Case Title: Gross v. Dailey

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC-2022-1007

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2023-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: June 16, 2023 
Corr: July 13, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2022-1007 
_________________________ 
 
Selanmin D. Gross 
 
v. 
 
Christopher Dailey 
 
Appeal from Conecuh Circuit Court 
(CV-20-900030) 
 
 
 
MENDHEIM, Justice. 
Selanmin D. Gross appeals from the Conecuh Circuit Court's order 
granting a new trial in an action commenced by Christopher Dailey 
SC-2022-1007 
 
2 
 
against Gross stemming from a motor-vehicle accident. We reverse and 
remand. 
I. Facts 
 
On April 6, 2020, Dailey commenced this suit against Gross and 
Gross's 
automobile-insurance 
company,1 
asserting 
that 
Gross's 
negligence and/or wantonness in operating his motor vehicle on 
August 5, 2019, had resulted in a collision with Dailey's motor vehicle 
and that Dailey had suffered physical, mental, and emotional injuries as 
a result of the accident.2 Subsequently, Dailey's action was consolidated 
with an action commenced by Ken W. Houston against Gross that 
stemmed from the same accident.3 However, the trial court dismissed 
Houston's action following the filing of a joint stipulation of dismissal. 
On October 18, 2022, Conecuh Circuit Judge Jack B. Weaver 
presided over a one-day jury trial concerning Dailey's negligence claim 
 
1Gross's automobile-insurance company, Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company, subsequently elected on March 18, 2021, to opt out of the 
litigation pursuant to the procedure set forth in Lowe v. Nationwide 
Insurance Co., 521 So. 2d 1309 (Ala. 1988). 
 
2At the conclusion of the trial, Dailey formally withdrew his claim 
of wantonness and any request for punitive damages. 
 
3Houston was an occupant in the truck Dailey was driving. 
SC-2022-1007 
 
3 
 
against Gross. See note 2, supra. The only witnesses were Dailey and 
Gross. Dailey testified that on the morning of the accident he was driving 
a truck for his employer, the Alabama Department of Transportation, 
from Evergreen to Brewton to pick up a boom and that two coworkers, 
Ellis Gill and Ken Houston, were in the truck with him. According to 
Dailey, before the accident there had been a heavy rain, but at the time 
of the accident there was a lighter rain. Dailey stated that the accident 
occurred on Highway 31 in Castleberry. Dailey testified that Gross's 
truck, as it was coming from the opposite direction down a hill, started to 
turn sideways and "fishtail." As Gross's truck came toward Dailey's work 
truck, Dailey said, Gross's truck veered over the center line and hit 
Dailey's truck head-on, causing a "big blow" to the truck and to his body. 
Dailey testified that he had sustained injuries to his forearm and his 
lower back in the accident. 
Gross testified that he was driving his 1996 Ford Ranger truck from 
Brewton to Evergreen to see his mom who lived in Evergreen. He stated 
that a little before the accident it had been "[s]torming real bad" but that 
it was drizzling when he reached the area where the accident occurred. 
SC-2022-1007 
 
4 
 
Gross stated that he was coming over a hill, that the speed limit was 
55 miles per hour, and that when he looked down the hill he saw  
"a State truck and a tractor on the side of -- the right side of 
the road, and the State truck was still halfway in the road. So 
when I seen the State truck, I just hit the brakes. And when I 
hit the brakes, [my truck] just hydroplaned, and [my] truck 
lost control. Basically, that was it."  
 
 
Following closing arguments by the parties' attorneys, Judge 
Weaver instructed the jury. Concerning the verdict forms, Judge Weaver 
stated: 
"[THE COURT:] Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, 
for your convenience, the Court has prepared for you, for your 
use in this case, verdict forms, which I will explain them to 
you. No inference is to be drawn by you from the fact that the 
Court has supplied you with these forms or the order in which 
the Court reads them to you. In other words, if I read one 
before I read the other, please don't take any inference that I 
read one before the other, because I have no opinion about the 
facts of the case. 
 
"When you have reached a verdict, you will select and 
complete the form which corresponds to the verdict and which 
is to be signed by the foreperson, and all 12 must agree. In 
this case, all 11 must agree before a verdict will be returned 
back into court.[4] 
"Now, ladies and gentlemen I'm going to tell you, the 
first verdict form I read says, verdict, 'we, the jury, find for 
 
4The jury initially had 12 members, but 1 juror was dismissed 
during the trial because he was not a resident of Conecuh County. Dailey 
and Gross agreed to continue the trial with 11 jurors. 
SC-2022-1007 
 
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the plaintiff, Christopher D. Dailey, and assess damages of 
blank dollars.' There's a place to date it and a place to sign it 
by the foreperson. 
"Okay. The next one says, 'we, the jury, find for the 
defendant.' There's a place to date it and a place for the 
foreperson to sign it. 
"Now, ladies and gentlemen, when you go back to the 
jury room in just a minute, you're going to select a foreperson. 
That foreperson will preside over the deliberations and sign 
the verdict form which -- when all 11 of you have agreed on a 
verdict. It must be the verdict of all 11 of you." 
 
Upon the conclusion of its deliberations, the jury returned to the 
courtroom, and the following occurred: 
"THE COURT: Okay. All right. [C.N.], you served as 
foreperson on this case. Thank you. 
 
"The verdict reads, 'we, the jury, find for the defendant.' 
And I'm going to poll the jury. I generally do this, so I'm going 
to start right here on the front row. 
 
"(Whereupon, all 11 jurors individually confirmed 
the verdict.) 
 
"THE COURT: Let the record reflect that all 11 affirmed 
that this was indeed their verdict, signed by the foreperson 
this date." 
 
 
On October 19, 2022, the trial court entered the jury-verdict forms 
into the record, which showed that the foreperson had signed both verdict 
forms. The first verdict form simply stated: "We the jury find for the 
SC-2022-1007 
 
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defendant" and had the date filled in by hand above a blank line labeled 
"Date" and the signature of the foreperson on a second blank line labeled 
"Foreman." The second verdict form stated: "We the jury find for the 
plaintiff, Christopher D. Dailey, and assess damages of $0 dollars." The 
zero was handwritten. That form likewise had the date filled in by hand 
above a blank line labeled "Date" and the signature of the foreperson on 
a second blank line labeled "Foreman." 
 
On October 19, 2022, Dailey filed a one-page "Motion for New Trial 
Due to Inconsistent Verdict." In full, the motion stated: 
"The jury returned a verdict for both the defendant and 
the plaintiff. This is an inconsistent verdict. 
 
"'[T]he general rule is that, where a verdict in a civil 
case is inconsistent and contradictory, it should be set aside 
and a new trial granted. See generally 66 C.J.S. New Trial 
§ 66 (1950). Alabama adheres to this rule.' Luker v. City of 
Brantley, 520 So. 2d 517[, 521] (Ala. 1987) (citing Ward v. 
Diebold, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1261 (Ala. 1986); Wickham v. Cotton, 
465 So. 2d 388 (Ala. 1985); Sibley v. Odum, 257 Ala. 292, 58 
So. 2d 896 (Ala. 1952)." 5 
 
 
On the same date, Gross filed a response in opposition to the motion 
for new trial in which Gross noted that Judge Weaver had announced a 
 
5The opinion relied upon by Dailey, Luker v. City of Brantley, 520 
So. 2d 517 (Ala. 1987), was subsequently overruled on other grounds by 
Jones Express, Inc. v. Jackson, 86 So. 3d 298, 309 (Ala. 2010). 
SC-2022-1007 
 
7 
 
verdict for the defendant in open court and had polled each juror and that 
each juror had confirmed the verdict for the defendant. He argued that 
"the verdict was in no way inconsistent: the verdict form for the Plaintiff 
awarded zero (0) dollars in damages which is perfectly consistent with a 
verdict for the Defendant." 
 
On October 21, 2022, Judge Weaver entered an order granting a 
new trial, which stated that "[t]he jury returned a verdict for both the 
defendant and the plaintiff (awarding the plaintiff $0.00). The plaintiff 
filed a motion for a new trial." The order then quoted verbatim the portion 
of Dailey's motion for a new trial that quoted from Luker v. City of 
Brantley, 520 So. 2d 517 (Ala. 1987), and cited other cases decided by this 
Court. The order then stated that the motion for a new trial was granted, 
and it set the new trial for February 27, 2023. 
 
On November 17, 2022, Gross filed a "Motion to Reconsider and 
Vacate Order Granting a New Trial" in which he reiterated that the 
verdict announced from the bench and confirmed by juror polling was for 
Gross. Gross attached to that motion an affidavit from the jury 
foreperson, in which she stated, in pertinent part: 
"4. After deliberation, the jury came to the unanimous 
conclusion that we were to deliver a verdict for the defendant, 
SC-2022-1007 
 
8 
 
Selanmin Gross, and against the plaintiff, Christopher 
Dailey. 
 
"5. It was my understanding that I was supposed to sign 
and deliver only one verdict form. However, another juror told 
me that I was supposed to sign and deliver both forms. 
Therefore, based on that instruction, I signed and delivered 
both forms. However, in order to clarify that the jury's verdict 
was for the defendant, Selanmin Gross, I noted that the 
plaintiff was to be assessed damages of zero dollars ($0). 
 
"6. As stated above, there was no question that the jury 
definitely found for the defendant, Selanmin Gross, and 
against the plaintiff, Christopher Dailey." 
 
 
On November 17, 2022, Judge Weaver entered an order denying 
Gross's postjudgment motion.6 The order did not provide a rationale for 
his conclusion. On November 22, 2022, Gross appealed. 
 
6Although Gross's motion was styled as a "motion to reconsider," it 
was clearly a postjudgment motion addressing Judge Weaver's order 
granting a new trial. See, e.g., Ex parte Mutual Sav. Life Ins. Co., 765 
So. 2d 649, 650 (Ala. 1998) ("As Mutual Savings correctly points out, the 
September 23, 1996, order granting Smith a new trial was a new 
'judgment' within the meaning of our Rules of Civil Procedure. … A party 
may challenge an adverse judgment by filing, within 30 days of its entry, 
a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, pursuant to Rule 59(e)[, 
Ala. R. Civ. P.] … An examination of Mutual Savings' October 22, 1996, 
motion, although styled as one to 'reconsider,' clearly reveals that it was 
a Rule 59(e) motion. This Court looks to the essence of a motion, not just 
to its title, to determine how the motion should be treated under our 
Rules of Civil Procedure."). 
SC-2022-1007 
 
9 
 
II. Standard of Review 
"Granting or refusing a motion for new trial rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial court; the exercise of that 
discretion carries with it a presumption of correctness which 
will not be disturbed by this court unless some legal right was 
abused and the record plainly and palpably shows the trial 
court was in error." 
 
Hill v. Cherry, 379 So. 2d 590, 592 (Ala. 1980). 
III. Analysis 
 
Gross's contention on appeal is straightforward: that the verdict 
was not inconsistent because everything indicated that the jury returned 
a verdict in his favor. Gross first notes, as he did to the trial court, that 
the colloquy in open court showed that the verdict was for the defendant, 
Gross. Judge Weaver first announced the verdict in open court as follows: 
"The verdict reads, 'we, the jury, find for the defendant.'" Judge Weaver 
did not read the second verdict form in open court.7 Without prompting 
from either party, Judge Weaver also polled each of the jurors in open 
court to confirm a verdict for the defendant. After polling the jurors, 
Judge Weaver stated: "Let the record reflect that all 11 affirmed that this 
was indeed their verdict, signed by the foreperson this date." Given that 
 
7The record does not disclose the reason the second verdict form was 
not disclosed until it was entered into the record. 
SC-2022-1007 
 
10 
 
the only announced verdict was for the defendant, a verdict for Gross was 
clearly affirmed by the jury polling. Gross insists that the second verdict 
form, which stated "We the jury find for the plaintiff, Christopher D. 
Dailey, and assess damages of $0 dollars" and which was likewise signed 
by the jury foreperson, also supports that the jury's verdict was in his 
favor because the jury did not award any damages to Dailey. Finally, 
Gross cites for support the postjudgment affidavit of the foreperson in 
which she testified that the jury's verdict was "definitely" in Gross's favor 
and that the only reason she had signed the second verdict form was 
because she had been was erroneously told by another juror that she was 
supposed to sign and return both forms. The foreperson testified that she 
sought to "clarify that the jury's verdict was for the defendant, Selanmin 
Gross," by listing Dailey's damages as $0 dollars. 
 
Dailey attempts to answer each aspect of Gross's argument. 
Concerning the announced verdict in favor of the defendant, Dailey 
contends it was "irrelevant" because, he says,  
"[n]o ore tenus rule applies to the Circuit Court's review of a 
verdict for the plaintiff on negligence awarding $0.00 
damages and a concurrent verdict for the defendant. … The 
Supreme Court may just as readily review those two pieces of 
paper in the record, accordingly, the review is de novo." 
 
