Case Title: State v. Mash

Citation: 287 S.E.2d 824

Docket Number: 65A81

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1982-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
287 S.E.2d 824 (1982) STATE of North Carolina v. Archie Ray MASH. No. 65A81. Supreme Court of North Carolina. March 3, 1982. *825 Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen. by Donald W. Stephens, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State. Malcolm R. Hunter, Jr., Asst. Appellate Defender, Raleigh, for defendant. BRANCH, Chief Justice. Defendant contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on "flight." He argues that he was not under arrest or in custody at the time he left the Sheriff's Department and that his actions could not be considered an "admission or show of consciousness of guilt" but rather were "insolubly ambiguous." *826 The well-settled rule in North Carolina is that evidence of flight of an accused may be admitted as some evidence of guilt. In State v. Lampkins, 283 N.C. 520, 196 S.E.2d 697 (1973), we find the following: Id. at 523, 196 S.E.2d at 698. We have also held: State v. Jones, 292 N.C. 513, 525, 234 S.E.2d 555, 562 (1977). Defendant's argument that the evidence of flight was incompetent because he had not been taken into custody or formally arrested before his hasty departure is without merit. The cases in which evidence of flight has been declared competent when the flight occurred before arrest or before the accused was in custody are legion. State v. Jones, supra; State v. Montgomery, 291 N.C. 91, 229 S.E.2d 572 (1976); State v. Self, 280 N.C. 665, 187 S.E.2d 93 (1972); State v. Downey, 253 N.C. 348, 117 S.E.2d 39 (1960); State v. Payne, 213 N.C. 719, 197 S.E. 573 (1938); State v. Bittings, 206 N.C. 798, 175 S.E. 299 (1934); State v. Parker, 45 N.C.App. 276, 262 S.E.2d 686 (1980); State v. Wilson, 23 N.C.App. 225, 208 S.E.2d 393 (1974); State v. McKinney, 19 N.C.App. 177, 198 S.E.2d 241 (1973); State v. Kirby, 7 N.C.App. 366, 172 S.E.2d 93 (1970). See also 2 Stansbury's N.C. Evidence § 178 (Brandis rev. 1973) and the cases there cited. Further, the fact that a defendant does not flee for several days after the commission of the crime charged affects the weight and not the admissibility of such evidence. State v. Murvin, 304 N.C. 523, 284 S.E.2d 289 (1981). Here after having been given his Miranda warnings, defendant's flight from law enforcement officers, by way of a speeding motor vehicle with officers in close pursuit followed by a seven hour trek across mountainous terrain with police officers and a bloodhound on his trail, presents a classic example of acts motivated by a "consciousness of guilt." By his next assignment of error, defendant argues that this Court should adopt the "merger doctrine" to bar application of the felony-murder rule to homicides committed during the perpetration of the felony of discharging a firearm into occupied property. For the reasons stated in State v. Wall, ___ N.C. ___, 286 S.E.2d 68 (1982), we decline to change the existing law. We have carefully examined the entire record and find no error warranting that the verdict returned or the judgment imposed be disturbed. NO ERROR.