Case Title: In re Eckberg

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88589

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 88589-Agenda 10-January 2000.
								In re DAVID EUGENE ECKBERG, Attorney, Respondent.
Opinion filed July 6, 2000.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	The Administrator of the Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) filed a petition with the Hearing
Board, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 758 (137 Ill. 2d R. 758),
seeking a determination whether respondent, David Eugene
Eckberg, was incapacitated from continuing to practice law by
reason of a mental infirmity or a mental disorder and should be
transferred to inactive status. The Hearing Board determined that
although respondent had been incapacitated from continuing to
practice law at the time the Administrator filed the petition,
respondent was not incapacitated at the time of the hearing. The
Hearing Board nevertheless recommended that, in order to remain
on active status, respondent should abide by conditions which
required his continued medical treatment and monitoring for a
period of five years. The Review Board affirmed the findings and
recommendations of the Hearing Board. However, the Review
Board modified the conditions to reduce their scope and extent.
Respondent appeals the recommendation by the Review Board that
conditions be imposed upon his continued practice of law. This
court granted respondent's petition for leave to file exceptions. See
166 Ill. 2d R. 753(e)). For the reasons that follow, we reject the
recommendation of the Review Board, and we dismiss this action.
BACKGROUND
I. The Evidence
	 On December 20, 1996, the Administrator filed a petition,
pursuant to Rule 758, requesting that the Hearing Board determine
whether respondent was incapacitated from continuing to practice
law by reason of mental infirmity or mental disorder, and whether
he should be transferred to inactive status pending removal of the
disability. The following evidence, relevant to the issues before this
court, was presented.
	Respondent is 57 years old and was admitted to the practice
of law in 1968. Thereafter, he was an assistant State's Attorney, an
attorney for a state governmental agency, and a private
practitioner. Since 1978, respondent has worked as a sole
practitioner in Chicago, handling cases involving unemployment,
wrongful termination, domestic relations, criminal matters, and
condemnation proceedings. Also since 1978, respondent has
continuously been a member of the Chicago Bar Association in-court referral panel, where he is assigned to a courtroom on one
day of the month. Approximately 50% of respondent's case load
consists of these in-court referral cases, and, typically, these cases
are disposed of on the same day that they are assigned to
respondent. Respondent is also a participant in the Chicago Bar
Associations' lawyer referral program and receives approximately
20% of his case load, or four cases per month, from this program.
Respondent has no prior disciplinary complaints filed against him.
	In June 1996, the Administrator initiated an investigation of
respondent's capacity to practice law as a result of two letters
written by respondent to the FBI, an Illinois Supreme Court
Justice, and a United States Congressman. In the first letter, dated
June 9, 1996, respondent alleged that he was the object of a
conspiracy directed by his co-counsel in a "sham" legal malpractice
case pending in the circuit court of Cook County. Respondent
further alleged that his estranged wife and her father were also
plotting against him. According to respondent, as a result of this
conspiracy, he was "under death threat," and was being followed
on a constant basis for at least one month. Respondent's second
letter, dated June 16, 1996, contained similar conspiracy
allegations.
	Copies of respondent's two letters were sent by the Supreme
Court Justice to the ARDC, which requested that respondent
contact that office to discuss the matters contained in the letters.
Respondent appeared at the offices of the ARDC on June 28,
1996, and continued to claim that he was the object of harassment
and death threats made by his wife, her father, and other Illinois
attorneys. Respondent also expressed concern that his letters had
come into the Administrator's possession. In a subsequent letter
sent to the ARDC, respondent asserted that the ARDC
investigation was "endangering [his] personal life [and] perhaps the
lives of others." Respondent concluded this letter by asking that the
ARDC close his file.
 	On October 17, 1996, the Administrator requested that
respondent voluntarily submit to a psychiatric examination by an
impartial medical examiner. The next day, respondent appeared at
the offices of the ARDC and agreed to submit to a psychiatric
evaluation. Arrangements were made for respondent to be
evaluated by Dr. S. Dale Loomis, a board-certified psychiatrist, at
Dr. Loomis' office.
