Case Title: State Ex Rel. Victory Lanes, Inc. v. Blackford Cir. Ct.

Citation: 231 N.E.2d 140, 249 Ind. 178

Docket Number: 30,705

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1967-11-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
249 Ind. 178 (1967)
231 N.E.2d 140
STATE EX REL. VICTORY LANES, INC.
v.
BLACKFORD CIRCUIT COURT.
No. 30,705.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed November 29, 1967.
Sidney E. McClellan, George S. Koons, of Muncie, and David B. Wilson, of Hartford City, for relator.
William E. Ervin, and Peterson, Ervin and Barry, of Hartford City, for respondents.
O.A. Pursley, pro se.
LEWIS, J.
This is an original action wherein the relator seeks a temporary writ of prohibition and an alternative writ of mandate. The facts are as follows:
1. The relator is defendant in an action filed in the Blackford Circuit Court on the 18th day of December, 1964, in Cause No. 16263.
2. The plaintiff, in said cause of action, on December 18, 1964, filed an application for an appointment of a receiver pendente lite.
3. On the day said application was filed, the court fixed the 23rd day of December, 1964, for the hearing on said application for receiver.
*179 4. At the time the date for the hearing was fixed, counsel for the relator was present in court and engaged in conversation with counsel for the plaintiff below.
5. On the 23rd of December, 1964, the relator filed its special appearance, a plea in abatement, a motion for a continuance, and a motion for change of venue from the judge. The Respondent Judge overruled the plea in abatement, the motion for continuance, and the motion for change of judge, and proceeded to the hearing on the appointment of a receiver. The motion for change of venue was unverified and was unsupported by affidavit. Such motion for change of venue was limited to the receivership application.
Supreme Court Rule 1-12B (1), 1964, reads as follows:
We conclude that under the law existing prior to the adoption of Rule 1-12B(1), the relator would have been entitled to a change of venue from the judge on the application for the appointment of a receiver if a proper application was filed.
Prior to Rule 1-12B(1), Burns' Indiana Statutes, Anno., § 2-1402, (1946 Repl.), read as follows:
*180 In the case Stair v. Meissel (1934), 207 Ind. 280, 192 N.E. 453, this Court said the provisions of Burns' Indiana Statutes, Anno., § 2-1402, (1933 Repl.) providing for a change from the judge in certain proceedings is broad enough to include application for receivership in a pending suit.
We then come to the question of whether or not the application in the form filed, and at the time filed, was adequate to meet the other provisions of Rule 1-12B.
Supreme Court Rule 1-12B(7), 1964, reads as follows:
The application for change of judge is as follows:
It is evident from the application that the relator has not conformed with the provisions of Rule 1-12B(7). The application for the appointment of receiver was, on the 18th day of December, 1964, set for hearing, or trial, on the 23rd day of December, 1964. The setting of such hearing, or trial, was entered in the order book on the 18th day of December, 1964.
In his application for change from judge, supra, the relator did not conform to the requisites of Rule 1-12B(7) in that he failed to show in his motion, or any other supporting documents furnished us in such action, why he did not object when he first learned of the setting of such cause for trial. Relator failed to show that he acted promptly as required under Rule 1-12B(7), if his right to change of venue from judge was to be preserved.
The petition together with the supporting exhibits failed to show compliance with Rule 1-12B(7) and, in addition thereto, certain exhibits filed by the respondent indicate that relator, by counsel, had full knowledge of the setting for hearing of the application for the appointment of receiver and that relator, by counsel, delayed its objection as provided by Rule 1-12B(7).
We conclude that the temporary writ was improvidently issued, and a permanent writ is denied.
Hunter, C.J., Arterburn and Mote JJ., concur.
Jackson, dissents with opinion.
JACKSON, J.
I am not able to agree with the majority opinion herein and therefore dissent thereto.
Relator's brief filed herein recites the following actions of the respondent judge as being erroneous in this to-wit:
The statement of the record as encompassed in relator's brief is as follows:
In my opinion the relator has raised several very grave questions in this proceeding. The actions complained of are satisfactorily set out in the briefs. The question of jurisdiction attempted to be presented by the plea in abatement is one that, in my opinion, should have been heard on the merits and not disposed of in a summary manner.
I would point out that at the time the court fixed the time for hearing on the application, summons in the case at bar had not even been issued let alone served upon the relator *184 herein; consequently, the action below had not then even been commenced.
In my opinion the implementation of Rule 1-12B (7), under the circumstances delineated in the case at bar, constitutes a grave threat to the proper administration of justice and works an undue hardship upon litigants. The requirement that upon the filing of an action the party must immediately request a change of venue before summons is even issued is a travesty of justice because under our practice an action is not commenced until a summons has been issued. In the instant case the defendant was by the action of this court deprived of the right to seek a change of venue before the action had even been commenced in the trial court. The doctrine of waiver applied in such circumstances not only is conducive to fraud and fraught with danger, it is illegal. In my opinion said section of the rule should be abrogated forthwith, or modified, as in my opinion there can be no intelligent waiver of rights under such a rule.
The change of venue should have been granted. And in the case at bar the temporary writ heretofore issued should be made permanent.
NOTE.  Reported in 231 N.E.2d 140.