Case Title: Gardner v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR97-785

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1998-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Scotty Ray GARDNER v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-785                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 26, 1998


1.   Appeal & error -- failure to object waived argument that trial court was
     vindictive in imposing consecutive sentences. -- To the extent that
     appellant claimed that the trial court was vindictive in
     imposing consecutive sentences, the supreme court concluded
     that the argument was waived by the failure to object to the
     imposition of consecutive sentences, and more particularly by
     the failure to object that the imposition of consecutive
     sentences violated appellant's due-process rights.

2.   Appeal & error -- prosecutorial vindictiveness -- trial court's finding
     reviewed for clear error. -- The supreme court reviews a trial
     court's finding regarding prosecutorial vindictiveness for
     clear error.

3.   Constitutional law -- prophylactic rule -- due process requires that
     vindictiveness play no part in sentence defendant receives after new trial.
     -- Under a prophylactic rule fashioned by the United States
     Supreme Court to protect against a sentencing authority
     imposing a greater sentence following a defendant's exercise
     of his right to appeal, when a defendant has successfully
     attacked his first conviction, due process requires that
     vindictiveness play no part in the sentence he receives after
     a new trial; due process requires that a defendant be freed of
     apprehension of a retaliatory motivation on the part of the
     sentencing judge so that the defendant will not be deterred
     from exercising his right to appeal or collaterally attack his
     first conviction. 

4.   Constitutional law -- reasons for imposing more severe sentence after new
     trial must affirmatively appear. -- To assure the absence of a
     retaliatory motivation, whenever a judge imposes a more severe
     sentence after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must
     affirmatively appear.

5.   Constitutional law -- prophylactic rule on vindictiveness applies to
     prosecutors. -- The Supreme Court's prophylactic rule regarding
     vindictiveness has been extended to prosecutors.

6.   Constitutional law -- convicted person exercising right to de novo trial
     should be free of apprehension of substitution of more serious charge. -- 
     A person convicted of an offense should be free of
     apprehension of the substitution of a more serious charge,
     subjecting that person to increased penalties and other
     collateral consequences, once that person exercises his
     statutory right to a de novo trial. 

7.   Constitutional law -- presumption of vindictiveness limited -- reasonable
     likelihood of actual vindictiveness in sentencing necessary. -- The
     Supreme Court has limited the presumption of vindictiveness to
     circumstances in which there is a reasonable likelihood that
     the increase in sentence is the product of actual
     vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority; where
     there is no such reasonable likelihood, the burden remains
     upon the defendant to prove actual vindictiveness.

8.   Constitutional law -- establishing claim for prosecutorial vindictiveness -
     - actual vindictiveness. -- A defendant may establish actual
     vindictiveness by proving objectively that the prosecutor's
     charging decision was motivated by a desire to punish him for
     doing something that the law plainly allowed him to do; this
     is an extremely difficult burden for the defendant to satisfy
     because it involves proving the prosecutor's state of mind.

9.   Constitutional law -- little objective evidence of actual vindictiveness -
     - failed to satisfy appellant's burden. -- In this case, there was
     little objective evidence of actual vindictiveness in the
     record; while at one time defense counsel alleged that the
     prosecutor's remarks during trial that appellant was "abusing
     the system" constituted evidence of actual vindictiveness,
     this evidence failed to satisfy the defendant's burden to
     prove actual vindictiveness.

10.  Constitutional law -- appellant established prima facie due-process
     violation in charging. -- The supreme court held that appellant
     had established a prima facie due process violation by showing
     that the State added a charge against him so as to expose him
     to a greater range of punishment following the successful
     collateral attack of his guilty plea; thus, the case turned on
     whether the State sufficiently rebutted a presumption of
     vindictiveness.

11.  Constitutional law -- presumption of vindictiveness -- how overcome. --
     The presumption of vindictiveness may be overcome by objective
     information in the record justifying the increased sentence or
     by objective evidence justifying the prosecutor's action.

12.  Constitutional law -- presumption of vindictiveness -- objective
     explanation on record sufficient to rebut. -- In the case of added
     counts, a prosecutor should be able to rebut a presumption of
     vindictiveness with an objective, on-the-record explanation.

13.  Constitutional law -- prosecutor produced objective evidence to justify
     addition of habitual-offender count -- trial court did not err in allowing
     State to amend information. -- Where the prosecutor produced
     objective, on-the-record evidence from which the trial court
     could find a sufficient justification for the addition of a
     habitual-offender count, the supreme court could not say that
     the trial court was clearly erroneous in allowing the State to
     amend the information to add the habitual count.

     Appeal from Arkansas Circuit Court; Russell Rogers, Judge;
affirmed.
     Alvin Schay, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Brad Newman, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.
     This case presents a question concerning the law of
prosecutorial vindictiveness.  The appellant purported to enter a
guilty plea which was subsequently vacated on federal habeas
review.  On retrial, the appellant was charged as a habitual
offender based on prior felony convictions, most of which had
occurred prior to the appellant's initial plea attempt.  The
trial court denied the appellant's motion to dismiss the habitual
charge based on prosecutorial vindictiveness.  We find no error
and affirm.   
     On November 8, 1990, Scotty Ray Gardner was charged with two
counts of criminal attempt to commit first-degree murder in
Arkansas County Circuit Court.  While the case was set for a jury
trial on November 15, 1991, Gardner purported to enter a guilty
plea to the two counts at a hearing on October 23, 1991.  On
October 30, 1991, the trial court sentenced Gardner to two
concurrent terms of thirty years' imprisonment, with seven years
of each term suspended.
     In an unpublished opinion, this court affirmed the denial of
Gardner's Rule 37 petition and his petition to withdraw the plea. 
Gardner v. State, No. CR 94-559 (Ark. slip op. Feb. 27, 1995). 
However, the United States District Court, Eastern District of
Arkansas, found that the trial court failed to establish a
factual basis for the guilty plea, and impermissibly sentenced
Gardner without his presence or the presence of counsel. 
Accordingly, on January 11, 1996, the District Court ordered the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus conditioned on Gardner's
rearraignment and retrial.
     On February 13, 1996, the prosecuting attorney filed an
amended information charging Gardner as a habitual offender with
four or more felonies pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  5-4-501 (Repl.
1997).  While at trial on July 11, 1996, Gardner objected to the
amendment of the habitual-offender count, arguing that the
amendment constituted a penalty for the exercise of his rights. 
He moved that the case should proceed as originally charged.  The
prosecutor explained as follows:  
The Court is well aware that a lot of times we don't
complete our review of somebody's criminal record until
well -- until just before trial, and it's not at all
uncommon for me to amend to allege habitual status a
week before trial, just as long as I let defense
counsel know.  In this case also, we have an additional
conviction after Mr. Gardner -- after we all thought
Mr. Gardner had plead [sic] guilty, which changed the -
- changed the statue even more.  He has Oklahoma
convictions; he has Fort Smith convictions.  He has
Cleveland County charges that were dismissed as a
result of what we thought was a plea here.  And then he
subsequently had escape charges in Arkansas County.  He
is a habitual offender.  And I think the State is
entitled -- he walked up there and we thought plead
[sic] guilty.  And I think the State is entitled to
amend at any point in time.  And I have told [defense
counsel], well, I think I amended probably in January
or February, as soon as I found this thing was being
remanded, and I was able to complete my -- complete my
checking of his -- of his past record."    

The trial court asked whether Gardner could have been charged as
a habitual before, to which the prosecutor responded in the
affirmative for "small habitual."  When asked again why Gardner
was not charged as a habitual offender initially, the prosecutor
states that: 
Your Honor, I had never gotten that far along.  He
walked up -- we had never gotten that far along in --
in trial preparation.  There are a lot of times that we
don't -- until I see a case is going to trial I don't
get certified copies of these things simply because
they charge me every time I get a copy from Oklahoma,
or Fort Smith, or wherever.  We didn't get close enough
to trial.  We walked up there and plead [sic] guilty to
the Court.  I didn't -- [defense counsel] might have an
argument if I had extended him an offer of twenty-three
years, and that was based upon a plea arrangement that
we reached and then he set it aside.  He refused, or
rejected my first offer.  And I did not tell the Court
I wasn't going to extend him an offer.  I said, "He has
rejected my offer.  I don't feel obligated to extend
him another one."  

* * *

And since then I have talked to the victims, and the
victims have both said they want their day in court. 
And -- and in this type of situation, I think I have
got to give them -- give them some deference, Judge.   


Following jury selection, an in-chambers hearing was held where
the prosecutor further explained that:
[A]fter we discussed the issue of the alleged
prosecutorial vindictiveness, I went back to and looked
at the escape Information that was charged -- filed
against Mr. Gardner in 1991, to which he pled and
received a sentence of four years.  He was charged as a
habitual offender at that time.  That was well before
there was any guilty plea set aside or anything else. 
And based upon that, I would -- I would offer that as
further evidence that there is no prosecutorial
vindictiveness in this case."  

     Following the close of the State's case-in-chief, Gardner
again objected to the increase in severity and moved that the
case be submitted only on the original charges.  The prosecutor
responded with the escape information that he filed against
Gardner in 1991, stating that he charged Gardner as a habitual
"some five -- four or five years before this guilty plea was set
aside."  While the jury was deliberating during the guilt phase, 
defense counsel once again objected to the addition of the
habitual charge.  The prosecutor responded as follows:
To bring anybody who ever uses this record up to date,
Mr. Gardner was arrested in November.  He was ordered
committed to the State Hospital -- the Southeast
Arkansas.  That was done, examination on 12-10.  They
recommend that he be seen at the State Hospital.  All
of which delays any -- any decision.  He was out on
bond, he was seen and examined by them, that -- that
report came down May the eighteenth, or May of '91,
sometime.  Mr. Gardner then went to Oklahoma.  His bond
was revoked.  Upon his return to the state of Arkansas
he pled open-ended to the Court.  Now, I don't know
that there was ever a trial date set in this case.  I
believe I have got the option to amend the habitual
status at any point as long as the defendant has
reasonable notice.  It's also very important to point
out that when he was charged with the escape in
November of '91, that was an allegation of the habitual
offender status, well before he filed any motion with
the Federal Court.   I have said he is manipulating the
system speaking solely about what he has told the
various mental health professionals that have dealt
with him.  I would also point out that the Amended
Information was filed in February of 1996.  As soon as
I found out this case had been remanded, I knew that I
was intending to charge Mr. Gardner as a habitual and I
amended.  It's not like I did it just before trial. 
[Defense counsel] has known about it."    

The trial court ultimately denied Gardner's request that the case
be submitted as originally charged.  The felony convictions given
to the jury in support of the habitual count included a 1983
Oklahoma larceny of merchandise from a retailer plea, and an
Oklahoma unauthorized use of a vehicle plea on the same date. 
Gardner had also pleaded guilty in 1986 to theft of property in
Sebastian County, and to a 1992 second-degree escape in Arkansas
County.      
     Following the trial, the jury found Gardner guilty of one
count of criminal attempt to commit murder in the first degree
and one count of battery in the first degree, and imposed
sentences in the amount of thirty and twenty years' imprisonment,
respectively.  The jury also recommended that these sentences run
consecutively.  The trial court entered a judgment and commitment
order reflecting these sentences, and ordered that they be served
consecutively. 
     As set forth in Gardner's sole point on appeal, his only
argument for reversal is that the trial court erred in allowing
the prosecutor to amend the information to add the habitual-
offender charge.  However, a fair reading of the remainder of
Gardner's brief suggests that he additionally contends that the
trial court was vindictive in imposing consecutive sentences, as
opposed to the concurrent sentences originally imposed when the
purported guilty plea was entered.  To the extent that this is a
claim that the trial court was vindictive in imposing consecutive
sentences, we agree with the State that this argument was waived
by the failure to object to the imposition of consecutive
sentences, and more particularly by the failure to object that
the imposition of consecutive sentences violated his due-process
rights.  We now turn to Gardner's claim that he was denied due
process when the prosecutor amended the information against him
to add the habitual-offender count.  We review a trial court's
finding regarding prosecutorial vindictiveness for clear error. 
Horne v. State, 12 Ark. App. 301, 677 S.W.2d 856 (1984). 
     In North Carolina v. Pearce,