Case Title: The People v. Saddiq Abdur-Rashid The People v. Damien Devone

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2010-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 91  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Damien Devone,
            Appellant.
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No. 92  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Saddiq Abdur-Rashid,
            Appellant.
Case No. 91:
Kent J. Gebert, for appellant.
Peter H. Willis, for respondent.
Case No. 92:
Peter B. Meadow, for appellant.
Henry Neal Conolly, for respondent.
PIGOTT, J.:
These appeals raise two issues, whether a canine sniff
of the exterior of a lawfully stopped vehicle constitutes a
search under article I, § 12 of our State Constitution and, if
so, what level of suspicion is required before law enforcement
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Nos. 91 & 92
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can conduct that search.  We hold that such action constitutes a
search requiring founded suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot and that, in each of these cases, such founded suspicion
was established.  The orders of the Appellate Division should
therefore be affirmed.
People v Devone
On August 1, 2007, two police officers pulled over a
vehicle after observing its operator, Troy Washington, talking on
a cell phone.  Washington, who was unable to produce his driver's
license or registration, told the officers that the vehicle was
registered to his cousin.  Asked his cousin's name, Washington
said that he did not know.  When the officer asked for the
cousin’s whereabouts he pointed to defendant, who was seated in
the passenger seat.  When the officers ran the license number
they discovered that the vehicle, while not reported stolen, was
registered to a female.  Because of the "suspicious
inconsistencies" in Washington’s answers, the officers decided to
conduct a canine sniff of the exterior of the vehicle. 
Washington and defendant were ordered out of the vehicle, and the
officers retrieved a dog, trained in detecting narcotics, from
their SUV.
After sniffing the exterior of the vehicle, the dog  
"alerted" at the pillar between the driver and rear passenger
seat windows, indicating to the officers the presence of drugs. 
One of the officers opened the driver's side door and commanded
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Nos. 91 & 92
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the dog to search.  The dog scratched at the console between the
driver and passenger seats.  A search of the console uncovered a
quantity of crack cocaine. 
Subsequent to his indictment for criminal possession of
a controlled substance in the third and fourth degrees, defendant
moved to suppress the drugs as the product of an illegal search. 
After a hearing, County Court held that the canine sniff
constituted a search, and that the police lacked reasonable
suspicion to conduct the canine sniff.  The Appellate Division,
Third Department reversed, holding that the police needed only
founded suspicion as opposed to a reasonable suspicion to conduct
a canine sniff of the vehicle's exterior (57 AD3d 1240, 1242-1243
[3d Dept 2008]).  
People v Abdur-Rashid
On July 27, 2007 at 10:30 a.m., a police officer
effected a lawful stop of defendant's vehicle, which had no front
license plate.  Although the officer initially suspected that
defendant's insurance had lapsed, he received verification from
the insurance carrier that the insurance was in effect.  The
officer wrote defendant a ticket for a missing front license
plate and expired inspection sticker, but permitted defendant to
go on his way. 
Approximately 45 minutes later, another police officer
effected a lawful stop of defendant's vehicle on the Taconic
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Nos. 91 & 92
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State Parkway in Columbia County, having observed that it was
missing its front license place and had sticks, twigs and other
debris protruding from the front of it.  A check of the license
number showed that defendant was the registered owner of the
vehicle, but also showed, incorrectly, that the insurance on the
vehicle had lapsed. 
Defendant showed the officer a ticket he had been
issued for the inspection sticker violation, and apprised the
officer about the prior stop and insurance mix-up.  Unsure
whether defendant had shown him all previously-issued tickets,
the officer directed defendant out of the vehicle.  The officer
tried to contact the first officer by cell phone and police radio
to verify defendant's account, but was unable to do so.  During
this time, defendant stood outside the passenger side of the SUV. 
According to the officer's suppression testimony, defendant
"started to get a little fidgety and nervous," was "leaning
towards my vehicle and [was] trying to look through the window,
towards the back" at the narcotics-sniffing dog.  The officer
told defendant, "Yeah, I really do have a dog in here." Defendant
responded, "I already got my ticket today.  Can't you just let me
go?  I need to go."  
The officer returned to defendant's vehicle and spoke
with the passenger, Ekwambu Gayle, who had remained seated. 
Gayle gave the officer a convoluted tale of being involved in a
minor accident upon entering the roadway, concluding with an
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Nos. 91 & 92
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implausible story that defendant picked him up on Long Island,
that his job was to keep defendant awake en route to Schenectady,
and that defendant was going to drive back from Schenectady to
Brooklyn to drop Gayle off mid-afternoon and then return, alone,
to Schenectady later that evening.
Suspecting more than a joy ride, the officer directed
Gayle out of the vehicle and retrieved his narcotics-sniffing dog
from the SUV.  As the dog circled the vehicle, it "alerted" to
the driver's side door and attempted to climb through the window. 
