Case Title: The People v. Robert Alonso and Emilia Alonso

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2011-05-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 72  
The People &c.,
            Appellant,
        v.
Robert Alonso and 
Emilia Alonso, 
            Respondents.
Roseann B. MacKechnie, for appellant.
Diane E. Selker, for respondents.
District Attorneys Association of the State of New
York, amicus curiae.
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge:
Several months into a criminal trial on charges related
to alleged Medicaid fraud, Supreme Court determined that the
People had failed to meet their obligation to disclose
exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v Maryland (373 US 83
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No. 72
[1963]).  Supreme Court found that the constitutional violation
was of such a magnitude that the prejudice to defendants could
not be overcome by any remedy short of dismissing the
indictments.  Having concluded that the defendants could not
receive a fair trial under the circumstances, Supreme Court
dismissed the indictments, with prejudice.     
The People brought an appeal to the Appellate Division. 
That court, however, dismissed the appeal without passing upon
the merits.  The Appellate Division reasoned that the People
lacked the statutory right to bring an appeal from a dismissal of
an indictment in response to a discovery violation (People v
Alonso, 70 AD3d 957 [2d Dept 2010]).  A Judge of this Court
granted the People leave to appeal.  For the reasons that follow,
and without expressing any view as to the merits of Supreme
Court's decision, we conclude that the People have a right to
appeal the dismissal of the indictments.  We therefore reverse
the Appellate Division order and remit the case to that court for
consideration of the merits of the People's appeal.
Historically, the People "were authorized, in general
terms, to appeal to an intermediate appellate court from any
order dismissing an indictment on any ground other than
insufficiency of the evidence at trial" (People v Coppa, 45 NY2d
244, 249 [1978]).  The availability of a People's appeal from the
dismissal of an indictment has since been circumscribed by
statute and is now governed by Criminal Procedure Law § 450.20
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No. 72
(see People v Dunn, 4 NY3d 495, 497 [2005]; see also People v
Laing, 79 NY2d 166, 170 [1992] [recognizing "the Legislature's
policy prerogative to limit appellate proliferation in criminal
matters" (internal quotation marks omitted)]).  Under that
provision, as relevant here, the People have a right to appeal
from "[a]n order dismissing an accusatory instrument or a count
thereof, entered pursuant to section 170.30, 170.50 or 210.20, or
an order terminating a prosecution pursuant to subdivision four
of section 180.85" (CPL 450.20 [1]), and we will not resort to
"interpretative contrivances to broaden the scope" of CPL 450.20
(Laing, 79 NY2d at 170-171; see People v Hernandez, 98 NY2d 8, 10
[2002]).  
Here, neither Supreme Court's order dismissing the
indictments nor its otherwise comprehensive discussion on the
record with counsel as to how it should address the Brady
violation unequivocally states on what authority Supreme Court
relied in dismissing the indictments.  However, in context, it is
clear that Supreme Court premised the dismissal of the
indictments on the language of CPL 240.70.  A court faced with a
party's discovery violation is empowered by CPL 240.70 to take a
number of actions, including ordering the non-compliant party "to
permit discovery of the property not previously disclosed, grant
a continuance, issue a protective order, prohibit the
introduction of certain evidence or the calling of certain
witnesses or take any other appropriate action" (CPL 240.70 [1]). 
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No. 72
In its discussions with counsel on the record, Supreme Court
referred to CPL 240.70, and it appears Supreme Court concluded
that it had the power to dismiss the indictments under the "any
other appropriate action" language of CPL 240.70 (1).   
The Legislature, however, provided the grounds upon
which Supreme Court may dismiss an indictment in a different
section of the Criminal Procedure Law, section 210.20.  That
provision provides that, "[a]fter arraignment upon an indictment,
the superior court may, upon motion of the defendant, dismiss
such indictment or any count thereof" upon a series of enumerated
grounds (see CPL 210.20 [1] [a] - [i]).  
The People do not argue that Supreme Court lacked the
power to dismiss these indictments (see Dunn, 4 NY3d at 497
[recognizing that "the People may seek a writ of prohibition in a
CPLR article 78 proceeding when a trial court clearly acts in
excess of its authorized powers and there is no adequate remedy
at law," such as a direct appeal, "to address the People's
grievance" (internal quotation marks omitted)]).  Rather, the
parties disagree as to whether Supreme Court's power to dismiss
these indictments springs exclusively from CPL 240.70 (the
discovery sanctions provision of the CPL).  Defendants argue that
it does, but the People argue that the dismissal power arises
either from CPL 210.20 (the provision listing the grounds upon
which a court may dismiss an indictment) alone or from reading
CPL 240.70 and CPL 210.20 together.  Whether resort to CPL 210.20
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No. 72
is necessary is determinative of the question of whether the
People have a right to appeal because, simply put, CPL 210.20 is
listed in CPL 450.20 (1), while CPL 240.70 is not among the
provisions listed in CPL 450.20.  We agree with the People that
Supreme Court's power to dismiss these indictments emanates from
CPL 210.20.  Thus, the People have the right to appeal Supreme
Court's order dismissing the indictments.
CPL 210.20's catch-all provision, CPL 210.20 (1) (h),
empowers a court to dismiss an indictment when "[t]here exists
some other jurisdictional or legal impediment to conviction of
the defendant for the offense charged."  The catch-all language
of CPL 240.70 (1) ("or take any other appropriate action"),
allows Supreme Court to exercise any other power it possesses in
fashioning an appropriate remedy for a discovery violation, but
it does not, in and of itself, empower Supreme Court to dismiss
an indictment.  As the People argue, resort to CPL 210.20 (1) (h)
was necessary to effectuate dismissal.
But, defendants protest, Supreme Court never referred
to CPL 210.20 (1) (h) in its written order or in its discussions
with counsel on the record, thus it must be assumed that Supreme
Court acted solely pursuant to CPL 240.70 in remedying the Brady
violation.  We cannot agree.  
First, under defendants' argument, a court could
effectively insulate its own dismissal of an indictment from
appellate review simply by stating erroneously that it acted in
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No. 72
reliance on a statutory provision not listed in CPL 450.20.  The
absurdity of such a result is obvious (see generally People v
D'Alessandro, 13 NY3d 216, 218-219 [2009] [citing People v Giles,
73 NY2d 666, 669-670 (1989)]).1  
Second, although Supreme Court did not expressly refer
to CPL 210.20 (1) (h), it is clear that the import of its order
fell squarely within its terms.  Supreme Court stressed in
thorough discussions with counsel on the record that the
magnitude of the Brady violation here, in the court's view, was
such that it would be impossible for the defendants to receive a
fair trial.  Supreme Court struggled to fashion a remedy for the
violation and engaged the People and defense counsel in that
effort, but it ultimately concluded that it had no choice but to
dismiss the indictments, with prejudice.  The Brady violation,
therefore, in Supreme Court's view, became a "legal impediment to
conviction" within the meaning of CPL 210.20 (1) (h) (see
Commission Staff Notes [1966], reprinted following N.Y. Cons Law
Serv., CPL 210.20, Vol. 7C, at 171 [describing CPL 210.20 (1) (h)
as a "dragnet provision" designed as such given "the
impossibility of specifying every kind of contention which may
1  Here, there is no suggestion that Supreme Court sought to
shield its order from appellate review.  Indeed, immediately
after Supreme Court orally announced its decision to dismiss the
indictments, the record reflects that the court presumed that its
order would be the subject of an appeal; it was only after
additional discussion with counsel that Supreme Court learned
that defendants took a different view and believed that the
People could not take an appeal.        
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No. 72
properly be raised in an attack upon an indictment"]).  
Our conclusion that the People have a right to appeal
the dismissal of the indictments here is not contrary to our
decision in People v Hernandez (98 NY2d 8 [2002]), where we
determined that the order dismissing the accusatory instrument
there could not be appealed.  In fact, Hernandez may be usefully
distinguished.  There, the defendant was subjected to a
warrantless arrest and was charged in a misdemeanor complaint
with consuming alcohol in public.  The dismissal of the complaint
was made pursuant to CPL 140.45, which "requires dismissal when
an accusatory instrument filed pursuant to warrantless arrest
provisions is facially insufficient" and the court determines
that it would be impossible, on the basis of the known facts, to
draft a sufficient accusatory instrument (Hernandez, 98 NY2d at
10; CPL 140.45).  Thus, contrary to the discovery sanctions
provision at issue here (CPL 240.70), CPL 140.45 itself empowered
the court to dismiss the accusatory instrument under certain
circumstances.  Given that express legislative grant of power,
coupled with the Legislature's omission of CPL 140.45 from the
provisions listed in CPL 450.20, we found the People had no right
to appeal.2  The same cannot be said here.  The Legislature
2  We explained in Hernandez, too, that the legislative
rationale behind not providing the People with an appeal in those
circumstances is clear:
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No. 72
empowered Supreme Court to take "appropriate action" in
addressing a discovery violation under CPL 240.70, but, unlike
CPL 140.45, there is no express grant of dismissal power in CPL
240.70.  
The impossibility of a fair trial created, in Supreme
Court's view, by the Brady violation presented a "legal
impediment to conviction" within the meaning of CPL 210.20 (1)
(h).  Thus, Supreme Court's order was issued pursuant to CPL
210.20, and, as CPL 210.20 is among the provisions listed in CPL
450.20 (1), the People may take an appeal of the dismissal order
to the Appellate Division.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed and the case remitted to the Appellate Division for
consideration of the merits of the appeal.                   
  
"As the legislative history of CPL 140.45
explains, in a case of an arrest under a
warrant, the information or felony complaint
underlying the warrant is filed with, and
examined for sufficiency by, a local criminal
court before the arrest, whereas when an
arrest is made without a warrant, since the
arraignment is the court's first opportunity
to examine it, it should have the power to
reject it on that occasion" (Hernandez, 98
NY2d at 10 [internal quotation marks
omitted]).
No analogous principle animates the Legislature's language in CPL
240.70 (1) allowing a trial court to take "appropriate action" in
the face of a discovery violation.  
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People v Robert Alonso and Emilia Alonso 
No. 72 
JONES, J. (dissenting):
Criminal Procedure Law § 450.20 (1) authorizes the
People to take an appeal as of right from "[a]n order dismissing
an accusatory instrument . . . entered pursuant to section
170.30, 170.50 or 210.20."  Until now, this Court has
consistently held that "[n]o appeal lies from a determination
made in a criminal proceeding unless specifically provided for by
statute" (People v Dunn, 4 NY3d 495, 497 [2005]; see also People
v Hernandez, 98 NY2d 8, 10 [2002]; People v Stevens, 91 NY2d 270,
278 [1998]).  
In Dunn, Supreme Court purported to dismiss an
indictment under Judiciary Law § 2-b (3), a statute not mentioned
in CPL 450.20's grant of appellate jurisdiction.  The court's
power to dismiss under that Judiciary Law section was
questionable at best, and the People argued that the order
"should be deemed to have been made pursuant to CPL 330.30," and
thus appealable (Dunn, 4 NY3d at 497).  We affirmed the Appellate
Division's dismissal of the appeal, repeating declarations made
in both Hernandez and People v Laing (79 NY2d 166, 170-171
[1992]):  "we will not resort to interpretive contrivances to
broaden the scope of CPL 450.20" (id. [internal quotation marks
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No. 72
omitted]).  
Notwithstanding the almost identical argument in Dunn,
the majority now holds that Supreme Court did not have the power
to dismiss an indictment under CPL 240.70, and therefore it must
have dismissed under CPL 210.20, making the dismissal appealable. 
The majority does so without distinguishing Dunn or explaining
why the Court does not follow that rule here.  Despite this
Court's jurisprudence, the majority converts indictments
dismissed under CPL 240.70 into indictments dismissed under CPL
210.20 so that an appeal may be taken by the People pursuant to
section 450.20 of the CPL.  As a result, rather than
"constru[ing] the clear and unambiguous statutes as enacted," the
majority's interpretation clearly "broaden[s] the scope and
application of" CPL 450.20, (Laing, 79 NY2d at 170-171).
Here, Supreme Court dismissed the indictments pursuant
to CPL 240.70, penalizing the People for a discovery violation. 
CPL 240.70 is not specifically enumerated in section 450.20.  
Because there is no express statutory authority for the People's
appeal from an order dismissing accusatory instruments pursuant
to section 240.70, the People have no right to appeal under CPL
450.20 (see Hernandez, 98 NY2d at 10; Laing, 76 NY2d at 170).  
Accordingly, I dissent and would vote to affirm the
Appellate Division order. 
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No. 72
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order reversed and case remitted to the Appellate Division,
Second Department, for consideration of the merits of the appeal
to that court.  Opinion by Chief Judge Lippman.  Judges Ciparick,
Graffeo, Read and Pigott concur.  Judge Jones dissents and votes
to affirm in an opinion in which Judge Smith concurs.
Decided May 3, 2011
  
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