Case Title: Jami L. Van Boxtel v. Brent F. Van Boxtel

Citation: 2001 WI 40

Docket Number: 1999AP000341

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 40 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0341 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Jami L. Van Boxtel,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant-Cross-Respondent- 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Brent F. Van Boxtel,  
 
Respondent-Respondent-Cross-Appellant.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  235 Wis. 2d 275, 616 N.W.2d 524 
(Ct. App. 2000-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 2, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
February 7, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Outagamie 
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Des Jardins 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner-appellant-cross-respondent-
petitioner there were briefs by John Miller Carroll and John 
Miller Carroll, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by John Miller 
Carroll. 
 
For the respondent-respondent-cross-appellant 
there was a brief by David J. Van Lieshout and Menn, Teetaert & 
Beisenstein, Ltd., Little Chute, and oral argument by David J. 
 
2 
Van Lieshout. 
 
 
2001 WI 40 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-0341 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Jami L. Van Boxtel,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Brent F. Van Boxtel,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent-Cross- 
          Appellant. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  (Affirmed) 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   In this divorce action, the 
petitioner, Jami L. Van Boxtel, seeks review of an unpublished 
decision of the court of appeals upholding the circuit court's 
refusal to enforce a written property division agreement between 
the petitioner and the respondent, Brent F. Van Boxtel.1  The 
petitioner asserts that the terms of the agreement are binding 
                     
1 Van Boxtel v. Van Boxtel, No. 99-0341, unpublished slip 
opinion (Wis. Ct. App. April 11, 2000) (affirming the judgment 
of the Circuit Court for Outagamie County, John A. Des Jardins, 
Judge). 
FILED 
 
MAY 2, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-0341 
 
 
2 
on the respondent and the circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.255(3)(L) (1995-96)2 and that the circuit court erred in 
refusing to incorporate the agreement into its judgment.  We 
disagree. 
¶2 
We conclude that because the agreement was entered 
into after divorce proceedings commenced, it is a stipulation 
under Wis. Stat. § 767.10(1).  We also conclude that the 
respondent repudiated his consent to that stipulation and, 
therefore, we uphold the circuit court's refusal to incorporate 
it into the judgment.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals.  
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  The petitioner 
and respondent married in July 1994.  At the time of the 
marriage, the petitioner owned a home on Walter Avenue in 
Appleton.  The respondent also owned property in Appleton, which 
was sold shortly after the marriage.  With the proceeds of this 
sale, the couple then built a new home.  The Walter Avenue 
property was subsequently sold in April 1996.  
¶4 
One month later, in May 1996, the petitioner filed for 
divorce.  Shortly thereafter, she sought to purchase her own 
home.  To obtain the necessary financing, the petitioner's 
lender required that the petitioner secure certain proceeds from 
the sale of the Walter Avenue property.  In meeting this 
                     
2 Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-96 version. 
  
No. 
99-0341 
 
 
3 
requirement, the petitioner asked the respondent to sign an 
agreement foregoing his interest in the Walter Avenue proceeds 
as well as any interest in the petitioner's new home.  
¶5 
The agreement specifically stated that the parties 
were "currently in the middle of a court proceeding for 
divorce," and further provided: 
 
Now, 
Therefore, 
in 
consideration 
of 
the 
mutual 
covenants of this Agreement, the parties agree as 
follows: 
 
1. 
That the [Walter Avenue property] and the net 
proceeds from the sale of such residence has [sic] 
always been and shall continue to be the individual 
property of [the petitioner]. 
 
2. 
That a certain parcel of real estate located at 
213 West Parkway Boulevard . . . or any other property 
purchased with the proceeds from the sale of the above 
mentioned real estate shall be classified as the 
individual property of [the petitioner]. 
 
3. 
That [the respondent] waives and releases all 
claims or rights he might otherwise have pursuant to 
Chapters 766 and 767 of the Wisconsin Statutes to [the 
Walter Avenue property], the proceeds from the sale of 
the same and any replacement residence purchased with 
such sale proceeds. 
The parties signed the agreement on January 27, 1997.   
¶6 
Approximately six months after the agreement was 
signed, the petitioner moved for partial summary judgment 
seeking to enforce the agreement and preclude the respondent 
from making any claims to the proceeds from the sale of the 
Walter Avenue property.  In response, the respondent submitted 
an affidavit contesting the agreement.  In his affidavit, the 
respondent set forth facts challenging the validity of the 
No. 
99-0341 
 
 
4 
agreement and asserted that "no agreement has been reached 
concerning the property division."  The record contains no 
ruling on the petitioner's motion and the matter was left to be 
resolved at trial. 
¶7 
At the following June 1998 trial, the petitioner 
pursued enforcement of the agreement and incorporation of it 
into the divorce judgment.  The respondent continued to 
challenge the validity of the agreement.  He presented evidence 
to support his position that he was pressured and rushed into 
signing the agreement and that it was entered prior to review by 
his attorney.   
¶8 
In making its property division determination, the 
circuit court concluded that the agreement was invalid and 
refused to incorporate it into the divorce judgment.3  The court 
was 
persuaded 
that 
the 
agreement 
was 
not 
entered 
into 
voluntarily and ultimately concluded that, under the totality of 
the circumstances, the agreement was inequitable.  The court 
thus refused to enforce the agreement and divided the proceeds 
from the Walter Avenue property equally between the parties. 
¶9 
The petitioner appealed and the court of appeals 
affirmed.  She maintained that the agreement was properly 
executed under Wis. Stat. § 766.58 and enforceable upon divorce 
pursuant to § 767.255(3)(L).  The court of appeals rejected the 
petitioner's argument and concluded that because the agreement 
                     
3 In reaching this conclusion, the circuit court did not 
expressly identify the nature of the agreement under the 
statutes, but termed it a "postnuptial agreement or contract." 
No. 
99-0341 
 
 
5 
was signed after divorce proceedings had commenced, it was a 
stipulation 
subject 
to 
court 
approval 
under 
§ 767.10(1).  
Because the circuit court had not approved the agreement and, in 
fact, found it to be inequitable to the respondent, the court of 
appeals found that the circuit court did not err in refusing to 
enforce the agreement. 
¶10 The specific issues presented to this court are 
whether the agreement between the parties is a stipulation under 
§ 767.10(1) or a binding agreement under § 767.255(3)(L) and, in 
turn, whether the circuit court properly refused to incorporate 
the agreement into its judgment.  Although the petitioner 
challenged numerous aspects of the circuit court's property 
division before the court of appeals, she has asked this court 
to review only the court of appeals' characterization of the 
agreement and the agreement's enforceability.  The respondent 
concurs that these are the only matters before this court.4  
¶11 This examination presents us with a question of 
statutory construction as it arises during the review of a 
circuit court's exercise of discretion.  Generally, a division 
of property in a divorce action will be upheld absent an 
                     
4 We have not been asked to review the entirety of the 
circuit court's determinations regarding the division of the 
parties' property.  Rather, the petition for review and the 
briefs of both parties state the issue presented for review as 
follows:  "When a husband and wife, during marriage but after 
the commencement of divorce proceedings, enter into a written 
marital property agreement classifying a piece of real estate as 
the individual property of the wife, should that agreement be 
enforced 
in 
making 
the 
property 
division 
in 
a 
divorce 
proceeding?"   
No. 
99-0341 
 
 
6 
erroneous exercise of discretion.  Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 
166, 
171, 
560 
N.W.2d 
246 
(1997). 
 
However, 
statutory 
construction is a question of law that we review independently 
of the determinations rendered by the circuit court and the 
court of appeals.  Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee, 2000 WI 41, 
¶9, 234 Wis. 2d 587, 610 N.W.2d 467.  When interpreting a 
statute, this court seeks to identify and effectuate the intent 
of the legislature.  Stockbridge Sch. Dist. v. DPI Sch. Dist. 
Boundary Appeal Bd., 202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996). 
¶12 We first address whether the court of appeals erred in 
characterizing this written agreement as a stipulation under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.10(1).  The petitioner contends that the 
agreement is properly governed by § 767.255(3)(L) and is binding 
upon the parties and the circuit court.  She maintains that 
because the parties intended to be bound by the agreement, the 
court should not treat it as a stipulation.5  The respondent, 
however, argues that the agreement is a § 767.10(1) stipulation 
subject to the approval of the court.  He asserts that any 
agreement between spouses signed after a filing for divorce is a 
stipulation.  
                     
