Case Title: People v. Hunter

Citation: 2017 IL 121306

Docket Number: 121306121345

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2017-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 IL 121306 
IN THE  
SUPREME COURT  
OF  
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS  
(Docket Nos. 121306, 121345 cons.) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.  
KEVIN HUNTER, Appellant.—THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,  
Appellee, v. DRASHUN WILSON, Appellant.  
Opinion filed November 30, 2017. 
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and 
Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
OPINION 
¶ 1 
In these consolidated appeals we consider the temporal reach of two legislative 
enactments: (1) an amendment to section 5-130(1)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act of 
1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2016)), which, inter alia, eliminated armed 
robbery while armed with a firearm and aggravated vehicular hijacking while 
armed with a firearm from the list of automatic transfer offenses, and (2) the new 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
juvenile sentencing provisions codified in section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of 
Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016)), which, inter alia, give the 
trial court discretion not to impose otherwise mandatory firearm sentencing 
enhancements. The appellate court rejected defendants’ arguments for retroactive 
application of these statutes to their cases that were pending on direct review when 
the statutes became effective and affirmed defendants’ convictions and sentences. 
People v. Hunter, 2016 IL App (1st) 141904, ¶¶ 62, 73; People v. Wilson, 2016 IL 
App (1st) 141500, ¶ 16. We affirm the judgments of the appellate court, albeit for 
different reasons. 
¶ 2 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
No. 121306—People v. Hunter 
¶ 4 
In June 2011, the State charged defendant Kevin Hunter with aggravated 
vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4) (West 2010)), aggravated kidnapping 
(720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(6) (West 2010)), and armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) 
(West 2010)), all while armed with a firearm. The charges arose out of an incident 
the previous month in which Hunter and two unidentified men robbed Steven 
Maxwell of personal property including his vehicle and kidnapped him, all at 
gunpoint. At the time of the offenses, Hunter was 16 years old. 
¶ 5 
The version of section 5-130(1)(a) of the Act then in effect provided as follows: 
“§ 5-130. Excluded jurisdiction. 
(1)(a) The definition of delinquent minor under Section 5-120 of this 
Article shall not apply to any minor who at the time of an offense was at least 15 
years of age and who is charged with: (i) first degree murder, (ii) aggravated 
criminal sexual assault, (iii) aggravated battery with a firearm where the minor 
personally discharged a firearm ***, (iv) armed robbery when the armed 
robbery was committed with a firearm, or (v) aggravated vehicular hijacking 
when the hijacking was committed with a firearm. 
These charges and all other charges arising out of the same incident shall be 
prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.” 705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 
2010). 
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Pursuant to this statute, Hunter was tried in adult court. 
¶ 6 
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, Hunter was 
convicted on all three counts. The trial court sentenced Hunter to 21 years on each 
count—the 6-year minimum for a Class X felony, plus the mandatory 15-year 
firearm enhancement—to be served concurrently. See 720 ILCS 5/18-4(b) (West 
2010); 720 ILCS 5/10-2(b) (West 2010); 720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West 2010); 730 
ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2010). Hunter appealed. 
¶ 7 
While Hunter’s case was pending in the appellate court, Public Acts 99-69 and 
99-258 became effective.1 Both Public Acts adopted new, identical sentencing 
provisions applicable to defendants under the age of 18 at the time of the 
commission of the offense. Pub. Act 99-69, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding 730 
ILCS 5/5-4.5-105); Pub. Act 99-258, § 15 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding 730 ILCS 
5/5-4.5-105). Subsection (b) of the new sentencing provisions directs that the court 
“may, in its discretion, decline to impose any otherwise applicable sentencing 
enhancement based upon firearm possession, possession with personal discharge, 
or possession with personal discharge that proximately causes great bodily harm, 
permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person.” 730 
ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b) (West 2016). 
¶ 8 
Public Act 99-258 also amended section 5-130(1)(a) of the Act, raising the age 
for automatic transfer to adult court from 15 years to 16 years and eliminating 
armed robbery while armed with a firearm and aggravated vehicular hijacking 
while armed with a firearm from the list of automatic transfer offenses. Pub. Act 
99-258 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a)). 
¶ 9 
In supplemental briefing in the appellate court, Hunter argued that the 
amendment to the Code and the new sentencing provisions in the Act applied 
retroactively and that his case should be remanded for a discretionary transfer 
hearing, as well as a new sentencing hearing. The appellate court held that neither 
1Neither public act contains an effective date, but pursuant to the Effective Date of Laws Act (5 
ILCS 75/0.01 et seq. (West 2014)), because the underlying bills were both “passed” prior to June 1, 
2015 (see 5 ILCS 75/3 (West 2014)), the effective date for both public acts was January 1, 2016 (see 
5 ILCS 75/1(a) (West 2014)). See also Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 10 (“The General Assembly shall 
provide by law for a uniform effective date for laws passed prior to June 1 of a calendar year.”). 
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provision applied retroactively and rejected Hunter’s other claims of error, thus 
affirming his convictions and sentence. Hunter, 2016 IL App (1st) 141904, ¶¶ 20, 
22, 62, 73, 80. We allowed Hunter’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 
(eff. Mar. 15, 2016). 
¶ 10 
No. 121345—People v. Wilson 
¶ 11 
In October 2012, defendant Drashun Wilson was indicted for attempted first 
degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a) (West 2012)) and aggravated battery with a 
firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2012)) in connection with the September 
23, 2012, shooting of Floyd Fulton. At the time of the offenses and indictment, 
Wilson was 17 years old and, under the Act, was tried in adult court. See 705 ILCS 
405/5-120 (West 2012). Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, 
Wilson was found guilty of both offenses. The jury also found that Wilson 
personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm to 
another person. After merging the aggravated battery conviction into the attempted 
murder 
conviction, 
the 
trial 
court 
sentenced 
Wilson 
to 
31 
years’ 
imprisonment—the 6-year minimum for a Class X felony, plus the minimum 
mandatory 25-year firearm enhancement applicable where the defendant 
personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm. See 720 
ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(D) (West 2012); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2012). Wilson 
appealed. 
¶ 12 
While Wilson’s case was pending in the appellate court, Public Acts 99-69 and 
99-258 became effective. In supplemental briefing, Wilson argued that he was 
entitled to be resentenced under section 5-4.5-105(b) of the Code, under which the 
trial court could decline to impose the firearm enhancement. The appellate court 
held that section 5-4.5-105(b) applied prospectively only. Wilson, 2016 IL App 
(1st) 141500, ¶ 16. The appellate court rejected Wilson’s other claims of error and 
affirmed his conviction and sentence. Id. ¶¶ 1, 28, 35, 43, 46-47. 
¶ 13 
We allowed Wilson’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Mar. 
15, 2016)) and consolidated Wilson’s and Hunter’s appeals for review. 
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¶ 14 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 15 
Whether the statutory amendments at issue here apply retroactively to 
defendants’ cases presents an issue of statutory construction. As such, our review 
proceeds de novo. People ex rel. Madigan v. J.T. Einoder, Inc., 2015 IL 117193, 
¶ 27; People v. Amigon, 239 Ill. 2d 71, 84 (2010). 
¶ 16 
I 
¶ 17 
We consider first the amendment to section 5-130(1)(a) of the Act, adopted in 
Public Act 99-258. As noted above, the amendment changed the requirements for 
automatic transfer of a juvenile to adult court, by raising the minimum age from 15 
years to 16 years and by eliminating armed robbery while armed with a firearm and 
aggravated vehicular hijacking while armed with a firearm from the list of 
automatic transfer offenses. Hunter was charged with both of these offenses. 
Relying on People ex rel. Alvarez v. Howard, 2016 IL 120729, Hunter argues that 
the amendment to section 5-130(1)(a) applies retroactively to his case, and because 
the offenses with which he was charged are no longer qualifying offenses for 
automatic transfer to adult court, he requests remand to the juvenile court for a 
discretionary transfer hearing but for purposes of sentencing only. Hunter does not 
challenge his conviction. 
¶ 18 
Howard was decided after we granted Hunter’s petition for leave to appeal. 
There, we addressed the retroactivity of the amendment to section 5-130(1)(a) 
adopted in Public Act 99-258. Although Howard involved the change in the 
minimum age requirement for transfer to adult court, rather than the change in the 
list of automatic transfer offenses that is at issue here, both changes appear in the 
same section of the Act. Thus, Howard informs our analysis in this case. 
¶ 19 
In Howard, the defendant, who was 15 years old, was indicted on multiple 
offenses, including first degree murder. The charges against defendant were 
brought in adult court, pursuant to section 5-130(1)(a) of the Act (705 ILCS 
405/5-130(1)(a) (West 2014)). Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 4. While the 
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defendant’s case was pending in the trial court, Public Act 99-258 became 
effective. The defendant argued that his case must proceed in juvenile court 
because he no longer met the minimum age requirement for transfer to adult court. 
The trial court agreed and transferred the cause to juvenile court. The State sought a 
writ of mandamus directing the trial court to rescind the transfer order. We denied 
the writ. Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶¶ 35-36. 
¶ 20 
In Howard, we reviewed the proper analysis courts must employ when 
determining the temporal reach of a statute. We noted that this court adopted the 
United States Supreme Court’s retroactivity analysis set forth in Landgraf v. USI 
Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 19 (citing 
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27, 36-39 (2001)). 
Under Landgraf, we first ask whether the legislature has clearly indicated the 
statute’s temporal reach. If so, and assuming no constitutional prohibition, the 
legislature’s intent will be given effect. Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 19. If the 
legislature’s intent is not clear, then, under Landgraf, the court must determine 
whether the statute has a retroactive impact, i.e., whether the statute “would impair 
rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, 
or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.” (Internal 
quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d at 38, 
quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280). “If there is no retroactive impact, the statutory 
amendment may be applied retroactively; if there is a retroactive impact, the court 
presumes that the legislature intended the amendment to be prospective only.” Id. 
¶ 21 
Howard made plain, however, that based on section 4 of the Statute on Statutes 
(5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2014)), Illinois courts need never go beyond the first step of the 
Landgraf analysis. Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 20. Section 4 of the Statute on 
Statutes, which has never been amended since its adoption in 1874 (see Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1874, ch. 131, § 4 (Hurd 1874)) states: 
“No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law, whether such former 
law is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed against the former 
law, or as to any act done, any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred, or 
any right accrued, or claim arising under the former law, or in any way 
whatever to affect any such offense or act so committed or done, or any penalty, 
forfeiture or punishment so incurred, or any right accrued, or claim arising 
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before the new law takes effect, save only that the proceedings thereafter shall 
conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such 
proceeding. If any penalty, forfeiture or punishment be mitigated by any 
provisions of a new law, such provision may, by the consent of the party 
affected, be applied to any judgment pronounced after the new law takes effect. 
This section shall extend to all repeals, either by express words or by 
implication, whether the repeal is in the act making any new provision upon the 
same subject or in any other act.” 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016). 
¶ 22 
As Howard explained, section 4 “is a general savings clause, which this court 
has interpreted as meaning that procedural changes to statutes will be applied 
retroactively, while substantive changes are prospective only.” Howard, 2016 IL 
120729, ¶ 20 (citing People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499, 506-07 (2002)). Thus, if the 
temporal reach of the statute is not clearly indicated in its text, then the statute’s 
temporal reach is provided by default in section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. Id. 
¶ 23 
Applying this analysis to Public Act 99-258, Howard noted that the portion of 
the public act amending section 5-130(1)(a) did not indicate its temporal reach, thus 
requiring resort to the default rule in section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. Id. ¶¶ 21, 
28. We agreed with the parties that the amendment to section 5-130(1)(a), 
impacting whether a defendant is tried in juvenile or criminal court, is purely a 
matter of procedure and concluded that, in the absence of a constitutional 
impediment to retroactive application, the amendment applies to “pending cases,” 
including the defendant’s case. Id. 
¶ 24 
Howard rejected the State’s argument that applying the amended statute to the 
defendant’s case, which had been pending in adult court for three years, would run 
afoul of section 4’s requirement that procedural changes only apply “so far as 
practicable” (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2014)). Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 32. We 
observed that transferring the defendant’s case to juvenile court for a transfer 
hearing “is something that is feasible.” Id. 
¶ 25 
Hunter argues that, like Howard, his case was also “pending” on the effective 
date of the amendment, albeit on direct review in the appellate court. Hunter posits 
that because our retroactivity jurisprudence does not distinguish between cases 
pending in the trial court and cases pending on direct review when a statutory 
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amendment becomes effective, Howard requires remand of his case to the juvenile 
court for a discretionary transfer hearing. 
¶ 26 
The State counters that this court’s statement in Howard that the amendment 
applies retroactively to “pending cases” does not mean that it applies broadly to all 
nonfinal cases, i.e., cases that are pending on direct review. The State argues that 
the amendment only applies retroactively to cases pending in criminal court that are 
capable of conforming to the new statute. The State maintains that applying the 
amendment to cases pending on direct review would result in an absurdity, 
requiring a remand in every such case where the legislature made an intervening 
change to a trial court procedure. The State further argues that even if the 
amendment applies retroactively to cases that were pending on direct review at the 
time the amendment became effective, remand to the juvenile court for a 
discretionary transfer hearing in this case is not practicable because Hunter, who is 
now 22 years old, has aged out of the juvenile court system. 
¶ 27 
We agree with Hunter that our retroactivity jurisprudence has not typically 
distinguished between cases that are pending in the trial court and cases pending in 
the appellate court on direct review at the time a statutory amendment becomes 
effective. The same retroactivity analysis that we employed in Howard, where the 
defendant’s case was pending in the trial court when the amendment became 
effective, has also been employed by this court where the defendant’s case was 
pending in the appellate court at the time the amendment became effective. See 
Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d at 508-09 (holding that the general savings clause of section 4 
of the Statute on Statutes prohibited retroactive application of a substantive 
statutory amendment that went into effect while the defendant’s case was pending 
on appeal); accord People v. Atkins, 217 Ill. 2d 66, 71-73 (2005) (holding that under 
section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, a substantive amendment that became effective 
after the defendant was convicted and sentenced would not apply retroactively). 
¶ 28 
Our agreement with Hunter on this point, however, does not lead us to conclude 
that, pursuant to section 4 of the Statute on Statutes and our decision in Howard, 
remand for further proceedings is mandated in this case. The process of statutory 
construction requires more than mechanical application of a rule of law or a 
decision of this court. We have an obligation to construe statutes in a manner that 
will avoid absurd, unreasonable, or unjust results that the legislature could not have 
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intended. People ex rel. Alvarez v. Gaughan, 2016 IL 120110, ¶ 19; Illinois State 
Treasurer v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 39. As 
we recently observed, “the process of statutory construction should not be divorced 
from consideration of real-world results.” People v. Fort, 2017 IL 118966, ¶ 35. 
Here, Hunter’s construction of the amended statute would lead to real-world results 
that the legislature could not have intended. 
¶ 29 
We return to the Howard case, on which Hunter relies. Although we stated in 
Howard that the amendment to section 5-130(1)(a) of the Act applies to “pending 
cases” (Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 28), we did not elaborate as to what that term 
means in the context of applying the default rule of section 4 of the Statute on 
Statutes. Certainly, we were not asked in Howard to consider the retroactivity of a 
procedural statute where, as here, the case was pending in the appellate court, rather 
than the trial court, when the statute became effective. 
¶ 30 
We also observe that our application of section 4 in the Howard case began 
with this statement of the law: “Under section 4, substantive amendments may not 
be applied retroactively, but ‘procedural law changes will apply to ongoing 
proceedings.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id. (quoting People v. Ziobro, 242 Ill. 2d 34, 46 
(2011) (citing section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2006)))). In 
Howard, the trial court proceedings had not yet been concluded. In a real-world 
sense those proceedings were “ongoing.” Indeed, we framed the question in 
Howard as whether, given the statutory amendment, the defendant should 
“continue” to be prosecuted in adult court. Id. ¶ 31. Application of the Statute on 
Statute’s default rule meant that the amended statute, changing the requirements for 
automatic transfer to adult court, would apply retroactively to a pending case, i.e., a 
case in which the trial court proceedings had begun under the old statute but had not 
yet been concluded. 
¶ 31 
Howard is consistent with the language of section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, 
which requires that “the proceedings thereafter”—after the adoption of the new 
procedural statute—“shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the 
time of such proceeding.” (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016). Section 4 
contemplates the existence of proceedings after the new or amended statute is 
effective to which the new procedure could apply. The phrase “ongoing 
proceedings,” used by this court in Ziobro and Howard, conveys this idea. See also 
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People v. Zito, 237 Ill. 434, 438 (1908) (under section 4, “what remained to be 
done” must conform to the mode of procedure under the new act). 
¶ 32 
In Hunter’s case, however, the proceedings in the trial court were completed 
well before the statute was amended. No “ongoing proceedings” exist to which the 
amended statute could apply. Thus, in contrast to Howard, this is not a case where 
we must decide whether the defendant should “continue” to be prosecuted in adult 
court. This is also not a case where remand for further proceedings is necessitated 
by reversible error at trial. See Ziobro, 242 Ill. 2d at 45-46 (where, after reversing 
the trial court’s dismissal of the criminal charges, we instructed that a new 
procedural statute would apply retroactively to the proceedings on remand). 
Although Hunter challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on direct review, the 
appellate court rejected that argument (Hunter, 2016 IL App (1st) 141904, 
¶¶ 13-20), and Hunter does not press that claim, or any other claim of reversible 
error, in this court. Simply stated, there are no “proceedings thereafter” capable of 
“conform[ing]” to the amended statute. 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016). Nothing remains 
to be done. 
¶ 33 
Because Hunter’s trial court proceedings have been concluded, and no further 
trial court proceedings are necessitated by reversible error, applying the amended 
statute retroactively to Hunter’s case would result in this court effectively creating 
new proceedings for the sole purpose of applying a procedural statute that postdates 
his trial and sentence. We have grave concerns about such a result. 
¶ 34 
The Landgraf opinion, from which our retroactivity jurisprudence sprang, 
speaks to this issue. There, the Supreme Court observed that procedural rules may 
often be applied in cases that arose before the rule was enacted. Landgraf, 511 U.S. 
at 275. The Court, however, went on to note: 
“Of course, the mere fact that a new rule is procedural does not mean that it 
applies to every pending case. A new rule concerning the filing of complaints 
would not govern an action in which the complaint had already been properly 
filed under the old regime, and the promulgation of a new rule of evidence 
would not require an appellate remand for a new trial.” Id. n.29. 
¶ 35 
Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, made a similar observation: 
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“A new rule of evidence governing expert testimony, for example, is aimed at 
regulating the conduct of trial, and the event relevant to retroactivity of the rule 
is introduction of the testimony. Even though it is a procedural rule, it would 
unquestionably not be applied to testimony already taken—reversing a case on 
appeal, for example, because the new rule had not been applied at a trial which 
antedated the statute.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 291-92 (Scalia, J., 
concurring, joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.). 
See also Michael S. Gilmore, Application of Statutory Changes to Cases in 
Progress: The Crossroads of the Legislative and Judicial Power—An Analysis of 
Federal and Idaho Law, 34 Idaho L. Rev. 517, 543 (1998) (reviewing Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence in Landgraf and noting that if procedural rule changes were 
truly applied retroactively “there would be retrial of cases every time new statutes 
governing pleadings, appeals, and evidence” were adopted that “would lead to 
different results from the old statutes”). 
¶ 36 
We recognize that our retroactivity jurisprudence, though flowing from 
Landgraf, was tempered by our construction of section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, 
and we presume that the General Assembly adopted Public Act 99-258 with 
knowledge of section 4 and this court’s interpretation thereof. See People v. Villa, 
2011 IL 110777, ¶ 36; People v. Jones, 214 Ill. 2d 187, 199 (2005). But in none of 
the several cases from this court on which Hunter relies did we remand a case to the 
trial court because “the new [procedural] rule had not been applied at a trial which 
antedated the statute.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 291-92 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined 
by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.).2 Remand under such circumstances would create 
2See Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 223 Ill. 2d 318, 333-34 (2006) (holding that curative 
legislation, adopted while the case was on appeal to this court, and which validated the challenged 
tax levy, applied retroactively under the clear language of the statute); Atkins, 217 Ill. 2d at 71-73 
(holding that a substantive amendment to the burglary statute, which became effective after the 
defendant was convicted and sentenced, would not apply retroactively); Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d at 509 
(holding that substantive statutory amendment repealing the offense of which the defendant was 
convicted, which went into effect while the defendant’s case was pending on appeal, would not 
apply retroactively); People v. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d 24, 49-51 (1997) (holding that an amendment 
to the venue statute, which became effective after the trial proceedings concluded, would not apply 
retroactively because the amendment effected a substantive change in the law); Johnson v. Edgar, 
176 Ill. 2d 499, 521-22 (1997) (holding that curative legislation, adopted while the case was pending 
on appeal, would apply retroactively pursuant to the statute’s express language); People v. Kellick, 
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inconvenience and a waste of judicial resources—a real-world result that the 
General Assembly could not have intended. Accordingly, we will not apply the 
amended statute retroactively to Hunter’s case. 
¶ 37 
We reject Hunter’s argument for retroactive application for the further reason 
that new procedural rules only apply to ongoing proceedings “so far as 
practicable.” 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016). We agree with the State that under the facts 
of this case, application of the amended statute is not practicable. 
¶ 38 
Howard equated what is “practicable” to what is “feasible” and concluded in 
that case that transfer to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing was feasible, even 
if not convenient. Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 32. At the time of our decision in 
Howard, the defendant was 19 years old3 and still subject to the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court. See People v. Fiveash, 2015 IL 117669, ¶¶ 14-16 (scope of the Act 
is limited to persons under the age of 21, and therefore, the juvenile court had no 
authority over the 23-year-old defendant). Hunter is now 22 years old. A 
discretionary transfer hearing in the juvenile court is no longer feasible because the 
juvenile court may not exercise jurisdiction over Hunter. Id. 
¶ 39 
We disagree with Hunter that, pursuant to Fort, 2017 IL 118966, and People v. 
Brown, 225 Ill. 2d 188 (2007), retroactive application of the amendment to section 
5-130(1)(a) is yet feasible, despite his age. 
¶ 40 
In Fort, the juvenile defendant was tried in adult court for first degree murder, 
an automatic transfer offense, but convicted of second degree murder, which is not 
an automatic transfer offense. We held that plain error occurred when the trial court 
sentenced the defendant as an adult under the Unified Code of Corrections without 
the State first filing a motion requesting adult sentencing, as required by the Act 
(705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(c)(ii) (West 2008)). Fort, 2017 IL 118966, ¶¶ 30-31. We 
determined that the appropriate remedy was to vacate the defendant’s sentence and 
102 Ill. 2d 162, 181 (1984) (holding that the legislative history of a statute changing the death 
penalty eligibility requirements, that became effective five days after the defendant was sentenced, 
indicated the legislature’s intent that the statute operate retroactively to a date that was 15 days prior 
to the commission of the murder, requiring vacatur of the defendant’s death sentence). 
3The defendant was born on September 4, 1997 (Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 4), and our 
opinion was filed December 1, 2016. 
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remand the matter to the trial court where the State would have the opportunity to 
file an appropriate motion for adult sentencing. Id. ¶ 41. We noted: “Should the trial 
court find after the hearing that defendant is not subject to adult sentencing, the 
proper remedy is to discharge the proceedings against defendant since he is now 
over 21 years of age and is no longer eligible to be committed as a juvenile under 
the Act.” Id. 
¶ 41 
In contrast to Fort, where the case was remanded to adult court to allow the 
State to file a motion in that court requesting adult sentencing, Hunter seeks remand 
for a discretionary transfer hearing, which, he acknowledges, proceeds in the 
juvenile court. See 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)(a) (West 2016). But as already noted, 
Hunter, who is 22 years old, is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court. 
¶ 42 
In Brown, on which Hunter also relies, the juvenile defendant was tried and 
convicted in adult court for attempted murder. Several years later, he filed a 
successive postconviction petition challenging his conviction because the statute 
under which his case had been transferred to adult court was found 
unconstitutional. We held that, because the statute was unconstitutional and void 
ab initio, the defendant’s transfer to adult court based on that statute was also void 
and the defendant was thus entitled to a new transfer hearing. Brown, 225 Ill. 2d at 
199. Although the defendant would have been 25 or 26 years old at the time we 
remanded the matter to the circuit court,4 the State apparently made no argument 
challenging the remand based on the defendant’s age. Brown’s silence on an issue 
that was not raised does not lend support to Hunter’s position here that a remand to 
the juvenile court for a discretionary transfer hearing is feasible, notwithstanding 
that the juvenile court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a 22-year-old defendant. 
¶ 43 
In sum, because the amendment to section 5-130(1)(a) of the Act did not 
become effective until after Hunter’s trial court proceedings were concluded and 
his case was pending in the appellate court; because no reversible error necessitates 
remand for further proceedings to which the amended statute could apply; and 
because Hunter, in any event, is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
4The defendant was 16 in 1997 at the time of the offense (Brown, 225 Ill. 2d at 192), and our 
opinion in Brown was filed in 2007. 
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court, making remand impracticable, we hold that the amendment to section 
5-130(1)(a) of the Act does not apply retroactively to Hunter’s case. 
