Case Title: Campbell v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC17-1725, SC18-260

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2018-11-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-1725 
____________ 
 
JOHN WILLIAM CAMPBELL, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-260 
____________ 
 
JOHN WILLIAM CAMPBELL, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
November 29, 2018 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
John William Campbell appeals an order of the circuit court denying in part 
his amended motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of 
death filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  He further petitions 
 
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for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. 
Const.  For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the order of the postconviction 
court and deny the habeas petition. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Campbell was convicted of the 2010 first-degree murder of his father, John 
Henry Campbell (the victim or father), which occurred in Inverness, Florida.  See 
Campbell v. State, 159 So. 3d 814, 818 (Fla.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 100 (2015).  
Campbell, who elected to testify during trial, admitted he struck the victim in the 
head three times with a hatchet.  Id. at 823, 838.1  The jury recommended the death 
penalty by a vote of eight to four.  Id. at 827.  The trial court gave great weight to 
the recommendation and sentenced Campbell to death.  Id. at 829.  The facts 
surrounding the crime and the ensuing investigation were described in the opinion 
on direct appeal.  Id. at 818-23.  Additionally, in the section of the opinion where 
we concluded sufficient evidence existed to support the first-degree murder 
conviction, a summary of the facts was presented: 
The victim was found on August 10, 2010, in his home, lying in a 
recliner and partially covered.  He had several deep gashes into his 
skull and a hatchet was found nearby with his DNA on it.  The 
medical examiner testified that the victim suffered several chopping-
type blows into his head causing a penetrating injury to his brain, and 
                                          
 
 
1.  The terms “hatchet” and “ax” are used interchangeably in the opinion on 
direct appeal.   
 
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that the wound on the right side of his head would be fatal, either 
immediately or within a few hours. 
Shortly after the murder, when Campbell was being sought by 
police, Campbell told his [former] girlfriend in a text message that he 
had killed his father with an ax.[2]  Campbell gave multiple statements 
to detectives.  In one statement, he told them that he killed his father 
with a hammer hatchet and that his father just wanted peace.  He told 
detectives that he sat behind his father and waited, pondering the best 
way to use the hatchet, and then struck his father.  When his father 
responded, “What was that?”  Campbell hit him again.  Campbell told 
detectives that he took his father’s credit cards and money and bought 
items at Walmart and took them to a crack house.  In another 
statement, Campbell told detectives that he thought about killing his 
father for a few days and decided he would kill his father to bring him 
peace. 
At trial, Campbell testified that he killed his father, but said it 
was a “snap decision.”  He explained he only told police he thought 
about it for days in order to assure that he would get the death penalty 
because he wanted to die, although this statement was subject to the 
jury’s determination of Campbell’s credibility. 
 
Id. at 838.   
 
Campbell gave five recorded statements to law enforcement.  Id. at 821-23. 
Miranda3 warnings were given before each statement.  Campbell, 159 So. 3d at 
821-23.  Four of the statements were given at Bayfront Medical Center in St. 
Petersburg, Florida, where Campbell was life-flighted after he intentionally struck 
a marked police car with his vehicle during a high-speed chase in an attempt to 
                                          
 
 
2.  Campbell also told her to “call the cops” and show them the text 
messages.  Id. at 820. 
 
3.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
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commit suicide.  Id. at 821-23.4  The fifth statement was given at the Citrus County 
jail after Campbell was discharged from the hospital.  Id. at 823.   
 
In imposing a sentence of death, the trial court found the existence of four 
aggravating factors: (1) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and 
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP) 
(great weight); (2) pecuniary gain (great weight); (3) the murder was heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (great weight); and (4) prior violent felony (great 
weight).  Id. at 827-28.  The prior violent felony aggravating factor was based upon 
Campbell’s 1998 conviction in Texas for attacking his sister-in-law and attempting 
to strike her on the head with a hammer after breaking into her apartment, as well 
as Campbell’s Florida convictions for attempted first-degree murder of a law 
enforcement officer and aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer with a 
deadly weapon, arising from his striking of the marked police car during the high 
speed chase.  Id. at 827.  Deputy Sam Ruby was standing in front of the stopped 
police car waiting to deploy stop sticks when Campbell, traveling at approximately 
one hundred miles per hour, veered toward the car and crashed into it.  Id. at 
                                          
 
 
4.  The chase commenced when a Citrus County detective who was 
attempting to locate Campbell spotted him driving and began to follow him.  Id. at 
820.  Campbell pulled off the highway, but when the detective pulled behind 
Campbell and activated the vehicle’s lights and siren, Campbell fled back onto the 
highway.  Id. 
 
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820-21.  Deputy Ruby, who had to flee to avoid being hit by Campbell’s vehicle, 
was struck with debris from the crash.  Id. at 821, 824.   
The trial court found two statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) the murder 
was committed while Campbell was under the influence of an extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance (little weight); and (2) Campbell’s capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law 
was substantially impaired (extremely little weight).  Id. at 828.  The court also 
found four nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) family history of depression, 
a difficult childhood, and a broken relationship with his own son (very slight 
weight); (2) extensive history of drug use (very slight weight); (3) Campbell 
experienced depression as a result of the loss of a job and from his relationship 
with his father (very slight weight); and (4) remorse (extremely little weight).  Id. 
at 828-29.   
 
On direct appeal, Campbell raised five issues: (1) whether the trial court 
erred in finding the CCP aggravator; (2) whether the trial court erred in finding the 
pecuniary gain aggravator; (3) whether the trial court erred in finding the HAC 
aggravator; (4) whether Florida’s death penalty sentencing scheme is 
unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); and (5) whether the 
death sentence was proportionate.  159 So. 3d at 829-35.  This Court struck the 
HAC aggravator but affirmed Campbell’s conviction and sentence.  Id. at 834, 838. 
 
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On September 19, 2016, Campbell filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment and 
Sentence, raising eleven claims.  The claims were: (1) Campbell’s initial 
confessions and Miranda waivers were involuntary due to trauma, medications, 
and police misconduct, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide 
prompt assistance to Campbell; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to, or move for a mistrial based on, improper comments by the prosecution, 
and also for failing to request that the jurors be individually questioned as to 
whether they overheard one prosecutor make a pejorative comment to the other 
during the direct examination of Campbell; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for 
introducing, or opening the door to the introduction of, evidence of nonstatutory 
aggravating factors; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to fully investigate 
and present mitigating evidence; (5) cumulative error; (6) Campbell’s death 
sentence violates Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and related cases; (7) the 
enactment of chapter 2016-13, Laws of Florida, demonstrates that standards of 
decency no longer permit a death sentence to be based upon a bare majority jury 
recommendation; (8) Florida’s capital sentencing statute fails to prevent the 
arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty and violates the guarantee 
against cruel and unusual punishment; (9) lethal injection constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment; (10) section 945.10, Florida Statutes (2018), is 
unconstitutional; and (11) Campbell may be incompetent at the time of execution.   
 
