Case Title: Fields v. Saunders

Citation: 

Docket Number: 107302

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2012-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
FIELDS v. SAUNDERS2012 OK 17Case Number: 107302Decided: 03/06/2012THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

LIMBUSHA FIELDS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of 
KEONTAE KEVON COLE, deceased; LIMBUSHA FIELDS, individually; and KEON COLE, 
individually, Plaintiffs/Appellants,v.KRISTI M. SAUNDERS, M.D., and 
KATHRYN REILLY, M.D., Defendants/Appellees,andTHE STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex 
rel. THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA; RITA RANKAJA RAMEN, 
M.D.; ADRIANA MONICA BRUNE, M.D.; and HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF OKLAHOMA, INC. 
d/b/a OU MEDICAL CENTER d/b/a CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, Defendants.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION II,ON 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY,STATE OF 
OKLAHOMAHONORABLE NOMA D. GURICH, TRIAL JUDGE
¶0 A jury returned verdicts in favor of all defendants on plaintiffs' medical 
malpractice claims. Thereafter, plaintiffs learned that a juror had voluntarily 
disclosed bias towards plaintiffs' cause of action and plaintiffs' race. 
Plaintiffs sought a new trial on this and other grounds. Following an 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for new trial. On 
appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals unanimously rejected all of plaintiffs' 
grounds for new trial except the claim of juror bias. This was rejected by 
majority vote. In rejecting this ground, the majority ruled the juror's 
post-verdict statements were impermissible impeachment of the jury verdicts. The 
dissenting judge concluded otherwise, noting the juror's statements were his own 
public, voluntary statements (not related by other jurors) and revealed the 
juror was intent on serving on the case with a predisposition to an outcome 
adverse to the plaintiffs. This Court has previously granted certiorari. Upon 
review, we vacate the Court of Civil Appeals opinion, and reverse and remand for 
a new trial.
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION 
VACATED;JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Joe E. White, Jr., Charles C. Weddle, III, WHITE & WEDDLE, P.C, Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma for Plaintiffs/Appellants,Hilton H. Walters, Jamie K. Bruehl, 
RIFE WALTERS & BRUEHL, LLP, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Alison A. Cave, 
ALISON A. CAVE, PLLC, Edmond, Oklahoma for Defendant/Appellee, Kristi M. 
Saunders, M.D.L. Earl Ogletree, Lane O. Krieger, WIGGINS SEWELL & 
OGLETREE, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Defendant/Appellee, Kathryn Reilly, 
M.D.
REIF, J.:
¶1 This case presents important issues regarding the right to jury trial 
guaranteed by Article 2, Section 19 of the Oklahoma Constitution. The primary 
issue is whether this right has been violated by a juror who concealed bias 
against one of the parties during voir dire, and revealed such bias of his own 
accord after a verdict has been rendered. The second but equally important issue 
is the standard of review to be employed in deciding a claim of error of this 
nature. One of the well settled tenets of the right to jury trial is that jurors 
must be impartial, and bias or prejudice in a case disqualifies one as a juror 
thereon. Parrish v. Lilly, 1993 OK 80, ¶ 10, 883 P.2d 158,160. Considering this fundamental tenet 
with the specific constitutional command that justice shall be administered 
without prejudice, Article 2, Section 6,1 as well as the general constitutional mandate of due 
process of law, Article 2, Section 7,2 this Court must conclude that participation by a juror 
under such circumstances presents a claim of error of constitutional dimension. 
Error of this nature calls for independent, non-deferential de novo review.3 
¶2 In the case at 
hand, a jury returned verdicts in favor of the defendants on plaintiffs' medical 
malpractice claims. Plaintiffs raised the issue of juror bias for the first time 
in their motion for new trial. The record of the evidentiary hearing on the 
motion for new trial reveals that plaintiffs did not learn of the bias on the 
part of a particular juror until after the verdicts were rendered and the jury 
discharged. The record reflects that the juror in question went to an Oklahoma 
City bar later in the day after the trial was concluded. It is undisputed that 
the juror talked to another individual at the bar about his service on the jury 
in this case. The other individual was an attorney and a member of the Oklahoma 
Bar Association. This attorney was employed as a deputy general counsel for an 
agency of the State of Oklahoma and had no connection to the case or the 
attorneys for the parties.
¶3 According to this attorney, the juror related, inter alia, that (1) the 
plaintiffs would have never won the case with him (the juror) serving in the 
case, (2) he (the juror) was not impartial despite stating in voir dire he could 
be, and (3) he (the juror) wanted to "play the judicial system" and believed 
plaintiffs had the burden to prove the defendants intended harm beyond a 
reasonable doubt before they could recover. The attorney also related that the 
juror expressed his dislike for African Americans. The plaintiffs in this case 
are African Americans.4 
¶4 In addition to 
the statements related by the attorney, it is undisputed that the juror provided 
inaccurate and incomplete information about his criminal convictions on the 
juror questionnaire used in voir dire. The juror reported that he had 
misdemeanor convictions from Linn County, Oregon, and Ventura County, 
California, but omitted another misdemeanor conviction for theft in the Kirkland 
Municipal Court, King County, Washington. As concerns the Linn County, Oregon 
conviction, the juror reported his sentence was three days, when he served 168 
hours (seven days) and was placed on thirty-six months of supervised probation. 
The juror failed to disclose that he was serving the probationary portion of his 
sentence at the time of trial.
¶5 The juror acknowledged that he did talk about his jury service at the 
place and time as related by the attorney. He denied, however, making any of the 
statements regarding bias against plaintiffs' right to recover or their race. He 
acknowledged that his answers on the questionnaire may have been incomplete, but 
explained that he gave answers in the space allotted on the questionnaire. He 
stated that he had no bias against the plaintiffs.
¶6 Upon de novo review of the record,5 this Court finds that the juror in question entertained 
bias against the plaintiffs' race and their right to recover under the 
appropriate burden of proof. In reaching this conclusion, we first note that 
this is not a case where dissenting or minority jurors are attempting to impeach 
a verdict with which they do not agree by breaching the sanctity of the jury 
deliberations. This is a case where a juror voluntarily revealed, after verdicts 
were returned, that (1) the juror entertained disqualifying bias against one 
party's race and right to recover under the appropriate burden of proof, and (2) 
deliberately concealed such bias upon voir dire in order to participate in 
rendering verdicts consistent with such bias.
¶7 In rejecting the juror's denials that he entertained such bias or made 
statements that revealed the bias, we first observe that jurors' assurances that 
they are unbiased are not dispositive or the sole test. Bickell v. State, 
1928 OK CR 
285, 270 P.  at 89. As the court in Bickell pointed out: "Prejudice is 
a subtle thing [that] exist[s] in the mind of an individual [and often] cannot 
be discovered, except by the conduct of some expression of the person 
entertaining it." Bickell, 1928 OK CR 285, 270 P.  at 89. The Bickell court 
went on to say that "the circumstances surrounding the juror should be 
considered in determining his competency." Id. We find that the juror's 
misleading answers on the voir dire questionnaire and his revelation of bias to 
the attorney are sufficient circumstances or expressions upon which to conclude 
the juror entertained disqualifying bias.
¶8 We also think it important to explain why we have given great weight to 
the testimony of the attorney to whom the juror revealed his bias. This attorney 
is a member of the bar of the State of Oklahoma who has sworn to reform 
falsehoods done in court when the attorney has knowledge of such falsehoods. 
5 O.S.2011, § 2. The juror's concealment 
of his bias and admission that he deliberately did so to participate in 
returning verdicts consistent with his bias constituted a "falsehood done in 
court" that the attorney was duty bound to bring to the attention of court.
¶9 Oklahoma jurisprudence has long recognized the general rule that "[i]f the 
objection [to a juror] relates to the moral capacity or impartiality of the 
juror [even] if not discovered until after the verdict, it would no doubt be as 
good a ground for new trial as a cause of challenge before." Carr v. State, 
1938 OK CR 
106, 84 P.2d 42, 46. The syllabus of the case indicates this rule applies to the 
discovery of a ground to disqualify a juror after verdict when the juror falsely 
qualifies on voir dire, knowing of the disqualifying ground.
¶10 It is well settled that "Courts have a duty to enforce strict observance 
of the constitutional and statutory provisions designed to preserve inviolate 
[the] right to, and purity of jury trial." Jackson v. General Finance 
Corp., 1953 OK 
22, ¶ 7, 253 P.2d 166, 168. As the appellate courts of this State have previously observed, 
every citizen is "entitled to jurors who [are] unbiased and qualified and 'not 
only of one such juror, nor eleven but twelve of such class."' State v. 
Smith, 1958 OK CR 
6, 
¶ 12, 320 P.2d 719, 724 (cited approvingly in Parrish, 1993 OK 80, at ¶¶ 11, 14 n.3, 883 P.2d at 161).
¶11 In the Parrish case, this Court squarely held that "[e]ach and 
every person who sits on a jury, regardless of the number of jurors required to 
render a verdict, must satisfy the constitutional and statutory requirements of 
impartiality." Parrish, 1993 OK 80 at ¶ 15, 883 P.2d  at 162. This Court also 
said that when an individual with disqualifying bias has served on a jury, "this 
Court will not engage in speculation regarding the influence such juror may or 
may not have had on the other members of the jury." Id. at ¶ 16, 883 P.2d  
at 162.
¶12 "Subjecting a party to anything less than twelve impartial jurors, where 
twelve jurors are guaranteed, will not survive judicial scrutiny. Id. at 
¶ 15, 883 P.2d  at 162. The error in such cases cannot be considered harmless and 
will result in reversal. Id. at ¶ 16, 883 P.2d  at 162.6 
¶13 In reaching 
this conclusion, we think it is important to stress that this is a fact specific 
case of juror bias and not a case of a juror impeaching a verdict. In the case 
of bias, prejudice is presumed, and the impact of the bias on the verdict need 
not be proven. Parrish, ¶ 16. Such bias presents a fundamental 
constitutional issue involving violation of the absolute right to a fair trial 
and an impartial jury. Such an issue is reviewable de novo. 
¶14 One of the significant facts in this case is that the disqualifying bias 
was disclosed by the juror himself, and not by other jurors repeating statements 
made by the juror during deliberations. Another significant fact is that the 
juror spontaneously disclosed the bias to a person unconnected to the parties 
and their counsel, and not in response to prying questions by the parties or 
their counsel. We stress these points to limit our holding in this case to cases 
with comparable circumstances.
¶15 We also stress these points to make it clear that this Court does not 
condone jurors impeaching verdicts, or disclosing statements made by other 
jurors during deliberations. Neither do we endorse efforts by the parties or 
their counsel to discover a juror's thoughts or personal decision-making 
process. In a few words, the shocking circumstances of this rogue juror are an 
absolute factual anomaly that we hope is never to be seen again in Oklahoma 
jurisprudence. We caution that we will not permit the holding in this case to be 
used to manufacture a ground for new trial, but we are likewise not hesitant to 
afford the remedy of new trial free from bias, if such circumstances are ever 
repeated.
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION 
VACATED;JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED.7 

¶16 TAYLOR, 
C.J., COLBERT, V.C.J., EDMONDSON, REIF, and COMBS, JJ., concur.
¶17 WINCHESTER, J., dissent.
¶18 KAUGER, J., not participating.
¶19 WATT, J., disqualified.
¶20 GURICH, J., recused. 
FOOTNOTES
1 In applying Article 2, 
Section 6, the Court of Criminal Appeals has declared that "trial before an 
unprejudiced and impartial jury . . . is a basic principle underlying our jury 
system." Bickell v. State, 1928 OK CR 285, 270 P. 88, 89. 
2 "A fundamental requirement of due process is a fair and 
impartial trial." Clark v. Board of Education of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 89, 
2001 OK 
56, ¶ 6, 32 P.3d 851, 854 (footnote omitted). The same general principles to ensure the 
impartiality of a judge acting as a trier of the fact would apply with equal 
force to a juror performing that role. Personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party makes a judge ineligible to act either as a trier of fact or a trier of 
law, and requires disqualification. Rule 2.11(A)(1) and (C), 5 O.S.2011, App. 4. 
Also, "[a] challenge to an assigned judge for want of impartiality presents an 
issue of constitutional dimension." Clark, 2001 OK 56 at ¶ 7, 32 P.3d  at 854 (italics omitted). 

3 The United States Supreme Court has said "[its] duty is 
not limited to the elaboration of constitutional principles [but the Court] must 
also in proper cases review the evidence to make certain that those principles 
have been constitutionally applied." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964). In such cases, "it [is] only natural that [the Court] 
should conduct an independent review of the evidence on the dispositive 
constitutional issue." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 
508 (1984); see Tsotaddle v. Absentee Shawnee Housing Authority, 
2001 OK CIV APP 
23, ¶ 15, 20 P.3d 153, 159 ("Where a case involves a violation of constitutional rights, an 
appellate court shall exercise its own independent judgment on questions of both 
law and interpretation of facts." (citation omitted)). 
4 In his testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the 
attorney quoted the juror as saying "he (the juror) wasn't going to let that 
black lady get a verdict." The attorney related that the juror also talked about 
a black juror and stated, "She was really hard for us to bring around" and "We 
had a hard time winning that . . . black lady over. We knew she was a liberal." 
On cross-examination, the attorney acknowledged that the juror did not use any 
"expletives" regarding race, but expressed a dislike for African-Americans by 
the tone of voice the juror used in referring to the plaintiff as "that black 
lady" and the African-American juror as "that black juror." When asked by the 
trial judge whether the juror was expressing dislike for the plaintiff 
African-American, as opposed to expressing dissatisfaction with the juror who 
was African-American, the attorney replied that the juror "spoke of two 
African-Americans, the plaintiff and what I believe he said was another woman 
juror. And he talked about them at separate times, and he used the same words 
and the same inflection and I - - I was left with an impression that he disliked 
African-Americans." 
5 In general, a trial court's denial of a motion for new 
trial is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. Bank of Oklahoma, N.A. 
v. Red Arrow Marina Sales & Service, Inc. 2009 OK 77, ¶ 11, 224 P.3d 685, 693. However, the standard of review to 
be employed by an appellate court in review of a claim of error is not 
determined by the procedural device by which an issue is presented for decision. 
A standard of review is the legal scale to be used by an appellate court in 
weighing a claim of error. Unified School District No. 500 v. Robinson, 
940 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1997) (syllabus 3). A standard of review provides the 
degree of deference the decision under review should receive. Unified, 940 P.2d  at 4. A trial court's decision on the issue of juror bias is an issue 
of constitutional dimension that implicates the right to a fair trial guaranteed 
by no less than three constitutional provisions as more fully discussed in ¶ 1 
and its footnotes. An issue of this magnitude, like the issue of jurisdiction, 
calls for independent, non-deferential de novo review as explained in footnote 
3. 
6 Our decision on the issue of juror bias is dispositive 
of this appeal and we do not address plaintiffs' claim of error regarding the 
trial court's refusal to instruct on res ipsa loquitur. At trial on remand, the 
trial court is free to decide whether a res ipsa loquitur instruction should be 
given based on the evidence adduced at trial. 
7 Plaintiffs only appealed the denial of their motion for 
new trial in regard to their claims against defendants Kristi M. Saunders, M.D., 
and Kathryn Reilly, M.D. The trial court's judgment is reversed and remanded 
only as to these defendants. The judgment is otherwise final and undisturbed as 
to the other named defendants.

COMBS, J., WITH WHOM COLBERT, V.C.J., JOINS, CONCURRING:
¶1 I fully concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to convey my 
opinion as to the scope of today's pronouncement. The facts in this case present 
a balancing test as to an individual's right to jury trial before an unbiased 
and impartial jury guaranteed by Okla. Const., art. II, § 6, and the provisions 
of 12 O.S., § 
2606 (B), that limit the inquiry of a juror for post-verdict testimony, 
thereby preserving finality of judgments, and protecting jurors from inquiry by 
unhappy non-prevailing litigants. I must fall on the side of our fundamental 
right to a jury of our peers, unbiased, unprejudiced, and impartial.
¶2 This opinion, however, must not be viewed as opening the floodgates to 
challenge, post trial, each and every jury verdict, by reason of disappointment 
in the results of a fairly-tried dispute, to an impartial and unbiased trier of 
fact. 
¶3 The limitation on the authority of courts to inquire into the reasons 
underlying a jury verdict does not mean a juror should disregard the courts' 
instructions. We do not prohibit racial bias in jury selection only to encourage 
racial bias in jury deliberations. See, Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986). Once seated 
a juror should not have autonomy as to racial bias. A juror who allows racial 
bias to influence or dictate an assessment of the case violates their oath as a 
juror. 12 O.S. 1991, § 
72, OUJI Instruction 1.3, OUJI Instruction 1.5:
Remember that under our justice system the race, religion, national origin, 
or social status of a party or his/her attorney must not be considered by you in 
the discharge of your sworn duty as a juror.
See also, Coddington v. State, 2006 OK CR 34, ¶¶10-17, 142 P.3d 437, 443-445, and Grant v. State, 
2009 OK CR 
11, ¶¶20-28, 205 P.3d 1, 14-15.
¶4 The facts of this case, must be viewed very narrowly. The juror openly 
volunteered to a total stranger his predilection to deny the litigants a fair 
trial. The stranger happened to be a member of the Oklahoma Bar Association 
whose very oath as an attorney includes the support and defense of the Oklahoma 
Constitution. If we allow the open, intentional destruction of the justice 
system, by jurors whose agenda is to deny to others the basic principles of 
equality and justice by reason of personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, 
we erode the pillars of our constitution. 

WINCHESTER, J., dissenting:
¶1 Prior to today, litigants in Oklahoma have always been subject to an abuse 
of discretion standard for review of cases involving the denial of a motion for 
new trial.1 Today's majority opinion eviscerates this long-standing 
precedent and substitutes the more stringent, de novo standard of review in its 
place. In doing so, the majority has created a vague, two-tiered approach in 
which to review a trial court's decision on whether to grant a motion for new 
trial and opens the door to discovery of the mental impressions of jurors on 
post-verdict attacks. The consequence is that trial judges, litigants, and 
citizens still do not know what level of trust we will place in the 
determinations made by the trial court in post-trial juror challenges of this 
type. 
¶2 I dissent to today's majority opinion because I would affirm the jury 
verdicts in the underlying matter and accept the judgment of the trial court, 
which was reached after a comprehensive evidentiary hearing on the matter, that 
this juror was able to evaluate the evidence on its own merit and decide the 
case fairly. To hold otherwise will invite the arbitrary and unnecessary removal 
of jurors and initiation of costly retrials. Moreover, such holding will also 
undermine the purpose of § 2606(B). The trial judge is well aware of the 
necessity of fairness and justice, and occupies a much-advantaged position for 
evaluating juror bias on a case-by-case basis, having tried this case for over a 
week.
¶3 Here, Plaintiffs seek a new trial, in accordance with 12 O.S. §651(2), claiming that the misconduct of a 
juror caused them to receive an unfair trial. My colleagues presume racial bias 
on the part of the juror based on nothing more than another bar patron's 
impressions as to a post-trial conversation he had with the juror while 
at a bar.2 In doing so, the majority wholly disregards the juror's 
denial of the alleged racial statements as well as the trial judge's evaluation 
of the credibility of all testimony presented. This Court did not observe 
firsthand the testimony of the bar patron like the trial court did.
¶4 We have always held that the trial court has great responsibility and wide 
discretion in dealing with a motion for new trial based on allegations of juror 
misconduct.3 Something more than unverified conjecture is necessary 
to justify the grant of a new trial where only potentially suspicious 
circumstances are shown. United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778, 787 (4th 
Cir. 1982). Further, even when juror bias is actually shown, not every incident 
requires a new trial. Misconduct must be clearly shown and there must be a 
reasonable suspicion that the misconduct improperly influenced the verdict. 
Mullinix Construction Co. v. Myers, 1960 OK 241, ¶31, 258 P.2d 187, 192 (alleged juror 
perjury during voir dire without clear showing of bias or prejudice is 
insufficient for new trial on grounds of juror misconduct).
¶5 Although I find it reprehensible for anyone, let alone a juror, to utter 
deprecatory racist remarks, Plaintiffs in this case have failed to show that any 
juror conduct denied them a fair trial. Plaintiffs' allegations of racial bias 
are comprised of the following testimony from the Plaintiffs' witness regarding 
an alleged, post-verdict conversation he had with the juror at a bar:
"Q. You did not put in your affidavit that Mr. Fendrych was prejudiced 
against blacks, did you?
"A. Well, what I said was as close as I could recall. He did not use--he did 
not use any expletives with regard--I mean, he--he expressed a dislike for 
African Americans. That is the most succinct way I can--and accurate way I can 
say it.
"Q. Is that a quote?
"A. It's not a quote. It's my words saying he expressed a dislike.
"Q. Can you quote what he said that led you to that belief?
"A. It was a number of things. He--it's a--it's a tone of voice we recognize 
when someone says "that black lady," or "that black juror." I formed an 
impression based on tone of voice and conduct.
"Q. But your impression didn't rise to the level where you put in the 
affidavit that you felt he was prejudiced against or biased against blacks, did 
it?
"A. That's correct."
The trial judge also interrogated the witness:
"The Court: How can you separate out that he was not expressing some 
dissatisfaction with that person, as opposed to the plaintiff, who was African 
American?
"The Witness: I can't, Judge. I mean, I'm just trying--I had that impression. 
And I got it only by tone of voice and there were no, you know, racial 
slurs.
"The Court: But you don't--I mean, you're not saying that he said that he 
disliked the plaintiff African American? I mean, we have different African 
Americans here, and you have one that you've expressed several times that he was 
exasperated perhaps with that juror.
"The Witness: But with regard to--he spoke of two African Americans, the 
plaintiff and what I believe he said was another woman juror. And he talked 
about them at separate times, and he used the same words and the same inflection 
and I--I was left with an impression that he disliked African Americans.
"The Court: But you can't recall the specific words?
"The Witness: No. But I can tell you, I mean--I can tell you in-- absolutely 
no expletives were used."
And finally:
"Q. Other than the tone of voice and using the word "black," there's no other 
basis for your judgment that Mr. Fendrych disliked African Americans; is that a 
true statement? 
"A. That is a true statement."
Here, the district court had the opportunity to observe the entire trial 
proceedings, and the court instructed the jury to decide the case based on 
evidence received during trial and not from any other source. The court also 
instructed the jury it must be fair and impartial, it must treat everyone equal 
under the law, it should not be prejudiced against or biased for a person for 
such reasons as race, and its decision must not be influenced by sympathy or 
emotion. A jury is generally presumed to follow instructions. See Sides v. 
John Cordes, Inc., 1999 OK 36, ¶17, 981 P.2d 301, 307-308 (constitutional right to trial by 
jury "imposes upon the appellate courts the obligation to accord on review the 
greatest deference to the determination by the trier of fact," and prohibits an 
appellate court from substituting its subjective view for that of the jury 
unless the latter's decision is "manifestly wrong"). 
¶6 In this case, the trial court erred on the side of caution and opted to 
hold an evidentiary hearing on the matter of the juror's alleged bias. At such 
hearing, testimony was taken from the juror and the witness, based on an alleged 
conversation the two had while drinking in a bar, and the trial court directly 
observed the tone of voices, mannerisms and other characteristics that could 
reflect upon a person's credibility but that are beyond the inherently limited 
review capabilities of an appellate court. The trial court evaluated the 
credibility of Plaintiffs' bias claims and rejected the suggestion that 
Plaintiffs did not receive a fair trial only after weighing all of the 
evidence.4 This is the exact constitutional due process required 
to ensure a fair trial and it is completely unnecessary for an appellate court 
to engage in a full-scale, non-deferential review to substitute its view for 
that of the trial court. On this record, we cannot conclude that the trial 
court's decision about the effect of the alleged juror misconduct was arbitrary, 
capricious, or unreasonable, or a misapplication of the law. Certainly, there 
was no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, I dissent.
¶7 Additionally, the majority claims that because the juror's alleged 
statements occurred outside the jury deliberation room, the anti-impeachment 
rule of § 2606(B) is not implicated. Although I would not delve into the 
admissibility of the juror's testimony as I believe there is no evidence to 
overturn the trial court's ruling under an abuse of discretion standard, I 
disagree that the juror's statements do not fall within the ambit of § 2606(B). 
The majority relies on the alleged statements solely to challenge the validity 
of the verdict and, therein, the mental processes utilized by the juror in 
reaching his vote for the verdict. Clearly, this is the very purpose for the 
existence of § 2606(B). The fact that the alleged statements were uttered 
outside the jury deliberation room has no bearing on whether they strike at the 
core of the juror's thought process. 
¶8 As the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized in Keller v. State, 
1982 OK CR 159, ¶18, 651 P.2d 1339, 1343, "public policy dictates that jurors 
will not be permitted to impeach their verdict after they have been discharged 
and have mingled with the public." The Keller court further found: 
It is not only against public policy, but it would be opening the doors of 
the courts to the practice of fraud and perjury. Litigants against whom verdicts 
had been rendered would be continually importuning jurors and attempting to 
obtain from them statements and affidavits upon which such verdicts could be 
assailed. There would be no end to litigation. It would destroy the very purpose 
of trial by jury…
Keller v. State, 1982 OK CR 159, ¶19, 651 P.2d 1339, 1343. 
¶9 Here, the majority attempts to distinguish between types of juror 
misconduct and argues that a heavier burden should exist in cases where there is 
even a hint of racial bias. The Tenth Circuit addressed this very topic in 
U.S. v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2008), and rejected the 
defendant's attempt to characterize racial bias as a more serious and 
fundamental danger to the justice system than other types of juror misconduct.5 In Benally, the 
court recognized that while racial bias may be especially odious, it would be 
difficult to fashion a distinction which would allow juror impeachment 
testimony, contra to Rule 606(b), in only the "most serious" cases of alleged 
juror misconduct. U.S. v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1241 (10th Cir. 2008). 
The Benally court reasoned that no principled reason exists "to limit the 
exception only to claims of bias, when other types of jury misconduct undermine 
a fair trial as well":
If a jury does not follow the jury instructions, or ignores relevant 
evidence, or flips a coin, or falls asleep, then surely that defendant's right 
to a fair trial would be aggrieved, just as Mr. Benally's was. How could we deny 
that defendant a chance to use juror testimony to seek a new trial, simply 
because the jury misconduct did not involve racial prejudice? But if every claim 
that, if factually supported, would be sufficient to demand a new trial warrants 
an exception to Rule 606(b), there would be nothing left of the Rule, and the 
great benefit of protecting jury decision-making from judicial review would be 
lost. 
U.S. v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1241 (10th Cir. 
2008).
¶10 The majority claims that the injection of alleged racial bias in this 
case requires a heightened standard of review because of the constitutional 
right to a fair and impartial trial. However, the determination of whether a 
juror is biased in favor of one of the parties, and whether such bias renders a 
fair and impartial trial impossible, has always been a matter this Court has 
left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Only in cases where the trial 
court has been shown to abuse that discretion have we overturned its ruling. If 
a juror engages in misconduct, whether such misconduct consists of race, gender, 
or age discrimination, or just plain incompetence,6 the end result is the 
same and that is the suggestion that a fair and constitutional trial cannot be 
had due to such misconduct. Regardless, our standard of review has steadfastly 
remained abuse of discretion. Because I believe today's decision will allow 
arbitrary and open-ended post-verdict inquiries to jeopardize the important 
policies underlying § 2606(B) and will impose additional costs on the parties, 
jurors and the judiciary, I respectfully dissent. 
FOOTNOTES
1 See, e.g., Rice v. 
Emerson, 1937 OK 
568, ¶ 8, 72 P.2d 498, 500; Parrish v. Lilly, 1993 OK 80, ¶ 9, 883 P.2d 158, 160; and Capshaw v. Gulf Ins. Co., 
2005 OK 5, ¶7, 107 P.3d 595. In Capshaw, we held that an 
"appellate court's standard of review is not mere ritualistic legal liturgy. It 
defines the permissible sweep of critical testing to be undertaken by a 
reviewing court. Its recitation must be correct and serve more significantly 
than as an empty gesture." Capshaw v. Gulf Ins. Co., 2005 OK 5, ¶7, 107 P.3d 595. 
2 In fact, the witness, a member of the Oklahoma Bar 
Association, also happens to be an admitted friend of Plaintiff's counsel, 
maintaining his contact information in his cell phone and to whom he referred 
another friend for the job of paralegal with Plaintiff's counsel's firm. 
Moreover, instead of contacting the court regarding his conversation with the 
juror, as he is required to do, the witness called Plaintiff's counsel to 
discuss the matter with him. 
3 See Rice v. Emerson, 1937 OK 568, ¶ 8, 72 P.2d 498, 500 ("A very large discretion is vested 
in the court in determining the competency and qualifications of jurors, and its 
action should never be disturbed by an appellate court, unless an abuse of such 
discretion is clearly apparent.")(quoting Bradford v. Territory of Okla. ex 
rel. J.H. Woods, 2 Okla. 228, 37 P. 1062); Parrish v. Lilly, 
1993 OK 80, ¶ 9, 883 P.2d 158, 160 (abuse of discretion standard applied 
in reviewing denial of new trial based on juror racial bias) . See also, 
McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 
559, 104 S. Ct. 845, 851, 78 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1984)(Justice Brennan, with whom 
Justice Marshall joins, concurring in the judgment)("Motions for new trial on 
the basis of juror bias are left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and 
its determination should not be lightly disturbed by an appellate court. This is 
especially true when decision on the motion turns, as it does here, on the 
particular facts and circumstances involved."). 
4 The "[c]redibility of witnesses and effect and weight 
to be given to conflicting or inconsistent testimony are questions of fact to be 
determined by trier of facts, whether court or jury, and not questions of law 
for the Supreme Court on appeal." Central Plastics Co. v. Goodson, 
1975 OK 71, ¶ 29, 537 P.2d 330, 335. See also Video Independent 
Theatres, Inc. v. Cooper, 1966 OK 219, 421 P.2d 833.
5 This Court has looked to federal case law guidance 
interpreting Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) as it is substantially similar to § 2606(B). 
Willoughby v. City of Oklahoma City, 1985 OK 64, ¶ 12, 706 P.2d 883, 887.
6 See, e.g., Tanner v. U.S., 483 U.S. 107, 
107 S. Ct. 2739, 97 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1987)("evidentiary hearing including jury 
testimony on drug and alcohol use was not required under Sixth Amendment right 
to trial by competent and unimpaired juries").