Case Title: McMillan v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 080622

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2009-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
WILLIS ALEXANDER McMILLAN 
 
v.  Record No. 080622               OPINION BY 
CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY ROUNTREE HASSELL, SR. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA         January 16, 2009 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
I. 
 
 
In this appeal from the Court of Appeals we consider:  
whether the evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a defendant possessed cocaine with the 
intent to distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248; and 
whether a circuit court erred by permitting the Commonwealth 
to introduce in evidence an exhibit that purports to establish 
that the defendant had a prior felony conviction. 
II. 
 
The defendant, Willis Alexander McMillan, was indicted by 
a grand jury in the City of Hampton for the following 
offenses: possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in 
violation of Code § 18.2-248; possession of a firearm while in 
the possession of cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-308.4; 
possession of a firearm after having previously been convicted 
of a felony in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2; possession of a 
concealed weapon in violation of Code § 18.2-308; and 
feloniously disregarding a visible or audible signal by a law 
enforcement officer in violation of Code § 46.2-817.  
 
During a bench trial in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Hampton, the defendant objected to the admission of an exhibit 
that purported to show that he had been convicted of attempted 
arson when he was 14 years old, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-
77 and 18.2-26.  The circuit court admitted the exhibit in 
evidence over the defendant’s objection.  The defendant also 
asserted in the circuit court that the evidence was 
insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
had possession of cocaine and, thus, he could not be convicted 
of possession with intent to distribute. 
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court found the 
defendant guilty of evading and eluding a police officer in 
violation of Code § 46.2-817 and fined him $100.  The court 
convicted the defendant of possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine, possession of a firearm while possessing 
drugs, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of a 
concealed weapon. 
The court fixed the defendant’s punishment as follows:  
twelve years imprisonment for possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine; five years imprisonment for possession of 
a firearm while possessing drugs; five years imprisonment for 
 
2
possession of a firearm by a felon; and six months 
imprisonment for the possession of a concealed weapon.  
 
The defendant appealed his convictions to the Court of 
Appeals.  Among other things, the defendant contended that the 
circuit court erred by admitting in evidence the exhibit that 
purported to demonstrate that he had a prior felony 
conviction.  The defendant also asserted that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that he had actual or constructive 
possession of the cocaine.  The Court of Appeals denied the 
defendant’s petition, McMillan v. Commonwealth, Record No. 
1488-07-1 (January 16, 2008), and we awarded the defendant an 
appeal. 
III. 
 
Applying well-established principles of appellate review, 
we will state the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the circuit court.  
Bishop v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 9, 11, 654 S.E.2d 906, 907 
(2008); Pruitt v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 382, 384, 650 S.E.2d 
684, 684 (2007). 
 
On June 9, 2005, Robert Bowers, a Virginia State Police 
Officer, was operating a radar device, designed to measure the 
speed of motor vehicles, in the city of Hampton on Interstate 
64.  Officer Bowers observed a car traveling east on 
Interstate 64 and a license plate was not affixed to the front 
 
3
of the car.  The officer, whose police cruiser was situated on 
the shoulder of the highway, drove his cruiser onto the 
interstate and followed the car.  Lushawn Carolina was driving 
the car and the defendant was a passenger.  
 
Carolina drove the car to an exit on Interstate 64 and 
entered Rip Rap Road at a high rate of speed.  Officer Bowers, 
who was following Carolina’s car, activated his police 
cruiser’s emergency lights in an attempt to stop Carolina’s 
car.  Carolina drove his car onto a residential street and he 
entered the driveway of a residence.  Carolina got out of his 
car and began to walk to the front door of the residence.  
Officer Bowers parked his police cruiser, got out of his car, 
and directed Carolina to return to the car he had been 
driving.  Carolina complied and sat in the driver’s seat. 
 
As Officer Bowers approached the driver’s window of 
Carolina’s car, he smelled an odor of “burnt” marijuana.  
After the officer asked Carolina for his driver’s license and 
registration, Carolina responded that his license had been 
suspended, the car belonged to his brother, and Carolina did 
not have the vehicle registration card. 
 
Bowers saw Carolina “lean[] forward as if he were about 
to open [the glove compartment], but he leaned back straight 
up in his seat and he didn’t open the glove compartment.”  
 
4
Carolina presented Officer Bowers with a Virginia 
identification card, but he did not have a driver’s license. 
 
Officer Bowers asked Carolina how did he know that the 
registration card was not in the glove compartment since he 
had not opened it to search for the card.  Carolina opened the 
glove compartment and Officer Bowers saw the registration card 
on top of several traffic summonses.  Officer Bowers also 
observed a “Crown Royal bag.”  The Crown Royal bag was made of 
purple cloth and had been used to package a bottle of Crown 
Royal Canadian whiskey, which was not inside the bag. 
 
Officer Bowers directed Carolina to exit his car and sit 
in the police cruiser so that the officer could separate 
Carolina from McMillan.  Officer Bowers checked to be sure 
that Carolina had no weapons on his person.  Officer Bowers 
and Carolina sat in the police car for about 15 minutes while 
the officer prepared traffic summonses and waited for another 
State police officer to arrive at the scene. 
 
As Officer Bowers conversed with Carolina in the police 
car, McMillan, who remained in the passenger seat of 
Carolina’s car, began to move “around in the seat and he was 
looking back in [the] direction” of the police cruiser.  
Carolina told Bowers that he wanted McMillan to drive 
Carolina’s car once Bowers had issued the traffic summonses.  
 
5
Bowers went to Carolina’s car where McMillan remained 
seated.  Bowers obtained McMillan’s driver’s license and 
returned to his police cruiser to ascertain the status of 
McMillan’s driver’s license. 
 
Officer Bowers told Carolina that Bowers had smelled 
marijuana in the car and he believed that Carolina and 
McMillan had “something illegal.” Carolina repeatedly told 
Officer Bowers that the officer had no reason to search the 
car and could not do so. 
 
Officer Bowers returned to Carolina’s car and gave 
McMillan his driver’s license.  Officer Bowers repeatedly 
asked McMillan to open the glove compartment so that the 
officer could determine to whom the summonses had been issued.  
McMillan refused to open the glove compartment.  McMillan told 
Officer Bowers that he should ask Carolina to open the glove 
compartment “because it wasn’t his [McMillan’s] car and he 
[McMillan] didn’t have anything to do with what was in the 
glove compartment.”  Subsequently, Officer Bowers opened the 
glove compartment, retrieved two traffic summonses and in the 
process removed the “Crown Royal bag.”  
Officer Bowers opened the “Crown Royal bag” and saw what 
appeared to be “chunks of . . . rock cocaine.”  Officer 
Bowers, who was standing on the passenger side of Carolina’s 
car, glanced at his police cruiser to watch Carolina.  
 
6
McMillan, who was in the front passenger seat, “jumped out” of 
the driver’s door of Carolina’s car and “ran fast.”  The 
police officers were unable to apprehend him.  Carolina, 
however, was arrested and Officer Bowers conducted a search of 
the car.  McMillan was arrested 12 days after he fled from 
Officer Bowers. 
 
During the search of Carolina’s car, Officer Bowers found 
a loaded Smith & Wesson .40 caliber pistol under the driver’s 
seat.  He also found under the driver’s seat a large plastic 
bag that contained a small baggie with crack cocaine residue. 
 
Officer Bowers found a “loaded [G]lock” .40 caliber 
pistol under the passenger seat where McMillan had been 
sitting.  The pistol was “fully loaded with 15 rounds in the 
magazine and one in the chamber.”  The officer also found, 
behind the gun under the passenger seat, a clear plastic 
baggie that contained “four other balled up baggies.” 
 
After Officer Bowers had searched the car, he “took a 
closer look inside of the Crown Royal bag that [he] had opened 
earlier.”  The “Crown Royal bag” contained a clear plastic 
baggie and 13 individually wrapped zip-lock baggies containing 
what appeared to be crack cocaine. 
 
Officer Bowers also found a shoe box on the back 
floorboard area behind Carolina’s seat.  The shoe box 
contained sneakers that were the same size as the shoes that 
 
7
Carolina was wearing at that time.  The shoe box contained 78 
of the “same type zip-lock baggies that [Officer Bowers] had 
found the crack cocaine in.  They were all empty.” 
 
Betty Jane Blankenship, a forensic scientist with the 
Virginia Department of Forensic Science, testified that she 
conducted DNA profiles on swabs that she obtained from 
McMillan and swabs “from the grip trigger” of the pistol that 
was found under the passenger seat where McMillan had been 
seated.  The DNA profile “from the grip trigger matched 
perfectly the DNA profile of Willis McMillan.”  Blankenship 
gave the following testimony about the DNA profile: 
“Question:  And you said it was a match.  And is 
there a certain ratio that you use in order to 
provide a Certificate of Analysis? 
 
“Answer:  Yes.  We do a statistical analysis on the 
DNA profile from the grips and trigger and you would 
expect to find that profile once in the population 
of the world.   
 
“Question:  And that’s 6 billion? 
 
“Answer:  6 billion people at the time that I did 
this certificate anyway.” 
 
IV. 
A. 
 
 
McMillan asserts that the evidence was insufficient to 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he possessed the 
cocaine.  He contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove 
that he exercised dominion or control over the cocaine.  
 
8
Continuing, he argues that the Commonwealth failed to exclude 
the reasonable hypothesis of innocence that the cocaine 
belonged to Carolina alone.  We disagree with McMillan’s 
contentions. 
 
We have stated that “[o]n appeal, great deference is 
given to the factfinder who, having seen and heard the 
witnesses, assesses their credibility and weighs their 
testimony.  Thus, a [circuit] court’s judgment will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it.”  Young v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 587, 
590-91, 659 S.E.2d 308, 310 (2008); accord Walton v. 
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 426, 497 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1998).  
The issue that we consider, upon appellate review, is 
“ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.’ ”  Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 437, 
442, 657 S.E.2d 499, 502 (2008) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 
 
We stated in Drew v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 471, 473, 338 
S.E.2d 844, 845 (1986) (quoting Powers v. Commonwealth, 227 
Va. 474, 476, 316 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1984)), the following 
principle that is pertinent here: 
 
9
“To support a conviction based upon constructive 
possession [of illegal drugs], ‘the Commonwealth 
must point to evidence of acts, statements, or 
conduct of the accused or other facts or 
circumstances which tend to show that the defendant 
was aware of both the presence and character of the 
substance and that it was subject to his dominion 
and control.’ ” 
 
When proof of constructive possession is dependent upon 
circumstantial evidence, “all necessary circumstances proved 
must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence 
and exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.”  
Garland v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 182, 184, 300 S.E.2d 783, 784 
(1983) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
Additionally, “[w]hile a conviction may properly be based upon 
circumstantial evidence . . . [t]here must be an unbroken 
chain of circumstances proving the guilt of the accused to the 
exclusion of any other rational hypothesis and to a moral 
certainty.”  Gordon v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 298, 300, 183 
S.E.2d 735, 737 (1971) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 
252, 255, 176 S.E.2d 813, 815 (1970)). 
 
Upon application of the aforementioned principles, we 
hold that the evidence in this case is sufficient to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that McMillan had possession of the 
cocaine.  The defendant was a passenger in the front seat of 
the car where the illegal drugs were found.  A loaded pistol, 
that contained his DNA material, was hidden under the 
 
10
passenger seat where he was seated.  Officer Bowers found 
packaging that could be used for distribution of illegal drugs 
immediately behind the defendant’s pistol.  The defendant 
refused to open the glove compartment where the “Crown Royal 
bag” containing crack cocaine was found because McMillan said 
“he didn’t have anything to do with what was in the glove 
compartment.”  When Officer Bowers opened the glove 
compartment, inspected the “Crown Royal bag” and saw “chunks 
of . . . rock cocaine,” McMillan fled.  These facts are 
sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that at a 
minimum, McMillan had constructive possession of the cocaine 
in the glove compartment, which was well within his reach. 
B. 
 
The trial court admitted in evidence, over McMillan’s 
objection, an exhibit that included a petition filed in the 
Hampton Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court dated 
September 10, 2000, and a document captioned “Office Contacts 
& Court Proceedings” that contained numerous notations made by 
an unknown scrivener.  The Commonwealth introduced this 
exhibit in evidence to establish the defendant’s prior felony 
conviction. 
 
According to the petition, R.O. Wooden, presumably an 
employee of the Hampton Fire Department, stated under oath 
that McMillan, who was 14 years old, “unlawfully and 
 
11
feloniously on or about 09/10/00 attempt[ed] to maliciously 
burn a dwelling house . . . in Hampton, in violation of [§§] 
18.2-77 and 18.2-26 of the 1950 Code of Virginia as amended.”  
The petition contained the following case number:  J036646-13-
00. 
 
The document captioned “Office Contacts & Court 
Proceedings” contains the following information: 
“J036646   
“MCMILLAN, WILLIS ALEXANDER 
“2-5-86 (age 14) 
 
“13-00 ATTEMPT ARSON 
9-10-00  18.2-77/18.2-26 
 
“WOODEN, R.O.” 
 
Below is the content of the document: 
“OFFICE CONTACTS & COURT PROCEEDINGS / copy to: 
SUMMONS ISSUED: Willis McMillan IP Deborah Curry IP 
9-11-00  Def. present w/Deborah Curry his legal 
custodian.  Michael King appt’d. 9-25-00 
for trial.  LRL/bg 
(Def. to remain in secure det. 
Def. motion for psych. eval. granted. CA 
to prepare order.  bg) 
9-14-00  Summ. iss. to mother & father & also 
mailed.  bg 
9-25-00  Cont. 10-25-00 for trial on def’s  
motion without objection.  Atty. King 
waives statutory req. for det. LRL/bg 
10-25-00 Def. present w/aunt & Atty. King. 
Cont. 1-3-01 for trial on joint motion. 
Def. placed on outreach det. JT/bg 
1-3-01   Def. present w/guardian & Atty. King. 
Def. offers a plea of guilty.  Waiver & 
stipulation of the evid.  Ct. accepts plea. 
Ct. finds def. guilty. Disposition 2-26-01. 
Def. released from outreach detention. 
                             /s/ Louis R. Lerna 
 
12
[date not legible]Order for comprehensive 
psychological eval. 
2-26-01  Atty. King present. Cont. 3-19-01 for 
disposition at req. of P.O. LRL/bg 
3-16-01  Disp. report in file. Copy to CA. bg 
3-19-01  CA Rickey & Atty King present - Both Agree 
with rec of P.O.  
Indef. sup. prob; Δ & guardian to comply 
w/all rec’s of FAP Team & Sub. Abuse  
Eval-                      R.R. Habel” 
 
 
The defendant argues the circuit court erred by admitting 
the exhibit in evidence.  The defendant contends that the 
exhibit is not an order of conviction, but merely contains 
notes and that the exhibit does not show the crime to which 
McMillan tendered his plea of guilty.  Continuing, the 
defendant argues that because the exhibit is inadmissible, the 
Commonwealth failed to establish that he had a prior felony 
conviction and, thus, his conviction for possession of a 
firearm by a felon must be reversed. 
 
Responding, the Commonwealth asserts that the circuit 
court did not err when it admitted the exhibit.  Additionally, 
the Commonwealth contends that the defendant has not 
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
conviction of the charge of possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon on the basis that the predicate offense had 
not been proven and, therefore, to the extent the defendant 
 
13
raises a claim of sufficiency of the evidence, that claim is 
procedurally defaulted pursuant to Rule 5:25.1 
 
“It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that 
evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”  Davis v. 
Marshall Homes, 265 Va. 159, 166, 576 S.E.2d 504, 507 (2003).  
This Court has repeatedly held:  “ ‘Evidence is relevant if it 
tends to prove or disprove, or is pertinent to, matters in 
issue.’ ”  McCloud v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 242, 257, 609 
S.E.2d 16, 24 (2005) (quoting Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 
253, 257, 546 S.E.2d 728, 730 (2001)); accord Hodges v. 
Commonwealth, 272 Va. 418, 436, 634 S.E.2d 680, 690 (2006); 
Barkley v. Wallace, 267 Va. 369, 373, 595 S.E.2d 271, 273 
(2004); Velocity Express Mid-Atlantic v. Hugen, 266 Va. 188, 
205, 585 S.E.2d 557, 566-67 (2003). 
 
We have held that: 
“Evidence which has no tendency to prove guilt, but 
only serves to prejudice an accused, should be 
excluded on the ground of lack of relevancy.  For 
evidence to be admissible it must relate and be 
confined to the matters in issue and tend to prove 
an offense or be pertinent thereto.  Evidence of 
collateral facts or those incapable of affording any 
reasonable presumption or inference on matters in 
issue, because too remote or irrelevant, cannot be 
accepted in evidence.” 
 
                     
1 The Commonwealth’s claim that the defendant’s assignment 
of error regarding admissibility is insufficient lacks merit. 
 
14
Smith v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 721, 723, 292 S.E.2d 362, 363 
(1982); (quoting Bunting v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 309, 314, 
157 S.E.2d 204, 208 (1967)). 
 
Recently, this Court considered in Palmer v. 
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 203, 609 S.E.2d 308 (2005), and Overbey 
v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 231, 623 S.E.2d 904 (2006), whether 
evidence of juvenile and domestic relations district court 
petitions, disposition orders, and notes were sufficient to 
prove that criminal defendants had been previously convicted 
of prior felonies, which were necessary elements of crimes 
that the Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Even though our decisions in Palmer and 
Overbey relate to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove 
prior felony convictions that were necessary elements to 
sustain convictions, these cases are highly instructive for 
our resolution of the present appeal. 
 
In Palmer, this Court considered whether the evidence was 
sufficient to prove that a defendant’s juvenile conviction was 
for an act felonious in nature.  George Palmer was indicted by 
a grand jury for several charges, including two charges of 
possession of a firearm when he was under the age of 29 after 
having been convicted of a delinquent act that would have been 
a felony if committed by an adult in violation of Code § 18.2-
308.2.  Palmer, 269 Va. at 205, 609 S.E.2d at 308-09.  
 
15
During Palmer’s trial, the Commonwealth presented four 
petitions and accompanying disposition orders from the Halifax 
County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court as 
evidence to prove that Palmer had been convicted of a 
delinquent act felonious in nature.  Two of the petitions 
contained allegations that Palmer committed the delinquent act 
of grand larceny in violation of Code § 18.2-95 and two other 
petitions contained allegations that Palmer committed the 
delinquent act of burglary with the intent to commit larceny 
in violation of Code § 18.2-91.  The juvenile and domestic 
relations district court records did not contain any orders 
providing an adjudication of the four charges.  The 
“disposition order” entered for each charge required Palmer to 
pay restitution to the victim and to be committed to jail for 
12 months, six months suspended, subject to two years of good 
behavior.  Id. at 206, 609 S.E.2d at 309.  
 
Palmer objected to the admission of the juvenile and 
domestic relations district court petitions and disposition 
orders.  He also made a motion to strike the evidence at the 
end of the Commonwealth’s case and at the conclusion of all 
the evidence.  He argued that the juvenile and domestic 
relations district court records did not establish a prior 
conviction of a delinquent act felonious in nature.  Id. at 
206, 609 S.E.2d at 309. 
 
16
 
The circuit court acknowledged that the juvenile and 
domestic relations district court form “is not good,” but the 
court held that there was “no question” that Palmer had been 
convicted of the delinquent acts as charged.  The court 
reasoned that Palmer could have only been committed to jail 
for a time period set forth in the court documents if he had 
been convicted of the delinquent acts that would have been a 
felony had those acts been committed by an adult.  Id.   
 
Reversing the conviction, we stated: 
“When the fact of a prior conviction is an 
element of a charged offense, the burden is on the 
Commonwealth to prove that prior conviction beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See Moore v. Commonwealth, 254 
Va. 184, 186, 491 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1997); Dowdy v. 
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 114, 116, 255 S.E.2d 506, 508 
(1979); McBride v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 30, 33, 
480 S.E.2d 126, 127 (1997); Essex v. Commonwealth, 
18 Va. App. 168, 171-72, 442 S.E.2d 707, 709-10 
(1994).  As provided by statute, a judgment order 
must reflect, among other things, the plea of the 
defendant, the verdict or findings of the fact 
finder, and the adjudication and sentence of the 
court.  Code § 19.2-307.  The mere notation of a 
sentence, although suggestive of a conviction, does 
not establish the fact or nature of any conviction.  
See McBride, 24 Va. App. at 35, 480 S.E.2d at 128; 
Bellinger v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 471, 475, 477 
S.E.2d 779, 780-81 (1996).” 
 
Palmer, 269 Va. at 207, 609 S.E.2d at 310 (emphasis added). 
 
We held that a circuit court must not engage in 
conjecture or surmise in determining the offense for which the 
defendant was convicted.  We concluded that when the 
Commonwealth seeks to establish a prior conviction as an 
 
17
element of a crime by presenting an order entered in a prior 
case, the order must show a judgment of conviction was entered 
in adjudication of the charge.  Id.  We explained the reasons 
for this principle: 
“First, a court’s orders are presumed to accurately 
reflect what actually transpired and nothing more.  
McMillion v. Dryvit Sys., 262 Va. 463, 469, 552 
S.E.2d 364, 367 (2001); Waterfront Marine Constr. v. 
North End 49ers, 251 Va. 417, 427 n.2, 468 S.E.2d 
894, 900 n.2 (1996); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 
Va. 260, 280-81, 257 S.E.2d 808, 822 (1979); 
McBride, 24 Va. App. at 35, 480 S.E.2d at 128.  
Second, as a practical matter, a defendant charged 
with felonious conduct may be convicted of a lesser- 
included offense, or the original charge may be 
reduced upon the defendant’s agreement to plead 
guilty to the reduced charge.”  
 
Palmer, 269 Va. at 207, 609 S.E.2d at 310. 
Even though we recognized in Palmer that the defendant 
objected in the circuit court to the admission of the juvenile 
and domestic relations district court petitions and 
disposition orders, we considered the sufficiency of the 
evidence, and not the admissibility of the records.  We held 
in Palmer that the juvenile and domestic relations district 
court records failed to establish the fact or nature of 
Palmer’s adjudication.  We stated that we did not know if 
Palmer pled guilty to four offenses that would have been 
misdemeanors rather than felonies if committed by an adult.  
We were unable to determine the nature of the delinquent acts 
for which Palmer was sentenced by the juvenile and domestic 
 
18
relations district court.  Additionally, we concluded that the 
mere notation of a sentence in a court document that is not an 
order does not establish the fact or nature of a conviction, 
even though that mere notation may be suggestive of a 
conviction.  Id. at 207-08, 609 S.E.2d at 310. 
 
In Overbey v. Commonwealth, we considered whether 
the Commonwealth established that a defendant, Robert 
Overbey, III, who had been charged with possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon in violation of Code § 18.2-
308.2, had been previously convicted of a felony as 
required by that statute.  During Overbey’s trial on the 
weapons charge, the Commonwealth introduced in evidence a 
copy of a petition filed in the Hampton Juvenile and 
Domestic Relations District Court.  Attached to the 
petition in the record were two pages of notes relating 
to the proceedings in the juvenile and domestic relations 
district court.  Overbey, 271 Va. at 232, 623 S.E.2d at 
904.  Notes relating to the proceedings in Overbey v. 
Commonwealth are on a form identical to the exhibit that 
is the subject of the present appeal before this Court. 
 
In Overbey, the notes indicated that Robert Overbey 
was charged with two offenses when he was 17 years old, 
the felony of burglary with the intent to commit larceny 
and the misdemeanor of petit larceny arising out of the 
 
19
same incident.  The signature of the judge of the Hampton 
Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court appears 
after each day’s entry on the notes.  At the top of each 
page, the burglary and larceny charges are listed, with 
the respective case number of each charge.  Id. at 232, 
623 S.E.2d at 904-05.  
 
An entry for notes, dated February 20, 1997, states 
that the defendant is “now 18 yrs of age & atty is 
prepared to proceed w/o a parent being present,” that 
“plea [of] guilty [and] stip[ulated] evid[ence] 
suff[icient] to convict,” and that “[b]ased on the plea 
of guilty, stip[ulation] & summary of evid[ence], Ct 
finds def guilty and refer for PO report.”  The defendant 
was sentenced pursuant to Code § 16.1-284 to 12 months in 
jail, suspended for two years on the condition that he 
“be of good behavior & complete 50 hours in the CDI 
program.”  Id. at 232-33, 623 S.E.2d at 905. 
 
Overbey did not object to the admission of the 
juvenile and domestic relations district court petition 
and notes in evidence.  He did, however, argue that the 
notes were ambiguous and were insufficient to show that 
he had been previously convicted of a felony.  Id. at 
233, 623 S.E.2d at 905. 
 
20
 
Both in the circuit court and on appeal in this 
Court, Overbey argued that the Commonwealth failed to 
establish that he had been previously convicted of a 
felony as required by Code § 18.2-308.2(A)(i).  Id.  We 
agreed with Overbey that the language in the notes was 
ambiguous and that the notes were of doubtful import and 
lacking in clearness and definiteness.  We held that the 
circuit court “had to engage in pure conjecture or 
surmise to determine, as the Commonwealth contend[ed], 
that the defendant pled guilty to both burglary and petit 
larceny.”  Id. at 234, 623 S.E.2d at 905-06.  We restated 
our holding in Palmer v. Commonwealth, supra, that a 
“court may not engage in conjecture or surmise in 
determining the offense for which a defendant was 
convicted.”  Overbey, 271 Va. at 234, 623 S.E.2d at 906 
(quoting Palmer, 269 Va. 207, 609 S.E.2d at 310). 
Implicit in our holdings in Palmer and Overbey is 
the recognition that the documents upon which the 
respective circuit courts relied were not orders and did 
not contain language from which the finder of fact could 
conclude that the respective defendants had been 
convicted of a prior felony conviction.  In each case, 
the circuit court relied upon documents that did not 
permit the finder of fact to make an inference that the 
 
21
defendant had been convicted of a prior felony.  Simply 
stated, in Overbey and Palmer, the admitted evidence did 
not tend to prove or disprove that the defendant had been 
convicted of a prior felony, which was an element of the 
charged crimes. 
The exhibit from the Hampton Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations District Court in the present appeal, just as 
the documents in Palmer v. Commonwealth, does not contain 
the findings of the fact-finder and the mere notation of 
a sentence in the exhibit in the present appeal does not 
establish the fact or nature of McMillan’s conviction.  
The exhibit in McMillan’s appeal clearly does not contain 
an order and, contrary to the assertions of the 
Commonwealth in the circuit court, the exhibits cannot be 
deemed to be an order.  The notations on the document 
captioned “Office Contacts & Court Proceedings” were made 
by an unknown scrivener and facts regarding the nature or 
type of conviction cannot be inferred from the notes.2  At 
best, the notes indicate that the defendant pled guilty 
to an offense and that as a disposition, McMillan was 
                     
2 In Overbey, just as in this case, the petitions 
filed in the juvenile and domestic relations district 
court contained a case number.  Likewise, the document 
“Office Contacts & Court Proceedings" we described in 
Overbey, just as in McMillan’s case, contains a 
corresponding case number. 
 
22
released from outreach detention.  However, a finder of 
fact cannot infer from the notes of the unknown scrivener 
that McMillan pled guilty to, or was convicted, of a 
felony. 
We hold that the notations in the challenged exhibit 
are not relevant because they do not tend to prove or 
disprove, nor are relevant to, matters in issue, 
specifically a prior felony conviction that is an element 
of the crime charged against McMillan.  And, as we have 
already stated, evidence that is not relevant is not 
admissible.  The circuit court erred by admitting the 
irrelevant evidence.3  Therefore, this Court will reverse 
the conviction for the violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse that 
portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals that 
affirmed the defendant's conviction for possession of a 
firearm by a felon and we will vacate that conviction.  
We will affirm that portion of the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals that approved the defendant's remaining 
                     
3 In its analysis, the dissent relies upon Code § 8.01-
389.  The litigants, the circuit court, and the Court of 
Appeals, did not consider what application, if any, Code 
§ 8.01-389 has to the admissibility of the evidence at issue 
in this appeal.  Thus, this Court need not, and does not, 
 
23
convictions.  We will remand this case to the Court of 
Appeals with direction that the Court of Appeals remand 
the case to the circuit court for a new trial if the 
Commonwealth be so advised. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  and remanded. 
 
 
SENIOR JUSTICE RUSSELL, with whom JUSTICE KINSER and 
JUSTICE LEMONS join, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
 
 
I concur in the majority's holding that the evidence was 
sufficient to support McMillan's conviction of possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine.  I respectfully dissent, 
however, from the majority's holding that the trial court 
erred in admitting in evidence the records of the Juvenile and 
Domestic Relations District Court of the City of Hampton. 
 
With respect to his conviction of possession of a firearm 
after having been previously convicted of a felony, McMillan 
presented two questions in his appeal to the Court of Appeals:  
(1) Did the trial court err in admitting in evidence the 
record of his 2001 conviction in the Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations District Court (JDR court) of attempted arson of a 
dwelling house?  (2) Was the evidence, consisting solely of 
that record, sufficient to support the firearm possession 
                                                                
consider what effect, if any, Code § 8.01-389 has upon the 
 
24
conviction?  McMillan abandoned the second claim in his appeal 
to this Court, perhaps because he had not made that argument 
at trial.  Here, with respect to the firearm possession 
conviction, he assigns as error only the trial court's 
admission of the JDR court record in evidence.  Consequently, 
our consideration is confined solely to the question of 
admissibility, not that of sufficiency.  Rule 5:17(C). 
 
Although evidence of prior crimes committed by the 
accused is inadmissible for the general purpose of showing bad 
character or a predisposition to commit the crime for which he 
is on trial, where a statute makes a prior conviction an 
element of the offense charged, the Commonwealth has the 
burden of proving the prior conviction beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The most efficient way of carrying this burden is by 
an attested copy of an order of conviction, but that is not 
the only method of proof available to the Commonwealth.  For 
this purpose, we have held, as has the Court of Appeals, that 
"[p]rior convictions may be proved by any competent evidence."  
Perez v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 724, 730, 652 S.E.2d 95, 98 
(2007) (emphasis added); accord McBride v. Commonwealth, 24 
Va. App. 30, 34, 480 S.E.2d 126, 128 (1997).  "Competent 
evidence" has been defined as "that which tends to establish a 
fact in issue."  Weiner v. State, 348 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Neb. 
                                                                
admissibility of the challenged evidence. 
 
25
1984) (emphasis added).  There is no requirement that evidence 
be sufficient in itself to establish proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt in order to be competent and admissible. 
 
"For many years, we have approved the principle that 
every fact, however remote or insignificant, that tends to 
establish a probability or improbability of a fact in issue is 
admissible."  Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 269, 257 
S.E.2d 808, 815 (1979) (emphasis added).  As the majority 
opinion indicates, we have reiterated that principle in a long 
series of decisions extending to the present time.  In one of 
these, we stated that the key to the admissibility of evidence 
is its relevance to a material issue in the case.  There, we 
said:  "Relevance exists when the evidence has a logical 
tendency, however slight, to prove a fact at issue in a case."  
Hodges v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 418, 436, 634 S.E.2d 680, 690 
(2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Applying those principles, our inquiry must be whether 
the JDR court record had even a slight tendency to prove that 
McMillan had been previously found guilty, as a juvenile 
offender, of a crime that would have been a felony if 
committed by an adult.  In that connection, it is noteworthy 
that McMillan does not dispute that he is the individual to 
whom the JDR record relates.  He does not contend that he was 
convicted of any offense other than attempted arson, the 
 
26
single charge named in the petition.  It is undisputed that 
attempted arson of a dwelling house, whether occupied or not, 
is a felony.  Code §§ 18.2-77 and 18.2-26.  McMillan does not 
contend that the charge was reduced to a misdemeanor or a 
lesser included offense by plea bargaining or otherwise, and 
any surmise on our part that such a reduction might have 
occurred would be speculation unsupported by any evidence 
whatever.  As the majority opinion points out, a court may not 
engage in conjecture or surmise in determining the offense for 
which a defendant was convicted.  McMillan's sole contention 
on appeal is that a reader of the JDR record cannot determine 
of what offense he was convicted. 
 
The JDR court record shows McMillan's name, the charged 
offense "Attempt Arson," the citations of the Code sections 
making that crime a felony and the case number on every page.  
The record contains the court order appointing counsel for 
McMillan, which is signed "Louis R. Lerner, Judge."  The page 
of notes containing the entries "Def. present w/guardian & 
Atty. King.  Def. offers a plea of guilty.  Waiver and 
stipulation of the evid.  Ct. accepts plea.  Ct. finds def. 
guilty.  Disposition 2-26-01" bears the handwritten signature 
"Louis R. Lerner."  I find it difficult to say that those 
entries have not the slightest tendency to persuade a fact-
 
27
finder that McMillan had a prior felony conviction and were 
therefore irrelevant to this case. 
 
The majority opinion stresses the fact that the notes in 
the JDR record were made by an "unknown scrivener."  The 
General Assembly has resolved any concern that may arise on 
that account.  Code § 8.01-389 provides, in pertinent part: 
A.  The records of any judicial proceeding and any 
other official records of any court in this 
Commonwealth shall be received as prima facie 
evidence provided that such records are 
authenticated and certified by the clerk of the 
court where preserved to be a true record. 
 
. . . . 
 
D.  "Records" as used in this article shall be 
deemed to include any memorandum, report, paper, 
data compilation, or other record in any form, or 
any combination thereof. 
 
 
Code § 8.01-391(C) provides that a copy of any record 
made by a court or clerk thereof in the performance of its 
official duties "shall be admissible into evidence as the 
original" if authenticated as a true copy by the clerk or 
deputy clerk of the court. 
 
The JDR court record to which McMillan objects bears the 
following certificate: 
Eighth Judicial District, City of Hampton 
Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court 
220 North King Street 
Hampton, VA 23669 
 
I, the undersigned clerk or deputy clerk of the 
above-named court, authenticate pursuant to Va. Code 
 
28
§ 8.01-391(C) on this date that the document to 
which this authentication is affixed is a true copy 
of a record in the above-named court, made in the 
performance of my official duties. 
 
1-18-06                   M. H. Forrest 
Date                      Deputy Clerk 
 
 
In my view, the JDR record was of the kind contemplated 
by the provision of Code § 8.01-389(A), mandating that it 
"shall be received as prima facie evidence."  The record may 
well not have been conclusive and may not have, in itself, 
amounted to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and it was surely 
subject to refutation by other evidence, but those questions 
are not before us.  The JDR record was offered at the 
beginning of the trial, before the first witness testified.  
At that point, the trial court had no means of knowing what, 
if any, additional evidence might be forthcoming.  The court 
was not, at that stage, called upon to decide the sufficiency 
of the Commonwealth's case, but was confronted with a pure 
question of admissibility.  The trial court had no choice but 
to admit the record as prima facie evidence. 
 
The majority opinion relies on our recent decisions in 
Palmer v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 203, 609 S.E.2d 308 (2005), 
and Overbey v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 231, 623 S.E.2d 904 
(2006).  As the majority opinion candidly admits, however, the 
issue in both Palmer and Overbey was the sufficiency of the 
evidence of juvenile records to support a conviction of 
 
29
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.  In neither case 
was the admissibility of evidence an issue.  Those cases, 
accordingly, have no bearing on the sole question presented in 
this appeal. 
 
The majority opinion states a conclusion that those cases 
do not support:  "Simply stated, in Overbey and Palmer, the 
admitted evidence did not tend to prove or disprove that the 
defendant had been convicted of a prior felony."  That is an 
admissibility analysis.  Because those were sufficiency cases, 
they did not touch upon the question whether the evidence 
"tend[ed] to prove or disprove" anything.  Rather, they simply 
held that the evidence, taken as a whole, did not establish 
the issue beyond a reasonable doubt.  In the circumstances of 
the present case, that analysis was entirely within the 
province of the fact-finder and is not subject to review on 
appeal.  Rules 5:17(C) and 5:25.  If sufficiency were the 
issue in the present case, my view would be quite different.  
Palmer and Overbey have settled that question. 
 
My concern with the majority opinion is that by 
commingling the principles applicable to an admissibility 
analysis with those applicable to a sufficiency analysis, 
considerable confusion may be introduced into the law of 
evidence in Virginia.  For that reason, I respectfully dissent 
 
30
 
31
in part, and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
in its entirety.