Case Title: In re Resignation of Leone

Citation: 2020-Ohio-2997

Docket Number: 2020-0422

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as In re Resignation of Leone, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-2997.] 
 
 
 
IN RE RESIGNATION OF LEONE. 
[Cite as In re Resignation of Leone, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-2997.] 
Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. 
VI(11)(C). 
(No. 2020-0422—Submitted April 8, 2020—Decided May 19, 2020.) 
ON APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT OR RESIGNATION 
PURSUANT TO GOV.BAR R. VI(11). 
____________________ 
{¶ 1} Donald Patrick Leone, Attorney Registration No. 0000154, last 
known address in Poland, Ohio, who was admitted to the bar of this state on April 
30, 1976, submitted an application for retirement or resignation pursuant to 
Gov.Bar R. VI(11).  The application was referred to disciplinary counsel pursuant 
to Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(B).  On March 24, 2020, the Office of Attorney Services filed 
disciplinary counsel’s report, under seal, with this court in accordance with 
Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(B)(2). 
{¶ 2} On consideration thereof, it is ordered by the court that pursuant to 
Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C), the resignation as an attorney and counselor at law is 
accepted as a resignation with disciplinary action pending. 
{¶ 3} It is further ordered and adjudged that from and after this date all 
rights and privileges extended to respondent to practice law in the state of Ohio be 
withdrawn, that henceforth respondent shall cease to hold himself forth as an 
attorney authorized to appear in the courts of this state, and that respondent shall 
not attempt, either directly or indirectly, to render services as an attorney or 
counselor at law to or for any individuals, corporation, or society, nor in any way 
perform or seek to perform services for anyone, no matter how constituted, that 
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must by law be executed by a duly appointed and qualified attorney within the state 
of Ohio. 
{¶ 4} It is further ordered that respondent desist and refrain from the 
practice of law in any form, either as principal or agent or clerk or employee of 
another, and hereby is forbidden to appear in the state of Ohio as an attorney and 
counselor at law before any court, judge, board, commission, or other public 
authority, and hereby is forbidden to give another an opinion as to the law or its 
application or advise with relation thereto. 
{¶ 5} It is further ordered that before entering into an employment, 
contractual, or consulting relationship with any attorney or law firm, respondent 
shall verify that the attorney or law firm has complied with the registration 
requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(23)(C).  If employed pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(23), 
respondent shall refrain from direct client contact except as provided in Gov.Bar R. 
V(23)(A)(1) and from receiving, disbursing, or otherwise handling any client trust 
funds or property. 
{¶ 6} It is further ordered that respondent shall not enter into an 
employment, contractual, or consulting relationship with an attorney or law firm 
with which respondent was associated as a partner, shareholder, member, or 
employee at the time respondent engaged in the misconduct that resulted in this 
acceptance of respondent’s resignation with discipline pending. 
{¶ 7} It is further ordered that respondent shall surrender respondent’s 
certificate of admission to practice to the clerk of the court on or before 30 days 
from the date of this order and that respondent’s name be stricken from the roll of 
attorneys maintained by this court. 
{¶ 8} It is further ordered by the court that within 90 days of the date of this 
order, respondent shall reimburse any amounts that have been awarded against 
respondent by the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection pursuant to Gov.Bar R. 
VIII(7)(F).  It is further ordered by the court that if after the date of this order the 
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Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection awards any amount against respondent 
pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VIII(7)(F), respondent shall reimburse that amount to the 
Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection within 90 days of the notice of that award. 
{¶ 9} It is further ordered that on or before 30 days from the date of this 
order, respondent shall do the following: 
{¶ 10} 1.  Notify all clients being represented in pending matters and any 
co-counsel of respondent’s resignation and consequent disqualification to act as an 
attorney after the effective date of this order and, in the absence of co-counsel, also 
notify the clients to seek legal services elsewhere, calling attention to any urgency 
in seeking the substitution of another attorney in respondent’s place; 
{¶ 11} 2.  Regardless of any fees or expenses due, deliver to all clients being 
represented in pending matters any papers or other property pertaining to the client 
or notify the clients or co-counsel, if any, of a suitable time and place where the 
papers or other property may be obtained, calling attention to any urgency for 
obtaining such papers or other property; 
{¶ 12} 3.  Refund any part of any fees or expenses paid in advance that are 
unearned or not paid and account for any trust money or property in the possession 
or control of respondent; 
{¶ 13} 4.  Notify opposing counsel or, in the absence of counsel, the adverse 
parties in pending litigation of respondent’s disqualification to act as an attorney 
after the effective date of this order and file a notice of disqualification of 
respondent with the court or agency before which the litigation is pending for 
inclusion in the respective file or files; 
{¶ 14} 5.  Send all notices required by this order by certified mail with a 
return address where communications may thereafter be directed to respondent; 
{¶ 15} 6.  File with the clerk of this court and disciplinary counsel of the 
Supreme Court an affidavit showing compliance with this order, showing proof of 
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service of the notices required herein, and setting forth the address where 
respondent may receive communications; and 
{¶ 16} 7.  Retain and maintain a record of the various steps taken by 
respondent pursuant to this order. 
{¶ 17} It is further ordered that on or before 30 days from the date of this 
order, respondent shall surrender the attorney-registration card for the 2019/2021 
biennium. 
{¶ 18} It is further ordered that until such time as respondent fully complies 
with this order, respondent shall keep the clerk and disciplinary counsel advised of 
any change of address where respondent may receive communications. 
{¶ 19} It is further ordered that all documents filed with this court in this 
case shall meet the filing requirements set forth in the Rules of Practice of the 
Supreme Court of Ohio, including requirements as to form, number, and timeliness 
of filings.  All case documents are subject to Sup.R. 44 through 47, which govern 
access to court records. 
{¶ 20} It is further ordered that service shall be deemed made on respondent 
by sending this order and all other orders in this case to respondent’s last known 
address. 
{¶ 21} It is further ordered that the clerk of this court issue certified copies 
of this order as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(1) and that publication be 
made as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2). 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and 
STEWART, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
FISCHER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 22} Respectfully, I dissent.  Because the report prepared by disciplinary 
counsel under Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(B) in this case is sealed and I therefore cannot 
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discuss the facts, this dissenting opinion is not case-specific.  Rather, I write in 
general terms to highlight my concerns with this court’s common practice of 
accepting applications to resign when there is discipline pending. 
I.  The Troubling Aspects of Routinely Accepting Applications to Resign with 
Discipline Pending 
{¶ 23} This case involves an application to resign with discipline pending.  
In recent years, this court has accepted an average of about 15 of these resignations 
a year, with this court accepting 20 resignations with disciplinary action pending in 
2015, 19 in 2016, 12 in 2017, 14 in 2018, and 12 in 2019. 
{¶ 24} To me, these cases present this court with some of the most difficult 
questions that it faces in the area of attorney discipline.  Others might see them as 
easy, in that an attorney who resigns from the practice of law is no longer a threat 
to cause harm to the public—see, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Edwards, 134 Ohio 
St.3d 271, 2012-Ohio-5643, 981 N.E.2d 857, ¶ 19 (recognizing that the primary 
purpose of our attorney-discipline system is to protect the public).  These cases 
remain unusually difficult to me because of problems within the system we have 
established for ourselves—that is for the members of the bench and bar—in this 
court’s regulating of the practice of law in Ohio. 
{¶ 25} The Supreme Court of Ohio has the clear and full constitutional 
power to administer and regulate the practice of law in this state.  Our state 
Constitution confers “original jurisdiction” upon this court over “[a]dmission to the 
practice of law, the discipline of persons so admitted, and all other matters relating 
to the practice of law.”  Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 2(B)(1)(g).  Because 
this court alone determines how all matters regarding the practice of law will be 
administered and regulated in Ohio, we could create a better system to deal with 
the following troubling aspects inherent in the practice of accepting resignations 
while discipline is pending. 
 
