Case Title: Brandt v. Pompa

Citation: 2022-Ohio-4525

Docket Number: 2021-0497

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2022-12-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Brandt v. Pompa, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4525.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-4525 
BRANDT, APPELLANT, v. POMPA, APPELLEE, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Brandt v. Pompa, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4525.] 
Civil law—Damages—R.C. 2315.18—As-applied constitutional challenge—Due 
process of law—Article I, Section 16, Ohio Constitution—Statutory cap on 
awards of compensatory damages for noneconomic losses set forth in R.C. 
2315.18 is arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional as 
applied to plaintiff and similarly situated plaintiffs who were child victims 
of intentional criminal conduct, such as sexual abuse, and who bring civil 
actions to recover damages from the persons who have been found guilty of 
those intentional criminal acts to the extent that it fails to include an 
exception for plaintiffs who have suffered permanent and severe 
psychological injuries—Judgment reversed—Jury verdict on damages 
reinstated. 
(No. 2021-0497—Submitted March 30, 2022—Decided December 16, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
2 
No. 109517, 2021-Ohio-845. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we determine whether the compensatory-damages caps 
for noneconomic loss in R.C. 2315.18 are unconstitutional as applied to appellant, 
Amanda Brandt.  A jury found that Brandt was entitled to a total-damages award 
that included $20 million in compensatory damages for noneconomic loss against 
appellee, Roy Pompa, who sexually abused Brandt when she was a child.  The trial 
court applied the statutory damages cap in R.C. 2315.18 and limited the award for 
noneconomic loss to $250,000.  We find the statutory cap as applied to this portion 
of Brandt’s award to be arbitrary and unreasonable and thus in violation of the due-
course-of-law guarantee of the Ohio Constitution.  See Article I, Section 16, Ohio 
Constitution.  We therefore hold that R.C. 2315.18 is unconstitutional as applied to 
Brandt. 
I.  RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} In 2006, Pompa was arrested and charged with, among other things, 
17 counts of rape, 5 counts of kidnapping, 55 counts of pandering sexually oriented 
matter involving a minor, and 21 counts of gross sexual imposition.  Pompa was 
accused of committing these acts against Brandt and other victims.  Brandt was 11 
and 12 years old when the incidents occurred. 
{¶ 3} A jury found Pompa guilty of over 90 counts, 34 of which involved 
acts against Brandt.1  The court sentenced Pompa to life in prison. 
 
1.  The offenses committed against Brandt for which Pompa was found guilty occurred on seven 
different occasions in 2004 and 2005 and included 18 counts of gross sexual imposition, 8 counts 
of rape, 3 counts of kidnapping, 4 counts of pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor 
under 13 years of age, and 1 count of illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material. 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
3 
{¶ 4} In 2018, Brandt filed a civil complaint against Pompa2 in the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas for intentional criminal wrongdoing, 
knowing dissemination of child pornography, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  She also asked the trial court for a declaratory judgment holding 
R.C. 2315.18 unconstitutional as applied to her case.  The trial court held that based 
on the verdicts in the criminal case and Pompa’s admissions, there was no genuine 
issue of material fact as to Pompa’s liability in the tort action.  A jury trial was 
commenced solely to determine the type and amount of Brandt’s damages. 
{¶ 5} At the damages trial, the jury learned of the 34 criminal offenses 
committed against Brandt for which Pompa was convicted, and the jury viewed 
Pompa’s testimony from a videotaped deposition.  The jury also heard testimony 
from Brandt and Brandt’s mother, as well as expert testimony from a clinical 
psychologist. 
{¶ 6} Brandt testified that Pompa was a friend of the Brandt family and that 
one of Pompa’s daughters was her childhood best friend.  Brandt frequently 
attended sleepovers at Pompa’s residence, just a mile away from her home.  Brandt 
recalled that before going to bed at the sleepovers, Pompa would offer her a juice 
box, iced tea, or water.  She said that although it did not strike her at the time, “there 
was not a morning [after a sleepover] that [she] didn’t wake up a little blurry, fuzzy 
feeling, * * * groggy.”  The Eighth District Court of Appeals found that “[o]n many 
occasions, Pompa put illicit substances in Brandt’s drinks before she went to sleep 
in order to commit sexual acts against her without her knowing or being fully 
aware.”  2021-Ohio-845, 169 N.E.3d 285, ¶ 2.  But Brandt was aware.  Brandt 
testified that she recalled occasions of abuse at the Pompa residence, particularly, 
being woken up at night at the feeling of being touched and realizing it was 
someone touching her all over and under her underwear.  Eventually, Brandt no 
 
2.  Brandt also filed her complaint against Pompa’s ex-wife, but those claims were settled before 
trial. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
4 
longer wanted to go to the Pompa residence.  She realized that “something was not 
right” there, and she felt “very panicked at the idea of going over” there.  She said, 
“I tried very hard to not get put back into that home.” 
{¶ 7} Pompa admitted the sexual abuse involved him masturbating on 
Brandt, ejaculating on her, including on her face, and abusing her with a dildo or 
vibrator.  The Eighth District found that Pompa recorded his sexual abuse of Brandt 
on at least eight occasions. Id. at ¶ 6.  Pompa also admitted using a “spy cam” to 
view his daughter’s friends when they visited the house. 
{¶ 8} Brandt told the jury she “was a pretty normal kid” until the abuse.  Her 
mother described Brandt prior to the abuse as follows: 
 
She was a beautiful, happy-go-lucky friend to everyone.  She 
wanted to conquer the world, loved to travel, loved to go places, had 
big dreams, was involved in a lot of school activities.  You know, 
she was friends with sports people.  She was friends with drama 
people.  She was friends with * * * honor students * * *.  She was, 
like, a friend to everyone.  She was involved in church.  She went 
[on] all kinds of mission trips.  She just had a big heart and was very 
outgoing. 
 
{¶ 9} Brandt’s mother testified that her daughter became a recluse after the 
abuse: “Her anxiety level was huge.  She never wanted to go anywhere.  We saw 
this beautiful, outgoing child turn into someone that didn’t want to leave.  She just 
wanted to be alone.”  Brandt’s mother said that her daughter became angry and had 
sleeping problems.  These issues prompted Brandt’s mother to take Brandt to see a 
therapist twice a week, even though the therapist was not close to their home.  
Brandt’s mother testified that the abuse had “totally changed” her daughter.  She 
explained, “I do not have the same daughter anymore.  She has a lot of anger, has 
January Term, 2022 
 
5 
a lot of anxiety issues.  She can’t handle being at a lot of family functions.  She has 
to go to another room when everyone is there.  She just is not the same kid that we 
knew growing up and even now in her adulthood.” 
{¶ 10} Brandt also testified to the changes she experienced as a result of the 
abuse.  She started having nightmares after the first time Pompa sexually abused 
her, and she continues to have nightmares, including ones in which Pompa appears.  
Brandt told the jury that she became a “very angry kid” after the abuse started.  She 
read for the jury a statement she had prepared for Pompa’s sentencing in the 
criminal case.  In that statement, she described having been involved in clubs, 
community service, and social activities before the abuse.  She wrote about losing 
her relationship with her best friend, Pompa’s daughter.  She described having 
difficulty sleeping and having serious emotional problems.  “Most of the time I 
don’t know what to feel,” she wrote.  “When I do, it’s always anger.”  She also 
wrote about not being able to remember anything at school, which caused her 
grades to suffer and affected which classes she was able to take in high school. 
{¶ 11} Brandt testified that after the abuse stopped, she graduated from high 
school and moved out of her parents’ home into an apartment, but she had trouble 
keeping a job.  About her first full-time job, she explained, “[M]y anxiety had been 
getting worse at that point and after a couple of years there, I was no longer able to 
meet my requirements and I ended up getting terminated from that job because I 
could no longer do the things required.”  She eventually found a door-to-door-sales 
job, which was worked in pairs.  Her coworker offered her heroin, assuring Brandt 
that she “would feel better” if she tried it.  Brandt did try it and became addicted.  
She told the jury that at that time, she was “desperate for anything that would make 
[her] feel okay.” 
{¶ 12} At the beginning of her drug addiction, Brandt lost her apartment 
and became homeless for approximately a year.  Brandt testified about continuing 
to have panic attacks and not being able to sleep during that time.  She said she 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
6 
“was at a really low point in [her] mental health and there was no break.”  She 
eventually sought help and returned to her parents’ home. 
{¶ 13} Brandt testified that while living with her parents and trying to get 
sober, her “mental health continued to get worse.”  She testified about attempting 
suicide and spending time in the hospital after an intentional heroin overdose.  After 
her time in the hospital, she moved in with her parents and was able to stop using 
heroin.  She told the jury that she had been sober for more than six years as of the 
time of the trial. 
{¶ 14} At the time of the trial, Brandt was married and had two young 
children.  She explained that she was still having nightmares about Pompa, which 
affected her sleep and her ability to function the next day despite her taking 
prescription medication to try to control them.  She worked part-time as a server in 
the food industry, working Mondays and Tuesdays to avoid the busier shifts and 
crowds, and was trying to get her real-estate license. 
{¶ 15} Brandt began attending counseling immediately after her parents 
learned of the abuse.  As of the date of the hearing on damages, she had been in 
counseling 14 years, and she testified that she could not foresee a time when she 
would not need counseling.  She explained, “I’ve seen multiple different counselors 
in multiple different areas and gone through multiple different treatment plans.  
Every counselor I’ve seen has agreed on the diagnosis of [posttraumatic stress 
disorder (“PTSD”)] and anxiety disorder.”  Brandt also described her use of 
medication not only to prevent nightmares but also to treat depression and PTSD.  
She testified that one of the prescribed medications had improved her ability to 
sleep uninterrupted, but it was unsuccessful at stopping all the nightmares.  She 
testified that her anxiety, including difficulty being in crowds and not liking to be 
touched, still prevents her from enjoying social activities and taking part in 
community service and that it affects her ability to perform daily activities like 
grocery shopping. 
January Term, 2022 
 
7 
{¶ 16} Dr. Patrick Yingling, a psychological expert, testified in a video 
deposition about his evaluation of Brandt.  Dr. Yingling testified that Brandt 
described for him her experiences with the abuse and with her mental health 
following the abuse.  He noted that Brandt described “her experience of developing 
panic attacks and agoraphobia in 2014.”  He said she recalled staying locked in a 
bedroom for a “large chunk of months.”  Dr. Yingling testified that Brandt 
described continuing to experience nightmares, thoughts about her own death, and 
anxiety leading to “meltdowns.”  He also testified that Brandt described her panic 
attacks as “weirdly physical,” including uncontrollable crying, blurry vision, and 
ringing in her ears, and “[f]eeling like [she had] barbed wire around [her] chest.”  
He said Brandt noted that she had tried to fix the meltdowns but that she was still 
experiencing them.  Brandt provided Dr. Yingling with specific instances of anxiety 
attacks, for example, when not being allowed to be with her daughter at her ballet 
class, when considering having to go back to work, and on some occasions, when 
her husband reached out to touch her. 
{¶ 17} Based on his evaluation of Brandt, including the tests administered 
and the records reviewed, Dr. Yingling opined that Brandt suffered from PTSD as 
a result of being sexually assaulted by Pompa and that her symptoms would persist 
to some degree over a significant period of time.  He opined that Brandt would 
benefit from ongoing psychotherapy as well as psychiatric medication. 
{¶ 18} On cross-examination, Pompa’s counsel questioned Dr. Yingling 
about whether Brandt’s symptoms were conclusively causally linked to the sexual 
abuse or whether they were, instead, brought on or exacerbated by other factors, 
like Brandt’s addiction or homelessness.  Dr. Yingling explained that the criteria 
for a PTSD diagnosis requires exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, 
or sexual violence, and he acknowledged that an overdose or a suicide attempt 
could cause or contribute to a diagnosis of PTSD. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
8 
{¶ 19} At the close of the evidence, the trial-court judge instructed the jury 
on its duty to determine what damages, if any, Brandt was entitled to.  The trial 
court included the following specific instructions on awarding compensatory 
damages: 
 
You will decide by the greater weight of the evidence an 
amount of money that will reasonably compensate the Plaintiff for 
the actual injury directly caused by the conduct of the Defendant, 
Roy Pompa. 
In deciding this amount, you will consider the Plaintiff’s loss 
directly caused by the Plaintiff’s actual injury. 
The Plaintiff seeks compensation for non-economic loss 
only.  She does not seek compensation for economic loss such as 
medical bills and so forth. 
“Noneconomic loss” means harm other than economic loss 
that results from the Plaintiff’s injury, including, but not limited to, 
pain and suffering; disfigurement; mental anguish; and any other 
intangible loss.  “Intangible loss” refers to loss that does not have a 
physical presence. 
The Plaintiff also claims that the injury or loss is permanent.  
As to such claims, no compensation or damages may be found 
except that which is reasonably certain to exist as a direct cause of 
the Defendant’s conduct.  “Reasonably certain” means probably, 
that is, more likely to occur than not. 
If you find that Plaintiff failed to prove by the greater weight 
of the evidence any amount of damages, you may award Plaintiff 
nominal damages.  “Nominal” means trifling or small. 
January Term, 2022 
 
9 
MATHEMATICAL FORMULA.  Any suggestion of 
counsel in argument that you use a mathematical formula to 
compensate for pain and suffering and disability cannot be 
considered as evidence.  There is no recognized mathematical 
formula for pain and suffering.  Compensation for pain and suffering 
and disability is solely within your province to decide. 
 
{¶ 20} The jury awarded Brandt (1) $14 million in compensatory damages 
for the abuse she suffered before April 6, 2005, when the damages caps in R.C. 
2315.18 went into effect, (2) $20 million in compensatory damages for the abuse 
she suffered after R.C. 2315.18 went into effect, and (3) $100 million in punitive 
damages. 
{¶ 21} In a posttrial brief, Pompa requested that the court limit the 
noneconomic damages that were awarded for the period after the effective date of 
R.C. 2315.18.  His sole assertion was that the reduction in damages was required 
under R.C. 2315.18.  Brandt opposed the request and again asked the trial court to 
find that R.C. 2315.18 was unconstitutional as applied to her.  The trial court 
granted Pompa’s request, denied Brandt’s request for declaratory relief, and 
reduced Brandt’s $20 million noneconomic-damages award to $250,000. 
{¶ 22} Brandt appealed.  The Eighth District applied the reasoning and 
rationale set forth in Simpkins v. Grace Brethren Church of Delaware, Ohio, 149 
Ohio St.3d 307, 2016-Ohio-8118, 75 N.E.3d 122 (lead opinion), and finding no 
meaningful difference between Simpkins and Brandt’s case, affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment. 
{¶ 23} We accepted discretionary review of Brandt’s appeal.  163 Ohio 
St.3d 1501, 2021-Ohio-2307, 170 N.E.3d 891. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
10 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  R.C. 2315.18’s cap on noneconomic damages 
{¶ 24} R.C. 2315.18 describes how compensatory damages may be 
awarded in tort claims for economic loss and noneconomic loss.  Relevant here is 
noneconomic loss, which includes “pain and suffering, loss of society, consortium, 
companionship, care, assistance, attention, protection, advice, guidance, counsel, 
instruction, training, or education, disfigurement, mental anguish, and any other 
intangible loss.”  R.C. 2315.18(A)(4).3  R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) provides that the 
amount of compensatory damages for noneconomic loss is capped and “shall not 
exceed the greater of [$250,000] or an amount that is equal to three times the 
economic loss, as determined by the trier of fact, of the plaintiff in that tort action 
to a maximum of [$350,000] for each plaintiff in that tort action or a maximum of 
[$500,000] for each occurrence that is the basis of that tort action.”  R.C. 
2315.18(B)(3)(a) and (b) explain that there is no limit on damages for noneconomic 
loss, however, if the loss is for “[p]ermanent and substantial physical deformity, 
loss of use of a limb, or loss of a bodily organ system” or “[p]ermanent physical 
functional injury that permanently prevents the injured person from being able to 
independently care for self and perform life-sustaining activities.” 
 
3.  By contrast, R.C. 2315.18 (A)(2) defines “economic loss” as 
 
any of the following types of pecuniary harm: 
(a) All wages, salaries, or other compensation lost as a result of an injury 
or loss to person or property that is a subject of a tort action; 
(b) All expenditures for medical care or treatment, rehabilitation 
services, or other care, treatment, services, products, or accommodations as a 
result of an injury or loss to person or property that is a subject of a tort action; 
(c) Any other expenditures incurred as a result of an injury or loss to 
person or property that is a subject of a tort action, other than attorney’s fees 
incurred in connection with that action. 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
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{¶ 25} These caps on damages for noneconomic loss became effective April 
7, 2005.4  See Am.Sub.S.B. No. 80, Section 3, 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, 7915, 8024-
8031 (“S.B. 80”).  S.B. 80 was not the General Assembly’s first effort to enact tort 
reform, but previously enacted tort-reform statutes had been successfully 
challenged in courts as being unconstitutional.  See Morris v. Savoy, 61 Ohio St.3d 
684, 686, 690-691, 576 N.E.2d 765 (1991) (Ohio Medical Malpractice Act of 1975, 
enacted by Am.Sub.H.B. No. 682, 136 Ohio Laws, Part II, 280, 2813, violated the 
right to due process); Sorrell v. Thevenir, 69 Ohio St.3d 415, 418-420, 633 N.E.2d 
504 (1994) (former R.C. 2317.45, enacted by Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1, 142 Ohio Laws, 
Part 1, 1661, 1694, as part of the Tort Reform Act of 1987, violated the rights to a 
jury trial, due process, and equal protection and the right to a remedy); Galayda v. 
Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc., 71 Ohio St.3d 421, 644 N.E.2d 298 (1994), paragraph one of 
the syllabus (former R.C. 2323.57 violated the rights to a jury trial and due process); 
Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 71 Ohio St.3d 552, 644 N.E.2d 397 (1994), paragraph 
two of the syllabus (former R.C. 2315.21(C)(2) violated the right to a jury trial); 
State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 
N.E.2d 1062 (1999), paragraphs two and three of the syllabus (Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
350, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3867, violated the separation-of-powers doctrine and 
the one-subject rule). 
{¶ 26} But in Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-
Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, this court concluded that R.C. 2315.18 was 
constitutional on its face. 
 
 
 
4.  This section of the Revised Code became effective April 7, 2005.  It was amended by the General 
Assembly, effective April 15, 2021, by 2020 Sub.H.B. No. 352, but the amendments do not affect 
Brandt or the question of her entitlement to the amount of noneconomic damages awarded to her by 
the jury. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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B.  Standard of review 
{¶ 27} Unlike the challenge to R.C. 2315.18 in Arbino, Brandt has 
presented a claim that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of her 
case.  In an as-applied constitutional challenge, “the party making the challenge 
bears the burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence of a presently existing 
set of facts that [makes the statute] unconstitutional and void when applied to those 
facts.”  Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 
N.E.2d 377, ¶ 181, quoting Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 
836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 38.  Thus, the constitutional claim that this court addressed in 
Arbino differs from Brandt’s constitutional claim here.  To establish a constitutional 
violation through a facial challenge, Arbino was required to demonstrate “that there 
[was] no set of circumstances in which [R.C. 2315.18] would be valid.”  Arbino at 
¶ 26, citing Harrold at ¶ 37, citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 
S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987).  To establish a constitutional violation through 
a facial challenge, it is not enough “ ‘that a statute might operate unconstitutionally 
under some plausible set of circumstances.’ ”  Id., quoting Harrold at ¶ 37. 
C.  Due-course-of-law challenge 
{¶ 28} Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution guarantees every 
person the right to a “remedy by due course of law” “for an injury done him in his 
land, goods, person, or reputation.”  In Arbino, one asserted basis of the facial 
constitutional challenge to R.C. 2315.18 was that the damages caps in that statute 
violated the “due course of law” provision of the Ohio Constitution.  Arbino at ¶ 7, 
48.  In addressing that question, this court applied the rational-basis test under 
which a statute is deemed valid “ ‘ “[1] if it bears a real and substantial relation to 
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public and [2] if it is not 
unreasonable or arbitrary.” ’ ”  (Brackets added in Mominee.)  Id. at ¶ 49, quoting 
Mominee v. Scherbarth, 28 Ohio St.3d 270, 274, 503 N.E.2d 717 (1986), quoting 
Benjamin v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957), paragraph five 
January Term, 2022 
 
13 
of the syllabus.  Considering the second prong of that test, this court noted its 
concern that in previous efforts to cap tort damages, the General Assembly had 
“imposed the cost of the intended benefit to the public solely upon those most 
severely injured.”  Id. at ¶ 59, citing Savoy, 61 Ohio St.3d at 690-691, 576 N.E.2d 
765, and Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d at 490, 715 N.E.2d 1062.  But we noted that “R.C. 
2315.18 alleviates this concern by allowing for limitless economic damages for 
those suffering catastrophic injuries.”  Arbino at ¶ 60, citing R.C. 2315.18(B)(3)(a) 
and (b).  We also noted that the General Assembly had “found that the benefits of 
noneconomic-damages limits could be obtained without limiting the recovery of 
individuals whose pain and suffering is traumatic, extensive, and chronic, and by 
setting the limits for those not as severely injured at either $250,000 or $350,000.”  
Id. at ¶ 61.  We concluded that the legislature’s policy decision was “tailored to 
maximize benefits to the public while limiting damages to litigants,” and that such 
“logic [was] neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.”  Id. 
{¶ 29} This court also rejected Arbino’s equal-protection challenge with 
similar reasoning, employing the rational-basis test and concluding as follows: 
 
The distinctions the legislature drew in refusing to limit certain 
injuries were rational and based on the conclusion that catastrophic 
injuries offer more concrete evidence of noneconomic damages and 
thus calculation of those damages poses a lesser risk of being tainted 
by improper external considerations. 
 
Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 72. 
{¶ 30} A significant distinction stands out between the facts presented in 
Arbino and the facts of this case.  Psychological injuries are not included in the 
permanent-injury exception to the compensatory-damages caps for noneconomic 
loss provided in R.C. 2315.18(B)(3)(a) and (b).  Those statutory provisions except 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
14 
“[p]ermanent and substantial physical deformity, loss of use of a limb, or loss of a 
bodily organ system” or “[p]ermanent physical functional injury that permanently 
prevents the injured person from being able to independently care for self and 
perform life-sustaining activities.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id.  Arbino originated in 
federal court as a product-liability action against the companies that had created a 
hormonal-birth-control medication that allegedly caused the plaintiff’s blood clots 
and other serious medical side effects.  Id. at ¶ 1.  We were not presented with facts 
of psychological injuries in that case, nor were we asked to opine on the reason for 
their exclusion from the statute. 
{¶ 31} But here, in light of the unavailability of the exception to the 
compensatory-damages 
caps 
for 
the 
most 
severely 
and 
permanently 
psychologically injured, we cannot say, as we did in Arbino, that R.C. 2315.18 
allows “for limitless noneconomic damages for those suffering catastrophic 
injuries,” Arbino at ¶ 60, because those suffering catastrophic psychological injury 
are excluded from that class of injured plaintiffs.  Thus, the rational basis of the 
statute found by this court in Arbino is eliminated as applied to Brandt and similarly 
situated plaintiffs.  For this limited class of litigants—people like Brandt who were 
victimized at a very young age and who bring civil actions to recover damages from 
the persons who have been found guilty of those intentional criminal acts—the 
constitutional guarantee of due course of law is unjustly withheld. 
{¶ 32} Other legislative justifications cited by this court in Arbino also fail 
when considered in light of R.C. 2315.18’s application, without exception, to 
catastrophic psychological injuries as a result of victimization as a child.  For 
example, in Arbino, we acknowledged the General Assembly’s concern that 
“noneconomic damages are inherently subjective and thus easily tainted by 
irrelevant considerations.”  Id., 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 
420, at ¶ 55.  But other statutory safeguards exist to address that concern.  For 
example, R.C. 2315.18(C) expressly prohibits the trier of fact (i.e., the jury in a jury 
January Term, 2022 
 
15 
trial) from considering (1) a defendant’s wrongdoing, misconduct, or guilt, (2) a 
defendant’s wealth or financial resources, or (3) evidence offered for the purpose 
of punishing the defendant, when determining the amount of compensatory 
damages to award for noneconomic loss.  And if a defendant challenges an award 
of compensatory damages for noneconomic loss as excessive, R.C. 2315.19 
instructs the trial court to consider, among other things, whether the evidence 
“inflamed the passion or prejudice of the trier of fact.”  Given the adequate 
safeguards in place to ensure that an award in a specific case is not “tainted by 
irrelevant considerations,” see Arbino at ¶ 55, coupled with the trial court’s 
authority to review an allegedly excessive award on a case-by-case basis, the 
General Assembly’s caps on damages as applied to a plaintiff such as Brandt seem 
arbitrary.  It is unclear how application of the caps on damages in R.C. 2315.18 to 
a plaintiff like Brandt who is not entitled to an exception to the caps for severe 
psychological injury serves, in any manner other than an arbitrary one, to address 
the General Assembly’s concerns that noneconomic damages are inherently 
subjective and easily tainted by irrelevant considerations. 
{¶ 33} In Arbino, we also noted that the General Assembly’s stated 
justification for enacting tort reform through R.C. 2315.18 was its “ ‘interest in 
making certain that Ohio has a fair, predictable system of civil justice that preserves 
the rights of those who have been harmed by negligent behavior, while curbing the 
number of frivolous lawsuits, which increases the cost of doing business, threatens 
Ohio jobs, drives up costs to consumers, and may stifle innovation.’ ”  Arbino at  
¶ 68, quoting S.B. 80, Section 3(A)(3), 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, at 8024.  But Brandt 
was harmed by intentional, not negligent, behavior.  And it cannot be said that 
Brandt’s lawsuit against Pompa is frivolous, given that his criminal liability for 
abusing Brandt has already been determined. 
{¶ 34} The General Assembly’s concern about the “cost of doing business,” 
S.B. 80, Section 3(A)(3), 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, at 8024, as it relates to the cost 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
16 
of general-liability-insurance policies that businesses purchase is unrealistic 
because coverage for the types of injuries that Brandt sustained in this case is 
extremely uncommon and, even if a business’s liability-insurance policy were in 
play, most policies now contain exclusions for intentional conduct committed by 
the insured and, specifically, for abuse or molestation.  See, e.g., World Harvest 
Church v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 148 Ohio St.3d 11, 2016-Ohio-2913, 68 N.E.3d 
738.  Thus, the only beneficiary of the General Assembly’s damages cap in this 
case is Brandt’s abuser, not the public and not the insurance industry. 
{¶ 35} This court noted in Arbino that the General Assembly’s policy 
decision “to achieve a public good” was based on a finding that “the benefits of 
noneconomic-damages limits could be obtained without limiting the recovery of 
individuals whose pain and suffering is traumatic, extensive, and chronic.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id., 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at 
¶ 61.  We concluded that this policy decision was “tailored to maximize benefits to 
the public while limiting damages to litigants” and was based on logic that was 
“neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.”  Id.  What we now know, given Brandt’s case, 
is that some who fit within this category—those “whose pain and suffering is 
traumatic, extensive, and chronic,” id.—are subject to limited recovery simply 
because their injuries are psychological, as opposed to physical, in nature.  Thus, in 
concluding in Arbino that the General Assembly’s decision to enact compensatory-
damages caps for noneconomic loss was not arbitrary on its face, we overlooked a 
small class of plaintiffs who are arbitrarily excluded from recovering the full 
amount of compensatory damages for noneconomic loss that was awarded by the 
jury.  While policy decisions are the purview of the legislature, it is the judiciary’s 
purview to determine whether those policy decisions violate the constitutional 
protections guaranteed to all Ohioans.  See Article IV, Section 2(B)(2)(ii), Ohio 
Constitution. 
January Term, 2022 
 
17 
{¶ 36} When viewing the damages caps set forth in R.C. 2315.18 in light of 
the facts of this case, the words of one of the dissenting justices in Arbino are 
persuasive: 
 
There is no rational reason to “improve” the tort system in Ohio at 
the sole expense of a small group of people who are able to prove 
that they suffered damage significant enough to exceed the damages 
caps imposed by the General Assembly.  Whatever improvement the 
tort system in Ohio needs, the Ohio Constitution should remain 
inviolate, unless properly amended. 
 
