Case Title: Dawn M. Sands v. Menard, Inc.

Citation: 2008 WI 70

Docket Number: 2008AP001703

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
2010 WI 96 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP1703 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Dawn M. Sands, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Menard, Inc., 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 70 
Reported at: 318 Wis. 2d 206, 767 N.W.2d 332 
(Ct. App 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 21, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 5, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire   
 
JUDGE: 
Paul J. Lenz   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY and CROOKS, JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Beth Ermatinger Hanan, Shawn K. Stevens, and Gass Weber Mullins 
LLC, Milwaukee, and Webster A. Hart, Terry L. Moore, and Herrick 
& Hart, S.C., Eau Claire, and oral argument by Beth Ermatinger 
Hanan. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent Charles K. Maier, Daniel R. 
Shulman, Julie L. Boehmke, Jeremy L. Johnson, and Gray Plant 
Mooty Mooty & Bennett, P.A., Minneapolis, Minn., and John P. 
Richie and Richie Wickstrom and Wachs, LLP, Eau Claire, and oral 
argument by Daniel R. Shulman. 
 
An amicus curiae brief filed by William F. Bauer and Coyne, 
Schultz, Becker & Bauer, S.C., Madison, and Byron F. Egan and 
Jackson Walker L.L.P., Dallas, Tex., on behalf of Byron F. Egan, 
Pro Hac Vice. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 96
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2008AP1703 
(L.C. No. 
2007CV991) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Dawn M. Sands, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Menard, Inc., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 21, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 affirming an 
arbitration award that, among other things, ordered Dawn Sands' 
reinstatement to her position as Vice President and Executive 
General Counsel following her wrongful termination from Menard, 
Inc. ("Menard").  Menard has refused to reinstate Sands and 
challenges the reinstatement award on multiple grounds.  The 
                     
1 Sands v. Menard, 2009 WI App 70, 318 Wis. 2d 206, 767 
N.W.2d 332. 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
2 
 
root 
of 
Menard's 
challenge 
is 
that 
the 
attorney-client 
relationship between Menard and Sands has been so irretrievably 
damaged that the panel exceeded its authority by ordering 
reinstatement. 
¶2 
We agree with Menard that the panel exceeded its 
authority.  An arbitration panel exceeds its authority when its 
award violates strong public policy.  An attorney owes a 
fiduciary duty of loyalty to her clients, a duty so replete in 
our cases and in the Rules of Professional Conduct as to be 
axiomatic.  Such a duty is deeply rooted in our laws and 
embodies the strong public policy of the State of Wisconsin.  In 
this case, we conclude that by accepting reinstatement, Sands 
would be forced to violate her ethical obligations as an 
attorney.  Thus, we vacate the panel's award of reinstatement on 
the grounds that it is void as a violation of strong public 
policy.  Under the applicable employment discrimination laws, 
front pay is a substitute for reinstatement.  Accordingly, we 
vacate the panel's award of reinstatement and remand to the 
circuit court to determine an appropriate award of front pay. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Dawn Sands is a 1993 graduate of the William Mitchell 
College of Law.  In 1998, John Menard,2 founder and president of 
Menard, approached Sands, the sister of his then-girlfriend 
Debra Sands, about working for Menard's legal department.  John 
                     
2 This opinion will refer to Menard, Inc. as "Menard."  When 
referring to John Menard or Charlie Menard, we will use their 
full names. 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
3 
 
Menard told Sands he was dissatisfied with the performance of 
the legal department in general, and of David Coriden, Vice 
President and General Counsel, specifically. 
A. Sands' Tenure at Menard 
¶4 
On June 1, 1999, Sands began working in a newly-
created position at the corporate legal office of Menard.  John 
Menard asked Sands to assess and oversee the in-house legal 
department,3 including Coriden, and to create a title that 
reflected this oversight.  Sands adopted the title of Executive 
General Counsel.  In addition to her legal duties, Sands 
operated as the spokesperson for Menard, handling inquiries from 
the media and generally acting as a public representative for 
the company. 
¶5 
Based on her pre-hire discussions and agreement with 
John Menard, Sands expected to begin working at Menard with a 
salary of $56,000 per year.  On her first day at Menard, Sands 
learned that she was required to punch a clock and would be paid 
by the hour at a rate of $26.92 ($55,993.60 annually, plus 
overtime).  With this hourly rate, Sands could earn up to $40.38 
per hour for overtime (at time-and-a-half) and an additional 
$2.50 per hour for weekend hours worked. 
¶6 
On August 17, 1999, just months after Sands began 
working 
at 
Menard, 
Coriden 
was 
terminated 
following 
a 
                     
3 Menard's 
in-house 
legal 
department 
consisted 
of 
a 
corporate legal practice, real estate practice, and store 
counsel practice.  The record reflects that Sands oversaw a 
staff of somewhere between 11 and 17 attorneys during her 
tenure, plus paralegal and administrative support staff. 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
4 
 
disagreement with John Menard.  Sands then assumed all of 
Coriden's duties while continuing to oversee Menard's in-house 
legal department.  At the time of his termination, Coriden was 
paid a yearly salary of $104,999.96, plus a bonus.  Shortly 
after Coriden's termination, John Menard told Sands, "[I]f you 
are here in a year, wouldn't you like to be making over a 
hundred thousand?  If you are you will be." 
¶7 
In June 2001, after working for Menard for two years 
without any pay increases, Sands made verbal and written 
requests to John Menard to raise her salary to $70,000 per year.  
Menard responded by increasing her wage to $30.92 per hour (a 
$4.00 per hour raise), or $64,313.60 per year without overtime, 
effective July 29, 2001. 
¶8 
Over the next several years, Sands made repeated 
requests to John Menard for a pay raise.  In one written request 
dated November 24, 2004, Sands requested a pay increase to 
$56.59 per hour, the equivalent of $117,707 per year.  The memo 
explained that this proposed figure was based on Coriden's 
salary at the time of his termination in 1999, plus cost of 
living increases he would have received were he still employed 
at Menard.  In the memo, Sands stated that she was "doing at 
least an equal level of work" as Coriden had done.  Sands never 
received a second pay increase. 
¶9 
On March 18, 2005, Sands received an e-mail from Chief 
Operating Officer Charlie Menard stating that she was eligible 
for a bonus to be paid in 2006 if she signed an employment 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
5 
 
agreement and was evaluated by the "9-Block" evaluation system.4  
In late 2005, evaluation surveys on Sands were completed, but 
Sands never received the results or final report due to her 
termination.5 
B. Sands' Termination 
¶10 On January 11, 2006, Sands received an e-mail from 
Jessica Bierman of the corporate human resources office advising 
that Charlie Menard wanted a job description to include with a 
new compensation agreement.  Several e-mails were exchanged 
between Sands, Charlie Menard, and Bierman, including an e-mail 
from Sands to Charlie Menard dated January 20, 2006, which 
stated, "Not only do I WANT to get paid more, but, in point of 
fact, I MUST be paid more (in both cash as well as bonus) if you 
intend to avoid a lawsuit." 
¶11 In a meeting on that same day, Sands provided Bierman 
a binder that included a job description, a comparison of 
compensation packages with other high-level private sector 
executives around the country and her male comparators within 
Menard, a copy of Sands' November 24, 2004, memo to John Menard 
requesting a pay raise, and an Equal Employment Opportunity 
                     
4 In the "9-Block" evaluation system used at Menard, 
employees 
are 
scored 
based 
on 
"Menard 
Values" 
and 
job 
performance.  For the "Menard Values" portion, subordinates, 
peers, and managers are asked to evaluate the employee on 
characteristics including "team player, innovation, team member 
development, guest focus, leadership, integrity, passion for 
excellence, problem solving, and courtesy." 
5 The record does not indicate the results of these surveys 
or give any indication as to the general quality of Sands' work. 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
6 
 
Commission 
Publication 
entitled 
"Facts 
About 
Compensation 
Discrimination."  During the meeting, which lasted approximately 
90 minutes, Sands reviewed the binder with Bierman.  Sands 
stated that she believed she had grounds for a lawsuit because 
she was not receiving pay equal to Coriden or other top 
executives 
within 
Menard, including the chief information 
officer and the chief financial officer, all of whom were men.6 
¶12 After her meeting with Sands, Bierman gave the binder 
to Charlie Menard and told him about their meeting.  Later that 
afternoon, Charlie Menard approached Sands and asked, "[H]ow 
dare you threaten a Menard?"  Sands responded that she was not 
trying to threaten the company; she was "just trying to point 
out a legal reality" and explained that she believed she had a 
valid legal claim against Menard. 
¶13 A little over six weeks later, on Monday, March 6, 
2006, Charlie Menard entered Sands' office with a proposed 
employment contract.  The contract included a wage of $30.92 per 
hour and an unspecified bonus to be paid in March and July of 
2007.  Sands told Charlie Menard that this was the same wage she 
had received for approximately five years.  Charlie Menard then 
wrote "$50,029.98" on a Post-it note and affixed it to the 
second page of the contract, stating that this was the bonus she 
would receive if she continued to work for Menard for another 
                     
6 From 2003 to 2006, Sands made the following amounts as 
stated on her W-2 forms: $77,092 in 2003 and 2004; $81,177 in 
2005; and $29,372 in 2006 (from January 1 until her termination 
on March 14). 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
7 
 
year.  Sands responded, "I've been sitting here working my butt 
off and I get nothing.  I just get all these promises . . . .  
[W]hat is that, just a big lie to make me keep working?"  
Charlie Menard shrugged and said, "Worked, didn't it?"  Sands 
replied that as a 43-year-old woman with no one else to rely on, 
she needed to be concerned about her retirement.  Charlie Menard 
responded, "[W]hy don't you get married like every other girl?"  
Sands countered, "Charlie, you understand there is a law called 
the Equal Pay Act?"  Charlie Menard then told Sands that she 
would be unsuccessful at Menard if she continued to threaten the 
company with lawsuits, and asked if she was planning to sign the 
contract.  Sands replied that she did not know and was going to 
think about it. 
¶14 On Thursday and Friday of that week (March 9 and 10, 
2006), Sands went to Chicago on business for Menard.  The 
following Monday, March 13, 2006, Sands returned to the office 
and found a memo from Charlie Menard dated Thursday, March 9, 
2006, in her in-box.  In the memo, Charlie Menard communicated 
his belief that Sands was not likely to accept the proposed 
contract, that an agreement on compensation might not be 
possible, 
and 
that 
she 
should 
suggest 
some 
ways 
to 
professionally dissolve their relationship.7  Sands viewed this 
                     
7 The memo from Charlie Menard to Sands read as follows: 
I came away from our meeting on Monday with the 
feeling that my offer of additional compensation for 
you was not acceptable to you. 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
8 
 
as a threat to her job and did not immediately respond.  Later 
that evening, Charlie Menard sent a follow-up e-mail to Sands, 
requesting that she respond to the memo.   Sands replied that 
she would work on his request and get back to him. 
¶15 According to the arbitration panel, on the evening of 
Tuesday, March 14, 2006, Sands was preparing for a meeting in 
her office when John Menard stepped in.  "This isn't working, is 
it," he said.  "I'm sick to death of your not getting back to 
Charlie and you don't respond and your threats."  John Menard 
then instructed Sands to work out an agreement with Charlie 
Menard by the end of business the next day or she would be "all 
done."  Then he left her office. 
¶16 Moments later, John Menard returned and declared, 
"[Y]ou know what, you're all done right now.  Pick your shit up; 
I want your ass out of here.  You've got five minutes."  Sands 
asked if he was firing her.  John Menard stated that he was 
placing her on administrative leave.  Sands asked for a 
clarification 
and 
stated 
that 
Menard 
did 
not 
have 
an 
                                                                  
I would like to get this rectified with you and, to 
that end, please advise me with what you feel would be 
fair. 
I also came away with the feeling that there is a 
possibility that we can not come together on the 
issues.  I would like your advice on how we can 
professionally dissolve our relationship and what you 
feel might be a proposed timetable for doing so. 
If you could please jot down your thoughts on these 
subjects and send them to me at your earliest 
convenience, it would be appreciated. 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
9 
 
administrative leave policy.  John Menard repeated that Sands 
was on administrative leave, that she had better get moving, and 
that she now had only four minutes.  "[D]o you understand what 
you're doing right now is unlawful?"  Sands asked.  "I don't 
care," John Menard replied.  "I want your ass out of here." 
¶17 At some point during this encounter, Sands turned to 
her computer in an attempt to log off.  John Menard saw this, 
approached her from the other side of her desk with his hand in 
a fist, and ordered her to get away from the computer.  He then 
continued to tell Sands to get "[her] ass out of there" and that 
he wanted "[her] ass gone."  Sands collected a few personal 
items, and left with John Menard following her out of the 
building. 
¶18 Sands later testified that during this incident, she 
felt "intimidat[ed]" by John Menard, who seemed "out of 
control"; 
she 
further 
testified 
that 
she 
was 
"scared," 
"humiliated," and "so embarrassed" by these events.  The 
following day, John Menard had Sands' office door secured with a 
chain and padlock, which was removed a few days later when the 
lock was changed. 
¶19 Unsure of her status, Sands had her attorney send a 
letter to Menard on March 20, 2006, to confirm that she had been 
terminated and not placed on administrative leave, as John 
Menard had stated.  Sands received no response to this letter.  
During the ensuing weeks, Sands received a notice terminating 
her health insurance through Menard, along with other documents 
confirming she had been terminated.  Sands returned to Menard on 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
10 
 
April 21, 2006, to pick up the remainder of her personal 
belongings.  When she entered her former office, she found 
papers and books strewn everywhere, and furniture upturned.   
Within months of Sands' termination, three other employees left 
the corporate legal department.  In their exit interviews with 
Jessica Bierman, all three stated that the main reason they were 
leaving was because of how Sands had been treated. 
C. Arbitration and Award 
¶20 After her termination, Sands maintained that she had 
been defamed by Menard and was the victim of gender-based 
discrimination and then retaliation for claiming discrimination.  
Sands and Menard initially attempted to settle their dispute 
independently.  Among their efforts was a private meeting 
between Sands and John Menard in May 2006 that ultimately proved 
unsuccessful.  On October 23, 2006, Sands and Menard mutually 
agreed to enter into binding arbitration.8 
¶21 The 
arbitration agreement bound both parties to 
resolve "all disputes" arising from Sands' employment with 
Menard.  The agreement further provided "that both state and 
federal laws may apply and that Sands may be entitled to 
remedies under both."  The agreement also required Sands to 
identify "the nature of relief sought." 
                     
8 Around October 31, 2006, Sands was offered a job at the 
law firm of McDermott, Will & Emery with a starting salary of 
$250,000.  Sands declined the offer because "she was reluctant 
to start in private practice in one area." 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
11 
 
¶22 
During the arbitration hearings, Sands testified 
regarding her role and work at Menard and her concerns about the 
discrepancy in pay between herself, her predecessor, and other 
male executives at Menard.  She also described the circumstances 
leading up to and including her termination.  The panel 
determined that various Menard representatives attempted to 
influence witnesses during the arbitration proceedings.  The 
panel described one instance when John Menard called Debra 
Sands, Sands' sister, and stated, as Debra Sands recalled it, 
that "he did not want to talk about the case, but he wanted to 
tell me that I should seriously think about what I was doing and 
that he would hate to see my obituary in the paper anytime 
soon." 
¶23 During the arbitration hearings, Sands did not request 
to be reinstated to her position at Menard, but instead sought 
two years of front pay.  In fact, in a brief to the arbitration 
panel, Sands stated that "no reasonable person would entertain 
reinstatement as a possibility" in these circumstances.  Sands 
also argued that reinstatement would be inappropriate in light 
of John Menard and Menard's conduct towards her. 
¶24 On October 19, 2007, the arbitration panel came back 
with its written award.  While it rejected Sands' defamation9 and 
                     
9 Sands' 
defamation 
claims 
were 
based 
on 
various 
communications during and after her termination. 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
12 
 
Title VII pay discrimination claims,10 the panel found that Sands 
(1) was the victim of pay discrimination under the Equal Pay Act 
("EPA")11 due to Menard's failure to compensate her on par with 
Coriden; and (2) was discharged in retaliation for her assertion 
of her statutory rights to be free from pay discrimination in 
violation of the EPA, Title VII,12 and the Wisconsin Fair 
Employment Act.13 
¶25 Because of these violations, the panel awarded Sands 
various monetary damages.  She was awarded $267,108 in back 
wages14 and an equal amount in liquidated damages15 for disparate 
                     
10 A disparate pay claim under Title VII requires the intent 
to discriminate, that is, a desire to pay women less because 
they are women.  Loyd v. Phillips Bros., Inc., 25 F.3d 518, 525 
(7th Cir. 1994).  The panel concluded that Sands did not 
satisfactorily show that she was paid less because of her 
gender. 
11 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).  All subsequent references to 
the United States Code are to the 2006 version unless otherwise 
indicated.  An EPA pay discrimination claim does not require a 
showing of intent as is required under Title VII. 
12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)-(b).  Though the panel concluded 
that Sands did not prove her Title VII pay discrimination claim, 
the panel did find that she suffered an adverse employment 
action in retaliation for asserting her rights under Title VII. 
13 Wis. Stat. § 111.36 (2007-08).  All subsequent references 
to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless 
otherwise indicated. 
14 Back wages are the wages the employee should have 
received had he or she been paid appropriately.  Under the EPA, 
an employee may recover back wages for the two-year period 
immediately preceding his or her claim.  If a willful violation 
of the EPA is found to have occurred, the back pay period can be 
extended to three years, as it was in this case. 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
13 
 
pay and willful violation of the EPA; $114,944.71 in back pay 
and bonus for lost wages due to termination, as allowed by the 
EPA and Title VII; $100,000 in compensatory damages for 
emotional distress; and $900,000 in punitive damages.  Menard 
also was required to pay Sands' attorneys' fees, which totaled 
$129,120.25. 
 
In 
sum, 
Menard's 
obligations 
totaled 
$1,778,280.96. 
¶26 In addition to these monetary damages, the panel 
ordered that Sands be reinstated to the position of Vice 
President and Executive General Counsel within 30 days of the 
date of the award.  Sands' reinstatement was to come with a 
salary of $166,250, to be increased to $175,000 effective 
January 1, 2008.  The panel also ordered Menard to pay her a 
profit sharing bonus of 15% of her 2007 earnings. 
¶27 As justification for the reinstatement award, the 
panel noted that reinstatement is one of the remedies available 
for violation of the EPA and Title VII.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 215(a)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).  It also noted that 
front pay may be ordered in lieu of reinstatement when 
reinstatement is inappropriate, citing Williams v. Pharmacia, 
Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 951-52 (7th Cir. 1998).  The panel explained 
its decision thusly: 
In this case, Sands argues that reinstatement to her 
position . . . would be inappropriate in light of the 
company's, particularly John Menard's, conduct toward 
her.  Whether to award reinstatement or front pay to 
                                                                  
15 Liquidated damages under the EPA consist of an additional 
sum of money equal to the back wages already due to an employee. 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
14 
 
Sands is a difficult decision.  The Panel recognizes 
that John Menard clearly was hostile to Sands at and 
near the time of her termination (as well as toward 
her sister, Debra Sands, thereafter, including during 
the pendency of these proceedings), and that such a 
consideration could be a basis for awarding front pay 
in lieu of reinstatement.  On the other hand, not to 
reinstate Sands would, in some sense, reward the 
company for its mistreatment of her and, moreover, 
would tend to send the wrong message to company 
employees who otherwise might be inclined to make 
meritorious 
complaints 
about 
unlawful 
conduct 
occurring within the company. 
On balance, the Panel has concluded that reinstatement 
is the appropriate approach here, on the ground that 
reinstatement is the favored remedy under the law. 
¶28 After the arbitration award was handed down, Menard 
prepared a check for the full amount of the panel's monetary 
award.  In a letter to Sands, Menard indicated that the check 
was available to pick up, but that Menard would not reinstate 
Sands.  Despite many additional communications between the 
parties, Menard continued to refuse to reinstate Sands. 
D. The Case Goes to Court 
¶29 On December 20, 2007, Sands filed suit in the Circuit 
Court for Eau Claire County, Paul J. Lenz, Judge, seeking to 
clarify the arbitration award and subsequently confirm it.16  In 
                     
16 Before filing suit, Sands asked the arbitration panel to 
clarify the award, alleging that the panel made various 
computational errors and that her award should be increased.  
The panel, however, held that it had no jurisdiction to consider 
her 
request 
because 
Sands' 
motion 
did 
not 
truly 
seek 
clarification of the award, but was instead a motion to 
reconsider or correct the award, which the panel did not have 
the power to do. 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
15 
 
addition to other claims,17 Sands sought to compel Menard to 
abide by the terms of the reinstatement award.    Menard filed a 
motion to vacate the award in full or in part, maintaining that 
the attorney-client relationship is vital to a company, as is 
the right to choose counsel, and that because of their broken 
relationship, Sands could no longer represent Menard, Inc., the 
Menards brothers, or their interests.  Sands responded that she 
could represent Menard, and that she would accept reinstatement 
if she could be assured of her personal safety.  Judge Lenz 
confirmed the arbitration award in its entirety and denied all 
motions to modify, correct, or vacate the award. 
¶30 Menard appealed, again arguing that the arbitration 
panel disregarded the law by requiring reinstatement.  The court 
of appeals affirmed.  It concluded that reinstatement is a 
statutory remedy under the EPA and Title VII, and that neither 
provides an exception for in-house attorneys.  Sands v. Menard, 
2009 WI App 70, ¶10, 318 Wis. 2d 206, 767 N.W.2d 332.  The court 
of appeals held that the panel's reinstatement order rested on 
substantial authority, and that the panel did not manifestly 
disregard the law.  Id., ¶¶10-11.  Additionally, the court found 
that 
awarding 
front 
pay 
in 
lieu 
of 
reinstatement 
is 
discretionary, and courts do not review arbitration awards for 
erroneous exercise of discretion.  Id., ¶12.  To choose one over 
                     
17 Sands also argued that her damages were incorrectly 
calculated.  The circuit court denied Sands' motion to adjust 
the award. 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
16 
 
the other is not a manifest disregard of the law, the court 
reasoned.  Id. 
¶31 Menard then petitioned this court for review, which we 
accepted. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶32 The question before us is whether the arbitration 
panel exceeded its authority in ordering Sands' reinstatement.  
In Part A, we review the general legal framework governing 
reinstatement and front pay in allegations of the type here.  In 
Part B, we examine whether the panel exceeded its authority, 
concluding that the panel did overstep its bounds in ordering 
Sands' reinstatement.  In Part C, we discuss the appropriate 
remedy for the panel's error. 
A. Reinstatement and Front Pay Generally 
¶33 We first turn to a general overview of the remedial 
framework for Title VII violations,18 with a specific focus on 
the remedy of reinstatement. 
¶34 Under Title VII, courts may "order such affirmative 
action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not 
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or 
without back pay . . . , or any other equitable relief as the 
court 
deems 
appropriate." 
 
42 
U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(g)(1).  
Reinstatement is the preferred remedy for violations because 
this accords with making the victim of discrimination whole.  
                     
18 There do not appear to be significant differences in the 
remedial framework for retaliatory violations of the EPA, Title 
VII, and the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act. 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
17 
 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kallir, Philips, 
Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
¶35 However, reinstatement is not appropriate or even 
possible in all cases.  Numerous courts, including the Seventh 
Circuit, have held that front pay——compensation for projected 
future earnings——may be awarded in Title VII cases where 
reinstatement is unavailable or inappropriate.  Williams, 137 
F.3d at 951-52. 
¶36 Reinstatement may be inappropriate for a number of 
reasons.  Two such overlapping circumstances deserve further 
attention here. 
¶37 The most common situation where reinstatement is 
inappropriate is when the employer-employee relationship is 
"pervaded by hostility."  Id. at 952 (citing McNeil v. Econ. 
Lab., 
Inc., 800 F.2d 111, 118 (7th Cir. 1986)).  This 
unacceptably high level of hostility, however, cannot simply 
constitute employer-generated frustration over the lawsuit.  
McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 116 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
 
Refusing 
reinstatement 
because 
of 
the 
natural 
frustration an employer would feel when an employee files suit 
"would arm the employer to defeat the court's remedial order."  
Id.19  But courts have routinely recognized that granting 
reinstatement is not appropriate when animosity and hostility 
                     
19 See also Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 648 F.2d 1129, 1138-39 
(8th Cir. 1981) ("To deny reinstatement to a victim of 
discrimination merely because of the hostility engendered by the 
prosecution of a discrimination suit would frustrate the make-
whole purpose of Title VII."). 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
18 
 
are 
so 
extreme 
that 
"a 
productive 
and 
amicable 
working 
relationship would be impossible."  Sasser v. Averitt Express, 
Inc., 839 S.W.2d 422, 433 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).  Whether the 
level 
of 
hostility 
or animosity is too great to allow 
reinstatement depends on the facts of the case. 
¶38 In one case, a U.S. District Court considered an age 
discrimination suit (under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634) by the Chief Labor Counsel 
for Union Carbide who was forced to retire upon reaching his 
65th birthday.  Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 567 F. 
Supp. 1320, 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).  Though under a different 
statute, the basic analytical framework regarding reinstatement 
under Title VII and the ADEA is the same.20  The court held that 
reinstatement was not an appropriate remedy, and instead ordered 
front pay.  Id. at 1330.  It reasoned that: 
Carbide has exhibited such hostility and outrage 
against him by reason of his bringing suit, he would 
certainly have difficulty functioning in the Law 
Department. 
 
By 
all 
indications, 
he 
would 
be 
ostracized and excluded from the functions of giving 
counsel. 
                     
20 See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1180 
(2d Cir. 1992) (stating that interpretations of the ADEA rely on 
interpretations of Title VII because the substantive provisions 
of the ADEA were essentially copied from Title VII). 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
19 
 
Id.  Though Carbide's actions were without justification, the 
court stated, this level of employer-directed hostility rendered 
reinstatement too difficult.21  Id. 
¶39 In 
another 
case, 
a 
U.S. 
District 
Court 
denied 
reinstatement when an employer referred to the employee as a 
"cancer" and repeatedly attacked his abilities during trial.  
Cancellier v. Federated Dept. Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (affirming the District Court's front pay award).  
The trial judge concluded that the employee and employer could 
no longer "co-exist in a business relationship that would be 
productive to the consumer, community or to the business 
itself." 
 
Id. 
at 
1319-20. 
 
Hence, 
reinstatement 
was 
inappropriate.  Id. at 1320. 
¶40 Similarly, in Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., the Third 
Circuit affirmed an award of front pay in lieu of reinstatement 
because of "the likelihood of continuing disharmony in a 
sensitive job and the difficulty of policing an ongoing 
relationship."  747 F.2d 885, 890 (3d Cir. 1984).  The trial 
judge had explained its award as follows: 
I do not believe that either plaintiff or defendant 
would seriously contend that it would be sensible to 
order 
plaintiff 
reinstated 
to 
a 
job 
in 
which 
harmonious working relationships are so important 
after the acrimony this case has engendered, nor could 
I possibly draft an injunctive order that would 
effectively make the existing ill feelings disappear. 
                     
21 The 
Second 
Circuit 
affirmed 
the 
District 
Court's 
determination on appeal.  See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 
742 F.2d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1984). 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
20 
 
Id.  Again we see that where hostility makes a future working 
relationship impossible, reinstatement is not an appropriate 
remedy. 
¶41 Other courts have similarly found front pay to be more 
appropriate where 
antagonism and hostility render working 
relationships impossible.  See Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, 
Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th Cir. 1980) (affirming an award of 
front pay in lieu of reinstatement where the defendant had 
engaged in psychological warfare against the plaintiff and where 
reinstatement would have led to retaliation); Hoffman v. Nissan 
Motor Corp. in USA, 511 F. Supp. 352, 355 (D.N.H. 1981) (holding 
that ordering reinstatement would be inappropriate because it 
"would be a harbinger of disaster and a catalyst to more 
litigation").  We stress that this does not leave the victim of 
discrimination without remedy; front pay is available to make 
the victim whole. 
¶42 A 
second 
situation 
where 
reinstatement 
may 
be 
inappropriate is when the employee served in a managerial or 
unusually high-level role, as a representative to the public, or 
other such sensitive position.  Dickerson v. Deluxe Check 
Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 280 (8th Cir. 1983) ("Those cases 
in which courts have declined to reinstate injured plaintiffs 
have frequently involved high level, unique or unusually 
sensitive positions in defendant's organization.").  Success in 
these positions of trust is difficult or impossible when trust 
has 
been 
broken. 
 
Whether 
the 
position 
is 
such 
that 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
21 
 
reinstatement would be unworkable due to the break in the 
relationship again depends upon the facts of each case. 
¶43 In one such case, the Southern District of New York 
awarded front pay in lieu of reinstatement because of the "close 
working relationship between plaintiff and top executives."  
Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. at 926-27.  The court 
noted 
that 
the 
plaintiff 
had 
frequent 
contact 
with 
the 
employer's 
clients, 
"with plaintiff acting as defendant's 
representative."  Id. at 927.  The court explained: 
Lack 
of 
complete 
trust 
and 
confidence 
between 
plaintiff 
and 
defendant 
could 
lead 
to 
misunderstandings, misrepresentations and mistakes, 
and could seriously damage defendant's relationship 
with its clients.  The situation here is quite unlike 
that presented when reinstatement is sought for an 
assembly line or clerical worker, or even for an 
executive whose job is not as sensitive for his 
employer's interests as is plaintiff's job here.  The 
Court is convinced that after three and a half years 
of 
bitter 
litigation 
the 
necessary 
trust 
and 
confidence can never exist between plaintiff and 
defendant.  To order reinstatement on the facts of 
this case would merely be to sow the seeds of future 
litigation, and would unduly burden the defendant.  
Thus, reinstatement will not be ordered in this case. 
Id.  In light of the sensitive nature of the position and 
litigation "marked by more than the usual hostility between the 
parties," the court concluded that reinstatement was not 
appropriate.  Id. at 926-27. 
¶44 In Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 831 F.2d 1321 (7th 
Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1020 (1988), the 
Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of reinstatement for an 
employee who "was required to hold himself out to the public as 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
22 
 
a managerial representative of the employer."  Id. at 1331.  The 
court recognized that the public image of the business could be 
compromised by a hostile employer-employee relationship.  Id.  
The court also focused heavily on the need for trust and 
confidence in the plaintiff's managerial position, the lack of 
which made reinstatement inappropriate.  Id. 
¶45 Other cases make clear that the nature of the position 
is important to the determination of whether reinstatement is 
appropriate.  Hyland v. Kenner Prods. Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 1309 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (denying reinstatement to a 
person in a management position because she would possess 
confidential information but lack the trust and confidence of 
her superiors, and because the parties would not be able to 
establish 
a 
proper 
working 
relationship 
and 
were 
very 
antagonistic toward each other); Combes v. Griffin Television, 
Inc., 
421 
F. 
Supp. 841, 
846 
(W.D. 
Okla. 
1976) 
(denying 
reinstatement to a news anchorman where the "[d]iscord, tension, 
suspicion, antagonism and sensitivity among them would be 
productive of a very difficult employment environment, with the 
particular difficulty of being perceivable to the viewing 
audience"). 
¶46 These principles emerge from this analysis: While 
reinstatement is the preferred remedy under Title VII, it is an 
equitable remedy that may or may not be appropriate depending 
upon the facts of each case.  Where the level of hostility is 
unusually high, or where the position is a sensitive one 
requiring a high degree of trust and cooperation between 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
23 
 
management and the employee, reinstatement is generally not 
appropriate.22 
B. The Panel Exceeded Its Authority 
¶47 Menard challenges the reinstatement portion of the 
arbitration award on multiple grounds.  First, it alleges that 
the Wisconsin Constitution guarantees Menard its choice of 
counsel.  Second, Menard argues that reinstatement was not 
feasible and appropriate under governing case law and employment 
law.  Third, it maintains that the arbitrators lacked the 
authority 
under 
the 
arbitration 
agreement 
to 
order 
reinstatement.  Finally, Menard argues that the panel exceeded 
its authority by ignoring the Rules of Professional Conduct for 
attorneys.   
                     
22 See Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 861-62 
(7th Cir. 2001): 
[A] 
court 
is 
not 
required 
to 
reinstate 
a 
successful plaintiff where the result would be a 
working 
relationship 
fraught 
with 
hostility 
and 
friction.  Reinstatement in such situations could 
potentially cause the court to become embroiled in 
each and every employment dispute that arose between 
the 
plaintiff 
and 
the 
employer 
following 
the 
plaintiff's reinstatement. . . .  
. . . [R]einstatement 
may 
become 
particularly 
infeasible if the plaintiff would no longer enjoy the 
confidence 
and 
respect 
of 
his 
superiors 
once 
reinstated. 
 
Reinstatement 
may 
also 
be 
more 
problematic when the plaintiff holds a management 
position, 
or 
would 
be 
supervised 
by 
the 
same 
individuals who discriminated against him in the first 
place. (citations omitted). 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
24 
 
¶48 Our review of arbitration awards is limited.  Lukowski 
v. Dankert, 184 Wis. 2d 142, 149, 515 N.W.2d 883 (1994).  Our 
task is to ensure that the parties receive what they bargained 
for——the adjudication of their dispute via the arbitration 
process.  Id.  Though limited, a court's role is not a mere 
formality; a court must overturn an arbitrator's award when the 
panel exceeds its powers.  Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(d).  An 
arbitration panel exceeds its powers when it engages in perverse 
misconstruction 
or 
positive 
misconduct, 
when 
the 
panel 
manifestly disregards the law, or where the award itself is 
illegal or violates strong public policy.  Racine County v. 
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 2008 WI 70, ¶11, 
310 Wis. 2d 508, 751 N.W.2d 312.  Whether the panel's decision 
meets any of these standards is a question of law we review de 
novo.  Id. 
¶49 We conclude that an attorney's ethical obligations, 
particularly an attorney's duty of loyalty to her clients under 
our cases and the Rules of Professional Conduct, embody the 
strong public policy of the State of Wisconsin.  Therefore, an 
arbitration panel exceeds its powers when it orders the 
reinstatement of an attorney where reinstatement would clearly 
lead to a violation of that attorney's ethical obligations.  
Moreover, we are persuaded that the panel exceeded its authority 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
25 
 
here because reinstatement of Sands would cause her to violate 
her ethical obligations as an attorney.23 
¶50 It is a rare occasion for this court to overturn an 
arbitration award on public policy grounds.  The public policy 
exception to the general rule of judicial deference should be 
narrowly construed and limited to situations where the public 
policy "is well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained 
by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from 
general considerations of supposed public interests."  State v. 
New England Health Care Employees Union, 855 A.2d 964, 970 
(Conn. 2004).  A public policy violation must be clear, and the 
burden of proving such a violation rests with the party seeking 
to overturn the award.  Id. 
¶51 We stand on firm ground in this case, however, because 
this court has supervisory authority over the practice of law in 
Wisconsin.  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(1); State v. Cadden, 56 
Wis. 2d 320, 324, 201 N.W.2d 773 (1972).  The legal profession 
is unique in that it is mostly self-regulating with ultimate 
authority vested largely in the courts.  SCR ch. 20 Preamble 
(10).  As part of our oversight, we have adopted Rules of 
Professional Conduct to guide attorney conduct.  See SCR ch. 20.  
¶52 While the Rules vary in emphasis and importance, some 
rules are so deeply established as to embody the strong public 
policy of the State of Wisconsin.  For example, we could not 
                     
23 Because we are persuaded that the panel violated strong 
public policy in awarding Sands' reinstatement, we need not 
address Menard's other arguments. 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
26 
 
countenance an arbitration award that ordered an individual to 
engage in the unauthorized practice of law, or one that ordered 
an attorney to use funds from the attorney's trust account in a 
fashion prohibited by the Rules of Professional Conduct.  
Similarly, we cannot countenance an award that forces an 
attorney to represent a client when it is clear that the 
complete disintegration of mutual goodwill, trust, and loyalty 
renders ethical representation by that attorney impossible. 
¶53 Attorneys owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their 
clients.  Berner Cheese Corp. v. Krug, 2008 WI 95, ¶41, 312 
Wis. 2d 251, 752 N.W.2d 800.  This obligation of absolute 
loyalty means that attorneys are required to act solely for the 
benefit of their clients.  Zastrow v. Journal Commc'ns, Inc., 
2006 WI 72, ¶31, 291 Wis. 2d 426, 718 N.W.2d 51.  Several 
Supreme Court Rules are aimed at enforcing this duty, including 
the requirement in SCR 20:1.7(a)(2) that attorneys may not 
represent clients when "there is a significant risk that the 
representation . . . will 
be 
materially 
limited 
by . . . a 
personal interest of the lawyer."  Indeed, the confidence and 
trust 
underlying 
the 
attorney-client 
relationship 
are 
foundational to the practice of law and deeply rooted in our 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
27 
 
law24 and Professional Rules.25  See, e.g., State v. Meeks, 2003 
WI 104, ¶59, 263 Wis. 2d 794, 666 N.W.2d 859 ("The attorney-
client privilege provides sanctuary to protect a relationship 
based upon trust and confidence.").26 
¶54 While it is unusual for a reinstatement award to be 
vacated on public policy grounds, it is not unheard of.  See, 
e.g., Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, 915 
F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990) (vacating a reinstatement award on 
public policy grounds when sexual harassment made the work 
environment too hostile); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line 
                     
24 Article I, § 21, cl. 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  "In any court of this state, any suitor may prosecute 
or defend his suit either in his own proper person or by an 
attorney of the suitor's choice."  While we need not address 
whether this provision precludes the reinstatement of Sands in 
this situation, this provision provides further support for the 
notion that the mutuality of trust underlying the attorney-
client relationship is central in our laws. 
25 See SCR ch. 20 Preamble (9) ("[T]he basic principles 
underlying the rules . . . include the lawyer's obligation 
zealously 
to 
protect 
and 
pursue 
a 
client's 
legitimate 
interests . . . while maintaining a professional, courteous and 
civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal 
system."); SCR 20:1.7 cmt. 1 ("Loyalty and independent judgment 
are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a 
client."). 
26 See also State v. Suemnick, 63 Wis. 2d 117, 118, 216 
N.W.2d 753 (1974) ("It goes without saying that the cornerstone 
of an attorney-client relationship must be a feeling of absolute 
trust in the attorney by the client."); In re Law Examination of 
1926, 191 Wis. 359, 362, 210 N.W. 710 (1926) ("An attorney 
occupies a fiduciary relationship towards his client.  It is one 
of implicit confidence and of trust . . . .  There is no field 
of human activity which requires a fuller realization with 
respect to a fiduciary relationship than that which exists 
between the lawyer and his client."). 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
28 
 
Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988) (vacating a 
reinstatement award on public policy grounds when the employee, 
a pilot, flew while intoxicated). 
¶55 There is also precedent for the proposition that an 
attorney's ethical duties constitute strong public policy and 
can be grounds for vacating an arbitration award.  For example, 
in Perkins & Mario, P.C. v. Annunziata, an arbitration award 
resulting from a legal fees dispute was vacated on the grounds 
that it violated the general statutory prohibition protecting 
injured persons from excessive legal fees, and because the award 
was 
in 
contravention 
of 
attorney 
ethics 
rules 
regarding 
contingent fee agreements.  694 A.2d 1388 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1997).27  Similarly, another court held that a clause in a 
partnership agreement between two lawyers could not be subject 
to arbitration because the clause violated a strong public 
                     
27 Deference to arbitration awards is a nearly universal 
policy in state and federal courts.  The law governing review of 
arbitration and the grounds for overturning an award are also 
very similar across state and federal courts. 
Wisconsin's arbitration statute is nearly identical to the 
federal statute in 9 U.S.C. § 10.  As such, this court will look 
to federal cases to assist in our interpretation.  Diversified 
Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Slotten, 119 Wis. 2d 441, 446, 351 
N.W.2d 176 (Ct. App. 1984).  The similar analytical framework 
between states also means that state decisions will often have 
persuasive value as well. 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
29 
 
policy found in the attorney code of ethics and was therefore 
void.  In re Silverberg, 75 A.D.2d 817 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).28 
¶56 In this case, it is clear that Sands cannot in good 
faith represent Menard without violating her ethical obligations 
as an attorney. 
¶57 Leading up to and throughout the arbitration process, 
all parties agreed that the relationship was irretrievably 
broken.  Sands understood this and unequivocally testified 
against reinstatement before the arbitration panel, even going 
so far as to state that "no reasonable person would entertain 
reinstatement as a possibility."  She further made clear her 
view of the prospective employment conditions at Menard, 
stating, "[I]t would be impossible to return to such a hostile 
environment."  Understanding that reinstatement was not feasible 
or available here, Sands sought two years of front pay instead. 
¶58 Sands 
also 
made 
clear 
her 
views 
of 
Menard's 
leadership——her clients if reinstatement were upheld.  In her 
briefing before the arbitration panel, Sands stated that John 
Menard's conduct was "so monstrous and reprehensible that it 
shocks the conscience"; that he is a "reckless, callous actor 
                     
28 Other 
courts 
have 
similarly 
recognized 
that 
an 
arbitration award contrary to attorney ethics may be vacated on 
public policy grounds.  See Schoonmaker v. Cummings & Lockwood 
of Connecticut, P.C., 747 A.2d 1017 (Conn. 2000) (recognizing 
that the Rules of Professional Conduct can serve as a public 
policy ground on which to vacate arbitration awards, though 
ultimately choosing not to do so in that case); Weiss v. 
Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey, 672 A.2d 1132 (N.J. 1996) 
(same). 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
30 
 
who care[s] nothing about anyone else's rights or reputation"; 
that he "is a man with no parameters, no limits, no respect for 
the law and obviously, no self-discipline to control or limit 
his own behavior——nor does he see any need to"; that his honesty 
and 
integrity 
are 
"completely 
illusory"; 
and 
that 
his 
"dishonesty is serious and overwhelming." 
¶59 Let there be no mistake——the mutual animosity and 
distrust between Sands and the executive leadership of Menard, 
the very people to whom her absolute loyalty would be owed, 
continued throughout the arbitration hearing and shows no signs 
of abating today.  Sands was right.  No reasonable person would 
consider reinstatement a possibility in this situation.  No one 
could 
have 
assessed 
this 
situation 
and 
determined 
that 
reinstatement could lead to a productive setting where both 
Sands and Menard would benefit.  Trust has been completely 
broken; nothing good could possibly come from reinstatement.  In 
view of this especially bitter litigation marked by personal and 
professional animosity, we see no way Sands could now return to 
Menard and serve the company in conformity with her ethical 
obligations. 
¶60 If the level of hostility alone was not enough, Sands 
performed an unusually high-level and sensitive role at Menard.  
She was the Executive General Counsel, heading up the in-house 
legal operations and supervising the legal work for all of 
Menard.  She also served as Menard's spokesperson and was a 
public representative to the community.  More than most 
attorneys, her position required a high degree of confidence and 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
31 
 
trust 
and 
a 
close 
relationship 
with 
Menard's 
executive 
leadership.  In order to perform her role, Sands had to 
represent the company's best interests with outside partners, 
attorneys, and the media.  Sands' unique and significant role at 
Menard required the highest level of good faith, loyalty, and 
mutual trust. 
¶61 The relationship between Sands and Menard, then, has 
been irretrievably broken.  Sands' view of Menard's leaders is 
clear, and Menard has similarly not hidden its view that trust 
and 
confidence 
in 
Sands 
cannot 
be 
restored 
under 
these 
circumstances.  We see no possible way Sands could, following 
this protracted litigation and acrimony, step in and serve 
Menard as her ethical obligations would require.29  Without 
question, there is, in the words of SCR 20:1.7(a)(2), "a 
significant 
risk 
that 
the 
representation . . . will 
be 
materially limited by . . . a personal interest of the lawyer." 
¶62 In 
its 
written 
award, 
the 
panel 
discussed 
the 
difficulty that hostility posed to reinstatement.  It recognized 
both John Menard's hostile behavior toward Sands, and that Sands 
believed reinstatement would be inappropriate as a result of the 
hostile relationship.  In the end, the panel chose reinstatement 
because front pay, it felt, would "reward the company for its 
mistreatment" and "would tend to send the wrong message to 
                     
29 We are satisfied that the conflict of interest between 
Sands and Menard is enough to prohibit reinstatement.  We 
decline to address the applicability of other portions of the 
Rules.  
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
32 
 
company employees who otherwise might be inclined to make 
meritorious complaints about unlawful conduct occurring within 
the company." 
¶63 Though the panel's decision was otherwise thorough, 
nowhere did the panel consider the applicability of Sands' 
ethical obligations as an attorney.30  It never examined whether 
Sands 
could 
ethically 
perform 
her 
role 
if 
it 
awarded 
reinstatement.  If it had, it would have reached the same 
conclusion Sands had: no reasonable person would entertain 
reinstatement as a possibility. 
¶64 The panel was right in seeking to make Sands whole.  
Even though it seemed to understand the complete breakdown in 
the relationship, the panel went forward anyway in order to send 
a message.  While a message surely needed to be sent——and it 
was, to the tune of more than $1.6 million, including $900,000 
in punitive damages——we conclude that reinstatement of Sands in 
this 
situation 
would 
cause 
her 
to 
violate 
her 
ethical 
obligations as an attorney.  We further hold that an arbitration 
award requiring an attorney to violate her ethical obligations 
is void as a matter of strong public policy.  The panel 
therefore exceeded its powers under Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(d).  
Racine County, 310 Wis. 2d 508, ¶11. 
                     
30 The dissent curiously chides us for not citing the record 
to support the notion that the panel did not consider attorney 
ethics.  See dissent, ¶80.  Nothing in the record reflects that 
the panel considered Sands' ethical duties.  Moreover, nothing 
in the panel's written award evinces a consideration of Sands' 
ability to represent Menard again as an attorney. 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
33 
 
¶65 We do not conclude that reinstatement is always 
inappropriate for in-house lawyers or general counsels,31 or that 
reinstatement is always inappropriate when the relationship is 
acrimonious or the employee served in a high-level role.  The 
specific circumstances of each case must be considered.  Here, 
it is our judgment that the panel's reinstatement order would 
have the practical effect of forcing Sands to violate her 
ethical obligations.  Such a result violates the strong public 
policy of the State of Wisconsin. 
C. Remedying the Panel's Error 
¶66 Because 
the 
panel 
exceeded 
its 
powers, 
the 
reinstatement 
award 
cannot 
stand. 
 
Under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 788.10(1)(d), an award may be vacated "[w]here the arbitrators 
exceeded 
their 
powers." 
 
As 
we 
have 
already 
explained, 
arbitrators exceed their powers when their award is in violation 
of strong public policy. 
¶67 Both parties agree that the court may vacate the 
reinstatement portion of the award while leaving the rest 
                     
31 This case presents the difficult question of whether the 
Rules of Professional Conduct give employers the right to 
discharge their in-house attorney employees at any time.  
Normally, attorneys may not represent clients when they have 
been discharged.  See SCR 20:1.16(a)(3).  But the question 
becomes more difficult in light of non-discrimination laws that 
protect 
in-house 
attorneys 
just 
as 
they 
do 
non-attorney 
employees.  Because we determine that the panel exceeded its 
authority in awarding reinstatement, we save this question for 
another day. 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
34 
 
intact.32  Menard urges us to vacate the reinstatement award and 
thus 
end 
the 
dispute. 
 
Sands 
argues 
that 
if 
we 
find 
reinstatement improper, we should remand for an award of front 
pay to effectuate the panel's clear intention to make the 
successful plaintiff whole. 
¶68 We agree with Sands.  Reinstatement is intended to put 
the employee in the position he or she would have been in before 
the adverse employment action.  But courts have recognized that 
where reinstatement is inappropriate, "an award of front pay as 
a substitute for reinstatement . . . [i]s a necessary part of 
the 'make whole'" purposes of Title VII.  Pollard v. E. I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 850 (2001).  Like 
reinstatement, front pay is an equitable remedy.  Williams, 137 
F.3d at 951.  It "is the functional equivalent of reinstatement 
because it is a substitute remedy that affords the plaintiff the 
same benefit (or as close an approximation as possible) as the 
plaintiff would have received had she been reinstated."  Id. at 
952. 
¶69 The panel made clear that it was going to award either 
front pay or reinstatement ("Whether to award reinstatement or 
front pay to Sands is a difficult decision.").  In order to make 
Sands whole in accord with the intentions of the arbitration 
panel, we vacate the award of reinstatement and remand to the 
                     
32 See Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. AT&T Co., 903 F. Supp. 3, 
6 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that courts may vacate the portions of 
an arbitrator's award that exceed the arbitrator's authority 
while enforcing the remainder). 
No. 
2008AP1703   
 
35 
 
circuit court for a determination on the equities of an 
appropriate front pay award. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶70 In sum, we agree with Menard that the panel exceeded 
its authority.  An arbitration panel exceeds its authority when 
its award violates strong public policy.  An attorney owes a 
fiduciary duty of loyalty to her clients, a duty so replete in 
our cases and in the Rules of Professional Conduct as to be 
axiomatic.  Such a duty is deeply rooted in our laws and 
embodies the strong public policy of the State of Wisconsin.  In 
this case, we conclude that by accepting reinstatement, Sands 
would be forced to violate her ethical obligations as an 
attorney.  Thus, we vacate the panel's award of reinstatement on 
the grounds that it is void as a violation of strong public 
policy.  Under the applicable employment discrimination laws, 
front pay is a substitute for reinstatement.  Accordingly, we 
vacate the panel's award of reinstatement and remand to the 
circuit court to determine an appropriate award of front pay. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and remanded. 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
1 
 
¶71 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I do not 
join the majority opinion because I conclude that the majority 
has "exceeded its powers" by "manifestly disregarding the law" 
in its decision to vacate the arbitration panel's award of 
reinstatement.   
¶72 I agree with the circuit court and court of appeals, 
both of which denied Menard's motion to vacate the arbitration 
award for  reinstatement of Dawn Sands.  These courts reached 
the right result, largely because they correctly understood the 
very limited role courts play in reviewing arbitration awards. 
¶73 At the circuit court, Judge Lenz observed that "at 
most, I find that this would be an error of law or fact and not 
enough to overturn the award.  The arbitration panel did an 
analysis, looking at the . . . hostile environment . . . so they 
did what they were supposed to do."  With regard to the claim 
that the award could be vacated for public policy reasons , the 
circuit court reasoned that "when a court bars enforcement of an 
arbitration award on public policy, that public policy must be 
clearly 
defined . . . and 
dominant. . . . the 
arbitrator 
balanced it out, they talked about it, that's not a situation 
where it is an explicit public policy that is well-defined and 
dominant and referenced to the laws and legal precedent."1     
                     
1 The circuit court relied on Local P-1236 v. Jones Dairy 
Farm, 680 F.2d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1982). 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
2 
 
¶74 At 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
Menard's 
claims 
were 
similarly dismissed as not approaching the standard for a court 
to vacate the discretionary remedy awarded in an arbitration to 
which the parties have voluntarily submitted.  The court of 
appeals explained, "Menard essentially asks that we create law 
stating 
reinstatement 
is 
not 
a 
remedy 
for 
in-house 
attorneys . . . . This is inconsistent with the standard of 
review. 
 
We 
cannot 
conclude 
the 
arbitrators 
manifestly 
disregarded law that was nonexistent at the time of the 
arbitrators' decision." 
¶75 Now, 
after 
Menard, 
who 
initially 
submitted 
to 
arbitration, has challenged the outcome of that arbitration 
through three courts, the majority does just what the court of 
appeals recognized that courts could not and should not do:  The 
majority recognizes for the first time a "clear strong public 
policy" and concludes, as the panel did not, that the 
arbitration award would clearly lead to a violation of Sands' 
ethical obligations as an attorney and thereby violate public 
policy.  On the basis of its newly announced public policy, and 
                                                                  
The circuit court further recognized, as the majority does 
not, that its own view of whether the award was "appropriate" or 
a good idea was not at issue.  Judge Lenz commented, "[T]he 
court may look at this and say that part of the award was really 
stupid . . . but the court doesn't substitute its judgment for 
the judgment of the arbitrator because that's not what you 
bargained for."   
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
3 
 
its own conclusion that the panel award would necessarily 
violate that policy, the majority vacates the arbitration award 
in the very case where it first sets forth the policy.  Yet the 
ordinary standard of review is that "[i]f the correctness of the 
award, including its resolution of the public-policy question, 
is reasonably debatable, judicial intervention is unwarranted."2   
¶76 The 
majority's 
result 
undermines 
the 
goals 
and 
practice of arbitration in Wisconsin and defeats the intent of 
the parties who entered this arbitration in particular.  How 
will parties in the future who voluntarily submit to arbitration 
be confident that the efficient and final resolution that 
arbitration promises will not be set aside by this court?  What 
other "strong public policies" may be lurking, not-previously 
articulated, that this court could use to vacate an arbitration 
award taht one party seeks to escape and with which four members 
of this court simply disagree?   
¶77 It may well be that in some cases a direct conflict 
will arise between the mostly state laws governing the attorney-
client relationship and the mostly-federal statutes and case law 
governing employment discrimination, including the provisions 
for reinstatement.  As nearly as I can tell, this touches on a 
question of first impression, whether in some circumstances, 
                     
2 Weiss v. Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey, 672 A.2d 1132, 
1144 (N.J. 1996).  
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
4 
 
employment reinstatement ordered under the federal employment 
law may violate a state's attorney-client law, and if so, how to 
resolve the two?3  But the place to resolve novel and emerging 
questions of law is not in a court's review of a private 
arbitration award.  Parties submit disputes to arbitration to 
reach swift resolution and specifically to avoid the lengthy 
appeals in which courts can definitively resolve every question 
of law and in the process create precedent.4  Review of an 
arbitration to which parties voluntarily submitted is not the 
appropriate vehicle for this court to announce new rules of law 
or to hold forth about generalized public policy. 
¶78 Although the majority's conclusions about a public 
policy are indeterminate, there is no doubt that attorneys have 
                     
3 A Non-Party Brief filed in this case asserts that "the 
Court is faced with a case of first impression" and further 
describes the potential tension in the law governing "in-house" 
attorneys:  
While in-house counsel enjoy the same attorney/client 
relationship that attorneys in private practice have 
with their clients, in-house counsel also have the 
relationship of employer and employee, and those two 
separate relationships can be the source of tension as 
someone whose livelihood is tied to one employer must 
also respect and fulfill his or her professional 
duties as an attorney. 
Non-Party Brief of Byron F. Egan, 2, 6. 
4 See majority op., ¶48 ("Our task is to ensure that the 
parties receive what they bargained for——the adjudication of 
their dispute via the arbitration process." (citing Lukowski v. 
Dankert, 184 Wis. 2d 142, 149, 515 N.W.2d 883 (1994)). 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
5 
 
fiduciary and ethical duties and obligations of professional 
conduct.  Other employees also have fiduciary and ethical 
obligations to their employers. 
¶79 The problem is that the majority is unable to pin down 
a particular rule, duty, or obligation or offer more than its 
own repeated assertions that if the award stands, a violation of 
ethical obligations would be the necessary result.  The majority 
claims that because the panel did not affirmatively discuss 
Sands' ethical duties as an attorney, this necessarily implies 
that the panel "never examined whether Sands could ethically 
perform her role if it awarded reinstatement."  Majority op., 
¶63.  The majority parlays this supposition into the conclusion 
that the award of reinstatement "would have the practical effect 
of forcing Sands to violate her ethical obligations."  Majority 
op., ¶65.  Both the claim and the observation are at best 
speculative and moreover are belied by the record. 
¶80 There 
is 
no 
reason 
to 
believe, 
much 
less 
to 
affirmatively conclude as the majority has done, that the 
arbitration panel did not consider the applicability of Sands' 
ethical obligations as an attorney.  It is no secret that Sands 
is an attorney.  Through its 49-page factual review, legal 
analysis, and ultimate findings, the panel was amply aware of 
Sands' professional role and her responsibilities toward the 
Menard 
corporation, 
its 
officers, 
and 
the 
individuals 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
6 
 
representing the corporation.  The panel explicitly acknowledged 
the "difficult[y]" of the "hostile" relationship between the 
parties.  In doing so they necessarily assessed the dynamic 
between attorney and client and the issues inherent therein.  
Even if there were uncertainty as to what law the panel did or 
did not consider, the majority oversteps its bounds in review of 
an arbitration award when it construes ambivalence or silence in 
the record to justify overturning a result it disfavors.   As 
the majority recognizes, the party seeking to overturn the panel 
award bears the burden of proof. 
¶81 Significantly, Sands and Menard explicitly stipulated 
that each member of the panel would be an attorney.  Each of the 
arbitrators 
was 
an 
experienced 
and 
successful 
attorney, 
themselves bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct and bound 
to be versed in those rules, which the majority opinion invokes 
to justify its result in the present case.  
¶82 According to Martindale-Hubbell and the law firm Web 
sites of each of the arbitrators, Attorney Peter Reinhardt has 
been licensed to practice in Wisconsin for 15 years, specializes 
in employment law, and has appeared before this court as well as 
the Federal 7th and 8th Circuit Courts of Appeals; Attorney 
Carol Skinner has been licensed to practice in Wisconsin for 16 
years and specializes in employment law as well as alterative 
dispute resolution; and Attorney Aaron Halestead has been 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
7 
 
licensed to practice in Wisconsin for 20 years, specializes in 
employment law, and is a long-time member of the Board of 
Directors of the Labor and Employment Section of the State Bar 
of Wisconsin, where he served as Chairperson from 2003-04.  
¶83 It strains credulity when the majority assumes these 
three attorneys failed to consider the rules of their profession 
or the nature of the attorney-client relationship when they 
assessed whether a reinstatement award would be feasible on the 
facts before them.  The majority considerably exceeds the 
supervisory role of a court in review of an arbitration award 
when it construes the record to presume that a capable 
arbitration panel somehow ignored the obvious.     
¶84 The majority declares that in order to vacate an 
arbitrator's award on the grounds of public policy, "[a] public 
policy violation must be clear, and the burden of proving such a 
violation rests with the party seeking to overturn the award." 
Majority op., ¶50.  The majority does not, however, apply this 
standard to the instant case.   
¶85 Rather, the majority attempts to persuade us that 
every one of the three arbitrators, along with the circuit court 
judge, the three judges on the court of appeals panel, and Sands 
herself, all lawyers, all overlooked a "clear violation of a 
strong public policy" and that all the lawyers involved in the 
present case overlooked the majority's own determination that 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
8 
 
"Sands cannot in good faith represent Menard without violating 
her ethical obligations."  Majority op., ¶56.   
¶86 While apparently the public policy relied on by the 
majority was neither so "clear" nor so "strong" that any prior 
attorney or tribunal spotted it, the majority nevertheless 
pronounces that it "cannot countenance" the panel's award of 
reinstatement on the basis of a newly-minted "clear strong 
public policy."  See majority op., ¶52. 
¶87 The strong public policy violated here, in the 
majority's view, is apparently embedded in an attorney's various 
ethical obligations.5  Majority op., ¶49.  The majority discusses 
                     
5 I qualify my statement as an "apparent" conclusion because 
the 
majority's 
opinion 
seems 
to 
float 
between 
multiple 
articulations of the public policy that was violated.  The 
majority first seems to rest its holding on Sands' unspecified 
"ethical 
obligations, 
particularly 
an 
attorney's 
duty 
of 
loyalty", but the majority cites only one specific section of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct (SCR 20:1.7(a)(2)).  See also 
majority op., ¶53.  Despite this, the majority also makes 
liberal use of generic references to attorneys' fiduciary duties 
of loyalty to clients, and the "confidence and trust underlying 
the attorney-client relationship," as established by case law.  
See, e.g., majority op., ¶53.   
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
9 
 
in general terms the attorney's fiduciary duty of loyalty and 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, SCR 20:1.7(a)(2), relating to 
"a personal interest."  Majority op., ¶¶53, 61.  
¶88 The majority cites SCR 20:1.7(a)(2), which states that  
"a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation 
involves a concurrent conflict of interest.  A concurrent 
conflict of interest exists if . . . there is a significant risk 
that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by . . . a personal interest of the lawyer" 
(emphasis added).  
¶89 The majority goes on to hold that it is "clear that 
Sands can not in good faith represent Menard without violating 
her ethical obligations as an attorney."  Majority op., ¶56.  
The majority's opinion is unpersuasive.  It is far from clear 
                                                                  
In light of these references, it is unclear whether the 
majority relies solely on SCR 20:1.7(a)(2) or on an amalgam of 
this one rule and other sources of more general ethical 
obligations.  If the basis for vacating the award is a 
hypothesized violation of one rule, how does the majority 
conclude that this is "strong public policy," rather than a 
simple attorney ethics violation?  If, on the other hand, 
discerning the "public policy" that would allegedly be violated 
by reinstatement requires the majority to rely on novel 
inferences to reach its conclusion, how then was the arbitration 
panel to recognize a public policy that meets the standard "that 
when a court bars enforcement of an arbitration award on the 
basis of public policy, that public policy must be clearly 
defined"?  See Local P-1236 v. Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142, 
1145 (7th Cir. 1982).     
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
10 
 
that if the reinstatement award stands, Sands will necessarily 
violate this ethical obligation.   
¶90 First, the commentary to this section of the Rules, 
SCR 20:1.7(a)(2) indicates that the phrase "personal interest" 
refers not to one's own emotive state or stake, but rather to 
substantive, material conflicts of interest.6  Notably, the 
comments identify business-related examples, such as "when a 
lawyer has discussions concerning possible employment with an 
opponent of the lawyer's client," and further direct the reader 
to "Rule 1.8 for specific Rules pertaining to a number of 
personal interest conflicts, including business transactions 
with clients."  No such objective, material business conflict 
has been identified here as a conflicting "personal interest" of 
Sands.  Instead, the majority seems to stretch the meaning of 
"personal interest" to the subjective and amorphous area of 
Sands' "feelings" toward Menard. 
¶91 The majority comes up short on citations to cases in 
Wisconsin or any other jurisdiction that have interpreted the 
Rules of Professional Conduct to cover "feelings" analogous to 
what the majority argues is the problem here, although the 
majority opinion is filled with pronouncements about a lawyer's 
obligations to the client and the strong public policy of the 
                     
