Case Title: State v. Murray. Dissenting Opinion by J. Nakayama [pdf]. ICA mem.op., filed 01/19/2007 [pdf], 113 Haw. 506. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 06/04/2007 [pdf].

Citation: 116 Haw. 3

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
‘+4POR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

000--~
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee

JAMES MURRAY, Petitioner/Defendant-Appel lant

 

No. 27549

 

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE. COURT OF APPEALS
(een Ne os 1 0086)

  

‘OCTOBER 29, 2007

OO KY 62190102

NOON, C.J, LEVINSON, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, J3.¥!
‘AND NAKAYAMA, J., DISSENTING

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant James Murray
(Petitioner) filed an application for writ of certiorari’ on

April 27, 2007, requesting that this court review the February 6,

 

» pursuant to Hawal"t Revised Statutes (HRS) § 602-59 (Supp. 2006),
a party may appeal the decision and judgment of the intermediate appellate
Court. {the ICA) only by an application eo this court for a writ of certiorari
See ARS. § 602-59(a), In determining whether to accept or reject the
application for writ of certiorari, this court reviews the ICA decision for:

 

(2) Grave errors of law or of fact; or

(2) Gbvicus incensistencies in the decision of the (ICA)
with that of the supreme court, federal decisions, or
its own decision,

fond the megaitude of such errors or inconsistencies

Gietating the need for further sppeal.

HRS § 602-59(b). The grant or denial of @ petition for certiorari is
Ghscreticnary with this court. Ses HRE § 662-89 a)

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*

 

2007 judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (the ICA),
Sesued pursuant to its January 19, 2007 memorandum opinion’
affirming the Septenber 13, 2005 judgment of the family court of
the second circuit (the court), convicting Petitioner of Abuse
of 2 Family or Household Menber as a class C felony, HRS $$ 709-
906(1) and (7) (Supp. 2006) .*

Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai'i
(Respondent) did not file a memorandum in opposition.

t
The following matters, sone verbatin, are taken from

the parties’ submissions and fron the record.

 

 

2 ae memorandum opinion wae issued by Chief Judge Janes S. Burne
and Associate Judges Corinne KA. Watanabe and Alexa D. FUjise.

> the Honorable Reinette M. Cooper presided. The court sentenced
Petitioner to probation for five Jeu fon Servic

Fee, 9 $105 Criminal injuries jetual costs
of DNA analysis, wnichever ‘As a special condition of probation,
Petitioner was ordered to serve a six-nonth term of imprisonment? however,
five months were suspended if fetitioner abidea by the terms and conditions of
probation, the remaining thirty days to be served on 18 consecutive Neekends.

 
     

    

 

“HRS $5 709-806(1) and (7) state as follows

 

Abuse of family or household members: penalty. (1) It
11 be nlawful for any person, singly or in concert, to
physically abuse «family Gr household menber or to refuse
Ecapliance with the lewful order of a police officer under
subsection (4). The police, in investigating any complaint
of abuse of a family or household menber, upon request, may

abused person to a hospital or safe shelter.
purposes of this section, “fanily or household
nenber” means spovses oF reciprocal beneficiaries, former
Spouses or reciprocsl beneficiaries, persons who have @
child in ccamon, parents, children, persone related by
Eensanguiniey, and persone jointly residing or formerly
Fesiding in the sane dwelling unit.

 

 

 

 

 

10) “For a third or any subsequent offense thet occurs
within two years of a second or subsequent conviction, the
Person shall be charged with # class C felony

 

   

2
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS

 

During motions in limine, defense counsel stipulated te
Abetitsoner's] oricr abuse convictions. The [court never

rors. i : Oy
“** on the first day of evidence, [Respondent] read the
soulstion ints evidence,” The [ecurt| did no
pirodsction of the stipulation.
Sennifer Murray {(Jennifer}}, (Petitioner's) estranged

wife, testified that on the date of the incident, she and
[Petitioner] were living separately... . [Petitioner]
arrived at Jennifer's reeisence and demanded to see their
Gaughter. ..'. [Petitioner] pushed her causing Jennifer to
Wy forward but she dig not fail, Jennifer dia not feet
pain from the push

cee Sgennifer testified that (Petitioner) pushed her
a second’ tine. The second shove hurt Jennifer and’ she got
pest. From behing, [Petitioner] grabbed Jennifer and
coused scratches to'her chest, redness, and red mark
Jennifer also testified that her right upper ara/shoulder
hore although there were no visible injuries. Laver, &
police officer arrived st the house and photographed’ seratch
harks on Jennifer's Fight lower collar bene.

 

 

 

(Emphases added). Thereafter,

[an Amended Conplaint filed on February 9, 2005 charged
[Petitioner] with violating HRS § 709-906 by causing
physical sbuse to his wife, [Jennifer], on or sbout January
ie, 2005, "within two (2) years of a second or subsequent
conviction of Abuse of Fanily or Household Menber.”

However, “[dluring the charae to the jurv, the {court

 

failed to instruct the jury with a limiting instruction regardin
Petitioner's] prior convictions. . . .” (Emphasis added).
I.

Petitioner raises the following questions in his

 

applicatio

1, Whether the ICA gravely erred in holding that where 3
victation of HRS § 709-906 is charged as a felony offense,
the prior convictions constitute an elenent of the offense.
2. hether the ICA gravely erred in holding thet. defense
Counsel's stipulation to an element of the offense
Constitutes a tactical decision that can be nace solely by
Counsel and, thus, that it did not requize 2 knowing,
intelligent, or voluntary waiver by the defendant of his
Fight to have that elenent proven to # jury beyond
Fessonsble doubt.

 
‘s*eF0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S EAAZ'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS+®

3. Wether the ICA gravely erred in holding that the trial
court's feilure to instruct the jury with 2 limiting
Instruction regarding the defendant’ s prior convictions dié
not constitute reversible error

 

 

(Brackets omitted.)
qn.

As to the first question, Petitioner argues “(t]he
offense of felony [a]buse is a recidivist statute where the prior
convictions are extrinsic sentencing factors determined by the
trial court” as opposed to a “status offense” where “the prior
conviction is an element of the offense[,]” because (1) “the
statute refers to the prior convictions in the penalty subsection
of the statute, separate and apart from the definition of the
offense[,]” (2) “(t]he legislature specifically stated that the
amendnents were to ‘clarify sentencing provisions{,]‘ not to add
‘an element to the felony offense, see . . . Stand. Com. Rep. No.
1268 (2003) (emphasis added) {,]” and (3) “[t]he difference
between HRS §§ 709-906(7) and 291E~61(b) (1) (4) [as construed in
State v. Domingues, 106 Hawai" 480, 107 P.3d 409 (2005), is
that] HRS § 709-906(7) provides that ‘for a third or subsequent
offense that occurs within two years of a second or subsequent
conviction, the person shall be charged with a Class C felony’
(emphasis added) [and iJn contrast, the prefatory language of HRS
§ 2918-61 (b) (1) (4) stated that the individual ‘shall be
sentenced.‘

In its answering brief, Respondent correspondingly

argued that prior convictions constituted elements because
‘#4FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERI+#

 

(2) “[tlo be convicted under subsection (7) {of HRS § 709-906}, a
defendant must have committed ‘a third or any subsequent offense
that occurs within two years of a second or subsequent
conviction{]’ . . . [which] describes an attendant circumstance -
- an essential element -~ that [Respondent] needs to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt [,]” (2) as in Domingues, “the prefatory
language in HRS § 703-906(5) (2) and (b) and HRS § 709-906(7)
describe attendant circumstances that are intrinsic to and
enmeshed in the hierarchy of offenses that HRS § 709-906 . .
describes [and, a]s such, . . . the essential element that
(Respondent must prove was that Petitioner] committed the instant
abuse within two years of 2 second or subsequent conviction{,]”
(3) “[ijn 1998, . . . [in] the creation of 2 felony abuse
offense[,] . . . the legislature stated that . . . ‘an enhanced
arade of offense for repeat criminal behavior sends a message to
the repeat offender , . . and will be treated as a serious
offensel,]’ Sen. Stand. Comm, Rep. No. 3252, in 1998 Senate
Journal, at 1314 (emphasis added),” (4) in 2002, the legislature,
in amending subsection (7) to read, “[fJor a third or any
subsequent offense . . . that occurs within two years{,]” said
that “[t]his measure . . . 1imit(s] misdemeanors to the first and
second offense, while making it a class C felony for any third

and subsequent offense.”

