Case Title: Showell v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 497, 2004

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2005-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988).
1
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STEPHANIE SHOWELL,
§
§
Defendant Below-
§ 
No. 497, 2004
Appellant,
§       
§
v.
§
Court Below - Superior Court
                                            §        of the State of Delaware
STATE OF DELAWARE
§
in and for Sussex County
§
Cr. ID No. 0402003511
Plaintiff Below- 
§
Appellee
§
 
Submitted: September 20, 2005
Decided:   October 18, 2005
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices.    
ORDER
This 18  day of October 2005, upon consideration of the briefs of the
th
parties, it appears to the Court that:
(1)  Stephanie Showell appeals from her conviction, following a jury
trial, of five counts of health care fraud.   She claims that the Superior Court
committed reversible error by: a) admitting into evidence testimony that was
purely speculative and unfairly prejudicial; b) failing to undertake the analysis
required by Getz v. State,  and admitting evidence of uncharged criminal
1
2
conduct for an improper purpose; and c) admitting certain business records in
violation of Showell’s due process right to confront witnesses.
(2)   From 1999 until 2004, Showell operated TIG Transportation, a
company that transported Medicaid recipients and others to and from medical
appointments.  Several members of Showell’s family worked as drivers for the
company, but Showell was the only person in charge of submitting Medicaid
claims for reimbursement.  Electronic Data System (“EDS”) was the fiscal
agent for Delaware’s Medicaid accounts.  Transportation providers for
Medicaid clients submitted bills either on paper or electronically, using
software provided by EDS.  Showell attended a mandatory EDS training class
on November 14, 2001, to learn the proper procedures for billing.
(3)  Karen Parker-Bender, an EDS employee, testified about the training
class and Showell’s payment requests. Louis Spahn, a special investigator with
the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the Attorney General’s Office, also testified
about Showell’s Medicaid reimbursement claims.  Both witnesses stated that
their review of Showell’s reimbursement claims revealed a pattern of improper
billing, such as missing transportation scheduling records, and multiple billing
for escorts and mileage when the children involved were taken to the same
facility in the same vehicle.  Spahn also explained that the State decided not to
go forward with criminal charges on all of the fraudulent claims filed by
 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986)..
 2
3
Showell because there were “too many.” Instead, according to Spahn, the State
decided to “cut it off at . . . the most blatant situations.” 
(4)
The Superior Court admitted records relating to claims involving
Medicaid recipients Nicolette Snead and Shirley Collick.  Neither person
testified at trial, however, and the trial court ultimately entered a judgment of
acquittal on the two counts involving Snead and Collick.  The court held that
the business records, alone, were insufficient to support a conviction on those
counts.  Showell was convicted on five of the remaining six counts.
(5)
Showell argues that the Superior Court erred in admitting Parker-
Bender’s testimony because it was purely speculative.  Parker-Bender used
various phrases such as “looks like,” “it’s basically speculation,” and “there is
no way to know” when explaining the apparent over-billing.  Since Showell
failed to object to this testimony, this Court reviews for plain error, which is
error that is “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the
fairness and integrity of the trial process.”   
2
(6) There is no plain error.  Parker-Bender testified that the billings were
suspect because, for example, Showell billed for two escorts when it appeared
that two children from the same family were taken to a medical provider.
Under those circumstances, only one escort is allowed.  The bills did not
 See Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 589 (Del. 2001). 
3
  See Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d at 1100 (error that is “so clearly prejudicial to
4 
substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”)
4
include required information that would have enabled Parker-Bender to
determine conclusively whether the charges were permitted.  The absence of
proper documentation, together with other evidence from Medicaid recipients,
provided a proper factual basis to assess the fraudulent nature of Showell’s
claims for reimbursement.  
(7)  Showell also complains that Parker-Bender testified that Showell’s
billing was “fraudulent.”  The lower court cured any possible prejudice from
those remarks, however, by instructing the jury to disregard them.3
Accordingly, we find no merit to this contention.
(8)
Showell next argues that the trial court erred when it allowed
Spahn to testify that the State could have filed 2000 charges, but decided to
pursue only “the most blatant situations.”  Again, because Showell did not
object at trial, we review for plain error.   Spahn’s comments would not amount
4
to plain error even if they had been elicited, as Showell argues, for the purpose
of proving her propensity to commit crimes.  In fact, the evidence of many
improper billings was necessary to establish Showell’s intent or plan to commit
fraud.  Although the trial court did not conduct a Getz analysis or give the jury
a limiting instruction, we are satisfied that there was no plain error.
 Van Arsdall v. State, 524 A.2d 3, 11 (Del. 1987).
5
5
(9)
Showell’s final argument is that the Superior Court violated her
Sixth Amendment rights when it admitted billing records for Snead and
Collick, two Medicaid recipients who did not testify at trial.  The Superior
Court initially admitted the bills as business records, but later ruled that they
provided insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.  Since the trial court
acquitted Showell on the two counts related to those records, we need not
consider whether the records should have been admitted inasmuch as any error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
5
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court be, and the same hereby is AFFIRMED.  
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice
6