Case Title: Cherrix v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
BRIAN LEE CHERRIX 
 
 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
v.  Record Nos. 981798 & 982063  
 February 26, 1999 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ACCOMACK COUNTY 
Glen A. Tyler, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we review the capital murder conviction 
and death penalty imposed upon Brian Lee Cherrix, along with 
his convictions for forcible sodomy, two counts of using a 
firearm in the commission of a felony, and possessing a 
firearm after being convicted of a felony. 
I.  Facts 
 
On the night of January 27, 1994, 23 year-old Tessa Van 
Hart was working as a pizza delivery person at a pizza 
delivery restaurant on Chincoteague Island.  A man telephoned 
the restaurant and ordered a pizza to be delivered to an 
address in the "Small Piney Island" area of Chincoteague.  
Around 7:45 p.m., Van Hart left the restaurant to deliver the 
pizza. 
 
When Van Hart failed to return from the delivery, the 
Chincoteague police were notified, and they began a search for 
Van Hart.  Shortly after midnight on January 28, the police 
found Van Hart's vehicle behind a vacant home approximately 
one mile from the Small Piney Island area.  Van Hart's body 
was found in the back seat. 
 
An autopsy revealed that Van Hart died from two gunshot 
wounds to the head.  The autopsy also showed that she had been 
sodomized and had suffered bruises and abrasions on her 
forehead, cheek, nose, and mouth sometime around the time of 
death.  In the yard of the house to which Van Hart was to have 
delivered the pizza on January 27, the police found two 
bloodstains which DNA typing showed to be consistent with Van 
Hart's blood. 
The murder of Tessa Van Hart remained unsolved for over 
two years.  On June 3, 1996, however, Brian Lee Cherrix, who 
was in the Accomack County Jail pending sentencing on 
unrelated charges, contacted the Accomack County Sheriff, 
Robert Crockett.  Cherrix said that he had information 
concerning the Van Hart murder that he would share with police 
in return for leniency on his pending sentencing.  Cherrix 
told Crockett that his cousin, Robert Birch, III, had killed 
Van Hart.  Cherrix claimed that Birch had told him in February 
1994 that he, Birch, had lured Van Hart to an unoccupied 
residence by ordering a pizza, raped and shot her, and then 
discarded the rifle used in the crime in a nearby creek.  
Birch died in 1995. 
 
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The state police began an underwater search of the creek 
for the murder weapon.  When Cherrix was informed that the 
dive team had not recovered the rifle, he agreed to go to 
Chincoteague to show the officers the location of the rifle 
according to what Birch supposedly had told him.  At the 
search site, Cherrix directed Trooper Mark Fowler to the place 
he claimed that Birch had told him he had thrown the rifle.  
Fowler testified at trial that, while Cherrix maintained that 
he was only relating facts imparted to him by Birch, Cherrix 
would occasionally lapse into the use of the first person in 
describing how and where the rifle came to be located in the 
creek.  The divers recovered a .22 caliber Marlin rifle at the 
location indicated by Cherrix. 
Later that same day, Cherrix was taken to the City of 
Chesapeake, where he was interviewed by state police 
investigator Lloyd Dobbs.  After being advised of his Miranda 
rights and signing a written waiver of those rights, Cherrix 
gave several differing versions of the story Birch supposedly 
had told him, all the while using hand and arm gestures to 
demonstrate how Birch supposedly had disposed of the rifle.  
Sheriff Crockett then took Cherrix back to Accomack County 
Jail. 
Although Birch had died in 1995, the police conducted an 
investigation of his whereabouts on the night of the murder, 
 
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and they concluded that he was not a suspect in the Van Hart 
murder.  In August 1996, after having been sentenced on 
unrelated charges to 20 years imprisonment with all but nine 
years suspended, Cherrix was transferred to the custody of the 
Virginia Department of Corrections to serve his sentence. 
On April 16, 1997, Cherrix was returned to Accomack 
County Jail on charges of uttering and grand larceny.  During 
the drive from Brunswick Correctional Center to the Accomack 
County Jail, Chincoteague Assistant Police Chief Edward Lewis 
interviewed Cherrix regarding the Van Hart murder.  After 
Lewis advised Cherrix of his Miranda rights and Cherrix agreed 
to discuss the matter, Cherrix told Lewis yet a different 
version of what he claimed had happened on the night of the 
murder, still maintaining that Birch had committed the murder. 
On April 17, 1997, counsel was appointed for Cherrix's 
uttering and grand larceny charges.  On April 25, 1997, 
Cherrix submitted a written request to the Accomack County 
Jail authorities asking to see Lewis.  Lewis went to the jail 
to see Cherrix.  After Lewis advised Cherrix of his Miranda 
rights and Cherrix reaffirmed that he wanted to speak with 
Lewis, Cherrix confessed to the murder and sodomy of Van Hart.  
Cherrix then accompanied Lewis and an Accomack County 
sheriff's deputy to Chincoteague, where he directed the 
 
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officers on a tour of various locations that he had described 
in his confession. 
II.  Proceedings 
Cherrix was indicted for capital murder, forcible sodomy, 
two counts of using a firearm in the commission of those 
offenses, and one count of being a felon in possession of a 
firearm.  Code §§ 18.2-31, -67.1, -53.1, and -308.2.  At the 
conclusion of the guilt stage of a bifurcated jury trial 
conducted pursuant to Code §§ 19.2-264.3 and –264.4, the jury 
convicted Cherrix on all counts. 
After hearing evidence on the issue of punishment, the 
jury sentenced Cherrix to death for the capital murder, life 
imprisonment for the forcible sodomy, a total of eight years 
for using a firearm in the commission of those offenses, and 
five years for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a 
felony.  Cherrix's death sentence was based upon the jury's 
finding of both "future dangerousness" and "vileness."  See 
Code § 19.2-264.4.  The trial court reviewed the presentence 
report and victim impact statements and imposed all of the 
sentences fixed by the jury. 
Cherrix appeals his capital murder conviction, Record No. 
981798.  We have certified Cherrix's appeal of his non-capital 
convictions from the Court of Appeals, Record No. 982063, and 
have consolidated the two appeals. 
 
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III.  Issues Previously Decided  
Cherrix filed a pre-trial motion asking the trial court 
to declare the Virginia death penalty statutes 
unconstitutional on a number of grounds.  He also filed pre-
trial motions asking the trial court to allow the use of a 
jury questionnaire, to allow individual sequestered voir dire, 
and to supplement the trial court's voir dire with questions 
submitted by defense counsel in order to ascertain possible 
juror bias necessary to empanel an impartial jury.1  He now 
appeals the trial court's denial of those motions, raising 
issues that we have considered and rejected in previous cases: 
 
(1)  Virginia's two statutory aggravating circumstances 
of "future dangerousness" and "vileness" are not 
unconstitutionally vague.  Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 
387, 484 S.E.2d 898, 907, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 
S.Ct. 608 (1997)("vileness"); Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 
79, 86, 472 S.E.2d 263, 267 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 
1122 (1997)("future dangerousness"). 
 
(2)  Virginia's penalty-stage instructions adequately 
inform the jury regarding the concept of "mitigation."  Swann 
                     
1 The trial court actually granted Cherrix's request for 
individually sequestered voir dire, but limited its inquiry to 
the issues of "publicity and whether a juror would consider 
the death penalty." 
 
6
v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 228, 441 S.E.2d 195, 200, cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 889 (1994). 
 
(3)  The use of unadjudicated conduct to prove "future 
dangerousness" without proof of such conduct beyond a 
reasonable doubt is not unconstitutional.  Goins v. 
Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 453, 470 S.E.2d 114, 122, cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996). 
 
(4)  Allowing, but not requiring, a trial judge to reduce 
a sentence of death to life imprisonment on a showing of "good 
cause" is not unconstitutional.  Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 
Va. 68, 76, 445 S.E.2d 670, 675, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 971 
(1994). 
 
(5)  Consideration of hearsay evidence or information in 
a presentence report during the sentencing phase of a capital 
murder case is not unconstitutional.  Goins, 251 Va. at 453, 
470 S.E.2d at 122; O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 701-
02, 364 S.E.2d 491, 507-08, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988). 
 
(6)  The review provided by this Court on direct appeal 
in capital cases is not unconstitutional.  Mickens v. 
Commonwealth, 252 Va. 315, 320, 487 S.E.2d 302, 306 (1996), 
cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1269 (1997). 
 
(7)  Capital murder defendants do not have the 
constitutional right to individual and sequestered voir dire 
 
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of prospective jurors.  Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 
229, 427 S.E.2d 394, 399, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 848 (1993). 
 
(8)  Capital murder defendants do not have the 
constitutional right to require the trial court to mail a 
questionnaire to all potential jurors.  Strickler v. 
Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 489-90, 404 S.E.2d 227, 232, cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991). 
 
We find nothing in Cherrix's arguments here that warrants 
a change in our previous positions. 
IV.  Pre-Trial Issues 
A.  Failure to Suppress Cherrix's Confession 
 
Prior to trial, Cherrix filed a motion asking the trial 
court to suppress all of his statements to the police "on or 
after June 7, 1996, in that on each and every occasion the 
statements secured from the defendant, if any, were obtained 
while the defendant was in custody and denied his right to 
counsel." 
 
At the suppression hearing, Cherrix testified that he 
requested counsel in the presence of Sheriff Crockett on the 
return trip from Chesapeake to Accomack on June 7, 1996, and 
that he invoked his right to counsel when he was being 
interrogated by Lewis on the trip from Brunswick Correctional 
Center to Accomack County Jail on April 16, 1997.  He admitted 
that he had asked to speak with Lewis on April 25, but he 
 
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denied that Lewis advised him of his Miranda rights before 
interrogating him on that date. 
 
