Case Title: State ex rel. Pansy Henley, Relator v. The Honorable James R. Bickel, Respondent

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC89614

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2009-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE ex rel. PANSY HENLEY,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Relator, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
No. SC89614 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
THE HONORABLE JAMES R. BICKEL, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent.  
) 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
James and Connie Graves (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a negligence lawsuit 
against Donald Henley (“Donald”) and Pansy Henley (“Pansy”) arising out of an 
automobile accident.  Donald was driving, and Pansy was a passenger.  The claim against 
Pansy is based upon the theory of joint venture or respondeat superior.  Pansy filed a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, but the 
circuit court overruled the motion.   
 
Pansy seeks prohibition pursuant to Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 4.  This Court issued a 
preliminary writ, which is now made absolute as modified.  The mere allegation of a 
husband and wife relationship, joint ownership of an automobile, and operation of the 
automobile by one spouse with the other spouse as a passenger for a purpose consistent 
with everyday activities of a marriage is not sufficient to establish a “realistic right of 
control” by the passenger spouse for liability under either joint venture or master servant 
theories.    
II.  
A. Standard of Review 
 
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief can be 
granted attacks the plaintiff's pleadings and the following standard of review applies: 
 
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is solely a test of the 
 
adequacy of the plaintiff's petition.  It assumes that all of plaintiff's averments are 
 
true, and liberally grants to plaintiff all reasonable inferences therefrom.  No 
 
attempt is made to weigh any facts alleged as to whether they are credible or 
 
persuasive.  Instead, the petition is reviewed in an almost academic manner, to 
 
determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action, or 
 
of a cause that might be adopted in that case. 
 
Bosch v. St. Louis Healthcare Network, 41 S.W.3d 462, 464 (Mo. banc 2001); Nazeri v. 
Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Mo. banc 1993).  In order to withstand 
the motion, the petition must invoke “substantive principles of law entitling plaintiff to 
relief and … ultimate facts informing the defendant of that which plaintiff will attempt to 
establish at trial.”  Dolan, 256 S.W.3d at 82 (citations omitted).  
B. Writ of Prohibition 
 
Prohibition is a discretionary writ that may be issued to prevent an abuse of 
judicial discretion, to avoid irreparable harm to a party, or to prevent the exercise of 
extra-jurisdictional authority.  State ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Dolan, 256 S.W.3d 77, 81 
(Mo. banc 2008).  In Dolan, the Court held that “[i]n the context of a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a cause of action, it has long been held that ‘where a petition reveals 
 
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that the pleader has not stated and cannot state a cause of action of which the circuit court 
would have jurisdiction, then prohibition will lie.’”  Id. at 81 (citation omitted).  Of 
particular relevance here is this Court’s statement that “prohibition will lie if plaintiff’s 
petition ‘does not state a viable theory of recovery, and relator was entitled to be 
dismissed from the suit as a matter of law.’”  Id. at 81 (quoting State ex rel. Barthelette v. 
Sanders, 756 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Mo. banc 1988)).  See also Adkisson v. Dir. of Revenue, 
891 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Mo. banc 1995) (citing Commercial Bank of St. Louis County v. 
James, 658 S.W.2d 17, 21 (Mo. banc 1983)).  
 
Traditionally, the Court has discussed writs of prohibition in jurisdictional 
language.  This Court’s recent decision of J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 
249 (Mo. banc 2009), attempts to refine the concepts of jurisdiction and authority in a 
practical way.  However, use of a writ in a motion to dismiss context does not depend 
upon jurisdictional analysis.  “This Court has repeatedly held that ‘prohibition may be 
appropriate to prevent unnecessary, inconvenient, and expensive litigation.’”  State ex rel. 
Coca-Cola Co. v. Nixon, 249 S.W.3d 855, 860 (Mo. banc 2008) (quoting State ex rel. 
Union Planters Bank, N.A. v. Kendrick, 142 S.W.3d 729, 735) (Mo. banc 2004)); State ex 
rel. Litnthicum v. Calvin, 57 S.W.3d 855, 857 (Mo. banc 2001); see also State ex rel. Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 106 S.W.3d 483, 486 (Mo. banc 2003).  If a party cannot 
state facts sufficient to justify court action or relief, it is fundamentally unjust to force 
another to suffer the considerable expense and inconvenience of litigation.  It is also a 
waste of judicial resources and taxpayer money.   
 
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Discovery provides no remedy as there is nothing pleaded upon which to focus 
any search for evidence.  Summary judgment likewise provides no remedy because it 
focuses upon whether evidence exists to support well-pleaded facts, not the absence of 
pleaded facts altogether.     
 
Where the federal courts now use discovery to identify the facts upon which the 
 
plaintiff's claim rests, such has always been the role of pleadings in Missouri.  
 
Finally, where the federal courts rely on summary judgment procedures to dispose 
 
of baseless claims, such continues to be the role of motions to dismiss in Missouri. 
 
ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp.  854 S.W.2d 371, 
380 (Mo. banc 1993) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).   
 
In sum, to allow a suit to proceed, without meeting the most minimal level of fact 
pleading, is a waste to the system and an unjust expense to the parties that cannot be 
repaired on appeal and is subject to a writ for abuse of judicial discretion to avoid 
irreparable harm and prevent unnecessary litigation and expense.   
III. Facts  
 
The underlying facts relevant to this Court’s determination are found in the 
language of Plaintiffs’ amended petition, which states, in part:   
 
4.  At all relevant times Defendant Donald E. Henley and Pansy Henley were 
 
husband and wife and joint owners of a 2006 Toyota Camry … 
 
 
5.  Defendant Donald E. Henley and Pansy Henley were engaged in a joint venture 
 
and/or joint journey at the time of the collision which gives rise to this cause of 
 
action such that both defendants are jointly and severally responsible for the 
 
negligence of defendant Donald E. Henley.  Defendant Pansy Henley was a 
 
passenger in the 2006 Toyota Camry at the time of the collision and, as such, was 
 
entitled to right of control over the operation of the vehicle.  
 
 
6.  At all times relevant, Defendant Donald E. Henley was the agent of Defendant 
 
Pansy Henley and was acting within the course and scope of said agency so as to 
 
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make Defendant Pansy Henley vicariously liable for Defendant Donald E.
 
Henley’s negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior.  
 
 
… 
 
 
8.  On or about November 8, 2006, at approximately 6:10 p.m., Plaintiff James L. 
 
Graves was operating a 1998 Honda Motorcycle westbound on U.S. Highway 160 
 
approximately four miles west of Lockwood, Missouri, in Dade County. 
 
 
9.  At that time, Plaintiff Connie Graves was a passenger riding on the motorcycle 
 
operated by her husband, Plaintiff James Graves.   
 
 
10.  At the same time, Defendant Donald E. Henley was operating a 2006 Toyota 
 
Camry southbound on Route D in Dade County.  Defendant Pansy Henley was a 
 
passenger in the Toyota Camry being driven by Defendant Donald E. Henley.   
 
 
11.  On the above mentioned date and time, Defendant Donald E. Henley and 
 
Pansy Henley were moving personal belongings from their home in Jerico 
 
Springs to a new home in Joplin.  
 
 
12.  On the above mentioned date and time, Defendant Donald E. Henley 
 
approached a stop sign at which point Route D intersects with U.S. Highway 160.   
 
 
13.  As Plaintiffs approached the intersection of Route D and U.S. Highway 160, 
 
Defendant Donald E. Henley violated the stop sign controlling traffic from his 
 
direction, and pulled his vehicle into the intersection directly into the path of 
 
Plaintiffs’ motorcycle. 
 
 
14.  A collision ensued between Plaintiffs’ motorcycle and the Henley vehicle, 
 
resulting in the personal injuries and damages set forth below.  
 
 
In her motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, Pansy argued that Plaintiffs’ amended petition failed to allege an element 
necessary to plead joint venture or master servant liability under Missouri law; that Pansy 
had a “right of control” over the vehicle.  The trial court overruled the motion.  Pansy 
now seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent Plaintiffs from proceeding with the lawsuit.     
IV. Analysis 
 
 
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A. Joint Venture 
 
 
Generally, to state a claim against defendants as a joint venture, plaintiff’s petition 
must allege the following:   
 
(1) an agreement, express or implied, among the members of the group; (2) a 
 
common purpose to be carried out by the group; (3) a community of pecuniary 
 
interest in that purpose, among the members; and (4) an equal right to a voice in 
 
the direction of the enterprise, which gives an equal right of control.   
 
Manley v. Horton, 414 S.W.2d 254, 260 (Mo. banc 1967) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS sec. 491); See also Mitchem v. Gabbert, 31 S.W.3d 538, 541 
(Mo. App. 2000) (citing McSorley v. Hauck 883 S.W.2d 562, 566 (Mo. App. 1994)).   
 
However, a more restrictive approach is applied in cases involving a husband and 
wife.  In the context of an automobile accident involving a vehicle that is jointly owned 
by husband and wife, this Court has held that the “[m]ere existence of the husband and 
wife relationship does not cause negligence of one spouse to be imputed to the other.”  
Stover v. Patrick, 459 S.W.2d 393, 398 (Mo. banc 1970).  “Trips for some family purpose 
or mutual pleasure have been held not to result in imputing negligence of the husband-
driver to his passenger-wife.”  Id.  Furthermore, this Court held that:  
 
[C]o-ownership of an automobile does not give a realistic right of control over its 
 
movement to a passenger-owner and that absent evidence of other facts which 
 
establish a basis for imposing liability on the passenger-wife for acts of her driver-
 
husband, the negligence of the latter should not be imputed to the former, merely 
 
because of joint-ownership of the vehicle. 
 
Id. at 401.  (emphasis added).  
 
The concept of “realistic right of control” is not expressly defined in Stover.  The 
Court noted:   
 
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As indicated in the foregoing quotation from Hamilton v. Slover, the basis in most 
 
cases for imputing negligence of the owner-driver to the passenger co-owner is the 
 
existence of an alleged equal right of possession and control.  The question we 
 
must decide is whether such presumed right is actually realistic.  Plaintiffs' brief 
 
states it thus: “How much true control, or right of control, did she have as she sat 
 
in the front seat of that car and the Patrick car came into view?  From a practical 
 
standpoint, she had none.  Her husband's hands steered the course of the car, 
 
shifted gears and turned off the ignition.  It was his foot which applied the brakes. 
 
She gave him no direction, and if she had, it would have been unavailing.” 
 
Id. at 399.  It would appear that the Stover “realistic right of control” test requires a 
practical showing of an actual ability to control the driver, beyond a showing of 
theoretical right of control over the vehicle via ownership.        
 
The plain language contained in paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs’ amended petition 
alleges that Pansy had a right of control over the vehicle by way of the fact that she was a 
passenger-owner.  It is clear from this Court’s decision in Stover that Plaintiffs must 
allege more.  See Bach v. Winfield-Foley Fire Protection District, 257 S.W.3d 605, 609 
(Mo. banc 2008).  Paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs’ amended petition is also insufficient as it 
merely alleges that Pansy and Donald were involved in a trip for some family purpose.  
Again, Plaintiffs are required to plead facts establishing a “realistic right of control.”  
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ petition does not adequately plead the necessary facts to state a 
claim for joint venture.    
B. Master-Servant 
 
“In order to establish a principal/agent relationship between [Pansy and Donald], 
the principal must have a ‘right to control.’”  Bach v. Winfield-Foley Fire Protection 
District, 257 S.W.3d 605, 608 (Mo. banc 2008); Gardner v. Simmons, 370 S.W.2d 359, 
362 (Mo. 1963).  Under the laws of agency, the principal does not need to control or 
 
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direct every movement of the agent, only that necessary to the accomplishment of the 
final result.  Bach, 257 S.W.3d at 610.   
 
Again, however, there is a more restrictive approach applied in cases involving a 
husband and wife. 
 
As a general proposition of law, the wife, lacking the right to control her husband's 
 
actions, and he being in no sense of the law her servant or agent, is merely to be 
 
regarded as her husband's guest when riding with him in an automobile which he 
 
is driving, and his negligence, if any, in the operation of the automobile is 
 
therefore not to be imputed to her. 
 
McAuliffe v. Vondera, 494 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Mo. App. 1973). 
 
Paragraph 6 of the amended petition states that, at the time of the accident, Donald 
was acting as Pansy’s agent but it fails to provide any facts to support the allegation more 
than that a husband-wife relationship exists between Pansy and Donald.  This is 
insufficient to establish that Pansy had a “realistic right of control” over the operation of 
the vehicle.  Plaintiffs’ petition does not adequately plead the necessary facts to state a 
claim for master-servant in a husband and wife situation.     
V. Conclusion 
 
The facts pleaded do not meet the elements of a recognized cause of action.  
Accordingly, this Court makes absolute its preliminary writ as modified.  The Plaintiffs 
are to be allowed to amend their petition to state a proper cause of action, or, absent such 
amendment, their petition shall be dismissed.  
 
__________________________ 
William Ray Price, Jr., Judge 
 
 
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 Stith, C.J., Russell, Wolff and Breckenridge, JJ., concur; Fischer, J., dissents in separate 
opinion filed; Teitelman, J., concurs in opinion of Fischer, J.  
 
     
            
 
 
 
 
  
 
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SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STATE ex rel. PANSY HENLEY, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Relator, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
No. SC89614 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
THE HONORABLE JAMES R. BICKEL, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondent.  
) 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
 
The procedural posture of this case does not justify the issuance of an 
extraordinary writ and, therefore, on that basis alone, I dissent.   
 
Article V, section 4.1, of the Missouri Constitution provides: 
The supreme court shall have general superintending control over all courts 
….  The supreme court … may issue and determine original remedial writs. 
… 
 
 
Historically, the issuance of an extraordinary writ of prohibition has been very 
limited.  "Prohibition will lie only where necessary to prevent a usurpation of judicial 
power, to remedy an excess of jurisdiction, or to prevent an absolute irreparable harm to a 
party."  State ex rel. Director of Revenue v. Gaertner, 32 S.W.3d 564, 566 (Mo. banc 
2000). 
Even if this Court granted a preliminary writ, it seriously considered in each case 
whether it should exercise its discretionary authority to make permanent the preliminary 
writ of prohibition.   Derfelt v. Yocum, 692 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. banc 1985). 
A writ of prohibition does not issue as a matter of right.  State ex rel. 
Hannah v. Seier, 654 S.W.2d 894, 895 (Mo. banc 1983).  Whether a writ 
should issue in a particular case is a question left to the sound discretion of 
the court to which application has been made.  Id.   
 
 
Because this extraordinary legal remedy provides litigants with 
abundant opportunity to circumvent the normal appellate process, we are 
mindful that courts should employ the writ judiciously and with great 
restraint.  A court should only exercise its discretionary authority to issue 
this extraordinary remedy when the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case demonstrate unequivocally that there exists an extreme 
necessity for preventive action.  Absent such conditions, the court should 
decline to act. 
 
 
The petition for writ of prohibition was filed while this case was still in the 
discovery phase and was prompted because the trial court overruled a motion to dismiss 
the amended petition.   
Had the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, then the plaintiffs would have 
had the remedy to appeal the judgment to the court of appeals.  Bosch v. St. Louis 
Healthcare Network, 41 S.W.3d 462, 464 (Mo. banc 2001); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley 
College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Mo. banc 1993).  The routine procedure when a trial court 
overrules a motion to dismiss is for the defendant to file a motion for summary judgment 
on completion of the discovery phase.  The purpose for filing a motion for summary 
 
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judgment is to resolve cases when there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
resolution depends solely on questions of law.  Rule 74.04. 
 
The principal opinion relies on State ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Dolan, 256 S.W.3d 
77 (Mo. banc 2008), for the proposition that it is proper to grant a writ of prohibition if 
the appellate court desires to overrule a trial court for failing to grant a motion to dismiss.  
That case holds "the failure to state a cause of action is a jurisdictional defect because 
there is no subject matter on which the court can take jurisdiction."  Id. at 82.   
 
J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249 (Mo. banc 2009), made clear 
that prior cases labeling mere error to be "jurisdictional" no longer should be followed as 
there were only two types of jurisdiction in Missouri state courts: personal jurisdiction, 
which refers to the power of the court to require a person to respond to a legal 
proceeding, and subject matter jurisdiction, which refers to the court's authority to render 
a judgment in a  particular category of cases.  "[S]ubject matter jurisdiction of Missouri's 
courts is governed directly by the state's constitution.  Article V, section 14 sets forth the 
subject matter jurisdiction of Missouri's circuit courts in plenary terms, providing that 
'[t]he circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction over all cases and matters, civil and 
criminal.'"  Id. at 253. 
 
Applying these pronouncements to this case makes simple the task of determining 
jurisdiction.  The circuit court had authority to hear this case and rule on the motion to 
dismiss.  The circuit court also has power to render a judgment that binds the parties, as 
neither contests personal jurisdiction.  If the trial court was wrong in not sustaining the 
motion to dismiss, it was mere error subject to appeal after final judgment. 
 
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I agree with this Court's recent efforts to restrict the use of the word "jurisdiction" 
to what it originally meant.  My thought was that what would follow was some 
curtailment of the issuance of remedial writs and that this Court would only exercise its 
constitutionally granted superintending control over the trial courts when "necessary to 
prevent usurpation of judicial power, to remedy excess of jurisdiction, or to prevent 
irreparable harm to a party."  State ex rel. Director of Revenue v. Gaertner, 32 S.W.3d at 
566. 
 
Unable to categorize the trial court's overruling of a motion to dismiss as a 
usurpation of judicial power, in excess of jurisdiction, or necessary to prevent irreparable 
harm, the principal opinion justifies the issuance of a writ of prohibition solely "to 
prevent unnecessary, inconvenient, and expensive litigation."  Slip op. at 3. 
 
I am skeptical that this case, which most likely would have been resolved by a 
motion for summary judgment at the trial court level had a writ not been issued, would 
have cost the parties more litigation expense than the writ proceedings in this Court.  I am 
also skeptical of the statement in the principal opinion that this case would have caused 
more of a waste of judicial resources and taxpayer money than if this Court would have 
just let the case be resolved by a summary judgment motion. 
 
Regardless of that skepticism, the argument that the issuance of a writ is going to 
save litigation cost holds no water in this case because the parties agree, and defense 
counsel, who represents both husband and wife, admitted during oral argument, the case 
is going to trial against the husband even if the wife dismissed as a defendant from the 
action. 
 
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None of the cases cited for the proposition that prohibition may be appropriate to 
prevent unnecessary, inconvenient, and expensive litigation involves the overruling of a 
motion to dismiss.  State ex rel. Linthicum v. Calvin, 57 S.W.3d 855, 857 (Mo. banc 
2001), involves the issue of venue, and State ex rel. Coca-Cola Co. v. Nixon, 249 S.W.3d 
855, 860 (Mo. banc 2008); State ex rel. Union Planters Bank, N.A. v. Kendrick, 142 
S.W.3d 729, 735 (Mo. banc 2004); and State ex rel. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Clark, 106 S.W.3d 483, 486 (Mo. banc 2003), involve the issue of class certification.  
The issuance of the remedial writs in those cases was appropriate because there was 
arguably no adequate remedy by appeal.  Such is not the case here.   
My position is that the writ procedures are not a substitute for the appellate 
process.  "[A] writ will not issue in a case where a direct appeal is available …."  State ex 
rel. Hilburn v. Staeden, 62 S.W.3d 58, 61 (Mo. banc 2001). 
 
Historically, this Court's case decisions regarding the remedial writ of prohibition 
used the word "extraordinary" for good reason.  There is nothing "extraordinary" about a 
trial judge overruling a motion to dismiss.  Even assuming the principal opinion correctly 
resolves the legal issues presented, this case may have been resolved by our normal civil 
procedures, including filing a motion for summary judgment.  Rule 74.04.  
 
There is no dispute that the trial court in this case had subject matter jurisdiction to 
overrule the motion to dismiss.  There is nothing about this case that could not have been 
adequately remedied by our normal rules of procedure.  The issuance of the writ of 
 
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prohibition in this case lacks judicial restraint and serves to circumvent not only our 
normal appellate process, but our normal process at the trial court level, as well.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
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