Case Title: Murchison v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Sherborn

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12867

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12867 
 
ROBERT MURCHISON & another1  vs.  ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF 
SHERBORN & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 5, 2020. - July 16, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Land Court.  Zoning, Appeal, By-law, Lot size, Setback, Building 
permit, Person aggrieved.  Practice, Civil, Standing. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on 
November 9, 2016. 
 
 
The case was heard by Karyn F. Sheier, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
James W. Murphy for the plaintiffs. 
 
Daniel P. Dain (Merriann M. Panarella also present) for 
David H. Erichsen & another. 
 
Amy E. Kwesell, for zoning board of appeals of Sherborn, 
was present but did not argue. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Benjamin Fierro, III, for Home Builders and Remodelers 
Association of Massachusetts, Inc. 
                     
 
1 Alison Murchison. 
 
 
2 Merriann M. Panarella and David H. Erichsen. 
2 
 
 
 
Alana V. Rusin & Gary M. Ronan for NAIOP Massachusetts, 
Inc. 
 
Nicholas P. Shapiro & Robert K. Hopkins for Real Estate Bar 
Association for Massachusetts, Inc., & another. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  We consider in this case whether abutting 
property owners have standing to challenge a dimensional zoning 
requirement without establishing particularized injury.  
Concluding that they do not, on March 6, 2020, we issued an 
order affirming the judgment of the Land Court dismissing the 
complaint.3 
 
The plaintiffs challenge the right of their neighbors, 
Merriann M. Panarella and David H. Erichsen (defendants), to 
construct a single-family residence on property directly across 
the street from the plaintiffs' home.  Although the defendants' 
irregularly shaped property is sufficiently wide at the street 
and meets setback requirements, the plaintiffs contend that the 
property is too narrow at the location where the home would be 
built.  The zoning board of appeals of Sherborn (board) upheld 
the issuance of the foundation permit, and the plaintiffs 
challenged the issuance by filing a complaint in the Land Court.  
After a trial, a Land Court judge dismissed the plaintiffs' 
appeal for lack of standing; the judge concluded that the 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Real Estate 
Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc., and The Abstract Club; 
Home Builders and Remodelers Association of Massachusetts, Inc.; 
and NAIOP Massachusetts, Inc. 
3 
 
 
plaintiffs were not "aggrieved" by the board's decision within 
the meaning of G. L. c. 40A, § 17.  The Appeals Court reversed.  
See Murchison v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Sherborn, 96 Mass. 
App. Ct. 158 (2019).  The Appeals Court concluded that 
noncompliance with the dimensional limits itself was sufficient 
to establish harm.  We granted the defendants' application for 
further appellate review. 
 
After oral argument in this case, we issued an order 
affirming the Land Court judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' 
complaint, with an opinion to follow.  This opinion states the 
reasons for our conclusion that the plaintiffs are not 
"person[s] aggrieved" for purposes of G. L. c. 40A, § 17, and 
therefore lack standing to challenge the board's decision. 
 
1.  Background.  The plaintiffs, Robert and Alison 
Murchison, own a thirteen-acre property on the east side of Lake 
Street, directly abutting Farm Pond, in the town of Sherborn.4  
It is within walking distance of the town beach.  Although the 
property initially was comprised of four potentially buildable 
lots, the plaintiffs constructed their residence such that the 
part nearest to Lake Street is sixty feet, the minimum setback 
required by the town's bylaws.  The plaintiffs' home is oriented 
with its front view toward Farm Pond, and was constructed with a 
                     
 
4 Lake Street has been designated a "scenic road."  See 
G. L. c. 40, § 15C. 
4 
 
 
very substantial drainage system around its entire perimeter.  
Storm water catch basins are located on both sides of their 
southern driveway; this is the only place where the plaintiffs 
allege that water has entered.  A third catch basin is located 
on the opposite side of Lake Street.  While there are other 
structures in the immediate vicinity, the plaintiffs' home is 
far larger than those. 
 
The defendants own an irregularly shaped three-acre parcel 
(referred to as lot 69F) on the west side of Lake Street, 
directly across from the plaintiffs' property.  Lot 69F does not 
abut Farm Pond; the plaintiffs' property is between the east 
side of Lake Street and the pond.  Although currently 
undeveloped, lot 69F has been partially cleared in anticipation 
of construction of a single-family residence.  There are 
existing houses on either side of lot 69F, at 172 and 180 Lake 
Street.  Lot 69F, which exceeds the required 250-foot frontage 
on Lake Street, is wider in the front and rear portions than it 
is in the center.  It has a moderate slope above the plaintiffs' 
property.  The defendants' proposed residence would be set back 
more than ninety feet from Lake Street, well in excess of the 
sixty-foot minimum setback.  It would be a distance of 
approximately 180 feet from the plaintiffs' garage, and further 
from the plaintiffs' main house.  The area is wooded, and a 
5 
 
 
buffer of trees, both on the plaintiffs' property and the 
defendants' property, lies along Lake Street. 
 
On June 29, 2016, Sherborn's zoning enforcement officer 
issued a foundation permit to the defendants with respect to 
construction of a single-family home on lot 69F.  On July 19, 
2016, the plaintiffs timely noticed their appeal to the board; 
they asserted that the lot lacked sufficient width to be 
buildable.5  The board held a public hearing on September 14, 
2016.  On October 5, 2016, it unanimously upheld the zoning 
enforcement officer's issuance of the permit.  Pursuant to G. L. 
c. 40A, § 17, the plaintiffs appealed from the board's ruling to 
the Land Court. 
 
In the Land Court, the defendants challenged the 
plaintiffs' standing to contest the board's foundation permit 
decision under G. L. c. 40A, § 17.  The judge acknowledged that, 
as owners of land directly opposite the defendants on Lake 
Street, the plaintiffs were presumed to be "persons aggrieved" 
with standing to seek judicial review of the board's decision.  
                     
 
5 Both properties are located within Sherborn's Residence C 
zoning district.  In that district, the applicable zoning bylaws 
require (1) three-acre minimum lot size; (2) minimum continuous 
frontage of 250 feet; (3) minimum lot width of 250 feet; 
(4) minimum front setback of sixty feet; (5) minimum side 
setback of forty feet; and (6) minimum rear setback of thirty 
feet.  Other than minimum lot width, there is no dispute that 
the defendants' proposed project complies with applicable zoning 
requirements, including those pertaining to lot frontage and 
front yard setback requirements. 
6 
 
 
Because the defendants challenged that presumptive standing, the 
judge considered the evidence, after a four-day trial and a 
view, as to the plaintiffs' claims of harm to their legal 
rights.  Those concerns generally related to density and 
overcrowding of the neighborhood, diminution of property value, 
and storm water runoff. 
 
With respect to the plaintiffs' claim that the construction 
of the defendants' home would have a negative impact on density, 
including light, air, and open space in the neighborhood, or 
would cause an increase in noise and traffic, the judge found 
the concerns either were generalized and not particular to the 
defendants, or amounted to speculation and conjecture.  At most, 
she concluded, the evidence demonstrated that any harm was de 
minimis.  As to the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants' 
residence would diminish the value of the plaintiffs' property, 
the judge found that construction of a single-family home on the 
vacant, cleared lot would constitute an improvement in the 
neighborhood, and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a 
nonspeculative particular and personal harm resulting in 
diminution of value.  Finally, the judge considered expert 
testimony and found that any storm water runoff and potential 
for flooding of the plaintiffs' property would not be 
significantly greater than runoff that occurs with lot 69F in 
its current undeveloped state. 
7 
 
 
 
In short, the judge found that the plaintiffs' concerns 
were, in various aspects, speculative, unsupported by evidence, 
de minimis, or not credible.  She concluded that the plaintiffs' 
presumptive standing as abutters had been rebutted, and that 
they had not marshalled evidence to demonstrate standing.  We 
agree. 
 
2.  Discussion.  Standing to challenge a decision by a 
zoning board of appeals is limited to persons who are "aggrieved 
by [the] decision."  G. L. c. 40A, § 17.  See 81 Spooner Rd., 
LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Brookline, 461 Mass. 692, 700 
(2012).  We conclude that the Land Court judge's findings as to 
standing are not clearly erroneous, and affirm the judgment of 
dismissal.  See Kenner v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Chatham, 459 
Mass. 115, 119 (2011); Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of 
Newburyport, 421 Mass. 719, 722 (1996); Bates v. Cohasset, 280 
Mass. 142, 155 (1932). 
 
To be "aggrieved" for these purposes, a person must suffer 
"some infringement of his legal rights."  Sweenie v. A.L. Prime 
Energy Consultants, 451 Mass. 539, 543 (2008), quoting 
Marashlian, 421 Mass. at 721.  The aggrievement must be more 
than "minimal or slightly appreciable," and the right or 
interest asserted must be "one that G. L. c. 40A is intended to 
protect."  Kenner, 459 Mass. at 120-121.  See 81 Spooner Rd., 
LLC, 461 Mass. at 700.  While a plaintiff ultimately bears the 
8 
 
 
burden of establishing standing, see Standerwick v. Zoning Bd. 
of Appeals of Andover, 447 Mass. 20, 34 n.20 (2006), he or she 
may be assisted in that burden by a rebuttable presumption of 
standing granted to parties qualifying as "parties in interest."  
G. L. c. 40A, § 11. 
 
Applying those principles here, the plaintiffs own property 
that is directly opposite lot 69F on Lake Street.  As abutters, 
they are entitled to notice of board hearings under G. L. 
c. 40A, § 11, and qualify as "parties in interest" under the 
statute,6 id.  There is no dispute, as the judge correctly 
observed, that the plaintiffs "enjoy a rebuttable presumption 
[that] they are 'persons aggrieved'" by the board's decision 
affirming the grant of a foundation permit to the defendants.  
Marashlian, 421 Mass. at 721-722.  See 81 Spooner Rd., LLC, 461 
Mass. at 700.  Because that presumptive standing has been 
challenged, the question becomes whether the evidence supports 
the plaintiffs' claims of aggrievement.  We consider each of 
those claims. 
 
a.  Standing based on density and overcrowding.  With the 
exception of the minimum lot width requirement, the parties do 
not dispute that lot 69F otherwise complies with applicable 
                     
 
6 "Parties in interest" is defined to include "owners of 
land directly opposite on any public or private street or way."  
G. L. c. 40A, § 11. 
9 
 
 
zoning bylaws, including dimensional requirements.  In the 
parties' Sherborn neighborhood, the bylaws require a minimum lot 
size of three acres.  Lot 69F meets that requirement, has more 
than the necessary 250 feet of continuous frontage on Lake 
Street, and has the requisite setback from Lake Street (and from 
all other sides).  See note 5, supra.  The plaintiffs –- from 
their vantage directly across the street -- contend that 
Sherborn's bylaws, properly construed, nonetheless preclude 
construction of the defendants' single-family home because 
lot 69F lacks the minimum lot width.  They claim they are 
aggrieved because the town's minimum lot width bylaw "protects 
their interest in preventing the overcrowding of their 
neighborhood and that this interest would be harmed by the 
proposed development."  Murchison, 96 Mass. App. Ct. at 161.  We 
reject the argument for two reasons. 
 
First, while the plaintiffs have presumptive standing, the 
presumption may be rebutted by a showing that, as a matter of 
law, the plaintiffs' "claims of aggrievement are not within the 
interests protected by the applicable zoning scheme."  Picard v. 
Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Westminster, 474 Mass. 570, 574 (2016).  
See 81 Spooner Rd., LLC, 461 Mass. at 702.  While "density, 
traffic, parking availability, [and] noise" have been denoted 
"typical" interests protected by G. L. c. 40A and zoning bylaws, 
Picard, supra; see Kenner, 459 Mass. at 120, there is nothing to 
10 
 
 
demonstrate that the purpose of Sherborn's dimensional lot width 
zoning requirement is to control density or overcrowding 
generally, or to protect an abutter's interests in particular.  
As stated, the project complies with lot size and setback 
requirements.  Contrast O'Connell v. Vainisi, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 
688, 692 (2012) ("setback requirement serves to address concerns 
about crowding"); Sheppard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Boston, 74 
Mass. App. Ct. 8, 12 (2009) (violation of density provision of 
bylaw generally constitutes aggrievement).  Certainly, there is 
no claim that the neighborhood is "already more dense than the 
applicable zoning regulations allow."  Standerwick, 447 Mass. at 
31. 
 
Second, establishing standing requires a plaintiff to do 
more than merely allege a zoning violation.  See Sweenie, 451 
Mass. at 545.  "The language of a bylaw cannot be sufficient in 
itself to confer standing:  the creation of a protected interest 
(by statute, ordinance, bylaw, or otherwise) cannot be conflated 
with the additional, individualized requirements that establish 
standing."  Id.  See Denneny v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of 
Seekonk, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 208, 213-214 (2003) (rejecting claim 
that proximity constituted per se injury).  Standing as an 
"aggrieved" person requires evidence of an injury particular to 
the plaintiffs, as opposed to the neighborhood in general, the 
injury must be causally related to violation of zoning laws, and 
11 
 
 
it must be more than de minimis.  See Kenner, 459 Mass. at 117 
(emphasizing distinction between impact and injury); 
Standerwick, 447 Mass. at 35; Marotta v. Board of Appeals of 
Revere, 336 Mass. 199, 203-204 (1957) ("status of the property 
or of the plaintiffs may be such that the plaintiffs are not 
aggrieved even though the property is very near").  None of 
those elements is present here. 
 
Although, as abutters, the plaintiffs enjoy presumptive 
standing, such standing may be rebutted by demonstrating the 
insufficiency of the evidence upon which it rests.  See 
Standerwick, 447 Mass. at 35.  Here, the judge's findings, after 
trial, support her conclusion that the plaintiffs are not 
aggrieved for density-related reasons.  There was no evidence, 
for example, that the defendants' project would "shut[] off a 
view," 81 Spooner Rd., LLC, 461 Mass. at 704; materially affect 
the plaintiffs' privacy in relation to their home, Dwyer v. 
Gallo, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 292, 296-297 (2008); or significantly 
reduce light or air, McGee v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 62 
Mass. App. Ct. 930, 930-931 (2004).  The evidence did not 
demonstrate harm particular to the plaintiffs, different from 
general concerns shared by the rest of the neighborhood.  See 
Kenner, 459 Mass. at 118; Standerwick, 447 Mass. at 30.  
Moreover, as the judge observed, "[Robert] Murchison's testimony 
that he expects an increase in lighting, traffic and noise as a 
12 
 
 
result of a new house being built across the street on a three-
acre lot was insufficient to establish standing to challenge" 
the board's decision.  Speculation and conjecture are not 
evidence, and in any event, more than a "minimal or slightly 
appreciable" harm is required. 
 
To demonstrate standing, it fell to the plaintiffs to "put 
forth credible evidence to substantiate [their] allegations" of 
aggrievement, Marashlian, 421 Mass. at 721, both from a 
qualitative and quantitative perspective.  "Quantitatively, the 
evidence must provide specific factual support for each of the 
claims of particularized injury," and "[q]ualitatively, the 
evidence must be of a type on which a reasonable person could 
rely to conclude that the claimed injury likely will flow from 
the board's action."  Butler v. Waltham, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 435, 
441 (2005).  See Kenner, 459 Mass. at 118.  Although we do not 
view claims of aggrievement narrowly, Marashlian, supra at 722, 
we do require that the plaintiffs "establish -- by direct facts 
and not by speculative personal opinion -- that [their] injury 
is special and different from the concerns of the rest of the 
community."  81 Spooner Rd., LLC, 461 Mass. at 701, quoting 
Standerwick, 447 Mass. at 33.  Neither conjecture nor 
speculative personal opinion substitutes for proof.  In this 
case, and on the evidence before her, the judge correctly 
13 
 
 
determined that the plaintiffs were not aggrieved, for purposes 
of G. L. c. 40A, § 17, by density-based considerations. 
 
b.  Standing based on diminution in property value.  The 
plaintiffs additionally assert a concern that the value of their 
property will be diminished as a result of the defendants' 
proposed development of lot 69F.  It is well established, 
however, that that diminution in value itself is not an interest 
protected under G. L. c. 40A.  See Kenner, 459 Mass. at 123.  
Unless diminution in value is "derivative of or related to 
cognizable interests protected by" Sherborn's minimum lot width 
requirement, it does not provide a basis on which to assert 
standing.  See Standerwick, 447 Mass. at 31-32.  There is 
nothing to suggest that that is the case here.  "Zoning 
legislation 'is not designed for the preservation of the 
economic value of property, except in so far as that end is 
served by making the community a safe and healthy place in which 
to live.'"  Kenner, 459 Mass. at 123-124, quoting Tranfaglia v. 
Building Comm'r of Winchester, 306 Mass. 495, 503-504 (1940). 
 
