Case Title: STATE v SCHRECKENDGUST

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13080 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T OF THE STATE OF M O N T A N A THE STATE OF M O N T A N A ACTING BY AND THROUGH T H E D E P A R T M E N T O F H I G H W A Y S OF T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, CLYDE SCHRECKENDGUST , J R . a /k /a C L Y D E SCHRECKENDGUST , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: 9 i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Edward Dussault, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Tipp and Hoven, Missoula, Montana Qouglas S k j e l s e t argued, Missoula, Montana Daniel J. Sullivan and James Beck, Helena, Montana James Beck argued, Helena, Montana 310 ;! , ' Filed: - - - - Submitted: April 20, 1976 Decided : Hon. M. James Sorte, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g for M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison, delivered the Opinion of the Court: The s t a t e of Montana by and through the department o i highways, brought condemnation proceedings i n the d i s t r i c t court, Ravalli County, against Clyde Schreckendgust f o r two parcels of land. Defendant answered and counterclaimed asking f o r damages i n the sum of $125,250. A commission hearing resulted in an award of $62,356. A n appeal by the s t a t e of Montana t o the d i s t r i c t court resulted i n a jury verdict of $29,600 and defendant appealed t o t h i s Court. Involved i s condemnation of 9.6 acres out of a t r a c t of land of 24.14 acres referred t o a s parcel 6, which l i e s near Florence, Montana. The 24.14 acres had been surveyed and platted i n t o l o t s i n 1967 but the p l a t was never f i l e d . Immediately adjacent t o the 24.14 acre t r a c t was another t r a c t owned by defendant's corporation and known a s Forest View Estates, Unit 1, which had been platted and a l s o f i l e d . A t the south end of the 24.14 acre parcel there was another parcel of land owned by defendant and condemned i n t h i s action, containing 1.6 acres of land referred t o as parcel 5. The s t a t e ' s attorneys entered into a stipulation with defendant t h a t provided the value of the 1.6 acres (parcel 5) would be computed by multiplying per acreage price determined i n parcel 6 and adding an increment of $1,000 f o r size. Defendant alleges the t r i a l court erred i n two respects: (1) The court did not allow defendant's appraisers t o t e s t i f y on value of the condemned l o t s compared t o platted sub- division property. (2) The court erred in refusing to allow defendant to introduce a value, on either direct testimony of his appraiser, or cross-examination of the state's expert, of comparable commer- cial sales of property. With reference to the first alleged error, the record discloses defendant called two appraisal witnesses, Charles Fricke and Roy Rodenberger. Fricke testified that he based his opinion of value on the basis of building sites and was permitted, over objection, to state that in his opinion the per acre value of the land was $10,500. Defendant's other appraisal witness Roy Rodenberger, was allowed to testify as to value of the 9.6 acres for the highest and best use as residential sites and subdivision. However, the district court would not permit him to use comparable sales located in an existing subdivision because the property sought to be condemned was not in an existing subdivision. In the refusal to allow testimony of comparable sales in an existing subdivision, we note the court did not restrict the witness' testimony on a per acre value of the land. He testified, as he did in a deposition prior to trial, that the highest and best use of the property was "residential sales or lots" and based upon that concluded the land's value was $6,867 per acre. Consequently, appraiser Fricke was permitted to testify as to the land's value for building sites at $10,500 per acre and appraiser Rodenberger was permitted to testify to the same value of $6,867 per acre for "residential sales or lots" as stated in his deposition prior to trial. The general rule is that the admission of evidence of comparable sales is within the discretion of the district court and will not be reversed unless there was manifest abuse of that discretion. In United States v . 55.22 Acres of Land, Etc., Yakima Co., Wash., 411 F.2d 432, 434, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated the rule thusly: "It follows that when evidence pertaining to an assertedly comparable sale is tendered, and objection is made thereto, a preliminary question of admissibility is presented. The determination of that question calls for an exercise of a sound discretion by the trial court, and the ruling thereon is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion. United States v . Eden Memorial Park Association, 9 Cir., 350 F.2d 933, 935." ~ ' S L See: United States v. & , 442 F.2d 1325 ( 1 9 7 1 ) . The Illinois Supreme Court, in City of Chicago v. Blanton, 15 I11.2d 198, 154 N.E.2d 242,244,245, considered the exclusion of an alleged comparable sale by the trial court. In affirming that court's ruling, it held: "* * * No general rule can be laid down regarding the degree of similarity which must exist between property sold and that condemned in order to make evidence of such sale proper. Since no two pieces of real estate are exactly alike and since economic influences are constantly changing, the admission of such proof rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will be reversed only where such discretion has been clearly abused." See: Salt Lake County v. Kazura, 22 Utah 2d 313, 452 P.2d 869; State v. Rowley, 74 Wash.2d 328, 4 4 4 P.2d 695; Adams v. City of Atlanta, 122 Ga.App. 662, 178 S.E.2d 291; Nystrom v. State, 8 0 S.D. 58, 119 N.W.2d 123; H.E. Fletcher Co. v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 316, 214 N.E.2d 721; Nonni v. Commonwealth, 356 Mass. 264, 249 N.E.2d 644. The general rule is that evidence of sales may be intro- duced as long as they are truly comparable. This Court, in State Highway Comm'n v . Churchwell, 146 Mont. 52,60, 403 P.2d 751, said: "* * * Concerning the admission of evidence, e i t h e r of value before or a f t e r the taking, the problem i s one of comparability or s i m i l a r i t y . In t h i s case a s hereinafter pointed out the f a c t s do not make a case f o r s i m i l a r i t y or com- parability. See Vol. 85 A.L.R.2d, pages 130 t o 163 . I ' In Churchwell t h i s Court acknowledged t h a t platted land was not comparable t o raw land: "The Sprunger property was an acreage s a l e a s against the appellants' allegation t h a t t h e i r s was platted land." This follows the general r u l e t h a t sales of platted land should not be used t o value land t h a t i s unplatted, especially i n situa- tions were there i s evidence of sales of unplatted land i n the area. I n Waukegan Park Dist. v. F i r s t National Bank of Lake Forest, 22 I11.2d 238, 174 N.E.2d 824,827, the I l l i n o i s Supreme Court held the t r i a l court properly struck t h e testimony of the landowner's appraiser because he referred t o s a l e s i n subdivisions and said: I f * * * There was no e r r o r i n s t r i k i n g the t e s t i - mony. The property involved i n the present pro- ceedings i s acreage property which is unsubdivided. The testimony sought t o be introduced related t o property which had been subdivided i n t o l o t s . .It is well established t h a t the l a t t e r is not similar t o unsubdivided o r acre property and t h a t the price of such l o t s i s not relevant i n fixing the value of property such as t h a t i n the cases a t bar." S t a t e Road Commission v. Ferguson, 148 W.Vir.742, 137 S.E.2d 206, 211, involved the condemnation of 10.22 acres of land f o r highway purposes. During the t r i a l of the case the t r i a l court p e ~ m i t t e d a witness t o t e s t i f y as t o the prices of l o t s i n an existing subdivision. The West Virginia Supreme Court held t h i s was e r r o r , noting: " * * I n the instant case, M r . Canterbury t e s t i - fied about a l o t which was sold from an existing sub- division. The property involved i n th& proceeding is a t r a c t of land of approximately eleven acres. There is no s i m i l a r i t y whatever between the two. If t h i s evidence were allowed the jury would be required t o investigate c o l l a t e r a l issues, such a s the many items of cost which necessarily would be incurred t o convert the subject property into l o t s . This could lead only t o confusion and cause the jury t o engage i n specula- tion and conjecture. 1 I Pertinent t o the instant proceeding, many courts have held t h a t evidence of the value of platted o r subdivided land is not admissible t o prove the value of acre o r unplatted property. Holding such evidence inadmissible, the Court, i n City o i Chicago v. Pridmore, e t a l . , 12 I11.2d 447, 147 N.E.2d 54, commented as follows: 'This court has consistently held t h a t pro- perty which has been subdivided i n t o l o t s i s not similar t o o r similarly conditioned a s unsubdivided o r acre property.' See Annotation, 85 A.L.R. 2d 110, a t p. 139, e t seq., and cases c i t e d therein. 11 The Colorado Supreme Court, i n Department of Highways v. Schulhoff, 167 Col. 72, 445 P.2d 402,407, considered the admiss- i b i l i t y of l o t sales i n an eminent domain action where the pro- perty sought t o be condemned was not subdivided. I n t h a t case the court refused t o admit evidence of such sales. The land- owner, on cross appeal, urged t h i s a s error. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the t r i a l court, holding: "In passing on the degree of comparability of the s a l e s which the Schulhoffs attempted t o introduce i n t o evidence t o Parcel No. 320, the t r i a l court correctly ruled: "'* * * the Court does not consider p l a t t e d sub- divisions, which l i k e l y have s t r e e t s , possibly a l l e y s and curbs and g u t t e r s , paved s t r e e t s , u t i l i t i e s , grading and other matter which a r e usually i n subdivisions, comparable t o the property i n question i n t h i s case, and therefore refuses t o permit testimony a s t o the value of these l o t s , even though they a r e c a l l e d comparable l o t s . " I * * * there a r e so many elements i n subdivisions t h a t a r e n ' t i n unimproved property t h a t it is d i f f i c u l t t o evaluate o r compare the two. ' "The a u t h o r i t i e s support the t r i a l c o u r t ' s ruling. W e quote with approval the following language of the court i n S t a t e Roads Commission v. Wood, 207 Md. 369, 114 A.2d 636, apropos of the general rule: " '* * *he vice i n comparing subdivided land and unsubdivided land l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t the comparison is between a wholesale and a r e t a i l price f o r t h e price of the platted l o t s includes the expense of subdividing and the promotional and sales c o s t s of moving the individual l o t s . * * *' [Citing cases]." This r u l e was reaffirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court i n Board of County Com'rs v. Vail Associates, Ltd.,l71 Co1.381, Here, the t r a n s c r i p t reveals there was testimony a t the t r i a l of comparable s a l e s of undivided property i n the area of the condemned land. The t r i a l court concluded the land i n question was not subdivided inasmuch as the p l a t had never been f i l e d . Defendant by not f i l i n g the subdivision p l a t , obtained some advantages i n regard t o taxes on the property and the non-dedication of such land t o the public. Lot sales i n an established subdivision recognize and take i n t o account these factors : the cost of u t i l i t i e s furnished with the l o t s , such a s gas, e l e c t r i c i t y , water, sewer and roads, e i t h e r paved or unpaved; (2) cost of land acquisition, p l a t t i n g and p r o f i t t o the subdivider; (3) s e l l i n g expenses such a s com- missions and advertising, and f o r hold-expenses such a s taxes, and i n t e r e s t costs on the unsold land. These costs have - not been incurred by the person who has not filed the subdivision plat and consequently the land in question in this case was not comparable to platted lots and the trial court did not abuse its discretion. With reference to the alleged second error, a reading of the transcript does not sustain the argument that the defendant was prevented from introducing the evidence on either direct testimony or on cross-examination of the state's experts concerning the sale of comparable commercial property. A reading of the transcript indicates the court did not restrict the cross-examina- tion. The only objection to any cross-examination was when defendant attempted to question a witness for the state about the sale from defendant to Bell McCall Company. The witness testified he did not know the answer to the question. Defendant then attempted to premise the question with the answer he wanted from the witness. An objection was made to this on the ground that the witness stated that he did not know the purchase price and the court sustained the objection. It is clear that counsel cannot put an answer into evidence through the guise of asking another