SC-2022-1007 
 
11 
 
Dailey's brief, p. 10.  
Dailey offers no authority for the foregoing contention. Moreover, 
his argument erroneously implies that the "real" verdict in the case stems 
from the verdict forms rather than anything stated in open court. 
However, the fact that the foreperson signed both verdict forms is not 
dispositive as to the verdict. 
"Appellant first complains that the verdict as rendered 
was not properly signed by the foreman and that 'the words 
appearing underneath the signature of the Foreman are not 
any part of the verdict of the jury.' This insistence is 
untenable and cannot be sustained. It is not essential to the 
validity of a verdict that it should be in writing. The law is, a 
jury may announce their verdict to the court ore tenus, and 
the fact that the verdict is returned in writing by the jury to 
the court adds nothing to its validity. Gary et al. v. Woodham, 
103 Ala. 421, 15 So. 840 [(1894)]; Howard v. State, 17 Ala. 
App. 628, 88 So. 215 [(1920)]; Hayes v. State, 21 Ala. App. 615, 
110 So. 696 [(1926)], and numerous cases cited; 27 R.C.L. 
p. 835, § 3." 
 
Floyd v. Jackson, 26 Ala. App. 575, 576, 164 So. 121, 122 (1935) (emphasis 
added). See, e.g., Horton v. Shelby Med. Ctr., 562 So. 2d 127, 131 (Ala. 
1989) ("'The law does not require any particular form in which a verdict 
must be rendered so long as it responds substantially to the issues 
raised.'" (quoting Whitmore v. First City Nat'l Bank of Oxford, 369 So. 2d 
517, 521 (Ala. 1979))); Alabama Power Co. v. Cleckler, 295 Ala. 73, 76, 
SC-2022-1007 
 
12 
 
323 So. 2d 344, 346 (1975) ("The verdict can be either written or oral."). 
The only necessary requirement for a verdict to become official is that it 
be accepted by the court. See, e.g., Comer v. Rush, 403 So. 2d 205, 207 
(Ala. 1981) (noting that "a verdict is not a finding by the jury until 
approved and accepted by the court"); Scott v. Parker, 216 Ala. 321, 325, 
113 So. 495, 499 (1927) ("It is true that there is not a final judgment until 
the verdict is returned and noted in open court."); King v. Robinson, 5 
Ala. App. 431, 438, 439, 59 So. 371, 373 (1912) ("A verdict is not a verdict 
until it is affirmed by the jury in open court." "When, … upon the 
reassembling of the court, the jury again took their seats in the jury box, 
and the sheriff handed back to the jury the papers in the case, in the 
presence of the court and of the parties to the cause, and the jury, in open 
court, formally announced the result of their deliberations, the 
formalities of law in regard to the reception of verdicts were in all things 
properly observed."). 
 
In this case, the trial court clearly announced a verdict in favor of 
the defendant, Gross, in open court. Additionally, Judge Weaver polled 
the jury concerning the announced verdict. "The purpose of polling the 
jury before the verdict is recorded is to give each juror the opportunity to 
SC-2022-1007 
 
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declare his assent to what the foreman will return, and thus to enable 
the court to determine that the jurors are in agreement." Comer, 403 
So. 2d at 207. In other words, the polling served as confirmation of the 
announced verdict. See, e.g., E & S Facilities, Inc. v. Precision Chipper 
Corp., 565 So. 2d 54, 61 (Ala. 1990) ("To prevent confusion, the trial judge 
polled the jury for the sole reason of clarification."). Dailey notes that 
Judge Weaver did not ask the jurors about the second verdict form, which 
leads Dailey to conclude that "the polling of the jury is thus irrelevant." 
Dailey's brief, p. 10 (emphasis omitted). But the jurors were plainly 
aware that there was a second verdict form because Judge Weaver read 
both forms to them during the jury instructions, and yet no juror raised 
the subject of the second verdict form when he or she was polled. Instead, 
all the jurors confirmed that their verdict was for the defendant. 
 
