Case Title: Gold v. Board of County Com'rs of Teton County

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5728

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Gold v. Board of County Com'rs of Teton County1983 WY 9658 P.2d 690Case Number: 5728Case Number: 5728Decided: 02/03/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROBERT N. GOLD, 
CHARLOTTE 
GOLD, SYDNEY JEAN GOLD AND ROBERT NEIL GOLD, APPELLANTS 
(PETITIONERS),

v.

BOARD OF COUNTYCOMMISSIONERS OF TETON COUNTY, WYOMING, AND W. BRADLEY MOREHOUSE AND WILLIAM 
RUDKIN, CO-TRUSTEES, APPELLEES (RESPONDENTS). No. 5728

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofTetonCounty, W.J. Nicholas, 
J.

Floyd R. King, 
Jackson, for appellants.

Henry C. Phibbs 
II, Jackson, for appellees Morehouse and 
Rudkin.

Paul O. Vaughn, 
DeputyCountyAtty., 
Jackson, for appellee Bd. of CountyCom'rs 
of TetonCounty.

Before ROONEY, C.J.*, RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE[fn**] and BROWN, JJ.

* Chief Justice since 
January 1, 1983.

[fn**] Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an order of the district court affirming the actions of the Board of County 
Commissioners of Teton County establishing a private road pursuant to §§ 
24-9-101 through 24-9-103, W.S. 1977.1 The appellants, sometimes referred 
to herein as the Golds, challenge the district court's order of affirmance, and 
raise for our review the following issues:

1. Did the Board of 
County Commissioners follow the procedures required by §§ 24-9-101 through 
24-9-103 in permitting the establishment of the private 
road?

2. Are the statutes 
permitting the establishment of private roads 
unconstitutional?

3. Was the road in 
question properly designated as a private road?

4. Is reversal of the 
Board's order warranted because one of the members was directly interested in 
the outcome by virtue of her ownership of neighboring 
property?

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶3.]     On January 2, 1980, an 
application was submitted to the Board of County Commissioners of TetonCounty requesting the establishment of a 
private road. The application was offered by W. Bradley Morehouse and William 
Rudkin as co-trustees, for a parcel of land held for the benefit of Dorothy 
Smith Rudkin, Henry Rudkin III and Margaret Mercedes Rudkin.2

[¶4.]     The application alleged 
that the parcel in question was landlocked, with no legally enforceable means of 
access to a public road. It then went on to designate several proposed roadways 
which could be established to provide access. The suggested road options 
traversed either the property of the Golds or the property of Bernard Reitmann, 
another neighboring landowner.

[¶5.]     On May 6, 1980 the 
Board conducted a hearing at which the applicants called a professional 
abstractor who testified that a search of county records failed to produce any 
record access from a public road to the subject property. Another witness 
testified to the suitability of the proposed road. The contestants called Mr. 
Robert Gold, who testified that he had been told by the grantor of applicants' 
property that an easement had previously been granted and later abandoned by 
applicants. However, no documentary evidence supporting this testimony was 
offered or admitted into evidence. Several other witnesses testified for the 
contestants, but this evidence mostly focused on the difficulty associated with 
the upkeep of the existing road on the Gold's property during the winter months. 
When the evidence was in, the Board took the matter under 
advisement.

[¶6.]     On May 20, 1980, the 
Board entered an order granting the application and appointing appraisers for 
the purpose of laying out the road and assessing damages. Specifically, the 
Board resolved:

"1. That the application 
of W. Bradley Morehouse and William Rudkin, Co-Trustees, for the establishment 
of a private road was filed on the 14th day of January, 1980, and that said 
application fully conforms to the requirements of law, to-wit Section 24-9-101 
through 24-9-103, Wyoming Statutes, 1977.

"2. That the applicants 
are owners of record of a parcel of property approximately 10 acres in area 
which has been subdivided into 3 tracts; each tract being beneficially owned by 
the beneficiaries of the three trusts of which the applicants are 
Co-Trustees.

"3. That the application 
sets out two, alternative, proposed private roads which would provide access 
from the property held by the applicants to a public road, Wyoming State Highway 
22,

"4. That one of the 
proposed routes traverses a parcel of property owned by Robert Gold and 
Charlotte Gold as well as an adjoining parcel owned by their children Sydney 
Jean Gold and Robert Neil Gold, utilizing an existing roadway for all but 
approximately 50 feet of the proposed road.