When the officer opened the door the dog jumped into the backseat
and "alerted" near the rear speaker on the passenger side.  After
removing the dog from the vehicle, the officer took the keys from
the ignition and walked the dog toward the rear of the vehicle. 
The dog once again "alerted" and the officer opened the trunk. 
There he found a black duffel bag, which the dog tried to grab
from his hands.  Defendant claimed no knowledge of the duffel
bag.  Upon inspection, it was found to contain two freezer bags
of cocaine.
Following defendant’s indictment for criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, County
Court conducted a suppression hearing and concluded that the
search was lawful.  The Appellate Division, Third Department
affirmed, holding that the officer properly conducted an exterior
canine sniff of the vehicle based upon "a founded suspicion that
criminality was afoot" (64 AD3d 1087, 1089 [3d Dept 2009]). 
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Nos. 91 & 92
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Leave to appeal to this Court was granted in both cases
and we now affirm.
In People v Dunn, this Court held as a matter of State
constitutional law that the use of a canine sniff in the hallway
of an apartment building to detect the presence of controlled
substances inside an apartment constitutes a search (77 NY2d 19,
25 [1990] cert denied 501 US 1219 [1991]).  We rejected the
Supreme Court's approach in United States v Place (462 US 696
[1983]) that a canine sniff does not constitute a search because
it discloses only the presence or absence of contraband,
observing "that the fact that a given investigative procedure can
disclose only evidence of criminality should have little bearing
on what constitutes a search" (Dunn, 77 NY2d at 24).  Rather, we
concluded that the analysis should "focus on whether there has
been an intrusion into an area where an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy" (id. at 25 [emphasis
supplied]).  
We applied a similar standard in People v Price, where
we held that the canine sniff of the defendant's luggage did not
violate either Federal or State constitutional standards or
statutory law (54 NY2d 557, 564 [1981]).  Our analysis, once
again under State law, centered on the reduced expectation of
privacy one has relative to luggage placed in the hands of a
common carrier (see id. at 563-564; Dunn, 77 NY2d at 24).  
Based on our State jurisprudence, therefore, whether a
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canine sniff constitutes a search is necessarily dependent upon
whether it constitutes an intrusion into a place where a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  One clearly has a
greater expectation of privacy in one's home than in an
automobile (see New York v Class, 475 US 106, 112-113 [1986]),
but that does not render the latter interest undeserving of
constitutional protection (see Arizona v Gant, __ US __, 129 SCt
1710, 1720 [2009] [addressing warrantless searches of
automobiles]).  There is a legitimate, albeit reduced expectation
of privacy in an automobile.  But that expectation is greater
than the significantly reduced expectation of privacy one has in
luggage turned over to a common carrier.  We therefore hold that
a canine sniff of the exterior of an automobile constitutes a
search under article I, § 12.
In both of these cases the Appellate Division properly
concluded that the officers "founded suspicion" that criminality
was afoot provided sufficient grounds for the search.  While the
more demanding "reasonable suspicion" standard applies to a
canine sniff outside the door of one's residence (see Dunn, 77
NY2d at 26), there is a "diminished expectation of privacy
attributed to individuals and their property when traveling in an
automobile" (People v Yancy, 86 NY2d 239, 246 [1995]).  It
follows that law enforcement need only meet a lesser standard
before conducting a canine sniff of the exterior of a lawfully
stopped vehicle.  Given that diminished expectation of privacy,
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Nos. 91 & 92
coupled with the fact that canine sniffs are far less intrusive
than the search of a residence and provide "significant utility
to law enforcement authorities" (Dunn, 77 NY2d at 26),
application of the founded suspicion standard in these cases is
appropriate.  
There is record support in each of these appeals for
the Appellate Division holdings that police possessed a founded
suspicion to conduct the canine sniff.  In Devone, Washington's
inability to produce his driver's license and registration for
the vehicle, coupled with his responses that his cousin owned the
vehicle, that he did not know his cousin's name, and that
defendant was his cousin--together with the fact that the vehicle
was registered to a female and not defendant--gave the officer a
founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, justifying
the canine sniff.  Similarly, in Abdur-Rashid, the condition of
defendant's vehicle, the unusual travel plans of defendant and
Gayle, and defendant's "nervous" behavior, gave the officer a
similar founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.  
Accordingly, the orders in Devone and Abdur-Rashid
should be affirmed. 
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People v Damien Devone; People v Abdur-Rashid
No. 91 & 92
CIPARICK, J. (dissenting):
Because I believe that the reasonable suspicion
standard should be met before law enforcement conducts an
exterior canine sniff of a vehicle, I respectfully dissent.
