Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Khaja M. Din

Citation: 2015 WI 4

Docket Number: 2012AP002695-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2015-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 WI 4 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2695-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Khaja M. Din, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Khaja M. Din, 
          Respondent-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DIN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 22, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs by Claude 
J. Covelli and Boardman & Clark LLP, Madison. 
 
 
For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief by Robert 
Krohn and Roethe Pope Roethe LLP, Edgerton.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 4
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP2695-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Khaja M. Din, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Khaja M. Din, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 22, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Khaja M. Din appeals that 
portion of a revised report filed by referee John Nicholas 
Schweitzer on April 9, 2014, recommending that Attorney Din be 
publicly reprimanded for eight counts of misconduct involving 
four clients.  Attorney Din does not appeal the referee's 
findings of fact or conclusions of law, but argues that his 
misconduct warrants a private, rather than a public, reprimand.   
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
After careful review of the matter, we agree with the 
referee that the appropriate discipline for Attorney Din's 
misconduct is a public reprimand.  We also agree with the 
referee's recommendation that Attorney Din pay $14,250 in 
restitution, and we agree that Attorney Din should pay one-half 
of the total costs of this proceeding, or $10,003.65.1 
¶3 
Attorney Din was licensed to practice law in Wisconsin 
in 2007 and practices in Chicago in the area of immigration law.  
He has not previously been the subject of discipline.   
¶4 
On December 11, 2012, the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) filed a complaint alleging 28 counts of misconduct with 
respect to Attorney Din's handling of six client matters.  
Attorney Din filed an answer to the complaint on February 15, 
2013.  The referee was appointed on March 28, 2013.   
¶5 
The OLR filed an amended complaint on October 28, 
2013, alleging 12 counts of misconduct with respect to Attorney 
Din's handling of four client matters.  Attorney Din filed an 
answer to the amended complaint on November 18, 2013.   
¶6 
On December 23, 2013, the parties filed a stipulation 
and no contest plea whereby the OLR voluntarily dismissed four 
counts of the amended complaint and Attorney Din withdrew his 
answer to the amended complaint and pled no contest to the 
remaining eight counts, as amended by the OLR in the parties' 
stipulation.  The parties jointly recommended that the referee 
                                                 
1 The supplemental statement of costs filed in this matter 
shows total costs of $20,007.30 as of July 28, 2014. 
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
3 
 
determine that the appropriate sanction in the matter be a 
private reprimand and restitution in the amount of $13,250.   
¶7 
The referee issued his report on February 13, 2014.  
Attorney Din filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the 
alternative, for relief from the stipulation and no contest 
plea.  The referee issued a revised report on April 9, 2014.   
¶8 
The first instance of client misconduct discussed in 
the 
referee's 
revised 
report 
involved 
Attorney 
Din's 
representation of A.N.  A.N. was interested in opening a martial 
arts club in Tomah.  She wanted to employ a Philippine national 
as a martial arts instructor.  The man did not have permission 
to work in the United States, and A.N. was looking for an 
immigration attorney to advise her concerning bringing him to 
Tomah to work.   
¶9 
A.N. spoke by telephone with Attorney Din, whose 
office at the time was in Madison, on February 5, 2010, and she 
informed him of her desire to employ the man.  When A.N. told 
Attorney Din that the man was a former Philippines national 
player 
and 
a 
judge 
of 
karate 
tournaments, 
Attorney 
Din 
recommended that A.N. pursue obtaining an O-1 visa, for people 
who possess extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, 
education, business, or athletics.   
¶10 Subsequent to the telephone call, Attorney Din mailed 
A.N. a flat fee agreement under which she was to pay $2,250 
immediately and the balance "at the point of submitting work:  
for a total fee of $4,500."  A.N. signed the fee agreement and 
made a $2,250 payment by credit card.  After that, she sent in 
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
4 
 
documents that she believed would assist in obtaining an O-1 
visa.   
¶11 A.N. and Attorney Din met in late July 2010, at which 
point Attorney Din suggested an L visa be pursued.  An L visa 
involved intercompany transfer of an employee.  A.N. told 
Attorney Din she did not think the L visa was an option.  A.N. 
explained that an H2-B visa appeared appropriate, and Attorney 
Din indicated that the documentation previously submitted was 
satisfactory for that purpose.  Attorney Din told A.N. they 
would need to enter into a new fee agreement and an additional 
$3,750 would have to be paid.  Attorney Din told A.N. he would 
have the H2-B paperwork ready by August 6, 2010.   
¶12 A.N. signed a second fee agreement for a flat fee of 
$3,750 and paid $2,000.  A.N. never received the H2-B visa 
certificate, any accounting of the hours or activities Attorney 
Din invested in the case, or any refund of unearned fees.   
¶13 The parties' stipulation averred, and the referee 
found, the following counts of misconduct with respect to 
Attorney Din's representation of A.N.: 
[Count One] By charging and accepting significant 
fees in [A.N.'s] matter without performing sufficient 
useful work on [A.N.'s] case, [Attorney] Din collected 
an unreasonable fee, in violation of SCR 20:1.5(a).2 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.5(a) provides: 
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, 
or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 
amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the 
following: 
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
5 
 
[Count Two] By failing to show that he had done 
sufficient work on [A.N.'s] immigration matter, yet 
failing to refund payments, [Attorney] Din failed to 
return unearned fees, in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d).3 
¶14 The second client matter discussed in the referee's 
revised report involved Attorney Din's representation of E.A-S., 
a native of Mexico who moved to the United States in 1991.  He 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly;  
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services; 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or 
by the circumstances; 
(6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client;  
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
3 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides: 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law. 
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
6 
 
returned to Mexico for a year and returned to the U.S. illegally 
in 1996.  He has never had permission to reside in the U.S. 
¶15 E.A-S. and his spouse sought Attorney Din's assistance 
in adjusting E.A-S.'s status from that of an illegal alien to a 
permanent resident or U.S. citizen, based on his marriage.  On 
May 26, 2010, E.A-S. entered into a fee agreement with Attorney 
Din by which E.A-S. agreed to pay a flat fee of $2,500 in 
exchange for the preparation and filing of a family-based 
petition.  Additional fees would be required if E.A-S. sought a 
hardship waiver.  E.A-S. paid Attorney Din the $2,500 that day.   
¶16 In June of 1010, Attorney Din's paralegal contacted 
E.A-S.'s spouse to advise that Attorney Din did not have all the 
documents needed and that it was essential he obtain a copy of 
E.A-S.'s I-94 document.  The paralegal was told that E.A-S. did 
not have an I-94.  Soon thereafter, Attorney Din contacted 
E.A-S. and requested additional legal fees of $3,000 due to the 
fact that Attorney Din would need to seek a hardship waiver on 
E.A-S.'s behalf.   
¶17 On June 29, 2010, E.A-S. and his spouse met with 
Attorney Din and signed a second flat fee agreement, which 
called 
for 
additional 
legal 
services 
consisting 
of 
the 
preparation of a hardship waiver for overstay in the United 
States.  E.A-S. told Attorney Din he would pay $1,500 of the 
$3,000 fee and would pay the balance the following afternoon.   
¶18 On July 2, 2010, E.A-S.'s spouse requested a full 
refund of the $4,000 paid to Attorney Din as of that date.  
Attorney Din and E.A-S.'s spouse spoke by telephone on July 2, 
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
7 
 
at which time Attorney Din advised he would not refund any money 
to E.A-S.  A request was made for copies of any paperwork 
Attorney Din's office had generated.  Attorney Din said that by 
early the next week he would send E.A-S. an itemization of his 
work performed and an explanation as to why he was not returning 
any part of a fee.   
¶19 On July 9, 2010, Attorney Din wrote to E.A-S. saying 
he had performed six hours and 50 minutes of work and that he 
considered the $4,000 flat fee fully earned.  On July 14, 2010, 
E.A-S. sent Attorney Din another request asking for a full 
refund of fees.   
¶20 The parties' stipulation averred, and the referee 
found, the following counts of misconduct with respect to 
Attorney Din's representation of E.A-S.: 
[Count 
Four] 
By 
charging 
and 
accepting 
significant fees in [E.A-S.'s] matter without any 
showing that he performed sufficient useful work on 
[E.A-S.'s] 
case, 
[Attorney] 
Din 
collected 
an 
unreasonable fee, in violation of SCR 20:1.5(a). 
[Count Five] By failing to show that he had done 
sufficient 
useful 
work 
on 
[E.A-S.'s] 
immigration 
matter, yet refusing a request for a refund of 
payments, [Attorney] Din failed to return unearned 
fees, in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d). 
¶21 The third client matter discussed in the referee's 
revised 
report 
involved 
Attorney 
Din's 
representation 
of 
F.J.C-L., a native of Mexico who resided in Dane County but did 
not have permission to reside in the U.S.  On July 17, 2009, 
Attorney Din and F.J.C-L. signed a fee agreement under which 
Attorney Din agreed to represent F.J.C-L. in filing and 
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
8 
 
appearing in court for a cancellation of removal.  Attorney Din 
asked for payment of a $6,000 advanced flat fee.  F.J.C-L. paid 
Attorney Din $3,000 on July 17, 2009.   
¶22 By mid-September 2009, F.J.C-L. had submitted to 
Attorney Din all the documents Attorney Din had requested of him 
for filing the immigration petition.  On October 15, 2009, 
Attorney Din and F.J.C-L. signed a second fee agreement, the 
terms of which were essentially the same as the first one.  On 
October 16, 2009, F.J.C-L. provided Attorney Din with a check 
for $1,010, which included funds for the filing fee for the 
immigration petition.  At the time that F.J.C-L. provided the 
check, Attorney Din told him that the petition was ready to 
file.   
¶23 In November of 2009, F.J.C-L. asked Attorney Din to 
return the $1,010 because he was short on money.  He informed 
Attorney Din he would give him that amount back within two 
weeks.  Attorney Din complied with F.J.C-L.'s request.  In 
December of 2009, F.J.C-L. contacted Attorney Din to advise him 
that he had the $1,010 again ready for him.  Attorney Din 
informed F.J.C-L. that he did not intend to do anything further 
with F.J.C-L.'s case.  F.J.C-L. asked for a refund of the $3,000 
in fees he had paid up to the time Attorney Din filed the 
petition.  Attorney Din provided no evidence of doing any legal 
work for F.J.C-L.  Ultimately, Attorney Din told F.J.C-L. that 
the $3,000 fee had been earned.  On July 7, 2010, F.J.C-L. filed 
an application with the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client 
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
9 
 
Protection (Fund), requesting the return of the $3,000 advanced 
fee.  The Fund approved the claim and paid F.J.C-L. $3,000. 
¶24 The parties' stipulation averred, and the referee 
agreed, that Attorney Din committed the following count of 
misconduct with respect to his representation of F.J.C-L.: 
[Count Six] By charging and accepting $3,000 in 
[F.J.C-L.'s] matter without performing or showing he 
had performed sufficient useful work for [F.J.C-L.], 
[Attorney] Din collected an unreasonable fee, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.5(a). 
¶25 The final client matter discussed in the referee's 
revised report involved Attorney Din's representation of K.F.  
On November 19, 2010, K.F. and his father hired Attorney Din to 
prepare an investor visa petition for the father, who is a 
citizen of Iran.  The father wanted to invest in a business in 
the U.S. with his son.  Attorney Din charged a flat fee of 
$8,000 to prepare the visa petition.  The fee agreement provided 
for payment of an additional $2,500 to SB Consulting Group, Inc. 
for preparation of a business plan.  K.F. paid $7,500 with the 
remaining $3,000 to be paid upon completion of the business 
plan.   
¶26 On October 12, 2011, the OLR received a grievance from 
K.F. against Attorney Din.  In response, Attorney Din claimed he 
had completed all the necessary work in a timely fashion.  In 
response to the OLR's request for a copy of his entire file, 
Attorney Din provided some paperwork but produced no work 
product and no draft of a business plan, completed visa 
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
10 
 
application, 
or 
any 
other 
document 
related 
to 
a 
visa 
application.   
¶27 The parties' stipulation averred, and the referee 
agreed, that Attorney Din committed the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to his representation of K.F.: 
[Count Seven] By failing to consult with his 
clients regarding the appropriate visa to pursue for 
[K.F.'s] father and how to best accomplish the 
transfer of funds for their business, [Attorney] Din 
violated SCR 20:1.2(a)4 and SCR 20:1.4(a)(2).5 
[Count Ten] By collecting $5,000.00 from his 
clients, yet not being able to show sufficient 
relevant work in furtherance of his clients' goals, 
[Attorney] Din collected an unreasonable fee, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.5(a). 
[Count Eleven] By failing to refund unearned 
fees, when he could submit no evidence of appropriate 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:1.2(a) provides:  
Subject to pars. (c) and (d), a lawyer shall 
abide 
by 
a 
client's 
decisions 
concerning 
the 
objectives of representation and, as required by 
SCR 20:1.4, shall consult with the client as to the 
means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may 
take such action on behalf of the client as is 
impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. 
A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to 
settle a matter. In a criminal case or any proceeding 
that could result in deprivation of liberty, the 
lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after 
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be 
entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the 
client will testify. 
5 SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) provides that a lawyer shall "reasonably 
consult with the client about the means by which the client's 
objectives are to be accomplished." 
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
11 
 
sufficient legal work he performed himself, [Attorney] 
Din violated SCR 20:1.16(d). 
¶28 The referee's revised report noted that Thomas C. 
Hochstatter was deposed as an expert witness on immigration law, 
and he expressed the opinion that Attorney Din did provide some 
useful work for all of the grievants, but not sufficient work to 
justify 
the 
full 
fees 
that 
were 
charged 
and 
retained.  
Hochstatter's testimony indicated that Attorney Din should 
refund $3,750 to A.N., $2,500 to E.A-S., $2,000 to F.J.C-L., and 
$5,000 to K.F. 
¶29 The referee noted that by pleading no contest to the 
eight charges, the OLR's burden of proof was satisfied and no 
further proof or analysis of the elements of the alleged 
offenses was necessary.  The referee also noted that the 
parties, in the stipulation and no contest plea, agreed that the 
referee may use the allegations of the amended complaint as an 
adequate factual basis in the record for a determination of 
misconduct.  Accordingly, the referee found that the OLR proved 
the eight counts of misconduct to which Attorney Din pled no 
contest.   
¶30 The referee said the only substantive issues remaining 
were the appropriate amount of discipline, including the amount 
of restitution, and costs.  Although the parties' stipulation 
recommended that Attorney Din make restitution to F.J.C-L. in 
the amount of $2,000, the referee pointed out that F.J.C-L. 
filed a claim with the Fund for the return of his $3,000 
advanced fee, and the Fund paid him the full $3,000.  The 
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
12 
 
referee further pointed out that the stipulation and no contest 
plea stated that the payment of restitution was to be "without 
prejudice to any claims held by the [Fund] as to the various 
grievants, provided such claims do not duplicate the amounts of 
restitution agreed to herein, and subject to any defenses 
[Attorney] Din may raise to such claims."  The referee said 
there was no apparent ambiguity about the Fund's claim and, 
accordingly, it was appropriate to order Attorney Din to repay 
$3,000 to the Fund.  Thus, the referee recommended that Attorney 
Din make restitution as follows:  $3,750 to A.N.; $2,500 to 
E.A-S.; $5,000 to K.F.; and $3,000 to the Fund.   
¶31 With respect to the appropriate level of discipline, 
the referee noted that the purposes of professional discipline 
are to protect the public from further misconduct by the 
offending attorney, to deter other attorneys from engaging in 
similar misconduct, and to foster the attorney's rehabilitation.  
Although the parties stipulated that a private reprimand was 
appropriate, the referee said that given the number of rule 
violations and the number of charges and clients affected, a 
private reprimand was not sufficient.  The referee explained: 
It is my opinion that imposing only a private 
reprimand in a case involving four violations of 
charging an unreasonable fee for three different 
clients, plus three failures to return unearned fees 
for three different clients, plus one instance of 
failing 
to 
consult 
with 
a 
client, 
would 
fail 
adequately to impress on other attorneys the need to 
follow the rules. 
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
13 
 
¶32 The referee went on to say that even though the 
purpose of discipline is not to impose punishment per se, 
appreciating 
the 
unpleasant 
consequences 
of 
unprofessional 
behavior is part of rehabilitation.  The referee said he would 
seriously worry that imposing only a private reprimand would 
have only minimal rehabilitative effect on Attorney Din.  The 
referee concluded that the purposes of discipline can only be 
achieved here by the imposition of a public reprimand. 
¶33 With respect to costs, the referee noted that the 
parties made a joint recommendation that Attorney Din pay one-
half of the OLR's pre-appellate costs.  The referee noted that 
this joint recommendation was based largely on the "number of 
counts charged, contested and proven" factor set forth in 
SCR 22.24(1m)(a), in that certain counts charged in the original 
complaint were removed from the amended complaint to which 
Attorney Din pled no contest.  The referee found the joint 
recommendation to be reasonable and recommended that Attorney 
Din pay one-half of the pre-appellate costs as filed in the 
OLR's preliminary statement of costs.  In its supplemental 
statement of costs filed on July 28, 2014, the OLR recommended 
that Attorney Din also be assessed one-half of the appellate 
costs. 
¶34 Attorney Din has appealed the referee's recommendation 
for a public reprimand and argues that a private reprimand is an 
appropriate 
sanction. 
 
Attorney 
Din 
notes 
that 
the 
OLR 
voluntarily withdrew 70 percent of the counts of misconduct 
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
14 
 
alleged in its original complaint and amended nearly all the 
counts that remained. 
¶35 While Attorney Din acknowledges that this court is 
free to impose whatever discipline it deems appropriate, he says 
this court should impose a private reprimand with restitution 
because: 
 The conduct occurred early in Attorney Din's practice 
when he was inexperienced; 
 Attorney Din provided useful services to his clients; 
 The amount of fees to be refunded were matters of 
judgment; 
 Attorney Din promptly and fully cooperated with the 
OLR's investigation; 
 Attorney Din has changed his practice to avoid a 
recurrence of similar conduct; and 
 Attorney 
Din 
has 
no 
prior 
private 
or 
public 
discipline. 
¶36 In spite of the fact that the parties stipulated that 
the referee may use the allegations of the amended complaint as 
an adequate factual basis in the record for a determination of 
misconduct relating to the eight counts to which Attorney Din 
entered a no contest plea, Attorney Din argues that the referee 
improperly made a point of describing the withdrawn allegations.  
Attorney Din says he did not admit the withdrawn allegations and 
indeed denies them.  He questions why the referee would mention 
the withdrawn allegations unless they played some conscious or 
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
15 
 
unconscious role in the referee's decision to recommend a public 
reprimand. 
¶37 Attorney Din says the need to document the stage of 
work completed under flat fee agreements may not be appreciated 
by lawyers early in their practice.  He says an inexperienced 
lawyer may not anticipate issues that arise if the lawyer's 
engagement is terminated before the lawyer's work is complete.  
He says these issues have been brought home to him by this 
proceeding and he has taken steps to improve his practices to 
avoid a recurrence of this problem in the future.  Attorney Din 
acknowledges that he exercised poor judgment in failing to make 
any refund to his clients, but he says the absence of bright 
line rules determining the proper amount of flat fee refunds 
ameliorates in some measure the severity of his conduct.   
¶38 Attorney Din says he acknowledges his mistakes, and he 
argues that a private reprimand with restitution will fulfill 
the purposes of discipline.  He says: 
In today's world, the difference between a 
private and a public reprimand is no small matter, 
particularly for a lawyer early in practice.  Today, a 
public reprimand is republished in a variety of 
internet and referral sources.  It is a permanent 
black mark easily accessed electronically.  A private 
reprimand provides lawyers fairly early in their 
practices with another chance without this permanent 
stigma.  A public reprimand is not necessary to 
protect the public, to deter others or to rehabilitate 
[Attorney] Din.  This proceeding has already had a 
salutary effect on [Attorney] Din's practices.  A 
private 
reprimand 
will 
fulfill 
all 
purposes 
of 
discipline and will be consistent with this Court 
[sic] 
adherence 
to 
a 
pattern 
of 
progressive 
discipline. 
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
16 
 
¶39 The OLR asserts that the referee's revised report 
addresses Attorney Din's objections to the initial report.  The 
OLR argues that a flat fee agreement does not excuse the 
repeated failure to return unearned fees when a lawyer fails to 
complete the agreed upon services.  The OLR says that regardless 
of the description of the fee, the fact is that a lawyer must 
perform the agreed upon services.  In this matter, Attorney Din 
collected fees from several clients but failed to provide 
sufficient useful work for the client and then refused to refund 
any fees upon the client's request.  The OLR disagrees with 
Attorney Din's argument that he ought to be afforded some 
special consideration due to the fact that the fee was a flat 
fee.  
¶40 The OLR acknowledges that it stipulated to the 
propriety of imposing a private reprimand, and it says it is not 
backing away from that recommendation.  However, the OLR says 
that a stipulation from the parties is not binding upon the 
court as to sanction.  The OLR also notes that no two 
disciplinary matters are identical, and it says the parties 
submitted a good deal of authority to the referee as to the 
appropriate sanction and the referee considered many cases on 
the subject. 
¶41 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless 
clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Eisenberg, 
2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  The court may 
impose whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of the 
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
17 
 
referee's recommendation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶42 There is no showing that any of the referee's findings 
of fact are erroneous.  Accordingly, we adopt them.  We also 
agree with the referee's conclusions of law that Attorney Din 
violated the supreme court rules set forth above. 
¶43 With respect to the appropriate level of discipline, 
upon careful review of the matter, we agree with the referee 
that Attorney Din's misconduct warrants a public reprimand.  
Even though Attorney Din had been practicing law for only a few 
years at the time he undertook the representations that gave 
rise to this case, and even though he has no prior disciplinary 
history, he pled no contest to eight counts of misconduct 
involving four clients, and he does not dispute the fact that he 
owes restitution of $14,250.  The misconduct allegations at 
issue here are not insignificant, nor are the violations 
technical in nature.  Attorney Din took fees from clients and 
failed to complete the agreed upon services.  When the clients 
asked for refunds, he refused to provide them.  
¶44 The facts of this case are somewhat analogous to those 
in 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Grapsas, 
174 Wis. 2d 816, 498 N.W.2d 400 (1993) and In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Halverson, 225 Wis. 2d 215, 591 N.W.2d 821 
(1999).  In both of those cases, the attorneys were publicly 
reprimanded for one count of failure to return unearned fees, as 
well as other violations.  Attorney Din pled no contest to four 
counts of collecting an unreasonable fee, three counts of 
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
18 
 
failing to return unearned fees when he failed to complete the 
agreed upon services, and one count of failing to consult with a 
client.  We agree with the referee that a private reprimand 
would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offenses.   
¶45 We agree with the referee that Attorney Din should be 
required to make restitution in the total amount of $14,250.  
Finally, we find it appropriate to reduce the amount of costs in 
this case by 50 percent.  SCR 22.24(1m) notes that it is this 
court's general policy, upon a finding of misconduct, to impose 
all costs upon the respondent.  In appropriate cases, the court 
may, in the exercise of its discretion, reduce the amount of 
costs imposed upon a respondent.  The OLR's original complaint 
alleged 
28 
counts 
of 
misconduct 
and 
sought 
a 
one-year 
suspension.  The amended complaint alleged 12 counts of 
misconduct and sought a public reprimand.  The OLR subsequently 
agreed to dismiss an additional four counts and concluded that a 
private reprimand would be sufficient.  In its supplemental 
statement of costs, filed on July 28, 2014, the OLR recommends 
that 50 percent of the total costs, $10,003.65, be assessed 
against Attorney Din.  We agree that assessing one-half of the 
costs is appropriate under the facts of this case.  
¶46 IT 
IS 
ORDERED 
that 
Khaja 
M. 
Din 
is 
publicly 
reprimanded for professional misconduct.   
¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Khaja M. Din shall make restitution as follows:  
$3,750 to A.N.; $2,500 to E.A-S.; $5,000 to K.F.; and $3,000 to 
the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection.  
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
19 
 
¶48 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Khaja M. Din shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation one-half of the costs of this proceeding, $10,003.65. 
¶49 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the restitution specified 
above is to be completed prior to paying costs to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation. 
¶50 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the director of the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation shall advise the court if there has not 
been full compliance with all conditions of this order. 
 
No. 
2012AP2695-D   
 
 
 
1