty days to  at least sixty 
days to complete that investigation, so they've asked for a continuance.  The Defendant has agreed to that, 
although he has  and we're going to take that up  a concern about his 
bail."

 

[¶28]   The district court proceeded to 
address the appellant's remaining pending motions.  The district court also considered bail, 
substantially reduced the appellant's bail, and the appellant was apparently 
released from jail shortly thereafter.9  The district court indicated that it 
would need "a written motion for a continuance and support it with an affidavit 
indicating the need to  because of the recent developments with regard to an 
expert."

 

[¶29]   On April 26, 2002, the appellant, 
"by and through" trial counsel, filed a Motion to Continue Jury Trial, 
requesting that the April 24, 2002, trial date be continued.  The motion stated that additional time 
was required "to have a vital piece of evidence, the mini-van driven by 
Defendant, examined by an accident reconstruction expert for the defense," that 
the minivan had been released by law enforcement "without consulting with 
Defendant," and pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 48, requested a continuance to a "date to 
be determined by the Court."  In an 
affidavit accompanying the motion, trial counsel additionally stated that he 
could "readily obtain the services of an expert in Nebraska to travel to the 
location of the mini-van and . . . conduct an examination of said vehicle for 
and on behalf of Defendant," that he believed this could "be accomplished within 
the next sixty (60) days," and that it was "essential to the defense of the case 
to have this additional time to conduct this investigation and 
examination."  On May 1, 2002, the 
district court continued the April 24, 2002, trial setting, and reset the trial 
for July 17, 2002.

 

            
Continuance of July 17, 2002, Trial Date

 

[¶30]   On May 14, 2002, trial counsel 
requested that a trial subpoena be issued for Evanston Police Chief Russell 
Harvey.  On June 12, 2002, the 
prosecution filed a motion to quash Chief Harvey's subpoena, or in the 
alternative to allow his testimony to be preserved by deposition, because Chief 
Harvey had previously scheduled a non-refundable trip to Alaska and would be 
unavailable to testify in person on July 17, 2002.  The district court held a hearing on the 
motion on June 19, 2002 (within sixty days of the April 24, 2002, trial 
setting), during which hearing the appellant's trial counsel opposed the 
motion.  Trial counsel stated that 
Chief Harvey was a "vital witness" for the appellant, that it was "absolutely 
important" that he "testify in front of the jury," and that this was "the one 
area that Mr. Whitney and I agree on completely, that Chief Harvey is vital to 
our case and his presence in front of the jury is vital."  According to trial counsel, a deposition 
would also "reveal trial strategy prematurely . . .."

 

[¶31]   In camera, trial counsel explained 
the appellant's trial strategy and Chief Harvey's "essential" role in regards to 
that strategy.  At one point, the 
following colloquy occurred:

 

[TRIAL 
COUNSEL]:  . . .  Now, one thing that I tried to bring up 
to the Court's attention in chambers is this idea of a continuance.  I've discussed this and, again, I note 
that Mr. Whitney and I are in total agreement here that the Chief needs to be a 
witness in person in this case.  And 
Mr. Whitney is so strong about that, even though he's had objections in the past 

 

. 
. .

 

THE 
COURT:  Well, what do you say about 
a continuance?

 

DEFENDANT 
WHITNEY:      Well, I agree with [trial counsel].  I think . . . Chief . . . Harvey is 
critical to my case.

 

THE 
COURT:  No, what do you say about a 
continuance, aside from him?

 

DEFENDANT 
WHITNEY:      I agree with it.  I want [Chief Harvey] to testify.  And if his fishing trip  he made 
reservations two years prior, you know, it's not his fault or the Court's fault, 
you know.  It just happened to fall 
on the date my trial was set.

 

THE 
COURT:  That's 
right.

 

DEFENDANT 
WHITNEY:      And I agree with 
that.

 

[TRIAL 
COUNSEL]:  So you would agree to a 
continuance?

 

DEFENDANT 
WHITNEY:  So yes, yes, I would 
agree, your Honor, to a continuance.

 

The 
district court concluded that the appellant "consented to continuing a trial if 
that is necessary, that  to put it fairly, the Defense would rather continue 
the trial rather than to have the testimony preserved by deposition."  The district court did not rule on the 
motion at that time.

 

[¶32]   In a June 21, 2002, letter to the 
district court, trial counsel informed the court of the dates Mr. LaPier would 
be available to testify for the appellant if the district court decided to 
continue the trial, and noted that the "month of October appears to be very open 
for Mr. LaPier, and certainly a trial date in that month would mean both parties 
would have ample time to line up all of their witnesses.   I hope the Court will consider an 
October trial date."  The letter 
also stated that "Mr. Whitney is not opposed to a 
continuance."

 

[¶33]   On July 10, 2002, it appears that 
the appellant (by and through trial counsel) and the prosecutor formalized what 
occurred at the June 19, 2002, hearing and filed a Joint Motion to Vacate 
Pretrial Conference and Jury Trial and Reset for a Later Date.  The motion, signed by trial counsel and 
the prosecutor, states that Chief Harvey would be unable to testify at the July 
17, 2002, trial setting.  In a July 
11, 2002, order, the district court found "just cause" to grant the motion, 
vacated the July 17, 2002, trial setting, and reset the case for trial October 
8, 2002.

 

            
W.R.Cr.P. 48

 

[¶34]   The appellant claims that he 
"affirmatively asserted" his right to a speedy trial and we should therefore 
dismiss this case, with prejudice, pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(7).  "In recognition that W.R.Cr.P. 48 
provides criminal defendants a procedural mechanism to ensure the protection of 
[the constitutional right to a speedy trial], we have held that compliance with 
its terms is mandatory."  Taylor 
v. State, 2001 WY 13, ¶ 8, 17 P.3d 715, 718 (Wyo. 2001).  W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) reads as 
follows:

 

Speedy 
trial.

 

(1)       It is the 
responsibility of the court, counsel and the defendant to insure that the 
defendant is timely tried.

 

(2)       A criminal 
charge shall be brought to trial within 180 days following arraignment unless 
continued as provided in this rule.

 

(3)       The 
following periods shall be excluded in computing the time for 
trial:

 

(A)       All 
proceedings related to the mental illness or deficiency of the 
defendant;

 

(B)       Proceedings 
on another charge;

 

(C)       The time 
between the dismissal and the refiling of the same charge; 
and

 

(D)       Delay 
occasioned by defendant's change of counsel or application 
therefor.

 

(4)       
Continuances exceeding 180 days from the date of arraignment may be 
granted by the trial court as follows:

 

(A)       On motion 
of defendant supported by affidavit; or

 

(B)       On motion 
of the attorney for the state or the court if:

 

(i)         
The defendant expressly consents;

 

(ii)        The 
state's evidence is unavailable and the prosecution has exercised due diligence; 
or

 

(iii)       Required in 
the due administration of justice and the defendant will not be substantially 
prejudiced; and

 

(C)       If a 
continuance is proposed by the state or the court, the defendant shall be 
notified.  If the defendant objects, 
the defendant must show in writing how the delay may prejudice the 
defense.

 

(5)       Any 
criminal case not tried or continued as provided in this rule shall be dismissed 
180 days after arraignment.

 

(6)       If the 
defendant is unavailable for any proceeding at which the defendant's presence is 
required, the case may be continued for a reasonable time by the trial court but 
for no more than 180 days after the defendant is available or the case further 
continued as provided in this rule.

 

(7)       A dismissal 
for lack of a speedy trial under this rule shall not bar the state from again 
prosecuting the defendant for the same offense unless the defendant made a 
written demand for a speedy trial or can demonstrate prejudice from the 
delay.

 

The 
appellant does not argue that the written motions to continue the trial failed 
to comply with W.R.Cr.P. 48.

 

[¶35]   We find that the district court 
continued the April 24, 2002, trial setting (the last trial setting within 180 
days of the appellant's arraignment) in accordance with W.R.Cr.P. 
48(b)(4)(A).  Trial counsel 
requested a sixty-day (minimum) continuance during the April 23, 2002, motion 
hearing in order to further investigate the scrape marks depicted in the crime 
scene photographs of the minivan and retain an expert to examine the minivan 
"for any other indications that it had been bumped" during the pursuit.  The district court clearly informed the 
appellant that he could exercise his right to a speedy trial and proceed to 
trial as scheduled on April 24, 2002, or a trial continuance beyond the 180-day 
period could be requested to examine the minivan.  The appellant, who wanted a "fair trial" 
and his "evidence brought up to . . . trial" and "into court," stated on the 
record that he did not object to a trial continuance for this purpose.  When the appellant simultaneously 
expressed a concern about his ability to meet the current bail conditions, the 
district court addressed bail, reduced the appellant's bail, and the appellant 
was released shortly thereafter.  
Based on what occurred at the hearing, trial counsel filed a formal 
motion to continue the trial, which motion was supported by an 
affidavit.

 

[¶36]   The appellant argues that he did 
not waive his right to a speedy trial and "[a]ny waiver implied by [the 
appellant's] statements was so coerced by the trial court and by his own counsel 
as to be meaningless."  According to 
the appellant, there "was not a shred of voluntariness in [the appellant's] 
coerced acquiescence to a continuance past the 180 day period."  Conspicuously absent from these bald 
characterizations is an articulation of how the appellant's consent to continue 
the trial was "coerced."  "We have 
consistently held that we will not consider claims unsupported by cogent 
argument . . .."  Barkell v. 
State, 2002 WY 153, ¶ 32, 55 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶37]   The appellant further argues that 
the district court misled the appellant when it stated that if it dismissed the 
case on April 23, 2002, the case could be refiled.  According to the appellant, this 
statement was incorrect under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(7), and any waiver of his speedy 
trial right was therefore based on an "erroneous advisement."  The district court made the statement at 
issue in discussing the appellant's motion to dismiss the case because the 
prosecution allegedly allowed the minivan to be "lost improperly concealed 
and/or destroyed" and the appellant could not "defend himself" without the 
minivan.10  The effect of a dismissal based on that 
particular motion, even if we assume for purposes of this appeal that the 
district court's statement was erroneous, clearly was of little 
consequence.  The district court 
denied the appellant's motion twice on the record prior to the point in the 
hearing that the appellant stated that he did not object to continuing the April 
24, 2002, trial setting.

 

[¶38]   We find that the district court 
also continued the July 17, 2002, trial date in accordance with W.R.Cr.P. 
48(b)(4)(A).  While the appellant 
states in passing that he was essentially "forced" to agree to this continuance 
because the April 24, 2002, trial setting was continued and Chief Harvey 
apparently was available to testify in person at that time, the appellant 
focuses his appellate argument on what occurred during the April 23, 2002, 
hearing and does not present cogent argument on the merits of continuing the 
July 17, 2002, trial date pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 48.

 

 

[¶39]              
This Court examines de novo the constitutional question of whether a 
defendant has been denied a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.  . . 
.

 

            
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial.  In 
deciding whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial, courts must balance 
1) the length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the defendant's 
assertion of his right; and 4) the prejudice to the defendant.  Warner [v. State, 2001 WY 
67,] ¶ 10, [28 P.3d 21, 26 (Wyo.2001)], Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 
655 (Wyo.2000); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 533, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 
2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).  None 
of these factors alone is sufficient to establish a speedy trial violation, 
"[r]ather they are related factors and must be considered together with such 
other circumstances as may be relevant."  
Barker, 407 U.S.  at 533, 92 S. Ct.  at 2193.  "The determinative dynamic in our 
inquiry is whether the delay in bringing the accused to trial was unreasonable, 
that is, whether it substantially impaired the right of the accused to a fair 
trial."  Warner, ¶ 10, 
Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104, 112 (Wyo.1992).  When a speedy trial violation is found 
to have occurred, the charges must be dismissed.  Warner, ¶ 10; Barker, 407 U.S.  at 522, 92 S. Ct.  at 2188.

 

Walters, 
2004 WY 37, ¶¶ 9-10, 87 P.3d  at 795.  See Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104, 
111-12 (Wyo. 1992) and Caton v. State, 709 P.2d 1260, 
1264-65 (Wyo. 1985) (Wyoming Constitution).  "The speedy trial clock starts to run 
upon arrest or when the complaint is filed."  Osborne v. State, 806 P.2d 272, 
277 (Wyo. 1991).

 

            
(A)       
Length Of The Delay

 

[¶40]   The appellant's jury trial began 
approximately 374 days following his arrest and 372 days following the filing of 
the charging information.  The 
appellant argues that the length of the delay in the instant case is sufficient 
to trigger an analysis of the remaining speedy trial factors.  The State essentially agrees with this 
proposition, as do we.

 

No 
precise length of delay determines a speedy trial violation, though we have held 
delays over 500 days to be presumptively prejudicial.  Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87, 94 
(Wyo.1989), cert. denied, [506 U.S. 1022,] 113 S. Ct. 661, 121 L. Ed. 2d 586; Phillips v. State, 774 P.2d 118, 125 (Wyo.1989).  We have recognized delays similar in 
length to appellant's 355 and 319 days sufficient to warrant a speedy trial 
analysis.  Wehr, 841 P.2d  at 
112 (320 and 238 days); Osborne v. State, 806 P.2d 272, 277 (Wyo.1991) 
(244 and 301 days).

 

Springfield 
v. State, 
860 P.2d 435, 451 (Wyo. 1993).  In Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 
304 (Wyo. 1999), 
a case involving a 370-day delay between Almada's arrest and the acceptance of 
his plea, we found that the delay raised "speedy trial concerns and [was] 
sufficient to warrant further analysis."  
See also Vargas v. State, 963 P.2d 984, 992 (Wyo. 1998), cert. 
denied, 124 S. Ct. 944 (2003); 
Wehr, 841 P.2d  at 112; 
and Estrada v. State, 611 P.2d 850, 853 (Wyo. 1980).

 

            
(B)       
Reasons For The Delay

 

[¶41]   The appellant argues that none of 
the delays in the instant case were his "fault."  In particular, the appellant contends 
that he "advised his lawyer of the information regarding" the minivan and "urged 
his lawyer to take action," the prosecution chose to send the minivan out of 
state without consulting trial counsel, and the prosecution chose not to share 
"its own investigation into the van and the police cars" with trial 
counsel.

 

[¶42]   The weight given to a particular 
delay "varies with its cause."  
United States v. Tranakos, 911 F.2d 1422, 1428 (10th 
Cir. 1990).

 

            
"A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense 
should be weighted heavily against the government.  A more neutral reason such as negligence 
or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be 
considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest 
with the government rather than with the defendant.  Finally, a valid reason, such as a 
missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate 
delay."

 

Wehr, 
841 P.2d at 112-13 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972)).  Official bad faith in causing delay is 
weighed heavily against the government.  
Barker, 407 U.S.  at 531.  "Delays attributable to the defendant 
are deducted from the equation."  
Jennings v. State, 4 P.3d 915, 921 (Wyo. 2000).  "[W]e weigh any delay properly 
attributable to the defendant against the delay chargeable to the State.  We have frequently acknowledged a 
defendant may defeat his claim to a speedy trial by his own dilatory 
practices."  Wehr, 841 P.2d  
at 113.

 

[¶43]   We find that the continuance of the 
January 30, 2002, trial date was attributable to the appellant.  It appears from trial counsel's own 
statements that the motion for a continuance was styled as a "joint" motion with 
the prosecutor only to the extent that the prosecutor did not object to the 
continuance.  Nothing in the record 
indicates that the prosecutor needed or desired the continuance, and the 
continuance was requested to specifically benefit the appellant.  The appellant's expert witness, Mr. 
LaPier, was unavailable to testify during the January 30th trial 
setting and trial counsel seemingly anticipated the need for a continuance on 
this basis even prior to the discovery meeting in early January.  It appears that the discovery meeting 
was held in early January, just weeks before trial, at trial counsel's request, 
and that the timing of that request contributed to any further delay for the 
unspecified discovery purposes.11  While the motion states that the 
"parties" needed until March 15, 2002, to complete discovery, it would seem that 
whatever discovery remained following the discovery meeting was pursuant to 
additional, specific requests by trial counsel for the appellant's benefit.  There is no indication that this 
additional discovery was necessary because the prosecution abused the discovery 
process in order to delay the trial or procure a tactical advantage.  The appellant does not assert that the 
prosecution acted in bad faith, or even negligently, with respect to this 
discovery; indeed, the prosecution "maintained an open file policy" and trial 
counsel stated that the prosecution had complied with his discovery requests and 
he was satisfied with the discovery he had been provided.

 

[¶44]   The continuance of the April 3, 
2002, trial date was similarly attributable to the appellant.  Again, while the motion for continuance 
was styled as a "joint" motion, the motion clearly was due to the unavailability 
of the appellant's expert witness to testify the first week of April.  The motion stated that the appellant's 
expert witness was available to testify April 24-26, 2002, the motion 
specifically requested that the district court set the trial for those dates, 
and the district court reset the trial accordingly.

 

[¶45]   The appellant stated in his pro se 
filings that trial counsel acted "on his own behalf" in requesting one or both 
of these continuances.  However, the 
continuances were requested by trial counsel12 to directly benefit the appellant 
due to the unavailability of the appellant's expert witness to testify regarding 
a defense theory the appellant himself had demanded, and apparently also to 
obtain additional discovery on the appellant's behalf.  The expert witness did ultimately 
provide testimony favorable to the appellant at trial.  While the circumstances may have been 
beyond the appellant's actual control to some degree, these delays should still 
weigh against the appellant in considering this speedy trial factor.  See, for example, United States v. 
Tanh Huu Lam, 251 F.3d 852, 855-60, amended by 262 F.3d 1033 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1013 (2001) and Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 
34, 93 P.3d 222, 228-33 (Wyo. 2004).  The appellant does not meaningfully 
question the merits of these continuances on appeal, agrees that trial counsel 
was not ineffective in requesting the continuances, and in addressing this 
factor of the constitutional speedy trial analysis on appeal, the appellant does 
not argue with any particularity that these continuances should not be 
attributed to him.13

 

[¶46]   We find that the continuance of the 
April 24, 2002, trial date was mostly attributable to the appellant.  As early as October 2001, trial counsel 
had investigated the possibility that a police vehicle bumped the minivan during 
the pursuit and concluded that there was no evidence to support this 
theory.  Trial counsel inexplicably 
did not examine the minivan, or request that another examine the minivan on the 
appellant's behalf, but on appeal the appellant does not allege that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to do so.14

 

[¶47]   The minivan's potential 
significance clearly surfaced within the two weeks or so prior to the April 24, 
2002, trial setting.  When the 
appellant pointed out the scrape marks at issue to trial counsel, trial counsel 
demanded that the prosecution produce the minivan.  The prosecution quickly located the 
minivan in Nebraska and, according to trial counsel, made it "available" to the 
defense.  The record does not 
indicate how much delay was necessitated by the appellant's need to retain an 
expert for this purpose versus the minivan's location in Nebraska (as opposed to 
Evanston), but trial counsel stated that he could "readily obtain" an expert in 
Nebraska to examine the minivan and in the alternative, expressed a willingness 
to also "load the van back on a flat bed, [and] bring it back to Wyoming."  He believed that either way, this could 
be accomplished with a minimum delay of sixty days.

 

[¶48]   The minivan had apparently been 
released from the prosecution's possession in the fall of 2001.  While the appellant's trial counsel 
stated in an affidavit that this occurred without consulting him, Trooper Lewis 
testified that it was his understanding that trial counsel approved the 
minivan's release.  We have not been 
directed to any findings by the district court on the issue, and the conflict is 
not clearly resolved by resorting to the record.  On appeal, the parties simply advocate 
the version that favors their respective positions.

 

[¶49]   We conclude that this delay is 
mostly attributable to the appellant for several reasons:  (1) the timing of the appellant's 
request to produce the minivan in relation to the April 24, 2002, trial setting; 
(2) according to the motion for continuance, the delay was "essential to the 
defense of the case" so that an expert could examine the minivan on behalf of 
the appellant; (3) the delay was requested by trial counsel and the appellant 
stated on the record that he did not object to a delay for this purpose (a 
purpose the appellant himself espoused); (4) the appellant does not argue that 
the prosecution acted in bad faith in releasing the minivan from its possession; 
(5) the record is not necessarily clear in light of the disputed facts that the 
prosecution acted negligently in releasing the minivan from its possession; and 
(6) the appellant points to no evidence, despite his expert's examination of the 
minivan, that the minivan's condition (as opposed to its location) contributed 
to the delay.

 

[¶50]   The record does not support the 
appellant's contention that an alleged failure by the Evanston police department 
to disclose its investigation of a rumor that a police vehicle bumped the 
appellant off the road during the pursuit contributed to the need for this 
delay.  Trial counsel spoke with 
Chief Harvey and Lieutenant Allmaras about this investigation, their 
observations as to the lack of physical damage to the police vehicles present 
during the pursuit, and the photographs of the police vehicles, prior to the 
April 23, 2002, hearing.  The 
appellant has not established how the timing of this disclosure impacted his 
ability to prepare for an April 24, 2002, trial or otherwise necessitated a 
delay in that trial setting.

