Case Title: Johnson v. United Airlines

Citation: 

Docket Number: 91894

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 91894-Agenda 14-March 2002.
LUANN JOHNSON, Surviving Spouse and Court-Appointed
Adm'r of the Estate of William E. Johnson, Deceased, et al., v.
UNITED AIRLINES et al. (Raytheon Aircraft Company,
								Appellant;  City of Quincy, Appellee).
Opinion filed January 24, 2003.
	 
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	Over the objection of Raytheon Aircraft Company
(Raytheon), the circuit court of St. Clair County ruled that a
settlement agreement entered into by the administrators of the
estates of Johnson, Carlson, Fries, Berger, Beville, DeSalle,
Hefflebower and Reed (plaintiffs herein) and the City of Quincy
(Quincy) was made in good faith within the meaning of the Joint
Tortfeasor Contribution Act (Contribution Act). 740 ILCS
100/0.01 et seq. (West 1996). That determination was affirmed by
the appellate court. No. 5-98-0719 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23). Raytheon now appeals the finding of
good faith before this court, arguing that the circuit court abused
its discretion when it refused to allow discovery or to conduct an
evidentiary hearing regarding Quincy's relative culpability before
deciding that the settlement and release were made in good faith.
Raytheon also asks this court to decide whether a nonsettling
tortfeasor who challenges the good faith of a settlement has the
burden of proving the absence of good faith by a preponderance of
the evidence or by the higher "clear and convincing" standard.
	For reasons that follow, we affirm the appellate court
judgment upholding the circuit court's finding of good faith.

BACKGROUND
	On November 19, 1996, United Express Flight 5925, carrying
10 passengers and a crew of two, attempted to land on runway 13
at Baldwin Field, a towerless municipal airport owned and
operated by the City of Quincy in Adams County, Illinois. Runway
13 runs northwest and southeast. As United Express Flight 5925
was attempting to land, a small privately owned aircraft,
Beechcraft A-90 King Air, Registration No. N1127D, piloted by
Neil Reinwald and Laura Brooks Winkleman, attempted to take
off at Baldwin Field on runway 4, which runs northeast and
southwest. The two aircrafts collided at the intersection of the two
runways, killing everyone aboard both aircrafts.
	Representatives(1) of eight of the passengers aboard the United
Express aircraft filed wrongful death and survival suits in St. Clair
County, naming as defendants: United Airlines, Inc., and Great
Lakes Aviation, Ltd., alleged to have operated United Express
Flight 5925 as a joint enterprise; Katherine Gathje and Darin
McCombs, the pilot and copilot of the United Express plane; Neil
Reinwald and Laura Brooks Winkleman, the pilot and alleged
copilot of the King Air aircraft; Robert Clarkson and Harvey
Imber, co-owners of the King Air private aircraft; and Raytheon
Aircraft Company, successor to Beech Aircraft Corporation, the
manufacturer of the United Express aircraft. None of the plaintiffs
filed suit against the City of Quincy.
	Raytheon filed third-party contribution claims against Quincy,
alleging that Quincy was subject to liability in tort for the
wrongful deaths of plaintiffs' deceaseds. The gravamen of the
third-party complaints was that Quincy negligently failed to
discharge its duty to business invitees to use ordinary care to
provide reasonably safe ingress and egress from the airport. More
specifically, Raytheon alleged that United Express Flight 5925
attempted to land at Baldwin Field using a straight-in approach,
which violated standard traffic pattern procedure for towerless
airports, that Quincy had been informed by the National
Transportation Safety Board that commercial aircraft were landing
at Baldwin Field using a straight-in approach, and that Quincy
negligently failed to give appropriate or effective notice to all
commercial airlines that they were required to conform their
landings with standard traffic pattern procedures. Raytheon also
moved to transfer venue in all of the cases to Adams County on
grounds of forum non conveniens.
	Quincy moved for the dismissal of the third-party actions.
Quincy first argued that dismissal was required because St. Clair
County was not the proper venue. Suit could only be brought
against Quincy in Adams County because "[a]ctions must be
brought against a *** municipal *** corporation in the county in
which its principal office is located or in the county in which the
transaction or some part thereof occurred out of which the cause
of action arose." 735 ILCS 5/2-103 (West 1998). As an alternative
argument, Quincy contended that the third-party contribution
actions could not be maintained against it because it is absolutely
immune from liability in tort pursuant to the Local Governmental
and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS
10/1-101 et seq. (West 1996)).
	Before the trial court ruled on Quincy's motion to dismiss or
Raytheon's motion to transfer venue, Quincy settled with each of
the eight plaintiffs for a sum of $1,000 plus costs, conditioned on
the plaintiffs' release of Quincy from all claims. Plaintiffs were
also required to obtain a court ruling on the good faith of the
settlement agreements and a dismissal of all third-party claims.
	As required by the settlements, each plaintiff filed a motion
seeking a good-faith ruling. The motions brought by plaintiffs
Johnson, Carlson, and Fries were argued at a hearing before circuit
court Judge Lloyd A. Cueto. The motions brought by the
remaining five plaintiffs-Berger, Beville, DeSalle, Hefflebower
and Reed-were argued at a hearing before circuit court Judge
Michael J. O'Malley. Arguments presented at both hearings were
substantially similar. Raytheon opposed the plaintiffs' motions,
arguing that the settlements were not made in good faith or,
alternatively, that a good-faith ruling would be premature at this
juncture. Raytheon asked both judges to allow discovery and to
conduct an evidentiary hearing to develop a factual basis for
deciding whether the settlements were made in good faith.
	Ruling independently, both circuit court judges denied the
request for discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Both judges held
that, in light of all the surrounding circumstances, the settling
parties had established that the settlements were made in good
faith and that Raytheon had not presented any evidence to
overcome the presumption of good faith. The settlements were
approved and Raytheon's third-party claims against Quincy were
dismissed. The circuit court orders contained an express finding,
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)),
that the judgment dismissing Quincy from all claims was final and
appealable. Raytheon appealed and the cases were consolidated for
review.
	The Fifth District of our appellate court affirmed the circuit
court's good-faith ruling. The appellate court agreed that the
settling parties had made a sufficient preliminary showing that the
settlements had been made in good faith. The court also held that
Raytheon had not met its burden of proving the absence of good
faith by clear and convincing evidence. The appellate court
rejected Raytheon's argument that a good-faith finding could not
be made without determining the relative liability of the settling
party and, consequently, held that the circuit court did not abuse
its discretion by refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing before
deciding the good faith of the settlements.
	Raytheon petitioned for leave to appeal and we granted the
petition. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).
	Raytheon raises two issues for our consideration. First,
Raytheon asks this court to resolve a split among the lower courts
as to the burden of proof imposed upon a nonsettling tortfeasor
who challenges a settlement on the grounds that the transaction
was not executed in good faith within the meaning of the
Contribution Act. Raytheon contends that when challenging the
good faith of a settlement, a nonsettling party has the burden of
proving the absence of good faith by a preponderance of the
evidence instead of the higher "clear and convincing" standard.
Second, Raytheon asks this court to reverse the circuit court's
ruling that the settlement between plaintiffs and Quincy was made
in good faith. Raytheon contends that the settlement constitutes
bad faith because the settlement amount of $1,000 per plaintiff is
grossly disproportionate to the overall damages claimed by each
plaintiff. Raytheon also contends that the circuit court could not
have determined whether the settlement was made in good faith
within the meaning of the Contribution Act without determining
Quincy's relative culpability. Thus, Raytheon argues that the
circuit court should have allowed discovery and conducted an
evidentiary hearing so that a factual basis for determining
Quincy's relative culpability could have been developed before a
good-faith determination was made.
ANALYSIS
	The Contribution Act was enacted by our legislature in 1979
as a codification of this court's decision in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1 (1977). See
In re Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d 153 (1994). The
Contribution Act creates a statutory right of contribution in actions
"where 2 or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out
of the same injury to person or property, or the same wrongful
death" (740 ILCS 100/1, 2(a) (West 1996)), to the extent that a
tortfeasor pays more than his pro rata share of the common
liability (740 ILCS 100/2(b) (West 1996)).
	The Act provides in section 2(c):
			"(c) When a release or covenant not to sue or not to
enforce judgment is given in good faith to one or more
persons liable in tort arising out of the same injury or the
same wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the
other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful
death unless its terms so provide but it reduces the
recovery on any claim against the others to the extent of
any amount stated in the release or the covenant, or in the
amount of the consideration actually paid for it,
whichever is greater." 740 ILCS 100/2(c) (West 1996).
	The "good faith" of a settlement is the only limitation which
the Act places on the right to settle and it is the good-faith nature
of a settlement that extinguishes the contribution liability of the
settling tortfeasor. 740 ILCS 100/2(d) (West 1996); Dubina v.
Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 185, 191 (2001); In
re Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 161. The Act, however,
does not define the term "good faith," nor does it provide any
procedural guidelines as to when or how a good-faith
determination is to be made.
Burden of Proof
	In the case at bar, Raytheon asks this court to resolve a
conflict which has arisen with regard to the burden of proof
imposed on a nonsettling tortfeasor to show that a settlement was
not made in good faith within the meaning of the Contribution
Act. Raytheon contends that the preponderance of the evidence
standard should be imposed, rather than the stricter "clear and
convincing" evidence standard. We agree.
	In Barreto v. City of Waukegan, 133 Ill. App. 3d 119 (1985),
one of the first cases in this state to consider the issue of good faith
within the context of the Contribution Act, the court, relying on
Fisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 447, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47, 56 (1980), formulated a basic procedure for deciding the
issue of good faith. Rejecting the notion that a jury or bench trial
was required to determine whether a settlement was made in good
faith, the Barreto court held that, when a trial court is notified that
a settlement has been reached and a good-faith ruling is sought,
the trial court should rule on the good faith of the settlement as
soon as practicable, apart from and in advance of any trial on the
tort issues. Barreto, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 128. Further, the Barreto
court held that the settling parties seeking discharge from
contribution liability should bear the initial burden of making a
preliminary showing of good faith, but that once a preliminary
showing is made, the "burden of proof on the issue of good faith
of the settlor shifts to the party who claims that the settlement was
not made in good faith or is collusive." Barreto, 133 Ill. App. 3d
at 128.
	This has been the basic scheme employed by courts of this
state when deciding the issue of good faith. See Wilson v. The
Hoffman Group, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 308, 318-19 (1989). However,
this court has never articulated what quantum of evidence must be
produced, either by the settling parties to establish a preliminary
showing of good faith, or by the nonsettling challengers of the
settlement to prove the absence of good faith. There are, however,
a number of appellate court decisions which have spoken to these
issues.
	In Wasmund v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater
Chicago, 135 Ill. App. 3d 926, 928 (1985), the court held that,
because public policy strongly favors the peaceful and voluntary
resolution of claims, "[w]here there is a resolution of a claim by
virtue of a release or covenant, a presumption of validity is
created" and the party challenging the release must carry the
burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.
Subsequently, courts, citing Wasmund and its progeny, have
applied these same standards when deciding the good faith of
settlements. See Warsing v. Material Handling Services, Inc., 271
Ill. App. 3d 556, 560 (1995) (after a preliminary showing of good
faith by the settling parties, the burden shifts to the challenging
party to prove the settlement invalid by clear and convincing
evidence); Higginbottom v. Pillsbury Co., 232 Ill. App. 3d 240,
249 (1992) (after a preliminary showing has been made, the party
opposing the settlement must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the settlement is invalid); Pritchard v.
SwedishAmerican Hospital, 199 Ill. App. 3d 990, 996-97 (1990)
(when settling parties represent to the court that they have reached
a good-faith settlement, identify the terms and show that
consideration was given, a presumption of validity arises, which
must be overcome by the party challenging the settlement by clear
and convincing evidence); Melzer v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,193 Ill.
App. 3d 59, 62 (1989) (once a preliminary showing of good-faith
settlement has been made, the burden shifts to the party
challenging the settlement to establish that it was not made in
good faith by presenting clear and convincing evidence of fraud or
mutual mistake); Ruffino v. Hinze, 181 Ill. App. 3d 827, 829
(1989) (where a preliminary showing of good faith is made, a
presumption of validity arises which must be overcome by clear
and convincing evidence); McKanna v. Duo-Fast Corp., 161 Ill.
App. 3d 518, 525 (1987) (assertion that an agreement is invalid
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence); Bituminous
Insurance Cos. v. Ruppenstein, 150 Ill. App. 3d 402 (1986)
(presumption of validity arises when a claim is settled by release
or covenant and, thereafter, one challenging the release bears the
burden of proving invalidity); O'Connor v. Pinto Trucking
Service, Inc., 149 Ill. App. 3d 911, 915 (1986) (the party
challenging the settlement has the burden of producing clear and
convincing evidence to establish the invalidity of the settlement).
	In general, for a "preliminary showing" of good faith, courts
have required only that the settling parties prove the existence of
a legally valid settlement agreement. In some instances, this
included the obligation to prove that consideration was given and
received. Proof of consideration was then held to be prima facie
evidence of validity, which gave rise to a presumption that the
settlement was in good faith. See Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc.,
317 Ill. App. 3d 628, 633 (2000); Solimini v. Thomas, 293 Ill.
App. 3d 430, 437 (1997); McDermott v. Metropolitan Sanitary
District, 240 Ill. App. 3d 1, 44 (1992).
	With regard to the standard of proof imposed on the
nonsettling tortfeasor challenging the good faith of the settlement,
"clear and convincing" evidence was generally recognized as the
appropriate standard. That standard, however, was called into
question in Bowers v. Murphy & Miller, Inc., 272 Ill. App. 3d 606
(1995). In Bowers, the court held that, because of the competing
policy considerations which must be weighed when deciding good
faith within the meaning of the Contribution Act, it would be more
appropriate to require nonsettling tortfeasors to prove the bad faith
of a settlement by a preponderance of the evidence. Following
Bowers, other panels of the First District have adopted the
preponderance standard. See Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc., 317 Ill.
App. 3d at 633; Stickler v. American Augers, Inc., 303 Ill. App. 3d
689 (1999); Evans v. Tabernacle No. 1 God's Church of Holiness
in Christ, 283 Ill. App. 3d 101, 107 (1996) (the burden of proof
rests on the nonsettling tortfeasor to establish a lack of good faith
by a preponderance of the evidence).
	Having reviewed the relevant case law, we conclude that,
when a court determines whether a settlement was negotiated in
good faith within the meaning of the Contribution Act, the settling
parties carry the initial burden of making a preliminary showing of
good faith. At a minimum, the settling parties must show the
existence of a legally valid settlement agreement. However, not all
legally valid settlements satisfy the good-faith requirements of the
Contribution Act. See Stickler v. American Augers, Inc., 325 Ill.
App. 3d 506, 511 (2001); Stickler v. American Augers, Inc., 303
Ill. App. 3d 689, 693 (1999); Bowers, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 610-11.
Therefore, other factual evidence may be necessary before the
court may determine, as an initial matter, whether the settlement
is fair and reasonable in light of the policies underlying the
Contribution Act.
	Further, we are persuaded by the well-reasoned decision in
Bowers that, once a preliminary showing of good faith has been
made by the settling parties, the party challenging the good faith
of the settlement need prove the absence of good faith by a
preponderance of the evidence. The "clear and convincing"
standard, when traced back to its genesis in Wasmund, rests on a
body of law where the burden was on a party to a settlement
attempting to set aside the settlement upon a claim of fraud,
misrepresentation, or mistake of fact. See McComb v. Seestadt, 93
Ill. App. 3d 705 (1981); Martin v. Po-Jo, Inc., 104 Ill. App. 2d 462
(1969). The Bowers court concluded:
			"When we address setting aside a release on the
application of a party to the agreement, we take into
consideration the rights of the contracting parties
tempered by a public policy favoring settlement.
Nonsettling defendants in a contribution setting are not
parties to the settlements entered into between a plaintiff
and a settling tortfeasor, yet they have rights that are
affected by those settlements. The Contribution Act
promotes not only the policy favoring settlement, it also
promotes the policy favoring the equitable apportionment
of damages among tortfeasors. [Citation.] The policy
favoring settlement is more than accommodated by
shifting the burden of proof to a nonsettling defendant to
establish that a settlement is not in good faith once a
preliminary showing of good faith has been made. By not
only shifting the burden of proof to a nonsettling
defendant, but also elevating that burden to proof by clear
and convincing evidence, a distinct priority is given to the
policy favoring settlement over the policy favoring the
equitable apportionment of damages. Both policies are
important [citation], and we fail to see any reason why
one should be favored over the other. In our opinion,
shifting the burden of proof to a nonsettling defendant to
establish a lack of good faith and fixing that burden at the
traditional preponderance of the evidence standard
protects both policies promoted by the Contribution Act
while favoring neither." Bowers, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 610.
	This court has previously recognized that the Contribution Act
seeks to promote two important public policies-the
encouragement of settlements and the equitable apportionment of
damages among tortfeasors. See Dubina v. Mesirow Realty
Development, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d at 193-94; In re Guardianship of
Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 171. When a court decides whether a
settlement was negotiated in "good faith," it must strike a balance
between these two policy considerations. We agree with Bowers
that the balance of these two policies is best struck by placing the
burden of proving the absence of good faith on the party
challenging the settlement, but by sustaining the challenge to the
settlement when a preponderance of the evidence indicates a lack
of good faith.
	In the case at bar, the appellate court held that the proper
standard to be imposed on a party attempting to overcome a
preliminary showing of good faith was proof by clear and
convincing evidence. Nevertheless, the appellate court ruled that
Raytheon had produced no evidence of bad faith and, for that
reason, upheld the trial court's finding of good faith. The trial
court(2) also ruled that, regardless of the burden imposed, Raytheon
had not supported its claim with any evidence. Consequently, it is
not necessary that we remand this cause to the trial court or the
appellate court for further consideration under the preponderance
standard announced today. Instead, we shall review the finding
that the settlements reached by the plaintiffs and Quincy were
made in good faith.


Good Faith
	As noted earlier, "good faith" is not defined by the
Contribution Act. Nor can there be a single, precise formula for
determining what constitutes "good faith" within the meaning of
the Contribution Act that would be applicable in every case. A
settlement will not be found to be in good faith if it is shown that
the settling parties engaged in wrongful conduct, collusion, or
fraud. In re Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 161; Lowe v.
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. 124 Ill. App. 3d 80, 94 (1984). Nor
will a settlement agreement satisfy the good-faith requirement if
it conflicts with the terms of the Act or is inconsistent with the
policies underlying the Act. Dubina v. Mesirow Realty
Development, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d  at 192 (assignment of plaintiffs'
claims against nonsettling tortfeasors to settling tortfeasors was
contrary to the terms of and policies underlying the Act); In re
Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d 153 (1994) (settlement
containing loan-receipt provision conflicted with the terms of the
Act and did not promote settlements or the equitable
apportionment of damages). Ultimately, however, whether a
settlement satisfies the good-faith requirement as contemplated by
the Contribution Act is a matter left to the discretion of the trial
court based upon the court's consideration of the totality of the
circumstances. Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 197
Ill. 2d at 191-92; In re Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 162.
A good-faith determination is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of
discretion. Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d  at 192; In re Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 162.
	In the case at bar, the trial court, ruling on the good faith of
the settlement between plaintiffs and Quincy, first required the
settling parties to make a preliminary showing of good faith.
Quincy represented to the court that, although it believed itself to
be immune from all tort liability, it agreed to settle with plaintiffs
for the nominal amount of $1,000 per plaintiff so that it could
avoid the time and expense of additional litigation. Plaintiffs'
counsel then advised the trial court that, after extensive research,
it had determined that the likelihood of success in a tort suit
against Quincy was marginal. Therefore, plaintiffs decided that the
limited amount of litigation dollars were better spent pursuing
other sources. The settlement money from Quincy would be used
for the on-going litigation.
	The trial court found that the representations made by the
settling parties were a sufficient preliminary showing of good faith
and shifted the burden to Raytheon to show that the settlements
were made in bad faith. The court then found that Raytheon failed
to show any evidence of bad faith and ruled that, based on the
totality of the circumstances, the settlement was made in good
faith.
	Raytheon now contends that the trial court abused its
discretion when it decided that the settlements between Quincy
and the plaintiffs were made in good faith without first conducting
an evidentiary hearing to determine Quincy's relative culpability.
Raytheon contends that where, as here, the amount tendered in
settlement is nominal and there is a gross disparity between the
settlement amount and the ad damnum in the complaints, the
nonsettling party should be given an opportunity to show that the
settlement amount bears no reasonable relationship to the settling
party's relative culpability. We disagree.
	At the outset we find Raytheon's premise to be faulty. The
fact that the trial court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, as
Raytheon requested, does not mean that the trial court did not
consider whether the settlement amount bore a reasonable
relationship to the settling party's relative culpability. At the
hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a good-faith finding, the trial
court had before it the pleadings, memoranda and other filings in
the case. The trial court also heard extensive argument by counsel
and, after hearing argument, took the matter under advisement and
invited the parties to submit any additional materials in support of
their positions. There is no reason to believe that the trial court
was unable to determine, from the facts before it, the parties'
relative culpability. The trial court is in the best position to decide
what type of hearing is necessary to fully adjudicate the issue of
good faith. See Barreto v. City of Waukegan, 133 Ill. App. 3d 119.
	We are also unpersuaded that the amount of the settlement
here is an indication of bad faith. It is true that plaintiffs'
complaints sought damages in the millions of dollars and that the
settlements with Quincy were for the nominal figure of $1,000 per
plaintiff. However, the disparity between the settlement amount
and the ad damnum in the complaint is not an accurate measure of
the good faith of a settlement. See Pritchard v. SwedishAmerican
Hospital, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 998. Nor does the small amount of
the settlement, alone, require a finding of bad faith. See Pritchard
v. SwedishAmerican Hospital, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 998. The amount
of a settlement must be viewed in relation to the probability of
recovery, the defenses raised, and the settling party's potential
legal liability. See Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 232 Ill. App. 3d 463
(1992); O'Connor v. Pinto Trucking Service, Inc., 149 Ill. App. 3d
911, 916 (1986).
	In the case at bar, Quincy claimed absolute immunity from all
tort liability by operation of the Tort Immunity Act. Quincy had
previously asserted this immunity defense in response to
Raytheon's third-party contribution claims and both Quincy and
Raytheon had submitted memoranda to the court on the issue.
Raytheon does not deny that, if Quincy were immune from direct
tort liability, the third-party contribution claims would be barred.
See Board of Trustees of Community College, District No. 508 v.
Coopers & Lybrand LLP, 296 Ill. App. 3d 538 (1998) (public
policy considerations supporting public officials' immunity
requires that the immunity be applied to bar contribution actions
as well as direct actions); Buell v. Oakland Fire Protection
District Board, 237 Ill. App. 3d 940 (1992); Martin v. Lion
Uniform Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 955 (1989); Lietsch v. Allen, 173 Ill.
App. 3d 516 (1988). If Quincy was immune, it could not be
culpable for any damages sought by plaintiffs.
	At the time that plaintiffs settled with Quincy, plaintiffs
recognized that Quincy had a viable defense against tort claims. In
fact, plaintiffs never sued Quincy directly and plaintiffs' counsel
represented to the trial court that the decision not to sue Quincy
was formed after extensive research on the matter indicated that a
suit against Quincy had little likelihood of success. Thus, here,
unlike the situation in Warsing v. Material Handling Services,
Inc., 271 Ill. App. 3d 556, 561 (1995), there is no evidence that
plaintiffs' settlement with Quincy was motivated by a desire to
impede a legitimate claim for contribution. Raytheon has offered
nothing to show that the settlement between Quincy and plaintiffs
was anything but an arms' length agreement. We conclude, then,
that the nominal amount of the settlement, viewed in light of the
circumstances surrounding this case, is not an indication that the
settlement was made in bad faith.
	Raytheon's main argument against the finding of good faith
is that Quincy's immunity defense is not a viable one. Raytheon
contends that the trial court should not have ruled on the good
faith of the settlement without conducting an evidentiary hearing
to "ascertain the validity" of Raytheon's third-party claims and
decide "whether the $1000 bore any reasonable relationship to
Quincy's relative culpability for the accident." Raytheon also
argues that Quincy's continued presence in the lawsuit would have
increased the likelihood that the entire matter would be transferred
out of St. Clair County, which is plaintiffs' chosen forum. Thus,
Raytheon suggests that plaintiffs' decision to settle with Quincy
was motivated by the desire to prevent a change of venue.
	Even if plaintiffs' decision to settle with Quincy was
influenced by matters of venue, we are not persuaded that that
constitutes evidence of bad faith. The fact that a settlement is
advantageous to a party is not necessarily an indication of bad
faith. See O'Connor v. Pinto Trucking Service, Inc., 149 Ill. App.
3d at 916. Although plaintiffs' settlement with Quincy may have
improved plaintiffs' chances of success in defeating Raytheon's
forum non conveniens motion and, thereby, would have allowed
plaintiffs to remain in the forum of their choice, this falls short of
being evidence of collusion or wrongdoing. Furthermore, the trial
court was aware of the venue issue and its possible influence on
plaintiffs' decision to settle. It was one factor in the totality of the
circumstances which the trial court considered when deciding
whether the settlement was made in good faith. Emphasis should
not be placed on any single factor. In re Guardianship of Babb,
162 Ill. 2d  at 162; Ballweg v. City of Springfield, 114 Ill. 2d 107
(1986).
	We also find no merit to Raytheon's claim that a good-faith
determination could not be made unless there was an evidentiary
hearing to determine the validity of the third-party complaints and
Quincy's relative culpability. Raytheon denies in its brief that it is
asking for a trial on the merits. It claims that it "seeks only
discovery and an evidentiary hearing sufficient to determine
whether there is a viable theory of recovery against Quincy."
However, in the context of this case, a determination that there is
"a viable theory of recovery" can only be interpreted as a ruling on
the merits of Quincy's immunity defense. Courts have repeatedly
and consistently held that a separate evidentiary hearing is not
required and that a trial court need not decide the merits of the tort
case or rule on the relative liabilities of the parties before making
a good-faith determination. See Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 232 Ill. App.
3d at 471; Ruffino v. Hinze, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 832; Barreto v. City
of Waukegan, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 128. A court is capable of ruling
on "good faith" without a precise determination of the overall
damages suffered by the plaintiff and the settling tortfeasor's
proportionate liability. See McDermott v. Metropolitan Sanitary
District, 240 Ill. App. 3d 1, 46 (1992) (courts have repeatedly
rejected the "proportionality" or "reasonable range" test for
determining the good faith of a settlement); Pritchard v.
SwedishAmerican Hospital, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 998 (doctor's
settlement contribution of $10,000 in a medical malpractice suit
where plaintiff sought several millions of dollars in damages was
reasonable because plaintiff might not be able to prove proximate
cause).
	We see no purpose for an evidentiary hearing. When the trial
court made its good-faith ruling, the record contained Raytheon's
response to Quincy's motion for dismissal of the third-party
claims. Raytheon disputed Quincy's claim of immunity, both in its
legal filings and in its argument at the good-faith hearing.
Raytheon was given the opportunity to supplement the record and
present additional argument even after the good-faith hearing was
held. Raytheon has made no offer of proof, nor has Raytheon even
suggested what additional evidence concerning the issue of
Quincy's immunity might be revealed by an evidentiary hearing.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Raytheon's
request for an evidentiary hearing.
CONCLUSION
	We agree with the trial court that the settling parties provided
a sufficient preliminary showing of good faith, which Raytheon
failed to overcome. Applying the totality of the circumstances test
to the facts of this case, we find that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it found the settlement between plaintiffs and
Quincy satisfied the good-faith requirement of the Contribution
Act. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate
court upholding the good-faith ruling made by the trial court.



Affirmed.
	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
1.      1Although representatives of all 10 United Express passengers and
the estate of copilot McCombs filed wrongful death and survival
actions, the representatives of eight United Express passengers are the
named plaintiffs in this appeal.

2.      2As noted above, two judges in the circuit court, after receiving the
same evidence and hearing substantially similar arguments, ruled that
the settlements were made in good faith and denied Raytheon's request
for an evidentiary hearing. References to "the trial court" encompass the
rulings of both judges.