Case Title: Patterson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 489, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SANDRA PATTERSON, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 489, 2006 
 
Defendant Below   
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
§ 
ID # 0502000662 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  February 23, 2007 
   Decided:  April 26, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 26th day of April 2007, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1)  
Appellant Sandra Patterson appeals her Superior Court convictions of 
Conspiracy Second Degree and Delivery of a Non-narcotic Schedule IV Controlled 
Substance.  Patterson contends that the Superior Court erred when it denied her 
motion for judgment of acquittal on both charges and that the trial court abused its 
discretion by admitting certain evidence.  We find no merit to her appeal and 
affirm.    
 2
(2)  
In 2004, Patterson worked as a nurse in the Delaware Correctional 
Center infirmary.  During that time, Saad Soliman worked as an infirmary barber, 
which involved several trips to the infirmary every week.  Patterson and Soliman 
became friendly.  In April 2004, Soliman was reassigned to another job which 
effectively denied him access to the infirmary.  Bruce Duncan, who was housed in 
the same building as Soliman, worked as a supervisor for an environmental crew.  
As a supervisor, he was able to visit the infirmary at any time.  Soliman asked 
Duncan to retrieve from Patterson some Muslim oil1 and bring it to him.  In 
exchange for making three deliveries, Soliman promised that Patterson would pay 
Duncan two hundred dollars.  Duncan agreed. 
(3)  
On one occasion, Duncan successfully obtained the oil from Patterson 
and delivered it to Soliman.  On May 9, 2004, Duncan made his second attempt.  
On his return from the infirmary, he was stopped by a correctional officer.  The 
officer searched the bag he received from Patterson and found nine bottles of 
Muslim oil, fifty smaller vials, three scarves, a letter later determined to be from 
Patterson to Soliman, photographs of Soliman’s family and Patterson’s children, 
and Zyrtec and Ambien pills.    
                                          
 
1 Muslim oil is “scented oil like cologne.”  Soliman v. State, Del. Supr., No. 270, 2006, Ridgely, 
J. (January 10, 2007). 
 3
(4)  
Duncan later pled guilty to misdemeanor charges of promoting prison 
contraband and conspiracy.  Soliman was found guilty of Conspiracy Third 
Degree, which this Court affirmed on appeal.2   
(5)  
Patterson moved for judgment of acquittal on both charges.  The 
Superior Court denied the motion.  She now contends that there was insufficient 
evidence to support either charge.  We review to determine “whether, after viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, [including all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom,] any rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”3  With 
regard to the conspiracy, Patterson contends that because Duncan testified that he 
was unaware that he was transporting Schedule IV narcotics to Soliman, she 
cannot be found guilty of a conspiracy to deliver the drugs. 
(6)  
A conspiracy can be shown by either direct or circumstantial 
evidence.4  In most cases, it is proven by circumstantial evidence.5  While the State 
is required to show a “common design,” “[i]t is not necessary that there be a formal 
                                          
 
2 Id. 
3 Dixon v. State, 567 A.2d 854, 857 (Del. 1989) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 
(1979)). 
4 State v. Biter, 119 A.2d 894, 898 (Del. 1955) (citing State v. Cole, 114 A.2d 201, 204 (Del. 
1921)) (“A conspiracy may be shown either by direct evidence, that is, by the admissions and 
declarations of the parties or co-conspirators, or by circumstantial evidence; that is, by facts and 
circumstances from which the existence of the conspiracy may be inferred.”). 
5 Id. 
 4
agreement in advance of the crime.”6  “If a person understands the unlawful nature 
of the acts taking place, and nevertheless assists in any manner in the carrying out 
of the common scheme, that person becomes a conspirator to commit the offense.”7 
(7)  
Delaware follows the unilateral approach to conspiracy.8  As the 
Commentary explains: 
 
[A]ttention is focused on each individual’s culpability.  He has no 
defense 
which 
rests 
solely 
on 
another 
party’s 
incapacity, 
irresponsibility, or obedience to the law.  Thus if he solicits a person 
to commit an offense, his crime is complete at that point, and it is 
irrelevant to his own liability that the person solicited does not 
commit the offense or could not be found guilty of committing the 
offense because of some legal incapacity or irresponsibility, or 
because he did not know that the conduct solicited was criminal . . . .  
It seems illogical to exclude one man from criminal liability, when he 
has convincingly demonstrated his criminal intent, because of another 
man’s defense.9   
                                          
 
6 Bender v. State, 253 A.2d 686, 687 (Del. 1969).   
7 Murray v. State, 880 A.2d 1047 (Del. 2005) (TABLE) (citing Bender, 253 A.2d at 687). 
8 11 Del. C. § 523 provides: 
(a) It is no defense to a prosecution for criminal solicitation that the person 
solicited could not be guilty of the crime solicited because of irresponsibility or 
other legal incapacity or exemption, or because of unawareness of the criminal 
nature of the conduct solicited or of the defendant's criminal purpose or because 
of other factors precluding the mental state required for the commission of the 
crime in question. 
(b) It is no defense to a prosecution for criminal conspiracy that, because of 
irresponsibility or other legal incapacity or exemption, or because of unawareness 
of the criminal nature of the agreement or the conduct contemplated or of the 
defendant's criminal purpose or because of other factors precluding the mental 
state required for commission of the conspiracy or the crime contemplated, 1 or 
more of the defendant's coconspirators could not be guilty of the conspiracy or the 
crime contemplated. 
See also Saienni v. State, 346 A.2d 152, 154 (Del. 1975).  
9 See Delaware Criminal Code with Commentary, § 523 (1973). 
 5
(8)  
Here, Patterson, Duncan and Soliman agreed to a “common design,” 
namely, to transport prison contraband from Patterson to Soliman.  It is not 
necessary that Duncan be specifically aware of all the contents of the bag to 
establish a conspiratorial agreement.  Duncan’s claim of ignorance is no defense 
for Patterson.  Moreover, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which 
the jury could have found that Duncan did, in fact, know the contents of the bag.  
The pills were in envelopes marked “Ambien” and a letter in the bag warned 
Soliman not to take too many pills.  Duncan testified that he “knew that he was 
delivering a letter, Muslim oil, and plastic vials . . . .”  Thus, Duncan could have 
discovered the contents simply by opening the bag.  Further, the jury could have 
concluded that Duncan denied knowledge of the pills to avoid a felony 
conviction.10   
(9)  
Patterson next contends that the trial judge erred when it denied her 
motion for judgment of acquittal with regard to the delivery of a non-narcotic 
Schedule IV controlled substance charge because there was no testimony that 
Ambien is a “non-narcotic” drug.   
(10)  Patterson’s argument mischaracterizes the statutory scheme.  16 Del. 
C. § 4751(b) criminalizes the manufacture, delivery or possession of “controlled 
                                          
 
10 Duncan testified that he believed that he would be subject to greater penalty for transporting 
the pills than the remainder of the contents of the bag. 
 6
substance or a counterfeit controlled substance classified in Schedule III, IV or V 
which is a narcotic drug.”11  16 Del. C. § 4752, the statute under which Patterson 
was convicted, criminalizes the manufacture, delivery or possession of a 
“controlled substance or a counterfeit controlled substance classified in Schedule I, 
II, III, IV or V which is not a narcotic drug.”12  A “narcotic drug” is defined in 16 
Del. C. § 4701(24), but there is no definition for a “non-narcotic” drug.13  Section 
4751 involves a greater penalty because it requires an additional element of proof, 
that is, that a “narcotic” drug is involved.     
(11)  The State was not required to prove that Ambien is a “non-narcotic” 
drug.  Instead, the State was only required to prove that Ambien was a Schedule IV 
controlled substance.  Bipin Mody, a forensic chemist from the Office of the 
Medical Examiner, testified that Ambien is the brand name for Zolpidem.  Further, 
                                          
 
11 16 Del. C. § 4715(b). 
12 11 Del. C. § 4752(a) (emphasis added).   
13 A narcotic drug is defined as follows: 
"Narcotic drug" means any of the following, whether produced directly or 
indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or independently by 
means of chemical synthesis: 
a. Opium opiates, derivatives of opium and opiates, including their isomers, 
esters, ethers, salts and salts of isomers, esters and ethers, whenever the existence 
of such isomers, esters, ethers and salts is possible within the specific chemical 
designation. Such term does not include isoquinoline alkaloids of opium. 
b. Poppy straw and concentrate of poppy straw. 
c. Coca leaves, except coca leaves and extracts of coca leaves from which 
cocaine, ecgonine and derivatives of ecgonine or their salts have been removed. 
d. Cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of isomers. 
e. Ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts and salts of isomers. 
f. Any compound, mixture or preparation which contains any quantity of any of 
the substances referred to in paragraphs a. through e. of this subdivision. 
 7
Mody testified that “Zolpidem is a controlled drug. No. 4.”  Zopidem is listed in 16 
Del. C. § 4720(b)(27) as a Schedule IV controlled substance.  Mody’s reference to 
“No. 4” is sufficient evidence from which a jury could have found Patterson guilty 
of Section 4752(a).  
(12)  Finally, Patterson contends that the trial court abused its discretion by 
admitting a letter written by Patterson into evidence because the State failed to 
show the letter’s chain of custody.  We review for abuse of discretion.14  
(13)  Under D.R.E 901(a), “a party offering an item into evidence bears the 
burden of proving that the item in question is what the proponent claims it to be.”  
The authentication requirement is a “lenient burden.”15  “The requirement of 
authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied 
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its 
proponent claims.”16  The State can authenticate evidence in one of two ways.  “It 
may have witnesses visually identify the [evidence] as the actual instrumentality of 
the crime, or it may establish a ‘chain of custody,’ which indirectly establishes the 
identity and integrity of the evidence by tracing its continuous whereabouts.”17 
                                          
 
14 Hendricks v. State, 871 A.2d 1118, 1121-22 (Del. 2005). 
15 Guy v. State, 913 A.2d 558, 564 (Del. 2006). 
16 Id. 
17 Whitfield v. State, 524 A.2d 13, 16 (Del. 1987). 
 8
(14)  Among the contents of the bag that Duncan was caught transporting 
from the infirmary was a letter written by Patterson instructing Soliman not to take 
too many Ambien pills.  Officer Lovett stopped and searched Duncan on his way 
from the infirmary to see Soliman.  Lovett testified there were three plastic bags 
inside Duncan’s larger bag.  He also testified that he recognized the oil, rubber 
gloves, vials, scarves, and the pills.  Lovett gave the bag to Captain Joseph 
Belanger.  Belanger testified that he visually inspected the bag and then placed it 
into the evidence locker.  Neither officer opened the bags nor did they recognize 
the letter at trial.  Inspector Joseph Richardson later removed the items from the 
locker and photographed the evidence, including the letter.  Although Richardson 
could not remember exactly which bag the letter was located, he testified that the 
items “were all . . . packaged together in a bag when I got them.”  He could not 
remember exactly what bag each item came out of.  The State presented the 
testimony of Georgia Carter, a handwriting expert.  Carter testified that the 
handwriting of the letter was consistent with Patterson’s handwriting.  There is 
nothing in the record to suggest that anyone else had access to the bag.  The fact 
that Lovett did not recognize the letter does not destroy the chain of custody.  The 
evidence was sufficient to show that the letter was in the bag that Duncan received 
from Patterson.   
 9
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice