Case Title: State ex rel. JobsOhio v. Goodman

Citation: 2012-Ohio-4425

Docket Number: 2012-1356

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-09-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. JobsOhio v. Goodman, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4425.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-4425 
THE STATE EX REL. JOBSOHIO v. GOODMAN, DIR. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. JobsOhio v. Goodman,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4425.] 
Cause dismissed—Relator essentially seeks a declaratory judgment or an 
advisory opinion on the constitutionality of 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1 and 
2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 153. 
(No. 2012-1356—Submitted September 11, 2012—Decided September 28, 2012.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an original action in mandamus by relator, JobsOhio, 
asking this court to (1) find that legislation authorizing the creation of JobsOhio to 
promote economic development in the state and to assume responsibility for the 
merchandising and sale of alcohol in the state is constitutional and (2) compel 
respondent, Ohio Department of Commerce Director David Goodman, to execute 
an agreement to transfer the state’s liquor business to JobsOhio.  We dismiss the 
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cause because it does not raise a justiciable controversy, essentially seeking either 
a declaratory judgment or an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of the 
statute. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} The General Assembly enacted and Governor John Kasich signed 
2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1 (“H.B. 1”), effective February 18, 2011.  Under H.B. 1, 
the governor is “authorized to form a nonprofit corporation, to be named 
‘JobsOhio,’ with the purposes of promoting economic development, job creation, 
job retention, job training, and the recruitment of business to this state.”  R.C. 
187.01.  R.C. 187.01(B) through (D) provide that the governor is the chair of the 
board of directors of JobsOhio and that he appoints the remaining eight directors. 
{¶ 3} In accordance with R.C. 187.01, the governor filed articles of 
incorporation for JobsOhio with the secretary of state’s office on July 5, 2011.  
According to its articles of incorporation, JobsOhio was organized and is to be 
operated “for the purposes of promoting economic development, job creation, job 
retention, job training, and the recruitment of business to the State of Ohio.”  The 
governor thereafter appointed people to serve on the board of directors for 
JobsOhio.  R.C. 187.01(B) and 187.02.  Pursuant to Section 5 of H.B. 1, the Ohio 
Department of Development (“ODOD”) set aside $1,000,000 “to establish and 
operate the JobsOhio corporation established in Chapter 187. of the Revised 
Code.”  JobsOhio and ODOD negotiated and executed an “agreement for 
services” pursuant to R.C. 187.04(A), and that agreement was approved by the 
Controlling Board of the state. 
{¶ 4} In June 2011, the General Assembly enacted and the governor 
signed 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 153 (“H.B. 153”), which, inter alia, authorized the 
state to transfer to JobsOhio all or a portion of its alcohol-distribution system for a 
transfer price payable by JobsOhio to the state.  See R.C. 4313.02(A) and 
4313.01(A). 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 5} Pursuant to R.C. 4313.02(E), as enacted in H.B. 153, JobsOhio, the 
Ohio Office of Budget and Management (“OBM”), and the Ohio Department of 
Commerce (“ODC”), negotiated a contract to provide for the continuing operation 
of the state’s alcohol business by the state’s division of liquor control.  The terms 
of the “operations services agreement” were finalized, and it was approved by the 
Controlling Board. 
{¶ 6} In September 2011, in accordance with R.C. 4313.02(C)(2), 
JobsOhio and OBM began negotiating the terms of a “franchise-and-transfer 
agreement” in which the state would grant to JobsOhio or its nonprofit corporate 
affiliate, in exchange for a payment from JobsOhio to the state, a franchise on the 
state’s liquor business for up to 25 years.  As required by the statute, respondent, 
ODC Director David Goodman, was consulted regarding the terms of the 
agreement.  R.C. 4313.02(C)(2). 
{¶ 7} After negotiations were concluded, JobsOhio and its wholly owned 
subsidiary, JobsOhio Beverage System, signed the franchise-and-transfer 
agreement on August 7, 2012.  OBM Director Timothy Keen also signed the 
agreement on August 7.  See R.C. 4313.02(C)(2). 
{¶ 8} By letter dated August 8, 2012, Mark Kvamme, the JobsOhio 
interim president and chief investment officer, forwarded a copy of the signed 
franchise-and-transfer agreement to ODC Director Goodman for his signature and 
advised Goodman that his “signature is the only step remaining before we may 
proceed with the proposed transfer.” 
{¶ 9} By letter dated and delivered August 9, 2012, Goodman refused to 
execute the franchise-and-transfer agreement.  His letter explains that although he 
supports JobsOhio and its mission, acknowledges that the agreement and the 
negotiating process complied with R.C. Chapter 4313, and questions the validity 
of constitutional challenges raised against H.B. 1 and H.B. 153, he believes that 
his oath of office to uphold the Ohio Constitution precludes him from executing 
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the agreement until the Ohio Supreme Court addresses the merits of the 
constitutional claims. 
{¶ 10} On the day following ODC Director Goodman’s refusal to sign the 
franchise-and-transfer agreement, August 10, 2012, JobsOhio filed this action for 
a writ of mandamus to “be issued to Respondent Goodman finding that the 
Legislation [H.B. 1 and 153] is constitutional and ordering Respondent to execute 
the Franchise and Transfer Agreement on behalf of the State, in accordance with 
R.C. § 4313.02(C)(2).”  Goodman filed an answer and a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings.  In his answer, Goodman admits all the pertinent facts and concurs 
with JobsOhio’s allegation that “[e]xercise of the Court’s jurisdiction is necessary 
to allow [JobsOhio] the opportunity to timely adjudicate its claim against 
[Goodman], and to provide a swift and conclusive resolution to any and all 
questions regarding the constitutionality of the Legislation.”  JobsOhio filed a 
memorandum in opposition to Goodman’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
{¶ 11} This cause is now before the court for S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.5 
determination. 
Analysis 
{¶ 12} We must now determine whether dismissal, an alternative writ, or 
a peremptory writ is appropriate.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.5(C).  Dismissal is required if it 
appears beyond doubt, after presuming the truth of all material factual allegations 
of JobsOhio’s complaint and making all reasonable inferences in its favor, that 
JobsOhio is not entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus.  See 
State ex rel. Johnson v. Richardson, 131 Ohio St.3d 120, 2012-Ohio-57, 961 
N.E.2d 187, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 13} For the reasons that follow, sua sponte dismissal of this case 
without reaching the merits of the constitutional claims is warranted. 
{¶ 14} First, a review of the complaint—as well as Goodman’s motion for 
judgment on the pleadings—indicates that the real object sought is a declaratory 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
judgment, which this court lacks original jurisdiction to grant.  ProgressOhio.org, 
Inc. v. Kasich, 129 Ohio St.3d 449, 2011-Ohio-4101, 953 N.E.2d 329, ¶ 2, citing 
State ex rel. Ministerial Day Care Assn. v. Zelman, 100 Ohio St.3d 347, 2003-
Ohio-6447, 800 N.E.2d 21, ¶ 22 (“neither this court nor the court of appeals has 
original jurisdiction over claims for declaratory judgment”).  If the allegations of 
a mandamus complaint indicate that the real object sought is a declaratory 
judgment, the complaint does not state a viable claim in mandamus and must be 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  State ex rel. Miller v. Warren Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 130 Ohio St.3d 24, 2011-Ohio-4623, 955 N.E.2d 379, ¶ 21.  In 
assessing the true nature of a mandamus claim, we examine the complaint.  State 
ex rel. Obojski v. Perciak, 113 Ohio St.3d 486, 2007-Ohio-2453, 866 N.E.2d 
1070, ¶ 13.  Although JobsOhio’s complaint is couched in terms of compelling 
ODC Director Goodman to comply with his affirmative duty under R.C. 
4313.02(C)(2) to execute the franchise-and-transfer agreement, it actually seeks 
an expedited ruling from this court declaring H.B. 1 and 153 constitutional, so as 
to preclude any further challenges. 
{¶ 15} Second, mandamus is not available if the relator has an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Nickleson v. Mayberry, 131 
Ohio St.3d 416, 2012-Ohio-1300, 965 N.E.2d 1000, ¶ 2; R.C. 2731.05.  JobsOhio 
has an adequate remedy by way of a declaratory-judgment action in common 
pleas court to raise its claim that H.B. 1 and 153 are constitutional.  The cases that 
JobsOhio and Director Goodman cite in which the court decided the 
constitutionality of legislation in the context of mandamus cases, see, e.g., State 
ex rel. Ohio Gen. Assembly v. Brunner, 114 Ohio St.3d 386, 2007-Ohio-3780, 872 
N.E.2d 912; State ex rel. Duerk v. Donahey, 67 Ohio St.2d 216, 423 N.E.2d 429 
(1981); and State ex rel. Shkurti v. Withrow, 32 Ohio St.3d 424, 513 N.E.2d 1332 
(1987), are distinguishable because in those cases, there was no evidence or 
inference of any agreement on the part of the parties to obtain an advisory opinion 
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on the constitutionality of legislation.  Instead, all the cited cases involved actual 
controversies between genuinely adverse parties. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 16} Based on the foregoing, it appears beyond doubt that JobsOhio’s 
mandamus claim does not properly invoke the original jurisdiction of the court.  
We will not decide constitutional claims raised by parties who seek an advisory 
declaratory judgment for which they have adequate remedies in the ordinary 
course of law.  Thus, we sua sponte dismiss the cause.  This result renders moot 
all pending motions, including the motion to intervene and the motions of amici 
curiae for leave to submit briefs on the merits of the constitutional claims. 
Cause dismissed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, and MCGEE 
BROWN, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
CUPP, J., dissents and would (1) grant the motions of the Ohio 
Manufacturers’ Association, the Columbus Partnership, Ohio Bankers League, the 
Ohio Chamber of Commerce, and the Ohio Council of Retail Merchants for leave 
to file briefs in support of relator; (2) grant the motion to intervene as respondents 
filed by Progress Ohio.org, Senator Michael Skindell, and Representative Dennis 
Murray Jr.; (3) expressly reserve ruling on the motion to dismiss filed by the 
prospective intervenors at this time; and (4) grant an alternative writ and issue a 
schedule for the presentation of evidence and briefs. 
O’DONNELL, J., not participating. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 17} I dissent.  I would grant an alternative writ.  This court’s 
consideration of original actions that address the constitutionality of statutes is 
“limited to exceptional circumstances that demand early resolution.”  State ex rel. 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 515, 715 N.E.2d 
1062 (1999) (Pfeifer, J., concurring).  See also State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. 
Voinovich, 69 Ohio St.3d 225, 631 N.E.2d 582 (1994); State ex rel. Ohio AFL-
CIO v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 97 Ohio St.3d 504, 2002-Ohio-6717, 780 
N.E.2d 981.  This is one of those extraordinary cases. 
__________________ 
 
Squire Sanders, L.L.P., Aneca E. Lasley, and Gregory W. Stype; Organ 
Cole & Stock, L.L.P., and Douglas R. Cole, for relator. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General; Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, 
L.L.P., James A. King, and L. Bradfield Hughes, for respondent. 
______________________