Case Title: Nelson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 176, 2000

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CRAIG NELSON,
Defendant Below,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below,
Appellee.
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No. 176, 2000
Court Below: Superior Court
of the State of Delaware in and
for New Castle County
C.A. No. IN98-12-1010 -
IN98-12-1012andIN99-01-
1112 - IN99-01-1115
Submitted: April 10, 2001
Decided:
April 30, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices.
ORDER
This 30th day of April 2001, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties,
it appears to the Court that:
(1) On January 19, 1999 Craig Nelson was indicted on charges of one
count First Degree Attempted Murder, two counts of Possession of a Firearm
During the Commission of a Felony, one count of First Degree Conspiracy, one
count Second Degree Conspiracy, and one count First Degree Reckless
Endangering.
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(2) A jury trial commenced on February 1, 2000 and Nelson was found
guilty on all charges.  Subsequently, Nelson was sentenced to thirty years
incarceration followed by probation.
(3) The charges stemmed from an incident that occurred on November 23,
1998 at approximately 8:00 p.m. on the corner of Fourth and Franklin Streets in
Wilmington, Delaware.  On that night, Luis Mercado was shot and wounded in
the abdomen and left forearm while he was crossing the intersection.
(4) Based on the statements of several witnesses, including Mercado, the
police were able to ascertain that the shots were fired from a white Chevy Blazer
with New York license plates.  This vehicle was found that evening in a hotel
parking lot on Route 13.
(5) Two females entered the parking lot and were questioned by the police
officers.  From the information obtained in those interviews, the police were able
to locate Devon Garner (Nelson’s co-defendant) at the Econo-Lodge on Route
13.  Garner and three others, including Nelson, were located in a room at the
hotel.  A lawful search of the room turned up a Raven Arms semi-automatic .25
caliber handgun.  Nelson, Garner, and one other person were arrested and taken
to police headquarters.
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(6) During the jury trial, four witnesses testified that they were present at
the time of the shooting.  Of those witnesses, only Mercado could identify the
occupants of the Chevy Blazer.  According to Mercado, Nelson was driving the
Blazer while Garner fired the shots out of the passenger side window.  The other
witnesses could say only that they were familiar with the Blazer and knew who
was usually in it.
(7) During the trial, the State introduced evidence that Nelson and
Mercado were rival drug dealers fighting over the business around Fourth and
Franklin Streets.  The State’s theory of the case was that the shooting was
retaliatory in nature because Mercado had “snitched” on one of Nelson’s
associates when the two were arrested in a previous incident.
(8) Nelson raises two issues on appeal.  He argues first that the trial court
erred by allowing the State to introduce prior “bad act” evidence in violation of
D.R.E. 404, and second that there was insufficient evidence to convict Nelson on
all charges.  We disagree on both issues for the following reasons.
(9) First, Nelson contends that allowing the evidence that he was a drug
dealer violated D.R.E. 404 because it constituted inadmissible “bad act”
evidence.  We begin by stating that when the defense has made a proper
objection to the admission of evidence under D.R.E. 404(b), this Court will
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review the trial court’s decision for abuse of discretion; if no objection is
preserved this Court will review for plain error.1  In this case, the defense did not
object to the introduction of evidence that Nelson was a drug dealer.  In fact, the
record indicates that both the State and Nelson made use of this information.
Moreover, both the State and the Defense stated to the jury during opening
arguments that Nelson, his co-defendant, and the victim were involved with
drugs.  Therefore, we will review this issue for plain error.
(10) Evidence of prior bad acts by a defendant is not admissible to prove
that the defendant is a bad person and therefore committed the crime charged.2
Evidence of prior bad acts will be admitted for other purposes such as motive,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.3
This is not an exclusive list.4  A party is “allowed to offer evidence of uncharged
misconduct for any material purpose other than to show a mere propensity or
disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the charged crime.”5
                                   
1 See Trump v. State, Del. Supr., 753 A.2d 963, 970 (2000); Zimmerman v. State, Del. Supr., 565 A.2d 887 (1989).
2 See D.R.E. 404(a).
3 See D.R.E. 404(b).
4 See Getz v. State, Del. Supr., 538 A.2d 726 (1988).
5 Id. at 730.
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(11) To guide the trial court in determining whether evidence of prior bad
acts is admissible, this Court in Getz announced the following six principles: (1)
the evidence must be material to an issue in the case; (2) the evidence must be
introduced for a purpose sanctioned by Rule 404(b) or any other purpose not
inconsistent with the basic prohibition against evidence of bad character or
criminal disposition; (3) evidence of the other acts must be proved by ... clear
and conclusive evidence; (4) the other acts cannot be too remote in time; (5) the
court needs to balance the probative value of such evidence against its potential
for prejudice;6 and (6) the court must instruct the jury about the reason the
evidence was admitted.7
(12) Under the circumstances of this case, it was not plain error to allow
the evidence of Nelson’s bad acts because the evidence was admissible under
Getz.  First, this evidence was material to both the State and the defense. Both
                                   
6 Under the fifth factor of Getz, the D.R.E 403 analysis, this Court has established factors for the trial court to weigh
when deciding whether to admit the 404(b) evidence.  Those factors are (1) the extent to which the point to be
proved is disputed, (2) the adequacy of proof of the prior conduct, (3) the probative force of the evidence, (4) the
proponent's need for the evidence, (5) the availability of less prejudicial proof, (6) the extent of the prejudice
associated with the evidence, (7) the similarity between the charged offense and the prior activity, (8) the
effectiveness of limiting instructions, and (9) whether the prior act evidence would significantly prolong the trial.
Trump, 753 A.2d at 970.
7 Getz, 538 A.2d at 730; see also Trump, 753 A.2d at 970.
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sides were asserting different theories of the case,8 but the assertions still
centered on drug transactions.  Second, the evidence was introduced for a
purpose sanctioned by Rule 404(b), which allows bad act evidence to prove
motive.  There were two possible motives for the shooting in this case.  Under
either theory, evidence that Nelson was a drug dealer was relevant to prove
motive.  Third, the evidence of prior bad acts was proven by clear and
convincing evidence.  Several witnesses testified that they knew or had seen
Nelson engage in drug transactions.  Fourth, these acts were not too remote in
time because the evidence of the drug transactions was very current.  Fifth, the
probative value of such evidence outweighed its potential for prejudice.9  It was
probative to both sides of the case.  Nelson asserts that, without the evidence that
he was a drug dealer, the evidence against him was weak.  But he never objected
to the admission of the drug-dealing evidence.  Finally, the trial court did provide
a limiting jury instruction pertaining to the prior bad act evidence.  Under the
facts of this case, it was not plain error for the court to allow this evidence.
                                   
8 The State’s theory was that Nelson and Garner shot the victim because he had snitched on their friend, Chavarria,
which resulted in her being arrested and incarcerated during a previous incident.  The defendant alleged that the
victim purposely misidentified him as being involved in the shooting because Mercado wanted to eliminate Nelson
and Garner from competing for drug customers on the same corner.
9 In conducting this analysis, the trial court should have conducted a balancing test using the factors outlined in this
Court’s decision in Trump, 753 A.2d at 970.  It does not appear that the trial court conducted this analysis.  The
court most likely did not conduct this analysis because neither the defense nor the prosecution sought to preclude
this evidence.
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(13) Nelson also alleges that the trial court erred by not granting his
judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty.
Nelson reasons that there was insufficient evidence because the witnesses who
testified were not credible.  On appeal from the denial of a motion for judgment
of acquittal, this Court decides de novo whether any rational trier of fact, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the crime.10  We find that
there was sufficient evidence to find Nelson guilty of the charges.
(14) In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court carefully
avoids second-guessing judgments within the traditional province of the jury.11
“Under Delaware law, the jury is the sole trier of fact, responsible for
determining witness credibility, resolving conflicts in the testimony, and drawing
any inferences from the proven facts.”12  It is entirely within the jury's discretion
to accept one witness' testimony and reject the conflicting testimony of other
witnesses.13
                                   
10 See Cline v. State, Del. Supr., 720 A.2d 891, 892 (1998).
11 Trump, 753 A.2d at 972.
12 See Chao v. State, Del. Supr., 604 A.2d 1351, 1363 (1992).
13 See Pryor v. State, Del. Supr., 453 A.2d 98, 100 (1982).
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(15) Here, there were two theories presented to the jury and the witnesses
presented testimony supporting those different theories. Although there was
conflicting testimony, it was for the jury to determine witness credibility.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there was
substantial evidence in the record to support the finding that Nelson was in the
white Chevy Blazer and that he was involved in the attempted murder of
Mercado.  For this reason, this Court will not disturb the findings of the jury.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ E. Norman Veasey
Chief Justice