Case Title: Mueller v. TL90108, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017AP001962

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2020-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
2020 WI 7 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP1962 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Richard A. Mueller, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Joseph L. Ford, III, 
          Plaintiff-Co-Appellant, 
     v. 
TL90108, LLC, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 383 Wis. 2d 740,917 N.W.2d 551 
PDC No:2018 WI App 52 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 4, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 4, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Rebecca F. Dallet   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, and KELLY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
DALLET, J.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Stephen E. Kravit, Brian T. Fahl, and Kravit, Hovel & 
Krawczyk S.C., Milwaukee; joined by Lawrence H. Heftman, Robert 
Middleton, and Schiff Hardin LLP, Chicago, Illinois. There was an 
oral argument by Lawrence H. Heftman. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Matthew V. Fisher, Brian C. Tokarz, and Meissner Tierney Fisher & 
 
 
2 
Nischols S.C., Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Matthew V. 
Fisher. 
 
For the plaintiff-co-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Joseph L. Ford, Boca Raton, Florida. There was an oral argument by 
Joseph L. Ford. 
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 7
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP1962 
(L.C. No. 
2017CV867) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Richard A. Mueller, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
Joseph L. Ford, III, 
 
          Plaintiff-Co-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
TL90108, LLC, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 4, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, and KELLY, JJ., joined.  
 
DALLET, J., did not participate.  
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Modified, and 
as modified, affirmed and cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   A late 1930s Talbot Lago is 
considered by some one of the most beautiful and innovative cars 
No. 
2017AP1962 
 
2 
 
in the world.  This collector's gem sang such a siren song that it 
became the subject of an international smuggling effort at the 
heart of today's case.  The Talbot Lago here——a 1938 model——
mysteriously disappeared from a Milwaukee business in 2001.  It 
reappeared in 2015 after being purchased in Europe by TL90108, LLC 
(TL).  When TL tried to obtain title in Illinois, it triggered a 
hit on a stolen vehicle report. 
¶2 
After hearing that the prized vehicle had turned up, 
Plaintiffs Richard Mueller and Joseph Ford III demanded its return 
from TL, claiming to be the rightful owners.  When TL did not 
oblige, Mueller and Ford brought an action for replevin1 seeking 
possession of the vehicle and damages.  The circuit court, however, 
granted TL's motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that 
the claim was barred by the applicable six-year statutes of repose.  
Wis. Stat. §§ 893.35, 893.51(1) (2017-18).2  The court of appeals 
reversed, holding that when Mueller and Ford demanded TL return 
the vehicle, this triggered a wrongful detention claim and 
restarted the six-year repose clock. 
¶3 
The core issue we address today is whether the six-year 
statutes of repose bar Mueller and Ford's action for replevin.  
More specifically, we address whether a wrongful detention claim 
may exist for previously converted property, and if so, when a 
replevin cause of action based on a subsequent wrongful detention 
                                                 
1 An additional claim was raised that we are not addressing, 
as explained further below. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version. 
No. 
2017AP1962 
 
3 
 
accrues.  We conclude that under the plain language of the statutes 
of repose and our cases, the true owner can maintain a replevin 
action for wrongful detention against a subsequent purchaser of 
converted property.  We hold that under Wis. Stat. §§ 893.35 and 
893.51(1), a cause of action for replevin based on wrongful 
detention under facts like those alleged here accrues when the 
subsequent purchaser obtains the property; no demand is necessary. 
¶4 
Thus, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, the replevin 
action based on TL's alleged wrongful detention of the vehicle 
accrued when TL obtained (and thereby wrongfully detained) the 
vehicle.  TL purchased the prized vehicle sometime in 2015.  Hence, 
Mueller and Ford's cause of action for replevin is not barred by 
the relevant statutes of repose. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
On the morning of March 4, 2001, Roy Leiske arrived at 
his place of business and found the front door curiously unlocked.3  
When he entered, he discovered that his mid-restoration 1938 Talbot 
Lago, then worth an estimated one million dollars, was gone.  
Leiske reported this to the Milwaukee Police Department, which 
entered a stolen vehicle report into a national database. 
                                                 
3 The facts in this section are taken from the complaint.  
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, "all facts alleged in the 
complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences from those facts, 
are accepted as true."  Kaloti Enter., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 
2005 WI 111, ¶11, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205 (citing Ollerman 
v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 24, 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980)). 
No. 
2017AP1962 
 
4 
 
¶6 
In 2005, Leiske died and bequeathed the vehicle to 
Mueller.  Mueller later sold a percentage of ownership in the 
missing vehicle to Ford.  Both attempted——without success——to 
locate the vehicle. 
¶7 
At around the same time, in either 2005 or 2006, the 
vehicle was transported from the United States to Europe.  In 2015, 
TL purchased the vehicle through an international automobile 
broker.  TL then arranged for the vehicle to be transported to the 
United States, and applied for title in Illinois in 2016.  The 
application, however, triggered a hit on the 2001 stolen vehicle 
report.  The Milwaukee Police Department confirmed to Illinois 
officials the vehicle had been reported stolen, and Illinois did 
not issue title to TL. 
¶8 
Upon learning of the vehicle's reappearance, Mueller and 
Ford sent TL a demand to return the vehicle.  When TL refused the 
demand, Mueller and Ford filed a two-count complaint, bringing 
both a replevin action to obtain possession of the vehicle and 
recover damages, and a declaratory judgment as to their ownership 
and possession of the vehicle.  TL moved to dismiss Mueller and 
Ford's claims, arguing they were timed-barred by the applicable 
statutes of repose, Wis. Stat. §§ 893.35 and 893.51(1). 
¶9 
After entertaining multiple briefs and hearings, the 
circuit court granted TL's motion to dismiss on the grounds that 
the replevin cause of action accrued in 2001 when the vehicle was 
stolen; the clock did not restart when the property changed hands; 
and therefore, the replevin action was barred by the six-year 
statutes of repose in Wis. Stat. §§ 893.35 and 893.51(1).  It also 
No. 
2017AP1962 
 
5 
 
dismissed the declaratory judgment action, reasoning that a cause 
of action for ownership cannot exist apart from replevin.4 
¶10 The court of appeals reversed.  It concluded that the 
statutes of repose recognize separate claims for conversion and 
wrongful detention.  The court of appeals reasoned that while a 
conversion claim accrued in 2001 when the vehicle was allegedly 
stolen, a separate wrongful detention claim accrued when TL refused 
Mueller and Ford's demand to return the vehicle.  Mueller v. 
TL90108, 
LLC, 
2018 
WI App 52, 
¶29, 
383 
Wis. 2d 740, 
917 
N.W.2d 551.  The court of appeals also remanded the cause for a 
ruling on Mueller and Ford's declaratory judgment action, stating 
that an action for a declaration of ownership differs from a 
replevin action for possession.  Id., ¶30 & n.5.  We granted TL's 
petition for review. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶11 The issue before us is whether the replevin action is 
barred by the six-year statutes of repose provided in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 893.35 and 893.51(1).5  As this presents a question of law 
                                                 
4 The circuit court provided Mueller and Ford time to amend 
their complaint; however, no amended complaint was filed.  The 
court entered a final order dismissing the complaint with 
prejudice. 
5 Because we affirm the court of appeals' determination that 
Mueller and Ford's replevin action is not barred by the statutes 
of repose, we need not address Mueller's alternative argument that 
"the doctrine of equitable estoppel by fraudulent concealment 
prevents TL from asserting a repose defense." 
No. 
2017AP1962 
 
6 
 
arising from a motion to dismiss based on a question of statutory 
interpretation, our review is de novo.  Doe 56 v. Mayo Clinic 
Health Sys.——Eau Claire Clinic, Inc., 2016 WI 48, ¶14, 369 
Wis. 2d 351, 880 N.W.2d 681 (motion to dismiss reviewed de novo); 
State v. Pinder, 2018 WI 106, ¶23, 384 Wis. 2d 416, 919 N.W.2d 568 
(statutory interpretation reviewed de novo). 
 
A.  Replevin and Repose 
¶12 Replevin is an action for possession where the factual 
question that must be resolved is "which party is entitled to 
possession of the disputed property."  Ford Motor Co. v. Lyons, 
137 Wis. 2d 397, 468, 405 N.W.2d 354 (Ct. App. 1987).  To succeed 
on a replevin claim, the court or jury must find:   
(a) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to possession of 
the property involved. 
                                                 