Dailey also asserts that the foreperson's affidavit "was properly not 
considered by the trial judge" because, he says, it was inadmissible 
evidence under Rule 606(b), Ala. R. Evid. Dailey's brief, p. 11. Rule 606(b) 
provides: 
 
"(b) Inquiry Into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon 
an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror 
may not testify in impeachment of the verdict or indictment 
as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of 
SC-2022-1007 
 
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the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that 
or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror 
to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or 
concerning the juror's mental processes in connection 
therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question 
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly 
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside 
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor 
may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the 
juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be 
precluded from testifying be received for these purposes. 
Nothing herein precludes a juror from testifying in support of 
a verdict or indictment." 
 
(Emphasis added.)  
 
However, Judge Weaver's order denying Gross's postjudgment 
motion did not state whether he had considered the foreperson's affidavit. 
Moreover, as Gross observes in his reply brief, the exclusion in 
Rule 606(b) applies only if the juror's affidavit impeaches the verdict, not 
if it supports the verdict. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Brooks, 479 
So. 2d 1169, 1178 (Ala. 1985) ("Neither testimony nor affidavits of jurors 
are admissible to impeach their verdicts; however, such evidence is 
admissible to sustain them."). The foreperson's affidavit did not seek to 
question the announced verdict; rather, it supported that the jury did, in 
fact, decide the case in Gross's favor. Therefore, the affidavit was not 
SC-2022-1007 
 
15 
 
inadmissible, and it further corroborates the verdict announced in open 
court in favor of Gross.8 
 
Finally, Dailey's most cogent argument for affirming the trial 
court's order granting a new trial -- the argument adopted by Judge 
Weaver -- is that multiple opinions of this Court have concluded that a 
verdict for a plaintiff on a negligence claim that awards no damages 
constitutes an inconsistent verdict. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. 
Epperson, 585 So. 2d 919, 921 (Ala. 1991) ("The trial court in this case 
correctly concluded that because the jury awarded zero damages, there 
was a failure to find each essential element of negligence and, therefore, 
 
8Dailey also contends that the foreperson's affidavit "asserted the 
hearsay statement of another juror," which, he asserts, was inadmissible. 
Dailey's brief, p. 13. However, as Gross observes in his reply brief, the 
foreperson's reference to a juror's statement telling her to sign both 
verdict forms was not introduced to prove the matter asserted but, 
rather, to explain why she had signed both forms. See Gross's reply brief, 
p. 13. In any event, Dailey did not object to the foreperson's affidavit on 
hearsay grounds in the trial court, so the objection was waived. See Petty-
Fitzmaurice v. Steen, 871 So. 2d 771, 774-75 (Ala. 2003) ("We pretermit 
a discussion of whether the affidavit of Petty-Fitzmaurice's counsel 
constitutes hearsay, because even if it is, Steen waived his argument that 
the affidavit is inadmissible by failing to object when the affidavit was 
presented to the trial court. This Court has held that a party cannot 
argue on appeal that an affidavit contains inadmissible hearsay when the 
party did not object to the affidavit when it was submitted to the trial 
court."). 
SC-2022-1007 
 
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that the verdict was inconsistent on its face, as a matter of law. We hold 
that the trial court correctly granted the plaintiffs a new trial on the basis 
of the inconsistency of the award of no damages, when that award was 
juxtaposed with the jury's finding of the defendant's liability."); Clements 
v. Lanley Heat Processing Equip., 548 So. 2d 1345, 1347 (Ala. 1989) ("The 
jury's finding for the plaintiff necessarily embraced all of the elements of 
the negligence claim, including the element of injury and resultant 
damages. To so find, and then award 'court costs only' and no 
compensatory damages, is inconsistent on its face, as a matter of law. The 
trial court should have afforded the plaintiff a new trial on the basis of 
the inconsistency of the award of no damages when that award is 
juxtaposed with the jury's finding of the defendants' liability. Its refusal 
to do so was reversible error."); Moore v. Clark, 548 So. 2d 1352, 1353 
(Ala. 1989) ("The jury apparently resolved the issue of injury or damage 
in [the plaintiff's] favor. However, that finding is inconsistent with fixing 
the damages as 'none.'").  
Dailey in particular emphasizes this Court's opinion in Stinson v. 
Acme Propane Gas Co., 391 So. 2d 659 (Ala. 1980), which, Dailey says, 
rejected the contention that a finding of zero damages for the plaintiff 
SC-2022-1007 
 
17 
 
constitutes a verdict for the defendant. In relevant part, the Stinson 
Court stated: 
 
"At the outset, we note that, while our discussion will 
focus on the issue as postured by the parties -- that of 
inadequacy vel non of damages -- we are inclined to 
characterize this as a situation where those damages awarded 
(i.e., none) were inconsistent with the jury's determination as 
to liability. 
 
 
"[The defendants] would have us adopt what seems to be 
the attitude of the Federal Courts, as well as some states, in 
situations similar to that before us. The rationale of these 
cases is summarily stated in Baldwin v. Ewing, 69 Idaho 176, 
180, 204 P.2d 430, 432 (1949): 
 
 
"'A jury is only required to find as to ultimate 
facts; and if it finds that plaintiff is entitled to 
recover, to fix the amount of recovery. If the 
finding is that plaintiff is not entitled to recover, 
the verdict should be for defendant. Where, as 
here, the jury finds that plaintiff is entitled to 
recover "$ none," it is in fact and in law a finding 
for the defendant.' 
 
 
"For other cases employing the same rationale, see 
Wingerter v. Maryland Casualty Company, 313 F.2d 754 (5th 
Cir. 1963); Joseph v. Rowlen, 425 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1970); 
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Price, 46 So. 2d 481 (Fla.1950). 
Thus, there is authority for the proposition that an award of 
no compensation to a prevailing plaintiff is, in fact, a verdict 
for the defendant. 
 
 
"We reject the holding and the reasoning of these cases. 
Here, the claims were grounded on theories of negligence and 
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wantonness. Both theories were presented to the jury under 
appropriate instructions. The jury returned a general verdict 
favorable to each Plaintiff and against each Defendant, but 
assessed no compensation. We assume, for purposes of 
appellate review, that the verdicts were based on the simple 
negligence charge alone, for which compensatory damages 
only were subject to recovery. Seitz v. Heep, 243 Ala. 376, 10 
So. 2d 150 (1942). The jury's finding for each of the Plaintiffs, 
which is clear and unequivocal, necessarily embraced all of 
the elements of the tort claim, including the element of injury 
and resultant damages. To so find, and then award no 
damages, is inconsistent on its face as a matter of law. 
 
 
"While courts do not favor the setting aside of verdicts 
for damages if it can be avoided (Airheart v. Green, 267 Ala. 
689, 104 So. 2d 687 (1958)), we deem such action here 
unavoidable. The verdict must be consistent and the damages 
awarded must be reasonably proportionate to the injury. 
Askin & Marine Co. v. King, 22 Ala. App. 452, 116 So. 804 
(1928). 
 
 
"…. 
 
 
"Our application of the above authority to the instant 
case compels a decision that the trial court should have 
afforded [the plaintiffs] a new trial on the basis of the 
inadequacy of the award, or, as we see it, the inconsistency of 
the award of no damages, when such award is juxtaposed with 
the jury's finding of Defendants' liability. Its refusal to do so 
was reversible error." 
 
391 So. 2d at 660-61 (some emphasis added). See also Northeast Alabama 
Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Owens, 584 So. 2d 1360, 1366 (Ala. 1991) ("[T]he law 
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19 
 
is clear that an award of no compensation to the plaintiff is not, in fact, a 
verdict for the defendant."). 
 
Gross readily admits that several cases have concluded that a 
verdict for a plaintiff that awards no damages is inconsistent and must 
be reversed. Gross highlights, however, an observation from the Court of 
Civil Appeals that, "'[w]ithout exception, these cases have pertained to 
juries which find the defendant negligent without awarding any damages 
to the plaintiff. Such verdicts are inherently inconsistent because they 
seek to establish negligence even while rejecting an essential element of 
the negligence claim.'" Downs v. Goodwin, 827 So. 2d 122, 123 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 2002) (quoting Denton v. Foley Athletic Club, 578 So. 2d 1317, 1318 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1990)) (emphasis added). Indeed, in all the cases relied 
upon by Dailey and cited by the trial court, the jury's award of no 
damages to the plaintiff was made along with a finding of liability against 
the defendant. See, e.g., Epperson, 585 So. 2d at 921 ("We hold that the 
trial court correctly granted the plaintiffs a new trial on the basis of the 
inconsistency of the award of no damages, when that award was 
juxtaposed with the jury's finding of the defendant's liability." (emphasis 
added)); Clements, 548 So. 2d at 1347 ("The trial court should have 
SC-2022-1007 
 
20 
 
afforded the plaintiff a new trial on the basis of the inconsistency of the 
award of no damages when that award is juxtaposed with the jury's 
finding of the defendants' liability." (emphasis added)); Stinson, 391 
So. 2d at 661 ("[T]he trial court should have afforded [the plaintiffs] a 
new trial on the basis of the inadequacy of the award, or, as we see it, the 
inconsistency of the award of no damages, when such award is juxtaposed 
with the jury's finding of Defendants' liability." (emphasis added)).  
 
In contrast to those cases, in the present case the jury did not find 
any liability against Gross: as we already have noted, the announced 
verdict in open court was for Gross, that verdict was confirmed by a 
polling of each juror, and it was accepted by the trial court. Such a 
scenario did not occur in any of the cases cited by Dailey or relied upon 
by the trial court. A better parallel to what occurred in this case is the 
situation that was before this Court in Hall v. Defoor, 273 Ala. 597, 143 
So. 2d 449 (1962). Hall arose from a collision between the plaintiff Harold 
Defoor's tractor-trailer truck and a dump truck owned by defendant 
Hubert Scogin and driven by Scogin's employee, defendant Paul Hall. 
Defoor sued Scogin and Hall for damages, and the defendants 
counterclaimed -- Scogin seeking recoupment for damage to his dump 
SC-2022-1007 
 
21 
 
truck and Hall seeking recovery for personal injuries. The jury returned 
four verdict forms. The first form was not signed by the jury's foreman 
but stated: "'We, the jury, find for the Plaintiff, and assess his damages 
at $ None.'" 273 Ala. at 597, 143 So. 2d at 450. The remaining three forms 
were signed by the jury's foreman. One stated: "'We, the jury, find for the 
defendant Paul Hall on his plea of set off and recoupment, and assess his 
damages at $1,000.00.'" Id. The second one stated: "'We, the jury, find for 
the defendant Hubert Scogin on his plea of set off and recoupment, and 
assess his damages at $400.00.'" Id. The third signed verdict form simply 
stated: "'We, the jury, find for the defendants.'" 273 Ala. at 598, 143 
So. 2d at 450. "The [trial] court then, in open court, polled the jury to 
determine exactly what their verdicts were and each juror stated that 
their respective verdicts were against the plaintiff and in favor of 
defendant Hall in the amount of $1,000.00, and defendant Scogin in the 
amount of $400.00." Id. The trial court subsequently granted a motion for 
a new trial from plaintiff Defoor because "the learned trial court seemed 
to have been of the opinion that the verdicts rendered in the cause were 
repugnant and contradictory, entitling the plaintiff to a new trial on 
those grounds." 273 Ala. at 597, 143 So. 2d at 450. This Court disagreed 
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with the trial court's conclusion that the verdict was contradictory, 
explaining: 
"The foregoing reflects, without doubt, that the jury returned 
a verdict against the plaintiff in favor of Hall in the amount 
of $1,000.00 damages and in favor of Scogin and against the 
plaintiff in the amount of $400.00 damages. Therefore, no 
error intervened by the action of the trial court in receiving 
the verdicts after having polled the jury and thus enrolling 
them as finally returned. A verdict need not be rendered in 
any particular form and may be either oral or written. Here 
the verdicts were in both proper forms." 
 
273 Ala. at 598, 143 So. 2d at 451 (emphasis added). 
 
Thus, in Hall, as in this case, the trial court accepted verdict forms 
finding in favor of the defendants as well as a verdict form that awarded 
$0 in damages to the plaintiff. Also in Hall, as in this case, the jurors 
were polled, and they all stated that their intent was to return a verdict 
in favor of the defendants. See Hall, 273 Ala. at 598, 143 So. 2d at 451. 
The Hall Court concluded that the verdict stated in open court was in 
proper form and was not contradictory. The same is true of the verdict in 
this case.  
IV. Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in concluding that the 
second signed verdict form awarding zero dollars in damages to Dailey 
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meant that the jury reached an inconsistent verdict. The cases relied 
upon by the trial court do not support that conclusion, and the evidence 
concerning the verdict overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the 
jury reached a verdict in favor of the defendant, Gross. Accordingly, the 
trial court's order granting a new trial is reversed, and the trial court is 
instructed to reinstate the verdict in favor of Gross and to enter a 
judgment on that verdict.  
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.