Case Title: The People v. George Konstantinides

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
- 1 -
=================================================================
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
No. 198  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
George Konstantinides,
            Appellant.
De Nice Powell, for appellant.
Karen Wigle Weiss, for respondent.
READ, J.:
Defendant George Konstantinides contends that he is
entitled to a new trial because he was deprived of his right to
conflict-free representation.  At a minimum, he argues, his
sentence should be vacated because Supreme Court did not hold a
hearing to determine the constitutionality of one of two prior
felony convictions.  For the reasons that follow, we reject both
claims, and uphold defendant's conviction and sentence.
- 2 -
No. 198
- 2 -
I.
Defendant violated the conditions of his parole in
2003, which sparked issuance of a warrant for his arrest in June
of that year.  According to the People's witnesses at trial, in
the early morning hours of December 20, 2003, the police learned
that defendant was in a bar in Queens.  They arrived just in time
to see defendant follow another man out of the bar and get into a
limousine parked at the curb.  Defendant jumped into the
passenger side, and the other man, later identified as G. T., got
behind the wheel and started up the engine.
Several of the police officers approached the limousine
on foot and directed G. T. to stop or shut off the engine.  In G.
T.'s account of what happened next, defendant retrieved a gun
from a bag he was carrying and pointed the barrel at G. T.,
holding the gun low, near his waist.  According to G. T.,
defendant said, "They're after me.  If you don't move this
limousine, I'm going to kill you where you're sitting." 
Frightened, G. T. obeyed defendant's order.  Traveling at speeds
approaching 100 miles per hour, the limousine careened down City
streets and eventually entered the Grand Central Parkway, pursued
all the way by the police cars, their lights flashing and sirens
sounding.  During this high-speed chase, defendant fumbled the
gun and accidentally fired a bullet into the limousine's
dashboard.
Again in G. T.'s telling, defendant repeatedly
- 3 -
No. 198
1Effective December 21, 2005, this provision of the Penal
Law was redesignated section 265.03 (1) (b).
2This provision of the Penal Law was repealed, effective
November 1, 2006.  Possession of a loaded, operable firearm
outside of a person's home or place of business, with certain
exceptions, is now criminal possession of a weapon in the second
degree, a violation of Penal Law § 265.03 (3).
- 3 -
instructed him to "[j]ust keep going," and that he would "tell
[him] when this [was] going to come to an end."  Near the 111th
Street exit on the Grand Central Parkway, defendant ordered G. T.
to pull over.  As the car slowed, defendant jumped out, gun in
hand.  With three police officers in pursuit, he scrambled up an
embankment into a wooded area.  The officers testified that they
saw "muzzle flashes" as defendant turned and shot multiple rounds
in their direction; one officer returned fire.  No one was
injured, and defendant got away.
Detectives found defendant the next day in Manhattan,
and arrested him; the gun shot off the night before was tucked in
the back of his waistband.  The People charged defendant with
attempted murder in the first and second degrees (Penal Law §§
110.00, 125.27 [1]; 110.00, 125.25 [1]); kidnapping in the first
degree (Penal Law § 135.20); and criminal possession of a weapon
in the second and third degrees (Penal Law §§ 265.03 [2];1 265.02
[4]).2  On the first day of jury selection at defendant's
subsequent trial, an attorney for whom he had worked for a time
while on parole (hereafter, attorney number two) joined the
- 4 -
No. 198
- 4 -
defense team to "assist" the attorney who had represented
defendant for the eight months preceding trial (hereafter,
attorney number one).
After the People had presented the testimony of some
police witnesses, the prosecutor informed the court out of the
jury's presence that, during his interview of L. T., G. T.'s
wife, he had acquired "information which . . . [might] bear on"
attorney number two's "remaining at counsel table."  He then
related that L. T. had told him that defendant and attorney
number two called her three times while defendant was
incarcerated.  L. T. claimed that, during one of these three-
party calls, attorney number two asked her if G. T. would be
willing to testify that the gun was his instead of defendant's. 
