Case Title: State v. Bussey

Citation: 321 N.C. 92, 361 S.E.2d 564

Docket Number: 712A86

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1987-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
361 S.E.2d 564 (1987)
321 N.C. 92
STATE of North Carolina
v.
Norville BUSSEY.
No. 712A86.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
November 5, 1987.
*565 Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen. by Steven F. Bryant, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the state.
Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender by Geoffrey C. Mangum, Asst. Appellate Defender, Raleigh, for defendant.
MARTIN, Justice.
For the reasons stated below, we find the defendant's assignment of error to be without merit and hold that he received a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.
The record reveals that the jury began its deliberations on 9 July 1986 after the court's customary morning break. The jury recessed for lunch and resumed its deliberations. Later, the jury sent word that it wished to pose a question to the court. The forewoman told the trial judge that the jury was "deadlocked." The judge responded by asking whether the jurors had taken any polls and was told that two polls had been taken. He then asked for "the numerical division" on each poll, cautioning the forewoman first that he wanted, "Just numbers, now. How many one side or how many the other, but don't tell me which one is voting for what." The judge was told that the split was eight and four on the first poll and remained so when the second poll was taken following further deliberations after the lunch recess. The judge then sent the jurors back to continue their deliberations, having advised them as follows:
The jurors deliberated for the remainder of the afternoon. When the jury returned to the courtroom for the overnight recess, the trial judge inquired, "Has there been any change in the position of your jury that you reported to us earlier?" He was told the split was then nine to three. The judge responded:
The jury resumed its deliberations the next day and after "some time" returned the verdicts of guilty.
Defendant's sole assignment of error concerns the trial judge's instructions and remarks to the jury following a report by it that it was deadlocked. Because defendant made no objection to the additional instructions or remarks by the trial judge, the plain error standard is applicable. State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 300 S.E.2d 375 (1983). It is defendant's contention that the judge coerced a guilty verdict, thereby violating defendant's right to a fair trial and an impartial jury under both the federal and state constitutions and N.C. G.S. §§ 15A-1232 and -1235. Because defendant failed to raise the alleged constitutional issues before the trial court, he has waived these arguments, and they may not be raised for the first time in this Court. State v. Mitchell, 317 N.C. 661, 346 S.E.2d 458 (1986); Wilcox v. Highway Comm., 279 N.C. 185, 181 S.E.2d 435 (1971). We turn then to the question of whether the trial judge's instructions and remarks constitute plain error under the applicable statute and decisions of this Court.
Defendant's case is for all relevant intents and purposes on all fours with State v. Fowler, 312 N.C. 304, 322 S.E.2d 389 (1984), which we find controls its disposition. Defendant resurrects the argument made in Fowler that under Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 47 S. Ct. 135, 71 L. Ed. 345 (1926), inquiry by the trial judge into the numerical division is prohibited per se because it is coercive of jury minorities. In Fowler, we concluded that, "[a]t most, Brasfield sets out a rule of federal practice and is not binding on our courts." 312 N.C. at 308, 322 S.E.2d  at 392. In Fowler, we also rejected the proposition that a trial judge's questions about the numerical division of a jury constituted a per se violation of article I, § 24 of the North Carolina Constitution. We held, rather, that the proper analysis was whether in considering the totality of the circumstances *567 the inquiry had been coercive, and explained why the judge's ability to inquire into numerical divisions was to be preserved.
312 N.C. at 308-09, 322 S.E.2d  at 392. Nothing in this case prompts us to alter our view as to the proper standard to be applied in analyzing the propriety of a trial judge's inquiry into the numerical division. We continue to adhere to Fowler.
We hold that in the totality of the circumstances the challenged inquiry was not coercive of the jury's verdict. The record shows that the presiding judge made it perfectly clear from the outset that he did not wish to be told whether the majority favored guilt or innocence. He was at all times respectful of the jury, never impugning its efforts or threatening it with being held for unreasonable periods of time to accomplish a unanimous verdict. The judge was confronted with a report of deadlock after rather scant deliberation on either side of the lunch recess on the day the jury first retired. He properly exercised his discretion to hold the jurors to their duty to deliberate thoroughly together before concluding that they were indeed unable to agree. The judge's additional instructions in response to the first inquiry of the jury hew closely to the language of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1235. They are notable for the balance he achieved between recalling the jurors to their duty to deliberate fully and reminding them that their duty also required them to stand fast for their convictions after full reflection. Nor is there the slightest reference in his remarks to burdens on the administration of justice, to wasted court resources, or to the necessity of empanelling another jury in the event of a mistrial. The trial judge's instructions and remarks were well within the rules established in State v. Fowler, 312 N.C. 304, 322 S.E.2d 389, and State v. Alston, 294 N.C. 577, 243 S.E.2d 354 (1978).
The trial judge held a second, very brief colloquy with the jury on the second day of its deliberations. Upon asking if there had been any change in its position, he was told that the division was then nine to three. The judge responded, "You're making progress." This remark, if taken out of context, might be considered of *568 questionable propriety. In the context of the court's previous lengthy additional instructions, however, the remark could only be taken to mean that the jury was making progress towards determining whether it could conscientiously agree on a verdict. The judge's final remark to the jurors as he sent them home for their overnight recess was that he hoped that when they returned they would "be able to resolve the matter." He thus again made it clear that what he sought was resolution after full reflection, not one outcome or another. Although we find the trial judge's remark about "making progress" does not constitute error, much less plain error, the better practice would be for trial judges to refrain from using such expressions.
NO ERROR.