Case Title: Natrona County School Dist. No. 1 v. McKnight

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Natrona County School Dist. No. 1 v. McKnight1988 WY 140764 P.2d 1039Case Number: 88-75, 88-76Decided: 11/15/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
NATRONA COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 1, PETITIONER,

v.

ARTHUR D. McKNIGHT AND 
CAROLE LEE McKNIGHT, PARENTS AND NEXT FRIENDS OF DAVID McKNIGHT, A MINOR; DAVID 
McKNIGHT; AND THE WYOMING STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 
RESPONDENTS.

WYOMING STATE DEPARTMENT 
OF EDUCATION, PETITIONER,

v.

ARTHUR D. McKNIGHT AND 
CAROLE LEE McKNIGHT, PARENTS AND NEXT FRIENDS OF DAVID McKNIGHT, A MINOR; AND 
DAVID McKNIGHT, RESPONDENTS. Nos. 88-75, 88-76

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Daniel R. Spangler, 
J.

Robert H. 
McCrary of Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & Walker, Casper, for petitioner Natrona County School Dist. 
No. 1 in No. 88-75.

Donald J. 
Sullivan of Sullivan and Zunker, Cheyenne, for respondents McKnight in 

Nos. 88-75 and 
88-76.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen. and Rowena L. Heckert, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent Wyoming 
State Dept. of Educ. in No. 88-75 and for petitioner in No. 88-76.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal, third in 
sequence, considers the hearing officer determination that the local school 
district must provide compensatory education to a handicapped student for 
thirty-seven months beyond attained age of twenty-one years at an anticipated 
minimum cost of $113,208 per year, $9,434 per month or $310 per day for a total 
of $349,058 to be added to the previous tuition expenditure of $539,841, in 
addition to other amounts spent for the student's "regular" educational 
assistance by the Natrona County School District during his eleventh through 
twenty-first years. The child, born in 1966, was twenty-one on November 8, 1987 
and has continued to receive the educational assistance and habilitation 
maintenance since that date, leaving about twenty-six months of compensatory 
education not yet provided for prospective costs in continuing controversy which 
will additionally total a cost to the state's educational system of not less 
than $245,284, plus the significant associated monitoring and supervisory 
expenses.

[¶2.]     This court will follow 
Natrona County School District No. 1 v. Ryan, 764 P.2d 1019 (Wyo. 1988) and 
Wyoming State Board of Education v. Cochran, 764 P.2d 1037 (Wyo. 1988) in 
determining that entitlement to education ends at the twenty-first birthday, and 
reverse the bad faith decision of the hearing officer and award of compensatory 
education past the twenty-first birthday as a service that the Wyoming 
educational institutions lack constitutional and statutory authority to provide. 
Monahan v. School Dist. No. 1 of DouglasCounty, 229 Neb. 139, 425 N.W.2d 624 (1988). Nor are we 
unmindful in application of this case to the statutes and constitution of the 
State of Wyoming of what was said by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 349 U.S. 294, 299, 75 S. Ct. 753, 756, 99 L. Ed. 1083 (1955) (Brown II) - "School authorities have the primary 
responsibility for education * * *." Upon reflection of this axiom, we apply the 
educational standard without inappropriate favor or discrimination in assessing 
and providing education for the handicapped as equally required for the 
non-discriminatory education for the unimpaired. Levine v. State Dept. of 
Institutions and Agencies, 84 N.J. 234, 418 A.2d 229 (1980).

[¶3.]     Within this complex of 
mixed issues of fact and law is the requirement to reconcile satisfactorily the 
"need for a free appropriate public education [for the student] with the need 
for the State to allocate scarce funds among as many handicapped children as 
possible," while at the same time maintaining the constitutional responsibility 
for a proper education for the 90% of the students who are not handicapped and 
the 89% of the handicapped students who are actually educable within their 
achievable capacity to become fully self-sustaining and participating adults. 
Age v. Bullitt County Public Schools, 673 F.2d 141, 145 (6th Cir. 1982).1 Our standard of philosophical 
review is the issue of appropriateness as addressed in majority opinion by now 
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central School 
Dist. Bd. of Ed., Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1982). We will also recognize in historical perspective the 
constitutional, ethical and proportionality issues which presented the endowment 
for congressional passage of the 1975 Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
(EHA). Comment, The Handicapped Child Has a Right to an Appropriate Education, 
55 Neb.L.Rev. 637 (1976); Comment, Toward a Legal Theory of the Right to 
Education of the Mentally Retarded, 34 Ohio St.L.J. 554 (1973).

I. ISSUES

[¶4.]     Issues enunciated for 
appeal by petitioner, Natrona County School District No. 1 (School District), include as dispositive subjects2 the contentions that the hearing 
officer erred:

[I]n granting DM 
compensatory education beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years because no child 
in Wyoming can 
be educated at public expense beyond the age of twenty-one (21).

[I]n determining that the 
prior administrative hearing regarding an appropriate educational placement and 
discussing the issues of due process violations, which was not appealed from by 
any party, did not create an estoppel nor was the same res judicata with respect 
to the present request for hearing involving educational deprivation, the claim 
for which arose out of the same issues determined in the prior administrative 
hearing.

[¶5.]     Respondents, Arthur and 
Carole McKnight, father and stepmother (parents), of the involved child (DM), 
differently phrase these subjects as whether:

[I]n an appellate review 
of an agency hearing determination in which Petitioners offer no showing of lack 
of substantial evidence supporting the findings of fact about which they appeal, 
any consideration should or may be given to any other matter asserted by 
Petitioners.

[A] party who 
successfully urges a rule of law upon a tribunal, so that it becomes the law of 
the case, may subsequently appeal from the application of the very rule of law 
which it had urged.

[¶6.]     Creating a collateral 
issue, the State Department of Education (State Board) appeared both as a 
captioned party and by appellate brief after filing a separate petition for 
review as now combined in this appeal. At issue was whether the Department or 
Board was a proper litigant or even properly before the hearing officer because 
of the parents' contention of pleading default. Our present disposition will not 
require any separate controversy resolution between state educational agencies 
and DM. Initial litigants are the School 
District and DM who properly and adequately present the issues to be 
decided. The relationships between the Wyoming state educational agencies and the 
controlling features of state constitution and statute as related to the federal 
statutes were comprehensively considered in Ryan, 764 P.2d  at 1027 and will not 
be further discussed. Compensatory 
education after the termination of the statutory age eligibility period is this 
case for present appeal.

II. FACTS

[¶7.]     Extended review of this 
educational effort of the School District will 
be addressed, since the present compensatory education claim relates to 
contended denial of the required free appropriate public education in a confined 
period between 1979 and 1982 of thirty-seven months. At age twenty-one, DM was 
considered by expert testimony to have attained something less than a 
chronological two year old academic development as the result of fifteen years 
of education and habilitation efforts of the School 
District. The problems of this young man are sufficiently severe so 
that different experts did not even agree on a diagnosis of autism, mental 
retardation or a combination of both.

[¶8.]     DM moved to Casper with his family in 
1973 at the age of seven. He was placed in the A.J. Woods school as specially 
structured by the School District to be a high effort, heavily staffed facility 
for educable or trainable handicapped children, including both educable mentally 
retarded and trainable mentally retarded students, although primarily the 
latter, within the Casper school system's 13,000 students. The Woods school in 
Casper like Miller in Cheyenne was in the forefront of handicapped education for 
Wyoming public education as an advanced educational system which, commencing in 
the mid-1960's, undertook responsibility for trainable as well as educable 
students with either or both physical and mental impairment.

[¶9.]     Despite all staff 
efforts within the special education environment at Woods, with apparent 
instigation of the parents, by 1977, factors of low attainment, advancing 
chronological age, and severity of problems induced the School District to place 
the child, then ten years old, in the Behavior Research Institute in Providence, Rhode 
Island (BRI), a high tuition private handicapped 
facility. About two years later with concern about cost, distance, and ultimate 
post-education transition, DM was moved from BRI and enrolled for 
maintenance-educational assistance in the Devereux Foundation, another private 
institution located in Scottsdale, Arizona.

[¶10.]  It is out of this move from BRI to the 
Devereux Foundation that principal controversy has subsequently been generated 
through two separate administrative hearings, one in 1981 and this present 
proceeding now on appeal. After eighteen months, the Devereux Foundation, by 
maximum age limitation and disinclination to retain DM because of his condition, 
denied continued care. In November 1980, DM was returned to Casper for anticipated 
re-entry into Woods. This change was not acceptable to the parents who contended 
that residential placement was required. Evaluation for care, maintenance and 
education by the WyomingStateTraining 
School, a state institution for handicapped, was made at the 
request of the School District resulting in the 
facility's conclusion that it was not organized to provide adequate education 
for an individual of the status of DM. From a course of disagreements between 
the parents and the School District regarding 
standard of care, including desired domiciliary arrangements, a hearing was 
convened by parental request in 1981.3 

[¶11.]  The hearing officer found generally for 
the parents and DM, in determining that the School District sponsored special 
school was not an appropriate placement to meet DM's educational needs to 
provide the needed twenty-four hour supervision and educational services. 
Neither party appealed for judicial review.

[¶12.]  The IHO with this decision is not 
recommending placement in any particular facility but rather admonishing the 
district to locate suitable placement. Said placement should provide for 
twenty-four hour, year around program designed to meet D's needs which are not 
confined to a school day but rather are pervasive. The programs provided by such 
a facility are professionally described as "precision teaching" and require 
consistent implementation not only during instruction periods but during D's 
waking hours. Since D in the past has been managed without the use of drugs, a 
facility in which only scrupulously, prudent use of this form of "therapy" 
should be considered. Further, since the use of aversive reinforcers or 
punishment, although appropriate under certain circumstances, is often 
questioned in the management of children like D, the district should chose a 
facility for placement which has clear ethical procedures for approval of the 
use thereof and maintains appropriate communication to district personnel and 
the parents of the intent to use and nature of said techniques.

It is apparent 
from the report of the hearing officer that education, training, maintenance, 
and parental respite were intermixed in concern to be addressed in the 
placement.

[¶13.]  To meet the decision requirements, and 
find an area of agreement with the parents, the School District hired an 
independent specialist, Dr. Allen Huang of Greeley, Colorado, for placement direction. Dr. Huang 
first considered placement in another Arizona institution called the Valley of the 
Sun which, with several other facilities, was visited. Finally, finding nothing 
that was acceptable to the family, he recommended re-enrollment in BRI, where DM 
has remained.

[¶14.]  BRI is a well-publicized non-profit 
corporation devoted to the development of behavioral technology. The facility 
combines residential units in Massachusetts and 
adjacent educational facilities in Rhode Island. The usual type of person 
accepted for placement involves severe behavioral problems. The regimen for 
control and instruction involves extensive use of negative aversives as well as 
affirmative food rewards as a very structured process. It was in the use of 
physical aversives that controversy developed; as for example, the delayed 
re-enrollment of DM in the institution in 1982 resulted from differences between 
Dr. Huang and BRI about limitations on use of certain aversive procedures for 
DM.

[¶15.]  As evidenced in the record through one of 
DM's individualized educational programs, the aversives included 
were:

The aversives which may 
be used are to be administered in a hierarchical fashion so as to ensure that at 
all times the student is receiving the least restrictive procedure that is 
effective in dealing with the behavior or treatment problem in question. 
Aversives for inappropriate behaviors are always to be used in paired 
combination with rewards for the opposite, desired behaviors. Aversives are to 
be employed within various constraints established by, among others, licensing 
and funding authorities, BRI's Human Rights and Peer Review Committees, and the 
Institute's own policies and procedures. Consultation from medical and 
psychiatric experts shall be used, when required, and the students are regularly 
examined by a nurse and by BRI staff with respect to the effects of aversives. 
Decisions concerning employment of, and change of, aversives are governed by 
data taken daily.

The aversives which may 
be used singly, in specified multiples, or in combination, and within the 
foregoing restraints and safeguards, include the following (which are not 
necessarily listed in the particular hierarchical order in which they might be 
used in a particular case): ignoring, no, token fine, water spray, vapor spray, 
vision-occluding, and sound-masking helmet, ammonia, taste aversive, cool 
shower, muscle squeeze, spank, pinch, time-out helmet with safety tube and 
optional automatic vapor spray, contingent physical exercise, and hand squeeze. 
It is understood that the number to be used cannot be limited in advance because 
it depends largely upon the number of times the inappropriate behavior occurs. 
Permission forms describing these procedures in detail are to be signed by the 
parents and renewed periodically.

The requirement 
for placement by Dr. Huang included:

After carefully reviewing 
your letter, the data you sent to me, and the materials in my office, I feel 
that my recommendation for [DM] to attend BRI or any other agency with the 
condition to exclude a "cold shower" and a "time-out with physical restraint in 
the barrel" from his treatment program should not be changed. It is not my 
intent to debate "the issue" related to aversive treatment at this time. I 
recognize, however, that some aversive procedures in conjunction with positive 
reinforcement may be needed to assist [DM's] total growth including social, 
psychological, and physical. Based upon the findings from my review, research, 
and observation, I have recommended your program with the best interests of [DM] 
in mind. I do believe that you and your staff could use many alternative 
techniques to work with [DM] and accomplish the objectives set for him.[4]

[¶16.]  In considerable detail, the entire 
hearing record demonstrates professional differences in acceptance of the BRI 
system, both as a matter of philosophy regarding corporal punishment and 
retained permanency of achieved behavioral modification after discontinuance. 
The latter concern is reflected in asserted refusal of some institutions to 
accept students who have previously attended BRI. More substantive in the 
unresolved inquiry is the retentive factor in adulthood of the "prompt 
proneness" in the system as a character retention factor upon the individual's 
movement to a less structured environment, such as a sheltered workshop; in 
short, does the rigidly controlled and augmented system lapse for behavioral 
control when discontinued.

[¶17.]  As clearly established by this record, 
BRI accomplished a life skill improvement of real credibility and a decreased 
destructive character of behavior for DM which had not been achieved by any 
other education or training system or institution. The unresolved doubt within 
the education fraternity was the application of the improvement to transition 
him to other environments, and whether near maximum results from that 
environment had been achieved first in 1979 or later by 1985-1986 so that the 
program thereafter was essentially maintenance and minimally directed education 
or training. Unquestionably, actual attainment age of approximately two years 
did not change for a period of eight to ten years of chronological time for the 
individual. Consequently, the philosophic subject of scope of responsibility of 
public education for twenty-four hour maintenance and habilitation5 was directly presented.

[¶18.]  In 1987, the School 
District was officially advised by the State Department of 
Education, that the State would not fund post-twenty-first birthday continued 
education for any handicapped student. The parents of DM were advised of the 
School District discontinuance of educational 
service which provided the domiciliary care at BRI. Another hearing was then 
requested by the parents under the procedures of federal statutes and state 
rules to contest this placement change. With a new hearing officer named by the 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction, primary issues developed were 
eligibility for additional education for the year past twenty-first birthday and 
compensatory education for the period between 1979 and 1982 when DM was not in 
BRI.6

[¶19.]  The hearing officer made three broad 
decisions; two legal and one factual. In legal decision, he determined, as had 
the hearing officer in Cochran, 764 P.2d 1037 (Wyo. 1988), that public educational eligibility in 
Wyoming ended 
at the twenty-first birthday. With this conclusion, we concur as established by 
our decisions in Ryan, 764 P.2d 1019 (Wyo. 
1988) and implicit in Cochran, 764 P.2d 1037 (Wyo. 1988). A second legal conclusion was then 
made by him in contradiction of the first decision, that he could require 
compensatory education beyond age twenty-one if, in his analysis, any period of 
adequate free appropriate public education had been denied during any time of 
the School District's responsibility of 1973 
through DM's twenty-first birthday in 1987.

[¶20.]  The third decision by the hearing officer 
was factual in determination that the School 
District acted in bad faith both substantively and procedurally in 
interruption of placement at BRI in 1979 as considered in the 1981 hearing. As a 
result of the factual decision and in accord with the second legal conclusion, 
he ordered thirty-seven months of post-twenty-one age compensatory education to 
apparently be provided in BRI.

[¶21.]  In application of both federal and state 
law, we separately consider these three substantive topics after first resolving 
the standard for review to be applied by this court.

III. STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
BY THIS COURT

[¶22.]  In Ryan, we casually considered the 
standard of review by the judicial tribunal to consider a petition for review 
from an administrative agency decision. This case in present juncture is 
somewhat novel for a number of reasons, including initially the uncustomary 
process provided in Wyoming law of the direct certification from 
district court to the Supreme Court when a petition for review is presented by 
an administrative agency under the purview of W.R.A.P. 12.09.7 Consequently, for present 
disposition, the decision of this court apprehends unusual characteristics of 
fact finding and appellate adjudication. Additionally, we are not presented with 
a typically reviewed decision from an administrative agency. The hearing officer 
in this case was not professionally trained in educational matters, since 
designated by application and status as a practicing attorney. His evidentiary 
decision was not evaluated by the professional agency implicit in the normal 
administrative proceedings. This would normally put the trial court, and in 
certification situation, this court in the express posture of re-analyzing the 
basic evidence used for decision since the technical expertise is not a factor 
presented. Additionally, we are presented with the peculiarities of the federal 
statutes which provide concurrent jurisdiction to either the federal or state 
courts and specifically apply a standard of review which is different from the 
normal process of federal administrative law or this state. Title 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(e)(2) (1982 ed. & Supp. IV 1986) states:

Any party aggrieved by 
the findings and decision made under subsection (b) [hearing process in local or 
state venue] who does not have the right to an appeal under subsection (c) of 
this section, [review of local decision by state superintending authority] and 
any party aggrieved by the findings and decision under subsection (c) of this 
section, shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the 
complaint presented pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in any 
State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United 
States without regard to the amount in controversy. In any action brought under this paragraph 
the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall 
hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on 
the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court 
determines is appropriate. [Emphasis added.]

This standard of 
review is simply not compatible with Wyoming administrative review standards of 
W.R.A.P. 12.09 and W.S. 16-3-114(c), which are comparable to present standards 
of the federal courts and most states.

[¶23.]  A fairly detailed consideration of the 
extensive number of EHA cases demonstrated that the normal administrative review 
standard is not preclusive. Beasley v. School Bd. of CampbellCounty, 6 Va. App. 206, 367 S.E.2d 738 (1988). Although 
this result is largely derived from the text of the federal statute itself as 
considered in general terms by the United States Supreme Court in Board of 
Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690, (1982) there 
has developed a fairly specified set of special EHA review rules as similar in 
both state and federal courts.

[¶24.]  First applied is the concept that the 
review analysis when considering the hearing officer's decision encompasses 
mixed questions of law and fact with the effective fact finding function 
finitely transferred to the judiciary by 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982 ed. & 
Supp. IV 1986). Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690; Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800 (1982), overruled on other grounds, 722 F.2d 910 
(1st Cir. 1983). The decisional process requires that "a district court must 
make an independent determination based on a preponderance of the evidence, giving due weight to the state 
administrative proceedings." Geis v. Board of Educ. of Parsippany-Troy 
Hills, MorrisCounty, 774 F.2d 575, 583 
(3rd Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). In Geis, the appellate court perceived that 
"the district court did exactly that, specifically citing the evidence in its 
record and the administrative record that supported its conclusion, as well as 
discussing the conflicting evidence." Id. at 583. See Board of Trustees of Pascagoula Mun. Separate 
School Dist. v. Doe, 508 So. 2d 1081 (Miss. 1987). See also David D. v. Dartmouth 
School Committee, 775 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1140, 106 S. Ct. 1790, 90 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1986) and Roncker on Behalf of Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied 464 U.S. 864, 104 S. Ct. 196, 78 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1983).8 

[¶25.]  The appellate consideration standard (as 
in the future to be first applied in this state by the district court) is that 
review is conducted de novo with issues presented encompassing mixed questions 
of fact and law, Wexler v. Westfield Bd. of Educ., 784 F.2d 176 (3rd Cir.), 
cert. denied 479 U.S. 825, 107 S. Ct. 99, 93 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1986), from which an 
independent determination will be made by a preponderance of the evidence with 
due deference given to professional expertise and decisional appropriateness as 
documented by the administrative hearing. The burden of proving that the hearing 
officer erred is on the appealing party. Pascagoula, 508 So. 2d 1081.

[¶26.]  The difficulty in decision is noted as an 
example in discussion of Martin v. School Bd. of Prince George County, 3 Va. 
App. 197, 348 S.E.2d 857, 864 (1986):

As the circuit court 
suggested, the School Board is not responsible primarily for treatment of 
David's emotional disability. Nevertheless, the School Board was required to 
offer a residential placement in which David would receive both educational 
instruction and intensive professional attention for his learning disability, if 
a free appropriate public education could not be provided by a less restrictive 
placement. This determination is not a simple task for the professional 
educators who were directly involved in preparing an IEP for David.

It is no less difficult 
for a court presented with the issue of residential placement to separate 
medical, social and educational problems.

Since we 
establish a preponderance test for the district court and a plainly wrong test 
for appellate review, the arbitrary and capricious and not supported by 
substantial evidence standard normally employed for administrative agency review 
is inapposite.

[¶27.]  Furthermore, as an appellate tribunal, we 
will not ignore precedent of the United States Supreme Court decisions in 
application of federalism principles which are determinative on matters of 
constitutional application through legislation of the United States Congress. 
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690, affords us no pause since we had previously held 
that a Wyoming 
standard is constitutionally emplaced for equal education and is, at least if 
not more, demanding than criteria resulting from the EHA. Ryan, 764 P.2d 1019 
(Wyo. 1988). 
The substantive thesis remaining is whether School Committee of Town of 
Burlington, Mass. v. Department of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 105 S. Ct. 1996, 
85 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1985) supersedes Wyoming's statutes and constitution in 
requiring an ongoing educational expenditure for thirty-seven months for a 
person not otherwise eligible as a replacement for claimed ineffective 
educational assistance some six to eight years earlier. Cf. Honig v. Doe, ___ 
U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 592, 98 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1988).

IV. TERMINATION OF 
EDUCATIONAL ELIGIBILITY AT AGE TWENTY-ONE

[¶28.]  This subject is settled by this court's 
decision in Ryan, 764 P.2d 1019 (Wyo. 1988). School District conduct and 
funding of post-twenty-first birthday education can be undertaken by neither the 
School District nor the state educational 
agencies as a public educational responsibility under present statutes or 
constitutional criteria. We have clearly defined and delineated the public 
educational function by age limitation as may be differentiated from higher 
education, vocational rehabilitation, maintenance, or medical care 
responsibility for the individual which would come within social services or 
other governmental agency responsibility. Neither the judiciary can nor the 
legislature has expanded public education past the intrinsic responsibility in 
age for what was adopted in the state constitution. The present finite 
limitation of public education ends with the twenty-first birthday. Adams 
Central School Dist. No. 090, AdamsCounty v. Deist, 214 Neb. 307, 334 N.W.2d 775, opinion supplemented by 215 
Neb. 284, 338 N.W.2d 591 (Neb.), cert. denied 464 U.S. 893, 104 S. Ct. 239, 78 L. Ed. 2d 230 (1983). Cf. Helms v. Independent School 
Dist. No. 3 of Broken Arrow, Tulsa County, Okla., 750 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied 471 U.S. 1018, 105 S. Ct. 2024, 85 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1985), required 
equivalent years of educational opportunity.

V. POST-TWENTY-ONE 
COMPENSATORY EDUCATION WHEN SUFFICIENCY OF THE PRIOR EDUCATION IS 
CONTESTED

[¶29.]  Intrinsic to the decision that 
educational responsibilities end at age twenty-one is the correlative inquiry 
whether, despite statute and constitution, continued eligibility can be obtained 
as compensatory to pre-age twenty-one challenged level of attainment. This is 
generically designated as the right to post-period compensatory education. As 
essentially resolved by Ryan, it is our conclusion that the State Board of 
Education lacked authority by statute or constitution which would authorize 
acceptance by negotiation for a residual liability against the School District to require it to violate statute and to 
extend the constitution in order to provide for educational services past age 
twenty-one. We recognize the stated argument that the federal statutory system 
could include a condition precedent for benefits which might invoke a 
compensatory contingent post-age twenty-one obligation. However, we find that no 
authority now exists for Wyoming to enter into this contractual 
requirement or any as might evolve from the federal programs by either implied 
agreement or adopted regulation. The hearing officer, likewise, as Monahan and 
Deist would teach, had no authority to order compensatory education, since the 
School District has no authority to provide the 
service.

[¶30.]  We are also concerned since if Wyoming, by policy, 
embarks upon theories of educational malpractice, which buttress claims for 
compensatory educational services, that it, under equal protection and due 
process, can properly confine relief to a subcategory of the handicapped. The 
system, consequently, would be faced with failed expectation complaints 
applicable to all "graduating" students or at least for those students who do 
not become Rhodes Scholars. This court is not presently willing to embrace a 
general theory of educational malpractice which would serve as a foundational 
premise from which compensatory education for those who have not reached desired 
limits of achievement by age twenty-one might opportunistically continue in the 
public educational system, and particularly so, if the predicate functions of 
special training or habilitation might be added. Comment, Educational 
Malpractice - Does the Cause of Action Exist?, 49 Mont. L.Rev. 140 (1988); 
Comment, Education Malpractice: A Cause of Action that Failed to Pass the Test, 
90 W.Va.L.Rev. 499 (1987); Note, Educational Malpractice: A Cause of Action in 
Need of a Call for Action, 22 Val.U.L.Rev. 427 (1988).

[¶31.]  Premised on constitutional definition and 
defined by statutory limitations, we will not extend educational responsibility 
by whatever theory beyond age twenty-one at least in the absence of peculiar 
circumstances that are not considered here as factually established whether 
characterized as egregious and unremitted bad faith or otherwise. Cf. Comment, 
Compensatory Educational Services and the Education For All Handicapped Children 
Act, 1984 Wis. 
L.Rev. 1469 (1984). Normalized public education in Wyoming ends about age 
eighteen or nineteen and the additional two years generally available as 
compensatory to the underachiever or the handicapped should be sufficient. 
Obligation of general public education must end at some point and other state 
responsibilities of higher education, vocational rehabilitation or habilitation 
should commence as the succeeding state responsibility to be conceptually 
provided in conjunction with whatever federal programs might, by authorization 
of the state legislature, be available.

[¶32.]  It is unquestioned that since 1975, the 
EHA has transferred the personal responsibility of exceptional school age 
individuals from social services and state domiciliary facilities to the 
financing obligation of public education. What may have been the unmet 
responsibility in prior times is not ignored.9 The specific subject of 
compensatory education to be provided past the public education age limitation 
authorized in statutes and constitution has developed a checkered pathway as in 
part inflicted by consideration of the United States Supreme Court discussion in 
Burlington, 471 U.S. 359, 105 S. Ct. 1996 and last raised by reference in 
majority opinion in Honig, 108 S. Ct. 592. Intertwined in application of this 
aspect of the individual's education is the applicability of statutes of 
limitation, since otherwise, a potential exposure would continue during the 
nineteen years when the student might be exposed to public education as finitely 
and finally reassessed at the limitation age which, in Wyoming, is the 
twenty-first birthday.10 This court will follow that 
application of the Wyoming Constitution and statutes for denial of compensatory 
education past the foreclosing age which is buttressed by well-reasoned and 
persuasive consideration of the Nebraska Supreme Court. See Monahan, 425 N.W.2d 624 and Deist, 334 N.W.2d 775. See also on state law application, although not 
specifically addressing upper age limitations, Levine, 418 A.2d 229.

[¶33.]  The Nebraska Supreme Court in last 
reference in Monahan, 425 N.W.2d  at 628 (quoting Deist, 334 N.W.2d at 786), 
stated:

"Turning to the issue of 
compensatory education, we find no support for the findings of the hearing 
officer in the relevant law. The [Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 
1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1976)], by its clear and unambiguous language, 
limits eligibility to children ages 3 to 21. § 1412(2)(B). There is no authority 
under this statutory scheme by which the hearing officer could grant free 
appropriate public educational benefits to David beyond his 21st 
birthday."

[¶34.]  We do not interpret Honig, 108 S. Ct. 592 
and Burlington, 471 U.S. 359, 105 S. Ct. 1996 to require contrary results when 
the application would require this court to use an administrative agreement to 
vitiate state statute and constitution. This posture is supported in comment by 
majority opinion of now Chief Justice Rehnquist in Pennhurst State School and 
Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1544, 67 L. Ed. 2d 694 
(1981), where in considering the accepted facets of federal fund receipt by the 
state, he surmised in another context:

[I]t is unlikely that a 
State would have accepted federal funds had it known it would be bound to 
provide such treatment. The crucial inquiry, however, is not whether a State 
would knowingly undertake that obligation, but whether Congress spoke so clearly 
that we can fairly say that the State could make an informed choice.

Without 
legislative approval, it is apparent that the state did not intend to assume 
conjecturally an indefinite educational responsibility beyond the statutorily 
established and constitutionally defined age of twenty-one. We would note that 
singular discussion and significant dispute in precedent is available. White v. 
State, 195 Cal. App. 3d 452, 240 Cal. Rptr. 732, 736-37 (1987), where the court 
additionally found systemic exclusion from the EHA while resident in a state 
hospital as the "systemic denial of a free appropriate public education * * * 
caused by the illegal allocation of EHA funds;" Stock v. Massachusetts Hosp. 
School, 392 Mass. 205, 467 N.E.2d 448 (1984), cert. denied 474 U.S. 844, 106 S. Ct. 132, 88 L. Ed. 2d 109 (1985), where supporting state law to afford continued 
educational eligibility was found. The variant results achieved with diversified 
factual situations when the federal court forum was chosen does not alter our 
application of controlling principles for Wyoming law.11 

[¶35.]  This decision does not leave the student 
and parents without remedy. The handicapped educational system by federal 
persuasion and state regulation contemplates a bilateral right for discussion 
and an empirical right to hearing and judicial review in case of the absence of 
mutual agreement or acceptability as to the level of education being provided. 
Essentially, this is what occurred in this case as resulting in the 1981 hearing 
and subsequent decision, which was 
accepted by all parties. Whatever rights for corrective opportunity may 
exist under the Wyoming Constitution and public education statutes, compensatory 
education past age twenty-one is not included in substance, text or by 
construction of what the legislative branch of state government has authorized 
or what the judicial branch of this state may provide.

VI. ADVERSE FINDING OF 
FACT

[¶36.]  Inquiry will not end at this juncture 
where our review is presented with a finding of the administrative hearing 
officer now to be considered in first judicial analysis that educational 
"deprivation" was the result of willful bad faith. That deprivation was found in 
cause and result by the 1979 removal from BRI for enrollment in Devereux 
Foundation, which as compensable deprivation continued until return to BRI since 
placement in other institutions was not thereafter mutually acceptable. We 
reverse the decision of the hearing officer as factually unsupported by the 
entire record that the educational efforts of the School 
District demonstrated "willful bad faith."12 This complex, convoluted and 
confused record13 reflects disagreement on many 
technical and practical questions, extreme personality reactivity of some of the 
participants, distinguishable concerns in allocation of financing and system 
responsibility for each and also all students in public education, but in no 
regard bad faith on the part of the school board members, Robert G. Jorgenson, 
Joanne Christensen, Jonnie Burton, Mary Helen Hendry, Bill Hollingsworth, George 
Tenant, Joanne L. Street, Joan Sutherland or J. Scott Hocker or School District 
employees, including school superintendent, Dr. Jacob Dailey, and legal counsel 
whose pathway is well-documented. Nothing in the record relates to intimated or 
asserted bad faith of the State Department of Education.

[¶37.]  With tuition expenditures by the 
School District now substantially exceeding 
$600,000 for DM, this record is noteworthy not only in demonstrated time, 
difficulty and expense for all participants, but also in highlighting the broad 
conceptual issues of public education.

[¶38.]  Issues, questions, contentions and 
philosophy are specifically marshalled under this dual hearing record (1981 and 
1987) as including the diverse concepts of trainable versus educable 
responsibilities of public education, cost benefit criteria as a system 
responsibility to the exceptional student, maintenance and personal care of 
training as a responsibility of education, and limitations of educational 
capabilities as a factor of responsibility. Also intertwined are points of 
damage to the operational system from behaviorally uncontrolled participants, 
responsibility for education of twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year for 
maintenance of some students, use of designated milieu therapy in a twenty-four 
hour environment as an educational and training quotient, and levels of 
appropriate aversive techniques available to school systems in living skill 
training programs as otherwise constituting physical abuse to the recipients. 
Additionally involved are interests of transitional training responsibilities as 
the end of educational age responsibility is approaching, system 
responsibilities of state social services and the Wyoming State Training School 
for the maintenance quotient of the handicapped student's life program during 
the ages of five to twenty-one, extreme behavior modification (or modification 
of extreme behavior or modification of behavior by extreme methodology), and 
twenty-four hour a day structured individual care as educational component. 
Moreover, this context encompasses substance of twenty-four hour a day personal 
supervision, and more specifically appropriate here, basis of regulation of 
behavior involving the educational habilitation care provider of the excess use 
of physical aversives and misuse of food contingencies, and federal statutory 
preference for mainstreaming. Of course, the backdrop of variant and other 
variable issues which dynamically invade the responsibilities of school trustees 
to educate all of the students for constructing a basic foundation to maintain a 
democratic society is also present.14 Intrinsic to the subject is the 
philosophic inquiry, which is the responsibility of the elected school trustees, 
to allocate resources for 13,000 students within a defined budget as questioning 
the degree that they can afford to spend $113,208 per year for one student. 
Academically involved is the individualized character of the institution desired 
by the parents, which was exceptional not only in distance and cost,15 but in its administrative agency 
regulatory problems. Closer to home, educational system management and good 
faith exercised discretion cannot be disregarded in this review adjudication of 
asserted bad faith.

[¶39.]  The record in striking detail establishes 
factually the evidentiary basis for the hearing officer's finding incorporated 
in numbers 20, 21, 22 and 23.

20. Petitioner's IQ found 
to be less than 35, mental age of 2 years and adaptive behavior level of one 
year, eight months as a result of testing done at BRI in September, 1985. The 
results of a test of adaptive behavior in November, 1986, indicate an adaptive 
behavior level of one year, seven months.

21. Study of data 
provided by BRI indicates that Petitioner's progress over time has been very 
slow. Testimony predicted that Petitioner will "at best" function in a highly 
supervised, sheltered workshop or "more likely" in a work activity 
center.

22. Petitioner will not 
be able to progress to a point of living independently. He will always be in a 
supervised environment. No such facilities exist in the State of Wyoming which can provide 
an appropriate work situation for Petitioner. Other states do provide such 
facilities.

23. There is nothing in 
Petitioner's reports, evaluations, or observations of him to indicate that he 
will demonstrate growth in mental age or adaptive behavior in the ensuing three 
years.

Conversely, 
there is absolutely no evidence which is not advocacy or conclusionary 
statements sufficient to sustain finding number 12.16 

12. Petitioner will be 
trained to a level of independence which will allow him to function in a 
sheltered workshop environment if his training continues at BRI for 
approximately three more years.

[¶40.]  In this total record, there is a plethora 
of detail about DM's life skill adaptability and improvement during the 
School District's involvement of about fifteen 
years. Regardless of the challenge to techniques used by BRI, it is informative 
to analyze the comparable changes of recent time. This is possible, since BRI, 
as a very structured institution, operates with a very clear system and explicit 
record keeping for progress measurement. One of the goals reflected for DM upon 
return to BRI in 1982 was to learn to take a shower. At the hearing in December 
1987, the school director provided the annual individualized educational program 
as invoked by "stay put" to be in effect for the year commencing December 1987 
to December 1988, which is now in progress. The showering sequence of using 
soap, wash cloth and towel involved nineteen recognized actions or responses to 
the direction to "take a shower." The training system as a graduated guidance 
process contemplated zero to five separate "prompts" to complete the activity 
for each of the sequences, for a total maximum prompts in taking a shower of 
ninety-five.

[¶41.]  In an April 1986 assessment, it was 
reflected that DM should shower with a prompt total of twenty-four of ninety-five, 100% of the 
time, a six month objective reflected a prompt total of fifteen or less and a 
one year objective of seven prompts or less. This is only the very normal daily 
shower. In June 1987, the status was eighteen prompts, the six month 
objection of fifteen prompts, and the annual goal to be seven prompts. The 
hearing date December 1987 report reflected the present status at that 
time:

PRESENT STATUS OF 
SKILL

1. [DM] showers with a prompt total of 23 (of 95), 100% of the 
time.

SIX MONTH 
OBJECTIVE

1. [DM] will shower with 
a prompt total of 18 or less, 100% of the time.

ANNUAL GOALS

1. [DM] will shower with 
a prompt total of 12 or less, 100% of the time. [Emphasis added.]

The 1986 goal 
had not been achieved and a 1987 regression had occurred. A further review of 
activity comparisons between April 1986 and December 1987 similarly reveal a 
personal case plateau of improvements for explicit tasks of washing hands and 
combing hair, and no notable improvement or regression in washing face and 
shaving. Nothing in the sequenced documentation as found in this comprehensive 
record reveals a general level of current improvement in living skills. More 
striking, however, is the documentation which reflects an allocation of 
individualized instructional time of 5% to academics in 1987 as compared to 20% 
of four years earlier in 1983, or a decrease of 15%. The comparisons of the 
earlier to current times are self-care, 25% versus 20%; individual living 20% 
versus 20%; free vocational 5% versus 30%; language 20% versus 10%; academics 
20% versus 5%; social skills 5% versus 10%; and physical education 5% versus 5%. 
What this factually demonstrates in the recent period of "education" and 
"training" in BRI was that language and academics dropped from 40% to 15% as the 
student went from age eighteen to twenty-one. See Matthews By Matthews v. 
Davis, 742 F.2d 825 (4th Cir. 1984), where the rented apartment and employed attendant reached 
the limit of achieved benefit.

[¶42.]  To be perceived from this broadly 
venturing record encompassing a multitude of educational inquiries is the 
recognition of a required exercise of discretion by the management of a school 
district and the countervailing objection of a student to the conclusions made 
and actions taken. Unless this court embarks on a program of embargoing 
responsible citizen community participation in elected office public 
responsibilities, a deference is required to elected officials who make 
contested decisions upon exercised discretion, Board of Educ. v. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174, 531 N.Y.S.2d 889, 527 N.E.2d 767 (1988), as different from egregious 
bad faith. In recognizing the tenant of public service to be of the essence in a 
democratic society, we determine that such a difference must be demonstrated by 
evidence which is clear, specific and persuasive. That test is not met in this 
record, and consequently such further findings as may have been factually made 
by the hearing officer to justify the compensatory educational program at a time 
now more than five years later than the challenged period are also factually and 
legally unsupported. After analysis of all of the evidence in this extensive 
record, this court both finds and determines that the School District has 
satisfied its educational obligation under EHA and Wyoming statutes to DM. 
A.C.B. By Pearlman v. Denver Dept. of Social 
Services, 725 P.2d 94 (Colo. App. 1986).

VII. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
AND STARE DECISIS

[¶43.]  The School District argues that the first 
hearing was determinative as to the relief to be granted, and that in compliance 
therewith, the School District was not further 
subject to additional penalization for compensatory education during the 
contested period as an issue neither raised nor determined at that time. The 
kinds of educational decisions and budgetary priority allocations which are 
encompassed within the subject, caution this court to avoid invitation to 
discuss this difficult subject which is not separately determinative for this 
decision.

VIII. OTHER 
ISSUES

[¶44.]  Two other broad issues were 
comprehensively briefed and assiduously argued in oral presentation before this 
court. The first was an argument presented by the School 
District of the undisclosed bias of the hearing officer. We simply 
note in rejection of consideration that documentation is lacking to afford a 
factual basis for analysis of the acidity of the argument presented.

[¶45.]  The second argument of singularly greater 
validity also will not be addressed by virtue of the decision which we make. 
This is the quandary of the applicable statute of limitations for student 
compensatory rights derived from contended improper School 
District conduct in the period 1979 to 1982. Adler By Adler v. 
Education Dept. of State of N.Y., 760 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1985). This subject 
directly raises the applicability and validity of the Wyoming statute of 
limitations for rights derived from federal statutes, W.S. 1-3-115. Although the 
consideration of this statute by the very recent Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal 
case, Trustees of Wyoming Laborers Health and Welfare Plan v. Morgen & 
Oswood Const. Co., Inc. of Wyoming, 850 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1988), deserves 
immediate attention by the Wyoming legislature, we decline present comment on 
the validity of that statute or other limitation statutes. Cf. Spiegel v. School 
Dist. No. 1, LaramieCounty, 600 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1979). 
Spielberg By Spielberg v. Henrico County Public Schools, 853 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 
1988); Adler, 760 F.2d 454; Flavin v. ConnecticutState Bd. of Educ., 553 F. Supp. 827 
(D.Conn. 1982); and Note, Limitations Period for Actions Brought Under § 1415 of 
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, LVI Fordham L.Rev. 725 
(1988).

IX. 
REMEDIATION

[¶46.]  This is the third case currently 
considered in which the litigative process has effectively required a school 
district and the State of Wyoming to pay for 
extra-statutory and unjustified educational services based on the student's 
contention of the School District's extended 
responsibility past the twenty-first birthday. Since the hearing officer lacked 
jurisdiction to grant educational services which extend beyond Wyoming's 
constitutional and statutory authorizations, we find no basis for payment by 
application of either the "stay put" provisions of federal law, 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(e)(3) (1982 ed. & Supp. IV 1986), or SBE Rule, § 84, "Status of Child 
During Hearings," beyond the date of the issuance of our mandate. Janzen v. 
KnoxCountyBd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 
1986). Consequently, since DM is now beyond the age of twenty-one years, further 
obligation for the maintenance of educational benefits will be continued for DM 
only to the date when our mandate issues in this case. After that time, neither 
the School District nor the State Board of 
Education is afforded the obligation or opportunity to continue to expend these 
funds as if the individual has not yet achieved the age of twenty-one years. 
Ryan, 764 P.2d 1019 (Wyo. 1988). "Stay put" and SBE Rule, § 84 end 
at age twenty-one unless this decision is reversed with supersession of the 
Wyoming 
statutes and constitution by federal authority.

[¶47.]  Reversed and remanded to the district 
court to enter an order in conformity herewith.

FOOTNOTES

1 Something more than 10% 
of all children fall within the generic classification of handicapped as 
addressed by the United States Congress in the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. (1982 ed. & Supp. IV 1986) (EHA). It 
was considered by the 1970 census that mildly handicapped children encompassed 
about 89% of the handicapped student population. Moderately handicapped, which 
still fell within the educable category, were 6%. Severe and profoundly severe, 
within which group this handicapped student (DM) is educationally included, 
totalled 5%, as a category with an IQ of thirty-five or below.

2 Serious and substantial 
issues as briefed and argued of undisclosed bias of the hearing officer and 
statute of limitations will only be noted by reference in opinion text and not 
otherwise considered for this decision.

3 Chronology of 
educational history and School District 
expenditures:

1973 - Family 
moved to Casper and seven year old DM was placed 
in A.J. Woods - the School District's special 
education school.

1977 - DM 
admitted to BRI.

4/1/79 - DM 
removed from BRI and taken by his father to Scottsdale, Arizona, where he was enrolled in the Devereux 
Foundation on about April 2, 1979.

10/20/80 - DM 
dismissed by Devereux, picked up by his father and returned to Casper.

11/7/80 - 
Transferred for attendance to A.J. Woods but apparently did not attend because 
of disputes between parents and School 
District.

1/6/81 - Child 
Study Committee (CSC) meeting for local school education, parents appeared and 
represented by counsel.

2/17/81 - 
Another CSC meeting, parents appeared and represented by counsel.

3/5/81 - 
Individualized Educational Program (IEP) approved by School 
District and rejected by parents, who appeared and were represented 
by counsel.

3/6/81 - Hearing 
requested.

8/10-12/81 - 
Hearing held.

9/2/81 - DM was 
moved from home to WyomingStateTraining 
School for respite care for the parents and did not return to 
Casper when 
school started.

9/11/81 - 
Decision rendered by Dr. Willard G. Jones, hearing officer, Greeley, Colorado.

9/20/81 - School 
board with parents and counsel in attendance voted to place DM in Valley of the 
Sun, a facility in and licensed by the State of Arizona. Thereafter, parents rejected that 
placement.

Late 1981 - From 
hearing officer recommendation, the School 
District hired Dr. Allen Huang for a placement recommendation. Three 
school board meetings were held in January, February and March when placement 
status was discussed.

3/15/82 - Dr. 
Huang reported to the board and parents in recommending return to BRI, which the 
board approved.

5/82 - DM 
returned to BRI after criteria for care enunciated by Dr. Huang was accepted by 
the institution so that reduced aversions would be utilized in the application 
of the IEP. Thereafter, BRI conceded to conditions and a contract was signed for 
admission to be accomplished on May 10, 1982.

11/18/85 - In 
confining letter by the School District to the father in addressing 
transitioning, it was stated by a School 
District authority:

I am surprised to see 
that you have forgotten about the conversation I had with you at the Ramada Inn 
(Downtowner) last February. I went there to collect a Consultant who was doing 
some workshops for the district (February 28 & March 1). Anyway I saw you 
there and approached you to ask you if you were beginning to plan for David 
given that he will reach 21 fairly soon (i.e. funding will cease). I also 
mentioned that I had recently been in Denver and was encouraged by the service model 
they have there for autistic children. I suggested that we need to plan for a 
transition, i.e., something between B.R.I. and adult services.

1987 - Parents 
were again advised that age twenty-one as forthcoming would end School District funding eligibility.

10/27/87 & 
11/3/87 - Hearing was requested by parents. As the result of the requested 
hearing, DM has since remained in BRI.

12/14-16/87 - 
Hearing held.

12/31/87 - 
Decision entered by the hearing officer.

1/15/88 - 
Petitions for review filed by School 
District.

2/12/88 - 
Petition for review filed by the State Department of Education.

3/23/88 - Case 
docketed by the Wyoming Supreme Court.

9/14/88 - After 
briefing was completed, oral argument was held.

In analysis of 
incurred costs, tuition costs at BRI in 1977 were $2,638 a month and in October 
1987, $9,434. These are pure tuition costs and do not include supervision, 
monitoring, parent and staff travel and other expenses.

Tuition 
totals:

BRI Feb.         1977 
-             
20 months      
$ 56,461 

March                         
1979 

DEV April       1979 -             
19 months      
$ 44,875 

November 1980 
BRI 

April                
1982 -             
67 months      
$438,505 

October 1987 

BRI October 
  1987 -             
12 months      
$113,208 

September 
1988

Total through 
September, 1988                  
$653.049

The current monthly cost of $9,434 compares with the 
1986-87 School District 401 Report: 1,392 handicapped students (without BD 
students) total $6,612,073.50, average $4,750.05 per year.

1,460 students 
(with BD students) $6,612,073.50, average $4,528.82 per year.

In all cases, 
these amounts reflect the costs for providing educational services only. It does 
not include related service costs which, for a facility in Rhode Island, are 
singularly greater. Total costs for all facets of expense to the School District including staff time, travel, litigative 
costs and expert fees probably now approach a million dollars and will certainly 
exceed that cost if an additional tuition for twenty-six months is 
provided.

4 The controversial nature 
of the BRI process as involving a hierarchy of negative physical aversives as 
also combined with use (or contended misuse) of food contingencies is found in 
the order to show cause document issued by the State of Massachusetts, which 
recites:

24. During the OFC 
[Massachusetts Office for Children] licensing study of September 1984 through 
April 1985, OFC learned that BRI was using the following hierarchy of 
aversives.

(1) Ignore

(2) Firm "no"

(3) Token 
Fines

(4) Water Squirt to the 
face or back of neck

(5)(a) Vapor Spray I to 
the face or back of neck (compressed air mixed with water vapor lasting 
approximately three seconds)

(b) Air Spray (same as 
Vapor Spray I without the water)

(6)(a) White Noise Visual 
Screen (a football helmet with an opaque screen to occlude vision and a masking 
or other unpleasant repetitive noise.)

(b) Taste Aversive 
(vinegar, vanilla extract, lemon juice, jalepeno pepper spray, or other taste 
aversives applied to lip or tongue)

(c) Standing time-out in 
White Noise Visual Screen (standing in bare feet on an uncomfortable rubber 
floor mat)

(d) Ammonia (ammonia 
fumes sprayed near nose)

(e) Vapor Spray II 
(lasting approximately 15 seconds)

(f) Vapor Spray III 
(lasting approximately two minutes)

(g) Contingent Physical 
Exercise (series of sit-ups or toe-touches)

(h) Remove vapor Spray 
(vapor spray attached to the White Noise Visual Screen)

(i) Social Punisher 
(student loosely tied to another student he/she finds aversive)

(7)(a) Hand 
Squeeze

(b) Wrist 
Squeeze

(8) Rubber Band (Snapped 
on wrist or inner arm)

(9) Spank (applied to 
bare buttocks or thigh)

(10) Muscle Squeeze 
(applied to shoulder, triceps, pectoral, or thigh)

(11) Rolling Pinch 
(applied to buttocks, inner arm, inner thigh, bottom of feet, palms of hands, or 
stomach)

(12) Finger Pinch 
(applied to buttocks, inner arm, inner thigh, bottom of feet, palms of hands, or 
stomach)

(13) Water Spray III 
(bucket of cold water poured over head)

(14) Brief Cool Shower 
(one minute shower at approximately 50 degrees)

(15) Automatic Vapor 
Spray Station (AVS) (wrists and ankles restrained while child wears Remote Vapor 
Spray Helmet; usually implemented in conjunction with other 
aversives)

(b) Multiple 
Consequences

(c) Combined 
Aversives.

5 Defined as education and 
training for those, such as the mentally retarded, who are not ill. 
PennhurstStateSchool 
and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 7 n. 2, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1535 
n. 2, 67 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1981).

6 The one fact not in 
controversy in this extended evidentiary proceeding was that DM had not 
substantially gained in general academic attainment age, to be differentiated 
from living skills, during the period between his fifteenth and twenty-first 
years. In 1980, in conjunction with habilitation at the Devereux Foundation, an 
independent agency, Behavior Evaluation Specialist Teams, Inc., conducted an 
evaluation. Then thirteen years and 5 months of age, the report 
reflected:

Intellectual 
Assessment reveals that [DM] is 
currently functioning in the profound range of mental retardation, however these 
results should be considered minimal estimates of his true capabilities. 
[Emphasis in original.]

Adaptive Behavior 
Assessment reveals that [DM] is 
functioning at approximately a 5 year old level. [Emphasis in 
original.]

In a report of September, 
1985, furnished by BRI, the levels found were one year and five months for 
communication domain; three years and one month for daily living skills domain; 
zero years and eleven months for socialization domain; and one year and eight 
months for adaptive behavior composite. The most recent reports in this record 
show chronological attainment age of between one year and seven months to two 
years of age.

7 The basis of direct 
certification is found in the second paragraph of W.R.A.P. 12.09, 
providing:

If after such review, the 
district court concludes the matter to be appropriate for determination by the 
Supreme Court, the district court may certify the case to the Supreme Court. 
Upon notification of such certification, the petitioner shall pay the required 
docketing fee.

* * * If the matter is 
not certified to the Supreme Court, the district court shall enter judgment, 
affirming, modifying, or reversing the order of the agency.

Ordinarily, we 
would remand and require findings of fact by the certifying trial court by 
virtue of the particularized nature of these proceedings as presented pursuant 
to the terms of the federal statute. In this case, the extreme cost status as 
currently accruing and indeterminate status of the appropriate standard of 
review forecloses that more leisurely disposition.

However, by virtue of the 
cases involving EHA and correlative state rules, no further direct 
certifications of these cases will be accepted. The district courts should 
consider that the provisions of W.R.A.P. 12.09 are subject to this 
interpretation. Although it was not attempted in this case, the requirement of 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (1982 ed. & Supp. IV 1986) of the federal statute, that 
additional evidence can be introduced, is preclusive of direct certification. 
Additionally, as adduced in this particular case, with the extreme volume of 
exhibit material actually presented and without a record determining clearly 
what the hearing officer actually considered, see footnote 13, infra, first 
consideration and review by the district court is not only appropriate but also 
required as similar to Cochran, 764 P.2d 1037 (Wyo. 1988), where the forum was 
declaratory judgment rather than petition for review and the case was remanded 
for initial decision by the district court.

8 The peculiarity of this 
case at this juncture is recognized in that the large majority of all litigation 
is derived from the federal courts which diagnose the initial state 
administrative agency proceedings. As a state appellate court, we are 
responsible for the final establishment of state law and do not have the 
deference responsibility largely referenced by the federal courts in these 
proceedings. Furthermore, we do not have a decision of either a fact finding 
court or an administrative agency, since the decision presented was unreviewed 
following hearing officer conclusion.

The evidentiary status is 
further complicated since one of the two principal witnesses for DM had 
previously served as an attorney for DM and his parents and the second was an 
officer in BRI whose monetary interest was recognized in the annual maintenance 
fee last billed at $113,208 per year. Consequently, this court approaches the 
review by a comprehensive consideration of the record. Witnesses at the extended 
hearing as called by DM included in addition to his parents, a representative of 
the School District, the prior attorney now 
appearing as professional expert witness and a representative of the domiciliary 
facility. Witnesses provided by the School 
District were two employees. Within the nature of the way the 
hearing was presented, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction's office 
did not directly participate nor provide witnesses, except that the Deputy 
Superintendent of Public Instruction was called as an adverse witness in regard 
to the issue now resolved by our prior case of the age twenty-one/age twenty-two 
eligibility.

Consequently, a 
resolution of most of the facts and factual issues as addressing either the 
circumstances involved in the prior hearing, confined to a record of that 
hearing with the transcript not presented and the documentary evidence there 
considered, or to the more current documentary evidence representing IEP and 
progress status. This leaves this court to make a detailed review and analysis 
of a very extended documentary case reflecting innumerable hours of professional 
activities of the educators as diagnostic, habilitation and educational in 
character, expertise and activity.

This court does find 
itself in the position reflected by the Florida Court of Appeals in Hendry 
County School Bd. v. Kujawski, 498 So. 2d 566, 568 (Fla.App. 1986):

Basically, Florida's plan mirrors 
the Federal EAHCA. The Florida plan, however, does have one very 
significant and unfortunate difference. The federal system provides for de novo 
review in a state court of competent jurisdiction or in a United States District 
Court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). The review in those courts is de novo. Roncker 
[v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983)]. The Florida system provides for review by the 
district courts of appeal. § 230.23(4)(m)(4), Fla. Stat. (1985). The district court of 
appeal is an appellate court and is, thus, ill-equipped to provide de novo 
review of a hearing officer's actions. We reluctantly accepted review of this 
case.

The extensive literature 
provides little concrete direction as how to meet and verify the immediate needs 
of DM as far removed from conventional educational assistance, to properly 
consider anguished and intense interests of the parents, find funds for the 
required activity and leave school district and state finances sufficiently 
solvent to perform its constitutional designed functions of public education in 
a time of attack and criticism. See Broadwell and Walden, "Free Appropriate 
Public Education" After Rowley: An Analysis of Recent Court Decisions, 17 J.L. 
& Educ. 35 (1988); Cichon, Educability and Education: Filling the Cracks in 
Service Provision Responsibility Under the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975, 48 Ohio St.L.J. 1089 
(1987); Rothstein, Right to Education for the Handicapped in West Virginia, 85 
W.Va.L.Rev. 187 (1983); Krass, The Right to Public Education for Handicapped 
Children: A Primer for the New Advocate, 1976 U.Ill.L.F. 1016 (1976); Comment, 
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act: The Benefits and Burdens of 
Mainstreaming Capable Handicapped Children in a Regular Classroom, 38 Mercer 
L.Rev. 903 (1987); Comment, supra, 34 Ohio St.L.J. 554; Note, The Meaning of 
Appropriate Education to Handicapped Children Under the EHCA: The Impact of 
Rowley, 14 Sw.U.L.Rev. 521 (1984); Note, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" 
Education: The Education For All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 Harv.L. 
Rev. 1103 (1979); Note, The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 
10 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 110 (1976); and Note, The Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act: Opening the Schoolhouse Door, 6 N YU.Rev.L. & Soc.Change 43 
(1976).

9 The course of literary 
consideration is extensive as philosophically anticipating EHA and now assessing 
its progress. Minimal consideration has however been given in law review 
articles to the consequently endangered public education in systematic distress 
from mainstreaming and fiscal disenchantment with the cost benefit relationship 
derived from the receipt of federal funds.

Within the myriad of 
recent cases created by EHA, the arena of conflict issues most often developed 
result from the tension between twenty-four hour residential care and mainstream 
classroom utilization. Normally, the issue raises parental demand for whichever 
is the most expensive as related directly to the severity of the individual's 
handicap. Apparent in factual recitation among these cases, is the observable 
factor that where a severely handicapped condition exists, that resolution 
invokes family respite and child physical control in structured habilitation. 
Conversely, for those less severely handicapped in a life skill context, the 
cases raise the feasibility of use of local school and mainstreaming with 
individualized physical and educational attention. Representing the 
habilitation-residential controversies, see Spielberg By Spielberg v. Henrico 
County Public Schools, 853 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1988); Board of Educ. of East 
Windsor Regional School Dist. v. Diamond in Behalf of Diamond, 808 F.2d 987 (3rd 
Cir. 1986); Parks v. Pavkovic, 753 F.2d 1397 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 473 U.S. 906, 105 S. Ct. 3529, 87 L. Ed. 2d 653, cert. denied 474 U.S. 918, 106 S. Ct. 246, 
88 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1985); David D., 775 F.2d 411; Matthews By Matthews v. Davis, 
742 F.2d 825 (4th Cir. 1984); Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 
1983); Doe, 692 F.2d 800; Hendry, 498 So. 2d 566; Taglianetti by Taglianetti v. 
Cronin, 143 Ill. App.3d 459, 97 Ill.Dec. 547, 493 N.E.2d 29 (1986); Parks v. 
Illinois Dept. of Mental Health, 110 Ill. App.3d 184, 65 
Ill.Dec. 695, 441 N.E.2d 1209 (1982); Levine, 418 A.2d 229; Semel v. Ambach, 118 A.D.2d 385, 505 N.Y.S.2d 466 (1986); Martin, 3 Va. App. 197, 348 S.E.2d 857; and 
Hunter on Behalf of Hunter v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 46 Wn. App. 523, 731 P.2d 19 (1987).

Cases conversely 
presented involving desired mainstreaming or utilization of local schools which 
sometimes require special attention including physical therapy and tutoring, 
etc. are DeVries By DeBlaay v. Spillane, 853 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1988); Lachman 
v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1988) (petition for 
certiorari filed 8/29/88); A.W. By and Through N.W. v. Northwest R-1 School 
Dist., 813 F.2d 158 (8th Cir.) cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 144, 98 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1987); Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist., 811 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 
1987); Mark A. v. Grant Wood Area Educ. Agency, 795 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied 480 U.S. 936, 107 S. Ct. 1579, 94 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1987); Roncker, 700 F.2d 1058; Powell v. Defore, 699 F.2d 1078 (11th Cir. 1983); and Springdale 
School Dist. No. 50 of Washington County v. Grace, 693 F.2d 41 (8th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied 461 U.S. 927, 103 S. Ct. 2086, 77 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1983).

The variability of 
results demonstrates the difficulties engendered when first the basic function 
of education is expanded to medical treatment and rudimentary living training, 
while the management and discretion in the complex concerns of family, society 
and habilitation move from the educational institution to adjudicative 
responsibilities of the court to be weighed and packaged by a preponderance of 
the evidence.

Litigative expenses which 
have mushroomed for school districts in the past two decades as involving 
personnel controversies have now obtrusively moved with the heavy costs involved 
into the handicapped education programming. Rollison v. Biggs, 656 F. Supp. 1204 
(D.Del. 1987); Guernsey, The School Pays the 
Piper, But How Much? Attorneys' Fees in Special Education Cases After the 
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 23 WakeForest L.Rev. 237 (1988); Cohen and Jones, 
The Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986: Congress Awards Attorneys' 
Fees to Handicapped Children, 17 J.L. & Educ. 127 (1988); Note, Congress, 
Smith v. Robinson, and the Myth of Attorney Representation in Special Education 
Hearings: Is Attorney Representation Desirable?, 37 Syracuse L.Rev. 1161 
(1987); Annotation, Award of Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to § 615(e)(4) of the 
Education of the Handicapped Act (20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)), as Amended by the 
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 87 A.L.R.Fed. 500 
(1988).

