Case Title: David Moore v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 990665

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton,1 Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ. 
 
DAVID ALLEN MOORE 
 
 
   OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 990665       JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
March 3, 2000 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
The primary focus of this appeal is a determination of the scope 
of our recent decision in Commonwealth v. Baker, 258 Va. 1, 516 
S.E.2d 219 (1999)(per curiam), aff’g Baker v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. 
App. 306, 504 S.E.2d 394 (1998).2  As in that case, the question is 
whether the trial court, here the Circuit Court of Loudoun County 
(the circuit court), lacked jurisdiction to try David Allen Moore, a 
juvenile, as an adult on indictments charging him with two counts of 
murder and the use of a firearm in the commission of those murders.  
Specifically, the question is whether the failure of the Loudoun 
                     
1Justice Compton participated in the hearing and decision of this 
case prior to the effective date of his retirement on February 2, 
2000. 
 
 
2Within this opinion, we will refer to the decision of the Court 
of Appeals as “Baker I” and our per curiam affirmance of that 
decision as “Baker II.” 
 
2 
                    
County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the juvenile 
court) to give notice of the initiation of juvenile court proceedings 
against Moore, required by the then applicable provisions of Code 
§§ 16.1-263 and 16.1-264, to his biological father rendered the 
subsequent transfer of jurisdiction by the juvenile court to the 
circuit court ineffectual and, thus, the convictions of Moore void. 
 
The pertinent facts are not in dispute.  Moore was born on May 
13, 1977.  In December 1994, four petitions were filed in the 
juvenile court charging that Moore committed the above noted criminal 
offenses in January 1994.  On each petition in the space provided on 
the pre-printed form for the name and address of the juvenile’s 
mother, “Lillie Ruth Moore — Arlington County Jail” was listed.  A 
similar space regarding the juvenile’s father was left blank.  The 
juvenile court judge made no certification on the record that the 
identity of Moore’s father was not reasonably ascertainable and no 
affidavit to that effect was made by Moore’s mother.  However, in a 
social history report later filed in the juvenile court by a 
probation counselor of that court, Moore’s father was identified as 
“Vernon Butts” and his location was identified as “Tampa, Florida 
(exact address unknown).”  Moore’s mother was never married to Butts.3  
 
 
3The social history report also recited that Moore’s mother 
“dated” Moore’s father for three months and that she terminated 
 
3 
                                                                 
Moore and his mother were summoned to appear in the juvenile court 
regarding the allegations in the petitions.  Moore’s father was not 
summoned and did not voluntarily appear. 
 
Throughout the juvenile court proceedings Moore was held in 
custody and was represented by two court-appointed attorneys.  
According to court records, Moore’s mother did not appear at any of 
the hearings in the juvenile court.  Ultimately, following a transfer 
hearing at which Moore and his attorneys were present, the juvenile 
court by order entered on June 14, 1995, found probable cause that 
Moore had committed the criminal offenses charged in the petitions 
and certified Moore to stand trial as an adult in the circuit court 
for those offenses. 
 
Moore was indicted for those offenses on July 28, 1995, found 
guilty of each by a jury on February 6, 1997, and sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment of two life sentences and eight years on December 19, 
1997.  Throughout the proceedings, both in the juvenile court and the 
 
the relationship because he denied that he was the father of her 
expected child after she became pregnant.  The record also 
reflects that on May 10, 1996, Moore’s counsel made an oral 
motion in the circuit court that Moore be permitted to attend 
the funeral of his father, “Vernon Butts,” scheduled for the 
next day. 
 
4 
circuit court, Moore raised no objection to the failure of the 
juvenile court to give notice of the initiation of the juvenile court 
proceedings to his father as required by the then applicable 
provisions of Code §§ 16.1-263 and 16.1-264. 
 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Moore challenged his 
convictions on other grounds, but did not raise the issue of the 
failure to give notice to his father.  The Court of Appeals affirmed 
Moore’s convictions in an unpublished opinion.  Moore v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 0063-98-4 (February 23, 1999).  We awarded 
Moore this appeal limited to the issue of the effect upon Moore’s 
convictions of the failure to give notice to his father. 
 
We begin our analysis in this appeal by noting the significant 
similarities and distinctions between the facts and circumstances 
involved in Moore’s case and those in Baker’s case.  In both cases 
the criminal acts were committed and the proceedings against the 
juveniles in the appropriate juvenile courts occurred when Code 
§§ 16.1-263 and 16.1-264 required notice of the initiation of 
juvenile court proceedings to the “parents” of the juvenile.  In 
neither case were there certifications on the record by the juvenile 
court judge that the identity of one of the juvenile’s parents was 
not reasonably ascertainable as provided in the exception to required 
parental notice under Code § 16.1-263(E).  In both cases the 
juveniles’ biological fathers were not given notice of the initiation 
of the juvenile court proceedings, or the subsequent transfer 
 
5 
hearings, and they did not voluntarily appear at any of the hearings 
conducted in the juvenile court. 
 
Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeals held in Baker I 
that the then applicable provisions of Code §§ 16.1-263 and 16.1-264 
required notice of the initiation of juvenile court proceedings to 
both parents.4  Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that “[b]ecause 
the notice of the initiation of juvenile proceedings was not properly 
served on [Baker’s biological father], the transfer of jurisdiction 
[to the circuit court] was ineffectual and the subsequent convictions 
[of the juvenile in the circuit court] are void.”  Baker I, 28 Va. 
App. at 315, 504 S.E.2d at 399.  In reaching this judgment, the Court 
of Appeals held that the provisions of these statutes are “mandatory” 
and “jurisdictional.”  Id. at 310, 504 S.E.2d at 396. 
 
Thereafter, for the reasons stated in the opinion of the Court 
of Appeals, we affirmed that Court’s judgment voiding Baker’s 
                     
4At the time Baker was transferred to the circuit court in 1996, 
Code § 16.1-269.1 was the applicable transfer statute.  When Moore 
was transferred to the circuit court former Code § 16.1-269 was 
applied by the juvenile court because the offenses for which Moore 
was charged were committed prior to the repeal of Code § 16.1-269 in 
1994.  
 
 
6 
convictions.5  Baker II, 258 Va. at 2, 516 S.E.2d at 220.  It is then 
readily apparent that in the absence of any significant distinction 
between the two cases, our decision in Baker II would control in 
Moore’s case without further analysis. 
 
However, there are significant distinctions between the facts 
and circumstances in Baker II and those in Moore’s case.  In Baker I, 
the Court of Appeals noted that “[p]rior to the indictment, Baker 
filed a motion to dismiss the charges or remand the case to juvenile 
court and alleged that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to 
transfer the case to the circuit court because the juvenile court 
failed to comply with the notice requirements of Code §§ 16.1-263 and 
16.1-264.”  28 Va. App. at 309, 504 S.E.2d at 396.  Thus, Baker 
preserved the issue of this defect in the juvenile court proceedings 
and was not subject to the waiver of objection to the “jurisdiction” 
of the circuit court provided for in Code § 16.1-269.6(E), a statute 
we will address subsequently in this opinion.  In contrast, as noted 
above, Moore raised no such objection to the defect in the juvenile 
court proceedings either in the juvenile court, the circuit court, or 
                     
5We also noted that effective July 1, 1999, Code § 16.1-263 was 
amended to provide for notice of the juvenile court proceedings to 
“‘at least one parent.’”  Id.  
 
 
7 
the Court of Appeals.  Accordingly, it is in this context that the 
scope of our decision in Baker II must be viewed.  More specifically, 
we must now decide, applying the applicable versions of the pertinent 
statutes, whether the failure to give the statutory notice of the 
initiation of juvenile court proceedings to a juvenile’s parent is a 
defect in the proceedings such that it is not subject to waiver by 
the juvenile either in the juvenile court or the circuit court. 
 
We continue our analysis by emphasizing the necessary 
distinction to be drawn here between the power of a court to 
adjudicate a specified class of cases, commonly known as “subject 
matter jurisdiction,” and the authority of a court to exercise that 
power in a particular case.  Subject matter jurisdiction is granted 
by constitution or statute.  Humphreys v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 765, 
772, 43 S.E.2d 890, 894 (1947).  It cannot be waived and any judgment 
rendered without it is void ab initio.  Moreover, lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction “may be raised at any time, in any manner, before 
any court, or by the court itself.”  Id., 43 S.E.2d at 893.  In 
contrast, “[a] court’s authority to exercise its subject matter 
jurisdiction over a case may be restricted by a failure to comply 
with statutory requirements that are mandatory in nature and, thus, 
are prerequisite to a court’s lawful exercise of that jurisdiction.”  
Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2000) 
(decided today) (holding that the failure to give statutorily 
required notice of initiation of juvenile court proceeding to 
 
8 
                    
juvenile’s parent is a defect in those proceedings cured by Code 
§ 16.1-269.1(E)).6
 
The statute that provides subject matter jurisdiction to the 
juvenile and domestic relations district courts is Code § 16.1-241, 
which gives these courts “exclusive original jurisdiction” over “all 
cases, matters and proceedings involving” a juvenile who is alleged 
to be delinquent.7  The jurisdiction of these courts is invoked and 
the proceedings therein commenced by the filing of a petition.  Code 
§ 16.1-260(A).  After the petition is filed, Code §§ 16.1-263 and 
16.1-264 mandate parental notice of the initiation of the proceedings 
 
 
6The defendant in Moore is not the same defendant in the 
present case. 
 
7This code section has been amended from time to time and was 
amended in 1996 specifically to limit the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile courts to conducting a preliminary hearing to determine 
probable cause in any case in which the juvenile, age 14 or older, is 
alleged to have committed certain violent juvenile felonies, 
including those charged against Moore in the present case.  This 
limiting provision, however, was not applicable at the time of the 
proceedings in the juvenile court against Moore. 
 
 
9 
by the issuance of a summons.  The subsequent transfer of such a case 
by the juvenile court to the circuit court is provided for under Code 
§ 16.1-269.1.  Former Code § 16.1-269, applied by the juvenile court 
in Moore’s case, also provided for this transfer to the circuit 
court.  While there are considerable distinctions between the 
statutes, when viewed in the limited context that they both provide 
the statutory means by which a circuit court acquires the authority 
to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction over a class of offenses 
committed by a juvenile that would otherwise fall within the 
exclusive original subject matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court, 
we need not address all those distinctions here.  The significant and 
pertinent distinction, however, is the applicability of Code § 16.1-
269.1(E), another statute we also will subsequently address in this 
opinion. 
 
There is no question that when the statutory requirements 
related to the juvenile court proceedings are followed, a circuit 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the class of offenses 
committed by a juvenile that are at issue here is invoked.  See Code 
§§ 17.1-513 and 19.2-239.  It is the unique statutory framework 
whereby a juvenile court and in turn a circuit court acquire the 
authority to exercise their subject matter jurisdiction that is at 
issue here and was at issue in a number of our prior cases.  In this 
regard, we have held that the statutory requirement of parental 
notice of the initiation of proceedings in the juvenile court, under 
 
10 
various former versions of what is now Code § 16.1-263, are mandatory 
in nature and limit a court’s rightful exercise of its subject matter 
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Gregory v. Peyton, 208 Va. 157, 159-60, 156 
S.E.2d 624, 626 (1967); Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 73, 80, 147 S.E.2d 
739, 743 (1966). 
 
In French, where the juvenile court failed to give parental 
notice of the initiation of the proceedings in that court, we stated 
that “the failure of the juvenile court to comply with the applicable 
statutes rendered the circuit court proceedings void.”  Id. at 80, 
147 S.E.2d at 743 (emphasis added).  Moreover, and pertinent to the 
present appeal, in Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 425, 192 S.E.2d 775 
(1972), we recognized that there had been various amendments to the 
notice requirements concerning juvenile court proceedings, but we 
stressed that “the requirement that the parents of an infant 
defendant charged with a crime have notification of the time and 
place of his trial and an opportunity to be present has remained 
constant.”  Id. at 428, 192 S.E.2d at 777.  In contrast to these 
cases, we have distinguished specific statutory requirements and held 
that certain defects in the juvenile court proceedings were merely 
procedural and, thus, were subject to cure or waiver.  See, e.g., 
Turner v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 666, 670, 222 S.E.2d 517, 520 
(1976)(failure to provide written notice to parents cured by actual 
presence of juvenile’s parents at transfer hearing). 
 
