Case Title: Westlake Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Pietrick

Citation: 2015-Ohio-961

Docket Number: 2013-0052

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Westlake Civ. Serv. Comm. v. Pietrick, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-961.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-961 
WESTLAKE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. 
PIETRICK, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Westlake Civ. Serv. Comm. v. Pietrick,  
Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-961.] 
Civil service—R.C. 124.34(C)—Appeal on questions of law and fact—Retrial by 
common pleas court—R.C. 2505.01(A)(3). 
(No. 2013-0052—Submitted February 5, 2014—Decided March 17, 
2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 98258, 2012-Ohio-6009. 
___________________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we review the application of R.C. 124.34 to the 
disciplinary action taken by appellant city of Westlake against its fire chief.  We 
hold that a trial court in an R.C. 124.34(C) appeal has the authority to reduce a 
firefighter’s punishment imposed by a civil service commission for violations of 
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R.C. 124.34(A) and that the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion by 
reducing the punishment imposed by the city. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Richard O. Pietrick, began his career with the Westlake 
Fire Department in 1980, when the city hired him as a firefighter/paramedic.  He 
was promoted to the position of lieutenant in 1989 and to captain in 1993.  On 
November 23, 1994, Westlake’s mayor, Dennis Clough, appointed Pietrick chief 
of the Westlake fire department.  Clough also serves as safety director and has 
direct supervisory control over the fire department. 
{¶ 3} Pietrick’s tenure as chief was not without problems.  In 2005, 
Westlake City Council, at the request of Pietrick and the firefighters’ union, 
International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 1814, allotted funding for a risk 
assessment of the fire department.  McGrath and Associates (“McGrath”), the 
firm conducting the assessment, issued its first report on the state of the 
department in November 2005.  McGrath found the department to be in complete 
disarray.  According to McGrath’s report, department leaders failed to display 
managerial competence or to punish employees for bad behavior.  McGrath 
recommended that Pietrick alter his management style to rectify these 
shortcomings. 
{¶ 4} Mayor Clough met with Pietrick to discuss McGrath’s report and 
recommendations.  According to Clough, Pietrick failed to implement many 
changes, and the state of the department continued to deteriorate.  In 2006, Mayor 
Clough requested that city council again commission McGrath for a follow-up 
review of the department. 
{¶ 5} McGrath issued its second report in December 2006. The review 
uncovered increased dysfunction between department leaders and rank-and-file 
employees.  Due to the lack of improvement in the department as set forth in the 
second report, Clough ultimately asked Pietrick to resign.  Pietrick declined.  
January Term, 2015 
3 
 
Clough demanded that Pietrick work on making the necessary improvements in 
the department as recommended in the report, and required that Pietrick move his 
office into City Hall.  Clough took an active role in working with Pietrick in 
correcting problems in the department. 
{¶ 6} But the foregoing is all background to the specific allegations at 
issue in this case.  On June 6, 2007, Clough was copied on a letter from the 
union’s president to Pietrick, requesting that Pietrick discontinue his practice of 
using department employees—firefighter-mechanics—to work on his personal 
vehicles.  Firefighter-mechanics are firefighters who also perform light and 
scheduled maintenance on fire department vehicles and work with the service 
department to make sure that the vehicles are fit for use.  Pietrick responded a 
week later, copying Mayor Clough, stating that he would discontinue the practice 
but denying that it was a conflict of interest. 
{¶ 7} Mayor Clough hired an attorney, Jonathan Greenberg of Walter & 
Haverfield, L.L.P., to conduct an independent investigation into the department.  
During his investigation, Greenberg interviewed Pietrick and three Westlake 
firefighter-mechanics—Todd Spriesterbach, Chris Gut, and Doug Vasi. 
{¶ 8} During Pietrick’s interview with Greenberg, he admitted that the 
mechanics had performed work on his personal vehicles while they worked for 
the city.  Greenberg, however, found no evidence that Pietrick had intimidated or 
coerced the mechanics to work on his personal vehicles. 
{¶ 9} Under Pietrick’s management, the mechanic position changed from 
a relatively permanent position to an annual appointment.  The mechanic position 
paid a 5 percent premium over the base wage for firefighters.  This position had 
no posted requirements or standardized test, and there was no interview for the 
job.  Greenberg wrote that, accordingly, Pietrick had “virtually unfettered 
discretion to make these appointments and reappointments according to whatever 
standards he deem[ed] fit.” 
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{¶ 10} Spriesterbach told Greenberg that Pietrick requested free 
mechanical services on multiple occasions but that these “favors” never interfered 
with his normal work duties.  Still, these requests made Spriesterbach 
uncomfortable.  But he felt compelled to perform them in order to “keep the Chief 
happy to keep [his] job active every year.”  Pietrick also requested free 
mechanical services from Chris Gut, who diagnosed a problem with Pietrick’s 
personal lawn tractor and dismantled the tractor’s engine. 
{¶ 11} Greenberg included all of the aforementioned information in his 
2007 report to Clough.  Greenberg concluded that Pietrick’s conduct was neither 
criminal nor violative of Ohio ethics laws but that “Chief Pietrick’s actions in 
having his subordinates perform repairs on his personal vehicles under 
circumstances suggesting that he may hav[e] been taking advantage of his status 
as their superior officer represents extremely poor judgment * * *.”  Greenberg 
recommended that the city consider punishing Pietrick through internal remedies. 
{¶ 12} On November 2, 2007, after receiving Greenberg’s report, Clough 
issued Pietrick a notice of disciplinary action for “acts of misfeasance, 
malfeasance, non-feasance, neglect of duty and failure of good behavior as 
provided in O.R.C. 124.34 and Westlake Civil Service Commission Rule XI.”  
The notice was based only upon Pietrick’s requests to department mechanics to 
work on Pietrick’s vehicles.  Clough demoted Pietrick from chief to firefighter 
and suspended him for 30 days without pay. 
{¶ 13} Pietrick filed an appeal with appellant Westlake Civil Service 
Commission.  Pietrick’s appeal was heard before a hearing officer, David Pincus, 
on November 30, 2007. 
{¶ 14} At that hearing, Acting Chief Ronald Janicek testified that the 
firefighters were permitted to work on hobbies when it was slow around the fire 
station.  If firefighters worked on their cars, they were permitted to perform only 
“light mechanic work,” like changing a headlight, but nothing that would render 
January Term, 2015 
5 
 
their cars inoperable.  Firefighters commonly helped one another with minor car 
repairs.  On several occasions, however, Pietrick requested Firefighter-Mechanic 
Spriesterbach to perform work on his and his family members’ cars.  Some of 
these repairs left the cars temporarily inoperable.  For example, Spriesterbach 
replaced the drive shaft for Pietrick’s mother’s vehicle, which involved major 
disassembly of the front end of the vehicle and extensive work to the car’s 
transmission.  Spriesterbach testified that Pietrick asked him to call around for the 
best prices on parts and to try to get the fire department’s commercial discount on 
the parts.  Firefighter Gut disassembled an entire lawn-tractor engine at Pietrick’s 
request.  The tractor remained in a firehouse bay for a week until Pietrick 
removed it.  Nonetheless, department mechanics performed work for Pietrick only 
five or six times during his career, and Pietrick assisted in many of these repairs. 
{¶ 15} Pincus issued a report and recommendation on April 30, 2008.  
Pincus concluded that “[t]he City had just cause to demote and suspend Fire Chief 
Pietrick,” finding that “[t]he actions engaged in by Chief Pietrick were egregious, 
substantive and reflect certain leadership failures.”  Pincus determined that 
Pietrick had violated R.C. 124.34 “for neglect of duty and failure of good 
behavior * * * and related City of Westlake rules and regulations.”  On May 8, 
2008, the Westlake Civil Service Commission approved and adopted Pincus’s 
report and recommendation. 
{¶ 16} Pietrick appealed the decision to the Cuyahoga County Common 
Pleas Court.  The trial court, noting that “[a]n appeal to a common pleas court on 
questions of law and fact from a municipal civil service commission’s decision, 
taken pursuant to R.C. 124.34(C), is a trial de novo,” affirmed in part and 
reversed in part the commission’s ruling.  The trial court concluded that “[t]he 
evidence supports a finding that appellant’s conduct in having a Department 
Mechanic make repairs on his personal vehicles and machinery was improper” 
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and that Pietrick had “demonstrated extremely poor judgment, reasonably 
drawing his leadership of the Fire Department into question.” 
{¶ 17} But the trial court found that the punishment imposed by the 
commission was excessive: 
 
Yet, against this instance of grossly poor judgment, other 
facts suggest that the discipline meted out was excessive.  Firstly, 
there were no written work rules or policies in place that were 
violated.  No prior complaints had been lodged.  No specific 
directives or guidelines discouraging such practices were ever 
issued.  Department Mechanics were not expressly told by 
appellant [that] they were required to perform the repairs in 
question.  No negative work action was ever taken against any one 
of them for not fulfilling appellant’s requests.  Finally, when a 
complaint was formally lodged by the union, appellant readily 
promised to cease the practice and offered to meet with the union 
to discuss the matter in greater detail. 
 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
{¶ 18} Further, the trial court held that the totality of Pietrick’s service in 
the department deserved consideration.  The court pointed out that Pietrick had 
worked his way up the ranks during his 25-year career and had received no prior 
reprimands and had an unblemished record of service. 
{¶ 19} Ultimately, the court concluded: 
 
January Term, 2015 
7 
 
Standing alone, the circumstances surrounding the repair of 
appellant’s automobiles and those of his family members merited 
discipline.  However, demotion to the lowest rank in the 
Department was unwarranted.  While the City of Westlake may 
have been justified in stripping appellant of his position as Fire 
Chief, reducing his rank below that of Captain was not.  Under the 
totality of circumstances, the demotion to firefighter was 
unreasonable and excessive. 
 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
{¶ 20} Accordingly, the court affirmed Pietrick’s 30-day suspension 
without pay and his demotion from the position of fire chief.  However, the court 
reversed the demotion to the position of firefighter and ordered that Pietrick be 
reinstated to the rank of captain “with full seniority, back pay and commensurate 
benefits.” 
{¶ 21} All parties appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, the 
city and its civil service commission arguing that the trial court had erred in 
modifying the penalty imposed by the commission, and Pietrick arguing that the 
trial court erred in not reinstating him to his position as fire chief.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 
{¶ 22} The cause is before this court upon the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal by the city and its civil service department. 136 Ohio St. 3d 
1406, 2013-Ohio-2645, 989 N.E.2d 1020. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 23} R.C. 124.34(A) describes the types of acts for which civil servants 
may be disciplined in Ohio.  The statute states: 
 
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No officer or employee shall be reduced in pay or position, fined, 
suspended, or removed, or have the officer’s or employee’s 
longevity reduced or eliminated, except * * * for incompetency, 
inefficiency, 
dishonesty, 
drunkenness, 
immoral 
conduct, 
insubordination, discourteous treatment of the public, neglect of 
duty, violation of any policy or work rule of the officer’s or 
employee’s appointing authority, violation of this chapter or the 
rules of the director of administrative services or the commission, 
any other failure of good behavior, any other acts of misfeasance, 
malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, or conviction of a felony. 
 
It is, to a large extent, a nonspecific list, setting forth types of misbehavior rather 
than specific prohibited acts.  When disciplining Pietrick, Mayor Clough cited 
specific language of the statute that also appears in Westlake’s civil service rules, 
concluding that Pietrick had “committed acts of misfeasance, non-feasance, 
neglect of duty and failure of good behavior.”  In its review, Westlake’s civil 
service commission affirmed the mayor’s decision. 
{¶ 24} Pietrick, as chief of a fire department in the classified civil service, 
had the right under R.C. 124.34(C) to appeal the civil service commission’s 
decision to the common pleas court on questions of law and fact:   
 
In the case of the suspension for any period of time, or a fine, 
demotion, or removal, of a chief of police, a chief of a fire 
department, or any member of the police or fire department of a 
city or civil service township, who is in the classified civil service, 
the appointing authority shall furnish the chief or member with a 
copy of the order of suspension, fine, demotion, or removal, which 
order shall state the reasons for the action. * * * An appeal on 
January Term, 2015 
9 
 
questions of law and fact may be had from the decision of the 
commission to the court of common pleas in the county in which 
the city or civil service township is situated. 
 
