Case Title: State v. Dilts

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  December 16, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
RANDY EVERETT DILTS,
Petitioner on Review.
(99CR-0172; CA A106034; SC S49525; USSC 03-9412)
En Banc
On remand from the United States Supreme Court.*
Submitted September 7, 2004.
Eric M. Cumfer, Senior Deputy Public Defender, Salem, filed the briefs for petitioner on
review.  With him on the briefs were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, Office of Public
Defense Services, and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender.
Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the brief for respondent on
review.  With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is
reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Dilts v. Oregon, 542 US ___, 124 S Ct 2906, 159 L Ed 2d 809 (2004).
BALMER, J.
This case is before us on remand from the United States Supreme Court.  In our
prior decision, we affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for assault.  State v. Dilts, 336
Or 158, 82 P3d 593 (2003) (Dilts I).
  Defendant petitioned for a writ of
certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, and the Court
vacated the judgment in Dilts I and remanded the case to us for
further consideration in light of the Court's decision in Blakely
v. Washington, 542 US ___, 124 S Ct 2531, 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). 
Dilts v. Oregon, 542 US ___, 124 S Ct 2906, 159 L Ed 2d 809
(2004).  For the reasons that follow, we now reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the trial court, and
remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
We begin by briefly reviewing the facts, the parties'
arguments, and the decision in Dilts I.  This court summarized
the procedural background of the case in Dilts I:
"Defendant pleaded guilty to assault in the third
degree. ORS 163.165.  The trial court found that the
crime was racially motivated and imposed an upward
departure sentence under the Oregon Felony Sentencing
Guidelines (sentencing guidelines).  The trial court
sentenced defendant to 36 months' imprisonment and an
additional 36-month period of post-prison supervision. 
Defendant appealed from that sentence, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed.  State v. Dilts, 179 Or App 238, 39
P3d 276 (2002).  Defendant sought review, arguing that
the trial court violated his state and federal jury
trial rights and his federal due process rights by
imposing a departure sentence based on a fact not
pleaded in the indictment or proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."
336 Or at 160.  
On review in this court, defendant argued that, based
on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 US 466, 120 S Ct 2348, 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000),
federal constitutional requirements for jury trial and due
process prohibited the trial court from imposing a sentence
greater than the "presumptive sentence" established in the
sentencing guidelines and determined by the seriousness of the
crime and defendant's criminal history. (1)  The presumptive
sentence for defendant's crime was 15 to 18 months' imprisonment,
but, as noted, the trial court had found that the crime had been
racially motivated and, as the sentencing guidelines permitted,
had imposed a sentence of 36 months' imprisonment and an
additional 36 months of post-prison supervision.  Dilts I, 336 Or
at 163-64.  
In this court, defendant maintained that, under
Apprendi, the trial court could not increase his sentence for
assault above the presumptive range based on the allegedly racial
motivation for the assault unless the state alleged racial
motivation in the indictment and proved it to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.  The state responded that Apprendi did not bar
the upward departure in defendant's sentence as long as
defendant's sentence was not greater than the statutory maximum
sentence for the crime that defendant had committed. (2) 
Because third-degree assault is a Class C felony, ORS 163.165(2),
for which the statutory maximum sentence is five years'
imprisonment, ORS 161.605(3), the state argued that defendant's
federal due process and jury trial rights had not been violated
by the upward departure from the guidelines' presumptive
sentence, as long as the sentence was not more than five years'
imprisonment. (3)
In Dilts I, this court affirmed defendant's sentence,
holding that ORS 161.605 established the maximum penalty for the
crime that defendant had committed and that defendant's sentence
therefore was constitutional under Apprendi because it had not exceeded that prescribed statutory maximum. (4)  Dilts I, 336
Or at 175-76.  In doing so, this court noted that its decision
was consistent with decisions from state courts in Minnesota and
Washington, including State v. Blakely, 111 Wn App 851, 47 P3d
149 (2002), and further noted that the United States Supreme
Court had granted the defendant's petition for certiorari in
Blakely.  Dilts I, 336 Or at 169 n 11.  Subsequent to this
court's decision in Dilts I, the Court reversed the decision of
the Washington Court of Appeals in Blakely.  As noted, defendant
also petitioned for a writ of certiorari, and, following its
decision in Blakely, the Court vacated and remanded this court's
judgment in Dilts I for further proceedings in light of Blakely.
