Case Title: State Ex Rel. Harris v. Zoning Board of Appeal and Adjustment

Citation: 221 La. 941, 60 So. 2d 880

Docket Number: 

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1952-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
60 So. 2d 880 (1952) 221 La. 941 STATE ex rel. HARRIS et al. v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEAL AND ADJUSTMENT et al. No. 40727. Supreme Court of Louisiana. July 3, 1952. Rehearing Denied October 7, 1952. *881 Chaffe, McCall, Toler & Phillips and Leon Sarpy, New Orleans, for intervenors-appellants. Robert L. Hickerson, New Orleans, for plaintiffs, relators and appellees. HAMITER, Justice. Leonhardt Brothers, a copartnership composed of Robert C. Leonhardt and Alex F. Leonhardt, is appealing from a judgment of the district court annulling and vacating a resolution of the Zoning Board of Appeal and Adjustment of the City of New Orleans, adopted November 2, 1949, which authorized the partnership to use for certain commercial purposes its property known as 3205 Belfort Avenue and situated in a district of New Orleans zoned as "A" Residential. Section 29 of Article 14 of the Constitution of 1921 grants authority to municipalities "to zone their territory; to create residential, commercial and industrial districts, and to prohibit the establishment of places of business in residential districts." In keeping with and incidental to this grant is Act No. 240 of 1926 as amended, LSA-R.S. 33:4721 through 33:4729, which announces various zoning regulations that may be imposed by the municipalities and prescribes the procedure to be followed. Pursuant to these constitutional and statutory provisions the City of New Orleans adopted on June 6, 1929 its Comprehensive Zoning Law, being Ordinance No. 11,302, C.C.S., which divided the City into districts for trade, industry, residence, and other purposes. As amended it pertinently provides, inter alia, as follows: Previous to and at the time of the adoption of the mentioned Comprehensive Zoning Law one James J. Monvoisin owned in the City of New Orleans adjoining properties known as 3201 and 3205 Belfort Avenue, the former being his residence and the latter a garage in which he stored numerous motor trucks, hand trucks, and other equipment, used in conducting his parcel delivery business. Although by the zoning regulations the properties were classified as "A" Residential, Monvoisin for a number of years continued the non-conforming commercial use of the garage (enlarged in 1930 under proper authorization), *882 operating therein his delivery business as he was entitled to do. In 1935 Monvoisin removed his business to new quarters located at 425 North Liberty Street, the garage then being insufficient in size to accommodate it. For the next six years, during which he still owned the Belfort Avenue properties, he continued to reside at No. 3201; but he kept the adjoining garage closed and personally made no use of it, except for occasionally and temporarily storing therein a few small items such as pieces of old lumber or a bench not needed at the time at the North Liberty Street business place. The only other use made of the garage during that six year period was by the election officials for a polling place and by a small neighborhood social club for storing their tables and chairs, this lasting some six or eight months. In 1941 Monvoisin sold 3201 and 3205 Belfort Avenue as a unit. Thereafter, they were separated, and in 1949 Leonhardt Brothers purchased the garage building, No. 3205. Meanwhile, between 1941 and 1949, some of the various owners of the garage used it as a warehouse for storing commodities and building materials. Before acquiring the garage the contracting firm of Leonhardt Brothers knew that it was zoned "A" Residential. One of the partners testified that on investigation he learned that it was in a district so classified. Notwithstanding this previous knowledge the partnership purchased the property and proceeded to use it for commercial purposes, specifically as a contractor's operating base. When neighboring property owners complained of this use Leonhardt Brothers filed with the Division of Regulatory Inspections for the City of New Orleans an application in which the following was said: "Please issue the necessary documents accordingly." The requested permission was denied, and applicant appealed to the Zoning Board of Appeal and Adjustment of New Orleans (created by Ordinance No. 13,649, C.C.S.). After a full public hearing, at which 28 opponents of the application appeared, the Board adopted on November 2, 1949, to quote from its minutes, the following resolution: "`Whereas, this Board believes that if the building is continued to be used under the conditions as outlined by applicant in his communication, dated *883 October 27, 1949, that the surrounding properties will not be further injured, and Upon the adoption of this resolution, and acting pursuant to the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 240 of 1926, LSA-R.S. 33:4727, 55 neighboring property owners instituted this suit in the Civil District Court of Orleans Parish praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari directed to the Zoning Board of Appeal and Adjustment to review its decision and, ultimately, for judgment annulling and setting aside that decision or resoluton. The writ issued without a restraining order. And in the suit Leonhardt Brothers filed a petition of intervention praying that there be judgment rejecting the demands of plaintiffs. After trial of the case, during which there was introduced a copy of the defendant Board's proceedings and additional evidence, the district court rendered a judgment in favor of plaintiffs vacating and setting aside the Board's decision or resolution and dismissing the intervention of Leonhardt Brothers. From the judgment intervenor requested and was granted the instant suspensive appeal. In providing for a review by the district court of a decision of the Zoning Board of Appeal and Adjustment, Section 7 of Act No. 240 of 1926, LSA-R.S. 33:4727, states in part: "Any person or persons jointly or severally aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjustment, * * * may present to the district court of the parish or city in which the property affected is located a petition, duly *884 verified, setting forth that the decision is illegal, in whole or in part, specifying the grounds of the illegality. * * Upon the presentation of such petition the court may allow a writ of certiorari directed to the board of adjustment to review the decision of the board of adjustment and shall prescribe therein the time within which a return may be made and served upon the relator's attorney, which shall be not less than ten days but which may be extended by the court. * * * The board of adjustment shall not be required to return the original papers acted upon by it, but may return certified or sworn copies thereof or such portions thereof as may be called for by the writ. The return shall concisely set forth such other facts as may be pertinent and material to show the grounds of the decision appealed from and shall be verified. If, upon the hearing, it shall appear to the court that testimony is necessary for the proper disposition of the matter, it may take additional evidence * * *. The court may reverse or affirm, wholly or in part, or may modify the decision brought up for review. * * *" Directing attention to these provisions appellant's counsel, to quote from their brief, argue: The basis for the district court's judgment is not disclosed by the record. No written reasons therefor were assigned. The judge might well have concluded that the action of the Zoning Board of Appeal and Adjustment was illegal, it having amounted to a reclassification of intervenor's property in violation of the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance. That is the conclusion which we reach. In the recent case of City of New Orleans v. Leeco, Inc., 219 La. 550, 53 So. 2d 490, 493, we recognized that such Board has authority, granted by the laws creating it, to make certain adjustments in carrying out the zoning ordinance by varying or modifying the application of any of the regulations thereof. But we said: The Comprehensive Zoning Law, as before shown, authorizes a continuance of any lawful commercial or industrial use, existing at the time of the passage of the ordinance, of property zoned residential. However, this is subject to the proviso that if a building, located in a residence district and continued to be used in whole or in part for nonconforming commercial or industrial purposes, becomes and remains vacant for a continuous period of six calendar months it can not be used thereafter except in conformity with the regulations of the district in which the building is situated. The word "vacant", as employed in the zoning law, is defined as follows: From the record before us it appears that the garage in question (3205 Belfort Avenue and zoned residential) was used continuously for nonconforming commercial purposes between 1929 and 1935 by its then owner Mr. Monvoisin, he having conducted therein his parcel delivery business. And it could possibly be concluded that on occasions after 1941 (when Monvoisin sold) and until 1949 (the time of intervenor's purchase) some commercial activity was therein carried on. However, the evidence is conclusive that between 1935 and 1941, a period of six years, no bona fide nonconforming commercial or industrial use whatever was made of the building. Monvoisin, the then owner, so testified; and his testimony is corroborated by that of other witnesses. True, infrequently during those six years the place was occupied as an election polling place and also used for storing small items such as tables, chairs and old pieces of lumber. But such use was only that which is ordinarily made of any large garage building situated on residential property. Therefore, it must be held that, within the contemplation of the Ordinance, the property involved herein became and remained vacant for a continuous period of more than six calendar months; that, as a result of such vacancy, it could not thereafter be used except in conformity with the regulations of a residential district; and that the action of the Board of Appeal and Adjustment, in authorizing intervenor to use it for commercial purposes, amounted to a reclassification of the property and was illegal. Recently, two other cases came before this court involving the right to use residential property for nonconforming purposes; and in each we concluded, just as we hold here, that there had occurred a vacancy of more than six months which rendered such use improper. See State ex rel. Harz v. City of New Orleans, 216 La. 849, 44 So. 2d 889 and Onorato v. Rossignol, 217 La. 751, 47 So. 2d 489. As a final observation we notice that the resolution presently under consideration contains nothing indicative of a finding by the Board of Appeal and Adjustment that a six months' vacancy had not occurred. The language of the resolution and the testimony of the Board's chairman, on the contrary, indicate that the Board recognized the occurrence of such a vacancy; but that it decided to grant to intervenor a permit to operate under numerous imposed conditions, hoping thereby to prevent any unnecessary hardship and entertaining the belief that the operations would continue for a very limited period of time. Thus, had there been a finding of nonconforming use of the building without a six months' vacancy, no reason would have existed for the Board's specifically restricting intervenor's commercial activities as it did. Again, according to the testimony of the Board's chairman, the resolution (adopted November 2, 1949) "extended to Leonhardt Brothers the right to use that building until the end of the amortization period, which would have been, ordinarily, in June, 1949, but by legislative act was extended to June, 1951." And the resolution itself recites that "this Board is further of the opinion that to deny this applicant the right to occupy the building for the purpose requested until the expiration of the amortization period would be most unjust and impose an unnecessary hardship upon him." For the reasons assigned the judgment appealed from is affirmed.