Case Title: Karen R. Bammert v. Don's Super Valu, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2000AP002473

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 85 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-2473 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Karen R. Bammert,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Don's SuperValu, Inc.,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  246 Wis. 2d 989, 632 N.W.2d 124 
(Ct. App. 2001-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 5, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dunn   
 
JUDGE: 
Eric J. Wahl   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BABLITCH, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BRADLEY, J., join dissent.  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Matthew A. Biegert and Doar, Drill & Skow, S.C., New Richmond, 
and oral argument by Brian H. Sande. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Phillip 
M. Steans and Phillip M. Steans, S.C., Menomonie, and oral 
argument by Phillip M. Steans. 
 
 
2002 WI 85 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-2473  
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 188) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Karen R. Bammert,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Don's Super Valu, Inc.,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.     
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.   This is an action for wrongful 
discharge, 
and 
it 
presents 
a 
single 
question 
of 
first-
impression: can the public policy exception to the employment-
at-will doctrine be invoked when an at-will employee is fired in 
retaliation for the actions of his or her non-employee spouse?  
We answer this question no. 
¶2  Karen Bammert worked at Don's Super Valu, Inc. in 
Menomonie.  Her husband is a Menomonie police officer.  Don's is 
owned by Don Williams, whose wife, Nona, was arrested for drunk 
driving. 
 
Bammert's 
husband 
assisted 
in 
the 
arrest 
by 
No. 
00-2473   
 
2 
 
administering a breathalyzer test.  Shortly thereafter, Bammert 
was 
fired, 
allegedly 
in 
retaliation 
for 
her 
husband's 
participation in the arrest of her boss's wife.  She sued for 
wrongful discharge, invoking the public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine.  The circuit court dismissed for 
failure to state a claim, and the court of appeals affirmed.  We 
accepted review. 
¶3  The public policy exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine is a narrow exception that allows at-will employees to 
sue for wrongful discharge if they are fired for fulfilling, or 
refusing to violate, a fundamental, well-defined public policy 
or an affirmative legal obligation established by existing law.  
It has never been extended to terminations in retaliation for 
conduct outside the employment relationship; neither has it been 
applied to terminations in retaliation for the conduct of 
someone other than the terminated employee.  To allow it here 
would 
therefore 
expand 
the 
exception 
beyond 
its 
present 
boundaries in two significant and unprecedented ways, with no 
logical limiting principles. 
¶4  Accordingly, we decline to recognize a cause of action 
for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine for terminations in retaliation for 
the conduct of a non-employee spouse.  The allegations in this 
No. 
00-2473   
 
3 
 
case, if true, make Karen Bammert's termination reprehensible, 
but not actionable. 
I 
¶5  The case is before us on the circuit court's order 
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2) (1999-2000)1, and so we accept the 
facts alleged as true for purposes of our review.  Strozinsky v. 
School Dist. of Brown Deer, 2000 WI 97, ¶7, 237 Wis. 2d 19, 28, 
614 N.W.2d 443.  Karen Bammert was employed at Don's Super Valu, 
Inc. in Menomonie for approximately 26 years.  Her husband is a 
Menomonie police sergeant.  Don's is owned by Don Williams, 
whose wife, Nona, was arrested for drunk driving on June 7, 
1997.   Bammert's husband participated in the drunk driving 
field investigation by administering a portable breathalyzer 
test to Nona Williams, which she failed. 
¶6  On August 28, 1997, Bammert was fired by Don's in 
retaliation for her husband's participation in Nona Williams' 
drunk driving arrest.  At the time of her termination, she was 
an assistant manager at the supermarket. 
                                                 
1 All other statutory references are to the 1997-1998 
version of the Wisconsin Statutes. 
No. 
00-2473   
 
4 
 
¶7 
Bammert sued for wrongful discharge.2  Don's moved to 
dismiss, and the Dunn County Circuit Court, the Honorable Eric 
J. Wahl, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, 
concluding that the employment-at-will doctrine's public policy 
exception, announced by this court in Brockmeyer v. Dun & 
Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983), did not 
apply.  The court of appeals affirmed.  We accepted review and 
now affirm. 
II 
¶8 
The question of whether the circuit court properly 
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  Hausman v. St. Croix 
                                                 