5  In her briefs to this court, the petitioner argued, much 
like she did to the court of appeals, that the agreement was a 
binding marital property agreement under Wis. Stat. § 766.58.  
However, at oral argument the petitioner acknowledged that the 
issue in this case is the status of the agreement under chapter 
767.  We thus do not address any prior contentions regarding 
chapter 766.   
No. 
99-0341 
 
 
7 
¶13 The parties dispute the statutory characterization of 
the agreement because the classification of the agreement as 
either a § 767.10(1) stipulation or a § 767.255(3)(L) agreement 
determines the degree of flexibility a circuit court has in 
incorporating the agreement into its judgment.  An agreement 
under § 767.255(3)(L) is binding upon the court unless the terms 
of the agreement are "inequitable as to either party."  Wis. 
Stat. § 767.255(3)(L).  
Such 
agreements are 
presumptively 
equitable.  Id.  In contrast, a § 767.10(1) divorce stipulation 
is only enforceable "subject to the approval of the court."  
Wis. Stat. § 767.10(1).  Such a stipulation is merely a 
"recommendation jointly made by [the parties in a divorce 
action] to the court suggesting what the judgment, if granted, 
is to provide."  Bliwas v. Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d 635, 638, 178 
N.W.2d 35 (1970). 
¶14 We conclude that any agreement regarding the division 
of 
property 
entered 
into 
between 
spouses 
after 
divorce 
proceedings have commenced is a stipulation under § 767.10(1) 
and is therefore subject to the approval of the court.  This 
conclusion 
is 
dictated 
by 
the 
language 
of 
the 
statute, 
controlling precedent, and the public policy considerations 
implicated when divorcing spouses enter into agreements. 
¶15 We turn to the language of the statutes.  The parties' 
dispute centers around whether § 767.10(1) or § 767.255(3)(L) 
applies to the agreement at issue.  Section 767.10(1) enables 
spouses in an action for divorce to stipulate to certain matters 
No. 
99-0341 
 
 
8 
relevant to their divorce judgment, subject to the approval of 
the court.  The statute specifically provides: 
 
The parties in an action for an annulment, divorce or 
legal separation may, subject to the approval of the 
court, stipulate for a division of property, for 
maintenance payments, for the support of children, for 
periodic family support payments under s. 767.261 or 
for legal custody and physical placement, in case a 
divorce or legal separation is granted or a marriage 
annulled. 
Wis. Stat. § 767.10(1). 
¶16 Section 767.255 governs the circuit court's division 
of property upon divorce.  The statute directs the court to 
equally divide between the parties all property that is not a 
gift or inheritance.  Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3).  The court may 
alter this distribution upon considering a variety of factors, 
including certain written agreements under § 767.255(3)(L).  
That provision allows the court to consider: 
 
Any written agreement made by the parties before or 
during the marriage concerning any arrangement for 
property 
distribution; 
such 
agreements 
shall 
be 
binding upon the court except that no such agreement 
shall be binding where the terms of the agreement are 
inequitable as to either party.  The court shall 
presume any such agreement to be equitable as to both 
parties. 
Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(L).    
¶17 The petitioner argues that § 767.255(3)(L) broadly 
applies to any agreement entered into "before or during the 
marriage." We note, however, that § 767.10(1) specifically 
applies to agreements entered into by "parties in an action 
for . . . divorce."  Although § 767.255(3)(L) does not expressly 
No. 
99-0341 
 
 
9 
exclude agreements executed after the filing of divorce, the 
classification of a post-filing agreement as a stipulation 
derives from the limitation found in § 767.10(1).  Because 
§ 767.10(1) more specifically addresses agreements regarding the 
division of property entered into after the filing for divorce, 
it is the applicable statute in this circumstance.  See State ex 
rel. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 595-96, 
547 N.W.2d 587 (1996) (specific statutory provisions generally 
take precedence over general provisions).  
¶18 In addition to the statutory language, our conclusion 
is required by precedent.  The court of appeals addressed facts 
similar to the present case in Evenson v. Evenson, 228 Wis. 2d 
676, 598 N.W.2d 232 (Ct. App. 1999).  In that case, a divorcing 
couple entered into an agreement after a petition for divorce 
had been filed but before the divorce judgment was entered.6  The 
agreement in Evenson was entitled a Limited Marital Property 
Agreement and covered each parties' rights as to their marital 
residence, the husband's new residence, and their various 
financial assets.  Prior to judgment, the husband sought to 
withdraw from a portion of the agreement, while the wife sought 
enforcement of the agreement and incorporation of it into the 
                     
6 We acknowledge that another recent court of appeals' 
decision concluded that an agreement entered into prior to the 
filing for divorce, but made in contemplation of divorce, was a 
§ 767.10(1) stipulation.  Ayres v. Ayres, 230 Wis. 2d 431, 602 
N.W.2d 132 (Ct. App. 1999).  We need not examine the court of 
appeals' conclusion in that case.  Today's decision addresses 
only agreements entered into after divorce proceedings are 
commenced.   
No. 
99-0341 
 
 
10
divorce judgment.  The parties' dispute presented the identical 
question of law posed by today's case: "whether the document 
presented to the court was a binding agreement pursuant to 
§ 767.255(3)(L), Stats., or a divorce stipulation pursuant to 
§ 767.10(1)."  Id. at 681.   
¶19 The court of appeals concluded that because "the 
agreement was executed after the parties filed for divorce," it 
was a divorce stipulation governed by § 767.10(1).  Id. at 686 
(emphasis in original).  Thus, to adopt the petitioner's 
characterization of the agreement before us would essentially 
require us to overrule Evenson, a case that remains controlling 
precedent.  While the agreement in Evenson was broader in scope 
than the agreement before us, the scope of the property 
agreement is not determinative of its classification under the 
divorce statutes. 
¶20 Much like the court in Evenson, we also examine the 
public policy considerations that inform our decision.  In 
Evenson, the court of appeals relied heavily upon the public 
policy concerns enunciated by this court in Ray v. Ray, 57 
Wis. 2d 77, 203 N.W.2d 724 (1973).  We too believe the 
principles articulated in Ray support the determination that all 
agreements entered into after the filing for divorce regarding 
the division of the parties' property are stipulations under 
§ 767.10(1).   
¶21 In Ray, this court recognized the need for court 
approval of agreements made between spouses after divorce 
proceedings 
are 
commenced 
due 
to 
the 
active 
third-party 
No. 
99-0341 
 
 
11
interests that the state has in divorce cases.  Id. at 82.  As 
we emphasized in Ray, once parties invoke the jurisdiction of 
the court, and the court is given the authority to determine the 
disposition of property upon divorce, parties cannot then oust 
the court of this authority.  Id. at 84.  The court's interest 
in divorce cases and its role in approving agreements made 
during divorce proceedings are safeguarded by treating such 
agreements 
as 
stipulations 
under 
§ 767.10(1). 
 
Unlike 
§ 767.255(3)(L), § 767.10(1) provides the circuit court with the 
flexibility and control necessary to carry out this authority.   
¶22 The petitioner maintains that the concerns articulated 
in Ray are not applicable under the current divorce statutes.  
When this court decided Ray, § 767.255(3)(L) had not yet been 
enacted.7  The only statute that contemplated the incorporation 
of marital agreements into a divorce judgment at that time was 
Wis. Stat. § 247.10 (1969), the predecessor to § 767.10(1).8  The 
petitioner 
asserts 
that 
the 
subsequent 
enactment 
of 
§ 767.255(3)(L) should be viewed as a limitation on the holding 
of Ray because the statute requires the court to enforce 
agreements governed by this statute unless they are inequitable. 
  
                     
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 247.255(11) was enacted in 1977.  It was 
later renumbered to Wis. Stat. § 767.255(11), and is now Wis. 
Stat. § 767.255(3)(L). 
8 Section 247.10 provided that "the parties may, subject to 
the approval of the court, stipulate for a division of estate, 
for alimony, or for the support of children, in case a divorce 
or legal separation is granted or a marriage annulled."  Wis. 
Stat. § 247.10 (1969). 
No. 
99-0341 
 
 
12
¶23 Although the divorce statutes have changed since Ray 
was decided, the policy concerns underlying Ray have not.  Ray 
emphasized the need for judicial approval of agreements that 
have not been made in contemplation of a continued marital 
relationship.  Id. at 82.  This need for judicial approval of 
such agreements continues as embodied in § 767.10(1).  Moreover, 
the statutory recognition of agreements under § 767.255(3)(L) 
since Ray does not alter the court's interest and authority 
described in Ray.  Section 767.255(3)(L) agreements implicate 
different concerns and further different goals.  As we explained 
in Button v. Button, 131 Wis. 2d 84, 94, 388 N.W.2d 546 (1986), 
§ 767.255(3)(L) serves the function of bringing certainty into a 
marriage.  This certainty encourages marriage and "may be 
conducive to marital tranquility by protecting the financial 
expectations of the parties."  Id.   
¶24 Marital tranquility is not furthered by agreements 
entered into after divorce proceedings have commenced.  Once 
spouses have filed for divorce, they are no longer contemplating 
a continued martial relationship.  As such, additional judicial 
oversight is necessary to ensure that the needs of the parties 
are met.  Section 767.10(1) embodies these concerns in requiring 
court approval of agreements made by parties in an action for 
divorce.   
¶25 Having determined from our review of the statutory 
language, precedent, and public policy that § 767.10(1) governs 
the agreement at issue, we now turn to the circuit court's 
refusal to enforce the stipulation and incorporate it into the 
No. 
99-0341 
 
 
13
divorce judgment.  Such a discretionary determination will be 
upheld in the absence of an error in law or the failure of the 
court to base its decision upon facts in the record.  King v. 
King, 224 Wis. 2d 235, 248, 590 N.W.2d 480 (1999).  In the case 
at hand, the circuit court reached the correct result in 
declining to enforce the agreement.  The court's refusal to 
incorporate the stipulation into the judgment was warranted by 
the respondent's repudiation of his consent to the stipulation. 
 We may sustain a circuit court's decision even though our 
rationale for doing so may differ from that of the circuit court 
where controlling legal authority and the record support the 
decision.  Schauer v. DeNeveu Homeowners Ass'n, 194 Wis. 2d 62, 
71, 533 N.W.2d 470 (1995).  
¶26 As previously explained, a stipulation is no more than 
an understanding of what the parties desire and recommend to the 
court.  Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d at 638; see also Miner v. Miner, 10 
Wis. 2d 438, 444, 103 N.W.2d 4 (1960) ("A stipulation . . . does 
not rise to the dignity of a contract.").  A party is free to 
withdraw from this recommendation until it is incorporated into 
the divorce judgment.  Evenson, 228 Wis. 2d at 686; Norman v. 
Norman, 117 Wis. 2d 80, 82, 342 N.W.2d 780 (Ct. App. 1983).  The 
repudiation of consent to a stipulation by a party may render 
the stipulation non-existent.  Thereafter a court's refusal to 
incorporate it into the judgment cannot be said to be an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.  Norman, 117 Wis. 2d at 82. 
¶27 In the case at hand, the respondent continuously 
disavowed the stipulation at issue.  From the first instance 
No. 
99-0341 
 
 
14
that the petitioner sought enforcement of the stipulation, the 
respondent challenged the agreement, contesting its validity.  
Because this constitutes a repudiation of the respondent's 
consent, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in refusing to incorporate the stipulation into its 
judgment.   
¶28 In sum, we conclude that because the agreement between 
the petitioner and respondent was entered into after divorce 
proceedings commenced, it is a stipulation under Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.10(1).  We thus uphold the circuit court's refusal to 
incorporate the stipulation into its judgment, because the 
respondent repudiated his consent.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
99-0341 
 
 
1