Case Title: In re Long

Citation: 

Docket Number: S249274

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2020-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re KIMBERLY LOUISE LONG 
on Habeas Corpus. 
 
S249274 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Two 
E066388 
 
Riverside County Superior Court 
RIF113354 
 
 
November 30, 2020 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, Groban and Franson*  concurred. 
 
 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
In re LONG 
S249274 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Petitioner Kimberly Louise Long filed an original habeas 
corpus petition in this court seeking relief from a 2005 
conviction for second degree murder of her boyfriend, Oswaldo 
Conde, for which Long was sentenced to prison for 15 years to 
life.  In 2015, upon finding that Long’s petition established a 
prima facie case for relief, we issued an order to show cause 
before the Riverside County Superior Court as to “why trial 
counsel was not ineffective in his failure to:  consult a time of 
death expert, investigate DNA evidence, present evidence 
petitioner did not change her clothes, and present evidence of 
the victim’s application for a restraining order, and why 
petitioner is not actually innocent of the crime as petitioner 
claims in [various] grounds.” 
Long was convicted by a jury after an earlier jury trial had 
ended in a mistrial.  In adjudicating Long’s habeas corpus 
petition, Judge Patrick Magers, who had presided over both of 
Long’s trials, held an evidentiary hearing over several days, 
adjudicated factual disputes, and ultimately found that Long’s 
trial counsel rendered objectively deficient performance that 
prejudiced Long’s case.  The court granted Long’s petition, 
vacated her conviction, ordered a new trial, and released her on 
a $50,000 bond.  The Court of Appeal reversed and reinstated 
her conviction.  We now reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal on the ground that trial counsel’s failure to investigate 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
the victim’s time of death was objectively unreasonable and 
prejudicial to Long’s defense. 
I. 
At the close of Long’s first trial, nine jurors favored 
acquittal and three favored guilt, and the court declared a 
mistrial.  Long’s second trial took place in December 2005 and 
resulted in her conviction.  The following facts were shown at 
the second trial. 
On October 5, 2003, Long spent the day with Conde, their 
friend Jeffrey Dills, and others riding their motorcycles and 
drinking at various bars.  Long had approximately 12 beers and 
10 shots of hard liquor that day.  The others had also been 
drinking.  At some point, an argument between Long and Conde 
escalated into a physical altercation when the two of them, along 
with Dills, returned to the couple’s home that evening in Corona.  
According to Dills, Long accused Conde of “not paying his share 
and being a loser and not having a job.” 
Long and Dills left sometime between 11:00 p.m. and 
midnight and went to Dills’s home about 2.5 miles away.  There, 
Dills and Long spent time in a jacuzzi, then moved to the 
bedroom and had oral sex.  At some point, Long told Dills she 
had to return home because her ex-husband was supposed to 
drop off her child. 
Dills informed police that he dropped Long off at her home 
around 1:20 or 1:25 a.m.  Dills then returned to his own home; 
he recalled seeing his alarm clock by his bedside at 1:36 a.m.   
Long disputed this, testifying that she was dropped off by Dills 
around 2:00 a.m. 
At 2:09 a.m., Long called 911 and said:  “Oh my god 
something happened to my husband. . . .  I just came home.  He’s 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
bloody.  I don’t know what’s going on.  He’s still breathing.  
Something’s wrong.”  She hung up and then called 911 again.  
During the second call, Long said she was an emergency room 
nurse but added, “I can’t give him medical attention.  
Something’s wrong with him.” 
Police officers Jeffrey Glenn and Edward Hurtado were 
dispatched to the scene at 2:10 a.m.  They arrived three to four 
minutes later and found Long waiting in the middle of the 
street, distraught.  When they entered the home, they found 
Conde slumped over the couch with his feet on the floor, and 
they saw blood on the walls.  Hurtado checked Conde’s body for 
a pulse and found none.  When Hurtado touched Conde’s neck, 
a blood bubble burst in Conde’s mouth. 
Paramedics arrived at 2:20 a.m.  They confirmed Conde 
had no pulse and observed evidence of trauma to the right and 
back of Conde’s head.  The paramedics noted that Conde’s 
wound was not actively bleeding and that his blood had already 
coagulated.  They described Conde’s skin as “pale or ashen” and 
“cold” to the touch.  Lividity, or skin discoloration resulting from 
internal pooling of blood, was present on the back of Conde’s 
arms and the left side of his face.  They also observed rigidity, 
or rigor mortis, in Conde’s arms. 
At 5:03 a.m., Deputy Coroner Richard Gomes arrived.  
Gomes inspected Conde’s body and noted in his report:  “Rigor 
had not started.  Lividity was almost fixed, with medium 
discoloration, and consistent with his position.”  On the morning 
of October 7, Dr. Joseph Pestaner performed an autopsy and 
noted in his report that “[r]igor mortis is mild to moderate and 
symmetric.  Livor mortis is fixed on the posterior aspect of the 
body.”  The coroner ultimately determined the cause of death 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
was blunt force injuries to the head.  Based on the autopsy 
report and photographs, a pathologist testified that Conde had 
been hit with a blunt weapon three to eight times and that an 
injury of that nature would have resulted in Conde’s death 
within 10 to 15 minutes. 
A forensic technician observed blood evidence 360 degrees 
around Conde’s body, including castoff on all four walls.  Police 
noticed broken glass in the kitchen and saw that the sliding 
glass door from the kitchen to the back yard was open.  A 
shotgun and shotgun shells were missing from a closet, as were 
a bowl of change and a stereo from the living room.  
Investigators found no evidence of an attempt to clean up the 
house, no sign of the murder weapon, no blood anywhere else in 
the house, and nothing to suggest the sinks or showers had been 
recently used.  Officers searched the area, but they did not 
recover the murder weapon, any bloody clothing, or other 
evidence linked to the crime. 
Corona police officers interviewed Long at the station.  