Arbino at ¶ 185 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  Brandt represents an even smaller group 
of people than that contemplated by the dissenting justice quoted above—namely, 
those child victims who suffer traumatic, extensive, and chronic psychological 
injury as a result of intentional criminal acts and who sue their abusers for civil 
damages.  Subjecting this group to the compensatory-damages caps for 
noneconomic loss has little to no connection to improving the tort system in Ohio.5  
This group comprises victims who are entitled to the full range of constitutional 
remedies, regardless of whether their severe injuries are physical or psychological. 
{¶ 37} These concerns leave sufficient doubt that Arbino correctly 
determines the constitutionality of R.C. 2315.18 as applied to Brandt and similarly 
 
5.  The General Assembly’s justification for enacting tort-reform legislation, including R.C. 
2315.18, was to balance the rights of victims of negligent behavior against the problems caused by 
an allegedly unpredictable civil-justice system.  See S.B. 80, Section 3(A)(3), 150 Ohio Laws, Part 
V, at 8024.  The General Assembly’s policy choice appears to presume that some level of harm 
caused by negligent acts (e.g., automobile accidents, defective consumer products, imperfect 
medicine, human error) is tolerable in society on balance for institutions and businesses that need 
predictability for liability for this kind of conduct.  But the sexual abuse of children is never 
tolerated.  Accordingly, it makes no sense to credit the General Assembly with a policy decision to 
protect an abuser from being subject to a damages award that is meant to compensate a victim of 
childhood sexual abuse. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
18 
situated plaintiffs.  In fact, because the rationale supporting Arbino falls away when 
applied to the facts of this case, and given the facts below, we conclude that Brandt 
has shown by clear and convincing evidence that R.C. 2315.18 is unconstitutional 
as applied to her under the due-course-of-law provision in Article I, Section 16 of 
the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 38} The Eighth District relied largely on Simpkins, 149 Ohio St.3d 307, 
2016-Ohio-8118, 75 N.E.3d 122, in rejecting Brandt’s as-applied challenge.  But 
Simpkins was a plurality opinion, and the reasoning from Simpkins that the court of 
appeals relied on when reviewing this case was the viewpoint of only two justices.  
Thus, the Simpkins analysis is not controlling here. 
{¶ 39} Turning to the facts of this case, there is no question that Brandt has 
suffered severely as a victim of Pompa’s intentional criminal acts.  There is no 
dispute that the jury found that Brandt should be awarded compensatory damages 
for noneconomic loss in the amount of $20 million for the abuse that she suffered 
after R.C. 2315.18 became effective.  The trial court’s instructions to the jury 
explained that Brandt sought compensation only for noneconomic loss, and the 
instructions defined “noneconomic loss” and “intangible loss.”  The instructions 
also explained that Brandt claimed that the injury or loss she suffered was 
permanent.  The instructions provided: “There is no recognized mathematical 
formula for pain and suffering.  Compensation for pain and suffering and disability 
is solely within your province to decide.”6  The record also shows that the jurors 
submitted questions to the trial court during Brandt’s testimony, inquiring about 
other possible causes of Brandt’s injuries.  Charged with the trial court’s 
instructions and with answers to their questions, the jurors unanimously awarded 
 
6.  R.C. 2315.18(F)(2) states: “If the trier of fact is a jury, the court shall not instruct the jury with 
respect to the limit on compensatory damages for noneconomic loss described in division (B)(2) of 
this section, and neither counsel for any party nor a witness shall inform the jury or potential jurors 
of that limit.” 
January Term, 2022 
 
19 
Brandt $20 million in compensatory damages for permanent noneconomic loss for 
the period in question. 
{¶ 40} Pompa’s sole argument to the trial court in his posttrial brief on 
damages was that the court should calculate the amount of damages pursuant to the 
damages caps in R.C. 2315.18.  He did not challenge the evidence by arguing, for 
example, that the award was excessive, that the evidence had inflamed the passion 
or prejudice of the jury, that the jury improperly considered his misconduct, or that 
the award was in excess of verdicts awarded to similarly situated plaintiffs.  See 
R.C. 2315.19(A)(1) and (2). 
{¶ 41} The Eighth District characterized the evidence regarding whether 
“all of [Brandt’s] mental health issues and symptoms can be attributed to the sexual 
abuse” as “equivocal.”  2021-Ohio-845, 169 N.E.3d 285, at ¶ 50.  But the jury here 
(i.e., the trier of fact) did not.  Indeed, the jury instructions were clear regarding the 
jury’s ability to award Brandt damages based on her claims that the injury or loss 
that she suffered was permanent: “[N]o compensation or damages may be found 
except that which is reasonably certain to exist as a direct cause of the Defendant’s 
conduct.”  And the jury was instructed that it could award nominal damages if it 
found that Brandt had failed to prove any amount of damages by the greater weight 
of the evidence.  Nonetheless, the jury found a significant monetary award to be 
appropriate.  Notwithstanding the application of the compensatory-damages caps, 
the fact-finding function of the jury to determine the amount of damages to be 
awarded is not to be intruded upon or ignored or replaced by another body’s 
findings.  Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 37.  
Trial courts are authorized to review an award that “the defendant has challenged 
as excessive,” R.C. 2315.19(A), and appellate courts may conduct a de novo review 
of such an award on appeal, R.C. 2315.19(C), but it is the duty of the trier of fact 
to ascertain the amount of the plaintiff’s loss, see R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) and (C).  
Here, the jury was in the best position to weigh the credibility of Brandt’s testimony 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
20 
and that of the other witnesses.  In doing so, the jury determined that Brandt 
suffered permanent noneconomic loss severe enough to warrant a $20 million 
award for the abuse that she suffered after R.C. 2315.18 went into effect.  Thus, the 
court of appeals’ equivocation regarding the evidence is unpersuasive because it 
appears that the court was substituting its own view of the evidence for the jury’s 
findings. 
{¶ 42} Because R.C. 2315.18(B)(3) does not include an exception for 
severe and permanent psychological injuries in its caps on damages for 
noneconomic loss and because the trial court applied R.C. 2315.18 to reduce 
Brandt’s $20 million award to $250,000, we hold that Brandt has established, by 
clear and convincing evidence, a set of facts that make the statute unconstitutional 
as applied to her case. 
D.  Recoverability is irrelevant 
{¶ 43} Pompa argues that because Brandt received a judgment “exceeding 
$114 million, [she] cannot credibly be heard to argue that she has been prevented 
or foreclosed from securing meaningful relief.”  Some of the amici in support of 
Pompa argue a similar refrain.  The issue we address, however, is the 
constitutionality of a single statute or, stated more specifically, the constitutionality 
of the caps on damages for noneconomic loss in R.C. 2315.18 as applied to Brandt.  
It is immaterial that some of the abuse in this case occurred before R.C. 2315.18’s 
caps on damages became effective, thereby entitling Brandt to uncapped damages 
for noneconomic loss that she suffered from acts that occurred during that time. 
{¶ 44} Nor should the jury’s award of punitive damages affect the 
consideration of the compensatory damages awarded to Brandt.  The question of 
punitive damages, which serve a different function in our legal system, is irrelevant 
here.  “The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate a plaintiff, but to 
punish and deter certain conduct.”  Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 69 Ohio St.3d 
638, 651, 635 N.E.2d 331 (1994).  Additionally, “punitive damages are separate 
January Term, 2022 
 
21 
and apart from any remedy for a plaintiff’s injuries,” Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 
2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 98, and under R.C. 2315.21, a plaintiff may 
be entitled to both.  Nothing in the relevant statutory scheme requires that 
compensatory damages be limited or reduced based on a separate award of punitive 
damages.  Thus, there is no reason to consider these separate awards of damages 
together here. 
{¶ 45} Additionally, the question whether Brandt can ultimately recover 
any portion of the total-damages award from Pompa is irrelevant to determining 
whether R.C. 2315.18 is unconstitutional as applied to Brandt and similarly situated 
plaintiffs.  Any suggestion otherwise serves to prejudice the reader and should be 
seen for what it is: a distraction from the legal question before this court. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 46} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that R.C. 2315.18 is 
unconstitutional as applied to Brandt and similarly situated plaintiffs (i.e., people 
like Brandt who were child victims of intentional criminal conduct and who bring 
civil actions to recover damages from the persons who have been found guilty of 
those intentional criminal acts) to the extent that it fails to include an exception to 
its compensatory-damages caps for noneconomic loss for plaintiffs who have 
suffered permanent and severe psychological injuries.  The judgment of the Eighth 
District Court of Appeals is reversed, and we reinstate the jury’s verdict on 
damages. 
Judgment reversed. 
DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., dissent, with an opinion. 
FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., dissenting. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
22 
{¶ 47} Appellee Roy Pompa’s abuse of appellant, Amanda Brandt, is 
appalling, and there is no doubt that Brandt has suffered as a result.  However, as 
members of the third branch of government, we must “temper our empathy” and 
resolve legal matters within the confines of the law.  See Collins v. Sotka, 81 Ohio 
St.3d 506, 512, 692 N.E.2d 581 (1998) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).  Because the 
majority opinion fails to do so, we must respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 48} Although this case has been litigated on the questions whether the 
caps on compensatory noneconomic damages enacted in R.C. 2315.18 violate the 
Ohio Constitution’s guarantees of due process of law, equal protection, trial by jury, 
open courts, and a remedy, the majority opinion today finds only a due-process 
violation of Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.  It does that by applying 
rational-basis review, a standard that presupposes that R.C. 2315.18 does not 
implicate a fundamental constitutional right.  The majority opinion holds that R.C. 
2315.18 violates Article I, Section 16 solely because it believes that the statute is 
arbitrary and unreasonable.  This dissent, then, is limited to addressing that single 
issue.  For the reasons that follow, we disagree with the determination made by the 
majority opinion that R.C. 2315.18 violates due-process protections. 
I. R.C. 2315.18 and the cap on noneconomic damages 
{¶ 49} The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2315.18 as part a tort-reform 
bill that restructured the tort-damages-award system in Ohio to ensure a “fair, 
predictable system of civil justice.”  Am.Sub.S.B. 80, Section 3(A)(3), 150 Ohio 
Laws, Part V, 7915, 8024 (“S.B. 80”).  In restructuring the tort-damages-award 
system, the General Assembly placed no cap on readily provable compensatory 
damages that represented an economic loss—e.g., pecuniary harms like lost wages, 
costs of medical care and treatment, and other measurable expenditures.  See R.C. 
2315.18(A)(2) and (B)(1).  However, it generally capped compensatory damages 
for noneconomic loss—e.g., nonpecuniary harms like pain and suffering, mental 
anguish, and other intangible losses.  See R.C. 2315.18(A)(4) and (B)(2). 
January Term, 2022 
 
23 
{¶ 50} The legislature justified the caps on noneconomic-damages awards 
because it had found that noneconomic losses are difficult to quantify since they 
“are inherently subjective.”  S.B. 80, Section 3(A)(6)(d), 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, 
at 8028; see also Simpkins v. Grace Brethren Church of Delaware, Ohio, 149 Ohio 
St.3d 307, 2016-Ohio-8118, 75 N.E.3d 122, ¶ 6.  The legislature wanted to ensure 
that those awards were intended to compensate a person for his or her loss.  Id.  
Additionally, the legislature believed that windfalls awarded to plaintiffs  
“ ‘create[d] an improper resolution of civil justice claims,’ leading to increased 
litigation costs and insurance premiums.”  Simpkins at ¶ 6, quoting S.B. 80, Section 
3(A)(6)(e), 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, at 8028.  The legislature made no distinction 
between wrongful conduct that was negligent and wrongful conduct that was 
intentional—the caps were enacted to apply to the types of damages that often 
varied significantly based on subjective valuations.  See S.B. 80, Section 3(A)(4) 
and (6), 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, at 8024-8028. 
{¶ 51} The General Assembly did, however, provide exceptions to the cap 
on compensatory noneconomic damages.  R.C. 2315.18(B)(3); see also S.B. 80, 
Section 3(A)(6)(c), 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, at 8027-8028.  The cap does not apply 
when the victim has sustained (1) an injury that resulted in “[p]ermanent and 
substantial physical deformity,” (2) an injury that resulted in “loss of use of a limb,” 
(3) an injury that resulted in “loss of a bodily organ system,” or (4) a “[p]ermanent 
physical functional injury that permanently prevents the person from being able to 
independently care for [him or her]self and perform life-sustaining activities.”  R.C. 
2315.18(B)(3).  So unless the victim has suffered from an injury that falls under 
one of the exceptions listed in R.C. 2315.18(B)(3), the victim’s compensatory 
noneconomic-damages award will be capped under R.C. 2315.18(B)(2). 
{¶ 52} In Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, we summarized the General 
Assembly’s evidence and findings as they pertained to R.C. 2315.18: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
24 
In an uncodified section of S.B. 80, [the General Assembly] found 
that the current state of the civil litigation system “represents a 
challenge to the economy of the state of Ohio.”  S.B. 80, Section 
3(A)(1), 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, 8024. This finding was supported 
by (1) a National Bureau of Economic Research study showing that 
states adopting tort reforms experienced growth in employment, 
productivity, and total output, (2) a 2002 White House Council on 
Economic Advisors study equating the cost of tort litigation to a 2.1 
percent wage and salary tax, a 1.3 percent personal-consumption 
tax, and a 3.1 percent capital-investment-income tax, (3) a Harris 
Poll of 928 senior corporate attorneys showing that the litigation 
environment in a state greatly affected the business decisions of their 
companies, (4) a Tillinghast–Towers Perrin study showing that the 
tort system failed to return even 50 cents for every dollar to injured 
plaintiffs and that the cost of the national tort system grew at a record 
rate in 2001, with a cost equivalent to a five percent tax on wages, 
and (5) testimony from Ohio Department of Development Director 
Bruce Johnson on the rising costs of the tort system, which he 
believed were putting Ohio businesses at a disadvantage and 
hindering development. S.B. 80 at Section 3(A)(3)(a) through (f), 
150 Ohio Laws, Part V, [8024-8025]. 
 
116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 53. 
II. R.C. 2315.18, as applied to Brandt, does not violate her right to due 
process of law under Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution 
{¶ 53} In an as-applied challenge, Brandt argues that the cap imposed on 
her noneconomic-damages award under R.C. 2315.18 violates her right to due 
process.  To prevail, Brandt must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
January Term, 2022 
 
25 
statute is unconstitutional when applied to her particular set of facts.  See Harrold 
v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 37-38.  She 
simply cannot meet this burden. 
{¶ 54} In reviewing this constitutional claim, we must remember that 
legislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality.  See State 
ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142, 128 N.E.2d 59 (1955), paragraph 
one of the syllabus.  This court does not consider the “policy or wisdom of a statute” 
in these determinations.  State ex rel. Bishop v. Bd. of Edn. of Mt. Orab Village 
School Dist., Brown Cty., 139 Ohio St. 427, 438, 40 N.E.2d 913 (1942).  Our “sole 
function” is to determine whether the statute “transcends the limits of legislative 
power.”  Id. 
{¶ 55} The right to due process of law in Ohio exists under Article I, Section 
16 of the Ohio Constitution: “[E]very person, for an injury done him in his land, 
goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law * * *.”  
(Emphasis added.)  It has been considered the functional equivalent of the “due 
process of law” protections in the United States Constitution.  Arbino, 116 Ohio 
St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 48. 
{¶ 56} The standard of review we apply when reviewing the 
constitutionality of a statute on due-process grounds depends on whether the 
legislation restricts a fundamental right.  Arbino at ¶ 49.  By applying rational-basis 
review, the majority opinion has implicitly decided that R.C. 2315.18 does not 
implicate a fundamental right.  We agree that rational-basis review is the 
appropriate test to be applied in these circumstances—that is the conclusion this 
court reached in Arbino.  See id. 
{¶ 57} R.C. 2315.18 is afforded “a strong presumption of validity” and will 
survive a due-process challenge if it is rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose.  Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 
(1993).  “This deferential rational-basis standard is ‘a paradigm of judicial 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
26 
restraint,’ Fed. Communications Comm. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 
307, 314, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993), and ‘not a license for courts to 
judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices,’ id. at 313, 113 S.Ct. 
2096.”  State v. Bevly, 142 Ohio St.3d 41, 2015-Ohio-475, 27 N.E.3d 516, ¶ 35 
(French, J., dissenting).  Our system of government presumes that the democratic 
process will rectify bad policy decisions and that “judicial intervention is generally 
unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.”  
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979). 
{¶ 58} Therefore, a statute does not violate due process under the rational-
basis test if the statute (1) “bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, 
safety, morals or general welfare of the public,” and (2) “is not unreasonable or 
arbitrary.”  Benjamin v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957), 
paragraph five of the syllabus.  “Whether an exercise of the police power does bear 
a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare 
of the public and whether it is unreasonable or arbitrary are questions which are 
committed in the first instance to the judgment and discretion of the legislative 
body, and, unless the decisions of such legislative body on those questions appear 
to be clearly erroneous, the courts will not invalidate them.”  Id. at paragraph six of 
the syllabus; see also Simpkins, 149 Ohio St. 3d 307, 2016-Ohio-8118, 75 N.E.3d 
122, at ¶ 47, quoting State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 531, 728 N.E.2d 342 
(2000) (we grant “ “substantial deference’ ” to the General Assembly’s 
determination). 
A. R.C. 2315.18(B) bears a real and substantial relation to the general welfare 
of the public 
{¶ 59} The General Assembly enacted S.B. 80 to protect the Ohio economy 
from the increasing number of tort claims being filed and the increasing amounts 
of the damages being awarded in those claims, both of which were negatively 
impacting the cost of doing business in the state, threatening Ohio jobs, driving up 
January Term, 2022 
 
27 
consumer costs, and stifling innovation.  S.B. 80, Section 3(A)(3), 150 Ohio Laws, 
Part V, at 8024.  Part of the issue was the cost of the tort system—it had grown 
significantly, and attorneys benefitted more from the system than those who had 
been injured.  S.B. 80, Section 3(A)(3)(a) through (f), 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, at 
8024-8025.  The General Assembly also noted the significant problem with 
damages, specifically noneconomic damages and punitive damages.  S.B. 80, 
Section 3(A)(4) and (6), 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, at 8025-8028.  The General 
Assembly was concerned about “[i]nflated damage[s] awards,” i.e., windfalls that 
a person could derive from awards of both punitive and noneconomic damages.  
S.B. 80, Section 3(A)(6)(e), 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, at 8027. 
{¶ 60} Noneconomic-damages awards, like the one at issue here, were 
intended to compensate an injured person for a loss, not to punish the defendant.  
S.B. 80, Section 3(A)(6)(a), 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, at 8027.  The General 
Assembly noted, however, that these damages, which have “no precise economic 
value,” id., are inherently subjective and may be influenced by “improper 
consideration of evidence of wrongdoing,” S.B. 80, Section 3(A)(6)(d), 150 Ohio 
Laws, Part V, at 8027.  It is these inflated noneconomic-damages awards that 
contributed to the problems in our civil-justice system.  See S.B. 80, Section 
3(A)(6)(e), 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, at 8028.  Thus, the General Assembly capped 
noneconomic-damages awards at “the greater of [$250,000] or an amount that is 
equal to three times the economic loss, as determined by the trier of fact,” but not 
exceeding $350,000 for each plaintiff in the tort action or $500,000 for each 
occurrence that is the basis of the action.  R.C. 2315.18(B)(2). 
{¶ 61} The majority opinion never says that reforming the tort system to 
advance the goal of preventing inflated and improperly punitive noneconomic-
damages awards bears no real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare of the public.  Nor can it.  This court has already found 
that S.B. 80 “bears a real and substantial relation to the general welfare of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
28 
public.”  Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 58.  
Reducing the cost of doing business in this state, ensuring job growth, reducing 
costs to consumers, and promoting innovation plainly have a real and substantial 
relation to the general welfare of the public and the economic health of this state. 
{¶ 62} Brandt argues, however, that the economic research on which the 
General Assembly based its decision to enact R.C. 2315.18 was flawed.  In Arbino, 
this court rejected that argument, finding that the General Assembly had made 
several findings of fact based on its own research.  Arbino at ¶ 53.  We explained 
that in determining whether a statute bears a real and substantial relation to 
legitimate governmental interests, “ ‘it is not the function of the courts to substitute 
their evaluation of legislative facts for that of the legislature.’ ” Id. at ¶ 58, quoting 
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 
L.Ed.2d 659 (1981).  The General Assembly, with the research available to it, made 
the decision to enact these caps to protect the Ohio economy.  There is no doubt 
that this statute bears a real and substantial relation to a legitimate government 
purpose, even under Brandt’s circumstances. 
{¶ 63} “[T]he status of the plaintiff [as a victim of sexual assault] does not 
diminish either the economic benefits of limiting noneconomic damages, as found 
by the General Assembly, or the substantial relationship that we found in Arbino 
between the statutory limitations and the benefits to the general public welfare.”  
Simpkins, 149 Ohio St.3d 307, 2016-Ohio-8118, 75 N.E.3d 122, at ¶ 38.  Therefore, 
the first element of the rational-basis test—that the challenged statute bears a real 
and substantial relation to the general public welfare—is satisfied.  See Arbino at  
¶ 55. 
B. R.C. 2315.18 is not unreasonable or arbitrary, and there is a rational basis for 
its creation of two classes of victims 
{¶ 64} As for whether the cap on noneconomic damages is unreasonable or 
arbitrary as applied to Brandt, or whether there is no rational basis for 
January Term, 2022 
 
29 
distinguishing between victims who have suffered (1) an injury resulting in 
“[p]ermanent and substantial physical deformity,” (2) an injury resulting in “loss of 
use of a limb,” (3) an injury resulting in “loss of a bodily organ system” or (4) a 
“[p]ermanent physical functional injury that permanently prevents the person from 
being able to independently care for [him or her]self and perform life-sustaining 
activities,” R.C. 2315.18(B)(3), from those who have not, those arguments too must 
fail. 
{¶ 65} The majority opinion concludes that the statutory scheme is 
unreasonable.  The majority opinion discusses how the statute does not consider 
psychological injuries at all and how R.C. 2315.18(B)(3) is limited to physical 
“catastrophic injuries.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 31.  The majority opinion maintains 
that this distinction is unreasonable given the trauma that Brandt has endured, 
evidenced by the jury’s high-dollar award for her noneconomic damages and the 
fact that no one has argued that this award was excessive for reasons other than its 
exceeding the statutory cap.  The majority opinion concludes that “unavailability 
of the exception to the compensatory-damages caps for the most severely and 
permanently psychologically injured” creates a due-process problem.  (Emphasis 
sic.)  Id. 
{¶ 66} But in enacting tort-reform legislation, the General Assembly was 
required only to be rational and unarbitrary.  This is a low bar.  And here, the 
legislature sought to limit inflated and subjective awards that it found to be both 
unfair to defendants and harmful to the state’s economy.  It also created categories 
of injury that, it believed, did not raise the same concerns for runaway verdicts and 
subjective awards, because the nature of the injury would assure that the damages 
award would not be based on improper considerations and could be more 
objectively valued by a jury.  In order to effectively enact legislation that solves the 
problems that the General Assembly found to exist, the legislature was required to 
draw lines somewhere.  As this court said in Arbino, “the General Assembly is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
30 
charged with making the difficult policy decisions on such issues and codifying 
them into law.  This court is not the forum in which to second-guess such legislative 
choices * * *.”  116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 71. 
{¶ 67} R.C. 2315.18 draws distinctions between the types of injured 
claimants, but those distinctions are not arbitrary or irrational.  The statute prohibits 
caps from being imposed on those who have suffered (1) an injury resulting in 
“[p]ermanent and substantial physical deformity,” (2) an injury resulting in the 
“loss of use of a limb,” (3) an injury resulting in the “loss of a bodily organ system,” 
or (4) a “[p]ermanent physical functional injury that permanently prevents the 
person from being able to independently care for [him or her]self and perform life-
sustaining activities.”  R.C. 2315.18(B)(3).  There are two categories of plaintiffs: 
those who fall into one of the four exceptions set forth in R.C. 2315.18(B)(3) and 
those who do not.  The classification remains the same regardless of the age of the 
victim and the nature of the tort.  Simpkins, 149 Ohio St.3d 307, 2016-Ohio-8118, 
75 N.E.3d 122, at ¶ 50.  The statute does not treat Brandt or other victims of sexual 
assault any differently than other tort victims who have not experienced one of the 
four types of injuries listed above. 
{¶ 68} The majority opinion and Brandt seem to emphasize that a minor 
victim of sexual assault could never fall into one of these categories.  This is simply 
untrue.  We need not speculate, but it is apparent that a victim of sexual assault 
could experience an injury of the sort covered under R.C. 2315.18(B)(3)—e.g., an 
injury caused by the violence of the assault, a resulting sexually transmitted disease, 
complications of a pregnancy occasioned by the assault that result in the “loss of a 
bodily organ system,” or another injury that results in  a “permanent physical 
functional injury that permanently prevents the person from being able to 
independently care for [him or her]self and perform life-sustaining activities.”  See, 
e.g., Ozmun v. Customer Engineering Servs., L.L.C., Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV 14 
824745, 2015 WL 13238578 (July 31, 2015) (allowing the jury to determine 
January Term, 2022 
 
31 
whether the damages cap applied after a plaintiff offered an expert report finding 
that her posttraumatic stress disorder was a physical, functional injury because it 
caused physical harm, including brain-cell damage and atrophy to the hippocampal 
gyrus and other areas of the brain); see also Giebel v. Lavalley, N.D.Ohio No. 5:12-
CV-750, 2013 WL 6903784, *2 (genuine issue of material fact whether the plaintiff 
who suffered depression and suicidal thoughts as a result of a brain injury suffered 
an injury under R.C. 2315.18(B)(3)(b) that exempted her from the cap on 
noneconomic damages).  No one is denying that Brandt’s experience was traumatic 
and that she suffers from psychological issues, but her injuries do not fall within 
one of the categories of injuries identified by the General Assembly as being 
exempt from the caps on noneconomic damages.  If they did, then Brandt would 
not be subject to a cap on her award of noneconomic damages.  This is the same for 
any other claimant whose injuries do not rise to the extent specified by the 
legislature. 
{¶ 69} As the General Assembly recognized, damages for things like pain 
and suffering and mental anguish are inherently subjective.  They are difficult to 
determine and quantify.  See Leininger v. United States, 499 F.Supp.3d 973, 997 
(D.Kan.2020) (“non-economic damages are notoriously difficult to quantify”).  The 
General Assembly had a substantial interest in protecting our civil-justice system 
and our economy when it enacted the statute that set a cap on noneconomic 
damages as a means to limit the awards for injuries that are either difficult to prove 
or the extent of which is difficult to quantify without evidence of some physical 
component.  This is a reasonable and legitimate government interest, and the 
General Assembly has not arbitrarily selected winners and losers under the statute.  
Thus, R.C. 2315.18(B) does not violate due process merely because it caps the 
noneconomic-damages award issued to Brandt in the same way that it would cap 
damages for every other injured person who does not fall into one of the four 
categories for which caps are exempted. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
32 
{¶ 70} “ ‘[C]ourts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a 
legislature’s generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and 
ends.  A classification does not fail rational-basis review because “ ‘ “ ‘it is not 
made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some 
inequality.’ ” ’ ” Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. 
State Univ., 87 Ohio St.3d 55, 58, 717 N.E.2d 286 (1999), quoting Heller, 509 U.S. 
at 321, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257, quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 
471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970), quoting Lindsley v. Natural 
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911).  That the 
distinctions drawn may not be perfect does not make them irrational or arbitrary.  
And the majority opinion does not dispute that lines must be drawn—it simply 
disagrees with how the General Assembly drew them. 
{¶ 71} The majority opinion argues that by finding the noneconomic-
damages cap constitutional, Brandt’s abuser, Pompa, would be the only winner 
here.  The majority opinion also emphasizes that denying Brandt the full amount of 
her noneconomic-damages award in this case is unreasonable since the award does 
not impact the insurance industry, because most insurance policies now contain 
exclusions that restrict coverage for criminal conduct such as Pompa’s.  This 
rationale is flawed for two reasons.  First, noneconomic-damages awards are not 
meant to punish the defendant, S.B. 80, Section 3(A)(6)(a), 150 Ohio Laws, Part 
V, at 8027; the fact that one bad person might benefit from caps on noneconomic 
damages does not make the statute, taken as a whole, irrational or arbitrary.  
Second, the majority opinion’s policy rationale does not belong in a 
constitutionality analysis at all; policy decisions are reserved for the General 
Assembly.  See Cleveland, 157 Ohio St.3d 330, 2019-Ohio-3820, 136 N.E.3d 466, 
at ¶ 40.  It is up to the General Assembly to change the statute if it is no longer in 
line with public interest.  We can only bring the issue to the attention of the General 
Assembly; we cannot “invade the province of the legislature” and “violate the 
January Term, 2022 
 
33 
separation of powers” doctrine to rewrite the statute in the manner we find most 
appropriate.  Pratte v. Stewart, 125 Ohio St.3d 473, 2010-Ohio-1860, 929 N.E.2d 
415, ¶ 54.  We “must leave it to the General Assembly to rewrite the statute if it 
deems necessary.”  Id. 
{¶ 72} Minor sex-abuse victims are worthy of protection and compensation.  
But it is not our role as members of the judicial branch to determine what 
compensation is necessary or adequate.  The General Assembly is the ultimate 
arbiter of public policy.  Cleveland at ¶ 40.  If the General Assembly would like to 
create another exception beyond those listed in R.C. 2315.18(B)(3), then it should 
do so.  See Pratte at ¶ 54.  If the people would like another exception added to the 
statute, then they should go to their legislators or pursue a referendum under Article 
II, Section 1b or 1c of the Ohio Constitution.  But that is a far cry from the 
determination in the majority opinion that if legislation tackles problems in the tort 
system, it must treat the survivors of sexual abuse the same as it treats people who 
have, for example, lost an organ or a limb.  The General Assembly could rationally 
decide that the types of injuries described in R.C. 2315.18(B)(3) do not present the 
same problems for ensuring that noneconomic-damages awards are not windfalls 
or are not inherently subjective.  That is all the Constitution requires. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 73} No one denies that child abuse is horrific.  And no one will deny that 
Brandt has suffered.  But it is not our job as members of the judicial branch to 
overreach and invade the province of the General Assembly.  Bad facts make bad 
law, as it does today. 
{¶ 74} By resolving the merits of this case, the majority opinion improperly 
involves the judiciary in matters that belong exclusively and fundamentally to the 
General Assembly.  It is this type of result-oriented judicial activism that blurs the 
line in the public’s eye about which branch of government is truly responsible for 
the policies of this state.  It erodes the public’s confidence in the judiciary to resolve 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
34 
problems within the confines of the law and places an unrealistic expectation on the 
members of the Ohio judiciary to resolve all society’s problems.  Policy-making is 
not our job.  If policy changes are desired, then the members of the majority opinion 
can take the short walk to Capitol Square to speak with their legislators—the people 
who are elected to create and set policy for Ohioans.  Brandt’s situation is certainly 
sad, but we cannot provide her with compensation simply because it may be our 
personal policy preference to do so.  This activism from the bench needs to stop. 
{¶ 75} Brandt 
has 
not 
demonstrated 
that 
R.C. 
2315.18(B) 
is 
unconstitutional as applied to her.  Thus, we must respectfully dissent. 
_________________ 
FISCHER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 76} The majority opinion abandons this court’s role as impartial jurist 
and exceeds the scope of its authority to hold that R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) is 
unconstitutional as applied to appellant, Amanda Brandt, and similarly situated 
victims.  What happened to Brandt is horrific and deeply saddening, as are the 
stories of every child victim—really any victim—of sexual assault.  But that reality 
does not bestow upon this court the constitutional authority to invade the purview 
of the General Assembly by questioning its policy decisions and fashioning 
remedies for victims we deem worthy.  While these types of cases turn our stomachs 
and tug on our heartstrings, we are still tasked with resolving these matters within 
the confines of the law. 
{¶ 77} As discussed in the joint dissent, I fully agree that Brandt cannot 
demonstrate that the caps on noneconomic damages in R.C. 2315.18(B)(2), as 
applied to her, violate her right to due process under Article I, Section 16 of the 
Ohio Constitution.  I write separately to address Brandt’s other arguments that go 
unresolved by the majority opinion, and I reach the conclusion that Brandt cannot 
demonstrate that R.C. 2315.18 is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to her.  
Thus, I would affirm the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. 
January Term, 2022 
 
35 
I. Standard of Review 
{¶ 78} It is important to address the applicable standards of review in this 
case given that the majority opinion seems to have forgotten how to apply them.  
Constitutional challenges fall into one of two categories: (1) facial challenges that 
claim a statute as a whole is unconstitutional, and (2) as-applied challenges that 
claim a statute is unconstitutional as applied to a particular set of facts.  In re D.B., 
129 Ohio St.3d 104, 2011-Ohio-2671, 950 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 12; Harrold v. Collier, 
107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 37. 
{¶ 79} In a facial challenge, the party must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that “there exists no set of circumstances under which the statute would be valid.” 
Id.; see also State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142, 128 N.E.2d 
59 (1955), paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Mason, 153 Ohio St.3d 476, 2018-
Ohio-1462, 108 N.E.3d 56, ¶ 5 (same).  But for an as-applied challenge, the party 
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the statute is unconstitutional 
when applied to a particular set of facts.  Harrold at ¶ 38; Belden v. Union Cent. 
Life Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 329, 55 N.E.2d 629 (1944), paragraph six of the syllabus. 
II. Presumption of Constitutionality 
{¶ 80} When evaluating these constitutional challenges, we must remember 
that legislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality.  
Dickman at paragraph one of the syllabus.  While this presumption has been subject 
to some limited criticism in the past, see Ohio Grocers Assn. v. Levin, 123 Ohio 
St.3d 303, 2009-Ohio-4872, 916 N.E.2d 446, ¶ 70, (Pfeifer, J., dissenting), it is 
firmly based on the General Assembly’s plenary power to legislate, and it serves to 
discourage courts from overruling legislation based on the court’s own policy 
preferences.  See League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., 
167 Ohio St.3d 255, 2022-Ohio-65, 192 N.E.3d 379, ¶ 339 (Fischer, J., dissenting).  
Indeed, this court has applied this presumption since our statehood and has affirmed 
this presumption even through the various amendments to our state constitution.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
36 
To show how deeply rooted this presumption is in our judicial system, a brief 
history is necessary. 
{¶ 81} The Ohio Constitution of 1803, drafted consistently with 
Jeffersonian principles, concentrated much of the state’s power in the General 
Assembly.  See Utter, Judicial Review in Early Ohio, The Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (June 1927) 3-24.  The legislature controlled 
the makeup of the judiciary.  Id. at 4, 6-7.  And the legislature believed that the 
court had no right at all to declare its enactments unconstitutional.  Id. 
{¶ 82} However, the Ohio Supreme Court determined in Rutherford v. 
M’Faddon (1807), that it had the authority to review the constitutionality of 
legislative acts.  Pollack, Ohio Unreported Judicial Decisions Prior to 1823, Part 
II, 71-105 (1952)  In Rutherford, the court expressed that the judiciary’s duty is to 
“expound, construe and declare the law,” which includes declaring a law 
unconstitutional.  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 72-73.  And in discharging that duty, the 
court “compare[s] the legislative act with the constitution,” and if it is determined 
that the legislative act is contrary to the Constitution or prohibited by the 
Constitution, then it is void.  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 73.  The court emphasized that 
its role is to support the Constitution.  Id. at 74. 
{¶ 83} The judiciary continued to exercise its authority, but it provided 
deference to the General Assembly in its legislative decisions: “It is never to be 
forgotten, that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of the law; and it 
is only when manifest assumption of authority, and a clear incompatibility between 
the constitution and the law appear, that the judicial power can refuse to execute it.  
Such interference can never be permitted in a doubtful case.”  Cincinnati, 
Wilmington and Zanesville, RR. Co. v. Clinton Cty. Commrs., 1 Ohio St. 77, 82 
(1852); see also Downes, Judicial Review Under the Ohio Constitution of 1802, 
Northwest Ohio Quarterly (October 1946) 145. 
January Term, 2022 
 
37 
{¶ 84} This shift, however, was not due to a fear of impeachment by the 
General Assembly nor the court deciding to give up its authority; this shift was 
founded in the court’s recognition that legislators took an “oath to support the 
constitution,” and they considered that oath when crafting legislation.  Cincinnati, 
Wilmington and Zanesville, RR. Co., at 83; Downes at 145.  If the court were to 
entertain declaring a law unconstitutional “while [also] entertaining doubts upon 
the subject,” then it would present a separation of powers problem and “make the 
dubious constructions of the judiciary[] outweigh the fixed conclusions of the 
General Assembly.”  Id.  The court noted that “ ‘it is not on slight implication and 
vague conjecture’ ” that it would pronounce that the General Assembly had 
“ ‘transcended its powers’ ” and declared its acts void.  Cincinnati,  Wilmington 
and Zanesville, RR. Co. at 84, quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 128, 3 L.Ed. 
162 (1810). 
{¶ 85} Even as the Ohio Constitution was amended to distribute power 
more equally among the three branches of government in 1851, this court still gave 
a strong presumption to the constitutionality of statutory enactments.  See, e.g., Ex 
parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 77, 96 (1859) (“No court will hold a law to be 
unconstitutional unless its unconstitutionality is clear beyond a doubt”).  And by 
1894, it was a settled rule that the court presumed constitutionality in favor of the 
validity of the challenged statute.  State ex rel. Poe v. Jones, 51 Ohio St. 492, 503, 
37 N.E. 945 (1894).  In reaffirming this rule, this court again emphasized that the 
presumption is necessary due to the General Assembly’s plenary power to legislate: 
“The legislative power of the state is vested in the general assembly, and whatever 
limitation is placed upon the exercise of that plenary grant of power must be found 
in a clear prohibition by the constitution.”  Id.  When “the constitutionality of the 
law is involved in doubt, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the legislative 
power.”  Id. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
38 
{¶ 86} The presumption of constitutionality remained strong even after the 
Ohio Constitution was revised in 1912 to provide the judiciary with more, yet still 
limited, power to review legislative enactments.  See Dickman, 164 Ohio St. 142, 
128 N.E.2d 59, at paragraph one of the syllabus; Article IV, Section 2, Ohio 
Constitution (1912) (amended to allow the Supreme Court to find a statute 
unconstitutional by a majority of all but one vote).  This court ruled still that 
legislative enactments were presumed to be constitutional and would only be 
deemed unconstitutional if proven so beyond a reasonable doubt.  Dickman at 147-
151; Williams v. Scudder, 102 Ohio St. 305, 131 N.E. 481 (1921), paragraph four 
of the syllabus; Xenia v. Schmidt, 101 Ohio St. 437, 130 N.E. 24 (1920), paragraph 
one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 87} Even after the people of Ohio adopted the Modern Courts 
Amendment in 1968, which eliminated the restriction on this court’s ability to find 
a statute unconstitutional by a certain majority, see Euclid v. Heaton, 15 Ohio St.2d 
65, 66, 238 N.E.2d 790 (1968), and provided this court with appellate jurisdiction 
involving constitutional questions, Article IV, Section2(B)(2)(a)(ii), Ohio 
Constitution, the presumption of a statute’s constitutional validity still reigned.  
This is because the presumption was always meant to ensure the separation of 
powers and to support the General Assembly’s plenary power to legislate, a power 
that was not altered by the Modern Courts Amendment.  See Village of Monroeville 
v. Ward, 27 Ohio St.2d 179, 182, 271 N.E.2d 757, 759 (1971), rev. on other grounds 
by Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 Sc.D. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972), citing 
State ex rel. Poe at 503; see generally Fischer et al., The Modern Courts 
Amendment at 50, Ohio Lawyer (Oct.-Dec. 2019) 12-15; O’Connor, The Ohio 
Modern Courts Amendment: 45 Years of Progress, 76 Alb.L.Rev. 1963 (2012-
2013); Milligan & Pohlman, The 1968 Modern Courts Amendment to the Ohio 
Constitution, 29 Ohio St.L.J. 811 (1968). 
January Term, 2022 
 
