Case Title: McCaskill v. Fort Smith Pub. Sch. Dist.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-05-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Joe McCASKILL v. FORT SMITH PUBLIC SCHOOL
DISTRICT

95-874                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered May 28, 1996


1.   Judgment -- standard for review of summary judgment --
     respective burdens of proof. -- The standard for review of a
     summary judgment is whether the evidentiary items presented by
     the moving party in support of the motion left a question of
     material fact unanswered and, if not, whether the moving party
     is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; all proof is
     viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
     motion, and all doubts and inferences are resolved against the
     moving party; however, when the movant makes a prima facie
     showing of entitlement to summary judgment, the respondent
     must meet that proof with proof showing a genuine issue for
     trial.  

2.   Judgment -- appellee met burden of showing entitlement to
     judgment as a matter of law -- appellant failed to meet proof
     with proof. -- Appellant's contention that there was a genuine
     issue of material fact involving intentional concealment of
     information that would have led him to avail himself of the
     grievance procedure was without merit; as the moving party,
     appellee demonstrated that there were no disputed factual
     issues regarding appellant's 1990-91 contract and stated
     unequivocally that the sole reason for appellant's
     reassignment was the overall change to the junior-high
     program; appellee met its burden of showing entitlement to
     judgment as a matter of law; appellant did not meet his burden
     of rebutting appellee's proof with proof of a disputed issue
     of material fact where he offered no proof whatsoever that the
     reason for his reassignment was anything other than the
     restructuring of the overall program; appellant did not prove
     that anything was fraudulently concealed from him. 

3.   Administrative law & procedure -- superseding portion of
     Teacher Fair Dismissal Act interpreted -- appellant's previous
     contract superseded when he signed new contact. -- Appellant's 
     contention that he was entitled to a trial because appellee
     did not strictly comply with the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act
     was meritless where appellant signed a superseding contract
     for a reduction in salary after the reassignment or nonrenewal
     of his coaching duties in 1990; pursuant to the terms of Ark.
     Code Ann.  6-17-1506(a), by appellant's signing the 1990-91
     contract, the 1989-90 contract was superseded and the notice
     requirements of the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act no longer
     applied; appellant could not sign a superseding contract and
     then claim the protection of the notice and renewal
     requirements of the Act; moreover, he could not sign a
     superseding contract and then wait well past the Act's
     limitation period for contesting the nonrenewal.


     Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court; Floyd G. Rogers, Judge;
affirmed.
     Walker Law Firm, by:  William J. Kropp, III, for appellant.
     Thompson & Llewellyn, by:  James Llewellyn, Jr., for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.Associate Justice Donald L.
Corbin, 5-28-96  *ADVREP*SC6*





JOE MCCASKILL,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

FORT SMITH PUBLIC SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
                    APPELLEE,



95-874



APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT
SMITH DISTRICT,
NO. CIV 94-340-II,
HON. FLOYD G. ROGERS, JUDGE,



AFFIRMED.





      Appellant, Joe McCaskill, appeals the letter order of the
Sebastian County Circuit Court granting summary judgment to
appellee, Fort Smith Public School District, on appellant's
complaint under The Teacher Fair Dismissal Act of 1983, Ark. Code
Ann.  6-17-1501 to -1510 (1987 & Supp. 1995).  The interpretation
and construction of The Teacher Fair Dismissal Act is at issue in
this case.  Jurisdiction of this appeal is therefore properly in
this court pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(3).
     Appellant filed a complaint and request for reinstatement with
appellee, relying on his 1989-90 contract for employment as
secondary-education teacher and seventh-grade coach.  Appellant
alleged he had been employed as a teacher and coach with appellee
since 1977 when he was "reassigned away" from his coaching
responsibilities beginning with his 1990-91 contract.  According to
the complaint, the reason for his 1990 reassignment from coaching
duties was intentionally concealed from him and made without notice
to him.  Appellant alleged in his complaint that it was not until
August 23, 1993, while attending an unrelated school board meeting,
that he discovered that the reason for his reassignment from
coaching duties in 1990 was disciplinary in nature.
     Appellee moved for summary judgment.  The trial court granted
the motion, ruling that appellant entered into a new contract with
appellee for the 1990-91 school year and that, having received the
benefits of the new contract, he was estopped from asserting his
right to lack of notice from appellee.  The trial court also ruled
that appellant was precluded from recovering against appellee for
his failure to file a prompt claim within seventy-five days after
notice of the reassignment as required by section 6-17-1510.
     The standard for review of a summary judgment is whether the
evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of the
motion left a question of material fact unanswered and, if not,
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.  National Bank of Commerce v. Quirk, 323 Ark. 769, 918 S.W.2d 138 (1996); Baker v. Milam, 321 Ark. 234,