Case Title: P. v. Standish

Citation: 

Docket Number: S129755

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 6/5/06 
 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S129755 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/3 B166344 
JARED JACOB STANDISH, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. MA025716 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Two principal issues are presented in this case.  The first is whether 
defendant was entitled to be released from custody on his own recognizance (OR), 
subject to reasonable conditions, when his preliminary examination was continued 
for good cause beyond the 10-day period specified in Penal Code section 859b.1 
The second question needs to be reached only if we answer the first 
question in the affirmative.  That question is whether the failure to grant defendant 
OR release pending his preliminary examination constituted a violation of a 
substantial right entitling him to have the information set aside pursuant to section 
995. 
                                              
1  
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
 
2
For the reasons explained below, we conclude defendant was entitled to OR 
release when the preliminary examination was continued for good cause, but that 
the court’s failure to grant him OR release pending the preliminary examination 
did not amount to denial of a substantial right at the preliminary examination 
within the meaning of section 995, in the absence of evidence that the error 
reasonably might have affected the outcome of that hearing.   
I 
Testimony introduced at the preliminary examination indicated that, on an 
occasion during the first week of April 2002, defendant held his two-year-old 
daughter over a second-floor balcony railing, while neighbors urged him to bring 
the child to safety.  On April 5, 2002, defendant killed his wife’s cat.  His daughter 
witnessed some of the events constituting the assault on the cat.  A neighbor, 
Annette Madison, who had witnessed the child-dangling incident, found the 
headless body of the cat on her balcony.  Madison telephoned the police, and 
defendant was arrested.  The Court of Appeal surmised from an incomplete record 
that a complaint was filed charging defendant with criminal offenses arising from 
the two incidents.   
After a short time in custody, defendant was released on bail.  Upon his 
return home, he saw Madison as she approached her apartment, and stated, 
“Whoa, aren’t you scared?”  Defendant then attacked his wife, hitting her in the 
face with his fist.  Madison again telephoned for police assistance.  Defendant 
accused Madison of having placed him under a spell, adding that she had broken 
up his family and that he planned to cut her throat.  He accompanied the threat 
with a gesture, drawing his finger across his throat.  Defendant was arrested, and 
apparently in mid-April a complaint was filed charging new criminal offenses, and 
the two cases were consolidated.     
 
 
3
Defendant was placed in custody at the time of his second arrest in April 
2002.  He remained in custody but proceedings on the mid-April complaint were 
suspended for an evaluation of his mental competency pursuant to section 1368.  
In late November or early December 2002, he was found competent to stand trial, 
whereupon criminal proceedings resumed.  The complaint was dismissed because 
the prosecution was unable to proceed without Madison, who was unavailable as a 
witness.  The prosecutor refiled the complaint on December 11, 2002, charging 
defendant with two felony offenses:  cruelty to an animal (§ 597, subd. (a)), and 
making a criminal threat (§ 422).  The complaint also charged a misdemeanor, 
willful cruelty to a child.  (§ 273a, subd. (b).)  It is the refiled complaint that is the 
subject of the present appeal.   
On December 24, 2002, the prosecutor moved for a continuance of the 
preliminary examination.  The motion was made on the ninth of the 10 court days 
within which a preliminary examination must be held if a defendant is in custody.  
(§ 859b.)  The prosecutor reported that, despite having been subpoenaed, Madison 
was out of the state on vacation and would not be available as a witness until 
“after the holidays.” 
Defense counsel objected to the continuance, asking in the alternative that 
defendant “be released OR if the court grants a continuance.”  Defense counsel 
referred to various circumstances in support of his request for OR release, 
including defendant’s having been in custody without a probable cause 
determination since the previous April — approximately eight months — and his 
currently taking medication “that addresse[d] the issues he had before.”  The 
magistrate declined to grant OR release, however, stating “[r]ight now I’m not 
inclined to release him on his own recognizance.  I might have considered that, I 
suppose, if this is really a medical issue and I had some sort of competent medical 
testimony.  But the file is replete with incidents that obviously cause great 
 
 
4
concern.”  The magistrate granted a continuance until January 7, 2003, but also set 
the case for hearing on January 3 in the event Madison should be available then, 
and also for review of the amount of bail.  
On December 31, 2002, another hearing occurred before a different judge.  
At this hearing, defense counsel moved for dismissal or at least for defendant’s 
release on OR pursuant to section 859b.  The magistrate denied the request for OR 
release, refusing to overturn the order of another judge.  (See In re Alberto (2002) 
102 Cal.App.4th 421, 426-428.)  The magistrate stated he would rule on the 
motion to dismiss on the date set for the preliminary examination. 
On January 7, 2003, the date of the preliminary examination before the 
original magistrate, defense counsel moved for dismissal pursuant to section 859b, 
arguing that the prosecution had failed to show good cause for the continuance, 
because the preliminary examination could have proceeded with the testimony of 
the arresting officer.  Defendant also moved for OR release under the authority of 
section 859b, stating “his preliminary hearing could have and should have 
occurred under Proposition 115 within the time period and there should not have 
been a good cause finding to go outside the period.”  The prosecutor responded 
that the officer who could have testified was not available for the December 24, 
2002 hearing.   
The magistrate denied the motion for dismissal, stating there had been good 
cause for the continuance and adding:  “I would be at a loss to understand[] how I 
can grant the motion anyway because I’m the one that found good cause on 
December 24 to continue today’s date.”  At the conclusion of the preliminary 
examination, the prosecution added a fourth count, felony child abuse (§ 273a, 
subd. (a)), and a fifth count, spousal battery, a misdemeanor.  (§ 243, subd. (e)(1).)  
The magistrate held defendant to answer.  Defense counsel renewed his motion for 
dismissal or OR release pursuant to section 859b.  The prosecutor responded: “I 
 
 
5
believe 859b was something that needed to be addressed prior to preliminary when 
the court found good cause.  That was an argument that was made at that time.  It 
was subsequently made . . . .  However that particular code section was not cited to 
this court on December 24.  It went back to Judge Ogden on January 3rd. [¶] Judge 
Ogden refused to re-hear something this court made a finding on . . . .”  The 
magistrate, evidently agreeing, set bail at $175,000.  
An information was filed on January 21, 2003, charging defendant with 
cruelty to an animal (§ 597, subd. (a)), cruelty to a child (§ 273a, subd. (b)), 
making criminal threats (§ 422), child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a)), and battery upon a 
spouse or cohabitant.  (§ 243, subd. (e)(1).)  The information also alleged as 
enhancements that defendant personally used a deadly weapon when committing 
the offense of cruelty to an animal (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and that the criminal 
threats and spousal battery occurred while defendant was released from custody on 
bail.  (§ 12022.1.) 
On February 27, 2003, defendant moved to set aside the information 
pursuant to section 995.  He contended it was “questionable” whether good cause 
justified the December 24, 2002 continuance of the preliminary examination, and 
that he had not been legally committed, because he was held in illegal custody in 
violation of section 859b.  He urged that section 859b required that he be released 
on the date the continuance was granted.  The prosecution countered that 
defendant had waived his claim by failing to refer to section 859b on 
December 24, that defense counsel had agreed to the continuance, and that 
defendant acted improperly in setting the matter for hearing before another judge 
on December 31 and “did not take all necessary steps to preserve [] the alleged 
error made on December 24, 2002.”  The prosecution’s points and authorities 
apparently conceded that the magistrate would have been required to grant a timely 
motion for OR release:  “The People concede that had the 859b OR release issue 
 
 
6
been raised prior to the preliminary hearing and after the continuance was granted 
consistent with Penal Code Section 1318, the defendant would have been eligible 
for release and would have been released at that time pending preliminary exam.”   
On March 13, 2003, the superior court granted defendant’s motion to set 
aside the  three counts in the information that were based on the December 11, 
2002, complaint, concluding that “there was a denial of the defendant’s rights 
under 859b; that the defendant should have been released on his own 
recognizance, and that based upon that denial, the 995 motion should be granted.”  
At a further hearing held on March 18, 2003, the court set aside the 
remaining two counts that had been added at the conclusion of the preliminary 
examination.   
The People appealed from the judgment of dismissal, and the Court of 
Appeal affirmed the judgment rendered by the trial court.  We granted the 
People’s petition for review. 
II 
A 
The present case requires this court to interpret section 859b, which 
governs the time within which a preliminary examination must be held.  The 
statute provides that with reference to in-custody defendants, the complaint must 
be dismissed if the preliminary examination is not held within 10 days of 
arraignment, except that the hearing may be continued with the consent of the 
defendant or if the prosecution establishes good cause for a continuance.  If the 
defendant is in custody,2 however, the statute requires that upon continuance of 
                                              
2  
It is understood that the OR-release provision applies when the defendant is 
in custody for reasons solely attributable to the charges to be adjudicated at the 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
7
the hearing, the defendant “shall” be released on his or her own recognizance, with 
specified exceptions where (1) continuance of the preliminary examination beyond 
the 10-day period is requested by the defendant; (2) the case involves capital 
charges where the “proof is evident and the presumption great”; (3) a necessary 
witness is unavailable due to the actions of the defendant; (4) counsel is ill; 
(5) counsel is required unexpectedly to appear in a jury trial; or (6) unforeseen 
conflicts of interest require appointment of new counsel.3   
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
preliminary examination.  (See Blake v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 
244, 248. 
3  
Section 859b provides in pertinent part:  “Both the defendant and the 
people have the right to a preliminary examination at the earliest possible time, 
and unless both waive that right or good cause for a continuance is found . . . , the 
preliminary examination shall be held within 10 court days of the date the 
defendant is arraigned or pleads, whichever occurs later, or within 10 court days of 
the date criminal proceedings are reinstated pursuant to Chapter 6 (commencing 
with section 1367) of Title 10 of Part 2.   
 
“Whenever the defendant is in custody, the magistrate shall dismiss the 
complaint if the preliminary examination is set or continued beyond 10 court days 
from the time of the arraignment, plea, or reinstatement of criminal proceedings 
. . . , and the defendant has remained in custody for 10 or more court days solely 
on that complaint, unless either of the following occur: [¶] (a)  The defendant 
personally waives his or her right to preliminary examination within the 10 court 
days. [¶] (b)  The prosecution establishes good cause for a continuance beyond the 
10-court-day period.   
 
“For purposes of this subdivision, ‘good cause’ includes, but is not limited 
to [specified circumstances].  Any continuance under this paragraph shall be 
limited to a maximum of three additional court days.   
 
“If the preliminary examination is set or continued beyond the 10-court-
day-period, the defendant shall be released pursuant to Section 1318 unless:  [¶]  
(1) The defendant requests the setting of continuance of the preliminary 
examination beyond the 10-court-day period.  [¶]  (2)  The defendant is charged 
with a capital offense in a cause where the proof is evident and the presumption 
great. [¶]  (3)  A witness necessary for the preliminary examination is unavailable 
due to the actions of the defendant.  [¶]  (4)  The illness of counsel.  [¶]  (5) The 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
8
The history of the enactment assists us in analyzing the questions before us.  
At one time, section 859b simply called for a preliminary examination to be set 
after the initial arraignment on the charges.  Case law required only that the 
accused, whether in custody or at liberty, be afforded a preliminary examination 
without “unreasonable delay.”  (People v. Du Bose (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 544, 
550.)   
Evidently not satisfied with this vague standard, the Legislature amended 
the statute in 1970, adding a provision granting accused persons in custody the 
right to a preliminary examination within 10 days of arraignment or plea.  (Stats. 
1970, ch. 1371, § 1, p. 2537.)  Reasoning that the statute employed mandatory 
terms, and that the statute expressed a plain policy to protect the liberty of persons 
who are unable to post bail, an appellate court held that the statute created an 
absolute right to a preliminary examination within the specified period for in-
custody defendants who do not waive the right, and that “in the absence of a 
waiver this right cannot be impinged upon by the magistrate, even on a showing of 
good cause.”  (Serrato v. Superior Court (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 459, 464 
[interpreting the 1970 version of the statute].)  Although the statute did not contain 
any enforcement mechanism, the court held that failure to conduct the preliminary 
examination within the mandated period constituted a deprivation of a substantial 
right requiring dismissal.  (Id. at pp. 468-470.) 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
unexpected engagement of counsel in a jury trial.  [¶]  (6)  Unforeseen conflicts of 
interest which require appointment of new counsel.   
 
“The magistrate shall dismiss the complaint if the preliminary examination 
is set or continued more than 60 days from the date of the arraignment, plea, or 
reinstatement of criminal proceedings . . . , unless the defendant personally waives 
his or her right to a preliminary examination within the 60 days.”   
 
 
9
Effective in 1978, section 859b was amended to provide that both the 
prosecution and the defendant have a right to a speedy preliminary examination, 
adding language stating that a preliminary examination could be continued for 
good cause beyond the 10-day period — but only if the accused was not in 
custody.  (Stats. 1977, ch. 1152, § 1, p. 3698.)  The Legislature made clear its 
intent to establish an absolute rule devoid of exceptions, adding the following 
language to the statute:  “In no instance shall the preliminary examination be 
continued beyond 10 court days from such arraignment or plea whenever the 
defendant is in custody at the time of such arraignment or plea and the defendant 
does not personally waive his right to preliminary examination within such 10 
court days.”  (Id., pp. 3698-3699, italics added.) 
In 1980, the Legislature again amended the statute, authorizing a 
preliminary examination to be continued beyond the 10-day period for all 
defendants, including persons in custody, upon a showing of good cause, but 
expressly requiring dismissal if the preliminary examination was continued 
beyond the 10-day period without a waiver and without good cause when the 
defendant is in custody.  (Stats. 1980, ch. 938, § 1, p. 2965.) 
Also in 1980, section 859b was amended to add a version of the language 
that is of principal concern in the present case.  That amendment provided that if a 
preliminary examination for an in-custody defendant is delayed beyond the 10-day 
period for good cause, the defendant “shall” be released on his or her own 
recognizance (subject to conditions as prescribed by section 1318), except for 
defendants charged with capital crimes “where the proof is evident and the 
presumption great.”  (Stats. 1980, ch. 938, § 1, p. 2965.)  Thus, although under the 
former law the prosecution would have suffered a dismissal (with the resulting 
release of the defendant without conditions) if a continuance were needed, whether 
the delay was justified by good cause or not, the new provision accommodated the 
 
 
10
prosecution’s needs in part, by substituting OR release for dismissal when the 
prosecution establishes good cause for the delay.4   
B 
The People contend that the language of section 859b leaves the magistrate 
with discretion to deny OR release on public safety grounds to a defendant who is 
in custody but whose preliminary examination is continued beyond the 10-day 
period for good cause.  According to the People, the magistrate retains such 
discretion whether or not the defendant’s case comes within the exceptions 
enumerated by the statute.  As we explain, neither the language nor the purpose of 
the statute supports such an interpretation. 
We interpret statutes with the object of ascertaining and effectuating the 
Legislature’s intent.  (People v. Smith (2004) 32 Cal.4th 792, 797.)  “In 
determining such intent, we begin with the language of the statute itself.  
[Citation.]  That is, we look first to the words the Legislature used, giving them 
their usual and ordinary meaning.”  (People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 
23 Cal.4th 183, 192.)   
In the present case, the meaning of the statute appears unambiguous.  If an 
in-custody defendant’s preliminary examination is delayed for more than 10 court 
days without a waiver or good cause, the complaint must be dismissed, but if the 
prosecutor shows good cause for postponement, no dismissal is required — but a 
defendant who is in custody must be released on OR, as long as he or she agrees to 
be bound by reasonable conditions and to appear at future hearings as provided in 
                                              
4  
In 1981, the Legislature added further exceptions to the rule requiring OR 
release, as noted in footnote 3, ante.  (Stats. 1981, ch. 854, § 1, pp. 3276-3277.)  
Subsequent amendments did not affect the OR-release provision of section 859b.  
(Stats. 1987, ch. 461, § 1, pp. 1699-1700; Stats. 1989, ch. 897, § 26.5, pp. 3066-
3067; Stats. 1996, ch. 122, § 1, pp. 462-463.)   
 
 
11
section 1318.  Indeed, case law and secondary authorities treat as commonplace 
the rule that OR release is required after the prosecutor secures a continuance for 
good cause pursuant to section 859b.  (See Landrum v. Superior Court (1981) 30 
Cal.3d 1, 5-6, fn. 4; 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Pretrial 
Proceedings, § 130, p. 332; 1 Levenson, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1999) ch. 10, 
§ 10.02(B), p. 10-8.)  It is evident that the Legislature examined its previous policy 
requiring dismissal in all cases of delay when the accused is in custody, and in part 
accommodated the prosecution’s needs by providing the lesser remedy of OR 
release whenever there is good cause for a continuance — presumably in light of 
the prosecution’s ability to refile a complaint dismissed by the court or itself 
dismiss and refile the complaint if OR release is ordered. 
Ordinarily, the term “shall” is interpreted as mandatory and not permissive.  
Indeed, “the presumption [is] that the word ‘shall’ in a statute is ordinarily deemed 
mandatory and ‘may’ permissive.”  (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. 
v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1143.)  There is no reason to 
believe that the OR-release provision contained in section 859b is merely 
permissive despite the Legislature’s use of the term “shall.”  In every other portion 
of section 859b, the Legislature has used the term in its mandatory sense, a 
circumstance undisputed by the People.5  Terms ordinarily possess a consistent 
meaning throughout a statute.  (Grafton Partners v. Superior Court (2005) 36 
                                              
5  
A related statute employs the same apparently mandatory language.  
Section 861 requires a preliminary examination to be held in a single session, 
unless there is good cause for proceeding otherwise.  Postponement for good cause 
cannot be for more than 10 days, unless the defendant waives his or her rights 
under the statute or the prosecution establishes good cause for a further 
postponement.  “If the magistrate postpones the preliminary examination beyond 
the 10-court-day period, and the defendant is in custody, the defendant shall be 
released pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 859b.”  (§ 861, subd. (a)(2).) 
 
 
12
Cal.4th 944, 960.)  The People have not suggested any reason to suppose the 
Legislature intended that the term “shall” in the portion of the statute presently 
under review means anything different from what that term signifies throughout 
the remaining portions of the statute.   
The evident purpose of section 859b supports the view that its provisions 
are mandatory, rather than permissive.  This enactment is one of a number of 
statutes “that are supplementary to and a construction of the constitutional right to 
a speedy trial.”  (People v. Luu (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1399, 1404.)  Section 859b 
“reflects a clear legislative intention to prevent prolonged incarceration prior to a 
preliminary hearing.”  (Landrum v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 12.)  
This statute “ ‘manifests a legislative policy to eliminate the possibility that 
persons charged with felonies might suffer prolonged incarceration without a 
judicial determination of probable cause merely because they are unable to post 
bond in order to gain their freedom.’ ”  (Blake v. Superior Court, supra, 108 
Cal.App.3d 244, 248, italics added.)  In many cases, that legislative policy would 
not be served under the People’s interpretation of the statute. 
The People contend that the language of section 859b leaves the magistrate 
with authority to deny OR release to in-custody defendants for reasons other than 
the exceptions to the OR-release provision specified in the statute itself.  But the 
presence of express exceptions ordinarily implies that additional exceptions are 
not contemplated.  “[W]here exceptions to a general rule are specified by statute, 
other exceptions are not to be implied or presumed” unless a contrary legislative 
intent is evident.  (Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190, 195.)  In the 
present case, we are unable to perceive any indication of legislative intent to 
deviate from that rule of statutory construction.   
The People stress that public safety is an interest that should be considered 
in any decision to release an accused person on OR and that such a concern must 
 
 
13
be the basis for the exercise of judicial discretion in any OR decision.  But the 
enactment of statutory exceptions to the OR-release provisions of section 859b 
demonstrates that the Legislature already has considered the public safety interests 
that might outweigh the interest of an incarcerated defendant in being set at liberty 
when the preliminary examination is delayed.  It has concluded that when good 
cause for a continuance is lacking, dismissal is required without regard to public 
safety concerns.  As for the lesser remedy of OR release when the prosecution has 
demonstrated good cause for continuance, the Legislature has identified those 
instances in which the incarcerated defendant’s interest must give way, for 
example when there is a capital charge or the defendant has acted to render a 
witness unavailable.  The Legislature has struck a balance between the 
incarcerated accused person’s interest in liberty and the public interest in security.  
The People evidently wish that a different balance had been struck to cover 
additional situations, but that did not occur.  The Legislature, of course, is free to 
revise the statute as it wishes within constitutional limits, but the current language 
of the statute does not support the People’s position. 
The People claim that section 859b’s reference to section 1318 affords 
magistrates full discretion to deny OR release.  The latter statute requires persons 
who are released on OR to sign a release agreement promising to appear at future 
proceedings and to obey all reasonable conditions ― including conditions that 
serve public safety.  (See In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133, 1145.)6  The People 
                                              
