Case Title: Purnell v. Delaware

Citation: 

Docket Number: 339, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2014-11-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MARK PURNELL, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 339, 2013 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
v. 
 
 
 
§ 
Superior Court of the  
§ 
State of Delaware, in and for 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0701018040 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  September 24, 2014 
Decided:   November 21, 2014 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, RIDGELY and VALIHURA, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED 
 
Thomas A. Foley, Esquire, (argued), Joseph M. Bernstein, Esquire, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for Appellant. 
 
Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire (argued), Karen V. Sullivan, Esquire, Department 
of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
VALIHURA, Justice: 
2 
 
Defendant-Below, Appellant Mark Purnell (“Purnell”) appeals from a 
Superior Court Order denying his Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief 
following his conviction of the following offenses:  murder second degree; 
attempted robbery first degree; possession of a firearm during commission of a 
felony; possession of a deadly weapon during commission of a felony; possession 
of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited; and conspiracy second degree. 
On October 17, 2008, Purnell was sentenced to an aggregate of 77 years at 
L-5, 21 years of which were mandatory, suspended after serving 45 years at 
decreasing levels of supervision.  Purnell’s convictions and sentences were 
affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.1 
A timely motion for post-conviction relief (“Rule 61 motion”)2 was filed on 
March 25, 2010.  An amended Rule 61 motion was filed on October 11, 2011.  The 
Superior Court referred the matter to a Commissioner for findings and a 
recommendation.  On July 3, 2012, the Commissioner recommended that the Rule 
61 motion be denied.3  Purnell filed a timely appeal from the Commissioner’s 
findings and recommendations.  On May 31, 2013, the Superior Court issued its 
decision denying Purnell’s Rule 61 motion.4 
                                          
 
1 See Purnell v. State, 979 A.2d 1102 (Del. 2009) [hereinafter Purnell I]. 
2 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61. 
3 See State v. Purnell, 2012 WL 2832990 (Del. Super. Jul. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Purnell II]. 
4 State v. Purnell, 2013 WL 4017401 (Del. Super. May 31, 2013) [hereinafter Purnell III]. 
3 
 
On June 28, 2013, Purnell filed a timely appeal in this Court from the 
Superior Court’s Rule 61 decision.  Purnell raises four arguments on appeal, all 
related to the performance of his trial counsel.  First, Purnell argues that his trial 
attorney was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington5 when he failed to request 
an accomplice credibility jury instruction.  Second, Purnell contends that his 
counsel was ineffective when he failed to request a limiting instruction regarding 
the guilty plea entered into by his co-defendant, Ronald Harris (“Harris”), where 
the plea was entered following selection of the jury for a joint trial, but before the 
trial began.  Third, Purnell contends that his counsel was ineffective when he failed 
to appeal the trial court’s ruling denying his request to empanel a new jury 
following disclosure of Harris’ guilty plea.  Finally, Purnell argues that his trial 
counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to comments made by the 
prosecutor, which Purnell contends amounted to improper “vouching” for Harris’ 
credibility. 
We find no merit to Purnell’s appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm.  
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY6 
Tameka Giles (“Mrs. Giles”) was murdered after a botched robbery attempt 
on January 30, 2006.  She was walking with her husband when two men 
                                          
 
5 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
6 These facts are drawn from the Commissioner’s findings and recommendation, which were in 
turn adopted by the Superior Court. 
4 
 
approached them and demanded money.  After she refused, one of them fatally 
shot her in the back.  Both men fled.   
The police quickly identified Harris as a suspect based on eyewitness 
identification from Angela Rayne, who had been smoking crack cocaine nearby at 
the time of the shooting.  Mrs. Giles’ husband also tentatively identified Kellee 
Mitchell (“Mitchell”) as one of the shooters in a photo lineup.  The police arrested 
both men on February 18, 2006.  At the time of the arrest, Purnell was in Harris’ 
apartment, but was not yet considered a suspect.  Neither Harris nor Mitchell 
identified Purnell as one of the assailants during any of their respective interviews 
with the police in 2006. 
Purnell was not identified as a suspect until January 2007, when Corey 
Hammond (“Hammond”) informed the police that he had seen Purnell and Harris 
together on the day of the shooting.  Hammond had previously denied knowing 
anything about the crime, but suddenly recalled that Purnell had complained about 
needing money and was carrying a firearm on the morning of January 30, 2006.  
Hammond also informed police that Purnell had later bragged about killing Mrs. 
Giles.  As with most of the State’s witnesses, Hammond’s credibility was an issue: 
his statement to police followed an arrest on drug-related charges, and the State 
agreed to reduce his sentence in exchange for his trial testimony.  
5 
 
Also in January 2007, Mitchell changed his story and informed the police 
that Purnell was involved in the shooting.  He recalled a conversation in April 2006 
with Purnell in which Purnell confessed to shooting Mrs. Giles.  Mitchell’s 
girlfriend, Etienne Williams (“Williams”), also claimed that she had overheard 
Purnell confess during a telephone call.   
Based on this evidence, the police arrested Purnell.  In April 2007, Purnell 
and Harris were jointly indicted on charges of murder in the first degree, attempted 
robbery in the first degree, conspiracy in the second degree, possession of a firearm 
during the commission of a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a person 
prohibited.  A jury was selected for the trial on April 2, 2008.  Five days later, 
before the trial began, Harris accepted a plea deal from the State.  In exchange for 
pleading guilty to reduced charges, Harris agreed to testify against Purnell.  The 
trial against Purnell began on April 14, 2008, with the same jury initially selected 
for the joint trial. 
The jury voted to convict Purnell of murder in the second degree, attempted 
robbery in the first degree, possession of a firearm during the commission of a 
felony, possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, 
possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited, and conspiracy in the 
second degree.  Purnell was sentenced by the Superior Court to an aggregate of 77 
years at Level 5 incarceration, 21 years mandatory, suspended after serving 45 
6 
 
years at decreasing levels of supervision.  Both the conviction and sentence were 
affirmed by this Court on direct appeal on August 25, 2010.7 
Purnell then filed a motion for postconviction relief under Rule 61, alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The Superior Court referred Purnell’s motion to 
a Commissioner for findings and a recommendation.  On July 3, 2012, the 
Commissioner issued her recommendation that the motion be denied,8 which 
Purnell appealed, seeking de novo review by a judge of the Superior Court.  After 
hearing oral arguments, the Superior Court issued its ruling denying Purnell’s 
motion on May 31, 2013.9   Purnell now appeals that decision to this Court. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
As we recently stated in Hoskins v. State,10 “‘[w]e review a Superior Court 
judge’s denial of a Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief for abuse of 
discretion.”’11  Constitutional questions and other questions of law are reviewed de 
novo.12 
                                          
 
7 Purnell I, 979 A.2d 1102. 
8 Purnell II, 2012 WL 2832990. 
9 Purnell III, 2013 WL 4017401. 
10 2014 WL 4722716 (Del. Sept. 22, 2014) [hereinafter Hoskins II].  This decision affirmed the 
denial of postconviction relief in Hoskins v. State, 14 A.3d 554, 556-59 (Del. 2011) [hereinafter 
Hoskins I], overruled by Brooks v. State, 40 A.3d 346 (Del. 2012). 
11 Id. at *2 (quoting Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 935, 941 (Del. 2013)). 
12 Hoskins II, 2014 WL 4722716, at *2 (citing Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013)). 
7 
 
Purnell’s claims all allege instances of ineffective assistance of counsel in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  An 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a defendant to satisfy the two-
pronged test set out in Strickland v. Washington.13  First, the defendant must show 
that counsel’s performance was deficient, “meaning that ‘counsel’s representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”’14  “If counsel is shown to be 
deficient, then the defendant must demonstrate prejudice from counsel’s error.”15 
In analyzing the first prong of Strickland, a defendant bears a heavy burden 
in demonstrating that trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness.  As we said in Hoskins, “[i]n order to eliminate ‘the distorting 
effects of hindsight,’ there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s 
representation was professionally reasonable.”16   “If an attorney makes a strategic 
choice after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options,’ 
that decision is virtually unchallengeable . . . .”17 
Strickland’s second prong requires the defendant to demonstrate how trial 
counsel’s error resulted in prejudice.  We have defined “prejudice” as “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
                                          
 
13 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
14 Hoskins II, 2014 WL 4722716, at *3 (citing Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 848 (Del. 2009)). 
15 Hoskins II, 2014 WL 4722716, at *3 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 
16 Hoskins II, 2014 WL 4722716, at *3 (citing Gattis v. State, 697 A.2d 1174, 1178 (Del. 1997)). 
17 Hoskins II, 2014 WL 4722716, at *3. 
8 
 
proceeding would have been different.”18  Mere allegations of ineffectiveness are 
not sufficient.  Instead, a defendant must allege actual prejudice and substantiate it.  
A “‘failure to state with particularity the nature of the prejudice experienced is fatal 
to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.’”19  “In particular, a court need not 
determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the 
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.”20 
A. 
Trial Counsel’s Failure to Request an Accomplice Credibility 
Instruction 
 
1. The Failure Constituted Deficient Performance Under Strickland’s 
First Prong 
 
Purnell’s first claim on appeal is that his trial counsel was deficient for  
failing to request a jury instruction concerning the credibility of accomplice 
testimony -- a so-called Bland instruction.21   In our recent decision in Hoskins II, 
we trace the somewhat tortured history of the law regarding accomplice credibility 
instructions.22  The law as it presently exists requires a trial court to provide a 
specific Bland instruction any time an accomplice witness testifies.23  This model 
                                          
 
18 Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 
19 Hoskins II, 2014 WL 4722716, at *3 (citing Dawson v. State, 673 A.3d 1186, 1196 (Del. 
1996)). 
20 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
21 See Bland v. State, 263 A.2d 286, 289-90 (Del. 1970). 
22 See Hoskins II, 2014 WL 4722716, at *3-5. 
23 Id. at *4 (citing Brooks v. State, 40 A.3d 346, 350 (Del. 2012)). 
9 
 
instruction, originally set forth in 1970 in Bland,24 and modified in Brooks,25 
provides: 
A portion of the evidence presented by the State is the 
testimony of admitted participants in the crime with which 
these defendants are charged.  For obvious reasons, the 
testimony of an alleged accomplice should be examined by you 
with more care and caution than the testimony of a witness who 
did not participate in the crime charged.  This rule becomes 
particularly important when there is nothing in the evidence, 
direct or circumstantial, to corroborate the alleged accomplices’ 
accusation that these defendants participated in the crime.  
Without such corroboration, you should not find the defendants 
guilty unless, after careful examination of the alleged 
accomplices’ testimony, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt that it is true and you may safely rely upon it.  Of course, 
if you are so satisfied, you would be justified in relying upon it, 
despite the lack of corroboration, and in finding the defendants 
guilty.26 
 
a. The Present State of the Law 
In Brooks, this Court issued important guidance as to how cases calling for a 
Bland instruction should be handled by the trial court.27  Seeking to “resolve this 
unnecessarily convoluted area of the law,”28 we announced a new rule that requires 
a trial court to provide a specific Bland instruction any time an accomplice witness 
                                          
 
24 Bland, 263 A.2d at 289-90. 
25 Brooks, 40 A.3d at 350 (modifying the original model instruction set forth in Bland). 
26 Id. 
27 See id. at 349-50. 
28 Id. at 350. 
10 
 
testifies -- regardless of whether or not it is requested by trial counsel.29  This 
Court unequivocally told trial courts to “give the modified Bland instruction [as 
stated in Brooks] or commit plain error.”30  However, we explained that this new 
rule would not be retroactive and there would be no plain error where a trial judge 
provides an instruction that “correctly applied the law as it existed on the day [the 
trial judge] instructed the jury.”31  Accordingly, for cases decided before our 2012 
decision in Brooks, “our analysis on postconviction review of a Bland claim is 
governed by the case law controlling at the time of trial.”32  
Purnell’s trial began on April 14, 2008.33   Thus, we must ascertain the state 
of the law as of April 14, 2008. 
b. The Law at the Time of Purnell’s Trial 
Following Bland, and up to the start of Purnell’s trial on April 14, 2008, we 
held on multiple occasions that accomplice testimony instructions that departed 
from the specific wording in Bland were acceptable so long as they were accurate 
and adequately explained the potential problems with accomplice testimony.34  For 
                                          
 
29 Id. at 348.   
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 351. 
32 Hoskins II, 2014 WL 4722716, at *4. 
33 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A7-8. 
34 Cabrera v. State, 747 A.2d 543 (Del. 2000), overruled by Brooks, 40 A.3d 346.  See also 
Soliman v. State, 2007 WL 63359 (Del. Jan. 10, 2007), overruled by Brooks, 40 A.3d 346; 
Bordley v. State, 2003 WL 22227558 (Del. Sept. 24, 2003), overruled by Brooks, 40 A.3d 346.  
11 
 
example, in Cabrera v. State, this Court held that a modified Bland instruction was 
adequate where it “warn[ed] the jurors that accomplice testimony may be suspect 
because of the accomplice’s self-interest and his plea agreement.”35  Three years 
later, in Bordley v. State, we held that there was no error where the pattern jury 
instruction warned that the accomplice testimony “may be affected by self-interest, 
by an agreement she may have with the State, by her own interest in the outcome, 
and by prejudice against the defendant.”36  Four years later, in Soliman v. State, we 
reiterated that when the jury is provided with a correct statement of the law, even if 
it does not instruct the jury to examine the testimony “with caution,” we will not 
find error.37 
c. Cases After Purnell’s April 2014 Trial:  Smith, 
Hoskins II, and Brooks 
 
To complete the chronology, in cases after Purnell’s trial, we again 
considered whether counsel’s failure to request a Bland instruction could 
successfully establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  In Smith v. State, 
a case of first impression, this Court reiterated, “a general credibility instruction is 
not an acceptable substitute for a specific accomplice credibility instruction.”38  
This Court determined that “the failure of [a defendant’s] trial counsel to request a 
                                          
 
35 Cabrera, 747 A.2d at 545. 
36 Bordley, 2003 WL 2222 7558, at *2. 
37 Soliman, 2007 WL 63359, at *3. 
38 Smith v. State, 991 A.2d 1169, 1179 (Del. 2010), overruled by Brooks, 40 A.3d 346. 
12 
 
specific instruction on the credibility of accomplice testimony amounted to 
‘deficient attorney performance’ under the first part of [this Court’s] Strickland 
analysis.”39  However, Smith still required the defendant to establish prejudice 
under the second prong of Strickland.  We explained in Smith that “trial counsel’s 
failure to request [a Bland] instruction will not always be prejudicial per se.”40  
Rather, “the prejudicial effect depends upon the facts and circumstances of each 
particular case.”41  Nonetheless, we found that the defendant in Smith did receive 
ineffective representation when trial counsel failed to request an accomplice 
instruction based on the facts of that case.42  
In Hoskins I,43 this Court considered whether it was plain error when a judge 
failed sua sponte to give an accomplice credibility instruction.  We held that Smith 
did not create such a broad rule.  We explained that the Smith decision required a 
trial judge “to give a Bland-type of instruction, upon request, when accomplice 
testimony is presented.”44  Thus, it was not plain error for a trial judge to fail to 
give sua sponte an accomplice credibility instruction. 
                                          
 
39 Id. at 1177; see also Brooks, 40 A.3d at 354 (“Counsel who forgets to request an instruction 
that could help his client fails to meet an objective standard of reasonableness.”). 
40 Smith, 991 A.2d at 1180. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Hoskins I, 14 A.3d 554, 556-59 (Del. 2011), overruled by Brooks, 40 A.3d 346. 
44 Hoskins I, 14 A.3d at 562 (emphasis in original). 
13 
 
 
The progeny of cases after Bland, up to and including Hoskins I, were 
overruled when we decided Brooks.  In Brooks, we held that trial judges must give 
an accomplice testimony instruction any time an alleged accomplice testifies 
regardless of whether trial counsel requests it.45 
But at the time of Purnell’s trial, his counsel did not have the benefit of this 
Court’s decision in Brooks.  This Court’s holding in Brooks is not applicable to our 
determination of whether the failure to request the Bland instruction was erroneous 
or prejudicial to Purnell.46  Instead, the earlier holdings in Cabrera, Bordley, and 
Soliman provide the applicable framework for analysis. 
In Bordley, we stated that “[a]lthough the trial judge in the present case did 
not instruct the jury to examine [the accomplice’s] testimony ‘with caution,’ the 
trial judge should be granted wide latitude in framing his jury instruction.”47  In 
Purnell’s trial, the jury was given a general credibility instruction as follows: 
You are the sole judges of credibility of each person who has 
testified and of the weight to be given to the testimony of each.  
You are to judge the credibility of all the witnesses that have 
testified before you whether for the prosecution or for the 
defense . . . . 
 
In considering the credibility of witnesses and in considering 
any conflict in testimony, you should take into consideration 
                                          
 
45 See Brooks, 40 A.3d at 350. 
46 See Guy v. State, 82 A.3d 710, 714 (Del. 2013) (“[T]he mandatory instruction set forth in 
Brooks does not apply retroactively.”). 
47 Bordley, 2003 WL 22227558, at *2. 
14 
 
each witness’ means of knowledge, strength of memory and 
opportunity for observation, the reasonableness or 
unreasonableness of the testimony, the consistency or 
inconsistency of the testimony, the motives influencing the 
witness, the fact, if it is a fact, that the testimony has been 
contradicted, the witnesses [sic] bias or prejudice or interest in 
the outcome of the litigation, the ability to have acquired the 
knowledge of the facts to which the witness testified, the 
manner and demeanor upon the witness stand, and that 
apparent truthfulness of the testimony, and all other facts and 
circumstances shown by the evidence which affect the 
credibility of the testimony.48 
 
The jury was further instructed as follows: 
The fact that a witness has been convicted of a felony or a 
crime involving dishonesty, if such be a fact, may be considered 
by you for one purpose only, namely, in judging the credibility 
of that witness.  The fact of such a conviction does not 
necessarily destroy or impair the witness’ credibility and it does 
not raise the suggestion that the witness testified falsely.49 
 
The Superior Court found that the instructions were “correct statement[s] of 
the substance of the law, [were] reasonably informative and not misleading.”50  
However, Cabrera, Bordley and Soliman all contained specific instructions 
regarding the accomplice’s agreement with the State.  In Cabrera, the jury 
instruction “did warn the jurors that accomplice testimony may be suspect because 
of the accomplice’s self-interest and his plea agreement.”51  In Bordley, the 
                                          
 
48 Purnell III, 2013 WL 4017401, at *7. 
49 Id. at *8. 
50 Id. 
51 Cabrera v. State, 747 A.2d 543, 545 (Del. 2000), overruled by Brooks, 40 A.3d 346. 
15 
 
instruction “did, in fact, warn that the testimony of . . . the accomplice[] may be 
affected by self-interest, by an agreement she may have with the State, by her own 
interest in the outcome, and by prejudice against the defendant.”52  In Soliman, the 
jury was instructed that it: 
may consider all the factors which affect the witness’ 
credibility, including whether the testimony of the accomplice 
has been affected by self-interest, by an agreement which he 
may have with the State, by his own interest in the outcome of 
the litigation, by prejudice against the defendant, or whether or 
not the testimony has been corroborated by any other evidence 
in the case.53 
 
Thus, in these cases -- where we did not find reversible error in the jury 
instructions -- language directing the jury to take into account accomplice 
testimony was used in addition to a general witness credibility instruction.  In 
Purnell’s trial, the trial court only gave the general witness credibility instruction.  
Thus, although a general credibility instruction was given, the jury was not 
instructed as to the specific concerns regarding accomplice testimony.   
What Cabrera, Bordley and Soliman make clear is that Purnell’s counsel 
was on notice that a separate jury instruction regarding accomplice testimony could 
be requested.  Accordingly, we must determine whether counsel’s decision not to 
                                          
 
52 Bordley v. State, 2003 WL 22227558, at *2 (Del. Sept. 24, 2003), overruled by Brooks, 40 
A.3d 346. 
53 Soliman v. State, 2007 WL 63359, at *3 n.20 (Del. Jan. 10, 2007), overruled by Brooks, 40 
A.3d 346. 
16 
 
request the separate instruction was a strategic one.  In Neal v. State, we observed 
that “[t]hough we do not require lawyers to predict the future, [Smith and Brooks] 
only underscore the concerns that this Court has long recognized:  a decision not to 
request a Bland instruction is not a product of trial strategy.”54  We further noted in 
Neal:   
even though this Court, at the time of Neal’s trial [in August of 
2009], displayed some ambivalence about the exact wording of 
a Bland instruction, “it was well established that, in Delaware, a 
defendant is entitled, upon request, to a specific jury instruction 
concerning the credibility of accomplice testimony in cases 
where the State’s evidence includes the testimony of an 
accomplice.”55 
In this case, Purnell’s trial counsel stated in an affidavit, “[c]andidly, I 
cannot recall why I did not request the instruction.”56  Yet, requesting an 
instruction would have been consistent with trial counsel’s strategy.  Purnell’s 
counsel wanted to convince the jury that Harris was credible when he initially told 
police that Purnell was not involved, but then lied at trial as a result of his plea deal 
                                          
 
54 Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 935, 944 (Del. 2013); see also Brooks, 40 A.3d at 354 (“When 
considering whether to request an instruction on accomplice testimony, the defense gains nothing 
by failing to request a cautionary instruction, aside perhaps from a later chance at a claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel.”); Smith, 991 A.2d at 1177 (“[T]here is no reasonable trial 
strategy for failing to request the cautionary accomplice testimony instruction. . . .  We cannot 
envision an advantage which could be gained by withholding a request for th[ese] 
instruction[s].”). 
55 Neal, 80 A.3d at 944 (quoting Smith, 991 A.2d at 1175) (applying Smith and Brooks to a trial 
conducted prior to those decisions); but see Torrence v. State, 2012 WL 2106219 (Del. Jun. 11, 
2012) (finding that where the language of the instruction differed from Brooks’ modification of 
Bland, this Court will not find error). 
56 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A24. 
17 
 
with the State.  Throughout the trial, Purnell’s counsel highlighted Harris’ motives 
in testifying and contrasted these with his motives upon first being questioned by 
the police.57  Although this Court only required accomplice testimony instructions 
to be accurate and adequately explain the potential problems with accomplice 
testimony and there was no precise language required to be used in the 
instruction,58 the instruction would nevertheless have furthered the defense 
strategy.  An accomplice testimony instruction would have helped illustrate the 
point defense counsel attempted to make during cross-examination and closing 
arguments:  accomplice testimony must be scrutinized for potential bias and 
unreliability.  We thus conclude that trial counsel’s performance in failing to 
request a Bland instruction “fell below an objective standard of reasonable attorney 
conduct” and constitutes deficient performance under the first prong of Strickland. 
                                          
 
57 App. to Appellee’s Answering Br. at B26.  See Purnell III, 2013 WL 4017401, at *9 (in its 
review of Purnell’s Rule 61 motion, the Superior Court stated that “[t]he fact that the defense 
counsel’s strategy did not prove to be successful does not diminish the reasonableness of that 
strategy”).  In concluding that the first prong of the Strickland standard had not been met, the 
Superior Court concluded that although defense counsel could not recall why he did not request a 
Bland instruction, the strategy was clear from the record -- namely, defense counsel did not want 
to discredit Harris’ testimony in its entirety.  Instead, we believe the instruction would have 
furthered the strategy of convincing the jury that Harris later lied at trial -- contrary to his earlier 
statements to the police -- as a result of his plea agreement. 
58 Soliman, 2007 WL 63359, at *3 (denying an appeal where both parties conceded that the 
accomplice testimony instruction was an accurate statement of law); Bordley, 2003 WL 
22227558, at *2 (“The record demonstrates that the pattern jury instruction used by the trial 
judge was a correct statement of the law and adequately guided the jury as trier of fact and 
determiner of credibility.”); Cabrera, 747 A.2d at 545 (“Turning to the language at issue, we 
find that the instruction is adequate. . . .  Considering the instruction as a whole, we are satisfied 
that it sufficiently communicated the credibility concerns associated with accomplice 
testimony.”). 
18 
 
2. The Failure Was Not Prejudicial Under Strickland’s Second 
Prong 
 
Although trial counsel’s failure to request a Bland instruction was deficient, 
Purnell must now demonstrate prejudice under the second prong of Strickland.  To 
show prejudice, Purnell must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s deficient performance, the jury would have decided differently.59   
Purnell asks us to reexamine the validity of the prejudice standard articulated 
in Brooks.  He claims that Brooks fails to recognize the fundamental differences 
between the “reasonable probability” inquiry under Strickland and the traditional 
“harmless error” analysis.  He argues that our interpretation of the second prong of 
Strickland makes it more difficult for a defendant to establish prejudice than what 
the Supreme Court intended.60 
The harmless error standard is different from the standard we articulated in 
Brooks.  Harmless error is a burden-shifting test.  In Chapman v. California,61 the 
United States Supreme Court noted: 
Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting 
highly prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone 
                                          
 
59 Zebroski v. State, 822 A.2d 1038, 1043 (Del. 2003) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Wright 
v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996)). 
60 Appellant’s Opening Br. at 16-17 (“In holding that a defendant is not prejudiced if:  (1) the 
testimony of the accomplice is corroborated by independent evidence; and (2) the defendant fails 
to show a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different, the Court has re-
defined Strickland’s prejudice inquiry by making it more difficult to establish prejudice than is 
required under Strickland and its progeny.”). 
61 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
19 
 
other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it 
was harmless.  It is for that reason that the original common-
law harmless-error rule put the burden on the beneficiary of the 
error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a 
reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment.62 
 
The Supreme Court has further explained that the analytical framework of the 
harmless error doctrine is “not whether the legally admitted evidence was 
sufficient . . . but rather, whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”63 
Our standard in Brooks comports with the standard set forth by Strickland 
and its progeny.  In Strickland, the Supreme Court noted that “actual 
ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject to 
a general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice.”64  The 
defendant has the burden to “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”65  Similarly, in Brooks we held that the burden is on the defendant to 
“demonstrate a reasonable probability that the jury would have decided differently 
had it heard the Bland instruction.”66   
                                          
 
62 Id. at 24.  
63 Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258-59 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
64 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. 
65 Id. at 694. 
66 Brooks, 40 A.3d at 354-55. 
20 
 
Here, we apply the standard for prejudice as it existed at the time of 
Purnell’s trial.  Strickland requires us to “consider the totality of the evidence”67 in 
determining whether the defendant has shown that, but for counsel’s deficient 
performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been 
different.  “A reasonably probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”68  It is therefore “not enough for the defendant to 
show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the 
proceeding.”69 
The Superior Court considered the totality of the evidence to find that even 
if Purnell had established deficient performance under the first prong of Strickland, 
Purnell failed to establish prejudice as required under the second prong.70  It 
concluded that there was “significant, additional information before the jury that 
substantiated the accomplice’s testimony.”71  We agree. 
Evidence, aside from Harris’ testimony, showed that Purnell was identified 
as the shooter by three other individuals, none of whom were accomplices -- 
Hammond, Mitchell and Williams.  Hammond testified at trial that he heard 
                                          
 
67 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.  See also Smith, 991 A.2d at 1180 (“The prejudicial effect depends 
upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”). 
68 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
69 Id. at 693. 
70 Purnell III, 2013 WL 4017401, at *9. 
71 Id. at *8. 
21 
 
Purnell complain that he was “broke” and saw Purnell carrying a semi-automatic 
gun in his waistband on the day of the shooting.72  He also testified that Purnell had 
later bragged that he had “popped” Mrs. Giles because she refused to hand over her 
money.73 
Most of Mitchell’s testimony came into evidence through a Section 350774 
statement because he claimed he could not remember anything on the witness 
stand.  The State introduced evidence that Mitchell was unwilling to cooperate at 
trial because Purnell had threatened him for being a “snitch.”  In the statements 
provided by the police detectives who had previously interviewed him, Mitchell 
claimed Purnell had confessed to him in April 2006 to killing Mrs. Giles because 
she recognized him when he tried to rob her.75  Williams, Mitchell’s girlfriend, 
testified at trial that she overheard a telephone conversation between Purnell and 
her cousin, Jerome Portis, in which Purnell confessed to killing Mrs. Giles, 
although she believed he might have been joking.76   
                                          
 
72 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A40. 
73 Id. at A42. 
74 Under 11 Del. C. § 3507, the voluntary out-of-court statement of a witness who is present and 
subject to cross-examination may be used as affirmative evidence with substantive independent 
testimonial value in a criminal prosecution.   
75 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A36.  Harris testified that he ran away when Purnell pulled 
out a gun.  Id. at A50.   
76 After claiming that he had killed Mrs. Giles, Purnell said “sike,” which Williams interpreted as 
indicating that his preceding statement was potentially false or in jest.  App. to Appellant’s 
Opening Br. at A45-46.  Aqueshia Williams was also present for the conversation, and testified 
to a similar account.  App. to Appellant’s Reply Br. at AR1-2.   
22 
 
The State also introduced the recording of a telephone call between Purnell 
and Tramont Mitchell, Kellee Mitchell’s brother, in which Purnell bragged that he 
had “a lot” to do with the murder.77  A video statement from Aqueshia Williams, 
Etienne Williams’ sister, was played for the jury, in which she claimed that Purnell 
said “I shot one bitch, I’ll kill another.”78   
Moreover, Purnell asserted that he did not associate with Harris, the 
accomplice, but that claim was undermined by the fact that he was found in Harris’ 
home when Harris was arrested.79  Purnell also lacked a credible alibi, as he 
presented two conflicting reports of where he was on the night of the shooting.   
Further, as discussed above, the jury was instructed that it had the “sole” 
responsibility for judging the “credibility of each person who has testified and of 
the weight to be given to the testimony of each.”  The jury was instructed to 
consider the witness’ motives, bias, prejudice, interest and general credibility.  
Additionally, Purnell’s counsel cross-examined Harris about his plea, focusing on 
the inconsistencies between Harris’ testimony and his previous statements to the 
police.80  He then used his closing argument to reiterate that theme, as to Harris 
                                          
 
77 App. to Appellee’s Answering Br. at B14. 
78 Id. at B5-6. 
79 Purnell did not testify at trial, but his attorney in his closing argument asserted that the jury 
could not “make a connection between [Purnell] and Ron Harris.”  App. to Appellant’s Opening 
Br. at A54. 
80 App. to Appellee’s Answering Br. at B10-11. 
23 
 
and the other witnesses:  “you have been instructed to . . . try to make one 
harmonious story of the events on January 30th 2006.  That is going to be a hard 
job based upon all those conflicting statements and all the motivation that people 
have to get out of jail, get out of trouble.”81 
Strickland requires the defendant to show that there is a reasonable 
probability that the result would have been different had his attorney not erred.  
Given the independent evidence corroborating Harris’ testimony, Purnell’s 
counsel’s vigorous efforts to undermine Harris’ credibility at trial, and the jury 
instruction’s general caution regarding “the motives influencing the witness” and 
the witness’s “bias or prejudice or interest in the outcome of the litigation,” we do 
not find that there is a reasonable probability that the jury’s verdict would have 
changed had it heard the Bland instruction.  Thus, Purnell has not met his burden to 
show prejudice as required by the second prong under Strickland. 
B. 
Trial Counsel’s Failure to Request a Limiting Instruction Regarding 
the Guilty Plea of Co-defendant Harris Did Not Constitute Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel 
 
Purnell argues that his counsel should have requested the jury be instructed 
about the effects of Harris’ guilty plea based on the fact that they knew Harris was 
a co-defendant and would learn he had pled guilty.  The jurors saw Harris sitting at 
the defense table during jury selection, but at the start of trial, Harris was absent.  
                                          
 
81 Id. at B26 (emphasis added). 
24 
 
During the State’s opening statement, the jury learned that Harris had pled guilty 
and would testify for the State. 
Purnell relies on this Court’s decision in Allen v. State82 to show that a 
reasonably competent defense attorney would request a cautionary instruction 
concerning Harris’ guilty plea.  The State argues, and the Superior Court found, 
that the facts in Allen “significantly differ” from the facts in this case.83  We agree.  
In Allen, we considered whether admitting into evidence a certified copy of a 
co-defendant’s guilty plea agreement without live testimony was an abuse of 
discretion.84  Allen and two co-defendants were indicted on twenty charges arising 
from three separate burglary incidents.  Both co-defendants entered into plea 
agreements with the State prior to the trial.  One of the co-defendants testified 
during Allen’s trial, but the other did not.  The Superior Court allowed into 
evidence, over defense counsel’s objection, the non-testifying co-defendant’s plea 
agreement.  We held that “a co-defendant’s plea agreement may not be used as 
substantive evidence of a defendant’s guilt, to bolster the testimony of a co-
defendant, or to directly or indirectly vouch for the veracity of another co-
defendant who pled guilty and then testified against his or her fellow accused.”85  
                                          
 
82 878 A.2d 447 (Del. 2005). 
83 Purnell III, 2013 WL 4017401, at *10. 
84 Allen, 878 A.2d at 449. 
85 Id. at 450. 
25 
 
We did acknowledge, however, that there are limited circumstances in which a 
prosecutor may seek to introduce a co-defendant’s guilty plea.  For example, 
“[d]uring the direct examination of a co-defendant, a prosecutor may elicit 
testimony regarding that co-defendant’s plea agreement and may actually introduce 
that agreement into evidence.”86   
The admission of the guilty plea in such a circumstance may serve “the 
limited purpose of allowing the jury to accurately assess the credibility of the co-
defendant witness, to address the jury’s possible concern of selective prosecution 
or to explain how the co-defendant witness has first-hand knowledge of the events 
about which he or she is testifying.”87  We made clear that even “[i]n these 
situations, a trial court must still give a proper cautionary instruction as to the 
limited use of the plea agreement and the accompanying testimony about it.”88  We 
warned that admitting a guilty plea, even for a limited purpose, must be 
accompanied by a cautionary instruction, because the “absence of such a limiting 
instruction is an important factor in determining whether the admission of the 
guilty plea was harmless error.”89 
                                          
 
86 Id. at 450-51.  We also noted that testimony about a guilty plea may also be elicited during 
cross-examination for the purposes of impeachment.  Id. at 451. 
87 Id. at 451. 
88 Id. (emphasis added). 
89 Id.   
26 
 
The trial court in Allen instructed the jury that there may be “many reasons” 
why a defendant may plead guilty.90  However, the trial court never instructed the 
jury on the proper limited purpose for admitting the actual plea agreement into 
evidence.91  This Court reasoned that without an instruction on how the jury should 
evaluate the evidence, it left open the possibility that the jury “use[d] the plea 
agreement as substantive evidence of Allen’s guilt, to bolster the testimony of co-
defendant Howard or to directly or indirectly vouch for the veracity of co-
defendant Howard who pled guilty and testified against Allen at trial.”92   
In this case, Harris’ plea agreement was not offered into evidence.  Further, 
Harris testified and was subject to rigorous cross-examination.  Thus, Allen does 
not provide valid grounds for Purnell to argue that his counsel needed to request a 
cautionary instruction regarding Harris having pled guilty.  Accordingly, Purnell 
has not demonstrated that his counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and was deficient under the first prong of Strickland.93 
                                          
 
90 Id. at 449-50. 
91 Id. at 451. 
92 Id. 
93 Harris’ decision to plead guilty was a central element of Purnell’s defense strategy at trial.  
Defense counsel used the fact that Harris accepted a plea agreement to make the argument that 
Harris was trying to protect his own interests by shifting responsibility for Mrs. Giles’ murder 
from himself to Purnell.  An instruction admonishing the jury not to use the plea as substantive 
evidence of Purnell’s guilt may have furthered defense counsel’s strategy.  However, as 
discussed above, not requesting such an instruction is not deficient performance under the first 
prong of Strickland.  Therefore, we do not reach the second prong under Strickland, i.e., whether 
27 
 
C. 
Trial Counsel’s Failure to Appeal the Trial Court’s Ruling Denying 
his Request to Empanel a New Jury Did Not Constitute Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel 
 
Purnell argues that his counsel’s failure to appeal the trial court’s rejection 
of his request to empanel a new jury was evidence of deficient performance under 
Strickland.  During jury selection, jurors saw Harris at the defense table and 
understood him to be Purnell’s co-defendant.  Purnell contends that the jury was 
likely to infer his guilt based on Harris’ guilty plea.  Indeed, his trial counsel did 
request a new jury on April 8, 2008, the day after Harris entered his plea.  
However, after the trial court denied the request for a new jury, Purnell’s counsel 
did not appeal the ruling.  Nor did he include the issue when he appealed the 
conviction and sentence on other grounds.  Purnell’s counsel stated in his affidavit 
that he did not appeal the ruling related to seating a new jury because he “did not 
believe that this issue would have been successful on direct appeal because the jury 
swore and [sic] oath to be fair and impartial.”94  He also stated in his affidavit that 
he “was able to cross-examine Harris concerning the beneficial plea he received to 
testify in an effort to attack the credibility of his proffer and trial testimony.”95 
                                                                                                                                        
there is a reasonable probability that a different outcome would result if the jury had been given 
such an instruction. 
94 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A25. 
95 Id. 
28 
 
Our analysis of a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel follows 
the standard Strickland framework.  In Neal v. State, we noted that:  
Appellate counsel “need not (and should not) raise every 
nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select from among them in 
order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal.”  
Nevertheless, “[i]t is still possible to bring a Strickland claim 
based on counsel’s failure to raise a particular claim, but it is 
difficult to demonstrate that counsel was incompetent.”96 
 
In this case, Purnell has not demonstrated that his counsel was incompetent 
for failing to raise this claim on appeal.  Defense counsel made a strategic decision 
not to pursue the claim, which is sufficient under the Strickland test.  “A strategy, 
which structures appellate arguments on ‘those more likely to prevail, far from 
being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate 
advocacy.’”97   
In Jones v. Barnes, the United States Supreme Court held that although a 
defendant has the final authority to make certain fundamental decisions, such as 
whether to plead guilty, or to take an appeal, the defendant does not have a 
constitutional right to compel his counsel to raise issues that counsel, in exercising 
his own independent and professional strategic judgment, decides not to present.98  
                                          
 
96 Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 935, 946 (Del. 2013) (quoting Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 
(2000)). 
97 Zebroski v. State, 822 A.2d 1038, 1051 (Del. 2003) (quoting Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 
758 (Del. 1990)). 
98 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (“It is also recognized that the accused has the 
ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to 
29 
 
This Court applied Jones in Scott v. State, a case raising a similar issue to the one 
presented here.99  In Scott, defendant’s counsel stated in his affidavit that he “did 
not argue [an] issue [on appeal] because [he] did not believe that there was any 
chance that [this Court] would reverse based on the circumstances of the ruling.”100  
Moreover, Scott’s trial counsel did, in fact, cross-examine the witness on the 
underlying issue that he did not appeal.  This Court held that Scott’s claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel was thus without merit.101 
In this case, defense counsel stated that his reason for not raising this 
argument on appeal was because it was unlikely to be successful.  Purnell’s current 
counsel does not cite to any rule of law or precedent that says that a new jury must 
be empanelled whenever a jury is aware that a case has been brought against two 
criminal defendants, and one of them pleads guilty before trial.  Jurors are 
presumed to follow the instructions given them.  The jury swore under oath to be 
fair and impartial.  Counsel used the information concerning Harris’ plea as part of 
the defense strategy.  Purnell’s counsel sought to do what Scott’s counsel did:  
cross-examine on the issue.  Purnell’s trial strategy was to show Harris as 
                                                                                                                                        
plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal…[but no] decision 
of this Court suggests, however, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to compel 
appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of 
professional judgment, decides not to present those points.”).  
99 Scott v. State, 7 A.3d 471, 479 (Del. 2010). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
30 
 
opportunistic because he was afraid of going to trial and the State offered him a 
plea agreement.  The fact that the jury saw Harris during selection only furthered 
Purnell’s argument.  Thus, we find that the trial court did not err in rejecting this 
claim. 
D. 
Trial Counsel’s Failure to Object to Certain Comments by the  
Prosecutor Did Not Constitute Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
Finally, Purnell argues that his trial counsel was deficient under Strickland 
for failing to object to the prosecutor’s alleged “vouching” for Harris.  Purnell 
alleges that the prosecutor improperly vouched for Harris by asking Harris whether 
he was “telling the truth” in his statements to police and in his trial testimony, but 
had lied during earlier statements.102  The trial counsel stated in his affidavit that he 
did not object because he “did not consider the prosecutors [sic] statements to be 
vouching for the witness because [trial counsel] had raise[d] the truthfulness of his 
statements during the cross-examination of Harris.”103   
 We reject Purnell’s contention that the prosecutor’s statements amounted to 
improper vouching such that his attorney was deficient for failing to object.  
“Improper vouching occurs when the prosecutor implies some personal superior 
knowledge, beyond that logically inferred from the evidence at trial, that the 
                                          
 
102 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A51-53. 
103 Id. at A26. 
31 
 
witness has testified truthfully.”104  It is proper for prosecutors to first establish a 
foundation, which can include a discussion of a witness’s truthfulness.105  Here, the 
prosecutor asked Harris if he had told the truth in his first two conversations with 
the police.106  Then he asked Harris about his plea deal: 
Q: 
Now, Mr. Harris, before you signed this plea agreement, 
did you go over it with your attorney?   
 
A: 
Yes.   
 
Q: 
And the agreement states:  “The defendant agrees to 
cooperate with the prosecution of his co-defendant by 
testifying truthfully during the co-defendant’s trial, if 
called as a witness by either party.”  Is that correct?   
 
A: 
Yes.   
 
Q: 
And that was read to you by your attorney?   
 
A: 
Yes.107 
 
On appeal, Purnell essentially concedes that the prosecutor’s statements did 
not in fact constitute vouching under current law, but argues that his trial counsel 
                                          
 
104 Miller v. State, 750 A.2d 530 (Del. 2000). 
105 See Ray v. State, 587 A.2d 439, 443 (Del. 1991) (“[A] witness’ statement may be introduced 
[under 11 Del. C. § 3507] only if the two-part foundation is first established:  the witness testifies 
about both the events and whether or not they are true.  Finally, in order to conform to the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of an accused’s right to confront witnesses against him, the victim must 
also be subject to cross-examination on the content of the statement as well as its truthfulness.”). 
106 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A51 (“Q: And were you telling [Detective Tabor] the 
truth when you told him all those things on February 18th?”); A52 (“Q: And on January 24th of 
2007, all those things that I just talked to you about, were you -- was that the truth that you told 
Detective Tabor?”). 
107 Id. at A53 (emphasis added). 
32 
 
“could have persuasively argued” that our standards for improper vouching 
“should be re-examined.”  Here, there is no deficient performance under Strickland 
because there was no improper vouching by the prosecution, and it is not deficient 
performance to not object under these circumstances where the prosecutor’s 
conduct comports with existing law.  Accordingly, we reject Purnell’s claim. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the forgoing, we conclude that the Superior Court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying Purnell’s motion for postconviction relief.  Accordingly, 
the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.