Case Title: Nylen v. Dayton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Nylen v. Dayton1989 WY 81770 P.2d 1112Case Number: 88-280Decided: 03/30/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
DEAN D. NYLEN, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 

SHARON DAYTON, INDIVIDUALLY; DAYTON 
RANCHES, A PARTNERSHIP, AND ITS PARTNERS, SHARONDAYTON AND LYNN T. DAYTON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS 
PARTNERS OF DAYTON RANCHES, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LincolnCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

 
 
Roger Cowan of Harris and 
Morton, P.C., Evanston, for appellant.

 
 
S.B. Freeman, III of 
Bormuth, Freeman & Fuller, Cody, for 
appellees.

 
 
George E. Powers, Jr. of 
Godfrey, Sundahl & Jorgenson, Cheyenne, for amici curiae Wyoming Stock Growers 
Ass'n, Wyoming Wool Growers Ass'n, and Wyoming Farm Bureau 
Federation.

 
 
Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and 
LEIMBACK, District Judge.

 
 

MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Dean D. Nylen 
brought an action to recover for property damage and related expenses resulting 
from the collision of his tractor-trailer with a horse owned or controlled by 
appellees Sharon Dayton, individually, Dayton Ranches, a partnership, and its 
partners, Sharon Dayton and Lynn T. Dayton, individually and as partners of 
Dayton Ranches. The district court granted summary judgment to 
appellees.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant states the 
issues in this manner:

 
 
     WHETHER A VIOLATION OF 
WYO. STAT. § 
11-24-108 (1977 AS AMENDED) CREATES A STANDARD OF:

 
 
(a) NEGLIGENCE ON THE 
PART OF THE LIVESTOCK OWNER/KEEPER; OR

 
 
(b) A REBUTTABLE 
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE LIVESTOCK OWNER/KEEPER; 
OR

 
 
(c) NEGLIGENCE PER SE ON 
THE PART OF THE LIVESTOCK OWNER/KEEPER.

 
 
Appellees, alternatively, 
articulate as a single combined issue:

 
 
     A. WHETHER THE MERE 
PRESENCE OF A HORSE UPON THE HIGHWAY WITHOUT ANY SHOWING THAT THE APPELLEES 
EITHER NEGLIGENTLY OR CONSCIOUSLY PERMITTED THE HORSE TO RUN AT LARGE 
CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF § 11-24-108, WYOMING STATUTES, 1977 (1987 Cum.Supp.), 
AND, IF SO, WHETHER SUCH VIOLATION CONSTITUTES A PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE 
SUFFICIENT TO MAKE A CASE FOR THE JURY.

 
 

[¶4.]     Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
4.08, the parties have submitted an agreed upon statement of the facts, approved 
by the district court, to be used as the basis for reviewing the legal 
determinations made by the district court. The statement of facts is consistent 
with the materials included in the record on appeal.

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellant is an 
independent long-haul truck driver. Sharon Dayton is a rancher who, in 
partnership with her brother, Lynn Dayton, owned a ranch near Cokeville, Wyoming.1 On June 9, 1987, appellant was driving his 
truck and trailer on U.S. Highway 30 north of Cokeville. At approximately 10:30 
that evening, a horse owned by Sharon Dayton wandered onto the roadway in front 
of appellant's truck. The truck collided with the horse, killing the horse and 
extensively damaging the truck. Prior to the accident the horse had been kept in 
pastures owned by Dayton Ranches, whose lands were adjacent to U.S. Highway 30 
near the location of the collision. In this area U.S. Highway 30 is a fenced 
public highway. A ranch employee stated in an affidavit that the gate enclosing 
the pasture containing the horse was closed when he left the ranch at the end of 
the work day on June 9, 1987. An outer gate accessing the highway from the ranch 
lands may have been open. It is unknown how the horse escaped from the enclosed 
pasture.

 
 

[¶6.]     By complaint and 
amended complaint, appellant alleged causes of action against appellees premised 
on negligence, negligence per se, and strict liability. After a period of 
discovery, both sides submitted motions for summary judgment supported by 
affidavit and deposition testimony. Appellant, in his motion for summary 
judgment, posited, as an alternative to his theory of negligence per se, the 
theory that a violation of the applicable statute created a rebuttable 
presumption of negligence. After a hearing, the district court denied 
appellant's motion for summary judgment and granted the motion of appellees. The 
district court found that appellant had presented no evidence of appellees' 
negligence and that the law in Wyoming does not subject livestock owners to 
strict liability, negligence per se, or presumptions of negligence under the 
facts of this case. This appeal followed in which appellant contests only the 
district court's findings as to negligence per se or a rebuttable presumption of 
negligence.

 
 

[¶7.]     Summary judgment is 
properly granted only where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 
prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Doud v. First 
Interstate Bank of Gillette, 769 P.2d 927 (Wyo. 1989); St. Paul Fire and Marine 
Insurance Co. v. Albany County School District No. 1, 763 P.2d 1255 (Wyo. 1988); 
Teton Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, Laramie County School 
District Number One, 763 P.2d 843 (Wyo. 1988). Where, as here, the facts are not 
in dispute and we are presented strictly with questions of law, we accord no 
deference to and are not bound by the lower court's decision. Mills v. Garlow, 
768 P.2d 554 (Wyo. 1989); Robinson v. Bell, 767 P.2d 177 (Wyo. 1989).

 
 

[¶8.]     Appellant essentially 
contends that the mere presence of livestock on a fenced public highway 
constitutes a violation of Wyo. Stat. § 11-24-108(a) (1977) and that, by its 
amendment to the statute in 1975, the legislature intended to create a standard 
of negligence per se or a rebuttable presumption of negligence for such a 
statutory violation. Section 11-24-108 provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 
     (a) No owner or person 
having custody or charge of livestock shall permit the livestock to run at large 
in any fenced public highways in Wyoming as defined in W.S. 31-4-101 [§ 
31-1-101]. Livestock shall not be picketed on a public highway right-of-way from 
one (1) hour before sundown to one (1) hour after sunrise. If livestock are 
picketed on a public highway and escape, the owner or person having custody or 
charge of the livestock is deemed to have permitted the livestock to run at 
large in violation of this section. No livestock shall be picketed on an 
interstate or national defense highway as defined in W.S. 
31-5-1001(a)(xiv).

 
 
     (b) Any person or 
corporation violating this section shall be fined not less than fifty dollars 
($50.00) nor more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) and in addition 
shall pay all damage   done by 
the livestock. The provisions of this section do not apply to livestock drifting 
into lanes or fenced roads in going to or returning from their accustomed 
ranges.

 
 
Prior to its amendment in 
1975,2 the predecessor to the above statute 
provided in material part:

 
 
     It shall be unlawful 
for any person, persons, company or corporation being the owner of livestock of 
any kind or having custody or charge thereof to permit said livestock to run at 
large in any fenced public lanes or fenced roads in the State of Wyoming. Any person, 
persons, company or corporation violating the provisions of this section shall 
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not 
less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100.00) and 
in addition shall pay all damage done by such stock unlawfully permitted to run 
at large in such lanes or roads; provided that the provisions of this act 
[section] shall not apply to range cattle drifting into lanes or fenced roads in 
going to, or returning from their accustomed ranges.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. § 11-507 
(1957).

 
 

[¶9.]     Appellant asserts that 
the deletion of the term "unlawful" in the amended version of the statute 
indicates the legislature intended to impose criminal and civil liability upon 
the owner or keeper for livestock running at large in a fenced public highway 
without any showing of negligence or knowledge on behalf of the owner or keeper. 
Alternatively, appellees persuasively contend that the cases decided by this 
Court both before and after the amendment to the statute establish that the 
operative word in the statute is "permit" and that the statute is not violated 
absent a showing of negligence.

 
 

[¶10.]  The facts in Hinkle v. Siltamaki, 361 P.2d 37 (Wyo. 
1961), involving a nighttime collision of an automobile with horses on a fenced 
highway, are strikingly similar to those in the instant case. The appellant in 
Hinkle similarly argued that the presence of livestock on a fenced highway 
created a prima facie case of negligence shifting the burden to the owners to 
show that they had used reasonable care in keeping the animals off the highway. 
In affirming summary judgment for the appellees, we 
observed:

 
 
     Various cases 
discussing the owner's liability for animals at large on the highway are 
mentioned in Annotations at 34 A.L.R.2d 1285 and 59 A.L.R.2d 1328. Although a 
few jurisdictions hold that proof of an animal's running at large raises a 
presumption of negligence on the part of the owner, or that the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur applies, the majority rule is:

 
 
"Where the particular 
statute involved provides that the owner shall not `permit,' `allow,' or `suffer' his 
animals to run at large, the courts have generally held, or recognized, that 
statutes of this type are not violated in the absence of at least negligence by 
the owner of the animals." 34 A.L.R.2d 1285, 1289.

 
 

Id. at 40 (emphasis added). 
We further stated in that case:

 
 
     According to the 
weight of authority, courts have had no hesitancy in holding that a statute 
making it unlawful for an owner of livestock "to permit" them to run at large 
implies knowledge, consent, and wilfulness on the part of the owner, or such 
negligent conduct as is equivalent thereto, so that the proof of one of these 
elements is essential either to a conviction or an assessment of damages growing 
out of a violation.

 
 

Id. at 41 (emphasis added). 
In Gilliland v. Steinhoefel, 521 P.2d 1350 (Wyo. 1974), we reaffirmed our holding in 
Hinkle and clarified that, for purposes of civil liability, § 11-507 could be 
violated by simple negligence without proof of knowledge, consent, or 
willfulness.

 
 

[¶11.]  As discussed, § 11-507 was amended in 
1975, eliminating the term "unlawful." Endresen v. Allen, 574 P.2d 1219 
(Wyo. 1978), 
was decided after the amendment. In that case, a motorcyclist was injured when a 
dog, in violation of a municipal leash law ordinance, ran in front of him on a 
city street. Although we held that the city ordinance eliminated any requirement 
of scienter, i.e., knowledge of the propensities of the dog, we declined to 
apply a standard of negligence per se and reiterated our holdings in Hinkle and 
Gilliland that, with respect to animal-at-large statutes, a showing of the 
defendant's negligence in permitting the animal to run at large is required in 
order to take the case to a jury. Endresen, 574 P.2d  at 
1222-25.

 
 

[¶12.]  Despite the apparently dispositive effect 
of the above decisions, particularly Endresen as being decided after the 
amendment of the statute, appellant urges that the deletion of the term 
"unlawful" from the statute must have been purposeful and that it was intended 
to change the meaning of the statute to create a standard of negligence per se 
or a rebuttable presumption of negligence. Inherent in this argument, as we see 
it, is the proposition that Endresen was wrongly decided. We cannot 
agree.

 
 

[¶13.]  Generally, when the legislature amends a 
statute by deleting an express provision, the presumption is that a change was 
intended. Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055 (Wyo. 1984); Forest Oil Corporation v. District Boundary 
Board of SweetwaterCounty, 419 P.2d 194 (Wyo. 1966). It may be just as reasonable, 
however, to say that a term was removed because it served no useful purpose. 
"Changes in phraseology do not always change the meaning given to a statute 
prior to amendment. The change may result from a variety of reasons." Id. at 197. See also 
Vincent v. Reeves, 47 Wyo. 117, 31 P.2d 680 (1934). In State v. 
Stern, 526 P.2d 344, 351 (1974), we quoted with approval Hughes v. United 
States, 338 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1964), for the proposition that "unlawfully" is a 
conclusion of law meaning contrary to law and nothing more. We agree with 
appellees that, considering the general prohibition stated in the act and the 
penalty provision, it is just as reasonable to assume the term "unlawful" was 
deleted because it was redundant and unnecessary language.

 
 

[¶14.]  As we read the amendatory language of the 
statute, it appears to be directed specifically to the problem of livestock 
picketed on fenced public highways without otherwise significantly changing the 
general prohibition regarding livestock at large on a fenced public highway. 
This interpretation, as noted by appellees, is consistent with the stated 
purpose of the amendment found in the 1975 Session Laws of Wyoming, which 
describe the amendment as:

 
 
     AN ACT to amend W.S. 
11-507 relating to livestock running at large in fenced public ways; providing 
that if picketed livestock escape, the owner or person in charge thereof is 
deemed to have permitted their escape; and providing 
penalties.

 
 
1975 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 68, § 
1. See also Digest of House Journal of the Forty-Third State Legislature of 
Wyoming at 127 (1975).3

 
 

[¶15.]  We are not persuaded, therefore, that the 
amendment to the statute affected the negligence standard for a violation of the 
statute established in Hinkle and reaffirmed in Gilliland and Endresen, except 
possibly in the case of livestock picketed on the highway. Thus in the instant 
case, where appellant has admittedly failed to present any evidence of 
appellees' negligence,4 the mere presence of the horse on the 
highway fails to establish a violation of the statute and, in the absence of a 
statutory violation, there can be no question of negligence per se or a 
rebuttable presumption of negligence. Summary judgment for appellees was proper 
as a matter of law.

 
 

[¶16.]  Affirmed.

 
 

URBIGKIT, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Subsequent to the accident involved 
in this case, the ranching operation was incorporated, and the partnership was 
dissolved.

 
 

2 Section 11-24-108 was also amended 
in 1978 and 1981 in ways not material to the issues in this 
case.

 
 

3 We note that this is not a case 
involving livestock picketed on a public highway which have escaped. The "deemed 
to have permitted" language regarding such livestock was undoubtedly intended to 
affect the standard to be applied when picketed livestock 
escape.

 
 

4 Appellant, as mentioned, has not 
raised as an issue on appeal the propriety of summary judgment in relation to 
his negligence claim. In the agreed upon statement of facts, appellant 
effectively conceded a failure of evidence on that claim. We need not consider, 
therefore, whether or not a factual issue of negligence was presented by the 
equivocal evidence that the outer gate accessing the highway may have been 
open.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶17.]  I dissent. In factual progression, this 
case tells us (1) appellee (defendant) owned a horse; (2) the horse was placed 
in a pasture under the control of appellee and came to run at large on a fenced 
public highway; (3) the horse was under the control of appellee; (4) the vehicle 
being driven by appellant (plaintiff) hit the horse on the public highway where 
the law says no owner or person having custody will permit livestock to be; (5) 
the driver of the damaged vehicle did not permit or encourage the animal to be 
on the fenced highway; (6) the owner of the horse provided no evidence how his 
horse got where the law denies it permission to be, although surely it did not 
fly nor swim, and must have been let out by unclosed gates or jumped over 
insufficient fences; (7) in the context of the English language, the horse 
itself did not permit itself to be upon the fenced highway; (8) in the absence 
of proof to the contrary in some defensive fashion, the permitting authority was 
the owner; and (9) absent proof to the contrary, there is evidence from the 
accident that followed that the owner permitted the horse to be where it was by 
failure of an adequate denial of access to be upon the 
highway.

 
 

[¶18.]  I would apply the statute in context 
presently written since the word unlawfully has been deleted in last amendment 
and find a case to be presented sufficient to escape summary judgment as now 
presented by the unexplained presence of the animal on the highway. "No owner or 
person having custody or charge of livestock shall permit the livestock to run 
at large in any fenced public highways in Wyoming * * *." W.S. 11-24-108(a). Somebody 
permitted the horse to be on the highway and, in this record, there is no other 
suspect except the owner. I do not find a basis justified in precedent for 
providing the owner of the offending horse absolving summary judgment as a 
matter of law. Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986).

 
 

[¶19.]  The purpose of fenced highways is 
well-defined as designed to keep livestock out of roadways and, consequently, to 
avoid collision injury or damage to the traveling public. No wonder highway 
accidents and injuries continue to increase if efforts to achieve safety are 
ascribed such results as will be provided by this case. Furthermore, if the 
legislature wants to trigger liability by "negligently permitting" or 
"intentionally permitting" as first requirements following creation of the 
dangerous condition, the statutory language should expressly provide that 
disinclination for responsibility. In statutory text, I would not follow Hinkle 
v. Siltamaki, 361 P.2d 37 (Wyo. 1961) to a summary judgment absolution of 
potential liability from a condition which the legislature obviously sought to 
prevent. Cf. Endresen v. Allen, 574 P.2d 1219 (Wyo. 1978) and Gilliland v. Steinhoefel, 521 P.2d 1350 
(Wyo. 
1974).

 
 

[¶20.]  This is a summary judgment case where the 
livestock owner gave no justified explanation for the presence of his horse on 
the fenced highway where it should not have been. Obviously, such a defense may 
exist as not now required for this litigation as concluded by this summary 
judgment. Further, I follow the principle that violation of a statute is prima 
facie evidence of negligence so that the presence of the animal on the fenced 
highway may be sufficient to escape motion disposition but not necessarily to 
establish finite liability following motor vehicle collision. See Short v. 
Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195 (Wyo. 1987) (Urbigkit, J., concurring). Cf. 
Endresen, 574 P.2d 1219.

 
 

[¶21.]  Livestock within a fenced highway 
constitute a singular danger to the public who travel upon the state highways 
and I would find that subject adequately addressed by the statute to establish a 
sphere of responsibility for the owner in order that a collision caused by 
unexplained presence will proceed to a factual resolution by trial. Stratman v. 
Admiral Beverage Corp., 760 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 
1988); Osborn v. Manning, 685 P.2d 1121, 1123 (Wyo. 1984). It should not be ignored that 
Hinkle, 361 P.2d 37 is distinguishable from both Endresen, 574 P.2d 1219 and 
Gilliland, 521 P.2d 1350, by contrary result with reversal of the summary 
judgment initially granted to the livestock owner. Like the result in those 
cases, I would require a full development of the facts here also by trial 
presentation. Who better than the owner should know what did happen and surely 
the statute loses substance if subject to a "Gee, I just don't know" amorphous 
summary judgment disposition.

 
 

[¶22.]  The disarmingly simple solution of the 
majority is a continued invitation for damage and injury to the traveling public 
for whom the fenced highways were constructed and the prohibitory statute 
enacted. Consequently, I dissent from affirmation of this summary 
judgment.