 
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A.  Transparency 
{¶ 26} First, these resignation-with-discipline-pending cases are the 
epitome of antithetical examples that are contrary to the concept that state 
government should be as transparent as reasonably possible.  These cases are 
“sealed” proceedings, and neither the public nor the bench and practicing bar have 
any idea what has occurred in these cases.  As numerous as these cases are, this 
lack of transparency is a problem when an application to resign with discipline 
pending is accepted. 
{¶ 27} Allowing these types of resignations closes off information from the 
public, a factor that must be weighed in the calculation of the cost-benefit for 
accepting a resignation with discipline pending.  For example, assume for the sake 
of argument that an investigation has uncovered evidence of possible criminal 
conduct.  While disciplinary counsel and the grievance committees have some 
obligations to turn over such information to local law-enforcement authorities, see 
Gov.Bar R. I(13)(D)(2) and V(8)(A)(1)(c), is this the type of information that this 
court should be hiding from the public?  
{¶ 28} This factor must also be considered when weighing the decision 
whether to accept a resignation with discipline pending.  For local law enforcement 
may not be inclined, or not have time or resources, to deal with a lawyer’s 
malfeasance.  It is possible the local law-enforcement authorities would feel that 
the resignation is enough of a “punishment” or sanction for the attorney’s 
misbehavior.  Under those conditions, the resigning attorney would just move on 
to some other occupation and the public would never know of that now-resigned 
attorney’s criminal-like conduct.  Should our court be a party to this?  Given that 
the citizens of Ohio gave this court plenary power over the admission and practice 
of law in the state of Ohio, should we not be doing a better job of notifying the 
public of such poor behavior by an attorney licensed by this court? 
 
