Case Title: State v. Welch

Citation: 

Docket Number: 91-438

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1992-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-438


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit

 David P. Welch, Sr.                          June Term, 1992


 Paul F. Hudson, J.

 Ann M. Metayer, Windsor County Deputy State's Attorney, White River
   Junction, for plaintiff-appellee

 Charles S. Martin and David Venman, Law Clerk (On the Brief), of Martin &
   Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant was convicted of lewd and lascivious behavior
 with a child (13 V.S.A. { 2602) after a jury trial and appeals on grounds
 that the evidence was insufficient for conviction, that the prosecutor's
 closing remarks were not supported by the evidence and were prejudicial, and
 that the court erred in denying defendant's motion for further competency
 evaluation.  We affirm.
      On August 10, 1990, defendant was arraigned on a charge of sexual
 assault involving an incident which occurred between himself and his
 daughter.  At the request of defense counsel, defendant was evaluated by Dr.
 Theodore Robbins, a psychiatrist who had treated defendant over the previous
 four years.  Dr. Robbins testified at a September 19, 1990 competency hear-
 ing that defendant showed no overt signs of psychiatric illness and was
 experiencing no delusions.
      Defendant thereafter filed a notice of insanity defense and moved for a
 psychiatric examination to evaluate both competency to stand trial and
 insanity at the time of the offense.  The court granted the motion, and
 defendant was transferred to the Waterbury State Hospital for examination.
 Dr. William Woodruff examined defendant and issued a report on January 2,
 1991, stating that he found defendant to be competent to stand trial, that
 defendant was sane at the time of the alleged offense, and that defendant
 had the mental state to commit the alleged offense.  A competency hearing
 was scheduled, but on February 14, 1991, defense counsel wrote the court a
 letter indicating that defendant did not contest Dr. Woodruff's finding of
 competency.  The letter also made clear, however, that defendant was relying
 on his own expert and was not withdrawing his insanity defense.  Counsel
 indicated that a trial date of early April 1991 would be suitable.
      At a status conference on April 12, 1991, defendant moved to suspend
 proceedings for the purpose of obtaining a competency evaluation.  The court
 denied the motion and scheduled a competency hearing, which was held on
 April 23, 1991, the day before the trial was scheduled to begin.  At that
 hearing Dr. Woodruff testified that he had examined defendant on December
 24, 1990 and had found him competent to stand trial and sane at the time of
 the offense.  He also testified that he had examined defendant shortly
 before the hearing on April 23, 1991, and had again found him to be
 competent.
      Dr. Henry Payson, a psychiatrist, testified at the same hearing that he
 had examined defendant in his office on April 10, 1991 and that he was not
 competent to stand trial because of an alleged psychotic episode that occur-
 red during the exam, when Dr. Payson turned on his video camera to tape the
 interview.  Dr. Payson did testify that defendant appeared to be competent
 on April 23, 1991, the day of the hearing, when he observed defendant tes-
 tify on his own behalf at the competency hearing.  The trial court found
 defendant to be competent to stand trial, and trial began the next day,
 April 24, 1991.
      At the trial, Officer Steven Morse of the Windsor Police Department
 testified that on August 9, 1990 defendant voluntarily appeared at the
 police station and confessed to Morse that he had undressed his daughter,
 C.W., had begun "massaging himself in the area of the groin," ejaculated,
 "massag[ed] her butt," and "touched her vagina, rubbed it and stuff."  The
 officer added that defendant also confessed that he had placed C.W.'s hand
 on his penis, and kissed her on the mouth, and was prepared to continue
 masturbatory activity when Officer Vincent Jordan of the Windsor Police
 Department, responding to another matter, knocked on his door.
      Officer Jordan, present for part of the defendant's confession at the
 police station, testified that defendant confessed that he had taken off
 his clothing, put his finger on and into the vagina of C.W., and
 ejaculated.  Defendant conceded in testimony that he masturbated beside his
 child but denied any penetration.  The jury returned a verdict of guilty,
 and the present appeal followed.
      Defendant argues first that the State did not introduce evidence on the
 element of sexual gratification in fulfillment of the requirement of 13
 V.S.A. { 2602, which states:
         A person who shall wilfully and lewdly commit any lewd
         or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or
         member thereof, of a child under the age of sixteen
         years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or
         gratifying the lust, passions or sexual desires of such
         person or of such child, shall be imprisoned not less
         than one year nor more than five years.

 Defendant contends that neither his testimony nor that of the witnesses
 testifying about defendant's confession supplied sufficient evidence to
 support the jury verdict that defendant was "gratifying . . . lust, passions
 or sexual desires" through his actions.  Defendant instead points to
 testimony tending to demonstrate that he acted out of personal frustration
 and to divert feelings of aggression.  He also relies on the testimony of
 Dr. Woodruff, who testified as to possible motives for defendant's conduct:
         I don't think anybody can really tell you why he did it.
         You've got to get into -- a psychiatrist has to try to
         get as much information as possible, and listen to the
         patient, but even then you never really know the truth.

      In testing the sufficiency of evidence in a criminal conviction, this
 Court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and
 will uphold the judgment unless there was no credible evidence justifying a
 guilty verdict."  State v. Warner, 151 Vt. 469, 471, 560 A.2d 385, 387
 (1989).  Defendant's claim is based on his faulty assumption that the
 evidence of the motive of sexual gratification need be explicit and direct.
 Such evidence may be, and almost invariably is, circumstantial, and a motive
 of "gratifying . . . lust, passions or sexual desires" can be inferred from
 the circumstances.  Egal v. State, 469 So. 2d 196, 199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
 1985) (lewd and lascivious interest of a defendant can be imputed from the
 circumstances), pet. for review denied, 476 So. 2d 673 (1985); see State v.
 Audette, 128 Vt. 374, 379,