11 
 
Guided by these principles, we turn to the specific 
circumstances in Moore’s case.  The notice provisions contained in 
the applicable version of Code § 16.1-263 require that “[a]fter a 
petition has been filed, the court shall direct the issuance of 
summonses . . . to the parents . . . .”  This requirement, although 
no longer containing earlier language prohibiting the hearing to 
proceed without the notice, is otherwise virtually identical to that 
considered by this Court from the time we decided French to the time 
we decided Baker II.  Based on this Court’s unswerving adherence to 
the nature of this notice requirement to parents, this requirement as 
applied to Moore’s case was “mandatory.”  Thus, because it failed to 
comply with this mandatory requirement, the juvenile court lacked 
authority to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction over the 
offenses charged against Moore.8  It then remains only to be 
                     
8In addition, we note that Code § 16.1-269.1(E) provides 
that “[a]n indictment in the circuit court cures any error or 
defect in any proceeding held in the juvenile court except with 
respect to the juvenile’s age.”  This provision, however, 
applies only to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1996, and 
therefore does not apply to Moore’s case.  See 1996 Va. Acts. 
ch. 755, cl. 7 and ch. 914, cl.7. 
 
 
 
12 
determined whether Code § 16.1-269.6(E) is applicable in the present 
case and operates to waive or cure this defect in the juvenile court 
proceedings such that the circuit court had the necessary authority 
to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction to try Moore as an adult 
for the offenses set forth in the indictments because Moore raised no 
objection to the jurisdiction of the circuit court. 
 
Code § 16.1-269.6(E) became effective on July 1, 1994.  As 
previously noted the offenses for which Moore was charged occurred in 
January 1994 and the petitions charging him with these offenses were 
filed in the juvenile court in December 1994.  He was subsequently 
indicted in the circuit court for these offenses on July 28, 1995, 
and arraigned in December 1996.  Accordingly, we will assume, without 
deciding, that Code § 16.1-269.6(E) is applicable to Moore’s case. 
 
Code § 16.1-269.6(E) provides that: “Any objection to the 
jurisdiction of the circuit court pursuant to this article shall be 
waived if not made before arraignment.”  (Emphasis added.)  The plain 
language of this section clearly manifests legislative intent that 
                                                                  
This provision was also not applicable in Baker II because 
the offenses at issue there were committed before July 1, 1996.  
However, the provision now acts to cure the defect in the 
juvenile court proceedings at issue in Moore’s case.  See Moore, 
259 Va. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___. 
 
13 
any defect in the transfer proceedings conducted in the juvenile 
court as provided in Article 7 is waived such that the circuit court 
acquires the authority to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction 
over the offenses charged against the juvenile unless the juvenile 
raises an objection based on a defect in the juvenile court transfer 
hearing prior to arraignment in the circuit court.  Beyond question, 
the legislature has the authority to provide for a waiver of a defect 
in the transfer proceeding in this manner. 
 
The Commonwealth’s reliance on Code § 16.1-269.6(E) in Moore’s 
case, however, is misplaced.  By its express terms this statute does 
not purport to cure or waive defects in the initiation of the 
juvenile court proceedings.  Code § 16.1-269.1(E), enacted subsequent 
to this statute, addresses those defects.  Code § 16.1-269.6(E), by 
contrast, does not address the requirements of Code §§ 16.1-263 and 
16.1-264, but only addresses the waiver of a defect in the transfer 
hearing conducted in the juvenile court.  Cf. Burfoot v. 
Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 38, 51, 473 S.E.2d 724, 731 (1996).  Thus, 
Code § 16.1-269.6(E) does not operate to cure or waive the initial 
defect in the juvenile court proceedings where, as here, the juvenile 
court fails to give the parental notice of the initiation of juvenile 
court proceedings as statutorily mandated. 
 
In short, the juvenile court in Moore’s case never acquired the 
authority to exercise its jurisdiction to conduct the transfer 
hearing that resulted in the transfer of Moore’s case to the circuit 
 
14 
court.  Accordingly, the circuit court never acquired the authority 
to exercise its jurisdiction to try Moore for the criminal offenses 
charged in the indictments, and Moore’s convictions in the circuit 
court are void. This result is consistent with our holdings in French 
and Baker II. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remand this case with directions that the case be 
remanded to the trial court for a new trial if the Commonwealth be so 
advised.  Since Moore has now reached his majority and cannot be 
retried as a juvenile, if the Commonwealth elects to retry him, Moore 
should be tried on new indictments.  French, 207 Va. at 80, 147 
S.E.2d at 743-44. 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE COMPTON, dissenting. 
 
In my opinion, the defendant waived the defect in the 
juvenile court proceeding. 
 
Code § 16.1-269.6(E) plainly provides:  "Any objection to 
the jurisdiction of the circuit court pursuant to this article 
shall be waived if not made before arraignment." 
 
Baker did not involve interpretation of this statute.  See 
Commonwealth v. Baker, 258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 (1999) (per 
curiam), aff'g Baker v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 306, 504 
S.E.2d 394 (1998). 
 
15 
 
As I understand the majority's reaction to this statute, 
waiver does not apply here because application of the statute is 
restricted to proceedings described in Article 7 of Chapter 11 
of Title 16.1 of the Code, which does not include statutes 
dealing with the initiation of the juvenile court proceedings. 
 
As I interpret Code § 16.1-269.6(E), it plainly speaks 
globally to the jurisdiction of the circuit court.  Acquisition 
of this jurisdiction involves one continuous process and results 
from the interplay of many statutes not codified within Article 
7, including the Article 5 notice provisions of former Code 
§§ 16.1-263 and -264.  In other words, a circuit court's 
jurisdiction is acquired not only by the transfer proceeding 
mentioned in Article 7 but also by the initiation requirements 
mentioned in Article 5. 
 
Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, which affirmed the defendant's convictions. 
 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LACY joins, dissenting. 
Because I believe that David Allen Moore has defaulted the 
alleged error under Rules 5:17(c) and 5:25, I would affirm his 
convictions. 
Before discussing my reasons for this conclusion, it is 
important to note, as does the majority, that the instant case 
comes to us in an entirely different procedural posture than did 
 
16 
the case of Baker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 
(1999) (per curiam).  Although Moore alleges the same error as 
the one addressed in Baker, namely the failure to give notice of 
the initiation of juvenile proceedings to the juvenile’s father 
in accordance with former Code § 16.1-263 (1994)9 and present 
Code § 16.1-264 (1994),10 Moore failed to raise an objection with 
regard to the issue either before the juvenile and domestic 
relations district court (juvenile court) or the circuit court.  
To the contrary, the juvenile  court judge stated in her notes, 
which are part of the record in this appeal, that neither party 
presented any question regarding the sufficiency of the notice 
required under former Code § 16.1-263 and present Code § 16.1–
264.  The juvenile court then found that notice as prescribed in 
those statutes had been given.  Likewise, Moore did not assign 
error to this alleged defect in his petition for appeal to the 
Court of Appeals.  Instead, he raised the question whether the 
circuit court lacked jurisdiction to try him as an adult because 
                     
9 This section was amended by the General Assembly in 1999 
to require the summons of only one of a juvenile’s parents, 
while the former section required notice to both parents. 
 
10 Code § 16.1-264 remains the same as it was in 1994. 
 
17 
the juvenile court did not comply with the notice provisions of 
former Code § 16.1-263 and present Code § 16.1–264 for the first 
time before this Court.11  
In contrast to Moore, the defendant in Baker preserved his 
objection to the error by filing a motion to dismiss before he 
was indicted.  Baker also timely raised the issue on appeal.  
Thus, we did not have to determine in Baker whether the error 
was one that deprived the juvenile court of its subject matter 
jurisdiction and thus could be raised at any time.12  
Consequently, this Court’s decision in Baker is not dispositive 
                     
11 Moore has not asked that his failure to object to the 
lack of notice be considered under the “ends of justice” 
exception to the requirements of Rule 5:25. 
 
12 A court’s subject matter jurisdiction is the only type of 
jurisdiction that cannot be waived.  Morrison v. Bestler, 239 
Va. 166, 169, 387 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1990).  Thus, an error, other 
than one addressing a court’s lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, is deemed waived if not timely raised.  See Rules 
5:17(c) and 5:25. 
 
 
18 
of the present question whether Moore has defaulted the alleged 
error.  
In analyzing this question, I begin with a series of this 
Court’s decisions in which we permitted defendants, in the 
context of habeas corpus proceedings, to collaterally attack 
their prior convictions because certain mandatory procedures 
were not followed in their juvenile court proceedings.  In 
Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 73, 147 S.E.2d 739 (1966), the 
juvenile court “certified” felony charges against the juvenile 
to the circuit court so the juvenile could be tried as an adult, 
but the juvenile court did so without notice to the juvenile or 
his parents, without the presence of even one of his parents, 
without the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the juvenile, 
and without a hearing.  Id. at 75, 147 S.E.2d at 740.  At that 
time, former Code § 16.1-172 (1960) provided that “[i]n no case 
shall the hearing proceed until the parent or parents of the 
child, if residing within the State, . . . have been notified of 
such.”13  If none of the persons required to be notified of the 
hearing were present in court at the time of the hearing, former 
                     
13 Neither French nor any of its progeny presented an issue 
concerning the non-residency of a juvenile’s parent.  Thus, that 
portion of the statute is not relevant to my analysis. 
 
19 
Code § 16.1-173 (1960) required the juvenile court to appoint a 
guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the juvenile.  
That appointment had to occur before the hearing could proceed, 
and the guardian ad litem had to be present at the hearing.  Id. 
at 76, 147 S.E.2d at 741.  This Court said the complete failure 
to comply with the statutory requirements was a violation of due 
process and concluded that compliance with those provisions was 
necessary “before criminal jurisdiction in a proper court of 
record comes into being.”  Id. at 79, 147 S.E.2d at 743. 
 
In Gregory v. Peyton, 208 Va. 157, 156 S.E.2d 624 (1967), 
we again confronted the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem 
for the juvenile when neither of his parents was present at the 
hearing.  Id. at 158, 156 S.E.2d 624.  There, we reaffirmed our 
holding in French that the failure “to comply with the 
applicable provisions of the [j]uvenile . . . [l]aw rendered the 
subsequent proceeding in the criminal court void.”  Id. at 159-
60, 156 S.E.2d at 625.  This Court addressed the same issue in 
Gogley v. Peyton, 208 Va. 679, 160 S.E.2d 746 (1968), where we 
applied our decision in French retrospectively so as to void the 
juvenile’s convictions.  208 Va. at 680, 160 S.E.2d at 747.  
Again, in Pruitt v. Peyton, 209 Va. 532, 165 S.E.2d 288 (1969), 
we held that the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for a 
juvenile after neither of his parents appeared at his juvenile 
 
20 
court hearing was “jurisdictional,” and consequently rendered 
the juvenile’s convictions void. Id. at 535, 165 S.E.2d at 290. 
While the errors in the above cases were raised by the 
respective defendants in petitions for writs of habeas corpus, 
in Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 425, 192 S.E.2d 775 (1972), 
which was a direct appeal of the defendant’s conviction as a 
recidivist, we also permitted Jones to collaterally attack his 
underlying juvenile conviction.  We did so because the official 
records of the juvenile court were silent as to whether either 
of Jones’ parents had been notified of his juvenile court 
proceeding, whether either was present at the hearing, and 
whether a guardian ad litem had been appointed to represent him 
at the juvenile court proceeding.  Id. at 427, 192 S.E.2d at 
777.  Again relying on our decision in French, we held that the 
failure to give notice to Jones’ parents and to appoint a 
guardian ad litem in the absence of a parent deprived the trial 
court of jurisdiction.  Id. at 428, 192 S.E.2d at 777. 
However, this Court has not always held that the failure to 
comply with mandatory provisions regarding juvenile proceedings 
deprived the juvenile court of its jurisdiction.  For example, 
in Turner v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 666, 222 S.E.2d 517 (1976), 
we decided that a mandatory requirement that “[n]otice in 
writing of the time, place and purpose of [a transfer] hearing” 
be provided “to the child and his parents . . . or attorney” was 
 
21 
not jurisdictional.  Id. at 667, 222 S.E.2d at 518.  In that 
case, the juvenile, his father, and his attorney all received 
oral notice of the hearing.14  Id. at 668, 222 S.E.2d at 519.  We 
concluded that the juvenile court’s failure to comply with the 
requirement of written notice was “a mere procedural defect,” 
which could not be challenged as error if not timely raised.  
Id. at 669-70, 222 S.E.2d at 520. 
More recently, this Court decided Jackson v. Commonwealth, 
255 Va. 625, 499 S.E.2d 538 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067 
(1999).  There, in the context of determining whether certain 
transfer proceedings were conducted appropriately, we held that 
statutory language providing that “[t]he circuit court shall, 
within a reasonable time after receipt of the case from the 
juvenile court (i) examine all . . . papers, reports and orders 
. . .,” established a “jurisdictional” requirement that such a 
transfer review take place, but merely a “procedural” rule for 
the time of review.  Id. at 642-43, 499 S.E.2d at 549. (Emphasis 
added.) 
                     
14 The juvenile’s parents and attorney were present at the 
hearing, but it is not clear if the mother had previously been 
notified of the hearing. 
 
22 
 
Upon reviewing the decisions in French and its progeny, it 
becomes evident that this Court addressed “jurisdictional” 
defects in those cases.  However, we never clearly specified 
that we were considering subject matter jurisdictional defects.  
Nevertheless, the question of the juvenile court's subject 
matter jurisdiction was implicated because we allowed the 
defendants in French, Gregory, Gogley, Pruitt, and Jones to 
collaterally attack their juvenile convictions.  In those 
decisions, this Court recognized that the statutes at issue 
imposed mandatory requirements regarding juvenile proceedings 
and that those requirements were coupled with limiting language 
that prohibited the court from going forward with a hearing 
until the requirements were fulfilled.  Therefore, the Court 
held that compliance with those mandatory requirements was a 
prerequisite for the juvenile court's exercise of its subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
I believe that there were two provisions in effect when the 
juvenile proceedings at issue in French and its progeny were 
conducted that rendered the defects in those cases 
“jurisdictional.”  The first one was the requirement that “[i]n 
no case shall the hearing proceed until the parent or parents of 
 
23 
the child . . . have been notified . . . .”15  Former Code 
§ 16.1-172 (1960).16  (Emphasis added).  The second provision was 
former Code § 16.1-173 (1960), requiring that when no person 
required to be notified under former Code § 16.1-172 (1960) was 
present in court for the hearing, the “court shall, before 
                     
15 That provision also incorporated the requirement that 
summons issue to “all proper or necessary parties” upon the 
issuance of a petition against a juvenile, former Code § 16.1-
166 (1960), which now appears in different form in Code § 16.1-
263 (1999). 
 
16 At the time of Pruitt’s juvenile proceedings, this 
language was codified at former Code § 16-172.38 (1952), and at 
the time of Jones’ juvenile proceedings, the pertinent 
provision, former Code § 63-273 (R.P. 1948), provided that “[i]n 
no case shall the trial proceed until the parents or parent of 
such child . . . have been duly notified . . . .”  Jones, 213 
Va. at 427, 192 S.E.2d at 777. 
 
 
24 
proceeding with the hearing, appoint a . . . guardian ad litem 
to represent the interests of the child.”17  (Emphasis added).18  
In 1973, after this Court's decisions in French and its 
progeny, and before the commission of the crimes at issue in 
Turner, the General Assembly enacted former Code § 16.1-176.2 
(1973), now Code § 16.1-270 (1999).  That section allows a 
juvenile, prior to a transfer hearing and with the consent of 
counsel, to waive the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and 
have the case transferred to the appropriate circuit court.  
                     
17 At the time of Pruitt’s juvenile proceedings, former Code 
§ 16-172.39 (1952) provided for the appointment of a guardian ad 
litem when those persons to whom notice needed to be given as 
prescribed in former Code § 16-172.38 (1952) were not present.  
At the time of the juvenile proceedings involving Jones, former 
Code §§ 63-269 and -272 (R.P. 1948) required that the juvenile’s 
parents be summonsed, and if at least one of them did not 
appear, that a guardian ad litem be appointed for the juvenile. 
 
18 In some of the French line of cases, the failure to 
comply with only one provision rendered the convictions void, 
while in some cases, there was a failure to appoint a guardian 
ad litem as well as a failure in the required notice. 
 
25 
That waiver provision played a role in this Court’s decision in 
Turner, where we held that the requirement of “written” notice 
was merely procedural.  216 Va. at 669, 222 S.E.2d at 520.  In 
deciding whether Moore can now challenge his convictions because 
of the alleged failure to summons his father after the petition 
was filed against Moore, I also find that waiver provision 
significant because it allows a juvenile, with the consent of 
his attorney, to forego virtually all the safeguards afforded to 
the juvenile before a case is transferred to the circuit court. 
Even more compelling is the fact that in 1977, the General 
Assembly repealed and reorganized the Code provisions pertaining 
to juveniles, and in doing so, deleted the requirement that 
“[i]n no case shall the hearing proceed” unless the juvenile’s 
parent or parents are notified.  Former Code § 16.1-172 (1960).19  
Similarly, in 1968, the General Assembly amended former Code 
§ 16.1-173 (1960), removing the requirement that the “court 
shall, before proceeding with the hearing,” appoint a guardian 
ad litem when no person required to be summonsed is present at 
                     
19 That section was amended between 1960 and 1977 but 
retained the quoted language until 1977. 
 
 
26 
the hearing.20  Thus, the statutory provisions at issue in the 
present case no longer contained limiting language, such as that 
found in former Code §§ 16.1-172 and -173 (1960), that 
specifically prohibited the juvenile court from proceeding in 
the absence of notice to both parents.  Cf. Jamborsky v. 
Baskins, 247 Va. 506, 511 n.*, 442 S.E.2d 636, 639 n.* (1994) 
(giving example of limiting prohibitory language).  Instead, 
former Code § 16.1-263 and present Code § 16.1–264 merely 
required that a summons be issued to the juvenile's parents 
after the filing of a petition against the juvenile.  
Furthermore, a juvenile like Moore can waive the jurisdiction of 
the juvenile court and virtually all its attendant safeguards. 
I believe that the majority incorrectly equates statutory 
provisions that are “mandatory” with those that are 
prerequisites to a juvenile court’s exercise of its subject 
matter jurisdiction.  See, e.g., the majority’s quotation in the 
present case from Moore v. Commonwealth, No. 990776, 259 Va. 
___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2000) (this day decided).  As already 
                     
20 In its place, the legislature enacted language requiring 
that the juvenile be advised of his or her right to counsel, 
which is advice that must be given whether a parent is present 
or not.  Former Code § 16.1-173 (1968). 
 
27 
noted, the error in Turner was “a mere procedural defect,” 216 
Va. at 669, 222 S.E.2d at 520, although the notice requirement 
at issue there used the mandatory term “shall.”  Former Code 
§ 16.1-176(a)(3) (1974).  The mandatory nature of a requirement, 
standing alone, does not always make that requirement 
jurisdictional. 
The majority concludes that the notice provision at issue in 
this case is mandatory, and in its view, therefore  jurisdictional, 
because of “this Court’s unswerving adherence to the nature of” the 
parental notice requirement with regard to juvenile proceedings.  
However, in doing so, the majority ignores the statutory changes, 
discussed above, deleting the language that prohibited the juvenile 
court from proceeding with a hearing until certain requirements were 
fulfilled.  Furthermore, this Court has not, in the context of a 
collateral attack on a juvenile conviction, addressed the parental 
notice requirement at issue today since the 1977 amendments, much 
less “unswerving[ly] adhere[d]” to a conclusion that the present 
requirement is jurisdictional. 
Since the juvenile court is a creature of statute, the 
General Assembly can modify any prerequisites for the juvenile 
court’s exercise of its subject matter jurisdiction.  See Burke 
v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 183, 188, 510 S.E.2d 743, 746 
(1999) (holding that when subject matter jurisdiction is 
statutorily created, General Assembly can alter rules governing 
 
28 
judicial exercise of that jurisdiction).  Thus, I conclude that 
what was deemed a “jurisdictional” defect in the French case and 
its progeny is no longer such because of the intervening changes 
in the language of the relevant statutory provisions.21  
Therefore, Moore cannot now raise the failure to summons his 
father as a basis for voiding his convictions.  See Humphreys v. 
Commonwealth, 186 Va. 765, 772, 43 S.E.2d 890, 894 
(1947)(court’s subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived); 
Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 169, 378 S.E.2d 753, 755 
(1990) (only type of jurisdiction which cannot be waived is 
subject matter jurisdiction).  Accordingly, under Rules 5:17(c) 
and 5:25, Moore has defaulted his objection to the alleged 
error. 
                     
21 The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), does not alter my analysis.  
That case, decided after this Court had decided French, stressed 
the content and timeliness of the constitutionally required 
notice. 
 
 
29 
                    
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm 
Moore’s convictions.22
 
22 Because I conclude that Moore had defaulted his objection 
to the alleged error, I need not address Code § 16.1-269.6(E) 
(1994).