 
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B.  The Inefficiency of the System 
{¶ 29} Second, one of the superficial arguments in favor of accepting these 
resignations is based upon the fact that a disciplinary investigation, hearings, and a 
decision from this court can take a long time.  The logic of this argument is that by 
getting the lawyer out of the legal system sooner rather than later, there is a net 
benefit to the public.  At a superficial level, that argument is true; however, it is 
true only because we have created a system in which it takes much, much too long 
to resolve an attorney-discipline case. 
{¶ 30} On average, a typical case in which a grievance is filed with 
disciplinary counsel, a formal complaint is filed after an investigation, and the 
respondent lawyer objects to the report and recommendation from the Board of 
Professional Conduct to the Ohio Supreme Court takes nearly 1,000 days to resolve.  
See Report and Recommendations of the Supreme Court of Ohio Task Force on the 
Ohio Disciplinary System (September 2019) at 20-23 (370 days for investigation of 
grievance before filing of formal complaint, approximately 282 days from 
certification of complaint to board disposition, and 341 days from filing with this 
court to final disposition).  This is a ridiculous amount of time.  Indeed, murder 
cases are often indicted and tried in less time. 
{¶ 31} If our disciplinary system were more efficient and swifter, this 
argument would be far less compelling.  We, the court, can alter that system.  In 
fact, proposals are pending to try to do just that.  See id. at 19, 20-26.  Barring any 
alterations, however, our disciplinary process causes us to impose nontransparent 
discipline, effectively through a forced resignation, because we have a system that 
takes too long.  In other words, we have created the very reason that essentially 
forces this court to grant a “plea deal” for these “hidden” ethical violations that 
have harmed the public.  That is quite a circular argument in favor of accepting 
these resignations. 
 
 
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C.  Client Restitution 
{¶ 32} Third, there is the issue of money and its related issue of restitution.  
Many of these resignation-with-discipline-pending cases have within them strong 
allegations of money still owed by the resigning attorney to former clients.  Some 
of this money owed comes through attorney fees taken for work not done and/or 
fiduciary violations in moneys taken from estates and settlements, as well as funds 
improperly taken out of client trust accounts.  Again, the superficial argument is 
that the resignation is better for the public, because the sooner the resignation is 
accepted, the sooner the harmed clients can obtain restitution via applications to the 
Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection (“the Fund”). 
{¶ 33} This Fund was established as the Clients’ Security Fund in 1985.  
See The Supreme Court of Ohio Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection Annual 
Report (2019) at 1.  As of its 2019 annual report, this Fund has compensated poorly 
treated clients of Ohio lawyers to the tune of more than $24 million.  Id.  According 
to its recent annual reports, in the three years that I have been a member of this 
court, the Fund has reimbursed claims totaling nearly $2 million.  In those three 
years, the Fund incurred administrative costs totaling approximately $1.25 million.  
This is an excellent, important, and upward-lifting program put together by this 
court, supported by the lawyers of Ohio through their attorney-registration fees, for 
the benefit of the public. 
{¶ 34} Applications to recover from the Fund must be presented within one 
year of the occurrence or discovery of the loss, and the maximum recovery by any 
single claimant is limited to $75,000.  Gov.Bar R. VIII(3)(C) and (5).  Again, there 
are proposals pending to alter that system, and that is a good thing. 
{¶ 35} However, the Fund’s current rules and regulations—a system that 
this court can change—contribute to an unnecessary leaning by members of this 
court in favor of the arguments to accept these resignations with discipline pending.  
Because this compensation system is based upon funds supplied by the lawyers of 
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Ohio—and no one else—along with some interest, there must be some limitations 
on the payouts, as the lawyers of Ohio cannot underwrite all losses caused by 
miscreant lawyers.  But consider a scenario in which an attorney is liable to the 
client for more than $100,000 or even more than $1 million.  In either case, the 
compensation available to the client under the Fund is capped at $75,000.  What 
about a settlement in a personal-injury case for $300,000?  Even if the client was 
entitled to two-thirds of the settlement and the resigning lawyer took all the money, 
the client could receive only $75,000 from the Fund, when the client would instead 
need to receive $200,000 in order to be made whole. 
{¶ 36} One might suggest that we could increase the amount of money in 
the Fund by increasing the $350 per biennium lawyer-registration fee upon which 
the Fund relies.  In my view, however, it would be unfair to increase that registration 
fee at this time, even for a program that does so much good and is handled so well 
by the individuals who administer it. 
{¶ 37} Another method of providing restitution to a wronged client would 
be to require the lawyer, or former lawyer, who was responsible for the loss to 
reimburse the client.  The current discipline system, however, does not permit this 
court to condition our acceptance of a resignation with discipline pending by 
requiring the resigning lawyer to make restitution before the resignation can take 
place.  The decision by the justices of this court on a request to resign with 
discipline pending is a basic accept or deny, i.e., we are limited to making a “yes” 
or “no” decision.  This court could change that rule under its constitutional 
authority.  By not doing so, this court again creates its own unnecessary rationale 
for accepting a nontransparent resignation of an attorney with discipline pending. 
{¶ 38} In one of the strangest parts of these cases, this court is confidentially 
informed of possible restitution amounts still owing to clients and beneficiaries due 
to breaches of fiduciary duties of some of the resigning lawyers in the reports 
submitted by disciplinary counsel under Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(B).  Yet this court is 
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never informed in those same reports of the potential resigning lawyer’s financial 
situation.  This court, then, must decide to deny or to accept the resignation with 
possible discipline pending without having all of the necessary information to make 
an informed decision.  While this court knows whether there is a legitimate 
argument regarding needed restitution, the court is unaware of whether the 
resigning attorney has access to funds to make some or all of that restitution.  We 
could require that an attorney who wishes to resign must provide financial 
information to allow us to determine if the resignation should be denied for a lack 
of the ability to make restitution, but we do not.  Once again, we have created, 
within our own disciplinary system, a system that favors these resignations with 
discipline pending by tilting the scale in favor of accepting the resignations.  And 
despite the fact that we have the authority to change that system, we have not done 
so. 
{¶ 39} An argument for not changing the current system is that this court 
should continue to accept these resignations without ordering restitution (or accept 
the resignations, even if restitution should be provided) because the Ohio Attorney 
General can always sue to recover those moneys on behalf of the Fund.  But while 
the Fund has paid out nearly $2 million in claims during the three years I have been 
on this court, the Fund’s recent annual reports indicate that the Attorney General’s 
office has returned to the Fund less than $85,000 during that time.  That is a ratio 
of about $1 dollar returned by the Attorney General’s office for every $23 paid by 
the Fund. 
{¶ 40} I am not critical of the Ohio Attorney General’s office, as I recognize 
that there are likely many reasons that this number is so low and that these reasons 
may be outside of the control of that office, whether they may be the inability to 
recover fees from very many resigned attorneys or simply because other matters 
take higher priority.  Nevertheless, these numbers show that this argument in favor 
of accepting resignations with discipline pending—the argument that we should 
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continue this practice because the Ohio Attorney General can collect restitution 
owed—is not a strong argument at all and is superficial at best. 
D.  Inappropriate Timing 
{¶ 41} Fourth and finally, there is a related issue regarding when the 
resignation with discipline pending is requested.  One of the arguments in favor of 
accepting these resignations is that every resignation that is accepted will save the 
disciplinary system resources, including the time of the volunteer lawyers on the 
certified grievance committees.  There are three phases to the disciplinary process: 
investigation, the Board of Professional Conduct’s review, and the Ohio Supreme 
Court’s review.  If this court allowed these types of resignations to be made only 
during the first phase of the disciplinary process, the investigative phase, then the 
argument that accepting these types of resignations saves time and resources might 
be true in certain instances.  For example, if the resignation request is filed at the 
beginning of the investigation, then there might be some substantial savings in 
resources. 
{¶ 42} But, on the other hand, if the resignation request is filed during a 
later stage, such as while the board determines whether there is probable cause, 
there is a real question as to what resources are actually being saved, because by 
that time the investigators should have uncovered documents, interviewed 
witnesses, and put together the case that disciplinary counsel or the grievance 
committee believes will show by clear and convincing evidence—which is not a 
low standard—that it will prevail against the respondent lawyer. 
{¶ 43} Admittedly, even if the resignation occurs later, some resources will 
always be saved.  But are the savings at later points in the process so material as to 
outweigh the hiding of the unethical behavior by the lawyer from the public as well 
as the practicing bar and bench?  I would say that such savings are nominal. 
 
 
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II.  Conclusion 
{¶ 44} Based upon the arguments and issues raised above (which may or 
may not apply to this specific case), I respectfully dissent and would not accept the 
resignation with discipline pending in this case.  I also invite my colleagues on this 
court, as well as members of the bench and bar, to consider whether we should 
revisit our practices and procedures related to the acceptance of resignations with 
discipline pending. 
_________________