This “appeal on questions of law and fact” is a relative rarity among civil service 
employees whose misdeeds allow for discipline under R.C. 124.34(A).  An appeal 
on questions of law and fact is “a rehearing and retrial of a cause upon the law 
and facts.” R.C. 2505.01(A)(3).  R.C. 124.34 “provides two separate procedures, 
one for civil servants who are not policemen or firemen and another for civil 
servants who are police or fire officers.” Chupka v. Saunders, 28 Ohio St.3d 325, 
331, 504 N.E.2d 9 (1986) (Brown, J. concurring).  R.C. 124.34(C) allows only 
members of city or township police and fire departments an appeal on questions 
of law and fact; such an appeal constitutes a trial de novo. Chupka at 327, citing 
Cupps v. Toledo, 172 Ohio St. 536, 179 N.E.2d 70 (1961), paragraph two of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 25} In a trial de novo, “the court of common pleas is empowered to 
‘ * ** substitute its own judgment on the facts for that of the commission, based 
upon the court’s independent examination and determination of conflicting issues 
of fact.’ ” Id., quoting Newsome v. Columbus Mun. Civ. Serv. Comm., 20 Ohio 
App.3d 327, 329, 486 N.E.2d 174 (1984).  Thus, the trial court in this case was 
charged with “determin[ing] the facts and giv[ing] judgment disposing of the 
issues of law and fact as if no trial had been had in the lower tribunal.”  Lincoln 
Properties, Inc. v. Goldslager, 18 Ohio St.2d 154, 248 N.E.2d 57 (1969), 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 26} The trial court wrote in its opinion that the commission “must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the charges against [Pietrick] were 
true and the discipline taken warranted.”  It found that the charges were true, but 
that the level of discipline imposed by the commission was unwarranted. 
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{¶ 27} The appellants present two propositions of law to this court.  The 
first states, “Criminal or unethical conduct is not a pre-requisite to a finding that a 
public employee has engaged in neglect of duty or failure of good behavior 
pursuant to R.C. §124.34.”  That is a statement that we do not disagree with, and, 
for that matter, neither does Pietrick.  But the statement is irrelevant to this case.  
The court of appeals never stated that criminal or unethical conduct is a 
prerequisite to finding that a public employee has violated R.C. 124.34(A).  The 
appellants seize upon the following paragraph from the court of appeals decision, 
characterizing it as making a crime or unethical behavior a prerequisite to 
discipline:  
 
 
Here, as previously noted, the trial court found that Pietrick 
demonstrated extremely poor judgment, as opposed to committing 
acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance, neglect of duty, 
and failure of good behavior.  The trial court’s finding was 
consistent with the determination of the outside law firm, which 
concluded that Pietrick had not done anything criminal and had not 
done anything that was likely an ethical violation. Accordingly, the 
trial court acted within its discretion. 
 
2012-Ohio-6009, ¶ 38. 
{¶ 28} But that paragraph does not make a crime or unethical behavior a 
prerequisite to punishment.  Pietrick was punished in this case: the trial court 
demoted him to captain and affirmed the commission’s 30-day suspension.  The 
trial court imposed a reduced punishment, but a punishment nonetheless, upon 
Pietrick for his behavior.  The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s imposition 
of a punishment based upon the trial court’s holding that Pietrick’s use of 
“extremely poor judgment” warranted discipline.  Neither the trial court nor the 
January Term, 2015 
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appellate court held that Pietrick’s wrongdoing did not fall under the type of 
activity covered by R.C. 124.34(A).  He did receive punishment for a noncriminal 
act. 
{¶ 29} The court of appeals reviewed the trial court’s holding under an 
abuse-of-discretion standard.  In the essential holding of the case, the court 
concluded:  
 
This court concludes that the following language of the trial 
court in its de novo authority amounts to a well-reasoned decision 
and is not unreasonable: 
“* * * Yet against this instance of grossly poor judgment, 
other facts suggest that the discipline meted out was excessive.  
Firstly, there were no written work rules or policies in place that 
were violated.  No prior complaints had been lodged.  No specific 
directives or guidelines discouraging such practices were ever 
issued. Department Mechanics were not expressly told by 
appellant they were required to perform the repairs in question.  No 
negative work action was ever taken against any one of them for 
not fulfilling appellant’s requests.  Finally, when a complaint was 
formally lodged by the union, appellant readily promised to cease 
the practice and offered to meet with the union to discuss the 
matter in greater detail.” (Trial Court's Opinion and Order, Page 9.) 
 
2012-Ohio-6009, ¶ 26.  That is, the court of appeals held that the trial court had 
not abused its discretion in taking into account certain mitigating factors and 
reducing the penalty imposed by the commission for a violation of R.C. 
124.34(A).  The appellate court imposed no requirement that a civil service 
employee must commit a crime or engage in unethical conduct for discipline to be 
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imposed.  Accordingly, the appellants’ first proposition of law is not relevant to 
this case. 
{¶ 30} The second proposition of law submitted by the city and 
commission is “Regardless of the term of art used to describe the conduct subject 
to discipline, the Court of Common Pleas upheld the Appellants’ determination 
that Appellee engaged in neglect of duty and/or failure of good behavior.”  Again, 
we agree with this proposition of law, but find that it has no bearing on the 
outcome of this case.  The trial court did find that Pietrick had engaged in activity 
proscribed by R.C. 124.34(A), and it never disputed the commission’s conclusion 
that Pietrick had engaged in behavior meriting discipline.  That discipline could 
come only from a finding of a violation of R.C. 124.34(A).  The trial court did not 
adopt the commission’s finding on the severity of Pietrick’s punishment, but it did 
conclude that he had engaged in wrongdoing sufficient for the imposition of 
discipline under R.C. 124.34. 
{¶ 31} This is not to say that all of the dicta in the court of appeals 
decision was perfectly stated.  The appellate court concluded that the trial court 
had come to a different conclusion from the city as to the underlying offense: 
 
Our review of the trial court’s opinion reveals that it failed to adopt 
the City’s finding of misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance, 
neglect of duty, and failure of good behavior, but instead 
substituted that finding to one of “grossly poor judgment.”  This, 
the trial court could do under its de novo review. 
 
