Case Title: Calcagno v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Paul CALCAGNO v. SHELTER MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY and Bill Bledsoe

97-45                                              ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered December 18, 1997


1.   Appeal & error -- supreme court review of appellate court decision. --
     When the supreme court grants review following a decision by
     the court of appeals, it reviews the case as though the appeal
     was originally filed with the supreme court.

2.   Motions -- motion to dismiss treated as one for summary judgment. --
     Where the trial court has considered matters outside the
     pleadings, the supreme court treats a motion to dismiss as one
     for summary judgment. 

3.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- when granted -- movant's burden. --
     Summary judgment should only be granted when it is clear that
     there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated
     and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
     law; the burden of sustaining a motion for summary judgment is
     the responsibility of the moving party; once the moving party
     has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment,
     the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate
     the existence of a material issue of fact; the appellate court
     views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party
     against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and
     inferences against the moving party.

4.   Judgment -- summary judgment appropriate where statute of limitations bars
     action. -- Where it is clear that the statute of limitations
     bars the action, summary judgment is appropriate.

5.   Limitation of actions -- insurance agent's negligence -- period begins to
     run on date act was committed -- appellant's claim precluded. -- In an
     action for negligence against an insurance agent, the three-
     year-limitations period begins to run, absent concealment of
     the wrong, on the date that the negligent act was committed,
     rather than on the date that it was discovered; the supreme
     court held that appellant's claim for the alleged negligent
     actions of appellee agent, which was filed more than three
     years after the date on which the alleged negligent act was
     committed, was precluded by the statute of limitations.

6.   Insurance -- implied underinsured motorist coverage -- failure to make
     available triggers. -- It is the act of failing to inform an
     insured about the availability of underinsured motorist
     coverage that triggers the trial court's implying such
     coverage by operation of law.

7.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- grant affirmed where pivotal admission
     made. -- Summary judgment is proper when an appellant fails to
     present proof of a material element of his claim; where a
     plaintiff makes a pivotal admission that goes to the heart of
     the case, the appellate court will affirm the grant of summary
     judgment.

8.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- trial court correctly ruled that appellee
     insurance company was entitled to. -- Where appellant failed to
     demonstrate that appellee insurance company did not fulfill
     its statutory duty to make underinsured motorist coverage
     available to him and in fact conceded in his deposition that
     appellee did comply with statutory requirements, the supreme
     court, noting that appellant's own words contradicted the very
     basis of his claim against appellee insurance company,
     concluded that the trial court was correct in ruling that
     appellee insurance company was entitled to summary judgment. 
     
9.   Appeal & error -- ruling affirmed if right result. -- The supreme court
     will affirm the ruling of the trial court if it reached the
     right result, even though it may have been for a different
     reason.


     Petition for Review from the Arkansas Court of Appeals;
affirmed.
     Q. Byrum Hurst, Jr., for appellant.
     Matthews, Sanders & Sayes, by: Margaret M. Newton and Roy Gene
Sanders, for appellees.
     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant Paul Calcagno appeals the decision of the Garland
County Circuit Court dismissing his complaint for negligence and
breach of contract against Appellees Shelter Mutual Insurance
Company and Bill Bledsoe.  The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's decision.  Calcagno v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 55
Ark. App. 321, 934 S.W.2d 548 (1996).  We granted Appellant's
petition for review of that decision pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R.
1-2(e).  When we grant review following a decision by the court of
appeals, we review the case as though the appeal was originally
filed with this court.  Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 328
Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997).  We affirm.
     The facts of this case are not in dispute.  Appellant was
injured in an automobile accident on January 11, 1990.  Appellant
settled with the tortfeasor for the limits of the tortfeasor's
insurance policy on January 24, 1992.  Appellant then demanded
payment from Shelter for underinsured motorist coverage pursuant to
his insurance policy, as his medical damages exceeded the amount of
money available from the tortfeasor's insurance.  Shelter refused
to pay, asserting that Appellant's policy did not include
underinsured motorist coverage.  Appellant filed his initial
complaint against Shelter on February 23, 1993, for breach of
contract and for the negligence of Bledsoe, Shelter's agent.  The
complaint was amended to include Bledsoe as a named defendant in
December 1994.  
     Appellees filed motions to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the three-year statute of limitations barred both causes of
action.  They argued that the limitations period began to run on
January 11, 1990, the date of the accident, and that Appellant's
initial complaint filed on February 23, 1993, was untimely.  The
trial court agreed with Appellees and granted the motions.  
     It is clear from a review of the abstract that the trial court
treated the motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment, by
considering the partial depositions of Appellant and Bledsoe. 
Where the trial court considered matters outside the pleadings, we
will treat the motion as one for summary judgment.  ARCP Rule
12(b)(6); Smothers v. Clouette, 326 Ark. 1017, 934 S.W.2d 923
(1996).  Summary judgment should only be granted when it is clear
that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Pugh v. Griggs, 327 Ark. 577, 940 S.W.2d 445 (1997).  The burden of
sustaining a motion for summary judgment is the responsibility of
the moving party.  Morrison v. Jennings, 328 Ark. 278, 943 S.W.2d 559 (1997).  Once the moving party has established a prima facie
entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof
with proof and demonstrate the existence of a material issue of
fact.  Pugh, 327 Ark. 577, 940 S.W.2d 445.  This court views the
evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the
motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the
moving party.  Id.  Where it is clear that the statute of
limitations bars the action, summary judgment is appropriate. 
Alexander v. Twin City Bank, 322 Ark. 478,