Case Title: Ellison v. Fry

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC93760

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2014-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
MARY ELLISON, ARTHUR FRY, DAVID FRY, ) 
and SUSAN SLEEPER,  
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellants/Cross-Respondents,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC93760 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
J.D. FRY, DECEASED, BY LINDA FRY,  
 
) 
TRUSTEE OF THE JOHN DELBERT FRY   
) 
REVOCABLE INTERVIVOS TRUST, et al., 
 
) 
 
Respondents/Cross-Appellants.  
 
) 
 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Camden County 
Honorable Ralph Jaynes, Judge 
 
Opinion issued August 19, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In a family dispute over the inheritance of money and property, Plaintiffs Mary 
Ellison, Susan Sleeper, and David and Arthur Fry appeal the trial court’s dismissal of all 
of Arthur’s claims and some of David, Susan, and Mary’s claims.1  Defendants cross-
appeal the court’s refusal to dismiss all of the remaining claims.  As a result of the 
dismissals, the trial court submitted only six of the ten claims Plaintiffs initially brought.  
The primary defendant, J.D. Fry, died after suit was filed but before trial. The trial court 
substituted J.D.’s wife, Linda Fry, in her capacity as trustee of J.D.’s trust.  The jury 
returned verdicts against Linda Fry, as substitute for J.D., and in favor of Mary, David 
and Susan on three of their claims that J.D. committed frauds and other wrongs beginning 
                                             
 
1 For the sake of brevity and clarity, the parties are referred to by their given names.  No 
disrespect is intended. 
in 1990 that resulted in J.D.’s pecuniary gain.  The trial court overruled Defendants’ 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
This Court reverses the trial court’s judgment on the jury verdicts in favor of 
David, Susan and Mary.  The statute of limitations for fraud claims, section 516.120(5),2 
gives a person up to 10 years to discover the fraud and requires, without exception, that 
all such claims be brought within five years of discovery so that no claim of fraud may be 
brought more than 15 years after the fraud occurred, even if the fraud is concealed for a 
longer period.  Because Susan and David’s claims were brought more than 15 years after 
the fraud allegedly occurred in 1990, their claims are time-barred by section 516.120(5).  
Mary’s claims likewise are barred.  Sections 537.010 and 537.021.1(2) require 
substitution of J.D.’s personal representative.  Linda was not J.D.’s personal 
representative – indeed, Plaintiffs failed even to open an estate – and, therefore, it was 
improper to substitute Linda upon J.D.’s death.  
The trial court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ other claims before trial for the 
reasons noted below, and the judgment of the trial court with respect to these claims is 
affirmed.  The judgment on the jury verdicts for Plaintiffs is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for entry of judgment for Defendants on those claims. 
I.  
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1981, Vincil and Willa Fry executed a joint will that distributed their assets 
among their children, Mary Ellison, Arthur Fry, and J.D. Fry, and two grandchildren, 
David Fry and Susan Sleeper.  The will devised a 40-acre tract of land and cash to Mary, 
a 160-acre homestead to J.D., and a 200-acre tract of land to David and Susan, subject to 
a life estate in their father Arthur.  
In 1990, when he was 82 years old, Vincil caused a car crash that injured the 
occupants of another car.  Although Vincil and Willa were fully insured, they worried 
that Vincil’s liability would cost them their farm.  J.D. took them to his attorney, and in 
June 1990 they executed new wills, settled a trust to benefit Arthur, Susan, and David, 
and deeded the 200-acre farm to J.D. and the 160-acre homestead to J.D.’s son Delbert, 
reserving life estates for themselves in both properties.  Vincil and Willa also conveyed 
the 40-acre tract to Mary subject to life estates in themselves.  In their 1990 wills, Vincil 
and Willa devised all of their property to the surviving spouse or, if the other spouse was 
deceased, to their three children.  J.D. subsequently conveyed the 200-acre tract to 
himself and his wife, Linda, and they later conveyed the land into the J.D. Fry Revocable 
Inter Vivos Trust.    In 1998, Vincil granted J.D. his durable power of attorney.  Vincil 
died in 2000, and Willa died in 2005.  After Willa’s death, her monies were distributed 
among the children without a probate estate being opened because, the children later said, 
they did not believe there was enough property to make it worthwhile to open an estate.  
Three years later, in April 2008, Mary sued to set aside the 1990 deeds to J.D. and 
Delbert and brought claims against J.D. for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, conversion, 
and unjust enrichment.  Though the 1990 deeds transferring property to J.D. were 
recorded and reported in the newspaper, Mary alleged that she and Arthur did not know 
that J.D. gave no consideration for the deeds until December 2006 because J.D. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
2 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise noted. 
 
