Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. George W. Curtis, Jr.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP001567-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-02-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 13 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1567-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against George W. Curtis, Jr., Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
George W. Curtis, Jr., 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST CURTIS, JR. 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 15, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
      
 
 
2018 WI 13
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP1567-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against George W. Curtis, Jr., Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
George W. Curtis, Jr., 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 15, 2018 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report of the referee, 
Richard M. Esenberg, regarding the Office of Lawyer Regulation's 
(OLR) complaint in this matter against Attorney George W. 
Curtis, Jr.  At all times relevant to this matter, Attorney 
Curtis operated the Curtis Law Office in Oshkosh, Wisconsin 
(hereafter, the "firm"), as a sole proprietorship.  The referee 
recommended that Attorney Curtis be suspended for 120 days in 
connection with his willful failure to pay his personal income 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
2 
 
taxes for several years and for various trust account violations 
committed at his firm.  The referee recommended the dismissal of 
three counts of misconduct:  one related to his trust account 
record keeping, another related to his failure to remit employee 
and employer contributions to his law firm's 401(k) plan, and 
another related to his failure to remit payroll taxes for his 
firm's employees.  The referee proposed that the court place 
certain conditions on Attorney Curtis' post-suspension practice 
of law, and that the court reduce the full costs of this 
proceeding ($16,886.87 as of October 31, 2017) by one-quarter.  
The OLR did not seek the payment of restitution in these 
proceedings, and the referee did not recommend it.   
¶2 
Because no appeal has been filed, we review the 
referee's report pursuant to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 22.17(2).  
After conducting our independent review of the matter, we adopt 
the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We agree 
with the referee that Attorney Curtis' license to practice law 
in Wisconsin should be suspended for a four-month period.  We 
also agree with the referee that Attorney Curtis should be 
required to pay three-quarters of the costs of this proceeding, 
which will result in a cost assessment of $12,665.15.  We impose 
certain conditions upon the reinstatement of Attorney Curtis' 
license to practice law in Wisconsin.  Finally, we decline to 
order restitution for reasons explained below.   
¶3 
Attorney Curtis was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1962.  His law license is currently in good 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
3 
 
standing.  He has not been the subject of any previous 
disciplinary proceedings. 
¶4 
On August 3, 2015, the OLR filed the underlying 
complaint against Attorney Curtis, raising seven counts of 
misconduct.  Count 1 concerned his willful failure to pay 
personal income taxes for 2007, 2008, and 2009, culminating in 
his federal conviction of three misdemeanor counts of failure to 
pay income taxes in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203.  Count 2 
concerned his failure to pay to the federal government employee 
payroll taxes withheld from his firm's employees' paychecks for 
the third and fourth quarters of 2013, and all four quarters of 
2014.  Counts 3 through 6 concerned various trust account 
problems.  Count 7 concerned the administration of funds that 
were to have been paid into his firm's 401(k) plan.  
¶5 
Attorney Curtis answered the complaint and admitted 
three counts of misconduct (Counts 3,1 4, and 6), denied three 
counts of misconduct (Counts 1, 2, and 5), and pled the Fifth 
Amendment in response to Count 7 and its background allegations.   
¶6 
The referee held an evidentiary hearing on December 5 
and 9, 2016.  Both parties submitted post-hearing briefs. 
                                                 
1 In his answer, Attorney Curtis invoked the Fifth Amendment 
in response to Count 3.  In post-hearing briefing before the 
referee, Attorney Curtis clarified that he had erroneously 
invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to Count 3, and that his 
intention was instead to "admit the violation and affirmatively 
allege the violation was unintentional."     
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
4 
 
¶7 
On September 26, 2017, the referee submitted a report 
containing his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a 
recommendation for discipline.  The findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are summarized below.   
Willful Failure to Pay Income Tax (Count 1) 
¶8 
Count 1 concerns Attorney Curtis' willful failure to 
pay income taxes——a problem that was long in the making and that 
culminated in a conviction, following a federal district court 
jury trial in January 2014, on three misdemeanor counts of 
willfully failing to pay the taxes he owed for 2007, 2008, and 
2009, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203.  See United States v. 
Curtis, 1:13-cr-00113-WCG (E.D. Wis.).  The amount of unpaid 
tax, with interest and penalties, was $387,233.  The district 
court sentenced Attorney Curtis to six months in prison and one 
year of supervised release, both of which he has now completed.  
The court also ordered Attorney Curtis to pay the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) $5,000 per month until the total tax 
liability for the three years was paid in full. 
¶9 
Attorney Curtis' tax difficulties began years before 
his conviction.  In 1996 and 1997, he filed returns reporting 
significant tax obligations, but he made no payments toward 
those debts.  Over the ensuing years, Attorney Curtis entered 
into installment payment plans with the IRS, but he did not 
fully comply with them; he made payments for a period of time, 
and then stopped.  Attorney Curtis also continued to file yearly 
tax returns showing significant tax liabilities that he had paid 
nothing toward at the time of filing.  Eventually the IRS ran 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
5 
 
out 
of 
patience 
and 
referred 
the 
matter 
for 
criminal 
investigation.  His conviction followed, which Attorney Curtis 
appealed, unsuccessfully.  See United States v. Curtis, 781 F.3d 
904 (7th Cir. 2015).  The Seventh Circuit wrote that there was a 
"sea of . . . damning evidence demonstrating Curtis' intent" to 
not pay his taxes, such as the facts that: 
 . . . during the three charged years, Curtis had 
adjusted gross income of more than $1.4 million but 
paid 
none 
of 
it 
toward 
his 
corresponding 
tax 
liabilities of approximately $378,000 for that same 
time period.  Instead, he spent more than $1.1 million 
on personal expenses that included $142,916 in life 
insurance 
premiums; 
$43,266 
for 
a 
new 
Lincoln 
Navigator luxury SUV; $17,730 worth of wine; $32,775 
in donations and political contributions; $6,945 on 
jewelry; and $10,891 on his pets.  Presented with 
these expenditures and a list that also included 
gifts, firearms, restaurants, department stores, and 
other purely discretionary spending, any jury would 
conclude that Curtis had the money to pay his taxes 
(at least in part) and simply chose not to.  
Id. at 911. 
¶10 The referee concluded that Attorney Curtis' long-
standing failure to pay his taxes reflected adversely on his 
fitness as a lawyer in violation of SCR 20:8.4(b),2 in that it 
showed a disregard for his legal obligations and reflected 
adversely on his legal judgment and expertise.  
Failure to Remit Payroll Taxes (Count 2) 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:8.4(b) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on 
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects. 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
6 
 
¶11 Count 2 concerns the undisputed fact that Attorney 
Curtis' firm failed to remit to the federal government the 
payroll taxes for his law firm's employees for the third and 
fourth quarters of 2013 and all of 2014.  The OLR alleged that 
this conduct was a form of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).3  
¶12 The referee recommended the dismissal of this charge, 
citing an overall "paucity of evidence."  On the one hand, the 
referee found that Attorney Curtis became aware, at some point, 
that his firm had not remitted the payroll taxes that it had 
withheld from its employees during part of 2013 and all of 2014.  
But the referee credited Attorney Curtis' testimony at the 
disciplinary hearing that the firm fell behind on remitting 
payroll taxes because the IRS's garnishment of firm accounts 
left him unclear as to whether the seized funds were being 
applied toward payroll taxes.  In the referee's view, the record 
was too unclear to permit him to conclude that Attorney Curtis 
engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  As such, the referee recommended 
the dismissal of Count 2.   
Trust Account Violations (Counts 3-6) 
¶13 These misconduct charges concern the disarrayed state 
of the firm's trust account.  Since 1999, Attorney Curtis has 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
7 
 
been the sole partner in the firm; for many years before that, 
he practiced in partnership with one or more lawyers.  Since 
1999, Attorney Curtis was the attorney primarily responsible for 
supervising and managing the firm's trust account, as well as 
for supervising the trust account-related work of the firm's 
office manager, bookkeepers, and other staff.   
¶14 As a firm largely engaged in the representation of 
plaintiffs, the firm would receive settlement and judgment 
payments and deposit these funds in a trust account, pending a 
determination of how the funds should be disbursed.  It was 
Attorney Curtis' practice (and apparently that of the lawyers 
who oversaw the firm's trust account before Attorney Curtis 
began doing so) to hold in the trust account any potentially 
disputed portions of settlement and judgment payments (e.g., 
funds that could be subject to subrogation claims) pending 
resolution of the claims or the expiration of any applicable 
statute of limitations, which Attorney Curtis understood to span 
six years from the firm's receipt of the funds.  If the claimant 
was not currently pursuing the claim, Attorney Curtis would 
advise his client to simply wait and not "wake up" the claimant 
by attempting to resolve the matter; that way, Attorney Curtis 
believed, his client might ultimately collect more money than 
they would have otherwise received had the claim been resolved. 
Because many clients followed his advice, more money was held in 
trust than would have been the case had these claims been 
resolved soon after receipt of the funds.  And because the firm 
failed to periodically review the trust account to ensure that 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
8 
 
releasable funds were, in fact, released, the funds languished 
in the firm's trust account for many years. 
¶15 This practice led to an impossibly jumbled trust 
account.  In 2009, while converting the firm from a paper to an 
electronic accounting system, firm employees discovered that a 
substantial amount of money had been held in trust for longer 
than the six-year statute of limitations that Attorney Curtis 
believed governed them.  The firm began an effort to identify 
and locate clients to whom these funds belonged——a task that 
proved difficult and, in some instances, unworkable.  Some of 
the clients had moved.  Others could not be found.  Others had 
died, sometimes requiring that an estate be opened or reopened.  
There were some funds held in trust for which the client could 
not be identified.  As a result, a substantial amount of money 
remained unpaid to its owners.  As of April 2014, the firm trust 
account held a total of $1,059,218.09.  Of that amount, at least 
$105,235.59 related to cases that had been closed prior to April 
2008; some funds had been held since as far back as 1978.  The 
firm has made some progress in disbursing these funds; by April 
2015, the firm disbursed $42,865.41 of the $105,235.59 related 
to cases that had been closed prior to April 2008.  As of 
January 2015, there remained $23,487.94 held in trust with 
respect to which the owners could not be identified.  
¶16 Based 
on 
these 
facts 
and 
on 
Attorney 
Curtis' 
admissions (see n.1), the referee determined that Attorney 
Curtis failed to ensure the prompt notice and delivery of funds 
to clients and third parties, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(b), in 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
9 
 
effect between October 1, 2000 and June 30, 2004, and former SCR 
20:1.15(d)(l), effective as of July 1, 2004 (Count 3).4   
¶17 Based on the above facts and on Attorney Curtis' 
admissions in his answer, the referee determined that Attorney 
Curtis failed to regularly reconcile his trust account in 
                                                 
4 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to 
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule."  See S. 
Ct. Order 14-07, (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 2016).  
Because the conduct underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 
2016, unless otherwise indicated, all references to the supreme 
court rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2016. 
Former SCR 20:1.15(b), in effect between October 1, 
2000 and June 30, 2004, provided: 
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 
client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall 
promptly notify the client or third person in writing.  
Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted 
by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall 
promptly deliver to the client or third person any 
funds or other property that the client or third 
person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the 
client or third person, shall render a full accounting 
regarding such property. 
Former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1), in effect between July 1, 
2004 and June 30, 2016, provided:   
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 
client has an interest, or in which the lawyer has 
received notice that a 3rd party has an interest 
identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or 
contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client 
or 3rd party in writing.  Except as stated in this 
rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement 
with the client, the lawyer shall promptly deliver to 
the client or 3rd party any funds or other property 
that the client or 3rd party is entitled to receive.  
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
10 
 
violation of SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)g (Count 4),5 and failed to 
adequately supervise his staff's management of the trust account 
in violation of SCR 20:5.3(a) and (b), in effect between October 
1, 2000 and December 31, 2009, and SCR 20:5.3(a) and (b), in 
effect as of January 1, 2010 (Count 6).6  
                                                 
5 Former SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)g, in effect between January 
1, 2010 and June 30, 2016, provided: 
For each trust account, the lawyer shall prepare 
and retain a printed reconciliation report on a 
regular and periodic basis not less frequently than 
every 30 days.  Each reconciliation report shall show 
all of the following balances and verify that they are 
identical: 
1. the balance that appears in the transaction 
register as of the reporting date; 
2. the total of all subsidiary ledger balances 
for IOLTA accounts and other pooled trust accounts, 
determined by listing and totaling the balances in the 
individual client ledgers and the ledger for account 
fees and charges, as of the reporting date; and  
3. the adjusted balance, determined by adding 
outstanding deposits and other credits to the balance 
in the financial institution's monthly statement and 
subtracting outstanding checks and other deductions 
from the balance in the monthly statement. 
6 Former SCR 20:5.3(a) and (b), in effect between 
October 1, 2000 and December 31, 2009, provided that, 
with respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or 
associated with a lawyer: 
(a) a partner in a law firm shall make reasonable 
efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures 
giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct 
is compatible with the professional obligations of the 
lawyer; 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
11 
 
