Case Title: Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy

Citation: 2016 IL 119518

Docket Number: 119518

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., 2016 IL 119518 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
MICHAEL RICHTER et al., Appellees, v. PRAIRIE FARMS 
DAIRY, INC., Appellant. 
 
 
 
Docket No. 
 
119518 
 
 
 
Filed 
 
 
May 19, 2016 
 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
 
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District; heard in that 
court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Macoupin County; the Hon. 
Patrick Londrigan, Judge, presiding. 
 
 
Judgment 
Affirmed and remanded. 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
Donald K. Schoemaker and Andrew J. Tessman, of Greensfelder, 
Hemker & Gale, P.C., of Swansea, for appellant. 
 
Todd W. Sivia and Paul A. Marks, of Edwardsville, for appellees. 
 
Ann C. Barron, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Edwardsville, 
for amicus curiae Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel. 
 
Leslie J. Rosen, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers 
Association. 
 
Digitally signed by 
Reporter of Decisions 
Reason: I attest to the 
accuracy and integrity 
of this document 
Date: 2016.06.24 
09:53:36 -05'00'
 
 
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Justices 
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Karmeier, 
Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
Following a voluntary dismissal, plaintiffs, Michael Richter and Denise Richter, doing 
business as Rich-Lane Farms, refiled their civil action against defendant, Prairie Farms Dairy, 
Inc. The circuit court of Macoupin County dismissed the refiled action pursuant to section 
2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the grounds of res judicata and the statute of 
limitations. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(4), (a)(5) (West 2012). The appellate court reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings. 2015 IL App (4th) 140613. This court allowed defendant’s 
petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). We now affirm the judgment of 
the appellate court. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
The pleadings alleged the following facts, which we accept as true in the context of a 
dismissal pursuant to section 2-619. See Board of Managers of the Village Centre 
Condominium Ass’n v. Wilmette Partners, 198 Ill. 2d 132, 134 (2001). Plaintiffs are partners in 
the business of dairy farming. Defendant is an agricultural cooperative (see 805 ILCS 315/1 
et seq. (West 2014)) in the business of producing and supplying dairy products. In August 
1980, plaintiffs became members of defendant’s cooperative, paid $15 for shares of 
defendant’s common stock, and entered into a “Milk Marketing Agreement” with defendant. 
According to the agreement, plaintiffs would provide defendant with whole milk, which 
defendant would market and sell. 
¶ 4 
 
In April 2005, plaintiffs temporarily ceased milk production. However, plaintiffs had 
“hoped and expected to resume production within one year and [had] retained their stock of 
heifers to enable them to do so.” At that time, defendant’s bylaws provided, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
“Section 8. Termination of Stock Interest. Any common stockholder who ceases to be a 
producer of agricultural products or who fails to patronize the association for one (1) 
fiscal year or who violates any provision of the Articles of Incorporation, the Bylaws, 
or a marketing agreement shall forfeit his right to own Common Stock in this 
association when evidence of such fact has been presented to the Board of Directors 
and upon passage of a resolution by the Board finding such to be the fact, immediately 
thereupon all the rights of such common stockholder shall cease ***. Upon termination 
of membership, the Board shall redeem the outstanding Common Stock of the 
terminating member by payment to the member of the actual dollar consideration paid 
by the member for such Common Stock.” 
Defendant became aware that plaintiffs temporarily ceased milk production no later than April 
30, 2005. 
 
 
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¶ 5 
 
In an October 2005 letter, defendant notified plaintiffs that it had terminated their 
agreement and plaintiffs’ membership in the cooperative. The letter contained two alternative 
reasons for its actions: “You were no longer marketing milk as an active producer of Prairie 
Farms, as set forth in the By-Laws, at the end of the fiscal year ending 9/30/05,” or “During the 
current fiscal year, there was a change in the way your membership was recorded in our books 
(name change, etc.).” Defendant tendered $15 to plaintiffs to redeem the shares of common 
stock, but plaintiffs rejected the payment. 
 
¶ 6 
 
 
 
 
A. Richter I 
¶ 7 
 
In October 2006, plaintiffs filed a three-count complaint against defendant in the circuit 
court of Madison County. Plaintiffs alleged that they sustained damages as a result of 
defendant’s termination of their agreement and plaintiffs’ membership in the cooperative. 
Count I sought shareholder remedies pursuant to section 12.56 of the Business Corporation 
Act of 1983 (Business Corporation Act) (805 ILCS 5/12.56 (West 2006)). Based on 
defendant’s alleged concealment, suppression, or omission of its interpretation of section 8 of 
its bylaws, count II alleged a claim pursuant to the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive 
Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2006)), and 
count III alleged common-law fraud. 
¶ 8 
 
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that each count failed to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted. See 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2006)). Defendant asked the 
circuit court to “dismiss Counts I through III of the Complaint with prejudice as a matter of 
law.” 
¶ 9 
 
On September 26, 2007, the circuit court ruled on defendant’s motion in a written order, 
which stated in pertinent part: 
 
“Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Counts I, II, and III are heard and argued. 
 
Defendant’s motion as to Count I is denied. 
 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Counts II and III are granted. 
 
Plaintiff[s] given leave to file amended complaint within 30 days. 
 
Defendant given leave to file response to amended complaint within 30 days after 
plaintiff’s filing of the same. 
 
Defendant to answer Count I within 30 day[s] of [today’s] order.” 
On October 24, 2007, plaintiffs moved for an extension of time to file an amended complaint. 
On November 28, 2007, the circuit court granted plaintiffs an extension of 120 days. However, 
plaintiffs never filed an amended complaint. Instead, the case proceeded on plaintiffs’ sole 
remaining claim for shareholder remedies pursuant to the Business Corporation Act as stated 
in count I. 
¶ 10 
 
In June 2011, the circuit court allowed plaintiffs’ attorney to withdraw. The court stayed 
discovery deadlines and granted plaintiffs a continuance to find new counsel. In November 
2011, plaintiffs’ current attorney entered his appearance. Beginning in February 2012, 
plaintiffs sought extensions of time to comply with discovery requests. On July 13, 2012, the 
court granted plaintiffs 30 days to disclose additional experts. On August 13, 2012, plaintiffs 
moved for a two-week extension to disclose expert witnesses. On September 7, 2012, the court 
denied plaintiffs’ request for a continuance. Plaintiffs then moved to voluntarily dismiss their 
 
 
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lawsuit without prejudice, which the court granted pursuant to section 2-1009 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1009 (West 2012)). 
 
¶ 11 
 
 
 
 
B. Richter II 
¶ 12 
 
On September 6, 2013, plaintiffs filed their four-count complaint. Count I sought 
shareholder remedies. Based on defendant’s alleged concealment, suppression, or omission of 
its interpretation of section 8 of its bylaws, count II alleged misrepresentation, and count III 
alleged common-law fraud. Count IV alleged that defendant’s directors or officers breached 
their fiduciary duty owed to plaintiffs. In December 2013, the circuit court of Madison County 
granted defendant’s motion to transfer venue to Macoupin County. 
¶ 13 
 
In February 2014, defendant filed a combined motion to dismiss Richter II with prejudice. 
See 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2012). Defendant contended, inter alia, that the doctrine of 
res judicata barred plaintiffs’ claims in Richter II and, alternatively, that the five-year statute 
of limitations (see 735 ILCS 5/13-205 (West 2012)) barred plaintiffs’ claims for 
misrepresentation, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. In June 2014, following a hearing, the 
circuit court of Macoupin County granted defendant’s motion to dismiss Richter II based on 
res judicata and the statute of limitations. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(4), (a)(5) (West 2012). 
¶ 14 
 
Plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court held that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar 
plaintiffs from filing Richter II. The court recognized that one of the requirements for 
res judicata to apply was a final judgment on the merits. 2015 IL App (4th) 140613, ¶ 23. The 
court concluded that the circuit court’s order dismissing the fraud counts in Richter I was not a 
final order. Id. ¶ 26. Thus, the doctrine of res judicata did not bar plaintiffs from refiling their 
action. Id. ¶ 36. The appellate court also held that the five-year statute of limitations (735 ILCS 
5/13-205 (West 2012)) did not bar Richter II. The court agreed with plaintiffs that the 
limitations savings statute (735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 1994)) permitted the refiled action. 2015 
IL App (4th) 140613, ¶¶ 37-42. The appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded the 
case to the circuit court for further proceedings. Id. ¶ 46. 
¶ 15 
 
Defendant appeals to this court. We granted the Illinois Association of Defense Trial 
Counsel leave to submit an amicus curiae brief in support of defendant. We also granted the 
Illinois Trial Lawyers Association leave to submit an amicus curiae brief in support of 
plaintiffs. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). Additional pertinent background will be 
discussed in the context of our analysis of the issues. 
 
¶ 16 
 
 
 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
¶ 17 
 
Defendant contends that the appellate court erred in reversing the circuit court’s section 
2-619 dismissal of Richter II. Defendant argues that Richter II was barred by (A) the doctrine 
of res judicata, (B) the rule against claim-splitting, (C) the statute of limitations, and (D) the 
equitable doctrine of laches. 
¶ 18 
 
A section 2-619 motion provides for the involuntary dismissal of a cause of action based on 
certain defects or defenses. 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2012). In ruling on the motion, the circuit 
court must interpret all pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Porter v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 227 Ill. 2d 343, 352 (2008); Borowiec 
v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 209 Ill. 2d 376, 383 (2004). A section 2-619 motion to dismiss presents 
a question of law, which we review de novo. In re Estate of Boyar, 2013 IL 113655, ¶ 27; 
 
 
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Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 201 Ill. 2d 403, 411 (2002). 
 
