Case Title: Libby Placer Mining v Noranda Mine

Citation: 2008 MT 367

Docket Number: 615ac158-3805-4d6e-a012-4771791d5563

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 2008-11-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED
November 7 2008

DA 07-0166
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 367

 

LIBBY PLACER MINING CO.,

Plaintiff and Appellant, F IL E D

NORANDA MINERALS CORP,, a Delaware corporation; NOV 07 zoog
and NORMIN CORP, a Delaware corporation, Et Smith
cuencor merit
Defendants and Appellees Sata Ways cour

 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lincola, Cause No. DV 06-31
Honorable Michael C. Prezeau, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appeltant:
Amy N. Guth, Attomey at Law, Libby, Montana
For Appellees:

J. Richard Orizotti, John P. Davis; Poore, Roth & Robinson,
Butte,

 

 

Submitted on Briefs: March 12, 2008
Decided: November 7, 2008

Filed:

Terk
District Court Judge Jeflrey H. Langton delivered the Opinion of the Court.

1 Appellant Libby Placer Mining Company (

 

{bby Placer”) appeals from an order
of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, denying Libby Placer's motion
for summary judgment on its complaint seeking declaratory judgment that Libby Placer
‘has reacquired a condemned mineral interest by operation of law; and granting a motion

for summary judgment filed by Noranda Minerals Corporation (“Noranda”) to quiet ttle

 

to the property at issue in favor of Norands. We affirm,

{2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:

{3 Did the District Court err (1) in determining that Libby Placer has no reversionary
interest in a previously condemned mineral interest, and (2) in quieting ttle to Noranda?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 

{4 On June 29, 1933, several individuals acquired a United States Patent by Warranty
Deed issued by the Department of Interior, General Land Office, for the mining claims
subject to this litigation, These claims were designated as U.S, Mineral Survey No.
10377 and were commonly known as the Comet, Hogum, and Deadwood placer mining
claims.

{5 In 1951, Paul K, Hennessy and Margaret H. Craik, successors-in-interest to the

 

patented mining claim, obtained a decree quieting title to the property designated within
U.S. Mineral Survey No. 10377 and declaring them to be “the owners against all the

world.”
16 Hennessy and Craik thereafter transferred the real property designated within U.S.
Mineral Survey No, 10377 to J. Heils Lumber Company “and to its successors heirs and
assigns forever,” excepting and reserving from the grant “all minerals and ores of
whatsoever nature lying within said lands, including coal, iron, gas and oil.” The
conveyance severed the mineral interest ofthe real property from the surface interest.

{7 Subsequently, Libby Placer acquired 75% of the mineral interest in the property
through deeds from various heirs, devisees, and assigns of Hennessy and Craik. Noranda
‘acquired 25% of the mineral interest through deed from an heir of Craik,

{8 On June 19, 1989, Champion Intemational Corporation (a successor-in-interest to
J. Heils Lumber Company) and Noranda executed an agreement by which Noranda was
granted an option to purchase the real property at issue, less the mineral interest which
previously had been severed from the surface estate,

{9 On September 13, 1989, Noranda filed condemnation action against Libby

 

Placer and other interested persons seeking acquisition by condemnation of all interests,
other than those Noranda presently owned or in which it held an option to acquire in “a
parcel of land comprising portions of the DEADWOOD PLACER and HOGUM.
PLACER of Mineral Survey No. 10377,” consisting of approximately 234 acres, pursuant
to § 70-30-102(5), MCA (1989), for mine tailings impoundments and related facilites.

{10 In its complaint, Noranda alleged it had the right through eminent domain to
‘acquire the interests in fee simple; stated it sought to take and condemn the outstanding

interests in fee simple; and in its prayer, sought an “order and judgment condemning said

real property, vesting in Noranda fee simple absolute title to said property.”
{11 Libby Placer was the only named defendant to defend against Noranda's
condemnation claim, All other defendants either disclaimed any interest or failed to
appear, answer, or otherwise defend and were defaulted.

412 On March 22, 1991, pursuant to a stipulation between Libby Placer and Noranda,
the District Court entered a Final Judgment of Condemnation “for all relief sought in
Noranda's complaint, including condemnation of all of defendants’ right, title and
interest in the property particularly described as ...[a] parcel of land comprising portions
of the DEADWOOD PLACER and HOGUM PLACER of Mineral Survey No. 10377."
‘The amount of $20,000 was assessed against Noranda in favor of Libby Placer as “full
just compensation.”

13. On September 1, 1993, Champion Intemational Corporation transferred “[a]ll that
land enclosed within the boundaries of U.S. Mineral Survey No, 10377, including the
Comet, Hogum and Deadwood Placer Mining Claims,” excepting the minerals and ores,
to Noranda by warranty deed, subject toa reservation of the timber on the property. This
transfer vested Noranda with all surface and mineral rights except for the timber
reservation,

{14 On April 29, 1996, Libby Placer filed a “Notice of Reversionary Interest” withthe
Lincoln County Clerk and Recorder conceming a “parcel of land comprising a portion of

the DEADWOOD PLACER and the HOGUM PLACER of Mineral Survey No. 10377.”

 

In its filing, Libby Placer gave notice that whereas Noranda's title to the mineral interest
awarded pursuant to the March 22, 1991 Final Judgment of Condemnation was “an

interest other than a fee simple interest,” Libby Placer was registering its intent to
exercise its reversionary rights (1) in the event Noranda abandons the condemned
interest, or 2) in the event thatthe purpose for which the property interests were acquired
by right of eminent domain is terminated, in accordance with §§ 70-30-321(3) and
-322(3), MCA.
IS On August 19, 2002, Noranda issued a news release in Toronto, Ontario, Canada,
announcing that it had decided to abandon the Montanore' copper-silver project in
Montana and had accordingly notified federal and state regulatory agencies. According
to the news release, the Montanore project was # proposed underground copper-silver
‘mine located near Libby that was initited in 1989 and suspended in 1991 due to the
‘economic unfeasibility ofits development as a result of depressed metal prices expected
to continue into the foreseeable Future

-PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND,
{16 On February 28, 2006, Libby Placer filed suit against Noranda seeking a
declaratory judgment thatthe fractional mineral intrest that Noranda acquired from it in
1991 through eminent domain had reverted to Libby Placer by operation of § 70-30-
321(3), MCA, as a result of Noranda’s abandonment of the mining operations.
$17 Noranda answered with @ general denial and counterclaimed to quit title to both
the surface and the mineral interests of the real property as against Libby Placer and all
persons claiming under Libby Placer. Additionally, Noranda denied it has abandoned the
ining projector that the issue of abandonment was material to the issue before the

court

 

" Noranda is now known as Montanore Minerals Corporation.
418 The partis filed eross-motions for summary judgment.
419 Libby Placer argued that one cannot own a fee simple interest in a mineral interest
separated from the surface estate, and, alternatively, if'a mineral interest can be legally
classified as fee simple estate, a fractional interest in the minerals eannot. Libby Placer
therefore asserted the District Court could not have condemned a fee simple interest in
1991 without condemning the surface interest, which the court did not do. Libby Placer
pointed out, in fat, that Champion International Corporation, the owner of the surface
estate atthe time of condemnation, was nota party to the condemnation litigation

20 Libby Placer further argued thatthe 1991 Final Judgment of Condemnation failed
to award a fee simple interest to Noranda because under the plain language of the
judgment, Noranda was granted “all relief sought in Noranda’s complaint, including
condemnation of all of defendant's right, title and interest in the (property),” without
specifying that such relief constituted a fee simple interest

{21 Finally, Libby Placer argued that if its fractional mineral interest was not
contemplated by § 70-30-321(3), MCA, then no condemned mineral rights would ever
revert to the original owner and subsection (3) would have been enacted without
purpose.”

Sponsors of Senate Bill No. 170, enacted in 1983 to amend §§ 70-30-321 and -322,
MCA, by adding the subsection (3) language to each section, appear to have been
primarily motivated to address disposition of condemned right of way casements
abandoned by railroads, utilities and public bodies. Sen. State Admin, An Act
Eliminating the Right of First Refusal of the Former Owner of a Real Property Interest
‘Acquired for a Public Use and Later Abandoned: Virg. on Sen. 170, 1983 Reg, Sess.

(an. 25, 1983) (Ex. 2: Brief in Support of Repealer SB 170). The Legislative history
Contains no reference to abandoned mining properties.

 

6
22 Noranda countered 1

 

in its eminent domain proceeding, it acquited ti

 

to
Libby Placer's mineral interests in fee simple, and therefore §§ 70-30-321(3) and -322(3),
MCA, which provide for reversionary interests under limited circumstances for interests
other than fee simple, do not apply. Noranda further noted that Libby Placer entered into
4 joint motion for entry of full and final judgment in Noranda’s favor and against Libby
Placer for the payment to Libby Placer of $20,000 and, thus, argued that Libby Placer's
<laim that its condemned interest was nota fee simple interest is barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.
{23 After a hearing on the issue of whether Noranda had acquired a fee simple interest
in Libby Placer’s mineral interest, which would thereby render moot the issue of
abandonment on which Libby Placer’s claim rests, the District Court ruled in favor of
Noranda. The District Court initially determined that in exchange for payment of
$20,000 to Libby Placer, Noranda received everything Libby Placer had owned. The
District Court further determined:

‘What is important in the context of this motion is not what interest Libby

Placer conveyed to Noranda, but what interest Noranda acquired in the

property from whatever source. Even if Libby Placer’s 75% ownership of

the mineral estate were not legally classified as a fee simple interest (and

oranda makes a convincing argument that it is properly classified as

such), when that 75% interest was consolidated with Noranda’s 25%

interest, and the mineral estate was later consolidated with Champion

International’s 100% interest in the surface estate, by 1993, there is no part

of the fee that Noranda had not acquired and did not own.
{24 Concluding that “[ilt is not necessary for the Court to determine whether there can
be separate fee simple ownerships of the mineral estate and the surface estate, as by 1993,

Noranda owned 100% of both estates[,]” the District Court held that because Noranda
 

owned 100% of both estates in fee simple prior to Libby Placer’s filing ofits Notice of
Reversionary Interest, Libby Placer had no reversionary interest in the property
regardless of whether Noranda abandoned the mining project.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
$25 We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
standard from M. R. Civ. B. 56. Balirusch v. Balerusch, 2006 MT $1, 411, 331 Mont
281, 411, 130 P.3d 1267, $ 11 (citation omitted). The moving party must establish the
absence of any genuine issues of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of
law.
{26 We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether they are
correct. Baltrusch, § 11. We will affirm a correct result, even if the district court reached
the correct result for the wrong reason, Montana Earth Resources Ltd. Partnership v.
North Blaine Estates, Inc, 1998 MT 254, § 29, 291 Mont. 216, § 29, 967 P.2d 376, § 29
(iting Bowen v, MeDonald, 276 Mont. 193, 200, 915 P-2d 201, 206 (1996)).
DISCUSSION
{27 Did the District Court err (1) in determining that Libby Placer has no reversionary
right to a previously condemned mineral interest taken by Noranda, and (2) in quieting
title to Noranda?
1. WHICH INTEREST IS CONTEMPLATED UNDER § 70-30-321(3), MCA?
$28 Libby Placer argues the District Court erred in construing the language of § 70-30-

321(3), MCA, to address the interest Noranda had acquired

 

of 1993 rather than Libby

Placer's interest at the time of condemnation in 1991. Libby Placer asserts the plain
language of the statute refers to the condemnee’s interest, not the after-acquired interest
of the condemnor.
{29 The statutory procedure governing eminent domain is codified at Title 70, chapter
30, Section 70-30-321(3), MCA, provides:
When an interest, other than a fee simple interest, in property that has been
‘acquired for a public purpose by right of eminent domain, or otherwise,
abandoned or when the purpose for which it was acquired is terminated, the

property reverts to the original owner or the original owner's successor in
interest.

 

(Emphasis added.)

730 In construing a statute, a court “is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms
or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has
been inserted.” Section 1-2-101, MCA.

{31 The “interest in property” contemplated in § 70-30-321(3), MCA, that reverts to
the original owner or the original owner's successor in interest is the interest in property
“that has been acquired by right of eminent domain.” The interest that has been acquired
by right of eminent domain is the interest that was held by the condemnee prior to
condemnation, The interest relevant to this dispute is the fractional mineral interest
Libby Placer held that Noranda acquired by condemnation on March 22, 1991, by entry
of the Final Judgment of Condemnation.

$82. The District Court, erroneously focusing on the interest Noranda held as of 1993,
saw no need to determine whether one may own a fee simple interest in a fractional
‘mineral interest. Because the correct focus is on the interest Libby Placer held prior to

condemnation, the legal nature of that interest must be determined. If Libby Placer's
interest was other than a fee simple interest, then § 70-30-321(3), MCA, governs and the
interest reverts to Libby Placer upon Noranda’s abandonment. If Noranda acquired a fee
simple interest from Libby Placer in 1991, then there is no possible reversion, regardless
‘of whether the mining venture was abandoned or not

Il, DID LIBBY PLACER HAVE A FEE SIMPLE ESTATE IN ITS FRACTIONAL
MINERAL INTEREST?

$83 Libby Placer argues that its fractional mineral interes

 

the property was nota fee
simple interest and, therefore, Noranda could not have acquired a fee simple interest from
it as a result of the condemnation proceeding. Because Noranda acquired an interest
other than a fee simple interest, Libby Placer asserts its condemned interest reverted to it
‘upon Noranda’s abandonment of the project by operation of law.

{34 Noranda argues that int its condemnation proceeding, it acquired Libby Placer’s
75% mineral interest in fee simple, which, together with Noranda’s 25% mineral interest

in fee simple, gave Noranda 100% of the mineral interest in fee simple as a matter of law.

 

Because the reversion provision codified at § 70-30-321(3), MCA, applies to interests

 

other than fee simple interests, Noranda argues that the District Court properly granted
Noranda’s motions for summary judgment on Libby Placer's claim for a declaratory

judgment and on Noranda’s counterclaim for quiet tite, and properly denied Libby

 

Placer’s cross-motion for summary judgment on its cla

Ac

 

wracteristics of Real Property Interests
{5 _ Property interests inland have atleast four major characteristics: (1) duration, (2)

right to possession, (3) degree of beneficial enjoyment conferred on the owner, and (4)
type of ownership. Richard R, Powell, Powell on Real Property vol. 1, § 11.01 (

 

el
Allan Wolf ed., Lexis 2007). ‘The duration of a real property interest is denoted by
“estate” and (1) may be infinite or perpetual, as in fee simple; (2) may last for a specified
period, such as life or a term of years; or (3) may end at any time, as in sufferance
Powell, Powell on Real Property vol. 1 at § 11.01. A right to possession may take the
form of a present right to possession, @ future right to possession, or no right to
possession at all, such as with an easement or franchise. Powell, Powell on Real
Property vol. 1 at § 11.01. The Benefit conferred by an interest to its owner may be an
unadulterated benefit, or only a partial or conditional benefit, as in a security interest.
Powell, Powell on Real Property vol. 1 at § 11.01. Finally, ownership of a real property
interest may be by a single person or entity, or by two or more persons or entities in
‘concurrent ownership. Powell, Powell on Real Property vol. 1, § 11.01.
B, Fee Simple Estate

{86 An “estate” is “an interest in land which (a) is or may become possessory; and (b)
is ownership measured in terms of duration.” Restatement (First) of Property, § 9.

lude fee simple and life estates, are

 

Freehold estates, which under the common law
‘states of indeterminate duration and are generally characterized by ownership. 28 Am.
Jur. 2d Estates §§ 11, 146 (2000). Nonfieehold estates, which include term, periodic
tenancy, tenancy at will, and tenancy at sufferance, are estates of less than freehold and
are generally characterized by possession through lease. 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estates §§ 11,
146. Permissible freehold and nonfrechold estates in Montana real property are codified

at § 70-15-202, MCA.
437 The words “fee simple” indicate “an absolute title or estate in lands wholly

 

unqualified by any reversion, reservation, condition or limitation, or possibility of any
such thing present or future, or precedent or subsequent." Thompson on Real Property
vol. 2, § 17.02, 612 (David A. Thomas ed., Matthew Bender 2000), The freehold estate
of fee simple absolute isthe highest form of ownership that can be held in real property.
Thompson on Real Property vol. 2, § 17.01 at $99. Itis “the estate that never ends but
continues into infinity.” Thompson on Real Property vol. 2, § 17.01 at $99. “{I]t has no
restrictions on its use or enjoyment except those imposed by public policy for the
common good.” Thompson on Real Property vol.2, § 17.01 at $99. “{A] fee-simple ttle

is ‘a freehold estate of inheritance absolute and unqualified. It stands at the head of

estates as highest in dignit

 

‘and the most ample in extent; since every other kind of estate
is derivable thereout, and mergeable therein.”” Gantt v. Harper, 82 Mont. 393, 404, 267
P. 296, 298 (1928) (citation omitted).
C. Division of Real Property Interests

$88 Real property interests are generally subject to division. Robert G. Natelson,
‘Modern Law of Deeds to Real Property, § 2.3.1, 16-17 (Little, Brown and Company
1992), An interest may be divided temporally into present and future estates. Natelson,
hereinafter Modern Law of Deeds, § 23.1 at 16. An interest may be divided vertically,
by spliting land into smaller tracts, each conveyed to a different grantee; or horizontally,
by dividing the air space into blocks as contemplated in condominiums or severing
surface interests from the mineral interests below. Natelson, Modern Law of Deeds, §

23.1 at 16. Finally, an interest may be divided as to ownership, i.e. an interest may be

R
held by one person or entity, or by two or more as tenants in common of joint tenants.
Natelson, Modern Law of Deeds, § 2.3.1 at 16-17, § 2.7 at 30-31; Powell, Powell on Real
Property vol. 1 at § 11.01.
$39 fee simple estate may be had in minerals beneath the surface of the ground
separate and apart from the surface, Thompson on Real Property vol. 2, § 17.02 at 613,
Since minerals are severable portions of the land, they are proper subjects,
Of an exception of reservation in grants or conveyances, A grantee of the
land other than the minerals or with the minerals reserved or excepted from
the grant gets ttle to all the surface, and the grantor has a fee simple in the
‘minerals retained,
S3A Am. Jur. 2d Mines and Minerals § 181 (2006). See also 58 CJS. Mines and
Minerals § 166 (1998). (Emphasis added.)
‘After the mineral is conveyed apart from the land, or vice versa, two
separate estates exist, each of which is distinct from the other . .. The

surface and the mineral rights are held by separate and distinct titles in
severalty, and each is separate from, and independent of, the other.

 

‘The owner of each estate has the right to exercise with respect thereto all,
the incidents of ownership in the same manner as over other property he ot
she may possess, subject only to such rights or servitudes as exist in favor
ofthe other owner. ‘The owners are free separately to convey their interest,
‘The estate in the minerals may be conveyed by deed in the same manner as
other real estate is conveyed; may be devised by will, may pass by
inheritance, and, unless the grant otherwise provides, the mineral estate
may be leased, and ... is subject to taxation.

58 .CJS. Mines and Minerals § 164.

When, by appropriate conveyance, the mineral estate in lands is severed
from the surface, separate and distinct estates are thereby created which are
held by separate and distinct titles, and each is a freehold estate of
inheritance subject to the laws of descent, devise, and conveyance ....

 

‘A grantee of the minerals underlying the land becomes the owner of them;
his or her interest is not a mere mining privilege. The minerals thus

3B
severed become a separate corporeal hereditament. Their ownership is
attended with all the attributes and incidents peculiar to ownership of land,
‘and they may be embraced in the terms “land” or “real property” in a
subsequent conveyance. Mineral interests are treated as real property
interests, and are subject to the rules related to real property. The duration
of a mineral interest is like that of common law estates, namely, in fee
simple, in fee simple determinable, for life, or for a fixed term of years.
“Mineral interests” are interests in real estate which are vested immediately
when created and which remain vested for whatever term is stipulated.

53A Am. Jur. 2d Mines and Minerals § 159. (Emphasis added.)
{40 “Where a deed reserves @ fraction of the minerals conveyed, the deed effectively
reserves a fee-simple fraction of the mineral estate under the entire tract.” 53A Am. Jur.

2d Mines and Minerals § 178.

 

D. Montana Law Regarding Divisions of Real Property Interests

{41 A property owner has the right “to carve out of his property as many estates or
interests (perpendicular or horizontal, perpetual or limited) as it may be able to sustain.”
R.M, Cobban Realty Co, v. Donlan, 51 Mont. 58, 66, 149 P. 484, 487 (1915) (citations
omitted),

$42 We have long recognized that ttle to mineral interests in land may be segregated
in whole or in part from the rest of the fee simple title. See Carbon County v. Union
Reserve Coal Co., 271 Mont. 459, 473, 898 P.2d 680, 688 (1995); Wyrick v. Hoefle, 136
Mont, 172, 175, 346 P.2d 563, 565 (1959); Stokes v. Tutvet, 134 Mont, 250, 256, 328

P.2d 1096, 1099 (1958); Voyta v. Clonts, 134 Mont. 156, 162, 328 P.2d 655, 659 (1958);

 

and Rist v, Toole County, 117 Mont. 426, 432, 159 P.2d 340, 342 (1945) (citing Krutzfeld
v, Stevenson, 86 Mont. 463, 284 P. $53 (1930); Broderick v. Stevenson Consolidated Oil

Co., 88 Mont. 34, 290 P. 244 (1930); Hodgkiss v. Northland Petroleum Consolidated,

“4
104 Mont, 328, $7 P.2d 811 (1937)). A division of the mineral interest from the surface
interes is a horizontal division,
{43 We have also recognized that mineral interests, like surface interests, may be
\ivided vertically into fractional interests. The Rist Court cited Broderick, Krutsfeld, and
Marias River Syndicate v. Big West Oil Co., 98 Mont, 254, 38 P.2d $99 (1934), as
examples in which mineral deeds expressly conveyed fractional interests in minerals.
Rist, 117 Mont. at 437-38, 159 P-2d at 345. “The extent of the interest conveyed,
reserved, or excepted by a grant, reservation, or exception of a fractional interest in
minerals or mineral rights depends on the particular terms of the instrument.” 58 C.1S.
‘Mines and Minerals § 178.

E. Analysis
44 The deed chain for the real property at issue is part ofthe record. The language of
the 1951 deed whereby Hennessy and Craik transferred the real property designated
within U.S, Mineral Survey No. 10377 to J. Heils Lumber Company, excepting and
reserving the mineral interest, contains no limitations or restrictions on the reserved
‘mineral interest. A fee simple ttle is presumed to be intended by every grant of real
property from which it does not appear that a lesser estate was intended. R. M. Cobban,
51 Mont. at 66, 149 P. at 486-87.
{45 The mineral reservation was subsequently acquired by various heirs, devisees, and

assigns of Hennessy and Craik, many of whom quit claimed their fractional interests to

 

Libby Placer. Ultimately, Libby Placer acquired 75% of the mineral interest, and

Noranda acquired the remaining 25%.
{46 The fact that Libby Places interest was a fractional interest has no bearing on the
‘quality of its estate. Prior to condemnation, Libby Placer had complete ownership and
control of its 75% fractional mineral interest. Libby Placer had the freedom to own it
forever, develop it, divide it, lease it, or sell it. Its interest was independent of any other
interest. We conclude Libby Placer held its 75% fractional mineral interest in fee simple.
$47 Contrary to Libby Placer’s argument that fee simple refers to particular quantity
(ice, the whole) of real property, fee simple describes the infinite or perpetual duration of
the ownership of the interest, be it an interest in-the whole, the surface, a fraction of the
surface, the minerals, or a fraction of the minerals. Just as children who inherit or are
devised a common parent's home would each receive concurrent fractional interests in
fee simple, Libby Placer and Noranda each held concurrent fractional interests in the
‘mineral estate in fee simple as tenants in common, prior to condemnation. Marias River,
98 Mont. at 265, 38 P.2d at 602. Libby Placer’s and Noranda’s interests were each
absolute and unqualified, the highest form of ownership that can be held in real property.
{48 _ In the Final Judgment of Condemnation, Noranda was granted “all relief sought in
Noranda's complaint, including condemnation of all of [Libby Placer’s} right, ttle and
interest in the [property].” Because Noranda acquired all of Libby Placer's fee simple
right, ttle and interest in the condemnation action, Libby Placer retained no reversionary
interest either under the terms of the condemnation decree or by operation of law.

$49 _ Section 70-30-321(3), MCA, which provides that an interest in property acquired
for a public purpose through condemnation will revert to the original owner upon

abandonment or when the purpose for which it was acquired is terminated, specifically

16
excludes fee simple interests. Libby Placer’s fee simple interest is excluded by the plain
language of the statute.

{50 We conclude that Libby Placer’s condemned 75% mineral interest was a fee
simple interest and, accordingly, has not reverted and can never revert to Libby Placer,
pursuant to § 70-30-321(3), MCA. While the District Court erroneously concluded that
‘what was relevant under § 70-30-321(3), MCA, was the interest Noranda acquired in the
property from whatever source, rather than Libby Placer’s interest condemned by
‘Noranda, we will affirm a court’s decision even ifit reaches the right result for the wrong,

reason, Montana Earth Resources, § 29 (ci

51 _ Affirmed.

 

 

”