Case Title: State of Arkansas v. Glen Herred

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE of Arkansas v. Glen HERRED

CR 97-664                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered March 12, 1998


1.   Criminal procedure -- postconviction relief -- available to petitioner in
     custody under sentence of circuit court. -- Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas
     Rules of Criminal Procedure, defining the scope of Rule 37,
     provides that postconviction relief is available to "[a]
     petitioner in custody under sentence of a circuit court
     claiming a right to be released, or to have a new trial, or to
     have the original sentence modified." 

2.   Criminal procedure -- withdrawal of guilty plea -- applicability of Ark.
     R. Crim. P. 26.1(b). -- The supreme court has allowed a petitioner
     to proceed under Ark. R. Crim. P. 26.1(b) when his motion to
     withdraw a guilty plea has been filed prior to the time
     sentence has been entered and placed in execution.

3.   Judgment -- when placed in execution. -- A judgment has been placed
     in execution when the court issues a commitment order, unless
     the trial court grants appellate bond or specifically delays
     execution of sentence upon other valid grounds.

4.   Criminal procedure -- postconviction relief -- trial court had jurisdiction
     to consider merits of Rule 37 motion. -- Where appellee was in
     custody when the trial court ultimately disposed of his motion
     to withdraw his guilty plea, and where his motion was
     otherwise timely under Ark. R. Crim. P. 26.1(b) and 37.2, the
     trial court had jurisdiction to consider the merits of
     appellee's Rule 37 motion.

5.   Criminal procedure -- postconviction relief -- guilty plea -- only two
     claims cognizable in Rule 37 proceedings. -- When a defendant pleads
     guilty, the only claims cognizable in Rule 37 proceedings are
     those that allege that the plea was not made voluntarily and
     intelligently or was entered without effective assistance of
     counsel.

6.   Criminal procedure -- postconviction relief -- when findings reversed. --
     The supreme court will not reverse the trial court's findings
     granting or denying postconviction relief absent clear error.

7.   Attorney & client -- ineffective-assistance claim -- two-part standard
     applies to guilty-plea challenges. -- The two-part standard for
     evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel --
     requiring that the defendant show that counsel's
     representation fell below an objective standard of
     reasonableness and that there was a reasonable probability
     that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
     the proceeding would have been different -- applies to guilty-
     plea challenges based on ineffective assistance of counsel; to
     satisfy the second requirement, the defendant must show that
     there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
     error, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
     insisted on going to trial; it is the defendant's burden to
     prove ineffective assistance of counsel, and it is a heavy
     burden because counsel is presumed effective.

8.   Criminal procedure -- defendant who has pleaded guilty has difficulty in
     establishing prejudice. -- A defendant who has pleaded guilty
     necessarily has difficulty in establishing prejudice given
     that his or her conviction is premised on an admission of
     guilt of the crime charged.

9.   Criminal procedure -- threats or offers of leniency to third party --
     good-faith standard -- satisfied by probable cause to prosecute third
     party. -- When a prosecutor threatens or offers leniency to a
     third party during plea negotiations with a defendant, the
     prosecutor is held to a high standard of good faith that is
     satisfied by probable cause to prosecute the third party. 

10.  Criminal procedure -- trial court clearly erred in finding that appellant's
     guilty plea resulted from ineffective assistance or State coercion -- State
     had probable cause to arrest and prosecute appellant and third party. --
     To the extent that the trial court found that appellant would
     not have pleaded guilty but for ineffective assistance or that
     his plea was coerced due to the State's threats of prosecution
     against a third party, the mother of his children, it was
     clearly erroneous; where the State had probable cause to
     arrest and prosecute appellant and the other party,
     appellant's guilty plea could not have been coerced as a
     result of promises of leniency or threats of prosecution made
     against the third party.

11.  Criminal procedure -- trial court clearly erred in granting postconviction
     relief -- failed to find counsel's purported deficiencies prejudiced
     appellant. -- The trial court clearly erred in granting
     postconviction relief because it failed to find that any of
     counsel's purported deficiencies prejudiced appellant; the
     trial court never specifically found that but for any of
     counsel's deficiencies, appellant would not have pleaded
     guilty and proceeded to trial; the order not only failed to
     set forth what, if any, additional information or defenses
     would have been discovered but for one or any combination of
     counsel's deficiencies; it also failed to find that, with the
     benefit of this additional information, there existed a
     reasonable probability that appellant would have insisted on
     going to trial.

12.  Criminal procedure -- trial court clearly erred in ruling that counsel was
     deficient in failing to object to warrant's facial sufficiency. -- While
     the trial court appeared to criticize appellant's failure to
     file a motion to suppress because of facial deficiencies in a
     nighttime search warrant, the warrant itself demonstrated the
     factual basis required to justify a nighttime search; to the
     extent that the trial court ruled that counsel was
     unconstitutionally deficient in failing to object to the
     warrant's facial sufficiency because it was difficult for the
     court to make a determination whether or not a nighttime
     search was authorized, it was clearly erroneous.

13.  Criminal procedure -- postconviction relief -- trial court clearly erred
     in granting -- judgment reversed. -- Holding that the trial court
     had clearly erred in granting appellant Ark. R. Crim. P. 37
     relief, the supreme court reversed the judgment of the trial
     court.


     Appeal from Phillips Circuit Court; L.T. Simes II, Judge;
reversed.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  C. Joseph Cordi, Jr., Asst.
Att'y Gen., for appellant.
     Louis A. Etoch, for appellee.

     Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.
     Glen Herred pleaded guilty to a charge of attempted possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, a Class A felony. 
He subsequently filed a petition for relief under Ark. R. Crim. P.
26.1 and 37, which the trial court granted.  We reverse and hold
that the trial court clearly erred in granting relief.
     Sometime before midnight on June 19, 1996, the police executed
a nighttime search warrant at the residence located at 625 Quarrles
Street in Marvell.  Among other things the officers seized a gun,
as well as twenty-four grams of cocaine that were discovered in a
pair of shorts belonging to Sadere Baker, found underneath Baker's
"bed tick."  At the time the police entered, Baker was in bed with
Herred, her boyfriend.  Baker was the mother of Herred's three
children.  Both Herred and Baker were arrested, along with other
people inside the residence.
     On July 30, 1996, the police charged Herred with one count of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, a
Class Y felony, as well as simultaneous possession of drugs and
firearms, a Class Y felony.  Baker was charged as well.  Herred
appeared for trial on December 12, 1996.  Represented by retained
counsel, Herred entered a negotiated plea of guilty.  The State
nolle prossed the simultaneous-possession count, and Herred pleaded
guilty to a reduced charge of attempted possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver, a Class A felony.  Following a
colloquy with Herred, the trial court accepted the plea as well as
the State's recommendation of fifteen years' imprisonment, with
credit for time served.  The trial court further explained to
Herred that he was going to allow Herred to remain on bond until
December 26, 1996.  On December 13, 1996, Sadere Baker pleaded
guilty to attempted possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver, a Class A felony, and received a six-year
suspended sentence.  On December 18, 1996, the judgment and
commitment order in Herred's case was entered.
     On December 23, 1996, Herred filed a pro se "Verified Petition
Under Rule 26.1 and 37, Ark. R. Crim. P. And Ark. Code Ann.  16-
90-111 To Set Aside Guilty Plea, To Vacate, Or To Correct
Defendant's Sentence And For Other Proper Relief."  Among other
things, Herred claimed that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel, and that his plea was coerced as a result of threats of
prosecution levied against Baker, the mother of his children.  On
December 26, Herred reported to begin serving his sentence, and on
January 28, 1997, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on
the petition.  Attorney Louis Etoch, who had previously represented
Sadere Baker in connection with the original charges, represented
Herred at the postconviction hearing.
     Vandall Bland was the attorney who represented Herred at the
time he pleaded guilty, and had been retained about a month before
the trial date.  On that date, Bland had a number of other cases
set for trial, as he was the Phillips County Public Defender.  He
explained that he had filed no written motions in the case, and had
not filed a motion to suppress the drugs seized from the residence. 
While he had filed no discovery motions in the case, the prosecutor
had provided him with the file.  Bland was prepared to go to trial
because he had all of the discovery and all of the witnesses were
available to testify.  He was not aware that Herred had been
drinking that day.  In fact, he did not notice any of the tell-tale
signs of intoxication such as slurred speech, blood-shot eyes or
unsteadiness.   Nor did he smell any alcohol on Herred, although he
conceded that he could not "smell that well."  Bland knew that
Herred could read and write.  He also thought that he had read the
plea execution form to Herred, and had him initial it.  Baker and
Herred were crying on the day of the plea.
     Bland was aware that the prosecutor had offered Sadere Baker 
(who had also been charged) probation if she testified against
Herred.  It was Bland's understanding that the prosecutor would
offer Baker a suspended sentence in exchange for Herred's plea. 
This occurred in the judge's chambers, where Bland, Herred, Baker,
and Attorney Louis Etoch (then representing Baker) were all
present.  Etoch had advised Baker not to testify against Herred.
     Victor Owens, a longtime friend of Herred's, testified that
the night before the plea he and Herred drank substantial
quantities of alcohol, and Herred appeared intoxicated.  They
stayed out until about 12:30 that night.  Herred was ill and taking
"Tylenol and a lot of more drugs."  Herred expressed his innocence
and concern for his children.  Owens stated that Herred had lived
at the Baker residence with Sadere less than a year, but later
clarified that "he wasn't staying there that I know of."
     Sadere Baker testified that Herred was not living with her at
her residence.  Baker stated that the cocaine seized was hers, and
that she was keeping it for a friend.  On cross-examination, she
stated that her intent was to sell it to make money.  The cocaine
was "in [her] shorts under [her] bed tick."  She did not inform
Herred of the cocaine, and he did not see it to her knowledge.  The
night before the plea, Herred came in around 12:30 or 1:00 in the
morning and appeared intoxicated.  He was also taking medication
for sinus problems, and he drank some more the morning he came to
court.  On the day of Herred's trial, she understood that the plea
negotiations were that she would get probation in exchange for
Herred's plea.  They were both crying on the day of the plea