 

[¶51]   The continuance of the July 17, 
2002, trial setting was clearly attributable to the appellant.  Trial counsel, with the appellant's 
"total agreement," requested the delay because a "vital" defense witness was 
unavailable to testify that week.  
Rather than take the witness' trial deposition, the defense insisted on 
the witness testifying in person as part of its trial strategy.  Trial counsel specifically requested an 
October 2002 trial date to accommodate its expert witness' (Mr. LaPier) 
schedule.  Although again, the 
formal motion for continuance was styled as a "joint" motion, which appears to 
have been true only to the extent that the prosecution did not object to the 
continuance and the continuance was sought for the appellant's benefit.  In discussing this issue on appeal, the 
appellant does not argue with any particularity that this delay should not be 
attributed to him.

 

 

[¶52]   The appellant claims that he 
"unequivocally demanded a speedy trial, and his later, coerced oral statements 
cannot be held as a voluntary, knowing waiver of that right."  The appellant does not cogently argue 
the voluntariness issue in discussing this factor.

 

We 
have held it is not necessary for a defendant to assert his right to a speedy 
trial in order to identify a speedy trial violation.  Osborne.  However, we can, and do, consider 
whether the right was asserted, and how vigorously, in determining the 
reasonableness of any delay.  
Osborne.  The action 
or inaction of the defendant in this regard is a reflection of the actual amount 
of prejudice being experienced.  
Barker.  We recognize 
pretrial delay may be either prejudicial or beneficial to a defendant.  See Barker.

 

Wehr, 
841 P.2d  at 113.  The appellant did state in his four 
February, March, and April 2001, pro se filings that he had not waived his right 
to a speedy trial, "I want my right to a speedy trial," "do not consent freely 
to this waiver," and "request my right to a speedy trial."  However, we note that the appellant also 
later stated on the record that he did not object to continuing the April 24, 
2002, trial setting and agreed on the record to continue the July 17, 2002, 
trial setting.

 

            
(D)       
Prejudice

 

[¶53]   In addressing this factor, the 
appellant mostly relies on the prejudice he claims is inherent in the length of 
the delay, simply stating that "while there was definitely prejudice, the extent 
of the prejudice is unknown."  In an 
attempt to identify specific prejudice, the appellant asserts that the minivan 
was "in the custody of some salvage yard, subject to unknown intrusions and 
alterations throughout the time period of the delay" and merely declares that he 
suffered unspecified "excessive pretrial anxiety throughout the period of the 
delay."

 

[¶54]   Prejudice is a key element to be 
considered in balancing these factors, but is not absolutely required to 
demonstrate a speedy trial violation.  
Springfield, 860 P.2d  at 451; 
Wehr, 841 P.2d  at 114; 
Osborne, 806 P.2d  at 278.  Prejudice may consist of:  (1) lengthy pretrial incarceration; (2) 
pretrial anxiety; or (3) impairment of the defense.  Osborne, 806 P.2d  at 
278.  Of these factors, the possibility that a 
defendant's defense will be impaired is the "most serious" factor "because the 
inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of 
the entire system."  Barker, 
407 U.S.  at 532.  Pretrial anxiety "is the least 
significant" factor and because a "certain amount of pretrial anxiety naturally 
exists," the appellant must demonstrate that he suffered "extraordinary or 
unusual" pretrial anxiety.  
Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 656 (Wyo. 2000); 
Wehr, 841 P.2d  at 114.

 

[¶55]   We do not find that the length of 
the delay in the instant case exceeded a point where there was a probability of 
substantial prejudice, particularly where the delay was mostly attributable to 
the appellant and sought exclusively for the appellant's benefit.  See Tanh Huu Lam, 251 F.3d at 
859-60 (where defendant responsible for the 
delay, "he bears the burden of demonstrating actual 
prejudice").

 

We 
held in Caton that "until delay exceeds a point where there is a 
probability of substantial prejudice,' the burden of proving prejudice should 
remain with the accused."  
Caton, 709 P.2d  at 1266.  
In Harvey [v. State, 774 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1989)] and Phillips [v. 
State, 774 P.2d 118 (Wyo. 1989)], we concluded an eighteen-month delay was 
excessive and gave rise to a probability of substantial prejudice warranting a 
presumption of prejudice.  
Harvey; Phillips.  
We have not, however, ruled a delay like that occasioned in this caseten 
and one-half monthsgives vitality to a presumption of prejudice.  Osborne, 806 P.2d 272; Binger 
v. State, 712 P.2d 349 (Wyo.1986); Estrada, 611 P.2d 850.

 

Wehr, 
841 P.2d  at 114; 
see also Osborne, 806 P.2d at 278 and Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1992).

 

[¶56]   The appellant has not demonstrated 
actual prejudice in the instant case.  
The appellant does not even refer to pretrial incarceration in addressing 
this factor in his appellate brief, and does not refer to any specific facts to 
support the assertion that he suffered unspecified excessive pretrial 
anxiety.  See Sides v. State, 
963 P.2d 227, 230 (Wyo. 1998) (appellant did not define or address with 
any particularity the "pretrial anxiety" he allegedly suffered).  Nor can the appellant establish any 
actual impairment to the defense of his case.  Three of the trial continuances were 
sought either exclusively, or primarily, due to the unavailability of the 
appellant's trial witnesses, and one continuance was sought in order to allow an 
expert witness to examine potentially exculpatory evidence (which did in fact 
occur prior to trial).  The 
appellant has not directed us to any evidence indicating that the minivan's 
condition was actually altered or somehow prevented him, or his expert, from 
examining or testing the minivan in anticipation of trial.  See generally also Jennings, 4 P.3d  at 922; 
Campbell, 999 P.2d  at 656; 
Almada, 994 P.2d at 305 (370-day delay and "burden is on the 
petitioner to show prejudice"); Sides, 963 P.2d  at 230; 
Roderick v. State, 858 P.2d 538, 542-43 (Wyo. 1993); 
and Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403, 1406 (Wyo. 1972), cert. denied, 
411 U.S. 971 (1973) (nineteen-month delay mostly for the 
benefit of or caused by the defendant and defendant not 
prejudiced).

 

[¶57]   In balancing all of these factors, 
we conclude that the reasons for the delay and the lack of actual prejudice to 
the appellant weigh heavily against the appellant, and are clearly not 
outweighed by the remaining factors.  
Accordingly, the appellant was not denied his constitutional right to a 
speedy trial in the instant case.

 

 

[¶58]   The appellant claims that the 
prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963) because:  (1) an Evanston police department 
investigation of rumors that a police department vehicle struck the minivan 
during the pursuit "was not discussed with defense counsel or even the 
investigating authority, the state highway patrol"; and (2) the minivan was 
released from the prosecution's custody without the appellant's knowledge or 
permission.  In discussing this 
issue, we will necessarily reiterate some of the facts previously set forth in 
this opinion.

 

            
In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 
(1963), the Supreme Court set forth the basic principle that the prosecution 
violates due process by suppressing favorable evidence that is material either 
to the guilt or to the punishment of the accused, "irrespective of the good 
faith or bad faith of the prosecution."  
Id. at 87, 83 S. Ct.  at 1196-97.  . . .  The duty to disclose . . . exculpatory 
evidence applies even though there has been no request by the accused.[15]  . 
. .  "Moreover, the rule encompasses 
evidence known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor.'  In order to comply with Brady, 
therefore, the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable 
evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in this case, 
including the police.'"  
Strickler [v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-81, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 
1948, 144 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1999)] . . ..

 

. 
. .

 

            
We must determine, therefore, whether the government's failure to 
disclose evidence favorable to the defendant deprived the defendant of a fair 
trial under Brady by considering whether the "favorable evidence could 
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to 
undermine confidence in the verdict."  
. . .  In order to establish 
a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecution 
suppressed evidence, the evidence was favorable to the defendant, and the 
evidence was material.  Helm v. 
State, 1 P.3d 635, 639 (Wyo.2000).  
We have previously decided that the materiality of withheld evidence and 
its possible effect on the outcome of the trial are mixed questions of fact and 
law.  Id.  . . .  [A] claim of failure to disclose 
evidence in violation of Brady is properly reviewed de novo.  

 

Davis 
v. State, 
2002 WY 88, ¶¶ 14-16, 47 P.3d 981, 985-86 (Wyo. 2002).  Favorable evidence is material if "its 
suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.'"  Id., 2002 WY 88, ¶ 19, 47 P.3d  at 
987 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680-81, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3382-83, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985)).  The delayed disclosure of Brady 
materials, "alone[,] is not always grounds for reversal.  As long as ultimate disclosure is made 
before it is too late for the defendant[ ] to make use of any benefits of the 
evidence, Due Process is satisfied.'"  
United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1376 (10th 
Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Warhop, 
732 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir. 1984)).  See also Young v. State, 849 P.2d 754, 765 (Wyo. 1993).  Similarly, Brady "is not 
violated when the Brady material is available to [a defendant] during 
trial.'"  United States v. 
Vap, 852 F.2d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Behrens, 
689 F.2d 154, 158 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1088 
(1982)).

 

[¶59]   It appears that 

 

"[t]he 
Supreme Court's jurisprudence divides cases involving nondisclosure of evidence 
into two distinct universes.  
Brady and its progeny address exculpatory evidence still in the 
government's possession.  
[Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S. Ct. 333, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1988)] and [California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1984)] govern cases in which the government no longer 
possesses the disputed evidence."  
Fero v. Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1472 (10th Cir.1994) 
(quoting United States v. Femia, 9 F.3d 990, 993 (1st 
Cir.1993)).

 

United 
States v. Gomez, 
191 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 1999).  Further, the

 

principles 
articulated in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1984), and Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S. Ct. 333, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1988), regarding the Due Process Clause and the 
government's destruction or loss of evidence prior to a criminal trial guide our 
analysis.  Under the two-prong 
Trombetta test, the government violates a defendant's right to due 
process when: (1) it destroys evidence whose exculpatory significance is 
"apparent before" destruction; and (2) the defendant remains unable to "obtain 
comparable evidence by other reasonably available means."  Trombetta, 467 U.S.  at 489, 104 S. Ct.  at 2534.  The Court in 
Youngblood extended Trombetta to provide that, if the exculpatory 
value of the evidence is indeterminate and all that can be confirmed is that the 
evidence was "potentially useful" for the defense, then a defendant must show 
that the government acted in bad faith in destroying the evidence.  Youngblood, 488 U.S.  at 58, 109 S. Ct.  at 337-38.