39 
{¶ 88} This presumption of constitutionality has been affirmed time and 
again since 1968.  Ohio Pub. Interest Action Group, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 43 
Ohio St.2d 175, 331 N.E.2d 730 (1975), paragraph four of the syllabus (“The 
question of the constitutionality of every law being first determined by the General 
Assembly, every presumption is in favor of its constitutionality, and it must clearly 
appear that the law is in direct conflict with inhibitions of the Constitution before a 
court will declare it unconstitutional”), following State Bd. of Health v. Greenville, 
86 Ohio St.1, 98 N.E. 1019 (1912); State ex rel. Swetland v. Kinney, 69 Ohio St.2d 
567, 576, 433 N.E.2d 217 (1982) (the sanctity of legislative enactments is firmly 
entrenched in our judicial system); State v. Warner, 55 Ohio St.3d 31, 43, 564 
N.E.2d 18 (1990) (recognizing that the presumption of constitutionality is based on 
the legislature’s plenary power); see also State ex rel. Horner v. Anderson, 41 Ohio 
St.2d 166, 172, 324 N.E.2d 572 (1975); State ex rel. Taft v. Campanella, 50 Ohio 
St.2d 242, 246, 364 N.E.2d 21 (1977); State v. Renalist, Inc., 56 Ohio St.2d 276, 
278, 383 N.E.2d 892 (1978); Cincinnati City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Walter, 58 
Ohio St.2d 368, 376, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979); State v. Saurman, 64 Ohio St.2d 137, 
138, 413 N.E.2d 1197 (1980); State v. Dorso, 4 Ohio St.3d 60, 61, 446 N.E.2d 449 
(1983); Ewing v. Lindley, 23 Ohio St.3d 222, 224, 492 N.E.2d 435 (1986); State v. 
Stambaugh, 34 Ohio St.3d 34, 35, 517 N.E.2d 526 (1987); Doyle v. Ohio Bur. of 
Motor Vehicles, 51 Ohio St.3d 46, 47, 554 N.E.2d 97 (1990); Conley v. Shearer, 
64 Ohio St.3d 284, 289, 595 N.E.2d 862 (1992); Sorrell v. Thevenir, 69 Ohio St.3d 
415, 418, 633 N.E.2d 504 (1994); Beagle v. Walden, 78 Ohio St.3d 59, 61, 676 
N.E.2d 506 (1997); Hughes v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 79 Ohio St.3d 305, 
307, 681 N.E.2d 430 (1997); Desenco, Inc. v. Akron, 84 Ohio St.3d 535, 538, 706 
N.E.2d 323 (1999); State ex rel. Haylett v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 87 Ohio 
St.3d 325, 328, 720 N.E.2d 901 (1999); Klein v. Leis, 99 Ohio St.3d 537, 2003-
Ohio-4779, 795 N.E.2d 633, ¶ 4; Yajnik v. Akron Dept. of Health, Hous. Div., 101 
Ohio St.3d 106, 2004-Ohio-357, 802 N.E.2d 632, ¶ 16; McCrone v. Bank One 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
40 
Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-6505, 839 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 20; State ex rel. Ohio 
Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Edn., 111 Ohio St.3d 568, 2006-
Ohio-5512, 857 N.E.2d 1148, ¶ 20; State v. Carswell, 114 Ohio St.3d 210, 2007-
Ohio-3723, 871 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 6-7; Toledo v. Tellings, 114 Ohio St.3d 278, 2007-
Ohio-3724, 871 N.E.2d 1152, ¶ 22; Ohio Apt. Assn. v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 76, 
2010-Ohio-4414, 936 N.E.2d 919, ¶ 56; Cleveland v. State, 128 Ohio St.3d 135, 
2010-Ohio-6318, 942 N.E.2d 370, ¶ 6; State ex rel. Zeigler v. Zumbar, 129 Ohio 
St.3d 240, 2011-Ohio-2939, 951 N.E.2d 405, ¶ 24;Mahoning Edn. Assn. of Dev. 
Disabilities v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 137 Ohio St.3d 257, 2013-Ohio-4654, 998 
N.E.2d 1124, ¶ 13; Haight v. Minchak, 146 Ohio St.3d 481, 2016-Ohio-1053, 58 
N.E.3d 1135, ¶ 11; State v. Noling, 149 Ohio St.3d 327, 2016-Ohio-8252, 75 
N.E.3d 141, ¶ 10; Toledo v. State, 154 Ohio St.3d 41, 2018-Ohio-2358, 110 N.E.3d 
1257. ¶ 17-18. Even this year, this court drew on this presumption to evaluate the 
constitutionality of challenged statutes.  See Newburgh Hts. v. State, ___ Ohio St.3d 
___, 2022-Ohio-1642, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 19; State v. Grevious, ___ Ohio St. ___, 
2022-Ohio-4361, ___ N.E. ___, ¶ 9.  Indeed, this presumption is consistent with 
the General Assembly’s statement that it enacts statutes with the Ohio and United 
States Constitutions in mind.  See R.C. 1.47(A). 
{¶ 89} This deeply-rooted presumption is vital to maintaining separation of 
powers.  See Cincinnati, Wilmington and Zanesville, RR. Co. v. at 83-84; State ex 
rel. Poe, 51 Ohio St. at 503, 37 N.E. 945; Ohio Pub. Interest Action Group, Inc.  at 
paragraph four of the syllabus; State ex rel. Swetland at 576; Warner at 43.  The 
presumption not only recognizes the General Assembly’s plenary power to 
legislate—to enact laws consistent with the will of the people—it ensures that 
judges do not replace the legislature’s views with their own personal views.  See 
League of Women Voters of Ohio, 167 Ohio St.3d 255, 2022-Ohio-65, 192 N.E.3d 
379, at ¶ 339 (Fischer, J., dissenting); The Federalist No. 78, at 468-469 (Alexander 
January Term, 2022 
 
41 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter Ed.1961); see also Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co., 92 
Ohio St.3d 115, 135, 748 N.E.2d 1111 (2001) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). 
{¶ 90} Thus, when evaluating constitutional claims, we must make every 
reasonable presumption and resolve any doubt as to the statute’s constitutionality 
in favor of the validity of the statue.  Dickman, 164 Ohio St. at 149, 128 N.E.2d 59; 
see State ex rel. Doerfler v. Price, 101 Ohio St. 50, 53, 128 N.E. 173 (1920).  Policy 
considerations raised by members of the judicial branch have no place in this 
analysis.  State ex rel. Bishop v. Mt. Orab Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn.,  139 
Ohio St. 427, 438, 40 N.E.2d 913 (1942). 
III. We have already held that R.C. 2315.18 is constitutional on its face 
{¶ 91} This court held that R.C. 2315.18 was constitutional on its face in 
Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 
420, ¶ 114.  Brandt maintains that this court’s decision in Arbino was wrong; she 
argues that R.C. 2315.18 violates due process, equal protection, and the right to 
trial by jury and is therefore unconstitutional on its face.  Though the majority 
opinion declines to address this issue, its silence and use of the rational-basis test is 
confirmation that Arbino should be affirmed.  Indeed, stare decisis demands that 
we affirm and follow Arbino. 
{¶ 92} Stare decisis “dictates adherence to prior judicial decisions.”  State 
v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 38.  It provides 
constancy and consistency in the law necessary to ensure that the value of law in 
society is not diminished.  Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St.3d 243, 249, 496 
N.E.2d 699 (1986).  So generally, we are “institutionally bound to uphold our prior 
decisions where time has vindicated the logic utilized to render the holding.”  Id. 
{¶ 93} We can, of course, reverse our precedent under the right 
circumstances: “(1) the decision was wrongly decided at that time, or changes in 
circumstances no longer justify continued adherence to the decision; (2) the 
decision defies practical workability; and (3) abandoning the precedent would not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
42 
create an undue hardship for those who have relied upon it.”  Westfield Ins. Co. v. 
Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, paragraph one of 
the syllabus.  If we apply the test set forth in Galatis, Brandt plainly cannot satisfy 
the third element, because Arbino is the foundation of many decisions and 
abandoning it would clearly create an undue hardship for those who have relied on 
it. 
{¶ 94} Over the past 15 years, we have reaffirmed and relied on Arbino 
numerous times.  Besides supporting the holding in Simpkins v. Grace Brethren 
Church of Delaware, 149 Ohio St.3d 307, 2016-Ohio-8118, 75 N.E.3d 122, at ¶ 49, 
Arbino has formed the legal foundation for affirming legislative limits on allowable 
damages in many constitutional claims.  See, e.g., Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp. 117 
Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 23 (Arbino is “useful in setting 
the stage” to provide “extensive background” and establishing “some important 
concepts that play a significant role” in resolving questions regarding the 
constitutionality of R.C. 2305.10, a products-liability statute of repose); Oliver v. 
Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. Ltd. Partnership, 123 Ohio St.3d 278, 2009-Ohio-
5030, 915 N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 7-16 (relying on Arbino to affirm the constitutionality of 
R.C. 2744.05(C)(1), a statute that limits noneconomic damages in suits against 
political subdivisions); Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 
2010-Ohio-1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066, ¶ 58-97 (relying on Arbino to determine that 
R.C. 2745.01, which limits an employer’s liability for intentional torts, is 
constitutional); Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., L.L.C., 125 Ohio St.3d 
280, 2010-Ohio-1029, 927 N.E.2d 1092, ¶ 33-93 (same); Flagstar Bank, F.S.B. v. 
Airline Union’s Mtge. Co., 128 Ohio St.3d 529, 2011-Ohio-1961, 947 N.E.2d 672, 
¶ 29 (citing Arbino to conclude that the Ohio Constitution’s right-to-remedy clause 
protects only against laws that completely foreclose a cause of action for injured 
plaintiffs or otherwise eliminate their ability to receive a meaningful remedy). 
January Term, 2022 
 
43 
{¶ 95} Arbino also helps explain and emphasizes the importance of stare 
decisis in Ohio.  See, e.g., State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 
933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 33.  And Arbino properly sets forth the role of this court as an 
arbiter of legal issues, not as a policymaker.  See, e.g., Cincinnati City School Dist. 
Bd. of Edn. v. Conners, 132 Ohio St.3d 468, 2012-Ohio-2447, 974 N.E.2d 78, ¶ 17; 
Pratte v. Stewart, 125 Ohio St.3d 473, 2010-Ohio-1860, 929 N.E.2d 415, ¶ 54.  To 
overrule Arbino would be to destroy the very foundation on which these decisions 
stand—a fact acknowledged by Brandt’s counsel at oral argument. 
{¶ 96} Furthermore, Arbino was not wrongly decided.  The crux of Brandt’s 
argument is that R.C. 2315.18 violates her right to trial by jury under Article I, 
Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution.  She argues that the statute requires the trial-
court judge to disregard the jury’s noneconomic-damages award, thereby rendering 
her jury award meaningless.  Her argument, however, is based on a 
misunderstanding about the jury’s right to determine damages as a matter of fact 
and the court’s ability to review and modify a damages award as a matter of law. 
{¶ 97} Under Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution, the right to a 
jury trial “shall be inviolate.”  We have determined that the right is fundamental 
and cannot be invaded or violated by legislative act or judicial order.  Shimko v. 
Lobe, 103 Ohio St.3d 59, 2004-Ohio-4202, 813 N.E.2d 669, ¶ 28; Gibbs v. Girard, 
88 Ohio St. 34, 102 N.E. 299 (1913), paragraph two of the syllabus.  But the right 
is limited in that it exists only as it did when the Ohio Constitution was adopted.  
Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc., 155 Ohio St.3d 567, 2018-Ohio-5088, 122 
N.E.3d 1228, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 98} The right to a jury trial applies in this case.  See Kneisley v. Lattimer-
Stevens Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 354, 357, 533 N.E.2d 743 (1988) (Article I, Section 5 
applies to intentional-tort actions).  And the right to a jury trial includes the right to 
have a jury determine all questions of fact, including the amount of damages that 
the plaintiff may be entitled to as result of the injury.  Galayda v. Lake Hosp. Sys., 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
44 
Inc., 71 Ohio St.3d 421, 425, 644 N.E.2d 298 (1994); Sorrell, 69 Ohio St. 3d at 
422, 633 N.E.2d 504 (1994).  However, the jury’s authority to determine the 
damages award at common law has never been unchecked, either by the General 
Assembly or the trial court. 
{¶ 99} The General Assembly has the power to alter the common law, 
which includes limiting the remedies available.  See Ruther v. Kaiser, 134 Ohio 
St.3d 408, 2012-Ohio-5686, 983 N.E.2d 291, ¶ 14 (the legislature has the right to 
determine causes of action recognized under the law); Groch, 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 
2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, at ¶ 150 (the General Assembly can limit 
remedies for injuries under the law).  This power held by the legislature, to limit 
remedies, existed when Article I, Section 5 was adopted.  That fact is made apparent 
when we consider the adoption of Article I, Section 19a of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 100} Article I, Section 19a was adopted in 1912, the same year that 
Article I, Section 5 was amended to allow verdicts that are not unanimous in civil 
jury trials.  Article I, Section 19a of the Ohio Constitution states, “The amount of 
damages recoverable by civil action in the courts for death caused by the wrongful 
act, neglect, or default of another, shall not be limited by law.” (Emphasis added.)  
By its plain language, the provision means that neither the General Assembly nor 
the judiciary may impose a cap on total damages recoverable for wrongful death.  
See Kennedy v. Byers, 107 Ohio St. 90, 96, 140 N.E. 630, 632 (1923).  But the 
provision also supports the conclusion that the General Assembly has the power to 
limit noneconomic damages for tort injuries that do not result in death.  See Gibbon 
v. Young Women’s Christian Assn. of Hamilton, 170 Ohio St. 280, 285, 164 N.E.2d 
563 (1960).  Since Brandt’s claim is not for wrongful death, the General Assembly 
has the right to limit her damages. 
{¶ 101} But even if we do not consider the General Assembly’s right to 
dictate remedies under the common law, R.C. 2315.18 still does not violate the right 
to trial by jury.  It is true that “it is the function of the jury to assess the damages 
January Term, 2022 
 
45 
and, generally, it is not for a trial or appellate court to substitute its judgment for 
that of the trier of fact.”  Villella v. Waikem Motors, Inc., 45 Ohio St.3d 36, 40, 543 
N.E.2d 464 (1989).  But once the jury has resolved the facts and assessed the 
damages in its verdict, the constitutional right is satisfied.  Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 
468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 37; Galayda, 71 Ohio St.3d at 436, 644 
N.E.2d 298  (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).  Therefore, a jury’s damages award is not 
impervious to outside interference after the jury’s duties are complete.  Arbino at  
¶ 35. 
{¶ 102} Prior to the adoption of Article I, Section 5, trial courts commonly 
questioned Ohio jury verdicts. See Hamden Lodge No. 517, Independent Order of 
Odd Fellows v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 127 Ohio St. 469, 481, 189 N.E. 246(1934) 
(“from time immemorial the court has had and exercised the power to regulate the 
jury’s action, at least to the extent of seeing that such action is not wholly 
unreasonable”).  This court, consistent with our precedent, has upheld a trial court’s 
modification of a jury verdict when that verdict cannot be sustained as a matter of 
law.  Indeed, we have upheld remittiturs that reduce a jury’s award when the trial 
court deems the amount excessive based on the facts found by the jury.  See 
Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp., 86 Ohio St.3d 431, 444, 715 N.E.2d 546 (1999) 
(noting, though, that the successful plaintiff must consent to such an order).  And 
we have upheld the constitutionality of a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict prior to the announcement that the court 
could not weigh the evidence.  Likes v. Van Dike, 17 Ohio 454 (1848).  
Additionally, we have not found that awarding a plaintiff double or treble damages 
as required by statute violates the right to trial by jury.  See, e.g., R.C. 319.58 
(double damages awarded to a plaintiff harmed by a person’s use of false weights 
and measures); see also Arbino at ¶ 39 (listing statutes allowing treble damages).  
So long as the trial court does not intrude upon the jury’s findings of fact, the court 
may amend the jury award as a matter of law, whether that is because the verdict is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
46 
not supported by sufficient evidence or because a statute requires it.  Id. at ¶ 37; 
Simpkins, 149 Ohio St.3d 307, 2016-Ohio-8118, 75 N.E.3d 122, at ¶ 24; see also 
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 442, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 
L.Ed.2d 659, (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting);  Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pacific 
RR. Co, 165 U.S. 593, 596, 17 S.Ct. 421, 41 L.Ed. 837 (1897) (so long as the jury 
determines issues of fact and the court determines issues of law, “the procedure by 
which this result shall be reached is wholly within the discretion of the legislature”) 
{¶ 103} Here, the General Assembly determined that caps on noneconomic 
damages in certain situations are necessary, and it enacted R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) to 
change the common law accordingly.  See Stolz, 155 Ohio St.3d 567, 2018-Ohio-
5088, 122 N.E.3d 1228, at ¶ 15.  The General Assembly did not force the trial court 
to invade the province of the jury; it required the trial court to modify the 
noneconomic-damages award only if the jury’s award exceeded a certain amount 
and the plaintiff’s injuries were not those exempted from caps under R.C. 
2315.18(B)(3).  See Galayda at 436 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (the trial court does 
not invade the province of the jury’s fact-finding process when it reduces the 
damages award, because the statute does not apply until after the jury has completed 
its assigned function).  Therefore, the General Assembly’s modification of the 
remedies available for common-law torts in R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) and the trial court’s 
compliance with that provision do not violate the right to a jury trial guaranteed by 
Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 104} This view is not unique.  Other state supreme courts have also 
found that caps on damages are constitutional so long as the jury award is not 
altered as a matter of fact but rather as a matter of law.  See Evans ex rel. Kutch v. 
State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1051 (Alaska 2002); Kirkland ex. Rel. Kirkland v. Blaine Cty. 
Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 464, 467, 4 P.3d 1115 (2000); Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 
342, 372-374, 601 A.2d 102 (1992); McClay v. Airport Mgt. Servs., L.L.C., 596 
S.W.3d 686, 696 (Tenn.2020); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 237 Va. 87, 95, 376 
January Term, 2022 
 
47 
S.E.2d 525 (1989); Horton v. Oregon Health & Science Univ., P.C., 359 Or. 168, 
244-245, 376 P.3d 998; Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Nebraska Methodist Health Sys., 
Inc., 265 Neb. 918, 947, 663 N.W.2d 43 (2003); Tam v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 
131 Nev. 792, 796, 358 P.3d 234 (2015); Judd ex rel. Montgomery v. Drezga, 2004 
UT 91, 103 P.3d 135, ¶ 35; Phillips ex rel. Hervey v. Mirac, Inc., 470 Mich. 415, 
419, 685 N.W.2d 174 (2004); Wright ex rel. Green v. Colleton Cty. School Dist., 
301 S.C. 282, 290, 391 S.E.2d 564 (1990). But see Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, 
P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731, 738, 691 S.E.2d 218 (2010); Hilburn v. Enerpipe 
Ltd., 309 Kan. 1127, 1147, 442 P.3d 509 (2019); Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Assn., 
592 So.2d 156, 164 (Ala.1991); Watts ex rel. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs, 376 
S.W.3d 633, 648 (Mo.2012); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash.2d 636, 638, 
771 P.2d 711 (1989). 
{¶ 105} And though the United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the 
issue, it is likely that it too would conclude that statutory caps on damages awards 
implemented by the court as a matter of law do not violate the right to trial by jury 
under the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  See Arkansas Valley Land 
& Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69, 74,  9 S.Ct. 458, 32 L.Ed. 854 (1889) (court is 
within its authority to set aside excessive verdict and order a new trial); Gasperini, 
518 U.S. at 442, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(precedent supports the conclusion that the right to a jury trial is not violated when 
a trial court reduces an award as a matter of law, whether that be due to a cap on 
damages, an unsupported verdict, or excessiveness); Estate of Sisk v. Manzanares,  
270 F.Supp.2d 1265, 1277-1278 (D.Kan.2003). 
{¶ 106} R.C. 2315.18 does not offend the right to a trial by jury under 
Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution.  Therefore, the Arbino court properly 
applied the rational-basis test to the jury-trial, due-process, and equal-protection 
claims.  We should reject Brandt’s proposition of law challenging this court’s 
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48 
holding in Arbino and reaffirm our holding that R.C. 2315.18 is facially 
constitutional. 
IV. The caps on damages in R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) are not unconstitutional as 
applied to Brandt and similarly situated victims 
{¶ 107} Brandt argues that her reduced noneconomic-damages award 
violates her rights to a jury trial, to open courts, to a remedy, to due process, and to 
equal protection.  To prevail, Brandt must prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that R.C. 2315.18(B)(2)  is unconstitutional when applied to her particular set of 
facts.  Harrold, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, at ¶ 37-38.  
As discussed in the joint dissent, Brandt cannot demonstrate that R.C. 
2315.18(B)(2) violates her right to due process.  And it is also clear that Brandt 
cannot establish that R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) violates her rights to a jury trial, to open 
courts, to a remedy, or to equal protection.  Like the plaintiff in Simpkins, 149 Ohio 
St.3d 307, 2016-Ohio-118, 75 N.E.3d 122, Brandt cannot meet her burden. 
A. Brandt cannot demonstrate that as applied to her circumstances, R.C. 
2315.18(B)(2) violates her right to a jury trial 
{¶ 108} Brandt argues that her right to trial by jury was violated because the 
jury valued her psychological injuries at $20,000,000 and the trial court’s reduction 
of that award to $250,000 pursuant to the statutory cap intrudes on and ignores the 
jury’s fact-finding process and renders it meaningless.  But as discussed earlier, 
R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) does not prevent the jury from determining issues of fact.  Nor 
does it allow the judge to substitute his or her findings for those of the jury.  See 
Simpkins at ¶ 23.  Rather, the General Assembly, through its right to alter the 
common law, requires the trial court to alter the award as a matter of law after the 
jury has rendered its verdict.  Thus, R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) and the trial court’s 
compliance with that statute do not violate Brandt’s right to trial by jury under 
Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution.  Simpkins at ¶ 27; Arbino, 116 Ohio 
St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 37. 
January Term, 2022 
 
49 
B. Brandt cannot demonstrate that as applied to her circumstances, R.C. 
2315.18(B)(2) violates her rights to open courts and to a remedy 
{¶ 109} Brandt argues that R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) violates her right to open 
courts and to a remedy under Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.  Under 
our precedent and understanding of “meaningful remedy,” Brandt cannot 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that her rights to open courts and to 
a remedy has been violated. 
{¶ 110} Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution provides, “All courts 
shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, 
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice 
administered without denial or delay.”  “The constitutional right to a remedy 
‘requires an opportunity granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner.’ ”  Simpkins, 149 Ohio St.3d 307, 2016-Ohio-118, 75 N.E.3d 122, at ¶ 29, 
quoting Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St.3d 45, 47, 512 N.E.2d 626 (1987), 
overruled on other grounds by Ruther, 134 Ohio St.3d 408, 2012-Ohio-5686, 983 
N.E.2d 291.  But a plain reading of the provision “reveals that it does not provide 
for remedies without limitation.”  Ruther at ¶ 12.  Article I, Section 16 prohibits 
“statutes that effectively prevent individuals from pursuing relief for their injuries.”  
Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 44. 
{¶ 111} The General Assembly has a right to alter the common law, whether 
that be by abolishing an action, defining an action, placing a statutory limitation on 
the action, or determining the remedies that may be afforded under an action.  
Ruther at ¶ 14; Groch, 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, at  
¶ 150.  The General Assembly has limited the amount of compensatory 
noneconomic damages that a plaintiff may recover under R.C. 2315.18(B)(2), but 
it has not “wholly den[ied] persons a remedy for their injuries.”  Simpkins at ¶ 30, 
citing Arbino at ¶ 45.  The limit imposed by the General Assembly on noneconomic 
damages is not nominal—R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) caps noneconomic damages at 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
50 
$250,000 in this situation.  Also, there are other remedies available in addition to 
an award of noneconomic damages, like an award for unlimited economic damages 
under R.C. 2315.18(B)(1) and an award for punitive damages under R.C. 2315.21.  
Though a several-million-dollar reduction in Brandt’s noneconomic-damages 
award is significant, we cannot say that an award of $114,250,000—the award 
Brandt would receive once the statutory cap is applied in this case—is not a 
meaningful remedy. 
{¶ 112} Brandt’s complaint is really that the cap in R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) is 
insufficient to compensate her as a minor victim of sexual abuse.  Citing Clarke v. 
Oregon Health Sciences Univ., P.C., 343 Or. 581, 175 P.3d 418, Brandt argues that 
the award is merely an emasculated version of the remedy that was available at 
common law.  In Clarke, the Oregon Supreme Court held that under Oregon’s 
Constitution, the state legislature is free to “modify both the form and measure of 
recovery for an injury, as long as it does not leave the injured party with an 
‘emasculated’ version of the remedy that was available at common law.” Id. at 606; 
see also Horton, 359 Or. at 220, 376 P.3d 998 (“the substantiality of the legislative 
remedy can matter in determining whether the remedy is consistent with the remedy 
clause”).  In Ohio, we have not limited the General Assembly’s right to modify 
damages for torts at common law.  And  our Constitution seems to allow the General 
Assembly to alter the remedies, especially considering Article I, Section 19a.  But 
even if the General Assembly’s ability to modify common-law remedies was 
limited in that it could not substantially modify the award that was available at 
common law, Brandt does not provide any evidence that a monetary award for 
noneconomic damages greater than $250,000 was available at common law. 
{¶ 113} The determination of a meaningful remedy is a policy decision that 
must remain in the purview of the General Assembly.  See Groch, 117 Ohio St.3d 
192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, at ¶ 150; Cleveland v. State, 157 Ohio St.3d 
330, 2019-Ohio-3820, 136 N.E.3d 466, ¶ 40.  R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) does not deny 
January Term, 2022 
 
51 
Brandt a meaningful remedy under the law; it limits one of many available 
remedies, and that limitation does not result in a nominal remedy.  Therefore, 
Brandt cannot demonstrate that R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) violates her rights to open 
courts and to a remedy as guaranteed under Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
C. R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) as applied to Brandt does not violate her right to equal 
protection under Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution 
{¶ 114} Brandt argues that, as applied to her circumstances, R.C. 
2315.18(B)(2) violates her right to equal protection under Article I, Section 2 of the 
Ohio Constitution. This argument too is without merit. 
{¶ 115} Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution guarantees equal 
protection under the laws: “All political power is inherent in the people.  
Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit * * *.”  This clause 
“requires that individuals be treated in a manner similar to others in like 
circumstances.”  McCrone, 107 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-6505, 839 N.E.2d 1, at 
¶ 6. 
{¶ 116} A statutory classification does not violate equal protection if it 
“bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest” and does not 
involve a suspect class or  fundamental right.  Id. at ¶ 8.  Because R.C. 
2315.18(B)(2) does not implicate a fundamental right, because it does not violate 
the right to a jury trial or the rights to open courts and to a remedy, and because 
Brandt does not maintain that R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) affects a suspect class, rational 
basis is the appropriate test.  See Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 
N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 49; McCrone at ¶ 8. 
{¶ 117} To prevail on this claim, Brandt must demonstrate “ ‘either that 
there was no rational basis for the creation of the class itself or that those within the 
class are not being treated equally in the furtherance of a legitimate governmental 
interest.’ ” Simpkins,149 Ohio St.3d 307, 2016-Ohio-8118, 75 N.E.3d 122, at ¶ 48, 
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52 
quoting Morris v. Savoy, 61 Ohio St.3d 684, 691, 576 N.E.2d 765 (1991).  “A 
classification does not fail rational-basis review because it is not made with 
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.”  (Cleaned 
up.)  Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ., 
87 Ohio St.3d 55, 58, 717 N.E.2d 286, 290 (1999).  This court will set aside 
legislative classifications only if they are “ ‘based solely on reasons totally 
unrelated to the pursuit of the State’s goals and only if no grounds can be conceived 
to justify them.’ ”  Simpkins at 48, quoting Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963, 
102 S.Ct. 2836, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982). 
{¶ 118} Brandt argues that R.C. 2315.18(B) creates four classes of persons 
distinguished by their injuries: (1) persons who have suffered catastrophic physical 
injuries, (2) persons who have suffered noncatastrophic physical injuries, (3) 
persons who have suffered catastrophic nonphysical injuries, and (4) persons who 
have suffered noncatastrophic nonphysical injuries.  While Brandt is correct that 
there are four injury classifications, they are not the ones that she lists.  R.C. 
2315.18(B)(3) does not create classes of plaintiffs based on whether they suffered 
“catastrophic injuries.”  The term “catastrophic injury” appears nowhere in the 
statute. 
{¶ 119} Rather, the Arbino court coined the term “catastrophic injury” to 
easily describe the injuries that were exempt from capped damages in R.C. 
2315.18(B)(3). Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at 
¶ 47, 60-61, 72.  And this court further complicated matters in Simpkins when we 
distinguished “catastrophic physical injuries” from “catastrophic nonphysical 
injuries.”  Simpkins at ¶ 41.  The majority opinion continues with this distinction, 
holding that plaintiffs suffering from “catastrophic psychological injuries” are 
wrongfully subjected to the caps on damages in R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) in violation of 
due process. 
January Term, 2022 
 
53 
{¶ 120} While the “catastrophic” distinction was seemingly harmless and 
appeared to be useful when this court decided Arbino and Simpkins, this description 
has led to some confusion and allowed litigants and courts to reframe the injuries 
described in R.C. 2315.18(B)(3) in a manner that the General Assembly did not 
adopt.  See Poteet v. MacMillan, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2021-08-071, 2022-
Ohio-876, ¶ 17; Torres v. Concrete Designs, Inc., 2019-Ohio-1342, 134 N.E.3d 
903, ¶ 77 (8th Dist.) (using Arbino’s description of injuries as “catastrophic” to 
inform its view of “permanent and substantial physical deformity” in the context of 
R.C. 2315.18(B)(3)).  The use of the term “catastrophic” has wrongly encouraged 
litigants and courts to place their own value judgments on plaintiffs’ injuries instead 
of following the language in the statute. 
{¶ 121} The fault is our own.  By using the term “catastrophic” to 
characterize the types of injuries exempted from the caps on damages, we placed 
words in the statutory scheme that do not appear there and reinforced the wrong 
idea that “catastrophic” is an element of the injuries listed in R.C. 2315.18(B)(3).  
Because “catastrophic” appears nowhere in the statute, the “catastrophic” 
distinction should not be used or developed further. 
{¶ 122} We must return to the plain language of the statute.  The exceptions 
to limits on noneconomic compensatory damages in R.C. 2315.18(B)(3) apply to a 
person who has sustained (1) an injury resulting in “[p]ermanent and substantial 
physical deformity,” (2) an injury resulting in “loss of use of a limb,” (3) an injury 
resulting in “loss of a bodily organ system,” or (4) a “[p]ermanent physical 
functional injury that permanently prevents the injured person from being able to 
independently care for self and perform life-sustaining activities.”  Anyone who 
experiences one of these four types of injuries is exempt from the noneconomic-
damages caps.  See R.C. 2315.18(B)(3).  Anyone who has not experienced one of 
these types of injuries is not so exempt.  R.C. 2315.18(B)(2).  And it must be 
emphasized again that the “classification remains the same regardless of the age of 
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54 
the victim and the nature of [the] tort.”  Joint dissenting opinion, ¶ 67.  R.C. 2315.18 
does not treat Brandt nor other victims of sexual assault differently from other tort 
victims who do not suffer from one of the four types of injuries listed above. 
{¶ 123} As discussed in the joint dissent, a minor victim of sexual assault 
might reasonably fall into one of these categories.  And contrary to the majority 
opinion’s argument, it is not that mental health is not considered in the statute—an 
exemption for it is just not as obviously available and easy to obtain.  “The General 
Assembly had a substantial interest in protecting our civil-justice system and our 
economy when it enacted the statue that set a cap on noneconomic damages as a 
means to limit the awards for injuries that are either difficult to prove or the extent 
of which is difficult to quantify without evidence of some physical component.  
This is a reasonable and legitimate government interest, and the General Assembly 
has not arbitrarily selected winners and losers under the statute.”  Joint dissenting 
opinion at ¶ 69.  Indeed, Brandt may have fallen into one of the exempted categories 
of injuries due to her mental illnesses—had she made the argument.  See, e.g., 
Ozmun v. Customer Engineering Servs., L.L.C., Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV 14 824745, 
2015 WL 13238578 (July 31, 2015) (allowing the jury to determine whether the 
damages cap applied after a plaintiff offered an expert report finding that her 
posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) was a physical, functional injury because it 
caused physical harm, including brain-cell damage and atrophy to the hippocampal 
gyrus and other areas of the brain). 
{¶ 124} Thus, Brandt cannot demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence 
that her capped damages award violated equal protection, because R.C. 
2315.18(B)(2) serves a legitimate governmental interest and there was a rational 
basis for the creation of the two classes—victims who fall into one of the four 
categories under R.C. 2315.18(B)(3) and those who do not. 
 
 
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55 
D. The majority opinion’s due-process analysis is wrong and will cause chaos in 
our judicial system 
{¶ 125} I agree fully with the joint dissent that the majority opinion is wrong 
in both its due-process analysis and its holding that the cap on noneconomic 
damages under R.C. 2315.18 as applied to Brandt is unconstitutional.  And the 
majority opinion’s misinterpretation of our due-process jurisprudence is not only 
wrong, it creates chaos within our judicial system. 
{¶ 126} The majority opinion’s holding in this case applies not only to 
Brandt but to similarly situated victims.  But that holding cannot be construed as a 
blanket prohibition against caps on damages for all minor sex-abuse victims.  
Rather, those victims will have to demonstrate that they are “similarly situated” to 
Brandt and her “extremely uncommon” case.  Majority opinion, ¶ 34.  This will 
prove to be difficult, especially considering this court’s holding in Simpkins, 149 
Ohio St.3d 307, 2016-Ohio-8118, 75 N.E.3d 122, in which this court held that caps 
on damages were constitutional as applied to a different minor victim of sexual 
assault; this court had rejected Simpkins’s as-applied due-process challenge to R.C. 
2315.18—the same argument that was raised by Brandt in this case.  See Simpkins 
at ¶ 1.  Under the majority opinion’s decision here, courts are now left to compare 
whether a child victim is more similar to Simpkins, a 15-year-old girl who was 
raped by her pastor during two counseling sessions at her church, or to Brandt, a 
girl who, between the ages of 11 and 12, was raped numerous times by her friend’s 
father while she was drugged or asleep at his home. 
{¶ 127} Courts may ask: Did the victim have PTSD, anxiety, depression, 
trust issues with men, nightmares, and fear of the dark like Simpkins?  Or did the 
victim have PTSD, anxiety, nightmares, difficulties sleeping, and agoraphobia like 
Brandt?   Did the victim graduate high school, engage in sports, do well in college, 
and have a job, like Simpkins?  Or did the victim graduate high school, have a job, 
get an apartment, but lose everything after falling victim to drug abuse and 
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addiction, which led to a suicide attempt and homelessness, like Brandt?  Do we 
need to consider the victim’s suffering in light of when the abuse occurred and 
when the tort action was pursued in order to better understand the victim’s injuries 
and responses?  Does it matter that a victim has had more time to reflect on how 
the abuse has affected his or her life?   If this process seems difficult, that’s because 
it is.  And this analysis will become ever more difficult as time goes on and more 
child-abuse cases are plotted on this arbitrary grid created by the majority opinion. 
{¶ 128} The majority opinion, through its due-process analysis, forces trial 
courts to engage in their own policy and value determinations in analyzing whether 
a victim has suffered “catastrophic psychological injuries,” a term not even used in 
the statutory scheme.  Then the majority opinion requires trial courts to compare 
abuse horror stories to determine whether the victim is relieved from caps on 
damages.  This nightmare could have been avoided had the majority opinion simply 
applied the objective constitutional analysis that was used in Simpkins and left these 
policy considerations for the General Assembly. 
V. Conclusion 
{¶ 129} Should the General Assembly revisit its decision to cap damage 
awards, especially in cases like Brandt’s?  Perhaps.  But it is not the role of this 
court to rewrite statutes or make judicial decisions based on our preferred policy 
preference.  As the late United States Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
stated, “Judges must be mindful of what their place is in this system and must 
always remember that we live in a democracy that can be destroyed if judges take 
it upon themselves to rule as Platonic guardians.”  Schweitzer, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Wise Legal Giant, 37 Touro L.Rev. 533, 537 (2021).  The majority 
opinion clearly does not heed these wise words. 
{¶ 130} If the cap on damages awards is to be modified or eliminated, it 
should be done through one of the mechanisms supported by our Constitution, like 
January Term, 2022 
 
57 
legislative amendment, legislative referendum, or constitutional referendum.  It 
should not be modified in the manner chosen by the majority opinion today. 
{¶ 131} Because Brandt cannot demonstrate that R.C. 2315.18 is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied to her, this court should hold that the cap 
on her noneconomic-damages award is constitutional.  Because it does not do so, I 
must respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 132} In addition, over my objection, the court did not follow the regular 
and orderly internal rules of operation and practice in this case due to others’ 
seeming concerns about voting on any motion for reconsideration.  Hence, my time 
on this case was aberrantly and improperly limited.  Thus, I most humbly apologize 
to the citizens of Ohio that my individual dissent is not of the quality that I have 
come to deliver and that the public expects.  This case involves many constitutional 
issues that deserve to be more completely analyzed and debated so that they may 
be resolved appropriately.  The litigants deserve full and fair consideration of their 
case, which has been shortchanged here.  We should do better. 
_________________ 
The Fitch Law Firm, John K. Fitch, and Kirstin A. Peterson; Taft, Stettinius 
& Hollister, L.L.P., and Stephen C. Fitch; and Center for Constitutional Litigation, 
P.C., and Robert S. Peck, for appellant. 
Zeiger, Tigges & Little, L.L.P., John W. Zeiger, Marion H. Little Jr., and 
Francesca R. Boland, for appellee. 
Rittgers & Rittgers and Konrad Kircher, urging reversal for amici curiae 
Child USA, Ohio Crime Victim Justice Center, Coalition for Children, and Crime 
Victims Center, Inc. 
The Law Offices of Pamela J. Miller and Pamela J. Miller, urging reversal 
for amicus curiae American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
58 
Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., Louis E. Grube, and Paul W. Flowers; and 
Cooper & Elliott, L.L.C., and Charles H. Cooper Jr., urging reversal for amici 
curiae Ohio Association for Justice and American Association for Justice. 
Camille M. Crary, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Alliance to End 
Sexual Violence. 
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, and 
Cary Silverman, urging affirmance for amici curiae Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States of America, NFIB Small Business Legal Center, American Tort 
Reform Association, Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., and American Property 
Casualty Insurance Association. 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., Frank C. Woodside III, Peter J. Georgiton, and 
Brady R. Wilson, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Product Liability Advisory 
Counsel, Inc. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, and 
Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost. 
Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P., Jason J. Blake, and Gretchen L. 
Whaling, urging affirmance for amicus curiae David Goodman, former chairman 
of the Ohio Senate Judiciary Committee for Civil Justice. 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Anne Marie Sferra, and Daniel C. Gibson, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Alliance for Civil Justice. 
Tucker Ellis, L.L.P., Benjamin C. Sassé, and Elisabeth C. Arko, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
_________________