Case Title: Rodgers v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-267

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rodgers v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div1997 WY 69939 P.2d 246Case Number: 96-267Decided: 06/06/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

In The Matter of the Worker's 
Compensation Claim of:

MILTON W. RODGERS, 

Appellant(Petitioner), 

v. 

STATE OF WYOMING ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, 

Appellee(Respondent).

Appeal from the District Court, Goshen 
County

The Honorable Keith G. Kautz, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Robert T. Moxley of 
Gage & Moxley, Cheyenne.

Representing 
Appellee:

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, 
Sr. Assistant Attorney General; Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant Attorney General, 
for Appellee.

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Milton 
W. Rodgers petitioned the district court for review of a hearing examiner's 
order denying extended benefits under the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act. The 
district court certified the case to this Court pursuant to WYO. R.APP. P. 
12.09. 

[¶2]      We affirm the 
order denying extended benefits.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Rodgers presents 
these issues:

I. Did the Office 
of Administrative Hearings err in refusing to apply the law which was in effect 
on the date of injury, to the determination of a claim for extended 
benefits?

II. To what extent 
are the factors set forth in the new statute, [the term "new statute" is used 
throughout herein to denote W.S. § 27-14-403(g) (1977 as amended), while the 
term "old statute" is used to denote the repealed W.S. 1977 § 27-12-405(d) (1983 
Replacement Title 27), as amended in 1983.] (e.g., "passive" household income) 
specifically excluded from consideration in extended benefits claims under the 
old statute?

III. Does the 
extended benefits law applicable to this case allow the Division to reopen 
proceedings yearly and place the burden of proving the claim upon the injured 
employee?

IV. Are the 
previous orders providing for extended benefits res judicata under the pre-1986 
law, which envisions a final order for a lifetime award of extended benefits 
absent significant change in circumstances?

[¶4]      Appellee Workers' 
Compensation Division (Division) restates the issues as:

A. Was the Hearing 
Examiner's decision to apply Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-403(g) (1987) in accordance with 
law?

B. Assuming, 
arguendo, that Wyo. Stat. § 27-12-405(d) (1983) applies, was the Hearing 
Examiner's denial of extended benefits in accordance with 
law?

FACTS

[¶5]      In December of 
1983, Rodgers injured his back and was awarded medical and temporary total 
disability benefits. The injury resulted in several more back surgeries, each of 
which increased his degree of permanent incapacity. During one of these back 
surgeries, Rodgers' neck was injured which necessitated three additional 
surgeries. Rodgers states his back surgeries resulted in several claims for 
total disability before the neck injury occurred, and one of these claims 
finally went to hearing in 1988 resulting in an adjudication that he had an 80% 
permanent partial disability. He further states that after another surgery, a 
settlement agreement with the Division designated him as having a 100% permanent 
partial disability,1 and the total award was paid out in 
payments spread over the span of 257 weeks.

[¶6]      In 1993, Rodgers 
underwent another surgery, and in November of 1993, he petitioned to reopen his 
case and made a claim for total permanent disability at the same time that he 
applied for extended benefits. His petition stated he had exhausted his 
permanent partial disability award and because of an additional surgery he was 
now permanently totally disabled entitling him to that award and extended 
benefits. His petition requested extended benefits under WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-403(g) which was enacted in 1987. In December of 1993, the Office of 
Administrative Hearings (OAH) issued an order setting the hearing and stating 
the new statute would be applied to claims arising after July 1, 1987, and the 
old statute, WYO. STAT. § 27-12-405 (1983), would be applied to claims arising 
before July 1, 1987. In May of 1994, Rodgers and the Division settled and agreed 
that he should receive a year of extended benefits at the permanent total 
disability rate of $999.88 per month. Their agreement stipulated that the 
primary issue of the contested case concerned whether or not Rodgers is in a 
permanently totally disabled status but also stipulated that Rodgers had been 
adjudged to be 100% disabled by the Social Security Administration. The Division 
reserved the right to contest the issue of total disability at a later date if 
it so chose. The agreement did not establish the date of total disability and 
did not state which statute was used to determine the extended benefit 
amount.

[¶7]      In 1995, Rodgers 
reapplied for extended benefits, and the Division determined that his need was 
$584 per month for another year. The OAH issued an order awarding that amount 
and cited to the new statute. It stated that the parties had stipulated that 
Rodgers was totally disabled, but the order did not establish the date of total 
disability. Rodgers did not appeal the order. While Rodgers was receiving 
extended benefits, he applied for temporary total disability in connection with 
his third neck surgery. The OAH denied the claim, finding that Rodgers was 
totally disabled and had not proved his disability was temporary. When his 1995 
extended benefits expired, Rodgers applied again for extended benefits, and the 
Division denied that request, ruling that Rodgers' family income was sufficient 
and he did not need the benefits. Rodgers requested and received a hearing to 
contest that denial.

[¶8]      At the hearing, 
Rodgers contended that his total disability injury occurred in 1983 and his 
latest application for extended benefits should be considered under the statute 
in effect at the time of his 1983 injury even though he had originally requested 
additional benefits under the statute which had gone into effect in 1987. 
Testimony at the hearing did not address the issue; however, during Rodgers' 
closing argument, the hearing examiner challenged Rodgers' attempt to apply the 
old statute, stating it was his understanding that the permanent total 
disability status had previously been established as occurring in 1989. Rodgers' 
counsel responded that his total disability injury was established as the back 
injury which occurred in 1983 and had caused Rodgers to be unable to work for 13 
to 14 years. Rodgers' counsel asserted that the decision in In Re Shapiro, 703 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1985), controlled and required that the date of the injury for 
total disability be established as 1983. The hearing examiner noted Rodgers had 
not established a record during the hearing about the course of his medical 
history which would establish the date of total disability. He asked whether 
Rodgers should have provided such an evidentiary record to persuade him to 
depart from the law previously used. This inquiry elicited an answer in the 
negative and a statement that the new law was addressed in the context of a 
statute of limitations issue, but if it was determined that counsel had erred 
previously, the hearing examiner was not at liberty to apply the wrong law and 
must consider any waiver on his part to be limited to that particular year. He 
further explained that all of the awards for temporary total disability that 
Rodgers had received were calculated under the old act. The hearing examiner 
pointed out that he had no evidence that the awards were calculated in that 
way.

[¶9]      It was the 
Division's position at the hearing that because Rodgers had relied upon the new 
statute to get the first year of additional benefits, he had to rely on it for 
future benefits. It was Rodgers' position that the doctrine of res judicata did 
not apply but possibly the doctrine of waiver applied and he argued that if he 
did waive the old statute, his waiver was only effective for that year. The 
hearing examiner agreed that Rodgers was probably correct that the hearing 
examiner should apply the correct law unless principles of res judicata or 
waiver applied, and he invited Rodgers' counsel to supply cogent argument and 
relevant authority on the issue in the next ten days. The record does not tell 
us if he did so.

[¶10]   The hearing examiner issued an 
order which denied extended benefits, applying the new statute without 
discussion and without establishing the date of total disability. Rodgers 
appealed to the district court and the matter was certified to us pursuant to 
WYO. R.APP. P. 12.09.

DISCUSSION

Standard of 
Review

[¶11]   WYO. R.APP. P. 12.09 provides for 
judicial review of agency action according to WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c), which 
states:

            
The reviewing court shall:

* * * * * * 

(ii) Hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law; . . 
. .

WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) 
(1990).

[¶12]   An agency's conclusions of law will 
be affirmed if they are in accordance with law. Aanenson v. State ex rel. 
Workers' Compensation Div., 842 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Wyo. 1992). Where the 
determination to be reviewed presents a mixed question of law and fact, i.e., a 
conclusion reached through application of legal precepts to the historical and 
narrative events of a particular case, the reviewing court will defer to the 
agency's findings of basic fact but will correct misapplications of the law to 
those facts. Aanenson, 842 P.2d  at 1080. If the agency has not invoked 
and applied the correct rule of law, we correct it. Tenorio v. State ex rel. 
Workers' Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 237 (Wyo. 
1997).

Applicable 
Statute

[¶13]   Rodgers contends WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-403(g) (1987) does not apply and argues that WYO. STAT. § 27-12-405(d) 
(1983) applies because it was the "additional compensation" provision in effect 
at the time of his original injury which also was the time of his total 
disability injury. He refers us to In Re Shapiro, 703 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 
1985), in which we ruled that the claimant should be paid the monthly average 
wage in effect at the time of the claimant's original injury. Shapiro, 
703 P.2d  at 1081-82. The Division argues that Rodgers' total disability occurred 
after § 27-14-403(g) replaced § 27-12-405(d) and refers us to In Re 
Nielsen, 806 P.2d 297, 299-301 (Wyo. 1991), contending that Nielsen's 
rule has supplanted Shapiro and is now controlling. It argues our 
decision produced the rule that, generally, for the purpose of a permanent total 
disability award, an injury is deemed to have occurred on the date a 100% 
disability is established by medical authority.

[¶14]   Rodgers correctly tells us that 
Shapiro ruled that the statute in effect at the time of injury applies, 
and we are required to determine the date of injury. Shapiro, 703 P.2d  at 
1082. Nielsen, however, held that the injury date for total disability 
can be different from the date of the accident, and this holding requires that 
we decide when the total disability occurred. Nielsen, 806 P.2d  at 299. 
Nielsen states that it is Rodgers' burden to establish when the total disability 
occurred and further instructs us that the date which is established will 
determine which statute was in effect and applies. Id. As our factual 
discussion establishes, Rodgers did not provide an evidentiary basis at the 
hearing establishing the date that total disability occurred, and nothing in the 
record permits a determination that Rodgers was determined to be totally 
disabled in 1983. All that can be determined from the record are several 
references to the fact that it was not until after 1988 that Rodgers was 
considered permanently totally disabled. Before 1988, he was adjudicated as 
permanently partially disabled.

[¶15]  Nielsen instructs that the 
particular facts of each case must be considered to determine the applicable 
statute, and that decision held that the claimant's injury is deemed to have 
occurred when the treating physician determined that the claimant was totally 
disabled. Id. at 300-01. In this case, Rodgers' injury for purposes of 
his new claim for permanent total disability and extended benefits is deemed to 
have occurred when he was found to be permanently disabled, in 1993-1994, by the 
parties' stipulation. We must affirm the order of the hearing examiner applying 
the 1987 statute which was in effect for that date. Our decision is dispositive 
of all the issues that Rodgers presented for our review, and the decision in 
this case is affirmed.

Footnotes

1 According to Rodgers' Petition for 
Reopening of Case filed in 1993, "[t]he previous award of 100% permanent partial 
disability was a combination of a percentage impairment (less than 100%), added 
to a vocational impairment that, while it was expressed in a high percentage of 
wage loss and loss of job market access, did not reach the level of total 
unemployability as would be contemplated by the provisions of Wyo. Stat. §§ 
27-14-102(a)(xvi) and 27-14-406."