2 Bammert had initially filed a claim with the Wisconsin 
Equal Rights Division of the Department of Workforce Development 
claiming that she had suffered employment discrimination as a 
result of her marital status, prohibited under Wis. Stat. §§ 
111.31-111.395.  Her claim was dismissed, the dismissal was 
affirmed by the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC), and 
ultimately sustained on judicial review in the circuit court and 
the court of appeals.  Bammert v. LIRC, 2000 WI App 28, 232 Wis. 
2d 365, 369, 606 N.W.2d 620 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Bammert I"), rev. 
denied, 2000 WI 21, 233 Wis. 2d 86, 609 N.W.2d 475.  The court 
of appeals in Bammert I agreed with LIRC's conclusion that the 
statute protected against discrimination on the basis of marital 
status in general, not the status of being married to a 
particular person.  Bammert I, 2000 WI App 28, ¶14.  Some of the 
record items from the administrative and judicial proceedings in 
Bammert I were put into the record on the motion to dismiss in 
this 
case, by way of an 
affidavit 
from 
Don's counsel.  
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss should have been treated as a 
motion 
for 
summary 
judgment 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 
802.06(2)(b) and 806.08.  This procedural irregularity does not 
affect our review of the legal issue presented. 
No. 
00-2473   
 
5 
 
Care Ctr., 214 Wis. 2d 655, 662, 571 N.W.2d 393 (1997).  Bammert 
was an at-will employee.  In general, at-will employees are 
terminable at will, for any reason, without cause and with no 
judicial remedy.  Whether Bammert has an actionable claim for 
wrongful discharge turns on the question of whether the public 
policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine can be 
extended to a retaliatory discharge based upon the conduct of a 
non-employee spouse. 
¶9 
The starting point for any wrongful discharge case is 
Brockmeyer.  There, we adopted a public policy exception to the 
long-standing employment-at-will doctrine which allows an at-
will employee to sue for wrongful discharge "when the discharge 
is contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy as 
evidenced by existing law."  Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 573.  
Brockmeyer noted that ordinarily, an employer may discharge an 
at-will employee "'for good cause, for no cause, or even for 
cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal 
wrong.'"3   Id. at 567 (footnote omitted).   
                                                 
3 There are various statutory exceptions to the employment-
at-will doctrine.  See Strozinsky v. School Dist. of Brown Deer, 
2000 WI 97, ¶35, 237 Wis. 2d 19, 39, 614 N.W.2d 443.  For 
instance, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Wisconsin Fair Employment Act each prohibit employers from 
discharging an employee on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.  Other statutes make it unlawful for 
employers to terminate workers because of participation in union 
activities, jury service, military service, or testifying at an 
occupational, safety, and health proceeding.  Id. at ¶34. 
No. 
00-2473   
 
6 
 
¶10  The court in Brockmeyer specifically declined to 
engraft a broad implied duty of good faith onto the at-will 
employment relationship.  Id. at 569.  "Imposing a good faith 
duty to terminate would unduly restrict an employer's discretion 
in managing the work force" and "'subject each discharge to 
judicial incursions into the amorphous concept of bad faith.'"  
Id. (quoting Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 629 
(Haw. 1982)).  Instead, the court concluded that "in the 
interests of employees, employers and the public, a narrow 
public policy exception" was justified, applicable only where 
the discharge "clearly contravenes the public welfare and 
gravely violates paramount requirements of public interest."4  
Id. at 572-73. 
¶11  In adopting the exception, the court recognized that 
"public policy" is too broad a concept to be sufficient as a 
legal standard for evaluating discharge claims, and therefore 
articulated several guidelines: 
                                                 
4 Brockmeyer also held that the cause of action for wrongful 
discharge pursuant to the public policy exception sounds in 
contract, 
not 
tort: 
"The 
contract 
action 
is 
essentially 
predicated on the breach of an implied provision that an 
employer will not discharge an employee for refusing to perform 
an act that violates a clear mandate of public policy."  
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 575-76, 335 
N.W.2d 834 (1983). 
 
No. 
00-2473   
 
7 
 
The 
public 
policy 
must 
be 
evidenced 
by 
a 
constitutional or statutory provision.  An employee 
cannot 
be 
fired 
for 
refusing 
to 
violate 
the 
constitution or a statute.  Employers will be held 
liable for those terminations that effectuate an 
unlawful end. 
We intend to recognize an existing limited public 
policy exception.  An employer may not require an 
employee to violate a constitutional or statutory 
provision with impunity.  If an employee refuses to 
act in an unlawful manner, the employer would be 
violating public policy by terminating the employee 
for such behavior.  To say that the employer could be 
prosecuted for criminal involvement as a result of the 
activities would be little solace for the discharged 
employee. 
Courts should proceed cautiously when making 
public policy determinations.  No employer should be 
subject to suit merely because a discharged employee's 
conduct was praiseworthy or because the public may 
have derived some benefit from it. 
  
Id. at 573-74. 
  
¶12  Accordingly, to state a claim for wrongful discharge 
under Brockmeyer, a plaintiff must identify a constitutional, 
statutory, or administrative provision that clearly articulates 
a fundamental and well-defined public policy.   Strozinsky, 2000 
WI 97, ¶39; see also Winkelman v. Beloit Mem'l Hosp., 168 Wis. 
2d 12, 23-24, 483 N.W.2d 211 (1992)(extending public policy 
exception to public policies found in administrative rules). Not 
every statutory, constitutional, or administrative provision 
invariably sets forth a clear public policy mandate.  Kempfer v. 
Automated Finishing, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 100, 112, 564 N.W.2d 692 
(1997). The determination of whether a public policy is 
No. 
00-2473   
 
8 
 
sufficiently fundamental and well-defined is made by reference 
to the content of the provision.  Id. (citing Winkelman, 168 
Wis. 2d at 24.)  If a plaintiff identifies a public policy 
sufficient to trigger the exception, and further demonstrates 
that the termination violated that public policy, the burden 
shifts to the employer to show just cause for the termination.  
Strozinsky, 2000 WI 97, ¶37. 
¶13 Our cases since Brockmeyer have cautioned against 
interpreting the public policy exception too broadly.  The 
employment-at-will doctrine is a "stable fixture" of our common 
law, and has been since 1871.  Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc., 
219 Wis. 2d 99, 112, 579 N.W.2d 217 (1998) (citing Prentiss v. 
Ledyard, 28 Wis. 131, 133 (1871)); see also Strozinsky, 2000 WI 
97, ¶33.  It is central to the free market economy and "serves 
the interests of employees as well as employers" by maximizing 
the freedom of both.  Batteries Plus, LLC v. Mohr, 2001 WI 80, 
¶¶13-15, 244 Wis. 2d 559, 565, 628 N.W.2d 364 (citing Mackenzie 
v. Miller Brewing Co., 2001 WI 23, ¶12, 241 Wis. 2d 700, 623 
N.W.2d 739).  The "antidote" to the potential for unfairness in 
employment-at-will "is an employment contract."  Batteries Plus, 
2001 WI 80, ¶15. 
¶14 The prevailing general rule is that an at-will employee 
has no legal remedy for "an employer's unjustified decision to 
terminate the employment relationship."  Strozinsky, 2000 WI 97, 
No. 
00-2473   
 
9 
 
¶33 (citing Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 574).  The employment-at-
will 
doctrine 
thus 
inhibits 
judicial 
"second-guessing" of 
discharge decisions——even those that are unfair, unfortunate, or 
harsh.  Strozinsky, 2000 WI 97, ¶33. 
¶15 Substantive expansions of the public policy exception 
since Brockmeyer have been few and limited in nature.  See 
Hausman, 214 Wis. 2d at 669 (public policy exception applies 
where employee is fired for fulfilling an affirmative legal or 
public policy duty even though there was no command from the 
employer to violate public policy); Winkelman, 168 Wis. 2d at 
23-24 (public policy can be embodied in an administrative rule, 
even though Brockmeyer had referred only to the constitution and 
statutes); Wandry v. Bull's Eye Credit Union, 129 Wis. 2d 37, 
46-47, 384 N.W.2d 325 (1986)(a discharge can violate public 
policy if it violates the spirit, if not the letter, of a 
statute). 
¶16  More often than not, the cases have emphasized the 
limited scope of the exception.  See, e.g., Batteries Plus, 2001 
WI 80, ¶33 (warning that a broad interpretation of the public 
policy exception would "interject government agencies and the 
courts into traditional employment relations in a manner 
inconsistent with employment-at-will"); Strozinsky, 2000 WI 97, 
¶64 (suggesting that an expansion of the exception would open a 
"Pandora's Box for employment litigation"); Kempfer, 211 Wis. 2d 
No. 
00-2473   
 
10 
 
at 113 (emphasizing that the exception is "very narrow"); 
Hausman, 214 Wis. 2d at 667-668 (declining to expand the 
exception to include a broad "whistle-blower" concept); Bushko 
v. Miller Brewing Co., 134 Wis. 2d 136, 142, 396 N.W.2d 167 
(1986) (stressing the importance of summary judgment as a means 
of screening out cases that seek to expand the exception beyond 
its traditionally narrow scope). 
¶17  Bammert's claim must be evaluated against this 
backdrop.  She has identified two public policies as being 
implicated here: Wis. Stat. § 346.63, which prohibits the 
operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant; and Wis. Stat. § 765.001(2), which describes the 
intent of the Family Code as including the promotion of the 
institution of marriage, for the preservation of the family, 
society, the state, morality, and indeed, all civilization. 
¶18  We would be hard-pressed to say that these are not 
fundamental, well-established public policies.  Clearly, both 
statutes reflect compelling public interests——one requiring the 
diligent pursuit and punishment of drunk drivers and the other 
requiring the vigorous promotion of the institution of marriage.  
But on the assumed facts of this case, that conclusion doesn't 
get us very far. 
¶19  Bammert was not fired for her participation in the 
enforcement of the laws against drunk driving; she was fired for 
No. 
00-2473   
 
11 
 
her husband's participation in the enforcement of those laws.  
Discharges for conduct outside of the employment relationship by 
someone other than the discharged employee are not actionable 
under present law.  The public policy generally favoring the 
stability of marriage, while unquestionably strong, provides an 
insufficient basis upon which to enlarge what was meant to be, 
and 
has 
always 
been, 
an 
extremely 
narrow 
exception 
to 
employment-at-will. 
¶20  Bammert advocates an expansion of the public policy 
exception far beyond that contemplated by our case law, and she 
cites no authority for it.5   Up to now, where the exception has 
been applied, the public policy at issue has always been 
vindicated by the employee himself or herself, within the 
context of the employment relationship.  See, e.g., Strozinsky, 
2000 WI 97, ¶2 (payroll clerk refused to violate tax withholding 
regulations); Hausman, 214 Wis. 2d at 659-61 (nursing home 
employee complied with legal obligation to prevent abuse or 
neglect of patients by reporting it); Kempfer, 211 Wis. 2d at 
106-07 (commercial truck driver refused to drive without a 
commercial driver’s license); Winkelman, 168 Wis. 2d at 16-18 
                                                 
5 That is, Bammert cites no authority in the employment-at-
will context. She does cite NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 
F.2d 1086, 1088 (7th Cir. 1987), but that case involved an 
action for unfair labor practices under the National Labor 
Relations Act, and so its analysis is not applicable here.      
No. 
00-2473   
 
