Case Title: Philbrook v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 162

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-07-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 162 
Docket: 
Aro-15-333 
Argued: 
February 6, 2017 
Decided: 
July 20, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
JAMES A. PHILBROOK 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
 
SAUFLEY, C.J. 
[¶1]  James A. Philbrook appeals from a judgment in which the court 
(Aroostook County, Hunter, J.) denied his petition for post-conviction review 
seeking relief from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him 
guilty of theft by misapplication of property (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 358(1)(B)(1) (2016), and securities fraud (Class C), 32 M.R.S. §§ 16501, 
16508 (2012).1  He contends that the evidence presented at his 
post-conviction hearing compelled the court to find that defense counsel’s 
representation during plea negotiations, and counsel’s illness and inattention 
                                         
1  Title 32 M.R.S. § 16508 has since been amended.  See P.L. 2013, ch. 39, § 2 (effective Oct. 9, 
2013) (codified at 32 M.R.S. § 16508(1) (2016)). 
 
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at trial, deprived Philbrook of the effective assistance of counsel, resulting in 
prejudice.  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  Philbrook was convicted of theft by misapplication of property and 
securities fraud upon evidence that he persuaded his longtime insurance and 
estate planning clients to transfer a total of $195,000 to his account for 
investment in a Pay-Per-View event and another investment he vaguely 
described as having to do with student loans.  See State v. Philbrook, 2013 ME 
86, ¶¶ 1-6, 81 A.3d 326.  Instead of investing their money, however, Philbrook 
used it to repay money that his son had embezzled from his employer and to 
cover Philbrook’s own ongoing expenses.  Id. ¶¶ 5-6.  He did not repay to his 
clients any of the $195,000 that they had invested.  Id. ¶ 7. 
 
[¶3]  The jury found Philbrook guilty of both charged counts.  Id. ¶¶ 1, 8.  
The court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Philbrook to eight 
years’ imprisonment for theft by misapplication of property, with all but three 
years suspended, and three years of probation with a special condition that he 
pay $195,000 in restitution, and to three years’ imprisonment for securities 
fraud, to run concurrently with the theft sentence.  Id. ¶ 8.  Philbrook appealed 
to us from that judgment and argued, among other things, that the jury 
 
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instruction provided by the trial court had omitted a necessary element of the 
crime of theft.  Id. ¶¶ 8-9.  We concluded that the court had not erred, and we 
affirmed the judgment in its entirety.  Id. ¶¶ 1, 9. 
 
[¶4]  On November 7, 2013, Philbrook filed his petition for 
post-conviction review alleging the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.  
See 15 M.R.S. § 2129 (2016).  In its judgment, entered on June 8, 2015, the 
court found that Philbrook “failed to prove . . . that his trial counsel did not 
communicate to him the State’s offer of a plea agreement and that there was a 
reasonable probability that he would have accepted it.”  With respect to 
counsel’s assistance at trial, the court found that, although defense counsel 
was coughing and at times felt fatigued and inattentive or lightheaded, 
Philbrook failed to connect counsel’s ailment to any particular deficiency in 
performance or to identify any prejudice to his case resulting from such a 
deficiency.  The court concluded that Philbrook had waived any argument 
regarding the jury instruction on theft because he raised the issue on direct 
appeal and we resolved the question in favor of the State.  See 15 M.R.S. 
§ 2128(1) (2016) (“Errors at the trial that have been . . . raised on a direct 
 
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appeal . . . may not be raised in an action for post-conviction review under this 
chapter . . . .”); Philbrook, 2013 ME 86, ¶ 9, 81 A.3d 326.2   
 
[¶5]  Philbrook did not move for further findings of fact.  See M.R.U. 
Crim. P. 23(c).  He filed a notice of appeal and submitted a memorandum 
seeking a certificate of probable cause.  See 15 M.R.S. § 2131(1) (2016); M.R. 
App. P. 19(a)(vi), (c).  We issued a certificate of probable cause, and we now 
consider Philbrook’s appeal.  See M.R. App. P. 19(f).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Burden of Proof and Standard of Review 
 
