Case Title: In re C.B.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S237801, S237762

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2018-08-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
SEE CONCURRING OPINION 
Filed 8/30/18 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re C.B., a Person Coming Under the 
) 
Juvenile Court Law. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
) 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S237801 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/3 A146277 
C.B., 
) 
 
) 
Contra Costa County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. J1301073 
 
____________________________________) 
 
) 
In re C.H., a Person Coming Under the 
) 
Juvenile Court Law. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
) 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S237762 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/3 A146120 
C.H., 
) 
 
) 
Contra Costa County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. J1100679 
 
____________________________________) 
 
The California Department of Justice maintains a databank of DNA 
samples and genetic profiles collected from certain adult and juvenile offenders 
2 
who have been arrested, convicted, or declared wards of the court.  (Pen. Code, 
§§ 295–300.4.)1  Juveniles declared wards based on felony conduct must submit 
samples, but need not do so for most misdemeanor offenses.  (§ 296, subd. (a).)  
The Legislature has also established a procedure to seek destruction of a sample 
and expungement of a profile from the databank.  (§ 299.) 
In 2014, the passage of Proposition 47 reclassified various drug and 
property offenses from felonies to misdemeanors.  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. 
Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, §§ 5–13, pp. 71‒73 (Proposition 47 Voter 
Guide).)  Appellants here are juveniles who were declared wards of the court 
based on conduct that was felonious when committed.  They urge that because 
their acts are now misdemeanors, they are entitled to have their DNA samples and 
profiles removed from the databank.  We hold that Proposition 47 does not 
authorize that relief, nor does equal protection compel it.  The judgments of the 
Courts of Appeal are affirmed. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
These two cases raise the identical legal issues and were consolidated for 
argument and decision. 
In 2011, C.H. entered a department store with two friends, changed into a 
pair of pants in a dressing room, and left the store alone without paying for the 
new pants.  He saw his friends fighting with a loss prevention officer and joined 
in, kicking the officer in the head.  C.H. was arrested and admitted both theft and 
assault. 
A juvenile wardship petition was sustained, with findings that C.H. 
committed felony grand theft person.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 602, 
                                              
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
3 
subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c).)  He was ordered to submit fingerprints and 
DNA samples to the California Department of Justice.  (Pen. Code, §§ 296, 
296.1.) 
In 2013, C.B. entered an unoccupied home and took jewelry, a wallet, cell 
phone, and video game system.  When the homeowner unexpectedly returned, 
C.B. brandished a knife to attempt escape.  The victim and witnesses detained 
C.B., who confessed when police officers arrived. 
The court sustained a wardship petition based on misdemeanor residential 
burglary and felony grand theft person.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 602, 
subd. (a); Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b), 487, subd. (c).)  C.B. was also 
ordered to submit fingerprints and DNA samples.  (Pen. Code, §§ 296, 296.1.) 
In 2015, after voters approved Proposition 47, C.B. and C.H. petitioned to 
have their felony violations redesignated as misdemeanors, their fines reduced, 
and their DNA samples and profiles expunged from the state databank.  (See 
§§ 299, 490.2, 1170.18.)  In each case, the trial courts redesignated the offense as 
a misdemeanor and reduced the fine.  However, both motions for expungement 
were denied. 
Two different panels of the Court of Appeal affirmed, one by a divided 
vote.  (In re C.B. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1112; id. at p. 1128 (dis. opn. of Pollak, 
Acting P. J.); In re C.H. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1139.)  In In re C.B., the majority 
concluded Proposition 47 did not expand the existing grounds for expungement.  
Moreover, after Proposition 47’s passage the Legislature had amended section 
299, subdivision (f), to clarify that redesignation of a felony to a misdemeanor was 
not a basis for removal.  (In re C.B., at pp. 1118–1128.)  The dissent argued that 
Proposition 47 required redesignated offenses to be treated as misdemeanors for 
all purposes, including eligibility for retention in the databank.  (See § 1170.18, 
4 
subd. (k).)  The dissent urged that the Legislature’s amendment of section 299, 
subdivision (f), was invalid because it contravened Proposition 47. 
In re C.H. was issued the same day.  There, a unanimous court interpreted 
the statutory scheme similarly to the In re C.B. majority.  It held that Proposition 
47 did not change the circumstance that C.H.’s conduct had been a felony when 
committed and his sample had been properly collected.  Nothing in section 299 or 
section 1170.18 authorized expungement based on subsequent redesignation of 
C.H.’s offense.  (In re C.H., supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1145–1151.)  The court 
expressly disagreed with Alejandro N. v. Superior Court (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 
1209, 1226–1230, which had held to the contrary.  In re C.H. also rejected the 
argument that equal protection principles required expungement.  (In re C.H., at 
pp. 1151–1152.) 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Legal Background 
 
1. 
The State DNA Databank 
For several decades, “California law [has] required the collection of 
biological samples from individuals convicted of certain offenses.  In 1983, the 
Legislature enacted legislation requiring certain sex offenders to provide blood 
and saliva samples before their release or discharge.  (Stats. 1983, ch. 700, § 1, 
pp. 2680–2681, codified at Pen. Code, former § 290.2.)  In 1998, the Legislature 
enacted the ‘DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act of 
1998,’ which required the collection of DNA samples from persons convicted of 
certain felony offenses, including certain sex offenses, homicide offenses, 
kidnapping, and felony assault or battery.  (Stats. 1998, ch. 696, § 2, pp. 4571–
4579; Pen. Code, former § 296, subd. (a).)”  (People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 
665.)  In 2004, the voters adopted Proposition 69, which amended the act to 
further expand the class of those obligated to submit samples.  This expanded 
5 
group included all juveniles adjudged wards of the court based on felony conduct.  
(Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004) text of Prop. 69, § III.3, 
pp. 137-138 (Proposition 69 Voter Guide).) 
The DNA and Forensic Identification Database and Data Bank Act of 1998 
(DNA Act) requires submission of “buccal swab samples, right thumbprints, and a 
full palm print impression of each hand, and any blood specimens or other 
biological samples required pursuant to this chapter for law enforcement 
identification analysis.”  (§ 296, subd. (a).)  The buccal swab samples contain the 
offender’s DNA.  (See § 295, subd. (e).)  Samples are submitted to the California 
Department of Justice’s DNA Laboratory, which creates and stores a genetic 
profile in the databank.  (§§ 295, 295.1; see People v. Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 
666.)2 
 
2. 
Proposition 47 
In 2014, Proposition 47 reclassified as misdemeanors various drug- and 
theft-related offenses previously treated as felonies or wobblers.  (People v. 
Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 355.)  The initiative had both prospective and 
retroactive aspects, reducing punishments going forward and providing relief for 
those who had already suffered felony convictions.  To achieve its retroactive 
purposes, the initiative added section 1170.18, which authorized a petition for 
recall of sentence or reclassification of an offense.  Felons currently serving a 
sentence based on conduct now reclassified as a misdemeanor could petition for 
recall of their sentences and imposition of a sentence consistent with their new 
misdemeanor status.  (§ 1170.18, subds. (a)–(b); People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 
                                              
2  
Hereafter, we use “sample” as a shorthand for the full range of biological 
samples and profile information submitted and stored under the DNA Act, as 
amended by Proposition 69. 
6 
1175, 1179.)  Those who had already completed a felony sentence could apply to 
have the felony redesignated as a misdemeanor.  (§ 1170.18, subds. (f)–(h).)  
Notably, the initiative gives redesignation broad effect:  “A felony conviction that 
is recalled and resentenced under subdivision (b) or designated as a misdemeanor 
under subdivision (g) shall be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes . . . .”  
(§ 1170.18, subd. (k).)3 
Nothing in the text of section 1170.18 explicitly applies to juveniles.  The 
various provisions for resentencing or redesignation speak entirely in terms of 
sentences and convictions, as opposed to juvenile adjudications.  (See, e.g., 
§ 1170.18, subds. (a), (b), (f), (k).)  “A juvenile adjudication is not a conviction.”  
(People v. Robinson (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1117, fn. 14; see Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 203.)  However, Alejandro N. v. Superior Court, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 1224–1226, concluded section 1170.18 applies equally to juveniles.  The 
People do not contest the application to juvenile cases, and we accept the People’s 
concession. 
B. 
The Scope of the Statutory Entitlement to Expungement from the 
State Databank 
C.B. and C.H. argue Proposition 47’s “misdemeanor for all purposes” 
requirement (§ 1170.18, subd. (k)) entitles them to exclusion from the DNA 
databank.  That contention hinges on the construction of two different voter 
enactments, Proposition 69, which expanded the databank, and Proposition 47, 
which reclassified various offenses.  We apply the same interpretive principles to 
initiatives as to legislative enactments, beginning with the text as the best guide to 
                                              
3  
The only exception to this “for all purposes” provision is that a grant of 
relief “shall not permit that person to own, possess, or have in his or her custody or 
control a firearm or prevent his or her conviction under Chapter 2 (commencing 
with Section 29800) of Division 9 of Title 4 of Part 6.”  (§ 1170.18, subd. (k).) 
7 
voter intent and turning to extrinsic sources such as ballot materials when 
necessary to resolve ambiguities.  (People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 796–
798; Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 321.)  Where 
possible, we seek to harmonize the measures, giving full effect to each.  (State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1029, 1043.) 
 
1. 
Text 
The DNA Act, as modified by Proposition 69, identifies those who must 
provide samples for the databank.  Since 2004, that group has included “any 
juvenile who is adjudicated under Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code for committing any felony offense.”  (§ 296, subd. (a)(1).)  C.B. and C.H. 
became obligated to submit samples when they were found to have committed 
felonies.  C.B. and C.H. would not be under a similar obligation today because 
Proposition 47 reclassified various crimes, including theirs, from felonies to 
misdemeanors.  (See § 490.2, added by Prop. 47, § 8.) 
With respect to sample submission, Propositions 69 and 47 interact 
harmoniously.  Proposition 69 identifies, in the abstract, juveniles who must 
submit samples, principally those adjudicated wards for having committed 
felonies.  Proposition 47 operates prospectively to narrow the class of juveniles 
who must submit samples because it redefines what offenses are felonies.  While 
Proposition 47 spares some future offenders a duty to submit samples, it does not 
alter the past reality that C.B. and C.H. were adjudicated to have committed 
felonies and were obligated at the time to provide samples based on those 
adjudications. 
Section 299 governs retention of samples after they have been submitted.  
Section 299, subdivision (a), says:  “A person whose DNA profile has been 
included in the databank pursuant to this chapter shall have his or her DNA 
specimen and sample destroyed and searchable database profile expunged from 
8 
the databank program pursuant to the procedures set forth in subdivision (b) if the 
person has no past or present offense or pending charge which qualifies that 
person for inclusion within the state’s DNA and Forensic Identification Database 
and Databank Program and there otherwise is no legal basis for retaining the 
specimen or sample or searchable profile.”  As enacted, subdivision (a) sets out 
three conditions for expungement:  (1) “no past or present offense or pending 
charge which qualifies that person for inclusion,” (2) no alternate legal basis for 
retention, and (3) compliance with “the procedures set forth in subdivision (b).” 
After Proposition 47, C.B. and C.H. now appear to satisfy the first and 
second conditions.  Their felony findings have been reclassified and their offenses 
redesignated as misdemeanors.  Under section 296, a juvenile adjudication based 
on a misdemeanor petty theft violation (§ 490.2) does not trigger an obligation to 
submit a sample for inclusion.  Section 299, subdivision (a), is written in the 
present tense; C.B. and C.H. do not currently have any “past or present offense 
. . . which qualifies [them] for inclusion.”  Further, the People present no other 
legal basis for retaining their samples.  As for the third condition, petitioners did 
make written requests for destruction and expungement under section 299, 
subdivision (b), but they do not satisfy the further requirements set out in that 
provision. 
To explain the nature of their failure, we trace the history of section 299, 
subdivision (b)’s procedures.  Since the databank’s inception, submission and 
removal of samples have been governed by different standards.  In 1983, the state 
began collecting blood and saliva samples from mentally disordered sex offenders 
but provided no mechanism for removal or expungement.  (Former § 290.2, 
enacted by Stats. 1983, ch. 700, § 1, pp. 2680–2681.)  By 1996, the categories of 
offenders required to submit samples had expanded to include those convicted of 
certain violent felonies.  (Former § 290.2, subdivision (a), as amended by Stats. 
9 
1996, ch. 917, § 2, p. 5217.)  Biological evidence from known or unknown 
suspects could also be included in the databank, but had to be stricken if an 
individual was later excluded as a suspect.  (Id., subd. (f)(3).)  The law still 
contained no provision for removing samples submitted by those convicted of 
crimes. 
In 1998, the DNA Act comprehensively revised the statutory scheme for 
both collection and retention of samples, repealing former section 290.2 and 
adding a new chapter to the Penal Code.  (Stats. 1998, ch. 696, pp. 4571–4587; see 
People v. Brewer (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1301–1303.)  The universe of those 
required to submit samples again expanded.  (Former § 296, enacted by Stats. 
1998, ch. 696, § 2, pp. 4574–4575.)  For the first time, the revised statutory 
scheme provided standards for removal of samples taken from those who had 
previously been charged with or convicted of a crime.  (Former § 299, enacted by 
Stats. 1998, ch. 696, § 2, pp. 4582–4583).  In cases of reversal, acquittal, or a 
finding of factual innocence, the court entering the judgment was directed to order 
expungement.  (Id., subd. (a).)  In the alternative, an affected individual could 
request expungement.  (Id., subd. (b)(1).)4 
In 2004, Proposition 69 reorganized the expungement provisions and 
amended the procedures for obtaining removal, which was still available only in 
limited circumstances.  (Prop. 69 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 69, § III.9, 
pp. 141–142.)  The court’s independent duty to order expungement was 
eliminated.  (Ibid.; see former § 299, subd. (a), as enacted by Stats. 1998, ch. 696, 
§ 2, p. 4582.)  The Department of Justice was no longer required to periodically 
                                              
4  
Former section 299, subdivision (d), also continued the provision for 
removing samples from individuals determined to no longer be suspects.  (Former 
§ 299, subd. (d), enacted by Stats. 1998, ch. 696, § 2, p. 4583.) 
10 
review and purge samples from former suspects.  (Prop. 69 Voter Guide, supra, 
text of Prop. 69, § III.9, pp. 141–142; see former § 299, subd. (d), as enacted by 
Stats. 2000, ch. 823, § 5, pp. 5680–5681.)  An additional basis for expungement 
was added, however.  Because Proposition 69 for the first time extended the duty 
to submit samples to specified arrestees, it also allowed individuals to seek 
expungement if charges were not filed or were subsequently dismissed.  (§ 299, 
subd. (b)(1).)  Even with this addition, the grounds for exclusion from the 
databank remain narrower than the grounds for inclusion in the first instance.5 
In an important particular, the current scheme operates as it has since the 
databank’s inception:  a showing of changed circumstances eliminating a duty to 
submit a sample is an insufficient basis for expungement of a sample already 
submitted.  As Coffey v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 809, 823, 
explained, the DNA Act does not “permit expungement of the DNA profile (or 
destruction of the samples or specimens) merely because [a] charge was 
subsequently reduced to a misdemeanor:  the [Act] permits expungement only on 
limited grounds.”  A petitioner must demonstrate one of four specific conditions:  
(1) charges were either not filed or were dismissed, (2) charges resulted in an 
acquittal, (3) any conviction was reversed and the case dismissed, or (4) the 
                                              
5  
The provisions of the DNA Act dealing with offenses subject to sex 
offender and arsonist registration reflect another area where the duty to submit a 
sample and the right to expungement are not coextensive.  Section 296, 
subdivision (a)(3), requires both felony and misdemeanor offenders to register as 
sex offenders or arsonists to submit a sample.  While the presence of a duty to 
register requires the submission of a sample, the expiration of that duty does not 
give rise to a corresponding right to expungement:  “Notwithstanding any other 
law, the Department of Justice DNA Laboratory is not required to expunge DNA 
profile or forensic identification information or destroy or return specimens, 
samples, or print impressions taken pursuant to this section if the duty to register 
[as a sex offender or arsonist] is terminated.”  (§ 299, subd. (e).) 
11 
petitioner was found factually innocent.  (§ 299, subd. (b)(1)–(4).)  The applicant 
must request expungement in writing, with copies to the DNA Laboratory of the 
Department of Justice, the trial court, and the prosecuting attorney.  (§ 299, 
subds. (b), (c)(1).)  Thereafter, the applicant must make “the necessary showing at 
a noticed hearing.”  (Id., subd. (c)(2).)  The court has discretion to determine 
whether that showing is sufficient.  (Id., subd. (c)(1).)  The Department of Justice 
is obligated to expunge a sample only after receiving a court order directing that 
action, along with documentary proof that one of the four conditions for 
expungement has been satisfied.  (Id., subd. (c)(2)(B), (D).)  Coffey was decided 
before Proposition 47 was passed.  The question here is whether Coffey remains 
good law.  We conclude that it does. 
After the court’s redesignation orders, C.B. and C.H. no longer stand 
adjudicated of felonies.  But they cannot meet the additional expungement 
requirements of subdivision (b):  lack of charges, acquittal, appellate reversal, or a 
finding of factual innocence.  On the face of the statute, eligibility for 
expungement is confined to these circumstances.  Nothing in section 299 
authorizes expungement on the ground that conduct previously deemed a felony is 
now punished only as a misdemeanor.6 
This reading of the DNA Act, as amended by Proposition 69, does not 
conflict with the text of Proposition 47, which provides that felonies redesignated 
as misdemeanors must be treated as such for “all purposes.”  (§ 1170.18, 
                                              
