Case Title: State v. Fugate

Citation: 

Docket Number: S45976

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: June 8, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
	Respondent on Review,
	v.
STEVEN GLEN FUGATE,
	Petitioner on Review.
(CC 96-0660-C; CA A96628; SC S45976)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted October 14, 1999.
	Peter Gartlan, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the brief were David E. Groom, Oregon Public Defender, Jesse Wm. Barton, Deputy Public Defender, Robin A. Jones, Deputy Public Defender, Anne Morrison, Deputy Public Defender, and Andy Simrin, Deputy Public Defender.
	Kaye E. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham,
Kulongoski, and Leeson, Justices.**
	GILLETTE, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
	* Appeal from Jackson County District Court, Rebecca G. Orf, Judge.
154 Or App 643, 963 P2d 686, modified and adhered to on recons 156 Or App 609, 969 P2d 395 (1998).
    ** Van Hoomissen, J., retired on December 31, 2000, and did
not participate in the decision of the case; Riggs and De Muniz,
JJ., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.
		GILLETTE, J.
		This is a criminal case in which defendant was charged
with driving while under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). 
ORS 813.010.  Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress any
evidence of his impairment due to alcohol, arguing that any such
evidence was obtained only because the arresting officer exceeded
the permissible scope of the traffic stop that preceded
defendant's arrest.  See ORS 810.410(3)(b) (1995) (limiting scope
of traffic stop).  The trial court granted defendant's motion to
suppress.  On appeal, the state asserted, inter alia, that Oregon
Laws 1997, chapter 313 (hereafter referred to as SB (Senate Bill)
936), which the 1997 Legislature enacted after the trial court's
decision, applied to the case and required reversal of the trial
court's order.  Defendant, relying on various constitutional
grounds, responded that SB 936 could not be applied to his case. 
A divided Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, disagreed with
defendant, agreed with the state, and reversed the order of the
trial court.  State v. Fugate, 154 Or App 643, 963 P2d 686,
modified and adhered to on recons 156 Or App 609, 969 P2d 395
(1998).  We allowed defendant's petition for review.  We now
conclude that, although SB 936 is constitutional on its face, the
part of SB 936 on which the state relies may not be applied
retroactively to defendant's case.  We therefore reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that
court to consider the state's remaining assignments of error.
I.  FACTS AND BACKGROUND

		We take our statement of facts from those found by the
trial court.  On February 11, 1996, (1) a police officer stopped the
vehicle that defendant was driving because it did not have a
license plate light and because a records check indicated that
the driving privileges of the vehicle's registered owner were
suspended.  The officer asked for and obtained identification
from defendant and his three passengers.  A check revealed that
there was an outstanding arrest warrant for one passenger.  The
officer went to speak to that passenger.  While doing so, the
officer saw a nylon pouch that he thought was a gun holster.  He
seized the pouch, which turned out to contain a spoon with white
residue on it.  The officer then ordered everyone out of the
vehicle.  It was at that point that the officer observed things
about defendant's physical condition that led him to arrest
defendant for DUII.
		At a pretrial hearing on his motion to suppress
evidence, defendant argued that the officer had expanded the stop
of the vehicle that defendant had been driving beyond what was
necessary to issue the pertinent traffic citation.  Defendant
reasoned that that expansion violated ORS 810.410(3)(b) (1995) (2)
and that the evidence obtained against him therefore should be
suppressed.  See State v. Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or 206, 895 P2d
306 (1995) (holding that evidence derived from violation of ORS
810.410(3)(b) must be suppressed).  As noted, the trial court
agreed.  On February 27, 1997, the court entered an order
suppressing the evidence. 
		The state appealed the trial court's order to the Court
of Appeals.  In that court, the state argued, inter alia, that
suppression of evidence for violation of ORS 810.410(3)(b) (1995)
no longer was appropriate because of the recent passage of SB
936. (3)  Section 1 of SB 936, now ORS 136.432, provides:
		"A court may not exclude relevant and otherwise
admissible evidence in a criminal action on the grounds
that it was obtained in violation of any statutory
provision unless exclusion of the evidence is required
by:
		"(1)  The United States Constitution or the Oregon
Constitution;
		"(2)  The rules of evidence governing privileges
and the admission of hearsay; or
		"(3)  The rights of the press."
Section 38 of SB 936 states that its provisions (other than those
expressly specified) apply "to all criminal actions pending or
commenced on or after December 5, 1996."  Or Laws 1997, ch 313,
§ 38.  Section 1 falls within that default provision.  The
present case had not yet come to trial, i.e., was pending on that
date.  Thus, by its terms, SB 936 applies to defendant's case,
unless some other source of law prevents it from being applied in
that manner.  In this court, defendant argues that there are such
other sources of law.  Before we turn to his arguments, however,
a review of the history surrounding the enactment of SB 936 is
helpful.
		SB 936 is a legislative paraphrase of selected
provisions of an amendment to the Oregon Constitution that was
known as Ballot Measure 40 (1996).  Measure 40 was approved by
the people at the 1996 general election and became Article I,
section 42, of the Oregon Constitution.  Or Laws 1997, v 1, at
ix-x.  Measure 40 became effective on December 5, 1996.  Measure
40 modified several parts of the Oregon Constitution relating to
the criminal law.  In Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 254-55,
959 P2d 49 (1998), this court summarized Measure 40 as follows:
		"Measure 40 was submitted to the voters as an
initiated amendment to Article I of the Oregon
Constitution.  According to its preamble, Measure 40
'is designed to preserve and protect crime victims'
rights to justice and due process and to ensure the
prosecution and conviction of persons who have
committed criminal acts.'  (Boldface in original.)
		"The measure contains nine sections.  Section 1
lists the following rights to which victims of crime
are entitled in all criminal prosecutions and juvenile
delinquency proceedings:  (1) rights relating to
pretrial detention and release of criminal defendants;
(2) the right to be notified of certain stages of
criminal proceedings and the right to be present and
heard; (3) the right to information about the
conviction, sentencing, imprisonment, criminal history,
and future release of criminal defendants; (4) the
right to refuse to participate in criminal defendants'
discovery requests; (5) the right to receive prompt
restitution; (6) the right to have all relevant
evidence admitted against criminal defendants; (7) the
right to have criminal defendants tried by a jury
composed of jurors who are registered voters and who
have not been convicted of a felony or served a felony
sentence within the last 15 years; (8) the right to
have criminal defendants convicted by a jury vote of 11
to 1 in aggravated murder and murder cases; (9) the
right to receive prepared copies of court transcripts;
(10) the right to have criminal defendants serve their
sentences in full, without such sentences being set
aside, except through the governor's reprieve,
commutation, or pardon power, or pursuant to appellate
or post-conviction relief; (11) the right to have
convicted criminals sentenced consecutively for crimes
against different victims; (12) the right to joinder of
charges against criminal defendants;  (13) the right to
be consulted during plea negotiations in certain cases;
and (14) the right to notification of the foregoing
rights as soon as reasonably practicable.  Measure 40,
§§ (1)(a) to (n).
		"Section (2) of Measure 40 declares that the
rights set out in the measure 'shall be limited only to
the extent required by the United States Constitution,'
that Article I, sections 9 and 12, of the Oregon
Constitution, 'shall not be construed more broadly than
the United States Constitution,' and that, in cases
involving victims, 'the validity of prior convictions
shall not be litigated except to the extent required by
the United States Constitution.'  Section (3) provides
that the measure 'shall not reduce a criminal
defendant's rights under the United States
Constitution, reduce any existing right of the press,
or affect any existing statutory rule relating to
privilege or hearsay.'
		"Section (4) of Measure 40 declares that the
decision to initiate criminal prosecutions or juvenile
delinquency proceedings rests with the district
attorney and gives the district attorney the authority
to assert the rights conferred upon victims in the
measure.  Sections (5) to (8) define the terms 'victim'
and 'relevant evidence' for purposes of Measure 40, and
clarify various matters relating to the rights
conferred in the measure.  Finally, section (9) states
that Measure 40 creates no new civil liabilities."
327 Or at 254-55.
		Measure 40 immediately faced constitutional challenges,
one of which -- Armatta -- resulted in this court declaring the
measure unconstitutional.  At least in part in response to the
various challenges to Measure 40, the 1997 Legislature took up
and eventually passed SB 936.  As noted, that bill became
effective June 12, 1997.  We shall discuss the contents of SB 936
in greater detail later in this opinion.  It is sufficient at
this point to state that SB 936 contains legislative versions of
certain parts of section 1 of Measure 40 that did not on their
face require amendment of the Oregon Constitution.  We turn to
defendant's various arguments that SB 936 is not applicable to
his case.
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

A. Article IV, Section 20:  Single-Subject and Title Requirements
		Defendant contends that SB 936 is invalid because it
was enacted in violation of Article IV, section 20, of the Oregon
Constitution, which governs the traditional legislative process
in which a bill makes its way through the House and Senate.  That
section provides, in part:
		"Every Act shall embrace but one subject, and
matters properly connected therewith, which subject
shall be expressed in the title.  But if any subject
shall be embraced in an Act which shall not be
expressed in the title, such Act shall be void only as
to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the
title."				
