Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Jerry Arthur Riggs, Sr.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC05-973

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2006-09-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-973 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
JERRY ARTHUR RIGGS, SR., 
Respondent. 
 
[October 5, 2006] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that Jerry Arthur 
Riggs, Sr., be found guilty of professional misconduct and suspended from the 
practice of law for three years.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  
We approve the referee’s findings and recommendations.   
FACTS 
 
The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Riggs, alleging that he engaged in 
misconduct regarding client funds, committed acts involving dishonesty and 
misrepresentation, and violated trust account requirements.  After holding a 
hearing, the referee issued a report in which he made the following findings and 
recommendations.  
 
Count I, Rafael and Maria Suncar.  Riggs represented Rafael and Maria 
Suncar in a Miami-Dade County residential real estate transaction.  The Suncars, 
through Argent Mortgage, financed the purchase of a foreclosed home from the 
seller’s lender, U.S. Bank.  In November 2003, upon receipt of the funds from 
Argent Mortgage, Riggs was obligated to satisfy the U.S. Bank mortgage, a second 
mortgage to American General Home Equity, and certain other obligations.  
However, after Argent Mortgage wired $171,174.58 to Riggs’s trust account for 
the purposes of closing, he failed to pay the $118,000 U.S. Bank mortgage.  Riggs 
did not and has not remitted these proceeds.  The Suncars did not receive 
satisfaction of the U.S. Bank mortgage, although they did receive satisfaction on a 
second mortgage through American General Home Equity for $9000.    
In February 2004, Riggs learned that a third-party bidder was attempting to 
purchase the Suncars’ home in accordance with U.S. Bank’s foreclosure.  Riggs 
contacted the Attorneys’ Title Insurance Fund (ATIF), of which he was a member, 
to inform it that he no longer possessed the Suncars’ funds to satisfy the U.S. Bank 
mortgage.  He claimed that a dishonest employee had victimized him.  After 
numerous hearings, ATIF satisfied the U.S. Bank mortgage and suspended Riggs’s 
 
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ability to underwrite title insurance.  Riggs has repaid ATIF approximately 
$10,000 of the $118,000 debt.    
 
Based on these findings, the referee found that Riggs violated the following 
provisions of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar: rules 4-1.3(a lawyer shall act 
with reasonable diligence and promptness when representing a client); 4-8.4(c) (a 
lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation); 5-1.1(b)(client money or other property that the lawyer has in 
his control, which is not subject to setoff for attorneys fees, shall be accounted for 
and delivered to the client; if not, it shall be deemed conversion); and 5-
1.1(e)(upon receiving client funds, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client and 
render full accounting). 
 
Count II, Other Transactions.  After Riggs failed to respond to the Bar’s 
request for his Bank of America (Bank) records for his “Client Account,” the Bar 
subpoenaed the Bank.  Riggs requested that the Bank deny the requested records.  
Thereafter, Riggs sought representation by an attorney, who tendered some of the 
trust account records to the Bar and lifted the restrictions on the Bank’s subpoena.  
As a result, the Bar completed an audit reviewing Riggs’s bank accounts, but 
primarily reconstructing his real estate trust account and IOTA trust account for the 
period of October 2002 through December 2003.   
 
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The Bar’s audit revealed various incidents of account mishandling.  Based 
solely on the Suncar matter, there was a $108,836 shortage in Riggs’s real estate 
trust account as of December 2003.  The real estate trust account only had a 
balance of $15,194, while Riggs still had a $124,030.71 liability to the Suncars.  
Also, Riggs failed to remit over $1300 in insurance concerning another matter, 
identified as the “Batista/Rutledge” closing, which he handled in December 2003.  
Furthermore, Riggs deposited several “fees” or “attorney fees” checks into the trust 
accounts during the audit period.  Depositing earned fees into a trust account is a 
violation of the Rules Regulating Trust Accounts.  Additionally, Riggs deposited 
checks concerning personal matters into his real estate trust account.  Riggs paid 
personal expenses totaling $18,959 from his trust accounts, including payments for 
employee salaries, furniture, office equipment, automotive repairs, cabinets, and a 
gift to a relative.  The audit also revealed Riggs transferred and commingled funds 
between multiple accounts for no apparent reason.  For example, Riggs transferred 
a $4000 fee related to the “Murphy case” from the IOTA account to the real estate 
trust account without explanation.  Riggs also deposited escrow funds from various 
other clients into his operating account and savings account and made numerous 
online transfers between accounts.   
Because the account transfers were not fully identified by name or purpose, 
the Bar’s auditor was sometimes unable to identify the case related to the transfers.  
 
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As a result, the Bar requested by letter in August 2004 that Riggs identify the client 
names and matters relating to the transfers.  Riggs did not provide a complete 
written response.  Thus, Riggs’s noncompliance with the Bar’s request renders him 
in violation of rule 4-8.4(g)(a lawyer shall not fail to respond in writing to any 
official inquiry by bar counsel or disciplinary agency).  
In addition, during December 2003 to March 2004, Riggs’s trust account 
balances were negative, sometimes by over $9700.  As a result, trust account 
checks were returned for insufficient funds.  Riggs had overdraft protection on his 
real estate trust account, which was linked to his savings account.  The Florida Bar 
Rules Regulating Trust Accounts prohibit overdraft protection.  Rule 5-1.2(c)(4) 
states that a lawyer shall authorize and request any bank where the lawyer is a 
signatory on a trust account to notify the Bar’s staff counsel of any trust check 
returned due to insufficient or uncollected funds.  Riggs did not direct the Bank to 
follow this requirement.  Also, Riggs did not notify the Bar of any trust check 
returned for insufficient or uncollected funds, as is required pursuant to the rules.  
Although Riggs was not in compliance with the rules applicable to lawyer trust 
accounts, he certified on his 2001-2002 and 2003-2004 Florida Bar Annual 
Membership Fees Statements that he read and was in compliance with such rules.  
Based on these facts, the referee found Riggs violated rules 4-1.15 (a lawyer 
shall comply with the Florida Bar Rules Regulating Trust Accounts), 4-8.4(c)(a 
 
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lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation), 5-1.1(a)(1)(no commingling of funds), 5-1.1(g)(2)(all nominal 
and client short-term funds shall be placed in an IOTA and each Florida lawyer 
must annually certify, in writing, that he is incompliance with or exempt from the 
rule provisions), and 5-1.2(b)(1) and (c)(noncompliance with minimum trust 
accounting records).   
Riggs testified that the trust account shortages were due to a $13,902.87 
overpayment to Dr. Rex Allen for a real estate closing and the misconduct of his 
former employee, Tammy Campbell.  Riggs claimed Campbell stole the account 
funds.  The referee did not find that Campbell was responsible for the missing 
funds.  The facts found by the referee demonstrate that Riggs handled the 
refinancing of Campbell’s home in December 2003, approximately one month 
after the Suncars’ closing.  Riggs asserted that Campbell was able to steal the funds 
due to the refinancing.  To support this argument, he testified that he filed an 
incident report with the police alleging Campbell engaged in theft and forgery.  
However, Riggs did not file the report with police until August 2005, which was 
two months after the Bar filed the disciplinary complaint and over eighteen months 
after the Suncars’ funds disappeared in 2003.  After considering the evidence, the 
referee concluded that Riggs failed to adequately supervise Campbell and failed to 
properly maintain his trust account.   
 
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Sanction.  With regard to recommending a disciplinary sanction, the referee 
found three mitigating and three aggravating factors.  In aggravation, the referee 
found:  (1) prior discipline; (2) dishonest or selfish motive; and (3) substantial 
experience in the practice of law.  In mitigation, the referee found:  (1) character or 
reputation; (2) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; and (3) remorse. 
As to discipline, the referee recommended that Riggs (1) receive a three-year 
suspension; (2) undergo probation for three years from the date of reinstatement, 
during which he must hire a certified public accountant to conduct monthly 
reviews of his trust accounts, submit quarterly reports to the Bar certifying that he 
is in compliance with trust accounting requirements, submit to random audits of his 
accounts by the Bar, and bear the costs associated with these terms of probation; 
(3) pay for and attend The Florida Bar’s Trust Accounting Workshop as a 
condition precedent to reinstatement; and (4) pay the Bar’s costs of $13,729.65. 
Riggs petitioned for review of the referee’s report.    
ANALYSIS 
First, Riggs challenges the referee’s findings of fact and conclusion that he 
violated rule 4-8.4(c)(a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation).  Riggs claims the Suncar mortgage was not 
satisfied because of insufficient funds in the trust account.  He continues to argue 
the shortage was due to theft by his former paralegal, Campbell, and an 
 
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overpayment to Dr. Allen.  Although Riggs admits that he had an obligation to 
properly supervise Campbell, he asserts that he should not be found guilty of 
violating rule 4-8.4(c) because his failure to supervise Campbell was unintentional 
conduct. 
Generally, a referee’s finding of fact regarding guilt carries a presumption of 
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without record 
support.  Fla. Bar v. Vining, 761 So. 2d 1044, 1047 (Fla. 2000).  Riggs concedes 
that he is guilty of some rule violations involving commingled funds, trust account 
procedures, and record maintenance.  However, Riggs disputes the referee’s 
finding of a violation of rule 4-8.4(c).  He claims that a rule 4-8.4(c) violation 
requires intent, and he asserts that he did not have intent.  We agree that intent is an 
element of a violation of rule 4-8.4(c).  We disagree, however, with Riggs’s narrow 
interpretation of intent under the rule.  Further, and contrary to Riggs’s continuing 
arguments, the referee did not find that Campbell stole the funds. 
 
In Florida Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1999), the Court stated 
that “in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be shown that the 
conduct was deliberate or knowing.”  Id. at 1252; see also Fla. Bar v. Brown, 905 
So. 2d 76, 81 (Fla. 2005); Fla. Bar v. Barley, 831 So. 2d 163, 169 (Fla. 2002).  In 
Fredericks, the motive behind the attorney’s action was not the determinative 
factor.  Rather, the issue was whether the attorney deliberately or knowingly 
 
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engaged in the activity in question.  Here, Riggs’s failure to supervise his 
employee constitutes intent because he knowingly assigned his trust account 
responsibilities to Campbell and then failed to manage her activities.  Knowingly 
or negligently engaging in sloppy bookkeeping amounts to intent under rule 4-
8.4(c).  See Fla. Bar v. Smith, 866 So. 2d 41, 46 (Fla. 2004) (holding that the 
respondent had the requisite intent and therefore violated rule 4-8.4(c) because she 
had deliberately or knowingly engaged in negligent bookkeeping).  Thus, the 
referee’s finding that Riggs violated rule 4-8.4(c) is supported by evidence in the 
record.   
 
Second, Riggs argues that the referee’s recommended sanction of a three-
year suspension is not supported by existing case law.  He claims that a ninety-day 
suspension is appropriate.  He bases this argument on his version of the facts, 
which is that Campbell stole the funds.  As stated above, the referee did not find 
that Campbell committed theft of the funds.  Further, the record does not clearly 
demonstrate that she absconded with the account money.   
In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, this Court’s scope of 
review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because, 
ultimately, it is the Court’s responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. 
Const.  However, generally speaking, this Court will not second-guess the referee’s 
 
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recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law 
and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999). 
It is well settled that the misuse of funds held in trust is one of the most 
serious offenses a lawyer can commit and that disbarment is presumed to be the 
appropriate sanction.  Fla. Bar v. Travis, 765 So. 2d 689, 691 (Fla. 2000); see also 
Fla. Bar v. Tillman, 682 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1996).  However, there are cases 
involving attorney misconduct relating to client funds in which the attorneys were 
disciplined by lengthy suspensions instead of disbarments.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Whigham, 525 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1988)(three-year suspension).  In light of the facts 
of this case, a lengthy suspension is the appropriate sanction.   
The record indicates that Riggs commingled funds, maintained shortages in 
the accounts, and failed to keep adequate records.  Further, the record demonstrates 
that Riggs failed to adequately supervise Campbell and failed to properly maintain 
his trust account.  The attorney in Whigham also failed to properly manage his 
trust accounts; he received a three-year suspension.  Because Whigham supports 
the instant referee’s recommended sanction of a three-year suspension, the sanction 
has a reasonable basis in existing case law.  See Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 
555 (Fla. 1999).  Accordingly, we approve the referee’s recommended discipline.  
CONCLUSION 
 
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Jerry Arthur Riggs, Sr., is hereby suspended for three years, effective nunc 
pro tunc, May 6, 2005, the effective date of the emergency suspension in Florida 
Bar v. Riggs, 901 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 2005)(table).  Also, Riggs shall pay for and 
attend The Florida Bar’s Trust Accounting Workshop as a condition precedent to 
reinstatement.  He shall be placed on probation for three years from the date of his 
reinstatement, during which he must hire a certified public accountant to conduct 
monthly reviews of his trust accounts, submit quarterly reports to the Bar certifying 
that he is in compliance with trust accounting requirements, submit to random 
audits of his accounts by the Bar, and bear the costs associated with these terms of 
probation.  Riggs shall accept no new business until he is reinstated. 
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Jerry Arthur Riggs, 
Sr., in the amount of $13,729.65, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and Kenneth L. Marvin, Director of 
Lawyer Regulation, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida; and Lorraine Christine 
Hoffmann and Lillian Archbold, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Fort Lauderdale, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Kevin P. Tynan of Richardson and Tynan, PLC, Tamarac, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
 
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