Case Title: The People v. Walkins Contreras

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 37  
The People &c., 
            Respondent, 
        v. 
Walkins Contreras, 
            Appellant.
Krista M. Chiauzzi, for appellant.
Sheila O'Shea, for respondent.
SMITH, J.:
At the outset of defendant's trial for kidnaping, rape
and other crimes, the prosecution called the court's attention to
notes written by the complainant, defendant's wife.  The court
decided that the notes had nothing to do with the case -- a
conclusion amply justified by the record.  Defendant argues,
however, that his rights were violated by the procedure the court
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used in reaching that decision, in that the court initially heard
from the prosecution and the complaining witness ex parte; and
then held a hearing at which defendant's lawyer was present, but
defendant himself was not, and ordered defendant's lawyer not to
disclose the contents of the notes to his client.  We hold that
the court's choice of procedures was a proper exercise of its
discretion. 
I
Defendant, unhappy about the breakup of his marriage to
the complainant and her relationship with another man, forced his
way into her apartment and held her and her seven-year-old son
captive for three hours.  During that time, according to the
complainant's testimony, he raped her twice, threatened
repeatedly to kill her, forced her to write a farewell note to
her child and choked her with an electric cord.  She was finally
able to call 911, and the police came and arrested defendant.
After defendant was arrested and the complainant was
taken to the hospital, the police found a small pad of paper on
the floor of her apartment, with some notes on it in her
handwriting.  The notes refer to a romantic relationship; some of
the language is erotic, and coarse.  The person discussed is not
named, but from the content of the notes it could hardly have
been defendant, complainant's husband: The notes include the
words "get tested," implying a new relationship, not an old one.
Before jury selection began, the prosecutor told the
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court, in defense counsel's presence, that she was requesting in
camera review of some "papers of the complainant."  The court,
treating the application as one for a protective order (see CPL 
240.50), did review the notes in camera, and conducted ex parte
proceedings to determine whether the notes were Rosario material
(People v Rosario, 9 NY2d 286 [1961]) or Brady material (Brady v
Maryland, 373 US 83 [1963]).
During the ex parte proceedings, the prosecutor
(relying on what she had learned from the complainant) asserted
that the notes had nothing to do with the event at issue in the
trial.  The court asked to hear from the complainant herself, who
testified to the same effect.  The complainant said that the
notes had been written a month or more before defendant's attack
on her, as notes to herself about her new relationship.  She said
that when defendant forced his way into her apartment, the
contents of her purse, including the notes, fell on the floor. 
She did not know if defendant had seen the notes. 
At this point, the court called in defense counsel and
told him the contents of the notes, ordering him not to disclose
those contents to his client.  The court said that it was
"excluding" the notes, on the ground that they had nothing to do
with the event at issue and that, if they were evidence of the
complainant's sexual activity, they would be protected by the
Rape Shield Law (CPL § 60.42).  Defense counsel argued that he
should be allowed to use the notes at trial, and asked to
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question the complainant in an effort to demonstrate their
relevance.  The court allowed counsel to ask the complainant
questions, but the questioning did not yield any evidence of a
connection between the notes and the event for which defendant
was on trial.
The court did not alter its ruling forbidding use of
the notes, and the trial proceeded without reference to them. 
Defendant was convicted on several counts.  The Appellate
Division affirmed, and a Judge of this Court granted leave to
appeal.  We now affirm.
II
It is important to understand at the outset the purpose
of the proceedings about which defendant complains.  It was to
determine whether the notes were either Rosario material (i.e.,
prior statements of the complainant relating to the subject of
her testimony) or Brady material (i.e., evidence favorable to
defendant).  Nothing in the record suggests that they were
either.  There is no reason to doubt that they were exactly what
the complainant said they were -- notes written at a different
time on another subject.  There is no evidence that defendant
ever saw them, much less that they motivated his conduct.
In light of the notes' apparent irrelevance to the
case, defendant did not have a right to any hearing on the
Rosario or Brady issue.  We have held that, where there is "some
basis" to believe that material is subject to Brady, "deference
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to the prosecutor's discretion must give way" (People v Andre W.,
44 NY2d 179, 184 [1978], quoting People v Consolazio, 40 NY2d
446, 553 [1976], cert denied, 433 US 914 [1977]), but this case
does not appear to meet even that undemanding test.  There would,
quite likely, have been no error if the prosecution had decided
on its own to withhold the document, and there would surely have
been no error if the court, having reviewed the document in
camera and heard the prosecutor's representations about it, had
decided without further proceedings that the notes were not
subject to either Rosario or Brady.  The prosecutor, in
submitting the document to the court, and the court, in deciding
to hold a hearing on the issue, were erring on the side of
caution.
We heartily approve their decisions to do so. 
Prosecutors and trial judges invite trouble when they push the
rules of disclosure to their limit (see e.g., People v Fuentes,
___ NY3d ___, [decided today]).  But where, as here, the
prosecutor and the court have wisely chosen to give defendant a
procedural opportunity he is not strictly entitled to, they
should not be penalized for not being still more generous.  Where
a court, although not required to do so, chooses to grant a
hearing on the issue of whether a particular piece of evidence
constitutes Rosario or Brady material, it has broad discretion as
to how the hearing should be conducted.  This does not mean that
the court's discretion is unlimited, but it does mean that where
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the trial court has made a reasonable choice among available
procedures, that choice will not be second-guessed on appeal.
The trial court's choice of procedures here was
reasonable.  The document in question, though irrelevant to the
case, had a significant tendency to embarrass the complainant,
and she might have been warranted in fearing worse than
embarrassment if the contents of the document had been
communicated to defendant.  Defendant was incarcerated at the
time of trial, but no one could guarantee that he would long
remain so, and there was ample reason to think he would not react
well to a document expressing the complainant's romantic interest
in another man.  Because the document was both irrelevant and
potentially inflammatory, the trial court was justified in
preventing it from coming to defendant's knowledge.
It is true, as a general matter, that ex parte
proceedings are undesirable, and they should be rare (People v
Frost, 100 NY2d 129, 132 [2003]).  But where the issue to be
decided is whether a document should or should not be disclosed
to the defense, the initial consideration of the question must be
ex parte, almost by its nature; the court can hardly disclose the
document before deciding whether to order it disclosed.  Also,
Criminal Procedure Law § 240.90 (3) expressly permits papers and
testimony on a motion for a protective order to be submitted ex
parte.  
Here, after an ex parte proceeding, the court decided
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to allow defense counsel to know the contents of the document, to
argue for the right to use it at trial and to question the
complainant about it, so long as defendant himself was not told
what the document said.  These rulings were not an abuse of
discretion.  A defendant is entitled to be personally present at
all critical stages of his trial if his presence would contribute
to the fairness of the procedure (Kentucky v Stincer, 482 US 730,
745 [1987]; People v Anderson, 16 NY2d 282 [1965]).  But that
rule is inapplicable here, where the hearing was not only non-
critical, but, as a matter of law, unnecessary.  And while
communication between attorney and client should generally be
unrestricted (Geders v United States, 425 US 80 [1976]; People v
Enrique, 165 AD2d 13, 16 [1st Dept 1991], affd for reasons stated
below 80 NY2d 869 [1992]), there are occasions where restrictions
may legitimately be applied (Perry v Leeke, 488 US 272, 283-285
[1989]; Enrique, 165 AD2d at 20-22).  The disclosure by lawyer to
client of an embarrassing and inflammatory document having
nothing to do with the case is not a constitutionally protected
communication.
Defendant's remaining contention is without merit.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Smith.  Judges Ciparick,
Graffeo, Read, Pigott and Jones concur.  Chief Judge Lippman took
no part.
Decided April 7, 2009