In People v Dunn (77 NY2d 19 [1990]), we held that an
exterior canine sniff constitutes a search within the meaning of
article I, § 12 of the New York Constitution (id. at 25).  We
further held that reasonable suspicion that defendant's apartment
contained illegal drugs was required before law enforcement could
conduct a canine sniff in the common hallway outside the
apartment (id. at 26).  To determine this standard, we balanced
the degree of the search's intrusion against its utility (see
id.; see also People v Kuhn, 33 NY2d 203, 209-210 [1973]
[reasonableness of search determined "by 'balancing the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails'"]). 
Because exterior canine sniffs are "uniquely discriminate and
nonintrusive" and of "significant utility to law enforcement
authorities," we found that they "may be used without a warrant
or probable cause, provided that the police have a reasonable
suspicion that a residence contains illicit contraband" (Dunn, 77
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No. 91 & 92
*   Under our traditional De Bour formulation governing the
appropriate level of suspicion in police-citizen encounters,
level one requires that police have "an objective, credible
reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality"; level two
requires "founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot";
level three requires "a reasonable suspicion that the particular
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NY2d at 26).  Conducting the same balancing here, I do not see
any reason to depart from the reasonable suspicion standard we
articulated in Dunn. 
It is well-settled that an individual has a legitimate
expectation of privacy with respect to spaces within a vehicle
that cannot be viewed from the outside (see People v Class, 63
NY2d 491, 495 [1984]), and law enforcement must usually have
probable cause before searching any of these areas (see People v
Yancy, 86 NY2d 239, 245 [1995]).  This is, of course, the same
level of suspicion required before law enforcement may search a
residence (see e.g. People v Brown, 96 NY2d 80, 88 [2001]),
though automobile searches may be conducted without a warrant
(see Yancy, 86 NY2d at 245-246).  While it is true that,
generally speaking, an individual has a lesser expectation of
privacy in a car than in a home (see Yancy, 86 NY2d at 245-246),
this distinction has never affected the standard required to
search areas of a vehicle shielded from outside view, and it
should not now justify a search of these private spaces based on
mere founded suspicion rather than the reasonable suspicion
standard applied to residences and their thresholds (see Dunn, 77
NY2d at 26).*  Indeed, prior to today, the predicate of founded
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individual was involved in a felony or misdemeanor"; and level
four "requires probable cause to believe that the person . . .
has committed a crime" (People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 498-499
[2006]; see also People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]).    
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suspicion of criminality adopted by the majority would have
permitted no more than a request to search, not a search itself
(see People v Dunbar, 5 NY3d 834, 835 [2005]; People v Hollman,
79 NY2d 181, 191-192 [1992]).
Where our law distinguishes between vehicular and
residential privacy, it does so because of pragmatic
considerations not present in this case.  The automobile
exception to the warrant requirement, for example, was born of
expediency, not a general finding that private areas of a vehicle
are not entitled to protection (Yancy, 86 NY2d at 245-246
[considering "the mobility of the vehicle and the corresponding
probability that any contraband contained therein will quickly
disappear, and the diminished expectation of privacy attributed
to individuals and their property when traveling in an
automobile"]).  Here, unlike in Yancy, there is no reason why the
contents of a car's trunk or console should be afforded less
constitutional protection than the contents of one's home.  In
fact, the officers in Yancy were justified in conducting a
warrantless search of the automobile based on "incidental
observation of hundreds of separately packaged empty vials and
caps in open view following a valid automobile stop" (id. at
246).  Thus, I believe that, as in Dunn, the minimal
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intrusiveness of an exterior canine sniff justifies requiring
such a search to be predicated on reasonable suspicion.  
Moreover, the predicate for a canine sniff selected by
the majority, founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot,
is divorced from the realities of the encounter.  By way of
example, the canine in Devone could not assist the officers in
ascertaining whether defendant's vehicle was stolen, as
originally suspected.  Trained canines are capable only of
detecting drugs.  Yet the majority allows such a search without
requiring any suspicion of illegal drug activity.  Without a
nexus between the suspicion held by the police and the capability
of the canine, the probe sanctioned by the majority is but a
fishing expedition.
Particularly in light of New York's strong tradition of
protecting our citizens from unreasonable searches under article
I, § 12 of the New York Constitution, I believe the appropriate
level of suspicion that must be present before law enforcement
conducts an exterior canine sniff search of a vehicle is the
standard of reasonable suspicion of the presence of illicit drugs
in the vehicle, not the lesser "founded suspicion" standard
chosen by the majority here.  
Accordingly, I would reverse both orders of the
Appellate Division. 
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*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
In Each Case:  Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Pigott.  Judges
Graffeo, Read and Smith concur.  Judge Ciparick dissents and
votes to reverse in an opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman and
Judge Jones concur.
Decided June 8, 2010