"5. That the other, 
alternative, proposed route traverses the parcel owned by Sydney Jean Gold and 
Robert Neil Gold using the lower portion of said existing roadway and then 
progresses in a northeasterly direction traversing property in the general area 
of the boundary line between the Sydney Jean Gold and Robert Neil Gold parcels 
and a parcel owned by Bernard Reitman.

"6. That the Board of 
County Commissioners set a hearing on the application for March 4, 1980, at 1:30 
p.m. That notice of the March 4, 1980 hearing was served on the persons over 
whose lands the private road was proposed, Robert M. Gold, Charlotte Gold, 
Robert Neil Gold and Sydney Jean Gold, through direct service on behalf of all 
family members on Sydney Gold, and through service by certified mail to Robert 
M. Gold for all family members, and through direct service on Bernard Reitman, 
all of which service was completed more than thirty (30) days prior to the March 
4th hearing date set by the Board of County Commissioners. Evidence of said 
service was submitted to and received by the Board from Henry C. Phibbs II, 
attorney for applicants.

"7. That notice of the 
application and hearing date was published in a newspaper of general circulation 
in Jackson, Wyoming on January 16, January 23 and January 
30, 1980, and proof of publication of said notice was submitted to the Board by 
Henry C. Phibbs II, attorney for applicants.

"8. That the hearing 
scheduled for March 4, 1980, was, at the request of the individuals over whose 
lands the private road was proposed, rescheduled to May 6, 1980 at 1:30 
p.m.

"9. That all interested 
parties were served adequate notice, as required by § 24-9-101 W.S. 
1977.

"10. That the land of the 
applicants is so situated that it has no outlet to nor connection with public 
road nor any legally enforceable means by which the applicants can gain access 
to a public road.

"11. That Wyoming State Highway 22 
is a convenient public road.

"12. That the two 
alternative proposed routes set forth in the application were proposed in good 
faith, are specified with sufficient particularity and that such routes are 
reasonable.

"13. That the applicants 
have complied with the requirements of § 24-9-101 W.S. 1977, and that the 
establishment of a private road is necessary and, therefore, they are entitled 
to have a private road established by the Board of County Commissioners of Teton 
County."

[¶7.]     On June 25, 1980, the 
appointed appraisers met at the site of the subject properties for the purpose 
of deciding upon the course of a roadway and to assess damages. The next 
regularly scheduled meeting of the Board was convened on July 1, 1980, and was 
regularly continued to July 8, 1980.3 The minutes of the July 8 meeting 
reflect that the appraisers' report was presented to the Board, at which time it 
was reviewed and approved. A written order of confirmation was issued by the 
Board on August 4, 1980 and it is from this order that the Golds appealed to the 
district court and, from an adverse decision there, now appeal to this 
court.

THE ISSUES 
RESOLVED

[¶8.]     Appellants' principal 
contentions have to do with their claim that the procedures mandated by §§ 
24-9-101 through 24-9-103, supra n. 1 have not been followed - all to their 
detriment and disadvantage. The district court rejected these contentions and we 
agree.

[¶9.]     First of all, the Golds 
urge that the application filed by the co-trustees was defective in that it 
failed to designate the desired access road with sufficient specificity. 
According to appellants, the application merely describes a desire for a way 
across the Gold's property and wrongfully places the burden of selecting the 
proper route upon the appraisers. They go on to say that our holding in McGuire v. McGuire, Wyo., 
608 P.2d 1278 (1980),4 requires reversal because the 
application did not meet the standards we developed in that opinion. We cannot 
agree.

[¶10.]  In McGuire v. McGuire, supra, we construed 
§ 24-9-101 as requiring a proposed roadway to be designated with some 
specificity. In concluding that the petitioner in McGuire had failed to file a 
proper application we said:

"* * * The first thing 
the appellants had to do was petition the county commissioners for a private 
road `leading from his [their] premises to some convenient public road.' The 
applicant complied with the notice requirements. It appears plain in the statute 
that the applicant must ask for the road with some specificity because the 
viewers are to `meet on a day named * * * on the proposed road, and view and 
locate a private road according to the 
application therefor.' [Emphasis in text.] The appellees merely said they 
wanted a road and gave notice to two parties and suggested that the road should 
go over the lands of one or the other but appellees did not know which, saying 
that was up to the viewers. The statutory 
language requires the applicants to set out a description of the road it 
proposes. [Emphasis added.]" 608 P.2d  at 1285.

In applying this 
requirement to the facts of this appeal, we cannot say that the Board abused its 
discretion when it found the application to be in compliance. The applicants 
specifically set forth several alternative roads to be established either across 
the appellants' property or that of Mr. Reitmann. In this regard, the agency and 
the trial court found that the McGuire rule of specificity had been 
complied with. We also agree with the Board's conclusion that there was 
sufficient evidence to establish that the application complied with § 24-9-101, 
W.S. 1977.

[¶11.]  The next contention raised by the Golds 
speaks to an assertion that the applicants failed to show "necessity" as 
required by law and the Board erred in concluding otherwise. We 
disagree.

[¶12.]  In McGuire v. McGuire, supra, we discussed 
the statutory requirement of "necessity" as follows:

"* * * We agree with the 
district judge that the county commissioners' finding that the road was not 
`necessary' was unsupported by the evidence. The evidence clearly demands the 
opposite conclusion. We hold that any 
person whose land is so situated that it has no outlet - no legally enforceable 
means by which he can gain access - has demonstrated necessity, as a matter of 
law, without there being a further need to show that he lives on that land or 
that it is being, or will be, used for some specific purpose nor was it proper 
to inquire into impact on adjoining owners (other than the owners whose land 
will be taken), financial interest of 
applicants, use for hunting, fences and improvements, or whether permissive 
access had been denied. In our view, the word `necessary' in the statute refers 
only to the lack of the type of outlet we have described to a `convenient' 
public road." (Emphasis added.) 608 P.2d  at 1286.

This rule was 
reiterated in Walton v. Dana, 
Wyo., 609 P.2d 461 
(1980).

[¶13.]  Appellants urge that even though the 
applicants were able to establish that they had no record access to their property, Mr. 
Gold's testimony concerning an alleged easement that was abandoned was 
sufficient to require the Board to conclude that applicants had failed to meet 
their burden of establishing no legally enforceable means of access. A review of 
the record does not support appellants' argument. It is clear to this court that 
the Board was correct in finding that the requested road was necessary in light 
of testimony which showed that there was no record of any easement or other 
enforceable means of access. The testimony relied upon by appellant was mostly 
hearsay and none of the documents which were relied upon to establish an 
easement were offered or admitted. Furthermore, appellants failed to establish 
that the application was not brought in good faith. McGuire v. McGuire, supra, 608 P.2d  at 
1286.

[¶14.]  We are guided by the rule which holds 
that in reviewing appeals from administrative bodies we are in the same position 
as the district court, Wyoming State 
Department of Education v. Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681 (1982); Spivey v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., Wyo., 
636 P.2d 518 (1981), and we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency as long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Spivey v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., supra, 
636 P.2d  at 521; Board of Trustees of 
School District No. 4 v. Colwell, Wyo., 611 P.2d 427, 428 (1980). Under the 
present circumstances, the Board's finding of necessity is clearly supported by 
substantial evidence and we cannot therefore substitute our judgment for that of 
the agency. Applicants' land is so situated that it has no outlet and no legally 
enforceable means of access and thus necessity was established as a matter of 
law.

[¶15.]  Having expressed disagreement with the 
actions of the appraisers, the appellants go on to charge that they were denied 
due process because they were not offered the opportunity to challenge the 
appraisers' report. They also allege that § 24-9-103, W.S. 1977, was not 
complied with because the report was not submitted at the next regularly 
scheduled meeting of the Board. In other words, the contention is that the 
report was not presented at the July 1, 1980 meeting but rather on July 8, 1980. 
We cannot agree with either of these positions.

[¶16.]  We find the argument that the 
presentation of the report on July 8, 1980 violated § 24-9-103 to be without 
merit5 because the minutes of the Board's 
meetings reflect that such a meeting, as is required by statute,6 was convened on July 1, 1980, and 
by unanimous vote was continued to July 8, 1980, at which later meeting the 
report was presented and adopted. Appellants have failed to cite any authority 
which would indicate that the Board lacked the ability to continue the meeting, 
and we fail to see how the presentation of the report on July 8, 1980, in any 
way violated § 24-9-103. There was no record showing that the continuance was 
intended for the purpose of permitting the appraisers to complete their report, 
as the appellants suggest, but, on the other hand, the record establishes that 
the meeting was continued because of the heavy volume of business before the 
Board on the 1st of July.

[¶17.]  Furthermore, we are of the opinion that 
the Golds cannot be heard to successfully complain that they failed to receive 
due process. Although § 24-9-103 does not specifically provide that the Board 
shall conduct a hearing on the appraisers' report, a reading of the statutes 
tells us that the legislature intended that a hearing be conducted. We agree 
with appellants that a due-process hearing is required because, considering the 
property rights involved, due process demands that the affected landowner have 
the right to contest the taking and the damage awards determined by the 
appraisers. Board of CountyCommissioners of TetonCounty 
v. Teton County Youth Services, Inc., Wyo., 652 P.2d 400 (1982). It is, thus, 
incumbent upon the agency to give the affected party notice of the time when the 
matter is to be considered so that he may be heard. Section 16-3-107(a), W.S. 
1977 (October 1982 Replacement); White v. 
Board of Trustees of Western Wyoming 
Community College District, 
Wyo., 648 P.2d 528 (1982). Here, not only did the Board 
in fact conduct a hearing, but it is further to be noted that § 24-9-103, by 
specific language, incorporates the notice requirement by directing that the 
appraisers' report would be considered at the Board's "next regular session." 
Section 24-9-103, supra n. 1. The problem in this case is that, for some reason, 
appellants failed to appear at the July 8, 1980 meeting which was, as we have 
said, a continuance of the July 1st "next regular session" or, if they did 
appear, they did not lodge an objection to the report. Appellants, however, make 
no claim that they were not aware of the July 1, 1980 meeting and its 
continuance to July 8, 1980. Under such circumstances, they cannot now be heard 
to complain that they were denied due process. The record clearly reflects the 
Board provided them with an opportunity to be heard - of which opportunity they 
did not avail themselves; or, at the very least, the record fails to evidence 
any denial by the Board of an opportunity to challenge the appraisers' report. 
Appellants, having been given the opportunity, failed to object and they cannot 
now be heard to successfully complain. We hold that § 24-9-103 provides for 
procedures consistent with concepts of due process, and the Board, in this case, 
did not in any way violate these rights of the 
appellants.

[¶18.]  Finally, with respect to the appellants' 
assertions of bias and conflict on the part of one of the county commissioners, 
the record shows that the appellants did not raise this objection before the 
Board considered the application. Although members of administrative bodies must 
be fair and impartial, Board of Trustees, 
Laramie County School District No. 1 v. Spiegel, Wyo., 549 P.2d 1161 (1976); 
Fallon v. Wyoming State Board of Medical 
Examiners, Wyo., 441 P.2d 322 (1968), the party claiming bias, prejudice or 
possible conflicting interest must raise these complaints prior to the agency's 
consideration of the dispute. Thus, even though we held in Lake De Smet Reservoir Company v. 
Kaufmann, 75 Wyo. 87, 292 P.2d 482, 485 (1956), that an administrative 
official who finds himself interested either directly or indirectly in a dispute 
is under an obligation to remove himself, we qualify that by requiring the party 
who feels aggrieved to lodge his or her objection when knowledge of facts 
indicating bias, prejudice or conflict of interest arise. See: 3 Davis, 
Administrative Law Treatise, § 19.10, p. 405 (2d ed. 1980). Such a requirement 
is no more restrictive than that which we require with respect to challenges of 
judges pursuant to Rule 40.1(b)(2), W.R.C.P. In addition, appellants have failed 
to show how the alleged bias or interest of the commissioner in any way affected 
the outcome of the dispute or denied them a right to a fair hearing. Absent such 
a showing, we will not reverse. State 
Board of Education v. Barber, supra.

[¶19.]  We therefore reject all of appellants' 
claims and affirm the order of the district court which, in turn, affirmed the 
actions of the Board of County Commissioners of Teton 
County.

[¶20.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The applicable statutes 
by which the legislature has provided for establishing private roadways 
are:

"§ 24-9-101. Petition; 
hearing; appointment of viewers and appraisers, etc.

