Case Title: The Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Birmingham v. Inland Lake Investments, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1070030

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2009-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 08/28/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2009
____________________
1070030
____________________
The Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Birmingham
v.
Inland Lake Investments, LLC
Appeal from Blount Circuit Court
(CV-07-189)
MURDOCK, Justice.
The Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Birmingham
("the Board") appeals from the denial of its motion seeking a
preliminary injunction against Inland Lake Investments, LLC
1070030
2
("ILI"), concerning ILI's development of property near Inland
Lake.  We reverse and remand.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
The Board provides drinking water to residents of
Jefferson, Shelby, Walker, Blount, and St. Clair Counties.  It
owns property adjacent to Inland Lake in Blount County as well
as the lake itself.  The Board uses Inland Lake as one of its
four major sources of water for its commercial and residential
customers.  The Board treats 12 to 15 million gallons of water
per day from Inland Lake at its Carson filter plant.  
ILI also owns property adjacent to Inland Lake.  In early
2006, ILI wrote the Board requesting access to Inland Lake for
purposes 
of 
a 
3,500-acre 
residential 
and 
commercial
development ILI proposed to build on the property.  The Board
responded that in order to permit such access, it would need
to review and approve ILI's development plans, including its
plans for sediment and erosion control.  ILI declined to turn
over its plans and instead started the development process.
This process included clearing and grading activities to
insert a roadway on ILI's property adjacent to the Board's
property.  
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3
The Alabama Department of Environmental Management
("ADEM") requires developers of commercial or residential
property to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES") permit before starting a project.  Before
ADEM approves such a permit, the developer must submit a
sediment and erosion control plan that details the best
management practices ("BMPs") the developer will use to
minimize soil runoff and erosion.  BMPs are structural and
nonstructural controls implemented to prevent erosion and to
control sediment runoff.  They include, among other measures,
mulch, grass, hay bales, trees, and fences.  ILI began its
construction without applying for or receiving an NPDES
permit.  ADEM issued a warning letter to ILI on November 17,
2006, ordering it to cease construction until it obtained an
NPDES permit.  On December 13, 2006, ADEM issued an NPDES
permit to ILI for its Inland Lake development project.
The Board alleges that as the development progressed, it
began to notice that large amounts of sediment were flowing
from ILI's property into a tributary of Inland Lake on the
Board's property, known as Sawmill Slough.  In order to
protect its water source, the Board sued ILI in the Blount
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4
Circuit Court, alleging continuing trespass, public and
private nuisance, and negligence and wantonness, and seeking
damages for the sediment deposited in Inland Lake as a result
of ILI's development project.  The Board accompanied its
complaint with a motion for a preliminary injunction against
ILI, asking the trial court to enter an order prohibiting ILI
from "continuing with construction of [its] development at
Inland Lake in such a manner as will result in further
discharge of sediment and other fill material or pollutants
onto [the Board's] land or into Inland Lake" and requiring ILI
"to implement all possible measures to prevent the failure of
sediment and erosion control measures on [ILI's] construction
site, to immediately repair any future failure, and to report
any failure to [ADEM] and [the Board] within 24 hours."  
During a hearing on the Board's motion for a preliminary
injunction, the Board's expert, DeWayne Smith, a professional
engineer and a certified professional in erosion and sediment
control, testified, based on a "flyover" of ILI's property he
had recently performed, that ILI had not implemented almost
any BMPs on its construction site.  Smith also testified that
drainage from ILI's construction site flowed downward onto the
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We assume that Inland Dam is the dam by which Inland Lake
1
was created.
5
Board's property.  Jimmy Jackson, the Board's supervisor of
Inland Dam,  testified that his inspection of Sawmill Slough
1
and Inland Lake revealed a marked increase in sediment that
appeared to be coming from ILI's construction site.  
Gail Holcomb, an environmental scientist with ADEM,
testified that she inspected ILI's construction site on
April 25, 2007, and had found the BMPs to be inadequate and
not maintained.  Holcomb had issued a warning letter on behalf
of ADEM to ILI on May 7, 2007, ordering that the deficiencies
she noticed on her April 25, 2007, inspection be corrected.
Holcomb again inspected ILI's construction site on July 25,
2007.  She found the situation concerning the implemented BMPs
to be much improved, but the BMPs were still inadequate.
Holcomb also testified that on August 3, 2007, she inspected
a tributary leading into Sawmill Slough and observed sediment
"all the way from the lake all the way up to an outlet of the
construction site."  On August 7, 2007, ADEM issued a notice
of violation to ILI, informing ILI that it was in violation of
its NPDES permit.
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6
ILI subsequently entered into a consent decree with ADEM
concerning its violations of the NPDES permit.  In the consent
decree, ILI denied the factual allegation that it had violated
the permit, but it agreed to implement all BMPs requested by
ADEM.  The consent decree provided for the imposition of daily
fines and penalties if ILI did not meet the requirements of
the consent decree.  In the hearing before the trial court,
ILI made an oral motion to dismiss the Board's complaint based
on the consent decree, arguing that the consent decree
provided all the relief the Board had requested in its
complaint and its motion for a preliminary injunction.  The
trial court denied ILI's motion to dismiss. 
In September 2007, a heavy rain event occurred in the
Inland Lake area.  Jimmy Jackson testified at the hearing that
he inspected Sawmill Slough during the rain event and observed
a heavy flow of muddy water coming downstream into Inland
Lake.  Jackson stated that he had never seen as much sediment
in Sawmill Slough as was present during the rain event.  The
Board's expert, DeWayne Smith, testified that, in the month
before the hearing, he had completed two ground inspections of
ILI's construction site, he had done a second flyover of the
1070030
Rhaly defined "turbidity" as "material that is suspended
2
in water.  It is an optical measurement of how cloudy the
water is."  He stated that turbidity is created by sediment
and gravel in the water.
7
construction site, and he had walked up Sawmill Slough.  Smith
testified that although some BMPs had been implemented by ILI,
they were not adequate, and sediment continued to flow off the
construction site and into Sawmill Slough.  Smith stated that
the additional BMPs ILI had implemented would not be
sufficient to prevent sediment from continuing to flow from
the construction site onto the Board's property during rain
events.
Joel Rhaly, the Board's manager of water and wastewater
treatment, testified that the water from Inland Lake was
historically "pristine" and the cleanest water from any of the
Board's water sources.  Rhaly stated that he had inspected
Sawmill Slough and observed increased sediment in the water.
He also stated that increased turbidity  in water requires an
2
increase in the amount of chemicals used to treat the water,
which can cause the water to have an undesirable odor or
taste.  Rhaly testified that filtering out the turbidity in
the water results in sludge that must be put into a form that
ADEM will accept so that it can be placed in a landfill, which
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8
adds to the Board's water-treatment expenses.  He also stated
that increased turbidity in the water could affect the kind of
expansion the Board planned for the Carson filter plant in the
next two years.  
Under questioning from the trial court, Rhaly admitted
that from the time ILI began its construction in November
2006, there had not been an increase in the turbidity of the
water tested at the Carson filter plant.  He stated that there
had not been a problem with water quality at the Carson filter
plant since ILI started its development project.  He stated
that he could not associate any problems with the water from
Inland Lake with ILI's construction activity.  All the Board's
witnesses -- Jackson, Smith, Holcomb, and Rhaly -- admitted
that with extra effort and expense any extra sediment in the
water could be removed.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated
that "[b]ased on the evidence and the caselaw," it did not
"believe [the Board had] met the burden" for the issuance of
a preliminary injunction.  Accordingly, the trial court made
an entry in the case-action-summary sheet denying the Board's
motion for a preliminary injunction.  The Board appeals.
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9
II.  Standard of Review
The requirements for a preliminary injunction are well
known and have been often stated by this Court:
"'Before 
entering 
a 
preliminary 
injunction,
the trial court must be satisfied: (1) that
without the injunction the plaintiff will
suffer immediate and irreparable injury;
(2) that the plaintiff has no adequate
remedy at law; (3) that the plaintiff is
likely to succeed on the merits of the
case; and (4) that the hardship imposed
upon the defendant by the injunction would
not unreasonably outweigh the benefit to
the plaintiff.'"
