Case Title: Mitchell v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR95-43-9

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Derrick MITCHELL v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 95-439                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered January 16, 1996


1.   Criminal procedure -- directed verdict motion must state
     specific grounds for motion. -- Due to a lack of specificity
     in his motion for a directed verdict following the State's
     case, where he merely stated in general terms that he did not
     believe that there was sufficient evidence to justify the
     charge, appellant failed to preserve for review his argument
     that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction
     for first-degree murder; a motion for directed verdict in a
     criminal case must include the specific ground for the motion;
     it must be sufficiently specific to apprise the circuit court
     of the particular point raised.

2.   Criminal law -- defendant in criminal case is ordinarily
     presumed to be mentally competent to stand trial -- test for
     determining if accused is competent. -- A defendant in a
     criminal case is ordinarily presumed to be mentally competent
     to stand trial, and the burden of proving incompetence is on
     that defendant; the test for determining if an accused is
     competent to stand trial is whether he is aware of the nature
     of the charges against him and is capable of cooperating
     effectively with his attorney in the preparation of his
     defense.

3.   Criminal law -- competency to stand trial -- substantial
     evidence supported circuit court's ruling. -- Where appellant
     was evaluated and found to be of average or low intelligence
     but able to understand the legal proceedings against him and
     to assist effectively in his own defense; the evaluation noted
     that other than appellant's own assertion that he was
     possessed by a demon at the time of the shooting, there were
     no other symptoms of a mental disorder at that time; the
     psychologist who was in charge of the evaluation concluded
     that the results of a personality test were inconclusive
     because appellant either did not read the questions, answered
     them randomly, or answered them in such a way as to over-
     report symptoms; the psychologist concluded that appellant was
     competent to stand trial; and appellant offered no expert
     testimony to rebut these opinions; the supreme court held that
     substantial evidence supported the circuit court's ruling of
     competency to stand trial.

4.   Jury -- appellant had burden of proving systematic exclusion
     of members of his racial group from venire -- elements of
     prima facie showing of systematic exclusion. -- Appellant had
     the burden of proving the systematic exclusion of members of
     his racial group from the venire; to make a prima facie
     showing of systematic exclusion, appellant had to establish
     that (1) the group allegedly excluded was a distinctive group
     in the community; (2) the representation of this group in the
     venire was not fair and reasonable in relation to the number
     of such persons in the community; and (3) the
     underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion; only
     after appellant made his prima facie case by establishing
     these three elements could the burden shift to the State to
     justify its procedure.

5.   Jury -- selection process -- mere showing that venire is not
     racially representative will not make prima facie showing of
     racial discrimination. -- When the jury venire is drawn by
     random selection, the mere showing that it is not
     representative of the racial composition of the population
     will not make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination. 

6.   Jury -- selection process -- appellant did not meet test of
     prima facie showing of racial discrimination. -- Where there
     was no dispute that blacks represented a distinctive group in
     the community, but appellant did not establish the second and
     third elements of the test of a prima facie showing of racial
     discrimination in the jury selection process, failing to offer
     statistical proof of the racial composition of the community
     or of the venire and completely failing to offer evidence of
     systematic exclusion, the supreme court held that there was no
     prima facie case, and, therefore, the burden never shifted to
     the State to justify its procedure; moreover, two blacks sat
     on appellant's jury; the circuit court correctly denied
     appellant's motion to quash.

7.   Jury -- Batson challenge -- procedure to be followed. -- The
     following procedure is to be followed when a Batson objection
     is raised: first, the defendant must make a prima facie case
     that racial discrimination is the basis of a juror challenge; 
     in the event that the defendant makes a prima facie case, the
     State has the burden of showing that the challenge was not
     based upon race; only if the defendant makes a prima facie
     case and the State fails to give a racially neutral reason for
     the challenge is the court required to conduct a sensitive
     inquiry.

8.   Jury -- Batson challenge -- elements of prima facie case that
     racial discrimination is basis of juror challenge -- standard
     of review. -- A prima facie case that racial discrimination is
     the basis of a juror challenge may be established by (1)
     showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to
     an inference of discriminatory purpose, (2) demonstrating
     total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of blacks from
     the jury, or (3) showing a pattern of strikes, questions, or
     statements by a prosecuting attorney during voir dire; the
     standard of review for reversal of a circuit court's Batson
     ruling is whether the court's findings are clearly against the
     preponderance of the evidence.