According to Long, she stayed at Dills’s house for “an hour and 
a half, two hours” but could not recall exactly when she arrived 
home.  When she arrived home, she noticed that the front door 
was unlocked.  She walked into the home and saw Conde was on 
the couch in the living room.  Given the blood, she initially 
thought he had gotten into a fight.  Long said that Conde was 
“gurgling,” so she believed he was still alive and breathing.  Only 
after he remained inert did Long realize something was wrong.  
She turned on the lights and saw he was gravely injured.  She 
told the police that she called 911 less than 10 minutes after 
arriving home, ran around the house screaming, hung up on 
911, ran outside, and called 911 again.  In a second interview on 
October 9, Long told officers that she suspected Conde’s ex-
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
girlfriend Shiana Lovejoy murdered Conde because Lovejoy had 
repeatedly threatened Long and Conde. 
The victim’s brother told law enforcement that on the 
Monday before Conde was killed, Lovejoy had threatened to 
“slice their throats” (referring to Long and Conde) and that 
Lovejoy’s behavior had gotten “pretty bad” in the weeks before 
Conde’s murder.  Two weeks before Conde’s death, Lovejoy sent 
a letter to Long claiming that she (Lovejoy) was still 
romantically involved with Conde and calling Long a “whore” 
and Conde a “broke mother fucker.”  Lovejoy repeatedly called 
Long and Conde and left harassing voicemails.  Long and Conde 
reported these calls to the police and changed their phone 
number in response.  Lovejoy also defaced Conde’s white truck 
with the phrase “asshole & deadbeat” while it was parked at 
Long’s house and put glue in the keyhole of his truck so he could 
not open the door. 
A week before his death, Conde sought a restraining order 
against Lovejoy and orders regarding custody and visitation of 
their son.  In the application, Conde wrote that Lovejoy “called 
and said that my girlfriend [Long] is going to get it and for me 
to watch my back,” and that Lovejoy “hates my girlfriend, and 
she is going to ruin our lives.”  His request for a temporary 
restraining order was denied, but the court set a hearing on 
Conde’s permanent restraining order application for October 20.  
On the same day Conde sought a restraining order against 
Lovejoy, Lovejoy filed a paternity suit against Conde.  A few 
days before Conde’s murder, Lovejoy filed a competing child 
custody application.  After Conde’s death, Lovejoy received 
Social Security payments on behalf of their son.   
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
Lovejoy told police that on the night of Conde’s murder, 
she had dinner at T.G.I. Friday’s with Oscar Castaneda, whom 
she was dating at the time, and then went to the Days Inn in 
Whittier where they paid cash for a room and stayed until 
around 1:30 a.m.  Police confirmed Castaneda’s credit card was 
used at the restaurant at 10:24 p.m.  The Days Inn manager on 
duty that night recognized a photo of Castaneda but had no 
recollection of Castaneda at the motel that evening, and there 
was no computer record of their stay.  Lovejoy’s mother was 
babysitting that night and told officers that Lovejoy arrived 
home in Anaheim around 1:30 a.m. 
In a police interview, Lovejoy said she had a great 
relationship with Conde until the last six months, when he 
moved in with Long.  Lovejoy admitted that she lied to the police 
when they visited her house to investigate the vandalism of 
Conde’s truck. 
Long’s ex-husband, Joe Bugarski, was also investigated as 
a potential suspect.  Long and Bugarski married in 1999 or 2000 
and had a son.  Bugarski described two incidents in which he 
said Long was physically violent with him.  According to a police 
report, the second of those incidents, in June 2000, resulted in 
Bugarski’s arrest for domestic violence.  During that incident, 
Bugarski held a butter knife to Long’s throat and threatened to 
kill her.  In March 2003, Long kicked Bugarski out of the house 
and ended their marriage.  On occasion, Long allowed Bugarski 
to stay at her home to watch their son when Long worked the 
graveyard shift.  Bugarski installed a spy camera in Long’s 
bedroom and a voice-activated tape recorder under her bed 
because he suspected Long was intimately involved with Conde.  
Bugarski threatened to “kick [Conde’s] ass” and told Long’s 
mother he wanted to kill Conde.  He occasionally stalked Long 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
“around town,” and about a month before Conde’s murder, he 
spied on Long and Conde at their home, which prompted a 
neighbor to call 911. 
On the night of October 5, Bugarski was supposed to visit 
Long’s home around 9:00 p.m. to drop off their son, but he left a 
message on Long’s phone at 7:30 p.m. saying their son did not 
want to go and would stay with Bugarski that night.  Long called 
back between 8:00 to 9:00 p.m. and told Bugarski that was fine 
because she could not be home that night.  Bugarski said he and 
his son stayed at the home of Bugarski’s girlfriend, Chelsea 
Murray, that night and fell asleep on Murray’s bunkbed 
between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m.  Murray told police she fell asleep 
around 10:00 p.m. and awoke at 5:00 a.m. to Bugarski’s cell 
phone vibrating. 
On October 22, police officers interviewed Alejandro and 
Juanita Sandoval, who lived next door to Long and Conde, and 
Phillip Virga, who lived across the street.  Alejandro 
remembered waking up around 12:00 a.m. to the sound of a 
motorcycle engine revving multiple times from inside his 
neighbor’s garage.  He told police he did not hear any voices at 
that time.  Alejandro went back to sleep and woke up again 
briefly when he heard Long’s car alarm around 2:00 a.m.   
Juanita believed she heard Conde attempting to start his 
motorcycle inside his garage at 1:30 a.m.  The motorcycle stalled 
multiple times, and she recalled hearing someone yelling “fuck” 
and “shit” loudly at the motorcycle.  Based on the engine’s 
noises, she believed Conde left home on his bike and returned 
around 1:45 a.m.  Around 2:00 a.m., Juanita also heard Long’s 
car alarm for “a little while.” 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
Virga told officers that he went out for dinner with his 
family and spotted two motorcycles parked in front of Long and 
Conde’s house around 8:00 p.m. on October 5.  By the time Virga 
returned at 9:30 or 9:45 p.m., the motorcycles were gone.  Virga 
was awakened around 11:50 p.m. to the sound of a motorcycle’s 
roaring engine from inside the couple’s garage.  He thought he 
heard a muffled female’s voice inside the garage.  Virga fell 
asleep and woke up again around 12:10 a.m. to the sound of a 
motorcycle engine and a female voice.  Around 1:20 a.m., he 
heard the sound of a motorcycle driving past.  Virga woke up 
again around 2:00 a.m. when he heard Long’s car alarm go off.   
Dills died unexpectedly before trial, so his preliminary 
hearing testimony was admitted.  Dills testified that he dropped 
off Long at her home at 1:20 to 1:25 a.m. and drove back to his 
own home by 1:36 a.m. on the night of Conde’s murder.  Because 
Dills was the only person who saw Long after midnight, the 
prosecution at trial used his preliminary hearing testimony to 
establish a timeline for the crime, with Long arriving home 
around 1:20 a.m. and mortally wounding Conde some time 
before her call to 911 at 2:09 a.m.   
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Long 
arrived home intoxicated around 1:20 a.m., killed Conde, 
disposed of the murder weapon, and cleaned herself and the 
scene before calling 911 at 2:09 a.m.  No physical or other direct 
evidence connected Long to Conde’s killing.  The jury found Long 
guilty of second degree murder.  On February 24, 2006, Long 
was sentenced to a prison term of 15 years to life.   
Long moved for a new trial.  (Pen. Code, § 1181.)  The trial 
court “reluctantly” denied Long’s motion, saying:  “To make a 
perfectly clear record in this matter, if this was a court trial, if 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
the Court would have heard the evidence in this case, I would 
have found the defendant not guilty.  I would have found that 
the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  In particular, the court found “troubling” that Dills’s 
preliminary hearing testimony featured so prominently in the 
prosecution’s case, despite the fact that the cross-examination of 
Dills “during the preliminary hearing was, as in most 
preliminary hearings, not extensive.”  In particular, the court 
noted that “his level of intoxication was not fully addressed in 
the examination.”  The Court of Appeal upheld Long’s conviction 
and denied her petition for rehearing.  This court denied review.   
 
In February 2010, Long filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in federal court.  Reviewing Long’s conviction under the 
standards set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA; 28 U.S.C. § 2254), the district 
court denied her petition but noted it was “unfortunate that 
[Long’s] conviction largely hinged on [Dills’s] preliminary 
hearing testimony.” 
 
Long appealed, claiming insufficient evidence supported 
her murder conviction.  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed, explaining that “[w]ere we the jury, 
we might have entertained a reasonable doubt.  Were we sitting 
as the reviewing court on direct appeal, we might have found 
the evidence to be insufficient.  But under AEDPA, which 
demands double deference, we are limited to deciding whether 
the California courts unreasonably applied Jackson [v. Virginia 
(1979) 443 U.S. 307].  They did not.”  (Long v. Johnson (9th Cir. 
2013) 736 F.3d 891, 897.)  One judge said, “I have grave doubts 
about whether the State has convicted the right person in this 
case.”  (Ibid. (conc. opn. of Watford, J.).) 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
Long then sought habeas corpus relief in state court on the 
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and actual 
innocence.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.)  After the trial court and 
Court of Appeal summarily denied Long’s petitions, this court 
found that Long had stated a prima facie case for relief and 
issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted. 
The trial court took judicial notice of the prior proceedings 
in Long’s case and conducted an evidentiary hearing over 
several days.  The court examined newly presented evidence and 
heard witness testimony proffered by both parties.  Following 
the hearing, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Long’s trial counsel, Deputy Public Defender Eric Keen, 
had rendered objectively deficient performance by failing to 
consult and present testimony from a time of death expert and 
by failing to present supporting evidence about Long’s clothing.  
The court granted Long’s petition, vacated her conviction, set 
bail, and ordered a retrial. 
The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that “Keen’s 
representation of defendant did not fall below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.”  (People v. Long (May 3, 2018, 
E066388) [nonpub. opn.].)  Because it found no deficient 
performance, the court did not examine prejudice.  We granted 
review. 
II. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution guarantee 
a criminal defendant the “ ‘right to the effective assistance of 
counsel at trial.’ ”  (In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 721; see 
ibid. [a defendant is “ ‘ “entitled to the reasonably competent 
assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent and conscientious 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
advocate” ’ ”]; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(Strickland).)  “The ultimate purpose of this right is to protect 
the defendant’s fundamental right to a trial that is both fair in 
its conduct and reliable in its result.”  (People v. Ledesma (1987) 
43 Cal.3d 171, 215 (Ledesma).) 
We focus here on Long’s allegation that her trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to consult a time of 
death expert.  To succeed, Long must show that this omission 
“fell 
below 
an 
objective 
standard 
of 
reasonableness”  
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688; see In re Thomas (2006) 
37 Cal.4th 1249, 1257) in light of “the professional norms 
prevailing when the representation took place” (Bobby v. Van 
Hook (2009) 558 U.S. 4, 7).  Long must also show “a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.”  (Strickland, 
at p. 694.)  Long “need not show that counsel’s deficient conduct 
more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.” (Id. at 
p. 693.)  It is enough to show “a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”  (Id. at p. 694.) 
“[T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation is a 
most deferential one.”  (Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 
86, 105 (Harrington).)  We “must indulge a ‘strong presumption’ 
that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance because it is all too easy to conclude that 
a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable in the 
harsh light of hindsight.”  (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 702.)  
“Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the 
relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and 
interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the 
judge.”  (Harrington, at p. 105.)  Accordingly, we must 
“reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
and . . . evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the 
time.”  (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689.) 
Long prevailed on her habeas petition following an 
evidentiary hearing with several findings in her favor.  In 
reviewing the trial court’s order granting relief, we apply “well 
settled” standards of review:  “[W]e give great weight to those of 
the [trial court]’s findings that are supported by substantial 
evidence.  This is especially true for findings involving 
credibility determinations.  The central reason for referring a 
habeas corpus claim for an evidentiary hearing is to obtain 
credibility determinations; consequently, we give special 
deference to the [trial court] on factual questions ‘requiring 
resolution of testimonial conflicts and assessment of witnesses’ 
credibility, because the [trial court] has the opportunity to 
observe the witnesses’ demeanor and manner of testifying.’  [¶] 
. . . [I]n other areas we give no deference to the [trial court]’s 
findings.  We independently review prior testimony, as well as 
all mixed questions of fact and law.  Whether counsel’s 
performance was deficient, and whether any deficiency 
prejudiced the petitioner, are both mixed questions subject to 
independent review.  Ultimately, the [trial court]’s findings are 
not binding on us; it is for this court to make the findings on 
which the resolution of [petitioner’s] habeas corpus claim will 
turn.”  (In re Thomas, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1256–1257, 
citations omitted.) 
A. 
The crux of Long’s claim is that Keen, her trial counsel, 
failed to sufficiently investigate Conde’s time of death.  At the 
evidentiary hearing, Keen testified that the only expert he 
consulted on time of death was Daniel Vomhof, an accident 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
reconstruction expert with no medical degree or experience in 
pathology.  Keen had contacted Vomhof in an effort to establish 
that Long was not physically capable of causing Conde’s 
injuries.  During that consultation, Keen learned that Vomhof 
“was also a time-of-death expert or purported to be.”  Although 
Keen said he “spoke to [Vomhof] about that issue,” he could not 
recall if Vomhof had seen the paramedics’ report or coroner’s 
report, nor could he “remember specifically what each of us 
said.”  Keen confirmed that he “didn’t contact an actual 
pathologist” or “anyone else besides Dr. Vomhof” to discuss time 
of death.  Defense investigator William Sylvester confirmed that 
Keen never instructed him to seek out a time of death expert in 
Long’s case. 
Keen further testified that his view at the time of Long’s 
trials was that no medical expert could offer a time of death that 
excluded the prosecution’s theory of Long’s window of 
opportunity for committing the crime.  Keen based this opinion 
on “what Dr. Vomhof told [him]” and on his “own experience,” 
which “at the time” consisted of “nothing more than [mandatory 
continuing legal education] for attorneys, homicide seminars, 
stuff of that nature.”  Keen said, “It’s my belief that anybody who 
testified regarding time of death would have to give a range, and 
that the times we were dealing with . . . were too small, and then 
necessarily that range would encompass both theories, the 
prosecution’s theory and our theory.”  Keen testified that if he 
were trying the case today, he would “seek the opinion of a 
pathologist, somebody who had performed on the order to 
thousands of autopsies over their career to render testimony.” 
The defense’s Strickland expert, Gary Gibson, provided 
additional context during the evidentiary hearing.  Gibson was 
a law professor at California Western School of Law, teaching 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
California evidence, forensic evidence, advanced criminal 
litigation, and California sentencing.  He had also been a public 
defender for over 20 years in San Diego County and worked on 
200 to 300 homicide cases.  He testified that Vomhof’s résumé 
indicated he took a continuing education course on time of death 
in 1979 or 1980 but had no other training or expertise on time 
of death.  Gibson said he would never seek a time of death 
opinion from “somebody who is not only not an M.D., but is [also] 
not a medical examiner.”  He considered Keen’s reliance on 
Vomhof unreasonable because Vomhof is a biochemical engineer 
and not a medical doctor with expert knowledge of how to 
estimate time of death. 
The trial court agreed, finding that Vomhof was “not a 
qualified expert to render an opinion regarding time of death” 
and that Keen made “no effort to contact or secure the testimony 
of such” an expert.  The trial court reviewed Vomhof’s résumé 
and noted that he “holds a Ph.D. in biochemistry” but “is not a 
forensic pathologist or medical examiner” and “does not have a 
medical degree.”  The court found that although Vomhof is an 
expert in biomechanics and accident reconstruction, “nothing” 
in Vomhof’s résumé showed he was qualified to provide an 
expert opinion on time of death. 
In general, estimating time of death requires expert 
knowledge on how to measure and evaluate relevant 
postmortem bodily processes and indicators such as lividity, 
rigor mortis, body temperature, and decomposition.  (See 
Henßge et al., Death Time Estimation in Case Work. II. 
Integration of Different Methods (1988) 39 Forensic Sci. Intl. 77, 
77–78 (hereafter Henßge); In re Richards (2016) 63 Cal.4th 291, 
303 [citing expert testimony that “time of death is a complex 
determination”].)  In addition to Vomhof’s lack of medical 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
training or expertise to evaluate such indicators, Keen could not 
recall — and there is no indication in the record — that Vomhof 
was provided with the paramedics’ report, the coroner’s report, 
or other information necessary to reach an informed opinion as 
to Conde’s time of death.  The trial court’s finding that Vomhof 
was not qualified to provide an expert opinion on time of death 
is supported by substantial evidence, and we adopt it. 
The further question, to which we apply our independent 
judgment, is whether Keen’s failure to consult a time of death 
expert fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  In 
addressing this question, we focus not on whether Keen “should 
have presented” expert testimony on Conde’s time of death, but 
on “whether the investigation supporting [counsel’s] decision 
not to [consult a time of death expert] was itself reasonable.”  
(Wiggins v. Smith (2003) 539 U.S. 510, 523 (Wiggins).) 
Not every homicide case presents a significant issue 
regarding the time of death.  Gibson testified that he recalled 
only two instances in which time of death was at issue among 
the hundreds of murder cases he worked on as a public defender.  
But Conde’s time of death was a particularly important issue in 
this case and therefore gave rise to a duty of defense counsel to 
investigate.  The core of the prosecution’s theory regarding 
Long’s opportunity to commit the crime rested on Dills’s 
preliminary hearing testimony that he dropped off Long at her 
home between 1:20 and 1:25 a.m.  Long repeatedly insisted she 
arrived home around 2:00 a.m., placing her outside the window 
of opportunity to murder Conde, clean herself up, and dispose of 
the evidence.  A reasonably competent defense attorney would 
have recognized the importance of investigating Conde’s time of 
death to examine whether it was inconsistent with the 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
prosecution’s timeline and could cause the jury to have a 
reasonable doubt about Long’s guilt. 
We acknowledge that time of death often cannot be 
estimated with precision and that reliable estimates are 
commonly stated as a time range.  Even so, Keen’s inquiry on 
this issue “did not reflect reasonable professional judgment.”  
(Wiggins, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 534.)  Although Keen discussed 
Conde’s time of death with Vomhof, the discussion was 
serendipitous.  Keen had contacted Vomhof to explore the level 
of force needed to fatally injure Conde; he did not contact 
Vomhof to discuss time of death, nor was he aware that Vomhof 
purported to have time of death expertise, nor is there any 
indication that he gave Vomhof the paramedics’ report, coroner’s 
report, or other information necessary to form a reliable opinion 
as to time of death.  Under these circumstances, a competent 
attorney would have sought the opinion of a time of death expert 
on what the observations of lividity and rigor mortis in the 
paramedics’ and coroner’s reports implied for Conde’s time of 
death.  At the time of Long’s trials, such observations had long 
been recognized in forensics literature and case law as 
indicators capable of informing time of death estimates.  (See, 
e.g., Henßge, supra, 39 Forensic Sci. Intl. at pp. 78–81; People v. 
Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 614 [“routine examinations for 
lividity and rigor mortis” are “two crude measures used to 
approximate time of death”]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 
818, 825 [medical experts estimated time of death based on rigor 
mortis]; People v. Adkins (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 942, 948 
[forensic pathologist relied on observations of rigor mortis and 
lividity in estimating time of death]; People v. Culuko (2000) 78 
Cal.App.4th 307, 320 [pathologist estimated time of death based 
on rigor mortis].) 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
Keen testified that he did not seek an expert opinion on 
time of death because he believed any estimate would 
encompass a range too broad to exclude the prosecution’s 
timeframe for the crime.  But there is scant evidence to indicate 
he sought expert advice to confirm that belief.  Even accepting 
that time of death estimates are inexact and are stated as a 
range, it is not clear what led Keen to believe that any range 
derived from the available evidence would necessarily 
encompass the prosecution’s timeframe — a timeframe that 
tended to rule out the possibility that someone other than Long 
committed the crime.  When asked what “specifically” in his 
training led him not to inquire further into Conde’s time of 
death, Keen identified nothing specific.  Although Keen said he 
had knowledge about lividity and rigidity, his testimony 
provides no indication as to whether or how that knowledge 
informed his judgment.  Without further inquiry, Keen had no 
basis to write off the possibility that a time of death estimate 
would help exculpate Long. 
The Court of Appeal believed it was reasonable that Keen 
did not consult a time of death expert and instead focused Long’s 
defense on third party culpability.  But the two lines of defense 
were potentially complementary, not mutually exclusive; an 
expert opinion that Conde likely died before 1:20 a.m. would 
have tended to bolster Long’s defense that another party 
committed the crime.  In any event, we see no reason why 
competent counsel would not have at least inquired.  (See 
Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 691 [“counsel has a duty to 
make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary”]; 
Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 215 [counsel must “make a 
rational and informed decision on strategy and tactics founded 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
on adequate investigation and preparation”].)  Without such 
investigation, Keen was not in a position to make a reasonable 
decision as to which defense or defenses to focus on at trial. 
A reviewing court must apply “ ‘a heavy measure of 
deference 
to 
counsel’s 
judgments’ ” 
in 
assessing 
the 
reasonableness of a particular decision not to investigate.  
(Wiggins, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 522.)  But “[i]n assessing the 
reasonableness of an attorney’s investigation, [we] must 
consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to 
counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a 
reasonable attorney to investigate further.”  (Id. at p. 527.)  The 
prosecution’s theory of the case put Long at the crime scene no 
earlier than 1:20 a.m., roughly 45 minutes before the police 
arrived.  Time of death was not only a central issue to 
investigate; it was also a viable issue for investigation in light of 
the lividity and rigidity observations by the paramedics and 
coroner.  A reasonably competent attorney would have 
investigated further, and Keen had no reasonable basis for 
failing to do so.  (See id. at p. 534.)  We conclude that counsel’s 
failure to consult a time of death expert “was the result of 
inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment” (ibid.), and that 
counsel’s performance in this regard fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. 
B. 
We now consider whether counsel’s failure prejudiced 
Long’s defense.  We examine what “evidence counsel failed to 
discover and present in this case” and whether there is “a 
reasonable probability that a competent attorney . . . would have 
introduced it” (Wiggins, supra, 539 U.S. at pp. 534–535), and 
then we address whether “there is a reasonable probability that 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
[the jury] would have returned” a different verdict if it “had 
. . . been confronted with [that] evidence” (id. at p. 536). 
1. 
The trial court found that “qualified medical opinions” 
concluding that Conde’s death occurred significantly earlier 
than 1:20 a.m. “were available at the time of trial” in 2005.  This 
finding is supported by substantial evidence. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Long presented the testimony 
of two pathology experts.  Dr. Zhongxue Hua was a professor of 
pathology at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine and 
previously served as chief medical examiner for Union County 
in New Jersey.  He testified that he has performed around 3,000 
autopsies and has reviewed “at least the same amount” of 
autopsy reports.  He explained that the science undergirding 
time of death estimation is not precise down to minutes or 
seconds, but it can provide a meaningful range of possible times. 
Upon reviewing the circumstances in this case, Dr. Hua 
opined that it was “remotely possible” but “extremely unlikely” 
that Conde died after 1:20 a.m.  Based on “the known set of 
evidence,” Dr. Hua concluded that Conde’s “time of death 
occurred long before 1:20 a.m.”  In providing this estimate, Dr. 
Hua assigned particular importance to the paramedics’ 
observation of rigor in Conde’s arm around 2:20 a.m.  He 
explained that although rigor may present as early as 30 
minutes to an hour after death in small muscles such as those 
in a person’s fingers or jaw, it would take “much, much later 
than 30 minutes” after a person’s death for rigor to present in 
the medium-sized muscles of the arms.  Dr. Hua also considered 
the paramedics’ observations regarding the body’s lividity.  He 
noted that some lividity could present as early as 30 minutes to 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
one hour following a person’s death, suggesting that Conde must 
have died at least 30 minutes before the paramedics’ 
observation. 