When L. T. answered that her husband would not say this because
it was not true, attorney number two was alleged to have replied
that the defense was going to be "that the gun was your husband's
and if he doesn't agree with that, then we're just going to go
ahead and say that it was his."
According to the prosecutor, L. T. further related
that, during a subsequent three-party call, attorney number two
threatened that 
"the defense was going to pay a woman named Jennifer,
who . . . supposedly had some sort of extramarital
affair with [G. T.] during the course of his marriage
to [L. T.] to say that [G. T.] was doing drugs with
[her], all during the day and that the gun was [G.
T.'s] and that they were going to do that so that [L.
T.] might want to distance herself from . . . [G. T.]."
- 5 -
No. 198
- 5 -
Finally, L. T. informed the prosecutor that she was offered a
diamond ring if she left her husband and married defendant
because it would "look good for . . . defendant that [L. T.] had
left [G. T.] . . . and had now come to be with" him.  L. T. was
said to have refused this overture, telling attorney number two
and defendant "[a]bsolutely not, and stop calling."
The prosecutor explained that, as an officer of the
court, he felt obligated to convey this information to the judge. 
He added that while he did not know the defense's strategy,
attorney number one's opening statement suggested that defendant
intended to attack G. T.'s credibility.  The prosecutor continued
that if defendant
"claim[ed] through cross-examination or through the
potential calling of witnesses that the gun was [G.
T.'s] and not defendant's, and/or if he . . .
interpose[d] some sort of a defense about [G. T.'s]
doing drugs during the course of the day, firstly . . .
based upon these conversations . . . which [L. T.] . .
. allegedly had with [the second attorney], . . . there
would be no good-faith basis to proffer that defense;
and, secondly, if they were to proffer such a defense,
[the prosecution sh]ould be permitted to call [L. T.]
to show recent fabrication."
The prosecutor noted that if this scenario, in fact,
developed, the second attorney's "credibility would become an
issue" and "he would become a potential witness in the case."  As
a result, the prosecutor asked the trial judge to disqualify
attorney number two and "have the defendant proceed with just
[attorney number one]."
  
When the trial judge asked attorney number two if he
- 6 -
No. 198
- 6 -
wanted to respond, attorney number one interjected "[m]ay we have
one second please?"  After a pause, the judge then asked attorney
number two if he wanted to deal with these matters after the
upcoming lunch recess.  Attorney number one again jumped in,
telling the judge that "I think that will be good . . . just
because there are a couple of issues.  First, I'd like to find
out the factual scenario of any of these phone calls, and
secondly, see what possible legal basis there would be to
disqualify or preclude a potential line of argument on defense." 
The trial judge then remarked as follows:
"Initially[,] disqualifying an attorney during the
course of a trial is [a] very difficult thing to
do.  I've only had representations by counsel,
secondhand representations; I haven't had a
hearing on the issue.
"Beyond that, these are serious allegations and if
they are pressed could certainly lead to
disbarment proceedings, because, [attorney number
two], allegations of suborning perjury and bribery
are serious.
"I don't know if you should discuss how you want
to proceed.  Attorney number one has done all the
work at this point, whether you wish to continue
at counsel table and, perhaps, these matters might
be injected into trial at some point.
"Decide, as a question of strategy, first what you
want to do."
When the trial resumed, the court apologized to the
jury for "these delays," and the prosecutor called G. T. to the
witness stand.  The second attorney remained at the defense
table.  The record does not disclose the substance of further
discussions that the court must have had with the parties to
- 7 -
No. 198
- 7 -
resolve the prosecution's application to disqualify attorney
number two.
Attorney number one cross-examined G. T.  He focused on
G. T.'s relationship with defendant, and sought to undermine his
insistence that he and defendant were mere acquaintances. 
Attorney number one's cross-examination showed that G. T. shared
a lot of information about his personal life with defendant,
including his history of drug abuse; that G. T. stayed with
defendant in his apartment when estranged from L. T.; and that he
told defendant that he had been convicted of illegally possessing
a firearm and was on probation.  Attorney number one also brought
out that, after defendant's arrest in this case, G. T. (and L.
T.) twice visited defendant in jail.  He questioned G. T. about
whether he kept a gun in his limousine to protect himself, and
whether he was "high" on December 20, 2003, evoking adamant
denials.  Attorney number one also elicited testimony to point
out to the jury that G. T. knew he would face prison time if
found in possession of a gun on December 20, 2003.
Defendant testified in his own behalf; he was examined
by attorney number two, whom he addressed familiarly, by his
first name.  Defendant acknowledged that he was aware on December
20, 2003 that he was wanted by the police, and that he was at the
time running an illegal bookmaking business.  He operated this
business out of an office in the basement of an apartment in
Astoria and G. T.'s limousine, which he called his "moving
- 8 -
No. 198
- 8 -
office."  He explained that both G. T. and L. T. worked for him:
G. T. drove him around to pick up betting "tickets" at
neighborhood bars and strip clubs, and L. T. acted as his
"secretary" by answering and placing phone calls while sitting
next to her husband in the limousine's front seat.  Defendant
asserted that G. T. kept guns in his limousine for protection
whenever he ferried rap entertainers around, as he was doing on
the night of December 19, 2003 before linking up with defendant
at about 2:00 A.M. on December 20th. 
Defendant maintained that he did not believe the police
were after him when they approached the limousine.  He claimed
that it was G. T.'s idea to flee because G. T. knew he would get
in trouble if picked up by the police with a gun in his
limousine.  According to defendant, he offered to take G. T.'s
gun and run from the police on foot, and the gun accidentally
discharged when G. T. reached under the front seat to retrieve it
and slide it over the seat to him with his right hand, while
steering the limousine with his left hand.  Defendant explained
that, as he headed into the woods, he heard shots, and so fired
one round in the air to slow down the police officers chasing
after him.  Defendant professed that he intended to return the
gun to L. T. (he assumed G. T. had been arrested), who did not
return the telephone calls he made to her while on the lam, or
give it to a lawyer.  He acknowledged that he knew the gun was
loaded and operable when he fled with it, and that he had the
- 9 -
No. 198
3This stands in stark contrast to defendant's testimony at
trial in this case, where he told the jury that he pleaded
guilty to the prior felonies that he was accused of committing
"[b]ecause I was guilty of every one of th[ose] crimes."
- 9 -
same loaded gun in his waistband when arrested the next day.  
Defendant also told the jury that when he volunteered to flee the
limousine with the gun, he did not appreciate the full
consequences of getting caught by the police with a loaded
firearm when he had so many prior felony convictions.  
The jury convicted defendant of both weapon counts, and
acquitted him of kidnapping.  After the jury failed to reach a
verdict on attempted murder, the court declared a mistrial on
those counts, which were later dismissed.  
Prior to sentencing, the People filed a persistent
violent felony offender statement pursuant to Criminal Procedure
Law § 400.16.  The statement listed two prior violent felony
convictions that, with tolling, fell within 10 years of
defendant's commission of the crimes he was convicted of in this
case -- a 1989 conviction for second-degree attempted murder and
a 1996 conviction for second-degree assault.  At the sentencing
hearing, defendant, represented by attorney number two (attorney
number one was actually engaged at a parole hearing at the time),
challenged the constitutionality of these two prior felony
convictions on the ground that he was innocent,3 that his guilty
pleas had been coerced, and that he had been deprived of
effective assistance of counsel.  He identified numerous 
- 10 -
No. 198
- 10 -
people whom he wished to call as witnesses, including attorney
number two.  Supreme Court denied defendant's constitutional
claims without a hearing; adjudicated him a persistent violent
felony offender; and sentenced him to concurrent indeterminate
prison terms of 25 and 20 years to life on the second and third-
degree weapon convictions respectively.