Sheriff Crockett testified that, while in Chesapeake on 
June 7, 1996, Cherrix had been advised of his Miranda rights 
and that he signed a written waiver.   He also testified that 
Cherrix never invoked his right to counsel or his right to 
remain silent during the return trip to Accomack. 
Lewis testified that on April 16, 1997, he advised 
Cherrix of his Miranda rights, and that Cherrix elected to 
speak to him.  He denied that Cherrix, "at any time . . . on 
April 16," requested counsel or otherwise indicated that he 
wished to stop answering questions.  Finally, Lewis testified 
that when he went to see Cherrix at the Accomack County Jail 
on April 25 pursuant to Cherrix's request, he again advised 
Cherrix of his Miranda rights, and that Cherrix never 
indicated on that date that he wished to have counsel present 
or that he wished to stop answering questions. 
Following the suppression hearing, the trial court denied 
Cherrix's motion to suppress his confession.  On appeal, 
Cherrix claims that he clearly invoked his right to counsel on 
April 16, that interrogations nevertheless continued without 
counsel being provided, in violation of his Fifth Amendment 
rights, and that the statements he made during those 
interrogations were thus inadmissible.  See Miranda v. 
 
9
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 
(1981).2  Cherrix contends that the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress the confession therefore constituted 
reversible error.  We do not agree. 
Admissibility of a defendant's statements is an issue to 
be decided by the trial court, which evaluates the credibility 
of the witnesses, resolves any conflicts in the testimony, and 
weighs the evidence as a whole.  Watkins v. Commonwealth, 229 
Va. 469, 477, 331 S.E.2d 422, 429 (1985), cert. denied, 475 
U.S. 1099 (1986).  Before admitting statements made by a 
defendant during custodial interrogation, the trial court must 
determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently 
relinquished and abandoned his rights.  See id.  The trial 
court's determination is the resolution of a question of fact 
based on the totality of the circumstances, Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Watkins, 229 Va. at 477, 
331 S.E.2d at 430, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
                     
2 Although Cherrix does not explicitly argue that the 
admission of his confession violated his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel, he does make repeated references to the fact that 
counsel had been appointed to him on unrelated charges prior 
to his being interrogated on April 25.  However, as the 
Commonwealth points out, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
is charge-specific and does not "travel with a defendant and 
attach [itself] to any other crimes . . . ."   Eaton v. 
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 252, 397 S.E.2d 385, 394 (1990), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 824 (1991). 
 
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plainly wrong.  Jones v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 427, 441, 323 
S.E.2d 554, 561 (1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012 (1985). 
Here, the record supports the trial court's admission 
into evidence of Cherrix's statements to the police.  Lewis 
testified unequivocally that he read Cherrix his Miranda 
rights on April 16 and April 25, and that Cherrix never asked 
for counsel on either date.  Cherrix testified to the 
contrary; however, the trial court was in a position to 
evaluate the credibility of witnesses and its decision to 
accept Lewis' testimony and reject Cherrix's testimony is 
amply supported by the record.  See Watkins, 229 Va. at 477, 
331 S.E.2d at 430.  
B.  Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Material 
 
Prior to trial, the trial court accepted the 
Commonwealth's assertion that all discovery requirements had 
been satisfied and declined to rule on Cherrix's motion for 
discovery.  At that time, the Commonwealth had a written 
statement from Cherrix's grandmother asserting that Cherrix 
was at home on the night of Van Hart's murder and that he 
placed a telephone call to his wife "around 8:00 o'clock or 
so."  The Commonwealth had not disclosed this written 
statement to Cherrix. 
 
At trial, Cherrix's grandmother testified as an alibi 
witness for him and stated that Cherrix placed a telephone 
 
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call to his wife at 8:15 on the night of the murder and that 
the call went on "a long while."  On cross-examination, she 
testified that she had been interviewed by a police officer, 
but that she could not remember what she told the officer.  
The Commonwealth subsequently called the interviewing officer 
as a rebuttal witness and asked him to read the statement 
signed by Cherrix's grandmother.  Cherrix objected to the 
admission of the statement, asserting that it contained 
exculpatory material which should have been disclosed by the 
Commonwealth prior to trial.  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83 (1963).  The trial court overruled Cherrix's objection and 
admitted the written statement. 
 
On appeal, Cherrix asserts that his knowledge of the 
information contained in the statement does not excuse the 
Commonwealth's failure to disclose the statement, but shows a 
lack of good faith and violates the due process clause under 
Brady.  We disagree. 
 
The disclosure requirement imposed by Brady applies to 
material exculpatory evidence.  Exculpatory evidence is 
material if there is a reasonable probability that the outcome 
of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence 
been disclosed to the defense.  United States v. Bagley, 473 
U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 
151, 341 S.E.2d 159, 164 (1986).  In calling his grandmother 
 
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as an alibi witness, Cherrix demonstrated that he and his 
counsel knew about and relied upon her testimony regarding his 
presence at home on the night of the murder and the telephone 
call he made to his wife.  The content of her written 
statement was, as he admits, "reasonably known" and 
"consistent with the defense case." 
The written statement of the grandmother's testimony did 
not change the substance of the information known to the 
defense, and the failure to disclose the fact that she had 
executed a written version of her testimony did not deprive 
Cherrix of material exculpatory information in violation of 
Brady.  See Castillo v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 218, 223 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 28 (1998)(prosecution 
has no obligation to produce information already known to 
defense).  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 
overruling Cherrix's objection and admitting the statement 
into evidence. 
V.  Guilt Phase 
A.  Reading and Admission of Statement 
 
During the Commonwealth's direct examination, Lewis 
related the oral confession Cherrix made during their April 25 
conversation.  Lewis then testified that he briefly left the 
room after Cherrix made the oral confession, with the 
expectation that Cherrix would write out and sign a written 
 
13
confession.  When Lewis returned, however, Cherrix had not 
done so. 
Lewis testified that he then initiated "a question and 
answer session" with Cherrix, in which he asked Cherrix 
several questions concerning the murder, wrote down each 
question as he had asked it, and then wrote down Cherrix's 
response to each question "word for word."  Lewis testified 
that he then read Cherrix's answers back to him, and that 
Cherrix acknowledged the accuracy of each written response 
before Lewis would proceed to the next question.  When all the 
questions and answers were complete, Lewis asked Cherrix to 
sign the document, but Cherrix refused.  
After Lewis testified about the procedure used in the 
"question and answer session," he then proceeded to read each 
question and answer to the jury.  Cherrix objected, taking the 
position that, because the "question and answer" document was 
not signed, it was "nothing more than a continuing oral 
statement at which time the officer may have taken notes."  
Cherrix asserted that since the document was merely Lewis' 
notes of the conversation, Lewis should only be permitted to 
refer to it to refresh his recollection, but not to read 
directly from it. 
The trial court overruled Cherrix's objection and 
permitted Lewis to read each question and answer.  Cherrix 
 
14
then raised an objection to the admission of the document into 
evidence as an exhibit, but the trial court deferred ruling 
until after Lewis finished testifying.  The Commonwealth moved 
to admit the document following Lewis' direct examination, and 
the trial court again deferred its ruling pending cross-
examination of Lewis by the defense.  The record bears no 
indication that the document was thereafter admitted as an 
exhibit; however, the document was made a part of the record 
because Cherrix attached it to a post-trial motion. 
On appeal, Cherrix renews his argument that the "question 
and answer" document is merely Lewis' notes.  He asserts that 
a document must be admitted into evidence as an exhibit if it 
is to be read to the jury by a witness, and that the only 
exception to this rule is the hearsay exception of "past 
recollection recorded."  Cherrix concludes that, because the 
Commonwealth did not meet the foundational requirements for 
introduction of "past recollection recorded" material, the 
trial court erred by permitting Lewis to read from the 
"question and answer" document.  We disagree. 
Contrary to Cherrix's assertion that the "question and 
answer" document represented Lewis' notes, the trial court 
found that the document represented Cherrix's own statements: 
[I]n all of the other statements that have come 
in in this case, they have been statements that 
were oral and that were testified to by the 
 
15
witness primarily from memory with him from time 
to time referring to notes to refresh his 
recollection, but in this case it is a very 
different set of circumstances.  The witness has 
stated that he specifically referred – that he 
specifically wrote out a question.  Specifically 
asked a question.  Specifically wrote down word 
for word the answer and reviewed it with the 
defendant. . . . 
 
(Emphasis added.)  As characterized by the trial court, then, 
the "question and answer" document was elevated to the status 
of a written confession. 
There can be no question but that a written confession is 
admissible into evidence.  Confessions, whether oral or 
written, are admissible against a criminal defendant under the 
"party admission exception" to the hearsay rule.  Quintana v. 
Commonwealth, 224 Va. 127, 148, 295 S.E.2d 643, 654 (1982), 
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1029 (1983); Land v. Commonwealth, 211 
Va. 223, 229, 176 S.E.2d 586, 590-91 (1970).  This is true even 
if the written confession is unsigned, as long as the defendant 
understood and adopted its substance.  Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963)("The fact that the statement 
was unsigned, whatever bearing this may have upon its weight 
and credibility, does not render it inadmissible").  Because 
the "question and answer" document was admissible as a 
confession, the failure of the Commonwealth to lay a foundation 
for its admission under the "past recollection recorded" 
exception is irrelevant. 
 
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Although the "question and answer" document could have 
been admitted into evidence as an exhibit and would have been 
the best evidence of Cherrix's confession, see McDaniel v. 
Commonwealth, 183 Va. 481, 32 S.E.2d 667 (1945), Cherrix 
objected to its admission as an exhibit at trial.  Therefore, 
he cannot now argue that the trial court erred in allowing the 
confession to be admitted in secondary form – through Lewis' 
reading it into evidence.  For these reasons, there was no 
error in the trial court's decision to permit Lewis to read 
from the "question and answer" document during his testimony. 
B.  Motion to Set Aside the Verdict 
Cherrix argues that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to set aside the verdict as contrary to the law and 
evidence because the Commonwealth failed to prove the corpus 
delicti beyond a reasonable doubt.  We disagree. 
 
In every criminal prosecution, the Commonwealth must 
prove the element of corpus delicti, that is, the fact that 
the crime charged has been actually perpetrated.  Maughs v. 
City of Charlottesville, 181 Va. 117, 120, 23 S.E.2d 784, 786 
(1943).  Further, if the accused has fully confessed that he 
committed the crime, then only slight corroboration of the 
confession is required to establish corpus delicti beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 625, 646, 
499 S.E.2d 538, 551 (1998). 
 
17
 
Cherrix was charged with capital murder, forcible sodomy, 
use of a firearm in the commission of those offenses, and 
being a felon in possession of a firearm.  Cherrix fully 
confessed to having committed these crimes, and the record 
reveals that the Commonwealth produced considerably more than 
slight evidence to corroborate Cherrix's confession. 
 
As discussed above, Van Hart's dead body was found with 
two .22 caliber gunshot wounds to the head.  The autopsy 
revealed recent penetration of the anus and signs of blunt 
force trauma to the head shortly before death.  This evidence 
sufficiently corroborates Cherrix's statements that he 
sodomized Van Hart and shot her to death. 
 
Furthermore, Christopher Fox, an acquaintance of Cherrix, 
identified the .22 caliber rifle found by the police, at the 
exact location indicated by Cherrix, as the rifle Fox had sold 
to Cherrix.  Cherrix's former wife also identified the rifle 
as one Cherrix once owned.  The Commonwealth also established 
that Cherrix was a convicted felon at the time of the offense.  
This evidence sufficiently corroborates the commission of the 
firearm offenses.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 
denying Cherrix's motion to set aside the verdict. 
C.  Jury Instructions 
 
At the conclusion of the guilt stage of the trial, 
Cherrix proffered the following jury instruction: 
 
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If you believe that Brian Lee Cherrix did not freely 
and voluntarily give a statement to law enforcement 
officers concerning his alleged involvement in the 
sodomy and murder of Tessa Van Hart, then you may 
give any such statement as much or as little 
credibility as you deem appropriate. 
 
The credibility and weight of any statements 
presented to the jury as having been made by the 
defendant are submitted for your consideration along 
with all the other evidence.  The weight, the 
credibility, the sufficiency are questions for 
determination by you the jury. 
 
The trial court granted the second paragraph of the 
instruction but refused to grant the first paragraph on the 
ground that there was no evidence to support a conclusion by 
the jury that Cherrix's statements to police were involuntary.  
The trial court also granted a "general" instruction, advising 
the jury of its role in assessing the credibility of witnesses 
and the weight of evidence. 
On appeal, Cherrix claims that a general instruction on 
credibility was insufficient to properly inform the jury of 
their role in assessing the voluntariness of Cherrix's 
confession, and that, therefore, the trial court erred in 
refusing his instruction regarding the voluntariness of his 
statements to police.  After reviewing the record, however, we 
find no error in the trial court's denial of Cherrix's 
proffered instruction. 
While it is true that the trial court's pre-trial 
determination that a defendant's statements are admissible in 
 
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evidence does not preclude the defendant from proving at trial 
that those statements were made involuntarily, see Jackson v. 
Commonwealth, 193 Va. 664, 674, 70 S.E.2d 322, 328 
(1952)("Admissibility of confession is for trial court but its 
weight and value are for the jury."), it is also well 
established that a defendant is not entitled to a jury 
instruction unless it is supported by more than a scintilla of 
evidence.  Commonwealth v. Donkor, 256 Va. 443, 445, 507 
S.E.2d 75, 76 (1998). 
Cherrix testified at a pre-trial suppression hearing that 
the police had violated his Miranda rights; however, he 
elected not to testify at trial, and the evidence presented to 
the jury was undisputed that Cherrix's statements to police 
were preceded by voluntary and intelligent waivers of those 
rights.  Furthermore, the trial court not only gave a 
"general" instruction on the jury's role in assessing 
credibility, but also granted the instruction contained in the 
second paragraph above, which specifically relates to the 
weight and credibility of statements "having been made by the 
defendant."  Accordingly, we conclude that the jury was 
adequately apprised of its role, and that the trial court 
properly refused Cherrix's proffered instruction. 
VI.  Sentencing Phase 
A.  Mental Health Expert 
 