Dr. Hua placed less emphasis on the coroner’s report.  As 
noted, the coroner arrived almost three hours after the 
paramedics; Dr. Hua said he generally finds earlier observations 
to be more helpful than subsequent observations.  He testified 
that the coroner’s observation of “almost fixed” lividity was 
inconsistent with the coroner’s notation that rigor “had not 
started,” since lividity and rigor tend to present together.  
According to Dr. Hua, the coroner’s notation that rigor had not 
started was “impossible” as Conde had been dead for over two 
hours.  Dr. Hua testified that any finding that rigor “had not 
started” by 5:03 a.m., when the deputy coroner arrived, was 
“extremely unlikely.”  Further, Dr. Hua testified that there is no 
precise definition of “almost fixed” lividity, so he discounted fully 
fixed lividity by 50 percent in order to derive his “most 
conservative” time of death estimate.  He opined that the 
earliest time when “almost fixed” lividity (so understood) could 
present is “minimum, minimum four hour[s]” after death, and 
he rejected the possibility that “almost fixed” lividity could occur 
within four hours after death.  On cross-examination, Dr. Hua 
testified that even if the coroner had examined the body closer 
to 7:00 a.m., his time of death estimate would be “still before” 
1:20 a.m. given the paramedics’ observation of rigor in Conde’s 
arm at 2:20 a.m. 
Long’s other expert was Dr. James Bonnell, who had 
previously served as the chief deputy medical examiner for San 
Diego County and had performed over 7,000 autopsies and had 
provided sworn testimony over 585 times at the time of the 
hearing.  Dr. Bonnell estimated that Conde died “much closer to 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
11:00 [p.m.] than 1 [a.m.].”  He placed “great reliability” on the 
paramedics’ observations, as they “were the first people to 
actually examine the body.”  Dr. Bonnell considered but did not 
credit the coroner’s findings.  In his view, the coroner’s 
observation that rigor “had not started” was “inaccurate.” Dr. 
Bonnell highlighted the paramedics’ contrary observation that 
rigor was present in Conde’s arms at 2:20 a.m.  According to Dr. 
Bonnell, if “rigidity was not present” during the coroner’s 
examination between 5:03 and 7:13 a.m., it “can equally mean 
that [rigor] has passed,” not that rigor had not yet started.  If 
Conde had died before midnight, Dr. Bonnell noted, “it wouldn’t 
surprise [him] that [rigor] has passed at 7 o’clock.”  Like Dr. 
Hua, Dr. Bonnell testified that the presence of “almost fixed” 
lividity at the time of the coroner’s examination “totally 
contradicts” the coroner’s finding of absence of rigor.  Especially 
in light of the paramedics’ observations, Dr. Bonnell 
characterized the prosecutor’s theory that Conde died at or after 
1:20 a.m. as “medically impossible.” 
Dr. Bonnell also considered the testimony of a neighbor 
who thought she heard Conde in his garage at 12:30 a.m.  He 
testified that given the strength of the evidence suggesting an 
earlier time of death, “I don’t place a whole lot of reliability on” 
the indicia that Conde was alive as late as 12:30 a.m.  On cross-
examination, Dr. Bonnell said he “wouldn’t rely . . . at all” on 
Long’s background as an emergency room nurse or her 911 call 
transcript in which she said Conde was “still breathing” 
because, “number one, she may have been in shock, and number 
two, I know she was intoxicated.” 
The district attorney called Dr. Joseph Cohen, who was 
the chief forensic pathologist of the Riverside County Sheriff-
Coroner’s Office and had performed over 7,000 autopsies.  Dr. 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
Cohen disagreed with Dr. Hua’s assessment of the paramedics’ 
observation of rigor in Conde’s arms.  He testified that rigor may 
be observable “within minutes” of a person’s death, although he 
acknowledged that it generally takes “30 to 60 minutes” for rigor 
to appear.  Dr. Cohen said he placed little weight on the 
paramedics’ report, as “the deputy coroner’s examination 
generally will trump the first responder’s impression — not 
always.”  Even so, Dr. Cohen largely dismissed the observations 
of rigidity and lividity in the coroner’s report.  Dr. Cohen 
doubted that rigor could be present at 2:20 a.m. but not at 6:00 
a.m., saying that such a finding “doesn’t make sense.”  He also 
“disagree[d] that [lividity] would have been fixed or nearly fixed 
at the time of the coroner investigator’s examination,” 
describing the coroner’s finding of “almost fixed” lividity as 
“hard to believe” and an “impossibility.” 
In estimating Conde’s time of death, Dr. Cohen said he 
would give “appropriate weight” to the testimony of Juanita 
Sandoval, who said she heard Conde attempting to start his 
motorcycle in his garage at 1:30 a.m., and to the 911 call in 
which Long said Conde was still breathing.  Dr. Cohen also 
disagreed with Dr. Hua’s and Dr. Bonnell’s time of death 
estimates, describing them as “ludicrous,” “skewed,” “too 
inflexible,” and “too narrow of a range.”  Ultimately, Dr. Cohen 
opined that Conde’s time of death was “as likely” before 1:20 
a.m. as after. 
After hearing the testimony of all three experts, the trial 
court found that Dr. Hua and Dr. Bonnell “concluded to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty that the postmortem 
changes observed in the victim’s body could not have occurred in 
less than an hour.  Neither forensic pathologist could give an 
exact timing of the victim’s death.  However, both forensic 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
pathologists testified in this court that the victim’s death 
occurred significantly earlier than 1:20 a.m., the earliest time 
the prosecution could place the petitioner at the scene.  Their 
observations were based upon postmortem changes by the first 
responders as well as the deputy coroner’s report . . . .   
[¶] Hearing their testimony, this Court finds both opinions to be 
credible, convincing, and compelling.  Their testimony indicates 
such qualified medical opinions were available at the time of 
trial and defense counsel failed to seek out medical experts to 
address the issue.”  These findings, reflecting the trial court’s 
determination of the witnesses’ credibility, are supported by 
substantial evidence. 
2. 
The trial court further ruled that the testimony of a 
qualified time-of-death expert was evidence that a competent 
attorney would have presented at trial:  “In making this ruling, 
I’m not saying that he should have contacted these two 
particular experts, but it’s apparent to the Court that these 
qualified opinions did exist in the medical field . . . .   [¶] If such 
expert would have testified, it would have put the victim’s time 
of death at a time when petitioner could not have committed the 
crime, if believed by the jury.  Obviously, it’s always a question 
of fact for the jury to either accept or reject the testimony of any 
witness that testifies, including an expert.” 
The Court of Appeal “disagree[d] with the trial court’s 
conclusion that no reasonable attorney would have failed to 
present expert time of death evidence to the jury.”  The Court of 
Appeal observed that “Hua estimated the victim died before 1:20 
a.m., but conceded that estimate could be effected [sic] by the 
timing of when Gomes [the coroner] observed the victim’s body; 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
the record fails to show at precisely what time Gomes examined 
the victim’s body.”  The court also said Dr. Bonnell’s estimate 
that Conde died between 11:00 a.m. and 12:30 p.m. “was based 
upon not considering, or disregarding, all evidence of a later 
time period, such as [a neighbor’s] statement that she heard the 
victim at 1:30 a.m., defendant’s 2:09 a.m. observation that the 
victim was breathing, [the coroner’s] conclusion that rigor had 
not started by 5:03 a.m. on October 6, and Dr. Pestaner’s 
observation that the victim’s body was in a state of rigor on 
October 7.”  Further, the court explained that Dr. Cohen’s 
inconclusive testimony “supports Keen’s reasoning” that a time 
of death estimate would be too broad to exclude the prosecution’s 
theory.  In sum, the court said, “an attorney could reasonably 
conclude that reliance upon expert testimony, such as Bonnell’s, 
would have been a risky defense strategy because a jury could 
reasonably view such testimony with skepticism and therefore 
it would be unlikely to raise a reasonable doubt.” 
In evaluating these competing views, we begin by noting 
that the Court of Appeal did not disagree with the trial court’s 
finding that “qualified medical opinions [that Conde died before 
1:20 a.m.] were available at the time of trial.”  The Court of 
Appeal’s concern was that Dr. Hua’s and Dr. Bonnell’s opinions 
were not clear or not persuasive.  However, the Court of Appeal 
appeared to ignore Dr. Hua’s testimony that he would place 
Conde’s time of death earlier than 1:20 a.m. even if the deputy 
coroner had not inspected the body until 7:00 a.m.  And the court 
did not mention Dr. Bonnell’s testimony that he did not give 
weight to the coroner’s observation that rigor had not started 
because it “totally contradicts” the other time of death 
indicators, or to Long’s 2:09 a.m. observation that Conde was 
breathing in light of her shock and level of intoxication. 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
More fundamentally, all the experts who testified were 
aware that the various pieces of evidence bearing on Conde’s 
time of death were potentially inconsistent, and they took those 
inconsistencies into account.  In their responses to extensive 
questioning, Dr. Hua and Dr. Bonnell explained why they placed 
greater reliance on some indicators and not others, and both 
experts placed significant weight on the observations of the 
paramedics, the first responders on the scene.  (Cf. In re 
Richards, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 303 [noting forensic 
pathologist’s testimony that “the closer to the time of death 
observations are made, the more accurate the findings will be”].)  
Notably, all three experts were critical of key findings in the 
coroner’s report.  Further, the trial court acknowledged that Dr. 
Cohen “is a highly qualified medical examiner” and that Dr. 
Cohen “disagreed with the expert testimony of Dr. Bonnell and 
Dr. Hua and opined the time of death was just as likely . . . 
before 1:20 a.m. as after.”  Nevertheless, the trial court, after 
hearing all three experts’ lengthy testimony over several days, 
found Dr. Hua’s and Dr. Bonnell’s opinions “to be credible, 
convincing, and compelling.”  This is not to say that contrary 
time-of-death opinions were not also available, as evidenced by 
Dr. Cohen’s testimony.  But our assessment of prejudice focuses 
on the availability of credible opinions favorable to Long 
because, in light of our determination that counsel did not 
properly investigate the victim’s time of death, we cannot rule 
out a reasonable likelihood that had he done so, he would have 
discovered an opinion helpful to Long’s defense. 
The Court of Appeal was correct to focus its inquiry not 
simply on whether expert testimony that Conde died before 1:20 
a.m. was available, but on whether a reasonable attorney could 
have chosen not to present such testimony.  It is true that such 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
testimony could have been challenged on various grounds, and 
the trial court recognized that “[a] jury hearing this case could 
accept [Dr. Cohen’s] testimony and disregard petitioner’s 
experts, whoever those qualified experts will be.”  But 
considering the totality of the experts’ testimony as well as the 
trial court’s findings, we conclude there is a reasonable 
probability that a competent attorney would have presented 
such evidence at trial. 
As noted, a time of death defense would have potentially 
complemented defense counsel’s theory of third party 
culpability; evidence that Conde died before Long got home 
would have suggested that someone else committed the crime.  
Although such testimony would have been at odds with Long’s 
statements during her 911 call at 2:09 a.m. and her statements 
to investigators, a competent attorney could have argued she 
was mistaken due to her intoxication and the shock of 
discovering Conde.  Indeed, Keen argued at trial that Long was 
“intoxicated” and “hysterical” when she came home “and saw 
[Conde] dead on the couch,” and Keen emphasized various 
aspects of the paramedics’ report to suggest Conde was dead 
before Long arrived.  In other words, discounting Long’s 2:09 
a.m. statement that Conde was still breathing was in fact part 
of, not in tension with, the defense strategy.  At the evidentiary 
hearing, Keen testified that expert testimony placing the time 
of death before Long’s arrival “would be consistent with our 
defense” and that he “would have fought to introduce that at 
trial” if he had known such testimony was available. 
In sum, the record before us does not support the Court of 
Appeal’s conclusion that presenting a time of death expert 
“would have been a risky defense strategy.”  As the trial court 
explained, such expert evidence, even if imperfect, would have 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
27 
provided a potentially meritorious defense ruling out Long as 
the perpetrator.  And even though a jury could have ultimately 
decided to reject it, such evidence would have had enough 
substance as to pose no serious risk of compromising the overall 
credibility of the defense.  We conclude that there is “a 
reasonable probability that a competent attorney . . .  would 
have introduced” expert testimony on the victim’s time of death 
in this case.  (Wiggins, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 535.)  Keen was “not 
in a position to make a reasonable strategic choice” as to 
whether to present such testimony because his investigation 
into Conde’s time of death was unreasonable.  (Ibid.) 
3. 
We now consider whether “there is a reasonable 
probability that [the jury] would have returned with a different” 
verdict (Wiggins, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 536) if counsel had 
presented the testimony of a time of death expert.  The trial 
court observed that “it’s always a question of fact for the jury to 
either accept or reject the testimony of any witness that testifies, 
including an expert.”  And the court acknowledged that Dr. 
Cohen disagreed with the testimony of Dr. Bonnell and Dr. Hua, 
and “opined the time of death was just as likely . . . before 1:20 
a.m. as after.”  Nevertheless, the court ruled that expert 
testimony estimating time of death before Long arrived home 
“could reasonably raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the 
jurors” and “could be fatal to the People’s case.”  Applying our 
independent judgment, we agree. 
The prosecution’s evidence against Long was not 
particularly strong.  The case rested on circumstantial evidence 
of Long’s motive and opportunity to commit the crime.  As noted, 
in the hours leading up to Conde’s murder, Long and Conde had 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
28 
been involved in a verbal and physical altercation.  Long was 
cheating on Conde with Dills, and she was heavily intoxicated.  
Although no neighbors saw Long or Conde, they heard several 
noises from the direction of the couple’s house late at night.  
When Long called 911, she said Conde was still breathing, yet 
she did not render assistance despite being a vocational nurse.  
Several items were missing from Long’s house, though it did not 
appear to police that the house had been ransacked.  And the 
prosecution had called into doubt Long’s uncorroborated 
testimony that she had not changed her clothes that night.   
At the same time, the prosecutor offered no confession, no 
eyewitnesses, no murder weapon identified or recovered, and no 
bloody clothes or other physical or forensic evidence linking 
Long to the crime.  Furthermore, the alibis of the other suspects, 
Bugarski and Lovejoy, were only weakly corroborated, if at all.  
In the months before Conde’s death, both Bugarski and Lovejoy 
had threatened the couple and had engaged in suspicious 
activity around Long’s house.  Ultimately, the sole testimony 
placing Long at the scene of the crime came from Dills.  As the 
trial court observed, “[O]bviously the People’s cornerstone to 
their prosecution was the reliability of Mr. Dills.”  But Dills had 
also been drinking throughout that day; he was intimately 
involved with the victim’s girlfriend; he was a suspect in the 
crime when interviewed by the police; and because he died 
before trial, he never testified before a jury and was never cross-
examined after full discovery. 
The centerpiece of the prosecution’s case was its theory 
that Long arrived at the murder scene at 1:20 a.m. and called 
911 at 2:09 a.m.  Under that scenario, she would have had 
approximately 50 minutes to arrive, secure a weapon, bludgeon 
the victim to death, and then clean up the scene as well as 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
29 
herself and dispose of the weapon.  Under the timeframe offered 
by the defense, Long would have had only 10 minutes to 
accomplish all of those tasks.     
Several facts stand against the prosecution’s theory.  
There were two other people with a potential motive to kill the 
victim, and their alibis were not firm.  In addition, the front door 
was unlocked, the kitchen slider was open, and items were 
missing from the home.  It was a bloody crime scene with a 360-
degree blood splatter pattern.  Yet there was no evidence that a 
sink or shower had been used to clean up.  A search of the home, 
the car, and the neighborhood, including storm drains, 
uncovered no weapon, no bloody clothes, and no other evidence.  
In addition, the prosecution expert opined at trial that the 
victim’s head injuries would have caused death within 10 to 15 
minutes.  The prosecution’s own evidence showed Long was over 
two miles away between 11:00 p.m. and 1:20 a.m.  Defense 
counsel did not present available evidence from which the jury 
could have concluded that the victim could have died much 
earlier, when Long was nowhere near the crime scene.  That 
evidence would have effectively negated the linchpin of the 
prosecution’s case and, together with the third party culpability 
evidence and the evidence of a possible break-in and theft, would 
have significantly enhanced the probability of a jury having a 
reasonable doubt as to Long’s guilt. 
A “verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the 
record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one 
with overwhelming record support.”  (Strickland, supra, 466 
U.S. at p. 696.)  Given the totality of the trial evidence, there is 
a “substantial, not just conceivable,” likelihood that expert 
testimony that Conde died before 1:20 a.m. would have led to a 
In re LONG 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
30 
more favorable result for Long.  (Harrington, supra, 562 U.S. at 
p. 112.)  We conclude it is reasonably probable that the 
presentation of expert testimony as to Conde’s time of death, 
along the lines of Dr. Hua’s and Dr. Bonnell’s testimony, would 
have led one or more jurors to harbor reasonable doubt about 
Long’s guilt.  Counsel’s failure to investigate the time of death, 
in a case where the timeline was crucial, is an error “sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  (Strickland, at 
p. 694.) 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
FRANSON, J.*
 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  In re Long  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 5/3/18 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted    
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S249274  
Date Filed:  November 30, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Riverside 
Judge:  Patrick F. Magers* 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michelle Rogers, under appointment by the Supreme Court; and Alissa Bjerkhoel for Petitioner Kimberly Louise 
Long. 
 
Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Alan D. Tate, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent the People. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Retired judge of the Riverside Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Alan D. Tate 
Deputy District Attorney 
3960 Orange Street 
Riverside, CA 92501 
(951) 955-0126 
 
Michelle Rogers 
Appellate Defenders, Inc. 
555 West Beech St., Suite 300 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 696-0282 
 
Alissa Bjerkhoel 
225 Cedar Street 
San Diego, CA 92101