6 See Wis. Stat. Ann. SCR 20:1.7 (2009) (setting forth the 
ABA Comments). 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
11 
 
state of Wisconsin.  Under these circumstances, with apparently 
no prior precedent, how can the majority conclude that Menard 
has met its burden of proving such a violation, let alone that 
it is clear or obvious that public policy would be violated by 
this award?  The obvious conclusion is that Menard has not met 
its burden.  The majority's contrary conclusion represents the 
majority's flat refusal to apply the standard of review that it 
espouses.  "The court will not relitigate issues submitted to 
arbitration."  Franke v. Franke, 2004 WI 8, ¶3 & n.8, 268 
Wis. 2d 360, 674 N.W.2d 832 (quoting Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10 v. 
Jefferson Educ. Ass'n, 78 Wis. 2d 94, 116-18, 253 N.W.2d 536 
(1977)).   
¶92 Second even assuming that "feelings" are within the 
scope of SCR 20:1.7(a)(2), this case still does not provide 
sufficient support for the majority's contention that Sands 
would 
"clearly" 
violate 
her 
ethical 
obligations 
by 
that 
"personal interest."  While the majority cites a string of 
emotionally charged language from Sands at the arbitration 
hearing,7  this reference does little more than establish Sands' 
level of personal affront from the situation of her discharge, a 
view which was apparently shared by the panel that ordered 
reinstatement.  Her statements do not establish that an ethics 
                     
7 Majority op., ¶¶57-58. 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
12 
 
violation either had or would occur if the reinstatement award 
were to stand.  Of all the quotes reported by the majority in 
sensationalist fashion, none refers at all to Sands' opinion or 
that of the panel or any other party as to her own future 
conduct or ethical obligations with respect to Menard.8 
¶93 Thus it is not clear at all what specific ethical 
breach the majority fears, or from exactly what "personal 
                     
8 To support the proposition that an attorney's ethical 
duties constitute public policy grounds to vacate an arbitration 
award, the majority cites two cases in which a specific rules 
violation would be compelled by an arbitration award.  See 
majority op., ¶55.  In the present case, no specific rules 
violation is identified that would necessarily follow from the 
award.  In both of the cited cases, the parties had already 
entered private agreements that would violate specific rules 
provisions if enforced by arbitration, a result the courts did 
not allow.   
In Matter of Silverberg, 75 A.D.2d 817, 427 N.Y.S.2d 480 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980), the court did not vacate an arbitration 
award.  The petitioner sought enforcement of a partnership 
provision that prevented other members of his firm from 
servicing his clients.  The court held that the provisions of 
the partnership agreement, if enforced, would violate the Code 
of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rules 2-107.  The 
court therefore refused to allow the matter to be arbitrated.  
The case is unlike the present case, where no rules violation 
would be a necessary result and the parties have already 
voluntarily agreed to arbitration.   
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
13 
 
interest" of Sands it would stem, much less that any breach at 
all is an inevitable foregone conclusion.  Such a vague 
rationale would not suffice for a trial court's sua sponte 
disqualification of an attorney.9  It is hard to see how an 
equally vague expectation of a conflict is sufficient to allow 
this court, barred from free-wheeling fact-finding and limited 
to a supervisory role in reviewing an arbitral award, to reach 
the conclusion that a future ethics violation is a certainty.   
¶94 The majority restates its conclusion that Sands cannot 
ethically represent Menard in various ways: that "no reasonable 
person 
would 
consider 
reinstatement"; 
that 
"a 
productive 
setting" was not possible; that "nothing good could possibly 
come from reinstatement."  None of these conclusions is tied to 
                                                                  
In Perkins & Mario, P.C. v. Annunziata, 694 A.2d 1388 
(Conn. App. 1997), the arbitral panel awarded legal fees to a 
discharged attorney who handled a personal injury matter on a 
contingency fee basis and had no written fee agreement.  The 
Rules of Professional conduct forbid such an arrangement, and 
the result would also have violated a statute prohibiting 
excessive legal fees.  The court vacated the award on appeal, 
which it recognized as "the exceptional case":  where the award 
in contravention of both statute and a very specific rules 
provisions "violates clear public policy." 
9 See State v. Peterson, 2008 WI App 140, ¶23, 314 
Wis. 2d 192, 757 N.W.2d 834 (finding "attorney disqualification 
should not be imposed cavalierly" and a lower court's decision 
to 
disqualify 
an 
attorney 
was 
an 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion because "the court did not explain what problem it 
anticipated if [the attorney] continued, the court did not 
describe 
any 
potential 
ethical 
violation 
that 
might 
arise . . . before deciding to disqualify [the attorney]."). 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
14 
 
any legal standard or any particular attorney ethics obligation.  
Together they offer little more than the majority's own 
restatement of its speculation about the facts that would result 
from reinstatement.  Again, the majority does not meet the 
standard of establishing a clear public policy or show that 
Menard has met the burden of proof. 
¶95 Third, 
the 
majority's 
holding 
that 
letting 
the 
reinstatement award stand would "force" or "require" Sands to 
violate her ethical obligations is not supported by the record 
and defies logic.  The majority assumes that only a single 
course of conduct can result from Sands' reinstatement——namely, 
Sands' professional misconduct following a return to employment 
at Menard.  
¶96 Suppose, faced with reinstatement, both parties accede 
to Sands' return.  It is neither impossible nor unreasonable to 
think that as the resolution gleaned from arbitration took hold, 
hurt feelings would fade and be overtaken by the professional 
nature and interests of both parties.10  It is entirely possible 
that Sands could resume her representation with no ethical 
violation 
whatsoever. 
 
More 
importantly, 
the 
award 
of 
reinstatement 
gives 
Sands 
the 
opportunity 
to 
make 
that 
                     
10 In point of fact, this very proceeding now demonstrates 
the likeliness of that outcome had reinstatement been left 
undisturbed, as Sands today states she is both willing and able 
to continue to professionally represent Menard. 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
15 
 
assessment for herself.  Sands would be the most capable person 
to do so.  Oddly, the majority seems to find itself better 
positioned than the lawyer involved.  The majority without 
hesitation reports "it is clear that Sands cannot in good faith 
represent Menard without violating her ethical obligations as an 
attorney."  
¶97 With great self-certainty, the majority concludes that 
"an arbitration award requiring an attorney to violate her 
ethical obligations is void as a matter of strong public 
policy."  Majority op., ¶64 (emphasis added).  Yet nothing in 
the award of reinstatement requires Sands to violate her ethical 
obligations.  If, as the majority predicts, allowing the 
reinstatement award to stand would force or require Sands to 
commit an ethical obligation, then she has a simple solution: 
resign.  It was Menard that defied the reinstatement award, not 
Sands.  In the event Sands resigns, the panel's award might in 
fact result in less than the make-whole remedy intended by the 
law, and might represent a "raw deal" for Sands, but courts do 
not vacate a valid arbitration award simply because the panel 
has awarded a remedy worth less than a reviewing court later 
sees as appropriate. 
¶98 There is another potential outcome that the majority 
does not acknowledge.  If the reinstatement award stands, and if 
the parties truly view reinstatement as untenable and mutually 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
16 
 
undesirable, then rather than enter a situation where, in the 
majority's view, an ethical violation is likely to occur, the 
parties could simply negotiate a settlement that avoids Sands' 
actual return to Menard.  Courts and commentators alike have 
recognized that parties are free to reach a more efficient or 
desirable result by negotiating an alternative solution to a 
court-imposed remedy.11  As Judge Posner observed in a case 
considering employment reinstatement, "the social costs of 
[reinstatement] may be avoided by corrective transactions."12  In 
                     
11 See, e.g., Youngs v. Old Ben Coal Co., 243 F.3d 387 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (acknowledging the reality of negotiation around 
judgments granting specific performance:  "Youngs is seeking, 
but not wanting, specific performance.  If he obtained the 
relief he is seeking, that would just be a prelude to a further 
negotiation with Old Ben.") 
12 Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 
1232 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960)). 
In the present case, the circuit court did not require 
academic commentary to recognize as a practical matter that what 
was at stake was likely just a question of putting  a price tag 
on the reinstatement award.  If the circuit court whose order 
Menard defied recognized that at that time Sands was not likely 
to actually return to Menard and that an ethical violation was 
not actually going to take place, how is the majority so certain 
that the "reinstatement order would have the practical effect of 
forcing Sands to violate her ethical obligations"?  See majority 
op., ¶65.  The circuit court had a very different view of "the 
practical effect" of the award:  
[T]he 
parties 
agreed 
to 
arbitration, 
and 
the 
arbitrator's award, I'm going to use the card game, 
this is the hand that's dealt out, and somebody got 
dealt the joker, okay, how much is this worth?  They 
ordered this.  How much is this worth?   
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
17 
 
other words, if the parties could not live with reinstatement, 
they were free to negotiate for another result.13     
¶99 Given 
the 
panel's 
awareness 
of 
Sands' 
ethical 
responsibilities as an attorney, given the panel's consideration 
of the relationship between the parties, given the majority's 
conclusory and unsubstantiated interpretation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct as allegedly governing this situation, and 
given that reinstatement does not actually require any violation 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the majority cannot 
reasonably conclude that Menard has proven that allowing the 
                                                                  
The circuit court then posited three different alternative 
ways the court might proceed to place a value on the arbitration 
under the court's authority: 
Alternative number one is . . . to go back and have 
that issue arbitrated. . . . Two, that this court now 
is to provide a value, that is damages, with regard to 
what 
the 
not 
reinstatement 
is 
worth . . . Or 
third . . . file a separate law suit . . . have a jury 
decide how much this was worth. 
13 An argument can be made that such a negotiated result 
would 
better 
establish 
the 
"make 
whole" 
value 
of 
what 
reinstatement (or avoiding reinstatement) is actually worth to 
the parties, rather than asking a court to provide this value 
though an award of damages or a determination of front pay.  
"Promisees know better than courts whether the damages a court 
is likely to award would be adequate because promisees are more 
familiar with the costs that breach imposes on them."  Alan 
Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 Yale L.J. 271, 
277 (1979).  Courts also recognize that a solution negotiated 
between the parties outside of court may reduce "the parties' 
expenditures on preparing and presenting evidence of damages, 
and the time of the court in evaluating the evidence."  Walgreen 
Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., B.V., 966 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
18 
 
reinstatement award to stand would violate any clear strong 
public policy.  The most one can say (and one would be 
stretching to do so) is that a public policy violation might be 
possible in the future, leaving its actual realization uncertain 
and reasonably debatable.  Under such circumstances, the 
arbitrators' award is not a clear and proven violation of a 
clear strong public policy.  The majority's saying there's a 
violation of a clear strong public policy, and then saying it 
again, does not make it so.  At worst, the arbitrators' award 
presents a reasonably debatable problem on lawyer ethics 
grounds.   
¶100 Under 
such 
circumstances, 
the 
normal 
and 
well-
established rules of deference to the arbitral process must 
prevail.  These statements of the rules of deference are many:  
¶101 "Where the parties have agreed to submit their dispute 
to binding arbitration, an award that is not clearly in 
violation of public policy should be given effect."14   
¶102 "[C]ourts should not disturb the award merely because 
of disagreements with arbitral fact findings or because the 
arbitrator's application of the public policy principles to the 
underlying facts is imperfect.  If the correctness of the award, 
                     