¶ 44 
II 
¶ 45 
We next consider the new juvenile sentencing provisions in the Code, adopted 
in Public Acts 99-69 and 99-258. Both public acts adopted identical provisions 
titled “SENTENCING OF INDIVIDUALS UNDER THE AGE OF 18 AT THE 
TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE.” Pub. Act 99-69, § 10 (eff. 
Jan. 1, 2016) (adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105); Pub. Act 99-258, § 15 (eff. Jan. 1, 
2016) (also adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105). The new provisions state in relevant 
part: 
“(a) On or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 99th 
General Assembly, when a person commits an offense and the person is under 
18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, the court, at the 
sentencing hearing conducted under Section 5-4-1, shall consider the following 
additional factors [enumerated 1 through 9] in mitigation in determining the 
appropriate sentence: 
* * * 
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), the court may sentence the 
defendant to any disposition authorized for the class of the offense of which he 
or she was found guilty as described in Article 4.5 of this Code, and may, in its 
discretion, decline to impose any otherwise applicable sentencing enhancement 
based upon firearm possession, possession with personal discharge, or 
possession with personal discharge that proximately causes great bodily harm, 
permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person.” 
730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016). 
¶ 46 
Section 5-4.5-105 of the Code became effective while defendants’ cases were 
pending in the appellate court on direct review. In each case, the appellate court 
rejected the defendant’s argument that subsection (b), which gives the court 
discretion not to impose otherwise mandatory firearm enhancements, applies 
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retroactively to his case. Hunter, 2016 IL App (1st) 141904, ¶ 43; Wilson, 2016 IL 
App (1st) 141500, ¶ 16. In Hunter’s case, the appellate court held that the 
legislature clearly indicated in subsection (a) that the new provisions apply to 
sentencing hearings “ ‘[o]n or after the effective date’ ” of the statute, January 1, 
2016. Hunter, 2016 IL App (1st) 141904, ¶ 43. In Wilson’s case, the appellate court 
also relied on the language in subsection (a), holding that a sentencing court’s 
consideration of the additional mitigating factors set forth in subsection (a) and the 
sentencing court’s discretion not to impose a firearm enhancement as set forth in 
subsection (b) may be exercised only when an individual that is under 18 years of 
age commits an offense on or after the effective date of the statute—January 1, 
2016. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 16. 
¶ 47 
Defendants argue that the appellate court erred in applying the language in 
subsection (a), which limits its temporal reach, to subsection (b). According to 
defendants, the legislature’s decision to omit such limiting language from 
subsection (b) means that the legislature intended subsection (b) to apply 
retroactively. The State counters that section 5-4.5-105 establishes a 
comprehensive sentencing scheme, and that the legislature’s expression of 
temporal reach in subsection (a) applies to the entire scheme. 
¶ 48 
Under our well-settled rules of statutory construction, “where the legislature 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another 
section of the same statute, courts will presume that the legislature acted 
intentionally in the exclusion or inclusion” (People v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659, ¶ 30) 
and that the legislature intended different results (In re K.C., 186 Ill. 2d 542, 549-50 
(1999)). Here, the fact that the legislature included language in subsection (a) 
limiting its temporal reach but omitted such language in subsection (b) is indicative 
that the legislature intended different results and that the limiting language in 
subsection (a) applies only to that subsection. Thus, only the trial court’s obligation 
set forth in subsection (a) to consider additional factors in mitigation at sentencing 
is controlled by the limiting language in that same subsection. 
¶ 49 
Had the legislature intended all of the new sentencing provisions to have the 
same temporal reach as the provisions in subsection (a), the legislature could have 
included the limiting language in a separate subsection so stating, as it did in 
connection with another amendment adopted as part of the same public act. See 
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Pub. Act 99-258, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-805, adding 
705 ILCS 405/5-805(7) ( “[t]he changes made to this Section *** apply to a minor 
who has been taken into custody on or after the effective date of this amendatory 
Act”)). The legislature, however, did not do so with respect to the new juvenile 
sentencing provisions. 
¶ 50 
The legislature also could have preceded all of the subsections of the new 
statute with a statement indicating that all of the new provisions have the same 
temporal reach, as it did when it added another new section to the Act. See Pub. Act 
99-258, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding 705 ILCS 405/5-822 (providing, prior to the 
numbered paragraphs, for data collection to commence “[o]n the effective date of 
this amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly”)). The legislature did not do so. 