Ford separately argued that "wrongful taking" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.35 does not include theft; that a plaintiff must know who 
took the property before the repose period provided in § 893.35 
goes into effect; and that § 893.35, if it includes theft, must 
toll the limitation period as it is tolled in criminal theft 
proceedings.  While we need not and therefore do not address Ford's 
first and third arguments, we reject Ford's second argument as 
explained below. 
Additionally, TL asks us to affirm the dismissal of the 
declaratory judgment action, in which Mueller and Ford seek a 
declaration that they "are the full and absolute owners of the 
Vehicle and entitled to its possession."  TL's arguments in support 
of dismissing this claim rely principally on the premise that the 
statutes of repose bar Mueller and Ford's replevin action——a 
conclusion we reject, as explained below——and that a declaratory 
judgment cannot provide an additional pathway to relief.  At this 
stage, breathing new life into Mueller and Ford's replevin action, 
we remand the claim for declaratory relief as well and express no 
opinion on its viability apart from replevin. 
No. 
2017AP1962 
 
7 
 
(b) Whether the defendant unlawfully took or detained 
the property involved. 
(c) The value of the property involved. 
(d) The damages sustained by the successful party from 
any unlawful taking or unjust detention of the property 
to the time of the trial. 
Wis. Stat. § 810.13(1).  This statutory provision tracks the 
requirements for replevin at common law.  See Eldred v. Oconto 
Co., 33 Wis. 133, 136 (1873) ("The verdict is as follows:  'The 
jury severally on their oaths do say, that they find for the 
plaintiff, that he is the owner and lawfully entitled to the 
possession of the property described in the complaint, that the 
value thereof is $3,195.20, and that the plaintiff's damages for 
the unlawful detention thereof is $301.31.'").  A party bringing 
an action for replevin, then, may recover not only possession of 
personal property, but also damages for its detention. 
¶13 To that effect, the legislature has enacted two statutes 
of repose——one regarding recovering possession of the property and 
one with respect to damages.  See Wis. Stat. § 893.35 ("action to 
recover personal property"); Wis. Stat. § 893.51(1) ("action to 
recover damages").  Mueller and Ford's complaint seeks both 
possession of the vehicle and damages for its wrongful detention, 
therefore we examine both §§ 893.35 and 893.51(1).6 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.35 provides:   
An action to recover personal property shall be 
commenced within 6 years after the cause of action 
accrues or be barred.  The cause of action accrues at 
the time the wrongful taking or conversion occurs, or 
the wrongful detention begins.  An action for damage for 
wrongful taking, conversion or detention of personal 
No. 
2017AP1962 
 
8 
 
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.35 governs when a cause of action 
for replevin seeking possession of personal property must be 
brought.  It provides:  "An action to recover personal property 
shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues 
or be barred."  § 893.35.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.51(1) governs an 
associated claim for damages:  "an action to recover damages for 
the wrongful taking, conversion or detention of personal property 
shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues 
or be barred."  § 893.51(1).  Both statutes continue:  "The cause 
of action accrues at the time the wrongful taking or conversion 
occurs, or the wrongful detention begins."  §§ 893.35, 893.51(1). 
¶15 Thus, the two provisions impose a six-year limit 
starting from when (a) "the wrongful taking . . . occurs," (b) the 
"conversion occurs," or (c) "the wrongful detention begins."  Wis. 
Stat. §§ 893.35, 893.51(1).  It is plain from the text that each 
of these are different causes of action, and therefore each could 
have different dates from which the six-year clock starts to run.  
Notice also that the plain language links the onset of the six-
                                                 
property shall be commenced within the time limited by 
[Wis. Stat. §] 893.51. 
And Wis. Stat. § 893.51(1) provides:   
Except as provided in sub. (2), an action to recover 
damages for the wrongful taking, conversion or detention 
of personal property shall be commenced within 6 years 
after the cause of action accrues or be barred.  The 
cause of action accrues at the time the wrongful taking 
or conversion occurs, or the wrongful detention begins. 
No. 
2017AP1962 
 
9 
 
year period to when the taking, conversion, or detention occurred; 
the claims are not tied to the property itself. 
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 893.35 and 893.51(1) are properly 
described as statutes of repose, not statutes of limitation.  A 
statute of repose "provides that a cause of action must be 
commenced within a specified amount of time after the defendant's 
action which allegedly led to injury, regardless of whether the 
plaintiff has discovered the injury or wrongdoing."  Tomczak v. 
Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 252, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998).  Though 
similar, a statute of limitation focuses on the timeliness of an 
injured party's claim rather than the underlying act or omission.  
See Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, 
¶26, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849.  Indeed, we previously called 
§ 893.51(1) a statute of repose in Tomczak, and § 893.35 contains 
the same language.  Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 259-60.  With regard 
to a wrongful detention claim, the statutes focus on when the 
wrongful detention begins, not when the property owner discovers 
or knows of the detention.  This classification matters both 
because it is textually evident and because we explicitly disavowed 
application of the discovery rule to statutes of repose in Tomczak.  
Compare id. at 260, with Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 
Wis. 2d 550, 560, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983) (adopting a discovery rule 
for statutes of limitation not already governed by a statutory 
discovery rule under which tort claims are deemed to "accrue on 
the date the injury is discovered or with reasonable diligence 
should be discovered, whichever occurs first"). 
 
