Case Title: In re Investigation into General Order No. 45

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2012-448

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2013-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
ENTRY ORDER
 
2013 VT 24
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2012-448
 
JANUARY TERM, 2013
 
In re
  Investigation into General Order No. 45
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
 
From:
 
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Public Service Board
 
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DOCKET NO. 6545
 
 
 
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
New England Coalition, Inc. (NEC) filed a complaint in this Court
pursuant to 30 V.S.A. § 15 seeking injunctive relief.  Specifically, it
asked this Court to enjoin Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC, and Entergy
Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) from continuing to operate the Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Plant.  NEC alleged that Entergy was operating in
violation of the Public Service Board's final order approving the 2002 sale of
the power plant to Entergy (Sale Order) in Docket No. 6545.  There are no
grounds to grant equitable relief, and NEC's complaint is therefore
dismissed.  
¶ 2.            
By statute, a "party to an order or decree of the public service board
or the board itself, or both, may complain to the supreme court for relief
against any disobedience of or noncompliance with such order or decree."  30 V.S.A. § 15.  In response to such complaint, the
Court may "make such order and decree in the premises by way of writ of
mandamus, writ of prohibition, injunction, or otherwise, concerning the
enforcement of such order and decree of the public service board as to law and
equity shall appertain."  Id.  Such extraordinary relief is
left to this Court's discretion.  See, e.g., Okemo
Mountain, Inc. v. Town of Ludlow, 127 Vt. 354, 356, 249 A.2d 401, 403
(1968) (confirming that an application for mandamus is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Supreme Court); In re Petition of Raymo,
121 Vt. 246, 249, 154 A.2d 487, 489 (1959) (noting that issuance of a writ of
prohibition is a matter within the Court's discretion).  
¶ 3.            
Some of the pertinent events leading to this complaint are summarized as
follows.  In 2006, following the Sale Order, Act 160 came into effect,
ostensibly requiring state legislative approval before the Board could renew
the Certificate of Public Good (CPG) authorizing
continued operation of the Vermont Yankee plant past its scheduled expiration
date of March 21, 2012.  See 2005, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.). 
In 2008, Entergy applied to the Board to renew or amend its CPG, a proceeding
now pending and underway.  Entergy filed a motion for a declaratory ruling
with the Board in March 2012, asking the Board to order, among other things,
that Entergy could continue operating Vermont Yankee while its petition for a
new or amended CPG remained pending.  In a March 2012 order, the Board
agreed that because Entergy had applied for a new or renewed CPG, and the
application had not yet been finally determined, Entergy's current CPG was
extended pursuant to 3 V.S.A. § 814(b).  
¶ 4.            
The Board reached a contrary conclusion, however, with respect to the
2002 Sale Order that had approved the sale of Vermont Yankee to Entergy. 
Condition 8 of that order prohibited Entergy from operating Vermont Yankee
after March 21, 2012 absent "issuance" of a new or renewed CPG.  The Board
concluded that this condition was a requirement of the order approving the sale
of Vermont Yankee to Entergy, and not part of the licensure of a continuing
activity, and thus, 3 V.S.A. § 814(b) did not apply.  Absent modification
of the Sale Order, the Board stated that the continued operation of Vermont
Yankee after March 21, 2012 without a new or renewed CPG would violate the
condition of that sale.  
¶ 5.            
In the meantime, Entergy obtained an injunction from the United States
District Court for Vermont against enforcement of the state legislative
approval law based on federal preemption under the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2011 et seq.  See Entergy Nuclear Vermont
Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D.
Vt. 2012).  The injunction prohibited the Board from "bringing an
enforcement action, or taking other action, to compel Vermont Yankee to shut
down after March 21, 2012 because it failed to obtain legislative approval . .
. for continued operation."  Id. at 243. 
Responding to Entergy's declaratory judgment action, the Board indicated that
it was not issuing an order directing Entergy to cease operations, but rather,
it was responding to Entergy's request for a declaratory ruling.  Entergy
then moved to amend the Condition 8 deadline in the Sale Order under Vermont
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), contending, essentially, that the legislative
interjection into the licensing process was an unforeseen circumstance
justifying modification of the deadline provision.  The Board denied the
motion in November 2012.  
¶ 6.            
In the instant complaint, NEC asserts that the Board correctly found
that 3 V.S.A. § 814(b) does not excuse Entergy from complying with
Condition 8 of the Sale Order.  Based on this assertion, it asks this
Court to enforce the terms of the Sale Order and the terms of a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) incorporated therein.  NEC seeks to enjoin Entergy
from continuing to operate Vermont Yankee until the Board has rendered a
decision on Entergy's application for a new or amended CPG.  
¶ 7.            
As we have recognized, "[a]n injunction is an extraordinary remedy and
will not be granted routinely unless the right to relief is clear."  Vt.
Div. of State Bldgs. v. Town of Castleton Bd. of Adjustment, 138 Vt. 250,
256, 415 A.2d 188, 193 (1980); see also 11A C. Wright, et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2942 (2d ed. 1995) ("Since an injunction is regarded
as an extraordinary remedy, it is not granted routinely; indeed, the court
usually will refuse to exercise its equity jurisdiction unless the right to
relief is clear." (footnote omitted)).  An
injunction "may issue only in cases presenting some acknowledged and well
defined ground of equity jurisdiction, as when it is necessary to prevent
irreparable injury or a multiplicity of suits."  Vt. Div. of State
Bldgs., 138 Vt. at 256-57, 415 A.2d  at 193. 
As a general matter, "the main prerequisite to obtaining injunctive relief is a
finding that plaintiff is being threatened by some injury for which he has no
adequate legal remedy."  Wright, supra, § 2942; see also Gerety v. Poitras,
126 Vt. 153, 155, 224 A.2d 919, 921 (1966) ("Equity will not afford relief
where there is a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law.  And if the
complainant does have such remedy, and the main cause of action is of a legal
nature, equity has no jurisdiction." (citation
omitted)).  "Probably the most common method of demonstrating that there
is no adequate legal remedy is by showing that plaintiff will suffer
irreparable harm if the court does not intervene and prevent the impending
injury."  Wright, supra, § 2944.
¶ 8.            
NEC fails to demonstrate, as predicates for the injunctive relief
sought, that it exhausted its administrative remedies and that it has no
adequate legal remedy.  See Smith v. Highway Bd., 117 Vt. 343, 349,
91 A.2d 805, 810 (1952) (stating that as a general rule, a party must exhaust
his or her administrative remedies before seeking equitable relief, and
"[w]here an administrative agency has primary jurisdiction of the question in
issue, the courts ordinarily will not grant injunctive relief prior to a
decision by the agency").  NEC has not requested, nor has the Board
issued, an order directing Entergy to cease operating Vermont Yankee on the
grounds advanced by NEC here.  Nor is it established that Board enforcement
of Condition 8, if applied for, would necessarily be covered by the federal
injunction enjoining enforcement of Act 160.  
¶ 9.            
Moreover, to the extent that NEC asserts that Condition 8 of the Sale
Order is actionable under 30 V.S.A. § 15, the Board decisions on which its
position rests are currently on appeal in this Court and are not yet
final.  The Board developed a record in those cases, and the merit of the
Board's actions can be determined in the appeals now before this Court.
 It would make little sense for this Court to retry the background of
those orders in the context of an action to enforce Condition 8 in a separate
proceeding under 30 V.S.A. § 15.  Given the ongoing legal processes in
place, we decline to grant NEC's request for equitable relief.  NEC's
complaint is therefore dismissed.  
           
Dismissed.
 
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber,
  Chief Justice
 
 
 
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 
 
Note:  Denise R. Johnson,
Associate Justice (Ret.), was present for oral argument but did not participate
in this decision.