9.   Jury -- Batson challenge -- appellant did not make prima facie
     case. -- Appellant did not make a prima facie case of racial
     discrimination, having failed to raise an inference of
     discrimination or to prove a disproportionate exclusion of
     blacks from the jury or a pattern of strikes; it was unclear
     from the record which party excluded which jurors, except in
     one instance; moreover, the fact that one black member is
     struck from the jury, by itself, is not sufficient to make a
     prima facie case.

10.  Jury -- discrimination -- presence of minority members on jury
     not determinative but significant -- State's explanation for
     challenge was racially neutral. -- The presence of minority
     members on the jury, while by no means determinative of the
     question of whether discrimination occurred, is significant;
     the best answer the State can have to a charge of
     discrimination is to point to a jury which has black members;
     in the present case, even if a prima facie case had been
     proven, the State's explanation for the challenge was racially
     neutral, and the circuit court was well within its discretion
     to deny the Batson challenge.

11.  Trial -- exclusion of witnesses at trial -- victim allowed to
     remain in courtroom -- appellant failed to show how fairness
     was jeopardized. -- Where appellant failed to show how
     fairness was jeopardized in his trial by the presence of one
     of his victims, the supreme court concluded that the circuit
     court did not err by permitting the victim to attend
     appellant's trial.

12.  Appeal & error -- admission of autopsy photograph -- issue not
     preserved for review. -- Where appellant contended that the
     admission into evidence of the nude autopsy photograph of a
     shooting victim was prejudicial to his case and constituted
     error by the circuit court, the supreme court held that the
     issue was not preserved for review because the photograph at
     issue was not included in either the record or the abstract;
     it was impossible for the appellate court to determine the
     degree of prejudice because the photograph in question was not
     before it. 


     Appeal from Canway Circuit Court; Paul E. Danielson, Judge;
affirmed.
     Michael L. Allison, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Kent G. Holt, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.Associate Justice Robert L. Brown
January 16, 1996






DERRICK MITCHELL,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,
                     APPELLEE,

CR 95-439




APPEAL FROM THE CONWAY COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CR 94-1 B,
HON. PAUL E. DANIELSON, JUDGE,




AFFIRMED.






     Appellant Derrick Mitchell was tried and convicted of three
offenses arising out of a shooting incident in Union Chapel,
including first-degree murder.  He appeals on six grounds.  We hold
that none of the points of appeal has merit, and we affirm.
     During the early morning hours of January 8, 1994, a fight
broke out at a party at Sonny's Place in Union Chapel.  In order to
stop the fighting, an individual named Michael Clemons fired at
least one shot from his pistol at the ceiling, and the fighting
stopped.  Hearing the shots, appellant Mitchell kicked in the door
at Sonny's Place and brandished a fully automatic Mac II nine
millimeter pistol.  According to one witness, he said: "You ...
want to play bad, I'm the baddest thing around."  He started
shooting and sprayed the ceiling and wall with gunfire.  According
to Shalla Criswell, she heard the shooting stop but when she and
Felicia Payne came to the bedroom door, Mitchell opened fire again. 
Shalla Criswell was wounded in the side, and Felicia Payne was shot
in the abdomen and later died as a result of that wound.  According
to Criswell, after the shooting Mitchell said: "I got the bitch,"
referring to Felicia Payne.
     During a mental health evaluation before trial, Mitchell
claimed that he had been possessed by a demon at the time of the
shooting.  He was found fit to stand trial.  At trial, he admitted
shooting the victims but offered a defense.  He claimed that he was
inside Sonny's Place when a door slammed, and he felt the gun go
off.  He did not remember firing it himself.  He blamed his memory
loss on intoxication.  He was convicted of first-degree murder,
first-degree battery, and aggravated assault and received 40 years,
20 years, and 6 years, respectively.  The circuit court ordered
that the sentences be served consecutively.
     Mitchell asserts that there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction for first-degree murder, and we consider
this point initially, as is our practice.  Rockett v. State, 319
Ark. 335,