No. 
2017AP1962 
 
10 
 
B.  Replevin and Wrongful Detention 
¶17 Everyone agrees that, based on the complaint, the 
vehicle was converted in 2001.  The statutes of repose measure six 
years from when a conversion occurs, and thus, the opportunity to 
bring an action for possession and damages based on a conversion 
claim has long since passed.  The question here, then, is whether 
an action based on wrongful detention is separately available, and 
if so, when that cause of action accrued. 
¶18 TL asserts the only tort it can be liable for is 
conversion.  The thrust of its argument is that once property is 
converted, the only claim that can be made regarding that property 
is conversion.  Further, citing Tomczak, TL posits that any 
interpretation allowing the repose clock to restart following a 
transfer of originally converted property to another would 
effectively impose the very discovery rule this court barred from 
use in statutes of repose.  Consistent with this theory, TL 
contends that a wrongful detention claim is available only when an 
initially lawful possession becomes unlawful by exceeding the 
owner's original authorization.  Playing out the logic, TL states 
it could not possibly be wrongfully detaining the vehicle because 
it never obtained Mueller and Ford's permission to possess the 
vehicle in the first place.  Mueller offers a different view.  He 
maintains that wrongful detention occurs when a defendant detains 
property which the plaintiff is entitled to possess, and that 
demand and refusal are not always necessary to trigger such a 
claim. 
No. 
2017AP1962 
 
11 
 
¶19 Distilling all of this, the dispositive dispute between 
the parties hinges on the nature of a wrongful detention claim 
under the statutes of repose.  The statutes themselves do not 
define the relevant terms.  However, the statutory terms 
"conversion" and "wrongful detention" are technical phrases with 
specific and distinct meaning in our common law, and we therefore 
give them their accepted legal meaning.  Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1) 
("[T]echnical words and phrases and others that have a peculiar 
meaning in the law shall be construed according to such meaning."); 
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("Statutory language is given 
its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical 
or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan 
A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 320 
(2012) ("The age-old principle is that words undefined in a statute 
are to be interpreted and applied according to their common-law 
meanings.").  While the parties spend considerable time citing 
treatises and delving into the common-law origins of a claim for 
wrongful detention, we believe the meaning of these statutory terms 
are best explained, and indeed controlled by, Wisconsin cases, not 
those of other jurisdictions or scholarly collections of foreign 
decisions. 
¶20 Personal property is wrongfully detained when the 
defendant "detains property when by law the plaintiff is entitled 
to have it returned to him . . . ."  Capitol Sand & Gravel Co. v. 
Waffenschmidt, 71 Wis. 2d 227, 232, 237 N.W.2d 745 (1976).  While 
No. 
2017AP1962 
 
12 
 
a wrongful detention claim may arise when an initially lawful 
possession 
becomes 
unlawful 
by 
exceeding 
the 
owner's 
authorization7——the narrow definition TL embraces——our cases 
demonstrate that this is not the only factual scenario that gives 
rise to such a claim. 
¶21 Eldred clearly demonstrates why TL's argument must fail, 
and why the reasoning underlying the court of appeals' otherwise 
correct decision must be modified.  33 Wis. 133.  In Eldred, 
someone removed logs from the eventual plaintiff's land and sold 
the logs to a good faith purchaser.  Id. at 139.  The original log 
owner filed a replevin action against the log purchaser for 
"unlawful detention"8 of the logs.  Id. at 139-40.  This court was 
asked to address whether "a demand is necessary before an action 
to recover the logs can be maintained against the defendant."  Id.  
We concluded the original log owner (i.e., the plaintiff) could 
maintain an "unlawful detention" claim because the defendant——
though a good faith purchaser——possessed something that was not 
his.  Id. at 141.  No demand was necessary to trigger the claim.  
Id. ("[B]y proving a state of facts which renders a demand 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Durham v. Pekrul, 104 Wis. 2d 339, 311 N.W.2d 615 
(1981). 
8 Our cases use the terms "unlawful detention" and "wrongful 
detention" interchangeably.  See, e.g., Korb v. Schroedel, 93 
Wis. 2d 207, 211, 214, 286 N.W.2d 589 (1980) (characterizing a 
circuit court's finding of "unlawful detention" as "wrongful 
detention"); Capitol Sand & Gravel Co. v. Waffenschmidt, 71 
Wis. 2d 227, 231, 237 N.W.2d 745 (1976) (noting the jury was asked 
if "there had been wrongful or unlawful detention"); Ronge v. 
Dawson, 9 Wis. 222 (*246) (1859) (using "wrongful detention" and 
"unlawful detention"). 
No. 
2017AP1962 
 
13 
 
unnecessary, he proves the gravamen of his action, to wit, the 
unlawful detention of the logs."). 
¶22 Neither party asks us to overrule or modify Eldred, and 
applying it here defeats TL's repose argument.  The import of 
Eldred is this:  (1) a wrongful detention claim is separate from 
a conversion claim; (2) a wrongful detention claim may arise 
against a possessor of previously converted or wrongfully taken 
property;9 and (3) in situations with analogous facts, a wrongful 
detention claim is available and accrues at the time the property 
is obtained——no demand is necessary.10  This is Wisconsin's common 
law heritage, and is therefore appropriately incorporated into our 
interpretation of "wrongful detention" in Wis. Stat. §§ 893.35 and 
893.51(1). 
¶23  Applying these principles, we hold that a "wrongful 
detention" in Wis. Stat. §§ 893.35 and 893.51(1) may arise against 
a possessor of previously converted property as in Eldred.  
                                                 
9 Our cases also stand for the proposition that a third-party 
purchaser may be liable for conversion if the purchaser knows the 
property has been stolen.  See Smith v. Briggs, 64 Wis. 497, 499, 
25 N.W. 558 (1885).  Remembering that it is the allegations in the 
complaint that establish the operative facts on a motion to 
dismiss, Mueller and Ford have not alleged TL knew that the 
property was stolen, rendering the holding of Smith inapplicable 
here.  Moreover, nothing in Smith stands for the proposition that 
a wrongful detention claim is precluded; it simply establishes 
that a claim for conversion is an available option under its facts. 
10 In other factual scenarios not relevant here, demand may 
trigger the accrual of a wrongful detention claim.  See Capitol 
Sand, 71 Wis. 2d at 231-32 (noting a demand may trigger a wrongful 
detention claim where the initially lawful possession becomes 
unlawful by exceeding the owner's authorization). 
No. 
2017AP1962 
 
14 
 
Therefore, Mueller and Ford may maintain a cause of action for 
replevin based on a claim of wrongful detention against TL. 
¶24 The court of appeals agreed, but concluded the wrongful 
detention began when TL denied Mueller and Ford's demand for return 
of the vehicle.  Mueller, 383 Wis. 2d 740, ¶29.  The court of 
appeals' conclusion is incorrect for at least two reasons.  First, 
we agree with TL that this determination in effect imposes a sort 
of discovery rule on Wis. Stat. §§ 893.35 and 893.51(1), standing 
at direct odds with this court's explicit prohibition against doing 
just that.  Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 260.  Allowing the cause of 
action to accrue at the time of demand could open the door to 
manipulation by a plaintiff who may choose when to make a demand 
based on a potential deadline, providing less certainty to property 
owners.  Second, and more to the point, under Eldred, neither a 
demand nor its refusal is necessarily required to initiate a 
replevin action based on wrongful detention.  33 Wis. at 141.  
Rather, the wrongful detention claim under the facts alleged here 
accrued at the time TL obtained possession of the vehicle. 
¶25 Applying Eldred and the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 893.35 and 893.51(1) to the facts of this case, Mueller and 
Ford may maintain a cause of action for replevin based on TL's 
alleged wrongful detention of the vehicle.  TL's wrongful detention 
began at the time it acquired the vehicle in 2015, not when Mueller 
and Ford issued a demand for its return.  For these reasons, 
Mueller and Ford's replevin action was brought within the six-year 
repose period provided by §§ 893.35 and 893.51(1), and the order 
dismissing the complaint on these grounds must be reversed. 
No. 
2017AP1962 
 
15 
 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶26 We agree with the court of appeals that Mueller and 
Ford's complaint is not barred by the six-year statutes of repose, 
but modify its reasoning because TL's wrongful detention began 
when TL obtained the vehicle——not when Mueller and Ford demanded 
its return.  On this basis, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals reversing the circuit court's dismissal of the complaint. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified, and affirmed as modified, and the cause is remanded to 
the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
¶27 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 
2017AP1962 
 
 
 
1