Case Title: SIKORSKI v OLIN ROLIN MFG INC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 13378

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-09-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13378 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 EDWARD R e SIKORSKI, Plaintiff and Respondent, RAY OLIN and ROLIN MFG., INC., Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, Honorable Alfred B. Coate, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Denzil R . Young argued, Baker, Montana For Respondent: Gene Huntley argued, Baker, Montana Submitted: May 6, 1977 Decided: f F,' ! $ . [ Filed: -. i : * LI"' ' \ - Clerk M r . Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendants Ray Olin and Rolin Mfg.,Inc. appeal from a Fallon County jury verdict and judgment i n favor of p l a i n t i f f Edward R. Sikorski, i n the amount of $10,000 for breach of a sales representative .contract. Edward Sikorski f i l e d s u i t against Ray Olin as the manager of Rolin Mfg.,Inc. alleging a breach of contract. Defendants answered by admitting the existence of a contractual relationship but denying any l i a b i l i t y for a breach. Discovery consisted of Sikorski' s deposition of Olin and interrogatories answered by Sikorski. O n the day of t r i a l , the t r i a l court allowed Sikorski to amend one answer t o the interrogatories t o reflect the f u l l extent of the asserted agreement. Following t r i a l , the jury returned a verdict for $10,000 in favor of Sikorski and against Olin and Rolin Mfg., Inc. (hereinafter referred t o as Olin and Rolin or Olin). Olin and Rolin appeal. This Court on appeal i s asked t o consider numerous ques- tions regarding the t r i a l of t h i s matter. In substance, these questions constitute but two arguable issues: (1) Whether the d i s t r i c t court erred i n permitting Sikorski t o amend the previously answered interrogatories, and (2) Whether the evidence offered by Sikorskiwas sufficient t o support the jury's award of $10,000 damages. The facts are: Sikorski alleged in h i s complaint and provided evidence a t t r i a l that in January 1971, Olin and Rolin agreed Sikorski would become a sales representative for Rolin in the sale of machinery and equipment produced by Rolin. Sikorski maintained the contract was t o extend for one year and he was to receive a s compensation therefor 7% of dealer costs f o r a l l s a l e s up t o $60,000 and 8% f o r a l l sales exceeding t h a t amount. A t t r i a l , Sikorski t e s t i f i e d he was t o receive a 5% commission on improvements he might make, based on wholesale prices of the improved equipment. Sikorski alleged f u l l performance on h i s p a r t , consisting of numerous demonstrations of the machinery and arrangements f o r dealer distribution. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t over a period of four months, he spent approximately 75% of h i s time i n performing under the agreement. Sikorski's testimony a t t r i a l t h a t he should have received $3,750 f o r h i s e f f o r t s i n t h i s regard was received without objection. Also, received without objection, was proof t h a t Sikorski had devised improvements for c e r t a i n functions of the machinery and he should have realized therefrom a $2,000 commission. He t e s t i f i e d had he been allowed t o per- form, he would have realized an estimated $4,800 i n commissions by the end of the f i r s t year. This, too, was received without objection. I n support of the estimate, Sikorski offered uncontroverted testimony he arranged f o r the s a l e of a large amount of equipment, which Rolin refused t o deliver. Sikorski argued he was never i n f a c t "terminakd" a s s a l e s representative by Rolin but rather t h a t he himself ceased performance i n June 1971, when Rolin refused t o deliver requested machinery and delegated h i s sales t e r r i t o r y t o another agent. Rolin, on the other hand, contended the terms of the contract were those embodied i n a l e t t e r sent by Olin t o Sikorski, received by Sikorski i n March 1971. The l e t t e r purported t o l i m i t the length of the contract t o three months, subject t o extension t o one year. Under i t s terms, Sikorski was t o receive a 7% com- mission on sales up t o $60,000 and 8% for amounts i n excess of $60,000. It was Olin' and4 Rolihl s position i n t h e i r answer t o sikorskit s complaint that Sikorski had made no sales and earned no commis- sions and therefore was not damaged because he failed t o perform. However, Olin, in h i s testimony in h i s deposition and as an adverse,wttness a t t r i a l , recanted and admitted a sale. Olin and Rolin's first contention is that they were surprised and prejudiced when the t r i a l court permitted Sikorski t o amend an answer t o h i s own-interrogatories on the day of t r i a l . They claim Sikorski was allowed t o interject what, i n effect, constituted a "new contract" by comparison t o the con- t r a c t as pled and as disclosed by prior discovery. It i s main- tained the "new contract" created new issues, and therefore Sikorski's proof a t t r i a l should have been limited t o those damages, i f any, occasioned by breach of the originally disclosed contract. However, the record consisting of the pleadings, answers t o interrogatories and Olin's testimony through deposition and a t t r i a l , establish that Olin and Rolin were well aware of the broader contractual terms upon which Sikorski intended t o rely a t t r i a l . Moreover, it is noteworthy Rolin did not request a continuance, on the ground of such alleged surprise or undue advantage, Rule 33, M.R.Civ.P. authorizes use of interrogatories for the purpose of p r e t r i a l discovery from an adverse party. This rule i s liberally construed t o make a l l relevant facts avail- able t o parties i n advance of t r i a l , and t o reduce the possibili- t i e s of surprise and unfair advantage. Wolfe v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 147 Mont, 29, 409 P.2d 528 (1966). However, failure t o properly answer certain interroga- tories w i l l not be deemed i n every case t o effect censure of material which should rightfully be developed i n a t r i a l on the merits. A detailed statement of the applicable rule and corresponding reasoning appears in Wolfe v. Northern Pacific Ry. C o . , supra: "* * * Even though under Rule 37 sanctions may be imposed upon a party who f a i l s t o comply with the discovery requirements of the rules, and specifically upon a party who f a i l s t o properly answer h i s interrogatories, necessarily it must l i e within the authority of the t r i a l judge t o determine from the circumstances of each case what constitutes compliance and non- compliance and to determine what sanctions, i f any, are t o be imposed. A s t r i c t rule of exclusion could i n many instances defeat the desired goal of a decision on the merits, Such a misfortune, we f e e l , may be avoided i f w e heavily rely upon the watchful eye of the t r i a l judge whose vision normally i s focused upon the delicate balance which weighs the server's right t o demand answers t o h i s interrogatories and the extent of the adverse party's compliance. I n interpreting these rules we w i l l reverse the t r i a l judge only when h i s judgment may materially affect the substantial rights of the appellant and allow a possible miscarriage of justice." 147 Mont. 29, 40-41. W e note, in reviewing the claims of surprise and unfair advantage, that Sikorski's complaint s e t s forth the same precise contractual terms a s to duration and remuneration for sales as were subjected t o proof a t t r i a l . Moreover, testimony of Olin established he had made certain contractual promises t o Sikorski, specifically regarding compensation for improve- ments. It i s clear the central issues of the case were formulated well in advance of t r i a l , and Olin and Rolin had knowledge of a l l facts responsive t o ~ i k o r s k i ' s claims a t t r i a l . Hence, any surprise or prejudice t o Olin and Rolin i n t h i s regard was minimal, a t most. Moreover, by not requesting a continuance a f t e r the t r i a l judge granted the r i g h t t o amend the interrogatory, Olin and Rolin waived any rfght t o claim e r r o r on appeal. Spencer v. Robertson, 151 Mont. 507, 445 P.2d 48 (1968); 17 C. J.S. Continuances 5 13. The action of the t r i a l judge, i n permitting the amend- ment t o the single interrogatory answer, was proper and should be sustained. Olin andtRolin were afforded every opportunity, through cross-examination, t o t e s t the c r e d i b i l i t y of Sikorski's version of the contract. W e find no miscarriage of j u s t i c e by permitting the amendment. Since Olin and Rolin a l s o f a i l e d t o obj'ect t o almost a l l of the evidence introduced by Sikorski, t h i s Court's function on review, except where there w i l l be a manifest miscarriage of j u s t i c e , is extremely limited. Here, the jury returned a general verdict i n favor of Sikorski i n the amount of $20,000. Items of damage s p e c i f i c a l l y offered by Sikorski, by h i s testimony, included these amounts: 1.$3,750 f o r the value of time expended i n performance of the contract; 2. $4,800 f o r loss of s a l e s commissions which would have been received but f o r the breach; and 3. $2,000 f o r loss of commissions on inventions. The law controlling the award of damages i n such cases was placed before the jury i n the form of instructions from the court. The instructions, takenfrom sections 17-301 and 17-302, R.C.M. 1947, were: Instruction No. 12. "For the breach of an obligation a r i s i n g from contract, the measure of damages, i s the amount which w i l l compensate the party aggrieved f o r a l l the detriment proximately caused thereby, o r which, i n the ordinary course of things, would be l i k e l y t o r e s u l t therefrom." Instruction No. 11. "No damages can be recovered for a breach of contract which are not clearly ascertainable i n their nature and origin." See Lovely v. Burroughs Corp., 165 Mont. 209, 527 P.2d 557 (1974) . Plainly, the damages alleged by Sikorski relate t o the failure on the part of Olin and Rolin t o supply equipment and machinery for resale, and premature termination of the con- tractual relationship with Sikorski. There i s no real question a s t o proximate causation of damages. Rather,it i s stressed the offered proof of damages was overly speculative and therefore an improper basis for the present damage award. Olin and Rolin concede damages t o the extent of the value of time invested by Sikorski i n performance of the contract i n the amount of $3,750. However, the striking fact that emerges from a review of the record is that counsel for Olin and Rolin wholly failed t o object t o Sikorski's evidence on the other items of damage and the method of computing those damages. It is elementary that unless a party urging error has made timely objection to evidence or testimony a t the t r i a l level, it w i l l hot be considered by t h i s Court on appeal. In re Stevenson, 167 Mont. 220, 538 P.2d 5 (1975); Berdine v. Sanders County, 164 Mont. 206, 520 P.2d 650 (1974); ~ o e h l e r v. Sanders, 146 Mont. 158, 404 P.2d 885 (1965). While the computations offered may have been subject t o the objection that they were speculative i n nature,we refuse to consider the matter for the f i r s t time on appeal. W e have said, i n prior cases, that any award of damages i s necessarily grounded, t o some degree, upon conjecture and surmise. However, the question.of damages i s clearly one t o be determined by the intelligence and common sense of the jury. Waltee v. Petrolane, Inc., 162 Mont. 317, 511 P.2d 975 (1973). W e find the evidence, admitted without objection, is s u f f i c i e n t t o support the jury verdict. W e affirm the judgment of the d i s t r i c t court. Justices.