¶ 19 
 
 
 
 
A. Res Judicata 
¶ 20 
 
Defendant contends that the circuit court correctly dismissed Richter II pursuant to section 
2-619(a)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides for dismissal where the action “is 
barred by a prior judgment.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(4) (West 2012). This provision allows a 
defendant to raise the affirmative defense of res judicata. Morris B. Chapman & Associates, 
Ltd. v. Kitzman, 193 Ill. 2d 560, 565 (2000). 
¶ 21 
 
The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a 
court of competent jurisdiction bars a subsequent action between the same parties or their 
privies involving the same cause of action. The bar extends not only to what was actually 
decided in the prior action, but also to those matters that could have been decided. Three 
requirements must be satisfied for res judicata to apply: (1) a final judgment on the merits 
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) an identity of cause of action, and (3) an 
identity of parties or their privies. Wilson v. Edward Hospital, 2012 IL 112898, ¶ 9; Hudson v. 
City of Chicago, 228 Ill. 2d 462, 467 (2008); Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill. 2d 325, 
334-35 (1996). The underlying policy of res judicata is to promote judicial economy by 
preventing repetitive litigation and to protect a defendant from the harassment of relitigating 
essentially the same claim. See Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional 
Regulation, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 45 (quoting Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill. 2d 520, 533 (2004)). 
¶ 22 
 
The requirement of a final order or judgment is a “critical” component in showing the 
applicability of res judicata. Hernandez v. Pritikin, 2012 IL 113054, ¶ 41. A judgment cannot 
bar a subsequent action unless it is a “final” judgment. Relph v. Board of Education of DePue 
Unit School District No. 103, 84 Ill. 2d 436, 441 (1981); People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park 
District, 66 Ill. 2d 65, 69 (1976). The party invoking res judicata carries the burden of 
establishing its applicability. Hernandez, 2012 IL 113054, ¶ 41; Chicago Historical Society v. 
Paschen, 9 Ill. 2d 378, 382 (1956). 
¶ 23 
 
The parties agree that the second and third elements of res judicata have been satisfied. 
However, the appellate court concluded that the circuit court’s September 2007 dismissal order 
in Richter I was not a final order, and, consequently, the bar of res judicata did not apply. 2015 
IL App (4th) 140613, ¶¶ 26, 36. Before this court, defendant assigns error to this conclusion. 
Defendant asserts that the dismissal of plaintiffs’ Consumer Fraud Act and common-law fraud 
claims in Richter I “became a final order on the merits” when plaintiffs did not amend the 
complaint, or seek appeal of that dismissal, but rather voluntarily dismissed the action. 
¶ 24 
 
To be “final,” a judgment or order must terminate the litigation and fix absolutely the 
parties’ rights, leaving only enforcement of the judgment. In re Detention of Hardin, 238 Ill. 
2d 33, 42-43 (2010); Village of Niles v. Szczesny, 13 Ill. 2d 45, 48 (1958). In determining when 
a judgment or order is final, one should look to its substance rather than its form. In re J.N., 91 
Ill. 2d 122, 128 (1982). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 273 provides: “Unless the order of 
dismissal or a statute of this State otherwise specifies, an involuntary dismissal of an action, 
other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join an 
indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. 
R. 273 (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). If a circuit court involuntarily dismisses a plaintiff’s action, other 
than for one of the rule’s three exceptions, and if the plaintiff does not procure leave of court to 
 
 
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refile the complaint or if a statute does not guarantee that opportunity, then Rule 273 deems the 
dismissal to be on the merits. DeLuna v. Treister, 185 Ill. 2d 565, 575 (1999). However, a 
dismissal “without prejudice” signals that there was no final decision on the merits and that the 
plaintiff is not barred from refiling the action. See DeLuna, 185 Ill. 2d at 576; People ex rel. 
Redd v. Mulholland, 134 Ill. App. 3d 929, 930-31 (1985). 
¶ 25 
 
The Code of Civil Procedure provides that the circuit court may allow amendments to 
pleadings “[a]t any time before final judgment.” 735 ILCS 5/2-616(a) (West 2012). A 
dismissal order that grants leave to amend is interlocutory and not final. Palm v. 2800 Lake 
Shore Drive Condominium Ass’n, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 21; Old Salem Chautauqua Ass’n v. 
Illinois District Council of the Assembly of God, 13 Ill. 2d 258, 262 (1958) (stating that order 
partially striking pleading and granting leave to amend is not final); see Hicks v. Weaver, 255 
Ill. App. 3d 650, 652 (1994). An order that dismisses the counts of a complaint, but grants the 
plaintiff leave to amend, is not “final” because the order does not terminate the litigation 
between the parties. March v. Miller-Jesser, Inc., 202 Ill. App. 3d 148, 158-59 (1990); Gray v. 
Starkey, 41 Ill. App. 3d 555, 558 (1976). A dismissal with leave to amend is consequently 
without prejudice. See Dewan v. Ford Motor Co., 343 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1070 (2003); Perkins 
v. Collette, 179 Ill. App. 3d 852, 854 (1989); Redd, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 930-31. Accordingly, for 
purposes of Rule 273, where a dismissal order does not specify that it is “without prejudice,” or 
that plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint, the dismissal order is a final 
adjudication on the merits. See Kostecki v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., of Illinois, 361 Ill. 
App. 3d 362, 373 (2005) (collecting cases). 
¶ 26 
 
In Richter I, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint based on insufficient facts alleged 
in each count. The involuntary dismissal order expressly granted plaintiffs leave to file an 
amended complaint within 30 days. Hence, there was no “adjudication upon the merits” in 
Richter I because “the order of dismissal *** otherwise specifie[d]” that plaintiffs had leave to 
file an amended complaint. Ill. S. Ct. R. 273. See Hernandez, 2012 IL 113054, ¶ 47; Stutzke v. 
Edwards, 58 Ill. App. 3d 832, 834-35 (1978). 
¶ 27 
 
Defendant distinguishes an involuntary dismissal order that grants leave to amend from an 
involuntary dismissal order that grants leave to amend within a time period. In its brief, 
defendant argues: “If the leave period ‘otherwise specifie[d]’ by the court expires and no 
action is taken by the plaintiff, Rule 273 operates to default the involuntary dismissal order to 
an ‘adjudication on the merits.’ ” We observe that during oral argument, defendant argued that 
a plaintiff is responsible for the consequences of failing to amend within a prescribed time 
period because the order is directed to the plaintiff. Indeed, defendant asserted that there was 
no rule even allowing a defendant to move for a final dismissal order where a dismissal order 
has a leave-to-amend time period and the plaintiff fails to timely amend. We cannot agree. 
¶ 28 
 
Defendant attempts to create an “automatic final judgment” mechanism that would absolve 
it of any responsibility for this prolonged litigation. However, defendant’s argument overlooks 
a significant body of case law. Initially, this court has repeatedly recognized the inherent 
power of the circuit court to review, modify, or vacate interlocutory orders while the court 
retains jurisdiction over the entire controversy. Hernandez, 2012 IL 113054, ¶ 42 (collecting 
cases); Catlett v. Novak, 116 Ill. 2d 63, 68 (1987) (collecting cases). Accordingly, where, as in 
this case, the circuit court dismisses a complaint, and specifies a number of days for filing an 
amended complaint, the court retains jurisdiction to allow the amended complaint to be filed 
 
 
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even after the time period has expired. Richardson v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 109 Ill. 2d 
41, 46 (1985) (collecting cases); Miller v. Suburban Medical Center at Hoffman Estates, Inc., 
184 Ill. App. 3d 545, 547 (1989) (collecting cases). By failing to ask for leave to amend after 
the circuit court enters an order dismissing a complaint, a plaintiff elects to stand on the 
complaint and a subsequent order dismissing the suit may be entered. Doner v. Phoenix Joint 
Stock Land Bank of Kansas City, 381 Ill. 106, 108-09 (1942). Even if a plaintiff subsequently 
elects to stand on his or her complaint, an order striking or dismissing a complaint is not final 
until a subsequent order finally dismisses the action or suit. See Boatmen’s National Bank of 
Belleville v. Direct Lines, Inc., 167 Ill. 2d 88, 99 (1995) (collecting cases); Cole v. 
Hoogendoorn, Talbot, Davids, Godfrey & Milligan, 325 Ill. App. 3d 1152, 1153-54, 1156 
(2001); Miller, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 547 (collecting cases); Martin v. Marks, 80 Ill. App. 3d 915, 
919 (1980). 
¶ 29 
 
However, defendant relies on this court’s decision in Smith v. Central Illinois Regional 
Airport, 207 Ill. 2d 578 (2003), in support of its “automatic final judgment” mechanism. In 
Smith, the dismissal order granted the plaintiff 60 days to amend the complaint. The plaintiff 
did not amend but instead filed a motion for a voluntary dismissal (735 ILCS 5/2-1009 (West 
2012)) within the 60-day period. Smith, 207 Ill. 2d at 588-89. This court held that the circuit 
court should have allowed the plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal because it was within the time 
period granted for leave to amend. In analyzing the nature and effect of the dismissal order, this 
court stated: 
“He [plaintiff] also could have elected, as he did here, to voluntarily dismiss the count 
because the upshot of the court’s February 27 order was that the granting of 
defendants’ section 2-615 motion would be considered to be with prejudice only after 
the expiration of the 60-day period.” (Emphases in original and added.) Id. at 588. 
In the case at bar, defendant focuses on the italicized sentence fragment to argue: “Smith 
specifically directs that an involuntary dismissal order becomes a final adjudication on the 
merits after the expiration of the temporary leave period.” 
¶ 30 
 
We do not read our opinion in Smith so broadly. Courts caution that “ ‘general language in 
an opinion must not be ripped from its context to make a rule far broader than the factual 
circumstances which called forth the language.’ [Citation.]” Rosewood Care Center, Inc. v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., 226 Ill. 2d 559, 572 (2007). Rather, the Smith opinion, “like all others, must 
be read in the context of the specific problem that was before the court.” Touhy v. State Board 
of Elections, 62 Ill. 2d 303, 310 (1976); see Spring Hill Cemetery of Danville, Illinois v. Ryan, 
20 Ill. 2d 608, 619 (1960) (cautioning that a judicial opinion “must be read as applicable only 
to the facts involved and is an authority only for what is actually decided”). “In construing the 
language of this court, as in construing any other language, it is necessary to examine the 
context to find the connection in which the language is used and to ascertain what was intended 
by such language.” Hoffman v. Hoffman, 330 Ill. 413, 420 (1928). 
¶ 31 
 
To the end of construing our Smith decision in context, we quote at length therefrom: 
 
“In the present case, it is true that defendants challenged the sufficiency of count III 
by way of a section 2-615 motion on December 29, 2000, and that the circuit court 
heard the motion prior to plaintiff’s filing of his motion to voluntarily dismiss. The 
court had, in fact, ruled in defendants’ favor by dismissing count III. Contrary to 
defendants’ claims, however, that ruling did not have the effect of a final disposition of 
 
 
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the case because the court made the dismissal without prejudice and gave plaintiff 60 
days in which to file an amendment. As we have explained, the order of February 27 
was not a final order. An order striking or dismissing a complaint is not final until the 
circuit court enters an order dismissing the suit. [Citations.] We must stress that no such 
order was entered in this case. Moreover, the circuit court made clear that no such order 
would be entertained until at least after the passage of 60 days. For all we know, the 
circuit court might even have allowed plaintiff more time to amend had plaintiff sought 
leave to do so. We stress, as the United States Supreme Court in [Jung v. K. & D. 
Mining Co., 356 U.S. 335, 336-37 (1958)] stressed under similar facts, that the circuit 
court’s order did not direct that the requested relief be denied but, rather, left the suit 
pending for further proceedings. 
 
“In our view, because the order of February 27 expressly left the suit pending for 
further proceedings, the order not only allowed plaintiff the opportunity to amend, but 
also allowed plaintiff to pursue other options available to him during this 60-day time 
frame besides filing the amendment. Plaintiff could have chosen to stand on his 
complaint and sought an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice, as a means of 
obtaining a final, appealable judgment. [Citations.] He also could have elected, as he 
did here, to voluntarily dismiss the count because the upshot of the court’s February 27 
order was that the granting of defendants’ section 2—615 motion would be considered 
to be with prejudice only after the expiration of the 60-day period. Under these 
circumstances, the circuit court should have allowed plaintiff to seek a voluntary 
dismissal up until the expiration of the 60-day period to amend. In its order, entered on 
May 2, the circuit court stated that plaintiff failed to act within the 60-day time period. 
Clearly this was error. We note that plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss was filed 
on April 12, 2001, on day 48 of the 60-day time period set forth in the February 27 
order. The circuit court erred in its calculation that the 60-day period had passed 
without any action on plaintiff’s part. This is not the case where the plaintiff waited 
until the sixty-first day to seek voluntary dismissal. Because plaintiff acted within the 
period of time left open for amendment, we believe his right to a voluntary dismissal 
was intact.” (Emphasis in original.) Smith, 207 Ill. 2d at 587-89. 
¶ 32 
 
When read in context, Smith did not hold that an involuntary dismissal order automatically 
becomes a final adjudication on the merits after a leave-to-amend time period expires. The 
plaintiff in Smith filed a motion for voluntary dismissal within the 60-day leave-to-amend time 
period. Smith expressly recognized that the circuit court retained jurisdiction to allow the 
plaintiff more time to amend had he sought leave and that the dismissal order was not final and 
would not be final until the circuit court entered a separate order dismissing the action or suit. 
Id. at 587-88. In Smith, this court specifically concluded that the plaintiff’s right to a voluntary 
dismissal was intact because he acted within the leave-to-amend time period. Id. at 589. 
¶ 33 
 
Although the Smith court conjectured that the dismissal order in that case would have been 
considered to be with prejudice only after the leave-to-amend period expired, that speculation 
was unnecessary to the court’s actual conclusion. This court did not know how that litigation 
would have proceeded after the leave-to-amend period expired. Id. at 588 (“For all we know, 
the circuit court might even have allowed plaintiff more time to amend had plaintiff sought 
leave to do so.”). In context, this court was merely attempting to emphasize the security of 
plaintiff’s position within the 60-day period. This court did not intend to overrule a significant 
 
 
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body of case law by this single sentence. “We resist reading a single sentence unnecessary to 
the decision as having done so much work.” Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 
568 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 511, 520 (2012). 
¶ 34 
 
Defendant complains that the above-cited case law provides “no consequences for a 
plaintiff’s failure to act within the temporary leave period. *** Accordingly, there would never 
be a need to dismiss a claim or complaint with temporary leave to amend because the plaintiff 
would never be compelled to take any action within the temporary leave period.” 
¶ 35 
 
However, this argument overlooks that the circuit court may impose whatever 
“consequences” that defendant would seek in a proper motion. The circuit court retains broad 
discretion in allowing or denying amendment to pleadings prior to the entry of final judgment, 
and a reviewing court will not reverse the trial court’s decision absent a manifest abuse of such 
discretion. Loyola Academy v. S&S Roof Maintenance, Inc., 146 Ill. 2d 263, 273-74 (1992) 
(collecting cases). Further, the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a circuit court may allow 
amendments to pleadings “on just and reasonable terms.” 735 ILCS 5/2-616(a) (West 2010). 
Such “just and reasonable terms” may include the enforcement of a time limitation within 
which the amended pleading must be filed. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Chicago Bar Ass’n, 233 Ill. 
App. 3d 1040, 1045 (1992); Shroat v. Robins, 7 Ill. App. 3d 293, 295 (1972). Conversely, the 
court may permit amendment long after the time period expires. Richardson, 109 Ill. 2d at 46. 
This rule supports the circuit court’s sound exercise of its discretion. “A contrary course would 
amount to a substitution of the judgment of the reviewing court in place of that of the trial court 
in which such discretion properly resides.” Nicholson, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 1045. See, e.g., 
Bosch Die Casting Co. v. Biallas, 269 Ill. App. 3d 377 (1995) (granting leave to file second 
amended complaint 25 days after court-imposed deadline, but denying leave to file third 
amended complaint 71 days after court-imposed deadline). We conclude that the involuntary 
dismissal order in Richter I did not automatically become a final order when plaintiffs failed to 
file an amended complaint within the leave-to-amend period. 
¶ 36 
 
In the case at bar, defendant moved to dismiss Richter I and Richter II each with prejudice. 
Defendant, therefore, knew the legal significance of such a dismissal order. Although nearly 
five years elapsed between the time plaintiffs were granted leave to file an amended complaint 
and their voluntary dismissal, defendant did not seek a final order dismissing Richter I with 
prejudice, definitively ending the action. “[A] party claiming res judicata—as the party 
bearing the burden of showing that res judicata applies—has a duty to clarify the record so as 
to clearly demonstrate his entitlement to the doctrine’s application.” (Emphasis in original.) 
Hernandez, 2012 IL 113054, ¶ 52. We conclude that defendant has failed to carry this burden. 
 
¶ 37 
 
 
 
 
B. Claim Splitting 
¶ 38 
 
Defendant next contends that the dismissal order in Richter I became a final judgment 
when the court granted plaintiffs’ motion to voluntarily dismiss the sole remaining shareholder 
remedies claim. Therefore, according to defendant, plaintiffs engaged in improper claim 
splitting by “refiling the entirety of Richter I, including claims that Plaintiffs elected to 
abandon five years prior, as a new action in Richter II.” Alternatively, defendant argues that 
plaintiff had a “limited” right to refile only the shareholder remedies claim alleged in count I of 
Richter I. 
 
 
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¶ 39 
 
We cannot accept this contention. The circuit court granted plaintiffs’ motion for a 
voluntary dismissal of Richter I pursuant to section 2-1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 
ILCS 5/2-1009 (West 2010)). A voluntary dismissal pursuant to section 2-1009 terminates the 
entire action and renders immediately appealable all final orders entered therein that were not 
previously appealable. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 468; Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, 
Inc., 178 Ill. 2d 496, 503 (1997). However, this court’s decisions in Rein and Hudson explained 
that res judicata prohibits a litigant from using section 2-1009 to split claims into multiple 
actions or suits. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 471-72; Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 339. In Rein, this court 
cautioned that a plaintiff’s statutory right to a voluntary dismissal within the limitations period 
(735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 2010)) does not “automatically immunize a plaintiff against the bar 
of res judicata or other legitimate defenses a defendant may assert in response to the refiling of 
voluntarily dismissed counts.” Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 342-43. In Hudson, this court explained: 
“Rein thus stands for the proposition that a plaintiff who splits his claims by voluntarily 
dismissing and refiling part of an action after a final judgment has been entered on another 
part of the case subjects himself to a res judicata defense.” (Emphasis added.) Hudson, 228 Ill. 
2d at 473. 
¶ 40 
 
Rein and Hudson are clearly distinguishable from the instant case. Here, the circuit court 
never entered an order dismissing the action in Richter I, or any other order that could be 
deemed final. A nonfinal order cannot bar a subsequent action. Relph, 84 Ill. 2d at 441. 
Because Richter I was dismissed with leave to file an amended complaint, there was no final 
adjudication on the merits of any of those three claims. Further, a voluntary dismissal pursuant 
to section 2-1009(a) is, by its express terms, without prejudice. 735 ILCS 5/2-1009(a) (West 
2010). Of course, it was within the discretion of the circuit court in Richter I to entertain a 
defense motion for a final order dismissing the cause of action prior to ruling on plaintiffs’ 
motion for voluntary dismissal. See Morrison v. Wagner, 191 Ill. 2d 162, 165 (2000). 
However, defendant did not raise such a motion. Without a final adjudication on the merits, the 
claim-splitting issues addressed in Rein and Hudson are not presented here, and res judicata is 
not applicable. See Piagentini v. Ford Motor Co., 387 Ill. App. 3d 887, 893-95 (2009). Hence, 
the circuit court’s nonfinal ruling in Richter I had no effect on Richter II. See Wilson, 2012 IL 
112898, ¶ 26; Hernandez, 2012 IL 113054, ¶ 54; People ex rel. Williams v. Board of 
Education of Pawnee Township High School, 350 Ill. 597, 601 (1932). 
 
¶ 41 
 
 
 
 
C. Statute of Limitations 
¶ 42 
 
Defendant alternatively contends that the circuit court correctly dismissed Richter II 
pursuant to section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides for dismissal 
where the action “was not commenced within the time limited by law.” 735 ILCS 
5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2012). This provision allows a defendant to raise a statute of limitations 
defense in a motion to dismiss. See Hermitage Corp. v. Contractors Adjustment Co., 166 Ill. 
2d 72, 84 (1995). 
¶ 43 
 
The complaint in Richter II contained four counts. Plaintiffs sought shareholder remedies 
(count I), alleged misrepresentation (count II), alleged common-law fraud (count III), and 
alleged that defendant’s directors or officers breached their fiduciary duty owed to plaintiffs 
(count IV). It is undisputed that the cause of action in Richter II accrued in October 2005 when 
defendant terminated the milk marketing agreement and plaintiffs’ membership in the 
 
 
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cooperative and that plaintiffs filed the complaint in Richter II on September 6, 2013. 
Defendant contends that plaintiffs’ claims for misrepresentation, fraud, and breach of fiduciary 
duty were not commenced within the applicable five-year statute of limitations (735 ILCS 
5/13-205 (West 2012)) and, therefore, are time-barred. In response, plaintiffs contend that 
section 13-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 2012)) saves these 
claims. 
¶ 44 
 
Section 13-217 provides in pertinent part that if the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a cause 
of action, “then, whether or not the time limitation for bringing such action expires during the 
pendency of such action, the plaintiff *** may commence a new action within one year or 
within the remaining period of limitation, whichever is greater *** after the action is 
voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff.” 735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 1994).1 Section 13-217 
operates as a limitations savings statute, with the purpose of facilitating the disposition of 
litigation on the merits and avoiding its frustration upon grounds unrelated to its merits. Case 
v. Galesburg Cottage Hospital, 227 Ill. 2d 207, 215 (2007); Gendek v. Jehangir, 119 Ill. 2d 
338, 343 (1988). 
¶ 45 
 
Although the cause of action in Richter II accrued in October 2005, plaintiffs filed Richter 
I in October 2006, well within the applicable five-year limitations period. Further, after 
plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Richter I on September 7, 2012, section 13-217 conferred on 
plaintiffs the right to refile within one year even if the statute of limitations had expired. As the 
appellate court correctly reasoned, plaintiffs, therefore, had until September 7, 2013, to refile 
their action. Accordingly, when plaintiffs refiled their action on September 6, 2013, the 
limitations savings period had not yet expired. 2015 IL App (4th) 140613, ¶ 41. 
¶ 46 
 
However, defendant contends that section 13-217 is not available to plaintiffs. Defendant 
argues that Richter I was not terminated by plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal, which section 
13-217 covers, but rather was terminated by the September 2007 involuntary dismissal order 
with leave to amend. This argument is premised on defendant’s position that the Richter I 
dismissal order with leave to amend automatically defaulted to an adjudication on the merits. 
We reject this argument as we earlier rejected its premise. We deem plaintiffs’ September 2012 
voluntary dismissal to be the effective order finally terminating Richter I. See Apollo Real 
Estate Investment Fund, IV, L.P. v. Gelber, 398 Ill. App. 3d 773, 785-86 (2009). 
¶ 47 
 
Defendant also repeats its contention before the appellate court that plaintiffs may not raise 
new claims in a refiled action. Defendant argues that plaintiffs’ common-law fraud claim in 
Richter II is improper because the only claim that was pending at the time of the voluntary 
dismissal in Richter I was count I for shareholder remedies. Thus, reasons defendant, “Count I 
of Richter I is the only claim that might conceivably be saved.” 
¶ 48 
 
The appellate court correctly rejected this argument. 2015 IL App (4th) 140613, ¶ 42. A 
refiled action pursuant to section 13-217 is not a restatement of the old action, but an entirely 
new and separate action. Dubina, 178 Ill. 2d at 504. Further, a cause of action may contain 
several theories of recovery (Wilson, 2012 IL 112898, ¶ 25 (collecting cases)) arising from a 
single group of operating facts. Hayashi, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 46. Here, plaintiffs’ claims in 
                                                 
 
1This version of section 13-217 is currently in effect because it preceded the amendments of Public 
Act 89-7, § 15 (eff. Mar. 9, 1995), which this court found unconstitutional in its entirety in Best v. 
Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997). See Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 469 n.1. 
 
 
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Richter II for misrepresentation, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty all grew out of the same 
transaction alleged in Richter I. 
 
¶ 49 
 
 
 
 
D. Laches 
¶ 50 
 
Defendant lastly contends that the doctrine of laches bars Richter II. Section 2-619(a)(9) of 
the Code of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal where the claim “is barred by other 
affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) 
(West 2012). One such affirmative matter is the defense of laches. See Mo v. Hergan, 2012 IL 
App (1st) 113179, ¶ 34; Summers v. Village of Durand, 267 Ill. App. 3d 767, 771 (1994). 
¶ 51 
 
“ ‘Laches is an equitable principle which bars recovery by a litigant whose unreasonable 
delay in bringing an action for relief prejudices the rights of the other party.’ ” First National 
Bank of Springfield v. Malpractice Research, Inc., 179 Ill. 2d 353, 364 (1997) (quoting People 
ex rel. Daley v. Strayhorn, 121 Ill. 2d 470, 482 (1988)). However, unlike a statute of 
limitations, “laches is not a mere matter of time but principally a question of the inequity of 
permitting the claim to be enforced,—an inequity founded upon some change in the condition 
or relation of the property and the parties.” Holland v. Richards, 4 Ill. 2d 570, 578 (1955). In 
other words, “it must appear that a plaintiff’s unreasonable delay in asserting his rights has 
prejudiced and misled the defendant, or caused him to pursue a course different from what he 
would have otherwise taken. [Citations.] If the defendant is not injured by the delay, then 
plaintiff is not guilty of laches.” People ex rel. Casey v. Health & Hospitals Governing 
Comm’n, 69 Ill. 2d 108, 115 (1977). The applicability of laches to a given case lies within the 
discretion of the circuit court. Finley v. Finley, 81 Ill. 2d 317, 330 (1980); Evans v. 
Woodsworth, 213 Ill. 404, 409 (1904). 
¶ 52 
 
Here, the circuit court granted defendant’s section 2-619 motion to dismiss Richter II 
expressly on the grounds of res judicata and the statute of limitations. The court did not rule on 
the issue of laches, and, consequently, the appellate court declined to address this issue. 2015 
IL App (4th) 140613, ¶ 43. We agree and do likewise. On remand, defendant is free to assert a 
laches defense. The circuit court is in the best position to make the relevant factual findings 
based on the totality of the circumstances of this particular case. See, e.g., Hurlbert v. Charles, 
238 Ill. 2d 248, 261 (2010); Morel v. Coronet Insurance Co., 117 Ill. 2d 18, 27-28 (1987). 
 
¶ 53 
 
 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶ 54 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed, and the cause 
remanded to the circuit court of Macoupin County for further proceedings. 
 
¶ 55 
 
Affirmed and remanded.