On appeal, defendant argued ineffective assistance of
counsel because of a conflict of interest with attorney number
two, and that he was improperly adjudicated a second violent
felony offender because he was denied a hearing to challenge the
1996 conviction on constitutional grounds.  With respect to the
former, the Appellate Division held that defendant did not
establish that the alleged "potential conflict of interest . . .
affect[ed] the conduct of his defense" (People v Konstantinides,
55 AD3d 752, 753 [2d Dept 2008]).  The court adjudged defendant's
claim that he was entitled to a hearing to determine his status
as a persistent violent felony offender to be unpreserved and, in
any event, meritless.  A Judge of this Court granted defendant
permission to appeal (12 NY3d 759 [2009]), and we now affirm.
II.
We have held that, where a defendant makes a conflict-
based claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, two questions
arise.  First, the court must determine whether there was a
potential conflict of interest (People v Abar, 99 NY2d 406, 409
[2003]).  Second, a "defendant must show that the conduct of his
- 11 -
No. 198
- 11 -
defense was in fact affected by the operation of the conflict of
interest, or that the conflict operated on the representation"
(People v Ortiz, 76 NY2d 652, 657 [1990] [internal quotation
marks omitted]).  As we have repeatedly held, "[w]hether a
conflict of interest operates on the defense is a mixed question
of law and fact and, as a result, our review is limited.  We may
disturb an Appellate Division determination on this issue only if
it lacks any record support" (Abar, 99 NY2d at 409 [citing People
v Berroa, 99 NY2d 134, 142 [2002]; People v Harris, 99 NY2d 202,
210 [2002]; and People v Ming Li, 91 NY2d 913, 917-918 [1998]). 
Here, the second attorney's continued representation of defendant
created a potential conflict of interest; however, there is
record support for the Appellate Division's determination that
defendant failed to establish that the conflict operated on the
defense.
First, defendant was fully informed of the potential
conflict.  The prosecutor set out the allegations against the
second attorney, and he told the court and defendant exactly what
steps he might take if the defense "claim[ed] through cross-
examination or through the potential calling of witnesses [e.g.,
Jennifer] that the gun was [G. T.'s] and not defendant's, and/or
. . . interpose[d] some sort of defense about [G. T.'s] doing
drugs during the course of the day": he might call L. T. to
describe the three-party conversations.  And, of course,
according to L. T., defendant himself participated in those
- 12 -
No. 198
- 12 -
conversations.
Neither defendant nor the first attorney, who did not
suffer from any alleged conflict, complained that the second
attorney's continued representation of defendant operated on the
defense.  The defense pursued, through its questioning of 
G. T. and/or defendant, the "claim . . . that the gun was [G.
T.'s] and not defendant's, and  . . . [that G. T. was] doing
drugs during the course of the day."  In other words, the
existence of a potential conflict did not, as defendant argues on
appeal, cause the second attorney to "relinquish[] this avenue of
defense in order to minimize the risks he faced" if the
prosecutor called L. T. to refute the claims as recently
fabricated lies in which the second attorney was complicit.  And
the prosecutor, in fact, never called L. T. despite his warning
that he might under these circumstances.
Second, defendant was simultaneously represented by
conflict-free counsel who was "singlemindedly devoted to [his]
client's best interests" (Harris, 99 NY2d at 209).  The first
attorney had represented defendant for the eight months preceding
trial, during which he handled all the plea negotiations and pre-
trial motions.  The first attorney conducted voir dire, delivered
the opening statement, cross-examined all of the People's
witnesses, and gave the closing argument.  There is no suggestion
that the first attorney's loyalty to defendant was compromised. 
In light of the first attorney's active participation, defendant
- 13 -
No. 198
- 13 -
has failed to establish that the potential conflict with the
second attorney operated on the defense such that he is entitled
to a new trial (see People v Jacobs, 6 NY3d 188, 190 [2005]).
Nevertheless, defendant argues that he met his burden 
because the second attorney, who presented the defense case, had
to decide which witnesses to call and what questions to ask them,
knowing that those decisions could affect his livelihood and
liberty.  But defendant does not point to any evidence elicited
by the second attorney that was harmful to him.  Although he
claims that the second attorney did not present evidence that
would have been helpful to his defense, his allegations on this
score are entirely speculative and unsubstantiated.
