Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Mark Alan Ruppelt

Citation: 2014 WI 53

Docket Number: 2012AP002341-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 53 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2341-D   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Mark Alan Ruppelt, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Mark Alan Ruppelt, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST RUPPELT 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
         
 
COUNTY: 
       
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 53
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP2341-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Mark Alan Ruppelt, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Mark Alan Ruppelt, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded. 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review a report and recommendation of 
Referee Richard C. Ninneman approving the Stipulation and No 
Contest Plea filed by the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and 
Attorney 
Mark 
Alan 
Ruppelt.1 
 
In 
the 
stipulation, 
Attorney Ruppelt pled no contest to three counts of misconduct 
                                                 
1 In the documents filed in this matter, the spelling of 
Attorney Ruppelt's middle name varies.  We note that his name as 
listed with the State Bar of Wisconsin is "Mark Alan Ruppelt," 
and we therefore use that spelling throughout this opinion. 
No. 
2012AP2341-D   
 
2 
 
as alleged in the complaint filed by the OLR.  The OLR 
voluntarily dismissed Count Four of the complaint.  The parties 
jointly recommended that the sanction imposed be a public 
reprimand.  The referee approved the stipulation and recommended 
that 
this 
court 
publicly 
reprimand 
Attorney 
Ruppelt.  
Attorney Ruppelt filed a timely objection to the OLR's statement 
of costs, which sought costs of $18,443.05.  The referee's 
amended recommendation as to the assessment of costs was that 
the requested fees for retained counsel be reduced by 50 
percent, which would reduce the costs assessed against Attorney 
Ruppelt to $9,990.55. 
¶2 
After carefully reviewing the matter, we uphold the 
referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We agree 
with the referee that a public reprimand is an appropriate 
sanction.  We also agree with the referee that it is appropriate 
to reduce the costs of this proceeding to $9,990.55. 
¶3 
Attorney Ruppelt was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1994 and practices in Milwaukee.  He was previously 
a partner in the law firm of Gatzke & Ruppelt SC (the Firm), 
located in Waukesha County. 
¶4 
In 2007, T.W. retained the Firm to represent her in 
two legal matters.  The first was a civil claim against a former 
teacher and his employer based on the teacher's alleged sexual 
assaults of T.W. when she was a student at the school.2  The 
                                                 
2 According to the Wisconsin Court System Circuit Court 
Access web site, T.W. was born in 1980, which means she was 27 
years old when she retained the Firm to represent her in the two 
legal matters. 
No. 
2012AP2341-D   
 
3 
 
other matter was to assist T.W. as a victim/witness in the 
criminal case pending against the teacher.  Prior to undertaking 
representation of T.W., Attorney Ruppelt had not had a sexual 
relationship with her. 
¶5 
Attorney Ruppelt attempted without success to settle 
T.W.'s civil claims against the former teacher and the school.  
In March of 2008, Attorney Ruppelt filed a lawsuit against the 
former teacher and the school.  From March 2008 through February 
2009, Attorney Ruppelt filed numerous pleadings on T.W.'s behalf 
in the civil case and appeared at hearings and scheduling 
conferences.  In August of 2008, Attorney Ruppelt appeared as 
counsel of record for T.W. at the former teacher's sentencing 
hearing in the criminal case. 
¶6 
In April of 2009, while the civil and criminal cases 
were still pending, Attorney Ruppelt and T.W. began a sexual 
relationship.  In mid-April 2009, the Firm became aware that 
Attorney Ruppelt may have been engaging in a sexual relationship 
with T.W. while representing her.  Attorney Ruppelt continued to 
represent T.W. until he and the Firm determined he could no 
longer do so, given the concerns surrounding the nature of his 
relationship with T.W. 
¶7 
On 
April 
19, 
2009, 
Attorney 
Ruppelt 
met 
with 
Attorney James Gatzke, and Paul Bucher, another senior attorney 
at the law firm, to discuss the Firm's concerns about 
Attorney Ruppelt's relationship with T.W.  At the meeting, 
Attorney Ruppelt falsely represented to Attorneys Gatzke and 
Bucher that he had not received or exchanged any texts, e-mail, 
No. 
2012AP2341-D   
 
4 
 
or voicemail messages of any kind with T.W. that were of a 
personal nature and unrelated to the law firm's representation 
of 
T.W. 
in 
her 
civil 
and 
criminal 
cases. 
 
In 
fact, 
Attorney Ruppelt had received an e-mail from T.W. on April 17, 
2009, that was of a personal nature.  At the April 19 meeting, 
Attorney Ruppelt falsely represented that he had not engaged in 
a 
sexual 
relationship 
with 
T.W. 
while 
representing 
her.  
Attorney Ruppelt agreed not to have contact with T.W. following 
the April 19 meeting.  On several occasions after April 19, 
2009, Attorney Ruppelt denied to Attorney Gatzke that he was 
involved in a romantic relationship with T.W. 
¶8 
In May or June of 2009, Attorney Ruppelt acknowledged 
to Attorney Gatzke that he was engaging in a sexual relationship 
with T.W. at that time.   
¶9 
On October 15, 2009, the OLR sent Attorney Ruppelt a 
letter notifying him of its pending investigation regarding his 
relationship with T.W. while representing her.  In late October 
2009, Attorney Ruppelt responded to the grievance and falsely 
indicated that his representation of T.W. was limited to 
assisting her in drafting a victim impact statement.  His 
response stated that Attorney Gatzke was lead counsel in the 
civil case and that Attorney Ruppelt only filled in when needed.  
The response also falsely represented that Attorney Ruppelt had 
not engaged in sexual relations with T.W. at a time when his law 
firm was representing her in the civil case.  Attorney Ruppelt 
further falsely represented that T.W.'s e-mail of April 17, 2009 
was unsolicited and not responded to by him. 
No. 
2012AP2341-D   
 
5 
 
¶10 The OLR directed Attorney Ruppelt to provide a more 
complete response.  Attorney Ruppelt and an OLR investigator had 
a telephone conference on October 30, 2009.  During the 
telephone conference, Attorney Ruppelt falsely represented that 
the April 17, 2009 e-mail was "all fabrication."  He again 
falsely represented that his representation of T.W. was limited 
to assisting her in drafting a victim impact statement in the 
criminal case.  He also falsely represented to the OLR 
investigator that Attorney Gatzke was lead counsel in the civil 
case and that Attorney Ruppelt only filled in when needed. 
¶11 On November 13, 2009, Attorney Ruppelt filed a 
supplemental response to the OLR's inquiry.  The supplemental 
response falsely represented that Attorney Ruppelt had not begun 
a sexual relationship with T.W. until June 27, 2009, and thus 
had not had a sexual relationship with her at any time while 
representing her on behalf of his law firm.  The supplemental 
response also falsely represented that Attorney Gatzke and 
Attorney Ruppelt had decided Attorney Ruppelt's contact with 
T.W. should cease because she had sent Attorney Ruppelt an 
unsolicited e-mail alluding to inappropriate contact that he 
denied.  The supplemental response also falsely represented that 
Attorney Ruppelt had told Attorney Gatzke about T.W.'s April 17, 
2009 e-mail and asserted that the decision to remove himself 
from 
T.W.'s 
legal 
matters 
was 
made 
between 
him 
and 
Attorney Gatzke, without mentioning Attorney Bucher or the 
Firm's investigation. 
No. 
2012AP2341-D   
 
6 
 
¶12 On April 20, 2009, as part of the Firm's investigation 
of Attorney Ruppelt's relationship with T.W., Attorney Bucher 
met with T.W.  During the meeting, T.W. denied that she and 
Attorney Ruppelt had engaged in a sexual relationship while he 
was representing her on behalf of the Firm.  T.W. subsequently 
had a telephone conference with an OLR investigator.  During the 
telephone conference T.W. denied that Attorney Ruppelt had had a 
sexual relationship with her during the period of time he was 
representing her on behalf of the Firm.  She also denied sending 
the April 17, 2009 e-mail. 
¶13 Attorney Ruppelt and T.W. were married in June 2010.  
On October 26, 2012, the OLR filed a complaint against 
Attorney Ruppelt alleging four counts of misconduct: 
[COUNT ONE] By engaging in sexual relations with 
[T.W.] while he was representing her in [civil and 
criminal cases], when they had not engaged in a 
consensual 
sexual 
relationship 
prior 
to 
the 
commencement 
of 
the 
attorney-client 
relationship, 
[Attorney] Ruppelt violated SCR 20:1.8(j).3 
[COUNT TWO] By providing false information to his 
Firm 
regarding 
the 
nature 
and 
timing 
of 
his 
relationship with [T.W.], by failing to disclose 
information to his Firm regarding the nature and 
timing of his relationship with [T.W.], and by 
engaging in a course of conduct to conceal from his  
Firm the nature and timing of his relationship with 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:1.8(j) states, "A lawyer shall not have sexual 
relations with a current client unless a consensual sexual 
relationship 
existed 
between 
them 
when 
the 
client-lawyer 
relationship commenced."  
No. 
2012AP2341-D   
 
7 
 
[T.W.], [Attorney] Ruppelt violated SCR 20:8.4(f)4 and 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Shea, 
190 
Wis. 2d 560, [527] N.W.2d [314] (1995).5   
[COUNT THREE] By providing false information to 
OLR and failing to provide relevant information to OLR 
regarding the scope and time of his representation of 
[T.W.], and/or by providing false information to OLR 
and failing to provide relevant information to OLR 
regarding the nature and timing of his relationship 
with [T.W.], and/or by providing false information to 
OLR and failing to provide relevant information to OLR 
regarding his Firm's investigation of his relationship 
with 
[T.W.], 
[Attorney] 
Ruppelt 
violated 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:8.4(f) states it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme court 
order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers; . . . ." 
5 The Shea court found an attorney's pattern of conduct 
"constituted a breach of his fiduciary duty to his law firm and 
his duty of honesty in his professional dealings with it."  
No. 
2012AP2341-D   
 
8 
 
SCR [22.03(2)]6 
and 
SCR 
22.03(6),7 
enforced 
via 
SCR 20:8.4(h).8 
[COUNT FOUR] By assisting or inducing [T.W.] to 
provide false information to OLR and to withhold 
relevant information from OLR regarding the nature and 
timing 
of 
[Attorney] 
Ruppelt's 
relationship 
with 
[T.W.], and/or by assisting or inducing [T.W.] to 
provide false information to OLR and to withhold 
relevant information from OLR regarding [Attorney] 
Ruppelt's Firm's investigation of the nature and 
timing 
of 
[Attorney] 
Ruppelt's 
relationship 
with 
[T.W.], and/or by assisting and inducing [T.W.] to 
provide false information to OLR and to withhold 
relevant 
information 
from 
OLR 
regarding 
[T.W.]'s 
knowledge of events relevant to OLR's investigation, 
and/or by failing to advise OLR that [T.W.] had 
provided or intended to provide false information to 
                                                 
6 SCR 22.03(2) states as follows: 
Upon commencing an investigation, the director 
shall notify the respondent of the matter being 
investigated unless in the opinion of the director the 
investigation of the matter requires otherwise.  The 
respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts 
and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct 
within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a 
request for a written response.  The director may 
allow additional time to respond.  Following receipt 
of the response, the director may conduct further 
investigation and may compel the respondent to answer 
questions, 
furnish 
documents, 
and 
present 
any 
information deemed relevant to the investigation. 
7 SCR 22.03(6) provides as follows:  "In the course of the 
investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance." 
8 SCR 20:8.4(h) states it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "fail to cooperate in the investigation of a grievance 
filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required by 
SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), or 
SCR 22.04(1); . . . ." 
No. 
2012AP2341-D   
 
9 
 
OLR and had withheld or intended to withhold relevant 
information from OLR, [Attorney] Ruppelt violated 
SCR 22.03(6), 
enforced 
via 
SCR 
20:8.4(h) 
and 
SCR 20:8.4(a).9 
¶14 The 
complaint 
sought 
a 
60-day 
suspension 
of 
Attorney Ruppelt's 
license 
to 
practice 
law 
in 
Wisconsin.  
Attorney Ruppelt 
filed 
an 
answer 
to 
the 
complaint 
on 
November 13, 2012.  Following the recusal of one referee and a 
motion for substitution of second referee, Referee Ninneman was 
appointed on April 16, 2013. 
¶15 The matter was set for a hearing that was scheduled to 
commence on September 16, 2013.  Prior to the hearing, the 
parties 
entered 
into 
a 
stipulation, 
which 
was 
filed 
on 
September 19, 2013.  The parties stipulated that the OLR would 
voluntarily 
dismiss 
Count 
Four 
of 
its 
complaint.  
Attorney Ruppelt agreed to plead no contest to Counts One, Two, 
and Three of the complaint and agreed that the referee could use 
the allegations of the complaint as an adequate factual basis in 
the record for a determination of misconduct as to those counts.  
The parties jointly recommended that the sanction imposed be a 
public reprimand. 
¶16 On October 9, 2013, the referee issued his report and 
recommendation.  Based on the stipulation, the referee found by 
clear, 
satisfactory, 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
Attorney Ruppelt violated the supreme court rules as alleged in 
                                                 
9 SCR 20:8.4(a) states that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "violate or attempt to violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do 
so, or do so through the acts of another; . . . ."  
No. 
2012AP2341-D   
 
10 
 
Counts One, Two, and Three of the complaint.  The referee also 
recommended that this court publicly reprimand Attorney Ruppelt 
for his disciplinary violations. 
¶17 The OLR filed its statement of costs on October 29, 
2013.  The OLR sought costs and disbursements of $18,443.05.  
The OLR noted that its complaint alleged four counts of 
misconduct and, as part of the stipulation, the OLR agreed to 
dismiss Count Four.  The OLR also noted that while it initially 
sought a 60-day suspension of Attorney Ruppelt's license, after 
Count Four was dismissed the OLR revisited its sanction 
recommendation and the OLR director determined that a public 
reprimand was an appropriate sanction.  The OLR said that 
Attorney Ruppelt was uncooperative in part with the OLR's 
investigation.  The OLR also said: 
Although the litigation was ultimately resolved by 
stipulation short of a hearing, this stipulation did 
not occur until after the case had been pending almost 
a 
year. 
 
Discovery, 
including 
depositions 
was 
extensive.  Attorney Ruppelt's discovery requests were 
onerous and resulted in OLR's expenditure of a 
tremendous amount of time (the majority of which was 
internal staff time and not even charged herein to 
Attorney 
Ruppelt). 
 
Counsel 
costs 
herein 
are 
substantial but were paid out by OLR as reasonable and 
necessarily incurred. 
¶18 Attorney Ruppelt filed an objection to the OLR's 
statement of costs on November 19, 2013.  Attorney Ruppelt 
asserts that he was in fact cooperative and proposed to enter 
into a stipulation that was ultimately adopted after thousands 
of dollars in costs were incurred by the OLR, primarily through 
retained counsel's legal fees of nearly $17,000. 
No. 
2012AP2341-D   
 
11 
 
¶19 Attorney Ruppelt said that on January 14, 2013, his 
counsel sent a letter to the OLR offering to discuss the case 
before either side invested a significant amount of time and 
money.  Attorney Ruppelt said: 
Respondent explained in the January 14 letter that his 
lack of complete candor was an effort to protect 
[T.W.] as opposed to any desire to mislead OLR.  While 
recognizing that being a gentleman and consideration 
of [T.W.'s] personal interests didn't excuse a failure 
to be candid with OLR, respondent requested that 
failure be put in proper context. . . . 
This was not an attempt to save respondent or to hide 
improper conduct from others; it was motivated by a 
desire to protect a woman for whom respondent had, at 
that point, extremely strong feelings, evidenced by 
the fact that they [have] since married and have had 
children together.  It was in that context that 
respondent suggested that his actions should be viewed 
as a less serious offense warranting less serious 
discipline than a failure to cooperate or respond 
candidly would under other circumstances. 
¶20 Attorney Ruppelt notes that while the OLR seeks 
counsel fees and disbursements of $16,926.09, the fees charged 
by Attorney Ruppelt's counsel from the time the OLR filed its 
complaint in October of 2012 through the time the stipulation 
was entered into total only $6,150.  Attorney Ruppelt suggests 
that any award of costs made should be in an amount not greater 
than the fees Attorney Ruppelt himself has been charged. 
¶21 The OLR replied to Attorney Ruppelt's objection to 
costs on November 21, 2013, and said it stands by its original 
costs statement. 
¶22 The referee issued his amended recommendation as to 
the assessment of reasonable costs on December 9, 2013.  The 
No. 
2012AP2341-D   
 
