Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Reed

Citation: 299 So. 2d 583

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1974-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
299 So. 2d 583 (1974)
THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant,
v.
John A. REED, Respondent.
No. 44613.

Supreme Court of Florida.
March 27, 1974.
Rehearing Denied May 22, 1974.
Norman A. Faulkner, Tallahassee, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, for complainant.
John A. Reed, in pro. per.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary case has been briefed and comes on for final disposition. Oral argument is dispensed with particularly because Respondent John A. Reed has fallen so far short of demonstrating in his proofs or his brief any basis for further delay or justification for oral argument before final disposition of the case.
The case discloses that the Referee found the Respondent had neglected his professional duty to a client and as a consequence appears unworthy of professional trust as an attorney with the credentials of membership in The Florida Bar.
In the Referee's extensive report, the following resume of Respondent's professional neglect in representing his client appears:
The Respondent was employed to represent a client, Carber E. Strange, who had been convicted without an attorney of a criminal charge in municipal court. Strange came to Respondent's office on August 25, 1970, and asked him to handle his appeal, pointing out judgment of conviction was entered on August 3, 1970, and there was no time to waste since the time limit to file notice of appeal was thirty days from the judgment. Respondent agreed to take the case and accepted a $10 retainer, his total fee to be $750. On September 3rd, 1970 he went to Strange and received his check for $375 on the fee. Respondent did not file the notice of appeal but kept assuring Strange that the time for filing was 90 days after judgment. Respondent finally filed the notice on October 28, 1970. It was dismissed as untimely *584 on March 23, 1971. A third check for $50 was given Respondent by Strange on account on December 15, 1970, as well as miscellaneous items of merchandise toward the total fee.
The Referee found that Respondent failed altogether to perfect an appeal for Strange and accepted the related payments without rendering the agreed professional service in the case.
The Respondent's defense before the Referee to Strange's complaint was found by the Referee to be further evidence of duplicitous unprofessional misconduct.
Respondent claimed the money he received by checks from Strange was not for appeal services in the criminal case but was to incorporate Strange's television repair business and thereby insulate him from the demands of his creditors.
Respondent offered as a witness in his behalf one Arnold Caudle who testified before the Referee that he spent much time with his friend, the Respondent, in the summer of 1970; that he was present at the August 25, 1970 meeting of Respondent and Strange and that nothing was discussed except problems relating to Strange's creditors. He also testified that he was present when the $350 check was given and it was only for the incorporation work. Caudle claimed he was present at "several" meetings of Respondent and Strange at the latter's TV repair shop.
The Referee found that Respondent did incorporate a company for Strange but it was not completed until January 5, 1971, well after the time the matter concerning the criminal appeal had transpired.
The Referee found the witness Caudle's testimony was unworthy of belief and was so "pat" it appeared to be manufactured. He concluded from the evidence that Strange had in fact paid Respondent for an appeal but that notice of same was neglectfully delayed and that the Respondent's claim that the fees were paid for the incorporation work was an after-the-fact fabrication to excuse the neglect.
In another criminal case, Strange was represented by Respondent and appeared for him at a trial in the City of Titusville Municipal Court on November 23, 1970. Strange was convicted and sentenced to a mandatory 10 days imprisonment and an alternative $501 fine or 60 days imprisonment on an assault and battery charge and an alternative $201 fine or 30 days imprisonment on a resisting arrest charge. The same fees paid in the appeal case were found by the Referee to also pay for Respondent's services in the assault and resisting arrest case. The Respondent filed a timely notice of appeal in the latter case, but the appeal eventually was dismissed for his neglectfully failing to file instructions to the clerk of the municipal court to perfect the appeal or his brief therein.
The Referee recommended as follows:
We have carefully reviewed the evidence and the Referee's findings and recommendations. It is our view that the case made is not sufficiently strong to justify disbarment because there are a number of inconclusive factors and uncertainties in the evidence. The Referee undoubtedly was provoked by the apparent general lack of diligence and triflingness of Respondent and his ostensibly transparent efforts to excuse his neglect of Strange's cases. However, it is not altogether clear from the ramifications of Strange's cases that Respondent's representation of him was unadulterably neglectful in every respect. An attorney sometimes has the discretion to "give up" an appeal or defense when a case is hopeless, especially where he may have gained some time or delay for his client in the process of his representation. Strange's reliability may be questioned in view of his convictions in Municipal Court. In fact, both Respondent and Strange's credibility in respect to the nature and extent of the representation for $750 is open to question which was disputedly claimed to cover at least three separate items of legal work. Nevertheless, we feel we would be in error if we should fault or attempt to substitute our judgment for the Referee's finding of Respondent's unprofessional conduct. Our view is that we should reduce the penalty of disbarment to that of suspension because the actual case made is not so flagrantly conclusive to warrant so harsh a result although we agree with the Referee that Respondent's unprofessional conduct merits correction.
We direct that Respondent John A. Reed be suspended from the practice of law for one year from date of this judgment and thereafter until he is able to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Florida Bar that it can in all good faith recommend to this Court his reinstatement.
Costs in this matter are charged to Respondent.
ADKINS, C.J., and ERVIN, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.