Specifically, defendant argues that the second
attorney's conflict prevented him from calling Jennifer, who
would have testified about her affair with G. T., that the gun
belonged to G. T., and that G. T. abused drugs on the day of the
incident.  But Jennifer was not on the defense's witness list;
she was never mentioned as a possible witness during the first
attorney's opening statement.  In short, there is no reason to
believe that the prosecutor's application to disqualify the
second attorney dissuaded the defense from calling Jennifer.  The
defendant has never attempted to show that Jennifer actually
exists, and was willing to provide truthful and beneficial
testimony.  Surely he cannot be heard to complain if an effort to
- 14 -
No. 198
4The dissent chastises the majority for holding defendant to
his burden to show that the conflict operated on the defense
given that, at the time of trial, defendant was still represented
by counsel subject to a potential conflict of interest
(dissenting op at 4).  But our cases have repeatedly held
defendants to this burden (see People v Longtin, 92 NY2d 640, 644
[1998]  [to prevail on conflicted counsel claim "defendant must
demonstrate that 'the conduct of his defense was in fact affected
by the operation of the conflict of interest,' or that the
conflict 'operated on' counsel's representation"] [quoting People
v Alicia, 61 NY2d 23, 31 [1983]; see also People v Smart, 96 NY2d
793, 795 [2001]; People v Ortiz, 76 NY2d at 657; People v
Lombardo, 61 NY2d 97, 102-103 [1984]).  That a defendant might
have to pursue such a claim, which relies on information that is
not on the record, by means of a Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10
motion, in which he can establish any existing facts to support
his claim, is also nothing new.  Indeed, that is precisely what
the defendants in Alicia and Ortiz did.  Accordingly, to the
extent that the record is devoid of facts to support defendant's
claim, that is the fault of defendant, whose burden it is to
establish that the conflict operated on the representation.
- 14 -
present perjured testimony was thwarted.  While the record on
appeal is insufficient to establish that Jennifer might have
given relevant and honest testimony, nothing prevented defendant
from raising an ineffective assistance claim in a Criminal
Procedure Law § 440.10 motion.  Such a motion could have included
an affidavit in which Jennifer explained the substance and
significance of her evidence.4
Nor does the absence of an on-the-record inquiry
require reversal.  While it surely would have been better
practice for the trial judge to place on the record the follow-up
discussions that must have taken place after the prosecutor's
- 15 -
No. 198
- 15 -
application (see People v Gomberg, 38 NY2d 307, 312 [1975]), the
court's neglect to do so does not relieve defendant of his
obligation to demonstrate that the potential conflict actually
operated on the defense (see e.g., People v Smart, 96 NY2d 793,
795 [2001]; People v Longtin, 92 NY2d 640, 644 [1998]; People v
Monroe, 54 NY2d 35, 39 [1981]).
Next, although defendant does not have to show that the
conflict affected the trial's outcome, any potential conflict
between defendant's and the second attorney's interests, in fact, 
had no impact on defendant's conviction for firearms crimes.  He
was acquitted of attempted kidnapping -- the only charge where
any truthful testimony from Jennifer casting doubt on G. T.'s
credibility would have been relevant -- and the attempted murder
charges were ultimately dismissed after the jury failed to reach
a verdict on those counts.  Police officers placed defendant in
the limousine's passenger seat; police officers also identified
defendant as the individual who fired a gun at them, and
defendant was arrested the day after the chase with the same
loaded gun in his possession.  Any possible testimony from
Jennifer that the gun belonged to or was owned by G. T. would not
negate this evidence, which conclusively established that
defendant possessed a weapon with the intent to use it, and thus
was guilty of the firearms crimes that he was convicted of
committing.  Indeed, defendant himself admitted under oath to
having engaged in the conduct underlying these crimes (see People
- 16 -
No. 198
- 16 -
v Seale, 47 NY2d 923, 925 [1979]).
Finally, defendant urges us to embrace a per se rule
mandating reversal in situations where a defense attorney is
accused of criminal misconduct directly related to the
representation of the defendant.  In support of such a per se
rule, defendant points to decisions from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit (see United States v Fulton, 5
F3d 605, 610-611 [2d Cir 1993]; United States v Cancilla, 725 F2d
867, 871 [2d Cir 1984]).  These cases are not controlling (see
People v Kin Kan, 78 NY2d 54, 59-60 [1991]) and, in any event,
are distinguishable.  In both Fulton and Cancilla, the defense
attorneys were alleged to have committed crimes related to those
for which their clients stood trial.  In this case, there is no
allegation that the second attorney was involved in defendant's
violent encounter with the police, or possession of the gun;
defendant was not on trial for witness tampering, or bribery, or
suborning of perjury arising from his alleged contacts with L. T.
Moreover, we have repeatedly declined to create a rule
of per se error (see e.g., People v Recupero, 73 NY2d 877, 880
[1988]; People v McDonald, 68 NY2d 1, 11-12 [1986]).  Defendant's
proposed rule would require automatic reversal upon mere
accusations of impropriety, whether true or false and regardless
of whether the attorney's loyalties were actually divided.  In
our view, such a per se rule is not necessary to protect a
defendant's right to conflict-free representation.  Under our
- 17 -
No. 198
- 17 -
precedent, a defendant does not have to establish that the
conflict affected the outcome of the proceedings; a defendant
must only show that the conflict operated on the defense.  Here,
defendant failed to make even this minimal showing.
III.
Criminal Procedure Law § 400.16 (2) states that the
method for determining whether a person is a persistent violent
felony offender is governed by Criminal Procedure Law § 400.15. 
This procedure honors the principle that a "conviction obtained
in violation of one's constitutional rights may not be used to
enhance punishment for another offense" (People v Harris, 61 NY2d
9, 16 [1983]).  To this end, the defendant must be given a
statement informing him of the date and place of his predicate
convictions, and an opportunity to controvert any allegations
within that statement (Criminal Procedure Law § 400.15 [3]).  A
defendant who wishes to controvert the allegations "must specify
the particular allegation or allegations he wishes to controvert"
or they are deemed admitted (id.).  And a defendant may
"controvert an allegation with respect to" a prior conviction on
the ground that it was unconstitutionally obtained "at any time
during the course of the hearing hereunder" (see Criminal
Procedure Law § 400.15 [7] [b]).
Where the "uncontroverted allegations . . . are
sufficient to support a finding that the defendant has been
subjected to a predicate violent felony conviction the court must
- 18 -
No. 198
- 18 -
enter such finding" and sentence defendant accordingly (Criminal
Procedure Law § 400.15 [4]).  Where the "uncontroverted
allegations . . . are not sufficient to support [such] a finding"
the court must hold a hearing (Criminal Procedure Law § 400.15
[5] [emphasis added]).  At the hearing, the People are required
to prove the defendant's predicate status "beyond a reasonable
doubt by evidence admissible under the rules applicable to a
trial of the issue of guilt" (Criminal Procedure Law § 400.15 [7]
[a]), but not the prior conviction's constitutionality (People v
Diggins, 11 NY3d 518, 524 [2008]).  Once the fact of the prior
conviction has been established, it is the defendant's burden to
allege and prove facts to establish his claim that the conviction
was unconstitutionally obtained (Harris, 61 NY2d at 15).
Defendant argues that, once he asserted that his 1996
conviction was unconstitutionally obtained, these statutory
provisions required the court to hold a hearing in which he could
call witnesses.  But to obtain a hearing, a defendant must do
more than make conclusory allegations that his prior conviction
was unconstitutionally obtained.  He must support his allegations
with facts (People v Gordon, 251 AD2d 93 [1st Dept 1998]; People
v Greco, 230 AD2d 23, 31 [4th Dept 1997]).
Here, defendant stated only that he wanted to call
numerous witnesses who, he claimed, would demonstrate that his
"guilty pleas were coerced" and that his attorney was
"ineffective."  But defendant did not explain how his guilty
- 19 -
No. 198
- 19 -
pleas were coerced or in what way his attorney was ineffective. 
Nor did defendant indicate what information the named witnesses
would provide on these issues.  These unsupported allegations
were insufficient to entitle defendant to a hearing on the
constitutionality of his prior conviction.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
- 1 -
People v George Konstantinides
No. 198
SMITH, J.(dissenting in part):
During defendant's trial, one of his lawyers was
accused in open court of joining with defendant in attempts to
suborn perjury and to bribe a potential witness.  Under a number
of federal cases, this accusation, true or false, would be enough
to create a per se, unwaivable, conflict requiring
disqualification of the lawyer or, failing that, reversal of
defendant's conviction (see e.g. United States v Jones, 381 F3d
114 [2d Cir 2004]; United States v Fulton, 5 F3d 605, 609-610 [2d
Cir 1993]).  I agree with the majority in rejecting this rule. 
In other words, I would hold that the conflict could be waived,
or that, even if not waived, the failure to disqualify the lawyer
would not justify reversal if it had no effect on defendant's
representation.
But here, the trial court never asked defendant whether
he would waive the conflict, much less conducted the hearing
necessary to assure that any waiver was knowing and intelligent
(see People v Gomberg, 38 NY2d 307 [1975]).  Nor did the trial
court inquire at all, so far as the record shows, into the
prosecutor's allegations or their possible impact on the trial. 
The prosecutor's motion to disqualify was never ruled on, and the
- 2 -
No. 198
- 2 -
conflicted lawyer continued to participate, in a significant way,
in defendant's defense.  Under the circumstances, I do not see
how we can affirm defendant's conviction without at least
requiring a post-trial hearing into whether the conflict operated
on the representation.  
Our recent decision in People v Ennis (11 NY3d 403,
409-410 [2008]) explains the framework we use to decide issues
like this:
"A claim that defense counsel's
representation was compromised by a conflict
of interest requires two inquiries.  First,
the court must examine the nature of the
relationship or circumstances that are
alleged to establish a conflict.  Second, if
a conflict is identified, the court must
determine whether the conflict operated on
the representation, i.e., whether the
relationship or circumstances bore a
substantial relation to the conduct of the
defense."  (Internal quotation marks and
citations omitted.)
When a lawyer is accused (rightly or wrongly) of
criminal conduct related to the subject matter of the case
against his client, the first Ennis test is met -- the
"relationship or circumstances" establish a conflict.  The
reasons are explained in the federal cases (see e.g. United
States v Jones, 381 F3d at 120): Any lawyer, guilty or innocent,
in the situation faced by defendant's lawyer here would recognize
that his personal interests were very much at stake, and would
feel a strong need to protect himself -- a goal that might not be
consistent with protecting his client.  Thus, it cannot be said
- 3 -
No. 198
- 3 -
here, as we said in Ennis, that "[m]any (perhaps most) attorneys
would not have perceived any conflict" (11 NY3d at 411).  There
are few, if any, lawyers who could easily disregard the
possibility of disbarment or criminal proceedings against them
personally, even if their client's interests demanded it.  
The second step in the Ennis analysis is to determine
whether the conflict "operated on the representation."  The trial
court here never took this step.  As a result of this error, the
record before us is silent as to whether there are witnesses who
might have been called, questions that might have been asked, or
strategies that might have been pursued if defendant's lawyer's
personal interests had not been threatened.  
Specifically, we have no way of knowing whether defense
counsel ever really considered calling the "woman named Jennifer"
(see majority op at 4) as a witness; it may well be that
Jennifer, if she existed, could have given no testimony (other
than testimony known to be perjured) that would have helped
defendant, but nothing in this record proves that.  Also, while
L.T., the source of the prosecutor's information about
defendant's lawyer, did not testify, her name came up both in the
direct examination of defendant (conducted by the lawyer accused
of wrongdoing) and on the prosecutor's cross-examination.  The
record does not show whether the lawyer would have handled this
subject differently if L.T. had not been his accuser.  And there
is nothing to show whether an offer to provide information to the
- 4 -
No. 198
- 4 -
People as part of a plea or sentence bargain was a realistic
option for defendant.  If it was, it would surely have been hard
for the lawyer -- knowing it at least possible that defendant
would provide information about the lawyer himself -- to give
impartial advice on the subject.
Astonishingly, the majority makes the absence from the
record of necessary information -- the consequence of the trial
court's failure to conduct stage two of the inquiry Ennis
requires -- a basis for affirming defendant's conviction.  The
silence of the record, it says, is "the fault of defendant, whose
burden it is to establish that the conflict operated on the
representation" (majority op at 14, n 4).  The flaw in this
assertion seems almost too obvious for statement: How was
defendant supposed to meet that burden while represented by the
very counsel who was subject to the conflict?  The majority seems
to suggest three possible answers to this question, all
completely unsatisfactory. 
First, the majority notes (majority op at 12-13) that
the conflicted lawyer sat in the second chair at the trial, and
that the lead lawyer had no apparent conflict.  Thus, the
majority implies, the silence of the record is "the fault of
defendant" because his lead counsel did not attack his own co-
counsel's fitness to continue in the case.  But no authority
supports, and simple common sense contradicts, the idea that
defendant may be blamed for his lawyer's failure to attack his
- 5 -
No. 198
- 5 -
colleague.
Secondly, the majority surmises that there "must have"
been an off-the-record conference, in which the concerns raised
by the prosecutor's application to disqualify were resolved
(majority op at 6).  But even in off-the-record discussions,
defendant was represented by the same conflicted counsel -- and
in any event, can it be doubted that, where the record shows an
apparent impairment of a defendant's right to conflict-free
representation, the problem must be resolved on the record, not
off it?
Thirdly, the majority suggests that defendant's remedy
was a post-trial motion under CPL 440 (presumably to be made
after defendant obtained new counsel)(majority op at 14).  The
majority cites no authority holding that a post-trial motion is
necessary to obtain relief for an error apparent on the face of
the trial record -- no doubt because the law is to the contrary. 
We held in People v Crump (53 NY2d 824, 825 [1981]):
"[I]nasmuch as both the trial court's failure
to make any inquiry and the conflict of
interest between defendant and Barclay are
discernible from the record, the question of
whether defendant was deprived of the
effective assistance of counsel is
appropriate for resolution on defendant's
direct appeal from his conviction.  While it
is true that claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel often involve factual questions
which can best be addressed in a collateral
or postconviction proceeding brought under
CPL 440.10 (see People v Brown, 45 NY2d 852,
854), where, as here, the record discloses
that reversible error has occurred below,
defendant should not be relegated to such
- 6 -
No. 198
- 6 -
collateral proceedings to obtain relief." 
Where a defendant claims that his lawyer was
conflicted, but the record contains no evidence of a conflict,
that evidence must be supplied in a post-trial motion (see People
v Mora, 290 AD2d 373 [1st Dept 2002]; and People v Frias, 250
AD2d 495 [1st Dept 1998]).  But here, the record shows both the
conflict and an error by the trial court in dealing with it, as
the majority essentially concedes (see majority op at 14: to
address the issue on the record "surely would have been the
better practice").  For me, the only difficult issue in this case
is what remedy for this error defendant is entitled to.  I am
prepared to hold that he is not entitled to a new trial, but only
to a hearing on the issue of how, if at all, the apparent
conflict affected his representation.  But I find the majority's
holding that he is entitled to no remedy at all indefensible.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Read.  Judges Graffeo, Pigott
and Jones concur.  Judge Smith dissents in part in an opinion in
which Chief Judge Lippman and Judge Ciparick concur.
Decided December 17, 2009