question with the answer as a premise. In any event the question was withdrawn by defendant. The state made no objection to the cross-examination of the state's second appraisal witness and consequently the court did not restrict the cross-examination of the state's witnesses by defendant. Defendant also alleges the court refused in his direct examination to allow him to place a dollar value concerning sales of commercial property. The question here is whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in its ruling. A t the t r i a l Rodenberger was called t o the stand and t e s t i f i e d , a s he did i n h i s deposition p r i o r t o trial, t h a t the land had a highest and best use f o r " r e s i d e n t i a l s i t e s and subdivision ." Defendant also attempted t o introduce evidence of a s a l e of .28 acres t o Bell McCall Company. The court ruled t h a t t h i s s a l e was covered by a s t i p u l a t i o n previously entered i n t o by the p a r t i e s and the testimony was improper. Defendant made an o f f e r of proof which was denied by the court, and the court gave an additional reason, the f a c t t h a t the s a l e was f o r commercial purposes as Rodenberger had t e s t i f i e d t h a t the highest and best use of the land was f o r r e s i d e n t i a l s i t e s . The witness was allowed t o t e s t i f y t h a t i n h i s opinion the land was worth $6,867 per acre. The following day the witness Rodenberger attempted t o t e s t i f y t h a t he was now of the opinion t h a t the property had the highest and best use f o r r e s i d e n t i a l and/or c o m e r c i a l . The s t a t e objected on the ground that no proper foundation had been provided and surprise, because of h i s previous deposition and testimony. The objection was sustained by the t r i a l court. Defendant made another o f f e r of proof which was denied. The s t a t e made a motion i n limine p r i o r t o t r i a l re- questing an order prohibiting defendant o r h i s attorney o r witnesses from making any reference t o the value of a t r a c t of land described i n the complaint a s parcel 5 , which included the Bell McCall Company property. The motion was not r e s i s t e d by defendant. Moreover, the Bell McCall Company s a l e involved .28 acres as compared with 24.14 acres i n t h e parcel described a s parcel 6 i n this case. They are not comparable i n size. The s t a t e ' s witnesses t e s t i f i e d the property was not comparable because it was project influenced, it was too small and it was a service station sale. There was no error i n the court's ruling. In Montana Power Company v. Wolfe, Mont . Y 545 P.2d 674, 33 St.Rep. 172, 174, t h i s Court said: "* * * Yet it i s well established that appellate review of comparable sale evidence admitted by the d i s t r i c t court i s limited. 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 5 21.31, pp. 21-54 t o 21-59, states: "'Similarity does not mean identical, but having a resemblance. Obviously, no two properties can be exactly alike, and no general rule can be l a i d down regarding the degree of similarity that must exist t o make such evidence admissible. It must necessarily vary with the circumstances of each particular case. Whether the properties are sufficiently similar t o have some bearing on the value under consideration, and t o be of any aid t o the jury, must necessarily r e s t largely i n the sound discretion of the t r i a l court, which w i l l not be interfered with unless abused. The exact limits, either of similarity or difference, or of nearness or remoteness i n point of time, i s d i f f i - c u l t , i f not impossible, t o prescribe by any arbitrary rule, but must t o a large extent depend on the loca- tion and the character of the property and the c i r - cumstance of the case. It i s t o be considered with reference t o the l i g h t thrown on the issue, and not as a mere method of raising a legal puzzle. "' Finally, the verdict of the jury i n t h i s case i s not out of proportion t o the injury t o defendant. This Court has followed the rule that in eminent domain proceedings the jury verdict w i l l not be disturbed on appeal unless it is out of proportion t o the injury done. State Highway Commission v. Manry, 143 Mont. 382, The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s affirmed. District Judge, s i t t i n g for M r . Chief Justice James T. Harrison. We Concur: Justices.