Case Title: CENTRAL CITY OPERA HOUSE ASSOCIATION v. Brown

Citation: 553 P.2d 64

Docket Number: C-810

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1976-08-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
553 P.2d 64 (1976) CENTRAL CITY OPERA HOUSE ASSOCIATION, a Colorado Corporation, Petitioner, v. Robert J. BROWN, Respondent. No. C-810. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. August 9, 1976. Hindry & Meyer, P. C., Charles H. Jacobs, Robert D. Showalter, William F. McGlone, Denver, for petitioner. Gould, Moch & Bernick, Richard J. Bernick, Denver, for respondent. GROVES, Justice. We granted certiorari to review the opinion of the Colorado Court of Appeals in Brown v. Central City Opera House Association, Colo.App., 542 P.2d 86. We affirm the court of appeals' opinion with some modification. The respondent, Brown, was employed by the petitioner, Central City Opera House Association (called the Association), for 22 years, during the last 18 of which he was the Association's general manager. In about September 1970 Brown ceased being general manager. The Association *65 made payments to him of $125 a month from September 30, 1970 through December 30, 1972, at which later time all payments stopped. Brown brought action against the Association, claiming that it was under contract to pay him $125 per month until his 75th birthday on October 5, 1987, or until his death, whichever first occurred. The plaintiff made the following allegation in his complaint: The evidence in the case consisted solely of the testimony of Brown and of four exhibits which were admitted into evidence.[1] Only one of these exhibits is material so far as this review is concerned. That exhibit was a letter to Brown by Myron D. Neusteter, who was president of the Association, which letter will be mentioned later. Under the testimony of Brown, he and Neusteter had lunch together in August of 1970. The record contains the following testimony of Brown as to the conversation at that luncheon: On redirect examination Brown testified that at the luncheon it was specified that the $125 monthly payments "were to go until I was 75 years of age." The letter from Neusteter to Brown was dated February 24, 1971. Its text read as follows: At the close of the plaintiff's case, the district court granted an oral motion of defendant for dismissal of the action. The transcript does not contain the motion as made by counsel for the defendant.[2] The ruling of the trial court was as follows: The court of appeals reversed for two reasons.[3] The first was that "the trial court erred in dismission the action merely because the complaint referred to a pension, while the evidence supported a contract for a consultant's fee." The second basis was stated as follows: We concur with the conclusion of the court of appeals that the district court erred in dismissing the action merely because the complaint referred to a pension. *67 If at the close of the plaintiff's case the court found that by a preponderance of the evidence it had been established that there was a valid contract by the Association to pay Brown $125 a month until his 75th birthday or his death, whichever first occurred, then the motion to dismiss should have been denied. There was no objection to Brown's testimony as to the alleged contract and, if the court had concluded that Brown should prevail under the evidence, the fact that the complaint mentioned a pension would not in itself justify a dismissal. C.R.C.P. 15(b); Hinsey v. Jones, 159 Colo. 326, 411 P.2d 242 (1966). We do not concur with the court of appeals which, citing Kvols v. Lonsdale, 164 Colo. 125, 433 P.2d 330 (1967), ruled that the proper test is whether the plaintiff produced some evidence which, when taken most favorably to him, proved a claim upon which relief could be granted. In Teodonno v. Bachman, 158 Colo. 1, 404 P.2d 284 (1965), quoted in Kvols v. Lonsdale, supra, it was stated: Here, ordinarily upon a motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiff's case in a trial to the court, the court in accordance with Kvols should rule as to whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to recover under all of the evidence. Except for the matters mentioned below, we would hold that the dismissal of the district court should be affirmed. It is to be noted that the trial court appeared to predicate its ruling upon its failure to find any discussion about pension. While it mentioned that the complaint had pleaded an agreement to pay $125 per month, its order is entirely devoid of any mention of evidence or lack of evidence relating to a contract to pay a monthly sum. In such a situation, Kvols, cited by the court of appeals, does come into play. There in a trial to the court, at the close of the plaintiff's case, the trial court dismissed his claim upon the erroneous assumption that there was no evidence of any agreement between the parties. This court found that the record disclosed that there was evidence of an agreement and ruled that the trial court erred in its dismissal on the ground that there was no evidence. We are not concerned about the fact that defendant's counsel apparently misstated the ground for the motion of dismissal as being failure to prove a prima facie case; nor are we concerned about the district court's mention that there was granted the motion for dismissal "for failure of plaintiff to make a prima facie case." If the district court had considered the evidence in the light of whether or not the plaintiff should recover under a contract for the payment of money (irrespective of whether it might be called a pension), and if it found that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case, it follows that the court of necessity was ruling that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the evidence. We are concerned, however, with the fact that, so far as appears from the district court's ruling, it did not consider whether or not there was a valid contract by the defendant to pay the plaintiff and *68 whether that contract remained in effect after December 30, 1972. For this reason the court of appeals was correct in its determination that the district court should be reversed. We do not accept the Association's argument that the trial court's words above quoted, "based upon the record as made," cures any defect in the ruling. In oral argument counsel for the Association stated that, if we did reverse, the district judge should "take up the case where it left off." We have an abiding conviction that there would be a fundamental unfairness so to treat this in the trial court. We conclude that there should be an entire new trial in this matter. The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed as modified by this opinion. The cause is returned to it for remand to the district court with directions for an entire new trial consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. LEE and ERICKSON, JJ., do not participate. [1] At the commencement of trial defense counsel had a number of other exhibits marked for identification. These included excerpts from the minutes of the Executive Committee of the Association, some of which related to the arrangement with Brown. However, these were not offered nor received in evidence. [2] The record states, "defendant's motion for dismissal of plaintiff's claim and argument of counsel for plaintiff and defendant not contained herein at the direction of counsel." [3] The statute of frauds was not pleaded and there is no mention thereof in the record, briefs, argument, court of appeals or, except this sentence, in this opinion.