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On January 27, 2017, Campbell amended claims four, six, and seven of his 
motion.  As is relevant to this case, Campbell deleted claims six and seven in their 
entirety and replaced them with claims that he is entitled to relief from his sentence 
based upon Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), and related cases.  
On February 21, 2017, the postconviction court held a case management hearing, 
during which it granted an evidentiary hearing on claim one and the subparts of 
claim two that involved comments made by the prosecution during the guilt phase.  
The court granted claim six, and awarded Campbell a new penalty phase based 
upon Hurst.  The court concluded that relief on claim six rendered the other 
penalty-phase claims moot, and those claims were dismissed.   
 
During the evidentiary hearing, Campbell presented as witnesses trial 
counsel, assistant public defenders Michael Lamberti and Thomas Devon Sharkey; 
and Dr. James O’Donnell, an associate professor of pharmacology, who testified as 
to the effects of the medications Campbell received while he was hospitalized and 
in the immediate days after his release on his ability to waive his Miranda rights.  
Campbell attempted to present attorney Norman Adam Tebrugge to give expert 
testimony as to whether the actions of trial counsel were deficient.  However, the 
State objected, and the postconviction court sustained the objection.  The court also 
declined to permit a proffer by Tebrugge as to the importance of “early contact 
with the accused in a homicide case.”  The State presented no witnesses.  On 
 
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August 30, 2017, the postconviction court issued an order that denied claim one, 
the guilt-phase subparts of claim two, and the cumulative error claim.  Thus, the 
court granted in part, dismissed in part, and denied in part Campbell’s amended 
rule 3.851 motion.   
 
This appeal follows.  On February 16, 2018, Campbell filed a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus. 
ANALYSIS 
Failure to Seek Suppression of Statements 
Campbell first asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek 
suppression of the five statements given to law enforcement in the days following 
his arrest.  We have described the requirements to demonstrate ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel as follows: 
First, counsel’s performance must be shown to be deficient.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  Deficient 
performance in this context means that counsel’s performance fell 
below the standard guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  Id.  When 
examining counsel’s performance, an objective standard of 
reasonableness applies, id. at 688, and great deference is given to 
counsel’s performance.  Id. at 689.  The defendant bears the burden to 
“overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  Id. 
(quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  This Court 
has made clear that “[s]trategic decisions do not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel.”  See Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 
(Fla. 2000).  There is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s 
performance was not ineffective.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669. 
Second, the deficient performance must have prejudiced the 
defendant, ultimately depriving the defendant of a fair trial with a 
 
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reliable result.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  A defendant must do 
more than speculate that an error affected the outcome.  Id. at 693.  
Prejudice is met only if there is a reasonable probability that “but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694.  Both 
deficient performance and prejudice must be shown.  Id.  Because 
both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and 
fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the 
circuit court’s factual findings that are supported by competent, 
substantial evidence, but reviewing the circuit court’s legal 
conclusions de novo.   
 
Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 671-72 (Fla. 2010) (alteration in original).  
Because Strickland requires a defendant to establish both prongs, if one prong is 
not met, it is not necessary to reach the other.  Stewart v. State, 801 So. 2d 59, 65 
(Fla. 2001).   
 
On direct appeal, we described the statements given by Campbell: 
 
Hernando County Sheriff’s Detective Thomas Breedlove, who 
on August 12, 2010, was investigating Campbell’s car crash near the 
Hernando/Citrus County line, accompanied Citrus County Detective 
Gary Atchison to the Bayfront Medical Center where they spoke to 
Campbell.  After reading him his Miranda rights, Campbell waived 
his rights and spoke with them, which interview was recorded.  In the 
recording, which was played for the jury and showed Campbell 
waiving his Miranda rights, Detective Atchison advised Campbell 
that they found his father and had spoken to [Campbell’s former 
girlfriend].  . . .  When Campbell said he was in a lot of pain, Atchison 
asked if it was his knee, and Campbell said that was not what he was 
talking about, and when asked if he was mentally all right, Campbell 
said, “No, I want to fuckin’ die” and “Until I die, I’m not going to be 
at peace with myself.”  Campbell told the officers that he would not 
stop trying to kill himself until he was dead, and that he was going to 
commit suicide.  Campbell said he crashed the car intentionally and 
had taken off his seat belt before the crash.  When asked if he wanted 
 
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to die because of what he had done recently, he responded that it was 
because of his whole life.  Campbell then started to cry. 
When Atchison asked him again about his father, Campbell 
said he did not want to talk about that and he wanted a lawyer.  He 
then said, “Unless y’all give me the death penalty, I don’t want to 
talk.”  The detective responded that they were finished talking and 
turned off the tape.  Detective Atchison testified that when the 
recorder was shut off, Campbell said he wanted to retract his request 
for a lawyer, and the detective again read Campbell his rights.  At that 
point, Campbell told the detectives he would continue to talk about his 
father if he could get some pain medication for his knee.  A nurse 
sought authority for pain medication but none was authorized at that 
time.  When the detectives advised Campbell of this, he said, “What's 
the use,” and demanded that they turn the recorder back on. 
An audio recording was then made of the second statement 
Campbell made at the hospital.  This statement was played for the jury 
and, in it, Campbell was read his Miranda rights again, which he 
waived, and said he did not want a lawyer.  When asked if he had 
murdered his father, Campbell said, “Yes.”  When asked how, he 
responded, “It was a hammer hatchet.”  When asked how many times 
he hit his father, Campbell said “twice.”  When asked what happened 
prior to the murder, Campbell started crying and said, “Years.  All this 
shit’s been going on for years,” and that “[h]e just never talked to me. 
I tried and any time I’d express my opinion . . . .”  Campbell said his 
father would not talk, but would just sit, and was miserable and angry 
and bitter, and kept saying he wanted peace.  Campbell said, “And I 
was like, You know what?  I can give you peace, and that’s when I—I 
sit behind him and waited and I just hit him.”  Campbell told the 
detectives: 
 
JOHN CAMPBELL: (Crying) I was sitting—yeah, I was 
sitting at the computer (moaning) and I hit him and he 
said—he said, “What was that?”  And I hit him again and 
that was it.  He died.  I covered him up and I put my 
sister’s picture on him because that was who he loved.  
He didn’t—he didn’t care about anybody else.  He didn’t 
care about me.  He just wanted peace and I gave it to 
him.  You know, my family wanted money, so now they 
got it.  I don’t want nothing.  I want to die. 
 
