Case Title: State ex rel. Spencer v. E. Liverpool Planning Comm.

Citation: 1997-Ohio-77

Docket Number: 19970555

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. SPENCER, APPELLANT, V. EAST LIVERPOOL PLANNING 
COMMISSION, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Spencer v. E. Liverpool Planning Comm. (1997), ___ Ohio 
St.3d ___.] 
Civil procedure — Summary judgment erroneously granted, when — Mandamus 
to compel city planning commission to institute an action under city 
codified ordinances to strike conveyances of land by the county port 
authority from county records erroneously denied, when. 
 
(No. 97-555 — Submitted September 23, 1997 — Decided November 19, 
1997.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Columbiana County, No. 95-CO-17. 
 
The Columbiana County Port Authority owned 27.54 acres of property in 
the city of East Liverpool.  In September 1992, the port authority transferred a 
parcel of 20.80 acres to Waste Technologies Industries (“WTI”) by general 
warranty deed and assignment of lease.  The deed and assignment were recorded 
by the Columbiana County Recorder.  The deed and assignment referred to several 
easements of access.  Appellee, East Liverpool Planning Commission, did not 
approve the transaction. 
 
In March 1995, appellant, Alonzo Spencer, filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Columbiana County for a writ of mandamus to compel the planning 
commission to institute an action under East Liverpool Codified Ordinances 
1159.01 to strike the illegal plat representing the September 1992 transfer of 
property from the port authority to WTI.  After the court of appeals granted an 
alternative writ, the planning commission filed a memorandum in opposition.  
Attached to the memorandum were several unattested exhibits and an affidavit.  
Spencer filed a memorandum in response to the planning commission’s 
 
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memorandum.  The court of appeals converted the parties’ memoranda into 
motions for summary judgment and gave them time to file additional evidence.  
Spencer subsequently filed a memorandum in opposition to the planning 
commission’s summary judgment motion and in support of his own summary 
judgment motion.  The court of appeals granted the planning commission’s motion 
for summary judgment and denied the writ. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Betras & Dann, Marc E. Dann and Jeffrey A. Rodgers, for appellant. 
 
G. Thomas Rodfong, East Liverpool Law Director, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Spencer asserts in his sole proposition of law that the court of 
appeals erred in granting the planning commission’s motion for summary 
judgment and denying the requested writ of mandamus.  Before summary 
judgment may be granted, it must be determined that (1) no genuine issue as to any 
material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can 
come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of 
the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the 
motion for summary judgment is made.  State ex rel. Leigh v. State Emp. Relations 
Bd. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 143, 144, 666 N.E.2d 1128, 1130.  The court of appeals 
granted the planning commission’s motion for summary judgment and denied the 
writ based on (1) Spencer’s failure to file evidence or an affidavit that he ever 
requested the planning commission to strike the conveyance, (2) Spencer’s failure 
to show how denial of the writ would cause him injury, and (3) laches.  For the 
 
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following reasons, the court of appeals’ stated grounds for summary judgment and 
denial of the writ of mandamus are erroneous. 
 
First, the court of appeals erred in denying the writ because Spencer “filed 
no evidence or affidavit that he ever requested Columbiana County to strike or to 
have those conveyances stricken from the records of Columbiana County.”  Sworn 
pleadings constitute evidence for purposes of Civ.R. 56, and courts are not limited 
to affidavits in determining a summary judgment motion.  Civ.R. 56(C); Jackson 
v. Alert Fire & Safety Equip., Inc. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 48, 51, 567 N.E.2d 1027, 
1031.  Spencer alleged in his verified complaint that the planning commission had 
refused his previous demand that it follow East Liverpool Codified Ordinances 
1159.01 and institute proceedings to have the illegal plat stricken from the county 
records.  The planning commission did not introduce summary judgment evidence 
to controvert these allegations and therefore did not obligate Spencer to respond 
with additional evidence to set forth specific facts.  Civ.R. 56(E); Mootispaw v. 
Eckstein (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 383, 385, 667 N.E.2d 1197, 1199.  In fact, the 
planning commission did not challenge these allegations of a prior demand and 
refusal.  Therefore, Spencer’s allegations in his pleading that the planning 
commission refused his prior demand were sufficient to withstand summary 
judgment. 
 
In addition, the ordinance at issue does not condition the planning 
commission’s duty to strike illegal plats on a prior demand and refusal.  See, e.g., 
1 Antieau, The Practice of Extraordinary Remedies (1987) 297, Section 2.05 (“The 
majority and better view is that when an applicant [for a writ of mandamus] seeks 
to hold a public servant to a duty clearly imposed upon him by law, no demand 
need be shown.”); cf. R.C. 733.59, which requires a prior written request on a 
village solicitor or city director of law by the relator prior to bringing a statutory 
 
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taxpayer action; see, also, State ex rel. Citizens for a Better Portsmouth v. Sydnor 
(1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 49, 572 N.E.2d 649 (action may be allowed as a common-
law taxpayer mandamus action if it is not a proper statutory taxpayer action). 
 
The court of appeals also erred in denying the writ because Spencer “has not 
shown where the denial of mandamus will cause any wrong or injury to [him].”  A 
person must be beneficially interested in the case in order to bring a mandamus 
action.  State ex rel. Russell v. Ehrnfelt (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 132, 133, 616 
N.E.2d 237; R.C. 2731.02.  A person’s status as a taxpayer is generally sufficient 
to establish a beneficial interest when the object is to compel performance of a 
duty for the benefit of the public.  State ex rel. Hodges v. Taft (1992), 64 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 4, 591 N.E.2d 1186, 1189; State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm. (1967), 
11 Ohio St.2d 141, 40 O.O.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631, paragraph nine of the 
syllabus.  Residents are normally taxpayers.  State ex rel. Nimon v. Springdale 
(1966), 6 Ohio St.2d 1, 6, 35 O.O.2d 1, 3, 215 N.E.2d 592, 596.  Therefore, 
Spencer’s allegation in his complaint that he is a resident of East Liverpool 
conferred sufficient standing on him to bring the mandamus action. 
 
Further, the planning commission never raised this issue.  Cf. State ex rel. 
Huntington Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Duryee (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 530, 533, 653 
N.E.2d 349, 353, quoting Civ.R. 17(A) (“ ‘No action shall be dismissed on the 
ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a 
reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commence-
ment of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest.’ ”). 
 
The court of appeals additionally erred in denying the writ based on laches.  
In nonelection cases, laches is an affirmative defense which must be raised or else 
it is waived.  Civ.R. 8(C); State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland 
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 31, 33, 661 N.E.2d 187, 189 (“An affirmative defense is 
 
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waived under Civ.R. 12[H], unless it is presented by motion before pleading 
pursuant to Civ.R. 12[B], affirmatively in a responsive pleading under Civ.R. 
8[C], or by amendment under Civ.R. 15.”); Graines v. Fleeter (1985), 30 Ohio 
App.3d 207, 212, 30 OBR 363, 368-369, 507 N.E.2d 376, 382; cf. State ex rel. 
Polo v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 656 
N.E.2d 1277, 1279 (“Extreme diligence and the promptest of action are required in 
election cases.”).  The planning commission never raised laches and consequently 
waived this affirmative defense.  In addition, the parties did not submit evidence 
concerning laches.  The court of appeals erred in finding unreasonable delay and 
prejudice to the planning commission and WTI.  See State ex rel. Meyers v. 
Columbus (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 603, 605, 646 N.E.2d 173, 174 (“Prejudice will 
not be inferred from a mere lapse of time.”); State ex rel. Chavis v. Sycamore City 
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 26, 35, 641 N.E.2d 188, 196 
(Laches defense rejected because there was no evidence that respondent’s ability 
to defend against mandamus suit was prejudiced by delay.). 
 
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals’ stated reasons for granting the 
planning commission’s motion for summary judgment and denying the writ are 
meritless. 
 
Nevertheless, the planning commission contends that the court’s judgment 
should still be upheld because the conveyance of property from the port authority 
to WTI was properly recorded.  The planning commission contends that the 
conveyance was exempt from the requirement of planning commission approval 
prior to recordation based on R.C. 711.001(B)(1) and East Liverpool Codified 
Ordinances 1151.09(32)(a).  These provisions exempt from the definition of 
“subdivision” any “division or partition of land into parcels of more than five 
acres not involving any new streets or easements of access.”  The planning 
 
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commission claims that the challenged conveyance created no new easements of 
access. 
 
The planning commission’s claim, however, is meritless.  A review of the 
general warranty deed and assignment of lease reveals that it did create new 
easements of access.  The planning commission’s argument that “easements of 
access” refer only to easements of access to public streets or roads is not supported 
by any authority or the plain language of the pertinent legislative provisions. 
 
Finally, there remains a general issue of material fact in this case which 
precludes summary judgment for either party.  Spencer requested in his complaint 
that a writ of mandamus issue to compel the planning commission to institute an 
action pursuant to Section 1159.01 of the East Liverpool Codified Ordinances “to 
have the illegal plat stricken from the records of Columbiana County.”  Section 
1159.01 provides: 
 
“No plat of any subdivision shall be entitled to record in the office of 
Recorder of Columbiana County or have any validity until it has been approved in 
the manner prescribed herein.  In the event any such unapproved plat is recorded, 
it shall be considered invalid, and the Planning Commission shall institute 
proceedings to have the plat stricken from the records of Columbiana County.” 
 
It is unclear in this case whether a plat of the conveyance was ever recorded.  
A “plat” is defined by Section 1151.09(24) as a “map upon which the subdivider’s 
plan of the subdivision is presented and which he submits for approval and intends 
to record in the final form.”  The general warranty deed and assignment of lease 
filed in the court of appeals includes maps relating to the prior lease but does not 
contain a plat.  In the planning commission’s court of appeals memorandum, it 
stated that the challenged conveyance was a deed transfer which did not include a 
 
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new plat.  If no plat was recorded, Section 1159.01, which Spencer is seeking to 
enforce via mandamus, does not apply. 
 
Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in granting summary judgment in 
favor of the planning commission.  The judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.  On remand, the 
parties should file evidence which comports with Civ.R. 56(C), i.e., “pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts 
of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact,” instead of 
relying on unsworn statements of counsel in memoranda.  See State ex rel. Boggs 
v. Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 94, 97, 647 
N.E.2d 788, 792.  While the court of appeals may consider evidence other than 
that listed in Civ.R. 56 when there is no objection, it need not do so.  See, e.g., 
Bowmer v. Dettelbach (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 680, 684, 672 N.E.2d 1081, 1084. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.