Case Title: TIMOTHY WAYNE GROENSTEIN V. YASMINE ELIZABETH GROENSTEIN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
TIMOTHY WAYNE GROENSTEIN V. YASMINE ELIZABETH GROENSTEIN2005 WY 6104 P.3d 765Case Number: 04-60Decided: 01/19/2005
October Term, A.D. 2004

TIMOTHY 
WAYNE GROENSTEIN,

Appellant

(Plaintiff),

v.

YASMINE 
ELIZABETH GROENSTEIN,

Appellee

(Defendant).

Appeal from theDistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Mark 
Charles Anzman, Cheyenne, 
WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Anzman.

Representing 
Appellee:

Lynda 
G. Cook, Cheyenne, 
WY.  Argument by Ms. 
Cook.

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and 
STEBNER, D.J., Retired.

  
  
            
STEBNER, District Judge, Retired.

[¶1]      Timothy 
Groenstein (Father) filed for divorce from Yasmine Groenstein (Mother).  The couple has one child.  Father appeals the divorce decree 
entered by the district court.  
Father claims that the district court abused its discretion in 
determining child custody and child support.  We affirm in part and reverse in part. 

[¶2]      Father states the 
issues as:

1.  Did 
the district court abuse its discretion in deciding that Defendant should have 
custody of the parties' son, []?

2.  Did 
the district court abuse its discretion by determining Plaintiff's child support 
obligation without giving any consideration to benefits paid to his son, [], by 
the Social Security Administration on account of his father's 
disability?

3.  Did 
the district court abuse its discretion in determining the amount of child 
support owed by Plaintiff by imputing income to him based on a 10% annual return 
on his investment portfolio?

4.  Did 
the district court abuse its discretion in determining the amount of imputed 
income attributed to the Defendant when computing child 
support?

Mother 
rephrases the issues as:

1.  Was 
the district court's award of primary custody to the mother a reasonable choice 
under the circumstances, giving full consideration to the best interests of the 
child and the evidence presented?

2.  Was 
the district court's decision not to consider social security disability 
payments to the minor child in computing income and determining the child 
support obligation of the father a reasonable choice?

3.  Was 
the district court's award of child support based on imputed income from an 
investment portfolio a reasonable choice under the circumstances given the 
evidence presented?

4.  Was 
the district court's award of child support based on imputed income of Appellee 
a reasonable choice under the circumstances?

[¶3]      Mother and Father 
met in Colombia 
in November of 2000.  After a brief 
courtship, Mother and Father were married on June 16, 2001, in Jackson, Wyoming.  
In December of 2001, the couple's son was born.  However, Mother's and Father's 
relationship deteriorated in the months following the child's birth, and Father 
filed for divorce on May 29, 2002.

[¶4]      Father is a 
former computer engineer.  In 1985, 
during back surgery, Father suffered a spinal cord injury at the C-5 level.  As a result, Father cannot walk and has 
lost some of the dexterity in his fingers.  
However, he uses a manually propelled wheel chair and has lived 
independently for the last 18 years.  
He continues to participate in many outdoor activities, and also repairs 
his own vehicles, cleans his own home, cooks, and does wood and metalworking. 
Father is not employed, but has a considerable investment portfolio funded by a 
settlement of the malpractice suit stemming from his injury.  

[¶5]      Mother is a 
citizen of Colombia.  
In 1985, she obtained a degree from New YorkUniversity in business administration and 
finance.  Upon earning her business 
degree, Mother worked as the operations manager at a large corporation.  After several years, Mother returned to 
school in Bogot¡, Colombia and obtained a degree in fashion 
design.  Following her schooling in 
Bogot¡, Mother worked in the fashion industry for several years before taking a 
position as a financial planner.  
During the parties' courtship and marriage Mother was not employed.  In the months following the couple's 
separation, Mother began working about 20 hours a week at three part-time 
jobs.  

[¶6]      Before trial, the 
district court appointed a special master to make recommendations on the various 
aspects of the case.  A guardian ad 
litem (GAL) was also appointed to represent the best interests of the 
child.  After a hearing, the special 
master issued his report and recommendations to the court regarding temporary 
custody, visitation, and support.  
The special master noted that both parties demonstrated "a good deal of 
love and concern" for the child and that there was no evidence to suggest that 
either parent was unfit.  The 
special master then found that it was in the best interests of the child to 
award Mother temporary primary physical custody and Father liberal 
visitation.  This recommendation was 
due in part to the child's tender age. 

[¶7]      When calculating 
temporary child support, the special master noted that it was difficult to do so 
because neither party had a real source of income.  At that time Mother did not work, and 
Father's income derived from social security disability payments and income on 
his investments.  The special master 
found that, because of market difficulties at the time, Father's income had 
almost ceased.  He therefore decided 
to impute the statutory rate of interest on Father's investment portfolio.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-102.  His recommendation 
stated:

In this 
case, [Father] has an investment portfolio valued (as of the date of the 
hearing) at $735,000.00.  Imputing a 
statutory rate of interest on that sum would yield [an] annual gross income of 
$73,500.00.  Reducing that amount by 
a tax rate of 36% would yield a net annual income of $49,245.00 or a monthly net 
income of $4,103.00 1]  

The 
special master also imputed net income of $500 to Mother.  Following the special master's report, 
the court ordered temporary support and custody in conformity with the special 
master's recommendation. 

[¶8]      A trial to the 
district court took place in September of 2003.  Both parties presented evidence 
regarding their parenting skills and finances.  Prior to trial, the parties received an 
evaluation from a custody evaluation expert, Dr. Steven Nelson.  Dr. Nelson testified at trial that he 
recommended a shared custody arrangement with physical visitation of three days 
with one overnight visitation.  The 
GAL recommended that Mother have primary custody.  As ordered in the Divorce Decree, the 
district court found that shared custody was not appropriate, and found that 
Mother should have primary care, custody, and control of the child subject to 
Father's liberal visitation.  The 
parties had previously stipulated to Father having visitation on three 
days.  The district court found that 
this three-day visitation was working well and should not be changed and also 
ordered overnight visitation at Father's house every other weekend.  

[¶9]      The district 
court additionally found that Mother was working 20 hours a week at three 
part-time jobs but determined that Mother was capable of working 40 hours a week 
and thus found Mother voluntarily underemployed and imputed Mother's net income 
at $1,400 per month.  The district 
court also found that Father was voluntarily unemployed and used the special 
master's calculation of imputed income to impute income to Father.  The district court reasoned, 

[Father's] income is derived from his investment portfolio, a 
$1,290.00 monthly Social Security Disability Insurance benefit and a $674.00 
monthly social security benefit for the [child].  [Father] has not filed a Financial 
Affidavit and the testimony at trial is unclear as to [Father's] income.  Therefore, the Court is relying upon 
[the special master's] finding of imputed net income of $4,103.00.  

Father 
appeals.  

[¶10]   This court recently reiterated the 
appropriate standard of review for cases involving these issues.  

            
Custody, visitation, child support, and alimony are all committed to the 
sound discretion of the district court.  
Scherer v. Scherer, 931 P.2d 251, 253-54 (Wyo. 1997); Triggs v. Triggs, 920 P.2d 653, 657 
(Wyo. 1996); Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 352 (Wyo. 
1995).  It has been our consistent 
principle that in custody matters, the welfare and needs of the children are to 
be given paramount consideration.  
Scherer, 931 P.2d  at 254; Rowan v. Rowan, 786 P.2d 886, 890 
(Wyo. 1990); see also Gurney v. Gurney, 
899 P.2d 52, 55 (Wyo. 1995) and Fink v. 
Fink, 685 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 1984).  The determination of the best interests 
of the child is a question for the trier of fact.  "We do not overturn the decision of the 
trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of 
a violation of some legal principle." Fink, 685 P.2d  at 36.

            
A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which 
exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.  Pinther v. Pinther, 888 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Dowdy v. 
Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 440 (Wyo. 1993)).  Our review entails evaluation of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the district court's decision, and we 
afford the prevailing party every favorable inference while omitting any 
consideration of evidence presented by the unsuccessful party.  Triggs, 920 P.2d  at 657; 
Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 351 (Wyo. 1994).  Findings of fact not supported by the 
evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the great weight of the evidence 
cannot be sustained.  Jones v. 
Jones, 858 P.2d 289, 291 (Wyo. 1993).  Similarly, an abuse of discretion is 
present "when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored.'" 
Triggs, 920 P.2d  at 657 (quoting Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 
996 ( 
Wyo. 
1993)).

Pahl v. 
Pahl, 2004 
WY 40, ¶6, 87 P.3d 1250, ¶6 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 1998)).

[¶11]   
Father contends that the district court abused its discretion in granting 
primary custody to Mother.  He 
claims that the district court failed to consider three factors.  First, he claims that because Dr. Nelson 
recommended a shared custody arrangement, the district court ignored Dr. 
Nelson's findings and recommendations.  
Second, he claims that the district court ignored the risk that Mother 
could return to Colombia and effectively deny Father any 
further contact with his son.  
Third, he claims that the district court ignored the fact that Mother 
would have to place the child in daycare while Father was available full-time to 
care for the child.  We do not agree 
that the district court abused its discretion in determining 
custody.

[¶12]   
As this court has noted many times before, Wyoming statutes require 
a district court to consider an array of factors in reaching a custody 
decision.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-201 (LexisNexis 2003).  
"Depending on the case, different factors will present a greater need for 
emphasis.  Additionally, a process 
of this kind could readily swing the balance toward one party despite there 
being a material factor in favor of the other party.'"  Pahl, ¶10 (quoting Produit v. 
Produit, 2001 WY 123, ¶22, 35 P.3d 1240, ¶22 (Wyo. 2001)).  The emphasis throughout the entire 
process is the best interest of the child in that particular family.  Pahl, ¶10.  Therefore, as with all child custody 
decisions, we must determine whether in this case the district court weighed the 
relevant factors to determine what was in the best interests of this child.  Id.  We would note at the outset that both 
parents were fit parents who loved their child.  Mother was the primary caretaker.  However, it was noted that both parents 
were better than adequate.  In that 
sense, it appears that most of the statutory factors failed to weigh heavily in 
one parent's favor.  We therefore 
examine the factors Father claims the district court failed to consider.         

[¶13]   
We begin with Dr. Nelson's testimony and recommendation.  Dr. Nelson evaluated Father and Mother 
prior to trial.  During the course 
of his testimony he noted that both parents had a lot to offer the child.  He suggested that the physical 
visitation arrangement of three days a week was appropriate.  He also made a recommendation for shared 
custody.  In looking at the record 
and divorce decree, it appears that the district court did not ignore Dr. 
Nelson's testimony.  In fact, the 
court followed Dr. Nelson's recommendation regarding physical custody fairly 
closely.  The court ordered exactly 
three days of visitation and added an overnight visitation.  

[¶14]   
It is likewise clear that the district court considered a shared custody 
arrangement because the district court specifically addressed shared custody in 
the divorce decree.  Therein the 
court stated:  "This is not an 
appropriate case for shared or joint custody.  These parties appear to have very little 
ability to cooperate.  Communication 
between the two is very limited and, at most times, unsuccessful."  We conclude that the record supports the 
district court's finding on this matter.  
Testimony showed that the parties had a hard time getting along.  Father and Mother often had little to no 
communication.  Father regarded 
Mother's attempts to communicate as "telling him what to do" and had no interest 
in working on communication.  We 
therefore determine that the district court did not ignore Dr. Nelson's 
recommendation, but instead decided that shared custody would be 
inappropriate.  

[¶15]   
Second, the evidence presented at trial included testimony about the 
dangers of living in Colombia.   The risk of a parent moving 
internationally is one of the many factors for the district court to 
consider.  See Stonham v. 
Widiastuti, 2003 WY 157, ¶¶14-19, 79 P.3d 1188, ¶¶14-19 (Wyo. 2003) and 
Pahl, ¶22.  Certainly, as we 
noted in Stonham, international elements complicate custody matters.  However, based on the testimony 
presented at trial, it appears that an international move was not an immediate 
concern.  Although Mother was from 
Colombia and Father asserted that she had 
threatened to move back there with the child, Mother clearly testified that she 
had no intention of moving to Colombia.  
Dr. Nelson similarly testified that Mother never said anything other than 
that she was planning to stay.  
Furthermore, Mother testified that she could not travel to Colombia with the child 
without Father's signed consent.  
The district court is placed in the position to assess the credibility of 
witnesses.  Ekberg v. Sharp, 
2003 WY 123, ¶10, 76 P.3d 1250, ¶10 (Wyo. 2003).  We do not reweigh the evidence; and, as 
noted in our standard of review, we afford the prevailing party every favorable 
inference from conflicting evidence.  
Pahl, ¶6.  We 
consequently conclude that the district court could reasonably determine that a 
move to Colombia 
was not a true concern and decide to not factor such a move into its custody 
decision.    

[¶16]   
Third, the district court did not specifically mention the daycare issue 
in the divorce decree.  However, Dr. 
Nelson testified that daycare was appropriate for the child rather than placing 
the child with Father because it "provided a good opportunity for social 
engagement" for the child.  Once 
again, the district court could weigh this testimony to decide that this factor 
did not favor Father.  

[¶17]   
Considering Father's three claims, we conclude that the district court 
considered all the relevant factors and made a reasoned decision.  We therefore hold that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in making its custody determination.  In cases such as this where it is 
apparent that both parents love and care for their child and are fit and 
competent to have custody, the custody determination is difficult and 
demanding.  See Pahl, 
¶9.   Nevertheless, a custody 
determination must be made, and the district court has wide discretion in making 
it.  In this instance, the district 
court did not abuse that discretion. 

Child Support

[¶18]   
Father claims three errors in the district court's calculation of child 
support.  The first is that the 
district court failed to consider the dependent payments the child was receiving 
from the Social Security Administration for Father's disability.  Father asserts that those amounts should 
be used to offset his support obligation.  
Second, Father claims that the district court erred in imputing income 
based on the statutory rate for unsatisfied judgments.  He argues that this was not a realistic 
amount to impute given that his investments were earning much less than that 
amount.  Third, Father claims that 
the district court erred in the amount of income that it imputed to Mother.  He maintains that, based on her 
education, the district court should have imputed a higher income to 
Mother.  We will consider the 
arguments in turn.  

[¶19]   
This court has addressed dependent social security benefits in the child 
support setting before.   In 
Hinckley v. Hinckley, 812 P.2d 907 (Wyo. 1991), we considered a case 
where the children began receiving social security benefits because their father 
was granted social security disability after a divorce.  When discussing the issue of that case 
we noted:  "The question is whether 
we should allow the obligor to unilaterally apply Social Security benefits that 
are received by his children to fulfill his obligation."  Id., at 911.  After acknowledging that a number of 
courts allowed a credit to the non-custodial parent for social security benefits 
paid to the children, we adopted the rule that "the receipt of payments from 
Social Security by the children of one obligated to pay child support may 
constitute a change of circumstances giving rise to justification for a petition 
for modification of the decree."  
Id. at 911.  We then held that those benefits are one 
factor to be considered by the district court in determining whether a material 
change of circumstances has occurred, but that other changes must also be 
considered.  Id.  The primary message of our decision, 
however, was that the obligor must petition the court for modification instead 
of unilaterally reducing his payment.  
Id. at 912 

[¶20]   
Importantly for our purposes today, in Hinkley we recognized that 
when determining child support, a court must consider social security benefits 
received by the child as a factor.  
Id. at 912.  However, we did not dictate how a 
district court must account for these payments and seemed to largely leave it as 
a matter of district court discretion.  
Likewise, we did not directly address what to do with these dependency 
benefits in an initial support determination because in Hinkley we were 
addressing a party seeking modification of an existing order.   

[¶21]   
Next, in Wood v. Wood, 964 P.2d 1259 (Wyo. 1998), we found that 
the district court was correct in not including social security benefits paid 
for the benefit of the children in the support calculation.  In Wood the mother had two 
daughters from a previous marriage.  
The daughters were eligible for, and the wife received on their behalf, 
monthly social security benefits because their biological father had passed 
away.  Id. at 1263.  The mother's second husband adopted the 
girls, and the couple also had two more children.  When the parties divorced, it was argued 
that the social security benefits for the two girls should be attributed to the 
mother as income.  We stated:  "The social security benefits belonged 
to the two girls and, therefore, were not income for the mother.  Accordingly, they cannot be included as 
a part of the mother's monthly net income."  Id. at 1264.  However, there is a significant 
difference between the circumstances of Wood and the instant case.  Because the benefits were the result of 
the girls' deceased biological father, they were not attributable to the social 
security contributions of either parent involved in the support 
calculation.  Certainly, in the 
Wood circumstances, it makes sense to not include the social security 
benefits as net income for the mother.  
Indeed, the circumstances of Wood were different enough from 
Hinckley that we did not even find that 
the district court had to consider those payments as a factor in its support 
calculation.  We, therefore, 
conclude that we have not specifically addressed how dependent social security 
benefits should be considered in circumstances such as those presented in this 
case.   

[¶22]   
In determining how these dependency benefits should be treated, it is 
important to consider the nature of the social security payments which both 
Father and the child receive.  The 
benefits paid in this case are often referred to as Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI).  People qualifying 
for SSDI are those who contributed to the social security program while they 
were working.  New York v. 
Sullivan, 906 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir. 1990).  SSDI benefits must not be confused with 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), which is a wealth-based program providing 
for individuals whose income does not meet a specific amount.  SSI covers those who have never 
contributed to the system and therefore do not qualify for SSDI.  Id.  In Hinckley, at 
910-11 (quoting Andler v. Andler,  
538 P.2d 649, 653 (Kan. 1975)), we noted the nature of disability 
payments: 

The United States 
Congress has seen fit to place the federal government in the role of insurer in 
order to afford members of the work force the protection and security of 
insurance against future disability.  
The fundamental nature of the Social Security system is a form of 
insurance in every sense of that word.  
Benefits paid out by a governmental insurer, under a policy of insurance 
for which the insured has paid premiums, are no more gratuitous than benefits 
paid out by a private insurance company.

This justification is often given for deciding to 
credit the disabled parent's support obligation with the payment made to the 
child.  Father urges us to adopt 
this reasoning and credit his support obligation by the amount the child 
receives.  However, we believe 
Father misses an important step.  
Before deciding whether to credit the parent, we must begin with deciding 
whether to include the child's payment in Father's income. 

[¶23]   
A thorough and helpful discussion of this topic can be found in Tori R. 
A. Kricken, Child Support and Social Security Dependent Benefits: A 
Comprehensive Analysis and Proposal for Wyoming, 2 Wyo. L.Rev. 39 
(2002).  After an in-depth analysis 
including how various states deal with SSDI, Ms. Kricken suggests that 
"Wyoming 
should follow the majority lead of incorporating the benefit payments into the 
obligor-parent's income and, subsequently, allowing a set-off of his support 
obligations."  Id. at 88.  We believe this to be the correct 
approach.  

[¶24]   
The Wyoming child support statutes provide that a 
child support obligation shall be determined considering the combined income of 
both parents.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-304.  Income is defined as: 

any form of payment or return in money or in kind to 
an individual, regardless of source.  
Income includes, but is not limited to wages, earnings, salary, 
commission, compensation as an independent contractor, temporary total 
disability, permanent partial disability and permanent total disability worker's 
compensation payments, unemployment compensation, disability, annuity and 
retirement benefits, and any other payments made by any payor, but shall not 
include .  In determining income, 
all reasonable unreimbursed legitimate business expenses shall be deducted.  Means tested sources of income such as 
Pell grants, aid under the personal opportunities with employment 
responsibilities (POWER) program, food stamps and supplemental security income 
(SSI) shall not be considered income.  
Gross income also means potential income of parents who are voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed.    

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-303(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2003).  The statute specifically 
uses the word "individual" so an argument could be made that the payment must go 
specifically to the parent to be included as income.  However, as can be seen, the definition 
of income is very broad.  For 
instance, it includes the phrases "regardless of source," "includes but is not 
limited to," and "any other payments made by any payor."  These phrases indicate the legislature's 
attempt to include many different sources of income and should therefore be 
interpreted broadly.  

[¶25]   
While the definition does not specifically include SSDI paid to the 
child, it does include worker's compensation payments, disability benefits, and 
annuity and retirement benefits.  It 
is, therefore, apparent that the disability payments received by the parent must 
be included in income.  The same 
reasoning can be used to include the dependency benefits.  SSDI paid to the child is also a 
"disability" benefit.  They are in a 
sense insurance proceeds paid on the occurrence of the parent's disability.  While they are paid for the benefit of 
the child, those amounts were earned and paid for by the disabled parent. 
Furthermore, the statute specifically excludes "means tested" sources of income, 
such as SSI.  Accordingly, it is 
clear that the legislature was well aware of the various types of social 
security payments. Had the Wyoming Legislature wanted to exclude dependent 
benefits from the definition of income, it would have listed them among the 
exclusions.  See Kricken, at 
56.  

[¶26] The Kansas Supreme Court 
reasons:

The Social Security Administration provides benefits 
for minor children whose parent(s) is (are) disabled.  The minor children are considered 
beneficiaries of the benefits earned and paid for by their parents under the 
Social Security Act.  The money 
given under this program is an unqualified grant of money to be used as the 
minor's guardian determines.  

Andler v. Andler, 538 P.2d 649, 651 (Kan. 1975).  Other courts "have been careful to point 
out that, unlike welfare and other forms of public assistance, social security 
benefits represent contributions that a worker has made throughout the course of 
employment; in this sense, benefits represent earnings in much the same way as 
do annuities paid by an insurance policy."  
Miller v. Miller, 890 P.2d 574, 576 (Alaska 1995).      

[¶27]   
This appears to be the majority view.  For instance in Washington, courts have 
noted that: 

            
Common sense also dictates that all disability payments be considered 
income of the disabled parent.  
Disability payments substitute for earned income.  Were the parent not disabled, the parent 
would continue to earn income which would be counted as parental income.  The substitutionary disability payments 
should similarly be counted as parental income.  The payments are made directly to the 
children, or custodial spouse, to protect the children and insure that the 
payments are used for the children's benefit.  But paying the child directly does not 
transform this substitute for the parent's earnings into income for the 
child.

Maples v. Maples, 899 P.2d 1, 5 (Wash.App. 1995).  Alaska courts have found that 
"[a]lthough the benefits are payable directly to the child rather than through 
the contributing parent, the child's entitlement to payment derives from the 
parent, and the payments themselves represent earnings from the parent's past 
contributions."  Miller, at 
577 (discussing social security retirement benefits, but concluding that there 
is no difference between retirement benefits and disability benefits for child 
support purposes.)  In Oklahoma the reasoning is 
similar:  "Social Security benefits 
are analogous to private insurance, where a parent insures against his ability 
to fulfill moral and legal obligations due his minor children.  The payments to a minor child are a 
direct result of the earnings and payments of the parent through his prior 
employment."  Wilson v. 
Stenwall, 868 P.2d 1317, 1319 (Okla.App. 1992).      

[¶28]   
When noting what other courts had done when faced with this question, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court noted, "These payments are for the purpose of 
replacing income lost because of the employee's inability to work upon becoming 
disabled.'  The benefits are not 
gratuities but are earned, and they substitute for lost earning power because of 
the disability.'"  Jenkins v. 
Jenkins, 704 A.2d 231, 235 (Conn. 1998) (citations omitted).  The Jenkins court goes on to 
reason that child support calculations are based on the concept that the child 
should receive the same proportion of parental income as he or she would have 
received if the parents had remained together.  Because both the disability income 
received by the disabled parent and the dependency benefits received by the 
children would have been available to support the children if the family had 
remained intact, those amounts should be included in the child support 
calculation.  The failure to include 
these benefits in the disabled parent's gross income leads to child support 
based on an income figure that does not accurately reflect the income available 
to the family unit.  Id.

[¶29] We agree with the reasoning of these 
courts.  Because dependency benefits 
represent an amount earned through the parent's contributions to the social 
security program, it is proper to include those amounts in the disabled parent's 
income.  We likewise agree that 
including those amounts in the parent's income accurately reflects the funds 
available to support the child, which will result in a more appropriate support 
calculation.    Therefore, 
the funds paid to the child must be included in the disabled parent's 
income.  

[¶30]   
Logically then, we must also conclude that the same amount must be 
credited to the disabled parent's support obligation once the appropriate amount 
of presumptive child support is calculated.  "The majority view  regards social 
security benefits [paid to the dependent children] as earnings of the 
contributing parent and, for this reason, allows benefits paid to a child on the 
parent's behalf to be credited toward child support obligations."  Miller v. Miller, at 577; see 
also Kricken, at 62 n.86 (collecting cases).  Indeed, "[m]ore than thirty states have 
allowed a credit to the noncustodial parent for SSDI dependency benefits or for 
Social Security retirement benefits paid to the minor children of the 
noncustodial parent." Rosenberg v. Merida, 697 N.E.2d 987, 990 (Mass. 
1998) (citing Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Right to Credit on Child 
Support Payments for Social Security or Other Government Dependency Payments 
Made for the Benefit of Child, 34 A.L.R. 5th 447, 469-87 (1996)). As noted above, these 
amounts represent contributions that the worker has made throughout the course 
of his employment, thus the payment to the child derives from the parent.  Miller, at 577.  Therefore, these amounts should be 
regarded as a substitute for support payments from the disabled parent.2  

[¶31]   
We conclude that this method allows for a just calculation of child 
support and hold that it is the method district courts should employ when 
considering dependency benefits in an initial child support calculation.  Of course, as always, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-307(b) allows the district court to deviate from the presumptive child 
support amount.  Should these 
calculations result in an unjust or inappropriate amount of support under the 
circumstances, the district court always has the power to adjust the amount 
through deviation.  

[¶32]   
Father's second claim regarding child support is that the court 
incorrectly calculated Father's income on his investments.  As noted in the fact section, the 
district court used a monthly $4,103 income figure for Father based on a 10% 
statutory rate applied to the value of his investments.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-16-102.  According to the special master's 
calculations, this figure did not include Father's social security benefit or 
the benefit paid to the child.   
Furthermore, it is clear that 10% is not based on any actual return on 
Father's investments.  

[¶33]   
As the district court recognized, Father's income is made up of three 
components: Father's disability payments, the disability payments made to the 
child, and income on Father's investments.  
Although the district court recognized these three components, it appears 
that none of these actual amounts were used to calculate the $4,103 monthly net 
income figure attributed to Father.  
Instead, a 10% statutory rate of interest on Father's investments was 
used as an estimate of Father's total income.  We find this to be an inappropriate 
method of calculating income in these circumstances.  Father's disability benefit and the 
child's SSDI benefit were easily ascertainable amounts.  Indeed, the district court noted these 
amounts in the divorce decree.   
Thus, the only portion of Father's income that was not readily 
ascertainable was his income from investments.  