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Cherrix argues that the trial court erred in denying him 
an adequate and competent mental health expert, as required by 
Code § 19.2-264.3:1. That statute provides, in relevant part: 
The mental health expert appointed pursuant to this 
section shall be (i) a psychiatrist, . . . who has 
successfully completed forensic evaluation training 
as approved by the Commissioner of Mental Health, 
Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services and 
(ii) qualified by specialized training and 
experience to perform forensic evaluations.  The 
defendant shall not be entitled to a mental health 
expert of the defendant's own choosing . . . . 
 
Code § 19.2-264.3:1(A).  Cherrix claims that Dr. John Bulette, 
the expert appointed by the trial court, did not possess the 
qualifications required by the statute.  Because the record 
shows that Dr. Bulette was qualified under the statute, 
however, we find no error in the trial court's appointment.3
Cherrix filed a motion, pursuant to the statute, 
requesting the appointment of a defense expert to assist him 
in the capital sentencing phase of the trial.  At a subsequent 
hearing, Cherrix informed the trial court that he had inquired 
into available experts, that he had "selected" Dr. Leigh Hagan 
of Chesterfield County, and that he wanted the trial court to 
appoint Dr. Hagan. 
                     
3 On appeal, Cherrix implies that the trial court's action 
denied him rights under the United States Constitution.  See 
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).  To the extent that he 
attempts to make this argument, however, it is defaulted 
because he did not object to Dr. Bulette's appointment on any 
 
21
 
The trial court subsequently informed counsel by 
telephone that it had decided not to appoint Dr. Hagan because 
of the distance between Chesterfield County and Accomack 
County, and that it would instead appoint a local 
psychiatrist, Dr. John Bulette.  Without any objection, the 
trial court then entered an order appointing Dr. Bulette. 
 
Two days later, Cherrix filed a motion to reconsider the 
matter and to appoint Dr. Hagan rather than Dr. Bulette, which 
motion the trial court denied.  At the hearing on that motion, 
Cherrix conceded that Dr. Bulette was a psychiatrist who had 
successfully completed his forensic evaluation training.  He 
contended, however, as he does now on appeal, that because Dr. 
Bulette had never before been involved in a capital murder 
case, he was not "qualified by specialized training and 
experience to perform forensic evaluations," as required by 
the statute. 
 
Contrary to Cherrix's interpretation of Code § 19.2-
264.3:1(A)(ii), however, the statute does not require 
experience in capital murder cases as a qualification for an 
appointed expert.  The relevant part of that statute simply 
requires specialized training and experience to perform 
forensic evaluations.  The trial court was familiar with Dr. 
                                                                
constitutional basis at trial.  Rule 5:25.  Therefore, we 
address only his statutory argument. 
 
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Bulette's background and specifically found that Dr. Bulette 
had "substantial experience" in such evaluations.  Cherrix 
does not argue that Dr. Bulette lacked the training and 
experience expressly required by the statute, and we decline 
his invitation to graft onto the statute the additional 
requirement of experience in capital murder cases.  
Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's appointment 
of Dr. Bulette. 
B.  Corrections Expert and Witnesses 
 
Cherrix sought to present evidence regarding prison life 
and its effect on his "future dangerousness" through the 
testimony of an expert penologist, several Virginia 
corrections officials, a criminologist, a sociologist, and an 
individual serving a life sentence in the custody of the 
Virginia Department of Corrections.  The trial court initially 
granted Cherrix's motion for the appointment of an expert 
penologist pending submission of a report and cost estimate.  
The Commonwealth objected to the issuance of a subpoena for 
the inmate and moved to quash the subpoenas issued for the 
corrections officials, criminologist, and sociologist. 
Following a hearing at which Cherrix proffered the 
testimony of these witnesses, the trial court determined that 
Cherrix's evidence was immaterial as mitigation evidence and 
therefore refused to compel the witnesses' attendance through 
 
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subpoenas.  The trial court vacated its prior order granting 
Cherrix's motion for appointment of an expert on the basis 
that the report was not timely filed, the cost estimate was 
high, and the proffered testimony of the expert, like the 
proffered testimony of the other witnesses sought, was 
immaterial. 
Cherrix argues that the trial court erred because Code 
§ 19.2-264.4 allows presentation of mitigating evidence.  He 
contends that exclusion of his proffered "mitigation evidence" 
was an abuse of discretion and violated his federal 
constitutional rights as established in Skipper v. South 
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 
104 (1982).  We disagree. 
 
