Case Title: In re Judge Harkin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 45S00-1106-JD-390

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2011-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR HON. 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR THE COMMISSION  
JEFFREY A. HARKIN 
 
 
 
 
 
ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS  
 
David W. Weigle  
 
 
 
 
 
Adrienne L. Meiring 
Hammond, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
 
_________________________________ 
 
No. 45S00-1106-JD-390 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE HONORABLE 
JEFFREY A. HARKIN, JUDGE 
OF THE HAMMOND CITY COURT 
 
_________________________________ 
  
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY ACTION 
_________________________________ 
 
December 20, 2011 
 
Per Curiam. 
 
This matter comes before the Court as a result of a judicial disciplinary action brought by 
the Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications (“Commission”) against the Respondent, 
Jeffrey A. Harkin, Judge of the Hammond City Court.  Article 7 Section 4 of the Indiana 
Constitution and Indiana Admission and Discipline Rule 25 give the Indiana Supreme Court 
original jurisdiction over this matter. 
Subsequent to the Commission’s filing of formal charges, the parties jointly tendered a 
“Statement of Circumstances and Conditional Agreement for Discipline,” which the Court 
accepted by order on November 17, 2011.  The parties have stipulated to the following facts. 
 
 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Dec 20 2011, 1:27 pm
 
 
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Unauthorized Traffic Infraction Deferral Program 
The jurisdiction of the Hammond City Court includes traffic infraction cases.  From 2005 
until March 8, 2011, traffic infraction litigants in the Hammond City Court who otherwise had 
good driving records were given the following options to resolve their cases:  (a) enter into a 
deferral agreement with the prosecutor; (b) admit liability and pay the face value of the ticket; 
(c) attend the Hammond City Court Traffic School (“Traffic School”); or (d) contest the ticket 
and proceed to trial.  Traffic infraction litigants in the Hammond City Court learned of their 
options from court staff who, prior to each court session, would screen the litigants for eligibility 
in the Traffic School program and/or the prosecutor’s deferral agreement program and then 
inform eligible litigants of their options. 
Participants in the prosecutorial deferral agreement program were statutorily required to 
enter into a written agreement with the prosecutor and pay various fees.  See Indiana Code § 34-
28-5-1(h) (West 2011).  For moving-violation traffic infraction litigants, the total fee in 2010 for 
the prosecutor’s deferral program was $191.50.  The fee for attending the Traffic School, 
however, was considerably less – $75 from July 2005 through December 2009 and $100 
thereafter – with the fee apportioned between the Northwest Indiana Traffic School (which 
administered the Traffic School) and the City of Hammond (for rental of meeting space).  The 
Traffic School program was a court program – the Lake County Prosecutor’s Office did not 
participate in the screening process, did not enter into written deferral agreements with litigants 
who chose Traffic School, and did not move for dismissal of the cases of litigants who attended 
Traffic School.1   
Not surprisingly, most eligible traffic infraction litigants chose the less expensive Traffic 
School option.  After selecting that option, court staff provided the litigant with an information 
sheet explaining when and where to attend Traffic School and the fee for the program.  The sheet 
also explained that if the litigant successfully completed the Traffic School class, then no points 
would be assessed against the litigant’s driver’s license and the infraction case would be 
dismissed; however, if the litigant failed to attend the class, then the court would enter default 
judgment against the litigant on each count plus court costs, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles would 
                                                 
1 The Traffic School was a lucrative program as well.  In 2010 alone, it generated $320,000 in fees, 
$192,000 of which went to the City of Hammond. 
 
 
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be notified, and points would be assessed against the litigant’s driving license.  After litigants 
voiced their selection of the Traffic School option and received the Traffic School information 
sheet, court staff told the litigants they were free to leave.  The litigants did not go before the 
judge nor enter into any written agreement with the prosecutor.  Instead, court staff would stamp 
onto the chronological case summary, “Defendant appears and pleads guilty.  Defendant 
sentenced to the Hammond City Court Traffic School.  Case to be dismissed upon completion of 
Traffic School.”  Respondent was aware and approved of the information his staff conveyed and 
the procedures utilized concerning the Traffic School program. 
From 2005 through March 8, 2011, Respondent dismissed the traffic infraction cases of 
all litigants who attended the Traffic School and paid the applicable fee, and entered default 
judgment, imposed fines and court costs, and ordered the suspension of driver’s licenses of all 
litigants who selected Traffic School but failed to complete the class.  He did so, however, 
without any legal authority to do so.  Only the prosecuting attorney had authority to establish a 
deferral program for traffic infractions.  See Ind. Code § 34-28-5-1(h).  No statute, Supreme 
Court rule, or other legal precedent authorized Respondent either to establish a traffic infraction 
deferral program or to discharge traffic infraction cases without a specific request from the 
prosecuting attorney. 
Beginning in 2006, and then again in 2007, 2008, and 2010, the State Board of Accounts 
(“SBOA”) issued audit reports indicating that the resolution of traffic infraction cases through 
the Traffic School did not comply with Indiana Code section 34-28-5-5, which pertains to the 
payment and depositing of court costs.  On at least one occasion, Respondent met with a SBOA 
representative to discuss the issue and express his disagreement with the SBOA’s interpretation 
of Indiana Code section 34-28-5-5.  He did not, however, seek a second opinion from the Indiana 
Judicial Center or any other judicial resource about whether the Traffic School program was, in 
fact, violating state law. 
On July 26, 2010, Respondent met with executives from the Lake County Prosecutor’s 
Office.  During the meeting, the Lake County Chief Trial Deputy informed Respondent that the 
Traffic Court program did not comply with Indiana Code section 34-28-5-1(h) and was not 
otherwise authorized by law, and the other executives voiced their objections to Respondent’s 
 
