Case Title: O'Donnell v. Krneta

Citation: 154 N.E.2d 45, 238 Ind. 582

Docket Number: 29,673

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1958-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
238 Ind. 582 (1958)
154 N.E.2d 45
O'DONNELL
v.
KRNETA ET AL.
No. 29,673.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed November 19, 1958.
*585 Philip M. Cagen, of Valparaiso, for appellant.
Lester L. Wilson, of Winamac and Thomas B. Dumas, of Rensselaer, for appellees.
ARTERBURN, J.
This is a quiet title action by appellees to set aside a tax deed under which the appellant claims title as a successor to the interest of the original purchaser at tax sale. The property was sold for delinquent taxes on April 13, 1942, and a tax deed issued by the auditor on April 13, 1944. The complaint in this action was filed on September 14, 1951. The principal defense below and asserted here for reversal is that the appellees' action was barred by a special one year statute of limitation written in the tax laws, while appellees insist that only the general fifteen year statute of limitations (Burns' § 2-603) applies in cases such as this.
No question is raised as to the procedure by which the alleged errors are presented to this court and we therefore need not detail it here. It is appellant's contention that the cause of action is barred by Burns' Indiana Statutes, § 64-2203a [Acts 1947, ch. 309, sec. 2] and § 64-2212, [Acts 1941, ch. 224, sec. 4], both of which limit the bringing of actions to contest tax titles to one year after the execution of the auditor's deed.
The Act of 1919, ch. 59, is a comprehensive tax act purporting to cover the entire field of taxes and the sale of real estate that is tax delinquent. The original 1919 Act contained no provision therein with reference to a statute of limitations. However, in 1941 and 1947 *586 this statute was amended. The amendatory Act of 1947, ch. 309, sec. 2, p. 1255 (Burns' § 64-2203a) reads as follows:
The amendatory Act of 1941, ch. 224, sec. 4 (Burns' § 64-2212) reads as follows:
It may be seen, we have one statute of limitation passed prior to the sale and deed and one act subsequent thereto.
Appellees contend that the words "under this act" in the 1941 amendment are to be construed as referring only to the amendments made in 1941 and thus would apply only to sales by the county, since the 1941 amendment for the first time empowered the county to purchase property that was delinquent for taxes and offer the same for sale. The property in question was not *587 a purchase by the county for delinquent taxes and a sale thereon and would thus not fall within such limitation under such an interpretation. The 1947 amendment, it is contended, does not apply because it was enacted subsequent to the sale and execution of the deed. It is not necessary for us to consider that question in view of what we have to say concerning the 1941 Act.
The Acts of 1941, sec. 2 completely revised sec. 260 of the original 1919 act providing for the manner of sale under that act. In fact, there could no longer, after the 1941 amendment, be any sale except pursuant to the amendment of that year. We must conclude that the sale and deed executed were pursuant to the amendatory act of 1941. The words "under this act" in section 4 (statute of limitations) therefore referred to the act under which the sale and deed were made in this case. If the legislature had intended to limit the amendment as contended by appellee, it could have said "under the amendments to this act" or otherwise have specified the particular sections. The word "act" as used in the amendment referred to the entire act as amended. Accordingly the one year statute of limitations is applicable.
The appellees next contend that section 4 (statutes of limitation) of the Act of 1941, ch. 224 (Burns' § 64-2212) is unconstitutional, because the title to chapter 224 of the Acts of 1941 is defective. The title is as follows:
The constitutional provisions applicable are Section 19 of Article 4 of the Constitution of Indiana, which provides:
and Section 21 of Article 4, which reads:
Appellee says sec. 209 of the Acts of 1919 is amended by sec. 1 of the amending Act of 1941; That amendment of section 3 referred to in the title is accomplished by section 2 of the amending act; Section 3 amends section 262 of the 1919 Act and section 222 and 261 thereof are repealed by section 6 as stated in the title; However, section 4 of the amendatory Act of 1941 provides for a statute of limitation (1 year) and no statute of limitation is contained in the 1919 act sought to be amended and the amendatory act of 1941 does not state that sec. 4 thereof amends any specified section in the original Act of 1919. Since section 4 does not state it amends any specific section in the title of the amendatory act, it is argued, section 4 is unconstitutional *589 on the authority of Draper v. Zebec (1941), 219 Ind. 362, 37 N.E.2d 952, 38 N.E.2d 995.
The appellant, on the other hand, contends that under the numerous decisions of this court an amendatory act may add or substitute sections dealing with different subject matters from those which they replace or repeal in the original act so long as such amendments still come within the purview of the title of the original act to be amended. State ex rel. Meyer-Kiser Bank v. Superior Ct. (1931), 202 Ind. 589, 177 N.E. 322; State v. Lewis (1924), 195 Ind. 344, 145 N.E. 496; State v. Closser (1912), 179 Ind. 230, 99 N.E. 1057; Stiers v. Mundy (1910), 174 Ind. 651, 92 N.E. 374; Brandon v. State (1861), 16 Ind. 197.
The title to the original act of 1919, ch. 59 is:
A statute of limitation confined to actions relating to the subject matter of the title to an act is within the purview of such title. An amendatory act which purports to add a statute of limitations to actions contesting tax title comes within the purview of a general act "concerning taxation". Wright-Bachman, Inc., v. Hodnett et al. (1956), 235 Ind. 307, 133 N.E.2d 713; Wright v. House (1919), 188 Ind. 247, 121 N.E. 433; Farrar v. Clark et al. (1882), 85 Ind. 449. Were it not for the fact that the Act of 1941 is an amendatory act rather than an independent or new general act, the question would be easily resolved.
The case of Draper v. Zebec, supra, relied upon by appellees overruled Stiers v. Mundy (1910), 174 Ind. 651, 92 N.E. 374 and limited other cases in that line of authority. Rose v. State (1909), 171 Ind. 662, 87 N.E. 103; Cain v. Allen (1906), 168 Ind. 8, 79 N.E. *590 201, 79 N.E. 896; Lewis v. The State (1897), 148 Ind. 346, 47 N.E. 675; Brandon v. State (1861), 16 Ind. 197; The State v. Bowers (1860), 14 Ind. 195.
The Stiers Case held: (p. 654)
This court said the same thing in State ex rel. Nicely v. Wildey et al. (1935), 209 Ind. 1, p. 6, 197 N.E. 844:
However, the same judge who wrote the opinion in the Nicely Case, supra, in Draper v. Zebec (1941), 219 Ind. 362, 383, 37 N.E.2d 952, 38 N.E.2d 995, when it came up on rehearing, said:
The opinion then states (p. 387): "that the subject-matter of the amendatory act must come within the purview of the section of the original act indicated for amendment in the title of the amendatory act."
Just how the legislature "may amend by substituting sections which differ entirely from the original" section and still "stay within the purview of the sections" *591 designated for amendment is difficult for us to understand. There is an obvious inconsistency in these words and the cases in which they are used. This conflict is all the more evident when the issue before the court in the Nicely v. Wildey Case, supra (p. 6), is stated thus:
We do not find that the Nicely Case is mentioned in the opinion in the Draper Case, although written by the same judge.
The confusion is not dissipated in First Bank & Trust Co. of South Bend v. Ralston (1944), 222 Ind. 584, 55 N.E.2d 115, when this court, speaking through the same judge, said: (p. 589)
The Act of 1941 referred to is the same act under consideration here. Peculiarities in the Draper Case were also pointed out in Griffin Tel. Corp. v. Public Serv. Com. (1956), 236 Ind. 29, 138 N.E.2d 150.
In the Nicely Case the contention that the amendatory section dealt with a different subject-matter from *592 that of the section amended was disposed of by stating it was covered by the general title of the act amended and was constitutional, while in the Draper Case the judgment was reversed for the same reason, namely that the subject-matter of the amendment was not germane to the original section it purported to amend.
With this unsatisfactory state of the law existing, we are compelled to review the question anew in this case.
To require in an amendment to an act that the subject-matter of the amendment must stay within the purview of the particular section purported to be amended, places a restriction on legislative procedure, not warranted by the constitution. Attempts to determine in each case just what is within the scope of the original section intended to be amended and whether or not the proposed amendment was germane to such section, would create endless uncertainty and encourage litigation. It would involve a legislative draftsman and the courts in an inextricable morass in attempting to make such determinations.
Under such a rule, if no section of the original act covered the subject-matter of the proposed amendment (as in the present case of the statute of limitations) and although the title to the original act was sufficiently broad to do so, still the old act could not be amended except by an entirely new act and then only by implication.
Likewise, an original act could not have additional sections added thereto by amendment if the subject-matter was not already contained in one or more of the existing sections and such sections were designated in the title of the amendatory act. New additional sections added to an act are as truly amendments as an outright repeal of any section.
*593 The problem here spills over into the question of repeal by implication.
The appellee urges that the Act of 1941, sec. 4 (special statute of limitations) is unconstitutional because it attempts to repeal by implication the general statute of limitations of fifteen years. (Acts 1881, ch. 33, sec. 39, p. 240, Burns' § 2-603) In our opinion the 1941 Act, being a later act on a special subject which conflicts with a general act, does repeal by implication the earlier statute to the extent that there is no such conflict. A general statute may be repealed, limited or modified by implication to the extent that a later statute of a more special nature is inconsistent with the earlier Act. Burd v. McCullough (C.C.A.) (1954), 217 F.2d 159; De Haven v. Municipal City of South Bend (1937), 212 Ind. 194, 7 N.E.2d 184; Daniels v. The State (1898), 150 Ind. 348, 50 N.E. 74; Western & Southern Indemnity Co. v. Cramer (1937), 104 Ind. App. 219, 10 N.E.2d 440.
However, the Draper v. Zebec Case, supra, (p. 381), says in part that an act "... to amend and modify certain specified sections of an existing law, cannot be treated as amending or repealing other unspecified sections or other laws by implication, ..."
We feel this is too broad a statement with reference to repeal by implication. There is nothing in the Constitution of Indiana which expressly limits repeals by implication to so-called independent acts. Repeals by implication are just as effective as those which are expressed. They result from necessity where conflicts in legislation exist.
There is no basic reason for holding repeals by implication may result in the enactment of a new or so-called independent act but not in an amendatory act if the amendatory act or section is set forth in full, as provided by Art. 4, sec. *594 21 of the Constitution. An amendment becomes an integral part of the original act after so amended and if a repugnancy exists with another earlier statute as a result of the amendment, the same problem arises as in an independent act that does not purport to amend any act, although it actually conflicts with and is inconsistent with another prior act not referred to in the title.
So long as the title of the amending act refers to the title of the act to be amended, there is not as much opportunity for deception as in the case of an independent act, which does not refer to the act which it will repeal by implication as a result of repugnancy. If there is any constitutional provision which would prohibit a repeal by implication in an amendatory act but exempts so-called independent acts from its provisions, such has not been pointed out to us.
Article 4, sec. 21 of the Constitution of Indiana, requiring the wording of an act or section as amended to be set forth in full, places no restriction on direct or implied repeals or amendments if there is a compliance with that provision as in this case, when the extra or additional section was set forth in full. State ex rel. Meyer-Kiser Bank v. Superior Ct. (1931), 202 Ind. 589, 177 N.E. 322; Stiers v. Mundy (1910), 174 Ind. 651, 92 N.E. 374; Bush v. The City of Indianapolis (1889), 120 Ind. 476, 22 N.E. 422; Branham v. Lange (1861), 16 Ind. 497.
We recognize that there are many conflicting statements to be found in the cases in this state on this question. Some are in point; some are obiter dicta. It would serve no purpose to review these cases with the hope of distinguishing them. Very few of these cases give any basic reasons for their statements. A better purpose to be served is to consider the basic *595 reason for the constitutional provisions under consideration.
It has been said, time after time, that both sec. 19 and sec. 21 of Article 4 of the Constitution of Indiana are to prevent surprise or fraud by including in the body of an act matter of which the title gives no indication and to apprise members of the legislature and public of the subject-matter of the proposed legislation.
One of the cases which impresses us with the study and analysis given to these constitutional provisions involved is Bush v. The City of Indianapolis (1889), 120 Ind. 476, 22 N.E. 422. It says: (pp. 479, 480, 481)
Sometimes it is said where additions are made to an earlier statute which is referred to in the title of an act, that the addition is "supplemental" and is not amendatory; therefore the same constitutional provisions do not apply to the "supplemental" acts as to amendatory acts, but we fail to follow this play on words since it merely points up the dilemma in which the court finds itself in attempting to carry out a rule not logical in its operation nor based upon the policy behind the constitutional provisions. McCleary v. Babcock (1907), 169 Ind. 228, 82 N.E. 453.
The statement in State v. Closser (1912), 179 Ind. 230, 235, 99 N.E. 1057, 1059, made concerning the same question we have before us now, we feel should be our guide:
We therefore hold that although sec. 4 of the Acts of 1941, ch. 224 (purporting to amend by its title the Act of 1919) does not designate in the body of the amending act any specific section to be amended, and although no other section in the *598 original act covers the same subject-matter as sec. 4 (statute of limitations), still, since the subject-matter of sec. 4 falls within the purview of the act to be amended, it is a valid amendment thereto by the addition of a section thereto.
We further hold that an amendatory act may repeal or modify another statute by implication to the same extent as a so-called independent statute may, and therefore sec. 4 of the amendatory Act of 1941 repeals and limits the earlier general statute of limitations to the extent that it is repugnant thereto in the limited area it purports to cover.
Draper v. Zebec, supra, insofar as it conflicts with the principles laid down in this opinion, is overruled.
It is not urged in this case that the tax sale or deed was a nullity or that the statutes of limitation were tolled by reason of lack of notice, fraud or concealment.
It is however contended that the auditor did not certify on his record the time and place of publication and posting of notice. That does not prove no notice was given nor that the sale was a nullity ab initio. The appellee was the plaintiff below and had the burden of proof. However, since the action was not brought within the proper statutory period, such matter can not now be reviewed.
Judgment reversed, with directions to grant a new trial.
Landis, Achor and Emmert, JJ., concur.
Bobbitt, C.J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 154 N.E.2d 45.