6  
Section 1318 provides:  “(a)  The defendant shall not be released from 
custody under an own recognizance until the defendant files with the clerk of the 
court . . . a signed release agreement which includes:  [¶] (1) The defendant’s 
promise to appear at all times and places, as ordered by the court or magistrate 
. . . . [¶] (2) The defendant’s promise to obey all reasonable conditions imposed by 
the court or magistrate. [¶] (3) The defendant’s promise not to depart this state 
without leave of the court. [¶] (4) Agreement by the defendant to waive extradition 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
14
suggest that, because the OR-release provision of section 859b refers to section 
1318, which calls for the magistrate’s exercise of discretion in setting reasonable 
conditions of OR release, the magistrate also must retain discretion to deny OR 
release altogether to persons whom the magistrate views as a public safety risk. 
Contrary to the People’s argument, however, section 1318 does not govern 
a magistrate’s exercise of discretion whether to grant OR release.  The 
magistrate’s discretion whether or not to grant OR release is governed by other 
provisions ― provisions to which the Legislature could have referred in section 
859b had it intended that OR release pursuant to section 859b be discretionary.  
(Compare §§ 1269c [governing applications for increase or decrease in bail and 
for OR release]; 1270 [setting out the general circumstances in which defendants 
may be granted OR release]; 1270.1 [requiring a hearing before scheduled bail 
may be increased or decreased or OR release granted to defendants charged with 
specific violent felonies, and specifying factors to be considered by the court]; see 
also §§ 273.75 and 273.84 [governing OR release in specified domestic violence 
and spousal abuse cases], 1319 [requiring a hearing prior to OR release in violent 
felony cases, prescribing circumstances to be considered by the court in such 
cases, and prohibiting OR release for any person charged with a violent felony 
who previously failed to appear], 1319.5 [requiring a hearing prior to OR release 
for parolees, probationers, and persons who previously failed to appear].) 
Rather, section 1318 prescribes the terms of the defendant’s OR release 
agreement, including his or her required promise to obey all reasonable conditions 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
. . . . [¶] (5) The acknowledgment of the defendant that he or she has been 
informed of the consequences and penalties applicable to violation of the 
conditions of release.”   
 
 
15
imposed by the court.  Section 1318 does not govern the court’s authority to grant 
or deny OR release.   
In addition, as the Court of Appeal explained, the People’s argument, if 
accepted, would render portions of section 859b a nullity.  There would have been 
no need, for example, for the Legislature to add a specific public safety exception 
for capital defendants ― let alone a qualification that the latter exception be 
limited to capital offenses in which the proof is evident and the presumption 
great ― if the reference to section 1318 conferred upon the magistrate full 
authority to deny OR release despite the magistrate’s having granted the 
prosecution a continuance of a preliminary examination beyond the 10-day period. 
The People cite In re Samano (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 984 in support of their 
claim that section 859b does not require OR release in every instance in which an 
in-custody defendant’s preliminary examination is continued for good cause 
beyond the 10-day period at the prosecutor’s request.  In that case, however, the 
request for a continuance came from the defense and  not from the prosecution.  
Two codefendants moved for continuance of the preliminary examination and 
waived the statutory period, while the other codefendants objected and did not 
waive time.  The reviewing court held that failure to hold the preliminary 
examination within the statutory period did not compel OR release for the 
objecting codefendants.   
The court acknowledged the general rule that section 859b mandates OR 
release when the prosecutor secures a continuance for good cause (In re Samano, 
supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 990), but pointed out that the prosecutor had not 
requested the continuance.  The court emphasized that “[s]ection 859b, 
subdivision (b) is premised on the People as the initiator of the continuance.”  (Id., 
at p. 989, italics added.)  The court reasoned that a codefendant’s request for a 
continuance “should not inure to the detriment of the People with the nonmoving 
 
 
16
codefendants as unintended third party beneficiaries.  The People were ready for 
the preliminary hearing and wanted to go forward . . . .”  (Ibid.)  The court also 
noted that another statute specifies that if the preliminary examination of one 
defendant is continued for good cause, proceedings for all codefendants may be 
continued so as to maintain joinder, a strong state interest.  (See § 1050.1.)  
Balancing the interests of the codefendants in not being held in custody for a 
prolonged period without any determination of probable cause against the state’s 
interest in joint trials, the court concluded that when it is not the prosecutor but a 
codefendant who requests the continuance, the request should be attributed to all 
codefendants.   
The decision in In re Samano is distinguishable from the present case, in 
which it was the prosecution that requested the continuance.  That decision does 
not support the People’s claim that courts retain general discretion to deny OR 
release when a defendant is in custody and the prosecutor secures a continuance of 
the preliminary examination for good cause, nor does the decision support the 
People’s claim that courts have engrafted exceptions onto section 859b for 
instances in which the prosecutor secures a continuance.  Two additional cases are 
distinguishable on a similar basis, in that the delay in the preliminary examination 
was attributable to the defense and, indeed, served the defendant’s constitutional 
interests.  (People v. Kowalski (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 174 [defense counsel’s 
request for additional time was treated as a defense time waiver although the 
defendant personally objected, because the request served the defendant’s 
constitutional right to be represented by competent counsel]; Curry v. Superior 
Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 221, 226 [§ 859b is subordinated to the defendant’s 
constitutional right of self-representation and the preliminary examination 
properly was delayed—over the defendant’s objection—because additional time 
was needed to assess his mental capacity to represent himself].)  By contrast, in 
 
 
17
the present case it was the prosecutor who sought the continuance, and obviously 
no constitutional right of defendant was served by denying him OR release.   
The prosecutor’s request for a continuance illustrates the very reason 
section 859b was enacted, that is, to ensure that the prosecution cannot cause 
delay that results in the prolonged incarceration of a charged individual without a 
determination of probable cause.  The People have not offered any theory under 
which the request for a continuance could be attributed to defendant in the present 
case.  Nor do the People explain as a general matter how the statute would 
continue to operate under their interpretation.  If section 859b provides that the 
court should grant OR release only to persons who otherwise would be eligible for 
OR release under other statutes, section 859b’s OR-release provision never would 
apply, because the accused person already would be out of custody on OR.  
Reading the People’s proposed public safety exception into the statute would 
operate to render its OR provision a dead letter, or at least render superfluous the 
specific exceptions set out in the statute.  
C 
The People next contend that provisions of the California Constitution 
require that a magistrate retain discretion to deny OR release notwithstanding 
section 859b.  The People rely principally upon article I, section 28, subdivision 
(e) as proposed by Proposition 8 on the June 1982 primary election ballot, entitled 
the Victims’ Bill of Rights.  Under that provision, according to the People, 
defendant was not entitled to OR release, because he was charged with a serious 
felony and posed a threat to public safety. 
Proposition 8 proposed to repeal article I, section 12 of the California 
Constitution, which governs bail and OR release and which provided, prior to the 
June 1982 election:  “A person shall be released on bail by sufficient sureties, 
except for capital crimes when the facts are evident or the presumption great.  
 
 
18
Excessive bail may not be required.  [¶]  A person may be released on his or her 
own recognizance in the court’s discretion.”  (Italics added.)  The language 
concerning OR was added to the Constitution as part of a constitutional revision 
adopted by the voters at the November 5, 1974, General Election.  Prior to that 
time, the bail provisions of the Constitution were contained in article I, section 6, 
but no mention was made of OR release.  There was, however, a “ ‘well-
established practice of releasing persons accused of crimes on their own 
recognizance’ ” in appropriate circumstances as an alternative to requiring the 
posting of bail ― an alternative continued and recognized by the OR provisions 
that were added in 1974.  (Dant v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 380, 
385, quoting Cal. Const. Revision Com., Proposed Revision (1971) p. 19.) 
As noted, Proposition 8 proposed to repeal article I, section 12 and 
substitute article I, section 28, subdivision (e).  The proposed subdivision was 
entitled “Public Safety Bail” and provided in pertinent part:  “A person may be 
released on bail by sufficient sureties, except for capital crimes when the facts are 
evident or the presumption great.  Excessive bail may not be required.  In setting, 
reducing or denying bail, the judge or magistrate shall take into consideration the 
protection of the public, the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous 
criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his or her appearing at the 
trial or hearing of the case.  Public safety shall be the primary consideration. [¶] A 
person may be released on his or her own recognizance in the court’s discretion, 
subject to the same factors considered in setting bail.  However, no person 
charged with the commission of any serious felony shall be released on his or her 
own recognizance.”  (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982) text of Prop. 8, 
p. 33, italics added.)  
In relying on the bail and OR provisions of Proposition 8, the People fail 
adequately to take account of a series of opinions, including one by this court, that 
 
 
19
have concluded that the relevant provision of Proposition 8 never became 
effective, because a competing initiative measure on the same ballot (Proposition 
4) garnered more votes than Proposition 8.  (In re York, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 
1140, fn. 4; see also Dant v. Superior Court, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 384-
385, fn. 6; People v. Cortez (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1211; People v. Barrow 
(1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 721, 723.) 
Proposition 4 added language to article I, section 12 that is relevant to the 
subject of release on bail.7  New language permitted courts setting bail to consider 
factors other than the probability that the defendant would appear at trial.  In 
particular, the measure authorized courts to consider the seriousness of the offense 
and the previous criminal record of the accused, and the proponents of the measure 
made it clear they intended that public safety should be a consideration in bail 
decisions.  (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982) argument in favor of 
Prop. 4, p. 18.)  Proposition 4, however, did not amend the preexisting provision 
of article I, section 12 of the state Constitution related to OR release.  Specifically, 
                                              
7  
Proposition 4 submitted the following text of article I, section 12 to the 
voters for approval:  “A person shall be released on bail by sufficient sureties, 
except for: [¶] (a) Capital crimes when the facts are evident or the presumption 
great; [¶] (b) Felony offenses involving acts of violence on another person when 
the facts are evident or the presumption great and the court finds based upon clear 
and convincing evidence that there is a substantial likelihood the person’s release 
would result in great bodily harm to others; or [¶] (c) Felony offenses when the 
facts are evident or the presumption great and the court finds based on clear and 
convincing evidence that the person has threatened another with great bodily harm 
and that there is a substantial likelihood that the person would carry out the threat 
if released. [¶] Excessive bail may not be required.  In fixing the amount of bail, 
the court shall take into consideration the seriousness of the offense charged, the 
previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his or her 
appearing at the trial or hearing of the case. [¶] A person may be released on his or 
her own recognizance in the court’s discretion.”  (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. 
(June 8, 1982) text of Prop. 4, p. 17.) 
 
 
20
Proposition 4 did not amend the language providing that “[a] person may be 
released on his or her own recognizance in the court’s discretion.”  (Cal. Const., 
art. I, § 12; Dant v. Superior Court, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 384-385, fn. 6; 
Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982) text of Prop. 4, p. 17.)  
In In re York, supra, 9 Cal.4th 1133, the defendant claimed that the 
magistrate violated section 1318 by placing conditions upon his OR release that 
were not concerned with guaranteeing his presence at the hearing.  We began our 
discussion as follows:  “Article I, section 12, of the California Constitution 
establishes a person’s right to obtain release on bail from pretrial custody, 
identifies certain categories of crime in which such bail is unavailable, prohibits 
the imposition of excessive bail as to other crimes, sets forth the factors a court 
shall take into consideration in fixing the amount of the required bail, and 
recognizes that a person ‘may be released on his or her own recognizance in the 
court’s discretion.’  Penal Code section 1318 sets forth a variety of requirements 
that an OR release agreement must satisfy.”  (In Re York, at pp. 1139-1140, fn. 
omitted.)  Having identified the constitutional source of the right to bail and to 
consideration for OR release, we explained in a footnote that the source of the bail 
provisions of article I, section 12 was Proposition 4.  “The provisions set forth in 
article I, section 12, of the California Constitution were contained in Proposition 4, 
enacted by the voters at the June 1982 Primary Election.  Proposition 4 received 
more votes than did Proposition 8, an omnibus initiative that, in the same election, 
added (among other provisions) article I, section 28, subdivision (e), to the 
California Constitution, providing in pertinent part:  ‘A person may be released on 
his or her own recognizance in the court’s discretion, subject to the same factors 
considered in setting bail.’ . . . [¶] Because Proposition 4 received more votes than 
did Proposition 8, the bail and OR release provisions contained in Proposition 4 
 
 
21
are deemed to prevail over those set forth in Proposition 8.  [Citations.]”  (In re 
York, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1140, fn. 4, italics added, original italics omitted.)   
The source of the California Constitution’s bail provisions was significant 
in the statutory analysis we conducted in In re York.  Had the provisions of 
Proposition 8’s article I, section 28, subdivision (e) taken effect, they quickly 
would have disposed of York’s claim that the sole legitimate purpose of imposing 
conditions for OR release was to ensure the defendant’s presence at the hearing, 
because the language proposed by Proposition 8 specified that considerations other 
than ensuring a defendant’s presence at the proceeding could be considered in the 
context of a decision to grant an OR release, just as other considerations were 
relevant in setting bail.  Having determined instead that it was the language of 
Proposition 4 that prevailed, however, we proceeded to analyze the ambiguities in 
section 1318 without regard to the directives that would have been controlling 
under Proposition 8. 
Undaunted, the People contend that in In re York, supra, 9 Cal.4th 1133, we 
were not called upon to consider whether Propositions 4 and 8 might be 
harmonized and both be given effect, and that we did not consider the applicability 
of our earlier decision in Yoshisato v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 978.  That 
decision drew a distinction between the situation of two competing or alternative 
initiative measures, only one of which could prevail, and that of two measures 
presented to the voters as complementary or supplementary.  In the latter situation, 
the two measures may be compared section by section, giving effect to both so 
long as there is no direct conflict.  (Id. at pp. 987-988, 991-992.)  The People insist 
that Propositions 4 and 8 were complementary, not competing.  Contending there 
is no conflict between each proposition’s bail and OR provisions, the People urge 
that the provisions of each proposition can be given effect. 
 
 
22
Although in In re York we did not analyze at any length the point presently 
raised, we did cite Yoshisato in support of our conclusion that the provisions of 
Proposition 4 prevailed over those of Proposition 8.  (In re York, supra, 9 Cal.4th 
at p. 1140, fn. 4.)  It is apparent we believed Propositions 4 and 8 contained 
competing measures respecting bail and OR release that could not both be given 
effect, and we held that because Proposition 4 had received more votes, that 
proposition must be given effect over the competing measure.  Moreover, our 
current review of the ballot pamphlet for the 1982 primary election, at which both 
Propositions 4 and 8 were proposed, demonstrates that the measures were not 
presented to the voters as complementary.  On the contrary, opponents of 
Proposition 8 (including a member of the Legislature that had voted unanimously 
in favor of placing Proposition 4 on the ballot) warned that the former measure 
would enact radical changes that would restrict individual liberty and harm “true 
efforts to fight crime,” adding:  “CONSIDER THESE EFFECTS OF 
PROPOSITION 8:  [¶] Takes away everyone’s right to bail.  (Compare 
Proposition 4, which targets only violent felons.)”   (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. 
(June 8, 1982) rebuttal to argument in favor of Prop. 8, p. 34.)   
The Legislature, as the proponent of Proposition 4, was concerned with 
improving public safety by imposing a measured restriction on the right of violent 
felons to bail, but the proposition left preexisting OR provisions intact.  (The 
ballot materials did not discuss the subject of OR release at all.)  Proponents of 
Proposition 8 would have eliminated the general right to bail, substituting a 
provision granting courts greater discretion to deny bail, and placing restrictions 
on access to bail different from those proposed by the Legislature in Proposition 4.  
Proposition 8 explicitly would have imposed these restrictions on OR release, as 
well. 
 
 
23
A section-by-section comparison of Propositions 4 and 8 demonstrates the 
direct conflict between the two measures.  Proposition 8 would have repealed 
California Constitution article I, section 12 (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 8, 
1982) text of Prop. 8, p. 33), while Proposition 4 amended that provision.  (Ballot 
Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982) text of Prop. 4, p. 17.)  Proposition 8 would 
have rescinded the court’s discretion to grant OR release for any serious felony 
(Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982) text of Prop. 8, p. 33), while 
Proposition 4 left the court’s preexisting discretion intact without any restriction.  
(Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982) text of Prop. 4, p. 17.)  Proposition 4 
stated that all accused persons “shall” be admitted to bail, subject to certain 
limitations (ibid.), while Proposition 8 would have rendered bail discretionary in 
all cases and would have extended the restrictions it imposed upon bail to OR 
release.  (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982) text of Prop. 8, p. 33.)  In 
view of these circumstances, we adhere to the view that the amendments to article 
I, section 12 proposed by Proposition 4 took effect, and that the provisions of 
article I, section 28, subdivision (e) proposed by Proposition 8 did not take effect. 
The People contend that even if, as we have concluded, article I, section 12, 
rather than article I, section 28, subdivision (e), represents the governing 
constitutional OR provision, section 859b still would be unconstitutional if it were 
interpreted to restrict the discretion of the magistrate to deny OR release on the 
basis of public safety concerns.  Because article I, section 12 provides in relevant 
part that “[a] person may be released on his or her own recognizance in the court’s 
discretion,” the People argue that any statutory provision purporting to provide for 
OR release without affording the court discretion to deny such release on public 
safety grounds violates this provision as well as the separation-of-powers doctrine, 
by improperly interfering with the court’s constitutionally granted discretion.  In 
essence, the People contend that section 859b, if it is interpreted as mandatory 
 
 
24
rather than permissive, would be inconsistent with California Constitution article I, 
section 12 and would violate the principle of separation of powers, because “[i]f 
section 859b requires the release of every accused OR, without exception, 
whenever the prosecution obtains a continuance for good cause, there is no 
discretion left, and the constitutional authority under article [I], section 12, to grant 
OR releases ‘in the court’s discretion’ will have been removed by operation of 
statute.”   
The People’s argument in this regard misapprehends the subject and scope 
of the bail and OR provisions of article I, section 12.  Those provisions establish 
the circumstances under which an accused person possesses a constitutional right 
to be released on bail pending trial, and authorize a court, as an alternative to 
requiring the posting of bail, to permit an accused to be released on his or her own 
recognizance in the court’s discretion.  These constitutional provisions do not 
purport to address the circumstances under which, once a prosecution has begun, 
the court may order the criminal proceeding dismissed (with the resultant release 
of the defendant from custody) or order other remedies for delay in prosecution —
such as the OR release of an in-custody accused. 
Section 859b — in providing for the OR release of an in-custody accused 
as an alternative to dismissal when the prosecution for good cause obtains a 
continuance of the preliminary examination beyond the statutorily prescribed 10-
day period — addresses a circumstance that does not fall within the purview of 
California Constitution article I, section 12.  As the People must acknowledge, 
article I, section 12 never has been interpreted to preclude the Legislature from 
prescribing dismissal of a proceeding — with the resultant release of the defendant 
without condition — when the prosecution is unable to proceed with the 
preliminary examination within 10 days.  For similar reasons, article I, section 12 
does not preclude the Legislature from adopting a lesser remedy or sanction when 
 
 
25
a defendant is not afforded a preliminary examination within the time specified by 
statute but the prosecution has established good cause for a continuance.  
Even in those situations to which article I, section 12’s OR provision is 
directed, namely, when a defendant is placed on OR as an alternative to being 
released on bail, article I, section 12 cannot properly be interpreted to mean that a 
court invariably retains discretion to release a defendant OR and to preclude the 
Legislature from, for example, establishing specific crimes for which OR release 
is not permitted.  The People’s argument that the terms of article I, section 12 
should be interpreted to establish that a court has a constitutionally enshrined 
authority to exercise discretion whether to grant OR release in all situations would 
invalidate any statutory provision that limits the crimes as to which OR release 
may be ordered, yet the People cannot point to any authority that supports a 
conclusion that such statutes would be unconstitutional.  Indeed, the People 
themselves rely upon section 1319 in support of the view that the nature of 
defendant’s crime prohibited his release on OR.  Furthermore, other statutes that 
merely channel the court’s discretion to grant or deny OR release also might be 
implicated under the People’s theory.  (See, e.g., §§ 1270, 1270.1.) 
The separation-of-powers doctrine recognizes the significant 
interrelationship and mutual dependency among the three branches of government.  
Although courts should “maintain vigorously all the inherent and implied powers 
necessary to properly and effectively function as a separate department in the 
scheme of our state government,” the Legislature retains certain authority to 
legislate even with respect to inherent powers of the court, because “the three 
departments of our government are . . . in many respects mutually dependent.  Of 
necessity the judicial department as well as the executive must in most matters 
yield to the power of statutory enactments.  [Citations.]  The power of the 
legislature to regulate criminal and civil proceedings and appeals is undisputed.”  
 
 
26
(Brydonjack v. State Bar (1929) 208 Cal. 439, 442-443; see also Obrien v. Jones 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 40, 48 [the separation-of-powers doctrine “does not command ‘a 
hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government’ ”]; Millholen v. Riley 
(1930) 211 Cal. 29, 34 [“the [L]egislature may at all times aid the courts and may 
even regulate their operation so long as their efficiency is not thereby impaired”].)  
Indeed, the separation-of-powers doctrine “permits actions of one branch that may 
significantly affect those of another branch.”  (In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 
616, 662, italics added.)  
Various aspects of inherent judicial power may be affected by legislative 
enactment, including measures limiting the power of contempt (In re McKinney 
(1968) 70 Cal.2d 8, 11-12), provisions for peremptory disqualification of a judge 
upon a party’s filing of an affidavit of prejudice pursuant to Code of Civil 
Procedure section  170.6 (Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 191; 
Johnson v. Superior Court (1958) 50 Cal.2d 693, 695-696), and the exercise of 
legislative power over the appointment of certain members of the State Bar Court.  
(Obrien v. Jones, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 48-49.)   
Even when the stake was such a core judicial function as controlling 
whether a court would be in session or remain closed, we concluded that 
reasonable legislation permitting counties to direct the superior court to remain 
closed on certain furlough days did not cross the boundary established by the 
separation-of-powers doctrine.  (Superior Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 45.)  In recognizing the power of the legislative branch to specify furlough 
days on which the court would remain closed, we recognized, of course, that there 
are limits upon the actions each branch may take with respect to the others.  “The 
judiciary, in reviewing statutes enacted by the Legislature, may not undertake to 
evaluate the wisdom of the policies embodied in such legislation; absent a 
constitutional prohibition, the choice among competing policy considerations in 
 
 
27
enacting laws is a legislative function.  [Citation.]  The executive branch, in 
expending public funds, may not disregard legislatively prescribed directives and 
limits pertaining to the use of such funds.  [Citation.]  And the Legislature may not 
undertake to readjudicate controversies that have been litigated in the courts and 
resolved by final judicial judgment.  [Citations.]”  (Superior Court v. County of 
Mendocino, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 53.) 
Notwithstanding these limitations, we reiterated that even with respect to 
inherent judicial powers, “the Legislature generally may adopt reasonable 
regulations affecting a court’s inherent powers or functions, so long as the 
legislation does not ‘defeat’ or ‘materially impair’ a court’s exercise of its 
constitutional power or the fulfillment of its constitutional function.”  (Superior 
Court v. County of Mendocino, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 58-59.)  Emphasizing that 
the superior court was levying a facial attack on the constitutionality of the 
furlough statute, we held it would not be reasonable to conclude that under all 
circumstances, the furlough days contemplated by the statute would defeat or 
materially impair the court’s fulfillment of its constitutional duties.  (Id. at p. 60.) 
Accordingly, we do not accept the view that California Constitution article 
I, section 12 confers judicial discretion that must remain free from legislative 
interference.  We do not believe that a constitutional grant of general authority to 
the courts necessarily constitutes a restriction on the power of the Legislature to 
place reasonable limits upon a court’s exercise of discretion in certain instances — 
any more than a court’s inherent power over its times of operation would bar the 
Legislature from establishing a limited restriction on that power of the court.  Nor 
do we believe it would defeat or materially impair the courts’ exercise of judicial 
power to permit the Legislature to direct courts to grant or deny OR release under 
specified circumstances. 
 
 
28
Next, the People draw our attention to the circumstance that defendant 
could have been denied bail pursuant to article I, section 12 because of public 
safety concerns related to the charged crimes.  (In fact, the court did set bail for 
defendant.)  The People claim it would be “unreasonable” to conclude that even 
though he could have been denied bail, defendant nonetheless was entitled to OR 
release when the magistrate continued the preliminary hearing for good cause.  
Again, although article I, section 12 governs the right to bail and acknowledges 
the court’s authority to release persons on OR, we do not believe that article I, 
section 12 addresses the circumstances under which a complaint may be dismissed 
or the defendant released from custody as an adjunct to the defendant’s right to 
speedy trial.  A defendant’s eligibility for bail, like his or her eligibility for OR 
release under provisions other than section 859b, is not at issue under section 
859b.  The People do not deny that under specified circumstances, section 859b 
would require an even greater sanction than OR release — dismissal of the 
complaint.  The defendant’s ineligibility for bail would have no impact upon the 
court’s obligation to dismiss a complaint under section 859b; neither would 
ineligibility for bail have anything to do with the sanction of OR release pursuant 
to that statute.   
In conclusion, we are mindful of the circumstance that section 859b might 
require OR release of (or dismissal of charges against) dangerous persons, but, 
having concluded that neither the terms of article I, section 12 nor the separation-
of-powers doctrine renders section 859b’s OR provision unconstitutional on its 
face, this court’s role is limited to interpreting the language the Legislature has 
chosen to employ.  We believe it is for the Legislature, not this court, to consider 
whether the Legislature adequately has balanced public safety concerns against the 
interest of accused persons in avoiding custody for a prolonged period prior to any 
determination that there is probable cause to believe the accused committed the 
 
 
29
charged offense.  Thus, the Legislature is free to consider whether additional 
exceptions should be created, both as to dismissal and OR release, to 
accommodate other public safety concerns or circumstances such as the illness of 
the magistrate or the unavailability of an interpreter.  Rather extreme hypotheticals 
were posed at oral argument, such as the defendant who announces an intention 
not to appear for trial or to commit further crimes of violence.  Again, the 
Legislature may elect to create exceptions for such circumstances.  In addition, 
although we certainly do not mean to minimize public safety as a valid concern, 
we point out that when the prosecution is unable to proceed within the statutory 
period, it has the option of dismissing the complaint and refiling immediately 
(§ 1387; see also § 1387.1 [permitting an additional dismissal and refiling for 
violent felonies]), thereby avoiding any gap in maintaining the defendant in 
custody.  And of course, explicit threats of violence could subject a defendant to 
rearrest and further prosecution.  (§ 422.) 
III 
The second issue presented in this case is whether the superior court must 
set aside an information pursuant to section 995 when a magistrate refuses (in 
violation of section 859b) to grant OR release to an in-custody defendant.  As we 
shall explain, we conclude that the superior court may not set aside the 
information on the basis of such an error in the absence of a determination that the 
error reasonably might have affected the outcome of the preliminary examination.   
Section 995 provides that an information shall be set aside upon the 
defendant’s motion if the defendant was committed without probable cause or if 
“before the filing [of the information] the defendant had not been legally 
committed by a magistrate.”  (§ 995, subd. (a)(2)(A).) 
As we have explained, the term “legally committed” pertains to the 
preliminary examination and the order holding the defendant to answer.  “ ‘An 
 
 
30
information, of course, will not be set aside merely because there has been some 
irregularity or minor error in procedure in the preliminary examination.  [Citation.]  
But where it appears that, during the course of the preliminary examination, the 
defendant has been denied a substantial right, the commitment is unlawful within 
the meaning of section 995, and it must be set aside upon timely motion.  
[Citations.]’ ”  (Jennings v. Superior Court (1967) 66 Cal.2d 867, 874.)  
Although some errors such as denial of the right to counsel by their nature 
constitute a denial of a substantial right, the present case does not fall into that 
category.  We have explained, in the context of a magistrate’s error in failing to 
exercise his or her inherent authority to dismiss pursuant to section 1385, that 
generally a denial of substantial rights occurs only if the error “reasonably might 
have affected the outcome.”  (People v. Konow (2004) 32 Cal.4th 995, 1024-1025; 
see also Jennings v. Superior Court, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 875; Moon v. Superior 
Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1534; People v. Pennington (1991) 228 
Cal.App.3d 959, 964-965 [because defense counsel’s potential conflict of interest 
could not have affected the preliminary examination, it did not constitute a denial 
of a substantial right].)  By this language, we do not mean that the defendant must 
demonstrate that it is reasonably probable he or she would not have been held to 
answer in the absence of the error.  Rather, the defendant’s substantial rights are 
violated when the error is not minor but “reasonably might have affected the 
outcome” in the particular case.  (People v. Konow, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1024, 
italics added.)   
We believe that a failure to grant OR release pending the preliminary 
examination in violation of section 859b constitutes an error subject to the general 
test for prejudice because, unlike the absence of counsel, for example, the error is 
not inherently prejudicial.  The error does not implicate a core right at the 
preliminary examination itself.  In addition, the error is not one for which the 
 
 
31
pertinent statute itself calls for dismissal — unlike a delay in the preliminary 
examination beyond the 10-day period without good cause or for more than 60 
days without a time waiver (§ 859b), or when the preliminary examination 
improperly is not conducted in a single session.  (§ 861.)  In enacting and 
amending section 859b, the Legislature elected not to require dismissal when there 
is good cause for a continuance, and it would be anomalous to require that the 
charges be set aside at the section 995 hearing when the preliminary examination 
was continued for good cause.   
We certainly agree with defendant that, as a general proposition, liberty 
constitutes a fundamental right, but the specific right to liberty contemplated by 
section 859b’s OR provision applies to the necessarily limited period between the 
order granting a continuance and the preliminary examination and ordinarily does 
not have any effect on the fairness or outcome of the proceedings at the 
preliminary examination.  Indeed, even when a court orders OR release pursuant 
to section 859b, the defendant may remain in custody if the prosecutor chooses to 
dismiss and refile the complaint.  (§ 1387.)  We note also that a defendant’s OR 
status may be revoked after he or she is held to answer — the finding of probable 
cause constitutes a changed circumstance that may warrant reconsideration of 
custody status.  (See In re Annis (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1199-1200; see 
also 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law, supra, Pretrial Proceedings, §§ 84-
86, pp. 283-285; 2 Erwin et al., Cal. Criminal Defense Practice (1981) 
§ 41.16(8)(c), p. 41-65.)8   
                                              
8  
The issue of custody also is subject to reconsideration for cause once the 
information has been filed.  (§ 1289.)   
 
 
32
If the prosecutor can avoid OR release by dismissing and refiling the 
complaint, and a defendant who properly was released on OR after the prosecution 
secured a continuance for good cause can be remanded at the time of the probable 
cause determination, it would be out of proportion to the potential for impact upon 
the fairness of the preliminary examination to hold that a failure to grant OR 
release pending the preliminary examination necessarily gives the defendant a 
remedy that extends beyond the probable cause determination ― a remedy that 
could be draconian from the perspective of the prosecution.   
According to defendant, the goal served by the right to have a preliminary 
examination conducted within 10 days is the same goal served by the right to OR 
release when the prosecution secures a continuance of the preliminary examination 
for good cause.  In both instances, he claims, the Legislature intended to prevent 
prolonged incarceration prior to a probable cause determination for accused 
persons who lack resources to post bond.  We believe that although the same 
general goal is at stake, the Legislature itself contemplated different remedies for 
the denial of each of these two rights, as can be seen from the text of section 859b 
itself.  Specifically, that statute provides that delay beyond the 10-day period 
without good cause should result in dismissal, while delay with good cause does 
not require dismissal.  If we were to hold that a defendant who was denied OR 
release in violation of section 859b automatically would be entitled to have the 
charges set aside pursuant to section 995, we would be supplying a dismissal 
remedy that the Legislature chose to omit.  In sum, we do not believe that, when a 
continuance for good cause has been granted, error in determining custody status 
necessarily implicates a substantial right pursuant to section 995.   
In other contexts, we have noted that OR release is comparable to bail; in 
fact, it is “ ‘simply an alternative to bail.’ ”  (People v. Jimenez (1993) 19 
Cal.App.4th 1175, 1178.)  We have not discovered any authority suggesting that 
 
 
33
the remedy, when excessive bail has been set prior to the preliminary examination, 
is an order setting aside the information.  Rather, it is settled that defendants may 
correct error in the setting of bail by seeking a writ of habeas corpus or other 
extraordinary writ ordering reconsideration of custody status or release.  (Ibid.; see 
also Ex Parte Newbern (1961) 55 Cal.2d 500, 503; In re McSherry (2003) 112 
Cal.App.4th 856, 859-860 [noting that the court can “grant relief without an 
evidentiary hearing if the return admits allegations in the petition that, if true, 
justify relief”]; In re Alberto, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th 421, 431.)  The same 
procedures are available when a court fails to grant OR release pursuant to section 
859b.  (See In re York, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1139 [petitioners employed a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus to challenge conditions of OR release]; In re Annis, 
supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1192 [the defendant’s habeas corpus petition 
challenged revocation of release on OR].) 
Defendant objects that in Landrum v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d 1, 
we held that violation of an in-custody defendant’s right to have a preliminary 
examination conducted within 10 days of the arraignment as provided by former 
section 859b constituted a violation of a substantial right within the meaning of 
section 995.  (Landrum v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 5-6, 11-12.)  
That case is distinguishable.  At the time of our decision, the defendant had an 
absolute right to a preliminary examination within 10 days, without regard to any 
claim of good cause for continuance, and case law held that violation of this 
absolute right required dismissal.  (As previously noted, the statute subsequently 
was amended to specify the circumstances in which a violation of the 10-day rule 
required dismissal and when, by contrast, the remedy would be OR release.)  Our 
holding in Landrum does not extend beyond the situation in which the defendant 
has an absolute right to have a preliminary examination conducted within 10 days, 
that is, when good cause for a continuance does not exist.   
 
 
34
Defendant next points to our decision in People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 
Cal.3d 519.  In that case, we held that, unlike the situation of pretrial review 
pursuant to section 995, posttrial review of error occurring at the preliminary 
examination requires a showing of prejudice.  (People v. Pompa-Ortiz, at p. 529.)  
In the course of our discussion of the appropriate standard of review on appeal, we 
commented that “[t]he right to relief without any showing of prejudice will be 
limited to pretrial challenges of irregularities.  At that time, by application for 
extraordinary writ, the matter can be expeditiously returned to the magistrate for 
proceedings free of the charged defects.  We follow this approach in other 
contexts.  In People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, for example, we held that 
denial of defendant’s right to trial within a prescribed statutory time period was 
not reversible error on appeal in the absence of a showing of prejudice.  If the 
issue is raised before trial, however, prejudice is presumed and the information is 
dismissed.”  (People v. Pompa-Ortiz, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 529.) 
Defendant reads too much into our decision in People v. Pompa-Ortiz.  
That case did not establish that any and all irregularities that precede or bear some 
relationship to the preliminary examination require that the information be set 
aside pursuant to section 995; later decisions such as People v. Konow, supra, 32 
Cal.4th 995, have made this clear.  Under defendant’s interpretation, he would be 
entitled to dismissal of the information even if, following improper denial of his 
request for OR release, he had been able to post bail immediately and thus had not 
been in custody while awaiting the preliminary examination.  Our decision in 
Pompa-Ortiz does not require such an unreasonable result. 
We acknowledge that the Wilson decision cited in People v. Pompa-Ortiz, 
supra, 27 Cal.3d 519, and other cases noted by defendant have declared that, prior 
to trial, an incarcerated defendant may prevail on a motion to dismiss premised 
upon a violation of his or her speedy trial rights ― specifically, a violation of 
 
 
35
section 1382 ― without any showing of prejudice.  These cases are 
distinguishable from the present case, however, because they were based in large 
part on the circumstance that the relevant statute required dismissal as the proper 
remedy when, without a showing of good cause, the defendant had not been 
brought to trial within the statutory period.  (See Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 
40 Cal.3d 239, 263; People v. Wilson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 151.)   
Defendant also relies upon dictum in another decision of this court, Stroud 
v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 952.  In that case we examined the 
requirement in section 861 that a preliminary examination be held within a single 
session.  The statute requires the magistrate to dismiss the complaint if the 
preliminary examination  is not held in a single session unless good cause has been 
shown.  We concluded that under the particular facts of the case, the magistrate 
had good cause to interrupt the preliminary examination for a day in order to 
attend to his administrative duties.  (Stroud, at p. 957.) 
Because the magistrate had not abused his discretion, we did not decide the 
more general question whether a violation of section 861’s single-session rule 
constitutes a denial of a substantial right requiring that the charges be set aside 
pursuant to section 995.  In a footnote, we observed, without deciding, that if a 
violation of section 861 occurred, the magistrate himself or herself would be 
required to dismiss the complaint under the terms of the statute.  We surmised that 
if the magistrate refused to dismiss, “the defendant’s subsequent commitment was 
not legal, and he was thus deprived of a substantial right for which pretrial relief is 
available under section 995, even if he suffered no prejudice beyond the 
interruption or delay itself.”  (Stroud v. Superior Court, supra, 23 Cal.4th at 
p. 963, fn. 4 [but noting possible support for a contrary conclusion in People v. 
Guevara (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 193, 201-202].) 
 
 
36
This court’s dictum in Stroud is distinguishable.  Like the current 
provisions of section 859b that govern failure to conduct a preliminary 
examination for an in-custody defendant within 10 days without good cause and 
failure to hold the preliminary examination within an outer boundary of 60 days, 
section 861 itself requires dismissal as a sanction.  As we have observed above, 
such a sanction is absent from the portion of section 859b governing continuance 
of a preliminary examination for good cause. 
Defendant objects that without the remedy of setting aside the charges 
pursuant to section 995, the OR-release provision of section 859b would be 
unenforceable, leaving accused persons in custody pending delayed probable 
cause determinations.  Defendant claims that other remedies are unlikely to afford 
relief in a timely manner, that is, before the defendant’s custody status is 
reconsidered at the preliminary examination. 
We believe these concerns are misplaced.  This is not a situation in which 
the opposing party has the power to frustrate the defendant’s right to OR release or 
in which the court may abuse its discretion.  The statute requires the court to 
release the defendant on OR when the prosecution establishes good cause for a 
continuance, and now that we have clarified that the statute imposes a mandatory 
duty upon courts to release defendants on OR in the absence of a showing that any 
of the exceptions to section 859b apply, we do not anticipate that courts 
nonetheless will defy our holding and refuse to release defendants.   
Further, if a court should err in this regard by denying OR release, an 
adequate remedy exists.  The defendant may seek release by filing a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus or other extraordinary writ just as a defendant may challenge 
the amount set as bail.  Habeas corpus proceedings can be quickly resolved, and 
the defendant may be released pending a decision.  (People v. Romero (1994) 8 
Cal.4th 728.)  As we have observed:  “If the claim asserted in the petition has 
 
 
37
apparent merit and there is some urgency because the petition, for example, 
alleges entitlement to release on bail or challenges the validity of a contempt 
order, the court may require the custodian or real party in interest to submit the 
return to the writ or order to show cause as little as 24 hours after being served 
with the petition.  [Citation.]  Pending the outcome of the habeas corpus 
proceeding, the court may order that the petitioner be temporarily released from 
custody.  [Citations.]  Once the return is received, the court may grant relief 
without an evidentiary hearing if there are no material contested issues of fact.”  
(Id. at p. 744, italics added.)  It is unlikely there will be any disputed issues of fact 
if the magistrate has refused to follow section 859b’s OR-release provision, so an 
evidentiary hearing should be unnecessary in most cases and the court should be 
able to decide the matter with a minimum of delay. 
Defendant contends it is unnecessary for this court to reach the issues we 
have discussed, because the prosecutor assertedly failed to establish good cause to 
continue the preliminary examination and defendant therefore was entitled to a 
dismissal pursuant to the provision of section 859b applicable to continuances 
ordered without good cause.  According to the People, defendant has forfeited the 
claim that good cause for the continuance did not exist.  The Court of Appeal 
declined to reach the issue of good cause or to decide whether defendant had 
forfeited the claim, because it affirmed the trial court’s judgment on other grounds.  
Because we reverse the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal, that court on 
remand may consider the question of whether good cause existed to continue the 
preliminary examination.9   
                                              
9  
Like the Court of Appeal, we decline to reach the People’s various 
forfeiture claims, because those claims were not timely raised in the appellate 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
38
IV 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed 
and the matter is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
court.  In addition, the People failed to raise the claims in their petition for review 
in this court.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(b)(1).)  
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
I concur only with the judgment.  I agree that the superior court erred in 
granting defendant’s motion to set aside the information pursuant to Penal Code 
section 995,1 but disagree that the magistrate erred in denying defendant release 
on his own recognizance (OR).  Under the California Constitution, defendant had 
no right to be released on OR pending his preliminary examination, and the 
magistrate acted reasonably within the bounds of his discretion in denying 
defendant OR release for public safety reasons.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 12 (hereafter 
article I, section 12).)  Because defendant was not denied any right—let alone a 
substantial right—at the preliminary hearing within the meaning of section 995, I 
would reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeal.  
The conflict between article I, section 12 and section 859b.  
Article I, section 12 of the California Constitution states, in pertinent part, 
that “A person may be released on his or her own recognizance in the court's 
discretion.”2  (Italics added.)  It follows logically from this provision that, as a 
                                              
1  
Except as otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Penal 
Code. 
2  
Article I, section 12 states, in full: “A person shall be released on bail by 
sufficient sureties, except for: 
 
“(a) Capital crimes when the facts are evident or the presumption great; 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
2 
matter of constitutional prerogative, a trial court may grant, or not grant, OR 
release in its sound discretion.  Article I, section 12 directs a court or magistrate, in 
granting or denying OR release or in imposing OR conditions, to weigh 
considerations relating to public safety that extend beyond those intended to 
ensure subsequent court appearances.  (In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133, 1143-
1144 & fn. 7, 1150 (York.) 
In contrast, section 859b provides that, if the defendant is in custody and 
the preliminary examination is set or continued beyond the 10-court-day period for 
good cause, “the defendant shall be released pursuant to Section 1318” (italics 
added) unless certain exceptions are met.3  Only one of the six exceptions 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
“(b) Felony offenses involving acts of violence on another person, or felony 
sexual assault offenses on another person, when the facts are evident or the 
presumption great and the court finds based upon clear and convincing evidence 
that there is a substantial likelihood the person's release would result in great 
bodily harm to others; or 
 
“(c) Felony offenses when the facts are evident or the presumption great 
and the court finds based on clear and convincing evidence that the person has 
threatened another with great bodily harm and that there is a substantial likelihood 
that the person would carry out the threat if released.   
 
“Excessive bail may not be required. In fixing the amount of bail, the court 
shall take into consideration the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous 
criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his or her appearing at the 
trial or hearing of the case. 
 
“A person may be released on his or her own recognizance in the court's 
discretion.” 
3  
Under section 859b, the defendant need not be released on OR if:  
 
“(1) The defendant requests the setting of continuance of the preliminary 
examination beyond the 10-court-day period. 
 
“(2) The defendant is charged with a capital offense in a cause where the 
proof is evident and the presumption great. 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
3 
arguably is concerned with public safety.4  Based on the language of section 859b, 
the majority holds that a court has no discretion to deny OR release in the absence 
of the specified exceptions, most of which are unrelated to public safety.  Thus, 
section 859b, as construed by the majority, conflicts with the plain words of article 
I, section 12.   
It is fundamental that a constitutional provision prevails over a conflicting 
statutory provision.  (Hart v. Jordan (1939) 14 Cal.2d 288, 292; Howard Jarvis 
Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Roseville (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1188.)  As 
explained below, both the language and the history of the OR provision in article I, 
section 12 establish that: (1) OR release is not a matter of right but a matter of 
sound court discretion and (2) public safety is a relevant factor which a court 
should consider in deciding OR release.  
The relevant language is “[a] person may be released on his or her own 
recognizance in the court's discretion.”  (Art. I, § 12, italics added.)  As the 
majority acknowledges in another context, the word “may” is ordinarily deemed 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
“(3) A witness necessary for the preliminary examination is unavailable due 
to the actions of the defendant. 
 
“(4) The illness of counsel. 
 
“(5) The unexpected engagement of counsel in a jury trial. 
 
“(6) Unforeseen conflicts of interest which require appointment of new 
counsel.” 
4  
The majority asserts that the Legislature accounted for public safety 
interests in section 859b by authorizing the denial of OR release when there is a 
capital charge or the defendant has acted to render a witness unavailable.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 13.)  However, the witness provision applies even if the defendant 
caused the unavailability by nonviolent or nonthreatening means.  Thus, the 
witness provision appears more concerned with preventing defendants from 
benefiting from their wrongdoings. 
 
4 
permissive.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.)  Here, interpreting the word “may” as 
permissive is consistent with the language “in the court’s discretion.”  This 
language, providing only for discretionary consideration of an application for OR 
release, leaves no room for recognizing a statutory right to OR release.  (Van Atta 
v. Scott (1980) 27 Cal.3d 424, 452 (Van Atta) [creation of right to OR release 
would contravene OR provision in article I, section 12].) 
The history of article I, section 12 provides further support.  That provision 
was enacted by ballot Proposition 7, adopted by the voters in the November 5, 
1974, General Election following a recommendation by the California 
Constitutional Revision Commission.  (Van Atta, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 453; Dant 
v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 380, 384 (Dant).)  Proposition 7 
provided: “A person shall be released on bail by sufficient sureties, except for 
capital crimes when the facts are evident or the presumption great.  Excessive bail 
may not be required.”  [¶]  A person may be released on his or her own 
recognizance in the court’s discretion.”  (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1974), 
text of Prop. 7, p. 71; Van Atta, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 452, fn. 33.)  The analysis 
by the Legislative Analyst explained that: “Instead of being released on bail prior 
to trial, the accused person may be released on his or her own recognizance at the 
discretion of the court.”  (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1974), analysis of 
Prop. 7 by Legis. Analyst, p. 26, italics added.) 
Previously, in 1971, the California Constitution Revision Commission had 
recommended amending various provisions of the California Constitution.  At that 
time, the bail provisions of the Constitution were contained in article I, section 6, 
but no mention was made of OR release in the Constitution.  (Dant, supra, 61 
Cal.App.4th at p. 385.)  The commission proposed an OR clause, which 
recognized the “well-established practice of releasing persons accused of crimes 
 
5 
on their own recognizance.”  (Proposed Rev. of Cal. Const., pt. 5, Cal. Const. Rev. 
Com. (1971) p. 19.)   
The revision commission noted that the proposed OR provision would 
explicitly incorporate current OR practices that already existed in the law.  The 
commission stated: “The ‘Own Recognizance’ system presents a desired 
alternative to the bail system, which frequently works an injustice on those who 
cannot afford to post a bail bond.  An individual who may be released on his own 
recognizance is better able to defend himself and to avoid incarceration until 
proved guilty.  It is important to note that while release on bail is a matter of 
right, release on personal recognizance is entirely at the court’s discretion and is 
not a matter of right.  The Commission recommendation will bring constitutional 
language more in line with actual practices in the release of criminal defendants 
and more consistent with contemporary concepts of social equity and fundamental 
justice for all persons, regardless of their economic status.”  (Proposed Rev. of 
Cal. Const., pt. 5, Cal. Const. Rev. Com. (1971) p. 19, italics added; see also 
(Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1974), analysis of Prop. 7 by Legis. Analyst, p. 
26.)   
When article I, section 12 was proposed and enacted, then Penal Code 
section 1318 stated, in pertinent part: “Upon good cause being shown, any court or 
magistrate who could release a defendant from custody upon his giving bail may 
release such defendant on his own recognizance if it appears to such court or 
magistrate that such defendant will surrender himself to custody as agreed, by 
following the provisions of this article.”  (Pen. Code, former § 1318, added by 
Stats. 1959, ch. 1340, § 1, p. 3612 and repealed by Stats. 1979, ch. 873, § 11, 
 
6 
operative Jan. 1, 1981.)5  Also, consistent with Proposition 7, then section 1318.2 
provided: “The powers granted to a court or magistrate by this article are purely 
discretionary and permissive.  This article does not give any defendant the right to 
be released on his own recognizance.”  (Pen. Code, former § 1318.2, added by 
Stats. 1959, ch. 1340, § 1, p. 3612 and repealed Stats 1979 ch. 873, § 11, operative 
Jan. 1, 1981.) 
As shown in its history, article I, section 12 (as originally enacted) 
expressly provided a right to bail, while OR release was only a discretionary 
alternative to release on bail as consistent with then sections 1318 and 1318.2.  
(See Van Atta, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 452-453; In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 
613 [OR procedure is “simply an alternative to bail in appropriate cases”].) 
In 1979, the Legislature reorganized the bail statutes and provided the 
procedural framework for OR releases.  (Stats. 1979, ch. 873; Dant, supra, 61 Cal. 
App.4th at p. 385.)  As part of the reorganization, it added newly enacted sections 
1318 and 1270.  (Stats. 1979, ch. 873, §§ 4, 12, pp. 3039, 3042-3043.)  The OR 
provision in former section 1318 was moved to section 1270.  Section 1270, 
subdivision (a) read, in pertinent part, “Any person, who has been arrested for or 
charged with an offense other than a capital offense may be released on his or her 
own recognizance by a court or magistrate who could release a defendant from 
custody upon the defendant giving bail . . . .”6  (Stats. 1979, ch. 873, § 4, p. 3039, 
italics added.)  The 1979 statutory scheme regarding OR release remained 
consistent with article I, section 12.    
                                              
5  
In 1973, the Legislature amended section 1318 to include within its 
provision, “a defendant arrested upon an out-of-county warrant.”  (Stats. 1973, ch. 
620, § 2, p. 1144.) 
6  
The same language is contained in the current section 1270. 
 
7 
In 1982, the voters were presented with a ballot measure proposing an 
amendment of article I, section 12 to allow courts to deny release on bail in the 
interest of public safety.  (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June. 8, 1982), Prop. 4, pp. 
16-17.)  The Attorney General’s official summary described the measure as adding 
provisions to the Constitution “prohibiting release of persons on bail when [a] 
court makes specified findings.”  (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982), 
Prop. 4, Official Title and Summary prepared by Atty. General, p. 16.)  It 
explained, “Release on felony offenses is prohibited where: (1) Acts of violence 
on another person are involved and court finds substantial likelihood the person’s 
release would result in great bodily harm to others.  (2) The person has threatened 
another with great bodily harm and court finds substantial likelihood the person 
would carry out the threat.”  (Ibid.)  Similarly, the Legislative Analyst explained 
the proposal “would broaden the circumstances under which the courts may deny 
bail,” specifically, in felony cases under the above two sets of circumstances.  
(Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982), analysis of Prop. 4 by Legis. Analyst, 
p. 16.)  
Supporters of Proposition 4 touted the measure as a “significant 
breakthrough on behalf of public safety,” allowing “judges to deny release on bail 
to a defendant who is accused of committing any felony, be it violent or 
nonviolent, in clear cases where the court finds based on clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant has threatened another with great bodily harm and that 
there is a substantial likelihood that the person would carry out the threat if 
released.”  (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982), Prop. 4, argument in favor 
of Prop. 4, p. 18.)  After explaining to the electorate that “[p]resent law does not 
allow judges in making bail decisions to consider public safety,” Proposition 4 
supporters stressed the measure would “provide the judges with a necessary legal 
tool to protect the public from repeat violent offenders.”  (Ibid.)   
 
8 
Significantly, Proposition 4 retained article I, section 12’s provision 
regarding discretionary OR release originally enacted by the voters in 1974.  
(Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982), text of Prop. 4, p. 17.)  In passing 
Proposition 4 on June 8, 1982, why would the voters approve of placing express 
public safety limitations on the constitutional bail provision but not the OR release 
provision?7  Because the prior constitutional bail provision gave a defendant an 
absolute right to bail in noncapital cases and gave no discretion to the court to 
deny bail, even where public safety was at stake.  In contrast, the constitutional 
OR provision already recognized the court’s discretion to deny OR release, 
whether or not based on public safety considerations.  In short, there was no 
comparable need to place limitations on the granting of OR release. 
From the history of article I, section 12, I infer the following: (1) although 
pretrial bail continues to be a matter of right, the voters considered public safety a 
paramount factor in determining whether that right even exists and (2) the voters 
also wanted judges, in granting OR release as a discretionary alternative to bail, to 
consider the same public safety interests.  (See York, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1143-
1144 & fn. 7 [article I, section 12’s OR provision incorporates public safety 
concerns of bail provision].)  To state these principles another way: “Any person 
who has been arrested for, or charged with, an offense other than a capital offense 
may be released on his or her own recognizance by a court or magistrate who 
could release a defendant from custody upon the defendant giving bail . . . .”  
(§ 1270, italics added.)   
                                              
7  
In 1994, the voters passed Proposition 189 which amended article I, section 
12 by inserting “ ‘or felony sexual assault offenses on another person.’ ”  
(Historical Notes, 1A West’s Ann. Const. (2002 ed.) foll. art. I, § 12, p. 89.) 
 
9 
Here, in denying defendant OR release, the magistrate noted that “the file is 
replete with incidents that obviously cause great concern.”  Those “incidents” 
included serious allegations: that defendant had dangled his two-year-old daughter 
over the balcony railing of his second-story apartment; that he had hit his wife in 
the face with his fist; that he had threatened to cut a neighbor’s throat; and that he 
had choked and decapitated the family cat.  Moreover, defendant was charged with 
serious felonies and there had been some question about his mental competence.  
The magistrate exercised his discretion by denying OR release for public safety 
reasons.   
The majority does not dispute that the magistrate exercised his discretion 
reasonably.  Rather, it finds that he had no discretion to deny OR release because 
none of section 859b’s exceptions existed.  How does the majority arrive at that 
finding despite the conflict between section 859b and article I, section 12?  
Without any citation to authority, it asserts that article I, section 12 simply does 
not apply to OR release when used as a lesser remedy in place of dismissal “when 
the prosecution for good cause obtains a continuance of the preliminary 
examination beyond the statutorily prescribed 10-day period.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 24; id. at p. 28.)  It reasons: “[A]rticle I, section 12 never has been interpreted to 
preclude the Legislature from prescribing dismissal of a proceeding — with the 
resultant release of the defendant without condition — when the prosecution is 
unable to proceed with the preliminary examination within 10 days.  For similar 
reasons, article I, section 12 does not preclude the Legislature from adopting a 
lesser remedy or sanction when a defendant is not afforded a preliminary 
examination within the time specified by statute but the prosecution has 
established good cause for a continuance.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24; id. at p. 28.) 
This argument is a “red herring,” i.e., an attempt to divert attention from the 
real question.  (Oxford English Dictionary,  [as of 
 
10 
June 5, 2006].)  Article I, section 12 never has been interpreted to preclude the 
Legislature from prescribing dismissal of a proceeding, because that constitutional 
provision has nothing to do with court dismissals.  Even if the Legislature can 
require the greater sanction of dismissal, it does not necessarily follow that it can 
adopt any remedy or sanction short of dismissal without regard to conflicting 
constitutional provisions.   
Article I, section 12 addresses bail and OR releases at the pretrial stage 
without any specified exceptions relating to particular stages of the pretrial 
proceedings.  (York, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 1139-1140.)  In order to construe the 
OR provision as the majority does, it would be necessary to insert additional 
language to that provision to the effect that: “A person may be released on his or 
her own recognizance in the court’s discretion, except: absent certain limited 
circumstances, a person must be released on his or her own recognizance without 
regard to public safety where there is a delay in prosecution even for good cause.”  
“To insert [such] words into this section of the Constitution would give to it an 
added meaning not to be found in the definite language of the section as adopted 
by the people.  ‘Courts are no more at liberty to add provisions to what is declared 
[in the Constitution] in definite language, than they are to disregard existing 
express provisions [of the Constitution].’  [Citations.]”  (Ross v. City of Long 
Beach (1944) 24 Cal.2d 258, 260.) 
There is another reason why the majority’s assertion of the inapplicability 
of article I, section 12 should be rejected.  Section 1318 codifies the court’s 
authority to place reasonable conditions on a criminal defendant who is released 
on OR.  (York, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1144.)  Article I, section 12 is the source of 
that authority, as well as the authority to grant or deny OR release.  (York, at p. 
1143, fn. 7.)  Significantly, section 859b expressly incorporates section 1318.  
Thus, it would be anomalous to conclude that article I, section 12 applies to a 
 
11 
section 859b situation regarding the imposition of OR conditions, but does not 
apply regarding the discretionary authority to deny OR release.   
The majority further argues that, “[e]ven in those situations to which article 
I, section 12’s OR provision is directed, namely, when a defendant is placed on 
OR as an alternative to being released on bail, article I, section 12 cannot properly 
be interpreted to mean that a court invariably retains discretion to release a 
defendant on OR and to preclude the Legislature from, for example, establishing 
specific crimes for which OR release is not permitted.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 25, 
second italics added.)  Again, the majority presents a red herring by proffering 
hypotheticals that do not apply here.  Section 859b does not establish specific 
crimes for which OR release is not permitted.  Rather, it abolishes any exercise of 
discretion by forbidding a court or magistrate from denying OR release in the 
interest of public safety, the very same interests that the voters were concerned 
with in enacting Proposition 4.  Thus, the majority’s decision today means that, 
absent the limited exceptions in section 859b, courts must grant OR release to a 
noncapital defendant who is charged with violent or serious felonies, has failed to 
appear in court in the past, has threatened others with violence, and has committed 
past acts of violence.   
The majority invokes general separation of powers principles as support for 
its claim that the Legislature may reasonably limit a court’s discretion with respect 
to its inherent powers.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 25-27.)  However, here, we have a 
specific constitutional provision granting express discretionary authority to the 
courts.  Nevertheless, I do not dispute that the Legislature has the authority to 
implement the standards and procedures set forth in article I, section 12 by 
establishing reasonable guidelines and restrictions under which courts will 
exercise their discretion.  In other words, the Legislature can reasonably define 
 
12 
what factors contribute to an abuse of discretion and forbid the unreasonable 
exercise of discretion.   
But I believe that, unlike section 859b, sections 1319, 1270, and 1270.1 
merely codify the very same public safety interests that are contained in article I, 
section 12 and designate those interests and other factors (including flight risk and 
the defendant’s failure to appear in the past) that a court should consider in its 
reasonable exercise of discretion.  Thus, sections 1319, 1270, and 1270.1 are 
consistent with article I, section 12.  In contrast, section 859b (in taking away all 
court discretion absent exceptional circumstances) “materially impairs” the trial 
court’s exercise of its express constitutional power.  (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 
35 Cal.4th 1094, 1103; see also maj. opn., ante, at p. 36 [“[t]he statute requires the 
court to release the defendant on OR when the prosecution establishes good cause 
for a continuance, and now that we have clarified that the statute imposes a 
mandatory duty upon courts to release defendants on OR in the absence of a 
showing that any of the exceptions to section 859b apply, we do not anticipate that 
courts nonetheless will defy our holding and refuse to release defendants”].) 
A defendant who is unable to post reasonable bail has no constitutional 
right to be free from confinement on OR before trial.  (York, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 
1149.)  Nevertheless, a defendant’s statutory right to a timely preliminary hearing 
and the seriousness of keeping a defendant in custody before a determination of 
probable cause are important considerations.  However, courts should have the 
discretion to make OR decisions on a case-by-case basis, weighing and balancing 
those considerations and the hardship on the defendant with other factors such as 
the length of the continuance and custody before the preliminary hearing, the 
potential danger to other persons if the defendant is released, the seriousness of the 
charged offense, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probability 
that the defendant will appear for subsequent court proceedings if released.  If 
 
13 
courts have the broad discretion to weigh considerations relating to the public 
safety in imposing OR conditions (York, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 1144-1145), so too 
should it have that same broad discretion in determining OR release.   
I therefore conclude that section 859b on its face conflicts with article I, 
section 12 because: (1) it establishes pretrial OR release as a matter of right absent 
exceptional circumstances, most of which are unrelated to public safety and (2) it 
removes a court’s discretion in considering public safety as a relevant factor in 
deciding OR release.  Consequently, I urge the Legislature to amend section 859b 
in a manner that is consistent with the state constitution.   
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Standish 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 123 Cal.App.4th 799 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S129755 
Date Filed: June 5, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Thomas R. White 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Steve Cooley, District Attorney, Lael Rubin, Head Deputy District Attorney, Brent D. Riggs, Patrick D. 
Moran and Shirley S. N. Sun, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Michael P. Judge, Public Defender, Robert M. Wilder and John Hamilton Scott, Deputy Public Defenders, 
for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Shirley S. N. Sun 
Deputy District Attorney 
320 West Temple, Suite 540 
Los Angeles, CA  90012-3213 
(213) 974-5921 
 
John Hamilton Scott 
Deputy Public Defender 
320 West Temple Street, Suite 590 
Los Angeles, CA  90012 
(213) 974-3050