Case Title: State v. Howes

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP001870-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 18 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP1870-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
David W. Howes, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 1, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 20, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
John W. Markson 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
GABLEMAN, J. joined by ZIEGLER, J. concur 
(Opinion filed). 
KELLY, J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. joined by BRADLEY, A. W., J. and 
KELLY, J. (joining Part II insofar as it 
discusses the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 
343.305 (3) (b)). (Opinion filed).  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by Ryan J 
Walsh, chief deputy solicitor general, with whom on the brief 
was Misha Tseytlin, solicitor general, Brad D. Schimel, attorney 
general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief by Mark A. 
Eisenberg, Jack S. Lindberg and Eisenberg Law Office, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Mark A. Eisenberg. 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 18
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP1870-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2013CF1692) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
David W. Howes, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 1 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from an order of the Circuit Court.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.    
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   This case comes 
before us by certification from the court of appeals.  David 
Howes was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated 
(OWI) (fourth offense while having a prior OWI within five 
years) in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) (2013-14)1 and 
operating a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration 
(PAC) (fourth offense while having a prior PAC within five 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
2 
 
years) in violation of § 346.63(1)(b) based on analysis of his 
blood showing a blood alcohol concentration of 0.11 percent.   
¶2 
Howes moved to suppress the results of a warrantless 
blood draw, arguing that the deputy that arrested Howes lacked 
probable cause to do so and, additionally, that the deputy 
violated Howes' rights by obtaining a warrantless blood draw.  
The circuit court granted Howes' motion to suppress.2  The 
circuit court concluded that the deputy had probable cause to 
arrest Howes.  However, the court reasoned, relying heavily on 
State v. Padley, 2014 WI App 65, 354 Wis. 2d 545, 849 N.W.2d 
867, that the section of Wisconsin's implied consent statutes 
that permits a blood draw from an unconscious individual is 
unconstitutional, unless exigent circumstances exist.  Because 
the circuit court concluded that none existed, it suppressed the 
report of Howes' blood alcohol concentration.3   
¶3 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
correctly 
determined that the deputy had probable cause to arrest Howes 
for operating a vehicle with a PAC, and that Howes was arrested 
prior to obtaining a blood sample.  Moreover, based on the 
totality of circumstances herein, the deputy's warrantless 
search was permissible under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution under the exigent circumstances doctrine that 
                                                 
2 The Honorable John W. Markson of Dane County presided.  
3 See Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3).  
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
3 
 
relates to the risk of destruction of evidence.4  Stated more 
fully, under the totality of circumstances presented herein, 
which included a seriously injured, unconscious person, who was 
being subjected to medical treatments for his injuries and who 
had 0.02 percent as his PAC threshold, a reasonable officer 
could have concluded that further delay in drawing Howes' blood 
would have led to the destruction of evidence through the 
dissipation and dilution of alcohol in Howes' bloodstream.  
Therefore, we reverse the order of the circuit court and remand 
for further proceedings. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
At approximately 9:18 p.m. on July 7, 2013, Deputy 
Robert Schiro of the Dane County Sheriff's Office received a 
call from dispatch indicating that an individual had been in a 
motorcycle crash with a deer.  Dispatch detailed that the driver 
was unconscious.  Deputy Schiro arrived at the scene of the 
accident and found the deceased deer and the motorcycle in the 
middle of the road.  The driver of the motorcycle was the 
defendant in the present case, David Howes.  He was positioned 
approximately 40 feet away from the deer and was seriously 
                                                 
4 Because we conclude that the search was reasonable under 
the totality of circumstances presented herein, we need not 
reach 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(b) 
is 
facially 
unconstitutional.  See generally, State v. Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d 
66, 70, 396 N.W.2d 177 (1986) ("When this court grants direct 
review upon certification, it acquires jurisdiction of the 
appeal, which includes all issues, not merely the issues 
certified or the issue for which the court accepts the 
certification.").   
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
4 
 
injured and unconscious.  When the deputy arrived, Emergency 
Medical Services (EMS) was already attending to Howes. 
¶5 
At the scene, there were several bystanders situated 
near EMS and the ambulance.  The deputy unsuccessfully searched 
for a witness that had observed the 
accident.  Though 
unsuccessful, the deputy testified that an individual approached 
him and, referring to Howes, stated he smelled an odor of 
intoxicants.  As the lone police officer at the scene, the 
deputy had multiple responsibilities relating to containing the 
accident scene and was unable to obtain the individual's name.  
¶6 
While EMS continued to attend to Howes, the deputy had 
to ensure the safety of those traveling through the accident 
scene because a dead deer and a motorcycle were partially 
blocking the road.  The deputy began to direct traffic lanes 
that ran through the scene of the accident.  The deputy also 
ensured that no one moved the motorcycle and preserved other 
evidence relating to the accident.  The deputy asked bystanders 
to move out of EMS's way.  During his investigation, other 
officers arrived, and Howes, still unconscious, was transported 
to the hospital. 
¶7 
The deputy then left to go to the hospital to follow 
up with Howes.  During the drive to the hospital, the deputy 
checked Howes' Department of Transportation records.  He 
testified that his purpose was to confirm that the motorcycle 
driver was in fact Howes and to check Howes' driving record.  As 
a result of this record check, the deputy discovered that Howes 
had three prior OWI/PAC convictions.  These prior convictions 
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
5 
 
signaled to the deputy that Howes had a PAC threshold more 
restrictive than the usual 0.08 percent.  Specifically, Howes 
violated the law if he had operated the motorcycle with a blood 
alcohol concentration of as little as 0.02 percent.5   
¶8 
After 
the 
deputy 
arrived 
at 
the 
hospital, 
he 
immediately spoke with the two Emergency Medical Technicians 
(EMTs), who were in the ambulance with Howes as he was 
transported to the hospital.  The deputy inquired about whether 
either of the EMTs had smelled alcohol on Howes' breath.  The 
deputy testified that the EMT positioned in the ambulance near 
Howes' head smelled a "high odor of intox coming from" Howes.  
The EMT positioned in the ambulance at Howes' feet did not smell 
intoxicants.  
¶9 
The deputy proceeded to the emergency room in which 
medical staff was treating Howes.  The deputy testified that 
"numerous nurses and medical staff [were] attending to [Howes] 
at the time."  The ongoing medical treatment prevented the 
deputy from approaching Howes.  However, one nurse told the 
deputy that there was a strong odor of intoxicants in Howes' 
room.  
¶10 The deputy observed that Howes had not regained 
consciousness and that he was intubated to assist his breathing.  
The deputy spoke with a physician with regard to Howes' medical 
condition.  The physician said that Howes was in critical 
                                                 
5 See Wis. Stat. § 340.01(46m)(c).  
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
6 
 
condition and possibly had a brain injury.  He said that Howes 
needed a CT scan to further evaluate his injuries.    
¶11 At approximately 10:15 p.m., the deputy arrested Howes 
for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol 
concentration.  The deputy testified that he arrested Howes for 
the following reasons:  (1) three different individuals smelled 
an odor of intoxicants emanating from Howes; (2) Howes had a 
prohibited alcohol concentration threshold of 0.02 percent due 
to his previous drunk-driving convictions; and (3) the crash.  
¶12 After arresting Howes, and while Howes was still 
unconscious, the deputy read Howes the informing the accused 
form.  The deputy asked Howes if he would submit to an 
evidentiary chemical test of his blood, and Howes did not 
respond.6  The deputy then instructed hospital staff to draw a 
blood sample to test for alcohol concentration.  
¶13 At 11:17 p.m., roughly two hours after the accident 
and an hour after the deputy asked hospital staff to draw Howes' 
blood, a phlebotomist completed the blood draw.  The deputy 
testified that the hour delay occurred either because medical 
personnel at the hospital were too busy to draw the blood, or 
Howes may have had a CT scan during this interim period.7  The 
                                                 
6 The deputy said he took these steps even though Howes was 
unconscious because he thought he was legally required to do so. 
7 If a CT scan occurred during this period, it would be 
consistent with a physician's statement to the deputy shortly 
after the deputy arrived at the hospital that Howes needed to 
have a CT scan.  
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
7 
 
report of the blood test stated that Howes had a 0.11 percent 
blood alcohol concentration.  This was well in excess of the 
0.02 percent prohibited alcohol concentration threshold to which 
he was subjected due to his prior drunk-driving convictions.  
¶14 Howes was charged with operating a vehicle while 
intoxicated (OWI) (fourth offense while having a prior OWI 
within five years) in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) and 
operating a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration 
(PAC) (fourth offense while having a prior PAC within five 
years) in violation of § 346.63(1)(b).  Howes moved to suppress 
the report that resulted from the blood draw.  The circuit court 
granted Howes' motion.  First, the circuit court concluded that 
the deputy had probable cause to arrest Howes.  The court based 
its conclusion, in part, on the statements to the deputy by 
various individuals indicating that there was a smell of 
intoxicants coming from Howes.  The court also concluded that 
"central to the probable cause determination [was] that this was 
a gentleman who had three prior convictions," and was subject to 
a PAC threshold of 0.02 percent, rather than 0.08 percent.  As 
part of this determination, the court found that the deputy had 
searched Howes' driving record prior to arresting Howes; and 
therefore, he knew that Howes was subject to a PAC threshold of 
0.02 percent.   
¶15 Next, 
the 
circuit 
court 
addressed 
the 
constitutionality of Wisconsin's implied consent statute as it 
relates to unconscious persons, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b).  The 
court concluded that § 343.305(3)(b), which allows withdrawal of 
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
8 
 
blood from an unconscious person, is unconstitutional if the 
blood draw is done without a warrant or the presence of exigent 
circumstances.  After finding the statute unconstitutional, the 
circuit court, without analysis, concluded that there were no 
exigent circumstances presented by this case.  
¶16 The State appealed and the court of appeals certified 
the case for our review.  We now reverse. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶17 "Our review of an order granting or denying a motion 
to suppress evidence presents a question of constitutional 
fact."  State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶27, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 
857 N.W.2d 120 (quoting State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 
Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463).  "When presented with a question 
of constitutional fact, this court engages in a two-step 
inquiry."  Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶22.  
¶18 First, the circuit "court's findings of evidentiary or 
historical fact will not be overturned unless they are clearly 
erroneous."  State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶26, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 
612 N.W.2d 29.  Next, we "independently determine whether the 
historical or evidentiary facts establish exigent circumstances 
sufficient to justify the warrantless" search.  Id. 
¶19 In the present case, we apply this two-step inquiry to 
determine whether the warrantless blood draw was reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
9 
 
B.  General Principles 
¶20 A blood draw is a search of the person.  Tullberg, 359 
Wis. 2d 421, ¶31 ("A blood draw to uncover evidence of a crime 
is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").  At 
issue in the present case is whether the deputy acted reasonably 
in instructing hospital personnel to draw Howes' blood when he 
did not have a warrant.  Accordingly, we must determine whether 
the deputy's warrantless search of Howes was permissible under 
the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11.  
¶21 "The 
Fourth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution protect the right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures."  Id., ¶29 (quoting Robinson, 359 Wis. 2d 
421, ¶24).  "The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness."  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  As 
such, "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-
initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those 
which 
are 
unreasonable." 
 
Id. 
(internal 
quotation 
marks 
omitted). 
 
"An 
action 
is 
'reasonable' 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, 
'as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] 
action.'"  Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 
(2006) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 
(1978)).  
¶22 Absent from the text of the Fourth Amendment is the 
obligation that the government must obtain a warrant to conduct 
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
10 
 
a search.  However, it is axiomatic that "warrants must 
generally be obtained."  Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 
1569 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  Consistent with these principles, "[a] warrantless 
search is presumptively unreasonable."  Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 
421, ¶30.   
¶23 To overcome this presumption, a warrantless search 
must fall under an exception to the warrant requirement.  See 
State v. Foster, 2014 WI 131, ¶32, 360 Wis. 2d 12, 856 N.W.2d 
847 
("Consistent 
with 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court's 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, we have adhered to the 
basic 
principle 
that 
warrantless 
searches 
are 
per 
se 
unreasonable unless they fall within a well-recognized exception 
to the warrant requirement.").  "One exception to the warrant 
requirement is the exigent circumstances doctrine, which holds 
that a warrantless search complies with the Fourth Amendment if 
the need for a search is urgent and insufficient time to obtain 
a warrant exists."  Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶30.  
¶24 "There are four well-recognized categories of exigent 
circumstances . . . 1) hot pursuit of a suspect, 2) a threat to 
the safety of a suspect or others, 3) a risk that evidence will 
be destroyed, and 4) a likelihood that the suspect will flee."  
Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶29.  The burden is on the government 
to establish that its actions fit into one of the well-
recognized exceptions.  State v. Phillips, 2009 WI App 179, ¶7, 
322 Wis. 2d 576, 778 N.W.2d 157.  And, "the test for determining 
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
11 
 
the existence of exigent circumstances is an objective one."  
Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶30.   
¶25 If 
exigent 
circumstances 
are 
present, 
we 
have 
distilled four additional requirements that a warrantless blood 
draw in a drunk driving case must satisfy to be reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment:  
(1) the blood draw is taken to obtain evidence of 
intoxication from a person lawfully arrested for a 
drunk-driving related violation or crime, (2) there is 
a clear indication that the blood draw will produce 
evidence of intoxication, (3) the method used to take 
the blood sample is a reasonable one and performed in 
a reasonable manner, and (4) the arrestee presents no 
reasonable objection to the blood draw. 
State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ¶17, 359 Wis. 2d 454, 856 N.W.2d 
834 (quoting State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 534, 494 N.W.2d 
399 (1993) abrogated in part by Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 
1552 (2013)).  We have "explained that probable cause to arrest 
for a drunk-driving related violation or crime 'substitutes for 
the predicate act of lawful arrest' under the first factor."  
Id. (quoting Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 534 n.1).  "The second 
factor, whether there is a clear indication that the blood draw 
will produce evidence of intoxication, in this case is also 
satisfied by the same facts that support a finding of probable 
cause to arrest."  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
¶26 In the present case, there is no dispute as to the 
presence of the third and fourth factors.  The blood was drawn 
in a reasonable manner; it was taken in a hospital by a person 
authorized to draw blood.  See State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, 
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
12 
 
¶47, 255 Wis. 2d 98, 648 N.W.2d 385 ("Krajewski and the State 
stipulated that the blood draw was taken in a hospital by a 
registered nurse.  Thus, the blood draw was effected in a 
reasonable manner.").  Similarly, with respect to the fourth 
factor, the suspect did not present a reasonable objection to 
the type of search the deputy sought to conduct, a blood draw.8  
Accordingly, we must examine whether the deputy lawfully 
                                                 
8 An analysis under the fourth factor does not require us to 
determine whether an individual consented to a search; instead, 
it refers to an objection to the type of search the officer 
chose to conduct (e.g., a blood draw as opposed to a 
breathalyzer).  See State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, ¶48, 255 
Wis. 2d 98, 648 N.W.2d 385.  As this Court in State v. Kennedy, 
2014 WI 132, 359 Wis. 2d 454, 856 N.W.2d 834 recognized, the 
fourth factor is derived from the Supreme Court's decision in 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).  In Schmerber, the 
Supreme Court explained that an analysis under the fourth factor 
is reserved for those instances in which an individual has 
raised a legitimate and significant objection to having his or 
her blood drawn.  The Court concluded that the defendant in that 
case did not raise a reasonable objection to the blood draw 
because the defendant was "not one of the few who on grounds of 
fear, concern for health, or religious scruple might prefer some 
other means of testing, such as the 'Breathalyzer' test 
petitioner refused."  Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.  See also 
State v. Krause, 168 Wis. 2d 578, 588, 484 N.W.2d 347 (Ct. App. 
1992) ("Krause asserts, however, that his refusal still is 
constitutionally protected because he told Officer Dornfeld that 
he 'didn't believe in needles' and 'd[id]n't want AIDS.'  This 
argument fails.  These isolated comments do not establish that 
Krause is 'one of the few who on grounds of fear, concern for 
health, or religious scruple might prefer some other means of 
testing' 
whose 
wishes 
the 
Schmerber 
Court 
declined 
to 
address.").  Consequently, the fourth factor speaks to the 
reasonableness of the type of search employed, not whether a 
warrant was required to conduct the search.  As such, to say 
that Howes made no objection to the type of search is not to say 
that Howes impliedly consented to being searched.  Each inquiry 
is analytically distinct.   
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
13 
 
arrested Howes based on probable cause that Howes had driven 
with a prohibited alcohol concentration, i.e., 0.02 percent or 
higher.  Next, we must determine whether exigent circumstances 
existed such that the deputy was justified in proceeding without 
a warrant.   
C.  Probable Cause to Arrest 
¶27 With respect to the probable cause analysis, the 
deputy in this case arrested Howes; therefore, the dispositive 
inquiry is whether the deputy had probable cause to conduct this 
arrest.  We conclude that the deputy had probable cause to 
arrest Howes for operation of a vehicle with a prohibited 
alcohol concentration under the facts as found by the circuit 
court.   
¶28 "Warrantless arrests are unlawful unless they are 
supported by probable cause."  State v. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, 
¶34, 362 Wis. 2d 138, 864 N.W.2d 26.  "Probable cause to arrest 
... refers to that quantum of evidence within the arresting 
officer's knowledge at the time of the arrest that would lead a 
reasonable law enforcement officer to believe that the defendant 
was 
operating 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
[at 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration]."  Id. (quoting State v. Lange, 2009 WI 49, ¶19, 
317 Wis. 2d 383, 766 N.W.2d 551).  "The burden is on the state 
to show [it] had probable cause to arrest."  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  And, "[w]e evaluate the existence of 
probable 
cause 
objectively, 
concerned 
with 
whether 
law 
enforcement acted reasonably."  Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶26.   
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
14 
 
¶29 We look at the "totality of the circumstances to 
determine whether probable cause . . . existed."  Tullberg, 359 
Wis. 2d 421, ¶33.  "In dealing with probable cause, . . . as the 
very name implies, we deal with probabilities.  These are not 
technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal 
technicians, act."  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) 
(quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).  
"This standard is case-specific:  '[t]he quantum of information 
which constitutes probable cause to arrest must be measured by 
the facts of the particular case.'"  Blatterman, 362 Wis. 2d 
138, ¶35 (quoting State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 625, 184 
N.W.2d 836 (1971)).  
¶30 A number of factors may be relevant to a determination 
of probable cause in the context of an arrest for a drunk-
driving related offense.  As we have previously detailed, 
"factors sufficient to support a finding of probable cause have 
included bloodshot eyes, an odor of intoxicants, and slurred 
speech, together with a motor vehicle accident or erratic 
driving."  Kennedy, 359 Wis. 2d 454, ¶22. 
¶31 Additionally, "[p]olice may properly consider prior 
convictions in a probable cause determination."  Blatterman, 362 
Wis. 2d 138, ¶36; see also State v. Goss, 2011 WI 104, ¶24, 338 
Wis. 2d 72, 806 N.W.2d 918.  "Prior convictions are especially 
relevant in this case because the statute reduced the PAC 
threshold applicable to [the defendant] from 0.08% to 0.02% 
alcohol concentration."  Blatterman, 362 Wis. 2d 138, ¶36. 
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
15 
 
¶32 In this case, the deputy checked Howes' driving 
record, which indicated that Howes had three prior OWI/PAC 
convictions.  This lowered Howes' PAC threshold to 0.02 percent.  
The circuit court properly found this highly relevant in 
determining that the deputy had probable cause to arrest Howes.  
¶33 Moreover, three people told the deputy that Howes 
smelled of intoxicants:  (1) an individual at the scene of the 
accident; (2) one of the EMTs who rode in the ambulance with 
Howes; and (3) a nurse at the hospital.  Taken together with the 
vehicle accident, these facts were sufficient to provide the 
deputy with probable cause to arrest Howes for operating a 
vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration.  
¶34 We note that probable cause in this case developed 
over a period of time.  At the accident scene, one bystander 
mentioned that Howes may have smelled of intoxicants.  While on 
his way to the hospital, the deputy learned that Howes' PAC 
threshold had been lowered to 0.02 percent because of his prior 
convictions for OWI/PAC.  Then, at the hospital, the deputy 
spoke with EMT personnel, one of whom said that Howes smelled of 
intoxicants and later he spoke with a nurse who also said that 
Howes smelled of intoxicants.  At that point, the deputy 
reasonably believed that he had probable cause to conclude that 
Howes had operated his motorcycle with a prohibited alcohol 
concentration of 0.02 percent.  He then placed Howes under 
arrest.  We agree that the deputy had probable cause to believe 
that Howes had violated Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b) under the 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 340.01(46m)(c). 
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
16 
 
D.  Exigent Circumstances 
¶35 We next examine whether the warrantless blood draw was 
justified 
by 
exigent 
circumstances. 
 
To 
determine 
if 
a 
warrantless 
blood 
draw 
was 
permissible 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment, we look at the totality of the circumstances and 
engage in a "careful case-by-case assessment of exigency." 
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561.  
¶36 "Like our analysis of probable cause, the test for 
determining the existence of exigent circumstances is an 
objective one."  Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶41 (quoting 
Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶30).  It follows that we give no 
weight to the subjective belief of an officer.9  See United 
States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(reasoning "a police officer's subjective belief that exigent 
circumstances exist is insufficient to make a warrantless 
search.  Instead, as is normally the case for Fourth Amendment 
inquiries, the test is objective . . . .").  Accordingly, we 
independently examine the facts known to the officer at the time 
of the warrantless search.  
¶37 An officer is justified in conducting a warrantless 
search to prevent the destruction of evidence.  And, "[e]vidence 
of a crime is destroyed as alcohol is eliminated from the 
bloodstream of a drunken driver."  Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 
¶42.  While the natural dissipation of alcohol is not, under all 
                                                 
9 Accordingly, the deputy's testimony that he had time to 
obtain a warrant in this case is irrelevant to our analysis.  
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
17 
 
circumstances, an exigent circumstance sufficient to allow an 
officer 
to 
conduct 
a 
warrantless 
blood 
draw, 
there 
are 
situations in which the totality of the circumstances would 
justify such a search.  "[A] warrantless blood draw [need not] 
always require a 'now or never' situation in order to be 
justified 
by 
exigent 
circumstances. 
 
Rather, 
exigent 
circumstances justify a warrantless blood draw if delaying the 
blood draw would 'significantly undermin[e] [its] efficacy.'"  
Id., ¶50 (quoting McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561); cf. State v. 
Parisi, 2016 WI 10, ¶40, 367 Wis. 2d 1, 875 N.W.2d 619 ("Under 
the circumstances, Officer Fenhouse might reasonably have feared 
that if he attempted to obtain a warrant before drawing Parisi's 
blood, Parisi's condition could again lapse, causing Officer 
Fenhouse to miss his window of opportunity.").  
¶38 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court's 
decision 
in 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), illustrates a 
circumstance in which a warrantless blood draw in the context of 
a drunk-driving offense is reasonable.  In Schmerber, an 
individual was "arrested at a hospital while receiving treatment 
for injuries suffered in an accident involving the automobile 
that he had apparently been driving."  Id. at 758.  Without 
obtaining a warrant, the officer instructed a physician at the 
hospital to draw the defendant's blood.  Id.  "The chemical 
analysis of this sample revealed a percent by weight of alcohol 
in his blood at the time of the offense which indicated 
intoxication, and the report of this analysis was admitted in 
evidence at the trial."  Id. at 759.  The defendant objected to 
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
18 
 
the admission of the report and contended, in part, that these 
results "should be excluded from evidence as the product of an 
unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments."  Id. at 766.  
¶39 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
rejected 
the 
defendant's contention that the warrantless blood draw was 
unreasonable and concluded that the officer's search was 
justified by exigent circumstances.  Id. at 770.  The Court, in 
part, premised its decision on the defendant's injuries that had 
delayed the officer's ability to secure a blood draw from the 
defendant.  Specifically, the Court reasoned:  
We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the 
blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, 
as the body functions to eliminate it from the system. 
Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to 
be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to 
investigate the scene of the accident, there was no 
time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. 
Given these special facts, we conclude that the 
attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in 
this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner's 
arrest. 
Id. at 770-71.  Consequently, the Court surmised that "[t]he 
officer . . . might reasonably have believed that he was 
confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to 
obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the 
destruction of evidence."  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
¶40 Following Schmerber, the Supreme Court in McNeely 
reaffirmed the principle that dissipation of alcohol from the 
blood stream may lead to the destruction of evidence, and 
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
19 
 