 

. 
. .  The . . . "mere fact that the 
government controlled the evidence and failed to preserve it is by itself 
insufficient to establish bad faith." [United States v.] Richard, 
969 F.2d [849] at 853-54 [(10th Cir. 1992)].  . . .

 

. 
. .  To invoke Trombetta, a 
defendant must demonstrate that the government destroyed evidence possessing an 
"apparent" exculpatory value.  
Trombetta, 467 U.S.  at 489, 104 S. Ct.  at 2534.  However, to trigger the 
Youngblood test, all that need be shown is that the government destroyed 
"potentially useful evidence."  
Younglood, 488 U.S.  at 58, 109 S. Ct.  at 337.  The Court in Youngblood defined 
"potentially useful evidence" as evidence of which "no more can be said than 
that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which 
might have exonerated the defendant."  Id. at 57, 109 S. Ct.  at 337 
(emphasis added).  . . 
.

 

. 
. .

 

. 
. .  Our inquiry into bad faith 
"must necessarily turn on the [government's] knowledge of the exculpatory value 
of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed."  Youngblood, 488 U.S.  at 57 n. *, 
109 S. Ct.  at 336 n. *.

 

. 
. .

 

. 
. .  Of course, mere negligence on 
the government's part in failing to preserve such evidence is inadequate for a 
showing of bad faith.  
Youngblood, 488 U.S.  at 58, 109 S.Ct. at 
337-38[.]

 

United 
States v. Bohl, 
25 F.3d 904, 909-12 (10th Cir. 1994) (footnote omitted).  See also Young, 849 P.2d 
at 763-65; 
Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 587-88 (Wyo. 1990); 
Wilde v. State, 706 P.2d 251, 255 (Wyo. 1985); 
and Wheeler v. State, 691 P.2d 599, 602-03 (Wyo. 1984).

 

            
Evanston Police Department Investigation

 

[¶60]   About a week after the incident, 
Chief Harvey testified that he received an email from the mayor regarding a 
rumor that the officers who pursued the appellant on September 29, 2001, "forced 
him off the road."  Chief Harvey did 
not know the particular source of the rumor; it appears that a rumor to that 
effect was widespread in the community, but not attributable to a particular 
source or an identifiable evidentiary basis.16

 

[¶61]   Upon learning of the rumor, Chief 
Harvey and Lieutenant Allmaras examined the "front, the rear, the back, the 
sides, [and] the exterior" of Officer Vranish's patrol vehicle, and did not 
observe any physical damage to the vehicle.  Lieutenant Allmaras then had another 
Evanston police officer photograph all of the patrol vehicles that were present 
during the pursuit, and according to Lieutenant Allmaras, no physical damage to 
the patrol vehicles was evident in the photographs.  Neither Chief Harvey, nor Lieutenant 
Allmaras, made a written report of this investigation or informed the Wyoming 
Highway Patrol of their observations at the time.  According to Lieutenant Allmaras, the 
officer who photographed the patrol vehicles did produce a written report "about 
taking the photos of the vehicles . . .."

 

[¶62]   During an April 2002 court hearing, 
trial counsel stated that even before he was "assigned the case" (and certainly 
before the October 11, 2001, preliminary hearing), he "heard rumors in the 
general community and one of the rumors was that the police officers had 
actually bumped . . . the [appellant's] vehicle and had bumped the vehicle off 
the road, causing it to run into the pedestrian."  Recognizing "the seriousness of the 
allegations" and "the seriousness of the rumor," trial counsel developed a 
preliminary defense theory that the police "bumped" the appellant's vehicle 
during the pursuit, and contacted an investigator.

 

[¶63]   The investigator went to the crime 
scene, obtained and examined the police reports, interviewed people who worked 
in the area, and according to trial counsel, even talked to "the police," who 
told the investigator

 

that 
they were inspecting their vehicles and they were taking photos and those photos 
could be made available to him.  
Honestly, I don't know if [the investigator] told me that or not, that 
there were  I believe he told me that he had talked with the police and there 
was no damage to the vehicles.  I 
don't know if he transmitted to me the idea that there were actual photos of the 
police vehicles."

 

At 
that time, the investigator determined that there was "simply no evidence of any 
kind of contact between the police vehicle and the [appellant's] vehicle" and 
trial counsel concluded that there was not "a scintilla of evidence to suggest 
that the police officer's vehicle had come into contact" with the minivan and 
"dropped that defense strategy" in October or November of 
2001.

 

[¶64]   By April 2002, trial counsel 
personally contacted the police department and it appears that he talked to both 
Lieutenant Allmaras and Chief Harvey.  
They told trial counsel that the patrol vehicles had been examined and 
photographed, "there was no sign of damage, no sign of collision,'" a written 
report had not been prepared, the photographs apparently remained "unprocessed," 
and they assured trial counsel that "they would get them processed and they 
would provide me photos of the police vehicles."  Lieutenant Allmaras did prepare a 
written report regarding these matters in April 2002, to which report trial 
counsel referred during a later court hearing.  Trial counsel even stated in April 2002 
that he didn't "see this giant conspiracy to hide evidence from" the 
appellant.

 

[¶65]   By June 2002, trial counsel stated 
that at trial he intended to use evidence of the police department's awareness 
of the rumor and the department's investigation of its own patrol vehicles 
(rather than referring the matter to the highway patrol) in "establishing in the 
minds of the jury the issue that there could have been a bump and there could 
have been a police cover up . . .."  
Trial counsel emphasized it was essential that Chief Harvey and 
Lieutenant Allmaras testify in person at trial so that he could question them 
regarding why "they are investigating themselves" and create an impression that 
they "were covering up something'" or were "too dumb to bring in the Highway 
Patrol' or whatever the jury might conclude from that act."  At trial, the appellant ultimately 
called Chief Harvey and Lieutenant Allmaras as witnesses during the appellant's 
case and questioned them about these matters.  Trial counsel also cross-examined 
Trooper Lewis and Trooper Lankford in this regard and referred to the rumors 
during closing argument in attacking Trooper Lewis' investigation of the 
incident.

 

[¶66]   The appellant seems to suggest, 
albeit with virtually no analysis, that the alleged failure to discuss or 
disclose the rumor and resulting Evanston police department investigation to 
defense counsel or Trooper Lewis constituted a Brady violation.  The appellant does not cite specifically 
to any portion of the record to support his contention that this information was 
not discussed with, or disclosed to, trial counsel.  In fact, the record reveals that trial 
counsel had actual knowledge of rumors to this effect shortly after September 
29, 2001, and had the rumors investigated at that time.  Trial counsel later personally talked to 
Lieutenant Allmaras and Chief Harvey about the particular rumor the mayor 
conveyed to Chief Harvey, and the existence and results of the police 
department's subsequent investigation.  
Accordingly, the appellant has not established that the prosecution 
suppressed or failed to disclose any of this information.  The appellant had actual knowledge of 
all of the information well in advance of trial17 and clearly made use of the 
benefits of the information at trial.  
We further note that the results of the police department's investigation 
were not exculpatory because the officers' observations, and the photographs, of 
the patrol vehicles within days of the pursuit did not reveal any physical 
damage to the patrol vehicles.

 

            
The Minivan

 

[¶67]   The appellant also contends that 
the prosecution "failed to preserve" the minivan  because the prosecution released the 
minivan from its possession without "the permission or knowledge of [the 
appellant] or his counsel . . .."18  According to the appellant, the minivan 
"had obviously been through the hands of many people" by the time it was located 
at a Nebraska salvage yard in April 2002, and was "subjected to unknown 
alterations or conditions" in the interim.  
Because the existing crime scene photographs of the minivan could not 
"give information such as depth, length, type or cause of the scrapes" visible 
in the photographs, the minivan, "in an unaltered state, was absolutely critical 
evidence."  The appellant concludes 
that the minivan was therefore "potentially exculpatory" material evidence 
because "if there was any indication whatsoever that the scraping marks came 
from a police vehicle, then the evidence was material" to the appellant's 
"guilt."

 

[¶68]   According to Trooper Lewis, the 
minivan was impounded, taken to a towing company "and secured inside the vehicle 
storage there," and later moved to the state department of transportation "shop 
and put into storage there."  
Trooper Lankford testified that he and Trooper Lewis examined, measured, 
and photographed the minivan while it was at the department of transportation 
shop.  It was trial counsel's 
understanding that the minivan, which minivan apparently belonged to Bobbie 
Decker, was subsequently released to an insurance company and in February 2002, 
"an outfit out of Casper" auctioned the minivan to a Nebraska salvage 
yard.

 

[¶69]   There is a conflict in the record 
regarding the circumstances of the minivan's release from the prosecution's 
possession.  Trial counsel stated in 
an affidavit attached to an April 2002 motion to continue the trial that the 
prosecution released the minivan "without consulting defense counsel."  Trooper Lewis testified at trial that a 
prior prosecutor in the case19 "apparently, got with [the 
appellant's trial counsel] and we got the information from him that it was okay 
for us to release the vehicle."  In 
late October or November 2001, according to Trooper Lewis, the prosecutor talked 
with trial counsel, who said that "there was nothing he wanted to do with the 
van.  He didn't want to have anybody 
look over it or anything and it was okay to release the van."  Trial counsel did not object or 
challenge this testimony at trial, although his co-counsel elicited the 
testimony while cross-examining Trooper Lewis.

 

[¶70]   As we previously stated, the 
appellant's trial counsel became aware in early October 2001 of the rumor that 
law enforcement had forced the appellant off the road or "bumped" the minivan 
during the pursuit, and had the rumor investigated.  The investigator did not inspect the 
minivan himself at that time, nor did trial counsel.  Nevertheless, the investigator 
determined that there was "simply no evidence of any kind of contact between the 
police vehicle and the [appellant's] vehicle" and trial counsel concluded that 
there was not "a scintilla of evidence to suggest that the police officer's 
vehicle had come into contact" with the minivan and "dropped that defense 
strategy" in October or November of 2001.

 

[¶71]   Although trial counsel had 
previously received the prosecution's crime scene photographs of the minivan, he 
did not notice the "scrape marks" depicted on the minivan's right rear quarter 
panel until the appellant pointed them out a "couple weeks" prior to the April 
23, 2002, court hearing.  After the 
appellant pointed out these "scrape marks" in the photographs of the minivan, 
trial counsel demanded in writing that the prosecution produce the minivan.  The prosecutor's office "did the foot 
work" and located the minivan at the salvage yard in Nebraska.  Trial counsel stated to the district 
court at that time that the minivan "has been produced" and it "is available for 
us."  He further characterized the 
circumstances in April 2002 as follows:

 

We're 
ready, willing and able to go to Ainsworth, Nebraska, if we have to, load the 
van back on a flat bed, bring it back to Wyoming.  I presume Cheyenne  and maybe I'm 
speaking out of turn here for the Public Defender's Office.  Of course, this would all be at the 
expense of the Public Defender's Office.  
But, in essence, have someone look at not only those scrapes but look at 
the van for any other indications that it had been bumped[.]  Quite frankly, I haven't done it before 
because there hadn't been a scintilla of evidence to suggest that, your 
Honor.

 

Trial 
counsel stated that he would call the salvage yard that day "and put a hold on 
the thing."  Co-counsel for the 
appellant indicated at an August 2002 pretrial conference that the defense "did 
locate the vehicle.  It was in a 
junk yard.  It had been moved to 
Nebraska.  And I'm not exactly sure 
if there was some alteration, but an expert did look at 
it."

 

[¶72]   Notwithstanding the conflicting 
information regarding the minivan's release from the prosecution's possession, 
the appellant has presented no evidence that the prosecution failed to preserve 
the minivan.20  The appellant does not contend on appeal 
that the minivan was lost, destroyed, or contaminated by the prosecution, and 
his statement that the minivan was "subjected to unknown alterations or 
conditions" following its release from the prosecution's possession is purely 
speculative.  Indeed, when the 
minivan was located in Nebraska in April 2002, the salvage yard sent a "current, 
digital photograph" of the minivan to the prosecutor, who shared the photograph 
with trial counsel.  The digital 
photograph depicted the minivan's "right, rear, quarter panel, . . . 
clearly showing the strafe marks."  
Trial counsel noted "[i]t's the very same vehicle," "it's still usable 
for parts," and the "vehicle was sitting there to be parted out, not to be 
smashed."  The appellant presents no 
evidence that the minivan's condition in April 2002 prevented him, or his 
expert, from examining, photographing, or testing the "scrape marks" at 
issue.  See Wheeler, 691 P.2d at 
602-03 and United States v. Wolf, 839 F.2d 1387, 
1391-92 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 923 (1988) ("[i]f the means of obtaining the 
exculpatory evidence has been provided to the defense, however, a Brady claim 
fails, even if the prosecution does not physically deliver the evidence 
requested").

 

[¶73]   The appellant has also failed to 
establish that the minivan's exculpatory value was sufficiently apparent at the 
time the prosecution released the minivan from its possession.21  On appeal, the appellant characterizes 
the minivan as "potentially exculpatory" evidence and states that "if" the 
scrape marks at issue indicated that they were caused by a police vehicle, the 
minivan would have been material evidence.  
The appellant also contends that the prosecution knew that the minivan 
was "potentially" exculpatory because the police department investigated the 
rumor that a police vehicle forced the appellant off the road.  However, when evidence is "potentially" 
useful or exculpatory,22 as even the appellant has 
characterized the minivan, the appellant must also demonstrate that the 
prosecution acted in bad faith in allegedly failing to preserve the 
evidence.  The appellant does not 
argue that the prosecution acted in bad faith in releasing the minivan from its 
possession.

 

[¶74]   The appellant has similarly failed 
to establish that the minivan's condition impaired his ability to advance his 
theories at trial.  The appellant 
clearly had access to the minivan itself well in advance of trial (the district 
court having granted the appellant a trial continuance in April 2002 to examine 
the minivan), an expert had examined the minivan in Nebraska on the appellant's 
behalf, and the appellant had crime scene photographs of the minivan depicting 
the scrape marks at issue.23  At trial, the appellant's counsel chose 
to use the crime scene photographs of the minivan's right and left rear quarter 
panels extensively to cross-examine Trooper Lewis and Trooper Lankford regarding 
the scrape marks, and also referred to the scrape marks during closing argument 
in attacking Trooper Lewis' investigation and arguing that Officer Vranish 
forced the minivan off the road.  
The record does not reveal why the appellant's trial counsel chose to 
rely on the crime scene photographs at trial rather than the minivan itself, or 
the expert that examined the minivan, but the reason was not, based on the 
record before us, due to a lack of information or opportunity to examine, 
photograph, or test the minivan.  
See Vap, 852 F.2d  at 1256; 
Young, 849 P.2d  at 765; 
Gale, 792 P.2d  at 588; 
and Warhop, 732 F.2d  at 776-77.

 

 

[¶75]   The appellant argues that the 
district court erred in admitting into evidence State's Exhibit 5 (the 
photograph), a photograph of the deceased victim at the crime scene.  The appellant did not object to the 
photograph's admission into evidence at trial.  On appeal, it is therefore incumbent 
upon the appellant to demonstrate plain error in that "the record clearly shows 
an error that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law which adversely 
affected a substantial right."  
Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 939 (Wyo. 1997).

 

[¶76]   The record clearly reflects what 
occurred at trial regarding the photograph's admission into evidence.  Officer Brackin testified that he 
arrived at the crime scene almost immediately after the minivan came to rest, 
and as the appellant was fleeing the scene.  Officer Brackin then described the 
minivan's location, and its extensive physical damage.  State's Exhibit 4, a photograph of the 
minivan's front end, was admitted into evidence without objection.  The vehicle's condition, including the 
physical damage described by Officer Brackin, is evident in Exhibit 4.  The following colloquy then 
ensued:

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  Officer Brackin, did you notice any 
passengers in that minivan at the time you first walked 
up?

 

A.  Yes, sir, I did.[24]

 

Q.  What position was that passenger 
in?

 

A.  As I walked to the front of the vehicle, 
I looked through the  the hole in the front windshield and I saw that there was 
a male that was in the van in a position where his face  the right side of his 
face and head was laying in the passenger seat.  His body was  essentially looked to be 
suspended in the air, with his pant leg or legs, ankle, caught on the broken 
glass.

 

Q.  Did you observe any obvious injuries to 
the passenger in the van?

 

A.  I did.  When I looked at him, of course, his  
his body was somewhat in an unnatural state.  His head and neck were bent further than 
what is normally allowed.  I also 
noticed that he was missing, about mid calf, his foot.  There was an obvious, of course, 
fracture of the lower leg.  And 
there was muscle tissue hanging from the bottom of the pant 
leg.

 

Q.  Did you check to see if this person was 
alive?

 

A.  I saw that from the obvious injury of 
the lower portion of the leg, there was actually no blood flow, either venous or 
arterial blood flow.  There was some 
blood in the seat where his face was on the seat, but not too  not a large 
amount.  I checked.  There was no 
pulse.

 

. 
. .

 

Q.  Officer Brackin, I'm handing you what I 
have marked as State's Exhibit 5 for identification.  Can you tell me what that 
is?

 

A.  That is the person that I saw when I 
looked in the van, in the position in which I found him.  I later identified him as  as Mr. 
Donald Walker.

 

Q.  How are you able to identify that 
person?

 

A.  He  I saw that he had a wallet in his 
back pocket.  I removed the 
wallet.  Went through the 
wallet.  Found a driver's license 
with his name.

 

. 
. .

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, I would offer State's 
Exhibit 5 for 

 

[APPELLANT'S 
COUNSEL]:  No objection, your 
Honor.

 

[¶77]   Trial court rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence are subject to our well-known review 
standard:

 

Such 
decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be 
disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.  Story v. State, 2001 WY 3, ¶ 9, 
15 P.3d 1066, 1068 (Wyo.2001); Blumhagen v. State, 11 P.3d 889, 892 
(Wyo.2000).  Determining whether the 
trial court abused its discretion involves the consideration of whether the 
court could reasonably conclude as it did, and whether it acted in an arbitrary 
or capricious manner.  Trujillo 
v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo.2000) (quoting Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo.1999)).

 

            
A trial court's evidentiary rulings "are entitled to considerable 
deference,'" and will not be reversed on appeal so long as "there exists a 
legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling . . ..'"  Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 
367 (Wyo.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980, 121 S. Ct. 1620, 149 L. Ed. 2d 483 (2001) (quoting Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1197 
(Wyo.1997)).  The appellant bears 
the burden of proving an abuse of discretion.  

 

Lancaster 
v. State, 
2002 WY 45, ¶¶ 11-12, 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶78]   Generally, photographs 
are

 

admissible 
if they correctly portray the subject matter, do not convey a false impression, 
and if their probative value is such as to outweigh the possibility of undue 
prejudice from such circumstances as their gruesome character.  Reeder v. State, 515 P.2d 969, 
973 (Wyo.1973).  Reversal is 
required for the admission of a photograph only if the photograph has little or 
no probative value and is extremely inflammatory or introduced merely to inflame 
the jury.  Shaffer v. State, 
640 P.2d 88, 97, 31 A.L.R.4th 166 (Wyo.1982).

 

Phillips 
v. State, 
835 P.2d 1062, 1071 (Wyo. 1992).25  Relevant evidence is defined as 
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence."  
W.R.E. 401.  "Evidence which 
is not relevant is not admissible."  
W.R.E. 402.  "Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."  W.R.E. 403.

 

[¶79]   The appellant first contends that 
the photograph was "not probative of any fact in dispute."  We find that the photograph was 
probative of the victim's identity, the fact of the victim's death (including 
the condition in which Officer Brackin found the victim upon arriving at the 
scene), and the jury's understanding of the cause of the victim's death (to the 
extent it coincided with several witnesses' specific testimony regarding the 
crime scene and what occurred between the point the minivan left the road and 
ultimately came to rest).  In this 
respect, we note the following:  (1) 
In "every homicide case the state must establish the identity of the person 
killed" and Officer Brackin used the photograph at trial in identifying the 
deceased victim.  Wilks v. 
State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 13, 49 P.3d 975, 983 (Wyo. 2002); 
(2) The State was also required to prove that the appellant operated a vehicle 
"in violation of [Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233 (driving while under the 
influence)]," caused the "death of another person," and that "the violation [of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann § 31-5-233 was] the proximate cause of the [victim's] 
death."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-106(b); (3) Generally, photographs "are properly received into evidence to 
enable the jury as the trier of facts to better understand that which the photo 
represents.'"  Mayer v. 
State, 618 P.2d 127, 130 (Wyo. 1980) (quoting Reeder v. State, 515 P.2d 969, 972 (Wyo. 1973)); 
see also Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522, 528 (Wyo. 1993); 
and (4) Generally, it "is well-established that photographs may be used to 
graphically portray, among other things, the scene of a crime, the 
identification of a victim, the appearance and condition of the deceased, and 
the location, nature and extent of the wounds or injuries, all of which matters 
are relevant.'"  People v. 
Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 746-47 (Colo.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 893 
(1999) (quoting Young v. People, 175 
Colo. 461, 488 P.2d 567, 574 (1971)).

