Case Title: Commonwealth v. Dustin

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12036

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12036 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DONALD DUSTIN. 
 
 
November 23, 2016. 
 
 
Assault and Battery.  Words, "Substantive dating relationship." 
 
 
 
After a jury trial, the defendant, Donald Dustin, was 
convicted in the Marlborough Division of the District Court 
Department of assault and battery on a family or household 
member, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a).1  We granted the 
defendant's application for direct appellate review to consider 
the "substantive dating relationship" element of § 13M (a).2  We 
affirm. 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of reckless operation of 
a motor vehicle, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24.  He makes no 
argument with respect to this conviction, and we do not consider 
it.  The jury returned a verdict of not guilty of a charge of 
strangulation, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15D (b). 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Tyrone 
Stampley.  We decline, however, to address the argument put 
forth in the amicus brief that G. L. c. 265, § 13M, is 
unconstitutionally vague.  "An amicus may not argue issues not 
raised by the parties."  Robinson v. State Ballot Law Comm'n, 
432 Mass. 145, 147 n.4 (2000).  See generally C.O. v. M.M., 442 
Mass. 648, 650 (2004) (considering same statutory language in 
context of G. L. c. 209A; "[b]ecause [G. L. c. 209A] enumerates 
four factors to be considered in determining the existence of a 
'substantive dating relationship,' there is sufficient language 
in the statute to enable [fact finders] to make informed and 
consistent determinations"). 
2 
 
 
 
1.  Timing of the defendant's motion.  The defendant did 
not make a timely motion at the close of the Commonwealth's case 
for a required finding of not guilty with respect to the assault 
and battery charge.3  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (a), as amended, 
420 Mass. 1502 (1995).  See also Commonwealth v. Brown, 449 
Mass. 747, 762 (2007).  Had he done so, we would have considered 
only the evidence admitted during the Commonwealth's case-in-
chief to decide "whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient 
evidence of the defendant's guilt to submit the case to the 
jury."4  Commonwealth v. Platt, 440 Mass. 396, 400 (2003).  See 
Brown, supra; Commonwealth v. Berry, 431 Mass. 326, 331-332 
(2000).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass. 53, 69 n.15 
(2009) (motion for required finding filed "after the 
Commonwealth has rested and before the defense was invited to 
present evidence" must be ruled on at that time).  Instead, we 
consider whether the evidence during the entire trial, including 
the evidence presented during the defendant's case, was 
sufficient to sustain the conviction. 
 
 
2.  Factual background.  A detailed description of the 
events of August 28, 2014, which gave rise to the criminal 
charges, is unnecessary to this appeal.  It suffices to say that 
                                                          
 
 
3 The defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence of a "substantive dating relationship" was first made 
after the Commonwealth had rested and after the defendant had 
called his first witness, the witness had completed his 
testimony, and he had been excused.  Unless a defendant moves 
for a required finding after the Commonwealth rests its case and 
before he begins his own, his rights are not fixed at that point 
for purposes of evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (a), as amended, 420 Mass. 1502 (1995).  
The defendant has not raised, in this direct appeal from his 
conviction, any claim of ineffectiveness of his counsel at 
trial. 
 
 
4 The point is of substantial significance here, because 
both the defendant and Stacey Rock testified about the nature of 
their relationship, essentially filling any gap in the 
Commonwealth's case. 
5 General Laws c. 209A, § 1 (e), 
instructs courts to consider the following factors when 
determining whether a "substantive dating" relationship exists 
for purposes of c. 209A:  "(1) the length of time of the 
relationship; (2) the type of relationship; (3) the frequency of 
interaction between the parties; and (4) if the relationship has 
been terminated by either person, the length of time elapsed 
since the termination of the relationship." 
3 
 
 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see 
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979), there 
was evidence at trial that the defendant and Stacey D. Rock  
were in a parked vehicle when a witness observed an altercation 
between the two of them.  After they were confronted by the 
witness, the defendant drove off at a high rate of speed and he 
was stopped a short time later for various motor vehicle 
infractions.  A police officer testified that when he asked the 
defendant why he had been driving "that way," the defendant 
replied, "something to the nature of that he was pissed off 
because he had just got in a fight with his girlfriend and that 
he knew he was driving like an idiot."  The defendant indicated 
to the officer that Rock was his girl friend.  This was the 
state of the evidence when the Commonwealth rested its case. 
 
 
The defendant testified in his own defense, and Rock 
testified as well.  Rock said that she had met the defendant 
several months before the incident.  They developed a 
friendship; the relationship evolved as "boyfriend-girlfriend"; 
and they began dating.  Although they were exclusive to one 
another, they did not live together.  Rock testified that they 
"got along beautifully.  Great friends."  The defendant agreed 
that they had a "[f]riendship at first and then boyfriend-
girlfriend," and he described the relationship as "awesome," 
"great," and "probably the best."  Rock acknowledged that their 
dating ("boyfriend-girlfriend") relationship did not end 
immediately after the incident. 
 
 
There also was other evidence about the defendant's 
relationship with Rock.  The defendant had cared for Rock while 
she was recovering from a medical issue; he "nursed her back" to 
health.  He also drove her motor vehicle.  On the day in 
question, they spent "a good part of the day" together, first at 
her home, and then doing errands.  The altercation for which the 
defendant was charged was, according to the defendant, brought 
on by Rock accidentally calling him by her former boy friend's 
name.  Rock also insisted, both to the witness and to the police 
officer, that there was no problem between her and the 
defendant, and "beg[ged] them" not to arrest the defendant. 
 
 
3.  Discussion.  The defendant claims that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a conviction under G. L. c. 265, § 13M.  
Subsection (a) of the statute provides: 
 
"Whoever commits an assault or assault and battery on a 
family or household member shall be punished . . . ." 
 
4 
 
 
Subsection (c) of § 13M provides: 
 
"'family or household member' shall mean persons who (i) 
are or were married to one another, (ii) have a child in 
common regardless of whether they have ever married or 
lived together or (iii) are or have been in a substantive 
dating or engagement relationship." 
 
Only the last definition is at issue in this case. 
 
 
Because the defendant did not make a timely motion for a 
required finding at the close of the Commonwealth's case, we 
consider whether the evidence during the entire trial: 
 
"viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, is 
sufficient so that the [fact finder] 'might properly draw 
inferences, not too remote in the ordinary course of 
events, or forbidden by any rule of law, and conclude upon 
all the established circumstances and warranted inferences 
that the guilt of the defendant was proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'" 
 
Commonwealth v. McGovern, 397 Mass. 863, 868 (1986), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Chappee, 397 Mass. 508, 519 (1986).  The only 
issue on appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to permit 
an inference that Rock was a "family or household member," on 
the ground that she and the defendant "are or have been in a 
substantive dating . . . relationship."  G. L. c. 265, § 13M (c) 
(iii).  The statute further instructs that: 
 
"the trier of fact shall determine whether a relationship 
is substantive by considering the following factors:  the 
length of time of the relationship; the type of 
relationship; the frequency of interaction between the 
parties; whether the relationship was terminated by either 
person; and the length of time elapsed since the 
termination of the relationship." 
 
Id.  These factors are essentially identical to the factors set 
forth in G. L. c. 209A to determine whether a "substantive 
dating relationship" exists for purposes of that statute, which 
authorizes a person involved in a "substantive dating 
relationship" to obtain a civil abuse prevention order.  See 
G. L. c. 209A, § 1.5  See also E.C.O. v. Compton, 464 Mass. 558, 
                                                          
 
 
5 General Laws c. 209A, § 1 (e), instructs courts to 
consider the following factors when determining whether a 
5 
 
 
564 (2013); Ginsberg v. Blacker, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 142 
(2006) ("conduct proscribed as abuse 'closely approximates the 
common-law description of assault'" [citation omitted]).  In 
determining the sufficiency of the evidence of a "substantive 
dating relationship" under G. L. c. 265, § 13M (c), and in 
otherwise interpreting and applying that statue, we therefore 
are guided by cases arising under c. 209A. 
 
 
As we said in C.O. v. M.M. 442 Mass. 648, 650-651 (2004), 
with respect to c. 209A: 
 
"[b]ecause the statute enumerates four factors to be 
considered in determining the existence of a 'substantive 
dating relationship,' there is sufficient language in the 
statute to enable judges to make informed and consistent 
determinations.  We need not add to this language by 
interpretation." 
 
That is no less true under c. 265, § 13M, even though the 
Commonwealth must prove the existence of such a relationship 
beyond a reasonable doubt under that statute.6  Both statutes 
identify the prohibited conduct and require the fact finder "to 
adjudge the existence of substantive relationships by 
considering [the enumerated] factors."  E.C.O., 464 Mass. at 
564.  These factors provide "explicit standards" both to 
ascertain culpability and to allow a person to conform his or 
her conduct accordingly (citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. 
Hendricks, 452 Mass. 97, 102 (2008).  See also C.O., 442 Mass. 
at 654-656 (vacating abuse prevention order where judge failed 
to consider statutory factors and improperly relied on other 
considerations); Brossard v. West Roxbury Div. of the Dist. 
Court Dep't, 417 Mass. 183, 184-185 (1994) (sufficient evidence 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
"substantive dating" relationship exists for purposes of 
c. 209A:  "(1) the length of time of the relationship; (2) the 
type of relationship; (3) the frequency of interaction between 
the parties; and (4) if the relationship has been terminated by 
either person, the length of time elapsed since the termination 
of the relationship." 
 
 
6 The statutes share a similar legislative purpose.  "The 
Legislature enacted G. L. c. 209A in 1978 to address the problem 
of domestic violence."  C.O., 442 Mass. at 651, citing St. 1978, 
c. 447, § 2.  Similarly, G. L. c. 265, § 13M, was enacted "to 
establish a specific penalty for perpetrators of domestic 
abuse."  St. 2008, c. 534 (preamble). 
 
6 
 
 
of "substantive dating relationship" for purposes of G. L. 
c. 209A, where defendant referenced victim as his "former girl 
friend" in other c. 209A proceedings, and alleged that he saw 
her two or three times per week, even though she was living with 
another man).7 
 
 
In this case, the evidence was sufficient to permit the 
jury to find that Rock and the defendant were involved in a 
"substantive dating relationship" on August 28, 2014.  Both 
testified that they had been involved in the relationship for 
several months, and that it had developed into an exclusive 
"boyfriend-girlfriend" relationship.  They described their 
relationship as "good" or "great."  Among other things, the 
defendant took care of Rock when she had a medical condition; 
she allowed him to drive her vehicle; and they participated in 
daily activities together, such as running errands.  The 
defendant had recently given Rock a "friendship ring."  See 
Brossard, 417 Mass. at 184-185 (sufficient evidence to establish 
"substantive dating relationship where defendant referred to 
victim as his "former girlfriend"; saw her "two to three times a 
week"; and correspondence "reveal[ed] an emotional relationship 
which entailed substantially more than a few casual dates").8 
 
 
Conclusion.  The evidence warranted a finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was involved in a 
"substantive dating relationship" with the person he was charged 
with assaulting, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13M (c), and 
therefore that conviction is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
 
7 The factors enumerated in the proviso of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13M (c), are not themselves elements of the offense.  There 
does not need to be evidence as to each factor, let alone proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt as to any one or more of them.  They 
are simply the legislative criteria that the fact finder must 
consider in determining whether the "substantive dating 
relationship" element has been proved.  It is enough that the 
evidence on these factors, taken as a whole, warrants a finding 
of a substantive dating relationship beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
 
8 The fact that there was less evidence on the "frequency of 
interaction" between the defendant and Rock, and more evidence 
as to "the length of time of [their] relationship" and "the type 
of relationship," is not dispositive.  See note 7, supra.  The 
evidence, taken as a whole, was sufficient to warrant the 
requisite finding of a substantive dating relationship. 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
Michael A. Waryasz for the defendant. 
 
Melissa Weisgold Johnsen, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Max Bauer, for Tyrone Stampley, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief.