Case Title: Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Nienaber

Citation: 1997-Ohio-314

Docket Number: 19970874

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION v. NIENABER. 
[Cite as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Nienaber (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 534.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension — Making affirmative 
representations to courts which were untrue and by silence allowing 
courts to make unwarranted inferences — Suspended for six months 
previously. 
(No. 97-874 — Submitted July 7, 1997 — Decided December 31,1997.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 96-49. 
 
On June 17, 1996, relator, Cincinnati Bar Association, filed a complaint 
charging that respondent, Joseph W. Nienaber of Cincinnati, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0032085, in representing a criminal defendant in the Hamilton 
County Municipal Court, violated DR 7-102(A)(5) (knowingly making a false 
statement of law or fact in the representation of a client), (7) (counseling or 
assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent), and 
1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation) and (5) (engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice).  Respondent filed an answer, and a panel of the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”) 
heard the matter on December 12, 1996. 
 
In January 1995 and again in September 1995, Carolyn S. Joyce was cited 
for driving under the influence.  In both cases respondent represented Joyce in the 
Hamilton County Municipal Court.  Because a witness failed to appear, the case 
on the January citation was dismissed and was later refiled.  According to 
respondent, the trial on the refiled case began on November 8, 1995 before Judge 
Timothy S. Black and was continued for appearance of a witness. 
 
2
 
Both the case on the September citation and the continued case on the 
January citation were then heard on the same day, December 20, 1995, before two 
different judges in the Hamilton County Municipal Court.  A hearing before Judge 
Dennis S. Helmick began on the September offense, and Joyce entered a plea of no 
contest.  Prior to sentencing, respondent said to Judge Helmick, “It’s obvious my 
client has a drinking problem and she recognizes that.  She hasn’t had any trouble 
since ’88.”  When Judge Helmick, referring to the January 1995 citation, asked, 
“Why was the ’95 DUI charge dismissed?” respondent replied, “WP [want of 
prosecution], I believe, Judge * * *.  The officer didn’t show up and the civilian 
witness didn’t show up, Judge.”  Respondent did not disclose to the court that the 
case based on the January 1995 citation, previously dismissed, had been refiled, 
and that trial on the January offense had already begun.  Judge Helmick sentenced 
Joyce on the September 1995 citation as a first offender to the minimum 
mandatory sentence, three days in jail and participation in the driver intervention 
program in Cincinnati. 
 
The respondent and Joyce then proceeded to Judge Black’s courtroom for 
the continued trial on the January citation.  After a prosecution witness testified, 
Joyce entered a plea of no contest.  When Judge Black asked, “This is charged as a 
first offense?” respondent replied, “Yes, it is a first offense.  She’s had three DUIs 
back in 1980.  She got this one in January of ’95, and then it was dismissed for 
want of prosecution, and then it was refiled.”  The court then asked, “First in 
five[?]” inquiring whether the case before him was Joyce’s first DUI charge within 
the last five years.  Respondent replied, “First within five.”  Respondent did not 
tell the court that Joyce had been convicted earlier that morning for the September 
offense.  Judge Black found Joyce guilty on the January 1995 offense and 
 
3
sentenced her to the minimum sentence for a first offender, three days in jail and 
probation in the driver intervention program. 
 
At a subsequent hearing on January 3, 1996, Judge Helmick, after having 
been contacted by the probation department about the anomaly of two first 
offender sentences, resentenced Joyce on the charge before him as a second 
offender. 
 
On the basis of these facts the panel concluded that respondent knowingly 
made false statements to each judge in violation of DR 7-102(A)(5), and that with 
respect to all of his conduct on December 20, 1995, respondent violated DR 1-
102(A)(4) and (5).  The panel did not find a violation of DR 7-102(A)(7).  After 
accepting the panel’s findings and conclusions, the board recommended that 
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years. 
__________________ 
 
Thomas M. Tepe, Carolyn A. Taggart and Gates T. Richards, for relator. 
 
John H. Burlew, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  In Disciplinary Counsel v. Greene (1995), 74 Ohio St. 3d 13, 
16, 655 N.E.2d 1299, 1301, we said, “It is true that the vigorous and effective 
representation of a client is the responsibility of all attorneys.  This duty, however, 
does not exist in isolation from the other obligations imposed upon an attorney 
through our Disciplinary Rules.  In addition to the commitment to a client, a 
lawyer’s responsibilities include a devotion to the public good and to the 
maintenance and improvement of the administration of justice.  * * * [T]he 
attorney’s duty, as an officer of the court, is to uphold the legal process and 
demonstrate respect for the legal system by at all times being truthful with a court 
and refraining from knowingly making statements of fact or law that are not true.” 
 
4
 
Here, in each case, respondent not only made affirmative representations to 
the courts which were untrue, but by his silence he allowed each court to make 
unwarranted inferences.  In the case before Judge Helmick, knowing that a 
continued case on a previously charged DUI would commence within a few 
minutes, respondent affirmatively stated that his client had not been in trouble 
since 1988.  Also before Judge Helmick, respondent, by his silence, led the court 
to believe that the January DUI case had been dismissed and not refiled, when, in 
fact, trial was soon to continue on that January offense before Judge Black.  In the 
case before Judge Black, respondent was asked, “First in five[?]” meaning “Is this 
the first charge with no convictions during the previous five years?”  Knowing 
that Joyce had been convicted on a DUI charge only minutes earlier, respondent 
replied, “First within five,” thus affirmatively misleading the court.  Also, when 
asked whether “This is charged as a first offense?” respondent told the court, 
“Yes, this is a first offense.”  By his silence about the events that had just 
occurred, respondent misled the court. 
 
Respondent contends that he did not misrepresent the facts to either Judge 
Helmick or Judge Black.  He claims that in Judge Helmick’s courtroom he 
correctly answered that Joyce had not had a DUI conviction in the past five years.  
Because he was not specifically asked the question, respondent did not believe 
that he was required to tell the judge that the January citation had been refiled and 
that a trial on that charge was actually in progress.  Respondent claims that in 
Judge Black’s courtroom, he was not asked about convictions within the preceding 
five years; rather, the judge asked whether the case was “charged as a first 
offense,” and respondent replied in the affirmative, because it was, in fact, 
“charged” as a first offense.  Moreover, having occurred before the September 
offense, the January offense was, in fact, the first offense in five years. 
 
5
 
Respondent also claims to have relied on advice he received at an American 
Bar Association seminar on criminal law that there is no duty for an advocate to 
disclose his client’s record unless specifically asked. Respondent directs our 
attention to a discussion in ABA/BNA Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Conduct 
901:102 et seq., wherein various provisions of ABA Comm. on Professional 
Ethics and Grievances (1953), Formal Op. 287, are discussed.  Most pertinent is 
the lawyer’s duty prior to sentencing when the “judge asks the defendant’s lawyer 
whether his client has a criminal record.”  The ABA’s discussion states that 
“Formal Opinion 287 concluded that * * * the lawyer is [not] permitted to disclose 
to the court the information he has concerning the client’s actual criminal record.” 
 
We reject both defenses raised by respondent.  First, DR 7-102(A)(5) 
specifically prohibits a lawyer from making a false statement of law or fact.  In 
Judge Helmick’s court respondent made affirmatively false statements.  Moreover, 
by his silence, respondent led both judges to a false appreciation of the situation. 
 
Second, Formal Op. 287, relied upon by respondent, applies only to 
confidential information obtained from the client.  As to the language in the 
Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Conduct cited by respondent, the opinion states, 
“If the fact of the client’s criminal record was learned by the lawyer without 
communication, confidential or otherwise, from his client, or on his behalf, Canon 
37 would not be applicable.”  (Emphasis added.)  Formal Op. 287 concludes, “The 
indignation of the court * * * on learning that the lawyer had deliberately 
permitted him, where no privileged communication is involved, to rely on what 
the lawyer knew to be a misapprehension of the true facts, would be something 
that the lawyer could not appease on the basis of loyalty to the client.  No client 
may demand or expect of his lawyer, in the furtherance of his cause, disloyalty to 
the law whose minister he is (Canon 32), or ‘any manner of fraud or chicane’ 
 
6
(Canon 15.)”  In this instance respondent’s knowledge of the pending cases did 
not depend upon confidential communications from his client, and Formal Op. 287 
does not apply. 
 
We require complete candor with courts.  We agree with the Supreme Court 
of Nebraska, which sixty years ago said, “An attorney owes his first duty to the 
court.  He assumed his obligations toward it before he ever had a client.  His oath 
requires him to be absolutely honest even though his client’s interests may seem to 
require a contrary course.  The [lawyer] cannot serve two masters; and the one [he 
has] undertaken to serve primarily is the court.”  In re Integration of Nebraska 
State Bar Assn. (1937), 133 Neb. 283, 289, 275 N.W. 265, 268. 
 
We are particularly concerned that the instant matter arose on the criminal 
docket of one of our municipal courts which handles an extremely heavy caseload.  
Judges, especially those who must process heavy caseloads, must be able to rely 
on the representations of the attorneys who appear before them. 
 
Section 6.12 of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline 
provides, “Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false 
statements or documents are being submitted to the court or that material 
information is improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial action, and 
causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an 
adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding.”  Respondent was 
previously suspended for six months in Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Nienaber (1994), 
68 Ohio St.3d 459, 628 N.E. 2d 1340.  On these charges respondent is hereby 
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Ohio.  Costs taxed to 
respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
7
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.