Case Title: MARTIN v. THE COMMITTEE FOR HONESTY AND JUSTICE AT STAR VALLEY RANCH

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARTIN v. THE COMMITTEE FOR HONESTY AND JUSTICE AT STAR VALLEY RANCH2004 WY 128101 P.3d 123Case Number: 03-196Decided: 11/01/2004Notice:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2004

                                                                                                
   

KENNETH 
MARTIN,

Appellant(Plaintiff) 
,

v.

THE 
COMMITTEE FOR HONESTY

AND 
JUSTICE AT STAR VALLEY

RANCH; 
and DICK BLACK, JIM A. ROSS,

DUANE 
JOHNSTON, STEVE CRITTENDEN,

and 
TOM BAKER,

Appellees(Defendants) 
.

Appeal 
from the District Court of Lincoln County

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
Cohen, Jackson, Wyoming

Representing 
Appellees:

Laurence 
W. Stinston of Bonner Stinston, P.C., Powell, Wyoming, for appellees Duane 
Johnston and Tom Baker; and James E. Phillips of James E. Phillips, P.C., 
Evanston, Wyoming, for appellee Jim A. Ross

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

[¶1]      This dispute 
arose out of a controversy in the Star Valley Ranch subdivision that resulted in 
the termination of the employment of the subdivision's general manager.  Jim Ross, Dick Black, Duane Johnston, 
and Tom Baker (collectively the Defendants) published and distributed throughout 
the subdivision several bulletins critical of Kenneth Martin's alleged role in 
that controversy and advocating for his recall from his position as a director 
on the board of the Star Valley Ranch Association (SVRA).  Martin filed suit against the Defendants 
alleging that various statements in the bulletins were defamatory.  The district court granted motions for 
summary judgment filed by the Defendants concluding that Martin was a public 
figure for the limited purpose of the controversy, and that he could not 
establish that the Defendants had acted with actual malice in publishing the 
bulletins. Martin appeals both findings.  
We will affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      In his brief, 
Martin sets out two issues:

Did 
the district court err in finding that Ken Martin was a limited purpose public 
figure?

Did 
the district court err in deciding on summary judgment that none of the 
Defendants acted with "actual malice" in publishing defamatory statements about 
Plaintiff?

Defendant 
Ross responds by setting forth three issues:

Issue 
No. 1: Did the District Court err in finding that Kenneth Martin  was a public 
figure for a limited purpose?

Issue 
No. 2: Did the District Court err in finding that Martin could not establish by 
convincing clarity that Jim A. Ross  acted with malice, even if Martin could 
show that Ross' statements were false or inaccurate?

Issue 
No. 3: Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to 
Ross?

Defendants 
Johnston and Baker set out five issues for consideration:

1.                  
Whether 
the District Court properly held that the Appellant [Martin] was a 
limited-purpose public figure.

2.                  
Whether 
the District Court properly held that the facts were insufficient to establish 
that the subject publications were published with actual 
malice.

3.                  
Whether 
the factual allegations of the complained-of publications are substantially 
true.

4.                  
Whether 
the Committee for Honesty and Justice in Star Valley Ranch is a Wyoming 
Unincorporated Nonprofit Association and, therefore, a distinct entity with 
which its members are not co-principals.

5.                  
Whether 
the undisputed facts are sufficient to support libel claims against Appellees 
Duane Johnston and Tom Baker.

FACTS

[¶3]      Star Valley Ranch 
is a residential development located in Lincoln County, Wyoming, consisting of 
about two thousand lot owners.  
Martin is a resident and lot owner in Star Valley Ranch, as are all of 
the Defendants.  The subdivision is 
managed by the SVRA, a non-profit homeowners association.  A seven-member board of directors, 
elected by the lot owners, governs the SVRA.  The day-to-day operations of the SVRA 
are run by a general manager, who is hired by and serves at the pleasure of the 
board of directors.

[¶4]      Kenneth Martin 
and Steve Crittenden were acquaintances who had played in a local band 
together.  In June of 1999, they 
were elected to the SVRA board of directors.  The general manager of the SVRA resigned 
in December of 1999.  At Martin's 
suggestion, Crittenden was appointed to an interim position -- business agent -- 
to run the day-to-day operations until the board could complete a search for a 
new general manager.  In March of 
2000, the board decided to permanently hire Crittenden as the general 
manager.

[¶5]      Martin did not 
concur with the decision because he believed that Crittenden was not qualified 
for the job.  Several allegations of 
impropriety were made against Crittenden, including an accusation of sexual 
harassment against him by an SVRA employee.  Martin and another board member were 
disturbed by the allegations against Crittenden.  They hired an attorney who composed a 
letter to the board outlining their concerns about Crittenden and requested an 
opportunity to address the board.  
The board subsequently allowed Crittenden, the attorney who was retained 
by Martin and the other board member, and the employee who had made the 
allegations, to address the board in a series of open public meetings.  A week after the last meeting, a new 
board election was held and three new directors were elected.  In their first meeting, the new board 
passed a resolution recommending termination of Crittenden from the general 
manager's position.  Crittenden was 
removed from the position shortly thereafter.

[¶6]      In the aftermath 
of the controversy surrounding Crittenden's dismissal, the Defendants formed an 
informal committee to counter what they perceived as "dirty politics" on behalf 
of certain board members, particularly Martin.  They called themselves "The Committee 
for Truth and Justice at Star Valley Ranch."  The Defendants prepared six bulletins 
critical of Martin and distributed them to Ranch residents through the mail and 
by posting them in public areas.  In 
the bulletins, the Defendants criticized Martin's role in Crittenden's firing 
and questioned his motivations.1  They also advocated a recall of Martin 
and reinstatement of Crittenden as general manager.

[¶7]      On February 19, 
2002, Martin filed a complaint against the Defendants asserting that the 
bulletins contained defamatory statements and seeking actual and punitive 
damages.  The Defendants moved for 
summary judgment, which was granted.  
The district court concluded that Martin was a limited purpose public 
figure because he had voluntarily injected himself into a public 
controversy.  The court also found 
that "based on the affidavits and materials provided, that [Martin] could not 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant acted with malice 
even if [Martin could] show that the Defendant's statements were false or 
inaccurate."  Martin has appealed 
these rulings.2

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶8]                              
When we review a summary judgment, we have before us the same materials 
as did the district court, and we follow the same standards which applied to the 
proceedings below.  The propriety of 
granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness of the dual 
findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a mater of law.  Reed v. Miles Land and Livestock 
Company, 2001 WY 16, ¶ 9, 18 P.3d 1161, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 2001).  A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if proven, would have the effect of establishing or 
refuting an essential element of an asserted cause of action or defense.  We, of course, examine the record from a 
vantage point most favorable to that party who opposed the motion, affording to 
that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that fairly may drawn from 
the record.  Scherer 
Construction, LLC v. Hedquist Construction, Inc., 2001 WY 23, ¶ 15, 18 P.3d 645, ¶ 15 (Wyo. 2001); Central Wyoming Medical Laboratory, LLC v. 
Medical Testing Lab, Inc., 2002 WY 47, ¶ 15, 43 P.3d 121, ¶ 15 
(Wyo. 2002).

Burnham 
v. Coffinberry, 
2003 WY 109, ¶ 9, 76 P.3d 296, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 2003).  Questions of law are reviewed de 
novo.

DISCUSSION

[¶9]      The United States 
Supreme Court has held that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and 
press prohibit a public official from recovering damages for defamatory 
statements unless it can be shown that the statements were made with actual 
malice.  New York Times Company 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964).  Three years later, the Court extended 
that protection to public figures.  
Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 
18 L. Ed. 2d 1094, rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 889, 88 S. Ct. 11, 19 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1967).  Public figures are 
those who "have assumed roles of special prominence in the affairs of 
society."  Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974).  There are two types of public figures: 
(1) individuals who have achieved such pervasive fame or notoriety that they are 
a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts;3 and, more commonly, (2) individuals 
who have voluntarily injected themselves or been drawn into a particular public 
controversy and thereby becoming a public figure for a limited range of issues 
for which they are prominent.  
Gertz, 418 U.S.  at 345, 351-52; Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting 
Company, 555 P.2d 556, 560 (Wyo. 1976).  Pursuant to the limited public figure 
concept, only those statements relating to the controversy that give rise to an 
individual's public figure status receive the protection of the actual malice 
standard.  Arnold v. Taco 
Properties, Inc., 427 So. 2d 216, 218 n.7 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 1983).  The defamatory statement itself cannot, 
of course, create a public controversy.  
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134-35, 99 S. Ct. 2675, 61 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1979).

[¶10]   The district court held that Martin 
was a public figure for the limited purpose of the controversy that was the 
subject of the alleged defamatory statements  Crittenden's termination from his 
job as general manager of the SVRA by the board of directors.  Martin argues that the court's 
conclusion was in error for two reasons.  
First, he insists that there was no public controversy.  He contends that the firing of 
Crittenden was simply an internal dispute within the confines of a private 
subdivision.  He points out that 
there was no media coverage of the dispute over Crittenden's termination through 
local or regional newspapers.  
Martin concludes that absent such coverage in the media there can be no 
public controversy.  Even if one 
could be said to exist, Martin claims it was created by the Defendants' 
publication of the bulletins.  
Second, if a public controversy does exist, Martin declares that his 
actions did not make him a public figure.  
Specifically, he argues that he was involuntarily drawn into the 
controversy surrounding Crittenden's employment by virtue of his position on the 
board of directors, and that he was simply carrying out his duties.  Martin also notes that he did not seek 
any publicity during the controversy.  
For these reasons, Martin urges us to reverse the district court's 
finding that he was a limited purpose public figure.

[¶11]   The first step in determining if a 
plaintiff is a public figure is to discern whether or not there is a public 
controversy.

A 
public controversy is not simply a matter of interest to the public; it must be 
a real dispute, the outcome of which affects the general public or some segment 
of it in an appreciable way.  The 
Supreme Court has made clear that essentially private concerns or disagreements 
do not become public controversies simply because they attract attention.  Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-55, 96 S. Ct. 958, 965-66, 47 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1976). [Footnote omitted] 
Rather, a public controversy is a dispute that in fact has received public 
attention because its ramifications will be felt by persons who are not direct 
participants.

Waldbaum 
v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 
627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Trotter v. Jack Anderson Enterprises, 
Inc., 818 F.2d 431, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1987); Silvester v. 
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 839 F.2d 1491, 1494 (11th 
Cir. 1988); Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1115-16 (N. Dist. Cal. 
1984).  A public controversy "is a 
legal term of art; the term only encompasses a dispute that in fact has 
received public attention because its ramifications will be felt by persons who 
are not direct participants.'"  
Carr v. Forbes, Inc., 259 F.3d 273, 279 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(citing Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1554 
(4th Cir. 1994)); see also Denny v. Mertz, 302 N.W.2d 503, 507 
(Wisc. App. 1981) ("A public controversy is a dispute having foreseeable and 
substantial ramifications for nonparticipants."). 

[¶12]   There is no question that the 
dispute at issue here had ramifications for persons who were not direct 
participants in it.  There are about 
two thousand lot owners in Star Valley Ranch.  The SVRA, a non-profit homeowners 
association, manages Star Valley Ranch. The lot owners elect the board of 
directors of the SVRA, who, in turn, hire a general manager to run the 
day-to-day operations of the SVRA.  
Typically, the duties associated with the position of manager in a 
homeowner's association have a direct impact on the members of the 
association:

Community 
association managers 
manage the common property and services of condominiums, cooperatives, and 
planned communities through their homeowners' or community 
associations.

.

In 
community associations, although homeowners pay no rent and pay their own real 
estate taxes and mortgages, community association managers must collect 
association dues.

.

In 
many respects, the work of community association managers parallels that of 
property managers.  They collect 
monthly assessments, prepare financial statements and budgets, negotiate with 
contractors, and help to resolve complaints.  In other respects, however, the work of 
these managers differs from that of other residential property and real estate 
managers.  Community association 
managers interact on a daily basis with homeowners and other residents, rather 
than with renters.  Hired by the 
volunteer board of directors of the association, they administer the daily 
affairs, and oversee the maintenance of property and facilities that the 
homeowners own and use jointly through the association.  They also assist the board and owners in 
complying with association and government rules and regulations. 

Some 
associations encompass thousands of homes and employ their own onsite staff and 
managers.  In addition to 
administering the associations' financial records and budget, managers may be 
responsible for the operation of community pools, golf courses, and community 
centers, and for the maintenance of landscaping and parking areas.  Community association managers also may 
meet with the elected boards of directors to discuss and resolve legal issues or 
disputes that may affect the owners, as well as to review any proposed changes 
or improvements by homeowners to their properties, to make sure that they comply 
with community guidelines.

Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook, 
2004-05 Edition, Property, Real Estate, and on the Internet at (http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos022.htm).  The record does not describe the 
specific duties of the general manager of the SVRA.  Nevertheless, whether or not those 
duties paralleled those set out in the Bureau of Labor Statistics handbook 
exactly, it is obvious that the general manager has a significant affect upon 
the lives of all of the lot owners in the subdivision:  His duties require decisions on issues 
that not only affect the financial interests of the lot owners, but their very 
quality of life.  For that reason, 
the outcome of the dispute over Crittenden's employment as general manager 
affected the lot owners in an appreciable way. 

[¶13]   The dispute at issue here was, at 
its essence, a political one.  The 
members of the board of directors, including Martin, were elected by the lot 
owners to administer the entity created to maintain and manage their 
community.  The directors are 
analogous to a city council, and the general manager is comparable to a city 
manager.  Entities that possess the 
characteristics of a governing body or are effectively the equivalent of such 
because they exercise traditional governmental functions ought to be regarded as 
the proper subjects of public controversies.  Note, Defining a Public Controversy 
in the Constitutional Law of Defamation, 69 Va. L. Rev. 931, 964 
(1983).  The lot owners of Star 
Valley Ranch should have the same rights as the citizens of a municipality to 
criticize or comment upon the actions of their elected representatives.  The entire purpose behind the adoption 
of the actual malice standard, along with the concepts of public officials and 
figures, is that there is a "profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it 
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on 
government and public officials," and despite the occurrence of the inevitable 
erroneous statements in a free debate, such statements "must be protected if the 
freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space' that they need 
* * * to survive.'" New York Times Company, 376 U.S.  at 270-72 
(omission in original). 

[¶14]   On a final note, we address two 
cases that Martin and the Defendants have cited in support of their 
positions.  In Smith v. A Pocono 
Country Place Property Owners Association, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1053 (M.D. Pa. 
1987), the plaintiff was the general manager of the defendant Association, a 
residential property development containing approximately 2,500 property 
owners.  The day after plaintiff was 
terminated from his position, the Association circulated a publication entitled 
"Pocono Country Place Special Issue Newsletter and Bulletin" to all of the 
property owners in the Association.  
Plaintiff sued alleging that the publication contained defamatory 
statements.  One question facing the 
court was whether or not a public controversy existed.  The dispute between the parties 
concerned the membership of the board of directors of the Association.  In support of its position that the 
dispute was a public controversy, the Association cited coverage of the dispute 
by two local newspapers.  The court 
concluded:

Concededly, 
while the controversy in question may not be of national or even state-wide 
importance, it is a public dispute of concern to residents of the local 
community, especially members of the Association.  See Lorain Journal Co. v. 
Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 963, 106 S. Ct. 322, L.Ed.2d 305 (1985) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting).  In 
Milkovich, Justice Brennan with whom Justice Marshall joined in 
dissenting from the denial of certiorari, stated that a controversy 
involving a local high school wrestling coach was a public controversy of 
concern to residents of the local community, as important to them as larger 
events are to the nation.  
Id.  106 S. Ct.  at 329. 
Justice Brennan found significant the fact that it was only in this community 
that the challenged article was circulated.  Id.  Similarly, in this case, the alleged 
defamatory material was published in newsletters specifically distributed to 
members of the Association.  It is 
these Association members to whom the controversy involving the directorship is 
most prominent.  Thus, as to the 
Association and the local community, the conflict over the proper directorship 
of the Association is a public controversy in that it affects a segment of the 
general public in an appreciable way.

Smith, 
686 F. Supp.  at 1058.  Martin latches 
onto the fact that the dispute in Smith was covered in two local 
newspapers and argues that since there was no local news coverage of the dispute 
in this case, then there could be no public controversy.  The problem with Martin's argument is 
that the court in Smith completely ignored the fact that newspapers had 
covered the quarrel when making its determination that the dispute was a public 
controversy.  Instead, the court 
focused on the fact that the defamatory material was specifically prepared for 
and circulated to the segment of the population  the members of the Association 
 affected by the dispute.  That is 
precisely the situation that is present here  the Defendants circulated their 
bulletins criticizing Martin's role in Crittenden's termination as general 
manager to the segment of the population  the lot owners in the SVRA  that 
were directly affected by the dispute.  
While media coverage may be a relevant factor in determining that a 
particular dispute is a public controversy, it is not determinative.  Denny, 302 N.W.2d  at 507 n.17 
(citing Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297).  The decision in Smith supports 
our conclusion that the dispute in this case is a public 
controversy.

[¶15]   The second case is Sewell v. 
Eubanks, 352 S.E.2d 802 (Ga. App. 1987).  Sewell distributed an allegedly libelous 
mailer to property owners in a resort community opposing Eubank's candidacy for 
re-election to the board of directors of the property owners association.  The Georgia Court of Appeals concluded 
that the dispute was not a public controversy:

It 
is uncontroverted that Bent Tree is a private residential development, access to 
which is controlled by lot ownership and payment of assessments.  The record further reveals that the 
Association election did not involve the entire Bent Tree community, but only 
those Bent Tree property owners who were also members of the Association  some 
600 of the 3,500 lot owners.  We 
have found no case, and appellant has cited us to none, in which activity in 
such a limited, private organization constituted a "public controversy" in order 
to confer upon the individual the status of "public 
figure."

Sewell, 
352 S.E.2d  at 803.  Martin again 
cites this case as support for the contention that the dispute in this case was 
not a public controversy.  We do not 
find the Georgia decision persuasive.  
There is no analysis of what constitutes a public controversy largely 
because it appears that the appellant in that case did not present a sufficient 
argument to the court.  The Georgia 
court also did not have the benefit of the Smith decision, which was 
decided eleven months later.  We 
stand by our analysis and hold that the dispute at issue here was a public 
controversy.

[¶16]   Martin claims that no public 
controversy over Crittenden's termination existed at the time the board of 
directors made its decision to fire him.  
Instead, he insists that the controversy arose only after the Defendants 
had published their bulletins.  
Martin points out that the defamatory statements cannot themselves create 
the public controversy. Hutchinson, 443 U.S.  at 134-35.  The record does not support Martin's 
argument.  The question of 
Crittenden's employment was the subject of at least two public meetings of the 
board.  Martin retained an attorney, 
who prepared a report for the board detailing allegations of sexual harassment 
against Crittenden.  The attorney, 
Crittenden, and the alleged victim of the sexual harassment, all addressed the 
board during a public meeting.  The 
board debated the matter, and a resolution was passed recommending Crittenden's 
termination.  Clearly, there was a 
public debate over this issue in which various parties expressed opposing 
views.  All of these events predate 
the publication of the bulletins.  
The publication of the bulletins did not create a public controversy, 
they only commented upon an existing one.

[¶17]   The final question in the 
determination of Martin's status as a public or private figure is whether he 
voluntarily injected himself into the public controversy.  Martin argues that he was involuntarily 
drawn into the controversy.  He 
claims that his participation in the controversy was simply an unavoidable 
consequence of his position as a director.  
Martin's contention is without merit.

In 
general, public figures voluntarily put themselves into a position to influence 
the outcome of the controversy.  
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.  at 345, 94 S. Ct.  at 
3009.  However, "occasionally, 
someone is caught up in the controversy involuntarily and, against his will, 
assumes a prominent position in its outcome.  Unless he rejects any role in the 
debate, he too has invited comment' relating to the issue at hand."  Waldbaum, 627 F.2d  at 1298.  As the Former Fifth Circuit noted in 
Rasanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 580 F.2d  at 861, "it is no answer 
to the assertion that one is a public figure to say, truthfully, that one 
doesn't choose to be.  It is 
sufficient, . . . that  * * *[plaintiff]4 voluntarily engaged in a course 
that was bound to invite attention and comment.'" 

Silvester, 
839 F.2d  at 1496.  There is no 
question that Martin voluntarily engaged in conduct intended to influence the 
course of the public controversy.  
Martin made the decision to be a candidate for the board of directors, 
presumably with full knowledge of the duties attendant to the position.  There is nothing to indicate that 
Martin's decision to pursue election to the board of directors was anything but 
a voluntary one.  Once elected, 
Martin chose to involve himself in the dispute over Crittenden's 
employment:  Martin hired an 
attorney to investigate the claims against Crittenden and to present the case 
for his termination to the full board.  
By his own admission, Martin was actively involved in the debate 
concerning Crittenden and his employment as general manager.  Martin should have expected attention 
and comment by the people affected by this issue.  "When an individual undertakes a course 
of conduct that invites attention, even though such attention is neither sought 
nor desired, he may be deemed a public figure."  McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942, 949 (3rd Cir. 1985).  Martin made a voluntary choice to assume 
a position that, because of its very nature, there was a high degree of 
probability that he would be required to participate in issues of concern to the 
lot owners of the subdivision.  
Martin must accept the consequences of that decision.  The district court's ruling that Martin 
voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy is 
affirmed.

[¶18]   When a public figure is involved, 
the actual malice standard for liability is invoked:

A 
public figure who has been libeled by the publication of a false statement of 
fact on a matter of public concern will not prevail in proving defamation under 
the actual malice standard unless he proves with convincing clarity that the 
statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false 
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

Davis 
v. Big Horn Basin Newspapers, Inc., 
884 P.2d 979, 984 (Wyo. 1994) (citing Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 912 (Wyo. 1992)).  The actual 
malice standard established by the United States Supreme Court in the New 
York Times case is a subjective one that focuses on the defendant's state of 
mind:

" 
knowledge of falsity' involves a subjective awareness of the falsity of 
the statements, and reckless disregard' involves sufficient evidence to permit 
an inference that the defendant must have, in fact, subjectively 
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statements." (emphasis in 
original).

Oil, 
Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union v. Sinclair Oil 
Corporation, 
748 P.2d 283, 287 (Wyo. 1987) (quoting McMurry v. Howard Publications, 
Inc., 612 P.2d 14, 18 (Wyo. 1980) (Rooney, J., specially 
concurring)).

With 
respect to the standard of convincing clarity, it may be helpful to recognize in 
this case that that standard is a stringent one.  It is greater than a mere preponderance 
of the evidence.  It requires proof 
that is clear, precise and indubitable or unmistakable and free from serious and 
substantial doubt.  It is that kind 
of proof which would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the contention 
is highly probable.

MacGuire 
v. Harriscope Broadcasting Company, 
612 P.2d 830, 839 (Wyo. 1980).  When 
applying these standards in the summary judgment context, we follow the same 
approach we use in any other summary judgment setting.  Davis, 884 P.2d  at 
984.

[¶19]   Even if we accept Martin's 
characterization of the statements in the bulletins, he fails to present any 
argument as to the Defendants' knowledge of their falsity.  Our independent review of the record 
fails to disclose any evidence that the Defendants "entertained serious doubts 
as to the truth of the statements."  
Our conclusion in the MacGuire case is equally applicable to this 
one:

We 
have examined the evidentiary material in the record before us, and like the 
trial court, we find the record to be devoid of evidence of knowledge by these 
appellees of the falsity of the information published even giving to that 
material the interpretation urged by the appellants.  Indeed we do not find the appellants 
seriously arguing actual knowledge of falsity.  Similarly even relying upon favorable 
inference we have been unable to discern in this record evidentiary material 
which could lead to a finding with the requisite convincing clarity that the 
appellees were aware of the probable falsity of any information which was 
published.

MacGuire, 
612 P.2d  at 839-40.  The convincing 
clarity standard is high, indeed.  
Martin has failed to meet it.

CONCLUSION

[¶20]   The dispute at issue here was a 
public controversy because its resolution directly affected non-participants in 
an appreciable manner.  Martin 
voluntarily and vigorously inserted himself into the controversy making him a 
public figure.  Since Martin has 
failed to present any evidence of actual malice on the part of the Defendants, 
we affirm the district court's summary judgment orders.

FOOTNOTES

1The bulletins 
are reproduced in the appendix at the end of this 
opinion.

2  The district court denied a 
motion by Martin to amend his complaint to add a claim of civil conspiracy.  In addition to the district court's 
orders granting the Defendants' motions for summary judgment, Martin's notice of 
appeal states that he was appealing the denial of his motion to amend.  However, Martin did not address this 
claim in his appellate brief.  
Accordingly, we consider his appeal on the claim to be waived.  Ultra Resources, Inc. v. McMurry 
Energy Electric Company, 2004 WY 121, ____ P.3d ____ (Wyo. 
2004).

3There is no 
question that Martin is not an all-purpose public 
figure.

4Silvester 
incorrectly states 
[defendant].

 
EXHIBITS

Exhibit 1 

 

Exhibit 
2

 

Exhibit 3

 
Exhibit 
  4

 
Exhibit 
  5 Page 1

 
Exhibit 
  5 Page 2

 
Exhibit 
  6