14 Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 654 N.E.2d 
95, 102 (N.Y. 1995) (emphasis added). 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
19 
 
including its resolution of the public policy question, is 
reasonably debatable, judicial intervention is unwarranted."15 
¶103 It is abundantly clear that no violation of a clear, 
strong public policy is sufficiently manifest in the present 
case by either the process used by the arbitration panel or the 
arbitration award.  Of the remaining grounds for vacating an 
arbitral award, as a strong public policy violation is absent, 
none otherwise apply.  
¶104 Because reinstatement here does not violate a clear 
and strong public policy, the choice of remedy was for the 
arbitration panel.  The panel had no way of anticipating that 
this court would use the present case to announce a clear, 
strong public policy against reinstatement.  Resolution of the 
remedy was well within the panel's discretion.  
¶105 To overturn the panel's exercise of discretion, a 
court must conclude that the arbitrators exceeded their powers.  
Wis. Stat. § 788.10(d).  A typical ground for arguing a panel 
has exceeded its powers is that the arbitrators manifestly 
disregarded the law.16  "Manifestly disregarding the law" has 
been described as not understanding the law or correctly stating 
                     
15 Weiss v. Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey, 672 A.2d 1132, 
1145 (N.J. 1996).  
16 Racine County v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers, 2008 WI 70, ¶11, 310 Wis. 2d 508, 751 N.W.2d 312. 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
20 
 
the law but ignoring it.17  "Manifestly disregarding the law" has 
also been described as "making no attempt to apply or interpret 
the relevant . . . law."18 
¶106 The arbitration panel in this case was very thorough.  
It analyzed the law and correctly stated it.  It made every 
attempt to apply its correct interpretation of the relevant law 
to the facts.  The panel's reasoning is extremely detailed.  In 
no way can these arbitrators be viewed as having manifestly 
disregarded the law. 
¶107 In its resolution, the arbitration panel did no more 
than order one of several remedies it was entitled to choose 
from, a remedy that is often identified as the "preferred" 
remedy and which the panel was in fact obligated to consider.19   
¶108 Reinstatement may be ordered even when the parties do 
not favor it and even when relationships between the parties are 
acrimonious.  According to the case law, "reinstatement is not 
infeasible simply because a plaintiff claims that he or she does 
not get along with the employer or because the plaintiff claims 
                     
17 Lukowski v. Dankert, 184 Wis. 2d 142, 149, 515 N.W.2d 883 
(1994).  
18 Racine County v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers, 310 Wis. 2d 508, ¶33. 
19 Kempfer v. Automated Finishing, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 100, 
120, 564 N.W.2d 692 (1997) (holding that "[f]ront pay is only an 
available remedy in those cases in which . . . reinstatement is 
not feasible"). 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
21 
 
that he or she is not comfortable working for someone who 
previously terminated him or her."20   
¶109 Courts have explained that "[t]he equitable remedy of 
reinstatement requires . . . a delicate balance.  On the one 
hand, reinstatement is the preferred remedy for victims of 
discrimination.  On the other hand, a [decision maker] is not 
required to reinstate a successful plaintiff where the result 
would be a working relationship fraught with hostility.  A 
[decision maker] must be careful, however, not to allow an 
employer to use its anger or hostility toward the plaintiff for 
having filed a lawsuit as an excuse to avoid the plaintiff's 
reinstatement."21  
¶110 The majority goes to great lengths to establish that 
in 
cases 
analogous 
to 
this 
one, 
reinstatement, 
although 
discretionary, may be "inappropriate."  See majority op., ¶37-
46.  In its analysis of the remedial framework for Title VII 
violations, 
the 
majority 
uses 
the 
word 
"appropriate" 
or 
"inappropriate" at every turn.  If the standard for vacating an 
arbitration award was when the award was "inappropriate," then 
the majority's treatment on this issue would be very persuasive 
indeed.  But "inappropriate" is not the standard.   
                     
20 Id.  
21 Bruso v. United Airlines, 239 F.3d 848, 861 (7th Cir. 
2001) (citations omitted). 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
22 
 
¶111 The 
majority's 
choice 
and 
use 
of 
case 
law 
on 
reinstatement only further reveals how far from the proper 
standard of review for arbitration the majority's analysis has 
strayed.  The majority relies on federal cases in which either a 
federal district court is deciding the appropriate remedy or a 
federal appellate court is reviewing (and generally affirming) 
the discretionary decisions of the federal trial court.22    
                     
22 EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (district court decision ordering front pay 
following a jury verdict finding wrongful termination); Williams 
v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1998) (reviewing a 
district court order denying reinstatement); McNeil v. Econ. 
Lab., Inc., 800 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1986) (reviewing a district 
court order denying front pay (emphasis added); McKnight v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990) (reviewing a district 
court order denying reinstatement); Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 
648 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir. 1981) (reviewing a district court order 
denying reinstatement); Sasser v. Averitt Express, Inc., 839 
S.W.2d 422 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (reviewing a circuit court 
damages judgment for wrongful termination); Whittlesey v. Union 
Carbide Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (district court 
bench trial awarding the plaintiff damages over reinstatement); 
Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(reviewing a district court judgment awarding front pay); 
Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 
1982) (reviewing a judgment of a district court denying 
reinstatement); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (reviewing a district court decision limiting front 
pay to four months); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 
F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980) (reviewing a judgment from a special 
jury verdict awarding front pay); Hoffman v. Nissan Motor Corp. 
in U.S.A., 511 F. Supp. 352 (D.N.H. 1981) (reviewing an amended 
jury verdict); Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 
F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983) (reviewing an order from a district 
court denying additional equitable relief); Coston v. Plitt 
Theatres, Inc., 831 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1987) (reviewing a 
judgment from a district court denying both reinstatement and 
front pay); Hyland v. Kenner Prods. Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 1309 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (reviewing a circuit court 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
23 
 
¶112 The majority's authority is thus drawn exclusively 
from cases in which an appellate court reviews a trial court 
judgment regarding reinstatement, applying normal appellate 
standards of review.  The majority does not cite a single case 
in which a court reviews an arbitration panel awarding the 
remedy of reinstatement.  In reviewing a trial court's judgment 
for reinstatement, an error of law would be sufficient for an 
appellate court to reverse the discretionary ruling of the trial 
court, applying an erroneous exercise of discretion standard of 
review.23  In contrast, an error of law is not a sufficient basis 
for a court to overrule an arbitration award.  A "court will not 
overturn the arbitrator's decision for mere errors of law or 
                                                                  
judgment denying plaintiff's attorney's fees); Combes v. Griffin 
Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (awarding 
back pay and benefits in light of a jury verdict for the 
plaintiff finding wrongful termination). 
23 See, e.g., McNeil, 800 F.2d 111 at 118 ("The decision 
whether or not to award front pay [rather than reinstatement] 
is, of course, within the discretion of the district court. We 
need only review the decision of the district court for an abuse 
of discretion"); Taylor, 648 F.2d 1129 at 1139 ("We cannot 
conclude that the district court abused its discretion in 
mandating reinstatement and, therefore, affirm that order"); 
Cancellier, 672 F.2d 1312 at 1320 ("Moreover, in view of the 
substantial verdict the judge did not abuse his discretion in 
[denying reinstatement]"); Goss, 747 F.2d 885 at 890-91 ("[W]e 
find 
no 
abuse 
of 
discretion 
in 
the 
choice 
of 
remedy . . . awarding 
[plaintiff] 
front 
pay 
in 
lieu 
of 
reinstatement"); Coston, 831 F.2d 1321 at 1332 ("[We determine] 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
reinstatement"). 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
24 
 
fact."24  This rule is in accord with the recognition that the 
parties have contracted for the arbitrator's decision——not the 
court's.   
¶113 The proper interpretation and application of SCR 
20:1.7(a)(2) to the instant case are at most reasonably 
debatable.  The effect of the application of the rule is 
uncertain and relies on the majority's assumptions.  Therefore, 
no violation of a clear, strong public policy resulting from the 
arbitration panel's award can be clearly established.  If the 
arbitrators erred in interpreting the rule, they made an error 
of law.25  Yet as previously stated, the proper standard of 
review for an arbitration award dictates that an error of law 
does not justify vacating the award.  Thus even allowing for the 
majority's stretches of interpretation and assumptions about 
outcome, the majority reaches an erroneous result. 
¶114 In the end, the only thing that is "clear" from the 
majority's treatment of the present case is that the majority 
does not like the reinstatement award and has substituted its 
                     
24 Madison v. Madison Prof'l Police Officers Ass'n., 144 
Wis. 2d 576, 585, 425 N.W.2d 8 (1988) (quoting Milwaukee Bd. of 
Sch. Dirs. v. Milwaukee Teachers' Educ. Ass'n, 93 Wis. 2d 415, 
422, 287 N.W.2d 131 (1980)). 
25 In an attorney discipline case enforcing the rules, a 
referee would interpret and apply the rule, a question of law.  
This court would not be bound by the referee's interpretation or 
application, a question of law. 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
25 
 
discretion for that of the arbitrators, in violation of the 
limitations on the court's standard of review.  
¶115 Because no clear violation of a strong public policy 
is present here, and no other grounds exist for vacating the 
arbitration 
panel's 
award 
as 
exceeding 
its 
powers, 
the 
majority's 
analysis 
becomes 
little 
more 
than 
a 
strained 
analytical effort to overturn an arbitration award with which 
four members of this court disagree.  The majority has 
improperly extended the authority of this court, at the cost of 
the well-established and highly deferential standard of review a 
court gives to arbitration awards. 
¶116 For the reasons set forth, I write separately in 
dissent. 
¶117 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this opinion. 
 
No.  2008AP1703.ssa 
1