Although diminution in property value is not an interest 
protected by Sherborn's minimum lot width bylaw, the judge 
concluded, in any event, that construction of the defendants' 
home would not diminish the plaintiffs' property value.  The 
realtor who listed lot 69F for sale was permitted to testify 
that, in her expert opinion, the addition of a single-family 
14 
 
 
residence on lot 69F would in no way diminish the value of the 
plaintiffs' property.  Rather, it was her opinion that a single-
family residence is the "best and highest use" of lot 69F, and 
that such a residence, accompanied by landscaping, would improve 
the lot as compared with its current condition as a vacant 
cleared lot.  The judge credited the broker's testimony, and 
found it sufficient to rebut any presumption of standing as to 
the diminution claim. 
 
In response, the plaintiffs did not demonstrate, with 
credible supporting evidence, a substantial basis for their 
claims.  See Marashlian, 421 Mass. at 721.  They neither 
rebutted the defense expert's testimony nor established that 
development of lot 69F would cause them a particular and 
personal harm different from the concerns of the rest of the 
general community.  See Butler, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 441.  They 
did not present any expert testimony on the issue.  Robert 
Murchison, as a nonexpert owner of the residential property, was 
permitted to testify as to his personal opinion.  See Winthrop 
Prods. Corp. v. Elroth Co., 331 Mass. 83, 85 (1954); Epstein v. 
Board of Appeal of Boston, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 752, 759 (2010).  
See also Canepari v. Pascale, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 840, 847 (2011).  
Based on "his familiarity with the characteristics of the 
property, his knowledge or acquaintance with its uses, and his 
experience in dealing with it," Winthrop Prods. Corp., supra, 
15 
 
 
Murchison testified that, in his personal opinion, the value of 
the plaintiffs' property would decrease as a result of the 
development of lot 69F.  Murchison's testimony was, as the judge 
found, wholly speculative and conjectural, and insufficient to 
establish aggrievement. 
 
Because the plaintiffs did not establish that the minimum 
lot width bylaw was intended to protect the value of their 
property and, in any event, the judge found that development of 
lot 69F would not diminish the value of their property, we 
discern no error in the judge's finding that the plaintiffs were 
not aggrieved persons on the basis of diminution in value. 
 
c.  Standing based on storm water runoff.  Finally, the 
plaintiffs claim that they have standing to challenge the 
issuance of a foundation permit to the defendants based on 
concerns about increased storm water runoff and potential for 
flooding.  As the judge found, however, possible storm water 
runoff is not an interest specifically protected by Sherborn's 
bylaws.  See Picard, 474 Mass. at 574.  Nonetheless, the judge 
determined that the evidence did not establish that the 
plaintiffs will be harmed by increased runoff or flooding, and 
that they are not aggrieved by the board's decision on that 
basis.  We agree. 
 
At trial, the defendants offered the testimony of a 
licensed professional engineer.  He testified that he considered 
16 
 
 
a survey of the area and the topography of lot 69F and Lake 
Street.  He identified the street's lowest points, and located 
three storm water catch basins.  He reviewed the proposed 
construction on lot 69F, including various mitigation measures, 
such as a foundation drain, an infiltration swale, an erosion 
control barrier, and other measures directed to reducing or 
directing runoff.  He constructed different models.  The expert 
testified that any storm water runoff after the proposed 
development would not be significantly greater than any runoff 
from the property in its current undeveloped state.  The judge 
found that the testimony was well supported and credible. 
 
The plaintiffs also offered expert testimony on this issue. 
The judge compared the testimony of the two experts and found 
that the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert failed to rebut the 
defense expert's testimony that runoff from lot 69F in its 
proposed developed state would be less than runoff from lot 69F 
in its current cleared state, and that runoff from the full area 
would not flow onto the plaintiffs' property and cause damage.  
Among other things, the judge recognized that the plaintiffs' 
expert compared storm water runoff from lot 69F in a natural 
state and a developed state, while the defendant's expert 
compared natural, cleared, and developed states.  As stated, 
lot 69F already has been partially cleared.  Further, the 
17 
 
 
plaintiffs' expert did not opine that runoff from lot 69F would 
cause damage to the plaintiffs' property. 
 
The judge found that, when the methodologies and findings 
of the two experts were compared, the testimony of the 
plaintiffs' expert was insufficient to establish the plaintiffs' 
standing based on harm from increased runoff or flooding.  
Discerning no error, we accept the findings. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, there was no 
error in the judge's decision that the plaintiffs are not 
aggrieved by the board's decision, and therefore lack standing 
to pursue the appeal.  On March 6, 2020, therefore, we ordered 
dismissal of the appeal without reaching the merits.