Case Title: BRUCE YOUNG v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
BRUCE YOUNG v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 37695 P.2d 1055Case Number: 84-165Decided: 03/01/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
BRUCE YOUNG, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, R.M. Forrister, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, Public Defender, and Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming 
Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Roger C. Fransen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant was tried by 
a jury and convicted of second degree sexual assault, § 6-4-303(a)(v) [§ 
6-2-303(a)(v)], W.S. 19771, and of incest, § 6-5-102 [§ 
6-4-402], W.S. 19772, stemming from actions involving 
his seven-year-old adopted daughter. Appellant was sentenced to two to seven 
years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary on each offense, with the sentences to 
run concurrently. He appealed to this court; in an opinion published on April 2, 
1984, we affirmed his conviction, but remanded for resentencing, inasmuch as the 
maximum penalty provided by § 6-5-102, incest, is five years and a 
two-to-seven-year sentence is therefore clearly improper.3 The two-to-seven-year sentence for 
second degree sexual assault was within the statutory limit set by § 
6-4-306(a)(ii), W.S. 1977 [§ 6-2-306(a)(ii), W.S. 1977], and it was a proper 
sentence.

[¶2.]     On resentencing, the 
district court set aside, for purposes of sentencing, the conviction of incest, 
and sentenced appellant on the second degree sexual assault conviction to not 
less than two nor more than seven years, with credit for time previously served 
on that conviction.

[¶3.]     The issue appellant 
raises on appeal is as follows:

"Whether a sentence 
imposed by a judge operating under grave misconceptions concerning the 
appropriate sentencing consideration must be reversed."

[¶4.]     We 
affirm.

Appellant's main 
complaint seems to arise from his perception that the sentencing court "clearly 
did not consider the circumstances of the crime nor the Appellant's character." 
Appellant's brief refers to the reimposition of the original sentence as a 
"mechanical imposition of a sentence," and quotes the following statement of the 
judge, made at the pronouncement of the sentence:

"I don't think that the 
Court really should act as an agency, and I don't think the Court should in 
cases generally, act as an agency of government charged with the problem of 
following the fortunes of people who go through the Court and whose cares are 
disposed of, as we rather impersonally and maybe unkindly call it in this 
practice. I don't think the courts are well advised to enter into the business 
with which other departments of government have been primarily charged of 
following these matters and taking them subject to continuous adjustment at any 
time on any occasion. This, I realize, isn't any time or any occasion. This 
matter has been through the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has, of course, 
determined that we erred in our procedure the first time, and so it is different 
in that respect; but in many respects, what the Supreme Court has done has 
simply, it seems to me, provided a sort of trigger for defense here to show the 
picture of your good conduct during the interim, and I really don't have any 
doubt that you have conducted yourself well in this interim. But I think for 
various reasons of policy and lack of real evidence that things are truly 
different, what the Court ought to do simply is impose the one legal sentence 
which it imposed in the same fashion as it did before, excepting only that, of 
course, it should give you credit for all of the time you spent in 
incarceration. I don't have any question about that at all. The Court will 
sentence accordingly."

[¶5.]     While we agree with 
appellant's short summary of the law in this state concerning sentencing, i.e., 
that sentencing involves a consideration of both the circumstances surrounding a 
crime, as well as the background of the appellant, Ventling v. State, Wyo., 676 P.2d 573, 
575 (1984), we believe, from a careful reading of the record, that the trial 
court gave due consideration to these two categories.

[¶6.]     It must be remembered 
that the sentencing judge had listened to the trial and had listened to 
arguments by the prosecution and the defense at the first sentencing hearing. He 
was given a presentence report and a report by the WyomingStateHospital. He also was presented with many 
letters from family, friends and acquaintances of appellant. These letters said 
things like, "My personal opinion of Bruce is one of high esteem and trust. I 
feel he is an honest and good man," to quote from one. On remand, at the second 
sentencing hearing, the judge listened to more arguments by the prosecution and 
the defense, to a statement by appellant himself, and was presented with even 
more letters, all similar in tone to the ones presented 
before.

[¶7.]     After all that, the 
judge simply stated that, for "lack of real evidence that things are truly 
different," he was going to reimpose the one legal sentence that he had imposed 
before. Nothing had changed. There was evidence that the appellant had led an 
exemplary life between the times of the two sentences, but there was similar 
evidence presented at the original sentencing hearing. The fact that appellant 
stood convicted of second degree sexual assault and of incest had not 
changed.

[¶8.]     The trial court 
properly gave appellant a full hearing, and took and considered evidence, and 
then imposed a sentence which is within the statutorily prescribed limits. We 
have repeatedly said that we are reluctant to review the length of a sentence 
imposed by the trial court if it is within the limits set by statute, and we 
will not disturb a sentence absent a clear abuse of discretion. Ventling v. State, supra, 676 P.2d  at 
574; Wright v. State, Wyo., 670 P.2d 1090, 1092 (1983); Eaton v. State, Wyo., 660 P.2d 803, 806 (1983); Taylor v. State, Wyo., 658 P.2d 1297, 1300 (1983); Daniel v. State, Wyo., 644 P.2d 172, 178 (1982); and Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378, 380 
(1979).

[¶9.]     Since we find no abuse 
of discretion, we affirm.

1 Section 6-4-303 provided 
in pertinent part:

"(a) Any actor who 
inflicts sexual penetration or sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual 
assault in the second degree if, under circumstances not constituted sexual 
assault in the first degree:

* * * * * 
*

"(v) At the time of the 
commission of the act the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age and the 
actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim."

2 Section 6-5-102, 
provided:

"If any stepfather shall 
have sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter, knowing her to be such, or if any 
stepmother and her stepson shall have sexual intercourse together, having 
knowledge of their relationship; or if any parent shall have sexual intercourse 
with his or her child, knowing him or her to be such; or if any brother and 
sister, being of the age of sixteen (16) years or upwards, shall have sexual 
intercourse together, having knowledge of their consanguinity, he or she shall 
be deemed guilty of incest, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more 
than five (5) years, or may be imprisoned in the county jail not more than 
twelve (12) months."

Statutory 
references herein are to the sections as they existed at the time of the 
incidents. Corresponding present statutory references are in 
brackets.

3 Young v. State, Wyo., 678 P.2d 880 
(1984).