10 At present, the exposure 
would not realistically commence at a date prior to the 1975 passage of 
EHA.

11 See Alexopulos By 
Alexopulos v. Riles, 784 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1986) and Powell, 699 F.2d 1078 (no 
compensatory education allowed). Cf. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Breen, 853 F.2d 853 (11th Cir. 1988); Miener By and Through Miener v. State of Missouri, 
800 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1986); Timms v. Metropolitan School Dist. of Wabash 
County, Ind., 718 F.2d 212, as opinion was withdrawn and restated as 722 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1983); Miener v. State of Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied 459 U.S. 909, 103 S. Ct. 215, 74 L. Ed. 2d 171, cert. denied 459 U.S. 916, 103 S. Ct. 230, 74 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1982); Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of 
Ed., 518 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.Ala. 1981); and Comment, supra, 1984 Wis.L.Rev. 
1469.

12 As stated in the hearing 
officer's findings of fact, the hearing officer found:

In view of evidence and 
testimony, this impartial hearing officer finds that Respondent has acted in bad 
faith in an egregious manner to deprive Petitioner of the free appropriate 
public education to which he was entitled and in so finding, I find for 
Petitioner on this issues.

It is interesting that in 
those numerous cases now presented and regularly accruing, Devereux, in its 
various facilities in different locations, is the desired habilitation placement 
and subject of request and controversy of the parents in a significant number of 
cases. Thus far, no other case has come to our attention as cited or reviewed 
where the issue of retention in BRI was presented. The parents for DM 
categorically reject the sufficiency of Devereux, which has been found by other 
courts to be not only an appropriate but required placement. Manecke v. School 
Bd. of Pinellas County, Fla., 762 F.2d 912, reh'g denied 770 F.2d 1084 (11th 
Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1062, 106 S. Ct. 809, 88 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1986); Christopher T. v. San Francisco Unif. School Dist., 553 F. Supp. 1107 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Semel, 505 N.Y.S.2d 466; 
and BucksCountyPublic 
School Intermediate Unit No. 22 v. Com., Dept. of 
Educ., 108 Pa.Cmwlth. 511, 529 A.2d 1201 (1987). Cf. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987, 
where the student was once placed in BRI by his parents for a short time but the 
litigative controversy involved special school placement in the May Institute, 
which is undefined as to whether located in the residence state of New 
Jersey.

It is apparent that EHA 
has created a singular opportunity for domiciliary twenty-four hour maintenance 
with life skill training and education institutions. The cost of funding is 
recognized in limitations of placement in some states and by development of 
multi-district institutions. See Sykes v. Lincoln 
County School District No. 1, 763 P.2d 1263 (Wyo. 1988).

13 It is difficult to 
establish of what the actual record as presented for review may consist. There 
is a pleading volume in district court and a hearing testimony transcript of 
three volumes. Not included anywhere, although actually "stipulated for 
introduction," is a transcript of the August 1981 hearing. The 1987 hearing 
appears by six volumes. Volume I of 236 pages is the apparent administrative 
hearing pleadings, although obviously not all of the communication with the 
hearing officer is included. Volumes II, III and IV are 361 numbered School District exhibits which are described in an exhibit 
list of fifty-seven pages which, in itself, is narrative in nature but was not a 
listed exhibit. Nothing of record clearly reflects admission or rejection of 
these exhibits, except for four items that were specifically offered and 
received plus the earlier hearing transcript which was received but was not 
provided. Volume V of the record is four boxes of documents consisting of school 
records whose relationship to introduction is indeterminate, except counsel for 
DM said during hearing that he would stipulate to introduction if requested by 
the School District's attorney - which request 
was not made. To add some question to the circumstance, each of these five 
boxes, although duly marked as exhibits by both district court and the supreme 
court offices, arrived with stick on slips as underlined with the legend: "Do 
Not Take This Box." The total of this material as lacking organization and 
demonstrating much redundancy offers evidence of the history of the educational 
effort and progress in the total which exceeds 12,000 pages of documents. This 
court has accepted the responsibility since the entire "conglomerate" arrived by 
designation and without objection that the parties intended the administrative 
hearing to include the entire volume. Actually, in addition to the four 
introduced exhibits, there were only twenty-two other exhibits identified out of 
the 361 listed and among them were video tapes, which are not to be found here. 
Consequently, the decision of this court is made on the certified record as 
filed here.

14 We also find merit in 
the logic of Hendry, 498 So. 2d  at 568, where the Florida Court of Appeals stated 
in finding that the hearing officer abused its discretion by a sua sponte order 
of residential placement:

The hearing officer is 
limited to determining the appropriateness of the IEP. Davis v. District 
of Columbia Board of Education, 530 F. Supp. 1209 
(1982). If the hearing officer determines that the school district's proposed 
placement is not appropriate, the hearing officer must remand the matter to the 
school district. In addition, he may recommend an appropriate placement. 
Davis at 1212. 
The hearing officer, in the instant case, exceeded his authority by sua sponte 
ordering a residential placement. Once he determined that the School Board's 
plan was inappropriate, he should have remanded the matter to the School Board. 
He could have attached his recommendation of residential placement.

It also seems clearly 
established that the hearing officer has no authority to require placement in an 
unapproved institution or incur a level of expenditures that are not acceptable 
to a state agency. The State of Wyoming apparently has neither the commonly 
applied process for limiting accreditation of out-of-state placements or in 
establishing a maximum limit for which obligation can be incurred in 
habilitation cost, as discussed in Taglianetti, 493 N.E.2d 29 and Semel, 505 N.Y.S.2d 466.

15 The hearing officer 
indicated that the entitlement money received by the State of Wyoming in 1987 was in 
excess of two million dollars. Those funds spread among the severely retarded, 
such as DM, would afford financing for less than twenty students. This would 
leave no funds remaining for assistance to the other handicapped students for 
whom eligibility exists in the Wyoming school system which, from normal 
statistics, would exceed 10,000 persons. Conversely, if each of those 10,000 
students received anything close to equivalent monetary attention, there would 
be no funds remaining for maintenance of the educational system of the State of 
Wyoming. 
Within this premise could lie the political inquiry that unless the system can 
more reasonably distribute the costs, the State of Wyoming may not be able 
to afford participation in the federal program as risking the continuation of 
the State's public education institution as constitutionally required. 
Admittedly, this situation is novel since no other reported case as currently 
reviewed nationwide among the large number indicate a cost per student which 
approaches the million dollars evidenced here.

16 The primary expert 
witness for DM in the 1987 hearing in addition to Dr. Matthew L. Israel, 
Director of BRI, was Dr. George Lewis Blau, Associate Professor of Psychology at 
the University of Wyoming, who also practiced law part-time in the 
Casper law firm 
of Miller and Blau. In the 1981 hearing, Dr. Blau appeared in the attorney 
capacity as co-counsel for DM in the contested hearing, while five years later, 
he appeared as an expert witness with the principal scope of his testimony to 
encompass the events presented in evidence at the hearing when he acted as 
attorney. Within the factual circumstance of his current hearing testimony, was 
the statement that he "had not done an evaluation of the child" as admitted on 
cross-examination. However, he testified in detail, without reviewing school 
records except for video tapes since 1981, as to the insufficiencies and the 
ineffectiveness of what the School District did 
in the period 1979 to 1982. During this time also, after the termination of the 
first hearing, he made appearances before the School Board of Natrona County 
School District No. 1 as attorney for DM and his parents.

By his 1988 testimony, he 
stated:

A. Mr. McCrary, I need 
for you to understand that I really was assisting only in the limited areas of 
working with the psychological evaluations of [DM]. Ms. Thornton took on primary 
responsibility and did not share everything with me. I surely cannot refute your 
statement, but I surely cannot acquiesce to it, either.

Q. [Mr. McCrary] Didn't 
you earlier testify that you acted as co-counsel for the family in the prior due 
process hearing?

A. I think the correct 
testimony was that I acted as co-counsel in an advisory capacity and doing the 
arranging for the evaluation of the child by three psychologists and doing their 
direct evaluation; and then I believe I participated in the cross-examination of 
two individuals, Mr. Schwartz and an individual from the University of Wyoming. That I believe was the extent of 
my participation.

For example, I did not 
participate in writing any of the legal briefs, I did not participate in writing 
any of the legal arguments, and I did not participate in any of the formal 
arguments to the independent due process hearing examiner.

Under the 
circumstance evidenced and in the face of the general objection of the School 
District that the first hearing was concluded by decision and could not be a 
basis for the present bad faith finding, we would not attribute significant 
reliability to the testimony of Dr. Blau as utilized for the egregious bad faith 
conclusion. The opinion of the attorney in present expert testimony as he 
differs from the first hearing witnesses for the opposing litigant affords 
little weight for our present evidentiary decision.