Case Title: State v. Gary L. Kluck

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1995AP002238-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-2238-CR, 95-2239-CR, 95-2240-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Gary L. Kluck, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURTH OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  200 Wis. 2d 837, 548 N.W.2d 97 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 6, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 8, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael W. Hoover 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Daniel J. O'Brien, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and 
oral argument by Keith A. Findley, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
 
No.  17050.rtf-CR 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-2238-CR, 95-2239-CR, and 95-2240-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Gary L. Kluck, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 6, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   The State of Wisconsin 
(State) seeks review of a court of appeals’ decision which 
reversed an order denying Gary L. Kluck’s (Kluck) motion to 
modify his 16 month county jail sentence.  State v. Kluck, 200 
Wis. 2d 837, 548 N.W.2d 97 (Ct. App. 1996).  The issue is 
whether a defendant’s four month period of sobriety while out on 
bail pending appeal of a misdemeanor conviction is a “new 
factor” authorizing the circuit court to modify the defendant’s 
county jail sentence.  We hold that it is not.  Accordingly, we 
reverse. 
 
 
No.  17050.rtf-CR 
 
 
2 
¶2 
This case consists of three consolidated cases.  The 
underlying facts, derived from the record, are as follows:  On 
December 27, 1992, police were sent to the home of Kluck and his 
wife, Rose Kluck (Ms. Kluck) on a domestic battery call.  When 
officers arrived at the Kluck home, Ms. Kluck and nine-year-old 
Patrick Kluck (Patrick) accused the defendant of flying into a 
drunken rage and hitting Patrick, causing him to fall and injure 
his neck.  Ms. Kluck also accused Kluck of punching her in the 
face, pushing her into the bedroom door, and trying to “smash” 
her.  Patrick and eleven-year-old Gary Kluck, Jr. (Gary Jr.) 
confirmed their mother’s statement.  Consequently, Kluck was 
arrested and charged with two counts of disorderly conduct. 
¶3 
On August 27, 1993, Marathon County Police were again 
called to Ms. Kluck’s home.  Kluck was free on bond pending 
trial for the December 27, 1992, disorderly conduct charges.  
One of the conditions of his bond was that he have no contact 
with Ms. Kluck.  Nonetheless, when officers arrived at the home, 
Kluck was there.  The officers spoke with Kluck’s two young 
sons.  Patrick complained that a very inebriated Kluck had 
shoved him and punched him in the right eye with a closed fist. 
 In his statement to the police, Patrick explained: 
 
This isn’t the first time my dad has punched me or 
pushed me around, he has done it quite a few times.  
Most of the time it is because he has been drinking.   
Patrick told the officer that his mother tried to protect him.  
Gary Jr. confirmed Patrick’s statement.  When asked how he knew 
his father was drunk, Gary Jr. replied that his father had 
trouble keeping his balance, he slurred his speech, and he got 
the identities of the boys confused.  Consequently, Kluck was 
 
 
No.  17050.rtf-CR 
 
 
3 
arrested 
and 
charged 
with 
misdemeanor 
battery 
and 
bail 
violation. 
¶4 
On January 11, 1994, while Kluck was still out on 
bond, and still under the bond condition that he have no contact 
with Ms. Kluck, a social worker for Marathon County observed Mr. 
and Mrs. Kluck together and contacted the district attorney’s 
office.  Consequently, Kluck was charged with misdemeanor bail 
violation. 
¶5 
Kluck pled no contest and was convicted and sentenced 
on February 1, 1994, for all five of the above stated charges.  
The Circuit Court for Marathon County, Judge Michael W. Hoover, 
presiding, withheld sentence and imposed probation. 
¶6 
On February 2, 1995, Kluck was arrested after the 
police were called to his home for a disturbing the peace 
complaint.  On February 9, 1995, Kluck’s probation agent issued 
a notice of probation violation recommending revocation of 
Kluck’s probation 
for 
the 
following 
violations: 
consuming 
alcohol; failure to report to his probation agent; showing up at 
his AODA appointment intoxicated; failing to show up at his AODA 
appointment; and leaving Marathon County without his probation 
agent’s approval.  Kluck’s probation was revoked. 
¶7 
Sentencing after probation revocation occurred on 
February 23, 1995.  At this sentencing, Judge Hoover observed 
that Kluck’s unlawful actions were in large part the product of 
his alcoholism and his continued refusal to acknowledge his 
disease.  After imposing an aggregate sentence of 16 months in 
county jail for the three convictions, the judge granted Kluck 
 
 
No.  17050.rtf-CR 
 
 
4 
Huber privileges, but ordered him to serve the first three 
months of his sentence without Huber.  Judge Hoover explained: 
 
[P]rimarily I think the driving force here is to give 
Mr. Kluck long enough not only to punish him in just 
measure for his conduct, but also long enough for him 
to have plenty of time to think about his situation 
and why he is in . . . that situation. 
Kluck remained in jail until March 28, 1995, when the circuit 
court granted him bail pending appeal. 
¶8 
On July 12, 1995, Kluck filed a post-conviction motion 
for sentence modification.  Kluck claimed that upon his release 
from 
jail 
he 
began 
full-time 
work; 
attended 
his 
status 
conference before the court; and stopped drinking alcohol.   He 
asked the circuit court to consider these changes as a “new 
factor” for purposes of sentence modification.  Accordingly, he 
asked the court to reduce his jail sentence from 16 to 12 
months. 
¶9 
At the hearing on the post-conviction motion, the 
circuit court acknowledged that it was “very impressed by Mr. 
Kluck’s apparent improvement.”  Nonetheless, the court denied 
Kluck’s 
modification 
motion, 
concluding 
that 
a 
person’s 
improvement after sentencing is not a legal basis upon which to 
modify a sentence.  The court of appeals, concluding that 
“rehabilitation” 
is 
a 
new 
factor 
justifying 
a 
sentence 
modification, 
reversed 
and 
remanded 
for 
a 
new 
sentence 
modification hearing. 
¶10 This case presents one issue: whether a defendant’s 
four month period of sobriety while out on bail pending appeal 
of his misdemeanor conviction is a “new factor” authorizing the 
circuit court to modify his county jail sentence.   
 
 
No.  17050.rtf-CR 
 
 
5 
¶11 Whether a set of facts is a new factor is a question 
of law which this court reviews without deference to the circuit 
court.  State v. Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 434 N.W.2d 609 
(1989).  
¶12 The issue presented involves the power of the circuit 
court to modify a valid sentence.  It is well established that a 
circuit court has inherent power to modify a previously imposed 
sentence after the sentence has commenced.  State v. Wuensch, 69 
Wis. 2d 467, 472-73, 230 N.W.2d 665 (1975).  However, the 
circuit court cannot modify a sentence on reflection alone or 
simply because it has thought the matter over and has second 
thoughts.  State v. Macemon, 113 Wis. 2d 662, 668, 335 N.W.2d 
402 (1983).  The court must base its modification on a “new 
factor.”  Id. 
¶13 The term “new factor” refers to a fact or set of facts 
highly relevant to the imposition of sentence, but not known to 
the trial judge at the time of original sentencing, either 
because it was not then in existence or because, even though it 
was then in existence, it was unknowingly overlooked by all of 
the parties.
1  Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 288, 234 N.W.2d 
                     
1 The “new factor” requirement originates from section 
6.1(a) of the American Bar Association’s Standards Relating to 
Sentencing 
Alternatives 
and 
Procedures 
which 
provides 
as 
follows: 
 
6.1  Authority to reduce: general.   
(a) 
 
It 
may 
be 
appropriate 
to 
authorized 
the 
sentencing court to reduce or modify a sentence within 
a specified time after its imposition or the final 
resolution of an appeal if new factors bearing on the 
sentence are made known. . . .(footnote omitted). 
 
 
 
No.  17050.rtf-CR 
 
 
6 
69 (1975).  In applying the new factor test, this court has 
never expressly distinguished county jail sentences from prison 
sentences. 
¶14 In a series of cases involving prison sentences, 
courts of this state have repeatedly held that rehabilitation is 
not a “new factor” for purposes of sentence modification.  Jones 
(Hollis), 70 Wis. 2d at 72; State v. Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 467, 
477, 230 N.W.2d 665 (1975).  See also State v. Ambrose, 181 Wis. 
2d 234, 510 N.W.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Kaster, 148 
Wis. 2d 789, 436 N.W.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Prince, 
147 Wis. 2d 134, 432 N.W.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. 
Krueger, 119 Wis. 2d 327, 351 N.W.2d 738 (Ct. App. 1984).  In 
these 
cases, 
the 
court 
held 
that 
information 
concerning 
rehabilitation cannot be a new factor for sentence modification; 
it reasoned that consideration of such information is more 
properly considered by the parole system. See, e.g., Jones 
(Hollis), 70 Wis. 2d at 72; Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d at 478.  
Although defendants serving a county jail sentence are not 
within the purview of the parole system, when asked to find that 
post-sentencing rehabilitation is a “new factor” in the case of 
a defendant sentenced to county jail, this court did not do so. 
 State v. Johnston, 184 Wis. 2d 794, 823, 518 N.W.2d 759 (1994). 
¶15 Kluck argues that the rule that rehabilitation is not 
a new factor for sentence modification purposes should only 
apply to prison and not county jail sentences.  He contends that 
                                                                  
This court adopted section 6.1 in State v. Foellmi, 57 Wis. 
2d 572, 581, 205 N.W.2d 144 (1973) overruled on other grounds by 
Korpela v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 697, 218 N.W.2d 368 (1974).. 
 
 
No.  17050.rtf-CR 
 
 
7 
a rule allowing circuit courts to modify county jail sentences 
based on post-sentencing conduct would create an incentive for 
defendants on bail to modify their behavior and make strides 
toward rehabilitation.  He further argues that the present rule 
cannot logically extend to jail sentences, because jailed 
defendants have no recourse to the parole system, or anything 
equivalent to the parole system.  We reject Kluck’s arguments. 
¶16 While encouraging rehabilitation is laudable, it is 
not the purpose of sentence modification.  The purpose of 
sentence modification is to correct “unjust sentences.”  Hayes 
v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 105, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970).  This court 
has flatly rejected the practice of using sentence modification 
as a method to encourage rehabilitation.  In Wuensch, the court 
renounced the practice of first imposing a long sentence in 
order to “shock” a defendant into rehabilitation and then, if 
this 
“shock 
treatment” 
creates 
the 
desired 
effect 
of 
rehabilitation, modifying the sentence.  Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d at 
479.  In this case, the circuit court imposed a long sentence to 
give Kluck “plenty of time to think about his situation.”  
Perhaps this long sentence “shocked” Kluck into rehabilitation. 
 But that is not relevant to sentence modification. 
¶17 Kluck also argues that the present rule cannot 
logically extend to county jail sentences, because jailed 
defendants have no recourse to the parole system, or anything 
equivalent to the parole system.  Kluck correctly states that 
defendants in county jail do not have recourse to the parole 
system.  However, the judge who sentences a defendant to county 
 
 
No.  17050.rtf-CR 
 
 
8 
jail does have the means to fashion a sentence that will take 
into account a defendant’s successful rehabilitation. 
¶18 One of these means is probation.  If the circuit court 
orders probation at sentencing, it has the authority to modify 
the terms and conditions of probation at any time.  Wis. Stat. § 
973.09(3)(a)(1993-94).  Probation modification provides the 
circuit 
court 
with 
a 
means 
of 
rewarding 
post-sentencing 
rehabilitation without modifying the sentence.   
¶19 Huber privileges are another means by which the 
circuit court can recognize rehabilitative progress.  These 
privileges allow persons sentenced to jail to leave the jail for 
several purposes, including employment and childcare.  Wis. 
Stat. § 303.08(1993-94).  A defendant may petition the court for 
Huber privileges “at the time of sentence or thereafter.”  
§ 303.08(2).  
¶20 Jailed defendants with good post-sentencing conduct 
are also entitled to earn “good time” - a reduction of one-
fourth of his or her sentence - for good behavior while serving 
the sentence.  Wis. Stats. § 302.43(1993-94).  “Good time” is a 
means, built into the system by the legislature, for providing 
an incentive for good conduct to jailed defendants. 
¶21 In sum, the legislature has provided several means by 
which post-sentencing good conduct by defendants in county jail 
is recognized and rewarded.  
¶22 Finally, we note that it flies in the face of reason 
and logic to modify a sentence that is achieving its purpose.  
Kluck’s alcoholism and his failure to recognize his drinking 
problem were both factors considered by the circuit court when 
 
 
No.  17050.rtf-CR 
 
 
9 
it sentenced him.  The 16 month sentence was selected by the 
court in part to encourage Kluck to recognize his alcoholism and 
quit drinking.  Assuming that Kluck’s post-sentencing sobriety 
indicates that he is making rehabilitative progress, the 
sentence is achieving its purpose. As the circuit court noted at 
the sentence modification hearing:  
 
The business of talking about Mr. Kluck’s sobriety as 
a 
new 
factor 
is 
. 
. 
. 
simply 
pointing 
out 
rehabilitative progress, which is what the court 
attempted to achieve in imposing the sentence as 
originally structured.  Mr. Kluck earned the sentence 
that he got based upon his past behavior, and the 
whole purpose of the sentence that was imposed was to 
hopefully bring him to the point of rehabilitation 
that he claims to have now have [sic] achieved. 
¶23 In sum, the legal system provides several means by 
which the rehabilitative behavior of jailed defendants is 
recognized.  Policy does not dictate modifying a sentence that 
is successfully achieving rehabilitation.  Accordingly, we hold 
that a four month period of sobriety while out on bail pending 
appeal of a conviction is not a “new factor” authorizing the 
circuit court to modify the defendant’s county jail sentence.  
We reverse. 
¶24 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
No.  17050.rtf-CR 
 
 
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