 

In reply, Petitioner argued (1) [t]he inclusion of the priors in a
complaint ‘or infermaticn does not... sake proof of the prior convictions
fenents (sic) of the offense[,]" (2) “[bloth HRS § 706-605.5, sentencing of
Fepeat offenders, and HRS § 706-662(1), (3), and (4), extended term
(continued...)

 

 

 
 

‘S*4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS:

 

Ww.

With reference to the first question, the ICA held “the
fact that [Petitioner] committed his crime ‘within two (2) years
of a second or subsequent conviction of Abuse of Family or

Household Member’ is an ‘intrinsic fact’ that must be determined

 

by the jury[,]" and (2) “[a] stipulation of that fact does not
violate the defendant's due process rights by impermissibly
lessening the prosecution’s burden to prove that material
elenent {, tJherefore, it is a tactical decision permissibly made
by counsel for the defendant.”
v.
On February 9, 2005, Respondent charged Petitioner by

complaint as follows:

‘That on or about the 16 day of January, 2005, in the
County of Maui, State of Hawaii, JAMES MURRAY within two (2)
years of 2 second or subsequent conviction of Abuse of
Fenily or Household Heaber in violation of Section 709-906
Of the Raxais Sevised statutes, did intentionally, knowsnely
Of recklessly engage in and couse physical abuse of a family
OF household member, to wit Jennifer Murray, thereby.
‘committing the offense Felony Abuse of Fanily or Household

 

 

 

  

 

"(continued
sentencingl,] categorized prior convictions as extrinsic sentencing factors
for a judge’ to determine(,) State v. White, 110 Hawai'i 79, 129 P.3d 1107
(2006); cf. Ascrendi v. New Jersey, 530 0.5. 466, 120 $.C. 2348, 147 L.td.24
435 (2000){,]" (3). in contrast to the OUT statute in Dosingues and state v
Kekvewa, 112 mawai's 269,145 .3d 812 (App. 2006), vacated in cart by 114
Hewai't 412, 1€3 .3¢ 1148 (2007), “the distinction between ‘shall Pe charasd’
sn HRS § 766-906(7) and ‘shall be sentenced’ in HRS $8 2918-61 (b) (1)~(b) (4)
nd 703-906(5) 2 signsfscant because the ove process issue noted in Domingues
is met{ ulnder HRS § 703-806(7), (because) at the time of charging, the sta
has already elected the grade of cffensel, u)heress, in HRS $§ 2916-616) (1)=
(B) (4) and 709-906(5), the trier of fact has to make the determination as to .

 

 

 

grade of offense|,]" end (¢) "(t]he Legislature fonenced HRS § 709"
$06 in 2002... and) specifically stated that the snerdnents were to
telarity not to add an element to the felony offer

{slee A Bill for an Act Relating to Chapter 2916, H-B, No, 807, #.D. 2, S.D-
1, Committee on Judiciary and Hawaiian Affaire, 22nd State Legislature,
Regular Sess., Stand. Com. Rep. No. 1268 (2003) (enphasis scded) .”

    

 

6
 

'FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS*#

 

Menber in violation of Section 709-906(7) of the Mawall
Revised Statutes.

HRS § 703-906 (Supp. 2004) states in pertinent part:
(2)_Ie shall be unlawful for any person, singly or in

concert, to physically sbuse a family or Nouschold member

(3) “Abuse of @ family or household menber and refusal
to comply with the lawiol order of a police officer under

 

 

Subsection (4) are misceneanors and the person shall be
Sentenced as. follows
(a) For the first offense the person shall serve a
ininum jail sentence of forty-eight hours) and
(e) For a second offense that occurs within one year

Of the first conviction, the person shall be
fersed 2 ‘repeat offender’ and serve a sininum
jail sentence of thirty days

O) 01 nat oe
“ no year wistien, the
Person shall be charged witha Class ¢ felony.

 

(Emphasis added) .
n

Under HRS $ 709-906 the prosecution would need to prove
{iret that Petitioner “physically abuse(d) a family or household
member” in violation of HRS § 703-906(1) and second that the
violation was Petitioner's “third or any subsequent offense that
cccur{ed) within two years of a second or subsequent conviction
+. :" dn violation of HRS § 709-906(7) as was charged in the
complaint. HRS § 702-205 (1993) states:

The elenents of an offense are such (1) conduct,
(2) attendent circumstances, and (3) results of conduct, as:
(a) Are specified by the definition of the offense,
ane
(b) Negative a defense (other than 9 defense based
onthe statute of limitations, lack of venue, oF
Tack of jurisdiction).

   

    

Conduct is defined in HRS § 701-118 (4) (1993) as “an

act or omission, or, where relevant, a series of acts or a series

 
‘s*4FOR PUBLICATION I MEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*S#

 

of omissions, or a series of acts and omissions[.]" Furthermore,
an act is defined under § 701-118(2) (1993) as a “bodily movement
whether voluntary or involuntary(.]” Based on the foregoing
definitions, the requisite conduct constituting a violation of
HRS § 709-906 is some physical bodily movement. The requisite
result of such conduct is physical abuse. The requisite
attendant circumstances are that the object of the abuse has the
attributes of @ person who is a family or household member of the
defendant.

Although the Hawai'i Penal Code does not define the
term “attendant circumstances,” in State v. Aivohi, 109 Hawai'i
115, 127, 123 P.3d 1210, 1222 (2005), this court stated that
“[alny circumstances defined in an offense that are neither
conduct nor the results of conduct would, by default, constitute
attendant circumstances elements of the offense.” (Quoting State
usMoser, 107 Hawai'i 189, 172, 111 P.3d 54, 67 (2005).)
(Brackets in original.). Thus, by default, whether Petitioner's
violation of the statute “was a third or any subsequent offense”
is also an attendant circumstance of class C felony abuse. Based
on the definition of attendant circumstances set forth in Aivohi,
a plain reading of HRS § 709-906 supports the conclusion HRS
§ 709-906(7) is an attendant circumstance,

Additionally, in the foregoing subsections of HRS §
7109-906, the degree of punishment escalates depending on whether

the violation is a first offense, second offense, or third or any
 

|POR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERS#®

subsequent offense that occurs within two years of a second or
subsequent conviction. This court has stated that when “the
degree of punishment for a violation. . . escalates as a
function of whether the violation” was committed within a certain
number of years of a prior offense, such language “describes
attendant circumstances that are intrinsic to and enmeshed in the
hierarchy of offenses that [the statute] as a whole describes.”
Dominoves, 106 Hawai'i at 487, 107 P.3d at 416 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also State ve
Ruggiero, 114 Hawai" 227, 238, 160 P.3d 703, 714 (2007).
Domingues further stated that such aggravating circumstances must
be alleged in the charging instrument and determined by the trier

of fact.

 

[Aggravating circumstances) . . . intrinsic to the
Gonaission of the erine charged | - . must be alleged in the
[charging instrument] in order to give the defendant notice
that they will be relied on to prove the defendant's guilt,
and suppert the sentence to be imposed, and they must be
Getermined by the trier of fact

 

Domingues, 106 Hawai" at 487-88, 107 P.3d at 416-27 (citation

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (some brackets in

 

original); see also Ruggiero, 114 Hawa:
na,

"i at 238, 160 P.3d at

 

Also, “[whether the offense] was a third or any
subsequent offense that occurfed) within two years of a second or
subsequent conviction” defines the felony offense of HRS

§ 709-906(7) as opposed to the misdemeanor offenses set forth in
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
§ 709-906(5) (a) and (b). By reason of the express language of

subsection 7, the particular offense charged includes the words
describing the class C felony version of abuse. HRS

$ 709-906(7). Hence, the foregoing reference to a prior
conviction set forth in HRS § 709-906(7) is “specified by the
definition of the offense[.]” See HRS § 702-205.

The legislative history of HRS § 709-906 supports the
conclusion that HRS § 709-906(7) defines a felony offense.
Previously, in 1998, HRS § 709-S06 was amended to include
subsection (7) as follows: (7) For any subsequent offense
cccurring within two years after @ second misdemeanor conviction,
the person shall be charged with a class C felony.” 1998 Haw.
Sess. L. Act 172, § 8 at 647. At that point the legislature
stated that “an enhanced arade of offense for repeat criminal
behavior sends a message to the repeat offender that such
behavior will not be tolerated and will be treated as a serious
offense.” Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 3252, in 1998 Senate
Journal, at 1315 (emphases added) .

In 2002, HRS § 709-906(7) itself was amended to read,
“(7) For a third ox any subsequent offense that occurs within two
years of a second or subsequent conviction, the person shall be
charged with a class C felony.” 2002 Haw. Sees. L. Act S, § 1 at
54 (emphasis added). The legislature stated that the 2002
emenduent “Limit [ed] misdemeanors to the first and second

offense, while making it a class C felony for any third and

10
 

FOR FUELICATION IN WEST'S AWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS*#

OO

 

subsequent offense.” Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 2949, in 2002 Senate
Journal, at 1418.*

‘Thus, proof that the offense was Petitioner's third or
subsequent offense is an attendant circumstance which
“negative[s} a defense{.]" HRS § 702-205(b). Arguably, @
defense to a charge that Petitioner committed a class C felony
offense would be that the offense was not Petitioner's “third or
any subsequent offense that occur{ed] within two years of a
second or subsequent conviction{.]” HRS § 709-906(7). In order
for the prosecution to negate Petitioner’s potential defense
against the offense constituting 2 felony violation of HRS
§ 709-906, the prosecution must prove at least two prior
convictions, and that the offense occurred within two years of
the second or subsequent offense. Thus, pursuant to the
definition of “element” set forth in HRS § 702-205, the prior
conviction reference in HRS § 709-906(7) constitutes an elenent
of the offense of the abuse charge.

vr.
a

Ae to the second question, Petitioner argues
(2) “[EJundamental rights, such as [Respondent's] burden to prove
each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, cannot be

waived or stipulated to by defense counsel[; oJnly the accused

 

+ tn 2006, the legislature further amended HRS § 709-306(7) to
provide thet "(Z]or'a thire of any subsequent offense

Jeera of & second or subsequent conviction, the offens
felony." "2006 Haw. Sess. 1. Act 230, § 46 at 1022.

    

‘shall be a ch

 

n
‘**4FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AKD PACIFIC REPORTERS+®

 

can knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive a fundamental
right[,]* (2) “{dJefense counsel cannot stipulate to matters that

go beyond tactical and procedural matters[,] State v, Casey, 51

Haw. 99, 451 P.2d 806 (1969)(,] (3) “Ferguson v, State, 362 Ark.
547, 210 S.W.3d 53 (2005), and . . . United States v. Perry, 1995

WL 45521 (4th Cir. 1995) [(unpublished)], both held that” failure
to conduct a colloquy to establish that the defendant's
stipulation to an elenent of the offense was “knowingly and
voluntarily entered” by the defendant was error, and (4) the sane
“error cannot be considered harmless [here] because the {court}
instructed the jury thet the stipulation was conclusively proven,
and the jury had to accept this evidence in order to find
(Petitioner) guilty.”

In response, Respondent had correspondingly said
(2) “Ipetitioner] waived this issue by failing to object, invited
error, and [Petitioner] should be judicially estopped from
raising this issue(,)” (citing State v. Adler, 108 Hawai"i 169,
175, 118 P.36 652, 658 (2005), (2) “lelven if not deened waived,
[Petitioner’s] substantial rights were not adversely affected{,]

+ the burden still rested upon [Respondent] to prove each and

every elenent beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.”

In reply, Petitioner maintains (1) “{Petitioner] did

not invite the error and he is not raising inconsistent

 

> the court instructed the jury in pertinent part that, “Five: You

must accept as conclusively proved eny fact to which the parties have
stipulated

 

12
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*#*

 

positions{,]” (2) “[Petitioner] should not be estopped from
raising the issue because it was the [court’s) duty to ensure
that the waiver of his constitutional right to a jury trial was
done intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily(,]" (3) “the
relinguishment of a fundamental right must be done by the
beneficiary[, slee . . . State v. Young, 73 Haw. 217, 222, 830
P.2d $12, 518 (1992)[,]" (4) “[cJontrary to (Respondent! s]
contention that ‘the stipulation did not conclusively prove the
entire element,’ the [court] instructed the jury(, *Ylou must
accept as conclusively proved any fact to which the parties have
stipulated.’ (Emphasis added and brackets omitted.)
8

With respect to these foregoing issues, the ICA framed
“the . . . question [as] whether an ‘instructional error’
occurred when the court did not instruct the jury that it could
not consider the fact that the alleged offense occurred within
two years . . . when deciding . . . the other elements of the
alleged offense.” The ICA briefly stated that “an ‘instructional
error’ did not occur.”

vir.

As to Petitioner's second question, pursuant to HRS
§ 701-114, the prosecution has the burden of proving each element
beyond a reasonable doubt. “where a prior conviction is an
essential element of the offense charged, proof of the prior

conviction is an exception to the general rule that evidence of

13
‘**0FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*

the commission of other crimes is inadmissible.” State v.
Buffalo, 4 Haw. App. 646, 648, 674 P.2d 1014, 1017 (1983)
(citations omitted), abrogated on other arounds by State vs.
Sanchez, 82 Hawai'i 517, 923 P.2d 934 (App. 1996). Additionally,
“[t]he prosecution must prove the prior conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt, generally by the introduction of the record of
conviction.” Jd, (citations omitted).

‘The defendant's right to have each element of an
offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt is a constitutionally
and statutorily* protected right. See State v. Macleaa, 80
Hawai'i 172, 178, 906 P.2d 758, 764 (1995) (jury instruction
erroneous because it impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to
defendant to prove his affirmative defense before the prosecution
was required to prove every element of the charged crime beyond a
reasonable doubt in violation of the due process clauses of the

fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and

 

article I, section 5 of the Hawai'i Constitution (citing State vw
Bone, 78 Hawai'i 262, 274, 892 P.2d 455, $67 (1995))); State vw.
Lima, 64 Haw. 470, 474, 643 P.2d 536, 539 (1982) ("It is well

established, as a precept of constitutional as well as statutory

 

lew, that an accused in a criminal case can only be convicted

* Rs § 701-124 (2993) states as follows:

(2) Except as otherwise provided in section 701-115,
no person nay be convicted of an offense unless the
following sre proved bevend a reasonable doubt

(3) Each elenent of the offensel.

(Emphases added).
ua
‘sesFOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER'*#

 

upon proof by the prosecution of every element of the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citing State v. Nuetzel, 61
Haw. 531, 606 P.2d 920 (1980). (Other citations omitted.)); State

Josefa, 77 Hawai'i 177, 182, 880 P.2d 1224, 1229 (App. 1994)

  

("It is also well-settled that the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Anendnents to the United States Constitution
protects an accused against a conviction ‘except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged.’” (Quoting In xe Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).)). In the instant case, Petitioner's
right to have all elements of an offense proven beyond a
reasonable doubt is statutorily protected under HRS § 701-114,
and constitutionally protected under the State and federal

constitutions.

 

Waiver of a defendant's fundamental rights must be
knowing and voluntary, and must come directly from the defendant.
State v. Ibuos, 75 Haw. 118, 121, 857 P.2d 576, 578 (1993) ("A

knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to trial by jury must

 

come directly from e defendant, either in writing or orally
In Ihuos, the defendant was charged under a previous version of
the same abuse statute as Petitioner. id, at 118, 857 P.2d at
577. At Ibuos’® arraignment and hearing plea, his counsel waived
his right to a jury trial. Id, at 119, 887 P.2d at 577.
Following a bench trial and conviction, Ibuos appealed on grounds
that such waiver by his counsel violated his “right to a trial by

as
 

‘*¥+OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS 28D PACIFIC REPORTER

Jury under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 14 of the Hawaii Constitution.” Id. at
121, 857 P.2d at 578. The Ibuos court stated that:

Wawais Rules of Penal Frocedure (HREP) Rule S(b) (1) requires
that “the court shall in appropriate cases. inform the
Gefendant that he has a right to (a jury trial in che
cirouit court or may elect to be tried without a jury in the
Gistrict court.” "Appropriate cases” arise wher
accused has a constitutional right toa Jury trial... In
Hawaii, a statutory right to a jury trial arises whenever @
criminal “defendant can be isprigoned for
‘upon conviction of the offense. HRS § 806-60. Because ®
person convicted of the offense of Abuse of a Family oF
Household Wenber, a misdenesnor, may be inpriscned for up to
fone year, (see ARS 5 706-663 (Supp. 1982) )>

to inform his clon py tury i

 

   

 

 

 

ure toa) waiver Pe fundamen

Id. at 120, 857 P.2d at 577 (emphasis added) (internal citations
and footnote omitted) .

