Case Title: Cochran v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49, 2007

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DONALD R. COCHRAN, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 49, 2007 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0102010757 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: April 4, 2007 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: May 17, 2007 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 17th day of May 2007, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a),1 it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Donald R. Cochran, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s January 22, 2007 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.2  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment 
                                                 
1 The Court also has considered the appellant’s response to the motion to affirm, which 
was filed on April 4, 2007 with the Court’s permission.  Supr. Ct. R. 25(a) (iii). 
2 The Superior Court adopted the commissioner’s report and recommendation.  Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 10, § 512(b) (1); Super. Ct. Cr. R. 62(a) (5).   
 
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of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the 
opening brief that the appeal is without merit.3  We agree and AFFIRM. 
 
(2) 
In February 2003, Cochran entered Robinson pleas4 to charges 
of Burglary in the First Degree, Assault in the First Degree, and Possession 
of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony.  On the burglary 
conviction, he was sentenced to 20 years incarceration at Level V, to be 
suspended after 6 years for decreasing levels of supervision.  He was 
sentenced to 10 years of Level V incarceration and to 2 years of Level V 
incarceration on the assault and weapon convictions, respectively.  This 
Court dismissed Cochran’s direct appeal as untimely.5   
 
(3) 
In February 2006, Cochran moved for postconviction relief in 
the Superior Court.  The Superior Court denied the motion on the grounds 
that the claims were procedurally barred6 and that Cochran had failed to 
demonstrate that his counsel provided ineffective assistance.7 
 
(4) 
In this appeal, Cochran claims that: a) the Superior Court 
lacked jurisdiction over him due to a violation of the extradition laws; b) the 
Superior Court improperly failed to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine 
his competency to stand trial; c) the Superior Court failed to consider the 
                                                 
3 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(b). 
5 Cochran v. State, Del. Supr., No. 356, 2003, Veasey, C.J. (Nov. 12, 2003). 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3). 
7 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
 
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mitigating evidence in his favor; d) his counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to raise those issues; e) his counsel’s Rule 61 affidavit 
failed to respond to one of his allegations of ineffective assistance; f) the 
Superior Court and his counsel failed to give him correct information 
concerning the maximum sentence he was facing; and g) the Superior Court 
erred by adopting the commissioner’s report and recommendation rather 
than engaging in its own fact-finding.    
 
(5) 
Cochran’s first three claims were properly denied by the 
Superior Court as procedurally barred because they were not raised on direct 
appeal and Cochran failed to demonstrate cause for relief from the 
procedural default and prejudice from a violation of his rights.8  Moreover, 
Cochran entered Robinson pleas to the charges against him, but presented no 
evidence that those pleas were involuntary.  As such, Cochran waived any 
allegations of errors or defects occurring prior to the entry of the pleas.9   
 
(6) 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance in the 
context of a plea, Cochran must demonstrate that, but for his counsel’s 
professional errors, he would not have entered the plea, but would have 
                                                 
8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3) (A) and (B); Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 555-56 
(1990). 
9 Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003). 
 
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insisted on proceeding to trial.10  In the absence of any such evidence, the 
Superior Court properly denied that claim as well.   
 
(7) 
Cochran’s next claim is that his postconviction motion should 
have been granted because his counsel’s Rule 61 affidavit failed to respond 
to one of his allegations of ineffective assistance.  In the absence of any 
evidence that a deficiency in Cochran’s counsel’s affidavit prevented the 
Superior Court from fully and fairly adjudicating Cochran’s postconviction 
motion, we conclude that this claim is without merit.  Cochran’s claim that 
the Superior Court and his counsel failed to present him with correct 
information concerning the maximum sentence he was facing was not 
presented to the Superior Court in the first instance and, therefore, may not 
be considered in this appeal.11   
 
(8) 
Cochran’s final claim is that the Superior Court should have 
engaged in its own fact-finding rather than relying on the commissioner’s 
report and recommendation.  There is no legal support for this proposition.  
The Superior Court is authorized to refer a matter to a commissioner for a 
report and recommendation.12  There is no evidence that the Superior Court 
                                                 
10 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 
11 Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
12 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 512(b) (1); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a) (5). 
 
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acted in a manner contrary to its authority in this case.  We, therefore, find 
this claim, too, to be without merit.  
 
 
(9) 
It is manifest on the face of Cochran’s opening brief that this 
appeal is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled 
by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is 
implicated, there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 On April 27, 2007, after he had filed his response to the motion to affirm, Cochran 
filed a motion for the appointment of counsel.  That motion is untimely.  Even if it had 
been timely, there is no constitutional right to counsel in collateral attacks on convictions.  
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).  Although this Court has the 
discretionary authority to appoint counsel in such cases, we find no compelling reason to 
justify the appointment of counsel in this case.  Supr. Ct. R. 26(b).  The motion is, 
therefore, denied.