Case Title: IN THE INTEREST OF: JW and BJ, JR., Minor Children ; LW v. THE STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0049

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE INTEREST OF: JW and BJ, JR., Minor Children ; LW v. THE STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2010 WY 28226 P.3d 873Case Number: No. S-09-0049Decided: 03/18/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
IN 
THE INTEREST OF:  JW and BJ, JR., 
Minor ChildrenLW,Appellant(Respondent)v.THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY 
SERVICES,Appellee(Petitioner).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Jamie 
M. Woolsey, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; 
Jill E. Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Susan K. Stipe, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Stipe.

 
 

Representing 
Guardian ad Litem:

Lori 
Gorseth, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
Hill, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; Golden, J., filed a dissenting opinion in 
which Burke, J., joined; and Burke, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
Golden, J., joined.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The district 
court entered its "Order on Permanency Hearing" on December 12, 2008.  The process of handling the neglect 
complaint against the Mother (LW) in this case, which process eventuated in the 
order cited above, was managed by the Department of Family Services (DFS), the 
State of Wyoming acting through the District Attorney for the Seventh Judicial 
District, the Guardian ad Litem for the children affected (GAL), and a 
Multidisciplinary Team (MDT) created under the child protection statutes and 
rules and regulations promulgated by DFS.  
An attorney was appointed to represent Mother.  The persons directly affected by that 
order will be identified by the use of generic terms/titles in order to maintain 
the confidentiality of all persons involved, but most especially the identities 
of the affected children.  The 
person most directly affected by the order will be referred to as Mother.  Although the long-term consequences may 
be equally as great for the children affected by the order, we mention them 
second because they are minors and their destiny lies in the hands of the adults 
involved in this case, which of course includes this Court.  We will refer to the children 
individually as the Daughter and Son of Mother (and when the reference is to 
both, "the children").  Each child 
had a different father, but neither is involved in this 
appeal.

 
 
[¶2]      The principal 
effect of the order at issue here was to permanently place the children with the 
Foster Parents, who had cared for the children for over one year, with the 
further intent that Mother's parental rights be terminated and the children 
adopted by the Foster Parents.  A 
secondary effect was to eliminate Mother's brother and his wife, who we will 
refer to as Uncle and Aunt, as the alternative, "kinship" placement for the 
children as provided for under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-208(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 
2009), as well as applicable federal statutes and rules and regulations of 
DFS.  Eventually Uncle and Aunt 
retained counsel to represent them during the permanency 
hearing.

 
 

[¶3]      It is Mother's 
contention that governing statutes and applicable rules and regulations 
enunciate a strong preference for "kinship/relative" placement in circumstances 
such as those that arose in this case and that the district court erred in 
permanently placing the children with the Foster Parents for adoption, rather 
than with the Uncle and Aunt.  
Although 
termination of Mother's parental rights had not yet been achieved when the 
appeal herein was perfected, it was a "given" that Mother's parental rights were 
to be terminated whether the children were placed with the Aunt and Uncle, or 
with the Foster Parents.  We reverse 
the district court's order and remand to the district court with directions that 
the children be placed with their Uncle and Aunt, this to be accomplished with 
all deliberate speed consistent with the children's well-being and under the 
supervision of qualified professionals in both Wyoming and Montana, the costs of 
that process to be borne by DFS and Natrona County.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶4]      Mother raises 
these issues:

 
 

1.      
Whether 
the district court erred in ignoring the recognized fundamental right of 
association of family by ordering permanent placement of the minor children 
outside the biological family.

 
 

2.      
 Whether the district court erred in 
ordering permanent placement of the minor children outside the home despite a 
clear Department of Family Services policy and Supreme Court preference that 
makes relative [kinship/family] placement a priority.

 
 
DFS 
posits these as the issues:

 
 

I.              
Does 
a mother whose children are in the custody of the Department of Family Services 
have standing to argue that the familial rights of her brother and sister-in-law 
have been violated by the court's permanency plan of adoption by the children's 
foster parents?

 
 

II.            
Did 
the court properly consider the best interests of the minor children when 
conducting a permanency hearing?

 
 
The 
GAL states these issues:

 
 

A.   [Mother] 
does not have standing to raise on behalf of [Uncle and Aunt] alleged violations 
of Department of Family Services policies or violations of fundamental 
rights.

 
 

B.   The 
district court correctly ruled that the best interests of the minor children 
would best be served by placement with and adoption by the Foster 
Parents.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶5]      This appeal 
presents extraordinarily weighty issues concerning the imminent termination of 
Mother's parental rights and, thereafter, the permanent placement of Mother's 
children with the Foster Parents.  
Mother was essentially a single parent who was raising her two children 
on her own.  The identity of the 
children's respective fathers was known to the Department of Family Services 
(DFS), but neither participated meaningfully in the proceedings nor are any 
issues raised with respect to their parental rights.

 
 
[¶6]      On May 9, 2007, 
Mother's Daughter was a few months shy of her seventh birthday.  Mother's Son was just a few days 
old.  On that date, a petition was 
filed in the juvenile court asserting that the children had been neglected by 
their Mother.  The children were 
taken into DFS's care and each was placed with a different foster parent.  Among many other things, the petition 
asked Mother to provide the names of relatives who might be considered as 
placement options, and she provided the names of Uncle and Aunt.  A shelter care hearing also was held on 
May 9, 2007, and in an order entered on May 23, 2007, the juvenile court placed 
the children in DFS custody with a primary goal to ascertain if the matter was a 
"IV-E case," a reference to a provision of the Social Security Act.  The GAL was appointed for the children 
on May 10, 2007, and Mother was appointed counsel on May 30, 
2007.

 
 
[¶7]      A June 18, 2007 
report of the MDT indicated that the children were returned to the physical 
custody of Mother and the father of the Son, with DFS retaining legal 
custody.  In a document entitled 
"Family Service Plan," Mother identified as a part of "Cultural/Ethnic and 
Family Traditions," going to Montana every other summer to visit Uncle 
Levi.  That same document identified 
"relative placement with [Uncle Levi]" as a concurrent plan for the 
children.  The "Family Service Plan" 
assigns many responsibilities to the caseworker (as well as to the parent(s)), 
including identifying "cultural, ethnic and family traditions."  Mother was assigned the responsibility 
to "[p]rovide any and all information on an absent parent, relative, or kinship 
adult."  Mother identified Uncle and 
Aunt in fulfillment of that responsibility.

 
 
[¶8]      The record 
reveals that four or five successive caseworkers had responsibility for this 
case over the relatively short time period from intake to permanency hearing, 
and that the "kinship placement" ball appears to have been dropped by DFS 
workers during the process.  This 
appears to have occurred in part due to oversight, and in part because Uncle and 
Aunt lived in Miles City, Montana, a city 300 miles away from Casper.  After an Initial Hearing on June 1, 
2007, the juvenile court issued an order directing that DFS retain temporary 
legal custody of the children, with Mother to have physical custody.  A Predisposition Report was filed of 
record on June 28, 2007, and Uncle Levi is mentioned twice in this 
document.  In a letter filed of 
record on July 3, 2007, it is noted that the children were placed back in foster 
care with the Foster Parents.  The 
children have remained in that placement until the present time, and they are 
the Foster Parents identified in the opening paragraph of this 
opinion.

 
 
[¶9]      On July 18, 2007, 
the children's grandmother's home was assessed as a potential interim placement 
for the children, and a recommendation was made that grandmother's home was a 
suitable home to be considered as a placement for the children.  That appears to have been abandoned 
despite a positive report in a DFS home study, because Mother objected on the 
basis that her mother was a "drunk" (although she later recanted that 
characterization).

 
 
[¶10]   The parties to this matter entered 
into a consent decree that was filed of record on August 8, 2007.  Mother admitted the neglect allegations, 
and the proceedings were held in abeyance while DFS continued to work with 
Mother to reunite her with her children.  
Mother's interest in the possibility of placement of the children with 
their Uncle and Aunt was conveyed to the MDT at its August 30, 2007 
meeting.  The Foster Parents 
stressed to Mother that the placement of the children with them was temporary 
and it was everyone's goal for Mother to get better and resume 
custody.

 
 
[¶11]   Progress in this matter appeared to 
be very slow, in significant part because Mother was undergoing in-patient 
treatment for her drinking problems.  
The Quarterly Progress Report dated November 8-9, 2007, indicated that 
the permanency plan was to reunite the children with their Mother and that the 
contingent permanency plan was to be with "Family Relations."  A hearing was held to continue the 
family reunification plan on February 5, 2008.  An order detailing the results of that 
hearing was entered of record on February 28, 2008.  A stipulated order extending the consent 
decree was entered on March 24, 2008.

 
 
[¶12]   On April 8, 2008, the State and DFS 
sought to reinstate the original petition and to reinstate proceedings to 
terminate Mother's parental rights.  
This change of course was based upon evidence that she had resumed 
drinking alcoholic beverages and had violated the terms of the contract she had 
entered into for purposes of reunifying her family in other ways as well.  A MDT report filed of record on April 
18, 2008, discussed Mother's situation in detail and concluded that efforts to 
reunify Mother with her children be waived and the "concurrent plan of other 
relative placement be adopted."  In 
an order entered of record on July 22, 2008, the district court accepted the 
recommendations of the MDT and directed that the matter proceed to a permanency 
hearing.

 
 
[¶13]   In a report entered of record on 
August 1, 2008, the MDT recommended that the parental rights of Mother be 
terminated (as well as those of the two respective fathers) and that the Foster 
Parents be granted guardianship of the children.  It is in this report that we discover 
that initial efforts to certify Uncle and Aunt as a family placement had been 
initiated.  On September 5, 2008, 
Uncle and Aunt filed an affidavit detailing their association with the children, 
including that Daughter had been in their care for almost 4 years prior to her 
move to Casper with her Mother, and attesting to the many telephonic and 
personal efforts they had made to make it clear to DFS that they wanted to be 
made responsible for the children.  
At Mother's request, on October 14, 2008, the district court ordered a 
"bonding study" to be completed to ascertain the potential for the children to 
bond with Uncle and Aunt.  By report 
entered of record on October 24, 2008, a MDT report indicated a recommendation 
that the Foster Parents adopt the children.  By order entered on November 14, 2008, 
Uncle and Aunt were permitted to intervene in this case for the limited purpose 
of participating in the permanency hearing.  It must be noted that the GAL and the 
attorney for the State resisted each and every effort that Uncle and Aunt made 
to become included in the proceedings that affected the 
children.

 
 
[¶14]   Eventually the Uncle and Aunt hired 
their own attorney and he advocated for them at the permanency hearing.  The permanency hearing was conducted on 
December 1, 2008.  That hearing 
lasted all day and well into the evening hours, and we commend the district 
court for its efforts to let all parties speak their piece, despite numerous 
objections and interruption made by the GAL and the attorney for the State.  Those objections were directed at 
limiting the information Uncle and Aunt could bring to the attention of the 
district court and otherwise to delay, protract, and minimize the amount of 
information the district court was able to hear.  To its credit, the district court 
overruled almost all objections and allowed Uncle and Aunt to present their plea 
that the permanency placement for the children be with 
them.

 
 
[¶15]   The bonding study is a key document 
in this case because it concluded that it was readily possible that the children 
could bond with Uncle and Aunt, even though they had also bonded with the Foster 
Parents.  Mother's Son was a focus 
of much of the study because he had spent very little time with his Mother and 
even less time with Uncle and Aunt.  
However, the bonding study bore out that Uncle and Aunt had the skills 
and the motivation to effectuate a transition for the children from the Foster 
Parents' home to their home in Montana.  
The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children Request, completed by 
a professional in Montana, further attested to the skills and abilities of Uncle 
and Aunt to parent their niece and nephew, as they had done for Aunt's brother 
in the past, and as they were doing for their own infant 
child.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶16]   At the outset we take note that the 
record establishes that there are two suitable, stable and loving families who 
want to be the permanent placement for the children.  One of those families is the Foster 
Family with whom the children have bonded during the process described 
above.  The other family is that of 
the Uncle and Aunt who have been available as a placement since the outset of 
these proceedings.  However, they 
lived in Montana and the reunification process Mother sought to pursue was done 
in Casper.  Thus, the bonds between 
Uncle and Aunt and Daughter had been interrupted for almost two years, and there 
was little bond at all with Son.  
Against this background, the district court had to make an almost 
literally Solomonic decision as to where the children would be placed, with the 
Foster Parents or with the Uncle and Aunt.  
Although we conclude the district court's order was ultimately erroneous, 
we commend the district court's thoroughness and thoughtfulness, because without 
it our effort to give meaningful appellate review to this case would have been 
gravely diminished.

 
 
Mother's 
Standing

 
 
[¶17]   Both the State and the GAL contend 
Mother does not have standing to bring this appeal:

 
 
"Standing" 
is short for "standing to sue," which requires a "legally protectible and 
tangible interest at stake in the litigation."  Olsten Staffing Servs., Inc. v. D.A. Stinger 
Servs., Inc., 921 P.2d 596, 599 (Wyo.1996) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 
1405 (6th ed.1990)).  The phrase 
"tangible interest" has been equated with the phrase "personal stake in the 
outcome."  Goshen Irrigation Dist. v. Wyo. State Bd. of 
Control, 926 P.2d 943, 947 (Wyo.1996);  
State ex rel. Bayou Liquors, Inc. 
v. City of Casper, 906 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Wyo.1995).  The person alleging standing must show a 
"perceptible," rather than a "speculative" harm from the action; a remote 
possibility of injury is not sufficient to confer standing.  Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Wyo. PSC, 2003 WY 
22, ¶ 13, 63 P.3d 887, 894-95 (Wyo.2003)

 
 

Halliburton 
Energy Services, Inc. v. Gunter, 
2007 WY 151, ¶ 11, 167 P.3d 645, 649 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶18]   Insofar as this appeal is 
concerned, Mother is on the brink of having her parental rights terminated, but 
that has not been accomplished yet.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-402(a)(xvi) (LexisNexis 2009) 
provides:

 
 
§ 14-3-402.  Definitions.

            
.

            
(xvi)  "Residual parental rights and duties" means those rights 
and duties remaining with the parents after legal custody, guardianship of the 
person or both have been vested in another person, agency or institution.  Residual parental rights and duties 
include but are not limited to:

            
(A)  The duty to support and provide necessities of 
life;

            
(B)  The right to consent to adoption;

            
(C)  The right to reasonable visitation unless restricted or 
prohibited by court order;

            
(D)  The right to determine the minor's religious affiliation; 
and

            
(E)  The right to petition on behalf of the 
minor.

 
 
We 
conclude Mother has standing in this appeal.

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶19]   It is difficult to pinpoint the 
standard of review that should be applied here because we have a convergence of 
several issues of constitutional magnitude, as well as clear expressions of 
legislative intent.  The activities 
of DFS in the arena at hand are guided in part by federal statutes that are a 
part of the Social Security Act.  Of 
particular importance here is 42 U.S.C.S. § 671(a)(19) (LexisNexis 2008) which 
provides:

 
 
§ 
671.  State plan for foster care and 
adoption assistance

(a)  
 Requisite features of State plan.  In order for a State to be eligible for 
payments under this part [42 USCS §§ 670 et seq.] it shall have a plan approved 
by the Secretary which 

.

(19)provides 
that the State shall consider giving preference to an adult relative over a 
non-related caregiver when determining a placement for a child, provided that 
the relative caregiver meets all relevant State child protection 
standards.

 
 
[¶20]   The district court found that the 
only Wyoming statute that discusses relative placement is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-429(b)(iii) (LexisNexis 2009), and the GAL agreed with that 
proposition.  That statute 
provides:

 
 
§ 
14-3-429.  Decree where child 
adjudged neglected; dispositions; terms and conditions; legal 
custody.

            
.

            
(b) If the child is found to be neglected the court 
may:

                        
(i) Permit the child to remain in the legal custody of his parents, 
guardian or custodian without protective supervision, subject to terms and 
conditions prescribed by the court;

                        
(ii) Place the child under protective supervision;

                        
(iii) Transfer temporary legal 
custody to a relative or other suitable adult the court finds qualified to 
receive and care for the child, with or without supervision, subject to terms 
and conditions prescribed by the court;  
[Emphasis added.]

 
 
 
 
[¶21]   However, § 14-3-431(m)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2009) provides:

 
 
§ 14-3-431.  Duration 
of orders of disposition; termination of permanency hearings; petition for 
termination of parental rights.

 
 
            
(m)  When a child has been placed in foster care under the 
responsibility of the state for fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) 
months the state shall file a petition to terminate parental rights or seek to 
be joined as a party to the petition if a petition has been filed by another 
party, unless:

                        
(i)  The child is in the care of a relative;  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
Also 
see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-440 (LexisNexis 2009) (reasonable efforts shall be 
made to preserve and reunify the family); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-427(d)(iv) and 
(f) (LexisNexis 2009) (court may appoint a relative to MDT; MDT shall give 
consideration to best interests of family); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-201 
(LexisNexis 2009) articulates that a primary purpose of child protective 
services is to "preserve family life whenever possible."; finally, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-3-208(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2009) provides:

 
 
§ 14-3-208.  Temporary 
protective custody, order, time limitation; remedial health 
care.

 
 
(a)  When 
a child is taken into temporary protective custody pursuant to W.S. 14-3-405(a) 
and (b), the person taking custody shall immediately notify the local department 
of family services office and place or transfer temporary protective custody to 
the local department of family services office as soon as practicable.  The local department of family services 
office shall:

                        
(i)  Accept physical custody of the 
child;

                        
(ii)  Make reasonable efforts to inform the parent, 
noncustodial parent or other person responsible for the child's welfare that the 
child has been taken into temporary protective custody, unless otherwise ordered 
by a court of competent jurisdiction;

                        
(iii)  Arrange for care and supervision of the child in the 
most appropriate and least restrictive setting necessary to meet the child's 
needs, including foster homes or other child care facilities certified by the 
department or approved by the court.  
When it is in the best interest of the child, the department shall place 
the child with the child's noncustodial birth parent or with the child's 
extended family, including adult siblings, grandparents, great-grandparents, 
aunts or uncles.  Prior to approving 
placement with the child's noncustodial birth parent or extended family, the 
department shall determine whether anyone living in the home has been convicted 
of a crime involving serious harm to children or has a substantiated case listed 
on the central registry established pursuant to W.S. 14-3-213.  The department may leave the child in 
the care of a physician or hospital when necessary to ensure the child receives 
proper care.  A neglected child 
shall not be placed in a jail or detention facility other than for a delinquent 
act;

 
 
[¶22]   The Family Services Manual, Chapter 
7 Section B (RELATIVE/KINSHIP CARE AND DILIGENT SEARCH), p. 7-B-5 (2008) 
articulates a series of guiding principles that stress the importance of kinship 
care, and  item "F" "[r]eflects a 
priority for placing children, siblings together, with kin whenever out-of-home 
placement is necessary."  It goes on 
to say that:

 
 
By 
law, relative/kinship families are the placement of preference for 
children.  The Wyoming Program 
Improvement Plan makes relative and kinship placements high priority for 
children placed in out of home care  DFS shall consider relative/kinship 
families as the placement of preference[.]

 
 
DFS 
is required to make a diligent search for such kinship placements.  Throughout this Chapter, the importance 
of kinship placements is stressed.  
DFS Policy 5.7 (2008) states that its purpose 
recognizes:

 
 
Relative 
and kinship placements are less restrictive and therefore preferable to other 
types of out-of-home care.  The DFS 
caseworker is responsible for conducting an ongoing diligent search for 
relatives and kin for any child in DFS custody until permanency is 
achieved.  DFS shall consider 
relative/kinship families as both temporary and permanent resources for children 
who are unable to live safely with a parent.  DFS recognizes that relative/kinship 
families are important to a child's sense of identity, belonging, and long term 
connections.

 
 
[¶23]   When an Interstate Compact on the 
Placement of Children study was finally done, Uncle and Aunt were given 
extremely high marks for their ability to take in Mother's children.  The Bonding Study done for the 
permanency hearing also attested to Uncle's and Aunt's ability to bond with 
Daughter especially, but also with Son (especially when the two children are 
placed in the same home environment).

 
 
[¶24]   We have repeatedly held that family 
relations such as those at issue here are fundamental and are protected by 
principles of constitutional proportions:

 
 
            
In applying our standard of review, we keep in mind that the right to 
associate with one's family is fundamental and strictly scrutinize petitions to 
terminate a parent's rights to his or her children.  C.L., ¶ 9, 151 P.3d  at 1105; SLB, ¶ 7, 136 P.3d at 799-800; TF v. Dep't of Family Servs., 2005 WY 
118, ¶ 15, 120 P.3d 992, 1000 (Wyo.2005).  DFS has the obligation to establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that termination is appropriate.  SLJ, ¶ 19, 104 P.3d  at 79-80.  "Clear and convincing evidence is that 
kind of proof that would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the 
contention is highly probable.'"  Id., quoting MN v. Dep't of Family Servs., 2003 WY 
135, ¶ 5, 78 P.3d 232, 234 (Wyo.2003).

 
 

R.L.A. 
v. State of Wyoming, Department of Family Services, 
2009 WY 109, ¶ 13, 215 P.3d 266, 268 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶25]   In DS v. Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services, 607 P.2d 911, 918 (Wyo. 1980) we 
held:

 
 
            
In addition, we are helped in our task by a large body of state and 
federal constitutional law defining the interests individuals have in their 
family associations.  The right to 
associate with one's immediate family is a fundamental liberty protected by the 
state and federal constitutions.  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972) (integrity of the family unit protected by the 
due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 
89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969) (implication that liberties guaranteed by 
the federal constitution are fundamental).  
See, also, State ex rel. Heller v. 
Miller, 61 Ohio St. 2d 6, 399 N.E.2d 66 (1980).  Analysis of the Wyoming Constitution and 
case law also leads to the conclusion that the right to associate with one's 
family is a fundamental liberty.  
Article 1, Sections 2, 6, 7 and 36, Wyoming Constitution; Washakie County School District Number One 
v. Herschler, Wyo., 606 P.2d 310 (1980); Matter of Adoption of Voss, Wyo., 550 P.2d 481 (1976); and In re Adoption of 
Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862 (1948).

 
 
[¶26]   In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 
431 U.S. 494, 97.S.Ct. 1932, 1938-39 (also see concurrence 1939-42) (1977) the 
United States Supreme Court held:

 
 
Ours 
is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members 
of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially 
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots 
equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.  Over the years millions of our citizens 
have grown up in just such an environment, and most, surely, have profited from 
it. Even if conditions of modern society have brought about a decline in 
extended family households, they have not erased the accumulated wisdom of 
civilization, gained over the centuries and honored throughout our history, that 
supports a larger conception of the family. Out of choice, necessity, or a sense 
of family responsibility, it has been common for close relatives to draw 
together and participate in the duties and the satisfactions of a common home. 
Decisions concerning child rearing, which Yoder, Meyer, Pierce and other cases have recognized 
as entitled to constitutional protection, long have been shared with 
grandparents or other relatives who occupy the same household indeed who may 
take on major responsibility for the rearing of the children.  Especially in times of adversity, such 
as the death of a spouse or economic need, the broader family has tended to come 
together for mutual sustenance and to maintain or rebuild a secure home life. 
This is apparently what happened here. 

 
 
Also 
see 2 Ann M. Haralambie, Handling Child 
Custody, Abuse, and Adoption Cases, §§ 12:31(Kinship care) and 12:32 
(Finding an alternative caregiver) (West 2009).

 
 

[¶27]   Based on these authorities we 
conclude that, as a matter of ageless tradition, as a matter of federal law, and 
as a matter of Wyoming law, there exists a compelling preference that what is 
"best" for a child in circumstances such as those presented here, is placement 
with nuclear or extended family members.

 
 
Placement 
with Foster Parents vs. Uncle and Aunt

 
 

[¶28]   The State and the GAL characterize 
the kinship care policies articulated by the Social Security Act and DFS as 
merely precatory, i.e., they are "recommended" and should be "considered."  In this case the GAL and DFS claim that 
they did consider them and determined that they were not feasible because of the 
geography separating Casper, Wyoming, and Miles City, Montana.  We are unable to accept these 
characterizations given the high stakes in play here.  Tools, resources, and an Interstate 
Compact on the Placement of Children are available to achieve just the result 
that was "preferred."  2 Haralambie, 
supra at § 12:29 (Interstate 
Placement and the ICPC).  The 
district court concluded that the outcome of this case was fixed early on in the 
proceedings when Mother chose to do her "reunification" work in Casper, during 
which time the children were placed with the Foster Parents.  By the time that concluded in failure, 
the district court found that it was too late to go back and consider the 
kinship placement.  We are unable to 
agree with those conclusions, although we once again emphasize that the district 
court was remarkably professional, thorough, and patient in creating a complete 
record, despite the resistance to the flow of information shown by the GAL and 
DFS, and other factors.  For these 
reasons we are compelled to reverse the district court 
order.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶29]   The order of the district court is 
reversed and this matter is remanded to the district court with instructions 
that the children be placed with their Uncle and Aunt, this to be accomplished 
with all deliberate speed consistent with the children's well-being/best 
interests and under the supervision of qualified professionals in both Wyoming 
and Montana, the costs of that process to be borne by DFS and Natrona 
County.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
J., dissenting, in which BURKE, J., joins.

 
 
[¶30]   I respectfully disagree with the 
majority opinion in several respects.  
First, I do not believe Mother has standing to bring the issues in this 
appeal.  At this stage of the 
proceedings, there will be no further attempts to reunify Mother with the 
children.   As the majority 
opinion informs us, termination of Mother's parental rights is a given.  Under the circumstances, Mother has no 
legally cognizable personal stake in the outcome of the determination of the 
permanency goal for the children.  
It is true that, until terminated, Mother retains residual parental 
rights, but these rights do not include a right to determine the permanent 
placement of the children.  
Certainly, it is appropriate for Mother to have a voice in the 
proceedings below as to her preference for permanent placement, but that is a 
far different concept from legal standing to bring this 
appeal.

 
 
[¶31]   Further, the issues Mother presents 
are couched in terms of the constitutional right to familial association.  Her right to familial association is not 
at issue in this appeal.  Rather, 
practically, it is Uncle and Aunt's right, if any, that is at issue.  Mother has no standing to present 
arguments on behalf of Uncle and Aunt.  
See In re Adoption of CF, 2005 
WY 118, ¶ 41, 120 P.3d 992, 1005 (Wyo. 2005) (Mother has no standing to argue 
violation of Grandfather's alleged right to familial association).  For these reasons, I would find Mother 
has no standing to prosecute this appeal and would decline to consider it 
further.  

 
 
[¶32]   I also have concerns with the 
remainder of the majority opinion's analysis.  The majority opinion seems to accept 
that Uncle and Aunt have a constitutional right to association with the 
children.  Wyoming has never 
recognized an uncategorical constitutional right to familial association by 
extended relatives.  I would not 
concede this point so easily because the recognition of such rights has profound 
implications.  Extended relatives 
would be entitled to the same procedural and due process protections as 
parents.  Thus, a relative would 
presumptively be entitled to custody of a related child.  The child could not be placed elsewhere 
without a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the relative is 
incapable of providing an adequate home for the child.  No further best interest analysis would 
be allowed.  

 
 
[¶33]   This presumption in favor of 
relative placement goes against current Wyoming legislative mandates as 
expressed in statutes.  For 
instance, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-208(iii) (LexisNexis 2009) provides that 
relative placement is preferred "when it is in the best interest of the 
child."  The Child Protection Act 
requires the juvenile court to review permanent placement plans to ensure they 
are in the best interests of the children involved.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-431(k) 
(LexisNexis 2009).  These statutory 
provisions, and others also requiring a best interest analysis, would be 
unconstitutional as applied to relatives.  
I do not believe this appeal, given its procedural difficulties and the 
lack of a comprehensive briefing of this constitutional issue, provides the 
appropriate backdrop for a determination by this Court of an issue of such great 
importance.

 
 
[¶34]   As it now stands, the Child 
Protection Act expresses a preference for relative placement.  This preference tilts the balance in 
favor of relative placement if all else in the best interest analysis is 
equal.  In this case both Uncle and 
Aunt and the Foster Parents were acknowledged to be able to provide a safe, 
nurturing environment for the children.  
If no other factors were involved, the decision should be for placement 
with Uncle and Aunt.  This case, 
however, as with all cases, does not exist in a contextual vacuum.  The situation was summed up in the 
report from the bonding study on Uncle and Aunt:

 
 
This 
is a situation in which there are two eminently suitable homes for the children 
involved. Each home is capable of providing these children with nurturing, 
comfort and emotional support as well as constructive expectations and the 
structure and limits children need to grow up to be responsible people.  The relevant question in making the 
placement decision should have to do with whether the desirability of keeping 
children connected to their family of origin outweighs the potential negative 
effects of requiring the children to give up the bonds they have formed to one 
family in order to begin again with a new family. There are many arguments 
supporting both sides of this question and the decision-making process should 
focus on how those arguments apply to the particular situation involving [the 
children]. The answer to the referral question, "do [Uncle and Aunt] have the 
skills and ability to form healthy attachments with [the children]" is "yes, 
they do." [Foster Parents] have proven clearly over the course of the past year 
that they also possess these skills and abilities and have used them to the 
childrens' benefit. The fortunate thing for [the children] is that whichever 
direction the Multidisciplinary Team and the Court choose to take in terms of 
placement for these children, the children will emerge from the foster care 
system with a home and family that can support their healthy growth to 
maturity.  

 
 
[¶35]   As mentioned, there were different 
arguments in favor of each placement.  
Some of the arguments were discussed in an MDT 
meeting:

 
 
[The 
assistant district attorney] predicted that the Team members would not 
unanimously agree on one recommendation, and recommended that [the childrens'] 
permanency plan should be with the [Foster Parents].  [Daughter's therapist] agreed, and 
pointed out that [Son] "lost his mom," is attached to [Foster Parents], and 
should not be separated from them. [The attorney for Uncle and Aunt] noted that 
[Daughter's therapist] had stated in a previous MDT that critical bonding occurs 
in the first three years of life, and asked if [Son] would still be able to bond 
with [Uncle and Aunt].  [Daughter's 
therapist] responded that it was possible, but if that occurred, [Son] would 
experience two losses, the loss of [Foster Parents] and the loss of his mother. 
She continued that if [Son] remains with [Foster Parents] he would only have one 
loss, the loss of [Mother].  [The 
attorney for Uncle and Aunt] asked when [Son] was taken from [Mother], and 
[Daughter's therapist] responded that although [Son] was only three days old 
when he was placed in foster care, the loss of his mother would still impact him 
at some point in his life. [Daughter's therapist] explained that loss could 
affect a child's brain development as well as having an emotional impact.  

 
 
[¶36]   Pursuant to statutory mandates, the 
juvenile court held a hearing to determine which placement would be in the best 
interests of the children.  The 
juvenile court took great pains to ensure everyone was able to speak his 
piece.  After the hearing, the 
juvenile court issued a thorough and very thoughtful order.  The possibility of permanent placement 
with Uncle and Aunt was given full consideration.  In the end, however, the juvenile court 
determined that the permanency plan goal should be placement of the children 
with Foster Parents for adoption.  
In doing so, the juvenile court determined all the factors did not weigh 
equally between the two placements.  
Of special concern was the age of Son.  Son's young age brings into play very 
real psychological attachment issues.  
The juvenile court determined removing Son from Foster Parents would not 
be in his best interest.  Daughter 
also benefitted from the stability she had found in her life with Foster 
Parents.  Whether this Court would 
make the same decision in the first instance is not the question.  I fail to see anything in the record 
evidence that would allow this Court to find the juvenile court erred in this 
matter.

 
 
[¶37]   I understand the grief this causes 
Uncle and Aunt, but minimizing the grief of the children takes priority.  The circumstances of this case are 
unfortunate for Uncle and Aunt.  
First, they live three hundred miles away from Casper.  Thus, it was inappropriate for them to 
have temporary physical custody of the children while reunification with Mother 
was the permanency goal.  All the 
parties, including Mother, agreed on this point.  Further, for whatever reason, the 
reality for the children is that visitation between them and Uncle and Aunt was 
limited during the reunification period.  
Then there is the age of the children.  As noted, their young age, especially 
Son's, raises emotional developmental issues.  These realities can only be ignored at 
the expense of the children.  The 
juvenile court chose not to do so.  
This Court should not second-guess that decision.

 
 
[¶38]   Finally, I believe the majority 
opinion goes too far in outright ordering placement of the children with Uncle 
and Aunt.  At issue in this appeal 
is the goal of the permanency plan.  
This is only the beginning of the process.  Much remains to be accomplished before 
permanent placement of the children with Uncle and Aunt becomes a reality, not 
least of which is the termination of Mother's parental rights.  In the meantime, circumstances may 
change.  The juvenile court, the 
MDT, and the DFS should retain the flexibility to continue to protect the best 
interests of the children throughout the process.

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice, 
dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, 
Justice, joins.

 
 
[¶39]   I join Justice Golden's dissent but 
write separately in order to focus upon the appropriate standard of review.  The majority opinion fails to identify 
or apply any standard of review.  It 
simply dodges the issue.1  The proper standard of review is abuse 
of discretion.  Had the majority 
recognized and applied this standard, it could not have concluded that reversal 
was warranted.

 
 

[¶40]   Fundamentally, our review process 
should be the same that we apply in child custody cases.  In those cases, trial judges must apply 
statutory factors in making a custody determination that is in the best 
interests of the children.  The same 
is true here.  The juvenile court 
was required to fashion a placement decision that was in the best interests of 
the children, taking into account the statutorily recognized preference for 
family placement.  That is precisely 
what the juvenile court did in this case and that decision should not be 
overturned.

 
 

[¶41]   In determining whether there was an 
abuse of discretion, "our 
primary consideration is the reasonableness of the district court's decision in 
light of the evidence presented.  We 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's 
determination, affording every favorable inference to the prevailing party and 
omitting from our consideration the conflicting evidence."  Blakely v. Blakely, 2009 WY 127, ¶ 6, 218 P.3d 253, 254 (Wyo. 
2009).

 
 
[¶42]   The majority did not apply that 
standard in its analysis.  It did 
not evaluate the juvenile court's decision in terms of reasonableness based upon 
the evidence presented.  It did not 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's 
determination.  It did not afford 
every favorable inference to the prevailing party and it did not omit from its 
consideration conflicting evidence.  
Instead it did just the opposite.  
It ignored evidence favoring the juvenile court's determination and 
emphasized the evidence favoring placement with relatives.  It ignored the fact that those 
relatives, who were intervening parties below, did not appeal the decision of 
the juvenile court.2  Although the majority takes great pains 
to recognize the juvenile court's "thoroughness and thoughtfulness," it 
inexplicably ignores all of the juvenile court's factual findings and 
analysis.  It is the juvenile 
court's job to weigh the evidence, not ours.  We should reverse only when there has 
been an abuse of discretion.  There 
was no abuse of discretion in this case.

 
 
[¶43]   The juvenile court determined that 
the best interests of the children would be served by continued placement with 
the foster parents.  There is 
overwhelming evidence in the record to support that decision.  The juvenile court provided a 
thoughtful, thorough, and convincing explanation of how it arrived at that 
decision. The court's "Order on Permanency Hearing" is 17 pages long.  In that order the court summarizes the 
testimony of every witness who testified at the hearing.  Those witnesses included a counselor, 
teachers, the foster parents and one of their children, a DFS caseworker, the 
expert who prepared the bonding study ordered by the court, the uncle, and the 
Montana Family Resource Specialist Supervisor.  After summarizing the testimony and the 
evidence, the court discussed the applicable law and then applied it to the 
facts of this case.  Here is what 
the court said:

 
 
As 
noted above, [Aunt and Uncle] contend that DFS's failure to conduct an ICPC 
[Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children] study in a timely manner, 
along with DFS policy favoring family or kinship placement require that 
permanency of [the children] be with them.  
This Court will first address the issues concerning DFS policies, rules 
and regulations.

 
 
            
The Wyoming Supreme Court has held that an administrative agency is bound 
to follow its own rules and regulations.  
See MB v. Laramie County Dept. of 
Family Services, 933 P.2d 1126, 1130 (Wyo. 1997).  However, in order for such a violation 
to be actionable, it must be demonstrated that the violation affected a 
fundamental right or materially impacted the result.  See In re MN, 78 P.3d 232, 239 (Wyo. 
2003) (any non-compliance with DFS rules and regulations was harmless and not 
shown to have affected mother's fundamental rights or impacted ultimate 
decision); see also, In re D.H., 173 P.3d 365, 368 (Wyo. 2007).  In this 
case, even assuming that the ICPC study should have been conducted more 
punctually, it does not materially impact the decision reached by this 
Court.  Due to the age of [the 
children] and the required reasonable efforts to reunify them with [Mother], 
placement of these children in Casper, Wyoming was essential.  These children would not have been 
placed with [Aunt and Uncle] in Miles City Montana even had the ICPC been timely 
conducted.  In addition, there were 
no other appropriate family members in Casper, Wyoming to place these children 
with while reunification efforts were being made.  Moreover, to the extent that the DFS did 
not adequately consider permanency with [Aunt and Uncle] and/or allow visitation 
during the reunification plan, it has not materially impacted this Court's 
decision.  In order to ensure that 
[Aunt and Uncle] were given full and complete consideration this Court ordered a 
bonding study to be conducted and a full evidentiary hearing to be held.  Thus, to the extent the DFS failed to 
give [Aunt and Uncle] sufficient access or visitation this Court's bonding study 
was designed to make sure they were not prejudiced.  Certainly, the case workers involved in 
this case could and should have done better in communicating and following 
up.  The constant changing of the 
caseworkers is an ongoing source of reality and frustration for this Court.  Nonetheless, these deficiencies do not 
materially alter this Court's findings.  
The [die] was cast when [Mother] began to work reunification in Casper, 
Wyoming, which necessitated the placement of these children with [Foster 
Parents].

 
 
            
Turning to the issue of a family preference for permanency options, [Aunt 
and Uncle] cite the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in In re, Adoption of CF, 120 P.3d 992, 
1002 (Wyo. 2005).  In CF, the Court was analyzing the mother's 
argument that DFS should have placed her child with grandfather rather than 
Foster Parents.  The mother claimed 
that this placement with Foster Parents was "a violation of her birth family's 
fundamental rights to associate with family and federal law."  Id. at ¶ 26.  In rejecting this argument the Supreme 
Court noted that mother was judicially stopped from complaining about DFS's 
failures because she had previously objected to a placement with 
grandfather.  In dicta the Supreme Court noted "in 
general, preference should be given to family placements."  Id. at ¶ 26.  In making this statement the Court cited 
federal statutes which require the State to consider giving preference to an 
adult relative over non-related caregiver.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 
671(a)(19).  This being said, the 
only Wyoming Statute which discusses relative placement is Wyo. Stat. § 
14-3-429(b)(iii), which notes that if a child is found to be neglected the court 
may "[t]ransfer temporary legal custody to a relative or other suitable adult 
the court finds qualified to receive and care for the child, . . . ."  Certainly, that does not create a vested 
right or entitlement to permanency in family members.  The question remains what is in the best 
interest of these children considering all the facts and circumstances.  

 
 
            
Many other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have rejected an 
argument that family preference is controlling.  In the Matter of B.O., 177 P.3d 584, ¶ 
15 (Okla. App. 2008) (trial court's consideration of statutory factors in 
determining permanency by foster family adoption, despite existence of relative 
with a loving bond); In the Matter of the 
Adoption of Bernard A., 77 P.3d 4, 9-10 (Alaska 2003) (continuity of care by 
foster parents outweighed access to extended family and mother's placement 
preference found to carry little weight in determining which adoptive placement 
was in best interest of child); In re 
Adoption of C.D., 729 N.E.2d 553, 560 (Ill. App. 2000) (preserving family 
ties between child and the child's relatives and siblings is important but only 
one factor to be considered).  As 
noted by one court "the overriding concern of dependency proceedings, however, 
is not the interest of the extended family members but the interest of the 
child."  In re Lauren R., 148 Cal. App. 4th 841, 855 (2007).  The Court in Lauren R., went on to observe 
"regardless of the relative placement preference, the fundamental duty of the 
court is to assure the best interests of the child, whose bond with a foster 
parent may required (sic) that placement with a relative be rejected."  Id. at 855.  That is the situation before this 
Court.

 
 
            
For the first time in their young lives [the children], due to no fault 
of their own, have been placed in an environment that is stable and 
nurturing.  They are thriving.  This placement was not made to defeat or 
keep family away.  Rather it was 
necessitated in order to allow an alcoholic, drug addicted mother to attempt to 
reunify with her two month old son and six year old daughter.  While these reunification efforts we[re] 
going on, between June of 2007 and June of 2008, it was neither feasible nor 
realistic to place these children with [Aunt and Uncle] in Montana.  Since [the children] have been placed 
with [Foster Parents] they have not had to witness domestic violence or 
excessive consumption of alcohol by their mother or anyone else.  They get to count stairs and learn their 
ABC's in a loving and nurturing home with sisters and a brother.  They have, as far as they are concerned, 
sisters and a brother who love and nurture them.  They have, as far as they are concerned, 
a mother and a father who care for them and love them.  In fact, the only parents that [Son] 
really knows are [Foster Parents].  
They are family.  [Daughter] 
is thriving in school and has now caught up to her grade level.  She has been able to return to being a 
child because of the comfort and consistency of her placement.  Is a family preference more important 
than maintaining this environment? This Court, based upon the evidence 
presented, does not believe so. 

 
 
            
As Ms. England aptly noted, does the desirability of keeping these 
children connected to their family of origin outweigh the potential negative 
effects of requiring them to give up these bonds to form new ones with [Aunt and 
Uncle].  The Court concludes that 
the evidence establishes it does not.  
All things are not equal.  As 
noted by Ms. Parrish the loss would be significant.  While they might overcome this loss, the 
question remains, why should they have to endure it and be exposed to yet 
further trauma and loss?  Why should 
that risk be taken? In this case the Court finds that the best interests of [the 
children] are best pursued by permanency through adoption by [Foster 
Parents].  Any family preference is 
outweighed by the bond and relationships [the children] have formed with [Foster 
Parents] and even this community.  
The loss [the children] would suffer if permanency was pursued through 
placement with [Aunt and Uncle] is not merited.  This is not to say [Aunt and Uncle] are 
not good, sincere people.  They 
are.  However, the focus of this 
issue is on [the children] and their best interests.  The Court finds that those best 
interests are served through a permanency plan of adoption by [Foster 
Parents].

 
 
[¶44]   I can find no fault with the 
juvenile court's analysis.  There 
clearly was no abuse of discretion.  
The children are flourishing in their current environment.  There is no legal or factual 
justification for this further disruption of their lives.  The decision should be 
affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1According to the 
majority: "It is difficult to pinpoint the standard of review that should be 
applied here because we have a convergence of several issues of constitutional 
magnitude, as well as clear expressions of legislative 
intent."

 
 

2The only appealing party is a mother whose parental rights will be, or 
have been, terminated.