Case Title: Waterman v. Halverson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 000260

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, 
JJ., and Whiting, S.J. 
 
LAURIE F.S. WATERMAN 
 
v.  Record No. 000260                    OPINION BY  
 
 
 
SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
SANDY (BUTLER) HALVERSON, ET AL. 
    January 12, 2001 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
Randolph T. West, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal we consider whether the trial court erred 
in dismissing plaintiff's motion for judgment as untimely 
filed based on its construction of Code § 8.01-275.1. 
 
Laurie F.S. Waterman filed a medical malpractice action 
against Sandy (Butler) Halverson, Michelle "Roe" McCormick, 
Riverside Hospital, Inc., Nancy Couleman, and Paul Rein in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Portsmouth (the defendants).1  
More than twelve months after the filing of this action, 
Waterman sought and was granted a nonsuit.  The defendants 
were not served with process and had no notice of the nonsuit 
motion or order granting the motion. 
On October 3, 1997, less than six months after the 
nonsuit was granted but more than two years after Waterman's 
medical treatments ended, Waterman filed this action against 
the same parties in the same court and promptly had the 
                     
1 Other named defendants, Janine Mooney, Riverside 
Regional Medical Center, and James River Anesthesia 
defendants served with process.  Later, by agreement, the case 
was transferred to the Circuit Court of the City of Newport 
News. 
 
The defendants filed pleas in bar asserting that the case 
should be dismissed on various theories.  Following 
consideration of the parties' briefs and oral arguments on the 
defendants' pleas in bar, the trial court concluded that the 
action was barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed 
the motion for judgment with prejudice.  The trial court's 
decision was based on its conclusion that Code § 8.01-275.1 
was enacted to "eliminate the problems that the Supreme Court 
addressed in Clark v. [Butler Aviation, 238 Va. 506, 385 
S.E.2d 847 (1989)]."2   Adopting a theory advanced by some of 
the defendants, the trial court construed Code § 8.01-275.1 to 
"eliminate the problems" by providing that service of process, 
if not completed within one year of the filing of an action, 
was "untimely," and, under those circumstances, the "only 
authority the Court should have is to determine if due 
diligence was exercised to have timely service effected on the 
defendants."  Applying that construction of Code § 8.01-275.1 
                                                                
Associates, Inc., were dismissed prior to entry of the trial 
court's judgment.  
2 Clark involved consideration and reconciliation of the 
provisions of Rule 3:3(c) and Code §§ 8.01-229(E)(3) and -380. 
238 Va. at 508, 385 S.E.2d at 848.   
 
 
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to this case, the trial court concluded that because there was 
no service of process within twelve months of filing in the 
original action, the jurisdiction of the court in that action 
was limited to consideration of the plaintiff's due diligence 
in effecting service and, therefore, that court had no 
jurisdiction to consider the motion for the nonsuit. 
On appeal Waterman assigns error to the trial court's 
construction of Code § 8.01-275.1.  Waterman asserts that the 
statute codified Rule 3:3(c) and did not abrogate the holding 
in Clark and its progeny.3  Having reviewed the relevant 
statutes, Rule 3:3(c), and case law, we conclude that Code 
§ 8.01-275.1 did not limit the jurisdiction of the trial court 
as the trial court held and did not abrogate the principles of 
Clark and its progeny. 
Code § 8.01-275.1 provides: 
Service of process in an action or suit 
within twelve months of commencement of the 
action or suit against a defendant shall be 
timely as to that defendant.  Service of 
process on a defendant more than twelve months 
after the suit or action was commenced shall be 
timely upon a finding by the court that the 
plaintiff exercised due diligence to have 
timely service made on the defendant.  
 
                     
3 Although we have not specifically addressed the 
construction of the section, we have previously referred to 
Code § 8.01-275.1 as a codification of Rule 3:3. Frey v. 
Jefferson Homebuilders, Inc., 251 Va. 375, 377 n.1, 467 S.E.2d 
788, 789 n.1 (1996); Gilbreath v. Brewster, 250 Va. 436, 442 
n.3, 463 S.E.2d 836, 838 n.3 (1995). 
 
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Rule 3:3(c) provides in pertinent part: 
No judgment shall be entered against a 
defendant who was served with process more than 
one year after the commencement of the action 
against him unless the court finds as a fact that 
the plaintiff exercised due diligence to have 
timely service on him. 
 
Any variance between a rule of court and a subsequently 
enacted statute must be construed to give effect to the 
statute.  Code § 8.01-3(D).  However, there is no variance 
between Rule 3:3(c) and Code § 8.01-275.1.  Both of these 
provisions seek to promote a policy of timely prosecution of 
law suits and to avoid abuse of the judicial system.  The 
statute, but not the rule, defines timely service as one year.  
However, the rule implies that timely service means service 
within one year.  Both the rule and the statute allow a 
plaintiff to establish the exercise of due diligence to 
perfect service within the one year period.  Thus, in the 
absence of any conflict or variance, there is no reason to 
conclude that the enactment of the statute nullified or 
invalidated any portion of the rule. 
Similarly, there is no basis to conclude that the 
enactment of Code § 8.01-275.1 nullified or invalidated the 
cases construing Rule 3:3(c).  The General Assembly is 
presumed to be aware of the decisions of this Court when 
enacting legislation.  Dodson v. Potomac Mack Sales & Serv., 
 
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Inc., 241 Va. 89, 94, 400 S.E.2d 178, 180 (1991).  In Clark, 
decided before the enactment of Code § 8.01-275.1, we held 
that failure to comply with the one year service provision of 
the rule did not preclude a trial court from granting a 
plaintiff's motion for nonsuit and that the refiled action was 
entitled to the tolling provisions of Code § 8.01-229(E)(3).  
Rule 3:3(c) "forbade entry of any judgment against [the 
defendant] in [the original] action, and the action ended with 
entry of the order allowing a nonsuit pursuant to Code § 8.01-
380."  Clark, 238 Va. at 511, 385 S.E.2d at 849.  We have 
applied this holding in cases decided subsequent to the 
enactment of Clark.  See, e.g., Bremer v. Doctor's Bldg. 
P'ship, 251 Va. 74, 81, 465 S.E.2d 787, 791 (1996). 
In the absence of any action by the General Assembly 
addressing or altering the holding in Clark, we can only infer 
that the General Assembly did not intend to abrogate, nullify 
or otherwise invalidate the rule or case law decided pursuant 
to the rule. 
The defendants also argue that the court did not have 
jurisdiction to enter the nonsuit order because there was no 
"active" or "personal" jurisdiction over the defendants in the 
original proceeding.  This contention was addressed in 
McManama v. Plunk, 250 Va. 27, 458 S.E.2d 759 (1995).  In that 
case, as in this, the defendant had not been served with 
 
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process when the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion 
for a voluntary nonsuit pursuant to Code § 8.01-380.  When the 
action was refiled, the trial court held the nonsuit order 
would be binding on the defendant only if, among other things, 
the defendant had been served with process and was "'before a 
court with jurisdiction over the defendant's person.'"  Id. at 
31, 458 S.E.2d at 761.  This Court reversed, stating that 
these conditions were not a prerequisite to the entry of a 
binding order of nonsuit.  Id. at 32, 458 S.E.2d at 761.  
Thus, McManama stands for the proposition that a plaintiff can 
secure a valid voluntary nonsuit pursuant to Code § 8.01-380 
even though there has been no service of process on the 
defendants. 
The cases cited by some of the defendants in support of 
their position are inapposite because those cases all involve 
the authority of the court to enter a valid judgment on the 
merits.  Here, as in McManama, the nonsuit order was not a 
judgment on the merits and the defendants were "not deprived 
of any . . . property interest, or prejudiced in any way" by 
the nonsuit order.  Id. at 35, 458 S.E.2d at 763. 
 
We have considered the other arguments put forth by 
defendants in support of the trial court's decision and find 
them without merit.  Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we 
 
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will reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the 
case for further proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded.
 
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