2012-Ohio-6009 at ¶ 30.  The court added, “The City suggests that there is no 
difference between ‘grossly poor judgment’ and misfeasance, malfeasance, 
nonfeasance, neglect of duty, and failure of good behavior.  We disagree.” Id. at 
¶ 34. 
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{¶ 32} But for all practical purposes, there truly was no real difference 
between the commission and the trial court as to whether Pietrick had engaged in 
behavior prohibited by R.C. 124.34(A).  The trial court did not attempt to create 
any dichotomy between its characterization of Pietrick’s wrongful acts and the 
commission’s.  Instead, it simply concluded that the punishment the commission 
imposed for that violation was unduly harsh, given certain mitigating factors.  
This it could do as part of its de novo review.  Raizk v. Brewer, 12th Dist. Clinton 
Nos. CA2002-05-021 and CA2002-05-023, 2003-Ohio-1266, ¶ 25; Hostiuck v. 
Gertz, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-840521, 1985 WL 8921 (July 10, 1985). 
{¶ 33} The court of appeals appeared to be under the misapprehension 
that the trial court was unable to modify the penalty imposed without rejecting the 
city’s finding of “misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance, neglect of duty, and 
failure of good behavior.”  The court unnecessarily addressed Maurer v. Franklin 
Cty. Treasurer, 10th Dist. No 07AP-1027, 2008-Ohio-3468, ¶ 16, which holds 
that “[w]here the evidence supports the board’s decision, the common pleas court 
must affirm the board’s decision and has no authority to modify the penalty.”  The 
court below held that Maurer did not apply in this case because “[h]ere, the trial 
court held that the evidence did not support the City’s findings and substituted its 
judgment when it held that at best Pietrick’s conduct was ‘grossly poor judgment’ 
that required a different penalty.”  Pietrick at ¶ 31. 
{¶ 34} But the real reason Maurer did not apply in this case is that it did 
not involve an R.C. 124.34(C) appeal.  In Maurer, a county employee appealed 
his termination from the treasurer’s office; he was not a police or fire official 
entitled to the benefit of R.C. 124.34(C).  As the court stated in Maurer, the trial 
court’s review of the administrative record in that case was not a trial de novo. 
Maurer at ¶ 15.  Instead, it was an appeal brought pursuant to R.C. 119.12, and, as 
the court stated in Maurer, in an R.C. 119.12 appeal, “the common pleas court 
may not substitute its judgment for that of the [agency]” if the evidence supports 
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the agency’s decision. Id. at ¶ 16.  But in this case involving an R.C. 124.34(C) 
appeal, the trial court did have the authority to substitute its judgment for that of 
the civil service commission.  This includes the authority to modify the 
punishment imposed by the commission.  Thus, although the statement in the 
appellants’ second proposition of law is correct—the trial court did uphold the 
commission’s determination that Pietrick had engaged in neglect of duty and/or 
failure of good behavior—that fact has no bearing on this case.  Where the trial 
court differed from the commission was on the severity of the penalty. 
{¶ 35} At oral argument, the appellants conceded that the trial court had 
the authority to modify the penalty imposed by the commission.  But as a subpart 
of its second proposition of law, the appellants argue that the trial court abused its 
discretion in so modifying the discipline imposed by the commission. 
{¶ 36} “Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, a lower court decision will 
not be reversed for mere error, but only when the court’s decision is unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Morrow v. Becker, 138 Ohio St.3d 11, 13, 2013-
Ohio-4542, 3 N.E.3d 144, ¶ 9.  A reviewing court must be deferential in 
considering whether a lower court abused its discretion: “It is not sufficient for an 
appellate court to determine that a trial court abused its discretion simply because 
the appellate court might not have reached the same conclusion or is, itself, less 
persuaded by the trial court’s reasoning process than by the countervailing 
arguments.”  State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St. 3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 
528, ¶ 14, citing AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban 
Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).  We agree 
with the appellate court that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
modifying the punishment imposed by the commission in this case.  The trial 
court included its reasoning in its opinion, setting forth a number of points 
justifying its modification of the commission’s penalty.  This court need not say 
whether it would have reached the same conclusion as the trial court, but we do 
January Term, 2015 
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conclude that the trial court’s determination was not unreasonable, arbitrary, 
unconscionable, or contrary to law. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 37} A trial court, as part of its de novo review of a civil service 
commission’s decision pursuant to R.C. 124.34(C), has the authority to modify 
the disciplinary measures imposed by the commission.  As the court of appeals 
determined, the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion in modifying the 
discipline imposed by the commission.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of 
the appellate court. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
____________________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 38} I respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 39} This case concerns the standard of review that a common pleas 
court should apply in reviewing discipline imposed on a fire chief found to have 
committed misconduct in office.  The Eighth District Court of Appeals 
erroneously concluded that an administrative appeal from a civil service 
commission is subject to a trial de novo, thus permitting the common pleas court 
to substitute its judgment for that of the commission and to modify the discipline 
it imposed—even if the court upholds the commission’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  Based on its view, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment 
of the trial court, which had affirmed the findings of misconduct made by the 
commission but modified the discipline imposed on Richard O. Pietrick as 
excessive. 
{¶ 40} The administrative review of an order of the civil service 
commission by the common pleas court is limited to determining whether the 
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decision is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in 
accordance with law.  Here, the court determined that the evidence and law 
supported the commission’s decision, and it had no authority to modify the 
discipline imposed absent a showing that the commission abused its discretion.  
Because the common pleas court found that the facts supported a finding that 
Pietrick had committed misconduct in violation of R.C. 124.34(A) and did not 
find an abuse of discretion in its review of the commission decision, the appellate 
court applied the wrong standard in affirming the court below, and therefore I 
would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the decision of 
the Westlake Civil Service Commission. 
R.C. 124.34(C) 
{¶ 41} R.C. 124.34(C) allows any member of a city or civil service 
township police or fire department who is suspended, fined, demoted, or removed 
to appeal on questions of law and fact to the common pleas court. R.C. 
2505.01(A)(3), in turn, defines “appeal on questions of law and fact” to mean “a 
rehearing and retrial of a cause upon the law and the facts.” 
{¶ 42} In Chupka v. Saunders, 28 Ohio St.3d 325, 327, 504 N.E.2d 9 
(1986), this court described this type of appeal as “governed by the provisions of 
R.C. Chapter 2505 to the extent they are applicable.”  Quoting former R.C. 
2505.21, 126 Ohio Laws 56, 58, as providing that “ ‘[a]n appeal taken on 
questions of law and fact entitles the party to a hearing and determination of the 
facts de novo,’ ” id., we concluded that the court of common pleas could, in fact, 
“ ‘substitute its own judgment on the facts for that of the commission, based upon 
the court’s independent examination and determination of conflicting issues of 
fact,’ ” id., quoting Newsome v. Columbus Civ. Serv. Comm., 20 Ohio App.3d 
327, 329, 486 N.E.2d 174 (1984). 
{¶ 43} However, shortly before we issued our decision in Chupka, the 
General Assembly repealed R.C. 2505.21, effective March 17, 1987.  141 Ohio 
January Term, 2015 
17 
 