6  
C.B. and C.H. argue that the basis for expungement they would have us add 
to the statute is analogous to the existing bases for expungement in cases of 
acquittal or reversal on appeal.  But reduction of a crime from a felony to a 
misdemeanor differs from the statutorily recognized bases in a crucial respect:  it 
lacks a determination that the defendant has not been proven to have any criminal 
culpability. 
12 
subd. (k).)  Section 296’s imposition of a duty to submit a sample hinges on the 
classification of the offense at the time of adjudication.  A later reclassification to 
a misdemeanor leaves that former duty undisturbed.  Section 299 hinges eligibility 
for expungement not only on the present status of any offense, but also on a range 
of other conditions, none of which are satisfied by the reclassification of the 
offense.  The Legislature or drafters of Proposition 69 could have subjected 
submission and retention of samples to the same standards, so that someone no 
longer obligated to submit a sample would be entitled to expungement.  
Alternatively, the drafters of Proposition 47 could have provided that 
reclassification was now a basis for expungement.  Such a provision would have 
addressed the established rule from Coffey v. Superior Court, supra, 129 
Cal.App.4th 809, that later reduction of a felony to a misdemeanor does not 
support expungement.  Neither alternative was pursued. 
C.B. and C.H. offer three interrelated textual arguments.  First, they stress 
that section 1170.18, subdivision (k), contains only one exception to its 
“misdemeanor for all purposes” rule, the continued limitation on gun possession.  
The voters should be presumed to know of the state’s DNA collection, and did not 
add an additional exception for DNA samples.  (Alejandro N. v. Superior Court, 
supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1227–1228; In re C.B., supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1130 (dis. opn. of Pollak, Acting P. J.).)  The difficulty with this argument is 
that no exception is needed to conclude that expungement is not a consequence of 
redesignation.  After Proposition 47, redesignation of a category of offenses can 
terminate the duty to submit samples.  But redesignation is largely immaterial to 
expungement, which does not hinge on whether an offense would give rise to a 
duty to submit were it committed today.  There is no inconsistency between 
treating a redesignated offense as a misdemeanor for all purposes and declining to 
expunge a previously submitted DNA sample. 
13 
C.B. and C.H. next contend redesignation of their offenses qualifies them 
for expungement because they have no past or present offense that would “qualif[y 
them] for inclusion” in the databank.  (§ 299, subd. (a); Alejandro N. v. Superior 
Court, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1229 [redesignated offenses are “disqualified 
for DNA sample retention”].)  This argument ignores the fact that section 299, 
subdivision (a), does not operate in isolation:  by its terms, section 299 also 
requires satisfaction of at least one of the additional conditions in subdivision (b). 
Finally, C.B. and C.H. argue that section 299, subdivision (b)’s express list 
of conditions should not be deemed exhaustive.  They rely on Alejandro N. v. 
Superior Court, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pages 1228–1229, which so held.  They 
also cite Coffey v. Superior Court, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at pages 816–817, 
which considered a constitutional challenge to the retention of a DNA sample, 
even though that petitioner had not sought to satisfy the statutory section 299 
conditions for expungement.  (See also In re C.B., supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 1130–1131, 1137 (dis. opn. of Pollak, Acting P. J.).)  Coffey stands for an 
unexceptional principle:  the state or federal Constitution may impose limits on the 
operation of a statutory scheme above and beyond those contained in the scheme 
itself.  Coffey offers no authority for what C.B. and C.H. seek here, judicial 
amendment of a statute based on purely statutory considerations.  Alejandro N. v. 
Superior Court, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th 1209, to the extent it held the language of 
Proposition 47 could justify inserting an additional unwritten basis for 
expungement into section 299, subdivision (b), was mistaken, and is disapproved. 
In sum, the text of Proposition 47 and the DNA Act as amended by 
Proposition 69 can be harmonized.  Proposition 47 narrows the universe of those 
who must submit samples in the future under section 296.  It does not, however, 
expand the universe of those who may seek expungement of samples already 
submitted. 
14 
 
2. 
Ballot Arguments and Other Indicia of Purpose 
This interpretation of the statutory scheme advances the ballot arguments 
put forward in support of Proposition 69 and is consistent with those articulated in 
support of Proposition 47. 
Proponents of Proposition 69 offered two principal reasons for expanding 
the state’s existing DNA databank to include samples from all felons and some 
arrestees.  First, the measure would allow law enforcement to solve additional 
cases.7  Second, it could exclude individuals as potential suspects, thus preventing 
wrongful accusation.8  Highlighting these twin purposes, the initiative was titled 
the “DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act.”  (Prop. 69 
Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 69, § I.(a), p. 135.)  The initiative’s codified and 
uncodified statements of purpose likewise stressed apprehension and exoneration 
in equal measure.9 
Interpreting the amended DNA Act by its terms, to require more stringent 
conditions for expungement than for initial inclusion, supports these purposes.  
                                              
7  
See Proposition 69 Voter Guide, supra, argument in favor of Proposition 
69, page 62 (“DNA IDENTIFIES CRIMINALS”; the measure “helps solve 
crime”; “Currently, California’s DNA database is too small,” allowing more 
crimes to go unsolved). 
8  
See Proposition 69 Voter Guide, supra, argument in favor of Proposition 
69, page 62 (the measure will “help[] . . . free those wrongfully accused”; “DNA 
evidence is one of the most effective ways to prove someone was not involved 
with a crime.  69’s complete DNA database helps ensure people are not 
wrongfully accused.”). 
9  
See Penal Code section 295, subdivision (c) (the purpose of the state’s 
databank is to assist law enforcement “in the expeditious and accurate detection 
and prosecution of individuals responsible for sex offenses and other crimes [and] 
the exclusion of suspects who are being investigated for these crimes”); 
Proposition 69 Voter Guide, supra, text of Proposition 69, section II.(a)–(g), page 
135; Good v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1508–1509. 
15 
The broader the databank’s reach, consistent with voter intent and constitutional 
limits, the more likely a sample will be available to inculpate, or exculpate, a 
suspect in a given case. 
As for Proposition 47, proponents emphasized the goal of reducing costs 
and reallocating both prosecutorial and prison resources.  Reclassifying various 
felonies as misdemeanors, proponents urged, would “focus[] law enforcement 
dollars on violent and serious crime” and “[s]top[] wasting money on warehousing 
people in prisons for nonviolent petty crimes, saving hundreds of millions of 
taxpayer funds every year.”  (Prop. 47 Voter Guide, supra, argument in favor of 
Prop. 47, p. 38; see id., rebuttal to argument against Prop. 47, p. 39.)  The 
measure’s uncodified findings and statement of purpose likewise emphasized 
“ensur[ing] that prison spending is focused on violent and serious offenses” (id., 
text of Prop. 47, § 2, p. 70) and “sav[ing] significant state corrections dollars” that 
could better be spent elsewhere (id., § 3(6), p. 70). 
Absent from these materials is any indication Proposition 47 was intended 
to retroactively alter the state’s existing DNA databank.  Modifying the databank 
neither advances nor impedes Proposition 47’s goals to reduce the prison 
population and reallocate resources.  Even reframing Proposition 47’s goal more 
generally as reducing the punishment for certain crimes does not suggest a 
different conclusion.  Because requiring the submission of a sample is not 
punishment (Good v. Superior Court, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1510; People v. 
Travis (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1271, 1295), it follows that retention of a sample is 
not punishment either. 
C.B. and C.H. highlight cases that have construed Proposition 47 as broadly 
intending to extinguish all collateral consequences for redesignated offenses, other 
than limits on future gun possession.  (See People v. Evans (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 
894, 900–901, review granted and held on other grounds for People v. Valenzuela, 
16 
review granted Mar. 1, 2017, S239122; Alejandro N. v. Superior Court, supra, 238 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1228; In re C.B., supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 1130 (dis. opn. of 
Pollak, Acting P. J.).)  In their view, this intent supports expungement because 
their offenses have been redesignated. 
The argument fails.  There is no evidence the voters intended to expand the 
grounds for expungement.  While many other sections of the Penal Code were 
amended (see People v. Valencia, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 355), the text of the 
expungement statute was left untouched.  Proposition 47 necessarily revised the 
operation of section 296’s requirement that a sample be submitted after a felony 
conviction by changing what crimes constitute a felony.  But Proposition 47 did 
not modify section 299, subdivision (b), to insert a new fifth basis for 
expungement. 
 C.H. also highlights Proposition 47’s direction that its provisions “shall be 
liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.”  (Prop. 47 Voter Guide, supra, text 
of Prop. 47, § 18, p. 74; see id., § 15, p. 74.)  The initiative’s overt ends emphasize 
reallocating resources and saving money by reducing penalties for certain 
offenses.  The retention of already-submitted samples generates no additional 
costs and imposes no punishment.  Whether samples are retained or not is 
unrelated to the stated purposes of Proposition 47.  The principle of liberal 
construction does not advance C.H.’s cause. 
C.B. and C.H. argue that the state’s public safety interest in collecting 
samples under Proposition 69 does not extend to most misdemeanants, so 
expungement would not conflict with the initiative’s purposes.  (See In re C.B., 
supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1137–1138 (dis. opn. of Pollak, Acting P. J.).)  Yet the 
state’s interest in retaining samples is also as broad as Proposition 69 and section 
299 indicate.  If one looks to section 296 to define the state’s interest in collecting 
samples, one must look equally to section 299’s limits on expungement to 
17 
determine the state’s interest in retaining them.  Expanding expungement beyond 
the explicit requirements of section 299 would be inconsistent with Proposition 
69’s purposes. 
In a related argument, C.B. contends he has a privacy interest in his sample 
that exceeds the state’s public safety interest.  C.B. does not contest the 
compelling nature of the state’s interest in properly prosecuting crimes and 
exonerating the innocent.  (People v. Robinson, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1121.)  He 
does not claim that collection of samples under section 296 as it applied before 
passage of Proposition 47 violated his privacy rights.  (See People v. Travis, 
supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1281–1290.)  Instead, his argument appears to be 
that passage of Proposition 47 indicates a reduced state interest in collecting 
certain samples.  He reasons that his privacy interests should now outweigh any 
state interest in retention.  Once again, there is no basis to disregard section 299 as 
an equally relevant measure of the state’s interest in retaining samples.  The 
passage of Proposition 47 did nothing to diminish that interest.  If, as C.B. 
concedes, neither the collection of his sample nor its retention was a privacy 
violation before Proposition 47, approval of the initiative does not change that 
calculus. 
C.B. discusses his privacy interests solely as a means of bolstering his 
claim that the statutory scheme should be read in a particular fashion.  He 
disavows the assertion of any constitutional privacy claim.  Accordingly, we 
express no views whatsoever on the merits of such a claim. 
In short, no purpose underlying Proposition 47 or 69 requires expungement 
here.  Proposition 69 expands the state’s databank to advance the compelling 
interests in public safety and appropriate exoneration through more accurate 
identification of criminals.  The retention of existing samples is consistent with 
that goal.  Proposition 47 reduces punishments for certain crimes as a means of 
18 
refocusing prison and prosecutorial resources on other crimes judged more 
serious.  Nothing in the retention of samples hinders those aims.10 
C. 
Equal Protection 
C.H. argues that reading the statutory scheme to allow retention of his 
sample in the databank deprives him of equal protection under the state and 
federal Constitutions.  (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, 
subd. (a).)11  He contends offenders who commit future acts reclassified as 
misdemeanors by Proposition 47 and those who committed the same acts before 
the initiative’s passage must be treated the same with respect to inclusion of 
samples in the state’s DNA databank. 
“ ‘The concept of equal protection recognizes that persons who are 
similarly situated with respect to a law’s legitimate purposes must be treated 
equally.’ ”  (People v. Valencia, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 376.)  It does not require, 
however, that different things must be treated as though they are the same.  
                                              
10  
The People also rely on section 299, subdivision (f), as amended by the 
Legislature in 2015.  That provision limits a court’s ability “to relieve a person of 
the separate administrative duty to provide specimens, samples, or print 
impressions required by this chapter if a person has been found guilty or was 
adjudicated a ward of the court by a trier of fact of a qualifying offense as defined 
in subdivision (a) of Section 296, or was found not guilty by reason of insanity or 
pleads no contest to a qualifying offense as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 
296.”  (§ 299, subd. (f).)  In 2015, the Legislature amended the provision to add 
section 1170.18 to the list of laws explicitly identified as not supplying a basis for 
court relief from the duty to submit a sample.  (§ 299, subd. (f), as amended by 
Stats. 2015, ch. 487, § 4.)  Given our determination that other portions of the 
statutory scheme preclude the relief petitioners seek, we need not address the 
import of this provision. 
11  
C.H. does not differentiate between the state and federal Constitutions or 
suggest the analysis under either should differ.  Accordingly, we address his state 
and federal claims together.  (See, e.g., Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 
60 Cal.4th 871, 881.) 
19 
(Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808, 842.)  Drawing on these two principles, we 
have noted that a meritorious equal protection claim must demonstrate “ ‘ “that the 
state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups 
in an unequal manner.” ’ ”  (People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 408.)  
“Similarly situated” in this context means that the compared groups are 
“ ‘similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.’ ”  (Cooley v. Superior 
Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253.)  C.H. contends those who committed offenses 
subject to Proposition 47 reclassification before the initiative and those who 
committed the same offenses after are sufficiently similarly situated to warrant 
application of equal protection principles.  We assume, without deciding, that this 
is so. 
C.H. presents no argument that a distinction between those who committed 
offenses before and after November 2014 implicates a suspect classification or 
fundamental right.  Counsel acknowledged at oral argument that no such argument 
had been preserved.  In the absence of any demonstration of a suspect 
classification or a distinction that impacts a fundamental right, the challenged 
disparity in treatment need only survive rational basis scrutiny.  (Johnson v. 
Department of Justice, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 881.)  Any reasonably conceivable 
basis for the disparity that is rooted in a legitimate government purpose, whether 
or not expressly articulated by the voters, is sufficient.  (See People v. Turnage 
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74–75.) 
Here, the voters rationally could differentiate between those who have 
submitted samples and those who have not based on cost considerations.  (See 
People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 290 [“Preserving the government’s 
financial integrity and resources is a legitimate state interest.”].)  They could 
conclude some crimes are no longer serious enough to justify the additional costs 
of obtaining samples.  Yet they could also view the risk of recidivism from those 
20 
who committed similar crimes when they were felonies as not slight enough to 
justify the additional costs of expunging samples already obtained.  Such 
expenditures would diminish the savings derived from other portions of the 
initiative and the amounts available to pursue the initiative’s ends.  (See Prop. 47 
Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 47, § 4, p. 70 [creating the “ ‘Safe 
Neighborhoods and Schools Fund’ ”]; Gov. Code, § 7599.1, subd. (a) [size of the 
Fund dependent on a calculation of “the savings that accrued to the state from the 
implementation of” the initiative].)  C.H. bears the burden of negating every 
plausible ground for the contested difference in treatment.  (See People v. 
Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 75.)  Because he cannot, his constitutional 
challenge must fail. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We affirm the judgments of the Courts of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.   
MURRAY, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ 
*         Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned 
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY LIU, J. 
 
 
Our holdings today — that C.B. and C.H. do not qualify for expungement 
under Penal Code section 299 (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 6–18) and that there is a 
rational basis for treating individuals who have already submitted DNA samples 
differently from those who have not (id. at pp. 18–20) — are limited to the claims 
presented in these cases.  As noted, neither C.B. nor C.H. pressed any claim that 
the state’s retention of his DNA samples implicates a constitutionally protected 
privacy interest.  (Id. at pp. 17, 19; see Cal. Const., art. I, § 1; People v. Buza 
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 689–690.)  Such a claim may give rise to a cause of action 
under the California right to privacy (see Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. 
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35–40) or require a more stringent equal protection analysis 
(see Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 597) in a future case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re C.B. and In re C.H. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 2 Cal.App.5th 1112 and 2 Cal.App.5th 1139 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S237801 & S237762 
Date Filed: August 30, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Contra Costa 
Judge: Thomas M. Maddock 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Anne Mania, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant C.B. 
 
Patricia Noel Cooney, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant C.H. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Donna M. Provenzano, Aileen Bunney, 
Laurence K. Sullivan, Eric D. Share and Enid A. Camps, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent in No. S237801. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Eric D. Share, Huy T. 
Luong and Enid A. Camps, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent in No. S237762. 
 
Jackie Lacey, District Attorney (Los Angeles), Roberta Schwartz and John Pomeroy, Deputy District 
Attorneys, for Los Angeles County District Attorney as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Respondent in No. S237762. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Anne Mania 
Law Office of Anne Mania 
1946 Embarcadero 
Oakland, CA  94606 
(510) 479-1818 
 
Enid A. Camps 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5976