Case Title: Thornton Mellon LLC v. Frederick County Sheriff

Citation: 

Docket Number: 51/21

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2022-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Thornton Mellon LLC, et al. v. Frederick County Sheriff, et al., No. 51, September Term, 
2021 
 
TAX SALE FORECLOSURE CASES – WRITS OF POSSESSION – EXPRESS AND 
IMPLIED POWERS OF SHERIFFS – Court of Appeals held that sheriffs did not exceed 
express or implied authority in adopting policies on how to serve writs of possession in tax 
sale foreclosure cases and that, in execution of writs of possession, sheriffs’ mover policy 
and weather policy are valid exercise of powers fairly implied by sheriffs’ expressly given 
duties and authority.
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 51 
 
September Term, 2021 
______________________________________ 
 
THORNTON MELLON LLC, ET AL. 
 
v. 
 
FREDERICK COUNTY SHERIFF, ET AL. 
______________________________________ 
 
Watts 
Hotten 
Booth 
Biran 
Eaves 
McDonald, Robert N. (Senior 
Judge, Specially Assigned) 
Getty, Joseph M. (Senior Judge, 
Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Watts, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed:  July 12, 2022
Circuit Court for Frederick County 
Case No. C-10-CV-18-000976 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County 
Case No. 03-C-18-011990 
 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 
Case No. C-02-CV-19-002613 
 
Circuit Court for Howard County 
Case No. C-13-CV-19-001149 
 
Argued: June 1, 2022 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2022-07-12 
08:59-04:00
 
 
In this case, tax sale buyers brought actions for declaratory and injunctive relief in 
circuit courts, alleging that sheriffs in Maryland exceeded their express and implied 
authority by adopting policies concerning how to execute writs of possession in tax sale 
foreclosure cases.  The case involves a challenge to two policies used by sheriffs in evicting 
people from their homes when a tax sale buyer obtains a judgment foreclosing the right of 
redemption with respect to a property and the homeowner does not redeem the property.  
Under the first policy (“the mover policy”), when serving writs of possession, sheriffs 
require tax sale buyers to provide movers to remove personal property from the premises 
at issue.  Under the second policy (“the weather policy”), during bad weather conditions, 
sheriffs postpone the service of writs of possession.1  We must determine whether the two 
policies followed by sheriffs for the execution of writs of possession constitute a valid 
exercise of powers fairly implied by the sheriffs’ expressly given authority. 
The power of a government official or agency to do something can be either express 
or implied.  An express power is “[a] power explicitly granted by a legal instrument.”  
Express Power, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  By contrast, an implied power is 
a “power that is not enumerated but that nonetheless exists because it is needed to carry 
out an express power.”  Implied Power, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  
“Generally, [] a government official or agency has reasonable discretion to carry out fairly 
 
1This case also involved a third policy (“the sixty-day policy”) under which sheriffs 
did not serve writs of possession that were more than sixty days old.  The Court of Special 
Appeals determined that the sixty-day policy was invalid because it exceeded the sheriffs’ 
fairly implied powers.  See Thornton Mellon, LLC v. Frederick Cnty. Sheriff, 252 Md. 
App. 320, 339, 258 A.3d 1032, 1043-44 (2021).  No sheriff petitioned or cross-petitioned 
for a writ of certiorari seeking our review of the holding. 
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implied powers incident to those duties or authority expressly granted.”  Town of La Plata 
v. Faison-Rosewick LLC, 434 Md. 496, 523, 76 A.3d 1001, 1017 (2013) (cleaned up). 
In the Circuit Courts for Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Frederick, and Howard Counties, 
one or all of Thornton Mellon LLC, Ty Webb LLC, Danny Noonan LLC, and Al Czervik 
LLC (together, “Thornton Mellon”), Petitioners,2 tax sale buyers, sued the sheriffs of those 
jurisdictions (together, “the Sheriffs”), Respondents, seeking declaratory judgment that the 
Sheriffs’ mover policy and weather policy were void and injunctions against enforcement 
of the policies.3  In Baltimore and Frederick Counties, Thornton Mellon LLC, which 
describes itself in the complaints as “a large institutional tax sale buyer,” was the only 
plaintiff.  In Anne Arundel County, all of the entities were plaintiffs and in the complaint, 
Ty Webb LLC, Danny Noonan LLC, and Al Czervik LLC are described as entities to which 
 
2In their opinions, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and the Court of Special 
Appeals observed that Petitioners were evidently named after characters in the popular 
1980s movies Back to School and Caddyshack.  See Thornton Mellon, LLC, 252 Md. App. 
at 326 n.3, 258 A.3d at 1036 n.3.  IMDb (an abbreviation of “Internet Movie Database”) 
describes Thornton Melon—the main character of Back to School—as “a fun[-]loving and 
obnoxious rich businessman[.]”  IMDb, Back to School, https://www.imdb.com/title/ 
tt0090685/ [https://perma.cc/A548-UUFF].  IMDb describes Ty Webb, Danny Noonan, 
and Al Czervik—characters in Caddyshack—as a “suave golf guru[,]” a “young caddie[,]” 
and a “distasteful, filthy rich construction magnate,” respectively.  IMDb, Caddyshack, 
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0080487/ [https://perma.cc/NDD3-4AUD].  As the Court of 
Special Appeals stated: “Thornton Mellon is [] entitled to name its entities howsoever it 
wishes.”  Thornton Mellon, LLC, 252 Md. App. at 326 n.3, 258 A.3d at 1036 n.3.  These 
are the names under which Thornton Mellon has chosen to engage in the tax sale 
foreclosure business.  
3In addition, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Al Czervik LLC filed a 
substantively identical complaint against the Montgomery County Sheriff.  See Al Czervik 
LLC v. Montgomery Cnty. Sheriff, No. 475730-V (Cir. Ct. Montgomery Cnty.).  The 
circuit court stayed the case pending the resolution of this one. 
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Thornton Mellon LLC “regularly assigns Judgments Foreclosing Rights of Redemption 
and tax sale certificates.”  In Howard County, Al Czervik LLC was the only plaintiff. 
In each case, the circuit court concluded that the mover policy and the weather 
policy are valid and enforceable.  Thornton Mellon appealed, and the Court of Special 
Appeals agreed with the conclusions of the circuit courts.  Thornton Mellon filed a petition 
for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.  
We hold that the Sheriffs have the implied authority to adopt policies for how to 
serve writs of possession in tax sale foreclosure cases and that, in the execution of writs of 
possession, both the mover policy and the weather policy constitute a valid exercise of 
powers fairly implied by the Sheriffs’ expressly given duties and authority.  
BACKGROUND 
Complaints and Motions to Dismiss 
As explained above, in the Circuit Courts for Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Frederick, 
and Howard Counties, Thornton Mellon filed complaints against each of the Sheriffs, 
seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.  In each complaint, Thornton Mellon 
alleged that the Sheriffs lacked a legal basis for adopting the mover and weather policies 
and that the policies should be declared void and unenforceable.  Thornton Mellon 
characterized the mover policy as a practice of requiring it to bring movers when the 
Sheriffs served writs of possession and characterized the weather policy as a practice of 
the Sheriffs refusing to serve writs of possession during certain months of the year when 
the weather is bad.  Thornton Mellon alleged that the mover policy improperly caused it to 
incur additional costs and was not uniformly applied in all jurisdictions or with respect to 
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all plaintiffs who obtained writs of possession.  Thornton Mellon alleged that the weather 
policy infringed on its right to prompt enforcement of writs of possession.  Thornton 
Mellon contended that neither the mover policy nor the weather policy is codified in any 
statute, and that both policies are unconstitutional. 
The Sheriffs moved to dismiss the complaints and alternatively moved for summary 
judgment.  The Sheriffs pointed out that the mover policy exists because a tax sale buyer 
is entitled only to possession of the real property on which there is a tax lien and not to any 
personal property that may be on the premises.  The Sheriffs contended that the mover 
requirement is part of a “Statewide policy and practice of Maryland sheriffs that prevents 
the unlawful conversion[4] of personal property” in the service of writs of possession for 
real property.  The Sheriffs argued that not following the mover policy would, in most 
jurisdictions, result in them engaging in conversion of residents’ personal property.5  
With respect to the weather policy, the Sheriffs contended that they have an 
unwritten policy to postpone the service of writs of possession in extreme weather 
 
4Conversion is “an act or series of acts of willful interference, without lawful 
justification, with an item of property in a manner inconsistent with another’s right, 
whereby that other person is deprived of the use and possession of the property.”  
Conversion, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
5Unlike other jurisdictions, Baltimore City and Prince George’s County have 
ordinances that address the issue of personal property left on a foreclosed or leased property 
when the resident or tenant is subject to eviction.  Balt. City Code, Art. 13, § 8B-4(a) states 
that “[a]ll personal property in or about [a] foreclosed property at the time that [a] writ of 
possession is executed is abandoned.”  Prince George’s Cnty. Code, § 13-164(a) concerns 
service of warrants of restitution and states in pertinent part that “the landlord shall dispose 
of the property of a tenant.  In no event may any of the tenant’s property be placed on a 
public right-of-way or on any public property.  Any property removed from the leased 
premises pursuant to a properly issued warrant of restitution shall be deemed abandoned.” 
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conditions because of the need for consistency in the service of writs of possession and 
warrants of restitution6 and that to do otherwise and evict people during bad weather would 
be “inhumane, dangerous, and/or impractical.”  The Sheriffs argue that the weather policy 
is valid and that they do not need express legal authorization to employ a policy of serving 
writs of possession in the same manner as warrants of restitution, the service of which can 
be stayed in the event of extreme weather conditions under Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. 
(1974, 2015 Repl. Vol.) (“RP”) § 8-401(f)(2)(I).7  The Sheriffs maintain that evicting 
residents without using the weather policy “would put vulnerable people at potentially life-
threatening risk” “who may not have immediate access to warm and dry shelter” during 
extreme weather conditions.  The Sheriffs contended that in seeking to have the weather 
policy declared invalid, Thornton Mellon asked the circuit courts to uphold the 
“uncompassionate and inhumane treatment of Maryland citizens during the eviction 
 
6A warrant of restitution—also known as a writ of restitution—is a warrant or writ 
issued to “enforc[e] a civil judgment in a forcible-entry-and-detainer action[.]”  Writ of 
Restitution, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  A forcible-entry-and-detainer action 
is “[a] quick and simple legal proceeding for regaining possession of real property from 
someone who has wrongfully taken, or refused to surrender, possession.”  Forcible Entry 
and Detainer, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  An ejectment action is an example 
of a forcible-entry-and-detainer action.  See id.  
A distinction between a writ of possession and a warrant of restitution is the type of 
plaintiff involved.  As its name suggests, a warrant of restitution is a method for possession 
of property to be restored to a landlord.  See Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. (1974, 2015 Repl. 
Vol.) (“RP”) § 8-216(b)(2)(i).  By contrast, a writ of possession is a method for possession 
of property to be transferred to a party who typically never possessed it in the first place, 
such as a ground lease holder, see RP § 8-807(i), a mortgage foreclosure sale buyer, see 
RP § 7-105.11(d)(1), or a tax sale buyer, see Md. Code Ann., Tax-Prop. (1986, 2019 Repl. 
Vol.) § 14-850.  
7At the time of the filing of the motions to dismiss, what is now RP § 8-401(f) was 
RP § 8-401(d). 
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process.” 
Thornton Mellon filed oppositions to the motions to dismiss, contending that the 
motions should be treated as requests for summary judgment because they referred to facts 
outside of the complaints.  Thornton Mellon argued that summary judgment was 
inappropriate because there were disputes of material fact as to, among other things, the 
specifics of the mover policy, and that no law authorized the Sheriffs to adopt the mover 
policy or the weather policy.8  
The Circuit Courts for Anne Arundel, Baltimore, and Frederick Counties conducted 
hearings.  The Circuit Courts for Anne Arundel and Frederick Counties issued opinions 
granting summary judgment in the Sheriffs’ favor, declaring that the mover policy and the 
weather policy were valid and enforceable, and denying the relief sought by Thornton 
Mellon.  The Circuit Court for Howard County reached the same conclusion and issued an 
order adopting the reasoning of the opinion issued by the Circuit Court for Frederick 
County.  The Circuit Court for Baltimore County issued a Decision and Order declaring 
that the mover policy and the weather policy were valid and enforceable and denying the 
request for relief.  Thornton Mellon filed notices of appeal. 
Affidavits 
In the circuit courts, the Sheriffs attached to each motion to dismiss an affidavit in 
 
8In Baltimore and Frederick Counties, the Sheriffs filed supplements to the motions 
to dismiss.  Thornton Mellon filed oppositions to the supplements, arguing, among other 
things, that the Sheriffs exceeded their authority by adopting the mover policy and the 
weather policy.  In addition, in Anne Arundel and Frederick Counties, Thornton Mellon 
filed supplements to the oppositions to the motions to dismiss.  The Anne Arundel County 
Sheriff filed a response to the supplement. 
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which Brian Andre, the Acting Lieutenant for the Anne Arundel County Sheriff, described 
the mover policy and a second affidavit in which Acting Lieutenant Andre or another 
officer serving under a Sheriff described the weather policy in the officer’s jurisdiction.  
With respect to the weather policy, the Sheriff in Frederick County submitted the affidavit 
of Adam Gregory, a sergeant of the Frederick County Sheriff.  In Baltimore County, 
Deputy Chief Ruby Hernandez submitted an affidavit.  The Howard County Sheriff relied 
on Acting Lieutenant Andre’s affidavits concerning both the mover and weather policies.  
All of the officers’ affidavits indicate that the Sheriffs serve warrants of restitution 
and writs of possession in the same manner.  In other words, the affidavits state that the 
Sheriffs follow the same procedures when performing evictions9 to secure possession of 
real property for both landlords (who are plaintiffs in landlord-tenant cases) and tax sale 
buyers (who are plaintiffs in tax sale foreclosure cases).  
Affidavit Describing the Mover Policy 
In his affidavit describing the mover policy, Acting Lieutenant Andre stated that 
over the previous eight months, problems had arisen with writs of possession sought by 
Thornton Mellon.  Acting Lieutenant Andre described the problems as including that writs 
of possession are typically issued by the Clerk but that in the preceding eight months 
Thornton Mellon had requested that judges issue writs of possession which did not 
 
9Although the terms “evict” and “eviction” are most often used in landlord-tenant 
cases, they are not specific to such cases.  To evict is “[t]o expel (a person, esp[ecially] a 
tenant), from real property, usu[ally] by legal process.”  Evict, Black’s Law Dictionary 
(11th ed. 2019).  An eviction is “[t]he act or process of legally dispossessing a person of 
land or rental property.”  Eviction, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
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resemble in substance writs issued by the Clerk.  Acting Lieutenant Andre averred that the 
writs recently authored by Thornton Mellon would include taking possession of personal 
property as well as real property, whereas the writs issued by the Clerk did not include 
taking possession of personal property.  Acting Lieutenant Andre averred that the Thornton 
Mellon writs relieved Thornton Mellon of the requirement of providing movers to remove 
personal property during the service of writs of possession, making it impossible for the 
Sheriff to serve a writ of possession without transferring someone’s personal property to 
Thornton Mellon.  Acting Lieutenant Andre stated that he believed that the judges who had 
signed this type of writ of possession were not aware of the key differences.  
Acting Lieutenant Andre provided a link to a webpage on the website of Anne 
Arundel County summarizing the Sheriff’s policy and practice of requiring movers to 
remove personal property during the service of writs of possession and warrants of 
restitution.  See Anne Arundel Cnty., Md., Landlord - Tenant Matters (2020), 
https://www.aacounty.org/services-and-programs/landlord---tenant-matters 
[https:// 
perma.cc/2JKN-GBGL] (“the Anne Arundel County Webpage”).  According to the Anne 
Arundel County Webpage—a printout of which was attached to Acting Lieutenant Andre’s 
affidavit—“[a] landlord is responsible for providing an adequate number of movers and 
exercising reasonable care in removing a tenant’s property from a location.  Under most 
circumstances, if a landlord has failed to provide enough movers to conclude an eviction 
within 2 hours, the eviction will be rescheduled.”  The Anne Arundel County Webpage 
also states that “[a]ll personal property except that which may pose a public safety threat 
is to be placed on the curb of the nearest public roadway and once there it is the tenant’s 
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responsibility to safeguard the property.”  According to the Anne Arundel County 
Webpage, “failure to remove a tenant’s evicted property from a County right-of-way within 
48 hours will result in removal by the County Department of Public Works.”10  
Acting Lieutenant Andre averred that, before setting the number of movers required 
for serving a writ, deputies visit the premises to assess its size, its proximity to the nearest 
public road, and the amount of personal property there.  The Sheriff does not require a 
plaintiff to provide movers where there is no personal property on the premises or the only 
personal property on the premises is trash.  In other words, the Sheriff requires a plaintiff 
to provide movers where there is personal property on the premises that is not trash.  To 
determine how many movers are needed, the Sheriff uses a formula and criteria similar to 
that developed by the Montgomery County Sheriff.  Acting Lieutenant Andre provided a 
link to a webpage on the website of Montgomery County that contains the formula and 
criteria.  See Montgomery Cnty. Gov’t, Eviction Section (2022), https://www. 
montgomerycountymd.gov/sheriff/sections/eviction-section.html [https://perma.cc/5G8J-
W33T] (“the Montgomery County Webpage”).  
 According to the Montgomery County Webpage—a printout of which was attached 
to Acting Lieutenant Andre’s affidavit—a landlord must provide: 
 
10The Anne Arundel County Webpage observes that this is pursuant to Anne 
Arundel Cnty. Code (“AACC”) § 13-1-106.  AACC § 13-1-106(a) states that “[a]n owner 
of rental real property may not dispose of, store, or abandon the personal property of an 
evicted tenant on County rights-of-way, easements, or other County property for more than 
48 hours after the date of the eviction.”  AACC § 13-1-106(b) states in pertinent part that 
“[t]he Department may remove and dispose of all personal property that is on County 
property in violation of this section, and the Department shall bill the owner of the rental 
real property for all costs incurred by the County[.]” 
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 A moving crew of at least: 
 8 persons for a 1-2 bedroom apartment 
 10 persons for a 3 bedroom apartment 
 10-12 persons for a townhouse 
 12-15 persons for a single family home 
 15-25 persons for a retail business 
 and any necessary moving equipment.  More people may be required 
depending on the size and nature of the property. 
 A person who can defeat the locks may be needed in order to gain 
entry. 
 A truck or means to get tenant’s personal property to the nearest public 
right of way. 
 Tools in case something has to be disassembled before it can be 
removed. 
 Plastic bags for clothing and other small items.  
 
The Montgomery County Webpage also states that “[u]navailability of sufficient or timely 
resources may result in the eviction being canceled.”  (Emphasis omitted).  
Acting Lieutenant Andre averred that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the 
Sheriff’s mover policy in Anne Arundel County is the Statewide policy and practice of all 
sheriffs in Maryland, with some slight variations.  Acting Lieutenant Andre averred that 
the purpose of the mover policy is to avoid transferring residents’ personal property to 
plaintiffs, i.e., tax sale buyers, without any legal authority for doing so.  
Affidavits Describing the Weather Policy 
Acting Lieutenant Andre’s affidavit describing the weather policy11 and the 
affidavit by Sergeant Gregory, an officer with the Frederick County Sheriff’s Office, stated 
that the Sheriffs of those jurisdictions do not serve writs of possession or warrants of 
 
11As explained above, Acting Lieutenant Andre’s affidavit describing the weather 
policy in Anne Arundel County was attached to the memorandum in support of the motion 
to dismiss filed in Howard County. 
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restitution during extreme weather conditions.  Similarly, Deputy Chief Hernandez averred 
that the Sheriff in Baltimore County has a practice of not serving writs of possession or 
warrants of restitution when Baltimore County courthouses and other Baltimore County 
government buildings are closed due to inclement weather.  
All three officers’ affidavits stated that, in an instance of extreme or inclement 
weather, the Sheriff will serve a warrant of restitution or writ of possession “as soon as 
weather conditions improve.”  All three officers’ affidavits also stated that “[t]he Sheriff 
does not generally refuse to serve writs during months when the weather is poor.”  In other 
words, the officers denied that their offices refuse to serve writs during certain months.12  
Acting Lieutenant Andre averred that the Anne Arundel County Sheriff follows the 
weather policy in that jurisdiction “for reasons relating to compassion, community 
relations, and practicality.”  Similarly, Sergeant Gregory averred that the Frederick County 
Sheriff follows the weather policy in that jurisdiction “for reasons relating to human 
welfare, community relations, and practicality.”  Acting Lieutenant Andre, Sergeant 
 
12Serving as another example of a weather policy, the Montgomery County 
Webpage describes its policy as follows:  
 
If it is raining or snowing at the scheduled time of the eviction, the 
eviction will not proceed.  However, if precipitation starts after an eviction 
has started, the eviction will continue until completion.  I[f] the predicted 
high temperature from the national weather broadcast on the scheduled 
eviction date is 32 degrees or lower, evictions for that day will be canceled. 
. . . If an eviction is canceled as a result of bad weather it will be rescheduled 
as soon as possible.  
 
In this case, the three officers’ affidavits describing the weather policy did not mention the 
Montgomery County Webpage.  The information concerning the Montgomery County 
Webpage is included as an example of the weather policy used by the Sheriff in that county.   
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Gregory, and Deputy Chief Hernandez each averred that to their knowledge the Sheriff in 
their jurisdiction never had a dispute with Thornton Mellon over the weather policy. 
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals 
The Court of Special Appeals granted a motion by the Sheriffs to consolidate the 
four appeals, affirmed each circuit court’s grant of judgment as to the mover and weather 
policies, and remanded the cases to the circuit courts with instructions to issue declarations 
consistent with the opinion.13  See Thornton Mellon, LLC v. Frederick Cnty. Sheriff, 252 
Md. App. 320, 339-40, 258 A.3d 1032, 1044 (2021).  The Court of Special Appeals held 
that sheriffs have powers fairly implied by their express powers and duties and that the 
mover and weather policies are valid exercises of such fairly implied powers.  See id. at 
339, 258 A.3d at 1044.  The Court of Special Appeals determined that neither the mover 
policy nor the weather policy was inconsistent with the Sheriffs’ duty under Md. Code 
Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.) (“CJ”) § 2-301(a) to serve a writ of 
possession according to its instructions within the time set by the trial court.  See id. at 334-
35, 258 A.3d at 1041-42.  The Court of Special Appeals explained that there was no reason 
not to conclude that, like all other public officials, sheriffs have powers fairly implied by 
their express powers and duties.  See id. at 332-33, 258 A.3d at 1039-40. 
Addressing the mover policy, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that it was 
 
13As discussed above, the Court of Special Appeals reversed each circuit court’s 
determination as to the validity of a policy under which the Sheriffs did not serve writs of 
possession more than sixty days old.  The Court of Special Appeals explained that because 
a writ of possession issued to a tax sale buyer does not expire, the sixty-day policy as 
applied to writs of possession was inconsistent with Maryland law. 
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not arbitrary or capricious for the Sheriffs to choose to serve writs of possession in tax sale 
foreclosure cases in the same way that sheriffs are required to serve writs of restitution in 
landlord-tenant cases, where, under what is now RP § 8-401(f)(1)(i), a sheriff must require 
a landlord to have personal property removed from the premises.  See id. at 334-35 & n.12, 
258 A.3d at 1041 & n.12.  The Court of Special Appeals disagreed with Thornton Mellon’s 
argument that the mover policy is inconsistent with the tax sale foreclosure process because 
it increases Thornton Mellon’s costs and discourages tax sale buyers from participating in 
the foreclosure process.  See id. at 335, 258 A.3d at 1041.  The Court of Special Appeals 
explained that the mover policy does not stop the tax sale foreclosure process from 
proceeding and that the record did not establish that the costs of the mover policy are a 
disincentive for would-be tax sale buyers.  See id. at 335, 258 A.3d at 1041. 
Addressing the weather policy, the Court of Special Appeals pointed out that, under 
what is now RP § 8-401(f)(2)(i), service of a warrant of restitution may be stayed due to 
extreme weather conditions.  See id. at 336-37 & n.15, 258 A.3d at 1042 & n.15.  The 
Court of Special Appeals agreed with the Sheriffs that refraining from following the 
weather policy in connection with writs of possession would be inhumane, dangerous, and 
impractical.  See id. at 337, 258 A.3d at 1042. 
The Court of Special Appeals was unpersuaded by Thornton Mellon’s assertion that 
summary judgment was unwarranted because of factual disputes concerning the mover 
policy and the weather policy.  See id. at 336-37, 258 A.3d at 1042-43.  The Court of 
Special Appeals determined that there was no need for an affidavit concerning the mover 
policy in each jurisdiction because Thornton Mellon did not allege that the policy 
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substantively varied by jurisdiction.  See id. at 336, 258 A.3d at 1042.  The Court of Special 
Appeals concluded that Thornton Mellon’s assertions concerning the weather policy 
pertained only to the language used to describe the policy and did not rise to the level of a 
genuine dispute of material fact.  See id. at 337, 258 A.3d at 1042. 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
Thornton Mellon petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the following four issues: 
1. 
Whether Sheriffs who are commanded to enforce writs of possession 
issued in a tax sale proceeding have the authority to impose on tax sale 
purchasers an arbitrary “Mover Policy,” which is not authorized by the 
Legislature, is unduly burdensome on tax sale purchasers, and does no more 
to accomplish the purported goal of the policy than substantially less 
burdensome options, including those which have been enacted by local 
governments? 
 
2. 
Whether Sheriffs who are commanded to enforce writs of possession 
issued in tax sale proceedings have the authority to impose on tax sale 
purchasers an undefined “Weather Policy,” which is not authorized by the 
Legislature and substantially burdens tax sale purchasers who are subject to 
the whims of the Sheriffs and their deputies executing their writs? 
 
3. 
Where the Legislature has codified statutes governing the eviction 
process in tax sale proceedings, do the Sheriffs have the “fairly-implied 
power” to enact their own unwritten policies concerning the eviction process, 
which are not authorized by nor consistent with the policies set forth by the 
Legislature, and then rely upon those unwritten policies as a basis to abdicate 
their statutory obligation to enforce writs of possession? 
 
4. 
Did the [Court of Special Appeals] err in holding that there was no 
genuine dispute of material fact regarding the content of the Sheriffs’ 
Policies?  
 
We granted the petition.  See Thornton Mellon LLC v. Frederick Cnty. Sheriff, 476 Md. 
585, 264 A.3d 1283 (2021). 
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DISCUSSION14 
The Parties’ Contentions 
Thornton Mellon contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that 
the Sheriffs have the fairly implied power to adopt mover and weather policies.  Thornton 
Mellon argues that a sheriff’s role in serving process is a ministerial duty as to which they 
have almost no discretion, and that the Sheriffs in this case lacked the ability to adopt the 
mover policy and the weather policy, which it characterizes as arbitrary and unauthorized 
by case law or statute.  Thornton Mellon asserts that this is demonstrated by CJ § 2-301(a), 
which provides that a “sheriff shall serve all papers directed to him according to their 
instructions, within the time set by the court.”  Thornton Mellon contends that the plain 
language and legislative history of RP § 8-401, which addresses the execution of warrants 
of restitution in extreme weather and the removal of a tenant’s personal property, 
demonstrates that the statute applies only to the service of warrants of restitution in 
landlord-tenant cases, not to writs of possession in tax sale foreclosure cases.  Thornton 
Mellon argues that RP § 8-401 does not provide a basis for either the mover policy or the 
weather policy. 
Likewise, Thornton Mellon contends that nothing in Maryland Rule 2-647, which 
authorizes a clerk to issue a writ of possession directing the sheriff to place a party in 
possession of real property, gives the Sheriffs the authority to do anything beyond placing 
parties in possession of the property, i.e., the Rule does not expressly authorize the mover 
 
14Although the petition for a writ of certiorari included four questions presented, 
because of the interrelated nature of the questions, we address them together. 
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and weather policies.  Thornton Mellon also points out that Maryland Rule 2-641, which it 
acknowledges has no application to the service of writs of possession and instead applies 
to writs of execution,15 contemplates that sheriffs may be instructed to remove personal 
property from premises and are authorized to require a bond to cover their expenses.  
According to Thornton Mellon, because Maryland Rule 2-647 provides no authorization 
to require a bond, a sheriff cannot require a party to pay anything more than a fee for the 
writ of possession and cannot require payment to a third-party moving company. 
Thornton Mellon contends that the mover policy is not necessary to avoid 
conversion of residents’ personal property because it is an incorrect assumption that 
personal property left on a premises will somehow be deemed converted when the premises 
is placed under its control.  Thornton Mellon asserts that placing a tax sale buyer in 
possession of real property where personal property remains on the premises does not 
satisfy the elements of the tort of conversion as to the personal property.  In addition, 
Thornton Mellon maintains that the mover policy subjects tax sale buyers to substantial 
unnecessary costs and does not serve to protect residents’ personal property.  
Thornton Mellon maintains that its position is not that there should be no policy 
regarding serving writs of possession in extreme weather conditions, but rather that such a 
policy must be set by an entity with policymaking authority, not the Sheriffs.  In addition, 
 
15A writ of execution—also known as an execution writ, an execution, an execution 
of judgment, a judgment execution, a general execution, or fieri facias—is “[a] court order 
directing a sheriff or other officer to enforce a judgment, usu[ally] by seizing and selling 
the judgment debtor’s property [.]”  Execution, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
- 17 - 
 
Thornton Mellon asserts that the weather policy is unclear and not employed consistently 
across the State, and that the Sheriffs have engaged in “arbitrary ‘rulemaking.’”  Thornton 
Mellon argues that because under RP § 8-401(f)(2) only administrative judges may stay 
service of warrants of restitution during extreme weather conditions, RP § 8-401(f)(2) does 
not give sheriffs the authority to refuse to serve writs of possession due to extreme weather.  
Thornton Mellon maintains that the Sheriffs do not have the implied power to enforce the 
weather policy, as the Sheriffs do not have such power in landlord-tenant matters.  
Finally, Thornton Mellon asserts that summary judgment was inappropriate because 
there were genuine disputes of material fact concerning the content of the mover policy 
and the weather policy.  Thornton Mellon maintains that there was no evidence concerning 
the substance of the mover policy in Baltimore, Frederick, and Howard Counties, as the 
counties relied on the affidavit of Acting Lieutenant Andre, an officer from Anne Arundel 
County.  Thornton Mellon argues that there was no evidence concerning the weather policy 
in Howard County, as the Sheriff submitted only the affidavit of Acting Lieutenant Andre, 
and that there were disputes of fact concerning the weather policy in Anne Arundel, 
Baltimore, and Frederick Counties.  
The Sheriffs respond that, as government officials, they are tasked with serving 
writs of possession and have the “reasonable discretion to carry out ‘fairly implied’ powers 
incident to those duties or authorities expressly granted.”  The Sheriffs contend that their 
implied authority is limited only to the extent that it must be exercised reasonably and not 
arbitrarily or capriciously.  The Sheriffs argue that it is reasonable for them to avoid serving 
two identical forms of judicial process—writs of possession and warrants of restitution—
- 18 - 
 
in an inconsistent manner.  The Sheriffs assert that by adopting the mover policy and the 
weather policy, they serve writs of possession in a manner that is consistent with the service 
of warrants of restitution and that they have the implied power to bring such consistency 
to the service of judicial process.  
The Sheriffs contend that the mover policy is necessary to avoid converting 
residents’ personal property, which is not subject to writs of possession in tax sale 
foreclosure cases.  The Sheriffs assert that, if they did not follow the mover policy, residents 
could sue the Sheriffs for conversion, and it would not be a defense that the Sheriffs acted 
in good faith.  The Sheriffs maintain that RP § 8-401(f)(1)(i) reflects a public policy that 
when a tenant is evicted from a property, the tenant’s personal property is to be removed 
and not left on the premises to be considered abandoned.  The Sheriffs point out that 
Baltimore City is a jurisdiction with an exception to this rule, as its local law expressly 
provides that “[a]ll property in or about leased premises at the time that the warrant of 
restitution is executed is abandoned.”  Balt. City Code, Art. 13, § 8A-4(a). 
The Sheriffs contend that the weather policy is necessary to avoid exposing 
vulnerable individuals who may not have immediate access to shelter to the risks of illness, 
injury, or death.  The Sheriffs argue that RP § 8-401(f)(2) reflects a public policy not to 
evict residents during extreme weather conditions, and that the legislative history of the 
provision demonstrates that the General Assembly intended for sheriffs not to proceed with 
evictions during extreme weather conditions.  
The Sheriffs maintain that Thornton Mellon is not entitled to relief because they 
brought a facial challenge (as opposed to an as-applied challenge) to the mover policy and 
- 19 - 
 
the weather policy and Thornton Mellon has failed to establish that there is no set of 
circumstances under which the policies would be valid.  The Sheriffs argue that this Court 
has never interpreted CJ § 2-301(a) or Maryland Rule 2-647 (on which Thornton Mellon 
relies) as depriving sheriffs of the ability to develop policies as to the service of writs.  The 
Sheriffs contend that the duty to serve writs is discretionary rather than ministerial.  The 
Sheriffs assert that Thornton Mellon’s reliance on the distinction between discretionary 
duties and ministerial ones is misplaced because the distinction applies to tort cases in 
which the doctrine of public official immunity shields certain government officials from 
liability for acts that are discretionary, and that the distinction has no relevance in 
determining whether a government official possesses the implied authority to take a 
reasonable action.  Finally, the Sheriffs maintain that there is no genuine dispute of material 
fact concerning the mover policy or the weather policy, that Thornton Mellon has not 
disputed that the policies are materially the same across the jurisdictions at issue, and that 
Thornton Mellon has essentially conceded that there is no genuine dispute of material fact 
by filing a substantively identical complaint in each of the jurisdictions. 
Standard of Review 
An appellate court reviews without deference a declaratory judgment issued 
pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.  See Emerald Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. 
v. Peters, 446 Md. 155, 161, 130 A.3d 469, 473 (2016). 
Fairly Implied Powers 
In Faison-Rosewick, 434 Md. at 523, 76 A.3d at 1017, we recognized the principle 
that government officials may exercise powers fairly implied by their express powers and 
- 20 - 
 
duties as long as they do so in a manner that is reasonable rather than arbitrary and 
capricious.  In Faison-Rosewick, id. at 525, 76 A.3d at 1018, where a statute stated that a 
Town Manager had the power to verify voters’ signatures and ascertain that there were 
enough for a referendum and the statute did not expressly indicate that procedures could 
be created for verifying the signatures, we held that the Town Manager had the implied 
power to create and publish procedures to be used to verify signatures on a petition 
necessary to have a referendum.  The case involved the passage by a Town Council of a 
resolution that would let the Town annex land so that retail stores and offices, including a 
Walmart, could be built.  See id. at 500-01, 76 A.3d at 1004.  Citizens of the Town and 
other interested individuals circulated a petition to have a referendum on the annexation 
resolution and three related resolutions.  See id. at 501, 76 A.3d at 1004.   
The Town Manager posted on the website of the Town an eight-page document with 
procedures that the Manager would follow to verify the signatures on the petition.  See id. 
at 502, 76 A.3d at 1004.  The procedures established criteria to guide the Town Manager 
in the validation and verification of signatures on the petition.  See id. at 502, 76 A.3d at 
1005.  For example, the procedures provided that if the Town Manager determined that the 
petition form was not legally sufficient, the petition would be rejected.  See id. at 502, 76 
A.3d at 1005.  In the alternative, if the Town Manager found that the form of the petition 
was legally sufficient, verification of the signatures would begin.  See id. at 502, 76 A.3d 
at 1005.  Or, if the legal sufficiency of the petition could not be reasonably determined but 
the Town Manager found that validating the petition was in the interest of orderly 
management of the referendum process, the Town Manager would begin to validate the 
- 21 - 
 
signatures.  See id.  at 502, 76 A.3d at 1005.  Ultimately, the Town Manager verified that 
the petition had a sufficient number of signatures.  See id. at 502, 76 A.3d at 1005. 
Opponents of the referendum, including citizens of the Town, landowners, and 
developers, petitioned for judicial review of the Town Manager’s determination.  See id. 
at 504, 76 A.3d at 1006.  The referendum supporters filed a motion to intervene, which the 
trial court granted.  See id. at 504, 76 A.3d at 1006.  The trial court ruled in favor of the 
referendum opponents, reasoning that the Town Manager lacked the power to come up 
with procedures for verifying the signatures on the petition.  See id. at 505, 76 A.3d at 
1006. 
We agreed with the Town and the supporters of the referendum that the Town 
Manager had the power to adopt procedures for verifying the signatures on the petition.  
See id. at 522, 525, 76 A.3d at 1016, 1018.  We acknowledged that the relevant statute 
stated only that the Town Manager had the power to verify signatures and ascertain that 
there were enough signatures, and that the statute did not expressly indicate that the Town 
Manager could create procedures for verifying signatures.  See id. at 523, 76 A.3d at 1017.  
Nonetheless, we determined that the Town Manager’s creation and publication of 
procedures to be used to verify signatures on the petition constituted a reasonable means 
of discharging the expressly given duty to verify signatures.  See id. at 524-25, 76 A.3d at 
1018.  We stated: 
The statute unambiguously provides the chief executive and 
administrative officer of the municipal corporation, here the Town Manager, 
the power to “cause to be made a verification” of the signatures on the 
petition and ascertain that the requisite number of qualified signatures are 
present.  § 19(g).  The statute, therefore, does not grant the express authority 
- 22 - 
 
to create verification and validation procedures.  Generally, however, a 
government official or agency has reasonable discretion to carry out “fairly 
implied” powers incident to those duties or authority expressly granted.  See 
River Walk Apartments, LLC v. Twigg, 396 Md. 527, 543, 914 A.2d 770, 
779-80 (2007) (recognizing that municipalities may exercise powers that are 
necessary, fairly implied, or incident to “the powers expressly granted”). 
 
Faison-Rosewick, 434 Md. at 523, 76 A.3d at 1017.  We stated that “[t]he exercise of 
implied or discretionary authority is limited in that it must be exercised reasonably, not 
arbitrarily or capriciously.”  Id. at 523, 76 A.3d at 1017 (citation omitted).16  
 
16More than a century ago, in Heiskell v. City Council of Balt., 65 Md. 125, 4 A. 
116, 118 (1886), we acknowledged that a governmental entity can have powers fairly 
implied by its express powers, stating that “a municipal corporation possesses and can 
exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, 
those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, 
those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation[.]”  (Cleaned 
up).  We have restated this principle several times, including recently in K. Hovnanian 
Homes of Maryland, LLC v. Mayor of Havre de Grace, 472 Md. 267, 288, 244 A.3d 1174, 
1186 (2021).  In a different line of cases, we have stated that an administrative agency’s 
decision not to exercise its discretionary power is reviewed under an arbitrary or capricious 
standard.  See Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 276, 884 A.2d 1171, 1191 (2005) (citing 
Spencer v. Bd. of Pharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 527, 846 A.2d 341, 348 (2004)).   
Implied authority and discretionary authority are two separate concepts.  “Implied” 
is defined as “1. Not directly or clearly expressed; communicated only vaguely or indirectly 
. 2. Recognized by law as existing inferentially .”  Implied, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  “Discretionary” is defined 
as “(Of an act or duty) involving an exercise of judgment and choice, not an implementation 
of a hard-and-fast rule exercisable at one’s own will or judgment.”  Discretionary, Black’s 
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  In Faison-Rosewick, 434 Md. at 523, 76 A.3d at 1017, 
after explaining that municipalities may exercise powers that are necessary, fairly implied, 
or incident to expressly granted powers, we stated that “[t]he exercise of implied or 
discretionary authority is limited in that it must be exercised reasonably, not arbitrarily or 
capriciously.”  (Citing Harvey, 389 Md. at 303, 884 A.2d at 1207).  Thus, we apply the 
same standard with respect to the review of implied authority as discretionary authority, 
i.e., the exercise of both types of authority must be reasonable and not arbitrary or 
capricious. 
- 23 - 
 
Sheriffs’ Express Duties 
Md. Const., Art. IV, § 44 states that a sheriff “shall . . . exercise such powers and 
perform such duties as now are or may hereafter be fixed by law.”  The Maryland 
Constitution does not expressly identify the powers and duties of a sheriff.  See Soper v. 
Montgomery Cnty., 294 Md. 331, 337, 449 A.2d 1158, 1161 (1982).  The powers and 
duties of a sheriff are defined by the common law, as modified by statute.  See id. at 337, 
449 A.2d at 1161. 
CJ § 2-301(a) is an example of a statute that sets forth an express duty of a sheriff 
and states that, generally, “the sheriff shall serve all papers directed to him according to 
their instructions, within the time set by the court.”  Maryland Rule 2-647 concerns writs 
of possession and states in pertinent part: 
Upon the written request of the holder of a judgment awarding possession of 
property, the clerk shall issue a writ directing the sheriff to place that party 
in possession of the property.  The request shall be accompanied by 
instructions to the sheriff specifying (a) the judgment, (b) the property and 
its location, and (c) the party to whom the judgment awards possession.  The 
clerk shall transmit the writ and the instructions to the sheriff. 
 
Maryland Rule 2-641(c) concerns writs of execution and states in pertinent part: 
Upon issuing a writ of execution or receiving one from the clerk of another 
county, the clerk shall deliver the writ and instructions to the sheriff. . . . If 
the instructions direct the sheriff to remove the property from the premises 
where found or to exclude others from access to or use of the property, the 
sheriff may require the judgment creditor to file with the sheriff a bond with 
security approved by the sheriff for the payment of any expenses that may be 
incurred by the sheriff in complying with the writ. 
 
RP § 8-401(f)(1)(i) and (f)(2) 
 
RP § 8-401 concerns summary ejectment actions by landlords.  RP § 8-401(f)(1)(i) 
- 24 - 
 
addresses the removal of a tenant’s personal property, stating: 
Subject to the provisions of (2) of this subsection, if judgment is given in 
favor of the landlord, and the tenant fails to comply with the requirements of 
the order within 4 days, the court shall, at any time after the expiration of the 
4 days, issue its warrant, directed to any official of the county entitled to 
serve process, ordering the official to cause the landlord to have again and 
repossess the property by putting the landlord (or the landlord’s duly 
qualified agent or attorney for the landlord’s benefit) in possession thereof, 
and for that purpose to remove from the property, by force if necessary, all 
the furniture, implements, tools, goods, effects or other chattels of every 
description whatsoever belonging to the tenant, or to any person claiming or 
holding by or under said tenant. 
 
RP § 8-401(f)(2) addresses the execution of a warrant of restitution in extreme weather 
conditions, stating: 
(i) The administrative judge of any district may stay the execution of a 
warrant of restitution of a residential property, from day to day, in the event 
of extreme weather conditions. 
 
(ii) When a stay has been granted under this paragraph, the execution of the 
warrant of restitution for which the stay has been granted shall be given 
priority and completed within 3 days after the extreme weather conditions 
cease. 
 
The relevant legislative history of RP § 8-401(f)(2) is as follows.  In 1985, a bill that 
would have required or allowed evictions in landlord-tenant cases to be postponed in 
inclement weather was introduced but not passed.  The original version of House Bill 1607 
(1985) would have amended Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. (1974, 1981 Repl. Vol., 1984 
Supp.) § 8-401(d) by adding the following language as new paragraph (2): 
An official who is ordered by warrant to return possession of the property to 
the landlord and to remove any of the tenant’s property: (i) May not carry out 
the order in rain, snow, sleet, hailstorm, windstorm, or when the temperature 
is at or below 0 degrees Fahrenheit; and (ii) Shall carry out the order as soon 
as the rain, snow, sleet, hailstorm, or windstorm stops, or when the 
temperature rises above 0 degrees Fahrenheit.  
- 25 - 
 
 
(Paragraph breaks omitted).  On the recommendation of the Honorable Robert F. Sweeney, 
Chief Judge of the District Court of Maryland, House Bill 1607 (1985) was amended to 
simply provide that “[t]he administrative judge of any district may stay the execution of a 
warrant of restitution, from day to day, in the event of extreme weather conditions.”  In a 
handwritten annotation to a copy of the amended version of House Bill 1607 (1985), Chief 
Judge Sweeney observed that administrative judges in most districts postponed evictions 
in poor weather, that landlords in some districts protested and pointed out that there was 
no authority for such postponements, and that House Bill 1607 (1985) would render the 
landlords’ protests moot.  
In 1987, the General Assembly enacted the earliest version of RP § 8-401(f) by 
passing two bills whose final versions were substantively identical to each other.  See 1987 
Md. Laws 2082 (Pt. 3, Ch. 408, S.B. 926); 1987 Md. Laws 3324 (Pt. 5, Ch. 740, H.B. 
1415).  The original versions of the bills, however, differed from each other.  The original 
version of House Bill 1415 (1987) would have created a new statute stating: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subtitle, a tenant may not be 
evicted from leased premises on a day when: (1) The National Weather 
Service predicts at 8:00 a.m. that the temperature for the area containing the 
leased premises will not exceed 32 degrees Fahrenheit within the next 24 
hours; (2) The Governor has declared an emergency for the area containing 
the leased premises due to weather conditions; or (3) A judge for the district 
contained the leased premises stays the execution of a warrant of restitution 
for the premises due to inclement weather conditions. 
 
Id. at 3324 (paragraph breaks omitted).  Meanwhile, the original version of Senate Bill 926 
(1987) would have created a new statute stating: “(a) In this section ‘inclement weather 
conditions’ includes: (1) snow; (2) sleet; (3) hail; (4) rain; and (5) high winds. (b) 
- 26 - 
 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subtitle, an evicting officer may delay 
implementation of a warrant for repossession of leased premises because of inclement 
weather conditions.”  Id. at 2081-82 (paragraph breaks omitted). 
In a letter to the Chair of the Judicial Proceedings Committee of the Senate, the 
Chair of the Real Property Code Revision Committee observed that, under Senate Bill 926 
(1987), there would not be a court order for an evicting officer to rely on, and an evicting 
officer would not be required to postpone service of a warrant of restitution in extreme 
weather conditions.  The Chair asserted that, accordingly, Senate Bill 926 (1987) would 
provide an evicting officer with discretion that the evicting officer should not have.  The 
Chair proposed that Senate Bill 926 (1987) be amended to allow a judge to issue a court 
order precluding an evicting officer from serving a warrant of restitution in extreme 
weather conditions.  In a letter to the sponsor of Senate Bill 926 (1987), Chief Judge 
Sweeney recommended amending it to replace the existing language with that of the 
amended version of House Bill 1607 (1985), which would allow an administrative judge 
to postpone service of a warrant of restitution.  Both Senate Bill 926 (1987) and House Bill 
1415 (1987) were amended to implement Chief Judge Sweeney’s recommendation and to 
add what is now RP § 8-401(f)(2)(ii), which concerns when a sheriff must serve a warrant 
of restitution after a stay due to extreme weather conditions.17   
 
17In 1997, the General Assembly amended Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 8-
401(d)(2)(i) so that it reads as RP § 8-401(f)(2)(i) does, adding the phrase “of a residential 
property[.]”  1997 Md. Laws 4010 (Vol. VI, Ch. 692, H.B. 761). 
- 27 - 
 
Authority for the Policies May Be Fairly Implied 
In this case, like the Court of Special Appeals, we conclude that sheriffs may 
exercise the same fairly implied powers to which other public officials are entitled and 
when sheriffs are given an express power or duty by the General Assembly, a sheriff is also 
given all powers that are fairly implied to exercise or safely fulfill the express power or 
duty.  Under CJ § 2-301(a), sheriffs must serve all papers directed to them, including writs 
of possession and warrants of restitution.  Under Maryland Rule 2-647, when serving writs 
of possession, sheriffs must place plaintiffs in possession of real property.  RP § 8-
401(f)(1)(i) requires that, in landlord-tenant cases, a tenant’s personal property be removed 
from the premises by the landlord.  Thus, under RP § 8-401(f)(1)(i), when serving warrants 
of restitution, sheriffs must require landlords to remove personal property from the 
premises.  Under RP § 8-401(f)(2)(i), administrative judges may stay the execution of 
warrants of possession during extreme weather conditions, and sheriffs must postpone 
service of the warrants.  From these statutes it can be fairly implied that the Sheriffs have 
the power to adopt both the mover policy and the weather policy in connection with the 
service of writs of possession.  
We disagree with Thornton Mellon’s contention that it cannot be inferred that the 
provisions of RP § 8-401 give rise to the conclusion that the Sheriffs have the fairly implied 
power to serve writs of possession in tax sale foreclosure cases in a manner similar to the 
service of warrants of restitution in landlord-tenant cases.  We also disagree with Thornton 
Mellon to the extent that it contends that the Sheriffs cannot adopt the mover policy and 
the weather policy for the service of writs of possession because the policies are not 
- 28 - 
 
expressly authorized under any statute or Maryland Rule, such as CJ § 2-301(a) or 
Maryland 2-647.  The point of our holding in Faison-Rosewick, 434 Md. at 523, 76 A.3d 
at 1017, in which we explained that government officials have fairly implied powers, is 
that government officials are not necessarily limited to powers expressly set forth in a 
statute or rule.  Rather, government officials may have powers fairly implied by their 
express authority and duties.  That a particular action by a government official may not be 
expressly authorized by a statute is the start of the analysis in determining whether the 
official is authorized to take an action, not the end.  In this case, it is not dispositive that CJ 
§ 2-301(a), Maryland Rule 2-647, and RP § 8-401 are silent as to a sheriff’s ability to adopt 
a mover policy and a weather policy to serve writs of possession.  What is critical is that 
when considered together, these provisions lead to the conclusion that the Sheriffs have the 
implied power to adopt the mover policy and the weather policy in connection with service 
of writs of possession, and that the policies are not arbitrary or capricious and do not 
conflict with any applicable statute or rule. 
The Mover Policy 
The mover policy is essentially the same as the process required by statute when a 
sheriff serves a writ of restitution to evict a tenant in a landlord-tenant case.  See RP § 8-
401(f)(1)(i).  As indicated by Acting Lieutenant Andre’s affidavit concerning the mover 
policy, there is no functional difference between the execution of warrants of restitution 
and writs of possession because, in serving both types of papers, the Sheriffs must transfer 
possession of real property from residents to plaintiffs.  Thornton Mellon contends that the 
mover policy results in additional costs and discourages participation in the tax sale 
- 29 - 
 
business.  We are not persuaded that this is a reason to conclude that the mover policy 
should be invalid or not fairly implied.  In the complaints, Thornton Mellon LLC described 
itself as “a large institutional tax sale buyer” that regularly assigns tax sale certificates and 
judgments to three other entities—Ty Cobb LLC, Danny Noonan LLC, and Al Czervik 
LLC.  Thornton Mellon has achieved the status that it describes with the mover policy in 
use in the four jurisdictions at issue.  Put simply, we are not convinced that Thornton 
Mellon has been deterred from participation in the tax sale business because of costs 
associated the mover policy.  
In any event, regardless of whether the mover policy is costly or acts as a deterrent 
on some level to Thornton Mellon’s participation in the tax sale business (which we do not 
believe it does), the question is whether the Sheriffs had the authority to adopt the mover 
policy.  We hold that the Sheriffs did.  Just as the Town Manager in Faison-Rosewick, 434 
Md. at 525, 76 A.3d at 1018, had the fairly implied power to create and publish procedures 
to be used to verify signatures on a petition to have a referendum, the Sheriffs have the 
fairly implied power to adopt the mover policy.  It would be inconsistent with the principles 
underlying RP § 8-401(f)(1) for the Sheriffs to not be allowed to adopt a mover policy in 
connection with the execution of writs of possession.   
The mover policy serves the goal of promoting consistency and efficiency in 
connection with the execution of warrants of restitution and writs of possession, which in 
turn furthers the goals of fair and equal treatment of residents in the eviction process, 
maintaining good relations between law enforcement officers and the public, and the 
protection of the personal property of residents who are evicted.  The mover policy is 
- 30 - 
 
plainly not arbitrary and capricious, as adopting Thornton Mellon’s position would result 
in former property owners being deprived of access to their personal property in a manner 
that tenants are not during evictions and in tax sale buyers being able to receive possession 
of real property potentially faster and at less expense than landlords due to being able to 
have writs of possession executed without being required to provide movers.  The adoption 
of the mover policy promotes identifiably desirable and reasonable goals and cannot be 
said to be an arbitrary or capricious exercise of implied authority. 
We are aware that the Sheriffs argue that adopting Thornton Mellon’s position and 
prohibiting the mover policy for service of writs of possession would potentially expose 
the Sheriffs and the officers working with them to civil liability.  It is not necessary, though, 
for us to determine whether the mover policy is required for the Sheriffs to avoid liability 
for the conversion of residents’ personal property.18  Under Md. Code Ann., Tax-Prop. 
(1986, 2019 Repl. Vol.) § 14-815, a tax collector’s power “to sell property for the 
nonpayment of taxes exists notwithstanding the existence of personal property of the owner 
 
18Conversion has two elements—“any distinct act of ownership or dominion exerted 
by one person over the personal property of another in denial of his right or inconsistent 
with it[,]” and “an intent to exercise a dominion or control over the goods which is in fact 
inconsistent with the plaintiff’s rights.”  Yuan v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 452 Md. 436, 463, 
157 A.3d 254, 269-70 (2017) (cleaned up).  The first element is satisfied where the 
defendant engaged in “the wrongful deprivation of” property, regardless of whether the 
defendant acquired the property.  Id. at 463, 157 A.3d at 270 (citation omitted).  The second 
element is satisfied where the defendant intended to exert control over the property, 
regardless of whether the defendant “acted in good faith and lacked any consciousness of 
wrongdoing[.]”  Id. at 463, 157 A.3d at 270 (citation omitted).  Regardless of the ultimate 
viability of such a claim, it appears that at the very least, were sheriffs to move or take 
control of personal property during the service of writs of possession, residents in tax sale 
foreclosure cases could bring actions against the Sheriffs alleging conversion, and the 
Sheriffs would be forced to defend themselves in costly, time-consuming lawsuits. 
- 31 - 
 
of the property to be sold.”  The residents’ personal property is not subject to writs of 
possession in tax sale foreclosure cases.  Although the viability of an action against the 
Sheriffs for conversion has not been tested, the adoption of a policy designed for the 
avoidance of potential civil liability for officers is not an arbitrary or capricious ground for 
determining the need for the policy.  See Faison-Rosewick, 434 Md. at 523, 76 A.3d at 
1017 (“The exercise of implied or discretionary authority is limited in that it must be 
exercised reasonably, not arbitrarily or capriciously.”  (Citation omitted)). 
We are also aware that it would be physically possible for the Sheriffs to perform 
evictions without following the mover policy.  For instance, in some other States that lack 
a counterpart to the mover policy, law enforcement officers perform evictions by giving 
residents a limited amount of time (such as ten minutes) to retrieve essentials, having the 
residents leave the premises, and then allowing a locksmith to change the locks.  See, e.g., 
Eli Saslow, The return of the 10-minute eviction, The Washington Post (Dec. 15, 2021), 
available 
at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/12/15/phoenix-evictions-
pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/5SHC-GZPB].  As discussed above, though, it would be 
inconsistent with a variety of important goals to prohibit the Sheriffs from adopting the 
mover policy when serving writs of possession, where, by statute, a similar process is 
authorized for the service of warrants of restitution and the authority to adopt such a policy 
may fairly be implied from the Sheriffs’ expressly authorized duties. 
The Weather Policy 
The Sheriffs’ policy of not serving writs of possession in extreme weather is 
consistent with the Sheriffs’ express duties under CJ § 2-301(a) and the principle 
- 32 - 
 
underlying RP § 8-401(f)(2)(I), and is not arbitrary or capricious.  Under CJ § 2-301(a), 
Sheriffs are required to serve all papers directed to them in accordance with instructions 
accompanying the papers, and within the time set by the court.  Under RP § 8-401(f)(2)(I), 
administrative judges may stay the execution of warrants of restitution in extreme weather 
conditions.  It would not be in keeping with the principles underlying RP § 8-401(f)(2) to 
prohibit the Sheriffs from adopting a policy aimed at not serving writs of possession in 
extreme weather conditions.  For the Sheriffs to follow RP § 8-401(f)(2) in connection with 
warrants of restitution and have no weather policy in connection with the execution of writs 
of possession would cause residents in tax sale foreclosure cases to suffer disadvantages 
that tenants in landlord-tenant cases are not subject to.  
If we adopted Thornton Mellon’s position, residents in tax sale foreclosure cases 
could be evicted during extreme weather conditions, which, to put it mildly, could include 
potentially hazardous cold temperatures and snowstorms.  We agree with the Sheriffs that 
such an outcome would potentially expose vulnerable individuals to the risks of illness or 
injury and would be at odds with “humanity, compassion, community relations, and 
practicality.”  If we adopted Thornton Mellon’s position, Sheriffs would be required to put 
citizens at risk who would be evicted in extreme weather conditions and the officers 
working with them at risk by forcing them to serve writs of possession during adverse 
weather conditions.  The Sheriffs’ weather policy, which is designed to avoid these 
outcomes, is neither arbitrary nor capricious but rather furthers the reasonable purpose of 
ensuring the safety of the public as well as government officials. 
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Thornton Mellon’s argument that the legislative history of RP § 8-401 shows that 
the Sheriffs do not have the authority to not serve writs of possession in extreme weather 
conditions is unconvincing.  Thornton Mellon relies, in part, on a handwritten note made 
by the Chief Judge of the District Court, the Honorable Robert F. Sweeney, on a copy of 
the bill that was in the bill file for House Bill 1607 (1985).  The bill was proposed but not 
passed by the General Assembly.  In the note, Chief Judge Sweeney indicated that 
landlords “correctly” asserted that there was no authority to postpone evictions in bad 
weather and that the proposed bill authorizing the administrative judge of a district to stay 
the execution of a warrant of restitution would render such objections moot.  Thornton 
Mellon points out that Senate Bill 926 (1987) and House Bill 1415 (1987), which were 
passed, gave authority to stay evictions to administrative judges not sheriffs and that later 
House Bill 761 (1997), which was passed, amended RP § 8-401(d) to give administrative 
judges authority to stay evictions due to extreme weather only with respect to residential 
properties.  Thornton Mellon contends that these circumstances demonstrate that sheriffs 
do not have the authority to adopt a weather policy as to the service of writs of possession 
in tax sale foreclosure cases.   
Contrary to Thornton Mellon’s contention, though, the legislative history of RP § 
8-401 does not lead to this conclusion.  In a letter to the Chair of the Judicial Proceedings 
Committee of the Senate, the Chair of the Real Property Code Revision Committee 
expressed the concern that if under Senate Bill 926 (1987) there was not a provision for a 
court order for an evicting officer to rely on, an evicting officer would not be required to 
postpone service of a warrant of restitution in extreme weather conditions.  In other words, 
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the Chair of the Real Property Code Revision Committee indicated that the availability of 
a court order would have the effect of ensuring that evictions did not occur in extreme 
weather conditions, not that sheriffs or evicting officers should not be trusted with or have 
the discretion to not serve a warrant of restitution in extreme weather conditions.  In this 
regard, the legislative history of RP § 8-401 reveals an interest in developing a statute that 
would assure through the use of a court order issued by an administrative judge that 
evictions would be stayed in extreme weather, rather than the intent to deprive evicting 
officers or sheriffs of the ability to refrain from serving warrants of restitution in extreme 
weather conditions. 
Additional Considerations 
We disagree with Thornton Mellon’s contention that the Sheriffs did not have the 
authority to adopt the mover and weather policies for the service of writs of possession 
because according to Thornton Mellon, serving a writ of possession is a ministerial duty.  
As the Sheriffs points out, Thornton Mellon’s reliance on the distinction between 
discretionary duties and ministerial ones is misplaced because that distinction is relevant 
only to tort cases involving the doctrine of public official immunity, which “applies to 
public officials . . . who perform negligent acts during the course of their discretionary (as 
opposed to ministerial) duties.”  Cooper v. Rodriguez, 443 Md. 680, 713, 118 A.3d 829, 
848 (2015) (cleaned up).  Nothing in our case law indicates that the distinction between 
discretionary duties and ministerial ones is relevant to the entirely separate issue of whether 
a government official’s action was a valid exercise of “fairly implied powers incident to 
those duties or authority expressly granted.”  Faison-Rosewick, 434 Md. at 523, 76 A.3d 
- 35 - 
 
at 1017 (cleaned up).  In other words, our case law does not support the conclusion that 
addressing whether the serving writs of possession involves a discretionary duty or a 
ministerial one is necessary to a determination as to whether the Sheriffs have the implied 
authority to adopt the mover policy and weather policy.  In addition, we are unpersuaded 
by Thornton Mellon’s reliance on CJ § 2-301(a) (under which a sheriff must serve papers 
directed to the sheriff per the instructions contained in the papers), and Maryland Rules 2-
647 (which concerns writs of possession) and 2-641 (which concerns writs of execution) 
for the proposition that a sheriff’s duty to serve writs is ministerial rather than discretionary.  
We agree with the Sheriffs that, given the various considerations at play when they perform 
evictions, serving writs of possession involves a discretionary duty, not a ministerial one.   
Next, the Sheriffs allege that Thornton Mellon brought a facial challenge to the 
mover and weather policies as opposed to an as-applied challenge and failed to establish 
that there is no set of circumstances under which the policies could be valid.  We 
agree.  When making a facial challenge, a party claims that a law or policy is invalid on its 
face and could never be found to be valid.  See Powell v. Md. Dep’t of Health, 455 Md. 
520, 550, 168 A.3d 857, 875 (2017).  With an as-applied challenge, a party contends that 
a law or policy has an unconstitutional effect on the party.  See id. at 550, 168 A.3d at 875. 
In this case, although Thornton Mellon alleged that the mover and weather policies 
generally place a financial burden on tax sale buyers like itself who would be required to 
pay for movers and who would have evictions delayed in bad weather conditions, Thornton 
Mellon supplied no counter-affidavit or information concerning any actual or particular 
effect of the policies on it.  Thornton Mellon’s allegations in each of the complaints amount 
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to it raising a general or facial challenge to the policies as having an overall negative impact 
upon tax sale buyers.  Thornton Mellon did not demonstrate that there is no set of 
circumstances under which the policies could be found to be valid.  And, as explained, 
Thornton Mellon did not allege sufficient information to sustain an as-applied challenge. 
We are mindful of Thornton Mellon’s argument that local governments benefit from 
tax sales because they recover revenue lost by property owners’ failure to pay taxes on the 
properties in question and, according to Thornton Mellon, the Sheriffs’ mover and weather 
policies interfere with a local government’s ability to recover revenue.  From our 
perspective, though, that tax sales may serve as a potential source of revenue for local 
jurisdictions does not mean that Thornton Mellon may gain possession of property under 
conditions not safe for the residents or Sheriffs and at the Sheriffs’ expense.   
No Genuine Dispute of Material Fact 
We are unpersuaded by Thornton Mellon’s position that genuine disputes of 
material fact concerning the mover and weather policies precluded summary judgment.  In 
each complaint, Thornton Mellon characterized the mover policy as a practice of requiring 
them to bring a sufficient number of movers when the Sheriffs serve writs of possession.  
The Sheriffs attached to each motion to dismiss an affidavit in which Acting Lieutenant 
Andre averred that the Anne Arundel County Sheriff requires a plaintiff to provide movers 
where there is personal property on the premises that is not trash.  Acting Lieutenant Andre 
also averred that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the mover policy in Anne Arundel 
County is the policy and practice of every sheriff in Maryland, with some slight variations.  
Thornton Mellon’s characterization of the mover policy in the complaints and Acting 
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Lieutenant Andre’s description of the policy in his affidavit are completely consistent with 
each other.  Thornton Mellon fails to draw our attention to any evidence whatsoever that 
would undermine Acting Lieutenant Andre’s averment that the mover policy is essentially 
the same in every jurisdiction in Maryland.  Nor does Thornton Mellon explain how any 
variations in the mover policy across jurisdictions would be material to the issue before us. 
There is no genuine dispute of material fact as to the weather policy either.  In each 
complaint, Thornton Mellon characterized the weather policy as a practice of refusing to 
serve writs of possession during months when the weather is poor.  The Sheriffs attached 
to the motions to dismiss affidavits from Acting Lieutenant Andre, Sergeant Gregory, and 
Deputy Sheriff Hernandez describing the applicable weather policy.  According to the 
affidavits, the Sheriffs of Anne Arundel and Frederick Counties do not serve warrants of 
restitution or writs of possession during extreme weather conditions, and the Sheriff of 
Baltimore County does not serve warrants of restitution or writs of possession when 
Baltimore County courthouses and other Baltimore County government buildings are 
closed due to inclement weather.  In Howard County, the Sheriff attached Acting 
Lieutenant Andre’s affidavit concerning the weather policy in support of the motion to 
dismiss.19  All three affidavits stated that, in an instance of extreme or inclement weather, 
the Sheriff will serve writs of possession or warrants of restitution as soon as weather 
 
19In the memorandum supporting his motion to dismiss, the Howard County Sheriff 
indicated that Acting Lieutenant Andre’s description of the weather policy in Anne 
Arundel County was an accurate summary of the policy in Howard County.  Thornton 
Mellon fails to draw our attention to any evidence whatsoever that the weather policy in 
Howard County differed at all from the policy in Anne Arundel County, let alone in a way 
material to the issue before us. 
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conditions improve.  All three affidavits stated that the Sheriffs do not generally refuse to 
serve writs during months when the weather is poor.  
In opposition to the motions to dismiss, Thornton Mellon contended that there was 
no way to know or plan for how the Sheriffs would choose to follow the weather policy 
and asked rhetorical questions, such as: “Are there certain months that writs simply will 
not be issued?”  Thornton Mellon does not identify any evidence contradicting the 
averments that the Sheriffs do not refuse to serve writs of possession during months when 
the weather is poor nor did Thornton Mellon provide a counter-affidavit to that effect.20  
Without more, Thornton Mellon’s bald, unsupported allegation in the complaints, i.e., that 
the Sheriffs refuse to serve writs during certain months, is insufficient to generate a genuine 
dispute of material fact. 
Conclusion 
The Sheriffs’ ability to adopt mover and weather policies is fairly implied from the 
express powers and duties afforded sheriffs and the policies are neither unreasonable, 
arbitrary, nor capricious.  In addition, notwithstanding that they have fallen behind on their 
property taxes, the former property owners are people and deserve to be treated humanely 
and, at the very least, with a basic level of dignity.  We affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Special Appeals, affirming the circuit courts’ grant of judgment in favor of the Sheriffs. 
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL 
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  PETITIONERS TO PAY 
COSTS. 
 
20Indeed, Thornton Mellon’s above-quoted rhetorical question in the oppositions to 
the motions to dismiss suggests that there is no such evidence.