Case Title: In re Forest G.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 26

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 26 
Docket: 
Fra-16-388 
Submitted 
 
On Briefs: January 19, 2017  
Decided: 
February 7, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE FOREST G. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  The father of Forest G. appeals from a judgment of the District 
Court (Farmington, Oram, J.) terminating his parental rights to his child.  See 
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2), (1-A)(A) (2016).  The father argues, for the first 
time on appeal, that the court violated his right to due process by applying a 
rebuttable presumption of parental unfitness and improperly placing the 
burden of proof on him.  See id. § 4055(1-A)(A).  We affirm the judgment. 
[¶2]  In its termination order, the court explicitly stated that it found 
two grounds of parental unfitness based on clear and convincing evidence—
namely, that the father “is unwilling or unable to protect [the child] from 
jeopardy within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet his needs, and 
that he is unwilling or unable to take responsibility for [the child] within a 
time which is reasonably calculated to meet his needs.”  See id. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii).  After making those separate findings of unfitness, 
 
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the court also noted that a statutory rebuttable presumption of unfitness 
arose based on an “aggravating factor” consisting of conduct that the court, in 
a jeopardy order to which the father agreed, found was “heinous and 
abhorrent to society.”  See id. § 4055(1-A)(A).   
[¶3]  For two reasons, we need not and do not reach the father’s 
argument that, as applied in this case, the court’s application of a rebuttable 
presumption of parental unfitness violated his right to due process.  Cf. In re 
Sarah T., 629 A.2d 53, 55 (Me. 1993) (concluding that a court’s application of a 
rebuttable presumption of parental unfitness in a termination case did not 
violate a parent’s right to due process or equal protection).  First, when 
certain predicate facts are proved, the express terms of section 4055(1-A)(A) 
authorize a court to presume only one of the two forms of parental unfitness 
that the court found here, namely, the parent’s inability or unwillingness to 
protect the child from jeopardy.  Because the court also found an alternative 
form of parental unfitness, its reference to the statutory presumption does not 
draw into question its ultimate determination that the father’s parental rights 
should be terminated.  See In re K.M., 2015 ME 79, ¶ 9, 118 A.3d 812 (“Where 
the court finds multiple bases for unfitness, we will affirm if any one of the 
alternative bases is supported by clear and convincing evidence.” (quotation 
 
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marks omitted)); Malenko v. Handrahan, 2009 ME 96, ¶ 25, 979 A.2d 1269 
(“As an appellate court, we seek to avoid answering important statutory and 
constitutional questions unless the answer is truly necessary to the resolution 
of the parties’ dispute.”). 
[¶4]  Second, the court’s affirmative findings supporting its parental 
unfitness determination, which it set out in the judgment even before 
referring to the statutory presumption, are well supported by the evidence, to 
the clear and convincing standard of proof, as illustrated by the following:  
• In 2009, the father pleaded guilty to one count of endangering the 
welfare of a different child (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 554(1)(C) 
(2009),1 and agreed to a jeopardy order in this case in which the 
court found that the serious injuries that were the basis of the 
2009 conviction—including injuries to that child’s head “with 
intra-cranial hemorrhage”—were deliberately inflicted.  
 
• During the pendency of these proceedings, the father denied that 
he had deliberately injured the child in the 2009 case despite a 
contrary medical opinion, instead explaining to a Department of 
Health and Human Services caseworker that he had been “young 
and irresponsible” and that the child had been injured when the 
father fell down the stairs after taking unprescribed Percocet.  
 
• Although the father’s initial visits with the child in this case went 
well, the visits were ultimately terminated after the father 
                                         
1  The statute provides that “[a] person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child if that 
person . . . recklessly endangers the health, safety or welfare of a child under 16 years of age by 
violating a duty of care or protection.”  17-A M.R.S. § 554(1)(C) (2009); see P.L. 2015, ch. 358, § 3 
(effective Oct. 15, 2015) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 554 (2016)) (amending the statute though not in 
any way that affects this appeal).   
 
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threatened to leave with the child, prompting supervisors to 
contact law enforcement.  
 
• The father initially prevented the Department from performing a 
scheduled hair follicle drug test by shaving his entire body, and 
when he eventually submitted to a number of subsequent tests 
they were positive for marijuana, and two tests in late fall 2015 
were positive for opiates and morphine.  
 
• The father was convicted of operating under the influence only 
one month before the termination hearing.  
 
• Although the father did “preliminary work” with two mental 
health treatment providers, he did not provide them with 
“complete and accurate information” and failed to complete a 
psychological evaluation as required by his reunification plan.  
 
• The father failed to consistently participate in mental health 
services provided by the Department and engaged in “bizarre, 
ineffective, 
irrational 
and 
nearly 
delusional 
actions”—as 
exemplified by his ongoing belief that the child was being abused 
in foster care despite the complete lack of evidence to support 
that allegation, and two incidents a few months before the 
termination hearing when his family members sought police 
assistance because they were concerned for the father’s physical 
and psychological welfare.   
 
These findings support the court’s determination that the Department had 
established the father’s parental unfitness and demonstrate, contrary to the 
father’s contention on appeal, that the court did not impermissibly shift the 
burden of proof to him. 
[¶5]  Additionally, although not challenged by the father on appeal, the 
court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest does not reflect 
 
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any error or abuse of discretion.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) (2016); 
In re Cameron Z., 2016 ME 162, ¶ 16, --- A.3d ---.   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rory A. McNamara, Esq., Drake Law, LLC, Berwick, for appellant father 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Farmington District Court docket number PC-2014-08 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY