Case Title: Robert Murphy v. International Robotic Systems

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC92-837

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2000-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 In the decision below, the Fourth District identified decisions from the First, Third, and Fifth District
Courts of Appeal with which it disagreed.  See Murphy v. Int'l Robotic Sys., Inc., 710 So. 2d 587,
587 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).  After the Fourth District decided Murphy, however, the Fifth District
issued its decision in Fravel v. Haughey, 727 So. 2d 1033, 1034-37 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (en banc),
wherein the court essentially aligned itself with the Fourth District on the issue of improper, but
unobjected-to, closing argument in civil cases.  Thus, conflict no longer exists between decisions from
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC92837
____________
ROBERT MURPHY and TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS 
INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Petitioners,
vs.
INTERNATIONAL ROBOTIC SYSTEMS, INC.,
and HOWARD HORNSBY,
Respondents.
[August 17, 2000]
LEWIS, J.
We have for review Murphy v. International Robotic Systems, Inc., 710 So.
2d 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), which expressly and directly conflicts with decisions
from the First and Third District Courts of Appeal1 regarding when relief may be
the Fourth and Fifth Districts.
2 Our decision here does not affect the law in criminal cases regarding improper, but unobjected-to,
closing argument.  Further, this decision does not impact the legal standards applicable to
consideration of the issue that has been properly preserved by objection and motion for mistrial,
which remains whether the comment was highly prejudicial and inflammatory.  See, e.g., Hagan v.
Sun Bank of Mid-Florida, N.A, 666 So. 2d 580, 585 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).  The rules and standards
applicable to preserved and unobjected-to comments are substantially different.
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granted in a civil case based upon improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument. 
We have jurisdiction.  See Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  As explained more fully
below, we hold that relief may not be granted in a civil case2 based on improper, but
unobjected-to, closing argument unless such argument is first challenged and
judicially evaluated in the trial court.
I. GENERAL FACTUAL BACKGROUND
IN THE PRESENT CASE
During the mid-1980s, Robert Murphy (Murphy) and Howard Hornsby
(Hornsby) developed a low-profile, remote-controlled, unmanned marine vehicle
known as the OWL.  Generally described, the OWL consists of a fiberglass hull,
motor, and various electronic components, all formed around the base of a jet ski
type personal watercraft.  In 1988, Murphy and Hornsby, along with several other
individuals, formed International Robotic Systems, Inc. (Robotic Systems I), a
Florida corporation, in large part to conduct business relating to the development
and marketing of the OWL.  Murphy and Hornsby each owned forty percent of the
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stock in Robotic Systems I; Murphy became the president of the company and
Hornsby its vice-president.  By 1990, two patents had been issued to Murphy and
Hornsby as co-inventors of the OWL, and they assigned those patents to Robotic
Systems I.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Murphy and Hornsby attempted to
attract business interest in the OWL, with a primary potential customer being the
U.S. Navy.  In addition to the U.S. Navy, private companies such as Boston Whaler
and Israeli Aircraft Industries expressed varying interest in the product. Also during
this time period, several business interests loaned funds to Robotic Systems I,
including a New York financier who loaned $100,000 to the company, and
International Commercial Development Company (ICDC), which loaned the
company $125,000.  To secure the $125,000 loan from ICDC, Robotic Systems I
assigned the two patents on the OWL to ICDC as collateral.  Robotic Systems I also
obtained several other smaller loans during this time period.
By the end of 1991, the U.S. Navy had expressed an interest in purchasing a
prototype OWL, but there were no guarantees of when, if ever, the Navy would
actually make the purchase.  During February 1992, Murphy and Hornsby were
introduced to John Terry Carroll (Carroll), an employee and representative of
United Technologies Optical Systems (UTOS), a subsidiary of United Technologies
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Corporation (UTC).  UTOS was not UTC's only subsidiary, as UTC was also the
parent company of entities such as Pratt-Whitney; generally speaking, UTC was a
large corporate entity with significant ties to the defense industry.  Upon meeting
with Murphy and Hornsby and viewing the OWL, Carroll expressed interest in the
OWL's potential uses.
In April 1992, Carroll introduced Murphy and Hornsby to Peter Just (Just)
and John Wood (Wood), officers of Laser Holdings, Ltd. (Laser), an Australian
company with which UTC had a pre-existing business relationship.  On April 12,
1992, Murphy, Hornsby, Just, and Wood met to discuss the sale of Robotic Systems
I's assets to Laser.  Carroll attended this meeting as well, acting in large part as
moderator.  At the end of the meeting, Murphy and Hornsby on behalf of Robotic
Systems I, and Just and Wood on behalf of Laser, executed a "Memorandum of
Understanding" (MOU).  According to the terms of the MOU, Robotic Systems I
agreed to sell its assets to Laser for $200,000, of which $25,000 would be payable
on April 15, 1992, with the remaining $175,000 payable at closing.  The assets to be
transferred included, among other things, the two OWL patents, any future contract
with the U.S. Navy, a prototype OWL, and the goodwill of Robotic Systems I,
including its corporate name.  The memorandum also specified that any sale was
contingent upon (1) Robotic Systems I successfully procuring a contract from the
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U.S. Navy for the purchase of an OWL; and (2) Hornsby becoming an employee of
the purchasing company.
After executing the MOU, but prior to closing, the parties entered into several
additional agreements.  Specifically, on May 27, 1992, Laser entered into a
"Consultancy Agreement" and a "Loan Agreement" with Robotics Systems I, and
Laser also entered into a "Commission Agreement" with Hornsby and Murphy,
individually.  Under the terms of the "Consultancy Agreement," Robotic Systems I
agreed to be a consultant to Laser for a period of five years for development of the
business purchased from Robotic Systems I, and Laser agreed to pay a total
consultant’s fee of not less than $300,000 but not more than $400,000 during that
five-year period.  According to the "Loan Agreement," Laser agreed to lend
$300,000 to Robotic Systems I for a five-year period at an interest rate of six
percent, to be paid back in amounts to be agreed upon by the parties "from time to
time."  Finally, under the terms of the "Commission Agreement," Laser agreed to
pay Murphy and Hornsby a commission of $5000 each for every OWL produced in
the first twelve months following the date of execution of the agreement, and $750
for every OWL produced in the four years following that first twelve-month period. 
The cap on commissions payable to Murphy and Hornsby over the five- year period
was $1,000,000 each.
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The closing on the proposed transaction was held on July 24, 1992.  Several
weeks prior to that time, one of the conditions precedent to the proposed transaction
had been fulfilled; namely, the U.S. Navy entered into a contract with Robotic
Systems I for the purchase of a prototype OWL, with a sales price of approximately
$449,000.  Hornsby fulfilled the other condition precedent set forth in the MOU by
agreeing at the closing to a five-year employment contract with the Australian
interests, with a starting salary of $80,000 per year.  In conjunction with the closing,
Just and Wood formed a new Florida corporation, Justwood, Inc. (Justwood), to
receive the assets of Robotic Systems I, including its corporate name.  Additionally,
all of Laser's rights under the previously executed agreements were transferred to
Justwood, which adopted the name International Robotic Systems, Inc. (Robotic
Systems II).  At the same time, Robotic Systems I changed its name to Technology
Innovations International, Inc. (Innovations), and Murphy remained with
Innovations.  Using the money obtained from the sale, Robotic Systems I satisfied
all of its existing debts.
After the closing, Hornsby, as president of Robotic Systems II, began
developing and building a new prototype OWL according to the specifications and
requirements set forth in the contract with the U.S. Navy.  Cost overruns occurred
during this development and building process, and the OWL ultimately was
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delivered to the U.S. Navy behind schedule.  During the same time period, Laser
experienced financial difficulties and was placed into receivership in Australia.  A
$5000 commission check was sent to Murphy for the OWL produced for the U.S.
Navy, and another $750 commission check was sent to him after another prototype
demonstrator OWL was produced.  The OWL built for the Navy and the
demonstrator OWL were the only two OWLs fully produced in the three years
following the closing of July 14, 1992.
II. PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT
AND THE FOURTH DISTRICT
Murphy and Innovations (collectively "the Plaintiffs") filed suit against
UTC/UTOS, Laser, Robotic Systems II, and Hornsby (collectively "the
Defendants").  One of the Plaintiffs' primary allegations was that Carroll, the
employee and representative of UTOS/UTC, had misrepresented the extent of
involvement that UTC/UTOS would have in producing and marketing the OWL
after the deal with Laser was completed.  More specifically, the Plaintiffs asserted
that Carroll represented that the Australian interests were merely a conduit for
UTC/UTOS to become involved with the OWL.  The Plaintiffs claimed that if the
major corporate presence of UTC/UTOS had supported the OWL, the ultimate
financial and production problems associated with the product would not have
3 The judgment in favor of the Defendants did not include Laser, however, because the trial court
previously had entered a default judgment as to liability against that business entity.  The Plaintiffs
moved for a new trial on damages in relation to Laser, but the trial court denied that motion.  The
validity of that denial is not before this Court for review.
4 Hornsby, individually, was not included as a defendant on the counts relating to the "Commission
Agreement" and the "Consulting Agreement."
5 The breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation/concealment claims concerned only Hornsby
individually, not the other defendants.
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occurred.
The case proceeded to trial and, at the conclusion of the four-week trial, the
jury found in favor of the Defendants3 on all but one claim.  Specifically, the jury
returned a special interrogatory verdict form finding the following: (1) none of the
Defendants either intentionally or negligently misrepresented material facts which
the Plaintiffs reasonably relied upon and which caused monetary losses to the
Plaintiffs; (2) none of the Defendants conspired with one another to intentionally
misrepresent material facts which the Plaintiffs relied upon and which caused
monetary losses to the Plaintiffs; (3) none of the Defendants breached the 
"Commission Agreement" with Murphy; (4) none of the Defendants breached the
"Consultancy Agreement" with Innovations;4 (5) Hornsby, individually, breached a
fiduciary duty owed to the Plaintiffs, from which the Plaintiffs suffered damages in
the amount of $1; (6) Hornsby, individually, did not receive and conceal moneys for
himself which were corporate opportunities of Innovations;5 (7) the assignment of
6 The Plaintiffs noted in their motion for new trial that counsel for Hornsby and Robotic Systems II
had not participated in the "offending argument."  However, the Plaintiffs argued that the trial court
should grant a new trial against every defendant (except for Laser, see supra note 3), including
Hornsby and Robotic Systems II, because every defendant benefitted from the improper argument
made by counsel for UTC/UTOS.  In support of this argument, the Plaintiffs relied on the Third
District's decision in Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Morse, 653 So. 2d 409, 412 (Fla. 3d DCA
1995), wherein the court granted a new trial against every defendant based upon improper closing
argument made by counsel for only one defendant.
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the two OWL patents from Innovations to Robotic Systems II should not be held
null and void due to the conduct of the Defendants; and (8) none of the Defendants
were liable for punitive damages.
After the jury returned its verdict and the trial court had discharged the jury,
the Plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial, seeking relief on several grounds.  First,
the Plaintiffs alleged that a special "reasonable reliance" jury instruction given by
the trial court at the request of the Defendants erroneously stated the law and thus
required a new trial.  Second, the Plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to a new
trial against the Defendants because counsel for UTC/UTOS6 allegedly made
numerous improper comments during closing argument, even though counsel for the
Plaintiffs made no objections during such argument.  Finally, the Plaintiffs alleged
that the jury verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence and was grossly
inadequate as to the award of damages against Hornsby.  After considering the
parties' memoranda of law and conducting a hearing, the trial court entered an order
7 Sometime after the trial concluded, the Plaintiffs settled all claims against UTC/UTOS.  Therefore,
those business entities are not involved in the present proceedings before this Court.
8 The Fourth District also considered and rejected on the merits "the other issues" raised by the
Plaintiffs, but the court in its opinion did not identify the substance of those other issues. See Murphy,
710 So. 2d at 591.
9 As noted above, the Fourth District issued its decision in Murphy before the Fifth District issued its
decision in Fravel.  See supra note 1.
10 The Plaintiffs also request that this Court address the "reasonable reliance" jury instruction issue,
which they raised in their motion for new trial.  However, because that issue is outside the scope of
the conflict issue, we decline to address it.  See, e.g., Asbell v. State, 715 So. 2d 258, 258 (Fla.
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summarily denying the Plaintiffs' motion for new trial, and the Plaintiffs appealed.7
On appeal, the Fourth District rejected the Plaintiffs' request for relief on the
closing argument issue.8  See Murphy, 710 So. 2d at 587-91.  In so doing, the court
(1) disagreed with decisions from the First, Third, and Fifth Districts9 as to when
relief may be granted in a civil case based upon improper, but unobjected-to, closing
argument, see id. at 587-88; (2) stated that "we do not think improper, but
unobjected-to, closing argument in a civil case is something which is so fundamental
that there should be an exception to the rule requiring an objection," id. at 589; and
(3) expressed that it did not think it was being inconsistent with precedent from this
Court on the improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument issue.  See id. at 590. 
The Plaintiffs petitioned this Court for review, and we granted review to resolve the
conflict among Florida's District Courts of Appeal regarding the improper, but
unobjected-to, closing argument issue.10  Thus, it is within these complex and
1998).  Further, we consider the Plaintiffs' claim that the verdict was against the manifest weight of
the evidence only to the extent necessary to analyze whether the closing argument comments being
challenged as improper warrant a new trial against Hornsby and Robotic Systems II.
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multiple contractual circumstances that required four weeks of trial for presentation
to a jury that we consider the unobjected-to closing argument issue.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT ISSUE
A. GENERAL BACKGROUND
This Court has previously decided four civil cases involving the issue of
improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument.  See White Constr. Co. v. Dupont,
455 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1984); Tyus v. Apalachicola N. R.R. Co., 130 So. 2d 580
(Fla. 1961); Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. Strickland, 88 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1956);
Baggett v. Davis, 124 Fla. 701, 169 So. 372 (1936).  As explained in more detail
below, this Court recognized in those cases that, under certain circumstances, a civil
litigant may obtain relief based on improper closing argument made by counsel for
an opposing party, even though the litigant's own counsel failed to
contemporaneously object to such improper argument.  See Dupont, 455 So. 2d at
1030; Tyus, 130 So. 2d at 587-88; Strickland, 88 So. 2d at 523-24; Baggett, 124
Fla. at 717, 169 So. at 379.  Stated another way, this Court recognized an exception
to the contemporaneous objection requirement in civil cases in the context of
improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument.  However, despite this Court's prior
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decisions, there has been much recent debate regarding (1) whether an exception to
the contemporaneous objection requirement should continue to exist in civil cases in
this context; and (2) if such an exception continues to exist, what the appropriate
standard for relief should be.  This case affords the opportunity to address both the
continuing validity of the exception and the appropriate standard for determining
whether relief should be granted.
B. CONTINUING VALIDITY OF THE EXCEPTION
The contemporaneous objection requirement originated in the English legal
system as a mechanism for preserving error for appellate review, and the
requirement was carried forward and generally adopted in America.  See, e.g.,
Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues On Appeal: The General Rule and the
Gorilla Rule, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1023, 1026 (1987).  In Florida, "[j]ust like with any
other trial error, lawyers have a duty to object to improper comments made during
closing arguments."  Fravel v. Haughey, 727 So. 2d 1033, 1034 (Fla. 5th DCA
1999) (en banc).  In Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 457 n.1
(3d Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 462 U.S. 523 (1983), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that the reasons for the
contemporaneous objection requirement:
go to the heart of the common law tradition and the
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adversary system.  It affords an opportunity for correction
and avoidance in the trial court in various ways: it gives
the adversary the opportunity either to avoid the
challenged action or to present a reasoned defense of the
trial court's action; and it provides the trial court with the
alternative of altering or modifying a decision or of
ordering a more fully developed record for review.
In Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1978), this Court similarly stated:
The requirement of a contemporaneous objection is based
on practical necessity and basic fairness in the operation
of a judicial system.  It places the trial judge on notice that
error may have been committed, and provides him an
opportunity to correct it at an early stage of the
proceedings.  Delay and an unnecessary use of the
appellate process result from a failure to cure early that
which must be cured eventually.
While it is clear that this Court has previously recognized an exception to the
contemporaneous objection requirement in civil cases in the context of improper,
but unobjected-to, closing argument, there has been much recent debate regarding
whether such an exception should continue to exist.  For example, the Fourth
District stated in Murphy that "we do not think improper, but unobjected-to, closing
argument in a civil case is something which is so fundamental that there should be
an exception to the rule requiring an objection."  710 So. 2d at 589.  Similarly, in
Walt Disney World Co. v. Blalock, 640 So. 2d 1156, 1159 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
(Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), Judge Griffin commented: "I
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have come to be of the view that a party who does not object to counsel's comments
in closing should not be allowed to complain of those comments on appeal." 
Finally, in a recently published law review article, the author of the opinion below,
Judge Klein, concluded that there should no longer be an exception to the
contemporaneous objection requirement in civil cases in the context of improper,
but unobjected-to, closing argument.  See Larry A. Klein, Allowing Improper
Argument of Counsel to be Raised for the First Time on Appeal as Fundamental
Error: Are Florida Courts Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water?, 26 Fla. St.
U. L. Rev. 97, 98-126 (1998) [hereinafter Klein, Baby with the Bath Water]; see
also Gary D. Fox, Objectionable Closing Argument: Causes and Solutions, 70 Fla.
B.J. 43, 48 (Dec. 1996) (proposing abolition of "the part of the fundamental error
rule that allows a party to preserve error without objecting to its adversaries' closing
argument").  In determining whether we should continue recognizing an exception to
the contemporaneous objection requirement in civil cases in this context, we
consider this Court's prior decisions addressing the issue, how courts in other
jurisdictions have addressed the issue, and the competing policy concerns that must
be considered.
1. THIS COURT'S PRIOR DECISIONS
The first of this Court's decisions in the civil context addressing improper, but
11 As noted above, the trial court in Baggett denied a motion for new trial filed by the defendant.  See
124 Fla. at 706, 169 So. at 375.  This Court's opinion in Baggett did not identify the specific issues
raised in the defendant's motion for new trial, noting only that the motion "embod[ied] some of the
grounds found in the assignment of errors, which grounds will be taken up in detail on disposing of
the questions presented."  See id.  However, while addressing the propriety of the statements made
by plaintiff's counsel during closing argument, the Baggett Court noted that plaintiff's counsel "filed
an affidavit in his motion for new trial which attempted in some measure to deny the facts as set out
in the bill of exceptions as to what actually took place at the trial."  See Baggett, 124 Fla. at 716, 169
So. at 378.  This language indicates that at least one of the issues raised in the defendant's motion for
new trial concerned the propriety of the statements made by plaintiff's counsel during closing
argument.
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unobjected-to, closing argument was Baggett, in which the plaintiff sought  recovery
for injuries sustained in an automobile accident.  See 124 Fla. at 704, 169 So. at
374.  The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant filed a motion for
new trial; the trial court denied that motion, and the case proceeded for review in
this Court.  See id. at 706, 169 So. at 375.
Before this Court, the defendant asserted that numerous errors had occurred
during trial, many of which related to the jury instructions given by the trial court,
see id. at 709-13, 169 So. at 376-78, two of which related to the admission of
evidence, see id. at 706-10, 169 So. at 375-76, and two of which related to several
statements made by plaintiff's counsel during closing argument.11  See id. at 715-16,
169 So at 378-79.  After addressing the admission of evidence and jury instruction
issues and finding two errors therein, see id. at 709-15, 169 So. at 376-78, this
Court considered the statements made by plaintiff's counsel during closing
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argument.  See id. at 714-17, 169 So. at 378-79.
The bill of exceptions filed by the defendant showed that the first allegedly
improper statement made by plaintiff's counsel consisted of the following:
Gentlemen of the Jury, in considering the amount of
your verdict you need not stop to consider that it will cost
Mr. Baggett, the defendant, because he will not be out
anything, and that same will not cost him a cent, and that
he will not be one cent richer or poorer; or words to that
effect.
Id.  The Baggett Court noted that the defendant did not object to this statement, nor
had the trial court "of its own motion" admonished plaintiff's counsel or instructed
the jury not to consider the statement.  See id. at 715, 169 So. at 378.  The
defendant's bill of exceptions also set forth the nature of plaintiff's counsel's second
allegedly improper statement:
That the defendant if a verdict was found against
him had a right to file a motion for a new trial, and upon
the hearing of which the trial judge would determine
whether the verdict should stand or fall, and that thereafter
if the trial judge held that the verdict should stand the
defendant had available the right of appeal by writ of error
to the Supreme Court of Florida where the legal errors in
the proceedings might be reconsidered and readjudged,
and that thereafter it would be necessary for the plaintiff
to sue out an execution; or words to that effect.
Id. at 716, 169 So. at 378.  The Baggett Court noted that defense counsel objected
to this second statement and that the trial court "immediately stopped counsel for
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plaintiff and stated to the jury that this statement should not be considered."  Id.
In analyzing the second, objected-to statement, this Court determined that the
statement was improper but that the trial court corrected any error by immediately
cautioning the jury to disregard the statement.  See id.  In analyzing the unobjected-
to statement, the Baggett Court first reiterated that a party should state the grounds
for objection to improper argument.  See id.  The Court then quoted from its prior
decision in the criminal case of Akin v. State, 86 Fla. 564, 572-73, 98 So. 609, 612
(1923), in which the Court stated:
The law seems to be well settled that it is the duty
of the trial judge, whether requested or not, to check
improper remarks of counsel to the jury, and to seek by
proper instructions to the jury to remove any prejudicial
effect they may be calculated to have against the opposite
party.  A verdict will not be set aside by an appellate court
because of such remarks or because of any omission of
the judge to perform his duty in the matter, unless
objection be made at the time of their utterance.  This rule
is subject to the exception that, if the improper remarks
are of such a character that neither rebuke nor retraction
may entirely destroy their sinister influence, in which
event a new trial should be awarded regardless of the
want of objection or exception.
See, Baggett, 124 Fla. at 716-17, 169 So. at 379.  The Baggett Court found that the
unobjected-to statement made by plaintiff's counsel during closing argument "was
similar in its probable effect upon the jury to the first remark of counsel objected to
12 While Akin does not specifically state that the trial court denied the defendant's motion for new
trial, see 86 Fla. at 570-71, 98 So. at 612, it is clear that the court did so given the defendant's appeal
to this Court.
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in . . . Akin v. State," and then, after addressing several other issues, reversed the
trial court's judgment "for the errors pointed out herein."  Id. at 717-18, 169 So. at
379.  On the face of the Baggett opinion, however, it is not absolutely clear whether
the unobjected-to statement made by plaintiff's counsel during closing argument was
among the multiple "errors" for which this Court reversed due to the reliance upon
Akin.  To understand the principles, therefore, we must look to Akin for guidance.
In Akin, the defendant appealed to this Court after being convicted of forgery,
arguing that numerous errors had occurred during his trial.  See 86 Fla. at 566-72,
98 So. at 610-12.  After agreeing with the defendant that numerous errors occurred
concerning the admission and exclusion of certain evidence, see id., the Akin Court
addressed the propriety of various statements made by the prosecutor during closing
argument, an issue that the defendant had raised in a motion for new trial. 12  See id.
at 572-73, 98 So. at 612.  The first statement made by the prosecutor during closing
argument in Akin, to which the Baggett Court analogized the unobjected-to
statement made by plaintiff's counsel in that case, consisted of the following:
(1)”This defendant has other indictments pending against him in
connection with these transactions.  I do not intend to try the other
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cases, and it is up to you as to whether you will let this man go scot
free and say that he has not committed any wrong.  If he is convicted
he would probably only have to pay a small fine, and it is in the power
of the court to fine him not more than 5 cents, if he wanted to.”
Akin, 86 Fla. at 571, 98 So. at 612.  The defendant also challenged three other
statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument.  See id.  In analyzing
all of the statements made by the prosecutor, the Akin Court used the language
quoted in Baggett: in short, that a timely objection to improper closing argument is
required before a new trial may be granted based on such argument unless "the
improper remarks are of such character that neither rebuke nor retraction may
entirely destroy their sinister influence."  Akin, 86 Fla. at 572-73, 98 So. at 612. 
The Akin Court determined that the prosecutor's first statement during closing
argument was both a misstatement of the law and had no basis in the record, and
that the other statements made by the prosecutor were also improper.  See id. at
572, 98 So. at 612.  However, the Akin Court stated the following regarding all of
the prosecutor's statements:
 In the case at bar no attempt seems to have been
made to check the improper remarks of the state attorney
by the trial court, and they were not properly excepted to
by the defendant, nor does it fully appear that they came
within the exception to the rule as above announced.  It is
proper to state, however, in addition to what has already
been said in this connection, that these remarks have no
basis in the record, should never be indulged in trial
13 The Second District concluded in  Hagan v. Sun Bank of Mid-Florida, N.A., 666 So. 2d 580, 585-
86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), that the defendant in Baggett received a new trial based on plaintiff's
counsel's improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument.  Similarly, the Fourth District's decision in
Carlton v. Johns, 194 So. 2d 670, 674 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967), may be read as concluding that this
Court granted a new trial in Baggett based on plaintiff's counsel's improper, but unobjected-to,
closing argument.  Regardless of the proper Baggett interpretation, based upon an analysis of Akin,
the standard for relief is exceedingly high.
14 The underlying facts in Strickland are fully set forth in this Court's earlier decision in that case, a
decision that was reversed by the United States Supreme Court on an issue of federal law.  See
Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Strickland, 80 So. 2d 914, 915-17 (Fla.), rev'd, 350 U.S. 893 (1955).  The
Strickland case that we now analyze came to this Court upon  remand from the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court.  See Strickland, 88 So. 2d at 520.
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courts, and would ordinarily be ground for reversal.
Id. at 573, 98 So. at 612 (emphasis added).  The Akin Court reversed and remanded
for a new trial, see id. at 574, 98 So. at 613, but, based on the language quoted and
emphasized above, it is clear that the Court did not reverse based on the
prosecutor's improper statements during closing argument.  Concomitantly, by
analogizing the unobjected-to improper statement made by plaintiff's counsel in
Baggett with the prosecutor's first statement in Akin, it appears that the Baggett
Court may not have counted plaintiff's counsel's improper, but unobjected-to,
statement among the errors for which it reversed.13
Twenty years after Baggett, this Court decided Strickland, which involved an
employee suing a railroad company by which he was employed to recover for
personal injuries he sustained while on the job.  See 88 So. 2d at 520-21.14  After
the plaintiff prevailed in the trial court, the defendant appealed to this Court,
1 5 Neither of this Court's Strickland opinions indicate whether the defendant included objectionable
statements as a basis for a new trial.
-21-
claiming that several errors were made during the trial. 15  See id. at 521. 
Specifically, the defendant claimed on appeal that (1) the trial court erred in
admitting several letters into evidence; and (2) various statements made by plaintiff's
counsel during examination of witnesses and closing argument--concerning those
letters and other matters--were so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.  See id. 
Several of the letters showed that the railroad’s general counsel and its doctor
derived "amusement" and engaged in "hearty laughter" after receiving a report from
a doctor who had examined the plaintiff.  See id. at 520-21.  After reviewing the
content of the letters, this Court determined that "[t]here was no foundation in the
evidence for admitting the letters and it was error to admit them over objection of
defendant."  See id. at 521.  The Court then proceeded to review the various
comments made by plaintiff's counsel throughout the trial.  See id. at 522-23.
First, the Court reviewed comments made by plaintiff's counsel while
questioning one of the plaintiff's witnesses.  See id. at 521-22.  In short, counsel's
comments during questioning stressed the "amusement" referred to in several of the
letters mentioned above, obviously attempting to elicit testimony from the witness
that the plaintiff's injuries were nothing to laugh about.  See id.  The Court noted
-22-
that defense counsel objected to many of the comments, with the trial court
sustaining some of the objections and issuing a "mild rebuke" to plaintiff's counsel in
several instances.  See id. at 523.  The Court then considered various comments
made by plaintiff's counsel during closing argument--relating to the letters--in which
counsel expressed that he could envision the railroad’s general counsel and doctor
sitting in their office "laughing," feet on their desks, saying," 'Isn’t this a big joke? 
Strickland has hurt his back, and he is having trouble with it.' " Id. at 522.  Plaintiff's
counsel argued that the matter was not a joke and that he would "like to wipe that
smile off [general counsel’s] face."  Id.  Finally, the Court considered comments
made by plaintiff's counsel during closing argument related to a demonstration the
jury had seen at the railroad yard that attempted to recreate the plaintiff’s working
conditions when he was injured.  See id. at 522-23.  Counsel repeatedly injected his
personal observations about the demonstration, ultimately stating that there was no
doubt in his mind that the railroad was negligent.  See id. at 523.  Counsel ended
this portion of the argument by commenting that "I think in this case [the defendant]
has pulled every sly trick in the books."  Id.
After finding that defense counsel raised no objections during closing
argument by plaintiff's counsel, this Court stated:
While we are committed to the rule that in the
16 As stated above, the Strickland Court previously had determined that the trial court erred in
admitting the letters into evidence.  See 88 So. 2d at 521.  Thus, the use of the word "admissible"
here must mean "admitted."
-23-
ordinary case, unless timely objections to counsel's
prejudicial remarks are made, this court will not reverse
the judgment on appeal, however, this ruling does not
mean that if prejudicial conduct of that character in its
collective impact of numerous incidents, as in this case, is
so extensive that its influence pervades the trial, gravely
impairing a calm and dispassionate consideration of the
evidence and the merits by the jury, this court will not
afford redress.  In this state of the record, even though the
[letters were] admissible,[16] the prejudicial remarks of
counsel, including the statements made in argument
amounting to testimony in the case, require a new trial. 
Courts are conscious of the fact that without partisan zeal
for the cause of this client, counsel in many instances
could have little success in properly representing litigants
in sharply contested cases, but his conduct during the
cause must always be so guarded that it will not impair or
thwart the orderly processes of a fair consideration and
determination of the cause by the jury.
Id. at 523 (footnote added).  The Strickland Court reversed and remanded for a new
trial, closing with the following comment: "It is the responsibility of the trial court to
protect litigants against such interference by counsel with the orderly administration
of justice and the protection of the right of the litigant to a verdict 'uninfluenced by
the appeals of counsel to passion or prejudice.' " Id. at 524.
Five years after deciding Strickland, this Court decided Tyus, in which the
plaintiff sought recovery due to the death of her husband resulting from a collision
-24-
with one of the defendant's trains.  See 130 So. 2d at 582.  The case proceeded to
trial, and a jury found in favor of the plaintiff.  See id.  The trial court entered
judgment in favor of the plaintiff after denying the defendant's motion for new trial,
and the defendant appealed to the First District.  See id. at 582, 588.
On appeal, the First District determined that the evidence presented was
insufficient to warrant submission to the jury and reversed with directions to enter
judgment in favor of the defendant.  See id. at 582; see also Apalachicola Northern
Railroad Co. v. Tyus, 114 So. 2d 33, 35-37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959), quashed, 130 So.
2d 580 (Fla. 1961).  In addition, the First District concluded that plaintiff's counsel
had made improper statements during closing argument which, standing alone,
constituted grounds for reversal "notwithstanding the effort of the trial court to
remove their effect by instructing the jury to disregard them."  Id. at 37.  In denying
a motion for rehearing, the First District set forth the statements made by plaintiff's
counsel which the court held to be reversible error:
“It would have cost them very little to have put
some kind of signals there so that the man, when he was
going across that track, would have had knowledge of the
fact that the train was coming out from this blinding end
of the railroad; but they didn't value the life of somebody
crossing that track enough to do it.  * * *
“In other words, what is another man unless he can
be some gain to that corporation, knowing its enterprise? 
What is a mere human being, dead or alive, unless he can
-25-
contribute something to the fortune and future of the
Apalachicola Northern Railroad?”
Id. at 38.
This Court accepted jurisdiction in the case to resolve a conflict regarding the
sufficiency of the evidence issue.  See Tyus, 130 So. 2d at 582-83.  After analyzing
that issue, this Court proceeded to disagree with the First District and held that there
was sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury for determination.  See id. at
586-87.  This Court’s view also differed from that of the First District regarding
whether plaintiff's counsel's closing argument statements constituted grounds for
reversal.  See id. at 587.  This Court noted that (1) defense counsel failed to object
to the improper statements quoted in the First District's opinion; and (2) the trial
court sustained objections to other improper statements and charged the jury to
disregard such statements.  See id.  The Tyus Court reiterated the standard for
reviewing unobjected-to improper statements by counsel set forth in Strickland, see
id., and also referred to Baggett.  See id. at 587 n.10.  Further, the Tyus Court
clarified the term "pervades" as used in the Strickland standard, finding that "in
order to employ the exception to the general rule where no objections are made to
alleged prejudicial remarks or conduct, such remarks or conduct need not begin at
the outset of a trial and continue intermittently to its conclusion."  Id. at 587.  In
17 We note that Tyus was a four-to-three decision, with Justice O'Connell authoring the dissenting
opinion.  See Tyus v. Apalachicola N. R.R. Co., 130 So. 2d 580, 588-96 (Fla. 1961) (O'Connell, J.,
dissenting in part, joined by Roberts and Drew, J.J.).  While the three dissenting justices agreed with
the majority's ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence issue, see id. at 588, they disagreed with the
-26-
declining to reverse for a new trial, the Tyus Court closed with the following
remarks:
We believe that the charge given in this case by the
able circuit judge was sufficient to alleviate any harm to
the defendant which might otherwise have existed by
virtue of the alleged prejudicial remarks made by counsel
for the petitioner only in his closing argument.
We are of the opinion that when the charge
delivered by the trial judge is considered together with the
fact that respondent failed to object to the alleged
prejudicial remarks relied on by the District Court of
Appeal as the basis for its holding on this issue, coupled
with the fact that the alleged “prejudicial conduct” took
place only during petitioner's closing argument and was
not so extensive that its influence pervaded the trial, it is
crystal clear this case should not have been reversed even
for a new trial.
 Moreover, it is most significant that in the instant
litigation the veteran and learned trial judge, who was in
the milieu of the court room throughout the trial and who
was therefore in a much better position than this court or
the District Court to determine whether the alleged
prejudicial remarks were actually “in effect” of such
character, denied a motion for a new trial.
No useful purpose would be served by submitting
the factual issues in this case to a second jury for a retrial
thereof because we find that such issues were fairly
considered and determined by the jury . . . .
Id. at 588.17
majority's decision on the closing argument issue.  See id. at 588-96.  The majority apparently
alleviated one of the main concerns expressed in the dissenting opinion by clarifying the meaning of
the term "pervades" as used in the Strickland standard.  See id. at 587, 588-91.  However, the
dissenting justices set forth the numerous improper statements made by plaintiff's counsel during
closing argument, some of which were objected to and some of which were not, and disagreed with
the majority that such statements did not warrant reversal for a new trial.  See id. at 591-96.
-27-
The last civil case in which this Court addressed improper, but unobjected-to,
conduct by counsel during closing argument was Dupont.  In that case, the subject
of the litigation was an accident that occurred at a mining site.  See Dupont, 455 So.
2d at 1027.  At the conclusion of the trial, the jury awarded the plaintiffs both
compensatory and punitive damages.  See id. at 1027-28.  The defendants filed a
motion for new trial raising several claims for reversal, including a claim that
plaintiffs' counsel made inflammatory statements during closing argument.  See id. at
1028.  The trial court denied the motion for new trial, and the defendants appealed. 
See id.
On appeal, the First District affirmed the trial court's ruling on all but one
basis, and the defendants sought review before this Court.  See id.  This Court
accepted review to resolve a conflict regarding the admissibility of evidence relating
to post-accident repairs, see id. at 1027, 1029, but proceeded to resolve several
other issues.  See id. at 1028-30.  Specifically, this Court found that punitive
damages should not have been assessed against the defendants, see id. at 1029, and
-28-
determined that several statements made by plaintiffs' counsel during closing
argument did not constitute a basis for reversal.  See id. at 1030.  In resolving the
closing argument issue, this Court stated the following:
Petitioners argue that some of the comments made
by respondent's counsel during closing argument were
improper and prejudicial.  These comments concerned the
differences in race and economic standing between the
two parties, among other things.  Some latitude is
permitted when arguing the amount of "smart money" to
punish defendants.  See, e.g., Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty,
359 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1978); Tate v. Gray, 292 So. 2d 618
(Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Dixie-Bell Oil Co. v. Gold, 275 So.
2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).  However, since in today's
decision we hold that the issue of punitive damages was
improperly submitted to the jury, it was error for the trial
judge to allow these comments.  In any event, we hold
that these comments do not amount to fundamental error,
and therefore, they cannot form the basis for a new trial
on appeal, since there was no timely and proper objection
made by defense counsel. Tyus v. Apalachicola Northern
Railroad, 130 So. 2d 580, 587 (Fla. 1961); Bishop v.
Watson, 367 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
Dupont, 455 So. 2d at 1030.
After analyzing this Court's decisions in Baggett, Strickland, Tyus, and
Dupont, several matters are clear.  First, this Court has recognized that a trial judge
is in the best position to determine both the propriety of counsel's closing argument
and any possible prejudice resulting from any improper argument.  Second, this
Court has recognized that a trial judge has a duty to prevent improper closing
18 It should be noted, however, that this Court has not allowed a trial judge's breach of duty in the
context of improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument to form an independent basis for appellate
review.  See Baggett, 124 Fla. at 717, 169 So. at 379 ("A verdict will not be set aside by an appellate
court because of [improper] remarks or because of any omission of the judge to perform his duty in
the matter, unless objection be made at the time of their utterance.").
-29-
argument from prejudicing the jury.18  Third, it is clear that in all but the Strickland
case, the party seeking relief on the basis of improper, but unobjected-to, closing
argument initially sought relief on that basis by filing a motion for new trial in the
trial court.  Finally, it is also clear that this Court's overarching concern in allowing
an exception to the contemporaneous objection requirement in civil cases in the
context of improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument is that a party should not
be deprived of a fair trial and due process based on such improper argument and
that public confidence in the system of justice be maintained.  With these
observations from prior decisions of this Court in mind, we now review how courts
in other jurisdictions have addressed the issue of improper, but unobjected-to,
closing argument in civil cases.
2. DECISIONS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS
In the decision below, the Fourth District observed that other courts in this
country do not allow issues concerning improper argument to be raised for the first
time on appeal in civil cases.  See Murphy, 710 So. 2d at 591; see also Fravel, 727
So. 2d at 1036 (citing Murphy for similar proposition); Klein, Baby with the Bath
1 9 We do not attempt to discuss decisions from every state and federal court, but instead attempt to
provide an overview of the various approaches taken by courts in other jurisdictions.
-30-
Water, 26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. at 114 (stating that "no courts outside Florida are
attempting to curb improper argument in civil cases by allowing it to be raised for
the first time on appeal").  Therefore, we consider the jurisprudence from other
jurisdictions to assist in the formulation of a just and workable framework, and our
research indicates that courts in other jurisdictions have addressed the issue.  We
now discuss the decisions of our sister courts.19
a. FEDERAL COURTS
Many of the federal appellate courts have taken similar approaches in
addressing the issue of improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument.  Illustrative is
Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19, 24-26 (1st Cir. 1999), in which the First Circuit
determined that the defendant could seek a new trial based on improper statements
made by plaintiffs' counsel during closing argument, even though defense counsel
failed to object to such argument and failed to address such argument in a motion
for new trial filed in the trial court.  The First Circuit found that even in the absence
of a contemporaneous objection to the allegedly improper argument, an appellate
court may conduct a "plain error" review of the improper argument.  See id. at 25-
26.  The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eight, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have taken
-31-
approaches similar to that of the First Circuit.  See, e.g., Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton
Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that an appellate court may reverse
for a new trial in a civil case based on improper, but unobjected-to, closing
argument only for plain error); Strickland v. Owens Corning, 142 F.3d 353, 358-59
(6th Cir. 1998) (recognizing exception to contemporaneous objection requirement in
civil case where conduct of counsel is outrageous); Oxford Furniture Co. v. Drexel
Heritage Furnishings, Inc., 984 F.2d 1118, 1128-29 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding that
improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument in a civil case may be reviewed by
appellate court only for plain error); Manning v. Lunda Constr. Co., 953 F.2d 1090,
1092-93 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting Thomure v. Truck Ins. Exch., 781 F.2d 141, 143
(8th Cir. 1986), for the proposition that "[w]hen statements in a closing argument
are not objected to at trial, we may only review them on a plain error standard"); 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frank Coluccio Constr. Co., 785 F.2d 656, 658 (9th Cir.
1986) (recognizing "high threshold" party must meet where no objection made to
improper closing argument; finding no "fundamental error"); Rojas v. Richardson,
703 F.2d 186, 190 (5th Cir.) (reviewing improper, unobjected-to closing argument
in a civil case for plain error and finding that argument rose to the level of plain
error), modified on rehearing, 713 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1983) (reversing earlier plain
error finding based on supplemental record information).  Based on these decisions,
-32-
it is clear that many federal appellate courts have recognized an exception to the
contemporaneous objection requirement in civil cases in this context.  However,
those courts have seldom granted relief in cases where counsel failed to
contemporaneously object to improper argument.  See, e.g., Smith, 177 F.3d at 26-
28 (stating that "[p]lain error is a 'rare species in civil litigation,' encompassing only
those errors that reach the 'pinnacle of fault'" and finding that plaintiffs' counsel's
improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument did not warrant reversal for a new
trial).
b. STATE COURTS
State courts have taken more varied approaches than the federal appellate
courts in addressing the issue of improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument in
civil cases.  Some state courts have created a bright-line rule: if counsel fails to
timely object to improper closing argument made by opposing counsel, then such
argument cannot form the basis for a new trial.  See, e.g., Copeland v. City of
Yuma, 772 P.2d 1160, 1162-63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Kempner v. Schulte, 885
S.W. 2d 892, 894 (Ark. 1994); Rego Co. v. McKown-Katy, 801 P.2d 536, 540
(Colo. 1990); Whitley v. Gwinnett County, 470 S.E. 2d 724, 730 (Ga. Ct. App.
1996); Cooper v. United Southern Assurance Co., 718 So. 2d 1029, 1037-39 (La.
Ct. App. 1998); cf. Johnson v. Emerson, 647 P.2d 806 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982)
-33-
(finding that exception to improper closing argument is timely if made before case is
submitted to the jury); Silier v. City of Kansas City, 505 P.2d 765, 766 (Kan. 1973)
(finding that improper closing argument was not available as basis for reversing
judgment where counsel for the party seeking relief did not object, request a
curative instruction, or move for a mistrial based on such improper argument). 
Other state courts have allowed parties to seek relief based on improper closing
argument, even in the absence of a timely objection, although the standards for
obtaining relief have varied significantly.  See, e.g., Hill v. Sherwood, 488 So. 2d
1357 (Ala. 1986) (relief warranted only "where counsel's remarks were so grossly
improper and highly prejudicial as to be beyond corrective action by the trial court")
(quoted source omitted); Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 657 A.2d 1087, 1097
(Conn. 1995) (relief warranted only where party can show it is "necessary to
remedy a manifest injustice"); Medical Center of Delaware, Inc., v. Lougheed, 661
A.2d 1055, 1060 (Del. 1995) (relief warranted only where improper remarks
amount to "plain error"); Zoerner v. Iwan, 619 N.E. 2d 892, 899-900 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) (stating that "despite the absence of an objection, a reviewing court may
consider claims of improper statements during closing argument to the extent such
statements prevented a fair trial"); Miller v. Szelenyi, 546 A.2d 1013, 1018 (Me.
1988) (reviewing unobjected-to closing argument only for "obvious error"); Reetz v.
-34-
Kinsman Marine Transit Co., 330 N.W. 2d 638, 641-42 (Mich. 1982) ("Where
improper conduct by one or both parties influences the outcome of a trial, an
appellate court may reverse although the appellant's attorney did not seek to cure the
error."); Molkenbur v. Hart, 411 N.W. 2d 249, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (relief
warranted only where trial court should have stepped in, sua sponte, and given
curative instructions); Nisivoccia v. Ademhill Assocs., 669 A.2d 822, 825 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (reviewing unobjected-to closing argument only for
"plain error"); City of Bellevue v. Kravik, 850 P.2d 559, 564 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993)
("Absent an objection to counsel's remarks, the issue of misconduct cannot be raised
on appeal unless the misconduct is so flagrant and ill intentioned that no curative
instructions could have obviated the prejudice engendered by the misconduct."). 
Finally, several state courts have held that a party may not seek relief in an appellate
court based on improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument unless such argument
is first brought to the attention of the trial court by way of a post-trial motion.  See,
e.g., Dial v. Niggel Assocs. Inc., 509 S.E. 2d 269, 271 (S.C. 1998); Austin v.
Shampine, 948 S.W. 2d 900, 906 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).  The varied approaches
taken by our sister courts in addressing a common issue show that there are
substantial policy concerns on both sides of the debate regarding whether there
should be an exception to the contemporaneous objection requirement in civil cases
-35-
in this context.  We now consider those policy concerns.
3. POLICY CONCERNS
In Fravel, 727 So. 2d at 1038-39 (Cobb, J., concurring specially), Judge Cobb
succinctly summarized the focus of the competing policy concerns regarding this
subject when he stated:
The basic conflict is exemplified by the clash
between the opinion of Judge Schwartz in Borden, Inc. v.
Young, 479 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), rev. denied,
488 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1986), and that of Judge Klein in
Murphy, and derives from a difference in focus: the
former is primarily concerned with correcting
reprehensible attorney misconduct during closing
argument; the latter with the proper preservation of trial
error and appellate predictability.  Formidable arguments
are available on both sides of this issue . . . .
In Goldfuss v. Davidson, 679 N.E. 2d 1099, 1103 (Ohio 1997), the Supreme Court
of Ohio used similar language while addressing whether the "plain error" doctrine
should apply in civil cases: "Reviewing courts desire to see justice done; they also
appreciate the importance of consistent application of procedural rules which
promote expeditious and uniform resolution of disputes in our adversary system of
litigation."  We must consider the various policy concerns summarized in Fravel and
Goldfuss.
Several policy concerns weigh against an exception to the contemporaneous
-36-
objection requirement under the circumstances of improper arguments.  First, if
counsel contemporaneously objects to improper closing argument, such objection
can deter opposing counsel from making further improper argument, thus preventing
improper argument from becoming cumulative.  Second, requiring a
contemporaneous objection prevents counsel from engaging in "sandbagging"
tactics, whereby counsel may intentionally refrain from objecting to improper
closing argument, hoping to prevail despite such argument, and then seek relief
based on the unobjected-to argument in the event that the desired outcome in the
case is not achieved.  See, e.g., Lowe Invest. Corp. v. Clemente, 685 So. 2d 84, 85
(Fla. 2d DCA 1996) ("Trial counsel simply cannot allow error to occur without
objection, hope they will win in spite of the error, and be confident of a new trial
when the trial court has not been afforded an opportunity to cure the error.  The
cases are legion that warn trial counsel they cannot have their cake and eat it too."). 
Relatedly, precluding relief absent a contemporaneous objection accounts for the
possibility that counsel may, as a tactical decision, refrain from objecting to
opposing counsel's improper argument based on the belief that such improper
argument actually hurts opposing counsel's rapport with the jury.  Cf. Nelson v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 361, 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).  Also, requiring a
contemporaneous objection provides the trial judge, who is in the best position to
-37-
evaluate the propriety and possible impact of allegedly improper closing argument,
with the optimal opportunity to stop such argument when it is made.  Finally,
requiring a contemporaneous objection helps prevent confusion that can stem from
appellate courts making "cold record" decisions regarding improper closing
argument.  See, e.g., Klein, Baby with the Bath Water, 26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. at 109-
15. 
Juxtaposed against the policy concerns just discussed is the overarching
concern that a litigant receive a fair trial and that our system operate so as to
deserve public trust and confidence.  Indeed, the concern that civil litigants receive a
fair trial undoubtedly was this Court's primary concern in recognizing an exception
to the contemporaneous objection requirement in Baggett, Strickland, Tyus, and
Dupont.  However, as evidenced by the present case, Florida's courts have had
difficulty balancing the right to a fair trial with the competing policy concerns
discussed above.  We now attempt to strike such a balance.  The policy
considerations favoring a bright-line rule requiring an objection are, most assuredly,
attractive.  However, we believe an escape valve with a very narrowly defined
parameter and of extremely limited application is essential to maintain public trust in
our jury trial system.  Additionally, the manner in which review of the issue is
conducted needs limitation.
-38-
4. CONCLUSION
 
After considering this Court's prior decisions, the analysis of each of our
District Courts of Appeal, the decisions of courts in other jurisdictions, as well as
the policy concerns discussed above, we find that the time has come to restate the
approach to be taken regarding the issue of improper, but unobjected-to, closing
argument in civil cases.  It has become increasingly clear that the problem is not so
much whether an exception exists, but, on the contrary, the difficulty has been
generated by a lack of appellate uniformity and a failure at the appellate level to
apply a very narrow and limited parameter of “fundamental error.”  Accordingly, we
now hold that a civil litigant may not seek relief in an appellate court based on
improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument, unless the litigant has at least
challenged such argument in the trial court by way of a motion for new trial even if
no objection was voiced during trial.  This approach is similar to that taken by our
sister courts in South Carolina and Texas, see Dial, 509 S.E. 2d at 271; Austin, 948
S.W. 2d at 906, and we find that such approach adequately promotes the need for
procedural rules, which enhance predictability in the resolution of cases, while also
recognizing that justice may require relief in certain very limited situations even
when established procedural rules have not been followed.  Moreover, this approach
ensures that the trial judge, who is in the best position to determine the propriety
20 As we noted above, however, the parties challenging the improper, but unobjected-to, closing
arguments in Baggett, Tyus, and Dupont first challenged such arguments by filing a motion for new
trial in the trial court, and were therefore not challenging such arguments for the first time on appeal.