[¶34]   
It appears from the trial transcript that Father submitted investment 
statements and five years worth of tax returns to prove his income from 
investments.  However, those 
documents were not designated as part of the record on appeal, and consequently 
we cannot determine what financial information those documents provided. 
Additionally, as the district court noted, Father did not file a financial 
affidavit.  Father bears the burden 
of proving his income.  When he 
fails to file a financial affidavit, he does so at his peril because the trial 
court enjoys wide latitude in determining income when a parent has not provided 
the records necessary to make the findings in strict conformity with the 
statute.  See Fountain v. 
Mitros, 968 P.2d 934, 938 (Wyo. 1998). 

[¶35]  
 Nevertheless, the district 
court must still use a reasonable method for determining income.  Simply applying the statutory rate of 
interest for unpaid judgments to Father's investment portfolio to estimate 
Father's entire income bears no rational relationship to Father's actual income. 
Given the lack of financial information, the district court is certainly well 
within its discretion to decide that 10% is the amount that Father is earning 
and can expect to earn on his investments.  
However, the interest rate used should be based on some reasonable 
relationship to Father's actual investment income, not simply the statutory rate 
of interest.  We cannot determine 
whether the district court believes 10% to be a reasonable estimate of Father's 
investment income or if the court intended 10% to be used only if estimating 
Father's entire income.  
Nevertheless because we are remanding this case for other reasons, the 
district court can determine whether the 10% rate is a reasonable interest rate 
to estimate Father's investment income.  
Then, whatever amount the district court decides is suitable to estimate 
Father's income from investments, that amount should be added to Father's 
disability payment, and the child's disability payment to arrive at an 
appropriate monthly net income figure.   

[¶36]   
Finally, the third mistake Father claims in the support calculation is 
that the district court abused its discretion in the amount of income it imputed 
to Mother.  The district court 
imputed income to Mother in the amount of $1,400 per month, finding that Mother 
was voluntarily underemployed.  
Father asserts that this amount should have been higher based on Mother's 
education.  While Father is correct 
that Mother has significant educational training in both finance and fashion 
design, there was no testimony that those jobs were available to Mother in 
Jackson.  At the time of trial Mother worked at 
three separate part-time jobs.  The 
district court heard testimony that the higher paying of those jobs had time 
limitations, and Mother could not increase her hours of work at those 
places.  The only place where she 
could increase her work paid $10 per hour.  
It was entirely reasonable for the district court to impute income at 
this rate.  Durham v. Durham, 
2003 WY 95, ¶12, 74 P.3d 1230, ¶12 (Wyo. 2003).  We therefore conclude that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in imputing income at this rate.  

[¶37]   
We find that the district court did abuse its discretion in determining 
child support.  All the components 
of Father's income must be correctly accounted for.  The portion of the district court's 
judgment regarding child support must, therefore, be reversed for a correct 
calculation in conformity with our above discussion.  

CONCLUSION

[¶38]   
For the reasons expressed above, we affirm in part and reverse in 
part.  The district court's judgment 
with regard to custody is affirmed.  
The district court's determination of child support is reversed and 
remanded for a proper calculation.  

FOOTNOTES

1We are 
slightly puzzled by the net annual income figure of $49,245 because, according 
to our calculations, $73,500 reduced by 36% equals $47,040.  However, we would note that $73,500 
reduced by 33% equals $49,245.  We 
are not sure whether the special master intended to use a 33% tax rate and the 
"36%" noted in the recommendation was an error, or whether he intended to use 
36% tax rate and the "$49,245" noted in the recommendation was in error, or if 
something else altogether was contemplated.  In any event, as we will see in the 
discussion below, the reason that this is important for our purposes is to 
determine if either Father's social security payments or the social security 
payments made to the child were figured into the monthly net income figure.  We conclude they were not, as that 
calculation (regardless a of 33% or 36% tax rate) yields a much higher 
number.

2Should 
the support obligation be less than the dependency benefit, the non-custodial 
parent owes no additional amount, but he is not entitled to a rebate.