 
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Campbell admitted to wiping off the hammer hatchet with a “scrubby 
pad” at the sink. 
. . . Campbell then related that after the murder he drove 
around, going to Silver Springs near Ocala, then to Hillsborough and 
Pinellas counties and back toward Citrus County.  Campbell again 
stated that the car crash was an attempt to kill himself and he was not 
trying to hurt the officer, “[s]o I don’t want no attempted murder on 
no officer.” 
A third recorded formal statement was taken from Campbell at 
the Bayfront Medical Center on the morning of August 13, 2010, and 
it was played for the jury.  Campbell was again read his Miranda 
rights, which he waived.  He related that before the murder, he had 
purchased groceries at Walmart and had gone to Lowe’s.  When he 
got home, he put the groceries away.  He could not say how long he 
was home before the murder, but at some point, he got the ax from a 
toolbox outside the house.  He waited a while before hitting his father 
and, during that time, was not arguing with him.  After the murder, 
Campbell opened his father’s strongbox but found nothing in it. 
However, he found a stack of $2 bills in his father’s dresser.  
Campbell admitted he was looking for money and that he took his 
father’s wallet and some credit cards.  He left the house, he said, “to 
buy crack” and admitted to using his father’s credit card at Walmart to 
purchase gift cards, cigarettes, gas, and some rugs.  He explained that 
a friend in Ocala asked him “to get some rugs, so I bought some damn 
rugs” for the “crack house” and, after he did so at Walmart, he took 
the rugs there.  He also took the gift cards and traded them for crack. 
. . . After leaving the crack house, he drove back by his father’s 
house, but saw a lot of police cars there so he “hauled butt.”  He 
subsequently found himself on I-275 in the Tampa area and planned 
to keep driving, and when he ran out of gas, he said, he “was gonna 
kill [himself] somehow.”  At some point, he was driving on Highway 
19 and drove back to Citrus County, he said again, in order to kill 
himself. 
This ended the playing of the third recorded statement. 
Detective Atchison explained that a short time later . . . after Atchison 
and Campbell spoke off the record, Atchison asked if he could turn 
the recorder back on for a fourth statement.  Detective Atchison again 
advised Campbell of his Miranda rights.  Campbell was asked about 
the point at which he pulled over while driving and was subsequently 
followed by one of the vehicles attempting to stop him.  Campbell 
 
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admitted that he took off when the officer turned on the police lights.  
Campbell said he was driving at least 110 miles per hour and that 
when he decided to ram a marked police car at that speed, he did not 
know if there was an officer inside or near the vehicle, but was just 
trying to kill himself. . . . 
Also in this fourth statement, Campbell agreed that he told 
Atchison off the record that he hit his father three times with the ax.  
He related that he was sitting behind his father, then got up and swung 
the ax from behind his father’s recliner.  He said that before he hit his 
father, he kept flipping the ax trying to decide whether to hit him with 
the sharp end or the flat end of the metal head of the ax.  After the first 
blow, his father yelled, “What was that?”  Campbell said, “[H]e might 
have even sit up, but I don’t think so.”  Campbell agreed that when he 
hit his father the second time, he used both hands and “buried the 
hatchet” inside his father’s head, feeling the skull give.  . . .  When he 
saw his father’s hand reach up about five minutes later, Campbell hit 
him again.  During that five-minute period, Campbell was pacing and 
looking for valuables in the house.  He said he hit his father the third 
time because he did not want him to suffer. . . .  
Detective Atchison left the hospital on August 13, 2010, but 
met with Campbell again when he was in the Citrus County jail on 
August 16, 2010, at Campbell’s request.  Atchison again advised 
Campbell of his Miranda rights.  In this fifth statement, Campbell 
began by saying, “As far as the murder goes—oh, God, it’s hard for 
me to say, but, you know, I’ve wanted to put him to death for a few—
for a few days.”  Campbell said he had been “meditating” on it and 
did not know how, but knew he would do it eventually.  He said it was 
“[f]or peace, mostly.”  Campbell said he and his father were both 
mentally suffering and Campbell finally “just snapped . . . .  I just—
you know, and I guess I wanted to do it, you know?” 
 
Campbell, 159 So. 3d at 821-23 (some alterations in original).  Trial counsel did 
not move to suppress any of the statements.   
 
During the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Dr. O’Donnell testified that 
he reviewed Campbell’s medical records from Bayfront Medical Center, where 
Campbell was taken after the crash, as well as his jail records after he was 
 
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discharged.  Dr. O’Donnell also interviewed Campbell on March 29, 2017.  During 
the interview, Campbell informed Dr. O’Donnell that he once had an adverse 
reaction to a relatively low dose of Vicodin, an opioid, where he felt “out of 
control.”  According to Dr. O’Donnell, Campbell’s prior experience of “significant 
cognitive impairment” with a relatively low dose of opiates would have great 
relevance in evaluating the effects of the high dosages of opiates that Campbell 
received post-traumatically and post-operatively.  Dr. O’Donnell noted that 
although Campbell had abused cocaine and methamphetamine in the past, he had 
not abused opiates.  Therefore, Campbell was “opiate naive,” i.e., he had no 
tolerance for opiates, which impact different receptors in the brain.   
 
Dr. O’Donnell testified that between August 10, 2010, and August 17, 2010, 
Campbell was given the opiates morphine and oxycodone,5 as well as the sedative 
Diprivan.  According to Dr. O’Donnell, morphine affects deliberation and 
judgment, it can release inhibitions, and it has also been reported to cause 
hallucinations.  Oxycodone, which is more potent than morphine for pain purposes, 
can produce the same effects.  Finally, because Diprivan impacts the “control 
center of the brain,” the drug “releases all controls on inhibitions.”  Dr. O’Donnell 
                                          
 
 
5.  Campbell initially received the synthetic opiate fentanyl in transport to 
and at the hospital.  However, the drug was discontinued, and Dr. O’Donnell 
testified that Campbell “clearly was not under the influence of fentanyl” at the time 
of the hospital statements. 
 
