Case Title: People ex rel. Ryan v. World Church of the Creator

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89780

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 89780-Agenda 22-March 2001.
THE PEOPLE ex rel. JAMES E. RYAN, Attorney General of 
Illinois, Appellant, v. THE WORLD CHURCH OF THE
CREATOR et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed November 21, 2001.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	The issue in this case is whether the Solicitation for Charity
Act (Solicitation Act) (225 ILCS 460/0.01 through 23 (West
1998)) is unconstitutionally vague on its face, as violative of the
first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution
(U.S. Const., amends. I, XIV). The circuit court of Cook County
held the statute unconstitutional and dismissed the Attorney
General's complaint against defendants for failure to register under
the Solicitation Act. The Attorney General appealed directly to this
court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 603. We now reverse the circuit court's
judgment.
BACKGROUND
	The Solicitation Act requires every "charitable organization,"
with exceptions not relevant here, that solicits or intends to solicit
contributions from persons within Illinois to file with the Attorney
General a registration statement providing specified information.
225 ILCS 460/2(a) (West 1998). The Solicitation Act defines
"[c]haritable organization" in pertinent part as:
			"[A] benevolent, philanthropic, patriotic, or
eleemosynary person or one purporting to be such which
solicits and collects funds for charitable purposes ***."
225 ILCS 460/1(a) (West 1998).
	The Solicitation Act defines "[c]haritable purpose" as "[a]ny
charitable, benevolent, philanthropic, patriotic, or eleemosynary
purpose." 225 ILCS 460/1(f) (West 1998).
	Annual reports must be filed with the Attorney General
setting forth detailed information concerning receipts and
expenses. 225 ILCS 460/4 (West 1998). When the Attorney
General has reason to believe that a charitable organization is
operating in violation of the Solicitation Act, he may seek an
injunction prohibiting the organization from continuing to solicit
or collect funds. 225 ILCS 460/9(c) (West 1998). In addition, any
organization that violates the Solicitation Act shall, at the request
of the Attorney General, forfeit any monies received through
solicitation (225 ILCS 460/9(h) (West 1998)) and may be subject
to punitive damages (225 ILCS 460/9(g) (West 1998)). Persons
and organizations failing to register under the Solicitation Act or
whose registration is canceled by the Attorney General for
violation of the Solicitation Act are subject "to injunction, to
removal, to account, and to appropriate other relief before the
circuit court exercising chancery jurisdiction." 225 ILCS 460/2(i)
(West 1998). In addition, the court "shall" impose a civil penalty
of not less than $500 and not more than $1,000 against such
person or organization. 225 ILCS 460/2(i) (West 1998). The
Solicitation Act also provides civil and criminal penalties for
professional fund-raisers found to be in violation of the
Solicitation Act. 225 ILCS 460/6(g), (h) (West 1998).
	On July 14, 1999, the Attorney General filed a complaint
against defendants, The World Church of the Creator (World
Church) and Matthew Hale. The World Church is an organization
that exists, according to a copy of its literature attached to the
complaint, to promote the survival, expansion, and advancement
of the white race. Count I sought a declaratory judgment that the
World Church was a charitable organization subject to the
Solicitation Act. It was alleged that the World Church held itself
out to be a religious not-for-profit unincorporated association and
that it was managed and controlled by Hale. The complaint alleged
that defendants sought members and solicited payment of
membership dues and money from the general public through an
Internet website and through flyers offering for sale books,
materials, and merchandise. In these solicitations, defendants
suggested that purchases would benefit the not-for-profit cause of
the World Church, thus giving it the appearance of a charitable
organization as defined in the Solicitation Act and subjecting it to
the statute's registration requirements. Count I requested that the
World Church be declared to be engaged in charitable solicitation
of the public and, therefore, subject to the Solicitation Act. Count
II of the complaint requested a finding that defendants had violated
the Solicitation Act and an injunction prohibiting defendants from
further soliciting of funds and from disbursing or transferring any
assets without court approval. The prayer for relief also requested
that the court freeze the assets of defendants, order them to
account for the funds collected from their solicitation on behalf of
the World Church, and impose a $1,000 fine.
	Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant
to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS
5/2-615 (West 1998)), claiming that the Solicitation Act is
unconstitutionally vague on its face, in that it fails to adequately
define the terms "charitable organization" and "charitable
purpose."
	In a memorandum opinion filed on February 8, 2000, the
circuit court granted defendants' motion. Relying on federal cases,
the court found that the definition of "charitable organization" in
the Solicitation Act does not guide the Attorney General in
determining which organizations are subject to the provisions of
the Solicitation Act. The court stated that the terms "benevolent,
philanthropic, patriotic, or eleemosynary" used to define
"charitable organization" are themselves undefined and so generic
as to fail to provide adequate notice as to which organizations may
be subject to the Solicitation Act. The court also expressed
concern as to the Attorney General's unbridled discretion in
determining which organizations are subject to the Solicitation Act
and the potential threat to protected first amendment activity. The
court determined that the Solicitation Act does not meet the
heightened standard of precision required of legislative enactments
that regulate the first amendment right to freedom of speech. The
circuit court denied the Attorney General's motion to reconsider
and this direct appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
	All statutes are presumed to be constitutionally valid. People
v. Sanders, 182 Ill. 2d 524, 528 (1998). It is the court's duty to
construe a statute in a manner upholding its constitutionality, if
such a construction is reasonably possible. City of Chicago v.
Morales, 177 Ill. 2d 440, 448 (1997). We review de novo the
circuit court's order granting defendants' section 2-615 motion to
dismiss the Attorney General's complaint (Neade v. Portes, 193 Ill. 2d 433, 439 (2000)), as well as the court's determination of the
Act's unconstitutionality (People v. Maness, 191 Ill. 2d 478, 483
(2000)).
	It is well settled that the first amendment's guarantee of
freedom of speech encompasses solicitation of funds. Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620,
633, 63 L. Ed. 2d 73, 85, 100 S. Ct. 826, 834 (1980). Defendants
argue that, because the Solicitation Act regulates speech, it must
meet a heightened standard of precision. See National Ass'n for
the Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405, 417-18, 83 S. Ct. 328, 337-38 (1963); Hynes
v. Mayor & Council, 425 U.S. 610, 620, 48 L. Ed. 2d 243, 253, 96 S. Ct. 1755, 1760 (1976) (stricter standards of permissible
statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute that has a
" 'potentially inhibiting effect on speech,' " quoting Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 151, 4 L. Ed. 2d 205, 210, 80 S. Ct. 215,
217-18 (1959)). However, not all laws that regulate speech are
subject to this higher standard. "Content neutral regulation of
protected speech is subject to 'an intermediate level of scrutiny.' "
American Target Advertising, Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1247
(10th Cir. 2000), quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Federal Communications Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497, 517, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459 (1994). In determining whether
a regulation is content neutral, the main inquiry is whether the
state has adopted the regulation because of its disagreement with
the content of the message sought to be conveyed. Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 675, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2754 (1989). Government regulation of expressive
activity is content neutral so long as it is " 'justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech.' " (Emphasis in
original.) City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,
48, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29, 38, 106 S. Ct. 925, 929 (1986), quoting
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771, 48 L. Ed. 2d 346, 364, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1830 (1976).
	In American Target, a professional fund-raising corporation
sought to have Utah's Charitable Solicitations Act declared
unconstitutional. Among other requirements, that law required all
professional fund-raising consultants to register with the state and
obtain permits. To obtain such a permit, the consultant must
complete a written application, pay an annual fee and post a bond
or letter of credit. Plaintiff did not comply with the registration
requirements and was consequently barred from assisting Judicial
Watch, a nonprofit organization, with its mailing campaign in
Utah. American Target, 199 F.3d  at 1246. The court of appeals
found that the law was a content-neutral regulation of protected
speech and was, therefore, subject to an intermediate level of
scrutiny. The law was designed to control the secondary effects of
professional solicitations, i.e., increased fraud and
misrepresentation. It simply facilitated oversight of the mailers'
backgrounds and methods. The court noted that subjecting the law
to intermediate scrutiny required the state to show that the law "(1)
serves a substantial governmental interest and (2) is 'narrowly
drawn' to serve that interest 'without unnecessarily interfering
with First Amendment freedoms.' " American Target, 199 F.3d  at
1247, quoting Schaumburg, 444 U.S.  at 637, 63 L. Ed. 2d  at 87-88, 100 S. Ct.  at 836.
