Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Tomson

Citation: 2013-Ohio-2154

Docket Number: 2012-2068

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Tomson, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-2154.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-2154 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. TOMSON. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Tomson,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-2154.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Neglect of entrusted legal matters—Failure to perform 
contracted work—Failure to cooperate in disciplinary investigation—
Permanent disbarment. 
(No. 2012-2068—Submitted February 6, 2013—Decided June 4, 2013.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 12-020. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, William Leonard Tomson Jr. of Cleveland, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0033832, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1971. 
{¶ 2} In an April 2012 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, alleged 
that Tomson had agreed to pursue postconviction relief on behalf of two separate 
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clients, taken excessive amounts of money from them, made false promises 
regarding the anticipated completion of the work, and failed to cooperate in one of 
the ensuing disciplinary investigations.  Relator further alleged that this conduct 
adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law and was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.  Although the complaint was served on Tomson by 
certified mail, he failed to answer it or otherwise appear in these proceedings, and 
relator moved for default. 
{¶ 3} A master commissioner appointed by the Board of Commissioners 
on Grievances and Discipline determined that the materials submitted in support 
of relator’s motion for default were sufficient, found by clear and convincing 
evidence that Tomson had committed the charged misconduct, and recommended 
that he be ordered to make restitution to the affected clients and suspended 
indefinitely from the practice of law in Ohio.  The board adopted the master 
commissioner’s findings of fact and misconduct and agreed with the 
recommendation for restitution, but concluded that Tomson’s misconduct 
warranted permanent disbarment.  On December 19, 2012, this court issued an 
order to show cause why the court should not confirm the board’s 
recommendation and enter an order of discipline.  No objections have been filed. 
{¶ 4} We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct and find that 
permanent disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Tomson’s misconduct. 
Misconduct 
Count One—The Limbach Matter 
{¶ 5} In 2001, Craig Limbach was convicted of attempted rape, illegal 
use of a minor in nudity-oriented material, pandering sexually oriented material 
involving a minor, and other offenses.  He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 
more than 45 years in prison.  His convictions were affirmed on appeal.  See State 
v. Limbach, 5th Dist. No. 2001CA00396, 2002-Ohio-3934, 2002 WL 1770536. 
January Term, 2013 
 
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{¶ 6} In 2003, Limbach sought Tomson’s assistance to pursue the 
reopening of his appeal and other postconviction relief, and in the winter of 2003-
2004 he paid the $4,000 retainer Tomson required to begin the work.  Tomson 
sent Limbach a letter in June 2004 stating that (1) he had completed 90 percent of 
the research, (2) he required an additional $4,000 to complete the research and 
prepare a brief and other pleadings, and (3) he would file the application and brief 
within 45 days of receiving the additional payment. 
{¶ 7} When nothing had been filed by late November 2005, Limbach 
sent Tomson a letter inquiring about the delay.  Tomson responded that (1) the 
prior ruling would be difficult to overcome, (2) he was confident that he would 
prevail in his efforts to reduce Limbach’s sentence, (3) he would continue to 
monitor cases decided by this court, and (4) he was confident that he would have 
something definitive to provide to Limbach in 30 to 45 days.  Despite these 
representations, Tomson filed nothing in the next three years. 
{¶ 8} In a February 2009 letter, Tomson told Limbach that he would visit 
him in prison during the last week of March with the final draft of the pleadings, 
but he failed to do so.  Tomson sent another letter to Limbach in September 2009, 
stating, “I feel confident that I will be able to complete a final product and bring it 
to you before the end of November or sooner.”  In October 2010—11 months 
after Tomson last predicted a date of completion—Limbach sent a letter to 
Tomson complaining that he had paid thousands of dollars but that Tomson had 
not performed the promised work.  After receiving no response to this letter, 
Limbach filed a grievance with relator in January 2011. 
{¶ 9} Tomson’s response to relator’s initial letter of inquiry stated that he 
expected to complete and file a brief in Limbach’s case no later than May 15, 
2011.  He did not file the seven-page application to reopen Limbach’s appeal, 
however, until September 20, 2011—four months after the date that he had told 
relator that it would be filed and more than seven years after his client retained 
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him to perform this work.  The court of appeals ultimately denied the application 
for reopening. 
{¶ 10} The board found that Tomson’s conduct in the Limbach matter 
violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (both prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 
DR 1-102(A)(5) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (both prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), DR 1-
102(A)(6) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (both prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in 
conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law), DR 2-
106(A) and Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) (both prohibiting a lawyer from making an 
agreement for, charging, or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee), DR 6-
101(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from neglecting an entrusted legal matter), and 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in 
representing a client) as charged in the complaint.1  We adopt these findings of 
fact and misconduct. 
Count Two—The Welker Matter 
{¶ 11} Charles Welker was convicted of gross sexual imposition and rape 
and sentenced to 15 years in prison in November 1999.  His convictions were 
affirmed on appeal.  See State v. Welker, 8th Dist. No. 83252, 2004-Ohio-1132, 
2004 WL 450336.  In December 2004, his wife, Phyllis Welker, retained Tomson 
to pursue a reduction of his sentence.  Phyllis Welker paid Tomson $5,200—$700 
to evaluate the case and $4,500 to reopen the appeal or seek other postconviction 
relief.  In a December 2005 letter, Tomson wrote that he would visit Welker in 
                                                 
1 Because Tomson’s misconduct occurred both before and after the adoption of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct on February 1, 2007, relator charged him under the applicable rules of both 
the former Code of Professional Responsibility and the current Rules of Professional Conduct.  To 
the extent that both the former and current rules are cited for the same acts, the allegations 
comprise a single continuing ethical violation.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman, 119 Ohio St.3d 
330, 2008-Ohio-3836, 894 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 1, fn. 1. 
 
January Term, 2013 
 
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prison during the last week of March 2006 with the final draft of the pleadings, 
but he failed to do so. 
{¶ 12} Charles Welker wrote to Tomson in January 2009 to request 
information about his case and to advise him that his wife had attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to reach Tomson by telephone.  Charles Welker again wrote to 
inquire about the status of his case in July 2009.  Tomson did not respond to 
either letter.  Tomson did, however, respond to a third inquiry from Charles 
Welker, stating in a letter dated September 25, 2009, “I feel confident that I will 
be able to complete a final product and bring it to you before the end of 
November or sooner.”  Despite this representation, he did not visit Welker in 
prison. 
{¶ 13} In July 2011, Phyllis Welker filed a grievance with relator.  
Although Tomson received the two letters of inquiry that relator sent by certified 
mail regarding this grievance, he never responded to them. 
{¶ 14} Tomson appeared for his October 18, 2011 investigatory 
deposition pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum and testified that he would provide 
Welker’s client file to relator, but he never did.  He admitted that he had not filed 
any documents on Welker’s behalf during the seven years that he represented 
him.  With Welker’s original prison sentence scheduled to expire in early 2013, it 
appeared unlikely at the time of the deposition that Welker would ever see any 
benefit from that representation.  Nonetheless, Tomson testified that no refund 
was warranted. 
{¶ 15} The board found that Tomson’s conduct in the Welker matter 
violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), DR 1-102(A)(5) and 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), and DR 1-102(A)(6) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h), as well as DR 
6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from intentionally failing to seek 
the lawful objectives of his client), and 7-101(A)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
intentionally failing to carry out a contract of employment for legal services), 
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Prof.Cond.R. 1.2(a) (requiring a lawyer to abide by the client’s decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation and to consult with the client as to 
means by which they are to be pursued), 1.3, and 8.1(b) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from knowingly failing to respond to a demand for information by a disciplinary 
authority during an investigation), and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (requiring a lawyer to 
cooperate with a disciplinary investigation).  We adopt these findings of fact and 
misconduct. 
Sanction 
{¶ 16} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 17} The board found that Tomson received attorney fees in exchange 
for his agreement to seek postconviction relief on behalf of two clients.  He made 
repeated promises to perform the contracted legal services and claimed to have 
performed substantial legal research on behalf of these clients.  But after seven 
years, he had filed only a seven-page application to reopen one client’s appeal and 
had filed nothing in the other client’s case. 
{¶ 18} As aggravating factors, the board found that Tomson acted with a 
dishonest or selfish motive, committed multiple offenses, failed to cooperate in 
the disciplinary process, refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his 
conduct, and failed to make restitution to the affected clients.  See BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (d), (e), (g), and (i).  The only evident mitigating factor is 
the absence of a prior disciplinary record.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a). 
January Term, 2013 
 
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{¶ 19} In his motion for default, relator argued that an indefinite 
suspension from the practice of law is the appropriate sanction for Tomson’s 
misconduct.  The master commissioner adopted this recommendation but also 
suggested that Tomson should be ordered to make restitution of $8,000 to 
Limbach and $5,200 to Phyllis Welker before seeking reinstatement.  In support 
of his recommendation, the master commissioner noted that an indefinite 
suspension is the presumptive sanction for attorneys who neglect client matters 
and fail to cooperate in the resulting disciplinary investigation.  Akron Bar Assn. 
v. Goodlet, 115 Ohio St.3d 7, 2007-Ohio-4271, 873 N.E.2d 815, ¶ 20.  The master 
commissioner then cited cases in which we have indefinitely suspended other 
attorneys for misconduct similar to Tomson’s, including attorneys who also 
accepted retainers and then failed to perform the contracted work and failed to 
cooperate in the ensuing investigation.  See, e.g., Columbus Bar Assn. v. Emerson, 
84 Ohio St.3d 375, 704 N.E.2d 238 (1999); Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Davis, 121 
Ohio St.3d 337, 2009-Ohio-764, 904 N.E.2d 517. 
{¶ 20} While the board agrees that Tomson should be ordered to make 
full restitution to Limbach and Phyllis Welker, it recommends that he be 
permanently disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio. 
{¶ 21} We have found that Tomson has neglected the Limbach and 
Welker matters and that he has failed to cooperate in the ensuing investigation.  In 
addition to this conduct, however, he has also accepted thousands of dollars in 
fees from these clients and failed to perform the contracted work.  Although he 
claims to have performed research on behalf of these clients, he testified at his 
deposition that he had not used common online research tools, such as Westlaw or 
Lexis, or reviewed any treatises that might have helped him formulate a strategy 
to pursue his clients’ legal objectives.  Instead, he read the weekly advance sheets 
published by the Ohio State Bar Association, waiting in vain for this court to 
develop case law that would advance his clients’ objectives. 
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{¶ 22} Moreover, Tomson repeatedly told his clients that he was 
“confident” that he would have something to them within a definite time period—
such as within 30 to 45 days—but he never met his projected completion dates.  
And at his deposition, he claimed that those projections were not promises to 
complete the clients’ work in a certain time frame but were merely statements of 
his intentions that his clients mistook for promises.  He explained that he intended 
to complete the work by those self-imposed deadlines but that he “could just 
never find the right case law” and that every time he would get ready to file 
something, he would decide that “it just wasn’t good enough.”  Rather than 
seeking postconviction relief with the case law he had found, or telling his clients 
that he could not help them and suggesting that they seek new counsel, Tomson 
kept their money—more than $13,000 in all according to the board’s report—and 
strung them along for more than seven years.  That he sees nothing wrong with 
his course of conduct is extremely troubling. 
{¶ 23} In Warren Cty. Bar Assn. v. Marshall, 121 Ohio St.3d 197, 2009-
Ohio-501, 903 N.E.2d 280, we permanently disbarred an attorney who accepted 
retainers totaling more than $5,000, neglected his clients’ entrusted legal matters, 
and intentionally failed to carry out his contracts of employment for legal services 
and who then failed to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigations.  There 
were no mitigating factors in that case.  Id. at ¶ 14.  Aggravating factors included 
Marshall’s two prior disciplinary offenses that resulted in separate two-year 
suspensions from the practice of law, his pattern of misconduct, his dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation to his clients about the status of their matters, 
his failure to refund unearned fees on request, and his failure to cooperate in the 
disciplinary investigation.  Id. at ¶ 14, 18. 
{¶ 24} In Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Hildebrand, 127 Ohio St.3d 304, 
2010-Ohio-5712, 939 N.E.2d 823, ¶ 20, 22, we also disbarred an attorney who 
collected fees from clients and failed to perform the agreed-upon services, ignored 
January Term, 2013 
 
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his clients’ inquiries about the status of their cases, ignored his clients’ requests 
for refunds when it became apparent that he was not performing the contracted 
work, made false statements to the relator regarding his intentions to respond to 
the resulting grievances, and intentionally failed to cooperate in the disciplinary 
proceedings.  We observed that “ ‘[t]aking retainers and failing to carry out 
contracts of employment is tantamount to theft of the fee from the client’ ” and 
stated that permanent disbarment is the presumptive sanction for such acts.  Id. at 
¶ 21, quoting Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Weaver, 102 Ohio St.3d 264, 2004-Ohio-
2683, 809 N.E.2d 1113, ¶ 16. 
{¶ 25} We recognize that Tomson does not have a prior disciplinary 
record, as did Marshall and Hildebrand.  However, we find that his offenses are 
comparable because he accepted thousands of dollars from the two affected 
clients, failed to pursue their claims for postconviction relief as they sat in prison 
for more than seven years, and deceived them by representing that he was 
working to secure the reductions of their criminal sentences.  Therefore, we agree 
that permanent disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Tomson’s misconduct. 
{¶ 26} Accordingly, William Leonard Tomson Jr. is ordered to make 
restitution of $8,000 to Limbach and $5,200 to Phyllis Welker and is permanently 
disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to Tomson. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
_________________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Philip A. King, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
_________________________