Case Title: Yacob v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC11-2505

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2014-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-2505 
____________ 
 
MICHAEL M. YACOB,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[March 27, 2014] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Michael M. Yacob, who was twenty-two years old at the time of the crime, 
was convicted of first-degree murder and armed robbery with a firearm in the May 
2008 death of nineteen-year-old Moussa Maida.  The trial court, in accordance 
with the jury’s recommendation, sentenced Yacob to death for the murder.  This is 
Yacob’s direct appeal from his judgment of conviction and sentence of death.  We 
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.   
We affirm the convictions for first-degree murder and armed robbery with a 
firearm, but we vacate the sentence of death because we conclude that a death 
sentence in this case is not proportionate to other cases in which the sentence of 
 
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death has been upheld.  In fact, we conclude after careful review that this case is 
indistinguishable from other cases involving the single aggravator of a murder 
during the commission of a robbery where we have vacated the death penalty.  
Accordingly, we vacate Yacob’s death sentence and remand for imposition of a 
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
In March 2010, a grand jury indicted Yacob for first-degree murder and 
armed robbery with a firearm for the May 2008 robbery of a Jacksonville 
convenience store and murder of the store’s clerk.  The jury trial was held in 
October 2011. 
A.  Guilt Phase 
 
The evidence presented at trial included both eyewitness testimony and 
audio-video recordings from security cameras of the events that occurred on 
Sunday morning, May 4, 2008.  Before 8 a.m., a car cruised past the closed Snappy 
Food store, returned, and parked across the street from the store.  Soon thereafter, 
nineteen-year-old Moussa Maida arrived at the family-owned store, unlocked the 
front door, and, once inside, lit the “open” sign in the store’s window.  Maida 
walked to the end of the glass-encased cashier’s booth, entered, and began filling 
the cash registers. 
 
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Not long after Maida entered the store, Yacob exited the car parked across 
the street.  Yacob wore dark pants and a loose-fitting camouflage jacket, the hood 
of which covered his head.  A mask covered his face, and he wore an orange, 
plastic glove on his left hand.  Yacob quickly crossed the street and entered the 
store.  He then walked down an aisle away from the cashier’s booth. 
 
Having heard the buzzer sound when Yacob entered, Maida soon exited the 
cashier’s booth.  Walking along in front of the booth toward the front door, he 
looked down each aisle for the customer.  He soon encountered Yacob, who 
pointed a loaded nine millimeter semi-automatic gun at him and said, “Money.”  
Maida put his hands in the air and led Yacob into the cashier’s booth.  Pointing the 
gun at Maida with both hands, Yacob ordered Maida to fill a plastic bag with 
money, and Maida complied, emptying the cash and change from each register into 
the bag.  Yacob then said, “safe, safe,” and Maida responded that there was no safe 
but gave Yacob cash stored beneath the counter.   
Yacob reached down and grabbed a cell phone that belonged to the store and 
then, in reference to the security camera, asked if there was a videotape or CD.  
Maida told Yacob that there was no videotape or CD and then stood up, hands in 
the air, and gave Yacob the remote control.  Still compliant and his hands up, 
Maida again knelt down.  
 
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Holding the plastic bag of money, Yacob exited the cashier’s booth, and 
Maida stood up.  Rounding the corner of the booth as he headed for the front door, 
Yacob pocketed the gun but kept an eye on Maida.  Just as he passed the midpoint 
of the booth, Yacob saw Maida move to the counter and reach underneath it.  
Maida flipped a switch that magnetically locked the store’s front door and then 
moved quickly toward the door of the cashier’s booth.   
Upon seeing Maida’s maneuver, Yacob pulled the gun out of his pocket and 
pointed it toward Maida as he ran back to the door of the cashier’s booth.  Maida, 
however, reached the booth’s door first and was locking it when Yacob arrived.  
Yacob immediately fired a shot that hit the door frame.  Yacob then dropped the 
plastic bag full of money, and holding the gun with both hands, pointed it at Maida 
and fired.  The bullet traveled through the thick glass door, striking Maida in the 
chest.   
Yacob ran to the store’s front door but was unable to escape because burglar 
bars and the locked glass door prevented him from doing so.  Yacob spent the next 
several minutes trying to figure out how to escape.  He first hit the door with his 
gun and shot at it, breaking the exterior glass.  Then, he ran to the cashier’s booth 
and shouted for Maida to open the door.  Yacob returned to the door and put the 
plastic bag of money on a nearby table.  However, the unstable bag fell, emptying 
its contents on the floor, and Yacob began gathering the money and placing it in 
 
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his pockets.  After putting the gun down, he finally succeeded in pulling some of 
the burglar bars in the door sufficiently apart so that he could squeeze between 
them and exit the store.  Before escaping, he reached back into the store and 
retrieved his gun, although he left behind the plastic bag that initially contained the 
stolen money.  He then ran to the waiting car, jumped into the passenger side, and 
fled the scene.    
 
Anthony Hardy, a regular customer who had entered the store unnoticed, 
quickly hid when he heard the voices and gunshots.  After observing Yacob’s 
escape efforts, Hardy went to the front of the store, exited through the opening 
Yacob had created, and ran into the parking lot calling for someone to phone 911.  
Then, he went back into the store and tried unsuccessfully to break into the 
cashier’s booth to help Maida, who was already dead.   
 
The medical examiner testified that the bullet entered Maida’s chest and 
traveled through his heart and right lung and into his back.  As a result, Maida 
suffered rapid blood loss that quickly resulted in unconsciousness and death in 
little more than a minute.  
 
Blood was found on the floor near the store’s front door, the interior and 
exterior handles of the door, a plastic bag, and a five-dollar bill.  The DNA from 
these blood samples matched the DNA from a cheek swab subsequently obtained 
from Yacob.  The probability of the DNA from the murder scene matching anyone 
 
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other than Yacob, who is African-American, was one in fifty-nine quadrillion 
among African-Americans.  In addition, latent prints lifted from the plastic bag that 
the masked robber handled also matched Yacob’s palm and finger prints.  
Moreover, Yacob’s height and weight were consistent with that of the masked 
robber in the store’s security video and Hardy’s eyewitness description. 
 
At the close of the State’s case, the defense’s motion for judgment of 
acquittal was denied.  Defense counsel announced that no defense witnesses would 
be called, and after Yacob waived his right to testify, the defense rested.  The next 
day, the trial court denied the defense’s renewed motion for judgment of acquittal.  
The jury found Yacob guilty as charged of first-degree murder and armed robbery 
with a firearm.  The murder conviction was premised on the alternative grounds of 
both premeditated murder and felony murder based on the commission of an armed 
robbery with a firearm.  
B.  Penalty Phase 
 
Discussions regarding a penalty phase in the event of a guilty verdict began 
shortly before the guilt phase of trial ended.  Defense counsel indicated that 
previously he had videotaped interviews with several potential witnesses who lived 
in Seattle.  Before moving to Jacksonville to live with his father and his family, 
Yacob had lived with his mother and attended high school in Seattle.  Counsel 
stated that it was his intent to present “snippets” from those unsworn interviews 
 
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during the penalty phase.  Upon the prosecutor’s request, the trial court instructed 
counsel to provide the prosecutor with copies of the videotaped interviews 
immediately. 
 
The jury returned the guilty verdicts on October 6, 2011.  At a hearing a 
week later, the defense presented a list of eight mitigation witnesses—five from 
Seattle (Yacob’s mother, grandmother, and three teachers) and three from 
Jacksonville (Yacob’s father, stepmother, and the defense investigator).  Counsel 
reiterated that the videotapes of the interviews of the five Seattle witnesses would 
be presented.  Noting that the defense had not yet provided copies of the 
videotaped interviews, the prosecutor objected on the basis that he could not cross-
examine the Seattle witnesses and they were not under oath.  The trial court ruled 
that the videotaped interviews were inadmissible hearsay. 
 
Defense counsel then informed the trial court that Yacob wished to waive 
calling any mitigation witnesses, except the defense investigator David Douglas.  
Although Yacob did not waive presentation of all mitigation, the trial court 
immediately conducted a hearing pursuant to Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246, 250 
(Fla. 1993), which “require[s] the defendant to confirm on the record that . . . 
despite counsel’s recommendation, he wishes to waive presentation of penalty 
phase evidence.”  Under oath and after the trial court’s inquiry, Yacob affirmed 
that because he did not wish to cause his family further pain, he wanted only the 
 
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defense investigator to testify.  In light of this development, the trial court ordered 
that Douglas be deposed under oath. 
Before the commencement of penalty-phase proceedings, the trial court 
reviewed a recording of the defense investigator’s deposition.  After hearing 
argument, the trial court ruled that Douglas could testify only to those matters 
within his personal knowledge and could not testify to matters that were based 
solely on what one of Yacob’s family members or teachers told him.  The trial 
court also questioned Yacob regarding his decision not to call other witnesses, 
some of whom were present in the courtroom.  The trial court outlined the 
nonstatutory mitigation proposed by the defense and stated that, if called, Yacob’s 
former teachers and family members could testify to this mitigation.  The trial 
court also offered to permit the Seattle witnesses to testify by telephone.  Yacob 
acknowledged his understanding of the available mitigation and affirmed that he 
was acting against the advice of counsel by waiving the presentation of this 
evidence.  He also waived his own right to testify during the penalty phase. 
 
With the jury present, the penalty phase commenced with members of the 
victim’s family reading victim impact statements and identifying various family 
photos.  Then, Douglas, the defense investigator, testified regarding Yacob’s 
biography.  Yacob was born in the African country of Eritrea in 1985 and moved 
to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at age two.  In 1998, he immigrated to the United States 
 
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and lived with his father in East Orange, New Jersey, for several years.  In 2001, 
he moved to Seattle, Washington, where his mother and grandmother lived and 
where he graduated from high school two years later.  After graduation, he moved 
to Jacksonville, Florida, where he resided with his father, stepmother, and siblings.   
Douglas then identified pictures of Yacob’s family and friends and of 
Yacob’s mother’s Seattle home, which contained various Christian religious icons.  
Based on his conversations with Yacob and his family members, Douglas testified 
that Yacob loves his family and they love him. 
 
The jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of ten to two. 
C.  Spencer Hearing 
At the Spencer1
As he had done during the penalty phase, Yacob waived his right to testify 
and to present mitigation witnesses during the Spencer hearing.  He did not, 
however, object to admission of the presentence investigation report (PSI) prepared 
by the Florida Department of Corrections.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.710.  The PSI 
 hearing, the defense again offered the videotaped interviews 
of the Seattle witnesses into evidence.  The prosecutor acknowledged having 
received copies of the videotaped interviews the day before the hearing and did not 
object to their admission into evidence.  The trial court accepted the recordings 
into evidence and also admitted the defense investigator’s deposition. 
                                          
 
 
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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indicated that Yacob had performed well in school despite numerous suspensions 
for behavioral problems.  He had worked as a clerk in various convenience stores 
in Jacksonville and had several misdemeanor brushes with the law, as to which 
adjudication was withheld or the charges dropped.  In addition, his record showed 
that he was sentenced to a prison term on a felony conviction of fleeing to elude.  
The PSI also contained a brief family history provided by Yacob and verified in 
part by his father. 
The prosecutor offered, and the trial court accepted into evidence, a 2001 
Washington state judgment adjudicating Yacob delinquent on two counts of third-
degree assault regarding a schoolyard fight.  However, the trial court denied the 
admission of the corresponding probable cause statement upon the defense’s 
hearsay objection.  When given the opportunity, the prosecutor expanded on his 
prior objection to the videotaped interviews of the Seattle witnesses and described 
the areas in which he would have cross-examined them, particularly the teachers.  
Subsequently, the trial court accepted the prosecutor’s statement that Yacob was 
placed in an alternative high school because of the schoolyard fight, based on facts 
Yacob had admitted in a 2010 interview with Jacksonville police. 
D.  Sentencing 
 
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Yacob to life without the 
possibility of parole for the armed robbery and sentenced him to death for the first-
 
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degree murder of Moussa Maida.  In support of the death sentence, the trial court 
found two aggravators: the capital felony was committed (1) during the 
commission of a robbery and (2) for pecuniary gain.  The trial court, however, also 
found that the two aggravators merged to become a single aggravator.   
 
With regard to mitigation, the trial court noted that Yacob validly waived the 
presentation of most mitigation.  In addition, the trial court found that although the 
videotaped interviews of the Seattle witnesses and the defense investigator’s 
deposition were admitted into evidence at the Spencer hearing without objection, 
the trial court did not consider or weigh those hearsay statements in determining 
the sentence.  The trial court then made findings regarding the mitigation that 
could be analyzed and weighed.   
The trial court found that the statutory mitigator of age—Yacob was twenty-
two—was established but ascribed it no weight.  See § 921.141(6)(g), Fla. Stat. 
(2008).  The trial court also found that the following nonstatutory mitigation was 
established and gave it the weight indicated: Yacob initially left without hurting 
anyone (no weight); Yacob did not harm anyone else in the store (little weight); 
Yacob emigrated from a foreign country (little weight); Yacob was intelligent and 
graduated from high school (slight weight); Yacob loves his family, and his family 
loves him (slight weight); and Yacob exhibited appropriate behavior at trial (no 
weight).  Finally, the trial court found the following nonstatutory mitigation was 
 
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either not established or was not proper mitigation and thus afforded it no weight: 
Yacob was in a panic during the shooting; everyone believed that the glass was 
“bulletproof,” and Yacob did not know he killed anyone; Yacob was a diligent 
student who overcame academic challenges; Yacob is a hard worker; Yacob was 
raised in a religious home and has faith in God; Yacob was abandoned by his 
father, torn between parents, and abused by his father; Yacob had no friends while 
growing up; Yacob once came to the defense of a boy being bullied; and society 
would be protected even if Yacob was sentenced to life imprisonment.   
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
In this appeal from his conviction for first-degree murder and sentence of 
death, Yacob raises three claims, all of which relate to the death sentence imposed: 
(1) Florida’s capital sentencing proceedings are unconstitutional under Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); (2) the trial court erred by failing to consider certain 
mitigation evidence admitted during the Spencer hearing; and (3) the death 
sentence in this case is disproportionate when compared to similar single-
aggravator cases.  Because we grant relief as to Yacob’s third claim and determine 
that the death sentence is not proportionate, we do not reach Yacob’s first or 
second claims, which relate only to the validity of the sentence of death.   
 
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We begin, however, with our mandatory obligation to independently 
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support Yacob’s conviction for 
first-degree murder. 
A.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
Although Yacob has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence 
underlying the guilty verdicts, this Court has a mandatory obligation to review the 
sufficiency of the evidence in every case in which a sentence of death has been 
imposed, even when not challenged.  See Jones v. State, 963 So. 2d 180, 184 (Fla. 
2007); Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5) (“On direct appeal in death penalty cases, 
whether or not insufficiency of the evidence or proportionality is an issue 
presented for review, the court shall review these issues and, if necessary, remand 
for the appropriate relief.”).  “In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the 
question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
State, a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 
2001).  
 
In this case, Yacob was charged with first-degree murder under both the 
premeditated murder and felony murder theories.  See § 782.04, Fla. Stat. (2008).  
The jury found Yacob guilty by special verdict under both theories.  The felony 
 
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murder conviction was based on the jury finding Yacob guilty of armed robbery 
with a firearm.  See id.   
As outlined in the facts recounted in this opinion, the DNA evidence from 
the blood found at the crime scene, as well as the fingerprint and palmprint 
evidence, established that Yacob was the masked person in a camouflage jacket 
appearing in the store’s security recordings from May 4, 2008.  The recordings, as 
well as eyewitness testimony, established that Yacob held a gun on Maida, 
demanded money, and directed him into the cashier’s booth.  Maida complied with 
all of Yacob’s directives, and Yacob left the booth with the money in a plastic bag. 
However, upon observing Maida move to the counter to flip the magnetic 
door switch, and then quickly run to lock the cashier’s booth door, Yacob pulled 
his gun out of his pocket and pointed it toward Maida.  As Maida locked the 
booth’s door, Yacob fired a shot at close range.  Then, after placing the bag of 
money on the floor, Yacob held the gun with both hands, aimed it at Maida, and 
fired again.  That shot pierced the glass and entered Maida’s chest, penetrating 
both his heart and right lung.  Maida died soon thereafter.  Yacob immediately ran 
to the locked door and broke the glass, eventually bent the burglar bars, and 
escaped with money from the plastic bag stuffed in his pockets.   
Accordingly, we conclude that the record in this case contains sufficient 
evidence to support the verdicts of guilt on the counts of (1) first-degree murder, 
 
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under both the felony and premeditated theories, and (2) armed robbery with a 
firearm.  We therefore affirm Yacob’s convictions.   
We now address Yacob’s claim that the death sentence imposed by the trial 
court for the murder is not proportionate.   
B.  Proportionality of the Sentence 
Yacob contends that his death sentence is disproportionate to other cases in 
which the sentence of death has been imposed, pointing to this Court’s well- 
established precedent that death is generally not a proportionate penalty in a single 
aggravator “robbery gone bad” case.  The State counters that Yacob’s death 
sentence, which is based on only the single aggravator of a murder committed 
during the course of a robbery, is proportionate in light of its “distinctive” facts and 
“weak” mitigation that, considering the totality of the circumstances, allegedly 
differentiates this case from other single aggravator cases in which this Court has 
held the death penalty to be disproportionate.   
For the reasons we explain, we conclude that Yacob’s sentence is not 
proportionate and therefore vacate his sentence of death.  We also reject the view 
of the dissenting-in-part opinion—not raised by any party in this proceeding or 
previously by any party in the hundreds of death penalty proceedings to come 
before this Court—that this Court is precluded by the conformity clause of article 
I, section 17, of the Florida Constitution from engaging in proportionality review 
 
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of death sentences and that we should recede from our long-standing precedent 
requiring such review.  
Contrary to the view espoused by the dissenting-in-part opinion that the state 
constitutional conformity clause precludes us from engaging in proportionality 
review because this review is not required by the Eighth Amendment, we conclude 
that our proportionality review flows from Florida’s capital punishment statute—
section 921.141, Florida Statutes.  This statute provides that every judgment of 
conviction and sentence of death “shall be subject to automatic review” by this 
Court.  § 921.141(4), Fla. Stat. (2008).  Section 921.141 further provides that this 
review “shall be heard in accordance with rules promulgated” by this Court.  Id.  
Forty years ago, in State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973), this Court 
interpreted section 921.141 as including proportionality review of death sentences, 
concluding that this Court’s automatic, mandatory, and statutorily required review 
of death penalty cases “must begin with the premise that death is different.”  
Fitzpatrick v. State, 527 So. 2d 809, 811 (Fla. 1988) (citing Dixon, 283 So. 2d at 
7).  In upholding the constitutionality of Florida’s amended capital punishment 
statute in the aftermath of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), this Court explained that proportionality review 
“guarantees that the reasons present in one case [for imposition of the death 
 
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penalty] will reach a similar result to that reached under similar circumstances in 
another case.”  Dixon, 283 So. 2d at 10.   
As we stated then and have consistently reaffirmed during the past four 
decades, “[i]f a defendant is sentenced to die, this Court can review that case in 
light of the other decisions and determine whether or not the punishment is too 
great” in order to control and channel the sentencing process until it “becomes a 
matter of reasoned judgment,” Dixon, 283 So. 2d at 10, rather than an exercise in 
the kind of “uncontrolled discretion” that led the Supreme Court in Furman, 408 
U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring), to invalidate the death penalty as applied 
“under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that [death] would be 
inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
188 (1976) (plurality opinion).  In other words, “[b]ecause death is a unique 
punishment, it is necessary in each case to engage in a thoughtful, deliberate 
proportionality review to consider the totality of circumstances in a case, and to 
compare it with other capital cases.”  Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 
1990) (citation omitted). 
This Court has stated that proportionality review “arises in part by necessary 
implication from the mandatory, exclusive jurisdiction this Court has over death 
appeals.”  Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1991) (citing art. V, 
§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.).  As we have previously articulated: 
 
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The obvious purpose of this special grant of jurisdiction is to ensure 
the uniformity of death-penalty law by preventing the disagreement 
over controlling points of law that may arise when the district courts 
of appeal are the only appellate courts with mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction.  Thus, proportionality review is a unique and highly 
serious function of this Court, the purpose of which is to foster 
uniformity in death-penalty law.       
Id. (citation omitted). 
This Court has also explained that in enacting section 921.141, “the 
legislature intended the death penalty to be imposed ‘for the most aggravated, the 
most indefensible of crimes.’ ”  Fitzpatrick, 527 So. 2d at 811 (quoting Dixon, 283 
So. 2d at 8).  As stated in Dixon, “[d]eath is a unique punishment in its finality and 
in its total rejection of the possibility of rehabilitation.  It is proper, therefore, that 
the Legislature has chosen to reserve its application to only the most aggravated 
and unmitigated of most serious crimes.”  283 So. 2d at 7.  “A high degree of 
certainty in procedural fairness as well as substantive proportionality must be 
maintained in order to insure that the death penalty is administered evenhandedly.”  
Fitzpatrick, 527 So. 2d at 811.     
Several of the reasons that led this Court to uphold Florida’s amended 
capital punishment statute in Dixon were critical to the United States Supreme 
Court’s subsequent decision to uphold the constitutionality of capital punishment 
in the aftermath of Furman.  In Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189, a plurality of the Supreme 
Court explained that Furman “mandates that where discretion is afforded a 
 
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sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life 
should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so 
as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”   
Key to what this Court has described as the “reasonable and controlled, 
rather than capricious and discriminatory” discretion necessary to uphold Florida’s 
capital sentencing scheme as constitutional is “[r]eview of a sentence of death by 
this Court, provided by Fla. Stat. § 921.141.”  Dixon, 283 So. 2d at 7, 8.  Indeed, in 
Gregg, the Supreme Court plurality declared a similar provision in Georgia’s death 
penalty statute—providing for automatic appeal of all death sentences and a 
statutory requirement that each sentence of death be reviewed to determine 
“whether the sentence is disproportionate compared to those sentences imposed in 
similar cases”—to be “an important additional safeguard against arbitrariness and 
caprice” in the imposition of the death penalty.  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198.  As the 
Supreme Court stated:  
In short, Georgia’s new sentencing procedures require as a 
prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty, specific jury 
findings as to the circumstances of the crime or the character of the 
defendant.  Moreover, to guard further against a situation comparable 
to that presented in Furman, the Supreme Court of Georgia compares 
each death sentence with the sentences imposed on similarly situated 
defendants to ensure that the sentence of death in a particular case is 
not disproportionate.  On their face these procedures seem to satisfy 
the concerns of Furman.  No longer should there be “no meaningful 
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which (the death penalty) is 
imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”  408 U.S., at 313 
(White, J., concurring). 
 
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Id.   
Moreover, in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251 (1976) (plurality 
opinion), a plurality of the Supreme Court, in specifically upholding the 
constitutionality of Florida’s amended capital punishment statute after Furman, 
cited to this Court’s discussion in Dixon of proportionality review as part of the 
“procedures, like those used in Georgia [and discussed in Gregg], [that] appear to 
meet the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman.”  The Supreme Court 
explained that the “Florida capital-sentencing procedures . . . seek to assure that the 
death penalty will not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner” and that 
“to the extent that any risk to the contrary exists, it is minimized by Florida’s 
appellate review system.”  Id. at 252-53.  The Supreme Court plurality explained 
this review, an essential linchpin to upholding the facial constitutionality of 
Florida’s amended death penalty statute, as follows: 
Under Florida’s capital-sentencing procedures, in sum, trial 
judges are given specific and detailed guidance to assist them in 
deciding whether to impose a death penalty or imprisonment for life.  
Moreover, their decisions are reviewed to ensure that they are 
consistent with other sentences imposed in similar circumstances.  
Thus, in Florida, as in Georgia, it is no longer true that there is “ ‘no 
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which (the death 
penalty) is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.’ ”  Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 188, quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 
313 (White, J, concurring).  On its face the Florida system thus 
satisfies the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman. 
Id. at 253 (emphasis added).   
 
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In addition, the Supreme Court specifically cited Dixon and this Court’s 
proportionality review as a basis to reject the defendant’s contention that, “while 
perhaps facially acceptable, [Florida’s] new sentencing procedures in actual effect 
are merely cosmetic, and that arbitrariness and caprice still pervade the system 
under which Florida imposes the death penalty.”  Id. at 254, 258.  The Supreme 
Court explained that this Court “has undertaken responsibly to perform its function 
of death sentence review with a maximum of rationality and consistency,” 
comparing the circumstances of cases under review with those of previous cases 
“to ensure that similar results are reached in similar cases,” thereby assuring “that 
the death penalty will not be imposed on a capriciously selected group of convicted 
defendants.”  Id. at 258-59.   
For decades since Proffitt, Gregg, and Dixon, this Court has consistently 
explained—unchallenged by the State in any proceeding, including this one—that 
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme mandates that this Court review the sentence 
of death in every capital case to determine whether the punishment is 
proportionate.  See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 407 (Fla. 2003) (“Due 
to the uniqueness of the penalty, this Court addresses the propriety of all death 
sentences in a proportionality review.”).  This requirement is embodied in the rules 
promulgated by this Court for review of death penalty cases, see § 921.141(4), Fla. 
Stat., requiring the Court to review the proportionality of the death sentence 
 
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regardless of whether the issue is raised by the defendant.  See Fla. R. App. P. 
9.142(a)(5) (“On direct appeal in death penalty cases, whether or not insufficiency 
of the evidence or proportionality is an issue presented for review, the court shall 
review these issues and, if necessary, remand for the appropriate relief.”).   
Although the dissenting-in-part opinion offers numerous citations as support 
for its proposition as to the basis for our proportionality review, see dissenting-in-
part op. at 48-49, all of those cases either directly cite to or quickly trace back to 
Tillman, 591 So. 2d at 169, in which this Court explained that “[t]he requirement 
that death be administered proportionately has a variety of sources in Florida law.”  
Indeed, while “the Florida Constitution’s express prohibition against unusual 
punishments” was listed as one reason for undertaking proportionality review, this 
Court also specifically stated in Tillman that “proportionality review in death cases 
rests at least in part on the recognition that death is a uniquely irrevocable penalty, 
requiring a more intensive level of judicial scrutiny or process than would lesser 
penalties.”  Id. (citing art. I, § 9, Fla. Const., which is the Florida Due Process 
Clause, and Porter, 564 So. 2d at 1064, which explained that a “thoughtful, 
deliberate proportionality review” is necessary “[b]ecause death is a unique 
punishment”).   
To adopt the view of the dissenting-in-part opinion that this Court should, 
sua sponte, recede from decades of precedent mandating proportionality review of 
 
- 23 - 
death sentences would raise substantial constitutional questions as to the defendant 
in this case, who, as even the dissenting-in-part opinion concedes, is similarly 
situated to other defendants whose sentences have been reduced to life on 
proportionality grounds.  See generally Duncan v. Moore, 754 So. 2d 708, 712 
(Fla. 2000) (explaining that equal protection requires that “persons similarly 
situated be treated similarly”).  In fact, as set forth in detail below, this case is 
completely indistinguishable from other comparable cases in which we have 
vacated the death sentence because it was disproportionate.2
As this Court has repeatedly stated, the death penalty is “reserved only for 
those cases where the most aggravating and least mitigating circumstances exist.”  
Silvia v. State, 60 So. 3d 959, 973 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 
954, 965 (Fla. 1996)).  “Therefore, in deciding whether death is a proportionate 
 
                                          
 
 
2.  We acknowledge, as the dissenting-in-part opinion points out, that the 
Supreme Court, in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1984), held that the Eighth 
Amendment does not require comparative proportionality review by an appellate 
court in every case in which the death penalty is imposed and the defendant 
requests proportionality review of the sentence.  In Pulley, however, the Supreme 
Court also proceeded to list the panoply of “checks on arbitrariness” that existed in 
the California statute being reviewed, including that at least one “special 
circumstance” must be unanimously found by the jury in order for the case to 
proceed to a penalty phase and each “special circumstance” must be proven to the 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 51.  Several of the “checks on arbitrariness” 
identified in Pulley as the kind contemplated by Furman are not present under 
Florida’s capital sentencing system, which is also currently one of the only death 
penalty statutes in the country to permit a non-unanimous jury recommendation of 
death.   
 
- 24 - 
penalty, the Court makes a ‘comprehensive analysis in order to determine whether 
the crime falls within the category of both the most aggravated and the least 
mitigated of murders, thereby assuring uniformity in the application of the 
sentence.’ ”  Id. (quoting Anderson, 841 So. 2d at 407-08).   
“This entails ‘a qualitative review . . . of the underlying basis for each 
aggravator and mitigator rather than a quantitative analysis.’ ”  Offord v. State, 959 
So. 2d 187, 191 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416 (Fla. 
1998)).  “In reviewing the sentence for proportionality, this Court will accept the 
jury’s recommendation and the weight assigned by the trial judge to the 
aggravating and mitigating factors.”  Silvia, 60 So. 3d at 973. 
In this case, the jury found Yacob guilty as charged of one count of first-
degree murder, as both premeditated murder and felony murder based on the armed 
robbery conviction.  The jury voted ten to two to recommend death.  The trial court 
initially found two aggravators—that the murder was committed in the course of a 
robbery and that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain.  See 
§ 921.141(5)(d), (f), Fla. Stat. (2008).  However, the trial court correctly 
recognized that “the pecuniary gain aggravator must merge with the murder in the 
course of a felony aggravator when the latter is based on a robbery conviction.”  
Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 110, 136 (Fla. 2001).  Accordingly, there is only a 
single aggravator in this case.   
 
- 25 - 
With regard to mitigation, the trial court found that Yacob’s age (twenty-
two) supported the finding of the statutory age mitigator, § 921.141(6)(g), Fla. Stat. 
(2008), but assigned it no weight in light of the degree of planning evidenced in the 
execution of the crime, citing Yacob’s disguise and use of a getaway driver.  The 
trial court also found six nonstatutory mitigating factors and ascribed each little to 
no weight: Yacob initially left without hurting anyone (no weight), did not harm 
anyone else in the store (little weight), immigrated to the United States (little 
weight), is intelligent and graduated from high school (slight weight), loves and is 
loved by his family (slight weight), and exhibited appropriate behavior at trial (no 
weight). 
After a thorough review of the record, we disagree with the trial court’s 
determination that the crime in this case was not a “robbery gone bad.”  The 
evidence shows that although Yacob held a gun on Maida while in the cashier’s 
booth, he pocketed it as he left the booth and continued walking toward the front 
door despite seeing Maida stand up inside the cashier’s booth.  Perceiving Maida’s 
sudden movement first to the counter and then toward the booth door as a threat to 
the completion of the robbery and his escape, however, Yacob immediately pulled 
out the gun, ran back to the booth door, and shot twice, killing Maida with the 
second shot.  There was no indication that murdering Maida was part of Yacob’s 
original robbery plan. 
 
- 26 - 
This Court has “stated that generally a death sentence is not proportionate 
when supported by a single aggravator and the mitigation is substantial.”  Rodgers 
v. State, 948 So. 2d 655, 670 (Fla. 2006).  “On the other hand, when the mitigation 
is not substantial, we have found death sentences to be proportional even when 
there is but a single aggravator.”  Id.  Although the mitigation in this case is not 
substantial, we nevertheless hold that the sentence of death is disproportionate 
because we conclude that this case is comparable to others in which we vacated the 
death sentence because it was disproportionate. 
First, in Johnson v. State, 720 So. 2d 232, 236 (Fla. 1998), the defendant 
was convicted of first-degree murder based on evidence that this Court described 
as “sufficient to uphold the conviction based on a theory of premeditation or felony 
murder” during the course of a burglary.  The trial court sentenced the defendant to 
death after finding two aggravators—a prior violent felony conviction, and the 
merged aggravator of committed in the course of a burglary and pecuniary gain—
and ascribing substantial to slight weight to the age statutory mitigator and six 
nonstatutory mitigators, including troubled childhood, good son and neighbor, and 
earned high school equivalency certificate.  Id. at 235.  Although we found 
proportionality to be a “close question,” we determined that the prior violent felony 
aggravator was not strong, and the totality of the circumstances, both standing 
 
- 27 - 
alone and in comparison to similar cases, supported vacating the death sentence.  
Id. at 238. 
We also vacated a death sentence in Scott v. State, 66 So. 3d 923, 925 (Fla. 
2011).  In that case, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, under both 
the felony and premeditated murder theories, attempted armed robbery, and 
aggravated battery.  Id. at 928.  Scott planned a robbery and upon entering the 
business hit one man on the head with his gun and shot and killed the owner after 
he told Scott that he had no money.  Id. at 925-26.  The trial court found two 
statutory aggravators: a prior violent felony conviction and committed in the 
course of an attempted armed robbery.  Id. at 928-29.  In mitigation, the trial court 
found nine nonstatutory mitigating factors—including that Scott loved his family, 
was respectful, evidenced religious faith, and was a good surrogate father—
according each slight or little weight.  Id. at 935.  We determined that under the 
totality of the circumstances, the aggravators—though properly found—were not 
particularly weighty, and concluded that comparable cases “were more aggravated 
and involved prior violent felony aggravators established by qualitatively different 
offenses, which were committed at times separate from the murder.”  Id. at 936.  
Moreover, the murder in Scott was more a “reactive action in response to the 
victim’s resistance to the robbery” than a “prearranged plan.”  Id. at 937.   
 
- 28 - 
Similarly, in Thompson v. State, 647 So. 2d 824, 827 (Fla. 1994), we 
vacated a death sentence where the defendant killed a store employee, and the 
single valid aggravator was murder in the course of a robbery.  Only nonstatutory 
mitigation was found, including that the defendant was a good parent and provider, 
exhibited no prior violent propensities, was honorably discharged from the United 
States Navy, had gainful employment and some artistic skill, was raised in a 
religious environment, and was a model prisoner.  Id. at 826 n.2; accord Sinclair v. 
State, 657 So. 2d 1138, 1142-43 (Fla. 1995) (vacating death sentence for murder of 
cab driver where single aggravator was murder in the course of robbery/pecuniary 
gain and three nonstatutory mitigators were found and given little to no weight but 
record showed mitigation of low intelligence level and emotional disturbances had 
“substantial weight”). 
In the above cases, this Court’s decisions to vacate the death sentences were 
based on an analysis of the weight of the aggravating and mitigating factors, the 
supporting evidence, and other relevant circumstances in each case.  This Court 
determined that none of these cases met the essential requirement of being one of 
the most aggravated and least mitigated of murders.  In this case, the trial court 
accorded great weight to the single, merged aggravator of murder in the course of a 
robbery/pecuniary gain.  Unlike other aggravators, such as heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel (HAC); a prior violent felony conviction; or cold, calculated, and 
 
- 29 - 
premeditated (CCP), the aggravating factor in this case is not typically considered 
especially weighty.  See Cole v. State, 36 So. 3d 597, 610 (Fla. 2010) (noting that 
CCP and prior violent felony conviction are “particularly weighty” aggravators); 
Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999) (stating that HAC and CCP are “two 
of the most serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme”).   
Moreover, the murder does not appear to have been a part of the pre-
arranged robbery plan.  Instead, Maida’s death resulted from a perceived threat, 
which can reasonably be inferred from the events surrounding the crime and is 
supported by Yacob’s prior experience working in convenience stores, even though 
this particular evidence was not presented to the jury, that occurred after Yacob 
pocketed his gun and headed for the store’s exit.  As a result, we conclude that the 
single aggravating factor based on the contemporaneous commission of the 
robbery is not weighty.  Accordingly, having reviewed the record and compared 
this case to similar capital cases, we hold that death is not a proportionate sentence 
in this case. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm Yacob’s convictions for 
first-degree murder and armed robbery with a firearm, but we vacate the sentence 
of death and remand this case for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole. 
 
- 30 - 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs with an opinion. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only. 
CANADY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
POLSTON, C.J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
LABARGA, J., concurring. 
 
I fully concur in the majority’s decision to reduce Yacob’s sentence to one 
of life in prison without the possibility of parole because death is not a 
proportionate sentence under the facts and circumstances of this case.  I agree with 
the majority that this Court’s obligation to review each death sentence to assure it 
is proportionate emanates in part from section 921.141, Florida Statutes, and from 
the mandatory, exclusive jurisdiction conferred on this Court by the Florida 
Constitution.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  However, I fully believe that our 
duty to examine each death sentence for proportionality arises in equal part from 
the law set forth by the United States Supreme Court that death as a penalty for 
first-degree murder “is reserved only for the most culpable defendants committing 
the most serious offenses.”  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012).  
The Supreme Court has reiterated many times that “the death penalty is reserved 
for a narrow category of crimes and offenders,” see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
 
- 31 - 
551, 568-69 (2005), thus there must be some mechanism by which the reviewing 
court can determine if this crime—measured not just by the fact that it is a first-
degree murder but also by the extent of its aggravating circumstances—and this 
offender—measured not just by the fact that he or she is guilty of murder but in 
part by the mitigation present in the record—are within the narrow class of 
murders for which the death penalty is warranted.  It is for this reason that we have 
long held that the death penalty in Florida is reserved for only the most aggravated 
and the least mitigated of first-degree murders.  We explained in Jones v. State, 
705 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1998), that “[t]he people of Florida have designated the 
death penalty as an appropriate sanction for certain crimes, and in order to ensure 
its continued viability under our state and federal constitutions ‘the Legislature has 
chosen to reserve its application to only the most aggravated and unmitigated of 
[the] most serious crimes.’ ”  Id. at 1366 (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 7 
(Fla. 1973)) (footnote omitted).  This concept is in accord with Supreme Court 
precedent both before and after the issuance of the decision in Pulley v. Harris, 465 
U.S. 37 (1984).  
The Supreme Court has emphasized many times that the concept of 
proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.  See Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48, 59 (2010); see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012).  
That court has recognized that a comparative proportionality review on appeal “is 
 
- 32 - 
intended to prevent caprice in the decision to inflict the [death] penalty.”  Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203 (1976).  The Supreme Court also recently reiterated 
that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive sanctions “flows from 
the basic ‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and 
proportioned’ ” to both the offender and the offense.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 
(quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (quoting Weems v. United 
States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910))).  Moreover, the Supreme Court continues to 
demand “individualized sentencing when imposing the death penalty.”  Miller, 132 
S. Ct. at 2467.   
Any limitation on this Court’s proportionality review of death sentences 
attributed to Florida’s constitutional conformity clause, article I, section 17, Florida 
Constitution, does not conflict with the United States Supreme Court’s continuing 
adherence to the principles that the death penalty must result, if at all, from 
individualized sentencing, and that it not be imposed in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner, or in a disproportionate manner in light of the circumstances of the crime 
and the mitigation present in the case.  Our proportionality review is but one 
component of this Court’s mandatory review of death sentences, and it allows the 
Court to make sure in every case in which the death penalty is imposed that the 
sentence is the result of reasoned individualized sentencing.   
 
- 33 - 
Our proportionality review also assists the Court in ensuring that the death 
penalty is not imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner.  The Supreme Court 
in Gregg explained that its earlier decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972), “mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter 
so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, 
that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of 
wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.  In examining 
Georgia’s death penalty statute, the Court in Gregg referred to the “safeguard” in 
Georgia’s capital sentencing that required all death sentences to be reviewed by the 
state supreme court to determine if the findings of aggravators are supported by the 
evidence and “whether the sentence is disproportionate compared to those 
sentences imposed in similar cases.”  Id. at 198.  The Supreme Court noted that 
“the proportionality requirement on review is intended to prevent caprice in the 
decision to inflict the penalty.”  Id. at 203.  “In particular, the proportionality 
review substantially eliminates the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die 
by the action of an aberrant jury [or judge].”  Id. at 206 (bracketed material added).   
As the Court in Gregg reiterated, “There is no question that death as a 
punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability” and is “an extreme 
sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes.”  Id. at 187.  Thus, one important 
safeguard against imposition of the death penalty in an arbitrary or capricious 
 
- 34 - 
manner in Florida’s death penalty scheme is this Court’s careful proportionality 
review—and it is an extremely important one.  Such a review is necessary to 
ensure that the death penalty is limited to the most aggravated and least mitigated 
of murders, thus providing for individualized sentencing and avoiding arbitrary and 
capricious imposition of the death penalty in Florida.  When this is ensured, it can 
be said that the punishment is proportionate to the crime.   
In performing the proportionality review, this Court has explained: 
“[W]e make a comprehensive analysis in order to determine whether 
the crime falls within the category of both the most aggravated and the 
least mitigated of murders, thereby assuring uniformity in the 
application of the sentence.”  We consider the totality of the 
circumstances of the case and compare the case to other capital cases.  
This entails “a qualitative review by this Court of the underlying basis 
for each aggravator and mitigator rather than a quantitative analysis.”  
In other words, proportionality review “is not a comparison between 
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” 
 
Williams v. State, 37 So. 3d 187, 205 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Offord v. State, 959 So. 
2d 187, 191 (Fla. 2007)).  As noted by the majority, in reviewing proportionality, 
the Court “will not disturb the sentencing judge’s determination as to ‘the relative 
weight to give to each established mitigator’ where that ruling is ‘supported by 
competent substantial evidence.’ ”  Blackwood v. State, 777 So. 2d 399, 412-13 
(Fla. 2000) (quoting Spencer v. State, 691 So. 2d 1062, 1064 (Fla. 1996)).  The 
Court will “review the weight the trial court ascribes to mitigating factors under the 
abuse of discretion standard.”  Smith v. State, 998 So. 2d 516, 527 (Fla. 2008).  
 
- 35 - 
The Court will “affirm the weight given an aggravator if based on competent 
substantial evidence.”  Blake v. State, 972 So. 2d 839, 846 (Fla. 2007).  “The 
weight to be given aggravating factors is within the discretion of the trial court, and 
it is subject to the abuse of discretion standard.”  Buzia v. State, 926 So. 2d 1203, 
1216 (Fla. 2006). 
Thus, we review the existence of and weight to be given the aggravating 
factors and the mitigating factors through the lens of competent, substantial 
evidence and the trial court’s sound discretion.  In the end, however, it is our 
evaluation of the interplay of those factors that must be brought to bear in 
determining if the ultimate punishment—death—fits the particular nature of the 
crime and the specific circumstances of the offender in each case.  In addition, 
comparing the circumstances of the case under review to other cases in which the 
death penalty has been imposed and affirmed, or reversed, by this Court assists the 
Court in assuring uniformity in application of the penalty in Florida. 
Even in Pulley, where the Supreme Court held that a comparative 
proportionality review is not indispensable to the constitutionality of a capital 
sentencing scheme, the Supreme Court noted that it had held several capital 
sentencing schemes that required such a review to be constitutional.  The Court in 
Pulley explained:  
Needless to say, that some schemes providing proportionality review 
are constitutional does not mean that such review is indispensable.  
 
- 36 - 
We take statutes as we find them.  To endorse the statute as a whole is 
not to say that anything different is unacceptable.  As was said in 
Gregg, “[w]e do not intend to suggest that only the above-described 
procedures would be permissible under Furman or that any sentencing 
system constructed along these general lines would inevitably satisfy 
the concerns of Furman, for each distinct system must be examined on 
an individual basis.”  
 
Pulley, 465 U.S. at 44-45 (emphases added) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195) 
(omitting footnote)).  Thus, even while holding that proportionality review is not 
indispensable, the Supreme Court reiterated that capital sentencing schemes 
containing such a requirement have been held constitutional.  Therefore, this 
Court’s engaging in such a review in deciding whether to affirm a death sentence 
does not depart from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning the Eighth 
Amendment, and thus is not in conflict with the Florida Constitution’s conformity 
clause.   
 
Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence in Pulley that in Gregg, Justice 
White focused on the proportionality review component of Georgia’s capital 
sentencing scheme “because it was a prominent, innovative, and noteworthy 
feature that had been specifically designed to combat effectively the systemic 
problems in capital sentencing which had invalidated the prior Georgia capital 
sentencing scheme.”  Pulley, 465 U.S. at 55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment).  Justice Stevens also stated, “But observations that 
this innovation is an effective safeguard do not mean that it is the only method of 
 
- 37 - 
ensuring that death sentences are not imposed capriciously or that it is the only 
acceptable form of appellate review.”  Id.  I recognize that in Florida, our 
proportionality review is not the only component of our mandatory review that 
ensures the death penalty is not imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner, but 
just as the Supreme Court has characterized such a review in the past, it is an 
important safeguard endorsed by the Supreme Court.   
 
In Walker v. Georgia, 129 S. Ct. 453, 456 (2008), Justice Stevens observed, 
with respect to the denial of certiorari relief, that although Pulley held that the 
Eighth Amendment does not require proportionality review of every capital 
sentence, “it was not meant to undermine our conclusion in Gregg and Zant [v. 
Stephens, 462 U.S. at 862 (1983)] that such review is an important component of 
the Georgia scheme.” 
 
In McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), decided after Pulley, the 
Supreme Court rejected McCleskey’s claim that a statistical study indicated that 
racial considerations entered into the capital sentencing determinations in Georgia, 
thus rendering his death sentence violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  However, as to the Eighth Amendment claim, the Supreme Court 
reiterated that inherent in the Eighth Amendment is the principle “that punishment 
for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.”  Id. at 300 (quoting 
Weems, 217 U.S. at 367).  In explaining why the Georgia capital sentencing 
 
- 38 - 
scheme was not unconstitutional, the Court in McCleskey explained what it found 
to be important when it decided Gregg, stating: 
Moreover, the Georgia system adds “an important additional 
safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice” in a provision for 
automatic appeal of a death sentence to the State Supreme Court.  428 
U.S., at 198.  The statute requires that court to review each sentence to 
determine whether it was imposed under the influence of passion or 
prejudice, whether the evidence supports the jury’s finding of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance, and whether the sentence is 
disproportionate to sentences imposed in generally similar murder 
cases.  To aid the court’s review, the trial judge answers a 
questionnaire about the trial, including detailed questions as to “the 
quality of the defendant’s representation [and] whether race played a 
role in the trial.”  
 
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 303 (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court in McCleskey 
also noted, “On automatic appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court found that 
McCleskey’s death sentence was not disproportionate to other death sentences 
imposed in the State.  The court supported this conclusion with an appendix 
containing citations to 13 cases involving generally similar murders.”  Id. at 306 
(some emphasis supplied; citations omitted).  At the same time, the McCleskey 
Court reiterated that “where the statutory procedures adequately channel the 
sentencer’s discretion, such proportionality review is not constitutionally 
required.”  Id. (citing Pulley, 465 U.S. at 50-51).  Thus, even given the holding in 
Pulley that comparative proportionality review is not required by the Eighth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court in McCleskey affirmatively recognized the fact 
that Georgia’s automatic appeal procedures provided for just such a review.   
 
- 39 - 
Justice Thomas reached a similar conclusion in his concurrence in Walker v. 
Georgia, 555 U.S. 979 (2008), referring to the comparative proportionality review 
undertaken by the Georgia Supreme Court in that case as “precisely the same 
proportionality review endorsed by this Court in McCleskey v. Kemp.”  Id. at 985 
(concurring in denial of certiorari relief).  Justice Thomas explained, “The Georgia 
Supreme Court then reviewed petitioner’s death sentence to determine whether it 
was ‘excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime and the defendant.’ ”  Walker, 555 U.S. at 986.   
 “As the Court several times has made clear, [the Supreme Court is] 
unwilling to say that there is any one right way for a State to set up its capital 
sentencing scheme.”  Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984) (citing Pulley, 
465 U.S. at 54.  In Florida’s capital sentencing scheme, some form of 
proportionality review has been a staple of automatic appellate review for many 
years, and similar review has been a feature of other states’ capital sentencing 
schemes approved by the Supreme Court.  Thus, inclusion of that safeguard against 
arbitrary imposition of the ultimate penalty in our mandatory review of death 
sentences cannot reasonably be said to conflict with the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence concerning evaluation of death sentences for conformance with the 
Eighth Amendment.  This is true both in determining if the offense and the 
offender fall into that class for which the death penalty is appropriate and in 
 
- 40 - 
ensuring that the penalty is imposed in a consistent manner that is not arbitrary and 
capricious.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 
U.S. 231 (1988), stated: “To pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing 
scheme must ‘genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty 
and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the 
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.’ ”  Id. at 244 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 862, 877).  This statement was reiterated in 
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 755 (1996).  Although the Supreme Court 
has made clear that a comparative proportionality review is not indispensable to 
the constitutionality of any specific state capital sentencing scheme, the Court has 
also recognized, even after its Pulley decision, that such a review can play an 
important part in automatic appellate review of death sentences to ensure that the 
death sentences are not being arbitrarily imposed. 
I therefore conclude that even though proportionality review as it has been 
conducted in Florida is not expressly required by the Eighth Amendment, that fact 
provides no basis for this Court to conclude it is prohibited from such an 
evaluation under the conformity clause of our state constitution.  As a Court, and 
as individual Justices, we are called upon to either affirm or reverse the most 
severe penalty that can ever be imposed on a human being.  That is a responsibility 
 
- 41 - 
that must be carried out in a manner that gives the Court, as a whole, and each 
Justice individually, moral and legal certainty that the defendant is deserving of the 
ultimate penalty when the facts of the crime, the aggravating circumstances, and 
the mitigating circumstances are carefully considered.  This, in my view, is 
necessary to ensure that the penalty is imposed fairly and consistently throughout 
the State.  Not insignificantly, examination of the sentences imposed on other 
defendants in similar circumstances, and either affirmed or reversed by this Court, 
aids our analysis not only because it promotes consistency in sentencing, but also 
because it is, in part, by this examination that we can discover the “evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”  See Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 
2463 (noting that the concept of proportionality is viewed “less through a historical 
prism than according to ‘ “the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society” ’ ” (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 
(1976) (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101) (plurality opinion))).  The United States 
Supreme Court has announced no prohibition against a state reviewing court 
engaging in a proportionality review in mandatory appeals of death sentences.  
Instead, that Court has consistently referred to such review in favorable terms.  
Unless an edict is handed down by the Supreme Court declaring that comparative 
proportionality review is inconsistent with proper capital sentencing review, I will 
 
- 42 - 
continue to make a proportionality review in every case in which I am called upon 
to place my judicial imprimatur on a sentence of death.  It is my fervent hope that 
this Court will also continue to do so as a body. 
 
CANADY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
I concur in the decision to affirm Yacob’s convictions, but I dissent from the 
reversal of his death sentence.  Although I agree that the death sentence in this case 
is not proportionate under this Court’s comparative proportionality jurisprudence, I 
conclude that comparative proportionality review by this Court is precluded by the 
provision of the Florida Constitution that requires this Court to interpret our state 
constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in conformity with the 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the parallel provision of 
the United States Constitution.  Because the United States Supreme Court has held 
that comparative proportionality review of death sentences is not required by the 
United States Constitution, the conformity clause of the Florida Constitution 
forbids the application of such review by this court. 
Article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution contains the following 
provision:  “The prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, shall be construed in conformity 
with decisions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to the 
 
- 43 - 
United States Constitution.”  Under this provision of article I, section 17—
commonly referred to as the conformity clause—the courts of Florida are 
precluded from determining that a sentence is cruel and unusual if a decision of the 
United States Supreme Court makes clear that the sentence does not violate the 
Eighth Amendment of the federal constitution.  Moreover, a sentence may be 
invalidated as cruel and unusual under the Florida Constitution by a Florida court 
only if a decision of the United States Supreme Court requires invalidation of the 
sentence as cruel and unusual. 
The plain import of the text of the conformity clause is explained in the 
ballot summary considered by the voters when the constitutional amendment 
incorporating the conformity clause was adopted.  The ballot summary contains the 
following statement:  
The amendment would prevent state courts, including the Florida 
Supreme Court, from treating the state constitutional prohibition 
against cruel or unusual punishment as being more expansive than the 
federal constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment or United States Supreme Court interpretations thereof.  
The amendment effectively nullifies rights currently allowed under 
the state prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment which may 
afford greater protections for those subject to punishment for crimes 
than will be provided by the amendment.  Under the amendment, the 
protections afforded those subject to punishment for crimes under the 
“cruel or unusual punishment” clause, as that clause currently appears 
in Section 17 of Article I of the State Constitution, will be the same as 
the minimum protections provided under the “cruel and unusual” 
punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
 
- 44 - 
Fla. HJR 951 (2001) at 2-3 (emphasis added) (proposing amendment to art. I, § 17, 
Fla. Const., and providing ballot summary). 
In Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021-22 (2010), the Supreme Court 
summarized its prior jurisprudence concerning the proportionality of sentences 
under the Eighth Amendment.  The Court recognized that its cases “addressing the 
proportionality of sentences fall within two general classifications.”  Id. at 2021.  
Neither of the two classifications includes comparative proportionality review of 
death sentences. 
The first category “involves challenges to the length of term-of-years 
sentences given all the circumstances in a particular case.”  Id.  Under this 
category, “the Court considers all of the circumstances of the case to determine 
whether the sentence is unconstitutionally excessive.”  Id.  Analysis under this 
category is triggered only when a comparison of the “gravity of the offense and the 
severity of the sentence” “ ‘leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.’ ”  Id. 
at 2022 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J.)).  
If such an inference does arise, “the court should then compare the defendant’s 
sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction 
and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions” to 
determine whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 
 
- 45 - 
1022.  Cases in which a sentence of death is imposed do not fall within this first 
category. 
The second category, on the other hand, dealt exclusively—until Graham 
was decided—with death penalty cases.  This category includes “cases in which 
the Court implements the proportionality standard by certain categorical 
restrictions on the death penalty.”  Id. at 2021.  These categorical rules include the 
prohibition on the death penalty for crimes committed by persons under the age of 
eighteen and by the mentally retarded, and for non-homicide crimes.  Id. at 2022.  
Graham extended the categorical approach outside the death penalty context in its 
holding prohibiting the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile 
offender who did not commit homicide.  Id. at 2034.  In Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. 
Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012), the Court extended Graham’s reasoning to homicides 
committed by juveniles, holding broadly “that the Eighth Amendment forbids a 
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders.” 
Comparative proportionality review, such as that applied by the majority 
with respect to Yacob’s death sentence, has no place within the framework of the 
Supreme Court’s case law.  The point is driven home in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 
37, 43-44 (1984), where the Court specifically considered—in a challenge to 
California’s death penalty scheme—the question of whether the Eighth 
 
- 46 - 
Amendment “requires a state appellate court, before it affirms a death sentence, to 
compare the sentence in the case before it with the penalties imposed in similar 
cases if requested to do so by the prisoner.”  The Court unequivocally held that 
such comparative proportionality review is not required by the Eighth Amendment.  
Id. at 50-51. 
In Pulley, the Court rejected any suggestion that the discussion of 
comparative proportionality review in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and 
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), established that such proportionality 
review is constitutionally required or was an essential predicate for the 
determination that the Georgia and Florida death penalty schemes were 
constitutional.  Pulley, 465 U.S. at 45-48.  The Court observed that examination of 
Gregg and Proffitt, along with Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)—which upheld 
the Texas death penalty scheme notwithstanding the absence of comparative 
proportionality review—“makes clear that they do not establish proportionality 
review as a constitutional requirement.”  Pulley, 465 U.S. at 45.  The Court 
summed up, stating:  
 
There is thus no basis in our cases for holding that comparative 
proportionality review by an appellate court is required in every case 
in which the death penalty is imposed and the defendant requests it.  
Indeed, to so hold would effectively overrule Jurek and would 
substantially depart from the sense of Gregg and Proffitt.  We are not 
persuaded that the Eighth Amendment requires us to take that course.  
 
- 47 - 
Id. at 50-51.  Thus, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the California death 
penalty scheme.  Id. at 54. 
Since Pulley was decided, nothing in the Supreme Court’s case law has 
suggested any change of view regarding comparative proportionality review.  
Indeed, in rejecting a subsequent challenge to Georgia’s death penalty scheme, the 
Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), reinforced what it had said in 
Pulley regarding comparative proportionality review.  Citing Pulley, the Court in 
McCleskey stated that “where the statutory procedures adequately channel the 
sentencer’s discretion, such proportionality review is not constitutionally 
required.”  Id. at 306. 
This Court has not been entirely unmindful of the holding of Pulley.  Citing 
Pulley, we have recognized that our comparative proportionality review is not 
required by the federal constitution but is a matter of state law.  Garcia v. State, 
492 So. 2d 360, 368 (Fla. 1986) (“Our proportionality review is a matter of state 
law.”); State v. Henry, 456 So. 2d 466, 469 (Fla. 1984) (“We note that 
proportionality review is not a requirement of the federal constitution, Pulley v. 
Harris, [465 U.S. 37] (1984), but rather a feature of state law.  Thus, the parameters 
of that duty are set forth in our cases interpreting that duty.” (citation omitted)).  
But we have never addressed the relationship between the holding of Pulley and 
the limitations imposed by the conformity clause of article I, section 17. 
 
- 48 - 
Nor does the Court address Pulley here.  Having relegated that decision to a 
footnote, majority op. at 23 n.2, the majority instead explains various bases for 
comparative proportionality analysis in state law.  In doing so, the majority ignores 
what the Court has said time after time about the connection between our 
proportionality review and the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments or 
cruel or unusual punishments.  As we frequently have stated, our Court “performs 
‘a proportionality review to prevent the imposition of ‘unusual’ punishments 
contrary to article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution.’ ”  Hunter v. State, 8 
So. 3d 1052, 1073 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Simmons v. State, 934 So. 2d 1100, 1122 
(Fla. 2006)); see Kocaker v. State, 119 So. 3d 1214, 1228 (Fla.) (“This Court is 
required to conduct a proportionality review ‘in order to prevent the imposition of 
unusual punishments under the Florida Constitution.’ ” (quoting Phillips v. State, 
39 So. 3d 296, 305 (Fla. 2010))), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2743 (2013); Allred v. 
State, 55 So. 3d 1267, 1284 (Fla. 2010) (“The Court performs a proportionality 
review to prevent the imposition of ‘unusual’ punishments contrary to article I, 
section 17 of the Florida Constitution.” (quoting Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167, 
169 (Fla. 1991))); Jackson v. State, 18 So. 3d 1016, 1034 (Fla. 2009) (“We 
perform a comparative proportionality review to prevent the imposition of 
‘unusual’ punishments contrary to article I, section 17 of the Florida 
Constitution.”); Bevel v. State, 983 So. 2d 505, 523 (Fla. 2008) (“The Court 
 
- 49 - 
performs proportionality review to prevent the imposition of ‘unusual’ 
punishments in violation of article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution.”); 
Philmore v. State, 820 So. 2d 919, 939 (Fla. 2002) (“This Court performs 
proportionality review to prevent the imposition of ‘unusual’ punishments contrary 
to article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution.”); Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 
1246, 1262 (Fla. 2004) (“The Court performs proportionality review to prevent the 
imposition of ‘unusual’ punishments contrary to article I, section 17 of the Florida 
Constitution.”); Rogers v. State, 783 So. 2d 980, 1002 (Fla. 2001) (“This Court 
performs proportionality review to prevent the imposition of ‘unusual’punishments 
contrary to article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution.”); Sexton v. State, 775 
So. 2d 923, 935 (Fla. 2000) (“This Court performs proportionality review to 
prevent the imposition of ‘unusual’ punishments contrary to article I, section 17 of 
the Florida Constitution.”); Voorhees v. State, 699 So. 2d 602, 614 (Fla. 1997) 
(“By ensuring that death not be imposed as a punishment for a murder in cases 
similar to those in which death was deemed an improper punishment, 
proportionality [review] prevents the imposition of ‘unusual’ punishments contrary 
to article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution.”).  Accordingly, although we 
find our authority to conduct comparative proportionality review in state law, we 
reason that such review is necessary to comply with the prohibition against the 
cruel and unusual punishment provision of our constitution.  This interpretation is 
 
- 50 - 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Pulley that proportionality 
review is not required by the Eighth Amendment and thus contravenes our state 
constitution’s conformity clause. 
In the face of the Court’s repeated reliance on the cruel and unusual 
punishments prohibition as the basis for our proportionality review, the majority 
now says that our proportionality review is not really based on that prohibition 
after all.  The majority thus asserts that this Court properly can conduct a 
comparative proportionality review on other grounds.  Specifically, the majority 
concludes “that our proportionality review flows from Florida’s capital punishment 
statute—section 921.141, Florida Statutes.”  Majority op. at 16.  The majority 
asserts that State v. Dixon “interpreted section 921.141 as including proportionality 
review of death sentences.”  Id.  But Dixon does not suggest—much less hold—
that section 921.141 requires proportionality review.  That is not surprising since 
nothing in the text of the statute refers to proportionality review.  Proportionality 
review can be predicated on the statute only by means of a judicial rewriting of the 
statute. 
Undeniably, Dixon—which upheld Florida’s capital punishment statute 
against a constitutional challenge—contemplated that in any case where “a 
defendant is sentenced to die, this Court can review that case in light of the other 
decisions [imposing sentences of death] and determine whether or not the 
 
- 51 - 
punishment is too great.”  283 So. 2d at 10.  The reasoning of Dixon, however, 
does not in any way tie this comparative review to a provision of section 921.141.  
Instead, the comparative review envisioned by Dixon can only reasonably be 
understood as a judicial-created means to ensure that the statute would be 
implemented in a way that would avoid the constitutional concerns articulated in 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), concerns which were rooted in the 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.  The Dixon court understood that 
such comparative review would be consistent with the statute, but that is different 
from concluding that the statute requires or specifically authorizes comparative 
proportionality review. 
The majority also relies on Tillman, which observes that “[t]he requirement 
that death be administered proportionately has a variety of sources in Florida law.”  
591 So. 2d at 169.  In addition to the “express prohibition against unusual 
punishments” in the Florida Constitution, Tillman refers to two additional state 
constitutional grounds: the due process clause and the provision granting this court 
mandatory, exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of cases in which a sentence of 
death has been imposed.  Id. 
Tillman states that the “obvious purpose” of our mandatory jurisdiction “is 
to ensure the uniformity of death-penalty law by preventing the disagreement over 
controlling points of law that may arise when the district courts of appeal are the 
 
- 52 - 
only appellate courts with mandatory appellate jurisdiction.”  Id.; see art. V, § 
3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  But “preventing the disagreement over controlling points of 
law” does not require comparative proportionality review.  Furthermore, the 
jurisdictional provision is purely a matter of procedure; it does nothing to 
substantively define the review undertaken by the court.  Tillman’s reliance on this 
jurisdictional provision as a basis for proportionality review is untenable. 
It is no more tenable to skirt the conformity clause by proclaiming that 
comparative proportionality review is required by the due process clause rather 
than by the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.  Under the federal 
Constitution, “the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
[is] made applicable to the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.  The prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishments thus is a particular aspect of due process.  And the conformity clause 
expressly limits the authority of this Court with respect to that aspect of due 
process.  To conclude otherwise is to treat the conformity clause as meaningless 
for all practical purposes. 
Since becoming a justice of this Court, this case is the first case in which I 
have had occasion to address a death sentence which I conclude does not meet the 
requirements established by our comparative proportionality case law and thus the 
first case in which I have been required to consider whether the conformity clause 
 
- 53 - 
precludes comparative proportionality review by this Court.  This case squarely 
presents that issue.  Given the absence of any other meritorious issues raised by 
Yacob, if the conformity clause precludes comparative proportionality review, the 
sentence of death must be affirmed.  We are constrained to affirm the trial court’s 
judgment if there is a legal basis for doing so.  See Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio 
Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999) (stating that the judgment of a 
trial court “will be upheld if there is any basis which would support the judgment 
in the record”); Cohen v. Mohawk, Inc., 137 So. 2d 222, 225 (Fla. 1962) (stating 
that if there is “any theory or principle of law which would support the trial court’s 
judgment,” an appellate court is “obliged to affirm that judgment”); § 924.33, 
Florida Statutes (2009) (“No judgment shall be reversed unless the appellate court 
is of the opinion, after an examination of all the appeal papers, that error was 
committed that injuriously affected the substantial rights of the appellant.”). 
Two things are very clear.  First, the United States Supreme Court has held 
that comparative proportionality review in death cases is not required by the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.  See Pulley, 465 U.S. 
at 50-51.  Second, the conformity clause of article I, section 17, precludes Florida 
courts from imposing requirements under the State’s prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment that go beyond those required by the United States Supreme 
Court.  From these two propositions it necessarily follows that our comparative 
 
- 54 - 
proportionality review violates the conformity clause.  Our case law applying the 
Florida constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment imposes 
substantive requirements that limit the imposition of death sentences even though 
those limitations are not required by the Eighth Amendment.  Our case law 
requiring comparative proportionality review in death cases thus “treat[s] the state 
constitutional prohibition against cruel [and] unusual punishment as being more 
expansive than the federal constitutional prohibition” as explicated by the United 
States Supreme Court.  Fla. HJR 951 at 2-3. 
This Court should bring its death penalty jurisprudence into conformity with 
the conformity clause.  I dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the death 
sentence imposed on Yacob, which is in derogation of the unequivocal provision 
adopted by the people of Florida to constrain the power of this Court to set aside 
sentences of death. 
POLSTON, C.J., concurs. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
Adrian Gentry Soud, Judge - Case No. 16-2010-CF-003188-AX 
 
Nancy Ann Daniels, Public Defender, and Nada Margaret Carey, Assistant Public 
Defender, Tallahassee, Florida,   
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Stephen Richard White, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellee