Case Title: State v. Davids

Citation: 

Docket Number: S51594

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  August 4, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
BRANT GREGORY DAVIDS,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 990231301; CA A111231; SC S51594)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January 6, 2005.
Janet A. Klapstein, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. 
With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General, and Joanna L. Jenkins, Assistant
Attorney General.
Susan F. Drake, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her on
the brief were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, and Peter
Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, 
William C. Snouffer, Judge (Motions); Jan Wyers, Judge (Trial and Sentencing). 193 Or App 178, 90 P3d 1 (2004). 
GILLETTE, J.
This case is one of three that we decide today
concerning the proper interpretation and application of two
"speedy trial" statutes, ORS 135.747 and ORS 135.750. (1)  The
three cases have certain issues of statutory construction in
common, which we addressed in our opinion in State v. Johnson,
___ Or ___, ___ P3d ___ (Aug 4, 2005).  This case presents two
additional issues that are case-specific:  (1) whether defendant
impliedly waived his speedy trial objection by engaging in
certain allegedly dilatory tactics; and (2) whether the trial
court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the case
because the state, in fact, had brought defendant to trial within
a "reasonable period of time" under ORS 135.747.  For the reasons
that follow, we conclude that defendant did not waive his speedy
trial right by engaging in dilatory tactics.  We further conclude
that the state violated defendant's statutory right to a speedy
trial.  We therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals,
which took the same view. 
The record discloses the following facts.  On December
30, 1998, police officers arrested defendant on suspicion of
Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicants (DUII), ORS 813.010, 
and Driving While Suspended (DWS), ORS 811.182.  On February 16,
1999, a Multnomah County grand jury indicted defendant for those
crimes, and an arrest warrant issued that same day.  The police
did not arrest defendant on the warrant until January 31, 2000 --
some 11 and one-half months after the indictment issued.  It
appears that, between the date that the warrant issued and the
date of defendant's arrest, the police made no attempt to execute
the warrant.
After his arrest on the warrant, defendant appeared in
Multnomah County Circuit Court for arraignment.  Defendant
pleaded not guilty, and the court set a trial "call" date (2)
of March 20, 2000.  The court also ordered defendant to appear in
court on February 8, 2000, for a preliminary proceeding. 
Defendant failed to appear for that proceeding and thereafter was
brought in on a "failure to appear" arrest warrant.  The court
then appointed defense counsel and released defendant.
On March 20, 2000, the state requested and obtained a
three-day setover.  Thereafter, defendant sought and obtained two
brief setovers and also filed a motion to dismiss on statutory
and constitutional speedy trial grounds.  On May 5, 2000, the
trial court denied defendant's speedy trial motion and set
defendant's trial for May 15.  However, on May 15, defendant
apparently was being detained in Wasco County on a new DUII
charge and, consequently, did not appear for the trial. 
Defendant ultimately was tried on July 18, 2000, and a jury
convicted him of both charges.
Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred
by denying his motion to dismiss on both statutory and
constitutional speedy trial grounds.  The Court of Appeals
reversed.  That court first determined that, in light of the 11
and one-half month delay in the warrant service, the state had
not brought defendant to trial within a "reasonable period of
time" under ORS 135.747 and that dismissal of the indictment
consequently was required.  The court further observed that,
because the charges against defendant were, respectively, a
felony and a Class A misdemeanor, ORS 135.753(2) ordinarily would
entitle the state to reindict him.  In this case, however,
dismissal pursuant to ORS 135.747 provided defendant with
complete relief, because the statute of limitations for both
crimes had expired.  State v. Davids, 193 Or App 178, 90 P3d 1
(2004).  We allowed the state's petition for review. 
Before this court, the state raises a number of general
arguments about the meaning and application of the speedy trial
statutes, including that:  (1) this court must review the trial
court's ruling under ORS 135.747 under an "abuse of discretion"
standard; (2) the requirement of ORS 135.747 that the state must
bring a criminal defendant to trial within a "reasonable period
of time" applies only after the defendant has been arraigned; and
(3) defendants who request or consent to any delay, as defendant
did here, are categorically excluded from the remedy provided in
ORS 135.747.  We already have considered and rejected those same
arguments in Johnson, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 6-37).  What
remains are the issues that are specific to this case: (1)
whether defendant impliedly consented to or waived objection to
the 11 and one-half month delay in executing the arrest warrant
by requesting a number of setovers and by failing to appear at a
scheduled proceeding; and (2) whether, in light of workload and
budgetary pressures on the law enforcement agency charged with
executing the arrest warrant, the 11 and one-half month delay in
executing the warrant was "reasonable."
With respect to the first issue, we note that, in
Johnson, we rejected the state's broader theory that ORS 135.747
categorically precludes dismissal when a defendant has requested
or consented to any delay.  Johnson, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at
37).  The state argues, however, that certain actions by a
defendant, or combinations of actions, are so inherently
inconsistent with a desire for a speedy trial that courts must
treat them as impliedly waiving any right to dismissal under the
statutory speedy trial statutes.  Applying that proposed
principle to the present case, the state contends that, by
seeking two setovers and failing to appear at a scheduled
proceeding, defendant impliedly waived the remedy provided in ORS
135.747. (3) 
Assuming, without deciding, that a defendant's dilatory
tactics could operate as an implied waiver in the manner that the
state has described, the facts of this case are insufficient to
establish such an implied waiver.  The setovers in question all
were relatively brief and, to all appearances, legitimate.  The
circumstances surrounding the one relevant "failure to appear"
incident, on February 8, 2000, are unknown, but there is nothing
in the record that suggests a particularly dilatory purpose.  In
short, there is no evidence in the record suggesting a pattern of
tactics at odds with demanding dismissal as provided by ORS
135.747.     
We turn, next, to the question whether the state
brought defendant to trial within a "reasonable period of time." 
Defendant expressly requested or cooperated with a number of
delays, that together account for about three of the 15 months
that passed between defendant's indictment and his motion to
dismiss.  We do not consider such delays in our "reasonable
period of time" analysis.  ORS 135.747; Johnson, ___ Or at ___
(slip op at 37).  We focus, instead, on the period of delay that
was beyond defendant's control, i.e., the 11 and one-half months
that the state took to serve the arrest warrant that issued at
the time when a grand jury indicted defendant.
In Johnson, we held that, when the state takes longer 
than ordinarily would be expected to bring a defendant to trial,
the circumstances that caused the delay generally determine
whether the delay is reasonable.  Johnson, ___ Or at ___ (slip op
at 27).  We also held that, in the absence of a good explanation,
we deem a 21-month interval in arraigning a defendant on an
arrest warrant issued pursuant to an indictment to be
unreasonable.  
The delay at issue here is somewhat shorter than the
one at issue in Johnson -- only 11 and one-half months, as
compared to 21 months.  For the purpose of serving a warrant,
however, we think that such a period is sufficiently exceptional
to require an explanation. (4)  Before the trial court, the
state did not attempt to explain the delay, except to say that
"we weren't able to serve the warrant until that time."  The
trial court apparently concluded that the delay was the product
of simple neglect. (5)  
The state now argues that there was good reason for the
delay, namely, that the sheriff's office was operating under
budgetary constraints and workload pressures that prevented it
from executing lower priority warrants, such as traffic offense
warrants, in a timely fashion.  The state contends that the trial
court was aware of those problems, pointing to the following
statement that the trial court made before it denied defendant's
motion to dismiss:
"It's very frustrating for the trial courts
because we have these hundreds of delays sitting
around.  The police department has thousands of
warrants out there.  The police department is
understaffed.  Lovely if we could send out about 20
people who did nothing but go out and serve warrants
and get those suckers cleaned up and get the backlog
cleaned up." 
The state acknowledges that there was no affirmative
evidence in the record pertaining to that explanation for the
delay.  The state suggests, however, that the above-quoted
statement reveals that the trial court was utilizing its own
knowledge that the time period for warrant service was "within
the normal range," given the resource deficiencies that Multnomah
County law enforcement agencies were facing.  The state contends
that we must defer to that factual finding, because the trial
court, "which handles these cases and is confronted with that
backlog on a daily basis," was in the best position "to evaluate
whether the delay in warrant service is beyond what is typical,
given county resources."     
The state's argument fails, because there is no basis
in this record to make any factual finding respecting what is a
"typical" period of delay in serving warrants of this type. 
Moreover, and even if we were willing to accept the foregoing
"finding," we would not accept the two further assumptions
underpinning the state's argument.  First, we do not accept the
state's assumption that a trial judge's direct knowledge of the
"typical" time frame for warrant service in cases in his
courtroom somehow extends to an equally direct knowledge of how
that time frame relates to county resources.  Second, we do not
accept the state's assumptions that, if a time frame for warrant
service is "typical" for a given jurisdiction or courtroom, it
necessarily is "reasonable" for purposes of ORS 135.747. 
In sum, we reject the state's suggestion that the trial
court could find on this record that resource limitations of the
relevant law enforcement agency caused the delay.  There is no
evidentiary support in the record for such a finding, and we know
of no other basis on which the trial court could have made it. 
In the end, given the length of the delay, the state's failure to
offer any reasons for that delay to the trial court, and the lack
of factual support in the record for the state's present
explanation to this court, we conclude that the delay was
unreasonable and that the trial court erred in denying
defendant's motion to dismiss. (6) 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed.   
1. ORS 135.747 provides:
"If a defendant charged with a crime, whose trial has not been postponed
upon the application of the defendant or by the consent of the defendant, is not
brought to trial within a reasonable period of time, the court shall order the
accusatory instrument to be dismissed."
ORS 135.750 provides:  
"If the defendant is not proceeded against or tried, as provided in ORS
135.745 and 135.747, and sufficient reason therefor is shown, the court may order
the action to be continued and in the meantime may release the defendant from
custody as provided in ORS 135.230 to 135.290, for the appearance of the
defendant to answer the charge or action."  
2. This "call" procedure is a feature of the local rules in Multnomah County.
3. The state refers to the two instances on February 8, 2000, and May 15,
2000, in which defendant failed to appear for scheduled proceedings.  However,
the second incident occurred after defendant's motion to dismiss was decided and,
therefore,  cannot serve as justification for the trial court's decision.  
4. As we noted in Johnson, ___ Or at ___ n 12 (slip op at 27 n 12), we
generally expect that the police will execute warrants of this sort within a matter
of weeks, not months.    
5. Before issuing his order denying defendant's motion, the trial judge
indicated that he "was very concerned about the fact that apparently there was no
effort to serve this warrant during the nearly one-year period after the indictment
was handed down."  The trial court ultimately denied the motion because it
concluded that "the fact that the warrant collected cobwebs for nearly a year really
does not impact upon the motion for speedy trial." 
6. Our disposition of the case on this basis leaves open the question whether
an extraordinary delay in service of a warrant, even if caused by limited resources,
could be "reasonable" for purposes of ORS 135.747.  We express no opinion
respecting that question.