Case Title: In re Child of Brooke B.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020 ME 20

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2020-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 20 
Docket: 
Yor-19-350 
Submitted 
On Briefs: January 23, 2020 
Decided: 
January 30, 2020 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILD OF BROOKE B. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Brooke B. appeals from a judgment of the District Court 
(Biddeford, Duddy, J.) finding that her child was in circumstances of jeopardy to 
the child’s health or welfare and ordering that the child remain in the custody 
of the Department of Health and Human Services.  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4035(2), 
4036(1)(A) (2018).  The mother contends that (1) her right to due process was 
violated by the way that the trial judge conducted the hearing, which 
demonstrated that the judge was not impartial; and (2) certain of the court’s 
factual findings were clearly erroneous.  We affirm the judgment.1 
A. 
Due Process 
 
[¶2]  The court made it clear to all parties throughout the hearing that the 
time available was limited, and the court interjected at several points to remind 
all parties of the need to focus their presentations.  The evidence presented on 
                                         
1  The identity of the child’s father had not been conclusively determined at the time of the hearing. 
 
2 
the first day of the two-day hearing was largely at the discretion of the 
Department, and the evidence presented on the second day was largely at the 
discretion of the mother. 
 
[¶3]  Contrary to the mother’s contention that she was deprived of due 
process because the trial judge did not act impartially, the court’s actions and 
comments are best viewed as an attempt to assist her in completing her case 
within the allotted time by advising her as to the areas of inquiry that the court 
deemed most important.2  See State v. Bard, 2018 ME 38, ¶ 43, 181 A.3d 187 
(“Statements made by a judge during . . . judicial proceedings will not constitute 
bias or prejudice except in the extraordinary circumstances in which those 
statements reveal a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair 
judgment impossible.” (alteration and quotation marks omitted)). 
[¶4]  Even in cases where fundamental rights are at issue, trial courts 
have broad discretion to control the order and timing of the presentation of 
evidence and to set and enforce reasonable time limits on hearings. Dolliver v. 
Dolliver, 2001 ME 144, ¶¶ 10–12, 782 A.2d 316; Bradford v. Dumond, 
675 A.2d 957, 962–63 (Me. 1996). 
                                         
2  We do not consider the “proffer” offered in the mother’s brief concerning what purportedly 
occurred during an unrecorded chambers conference.  The substance of the conference was not 
placed on the record, and the mother did not avail herself of the procedure available in 
M.R. App. P. 5(d) to create a record of the unrecorded proceeding. 
 
3 
[¶5]  The court did not restrict or direct the mother’s presentation of her 
case apart from the time limitation, which it imposed on the Department’s case 
as well.  See M.R. Evid. 611(a) (“The court must exercise reasonable control over 
the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to . . . 
[m]ake those procedures effective for determining the truth [and] [a]void 
wasting time.”).  See also Field & Murray, Maine Evidence, § 611.1 (6th ed. 2007). 
 
[¶6]  Furthermore, the mother did not move for the judge’s recusal, either 
during the hearing or at any subsequent point.  We have emphasized that 
“a party who is concerned about a judge’s impartiality should tender 
its concerns to the court at the earliest possible moment.  To the maximum 
extent possible, this should occur before adjudication takes place.”  
Samsara Mem’l Tr. v. Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman, 2014 ME 107, ¶ 30, 
102 A.3d 757 (citation omitted).  Because the mother did not do so, our review 
is for an obvious error that “deprived the [mother] of a fair trial and resulted in 
a substantial injustice.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  We discern no error, 
obvious or otherwise, on this record. 
B. 
Factual Findings 
 
[¶7]  The court based its jeopardy determination on the following factual 
findings, all of which have support in the record: 
 
4 
 
From October 2017 to present, [the mother] has suffered 
from, and continues to suffer from, an active substance abuse 
condition. . . . 
 
 
In February of 2019, [the mother] engaged in a domestic 
violence incident involving [the father of her older child] in which 
she was at least a partial participant . . . . The incident occurred 
when [the child at issue here] was in the home.  During this 
incident, [the mother] tried to commit self-harm and she admits 
that she has tried to harm herself in the past. 
 
 
On or about April 8, 2019, [the mother] took [the child] and 
[the child’s sister] to a home . . . that is not safe for children because 
of the adult inhabitants or their visitors, some of whom have a 
history of unlawful drug activity.  One of the individuals in the 
home was actively using methamphetamine while [the mother] 
and the children were visiting. 
 
 
On April 25, 2019, [the mother] tested positive for abusing 
amphetamines and methamphetamine and the court finds that she 
was, in fact, abusing amphetamines and methamphetamines.  
There is no evidence to suggest that the test is not reliable. . . . The 
court is singularly concerned about [the mother’s] denial of the 
results of that test. . . . 
 
 
[The mother’s] judgment and memory are impaired due to 
her substance abuse.  [The mother] is in denial and does not 
recognize, acknowledge, or take responsibility for her substance 
abuse. 
 
 
The Court finds as a matter of law and by a preponderance of 
the evidence that jeopardy exists based on [the mother’s] misuse 
of substances and her ongoing substance use which is not 
successfully treated . . . [,] her mental health issues which are not 
yet successfully treated . . . [,] exposing [the child] to unsafe 
individuals . . . [, and] engaging in domestic violence in the presence 
of [the child]. 
 
 
5 
 
[¶8]  “We review the court’s factual findings for clear error and will affirm 
its jeopardy determination . . . unless there is no competent record evidence 
that can rationally be understood to establish as more likely than not that the 
child was in circumstances of jeopardy to his or her health and welfare.” 
In re Children of Troy H., 2019 ME 154, ¶ 5, 218 A.3d 750 (quotation marks 
omitted).  On this record, contrary to the mother’s contention, we conclude that 
the court’s supported findings “establish as more likely than not that returning 
the child[] to the [mother’s] custody would cause the child[] serious harm or 
the threat of serious harm.”  Id. ¶ 7 (alterations, footnote, and quotation marks 
omitted); see 22 M.R.S. §§ 4002(6)(A), 4035(2) (2018). 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vicki Mathews, Esq., Scarborough, for appellant mother 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Biddeford District Court docket number PC-2019-36 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY