Case Title: Motley v. Battle

Citation: 368 So. 2d 20

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1979-03-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
368 So. 2d 20 (1979)
Samuel Edward MOTLEY
v.
Preastley H. BATTLE, Adm'r., etc.
77-729.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 2, 1979.
Frank O. Hanson, Jr., Birmingham, for appellant.
Thomas A. Woodall of Rives, Peterson, Pettus, Conway, Elliott & Small, Birmingham, for appellee.
*21 SHORES, Justice.
On October 14, 1977, Preastley H. Battle, as administrator of the estate of Willie H. Battle, filed a wrongful death action against General Motors Corporation and Samuel Edward Motley for the death of Battle which resulted from injuries sustained in an automobile accident on December 26, 1976. The suit charged Motley with negligently causing Battle's death.
On November 14, 1977, Motley filed an answer and counterclaim alleging that decedent Battle negligently operated his automobile causing Motley's injury.
Letters of Administration were granted upon Battle's estate on January 17, 1977, and no claim was filed against his estate by Motley within six months thereof for any alleged injuries suffered by Motley and made the basis of his counterclaim.
These facts are undisputed. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Battle estate, holding that Motley's counterclaim was barred for failure to comply with the nonclaim statute, § 43-2-350, Code of Alabama 1975. We affirm.
The nonclaim statute, in pertinent part, provides:
In Moore v. Stephens, 264 Ala. 86, 93, 84 So. 2d 752, 760 (1956), this court held:
Clearly, Motley's counterclaim seeking damages for personal injury is a tort claim and it is clearly a claim against the Battle estate. He argues, however, that because ARCP 13(c) provides in part that
his counterclaim should be treated as relating back to the time Battle's death action arose and, therefore, not barred by the nonclaim statute, because the filing of the counterclaim is sufficient notice to comply with the statute. It is true that Barrett v. Fondren, 262 Ala. 537, 80 So. 2d 243 (1955), held that a suit filed within six months after grant of letters of administration was a sufficient presentation of a claim against an estate. That case would support an argument that a counterclaim filed within six months of the grant of letters of administration would be sufficient; but that situation is not presented here. In the instant case, the counterclaim was not filed within six months. It was filed some eight months after letters of administration were granted. ARCP 13(c) was not intended to excuse noncompliance with the nonclaim statute. Rule 13(c) was drawn to ". . . harmonize with Title 7, § 355, Code of Ala." Committee Comments. That statute, now codified as § 6-8-84, Code of Alabama 1975, reads:
Many years ago, this court held that nonclaim did not fall within the healing provisions of the relation back statute, a predecessor to Title 7, § 355, Code of Alabama Recompiled 1958, which was § 2682, Code of 1886.
In Patrick v. Petty, 83 Ala. 420, 423, 3 So. 779 (1887), this court held:
*22 Because Rule 13(c), ARCP, is only a restatement of the statute, nonclaim does not fall within its "healing provisions."
The purpose of the statute of nonclaim, originally enacted in 1815, Clay's Digest 195, § 17, is to ". . . promote a speedy, safe, and definitive settlement of estates, by giving the personal representative notice and knowledge of all claims against the estate in his hands." Smith v. Fellows, Adm'r, 58 Ala. 467, 471 (1877). It was described by Chief Justice Brickell in Fretwell v. McLemore, 52 Ala. 124, 144, 147 (1875), as follows:
We hold that "all claims against the estate of the decedent" as used in the nonclaim statute includes counterclaims as well as original claims brought against the estate.
The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C. J., and MADDOX, JONES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.