Case Title: Word v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 413, 2000

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CLARENCE WORD,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 413, 2000
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN99-06-1635
§                   IN99-06-1636
§
Submitted: April 20, 2001
  Decided:   June 19, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices
O R D E R
This 19th day of June 2001, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal
and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
In 1999, Clarence Word was indicted on charges of Possession
With Intent to Deliver Heroin and Use of a Dwelling for Keeping Controlled
Substances.  Following a jury trial in Superior Court, Word was found guilty
of both charges.  On the first conviction, he was sentenced to 5 years
incarceration at Level V.  On the second conviction, he was sentenced to 2
1Word filed a motion to proceed pro se on appeal, which, following a hearing in
Superior Court, was granted by this Court on January 18, 2001.
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years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended for decreasing levels of
supervision.  This is Word’s direct appeal.1
(2)
On June 17, 1999, Word, who was on probation, was placed
under surveillance by the Wilmington Police Department based on a
confidential informant’s tip that he was storing illegal drugs at his mother’s
house and selling them out of Govatos, a candy store where he was employed.
On that date, as Word was walking to his job at Govatos, his probation
supervisor, Officer Raymond DiClementi, called to him from a parked car.
Word ran into the employees’ entrance to Govatos and up the stairs to the
third floor, with Officer DiClementi and his partner following him and calling
to him to stop.  Word was out of sight for a few seconds.  When he again
appeared, he asked the officers what was going on.  They told Word they had
received a tip he was selling drugs, which he denied.  Word was arrested, but
no drugs were found on his person or in the immediate area.  The officers
then went to Word’s mother’s house, where Word resided, and waited until
she returned home from work.  
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(3)
At trial, the prosecution offered testimony concerning the
subsequent search of Word’s bedroom and the evidence seized there.  Officer
Raymond DiClementi testified that, before the police officers entered Word’s
mother’s residence to conduct the search, she orally consented to a search of
her entire residence, including her son’s bedroom, and showed the officers
where the bedroom was located.  She also subsequently signed a consent to
search form.  Officer DiClementi testified that six or seven bags of heroin
were found in a cigar box on Word’s night stand and twenty-six bags of
heroin were found in the pocket of a shirt hanging in the room.  He further
testified that the heroin, which he identified at trial, was turned over to
Detective Michael Rodriguez, another officer with the Wilmington Police
Department, immediately following its discovery in Word’s bedroom. 
(4)
Detective Henry Cannon testified that his search dog “alerted”
on a cigar box on Word’s night stand from which seven bags of heroin were
retrieved.  He identified the cigar box at trial.  
(5)
Detective Rodriguez testified as a fact witness and as an expert
on the distribution of heroin.  He stated that the search of Word’s bedroom
was in progress when he arrived and the cigar box containing the bags of
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heroin was open on the night stand.  He asked Word if there was any more
heroin in the room and Word told him there was more in the shirt pocket. He
was able to identify the contents of the cigar box and the contents of the shirt
pocket as heroin.  Detective Rodriguez turned the evidence over to Detective
John Drysdale, who was also involved in the search.  
(6)
Detective Drysdale, an officer with the Wilmington Police
Department, testified that he asked the defendant’s mother to sign a consent
to search form immediately after arriving at her house.  Detective Drysdale
also testified that, as he was standing outside Word’s bedroom door, Detective
Rodriguez handed him the cigar box, which he tagged as evidence and took
back to the police station with him for processing. 
(7)
Corporal Redemptor Hidalgo, a narcotics control officer with the
Wilmington Police Department, testified that the evidence seized from Word’s
bedroom was placed in the drug locker at the police department by Detective
Drysdale.  Corporal Hidalgo later retrieved the evidence and gave it to the
Medical Examiner’s office for analysis.  When the Medical Examiner’s office
was finished with its analysis, the evidence was given back to Corporal
Hidalgo, who placed it back in the drug locker.  
211 Del. C. § 4321(d) states as follows:
Probation and parole officers shall exercise the same powers as constables
under the laws of this State and may conduct searches of individuals under
probation and parole supervision in accordance with Department [of
Correction] procedures while in the performance of the lawful duties of
their employment . . . .
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(8)
Dr. Kochu Madhavan, senior forensic chemist with the Medical
Examiner’s Office, testified that his testing of the seized material confirmed
that it was heroin. 
(9)
The defense offered the testimony of Beulah Word, the
defendant’s mother.  She testified that, as she and Officer DiClementi stood
in her living room prior to the search, she gave verbal permission for the
police to search her entire house and then later signed a consent to search
form.  She further stated that she directed the officers to her son’s bedroom.
Finally, Mrs. Word testified that she saw the cigar box being taken from the
night stand and saw that there were little blue plastic bags in the box, but she
did not see the police officers take any drugs out of the shirt pocket. 
(10)
In this appeal, Word claims that: a) the warrantless search of his
bedroom violated 11 Del. C. § 43212, Department of Correction procedures
for searches of probationers’ property, and his constitutional rights, mandating
suppression of the evidence of drug activity; b) the prosecutor and his defense
3Plain error is established by showing “material defects which are apparent on the
face of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and which
clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.”
