Case Title: State v. Cunningham

Citation: 2007-Ohio-1245

Docket Number: 20051780

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Cunningham, 113 Ohio St.3d 108, 2007-Ohio-1245.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. CUNNINGHAM, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Cunningham, 113 Ohio St.3d 108, 2007-Ohio-1245.] 
R.C. 2953.08(B)(2) does not authorize a prosecuting attorney to appeal an order 
granting judicial release of a prisoner serving time for a felony of the 
third, fourth, or fifth degree. 
(No. 2005-1780 – Submitted November 28, 2006 – Decided April 4, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 85342, 2005-Ohio-3840. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
R.C. 2953.08(B)(2) does not authorize a prosecuting attorney to appeal the 
modification of a sentence granting judicial release for a felony of the 
third, fourth, or fifth degree. 
2. 
Where an eligible inmate has timely filed a motion seeking judicial release 
pursuant to R.C. 2929.20 involving a felony of the fifth degree, but later 
withdraws that motion, an order of the trial court reinstating that motion is 
not an abuse of discretion, and a judgment entry granting it is not contrary 
to law. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J.
. 
 
{¶ 1} The state appeals from an order of the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals that dismissed its appeal and held that an order granting judicial release 
for a felony of the fifth degree did not constitute a final, appealable order pursuant 
to R.C. 2953.08.  After reviewing the history of this case and the relevant 
statutory authority, we affirm that decision. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 2} On September 10, 2003, Kim Cunningham pleaded guilty to theft 
in violation of R.C. 2913.02, a felony of the fifth degree, and the trial court 
sentenced her to community control, placing her on electronic home detention for 
60 days.  On December 9, 2003, the trial court entered an order finding that 
Cunningham had violated the terms of her community control by being out of 
range of her electronic home-detention monitor, and it therefore imposed a one-
year sentence of incarceration. 
{¶ 3} Two months later, Cunningham filed a motion for judicial release 
in accordance with R.C. 2929.20(B)(1)(a).  However, before the trial court ruled 
on that motion, Cunningham filed a motion to withdraw it, which the trial court 
granted.  Thereafter, on June 18, 2004, Cunningham filed a second motion for 
judicial release.  During the pendency of that second motion for judicial release, 
Cunningham moved to reinstate her first motion for judicial release, which she 
had withdrawn.  The trial court granted that motion, and, after a hearing, it 
modified her sentence of incarceration to a four-year period of community 
control.  The prosecuting attorney then appealed the court’s order granting 
judicial release. 
{¶ 4} Prior to oral argument in the court of appeals, the court, sua sponte, 
raised the issue of whether the trial court’s order modifying the sentence 
constituted a final, appealable order.  In a split decision, the appellate court 
dismissed the state’s appeal for lack of a final, appealable order, holding that R.C. 
2953.08(B) did not grant the state the right to appeal in this instance. 
{¶ 5} The state has now appealed that decision to this court, urging that 
it has a right to appeal pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(B)(2) from orders granting 
judicial release pursuant to R.C. 2929.20 that are contrary to law.  We granted 
discretionary review. 
{¶ 6} The right of a prosecuting attorney to appeal a sentence is provided 
by R.C. 2953.08(B): 
January Term, 2007 
3 
{¶ 7} “(B) In addition to any other right to appeal and except as provided 
in division (D) of this section, a prosecuting attorney * * * may appeal as a matter 
of right a sentence imposed upon a defendant who is convicted of or pleads guilty 
to a felony or, in the circumstances described in division (B)(3) of this section the 
modification of a sentence imposed upon such a defendant, on any of the 
following grounds: 
{¶ 8} “ * * * 
{¶ 9} “(2) The sentence is contrary to law. 
{¶ 10} “(3) The sentence is a modification under section 2929.20 of the 
Revised Code of a sentence that was imposed for a felony of the first or second 
degree.” 
{¶ 11} R.C. 2953.08(B)(3) grants the state a right to appeal if a court 
modifies a sentence imposed for a felony of the first or second degree.  
Cunningham’s conviction here, however, is for theft, a felony of the fifth degree. 
{¶ 12} The prosecuting attorney contends that R.C. 2953.08(B)(2) 
authorizes an appeal from modification of any sentence that is contrary to law, 
and urges that the modification of sentence granting judicial release to 
Cunningham violated R.C. 2929.20(B)(1)(a) because Cunningham did not file her 
motion seeking judicial release in a timely manner; in addition, the prosecutor 
argues that the court had no authority to reinstate Cunningham’s withdrawn 
motion for judicial release and, therefore, that the court acted contrary to law in 
granting judicial release. 
{¶ 13} Cunningham claims that R.C. 2953.08(B)(3) precludes appellate 
review of any sentence modification involving any third-, fourth-, or fifth-degree 
felony.  Thus, we are confronted with a question of statutory interpretation 
concerning whether R.C. 2953.08(B)(2) authorizes the prosecuting attorney to 
appeal as contrary to law the modification of a criminal sentence granting judicial 
release for a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree, or whether R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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2953.08(B)(3) precludes the prosecuting attorney from doing so because it 
expressly grants the right to appeal only the modification of sentences imposed 
for felonies of the first or second degree. 
{¶ 14} R.C. 2929.20 restricts the time within which an eligible offender 
may file a motion for judicial release.  It reads:  
{¶ 15} “(B) Upon the filing of a motion by the eligible offender or upon 
its own motion, a sentencing court may reduce the offender's stated prison term 
through a judicial release in accordance with this section. * * * An eligible 
offender may file a motion for judicial release with the sentencing court within 
the following applicable period of time: 
{¶ 16} “(1)(a) Except as otherwise provided in division (B)(1)(b) or (c) of 
this section, if the stated prison term was imposed for a felony of the fourth or 
fifth degree, the eligible offender may file the motion not earlier than thirty days 
or later than ninety days after the offender is delivered to a state correctional 
institution.” 
{¶ 17} Further, R.C. 2929.20(B)(2) pertains to first-, second-, and third-
degree felonies, and provides: 
{¶ 18} “[I]f the stated prison term was imposed for a felony of the first, 
second, or third degree, the eligible offender may file the motion not earlier than 
one hundred eighty days after the offender is delivered to a state correctional 
institution.” 
{¶ 19} What is immediately apparent from the foregoing code sections is 
that the General Assembly has imposed time parameters for eligible offenders to 
file for a modification of sentence seeking judicial release.  It does not appear to 
be an oversight that the General Assembly excluded felonies of the third, fourth, 
or fifth degree from R.C. 2953.08(B)(3), which authorizes a prosecuting attorney 
to appeal modification of a sentence imposed for a felony of the first or second 
degree. 
January Term, 2007 
5 
{¶ 20} First, the plain language of R.C. 2953.08(B)(3) does not include 
any reference to a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree.  By including only 
felonies of the first and second degree within the text of (B)(3), the General 
Assembly has excluded all other felony offenses of a lesser degree because “the 
express inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of the other.”  Myers v. 
Toledo, 110 Ohio St.3d 218, 2006-Ohio-4353, 852 N.E.2d 1176, ¶ 24. 
{¶ 21} Next, in establishing time parameters within which to file motions 
for judicial release pursuant to R.C. 2929.20, the General Assembly established 
two different time periods:  one for filing a motion for judicial release involving 
felonies of the first, second, and third degree, R.C. 2929.20(B)(2); and a separate 
time period for felonies of the fourth and fifth degree, R.C. 2929.20(B)(1).  But 
when it authorized the prosecuting attorney to appeal a modification of sentence, 
it limited the right to sentence modifications involving only felonies of the first 
and second degree. 
{¶ 22} Finally, we recognize that the state, relying on R.C. 2953.08(B)(2), 
contends that it has a right to appeal a sentence modification that is contrary to 
law.  Here, it urges that the court acted contrary to law in permitting Cunningham 
to reinstate a motion that had been withdrawn and that would have been untimely 
if it were refiled.  A careful examination of R.C. 2953.08(B)(2), however, reveals 
that it does not refer to the modification of a sentence; rather, it authorizes the 
prosecuting attorney to appeal, as a matter of right, a sentence imposed on a 
defendant on the grounds that “[t]he sentence is contrary to law.”  Thus, it does 
not apply to a modification of a sentence that is allegedly contrary to law.  See 
State v. Raitz, 6th Dist. No. L-03-1118, 2003-Ohio-5687, ¶ 13.  The state argues 
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate Cunningham’s first motion for 
judicial release and as a result that modification is contrary to law.  The state 
argues in the alternative that if the trial court had the jurisdiction to reinstate the 
motion, it abused its discretion in so doing. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Abuse of Discretion 
{¶ 23} We have stated that “[a]ny attempt by a court to disregard statutory 
requirements when imposing a sentence renders the attempted sentence a nullity 
or void.”  State v. Beasley (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 75, 14 OBR 511, 471 N.E.2d 
774.  In Beasley, we reasoned that “ ‘[c]rimes are statutory, as are the penalties 
therefor, and the only sentence which a trial judge may impose is that provided 
for by statute * * *.’ ”  Id., quoting Colegrove v. Burns (1964), 175 Ohio St. 437, 
438, 25 O.O.2d 447, 195 N.E.2d 811.  Thus, a trial court may grant judicial 
release and modify a sentence only as provided for by statute. 
{¶ 24} Based upon the narrow facts of this case, however, the trial court 
did not disregard statutory requirements in modifying Cunningham’s sentence.  
Cunningham complied with the time parameters in R.C. 2929.20(B)(1)(a) in filing 
her original motion on February 20, 2004, vesting the trial court with jurisdiction 
at that time.  And, where “ ‘jurisdiction has attached[,] the right to hear and 
determine is perfect[,] and the decision of every question thereafter arising is but 
the exercise of the jurisdiction thus conferred.’ ”  Tari v. State (1927), 117 Ohio 
St. 481, 491, 159 N.E. 594, quoting Sheldon’s Lessee v. Newton (1854), 3 Ohio 
St. 494, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 25} Because the trial court had jurisdiction through Cunningham’s 
initial motion for judicial release, it also had “inherent authority and wide 
discretion in exercising its duty to administer proceedings,” State v. Boddie (Sept. 
6, 2001), 3d Dist. No. 1-2000-72, 2001 WL 1023107, citing Royal Indemn. Co. v. 
J.C. Penney Co., Inc. (1986), 27 Ohio St.3d 31, 33-36, 27 OBR 447, 501 N.E.2d 
617, which includes the ability to reinstate a withdrawn motion.  In addition, the 
court’s decision “will not be disturbed absent a showing that the court abused that 
discretion.”  Id.  We have defined an “abuse of discretion” as an unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or unconscionable use of discretion, State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 
57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 1032, ¶ 130, or as a “ ‘view or action “that no 
January Term, 2007 
7 
conscientious judge, acting intelligently, could honestly have taken.” ’ ”  State ex 
rel. Wilms v. Blake (1945), 144 Ohio St. 619, 624, 30 O.O. 220, 60 N.E.2d 308, 
quoting Long v. George (1937), 296 Mass. 574, 579, 7 N.E.2d 149, quoting Davis 
v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co. (1920), 235 Mass. 482, 497, 126 N.E. 841. 
{¶ 26} Given the facts before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court 
abused its discretion in this case.  Significantly, the court did not rule on the 
second, untimely motion for judicial release filed on June 18, 2004.  Instead, it 
reinstated Cunningham’s timely filed motion.  The court did not act arbitrarily or 
otherwise ignore the language of the statute.  Therefore, where an eligible inmate 
has timely filed a motion seeking judicial release pursuant to R.C. 2929.20 
involving a felony of the fifth degree, but later withdraws that motion, an order of 
the trial court reinstating that motion is not an abuse of discretion, and a judgment 
entry granting it is not contrary to law. 
{¶ 27} Since it is our responsibility to interpret the law, and not to make 
it, we are constrained by the language used in R.C. 2953.08 to conclude that the 
General Assembly has granted the prosecuting attorney a limited right to appeal 
the modification of a sentence granting judicial release for a felony of the first or 
second degree. 
{¶ 28} Accordingly, R.C. 2953.08(B)(2) does not authorize a prosecuting 
attorney to appeal the modification of a sentence granting judicial release for a 
felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree.  We therefore affirm the judgment of 
the court of appeals dismissing the state’s appeal. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., CARR, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
DONNA J. CARR, J., of the Ninth Appellate District, was assigned to sit for 
RESNICK, J., whose term ended on January 1, 2007. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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CUPP, J., whose term began on January 2, 2007, did not participate in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
__________________ 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven 
Gall, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Robert L. Tobik and Cullen Sweeney, for appellee. 
______________________