Case Title: HEDGES v. HEDGES

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96030

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
HEDGES v. HEDGES  HEDGES v. HEDGES 2002 OK 92 66 P.3d 364 Case Number: 96030 Decided: 11/26/2002 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA JOAN F. HEDGES, now PHILLIPS,Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EDWARD LANE HEDGES,Defendant-Appellee. ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT, OKLAHOMA COUNTY Barbara Swinton, trial judge ¶0 At a post-decree stage of the case, the plaintiff brought contempt proceedings against her divorced spouse for failure to pay child support for their three children, all of whom had reached the age of majority. The trial court dismissed the contempt application and recast the proceeding into a quest for ascertainment and satisfaction of past-due and unpaid child-support obligation, resting its denial order on the obligor's (defendant's) defense theories of laches and waiver. The plaintiff's appeal stands retained for this court's disposition. THE TRIAL COURT'S POST-DECREE ORDER IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO BE CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT Barry K. Roberts, Norman, Oklahoma, James M. Levine, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Appellant. Jon L. Hester, Scott A. Hester, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Appellee. OPALA, J. ¶1 Two issues are dispositive of this appeal: (a) Does Obligee-Mother's laches in prosecuting this postjudgment proceeding avail as an equitable defense against her quest for satisfaction of past-due and unpaid periodical installments of a child-support obligation? and (b) If laches is not available, is the record clear that the trial court would have entered the post-divorce order for Obligor-Father solely on his statutory defense of agreement-based satisfaction of the entire obligation? We answer the first question in the negative. Because the trial court relied on both laches and "waiver"2 in denying Mother's relief quest and we cannot, on this record, determine whether it would have predicated its order solely on Mother's agreement-based relinquishment of rights (if it had ruled out laches as unavailable), the cause stands remanded for reconsideration of the latter defense alone - that which rests on the parties' oral agreement.3 I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 Joan F. Hedges, now Joan F. Phillips (Mother), and Edward Lane Hedges (Father) were divorced on 13 April 1988. Three children were born of the marriage - JCH in 1973, BFH in 1977 and EMH in 1979. Father was directed to pay as child support a total of $684.00 per month. The children reached majority in 1991, 1995 and 1997. On 19 June 2000 Mother brought contempt proceedings against Father for his failure to pay child support. She alleged a total arrearage with interest of $84,992.08.4 Father interposed several affirmative defenses.5 ¶3 The trial court (a) determined that contempt was not an available enforcement remedy and dismissed the application for that relief, ¶4 Mother's appeal stands retained for this court's disposition. II THE ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL ¶5 Mother (appellant) argues on appeal that the trial court should have applied the [66 P.3d 367]teachings of Aguero v. Aguero ¶6 Father counters that according to Thrash, "equitable defenses may be invoked to bar the recovery of delinquent child support payments." III THE NATURE OF THIS POSTJUDGMENT PROCEEDING ¶7 This postjudgment proceeding in a divorce case was brought to ascertain the quantum of arrearage, i.e., adjudicated child support then due and owing, and to enforce the declared obligation's satisfaction. Father plead multiple defense theories, but appears to have later abandoned all but those tendered by the evidence adduced at trial IV THE TRIAL COURT'S ALLOWANCE OF THE LACHES DEFENSE FOR DELAYED PROSECUTION OF MOTHER'S QUEST IS CLEARLY CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ¶8 Laches is an equitable defense against the tardy prosecution of stale claims not yet barred by limitations.20 Before a claim will be considered barred by laches it must be shown that (a) there has been an unreasonable delay in the commencement of proceedings to enforce the claim and that (b) by reason of this delay the defendant has been materially prejudiced. The party invoking the doctrine's benefit as an affirmative defense has the burden of proof and persuasion.21 There is no bright-line rule for ascertaining when a claim becomes barred by laches or what delay is excusable.22 Application of the doctrine is discretionary and varies with the facts and circumstances of each case.23 The defendant is required to show more than mere lapse of time.24 Equity must follow the law. It may not allow legal limitations to be abridged unless there are equitable considerations of a compelling nature which demonstrate prejudice-dealing delay.25 ¶9 In support of his laches defense, Father argues that Mother's ten-year delay in [66 P.3d 369]prosecuting her quest has caused a substantial amount of interest to accrue ($32,032.58) for a total child-support arrears of $82,080. He urges that he is put at a severe disadvantage and will be irreparably damaged if he were ordered to satisfy the full amount of the arrearage that is pressed. At the time of trial his gross annual income was $30,300. He argues that because of his age (he is in his 50's), he will never earn enough money to pay off the obligation and the large amount of interest that Mother has allowed to accrue during the years of her inaction and failure to enforce the unpaid child-support obligation. ¶10 Child-support proceedings are of equitable cognizance.26 In suits of that class, a trial court's decree will be set aside only if it is found to be clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence or to some governing principle of equity jurisprudence.27 ¶11 The record here is grossly deficient. Father's failure to pay the decreed child support in reliance on the alleged oral agreement with Mother and the resulting accumulation of arrearage (with interest) do not, in contemplation of law, constitute the prejudice that is necessary to support the defense of laches. Although as a result of Mother's delay he now owes a substantial amount of accrued interest, his proof does not demonstrate that the delayed institution of enforcement proceedings placed him in a far more detrimental or disadvantaged position. It indicates only that he would now owe more money. ¶12 Because there has been no record showing of a material prejudice-dealing delay injurious to Father's interest, we hold that Mother's quest for enforcement of unpaid child-support obligation is not barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. V THE DEFENSE OF AN AGREEMENT-BASED REDUCTION (OR RELINQUISHMENT) OF CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION IS STATUTORILY LIMITED TO MATURED (PAST-DUE) AND UNPAID INSTALLMENTS A. Father's Agreement-based Defense ¶13 Father argues that Mother "waived" her right to collect past-due and unpaid child support because of an oral agreement she made with him shortly after the divorce petition was filed but before the decree's entry. By its terms she is said to have agreed to accept fifty percent less than the amount reflected in the decree. According to his testimony Mother thought the amount to be decreed as child-support obligation was excessive. She allegedly agreed that if he would assume responsibility for all the bills and not ask for the return of any items she took out of the house she would accept as full satisfaction the reduced amount of child support. ¶14 Father also testified that after his post-decree bankruptcy, ¶15 Mother disputes the existence of an oral agreement. She claims she neither agreed to reduced child support nor acquiesced (by silence or inaction) in accepting a lesser amount. According to Mother, she would occasionally contact Father about the reduced payments, but after her youngest son, EMH, reached the age of 19, she no longer tried to contact him about child support. She testified that several years before EMH's 19th birthday, she approached two lawyers about collecting the unpaid child support. Faced with financial difficulties as well as problems between Father and her oldest son, Mother chose not to then commence enforcement proceedings. B. A Trial Judge's Unmemorialized Oral Remarks, Made at Any Stage of the Nisi Prius Proceedings, Constitute No Part of the Trial Court's Order or Findings ¶16 According to Mother, the trial court explicitly ruled there was no agreement between the parties whose terms were certain enough to be enforceable. For this view she directs us to the trial judge's oral comments made during the 20 December 2000 hearing. ¶17 A trial judge's statements in announcing the post-decree order do not constitute her "findings of fact" and will not be considered to vary the order whose terms are to be measured solely by the recorded journal entry. C. The Statutory Scheme in Force at the Time of the 1988 Divorce Decree ¶18 The legislature recognized in 1987 that an agreement-based reduction (or relinquishment) of past-due and owing child-support installments is effective in law. According to the terms of 12 O.S.Supp.1987 § 1277 (renumbered 43 O.S. O.S.Supp.1989 § 112 ), D. The State of the Record That Addresses Father's Agreement-Based Defense ¶19 We cannot assess, on this record, the legal effectiveness of the critical statutory agreement-based defense. This is so because on the dispositive point in question there is considerable evidentiary vacuity. ¶20 (1) We are unable to identify (with any degree of precision) the circumstances the noncustodial parent relies on to fashion his agreement-based "binding understanding" with Mother. There is here but paltry proof to support either an agreement-based reduction (or relinquishment) of child-support obligation (by parol agreement) or the custodial parent's denial of the agreement's existence. Neither does the proof clearly reveal the date of the mutual agreement (or agreements), which is critical to ascertaining the amount of matured unpaid installments that stood relinquished by its terms. ¶21 (2) The trial court based the denial of Mother's enforcement quest on her joint finding of laches and of waiver by agreement-based reduction of child support. Today's pronouncement - that laches does not avail - will not support the ruling's affirmance on the latter defense. From this amorphous record we cannot tell whether, in the absence of laches, the so-called waiver defense would have been accepted by the trial court and made the basis for its ruling in Father's favor. ¶22 There is another reason for remanding the cause instead of directing that the defense of contract-based reduction (or relinquishment) be rejected in postremand proceedings. Father's agreement-based defense was focused on equitable considerations rather than on the statutory nature of his defense. The statutory defense (based on the parties' "mutual agreement") was neither brought to the attention of, nor considered by, the trial court. The parties seem to have presented the case in total oblivion to the restrictive effect of a controlling statute on Father's waiver defense. Their lack of awareness is apparent not only from the transcript of the evidentiary proceedings, but also from the trial court's decision as well as from the briefs on appeal. Because Father did not know that the range of his agreement-based defense stood statutorily limited, [66 P.3d 372] it is only fair that on this dispositive point he should have the opportunity to revisit that defense in light of those restrictions and to bring his theory within the ambit of statutory terms. In these circumstances, a ruling favoring Mother as a matter of law would be a less than equitable solution. Moreover, even if we could reject out-of-hand Father's agreement-based defense, there can be here no proceeding for enforced satisfaction of a judgment until the quantum due has been ascertained below and the impact of the time-bar issue resolved. ¶23 If the record is sufficient, this court will - in an appeal from an equity decision - render that decree which the chancellor should have entered. VI THE PROCEEDINGS ON REMAND ¶24 In postremand proceedings the trial court shall, among others, (1) reject Father's laches defense; (2) afford Father the opportunity to adduce proof of a "mutual agreement" with Mother concerning reduction or relinquishment of the then past-due and owing decreed child-support installments and the date it was made; and (3) if there be ascertained a past-due-and-owing portion of the child-support obligation, direct that it be satisfied as a judgment ¶25 The proceedings to be conducted on remand shall stand confined to a full-scale inquiry into whether a statutory agreement-based defense (rested on a parol agreement or agreements and/or by acquiescence) can be found. Both parties are to be given the opportunity to develop the proof necessary to advance their respective positions. In its postremand consideration of the issue in contest the court should accord due importance to the subject matter of the mutual agreement. If it finds that a mutual agreement (or agreements) was made, it should establish its date for the purpose of ascertaining the quantum of matured unpaid installments that stood relinquished (or reduced) by its terms. If the agreement dealt only or partly with future installments it is unenforceable (in toto or pro tanto), but if it dealt with past-due and unpaid installments, it is within the range of Father's statutory defense.40¶26 Should the trial court rule that there was no viable statutory agreement-based reduction (or relinquishment) or that the parties' agreement (or agreements) does not reduce (or relinquish) all the overdue and unpaid installments, the trial court should consider the impact, if any, of post-decree (after-enacted) statutory changes that may legally affect the obligation sought to be satisfied. 41[66 P.3d 373] VII SUMMARY ¶27 The trial court's allowance of laches defense against Mother's enforcement quest in contest is clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence. Absent a laches defense, we cannot say on this record whether an agreement-based defense alone would have led to the trial court's denial of Mother's enforcement quest. Because affirmance of Father's nisi prius victory (on the agreement-based defense) is not his due, the cause stands remanded for a full adversarial re-inquiry into the merits of this defense against Mother's demand. In postremand proceedings to follow this pronouncement, the trial court may consider whether there was an enforceable agreement-based reduction or relinquishment and assess the amount of the obligation still due, if any. In the event the court finds that there is an unpaid obligation to be enforced, it should give Mother a judgment for that amount. ¶28 The trial court's post-decree order is affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded for further consideration to be consistent with today's pronouncement. ¶29 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR. [ 66 P.3d 374 ] FOOT