As recounted above, the Ibuos court stated that a
knowing and voluntary waiver of a defendant’s fundamental right
must come directly from the defendant, and requires the court to
engage in a colloquy with the defendant. Id, at 121, 857 P.2d at
578. Ibuos noted that “[bJecause the record is silent as to any
colloquy between the court and defendant, counsel's waiver of her
Client's right . . . was, therefore, invalid[.]” Id, at 121, 057
P.2d at 578,

Simtlerly, Tachibana v, State, 79 Haw. 226, 900 P.2d
1293 (1995), held that a defendant's constitutional rights may
not be waived by counsel. In that case the defense team decided
as a tactical matter that it would be best that Tachibana not be

called as a witness despite his frequently expressed desire to

16
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testify. Id, at 228, 900 P.2d at 1296. However, this court
stated that “[a] defendant's right to testify in his or her own
defense is guaranteed by the constitutions of the United states
and Hawai'i and by a Hawai'i statute(,]" id. at 231, 900 P.2d at
1298 (alteration omitted) (quoting State v. Silva, 78 Hawai'i
115, 122, 890 P.2d 702, 709 (App. 1995)), and “‘a defendant’s
yersonal constitutional right suthfully in his or
own behalf may not be w as a matter of
strateay(.]" Id, at 232, 900 P.2d at 1299 (quoting United States
vs Moody, 977 F.2d 1425, 1431 (11th Cir. 1992) (other citation
omitted) ).

Tachibana determined that the trial court must engage
in an on-the-record colloquy to ensure that the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional right to
testify. Id, at 235, 900 P.2d at 1302. Before reaching this
conclusion, this court stated that courts throughout the country

have looked at thri

 

approaches when defendants claim that their
attorneys have deprived them of their constitutionally protected
right to testify. Id. at 233, 900 P.2d at 1300 (citing Bovd we
United States, $86 A.24 670 (D.C. App. 1991)).

One approach would require the trial court to engage in
an on-the-record colloquy with every defendant to ensure a
defendants right is knowing and voluntarily waived. Id. Other
courts have adopted the “demand rule,” holding that a defendant
who fails to complain about the right to testify during trial is
conclusively presumed to have waived that right. Id. The

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“demand rule" has been justified in two ways, Some courts find
that the right to testify is not a fundamental right and other
courts presume that a defendant has knowledge of the right to
testify, having been educated of such a right “by television and
past courtroom experience|.]" Id, (quoting United States vs
Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 761 (Sth Cir. 1989), vacated on other
arounds, 928 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 501 U.S.
1249 (1991)). A third group of courts hold that a trial judge
need not question the defendant at trial sua sponte, but the
defendant may bring a post-conviction challenge based on the
denial of his right to testify. Id.

‘The Tachibana court adopted the colloquy approach on
the ground that it would “best protect defendants’ rights while
Ide

determined that

 

maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system.

at 234, 900 P.2d at 1301. Additionally, it wi

 

the colloquy approach promotes judicial efficiency:

{ily suunsina in the collomys a tela) iudue would establish
iisuss in the case, and thereby celieve the trial incae of

ath 7

= z ue

se not ese hi The

citys i oul rath he

r Thos, many defendants would be able

fo raise colorabie claine that their right to testify hea
been violeted. Hen -
o-sveis a post=n aati i za
Exialsudoe, ae well ae th our 3h

iene Be Tt est serve th

Id. at 235, 900 P.2d at 1302 (emphases added) (citation and

quotation marks omitted). This court ultimately concluded that @

ae
 

/+FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HANAT'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER:

 

colloquy best protects defendant’s constitutional rights. Id. at
236, 900 P.2d at 1303 (Thus, we hold that in order to protect
the right to testify under the Hawai'i Constitution, trial courts
must advise criminal defendants of their right to testify and
must obtain an on-the-record waiver of that right in every case
in which the defendant does not testify.) (footnotes omitted) .
See also State v. Lewis, 94 Hawai'i 292, 294-95, 12 P.3d 1233,
1235-36 (2000) (explaining that where a defendant chooses to
testify, the court is not required under the Hawai'i Constitution
to hold a colloquy advising him of right to testify, but, prior
to start of trial, the court must inform defendant of right to
testify or not to testify, and that if defendant chooses not to
testify the court will question defendant to ensure that decision
is his or her own decision).

In concluding that the trial court is required to
engage in a colloquy with the defendant, Tachibana noted that the
trial court is mandated to engage in such colloquies with
criminal defendants regarding waiver of other fundamental rights,
and therefore, there was no reason why colloquies regarding the
Fight to testify should be any different:

Feouired to encsoe In on-thes id

aL issue. “See, ¢.g2, State v. Kupay, 76 Hawaii 387, 395-96
4b. 13, 879 F.2d $92, SO0-01 n. 13 (1954) (right co included
Sffente instructions); State v. Ibuos, 78 Haw. 138, 121, 657
P.2a 576, 878 (1983) (right to trial by jury); State ¥

  

    

ares, Ti Haw, 617, 622-23, 601 F.2d 588, S8t (1990) (Fight
zo counsel}; Conner v. state, 9 Haw. App: 122, 126, 626 F.2d

Hho, 442-43) 1992). Tetght £0 nave guile proved Beyond &
Feesonsble doubt (1.e., entry of guilty plea).

 

as
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER®

 

hers not ance cobloaut
Id. at 235-36, 900 P.2d at 1302-03 (emphases added).
B.

As a general principle, then, Ibvos and Tachibana
prohibit the waiver of a defendant’s fundamental right without
the trial court first engaging in a personal on-the-record
colloquy with the defendant to ensure such rights are voluntarily
and knowingly waived. Those cases indicate that a colloquy
between the trial court and defendant is the best way to ensure
that a defendant’s constitutional right such as waiver of proof
of an element is protected, and that the defendant has knowingly
and voluntarily waived such a right. In that light, the colloquy

approach also best promotes judicial efficiency by establishing

 

on the record that the defendant has voluntarily waived an
element of the offense. Without such a record it is difficult to
determine whether the defendant personally waived such a right.
As exemplified in Tachibana, the trial court, by engaging in a
colloquy with the defendant, would prevent or reduce post-trial
challenges. Additionally, trial courts are already required to
engage in colloguies with defendants regarding the waiver of
other fundamental rights as noted in Tachibana and consistent
with this practice, the trial court must conduct a colloquy

regarding waiver of proof of an element of the offense.

20
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Sa

viii.

Ferguson is also instructive on the issue of mandatory
colloguies. In that case the defendant was charged with, inter
alia, possession of firearms by a convicted felon. 210 S.W.3d at
54. The prosecution sought to introduce the record of his
previous felony assault conviction. Id. The defendant filed a
motion in limine offering to stipulate that he fell into the
class of individuals prohibited from owning a firearm and that
the “State be prohibited from introducing the specific details of
the felony.” Id, The court denied the motion and a certified
copy of the conviction was submitted into evidence. Id.
Following conviction, the defendant appealed and his conviction
was overturned by the Arkansas Court of Appeals. Id, The State
filed petition for review. Id. The Supreme Court of Arkansas
reviewed the issue of “whether @ defendant can stipulate or admit
to his status as a member of the class of individuals not allowed
to possess a firearm and prohibit the State from introducing
evidence detailing the nature of the conviction.” Id.

‘That court determined that a defendant could stipulate
to the element of a prior felony conviction provided that the
court engage in an on-the-record colloquy with the defendant
acknowledging the prior felony conviction and acceding to the
stipulation.

W)hen 2 criminal defendant offers to stipulate or adait to
the convicted-felon elenent of the felon-in-possession~
ofsacfirears charge, the circuit court must accept that

 

    

 

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‘S**F0R PUBLICATICN IN WEST’ S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERES

stipulation or admission, conditioned by an on-the-record
Collequy with the defendant acknowledging the underlying
petor felony conviction and acceding to the stipulation o
Sonieeion.

Ad, at $7 (citing Brown v. State, 719 So.2d 862, 684 (Fla. 1998).
Under Tachibana the same rationale would apply to the stipulation

 

 

here.
m

Although stipulations are ordinarily binding, “(al
stipulation in and of itself may be set aside if it was made
inadvertently, unadvisedly or improvidently and will operate
inequitably and to the prejudice of one of the parties, provided
all . . . parties may be placed in the condition in which they
were before the stipulation was made.” In re Doe, 90 Hawai'i
200, 211, 978 P.2d 166, 177 (App. 1999) (citing State v. Foster,
44 Haw. 403, 423, 354 P.2d 960, 971 (1960)), (internal quotations
and other citations omitted) (ellipsis in original). Here, the
ICA determined that a stipulation by Petitioner's defense counsel
of the fact that Petitioner committed his crime within two years
of a second or prior conviction of abuse did not violate
Petitioner's due process rights. However, as noted supra,
Petitioner’s fundamental rights could not be waived or stipulated
to by his counsel; only Petitioner personally could have waived
such rights. Thus the stipulation must be deemed invalid.

x,
Respondent contends that Petitioner waived the

foregoing issue by failing to object. Under similar

22
4s++70R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERY+®
—_—

circumstances, in Tachibana, the prosecution contended that it

 

would be an absurdity to allow Tachibana another trial based on
his claim that his right to testify had been violated by the
unilateral action of his attorney. Tachibana, 79 Haw. at 232-33,
900 P.2d at 1299-300. This court rejected the approach used by
courts that refuse to entertain post-trial challenges based on
the right to testify. Id. at 234, 900 P.2d at 1301. Ie
explained that defendants are often unaware that they have
certain constitutional rights thet may not be waived by their
counsel or that they must object to waiver by counsel at trial.

1d. The Tachibana court stated:

Wan defenconts are unaware thet they haves constitutional,
erat ify which no-one, not even their lasver, may
Eake aeay from them.

[The defendant... may not _know that en cbiection must be

a dating trial or that-riaht i forever lost. Further, in
johnson ¥.Zerbat the Court was unwilling to “presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.” 308 0.
at t64, $6 .Ce. at 1023.” tn eum, the cenand ru!
acefencant to assert a right of which the defendant m
be aware by objecting in a manner the defendant has been
told 1s inappropriate. "We Gecline to adopt « rule which
pieces such burdens on the exercise of 8 fundamental
Constieutional right.

   

 

Ida (emphases added) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, with respect to the waiver of proof of an elenent,
many defendants may not know that they have a right to have all

elements proven beyond a r

 

sonable doubt or that an objection
with respect to waiver or stipulation of an element by defense
counsel must be cbjected to during trial or the right to object

may be lost.

23
 

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Second, Respondent contends that Petitioner's failure
to object invited error and thus Petitioner should be judicially
estopped from raising the issue. However, the Ibuos court
refused to consider the “invited error doctrine,” choosing
instead to follow State v Smith, 68 Haw. 304, 313-14, 712 P.2d
496, 505 (1986) relating that “[tJhe court in Smith .

rejected the ‘invited error doctrine’ where the result would
deprive a defendant of a constitutional right. We similarly
refuse to consider the ‘invited error doctrine’ in this
instence." Ibuos, 75 Haw. at 122, 857 P.2d at $78 (internal
eStation omitted). Similarly, in the instant case, Respondent! s
position would deprive Petitioner of a constitutional right,
rendering the invited error doctrine inapplicable.

Third, Respondent contends that even if the proof of
the element is not deened waived, Petitioner's substantial rights
were not adversely affected because Respondent had the burden of
proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, the court instructed that jury that it “must accept as
conclusively proved any fact to which the parties have
stipulated.” In essence, the stipulation satisfied Respondent's
burden of proving an element beyond a reasonable doubt. A
colloquy would have ensured that the defendant understood that a
stipulation to his prior convictions amounted to satisfying
Respondent's burden of proving an element of the offense beyond a

reascnable doubt.

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xr.
Because, as indicated supra, the court did not engage
Petitioner in a colloquy regarding waiving proof of an element of
the charge, the judgment must be vacated and the case remanded
for anew trial. In that circumstance we discuss Petitioner's
argument, in conjunction with the first question, that the jury
should not have been informed of the stipulation and his third
question regarding limiting instructions because they are

relevant to a new trial.*

 

+ Respondent contends that because Petitioner failed to request @
Limiting instruction, Petitioner waived the iseve and should be judicially
topped from raising it. Under the disposition proposed, this matter need
hot be decised
Te may be noted, however, that this court has held that “[a]s a
general rule, jury instructions to which no objection has been made at trial
will be reviewed only for plain error.” State‘. Sewver, BE Hawai 325, 330,
566 p.2a 637, €42 (1996) (citing State v. Finere, 72 Hawai'i 262, 291-92, 059
P.2d ise, 157¢ (1993)) Plain error exists where “the substantial rights of
the defendant have been affected adversely(.1” Ida: see alsa NRFP Role 52(b)
("Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights nay be noticed although
'y were not brought tothe attention of the court."); Sanches, 82 Hawai'i at
"25, 923 P.2d at S4in42 (*"(W)here plain error hes been committed and
substantial rignte have been affected thereby, the exzor may be noticed even
though it was not brought to the attention of the trial court.’” (Quoting
State e. Kelekotio, 74 Haw, 479, 515, 849 P.zd $6, 75. (1993).}); State w.
Kinnane, 79 Havas 46, 50, 697 P.24 973, 977 (1995) (*[2]t say be plain error
for a trial court to fail to give an --- instruction even when neither ‘the
prosecution nor the defendant have requested it ... because ;.. the ultinate
Fesponsibilicy properly to instruct the Jury Lies with the circuit court and
ot with trial counsel.“} (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)
(Emphasis castted.))-
In erder to determine whether a defendant’s substantial rights
sonable

 

 

 

   

  
 

 

 

   

 

 

 

been affected the court must determine “whether there 18 0
possibility thet the exzor aight have contributed te conviction.”

1/108 Hawai'i 269, 293, 119 P.3a 587, 601 (2005) (inter
marke and’ citations omitted)

 

 

 

‘State w.
2 “quotation

When jury instructions oF the omission thereof are at issue

fon appeal, the standard of review ie whether, when read and

Eoneidered ss 2 whole, the instructions given are

prejudicially insufficient, exreneous, inconsistent, oF

isieading.

Rerefol end ave s cround for reversal unless

ely anpesrs =
Lal. (However, e]7for 1# not to be

viewed in isolation and considered purely in the abstract.

Te must be exanined in the light of the entire proceedings
(continued...)

 

   

 

2s
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a.

In conjunction with Petitioner’s objection to the
submission of the stipulation to the jury, Petiticner argues

(2) “(a}ssuming arauendo that [Petitioner's] prior convictions
constituted elenents of the offense, the [court] . . . erred in

submitting the priors to the jury because they had been already

stipulated to{ and thus, they were) . . . irrelevant [and) overly
prejudiciall,] . . . {under] Rules 402, 403 of the Hawai'i Roles

of Evidence,” (2) “[iJn Old Chief v. United states, 519 U.S. 172
(2997), . . . [t]he Court reasoned that because a status elenent

of an offense is independent of an offense’s mental and physical
requirements, it was not necessary that a jury be informed of a
status element(,]" and (3) “many jurisdictions have similarly
held that criminal defendants can stipulate to prior convictions
for the purpose of keeping such prejudicial evidence from the
jury."
B.
Qld Chief considered whether a defendant can stipulate

to prior convictions, as opposed to the government proving the

 

 

continued)
‘and given the effect which the whole record shows it to be
entitled. In th ee
Ft nero seabiLit son
sonable 60: Seizing) ces the error 4.
conziction on which it say have been based must be set
sige.

3, 119 P.3¢ at €00-01 (internal citations, quotetion marks,
and paragraphing onitted); eg alas, state v, shinvana, 102
Pawai't 388, 395, ¢8 P.3a'517, $23 (2003).

   

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‘s++70R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER:

element by introducing a record or judgment or other similar
evidence. In Qld Chief, the subject “statute ma(de) it unlawful
for anyone ‘who has been convicted in any court of, a crime
punishable by inprisonnent for @ term exceeding one year’ to
‘possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm[.]'" 519 U.S. at
174 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 922(g) (1))- The Court noted that “(t]he
earlier crime charged in the indictment against Old Chief was
assault causing serious bodily injury.” Id. at 175. Defendant

moved for an order requiring the Governnent “to refrain from
Rentioning (the pricr conviction)... » axcapt to state
That the Defensant ha(a) been convicted Of e crise
Punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year.” .
{ile offered to “solve the problem here by stipulating...
[to the face] ‘that he has been convicted of a crime
Punshable by inprisennent exceeding one (1) year.” He
Ergued chat the offer to stipulate to the fact of the prior
Conviction rendered evidence of the nane and nature of the.
Cffense inesnissible under ule 403 of the Federal Rules of
‘the danger being that unfair prejudice from that
tially outweigh its probative value.

 

 

  

Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The
question as posed by the Court was as follows:

Subject to certain Linitetions, 18 U.5.C, $ 922(9)(1)
pronibite possession of @ faresrm by anyone with a prior
Felony conviction, which the Government can prove by
introducing a record of judgment or similar evidence
identifying the previous offen

the nature o sercru

iopetines seek to avoid such an informative disclosure by
SGISrinS to concede the tact of the orier conviction, ine

is matter an foil record
z when the nie rior of

Eaises the risk-of «verdict tainted by improper

Sonsiceests a oreose 6 73

 

 

thar it -doess
Id. at 174 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
‘The United States Supreme Court recognized the

potential prejudice of submitting evidence of the name or nature

27
 

‘***F0R PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER

of the prior offense. Id. at 185 (stating that “there can be no

 

 

question that evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense
generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant (]”)
(emphasis added). For this reason, it was determined that the
defendant's adnission that he was included in the category of
Persons covered by the statute would have amounted to conclusive
evidence of the element and the Court noted that the statutory
language of the prior-conviction requirement “show{ed] no
congressional concern with the specific nane or nature of the
prior offense beyond what is necessary to place it within the
broad category of qualifying felonies(.]" Id, at 186. Further,
the Supreme Court stated that the defendant “clearly meant to
admit that his felony did quality, by stipulating that the
Government [had] proven one of the essential elements of the
offense.” Id, 186 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

The Court explained that “[t}he most the jury needs to
know is that the conviction admitted by the defendant falls

within the class of crimes that Congress thought should bar a

 

 

convict from possessing a gun, and this point may be made readily
in a defendant's admission and underscored in the court's jury
instructions.” Id, at 190-91. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed
on grounds that “it was an abuse of discretion to admit the

record when an admission was available.” id, at 191.

28
 

|S+4POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER'

 

However, some courts have relied upon Old Chief and

extended it to preclude completely the introduction of prior
conviction evidence to the jury where that evidence establishes a

status element of the offense and a defendant offers to stipulate

to such a conviction. For example, in State v. Nichols, 542
S.E.2d 310 (W. Va, 1999), modified on other grounds by State v.

McCraine, 588 S.£.2¢ 177, 182 (W. Va. 2003), the West Virginia
Suprene Court stated that “when a defendant offers to stipulate
to. . . prior convictions Old Chief has provided the basis for
some state courts to preclude the mention of a prior conviction
that is a status element of the underlying offense.” Id, at 321
(emphasis added), Thus, that court held “that when a prior
conviction(s) constitutes @ status elenent of an offense, a
defendant may offer to stipulate to such prior conviction(s)” and
“Lif a cefendant makes an offer to stipulate to a prior
conviction(s) that {a @ status element of an offense, the trial
court must permit such stipulation and preclude the state from
presenting any evidence to the jury regarding the stipulated
prior conviction(s).” Id. at 323.

The West Virginia court reiterated this rule in State
vs Dews, 549 S.E.2d 694 (W. Va. 2001), where the defendant was
charged with “a third offense [of] driving under the influence of
alcohol (DUI) and “{bJefore the trial began, the (defendant)

stipulated te his prior DUI convictions and moved that the court

23
‘**4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERI®

 

not permit any reference to his prior DUI convictions to be made
before the jury.” Id. at 696. The motion was denied and
consequently the “prior DUI convictions were mentioned at trial,
in the presence of the jury, nine times[.]” Id. Dews held that
a “criminal defendant's stipulation to a prior conviction status
element of an offense. . . is to be treated in the same fashion
‘as other evidence that shows the status element, and is not to be
mentioned to the jury.” Id, at 698 (citation omitted). That
court further opined that “the court should craft its remarks and
instructions to the jury, including informing the jury of the
charge against the defendant and the verdict form, in a fashion
that omits reference to stipulated-to status elements of the
offense, and that authorizes the jury to base its verdict upon
those elements of the offense that are not stipulated to by the
defendant.” Id, (footnote omitted) .

Other courts have adopted various approaches to whether
prior conviction stipulations should be removed from the jury's
consideration, In State v. Saul, 434 N.W.2d 572, 574 (N.D,
1989), the defendant was charged “with driving or being in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor” and that “within the past seven years, [the
defendant] had three prior convictions [for the same offense.]”
‘The North Dakota Suprene Court held that where the defendant,
charged under enhancement provisions, stipulated to a prior

conviction which was an element of the charge, the submission of

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‘+FOR PUBLICATION IN EST’S AWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPCRTER***
ee

evidence regarding the prior convictions constituted prejudicial
and reversible error. Id. at 575.

That court further noted that although it is “the
general rule that the prosecution is not bound by the defendant's
offer to stipulate[,]" if “a defendant stipulates to the prior
convictions . . . he effectively removes that element of the
crime from the charge, and we do not see any reason why evidence
of the prior convictions should be submitted to the jury unless
they ere relevant to sone disputed issue[.]" Id. at 575
(citations onitted).

‘The North Dakota Suprene Court reiterated that the
trial court’s “cautionary instruction [(stating that the
defendant's prior convictions may not be used to “determinfe] the
guilt or innocence of the (djefendant on the present charge”)]
may be a proper counter-balancing factor to the prejudice
resulting from introduction of the prior convictions in the
weighing in which the trial court must engage under Rule 403" in
sone cases, but that “there [was] no purpose in risking reliance
on the cautionary instruction to alleviate the prejudicial effect

of the prior convictions when the defendant ha{d) stipulated to

 

them.” Id. at $73 n.2, $75.

 

\ Respondent refers to State v. Cardin, $23 A.2d 105 (NH. 2967), in
which case the sefendant had previously been convicted of Driving While

 

 

 

Jntoatested (DHE), wae on trial for s fubsequent DNI charge, and the pricr ONT
EGhviction wae at’ issue in the offense. Hocever, the Cardin court construed
os he ores rw and so if inepposite from the instent
case, dd at 106.
(continved. .)

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Sinilarly, in State v, Berkelman, 355 N.W.2d 394 (Minn.
1984), cited by Respondent, the defendant was found guilty of the
“gross misdeneenor offense of driving with a blood alcohol
concentration of .10 or more within [five] years of a prior
conviction under the DWI statute[.J” Id. at 395. The Minnesota
Supreme Court concluded that the prior conviction was “an element
of the offense of aggravated OWI, that the trial court erred in
not letting [the] defendant vse the stipulation procedure to
renove the elenent fron consideration by the jury, but that the
error was not prejudicial.” Id, Although it did not state
explicitly, it appears that Berkelman determined that the error
kas not prejudicial based on a Limiting instruction given by the
trial court in its final instructions:

ow, evidence has been introduced concerning an alleged
prior conviction of the defendant for driving while under
the influence, This evidence was received because T have
ruled that such proof ia an essential element of the offen:

Charged in the complaint in this case. You-nay not consider

concentration of nore then 0-10 in

 

 

+= -continved)
Likewise, in People ve Hall, 67 Cal. App. éth 128 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998), where the defendant "was chargea with being s convicted pergen having
sd firearm in {his] vehiciel,]” the California Appellate Coure
prior conviction constituted @ sentencing factor, not an
‘lenent of the offense, and as such the defendent could stipulate to the crine
land the elenent should not have been sent to the jury. id. at 134~35
However, Hall concludes that the error was not prejodicisi because “the court
expressly instructed the jury that the evidence of [the defendant's} pricr
conviction was nat to be Considered for any purpose except to establish @
necessary element of the crime charged; the jury was not to speculate
regarding the nature of that prior conviction; and the Jury wes not to be
Prgiudiced against (the defendant] because of such prior conviction." Ide at

 

 

        

 

 

 

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ee

Finally, in Ross v. State, 950 P.2d 587, 589 (Alaska
ct. App. 1997), also relied upon by Respondent, “(t]he main issue
raised [on] appeal [was] whether the existence of the defendant's
two prior convictions is an elenent of the crime of felony
DWI[.]” The Alaska Court of Appeals concluded that it was an
elenent of the offense that must be submitted to the jury. The
trial judge had determined that the State must prove prior
convictions to the jury “beyond a reasonable doubt{,1” id. at
590, but that the “risk of prejudice could minimized if [the
defendant) and the State stipulated to the bare facts of the
prior convictions.” Id, at 589. The Alaska court, in affirming
this action stated that “we do not hold that the stipulation used
in [the defendant’s} case is the only correct method for dealing
with the issue of the defendant's prior convictions[, but]

only that it 4s a permissible method, and that it was a fair

 

method under the facts of (the defendant’s} case.” Id, at $91.
However, Boss also stated that a bifurcated trial was the
“recconend{ed]” method of addressing the prior conviction issue.
Id. at 592.

xr.

As to the third question, Petitioner argues that,
assuming the jury is told of the stipulation, (1) the court must
give a limiting instruction both “prior to the introduction of
the evidence and during the charge to the jury” to ensure the

jury is not tainted by evidence of another crime committed by the

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defendant, (citing Zavares v. State, 30 P.3d 1128, 1133 (Nev.

2001)), and in this case, the [court] failed to do either”;
(2) Respondent’s “closing argument could invariably have inferred
to the jury that [Petitioner] hed a propensity to commit these
violent crimes of abuse”; and (3) “{t)he [court's] failure to
include @ limiting instruction resulted in an attack on
(Petitioner’s} character and improperly bolstered Jennifer's
credibility.”

Respondent maintains that (1) “the [defense’s failure
to] request limiting instruction regarding [Petitioner's] prior
conviction at any time during trial . . . constitutes waiver,”
(2) “defense counsel’s withdrawal of the proposed Limiting
instruction may have invited error{,]” (3) (Petitioner) should

be judicially estopped from raising this issue,” (emphasis in

 

original)* (4) “[e]ven if not deemed waived, [Petitioner's]
substantial rights were not adversely affected{,] . . . [because
Respondent] was duty-bound to introduce evidence of
(Petitioner's) prior abuse convictions to the jury” (5) “the
[court] . . . allowfed] the convictions into evidence in the most.
non=preiudicial manner -- through a trial stipulation{,]"
(emphasis in original) (6) “[i]t is inconceivable that the jury
used the stipulation to bolster . . . (Jennifer's) credibility,
+ + + a8 no evidence was adduced through the stipulation that she
was the victim in the prior convictions[,]” and (7) “[Respondent]
Onder the disposition here, itens 1-3 need not be discussed.

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briefly mentioned the trial stipulation and only did in the
context of showing that [Respondent] met its burden of proving an
essential elenent."

The ICA did not express an opinion as to this issue.

xqir.
AL

A limiting instruction is necessary when the jury may
only consider particular evidence for one element of an offense
but not for another. For example, this court has

recognize[d) that expert medicel testimony regarding what
Person's injuries would have been absent
fo'prove that @

Sefendant connitted the offense of attempted assault in the

first cegree By “intentionally engaging in conduct which

@ substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known

     

 

  

 

 

fo cause” serious bodily injury. Seg HRS §5 705-500(2)

(3959), 707-720(1) Be further note thas nevis
sted se68 hefiret dear an

anderstends ss zetebl

 

in reply, Petitioner argues: (2) “Izlegardiess of whether the

defense withdrew its request for @ limiting instruction during the settlenent

‘Ene [court] committed the error... before Jury instructions were
icies,” (2) "[iJt 1s the [court's] uitinate responsibility and duty to
properly instruct the Jury even when the defense objecte[,)” (citing State vy
Hasnig, 94 Hawai'i 405, 410, 16 P34 246, 255, (2001)1, (3) “[1]imiting
Enetractione should be give (sic) prior to the introduction of the evidence
ang during the cherge to the juryly]” (citing Tavares, 30 P.3d at 1133), and
(a) “the evidence of the prior convictions uss unfairly and substantially
prejudicisl [inasmuch es t]he Jury was never instructed as to the linived
Borpose of the prior convictions and was left to treat it es constitating bad
Cherecter evidence.”

 

 

 

 

 — Hawes's Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 105 provides

linen evidence which is admissible ax to one party or for one
Purpose but not adnissible as to ancther party oF for
Encther purpose is sdnitted, the court, upen request, shall
Festrict the evidence to ite proper scope and instruct the
Sury secoraingly.

 

Petitioner did not request a Limiting instruction in this case

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State v. Mevers, 112 Hawai'l 278, 286-289, 145 P.3d 621, 631 -
832 (2006) (quoting State v, Malufay, 60 Hawai'i 126, 130 n.6,

906 P.2d 612, 616 n.6 (1995)) (emphasis added) (brackets in
original). A limiting instruction may also be ‘necessary to
prevent potential prejudice to a defendant. See, State v.

Konohia, 106 Hawai'i 517, 528, 107 P.3d 1190, 1201 (App. 2005)

 

[Any potential prejudice resulting from arguing evidentiary
matters in the jury’s presence was cured by the trial judge's
instructions to the jury.”)

B.

State v. Green, 493 So. 24 588, 590-91 (La. 1986),
supports the position that where a prior conviction is admitted
to prove an element of an offense, a jury instruction is required
as to the limited purpose for which that evidence is to be
considered. Green followed Spencer v, Texas, 385 U.S. 554
(1967), which affirmed the constitutionality of Texas habitual
offender provisions that allowed evidence of prior convictions to
be submitted to the jury when limiting instructions were given.
The Louisiana court determined that admitting such evidence in “a
one-stage . . . trial procedure would, in the absence of a
mandatory limiting jury instruction, ‘fall below the minimum
level _the Fourteenth Amendment will tolerate.” Green, 493 So.
2d at $91 (quoting Spencer, 385 U.S. at 569 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added) .

‘The United States Suprene Court in
Gpheld the constitotionslity of a Texas recidivist statute
which permitted the state to fully inform « jury, dering &

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ee

defendant's trial on the pending criminal charger of the
Sefendant's past convictions when the jury was aiso charged
that such matters were to be considered only for the Limited
purpose of eansncenent of punishment and not for deciding

 

Guile or innocence: :
then SoisSies of cefencant"s cant ocines to

ernination trial the sqscedure Tecuicer @ tun
‘icone

‘Id. at 590-91 (emphasis added). Green also explained that two
united States Courts of Appeal expanded Spencer by holding that
imissil 2 conviction wit! aim: instruction 4

cia! it Atute: error. Id. at 591
(citing Dawson v. Cowan, $31 F.2d 1374 (6th Cir. 1976); Evans ve
Cowan, $06 F.2d 1248, 1249 (Sth Cir. 1974)).

In both Dawson and Evans, which involved the admission
of prior convictions, the defendant failed to request @ limiting
instruction and the court did not give such an instruction sua
sponte. Dawson, $31 F.2d at 1377; Evans, $06 F.2d at 1249.
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, epplying Evans
and Spencer, concluded that “where no limiting instruction was
given, .. the prejudice to the defendant was so areat that
failure te aive the instruction constituted plain error of
constitutional magnitude, requiring relief even though the
defendant did not request the instruction.” Dawson, 531 F.2d at
1377 (emphasis added) «

In both Daweon and Evans, evidence of prior convictions
was prejudicial to the defendant because such evidence could
unduly influence a jury te conclude that the defendant is a “bad
person,” or more Likely to have committed the offense, leading it

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to improperly convict the defendant based on those
considerations. Cf. Tavares, 30 P.3d at 1131 (stating that “the
principal concern with admitting bad acts ie that the jury will
be unduly influenced by the evidence, and thus convict the
accused because it believes the accused is a bad person.”). The
potential for undue prejudice is so great that failure to give a
Limiting instruction with regard to prior convictions, even if
the defendant has not requested one, constitutes) clear error.”
Evans, 506 F.2d at 1249.

ce.

We now adopt an approach specifically concerning the
use of prior convictions to prove an element of a charged
offense. As discussed above, the Gases have generally adopted
two initial steps in applying statutes aimed at recidivist
conduct or habitual offenders. First, if a defendant decides to
stipulate to the prior convictions, the trial court must accept
the stipulation. Second, the trial court must engage defendant
in a colloquy to confirm that defendant understands his
constitutional rights to a trial by jury and that his stipulation
is a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to have the issue
of his prior convictions proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

‘These two requirements are widely established but
thereafter approaches differ as to how the trial court utilizes
the stipulation once it is accepted. To summarize, the trial
court could: (1) exclude all evidence of the prior convictions
from the jury; (2) inform the jury that defendant has stipulated

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to the prior convictions with an instruction that the jury must
consider the prior convictions as conclusively proven, but that
the jury may not consider the prior convictions for any purpose
other than as conclusive proof of the particular requisite
element of the offenses charged in the case; or (3) bifurcate the
trial.

This court has already rejected the third approach.
See State v, Olivera, 57 Haw. 338, 345, 555 P.2d 1199, 1203
(1976). In Olivera, the defendant appealed from several
convictions including “possession of a firearm by a person
convicted of a crime of violence.” The defendant contended,
Antex alia, that “denial of his pre-trial motion [for a
bifurcated trial] was error for which his conviction should be
reversed.” Id, The defendant had sought by means of pre-trial
notion, “a bifurcated trial in which the jury would try the issue

da firearm in one stage of

 

of whether the (defendant) posse:
the trial,” and upon such finding, “would then inguire as to
whether (the defendant] had been previously convicted of a crime
of violence and return a verdict of guilty or not guilty
thereon.” Id, The defendant had also requested in his motion,
an “order in limine barring the State from reading the indictment
to the jury, insofar as it recite(d) that (the defendant] had
previously been convicted of a crime of violence and fron
offering any connent or evidence upon such matter unless and
until the jury had found that (the defendant] had possessed a
fizearm as charged in the indictment.” Id.

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‘This court noted that the “prior conviction which (the
defendant) sought to keep from the jury [was] an elenent of the
crime for which [the defendant] was charged{.]" Id, at 346, 585
P.2d at 1203, This court reached the same conclusion as Oklahona
courts which have “held that the previous conviction of a felony
was a necessary elenent of the crime charged which should be
pleaded and proven in the State's case in chief in a one stage
proceeding.” Id, at 347, 555 P.2d at 1204 (citing Marr v, State,
513 P.2d 324 (OK1. Cr. App. 1973)). Accordingly, the defendant's
conviction was affirmed. Id.

In choosing between the other approaches, we adopt a
variation of the second approach. Under the chosen approach, the
defendant should be allowed to stipulate to the fact of the

required prior conviction:

 

“ This will serve the purpose of

 

preventing the prejudice that would result from relating the
details of the previous incidents to the jury. See Old chief,
519 U.S. at 174 ("Fearing prejudice if the jury learns the nature
of the earlier crime, defendants sometimes seek to avoid such an
informative disclosure by offering to concede the fact of the
prior conviction.”) In this regard, we recognize, as did the
Supreme Court in Old Chief, the potential for unfair prejudice to
a defendant charged with 2 status offense if the jury knows “the

M under our adopted approach, failure to allow the defendent to ure
the stipulation precedure would not be considered hermles® exror.. Contrs,

358 NiW.2d at 395 (holding that it was error co prevent cefendant

from stipiiating to prior convictions, "but that the exror was not
prejudiciai*). We decline to fellow the Minnesota Suprene Court's holding

Unasmuch as the reasoning underlying the decision in Berkelnan was not clearly

 

 

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name and nature” of the previous offenses. Id, (noting that “the
name or nature of the prior offense raises the risk of a verdict
tainted by improper considerations . . ."). We further note

that the risk of tainting the juzy verdict with evidence of prior
convictions is of especial concern when the current charge is for

the same crime of which the defendant was previously convicted.

Jd. at 184 (“Where a prior conviction was for . . . one similar
to. . . charges in a pending case the risk of unfair prejudice
wo specia wiovs . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also

ews, 549 8.£.2d at 698 (“For a jury to learn of a prior

[similar] offense by mention of the defendant's stipulation has

the same unfairly prejudicial effect as presenting the jury with
other evidence of the offense . . . .”) (emphasis and brackets
added) .

Second, the jury should be instructed that the
defendant has stipulated to this particular element of the
charged offense to make it plain that this elenent is considered
proven beyond a reasonable doubt." The instruction must be
carefully crafted to omit any reference to the “name or nature”
of the previous convictions. Deus, $49 5.E.2d at 698. The court
must also preclude any mention of the nature of Petitioner's

prior convictions at any point during the trial, including

 

 

We observe that “Lt no brishte " for determining
hen (iuea, before the evidence ie introauced and/or at the conclusion of the
Criai} the triel. court should sesue a limiting instruction.

Corder, 99 Hawai'i 390, 418-19, 56 P.3d 692, 720-21 (2002)
Teltations omitted). The trial court must consider on = cas
then te teeve the Limiting instruction. 1d.

 

‘state y
jenphasis sdded)
‘by-case basis

     

   

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argunents, presentation of evidence, and instructions.
Eliminating the name and nature of the previous convictions from
the jury's realm will prevent unfair prejudice to defendants
charged under HRS § 709-906(7) and will notify the jury of all
elements of the charged offense. Finally, the instruction should
ensure that the prior convictions are not considered by the jury
for any purpose other than conclusively establishing the “prior
conviction(s)” elenent.

D.

In the instant case, Petitioner's prior convictions
were admissible only with respect to the element of whether
Petitioner had two or more prior convictions, the last of which
occurred within two years of the date of the charged offense in
violation of HRS § 709-906(7). The jury was not to consider
evidence of Petitioner's prior convictions with respect to
whether Petitioner physically abused a household or family member

on January 18, 2005, the specific date of the offen:

 

charged.
Hence, the court abused its discretion when it denied
Petitioners request to prohibit Respondent from informing the
jury of the nature of the prior convictions to which Petitioner
had stipulated. ‘This error was compounded by the failure to
Anstruct the jury that the stipulation could be used only to
prove the prior conviction element and was not otherwise to be

considered in relation to the current offense.

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xav.
tn conclusion, on remand, if Petitioner wishes to
stipulate to the prior convictions, the court must accept his
stipulation. The stipulation may be accepted only after engaging
Petitioner in an on-the-record colloquy regarding Petitioner's
constitutional rights, and ensuring that Petitioner is making a
knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to have the prior
convictions proven beyond a reasonable doubt and decided by @
jury. If such @ stipulation is accepted, the court must instruct
the jury of the following: (1) conviction under HRS § 708-906(7)
requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
elenent that defendant has had at least two prior misdemeanor
convictions, the last of which occurred within two years of the
charged offenses (without indicating that the two prior
convictions must be for abuse of a household or family member);
(2) defendant has stipulated to at least two prior misdemeanor
convictions, the lest of which occurred within two years of the
charged offense; (3) the stipulation is evidence only of the
prior conviction element; (4) the prior conviction element of the
charged offense must be taken as conclusively proven; (5) the
Jury is not to speculate as to the nature of the prior
convictions; and (6) the jury must not consider defendant’ s

stipulation for any other purpose.

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xv.

Based on the foregoing,
judgment is reversed, the court's

vacated, and the case is remanded

‘Taryn R. Tonasa, Deputy
Public Defender, for
pet itioner/defendant-
appellant.

Brandon Paredes, Deputy
Prosecuting attorney,
County of Maui, for
respondent/plaintiff-
appellee.

44

the ICA's February 6, 2007
Septenber 13, 2005 judgment is

to the court for a new trial.

Beilin nae
Gow

Yume Publi dh +