3
fraudulently concealed this information.  Nor was she aware of their 1990 wills, which 
replaced the also unknown 1981 will that had divided Willa and Vincil’s property evenly 
among the children.  Mary also alleged that J.D. had used the power of attorney he 
obtained in 1998 to purchase multiple certificates of deposit (CDs) in his own name with 
Vincil and Willa’s funds and to cash other CDs owned by Willa and Vincil that had listed 
Mary and Arthur as payable-on-death beneficiaries.  She further alleged that J.D. 
exercised undue influence over his parents to obtain the 1990 deeds, change their wills, 
and obtain powers of attorney, and that he acted fraudulently and unjustly enriched 
himself.  Arthur did not join Mary’s suit and instead entered into a settlement agreement 
with J.D. under which he fully released any and all potential claims in exchange for $100.  
J.D. vehemently denied all of the allegations.   
In December 2008, just a few months after the suit was filed, J.D. died. Mary filed 
suggestions of death on December 15, 2008.  Rule 52.13 requires that a new party be 
substituted in the manner permitted by the probate statutes within 90 days after a 
suggestion of death is filed or the case will be dismissed without prejudice.  Sections 
537.010 and 537.021.1(2) together provide that a property claim against a defendant may 
continue after the defendant’s death by substituting the appointed personal representative 
of the deceased defendant’s estate.  Neither Arthur, Mary, nor any person legally entitled 
to do so opened an estate for J.D. or sought appointment of a personal representative.  
Mary instead moved the trial court to substitute J.D.’s daughter as a defendant in J.D.’s 
place.  Defendants objected that only a personal representative could be appointed.  The 
trial court sua sponte substituted J.D.’s widow, Linda, in her capacity as trustee of J.D.’s 
 
4
trust, as defendant.  
 
Plaintiffs subsequently subpoenaed Arthur’s testimony and, in 2011, Arthur and 
his children David Fry and Susan Sleeper joined the suit.  Plaintiffs amended the petition 
to bring a total of 10 counts against J.D., Linda, Linda as trustee, Delbert, and Fry Grain 
Enterprises, a business owned by J.D. and Delbert.  Just prior to trial, Plaintiffs again 
amended their petition by removing Mary from multiple counts.3 
 
At the close of Plaintiffs’ evidence and again at the close of all the evidence, 
Defendants moved for a directed verdict on numerous grounds.  The trial court sustained 
these motions in part, dismissing all claims by Arthur based on his signing of a release of 
those claims, dismissing all claims against J.D.’s son Delbert because of lack of evidence 
of his involvement in any of the asserted wrongs, dismissing the conversion claim against 
J.D.’s company, Fry Grain, and refusing to submit punitive damages.   
As a result of the amendments and the dismissals, the only claims that remained at 
the close of evidence were Susan and David’s claims against J.D. (through Linda as 
                                             
 
3 At this point, in Count I, as amended, Arthur, Susan, and David sued J.D., Linda 
(individually), Delbert, and the trust for fraud and undue influence related to the 1990 
deeds.  In Counts II through V, Mary and Arthur sued J.D. and Linda (individually) for 
breach of fiduciary duties, fraud, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, 
conversion and replevin, and unjust enrichment related to their alleged misuse of J.D’s 
powers of attorney and Willa and Vincil’s CDs and safe deposit box.  In Count VI, Mary 
and Arthur sued Fry Grain for conversion of USDA farm payments, rent, and farm 
equipment related to Defendants’ use of the 200-acre and 160-acre tracts of farmland.  In 
Count VII, Mary and Arthur sued Delbert for unjust enrichment through his receipt of the 
160-acre tract of land, but they dropped this count during trial.  In Count VIII, as 
amended, Arthur, Susan, and David sued the trust alleging it was unjustly enriched by the 
1990 deeds.  In Counts IX and X, Arthur sued J.D., Linda (individually), and Delbert for 
breach of contract, fraud, fraudulent concealment, and fraudulent misrepresentation 
relating to Arthur’s release of claims agreement. 
 
5
trustee4) and Linda (individually) for fraud and undue influence (Count I), Susan and 
David’s claims against Linda as trustee for unjust enrichment relating to the 1990 deeds 
(Count VIII), and Mary’s claims against J.D. and Linda (individually) for breach of 
fiduciary duty, fraud, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, conversion 
and replevin, and unjust enrichment (Counts II through V).  The court instructed the jury 
on these six remaining claims.  As to claims against J.D., the court instructed the jury that 
“defendant J.D. Fry is deceased and [trustee] has been substituted to take his place; 
therefore if you find against defendant J.D. Fry, your verdict must be against [trustee].”   
In Verdicts A and C, the jury found for David and Susan against Linda as trustee 
for unjust enrichment, awarding each $5,500.  In Verdicts B and D, the jury found for 
David and Susan against Linda as trustee for undue influence but awarded $0.   
In Verdict E, the jury found for Mary against Linda as trustee for unjust 
enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent concealment, and conversion and 
awarded her $35,000.5  In Verdict F, the jury found for Mary against Linda individually 
for unjust enrichment, but awarded Mary $0.  
After the verdicts were returned, Plaintiffs moved the court to add to the final 
judgment an award to Mary of several items of personal property she claims were 
                                             
 
4 In Verdicts A through E, Linda is named as the defendant solely in her capacity as 
trustee as the court-ordered substitute for J.D.; none of the counts underlying these five 
verdicts made claims against her personally.  Verdict F was against Linda personally, but 
awarded $0 in damages.  Susan, David and Mary do not complain about the award of $0 
in Verdicts B, D and F, nor did they seek a new trial on these claims or argue that it was 
inconsistent to find for them on these counts but award no damages, so those issues are 
not before this Court on appeal.   
 
6
intended for her.  Defendants timely filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, for a new trial.   
The trial court did not rule on Mary’s motion for an order granting her certain 
items of personal property, and it overruled Defendants’ motion for JNOV. Plaintiffs 
appealed, Defendants cross-appealed, and the court of appeals consolidated the appeals.  
This Court transferred the consolidated case after opinion under article V, section 10 of 
the Missouri Constitution.   
II.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Defendants argue that the trial court erred in overruling their motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict on all issues.  Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in 
sustaining Defendants’ motions for directed verdict on any issue.   
A case may not be submitted unless each and every fact essential to liability is 
predicated on legal and substantial evidence.  Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 332 S.W.3d 749, 
756 (Mo. banc 2011).  Whether the plaintiff made a submissible case is a question of law 
that this Court reviews de novo.  Id.  To determine whether a directed verdict or judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted this Court applies essentially the 
same standard.  Keveney v. Mo. Military Acad., 304 S.W.3d 98, 104 (Mo. banc 2010).  To 
determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, an appellate 
court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.  Moore, 332 S.W.3d at 
756.  A motion for directed verdict or JNOV should be granted if the defendant shows 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
5  This Court does not reach alleged errors in Mary’s submission of multiple causes of 
action in a single verdict director, as that issue is not raised on appeal.  See MAI 2.00.     
 
7
that at least one element of the plaintiff’s case is not supported by the evidence.  Id.; 
Clevenger v. Oliver Ins. Agency, Inc., 237 S.W.3d 588, 590 (Mo. banc 2007).   
III. 
DISCUSSION 
The parties’ cross-appeals raise a total of 11 points.  Defendants offer multiple 
grounds on which they believe that the trial court erred in overruling their motion for 
JNOV.  Because this Court’s resolution of two of Defendants’ points requires the 
judgment be reversed, it does not reach Defendants’ other points.  Plaintiffs argue that the 
trial court erred in sustaining Defendants’ motions for directed verdict to the extent that 
the court refused to submit punitive damages, dismissed Arthur’s claims, and dismissed 
all claims against Fry Grain and Delbert.  Plaintiffs also appeal the trial court’s refusal to 
rule on Mary’s motion to award her specific personal property.6  This Court finds each of 
these points lacks merit. 
A. 
Defendants’ Cross-Appeal 
 
 
i. 
Susan and David’s Claims are Time-Barred 
   
Susan and David claimed unjust enrichment based on J.D.’s alleged fraud in 
causing Willa and Vincil to sign the 1990 deeds and to prepare the 1990 wills to replace 
the 1981 will under which Susan and David were to receive remainder interests in the 
200-acre tract of land subject to a life estate in Arthur.  They assert that J.D. fraudulently 
concealed the existence of both the 1981 and 1990 wills executed by Willa and Vincil 
                                             
 
6 Plaintiffs do not appeal Mary’s $0 verdict for unjust enrichment against Linda 
individually or Susan and David’s $0 verdicts for undue influence against Linda as 
trustee, despite the fact that Susan and David repeatedly refer to conduct that they believe 
 
8
and the fact that no consideration was given for the 1990 deeds.   
Defendants argue that the trial court should have granted their motion for JNOV 
on Susan and David’s unjust enrichment claims because these claims were barred by the 
statute of limitations.  Susan and David counter that, because they allege fraud, the 
controlling statute of limitations is section 516.120(5), and that their claim is not barred 
under the latter statute.  Section 516.120(5) sets out the statute of limitations for fraud 
claims as follows: 
Within five years: … (5) an action for relief on the ground of fraud, the 
cause of action in such case to be deemed not to have accrued until the 
discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten years, of the facts 
constituting the fraud. 
 
§ 516.120(5).  Under this statute, all fraud claims must be brought within five years from 
when the cause of action accrues, which is either when the fraud is discovered or at the 
end of 10 years after the fraud takes place, whichever occurs first.  Klemme v. Best, 941 
S.W.2d 493, 497 (Mo. banc 1997); State ex rel. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc. v. Clymer, 
522 S.W.2d 793, 798 (Mo. banc 1975).   
Consequently, the latest a fraud claim can accrue and the statute of limitations 
begin to run is 10 years after it is committed, regardless of whether the fraud actually is 
discovered.  Clymer, 522 S.W.2d at 798.  As Clymer explains: 
[T]he cause of action does not accrue from discovery of the fraud.  If ten 
years elapse without discovery of the fraudulent acts, the statute of 
limitations begins to run and after five years the cause of action is barred, 
even if the fraud has not yet been discovered. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
constituted undue influence.  This Court therefore does not discuss further either of these 
matters. 
 
9
Id. at 798.  This means that the latest a fraud claim may be brought is 15 years after the 
fraud occurred.  Id.   
Susan and David argue that this 15-year maximum period is extended further 
because of J.D.’s alleged fraud in concealing the transfer of property and the existence of 
the 1990 wills.  Although they do not identify a specific statutory basis for this extension, 
Susan and David implicitly are referring to section 516.280, the general tolling statute,7 
which sets out a “discovery rule” for cases in which a defendant conceals the wrong. 
Susan and David’s arguments are not well-taken.  It is well settled that the general 
tolling statute does not apply to fraud claims under 516.120(5) because it contains its 
own, more specific, 10-year discovery rule.  As explained in Anderson v. Dyer: 
The imposition of Sec. 516.280 onto Sec. 516.120(5) would make the latter 
ineffective insofar as it undertakes to establish a particular period within 
which the fraud is deemed to have been discovered and the action to have 
accrued. Therefore, “(i)f the action is founded upon fraud, as provided in 
(Sec. 516.120(5)), *** it does not matter whether the party who has 
defrauded him does anything to prevent his discovery or not.” 
 
456 S.W.2d 808, 813 (Mo. App. 1970), quoting Maynard v. Doe Run Lead Co., 265 S.W. 
94, 99 (Mo. 1924).  Anderson noted that section 516.120(5) is the only provision that 
specifically controls the statute of limitations for fraud and, so, is narrower in scope than 
the general tolling statute.   
This Court implicitly approved Anderson’s analysis in Clymer.  522 S.W.2d at 
                                             
 
7 Section 516.280 provides: 
If any person, by absconding or concealing himself, or by any other 
improper act, prevent the commencement of an action, such action may be 
commenced within the time herein limited, after the commencement of 
such action shall have ceased to be so prevented. 
 
10
797-98.  Although Clymer specifically involved the separate issue of the time at which a 
cause of action for fraud accrues, it quoted approvingly Anderson’s analysis that section 
516.280 does not toll the time for bringing a fraud claim under section 516.120(5) as 
support for the rule that the time allowed for discovery does not affect the accrual of the 
cause of action.  Id. at 796-98.  This Court’s approval of Anderson’s analysis on this 
point is persuasive.  See also Gilmore v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 926 S.W.2d 695, 699 
(Mo. App. 1996) (holding  “fraudulent concealment does not toll the statute of limitations 
for fraud beyond what is provided for in § 516.120(5)”); Graf v. Michaels, 900 S.W.2d 
659, 662 (Mo. App. 1995) (quoting Anderson and stating that fraud actions must be 
brought within 15 years).   
Despite this seemingly settled rule, Plaintiffs note that a separate line of cases does 
suggest that the statute of limitations for fraud may be tolled indefinitely by a defendant’s 
active concealment of the fraud.  This separate line of authority had its genesis in 
Obermeyer v. Kirshner, 38 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Mo. App. 1931).  Obermeyer recognized a 
common law exception to the predecessor to section 516.120(5), under which fraudulent 
concealment of defendant’s fraud could toll the statute of limitations for fraud.   
Kansas City v. W.R. Grace & Co., 778 S.W.2d 264, 273 (Mo. App. 1989), which 
Plaintiffs cite, relied on Obermeyer to state: “If a party takes affirmative action to conceal 
the fraud, the statute is tolled until the fraud is discovered.”  Occasionally, the court of 
appeals has reiterated this same alternative line of analysis, although in none of these 
cases did the court of appeals actually find tolling.  See, e.g., Misischia v. St. John’s 
Mercy Med. Ctr., 30 S.W.3d 848, 867 (Mo. App. 2000) (quoting W.R. Grace for this 
 
11
rule); Cullom v. Crittenton, 959 S.W.2d 915, 918-19 (Mo. App. 1998) (to same effect); 
and Tilley v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 957 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Mo. App. 1997) (same).  
 
To the extent that these cases state that the statute of limitations for fraud under 
section 516.120(5) is tolled if the fraud is concealed, they conflict with section 516.120, 
Clymer, Anderson, and similar cases properly applying section 516.120, and they no 
longer should be followed.  This Court reaffirms its holdings in Klemme and Clymer that 
all claims for fraud must be brought within a maximum of 15 years, as provided by 
section 516.120(5).  Neither section 516.280 nor the common law tolls the accrual of a 
cause of action for fraud.   
Applying this analysis here,8 the alleged fraud in the transfer of the deeds and the 
preparation of the new will occurred in 1990, and the right to contest this conduct accrued 
in Willa and Vincil at that time.  Assuming, without deciding, that fraudulent 
concealment were involved here, the statute of limitations would have run 15 years later, 
in June 2005, and so would have expired prior to Willa’s death in November 2005.9  
David and Susan did not sue until 2008.  That was too late.  In fact, by the time David 
and Susan obtained an interest in these claims, the claims already were time-barred.  
                                             
 
8 On appeal, Plaintiffs’ tolling argument is based only on their claim that the statute of 
limitations was tolled under section 516.120(5) due to J.D.’s fraud.  They do not argue 
that a different statute of limitations applied to specific torts that J.D. is alleged to have 
committed or that the general tolling statute might apply to one of those other claims.  
Consequently, this Court does not address those issues. 
9 Defendants note that the transfer of property properly was recorded and published in the 
newspaper, and they argue that neither they nor Willa or Vincil were under any 
obligation to alert the Plaintiffs about the terms of the transfer or about the 1990 or 1981 
wills. 
 
12
Willa had no cause of action under either claim to pass on to Susan and David.10  The 
trial court, therefore, erred in not granting Defendants’ motion for JNOV on the ground 
that Susan and David’s claims based on the 1990 wills and deeds are barred by the statute 
of limitations. 
ii. 
The Trial Court Erred in Substituting the Trustee of J.D.’s Trust 
for J.D. After J.D.’s Death  
 
 
Defendants assert that the trial court erred in not granting their motion for JNOV 
on Plaintiffs’ claims against Linda, in her capacity as trustee, as substitute for J.D.  The 
trial court permitted Plaintiffs to proceed on their claims against J.D. through the trustee 
and later instructed the jury: “if you find against defendant J.D. Fry, your verdict must be 
against Linda Fry, Trustee of John Delbert Fry Revocable Inter Vivos Trust.”  The jury 
returned a verdict for Mary against the trustee for $35,000 “under the theory of breach of 
fiduciary duty, fraudulent concealment, conversion, and/or unjust enrichment.”11  The 
jury also returned a verdict for Susan and David against the trustee for $5,500 each for 
unjust enrichment related to the 1990 deeds and wills.  But, as discussed above, Susan 
and David’s claims were time-barred.   
To the extent that Mary’s claims for Counts II through V allege conduct that 
occurred between 1998 and 2006, including that J.D. abused his powers of attorney and 
                                             
 
10 Because Mary ultimately did not submit a claim regarding the 1990 deeds or wills, this 
analysis is not applied to her.  But, because she did sue over these documents initially 
when she filed her first petition in 2006, Susan and David assert that their claims relate 
back to Mary’s original petition.  This Court need not reach this issue because, for the 
reasons discussed above, the claims are time-barred regardless whether measured by the 
2006 or the 2008 filing dates. 
11 See note 5 above regarding the propriety of this joint submission of multiple theories. 
 
13
that J.D. and Linda improperly used J.D.’s powers of attorney to purchase multiple CDs 
in his own name with Vincil and Willa’s funds and to cash other CDs owned by Willa 
and Vincil that had listed Mary and Arthur as payable-on-death beneficiaries, Defendants 
do not claim that they are time-barred.12  Mary’s claims against Linda as trustee are 
barred, nonetheless, because the trial court erred in substituting Linda, as trustee, for J.D.   
Section 537.010 allows tort actions for wrongs done to property interests to 
survive when the alleged wrongdoer is deceased.  It provides in relevant part: 
Actions for wrongs done to property or interests therein may be 
brought against the wrongdoer by the person whose property or interest 
therein is injured … If the wrongdoer is dead, the action also survives and 
may be brought and maintained in the manner set forth in section 537.021. 
 
§ 537.010.13  Section 537.021.1(2) requires that if a defendant dies while a property 
action is pending, the action, if it continues, must proceed against a personal 
                                             
 
12 To the extent that these counts assert misconduct constituting fraud that occurred more 
than 15 years prior to suit, however, they would be time-barred for the reasons noted in 
the preceding section.  
13 The term “property or interests therein” has been interpreted broadly to include injuries 
in tort or injuries to economic interests such as in cases of fraudulent disbursing or taking 
of money.  See, e.g., Breeden v. Hueser, 273 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. App. 2008) (action for 
monetary loss due to payment for medical services that were not provided due to fraud 
constituted damage to monetary or economic interest in property and survived); Foster v. 
Hesse, 43 S.W.2d 891 (Mo. App. 1931) (action against defendant for fraudulent 
disbursement of funds to contractor survived defendant’s death); State ex rel Smith v. 
Greene, 494 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. banc 1973) (claim for damage to car in accident would 
survive death of owner).  See also Gray v. Wallace, 319 S.W.2d 582 (Mo. 1959) (survival 
of actions for personal injury is intended to change common law that personal injury 
claims abate upon death and will be broadly interpreted to include all claims for personal 
injury not barred by section 537.030, which provides that “sections 537.010 and 537.020 
shall not extend to actions for slander, libel, assault and battery and false imprisonment”). 
 
14
representative of the estate appointed by the probate division,14 stating in relevant part: 
1. The existence of a cause of action for an injury to property … which 
action survives the death of the wrongdoer … shall authorize and require 
the appointment by a probate division of the circuit court of: 
 
 
…. 
(2) A personal representative of the estate of a wrongdoer upon the death of 
such wrongdoer; …  Should the plaintiff in such cause of action desire to 
satisfy any portion of a judgment rendered thereon out of the assets of the 
estate of such deceased wrongdoer, such action shall be maintained against 
a personal representative appointed by the probate division of the circuit 
court and the plaintiff shall comply with the provisions of the probate code 
with respect to claims against decedents’ estates …. 
 
As a number of court of appeals cases explain, this means that the probate division 
appoints a personal representative in cases in which the assets of the estate potentially are 
involved.  In re Estate of Hayden, 837 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Mo. App. 1992); Am. Home Assur. 
Co. v. Pope, 487 F.3d 590, 605 (8th Cir. 2007), citing Hayden, 837 S.W.2d at 32.15  
Compliance with sections 537.010 and 537.021.1(2) is necessary for a plaintiff to 
maintain a cause of action against a deceased defendant after her death.  § 537.010;         
§ 537.021.1.   
Rule 52.13 requires a plaintiff to serve a motion to substitute a party for the 
deceased within 90 days after a suggestion of death is filed.  If a party is not properly and 
timely substituted for the deceased in the manner required by section 537.021.1, Rule 
52.13(a)(1) requires that “the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party without 
                                             
 
14 A different procedure applies when the only damages sought are those of the deceased 
defendant’s insurer.  See § 537.021.1(2).  That situation does not exist here and is not 
discussed further. 
15 “A personal representative of an estate is appointed by the probate division of the 
circuit court in the applicable jurisdiction upon the filing of letters of administration with 
the court.”  Johnson v. Akers, 9 S.W.3d 608, 609 (Mo. banc 2000). 
 
15
prejudice.”  Rule 52.13(a)(1). 
 
After J.D.’s death on December 9, 2008, Mary filed suggestions of death on 
December 15, 2008 and timely moved for substitution on March 9, 2008.  But she moved 
to substitute J.D.’s daughter as a defendant.  Defendants objected and directed the court 
to section 537.021.1(2), which, Defendants noted, controlled the substitution of a 
deceased defendant and required the substitution of a personal representative.   
Although Missouri law provides one year in which to open an estate after the 
decedent’s death, § 473.020.2, the record shows, and the parties do not dispute, that no 
estate was opened for J.D. before or after the filing of these pleadings and, consequently, 
no personal representative was appointed.  After a hearing, the trial court sua sponte 
substituted J.D.’s widow, Linda, as trustee of the trust, in J.D.’s place.  No party argues 
on appeal, nor could one, that section 537.021.1(2) permitted the substitution of the 
trustee rather than the personal representative.  Instead, Plaintiffs maintain that “it would 
have been an exercise in futility to open an estate for J.D. Fry since the information 
available to Plaintiffs was that any theoretical estate would have held no assets.”  Further, 
they say, it was the trial court’s idea to substitute J.D.’s widow as trustee.  Therefore, 
they argue, it should not be found to be reversible error.   
These arguments must fail.  Section 537.021 requires the appointment of a 
personal representative as substitute if a claim for damages to property or property 
interests against the deceased defendant is to survive.  § 537.010; Hayden, 837 S.W.2d at 
32.  That the deceased party’s estate contains little or no property does not change this 
requirement.  This Court’s decisions applying section 537.020, which governs the 
 
16
substitution of a personal representative for a deceased party in cases involving personal 
injury (rather than property) claims, are instructive.  In Darrah v. Foster, for example, 
this Court stated that even claims for wrongful death or personal injury when the 
deceased left no property require the appointment of a personal representative:  
Causes of action for wrongful death and for personal injury which survive 
the death of the alleged tortfeasor are sufficient to require the appointment 
of an administrator even though the deceased left no property and the sole 
purpose of the administration is to prosecute actions for death and for 
personal injury. 
 
355 S.W.2d 24, 30 (Mo. 1962); see also Clarke v. Organ, 329 S.W.2d 670, 673 (Mo. banc 
1959).     
 
That neither Linda nor Delbert opened an estate for J.D. did not prevent Plaintiffs 
from opening one.  As section 473.020.1 states, “If no application for letters testamentary 
or of administration is filed by a person entitled to such letters pursuant to section 
473.110 within twenty days after the death of a decedent, then any interested person may 
petition the probate division of the circuit court … for the issuance of letters testamentary 
or of administration.”  Plaintiffs, however, did not do so.   
Due to Plaintiffs’ failure to open an estate and have a personal representative 
appointed, the trial court was unable to appoint a proper substitute for J.D.  Its attempt to 
substitute instead the trustee of J.D.’s trust is not permitted by Missouri statute as to these 
claims alleging misconduct by J.D. personally.  In the absence of the substitution of a 
proper party defendant within 90 days after the suggestion of death was filed, Rule 52.13 
required the trial court to dismiss the claims against J.D. without prejudice.  Rule 52.13; 
Rule 44.01(b); Gillespie v. Rice, 224 S.W.3d 608, 612 (Mo. App. 2006).   
 
17
Because the trial court improperly substituted Linda, as trustee, for J.D., Plaintiffs’ 
causes of action against J.D. did not survive.  § 537.021.1(2).  The trial court was 
required to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against Linda, as trustee, and erred in submitting 
them to the jury.  This Court’s resolution of this issue requires reversal of the $35,000 
judgment in favor of Mary and provides an alternate ground for requiring reversal of the 
$5,500 judgments in favor of David and Susan.   
B. 
Plaintiffs’ Appeal 
i. 
Dismissal of Arthur’s Claims 
Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict on Arthur’s claims.     
Arthur entered into a release of claims agreement with J.D. in which Arthur released all 
known and unknown claims against J.D. in return for $100.  The trial court found that 
Arthur entered the release agreement knowingly, voluntarily, and freely, with knowledge 
of all relevant facts, that the agreement was supported by adequate consideration, and that 
it released and extinguished all of Arthur’s claims.  The court further found that Arthur 
had not met his burden of providing that the release agreement was invalid or 
unknowingly signed. 
On appeal, Arthur argues that these rulings were improper because the record 
raised questions of fact as to whether he signed what is now purported to be the release 
agreement and whether he intended to release unknown claims.  He alleges this is key 
because he only signed the agreement in return for being promised he would not be 
brought into the suit, he did not realize that in signing the agreement he was releasing 
unknown claims, and that had he known he was doing so or had he known what he knows 
 
18
now about the circumstances of the 1990 deed and will, the $100 he received as 
consideration would not have been adequate. 
The record does not support these arguments.  When a party against whom a 
release is asserted admits signing the release, the release purports to rest upon 
consideration, and the release is admitted into evidence, the release is presumed to be 
valid, and the party contesting the release has the burden of proving otherwise.  Hatfield 
v. Cristopher, 841 S.W.2d 761, 766 (Mo. App. 1992); Blackstock v. Kohn, 994 S.W.2d 
947, 954 (Mo. banc 1999) (“Executed releases are presumptively valid”).  The release 
expressly states that, in return for $100, Arthur released “any and all claims … of any 
kind or nature whatsoever, known or unknown, and particularly on account of all 
damages.”  The release further specifically states that it includes any claims pertaining to 
real estate conveyances between Vincil and Willa and Defendants, transactions by J.D. as 
attorney-in-fact for Vincil and Willa, and transactions related to the purchase or 
disposition of the proceeds from any certificates of deposit or contents of the safe deposit 
box by any of the Defendants.   
While Arthur did not initial the first two pages of the three-page release agreement 
and said “it could be possible” he did not see them and he did not recall signing the 
release, he also testified that he did sign it, that it contained his signature, and that he did 
not ask J.D. about the details of Mary’s lawsuit before doing so.  The release is clear that 
it releases known and unknown claims.  It also is clear that the only consideration is 
$100; it does not say anything about not drawing Arthur into a lawsuit as a further 
consideration for the release.  And, while Arthur now claims that $100 is not adequate 
 
19
consideration, he alleges no facts and cites no authority that would permit this Court to 
second-guess the amount he voluntarily chose to take in settlement.   
In sum, Arthur alleges the release was invalid for various reasons, but the evidence 
presented does not support any of the reasons he provides for finding such invalidity.  
The trial court did not err in finding that he failed to satisfy his burden to show that the 
release was invalid. 
Even assuming this Court had found the release agreement invalid and allowed 
him to proceed on his claims, however, the claims he sought to assert are the same ones 
that this Court has found to be barred by the statute of limitations and Plaintiffs’ failure to 
substitute a proper party for J.D.  Accordingly, even were the release invalid, he has 
failed to show prejudicial error.    
ii. 
Dismissal of Claim Against Fry Grain Enterprises 
 
Sustaining in part Defendants’ motion for directed verdict at the close of all the 
evidence, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ conversion claim against Fry Grain 
Enterprises.  Fry Grain operated on the 200-acre and 160-acre tracts of land in which 
Willa held a life estate.  In their petition, Plaintiffs alleged that while farming this land, 
Fry Grain deprived Willa of United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) farm 
payments, rent, and income.  As a result, Plaintiffs alleged, Mary and Arthur received 
less money under Willa’s 1990 will than they otherwise would have received.  
Dismissing the claim, the trial court ruled that the claims were not supported by the 
evidence and the claims alleged conversion of property that is not able to be converted.   
 
Plaintiffs argue that USDA payments are convertible.  They argue further that Fry 
 
20
Grain improperly received USDA payments.  Their point relied on fails to explain 
wherein and why this entitles them to damages, however, as required by Rule 84.04(d), 
which requires that the point relied on “state concisely the legal reasons for [the] claim of 
reversible error” and “explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those 
legal reasons support the claim of reversible error.”  See Smith v. City of St. Louis, 395 
S.W.3d 20, 28 (Mo. banc 2013). 
The argument section of this point is no better.  It fails to cite any facts showing 
that Plaintiffs are entitled to any part of the USDA payments, rent, or income from the 
land.  Plaintiffs’ brief focuses on the time period between 1986 and 1988, when Delbert 
allegedly altered the USDA contract to give Arthur’s 50-percent share of the 1987 
payment to Fry Grain and Arthur quit farming the land.  Plaintiffs admit they knew that 
the payments went to Fry Grain rather than Willa or Arthur at that time.  They do not 
specifically allege any facts pertaining to conversion that occurred after Arthur stopped 
farming the land in 1988.  Therefore, they make no showing that they brought their 
claims within the five-year statute of limitations for conversion.  See § 516.120(1).   
And, while Plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal seem to be premised on the assumption 
that this conversion continued as to USDA payments after 1988, their brief fails to cite 
any specific evidence that any USDA payments were made after 1988 or any authority 
showing that Mary or Arthur legally were entitled to such payments.  (Defendants claim 
to the contrary.)  Plaintiffs’ single-paragraph discussion of the alleged conversion of rent 
and income is particularly bereft of evidence or authority supporting such a claim.  It is 
not this Court’s duty to search the record for such evidence or to make Plaintiffs’ 
 
21
argument for them.   
   
Further, any claim to the payments accrued in Willa and, therefore, upon her death 
would belong to Willa’s estate, if the claim was not time-barred.  Plaintiffs offer no legal 
authority for their claim that they can sue for these payments because, had the payments 
gone to Willa, they believe that she would have passed them on in her will.  
 
 
iii. 
Dismissal of Claims Against Delbert 
Only three claims remained against Delbert after Plaintiffs dropped Count VII 
during trial: one brought by Susan and David for fraud and undue influence arising out of 
the 1990 deeds and wills and two brought by Arthur arising out of Arthur’s release of 
claims agreement.  As discussed above, the trial court properly dismissed Arthur’s claims 
relating to the release agreement.  The trial court also properly dismissed Susan and 
David’s claims for fraud based on the 1990 will and deeds because the reasons those 
claims are barred by the statute of limitations apply equally to Delbert.16  Accordingly, 
no submissible claims remained against Delbert.  
                                             
iv. 
Mary’s Equitable Claim 
 
After the jury returned its verdicts, Plaintiffs moved the trial court to add to the 
final judgment a list of personal property that Mary sought to recover from the family 
homestead.  The motion cited two counts of the petition that sought money damages or, 
in the alternative, an order for delivery of personal property.  The court never entered an 
 
16 As Plaintiffs’ claims against Delbert were time-barred, this Court need not further 
address the additional issue raised as to whether, had the claims not been barred, 
Plaintiffs failed to make a submissible case that Delbert had any involvement in the 
alleged fraud or undue influence. 
 
22
order on this claim, and Plaintiffs argue that this was error.   
While Mary argues that the Defendants knew she wanted this property and that 
she included it on a list she prepared of personal property she wanted from her parents’ 
home, she has not identified why she had a legal or equitable right to receive this specific 
property, as opposed to a certain percentage of the value of all the property bequeathed.  
In fact, Plaintiffs cite no law for the proposition that Mary was entitled to an order 
directing Defendants to give her this property.  Further, a review of the record does not 
show that Willa left Mary this specific property in her will or directed it be held in trust 
for her or that the will referred to a list of personal property that said these items were to 
be left to Mary.  See § 474.333 (permitting will to dispose of personal property by 
separate list).  In the absence of some legal or equitable basis for the trial court to be 
required to award this property to Mary, it did not err in failing to do so.  
Even had Mary identified a basis for her claim to these specific items, she chose 
instead to seek a money judgment for the portion of Willa’s property that she claimed 
should have gone to her.  When a party has the right to pursue one of two inconsistent 
remedies and makes an election, institutes suit, and prosecutes it to final judgment, that 
party thereafter cannot pursue another and inconsistent remedy.  Trimble v. Pracna, 167 
S.W.3d 706, 711 (Mo. banc 2005).  The purpose of the election of remedies doctrine is to 
prevent double recovery for a single injury.  Whittom v. Alexander-Richardson P’ship, 
851 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Mo. banc 1993).  To illustrate: 
[T]he plaintiff whose horse has been stolen can sue the thief for damages or 
for conversion, or he can bring replevin … to get the horse back. But he 
cannot do both, for this would give him both the value of the horse and the 
 
23
horse itself, a form of double recovery. 
 
Id., quoting DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES, § 1.5 at 14 (1973).   
In the petition, Mary requested either money damages or an order for delivery of 
personal property.  Because Mary elected her remedy of monetary damages and received 
a verdict for those damages, the election of remedies doctrine precludes her from 
pursuing her alternative remedy.17   
v. 
Punitive Damages 
Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on punitive damages.  
Punitive damages may not be awarded in the absence of nominal or actual damages.  See, 
e.g., Compton v. Williams Bros. Pipeline Co., 499 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Mo. 1973) (“[A]ctual 
or nominal damages must be recovered before punitive damages can be recovered”); 
Giles v. Riverside Transp., Inc., 266 S.W.3d 290, 296 (Mo. App. 2008) (“[I]t is 
fundamental that a determination of liability is a prerequisite to a finding of damages, 
such that an award of damages cannot survive independent of the accompanying 
determination of liability.  A plaintiff must prevail on his or her underlying claim to 
submit punitive damages to the jury”) (internal citations omitted).    
Because this Court reverses the damage judgments against Defendants, Plaintiffs 
are entitled to no actual damages and the punitive damages issue is rendered moot.   
                                             
 
17 While Mary argues that the jury was aware that she would request the specific property 
after the verdicts were returned and, therefore, did not include the value of that property 
in its verdict, the instructions directed the jury to return the damages to which Mary was 
entitled under the evidence; the instructions did not tell the jury to subtract out the value 
of the specific items.  In any event, as noted, Mary elected her remedy of money 
damages, and her claim was barred for the reasons noted. 
 
24
 
25
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The judgment on the jury verdict for Plaintiffs is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for entry of judgment for Defendants on those claims.  The trial court’s 
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ other claims by directed verdict, refusal to submit punitive 
damages, and refusal to enter an order on Mary’s equitable claim are affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE 
 
 
Russell, C.J., Breckenridge, Fischer,  
Draper and Teitelman, JJ., concur.  
Wilson, J., not participating.