¶18 The referee determined, however, that the OLR had not 
proven  that Attorney Curtis failed to maintain and retain 
complete records of trust account funds in violation of 
SCR 20:1.15(e), in effect between October 1, 2000 and June 30, 
2004 and SCR 20:1.15(e)(6), in effect since July 1, 2004 (Count 
5).7  According to the referee, the record was unclear as to 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority 
over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to 
ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with 
the professional obligations of the lawyer. 
Current SCR 20:5.3(a) and (b) provide that, with 
respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or 
associated with a lawyer: 
(a) a partner, and a lawyer who individually or 
together 
with 
other 
lawyers 
possesses 
comparable 
managerial 
authority 
in 
a 
law 
firm 
shall 
make 
reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in 
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the 
person's conduct is compatible with the professional 
obligations of the lawyer; 
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority 
over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to 
ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with 
the professional obligations of the lawyer. 
7 Former SCR 20:1.15(e), in effect between October 1, 2000 
and June 30, 2004, provided:  "Complete records of trust account 
funds and other trust property shall be kept by the lawyer and 
shall be preserved for a period of at least six years after 
termination of the representation." 
Former SCR 20:1.15(e)(6), in effect between July 1, 2004 
and June 30, 2016, provided:  "A lawyer shall maintain complete 
records of trust account funds and other trust property and 
shall preserve those records for at least 6 years after the date 
of termination of the representation." 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
12 
 
whether Attorney Curtis' trust account problems were the result 
of a failure to keep the records required by SCR 20:1.15, or a 
failure to properly reconcile the records he kept.  The referee 
therefore concluded that the OLR had failed to prove trust 
account misconduct independent of that charged in Counts 3, 4, 
and 6.   
401(k) Issues (Count 7) 
¶19 This misconduct charge concerned the firm's payment 
(or non-payment) of funds into the 401(k) plan that it 
maintained for its employees.  Both firm employees and the firm 
itself 
would 
make 
contributions 
to 
the 
plan, 
which 
was 
administered by a third party.  Attorney Curtis determined the 
amount of the firm's contribution to the plan.  
¶20 The OLR claimed that the firm did not remit to the 
401(k) plan the amounts that had been withheld from employee 
paychecks for that purpose, nor did the firm make its promised 
contributions to the plan.  The OLR claimed that these actions 
displayed dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  In his answer to the OLR complaint 
and in his hearing testimony, Attorney Curtis invoked the Fifth 
Amendment in response to allegations and questions about the 
401(k) plan. 
¶21 The 
referee 
recommended 
the 
dismissal 
of 
this 
misconduct charge, again citing a paucity of evidence in the 
record.  The referee maintained that the record did not show why 
amounts withheld from employee checks were not promptly paid to 
the 401(k) plan; whether Attorney Curtis was involved in the 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
13 
 
nonpayment 
of 
employee 
funds 
to 
the 
401(k) 
plan; 
what 
representations Attorney Curtis made to employees regarding the 
401(k) plan; how any such representations related to the status 
of the 401(k) plan at the time they were made; and whether the 
firm was current on its own contributions to the plan.  The only 
established facts regarding the 401(k) plan, according to the 
referee, were that:  (1) while delayed, all amounts that the 
firm withheld from employee paychecks were eventually paid into 
the 401(k) plan; and (2) Attorney Curtis pled the Fifth 
Amendment in response to allegations and questions about the 
401(k) plan.  The referee reasoned that neither of these facts, 
viewed together or in isolation, constituted sufficient proof of 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation to warrant a 
determination of an SCR 20:8.4(c) violation.  Although an 
attorney's invocation of the Fifth Amendment in a disciplinary 
proceeding permits an inference to be drawn on issues involving 
grounds for discipline, State v. Postorino, 53 Wis. 2d 412, 416–
17, 193 N.W.2d 1 (1972), the referee wrote that the OLR was 
"asking the possibility of a negative inference do too much 
work" in this case.   
¶22 As for the amount of discipline required to address 
the above-described misconduct, the referee noted various 
mitigating and aggravating factors.  On the mitigating side of 
the ledger, the referee noted that Attorney Curtis did not 
attempt to conceal his tax obligations; rather, he filed yearly 
tax returns informing the government what he owed, though he did 
not pay the amount owed.  Attorney Curtis served time in prison, 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
14 
 
without practicing law, for his failure to pay income taxes.  
The referee also noted that the trust account violations did not 
benefit Attorney Curtis, were not intentional, and did not 
involve misrepresentation or dishonesty.  Attorney Curtis also 
tried to locate the clients to whom money was owed.  The referee 
further noted that Attorney Curtis had practiced law for 55 
years without prior discipline, and is now 81 years old.   
¶23 On the aggravating side of the ledger, the referee 
noted that the length of time during which Attorney Curtis was 
delinquent on his taxes and the size of the delinquency itself 
were quite considerable.  Likewise, the dollar amount of the 
undisbursed trust account funds and the length of time during 
which 
those 
funds 
languished 
in 
the 
trust 
account 
were 
significant.     
¶24 Given all of the above considerations, the referee 
proposed that a 120-day license suspension was in order.  The 
referee also recommended that, as a condition of Attorney 
Curtis' practice of law following his suspension, he must 
disburse the funds held in trust to the proper recipients, and 
he must certify to the OLR that he has a system in place that:  
(1) provides periodic reports to clients regarding amounts held 
in trust; (2) flags amounts that have remained in trust for more 
than a specified period since receipt of the funds and since the 
last review by an attorney; and (3) requires an attorney in the 
firm to review these funds on an annual basis to determine 
whether they should be disbursed. 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
15 
 
¶25 Because no appeal has been filed from the referee's 
report and recommendation, we review the matter pursuant to 
SCR 22.17(2). 
When 
reviewing 
a 
referee's 
report 
and 
recommendation, we affirm the referee's findings of fact unless 
they are found to be clearly erroneous, but we review the 
referee's conclusions of law on a de novo basis. In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 
Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We determine the appropriate level 
of discipline to impose given the particular facts of each case, 
independent of the referee's recommendation, but benefiting from 
it.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, 
¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶26 This is a difficult case.  The referee's task was 
undoubtedly complicated by the polar opposite positions taken by 
the parties before him:  the OLR demanded the revocation of 
Attorney Curtis' license, and Attorney Curtis insisted that no 
discipline was warranted whatsoever.  In a lengthy report, the 
referee 
resisted 
any 
temptation 
to 
make 
a 
middle-ground 
recommendation, instead proposing a 120-day suspension——a result 
from which neither party appealed, leaving us to decide this 
matter without the benefit of automatically ordered briefing.8    
                                                 
8 We could have ordered the parties to file briefs with us 
on our own motion.  See SCR 22.17(2).  But we have not done so, 
as the issues are not so insurmountable as to justify the 
further expense and delay of additional briefing in this long-
pending matter. 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
16 
 
¶27 Adding another layer of complexity, Attorney Curtis 
declined, on Fifth Amendment grounds, to answer any allegations 
or questions regarding his firm's 401(k) plan (Count 7), but 
also introduced evidence at the disciplinary hearing to suggest 
that the plan's finances were in order.  This litigation 
strategy 
was 
entirely 
permissible: 
 
our 
rules 
permit 
a 
respondent-lawyer to invoke his or her right against self-
incrimination, SCR 22.03(7), and this right is unaffected by 
assertions of innocence.  See Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 
(2001).  It was then incumbent on the OLR to make a strong case 
against Attorney Curtis on the subject of the 401(k) plan from 
independent sources——a task that, the record shows, the OLR 
might have done better.  For example, the record is largely 
devoid of records relating to the 401(k) plan, such as the 
plan's accounting and tax records, or its standard quarterly and 
annual reports, or any regular correspondence between the firm 
and the plan's third-party administrator.  All said, this court 
is left with a challenging task in determining, on the facts, 
the magnitude of Attorney Curtis' misconduct and the amount of 
discipline necessary to prevent its recurrence, either by him or 
other lawyers.  
¶28 We start by addressing the easiest issue to dispose 
of:  whether Attorney Curtis' willful failure to pay income 
taxes reflected adversely on his fitness as a lawyer, in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(b) (Count 1).  The answer is a clear 
yes.   
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
17 
 
¶29 Attorney Curtis' position before the referee seemed to 
be that his tax woes didn't amount to professional misconduct 
given that he filed accurate tax returns——he simply didn't pay 
the taxes owed, which was a purely personal failing that didn't 
abuse his professional status as a lawyer, or violate any 
professional norms, or harm any clients, or (he claimed) tarnish 
his reputation in the legal community.  We disagree, as did the 
referee.  Given his federal conviction, upheld on appeal, 
Attorney 
Curtis 
cannot 
meaningfully 
dispute 
that 
he 
intentionally failed to pay any of the taxes he owed for the 
years 2007 through 2009 despite having adjusted gross income of 
more than $1.4 million over those years, and despite having 
spent significant sums on extravagances——$17,730 on wine, for 
example.  See Curtis, 781 F.3d at 911.  As Attorney Curtis 
himself 
told 
the 
district 
court 
during 
his 
sentencing 
allocution,9 "my whole system was wrong.  . . . I had the concept 
that it was my money and it isn't my money.  Unfortunately I 
never really thought about it."  This sort of blinkered thinking 
raises a red flag as to Attorney Curtis' fitness as lawyer——one 
that he, in this proceeding, seems unable or unwilling to 
acknowledge:  during his disciplinary hearing, he blithely 
compared the jury's verdict that he willfully failed to pay his 
taxes to "historical verdicts that the world was flat.  I got 
                                                 
9 The transcript of Attorney Curtis' sentencing hearing from 
his federal tax case is included in the record of this 
disciplinary matter, along with various other documents from 
that case.   
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
18 
 
beat."   On these facts, we have no difficulty concluding that 
Attorney Curtis' criminal act reflects adversely on his fitness 
as a lawyer. 
¶30 We move next to Count 2, which alleged that, by 
failing to remit to the federal government the payroll taxes10 
that had been withheld from employee paychecks during the third 
and fourth quarters of 2013 and all of 2014, Attorney Curtis 
engaged 
in 
a 
form 
of 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  As described 
above, the referee recommended the dismissal of this charge, 
citing ambiguity in the record as to whether Attorney Curtis 
understood that the firm's payroll taxes were not being paid.  
On the one hand, the referee found that Attorney Curtis became 
                                                 
10 On the subject of payroll taxes, the Seventh Circuit has 
explained: 
The Internal Revenue Code requires employers to 
withhold income and Federal Insurance Contribution Act 
taxes from their employees' wages.  The amounts 
collected from the employees' wages are considered to 
be held by the employer in trust for the United 
States, and must be paid over quarterly.  See Slodov 
v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 244, 98 S.Ct. 1778, 
1783–84, 56 L.Ed.2d 251 (1978) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 
7501(a)).  While it is not always required that these 
funds be segregated by the employer prior to being 
paid over to the IRS, the law is clear that the funds 
may not be used by the employer for any other 
obligations, including but not limited to operating 
expenses.  Id.; see also Purdy Co. of Illinois v. 
United States, 814 F.2d 1183, 1186 (7th Cir. 1987). 
United States v. Kim, 111 F.3d 1351, 1356-57 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
19 
 
aware, at some point, that his firm had not remitted the payroll 
taxes that it had withheld from its employees during part of 
2013 and all of 2014.  But the referee credited testimony at the 
disciplinary hearing that the firm fell behind on remitting 
payroll taxes because the IRS had garnished firm accounts, which 
in turn left Attorney Curtis unclear as to whether the seized 
funds were being applied toward payroll taxes.  These facts, the 
referee wrote, preclude a determination that Attorney Curtis' 
conduct rose to the level of dishonesty, fraud, or deceit that 
constituted an SCR 20:8.4(c) violation.  As such, the referee 
recommended the dismissal of Count 2.   
¶31 We accept the referee's recommendation to dismiss 
Count 2.  Neither party has challenged any of the referee's 
findings of fact or legal conclusions underlying the referee's 
recommended dismissal of this count.  Our own review of the 
matter leads us to accept the referee's findings of fact——in 
particular his credibility determination that Attorney Curtis 
was unclear as to whether funds seized by the IRS were being 
applied 
toward 
payroll 
taxes. 
 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Nunnery, 2009 WI 89, ¶40, 320 Wis. 2d 422, 
769 N.W.2d 858 ("The referee is best situated to judge the 
credibility of witnesses.")  We also note, as did the referee, 
the absence from the record of certain documentary evidence that 
would have been helpful in analyzing this misconduct count; 
e.g., the firm's payroll tax returns, payroll accounting 
records, employee payroll stubs, etc.  Based on the referee's 
unchallenged factual findings of fact and on the state of the 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
20 
 
record, we agree with the referee's conclusion that the OLR 
failed to establish that Attorney Curtis engaged in dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation sufficient to warrant a 
misconduct determination on Count 2.   
¶32 We move next to Counts 3 through 6, which concern 
trust account problems.  Attorney Curtis admitted in his answer 
that he failed to regularly reconcile his trust account (Count 
4), and he failed to adequately supervise his staff's management 
of the trust account (Count 6).  Attorney Curtis admitted in his 
post-hearing briefing that he failed to ensure the prompt notice 
and delivery of funds to clients and third parties (Count 3).  
Given Attorney Curtis' misguided practice of trying to wait-out 
subrogated claims by letting subrogated funds lay dormant——and 
untracked——in his trust account, we have no difficulty accepting 
his admissions on these counts.   
¶33 We also agree with the referee's recommendation to 
dismiss Count 5, which alleged that Attorney Curtis failed to 
maintain and retain complete records of trust account funds.  
According to the referee, the record is unclear as to whether 
Attorney Curtis' trust account problems were the result of a 
failure to keep the records required by SCR 20:1.15, or a 
failure to properly reconcile the records he kept.  The referee 
therefore concluded that the OLR had failed to prove trust 
account misconduct independent of that charged in Counts 3, 4, 
and 6.  Neither party has appealed from this determination.  We 
conclude that the referee's findings of fact are not clearly 
erroneous, and thus we uphold the referee's conclusion of law 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
21 
 
that Attorney Curtis' conduct did not violate former and current 
SCR 20:1.15(e)(6). 
¶34 We move next to Count 7, which alleged that Attorney 
Curtis 
engaged 
in 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) by virtue of his 
failure to deposit in the firm's 401(k) plan the amount of funds 
that his firm withheld from employee paychecks and the amount of 
funds that his firm had committed to pay into the fund.  As 
mentioned above, Attorney Curtis pled the Fifth Amendment with 
respect to any allegations regarding this count during the 
discovery, pleadings, and disciplinary hearing stages of this 
matter.  We have previously held that although a respondent-
lawyer's invocation of the Fifth Amendment "is not in itself a 
ground for disbarment," we may draw a negative inference from 
that invocation.  Postorino, 53 Wis. 2d at 417.  The referee 
concluded that this negative inference constituted the entirety 
of the OLR's case in support of Count 7——not enough to support a 
misconduct 
charge, 
and 
thus 
the 
referee 
recommended 
its 
dismissal. 
¶35 The referee's discussion of this issue lacks a 
recommendation on whether Attorney Curtis properly invoked the 
Fifth Amendment.  Fifth Amendment protection "must be confined 
to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend 
danger from a direct answer."   Hoffman v. United States, 341 
U.S. 479, 486–87 (1951).  "The witness is not exonerated from 
answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would 
incriminate himself——his say-so does not of itself establish the 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
22 
 
hazard of incrimination.  It is for the court to say whether his 
silence is justified, and to require him to answer if 'it 
clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.'"  Id. 
(citations omitted).  Thus, the "trial court has a clear 
responsibility to make a full record that the witness' fear of 
incrimination 
is 
valid, 
real 
and 
appreciable, 
and 
not 
speculative or merely an imaginary possibility of incriminatory 
danger." 
 
State 
v. 
Harris, 
92 
Wis. 2d 836, 
844–45, 
285 
N.W.2d 917 (Ct. App. 1979) (footnotes omitted).   
¶36 The referee was to have made such "a full record" 
here.  See SCR 22.16(1) ("The referee has the powers of a judge 
trying a civil action and shall conduct the hearing as the trial 
of a civil action to the court.")  The referee did not do so; it 
appears that the parties and the referee alike simply assumed 
that Attorney Curtis' silence regarding the 401(k) funds was 
justified.  Thus, at no point in the record before us did 
Attorney 
Curtis 
articulate 
a 
reason 
why 
responding 
to 
allegations or questions regarding the 401(k) plan could subject 
him to criminal liability, nor did the referee make a 
determination of the proper scope and legitimacy of his Fifth 
Amendment claim.  Such an unchecked use of the Fifth Amendment 
rests uneasily alongside our method of maintaining the integrity 
of the bar by requiring attorneys to fully cooperate with OLR 
investigations. 
 
See 
SCR 
20:8.4(h), 
SCR 
21.15(4), 
SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), and SCR 22.04(1).   
¶37 Nevertheless, it takes little imagination to see the 
"real and appreciable" fear that presumably motivated Attorney 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
23 
 
Curtis' invocation of the Fifth Amendment.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§ 664 (criminalizing theft or embezzlement from an employee 
benefit plan).  At this point, requiring Attorney Curtis to 
trace the path of his employees' 401(k) withholdings from 
paycheck-to-plan might improperly compel him "to surrender the 
very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee."  
Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486.  Thus, we conclude that Attorney 
Curtis properly asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid 
answering allegations and questions about his firm's payment of 
401(k) funds.   
¶38 The referee's discussion of the 401(k) issue is 
lengthy and appropriately critical of the ambiguous nature of 
much of the testimony and exhibits received on the issue.  Based 
on the evidence submitted, the referee found that, for an 
unknown period of time, an unknown amount of employees' 401(k) 
withholdings were delinquent from the firm's 401(k) plan, but 
the firm cured this delinquency by no later than August 2015.  
Citing a shortage of evidence, the referee wrote that he was 
unable to make findings as to why employees' 401(k) withholdings 
were 
delinquent 
from 
the 
firm's 
401(k) 
plan, 
or 
what 
representations Attorney Curtis made to employees related to the 
plan, or whether Attorney Curtis was even involved with the 
401(k) withholdings.  The referee opined that the delay in 
remitting employees' 401(k) withholdings to the 401(k) plan, 
along with the adverse inference drawn from Attorney Curtis' 
invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, were not enough to 
demonstrate an SCR 20:8.4(c) violation; additional evidence of 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
24 
 
"the circumstances of [the funds'] delay" was necessary, the 
referee wrote.   
¶39 We agree.  Given the OLR's failure to submit all 
relevant information about the delinquent 401(k) contributions 
(answering the essential inquiries of who, what, where, when, 
why, and how), we cannot conclude that Attorney Curtis' actions 
rose to the level to the level of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation that constituted a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  
We agree with the referee's observation that the OLR was asking 
the adverse inference drawn from Attorney Curtis' assertion of 
his Fifth Amendment privileges to do "too much work." 
¶40 We 
turn 
next 
to 
the 
issue 
of 
the 
appropriate 
discipline for Attorney Curtis.  The referee recommended a 120-
day suspension of Attorney Curtis' law license, along with a 
variety of trust account related reinstatement conditions.  We  
agree that  a four-month suspension is sufficient, as it is well 
within the wide range of discipline this court has imposed for 
arguably 
similar 
misconduct. 
 
See 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Washington, 2007 WI 65, 301 Wis. 2d 47, 732 
N.W.2d 24 (18-month suspension for conduct resulting in federal 
conviction for one count of tax evasion); In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against McKinley, 2014 WI 48, 354 Wis. 2d 717, 848 
N.W.2d 295 (60–day suspension for conduct resulting in two state 
misdemeanor convictions for filing a false tax return); In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Usow, 214 Wis. 2d 596, 571 
N.W.2d 162 (1997) (six-month suspension for misrepresentation 
and trust account violations that were found to be committed 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
25 
 
without intent and due to a failure to properly supervise office 
staff).   
¶41 We 
turn 
next 
to 
the 
various 
conditions 
of 
reinstatement recommended by the referee.  We agree that certain 
conditions are appropriate to foster Attorney Curtis' compliance 
with trust account requirements, though we do not impose the 
exact conditions suggested by the referee.  Rather, we simply 
direct Attorney Curtis, following reinstatement, to submit to 
OLR trust account monitoring for a period of three years, or 
until such time as this court enters an order ending monitoring. 
¶42 We turn next to the issue of costs.  Citing his view 
that the OLR failed to prove the misconduct alleged in three of 
the seven alleged counts (Counts 2, 5, and 7), the referee 
recommended that Attorney Curtis be ordered to pay three-
quarters of the cost of this proceeding, which will result in 
Attorney Curtis being required to pay costs of $12,665.15. 
Neither 
Attorney 
Curtis 
nor 
the 
OLR 
challenges 
this 
recommendation.  We agree with the referee and the parties that 
a 
one-quarter 
reduction 
in 
costs 
is 
warranted. 
 
Our 
determination is not the result of the application of a precise 
mathematical formula, but is based on our thorough consideration 
of the record, the manner in which this case developed, and the 
factors set forth in SCR 22.24(1m). 
¶43 Finally, we turn to the issue of restitution.  The OLR 
has not sought restitution, citing two reasons:  (1) as part of 
his criminal judgment, the district court ordered Attorney 
Curtis to make $5,000 monthly payments until his overdue income 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
26 
 
taxes are fully paid, making a restitution award related to 
Count 
1 
unnecessary; 
and 
(2) 
the 
remaining 
counts 
not 
recommended for dismissal by the referee concern trust account 
problems of such age and complexity that there is no reasonably 
ascertainable amount of restitution.   
¶44 We agree with the OLR's reasoning.  As for Attorney 
Curtis' back taxes, there is no need for this court to order 
restitution that would duplicate that already ordered in the 
federal court system.  As for Attorney Curtis' trust account 
violations, we note that, according to the record, thousands of 
dollars remain in the firm's trust account with respect to which 
the owners have not been identified, despite the firm's 
substantial efforts to do so.  Given the OLR's plausible 
inability to determine whether any particular client or third 
party is owed any particular amount of money by Attorney Curtis, 
we will accede to the OLR's request not to award restitution in 
this matter.  However, as both part of Attorney Curtis' sanction 
and as a condition of reinstatement, we will require him to 
disburse all funds in his trust account to their rightful 
owners, and if the rightful owners cannot be located, he must 
transfer the funds to the state treasurer's office as unclaimed 
or unidentifiable property.  
¶45 IT IS ORDERED that the license of George W. Curtis, 
Jr. to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 
four months, effective March 29, 2018.   
¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that George W. Curtis, Jr. shall 
distribute all funds in his trust account to their rightful 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
27 
 
owners.  If the rightful owners cannot be located, George W. 
Curtis, Jr. shall transfer those funds to the state treasurer's 
office as unclaimed or unidentifiable property.  George W. 
Curtis, Jr. shall provide documentation to the OLR that all 
funds in his trust account have been so distributed. 
¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, upon reinstatement of his 
license to practice law, George W. Curtis, Jr.'s trust account 
shall be subject to monitoring by the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation for three years or until further order of this court. 
¶48 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, George W. Curtis, Jr. shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation costs in the amount of $12,665.15.    
¶49 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that George W. Curtis, Jr. shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
an attorney whose license to practice law has been suspended. 
¶50 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.28(2). 
 
 
No. 
2015AP1567-D   
 
 
 
1