Although the United States Constitution guarantees the 
defendant in a capital case a right to present mitigating 
evidence to the sentencing authority, it does not limit "the 
traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, 
evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior 
record, or the circumstances of his offense."  Lockett v. 
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 n.12 (1978).  Code § 19.2-264.4(B) 
vests the trial court with the discretion to determine, 
subject to the rules of evidence governing admissibility, the 
evidence which may be adduced in mitigation of the offense.  
 
24
Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 253, 257 S.E.2d 797, 804 
(1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980). 
 
The record shows that the evidence Cherrix sought to 
introduce involved the general nature of prison life.  The 
inmate's proffered testimony sought to establish, based on the 
inmate's personal prison experience, what prison life would be 
like for Cherrix if he received a life sentence.  The 
officials from the Department of Corrections would have 
testified regarding the ability of the penal system to contain 
Cherrix and the cost to the taxpayers of an inmate's life 
sentence.  Cherrix's counsel stated that the testimony of the 
expert penologist, the sociologist, and the criminologist 
would be similar to that of the inmate and corrections 
officials.  As the trial court observed, none of this evidence 
concerns the history or experience of the defendant.4  We agree 
with the conclusion of the trial court that "what a person may 
expect in the penal system" is not relevant mitigation 
evidence.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 
trial court excluding this evidence. 
C.  Post Trial-Offense Convictions 
                     
4 Contrary to Cherrix's assertion, none of the evidence 
proffered at trial addressed Cherrix's ability to conform or 
his experience in conforming to prison life, as the 
defendant's evidence did in Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4. 
 
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Cherrix filed a pre-trial motion to exclude from the 
sentencing phase of the trial evidence of crimes he committed 
after he committed the capital offense in January of 1994.  
The trial court declined to rule on the motion because it was 
premature.  During the sentencing phase, the Commonwealth 
offered as evidence two convictions that Cherrix received 
after January 1994.  We have already stated on two prior 
occasions that evidence of "prior history" to establish future 
dangerousness under Code § 19.2-264.4(C) encompasses the time 
after which the subject offense was committed, Joseph v. 
Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 88-89, 452 S.E.2d 862, 869, cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 876 (1995), and includes a defendant's most 
recent history, Saunders v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 107, 117, 
406 S.E.2d 39, 45, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991).  
Accordingly, the trial court's admission of this evidence was 
proper. 
D.  Failure to Properly Advise Jury on Parole Eligibility 
 
Cherrix contends that the trial court erred in failing to 
properly advise the jury of his eligibility, or lack thereof, 
for parole.  He claims that, because "future dangerousness" 
was relevant to his sentencing, the trial court erred in 
failing to inform the jury that Cherrix "would effectively 
never be paroled."  The record reveals, however, that Cherrix 
 
26
has waived this argument for failure to object in the trial 
court.  Rule 5:25. 
 
At the sentencing phase of the trial, Cherrix did not 
offer a parole eligibility instruction.  The issue of parole 
eligibility did not arise until the jury foreman inquired of 
the trial court, during deliberations, whether a life sentence 
would include the possibility of parole.  The trial court then 
suggested to counsel that it should "instruct the jury that 
they are to have no concern with parole."  When the trial 
court then asked Cherrix for his position on the matter, 
Cherrix responded, "I would suggest that the court instruct 
the jury as you have indicated.  [The jury] should not be 
concerned with parole . . . ."  The trial court subsequently 
instructed the jury that it "must decide whether to impose a 
life sentence or the death penalty based upon the evidence and 
the instructions that you have received and you are to give no 
consideration to the issue of parole."  Cherrix's failure to 
proffer a parole eligibility instruction and his failure to 
object to the trial court's instruction in response to the 
jury's inquiry mentioned above precludes us from addressing 
the merits of this assignment of error. 
E.  Aggravating Factors 
 
A penalty of death may be imposed only if the 
Commonwealth proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
 
27
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would be 
a continuing serious threat to society or that his conduct in 
committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of 
mind, or aggravated battery.  Code § 19.2-264.4(C).  In this 
case, the Commonwealth sought the death penalty based on both 
of the aggravating factors, future dangerousness and vileness.  
The jury returned a sentencing verdict making the required 
findings under both factors.  Cherrix contends that the death 
penalty should not have been imposed because it was 
"unreasonable" for the jury to conclude that Cherrix would be 
a continuing serious threat to society, and because the 
Commonwealth failed to prove that his actions in committing 
the crime were outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or 
inhuman as that term is defined by the statute.  We disagree. 
1.  Future Dangerousness 
 
Cherrix argues that because the jury was fully informed 
of Cherrix's sentences for other crimes, it "could reasonably 
expect" that Cherrix had "at best" a "remote" chance of ever 
being released.  Thus, asserts Cherrix, any danger Cherrix 
might pose would be to the society within the prison, and a 
"five-foot-four inch, small framed, light weight man does not 
represent a danger to fellow inmates or guards."  
 