	The court of appeals further found that the mandatory
registration and disclosure requirements were narrowly tailored to
serve Utah's substantial interest in combating fraud, in that the law
allowed Utah citizens to make informed decisions about making
charitable donations, and the requirements directly promoted
Utah's legitimate interest, while not unnecessarily burdening
speech. American Target, 199 F.3d  at 1248.
	Here, the Solicitation Act's registration provisions apply to all
entities that solicit funds for purposes defined in the Solicitation
Act, except those specifically exempted. They do not in any way
control the content of speech. We, therefore, conclude that the
registration and reporting requirements are content neutral and the
law is therefore subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, rather
than the more exacting standard urged by defendants.
	Intermediate scrutiny first requires that the regulation at issue
serve a substantial governmental interest. A state or municipality
undoubtedly has the power to protect its citizens from fraud by
regulating solicitation of funds. Hynes, 425 U.S.  at 616-17, 48 L. Ed. 2d  at 251, 96 S. Ct.  at 1758-59. The Solicitation Act seeks to
prevent frauds on Illinois citizens in the solicitation and use of
charitable funds. People ex rel. Scott v. Gorman, 96 Ill. App. 3d
289, 290 (1981). To that end, violators may be subject to a
prohibition on future solicitation of funds (225 ILCS 460/9(c)
(West 1998)), forfeiture of any monies received through
solicitation (225 ILCS 460/9(h) (West 1998)), civil penalties (225
ILCS 460/2(i) (West 1998)), punitive damages (225 ILCS 460/9(g)
(West 1998)) and, in some instances, criminal penalties (225 ILCS
460/6(g) (West 1998)). The registration and reporting
requirements may serve as a deterrent to fraudulent solicitation of
funds, since those intent on defrauding the public will be less
likely to do so if required to disclose identifying information to the
Attorney General. The additional deterrence provided by the
registration and reporting provisions of the Solicitation Act
promote Illinois' interest in protecting its citizens from fraud.
Without such provisions, the State's ability to detect fraudulent
solicitations would be undermined. Thus, we conclude that the
registration and reporting requirements of the Solicitation Act
serve a substantial governmental interest.
	We now turn to the question of whether the challenged
provisions of the Solicitation Act are narrowly tailored to serve
this interest. Defendants claim that the Solicitation Act is not
narrowly drawn and that its definitions of "charitable
organization" and "charitable purpose" are unconstitutionally
vague. In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972), the United States Supreme Court
explained the dangers posed by unconstitutionally vague laws:
			"It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment
is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly
defined. Vague laws offend several important values.
First, because we assume that man is free to steer between
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must
provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc
and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but
related, where a vague statute 'abut[s] upon sensitive
areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,' [citation] it
'operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.'
[Citation.] Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to
' "steer far wider of the unlawful zone" ... than if the
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.'
[Citations.]" Grayned, 408 U.S.  at 108-09, 33 L. Ed. 2d 
at 227-28, 92 S. Ct.  at 2298-99.
	A law is unconstitutionally vague, and therefore violative of
due process, when it lacks " 'terms susceptible of objective
measurement' " (Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University
of the State of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 604, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629,
641, 87 S. Ct. 675, 684 (1967), quoting Cramp v. Board of Public
Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 286, 7 L. Ed. 2d 285, 291, 82 S. Ct. 275, 280 (1961)) and when persons of " 'common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application' " (Keyishian, 385 U.S.  at 604, 17 L. Ed. 2d  at 641, 87 S. Ct.  at 684, quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367, 12 L. Ed. 2d 377, 382, 84 S. Ct. 1316, 1320 (1964)).
	The Attorney General argues that the Solicitation Act may not
be declared facially invalid because it is capable of at least one
valid application. He notes that during oral argument in the circuit
court, counsel for defendants conceded that the Solicitation Act
could validly be applied to the United Way. However, a party must
establish that a statute is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications only where the statute does not implicate
constitutionally protected conduct. Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 369, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (1982); see City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55, 144 L. Ed. 2d 67, 79, 119 S. Ct. 1849,
1858 (1999) (noting that where vagueness permeates the text of a
law that infringes on constitutionally protected rights, the law is
subject to a facial challenge).
	The circuit court relied on three federal cases in concluding
that the Solicitation Act is unconstitutionally vague. The first case,
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v.
Golden, 744 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1984), involved a city ordinance
prohibiting uninvited door-to-door solicitation unless the city
manager granted an exemption. Such an exemption would be
granted only if the city council determined that the solicitation was
for a "charitable, religious, patriotic or philanthropic purpose or
otherwise provides a service or product so necessary for the
general welfare of the residents of the city that such activity does
not constitute a nuisance." Golden, 744 F.2d  at 741. The court of
appeals reversed the district court's judgment in favor of the city,
finding that the ordinance vested unguided discretion in the city
council to grant exemptions. The court noted that the definition of
the types of organizations eligible for an exemption was not
specific. It found the words "charitable, religious, patriotic or
philanthropic purpose" to be vague and indefinite. Such terms did
not provide sufficient guidance to the city council in exercising its
authority under the ordinance. The court also noted that no
regulations or written interpretations of the ordinance existed.
Golden, 744 F.2d  at 748.
	In Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now
v. City of Chicago, No. 84-C-10536 (N.D. Ill. February 24, 1986)
(unpublished decision), plaintiffs challenged two city ordinances
that regulated solicitation activities through an application process.
The city filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The original
ordinance required that an organization, for a period of one year
prior to application, must have been engaged in charitable and
philanthropic work. Churches were excepted from this
requirement. The grant or denial of an application was left to the
sole discretion of a committee of the city council. Association of
Community Organizations for Reform Now, slip op. at 6. After suit
was filed, the city replaced this ordinance with a new one that
required an organization to obtain a permit prior to engaging in
solicitation activities. Only those organizations that intended to
solicit for "charitable purposes" were required to apply for a
permit. The ordinance did not purport to regulate political,
religious, or other activities. Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now, slip op. at 8.
	Plaintiffs challenged the facial validity of the ordinance,
arguing that the language was unconstitutionally vague,
particularly with respect to the scope of the ordinance's
application. The district court noted that the ordinance did not
define "charitable purposes." The court rejected the city's
argument that the ordinance's requirement that an organization
applying for a permit must be a "benevolent, philanthropic,
patriotic, or eleemosynary organization" registered under the
Charitable Solicitation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 23, par. 5102),
or be exempt from such registration, served to narrow the scope of
the ordinance. The court noted that this requirement merely
compelled organizations to be in compliance with state law.
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, slip op.
at 21-22. The court found that the term "charitable purposes" was
unconstitutionally vague and required police to make decisions on
the street as to whether a particular organization was soliciting for
charitable purposes, as opposed to some other purpose. Thus, the
ordinance vested unbridled discretion in the police to decide what
organizations were violating the ordinance when they solicited
without a permit. The court noted that the term "charitable
purposes" is "generic, malleable, and difficult to apply."
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, slip op.
at 23.
	The third federal decision relied on by the circuit court in this
case is Carolina Action v. Pickard, 465 F. Supp. 576 (W.D.N.C.
1979). There, the district court struck down an ordinance that
imposed a requirement that expenses of soliciting not exceed 25%
of contributions and required a permit for organizations soliciting
for "charitable, patriotic, educational or philanthropic purposes."
These terms were not defined in the ordinance. Carolina Action,
465 F. Supp at 577. Plaintiff was denied a permit on the ground
that the cost of its fund-raising effort would exceed the 25%
ceiling set forth in the ordinance. Carolina Action, 465 F. Supp.  at
578. The district court held the ordinance unconstitutionally
vague, noting the inconsistency with which defendants applied the
permit and expense percentage requirements. Some organizations
were allowed to solicit without any investigation into the accuracy
of the statements on their permit applications. Other applications
were approved despite incomplete information. At times,
organizations whose reported costs exceeded the 25% limitation
were issued permits. Carolina Action, 465 F. Supp.  at 579-80. The
court also noted that while defendants had construed the term
"charitable" to exclude political organizations, it had included as
charitable some organizations that were in fact political. Carolina
Action, 465 F. Supp.  at 581-82.
	We note that lower federal court decisions are not binding on
Illinois courts, but may be considered persuasive authority. People
v. Stansberry, 47 Ill. 2d 541, 545 (1971). However, this court has
the final word on interpretation of Illinois statutes.
	We find that the cited cases are distinguishable from the case
before us. In Golden, the phrase "charitable, religious, patriotic or
philanthropic purpose or otherwise provides a service or product
so necessary for the general welfare of the residents of the city that
such activity does not constitute a nuisance" was not defined in the
ordinance, nor were there any regulations or directions to guide the
city council's discretion. The record indicated that the council had
applied the ordinance inconsistently. We disagree with the district
court's conclusion in Association of Community Organizations for
Reform Now that reference in the ordinance to the Solicitation Act
did not provide a definition of the term "charitable purposes." In
Carolina Action, the terms "charitable," "patriotic," "educational,"
and "philanthropic" were not defined in the ordinance. Although
defendants had interpreted those terms so as not to include
political organizations, the ordinance had been applied
inconsistently.
	In all three cases, the regulatory schemes required either a
permit to solicit or the obtaining of an exemption to a general
prohibition on solicitation. In the instant case, the Solicitation Act
merely requires that entities subject to its provisions register and
report certain specified information. In addition, the Solicitation
Act contains definitions of the terms "[c]haritable organization"
and "charitable purpose." 225 ILCS 460/1(a), (f) (West 1998).
	In fact, the terms "charity" and "charitable" have a settled
meaning in Illinois case law. For example, in Congregational
Sunday School & Publishing Society v. Board of Review, 290 Ill. 108 (1919), the appellant's claimed exemption from personal
property taxation for religious books and Sunday school supplies
was denied. See Congregational Sunday School, 290 Ill.  at 109,
113. This court, in construing the statutory term "beneficent and
charitable organizations," noted that charity is a gift to be applied
for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, by bringing
their " 'minds and hearts under the influence of education or
religion, *** by assisting them to establish themselves in life ***
or by otherwise lessening the burdens of government.' "
Congregational Sunday School, 290 Ill.  at 112-13, quoting Crerar
v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 643 (1893).
	The Solicitation Act was construed in People ex rel. Hartigan
v. National Anti-Drug Coalition, 124 Ill. App. 3d 269 (1984).
There, the State sought injunctive relief against defendant and an
accounting of donations solicited by it without first registering
under the Solicitation Act as a charitable organization. The circuit
court granted the State's motion to strike defendant's affirmative
defenses that the Solicitation Act was unconstitutionally overbroad
and vague and that it violated the first amendment to the United
States Constitution. Hartigan, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 270. The circuit
court granted the relief requested on the ground that defendant was
a charitable organization and required to register. Hartigan, 124
Ill. App. 3d at 271.
	On appeal, the appellate court found defendant's
constitutional claims waived. Hartigan, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 272. In
addressing the question of whether defendant was in fact a
charitable organization, the appellate court noted that:
		"The courts in this State are in accord in applying a broad
legal definition of 'charity' to include almost anything
that tends to promote the improvement, well[-]doing and
well[-]being of social man. [Citation.] Moreover,
charitable organizations may include organizations whose
primary purpose is not to provide money or services for
the poor, the needy or other worthy objects of charity, but
to gather and disseminate information about and to
advocate positions on matters of public concern."
(Emphases in original.) Hartigan, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 274.
The court held that, based upon the evidence before the circuit
court, defendant had a charitable purpose. Hartigan, 124 Ill. App.
3d at 274-75.
	Thus, the term "charity" has a broad legal meaning. This court
has stated:
		" 'A charity, in a legal sense, may be more fully defined
as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for
the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by
bringing their hearts under the influence of education or
religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering
or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves for
life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or
works, or otherwise lessening the burthens of
government.' " Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 643
(1893), quoting Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 556.
	The Solicitation Act's definition of "charitable organization"
is so well understood that it has been incorporated into other
Illinois statutes. For example, the statute defining the offense of
international terrorism provides that the terms "[c]haritable
organization," "professional fund raiser," and "professional
solicitor" have the meanings ascribed to them by the Solicitation
Act. 720 ILCS 5/29C-5 (West 1998). Likewise, the Good
Samaritan Food Donor Act (745 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 1998))
provides that the term "[c]haritable organization" is to be defined
as set forth in the Solicitation Act. 745 ILCS 50/2.02 (West 1998).
Some Illinois statutes provide even broader definitions of
"charitable organization" than does the Solicitation Act. The
Illinois Pull Tabs and Jar Games Act (230 ILCS 20/1 et seq. (West
1998)) defines "[c]haritable organization" as "an organization or
institution organized and operated to benefit an indefinite number
of the public." 230 ILCS 20/1.1 (West 1998). The same definition
applies to the Bingo License and Tax Act (230 ILCS 25/1 (West
1998)).
	Other states have rejected vagueness challenges to broad
definitions of "charitable" or similar terms. In State v. Watson, 433 N.W.2d 110 (Minn. App. 1988), defendant was convicted of, inter
alia, diversion of charitable gambling funds. He challenged
Minnesota's charitable gambling statute, arguing that it was
unconstitutionally vague. Watson, 433 N.W.2d  at 111. He claimed
that use of the term "lawful purposes" as defined in the statute did
not give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what
conduct was proscribed. Watson, 433 N.W.2d  at 112. The statute
provided that profits from lawful gambling could be used only for
lawful purposes or expenses related to the gambling operation. In
upholding the statute's constitutionality, the court of appeals noted
that
			"Statutes regulating charities must be inclusive so as to
cover many varied organizations. The fact that a statute is
inclusive does not make it vague. Definitions of charitable
or lawful purposes, therefore, are by nature general and
more inclusive." Watson, 433 N.W.2d  at 113.
	The court found the definition of "lawful purposes" to be
similar to the generally accepted legal definition of "charitable."
Watson, 433 N.W.2d  at 113-14.
	In Holloway v. Brown, 62 Ohio St. 2d 65, 403 N.E.2d 191
(1980), an ordinance prohibited a person from soliciting for a
charitable organization unless the organization registered with a
commission. Professional promoters and solicitors were required
to obtain a license. "Professional promoter" was defined in the
ordinance as a person who for compensation plans, promotes, or
carries on any drive or campaign for the purpose of soliciting
contributions on behalf of any charitable person or engages in the
business of soliciting contributions for charitable purposes.
Holloway, 62 Ohio St. 2d at 67-68, 403 N.E.2d  at 193. The term
"charitable" was defined as "meaning and including 'the words
patriotic, philanthropic, religious, social service, welfare,
benevolent, educational, civic or fraternal, either actual or
purported.' " Holloway, 62 Ohio St. 2d at 70, 403 N.E.2d  at 195.
One of plaintiffs' arguments was that the definition of "charitable"
was unconstitutionally vague. Holloway, 62 Ohio St. 2d at 70, 403 N.E.2d  at 195. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this argument,
finding that the term "charitable" has a meaning that persons of
ordinary intelligence can discern, and that this is especially true
when the ordinance itself defines the term more specifically.
Holloway, 62 Ohio St. 2d at 75, 403 N.E.2d  at 198.
	Although the terms at issue in this case are broad in scope, we
fail to see how they could be more precisely defined. Given the
wide variety of organizations subject to the Solicitation Act, an all-inclusive definition must be used. The terms defendants challenge
have well-settled definitions in Illinois jurisprudence. Judicial
interpretations of the same or similar terms in other states also
support our conclusion that the terms "charitable organization"
and "charitable purpose" are not unconstitutionally vague.
	We conclude that the Solicitation Act's registration and
reporting requirements are narrowly tailored to serve the state's
substantial governmental interest in protecting its citizens from
fraud and do not unnecessarily burden first amendment speech.
Therefore, the terms "charitable organization" and "charitable
purpose" are not unconstitutionally vague.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, we reverse the circuit court's judgment
and remand to that court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.