Case Title: McDonald v. Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co.

Citation: 235 S.E.2d 367

Docket Number: 

State: west-virginia

Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1977-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
235 S.E.2d 367 (1977) Jackie W. McDONALD v. BENEFICIAL STANDARD LIFE INS. CO. No. 13615. Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. June 7, 1977. Harry R. McCulloh, Petersburg, Charles W. Smith, Keyser, for appellant. *368 Geary & Geary, James Paul Geary and Dennis V. DiBenedetto, Petersburg, for appellee. HARSHBARGER, Justice: Beneficial Standard Life Insurance Company brings this appeal from the Circuit Court of Grant County, where a jury found against it and returned a $7,460.00 verdict favoring Jackie W. McDonald. McDonald's suit against Beneficial was inspired by the company's failure to pay him disability benefits after open heart surgery. The company's defense was that he did not tell its agent that he had heart or blood vessel disease when he applied for the insurance; that it would not have insured him if he had made an accurate disclosure of his medical history; and therefore the policy was fraudulently obtained. The medical history attached to his application was filled out by the agent during an interview with McDonald and then signed by McDonald, who testified he did not read it. McDonald's evidence was that he told the agent he had for thirteen years visited physicians and on four occasions been hospitalized for chest pains and the physicians always told him his heart was normal. The controlling West Virginia law is: This has been our rule since the last century and we certainly know of no reason to change it. And, since the matter was decided by a jury, we add this ancient rule that needs no citation: Neither this Court nor our trial courts will set aside a jury verdict if a case involving conflicting evidence has been fairly tried, unless the verdict is plainly contrary to the great weight of the evidence or is plainly without evidence to support it. Our review of the record reveals to us abundant evidence to support the verdict. But it also discloses disturbing comments to the jury by the trial judge about the evidence. For example, he discussed McDonald's professed lack of knowledge of McDonald's blood vessel or heart disease, despite the history of hospitalization and physicians' examinations prompted by complaints about chest pains. The judge stated: The paramount function of the trial judge is to conduct trials fairly and to maintain an atmosphere of impartiality. That is why both common sense and our law demand that trial judges refrain from making prejudicial remarks in the presence of the jury. Stenger v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 141 W.Va. 347, 90 S.E.2d 261 (1956). It is improper for a judge to express verbally or by conduct an opinion on questions of fact, or to indicate in any manner to the jury his personal views on the credibility of the witness or the weight of the evidence. See Ellison v. Wood & Bush Co., 153 W.Va. 506, 170 S.E.2d 321 (1969); Nash v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 106 W.Va. 672, 146 S.E. 726 (1929); Dye v. Rathbone, 102 W.Va. 386, 135 S.E. 274 (1926), and Kinney v. Town of West Union, 79 W.Va. 463, 91 S.E. 260 (1917). There are a few other instances of this type of improper judicial comment revealed by the record; but we believe they were not sufficiently pervasive in the trial to warrant reversal. Lester v. Rose, 147 W.Va. 575, 130 S.E.2d 80 (1963). We therefore affirm the judgment below. Judgment affirmed.