Case Title: Ex parte Liberty National Life Insurance Company.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1140612

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2016-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:03/25/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1140612
____________________
Ex parte Liberty National Life Insurance Company
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Misty Ann Barton, as administratrix of the Estate of
Benjamin H. Miller, Jr., deceased
v.
Liberty National Life Insurance Company)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division, CV-13-900563;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2130443)
BOLIN, Justice.
1140612
Liberty National Life Insurance Company ("Liberty
National") petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to
review the Court of Civil Appeals' decision (1) holding, as a
matter of first impression, that § 27-14-3(f), Ala. Code 1975,
a part of the Alabama Insurance Code, § 27-1-1 et seq., Ala.
Code 1975 ("the Insurance Code"), requires an insurable
interest in a life-insurance policy to exist at a point other
than the time at which the policy becomes effective; and (2)
reversing the trial court's dismissal of the complaint filed
by Misty Ann Barton, as administratrix of the estate of
Benjamin H. Miller, Jr. ("Benjamin Jr."), in which Barton
alleged that Liberty National was negligent in 
allowing 
Leanne
Jean Miller ("Leanne"), Benjamin Jr.'s stepmother, to
substitute herself as beneficiary of an insurance policy
insuring the life of Benjamin Jr.  See Barton v. Liberty Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., [Ms. 2130443, December 12, 2014] ___ So. 3d
___, ___ (Ala. 2014).  We granted Liberty National's petition,
and, for the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part and
reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
2
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Liberty National issued a life-insurance policy ("the
policy") to Benjamin H. Miller, Sr. ("Benjamin Sr."), on the
life of his son, Benjamin Jr. The named beneficiary on the
policy was Nona June Miller, the mother of Benjamin Sr. and
grandmother of Benjamin Jr.  Benjamin Sr. subsequently
modified the policy to name himself as the beneficiary.  On
January 15, 2011, Benjamin Sr. died.  On or about February 23,
2011, Leanne, Benjamin Sr.'s widow, was issued letters of
administration 
for 
Benjamin 
Sr.'s 
estate. 
During the
administration of Benjamin Sr.'s estate, Leanne contacted
Liberty National and had herself substituted as the named
beneficiary of the policy insuring Benjamin Jr.'s life.
On July 20, 2011, Benjamin Jr. died.  Leanne, thereafter,
made a claim for the life-insurance proceeds under the policy,
which Liberty National paid. Barton, as administratrix of
Benjamin Jr.'s estate, sued both Liberty National and Leanne. 
In the complaint, Barton alleged (1) that the policy was void
because Leanne had no insurable interest in Benjamin Jr., her
stepson; (2) that Liberty National was negligent in failing to
determine at the time of the requested beneficiary change that
Leanne had no insurable interest in Benjamin Jr.; and (3) that
3
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Liberty National's negligence caused Benjamin Jr.'s estate to
be deprived of the policy benefits that were payable, under
the terms of the policy, to Benjamin Jr.'s estate.  Barton
further alleged that Leanne had been unjustly enriched in an
amount equal to the proceeds paid to her that were rightfully
payable to Benjamin Jr.'s estate.  Barton sought a judgment
from Liberty National and Leanne in the amount of $25,000,
plus interest and costs.  
On October 15, 2013, Liberty National filed a motion,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., to dismiss
Barton's complaint, in which it argued that, pursuant to § 27-
14-3 of the Insurance Code, there was no requirement that
Leanne have an insurable interest in the life of Benjamin Jr.
at the time of the beneficiary change. Barton filed a motion
in response, in which she argued that because Leanne never had
an insurable interest in Benjamin Jr.'s life, Liberty
National's actions in allowing Leanne to substitute 
herself 
as
beneficiary was tantamount to the creation of a "wagering"
policy, which, under Alabama law, is void.  
On December 15, 2013, the trial court entered an order
granting Liberty National's motion to dismiss Barton's
4
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complaint; it subsequently entered an order denying Barton's
motion for reconsideration.  On April 4, 2014, the trial court
certified its December 15, 2013, order as final, pursuant to
Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Barton appealed.  
On December 12, 2014, the Court of Civil Appeals issued
an opinion holding that, when "[v]iewing the Insurance Code as
a whole, we agree with Barton that § 27-14-3(f) does not allow
for the change of a beneficiary on the life-insurance policy
of another when the proposed new beneficiary does not possess
an insurable interest in the insured."  Barton v. Liberty
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., ___ So. 3d at ___. Based on its
interpretation of § 27-24-3(f), the Court of Civil Appeals
concluded that Leanne, Benjamin Jr.'s 
stepmother, did 
not 
have
an insurable interest in Benjamin Jr. either when the policy
was issued or at any time thereafter. The Court of Civil
Appeals further concluded that the trial court had erred in
dismissing Barton's complaint in light of the fact that it
appeared 
that 
she 
could, 
under 
certain 
circumstances, 
maintain
a cause of action against Liberty National for negligence. 
For these reasons, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the
trial court's judgment of dismissal of Barton's negligence
5
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claim against Liberty National and remanded the cause to the
trial court for further proceedings.  On March 13, 2015,
Liberty National filed its petition for writ of certiorari;
this Court granted the writ and has heard oral arguments from
the parties.
II.   Standard of Review
"On certiorari review, this Court accords no
presumption of correctness to the legal conclusions
of the intermediate appellate court. Therefore, we
must apply de novo the standard of review [for a
Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., dismissal] that was
applicable in the Court of Civil Appeals."
Ex parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 1996).
The Court of Civil Appeals stated the following standard
of review:  
"'The applicable standard of review for a
Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., dismissal
is set forth in Nance v. Matthews, 622 So.
2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993):
"'"On appeal, a dismissal is
not entitled to a presumption of
correctness. Jones v. Lee County
Commission, 394 So. 2d 928, 930
(Ala. 1981); Allen v. Johnny
Baker Hauling, Inc., 545 So. 2d
771, 772 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989).
The 
appropriate 
standard 
of
review under Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala.
R. Civ. P.,] is whether, when the
allegations of the complaint are
viewed 
most 
strongly 
in 
the
6
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pleader's favor, it appears that
the pleader could prove any set
of 
circumstances 
that 
would
entitle her to relief. Raley v.
Citibanc of Alabama/Andalusia,
474 So. 2d 640, 641 (Ala. 1985);
Hill v. Falletta, 589 So. 2d 746
(Ala. Civ. App. 1991). In making
this determination, this Court
does not consider whether the
plaintiff 
will 
ultimately
prevail, but only whether she may
possibly prevail. Fontenot v.
Bramlett, 470 So. 2d 669, 671
(Ala. 1985); Rice v. United Ins.
Co. of America, 465 So. 2d 1100,
1101 (Ala. 1984). We note that a
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper
only when it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of the
claim that would entitle the
plaintiff to relief. Garrett v.
Hadden, 495 So. 2d 616, 617 (Ala.
1986); Hill v. Kraft, Inc., 496
So. 2d 768, 769 (Ala. 1986)."
"'(Emphasis added.)'
"Smith v. Smith, 865 So. 2d 1221, 1223-24 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2003) (footnote omitted)."
___ So. 3d at ___.  Further, this Court also reviews de novo
questions 
of 
law 
concerning 
statutory 
construction.
Continental Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Fields, 926 So. 2d 1033 (Ala.
2005).
III.   Analysis
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A.  Insurable Interest
Section 27-14-3(a) of the Insurance Code, regarding
"personal insurance," defines "insurable interest" as
"an interest based upon a reasonable expectation of
pecuniary advantage through the continued life,
health, or bodily safety of another person and
consequent loss by reason of his or her death or
disability or a substantial interest engendered by
love and affection in the case of individuals
closely related by blood or by law."
It has long been established under Alabama's common law and
statutory law that a life-insurance policy issued to a person
not having an insurable interest in the life of the insured is
considered a "wager" on the life of another and is therefore
void as against public policy.  Helmetag's Adm'x v. Miller, 76
Ala. 183 (1884); see also Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v.
George, 248 Ala. 649, 28 So. 2d 910 (1947). In Mutual Savings
Life Insurance Co. v. Noah, 291 Ala. 444, 448-49, 282 So. 2d
271, 273-74 (1973), this Court expounded on the long-
established rule requiring an insurable interest in the life
of the insured:
"[T]he long-established rule that [a policy of life
insurance procured or taken out by a beneficiary on
the life of another] is invalid unless the
beneficiary has an 'insurable interest' in the life
of the insured applies. This rule is to the effect
that a person has an unlimited insurable interest in
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his own life and may designate any person as his
beneficiary so long as the insurance was procured or
taken out by the insured and the premiums paid by
him, but one taking out a policy of  insurance for
his own benefit, on the life  of another person,
must have an insurable interest in the continuance
of the life of such insured. National Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 226 Ala. 325, 147
So. 173 [(1933)]; Tit. 28A, s 316, Code of Alabama,
1940 (Recomp. 1958). 
"Several 
reasons 
have been assigned 
as 
the 
basis
for the insurable interest requirement, both of
which 
are 
grounded 
upon 
public 
policy
considerations: a policy taken out by one for his
own benefit on the life of another, in whom he has
no insurable interest is, in substance, a wagering
contract; and such a policy may hold out a
temptation to the beneficiary to hasten by improper
means the death of the insured. Commonwealth Life
Insurance Co. v. George, 248 Ala. 649, 28 So. 2d 910
[(1947)]; Helmetag's Adm'x v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183
[(1884)]."
In other words, the public-policy rule making wager
contracts void developed to discourage speculation in human
life.   Id.  At common law, this public-policy principle that
1
Cf., however, § 43-8-253(c), Ala. Code 1975, a part of
1
the Probate Code:
"A named beneficiary of a bond, life insurance
policy, 
or 
other 
contractual 
arrangement 
who
feloniously and intentionally kills the principal
obligee or the person upon whose life the policy is
issued is not entitled to any benefit under the
bond, policy or other contractual arrangement, and
it becomes payable as though the killer had
predeceased the decedent."
9
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prohibits a person from insuring the life of a person in whom
he or she has no insurable interest also prohibited a person
from assigning a policy to one who had no insurable interest
in the insured's life. See Helmetag's Adm'x v. Miller, supra
(holding that an assignment of a life-insurance policy by the
insured to one without an insurable interest in the insured's
life is regarded as void as against public policy).  As early
as 1886, however, courts began to recognize that there were
conditions that could take an insurance policy on the life of
one in whom the person purchasing the policy had no insurable
interest out of the category of a mere wager.  In Connecticut
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 457,
460-62 (1876), the United States Supreme Court held that the
owner of a validly issued life-insurance policy could assign
the policy to another having no insurable interest in the
insured's life, provided the assignment was not done by way of
a cover for a wager policy:
"The essential thing is, that the policy shall
be obtained in good faith, and not for the purpose
of speculating upon the hazard of a life in which
the insured has no interest. ...
".... 
10
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"... We do not hesitate to say, however, that a
policy taken out in good faith, and valid at its
inception, is not avoided by the cessation of the
insurable interest, unless such be the necessary
effect of the provisions of the policy itself. 
"But supposing a fair and proper insurable
interest, of whatever kind, to exist at the time of
taking out the policy, and that it be taken out in
good faith, the object and purpose of the rule which
condemns wager policies is sufficiently attained;
and there is then no good reason why the contract
should not be carried out according to its terms.
..." 
In 1971, the Alabama Legislature recognized as much when
it enacted the Insurance Code, the purpose of which was, in
part, "[t]o provide a comprehensive revision, consolidation
and classification of the laws of the State of Alabama
relating to insurance and to the insurance business." Act No.
407, Ala. Acts 1971.  As for assignments, the insurable-
interest requirement is now codified at § 27-14-21(b), Ala.
Code 1975:
"A policy of life insurance, taken out by the
insured himself or by a person having an insurable
interest in the life of the insured, in good faith
may, unless the policy provides otherwise, be
assigned to anyone as any other chose in action
without regard to whether the assignee has an
insurable interest in the life insured or not." 
(Emphasis added.)
11
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The question presented in this case is whether, akin to
an assignment, a validly issued life-insurance policy may, in
good faith, if the policy does not provide otherwise, be
modified to substitute a beneficiary, regardless of whether
that beneficiary has an insurable interest in the life of the
insured.  The answer to this question, of course, depends on
the statutory interpretation of § 27-14-3(f), which states
that "[a]n insurable interest shall exist at the time the
contract of personal insurance becomes effective, but this
requirement need not exist at the time the loss occurs."  The
Court of Civil Appeals deemed § 27-14-3(f) to be ambiguous and
thus interpreted it as requiring an insurable interest to
exist not only at the time the policy becomes effective, but
also at any time thereafter.  Liberty National, however,
contends that § 27-14-3(f) unambiguously requires that an
insurable interest exist only at the time the policy becomes
effective.  Stated differently, Liberty National argues that
27-14-3(f) requires only that the original beneficiary of a
policy have an insurable interest in the insured's life and
that a validly issued policy can (unless the policy provides
otherwise) be subsequently modified to name another person as
12
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beneficiary, irrespective of whether that other person has an
insurable interest in the life of the insured.
In Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc. v. Nielsen,
714 So. 2d 293, 296 (Ala. 1998), this Court discussed the
principles of statutory construction as follows:
"'[When a court] is called upon to construe
a statute, the fundamental rule is that the
court 
has 
a 
duty 
to 
ascertain 
and
effectuate legislative intent expressed in
the statute, which may be gleaned from the
language used, the reason and necessity for
the act, and the purposes sought to be
obtained.'
"Ex parte Holladay, 466 So. 2d 956, 960 (Ala. 1985).
In IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602
So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992), this Court further
stated with regard to statutory construction:
"'Words used in a statute must be given
their 
natural, 
plain, 
ordinary, 
and
commonly understood meaning, and where
plain language is used a court is bound to
interpret that language to mean exactly
what it says. If the language of the
statute is unambiguous, then there is no
room for judicial construction and the
clearly 
expressed 
intent 
of 
the 
legislature
must be given effect.'"
Additionally, various subsections of a statute are to be read
in pari materia, i.e., they are to be construed together to
ascertain the meaning and intent of each. Ex parte Jackson,
13
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614 So. 2d 405 (Ala. 1993); McCausland v. Tide–Mayflower
Moving & Storage, 499 So. 2d 1378 (Ala. 1986).
In interpreting § 27-14-3(f), the "[p]rinciples of
statutory construction instruct this Court to interpret the
plain language of a statute to mean exactly what it says and
to engage in judicial construction only if the language in the
statute is ambiguous." Ex parte Pratt, 815 So. 2d 532, 535
(Ala. 2001).  Section 27-14-3(f) specifically states that
"[a]n insurable interest shall exist at the time the contract
of personal insurance becomes effective, but this requirement
need not exist at the time the loss occurs."  (Emphasis
added.)  We find the meaning of § 27-14-3(f)  clear and
unambiguous.  Section 27-14-3(f) defines the moment in time at
which the insurable-interest requirement applies as the time
the contract "becomes effective."   Section 27-14-3(f) also
states 
that "this requirement," i.e., the requirement that the
insurable interest shall exist at the time the contract
becomes effective, "need not exist at the time the loss
occurs." 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
insurable-interest 
requirement 
does
not place any restrictions on a subsequent change of
beneficiary for a validly issued life-insurance policy.  To
14
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interpret § 27-14-3(f) as requiring an insurable interest to
exist beyond the time the policy is procured and/or becomes
effective would require this Court to add words to the statute
the legislature has chosen not to include. 
To be sure there is no ambiguity that § 27-14-3(f)
requires an insurable interest to exist only at the time the
policy 
becomes effective, 
this Court points to subsections 
(b)
and (g) of the statute--concerning the same subject matter. 
Section 27-14-3(b), Ala. Code 1975, concerning procuring
insurance on one's own life, states:
"An individual has an unlimited insurable interest
in his or her own life, health, and bodily safety
and may lawfully take out a policy of insurance on
his or her own life, health, or bodily safety and
have the same made payable to whomsoever he or she
pleased, regardless of whether the beneficiary so
designated has an insurable interest."
(Emphasis added.)  In other words, § 27-14-3(b) provides  that
a person may procure insurance on his own life for the benefit
of anyone.  Section § 27-14-3(g), Ala. Code 1975, concerning
procuring insurance on the life of another, states:
"Any personal insurance contract procured, or caused
to be procured, upon another individual is void
unless the benefits under the contract are payable
to the individual insured, or his or her personal
representative, or to a person having, at the time
15
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when the contract was made, an insurable interest in
the individual insured."
(Emphasis added.)  By comparison, although § 27-14-3(b)
provides that a person may procure insurance on his own life
for the benefit of anyone, § 27-14-3(g) provides that an
insurance policy procured on the life of another is void
"unless the benefits under the contract are payable to ... a
person having, at the time when the contract was made, an
insurable interest in the individual insured."  (Emphasis
added.)  In other words, the plain language of § 27-14-3(g)
confirms that a life-insurance policy procured on the life of
another is void unless "at the time when the contract was
made" the proceeds are payable to someone having an insurable
interest in the insured. See, e.g., In re Estate of D'Agosto,
134 Wash. App. 390, 395, 139 P.3d 1125, 1128 (2006), in which
the Court of Appeals of Washington was called upon to
interpret 
a 
Washington 
statute 
containing 
language 
essentially
identical to § 27-14-3(g):
"This 
common 
law 
rule that an 
insurable 
interest
is required at the making of a policy was codified
by 
the 
Washington 
legislature 
in 
1947. 
RCW
48.18.030(1) provides: 
"'Any 
individual 
of 
competent 
legal
capacity may procure or effect an insurance
16
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contract upon his own life or body for the
benefit of any person. But no person shall
procure or cause to be procured any
insurance contract upon the life or body of
another individual unless the benefits
under such contract are payable to the
individual 
insured 
or 
his 
personal
representatives, or to a person having, at
the time when such contract was made, an
insurable 
interest 
in 
the 
individual
insured.'  
"The plain words of this statute make clear that
the relevant time for purposes of determining an
insurable interest is 'at the time when [the
insurance] contract [is] made.'  To argue that
another time is relevant would require us to add
wording to the plain words of the statute. ..."
(Some emphasis omitted; some emphasis added.)  Thus, §§ 27-14-
3(b), (f), and (g) harmoniously provide that, regarding
personal insurance, an insurable interest in the life of the
insured need exist only at the time the policy of insurance
becomes effective, but that that requirement need not exist at
the time the loss occurs. 
This Court further points to the
distinction made by the legislature concerning the time at
which an insurable interest must exist with "personal
insurance" 
versus 
"property 
insurance." 
As 
previously
indicated, in regard to personal insurance, § 27-14-3(f)
provides that "[a]n insurable interest shall exists at the
time of the contract of personal insurance becomes effective,
17
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but this requirement need not exist at the time the loss
occurs." (Emphasis added.)  The next section of the Insurance
Code concerning "property insurance," § 27-14-4(a), Ala. Code
1975, provides that "[n]o contract of insurance of property
... shall be enforceable as to the insurance except for the
benefit of persons having an insurable interest in the things
insured as at the time of the loss." (Emphasis added.)  See
Middleton v. Rush, 764 So. 2d 1276, 1278 (Ala. Civ. App.
2000)("No 
contract 
of 
property 
insurance 
is 
enforceable 
except
for the benefit of persons having an insurable interest in the
things insured as of the time of the loss." (emphasis added)).
In enacting § 27-14-3(f), the legislature did not include
language indicating that an insurable interest in personal
insurance must exist at the time of the loss.  Rather, it
specifically stated that "this requirement," i.e., the
requirement that an insurable interest exist at the time the
policy becomes effective, "need not exist at the time of the
loss."  Several treatises discussing the subject of when an
insurable interest must exist are in agreement with the
interpretation that, in regard to property insurance, "most
courts adhere to the rule that the insurable interest must
18
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only exist at the time of loss," whereas with personal
insurance, i.e., life insurance, "it is commonly said that the
insurable interest must exist at the time that the contract is
made, and the lack of the interest at the time of the
insured's death is irrelevant."  Robert H. Jerry II,
Understanding Insurance Law § 44, at 316-18 (3d ed. 2002). 
Specifically, regarding life insurance,
"[a]s a contract of life insurance is generally
not regarded as a contract of indemnity, it is
generally sufficient that an insurable interest
existed at the inception of the contract, and it is
immaterial that the interest ceased prior to the
death of the insured unless the contract provides
otherwise."
3 Couch on Insurance § 41:26 (3d ed.). Further,
"[t]he almost universal rule of law in this
country 
is 
that 
if 
the 
insurable 
interest
requirement is satisfied when the policy is issued,
the proceeds of the policy must be paid upon the
death of the life insured without regard to whether
the beneficiary has an insurable interest at the
time of death. Thus, where the policy is valid at
its inception by reason of the existence of an
insurable interest at that time, the subsequent
diminution or cessation of that interest does not
invalidate the policy unless the policy itself, a
statute, or an insurance regulation so provides.
Statutes requiring an insurable interest have been
construed as requiring merely that the insurable
interest be present at the inception of the
contract."
44 C.J.S. Insurance § 374 (2007).  
19
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Based on the plain and unambiguous language employed by
the legislature in § 27-14-3(f), we conclude that an insurable
interest in personal insurance need exist only at the time
policy becomes effective and not at the time the loss occurs.
Accordingly, insofar as the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion
interpreted § 27-14-3(f) to require the existence of an
insurable interest after the time a policy becomes effective,
its judgment is reversed.
B.  Rule 12(b)(6) - Motion to Dismiss
Liberty National also argues that the Court of Civil
Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's order dismissing
Barton's negligence claim.  We disagree.  In Nance v.
Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993), this Court stated
the following well settled standard for reviewing the
dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.:
"On appeal, a dismissal is not entitled to a
presumption of correctness. Jones v. Lee County
Commission, 394 So. 2d 928, 930 (Ala. 1981); Allen
v. Johnny Baker Hauling, Inc., 545 So. 2d 771, 772
(Ala. Civ. App. 1989). The appropriate standard of
review under Rule 12(b)(6) is whether, when the
allegations of the complaint are viewed most
strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that the
pleader could prove any set of circumstances that
would entitle her to relief. Raley v. Citibanc of
Alabama/Andalusia, 474 So. 2d 640, 641 (Ala. 1985);
Hill v. Falletta, 589 So. 2d 746 (Ala. Civ. App.
20
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1991). In making this determination, this Court does
not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately
prevail, but only whether she may possibly prevail.
Fontenot v. Bramlett, 470 So. 2d 669, 671 (Ala.
1985); Rice v. United Ins. Co. of America, 465 So.
2d 1100, 1101 (Ala. 1984). We note that a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of the claim that would entitle the
plaintiff to relief. Garrett v. Hadden, 495 So. 2d
616, 617 (Ala. 1986); Hill v. Kraft, Inc., 496 So.
2d 768, 769 (Ala. 1986)."
Additionally, "[i]n considering whether a complaint is
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), ... a court 'must accept the allegations of the
complaint as true.'  Creola Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke
Housing, L.L.C., 828 So. 2d 285, 288 (Ala. 2002) (emphasis
omitted)."• Crosslin v. Health Care Auth. of Huntsville, 5 So.
3d 1193, 1195 (Ala. 2008). 
In this case, Barton alleges in her complaint:  
"4.  At the time [Benjamin Sr.] took out the
insurance policy ... Nona June Miller [Benjamin,
Jr.'s grandmother] was named as beneficiary.  During
his lifetime, [Benjamin Sr.] changed the beneficiary
of said policy to himself, in accordance with the
terms of said policy of which he was the owner.  No
other relevant change to the policy was made by him
during 
his 
lifetime. 
[Benjamin 
Sr.] 
preceded
[Benjamin Jr.] in death.  Thereafter, [Benjamin Jr.]
died.  Therefore, pursuant to the terms of said
policy, the proceeds of any benefits paid thereunder
were payable to the estate of the said named
insured, [Benjamin Jr.].
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"....
"11.  Further, the acts of [Leanne] resulted in her
being unjustly enriched in an amount equal to the
insurance proceeds paid to her which were rightfully
payable to the Estate of [Benjamin Jr.]."
(Emphasis added.)  In essence, Barton alleges that Liberty
National was negligent in allowing Leanne to name herself as
beneficiary of an insurance policy that was owned by Benjamin
Sr. at his death and, pursuant to the terms of the policy,
payable to Benjamin Jr.'s estate. At this juncture in the
proceedings, however, the policy has not been produced or
viewed by the trial court, nor has any discovery ensued
concerning ownership of the 
policy, 
i.e., concerning who owned
the policy at Benjamin Sr.'s death, and who exactly had the
right to effect a beneficiary change.  Accordingly, in viewing
the allegations of Barton's complaint most strongly in
Barton's favor, as we are required to do, it appears that the
Barton could, under 
certain 
circumstances, 
maintain a cause of
action against Liberty National alleging negligence on its
part in allowing Leanne, either as personal representative of
Benjamin Sr.'s estate or individually, to substitute herself
as beneficiary on the policy insuring Benjamin Jr.'s life. 
Accordingly, we affirm that portion of the Court of Civil
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Appeals' opinion reversing the trial court's order dismissing
Barton's complaint.
IV.  Conclusion
We reverse the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment insofar
as it interprets § 27-14-3(f) to require an insurable interest
in personal insurance to exist at any point beyond the time
the policy of insurance becomes effective.  We affirm the
judgment insofar as it reverses the trial court's order
dismissing Barton's complaint.  Accordingly, the cause is
remanded to the Court of Civil Appeals for proceedings
consistent with this opinion. 
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. 
Stuart, Parker, Murdock, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.
Moore, C.J., concurs in the result.  
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