		This case is concerned with the first sentence of
Article IV, section 20.  The second sentence becomes pertinent
only if the legislature has not complied with the requirements of
the first sentence.  This court most recently discussed the first
sentence of Article IV, section 20, in McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or
426, 909 P2d 846 (1996), where it stated:
	"* * * [T]he first sentence of Article IV, section 20,
expressly mandates that '[e]very Act shall embrace but
one subject, and matters properly connected therewith'; 
it requires that every act shall have a title; and it
expressly requires that the one subject of the Act
'shall be expressed in the title.'  The first sentence
thus states separate requirements for the body of an
act and the title of an act, and it also connects the
two requirements by establishing a relationship between
the body and the title."
322 Or at 438 (footnote omitted).
		Defendant first asserts that the answer in this case is
controlled by Armatta, in which, he contends, this court held
that Measure 40 -- the constitutional progenitor of SB 936 --
contained multiple subjects.  It follows, defendant contends,
that SB 936 does so as well.  The parallelism for which defendant
contends does not exist, however, because Armatta dealt with a
substantively different constitutional standard.  
		In Armatta, this court considered whether Measure 40
violated the requirement in Article XVII, section 1, of the
Oregon Constitution, that "'two or more amendments'" to the
Oregon Constitution must be "'so submitted that each amendment
shall be voted on separately.'"  327 Or at 257 (emphasis omitted;
quoting Article XVII, section 1).  The court explained that the
test under Article XVII, section 1, is "whether, if adopted, the
proposal would make two or more changes to the constitution that
are substantive and that are not closely related."  Id. at 277. 
That is a different inquiry from an inquiry whether a measure
violates the single-subject requirement of Article IV, section
20.  As this court explained:
	"* * * [T]he single-subject requirement, * * *
contained * * * in Article IV, section 20, * * *
focuses upon the content of a proposed law or
amendment, by requiring that it embrace only one
subject and matters properly connected therewith.
		"The separate-vote requirement [in Article XVII,
section 1], by contrast, focuses upon the form of
submission of an amendment, as well as the potential
change to the existing constitution, by requiring that
two or more constitutional amendments be voted upon
separately.  That is, in addition to speaking to the
form of submission, the separate-vote requirement
addresses the extent to which a proposed amendment
would modify the existing constitution.  That is
significantly different from the wording of the
single-subject requirement, which focuses in isolation
upon only the text of a proposed amendment in requiring
that it embrace a single subject."
Id. at 275-76 (citations omitted; emphasis in original). 
Furthermore, 
	"* * * the fact that a proposed amendment containing
more than one subject would violate both the separate-vote and single-subject requirements does not compel
the conclusion that the opposite also is true, i.e.,
that a proposed amendment that contains only one
subject would not violate the separate vote
requirement."
Id. at 277 (emphasis in original).
		In other words, the statements in Armatta regarding
Measure 40 applied a different standard than the one that we
consider here.  Armatta examined Measure 40 against the framework
of those constitutional provisions that the measure would have
amended and considered whether the changes to those provisions
were "closely related."  By contrast, under Article IV, section
20, we consider the far broader question whether the provisions
of SB 936 "embrace but one subject, and matters properly
connected therewith."  Read in context, Armatta does not support
defendant's argument that SB 936 embraces more than one subject.
		Article IV, section 20, was designed to serve two
purposes.  The requirement that the body of each act embrace a
single subject and matters properly connected therewith was
intended to avoid "logrolling," which this court has defined as
"'combining [unrelated] subjects representing diverse interests,
in order to unite the members of the legislature who favored
either, in support of all.'"  McIntire, 322 Or at 439 (quoting
Nielson v. Bryson, 257 Or 179, 186, 477 P2d 714 (1970)).  On the
other hand, the part of Article IV, section 20, relating to the
title is designed to prevent deception.  See McIntire, 322 Or at
438 ("The principal purpose for the title requirement of Article
IV, section 20, is to provide fair notice to legislators (and to
others) of the contents of a bill * * *."  (Emphasis omitted.)). 
See also Warren v. Marion County et al, 222 Or 307, 321, 353 P2d
257 (1960) ("The restriction [of Article IV, section 20,] was
intended to assure those who could not examine the body of the
act itself that the act did not deal with more than its title
disclosed.").
		With the foregoing in mind, we turn to an analysis of
the application of the "single subject" requirement to this case.
	1.  Subject Analysis
		The first step in addressing a challenge under Article
IV, section 20, is to consider whether the act embraces only one
subject and matters properly connected with that subject.