On remand, defendant argues that, under Blakely, the
sentence that the trial court imposed and that this court
affirmed in Dilts I violates his federal jury trial and due
process rights and that this court should remand to the trial
court for resentencing to a sentence within the presumptive
range.  
The state agrees that this court's decision in Dilts I
"cannot be reconciled with the constitutional requirements set
forth in Blakely."  Specifically, the state concedes that Blakely
rejected the proposition, upon which this court based its holding
in Dilts I, that the statutory maximum sentence for Apprendi
purposes is the statutory indeterminate maximum sentence, rather
than the guidelines' presumptive sentence.  The state argues,
however, that this court should sever the requirement in OAR 213-008-0001 that makes the presumptive sentence mandatory. 
According to the state, if this court treats the presumptive
sentence merely as a "recommended" sentence and permits the trial
court either to impose that sentence or a departure sentence
based on the factors in the guidelines, then the presumptive
sentence no longer will be the "statutory maximum," and the
Oregon sentencing scheme will be consistent with Blakely and
Apprendi.  By applying the sentencing guidelines in that way, the
state argues, this court can and should affirm defendant's
sentence.  Alternatively, the state argues that, to comply with
Blakely, this court should remand the case to the trial court to
permit a jury to consider aggravating facts that could permit a
sentence greater than the guidelines' presumptive sentence. (5)
We now turn to the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely
and the effect of that decision on defendant's sentence here. 
The defendant in Blakely pleaded guilty to second-degree
kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of a firearm. 
Blakely, 124 S Ct at 2534-35.  Washington's sentencing
guidelines, like Oregon's, establish a presumptive sentence --
known as the "standard range" -- for a particular crime.  Id. at
2535.  They also permit the sentencing court to impose a sentence
above the standard range -- an "exceptional" sentence -- if the
court finds "substantial and compelling reasons" to justify such
a sentence.  Id. (quoting former Revised Code of Washington (RCW)
Section 9.94A.120(2), recodified as RCW Section 9.94A.505). 
Under the Washington sentencing guidelines, the standard range
for the crime to which defendant pleaded guilty was 49 to 53
months.  Id.  The trial court, however, found that the defendant
had acted with "deliberate cruelty," one of several statutorily
enumerated grounds for departure in a domestic violence case,
and, on that basis, it imposed an exceptional sentence of 90
months.  Id.  The defendant argued that imposing a sentence in
excess of the standard-range maximum
, based on aggravating facts
that neither were 
admitted by him nor found by a jury, violated
his jury trial and due process rights as articulated in Apprendi. 
Washington responded that the relevant statutory maximum for
Apprendi purposes was the 10-year maximum for Class B felonies,
including second-degree kidnapping, rather than the 53-month
standard-
range maximum 
under the sentencing guidelines.  Blakely,
124 S Ct at 2537.
The Court rejected Washington's argument:
"Our precedents make clear * * * that the 'statutory
maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence
a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant.  In other words, the relevant 'statutory
maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose
after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may
impose without any additional findings."
Id. (citations omitted; emphasis in original).  The Court noted
that, if the trial court had imposed the 90-month sentence solely
on the basis of the plea -- that is, without making the
additional finding regarding deliberate cruelty -- then the trial
court would have been reversed.  Id. at 2538.  Because the trial
court had imposed a sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum
and did so because it had found additional facts that had not
been admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury, the
"sentencing procedure did not comply with the Sixth Amendment." 
