Case Title: Thomas J. Awen v.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP002520-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2520-D 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against 
Thomas J. Awen,  
Attorney at Law. 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST AWEN 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 20, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
No.  96-2520-D 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2520-D 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against THOMAS J. AWEN, Attorney at Law. 
FILED 
 
JUNE 20, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
Attorney 
disciplinary 
proceeding. 
 
Attorney’s 
license 
suspended. 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report and recommendation 
of the referee that the license of Thomas J. Awen to practice 
law in Wisconsin be suspended for 90 days as discipline for 
professional misconduct. 
That 
misconduct consisted of his 
charging unreasonable fees and engaging in dishonesty, deceit 
and misrepresentation in his billings to the State Public 
Defender (SPD) for services in matters to which it had appointed 
him. The seriousness and extent of that misconduct would warrant 
discipline 
substantially 
more 
severe 
than 
the 
suspension 
recommended by the referee or the six-month license suspension 
sought by the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility 
(Board) in this proceeding were it not for the presence of 
mitigating factors to which the referee gave great weight. We 
accept the referee’s assessment of those factors in mitigation 
 
 
No.  96-2520-D 
 
 
2 
of the severity of discipline warranted and impose the license 
suspension recommended.  
¶2 
Attorney 
Awen 
was 
admitted 
to 
practice 
law 
in 
Wisconsin in 1988 and practices in Waukesha. He has not been the 
subject of a prior disciplinary proceeding. The referee, 
Attorney Michael Ash, made the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law based on the stipulation of the parties and evidence 
presented at the disciplinary hearing.  
¶3 
Following his admission to the practice of law, 
Attorney Awen spent much of his time on appointments from the 
State Public Defender to represent indigent criminal defendants. 
A review conducted by the Board of his bills, records and time 
sheets relating to SPD work in hundreds of cases between July, 
1991 and July, 1993 disclosed that Attorney Awen billed and was 
paid for a substantial number of hours of work that either had 
not been performed or had been mischaracterized. For example, in 
numerous cases he at times billed in excess of 24 hours for a 
day’s work; he billed time for court appearances when court 
records did not show that a hearing was held or indicated that a 
hearing was held but for a shorter period of time than claimed; 
he billed several cases for the same hours he spent waiting in 
court; he regularly billed more than 18 hours per day for work 
on numerous cases.  
¶4 
Regarding the matter of his billing of hours spent 
waiting for court appearances, a judicial court commissioner of 
the circuit court for Milwaukee county testified at the 
disciplinary hearing concerning his prior experience serving as 
SPD-appointed counsel in that county. He described the waiting 
 
 
No.  96-2520-D 
 
 
3 
time for cases to be called as “horrendous.” It was customary 
practice that numerous matters, including trials, would be 
scheduled for hearing at the same time at the beginning of the 
morning and at the beginning of the afternoon, but rarely did 
those matters commence at the time scheduled. Consequently, it 
was not unusual that lawyers would have to wait several hours 
for their case or cases to be called.  
¶5 
The court commissioner testified that until late 1993 
the written policies and instructions the SPD issued to 
appointed counsel, which were revised periodically, did not 
address attorney in-court waiting time, other than expressly to 
permit it to be billed as “court time,” at a higher rate than 
“out-of-court time.” It was his testimony that during 1991 many 
lawyers acting in SPD-appointed matters in Milwaukee and 
Waukesha counties believed it was permissible under some 
circumstances to double or triple bill for court waiting time if 
the lawyer was waiting for more than one case scheduled for a 
particular time. It was not until November, 1993, that a 
revision of the policies expressly limited the billing of 
waiting time to only one case and prohibited double billing.  
¶6 
Testimony at the disciplinary hearing also established 
that under SPD policies in effect during the relevant period, it 
was proper for an appointed attorney to bill the SPD for routine 
court appearances made by a lawyer other than the one appointed 
to the case. However, that substitution was done only in non-
substantive matters when the appointed lawyer was unable to 
appear, and the substitute lawyer had to be certified by the 
SPD. In such cases, the appointed lawyer would bill the SPD for 
 
 
No.  96-2520-D 
 
 
4 
the time and, after the SPD made payment, then would pay the 
substitute lawyer who had made the appearance.  
¶7 
Regarding 
his 
specific 
billings, 
Attorney 
Awen 
testified 
that 
his 
appearances 
at 
probation 
and 
parole 
revocation hearings before an administrative law judge would not 
be reflected in the court record. As a result, it appeared that 
he had billed for “court hearings” that were not substantiated 
by the court record. He also testified that in instances when he 
claimed eight hours’ time for a jury trial but court records 
indicated that the trial did not last that long, he had included 
in his calculation the time for pre-trial and post-trial 
conferences and waiting time as “court time.” Also, some of his 
apparently excessive or duplicate billings for jail interview 
time or court time reflected the double billing which was then 
somewhat common practice. Other apparently excessive billings 
were accounted for as appearances made on a client’s behalf by a 
colleague, for which Attorney Awen billed the time pursuant to 
the SPD-approved practice. On several occasions he inadvertently 
billed the same time for the same case on two separate vouchers 
submitted to the SPD, but the SPD detected and corrected the 
errors in the supplemental vouchers.  
¶8 
When he learned that the SPD was going to conduct an 
audit of his invoices for all of his SPD work, including the 
two-year period considered in this proceeding, Attorney Awen 
sought to resolve any problems without litigation. While he was 
attempting to do so, the SPD commenced a civil action against 
him. That action was settled by Attorney Awen’s agreement to 
make restitution in the amount of $99,672, of which he has made 
 
 
No.  96-2520-D 
 
 
5 
partial payment and continues to be obligated to make periodic 
payments through March 1, 2000.  
¶9 
The referee concluded, as the parties had stipulated, 
that Attorney Awen’s billing practices violated SCR 20:8.4(c),1, 
which proscribes conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation, and constituted charging unreasonable fees, 
in violation of SCR 20:1.5(a),2. In addition to the 90-day 
                     
1 SCR 20:8.4 provides, in pertinent part: Misconduct 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:  
. . . 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation; 
2 SCR 20:1.5 provides, in pertinent part: Fees 
(a) A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be 
considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include 
the following:  
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty 
of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the 
legal service properly; 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the 
acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other 
employment by the lawyer;  
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar 
legal services; 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the 
circumstances;  
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship 
with the client;  
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer 
or lawyers performing the services; and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
 
 
No.  96-2520-D 
 
 
6 
license suspension as discipline for that misconduct, the 
referee recommended 
that 
reinstatement 
of 
Attorney 
Awen’s 
license be conditioned on his continuing to make the stipulated 
restitution payments. Finally, the referee recommended that 
Attorney Awen be required to pay the costs of this proceeding.  
¶10 In making that recommendation for discipline, the 
referee considered several factors as mitigating the seriousness 
of Attorney Awen’s misconduct and the severity of discipline to 
be imposed for it. During the period relevant to this proceeding 
–- July, 1991 to July, 1993 -– Attorney Awen was a salaried 
associate of a law firm, and the payment for his SPD work did 
not go directly to him but was paid to the law firm. Thus, he 
did not benefit directly from the fees he charged. Also, his 
time keeping and invoicing practices were “sloppy and careless.” 
He did not monitor closely the revisions in SPD policies, did 
not total his daily time records, and did not customarily record 
his time contemporaneously or even on a daily basis. Also, he 
did not review closely the invoices and vouchers he had his 
office staff send to the SPD for payment.  
¶11 In his report, the referee distinguished this case 
from Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kravat, 193 Wis. 2d 152, 
532 N.W.2d 454 (1995), in which the court revoked the license of 
an attorney for similar professional misconduct, on the basis of 
the mitigating factors presented here. The referee was impressed 
particularly 
with 
Attorney 
Awen’s 
prompt 
acceptance 
of 
responsibility for his conduct and his demonstrated, sincere 
remorse for it.  
 
 
No.  96-2520-D 
 
 
7 
¶12 We adopt the referee’s findings of fact and conclusion 
of law concerning Attorney Awen’s professional misconduct and 
determine that the recommended 90-day license suspension is 
appropriate discipline to impose for it under the circumstances 
presented. 
Further, 
we 
accept 
the 
referee’s 
recommended 
condition and direct that in order for his license to practice 
law to be reinstated following completion of the period of 
suspension, 
Attorney 
Awen 
must 
establish 
that 
he 
is 
in 
compliance with the terms of the restitution agreement by which 
the SPD’s civil action was settled. We also order that Attorney 
Awen pay the costs of this proceeding.  
¶13 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Thomas J. Awen to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 90 days, 
commencing August 4, 1997.  
¶14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Thomas J. Awen pay to the Board of Attorneys 
Professional Responsibility 
the costs 
of this 
proceeding, 
provided that if the costs are not paid within the time 
specified and absent a showing to this court of his inability to 
pay the costs within that time, the license of Thomas J. Awen to 
practice law in Wisconsin shall remain suspended until further 
order of the court.  
¶15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Thomas J. Awen comply with 
the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person 
whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.  
 
 
 
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