Case Title: Harr v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 368, 2007

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TIMOTHY B. HARR, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 368, 2007 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 82003606DI 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 13, 2007 
 
                
 
Decided:    October 12, 2007 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 12th day of October 2007, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Timothy B. Harr, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s July 6, 2007 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
 
2
 
(2) 
In January 1983, Harr pleaded guilty to two counts of Rape in 
the First Degree.  He was sentenced to Level V incarceration for life on each 
count.  Immediately following sentencing, Harr was returned to North 
Carolina, where he was serving a criminal sentence.  Harr did not file a 
direct appeal from the Superior Court’s convictions and sentences. 
 
(3) 
In June 2007, approximately 24 years after his conviction 
became final, Harr filed the instant motion for postconviction relief.1  Under 
Rule 61(i) (1), Harr had three years after his conviction was final to file a 
motion for postconviction relief.2  Harr, however, alleges that the time bar 
should not apply to his claim because of a “miscarriage of justice” under 
Rule 61(i) (5).3  Specifically, Harr claims that his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to inform him that his sentences on the rape 
convictions would run consecutive to, and not concurrent with, his North 
Carolina sentence.   
 
(4) 
  In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in connection with a guilty plea, a defendant must demonstrate that, 
but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, he would not have pleaded 
                                                 
1 Harr’s conviction became final in February 1983. 
2 Harr’s conviction became final prior to July 1, 2005, the date when the Rule was 
changed to reduce the statute of limitations from three years to one year.  
3 The Rule provides that the time bar “shall not apply to a claim that the court lacked 
jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a 
constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or 
fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.”  
 
3
guilty, but would have insisted on proceeding to trial.4  The defendant must 
make concrete allegations of actual prejudice, and substantiate them, or risk 
summary dismissal.5 
 
(5) 
As noted in the Superior Court’s order, the transcript of Harr’s 
guilty plea is not available, since the court reporter’s notes from 1983 are not 
available and the retention period for such notes is 20 years.  Harr’s 
sentencing order states that, on the first count of rape, he is to “[b]e 
imprisoned for life beginning at the expiration of sentence now serving in 
North Carolina.”  On the second count of rape, he is to “[b]e imprisoned for 
life beginning at the expiration of sentence imposed [on the first rape 
count].” 
 
(6) 
Harr’s sentencing order clearly provides that his Delaware 
sentences are consecutive to his North Carolina sentence and that the 
sentence on the second rape count is consecutive to the sentence on the first 
rape count.  As such, Harr should have been aware that the sentences were 
consecutive, not concurrent.  If Harr believed that there was some 
irregularity with respect to his sentences, he had the opportunity to file an 
appeal or a motion challenging his sentences.  He did not do so.  Under these 
circumstances, we conclude that Harr has failed to demonstrate either that 
                                                 
4 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
5 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
 
4
his counsel was ineffective or that there has been a miscarriage of justice 
with respect to his sentences.  His claim is, therefore, time-barred.6 
 
(7) 
It is manifest on the face of Harr’s opening brief that his appeal 
is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Justice  
 
 
                                                 
6 Harr’s claim that his sentences should be reviewed because of the ambiguity of 
Delaware law regarding life sentences was not presented to the Superior Court in the first 
instance and we, therefore, decline to consider it in this appeal.  Supr. Ct. R. 8.