28
 
Not only is this argument based primarily on speculation, 
it ignores the substantial evidence in the record of Cherrix's  
continuing assaultive behavior for which he expressed little 
remorse.  Cherrix had a lengthy record of criminal convictions 
including assault and battery, malicious wounding, and use of 
a firearm.  Furthermore, after the murder of Van Hart, Cherrix 
shot his half-brother and, according to his own mental health 
expert, had no remorse for the shooting.  Cherrix had a 
similar lack of remorse after he broke his mother-in-law's arm 
with a pool cue.  Cherrix told his mental health expert that 
he "would say anything to obtain his goals."  His expert 
testified that Cherrix had an anti-social personality, was 
"angry with women," and acted out this anger by assaulting 
them.  Finally, there is nothing in the record regarding 
Cherrix's ability to conform to prison life and work 
productively in that environment. 
 
Our review of the record fully supports the jury's 
determination that Cherrix would constitute a continuing 
serious danger to society.  
2.  Vileness 
 
The jury verdict found Cherrix's conduct in committing 
the crime "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman 
in that it involved torture or depravity of mind . . . ."  
Cherrix argues that the record fails to support this finding 
 
29
because there was no showing of depravity of mind beyond that 
inherent in ordinary legal malice and premeditation, and 
because there was no torture in that Van Hart died almost 
instantaneously.  Again we disagree. 
 
The events surrounding the murder show that Cherrix 
carefully planned his crime and lured his victim to a remote 
area.  According to the defendant's recitation of events, 
after forcing her at gun point to partially disrobe and lie on 
the ground, he forcibly sodomized her while holding a rifle to 
the back of her head.  Even though she "begged [him] not to 
kill her" and promised that she would "act like this never 
happened," he stood over her and shot her in the head for fear 
that "she was going to tell on [him]."  Not sure that the 
first shot killed her, he "shot her again to make sure." 
 
After the murder, Cherrix drove around with the victim's 
body in the car, considered going to a restaurant for a beer, 
and ultimately abandoned the car and victim at a deserted site 
and tossed the murder weapon in a creek.  He then went home 
and called his wife at the hospital "like nothing ever 
happened."  Cherrix visited the funeral home to view his 
victim's body and told the police that she looked "beautiful." 
 
This evidence supports the jury's determination that 
Cherrix's conduct in committing the sodomy and murder 
 
30
constituted torture of Van Hart or reflected depravity of 
mind. 
VII.  Statutory Review 
 
Code § 17.1-313(C) requires this Court to consider 
whether the sentence of death was imposed "under the influence 
of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor," and 
whether such sentence is excessive or disproportionate to 
penalties imposed in similar cases, "considering both the 
crime and the defendant."  As to our first consideration, 
Cherrix asserts that the death penalty was imposed under the 
influence of passion, prejudice, or some other arbitrary 
factor because the jury improperly found the aggravating 
factors of future dangerousness and vileness.  However, we 
have already determined that these jury findings were 
supported by the record.  Our review of the record reveals no 
support for the proposition that the jury imposed the death 
sentence as a result of passion, prejudice, or any other 
arbitrary factor. 
In considering whether the sentence imposed in this case 
is excessive or disproportionate to other sentences imposed 
for similar crimes, we compare the record in this case with 
records in other capital murder cases, including those in 
which life sentences have been imposed.  Since the jury based 
its death sentence on both the future dangerousness and 
 
31
vileness predicates, we give particular consideration to other 
capital murder cases in which the death penalty was sought 
based on both predicates.   
When considering the penalty for convictions of capital 
murder based on premeditated murder and rape/forcible sodomy, 
juries in this Commonwealth have generally, although not 
without exception, imposed the death sentence.  Barnabei v. 
Commonwealth, 252 Va. 161, 477 S.E.2d 270 (1996), cert. 
denied, 520 U.S. 1224 (1997); Clozza v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 
124, 321 S.E.2d 273 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 
(1985); Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 307 S.E.2d 864 
(1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1109 (1984); Waye v. 
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 683, 251 S.E.2d 202, cert. denied, 442 
U.S. 924 (1979).  The death sentence has been imposed in cases 
where the victim, like the victim in this case, was killed 
solely to assure her silence.  Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 257 
Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (this day decided); Justus v. 
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 266 S.E.2d 87 (1980), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 983 (1982); Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 
S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).  Based 
on this review, we conclude that Cherrix's death sentence is 
neither excessive nor disproportionate to penalties imposed by 
other sentencing bodies in the Commonwealth for similar and 
comparable crimes. 
 
32
VIII.  Conclusion 
We find no reversible error in the issues presented in 
this case.  After reviewing Cherrix's death sentence pursuant 
to Code § 17-110.1, we decline to commute the sentence of 
death.  Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
Record No. 981798 —Affirmed. 
Record No. 982063 —Affirmed. 
 
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