Laws, Part II, 3563, 3643.  Thus, the Revised Code no longer affords a party 
taking an appeal on questions of law and fact a hearing de novo.  For this reason, 
R.C. 124.34(C) permits the common pleas court to review the evidence submitted 
to the civil service commission, but that review is no longer a de novo proceeding, 
and therefore the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the civil service 
commission. 
{¶ 44} By eliminating the right to a trial de novo, the General Assembly 
has aligned the appeal afforded by R.C. 124.34(C) with the appeal afforded by 
R.C. 124.34(B), which permits other similarly situated public employees in the 
classified service, including state and county public safety officers, to appeal their 
removal or reduction in pay to the common pleas court pursuant to R.C. 119.12. 
{¶ 45} R.C. 119.12—like R.C. 124.34(C)—provides for a rehearing and 
retrial on the law and the facts, requiring the appeal in the common pleas court to 
“proceed as in the trial of a civil action,” authorizing the court to admit additional 
evidence, and directing it to review whether the disciplinary action “is supported 
by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.” 
{¶ 46} Further, in an administrative appeal brought pursuant to R.C. 
119.12, the common pleas court is not authorized to modify a penalty that is 
supported by both sufficient evidence and the law, even if that penalty seems 
“admittedly harsh.”    Henry's Cafe, Inc. v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 170 Ohio St. 
233, 236-237, 163 N.E.2d 678 (1959); accord Maurer v. Franklin Cty. Treasurer, 
10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-1027, 2008-Ohio-3468, ¶ 16  (“Where the evidence 
supports the board’s decision, the common pleas court must affirm the board’s 
decision and has no authority to modify the penalty”).  In those circumstances, the 
statute requires the court to defer to the determination of the commission.  See 
Univ. of Cincinnati v. Conrad, 63 Ohio St.2d 108, 111, 407 N.E.2d 1265 (1980) 
(requiring “deference to the administrative resolution of evidentiary conflicts”). 
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{¶ 47} Thus, construing R.C. 124.34(C) in harmony with R.C. 124.34(B) 
and 119.12, the same procedures and scope of review apply whenever an officer 
or employee in the classified service—state, county, city, or township—is 
disciplined pursuant to R.C. 124.34(A). 
{¶ 48} For these reasons, the common pleas court is not authorized to 
conduct a trial de novo or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the civil 
service commission in an appeal brought pursuant to R.C. 124.34(C), and 
therefore, it must affirm the commission if its decision is supported by reliable, 
probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. 
{¶ 49} Here, the common pleas court made such findings; it upheld the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law of the commission, but it errantly changed 
the sanction imposed by the civil service commission.  Based on the state of this 
record, the court of appeals erred in overlooking this abuse of discretion by the 
trial court. 
Pietrick’s Misconduct 
{¶ 50} Pietrick’s tenure as fire chief left the Westlake Fire Department 
plagued by “organizational dysfunction” and deteriorating morale among rank 
and file firefighters.  An independent audit recommended improvements to his 
management of the department, but a year later, a second audit revealed that many 
of the needed changes had not been made, noting “the continued decline in morale 
and sometimes openly hostile feelings exhibited by members of the fire 
department” and that “[t]he firefighting staff continues to be unsupportive of the 
Fire Chief * * *.”  Mayor Dennis Clough requested Pietrick’s resignation due to 
the fact that “he had a year after the audit and it still appeared things were much 
worse,” but Pietrick refused. 
{¶ 51} The Westlake Fire Fighters Association then wrote a letter to 
Pietrick and sent a copy to the mayor, complaining of Pietrick’s practice of asking 
firefighters to do personal work for him:  
January Term, 2015 
19 
 
 
[T]he current practice of having Union Members work on your 
personal vehicles can no longer be tolerated.  It puts our Union 
membership in an uncomfortable position as you make the final 
decision on who maintains the Department’s “Mechanics” title 
every year.  The Union believes that this is a conflict of interest 
and not good for the moral of [the] Fire Department. 
 
{¶ 52} Mayor Clough ordered a separate investigation into these 
allegations and determined that Pietrick had “abused [his] authority by asking the 
appointee to do personal favors * * * [by] providing free mechanical services on 
[his] private vehicles.”  The disciplinary action taken by the mayor—stripping 
Pietrick of any managerial role in the department—represented the culmination of 
the city’s review of Pietrick’s tenure as fire chief, because his own misconduct 
had directly contributed to dysfunction and resentment in the fire department. 
{¶ 53} The city demonstrated that Pietrick had sole, unfettered discretion 
to appoint firefighters to the mechanic positions, which paid 5 percent more than 
base wages.  And because the appointments had to be renewed annually by the 
chief, appointees felt pressure to “keep the Chief happy.” 
{¶ 54} For instance, Pietrick asked Mechanic Christopher Gut to work on 
his lawn tractor.  Gut testified: “He insisted I tear it apart and show him what the 
problem was.”  Over the next few days, Pietrick asked Gut whether he had called 
about the part needed to repair the tractor, “insinuating that he wanted [Gut] to get 
the part.” 
{¶ 55} Similarly, Mechanic Todd Spriesterbach testified that Pietrick 
asked for major repairs to his privately owned vehicles.  Spriesterbach replaced 
the drive shaft on Pietrick’s mother’s car, the water pump and radiator on 
Pietrick’s van, and the brakes and rotors on Pietrick’s car.  When Pietrick’s son’s 
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Cadillac was not steering property, Spriesterbach diagnosed a broken power 
steering pump; according to Spriesterbach, Pietrick purchased a new pump.  
Spriesterbach testified: “He told me he was going to have the car in the parking 
lot and that I should bring it inside and get it done.  He gave me a time frame that 
was going to be convenient for him to come back and pick it up later that night.”  
On other occasions, Pietrick also asked Spriesterbach to call stores for parts and 
tires to obtain the commercial discount offered to the fire department. 
{¶ 56} Even 
though 
Pietrick’s 
requests 
made 
Spriesterbach 
“uncomfortable,” he complied, explaining, “[A]t that point in time my job was to 
do what I was told and I wanted to keep my job.”  And when he finally 
complained to the chief and refused to do any further repairs for him, Pietrick 
“became agitated” and retaliated by prohibiting other firefighters from performing 
mechanical work on their personal vehicles. 
{¶ 57} The major repairs Pietrick sought on his vehicles went beyond 
“firefighters help[ing] firefirghters,” as Pietrick had characterized the situation.  
He could not have reasonably believed that his requests were in line with his own 
policy of allowing firefighters to perform minor types of mechanical work if it did 
not immobilize or disable the vehicle, and Assistant Fire Chief Ronald Janicek 
testified that other firefighters were not permitted to perform major repairs such as 
overhauling a car engine, replacing brakes, or changing power steering pumps 
during their shifts.  Pietrick violated written departmental policies, including rules 
against creating conflicts of interest and abusing his position for personal gain, 
when he asked subordinate employees and appointees for major repairs to his 
personal vehicles. 
{¶ 58} The common pleas court upheld the factual findings and legal 
conclusions made by the civil service commission, stating that Pietrick had 
expected the mechanics to “simply make repairs as if they were the neighborhood 
garage” and had used their subordinate position to implicitly coerce them.  The 
January Term, 2015 
21 
 
court therefore lacked any basis to substitute its judgment for that of the 
commission and reduce the punishment imposed for this misconduct. 
{¶ 59} Thus, the court of appeals erred in determining that the  common 
pleas court had authority to conduct a trial de novo, because the General 
Assembly has repealed the statute authorizing a de novo proceeding.  The 
decision of the Westlake Civil Service Commission is supported by reliable, 
probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.  Accordingly, I 
would reverse the judgment of the appellate court and reinstate the decision of the 
Westlake Civil Service Commission. 
O’NEILL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________________ 
John D. Wheeler, Westlake Director of Law, and Robin R. Leasure, 
Assistant Director of Law, for appellants. 
Diemert & Associates Co., L.P.A., Joesph W. Diemert Jr., Thomas M. 
Hanculak, and Daniel A. Powell, for appellee. 
Frost Brown Todd, L.L.C., Philip K. Hartmann, Yazan S. Ashrawi, and 
Stephen J. Smith; and John Gotherman, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio 
Municipal League. 
_______________________