Case Title: FLETCHER v. MONROE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 104364

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2009-02-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
FLETCHER v. MONROE  FLETCHER v. MONROE 2009 OK 10 208 P.3d 326 Case Number: 104364 Decided: 02/10/2009 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA DONNA FLETCHER, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. MICHAEL MONROE, Defendant/Appellee. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION I ¶0 The defendant/appellee, Michael Monroe (Monroe), admitted liability for personal injuries suffered in a car accident by the plaintiff/appellant, Donna Fletcher (Fletcher). Nevertheless, Monroe contested the necessity of medical attention Fletcher received and the amount of damages arising therefrom. Before submitting the issue of damages for personal injury to the jury, the trial court gave an unrequested jury instruction indicating that it would exercise its discretion in any award of attorney fees which might be made. Considering our recent pronouncement in Snyder v. Dominguez, COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; REVERSED AND REMANDED. Mark S. Stanley, Carpenter, Stanley & Myers, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant, David D. Wilson, Frances J. Armstrong, Wilson, Cain & Acquaviva, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee. WATT, J.: ¶1 We granted certiorari to address a single issue: RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 It is undisputed that on December 17, 2003, Monroe was operating a motor vehicle and rear-ended an automobile occupied by Fletcher. On November 24, 2004, Fletcher filed suit to recover $8,928.05 in medical expenses along with remuneration for pain and suffering, costs, and a reasonable attorney fee. The trial was held on March 20 and 21, 2006. Monroe did not deny that his negligence caused the accident during the jury trial. Nevertheless, he did dispute the reasonableness and necessity of medical treatment Fletcher obtained as a result of the crash. ¶3 At trial, Fletcher did not request that the jury consider the issue of attorney fees as a part of the damages to be awarded. ". . . should not consider or attempt to award attorney fees as a part of any verdict you may render in this case for any party or parties. Based upon your verdicts, the Court will determine the entitlement of any party or parties to recover attorney fees." The jury returned a verdict in Fletcher's favor for $2,800.00. The figure does not conform with medical expenses Fletcher incurred immediately following the accident or with any other combination of expenses incurred at a later date. ¶4 On June 26, 2006, Fletcher filed a motion for new trial alleging irregularities in the proceedings and errors of law occurring at trial. ¶5 Responses to the show cause order were filed on December 9 and 11, 2008. On January 12, 2009, upon reconsideration of the petition to grant certiorari and the answer thereto along with the responses to the show cause order, we issued an order refusing to withdraw certiorari as improvidently granted and allowing the filing of an answer to the certiorari petition. The answer was filed on January 23, 2009. ¶6 UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, WHERE ATTORNEY FEES WERE NOT SOUGHT AS A PART OF THE AWARD AT TRIAL, THE CAUSE OF ACTION TRIED TO THE JURY WOULD NOT SUPPORT AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES, AND THE TRIAL COURT SUA SPONTE GAVE AN INSTRUCTION INDICATING THE JUDGMENT MIGHT BE INCREASED BY THE DISCRETIONARY AWARD OF SUCH A FEE, ERROR OCCURRED REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL. ¶7 The parties agree that Fletcher's personal injury claim will not support an award of attorney fees. ¶8 Generally, the right of a litigant to recover attorney fees is governed by the American Rule. Pursuant to the rule, courts are without authority to award attorney fees in the absence of a specific statute or a contractual provision allowing the recovery of such fees. ¶9 We were recently presented with a situation similar to the one posed here in Snyder v. Dominguez, ". . . The power of an appellate court to disturb a jury's verdict on the basis of an error in jury instructions is tightly circumscribed and can be exercised only if the court concludes that the error 'has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right.' Okla. Stat. Tit. 20, § 3001.1 (2001); see also Lierly v. Tidewater Petroleum Corp., ¶10 Snyder involved a car accident in which there were allegations of a passenger's contributory negligence. The evidence presented in the cause did not support a finding of contributory negligence on the passenger's part. Nevertheless, the trial court gave the instruction. This Court determined that the giving of the unwarranted instruction was fundamental error tending to create confusion, conjecture and speculation on the part of the jury. ¶11 Here, as in Snyder, the trial court gave an instruction which was entirely inappropriate to the issue to be determined by the jury, the extent of Fletcher's physical injuries and the reasonableness of the medical expenses incurred. Although there was no basis upon which the trial court could award attorney fees to either party, it gave an instruction implying that any award the jury entered might be enhanced by the trial court's discretionary award of an attorney fee. ¶12 The instruction misled the jury on the dispositive legal issue of what amount would be sufficient to compensate Fletcher for her physical injury arising from the automobile accident. Most certainly the jury believed that any award it entered would be enhanced once the trial court determined the attorney fee issue. Instructing on a non-existent issue, an award which was not supported by the facts or the cause of action, constituted an unauthorized application of judicial force. CONCLUSION ¶13 The right to a fair trial is statutorily preserved.15 A new trial is required when a party is prevented from having a fair trial as a result of an error which materially affects the substantial rights of the party.16 Reversible error is present when a probability of change in the outcome of a lawsuit occurs.17 Prejudicial error occurs requiring a new trial when an instruction materially deviates from the dispositive legal issue.18 ¶14 The only issue before the jury here was the amount sufficient to compensate Fletcher for her physical injuries. Fletcher did not seek attorney fees and the recovery sought, compensation for personal injuries, would not support such an award.19 We determine that the trial court erred in giving sua sponte the misleading jury instruction on attorney fees and in subsequently denying Fletcher a new trial. Therefore, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; REVERSED AND REMANDED. EDMONDSON, C.J., TAYLOR, V.C.J., OPALA, KAUGER, WATT, COLBERT, JJ. - concur HARGRAVE, WINCHESTER, REIF, JJ. - dissent FOOT