Case Title: Barth v. Barth

Citation: 2007-Ohio-973

Docket Number: 20060896

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Barth v. Barth, 113 Ohio St.3d 27, 2007-Ohio-973.] 
 
 
BARTH, APPELLANT, v. BARTH, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Barth v. Barth, 113 Ohio St.3d 27, 2007-Ohio-973.] 
Divorce — Residency requirements — Strict requirements of R.C. 3105.03 — A 
plaintiff must have been a resident of Ohio for six months immediately 
prior to the filing of a divorce complaint — In determining compliance 
with residency requirements, the court cannot consider either spouse’s 
motives for leaving Ohio. 
(No. 2006-0896 – Submitted December 13, 2006 – Decided March 21, 2007.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 86473, 2006-Ohio-1094. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  R.C. 3105.03 creates a strict test of residency, and to file a complaint for 
divorce in Ohio, a plaintiff must have been a resident of Ohio for six 
months immediately prior to the filing of the complaint. 
2.  In determining residency for purposes of R.C. 3105.03, a court shall not 
consider the motives of either spouse with regard to his or her 
establishment of residency outside of Ohio. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} The Eighth District Court of Appeals has certified this case 
pursuant to Section 3(B)(4), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution and App.R. 25.  
The Eighth District Court of Appeals found its judgment to be in conflict with the 
judgments of the Second District Court of Appeals in McMaken v. McMaken 
(1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 402, 645 N.E.2d 113, and the Sixth District Court of 
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Appeals in Heath v. Heath (Mar. 7, 1997), Lucas App. No. L-96-288, 1997 WL 
103832. 
{¶ 2} The certified issue is “[w]hether the six-month residency 
requirement for jurisdiction set forth in R.C. 3105.03 is a strict test or [whether] a 
court [may] examine one party’s intent and the other party’s fraudulent 
inducement in abandoning Ohio as their domicile.”  We hold that R.C. 3105.03 
creates a strict test of residency and that to file a complaint for divorce in Ohio, a 
plaintiff must have been a resident of Ohio for six months immediately prior to 
the filing of the complaint.  Further, in determining residency for purposes of R.C. 
3105.03, a court shall not consider the motives of either spouse with regard to his 
or her establishment of residency outside of Ohio. 
{¶ 3} Some facts are in dispute.  However, both parties agree that Jeffrey 
Barth and Andrea Barth were married in 1989.  They resided in Ohio from 1994 
until Jeffrey accepted a job in California, where he began working in February 
2004.  Andrea and Jeffrey had visited California in January to look for a house, 
visit churches, and familiarize themselves with various communities.  Andrea and 
the children visited Jeffrey in April to continue the search.  In June 2004, the 
Barths sold their Westlake, Ohio residence and shipped their household 
belongings to California. 
{¶ 4} Andrea and the children arrived in California in July 2004 and 
moved into Jeffrey’s rented California residence.  Andrea arranged to have 
utilities connected there, including cable and telephone services, subscribed to a 
local newspaper, applied for library cards, changed addresses on credit cards, 
enrolled the children in swimming lessons and a sport camp, sent a change-of-
address announcement, and scheduled a medical appointment for her daughter. 
{¶ 5} In August 2004, Jeffrey divulged to Andrea an intimate 
relationship with another woman and previous extramarital affairs.  Within two 
days of this confession, Andrea and the children returned to Ohio, where she filed 
January Term, 2007 
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for divorce on August 24, 2004.  Jeffrey filed for divorce in California on August 
25. 
{¶ 6} Jeffrey answered Andrea’s complaint and moved to dismiss the 
complaint, stating that the Ohio court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.  Jeffrey 
argued that Andrea did not meet the residency requirement in R.C. 3105.03 and 
therefore could not file for divorce in Ohio.  R.C. 3105.03 states:  “The plaintiff in 
actions for divorce * * * shall have been a resident of the state at least six months 
immediately before filing the complaint.” 
{¶ 7} The trial court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation that the 
motion to dismiss be denied.  The magistrate had applied former R.C. 3109.22, 
repealed by 2004 Sub.S.B. No. 185, which addressed a court’s jurisdiction 
regarding parenting determinations, and found that the children’s connections to 
Ohio were far more significant than those to California, where the children had 
resided for only a few weeks.  Further, the magistrate concluded “that despite 
[Andrea’s] traveling to California and staying for forty days, Plaintiff could not 
have formulated the necessary intent to abandon her domicile in Ohio or to adopt 
a domicile in California because she did not have the prerequisite knowledge of 
the facts to formulate legitimate intent.” 
{¶ 8} In a split decision, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of 
the trial court, holding that jurisdiction was established for the same reasons 
articulated in the magistrate’s opinion:  “the present Ohio connections are far 
more pervasive than any California ties,” and Andrea Barth “was incapable of 
forming an actual intent to make California her domicile * * * because she was 
without knowledge of facts sufficient to form a reliable and specific intent.”  
Barth v. Barth, Cuyahoga App. No. 86473, 2006-Ohio-1094, ¶ 21-22. 
{¶ 9} R.C. 3105.03, not former R.C. 3109.22, governs residency 
requirements for divorce actions in Ohio.  The grounds and procedures for 
obtaining a divorce in Ohio are purely statutory.  “Divorce is a creature of state 
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statute, and the power of the General Assembly over the entire subject of 
marriage, as a civil status, and its dissolution, is unlimited except as restricted by 
the state and federal constitutions.”  Coleman v. Coleman (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 
155, 159, 61 O.O.2d 406, 291 N.E.2d 530. 
{¶ 10} As this court has repeatedly stated, “It is a cardinal rule of statutory 
construction that where the terms of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the 
statute should be applied without interpretation.”1  “ ‘ “To construe or interpret 
what is already plain is not interpretation but legislation, which is not the function 
of the courts.” ’ ”2   
{¶ 11} The statute in this case is clear:  in order to file for divorce in Ohio, 
the plaintiff must have been an Ohio resident for six months immediately before 
the filing of the complaint.  Therefore, the statute must be applied strictly and 
without interpretation. 
{¶ 12} We have previously defined “resident” as used in R.C. 3105.03:  
“The word ‘resident’ * * * means one who possesses a domiciliary residence, a 
residence accompanied by an intention to make the state of Ohio a permanent 
home.” (Emphasis added.) Coleman, 32 Ohio St.2d 155, 162, 61 O.O.2d 406, 291 
N.E.2d 530. Clearly, during the 40 days that Andrea lived in California, she was 
not a resident of Ohio. 
{¶ 13} The following facts are not disputed:  Prior to learning of Jeffrey’s 
extramarital activities, the Barth family was planning to remain in California.  
Jeffrey moved to California and began a new job in February 2004.  In the 
summer of 2004, the Barths sold the family residence in Ohio and moved all of 
                                                 
1.  Wingate v. Hordge (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 55, 58, 14 O.O.3d 212, 396 N.E.2d 770, citing 
Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105-106, 65 O.O.2d 296, 304 N.E.2d 378. 
 
2.  Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Ohio Ins. Guar. Assn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 521, 524, 634 N.E.2d 611, 
quoting Thompson Elec., Inc. v. Bank One, Akron, N.A. (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 259, 264, 525 
N.E.2d 761, quoting Iddings v. Jefferson Cty. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1951), 155 Ohio St. 287, 
290, 44 O.O. 294, 98 N.E.2d 827. 
 
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the family belongings to California.  Andrea and the children arrived in California 
in July 2004 and moved into a rented residence with Jeffrey.  Andrea quickly 
made arrangements for a new life in California:  she had utilities connected, 
subscribed to a local newspaper, applied for library cards, changed addresses on 
credit cards, enrolled the children in activities, sent a change-of-address 
announcement, and scheduled a medical appointment.  At this time, Andrea Barth 
was not a resident of the state of Ohio — she was living in California and 
intended to make California her home. 
{¶ 14} In August 2004, after learning of Jeffrey’s extramarital affairs, 
Andrea returned to Ohio with her children, where she found a new place to live 
and re-established her life in Ohio.  Andrea was then living in Ohio and intended 
to make Ohio her home.  As a result, she began a new residency period in Ohio. 
{¶ 15} However, Andrea’s residency in Ohio began upon her return to 
Ohio in August 2004.  Andrea Barth could not have maintained her Ohio 
residency while she was living in California.  R.C. 3105.03 requires that a 
plaintiff in a divorce action be a resident of Ohio for six months immediately prior 
to the filing of the complaint.  Andrea moved to California in July 2004 and then 
returned to Ohio in August 2004.  As a result, when Andrea filed her complaint 
for divorce in Ohio on August 24, 2004, she had been residing in Ohio for only a 
few days. 
{¶ 16} Andrea argues, and the trial court and court of appeals both agreed, 
that she could not establish residency in California because she did not have the 
requisite factual information to form intent.  However, there is no legal basis for 
this conclusion.  All of Andrea’s conduct prior to her decision to return to Ohio 
manifested her intent to be a resident of California.  When she became informed 
of her husband’s infidelity, she decided to return to Ohio.  A person may intend to 
create a residence without awareness of every available fact regarding the 
decision that bears on that choice.  We are compelled to conclude that Andrea 
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Barth did not meet the residency requirement of R.C. 3105.03 and that the trial 
court lacked statutory authority to assume jurisdiction of her divorce action. 
{¶ 17} For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
PETREE, O’CONNOR and Lanzinger, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs separately. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
 
CHARLES R. PETREE, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, was assigned to sit 
for RESNICK, J., whose term ended on January 1, 2007. 
 
CUPP, J., whose term began on January 2, 2007, did not participate in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring. 
{¶ 18} This case presents a tempting fact pattern for accepting the 
appellee’s “intent” interpretation.  Appellee alleges that her husband lured her to 
California upon false pretenses solely to establish residency and presumably some 
tactical advantage by filing for divorce in California.  The court of appeals held 
that fraud negated appellee’s intent to make California her domicile; her residency 
in Ohio was therefore uninterrupted, meeting the six-month requirement. 
{¶ 19} We have concluded that intent is not relevant, nor apparently is 
fraud in the inducement; only actions can establish residency.  Fraud in the 
inducement is a tempting argument, but to adopt that exception would create a 
difficult burden for courts that now have a bright-line test to apply.  However, the 
bright-line test can also lead to inequities, as this case demonstrates.  As the 
residency requirement is a pure creature of statute, the legislature may wish to 
consider an exception to the residency requirement in cases of fraud.  Until then, 
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we are bound by the clear language of the statute.  Therefore, I concur in the 
majority’s opinion. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 20} The facts of this case distinguish it from the cases it is alleged to 
conflict with.  I would find that no conflict between appellate districts exists and 
would affirm the judgment of the appellate court and trial court. 
__________________ 
 
Gallagher Sharp and Timothy J. Fitzgerald, for appellant. 
 
Wolf & Akers, L.P.A., and Deborah Akers-Parry, for appellee. 
 
John J. Ready, guardian ad litem.   
  
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