Case Title: New 52 Project, Inc. v. Proctor

Citation: 2009-Ohio-1766

Docket Number: 20080574

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as New 52 Project, Inc. v. Proctor, 122 Ohio St.3d 1, 2009-Ohio-1766.] 
 
 
 
NEW 52 PROJECT, INC., APPELLEE, v. PROCTOR, DIR., OHIO DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as New 52 Project, Inc. v. Proctor, 122 Ohio St.3d 1, 2009-Ohio-1766.] 
Abandonment of state highway — R.C. Chapter 5511 gives the director of 
transportation the exclusive authority to abandon or vacate portions of the 
state highway system.  A court of common pleas has no jurisdiction to 
decide whether an easement for a state highway has been abandoned. 
(No. 2008-0574 — Submitted February 4, 2009 — Decided April 21, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 07AP-487, 2008-Ohio-465. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
R.C. Chapter 5511 gives the director of transportation the exclusive authority to 
abandon or vacate portions of the state highway system.  Therefore, a 
court of common pleas has no jurisdiction to decide whether an easement 
for a state highway has been abandoned. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} Today we must decide whether a court of common pleas has 
jurisdiction to decide whether an easement for a state highway has been 
abandoned.  Because we hold that R.C. Chapter 5511 gives the director of 
transportation the exclusive authority to abandon or vacate portions of the state 
highway system, we answer that question in the negative.  Accordingly we 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial 
court dismissing the complaint. 
Facts and Procedural History 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 2} In 1959, Lillian Parsons deeded an easement through a portion of 
her property, in the village of Chesapeake, to the state of Ohio.  By conveyance 
from Parsons’s successors in interest, New 52 Project, Inc. (“New 52”), appellee, 
became owner of the underlying fee.  The deed stated that the grantor, “for and in 
consideration of the sum of * * * $38,840.64 and for other good and valuable 
consideration to her paid by the State of Ohio, the Grantee, * * * does hereby 
grant, bargain, sell, convey and release to the said Grantee, its successors and 
assigns forever, a perpetual easement and right of way for public highway and 
road purposes in, upon and over the lands hereinafter described, including loss of 
direct access as hereinafter provided.” 
{¶ 3} The easement was used for highway purposes for some years as the 
main route of U.S. 52 for ingress to and egress from Chesapeake, Ohio.  
Beginning in 1984 or 1985, the highway was rerouted; the previous highway 
became an exit ramp and was rerouted so that it did not traverse the easement at 
issue. 
{¶ 4} In 2006, New 52 sued the director of transportation in the Franklin 
County Court of Common Pleas, seeking a declaration that the Ohio Department 
of Transportation (“ODOT”) had abandoned this easement or that the easement 
was extinguished by operation of law.  The director moved to dismiss the 
complaint, arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted.  The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that New 52 
had no common-law cause of action because R.C. 5511.01 set forth the exclusive 
procedures for abandoning a highway and any action for an abandonment of the 
easement must be accomplished through the guidelines set forth in the statute. 
{¶ 5} The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that R.C. 
5511.01 provided one means, but not the exclusive means, to abandon a highway.  
New 52 Project, Inc. v. Proctor, Franklin App. No. 07AP-487, 2008-Ohio-465, ¶ 
23.  The court decided that New 52’s complaint sufficiently pleaded facts stating a 
January Term, 2009 
3 
claim for relief and reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.  The 
director appealed, and this court accepted jurisdiction.  New 52 Project, Inc. v. 
Proctor, 118 Ohio St.3d 1505, 2008-Ohio-3369, 889 N.E.2d 1024. 
Analysis 
{¶ 6} Pursuant to R.C. 5501.31, the director of transportation has 
“general supervision of all roads comprising the state highway system.”  As part 
of that general supervision, R.C. 5511.01 and 5511.07 establish a process for the 
director to abandon or vacate highway property interests. 
{¶ 7} The abandonment of a state highway is governed by R.C. 5511.01, 
which provides that the director of transportation “may, upon giving appropriate 
notice and offering the opportunity for public involvement and comment, abandon 
a highway on the state highway system or part of such a highway which the 
director determines is of minor importance or which traverses territory adequately 
served by another state highway, and the abandoned highway shall revert to a 
county or township road or municipal street.” 
{¶ 8} R.C. 5511.07 establishes the procedure for vacating a highway or 
portion of a highway and provides that the director, “in vacating any highway or 
portion thereof on the state highway system that the director finds is no longer 
necessary for the purposes of a public highway, shall issue such a finding, which 
shall contain a description of the highway or part thereof to be vacated.  Notice of 
such finding shall be published once a week, for two consecutive weeks, in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the highway, or part 
thereof, to be vacated lies, and a copy of the notice shall be served as in civil 
cases, or by registered first class mail, return receipt requested, upon each owner 
of property abutting on the portion of the highway to be vacated, and upon the 
director of natural resources.  * * * The director shall make any vacation of a 
highway or portion of a highway to an abutting landowner or current underlying 
fee owner of record at no cost.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 9} In spite of the statutory process, New 52 filed a common-law action 
seeking a declaration that ODOT had abandoned the easement or that the 
easement had been extinguished, and that New 52 was the sole owner of the real 
property, free from the easement.  In reversing the trial court’s grant of the 
director’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted, the court of appeals concluded that R.C. 5511.01 provided one means to 
abandon a highway, but it did not agree that the mechanism was exclusive.  
Holding that the statute “neither expressly repeals nor incorporates any aspect of 
the common law cause of action for abandonment of a highway easement,” the 
court held that a common-law claim for abandonment of the easement remained 
available to the fee owner.  New 52 Project, Inc., 2008-Ohio-465, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 10} The court of appeals relied upon Kelly Nail & Iron Co. v. Lawrence 
Furnace Co. (1889), 46 Ohio St. 544, 22 N.E. 639, in which this court considered 
a claim of abandonment of a road in a municipal corporation that was at times in 
bad condition and impassable, and had not been used for 11 years.  This court 
held that the facts did not sufficiently show abandonment.  Although this court did 
hold that “[i]f non-user [sic] of such road may work an abandonment of it, the 
non-user [sic] must be shown to have extended over a period of twenty-one 
years,” id. at paragraph two of the syllabus, the court also noted that “no good 
reason exists why the statutory remedy may not be resorted to in all cases where 
there has not been a clear non-user [sic] of the street by the public for the period 
of twenty-one years.” Id. at 549. 
{¶ 11} It would appear that in Kelly Nail the court left open the possibility 
of a common-law action for abandonment of the easement.  However, six years 
later, this court held that an individual could not adversely possess a public road 
established by a county.  Heddleston v. Hendricks (1895), 52 Ohio St. 460, 40 
N.E. 408.  In 2002, this court reaffirmed Kelly Nail in State ex rel. Shemo v. 
Mayfield Hts. (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 59, 68, 765 N.E.2d 345.  However, Shemo 
January Term, 2009 
5 
involved city streets rather than the state highway system, so it is inapplicable 
here. 
{¶ 12} In Houck v. Bd. of Park Commrs. of the Huron Cty. Park Dist., 116 
Ohio St.3d 148, 2007-Ohio-5586, 876 N.E.2d 1210, in holding that a park district 
was not subject to adverse possession, this court held that “adverse possession of 
park property deprives the public of the enjoyment of park property and imposes a 
burdensome obligation on park districts to monitor their property.”  Id. at ¶ 29.  If 
one cannot adversely possess public property, then clearly an action for common-
law abandonment of an easement due to nonuse of a public highway cannot be 
permitted. 
{¶ 13} Not only will adverse possession not lie against the state, Haynes v. 
Jones (1915), 91 Ohio St. 197, 110 N.E. 469, syllabus, an action to quiet title will 
not lie against the state.  W. Park Shopping Ctr. v. Masheter (1966), 6 Ohio St.2d 
142, 35 O.O.2d 216, 216 N.E.2d 761.  Therefore, to the extent that Kelly Nail 
conflicts with today’s statutes establishing statutory procedures for abandonment 
or vacation of state highways, we find that it has been implicitly overruled by 
statute. 
{¶ 14} Rather, we find this court’s decision in Bigler v. York Twp. (1993), 
66 Ohio St.3d 98, 609 N.E.2d 529, to be dispositive.  In Bigler, we examined the 
means by which a township could abandon township roads.  The relevant statute 
in that case was R.C. 5553.042, which empowers a board of county 
commissioners to vacate a township road upon petition by an abutting land owner.  
We held, “If this court were to hold that an action could also be brought in a court 
of common pleas to quiet title to a township road on the grounds of abandonment, 
we would directly undermine the discretion which the General Assembly 
expressly granted to the board of county commissioners in R.C. 5553.042.  With 
this separate means to the same end, the statutory powers conveyed to the county 
commissioners in R.C. 5553.042 would be rendered meaningless.” Id. at 101. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 15} In addition, R.C. 5529.01 prevents the automatic vacation or 
abandonment of a public highway outside of a municipal corporation.  R.C. 
5529.01 provides: “When the director of transportation, in the construction, 
maintenance, or repair of a road on the state highway system outside the limits of 
municipal corporations, relocates the road or relocates or constructs a bridge, 
culvert, underpass, overpass, or other structure or improvement, the highway or 
portion thereof from which it is proposed to divert the travel shall not thereby be 
deemed to be vacated or abandoned, nor shall the title or easement of the state 
therein be vacated or abandoned, but shall remain in effect until the road or 
portion thereof is vacated or otherwise disposed of.” 
{¶ 16} Therefore, R.C. 5553.042 applies to abandonment of a township 
road, R.C. 5529.01 applies to abandonment of a public highway outside of a 
municipal corporation, and we find that R.C. 5511.01 and 5511.07 express the 
General Assembly’s intent to prohibit common-law claims for abandonment of an 
easement within a municipal corporation on which a public highway was built. 
{¶ 17} Rather than being a mere dispute between ODOT and a fee owner, 
we noted in Bigler that the vacation of a road “involves the careful weighing of 
widely diverse interests and public-policy considerations.”  66 Ohio St.3d at 100, 
609 N.E.2d 529.  To that end, we note that R.C. 5511.01 and 5511.07 provide 
other protections that would not exist in a common-law action for abandonment of 
an easement.  For example, both statutes provide for notice to the public or to the 
owners of abutting property about the prospective abandonment or vacation of the 
highway, and they allow public involvement, which a private lawsuit does not 
allow.  Further, R.C. 5511.01 provides for notice to other authorities, such as local 
governments and planning commissions, and any affected utilities and railroads.  
R.C. 5511.07 provides for notice to the director of natural resources, who is 
empowered by R.C. 1519.03 to maintain an inventory of trails and to prepare 
plans for development of a statewide trails system for recreation. 
January Term, 2009 
7 
{¶ 18} Finally, if the director decides to vacate a state highway, R.C. 
5511.07 allows claims for resulting damages.  R.C. 5511.07 provides that a final 
determination for vacating the highway cannot occur until all damage awards 
have been accepted or deposited in court, thereby giving the director the 
discretion to refuse to vacate the highway, portion of highway, or highway 
easement, if damage claims would be too large. 
{¶ 19} In addition to the state implications, there are federal implications, 
as well.  Federal Highway Administration regulations require state transportation 
departments, if they wish to dispose of any interest in real property that was 
acquired with federal funds, to offer the property to other government agencies 
for use as parks, in conservation, or for other recreational purposes if the property 
has potential for such use.  23 C.F.R. 710.409(b).  If the property is not 
transferred for continued state use, the state transportation department may sell 
the land to a private party for fair market value.  23 C.F.R. 710.409(a) and 
710.403(d). 
{¶ 20} Permitting a common-law action to declare the easement 
abandoned would defeat much of the intent of the statutory scheme set up in R.C. 
Chapter 5511.  We find that the detailed procedures for abandoning or vacating a 
public highway signal the General Assembly’s intent to make the statutory 
process an exclusive one. 
{¶ 21} Finally, the court of appeals concluded that Bigler did not control 
because R.C. 5553.042 expressly provided for property owners to petition a board 
of county commissioners to vacate a township road, while R.C. 5511.01 does not 
expressly provide such a petition process.  We find this distinction to be of little 
consequence since fee holders can always petition the director of transportation to 
exercise its discretion to vacate and abandon a highway easement, even though no 
specific petition process is set forth in the statutes. 
Conclusion 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 22} In 1959, Parsons granted a perpetual easement to the highway 
department.  The state fully compensated Parsons for the burden that the perpetual 
highway easement imposed on her property.  The current fee holder, New 52, 
wishes to vacate that perpetual easement.  R.C. Chapter 5511 gives the director of 
transportation the exclusive authority to abandon or vacate portions of the state 
highway system.  Therefore, a court of common pleas has no jurisdiction to 
decide whether an easement for a state highway has been abandoned.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the 
judgment of the trial court dismissing the complaint. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 23} I agree with Justice Lanzinger’s analysis that R.C. 5303.01 
recognizes that common-law actions to quiet title may be brought against the 
state.  When a landowner grants an easement to the state for highway use and the 
state no longer uses the easement for a highway, the landowner should not be held 
to the whim of the director of the Ohio Department of Transportation to regain fee 
simple in his or her property.  Landowners have retained the right to bring a 
common-law action to force abandonment to reclaim their full fee rights in 
instances where the state has abandoned the sticks it acquired from the 
landowner’s bundle of rights. 
{¶ 24} I further dissent in order to challenge the majority’s citation of 
Federal Highway Administration regulations that “require state transportation 
departments, if they wish to dispose of any interest in real property that was 
acquired with federal funds, to offer the property to other government agencies 
for use as parks, in conservation, or for other recreational purposes if the property 
January Term, 2009 
9 
has the potential for such use. 23 C.F.R. 710.409(b).”  Those rules, if applied 
here, would constitute an unconstitutional taking.  The state’s property interest 
here is an easement for highway use; to transfer the interest for use as a park 
would be transferring an interest greater than the state held. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 25} I dissent from the holding of the majority that a court of common 
pleas has no jurisdiction to decide whether an easement for a state highway has 
been abandoned. 
{¶ 26} My analysis begins with the fact that New 52 Project, Inc. (“New 
52”) has sued the state in common pleas court, seeking a declaration that the 
public-highway easement has been abandoned or extinguished.  This court has 
held that the state of Ohio cannot be sued without its consent and further held that 
an action to quiet title cannot lie against the state.  W. Park Shopping Ctr. v. 
Masheter (1966), 6 Ohio St.2d 142, 35 O.O.2d 216, 216 N.E.2d 761, paragraphs 
one and two of the syllabus.  W. Park was effectively overruled, however, when 
the General Assembly subsequently waived the state’s immunity with regard to 
actions to quiet title under R.C. 5303.01.  Am.S.B. No. 208, 134 Ohio Laws, Part 
I, 402, 405. 
{¶ 27} R.C. 5303.01 provides:  
{¶ 28} “An action may be brought by a person in possession of real 
property, by himself or tenant, against any person who claims an interest therein 
adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse interest. Such action 
may be brought also by a person out of possession, having, or claiming to have, 
an interest in remainder or reversion in real property, against any person who 
claims to have an interest therein, adverse to him, for the purpose of determining 
the interests of the parties therein. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 29} “Whenever the state or any agency or political subdivision thereof 
has, or appears to have, an interest in real property adverse to the person in 
possession claiming the right thereto, the state or such agency or such political 
subdivision may be made a party in any action brought under this section.” 
(Emphasis added.)  
{¶ 30} Therefore, property owners have a statutory right to pursue an 
action to quiet title against the state. 
{¶ 31} The ability of New 52 to pursue an action to quiet title is not 
affected by this court’s decision in Bigler v. York Twp. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 98, 
609 N.E.2d 529.  Bigler involved an entirely different statute, R.C. 5553.042(B), 
which provides a specific procedure for an abutting landowner of a township road 
to petition for vacation of “a public road, highway, street, or alley.”  This court 
held that R.C. 5553.042 established an exclusive mechanism for vacating 
township roads and therefore the court of common pleas had no jurisdiction over 
a common law action to quiet title to a township road.  Id. at syllabus.  However, 
neither R.C. 5511.01 nor 5511.07, which are at issue here, offers a similar petition 
process to fee owners who have public highway easements on their property. 
{¶ 32} To reach its conclusion that the court of common pleas lacks 
jurisdiction over New 52’s action, the majority adds language to the statutes being 
interpreted.  But if the General Assembly truly intended to give exclusive 
authority to the director of transportation to abandon or vacate state highway 
easements, it would have eliminated the second paragraph of R.C. 5303.01, which 
specifically allows property owners to challenge the state’s interest in their realty. 
{¶ 33} New 52 has a remedy under R.C. 5303.01, and although it did not 
specifically refer to the statute in its complaint, it has set forth a claim to quiet 
title.  The complaint sought a declaration that the public highway easement had 
been abandoned by the state or had been extinguished through nonuse and a 
declaration that it is the owner of the unencumbered real property in which the 
January Term, 2009 
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state has consented to be a party.  Ohio is a notice-pleading state, and as the court 
of appeals recognized, the declaratory judgment action sought to quiet title in 
New 52. For this reason, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals that 
remanded this case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
__________________ 
David Reid Dillon, for appellee. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
Stephen P. Carney, Deputy Solicitor, Michael Stokes, Assistant Solicitor, and 
Frederick C. Schoch, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. 
______________________