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further stated that the additive effect of each of these drugs increases the risk of 
impairment, as can the additional impact of trauma, surgery, anesthesia, and mental 
distress.  According to Dr. O’Donnell, a patient who is impaired might not exhibit 
visible signs of impairment.  He reviewed which of these medications Campbell 
received prior to each of the statements and concluded that Campbell’s judgment 
was impaired during each statement.  Dr. O’Donnell stated he would never 
recommend that an “opiate-naive” patient make decisions while under the 
influence of any of these drugs because they “inhibit the ability to make decisions 
and people make bad decisions because they’re not exercising judgment, they’re 
not exercising controls.”   
 
On cross-examination, Dr. O’Donnell verified he had listened to the 
recordings of Campbell’s statements.  He admitted his opinion was based in part 
upon what Campbell told him and not on his personal observation of Campbell at 
the time he made the statements to law enforcement.  On redirect, Dr. O’Donnell 
testified that although the dosages given to Campbell were normal for a patient 
who is in an intensive care unit, they would still cause impairment in an “opiate-
naive” patient, even if the patient is coherent.   
 
Trial counsel Sharkey believed the most damaging part of the case was 
Campbell’s statement at the Citrus County jail that he had been thinking about 
killing his father for a few days, because it elevated simple premeditated murder 
 
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for a first-degree murder conviction to heightened premeditation for purposes of 
the death penalty.  Therefore, the defense strategy was to try to obtain a second-
degree murder conviction, and then, if the jury found Campbell guilty of first-
degree murder, to attempt to obtain a life recommendation.  After noting that the 
jail statement seemed “very cold, emotionless,” Sharkey testified: 
 
I found the statements that he made in the hospital to be more 
emotionally fraught.  They were—he was clearly, you know, very 
emotional, upset.  They seemed far more—he even seemed remorseful 
at times.  He made it seem far more spontaneous in those statements.  
. . . [T]he decision was made because I felt that they, too, contradicted 
or kind of rebutted the heightened premeditation of the last statement.   
 
Consistent with this strategy, trial counsel discussed Campbell’s hospital 
statements “at some length” with penalty-phase defense expert Dr. Peter Bursten—
specifically, “[t]he fact that he was emotional, the fact that he was going through 
all this turmoil, [which] is what Dr. Bursten testified to on the stand.”    
 
Counsel was presented with a difficult case to defend during the guilt phase.  
In addition to other incriminating evidence, prior to the accident and the statements 
at issue, the defendant sent a text message to his former girlfriend admitting that he 
killed his father with an ax.  Campbell, 159 So. 3d at 820.6  He used his father’s 
credit card multiple times after the murder to purchase items, and further 
                                          
 
 
6.  When she asked Campbell via text message, “Why would you do that 2 
him,” Campbell responded, “He is no more.”   
 
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telephoned the bank when the credit card was declined in an attempt to have the 
account reactivated.  Id. at 819.  Trial counsel made a strategic decision not to seek 
suppression of the hospital statements because they felt that during these 
statements, Campbell exhibited remorse for the killing of his father.  A review of 
the recordings of the hospital statements reflects that at times, Campbell was 
emotional and crying.  Sharkey believed Campbell appeared to be more sincere 
during the hospital statements than he was at the jail, where he stated he had been 
“meditating” on killing his father.  159 So. 3d at 823.   
We have concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective where a strategic 
decision was made to introduce a defendant’s statements with the goal of negating 
or reducing the defendant’s culpability.  See, e.g., Johnston v. State, 70 So. 3d 472, 
481-82 (Fla. 2011) (counsel not ineffective for failure to seek suppression of the 
defendant’s statements because they provided an alternate reason why the 
defendant’s fingerprints were in the victim’s bathroom where the body was found); 
Lawrence v. State, 969 So. 2d 294, 308-09 (Fla. 2007) (counsel made a strategic 
decision not to seek suppression of the defendant’s statements in order to 
demonstrate the codefendant was the more culpable party and the defendant was 
under his influence).   
Further, trial counsel did not believe there was a basis to seek suppression of 
the jail statement.  This conclusion is supported by the direct appeal record, which 
 
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reflects it was Campbell who initiated the discussion with Detective Atchison by 
affirmatively requesting he visit Campbell at the jail.  Id.  Moreover, after 
confirming that Campbell wanted to speak with him, and before allowing 
Campbell to speak, Detective Atchison read the Miranda warnings again to ensure 
that Campbell did not wish to have a lawyer present during this discussion.  Id.  
Finally, when Campbell states, “I’ve wanted to put him to death for . . . a few 
days,” the recording reflects that he is coherent.  He interacts with Detective 
Atchison in a normal fashion and is not behaving erratically.  Had trial counsel 
moved to suppress the jail statement, the motion would not have been successful.  
Accordingly, Campbell cannot demonstrate he was prejudiced by counsel’s actions 
with respect to the jail statement, and they were not ineffective.  See Kormondy v. 
State, 983 So. 2d 418, 430 (Fla. 2007) (“[T]rial counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective for failing to argue a nonmeritorious motion to suppress.”).   
In conclusion, Campbell has failed to demonstrate that if trial counsel had 
sought to suppress the jail statement, the motion would have been successful.  
Therefore, to counter the jail statement—which evidenced premeditation—trial 
counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to seek suppression of the 
hospital statements.  Based upon the foregoing, trial counsel was not ineffective, 
and we affirm the denial of this claim. 
 
 
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Failure to Provide Prompt Assistance 
 
Campbell next asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide 
prompt assistance to him.  Campbell asserts that, as soon as the fact of his arrest 
became common knowledge, the Fifth Judicial Circuit Office of the Public 
Defender had an obligation to make contact with him to prevent uncounseled 
admissions.  As part of this claim, he also asserts that the postconviction court 
erred in not allowing attorney Tebrugge to testify as to the prevalence and 
necessity of a rapid response by attorneys in capital cases.   
Campbell is not entitled to relief because the Office of the Public Defender 
had not yet been appointed to represent him at the time he gave the five statements 
to law enforcement on August 12, 13, and 16.  Accordingly, Campbell was not a 
client of that office during that time, and its attorneys had no duty to him.  The 
Office of the Public Defender was first appointed to represent Campbell on 
August 17, 2010, in one of his noncapital cases.  Although Campbell signed a 
Notice of Intent to Invoke Right to Counsel and Exercise Right to Remain Silent 
the same day, the Office of the Public Defender did not officially represent him 
until that time, and advising Campbell before then was not its responsibility. 
 
We previously addressed a capital defendant’s claim that an assistant public 
defender was ineffective for failing to communicate with him prior to appointment 
and advise him not to speak to law enforcement.  In Everett v. State, 54 So. 3d 464 
 
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(Fla. 2010), within hours of a Florida murder (and other crimes), the defendant was 
captured by an Alabama bail bondsman who transferred the defendant back to 
Alabama where he was wanted as a fugitive.  Id. at 470.  Two Florida law 
enforcement officers subsequently connected the defendant to evidence found near 
the Florida crime scene and traveled to Alabama.  Id.  During the time the 
defendant was in an Alabama county jail, he confessed to the Florida crimes in a 
statement to a Florida law enforcement officer.  Id.   
 
We held that the Florida assistant public defender (attorney Smith) was not 
ineffective for failing to advise the defendant not to speak to law enforcement 
under these circumstances: 
Because attorney Smith had not then been appointed to represent 
Everett, attorney Smith was not ineffective for failing to communicate 
with Everett while Everett was in Alabama custody—before Everett 
was ever charged with any Florida offense. . . .  
Chapter 27, Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.111 offer guidance on when a public defender is 
“representing” a defendant.  Section 27.51(1)(a), Florida Statutes 
(2001), provides in pertinent part that “[t]he public defender shall 
represent . . . any person who is determined by the court to be indigent 
as provided in s. 27.52 and who is . . . [u]nder arrest for, or is charged 
with, a felony.”  Section 27.51(2) adds that “[t]he court may not 
appoint the public defender to represent, even on a temporary basis, 
any person who is not indigent.”  § 27.51(2).  Chapter 27 is in 
agreement with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(a), which 
provides that “[an indigent] person entitled to appointment of counsel 
. . . shall have counsel appointed when the person is formally charged 
with an offense, or as soon as feasible after custodial restraint, or at 
the first appearance before a committing magistrate, whichever occurs 
earliest.”  Rule 3.111(b)(5) states also that “[b]efore appointing a 
public defender, the court shall . . . make inquiry into the financial 
 
- 20 - 
status of the accused in a manner not inconsistent with the guidelines 
established by section 27.52, Florida Statutes.  The accused shall 
respond to the inquiry under oath.”  Finally, the rules provide that the 
court shall “require the accused to execute an affidavit of insolvency 
as required by section 27.52, Florida Statutes.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.111(b)(5)(C). 
In this case, at the time that Everett was in Alabama and gave 
statements to law enforcement officers, the Florida trial court had not 
determined that Everett was indigent, as required by both sections 
27.51-.52 and rule 3.111(b)(5).  Likewise, attorney Smith had not 
been appointed as counsel and was not “representing” Everett 
according to sections 27.51-.52 and rule 3.111 because Everett had 
not been formally charged, was not under custodial restraint in 
Florida, and had not had a first appearance for his Florida charges. 
Specifically, Everett made statements to law enforcement in 
November 2001, while in Alabama custody for an Alabama charge; 
Everett was indicted for the Florida crimes in late January 2002; and 
the trial court determined that Everett was entitled to a Florida public 
defender in late February 2002 upon determining that Everett was 
indigent.  Based on this timeline, it was impossible for attorney Smith, 
as an assistant public defender, to have been “representing” Everett at 
the time that Everett made the statements in Alabama.  Because 
attorney Smith was not yet representing Everett as defined by Florida 
Law, attorney Smith was not yet responsible for advising Everett. 
 
Id. at 472-73 (alterations in original).  Here, as in Everett, at the time Campbell 
gave the five statements to law enforcement, he had not been formally charged 
with any crimes, he had not been given a first appearance, and the Office of the 
Public Defender had not yet been appointed to represent him.7  Accordingly, trial 
counsel was not ineffective for failing to respond to Campbell sooner.    
                                          
 
 
7.  However, unlike Everett, Campbell was under custodial restraint in 
Florida from the time of the car crash onward.  After discharge from the hospital, 
Campbell was taken to the Citrus County jail.   
 
- 21 - 
 
Further, because the Office of the Public Defender had no duty to Campbell 
prior to its appointment on August 17, 2010, defense witness Tebrugge’s testimony 
as to the importance of “early contact with the accused in a homicide case” would 
not have been relevant to whether trial counsel here was ineffective.  Accordingly, 
the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in not permitting Tebrugge to 
testify.  See Frances v. State, 970 So. 2d 806, 813 (Fla. 2007) (“A trial court’s 
rulings as to . . . excluded evidence should be reviewed under the abuse of 
discretion standard.”).  We affirm the denial of this claim. 
Failure to Request Inquiry/Object 
 
In his third claim, Campbell contends trial counsel was ineffective both for 
failing to request an inquiry of the jurors as to whether any of them heard an 
inappropriate comment made by a prosecutor and for failing to object to an 
argument made during guilt-phase closing statements.  We conclude that the 
postconviction court properly rejected both challenges.   
With respect to the inappropriate comment, the direct appeal record reflects 
that while Campbell was testifying as to his strained relationship with his father, 
trial counsel Sharkey asked to approach the bench.  At sidebar, Sharkey informed 
the court that he heard one prosecutor whisper to the other, “What a manipulative 
ass.”  Sharkey moved for a mistrial, stating, “If I could hear it and I’m not far from 
the jury . . . I can’t be certain that a juror didn’t hear that and I think that’s 
 
- 22 - 
extremely inappropriate.”  The prosecutor admitted he made the comment and 
apologized to trial counsel and the court.  In response to the motion, the prosecutor 
stated there was no evidence that anyone other than Sharkey heard the comment, 
and “[i]f [Sharkey] wants an inquiry made of the juror[s], I mean, the Court does 
not have any evidentiary foundation to support the granting of a mistrial.”  Sharkey 
did not ask for an inquiry, and the trial court denied the motion.   
 
During the evidentiary hearing, no evidence was presented to support the 
assertion that a juror may have heard the statement.  Sharkey testified he did not 
request an inquiry because it would “draw even more attention to the incident and 
take up more time while the client’s on the stand, so I just elected to move on from 
there.”  In concluding that trial counsel was not ineffective, the postconviction 
court noted the improper comment occurred during Campbell’s testimony, and 
while the jurors’ attention was directed toward Campbell.8   
 
Trial counsel’s decision not to seek individual voir dire was a reasonable 
strategy.  The prosecutor’s improper comment was made during the most 
important part of the defense’s case—while Campbell was describing the tense, 
strained relationship with his father, and how the tensions escalated until the time 
of the murder.  Had trial counsel requested individual voir dire, it would have 
                                          
 
 
8.  The judge who presided over the postconviction proceedings is the same 
judge who presided over the capital trial.   
 
- 23 - 
disrupted the flow of Campbell’s testimony and broken the jurors’ concentration.  
Further, had voir dire demonstrated that none of the jurors heard the whispered 
comment, once Campbell recommenced testifying, the attention of the jurors easily 
could have been diverted into speculation as to what the comment was.  Thus, it 
was a reasonable decision for trial counsel not to call attention to the improper 
comment and simply proceed with Campbell’s testimony.  See Johnson v. State, 
135 So. 3d 1002, 1016-17 (Fla. 2014) (counsel not deficient for failing to request a 
limiting instruction with respect to witness’s testimony that victim asked for her 
children while being strangled because the request “would have drawn further 
attention to the emotionally charged comment”). 
Further, even if counsel was deficient for not requesting individual voir dire, 
Campbell has failed to demonstrate prejudice.  As previously discussed, Campbell 
did not offer any evidence that a juror heard the improper comment and, therefore, 
any allegations of prejudice are purely speculative.  Accordingly, he has not met 
the burden of showing a reasonable probability that, but for the failure to request 
individual voir dire, the outcome of the guilt phase would have been different, and 
confidence in the outcome has not been undermined.  Bradley, 33 So. 3d at 672.9 
                                          
 
 
9.  We remind all attorneys to be cognizant of any spoken comments and to 
always maintain decorum in the courtroom.  The statement by the prosecutor here 
was completely inappropriate.    
 
- 24 - 
 
Campbell further alleges ineffectiveness based upon trial counsel’s failure to 
object to the following argument during guilt-phase closing statements on the basis 
that it shifted the burden of proof to Campbell: 
You know, the Court is going to tell you and give you some guidance 
in evaluating the evidence in the case, the witnesses’ testimony in the 
case, and that the defendant is to be treated just like any other witness 
in the case.  Some of the guidelines is [sic] does the witness’[s] 
testimony agree with the other evidence and the other testimony in the 
case? 
 
It’s been proven that the witness was convicted of a felony.  
Well, we know that [the] defendant is not a one-time convicted felon 
or a four-time convicted felon, he’s a seven-time convicted felon.  But 
he was stressed and he was depressed, he was in a fog, he was in a 
daze, he was in shock, it didn’t register, he couldn’t piece it together. 
 
If you want to believe that, go right ahead.  I can’t stop you.  
Let him walk out the back of that courtroom door.  I submit to you 
that flies in the face of the other evidence and the other testimony with 
regard to this case. 
 
. . . [G]iven all the testimony and the evidence that you’ve 
heard in this case proves that [the] defendant is guilty as charged in 
the indictment of murder in the first degree. 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
 
During the evidentiary hearing, Sharkey testified that while he did not 
believe the emphasized statement was objectionable, he thought it was “silly” and 
a “sort of absurd thing for [the prosecutor] to say.”  Sharkey explained that 
“Campbell himself said that he knew he wasn’t getting out of this and he was 
going to do life when he was on the stand.  So I think I answered [the prosecutor] 
right back when I had a chance.”  The trial record reflects that Sharkey’s first point 
raised during guilt-phase closing statements was with respect to this comment: 
 
- 25 - 
[The prosecutor] said, If you want to let him walk out that door, you 
let him walk out that door.  He’s not going to walk out that door.  You 
know he’s not going to walk out that door.  He said on the stand 
yesterday he knows he’s not going to walk out that door.  We’re not 
even going to ask you to let him walk out that door. 
Sharkey reaffirmed this assertion two more times during closing statements.  The 
final reference to the comment was made in the context of arguing that Campbell 
should not be found guilty of first-degree murder, but second-degree murder: 
 
And as I said, I’m not asking you to let him walk out that door.  
He never said he was going to walk out that door.  He knew where—
he knows where he’s going because there’s other alternatives.  We’re 
not asking you for not guilty of every charge.  There are other offenses 
and you’ll be charged with these. 
 
You’ll have a whole host of lessers that you’ll be charged on 
. . . .  [A]nd on the board right here as you’ve seen is second-degree 
murder. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Sharkey proceeded to discuss the elements of second-degree 
murder and concluded, “That’s what works here.”  Sharkey completed the guilt-
phase closing statement by stating, “When you apply the facts in this case to that 
law, you will find the only true and correct verdict is something less than first-
degree murder.”   
 
In denying this claim, the postconviction court concluded the prosecutor’s 
statement did not shift the burden to Campbell because it did not “rise to the level 
of challenging the defendant’s failure to refute the evidence or denigrate defense’s 
theories.”  The court also noted the statement only questioned the reliability of 
Campbell’s testimony, and counsel made the strategic decision to address it during 
 
- 26 - 
closing statements.  As a result, the court concluded trial counsel had no basis to 
object to the statement, and they were not ineffective.   
We agree with the postconviction court’s findings and holding.  This Court 
has explained that “an attorney is allowed to argue reasonable inferences from the 
evidence and to argue credibility of witnesses or any other relevant issue so long as 
the argument is based on the evidence.”  Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243, 1254-55 
(Fla. 2006).  “The credibility of a criminal defendant who takes the stand and 
testifies may be attacked in the same manner as any other witness.”  Chandler v. 
State, 702 So. 2d 186, 195-96 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida 
Evidence, § 608.1, at 385 (1997 ed.)).  Nevertheless, “it is error for a prosecutor to 
make statements that shift the burden of proof and invite the jury to convict the 
defendant for some reason other than that the State has proved its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197, 1200 (Fla. 1998).   
Here, the challenged statement was made in the context of the State 
contending that Campbell’s testimony was inconsistent with the other evidence 
presented during trial.  The gist of the statement was if the jury found Campbell 
credible, it had the option of acquitting him; however, the other evidence and 
testimony supported a conviction for first-degree murder.  This argument did not 
shift the burden of proof to Campbell to demonstrate he was innocent or guilty of a 
lesser offense.  Cf. Hayes v. State, 660 So. 2d 257, 265 (Fla. 1995) (trial court erred 
 
- 27 - 
when it allowed the prosecutor to elicit testimony and argue in closing that the 
defense failed to request testing of various pieces of evidence because the 
prosecutor’s questions and comments “may have led the jury to believe that Hayes 
had an obligation to test the evidence found at the scene of the murder and to prove 
that the hair and blood samples did not match his own”).   
At worst, the statement could be viewed as misleading; i.e., if the jury 
believed Campbell’s version of events, it was required to acquit him.  Even under 
this scenario, however, Sharkey corrected any potential misconception multiple 
times during his closing statement by informing the jurors (1) the defense was not 
asking the jury to acquit Campbell, (2) Campbell knew he was not going to be 
acquitted, and (3) the evidence supported a conviction for second-degree murder.  
Therefore, Campbell has failed to demonstrate trial counsel was deficient for 
failing to object to the comment.   
We affirm the denial of this claim. 
Cumulative Error 
Finally, Campbell claims the cumulative effect of the errors that occurred 
during the guilt phase deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial.  
However, where the individual claims asserted by a defendant are without merit, a 
claim of cumulative error will fail.  Israel v. State, 985 So. 2d 510, 520 (Fla. 2008).  
 
- 28 - 
Because each of Campbell’s challenges lacks merit, he is not entitled to relief 
based upon cumulative error. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
In his habeas petition, Campbell presents three claims of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel.  In considering such claims, the Court evaluates: 
[F]irst, whether the alleged omissions are of such 
magnitude as to constitute a serious error or substantial 
deficiency falling measurably outside the range of 
professionally acceptable performance and, second, 
whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine 
confidence in the correctness of the result. 
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986).  It is the 
defendant’s burden to allege a specific, serious omission or overt act 
upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be 
based.  If a legal issue “would in all probability have been found to be 
without merit” had counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the 
failure of appellate counsel to raise the meritless issue will not render 
appellate counsel’s performance ineffective.   
Frances v. State, 143 So. 3d 340, 357 (Fla. 2014) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000)). 
Denial of Request for Mistrial 
 
 
In his first claim, Campbell contends appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to appeal the trial court’s denial of the request for a mistrial when trial 
counsel heard one prosecutor whisper to the other, “What a manipulative ass” 
 
- 29 - 
during Campbell’s testimony.  Campbell has failed to demonstrate appellate 
counsel was ineffective.  We have explained: 
 
“A motion for mistrial should be granted only when the error is 
deemed so prejudicial that it vitiates the entire trial, depriving the 
defendant of a fair proceeding.”  For a new trial to be warranted, the 
comments “must either deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial 
trial, materially contribute to the conviction, be so harmful or 
fundamentally tainted as to require a new trial, or be so inflammatory 
that they might have influenced the jury to reach a more severe verdict 
than that it would have otherwise.” 
 
Delhall v. State, 95 So. 3d 134, 169 (Fla. 2012) (citations omitted) (quoting Wade 
v. State, 41 So. 3d 857, 872 (Fla. 2010), and Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 207 
(Fla. 2005)).  A trial court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion.  England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 402 (Fla. 2006).  As 
previously discussed, there is no evidence that any juror heard the prosecutor’s 
comment.  In fact, in denying this claim, the postconviction court noted the jurors’ 
attention was directed to Campbell, who was testifying at the time the statement 
was made.  Accordingly, where there is no evidence the comment was even heard, 
the trial court cannot be deemed to have abused its discretion in refusing to declare 
a mistrial over the comment.   
Moreover, even if one or more jurors did hear the comment, that comment 
cannot be said to be so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.  While 
unprofessional and crass, the single comment was isolated and not part of opening 
statements, closing statements, or the State’s cross-examination of Campbell.  In 
 
- 30 - 
whispering this comment to co-counsel, the prosecutor was not urging the jury to 
convict Campbell on the basis of Campbell’s truthfulness or lack thereof.  Cf. Ruiz 
v. State, 743 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1999) (by “characterizing Ruiz as ‘Pinocchio’ and 
then telling the jury that ‘truth equals justice’ and ‘justice is that you convict him,’ 
the prosecutor was inviting the jury to convict Ruiz of first-degree murder because 
he [was] a liar,” which crossed the boundary of proper advocacy).  Therefore, had 
counsel appealed the denial of the request for a mistrial, it would “in all probability 
have been found to be without merit.”  Frances, 143 So. 3d at 357. 
Accordingly, we deny this claim. 
Admission of Collateral Crimes Evidence 
 
Campbell next claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
appeal the admission of collateral crimes evidence—specifically, evidence related 
to the high-speed chase and collision with the deputy’s vehicle.  According to 
Campbell, although the car chase and collision were to some degree inextricably 
intertwined with the murder, these events were impermissibly allowed to become a 
feature of the trial.  We disagree. 
 
The admissibility of evidence regarding collateral crimes is within the 
discretion of the trial court, but that discretion is limited by the rules of evidence.  
Ballard v. State, 66 So. 3d 912, 917 (Fla. 2011).  Section 90.402, Florida Statutes 
(2018), provides: “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as provided by law.”  
 
- 31 - 
However, section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2018), states: “Relevant evidence is 
inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence.”  We have explained: 
“Admissible evidence of uncharged crimes falls into two categories: 
‘similar fact’ evidence and ‘dissimilar fact’ evidence.”  Victorino v. 
State, 23 So. 3d 87, 98 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 
9, 16 (Fla. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Similar fact 
evidence, also known as Williams-rule evidence, “is governed by the 
requirements and limitations of section 90.404, [Florida Statutes 
(2004)],” id.[,] which permits “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts . . . when relevant to prove a material fact in issue,” such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident.  Id. (quoting § 90.404, Fla. Stat.).  
Dissimilar fact evidence is governed by section 90.402 and has been 
described as follows: 
[E]vidence of uncharged crimes which are inseparable 
from the crime charged, or evidence which is inextricably 
intertwined with the crime charged, is not Williams rule 
evidence.  It is admissible under section 90.402 because 
“it is a relevant and inseparable part of the act which is in 
issue . . . . [I]t is necessary to admit the evidence to 
adequately describe the deed.” 
Griffin v. State, 639 So. 2d 966, 968 (Fla. 1994) (quoting Charles W. 
Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 404.17 (1993 ed.)).  The admissibility 
of both categories—similar fact evidence and dissimilar fact 
evidence—is determined by its relevancy and, of course, subject to 
exclusion under the balancing test of section 90.403, Florida Statutes 
(2010).  Id.  In establishing its case, the State “is entitled to present 
evidence which paints an accurate picture of the events surrounding 
the crimes charged,” Griffin, 639 So. 2d at 970, but cannot “make the 
evidence of other crimes the feature of the trial or . . . introduce the 
evidence solely for the purpose of showing bad character or 
propensity.”  Smith v. State, 866 So. 2d 51, 61 (Fla. 2004).  
 
- 32 - 
Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d 930, 945 (Fla. 2017) (second alteration added). 
 
Here, evidence of the chase and crash was necessary to provide the jury with 
an accurate picture of the events surrounding the murder.  The evidence 
demonstrated how Campbell was apprehended by law enforcement.  It reflects that 
law enforcement did not stop Campbell—Campbell fled from law enforcement, 
and it was he who ended the chase by crashing his vehicle into a deputy’s marked 
car in an attempt to commit suicide.  Further, evidence of the crash provided the 
jury with context as to why Campbell gave four of his five statements from a 
hospital bed.  Therefore, at issue is whether these events impermissibly became a 
feature of the trial.   
We have carefully reviewed the entire trial record and conclude they did not.  
The State dedicated less than one-quarter of its opening statement to the chase and 
crash, which is not excessive.  Further, only three of more than one dozen guilt-
phase State witnesses testified as to these events in any detail.  Finally, the State 
dedicated only a single sentence to them during its closing statement.  
Accordingly, had appellate counsel challenged on appeal the admission of the 
collateral crimes evidence, the claim in all probability would have been found to 
lack merit.  Accordingly, we hold appellate counsel was not ineffective and reject 
this claim.  Frances, 143 So. 3d at 357. 
 
- 33 - 
Autopsy Photograph 
 
Finally, Campbell asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
appeal the admission of a graphic autopsy photograph into evidence.  We disagree. 
During trial, four autopsy photographs of the victim’s injuries were introduced.  
Exhibits 35, 36, and 37 depicted the victim in the condition in which he was found, 
and the defense did not object to introduction of these photographs.  However, 
exhibit 38 involved a photograph of the victim’s head after the medical examiner 
folded back the scalp to expose the skull.  The medical examiner testified that he 
“measured an approximately five-by-four-inch area of laceration, disruption of the 
brain, on [the] right side with bits of embedded tissue, including bone and hair.”   
When the State attempted to introduce exhibit 38 into evidence, trial counsel 
objected on the basis that the probative value of the photograph was greatly 
outweighed by its gruesome nature, and the photograph would inflame the passions 
of the jury.  The trial court reviewed the photograph and, while concluding it was 
“to . . . the average sensibility[,] a little rough,” the testimony indicated there had 
been chopping-type injuries not only to the skull, but into the victim’s brain.  The 
court concluded “the defendant essentially takes the evidence of their crime as it is 
found” and admitted exhibit 38 into evidence.   
The admission of photographic evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  
Philmore v. State, 820 So. 2d 919, 931 (Fla. 2002).  We have explained: 
 
- 34 - 
“The test for admissibility of photographic evidence is relevancy 
rather than necessity.”  Pope v. State, 679 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla. 1996).  
. . .  This Court has upheld the admission of autopsy photographs 
when they are necessary to explain a medical examiner’s testimony, 
the manner of death, or the location of the wounds.  See, e.g., 
Philmore, 820 So. 2d at 932 (autopsy photograph was relevant to 
show the nature and extent of the bullet wound, and for demonstrating 
premeditation); Floyd v. State, 808 So. 2d 175, 184 (Fla. 2002) 
(autopsy photographs “were relevant to show the circumstances of the 
crime and the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries”); Brooks v. 
State, 787 So. 2d 765, 781 (Fla. 2001) (five autopsy photographs were 
relevant to the medical examiner’s determination as to the manner of 
the victim’s death); Pope, 679 So. 2d at 713-14 (autopsy photographs 
were relevant to illustrate the medical examiner’s testimony and the 
injuries he noted); Wilson v. State, 436 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1983) 
(nine autopsy photographs were admissible because they were 
relevant to show identity, the nature and extent of the victims’ 
injuries, the manner of death, the nature and force of the violence 
used, and premeditation). 
However, even where photographs are relevant, the trial court 
must still determine whether the “gruesomeness of the portrayal is so 
inflammatory as to create an undue prejudice in the minds of the 
jur[ors] and [distract] them from a fair and unimpassioned 
consideration of the evidence.”  Czubak v. State, 570 So. 2d 925, 928 
(Fla. 1990) (quoting Leach v. State, 132 So. 2d 329, 331-32 (Fla. 
1961)) (second alteration in original).   
 
Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1255 (Fla. 2004) (alterations in original).   
 
There is no question that exhibit 38 is graphic, depicting a significant 
chopping wound to the brain.  However, the photograph was relevant to illustrate 
the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries, as well as the medical examiner’s 
testimony.  Exhibit 38 is no more inflammatory than autopsy photographs in other 
cases where we held they were relevant to show the nature of the victim’s injuries 
and were not unduly prejudicial.  See, e.g., Patrick v. State, 104 So. 3d 1046, 1061-
 
- 35 - 
62 (Fla. 2012) (“[P]hotographs . . . depicting the skin of the victim’s head pulled 
back to reveal his skull and the entire torso opened to reveal his upper chest . . . 
were provided to demonstrate the internal injuries sustained since they were not 
otherwise visible.”). 
Therefore, had appellate counsel appealed the introduction of exhibit 38, the 
claim in all probability would not have been successful.  Accordingly, appellate 
counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this claim on direct appeal.  
Frances, 143 So. 3d at 357.   
CONCLUSION 
 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the postconviction court’s order and 
deny habeas relief.   
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
ANY MOTION FOR REHEARING OR CLARIFICATION MUST BE FILED 
WITHIN SEVEN DAYS. A RESPONSE TO THE MOTION FOR 
REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MAY BE FILED WITHIN FIVE DAYS 
AFTER THE FILING OF THE MOTION FOR REHEARING/CLARIFICATION. 
NOT FINAL UNTIL THIS TIME PERIOD EXPIRES TO FILE A 
REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Citrus County,  
Richard A. Howard, Judge - Case No. 092010CF001012XXXAXX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
 
- 36 - 
Maria DeLiberato, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Julie A. 
Morley, Margaret S. Russell, and Mark S. Gruber, Assistant Capital Collateral 
Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Patrick A. Bobek, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
for Appellee/Respondent