Case Title: STEWART TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY v. TILDEN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-37

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
STEWART TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY v. TILDEN2003 WY 3164 P.3d 739Case Number: 02-37Decided: 03/05/2003
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

STEWART 
TITLE GUARANTY

COMPANY, 
a Texas corporation,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

SAMUEL 
J. TILDEN,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Andrea 
L. Richard and John A. Coppede of Rothgerber Johnson & Lyons LLP, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Stephen 
L. Simonton of Simonton & Simonton, Cody, Wyoming

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
The 
primary issue in this appeal is whether the satisfaction of an arbitration award 
of costs precludes a district court from confirming the award as a judgment 
under Wyoming's Arbitration Act.  We 
conclude that when an arbitration award for costs has been satisfied and no 
controversy remains, the doctrine of mootness prohibits the district court from 
entering judgment.  We reverse the 
order confirming the award and remand for dismissal.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
Appellant 
Stewart Title Guaranty Company (Stewart) presents this statement of the 
issues:

 

I.  A party must demonstrate injury in fact 
in order to have standing to bring an action in the court system.  Roe v. Board of County Comm'rs, 
997 P.2d 1021, 1021 (Wyo. 2000).  
Stewart Title previously satisfied all obligations to Tilden which were 
entered in an underlying arbitration proceeding.  Did the District Court properly enter 
judgment on a prior arbitration award, when no unsatisfied duties or obligations 
existed as between the parties?

 

II. 
The Wyoming Arbitration Act is designed to allow litigants to reduce an 
arbitration award to judgment so that they can obtain the relief ordered by the 
arbitrator.  The Arbitration Act 
does not provide authority for the Judgment entered by the District Court 
because the Arbitration Award had been previously satisfied.  Does the Wyoming Arbitration Act require 
that a district court enter a judgment on an arbitration award that has been 
previously satisfied?

 

Appellee 
Samuel J. Tilden (Tilden) states that the issues are:

 

1.  Did the District Court correctly 
construe the language of W.S. § 1-36-102 and 1-36-113 of the Wyoming Uniform 
Arbitration Act?

 

2.  Having neglected to seek review of the 
arbitration findings within the time permitted by the Uniform Arbitration Act, 
was the Company bound by its own Title Policy's express consent to entry of 
judgment on the arbitration award?

 

3.  Was there reasonable basis for the 
arguments Stewart Title presented in the Brief of 
Appellant?

4.  Should Tilden be awarded fees on 
appeal?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
In 
May of 1998, Tilden informed Stewart of a title defect. Two years later, an 
arbitration award determined that insurance coverage existed, and Stewart cured 
the title defect.  A few months 
later, on December 5, 2000, a final arbitration award determined that Stewart 
failed to cure the title defect in a reasonably diligent manner, but that Tilden 
had suffered no actual damages.  
Both parties had deposited an amount for arbitration fees and costs, and 
the final arbitration award ordered Stewart to pay Tilden's share of those fees 
and costs in an amount of $5,299.20.  
One week later, on December 12, 2000, Stewart paid that amount to 
Tilden.  

 

[¶4]           
Many 
months later, Tilden filed an application for confirmation of the arbitration 
award pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-113.  Stewart objected on grounds that its 
earlier  satisfaction of the award 
rendered the controversy moot and the district court was without jurisdiction to 
enter the award confirmation.  The 
district court found that Stewart's objections included a claim that the 
arbitration proceedings were defective, decided this claim was tantamount to a 
request for the court to review, and concluded that the claim proved that 
mootness was not at issue.  It held 
that the statutory time frame for such a review had expired and summarily 
confirmed the arbitration award.   
Stewart appealed.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶5]           
Wyoming's 
Uniform Arbitration Act (Act), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-101 through 1-36-119, 
provides for confirmation of an arbitration award by a district court having 
jurisdiction under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-113 (Lexis 1999) which states, in 
pertinent part:

 

Upon 
application of a party the court shall confirm the award unless within the time 
limits allowed grounds are urged for vacating or modifying the 
award[.]

 

Stewart 
contends that Tilden did not have standing to request confirmation of a 
satisfied award and the district court did not have jurisdiction to confirm a 
satisfied award.  These contentions 
present a question of law, requiring statutory interpretation of the Act.   

 

[¶6]           
A 
question of law is reviewed de novo by this Court as an exercise of its plenary 
authority, and no deference is given to the district court's determination that 
it could confirm a satisfied arbitration award.   Pecha 
v. Smith, Keller & Associates, 
942 P.2d 387, 390 (Wyo. 1997).  
Absent ambiguity, we do not construe the statute but will rely on its 
plain language alone to ascertain its meaning.  LePage 
v. State Dep't of Health, 2001 
WY 26, ¶10, 18 P.3d 1177, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001). The statute directs the court to 
confirm an award unless it is petitioned to vacate or modify the award.  We have previously decided that judicial 
review of arbitration awards is limited and an award can only be vacated, 
modified or corrected as provided by statute.  Dorr, 
Keller, Bentley & Pecha v. Dorr, Bentley & Pecha, 841 P.2d 811, 817-18 (Wyo. 1992).  The 
statutory grounds for vacating or modifying an award are not relevant here 
because Stewart's only contention on appeal is that the district court was 
without power to confirm the award.  

 

[¶7]           
The 
authorities generally agree that the purpose of confirming an award is to 
provide a judgment that can be enforced through court proceedings.  Kutch 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 960 P.2d 93, 98-99 (Colo. 1998).  
Usually, the arbitration agreement under which the parties operate 
provides for resolution by an award, and a breach permits judicial involvement 
to confirm the award and permit enforcement. Id. 
Wyoming 
statute provides the mechanism for a confirmation, and the statute uses the 
language, "shall," which is usually accepted by this Court as mandatory. 
 LaPage, 
¶11.  The 
statute mandates that a district court confirm the award upon petition and does 
not state that the district court may reject a confirmation motion and dismiss 
it.  See 
Kenneth W. Brooks Trust v. Pacific Media LLC, 44 P.3d 938, 941 (Wash. App. 2002). Accordingly, it cannot be found that Tilden did 
not have standing or that the district court did not have jurisdiction to enter 
a confirmation.  The purpose of the 
statute, however, is to provide a means for enforcement of an unsatisfied award 
by means of court-ordered judgment.  
If the trial court confirms the award, it must then enter a consistent 
judgment for enforcement.  Id. 
 The purpose of the Uniform Arbitration 
Act itself is to limit the role of the judiciary, and its procedure is "designed 
to achieve enforcement without undue delay or undue expense."  Kutch, 
960 P.2d  at 99.   We have said 
that: 

 

[A]rbitration 
provides for voluntary settlement of disputes in an inexpensive and expeditious 
manner without resort to a tribunal and conducted without the rigid formality of 
strict rules of law.  Riverton 
Valley Electric Association v. Pacific Power and Light Company, 
Wyo., 391 P.2d 489 (1964).   
Arbitration is embedded in the public policy of Wyoming and is favored by 
this court.  Matter 
of Town of Greybull, 
Wyo., 560 P.2d 1172 (1977). 

 

Simon 
v. Teton Bd. of Realtors, 4 P.3d 197, 201 (Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶8]           
Given 
these purposes and our policy, the satisfaction of the award requires that we 
examine whether the doctrine of mootness applies.  We recently summarized 
that:

 

Our 
general law on justiciability provides that courts should not consider issues 
which have become moot.  We do not 
decide cases when a decision will have no effect or pertains only to matters 
that might arise in the future.  A 
case is moot when the determination of an issue is sought which, if provided, 
will have no practical effect on the existing controversy.  Therefore, if events occur during the 
pendency of an appeal that cause a case to become moot or make determination of 
the issues unnecessary, we will dismiss it. . . . [We have] further elaborated 
that a case is moot when the matter upon which a determination is sought 
presents no actual controversy or when a decision can have no practical effect. 
We have also recognized the general rule that the issue of mootness constitutes 
a question of law and may be properly addressed by a court sua 
sponte.  

 

Wyoming 
Bd. of Outfitters and Professional Guides v. Clark, 2002 
WY 24, ¶9, 39 P.3d 1106, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002) (citations omitted).  

 

[¶9]           
Stewart's 
satisfaction of the award effectively rendered the issue moot, and the district 
court should have dismissed the confirmation motion unless it determined that 
live issues remained to be litigated.  
See 
Goodman v. Seaver, 12 
Mass.L.Rept. 145, 2000 WL 1257462 *7.  
In Goodman, 
the 
Superior Court held that a satisfied arbitration award was not moot because 
under Massachusetts law a judgment was necessary to receive an award of multiple 
damages.  Because the good faith 
settlement was a live issue, the award would have practical legal significance 
if it was confirmed and made a judgment.             

 

[¶10]      
Here, 
Tilden asserts that Stewart opposed confirmation of the award because it carried 
res judicata and collateral estoppel implications for a bad faith claim.  Specifically, Tilden claims that the 
award implicates Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124(c) which permits attorney fees and 
interest against an insurance company found to have acted unreasonably and under 
tort law establishing the element of a bad faith claim.  Tilden, however, also states that the 
arbitrator determined his scope of authority under the arbitration provision of 
the policy was not broad enough for him to hear and decide the statutory and 
tort claims.  These facts 
significantly depart from the rationale of Goodman, 
and we cannot see that a judgment on the award is necessary to receive a further 
additional judgment permitted by law.1

 

[¶11]      
This 
award had been satisfied, and, under the doctrine of mootness, the order of 
confirmation is reversed and remanded for dismissal.  

 

FOOTNOTES

1Tilden has not offered any authority that the judicial concepts of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel would apply to an arbitration award, and we 
make these observations without deciding that they apply to an arbitration 
award.