Accordingly, the defendant's sentence was invalid.  Id.
The Court's decision in Blakely compels us to reverse
our decision in Dilts I.  As relevant to the Court's holding in
Blakely, Oregon's sentencing scheme is not materially different
from Washington's.  The Washington sentencing guidelines
establish a "standard range," and the trial court may impose a
sentence that exceeds the standard range maximum only if the
court makes additional findings.  Under that sentencing scheme,
the Court held that a defendant has a constitutional right to
have a jury decide whether the state has proved those additional
facts.  Similarly, Oregon law
 provides that "the sentencing judge
shall impose the presumptive sentence * * * unless the judge
finds substantial and compelling reasons to impose a departure." 
OAR 213-008-0001 (emphasis added) (6)
; see also ORS 137.669
(sentencing guidelines "shall control the sentences for all
crimes committed after the effective date of such guidelines * * *"); ORS 137.671(1) ("The court may impose a sentence outside
the presumptive sentence or sentence range made presumptive by
ORS 137.669 for a specific offense if it finds there are
substantial and compelling reasons justifying a deviation from
the presumptive sentence.").  If the trial court imposes a
sentence that exceeds the presumptive sentence without making the
required additional findings, then that sentence is erroneous. 
See, e.g., State v. Woodin, 131 Or App 171, 176, 883 P2d 1332
(1994) (remanding case for resentencing because trial court
imposed sentence in excess of presumptive sentence without making
departure findings). 
Here, the presumptive sentence that was based on the
facts that were alleged in the indictment and admitted by
defendant in his guilty plea was 15 to 18 months' imprisonment,
so the "statutory maximum" sentence that the trial court could
have imposed without making additional factual findings was 18
months' imprisonment.  If the trial court had imposed its
sentence of 36 months' imprisonment without finding the
additional facts regarding the racial motivation for the assault,
then that sentence would have been subject to reversal on appeal. 
The trial court had authority to impose the upward departure only
because it made additional findings of fact.  That is precisely
the procedure that the Court in Blakely found did not comply with
the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee.  The Court held in
Blakely that, under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has a right
to have additional facts that may increase his or her sentence
beyond the otherwise applicable maximum sentence decided by a
jury, rather than by a trial judge.  Therefore, like the
defendant's sentence in Blakely, defendant's sentence here is constitutionally impermissible.
We now turn to the consequences of that conclusion.  As
noted, the state argues that, notwithstanding Blakely, this court
should affirm defendant's sentence by construing the presumptive
sentence that the sentencing guidelines establish for his crime
to be a "recommended" sentence rather a "mandatory" sentence. 
The state argues that this result can be achieved by severing OAR
213-008-0001, which provides that the sentencing court "shall"
impose the presumptive sentence "unless the judge finds
substantial and compelling reasons to impose a departure" from
the rest of the sentencing guidelines.  If that mandatory
provision is severed, the state asserts, the guidelines would not
suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
The state misapprehends the nature of severability. 
ORS 174.040 governs decisions regarding severability.  That
statute provides that, "if any part of the statute is held
unconstitutional, the remaining parts shall remain in force"
unless certain conditions identified in the statute are met. 
(Emphasis added.)  See also City University v. Oregon Office of
Educ. Policy, 320 Or 422, 425, 885 P2d 701 (1994) ("This court
has held that, when part or parts of a statute are held
unconstitutional, the whole statute need not be invalidated if
the part or parts that are constitutionally impermissible are
severable from the remainder of the statute." (Emphasis added.)). 
ORS 174.040 and this court's cases thus demonstrate that this
court considers whether a part of a statute should be severed
only when part of a statute is held to be unconstitutional and
the court therefore must determine whether that part of the
statute can be severed and the remaining parts of the statute
saved.  
The state's severability argument suffers from two
defects.  First, the state asks us to sever a part of the
guidelines -- the requirement that the presumptive sentence be
imposed in the absence of additional findings -- that no party
claims is unconstitutional.  Second, nothing in Blakely or in our
application of Blakely to the sentencing guidelines here suggests
that the guidelines themselves, properly applied, are
unconstitutional.  Because these two defects are closely related
in this case, we discuss them together.
As stated above, we hold in this case only that, under
Blakely, the sentencing guidelines were applied
unconstitutionally
 to defendant.  We agree with the state that
this decision will have a significant impact on criminal
sentencing because Blakely also makes it clear that whenever
 a
trial court, in the absence of an effective waiver, 
imposes a
sentence that exceeds the presumptive sentence on the basis of
aggravating facts found by the trial court rather than by a jury
(other than the fact of a prior conviction), 
that sentence
amounts to an unconstitutional application of the sentencing
guidelines.  
However, the fact that the sentencing guidelines may be
applied unconstitutionally, as they were in this case, does not
mean that we must reject the sentencing guidelines themselves as
unconstitutional.  On the contrary, the Court in Blakely
specifically stated that determinate sentencing schemes, like
Oregon's sentencing guidelines, are permissible if they are
implemented "in a way that respects the Sixth Amendment."  124 S
Ct at 2540; see also id. at 2540-41 (rejecting argument that
Blakely undermines determinate sentencing and concluding that
focus instead is on protecting jury trial right).  Because we
have not held that a part of the sentencing guidelines is
unconstitutional, we can identify no unconstitutional part of the
guidelines that might be appropriate to sever.  Rather than add
to or subtract from the words in the sentencing guidelines, as
the state suggests, our holding simply requires Oregon courts to
apply the guidelines "in a way that respects the Sixth
Amendment."  124 S Ct at 2540.
Our holding in this regard illustrates the appropriate
role of the judicial branch in criminal sentencing.  "Determining
the range of possible sentences for particular crimes
historically has been a legislative, rather than a judicial,
function."  State ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597, 615,
932 P2d 1145 (1987); see also State v. Smith, 128 Or 515, 524,
273 P 323 (1929) ("The power to declare what punishment may be
assessed against those convicted of crime is not a judicial, but
a legislative, power * * *.").  Here, the legislature authorized
the creation of the sentencing guidelines and later adopted the
guidelines that the Oregon Criminal Justice Council promulgated. 
The guidelines describe the presumptive sentence range as the
"appropriate punishment" for a crime based on "the seriousness of
the crime of conviction * * * and the offender's criminal
history."  OAR 213-002-0001(3)(d).  "A sentencing judge must
impose a presumptive sentence * * * unless there are 'substantial
and compelling' reasons in aggravation or mitigation * * *." 
State v. Davis, 315 Or 484, 487, 847 P2d 834 (1993). 
The Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Blakely,
prohibits the trial court from imposing a sentence in excess of
the presumptive sentence unless a jury finds the aggravating
facts or the defendant effectively waives that jury trial right. 
Our obligation is to apply the guidelines adopted by the
legislature, consistently with constitutional requirements, and
our decision here does that.  We see no basis upon which to sever
a part of the guidelines as the state suggests.

The state has an alternative argument.  The state
argues that, if this court concludes that defendant's sentence is
invalid, then it should remand to allow a jury to consider
aggravating factors that could support a sentence in excess of
the presumptive sentence in the guidelines.  Defendant agrees
with the general proposition that, under Blakely, a trial court
may impose a sentence that exceeds the presumptive sentence if
the facts on which the increased sentence is based are determined
by a jury.  That conclusion follows ineluctably from the
reasoning of Blakely.  Defendant disagrees, however, with the
state's position that, at this stage of the proceeding, it now
could subject defendant to a separate sentencing trial on remand
during which it would seek to prove to a jury the aggravating
facts previously found by the trial court.  Defendant asserts
that the common law and various state and federal constitutional
provisions require the state to allege in the indictment any
facts that may enhance the defendant's sentence, or at least to
notify the defendant before trial that those facts will be at
issue. (7)  Defendant points out that the indictment here did
not allege such facts and that the state did not notify defendant
that such facts would be at issue before his guilty plea.  In
those circumstances, he argues, the state is precluded from
seeking to present those facts to a sentencing jury now
.
We decline to answer the question that the state
raises, because, at this point in the proceeding, it is not
presented in a sufficiently concrete way.  It is, at least,
contingent on actions that the parties may or may not take on
remand.  The only concrete issue before us at this time is
whether defendant's sentence, which we affirmed in Dilts I, is
invalid in light of Blakely.  We have held that it is.  We also
have rejected the state's argument that we nevertheless should
affirm defendant's sentence by severing the "mandatory" sentence
provision of the guidelines and applying the guidelines to
defendant, as so modified.  Instead, we have determined that the
case must be remanded to the trial court for resentencing.  Our
discussion above makes clear that a sentence within the
guidelines' presumptive range would be constitutional.  However,
we do not speculate as to the specific positions that the parties
may take before the trial court respecting that court's authority
in the resentencing proceedings.  It is inappropriate to address
statutory issues, as well as more fundamental state and federal
constitutional issues, relating, inter alia, to indictment,
notice, and jury trial until they have been raised before and
decided by the trial court.
For the reasons set out above, defendant's sentence is
invalid and must be vacated.  If the parties agree, then the
trial court may sentence defendant to a sentence that does not
exceed the upper limit of the presumptive sentence under the
sentencing guidelines.  If the parties disagree, then their
positions regarding particular alternative means of determining
the proper sentence must be presented to and decided by the trial
court in the first instance.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
1. In Dilts I, this court described the origins and mechanics
of the sentencing guidelines.  336 Or at 161-62.
2. In Apprendi, the Court summarized its holding as follows:  "Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  530 US at 490.
3. Defendant's sentence of 36 months' post-prison supervision, when added to his sentence
of 36 months' imprisonment, exceeded the statutory maximum sentence of five years (60
months).  However, defendant did not preserve any issue as to that fact in the Court of Appeals. 
Dilts I, 336 Or at 164 n 5.
4. This court declined to reach defendant's state law challenges to his sentence, because he
had failed to develop them with sufficient particularity.  Dilts I, 336 Or at 164 n 6.
5. The state makes several other arguments regarding how this court should or should not
apply Blakely in other contexts.  Here, we reach only the arguments necessary to the disposition
of this case in this court.  We recognize the many unsettled questions regarding the application of
Blakely and Apprendi to different aspects of Oregon's sentencing scheme.  We think that those
questions are better answered in the context of specific cases in which they are raised and
briefed.  Moreover, we are aware that we may be shooting at a moving target.  In response to
Blakely, prosecutors, the criminal defense bar, and members of the legislature in many states,
including Oregon, may be reviewing sentencing procedures for possible modification. 
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has granted petitions for certiorari in two cases
that raise Blakely-related issues, United States v. Booker, 375 F3d 508 (7th Cir 2004), cert
granted, 73 USLW 3033 (US Aug 2, 2004) (No 04-104), and Fanfan v. United States, No 03-47,
2004 WL 1723114 (D Me June 28, 2004), cert granted sub nom United States v. Fanfan, 73
USLW 3073 (US Aug 2, 2004) (No 04-105).  In deciding those cases, the Court may provide
further guidance regarding the scope of the jury trial right as it applies to criminal sentencing.
6. As this court noted in Dilts I, although the Oregon Criminal Justice Council created the
sentencing guidelines as administrative rules, the legislature approved them in 1989, and they
have the authority of statutory law.  336 Or at 162.
7. Defendant's brief is less than clear on his specific objections to a sentencing trial on
remand, but he cites Oregon common law, Article I, section 11, and Article VII (Amended),
section 5, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.