12 
 
referee stated that this was not a complicated case involving 
multiple client matters, nor was this a case involving extensive 
discovery.  The referee said he was troubled by the fact that 
retained 
counsel 
spent 
33.7 
hours 
reviewing 
the 
OLR's 
investigative file and drafting the complaint, which was more 
than the 27.33 hours that Attorney Ruppelt's counsel spent 
defending the matter from the time of the filing to the time of 
the stipulation.   
¶23 The referee said he was also troubled that retained 
counsel billed approximately 125 hours for discovery, which 
included responding to Attorney Ruppelt's request for production 
of documents and conducting two depositions, one by telephone, 
of Attorney Ruppelt's two former law partners/employers.  The 
referee said, "[M]ost importantly, this referee is very troubled 
by the fact that the OLR's retained counsel billed 241.5 hours 
in this matter, resulting in $16,905 in total fees, when 
respondent's counsel was proposing some type of reprimand as 
opposed to a sixty-day suspension as early as January 14, 2013 
as reflected in retained counsel's own billing records." 
¶24 The referee recommends that the requested fees for 
outside counsel be reduced by 50 percent, making the recommended 
costs in this matter $9,990.55 as opposed to the requested costs 
of $18,443.05. 
¶25 This court will adopt a referee's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are 
reviewed de novo.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  The 
No. 
2012AP2341-D   
 
13 
 
court may impose whatever sanction it sees fit regardless of the 
referee's recommendation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶26 We 
adopt 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law that Attorney Ruppelt violated the supreme 
court rules as alleged in Counts One, Two, and Three of the 
OLR's complaint.  We also agree with the referee that a public 
reprimand is an appropriate sanction for Attorney Ruppelt's 
misconduct. 
¶27 We turn next to the issue of costs.  Assessment of 
costs in OLR matters is governed by SCR 22.24.  Our general 
policy is that upon a finding of misconduct it is appropriate to 
impose all costs, including the expenses of counsel for the OLR, 
upon the respondent.  In some cases this court may, in the 
exercise of its discretion, reduce the amount of costs imposed 
upon a respondent.  In exercising its discretion regarding the 
assessment of costs, the court will consider the statement of 
costs, any objection and reply, the recommendation of the 
referee, and all of the following factors: the number of counts 
charged, contested, and proven; the nature of the misconduct; 
the level of discipline sought by the parties and recommended by 
the referee; the respondent's cooperation with the disciplinary 
process; 
prior 
discipline, 
if 
any; 
and 
other 
relevant 
circumstances. 
¶28 Upon consideration of the relevant factors and the 
submissions of the parties, we agree with the referee that it is 
appropriate in this case to reduce the amount of retained 
No. 
2012AP2341-D   
 
14 
 
counsel's fees by 50 percent.  In making our determination on 
costs, we appreciate the referee's analysis.  On balance, we 
find it appropriate to follow the referee's recommendation and 
reduce retained counsel's fees by 50 percent.  Our determination 
is not the result of the application of a precise mathematical 
formula, but instead is based on our thorough consideration of 
the record, the manner in which this case developed, and the 
factors set forth in SCR 22.24(1m). 
¶29 IT IS ORDERED that Mark Alan Ruppelt is publicly 
reprimanded for professional misconduct. 
¶30 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Mark Alan Ruppelt shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the imposed costs of this proceeding, which 
are $9,990.55. 
¶31 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the director of the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation shall advise the court if there has not 
been full compliance with all conditions of this decision. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2012AP2341-D.awb 
 
1 
 
¶32 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The discipline 
should be more than a public reprimand.  Attorney Ruppelt not 
only violated SCR 20:1.8(j), but also violated SCR 20:8.4(h) and 
(f) by repeatedly misrepresenting the facts to his law firm and 
the OLR, as explicitly set forth in the opinion.  Per curiam, 
¶¶7, 9, 10, 11. 
¶33 In addition, I would impose full costs.  SCR 22.24(1m) 
states the court's "general policy [] that upon a finding of 
misconduct, it is appropriate to impose all costs."  The rule 
then sets forth the factors to consider when determining whether 
to deviate from that general policy and reduce the costs.    
¶34 Because the per curiam does not explain or evaluate 
how those factors apply in this case, there has been no showing 
that we should deviate from our general policy here.   
¶35 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2012AP2341-D.awb 
 
 
 
1