therefore constitute an exigent circumstance sufficient to 
justify a warrantless blood draw.  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1560 
(reasoning, "our analysis in Schmerber fits comfortably within 
our case law applying the exigent circumstances exception.").  
The Court clarified that its decision in Schmerber was not 
predicated solely on the natural dissipation of alcohol from the 
bloodstream; rather, there were "special facts" that made the 
blood draw reasonable under the totality of circumstances 
present in Schmerber.  Id.  These "special facts" were that the 
defendant was injured and in the hospital, and that the officer 
had to investigate the scene of the accident.  The Court 
reasoned,  
Regardless of the exact elimination rate, it is 
sufficient for our purposes to note that because an 
individual's alcohol level gradually declines soon 
after he stops drinking, a significant delay in 
testing will negatively affect the probative value of 
the results.  This fact was essential to our holding 
in Schmerber, as we recognized that, under the 
circumstances, further delay in order to secure a 
warrant after the time spent investigating the scene 
of the accident and transporting the injured suspect 
to the hospital to receive treatment would have 
threatened the destruction of evidence. 
Id. at 1560-61.  These facts made the officer's need to draw 
blood more urgent and, given this urgency, the officer's actions 
were justified under the exigent circumstances doctrine.  Id. at 
1560 ("We added that '[p]articularly in a case such as this, 
where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital 
and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time 
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
20 
 
to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant.'" (quoting 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71).  
¶41 Moreover, we note that our decision is consistent with 
the Supreme Court's narrow holding in McNeely that dissipation 
of alcohol from the bloodstream, standing alone, does not always 
constitute an exigent circumstance.  The Supreme Court in 
McNeely did not simultaneously create that which it sought to 
eradicate.  Stated otherwise, McNeely did not create a per se 
rule that a warrantless blood draw based on the natural 
dissipation 
of 
alcohol 
from 
the 
blood 
stream 
is 
never 
reasonable.  Id. at 1568 ("The relevant factors in determining 
whether a warrantless search is reasonable, including the 
practical problems of obtaining a warrant within a timeframe 
that 
still 
preserves 
the 
opportunity 
to 
obtain 
reliable 
evidence, will no doubt vary depending upon the circumstances in 
the case.").  
¶42 Instead, the Court in McNeely validated the foundation 
of its decision in Schmerber; specifically, dissipation of 
alcohol 
from 
the 
bloodstream 
may 
justify 
an 
officer's 
warrantless blood draw.  The Court in McNeely went so far as to 
recognize that delay in obtaining a warrant, even without the 
presence of extraneous factors, may justify a warrantless blood 
draw.  The Court stated, "an individual's alcohol level 
gradually declines soon after he stops drinking, a significant 
delay in testing will negatively affect the probative value of 
the results."  Id. at 1561; see also id. at 1568 ("No doubt, 
given the large number of arrests for this offense in different 
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
21 
 
jurisdictions nationwide, cases will arise when anticipated 
delays in obtaining a warrant will justify a blood test without 
judicial authorization, for in every case the law must be 
concerned that evidence is being destroyed.").  
¶43 As is evident from the Court's analysis in Schmerber 
and McNeely, certain facts are particularly relevant to an 
exigent circumstances analysis in drunk-driving cases.  Whether 
an officer was delayed in obtaining a blood draw due to the 
defendant's medical condition is one such fact.  Additionally, 
whether the officer was delayed because time had to be taken to 
investigate the scene of the accident is also highly relevant.  
See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2174 (2016) 
("On the specific facts of [Schmerber], where time had already 
been lost taking the driver to the hospital and investigating 
the accident, the Court found no Fourth Amendment violation even 
though the warrantless blood draw took place over the driver's 
objection.").  
¶44 The Minnesota Supreme Court, relying on these factors, 
concluded that exigent circumstances justified a search under 
circumstances similar to that of Schmerber.  See Minnesota v. 
Stavish, 868 N.W.2d 670, 676-77 (Minn. 2015).  In Stavish, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that, under the totality of 
circumstances, a warrantless blood draw of a hospitalized 
individual was justified by exigent circumstances.  The Court 
reasoned, "Stavish's medical condition and need for treatment 
rendered his future availability for a blood draw uncertain.  
[The officer] did not know how long Stavish was likely to remain 
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
22 
 
at the same hospital or whether further medical care would 
preclude obtaining a sample even if Stavish stayed at the same 
hospital."  Id. at 678.  As a result, "it was objectively 
reasonable for [the officer] to conclude that he was faced with 
an emergency in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant 
threatened the destruction of evidence."  Id. 
¶45 The circumstances of a critically injured driver who 
needed immediate medical care that justified the warrantless 
blood draw in Schmerber and Stavish are present in the case at 
hand.  And in addition, Howes' prohibited alcohol concentration 
threshold of 0.02 percent increased the need for a prompt blood 
draw.  Dissipation or dilution of alcohol in his bloodstream due 
to the passage of time and medical treatments threatened the 
State's ability to prove the crime for which he was arrested.  
This is so because "[a]lcohol dissipates from the bloodstream at 
a rate of 0.01 percent to 0.025 percent per hour."  McNeely, 133 
S. Ct. at 1570-71 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing Richard Stripp, Forensic and 
Clinical Issues in Alcohol Analysis, in Forensic Chemistry 
Handbook 440 (Lawrence Kobilinsky ed., 2012)).  If Howes 
violated his restricted PAC with a blood alcohol concentration 
of 0.02 percent, it would take approximately an hour for Howes' 
blood alcohol level to go to 0.00 percent.  This is roughly the 
amount of time that elapsed between Howes' accident and the time 
in which the deputy first had probable cause necessary to obtain 
a warrant.  As each minute passed, the likelihood that Howes' 
blood alcohol level would diminish to 0.00 percent increased 
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
23 
 
significantly.  At 0.00 percent, it would be impossible to 
calculate what his blood alcohol level was at the time of the 
accident.  
¶46 In addition, similar to the officer in Schmerber, the 
deputy's responsibilities at the accident scene led to a 
significant delay in the ability of the deputy to obtain a blood 
draw.  For example, he was required to secure evidence relating 
to the accident and ensure the safety of those traveling on 
roads through the scene of the accident.  The investigation of 
the accident took time.  During this time, reliable evidence of 
Howes' blood alcohol concentration was being destroyed by the 
passage of time and treatment at the hospital.10   
¶47 Furthermore, akin to the defendant in Schmerber, Howes 
was in critical condition.  The severity of Howes' condition 
made the deputy's ability to obtain a blood draw in the future 
uncertain.  This uncertainty was exacerbated because at least 
one hour already had passed since the accident and the deputy 
had no knowledge about the time at which Howes stopped drinking.   
¶48 Howes was unconscious, and it was unknown whether he 
had suffered brain damage.  Importantly, a physician indicated 
                                                 
10 Howes was in critical condition that required additional 
testing, intubation to support his respiration.  He had been 
given medication resulting in "heavy sedation," and because he 
was 
unconscious, 
he 
must 
have 
received 
this 
medication 
intravenously.  
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
24 
 
that Howes would need a CT scan.11  The deputy could reasonably 
have concluded that waiting for a CT scan before obtaining a 
blood draw would "significantly undermin[e] the efficacy" of the 
blood analysis to prove Howes violated his PAC threshold of 0.02 
percent.  See Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶50 n.26 (quoting 
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561).  
¶49 Additionally, as we have explained, the deputy did not 
have probable cause to arrest Howes until he arrived at the 
hospital, talked with EMTs and talked with the nurse who told 
him that she also smelled alcohol.  Accordingly, the present 
case is not one in which the officer could have obtained a 
warrant on the way to the hospital because he did not have 
probable cause to obtain a warrant then.  Applying for a warrant 
after his conversations with Howes' care-givers would have led 
to additional delay and the further dissipation of alcohol from 
Howes' bloodstream.  See id., 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶48 n.25 ("We 
note that Deputy Hoffman could not have had other officers 
assist him in obtaining a warrant while he investigated the 
accident because he did not have probable cause to have 
Tullberg's blood drawn until immediately before it was drawn.").   
¶50 Accordingly, we conclude that the warrantless blood 
draw from Howes was permissible under the Fourth Amendment of 
                                                 
11 The deputy asked hospital staff to conduct a blood draw, 
but they were unable to draw Howes' blood until roughly an hour 
after the deputy's request.  This passage of time is further 
evidence that the deputy needed to request a blood draw 
immediately.  
No. 
2014AP1870-CR   
 
25 
 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
because 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
circumstances 
the 
exigent 
circumstance 
of 
destruction 
of 
evidence existed. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶51 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
correctly 
determined that the deputy had probable cause to arrest Howes 
for operating a vehicle with a PAC, and that Howes was arrested 
prior to obtaining a blood sample.  Moreover, based on the 
totality of circumstances herein, the deputy's warrantless 
search was permissible under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution under the exigent circumstances doctrine that 
relates to the risk of destruction of evidence.  Stated more 
fully, under the totality of circumstances presented herein, 
which included a seriously injured, unconscious person, who was 
being subjected to medical treatments for his injuries and who 
had 0.02 percent as his PAC threshold, a reasonable officer 
could have concluded that further delay in drawing Howes' blood 
would have led to the destruction of evidence through the 
dissipation and dilution of alcohol in Howes' bloodstream.  
Therefore, we reverse the order of the circuit court and remand 
for further proceedings. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
1 
 
 
¶52 MICHAEL 
J. 
GABLEMAN, 
J.   (concurring 
in 
the 
judgment).  I agree that the blood draw here was a permissible 
warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment, and I concur in 
the mandate of the court.  However, rather than addressing this 
case as one of exigent circumstances, I would decide the 
question certified to us by the court of appeals: whether 
provisions in Wisconsin's implied consent law authorizing a 
warrantless blood draw from an unconscious driver based on the 
driver's implied consent are unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
¶53 Wisconsin's implied consent law, Wis. Stat. § 343.305, 
provides notice to all drivers that when they operate a motor 
vehicle in this state, they are deemed to have consented to 
blood, breath, or urine testing for the presence of alcohol or 
controlled substances, § 343.305(2),1 if and when such testing is 
                                                 
1 Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2) provides, in full: 
IMPLIED CONSENT. Any person who is on duty time with 
respect to a commercial motor vehicle or drives or 
operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of 
this state, or in those areas enumerated in s. 346.61, 
is deemed to have given consent to one or more tests 
of his or her breath, blood or urine, for the purpose 
of determining the presence or quantity in his or her 
blood or breath, of alcohol, controlled substances, 
controlled substance analogs or other drugs, or any 
combination 
of 
alcohol, 
controlled 
substances, 
controlled substance analogs and other drugs, when 
requested to do so by a law enforcement officer under 
sub. (3)(a) or (am) or when required to do so under 
sub. (3)(ar) or (b).  Any such tests shall be 
administered upon the request of a law enforcement 
officer.  The law enforcement agency by which the 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
2 
 
required 
by 
a 
law 
enforcement 
officer 
under 
certain 
circumstances, including when the driver is arrested for one of 
certain enumerated intoxicated-driving offenses, § 343.305(3).2  
It further provides that a driver "who is unconscious or 
otherwise not capable of withdrawing consent is presumed not to 
have 
withdrawn 
consent" 
and 
a 
test 
may 
therefore 
be 
administered.  See § 343.305(3)(ar)-(b).3 
                                                                                                                                                             
officer is employed shall be prepared to administer, 
either at its agency or any other agency or facility, 
2 of the 3 tests under sub. (3)(a), (am), or (ar), and 
may designate which of the tests shall be administered 
first. 
2 Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(a) provides, in relevant part: 
Upon arrest of a person for violation of s. 346.63(1), 
(2m) or (5) or a local ordinance in conformity 
therewith, or for a violation of s. 346.63(2) or (6) 
or 940.25, or s. 940.09 where the offense involved the 
use of a vehicle, or upon arrest subsequent to a 
refusal under par. (ar), a law enforcement officer may 
request the person to provide one or more samples of 
his or her breath, blood or urine for the purpose 
specified under sub. (2). 
Subsection (3)(am) includes similar provisions that apply when 
the "officer detects any presence of alcohol . . . on a person 
driving or operating or on duty time with respect to a 
commercial motor vehicle or has reason to believe the person is 
violating or has violated s. 346.63(7)." 
3 Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)1. applies if "a person is the 
operator of a vehicle that is involved in an accident that 
causes substantial bodily harm, as defined in s. 939.22(38), to 
any person, and a law enforcement officer detects any presence 
of alcohol, a controlled substance, a controlled substance 
analog or other drug, or a combination thereof."  Subsection 
(3)(ar)2. applies if "a person is the operator of a vehicle that 
is involved in an accident that causes the death of or great 
bodily harm to any person and the law enforcement officer has 
reason to believe that the person violated any state or local 
traffic law."  Both provisions provide that a "person who is 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
3 
 
¶54 In this case, a warrantless blood draw was taken from 
the defendant, David W. Howes, while he was unconscious.  Howes 
had been involved in a motorcycle accident with a deer, and he 
was found injured, unconscious, and smelling of alcohol.  Howes 
was still unconscious when a sheriff's deputy later arrested him 
at the hospital on suspicion of drunk driving.  Following the 
procedures set forth in the implied consent law, the deputy 
asked the hospital to take a blood sample from Howes,4 and the 
test results revealed the presence of a prohibited alcohol 
concentration.  Howes was charged with operating a motor vehicle 
while intoxicated, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a), 
                                                                                                                                                             
unconscious or otherwise not capable of withdrawing consent is 
presumed not to have withdrawn consent under this subdivision 
and one or more samples specified in par. (a) or (am) may be 
administered to the person."  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)1.-2. 
 
Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b) provides, in full: 
A person who is unconscious or otherwise not capable 
of withdrawing consent is presumed not to have 
withdrawn consent under this subsection, and if a law 
enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that 
the person has violated s. 346.63(1), (2m) or (5) or a 
local 
ordinance 
in 
conformity 
therewith, 
or 
s. 346.63(2) or (6) or 940.25, or s. 940.09 where the 
offense involved the use of a vehicle, or detects any 
presence of alcohol, controlled substance, controlled 
substance analog or other drug, or a combination 
thereof, on a person driving or operating or on duty 
time with respect to a commercial motor vehicle or has 
reason 
to 
believe 
the 
person 
has 
violated 
s. 346.63(7), 
one 
or 
more 
samples 
specified 
in 
par. (a) or (am) may be administered to the person. 
 
4 This situation was governed by Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b), 
because the deputy had probable cause to believe Howes was 
guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol 
concentration, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b). 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
4 
 
and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol 
concentration, in violation of § 346.63(1)(b).  
¶55 The circuit court suppressed the test results, ruling 
that subsections (3)(ar) and (3)(b) of the implied consent law 
are facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to the 
extent they authorize warrantless testing of unconscious drivers 
in the absence of exigent circumstances.5  The circuit court 
rejected the argument that Howes consented, concluding that 
"[t]here can be no consent in the constitutional sense where 
somebody is unconscious and incapable of giving consent."  The 
State appealed, and the court of appeals certified the case to 
this court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61. 
¶56 On appeal, Howes takes the position that the circuit 
court was correct to find the unconscious-driver provisions 
facially unconstitutional.6  Howes argues that, absent an 
established 
exception 
to 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment's 
warrant 
requirement, officers must obtain a warrant before ordering a 
                                                 
5 I will refer to these provisions collectively as the 
"unconscious-driver provisions" of the implied consent law. 
6 This case also presents an as-applied challenge to the 
statute, but Howes does not develop any distinct argument to 
support his as-applied challenge.  Rather, he states that his 
challenge is "as-applied only insofar as his Fourth Amendment 
rights were personally violated by the State's conduct under the 
general auspices of the provisions in question when the blood 
draw was performed."  Howes "does not believe that any variation 
in 
the 
circumstances 
(except 
for 
the 
crucial 
one——
incapacitation, which brings him within the purview of the 
provision in the first place) would materially affect the 
analysis."  Therefore, if the unconscious-driver provisions can 
be constitutionally applied, Howes does not dispute that they 
were constitutionally applied to him. 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
5 
 
blood test of a driver who is unconscious or otherwise not 
capable of withdrawing consent.  Howes further argues that the 
statutory provisions authorizing blood tests of such drivers 
based on their implied consent create an unreasonable per se 
exception to the warrant requirement. 
¶57 I conclude that Howes has not met his burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the unconscious-driver 
provisions of the implied consent law are unconstitutional.  
Voluntary consent to testing may be implied from the conduct of 
driving with notice of the conditions of Wisconsin's implied 
consent law, and such consent continues unless it is revoked.  
Therefore, I conclude that the circuit court erred in striking 
down the statute as facially unconstitutional and in suppressing 
the results of the blood test. 
¶58 I begin with the applicable standard of review and 
with a general overview of Wisconsin's implied consent law, 
focusing on the challenged unconscious-driver provisions.  I 
then apply the principles of the Fourth Amendment to the 
unconscious-driver provisions in light of Howes' argument that 
they are facially unconstitutional. 
I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶59 Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of 
law that this court reviews de novo.  Dane Cty. DHS v. P.P., 
2005 WI 32, ¶14, 279 Wis. 2d 169, 694 N.W.2d 344.  Statutes are 
presumed to be constitutional.  Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wis. 
Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶18, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 
N.W.2d 849.  "The court indulges every presumption to sustain 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
6 
 
the law if at all possible, and if any doubt exists about a 
statute's constitutionality, we must resolve that doubt in favor 
of constitutionality."  Id.  The burden is on the challenger to 
"prove that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶11, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 
N.W.2d 328.  Here, because Howes presents his argument as a 
facial challenge to the unconscious-driver provisions, the 
burden is on him to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
statute 
"cannot 
be 
constitutionally 
enforced 
under 
any 
circumstances."  See Society Ins. v. LIRC, 2010 WI 68, ¶26, 326 
Wis. 2d 444, 786 N.W.2d 385 (citing State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, 
¶13, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63). 
II.  OVERVIEW OF WISCONSIN'S IMPLIED CONSENT LAW 
¶60 Wisconsin's implied consent law was first enacted in 
1969 and is codified at Wis. Stat. § 343.305.  "The purpose 
behind the implied consent law is to combat drunk driving by 
'facilit[ating] 
the 
gathering 
of 
evidence 
against 
drunk 
drivers.'"  
State v. Piddington, 2001 WI 24, ¶17, 241 
Wis. 2d 754, 623 N.W.2d 528 (quoting State v. Neitzel, 95 
Wis. 2d 191, 203, 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980)).  Like every one of our 
forty-nine sister states, Wisconsin has chosen to combat the 
problem of drunken and impaired driving by enacting an implied 
consent law, such that consenting to testing has long been "a 
condition of the privilege of operating a motor vehicle upon 
state highways."  State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39, 48, 403 
N.W.2d 427 (1987). 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
7 
 
¶61 The implied consent law provides that a driver is 
deemed to have consented, in certain circumstances, to testing 
of his or her blood, breath, or urine for the presence of 
alcohol 
or 
other 
controlled 
substances. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(2).  Specifically, it provides that anyone who "drives 
or operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this 
state" is "deemed" to have consented to testing when required by 
a law enforcement officer under the specific circumstances 
enumerated in the statute.  Id. 
¶62 Although the statute acknowledges that a person may 
withdraw consent and refuse to submit to testing, a driver has 
no 
statutory 
or 
constitutional 
right 
to 
refuse 
without 
consequences.  See State v. Crandall, 133 Wis. 2d 251, 255-56, 
394 N.W.2d 905 (1986).  Nor does the statute provide that 
officers must ask drivers whether they want to refuse testing.  
"This statutory scheme does not contemplate a choice, but rather 
establishes that a defendant will suffer the consequences of 
revocation should he refuse to submit to the test after having 
given his implied consent to do so."  Milwaukee Cty. v. 
Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 624, 291 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980). 
¶63 The occasions on which drivers are deemed to have 
consented to testing are limited to particular circumstances 
where the legislature has decided that such testing is necessary 
to combat intoxicated driving and to protect public safety.  See 
Piddington, 241 Wis. 2d 754, ¶42 ("The implied consent law is 
based upon the legitimate government interest of protecting the 
public welfare, to wit, removing drunk drivers from the road." 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
8 
 
(citing Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d at 631)).  For example, a driver is 
deemed to have consented to testing upon arrest, but only if the 
offense for which the driver is arrested is one of certain 
enumerated 
intoxicated-driving 
offenses 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.63 or certain other offenses involving injury or homicide 
by 
intoxicated 
use 
of 
a 
vehicle. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(a).  If none of the statutory circumstances exist, 
testing pursuant to the implied consent law is not permitted, 
though officers may still procure evidence through "any other 
lawful means."  § 343.305(3)(c). 
III.  THE UNCONSCIOUS-DRIVER PROVISIONS 
¶64 The 
unconscious-driver 
provisions 
of 
the 
implied 
consent law provide that, under certain circumstances, a driver 
"who is unconscious or otherwise not capable of withdrawing 
consent is presumed not to have withdrawn consent."  See Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(ar)-(b). 
 
Provided 
the 
other 
relevant 
statutory conditions are met, law enforcement may presume that 
an unconscious driver consents to the tests that are set forth 
in the statute, unless consent is revoked.  The statute contains 
no requirement that any driver, whether conscious or not, must 
expressly consent to testing; consent is deemed to have been 
given when the person voluntarily chose to drive on Wisconsin 
highways.  See § 343.305(2). 
¶65 Indeed, the informational statement that officers must 
read to a driver before administering the test is a notice of 
the consequences of refusal, not a "request" for consent.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4).  The purpose of this notice is to 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
9 
 
advise drivers about the nature of their implied consent, not 
necessarily to provide a meaningful opportunity to decide 
whether to withdraw their consent.  See Piddington, 241 
Wis. 2d 754, ¶¶17, 20, 55 (holding that an analysis of the 
proper administration of the notice focuses on the objectively 
reasonable conduct of the officer, not "[w]hether the accused 
driver has actually comprehended the warnings").  "The entire 
tenor of the implied consent law is . . . that consent has 
already been given . . . ."  Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d at 203. 
¶66 To summarize, the unconscious-driver provisions of the 
implied consent law put every driver on notice that, in the 
event he or she becomes unconscious and, for example, an officer 
has probable cause to believe the driver is guilty of a drunk-
driving offense, the driver's previously given consent would 
remain unrevoked.  I turn now to the question of whether Howes 
has met his burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that these 
provisions are unconstitutional. 
IV.  APPLICABLE FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES 
¶67 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures."  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Courts will 
presume that a search was unreasonable if the officers did not 
have a warrant, but "[i]t is well established that a search is 
reasonable when the subject consents."  Birchfield v. N. Dakota, 
136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016).  Specifically in the context of 
state implied consent laws, the Supreme Court has emphasized 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
10 
 
that "consent to a search need not be express but may be fairly 
inferred from context."  Id.  This court has likewise recognized 
that "[c]onsent to search need not be given verbally; it may be 
in the form of words, gesture, or conduct."  State v. Phillips, 
218 Wis. 2d 180, 197, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998). 
A.  Consent May Be Implied By Conduct 
¶68 The principle of consent by conduct is neither new nor 
infrequently applied.  In his treatise on the Fourth Amendment, 
Professor Wayne LaFave provides a number of examples in which 
"it is said that consent is 'implied' because it is found to 
exist merely because of the person's conduct in engaging in a 
certain activity."  4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 8.2(l), at 162-63 (5th ed. 2012).  For example, "a warrantless 
search of a person seeking to enter a military base may be 
deemed reasonable based on the implied consent of the person 
searched," Morgan v. United States, 323 F.3d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 
2003), and consent "may be implied from [the] act of driving 
past the guard shack and onto [the base] and imputed from the 
posted notice indicating that entry onto [the base] constituted 
consent to a search,"  State v. Torres, 262 P.3d 1006, 1022 
(Haw. 2011).  Another analogous situation concerns a "business 
owner in a highly regulated or licensed industry" who "in effect 
consents to the restrictions put in place by the government."  
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
11 
 
United States v. Hamad, 809 F.3d 898, 905 (7th Cir. 2016).7  
Similarly, some courts have justified airport screening searches 
based on implied consent, reasoning that "[t]he signs in the 
terminal gave [passengers] fair notice that if in the course of 
the total screening process a physical inspection of [their] 
hand luggage should be considered necessary . . . [they] could 
be required to submit to it . . . ."  United States v. DeAngelo, 
584 F.2d 46, 47-48 (4th Cir. 1978); see State v. Hanson, 34 P.3d 
1, 4-7 (Haw. 2001) (collecting cases).8 
B.  The Limits of Implying Consent By Conduct 
¶69 Of course, there must be a limit to the scope of the 
consent that may be implied by a person's conduct.  See 
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185.  Consent "cannot be said to 
exist merely because a person (a) knows that an official 
intrusion into his privacy is contemplated if he does a certain 
thing, and then (b) proceeds to do that thing."  LaFave, supra, 
at 164-65 (emphasis added).  A reviewing court must also 
                                                 
7 Although the cases involving warrantless inspections of 
highly regulated businesses do not rely on consent as the basis 
for the reasonableness of such searches, the rationale in those 
cases is analogous in that the inspections are reasonable in 
part because a business owner chooses to enter the regulated 
field and the government regulations supply notice of the scope 
and frequency of inspections.  See United States v. Biswell, 406 
U.S. 311, 316 (1972). 
8 Some more recent decisions hold that consent is not 
required at all in the airport screening context, because such 
searches 
are 
reasonable 
under 
the 
administrative 
search 
doctrine.  See, e.g., United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960 
(9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 178-81 
(3d Cir. 2006). 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
12 
 
consider the scope and the voluntariness of the individuals' 
consent under the particular implied consent scheme presented.  
See, e.g., Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2186 (remanding to state 
court to revisit voluntariness of consent, in light of holding 
that "motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit to 
a blood test on pain of committing a criminal offense"). 
¶70 A federal case out of the Seventh Circuit is helpful 
in illustrating how both the scope and the voluntary nature of 
the consent implied by conduct are evaluated by what is 
reasonable under the particular circumstances.  Where a parking 
lot for government employees had signs posted stating that all 
vehicles were "subject to search," the mere conduct of parking 
in the lot did not imply consent to a sudden, unprecedented 
search of all vehicles because the vague signs gave no reason to 
expect such a singular suspicionless search.  McGann v. Ne. Ill. 
Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp., 8 F.3d 1174, 1176, 1182-83 (7th Cir. 
1993); see also State v. Iaccarino, 767 So.2d 470, 477 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that implied consent to searches 
at festival entrance did not extend to intrusive drug searches, 
because a "reasonable person would conclude from the signs 
posted at the gate that the search was limited to cans, bottles, 
and the contents of coolers or backpacks, . . . [not] wallets, 
pockets, and underwear"). 
V.  APPLICATION 
¶71 I now apply these principles to the unconscious-driver 
provisions of Wisconsin's implied consent law, in light of 
Howes' arguments.  Howes argues that, under the Supreme Court's 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
13 
 
recent decisions in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), 
and Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), 
authorizing warrantless blood tests of unconscious drivers based 
solely on their implied consent creates an unreasonable per se 
exception to the warrant requirement.  I therefore address 
McNeely and Birchfield to explain why they do not support the 
result that Howes suggests.  I then examine the reasonableness 
of the law's presumption that a person has impliedly consented 
to testing while unconscious, and I conclude that it does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment. 
A.  McNeely and Birchfield 
¶72 In McNeely, the Supreme Court held that the natural 
dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute a 
per se exigency that always justifies a warrantless blood draw.  
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1563.  Although Howes points to broad 
language in McNeely that emphasizes the intrusive nature of a 
blood draw and the need for an examination of the totality of 
the circumstances, the holding in McNeely is limited only to the 
question of exigent circumstances.  The McNeely Court "pointedly 
did 
not 
address" 
any 
other 
exceptions 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2174.  Here, the State 
does not ground its argument in exigent circumstances, but 
rather bases its case entirely upon the consent exception to the 
warrant requirement.  So, put simply, McNeely is inapplicable to 
the question before us, that is, whether the unconscious-driver 
provisions 
of 
Wisconsin's 
implied 
consent 
law 
are 
unconstitutional. 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
14 
 
¶73 With Birchfield, we get closer to the mark.  In 
Birchfield, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that it was 
unreasonable to deem a driver "to have consented to submit to a 
blood 
test 
on 
pain 
of 
committing 
a 
criminal 
offense."  
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2186.  But Wisconsin's implied consent 
law does not threaten the criminal penalties that Birchfield 
disapproved; instead, the result of refusal is that the officer 
shall "prepare a notice of intent to revoke, by court order 
under sub. (10), the person's operating privilege."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a).  A court-ordered revocation under § 343.305(10) 
is not a criminal penalty.9  Therefore, nothing in Birchfield 
undermines the longstanding provisions of Wisconsin's implied 
consent law. 
¶74 On 
the 
contrary, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
stated 
in 
Birchfield that "[i]t is well established that a search is 
reasonable when the subject consents, and that sometimes consent 
to a search need not be express but may be fairly inferred from 
context."  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185 (citations omitted).  
                                                 
9 A revocation under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(10) has other 
consequences, but they are not criminal penalties for the 
withdrawal of consent.  For example, Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(f) 
provides that a revocation under § 343.305(10) is counted in 
determining the penalty for operating a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1).  But that 
penalty is imposed only on the subsequent criminal offense of 
drunk driving, not on the earlier withdrawal of consent to 
testing under the implied consent law.  Unlike the North Dakota 
law at issue in Birchfield, which made the refusal itself a 
misdemeanor in the first instance, see Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 
2170-71, a person's withdrawal of consent to a blood test under 
Wisconsin's implied consent law is not a criminal offense. 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
15 
 
The 
Court 
continued, 
"Our 
prior 
opinions 
have 
referred 
approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that 
impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists 
who refuse to comply.  Petitioners do not question the 
constitutionality of those laws, and nothing we say here should 
be read to cast doubt on them."  Id. (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted).  Far from disapproving the concept of consent by 
conduct within the context of a driver's implied consent, the 
Court expressly endorsed the general validity of state implied 
consent laws that infer motorists' consent to testing from the 
conduct of driving. 
B.  Drivers in Wisconsin Consent to Testing By Choosing to Drive 
With Notice of Their Responsibilities 
¶75 Howes argues that it is unreasonable to presume that a 
driver has consented to testing merely by the conduct of driving 
on state highways.  However, the understanding that a driver's 
voluntary consent to testing of blood, breath, or urine is 
validly implied by the conduct of driving has been consistently 
recognized in this court's cases.  See, e.g., Zielke, 137 
Wis. 2d at 48 ("The consent is implied as a condition of the 
privilege of operating a motor vehicle upon state highways."); 
Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d at 203 ("The entire tenor of the implied 
consent 
law 
is . . . that 
consent 
has 
already 
been 
given . . . .").  In Neitzel, we concluded that an arrestee does 
not have a statutory right to consult with counsel about whether 
to refuse testing, because "a lawyer cannot induce his client to 
recant a consent previously given knowingly and voluntarily."  
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
16 
 
Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d at 201 (emphasis added).  At the time the 
defendant chose to drive, "he was fully cognizant of his rights 
and was deemed to know that, in the event he was later arrested 
for drunken driving, he had consented . . . to chemical testing 
under the circumstances envisaged by the statute."  Id.  Put 
simply, consent to testing had already been given, and it 
remained valid until withdrawn.10 
¶76 Inferring consent to testing from the conduct of 
driving appears essential to the validity of the warrantless 
blood test that occurred in State v. Disch, 129 Wis. 2d 225, 385 
N.W.2d 140 (1986), where this court upheld a blood test of a 
driver who was "in a stupor" and "did not seem able to 
concentrate."  Id. at 236.  The only basis for this ruling was 
the same statutory language that Howes now challenges.  See id. 
at 236-38. Therefore, unless this court has had a sudden change 
of heart unsignaled over the course of the past thirty years of 
                                                 
10 Howes argues that a recent court of appeals decision, 
State v. Padley, 2014 WI App 65, 354 Wis. 2d 545, 849 
N.W.2d 867, stands for the contrary proposition.  In Padley, the 
court of appeals rejected "the State's incorrect view that . . . 
'implied consent' alone can 'serve as a valid exception to the 
warrant requirement.'"  Id., ¶37.  However, Padley did not cite 
authority for its rejection of the validity of a driver's 
implied consent as an exception to the warrant requirement, nor 
was such a conclusion necessary to decide the case, because the 
driver in Padley consented expressly.  See id., ¶11.  I reject 
Padley's view as having no basis in law and as inconsistent with 
the Supreme Court's analysis of a state implied consent law 
under the principle that "consent to a search need not be 
express but may be fairly inferred from context."  Birchfield, 
136 S. Ct. at 2185. 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
17 
 
its jurisprudence on the implied consent law, it would appear 
that Howes should receive the same result that Disch received. 
¶77 Wisconsin is not the only jurisdiction to recognize 
that consent to testing is implied when a person operates a 
motor vehicle and continues until it is revoked.  The Idaho 
Supreme Court recognizes that drivers "give their initial 
consent to evidentiary testing by driving on Idaho roads 
voluntarily," and such consent will "qualify as voluntary" so 
long as the driver "continue[s] to give voluntary consent."  
State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575, 582 (Idaho 2014).  Applying this 
rule to an apparently unconscious driver, Idaho's court of 
appeals recognized the validity of the driver's implied consent 
under the Fourth Amendment, because "[t]he fact that [the 
driver] was allegedly unconscious when the officer read her the 
advisory does not effectively operate as a withdrawal of her 
consent."  Bobeck v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 363 P.3d 861, 866-67 
(Idaho Ct. App. 2015).  Further, the court held that the 
officers had no duty "to ensure comprehension of a person who is 
under the influence to the point of being semi-conscious or 
unconscious at times."  Id. at 865. 
¶78 I acknowledge that other courts have found that the 
implied consent of an unconscious driver cannot justify a 
warrantless blood draw.  See, e.g., People v. Arredondo, 199 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016), modified on denial of 
reh'g (Mar. 24, 2016), review granted, 371 P.3d 240 (Cal. 2016); 
Bailey v. State, 790 S.E.2d 98 (Ga. App. 2016); State v. Romano, 
785 S.E.2d 168 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016), review granted, 794 S.E.2d 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
18 
 
315 (N.C. 2016), review granted, writ granted, 794 S.E.2d 317 
(N.C. 2016); State v. Ruiz, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 5626252 
(Tex. App. Aug. 27, 2015), vacated, No. PD-1362-15, 2017 WL 
430291 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 1, 2017) (per curiam). 
¶79 At first blush, this appears to be a significant list 
of courts with holdings inapposite to that which I advocate 
today.  However, the holdings in those cases all assume that 
McNeely (the exigent circumstances case) controls the outcome in 
implied consent cases.  See, e.g., Bailey, 790 S.E.2d at 104 
("In light of McNeely . . . implied consent was insufficient to 
satisfy the Fourth Amendment . . . .").  Both as a matter of 
logic and in light of the relevant language in Birchfield 
(decided after McNeely), I fail to see how that can be the case.  
Because McNeely does not control as to the application of the 
consent exception to the warrant requirement, I reach a 
different conclusion than other jurisdictions do. 
C.  The Scope of Consent Is Reasonable 
¶80 I conclude that the unconscious-driver provisions are 
reasonable in light of the clarity and specificity of the notice 
given and the strict statutory parameters for the occasion and 
manner of testing. 
¶81 First, the notice given in the statute is clear: a 
test may be performed on a driver while he or she is 
unconscious, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)-(b), and continuing 
consent to testing is deemed to exist by virtue of the operation 
of a motor vehicle, § 343.305(2).  A driver is "deemed to know" 
the conditions imposed by the implied consent law, Neitzel, 95 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
19 
 
Wis. 2d at 201, and the conditions in the unconscious-driver 
provisions are unequivocal. 
¶82 Second, the notice given is much more specific than 
the vague, generalized notices rejected by the Seventh Circuit 
in McGann and by the Florida District Court of Appeal in 
Iaccarino.  In those cases, generic "subject to search" notices 
did not provide fair notice of the extensive searches actually 
performed, and it was therefore unreasonable to deem individuals 
to have consented to those searches.  See McGann, 8 F.3d at 
1176, 1183; Iaccarino, 767 So.2d at 477-80.  But as the Florida 
court suggested in Iaccarino, providing a clearer and more 
specific notice would have been enough to establish consent.  
Iaccarino, 767 So.2d at 480.  Here, the statute explicitly 
notifies all drivers that they will be deemed to have consented 
to the tests (not to the choice of testing or revocation), in 
particular circumstances specifically tailored to combating the 
dangers of intoxicated driving.  Unlike the parking lot in 
McGann, where unwarned and unprecedented searches were held 
unreasonable based on a vague notice, the State provides notice 
through its statutes of its regularly performed tests, and 
drivers have no reason to expect otherwise. 
¶83 Further, tests may be performed on an unconscious 
person only in specific situations.  Testing may be performed if 
an officer has probable cause to arrest the driver, but only if 
the arrested offense is one of certain enumerated intoxicated-
driving offenses under Wis. Stat. § 346.63 or certain other 
offenses involving injury or homicide by intoxicated use of a 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
20 
 
vehicle.  See Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b).  But if the driver has 
not been arrested, testing of an unconscious person is limited 
to cases involving an accident causing bodily harm and either 
the 
presence 
of 
alcohol 
or 
a 
violation 
of 
law.  
§ 343.305(3)(ar)1.-2.  Also, if the test is a blood test, it may 
be administered "only by a physician, registered nurse, medical 
technologist, 
physician 
assistant, 
phlebotomist, 
or 
other 
medical professional who is authorized to draw blood, or person 
acting under the direction of a physician."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(5)(b) (2015-16).  These conditions circumscribe the 
scope of the testing, and testing an unconscious person outside 
of them requires a warrant, exigent circumstances, or "other 
lawful means."  § 343.305(3)(c). 
¶84 In the final analysis, "[i]t is the motorist who has 
voluntarily asserted his or her autonomy" in deciding to drive, 
State v. Wintlend, 2002 WI App 314, ¶19, 258 Wis. 2d 875, 655 
N.W.2d 745, and "voluntary consent to a blood draw is not 
negated by the fact that consent was procured by informing a 
suspect that the alternative is a penalty,"  Padley, 354 
Wis. 2d 545, ¶72 (citing Vill. of Little Chute v. Walitalo, 2002 
WI App 211, 256 Wis. 2d 1032, 650 N.W.2d 891).  Howes exercised 
his autonomy by electing to drive under the conditions all 
drivers in Wisconsin accept, and he has not developed——much less 
perfected——any argument as to why, if a driver's voluntary 
consent to testing may be implied from the conduct of driving, 
the blood test performed on him was not authorized by his 
implied consent. 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.mjg 
 
21 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
¶85 No warrant is required in order to administer the 
tests to which a driver has impliedly consented, even if the 
driver is found unconscious.  Voluntary consent to testing can 
be presumed from the decision to drive made with notice of the 
statutory requirements and in the absence of any expressed 
intent to revoke such consent.  Further, this presumption that 
an unconscious driver does not withdraw consent is not per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  Therefore, I cannot 
conclude that Howes has met his burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the unconscious-driver provisions of the 
statute 
are 
facially 
unconstitutional 
and 
"cannot 
be 
constitutionally enforced under any circumstances."  Society 
Ins., 326 Wis. 2d 444, ¶26.  I conclude that the circuit court 
erred in striking down the statute as facially unconstitutional 
and in suppressing the results of the blood test on that basis. 
¶86 For the foregoing reasons I concur. 
¶87 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.dk 
 
1 
 
 
¶88 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  I join Chief Justice 
ROGGENSACK's opinion in toto as well as the mandate of the 
court.  I, at the same time, join Part II of Justice 
ABRAHAMSON's 
dissent 
insofar 
as 
it 
discusses 
the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. §343.305(3)(b). 
 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶89 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  Only one 
question of law has been at issue in the instant case since its 
inception:  Whether provisions of Wisconsin's implied consent 
law 
authorizing 
warrantless 
blood 
draws 
from 
unconscious 
drivers, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 343.305(3)(ar) 
and 
(b), 
are 
constitutional.  These statutory provisions appear in Attachment 
1.1   
¶90 The 
constitutional 
inquiry 
into 
the 
statute's 
unconscious driver provisions focuses on whether statutory 
implied consent to a blood draw, a significant search of the 
person, 
satisfies 
the 
"consent" 
exception 
to 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment.  This is the only Fourth Amendment issue the parties 
addressed in the circuit court and in their briefs and arguments 
in this court.  This is the only Fourth Amendment issue 
addressed by the circuit court.  This is the only issue 
addressed by the court of appeals in its certification memo.2 
¶91 At 
the 
suppression 
hearing, 
the 
circuit 
court 
considered the only two issues presented by the parties:  
                                                 
1 For clarity, Chief Justice Roggensack's lead opinion is 
joined by Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Justice Daniel 
Kelly.  Justice Gableman's concurring opinion is joined by 
Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler.  Justice Daniel Kelly filed a 
concurring opinion.  This dissent is joined in its entirety by 
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, and in Part II by Justice Daniel 
Kelly insofar as it discusses the constitutionality of Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(3)(b).  
2 See State v. Howes, No. 2014AP1870-CR, certification by 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2016).   
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
probable cause to arrest the defendant and the constitutionality 
of the Wisconsin implied consent law.  
¶92 The circuit court held that there was probable cause 
to arrest the defendant.  I agree.  
¶93 After indulging every presumption to sustain the 
constitutionality of the statute, the circuit court concluded 
that 
the 
statute 
was 
unconstitutional 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment:  No consent in the constitutional sense can be given 
when the driver is unconscious and incapable of giving or 
withdrawing consent.  I agree.     
¶94 Rather 
than 
address 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
issue 
presented by the parties, the lead opinion sua sponte upholds 
the warrantless blood draw under the Fourth Amendment by 
fabricating "exigent circumstances."  The lead opinion misleads 
the reader into believing that the circuit court addressed and 
decided the existence of exigent circumstances.  See lead op., 
¶2.  The circuit court did not do so.  In paragraph 15, the lead 
opinion fesses up that the circuit court merely stated without 
analysis that no exigent circumstances were presented by the 
instant case.       
¶95 The lead opinion establishes the existence of "exigent 
circumstances" by stepping off the bench, seating itself at the 
counsel table as advocate for the State, and putting itself on 
the stand as witness for the State, thus abandoning its role as 
neutral decision maker.  By raising and deciding the exigent 
circumstances exception sua sponte without giving the defendant 
an opportunity to present evidence or to be represented by 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
counsel, the lead opinion violates basic concepts of due process 
and destabilizes the adversary system at both the trial and 
appellate levels.3   
¶96 Furthermore, no reasonable view of the record supports 
theholding that exigent circumstances justify a warrantless 
blood draw in the instant case.  The lead opinion refuses to 
hold itself to the "heavy burden" it undertakes (when it acts as 
the State's surrogate) to rebut the presumption by clear and 
convincing evidence that a warrantless search of Howes is 
unreasonable.4     
¶97 In essence, the lead opinion engages in an assault on 
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).  McNeely caused a 
paradigm shift in Fourth Amendment and drunk-driving law.5  The 
McNeely Court held:  
                                                 
3 As the United State Supreme Court has explained:  "In our 
adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the first 
instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of party 
presentation.  That is, we rely on the parties to frame the 
issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral 
arbiter of matters the parties present."  Greenlaw v. United 
States, 554 U.S. 237, 243–44 (2008) (citing Castro v. United 
States, 540 U.S. 375, 381–83 (2003)).  The Court further 
explained:  "To the extent courts have approved departures from 
the 
party 
presentation 
principle 
in 
criminal 
cases, 
the 
justification has usually been to protect a pro se litigant's 
rights."  The defendant in the instant case is not a pro se 
litigant.  He is represented by counsel. 
4 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984) ("[P]olice 
bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent 
need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests"). 
5 See, e.g., State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶42, 359 
Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120 (McNeely "changed the landscape of 
warrantless blood draws in Wisconsin"). 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
• "[W]hile the natural dissipation of alcohol in the 
blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific 
case, . . . it 
does 
not 
do 
so 
categorically."  
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1563.   
• A "careful case—by-case assessment of exigency" must 
be undertaken.  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561.   
• Most importantly, if law enforcement "can reasonably 
obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn 
without significantly undermining the efficacy of the 
search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do 
so."  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561 (emphasis added).  
¶98 These McNeely principles govern the instant case.  
McNeely's directive that a court engage in careful, case-by-case 
assessments of exigency cannot be met by way of the lead 
opinion's assumptions and speculation in an appellate opinion.  
The record does not support a case-by-case assessment of 
exigency in the instant case and does not support a holding that 
law enforcement could not have reasonably obtained a warrant 
before a blood sample could be drawn.      
¶99 Because the lead opinion whittles away constitutional 
protections for the defendant and all of us under the rubric of 
exigent circumstances, I dissent. 
¶100 I will first address the lead opinion's explication of 
exigent circumstances as an exception to the Fourth Amendment in 
the instant case.  I will then address the constitutionality of 
the statutory implied consent under the Fourth Amendment.    
I 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶101 At the hearing on the motion to suppress the test 
results from the blood draw, the State's witness, Deputy Schiro 
of the Dane County Sheriff's Office, was the only witness.  He 
testified to establish probable cause and his compliance with 
the implied consent law.   
¶102 The State did not introduce any evidence to establish 
exigent circumstances.  Indeed, the State did not even hint that 
exigent circumstances may have authorized the warrantless blood 
draw. 
¶103 The defendant has never been given notice or an 
opportunity to present evidence or make arguments regarding what 
has become the dispositive issue in the instant case——exigent 
circumstances.  I thus conclude that the lead opinion has 
deprived the defendant of due process and has destabilized the 
adversary system at both the trial and appellate levels. 
¶104 A defendant has due process rights to notice of issues 
to be resolved and to be heard in a meaningful way, including "a 
right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, 
and to be represented by counsel."  Washington v. Texas, 388 
U.S. 14, 18 (1967) (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 
(1948)).6  The defendant's due process rights in the instant case 
                                                 
6 Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 126 (1991) ("notice of 
issues to be resolved by the adversary process is a fundamental 
characteristic of fair procedure."); California v. Trombetta, 
467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) ("criminal prosecutions must comport 
with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness"); Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950) 
(due process requires that "adjudication be preceded by notice 
and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the 
case"). 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
to get notice, to be heard, to present a complete defense, and 
to have counsel have been violated.7 
                                                 
7 See In re Termination of Parental Rights to Daniel R.S., 
2005 WI 160, ¶65, 286 Wis. 2d 278, 706 N.W.2d 269 ("the 
opportunity to be heard includes the right to 'present a 
complete defense'") (quoted source omitted).  
"The opportunity to present arguments on the legal issue 
upon which a case is to be decided is fundamental to sound legal 
process . . . ."  Bloomer v. Gibson, 912 A.2d 424, 433–34 (Vt. 
2006) (citing Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A 
Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 
Tenn. L. Rev. 245 (2002)).  The Bloomer court cited large swaths 
of 
Milani 
and 
Smith's 
article, 
including 
the 
following 
discussion:  
[B]eing denied an opportunity to address the issue 
that ultimately proves dispositive of a case is no 
different than a complete denial of an opportunity to 
be heard.  If a court perceives the issues on appeal 
as different from those addressed by the parties, the 
parties should have a right to receive notice of the 
court's concern about those issues and to present 
arguments 
on 
them. 
 
Without 
this 
right, 
the 
opportunity to be heard is but a "teasing illusion."  
Allowing a party to submit briefs and arguments on 
what the party believes to be the issues, but denying 
that party the opportunity to be heard on the issue 
the court deems dispositive, is akin to granting 
citizens free speech but barring them from speaking on 
issues of public concern.  In both situations, the 
exception renders the right meaningless.   
Milani & Smith, 69 Tenn. L. Rev. at 268-69 (footnotes omitted). 
See also Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's concurrence in City of 
Janesville 
v. 
CC 
Midwest, 
Inc., 
2007 
WI 
93, 
¶68, 
302 
Wis. 2d 599, 641, 734 N.W.2d 428, 450 (Bradley, J., concurring), 
explaining the fundamental premise of the adversary system:   
The rule of law is generally best developed when 
issues are raised by the parties and then tested by 
the fire of adversarial briefs and oral arguments.  
Indeed, "[t]he fundamental premise of the adversary 
process is that these advocates will uncover and 
present more useful information and arguments to the 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶105 Furthermore, this kind of violation of due process may 
undermine the validity and legitimacy of the court's decision:  
"If notice is not given, and the adversary process is not 
permitted to function properly, there is an increased chance of 
error . . . and with that, the possibility of an incorrect 
result."  Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 127 (1991).  
¶106 Moreover, the lead opinion violates a basic rule of 
appellate review by bypassing the adversary process and raising 
and deciding a dispositive issue on its own without the benefit 
of briefs or argument.8 
                                                                                                                                                             
decision maker than would be developed by a judicial 
officer acting on his own in an inquisitorial system."  
Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A 
Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions By Appellate 
Courts, 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 245, 247 (2002), citing 
United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246, 112 S. Ct. 
1867, 
119 
L. 
Ed. 
2d 
34 
(1992) 
(Scalia, 
J., 
concurring). 
8 "As various members of this court have said, we should not 
'reach out and decide issues' that were not presented to the 
court by the parties."  Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., v. 
Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶335, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408 
(Roggensack, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) 
(quoting Town of Beloit v. Cty. of Rock, 2003 WI 8, ¶72, 259 
Wis. 2d 37, 657 N.W.2d 344 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting)).  See 
also State v. Thompson, 2012 WI 90, ¶¶9, 60, 342 Wis. 2d 674, 
818 N.W.2d 904 (declaring that the court should not decide 
issues that are not briefed). 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶107 In addition to issues of violating due process and 
appellate practice, as a factual matter, if counsel for the 
defendant 
had 
had 
an 
opportunity 
to 
address 
exigent 
circumstances, 
counsel 
might 
have 
presented 
evidence 
and 
argument 
that 
significantly 
undercut 
the 
lead 
opinion's 
presentation of what might have been (but was not and might not 
be) the State's position on exigent circumstances.   
¶108 For example, a key factual sticking point in the lead 
opinions's exigent circumstances analysis is that the record 
does not demonstrate that law enforcement could not have timely 
secured a warrant.  The lead opinion presents no evidence 
establishing approximately how long it would have taken to 
obtain a warrant for the blood draw in Dane County.  Yet the 
                                                                                                                                                             
The United States Supreme Court has often explained the 
fundamental importance of the adversarial presentation of 
issues.  See, e.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988) ("This 
system is premised on the well-tested principle that truth——as 
well as fairness——is 'best discovered by powerful statements on 
both sides of the question.'" (citations omitted)); Polk Cty. v. 
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) ("The system assumes that 
adversarial testing will ultimately advance the public interest 
in truth and fairness."); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 
(1979) ("[O]ur legal tradition regards the adversary process as 
the best means of ascertaining truth and minimizing the risk of 
error . . . ."). 
See also State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, ¶80 n.20, 343 
Wis. 2d 1, 
819 
N.W.2d 749 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting) 
("Scholars have made similar observations.  See, e.g., Stephan 
Landsman, Readings on Adversarial Justice:  The American 
Approach to Adjudication (1988); Jerold H. Israel, Cornerstones 
of the Judicial Process, Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y, Spring 1993, at 
5; Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the 
Adversary System, 64 Ind. L.J. 301, 316–19 (1989)."). 
 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
lead opinion, without any evidentiary record, concludes that the 
officer did not have time.         
¶109 At the suppression hearing, which addressed whether 
the officer had probable cause to arrest and the officer's 
compliance with the implied consent statute, the officer 
testified as follows on cross-examination by defense counsel and 
on redirect examination by the State that he had the time to get 
a warrant: 
On cross-examination of Deputy Schiro by defense counsel: 
Q. And you had plenty of time in this case to get a 
warrant, didn't you? 
A.  Yes  
. . . . 
On redirect examination of Deputy Schiro by the State: 
Q. You testified on cross-examination, Deputy Schiro, 
that you had plenty of time to get a warrant before 
the blood draw.  Why didn't you? 
A. I believe I did not have to.  
¶110 The lead opinion rejects the Dane County deputy's 
testimony as the deputy's subjective belief.  The lead opinion 
reminds us that the totality of the circumstances test for 
exigent circumstances is an objective one.  See lead op., ¶36 & 
n.9. 
¶111 Relying on United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626, 
629 (7th Cir. 2000), the lead opinion reasons that "a police 
officer's subjective belief that exigent circumstances exist is 
insufficient to make a warrantless search."  The instant case is 
distinguishable from Richardson.  Here, the officer testified 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
that he did not believe there were exigent circumstances.  
Because the Fourth Amendment puts the burden to prove the 
reasonableness of a warrantless search on the government, it is 
one thing to ignore the officer's subjective, self-serving 
belief that he did not have time to get a warrant and a wholly 
different issue to rely on the officer's statement that he had 
time to get a warrant as an objective evaluation of exigency.  
¶112 Furthermore, defense counsel might have offered as 
expert testimony the deputy's testimony about whether he had 
time to get a warrant.  The testifying deputy has worked for 15 
years as a Dane County law enforcement officer, and he ought to 
be qualified to testify from personal, professional expertise 
about the time needed to get a warrant in Dane County. 
¶113 Advancements have been made for the expeditious 
processing of warrant applications.  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 
1561-63.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 968.12(3)(a)-(d) (authorizing search 
warrants on oral testimony communicated to the judge by 
telephonic, radio, or other means of electronic communication).  
The Dane County Circuit Court has a system of 24/7 duty judges 
to provide telephonic warrants.  See Dane County Court Rules, 
Rule 102, entitled "Duty Judge Responsibility."  
¶114 Indeed the Dane County deputy's view on how long it 
would take to get a telephonic warrant in Dane County ought to 
be more reliable than the unsupported view of the three justices 
joining the lead opinion.  Furthermore, the Dane County Circuit 
Court's view on how long it would take to get a telephonic 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
warrant in Dane County ought to be more reliable than the view 
of the three justices joining the lead opinion.   
¶115 In rendering its decision declaring the blood draw 
unconstitutional, the circuit court declared as an aside that 
there were no exigent circumstances causing an exception to the 
warrant requirement and that the deputy had time to get a 
warrant:  
[T]here 
are 
no 
exigent 
circumstances 
that 
are 
identified here that would cause an exception to the 
warrant requirement. . . . [t]he officer testified 
that there was no reason he could not have gotten a 
warrant. . . . There is nothing to suggest that there 
were exigent circumstances that would obviate the 
warrant requirement, so that's where we need to leave 
it then today. 
¶116 In addition, defense counsel might have challenged the 
lead opinion's reliance on the defendant's prohibited alcohol 
concentration 
of 
0.02 
percent 
as 
supporting 
exigent 
circumstances.  Blood alcohol concentration, BAC, refers to the 
amount of alcohol in the driver's blood.  Prohibited alcohol 
content, PAC, refers to the legal limit of alcohol in a driver's 
blood.9   
                                                 
9 See Wis. Stat. § 346.63, Operating under influence of 
intoxicant or other drug: 
(1) No person may drive or operate a motor vehicle 
while: 
 
. . . . 
(b) The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration. 
See Wis. Stat. § 340.01(46m):  
"Prohibited alcohol concentration" means one of the 
following: 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶117 According to the lead opinion, a 0.02 percent BAC will 
disappear in one to two hours.  Lead op., ¶45.  With this 
shortened timeline, the time available for an officer to obtain 
a warrant decreases, according to the lead opinion.  This 
proposition is central to the analysis in the lead opinion.   
¶118 Under closer scrutiny, it appears that this critical 
one-to-two-hour time period might have elapsed before the blood 
draw was requested or taken and that the lowered PAC is 
irrelevant to the exigent circumstances analysis in the instant 
case. 
¶119 The record does not reveal the time at which the 
defendant stopped drinking or the time at which the accident 
occurred.  See lead op., ¶47.  The record demonstrates only that 
the blood draw was roughly two hours after the sheriff's office 
was advised of the accident.  See lead op., ¶13.   
¶120 Thus, the defendant's last drink and the accident were 
obviously more than two hours before the blood was drawn.  If a 
0.02 percent BAC will dissipate in one to two hours (as the lead 
opinion suggests), there were no exigent circumstances when the 
blood draw was made because the BAC in all probability would had 
already dissipated.    
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) If the person has 2 or fewer prior convictions, 
suspensions, or revocations, as counted under s. 
343.307(1), an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. 
(c) If the person is subject to an order under s. 
343.301 or if the person has 3 or more prior 
convictions, suspensions or revocations, as counted 
under s. 343.307(1), an alcohol concentration of more 
than 0.02.   
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶121 The record nevertheless indicates that the defendant's 
BAC was in all probability more than 0.02 percent.  Several 
witnesses reported smelling intoxicants on the defendant.  
According to the Assistant District Attorney's argument at the 
suppression hearing, a person with a 0.11-.13 percent BAC will 
not exude "an incredibly heavy" odor.  Thus, a person with a 
0.02 percent BAC would have exuded even less of an odor of 
intoxicants.10   
¶122 If the defendant's BAC was substantially higher than 
0.02 percent, then law enforcement would have had more than one 
to two hours after the last drink within which to obtain a 
warrant for a blood draw and still gather evidence that 
defendant violated the law.   
¶123 In either eventuality, that is, whether the defendant 
had a .02 percent BAC or had a higher BAC, the lead opinion's 
reliance on the defendant's lower PAC threshold to support 
exigent circumstances falls apart.     
¶124 Defense counsel might have shown that the hour before 
law enforcement requested the hospital for a blood draw and the 
hour between the officer's request for a blood draw and the 
blood draw were sufficient times for the officer to get a 
warrant.  
                                                 
10 The 
assistant 
district 
attorney 
set 
forth 
this 
proposition in order to explain why Deputy Schiro did not 
testify that he recalled smelling alcohol on the defendant.  See 
Pet. App. at 77. 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶125 The evidence of the defendant's medical condition was 
sketchy. It is thus unclear whether it would have led a 
reasonable officer to conclude that there was no time to obtain 
a warrant before blood was drawn.   
¶126 Defense counsel might have also shown that several law 
enforcement officers were on the accident scene and were 
available to aid Deputy Schiro.  Deputy Schiro also talked with 
his sergeant. 
¶127 The involvement of other law enforcement agents cuts 
against the existence of exigent circumstances.  There is 
nothing in the record indicating that the several officers 
involved were so busy finding or identifying the driver, 
extensively investigating the accident, tending to injured 
victims, removing the deer and motorcycle from the road, or 
engaging in other activities that neither they nor the sergeant 
could not initiate a telephone warrant process. 
¶128 In addition, defense counsel might have persuaded the 
court to follow precedent, namely State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, 
¶34 n.13, 359 Wis. 2d 454, 856 N.W.2d 834, in which the court 
explained its reluctance to address exigent circumstances when 
the State does not argue that exigent circumstances existed: 
The State, which would bear the burden, does not argue 
that exigent circumstances existed in this case.  
Neither the State nor Kennedy focus on this issue. 
Whether an exigency exists in a given case will vary 
depending on any number of facts or circumstances, as 
law 
enforcement 
investigations 
are 
often 
extraordinarily fluid situations.  Our holding in this 
case must not be read to affirmatively conclude that 
exigent circumstances did not support the warrantless 
investigatory 
blood 
draw 
performed 
on 
Kennedy. 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
Nonetheless, our analysis remains focused on the 
arguments addressed by counsel . . . .11 
¶129 The legal effect of the exigent circumstances analysis 
in the lead opinion is that it allows a warrantless blood draw 
when it is unclear from the record whether law enforcement had 
time to secure a warrant.  Yet McNeely declares that no exigent 
circumstances exist when there is time to secure a warrant.   
¶130 Furthermore, 
the 
legal 
effect 
of 
the 
exigent 
circumstances 
analysis 
in 
the 
lead 
opinion 
creates 
an 
impermissible per se rule that no warrant is needed to draw 
blood for certain drivers.  It is unclear, however, to whom the 
per se rule is applicable:  To drivers who are unconscious from 
a motor vehicle accident?  To unconscious drivers of motor 
vehicles who are restricted to a 0.02 BAC?  To seriously injured 
hospitalized drivers?   
¶131 In other words, law enforcement doesn't know which 
elements of the totality of the circumstances present in the 
instant case, see lead op., ¶3, are essential to justify a 
                                                 
11 See also Bailey v. State, 790 S.E.2d 98, 104 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2016): 
The State, however, produced no evidence of exigent 
circumstances.  For example, there was no evidence 
regarding how long the warrant process was expected to 
take and whether officers could have been seeking a 
warrant while Bailey was being transported to the 
hospital.  Thus, this could have been the situation 
imagined by the McNeely Court "in which the warrant 
process will not significantly increase the delay 
before the blood test is conducted because an officer 
can take steps to secure a warrant while the suspect 
is being transported to a medical facility by another 
officer." 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
warrantless blood draw.  The lead opinion provides no clear 
direction for law enforcement to follow in the future. 
¶132 In sum, as a matter of law, when both the State and 
the defendant have not had the opportunity to offer evidence or 
argument on the issue of exigent circumstances and this court 
decides 
the 
case 
on 
the 
dispositive 
issue 
of 
exigent 
circumstances, the defendant has not received a full and fair 
due process evidentiary or appellate hearing on his Fourth 
Amendment motion to suppress.  The instant case does not present 
an extraordinary situation justifying departure from the rule 
requiring the parties to present the issues. 
¶133 In sum, as a matter of fact, the lead opinion cannot 
condone the warrantless blood draw on exigent circumstances with 
the sparse record of facts before it.12  As the Dane County 
                                                 
12 The 
lead 
opinion 
also 
considers 
the 
four-part 
reasonableness test that applies once exigent circumstances are 
established that was set forth in State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, 
¶17, 359 Wis. 2d 454, 856 N.W.2d 834.  See lead op., ¶25.   
Because I conclude that there were no exigent circumstances 
in the instant case, I do not respond to the lead opinion's 
application of these factors.  However, I am skeptical that the 
instant case satisfies the fourth factor, that "the arrestee 
presents no reasonable objection to the blood draw."  Kennedy, 
359 Wis. 2d 454, ¶17.  Because the defendant was unconscious, he 
had no chance to object.   
The lead opinion's response seems to be that "the fourth 
factor speaks to the reasonableness of the type of search 
employed, not whether a warrant was required to conduct the 
search."  Lead op., ¶26 n.8.   
(continued) 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
Circuit Court observed in declaring the relevant provisions of 
Wisconsin's implied consent law unconstitutional: 
All the police officer had to do to comply with the 
Fourth Amendment was to get a warrant.  The defendant 
was not about to go anywhere but to the operating 
room.  The duty judge was a phone call away.  
Following McNeely, we routinely handle blood draw 
search warrants by telephone.   I respectfully suggest 
that procedure is more consonant with the Fourth 
Amendment than reading a form to an unconscious man 
and then ordering his blood to be taken.     
II 
¶134 Because I conclude that exigent circumstances did not 
render the warrantless blood draw constitutionally permissible, 
I turn to considering the provisions of the implied consent law 
regarding unconscious drivers.  According to the statute, 
unconscious 
drivers 
incapable 
of 
withdrawing 
consent 
are 
presumed not to have withdrawn consent to the blood draw.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b).   
¶135 The State did not solicit any testimony at the 
suppression hearing that the defendant's consent to the blood 
                                                                                                                                                             
Characterizing this factor as a reference to the type of 
test conducted and asserting that the defendant raised no 
objection to the type of search misses the point:  The defendant 
was unconscious.  The lead opinion has no way of knowing whether 
the defendant was "one of the few who on grounds of fear, 
concern for health, or religious scruple might prefer some other 
means of testing . . . . ."  Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 771 (1966).  The lead opinion seems to concede that the 
defendant did not impliedly consent to the search.  
I do not understand the reasoning of the lead opinion in 
its footnote, but it seems internally inconsistent.     
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
draw was given in fact and was voluntary.  The State relied on 
the statute alone to prove the defendant's consent. 
¶136 Adhering to the reasoning set forth in State v. 
Padley, 2014 WI App 65, 354 Wis. 2d 545, 849 N.W.2d 867, I 
conclude that the statute's unconscious driver provisions are 
unconstitutional because unconscious drivers have not freely and 
voluntarily consented to the warrantless blood draw under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Therefore, the warrantless blood test in the 
instant case should be suppressed.   
¶137 Throughout the course of the instant litigation, the 
State has relied on consent as the applicable exception to the 
warrant requirement to validate the warrantless blood draw.  The 
State's position is that the defendant's statutory "implied 
consent," deemed to have occurred before the defendant was 
arrested for suspected drunk driving, is voluntary consent for 
purposes of the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement.   
¶138 The parties disagree whether this statutory implied 
consent satisfies the Fourth Amendment requirement of consent.  
No federal or state cases are directly on point, and, as the 
court of appeals' excellent certification memorandum explains, 
tension exists in the case law.  
¶139 Because a majority of the court has not written on the 
constitutional issue, I do not address it at length.    
¶140 Upon considering the parties' arguments, the reasoning 
of the circuit court, and case law from the United States 
Supreme Court and the states, I conclude that the Wisconsin 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
implied consent statute, applied to unconscious drivers, does 
not provide an independent and valid consent exception to the 
warrant requirement.   
¶141 Warrantless searches are unreasonable, subject to a 
few narrow exceptions.  State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶29, 327 
Wis. 2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430.  One such exception is a search 
conducted pursuant to consent.  The general rule is that the 
State must prove that consent was "given in fact by words 
gestures, or conduct" and that the consent was "voluntary."  
Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶30. 
¶142 Whether the consent was given in fact is a "question 
of historical fact" that an appellate court will uphold "if it 
is not contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of 
the evidence."  Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶30.  
¶143 If the State establishes consent in fact, the State 
must prove that the consent was given freely and voluntarily.  
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 225 (1973) 
(consent must result from "an essentially free and unconstrained 
choice").13  The State must meet this burden of proof by clear 
                                                 
13 In State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 577 N.W.2d 794 
(1998), this court provided a non-exclusive list of factors for 
courts considering the voluntariness of consent to consider:  
(1) whether the police used deception, trickery, or 
misrepresentation in their dialogue with the defendant 
to persuade him to consent; (2) whether the police 
threatened or physically intimidated the defendant or 
"punished" him by the deprivation of something like 
food or sleep; (3) whether the conditions attending 
the request to search were congenial, non-threatening, 
and 
cooperative, 
or 
the 
opposite; 
(4) 
how 
the 
defendant responded to the request to search; (5) what 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
20 
 
and convincing evidence.  Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶32.  "The 
determination of voluntariness is a mixed question of fact and 
law based upon an evaluation of the totality of all the 
surrounding 
circumstances." 
 
Artic, 
327 
Wis. 2d 392, 
¶32 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
¶144 The consent required in Fourth Amendment cases must be 
"'an essentially free and unconstrained choice,' not 'the 
product of duress or coercion, express or implied.'"  Artic, 327 
Wis. 2d 392, ¶32 (quoted source omitted).   
¶145 The State argues that drivers on a Wisconsin highway 
have given "implied consent" to a warrantless blood draw; that 
statutory 
"implied 
consent" 
is 
the 
equivalent 
of 
actual 
voluntary consent for Fourth Amendment purposes; and that the 
Wisconsin implied consent statute is constitutional.  According 
to the State, McNeely does not govern this case because McNeely 
concerns exigent circumstances, not consent.   
¶146 The State asks this court to hold that the statutory 
implied consent supplies constitutional consent for conscious 
and unconscious drivers.  The State asks this court to overturn 
State v. Padley, 2014 WI App 65, 354 
Wis. 2d 545, 849 
N.W.2d 867, in which the court of appeals held that the implied 
                                                                                                                                                             
characteristics 
the 
defendant 
had 
as 
to 
age, 
intelligence, 
education, 
physical 
and 
emotional 
condition, and prior experience with the police; and 
(6) whether the police informed the defendant that he 
could refuse consent (emphasis added).   
State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶32, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 786 
N.W.2d 430 (citing Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 198-203).  
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
21 
 
consent statute relating to conscious drivers does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment because it provides the person with the 
choice of providing actual consent to a blood draw or facing 
license revocation.  Under Padley, the statutory implied consent 
of drivers is consent to this choice, not consent to a blood 
draw.  The State asks this court to overturn Padley because the 
import of Padley is to cast doubt on whether the statute's 
implied 
consent 
suffices 
as 
voluntary 
consent 
in 
all 
circumstances for Fourth Amendment purposes.14  The State's 
position is that the statutory implied consent is sufficient for 
Fourth Amendment purposes in all circumstances.15    
¶147 The 
defendant 
argues 
that 
Padley 
was 
correctly 
decided.  He asserts that he did not consent in fact to a blood 
draw because he was unconscious; that any consent was not 
                                                 
14 The court of appeals explained that several cases, 
including the following, may be inconsistent: State v. Neitzel, 
95 Wis. 2d 191, 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980); State v. Wintlend, 2002 
WI App 314, 258 Wis. 2d 875, 655 N.W.2d 745; Village of Little 
Chute v. Walitalo, 2002 WI App 211, 256 Wis. 2d 1032, 650 
N.W.2d 891; State v. Piddington, 2001 WI. 24, 241 Wis. 2d 754, 
623 
N.W.2d 528; 
State 
v. 
Disch, 
129 
Wis. 2d 225, 
385 
N.W.2d 140 (1986).  See State v. Howes, No. 2014AP1870-CR, 
certification by Wisconsin Court of Appeals (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 
28, 2016).   
Thus, the court of appeals requested that this court issue 
an authoritative decision clarifying the law.   
15 The Padley court noted that, "at least in the context of 
incapacitated drivers, 'implied consent' is a sufficient basis 
on which to proceed with a warrantless search."  The Padley 
court acknowledged there may be a tension between its decision 
and the statutory language relating to incapacitated drivers.  
See State v. Padley, 2014 WI App 65, ¶39 n.10, 354 Wis. 2d 545, 
849 N.W.2d 867.          
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
22 
 
voluntary because the State's interpretation of the statute 
makes implied consent irrevocable;16 and that the statutory 
provisions regarding unconscious drivers are the functional 
equivalent of a categorical rule rejected in McNeely.17  
¶148 Relying on State v. Padley, 2014 WI App 65, ¶26, 354 
Wis. 2d 545, 849 N.W.2d 876, in which the court of appeals 
distinguished between implied consent (which is consent to 
choose between a blood draw and license revocation) and actual 
voluntary consent for Fourth Amendment purposes, the circuit 
court correctly reasoned, in my opinion, that an unconscious 
defendant did not give actual voluntary consent to a blood draw 
and 
that 
statutory 
implied 
consent 
is 
analogous 
to 
the 
categorical exigent circumstances declared invalid in McNeely.  
¶149 Padley has statewide precedential effect.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.41(2).  We should not overrule precedent without a 
compelling justification.  Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. 
Ct. 2160 (2016), a recent United States Supreme Court case, 
supports Padley and the circuit court's decision in the instant 
                                                 
16 See Byars v. State, 336 P.3d 939, 945 (Nev. 2014) (a 
"necessary element of consent is the ability to limit or revoke 
it") (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991) ("A 
suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the 
search to which he consents.")); State v. Halseth, 339 P.3d 368, 
371 (Idaho 2014) ("Inherent in the requirement that consent be 
voluntary is the right of the person to withdraw that 
consent.").  
17 See State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575, 582 (Idaho 2014) 
(declaring that Idaho's implied consent law, which did not allow 
drivers 
to 
revoke 
consent 
to 
a 
blood 
draw, 
was 
an 
unconstitutional per se exception to the Fourth Amendment).  
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
23 
 
case.  In Birchfield, the United States Supreme Court recognized 
that the longstanding rule permitting a search incident to 
arrest allows warrantless breath tests.  Nevertheless, the Court 
recognized that blood draws are significant intrusions into the 
body 
and 
concluded 
that 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
does 
not 
categorically permit warrantless blood draws as valid incident 
to an arrest for drunk driving.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184.  
Referring to McNeely, the Court explained that "[n]othing 
prevents the police from seeking a warrant for a blood test when 
there 
is 
sufficient 
time 
to 
do 
so 
in 
the 
particular 
circumstances or from relying on the exigent circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement when there is not."  
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184.     
¶150 If 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
refuses 
to 
categorically permit a warrantless blood draw premised on the 
well-established search incident to arrest exception to the 
warrant requirement, a blood draw based on a statutorily imputed 
implied 
consent 
surely 
cannot 
pass 
muster. 
 
Birchfield, 
therefore, supports the notion that warrantless blood draws 
justified by only statutory implied consent (rather than 
voluntary consent in fact) are unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Birchfield also supports the notion that such blood 
draws, especially regarding an unconscious driver, lead to 
impermissible per se exceptions to the Fourth Amendment.   
¶151 In sum, in addition to my conclusions regarding the 
errors in the lead opinion in relying on exigent circumstances, 
I conclude that the warrantless blood test in the instant case 
No.  2014AP1870-CR.ssa 
 
24 
 
is not the product of actual consent in fact made freely and 
voluntarily. 
¶152 Accordingly, I conclude that the blood test results 
should be suppressed as a violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
¶153 For the reasons set forth, I write separately to 
affirm the order of the circuit court suppressing evidence of 
the blood test. 
¶154 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent and that Justice DANIEL KELLY joins 
Part 
II 
of 
this 
dissent 
insofar 
as 
it 
discusses 
the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b). 
 
 
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