¶ 51 
We presume that the legislature acted intentionally when it included the 
limiting language in subsection (a) but omitted that same language in subsection 
(b), and we therefore agree with defendants that the appellate court erred in 
applying the language in subsection (a) to subsection (b). That said, we disagree 
with defendants that the omission of that language in subsection (b) means that the 
legislature must have intended that subsection (b) apply retroactively to cases that 
were pending on direct review when the statute became effective. Just as we will 
not read the limiting language of subsection (a) into subsection (b), neither will we 
inject into the statute an unexpressed provision requiring retroactive application of 
subsection (b). See King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 26 
(2005) (courts may not, in the guise of statutory construction, annex new provisions 
not expressed by the legislature). 
¶ 52 
Because the statute is silent as to the temporal reach of subsection (b), we once 
again refer to section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. Although the parties dispute 
whether subsection (b) is properly labeled “procedural” or “substantive,” we need 
not decide that issue. Rather, we agree with the State that, under section 4, 
subsection (b) of the new statute cannot apply to Hunter and Wilson, who were 
sentenced before the statute took effect. 
¶ 53 
The second sentence of section 4 of the Statute on Statutes expressly provides: 
“If any penalty, forfeiture or punishment be mitigated by any provisions of a 
new law, such provision may, by the consent of the party affected, be applied to 
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any judgment pronounced after the new law takes effect.” 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 
2016). 
¶ 54 
In People v. Hansen, 28 Ill. 2d 322, 340-41 (1963), we held that the defendant 
was not entitled to be resentenced under the new criminal code, which went into 
effect just 13 days after he was sentenced, because, under section 4, “a punishment 
mitigated by a new law is applicable only to judgments after the new law takes 
effect.” Similarly, in People v. Bradford, 106 Ill. 2d 492, 504 (1985), we held that, 
under section 4, the defendant was not eligible to be sentenced under a statutory 
amendment that became effective while his case was pending in this court because 
he had already been sentenced prior to the statute’s effective date. Where, however, 
a defendant’s sentence is vacated on appeal and the matter remanded for 
resentencing, under section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, the defendant may elect to 
be sentenced under the law in effect at the time of the new sentencing hearing. 
People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 12 (per curiam) (vacating the defendant’s 
sentence as unconstitutional and remanding to the trial court where, pursuant to 
section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, the defendant was entitled to be resentenced 
under the new juvenile sentencing provisions). 
¶ 55 
Here, no dispute exists that defendants were sentenced well before the new 
juvenile sentencing provisions, including subsection (b), became effective on 
January 1, 2016.5 Further, defendants make no claim that error occurred in the trial 
court that would require vacatur of their sentences and remand for resentencing, 
thus giving them the option to be sentenced under subsection (b). 
¶ 56 
Defendants’ sole argument against applying the second sentence of section 4 in 
the present case is that subsection (b) of the new statute does not mitigate 
punishment. We disagree. To “mitigate” means “to make less severe.” Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary 1447 (1993); see Black’s Law Dictionary 1154 
(10th ed. 2014). Subsection (b) provides that the trial court “may, in its discretion, 
decline to impose any other applicable [firearm] sentencing enhancement.” 730 
ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b) (West 2016). Thus, in the case of Hunter, who was found 
guilty of aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated kidnapping, and armed 
robbery, all while armed with a firearm, application of subsection (b) would mean 
5Hunter was sentenced on May 29, 2014. Wilson was sentenced on May 2, 2014. 
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that the low end of the sentencing range would be reduced from 21 years (the 6-year 
minimum sentence for a Class X felony, plus the mandatory 15-year firearm 
enhancement) to 6 years (the minimum unenhanced sentence for a Class X felony). 
In the case of Wilson, who was found guilty of attempted first degree murder where 
he personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, 
application of subsection (b) would mean that the low end of the sentencing range 
would be reduced from 31 years (the 6-year minimum sentence for a Class X 
felony, plus the mandatory 25-year minimum firearm enhancement) to 6 years (the 
minimum unenhanced sentence for a Class X felony). We conclude that subsection 
(b) of the new juvenile sentencing provisions mitigates punishment because the 
potential sentence is “less severe” than under the prior sentencing scheme. 
Accordingly, defendants are not eligible to be sentenced under subsection (b). The 
appellate court came to the correct conclusions, but for the wrong reasons. 
¶ 57 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 58 
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the judgments of the appellate 
court. 
¶ 59 
Affirmed. 
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