Case Title: State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts.

Citation: 2001-Ohio-1294

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-08-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts., 93 Ohio St.3d 1, 2001-
Ohio-1294] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. SHEMO ET AL. v. CITY OF MAYFIELD HEIGHTS ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 1.] 
Municipal corporations — Zoning — Motion for expedited consideration of 
relator’s mandamus claim to compel city of Mayfield Heights et al. to 
approve relators’ application for road improvement plan granted — Motion 
for expedited consideration of relators’ mandamus claim to compel 
appropriation proceedings denied — Peremptory writ of mandamus to 
compel respondents to approve relators’ road improvement plans in 
connection with the proposed development of their property granted. 
(No. 01-1325 — Submitted July 24, 2001 — Decided August 8, 2001.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
ON MOTION FOR EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION AND FOR PEREMPTORY WRIT. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Relators, Michael A. Shemo, Trustee, and Larry Goldberg, 
Trustee, are co-owners of an undeveloped parcel of land containing approximately 
twenty-two acres located in respondent city of Mayfield Heights.  The property was 
zoned U-2-A, which is a classification for cluster single-family residences.  On May 
16, 1996, following a lengthy trial in an action for declaratory and injunctive relief 
brought by relators against Mayfield Heights and other municipal defendants, the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas issued an order declaring the city’s U-2-A 
zoning classification to be unconstitutional as applied to relators’ property. 
 
On September 2, 1997, the common pleas court entered a judgment 
incorporating its previous declaration and held that relators be “permitted to use and 
develop their Property generally consistent with the prepared Site Plan proposed by 
Keera [sic] Kekst * * * introduced into evidence at trial and consistent with the terms 
of the recorded deed restrictions * * * and recorded access easement (Plaintiffs’ 
Exhibit 82).”  The judgment authorized relators to use the property for their proposed 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
retail use.  The site plan provides for access to the property through Maplewood Road 
and an access driveway from Golden Gate Boulevard. 
 
Under one of the recorded deed restrictions, “[n]o automobile traffic (except 
municipal law enforcement or emergency vehicles) shall be permitted to access to 
and from any retail building or use on the Property directly to, from or onto 
Maplewood Road unless and until  [1] [the relators have] recorded an easement 
providing for automobile access to and from the Property and Golden Gate Boulevard 
across the retail zoned properties abutting the southerly boundary of the Property * * 
*, and [2] the road improvements for the Golden Gate Boulevard Access and related 
* * * improvements * * * have been completed.”  Another of the deed restrictions 
prohibits vehicles weighing over ten thousand pounds from accessing relators’ 
property from Maplewood Road.  Thus, once the Golden Gate Boulevard easement 
and access improvements have been completed, only the deed restriction regarding 
vehicle weight would apply to Maplewood Road. 
 
The common pleas court further ordered in its September 2, 1997 judgment 
entry that relators make the improvements to Golden Gate Boulevard described in 
their site plan, that Mayfield Heights take any and all actions to facilitate these road 
improvements, that the city and the other municipal defendants be enjoined from 
interfering with relators’ proposed retail use of their property and installation of the 
road improvements, and that the city and the other defendants issue all approvals and 
permits to allow such retail development and use consistent with the court’s 
judgment. 
 
Subsequently, on appeal, the court of appeals vacated the common pleas court 
judgment and remanded the cause for further determination.  On further appeal to this 
court, we reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment 
of the common pleas court.  Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 7, 722 
N.E.2d 1018 (“Shemo I”).  In so holding, we rejected the city’s contention that the 
common pleas court erred in failing to hold that decreasing traffic congestion is a 
legitimate governmental concern in part because relators “have also proposed to limit 
January Term, 2001 
3 
direct access from their property to the residential streets to cases of emergency 
only.”  Id., 88 Ohio St.3d at 12, 722 N.E.2d at 1023.  We did not, however, modify 
the common pleas court’s judgment.  Id., 88 Ohio St.3d at 14, 722 N.E.2d at 1025. 
 
In April 2001, the committee to re-elect respondent Mayfield Heights Mayor 
Margaret A. Egensperger circulated a campaign flier noting that neither the city nor 
its residents wanted the proposed development and that the Ohio “Supreme Court 
Justices hold the sole blame for this fiasco.”  The flier also contained statements that 
respondents Mayor Egensperger and city council would not open Maplewood Road 
to through traffic except for emergency vehicles and that “only the Supreme Court 
can open Maplewood Road to full traffic.”  (Capitalization and emphasis omitted.) 
 
On April 16, 2001, respondent Mayfield Heights Planning Commission voted 
to approve a preliminary site plan in connection with relators’ proposed development, 
but, over relators’ objections, without Maplewood Road access other than for 
emergency purposes.  At the planning commission meeting, Mayor Egensperger 
stated, “I have no problem opening Maplewood for emergency traffic only, but until 
the Supreme Court comes back and says the City of Mayfield Heights will open 
Maplewood, as far as I’m concerned, we will not open it.” 
 
Relators’ development plan includes a Costco Wholesale (“Costco”) store 
that will occupy seventy-five percent of the retail space on the property.  Unless 
respondents approve relators’ road improvement plans, which include general access 
to the development from Maplewood Road, Costco will cancel its plans for a store on 
the property and relators may suffer irreparable harm. 
 
On April 23, the city council confirmed the decision of the planning 
commission.  On May 7, the planning commission gave final approval to the site plan 
as amended to limit Maplewood Road traffic to relators’ property to emergency 
traffic.  On May 14, the city council confirmed the planning commission’s final 
approval of the project as amended. 
 
On May 16, relators filed a complaint in this court against respondents, 
Mayfield Heights and its mayor, city council, and planning commission.  Relators 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
requested a writ of mandamus to compel respondents “to grant final approval of 
Relators’ Road Improvement Plans [in connection with the proposed development], 
including unrestricted access to and from Maplewood Road except for vehicles 
weighing more than [ten thousand pounds], to grant all other approvals and permits 
necessary for the retail development of the Property,” and to commence appropriation 
proceedings in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division, to 
determine the amount of the city’s alleged regulatory taking of relators’ property.  
Relators’ complaint contained a verification by relator Shemo, but Shemo did not 
specify in his verification that the allegations of his complaint were based on his 
personal knowledge.  Relators also filed a motion for a peremptory writ.  On May 17, 
relators filed a motion for expedited consideration of their motion for peremptory 
writ. Respondents subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, and relators filed a 
memorandum in opposition to the dismissal motion. 
 
On July 18, 2001, we dismissed without prejudice relators’ mandamus action 
because they failed to fully comply with the affidavit requirement of S.Ct.Prac.R. 
X(4)(B).  State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 324, 750 N.E.2d 
167 (“Shemo II”). 
 
On July 23, 2001, relators refiled their mandamus action, which now fully 
comports with S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B). 
 
This cause is now before the court upon relators’ motions for expedited 
consideration and for a peremptory writ. 
Motion to Expedite 
 
We generally await a response before determining entitlement to the 
requested extraordinary writ.  See S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5).  See, also, State ex rel. 
Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (2000), 88 Ohio 
St.3d 447, 449, 727 N.E.2d 900, 902.  But under S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(4)(C), we can act 
sooner if “the interests of justice warrant immediate consideration.”  See State ex rel. 
Taft-O’Connor ’98 v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 
487, 488, 700 N.E.2d 1232, 1233. 
January Term, 2001 
5 
 
This case warrants expedited consideration of relators’ claim for a writ of 
mandamus to compel respondents to grant final approval of its road improvement 
plans and to grant all other approvals and permits necessary for the retail 
development of the property.  Relators have challenged respondents’ attempts to 
prohibit their retail use of the property for over five years, and over a year ago, we 
reinstated the September 1997 common pleas court judgment they seek to enforce.  
Shemo I, 88 Ohio St.3d 7, 722 N.E.2d 1018.  In fact, as relators assert, the city’s 
unconstitutional zoning of their property has allegedly deprived them of the viable 
economic use of the property for over nine years. 
 
In the interim, relators’ prospective primary tenant, Costco, may withdraw 
and destroy the proposed retail development approved by the court, and respondents 
have noted that they will provide access for nonemergency vehicles to the property 
through Maplewood Road only if we order them to do so. 
 
Under these unique circumstances, we grant relators’ motion for expedited 
consideration concerning their first mandamus claim to compel respondents to 
approve relators’ application for approval of the road improvement plans.  Their 
second mandamus claim, to compel appropriation proceedings, however, does not 
warrant similar expedited treatment.  In other words, relators’ arguments supporting 
expedited treatment of their first claim do not support expedited consideration of their 
second claim, which ultimately relates to potential damages from respondents’ 
alleged deprivation of the economic viable use of their property since March 1992.  
We will consider this claim in the normal process.  See S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5). 
 
Therefore, we grant relators’ motion for expedited consideration of their 
motion for a peremptory writ for their first claim and deny the motion as it relates to 
their second claim. 
Motion for Peremptory Writ 
 
Relators request a peremptory writ of mandamus.  If it appears beyond doubt 
that relators are entitled to the requested extraordinary relief, a peremptory writ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
should issue.  State ex rel. Stern v. Mascio (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 297, 298, 691 
N.E.2d 253, 254. 
 
Relators are entitled to the requested writ.  Contrary to respondents’ position, 
as reflected above, we did not modify the common pleas court’s September 1997 
judgment; instead, we reinstated the judgment.  Shemo I, 88 Ohio St.3d at 14, 722 
N.E.2d at 1025.  Under that judgment, which incorporates the site plan and deed 
restrictions, once the recordation of an easement providing for automobile access to 
the development from Golden Gate Boulevard and improvements for the Golden 
Gate Boulevard access are completed, the only limitation on access to the property 
through Maplewood Road is the prohibition against vehicles weighing over ten 
thousand pounds.  By restricting approval of relators’ site plan to forever limit 
Maplewood Road traffic to relators’ property to emergency traffic, respondents acted 
contrary to the common pleas court’s September 1997 judgment. 
 
A writ of mandamus will not be issued if there is a plain and adequate remedy 
in the ordinary course of the law.  R.C. 2731.05; State ex rel. Wilke v. Hamilton Cty. 
Bd. of Commrs. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 55, 64, 734 N.E.2d 811, 820.  “In order for an 
alternative remedy to constitute an adequate remedy at law, it must be complete, 
beneficial, and speedy.”  State ex rel. Natl. Electrical Contractors Assn., Ohio 
Conference v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 179, 183, 699 N.E.2d 
64, 67. 
 
Respondents have previously contended in Shemo II that relators have an 
adequate remedy by a motion in the common pleas court to enforce that court’s 
September 1997 judgment.  And, as respondents noted at that time, in general, “[t]he 
use of mandamus to enforce a judgment is not popular and widespread because other 
avenues of enforcement [e.g., motion for contempt] are readily available.”  Hunt v. 
Westlake City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 563, 568, 683 
N.E.2d 803, 806; see, also, State ex rel. Bitter v. Missig (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 249, 
252, 648 N.E.2d 1355, 1357 (“The court that issued the order sought to be enforced is 
in the best position to determine if that order has been disobeyed”). 
January Term, 2001 
7 
 
Nevertheless, a motion to enforce the common pleas judgment would be 
inadequate here because respondents erroneously rely on language from our 2000 
judgment reinstating the common pleas court judgment and they have specified that 
they will not abide by the trial court judgment unless we order them to do so.  Given 
the lengthy litigation that this dispute has already engendered, relegating relators to a 
motion in the trial court and yet another appellate process would not be sufficiently 
speedy.  Even if relators were to prevail on such a motion in the common pleas court, 
respondents could stay the judgment without posting bond pending its resolution on 
appeal.  See State ex rel. Ocasek v. Riley (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 488, 8 O.O.3d 466, 
377 N.E.2d 792. 
 
It appears beyond doubt that relators do not have an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of law to enforce the trial court’s September 1997 judgment.  
Therefore, relators are entitled to the requested relief on their first claim, and we grant 
a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel respondents to approve relators’ road 
improvement plans in connection with the proposed development, including 
unrestricted access to and from Maplewood Road once the conditions included in the 
deed restrictions are met, except for vehicles weighing more than ten thousand 
pounds, and to grant all other approvals and permits necessary for the retail 
development of the property ordered by the common pleas court’s September 2, 1997 
judgment.1 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents but would grant an alternative writ as to both claims. 
__________________ 
                                          
 
1. 
This constitutes a judgment entry and a decision on the merits relating to the first claim for 
purposes of S.Ct.Prac.R. XI.  We find that there is no just reason for delay.  See Civ.R. 54(B) (“When 
more than one claim for relief is presented in an action * * *, the court may enter final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims * * * only upon an express determination that there is no 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
Kahn, Kleinman, Yanowitz & Arnson Co., L.P.A., Sheldon Berns and 
Benjamin J. Ockner, for relators. 
__________________ 
                                                                                                                   
just reason for delay”); S.Ct.Prac.R. X(2) (“All original actions shall proceed under the Ohio Rules of 
Civil Procedure, unless clearly inapplicable”).