Case Title: Treacy v. Lamberti

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC12-647

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2013-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-647 
____________ 
 
WAYNE TREACY,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
AL LAMBERTI, AS SHERIFF OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[October 10, 2013] 
 
PERRY, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Treacy v. Lamberti, 80 So. 3d 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), 
holding that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48 (2010), does not impact a juvenile defendant’s entitlement to bond because 
the Florida Constitution “focuses on the classification of the offense to determine 
entitlement to pretrial release, and not the potential severity of punishment.”  
Treacy, 80 So. 3d at 1054.  Because the district court expressly construed a 
provision of the Florida Constitution, this Court has jurisdiction to review the 
decision.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  Because we find that juvenile offenders 
 
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cannot be charged with a crime punishable by life imprisonment under Florida’s 
current statutory scheme and Graham, we hold that such defendants are entitled to 
bond under the provisions of article I, section 14, of the Florida Constitution and 
we quash the decision entered below.   
OVERVIEW 
 
Treacy is a juvenile charged as an adult with attempted first-degree murder 
with a deadly weapon.  Treacy moved to have a bond set, which was denied.1
                                         
 
1.  Treacy has subsequently been convicted of the offense for which he was 
charged and sentenced to a term not to exceed 20 years, followed by 10 years’ 
probation.  We maintain jurisdiction in this case because “[i]t is well settled that 
mootness does not destroy an appellate court’s jurisdiction . . . when the questions 
raised are of great public importance or are likely to recur.”  Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 
2d 217, 218 n.1 (Fla. 1984). 
  
Treacy argues that article I, section 14, of the Florida Constitution provides for 
pretrial release as a matter of right for a noncapital offense or an offense that does 
not carry the possibility of a life sentence.  He further argues that because Florida 
does not currently provide an opportunity for parole and Graham prohibits the 
State from sentencing him to life without such a possibility, he is entitled to bond 
under the provisions of the Florida Constitution.  The Fourth District Court 
disagreed, finding that because the Florida Constitution only considers the 
classification of the offense, not a defendant’s eventual sentence, Treacy was not 
entitled to bond as a matter of right.  Furthermore, the Fourth District reasoned that 
 
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the Legislature could provide an opportunity for parole at some point in the future, 
which would satisfy the requirements of Graham.  The issue before us is whether 
the prohibition in Graham provides that juveniles such as Treacy are entitled to 
bond as a matter of right.  This issue is a matter of first impression for this Court.  
First, we reject the State’s assertion that Treacy may be sentenced to life 
imprisonment based on prospective legislation creating an opportunity for parole.  
The security of Constitutional rights, especially those involving individual liberty, 
is not a matter of legislative grace.  Second, we adopt a strict construction of the 
plain language of the Florida Constitution and determine that because Treacy 
cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment, he cannot be charged with “an offense 
punishable by life imprisonment” under current Florida law.  Accordingly, we 
quash the decision of the Fourth District. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
 
On March 17, 2010, Treacy was arrested by the Broward County Sheriff’s 
Office for attempted premeditated murder in the first degree.2
                                         
 
2.  See §§ 782.04(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009) (“[t]he unlawful killing of a human 
being [w]hen perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of the 
person . . . is murder in the first degree and constitutes a capital felony”); 
777.04(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009) (“ [i]f the offense attempted . . . is a capital felony, 
the offense . . . is a felony of the first degree”); 775.087(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009) 
(“whenever a person is charged with a felony . . . and during the commission of 
such felony . . . carries, displays, uses, threatens to use, or attempts to use any 
weapon or firearm . . . the felony for which the person is charged shall be 
reclassified  . . . [i]n the case of a felony of the first degree, to a life felony.”).   
  Treacy was 15 years 
 
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old at the time of his arrest.  Treacy was taken into custody by the Department of 
Juvenile Justice and held until April 16, 2010, when the State filed an information 
against him charging him as an adult.  Treacy was then transferred to the custody 
of the Broward County Jail.   
 
