Case Title: State v. Alsup

Citation: 239 Kan. 673, 722 P.2d 1100

Docket Number: 58,921

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1986-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
239 Kan. 673 (1986)
722 P.2d 1100
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
JOHN BENJAMIN ALSUP, Appellant.
No. 58,921

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 18, 1986.
Tom Crossan, of Independence, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Sally Davis Pokorny, county attorney, argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, was with her on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HERD, J.:
This is a direct appeal from a criminal proceeding in which the appellant, John Alsup, pled no contest to one count of aggravated robbery (K.S.A. 21-3427) and one count of kidnapping (K.S.A. 21-3420).
The charges against Alsup arose from the following incident. In the late afternoon of November 13, 1982, appellant entered the Caney Drugstore in Caney, Kansas. He grabbed Diana Pinegar, a 14-year-old drugstore employee, and pointed a sawed-off shotgun at her abdomen. He then ordered Don Wagner, the store owner, to the back of the store and forced Harold Winkler, the pharmacist, to lie on the floor. Alsup demanded that Wagner give him some drugs  demerol, preludin, and dilaudid  and threatened to kill Diana if Wagner didn't comply. After obtaining the drugs, Alsup took Diana out of the store and told Wagner, "[I]f the police show up, she's dead."
Charges were filed against Alsup on December 2, 1982, but the preliminary hearing did not take place until November 21, *674 1984. The delay resulted from Alsup being incarcerated in Oklahoma for another offense. He was returned to Kansas after he filed a demand for trial pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. A jury trial was set for April 16, 1985.
One day before the scheduled trial date, appellant's attorney, Robert Claus, moved to withdraw as counsel because he and Alsup disagreed on the manner in which to conduct Alsup's defense. The trial court granted the motion and appointed Tom Crossan to represent the appellant. However, at the hearing on Claus' motion to withdraw, Alsup objected to Claus' withdrawal and informed the trial court he wanted to plead to the offenses for which he was charged. The trial court urged him to wait and speak to Crossan, cautioned him of the consequences and inquired as to his understanding of the plea. Upon obtaining satisfactory answers from Alsup, the court finally accepted his nolo contendere plea, all as more fully set out later in this opinion.
The appellant was sentenced to a term of not less than five years nor more than life for the offense of aggravated robbery and to a term of not less than ten years nor more than life for the offense of kidnapping, with the sentences to run consecutively to each other and consecutively with sentences for any crimes for which appellant was previously sentenced or on parole.
K.S.A. 22-3602(a) precludes a direct appeal from a "judgment of conviction" where the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere. However, in this case the court permitted extensive additional discovery and held additional hearings after the plea and before pronouncing sentence some six months later. In light of the foregoing circumstances we consider this appeal as if it were a proceeding under K.S.A. 60-1507 and not a direct appeal. We thus have jurisdiction of the appeal.
Let us turn to the merits of the case. Appellant first alleges the trial court erred in allowing his trial counsel, Robert Claus, to withdraw just one day before the appellant's scheduled trial date.
In support of his contention, appellant cites Supreme Court Rule 117 (235 Kan. civ), which provides:
Claus made an oral motion to withdraw in the presence of the appellant in a proceeding which was on the record. Additionally, the court allowed Alsup to comment regarding his (Alsup's) reasons for not wanting Claus to withdraw. Claus did serve a formal motion to withdraw on Alsup and opposing counsel and filed the motion with the court on the same day as the proceeding. Under these circumstances, it appears Rule 117 has been substantially complied with.
Alsup's primary argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in accepting his nolo contendere plea. Alsup argues his plea was not voluntary because it was induced by "long delays" perpetrated by the court and counsel for both sides.
The acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is governed by K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 22-3210, which provides as follows:
We discussed the necessity for this statutory procedure in Trotter v. State, 218 Kan. 266, 268-69, 543 P.2d 1023 (1975):
We further held in Trotter that a failure to strictly comply with 22-3210 is harmless if it can be determined that the plea of guilty (or no contest) is knowingly and voluntarily made. 218 Kan. at 269. See also James v. State, 220 Kan. 284, 287, 553 P.2d 345 (1976), where we held strict compliance with 22-3210 is not mandatory if the purpose of the statute is served.
A review of the record in the instant case reveals the appellant's plea of nolo contendere was knowingly and voluntarily made and indicates the procedures followed by the trial court substantially complied with K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 22-3210.
The following colloquy occurred between the trial court and Alsup:
"DEFENDANT ALSUP: Yes.
The trial court continued:
"THE COURT: Mr. Alsup, how old are you?
"DEFENDANT ALSUP: I will be thirty in October.
"THE COURT: How much education do you have?
"DEFENDANT ALSUP: Part in part out.
"THE COURT: How far did you go in formal school?
*677 "THE COURT: I haven't made one yet."
After this exchange, the court informed Alsup his request to represent himself was denied, and Tom Crossan was appointed to represent him. The court also stated the matter would be set for trial in thirty days. Alsup then stated he wanted appointed counsel only if there would be no further delay in trial. At that point, a rather long conversation ensued between Alsup and the court, a review of which is crucial to a determination of the voluntariness of defendant's confession. Therefore, it will be repeated in full here:
"DEFENDANT ALSUP: I understand that.
"DEFENDANT ALSUP: Yes, Your Honor.
After examining a transcript of the preliminary hearing to confirm there was a factual basis for the plea, the court accepted Alsup's plea of nolo contendere.
A thorough review of the transcript indicates Alsup pled no contest because he knew he was guilty of the offenses with which he was charged and he did not want to take advantage of the plea bargain offered him because that would be a "miscarriage of justice." The plea bargain referred to pertained to a recommended sentence of five to life on each count. When Claus withdrew, the plea bargain was cancelled.
The trial court addressed the appellant personally and at length, and a record was made of the entire proceeding. The court determined the plea was voluntary only after examining the factual basis for the plea and questioning the appellant regarding his understanding of the nature of the charges against him and the potential punishment. When the total circumstances of the appellant's plea are examined, we have no hesitation in holding the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. Accordingly, the court did not err in denying appellant's motion to withdraw his nolo contendere plea.
Appellant next alleges he received an excessive sentence. Alsup was sentenced to consecutive terms of not less than five years nor more than life for aggravated robbery and not less than ten years nor more than life for kidnapping.
A sentence imposed by the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal on the ground it is excessive provided it is within the limits prescribed by law and within the realm of discretion on the part of the trial court, and the sentence is not the result of partiality, prejudice, or corrupt motive. State v. Cunningham, 236 Kan. 842, 846, 695 P.2d 1280 (1985).
The appellant was convicted of two class B felonies, which carry a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than five years nor more than fifteen years and a maximum term of not less than twenty years nor more than life. K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 21-4501(b). *679 The sentences were clearly within the statutory limits and the appellant does not allege the sentences resulted from partiality, prejudice, or corrupt motive. Accordingly, the sentences imposed were not excessive and there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
As his next point on appeal, appellant contends the $500,000 appeal bond is "grossly excessive." Since Alsup is serving time in Oklahoma, this issue is moot. However, even if the issue were not moot, the bond is not excessive when considered in light of the factors listed in K.S.A. 22-2802(4):
The appellant was convicted of two violent and serious felonies in this state and is currently serving a prison sentence in Oklahoma for shooting with intent to kill. Under the circumstances, the amount of the appeal bond was not excessive.
Appellant next contends the court erred in placing him in the custody of the Secretary of Corrections of the State of Kansas, when he still had time remaining on his Oklahoma sentence. The State concedes this issue but correctly points out the issue is now moot since appellant is presently in custody at the Conner Correctional Institute in Oklahoma.
As his final point, appellant alleges the trial court erred in failing to credit him with the period of time spent in the Montgomery county jail awaiting trial. The State concedes this issue and states that the journal entry is in the process of being corrected to provide credit for time served.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed as to credit for time served.
HOLMES, J., dissenting:
It has long been the law in Kansas that the right to appeal is purely statutory. If we do not have jurisdiction under proper statutory authority, we cannot create it by stating that we "consider this appeal as if it were a proceeding under K.S.A. 60-1507 and not a direct appeal." While judicial *680 economy and expediency may be justified under certain circumstances, it is no substitute for jurisdiction.
I further dissent from the holding that the plea of nolo contendere was knowingly and voluntarily made. The court felt it was necessary to protect the defendant's interests by appointing counsel when defendant wanted to waive the right to counsel and proceed pro se. How can it be said that a defendant needs counsel and then allow the defendant to proceed without consulting with the counsel the court found was necessary? I firmly believe that when a defendant is represented by counsel there should never be court proceedings or interrogation without that counsel at least being given the opportunity to be present to safeguard his client's interests. Anything less is a lack of due process of law.
I would reverse the judgment.