Case Title: Sanders v. State

Citation: 266 So. 2d 802

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1972-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
266 So. 2d 802 (1972)
In re Tommy William SANDERS, Alias
v.
STATE of Alabama.
Ex parte STATE of Alabama ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL.
6 Div. 959.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 10, 1972.
*803 William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and Don C. Dickert, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
No brief from respondent.
MERRILL, Justice.
Defendant Sanders was convicted of robbery and sentenced to ten years. He appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals and the judgment was reversed, 48 Ala.App. 589, 266 So. 2d 797. The State petitioned for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals was in conflict with a prior decision of this court on the same point of law. We grant the writ.
There was ample evidence from the victim, Smith T. Murphy, and two passers-by that two men, Jasper Hall and Melvin Pye, grabbed Murphy, overpowered him, stabbed him several times as he was wrestled to the ground, and one of them took Murphy's billfold, containing five dollars and some personal papers, from his pocket. The question as to the defendant was whether he aided and abetted Hall and Pye by sitting on Murphy's feet shortly before the billfold was taken.
The only point before us is that on which the judgment was reversed, namely, that the trial court erred in refusing to give Charge I, which follows:
We quote from the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals:
* * * * * *
In Edwards v. State, 49 Ala. 334, this court, speaking through Brickell, J., said:
In Carden v. State, 89 Ala. 130, 7 So. 801, the defendant "requested several charges to be given to the jury, based on the assumption that the grand jury knew, or by due diligence might have known, a more particular description of the money." This court, Colpton, J., writing, said (and we quote the entire opinion):
Under these two cases, the indictment in the instant case was sufficient, and the phrase "a more particular description of which is to the Grand Jury otherwise unknown" was surplusage, and the court did not err in refusing the requested charges.
Viewed from another angle, the only evidence before the court as to what was told the grand jury about the description of the money taken from his person came from Murphy, as stated in the opinion under consideration. Murphy "testified first on cross-examination that he told the Grand Jury he was robbed of a five dollar bill and later when recalled on direct examination he testified that he told the Grand Jury it was five dollars." If he told the same story to the grand jury that he *805 told before the petit jury then "a more particular description of which" (the five dollars) was unknown to the grand jury.
Three cases are cited in support of the holding on this point in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We treat them as they appear in that opinion.
In Young v. State, 20 Ala.App. 219, 101 So. 469, the opening paragraph of the opinion begins:
and the judgment of conviction was affirmed.
James v. State, 115 Ala. 83, 22 So. 565, was cited in Young, supra, and it is authority for the statement quoted from the Young case. But it cannot be said in the instant case that "the proof shows that the description (of the money) was in fact known to the grand jury," and so neither Young nor James is apt authority under the facts of the instant case.
In the last case cited in the opinion, DeFranze v. State, 46 Ala.App. 283, 241 So. 2d 125, the indictment charged that appellant "feloniously took thirty-three dollars in greenbacks, the exact denominations of which are unknown to the Grand Jury, all lawful currency of the United States of America, of the value of thirty-three dollars." Young and James, supra, are cited in support of the same proposition already discussed, but we think additional quotations from DeFranze will clarify the situation:
* * * * * *
The judgment was affirmed.
In Gayden v. State, 38 Ala.App. 39, 80 So. 2d 495, we read:
We think the indictment at bar meets each of these requirements.
*806 Title 15, § 231, Code 1940, provides:
As we read the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals and the cases cited in support of it, it seems to be indicated that if the words "a more particular description of which is to the Grand Jury otherwise unknown" had been omitted from the indictment the case would not require reversal. This appears to be a matter of form which did not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant in this particular case. We think the reversal of conviction here is the result of the application of a super-technicality where no prejudice was actually involved.
To further show lack of prejudice, this court has held that "In robbery the amount of money or the value of the property taken is immaterial." Wilson v. State, 268 Ala. 86, 105 So. 2d 66 [6]. Wilson, supra, and Richardson v. State, 237 Ala. 11, 186 So. 580, are authority for the principle that where testimony on the trial of a robbery charge as to the amount of money taken is not in accordance with the allegations of the indictment, such a variance is not fatal and is immaterial. Therefore, if the variance in the allegations in the indictment and the proof in a trial for robbery is immaterial and not fatal, by analogy, there was no fatal variance in the instant case.
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to that Court.
Reversed and remanded.
HEFLIN, C. J., and HARWOOD, BLOODWORTH, MADDOX, McCALL and SOMERVILLE, JJ., concur.
COLEMAN, J., dissents.