Case Title: In Re Wirsing

Citation: 456 Mich. 467, 573 N.W.2d 51

Docket Number: 104834

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 1998-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Decided February 3, 1998.
Herbert J. Booth and John P. Siler, Flint, for petitioner-appellant.
Calvin A. Luker, Marsha Lynn Tuck, Livonia, Stewart R. Hakola, Marquette, and Mark A. Cody, Lansing, for intervenor-appellee.
*52 Mark Todd Twichel, Goodrich, amici curiae for American Association of Mental Retardation, Arc of Michigan, Association for Community Advocacy, and Autism Society of Michigan.
MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, Justice.
In this case we are asked to determine if a probate court has the statutory authority to permit the plenary guardian of a ward to consent to a tubal ligation of the ward for birth control purposes. For the reasons indicated below, we conclude that the probate court does have such authority. We further conclude that the authority was properly exercised in this case, and therefore affirm the order of the Genesee County Probate Court.
The underlying facts in this case are straightforward, despite the lengthy course of litigation. In 1981, eighteen-year-old Lora Faye Wirsing was adjudicated to be a developmentally disabled person as a result of retardation since her birth. The Genesee County Probate Court appointed petitioner-appellant Donna L. Wirsing as plenary guardian of her daughter, Lora Faye Wirsing, under the Mental Health Code, M.C.L. § 330.1600 et seq.; M.S.A. § 14.800(600) et seq. In 1986, the guardian petitioned the Genesee County Probate Court for authorization for a tubal ligation for birth control purposes. Both the Genesee Probate and Circuit Courts denied having jurisdiction. The first decision of the Court of Appeals in this matter held that jurisdiction properly lay in the probate court.
The case was returned to the probate court, where the Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service (MPAS) was allowed to intervene. Following denial of a MPAS motion to dismiss the petition, with leave for an interlocutory appeal being denied by the Court of Appeals and this Court, the case proceeded to an extensive evidentiary hearing. The guardian and MPAS presented numerous lay and expert witnesses.
The trial judge made nineteen specific findings of fact, as follows:
On the basis of these factual findings, the probate court authorized the guardian to consent to the procedure for the ward. MPAS appealed in the Genesee Circuit Court, which affirmed. The Court of Appeals denied leave to MPAS, which then applied for leave to appeal to this Court. This Court, in lieu of granting leave, directed the Court of Appeals to determine, as on leave granted, without restriction, "whether probate judges possess the power to authorize a guardian to consent to the sterilization of a developmentally disabled citizen." 441 Mich. 886, 495 N.W.2d 388 (1992).
On remand, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the probate court. 214 Mich. App. 131, 542 N.W.2d 594 (1995). The Court of Appeals reasoned that the 1974 revision of the Mental Health Code, M.C.L. § 330.1600 et seq.; M.S.A. § 14.800(600)et seq., eliminated the authority of the probate court to authorize a guardian to consent to the sterilization of a ward. We granted the guardian leave to appeal, and now reverse.
Probate courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Const. 1963, art. 6, § 15. The jurisdiction of the probate court is defined entirely by statute. In re Kasuba Estate, 401 Mich. 560,258 N.W.2d 731 (1977).
The history of sterilization of mentally ill and developmentally disabled persons in Michigan began in 1897, when a bill was introduced in our Legislature to utilize sterilization to prevent "idiocy."[1] As may be gathered from the terminology employed, the reasoning underlying this proposed legislation was of a sort no longer condoned by a large portion of society. While this bill failed, a similar act, 1913 P.A. 34, later became law, applying to those persons who were "mentally defective" and supported at public expense in public institutions. We found that statute constitutionally deficient on equal protection grounds in Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge, 201 Mich. 138, 166 N.W. 938 (1918).
A subsequent act, 1923 P.A. 285, was upheld by this Court in Smith v. Wayne Co. Probate Judge, 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140 (1925). That act applied to mentally defective persons. It was replaced by 1929 P.A. 281, allowing sterilization of insane and mentally ill persons to prevent them from procreating.
While these later acts authorized the application by a parent for sterilization of a child, as was the case in Smith, the bulk of applications, as the parties here agree, came from the administrators of various institutions for the sterilization of the wards under their care.
In 1974, our Legislature undertook a complete revision of the statutes dealing with mentally ill and developmentally disabled persons. The resulting Mental Health Code, M.C.L. § 330.1600 et seq.; M.S.A. § 14.800(600) et seq., repealed 1929 P.A. 281. This new Mental Health Code did not mention sterilization or, for that matter, any medical procedures. Presumably, § 602's reference to utilizing a guardianship "to promote *54 and protect the well-being of the individual" contemplated the provision of necessary medical assistance.
In 1977, the Legislature passed M.C.L. § 330.1629; M.S.A. § 14.800(629), which concerned a guardian's consent to ordinary medical procedures on behalf of a ward. The 1978 amendment of this section added a reference to "extraordinary procedures," specifically including sterilization. M.C.L. § 330.1629; M.S.A. § 14.800(629) currently reads as follows:
This case involves a petition by a plenary guardian. The duties of a plenary guardian are defined by M.C.L. § 330.1631; M.S.A. § 14.800(631). Subsection 1 of that section defines the relevant duties in this matter:
In view of the above, we are able to answer this question with the application of a rule so basic that it predates the history of the sterilization statutes. When interpreting statutes, "[t]he fair and natural import of the terms employed, in view of the subject matter of the law, is what should govern." People ex rel. Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127, 167 (1865) (opinion of Cooley, J.; citations omitted). While not discounting the languishing of this matter in the courts for over eleven years, we find the statute to plainly contemplate the probate court's authorization of a guardian to consent to extraordinary medical procedures, specifically including sterilization.
The Court of Appeals majority failed, as noted by the dissent below, to distinguish between the unfortunate history of forced eugenic sterilization and the separate concept of voluntary sterilization. Our decision here is based on the later concept. Nothing in this decision should be interpreted as an endorsement of a return to the routine sterilization system of the past, as MPAS argues may occur. Indeed, our decision here is based on the Legislature's sound determination of the probate court's role, and we have every confidence that the probate courts of our state will diligently carry out that role, limiting extraordinary procedures to only those situations in which they are appropriate. Our Legislature halted the routine involuntary sterilizations of the past, but our approval of this effort must not cloud our recognition of the Legislature's authorization of the availability of sterilization as a voluntary extraordinary procedure.
We have previously recognized that, where an individual is unable to exercise an important right, a substituted-judgment analysis may be appropriate. In re Martin, 450 Mich. 204, 538 N.W.2d 399 (1995). In Martin, we also noted that in those cases, such as this, in which a person has never been able to *55 make a decision in the context of an important right, an objective best-interests standard might be appropriate. Id. at 223, n. 15, 538 N.W.2d 399.
In this case, the ward is unable to choose for herself whether she wishes to become pregnant. To deprive her of the option of sterilization, in addition to affronting the statute, would make the choice for her, and make the same choice for each ward, regardless of the circumstances. This result comports neither with the statute nor the best interests of the individual ward.
What the Legislature has instead provided is a mechanism designed to encourage a guardian, upon concluding it is in the ward's interests, to apply to the probate court for an order authorizing consent for an extraordinary procedure such as sterilization. The probate court shall then evaluate the case, and, if it is persuaded and finds that the procedure is in the ward's best interests, order the authorization of consent.
We find that to be exactly what happened here. The guardian articulated reasons for believing this procedure was in the ward's best interests, and supported those reasons with evidence. The probate court concluded that such a procedure indeed was in the ward's best interests and authorized it. In these matters, where the ward cannot exercise personal judgment, the decision passes to the guardian. In this case, the probate court appropriately evaluated the evidence to insure that the decision made was indeed in the ward's best interests.
We specifically decline to hold that a "clear and convincing" evidence standard is required in these matters, entrusting the probate court to exercise its sound discretion in deciding whether an extraordinary procedure is in the ward's best interests. A review of the record leaves us convinced that the probate court carefully and thoughtfully carried out its role and made a well-reasoned decision.
Accordingly, we hold that the probate court has jurisdiction to hear an application by a guardian for authorization to consent to an extraordinary procedure under M.C.L. § 330.1629; M.S.A. § 14.800(629), including sterilization, and to order such authorization if it determines the procedure is in the ward's best interests. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the August 1, 1990, order of the Genesee County Probate Court allowing the guardian to consent to the performance of a tubal ligation on her ward.
MALLETT, C.J., and BRICKLEY, BOYLE, WEAVER, MARILYN J. KELLY, and TAYLOR, JJ., concurred with MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, J.
[1]  See Brakel, The Mentally Disabled and the Law (3rd ed.), p. 522.