On May 17, 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in 
Graham.  Thereafter, on June 24, 2010, Treacy filed a Motion to Set Bond, which 
the trial court denied.  In its order denying Treacy’s motion, the trial court agreed 
with the State’s assertion that Treacy was not entitled to bond as a matter of law.  
Specifically, the court found that Treacy was charged with an offense that “is 
clearly an ‘offense punishable by life imprisonment.’ ”  See Treacy, 80 So. 3d at 
1054.  The court then found that Graham “does not change the statute with respect 
to [Treacy’s] right to bond in the present case.”  Id.  Further, the court found that 
its reasoning was consistent with the Legislature’s intent in providing pretrial 
detention, citing section 907.041(1), Florida Statutes (2009): “Based upon the 
seriousness of the charge in the present case, the [c]ourt’s finding . . . is also 
consistent with the legislative intent that persons committing serious criminal 
offenses be pretrial detained.”  The court then declined to exercise its discretion to 
nevertheless grant Treacy a bond.  
 
Treacy filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on July 16, 2010.  The 
Fourth District Court of Appeal denied the petition without issuing an opinion.  
 
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Subsequently, the Fourth District granted another juvenile’s petition for writ of 
habeas corpus under identical circumstances in McCray v. Lamberti, No. 4D11-
3884 (Fla. 4th DCA Nov. 8, 2011).  Treacy filed another motion with the trial 
court, which was again denied without any alteration to its previous decision.   
 
On December 16, 2011, Treacy filed a second Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus.  The Fourth District issued an opinion denying the petition, and noted the 
inconsistent application it had created with its decision in McCray.  Treacy, 80 So. 
3d at 1055-56 (Polen, J., concurring specially).  In its opinion, the Fourth District 
considered whether, because Graham held that the United States Constitution 
prohibits sentencing juvenile defendants who have not committed a homicide to 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, article I, section 14, of the 
Florida Constitution entitles juvenile defendants charged with non-homicide 
crimes to bond as a matter of right.  First, the Fourth District stated that “[t]he 
Florida [L]egislature has not enacted a parole system that would satisfy Graham by 
allowing juvenile defendants sentenced to life in prison a chance to be released.”  
Treacy, 80 So. 3d at 1054.  “Therefore,” the court reasoned, “life sentences for 
such juveniles are now subject to reversal based on Graham.”  Id. (citing 
Cunningham v. State, 74 So. 3d 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Garland v. State, 70 So. 
3d 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 574 (2011).  Next, the Fourth 
District determined that Graham does not impact the entitlement to bond because 
 
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the Florida Constitution “focuses on the classification of the offense to determine 
entitlement to pretrial release, and not the potential severity of punishment.”  
Treacy, 80 So. 3d at 1054.  Adopting the reasoning of the trial court in its order 
denying Treacy’s motion to set bond, the Fourth District held that because 
attempted murder is an offense that is punishable by life imprisonment, Treacy’s 
actual eligibility for such punishment does not change his right to bond.  Id.  The 
court noted that its classification approach was supported by this Court’s decisions 
in Batie v. State, 534 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1988) (holding that despite sexual battery’s 
classification as a non-capital crime, the Legislature’s definition of the crime as 
“capital” was sufficient to deny postconviction bond) and State v. Hogan, 451 So. 
2d 844 (Fla. 1984) (holding that although a death sentence may not be imposed for 
a sexual battery, it is a capital offense for purposes of determining the maximum 
allowable sentence but is not a capital offense for purposes of determining whether 
a twelve-person jury is required).  Last, the Fourth District noted that “were the 
[L]egislature to enact a parole system for juveniles who have been sentenced to life 
for non-homicide offenses, this issue would not even arise.”  Treacy, 80 So. 3d at 
1055. 
 
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DISCUSSION 
 
We are presented with a matter of constitutional construction.  Accordingly, 
our review is de novo.  See Zingale v. Powell, 885 So. 2d 277, 280 (Fla. 2004).  
Furthermore, as we have stated, “when constitutional language is precise, its exact 
letter must be enforced . . . .”  Fla. League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397, 400 
(Fla. 1992).  Both the arguments presented by Treacy and the State are based on 
what is arguably a reasonable reading of the plain language of article I, section 14, 
of the Florida Constitution.  However, their incongruent readings do not create an 
ambiguity where none exists.  “Ambiguity is an absolute prerequisite to judicial 
construction. . . .”  Id. at 400.  Accordingly, the plain language of the Florida 
Constitution prevails here.  Article I, section 14, provides: 
Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life 
imprisonment
(emphasis added).  The State concedes that Treacy cannot be punished by life 
imprisonment under Florida’s current statutory sentencing scheme because of the 
constitutional prohibition announced in Graham:  
 and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is 
great, every person charged with a crime or violation of municipal or 
county ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release on reasonable 
conditions.  If no conditions of release can reasonably protect the 
community from risk of physical harm to persons, assure the presence 
of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process, 
the accused may be detained. 
 
The [United States] Constitution prohibits the imposition of a 
life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not 
commit homicide.  A State need not guarantee the offender eventual 
 
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release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him or her 
with some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that 
term. 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 64.  Currently, the State of Florida does not provide any 
opportunity for parole, and any life sentence imposed is a sentence for a prisoner’s 
natural life.  See § 921.002(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2009) (“The sentence imposed by the 
sentencing judge reflects the length of actual time to be served, shortened only by 
the application of incentive and meritorious gain-time as provided by law, and may 
not be shortened if the defendant would consequently serve less than 85 percent of 
his or her term of imprisonment . . . . The provisions of chapter 947, relating to 
parole, shall not apply to persons sentenced under the Criminal Punishment 
Code.”).  Because Treacy, and juveniles like him, cannot receive a life sentence, 
we hold that the plain language of the Florida Constitution provides that they are 
“entitled to pretrial release on reasonable conditions [that] reasonably protect the 
community from risk of physical harm. . . .”  See, art. I, § 14, Fla. Const.  
 
The State asks us to construe the clause “offense punishable by life 
imprisonment” to encompass defendants who may not legally be sentenced to life 
imprisonment, arguing that it is the classification of the offense and not the 
available punishment that should control our interpretation.  Because we find this 
interpretation inconsistent with the language of the provision, we decline to apply 
the State’s reasoning. 
 
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First, we reject the assertion that Treacy’s offense is “punishable by life 
imprisonment.”  Because Florida does not currently provide any opportunity for 
juvenile parole, the trial court was correct that it “could not impose a life 
sentence.”  We do not agree with the trial court’s statement that the Legislature 
could provide a parole mechanism without revising the charging statute.  
Irrespective of the Legislature’s future intent to provide juveniles sentenced to life 
imprisonment with a reasonable opportunity for parole, the current statutory 
scheme makes no such provision.  A current violation of a constitutional right is 
not cured by the potential for future legislative goodwill.   
 
Secondly, having found that Treacy cannot be sentenced to life 
imprisonment, we hold that article I, section 14, of the Florida Constitution 
prevents the trial court from denying his bond as a matter of right.  While both the 
Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court and the Fourth District Court of Appeal have 
determined that the Florida Constitution, Article I, Section 14, requires a 
classification-based contemplation of a defendant’s right to bond and not a 
punishment-based one, we find this conflicts with the unambiguous language of 
the constitutional provision.  We therefore find that the Fourth District’s reliance 
on our decisions in Batie and Hogan is misplaced.   
  
Under the unambiguous language of article I, section 14, Treacy is not 
charged with an offense punishable by life imprisonment because he, himself, 
 
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cannot be sentenced to life.  We therefore hold that Treacy is correct that the 
unavailability of a life sentence in his case prohibits the classification of his 
offense as one “punishable by life imprisonment,” and quash the decision entered 
by the Fourth District below. 
 
It is so ordered.  
 
LEWIS, QUINCE, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, C.J., and CANADY, J., concur in result. 
PARIENTE, J., recused.  
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – 
Constitution Construction  
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D11-4645  
 
Jason T. Forman of Law Offices of Jason T. Forman, P.A. and Russell J. Williams 
of Law Offices of Russell J. Williams, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,  
 
for Petitioner  
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Celia Terenzio and 
Mitchell A. Egber, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, Florida,  
 
for Respondent