	However, respondent did not meet with Dr. Loomis as
scheduled because respondent was hospitalized in the psychiatric
unit at Rush-Presbyterian St. Luke's Hospital on October 23,
1996. Evidence at the hearing revealed that respondent had been
previously hospitalized at Lutheran General Hospital in 1989. The
records from respondent's 1989 hospitalization made reference to
prior psychiatric hospitalizations, and indicated that respondent had
a history of psychiatric disturbances over a 20-year period. At the
time of his 1989 hospitalization, respondent was diagnosed as
having a generalized anxiety disorder.
	During respondent's 1996 hospitalization, which lasted from
October 23 to November 11, he was diagnosed as having a
generalized anxiety disorder, although bipolar affective disorder
was also suspected at that time. In addition, a neuropsychological
evaluation indicated that respondent may suffer from frontal lobe
syndrome, an organic brain disease which impairs judgment and
behavior. After his release from Rush, respondent voluntarily
admitted himself to the psychiatric ward at Lutheran General
Hospital on November 11, 1996, in response to his wife's report
to the local fire department that respondent indicated that he
intended to commit suicide.
	Subsequent to respondent's release from Lutheran General
Hospital in December 1996, the Administrator filed the petition at
issue in this case. At the hearing before the Hearing Board, four
psychiatrists presented testimony. Three of these psychiatrists, Dr.
S. Dale Loomis, Dr. Stafford Henry, and Dr. Robert Galatzer-Levy, had examined respondent for the purposes of these
proceedings and testified on behalf of the Administrator. The
fourth psychiatrist, Dr. Carl Aagesen, was respondent's treating
psychiatrist and testified on respondent's behalf.
	Dr. Loomis testified that his initial contact with respondent
was during respondent's hospitalization at Lutheran General in
November 1996. According to Dr. Loomis, during this one hour
session, respondent talked very rapidly, constantly spoke of
tangential matters which made his speech difficult to follow, and
claimed that he was the target of a conspiracy in which he had been
constantly followed and his phones tapped. Dr. Loomis testified
that respondent denied any medical reason for his hospitalization,
instead asserting that he had been "railroaded" into the hospital by
his wife. On the basis of this initial examination, Dr. Loomis
concluded that respondent suffered from a bipolar disorder.
	Almost one year later, in December 1997, Dr. Loomis
conducted a second interview with respondent. Dr. Loomis
testified that during their meeting, respondent's thought processes
were "extremely scattered," respondent behaved in an expansive,
grandiose, and paranoid manner, and, after a period of time,
respondent became resentful of being questioned. Based upon this
second meeting, Dr. Loomis reaffirmed his diagnosis of bipolar
disorder. He specifically disagreed with the conclusion of
respondent's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Aagesen, that respondent
suffers from generalized anxiety disorder. Dr. Loomis testified that,
if left untreated, respondent would likely experience "repeated
cycling episodes" of mania and depression, and recommended that
respondent be treated with psychiatric management and a mood-stabilizing medication. Based upon his two sessions with
respondent, Dr. Loomis concluded that respondent was incapable
of practicing law. On cross-examination, Dr. Loomis
acknowledged that he was unaware of the types or complexity of
the cases respondent handled before, during, and after his
hospitalizations.
	The Administrator also called Dr. Stafford Henry to testify. He
evaluated respondent during a 2½-hour session in July 1997. Dr.
Henry testified that respondent was "generally agitated," jumped
"from subject to subject" in an incoherent manner, and believed
that he was the target of a far-reaching conspiracy. Dr. Henry
diagnosed respondent as having bipolar affective disorder,
accompanied by the psychotic features of paranoia and
suspiciousness. Dr. Henry opined that, at the time of the
evaluation, respondent was not competent to practice law because
respondent's thinking was characterized by disturbed and
disorganized thoughts, and was not reality-based. In addition, Dr.
Henry found that respondent lacked insight into the severity of his
illness.
	Dr. Henry further testified that, based upon the classic
symptoms of bipolar affective disorder displayed by respondent, he
disagreed with the diagnosis of Dr. Aagesen that respondent
suffers from generalized anxiety disorder. According to Dr. Henry,
respondent's treatment under Dr. Aagesen was therefore
inappropriate because respondent's bipolar disorder has not been
addressed. Because bipolar disorder is a progressive illness that
will worsen if untreated, Dr. Henry opined that respondent requires
a structured, secure environment, and medication with mood-stabilizing drugs.
	When questioned about respondent's apparent ability to
continue to handle legal matters without incident subsequent to his
hospitalizations, Dr. Henry opined that because respondent's cases
were primarily "simple matters," respondent was merely operating
"out of rote and routine." On cross-examination, however, Dr.
Henry admitted that he was unaware that respondent handled more
complex legal matters after his hospitalizations.
	The third and final psychiatrist called by the Administrator was
Dr. Robert Galatzer-Levy, who interviewed respondent on three
occasions in 1998: twice in February, and once in March, for a
total time of approximately 2½ hours. Dr. Galatzer-Levy also
examined respondent's past medical records, which showed that
respondent failed to continue treatment after he had left the
hospital, and had unilaterally decided to discontinue prescribed
medication.
	Dr. Galatzer-Levy diagnosed respondent as suffering from
schizoaffective disorder, frontal lobe syndrome, generalized anxiety
disorder, and personality disorder not otherwise specified, with
borderline features. Based upon his findings that respondent's
judgment was impaired, Dr. Galatzer-Levy concluded that, at the
time of his evaluations, respondent was incapacitated from
practicing law. However, on cross-examination, Dr. Galatzer-Levy
acknowledged that he was not aware of any instance where
respondent's psychiatric difficulties directly interfered with his
capacity to practice law.
	The final psychiatrist to testify during the proceedings was Dr.
Carl Aagesen, respondent's treating psychiatrist. Dr. Aagesen first
met respondent in July 1997, when respondent was referred to him
for evaluation of the need for continuing on the medication known
as librium. Respondent thereafter requested that Dr. Aagesen
evaluate him for psychiatric suitability to practice law. The initial
session lasted approximately two hours. Based upon this session,
as well as a review of respondent's medical history, Dr. Aagesen
made an initial diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder. However,
the doctor informed respondent that it would take several months
of observation before he could render an opinion upon whether
respondent's generalized anxiety disorder would prevent him from
practicing law.
	After meeting with respondent on a monthly basis, Dr.
Aagesen concluded in November 1997 that respondent was
capable of practicing law. Dr. Aagesen testified that, since the
beginning of his treatment of respondent, he had observed no
symptoms that would preclude respondent's practice of law, and
he noted that respondent had continued to practice law without
complaint during his treatment.
	Dr. Aagesen did recommend, however, that respondent
continue with his psychiatric treatment. On cross-examination, Dr.
Aagesen acknowledged that during his sessions with respondent,
there have been "isolated instances" when he believed that
respondent's judgment was impaired, but testified that these rare
occurrences did not cause him either to alter his diagnosis or to
change his opinion that respondent is capable of practicing law.
	Respondent testified in his own behalf. Respondent stated that
since summer 1996 he has been practicing law consistently,
handling cases in the areas of unemployment, wrongful termination,
domestic relations, traffic, and criminal law. Respondent testified
that he has sessions with Dr. Aagesen on a monthly basis, and has
attempted to follow all of the doctor's recommendations.
Respondent stated that he believes that he suffers from anxiety that
needs to be controlled by medication, and that he will abide by Dr.
Aagesen's treatment program in the future. Although respondent
admitted that, while under Dr. Aagesen's care, he took steps on his
own to discontinue taking the medication librium, respondent
explained that he believed that it was necessary to show progress
during these proceedings, and that Dr. Aagesen had intended that
respondent eventually stop taking that medication in favor of
another. In addition, respondent did not suffer any adverse reaction
from discontinuing the medication.
	In explanation of his actions in 1996, respondent testified that
he "was under tremendous stress, tirade [sic], and upheaval," and
that he will not repeat those or similar actions. Respondent stated
that he does not believe that he has been hindered in the practice of
law as a result of his mental condition, and that he has continued
to represent clients in a wide variety of legal matters.