 
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continued use of the Traffic School program.  Respondent, however, continued to offer the 
Traffic School program to eligible litigants for seven more months.  He discontinued doing so 
only after the Commission’s counsel, on March 8, 2011, informed him of the Commission’s 
belief that Respondent was abusing his authority by diverting litigants’ cases through a de facto 
deferral program that was not authorized by the county prosecutor. 
The Respondent and the Commission agree that by referring traffic infraction litigants to 
the Traffic School and then dismissing their cases upon their completion of the program without 
any dismissal request from the prosecutor, Respondent abused his judicial authority, committed 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct’s 
provisions that required him:  to “comply with the law,” Ind. Judicial Conduct Rule 1.1 (West 
2011) (asterisk deleted); to “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
integrity, independence, and impartiality of the judiciary,” Jud. Cond. R. 1.2 (asterisks deleted); 
to “uphold and apply the law,” Jud. Cond. R. 2.2; and to “perform judicial and administrative 
duties competently,” Jud. Cond. R. 2.5.  The parties also agree, in mitigation of these violations, 
that the Hammond City Court had been referring litigants to Traffic School for decades, and 
previous judges of that court had not been notified of any concerns about the legality of the 
program from the Lake County Prosecutor’s Office, the SBOA, or any other entity.  Further, 
deputy prosecutors assigned to the Hammond City Court were aware of the court’s Traffic 
School program and practice but did not voice any objections to it until the meeting on July 26, 
2010.  Finally, Respondent has taken measures to address some of the personal issues that may 
have accounted, in part, for his lack of thoroughness in investigating the concerns brought to his 
attention about the legality of his court’s Traffic School program when they were raised with 
him. 
State v. Aubrey 
On August 18, 2010, Matthew Aubrey was scheduled to appear before Respondent in 
case number 45H04-1006-IF-14765 for an alleged seatbelt violation.  When Aubrey’s case was 
called, the following exchange took place: 
Respondent: Mr. Aubrey – Seatbelt violation.  Admit or deny? 
 
 
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Aubrey: 
I deny.  I have some paperwork though to back me up. 
Respondent: Well . . . Let me ask you something.  Was it under your arm? 
Aubrey: 
Yes. 
Respondent: Do you have a medical excuse for that from a medical doctor? 
Aubrey: 
No. 
Respondent: Then you have no paperwork to convince me of anything. 
Aubrey: 
Well, under law that I was . . . uh 
Respondent: Are you a lawyer? 
Aubrey: 
No. 
Respondent: Ok. Good. Don’t hurt yourself. 
Aubrey: 
It’s just that under 9-19-10-2.  Uhh . . .  “Each occupant of a motor vehicle 
equipped with a safety belt shall have a seat belt properly fastened.”  It 
does not say what properly is.  The same thing in the driver’s manual – 
page 75.  “Indiana law requires that a driver and all passengers to [sic] use 
seat belts at all times when the vehicle is in operation.  Operators of busses 
[sic] are also required to use seat belts.” 
Respondent: Is this an accurate description of your vehicle?  That it’s an ’05 vehicle? 
Aubrey: 
Yes. 
Respondent: Okay.  I believe that the automotive industry, since well before 2005, has 
installed seat belts that include a shoulder harness. 
Aubrey: 
Yes. 
Respondent: There you go. 
 
 
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Aubrey: 
Well, how are you supposed to know if nobody’s ever told you? 
Respondent: I’ll tell you what – let’s have a trial on this, okay?  Then it gets about 10 
times as expensive.  October 6. 
Aubrey: 
Uh . . . 
Respondent: Do you admit the seatbelt violation? 
Aubrey: 
I do. 
Respondent: Alright.  $25.  Step around and get a to-pay card. 
The parties agree that Respondent’s statements made during the hearing in 45H04-1006-
IF-14765, as quoted above, violated the Code of Judicial Conduct’s provisions that required him: 
to “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, 
and impartiality of the judiciary,” Jud. Cond. R. 1.2 (asterisks deleted); to “perform all duties of 
judicial office fairly and impartially,” Jud. Cond. R. 2.2; to refrain from “act[ing] in a manner 
that coerces any party into settlement,” Jud. Cond. R. 2.6(B); and to “be patient, dignified, and 
courteous to litigants,” Jud. Cond. R. 2.8(B).  See also In re Young, 943 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind. 
2011) (imposing discipline where judge threatened to, and did, impose increased penalties for 
traffic infraction litigants who exercised their right to trial instead of pleading guilty, so as to 
penalize them for doing so and to discourage others from doing so). 
Sanction 
The parties agree that the appropriate sanction for Respondent’s misconduct is 
suspension without pay for sixty (60) days.  The Court agrees with the parties that under the 
circumstances of this case, the disposition they propose is an appropriate result.  As we stated 
recently in another matter, “A suspension from office without pay, regardless of duration, is not a 
minor sanction.  Even more than a public reprimand, any such suspension is a significant 
blemish on a sitting judge's reputation.”  Matter of Hawkins, 902 N.E.2d 231, 246 (Ind. 2009). 
Accordingly, Respondent, Jeffrey A. Harkin, Judge of Hammond City Court, is hereby 
suspended from office without pay for a period of sixty (60) days, commencing at 5:00 p.m. CST 
 
 
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on Tuesday, December 27, 2011.  The suspension shall terminate and the judge shall 
automatically be reinstated to office at 5:00 p.m. CST on Saturday, February 25, 2012.   
This discipline terminates the disciplinary proceedings relating to the circumstances 
giving rise to this cause. The costs of this proceeding, if any, are assessed against the 
Respondent. 
 
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, J., SULLIVAN, J., RUCKER, J., and DAVID, J., concur.