Case Title: CERECK v ALBERTSON S INC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 81-093

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. 81-93 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 MARY CERECK, Plaintiff and Appellant, ALBERTSON'S INC., a corporation, and Holiday Village Shopping Center, a Montana corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial ~istrict, In and for the County of Cascade Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hoyt and Trieweiler, Gieat Falls, Montana John Hoyt argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent : Church, Harris, Johnson & Williams, Great Falls, Montana Mike Anderson argued and Cresap S. McCracken argued, Great Falls, Montana NQV 2 5 t9Vt Filed: - Submitted: September 22, 1981 Decided : ROV 2 5 1 % // I I w Clerk M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. I n a damage a c t i o n by a customer who s l i p p e d , f e l l and was i n j u r e d on b u s i n e s s p r e m i s e s , t h e District Court of Cascade County g r a n t e d summary j udgment t o d e f e n d a n t s . P l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s . W e r e v e r s e . On February 25, 1979, a warm F e b r u a r y d a y , M r s . Cereck and h e r husband t r a v e l l e d by automobile t o t h e Holiday V i l l a g e Shopping C e n t e r i n Great F a l l s , Montana, to do some shopping a t t h e A l b e r t s o n l s g r o c e r y store. I t had snowed i n Great F a l l s p r i o r to February 25 and t h e snow i n t h e p a r k i n g l o t l o c a t e d n o r t h of t h e A l b e r t s o n l s store had been plowed o f f t h e l o t and pushed up along t h e n o r t h edge of t h e s t o r e , forming a snow bank s e v e r a l f e e t h i g h . A passageway had been shoveled through t h e snowbank to e n a b l e p e d e s t r i a n s to walk from t h e p a r k i n g l o t through t h e snowbank t o t h e e a s t e r n e n t r a n c e of t h e A l b e r t s o n ' s s t o r e . Mrs. C e r e c k l s husband parked t h e car immediately w e s t of t h e shoveled passageway. Mrs. Cereck g o t o u t of t h e car, walked around behind it and approached t h e passageway. She observed a water-puddle i n t h e passageway and b e l i e v i n g she could n o t s t e p o v e r it, she s t a r t e d o v e r t h e snowbank to t h e r i g h t s i d e of it. While a t t e m p t i n g to so make h e r way forward, s h e lost h e r f o o t i n g , s l i p p e d , f e l l , and i n j u r e d h e r l e f t l e g and h i p . She was h o s p i t a l i z e d f o r t h e i n j u r i e s s h e s u s t a i n e d i n t h e f a l l and was unable to work f o r s e v e r a l months. Holiday V i l l a g e Shopping C e n t e r w a s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r main- t a i n i n g t h e p a r k i n g l o t area. The shopping c e n t e r ' s manager was aware t h a t a snowbank e x i s t e d along t h e n o r t h s i d e of t h e A l b e r t s o n ' s s t o r e as a r e s u l t of t h e snow plowing a c t i v i t i e s which had been conducted i n t h e parking l o t area. A j a n i t o r i a l s e r v i c e had been h i r e d by t h e shopping c e n t e r to keep t h e shopping c e n t e r e n t r a n c e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e e n t r a n c e to t h e A l b e r t s o n l s s t o r e , f r e e of ice and snow b u i l d u p . T h i s j o b included c u t t i n g passageways through t h e snowbanks to allow customers access to t h e s t o r e e n t r a n c e s . It also included t h e removal o f water and t h e s p r e a d i n g of ice m e l t a t t h e store e n t r a n c e s when n e c e s s a r y . The A l b e r t s o n v s store p e r s o n n e l had a l s o helped m a i n t a i n t h e walkways l e a d i n g to t h e e n t r a n c e s of t h e A l b e r t s o n v s s t o r e . The i s s u e on a p p e a l is whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t s v motion f o r summary j udgment . The purpose of t h e summary judgment procedure is to encourage j u d i c i a l economy by e l i m i n a t i n g unnecessary trials, and it is p r o p e r under Rule 5 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., o n l y when t h e r e is no g e n u i n e i s s u e of material f a c t and t h e moving p a r t y is e n t i t l e d t o a judgment as a matter of l a w . Reaves v. Reinbold ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont . , 615 P.2d 896, 37 St.Rep. 1500. I t is w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t a p a r t y moving f o r sum- mary judgment h a s t h e burden of showing a complete absence o f any g e n u i n e i s s u e as t o a l l f a c t s deemed material i n l i g h t of t h e s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n c i p l e s t h a t e n t i t l e t h a t p a r t y to a judgment a s a matter of l a w . Reaves, s u p r a ; Harland v. Anderson ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 447, 548 P.2d 613; Bahm v. Dormanen ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont. 408, 543 P.2d 379. A l l reaso- n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s t h a t may be drawn from t h e o f f e r e d proof are to be drawn i n f a v o r of t h e p a r t y opposing t h e summary judgment. Reaves, s u p r a ; Mally v. Asanovich ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 149 Mont. 9 9 , 423 P.2d 294. When a d u t y is imposed upon t h e d e f e n d a n t and t h e p l a i n t i f f I s a l l e g a t i o n s , i f proven, would s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g o f a breach of t h e d u t y , summary judgment is improper. Rennick v. Hoover ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont . r 606 P.2d 1079, 37 St.Rep. 308. I n Montana t h e d u t y imposed upon a p r o p e r t y owner depends upon t h e s t a t u s of t h e i n j u r e d p a r t y on t h e premises. I n t h i s case M r s . Cereck was a b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e . Montana cases have h e l d t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y owner's d u t y toward a n i n v i t e e is to use o r d i n a r y care to keep t h e premises r e a s o n a b l y safe and to warn t h e i n v i t e e of any hidden o r l u r k i n g d a n g e r s ; t h e d u t y is s a t i s f i e d i f t h e c o n d i t i o n is o b v i o u s o r a c t u a l l y known. Rennick, s u p r a ; Luebeck v. Safeway S t o r e s , I n c . (1968) 1 152 Mont. 88, 446 P.2d 921. Regedahl v. Safeway S t o r e s , I n c . ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 149 Mont. 229, 425 P.2d 335. S e v e r a l Montana cases have involved i n j u r i e s to i n v i t e e s caused by i c y c o n d i t i o n s , and t h i s Court h a s h e l d t h a t t h e r e is no l i a b i l i t y imposed upon t h e landowner where t h e danger c r e a t e d by t h e e l e m e n t s such as t h e forming of ice and t h e f a l l i n g of snow is u n i v e r s a l l y known o r a c t u a l l y known. Rennick, s u p r a ; Dunham v. S o u t h s i d e N a t i o n a l Bank ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 466, 548 p.2d 1383; Luebeck, s u p r a . The f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t from Crawford v. Soennichsen ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 175 Neb. 8 7 , 120 N.W.2d 578, was c i t e d w i t h a p p r o v a l by t h i s Court i n Luebeck, s u p r a : " I [Tlhe g e n e r a l r u l e seems c l e a r l y to be t h a t a store owner cannot be charged w i t h n e g l i g e n c e by r e a s o n of n a t u r a l accumulation of ice and snow where t h e c o n d i t i o n is as w e l l known t o t h e p l a i n t i f f as t h e d e f e n d a n t . " I n Luebeck, t h i s Court s p e c i f i c a l l y r e j e c t e d t h e r a t i o n a l e t h a t n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s such as obvious snow and ice create such a n u n r e a s o n a b l y dangerous c o n d i t i o n as to r e q u i r e t h e landowner t o t a k e c e r t a i n p r e c a u t i o n s . The i c y c o n d i t i o n s d i s c u s s e d i n t h e cases c i t e d above were n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s caused by t h e elements. The case b e f o r e u s d i f f e r s i n t h a t t h e n a t u r a l accumulation of ice and snow had been a l t e r e d . The p l a i n t i f f c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e hazard c r e a t e d by t h e n a t u r a l accumulation of ice and snow was i n c r e a s e d when t h e snow was p i l e d n e a r t h e store e n t r a n c e . I n W i l l i s v. S t . P e t e r ' s H o s p i t a l ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 157 Mont. 417, 486 P.2d 593, a patrolman brought an a c t i o n f o r i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d when he a l l e g e d l y s l i p p e d on an accumulation of ice and snow n e a r a h o s p i t a l s emergency e n t r a n c e . T h i s Court h e l d t h a t t h e g r a n t i n g of summary judgment was improper i n t h a t case and s t a t e d t h a t one q u e s t i o n f o r t h e j u r y to d e c i d e was whether t h e s l i p p e r y c o n d i t i o n of t h e snow and ice was t h e r e s u l t of a n a t u r a l accumulation or t h e r e s u l t of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s careless- n e s s . A p r o p e r t y owner may be held l i a b l e f o r f a l l s on accumula- t i o n s of ice and snow where t h e hazard c r e a t e d by t h e n a t u r a l accumulation is i n c r e a s e d o r a new hazard is c r e a t e d by an a f f i r - m a t i v e act of t h e p r o p e r t y owner; even where such a c o n d i t i o n is a c t u a l l y known or o b v i o u s , a p r o p e r t y owner may be h e l d l i a b l e i f he should have a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t i n j u r i e s would r e s u l t from t h e d a n g e r o u s c o n d i t i o n . Rennick, s u p r a ; Restatement (Second ) of T o r t s , S 343A (1) ( 1 9 6 5 ) . M r s . Cereck claims t h a t d e f e n d a n t s ' a f f i r m a t i v e acts i n c r e a s e d t h e hazard caused by t h e n a t u r a l accumulation of snow and ice and t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s should have a n t i c i p a t e d t h e i n j u r i e s t h a t r e s u l t e d . The p a r t y opposing summary judgment is e n t i t l e d to t h e b e n e f i t of a l l r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s t h a t may be drawn from t h e o f f e r e d p r o o f . In t h i s c a s e it may r e a s o n a b l y be i n f e r r e d t h a t t h e p i l i n g of snow i n f r o n t of t h e store e n t r a n c e i n c r e a s e d t h e hazard c r e a t e d by t h e n a t u r a l accumulation of snow and ice and t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s should have a n t i c i p a t e d t h e i n j u r i e s t h a t M r s . Cereck r e c e i v e d as a r e s u l t of t h e dangerous c o n d i t i o n . S i n c e t h e claim made by M r s . Cereck would s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g o f breach of d e f e n d a n t s t d u t y toward h e r , t h e g r a n t i n g of summary j udgment was improper. Reversed and remanded f o r t r i a l . Chief Justice \ s u - - - --------------- M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., concurs: I concur i n t h e r e s u l t , b u t n o t i n a l l t h a t i s s a i d t h e r e i n . S p e c i f i c a l l y t h i s Court has begun t o d e p a r t from " s t a t u s " i n determining t h e degree of c a r e owed by a property owner. See Corrigan v. Janney (1981), Mont., 626 P.2d 838, 38 St.Rep. 545. The p l a i n t i f f , M r s . Cereck, need n o t enjoy the s t a t u s of i n v i t e e i n order t o recover. A general duty of due c a r e i s owed. The majority opinion confines property owner l i a b i l i t y f o r n a t u r a l accumulations of i c e and snow t o those s i t u a t i o n s where the property owner has increased o r changed t h e hazard through some a f f i r m a t i v e a c t . I would adopt Section 343 A. (1) Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) which provides a s follows: "A possessor of land i s n o t l i a b l e t o h i s i n v i t e e s f o r physical harm caused t o them by any a c t i v i t y o r condition on t h e land whose danger i s known o r obvious t o them, unless t h e possessor should a n t i c i p a t e t h e harm d e s p i t e such knowledge o r obviousness." Admittedly, t h e restatement r u l e i s applicable t o i n v i t e e s . However, though I would n o t recognize s t a t u s i n "land p o s s e s s o r ' s l i a b i l i t y , " I f e e l t h e r u l e t o be a p p l i c a b l e t o f a c t s such a s those a t bar. I n m y opinion, t h e r e s t r i c t i v e r a t i o decidendi of t h i s case i s inadequate t o meet s i t u a t i o n s such a s f a i l u r e t o plow. I f t h e parking l o t i n question had n o t been maintained i n any fashion, and snow were allowed t o accumulate so t h a t customers were required t o wade through knee deep snow, no duty would be owed by t h e possessor under t h e r u l e adopted by t h e majority. Those who do nothing i n c u r no l i a b i l i t y . Those who plow t h e i r parking l o t s a r e exposed. I b e l i e v e such a r e s t r i c t i v e duty does n o t adequately recognize t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s owed by t h e business community, does n o t adequately p r o t e c t a public dependent upon t h e s e r v i c e s provided by t h a t community, and does n o t promote sound public policy. For t h e foregoing reasons, I concur i n t h e r e s u l t b u t would adopt d i f f e r e n t l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s t o s u s t a i n t h e same outcome.