-39-
and potential impact of allegedly improper closing argument, has an opportunity to
make a such a determination.  In holding as we do, we recede from this Court's prior
decisions in Baggett, Strickland, Tyus, and Dupont to the extent that those decisions
stand for the proposition that improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument in a
civil case may be challenged for the first time on appeal. 20  We also disapprove
decisions issued by Florida's District Courts of Appeal to the extent that they stand
for such proposition.
In adopting this method of analysis, we have disposed of the first question
posed above; namely, whether an exception to the contemporaneous objection
requirement should continue to exist in civil cases in the context of improper, but
unobjected-to, closing argument.  However, we are mindful that adopting this
approach does not clarify the appropriate standard for determining whether relief
should be granted in post-trial proceedings at the trial level when no objection was
presented during trial but the issue is presented in a motion for new trial.  
Therefore, we must now address the appropriate standard to be applied by the trial
court.
C. THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD
-40-
In Baggett, Strickland, Tyus, and Dupont, this Court set forth different
standards for determining whether relief should be granted in a civil case based on
improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument.  In Baggett, this Court focused on
whether the improper argument was, in effect, incurable, see 124 Fla. at 717, 169
So. at 379; in Strickland and Tyus, this Court focused on the cumulativeness of the
improper argument and whether such argument "gravely impair[s] a calm and
dispassionate consideration of the evidence and the merits by the jury," 88 So. 2d at
523; 130 So. 2d at 587; and in Dupont, this Court stated that improper, but
unobjected-to, closing argument cannot form the basis of a new trial unless such
argument constitutes "fundamental error."  455 So. 2d at 1030.  Further, Florida's
District Courts of Appeal have applied different standards for determining whether
relief should be granted when the situation arises.  See, e.g., Murphy, 710 So. 2d at
587; D'Auria v. Allstate Insurance Co., 673 So. 2d 147, 147 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
(Antoon, J., concurring) ("Recent case law from the various district courts has
provided little guidance on the question of when unpreserved error justifies
reversal."); Hagan v. Sun Bank of Mid-Florida, N.A., 666 So. 2d 580, 583 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1996) ("Confusion, if not conflict, exists concerning the tests that trial courts
should apply in granting or denying a new trial based on preserved or fundamental
error in closing argument and the standards of review that appellate courts should
-41-
apply . . . ."); see also Michael A. Kamen, Summation, in Florida Civil Trial
Practice 48, 50 (1998) ("There is a divergence among the district courts about the
propriety of granting a new trial in a civil case based on improper, but unobjected
to, closing argument.").  We now attempt to eliminate the confusion over the
appropriate standard and outline the standard to be applied by the trial court when
considering unobjected-to statements on a motion for new trial.
1. THE CHALLENGED ARGUMENT MUST BE IMPROPER
To receive a new trial in a civil case based on unobjected-to closing
argument, a complaining party must first establish that the argument being
challenged is, in fact, improper.  In determining whether the argument being
challenged is improper, a trial judge should be guided by the following principles.
The purpose of closing argument is to help the jury understand the issues in a
case by "applying the evidence to the law applicable to the case."  Hill v. State, 515
So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. 1987).  Attorneys should be afforded great latitude in
presenting closing argument, but they must "confine their argument to the facts and
evidence presented to the jury and all logical deductions from the facts and
evidence."  Knoizen v. Bruegger, 713 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); see
also Venning v. Roe, 616 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).  Moreover, closing
argument must not be used to "inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that
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their verdict reflects an emotional response . . . rather than the logical analysis of the
evidence in light of the applicable law."  Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 134
(Fla. 1985).
Attorneys presenting closing argument in Florida courts, whether in criminal
or civil trials, are governed by rule 4-3.4 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. 
Rule 4-3.4 states:
A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, allude to any matter
that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or
that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert
personal knowledge of facts in issue except when
testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to
the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the
culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of
an accused.
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.4(e).  The underpinnings of this ethical rule are well-
founded; it not only prevents lawyers from placing their own credibility at issue in a
case, it also limits the possibility that the jury may decide a case based on non-
record evidence.  See Davis v. South Florida Water Management Dist., 715 So. 2d
996, 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998):  Forman v. Wallshein, 671 So. 2d 872, 875 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1996).  In sum, rule 4-3.4 is in place to help ensure that juries render verdicts
based on record evidence and applicable law, not based on impermissible matters
interjected by counsel during closing argument.
21 We disapprove King v. National Security Fire & Casualty Co., 656 So. 2d 1335, 1337 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1995), to the extent that it stands for the proposition that counsel may not use the terms "liar"
or "lied" regarding a witness when there is record support to question the witness's credibility.
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While we do not attempt to list here all of the various types of improper
argument, we do wish to clarify several matters regarding how rule 4-3.4 should be
interpreted.  First, it is not improper for counsel to state during closing argument that
a witness "lied" or is a "liar," provided such characterizations are supported by the
record.  See Craig v. State, 510 So. 2d 857, 865 (Fla. 1987) (finding that even
though intemperate, prosecutor's closing argument remarks characterizing
defendant's testimony as untruthful and the defendant himself as being a "liar" did
not exceed the bounds of proper argument in view of the record evidence); Forman,
671 So. 2d at 874 (refusing to find improper counsel's closing argument
characterization of plaintiff as being a liar where "there was an ample evidentiary
basis on which to dispute the credibility of the plaintiff"); see also Goutis v. Express
Transport, Inc., 699 So. 2d 757, 763-64 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (agreeing with
Forman).  If the evidence supports such a characterization, counsel is not
impermissibly stating a personal opinion about the credibility of a witness, but is
instead submitting to the jury a conclusion that reasonably may be drawn from the
evidence.21
Second, use of the personal pronoun "I" during closing argument is not, in
22 We disapprove Tremblay v. Santa Rosa County, 688 So. 2d 985, 988 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), and
Bullock v. Branch, 130 So. 2d 74, 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961), to the extent that those decisions stand
for the proposition that a complaining party need not establish the harmfulness of improper, but
unobjected-to, closing argument in order to be granted a new trial based on such argument.
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and of itself, improper.  On this issue, we agree with the Third District's analysis in
Forman, wherein the court reviewed several treatises and concluded that defense
counsel's use of the phrases "I think" and "I believe" did not impermissibly express a
personal opinion, but was instead merely a figure of speech.  See 671 So. 2d at 874-
75 (reviewing Thomas A. Mauet, Fundamentals of Trial Techniques 366 (3d ed.
1992), and Steven Lubet, Modern Trial Advocacy Analysis and Practice, 432-33
(1993)).  When determining whether counsels' use of the personal pronoun "I" is
improper, judges must not place form over substance; it must be understood that
trial counsel is required to analyze the evidence and present reasonable
interpretations and inferences based on the evidence to the jury.
2. THE ARGUMENT MUST BE HARMFUL
Should a complaining party establish that the unobjected-to argument being
challenged is improper, the party must then also establish that the argument being
challenged is harmful. 22  See, e.g., § 59.041, Fla. Stat. (1999); Weise v. Repa Film
Int'l, Inc., 683 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (declining to grant new trial based
on allegedly improper closing argument where complaining party failed to establish
-45-
that such argument was harmful).  In imposing this harmfulness requirement, we
recognize that "there is a temptation for both trial courts and appellate courts to use
the remedy of new trial as a tool to punish misconduct of an attorney."  Hagan, 666
So. 2d at 584.  However, closing argument that is violative of rule 4-3.4 does not
necessarily constitute harmful error.  See, e.g., Winterberg v. Johnson, 692 So. 2d
254, 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).  Although courts have a supervisory role in
overseeing the conduct of attorneys, the primary concern of courts must be how the
improper closing argument affected the fairness of the trial proceedings.  Thus, we
agree with the Fifth District's statement in Fravel that, in many cases, "[w]hen
argument descends to the level of ethical violations, there are other ways to address
the transgression than reversal of a jury verdict."  727 So. 2d at 1036; cf. United
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 (1983) (finding that court should not exercise
supervisory power to reverse jury verdict based on improper closing argument
where such argument is harmless and where "means more narrowly tailored to deter
objectionable prosecutorial conduct are available").  We in no way condone
improper comments but conclude the litigation process is intended to resolve the
pending dispute, not provide a mechanism to deal with wayward lawyers.
Harmfulness in this context also carries a requirement that the comments be
so highly prejudicial and of such collective impact as to gravely impair a fair
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consideration and determination of the case by the jury.  Passing remarks of little
consequence in the scope of a lengthy trial should find little sympathy if no
contemporaneous objection is voiced.  The extensiveness of the objectionable
material is a factor to be considered in the harmfulness analysis.  In sum, the
improper closing argument comments must be of such a nature that it reaches into
the validity of the trial itself to the extent that the verdict reached could not have
been obtained but for such comments.
3. THE ARGUMENT MUST BE INCURABLE
Should a complaining party establish that the unobjected-to closing argument
being challenged is both improper and harmful, the party must then establish that the
argument is incurable.  Specifically, a complaining party must establish that even if
the trial court had sustained a timely objection to the improper argument and
instructed the jury to disregard the improper argument, such curative measures could
not have eliminated the probability that the unobjected-to argument resulted in an
improper verdict.  This concept of "incurability" can be traced back to the Baggett
standard that a timely objection to improper closing argument is required before a
new trial may be granted based on such argument unless "the improper remarks are
of such character that neither rebuke nor retraction may entirely destroy their sinister
influence."  124 Fla. at 717, 169 So. at 379.  As evidenced in Akin and Baggett, it
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will be extremely difficult for a complaining party to establish that the unobjected-to
argument is incurable.
4. THE ARGUMENT MUST BE SUCH THAT IT SO DAMAGED THE
FAIRNESS OF THE TRIAL THAT THE PUBLIC'S INTEREST
IN OUR SYSTEM OF JUSTICE REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL
Should a complaining party establish that the unobjected-to argument being
challenged was improper, harmful, and incurable, the party finally must also
establish that the argument so damaged the fairness of the trial that the public's
interest in our system of justice requires a new trial.  See Hagan, 666 So. 2d at 586;
Klein, Baby with the Bath Water, 26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. at 122-23; cf. Goldfuss, 679
N.E. 2d at 1104 (holding that in civil cases, the plain error doctrine is applicable
"only in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to
which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the
legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself").  Although we do not
specifically limit the types of improper argument that may fit within this category,
we recognize that the category necessarily must be narrow in scope.  For example,
closing argument that appeals to racial, ethnic, or religious prejudices is the type of
argument that traditionally fits within this narrow category of improper argument
requiring a new trial even in the absence of an objection.
23 Depending upon the extent to which the improper argument affected the trial, the trial court may
award a new trial as to liability, damages, or both. 
24 We disapprove Goutis, 699 So. 2d at 760; Tremblay, 688 So. 2d at 987; Hagan, 666 So. 2d at 587;
Eichelkraut v. Kash N' Karry Food Stores, Inc., 644 So. 2d 90, 92 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Wasden, 474
So. 2d at 829; and Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Jackson, 433 So. 2d 1319, 1322 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983),
to the extent that those decisions stand for the proposition that a trial court's grant of a new trial
based on unobjected-to closing argument should be subject to a de novo standard of review on
appeal.  The nature of the elements to be examined and the impact upon a trial are issues that are
more properly resolved at the trial level, subject to extremely limited review on appeal.
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5. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
If a complaining party establishes that the unobjected-to argument being
challenged was improper, harmful, incurable, and so damaged the fairness of the
trial that the public's interest in our system of justice requires a new trial, then the
complaining party is entitled to a new trial. 23  We agree with the Second District
that, when granting a new trial based on unobjected-to closing argument, the trial
court must specifically identify the improper arguments of counsel and the actions of
the jury resulting from those arguments.  See Hagan, 666 So. 2d at 583 (relying on
Wasden v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 474 So. 2d 825, 830 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985));
cf. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530(f) (stating that "[a]ll orders granting a new trial shall specify
the specific grounds therefor").  On appeal, the appellate court must then apply an
abuse of discretion standard in reviewing either the trial court's grant or denial of a
new trial based on the unobjected-to closing argument.24  Cf., e.g., Brown v. Estate
of A.P. Stuckey, 749 So. 2d 490, 498 (Fla. 1999) ("Regardless of whether a new
25 In Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980), this Court set forth the standard of
review to be employed by an appellate court in reviewing a discretionary act of the trail judge:
In reviewing a true discretionary act, the appellate court must
fully recognize the superior vantage point of the trial judge and should
apply the "reasonableness" test to determine whether the trial judge
abused his discretion.  If reasonable men could differ as to the
propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then the action is not
unreasonable and there can be no finding of an abuse of discretion.
The discretionary ruling of the trial judge should be disturbed only
when his decision fails to satisfy this test of reasonableness.
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trial was ordered because the verdict was excessive or inadequate or was contrary
to the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court must employ the
reasonableness test to determine whether the trial judge abused his or her
discretion.").  We find that appellate courts must apply the abuse of discretion
standard of review because applying such standard sufficiently recognizes that the
trial judge is in the best position to determine the propriety and potential impact of
allegedly improper closing argument.25
6. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we hold that before a complaining party may receive a new
trial based on unobjected-to closing argument, the party must establish that the
argument being challenged was improper, harmful, incurable, and so damaged the
fairness of the trial that the public's interest in our system of justice requires a new
trial.  Should the trial court find that these criteria have been established, the court
26 The actual motion for new trial filed by the Plaintiffs did not identify any of the allegedly improper
closing argument made by counsel for UTC/UTOS, but instead stated, "The jury's verdict was tainted
by inflammatory and unfairly prejudicial closing argument of counsel for UTC/UTOS which
permeated the entire proceeding and amounted to fundamental error depriving the Plaintiffs of a fair
trial."  The Plaintiffs' memorandum of law in support of their motion for new trial did, however,
specifically identify various portions of opposing counsel's allegedly improper closing argument, and
the Plaintiffs' initial brief filed in this Court closely tracks the memorandum of law filed in the trial
court.  In fact, all of the allegedly improper closing argument identified in the memorandum of law
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must enter an order granting a new trial specifically identifying both the improper
arguments of counsel and the actions of the jury resulting from those arguments. 
Finally, an appellate court must employ an abuse of discretion standard of review
when considering the correctness of the trial court's grant or denial of a new trial
based on unobjected-to closing argument.  Although we have not absolutely “closed
the door” on appellate review of unpreserved challenges to closing argument, we
have come as close to doing so as we believe consistent with notions of due process
which deserve public trust in the judicial system.  With these standards in mind, we
now review the closing argument being challenged in the present case. 
IV. ANALYZING THE CHALLENGED ARGUMENT IN THIS CASE
At the outset, we note that Plaintiffs' counsel failed to raise any objections
during closing argument made by counsel for UTC/UTOS, nor did Plaintiffs' counsel
request a curative instruction or a mistrial during or at the close of such argument. 
As noted above, however, Plaintiffs' counsel did challenge various portions of
opposing counsel's closing argument by way of a motion for new trial, 26 which was
is identified in the Plaintiffs' initial brief as a basis for a new trial.
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summarily denied by the trial court.  Accordingly, we must determine whether the
trial court abused its discretion in denying the Plaintiffs' motion for new trial on the
basis of allegedly improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument made by counsel
for UTC/UTOS.  After reviewing the closing argument being challenged, as well as
the entire record in this case, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
in denying the Plaintiffs' motion for new trial.
We agree with the Plaintiffs that portions of the closing argument now being
challenged were indeed improper, especially (1) counsel's repeated use of the term
"B.S. detector"; (2) counsel's comment that if the jury found for the Plaintiffs on the
consultancy agreement claim, the jury would be "accessories, after the fact, to tax
fraud"; and (3) counsel's characterization of the Plaintiffs' case as cashing in on a
"lottery ticket."  However, we do not find improper counsel's comments regarding
Murphy's credibility, as there was sufficient record evidence to support counsel's
questioning of Murphy's credibility.  More importantly, it is clear that a reasonable
jurist could conclude that the improper closing argument made by counsel for
UTC/UTOS was not harmful, incurable, or of a character to so damage the fairness
of the trial that the public's interest in our system of justice requires a new trial. 
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we approve the Fourth District's affirmance of
27This four-part test, which all but closes the door on unobjected-to closing argument, requires that
the challenged argument be:  (1) improper; (2) harmful, which the majority defines as "
be[ing] of such
a nature that it reaches into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that the verdict reached could
not have been obtained but for such comments"; (3) incurable; and (4) such that it "so damaged the
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the trial court's denial of the Plaintiffs' motion for new trial.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs specially in result only with an opinion, in which
ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., concurring specially in result only.
I concur in the result reached by the majority and commend Justice Lewis's
scholarly analysis.  I agree with the majority's rejection of the Fourth District's
bright-line rule in Murphy that would preclude reversal if no objection to the
improper argument was registered at trial.  See majority op. at 38.  Further, even
under our prior case law, the unobjected-to arguments in this case do not constitute
fundamental error. 
I am concerned, however, that the majority's newly formulated four-prong
test27 for fundamental error might unnecessarily restrict the authority of trial courts
fairness of the trial that the public's interest in our system of justice requires a new trial."  Majority
op. at 41-48.  
28Many of the opinions of the other courts that have embraced this doctrine are discussed extensively
in the majority's opinion.  See majority op. at 30-35.  Accordingly, I question the accuracy of the
Fourth District's statement that "[s]o far as our research indicates, no other courts in this country
allow improper argument to be raised for the first time on appeal in civil cases."  Murphy v. Int'l
Robotics Sys., Inc., 710 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
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to grant new trials.  Further, although I generally agree with the majority's
requirement that the trial court first evaluate the unobjected-to improper argument in
a motion for new trial, I would still retain the right of appellate courts to reverse for
fundamental error where the conduct "so damaged the fairness of the trial that the
public's interest in our system of justice requires a new trial."  Majority op. at 47. 
The appellate courts should exercise this right, however, only in those rare cases
where the public's confidence in the judicial process would be seriously undermined
if the improper argument went uncorrected.
I reach this conclusion because the primary reason to continue to embrace the
"fundamental error" doctrine based on unobjected-to closing argument in civil cases,
or the "plain error" doctrine as the term is used by many other state and federal
jurisdictions,28 is to ensure the fundamental fairness of the judicial process and the
public trust and confidence in what transpires in our halls of justice.  Accordingly, I
regard the conflict represented by the competing viewpoints in this case as more
than simply a dispute between whether it is more important to correct "reprehensible
2 9See, e.g., R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.4(c) ("A lawyer shall not . . . knowingly disobey an obligation
under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation
exists."); id. 4-3.4(e) ("A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence . . . ."); id. 4-3.5(a)
("A lawyer shall not seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror, or other decision maker
except as permitted by law or the rules of court.").
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attorney misconduct during closing argument" or whether it is more important to
promote the principle of "proper preservation of trial error and appellate
predictability."  Majority op. at 35 (quoting Fravel v. Haughey, 727 So. 2d 1033,
1038-39 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (Cobb, J., concurring specially)).  In addition, I agree
that the fundamental error principle should not be used by courts to enforce
compliance with ethical standards or to sanction lawyer misconduct.  Other methods
are available when those issues require redress.29
The fundamental or plain error doctrine recognizes the public responsibility of
the appellate court to reverse when the improper misconduct during closing
argument "seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial
process itself."  Goldfuss v. Davidson,  679 N.E.2d 1099, 1104 (Ohio 1997).  In
recognizing this important interest in Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. Strickland, 88
So. 2d 519, 524 (Fla. 1956), we quoted with approval the following statement from
the United States Supreme Court:
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[A] trial in court is never, as respondents in their brief argue this one
was, "purely a private controversy . . . of no importance to the public." 
The state, whose interest it is the duty of court and counsel alike to
uphold, is concerned that every litigation be fairly and impartially
conducted and that verdicts of juries be rendered only on the issues
made by the pleadings and the evidence.  The public interest requires
that the court of its own motion, as is its power and duty, protect
suitors in their right to a verdict, uninfluenced by the appeals of counsel
to passion or prejudice.  Where such paramount considerations are
involved, the failure of counsel to particularize an exception will not
preclude this court from correcting the error.
New York Cent. R.R. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1929).  As Judge
Altenbernd has explained:
Although fundamental error is extraordinarily difficult to define, the
doctrine functions to preserve the public's confidence in the judicial
system.  Relief is granted for a fundamental error not because the party
has preserved a right to relief from a harmful error, but because the
public's confidence in our system of justice would be seriously
weakened if the courts failed to give relief as a matter of grace for
certain, very limited and serious mistakes.
Hagan v. Sun Bank of Mid-Florida, 666 So. 2d 580, 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
In this case, the majority has rejected the Fourth District's bright-line rule
abolishing fundamental error in civil cases and instead has recognized "an escape
valve with a very narrowly defined parameter and of extremely limited application." 
Majority op. at 38.  At the same time, the majority has also included an additional
requirement that the trial court should first evaluate the impact of the objectionable,
but not objected-to, closing argument.  
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I generally agree with the requirement that the objectionable closing argument
remarks should first be addressed by the trial court through a post-trial motion.  This
requirement is a sound one because of the trial court's unique ability  to evaluate the
impact of the allegedly improper argument along with other conduct that the litigant
claims forms the basis for a new trial.  Because appellate courts have only the written
record by which to evaluate the impact of the argument, undue emphasis may be
placed on a comment that was innocuous at the time it was uttered.  This is especially
true with arguments involving words such as "you" or "I," that often may be
misconstrued and that rarely constitute the type of highly prejudicial or inflammatory
argument precluding dispassionate consideration of the evidence.  See majority op. at
44.  In addition, review by the trial court would provide the appellate court with the
benefit of the trial court's assessment of the allegedly improper remarks and their
impact, or lack of, on the trial. 
Long ago, we acknowledged that it is the trial judge's responsibility, as the
impartial judicial officer in charge of the proceeding, "to protect litigants against such
interference by counsel with the orderly administration of justice and the protection of
the right of the litigant to a verdict 'uninfluenced by the appeals of counsel to passion
or prejudice.'''  Strickland, 88 So. 2d at 524.  Recently, we reiterated the trial court's
broad discretionary power to grant a new trial when a verdict is against the manifest
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weight of the evidence and we explained that "this discretionary power emanates from
the common law principle that it is the duty of the trial judge to prevent what he or
she considers to be a miscarriage of justice."  Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So. 2d
490, 495 (Fla. 1999).  
Despite my general agreement with the requirement that the trial court first 
evaluate the effect of the unobjected-to closing argument, I disagree with the majority
as to the standard the trial court should follow when evaluating the effect of the
unobjected-to closing argument.  In my opinion, the trial court should have the power
to grant a new trial based on pervasive, improper closing argument when necessary to
prevent a miscarriage of justice.  In other words, I would enunciate a two-part test
that would allow trial courts to grant a new trial based on unobjected-to closing
argument where the trial court finds that:  (1) the improper remarks are incurable; that
is, the trial court finds the remarks to be "of such character that neither rebuke nor
retraction may entirely destroy their sinister influence,"  Baggett v. Davis, 124 Fla.
701, 717, 169 So. 372, 379 (1936); and (2) "the prejudicial conduct in its collective
import is so extensive that its influence pervades the trial, gravely impairing a calm
and dispassionate consideration of the evidence and the merits by the jury."  Tyus v.
Apalachicola N. R.R., 130 So. 2d 580, 587 (Fla. 1961); see also Strickland, 88 So. 2d
at 523.  
30In Hagan, Judge Altenbernd set forth a two-part analysis, which provides: 
First, the trial court must determine whether the error was so pervasive, inflammatory,
and prejudicial as to preclude the jury's rational consideration of the case. . . .
Second, the trial court must decide whether the error was fundamental.  In essence,
this is a legal decision that the error was so extreme that it could not be corrected by
an instruction if an objection had been lodged, and that it so damaged the fairness of
the trial that the public's interest in our system of justice justifies a new trial even
when no lawyer took the steps necessary to give a party the right to demand a new
trial.  
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A standard that would allow trial courts to evaluate cases under this two-part
analysis would blend our prior case law on fundamental error as set forth in Baggett,
Strickland and Tyus and would be more consistent with the approach taken by those
states that require evaluation by a trial court.  See Austin v. Shampine, 948 S.W.2d
900, 906 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (reversing only where issue preserved through motion
for mistrial and where the argument is so inflammatory that its harmful or prejudicial
nature cannot be cured by an instruction to disregard); Dial v. Niggel Assocs., Inc.,
509 S.E.2d 269, 271 (S.C. 1998) (even where there has not been a contemporaneous
objection, a new trial motion should be granted "in flagrant cases where a vicious
inflammatory argument results in clear prejudice").  In contrast, the stringent four-part
test set forth by the majority risks undermining the major tenet of both Tyus and
Strickland, that "the judge in the milieu of the trial courtroom is in the best position to
gauge the actual effect of prejudicial remarks and deal with them accordingly." 
Fravel, 727 So. 2d at 1039 (Cobb, J. concurring specially).30   
666 So. 2d at 586.  Judge Cobb objected to this two-step analysis as "a constriction of the authority
of a trial judge to deal with the problem of attorney misconduct in closing argument."  Fravel, 727
So. 2d 1039 (Cobb, J. concurring specially). 
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I also write to emphasize that the majority opinion should not be read to
condone arguments that permit the "noble art of trial practice" to at times "degenerate
into a free-for-all."  Nelson v. Reliance Ins., 368 So. 2d 361, 361 (Fla. 4th DCA
1978).  As Judge Schwartz observed long ago, it is unacceptable "for the judiciary to
act simply as a fight promoter, who supplies an arena in which parties may fight it out
on unseemly terms of their own choosing."  Borden, Inc. v. Young, 479 So. 2d 850,
851 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).  Thus, it remains the duty of trial judges to admonish
lawyers to refrain from improper closing argument.  See Fravel, 727 So. 2d at 1036
("[W]e find it troubling that trial judges are reluctant to curb the abuse perpetrated by
trial counsel in the area of improper comments made during closing arguments.").  I
have no doubt that many trial judges take this responsibility seriously.
Even those judges who may be reluctant to step in during closing argument do
not hesitate to issue instructions to lawyers before closing argument reminding the
litigants what is and what is not proper argument based on the plethora of appellate
decisions that have previously identified the limits of proper advocacy.  For these
reasons, and to provide further guidance for the trial courts and trial lawyers as to the
31In Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Stone, 650 So. 2d 676, 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), a case in which the
court reversed for a new trial based on improper closing argument, the appellant cited to many
instances of counsel's use of the word "ridiculous" during closing argument.
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permissible bounds of advocacy, I urge appellate courts to continue to report the
actual substance of the remarks that they deem objectionable, and to explain why they
are objectionable.
The type of closing arguments to which I refer are not simply those advanced
by lawyers engaged in zealous advocacy or ones that contain words such as
"ridiculous"31 or other colorful adjectives.  Instead, I am referring to those clear
instances of a lawyer's attempt to appeal to juries' passions and prejudices by drawing
attention to impermissible considerations outside of the record.  Arguments about
"[w]hat other lawyers have done, what has occurred in other law suits, and what other
corporations have done," are examples of arguments that are clearly outside the
bounds of vigorous but acceptable advocacy.  Bellsouth Human Resources Admin.,
Inc. v. Colatarci, 641 So. 2d 427, 430 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
As much as it is the primary responsibility of trial lawyers to lodge proper,
specific and timely objections and the responsibility of the trial court to maintain a fair
and orderly trial, we, at the appellate level, cannot abdicate all responsibility. 
Although there are many sound reasons why a litigant should not be "rewarded"
because his or her attorney strategically decides not to object, it is important that
32Further, if the attorney has made objections to some of the closing argument remarks, which have
been overruled, the fact that all of the objectionable remarks have not been preserved by subsequent
objection does not preclude the appellate court from reviewing the cumulative effect of the objected-
to and unobjected-to remarks.  I also share Judge Sharp's concern that even when there has been
proper objection, the appellate court standard for reversal for a new trial may be unreasonably high.
See Fravel, 727 So. 2d at 1039-40 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
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appellate courts nonetheless retain the right to address fundamental error.  As Judge
Dauksch explained in his specially concurring opinion in Fravel:
It is not a matter of who is at fault--the offending lawyer who
misbehaves, or the negligent or crafty lawyer on the other side who does
not object, or the trial judge who shirks his duty to intercede.  It is a
matter of fundamental fairness and this court's duty to see to it that all
litigants are given their due in court.  That is the primary reason for
having courts of appeal.
727 So. 2d at 1038 (Dauksch, J., concurring specially).  If we simply preclude
consideration of fundamental error in civil cases, the danger, as Judge Sharp
observes, is that "we ourselves, as appellate judges, have all but disappeared from this
equation, like the Chesire Cat, fading behind a smile in search of a 'bright line,'
leaving only the trial judges to fight the battle."  Id. at 1040 (Sharp, J., dissenting).32 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Fourth District - Case No. 4D97-0388 
-62-
(Palm Beach County)
R. Stuart Huff and Mark L. Mallios, Coral Gables, Florida,
for Petitioners
David A. Jaynes, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Respondents