because the drugs did not belong to Herred and she did not want him
to go to jail.  He told her that he would rather go to jail.  As
Bland was discussing the case with Herred, Baker told Herred that
she did not want to go to jail.  She stated that the gun in her
house belonged to Kevin Sanders, apparently Herred's nephew, who
was willing to testify to that effect.
     Glen Herred testified that he was not incarcerated immediately
after his plea, but that he began serving his term on December 26. 
He stated that he did not live at the Baker residence.  He was not
aware that his case was going to trial on December 12, 1996, until
the day before.  He did not sleep well the night before the trial
date, and he drank a large quantity of alcohol as well as
medication for flu symptoms.  On the way to Bland's office the
morning of trial he drank a beer.  He did not know that cocaine was
in the house, and did not possess it.  Neither did he know that the
gun was in the house.  Bland told him that Baker would be sentenced
"fifteen to life" if he "didn't take them charges."  He also told
Bland about Kevin Sanders admitting to possessing the gun, to which
Bland responded that he should do the "manly thing and take the
charge, because if you let that young kid take the charge, they
will try to hang him.  So he told me to do the right thing, just
take the charges."  Etoch explained to Herred that Baker would get
probation only if she testified against him, and later that she
would only get probation if he pleaded guilty.  Herred expressed
his innocence to Bland, but he pleaded guilty because he wanted the
mother of his children to take care of the children.  He did not
feel that Bland was prepared to try the case.  Bland told him that
he would get life if he went to trial.  Herred testified that he
lied in answering the questions asked of him during the plea
colloquy.  He stated that he paid some bills at the Baker
residence, and considered it "home" along with his mother's house.
     Lovell Ashley Higgins was then the circuit judge who took
Herred's plea.  He noticed nothing unusual about Herred's
appearance or demeanor on December 12 while he took the plea. 
Judge Higgins had been in Herred's presence for at least one hour
before the plea was taken.  Part of that time was in the close
confines of the judge's chambers where he saw no signs of
intoxication.  Nor did he smell the odor of intoxicants.   Judge
Higgins did have concerns about Etoch trying to manipulate Herred.
     Following this evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an
order on April 10, 1997, vacating Herred's plea and granting him a
new trial.  The trial court found that Herred's petition was
untimely pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 26.1, and denied Herred's
requested relief to the extent that it was a Rule 26.1 motion to
withdraw guilty plea.  Considering Herred's petition as a Rule 37
motion for postconviction relief, the trial court found that Herred
was denied effective assistance of counsel and that his plea was
coerced.  The trial court's order contains the following findings:
     --  Defense counsel had represented Herred for only a month,
     counsel's time was inadequate for preparation;
     --  The only motions filed by defense counsel were oral
     motions made the morning of trial;
     --  Defense counsel also served as the Phillips County Public
     Defender during which he had a large number of cases set for
     trial;
     --  Defense counsel testified that the prosecutor had
     voluntarily given him discovery;
     --  Defense counsel made no motion to suppress the drugs and
     gun seized pursuant to the nighttime search warrant;
     --  It was unclear whether the search warrant was properly
     executed so as to authorize a nighttime search;
     --  Defense counsel testified "the whole case created a
     problem";
     --  Defense counsel issued no subpoenas and did not respond to
     discovery motions;
     --  Defense counsel did not move for a continuance;
     --  Defense counsel testified that he knew that Sadere Baker,
     Herred's girlfriend and the mother of his children, would
     receive a five-year suspended sentence if Herred pleaded
     guilty;
     --  Defense counsel testified that there was "pressure" on
     Herred;
     --  Defense counsel testified that "I think what persuaded him
     to take the plea. . . he was looking out for Sadera [sic]."
     --  Herred and Sadere Baker were outside the courtroom crying
     immediately before entering the plea;
     --  The State did not "deny or refute" Herred's contention
     that he must plead guilty before the State would offer Baker
     a suspended sentence;
     --  Defense counsel testified that the prosecutor reminded him
     of the "Sam Lanford" case (Herred's defense counsel had also
     represented Lanford), where the defendant refused a plea
     bargain, went to trial and received a 120-year sentence;
     --  Defense counsel testified that the prosecutor "pushed his
     chest out;"
     --  A longtime friend of Herred's testified that the night
     before the plea was entered Herred expressed concern for his
     children, "needed someone to talk to," and consumed
     substantial amounts of alcoholic beverages;
     --  "Defendant Herred was granted a hearing and given an
     opportunity to prove that the entry of the plea was the result
     of fear or threats that his wife would be tried or brought to
     trial."
     --  The trial court found that the State insisted on Herred's
     guilty plea before offering a suspended sentence to Sadere
     Baker the next day.
     --  Sadere Baker was the mother of Herred's children, ages
     one, two, and three.
     --  Herred entered the plea as a result of "threats of
     prosecution of the mother of his children."
     --  Defense counsel testified that "I might have told him that
     the manly thing to do was take the charge."

Following these findings, the trial court's order concludes as
follows:
  A two part test for reviewing claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel was adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington,