Case Title: Great Northern Railway Co. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COM'N

Citation: 169 N.W.2d 732

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1969-07-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
169 N.W.2d 732 (1969) GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Relator, v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF MINNESOTA et al., Respondents. No. 41996. Supreme Court of Minnesota. July 25, 1969. *733 Anthony Kane, L. E. Torinus, Jr., H. V. Rhedin, D. E. Engle, St. Paul, for relator. Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., Norton M. Hatlie, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondents. KNUTSON, Chief Justice. This is a writ of prohibition. The Great Northern Railway Company has for many years operated trains between Minneapolis-St. Paul and Duluth, Minnesota, providing both freight and passenger service. The route of these trains runs in part through the State of Wisconsin and provides service to the city of Superior in that state. On May 1, 1969, the Great Northern suspended passenger train operations between Superior, Wisconsin, and Duluth, Minnesota, and substituted chartered bus service operating on the same schedule as the trains between the two cities. Thus, a person traveling on the train from St. Paul to Duluth would disembark at Superior and be transported by bus from Superior to Duluth. Similarly, a person traveling from Duluth to St. Paul would purchase a ticket at the bus station in Duluth and be transported by bus to Superior, where he would board the train. The distance between the railroad stations in Superior and Duluth is approximately 4 miles. No purely intrastate passenger train service has been or is provided by Great Northern between Duluth and any point in Minnesota. An affidavit by a Great Northern official indicates that by discontinuing train service between Superior and Duluth the saving in reduced wages and operating costs, including depot and track rentals, bridge tolls and other charges, is approximately $225,000 per year. For the purpose of clarity the Minnesota Public Service Commission will be referred to in this opinion as the Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission will be referred to as the ICC. *734 On May 2, 1969, on its own motion, the Commission entered an order requiring the railroad to show cause why passenger train service between Duluth and Superior should not be continued and ordering the Great Northern to immediately restore such passenger service pending a hearing on its order to show cause. On May 6, 1969, we issued our writ of prohibition restraining the Commission from further action of any kind or character which would implement its order of May 2 until the further order of this court. The sole question presented in this proceeding is whether the Commission has jurisdiction to regulate passenger train service between Duluth, Minnesota, and Superior, Wisconsin. At the outset it must be conceded that Great Northern in its operation of the train between Minneapolis-St. Paul and Duluth, Minnesota, which runs through Wisconsin and furnishes service to Superior in that state, is engaged in interstate commerce. Hardwick Farmers Elev. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 110 Minn. 25, 124 N.W. 819; State v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co., 40 Minn. 267, 41 N.W. 1047, 3 L.R.A. 238. In the regulation of commerce it seems quite clear that there are areas where the jurisdiction of the ICC is exclusive; other areas where the jurisdiction of the state regulatory body is exclusive; others where regulation may be exercised concurrently and independently by both; and still others where the regulation may be exercised by the states, but only until Congress may see fit to act upon the subject. Hardwick Farmers Elev. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., supra; Ex parte McNiel, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236, 20 L. Ed. 624. Under the Transportation Act of 1920, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1(18), it seems clear that where there is a complete abandonment of a portion of a line of railroad engaged in interstate commerce the ICC has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject. Prior to 1958, apparently the ICC had no authority over the partial discontinuance of an interstate railroad operation. New Jersey v. New York, S. & W. R. Co., 372 U.S. 1, 83 S. Ct. 614, 9 L. Ed. 2d 541. In that year Congress enacted what is now codified as 49 U.S.C.A. § 13a. Subd. (1) of this statute covers the discontinuance of a railway operation between a point in one state and a point in another state; and subd. (2), the discontinuance of an operation wholly within one state. In construing the language of this statutory provision, the Supreme Court of the United States said (372 U.S. 5, 83 S. Ct. 616, 9 L.Ed.2d 544): The court then considered the legislative history of the act and concluded (372 U.S. 8, 83 S. Ct. 618, 9 L.Ed.2d 546): A reading of § 13a leads us to the conclusion that with respect to a railroad operating from one state into another, even though both terminals are in the same state, the state regulatory body, such as our Commission, has the power to institute a proceeding of this kind if it lies within the powers conferred upon it by the state, and that if it does so the railroad can in a proper proceeding have the case removed to the ICC. Here, no attempt has been made to invoke the jurisdiction of the ICC, and the question then is whether under our statutory scheme the Commission has the power to act at all. It is elementary that the Commission, being a creature of statute, has only those powers given to it by the legislature. Backus-Brooks Co. v. N. P. Ry. Co. (8 Cir.), 21 F.2d 4, 19, where the court said: The powers of our Commission were enacted, or reenacted, by Ex.Sess.L.1957, c. 10. At that time, as pointed out in New Jersey v. New York, S. & W. R. Co. supra, the ICC had no authority to regulate the discontinuance of a part of the operation of a railroad running from one state through another. As now codified, Minn. St. 216 A. 05, subd. 2, provides in part: "The commission shall, to the extent prescribed by law: We take it that it is this provision upon which the Commission relies mainly for authority to proceed as it has here. However, throughout our act the legislature has, wherever definition was necessary, limited the power of the Commission to the regulation of intrastate commerce. Section 218.041, which sets out the duties of the Commission, provides in part: Section 218.021 lists certain acts which a common carrier may not perform. Subd. 1(2), for instance, states that it is unlawful for a common carrier: The only interpretation of the language quoted in these statutory provisions seems to be in an opinion of the attorney general issued in 1950. He was then asked to interpret *736 Minn.St. 216.62 (subsequently repealed by Ex.Sess.L.1957, c. 10, § 8), which provided that a railroad could not discontinue any "regularly scheduled intrastate passenger trains" without permission. (Italics supplied.) The questions raised were whether the railroad and warehouse commission had jurisdiction over the discontinuance where only interstate service was involved and where both interstate and intrastate service was provided. The attorney general concluded (Report Attorney General, 1950, No. 210, pp. 376, 377) that the legislature "did not intend the commission to have jurisdiction over the discontinuance of interstate passenger trains," but that the commission did have jurisdiction over the discontinuance of intrastate service "even though the trains were also engaged in interstate service." The authorities from foreign states are not of any assistance. A review of the railroad regulation statutes of the various states indicates that Minnesota is unique in its specific reference to intrastate passenger trains. Most states which deal with the question of discontinuance at all have far more general provisions. Thus, for instance, the New Jersey law, N.J.Stat.Ann. § 48:2-24, provides: At least 20 other states have statutes which are equally or even more specific in allowing regulation of interstate passenger service to the extent permitted by Federal law. A discussion of the statutes and the decisions of other states would be of no value here. The Commission relies upon the following statement taken from State v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co., 40 Minn. 267, 270, 41 N.W. 1047, 1048: In the first place, this statement is not applicable to the facts in the case before us, because the railroad here does more than run through Wisconsin. It serves the city of Superior in that state; but above and beyond that, the Commission fails to recognize that the case from which this statement was taken held against the position they now advocate, and continued, after the quoted statement, to say (40 Minn. 270, 41 N.W. 1048): This latter statement is directly applicable to the facts before us. We also said in the same case, which involved the regulation of rates (40 Minn. 268, 41 N.W. 1048): The Commission apparently fails to distinguish between the right to regulate transportation within the state of a carrier operating interstate and the power to regulate the interstate commerce itself. Thus, relying on 49 U.S.C.A. § 1(17), it contends that it has power to regulate the discontinuance of the interstate part of this commerce. We fail to see that this section has anything to do with the question involved in the present case. We assume the following language is what the commission relies upon: Here, again, it is noticeable that Congress is dealing with the right of a state regulatory body to regulate intrastate commerce and not the right to regulate interstate commerce. As we have pointed out above, prior to 1958 the ICC had no such power. Whatever power a state commission now has must be subject to § 13a, and then only when the state itself has given the regulatory body the power to act, which is not true of our state. It seems quite clear to us that under § 13a the Commission could be given regulatory power to institute a proceeding of this kind subject to the right of the railroad to remove it to the ICC, if the legislature saw fit to do so. The difficulty is that the legislature has not granted the Commission that power and, until it does, the Commission is not in a position to act. In the light of this situation the writ here must be made absolute. Writ made absolute. PETERSON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.