		The Court of Appeals identified that single subject in
SB 936 as the "prosecution and conviction of persons who have
committed criminal acts."  Fugate, 154 Or App at 654.  We would
put it differently, but only slightly so.  Sections 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 11, 12, 13, and part of section 20 of SB 936 directly
provide various specific rights to crime victims.  Sections 1,
22, 29, and 37 deal at various levels with the admissibility of
evidence in criminal trials.  Sections 18 and 19, and the
remainder of 20, deal with release criteria respecting those
accused of crimes.  Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 24, 26, 27, and
32 address criminal sentencing and orders for restitution. 
Sections 8, 9b, 21, and 25 make various changes to the law
respecting juries in criminal cases.  (The remaining sections
involve conforming amendments, effective dates, and the like.) 
We would summarize the foregoing by saying that the subject of SB
936 is the prosecution and conviction of persons accused of
crime.  That subject logically connects and unifies all the
provisions of SB 936, including those that create, within the
process of criminal law enforcement, certain legal rights for the
victims of crime, and those that deal with sentencing and
restitution.
		Defendant argues that "victims' rights" and "criminal
prosecutions" are different legislative subjects.  The rights of
victims may be vindicated in civil cases, defendant contends,
while criminal cases involve the protection of the public, not
the rights of victims.  For that reason, defendant contends that
SB 936 contains two subjects:  victims' rights, and criminal
procedure and sentencing.  We do not accept that distinction. 
Both victim's rights and criminal procedure and sentencing are
connected by, indeed are aspects of, the occurrence of a criminal
act.  There is a logical connection between what is done for the
victim and what is done to the criminal.
		Defendant next contends that the definition of a
"subject" under Article IV, section 20, should be delimited by
the possibility of "logrolling."  That is, defendant suggests
that the test is whether a legislator could support one provision
of an act while opposing another.  If so, defendant argues, then
the act involves logrolling and the statute should be construed
as involving multiple subjects.
		We disagree.  "Logrolling" is not a constitutional
term.  "Subject," on the other hand, is such a term.  Our holding
that SB 936 embraces only one subject and matters properly
connected therewith answers the pertinent question.  The capacity
of legislators to combine or disagree over sections, sentences,
clauses, or even single words in a bill may be illimitable, but
logrolling becomes a concern only when proposed legislation
embraces more than one subject and matters properly connected
therewith -- a circumstance not presented here.  Defendant's
proposed rule effectively would require that each act contain but
a single provision -- a result that this court has rejected. 
See, e.g., State v. Allen, 152 Or 422, 429-30, 53 P2d 1054 (1936)
("[W]hile the subject must be single, the provisions involved may
be multifarious."). 
		Defendant contends, in the alternative, that SB 936 has
two distinct purposes -- to "'protect crime victims' rights'" and
"'to ensure the prosecution and conviction of persons who have
committed criminal acts.'"  Armatta, 327 Or at 278 n 8 (emphasis
omitted; quoting preamble to Measure 40).  The constitutional
test, however, is whether the provisions of the act embrace one
"subject" and matters properly connected therewith.  That test
does not prohibit legislation from promoting more than one
desirable purpose in the process.  Defendant's proposed
interpretation would prohibit the legislature from ever passing
any act that promoted two or more desirable ends, even if the act
involved but a single section.  Such a result would inhibit
legislation without promoting any of the purposes underlying
Article IV, section 20.  See McIntire, 322 Or at 437-38 (Article
IV, section 20 "should not be so construed so as to hamper or
cripple legislation * * * by a strictness unnecessary to the
accomplishment of the beneficial purpose for which it was
adopted" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). (4)
		In summary, we conclude that SB 936 embraces only a
single subject and matters properly connected therewith, as
required by Article IV, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution.
	2.  Title Analysis
		Defendant next contends that SB 936 is unconstitutional
under that part of Article IV, section 20, requiring that every
act shall have a title and that the one subject of the act shall
be expressed in the title.  As this court explained in McIntire,
the second sentence of Article IV, section 20, 
	"* * * prescribes a consequence when all or part of the
body of an act is not expressed in the title.  An act
'shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not
be expressed in the title.'  The second sentence thus
expressly ties the title of an act to the one-subject
requirement."
322 Or at 438.
		As we already have noted, the purpose of the title
requirement "is to provide fair notice to legislators (and to
others) of the contents of a bill."  Id.; see also Warren, 222 Or
at 321 (to same effect).  Accordingly, "[i]f the subject of the
enactment is so expressed in the title as to give reasonable
notice of the contents of the law, it is sufficient."  Lovejoy v.
Portland, 95 Or 459, 467, 188 P 207 (1920).
		Courts do not review titles hypertechnically.  This
court has stated that a title is sufficient if it "afforded
sufficient warning of the subject."  Warren, 222 Or at 323. 