 

[¶80]   According to the appellant, the 
victim's identity and the victim's physical condition at the scene were not 
disputed issues at trial and Officer Brackin was capable of testifying to these 
matters in the absence of the disputed photograph.  The appellant's contention is 
essentially that the photograph was irrelevant or unnecessary in light of the 
"disputed" issues at trial and Officer Brackin's testimony regarding what he 
observed at the crime scene.  We 
have previously rejected similar arguments, even when the defense has conceded 
or stipulated to elements of a crime.  
In Wilks, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 13, 49 P.3d  at 983, 
we stated that "[s]ince the prosecution has the burden of proving all the 
elements of a crime, relevant photographs do not become inadmissible because the 
defendant concedes the fact and cause of the victim's death."  See also Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Wyo. 1978).  Similarly, in Barnes, 858 P.2d  at 
526-28, 
after stating that relevant photographs do not become inadmissible because the 
defendant concedes the fact and cause of the victim's death, we 
said:

 

Following 
defendant's stipulation, it was argued that the photographs were cumulative and 
unnecessary.  Such claim does not 
deal with relevancy but concerns the quantum and sufficiency of evidence.  Evidence has never been held irrelevant 
because there was other evidence that may prove the same facts.  Rather, the test of relevancy, found in 
W.R.E. 401, is one of reasonableness and common sense and is to be liberally 
applied to favor admissibility rather than exclusion of evidence.  . . .

 

. 
. .

 

            
Appellant's position is that, conceding the nature, extent and severity 
of the injuries as necessary and relevant, the pathologist could orally testify 
to facts that would describe the injuries sufficiently for the jury to 
comprehend their magnitude.  We 
trust juries to decide cases involving gory, gruesome killings and decide 
questions of life and death.  It is 
inconsistent that we must sanitize the case by withholding fair evidence of the 
crime and its results.

 

[¶81]   The appellant also argues that the 
photograph was "unduly prejudicial."  
According to the appellant, the photograph was "gruesome" because blood 
is visible around the victim's face, the victim's "empty pant leg is dangling," 
and it "graphically portrayed the victim, lodged in the vehicle, with the 
amputation of the foot obvious from the dangling pant leg."  The appellant further argues that the 
photograph was introduced solely to inflame the jury because it "appears that 
the photograph may have been used pointedly during closing 
argument."

 

[¶82]   The photograph depicts the position 
of the victim's body (fully clothed) in the minivan, with the victim's head near 
the crease of the passenger's seat and his legs on the dashboard near the 
minivan's shattered windshield.  The 
victim's body is facing away from the camera, a small amount of blood is visible 
on the passenger seat near the victim's face, and a portion of the victim's 
apparently empty pant leg is also visible.26  However, considering the nature of the 
severe impact between the minivan and the victim, and the victim's resulting 
injuries as described in the coroner's report27 and by Officer Brackin, the 
photograph was likely less gruesome than would be expected under the 
circumstances and certainly was not extremely inflammatory on its 
face.

 

[¶83]   Contrary to the appellant's 
argument, the record does not clearly show that the prosecutor referred to the 
photograph during his closing argument.  
The relevant portion of the prosecutor's closing argument 
follows:

 

            
As the minivan approaches the intersection of Wasatch and Harrison Drive, 
the driver fails to make the turn.  
He fails to make this turn.  
He basically  in a timely manner.  
He does try to turn, but he doesn't start his turn until he gets up on 
the sidewalk.  His reactions are 
slow because of  because of his intoxication.

 

            
At Point A, at this point, on the sidewalk where he comes up over the 
curb, a minimum speed of 70 mile an hour.  
So he's going at least 70.  
He follows along at Point C, where the officers were able to determine 
was the area of impact.  This is not 
exactly where Donald Walker was.  
Nobody knows exactly where he was.  
But he was in this area.  
Because of the damage to the vehicle and the mark on the sidewalk were 
consistent, that is the area that he was at.  At that point, the vehicle  this point 
where there's a little scuff mark, there is an estimated speed, a minimum speed, 
of 63 mile an hour when he hit Donald Walker.  When he hit Mr. Walker and he did this 
to him.  (Indicating all the 
while.).

 

            
The only place that they got a definite speed for the green minivan that 
Mr. Whitney was driving was here at Point F.

 

The 
"points" to which the prosecutor referred (Point A, Point C, and Point F) 
coincide with locations depicted in State's Exhibits 17 and 17A.  Exhibit 17 is a scale diagram of the 
crime scene, and Exhibit 17A is a legend for the various "points" depicted in 
Exhibit 17.28  According to the record, the prosecutor 
was "[i]ndicating all the while" during this portion of his closing argument; 
however, given the context of the prosecutor's argument, Exhibit 17 is the only 
ascertainable exhibit to which the prosecutor might have been 
"indicating."

 

[¶84]   Accordingly, the appellant has 
failed to establish a clear abuse of discretion (and thereby an error that 
transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law) by the district court in 
admitting this single photograph into evidence.  See generally also People v. 
Viduya, 703 P.2d 1281, 1291 (Colo. 1985); 
Munden v. State, 698 P.2d 621, 626 (Wyo. 1985); 
Collins v. State, 589 P.2d 1283, 1291 (Wyo. 1979); 
and Seyle, 584 P.2d  at 1084.

 

 

[¶85]   The appellant contends that the 
prosecutor made several remarks during his opening statement and principal 
closing argument that amounted to improper victim impact statements and 
improperly implied that a guilty verdict was the only way to give the victim and 
his family "closure" and "justice."  
We review allegations of prosecutorial misconduct "by reference to the 
entire record.'"  Mazurek v. 
State, 10 P.3d 531, 542 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 143 (Wyo. 1999)).  Such allegations "hinge on whether a 
defendant's case has been so prejudiced as to constitute denial of a fair 
trial.'"  Mazurek, 10 P.3d  at 
542 (quoting English, 982 P.2d at 143).

 

Prosecutorial 
misconduct "has always been condemned in this state."  Valerio v. State, 527 P.2d 154, 
156 (Wyo.1974).  Whether such 
misconduct has been reviewed on the basis of harmless error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and 
W.R.A.P. 9.04, or on the basis of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 
9.05, this Court has focused on whether such error . . . affected the accused's 
"substantial rights."  The accused's 
right to a fair trial is a substantial right.  Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 6, 9, and 10; 
and see, e.g., Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Wyo.1978).  Before we hold that an error has 
affected an accused's substantial right, thus requiring reversal of a 
conviction, we must conclude that, based on the entire record, a reasonable 
possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have 
been more favorable to the accused.  
Jones v. State, 735 P.2d 699, 703 (Wyo.1987).  We read this standard to be in 
consonance with the standard followed by the United States Supreme 
Court[.]

 

Earll 
v. State, 
2001 WY 66, ¶ 9, 29 P.3d 787, 789-90 (Wyo. 2001).  See also Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 
31, 43 P.3d  at 93-94.  The appellant bears the burden of 
establishing prosecutorial misconduct.  
Id., 2002 WY 45, ¶ 32, 43 P.3d  at 94.

 

[¶86]   We have said the following with 
regard to opening statements:

 

            
"An opening statement has a narrow purpose and scope.  It is to state what evidence will be 
presented, to make it easier for the jurors to understand what is to follow, and 
to relate parts of the evidence and testimony to the whole; it is not an 
occasion for argument.  To make 
statements which will not or cannot be supported by proof is, if it relates to 
significant elements of the case, professional misconduct.  Moreover, it is fundamentally unfair to 
an opposing party to allow an attorney, with the standing and prestige inherent 
in being an officer of the court, to present to the jury statements not 
susceptible of proof but intended to influence the jury in reaching a 
verdict."

 

Hopkinson 
v. State, 
632 P.2d 79, 112 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 908 (1983) (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 
424 U.S. 600, 612, 96 S. Ct. 1075, 47 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1976), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 1104 (1977)).  Further, the

 

prosecutor's 
opening statement should be confined to a statement of the issues in the case 
and the evidence the prosecutor intends to offer which the prosecutor believes 
in good faith will be available and admissible.  A prosecutor should not allude to any 
evidence unless there is a good faith and reasonable basis for believing that 
such evidence will be tendered and admitted in evidence.

 

ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.5 at 99-100 (3rd ed. 1993).  The commentary to Standard 3-5.5 
states:

 

            
The primary purpose of the opening statement is to give the prosecutor an 
opportunity to outline the issues and matters he or she believes can and will be 
supported by competent and admissible evidence introduced during the trial.  In that statement, the prosecutor should 
scrupulously avoid any utterance that he or she believes cannot and will not 
later actually be supported with such evidence.  If, through honest inadvertence, the 
proof actually offered at trial falls significantly short of points made in the 
opening statement, the court should be asked to give a clarifying instruction to 
avoid either advantage or penalty.  
In other respects, the opening statement is governed by the Standard for 
closing argument.

 

Id. 
(footnote omitted).

 

[¶87]   Closing 
arguments

 

must 
be based upon the evidence submitted to the jury.  The purpose of closing argument is to 
allow counsel to offer ways of viewing the significance of the evidence.  Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 
145 (Wyo.1981).  Prosecutors, just 
like defense counsel, may review the evidence and suggest to the jury inferences 
based thereon.  . . . There are 
limits, however, on prosecutor's closing arguments that are designed to insure 
the fairness of the trial and prevent compromise of the judicial 
system.

 

Dysthe 
v. State, 
2003 WY 20, ¶ 24, 63 P.3d 875, 884-85 (Wyo. 2003).  In Wilks, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 27, 49 P.2d  at 986-87 (quoting I A.B.A., Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8 at 
3.87 to 3.88 (2d ed. 1980)), 
we stated:

 

            
In Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 51, ¶ 5, 44 P.3d 22, ¶ 5 (Wyo.2002), 
this court set forth the following broad guidelines found in the Standards for 
Criminal Justice which are applicable to a prosecutor's arguments to a 
jury:

 

"(a) 
The prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in the 
record.  It is unprofessional 
conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the 
jury as to the inferences it may draw.

 

. 
. .

 

(c) 
The prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to inflame the passions or 
prejudices of the jury.

 

(d) 
The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from its 
duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than the 
guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law, or by making 
predictions of the consequences of the jury's verdict.

 

(e) 
It is the responsibility of the court to ensure that final argument to the jury 
is kept within proper, accepted bounds."

 

[¶88]   In the instant case, the prosecutor 
said the following during his opening statement (the remarks to which the 
appellant attributes error are italicized):

 

            
The path through life has many twists and turns.  The path each of us takes intersects 
with the lives of other people.  
However brief that may be, it can have a lasting impact upon those other 
lives.  Each choice we make in life 
is like a cross-roads.  Some choices 
will lead us down the brightly lit streets.  Others will lead us down dark and 
dangerous alleys.  It just depends 
on what the choice is.

 

            
Donald Walker took a path that, unfortunately, led him into contact with 
the intersecting path of Harold Whitney, Jr., the Defendant sitting here.  That occurred on September 29, 
2001.  The path that he took, though 
brightly lit, was a dead end, thanks to the path that Harold Whitney took.  Donald Walker was a father, a son, 
a brother and a friend.  He would go 
without so that the people he loved could have the things they 
needed.

 

            
Donald Walker's path during the early morning hours of September 29 . . . 
consisted of walking to where he was staying after meeting with friends to 
discuss a hunting trip that he was leaving on the next 
morning.

 

The 
prosecutor continued by describing the appellant's "path" in drinking at local 
establishments, interacting with Officer Vranish, and crashing the vehicle he 
was driving.

 

            
In the brief moment that Harold Whitney's path crossed that of 
Donny Walker, lives were shattered forever.  Children lost a father.  Parents lost a son.  And siblings lost a 
brother.  The evidence will 
show that Harold Whitney was traveling between 80 and 85 miles per hour when he 
struck Donald Walker, killing him.  
We'll further show that due to his intoxication, due to his delayed 
reaction time, he wasn't able to make the corner at that speed.  He went up over the curb, followed the 
curb for almost 200 feet, a little over 200 feet, and struck Donny Walker.  The impact was so severe from the impact 
that Donald Walker's jeans were imbedded into the bumper of the minivan.  Donny Walker broke  broke both of his 
legs, both of his arms, broke his neck, broke his back, his ribs.  The impact was so severe that Donald 
Walker's left foot was found 273 feet from the area of 
impact.

 

The 
prosecutor made the following remarks during his principal closing 
argument:

 

But 
today, we're nearing the end of a long and rocky road that took over a year to 
complete, or at least to get to this point.  For some, the path has been 
shorter.  For most  most of you, 
that journey that started on September 29, 2001, will end when a verdict is 
reached.  For others, the journey 
has just begun.  For Donald 
Walker's family, it will never end.

 

[¶89]   The remarks at issue focus on the 
effect of the victim's death upon his family or others.  "Consideration of victim-impact 
testimony or argument remains inappropriate during proceedings determining the 
guilt of an accused."  Armstrong 
v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1116 (Wyo. 1992).  Generally, the

 

key 
inquiry on the admissibility of victim impact testimony during the guilt phase 
of a criminal trial is relevancy.  
McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 751 (Wyo.1993).  Victim impact testimony must not be 
permitted "unless there is a clear justification of relevance."  Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002, 1011 (Wyo.1989).  Such testimony may 
be irrelevant if offered during the guilt phase of the trial as proof of the 
victim's loss; the physical, emotional, or psychological impact on the victim; 
or the effect upon the family.  Yet, 
it may be relevant if offered for another proper purpose.  Id. at 
1010.

 

Wilks, 
2002 WY 100, ¶ 8, 49 P.3d  at 981.

 

[¶90]   The State does not contend that the 
prosecutor's remarks were relevant to any trial issue or evidentiary purpose 
other than the effect of the victim's death upon his family or others, and 
concedes in its appellate brief that the remarks "did, admittedly, inject into 
the trial issues broader than Appellant's guilt or innocence."  We note that the statements also 
implicate other areas of impropriety.  
It does not appear that the remarks made during the prosecutor's opening 
statement related to any evidence the prosecutor intended to offer at trial,29 or that the remark made during the 
prosecutor's principal closing argument was a reasonable inference based on any 
evidence actually introduced at trial.  
The remarks also risked inflaming the passions of the jury by creating 
sympathy for the victim, and the victim's family and 
friends.

 

[¶91]   However, based on our review of the 
entire record, we do not find that the prosecutor's remarks prejudiced the 
appellant to a degree that requires reversal and a new trial.  The appellant did not object to the 
referenced remarks at trial.

 

In 
Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d  at 539, this court listed several 
non-exhaustive factors to be utilized to evaluate whether there was prejudicial 
plain error at the trial level as a result of prosecutorial misconduct.  Those factors . . . include 1) the 
degree to which the prosecutor's remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and 
prejudice the accused; 2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; 3) the 
strength of competent proof to establish guilt, absent the remarks; 4) whether 
the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to 
extraneous matters; 5) the presence or absence of a limiting instruction; 6) 
whether the error was invited by defense counsel; 7) whether the failure to 
object could have been the result of tactical decisions; and 8) whether, in 
light of all the evidence, the error was harmless.

 

Trujillo 
v. State, 
2002 WY 51, ¶ 15, 44 P.3d 22, 28 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶92]   On appeal, the appellant argues 
only that the prosecutor's remarks prejudiced him because the appellant mounted 
a "challenging defense" at trial regarding Officer Vranish's alleged role in 
proximately causing the victim's death, and "remarks that elicited sympathy for 
the grieving family must have made the jury more inclined to find [the 
appellant] guilty."  We find that, 
based on a careful review of the record, the evidence of the appellant's guilt 
was overwhelming, the prosecutor's remarks were relatively isolated, and the 
district court instructed the jury as follows immediately prior to the 
prosecutor's opening statement:

 

On 
the other hand, it is the exclusive province of the Jury to weigh and consider 
all evidence which is presented to it; to determine the credibility of all 
witnesses who testify before you, and from such evidence and testimony, to 
determine the issues of fact in this case.

 

            
This duty you shall perform with sincere judgment and sound discretion, 
uninfluenced by sentiment, conjecture, or by passion or prejudice against any of 
the litigants in this case, or by public opinion or public feeling.  The litigants have the right to demand 
and expect that you will conscientiously and dispassionately consider and weigh 
the evidence and apply the law of the case, and that you will reach a just 
verdict, regardless of the consequences.  
That verdict must express the individual opinion of each 
Juror.

 

            
You are the exclusive judges of the facts and of the effect and value of 
the evidence, but you must determine the facts from the evidence produced here 
in court.  If any evidence is 
admitted and afterwards is ordered by me to be stricken out, you must disregard 
entirely the matter thus stricken, and if any counsel intimates by any of his 
questions that certain hinted facts are, or are not, true, you must disregard 
any such intimation and must not draw any inference from it.  As to any statement made by counsel in 
your presence concerning the facts of the case, you must not regard such a 
statement as evidence[.]

 

The 
district court also gave the jury a nearly identical instruction immediately 
prior to the prosecutor's principal closing argument.  Accordingly, weighing all of the factors 
against the record as a whole, we do not think a reasonable possibility exists 
that in the absence of the prosecutor's remarks, the verdict might have been 
more favorable to the appellant or that the remarks put the fairness of the 
trial into serious question.

 

[¶93]   The appellant also contends that 
the prosecutor improperly implied that the only "just' conclusion the jury 
could reach after listening to the evidence would be to find [the appellant] 
guilty."  After detailing the 
elements of the charged offenses, the prosecutor concluded his opening statement 
with the following remarks:

 

            
After all the evidence is heard regarding these charges, you will have to 
choose your path, both individually and collectively.  I know that you'll do what's 
right.  I know that you will choose 
the correct path.  Give the Walker 
family some closure.  Give them 
justice.  Give Donald Walker 
justice.  Thank 
you.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  The appellant objected to 
these remarks.  In response to that 
objection, the district court instructed the jury as 
follows:

 

Ladies 
and Gentlemen of the Jury, there's been an objection raised to the State's 
opening statement regarding what the State wished the Jury to do.  The function of an opening statement is 
to inform the Jury of the evidence that a party wishes to present and it's not 
an appropriate time to make an argument.  
That is customarily reserved to closing argument.  The Jury will disregard the closing 
statements made in the State's opening statement.

 

[¶94]   It does not appear that the 
prosecutor's remarks comport with the standards we previously set forth 
regarding the proper purpose and scope of an opening statement.  In addition, "an exhortation to the 
jury to "do the right thing," . . . is error if it "impl[ies] that, in order to 
do so, it can only reach a certain verdict regardless of its duty to weigh the 
evidence and follow the court's instructions on the law"'" and "may also run 
afoul of the admonition against injecting issues broader than the guilt or 
innocence of the accused."  
Wilks, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 28, 49 P.3d  at 987 (quoting Jackson v. 
State, 791 So. 2d 979, 1026 (Ala.Crim.App. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 934 (2001) and Arthur v. State, 575 So. 2d 1165, 1185 (Ala.Crim.App. 
1990), aff'd, 711 So. 2d 1097 (Ala. 1997), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1053 (2002)).

 

[¶95]   We note that the prosecutor did 
preface the remarks at issue by stating that the jurors, individually and 
collectively, would have to choose their own "path," after hearing all of the 
evidence.  However, to the extent 
that the remarks might arguably have implied that only a guilty verdict would 
give the victim and his family "closure" or "justice," we cannot say that the 
appellant was prejudiced to a degree that requires reversal and a new 
trial:  (1) the evidence of the 
appellant's guilt was overwhelming; (2) the district court gave the 
aforementioned jury instruction immediately prior to the prosecutor's opening 
statement; and (3) the district court also specifically instructed the jury to 
disregard the prosecutor's remarks immediately after they 
occurred.

 

[¶96]   We affirm.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1The record indicates that Bobbie 
Decker, a female, is the appellant's fiancé.

 

   2Evanston police officer Chris 
Brackin testified that he was traveling seventy miles per hour while following 
the vehicles involved in the pursuit (from a distance), and the other vehicles 
"were traveling at speeds greater than I was traveling."

 

  3Robert LaPier, an expert witness for 
the appellant, testified that Officer Vranish should have asked the appellant to 
exit the minivan to perform field sobriety tests, or otherwise controlled the 
vehicle and/or its driver to "prevent [him] from driving."  Mr. LaPier concluded that it was not 
reasonable or prudent for Officer Vranish to return to his patrol vehicle and 
attempt to identify the appellant under the circumstances.

 

  4A "pit maneuver," as described by 
Officer Vranish, is when a police vehicle comes alongside a suspect vehicle, 
makes soft contact between the police vehicle's front bumper and the rear 
quarter panel of the suspect vehicle, pushes the back wheels of the suspect 
vehicle away from the line of traffic, and sends the suspect vehicle into an 
uncontrollable skid to stop the vehicle.  
Officer Vranish was the only Evanston police officer trained to perform 
the pit maneuver and was qualified to instruct others on how to perform the 
maneuver, but Evanston police officers were not allowed to perform the maneuver 
because the department had not implemented any policies for doing 
so.

 

  5Officer Vranish testified that he 
did not perform a pit maneuver on the minivan, nor did he see any "Evanston 
patrol vehicle" come into contact with the minivan during the pursuit.  Officer Vranish estimated that he was 
600 feet behind the minivan when he saw the cloud of dust.

 

Evanston 
police officer John Evans, who was driving behind Officer Vranish during the 
pursuit, never saw Officer Vranish's vehicle contact the minivan, and when he 
observed the cloud of dust at the end of the pursuit, Officer Vranish's vehicle 
was approximately fifty to seventy yards behind the minivan and never close 
enough to the minivan for physical contact.

 

A 
narcoleptic taxi driver testified for the appellant and stated that although she 
didn't "know," she would "guess" that the distance between the police vehicle 
and the minivan ranged anywhere from about "a half block," to "a car and a 
half," to twenty-eight feet.

 

Trooper 
Lewis testified that at "the speeds involved, the damage to the [minivan's] left 
quarter panel would have been much, much worse than" what he observed on the 
minivan.  When asked if, during the 
course of his investigation, Trooper Lewis located any evidence that indicated 
the minivan had been forced off the road, Lewis replied "None."  Trooper Lankford testified that if 
Officer Vranish had used a pit maneuver to stop the minivan, he would expect to 
see tire marks in the roadway because "scuff marks or skid marks . . . will come 
from that type of a maneuver."  No 
one apparently observed marks of this nature at the crime 
scene.

 

  6Based on the prosecutor's position 
at sentencing that the driving while under the influence conviction merged with 
the aggravated homicide by vehicle conviction, the appellant was not sentenced 
for driving while under the influence.

 

  7Trial counsel also recalled that a 
police officer testified, likely at the preliminary hearing, that the police 
officers that pursued the appellant never "got that close" to the minivan during 
the pursuit.

 

  8According to trial counsel, who 
"still wanted the trial within the 180 days," the April 24th trial 
date was coordinated between trial counsel, the prosecutor, and the district 
court.

 

  9By April 26, 2002, the appellant was 
reporting to the detention center by telephone from Nevada, as required by his 
bail conditions.

 

  10By the April 23, 2002, hearing, of 
course, the prosecution had located the minivan in Nebraska and the minivan was 
available to the appellant for further examination.

 

  11Trial counsel had filed a formal 
motion for discovery on October 31, 2001.

 

  12In referring to these two 
continuances, trial counsel stated that "the continuances that have already been 
requested have been at the request of the Defense . . .."

 

  13The appellant does briefly question 
in one paragraph of his appellate brief whether trial counsel could waive the 
appellant's right to a speedy trial despite the appellant's objection.  To support his contention that the right 
to a speedy trial is solely the client's to waive, the appellant cites to 
People v. Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d 557, 162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738 
(1980) and quotes from People v. 
Anderson, 25 Cal. 4th 543, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575, 22 P.3d 347 
(2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1136 (2002).

 

Johnson 
does not help the appellant at all in the instant case because counsel in 
Johnson sought trial continuances based on his scheduling conflicts with 
other cases and the issue concerned "the decision of the public defender and the 
court to resolve these conflicts by trying other cases in advance of that of 
defendant."  Johnson, 606 P.2d  at 743.  In Johnson, counsel did not seek 
"additional time to prepare the defense or to secure attendance of witnesses," 
counsel was not "pursuing his client's best interest in a competent manner,'" 
there was "no reason to believe delay would benefit defendant," and it was not a 
matter of "defense strategy."  
Id. at 744-45 (quoting Townsend v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 774, 126 Cal. Rptr. 251, 543 P.2d 619, 626 (1975)).  Johnson also involved the waiver 
of a state statutory right to a speedy trial, and Johnson did not contend that 
the delay violated his federal constitutional right to a speedy trial.  Id. at 744 n.6.  

 

Interestingly, 
three statements in Anderson also appear to contradict the appellant's 
assertion as it applies to the instant case:  (1) "Though neither this court nor the 
United States Supreme Court has decided the precise issue, it would appear, in 
any event, that defendant's express personal on-the-record agreement to all but 
one of the continuances constituted absolute waivers, to that extent, of his 
speedy trial rights under the federal Constitution"; (2) While the appellant in 
the instant case quotes the following passage from Anderson in his 
appellate brief, "We have never decided whether or how the fundamental state 
constitutional right . . . can be waived, except to suggest in dictum that 
counsel cannot waive it over his client's objection for counsel's own 
convenience," the court in Anderson actually continued by stating 
that "[b]ut for reasons set forth in the preceding footnote, we readily conclude 
that the defendant's express personal agreement to trial continuances sought 
for his benefit constituted such a waiver"; and (3) the delays in 
Anderson were "for defendant's benefit, not the result of prosecutorial 
negligence or bad faith."  
Anderson, 22 P.3d  at 388 and n.21 and 389 n.22 (emphasis added).  Aside from these two cases, the 
appellant does not cite any additional legal authority.

 

In 
the instant case, the appellant's brief discussion of the issue occurs in the 
context of his W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) argument and the continuance of the April 24, 
2002, trial setting.  That 
continuance was not granted despite an objection by the appellant; the appellant 
clearly stated on the record that he did not object to the continuance and he 
has not presented cogent appellate argument that he was "coerced" during the 
April 23, 2002, hearing.  The 
appellant does not renew the argument with any particularity in the context of 
his constitutional analysis and whether the January 30, and April 3, 
continuances should be attributable to him, and in fact, appellate counsel 
stated at oral argument that she believed trial counsel had "strategic 
authority" to properly request trial continuances within the 180-day period even 
if the appellant had objected.  
Finally, the continuances of the January 30, April 3, and April 24, trial 
dates were sought directly for the appellant's benefit.  The authority cited by the appellant 
would therefore appear to compel a result contrary to the position he espouses 
on appeal. Under the circumstances, we need not comment further on this 
issue.

 

  14As trial counsel noted, the scrape 
marks depicted in the crime scene photographs of the minivan were "not 
consistent with what I, as a lay person, believe would be consistent with a 
vehicle being bumped in the right, quarter panel."

 

  15On October 31, 2001, the appellant 
did file a motion seeking an order "permitting Defendant's counsel to inspect 
and copy any exculpatory material or statements required to be furnished 
pursuant to the findings in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963)."

 

  16Trooper Lewis had heard the rumor 
within days after the incident, and the appellant's trial counsel was aware of 
the rumor possibly even before he "was assigned the case."  According to Chief Harvey, the police 
department was "often" rumored to have done "things."

 

  17See United States v. Zagari, 
111 F.3d 307, 320 (2nd Cir.), cert. 
denied, 522 U.S. 988 (1997), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1103 
(1999) ("Brady cannot be violated if the 
defendant[] had actual knowledge of the relevant information") and Relish v. 
State, 860 P.2d 455, 459 (Wyo. 1993).

 

  18The appellant's argument on appeal 
is based on the prosecution releasing the minivan from its possession and not 
the alleged suppression or nondisclosure of the minivan.  In fact, when the appellant demanded 
that the prosecution produce the minivan in April 2002, the prosecution located 
the minivan and made it "available" to the appellant prior to trial.  As appellate counsel acknowledged at 
oral argument, this issue is "more a question of preservation of evidence which 
was potentially exculpatory."

 

  19The prosecutor who originally filed 
the charges apparently left between the April 23, 2002, court hearing and a June 
19, 2002, court hearing.  A 
different prosecutor appeared at the June 19 court hearing, and yet a different 
prosecutor appeared at the August 28, 2002, pretrial conference.  The prosecutor who appeared at the 
pretrial conference, and his co-counsel, tried the case to the 
jury.

 

  20It does not appear that the 
prosecution ever intended to offer the minivan as a trial exhibit, so chain of 
custody was not a concern.

 

  21We note that the appellant's own 
trial counsel even characterized the scrape marks he observed in the crime scene 
photographs as "[in]consistent with what I, as a lay person, believe would be 
consistent with a vehicle being bumped in the right, quarter panel."  At trial, Trooper Lewis described the 
marks on left rear as "pretty insignificant" "minor scratching" down the side 
and the right rear as "some scratch marks along the side that extends from 
nearly the bottom of the bumper all the way up, along the side, along the 
plastic molding, up to nearly the top of the tire."  He discovered "some sand and some small 
rocks consistent with a concrete type thing imbedded in the plastic" of the 
right rear scrape marks, and did not observe any paint transfers in that area of 
the minivan.  Trooper Lewis 
testified that he was not able to "find anything at the crash scene . . . that 
had impacted the van in this manner," and the minivan looked as if "the vehicle 
had run alongside, maybe, a concrete Jersey barrier or something of that 
nature."

 

  22The United States Supreme Court has 
characterized "potentially" exculpatory or useful evidence as "evidentiary 
material of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to 
tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant."  Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57, 109 S. Ct. 333, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1988).

 

  23Trial counsel noted that he had 
been provided approximately two hundred "photographs taken by various agents of 
the State of Wyoming . . .."

 

  24Of course, the officer later 
determined that the victim was a pedestrian, not a passenger in the 
vehicle.

 

  25The appellant does not argue that 
the photograph incorrectly portrayed the subject matter or conveyed a false 
impression.

 

  26An object near the bottom of the 
victim's pant leg is not readily identifiable from the photograph.  The appellant does not argue that this 
object was the muscle tissue Officer Brackin described.

 

  27The parties stipulated to 
introducing a copy of the coroner's report into evidence.  The coroner's report describes the 
victim's injuries as follows:

 

His 
neck was broken, as were his ribs and sternum.  He had fractures of the right and left 
humerus, left ulna and radius, a fracture or dislocation of the right shoulder, 
fracture of the left femur, compound fracture of the right femur, fracture of 
the right tibia and fibula, amputation of the left lower leg approximately six 
inches above the ankle joint which was due to a complete fracture of the left 
tibia and fibula from the impact of the front of the 
vehicle.

 

His 
right and left carotid arteries were completely torn, as were his trachea and 
esophagus due to high speed impact injury.

 

There 
were also abrasions on the victim's face and hands, as well as on[e] deep 
laceration on the chin.

 

  28According to Exhibit 17A, Point A 
is where the right front tire of the minivan "jumps the curb," Point C is the 
"area of impact, pedestrian," and Point F is where the pedestrian's hat was 
located.

 

  29There is no indication in the 
record (particularly the respective witness lists filed by the parties) that 
either party intended to call a member of the victim's family, or a friend of 
the victim, as a trial witness.