"Any person whose land 
shall be so situated that it has no outlet to, nor connection with a public 
road, may make application in writing to the board of county commissioners of 
his county at a regular session, for a private road leading from his premises to 
some convenient public road. Said applicant shall give at least thirty (30) days 
notice in writing to the owner or resident agent or occupant of all lands over 
which such private road is applied for, of the time of making such application 
to such board. If the owner of such land be a nonresident, and there be no 
resident agent upon which personal service can be had, then such notice may be 
published in some newspaper published in the county for three (3) weeks, the 
last publication shall be at least thirty (30) days before the hearing of said 
application, at which time all parties interested may appear and be heared [sic] 
by said board as to the necessity of said road, and all matters pertaining 
thereto. Upon the hearing of said application, whether the owner or others 
interested appear or not, if the said board shall find that the applicant has 
complied with the law, and that such private road is necessary, said board shall 
appoint three (3) disinterested freeholders and electors of the county, as 
viewers and appraisers, and shall cause an order to be issued directing them to 
meet on a day named in such order on the proposed road, and view and locate a 
private road according to the application therefor, and to assess damages to be 
sustained thereby, and if for any reason such viewers and appraisers are unable 
to meet at the time set by the board to view said proposed road, they may fix 
some other date, but shall be required to give notice in writing to the owner or 
resident agent or occupant of said lands over which said road is proposed to be 
laid of the time and place where such viewers will meet, at least ten (10) days 
before viewing such road, at which time and place all persons interested may 
appear and be heard by said viewers. Before entering upon their duties such 
viewers shall take and subscribe to an oath that they will faithfully and 
impartially perform their duties under their said appointment as viewers and 
appraisers. Such viewers shall then proceed to locate and mark out a private 
road in accordance with said application, not exceeding thirty (30) feet in 
width from a certain point on the premises of the applicant to some certain 
point on the public road, so as to do the least possible damage to the lands 
through which such private road is located, and they shall also at the same time 
assess the damages sustained by the owner or owners over which such road is to 
be established and make full and true returns, with a plat of such road to the 
board of county commissioners."

"§ 24-9-103. Report of 
viewers and appraisers; confirmation by commissioners; 
appeal.

"The viewers and 
appraisers so appointed, or a majority of them, shall make a report to the 
county commissioners at the next regular session, of the private road so located 
by them, and also the amount of damages, if any, assessed by them, and the 
person or persons entitled to such damages, and if the commissioners are 
satisfied that such report is just, and after payment by the applicant of all 
cost of locating such road, and the damages assessed by the viewers, the 
commissioners shall order such report to be confirmed and declare such road to 
be a private road, and the same shall be recorded as such. Any person aggrieved 
by the action of the board or as to the amount of damages awarded, may appeal to 
the district court at any time within thirty (30) days after said road is 
finally established by said board of county 
commissioners."

2 In 1977 the parcel had 
been subdivided into three separate tracts with one tract being held for each of 
the beneficiaries of the trust.

3 The transcript from the 
district court proceeding reflects that appellant's counsel attended a portion 
of the meeting but chose not to object.

4 In their brief, the 
appellants have requested us to overrule our recent decisions in McGuire v. McGuire, supra, and Walton v. Dana, Wyo., 609 P.2d 461 
(1980). A review of those decisions leads us to the conclusion that they reflect 
the correct rules of law, and we therefore decline the invitation to overrule 
them and consider the results reached therein to be controlling 
here.

5 We also find the 
appellants' argument to the effect that the proposed road cannot be 
characterized as a private road to be without merit. We pointed out in McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d  at 1288, 
that a "public road" is one that the public generally is privileged to use. 
Given this definition, the road in question cannot be regarded as anything but a 
private road, and the fact that it is to be used to access one of these small 
tracts does not take it out of the latter category.

6 Section 18-3-502, W.S. 
1977, provides:

"Each board of county 
commissioners shall meet at the county seat of their respective counties on the 
first Tuesday in each month or at such other times as may be designated by 
resolution of the board or when it is necessary to meet for the transaction of 
urgent county business."

ROONEY, Chief Justice, 
dissenting, with whom BROWN, Justice, joins.

[¶21.]  I dissent. In doing so, I can only direct 
attention to my dissents in McGuire v. 
McGuire, Wyo., 608 P.2d 1278 (1980), and in Walton v. Dana, Wyo., 609 P.2d 461 
(1980), in which Justice McClintock joined. It was there established that §§ 
24-9-101 through 24-9-103, W.S. 1977, were superseded by the Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and that such statutes would not pass constitutional muster 
even if they were viable. As there pointed out (at of 608 P.2d), the last word 
from the legislature, in 1977, relative to eminent domain, was specific and 
plain:

"`Any action or proceeding to acquire 
title to or any interest in real or personal property of another by 
condemnation, for any purpose 
whatsoever, shall be commenced and conducted in accordance with Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure.' (Emphasis supplied.) Section 1-26-405, W.S. 
1977."

[¶22.]  This action and proceeding was subject to 
the direction contained in § 1-26-405, W.S. 1977, but it was not conducted in 
accordance with the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.

[¶23.]  I would remand with direction to vacate 
both the order appealed from and the decision of the Board of County 
Commissioners without prejudice to institute proper proceedings under Rule 71.1, 
W.R.C.P., for the purpose of obtaining an alleged private way of 
necessity.