Case Title: Abolafia v. Reeves

Citation: 

Docket Number: 38189-2010

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2012-04-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 38189-2010 
 
JOSEPH MICHAEL ABOLAFIA, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
REBECCA REEVES, 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
_______________________________________ 
 
KENNETH PAUL ADLER, Guardian ad 
Litem, 
 
Appellant. 
 
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Coeur d’Alene, April 2012 Term 
 
2012 Opinion No.  65 
 
Filed: April 26, 2012 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for Bonner County.  The Hon. Benjamin R. Simpson, District Judge; the 
Hon. Debra A. Heise, Magistrate Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Charles B. Bauer and Margalit Z. Ryan, Bauer & French, Boise, argued for 
appellant. 
 
Suzanne Fegelin, Powell & Reed, Sandpoint, argued for defendant-respondent. 
 
Glorianne Gooding-Jones, Sandpoint, argued for plaintiff-respondent. 
 
 
 
EISMANN, Justice. 
 
The appellant in this case had been appointed as a guardian ad litem for children whose 
parents were involved in a proceeding to modify the custody provisions of their divorce decree.  
After the parties reached an agreement to resolve their dispute and the magistrate court  
terminated the appellant as the guardian ad litem, the appellant sought to appeal, challenging his 
termination.  The district court held that he did not have standing to appeal, and it dismissed the 
appeal and awarded attorney fees to the parents pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121. 
 
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I. 
Factual Background. 
 
Joseph M. Abolafia (Father) and Rebecca Reeves-Abolafia (Mother) were divorced by a 
decree entered on August 29, 2006.  The decree awarded the parties joint legal and physical 
custody of their two minor children, with the children’s primary residence being with Mother.  
On May 9, 2007, Mother filed a petition to modify the decree by granting her sole legal custody 
of the children with respect to health and education issues.  On May 15, 2007, Father filed a 
motion to appoint a guardian ad litem for the children, and at the hearing on that motion the 
parties orally stipulated that a guardian ad litem be appointed. 
By order entered on June 12, 2007, the magistrate court appointed Kenneth Adler as the 
guardian ad litem.  He was ordered to “prepare a written report for the Court concerning the child 
[sic] and his [sic] present circumstances and submit the report to the Court and counsel.”  Each 
party was to pay one-half of the cost of Adler’s services.  During the ensuing eight months, 
Adler did not submit any report to the court. 
 
On January 18, 2008, Adler filed a motion to join the children as parties to the action, to 
be permitted to file an independent claim on their behalf, and to require Mother to respond to 
discovery promulgated by Adler.  Mother filed a motion to terminate the appointment of Adler as 
guardian ad litem on the grounds that the parties had negotiated a settlement to resolve the issues 
between them and that the continued appointment of Adler would increase the fees for all parties.  
The parties also filed their written stipulation to modify the child custody provisions of the 
divorce decree. 
 
The various motions were scheduled for hearing at the pretrial conference on February 4, 
2008, which was three weeks before the trial.  Before deciding which motion to take first, the 
magistrate court addressed the parties regarding the stipulation to resolve the motion to amend 
the decree.  Under the stipulation, the decree would not be modified as to joint legal custody, but 
it would be modified as to the times Father would have physical custody of the children.  
Counsel for both parties stated that they agreed to the stipulation and that the parties’ abilities to 
communicate had improved during the process.  In fact, counsel stated that it was the parties who 
negotiated the stipulation between themselves.  The parties also stated to the magistrate that they 
were communicating much better.  The court went over the terms of the stipulation, and Adler 
 
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stated that in his opinion there was nothing wrong with the schedule the parties had agreed upon.  
When asked whether, considering the best interests of the children, Adler approved of the 
structure of the visitation schedule, he stated that he did.  His objections were that he had not 
been consulted regarding the stipulation and that he wanted the parties to litigate other issues not 
covered by the stipulation. 
 
After considering the comments by the parties and their respective counsel and Adler’s 
comments, the magistrate court stated that it accepted the stipulation, and it orally granted the 
motion to terminate Adler as guardian ad litem.  On February 15, 2008, the court entered the 
order terminating Adler as guardian ad litem and the order modifying the divorce decree 
pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. 
 
On March 21, 2008, Adler, acting pro se, filed a notice of appeal, stating that he was 
appealing from the order modifying the divorce decree and from the order terminating him as 
guardian ad litem.  The issues that he sought to raise on appeal were: 
1.  The GAL [guardian ad litem] having claimed by motion an interest in 
the subject matter of the litigation, and having sought to be joined in the action, 
joinder was mandatory [under Rule 19(a)(1)], and the court erred in refusing to 
grant joinder. 
2.  The magistrate violated the children’s, and the GAL’s, due process 
rights by depriving them of the opportunity to participate in the action as parties 
in thier [sic] own right. 
3.  The magistrate’s decision to dismiss the GAL and proceed to dispose 
of the case on its merits, was an abuse of discretion. 
4.  Where the court has appointed a guardian for the children, the guardian 
has accepted those duties, his standing to appeal adverse rulings is the same as for 
any party, and his decision to pursue such an appeal is properly within the scope 
of his appointment, particularly where the appeal challenges an erroneous 
dismissal. 
 
Adler sought to be reinstated as the guardian ad litem, to be “joined and named as an 
Independent Claimant,” to be permitted to file his independent claim, and to have the order 
entered pursuant to the parties’ stipulation vacated. 
After hearing oral argument on the appeal, the district court remanded the case to the 
magistrate to make further findings in the following issues: 
a.  What facts support, and under what authority may the Magistrate Judge 
take up the Motion to Terminate the Guardian Ad Litem, before hearing the 
pending motions of the Guardian Ad Litem, which were scheduled for hearing at 
the same time? 
 
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b.  What facts support, and under what authority does the Magistrate Judge 
grant the stipulated Motion to Terminate the Guardian Ad Litem? 
c.  What facts support, and under what authority does the Magistrate Judge 
determine that the stipulated modification of child custody decree of the parties is 
in the best interests of the minor children of the parties? 
 
On August 11, 2010, the magistrate entered additional findings as requested by the 
district court.  In those findings, the magistrate stated that the only authority for the appointment 
of a guardian ad litem in the case was the consent of the parties pursuant to the local practice in 
Bonner County and that, upon the court’s acceptance of the parties’ stipulation to resolve the 
matter, continued involvement of Adler as guardian ad litem became moot. 
On September 7, 2010, the district court entered its decision on appeal.  The court held 
that Adler did not have the authority to litigate the interests of the children; that the primary 
purpose of Adler’s appointment was to conduct an investigation and to report to the court 
regarding facts relative to the best interests of the children; that Adler served at the pleasure of 
the magistrate; and that the magistrate properly terminated Adler’s appointment on February 15, 
2008.  The district court also held that Adler did not have the authority to appeal his termination, 
that the order terminating him was not an appealable order, that Adler had no standing to bring 
the appeal, and that his appeal was brought unreasonably and without foundation.  It therefore 
awarded Father and Mother attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121.  Adler then 
appealed to this Court. 
 
II. 
Did Adler Have Standing to Appeal the Orders of the Magistrate Court? 
 
“Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by this Court before reaching the 
merits of the case.”  Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002).  
“The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party 
wishes to have adjudicated.”  Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 
(1989).  To satisfy the requirement of standing, “litigants generally must allege or demonstrate 
an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or 
redress the claimed injury.” Id.  The alleged injury must be to the litigant whose standing is at 
issue.  Troutner v. Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389, 392, 128 P.3d 926, 929 (2006). 
 
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The magistrate court appointed Adler as guardian ad litem for the children of the parties 
in connection with Mother’s proceedings to modify the custody provision of the divorce decree.  
The children were not parties to the litigation, and Adler was not appointed to be their legal 
counsel.  His primary duty was to conduct an investigation and prepare a written report to the 
court regarding the best interests of the children.  During the eight months of his appointment, 
Adler did not manage to prepare the report.  Ultimately, the parties agreed to a resolution of their 
dispute and the magistrate court determined that it no longer needed Adler’s services. 
Because Adler served at the pleasure of the magistrate court, it could terminate his 
appointment at any time when the court, in its sole discretion, determined that it no longer 
needed his services.  The court’s decision to terminate his services did not have to be supported 
by any factual findings, nor did the court have to give a reason.  All that was required was for the 
court to decide that it no longer desired Adler’s services.  Once the court made that decision and 
entered the order terminating him as a guardian ad litem, he ceased to be the guardian ad litem.  
Adler had no right to continue in the role of guardian ad litem for the children, nor did he have 
any legally protected interest that was impacted by the court terminating him as guardian.  
Because he was not a party to this litigation and did not represent a party, he had no right to 
challenge the court’s decision regarding the custody of the children.  He had no standing to 
appeal to the district court because he had no justiciable interest in this litigation.  Although he 
may have been miffed by his termination as guardian ad litem, injury to his pride is not 
justiciable.  After he was terminated as guardian ad litem on February 15, 2008, his actions in 
appealing to the district court have simply been those of an officious intermeddler.  He had no 
standing to appeal. 
 
III. 
Does Adler Have Standing to Appeal the Decision of the District Court? 
After the district court affirmed the order of the magistrate court1 and awarded attorney 
fees to Father and Mother, Adler retained Bauer and French to represent him in an appeal to this 
Court.  In this appeal, Adler seeks to raise on appeal the following issues: 
                                                 
1 Because, as the district court held, Adler did not have standing to appeal, the appropriate order would have been to 
dismiss the appeal rather than to affirm the decision of the magistrate judge.  Affirmance indicates a consideration of 
the merits of the appeal, which Adler did not have standing to challenge. 
 
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1) Did the trial court err in summarily terminating the Guardian ad Litem 
before it addressed his concerns regarding the best interest of the children? 
2) Did the trial court err in approving and entering a stipulated custody 
agreement without proper discussion of the best interest of the children? 
3) Did the district court err in holding that the Guardian ad Litem had no 
standing to appeal his termination without affording him the hearings he 
requested that addressed his concerns regarding the best interest of the children? 
4) Did the district court err in failing to reverse the trial court’s decision 
when the district court determined that the trial court’s Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were completely inadequate to support the orders on appeal? 
5) Did the district court err in holding that the Guardian ad Litem, 
appointed by the trial court to represent the children at all hearings, had no 
standing to appeal the errors made and orders entered at a hearing where the 
Guardian ad Litem was representing the children? 
6) In light of the Guardian ad Litem’s duty to represent the children at all 
hearings, absent Idaho law on a GAL’s standing to appeal, and absent findings of 
facts and conclusions of law sufficient to support the trial court’s orders, was the 
appeal by the Guardian ad Litem of the court’s failure to address the best interest 
of the children and termination of the Guardian Ad Litem a frivolous appeal? 
 
The only aspect of the district court’s decision that affects any of Adler’s rights is the 
award of attorney fees against him.  That is the only issue he has standing to appeal.  As to the 
other issues he seeks to raise, he is not an aggrieved party because as to those issues he is not 
injuriously affected by the judgment of the district court.  First State Bank of Eldorado v. Rowe, 
142 Idaho 608, 612, 130 P.3d 1146, 1150 (2006); I.A.R. 4. 
 
 
III. 
Did the District Court Err in Awarding Father and Mother Attorney Fees on Appeal? 
 
The district court awarded attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121 
to Father and to Mother on the ground that Adler brought the appeal unreasonably and without 
foundation.  Adler raises several arguments as to why he contends his actions were not 
unreasonable or without foundation. 
 
First, he states that “[t]he trial court’s appointment of the GAL conferred on the GAL the 
standing to represent the children and guard their best interest at all hearings before the trial 
court.  This was exactly what Ken was doing when he filed his appeal . . . .”  The order did not 
purport to authorize Adler to file any pleadings or to appeal, and he was no longer the guardian 
ad litem when he filed his appeal.  Any authority that he may have had to act while he was 
guardian ad litem had been terminated before he filed his appeal to the district court. 
 