Wainwright v. State, Del. Supr., 504 A.2d 1096, 1100, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869 (1986).
4Scott v. State, Del. Supr., 672 A.2d 550, 552 (1996) (citing Hanna v. State, Del.
Supr., 591 A.2d 158, 162 (1991)).
5Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1973)).
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counsel failed to inform him about a hearing at which an unidentified
informant testified, thereby violating his constitutional rights; c) the “chain of
custody” of the drug evidence against him was broken, rendering the evidence
inadmissible; and d) the Superior Court abused its discretion by failing to give
a curative instruction concerning testimony about his history of drug use and
a previous shoplifting charge.
(11)
Word’s first claim of an unconstitutional search and seizure is
without merit.  Because Word did not object to the admission of the evidence
of drug activity at his trial, this Court will review the claim under a plain
error standard.3  Searches and seizures are per se unreasonable, in the absence
of exigent circumstances, unless authorized by a warrant supported by
probable cause.4  An exception to the warrant requirement, however, is for
searches that are conducted pursuant to a valid consent.5  In order to be valid,
6Id. (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)).
7DeShields v. State, Del. Supr., 534 A.2d 630, 642-44 (1987); Flamer v. State,
Del. Supr., 490 A.2d 104, 116-17 (1984).
8Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d at 1100.  We also note the United States Supreme
Court’s ruling that probation supervision, including administrative searches of a
probationer’s property, permits a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be
constitutional if applied to the public at large.  Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875
(1987).
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a consent must be voluntary and given by a person with the authority to do
so.6  
(12)
In this case, the trial testimony of Officer DiClementi, Detective
Drysdale and, most importantly, Mrs. Word herself clearly established the
voluntariness of Mrs. Word’s initial verbal consent as well as her subsequent
written consent to search her home, including her son’s bedroom.7  In light
of Mrs. Word’s valid consent, there is no need for us to reach Word’s claim
that certain statutory and regulatory procedures relating to administrative
searches of probationers’ property were not followed.  The claim is meritless
in any case, since Word has failed to show how any failure to follow such
procedures deprived him of a substantial right or resulted in a manifest
injustice.8  Thus, we conclude that Word’s claim of plain error in the
admission of the evidence of drug activity must fail.
9D.R.E. 509(c) (2); Wheatley v. State, Del. Supr., 465 A.2d 1110, 1111-12 (1983).
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(13)
Also without merit is Word’s claim that the failure to inform him
of a hearing concerning the confidential informant violated his constitutional
rights.  The record reflects that Word filed a motion for disclosure of the
identity of the informant, which the Superior Court denied, but does not
reflect that the Superior Court held a hearing on the motion.  Furthermore,
because the record indicates the only information provided by the informant
was the initial tip that Word was involved in selling drugs and the informant
had no information that would “materially aid” the defense, there was no
reason to reveal the informant’s identity and the Superior Court did not abuse
its discretion in so finding.9  
(14)
Word’s third claim is that the prosecution did not properly
establish the “chain of custody” of the evidence of drug activity and,
specifically, that the discrepancy between the weight of the heroin listed on
the police report and that listed on the Medical Examiner’s report shows the
evidence was tampered with.  This claim, presented for the first time in this
appeal and which we therefore review for plain error, is without merit.  The
proper standard for the admission of items into evidence over a chain of
10Baker v. State, Del. Supr., No. 74, 1988, Holland, J., 1988 WL 137190 (Nov.
21, 1988) (ORDER) (citing Tricoche v. State, Del. Supr., 525 A.2d 151, 153 (1987)).
11Id. (citing United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1985)).
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custody objection is whether there is a reasonable probability that the evidence
offered is what the proponent says it is—that is, that the evidence has not been
misidentified and no tampering or adulteration has occurred.10  In the absence
of a clear abuse of discretion, any “breaks” in the chain of custody go to the
weight, rather than the admissibility, of the evidence.11  The record in this
case, and in particular the trial testimony of Officer DiClementi, Detective
Cannon, Detective Rodriguez, Corporal Hidalgo, Dr. Madhavan and
Detective Drysdale, established to a reasonable probability that the evidence
was what the prosecution said it was and that it had not been tampered with
or adulterated, despite the apparent discrepancy in the reporting of the
heroin’s weight.  Therefore, the admission of the evidence by the Superior
Court did not constitute plain error.
(15)
Word’s final claim that the Superior Court committed plain error
by failing to give a curative instruction concerning Officer DiClementi’s
testimony about his history of drug use and a previous shoplifting charge is
also without merit.  Our review of the record indicates that the testimony
12Bromwell v. State, Del. Supr., 427 A.2d 884, 892-93 (1981).
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about which Word complains was elicited by his defense counsel in the
defense’s case in chief.  Furthermore, immediately after the testimony was
elicited, the Superior Court judge had the jury removed from the courtroom
in order to discuss the potentially damaging nature of the testimony with
defense counsel.  Word’s counsel elected to clarify the testimony by eliciting
additional information from the witness rather than request a curative
instruction.  Under these circumstances, the Superior Court did not commit
plain error by permitting the trial to proceed without issuing a curative
instruction sua sponte.12
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ E. Norman Veasey  
Chief Justice