Case Title: KIRT ORLANDO ROYBALL, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0234

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
KIRT ORLANDO ROYBALL, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 79210 P.3d 1073Case Number: S-08-0234Decided: 06/17/2009
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
KIRT 
ORLANDO ROYBALL, JR.,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Alden.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Mr. 
Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]  The State charged Kirt Orlando Royball, 
Jr. with three counts of first degree sexual assault and one count of 
kidnapping.  The parties 
subsequently entered into a plea agreement in which the State agreed to amend 
the information to charge two counts of third degree sexual assault in place of 
two of the first degree sexual assault counts and dismiss the remaining sexual 
assault and kidnapping charges.  In 
exchange, Mr. Royball agreed to plead guilty to the amended counts of third 
degree sexual assault.  

 
 
[¶2]  At the change of plea hearing, the 
district court judge made statements concerning the plea agreement which caused 
Mr. Royball to terminate the hearing and file a motion for change of judge on 
the grounds of bias or prejudice.  
The circuit court to which the matter was assigned denied the 
motion.  Mr. Royball entered a 
conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion 
for change of judge.  We 
affirm.        

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶3]  The issue presented for our 
determination is whether the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied 
the motion for change of judge.  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]  The State charged Mr. Royball with three 
counts of first degree sexual assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-302(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007) for forcible sexual intrusion involving a 13 
year old girl.  The State also 
charged him with one count of kidnapping in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-201(a)(i), (b)(i) and (c) (LexisNexis 2007) for forcibly confining the 
victim during the sexual assault.  
The parties subsequently entered into a plea agreement in which Mr. 
Royball agreed to plead guilty to two counts of third degree sexual assault in 
exchange for the State's agreement to amend the charges to allege two counts of 
third degree sexual assault in place of two of the first degree sexual assault 
counts and dismiss the remaining count of first degree sexual assault and the 
kidnapping charge.      

 
 
[¶5]  The parties appeared at a change of plea 
hearing and informed the district court of the terms of the plea agreement.  The district court asked the State what 
the victim and her family thought about the amended charges.  The district court expressed concern 
that the victim and her family went along with the plea agreement because they 
thought Mr. Royball would serve 30 years in prison when that might not be the 
outcome.  After some discussion, the 
district court judge stated:

 
 
I'm 
having trouble understanding this.  
I know you have the executive division's prerogative of doing as you see 
fit with the charging and amending that's to be done, but I don't understand how 
anybody can read this Affidavit of Probable Cause and believe it is appropriate 
to reduce two first degree rape charges to third degree sexual assault. 

 
 
Defense 
counsel responded that she was concerned from these comments that the judge may 
have prejudged Mr. Royball's behavior and might impose a higher sentence based 
upon the affidavit supporting the original charges rather than the charges to 
which Mr. Royball had agreed to plead guilty.  Defense counsel asked that the hearing 
be continued to give her the opportunity to confer with Mr. 
Royball.

 
 
[¶6]  The following day, Mr. Royball filed a 
motion for change of judge pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 21.1(b).  As grounds for his motion, Mr. Royball 
stated:  

 
 
This 
court has indicated by its comments that it has read the Affidavit of Probable 
Cause in this matter and believes that the acts therein constitute "rape" and 
indicates an inability to understand why the Defendant is being allowed to enter 
pleas to lesser charges.  The counts 
of third degree sexual assault to which the Defendant will enter his guilty plea 
do not contend that the sexual contact was by force or "rape."  However, the court, by its comments 
appears to be convinced that a "rape" occurred and concerned that it could be 
foreclosed from the opportunity of sentencing the defendant to a sentence which 
could merge and end up being only one of fifteen years, rather than 
thirty.

 
 
[¶7]  Mr. Royball asserted the judge's 
comments demonstrated a personal bias and/or prejudice against him and an 
inability to perform his judicial duties impartially.  He asserted that to proceed under the 
circumstances would deny him his constitutional and statutory rights.  Mr. Royball submitted an affidavit with 
his motion in which he averred that he was present in the courtroom when the 
judge made the comments, it was evident to him the judge felt strongly that the 
State should not have entered into the plea agreement, and the written 
transcript of the hearing did not demonstrate the emotion behind the judge's 
words.   

 
 
[¶8]  At a hearing convened the same day, the 
district court judge advised the parties that he would not take himself off the 
case.  He 
stated:

 
 
I 
will advise you, Mr. Royball, why I'm not going to do that.  When I made those comments, I was 
concerned about several . . . different things.  And . . . I acknowledge it is not my 
role to second guess the DA's office as to what they do with regard to whether 
they amend a complaint.  It was not 
my intention to suggest that. But I was concerned about a couple [of] different 
things, not so much that I took for granted that the information contained in 
the Probable Cause Affidavit was correct but rather the charging philosophy of 
the DA's office, and I guess to a certain extent the negotiation position. 

I 
felt I had a duty to insure that the victim was aware of the plea agreement and 
of the consequences of that agreement.  
And in fact it appears as though there was a possibility that the victim 
and her family had received some information which might not have been 
accurate.

It 
is not my function, not my responsibility to interfere with the discussions 
between the DA's office and the victim.  
But I will tell you, Mr. Royball, that I was concerned about the  as 
much concerned about the charging philosophy of the DA's office to charge the 
matter as they did and then reach an agreement which appears to be significantly 
less  to involve charges that are significantly less than those first charged 
rather than an assumption on my part that you did exactly what the affidavit 
alleged you did.  I don't know if 
that makes any sense to you, but that was my thought process.  And for that reason I'm not going to 
recuse myself.

 
 
The 
district court judge entered an order assigning the case to a circuit court 
judge for the limited purpose of deciding the motion for change of judge.1  

 
 
[¶9]  The circuit court set the motion for 
hearing.  Prior to the hearing, Mr. 
Royball filed with the circuit court the amended information, his affidavit and 
the transcript from the initial change of plea hearing in district court.  During the hearing, the circuit court 
noted that it had reviewed those documents as well as the transcript of the 
district court hearing held after Mr. Royball filed his motion for change of 
judge.  After the hearing, the 
circuit court denied the motion, concluding the record did not support a finding 
that the district court judge was biased against Mr. Royball.    

 
 
[¶10]  Back in the district court, Mr. Royball 
entered guilty pleas to two counts of third degree sexual assault, reserving his 
right to appeal the denial of his motion for change of judge.2  The district court accepted the pleas 
and set the matter for sentencing.  
Following the sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Mr. 
Royball to consecutive terms of 11 to 13 years on each third degree sexual 
assault count.  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]  Motions to disqualify a judge based upon 
bias or prejudice are governed by W.R.Cr.P. 21.1(b), which 
provides:

 
 
(b) 
Disqualification for cause.  
Promptly after the grounds for such motion become known, the state or the 
defendant may move for a change of judge on the ground that the presiding judge 
is biased or prejudiced against the state, the attorney for the state, the 
defendant or the defendant's attorney.  
The motion shall be supported by affidavits stating sufficient facts to 
demonstrate such bias or prejudice.  
Prior to a hearing on the motion other affidavits may be filed.  The motion shall be referred to another 
judge, or a court commissioner, who shall rule on the motion, and if granted 
shall immediately assign the case to a judge other than the disqualified 
judge.  A ruling on a motion for a 
change of judge is not an appealable order, but the ruling shall be made a part 
of the record, and may be assigned as error in an appeal of the case or on a 
bill of exceptions.  

 
 
[¶12]  The rule requires the party seeking 
disqualification to state facts that would convince a reasonable person with 
knowledge of all the facts that the judge harbors a personal bias or prejudice 
against the party or his attorney.  
DeLoge v. State, 2007 WY 71, ¶ 
10, 156 P.3d 1004, 1008 (Wyo. 2007).  
The denial of a motion for disqualification of a judge for cause is 
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.  Pote v. State, 695 P.2d 617, 632 (Wyo. 
1985).  An abuse of discretion 
occurs when the deciding court could not have reasonably concluded as it 
did.  Young v. State, 2005 WY 136, ¶ 9, 121 P.3d 145, 147 (Wyo. 2005).

    
     

DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶13]  Mr. Royball contends the circuit court 
abused its discretion by considering, along with the documents he submitted, the 
transcript of the hearing the district court held after he filed his motion for 
change of judge.  Neither Mr. 
Royball nor the State submitted that transcript to the circuit court.  Mr. Royball contends the circuit court's 
"self-directed, investigatory expedition through the courthouse to locate 
transcripts" not submitted by the parties was improper.  The State asserts that the circuit court 
properly considered all of the facts in determining the motion, including the 
hearing transcripts.  

 
 
[¶14]  Mr. Royball cites no authority for the 
assertion that in deciding his motion the circuit court was precluded from 
considering other parts of the district court record not submitted by the 
parties.  Although Rule 21.1(b) 
provides that a motion to disqualify a judge for cause shall be supported by 
affidavits, the rule does not prohibit the judge assigned to decide the motion 
from considering the district court record.  A judge assigned to decide a motion for 
change of judge must determine whether a reasonable person "with knowledge of 
all the facts" would be convinced that 
the judge is personally biased or prejudiced against the party or his 
attorney.  The circuit court judge 
did not abuse his discretion in considering the hearing 
transcript.

 
 
[¶15]  Mr. Royball also contends that the 
record the parties presented to the circuit court clearly supported his 
motion.  He cites Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725, 728-29 
(Wyo. 1979) in which this Court stated:

 
 
Prejudice 
involves a prejudgment or forming of an opinion without sufficient knowledge or 
examination.  Bias is a leaning of 
the mind or an inclination toward one person over another.  The "bias" which is a ground for 
disqualification of a judge must be personal, and it must be such a condition of 
the mind which sways judgment and renders the judge unable to exercise his 
functions impartially in a given case or which is inconsistent with a state of 
mind fully open to the conviction which evidence might 
produce.

 
 
He 
asserts that the district court judge's comments demonstrated that he had 
prejudged Mr. Royball's conduct and formed the opinion that he "raped" the 
victim and should be sentenced accordingly.  He contends the judge made this 
prejudgment on the basis of allegations contained in the probable cause 
affidavit filed in support of the original charges which the prosecutor in his 
discretion had agreed to dismiss and amend.  He contends that the judge in essence 
improperly inserted himself into the prosecutor's role, thereby demonstrating 
that he was unable to exercise his function impartially.  The State asserts that the record did 
not support the motion and the circuit court correctly concluded the district 
court judge's comments did not reflect any personal bias or prejudice toward Mr. 
Royball.

 
 
[¶16]  Our review of the record leads us to 
conclude that the circuit court reasonably could have concluded that Mr. Royball 
did not meet his burden of proving that the district court judge was personally 
biased or prejudiced toward him or his attorney. The district court judge's 
comment that, in light of the allegations contained in the probable cause 
affidavit, he did not understand how the original charges could be reduced from 
first to third degree sexual assault, could not be considered in isolation but 
had to be read in the context of all of his comments during these 
proceedings.  

 
 
[¶17]  In addition to the comment relied upon 
by Mr. Royball, the district court judge made the following statements at the 
initial change of plea hearing:  

 
 
I 
don't have any choice about what the state does with the charging decision.  We are a long way from sentencing.  I don't have any idea what [Mr. 
Royball's] criminal history is; I don't have any idea what comments the victim 
or her family might make . . . .

 
 
And,  

 
 
I 
can tell you that I will not sentence you for anything that you don't admit 
to[,] that you haven't been proven to have done.  

 
 
[¶18]  The following day, the district court 
judge stated:

 
 
. 
. . I acknowledge that it is not my role to second guess the DA's office as to 
what they do with regard to whether they amend a complaint. 

 

. 
. . .

 
 
            
It is not my function, not my responsibility to interfere with the 
discussions between the DA's office and the victim.       

 
 
[¶19]  Given these statements, the circuit 
court reasonably could have concluded the district court judge was not swayed 
and that he was able to exercise his functions impartially.  From these statements, the circuit court 
reasonably could have concluded that the district court judge understood his 
function and would exercise it with an open mind.  It could be reasonably concluded from 
the judge's statements that he understood his duty was to sentence Mr. Royball 
only for the offenses he admitted to having committed and to which he pled 
guilty and on the basis of all of the factors presented at the time of 
sentencing.  We find no abuse of 
discretion.   

 
 
[¶20]   Affirmed.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-3-112 (LexisNexis 2007) provides the authority for 
the district court's assignment.  
That section states in relevant part:

 
 
(a)  A judge of a district 
court may assign to a circuit court judge any case or proceeding within the 
jurisdiction of the district court subject only to the following 
restrictions:

. . . .

(ii)  Acceptance of the judge 
to whom the assignment of the case or proceeding is to be 
made;

. . . .

(iv)  Consent of both the 
prosecutor and the defendant in a criminal case in which the defendant is 
charged with any crime for which the aggregate sentences for all crimes charged 
exceed five (5) years in prison.

 
 
The record is clear that the prosecutor and Mr. Royball agreed to the 
assignment of the motion to the circuit court and the circuit court accepted the 
assignment. 

 
 

2W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2) allows a defendant to enter a conditional guilty plea 
while reserving his right to appeal an adverse determination of a specified 
pretrial motion.  In Bouch v. State, 2006 WY 122, ¶ 29, 143 P.3d 643, 652 (Wyo. 2006), we held the conditional plea procedure is appropriate 
only when determination of the issue on appeal will resolve the case.  Bouch was an appeal from an order 
denying a motion to suppress evidence without which the State still would have 
pursued the charges.  Under those 
circumstances, where a trial would have occurred even if this Court had reversed 
the denial of the suppression motion, we said that use of the conditional plea 
was not appropriate.  This 
limitation on the use of conditional pleas was intended to prevent conditional 
pleas from being used for purposes of delaying a trial that is inevitable 
regardless of the ruling on appeal.  
Id., ¶ 28, 143 P.3d  at 652, 
quoting Fed.R.Cr.P. 11, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1983 
Amendment.  Arguably, the reason for 
the limitation does not apply here where the only further proceeding resulting 
from reversal would be a new sentencing by a different judge.  In any event, because the district court 
allowed Mr. Royball to enter a conditional plea reserving his right to appeal 
the denial of his motion, we proceed with our review.  Johnson v. City of Laramie, 2008 WY 73, 
¶ 5, 187 P.3d 355, 356-57 (Wyo. 2008).