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Second, he asserts that Father’s motion asked for appointment of a guardian ad litem 
“pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 32-704(4), 15-5-207, and Rule 17(c),” the magistrate must have 
made the appointment pursuant to one of those statutes.  The order does not cite any statute or 
rule authorizing the appointment.  The magistrate judge explained the basis for the appointment 
as follows:  “Consistent with the local practice that has developed in Bonner County, this court 
appointed a Guardian ad Litem in this child custody case pursuant to the request, consent, and 
stipulation of both parents.  This was the exclusive authority on which this Court relied for the 
appointment.”  Adler does not contend that either Idaho Code section 32-704(4) or section 15-5-
207 could by any stretch of the imagination be construed as authorizing the appointment.  
However, he does contend that he had standing to appeal pursuant to Rule 17(c) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure.2  That rule only applies to the appointment of guardians ad litem for 
infants or incompetent persons who are parties to the litigation.  It had no application here. 
 
Third, Adler cites In the Interest of Brandon S.S., 507 N.W.2d 94 (Wis. 1993), and 
Grunewald v. Technibilt Corp., 931 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. App. 1996), as authority for “the broad 
spam [sic] of the GAL’s reach in discharging his or her responsibilities to guard the best interest 
of the children.”  Neither of the cases could reasonably be read as supporting Adler’s actions in 
this case.  In the Wisconsin case, the guardian ad litem was appointed pursuant to a statute which 
expressly stated that “[t]he guardian ad litem may appeal.”  W.S.A. 767.045(5) (1992).  Adler 
was not appointed pursuant to any statute, much less a similar one, and he was not the children’s 
guardian ad litem when he filed his appeal.  In the Texas case, the guardian ad litem was 
appointed to represent a child who was a party to the litigation pursuant to a rule of civil 
procedure that required the  trial court to “appoint a guardian ad litem for a party represented by 
a next friend . . . if:  (1) the next friend . . . appears to the court to have an interest adverse to the 
party.”  Tex. R. Civ. P. 173.2(a).  In that case, “[t]he parents sought damages individually and as 
                                                 
2 That rule provides: 
 
Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as a general 
guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on 
behalf of the infant or incompetent person.  If an infant or incompetent person does not have a 
duly appointed representative the person may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem.  The 
court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise 
represented in an action or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the 
infant or incompetent person. 
 
 
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next friends of their minor daughter” and the guardian ad litem was appointed for the daughter 
“based on the adverse interests existing between the child and her parents, who sought damages 
for their individual claims.”  Grunewald, 931 S.W.2d at 594.  Adler was not appointed as a 
guardian ad litem to represent any party to this litigation, and he understood that he was not 
guardian ad litem for any party because he filed a motion seeking to make the children parties.  
That motion was not granted,3 and, as stated above, Adler was terminated as guardian ad litem 
before he filed his appeal. 
 
Adler contends that his appeal to the district court was not unreasonable or without 
foundation because he won the “first round” of the appeal.  For some reason, the district court 
remanded the case to the magistrate judge to make additional findings before the court addressed 
Adler’s lack of standing to appeal.  That action by the district court did not make Adler’s appeal 
any less unreasonable or without foundation. 
 
Adler argues that Father and Mother failed to make proper requests for attorney fees on 
appeal to the district court.  He asserts, “Respondent Father did not even mention attorney fees in 
his brief on appeal.  . . .  Respondent Mother failed to properly support her requests or claims for 
attorneys fees on appeal by asserting it as an issue on appeal.” 
After Father filed his brief, he filed an amendment to his brief in which he requested an 
award of attorney fees on appeal.  Adler did not seek to strike that amendment, and in his reply 
brief he responded to Father’s request for attorney fees.  The appeal to the district court was 
governed by Rule 83 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  Rule 83(x) states, “Any appellate 
procedure not specified or covered by these rules shall be in accordance with the appropriate rule 
of the I.R.C.P. or the I.A.R. to the extent the same is not contrary to this Rule 83.”  Adler quotes 
from Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a), however, he omits the latter portion of the rule which is 
italicized below: 
Any party seeking attorney fees on appeal must assert such a claim as an 
issue presented on appeal in the first appellate brief filed by such party as 
provided by Rules 35(a)(5) and 35(b)(5); provided, however, the Supreme Court 
may permit a later claim for attorney fees under such conditions as it deems 
appropriate. 
 
                                                 
3 Adler did not cite any authority that would support his motion to have the children joined as parties in this action, 
and we are likewise unaware of any. 
 
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Applying that rule, the district court had discretion to permit a later claim for attorney fees.  
Adler has not argued on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in doing so. 
 
Mother did not include her request for attorney fees in her list of issues on appeal, but she 
did include the request in a separate section of her brief entitled, “Request for Attorney Fees,” in 
which she argued “that this appeal was brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably and 
without foundation.”  Rule 83(v) provides that briefs on appeal to the district court “shall be in 
the form and arrangement . . . provided by rules for appeals to the Supreme Court unless 
otherwise ordered by the district court.”  Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(5) states, “If the respondent 
is claiming attorney fees on appeal the respondent must so indicate in the division of additional 
issues on appeal that respondent is claiming attorney fees and state the basis for the claim.”  We 
need not address the consequences, if any, of Mother’s failure to list her request for attorney fees 
as an additional issue on appeal because Adler did not raise that issue in the district court.  “This 
Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.”  Houston v. Whittier, 147 Idaho 
900, 911, 216 P.3d 1272, 1283 (2009). 
 
Finally, Adler argues that while discharging his duties as guardian ad litem, he had quasi-
immunity that protected him from an award of attorney fees.  In making that argument, he relies 
upon McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 937 P.2d 1222 (1997).  In McKay, an attorney was 
appointed pursuant to Idaho Code section 5-306 as a child’s guardian ad litem in order to make 
recommendations to the court regarding the proposed settlement of the child’s personal injury 
action.  We held that a guardian ad litem appointed pursuant to Idaho Code section 5-306 to 
represent a child who was a party in a personal injury action had absolute quasi-immunity 
because the guardian must be free to make recommendations to the court that the guardian 
believes are in the child’s best interests.  Id. at 157, 937 P.2d at 1231.  That case does not support 
quasi-immunity here because Adler was not guardian ad litem for the children at the time he filed 
his appeal. 
 
During his comments to the magistrate judge, Adler stated that he filed his motion 
seeking to have the children joined as parties with him representing them because he became 
aware of the settlement and it appeared to him that “there was now an eleventh hour attempt by 
the parties to avoid litigating the issues that are corrosive to the actual co-parenting.”  When the 
court asked, “So what issues are corrosive?” Adler’s response was that he “has not been 
consulted on this stipulation, including in any negotiations for this stipulation, ever seen this 
 
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stipulation.”  The court then stated to Adler:  “Okay, I know that you feel personally slighted but 
let’s talk about the kids.  What—what part of this agreement is not in their best interests?”  Adler 
answered that he had not seen the agreement.  He was provided with a copy, and its terms were 
discussed.  The court then asked Adler, “Is there anything wrong, in your opinion, with the 
schedule to which they agreed?” and Adler answered, “No.”  Later in their dialogue, the court 
again asked Adler:  “Okay.  Let’s get back to the best interests of the children then.  So the—
the—the structure of the schedule itself, you’re okay with?” to which Adler answered, “Yes.” 
The discussion between Adler and the Court continued, and Adler correctly stated, “I 
serve at the pleasure of the court.”  When the court did not do what Adler wanted, he decided 
that he served at his own pleasure and filed the appeal.  The sole purpose of the appeal was to 
assuage his hurt pride.  He has provided absolutely no argument or authority that would even 
remotely support his assertion that he has standing to appeal.  All he has done is increase the cost 
to the parties.  The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Father and Mother 
attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121 on the ground that Adler brought 
this appeal unreasonably and without foundation. 
 
IV. 
Are Respondents Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal? 
 
Father and Mother have each requested that they be awarded attorney fees on appeal to 
this Court pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121.  “Attorney fees under § 12-121 will be 
awarded to the prevailing party on appeal when this Court is left with the abiding belief that the 
appeal was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.”  
Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 533, 66 P.3d 230, 237 (2003).  Adler did not have standing to 
appeal most of the issues he sought to raise.  That portion of his appeal was brought frivolously, 
unreasonably, and without foundation.  Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 229, 159 P.3d 862, 866 
(2007).  As to the award of attorney fees by the district court, Adler has not presented any cogent 
argument showing that the district court abused its discretion in making that award.  We 
therefore award Father and Mother attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-
121. 
 
 
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IV. 
Conclusion. 
 
We affirm the judgment of the district court, and we award respondents costs on appeal, 
including attorney fees.  
 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices J. JONES, W. JONES, and HORTON CONCUR.