II. The Hearing Board
	The Hearing Board issued its report and recommendation on
September 3, 1998. The Hearing Board found that the
Administrator established, by clear and convincing evidence, that
respondent suffered from a mental illness in 1996, and was
incapacitated from practicing law at that time. However, the
Hearing Board also found that, as of September 1998, the
Administrator failed to prove that respondent was incapacitated
from continuing to practice law, and accordingly recommended
that the request to place him on inactive status be denied.
	The decision of the Hearing Board was premised on several
factors. First, the Hearing Board determined that the evidence
established that respondent practiced law without complaint since
1996, and that he handled numerous cases of varying degrees of
complexity. The Hearing Board found that there was no evidence
that respondent handled these cases in less than a competent
manner, or that his mental state interfered with his representation
of his clients. Further, the Hearing Board found it significant that
respondent has remained on the Chicago Bar Association panels
for referrals, and has continued to receive in-court referrals from
circuit court judges.
	In addition, the Hearing Board determined that the evidence
established that Dr. Aagesen had treated respondent on a monthly
basis since July 1997, and that the doctor had observed no
symptoms that would demonstrate that respondent was incapable
of practicing law. The Hearing Board noted that although the three
psychiatrists presented by the Administrator opined that respondent
was not receiving appropriate treatment from Dr. Aagesen, these
opinions also ignored the fact that, under Dr. Aagesen's current
treatment, respondent has continued to engage in the practice of
law and to function without incident. The Hearing Board stated
that it was "mindful" of the conclusions of Drs. Loomis, Henry,
and Galatzer-Levy that, at the time of their evaluations, respondent
was incapacitated from practicing law due to bipolar illness, and
that these conclusions conflicted with Dr. Aagesen's diagnosis of
respondent as suffering from a generalized anxiety disorder, as well
as his conclusion that respondent is capable of practicing law. The
Hearing Board, however, determined that Dr. Aagesen, as
respondent's treating physician, was in the best position to assess
respondent's current mental state, as he had been the only
professional to see respondent on a regular basis and spend a
significant amount of time with him.
	Finally, the Hearing Board was influenced by respondent's
demeanor during the hearing. The Hearing Board found that
respondent's answers to questions were "responsive and
appropriate," that respondent "behaved in lawyerlike manner," that
respondent "was knowledgeable about his disciplinary case and
about the court cases he has litigated in the past year," and that
respondent did not exhibit any of the classic symptoms of bipolar
disorder during the hearing.
	However, although the Hearing Board found that respondent
was currently capable of practicing law in a satisfactory manner
"and that the protection of the public would not be served by
suspending his privilege to practice law at the present time," the
Hearing Board nevertheless recommended that respondent "should
be allowed to exercise this privilege only if he abides by certain
conditions calculated to protect the public." Citing to this court's
decision in In re Hessberger, 96 Ill. 2d 423 (1983), and stating that
"[t]he principles of Hessberger establish that reasonable conditions
may be imposed upon respondent to insure that he continues to
practice law only as long as he is capable of doing so and the
condition that incapacitated him does not again manifest itself," the
Hearing Board recommended that respondent be permitted to
practice law, subject to the following conditions: (1) respondent
shall continue a course of treatment with a board-certified
psychiatrist and shall meet with that psychiatrist on a regular basis,
not less frequently than once each month, and the Administrator
shall be advised in writing of any material change in the treatment
plan; (2) respondent shall execute a release authorizing his
psychiatrist to provide the Administrator with a quarterly written
report of respondent's compliance with the treatment plan, answer
the Administrator's questions regarding respondent's mental
condition, and inform the Administrator of noncompliance with
treatment or any conduct which the psychiatrist believes to be
symptomatic of a condition that will possibly incapacitate
respondent from competently practicing law; (3) respondent shall
provide a quarterly written report to the Administrator articulating
any problems which have arisen in the handing of any matters that
may relate to his mental disorder, or stating that there have been
none; and (4) respondent shall notify the Administrator in writing
within seven days of any change in the name/address of his treating
physician. The Hearing Board recommended that the above
conditions remain in effect for a period of five years from the date
this court issues its final order in this case.
III. The Review Board
	Respondent objected to, and appealed from, the imposition of
conditions on his continued practice of law. 	Before the Review
Board, respondent filed exceptions challenging the Hearing
Board's jurisdiction to recommend that his right to continue to
practice law be subject to conditions after it was determined that
the Administrator failed to establish that respondent was not
presently incapacitated from practicing law. The Administrator
sought to uphold the conditions recommended by the Hearing
Board and did not challenge the Hearing Board's conclusion that
respondent is not currently incapacitated from practicing law.
	The Review Board affirmed the Hearing Board's findings,
concurring that the evidence presented during the hearing
demonstrated that respondent had an extensive history of cyclical
mental health problems. The Review Board noted that all four
psychiatrists agreed during the hearing that respondent should
continue in psychiatric treatment in order to control his condition,
and that respondent could function well if he complied with the
treatment recommendations. All doctors also agreed that, without
treatment, respondent would experience repeated episodes in
which his ability to function would be impaired.
	The Review Board rejected respondent's contention that the
finding that he was not presently incapacitated was inconsistent
with the recommendation to impose conditions upon his continued
practice of law. The Review Board concluded that, based upon the
evidence presented during the hearing, the recommended
conditions were necessary in order to minimize the risks to the
public if there were a recurrence of respondent's mental health
problems. The Review Board concluded that Rule 758 allows the
Hearing Board to recommend that an attorney be permitted to
continue to practice law subject to reasonable conditions as
warranted by the circumstances and as approved by this court.
	The Review Board affirmed the substance of the conditions
recommended by the Hearing Board, but modified the conditions
to reduce their scope and extent. The Review Board recommended
that respondent be permitted to practice law, subject to the
following modified conditions:
			"1. Respondent shall continue in his course of treatment
with Dr. Aagesen, or such other qualified mental health professional acceptable to the Administrator, and shall
report to Dr. Aagesen or such other qualified mental
health professional on a regular basis of not less than once
per month, with the Administrator advised of any change
in attendance deemed warranted by such professional;
			2. Respondent shall comply with all treatment
recommendations of Dr. Aagesen or such other mental health professional, including the taking of medications as
prescribed;
			3. Respondent shall provide to Dr. Aagesen, or such other qualified mental health professional, an appropriate
release as required under the Confidentiality Act of the
Mental Health Code, 740 ILCS 110/1 et.seq., authorizing
the treating professional to: (1) disclose to the
Administrator on at least a quarterly basis information
pertaining to the nature of respondent's compliance with
any treatment plan established with respect to
respondent's condition; (2) promptly report to the
Administrator respondent's failure to comply with any part
of an established treatment plan; and (3) respond to any
inquiries by the Administrator regarding respondent's
mental or emotional state or compliance with any
established treatment plan;
			4. Respondent shall notify the Administrator within 14
days of any change in treatment professionals."
The Review Board agreed with the Hearing Board that these
conditions are to remain in effect for a period of five years from the
date this court issues its final order in this case.
ANALYSIS
	The principles governing our review of the reports and
recommendations of both the Hearing Board and the Review
Board are clearly established. The Administrator bears the burden
of proving the allegations contained within the petition by clear and
convincing evidence. 137 Ill. 2d R. 758(b); 166 Ill. 2d R.
753(c)(6).
	The findings of fact made by the Hearing Board are entitled to
virtually the same weight as the findings of any initial trier of fact.
In re Parker, 149 Ill. 2d 222, 233 (1992); In re Owens, 144 Ill. 2d 372, 377 (1991). Deference is to be accorded to findings of fact
made by the Hearing Board, for the Hearing Board is able to
observe the witness' demeanor, judge his credibility, and resolve
conflicting testimony. In re Spak, 188 Ill. 2d 53, 66 (1999); In re
Anglin, 122 Ill. 2d 531, 538 (1988). Therefore, this court will
generally not disturb the Board's factual findings unless they are
against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Timpone, 157 Ill. 2d 178, 196 (1993); In re Ushijima, 119 Ill. 2d 51, 56-57 (1987).
However, the recommendations of both the Hearing Board and the
Review Board resulting from their findings of fact are advisory and
not binding on this court. In re Imming, 131 Ill. 2d 239, 251
(1989); In re Karzov, 126 Ill. 2d 33, 40 (1988); Anglin, 122 Ill. 2d 
at 538.
	Before this court, neither party challenges the factual findings
of the Hearing Board or the Review Board. Significantly, neither
the ARDC nor respondent challenge the finding of both the
Hearing Board and the Review Board that respondent was not
mentally incapacitated from practicing law. At issue in this case is
whether, despite the factual finding of the Boards that respondent
is not incapacitated from practicing law, the imposition of
conditions upon respondent's continued practice of law is
warranted by the circumstances. Respondent contends that the
factual finding that the Administrator failed to meet her burden of
proof to show his incapacity to practice law should have resulted
in the dismissal of the Administrator's Rule 758 petition.
Therefore, respondent asserts, the Hearing and Review Boards
improperly recommended conditions upon respondent's practice of
law which were neither requested by the Administrator in the
petition, nor argued by the parties during the hearing. During oral
argument before this court, counsel for respondent raised the
additional contention that the Hearing Board's sua sponte
formulation and recommendation of these conditions upon
respondent's continued law practice violated respondent's right to
due process, as he was denied notice and an opportunity to be
heard on the imposition of conditions.
	The resolution of this matter is dependent upon Supreme
Court Rule 758, which provides, in pertinent part:
			"(a) Petition. If the inquiry Board has reason to believe
that an attorney admitted to practice in this State is
incapacitated from continuing to practice law by reason of
mental infirmity [or] mental disorder *** the
Administrator shall file a petition with the Hearing Board
requesting a hearing to determine whether the attorney is
incapacitated and should be transferred to inactive status
pending the removal of the disability, or be permitted to
continue to practice law subject to conditions imposed by
the court.
			***
			(c) Transfer to Inactive Status. If the court determines
that the attorney is incapacitated from continuing to
practice law, the court shall enter an order transferring the
attorney to inactive status until further order of the court.
The court may impose reasonable conditions upon an
attorney's continued practice of law warranted by the
circumstances." 137 Ill. 2d R. 758.
Under the plain language of Rule 758, the authority to determine
whether appropriate conditions are to be placed upon an attorney's
continued practice of law rests solely with this court. Subsection
(c) of Rule 758 explicitly vests this court with the exclusive power
to impose conditions upon an attorney's practice if warranted by
the circumstances. We must therefore determine whether an
exercise of this authority is appropriate in light of the facts of this
case. We reject the recommendation of the Hearing and Review
Boards, and conclude that the imposition of conditions upon
respondent's practice of law is unwarranted by the circumstances. 	There is no dispute that the evidence presented during the
hearing showed that, prior to 1996, respondent had practiced law
without complaint for nearly three decades. It was also established
that during the period that respondent was found to be
incapacitated in 1996, no client had been harmed by his actions.
Furthermore, the evidence established that, since the events of
1996, respondent has continued to practice law without incident or
complaint. Respondent testified that he handles a wide variety of
legal matters, including unemployment and wrongful-termination
suits, condemnation cases, domestic relations matters, and traffic
cases. In addition, respondent handles misdemeanor and felony
criminal cases. The evidence also showed that respondent has,
since 1978, been a member of the Chicago Bar Association's
lawyer referral program, as well as a participant in the Chicago Bar
Association's in-court referral panel. Subsequent to the events of
1996, respondent has remained involved with these Chicago Bar
Association programs, and has continued to receive in-court
referrals from circuit court judges. No evidence was presented
during the hearing to indicate that respondent has handled cases in
less than a competent manner, or that his representation of clients
was hindered by his mental state.
	The evidence established that Dr. Aagesen has treated
respondent on a monthly basis since July 1997, and that he has
observed no symptoms demonstrating that respondent is incapable
of practicing law. Although there was testimony from the
psychiatrists called by the Administrator that Dr. Aagesen has not
provided respondent with appropriate treatment, it is undisputed
that, under Dr. Aagesen's care, respondent has continued to
practice law without incident. As respondent's treating psychiatrist,
Dr. Aagesen was the only testifying professional to meet with
respondent on a regular basis, to spend a substantial amount of
time with him, and to give an opinion concerning respondent's
mental state and capacity to practice law as of the time of the
hearing in June 1998. In contrast, the three psychiatrists called by
the Administrator examined respondent for short, isolated periods
of time, and gave opinions regarding respondent's mental state and
capacity to practice law as of the time of these examinations. We
note that each of the three psychiatrists admitted during cross-examination that they were unaware of the types or complexity of
cases respondent handled before, during, and after his
hospitalizations.
	We also note the statement of the Hearing Board that its
decision to find respondent competent to practice law was
"influenced" by respondent's demeanor during the hearing. The
Hearing Board found that respondent's answers to questions were
"responsive and appropriate," that respondent "behaved in a
lawyerlike manner," that respondent "was knowledgeable about his
disciplinary case and about the court cases he has litigated in the
past year," and that respondent did not exhibit any of the classic
symptoms of bipolar disorder during the hearing.
	Proceedings involving attorney competence have as their goal
the protection of the public, the maintenance of the integrity of the
profession, and the safeguarding of the administration of justice
from reproach. See In re Smith, 168 Ill. 2d 269, 295 (1995). The
Administrator argues that, in light of respondent's lengthy history
of mental illness, conditions upon respondent's continued practice
of law are reasonable and warranted "to minimize the risk to the
public that would be presented by respondent's unconditional
maintenance on active status." In support of this argument, the
Administrator relies upon this court's ruling in In re Hessberger,
96 Ill. 2d 423 (1983), stating that "the concern expressed in
Hessberger is one that should be recognized to exist in the present
case." We find Hessberger to be inapposite to the matter at bar.
	In Hessberger, an attorney who suffered from bipolar illness
and who had been placed on inactive status after killing his wife
petitioned for restoration to active status pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 759. In continuing Hessberger's petition for restoration
to active practice, this court determined that, in the circumstances
presented in that case, it was inappropriate to immediately restore
Hessberger to active practice after eight years of inactivity. Instead,
this court, inter alia, instructed Hessberger's treating psychiatrist
to prepare a program which would reasonably insure that
Hessberger followed his medication schedules and which would
subject Hessberger to periodic medical examinations to insure that
he had not suffered any recurrence of mental disorder or developed
any new condition which would disable him from practicing law.
Hessberger, 96 Ill. 2d  at 430-31. The procedural posture and
circumstances present in Hessberger stand in sharp contrast to that
in the instant case. In the matter at bar, respondent, unlike
Hessberger, has never been transferred to inactive status and has
continued to practice law without incident. Therefore, no petition
for reinstatement under Rule 759 is involved in this case.
Accordingly, we find the Administrator's reliance upon the
reasoning in Hessberger to be misplaced.
	We are mindful that the psychiatric testimony adduced during
respondent's hearing established that respondent requires on-going
psychiatric treatment and administration of mood-stabilizing drugs.
All four experts were in agreement that with such treatment
respondent can function well and avoid a recurrence of the
symptoms which initially caused the Administrator to file this
competency petition in 1996. We find it significant that, since
1996, respondent has been under regular psychiatric care and
medication management, and has practiced law satisfactorily during
this period. We also find it significant that respondent testified
during the hearing that he knows that he suffers from a mental
condition which requires medication, that he has complied with Dr.
Aagesen's treatment recommendations, and that he will continue
treatment with Dr. Aagesen and abide by the doctor's
recommendations in the future. It would be too speculative for this
court to conclude that, in the future, respondent will experience
mental difficulties which will incapacitate him from continuing to
practice law. Indeed, the psychiatrists testifying on behalf of the
Administrator could not state with certainty if, or when,
respondent would experience a debilitating mental occurrence.
There is insufficient basis to conclude that, despite his assurances
to the contrary, respondent will not continue psychiatric treatment
and take the prescribed medication. If any question were to arise
in the future concerning respondent's ability to practice law due to
his mental condition, the Administrator retains the option to initiate
new proceedings pursuant to Rule 758.
	As a final matter, we note that during oral argument before
this court, counsel for respondent, for the first time, contended that
a violation of respondent's rights to due process had occurred.
Specifically, counsel urged us to find that, since the Administrator
did not request, either in the petition or during the hearing, that
conditions be imposed upon respondent's continued practice of
law, respondent's due process rights had been violated.
Respondent's due process violation argument is based upon the
fact that since conditions were not requested at any time, he was
denied the opportunity to be heard and defend against the
imposition or validity of such conditions. We decline to address
respondent's due process argument, as it was not raised in
respondent's brief to this court, and we lack the benefit of a
thoroughly researched and analyzed presentation of both sides of
this issue. See Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 168 Ill. 2d 312, 329 (1995).
We do, however, emphasize that subsection (a) of Rule 758
dictates that in the petition the Administrator must request "a
hearing to determine whether the attorney is incapacitated and
should be transferred to inactive status pending the removal of the
disability, or be permitted to continue to practice law subject to
conditions imposed by the court." 137 Ill. 2d R. 758(a). The
Administrator's adherence to the pleading requirements for Rule
758 petitions contained in subsection (a) will assure that
respondents are provided adequate notice of what will be at issue
during the proceedings.
	In sum, based upon the evidence presented in this case, we
find that the placing of conditions at this time upon respondent's
continued practice of law is not warranted. The uncontradicted
evidence upon which our decision is based establishes that
respondent has regularly attended treatment, has pledged to
continue to conform to Dr. Aagesen's recommendations, and, most
significantly, has continued to practice law since 1996 without
complaint.
CONCLUSION

	For the foregoing reasons, we reject the recommendation of
the Review Board and order that the petition filed by the
Administrator against respondent be dismissed.
Petition dismissed.
	JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting:
	Unlike the majority, I believe that appropriate conditions
should be imposed on the respondent's continued practice of law.
Accordingly, I dissent.
	Although the psychiatric testimony in this case is sharply
conflicting on the respondent's proper diagnosis, there is expert
unanimity on one conclusion: that the respondent will require
continued psychiatric treatment if he is to be able to practice law
in the future. Even the respondent's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Carl
Aagesen, believed that the respondent should remain under
psychiatric care if he is to continue in his practice. On this record,
then, the majority errs when it determines that no conditions are
necessary to ensure that the respondent may continue to practice
law without posing any risk to the legal system or to the public at
large.
	The respondent, in his own testimony before the hearing panel,
acknowledged as much. As the Administrator notes in her brief
before this court, the respondent testified in the proceedings below
that he knows that he suffers from a mental condition that requires
medication for its control. He further stated that he intends to
follow Dr. Aagesen's treatment recommendations. Thus, the
respondent essentially agrees with the principal condition
recommended by both the Hearing Board and the Review Board:
that he continue receiving treatment from a qualified mental health
professional.
	Despite the testimony of the respondent and his psychiatrist,
the majority concludes that the imposition of any conditions on the
respondent's continued practice of law is unnecessary. The
majority offers no explanation for this decision apart from the
singular assertion that"[t]here is insufficient basis to conclude that,
despite his assurances to the contrary, respondent will not continue
psychiatric treatment and take the prescribed medication." Slip op.
at 16. In essence, even though the respondent's prior behavior has
shown a need for close psychiatric supervision, the majority
delegates to the respondent himself the duty to ensure that he will
continue to receive the necessary treatment.
	The tripartite goals of the attorney disciplinary system are not
so easily satisfied. As the majority notes, the purposes of these
proceedings are to safeguard the public, maintain the integrity of
the legal profession, and protect the administration of justice from
reproach. In re Smith, 168 Ill. 2d 269, 295 (1995); In re Chandler,
161 Ill. 2d 459, 472 (1994). Those goals can only be frustrated by
today's result. The evidence in this case demonstrates that the
respondent has a lengthy history of mental illness and that he will
require continued psychiatric treatment if he is to remain fit to
practice law. This court has a duty to the bar and to the general
public to ensure the respondent's continued professional
competence. We abdicate those responsibilities, however, when we
simply defer to the respondent's stated intent to continue his
psychiatric therapy, without requiring the safeguards recommended
by both the Hearing and Review Boards. I do not believe that our
authority to impose conditions on an attorney's continued practice
of law extends only to recalcitrant lawyers who deny the need for
treatment. That the respondent today vows to continue to see Dr.
Aagesen and follow the psychiatrist's plan of treatment speaks in
the respondent's favor, but it cannot relieve us of our obligation to
ensure that the respondent will actually do so.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON joins in this dissent.