"[A]ny expression in the title which calls attention to the
subject of the bill, although in general terms, is all that is
required."  Calder et al. v. Orr et al., 105 Or 223, 231, 209 P
479 (1922) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  See
also Tompkins v. District Boundary Board, 180 Or 339, 349, 177
P2d 416 (1947) (not "necessary that the legislature adopt that
which the courts may regard as the most appropriate or expressive
title" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State ex
rel. Pierce v. Slusher, 119 Or 141, 151, 248 P 358 (1926) ("To
entertain the notion that a better title might have been written
is not sufficient reason for holding a title invalid.").
		We turn to the title of SB 936.  As this court has
explained, the relating clause of an act serves as the title. 
McIntire, 322 Or at 445.  The relating clause of SB 936 provides:
		"Relating to implementation of victims' rights
initiative; creating new provisions; amending ORS
10.030, 10.050, 40.170, 40.175, 131.007, 135.230,
135.240, 135.245, 135.432, 135.970, 136.001, 136.450,
136.619, 137.106, 137.281, 137.540, 137.550, 144.108,
144.343, 419C.270, 419C.450, 421.508 and 423.478;
repealing ORS 133.585 and 133.683; and declaring an
emergency."
The title of SB 936 states that it "implement[s]" an "initiative"
relating to "victims' rights."  All those words are important. 
		Determining what "victims' rights initiative" the title
refers to is not difficult.  Article IV, section 1(2)(a), of the
Oregon Constitution, provides:  "The people reserve to themselves
the initiative power, which is to propose laws and amendments to
the Constitution and enact or reject them at an election
independently of the Legislative Assembly."  An initiative, then,
is a law or an amendment to the Constitution that the people
propose.  As noted, SB 936 became effective on June 12, 1997.  At
the previous general election in November 1996, the voters had
adopted Measure 40.  Or Laws 1997, v 1, at ix-x.  The ballot
title caption for Measure 40 provided:  "Amends Constitution;
Gives Crime Victims Rights, Expands Admissible Evidence, Limits
Pretrial Release."  Id. at x.  Of the 23 measures on the ballot
in November 1996, only the ballot title caption for Measure 40
contained the words "victims" and "rights."  Id. at ix-x.  The
reference to "victims' rights initiative" thus provided notice to
legislators and to the public that SB 936 was an effort to place
into statute legislative versions of as many of the provisions of
Measure 40 as could be placed there without a constitutional
amendment.
		Having determined what the title of SB 936 means, we
must consider whether it sets out the subject of the act.  We
conclude that it does.  As we have explained, every substantive
provision of SB 936 is related to or paraphrases one or another
of the provisions of Measure 40.  Defendant does not cite to us,
and we have not located, any substantive provision of SB 936 that
is not related to the implementation of Measure 40.  Logically,
if derivatively, it follows that what we said in the abstract of
the subject of the act also could be said of Measure 40, viz.,
its subject is the prosecution and conviction of persons accused
of crime.  Thus, the title is valid under Article IV, section 20,
of the Oregon Constitution.
		Defendant contends that the title renders SB 936
invalid because it states that the act is the "implementation" of
Measure 40.  Once Measure 40 was declared unconstitutional,
defendant argues, SB 936 no longer was capable of "implementing"
it.  Defendant's argument is based on too restrictive a view of
what SB 936 was intended to accomplish.  As the title portrays,
SB 936 amends certain statutes and creates others.  The
substantive content of its provisions is, as we have pointed out
earlier, a legislative paraphrase of certain provisions of
Measure 40.  "Implement" is defined as:  "to carry out:
ACCOMPLISH, FULFILL * * *."  Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary, 1134 (unabridged ed 1993).  Considered in light of
that definition, SB 936 truthfully may be said to "implement,"
i.e., carry out, accomplish, or fulfill, certain of the ideas
found in certain of the provisions of Measure 40.  That is all
that is necessary to justify the use of the word "implementation"
in the title.
		Defendant contends that the title of SB 936 was
deceptive because legislators and others, skimming that title,
might have concluded that "victims' rights" meant that the
statute related only to granting rights to victims.  That
argument refuses to recognize that the words, "victims' rights,"
are part of a phrase, viz., "victims' rights initiative."  That
phrase is a sufficient cross-reference to the recently passed
constitutional amendment that dealt, inter alia, with the same
topics with which SB 936 deals.  Put differently, Article IV,
section 20, requires only that the title carry certain
information; it does not relieve the reader of the obligation to
read the title accurately.  An observation that this court made
over a century ago remains apt:  "[I]f parties interested in the
matter had no other source of information than that imparted by
the title[] * * *, they would have sufficient [information] to
put them upon inquiry, and could easily ascertain what provisions
had been adopted, if desirous of observing them."  State of
Oregon v. Phenline, 16 Or 107, 111, 17 P 572 (1888).
		Defendant presents a number of arguments to the effect
that Measure 40 actually did not grant rights to victims. 
Defendant notes, for example, that certain of the "rights"
granted by both Measure 40 and SB 936 would apply even in cases
in which there was no victim.  But those criticisms miss the
point:  All substantive sections of SB 936 address either its
subject or "matters properly connected" with the subject.  That
is all that is required.  See Lovejoy, 95 Or at 466 ("It is the
'subject' of the act and not 'matters properly connected
therewith' that must be expressed in the title * * *.").
		Defendant also argues that SB 936 is invalid because it
somehow depends on Measure 40, and this court held Measure 40
unconstitutional in Armatta.  That argument need not delay us
long.  As explained, Measure 40 was declared unconstitutional
because it contained multiple amendments in violation of Article
XVII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution.  SB 936 does not
have that problem, because it is not a constitutional amendment. 
The constitutionality of SB 936 under Article IV, section 20,
turns on its own merits.  Even if Measure 40 was not itself 
valid, defendant does not explain why it may not serve as a
permissible referent for some other enactment, and we do not
perceive any reason for so holding.
		Defendant next contends that SB 936 partakes of the
constitutional defects of Measure 40.  We disagree.  SB 936 did
not depend on any power granted to the legislature by Measure 40,
and there is nothing in SB 936 that is conditioned on the
existence of Measure 40. 
		Finally, defendant contends that Article IV, section
20, required the title of SB 936 to disclose all the purposes of
the act; that the title disclosed only the purpose of giving
effect to certain of the provisions of Measure 40, not the
purpose of preserving much of the essence of Measure 40 against
the possibility that it might be held unconstitutional; and that
the title therefore is constitutionally inadequate.  Defendant's
argument fails because his premise is faulty:  There is no
constitutional requirement that legislation promote only one end.
		In conclusion, we hold that SB 936 embraces a single
subject and matters properly connected therewith, and that none
of the provisions of the act exceed the scope of the title.  The
act is valid under Article IV, section 20, of the Oregon
Constitution.  We turn to defendant's next contention, viz.,
whether application of the terms of the act to defendant's
particular case was unconstitutional.
B.  Article I, Section 21:  Oregon Ex Post Facto Clause
		Defendant contends that application of the provisions
of SB 936 to his case violates the constitutional restrictions
against ex post facto laws, set out in Article I, section 21, of
the Oregon Constitution, and in Article I, section 10, of the
United States Constitution. (5)  As noted, the Court of Appeals
disagreed, holding that section 1 of SB 936 could be applied
retrospectively to defendant's case, thereby depriving him of the
right to seek to have certain evidence suppressed because it was
seized in violation of ORS 810.410(3)(b) (1995).  For the reasons
that follow, we conclude that application of ORS 136.432 (section
1 of SB 936) to defendant for crimes committed before the date
that SB 936 became effective violates Article I, section 21, of
the Oregon Constitution.
		Although defendant makes both state and federal
constitutional challenges, we first consider his argument under
Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution.  See State v.
Cookman, 324 Or 19, 25, 920 P2d 1086 (1996) (explaining that
paradigm).
		In Cookman, this court analyzed the meaning of Article
I, section 21, by examining its text, the case law interpreting
the provision, and the historical circumstances that underlay its
creation.  Id. at 25.  We review that case in detail, because its
analysis bears directly on the analysis here.  The court first
noted that the text "forbids the passage of laws 'after the
fact.'"  Id. at 26.  "[F]rom its wording, the provision forbids
only those laws that are designed to be applicable to facts that
have occurred before the passage of the laws."  Id. (emphasis
omitted). 
		Cookman then turned to the case law.  "Despite Article
I, section 21's seemingly broad scope, this court has restricted
that provision's prohibition to criminal laws, and, further, to
only certain kinds of criminal laws * * *."  Id. (citation
omitted).  "'Generally speaking, ex post facto laws punish acts
that were legal at the time they occurred, change the punishment
for those acts, or deprive the defendant of a defense for those
acts.'"  Id. (footnote omitted; quoting State v. Gallant, 307 Or
152, 155, 764 P2d 920 (1988)).
		The Cookman court then considered the history behind
the provision.  The court noted that no records existed regarding
the intent of the framers.  324 Or at 28.  The court observed,
however, that Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution,
appeared to have been derived from Article I, section 24, of the
Indiana Constitution of 1851, which in turn was substantially
similar to Article I, section 18, of the Indiana Constitution of
1816.  Id.  The court noted that the Indiana Supreme Court had
construed the meaning of the 1816 clause as follows:
	"'The words ex post facto have a definite, technical
signification.  The plain and obvious meaning of this
prohibition is, that the Legislature shall not pass any
law, after a fact done by any citizen, which shall have
relation to that fact, so as to punish that which was
innocent when done; or to add to the punishment of that
which was criminal; or to increase the malignity of a
crime; or to retrench the rules of evidence, so as to
make conviction more easy.'"
Id. (quoting Strong v. The State, 1 Blackf 193, 196 (1822)). 
Because the Strong court had cited to Calder v. Bull, 3 US (3
Dall) 386, 1 L Ed 648 (1798), the Cookman court turned to
consideration of that case (as well as other authorities).  324
Or at 28-31.
		In Calder, Justice Chase had set out what the Cookman
court characterized as "his now classic formulation of the ex
post facto prohibition":
		"I will state what laws I consider ex post facto
laws, within the words and the intent of the
prohibition.  1st.  Every law that makes an action done
before the passing of the law, and which was innocent
when done, criminal; and punishes such action.  2d. 
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater
than it was, when committed.  3d.  Every law that
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed.  4th.  Every law that alters the legal rules
of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony,
than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offence, in order to convict the offender.  All
these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and
oppressive."
3 US (3 Dall) at 390-91 (second emphasis added), quoted in
Cookman, 324 Or at 30.  Regarding that statement from Calder, the
Cookman court stated:
	"Whatever the merits of Justice Chase's formulation
with regard to the federal constitution, as with
Blackstone's Commentaries and The Federalist, Chase's
opinion was available to the framers of the Oregon
Constitution.  Perhaps more importantly, it also was
cited by the Indiana Supreme Court in Strong, a
decision that was available to the framers of the
Oregon Constitution when they decided to adopt the
Indiana ex post facto provision in our state
constitution."
324 Or at 31 (footnote omitted).
		Respecting the fourth category of enactments discussed
in Calder, Justice Chase apparently conceived of alterations of
the law of evidence as being ex post facto violations at least in
part because of separation of powers concerns.  Justice Chase
suggested that the ex post facto clause was a reaction to bills
of attainder and bills of pains and penalties, which he
characterized as "legislative judgments; and an exercise of
judicial power."  3 US (3 Dall) at 389.  He then noted that some
bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties "violated the
rules of evidence (to supply a deficiency of legal proof) by
admitting one witness, when the existing law required two; by
receiving evidence without oath; or the oath of the wife against
the husband; or other testimony, which the courts of justice
would not admit * * *."  3 US (3 Dall) at 389 (footnote
omitted). (6)
		It is the last category mentioned in Strong and Calder
that concerns us here, viz., laws that "retrench the rules of
evidence, so as to make conviction more easy."  Strong, 1 Blackf
at 196.  This court's analysis in Cookman indicates, although it
does not expressly hold, that Article I, section 21, of the
Oregon Constitution, also prohibits that fourth category of ex
post facto laws.  We now hold explicitly what Cookman suggested: 
Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, forbids ex
post facto laws of the kind that fall within the fourth category
in Strong and Calder, viz., laws that alter the rules of evidence
in a one-sided way that makes conviction of the defendant more
likely.
		The state relies on Carmell v. Texas, 529 US 513
(2000), a recent United States Supreme Court decision
interpreting the ex post facto clause of the United States
Constitution, that suggests that the fourth category properly is
understood to reach only those laws that "allow a defendant to be
convicted on 'less, or different, testimony.'"  See id. at 530
(restating fourth category as "'less evidence required to
convict'"); id. at 532 (finding "[a] law reducing the quantum of
evidence required to convict an offender" as being squarely
within the fourth category).  Whatever the merits of Carmell as a
definitive statement of the scope of the fourth category under
the federal ex post facto clause today, Carmell is not correct
insofar as the Oregon ex post facto clause is concerned.  Both
Strong and Calder clearly stated that the fourth category forbade
as a general rule a change in the rules of evidence that favored
only the prosecution.  Thus, in Strong, the court restated the
fourth category as a question:  "Does it change the rules of
evidence as to make conviction more easy?"  1 Blackf at 197. 
Similarly, in Calder, Justice Chase restated the fourth category
of ex post facto laws as including those that "change the rules
of evidence, for the purpose of conviction."  3 US (3 Dall) at
391.  Those statements were in the minds of the framers when they
enacted Article I, section 21.  Under their understanding, all
four categories identified in Calder are applicable in applying
Article I, section 21.
		Although the state argues to the contrary, the
foregoing conclusion is consistent with the result in Gallant,
307 Or 152.  That case involved an initiative measure that the
Oregon voters had passed in 1986.  The initiative amended OEC
609(1) to allow the impeachment of a witness with prior
convictions for crimes involving dishonesty.  Id. at 154-55. 
Gallant held that the amendment did not violate the ex post facto
clause.  Id. at 155.  The result in Gallant is consistent with
the fourth category of Strong and Calder, because the amendment
did not operate in such a way as to favor only the prosecution. (7)
		Application of the fourth Calder category to the
present case is straightforward.  As pertinent to the present
case, section 1 of SB 936, now ORS 136.432, forbids Oregon courts
from suppressing evidence obtained in violation of a statute,
unless suppression otherwise is required by the Oregon
Constitution or the United States Constitution.  As noted, SB 936
became law on June 12, 1997, but section 1 ostensibly applies "to
all criminal actions pending or commenced on or after December 5,
1996 * * *."  Or Laws 1997, ch 313, § 38.  The legislature
clearly intended that the act apply retrospectively, depriving a
criminal defendant of a right to have evidence suppressed under
certain conditions.  We cannot conceive of a circumstance in
which a defendant would be benefitted by the admission of
evidence that otherwise would be suppressed.  Section 1 thus
operates only in favor of the prosecution.  Application of
section 1 to any case in which the crime was committed before
June 12, 1997, therefore would violate the ex post facto clause
in Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution.  The Court
of Appeals' contrary conclusion was error. (8)
		The state presented other arguments to the Court of
Appeals regarding why the evidence at issue should not have been
suppressed.  The Court of Appeals did not reach those arguments,
because it concluded that SB 936 applied to defendant's case.  We
therefore remand the case to the Court of Appeals to consider the
state's remaining arguments.
III.  CONCLUSION

		In summary, we hold that SB 936 does not violate the
single subject requirement of Article IV, section 20, of the
Oregon Constitution.  We conclude, however, that Section 1 of SB
936, presently codified as ORS 136.432, may not be applied to
crimes committed before June 12, 1997.  Or Const, Art I, § 21. 
Accordingly, we reverse the contrary decision of the Court of
Appeals and remand the case to that court for further
proceedings.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.

1. The date is not discussed in the trial court's opinion,
but is not disputed.

2. ORS 810.410 (1995) provided, in part:
	"(3) A police officer:
		"(a) Shall not arrest a person for a traffic
infraction.
		"(b) May stop and detain a person for a traffic
infraction for the purposes of investigation reasonably
related to the traffic infraction, identification and
issuance of citation.
		"(c) May make an arrest of a person as authorized
by ORS 133.310(2) if the person is stopped and detained
pursuant to the authority of this section."


3. The 1997 Legislature enacted SB 936.  The act became
effective on June 12, 1997.  Or Laws 1997, v 1, at 728.

4. The so-called "sin taxes" provide a good example.  The
legislature may choose to impose a tax on cigarettes or liquor
for two purposes:  to discourage the particular conduct (smoking
or drinking), and to increase state revenue.  It is difficult to
see how the legislature could impose the tax in such a way as to
promote only one of those goals.  Under defendant's
interpretation, Article IV, section 20, would prevent the
legislature from ever passing such a tax.

5. Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part:  "No ex-post facto law * * * shall ever be
passed * * *."  (Emphasis in original.)  Similarly, Article I,
section 10, of the United States Constitution, provides, in part: 
"No State shall * * * pass any * * * ex post facto Law * * *."

6. Justice Chase's discussion of the history underlying
the federal ex post facto clause has been challenged.  See, e.g.,
Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 US 380, 416 n (a), 2 Pet 380, 681, 7
L Ed 458 (1829) (note by Johnson, J., concurring) (strongly
criticizing legal analysis in Calder, although for the purpose of
demonstrating that ex post facto clause should not be limited to
criminal context); Oliver P. Field, Ex Post Facto in the
Constitution, 20 Mich L Rev 315, 321-22 (1922) (noting that
debates on Federal Constitution contain "not a single mention of
the practice of the British Parliament to which Justice Chase
referred," though conceding that that may have been an unspoken
factor).  What concerns us, however, is the fact that, as the
Cookman court recognized, Calder and Strong would have influenced
what the framers of the Oregon Constitution understood by the
prohibition against ex post facto laws.  324 Or at 31.

7.  See also State v. Montez, 324 Or 343, 364, 927 P2d 64
(1996) (court rejected argument that change to law of evidence
was within ex post facto clause; although post-Cookman, court did
not cite fourth Calder category, relied only on Gallant, and did
not cite or discuss Cookman).  The Montez court's failure to
speak to the fourth Calder category was not error, however,
because the defendant was not being subjected in a second
proceeding to new and different evidence that made his conviction
more likely.

8. Because Section 1 of SB 936 may not be applied to
defendant, we need not consider defendant's alternative arguments
regarding the federal ex post facto clause, separation of powers,
or due process.