Case Title: SC DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. Smith

Citation: 429 S.E.2d 807

Docket Number: 

State: south-carolina

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1993-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
429 S.E.2d 807 (1993) SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Respondent, v. Kitty Oree SMITH, Eddie Dean Smith, Chrissy Smith (DOB: 9/16/85), and Louise Smith (DOB: 11/27/87), of whom Kitty Oree Smith and Eddie Dean Smith are Appellants. No. 23843. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard March 10, 1993. Decided April 19, 1993. Perry D. Boulier, of Holcombe, Bomar, Cothran and Gunn, P.A., Spartanburg, for appellants. Warran A. Kohn, Columbia, for respondent. CHANDLER, Associate Justice. Kitty and Eddie Smith (Parents) appeal an Order terminating their parental rights. We reverse and remand. Kitty and Eddie Smith have two daughters, Chrissy, born September 16, 1985, and Louise, born November 27, 1987. Both Parents suffer from mild mental retardation. *808 In August of 1990, the children were removed from Parents' home after allegations that Chrissy had been sexually abused by an aunt and uncle. The charges against the aunt and uncle were subsequently dismissed. However, DSS sought to retain physical and legal custody of the children on the basis of Parents' neglect in failing to seek medical attention for Chrissy when the allegations of abuse arose. In an Order of October 10, 1990, Family Court awarded DSS custody of the children, holding that due to Parents' mental retardation, DSS was not required to institute a treatment plan for rehabilitation. In June 1991, DSS commenced an action against Parents for termination of parental rights pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1572(6), which provides: After a hearing, Family Court terminated parental rights. This appeal follows. It is well established that grounds for termination of parental rights must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982); S.C.D.S.S. v. Martell, 279 S.C. 289, 307 S.E.2d 601 (1983). This Court may review the record of the Family Court to determine whether termination is supported by such evidence. Martell, supra; S.C.D.S.S. v. Humphreys, 297 S.C. 118, 374 S.E.2d 922 (Ct.App.1988). In termination proceedings brought pursuant to § 20-7-1572(6), there must be clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the parent has a diagnosed mental deficiency, and (2) this deficiency makes it unlikely that the parent will be able to provide minimally acceptable care of the child. Humphreys, supra; Orangeburg County DSS v. Harley, 302 S.C. 64, 393 S.E.2d 597 (Ct.App.1990). There is no requirement that the agency removing the child provide rehabilitative services to mentally incompetent parents prior to seeking termination, unlike in cases with competent parents. Id. DSS offered the following evidence to support termination: Parents offered testimony of Bill Chidester, assistant to the Executive Director of the Charles Lea Center, a treatment and education facility for mentally retarded *809 people.[1] He testified in detail concerning the Center's recently instituted program for the education of the mentally retarded in parenting skills, family planning, and sexuality. Parents have been accepted into the program. Further, Dr. Diehl, upon cross-examination, testified that Parents could benefit from such a program and should be given the opportunity to do so: In her testimony, Kim Roseborough agreed with Dr. Diehl: "I would not disagree if there was a program available that would help either Mr. or Mrs. Smith, that they should be referred to it at this time." Given the testimony of Dr. Diehl, Kim Roseborough, and the administrators of the Charles Lea Center, we hold that DSS has failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the statutory requirements for termination of parental rights pursuant to § 20-7-1572(6) have been met. The case here is distinguishable from Humphreys and Harley, supra. The Order terminating parental rights is reversed and the case remanded to Family Court. Termination shall be reconsidered, de novo, following Parents' participation in the Charles Lea program for a period not to exceed one year from the date of Parents' acceptance into the program. We express no opinion as to the final determination in this matter. Pending that determination, children shall remain in the custody of DSS. REVERSED AND REMANDED. HARWELL, C.J., and FINNEY, TOAL and MOORE, JJ., concur. [1] Dr. Diehl, in his testimony, acknowledged the pre-eminence of the Charles Lea Center in the area for treatment of mentally retarded persons.