12 
 
(nurse refused to work in area of hospital for which she was not 
qualified); Wandry, 129 Wis. 2d at 39-40 (credit union clerk 
refused to comply with credit union demand for reimbursement of 
customer's bad check). 
¶21  In contrast, Bammert’s claim identifies a public 
policy completely unrelated to her employment, being enforced by 
someone else, who is employed elsewhere.  That the "someone 
else" is her husband makes her discharge obviously retaliatory, 
and reminds us of the sometimes harsh reality of employment-at-
will, but it does not provide acceptable grounds for expansion 
of the public policy exception beyond its present boundaries. 
¶22 The public policy exception is rooted in the principle 
that "[a]n employer may not require an employee to violate a 
constitutional or statutory provision with impunity.  If an 
employee refuses to act in an unlawful manner, the employer 
would be violating public policy by terminating the employee for 
such behavior."  Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 573 (emphasis 
added). 
¶23 In Hausman, the most recent case to entertain any 
expansion of the public policy exception, we held that "[w]here 
the law imposes an affirmative obligation upon an employee 
. . . and the employee fulfills that obligation," termination 
No. 
00-2473   
 
13 
 
for that reason violates public policy.6  Hausman, 214 Wis. 2d at 
669.  Thus, as it currently stands, the public policy exception 
applies to discharges in retaliation for the fulfillment of "an 
affirmative obligation" which the law places "upon an employee."  
Extending it to discharges for fulfillment of an affirmative 
obligation which the law places on a relative of an employee 
would go too far, and have no logical stopping point. 
¶24  Line-drawing would be required but almost impossible 
to do in any principled way.  For now, the rule would apply to 
police officers' spouses fired in retaliation for the officers' 
conduct in the line of duty——but what about the spouses of 
prosecutors, or judges, or DNR investigators, or IRS agents?   
What about discharges in retaliation for the conduct of the 
employee's parents, children, or siblings?  The Family Code's 
strong endorsement of the stability of marriage is accompanied 
by an equally strong endorsement of the family as a central and 
fundamentally important societal institution.  See Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
6 As noted above, Hausman also expressly rejected an 
expansive "whistle-blower" exception, even though we conceded 
that such an exception would better protect citizens from 
reprisal for carrying out "'their civil duty of reporting 
infractions of rules, regulations, or the law pertaining to 
public health, safety, and the general welfare.'"  Hausman v. 
St. Croix Care Ctr., 214 Wis. 2d 655, 666, 571 N.W.2d 393 (1997)  
(quoting 
Palmer 
v. 
Brown, 
752 
P.2d 
685 
(Kan. 
1988)).  
Acknowledging that adoption of "such a wide-ranging" exception 
would advance the public interest, we declined to do so, because 
"[s]uch a wide extension of existing law . . . would be 
No. 
00-2473   
 
14 
 
§ 765.001(2). 
 
If 
the 
statute 
is 
sufficient 
to 
justify 
application of the public policy exception to discharges in 
retaliation for the conduct of non-employee spouses, it is 
certainly sufficient to justify extension of the exception to 
discharges in retaliation for the conduct of non-employee 
parents, children, and siblings. 
¶25  Public policy comes in many variations, is implicated 
in many contexts, and is carried out by many people, both 
publicly and privately.  Once expanded in the manner argued 
here, the public policy exception would no longer be subject to 
any discernable limiting principles.  It would arguably apply to 
retaliatory discharges based upon the conduct of any non-
employee relative, for the fulfillment of or refusal to violate 
public policy in a wide variety of ways and in a manner 
completely unconnected to the employment relationship. 
¶26  The public policy exception cannot be stretched that 
far and still be recognizable under Brockmeyer's limited 
formulation.  Accordingly, we decline to recognize a cause of 
action for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception 
                                                                                                                                                             
contradictory to our established precedent."  Hausman, 214 
Wis. 2d at 666. 
No. 
00-2473   
 
15 
 
to 
the 
at-will 
employment 
doctrine 
for 
terminations 
in 
retaliation for the conduct of a non-employee spouse.7 
¶27  Of course, a natural sense of outrage over the facts 
alleged in this case brings on a desire to see the law provide a 
remedy, but it does not.  Sergeant Bammert was doing his duty, 
for the benefit of the public, but Brockmeyer made it clear that 
the public policy exception does not apply where the "conduct 
[precipitating the discharge] was praiseworthy or because the 
public may have derived some benefit from it."  Brockmeyer, 113 
Wis. 2d at 573-74.  To expand the public policy exception to fit 
this case would invite future applications to retaliatory 
discharges based upon the conduct of any close relative, conduct 
which is wholly unconnected to the employment relationship.  
This clearly would be inconsistent with Brockmeyer's intention 
that the public policy exception remain narrow in scope.  The 
case was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim, and we 
affirm.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
                                                 
7 The dissent would expand the public policy exception to 
cover any retaliatory discharge of a police officer's spouse, 
citing Wis. Stat. § 946.10, the bribery statute.  That statute, 
however, criminalizes the transfer or promise of some item of 
property or personal advantage as an inducement before the 
public official acts.  Bammert's discharge occurred after Nona 
Williams' drunk driving arrest.  She did not cite the bribery 
statute, which has no application here.  
No. 
00-2473   
 
16 
 
 
 
 
No.  00-2473.wab 
 
 
 
1
¶28 WILLIAM 
A. 
BABLITCH, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
Karen 
Bammert's (Bammert) 26 years of employment at Don's Super Valu 
ended by her being fired.  Bammert was not fired for showing up 
late to work or treating customers poorly.  In fact, she was not 
fired for any job-related reason at all.   
¶29 She was fired for her husband's actions.   
¶30 Her husband made no mistake either.  He was a police 
officer.  He fulfilled his obligation to society by assisting in 
the drunk driving arrest of Nona Williams.  Nona is the spouse 
of Bammert's employer.   
¶31 Retaliation for Bammert's husband's actions as a 
police officer was the reason Bammert was fired.  In my view, 
this is unacceptable.  There is a strong public policy in 
vigorous enforcement of the law.  Society is not served by 
police officers being influenced in how they do their job 
because of the potential consequences of a retaliatory firing.  
Furthermore, extending 
the 
employment 
at-will 
doctrine to 
protect police officers is consistent with past precedent.   
Unfortunately, the majority opinion does not agree.  The result 
is that an individual will be able to influence a police officer 
in the form of a retaliatory firing.  For these reasons, I 
respectfully dissent.    
¶32 Bammert was an at-will employee of Don's Super Valu.  
The general rule regarding employment relationships in Wisconsin 
is the at-will doctrine.  The doctrine generally allows an 
employer to "discharge an employee 'for good cause, for no 
cause, or even for a cause morally wrong, without being thereby 
No.  00-2473.wab 
 
 
 
2
guilty of legal wrong.'"  Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 
Wis. 2d 561, 567, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983) (footnote omitted).  
However, Wisconsin law does allow narrow exceptions to the at-
will employment doctrine for public policy reasons.  The public 
policy exception allows the firing of employees to recover if 
the firing violates a well-established and important public 
policy.  Id. at 572-73.  The exception that I propose is a 
narrow one, and certainly is a well-established, important 
public policy——retaliatory firing in response to a police 
officer's lawful actions in his or her capacity as a police 
officer is actionable.  
¶33 The exception I propose is narrow in that it covers 
only a police officer acting lawfully in his or her capacity as 
an officer.  This exception will not open the floodgates to 
litigation, as there are very few instances when a firing could 
fit into this exception.  And when it does, it should. 
¶34 The public policy in the case at hand is well-
established and of utmost importance.  Police officers have to 
be able to do their jobs without being influenced by the 
possibility of a retaliatory firing.  A police officer must be 
able to arrest a drunk driver without his or her spouse being 
fired because of the arrest.  Public policy dictates the 
vigorous enforcement of the law no matter who is on the 
receiving end of the enforcement.  Without an exception to the 
at-will doctrine for retaliatory firings against police officers 
acting lawfully in their capacity, this public policy will be 
undermined. 
No.  00-2473.wab 
 
 
 
3
¶35 Although there is little doubt that influencing, 
intimidating, or bribing a police officer is against public 
policy, Brockmeyer dictates that public policy must be shown by 
a 
constitutional 
or 
statutory 
provision. 
 
Id. 
at 
573.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 946.10(1) (1997-98) states:  
946.10  Bribery of public officers and employes.  
Whoever does either of the following is guilty of a 
Class D felony:   
(1) Whoever, 
with 
intent 
to 
influence 
the 
conduct of any public officer or public employe in 
relation to any matter which by law is pending or 
might come before the officer or employe in the 
officer's or employe's capacity as such officer or 
employe or with intent to induce the officer or 
employe to do or omit to do any act in violation of 
the officer's or employe's lawful duty transfers or 
promises to the officer or employe or on the officer's 
or employe's behalf any property or any personal 
advantage 
which 
the 
officer 
or 
employe 
is 
not 
authorized to receive; . . . . 
See also State v. Rosenfeld, 93 Wis. 2d 325, 286 N.W.2d 596 
(1980); 
Wis. Stat. § 946.17 
(1997-98) 
("Corrupt 
means 
to 
influence legislation; disclosure of interest."). 
¶36 As Wis. Stat. § 946.10 (1997-98) clearly points out, 
as a society we do not allow a person to bribe, intimidate, or 
otherwise illegally influence police officers about any pending 
matter or any matter that "might come before the officer".  In 
turn, there is no reason to allow an employer to bribe, 
intimidate or otherwise influence a police officer in this 
regard.  There is no reason to give an employer a get-out-of-
jail free card that is not afforded to the rest of society, 
simply because the employer has some retaliatory influence over 
No.  00-2473.wab 
 
 
 
4
a police officer.  There should not be one standard of the law 
for employers and one standard for everyone else.   
¶37 There is no legitimate reason to protect the conduct 
of this employer.  In a normal circumstance, this employer could 
not reach the person that the employer wishes to retaliate 
against.  In this circumstance, the employee is married to one 
of the officers participating in the arrest, which allows the 
employer to therefore reach this officer.  Normally, the officer 
would be protected from the disgruntled arrestee, but in this 
case, the arrestee can reach the officer.  As stated previously, 
we do not allow retaliation against a police officer for 
performing his or her duty, but in this circumstance the 
employer has a way around the protection of the officer.  In my 
opinion, this loophole that allows an employer to retaliate 
against a police officer must be put in line with the rest of 
our laws, and the loophole that provides a retaliatory tool for 
the employer must be closed, thereby protecting police officers.  
¶38 Furthermore, society owes its police officers a duty 
not to put them in the no-win position that Bammert's husband 
was placed in.  On the one hand, he was sworn to uphold the laws 
of Wisconsin.  On the other hand, if he keeps his oath and 
upholds the laws of our state, he is put in the position that 
the person that he assists in arresting could retaliate against 
him.  The majority gives Bammert's husband a choice: either do 
your job and assist in the arrest of the drunk driver or protect 
your family by looking the other way.  I want to eliminate this 
no-win situation by giving police officers the tools to do their 
No.  00-2473.wab 
 
 
 
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job without the fear of retaliation.  We owe such officers, like 
Bammert's husband, that much.   
¶39 Moreover, the exception that I propose is consistent 
with past precedent.  This court has recognized that compliance 
with an affirmative legal duty requiring action comports with a 
well-defined public policy, and the rationale of the public 
policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine.  See 
Hausman v. St. Croix Care Ctr., 214 Wis. 2d 655, 571 N.W.2d 393 
(1997).  In Hausman, we gave employees that fulfilled their 
legal duty protection from retaliatory firing.  The idea behind 
the exception is simply that we want people to fulfill their 
legal duties.  In Hausman, it took the form of reporting abuse 
in a nursing home.  We do not want people to be afraid to report 
nursing home abuse because they are afraid to be fired; 
therefore, we protect them.  In the present case, we do not want 
a police officer to not enforce the law because the officer is 
afraid of a retaliatory firing.  We should protect the officer, 
not subject him to retaliatory firing.  
¶40 I recognize the reluctance to expand the at-will 
doctrine, and I too appreciate the importance of keeping with 
the policy of the well-defined narrow policy exception rule.  We 
have a well-defined, extremely important policy, and we should 
carve out a very narrow exception that is consistent with past 
precedent.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent.   
¶41 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
No.  00-2473.wab 
 
 
 
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