Blount Recycling, LLC v. City of Cullman, 884 So. 2d 850, 853
(Ala. 2003) (quoting Blaylock v. Cary, 709 So. 2d 1128, 1130
(Ala. 1997)).  Because, as discussed below, our review of the
trial court's order in this particular case "is grounded only
in questions of law based on undisputed facts," our review is
de novo.  See Holiday Isle, LLC v. Adkins, [Ms. 1070202, May
23, 2008] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2008). 
III.  Analysis
In the present action, the record clearly reflects that
the trial court denied the Board's motion for a preliminary
injunction because the trial court concluded that the Board
had not shown an "irreparable injury" (element number 1) and
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10
therefore had not shown that it did not have an "adequate
remedy at law" for its injury (element number 2).  At the end
of the hearing on the Board's motion for a preliminary
injunction, counsel for the Board and the trial court engaged
in the following colloquy, which succinctly explains both the
position of the Board and the basis upon which the trial court
made its ruling: 
"[COUNSEL FOR THE BOARD]:  Judge, we have other
cases here on point on the continued nature of the
trespass which [state that] injunction is the proper
remedy for the continuing nature [of the trespass].
"THE COURT:  That is all well and good, but what
about the aspect of what is required for a
preliminary injunction?  The caselaw that I have
cited from your motion that you filed, I think the
law is pretty clear that certain requirements be
met.  One is that the plaintiff suffered immediate
and irreparable injury, likelihood of success [on]
the merits, [and the] hardship imposed on the
defendant by the injunction would not reasonably
outweigh the claim of the plaintiff.  It seems to me
you have an adequate remedy at law.  I don't have
any testimony that satisfies me that there is an
irreparable injury.
"[COUNSEL FOR THE BOARD]:  The continued nature of
this trespass is irreparable injury.  The adequate
remedy that we have is after we have more damage.
The injunction comes in to keep us from being
damaged over and over again.  That is what the
caselaw holds.  That is the irreparable part.
Unless you enjoin [ILI] and it rains again, [the
Board] is going to be harmed.  That is the
irreparable harm.  ...
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11
"THE COURT:  No, you are harmed again.  That doesn't
mean it is irreparable.  It could rain or not and
there would be more sedimentation com[ing] in.  But
based on the testimony, it can be removed.  Based on
the 
testimony 
of 
Mr. 
Rhaly 
that 
since 
the
construction started ... in November, there has been
no degradation of the water quality from the lake.
...  I don't doubt and disagree to the testimony
that there is a trespass of maybe a continuing
nature.  I'm looking to get over these hurdles that
there is no adequate remedy [at] law and [the
injury] is immediate and irreparable.  Your own
people testified that [the sediment] could be
removed.  There is no degradation of water quality.
Nothing has been changed at the [Carson] filter
plant.  The law says you have to meet each one of
the prerequisites.  ..."  
The trial court elaborated on its conclusion with the
following statements:
"THE COURT:  ...  I don't believe [the Board has]
met the burden to grant a preliminary injunction.
However, I certainly would admonish [ILI], given
[the ADEM] consent decree that [ILI] has entered
into, that there ought to be negotiations with [the
Board] such that would negate the necessity of going
forward on the whole complaint.
"....
"THE COURT:  I don't know what [ILI's] evidence
would be, but I do think it is fairly clear that
there is a trespass of even a continuing nature on
[the Board's] property.  I haven't read this whole
Consent Order, but as I said, [ILI] should negotiate
and enter into something in a fairly quick manner
with [the Board] such that [the Board] or this Court
[has] rights to enforce the same things or secure
[the Board's] further rights requiring basically the
same thing as ADEM is requiring."
1070030
We are not presented with an argument by the Board that
3
the essential nature of its rights in its real property would
entitle it to injunctive relief to prevent an anticipated
trespass to those rights even if the anticipated trespass were
not expected to be recurring.  Further, we are not clearly
presented with an argument that the extent to which the Board
12
From these and other comments by the trial court in the
hearing on the Board's motion for a preliminary injunction, it
seems clear that the trial court believed that the Board had
established that ILI was committing a continuing trespass
during the construction of its Inland Lake development project
by allowing sediment from its construction site to migrate
into the Sawmill Slough and subsequently into Inland Lake.  It
is also apparent, however, that the trial court concluded that
the injury sustained by the Board was not "irreparable"
because its witnesses had testified that the sediment could be
removed from the water.  The trial court therefore reasoned
that the Board had an adequate remedy at law because its
injury consisted of the added expense involved in treating the
water it extracted from Inland Lake that contained more
sediment.  
The Board contends on appeal -- as it did before the
trial court -- that its injury is irreparable because it is
continuing in nature.   The evidence the Board presented
3
1070030
will incur added water-treatment expenses in the future as a
result of ILI's acts will not be discernible, or subject to
proof, with a sufficient certainty to make the Board's injury
reparable at law.  The Board does, however, cite Wells
Amusement Co. v. Eros, 204 Ala. 239, 240, 85 So. 692, 692-93
(1920), for the proposition that "the fact that no actual
damages can be proved, so that in an action at law the jury
could award nominal damages only, often furnishes the very
best reason why a court of equity should interfere."  The
Board does not develop an argument based on this authority,
however, and we therefore will not pursue it for purposes of
this opinion.  
In the hearing, the trial court, after stating that it
4
believed "there could be more and better things done in
respect to the erosion and sedimentation out there [at Inland
Lake,]" observed:  "I think all of you have been quite lucky
as far as we have had this drought.  This [runoff of sediment]
could be worse.  I think things should be implemented such as
better controls for runoffs and such as that."  
13
indicated -- and the trial court agreed -- that every time it
rains, sediment from ILI's construction site pours into
Sawmill Slough and Inland Lake.   The Board adds that monetary
4
damages are not an adequate remedy for an injury of this
nature because, it says, only an injunction can prevent
recurring damage to its property.  
The remedy of an injunction is available for trespasses
of this nature.  See, e.g., Poffenbarger v. Merit Energy Co.,
972 So. 2d 792, 802 n.11 (Ala. 2007) (noting that "[i]n an
appropriate case, the equitable remedy of an injunction can be
an appropriate form of relief by which a thing or a substance
1070030
See also, Martin v. City of Linden, 667 So. 2d 732, 736
5
(Ala. 1995) (stating that "[t]he primary reason for issuing an
injunction is to prevent an 'irreparable injury,' i.e., an
injury not redressable by an award of pecuniary damages in a
court of law"); Triple J Cattle, Inc. v. Chambers, 551 So. 2d
280, 282 (Ala. 1989) (same).  
14
tortiously placed on another's land can be removed or by which
an injury to property otherwise is corrected and the property
restored to its pre-trespass condition"); Borland v. Sanders
Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 530 (Ala. 1979) (explaining the
difference between a nuisance and an "actionable trespass" for
an "indirect invasion" of property in which "some substance
has entered upon the land itself").  
This Court has observed that "[i]rreparable injury' is an
injury that is not redressable in a court of law through an
award of money damages."  Perley v. Tapscan, Inc., 646 So. 2d
585, 587 (Ala. 1994).   The Court has likewise stated that
5
"[a] plaintiff that can recover damages has an adequate remedy
at law and is not entitled to an injunction."  SouthTrust Bank
of Alabama, N.A. v. Webb-Stiles Co., 931 So. 2d 706, 709 (Ala.
2005).  Thus, "a conclusion that the injury is irreparable
necessarily shows that there is no adequate remedy at law."
Fleet Wholesale Supply Co. v. Remington Arms Co., 846 F.2d
1095, 1098 (7th Cir. 1988).
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15
The trial court concluded that because the invasive
sediment could be removed from the water at Inland Lake
through various treatment techniques, the Board had not
suffered an irreparable injury.  In other words, because, in
the trial court's view, the Board could be compensated for the
increase in the cost of water treatment created by ILI's
trespass, the Board was not entitled to injunctive relief.  We
disagree.   
"To say that the injury is irreparable means that the
methods of repair (remedies at law) are inadequate."  Fleet
Wholesale Supply, 846 F.2d at 1098.  In Cobia v. Ellis, 149
Ala. 108, 42 So. 751 (1906), the plaintiff sought an
injunction after the defendant had increased the height of a
dam he had erected across the Chattooga River, resulting, at
high tide, in an overflow of water onto the plaintiff's land.
This Court stated:
"To protect a landowner against constant or
frequently recurring injuries from the wrongful
diversion 
of 
water, 
equity 
has 
jurisdiction
concurrent with courts of law, and will enjoin the
wrongdoer without regard to his ability to respond
in damages, since a single action at law will not
furnish an adequate remedy, and a multiplicity of
suits can be avoided by proceedings in chancery. ...
"....
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"The injury complained of in the bill is
constantly recurring at each high tide of the river;
a single action of law would not, therefore, furnish
an adequate remedy, and the right to preventive
relief in a court of equity, upon such facts, is
clear."
Cobia, 149 Ala. at 111, 42 So. at 752 (emphasis added).  
Like the water that would flood the plaintiff's land in
Cobia at each high tide, the body of water from which the
Board extracts water is inundated with new sediment from ILI's
construction site each time it rains because of ILI's failure
to take steps to curtail the effects of runoff and erosion
from its property.  To receive compensation for the injury
done to its property, the Board would have file a new action
after every substantial rainfall.  That is an ineffective and
inefficient means of adequately compensating the Board for the
injury.  See Cardinal Health Staffing Network, Inc. v. Bowen,
106 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that
"[a]n adequate remedy at law is one that is as complete,
practical, and efficient to the prompt administration of
justice as is equitable relief").  
This Court has stated repeatedly that it is
"committed to the equitable right of injunction by
the owner of land in possession when the trespass is
of a continuous or repeated nature, so that actions
1070030
17
at law would be inadequate.  Birmingham Trust &
Savings Co. v. Mason, 222 Ala. 38, 130 So. 559
[(1930)], and cases cited; Tidwell v. H.H. Hitt
Lumber Co., 198 Ala. 236, 73 So. 486 [(1916)]; Green
v. Mutual Steel Co., Inc., 268 Ala. 648, 108 So. 2d
837 [(1959)].  There being no question of disputed
title, or at least that equitable relief is not
barred on that ground, injunction is the proper
remedy to restrain trespasses where the remedy at
law is inadequate because of the nature of the
injury or because of the necessity of multiplicity
of actions to obtain redress.  Lewis v. Hicks, 264
Ala. 440, 87 So. 2d 867 [(1956)]."
Underwood v. West Point Mfg. Co., 270 Ala. 114, 118, 116 So.
2d 575, 577 (1959); see, e.g., Brackin v. Porter, 270 Ala.
629, 631, 120 So. 2d 693, 695 (1960) (same).  See also Green
v. Mutual Steel Co., 268 Ala. 648, 651, 108 So. 2d 837, 839
(1959) (stating that a "remedy at law is inadequate" where
there is "an injury occasioned by repeated trespasses which
would require a multiplicity of actions at law in order for
complainant to secure complete pecuniary compensation").
In short, having concluded that ILI was committing a
continuing trespass upon the Board's property, one that
recurred every time the Inland Lake area sustained a
substantial rain event, the trial court erred in ruling that
the injury suffered by the Board was not irreparable solely
because the additional sediment could be removed in the water-
1070030
18
treatment process.  Redress through money damages for such a
trespass is not adequate because of the continuing nature of
the trespass and the multiplicity of actions that would be
required to compensate the Board for the ongoing injury. The
trial court's order therefore is due to be reversed. 
A reading of the record at trial indicates that the trial
court believed that the Board was likely to succeed on the
merits of its action (the third element required for a
preliminary injunction, see Blount Recycling, supra).  Whether
the Board's motion for preliminary injunction was due to be or
could be denied on the ground that the Board failed to prove
"that the hardship imposed upon [ILI] by the injunction would
not unreasonably outweigh the benefit to the [Board]" (the
fourth element required for a preliminary injunction, see
Blount Recycling, supra), however, is a question of fact not
addressed by the trial court.  "It is the function of a trial
judge sitting as factfinder to decide facts where conflicts in
the evidence exist.  ...  The appellate courts do not sit in
judgment of the facts ...."  Curtis White Constr. Co. v. Butts
& Billingsley Constr. Co., 473 So. 2d 1040, 1041 (Ala. 1985).
We will not do so here.
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19
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we agree with the Board that the
trial court's order denying a preliminary injunction was based
on an erroneous 
understanding of the applicable law.
Accordingly, that order is due to be reversed, and this cause
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, and Bolin, JJ., concur.