Case Title: Haith v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 6, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
BARRY HAITH,
§
§
No.  6, 2003
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§
§
Court Below–Superior Court of 
v.
§
the State of Delaware, in and
§
for Kent County in IK01-08-
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
0305, 0307, 0309 through 
§
0312, 0314.
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Def.  ID No.  0108002394
Submitted: December 29, 2003
Decided:
March 1, 2004
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, Justices.
O R D E R
This 1st day of March, 2004, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief
filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw,
and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
At around Noon on August 2, 2001, the Delaware State Police
received a tip from a confidential informant who claimed that Barry Haith and
a companion, Herbert Watkins, had left the Dover area at around 10:00 that
morning to travel to New York City to buy cocaine.  The informant told the
police that Haith and Watkins would return to Dover at approximately 6:00 that
evening and would be traveling in a purple-blue Ford Expedition.
1DELJIS is Delaware’s computerized criminal justice information system.
2
(2)
Based on that information, and after confirming with DELJIS1 that
Haith was a co-owner of a Ford Expedition, the police set up surveillance along
State Route 1, south of Odessa.  Sometime after 5:30 p.m., the police observed
Watkins and Haith traveling in Haith’s Ford Expedition heading southbound
on Route 1.  At approximately 6:00 p.m., as Haith and Watkins exited Route 1
at Exit 95 in Dover, the police attempted to stop Haith’s vehicle, using two
unmarked police vehicles.  During the stop, Haith’s vehicle and the two police
vehicles collided.  Haith attempted to flee the scene on foot, but he was chased
down by a K-9 police dog and was apprehended.  After a pat-down search,
Haith was found with a large quantity of cocaine and a small amount of
marijuana.
(3)
As a result of this incident, Haith was arrested and indicted on
numerous drug and drug-related offenses.  He was eventually released on a
secured bond pending his trial.
(4)
Haith, through counsel, filed two pretrial motions: (a) a “Motion
for Specific Brady Material” that sought extensive information about the
confidential informant; and (b) a motion to suppress, arguing that there was a
2Suppression Hr’g  Tr.  at 18-19 (Mar.  20, 2002).
3The suppression hearing was protracted due to Haith’s failure to return to the
hearing after the first day.  When Haith failed to return to the hearing on the second day, the
Superior Court excused the jury, issued a capias for Haith and recessed the proceedings until
the following Monday, March 25, 2002.  When Haith failed to appear on March 25, 2002,
the Superior Court issued a rule to show cause why Haith’s bail should not be forfeited and
allowed his counsel to withdraw.  Haith was eventually located in North Carolina in May
2002 and was returned to Delaware where he was committed to the Department of
Correction pending his trial in September 2002.
4Suppression Hr’g Tr.  at 6-7 (Mar.  25, 2002)
3
lack of probable cause for the arrest and search.  At a suppression hearing that
began on March 20, 2002, the Superior Court denied Haith’s Motion for
Specific Brady Material, ruling that the prosecution was not required “to
undertake . . . [an] . . . extensive search for an accumulation of information
concerning the confidential informant.”2  Later, on day three of the hearing,3 the
Superior Court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the tip that led
to Haith’s arrest was from a past-proven reliable informant, and that the
information was corroborated.4 
(5)
Haith represented himself for much of his jury trial.  At several
points during the trial, Haith sought leave of court to call his wife as a witness
to ask her specifically if she was the confidential informant in the case.  In
support of his request, Haith argued that his wife had disclosed to him that she
was, in fact, the confidential informant.  
5Trial Tr.  at 42 (Sept.  19, 2002).
6Trial Tr.  at 146-147 (Sept.  23, 2002).
7Haith requested the assistance of counsel on September 24, 2002, the last day of his
three-day trial.  See Trial Tr.  at 5 (Sept.  24, 2002).
4
(6)
The Superior Court refused Haith’s requests to call his wife as a
witness to ask her whether she was the confidential informant.  Initially, on the
prosecution’s motion in limine, the Superior Court limited any questions that
sought to disclose the identity of the confidential informant.5  Later, after an in
camera hearing with Haith’s wife, the Superior Court ruled that Haith could
call his wife as a defense witness, but that neither side was “permitted to ask
her directly whether she was or is the confidential informant or whether she  .
. . is the one who called the police that day.”6  The Superior Court reiterated
that ruling when Haith, with the assistance of counsel,7 sought to reopen the
pretrial motion to suppress on the basis that (a) his wife had told him that she
was the confidential informant, and (b) she was not reliable.  Ultimately, the
defense elected not to call Haith’s wife as a witness, and Haith did not testify.
(7)
On September 24, 2002, the jury convicted Haith of seven of the
original offenses.  He was sentenced to a total of twenty-seven years at Level
5
V, suspended after sixteen years, for eleven years of probation.  This is Haith’s
direct appeal. 
(8)
Haith’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  In his motion to withdraw, Haith’s
counsel represents that he conducted a conscientious review of the record and
concluded that there are no meritorious issues on which to base an appeal.
Moreover, Haith’s attorney informed him of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and
provided Haith with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying
brief.  On appeal, Haith identifies three issues for this Court’ consideration.
The State has responded to Haith’s points, defense counsel’s position, and has
moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.
(9)
The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration
of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is
twofold.  First, this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a
conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims.
Second, this Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine
8Penson v.  Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v.  Court of Appeals of Wisconsin,
486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v.  California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
9Seward v.  State, 723 A.2d 365, 372 (Del. 1999).
10Id.
6
whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues
that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.8
(10)
In his first claim, Haith argues that the Superior Court committed
error when it denied his request to inquire into the confidential informant’s
identity.  Second, Haith claims that there was no evidence that the confidential
informant was a reliable source of information.  Third, Haith contends generally
that the search and seizure of his person and motor vehicle violated his
Constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. 
(11)
This Court reviews evidentiary rulings for an abuse of  discretion.9
If we find an abuse of discretion, we must then determine whether the error
rises to the level of significant prejudice that denied the defendant a fair trial.10
(12)
Under Delaware Uniform Rule of Evidence Rule (D.R.E.) 509(a),
the prosecution has a privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of a confidential
11Del.  Unif.  R.  Evid.  509(c)(1).
7
informant.  No privilege exists, however, “if the identity of the informer has
been disclosed . . . by the informer’s own action.”11
(13)
In this case, the prosecution asserted its privilege under D.R.E.
509(a) to refuse to disclose the identity of the confidential informant.  After the
in camera hearing with Haith’s wife, the Superior Court upheld the
prosecution’s privilege, ruling that Haith was not permitted to ask his wife
directly whether she was the confidential informant or whether she called the
police on August 2, 2001.
(14)
In our review of this case, we have assumed, for purposes of
argument, that Haith’s wife, in fact, voluntarily disclosed to him that she was
the confidential informant, and that such a disclosure extinguished the
prosecution’s privilege not to disclose the identity of the informant.  Moreover,
assuming arguendo that the prosecution’s privilege was extinguished, it follows
that the Superior Court’s later ruling upholding the privilege and refusing to
allow Haith to question his wife on her identity as the confidential informant,
was an abuse of discretion.  Assuming an abuse of discretion, however, we are
further called upon to determine whether that error rises to the level of
12Under the totality of the circumstances, corroborated information from a past-
proven reliable informant can provide the basis for probable cause.  King v.  State, 1993 WL
445484 (Del.  Supr.).
13Gregory v.  State, 616 A.2d 1198, 1200 (Del. 1992).
8
significant prejudice that denied Haith a fair trial.  After having carefully
reviewed the record, we conclude that it did not.  
(15)
Haith does not assert that he was prejudiced in any way,
significant or otherwise, as a result of the Superior Court’s alleged abuse of
discretion.  Moreover, having considered the overwhelming evidence of Haith’s
guilt, including his statement to the police, the testimony of his co-defendant,
his flight from the crime scene, and the drugs that were found in his possession,
we have concluded that Haith’s defense was not prejudiced as a result of the
Superior Court’s alleged error.
(16)
In his second claim, Haith challenges the Superior Court’s pretrial
finding at the March 2002 suppression hearing that the confidential informant
was reliable.12  The Superior Court’s denial of a pretrial evidence suppression
motion is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.13
14The Superior Court found as follows:
As to the motion to suppress in this case, the police received
a tip that the defendant and his codefendant would be in
possession of illegal narcotics after returning from New York.
The tip was from a past-proven, reliable informant, who had
a particularly good record of reliability, in fact, after a tip, it
was specific, the police were able to corroborate the material
parts of it.
I find that the police had probable cause to arrest the
defendant, and that the search of his person was proper as a
search incident to his arrest.
Suppression Hr’g Tr.  at 6-7 (Mar.  25, 2002).
15Delaware State Police Detective David M.  Ellingsworth testified as follows:
Q.
In your experience with the confidential informant,
had the confidential informant ever given up what you later
determined to be incorrect information?
A.
No, they did not.
Q.
Was there -- would you each time you would get some
information from this individual attempt to corroborate it
through other sources?
A.
That’s correct.  Every time.
Q.
But you never had a problem?
9
(17)
Haith’s claim is without merit.  The Superior Court’s factual
finding that the confidential informant was “past-proven reliable”14 was not an
abuse of discretion and, indeed, is amply supported by the pretrial evidence
suppression testimony of the Delaware State Police.15
A.
Never had any false information, no.
Q.
Approximately how many times would you estimate
you had contact with this informant, excluding the other
officers, just yourself, where you had some kind of transfer of
information?
A.
Numerous.  Estimate, 34. 
Suppression Hr’g Tr.  at 46-47 (Mar.  20, 2002).
10
(18)
In his third and final claim, Haith makes a general statement that
the search of his person and motor vehicle, and the subsequent seizure,
deprived him of his Constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Haith does not elaborate about
those alleged errors, however, and this Court, having found no reversible error
in Haith’s challenges to the evidentiary rulings, nor any error in the record,
concludes that there is no merit to Haith’s Constitutional claim.
(19)
The Court has carefully reviewed the record and has concluded
that Haith’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Haith’s counsel has made a
conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly determined that
Haith could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.
11
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm
is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice