Case Title: State v. Iron Shell

Citation: 191 N.W.2d 803

Docket Number: 

State: south-dakota

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1971-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
191 N.W.2d 803 (1971) STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Frederick IRON SHELL, Defendant and Appellant. No. 10792. Supreme Court of South Dakota. November 19, 1971. Ron Schmidt, Pierre, for defendant and appellant. Gordon Mydland, Atty. Gen., C. J. Kelly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and respondent. WINANS, Judge. In the early evening hours of November 22, 1968, Mrs. Myrtle Wilhelm was on duty alone as night manager of Price's Motel in Rapid City, South Dakota. She was acting as registration clerk. At approximately 6:30 p. m. of that day two men entered the office of the motel. One of the men inquired for the use of the rest room and was told by Mrs. Wilhelm that the motel had no public rest room, but there was one in a filling station across the street. He turned and walked back toward the door. The other man, later identified by Mrs. Wilhelm as the defendant herein, stayed at the registration desk, laid his towel-wrapped hand on the desk and nodded toward the cash register and told Mrs. Wilhelm to give him everything in the cash register or he would blow her head off. She complied with such request and collecting the bills from the cash register handed them to him. He took the money and directed Mrs. Wilhelm to get down on the floor and stay there five minutes or he'd blow her head off. She got down on the floor and stayed there until she heard the office door close. She then telephoned Richard Price, the owner of the motel, and the Rapid City police what had occurred. Police officers Schramm and Childs responded to the call within minutes and received from Mrs. Wilhelm a general description of the two robbers. The two officers then proceeded to the M & W Cabins one block east and across the street from the Price Motel, to enlist the aid of officer Preble in their investigation of the robbery. Officer Preble was investigating an attempted robbery of Bus'z Liquor Store on east North Street. From the liquor store he had gone to cabin #17 at the M & W Cabins and within minutes after arriving there the defendant and his companion, Francis Stands, also arrived at the doorway of this cabin, both breathing heavily *804 as if from running. Stands was observed by officer Preble removing an orange sweater and handing it to the defendant who put it on. He asked the two men for identification which Stands produced, but Iron Shell was unable to produce. Officer Preble observed that the defendant had a large lump of something in his pocket and upon inquiry, defendant removed a large roll of bills from this pocket. Defendant explained that he had been working and had earned the money, and replaced it in his pocket. Officers Schramm and Childs then arrived at cabin #17 and informed officer Preble that a bunch of bills was taken from Price's Motel and related a general description of the robbers, given them by Mrs. Wilhelm; this general description was consistent with the general appearance of defendants Iron Shell and Stands. Sergeant Preble asked them to accompany the officers to Price's Motel for possible identification as the robbers. At the motel Mrs. Wilhelm was asked whether she could identify the two men and responded, "yes, I could". The policemen then brought the men in and they were identified by Mrs. Wilhelm as "Those are the ones". From the time of the robbery to the time of this identification approximately thirty minutes had elapsed. In the identifying process by Mrs. Wilhelm the two men were not required to talk, walk around the room or perform in any way, but were required to stand before the registration desk. Mrs. Wilhelm also made an in-court identification of the defendant as one of the robbers and in her testimony at this time she identified the sweater as having been worn by Mr. Stands when the two men first entered the motel and as having been worn by the defendant on the second occasion when they were brought in for identification. Defendant was charged with the offense of robbery and entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental illness. He was tried to a jury and found guilty of robbery in the first degree. The questions presented by defendant's appeal by assignments of error are two, as follows: In consideration of defendant's assignment of error concerning identification, we are at once confronted with three decisions of the United States Supreme Court decided June 12, 1967. Those cases are United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178; and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199. We are also mindful of our own case of Utsler v. State, 84 S.D. 360, 171 N.W.2d 739, at p. 743, in which this court adopted the following language: Utsler also reached the United States Court of Appeals, Utsler v. Erickson, 8th Circuit, 440 F.2d 140, where that court among other things held that "police in investigating a probable offense may ask preliminary questions on identification and the recent whereabouts of persons under suspicion in order to proceed with the investigation and quickly eliminate those who appear to be beyond suspicion." The Wade and Gilbert decisions have caused considerable difficulty and differences of opinion in their application to the fact situations that are subject of appeal to the state courts, and even federal courts. For instance, the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of People v. Palmer, 41 Ill. 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173, appears to have adopted the view that Wade and Gilbert apply only to post-indictment confrontations. There is no doubt the identification lineup which was found to be violative of defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment in Wade and Gilbert were in both cases post-indictment and defendant's counsel was not present. Holding contrary to the Illinois position is the State of California in People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 461 P.2d 643. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas in an identification case wrote: The Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Massachusetts in the case of Commonwealth v. Bumpus, 354 Mass. 494, 238 N.E.2d 343, has set some guidelines which we feel are sound. Bumpus was found guilty upon an indictment charging breaking and entering a building in the nighttime with intent to steal. The facts of that case, in short, are: In court Greenberg identified Bumpus as the intruder and he also said that Bumpus was with Fallon when he came back. Bumpus argued that admission of the incourt identification was in violation of Wade, Gilbert and Stovall, supra. The Court said: The Massachusetts court analyzed the Wade, Gilbert and Stovall cases and we borrow from their analysis: 1 The opinion * * * also said that `[q]uite different considerations' governed testimony of witnesses `that they identified Gilbert at the lineup,' because `[t]hat testimony is the direct result of the illegal lineup.' It then proceeded, `The State is therefore not entitled to an opportunity to show that that testimony had an independent source. Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the accused's constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup.'" After the above analysis of the Wade, Gilbert and Stovall cases the Supreme *807 Court of Massachusetts applied it to their own case in the following language, which we think especially appropriate to our case: They further held in the Bumpus case that "The `totality of the circumstances' * * * shows no violation, intentional or otherwise, of due process of law in this confrontation at the culmination of a still continuing series of events." They further held that there was no improper supporting of an in-court identification by evidence of prior identification. The Supreme Court of Montana in the case of State v. Borchert, Mont., 479 P.2d 454, has adopted a similar position to the Massachusetts court in that they held the decisions of Wade and Gilbert were not binding where the lineup was immediately following the defendant's arrest and prior to his being charged and the appointment of counsel, even though the pretrial lineup occurred after the date of those decisions. They then considered the question of whether the pretrial identification was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to mistaken identification that the defendant was denied due process of law. Stovall v. Denno, supra. The court in Borchert said: The Supreme Court of Indiana, in McPhearson v. State, 253 N.E.2d 226, had before it the question of whether or not a defendant's right to counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings against him was violated by virtue of the fact that he was taken back to the service station immediately after apprehension to be identified without benefit of counsel. McPhearson was apprehended by police within minutes after the commission of the crime and was taken directly to the service station where he was identified by Hodgin as one of the robbers of the station. We think the court in an excellent reasoned opinion which we adopt in our case stated the right decision in the following language: In view of the foregoing decisions which we believe to be applicable to our case, we hold that the confrontation between Myrtle Wilhelm and the defendant, Iron Shell, conducted at the motel and the subsequent testimony describing that confrontation and the in-court identification of defendant Iron Shell by Myrtle Wilhelm were not violative of defendant's constitutional rights to due process of law and to counsel. The defendant has challenged Instructions 4 and 14 because he claims they placed the burden of proving insanity upon the defendant, Iron Shell. We believe he is in error. We have considered all of the instructions which were given by the court and especially those having to do with the burden of proof, and hold they correctly state the law in regard to the burden of proof of insanity in a criminal action. The statutory law of this state, SDCL 22-3-1, provides in part: The instructions which were objected to were couched in the language of the statutes and they further placed upon the state the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Instructions must be considered as a whole to determine whether the instructions as given were prejudicial to the defendant in a criminal case. State v. Brennan, 1891, 2 S.D. 384, 50 N.W. 625; State v. Bjelkstrom, 1905, 20 S.D. 1, 104 N.W. 481; State v. Montgomery, 1910, 26 S.D. 539, 128 N.W. 718; State v. Sonnenschein, 1916, 37 S.D. 585, 159 N.W. 101; State v. James, 1917, 39 S.D. 263, 164 N.W. 91; State v. Sturgis, 1929, 54 S.D. 245, 222 N.W. 681. Affirmed. BIEGELMEIER, P. J., and HANSON and WOLLMAN, JJ., concur.