Case Title: Dickerson v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 021968

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
VINCENT DICKERSON 
 
v.  Record No. 021968     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
June 6, 2003 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal we again consider whether, following the 
conclusion of a valid stop for a traffic violation, the 
continued encounter between a police officer and the driver of 
the vehicle was consensual or an illegal seizure in violation 
of the driver's Fourth Amendment rights. 
 
On August 20, 1999, Pittsylvania Sheriff's Deputy B.K. 
Parker received a radio dispatch giving him the license plate 
number and description of a motor vehicle traveling westbound 
on Route 58.  The vehicle, driven by Vincent Dickerson, had 
failed to yield the right of way to a Danville Life Saving 
Crew truck.  Soon thereafter, Deputy Parker saw the vehicle 
traveling at a speed of 65 miles-per-hour in a 55 mile-per-
hour zone.  He activated his vehicle's emergency lights and 
siren and initiated a traffic stop.  A second officer, Deputy 
Morrison, arrived on the scene and parked his patrol car 
behind Deputy Parker's vehicle. 
As Deputy Parker approached Dickerson's vehicle, he 
noticed that Dickerson had "a slight odor of alcohol about his 
person."  Deputy Parker asked Dickerson to get out of the car 
and perform some field sobriety tests.  The tests were 
conducted at the rear of Dickerson's vehicle.  After 
conducting these tests, Deputy Parker decided not to arrest 
Dickerson for any alcohol-related violations.  He told 
Dickerson he was free to go but that he might be subpoenaed 
later for the failure-to-yield traffic infraction. 
Dickerson returned to his car, opened the driver's side 
door, and started to get back into the vehicle when Deputy 
Parker asked Dickerson "if there was anything in the car [he] 
should know about, dope, marijuana, roaches in the ashtray, 
something, anything like that."  Dickerson said "no."  Deputy 
Parker then asked Dickerson whether he smoked marijuana.  
Dickerson replied that he did smoke marijuana but not while he 
was driving.  Dickerson also volunteered that there were "some 
roaches in the ashtray." 
Deputy Parker asked if he could look in the car.  
Dickerson said "no," but pulled out the ashtray from the 
vehicle's console and handed it to Deputy Parker.  The ashtray 
contained "numerous hand-rolled cigarette roaches" which 
Dickerson said were the remains of marijuana cigarettes. 
 
Deputy Parker again asked Dickerson for permission to 
search the vehicle.  Although Dickerson again refused 
permission to search the vehicle, Deputy Parker told Dickerson 
to step away from the vehicle and began to search it.  Deputy 
 
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Parker found three plastic bags of cocaine and a plastic box 
containing scales under the driver's side floormat.  At Deputy 
Parker's direction, Deputy Morrison retrieved the keys from 
the vehicle's ignition, opened the trunk, and found several 
additional plastic bags of cocaine and another set of scales.  
Deputy Parker placed Dickerson under arrest. 
 
Dickerson was subsequently charged with violating Code 
§ 18.2-248, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.  
The Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County denied Dickerson's 
motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search of his 
vehicle and convicted him of the crime charged.  Dickerson was 
sentenced to six years' imprisonment, with three years 
suspended.  The Court of Appeals affirmed Dickerson's 
conviction.  See Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 172, 
543 S.E.2d 623 (2001).  This Court granted Dickerson's 
petition for appeal.*
Dickerson claims that, like the encounter in Reittinger 
v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 232, 532 S.E.2d 25 (2000), Deputy 
Parker's questions regarding criminal activity were unrelated 
to the traffic offense and constituted a seizure in violation 
of his Fourth Amendment rights.  Continuing, Dickerson asserts 
                     
* Dickerson's original appeal was dismissed because his 
attorney at the time failed to file an opening brief.  
Dickerson filed a petition for habeas corpus seeking a belated 
appeal, which was granted. 
 
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that because the evidence taken from his vehicle was obtained 
through an illegal seizure, it should have been suppressed. 
 
The Fourth Amendment protects persons against 
unreasonable searches and seizures by the police, but the 
protections afforded by this Amendment are not implicated 
simply because a police officer approaches an individual and 
asks a few questions.  Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 
(1991).  So long as a reasonable person would feel free "to 
disregard the police and go about his business," the encounter 
is consensual and there is no violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 
621, 628 (1991)). 
Dickerson argues that Deputy Parker's persistent 
questioning regarding criminal activity, after telling 
Dickerson that he was free to go, would lead a reasonable 
person to believe that Deputy Parker "had decided to continue 
the detention and that the officer had revoked his consent for 
the driver to leave."  Dickerson further asserts that, during 
the questioning, he was "effectively cornered between the door 
and the passenger compartment of his car, blocked in by at 
least one uniformed police officer."  We disagree. 
The record in this case shows not only that a reasonable 
person would have felt free "to disregard the police and go 
about his business" but also that Dickerson believed that his 
 
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detention had ended, that he could leave, and that he was no 
longer required to remain with the officers or answer their 
questions.  When Deputy Parker told Dickerson that he was free 
to go, Dickerson returned to his vehicle and started to get 
inside.  This course of action is not consistent with a belief 
that one is under police detention or subject to police 
control. 
The events of the original encounter resulting in 
Dickerson's initial detention and release were complete and 
the ensuing events constituted a new, and consensual, 
encounter.  As the Court of Appeals noted, Deputy Parker's 
questions sought information and did not implicate restraint 
or the need to restrain.  Dickerson, 35 Va. App. at 182, 543 
S.E.2d at 628.  Dickerson responded to Deputy Parker's 
questions by freely indicating that he had used marijuana in 
the past and by showing Deputy Parker what Dickerson admitted 
were the remnants of marijuana cigarettes. 
Dickerson's claim that the positioning of the officers 
created such a show of force that he was prevented from 
leaving the scene is not supported by the evidence in this 
case.  According to the record, the officers were standing 
behind Dickerson's car while Dickerson was performing the 
field sobriety tests.  Dickerson implies that the officers 
followed him as he was returning to his vehicle.  The record 
 
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does not show when the officers moved from the rear of 
Dickerson's vehicle or where they were standing when Deputy 
Parker asked Dickerson about his possession and use of 
marijuana.  The mere presence of officers who are uniformed 
and armed does not constitute a "show of authority" that 
transforms a consensual encounter into a seizure.  United 
States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204 (2002). 
When the detention based on the traffic violation and 
suspicion of an alcohol-related offense terminated, both the 
police officers and Dickerson understood that Dickerson was 
free to leave.  Nothing in this record indicates that the 
officers acted in any manner that threatened Dickerson or that 
supports a conclusion that he was not free to go.  Any further 
interaction was on a consensual basis until Dickerson's 
answers to Deputy Parker's inquiries gave rise to a reasonable 
suspicion regarding possible drug-related criminal activity.  
Thus, Deputy Parker's questions seeking information did not 
constitute a seizure in violation of Dickerson's Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
Finally, contrary to Dickerson's assertions, the facts in 
Reittinger are materially different from the facts here.  The 
defendant in that case, unlike Dickerson, never took any 
action to leave or indicated, in any way, that he was going to 
leave, even after being told he was free to go.  Neither the 
 
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defendant nor the police officer had changed position from the 
initiation of the encounter through the officer's repeated, 
unanswered questions.  At that point, the defendant, without 
direction from the police, got out of his vehicle, 
demonstrating that he did not think he was free to leave.  
Reittinger, 260 Va. at 234-35, 532 S.E.2d at 26.  Nor would a 
reasonable person have believed he was free to leave. 
 
For the reasons stated above, the questions posed to 
Dickerson by Deputy Parker after Dickerson was told he was 
free to leave were asked in the context of a consensual 
encounter, and, therefore, Dickerson was not seized in 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.  Accordingly, the 
trial court did not err in denying Dickerson's motion to 
suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle, and we will 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed.
 
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