Case Title: Medford v. Pac. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co.

Citation: 189 Or. 617, 222 P.2d 407

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1950-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Reversed and remanded June 6, 1950.
Petition for rehearing denied September 27, 1950.
*620 Austin Dunn, of Baker, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Dunn & Jackson, of Baker.
David C. Silven, of Baker, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Hallock, Donald, Banta & Silven, of Baker.
Before LUSK, Chief Justice, and BRAND, BELT, ROSSMAN and LATOURETTE, Justices.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
BRAND, J.
On 20 May 1946 the defendant insurance company issued a policy insuring the plaintiff against loss or damage to his automobile caused by collision. The plaintiff sues on the policy and alleges that on 8 November 1946 when the policy was in full force and effect his car was totally wrecked in an accident; that its reasonable value was $2100; that $700 is a reasonable attorney fee; that all conditions precedent have been performed and that payment has been demanded and refused.
The defendant denies the allegations to which we have referred and alleges that the plaintiff has not filed any proof of loss. As a separate answer the defendant sets up certain provisions of the policy concerning cancelation and in apparent reliance upon those *621 provisions alleges that on 16 October 1946 written notice of cancelation was mailed to the plaintiff at his address as shown in the policy and that the letter containing said notice was not returned to the defendant. The defendant asserts that under the terms of the policy liability ceased at midnight on 23 October 1946. The provisions of the policy so far as material are set forth in the answer as follows:
A copy of the alleged notice of cancelation is attached to the answer as an exhibit and reads as follows:
To the separate answer, the plaintiff filed a demurrer which was sustained. The defendant elected to stand upon the answer. The cause was tried by the court without a jury. The plaintiff submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law. Objections were filed by the defendant and the court, having considered the objections, made findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $1915 with legal interest from 8 November 1946 and for the further sum of $500 attorney's fee and costs and disbursements. The defendant appeals.
The defendant, as its first assignment, asserts that:
The appellant states the issue thus:
The plaintiff contends that "The statutory method providing for cancellation of an insurance policy is exclusive" and relies upon the provisions of O.C.L.A., § 101-1609 as the exclusive method by which the policy in question could be canceled. Plaintiff argues further that the notice of cancelation did not comply with the provisions of that section and therefore was ineffectual. We will first consider whether the statutes of this state have provided any exclusive method for canceling a policy of this kind. The statute provides that:
The statute further provides that:
O.C.L.A., § 101-131 provides in part:
O.C.L.A., § 101-1608 provides in part as follows:
Then follows the provision of the statute on which the defendant relies as a statement of the exclusive method by which the policy in question could have been canceled.
1. We may now call attention to certain provisions of the statutes thus far cited. A company issuing automobile insurance is deemed an insurance company under the provisions of O.C.L.A., § 101-117, and policies insuring automobiles against damage from collision are classified for the purpose of licensing, along with fire and marine insurance. O.C.L.A., § 101-117, par. (2). Automobile insurance policies, though classified with fire insurance policies, need not use the standard fire policy. Such insurance is known as "automobile insurance". O.C.L.A., § 101-122, par. (3). The crucial section. O.C.L.A., § 101-1609, does not provide that all policies issued by fire insurance companies may be canceled as therein provided. If that section did apply to all policies issued by a fire insurance company, then there would be ground for arguing that the section applied to automobile insurance when issued by a fire insurance company. The provisions of O.C.L.A., § 101-1609 are that "Any fire insurance policy may be canceled * * *", etc. The policy issued to the plaintiff was issued by a fire insurance company, but was not a fire insurance policy and was *626 a policy known as an "automobile insurance" policy, which, by express terms of the statute need not be in the form of a standard fire policy.
2. O.C.L.A., § 101-1801, et seq., specified the required provisions to which any fire insurance policy issued by a fire insurance company must conform. That act was repealed by Oregon Laws 1945, ch. 237, p. 352, and a new statute "To prescribe the form of fire insurance policies to be used by insurers in the state of Oregon" was enacted. That statute provides that:
The procedure by which policies covered by the act shall be canceled is set forth in section 1 of that act. But, an automobile insurance policy, not being a fire insurance policy, and the company not being required to use the standard fire policy, is not governed by the provisions of the Standard Fire Insurance Policies act. We have been cited to no provision of the statute which purports to require any standard form in automobile insurance policies.
3. Condition No. 23 of the policy reads as follows:
*627 But we find no provision of the policy concerning the method of cancelation which is in conflict with any statute of Oregon. The provision is therefore inapplicable. The next question for decision under the first assignment of error is whether the plea of cancelation was demurrable when tested, not by the requirements of the statute, but by the provisions of the policy itself.
4. Cancelation is an affirmative defense to an action on the policy. Van Scoy v. National Fire Insurance Co., 191 Iowa 318, 184 N.W. 306; Artificial Ice Co. v. Reciprocal Exchange, 192 Iowa, 1133, 184 N.W. 756; 46 C.J.S., Insurance, § 1294, pp. 344-5; 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, § 1433, p. 1074. To the plea of cancelation, a general demurrer was filed and sustained in the trial court. The defendant elected to stand on his answer without amending. Under these circumstances, it becomes our duty to apply the established rules of construction in determining the sufficiency of the answer.
5. Where a pleading states all of the material allegations requisite for a good cause of action or defense and is defective only by reason of the fact that it is vague or ambiguous or is wanting in that plainness and conciseness of statement required by the code, this court has held that the defect should be reached by motion to strike or to make more definite or certain rather than by demurrer. As said in Clarkson v. Wong et al., 150 Or. 406, 42 P.2d 763, 45 P.2d 914:
6, 7. If such a pleading is tested only by demurrer it will receive liberal construction. Jackson v. Jackson, *628 17 Or. 110, 19 P. 847; Murray v. Lamb et al., 174 Or. 239, 148 P.2d 797. Again, when the sufficiency of a pleading is drawn in question on the admission of evidence, no demurrer having been filed, or when the question is raised for the first time in the Supreme Court, the rule of liberal construction applies and all intendments come to the support of the pleading. But when, as in the case at bar, the sufficiency of a pleading is tested by demurrer, and the demurrer has been sustained and the party receiving the adverse decision elects to stand upon the pleading without amending, it must be presumed that the party has stated his case as strongly as the facts will permit and the pleading must therefore be construed most strongly against the pleader. Walin et al. v. Young, 181 Or. 185, 180 P.2d 535; Mattoon v. Cole, 172 Or. 664, 143 P.2d 679. The rule of strict construction is peculiarly applicable under the circumstances of this case. Except as the right to cancel an insurance contract is provided for by statute or reserved in the contract, neither party can effect a cancelation without the consent of the other. Artificial Ice Co. v. Reciprocal Exchange, supra; 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, § 273, p. 256. Provisions for cancelation contained in the policy will be enforced, but any reasonable doubt as to the meaning in an insurance policy must be resolved in favor of the insured. Clark Motor Co. v. United Pacific Insurance Company, 172 Or. 145, 139 P.2d 570; Purcell v. Washington Fidelity National Insurance Company, 146 Or. 475, 30 P.2d 742; Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 277 U.S. 311, 72 L. ed 895; 6 Berry, Automobiles, 7th Ed., § 6.464. Not only is reasonable doubt to be resolved in favor of the insured in determining the meaning of the policy; the courts have also established strict rules for the protection *629 of the insured when the issue of cancelation is raised by the insurer. Although some authorities hold that substantial compliance with statutory provisions concerning the right of cancelation is sufficient (29 Am. Jur., Insurance, § 274, p. 256) nevertheless when a contractual nonstatutory provision for cancelation is contained within the policy itself:
Having in mind the foregoing rules concerning construction of the contract and strict compliance with its terms in the matter of cancelation, we turn to the allegations of the answer. The answer contains no allegation that the unearned premium has been paid or tendered to the insured. The plaintiff asserts that the payment or tender of the unearned premium is a condition precedent to effective cancelation, citing 32 C.J., Insurance, § 440, p. 1252; 6 Berry on Automobiles, 7th Ed., 1944 Supp., § 6.466; 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, § 290, p. 268; Grant Lumber Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 253 F. 83; Chadbourne v. German-American Ins. Co., 31 F. 533; Taylor v. Ins. Co., of North America, 25 Okla. 92, 105 P. 354; Gosch v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 496; Sanks v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 131 Neb. 266, 267 N.W. 454. Reference is also made to the annotations in 127 A.L.R. at 1341. As pointed out by the annotator in the citation from A. *630 L.R., "the language of the particular provision involved with respect to such cancelation is of primary importance." In many instances the policy has provided for cancelation upon notice to the insured and upon refunding a ratable proportion of the premium. In such cases the courts have universally held that return or tender of the unearned premium is a condition precedent to cancelation by the insurer. See cases cited; 127 A.L.R. 1343.
A second group of policies employ the so-called standard cancelation clause which provides in substance that the insurer may cancel upon specified notice to the insured and that the unearned portion of the premium shall be returned to the insured upon surrender of the policy and that the insurer "shall retain only the pro rata premium". Many courts hold that such provisions are ambiguous and that they should therefore be construed in favor of the insured. These courts reach the conclusion that the payment or return of the unearned premium is a condition precedent to cancelation. On this point the authorities are in conflict and the decisions pro and con are collected in 127 A.L.R. 1347 to 1354. To this class belong the following cases cited by the plaintiff: Grant Lumber Co. v. North River Ins. Co.; Taylor v. Ins. Co. of North America; Gosch v. Firemen's Ins. Co., all supra; Bessette v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 111 Conn. 549, 150 A. 706.
In a third type of policy provision is made for cancelation by the insurer by giving (usually) five days' written notice of cancelation "with or without tender of the excess of paid premiums above the pro rata premiums for the expired time, which excess, if not tendered, shall be refunded on demand. Notice of cancelation *631 shall state that said excess premium (if not tendered) shall be refunded on demand". (127 A.L.R. 1354). Where the notice fails to state that the unearned premium will be refunded on demand the courts have applied the rule of strict compliance and have held the notice of cancelation insufficient. The following authorities cited by the plaintiff belong to this class: Sanks v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 131 Neb. 266, 267 N.W. 454; B. & B. Trucking Co. v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 209 N.Y.S. 511; Naify v. Pac. Ind. Co., 11 Cal. 2d 5, 76 P.2d 663; Molyneaux v. Royal Exchange Assurance, 235 Mich. 678, 209 N.W. 803; Pomerantz v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 279 Pa. 497, 124 A. 139; Artificial Ice Co. v. Reciprocal Exchange, supra.
The case at bar does not fall within any of the classes above designated, nor does either party cite any case which has arisen under a contractual cancelation clause such as the one involved here. Turning to the cancelation clause of the policy in the case at bar, which is set forth at the first of our opinion, we find that the language is clear and unequivocal. There is no room for construction and we cannot make a new contract for the parties. Leslie v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 327 Ill. App. 343, 64 N.E.2d 391. In the absence of controlling statute or rule of public policy, parties may make such contract as they desire concerning the method of cancelation. 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, § 275, p. 257.
We come now to cases which are directly in point on the issue now under consideration and which were decided under policy provisions identical to those in the case at bar. In Leslie v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., supra, a notice canceling an automobile liability policy was mailed on 23 July 1942 stating that cancelation *632 would become effective on 29 July 1942. The accident occurred in September. The insured received the notice but contended that the return of the unearned premium was a condition precedent to cancelation and that it had not been returned. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff but upon appeal, judgment was reversed. The court said:
In Parks v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 327 Ill. App. 356, 64 N.E.2d 210, action was brought on a public liability and property damage insurance policy. The defendant company gave the plaintiff notice of cancelation on 24 June, effective 6 July, and the plaintiff had an accident on 9 July of 1943. At the time of the notice of cancelation there was due to the plaintiff $3.65 unearned premium. As in the case at bar the policy provided:
This is the identical language found in the policy in the case at bar. The Illinois court held that the parties were free to contract, unrestricted by any statute of Illinois, so far as the return of the unearned premium was concerned. The court referred to many decisions on the "standard cancellation clause", citing 127 A.L.R. 1347. It held that the majority rule under the standard clause requires refund of the unearned premiums as a prerequisite to cancelation, citing cases. The court then said:
The court then reviewed numerous cases and said:
In Wallace v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 187 Tenn. 692, 216 S.W.2d 697, similar facts were before the court for consideration under a policy, the provisions of which concerning cancelation, were identical to those in the case at bar. The court cited with approval Summers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 8 Cir., 109 F.2d 845, 127 A.L.R. 1336, a case which on its facts is of the third type to which we previously referred. The court recognized the conflict of authority as to this type of case and then said:
The court then quoted with approval from Parks v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. and Leslie v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., both supra. The court held that there is no ambiguity in the policy and that none can be created when none exists. It then said:
Judgment was rendered for the defendant.
*636 The cancelation clause in Summers v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra, contains some provisions which are very similar to those with which we are concerned in the case at bar, but the two provisions differ markedly in other respects. The provision of the Summers case was as follows:
The Court of Appeals in the Summers case gave careful consideration to the contention that the return of the unearned premium was a condition precedent to the right to cancel the policy. It found no Missouri statute applicable to the question and held that the parties were therefore at liberty to contract on the subject, and since there was no ambiguity, it was held that the contract must be given effect as written. We quote from the opinion as follows:
8. If the decision in the Summers case, and in others like it, is correct, then a fortiori we must conclude that the return of the unearned premium was not a condition precedent to cancelation under the terms of the policy in the case at bar. The policy in the Summers case did not contain the provision found in the policy with which we are now concerned, which reads as follows: "Premium adjustment may be made at the time cancelation is effected and, if not then made, shall be made as soon as practicable after cancelation becomes effective." To summarize; the policy in question may be canceled "by mailing * * *" to the insured, not "by giving notice" to him. Notice shall state when cancelation "shall be effective". Mailing is sufficient proof of notice. The date and hour stated in the notice is the end of the policy period. Premium adjustment may be made "after cancellation becomes effective". If return of the unearned premium may be made after cancelation becomes effective it cannot be a condition precedent to effective cancelation.
Plaintiff next contends that the answer is demurrable because of failure to allege that the notice of cancelation was actually received by the plaintiff. The plaintiff cites in support the following authorities: 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, § 285, p. 264; 14 A.L.R. 200; *638 35 A.L.R. 1472; 123 A.L.R. 1008; 32 C.J., Insurance, § 436, p. 1248; American Building Maintenance Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 214 Cal. 608, 7 P.2d 305; Merrill v. Farmers' Alliance Ins. Co., 155 Kan. 31, 122 P.2d 776. Reference to the authorities cited again discloses that no general rule can be laid down and that the language of the particular provision involved with respect to cancelation is of primary importance. Where the policy provides that it may be canceled by the company "on giving notice to that effect" (Farnum v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 83 Cal, 246, 23 P. 869) or by "giving to the insured" five days' notice of written cancelation (Hendricks v. Continental Ins. Co., 121 Pa Super. Ct. 390, 183 A. 363; Potomac Ins. Co. v. Atwood, 118 Ill. App. 349; Hartford F. Ins. v. Tewes, 132 Ill. App. 321; American F. Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 83 Md. 22, 43 A. 373; Commercial Union F. Ins. Co. v. King, 108 Ark, 130, 156 S.W. 445) the cancelation does not become effective until the notice is received, that is, until, as required by the policy, notice has been given to the insured. Again, in a number of cases, the attempted cancelation has been ineffective when, without any provision of the policy authorizing it, the insurer has sent the notice of cancelation in an envelope marked "After 5 days return", etc., or when the notice is sent by registered mail in an envelope on which was printed "Personal receipt of addressee required". Under such circumstances, if the letter is returned to the sender without delivery to the insured, the cancelation has been held ineffective under a policy providing for cancelation by giving to the insured five days' notice of cancelation with the added provision that notice of written cancelation mailed to the address of the insured stated in the policy shall be a sufficient notice. American Automobile *639 Ins. Co. v. Watts, 12 Ala. App. 518, 67 S. 758, 67 S. 1017; Irish v. Monitor Ins. Co., 264 Mich. 586, 250 N.W. 318. In a case of this kind, however, a New York court said:
And in Werner v. Commonwealth Casualty Co., 9 N.J. Misc. R. 963, 156 A. 116, affirmed 109 N.J.L. 119, 160 A. 547, the court held that since there was no provision *640 in the policy for sending a cancelation notice by registered mail, the insurer, by sending by registered mail and requesting a personal receipt, assumed the responsibility of personal delivery to the insured.
In American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Watts, supra, the policy provided that: "notice of cancellation deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the address of the assured, as stated herein, shall be sufficient notice." This case is quoted at length in 6 Berry Law of Automobiles, § 6.466, p. 544. The court said:
In Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Willrich, 13 Wn.2d 263, 124 P.2d 950, the clause provided for cancelation by mailing written notice to the insured and provided further:
*641 The notice was mailed, but the trial court found that it was never received. The court said:
The opinion cites many cases in support. The court observed that:
To the same effect see Gendron v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 47 N.M. 348, 143 P.2d 462; Seaboard Mutual Casualty Co. v. Profit, 108 F.2d 597; Boyle v. Inter Ins. Exchange of the Chicago Motor Club, 335 Ill. App. 386, 82 N.E.2d 179; Raiken v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., (N.J. Sup.) 135 A. 479; California-Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, Tex. Civ. App., 120 S.W.2d 844; Byard v. Royal Indemnity Co., 49 N.Y.S.2d 60; Naify v. Pacific Indemnity Co., supra, (dictum); see also Cuttle v. Concordia Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 290 *642 Mich. 117, 287 N.W. 401. American Building Maintenance Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 214 Cal. 608, 7 P.2d 305, cited by the plaintiff is against his contention. In Merrill v. Farmers' Alliance Ins. Co., 155 Kan. 31, 122 P.2d 776, cited by the plaintiff, the policy provided:
The jury made a special finding to the effect that the defendant company never mailed the notice of cancelation. The court, however, discussed the rule and emphasized the provision requiring the giving of notice "to the insured" and held that since the insured never received the notice "if it was in fact mailed", the cancelation would be ineffective. The statement is dictum.
9. It will be observed that the older forms of policy require notice to the insured whereas that phrase does not appear in the policy with which we are now concerned. The provision here is that the policy may be canceled by mailing to the insured at the address shown in the policy a written notice. Again, instead of the earlier type of provision which makes mailing the equivalent of personal delivery, this policy, by its terms, makes clear that the mailing is the cancelation and provides that delivery shall be equivalent to mailing. Finally it is provided that the mailing of notice as aforesaid, shall be sufficient proof of notice. We hold that the defendant's answer was not demurrable by reason of the omission therefrom of an allegation that the mailed notice was also actually received.
*643 10, 11. The next contention of the plaintiff is that there was no valid cancelation of the policy because of a discrepancy between the provision of the policy and the letter canceling. The policy provides that if premium adjustment is not made at the time cancelation is effected it "shall be made as soon as practicable after cancelation becomes effective." The notice, which was mailed, states that the excess of premium (which was not tendered with the notice) "will be refunded on demand". If the policy had required the notice to affirmatively state that the unearned premium would be returned as soon as practicable, and if instead of so stating, the defendant had stated that payment will be refunded on demand, there would be a basis of precedent for holding that the notice of cancelation was insufficient since it did not comply with the requirements of the policy. Plaintiff could then claim support from such cases as Sanks v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.; B. & B. Trucking Co. v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co.; Naify v. Pacific Indemnity Co.; Molyneaux v. Royal Exchange Assurance; Pomerantz v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co.; Artificial Ice Co. v. Reciprocal Exchange; all supra. These cases hold that when the policy requires that a notice shall state certain facts, a failure so to state is fatal. But, in the case at bar, the only provision specifying what the notice shall state is that it be one "stating when not less than five days thereafter such cancelation shall be effective." The notice as mailed strictly complied with this requirement. It stated "Said policy will stand canceled, and all liability * * * thereunder will cease, at and from midnight, standard time, October 23, 1946, without further notice." Any further question as to the sufficiency of the notice of cancelation is, in our opinion, foreclosed *644 by the decisions previously cited, being the only ones which pass upon provisions identical to those in this policy. If those cases are sound, and we think they are, then the giving of the required notice, plus the expiration of the time specified, results ipso facto in cancelation. The return of the premium would be a consequence of cancelation instead of a condition precedent, as said in Leslies v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., supra. The balance in the hands of the company after the cancelation would merely create a debtor creditor relationship, as said by the Tennessee court in Wallace v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., supra. The discrepancy between the policy provision that refund of the debt "shall be made as soon as practicable" (which was not required to be stated in the notice) and the notice to the effect that the debt "will be refunded on demand" becomes immaterial for the discrepancy relates to matters subsequent to the effective cancelation. If it be suggested that by demanding the unearned premium or by complying with the request for return of the policy, the plaintiff might be thought to waive some rights, the answer is, that if the policy had been already canceled through the definite exercise by the defendant of a clear right so to do, the plaintiff could have no right of recovery under the policy for any loss suffered subsequent to the cancelation, and therefore could waive none. His right to the unearned premium would alone exist, and this certainly would not be waived by demanding it or by returning the policy. Since the notice of cancelation was given exactly as required by the policy, we hold that it was sufficient.
This case went to trial on the complaint and the denials and allegations of the first answer, but the issue of cancelation raised by the further and separate answer *645 was not tried. The defendant made an offer of proof in support of his defense of cancelation, but the offer was rejected. Under a new trial the defendant will have the right to submit evidence supporting this issue and the plaintiff will be entitled to introduce evidence tending to contradict the allegations of the further affirmative defense.
12. Since the case may be retried, we will briefly notice the other assignments of error. The defendant asserts that the court erred in denying defendant's motion for nonsuit. The policy provides that it does not apply under coverages "D", "E", "F", "G", and "H" for damage by collision, fire, theft, etc., "while the automobile is subject to any * * * mortgage * * * not specifically declared and described in this policy". The policy recites that there is an encumbrance of $1038 and that loss is payable to the insured and the First National Bank, Baker, Oregon. There was no other encumbrance at the time of the execution of the policy. The plaintiff paid off the mortgage to the bank on 9 September 1946 but a few days later borrowed $200 or $250 from a third party. In view of the phraseology of the policy we hold that there was no warranty or agreement against encumbrances created after the execution of the policy. Such encumbrances obviously could not be described in "this policy". The words used are open to such construction, and applying the authorities earlier quoted, we hold that the policy should be construed favorably to the insured if there be any ambuiguity. If the company intended to cover future mortgages it could have said so. Collins v. Merchants & Bankers Mut. Ins. Co., 95 Iowa 540, 64 N.W. 602; 4 Couch, Insurance, § 901, p. 3123; 27 Am. Jur., Insurance, § 624, p. 502. See also Kautz v. Zurich General *646 Accident and Liability Ins. Co., 212 Cal. 576, 300 P. 34; Kister v. Lebanon Mutual Ins. Co., 128 Pa. 553, 18 A. 447; Gould v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co., 134 Pa. 570, 19 A. 793; Koshland v. Home Ins. Co., 31 Or. 321, 49 P. 864; Russell v. The Cedar Rapids Ins. Co., 71 Iowa 69, 32 N.W. 95.
13. By his third and last assignment the defendant asserts that the court erred in rejecting the offer of defendant to show that no proof of loss had been filed. There is no merit to this assignment. The position of defendant is, that it canceled the policy on 16 October. The evidence was that on the day after the accident the plaintiff was informed by the defendant's agent that the policy had been canceled. This amounted to a denial of liability which constituted a waiver of any proof of loss. Meader v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Relief Association, 137 Or. 111, 1 P.2d 138; Ringo v. Automobile Insurance Co., 143 Or. 420, 22 P.2d 887.
The judgment for plaintiff is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Hallock, Donald, Banta & Silven, of Baker, for the petition.
Dunn & Jackson, of Baker, contra.
Before LUSK, Chief Justice, and BRAND, BELT[*], ROSSMAN and LATOURETTE, Justices.
Petition denied.
BRAND, J.
In our former opinion we held that the provisions of O.C.L.A., § 101-1609 did not control the method by which the policy on the plaintiff's automobile might *647 be canceled by the company. We further held that the provisions of the policy itself controlled the method by which it might be canceled. By a petition for rehearing the plaintiff contends that we erred in so holding and again urges that compliance with the provisions of O.C.L.A., § 101-1609 constituted the only method by which the automobile insurance policy in question could be canceled.
In the year 1907 the legislature passed an act "to provide for a uniform contract or policy of fire insurance * * *." Laws 1907, Ch. 137. That act specifically set forth the provisions which shall be incorporated into the policy, and among other such provisions, there was one which specified the method by which any "fire insurance policy" or renewal of any "fire policy" might be canceled. The act was limited to policies insuring against loss by fire and contained no reference to policies insuring against damage to automobiles unless that damage was the result of fire. The act was amended by the Laws of 1911, Chapter 175. The 1911 act made only a minor change in the required standard form for cancelation. The 1911 statute was not expressly repealed until the enactment of Chapter 237, Laws of 1945. In 1917 a comprehensive statute, known as the "Insurance Law" was enacted, which provided that:
The same chapter of the 1917 Laws indicates that the legislature contemplated that "automobile insurance" would be issued by fire insurance companies, for it is provided "For this purpose a fire insurance company need not use the standard fire policy." Laws 1917, Ch. 203, Sec. 5-e (3). The same provision appears in Laws 1927, Ch. 93, Sec. 1, which was amendatory of the 1917 act and which now appears as O.C.L.A., § 101-122. In the same statute, and under the heading "GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO ALL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANIES", the following provision was enacted:
14. The provision concerning the "form known as the `Standard'" must apply to the 1911 statute, supra, which provided for standard forms of fire insurance policies. Section 22-i of the 1917 act contains the provision which became O.C.L.A., § 101-1609 on which the plaintiff relies. It will be observed that O.C.L.A., § 101-1609 (Laws 1917, Sec. 22-i) provides the manner by which "any fire insurance policy" may be canceled. That act went into effect on 21 May 1917, but 22-h of Chapter 203 of the 1917 Laws, quoted supra, provides that all fire insurance companies issuing fire insurance policies after 1 January 1918 must employ the standard *649 form which was then provided by the 1911 act. We conclude that any fire insurance policy which was issued after 1 January 1918 was controlled by the cancelation provisions in the standard form, and not by the provisions of O.C.L.A., § 101-1609 which were in effect only as to cancelations which occurred prior to 1 January 1918. Since the plaintiff's policy was issued after 1 January 1918, it follows that O.C.L.A., § 101-1609 never applied to it, whatever the meaning of the words "fire insurance policy" may be.
15. Chapter 237 of the Laws of 1945 amends the standard form statute and provides that no fire insurance company shall issue "any fire insurance policy" except in conformance with the mandatory provisions of the act. The requisite steps for cancelation under the 1945 act are materially different from, and inconsistent with, the provisions of O.C.L.A., § 101-1609. We know that the 1945 act does not apply to automobile insurance because it is expressly provided by O.C.L.A., § 101-122, Par. 3, that insurance known as automobile insurance need not use the standard fire policy. O.C.L.A., § 101-1609 provides that "Any fire insurance policy may be canceled". The 1945 statute, providing the standard form, also employs the term "Any fire insurance policy". We think that the words were used in the same sense in both statutes and that in neither case were they intended to include automobile insurance policies insuring against collision. We therefore find no statute which defines the method by which an automobile policy insuring against collision, or any other loss, other than that caused by fire, shall be canceled by the insurer, and we conclude that the method specified in the policy controls. Even in the absence of the express provision that automobile insurance *650 covering fire, collision and liability for damage shall be known as automobile insurance, we find it difficult to believe that the usual automobile insurance policy such as is involved in the pending case would ever be referred to as a fire insurance policy. The licensing statute, O.C.L.A., § 101-117, groups for the purposes of licensing, not only fire insurance and automobile insurance, but also insurance against flood, snow and the like. We think no one would designate a policy insuring against flood as a fire insurance policy. The foregoing considerations sustain the views which we expressed in our first opinion.
Counsel cites the following cases in support of the proposition that section 101-1609, O.C.L.A., is the exclusive method by which the policy in question could be canceled: Walker v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, 114 Or. 545, 234 P. 542; Williams v. Pacific States Fire Insurance Company, 120 Or. 1, 251 P. 258; Commercial Securities, Inc. v. Hall, 140 Or. 644, 15 P.2d 483. Support from the cited cases is claimed by reason of language in each of them which asserts, or implies, that a policy of insurance on automobiles was a fire insurance policy. In the Walker case the court referred to a standard policy "used in other kinds of fire insurance". In the Williams case the court said, "This is an action on a fire insurance policy", and in the Commercial Securities case the court referred to the policy as an "automobile insurance policy", but it also said that the policy "is not a standard fire policy". In each of the three cases, automobiles were specifically insured against fire, and were consumed by fire. The fact that the court referred expressly, or by implication, to the policies as fire insurance policies, is without any significance in the case at bar. The petition for rehearing is denied.
[*]  Died August 6, 1950.