Case Title: Davis v. State

Citation: 233 N.E.2d 642, 249 Ind. 596

Docket Number: 30,668

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1968-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
249 Ind. 596 (1968)
233 N.E.2d 642
DAVIS
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30,668.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed February 14, 1968.
*597 George P. Dickmann, and Dickmann & Dickmann, of Greenfield, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and David S. Wedding, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
JACKSON, J.
This appeal comes from the Hancock Circuit Court. Appellant was originally charged, by affidavit in two counts filed in Criminal Court of Marion County, with the crimes of Robbery (Count 1) and Kidnapping (Count 2). The venue of said cause was transferred from Marion County to Hancock County pursuant to the granting of appellant's motion for change of venue from Marion County.
The Hancock Circuit Court granted the State's Motion to Nolle Count 1 of the affidavit subsequent to the filing of a Motion to Quash the original affidavit by the appellant.
The issues were joined by appellant's Plea of Not Guilty to Count 2 of the original affidavit, such Count charging appellant with the crime of kidnapping.
The issues were decided by the verdict of the jury finding the defendant, Wilbur R. Davis, guilty of the crime of kidnapping and by the rendition of judgment thereon by the Hancock Circuit Court.
*598 The verdict of the jury, omitting caption and signature, reads as follows:
The judgment of the Hancock Circuit Court rendered on the verdict of the jury reads as follows:
On the 4th day of September, 1962, the State of Indiana filed an affidavit in the Criminal Court of Marion County, Indiana, which affidavit, omitting caption and jurat, reads as follows, to-wit:
Appellant Davis challenged sufficiency of the affidavit by a Motion to Quash, such motion, omitting heading, reads as follows, to-wit:
....
On January 6, 1964, the State of Indiana filed a Motion to Nolle Count 1 of the affidavit. Such motion, omitting heading and signatures, reads as follows, to-wit:
The court on the same day sustained the State's Motion to Nolle Count 1 of the affidavit.
January 22, 1964, appellant filed a Plea in Abatement to the affidavit. Such Plea omitting caption and signatures, reads as follows, to-wit:
January 25, 1964, the State of Indiana filed its Demurrer to appellant's Plea in Abatement. Such Demurrer and supporting memorandum, omitting caption, reads as follows, to-wit:
....
In Randolph v. State, 1928, 200 Ind. 210, the Court said:
The court sustained the Demurrer to appellant's Plea in Abatement January 28, 1964.
On the 3rd day of April, 1964, the jury was empaneled to try this cause. On the 6th day of April, 1964, the preliminary instructions were settled and read to the jury by the court.
The appellee introduced evidence and rested. The appellant Davis filed his Motion For A Directed Verdict, which, omitting the caption and signatures, reads as follows:
On the 7th day of April, 1964, the court overruled appellant's above motion.
*604 On the 8th day of April, 1964, appellant tendered his written request that the jury be instructed in writing only. Such motion, omitting caption and signature, reads as follows:
The court indicated it would give appellant's tendered instructions 6, 7, 9 and 11 and refused to give appellant's tendered instructions numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 10. Appellant raised objections and saved same only to his tendered instructions numbered 1 and 8 in his Motion for New Trial. The appellant objected to the refusal of the court to give his tendered instruction No. 8 "for the reason, that the matter contained in this instruction is not covered by any other instructions indicated to be given by the Court; that the legal definition of force is not included in any such instruction to be given by the court as indicated."
On the 7th day of May, 1964, appellant filed his Motion for a New Trial. Such motion, omitting caption and signature, reads as follows:
Appellant's Assignment of Errors is the single specification:
A synopsis of the evidence adduced most favorable to the appellee indicates that about 1:00 o'clock A.M. on August 23, 1962, appellant and a companion Janet Atherton went into the office of the Alamo Plaza Motel at 7550 East Washington Street, Marion County, Indiana. The appellant requested a room and was told none were available. Appellant replied it "don't make any difference this is a stick up anyway." Appellant told Janet to open the cash register, which she was unable to do. Appellant then ordered the manager, Howard Hopkins, to open the register, which he did. Janet took the money out of the cash register and picked up a valise. At this juncture George Henry Willis walked in the door and told the manager, "You are going with us." Hopkins testified he did not go with them of his own accord but was forced to go with them to a car where he was forced to the floor in the back seat. Ronnie Coleman Murray was waiting in the car.
After the manager got in the car it was driven east on highway 40 as far as Martin's Ford Sales and then turned to the left. Someone in the front seat said to blindfold Hopkins, and Willis who was in the back seat did so. After he was blindfolded the parties drove around for ten or fifteen minutes. Then they stopped and Hopkins was pulled out of the car into the road where he was hit several times about the head. He fell in the ditch and was hit again, at which time he pretended to pass out. The car and the parties drove away. *608 Hopkins made his way to a nearby house, asked for assistance and was taken into the house. Police and an ambulance were called. Hopkins was taken to Community Hospital where he received treatment. Some days later he was called down to the Sheriff's office in Marion County where there was a line up of seven men at which time he identified Davis and Willis. He first saw Murray and Miss Atherton in the Sheriff's office, not in the line up.
Appellant's confession, being State's Exhibit 5, was admitted in evidence and reads as follows:
The record in this case is very lengthy and the evidence could be greatly expanded but no reason exists for so doing.
Appellant objected to the introduction of his alleged written statement in evidence on the theory that at the time it was given he was suffering from the effects of excessive drinking, bennies and an epileptic seizure. Appellant produced two witnesses who were in the Marion County Jail with him the day the statement or confession was made. Both were friends. Both said that appellant was "glassy-eyed," "drunk" and "didn't seem to know what he was doing or saying." He kept asking one of the witnesses, Mr. Lafferty, "How long you *610 been here?" Despite being answered he kept on repeating the question. Appellant was brought to the jail on a Saturday evening. Lafferty testified:
Dr. Beeson, a defense witness, testified he treated appellant for the after effects of a grandmal epileptic seizure on February 9, 1964. He was qualified as an expert witness. In his opinion, appellant's seizure which was described by Mr. Lafferty could possibly affect the coherence and mental processes for a period of about 48 hours. Intoxicating beverage or benzidrene pills would aggravate the convulsion or series of convulsions, and the after effects.
Officer Thompson, testifying for the State, stated that appellant confessed the crime orally to him, that it was then reduced to writing and that at that time he appeared normal and was not drunk. The witness testified as follows:
Officer Haines testified that at the time appellant confessed he "was coherent, sharp, he remembered me from previous case. I seen nothing wrong with him."
*611 We are here confronted with a question of conflicting evidence. It is well settled that the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of a confession will not be disturbed by this Court on appeal when it is based upon conflicting evidence. Matthews v. State (1959), 239 Ind. 252, 156 N.E.2d 387.
In the argument section of his brief appellant has set out the various specifications on which he relies for reversal. We will generally discuss them in the same order except in those instances where we have heretofore in this opinion covered the same question.
Under specification A appellant urges cause No. 11 of his motion for new trial. He breaks his argument into three points thereunder:
On appeal it is well settled that only the evidence most favorable to the State, together with all the reasonable and logical inferences therefrom will be considered. Beatty v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 598, 194 N.E.2d 727; White v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 199, 191 N.E.2d 486.
This Court in Beatty v. State, supra, said:
Furthermore, it is well settled that accessories may be tried as principals. Acts of 1905, ch. 169, § 224, p. 584, being § 9-102 Burns' (1956 Repl.) Ard v. State (1958), 238 Ind. 222, 149 N.E.2d 825.
Under specification B appellant argues causes 12, 6 and 4 of his motion for new trial, and again breaks his argument into three points thereunder:
With regard to specification B and points thereunder, this Court has recently held:
Under specification C appellant argues cause No. 3 of his motion for new trial. He breaks his argument into two points thereunder:
The controversy and ground three of appellant's motion for new trial arose over the question of the Prosecuting Attorney addressed to state's witness Hopkins, as follows:
While we do not approve of the acts of the prosecutor, we do approve of the action of the trial court in sustaining the objection of appellant's trial counsel thereto. We are of the opinion the objection was waived by appellant's failures to sufficiently and specifically set forth the questions, answers, objections and rulings of the court in regard thereto. See: Triggs v. State (1958), 238 Ind. 260, 149 N.E.2d 545; Brown v. State (1939), 216 Ind. 106, 23 N.E.2d 267. Furthermore, appellant in his confession admitted putting Hopkins in the back seat of the car and had been identified by Hopkins in the police line up long prior to trial.
*614 Appellant's specification D urging cause No. 5 of his motion for new trial has been previously discussed and decided.
Appellant's specification E argues cause No. 9 of his motion for a new trial alleging the defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a Fair and Impartial Trial. The ground argued relates to the alleged error of the court in sustaining the state's demurrer to appellant's Plea in Abatement. The argument is to the effect that by the filing of the demurrer the state admitted that by virtue of adverse and erroneous pre-trial publicity the appellant could not have a fair trial in Hancock County, Indiana; the state admitted defendant Davis had not been taken before a magistrate immediately after his arrest as required by Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 65, p. 584, as amended, being § 9-704 Burns', and that the state admitted that a purported criminal record of the defendant Davis had been incorporated in the court file to the extreme prejudice of the defendant. (In regard to the latter question, counsel for appellant in oral argument before this Court admitted the record mentioned did not get to the jury.)
As pointed out by the state in its answer brief:
*615 It is also well settled that a plea in abatement cannot be used to raise matters which should have been raised in bar. 8 I.L.E. Criminal Law § 92.
Appellant's specification F urges cause No. 8 of his motion for new trial relating to the court's failure to rule on the appellant's motion to quash the affidavit. The record discloses the original affidavit to which the motion was directed contained two counts; (1) robbery, (2) kidnapping. In our opinion, and evidently the prosecuting attorney felt the same way, the motion to quash was good. Before the court had ruled on the motion to quash the state moved to nolle Count 1, the robbery count. At that point the question in a sense became moot. Had the court sustained the motion to quash, the state could have filed an amended affidavit containing the same averments remaining in Count 2. Appellant's argument that the jury had access to and could be influenced by the contents therein, in the case at bar at least, is not well taken. The physical facts adduced at the trial certainly apprised the jury of the fact that a robbery preceded the kidnapping and was so inextricably interwoven that it could not be separated therefrom. In the case at bar, we can see no harm or prejudice coming to or affecting the defendant by the court's failure to rule specifically on the motion to quash.
In view of the many questions presented by this appeal, the number of co-defendants and the severity of the penalty imposed, we have given careful consideration to the issues involved and presented and perhaps have unduly extended this opinion.
We find no reversible error in the record. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Arterburn and Hunter, JJ., concur.
Lewis, C.J. and Mote, J., concur in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 234 N.E.2d 853.