[¶6]  Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on 
post-conviction review “are governed by the two-part test outlined in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 
(1984).”  Middleton v. State, 2015 ME 164, ¶ 12, 129 A.3d 962.  Applying that 
test, a petitioner bears the burden, at the post-conviction trial, of proving the 
following: (1) “‘counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness,’” and (2) “the deficient representation resulted in prejudice.”  
Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).  A court need not “address both 
                                         
2  We agree with the court on this point and do not discuss the issue further. 
 
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components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on 
one.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶7]  As to the first part of the Strickland test, counsel’s representation 
of a defendant falls below the objective standard of reasonableness if it falls 
“below what might be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney.”  Francis v. 
State, 2007 ME 148, ¶ 4, 938 A.2d 10 (quotation marks omitted).  “Judicial 
inquiry into the effectiveness of representation is ‘highly deferential.’”  
Middleton, 2015 ME 164, ¶ 13, 129 A.3d 962 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689).  “The post-conviction court must make every effort . . . to eliminate the 
distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s 
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at 
the time.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  “[A] court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶8]  To establish prejudice—the second part of the Strickland test—the 
post-conviction petitioner must prove that there is “a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
 
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would have been different,” meaning that the “ineffective assistance of counsel 
rose to the level of compromising the reliability of the conviction and 
undermining confidence in it.”  Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137, ¶¶ 19, 25, 125 
A.3d 1163 (quotation marks omitted).  A conviction may be “unreliable and 
not worthy of confidence,” thus satisfying the “reasonable probability” test, 
even without proof that a different outcome was “more likely than not,” as the 
now superseded “outcome determinative” test would require.  Id. ¶¶ 19-22, 
25 (quotation marks omitted).   
 
[¶9]  In reviewing a post-conviction court’s findings on appeal, the facts 
found regarding both the underlying trial and the post-conviction hearing are 
viewed in the light most favorable to the post-conviction court’s judgment.  
Lamarre v. State, 2013 ME 110, ¶ 2, 82 A.3d 845; Heon v. State, 2007 ME 131, 
¶ 5, 931 A.2d 1068.  Because a petitioner bears the burden of proof at the 
post-conviction hearing, “we will not disturb the court’s determination that 
[the petitioner] failed to satisfy his burden unless the evidence compelled the 
court to find to the contrary.”  Laferriere v. State, 1997 ME 169, ¶ 6, 697 A.2d 
1301 (quotation marks omitted); see Heon, 2007 ME 131, ¶ 8, 931 A.2d 1068.  
“On review after a hearing in which the court has stated its findings, and there 
has been no motion for further findings, we will infer that the court found all 
 
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the facts necessary to support its judgment if those inferred findings are 
supportable by evidence in the record.”  State v. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 9, 977 
A.2d 1003.  Only legal conclusions reached on post-conviction review are 
reviewed de novo.  See Fortune v. State, 2017 ME 61, ¶ 12, 158 A.3d 512. 
B. 
Review of the Post-Conviction Judgment 
 
[¶10]  We now consider whether the evidence presented on 
post-conviction review compelled the court to find ineffectiveness, either 
(1) during plea negotiations or (2) at trial, that resulted in prejudice. 
1. 
Effectiveness of Assistance During Plea Negotiations 
 
[¶11]  A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel “extends to the 
plea-bargaining process.”  Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012); see 
Laferriere, 1997 ME 169, ¶¶ 5, 7, 697 A.2d 1301.  With respect to the decision 
whether to accept a plea offer, “an erroneous strategic prediction about the 
outcome of a trial is not necessarily deficient performance.”  Lafler, 566 U.S. at 
174.  When a defendant alleges that the rejection of a proposed plea resulted 
from the ineffectiveness of counsel, the defendant must show that, but for the 
ineffective assistance of counsel, there is a “reasonable probability” that 
• The plea offer would have been presented to the court, meaning that the 
defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not 
have withdrawn it for other reasons; 
 
 
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• The court would have accepted the terms presented; and  
 
• The terms of the offer would have provided for a less severe conviction 
or sentence than the conviction or sentence ultimately reached. 
 
Id. at 164. 
 
[¶12]  Here, the court found—with evidentiary support—that 
(1) counsel did communicate to Philbrook the plea offer from the State 
involving a cap of two years in prison, (2) Philbrook would not agree to an 
offer that would require prison time and would accept only a short sentence 
to county jail, (3) Philbrook never stated or testified that he would have 
agreed to accept the offer, and (4) counsel and Philbrook shared a level of 
optimism that informed their strategy in rejecting the offer.  Although there 
was evidence that counsel did not forward to Philbrook each letter he 
exchanged with the State, the evidence does not compel a finding that, if 
Philbrook had seen those communications instead of just conversing about 
them by telephone, there was “a reasonable probability that . . . [he] would 
have accepted the plea.”  Id.  Accordingly, the court was not compelled to find 
that Philbrook established deficient representation or prejudice during plea 
negotiations.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-96; Laferriere, 1997 ME 169, ¶ 6, 
697 A.2d 1301. 
 
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2. 
Effectiveness of Assistance During Trial 
 
[¶13]  Philbrook next contends that his counsel, due to illness, failed to 
object to leading questions.  Philbrook argues that he suffered prejudice 
because the guilty verdict and judgment of conviction are “unreliable and not 
worthy of confidence,” Theriault, 2015 ME 137, ¶ 25, 125 A.3d 1163, due to 
counsel’s alleged unresponsiveness or inattention.  Philbrook also argues that 
prejudice may be legally presumed because “counsel’s ineffectiveness 
amounts to the constructive denial of the assistance of counsel.”  Id. ¶ 17 
(quotation marks omitted).  Philbrook did not raise the issue of presumed 
prejudice with the trial court, however, and therefore we review that issue 
only for obvious error.  See M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(b); State v. True, 2017 ME 2, 
¶ 15 & n.6, 153 A.3d 106. 
 
[¶14]  Although counsel was ill during the trial, the court was not 
persuaded that the illness resulted in ineffectiveness, including prejudice to 
Philbrook’s case.  The court specifically articulated the “reasonable 
probability” test—not the “outcome determinative” test—as the applicable 
test and found that Philbrook had failed to establish prejudice, see Theriault, 
2015 ME 137, ¶¶ 19-25, 125 A.3d 1163.  The court’s judgment indicates that it 
“observed nothing that would have caused it concern regarding trial counsel’s 
 
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ability to perform his professional responsibilities at trial of this matter,” and 
the trial transcript demonstrates that counsel presented an opening 
statement, actively cross-examined and re-cross-examined witnesses, directly 
examined Philbrook, and presented a cogent closing argument.   
 
[¶15]  Thus, even if the court did not specifically use the words 
“unreliable and not worthy of confidence,” id. ¶ 25, we infer from the court’s 
judgment that it was not persuaded that the conviction was unreliable, see 
Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 9, 977 A.2d 1003.  Because Philbrook has not indicated 
that any changes in the content of testimony would have resulted from 
objections to the form of the prosecutor’s questions, and has not argued that 
any other specific consequences flowed from counsel’s illness or alleged 
inattention, the record does not compel a finding of ineffectiveness or that any 
ineffectiveness resulted in prejudice.  See Laferriere, 1997 ME 169, ¶ 6, 697 
A.2d 1301.  Absent a finding that counsel’s representation was ineffective, 
there was no “constructive denial” of the assistance of counsel, and therefore 
the court did not commit obvious error in not applying that concept.  
Theriault, 2015 ME 137, ¶ 17, 125 A.3d 1163 (quotation marks omitted); see 
M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(b); True, 2017 ME 2, ¶ 15, 153 A.3d 106. 
 
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The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sarah LeClaire, Esq. (orally), Presque Isle, for appellant James A. Philbrook 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Denis Culley, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), 
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
Aroostook County Superior Court docket number CR-2013-198 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY