Case Title: Dichard v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92-142

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-12-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Dichard v. State1992 WY 184844 P.2d 484Case Number: 92-142Decided: 12/24/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Christopher 
DICHARD, Appellant (Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE of 
Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from 
District Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
Walter A. 
Murray, Jr., Casper, for appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mark T. Moran, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

MACY, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     In this appeal, we 
confront the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion by 
denying Appellant Christopher Dichard's presentence motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea to attempted second-degree murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. §§ 
6-2-104 and 6-1-301 (1988) and his guilty plea to first-degree sexual assault in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-302(a)(ii) (1988).

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     As extracted from the 
investigating officer's affidavit, this case had its genesis in the following 
facts: On July 23, 1991, Appellant unlawfully entered the victim's home. The 
victim arrived at her home for lunch at approximately one o'clock in the 
afternoon, and, as she walked down the hallway, a coat was thrown over her head. 
She was simultaneously knocked to the floor and hit several times. The assailant 
then removed the coat. The victim immediately recognized her assailant as being 
Christopher Dichard, an acquaintance she made while she was attending a 
substance abuse program.

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant vulgarly 
informed the victim that he intended to have sexual intercourse with her. As the 
victim began to scream, Appellant choked her into temporary unconsciousness. The 
victim next remembers waking up with Appellant on top of her. After having 
achieved sexual intercourse, Appellant led the victim to another room, threw her 
on a couch, and performed an oral sex act on her. The telephone began to ring as 
the victim was pleading for her life. At this point, she escaped in hopes of 
answering the telephone; however, Appellant caught her before she reached her 
destination. He beat her over the head with a cutting board and threw her to the 
floor, choking her into unconsciousness a second time.

 
 

[¶5.]     The victim's husband 
arrived at their home at approximately 1:40 p.m. Upon entering the house, he was 
confronted by Appellant brandishing a cutting board. The victim's husband was 
able to repel the attack and make his way into the kitchen. There, he saw his 
wife lying unconscious on the floor. She was nude from the waist down, and her 
eyes were rolled back into her head. Thinking that his wife was dead, the 
victim's husband called for an ambulance. Appellant attempted to pull the 
telephone away but, upon hearing that the call had been received, ran out of the 
house. The victim was subsequently taken to the emergency room of a local 
hospital. At the hospital, emergency room staff stated that her injuries, which 
included burst blood vessels around the eyes, were consistent with those which 
occur just prior to death by strangulation.

 
 

[¶6.]     On July 25, 1991, a 
criminal complaint was filed against Appellant, and a warrant was issued for his 
arrest. The complaint alleged three felony counts: (1) attempted first-degree 
murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. §§ 6-1-301 (1988) and 6-2-101 (Supp. 1992); 
(2) first-degree sexual assault by sexual intercourse in violation of § 
6-2-302(a)(ii); and (3) first-degree sexual assault by cunnilingus in violation 
of § 6-2-302(a)(ii). Appellant was arrested, and he made his initial appearance 
in county court on August 5, 1991. There, he was informed of the charges against 
him, of his right to a preliminary hearing, and of his constitutional rights. 
Bond was set at $50,000, and Appellant requested to have counsel 
appointed.

 
 

[¶7.]     On August 7, 1991, the 
county court appointed the public defender to represent Appellant. Appellant 
waived his right to a preliminary hearing and was bound over to the district 
court. An information which recited the three felony counts contained in the 
complaint was filed in the district court. At the arraignment, Appellant pleaded 
not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency to all 
counts. The WyomingStateHospital and an independent 
psychologist evaluated Appellant, and they both found that he was mentally 
capable of understanding the wrongfulness of his actions and of participating 
meaningfully in his defense.

 
 

[¶8.]     A change-of-pleas 
hearing was held on February 11, 1992. In accord with a plea bargain agreement 
placed on the record, Appellant withdrew his pleas of not guilty and not guilty 
by reason of mental illness or deficiency. He pleaded guilty to the first count 
which was reduced by an amendment to attempted second-degree murder in violation 
of §§ 6-1-301 and 6-2-104. For this crime, Appellant agreed to be sentenced to a 
term of not less than thirty-seven years nor more than forty-five years. He also 
pleaded guilty to the second count which charged him with first-degree sexual 
assault by sexual intercourse in violation of § 6-2-302(a)(ii). For this crime, 
Appellant agreed to accept a concurrent sentence not to exceed the sentence for 
attempted second-degree murder. The State moved to dismiss the third count which 
charged Appellant with first-degree sexual assault by cunnilingus in violation 
of § 6-2-302(a)(ii). Appellant's counsel explained that, although discussions 
occurred concerning alleged charges of child molestation which were being 
investigated by Arizona authorities, the plea agreement was in 
no way contingent upon the disposition of those charges.

 
 

[¶9.]     The district court 
accepted Appellant's guilty pleas in accord with the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 
15.1 The district court properly advised 
Appellant and inquired into whether he understood the nature of the charges 
against him, whether he was aware of the consequences of pleading guilty, 
whether his pleas were voluntarily entered, and whether a factual basis existed 
for the pleas. After doing so, the district court found that Appellant 
intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily entered the guilty pleas after 
consulting with competent counsel. However, the district court deferred 
acceptance of the plea agreement and sentencing until after a presentence 
investigation report had been completed.

 
 

[¶10.]  On March 23, 1992, Appellant wrote a 
letter to the district court in which he requested to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
He stated that he was "pressured" into entering the pleas to avoid child 
molestation charges under investigation in Arizona. This letter precipitated a motion to 
withdraw by his appointed counsel. As grounds for this motion, his appointed 
counsel stated that Appellant felt they rendered ineffective assistance by, most 
particularly, failing to negotiate a satisfactory disposition of his case. The 
district court granted the withdrawal motion, and an entry of appearance was 
filed by privately retained counsel.

 
 

[¶11.]  Appellant, through his privately retained 
counsel, filed a motion on May 11, 1992, to withdraw his guilty pleas. At a 
hearing held two days later, Appellant generally recanted the representations 
which he had made to the district court at the change-of-pleas hearing. He 
stated that he did not make his pleas intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily. 
Appellant testified that it was his understanding that no charges would be filed 
in Arizona if 
he were to plead guilty, that he was merely doing what his attorneys told him to 
do, and that he could not remember the incident due to being intoxicated at the 
time. The State substantially impeached Appellant's testimony through 
cross-examination and the investigating officer's testimony, to whom Appellant 
gave a confession.

 
 

[¶12.]  The district court denied Appellant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas after hearing the evidence. The district 
court determined that no evidence had been presented to undermine its initial 
determination that Appellant intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily entered 
pleas of guilty after consulting with competent counsel. In accord with the plea 
agreement, the district court sentenced Appellant to serve concurrent terms of 
thirty-seven to forty-five years on each count. Appellant timely filed a notice 
of intent to appeal his judgment and sentence. He asserts on appeal that the 
district court erroneously denied his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. He 
requests this Court to reverse his judgment and sentence and to remand this case 
for further proceedings.

 
 

[¶13.]  The withdrawal of guilty pleas and pleas 
of nolo contendere is governed by W.R.Cr.P. 32(d):

(d) Plea withdrawal. - If a motion for 
withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is made before sentence is 
imposed, the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the 
defendant of any fair and just reason. At any later time, a plea may be set 
aside only to correct manifest injustice.

 
 
As 
indicated by the rule's permissive tenor, whether or not to permit a withdrawal 
of a guilty or nolo contendere plea lies within the discretion of the district 
court. See, e.g., Reay v. State, 800 P.2d 499 (Wyo. 1990). The standard against which the 
district court's exercise of discretion is measured varies depending upon 
whether the withdrawal motion is filed before or after the sentence has been 
imposed. If a motion is filed before the sentence is imposed, as in this case, 
the district court may grant the motion upon a showing of "any fair and just 
reason." W.R.Cr.P. 32(d). This Court has held, however, 
that:

 
 
[A]n abuse 
of discretion is not demonstrated even if a "plausible" or a "just and fair" 
reason for withdrawal is presented if the requirements of Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P., 
have been met and the record is clear that the defendant intelligently, 
knowingly, and voluntarily entered into his plea of 
guilty.

 
 
Triplett v. 
State, 802 P.2d 162, 165 (Wyo. 1990) 
(discussing Schmidt v. State, 668 P.2d 656 (Wyo. 1983)). See also Chorniak v. State, 715 P.2d 1162 (Wyo. 1986).

 
 

[¶14.]  Appellant's primary argument on appeal is 
that his pleas were not intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily entered 
because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He particularly complains 
that his counsel failed to adequately investigate his potential exposure to 
charges in Arizona prior to advising him to plead guilty. 
He also claims that his counsel failed to inform him that intoxication is a 
potential defense to a specific intent crime such as attempted first-degree 
murder. Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel would constitute 
a "fair and just reason" to grant a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
if they were substantiated by the record. The record, however, simply does not 
speak to these allegations. Appellant failed to present any evidence at the 
motion hearing concerning what his counsel did or did not do in relation to 
investigating the Arizona charges or whether or not they informed him of an 
intoxication defense. He will not now be heard to complain that the district 
court abused its discretion by failing to grant his withdrawal motion on these 
grounds.

 
 

[¶15.]  Absent the 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, Appellant is left to argue that the 
district court abused its discretion by denying his withdrawal motion on the 
basis of the evidence produced at the hearing. The evidence produced at the 
hearing was his uncorroborated testimony that he did not enter his guilty pleas 
intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily. His statements to the effect that he 
did not understand the terms of the plea bargain, that he was merely doing what 
his attorneys told him to do, and that he could not remember what he had done on 
July 23, 1991, were all patently inconsistent with the representations he made 
to the district court when he entered his guilty pleas. The issue thus became 
one of credibility. The district court carefully complied with W.R.Cr.P. 15 when 
it accepted Appellant's guilty pleas and, therefore, did not abuse its 
discretion by denying Appellant's presentence withdrawal motion. See, e.g., 
Triplett, 802 P.2d 162.

 
 

[¶16.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Revised 
effective March 24, 1992 (now W.R.Cr.P. 11).