Case Title: People v. Turner

Citation: 

Docket Number: S154459

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2020-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
CHESTER DEWAYNE TURNER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S154459 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BA273283 
 
 
November 30, 2020 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, Groban, and Gilbert* concurred. 
 
 
 
*  
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
S154459 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
Over the course of nearly 12 years, a serial killer raped 
and murdered women in high crime areas of Los Angeles.  Police 
identified defendant Chester Dewayne Turner as a suspect in 
2003, when his DNA was found to match DNA left on the victims 
in several unsolved cases.  Convicted of murdering ten women 
and one viable fetus, he was sentenced to death.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 187, subd. (a).)1  This automatic appeal primarily challenges 
the admission of statistical evidence about the significance of 
the DNA matches and hearsay testimony about the fetus’s 
viability.  The hearsay claim has merit and warrants reversal of 
the fetal murder conviction.  The judgment is affirmed in all 
other respects. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase 
 
1. 
Figueroa Corridor Murders 
 
Between 1987 and 1996, the bodies of eight women were 
found in the Figueroa Corridor of Los Angeles, an area beset by 
crime, including prostitution and narcotics activity.  Defendant 
 
1  
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 
otherwise stated.  Defendant was convicted of second degree 
murder for the fetus, but all other murders were in the first 
degree.  The jury also found true special circumstance 
allegations of multiple murder and, as to one of the victims, 
murder in the course of a rape.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (17).)  
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
lived at various addresses in the Figueroa Corridor during this 
period.  All of the victims had been sexually assaulted and 
strangled to death, sometimes by ligature and sometimes 
manually.  All had a history of drug abuse, and all but one had 
cocaine in their systems.  Some were homeless; some were 
thought to be mentally ill; and some had arrests for prostitution. 
 
 a. 
1987 to 1989 
 
The body of 21-year-old Diane Johnson was found on 
March 9, 1987, in a construction area six blocks from 
defendant’s home.  Drag marks led to her body, which was nude 
from the waist down.  She had been strangled.   
 
Annette Ernest, age 26, was found just three blocks away 
on October 29, 1987.  She lay face down with her pants lowered.  
There was a possible ligature mark on her neck and a bite on 
one breast.  The cause of death was strangulation.   
 
On January 20, 1989, a young boy discovered the body of 
31-year-old Anita Fishman in an alley less than two blocks from 
defendant’s home.  Her pants were partially down and the body 
was beginning to decompose.  She died of manual strangulation.   
 
Regina Washington was 27 years old and visibly pregnant 
when she was killed.  Her body was found on September 23, 
1989, lying on a mattress in a burnt-out garage about 14 blocks 
from defendant’s home.  Although she was clothed, her pants 
were unfastened and her shirt pulled up.  A black coaxial cable 
was wrapped around her throat and attached to an electrical box 
on a nearby wall.  She died of ligature strangulation with signs 
of a struggle.  Washington’s female fetus weighed 825 grams 
with a gestational age of 27 to 28 weeks.  That weight and age 
were considered viable under World Health Organization 
guidelines.  Despite her mother’s cocaine use, the fetus had no 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
congenital abnormalities and appeared to be developing 
normally.  She died from lack of oxygen due to her mother’s 
strangulation.2 
 
 b. 
1993 to 1996 
 
On April 2, 1993, 29-year-old Andrea Tripplett was found 
dead behind an abandoned house 22 blocks from defendant’s 
residence and only two blocks from her own home.  Her skirt 
was pushed up and she was naked below the waist.  She was 
around five months pregnant when she was manually strangled 
to death.  At 305 grams, the fetus was not yet viable.  
 
Deserae Jones, who sometimes went by Tracy Williams, 
was also 29 years old and killed by manual strangulation.  Her 
body was found on May 16, 1993 in the trash-filled yard of a 
burned, boarded-up house within 30 blocks of defendant’s 
address.  She was unclothed below the waist.  
 
On February 12, 1995, Natalie Price’s body was found 
approximately five blocks from defendant’s home, next to an 
empty house where people gathered to smoke narcotics.  Her bra 
was pushed up around her neck and her pants were pulled 
down.  She had been strangled and struck on the head.  She was 
39 years old when she died.  
 
Mildred Beasley, age 45, was on her way to her sister’s 
house when she disappeared.  Her body was found on November 
6, 1996 on a trash-strewn embankment of the 110 Freeway 
about 18 blocks from defendant’s home.  The area was 
 
2  
These details as to fetal age and condition were taken from 
an autopsy report and conveyed by a pathologist who did not 
perform the procedure.  We discuss their erroneous admission 
post, at pages 38 to 46. 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
frequented by transients and known for drug activity.  She had 
been strangled to death and left naked below the waist, with her 
upper garments pulled up.  Insect activity indicated the body 
had begun to decompose.  
 
2. 
Downtown/Skid Row Murders in 1998 
 
Two additional murder victims were found under similar 
circumstances near downtown Los Angeles in 1998.  During that 
year, defendant lived downtown at the Regal Hotel on 6th 
Street.  
 
Paula Vance, age 41, was found dead on February 3, 1998.  
Her body lay next to an abandoned building near 6th and Hope 
Street, about 14 blocks from defendant’s residence.  Her upper 
garments were pulled up, her nylons and underwear pulled 
down.  She had been strangled, and there were signs of sexual 
assault.  A surveillance camera at the scene recorded her 
entering the alleyway with a man, who grabbed her around the 
neck until she fell to the ground.  Vance was the only murder 
victim without cocaine in her system.  Evidence showed that she 
was homeless and suffered from mental illness.  
 
On April 6, 1998, the body of 37-year-old Brenda Bries was 
found in a portable toilet on South Gladys Avenue and 5th 
Street, just 50 yards from defendant’s residence.  She was 
slumped with her head on the seat, pants around her knees, and 
shirt pulled around her neck.  A fabric cord, intertwined with 
her bra, was wrapped around her neck.  She died from ligature 
strangulation and showed signs of a struggle.  
 
3. 
Investigation 
 
Crime scene investigators compiled and stored sexual 
assault kits for all victims. 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
 
 a. 
2002 Rape of Maria M. 
 
In March 2002, defendant raped Maria M., a 47-year-old 
homeless woman who worked as a prostitute and sold drugs.  
She knew defendant from the Midnight Mission, a shelter they 
both frequented.  As she walked alone near the shelter one 
night, defendant asked to borrow her lighter, which he used to 
smoke cocaine.  Instead of returning the lighter, defendant 
grabbed Maria in a chokehold and dragged her behind some 
dumpsters, where he raped and sodomized her, ejaculating in 
the process.  He threatened to kill her if he was arrested.  
 
Maria immediately went to a police station, but after being 
kept waiting for some time she felt ignored and left.  The next 
morning, she reported the assault to Midnight Mission 
employees and the police.  Defendant attempted to flee but was 
arrested at the shelter.  Evidence for a sexual assault kit was 
collected at a hospital.  Defendant ultimately pled no contest to 
rape by force or fear and unlawful penetration.  (§§ 261, 
subd. (a)(2), 289, subd. (a)(1).) 
 
 b. 
DNA Identification of Defendant 
 
 
 
 
i. 
General Evidence 
 
Gary Sims, a director of the Department of Justice DNA 
Laboratory, testified as an expert on forensic DNA analysis.  
Chromosomes found in cell nuclei contain DNA, which is the 
same in all cells of a person’s body.  The vast majority of human 
DNA is the same, coding basic traits all people share.  At some 
chromosomal regions, however, the DNA is highly variable.  
Forensic DNA analysis studies these areas of variation.  The 
specific site being studied is called a “locus.”  “Allele” describes 
the alternative forms of genetic material at a particular locus.  
Each locus has two alleles, one inherited from each parent.  
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
Current forensic testing focuses on loci with sections of DNA 
that repeat a variable number of times, known as short tandem 
repeats or STRs.  Different people have different numbers of the 
repeating sequence at these sites.  DNA testing compares the 
alleles at these sites to see if they are the same or different.  As 
the science of DNA analysis developed, more loci with variable 
STRs could be tested.  At the time of defendant’s trial, analysts 
could study DNA variation at 13 different loci.  Sims explained 
that DNA analysis is a powerful tool in determining “the 
probability of identity,” which is the likelihood that two people 
chosen at random will have the same DNA sequences at the 
areas tested.   
 
Once DNA is extracted from biological material left at a 
crime scene, the STR regions are amplified.  Analysts determine 
the number of STR repeats for alleles present at each of the 13 
loci, producing a “profile” for the evidence sample.  Biological 
material is then obtained from a suspect to create a DNA profile.  
When the two profiles are compared, a match is declared if the 
alleles at all loci are the same.  The significance of a match 
depends on how common the particular DNA profile is in the 
population.  Sims explained that population databases have 
been developed to determine how frequently particular alleles 
are found in each major ethnic group.  After the allele 
frequencies are determined at each locus, the frequencies are 
multiplied together to determine the rarity of the overall profile.  
This number, called the random match probability, reflects the 
probability that DNA from a randomly chosen person would 
match the evidence profile.  
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
ii. 
Case-specific Evidence 
 
On July 3, 2002, defendant gave cheek swabs for DNA 
testing in connection with Maria’s assault.  The Los Angeles 
Police Department (LAPD) DNA Unit prepared defendant’s 
DNA profile from this reference sample.  His profile matched the 
DNA in sperm cells recovered during Maria’s examination.  
 
Investigators later compared defendant’s profile with 
DNA samples from unsolved crimes.3  Defendant’s profile 
matched DNA left on all of the victims here.  A private forensic 
laboratory, Orchid Cellmark (Cellmark), retested the evidence 
and independently confirmed LAPD’s findings.  Specifically, the 
laboratories found as follows. 
 
Sperm cell DNA matching defendant’s profile was 
recovered from anal and vaginal swabs from Diane Johnson.  In 
the Anita Fishman, Regina Washington, Andrea Tripplett, 
Natalie Price, Mildred Beasley, Paula Vance, and Brenda Bries 
cases, DNA from sperm cells in vaginal swabs matched 
defendant’s profile.  Occasionally these samples included some 
“carryover” DNA from the victim’s epithelial cells, but there 
were no other sperm cell contributors.  Cellmark also found 
DNA with defendant’s profile in external genital swabs from 
Price, Beasley, Vance, and Bries, and in the anal swabs for 
Beasley and Bries.  In the Annette Ernest and Deserae Jones 
cases, sperm cell DNA recovered from the external genital area 
matched defendant’s profile.  Cellmark also found DNA with 
defendant’s profile in nipple and anal swabs in the Ernest case 
and in oral and anal swabs in the Jones case.  Some external 
 
3  
The profile used in this analysis was obtained from a blood 
sample defendant submitted after his rape conviction.  (See 
§ 1202.1, subd. (a).)  
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
genital samples included DNA from unknown individuals, but 
in all such cases defendant was the primary contributor.  Each 
unknown DNA profile appeared in only one victim.  Defendant’s 
DNA profile alone recurred in all of the victims.  
 
Both laboratories declared a match when DNA sequences 
were the same at all 13 sites examined.  LAPD’s DNA Unit 
determined the probability of this match occurring at random 
was one in one quintillion.  Cellmark calculated the probability 
of a random match within the Black population group as one in 
6.725 quintillion.  A quintillion is rendered as a one followed by 
18 zeroes.  
 
4. 
Defense Case 
 
A third forensics laboratory analyzed the DNA evidence 
for the defense.  Unlike the other two laboratories, Technical 
Associates (TA) used the Y-STR test, which isolates male DNA 
by studying sites on the Y chromosome.  Because it examines 
only male lineage, the Y-STR test is less powerful than other 
tests, producing random match probabilities of one in thousands 
versus one in quadrillions.  It is useful, however, when the 
amount of male DNA in a sample is comparatively small.   
 
TA tested samples from all of the victims except Anita 
Fishman, examining 12 loci on the Y chromosome.  Defendant 
was considered identified when his DNA profile matched most, 
if not all, of the 12 loci in the sample DNA.  Rather than 
describing a correspondence between defendant’s profile and the 
sample as a “match,” the TA criminalist preferred to state that 
defendant could not be excluded as the source of DNA in the 
sample.  Because genes examined by the Y-STR test are less rare 
than those in other tests, it was possible another male’s profile 
could overlap defendant’s at some sites.   
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
 
TA found DNA consistent with defendant’s profile in 
samples from each of the victims studied.  Specifically, DNA 
consistent with defendant’s was found:  in the nipple and 
vaginal swabs from Diane Johnson; in the nipple, vaginal, and 
anal swabs from Annette Ernest; in the external genital swab 
from Regina Washington; in the anal swab from Andrea 
Tripplett; in the nipple and anal swabs from Deserae Jones; in 
the external genital, nipple, and anal swabs from Natalie Price; 
in the nipple and anal swabs from Mildred Beasley; in the 
external genital and nipple swabs from Paula Vance; and in the 
external genital swab from Brenda Bries.  The Y-STR test 
detected male DNA from unknown contributors in several of the 
samples.  No DNA profile other than defendant’s repeated from 
victim to victim.  
 
The defense expert testified that sperm cells deposited in 
the vagina are typically expelled within one to two days from a 
living woman.  After death, however, bodily processes slow down 
the expulsion.  Sperm cells could remain as long as two weeks 
postmortem.  Sperm found in a female who had been deceased 
for a day could have been deposited three or four days earlier.  
Even if defendant’s DNA profile was detected at a higher 
concentration than unknown profiles, the finding did not mean 
defendant was necessarily the last person to deposit DNA.  
 
The parties stipulated that the defense requested 
discovery of DNA test results for all clothing booked into 
evidence and that neither side conducted such testing.  
B. Penalty Phase 
 
1. 
Aggravating Evidence 
 
The prosecution presented victim impact evidence relating 
to seven victims.  The jury heard from Annette Ernest’s mother, 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
Andrea Tripplett’s mother, Anita Fishman’s mother and 
younger sister, Deserae Jones’s mother and niece, Regina 
Washington’s daughter, Natalie Price’s daughter, and Mildred 
Beasley’s younger sister and niece.  They described the families’ 
sorrow at losing their loved ones and their anguish at having the 
cases remain unsolved for so many years. 
 
Most of the aggravating evidence concerned defendant’s 
violent conduct in four unrelated incidents:  murder, sexual 
assault, felony resisting arrest, and threatening a sheriff’s 
deputy while awaiting trial on the current charges.  The 
prosecution also presented evidence of defendant’s conviction for 
the attack on Maria M.  
 
 a. 
Murder of Elandra Bunn 
 
In June 1987, less than three months after Diane 
Johnson’s murder, Elandra Bunn was killed in the Figueroa 
Corridor.  Her body had been left in an alley near 88th Street 
and Figueroa.  Her pants had been pulled down to her ankles.  
She had “massive facial trauma” and multiple abrasions.  The 
injuries were consistent with her face being pushed or dragged 
across a rough surface.  She died of strangulation, likely 
manual.  Bunn had a history of cocaine abuse, and the drug was 
found in her system.  She was in the early stages of pregnancy.   
 
Crime scene investigators compiled a sexual assault kit.  
Although it was destroyed in 1996, some evidence was retained, 
including a bloody tissue found four or five feet from the body.  
DNA obtained from the tissue matched defendant’s profile, with 
a random match probability of one in one quintillion.  
 
 b. 
Sexual Assault of Carla W. 
 
After midnight in October 1996, 22-year-old Carla W. was 
walking alone in downtown Los Angeles.  A man grabbed her by 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
the arm and crotch.  He tried to pull her into a nearby alley but 
she struggled and screamed.  When a patrol car drove by, he 
fled.  Later that night, Carla identified defendant as her 
attacker and did so again in court.  
 
 c. 
Resisting Arrest 
 
In March 1997, the police tried to interview defendant 
about a possible parole violation.  When two officers came to his 
motel room, defendant answered the door but refused to put his 
hands behind his head for a weapons check.  Officers attempted 
to handcuff him but he ran, dragging the officers 10 to 20 yards 
down a hallway and into the parking lot.  Kicking one officer 
several times in the chest and leg, he tried to grab the officer’s 
gun, then broke free and fled.  When a search dog alerted near 
a woodpile, the officers ordered defendant to emerge.  He rose 
from his hiding place then hit the search dog with a nearby 
fiberglass sink.  The dog bit him in response.  Defendant ran at 
the officers, charging ahead even after being struck with six 
rounds from a beanbag shotgun.  Following another violent 
struggle, defendant was finally taken into custody.  
 
 d. 
Threatening a Deputy 
 
In May 2006, while in county jail awaiting trial, defendant 
confronted Deputy Natalie Uyetatsu, the only female deputy 
assigned to his area.  Angry because Uyetatsu had put him on 
lockdown, defendant told another inmate he would kill Uyetatsu 
if he was found guilty of the pending charges.  The inmate 
thought the threat was serious because defendant seemed to 
hate women.  
 
2. 
Mitigating Evidence 
 
Defendant’s mother, Audrey Turner, described his 
upbringing.  She raised defendant alone from the time he was a 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
year old.  She worked full time while a friend watched her son.  
They moved from Arkansas to California when defendant was 
four.  He was a fun-loving child but struggled in school, often 
getting into trouble.  Defendant went to live with his father in 
Arkansas but returned after a year.  His father provided no 
financial or emotional support.   
 
When defendant was 14, Ms. Turner had a second son, 
Anthony.  Soon thereafter she began working a second job.  
Friends helped with babysitting until Ms. Turner’s father 
arrived to help in 1984.  Defendant eventually dropped out of 
high school and worked as a pizza delivery driver.  When he was 
17, his mother insisted he leave the home due to his drinking 
and drug use, but she let him return while he recovered from a 
gunshot injury.  During that time, defendant treated his mother 
well.  He helped her with her cleaning job and cooked and 
cleaned for the family.   
 
In 1991, Ms. Turner moved to Salt Lake City.  Anthony 
stayed behind to finish the school year, then joined his mother.  
Each summer, Anthony stayed in California with defendant, 
who was his primary caretaker.  Defendant warned his brother 
to stay in school and keep out of trouble.   
 
Defendant had four children who loved him.  He was 
unable to support them because he was often in custody.  His 
mother helped raise the children in Salt Lake City.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Pretrial Issues 
 
1. 
DNA Issues 
 
The court denied defendant’s pretrial motion under People 
v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 (Kelly) to exclude evidence about the 
DNA matches and their statistical significance.  Defendant now 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
makes two related arguments concerning this ruling.  First, he 
contends the court erred in admitting random match probability 
numbers because this statistic is not a generally accepted 
measure of significance in “cold hit”4 DNA cases.  (See Kelly, at 
p. 30.)  Building on this argument, defendant next asserts that 
insufficient evidence supports the guilt verdicts because the jury 
heard no evidence of the rarity of his DNA profile.  The first 
argument was rejected in People v. Nelson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 
1242 (Nelson).  Defendant does not persuade us that Nelson was 
wrongly decided.  Defendant’s second argument fails because, as 
Nelson and other cases have explained, random match 
probability is an expression of a DNA profile’s rarity in the 
population.  Because the jury was given this statistic, it was able 
to evaluate the probative value of the DNA matches in 
determining his guilt. 
 
 a. 
Background 
 
“Forensic DNA analysis is a comparison of a person’s 
genetic structure with crime scene samples to determine 
whether the person’s structure matches that of the crime scene 
sample such that the person could have donated the sample.”  
 
4  
A “cold hit case,” sometimes called a “trawl case,” 
colloquially refers to a case in which “the DNA match itself made 
the defendant a suspect, and the match was discovered only by 
searching through a database of previously obtained DNA 
samples.”  (Donnelly & Friedman, DNA Database Searches and 
the Legal Consumption of Scientific Evidence (1999) 97 Mich. 
L.Rev. 931, 932.)  Cold hit cases may be contrasted with 
traditional “confirmation cases,” in which other types of 
evidence pointed to the defendant as a suspect and warranted 
testing his DNA against crime scene samples.  (Ibid.; see Kaye, 
Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: A Legal and Logical Analysis 
of DNA Trawling Cases (2009) 87 N.C. L.Rev. 425, 428 (Kaye).) 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
(Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1257–1258.)  As discussed, 
scientists examine specific loci that are highly variable among 
individuals.  A match is declared when DNA sequences in the 
samples being compared are identical at all loci.  Here, 
prosecution experts found matches between defendant’s DNA 
and crime scene DNA for each victim at 13 different loci.  
Defendant does not dispute the accuracy of this part of the 
analysis. 
 
“Once a match is found, the next question is the statistical 
significance of the match.”  (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
p. 1258.)  This number helps the jury evaluate how much weight 
it should give to evidence of a match.  A match would be of little 
significance if the genetic profile were shared by many others in 
the population.  (People v. Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 82 
(Venegas).)  The concept is frequently explained in terms of “how 
unlikely it is that the crime scene samples came from a third 
party who had the same DNA pattern as the suspect.”  (People 
v. Barney (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 798, 809 (Barney).)  In other 
words, the question is:  “Given that the suspect’s known sample 
has satisfied the ‘match criteria,’ what is the probability that a 
person chosen at random from the relevant population would 
likewise have a DNA profile matching that of the evidentiary 
sample?”  (People v. Soto (1999) 21 Cal.4th 512, 523 (Soto).)  The 
smaller the odds that a match could be found at random in the 
relevant population, the greater the evidentiary weight of a 
suspect’s match.  (Venegas, at p. 82.)  
 
“Experts use a statistical method called the ‘product rule’ 
to calculate the rarity of the sample in the relevant population.”  
(Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1259.)  We have discussed this 
calculation in detail previously and need only summarize it 
here.  In short, examiners first determine the frequency of 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
alleles at each locus using population databases, then multiply 
the frequencies of all loci together, generating a statistic that 
reflects the probability that an individual will have the complete 
profile across all loci studied.  (Ibid.; Soto, supra, 21 Cal.4th at 
p. 525.)  As in other cases involving a match across many loci, 
application of the product rule here produced “astronomical 
odds” (Nelson, at p. 1259):  one in one quintillion according to 
the LAPD expert, and one in 6.725 quintillion according to the 
Cellmark expert.  Earth’s total population at the time of trial 
was around six and a half billion people. 
 
Under the Kelly test, when expert testimony relies on “ ‘a 
new scientific technique,’ ” the proponent must establish “that 
the technique is ‘ “sufficiently established to have gained 
general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs” ’ 
(quoting Frye [v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1923)] 293 F. [1013,] 
1014, italics omitted).”  (Venegas, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 76; see 
Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30.)  Reliability need not be 
relitigated in every case.  “[O]nce a trial court has admitted 
evidence based upon a new scientific technique, and that 
decision is affirmed on appeal by a published appellate decision, 
the precedent so established may control subsequent trials, at 
least until new evidence is presented reflecting a change in the 
attitude of the scientific community.”  (Kelly, at p. 32.) 
 
We have considered whether evidence calculated by the 
product rule satisfies Kelly’s reliability requirement in several 
cases.  Venegas held that a modified version of the product rule 
known as the interim ceiling principle was “ ‘artificially 
conservative,’ ” yet it was a generally accepted method for 
calculating the significance of a DNA match while also 
compensating for any possible effect caused by population 
substructuring.  (Venegas, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 89; see 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
Barney, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 814–816.)5  Soto determined 
concerns about population substructuring had been laid to rest 
by later scientific developments and held that use of the 
unmodified product rule is generally accepted in the relevant 
scientific community as a means of expressing the significance 
of a DNA match.  (Soto, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 515–516.)  Most 
recently, Nelson held that the admissibility of evidence based on 
the product rule in a cold hit case “is a question of relevance, not 
scientific acceptance,” thus obviating the need for a Kelly 
inquiry.  (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1260.)  We further held 
that the product rule provides relevant and admissible evidence 
in cold hit cases.  (Ibid.) 
 
 b. 
Admissibility of Random Match 
Statistics  
 
Defendant was initially identified as a suspect based on 
cold hits in the state’s database of convicted offenders.6  
 
5  
In the early days of forensic DNA analysis, population 
geneticists were concerned that nonrandom mating within 
subgroups would undermine the product rule’s assumption that 
alleles at different loci were statistically independent.  (See 
Barney, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 815.) 
6  
No information about the database search was presented 
at trial.  In an early court appearance, the prosecutor explained 
how defendant was identified.  When DNA samples preserved 
from various unsolved cases were uploaded to the state’s 
offender database, defendant’s profile was found to match crime 
scene evidence in the Beasley and Vance cases.  After learning 
of the matches, investigators identified approximately 25 
unsolved murder cases with preserved biological evidence that 
appeared to be sexually motivated killings of women in the 
geographic region where defendant “either lived, worked[,] or 
was known to associate.”  DNA evidence from these cases was 
then uploaded to the database, and eight more matches were 
made to defendant’s profile.  The Attorney General argues this 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
Renewing the arguments we rejected in Nelson, he claims the 
random match probability statistic generated by the product 
rule does not accurately convey the significance of a DNA match 
derived from searching an offender database.  He also disputes 
the relevance of this statistic in the cold hit context.  Because 
defendant insists Nelson was wrongly decided, we discuss that 
case in some detail. 
 
Nelson was identified as a suspect when DNA evidence 
from a 26-year-old murder was uploaded to the state’s offender 
database.  (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1248–1249.)  
Further testing confirmed the database match.  (Id. at p. 1249.)  
At Nelson’s trial, the prosecution expert testified that the 15-loci 
match profile would occur at random in only one in 950 sextillion 
African-Americans, one in 130 septillion Caucasians, or one in 
930 sextillion Hispanics.  (Ibid.)7  Challenging these statistics, 
Nelson conceded the product rule is a generally accepted method 
for calculating the odds of a random match when a suspect’s 
DNA is compared to crime scene evidence.  (See Soto, supra, 21 
Cal.4th at p. 541.)  But he argued scientists disagree as to 
whether the method is an appropriate way to assess the 
significance of a match when the suspect is not identified at 
random but is instead found through a database search.  
 
is not a pure cold hit case because the second database search 
was conducted after other evidence pointed to defendant as a 
suspect.  Even so, we address defendant’s arguments because it 
is clear the initial identification was based exclusively on a 
database match.  
7 
The LAPD DNA Unit did not report random match 
probabilities broken down by racial population subgroups.  
Defendant does not argue this omission was error, nor does he 
contend the distinction alters Nelson’s force as precedent here. 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
(Nelson, at pp. 1259–1260.)  Defendant makes the same 
argument here. 
 
The challenges are premised on the idea that reported 
statistics should avoid “ ‘ascertainment bias,’ ” which can result 
when repeated testing of a hypothesis imbues a particular result 
with more significance than it warrants.  (Kaye, supra, 87 N.C. 
L.Rev. at p. 454.)  For example, while the odds of winning a 
lottery are very small, a winner will likely be found if everyone 
who actually bought a lottery ticket is considered.  (See 4 
Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and 
Science of Expert Testimony (2019–2020 ed.) § 30:20)  “The 
probability [of winning], while remote, is not impossible, and 
looking in a pool of people, rather than just picking a person at 
random, affects the likelihood that you will find what you are 
looking for.”  (Ibid.)  Ascertainment bias also describes “the bias 
that exists when one searches for something rare in a set 
database.”  (U.S. v. Jenkins (D.C. 2005) 887 A.2d 1013, 1018–
1019 (Jenkins).)8  In the DNA context, for example, “if the 
frequency of a given profile is expected to occur in 1 out of every 
100,000 people, the chances of finding a match increase if one 
searches a database with 50,000 entries versus a database with 
only 10 entries.”  (Jenkins, at p. 1018, fn. 8.) 
 
Four methods have been proposed for expressing the 
statistical significance of a match following a database search.  
Only three need be considered here.9  One method, the random 
 
8  
While the Jenkins opinion is not binding precedent, we 
find its analysis persuasive and its explanations of these 
complex concepts helpful. 
9  
One proposal is not a statistical calculation but a different 
approach to testing.  The first National Research Council report 
on forensic DNA analysis suggested ascertainment bias could be 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
match probability statistic, is calculated by the unmodified 
product rule, which calculates the rarity of a match in the 
population.  (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1261; see Soto, 
supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 515–516.)  An alternative proposal 
begins with the rarity of the profile in the general population, 
the statistic generated by the product rule, then multiplies that 
number by the number of profiles in the database searched.  
(Nat. Research Council, DNA Technology in Forensic Science 
(1996) pp. 134–135.)  The result reflects the probability of 
finding a match in a particular database and is frequently called 
the database match probability.  (See Nelson, at p. 1262; 
Jenkins, supra, 887 A.2d at p. 1020.)  By definition, it will 
always be a larger number than the rarity statistic alone, and 
thus more favorable to the defendant.  The last approach, often 
called the Balding-Donnelly or Bayesian method, differs from 
the others in its premise that a database match is more 
significant than a confirmatory match.  This model reasons that 
a database search not only identifies a match but also 
“simultaneously eliminates other profiles as being the source of 
 
avoided by using one set of loci to identify a suspect in a 
database and then examining a different set of loci to confirm 
the match.  (Nat. Research Council, DNA Technology in 
Forensic Science (1992) p. 124.)  Because this approach would 
use fewer loci than actually matched in determining 
significance, product rule calculations would result in shorter, 
perhaps “unnecessarily conservative,” odds.  (Nelson, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at p. 1261.)  Defendant does not challenge Nelson’s 
observation that this approach “ ‘is no longer accepted or 
followed by the relevant scientific community.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1262, 
quoting Jenkins, supra, 887 A.2d at p. 1022, fn. 17.) 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
the sample,” thus increasing the likelihood the identified person 
is the actual source.  (Jenkins, at p. 1020.)10 
 
After reviewing these different approaches, Nelson 
observed that while there was “some disagreement among 
experts as to which of these methods is the best, i.e., the most 
probative, way to judge the significance of a cold hit” from a 
database search, “the question before us is not what technique 
is ‘best,’ but whether use of the product rule in a cold hit case is 
permissible.”  (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1263.)  The 
product rule had already been approved as a reliable method for 
calculating the rarity of a DNA profile in the relevant population 
(see Soto, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 515–516), and we observed 
that the rule’s use in a cold hit case did not convert it into a new 
scientific technique requiring further Kelly scrutiny.  (Nelson, at 
pp. 1263–1264.)  On the contrary, the real questions here 
 
10  
Professor Kaye illustrates this reasoning by contrasting a 
database trawl with a hypothetical drug company that conducts 
20 clinical trials and achieves success in only one, but then 
reports that one success “as if there had been no search.”  (Kaye, 
supra, 87 N.C. L.Rev. at p. 469.)  In the drug trial context, “the 
omitted information contradicts the company’s claim of 
therapeutic effectiveness.  In contrast, if all the other clinical 
trials were consistent with the company’s claim, the failure to 
mention them would not prejudice the case for approving the 
drug.  The trawl case is similar to a series of successful clinical 
trials . . . .  The additional evidence — that everyone else in the 
database is excluded — is consistent with the claim of 
defendant’s guilt.  The lack of other hits in the database trawl 
therefore has an effect opposite to that of the lack of other 
significant differences in the clinical trials.  It supplies 
compatible rather than contradictory data.”  (Ibid., italics 
added.)  According to this reasoning, ascertainment bias is not 
a problem that needs correction in database search cases.  (Id. 
at pp. 469–472.) 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
concern relevance, not the reliability of methodology.  (Id. at 
p. 1264.)  As the Jenkins court explained:  “At the heart of this 
debate is a disagreement over the competing questions to be 
asked, not the methodologies used to answer those questions.  
The rarity statistic, the database match probability, and the 
Bayesian approach each answer unique and potentially relevant 
questions.  More importantly, there is no controversy in the 
relevant scientific community as to the accuracy of the various 
formulas.  In other words, the math that underlies the 
calculations is not being questioned.  Each approach to 
expressing significance of a cold hit DNA match accurately 
answers the question it seeks to address.  The rarity statistic 
accurately expresses how rare a genetic profile is in a given 
society.  Database match probability accurately expresses the 
probability of obtaining a cold hit from a search of a particular 
database.  Bayesian analysis accurately expresses the 
probability that the person identified through the cold hit is the 
actual source of the DNA in light of the fact that a known 
quantity of potential suspects was eliminated through the 
database search.  These competing schools of thought do not 
question or challenge the validity of the computations and 
mathematics relied upon by the others.  Instead, the arguments 
raised by each of the proponents simply state that their 
formulation is more probative, not more correct.  Thus, the 
debate . . . is one of relevancy, not methodology . . . .” (Jenkins, 
supra, 887 A.2d at pp. 1022–1023, fn. omitted, italics added; see 
Nelson, at p. 1264.) 
 
Relevant evidence is that “having any tendency in reason 
to prove or disprove any disputed fact.”  (Evid. Code, § 210.)  
Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise 
provided by statute.  (Evid. Code, § 351.)  If admitted, the trier 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
of fact determines the weight it gives to that evidence.  Two 
sources of relevant evidence may potentially conflict or lead to 
opposite conclusions.  Evidence may be relevant but found 
unpersuasive.  A jury hearing competing relevant evidence will 
ultimately have to determine what weight, if any, to give each.  
“Relevance” describes whether evidence should be heard 
because it might reasonably resolve a dispute.  “Weight” 
describes the degree to which the jury finds the evidence 
probative. 
 
“Relevancy is a legal issue for courts to answer.”  (Nelson, 
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1265.)  While deference to scientists is 
appropriate on scientific questions, determining the relevance of 
evidence “ ‘is a hallmark responsibility of the trial judge and 
that responsibility is not appropriately delegated to parties 
outside the court.’  (Jenkins, supra, 887 A.2d at p. 1025.)”  (Id. 
at p. 1265.)  Nelson concluded the statistical rarity of the DNA 
profile, calculated by the product rule, is relevant in cold hit 
cases.  (Id. at p. 1267.)  We see no basis to depart from that 
conclusion.  To be sure, a defendant remains free to present 
evidence that the product rule statistic should be given less 
weight because some experts have concerns about its persuasive 
value due to ascertainment bias.  But defendant did not attempt 
to do so here, nor did he offer evidence of an alternative measure 
of statistical significance, such as database match probability.11 
 
11  
Nelson left open the possibility that database match 
probability might also be admissible in an appropriate case.  
(Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1267, fn. 3.)  Defendants may 
indeed seek to introduce such evidence, particularly in cases 
where the database searched was especially large.  As with the 
other measures of statistical significance, the trial court may, of 
course, consider an Evidence Code section 352 objection that the 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
 
 
 
 
i. 
Applicability of the Kelly Test 
 
Defendant first asserts that Nelson misapplied California 
law because, contrary to Venegas and Soto, the court exempted 
a category of DNA statistics from Kelly analysis despite an 
ongoing scientific controversy.  This argument misconstrues 
both our prior precedents and Nelson’s holding.  The issue in 
Venegas and Soto was whether the product rule was a reliable 
measure of a DNA profile’s rarity or whether some modification 
was needed to account for population substructuring and other 
issues.  But, critically, both the unmodified product rule and the 
modified ceiling approach are statistical formulae designed to 
answer the same question:  How frequently can we expect a 
specific profile to appear in the relevant population?  As 
discussed, the alternative statistical models proposed for cold 
hit cases are each answering a different question.  We adhere to 
the view that admissibility of the random match statistic in 
these cases presents an issue of relevance, not scientific 
reliability. 
 
Defendant argues Nelson misconstrued the scientific 
debate.  He contends the issue is not one of legal relevance but 
of science, because the various methodologies all seek to answer 
the question:  What is the correct way to statistically account for 
ascertainment bias?  Defendant merely repeats the arguments 
made in Nelson.  It is evident that experts disagree about what 
information would be most helpful to the factfinder in 
evaluating a cold hit DNA match.  Frequentists believe juries 
should be told the probability of finding a match in the offender 
 
relevance of the database match probability statistic is 
outweighed by a substantial possibility of juror confusion or 
undue consumption of time.  
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
database because the database trawl makes the match to the 
defendant less significant.  (See Kaye, supra, 87 N.C. L.Rev. at 
p. 460.)  Bayesians believe the database match itself “has 
considerable probative value” and does not reduce the 
significance of the match to the defendant.  (Id. at p. 471.)  But, 
as Nelson observed, the dispute among these statisticians 
concerns not which information is correct, but which 
information is “the best, i.e., the most probative, way to judge 
the significance of a cold hit.”  (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
p. 1263.)  Relevance, and hence admissibility, is a question for 
the court.  (Id. at p. 1265.)  Probative value, or weight, is an issue 
for the jury to decide. 
 
Defendant’s renewed arguments do not persuade us that 
a Kelly hearing was required.  He cites no case agreeing with his 
position.  It appears all published decisions considering the 
issue have concluded the product rule statistic is admissible in 
cold hit cases without a Kelly hearing or the equivalent.  (See 
U.S. v. Davis (D.Md. 2009) 602 F.Supp.2d 658, 676–677; 
Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz (2011) 459 Mass. 400, 407–409 
[945 N.E.2d 356, 362–363]; State v. Bartylla (Minn. 2008) 755 
N.W.2d 8, 20; Jenkins, supra, 887 A.2d at pp. 1023–1025; see 
also Crews v. Johnson (W.D.Va. 2010) 702 F.Supp.2d 618, 639 
[opining that database match probability should also have been 
admitted, but finding no error in admission of product rule’s 
rarity statistic because it was “clearly probative of guilt”].)  
Indeed, 
the 
Massachusetts 
Supreme 
Judicial 
Court 
persuasively observed that excluding evidence of the rarity 
statistic would eviscerate the purpose for which offender 
databases have been created.  (Bizanowicz, at p. 408.)  “DNA 
evidence from convicted offenders whose DNA is stored in a 
CODIS [(Combined DNA Index System)] database could never 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
be used at trial unless it was obtained without using the CODIS 
database.”  (Id. at pp. 408–409.) 
 
Nor are we persuaded that the denial of a Kelly hearing 
was erroneous because of the trial court’s reasoning.  The court 
found it significant that the database match here was confirmed 
by later testing, comparing the cold hit to a confidential 
informant who initiates the investigation of a particular subject.  
Similar reasoning appeared in People v. Johnson (2006) 139 
Cal.App.4th 1135, where the Court of Appeal observed that a 
“database search merely provides law enforcement with an 
investigative tool, not evidence of guilt.”  (Id. at p. 1150.)  
Reasoning that proof of guilt depends upon the confirmatory 
match between a defendant’s profile and that of the perpetrator, 
the court concluded a defendant’s initial identification “as a 
possible suspect based on a database search simply does not 
matter.”  (Id. at p. 1151.)  The trial court disclaimed reliance on 
Johnson, which was not yet final at the time of its ruling.  
Nevertheless, defendant argues Johnson was wrongly decided 
and could not properly support denial of a Kelly hearing.  We 
need not consider the validity of Johnson’s holding.  Our task is 
to review the trial court’s ruling, not its reasoning.  “ ‘No rule of 
decision is better or more firmly established by authority, nor 
one resting upon a sounder basis of reason and propriety, than 
that a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be 
disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason.  If 
right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must 
be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have 
moved the trial court to its conclusion.’ ”  (D’Amico v. Board of 
Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19.)  The court’s ruling 
here was sound. 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
ii. 
Relevance of the Profile’s Rarity 
 
Defendant also disagrees with Nelson’s holding that the 
generally accepted product rule statistic is relevant in cold hit 
cases.  Our discussion of this issue relied heavily on Jenkins, 
supra, 887 A.2d 1013.  First, Nelson agreed with Jenkins that 
“in a non-cold-hit case, the number derived from the product 
rule ‘represents two concepts:  (1) the frequency with which a 
particular DNA profile would be expected to appear in a 
population of unrelated people, in other words, how rare is this 
DNA profile (“rarity statistic”), and (2) the probability of finding 
a match by randomly selecting one profile from a population of 
unrelated people, the so-called “random match probability.” ’  
(Jenkins, [] at p. 1018.)”  (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1266.)  
The government in Jenkins had conceded that when a match is 
the result of a database search, the number derived from the 
product rule is no longer an accurate expression of the 
probability of finding a matching profile by chance.  (Ibid.; see 
Jenkins, at p. 1018 & fn. 7.)  This is essentially the same 
argument defendant makes here.  Even accepting the 
government’s concession that random match probability was not 
an applicable principle in cold hit cases, Jenkins explained that 
the “same product rule number . . . still accurately expresses the 
rarity of the DNA profile.”  (Jenkins, at p. 1018, fn. 7.)  Although 
the database search might alter the probability of finding a 
match, it does not change how rare a specific profile is among 
humans.  (See Nelson, at pp. 1266–1267; Jenkins, at pp. 1018–
1019.)  We held that this expression of rarity is relevant in cold 
hit cases just as it is when the defendant has been identified by 
other means.  (Nelson, at p. 1267.) 
 
Defendant contends the rarity statistic loses all relevance 
when there has been a database search.  That argument fails.  
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
In light of “modern DNA technology and statistical methods,” 
the rarity of a matching profile is relevant no matter how the 
suspect was first located.  (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1267.)  
If a profile is extremely rare, as is increasingly likely the more 
loci are examined, “[i]t is relevant for the jury to know that most 
persons of at least major portions of the general population could 
not have left the evidence samples.”  (People v. Wilson (2006) 38 
Cal.4th 1237, 1245.)  The rarity of the evidence profile has a 
tendency to prove that the defendant, who has a matching 
profile, was the source of the evidence at the crime scene.  This 
test for relevance is met regardless of how the defendant was 
first identified.  The product rule statistic “refer[s] to the 
perpetrator’s profile and [is] therefore . . . unaffected by any 
particular defendant or suspect.”  (People v. Xiong (2013) 215 
Cal.App.4th 1259, 1274 (Xiong).)  It informs the jury “how few 
people are likely to have this profile.” (Ibid.)  The product rule 
statistic therefore provides relevant evidence, although its 
admissibility, as with all relevant evidence, may be subject to an 
Evidence Code section 352 analysis.  
 
Defendant contends random match probability is not 
relevant in cold hit cases because a match resulting from a 
database search is not “random.”  Whereas random match 
probability is appropriate if only one person is tested, defendant 
insists the statistic is inapt when a potentially large number of 
profiles are tested in a database trawl.  This argument focuses 
on the odds of finding a match in a database, relying on the 
assertion that the more profiles are compared against the 
evidence sample, the greater the likelihood a match will 
ultimately be found.  The assertion may be accurate, but it does 
not assist defendant here.  If a suspect’s profile is compared to a 
database of 10, it may be quite unlikely that the suspect’s profile 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
will happen to match one of those 10 profiles.  But if the 
database is expanded to 10,000, the chances of a successful 
match increase because there are more opportunities for a 
match.  That the opportunities for a match increase as the 
database size grows does not mean the database trawl itself 
injects error, nor does it cast doubt on the fact that the suspect’s 
DNA has been found to match crime scene evidence. 
 
When the random match probability statistic is very 
small, such as the one in one quintillion figure calculated by the 
LAPD’s DNA Unit in this case, the probability of finding a match 
in an offender database will generally not be germane to an 
issue the jury must decide.12  In such cases, the relevance of 
asking how likely it is that someone in the database committed 
the crime is eclipsed by the issue of how likely it is that someone 
other than the defendant could have been the source of the 
evidence samples.  This latter question is addressed by a 
statistic that measures the prevalence of a DNA profile in the 
entire population of potential suspects.  (See Xiong, supra, 215 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1274–1275.)  Thus, the statistic generated by 
the product rule, which describes the rarity of the DNA profile 
 
12  
We reaffirm, however, that trial courts have discretion to 
permit evidence of database match probability in an appropriate 
case.  Database match probability is relevant in some 
circumstances.  For example, a profile’s random match 
probability may be relatively high if a degraded crime scene 
sample provides only a few loci for testing.  In such a case, there 
is a significant chance that a “match” based on those few loci 
could be found in a large database by coincidence, even though 
the individual had nothing to do with the crime.  (Chin et al., 
Forensic DNA Evidence: Science and the Law (The Rutter 
Group 2019) § 5:4.)  Database match probability is a way of 
conveying this concept. 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
shared by the perpetrator and the defendant, is relevant even in 
cold hit cases.  (Chin et al., Forensic DNA Evidence: Science and 
the Law, supra, § 5:4.)  Of course, defendants remain free to 
challenge the probative value of this statistic through 
objections, cross-examination, or the introduction of other 
evidence, such as database match probability, and trial courts 
may give clarifying jury instructions when appropriate.  
 
 c. 
Sufficiency of Evidence Regarding DNA 
Profile Rarity  
 
Building on his previous arguments, defendant claims 
insufficient evidence supports the verdicts because the jury only 
heard evidence of random match probability, not rarity.  It is 
true that the prosecution experts typically described statistical 
significance in terms of “the probability of a random match of 
unrelated individuals.”  But this information did convey 
essential facts about the significance of the matches between 
defendant’s profile and crime scene DNA.  The rarity of a DNA 
profile and random match probability are two different ways of 
expressing the meaning of the same statistic calculated using 
the product rule, and it is ultimately the statistic that is 
relevant.  (See Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1266.)  Defendant 
incorrectly asserts that Nelson disapproved use of random 
match probability in cold hit cases.  Nelson recited the Jenkins 
court’s observation that “ ‘the product rule number no longer 
accurately expresses the random match “probability” ’ ” in cold 
hit cases.  (Nelson, at p. 1266, quoting Jenkins, supra, 887 A.2d 
at p. 1018, fn. 7.)  But the statement simply acknowledged that 
the defendant in a cold hit case has been identified by a database 
search and not selected “at random.”  Although the concept of 
“random match probability” is not directly applicable when the 
defendant has been identified by a database search, and the 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
30 
defendant may point this out at trial, the statistic generated by 
the product rule continues to have relevance in cold hit cases 
because it expresses rarity.  Nelson did not suggest otherwise.  
On the contrary, Nelson held, and we reaffirm, that the statistic 
generated by the product rule provides relevant and admissible 
evidence in cold hit as well as confirmatory match cases.  
(Nelson, at pp. 1266–1267.)13 
 
Here, one expert told the jury that the probability a 
random person, unrelated to defendant, would match DNA left 
at each crime scene was one in one quintillion.  Another expert 
set the probability at one in 6.725 quintillion.  Even though 
phrased in “random match” language, the point of these product-
rule-derived statistics was clearly to convey the rarity, if not 
uniqueness, of the 13-loci profile.  The evidence was properly 
admitted and constitutes substantial evidence in support of the 
verdicts. 
 
2. 
Excusal of Prospective Jurors for Cause  
 
Defendant next argues two prospective jurors were 
improperly dismissed from the venire based on their views about 
the death penalty.  The dismissals were permissible. 
 
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to an 
impartial jury, and “a prospective juror’s personal views 
 
13  
Trial courts and parties have tools available to address 
any possible confusion arising from the use of “random match” 
terminology in cold hit cases.  If there is a risk jurors might 
mistakenly think the defendant was identified at random, 
rather than from a database search, the concept can be clarified 
through cross-examination, additional evidence, and/or jury 
instructions.  Defendant did not object on this ground below, nor 
did he seek to present evidence about the database searches by 
which he was located. 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
31 
concerning the death penalty do not necessarily afford a basis 
for excusing the juror for bias.”  (People v. Martinez (2009) 47 
Cal.4th 399, 425 (Martinez).)  Instead, consistent with the 
constitutional imperative, prospective jurors may be dismissed 
for cause only if their views on capital punishment “ ‘would 
“ ‘prevent or substantially impair’ ” the performance of [their] 
duties as defined by the court’s instructions and [their] oath.’  
(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 975; see 
Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424; Witherspoon v. 
Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 521–522.)”  (People v. Winbush 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 424 (Winbush).)  A prospective juror’s bias 
against the death penalty need not be shown with unmistakable 
clarity.  (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 497.)  “Jurors 
commonly supply conflicting or equivocal responses to questions 
directed at their potential bias or incapacity to serve.”  
(Martinez, at p. 426.)  Indeed, “many prospective jurors ‘simply 
cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their 
bias has been made “unmistakably clear”; these [prospective 
jurors] may not know how they will react when faced with 
imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or 
may wish to hide their true feelings.’ ”  (People v. Beck and Cruz 
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 607 (Beck and Cruz).)  Nevertheless, a 
dismissal for cause is appropriate if, “after examining the 
available evidence, . . . the trial court [is] left with a definite 
impression that the prospective juror is unable or unwilling to 
faithfully and impartially follow the law.”  (People v. Thompson 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1066 (Thompson).) 
 
Our review in this area is necessarily deferential because 
“the trial court, through its observation of the juror’s demeanor 
as well as through its evaluation of the juror’s verbal responses, 
is best suited to reach a conclusion regarding the juror’s actual 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
32 
state of mind.”  (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 41; see 
Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 7.)  In applying deferential 
review, “appellate courts recognize that a trial judge who 
observes and speaks with a prospective juror and hears that 
person’s responses (noting, among other things, the person’s 
tone of voice, apparent level of confidence, and demeanor), 
gleans valuable information that simply does not appear on the 
record.”  (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 451 (Stewart).)  
Accordingly, the trial court’s determination as to the juror’s true 
state of mind is binding on appeal if supported by substantial 
evidence.  (Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1066; Martinez, 
supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 426–427.) 
 
 a. 
Prospective Juror No. 4 
 
In her jury questionnaire, Prospective Juror No. 4 said she 
was moderately in favor of the death penalty, and her responses 
evinced a general willingness to impose death in an appropriate 
case.  When asked to consider this particular case, however, the 
juror’s confidence faltered.  The questionnaire asked whether, 
depending on the evidence and circumstances presented, jurors 
could impose the death penalty in a case involving a multiple 
murder allegation.  Instead of circling “yes” or “no,” Prospective 
Juror No. 4 wrote “possibly.”  The court probed this response in 
voir dire, asking whether the juror could impose the death 
penalty in a case involving allegations of multiple murder and 
murder in the course of a rape.  She responded, “I’d have to hear 
everything,” and “I am open.”  However, after the court finished 
its question with the phrase “could you actually vote for death,” 
Prospective Juror No. 4 said, “I would not vote for death.”  The 
questioning continued: 
 
“THE COURT: 
I’m sorry.  You would not? 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
33 
 
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 4: No.  I’d have to listen to 
everything and, you know, get an understanding and the good 
and the bad and all of that. 
 
“THE COURT: 
All right. 
 
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 4: And it would be a hard 
decision to say now. 
 
“THE COURT: 
There are some people that believe in the 
death penalty, support it but cannot participate in the process. 
 
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 4: Right. 
 
“THE COURT: 
Is that you?  You could not vote for death, 
no matter what the evidence is in the penalty phase? 
 
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 4: Possibly, yeah.”  
 
Later in voir dire, the prosecutor explained that there is 
no burden of proof at the penalty phase, but jurors must make 
“a moral decision and . . . a choice.”  She then asked Prospective 
Juror No. 4 about her ability to make such a choice: 
 
“MS. DO: And so given some of the reluctance that I’m 
seeing in you, knowing that it’s a choice, do you think that if you 
have the option of giving a person, a human being[,] life without 
parole, that you would always choose that? 
 
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 4: I have a hard time 
putting someone to death.  Most likely my choice would be the 
life in prison. 
 
“MS. DO: Okay. 
 
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 4: I would have a hard 
time with the other. 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
34 
 
“MS. DO: All right.  So do you think that you might, if 
we get to penalty phase, walk in predisposed to life without 
parole? 
 
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 4: Most likely, yes. 
 
“MS. DO: Okay.  And would the prosecution have quite a 
burden to prove to you that death would be appropriate to 
overcome that predisposition? 
 
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 4: Yeah.”  
 
In 
granting 
the 
prosecution’s 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
Prospective Juror No. 4, the court remarked that it had noticed 
the juror’s “body language as she was answering the questions, 
and she seemed to be very tightly drawn, is what I would say.  
That’s a bad description, but not open and free with her feelings 
about it but somewhat defensive about it.”  Although the juror 
had said on the questionnaire that she could “possibly” impose 
the death penalty, in oral questioning she made it “awfully 
clear,” in the court’s opinion, that she would not actually do so.  
Based on the juror’s demeanor and responses in voir dire, the 
court concluded “she would not fairly impose the death penalty.”  
 
Substantial evidence supports this decision.  Although the 
juror may have supported the death penalty in theory, her voir 
dire responses made it clear she felt great reluctance about 
actually voting to impose it.  We considered a similar record in 
People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792 (Solomon).  There, we 
deferred to the trial court’s finding of substantial impairment 
regarding a prospective juror who expressed support for the 
death penalty in her questionnaire but later equivocated about 
whether she could ultimately vote to sentence someone to death.  
(Id. at pp. 835–836.)  Similarly, in People v. Cunningham, supra, 
25 Cal.4th at page 981, we upheld the dismissal of a prospective 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
35 
juror who said “she believed in the death penalty and would like 
to see it applied more often but was not certain whether 
personally she could vote for it.” 
 
Deference to the court’s finding of substantial impairment 
is particularly appropriate here because the court expressly 
based its ruling, in part, on the juror’s “tightly drawn” and 
“defensive” body language.  (See People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 
Cal.4th 40, 73.)  This demeanor, combined with the juror’s 
repeatedly expressed doubts about whether she could impose a 
death sentence, could support a “definite impression” that the 
juror would be unwilling or unable “to faithfully and impartially 
apply the law.”  (Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 426; 
see People v. Nunez and Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1, 24.) 
 
Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th 425 does not compel a different 
result.  There, we held it was error to dismiss jurors based solely 
on brief written comments and a check mark next to a box 
indicating their views “would either ‘prevent or make it very 
difficult’ ” to impose the death penalty.  (Id. at p. 446.)  Here, the 
court and prosecutor explored Prospective Juror No. 4’s views in 
greater detail.  While it is true that a prospective juror is not 
disqualified merely because she would find it difficult to impose 
the death penalty (id. at pp. 446–447), Prospective Juror No. 4’s 
responses to oral questioning indicated not only that she would 
have difficulty with the decision but also that she would be 
predisposed to voting for a life sentence, regardless of the 
evidence presented.  Nor is this case like People v. Pearson 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 306, 332, in which the court improperly 
dismissed a prospective juror who had no strong views on the 
death penalty and gave no indication she would be unable to 
perform her duty as a capital juror.  The juror’s responses here 
indicated she would not be able to impartially apply the law. 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
36 
 
 b. 
Prospective Alternate Juror No. 1 
 
Prospective 
Alternate 
Juror 
No. 1’s 
questionnaire 
responses consistently expressed personal opposition to capital 
punishment.14  He checked a box indicating he was strongly 
against the death penalty and wrote, “I’m not for death penalty” 
in response to the question whether he would always vote guilty 
to reach the penalty phase in a capital case.  He wrote that he 
was “not sure” what purpose the death penalty serves and that 
he did not feel it should be used.  When asked whether he could 
impose the death penalty in a case involving multiple murder, 
the juror circled “yes” and wrote, “I will perform my civi[c] duty 
but I’m not for it.”  He reported that his religious organization 
was “anti death penalty” and, though he felt obligated to accept 
that view, he could “do what I’m ask[ed] to do” regardless of his 
views.  Finally, he agreed somewhat that people who 
intentionally kill should never get the death penalty, explaining, 
“I’m not for the death of anyone.”  
 
In voir dire, the court asked whether Prospective 
Alternate Juror No. 1 would always vote against the death 
penalty, regardless of the evidence.  The juror responded, “Not 
always, but I’d say if it was on a scale, it would be more towards 
life than death.”  When the court asked if he was open to voting 
for death, the juror said, “If I have to, . . . I will follow the 
instructions,” but in his “personal view,” he “would lean towards 
life.”  When pressed about whether he could realistically ever 
see himself voting for death, the juror responded, “Not really,” 
 
14  
Because an alternate juror was selected at random and 
seated early in the trial, it does not appear that any error in this 
excusal would have been harmless.  (See People v. Bryant, Smith 
and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 399, fn. 19.) 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
37 
and “it would be kind of tough for me.”  Nevertheless, he stated 
that he could perform his duty as a juror and could vote for death 
if the penalty was warranted.  
 
The prosecutor asked whether, given his religious and 
moral opposition to the death penalty, Prospective Alternate 
Juror No. 1 could “make a decision that would end a man’s life.”  
The juror responded, “I’m not sure if I could do that,” adding 
that he might not be able to vote for death if the defendant’s 
family members were present.  The prosecutor explained that 
there might be family members in the audience but asked again 
whether, regardless of family members, the juror could vote for 
death.15  Again, he answered, “I’m not sure.”  
 
The court granted the prosecutor’s cause challenge.  
Although the juror said he would “do his duty,” the court found 
his answers indicated he would not be able to vote for death, 
“especially if there were any people in the courtroom related to 
the defendant.”  As with Prospective Juror No. 4, this dismissal 
is supported by substantial evidence.  We recently upheld the 
dismissal of a prospective juror who expressed similar doubts 
about her ability to impose the death penalty.  (Beck and Cruz, 
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 607.)  When a prospective juror repeatedly 
says he does not know whether he could realistically impose the 
death penalty, we will not second-guess the trial court’s 
 
15  
Defendant argues it was “improper” for the prosecutor to 
probe the juror’s ability to announce a death verdict in front of 
family members.  We have repeatedly approved similar lines of 
questioning.  (See People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 734; 
People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1235; People v. 
Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 853–854.) 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
38 
determination that the juror is substantially impaired.  (See id. 
at pp. 607–608; Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 835–836.) 
B. Guilt Phase Issues 
 
1. 
Third Party Culpability Evidence  
 
Defendant argues the court infringed his constitutional 
right to present a defense when it excluded evidence about police 
efforts in the Washington case to match a partial shoe print with 
a different suspect.  The ruling was an appropriate exercise of 
discretion. 
 
Shortly before trial, defense counsel announced he 
intended to introduce evidence that police had compared a 
partial footprint found on Regina Washington’s shirt to the shoe 
of another individual.  The court deferred ruling, noting 
admissibility would depend on the print’s significance in 
relation to the crime scene.  Trial evidence established that a 
partial shoe print outline had been found on the back shoulder 
of Washington’s white T-shirt.  At an Evidence Code section 402 
hearing, a criminalist testified that the shoe print was 
approximately one square inch and “of a quality that no further 
comparison could be made.”  He had compared the print to a 
shoe belonging to Ray Anthony Williams and could not 
eliminate the shoe as the source of the print.  Mr. Williams was 
connected to the case by unspecified hearsay evidence, which 
was not made part of the record.  The prosecution sought to elicit 
evidence about the size and quality of the print but argued the 
defense should be precluded from inquiring about the Williams 
comparison under Evidence Code section 352.16  
 
16  
Evidence Code section 352 provides:  “The court in its 
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
39 
 
The court agreed the evidence would be irrelevant and 
inadmissible.  It explained, “[T]he problem is this:  By making 
the comparison, it suggests to the jury that there was a reason 
for the comparison, which is hearsay, which is not admissible.  
[¶] So you can’t get the reason for doing the comparison in front 
of the jury.”  The court also denied defendant’s request to ask 
more generally whether the print had been compared “to 
anybody else” to eliminate them as a suspect, explaining that 
the print “doesn’t include or eliminate because it’s not sufficient 
to do that.  And . . . bringing forth the fact of the comparison, it 
suggests that there is more than the actual evidence in the case, 
which is the reason for it, which is hearsay.”  Defendant now 
contends he had a constitutional right to present evidence of the 
Williams comparison because it tended to show a third party 
committed the Washington murder. 
 
Like all other evidence, third party culpability evidence 
may be admitted if it is relevant and its probative value is not 
substantially outweighed by the risk of undue delay, prejudice, 
or confusion, or otherwise made inadmissible by the rules of 
evidence.  (Evid. Code, §§ 350, 352; see People v. Hall (1986) 41 
Cal.3d 826, 834 (Hall).)  “To be admissible, the third-party 
evidence need not show ‘substantial proof of a probability’ that 
the third person committed the act; it need only be capable of 
raising a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.  At the same 
time, we do not require that any evidence, however remote, must 
be admitted to show a third party’s possible culpability.”  (Hall, 
 
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, 
or of misleading the jury.” 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
40 
at p. 833.)  For example, “evidence of mere motive or opportunity 
to commit the crime in another person, without more, will not 
suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt 
. . . .”  (Ibid.)  Moreover, admissible evidence of this nature 
points to the culpability of a specific third party, not the 
possibility that some unidentified third party could have 
committed the crime.  (See People v. Page (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 
39 (Page); People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 481; People v. 
Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1136.)  For the evidence to be 
relevant and admissible, “there must be direct or circumstantial 
evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the 
crime.”  (Hall, at p. 833, italics added.)  As with all evidentiary 
rulings, the exclusion of third party evidence is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.  (See People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 
372–373 (Lewis); People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 686.) 
 
The court properly excluded evidence about the shoe print 
comparison.  No direct or circumstantial evidence linked 
Williams to the Washington murder.  Defendant insists the 
evidence would have shown that “someone else was present at 
the scene [and] was responsible for the murder.”  But the 
evidence could establish no such thing.  The one-inch print was 
deficient in quality and size to be matched to any particular 
shoe.  This deficiency would have made it impossible to exclude 
any number of shoes as the source of the mark.  The criminalist’s 
inability to exclude Williams as the source of the print was 
therefore irrelevant and potentially misleading, to the extent 
the jury might have speculated the result indicated an 
affirmative identification.  Defendant contends forensic 
evidence linking a third party to a crime scene is always 
admissible, but the premise of his argument fails.  The shoe 
print did not affirmatively link Williams, defendant, or anyone 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
41 
else to the murder.  Nor was it relevant that the police had 
compared the shoe print to a third party, since the comparison 
yielded no “direct or circumstantial evidence linking [him] to the 
actual perpetration of the crime.”  (Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at 
p. 833.)  We have repeatedly upheld the exclusion of third party 
culpability evidence when the third party’s link to a crime is 
tenuous or speculative.  (See, e.g., Page, supra, 44 Cal.4th at 
pp. 38–39; Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 373; People v. Alcala 
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 792–793.)  The linkage here is similarly 
unsupported. 
 
Furthermore, as the trial court noted, testimony about the 
comparison would have invited speculation about why Williams 
was being investigated.  Yet no explanation could be provided 
because the evidence about Williams’s potential as a suspect 
was inadmissible hearsay.  The court reasonably concluded the 
shoe print evidence would have been irrelevant and potentially 
confusing without this additional information.  Although the 
court did not expressly invoke Evidence Code section 352 as the 
basis for its ruling, it clearly had the concerns of that statute in 
mind when excluding the evidence.  Moreover, express reliance 
on section 352 is not required because we must affirm if the 
court’s ruling is correct on any ground.  (People v. Geier (2007) 
41 Cal.4th 555, 582.) 
 
Defendant also claims exclusion of the evidence violated 
his constitutional rights to due process, compulsory process, and 
“to present a complete defense.”  (California v. Trombetta (1984) 
467 U.S. 479, 485.)  There was no constitutional error.  “As a 
general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not 
impermissibly infringe on the accused’s right to present a 
defense.”  (Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 834; see United States v. 
Scheffer (1998) 523 U.S. 303, 308.)  This case is no exception.  
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
42 
The court’s reasonable application of the rules of evidence to 
exclude irrelevant and potentially misleading information did 
not deprive defendant of his constitutional rights.  (See Lewis, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 373–374; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 
585, 611.) 
 
2. 
Issues Regarding Fetal Viability 
 
Defendant was charged with murdering the fetus carried 
by Regina Washington.  In 1989, when this crime was 
committed, the murder statute had consistently been 
interpreted to require a finding of fetal viability.  (See People v. 
Davis (1994) 7 Cal.4th 797, 804–805, 812 (Davis).) 
 
Dr. Lisa Scheinin, a deputy medical examiner with the Los 
Angeles County Coroner’s Office, testified on that topic.  
Although she had not autopsied the fetus herself, Dr. Scheinin 
related findings from an autopsy report that the fetus was 
female, weighed 825 grams, and had a gestational age of 27 to 
28 weeks, or approximately six and a half months.  She 
explained that World Health Organization guidelines consider a 
fetus viable after it has reached the 22nd week or a weight of 
500 grams.  Although the autopsy report said nothing specific 
about whether the fetus could have survived outside the womb, 
Dr. Scheinin concluded from the numbers in the report that it 
was “clearly well into the range that’s defined as viable.”  The 
fetus had no congenital abnormalities, and there was nothing to 
suggest Washington’s cocaine use had negatively affected its 
health or development.  Based on the autopsy report’s findings, 
the fetus appeared to be a “normally developing healthy baby.”  
 
 a. 
Fetal Viability Instruction  
 
Defendant first contends the jury instruction defining 
viability was erroneous and violated his rights to due process, a 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
43 
fair trial, and a fair and reliable penalty determination.  The 
claim fails because the instruction accurately conveyed the legal 
definition of viability. 
 
The jury was instructed with a modified version of 
CALJIC No. 8.10:  “In the crime of murder, a human fetus is 
defined as a viable unborn child.  Viability is defined as the 
capability of the fetus to maintain independent existence 
outside of the womb even if this existence required artificial 
medical aid.”17  Defendant did not object or propose an 
alternative instruction. 
 
In 
1970, 
the 
Legislature 
amended 
section 187, 
subdivision (a), to include the killing of a fetus within the 
definition of murder.  (Stats. 1970, ch. 1311, § 1, p. 2440; Davis, 
supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 803.)  Thereafter, the United States 
Supreme Court decided in the abortion context that states have 
no legitimate interest in protecting a fetus before it reaches 
viability, which the court defined as the “capability of 
meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.”  (Roe v. Wade (1973) 
410 U.S. 113, 163; see Davis, at p. 803.)  A series of Court of 
Appeal decisions relying on Roe held that only the killing of a 
viable fetus could constitute murder.  (See People v. Smith 
(1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 751, 757 (K.A. Smith); People v. Apodaca 
(1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 479, 487, 489 (Apodaca); People v. Smith 
(1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1495, 1514 (R.P. Smith); see also Davis, 
at pp. 804–805.)  We disapproved this line of cases in 1994 when 
 
17  
The 1988 version of the instruction in effect at the time of 
the Washington murder was similar.  It said:  “A viable human 
fetus is one who has attained such form and development of 
organs as to be normally capable of living outside of the uterus.”  
(CALJIC No. 8.10 (5th ed. 1988).) 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
44 
we held that viability is not required for the crime of murdering 
a fetus.  (Davis, at p. 810.)  However, our decision was 
prospective only.  (Id. at p. 812.)  Accordingly, when defendant 
was tried, a conviction for murdering the Washington fetus 
required a finding that the fetus was viable. 
 
Courts first defined viability for this purpose as “ ‘having 
attained such form and development of organs as to be normally 
capable of living outside the uterus.’ ”  (K.A. Smith, supra, 59 
Cal.App.3d at p. 758.)  The definition was later expanded to 
address the availability of medical assistance.  Apodaca, supra, 
76 Cal.App.3d at page 489 stated that “a fetus is deemed viable 
when it is possible for it to survive the trauma of birth, although 
with artificial medical aid.”  Similarly, R.P. Smith, supra, 188 
Cal.App.3d at page 1514 summarized case law as holding that 
“viability means being capable of surviving the trauma of birth 
with the aid of normal medical science.”  The instruction here 
was fully consistent with the controlling law.  It defined viability 
as the fetus’s capability to live outside the womb, even if doing 
so required medical assistance. 
 
Nevertheless, defendant complains the instruction was 
comparable to one we found lacking in Davis.  The comparison 
does not withstand scrutiny.  The instruction at issue in Davis 
stated that “ ‘a fetus is viable when it has achieved the capability 
for independent existence; that is, when it is possible for it to 
survive the trauma of birth, although with artificial medical 
aid.’  (Italics added.)”  (Davis, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 813.)  We 
found the term “possible” to be problematic because it could 
permit a finding of viability for a fetus that was “incapable of 
survival outside the womb for any discernible time.”  (Id. at p. 
814.)  Because the term significantly lowered the viability 
threshold as it was commonly accepted at the time, we 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
45 
concluded this modification of CALJIC No. 8.10 was error.  
(Davis, at p. 814.)  By contrast, the instruction in defendant’s 
trial used no variant of the word “possible,” nor did it include 
any similar language that could have lowered the threshold for 
when a fetus becomes viable.  The instruction required that a 
viable fetus have the “capability . . . to maintain independent 
existence outside of the womb even if this existence required 
artificial medical aid.”  (Italics added.)  The word “maintain” 
excludes a case in which the fetus might only survive 
momentarily.  Even assuming defendant did not forfeit his claim 
by failing to object, the instruction given here accurately defined 
viability and did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights. 
 
 
b. 
Hearsay Evidence of Viability 
 
After we notified the parties of our intention to set the case 
for oral argument, defendant filed a supplemental brief 
contending Dr. Scheinin violated state law by relating case-
specific hearsay from the fetus’s autopsy report to support her 
viability opinion.18  (See People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 
(Sanchez).)  He also argued the report’s statements were 
testimonial and admitted in violation of his Sixth Amendment 
right to confront his accusers.  (See Crawford v. Washington 
(2004) 541 U.S. 36.)  Because we conclude the state law error 
was prejudicial and requires reversal of the fetal murder 
conviction, 
we 
need 
not 
address 
these 
constitutional 
arguments.19  It is not reasonably possible the error affected the 
 
18  
He also sought judicial notice of the autopsy report and its 
attachments.  We granted this unopposed request.  (See Evid. 
Code, §§ 452, subds. (c), (h), 459, subd. (a).) 
19  
Whether a challenged statement is hearsay is always the 
threshold question.  If it is, it cannot be admitted unless it 
satisfies an exception.  If it does not do so, and the error is 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
46 
jury’s penalty decision, however, and defendant’s death 
sentence remains undisturbed.  (See People v. Gonzalez (2006) 
38 Cal.4th 932, 960-961 (Gonzalez); see also Chapman v. 
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).) 
 
 
 
i. 
Hearsay 
 
Hearsay is “evidence of a statement that was made other 
than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is 
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.”  (Evid Code, 
§ 1200, subd. (a).)  “Documents like letters, reports, and 
memoranda are often hearsay because they are prepared by a 
person outside the courtroom and are usually offered to prove 
the truth of the information they contain.”  (Sanchez, supra, 63 
Cal.4th at p. 674.)  Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible 
unless it satisfies a statutory exception.  (Evid. Code, § 1200, 
subd. (b).) 
 
As noted, Dr. Scheinin did not perform the autopsy on 
Regina Washington’s fetus.  She did, however, relate to the jury 
observations recorded by the non-testifying medical examiner, 
including the weight and gestational age of the fetus.  These 
facts were hearsay if offered to prove their truth.  (See Sanchez, 
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 674.)  Experts enjoy wide latitude in the 
sources they may draw upon, and they are permitted to rely on 
hearsay in reaching their conclusions.  (Id. at pp. 685–686; 
People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 603; see Evid. Code, § 802.)  
That is to say, experts can take hearsay into account when 
forming their own opinions.20  “What an expert cannot do,” 
 
prejudicial under state law, a further Crawford analysis is 
unnecessary.  (See Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 680.) 
20  
Experts may also tell the jury about background 
information generally accepted and reasonably relied on in their 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
47 
however, “is relate as true case-specific facts asserted in hearsay 
statements, unless they are independently proven by competent 
evidence or are covered by a hearsay exception.”  (Sanchez, at 
p. 686.)  Some prior cases had allowed experts to relate case-
specific facts on the theory that the material was not offered for 
its truth, but merely to show the basis of the expert’s opinion.  
Sanchez pointed out the flaw in this logic:  “When an expert 
relies on hearsay to provide case-specific facts, considers the 
statements as true, and relates them to the jury as a reliable 
basis for the expert’s opinion, it cannot logically be asserted that 
the hearsay content is not offered for its truth.  In such a case, 
‘the validity of [the expert’s] opinion ultimately turn[s] on the 
truth’ (Williams[ v. Illinois (2012)] 567 U.S. [50,] 108 . . . (conc. 
opn. of Thomas, J.)) of the hearsay statement.  If the hearsay 
that the expert relies on and treats as true is not true, an 
important basis for the opinion is lacking.”  (Sanchez, at 
pp. 682–683.)21  When Dr. Scheinin gave facts about gestational 
 
field.  This information is part of the expert’s specialized 
knowledge, even if derived from hearsay sources.  (See Evid. 
Code, §§ 801, subd. (b), 802; Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 
p. 676; see also Simons, Cal. Evidence Manual (2020) § 4:31.)  
On the distinction between case-specific facts and general 
background information, see Sanchez at pages 676 to 677. 
21  
Defendant raised no hearsay or confrontation objection 
below.  Although his case was tried after Crawford established 
a constitutional ban on testimonial hearsay, the statements in 
question would not have been considered hearsay at all under 
the law then in effect because they were offered for the “non-
hearsay purpose” of explaining the basis for Dr. Scheinin’s 
opinion.  (See People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 918–919 
(Montiel), overruled in Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 686, 
fn. 13.)  Drawing on United States Supreme Court precedent, 
particularly Williams v. Illinois, supra, 567 U.S. 50, Sanchez 
rejected that approach.  (See People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
48 
age and weight obtained only from the autopsy report, presented 
them to the jury as true, and represented that those facts 
bolstered her opinion, she related case-specific hearsay.  (See 
Sanchez, at p. 685.) 
 
The Attorney General concedes the testimony was hearsay 
but argues the report could have been admitted under an 
exception to the hearsay rule.  For example, when an 
appropriate foundation has been laid, autopsy reports have 
sometimes been admitted as business records (Evid. Code, 
§ 1271; see People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 979 (Beeler)) or 
official records (Evid. Code, § 1280; see People v. Clark (1992) 3 
Cal.4th 41, 158–159).  However, it is significant that the 
prosecution did not offer the report itself into evidence, and the 
trial court did not rule on whether it was admissible under 
either exception.  “The proponent of hearsay has to alert the 
court to the exception relied upon and has the burden of laying 
the proper foundation.”  (People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 
759, 778.)  A trial court’s decision to admit evidence under a 
hearsay exception is entitled to great deference on appeal, but 
here foundational testimony was neither elicited by the 
prosecution nor ruled upon by the court.   
 
Both the business record and official record exceptions 
require a showing that the writing “was made at or near the 
time of the act, condition, or event” (Evid. Code, §§ 1271, 
subd. (b), 1280, subd. (b)); either “in the regular course of a 
business” (id., § 1271, subd. (a)) or “by and within the scope of 
duty of a public employee” (id., § 1280, subd. (a)); and that 
 
9.)  Accordingly, as the Attorney General acknowledges, 
defendant’s failure to object did not forfeit his present claims.  
(Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
49 
“sources of information and method and time of preparation 
were such as to indicate [the writing’s] trustworthiness” (id., 
§§ 1271, subd. (d), 1280, subd. (c)).  Dr. Scheinin described how 
autopsy reports are customarily prepared and maintained in the 
Los Angeles County Coroner’s Office, but she did not begin 
working there until two years after the autopsy in question.  She 
did not testify that the same procedures were followed before 
her arrival, nor did she link her description of the office’s 
procedures to the preparation of this particular autopsy report.  
The foundational showing here is notably thinner than we have 
encountered in upholding rulings to admit other autopsy 
reports.  For example, in Beeler, supra, 9 Cal.4th at page 979, 
the testifying pathologist both explained the office’s autopsy 
procedures and attested that these standard procedures were 
followed in the autopsy’s performance and documentation.  That 
testimony was sufficient to support the court’s admission of the 
report as a business record.  (Ibid.)  In contrast, given the record 
here, we cannot say with confidence that the fetal autopsy report 
would have been admissible as either a business record or a 
public record, and the issue was not explored at trial. 
 
We recognize that the prosecution might reasonably have 
perceived no need to offer the autopsy report under a hearsay 
exception.  When defendant’s case was tried in 2007, courts 
frequently allowed experts to relate case-specific hearsay under 
the rationale that such evidence merely explained the basis of 
the expert’s opinion and was not offered for its truth.  (See, e.g., 
Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 919, overruled in Sanchez, supra, 
63 Cal.4th at p. 686, fn. 13.)  Sanchez changed this aspect of the 
law.  (See Sanchez, at p. 686.)  But, while our treatment of 
hearsay has changed in light of evolving Supreme Court 
jurisprudence (see id. at p. 682), this change does not make it 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
50 
appropriate in this case to uphold the admission of hearsay 
against a criminal defendant based on an exception that was 
never presented to the trial court, for which no effort was made 
to lay the necessary foundation, and on which the court never 
ruled. 
 
Had the report been offered and admitted under an 
exception, the words of the document itself would have 
constituted admissible hearsay.  Dr. Scheinin’s recitation of the 
content of an unadmitted document remains hearsay for which 
no exception was established.  She was allowed to present 
inadmissible hearsay as true and supportive of her opinion.  
This was error under California’s hearsay statutes.  (See 
Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 686).  
 
 
 
ii. 
Prejudice 
 
State law error in the admission of hearsay requires 
reversal of the judgment if “ ‘it is reasonably probable that a 
result more favorable to the [defendant] would have been 
reached in the absence of the error.’ ”  (People v. Watson (1956) 
46 Cal.2d 818, 837 (Watson); see People v. Duarte (2000) 24 
Cal.4th 603, 618–619.)  Given the significance of the hearsay 
evidence to the fetal murder charge, and the dearth of other 
evidence on the issue, we cannot conclude the error was 
harmless.  Defendant’s conviction for the fetal murder count 
must be reversed. 
 
The prosecution had to prove the fetus was viable at the 
time of death.  Dr. Scheinin testified that viability is largely a 
function of weight and gestational age.  At both the time of trial 
and in 1989 when Regina Washington was murdered, scientists 
generally considered a fetus viable after it had reached a 
gestational age of 22 weeks or a weight of 500 grams.  To 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
51 
illustrate her testimony, Dr. Scheinin displayed a chart showing 
the week-by-week development of an embryo into a fetus.  She 
drew the jury’s attention to a dividing line on this chart labeled 
“stage of viability.”  She explained, “Anything to the left of this 
line is considered a pre-viable fetus and anything to the right of 
it is considered viable,” noting the dividing line of weight and 
age.  Having previously quoted from the autopsy report that the 
Washington fetus weighed 825 grams and had reached a 
gestational age of 27 to 28 weeks, Dr. Scheinin then pointed to 
the place on the chart indicated by these statistics.  She 
observed that, “according to the medical examiner who did the 
autopsy, . . . the baby is in this ballpark here, and about in this 
ballpark here by weight, so it’s clearly well into the range that’s 
defined as viable.”  (Italics added.)  Finally, she quoted the 
report’s statement that the fetus had “no congenital 
abnormalities” and concluded “nothing in the report” suggested 
the fetus was anything other than healthy.  All of Dr. Scheinin’s 
statements about the fetus’s ability to survive outside the womb 
were expressly tied to the autopsy report, the contents of which 
she presented to the jury.  This case-specific information was 
neither stipulated nor independently proven.   
 
Dr. Scheinin’s testimony was essential in proving 
viability.  The only other evidence bearing on the subject was 
testimony from Washington’s daughter, 11 years old at the time 
of the crime, who recalled that her mother was visibly pregnant 
and the family believed the gender was female.  This evidence 
was insufficient to prove viability beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Although the Attorney General is correct that no contrary 
evidence was presented, it was the prosecution’s burden to prove 
every element of the charge.  (See Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 
U.S. 62, 69; see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
52 
U.S. 305, 324 [“the Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on 
the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to 
bring those adverse witnesses into court”].) 
 
The Attorney General argues the error was harmless 
because, apart from the hearsay, Dr. Scheinin gave her own 
opinion about fetal viability.  He reasons that even if she had 
been precluded from reciting the report’s facts about fetal 
weight and gestational age, she still would have been able to 
testify to her opinion on the ultimate question.  It is true that an 
“expert may still rely on hearsay in forming an opinion, and may 
tell the jury in general terms that he did so.”  (Sanchez, supra, 
63 Cal.4th at p. 685.)  Dr. Scheinin thus could have told the jury 
that she read the autopsy report and relied on it in forming her 
opinion.  But that is not what happened here.  Instead, she 
repeatedly recounted case-specific facts from the report and 
invited the jury to compare that hearsay to the medically 
accepted guidelines for determining viability.   
 
Once the improperly admitted hearsay testimony is 
excluded (see People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 448), all 
that remains of Dr. Scheinin’s viability testimony is a bare 
conclusion that “just looking at the numbers, the age of the baby 
would indicate that it was a viable fetus, meaning it has a 
chance for life by itself.”  The persuasive force of this conclusion 
would have been considerably diminished without testimony 
about the case-specific facts on which it was based.  An expert’s 
opinion is only as strong as its factual basis.  “The jury is not 
required to accept an expert’s opinion.  The final resolution of 
the facts at issue resides with the jury alone.  The jury may 
conclude a fact necessary to support the opinion has not been 
adequately proven, even though there may be some evidence in 
the record tending to establish it.  If an essential fact is not 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
53 
found proven, the jury may reject the opinion as lacking 
foundation.”  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 675.)  A 
conclusory opinion, with no articulated factual foundation, 
would have been substantially less compelling than the 
testimony Dr. Scheinin actually gave.  She repeatedly stated the 
fetus’s specific weight and gestational age and showed on a 
demonstrative exhibit how these attributes placed it “well into” 
the medically established viability range. 
 
The case-specific hearsay erroneously admitted here 
served two interrelated purposes.  First, it provided nearly all 
the direct evidence pointing to fetal viability.  Second, it 
provided the entire factual basis for the expert’s opinion on that 
question.  The hearsay evidence was relevant to an especially 
important issue.  On this record, it is reasonably probable the 
jury would have reached a different verdict on the fetal murder 
count absent the admission of hearsay evidence.  (See Watson, 
supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 837.) 
 
We do not agree with defendant, however, that this error 
undermines the penalty judgment.  Defendant was a convicted 
serial killer who preyed on vulnerable women for over a decade.  
A jury convicted him of strangling his victims and abandoning 
their corpses in degrading conditions.  Apart from the fetal 
death, the jury found that defendant murdered 10 women.  The 
jury heard evidence about these murders and defendant’s sexual 
assault of Maria M.  In the penalty phase, it heard aggravating 
evidence about yet another murder and sexual assault.  
Although defendant suggests the jury may have considered the 
fetus’s murder especially aggravating, that argument is 
speculative at best.  Moreover, despite the error, the jury was 
still entitled to give aggravating weight to the fact that 
defendant murdered a visibly pregnant woman.  (See Brown v. 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
54 
Sanders (2006) 546 U.S. 212, 220.)  The prosecutor’s closing 
argument only mentioned this death in a single sentence.  Nor 
was there any victim impact evidence concerning the fetus.  In 
view of the substantial aggravating facts of both the charged and 
uncharged crimes, it is not reasonably possible the jury would 
have reached a different penalty verdict absent the error.  (See 
People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 518.)  Likewise, any 
federal constitutional error in admitting the evidence was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to penalty.  (Chapman, 
supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; see Gonzalez, supra, 38 Cal.4th at 
pp. 960-961.) 
C. Penalty Phase Issues 
 
1. 
Criminal Threat Evidence  
 
Defendant contends insufficient evidence was admitted to 
establish that he made a criminal threat against Deputy 
Uyetatsu.  Assuming this claim was not forfeited, any error was 
harmless. 
 
To establish a criminal threat, the prosecution must prove:  
(1) the defendant willfully threatened death or great bodily 
injury to another person; (2) the threat was made with the 
specific intent that it be taken as a threat, regardless of the 
defendant’s intent to carry it out; (3) the threat was “on its face 
and under the circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so 
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey 
to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate 
prospect of execution”; (4) the threat caused the person 
threatened “to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or 
for his or her immediate family’s safety”; and (5) this fear was 
reasonable under the circumstances.  (§ 422, subd. (a); see 
People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227–228.)  Defendant 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
55 
challenges the evidentiary support for three elements.  First, 
defendant argues the evidence does not show he specifically 
intended to threaten Deputy Uyetatsu.  Although he told 
another inmate he planned to kill the deputy if he was convicted 
of the pending charges, he did not instruct the inmate to report 
the threat to her, nor was there evidence to suggest he thought 
such a report was likely.  Second, defendant asserts the threat 
was not sufficiently unconditional and immediate because he 
made it while in a locked cell, and he would have even less 
ability to carry it out if he were convicted of the capital charges.  
Finally, he argues there was no evidence the threat caused 
Deputy Uyetatsu to be in a state of sustained fear.  When asked 
how she felt upon learning of the threat, Uyetatsu said only that 
she thought defendant had the ability to carry it out and would 
do so if given the opportunity.  She did not say she was afraid, 
nor did she testify that she wanted to be moved to a different 
unit. 
 
First, the claim is not cognizable on appeal because 
defendant did not object or move to strike the evidence he now 
challenges.  (See People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 
1175; People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 934.)  Defendant 
couches his argument as a challenge to the sufficiency of 
evidence, noting such claims are generally permitted on appeal 
without the need for an objection.  (See People v. McCullough 
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 596.)  However, it is significant that “here 
the evidence was admitted at the penalty phase of a capital trial 
as aggravating evidence, not to support a conviction for that 
crime.”  (Livingston, at p. 1175.)  “Even if defendant need do 
nothing at trial to preserve an appellate claim that evidence 
supporting his conviction is legally insufficient, a different rule 
is appropriate for evidence presented at the penalty phase of a 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
56 
capital trial.  There the ultimate issue is the appropriate 
punishment for the capital crime, and evidence on that issue 
may include one or more other discrete criminal incidents.  
(§ 190.3, factors (b), (c).)  If the accused thinks evidence on any 
such discrete crime is too insubstantial for jury consideration, 
he should be obliged in general terms to object, or to move to 
exclude or strike the evidence, on that ground.”  (Montiel, supra, 
5 Cal.4th at p. 928, fn. 23.) 
 
Even assuming admission of the threat evidence was 
error, there is no reasonable possibility it affected the penalty 
verdict.  (See People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 220.)  The 
threat was only one of five violent crimes admitted under section 
190.3, factor (b) and had arguably less impact.  The jury heard 
evidence in the penalty phase that defendant had murdered 
Elandra Bunn, sexually assaulted Carla W., and forcibly 
resisted arrest.  It was also directed to consider guilt phase 
evidence about his attack on Maria M.  The threat was certainly 
less impactful than defendant’s capital crimes.  Defendant was 
a proven serial killer who brutally raped and murdered nearly 
a dozen known victims, preying on vulnerable women from his 
own neighborhood.  As the court stated in denying defendant’s 
automatic motion for modification of the verdict, “defendant 
methodically located unescorted and vulnerable women, 
overwhelmed each of them in isolation, and strangled each to 
death for his own sexual pleasure.”  The aggravating facts here 
were overwhelming, and any error relating to the threat 
evidence was clearly harmless. 
 
2. 
Constitutionality of Death Penalty Law  
 
Defendant raises a number of challenges to the 
constitutionality of California’s death penalty statute and 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
57 
instructions.  He acknowledges that we have previously rejected 
all of these arguments.  We decline to reconsider our precedents 
as follows: 
 
Section 190.2 adequately narrows the class of offenders 
eligible for the death penalty.  (People v. Reed (2018) 4 Cal.5th 
989, 1018; Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 488.)  Section 190.3, 
factor (a), allowing aggravation based on the circumstances of 
the crime, does not permit arbitrary and capricious sentencing.  
(People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1013 (Capers); 
Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1129.)  “Choice of penalty is a 
normative decision,” not a factual one.  (Beck and Cruz, supra, 8 
Cal.5th at p. 670.)  Accordingly, the death penalty scheme does 
not violate the federal Constitution for failing to require: 
• written findings (People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 455 
(Rhoades); Winbush, at p. 490); 
• unanimous findings as to proof of each aggravating factor or 
unadjudicated crime (Capers, at p. 1013); 
• findings that aggravating factors (other than section 190.3, 
factors (b) and (c)) were proven beyond a reasonable doubt; 
• or specific, articulated findings that aggravating factors 
outweigh those in mitigation, or that death is the appropriate 
penalty (People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 350 (Krebs); 
People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235). 
These conclusions are not altered by Apprendi v. New Jersey 
(2000) 530 U.S. 466, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, or 
Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. 92.  (Capers, at pp. 1013–1014; 
People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 45.)  Because sentencing 
is “an inherently moral and normative function, and not a 
factual one amenable to burden of proof calculations” (Winbush, 
at p. 489), the prosecution has no obligation to bear a burden of 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
58 
proof or persuasion (Capers, at pp. 1014–1015).  Nor does the 
federal Constitution require an instruction that life is the 
presumptive penalty.  (Capers, at p. 1016; Beck and Cruz, at 
p. 670.) 
 
CALJIC No. 8.88 is not impermissibly vague or otherwise 
defective for failing to require a finding that death is the 
“appropriate” penalty (People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 853; 
see Beck and Cruz, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 671) or failing to 
require a life sentence if the jury finds that mitigating factors 
outweigh aggravating ones (Capers, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1016; 
People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 594 (Johnson)).  The 
phrase “so substantial” in this instruction is not overbroad or 
unconstitutionally vague.  (Beck and Cruz, at p. 671; People v. 
Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 292.)  Nor is the jury’s 
consideration of mitigating factors impermissibly constrained 
by CALJIC No. 8.85’s use of the words “extreme” and 
“substantial” to describe mitigating circumstances.  (Beck and 
Cruz, at p. 671; People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 94.)  The 
court is not constitutionally obligated to delete inapplicable 
sentencing factors, identify which factors are aggravating or 
mitigating, or instruct that certain factors are relevant only for 
mitigation purposes.  (Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 351; 
Rhoades, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 455; Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th 
at p. 490.) 
 
Intercase proportionality review is not constitutionally 
required.  (Rhoades, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 455–456; Johnson, 
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 594.)  Nor does the death penalty law 
violate equal protection by providing different procedures to 
capital and noncapital defendants.  (Rhoades, at p. 456; Capers, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1017.)  We continue to hold that 
California’s capital sentencing scheme does not violate 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
59 
international norms or evolving standards of decency in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  (Beck and 
Cruz, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 671; Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at 
p. 351; Capers, at p. 1017.) 
D. Cumulative Error  
 
Finally, defendant argues errors in his trial were 
cumulatively prejudicial.  We conclude to the contrary.  (See 
People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 172.)  Hearsay was 
improperly admitted on the question of fetal viability.  That 
murder conviction is reversed.  We also assumed a penalty 
phase error involving evidence that defendant threatened 
Deputy Uyetatsu.  In light of the totality of evidence at both 
phases of trial, reversal of neither the guilt nor penalty 
judgments is required for the reasons discussed above. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. TURNER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
60 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The second degree fetal murder conviction is reversed.  In 
all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
GILBERT, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ 
*         Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Turner 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion  
Original Appeal  XXX 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted    
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S154459 
Date Filed:  November 30, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  William R. Pounders 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek and Mary K. McComb, State Public Defenders, under appointments by the Supreme Court, and 
William C. Whaley, Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 
Attorneys General,  Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Joseph P. Lee and Blythe J. Leszkay, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
William C. Whaley 
Deputy State Public Defender 
770 L. St., Suite 1000 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 322-2676 
 
Blythe J. Leszkay   
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring St., Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013   
(213) 269-6191