Case Title: State v. Walston

Citation: 

Docket Number: 392PA13

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. COA 12-1299 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 6 August 2013 
 
 
RIGGINGS HOMEOWNERS, INC. 
      Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
New Hanover County 
No. 09 CVS 2761 
COASTAL RESOURCES COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, 
      Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by respondent and cross-appeal by petitioner from 
order entered 1 June 2012 by Judge Jay D. Hockenbury in New 
Hanover County Superior Court.  Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 
April 2013. 
 
Shipman & Wright, L.L.P., by William G. Wright and Gary K. 
Shipman, for petitioner-appellee/cross-appellant. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
Christine A. Goebel and Special Deputy Attorney General 
Marc Bernstein, for respondent-appellant/cross-appellee. 
 
 
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge. 
 
 
The North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission 
(the 
“Commission”) appeals a trial court order: (i) reversing the 
Commission’s denial of a variance request; and (ii) remanding 
the case to the Commission for 
new hearing.  Riggings 
Homeowners, Inc. cross-appeals, alleging: (i) the trial court 
-2- 
erred in concluding the Commission did not need to make a 
“reasonable use” determination; (ii) the Commission’s variance 
denial violated the takings doctrine; and (iii) the Commission’s 
variance denial violated the separation of powers doctrine.   
Upon review, we affirm. 
I. Facts & Procedural History 
 
 Riggings Homeowners, Inc. (“The Riggings”) manages a 
homeowners’ 
association 
(a 
North 
Carolina 
non-profit 
corporation) in Kure Beach.  The Riggings operates forty-eight 
condo units located in four buildings facing the Atlantic Ocean.  
The condos were built in 1985. 
 
Immediately south of The Riggings is Fort Fisher, a North 
Carolina state park.  From July 1995 to January 1996, the State 
built a permanent stone revetment1 to protect Fort Fisher from 
erosion.  Although the Coastal Area Management Act (“CAMA”) 
generally does not allow permanent revetments, the Commission 
allowed this revetment under the historic sites exception.  
 
Immediately north of The Riggings is the Fort Fisher 
Coquina Outcrop Natural Area.  Coquina rock formations provide a 
natural barrier against beach erosion.  In 1926, the New Hanover 
County Board of County Commissioners allowed a government 
                     
1 A “revetment” is “a facing of stone, concrete, fascines, or 
other material to sustain an embankment.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 1944 (1971).  When used for coastal 
protection, revetments prevent sand erosion. 
-3- 
contractor to use the coquina rock to complete a section of U.S. 
Highway 421.  The contractor removed a 50-100 foot strip of 
coquina rock near The Riggings.  On 6 February 1982, the Fort 
Fisher Coquina Outcrop Natural Area was entered on the North 
Carolina Registry of Natural Heritage Areas.  
 
These two state actions have made The Riggings’ beachfront 
especially prone to erosion.  First, the removal of the coquina 
rock in 1926 took away a natural barrier to erosion.  Second, 
the construction of the stone revetment at Fort Fisher protected 
the beachfront there but at The Riggings’ beachfront increased 
erosion rates.  This combination of state action makes The 
Riggings’ beachfront sui generis.   
 
In 1985, Kure Beach’s local CAMA officer issued a permit 
allowing The Riggings to place a sandbag revetment on its 
beachfront because the condos were “imminently threatened” by 
erosion.2  On 3 December 1994, the Division of Coastal Management 
(“DCM”)3 issued CAMA General Permit No. 13355-D, authorizing 
repair of the 1985 sandbags and placement of new sandbags.  
Permit No. 13355-D allowed the sandbags to remain in place until 
                     
2 15A N.C.A.C. 7H.0308(a)(2)(b) allows temporary erosion control 
structures when buildings are “imminently threated” by being 
less than 20 feet from an erosion scarp.   
 
3 In 1992, the DCM took responsibility for the issuance of CAMA 
permits.  
-4- 
1 May 2000.  After 1 May 2000, The Riggings was precluded from 
maintaining the sandbags without a variance.4 
 
From 2000 to 2005, The Riggings applied for and received 
three variances to maintain the sandbags: (i) on 26 May 2000, 
the Commission granted a variance allowing the sandbags to 
remain in place until 26 May 2001; (ii) on 4 February 2002, the 
Commission granted another variance, allowing the sandbags to 
remain in place until 23 May 2003; (iii) on 9 May 2003, a new 
variance allowed the sandbags to remain in place until 9 May 
2005.  Meanwhile, The Riggings pursued several permanent erosion 
solutions. 
 
One potential solution was beach renourishment.  In 2000, 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers undertook the Carolina/Kure 
Beach Renourishment Project.  This project covered 98% of Kure 
Beach, but stopped 1,500 feet short of The Riggings’ beachfront.  
The Riggings was unsuccessful in efforts to convince the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers to extend the renourishment project to 
The Riggings’ beachfront.  In a 25 February 2000 letter to U.S. 
Representative Mike McIntyre, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
explained that it could not extend the renourishment project to 
The 
Riggings’ 
beachfront 
because 
the 
“[coquina] 
rock 
outcropping[s] [have] been declared a natural heritage area by 
                     
4 15A N.C.A.C. 7H.1705(a)(14) only allows “imminently threatened” 
buildings to seek one permit. 
-5- 
the North Carolina Natural Heritage Program and burying them was 
not an acceptable alternative.”  A second Carolina/Kure Beach 
Renourishment Project in 2007 renourished 98% of Kure Beach, but 
again stopped 1,500 feet short of The Riggings’ beachfront.  
 
 Concurrently, The Riggings explored rebuilding its condos 
across the street on the landward side of U.S. Highway 421.  The 
Riggings contacted the North Carolina Division of Emergency 
Management (“NCDEM”), the Natural Heritage Trust Fund, and the 
DCM for financial assistance with this venture.  It requested 
that the Town of Kure Beach assist by seeking FEMA grants to 
relocate these buildings.  
 
In July 2004, the Town of Kure Beach received a FEMA pre-
disaster grant for a $3,617,624 project to: (i) acquire The 
Riggings’ beachfront real estate; and (ii) rebuild The Riggings 
on the landward side of U.S. Highway 421.  FEMA agreed to 
provide $2,713,218 (75% of the costs), but required The 
Riggings’ homeowners to contribute the remaining $904,406 (25% 
of the costs).  This grant, by its terms, would expire on 30 
June 2007. 
 
By 
March 
2005, 
The 
Riggings 
had 
hired 
architects, 
surveyors, and other contractors to finalize plans to relocate 
the buildings to U.S. Highway 421’s landward side.  On 25 April 
2005, the Commission granted The Riggings another variance to 
-6- 
allow the sandbags to remain in place “until the FEMA grant 
expires in June, 2007.”  The variance order also stated, 
“Petitioner shall be responsible for removal of the sandbags 
prior to expiration of the FEMA grant.”  
 
The Riggings approached its homeowners to discuss funding 
the remaining $904,406 for the project.  On 1 May 2006, the 
President of The Riggings’ homeowners’ association notified the 
Mayor of Kure Beach that The Riggings’ homeowners voted to 
reject the FEMA grant.  The homeowners cited several reasons for 
this decision: (i) some homeowners could not contribute the 
required capital; (ii) the grant did not guarantee that future 
permitted uses for the oceanfront real estate would not change; 
and (iii) the holders of some homeowners’ mortgages did not 
consent to the project.  
 
As a result, on 17 May 2006 the Mayor of Kure Beach 
requested that NCDEM terminate the FEMA grant.  On 20 June 2006 
a NCDEM officer notified the DCM that the FEMA grant was 
terminated.  On 10 July 2006, a DCM district manager notified 
The Riggings that it had 30 days to remove the sandbags.  
 
However, The Riggings did not comply.  On 15 August 2006, 
the DCM sent The Riggings a Notice of Violation, requiring 
removal of all sandbags.  On 18 September 2006, the DCM sent The 
Riggings a Notice of Continuing Violation. 
-7- 
 
Meanwhile, on 22 August 2006, The Riggings applied for a 
new variance under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-120.1 and 15A N.C.A.C. 
7J.0700 while it pursued a new beach renourishment project (the 
“Habitat Enhancement Project”).  The relevant statute states 
that: 
(a) Any person may petition the Commission 
for a variance granting permission to use 
the person’s land in a manner otherwise 
prohibited by rules or standards prescribed 
by the Commission, or orders issued by the 
Commission, pursuant to this Article. To 
qualify for a variance, the petitioner must 
show all of the following: 
 
(1) Unnecessary hardships would result from 
strict application of the rules, standards, 
or orders. 
 
(2) The hardships result from conditions 
that are peculiar to the property, such as 
the location, size, or topography of the 
property. 
 
(3) The hardships did not result from 
actions taken by the petitioner. 
 
(4) The requested variance is consistent 
with the spirit, purpose, and intent of the 
rules, standards, or orders; will secure 
public safety and welfare; and will preserve 
substantial justice. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-120.1(a) (2011). 
 
 
On 17 January 2008, the Commission heard the variance 
request.  On 31 January 2008, the Commission entered an order 
denying the request because The Riggings did not prove: (i) that 
denial of a variance would result in “unreasonable hardship;” 
-8- 
(ii) that any hardship “result[ed] from conditions peculiar to 
[its] property;” (iii) that any hardship was not the result of 
its actions; and (iv) that its request is “within the spirit, 
purpose, and intent of the Commission’s rules.”  
 
On 7 March 2008, The Riggings timely filed a petition for 
judicial review in New Hanover County Superior Court.  The trial 
court issued a writ of certiorari and heard the case during its 
5 January 2009 Civil, Non-Jury Session.  On 20 February 2009, 
the trial court: (i) reversed the Commission’s denial of the 
variance; and (ii) remanded the case to the Commission to apply 
an “unnecessary hardships” standard instead of an “unreasonable 
hardship” standard.  
 
On 29 April 2009, the Commission reheard the case.  On 21 
May 2009, it denied The Riggings’ variance request under the 
“unnecessary hardships” standard.  On 17 June 2009, The Riggings 
timely filed a petition for judicial review in New Hanover 
County Superior Court.  The trial court heard the case during 
its 12 March and 13 March 2012 Civil, Non-Jury Sessions. 
 
On 1 June 2012, the trial court reversed the Commission’s 
variance denial because it determined the Commission erred by: 
(i) concluding The Riggings did not demonstrate unnecessary 
hardship; and (ii) concluding the variance is not “consistent 
with the spirit, purpose, and intent of the rules.”  The trial 
-9- 
court also determined: (i) the Commission did not need to make 
factual findings or legal conclusions as to the impact of the 
variance denial on The Riggings’ ability to make reasonable use 
of its property; (ii) the Commission’s actions did not violate 
the takings doctrine; and (iii) the Commission’s actions did not 
violate the separation of powers doctrine.  
 
On 27 June 2012, the Commission filed timely notice of 
appeal to this Court.  On 29 June 2012, The Riggings filed 
timely notice of cross-appeal. 
II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the instant case 
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §7A-27(b) (2011) and N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 150B-52 (2011). 
 
The Administrative Procedure Act provides the standard of 
review for agency decisions: 
(b) The court reviewing a final decision may 
affirm the decision or remand the case for 
further proceedings. It may also reverse or 
modify 
the 
decision 
if 
the 
substantial 
rights of the petitioners may have been 
prejudiced because the findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions are: 
 
(1) 
In 
violation 
of 
constitutional 
provisions; 
 
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or 
jurisdiction of the agency or administrative 
law judge; 
 
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; 
-10- 
 
(4) Affected by other error of law; 
 
(5) 
Unsupported 
by 
substantial 
evidence 
admissible under G.S. 150B-29(a), 150B-30, 
or 150B-31 in view of the entire record as 
submitted; or 
 
(6) Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. 
 
(c) In reviewing a final decision in a 
contested case, the court shall determine 
whether the petitioner is entitled to the 
relief sought in the petition based upon its 
review 
of 
the 
final 
decision 
and 
the 
official record. With regard to asserted 
errors pursuant to subdivisions (1) through 
(4) of subsection (b) of this section, the 
court shall conduct its review of the final 
decision using the de novo standard of 
review. 
With 
regard 
to 
asserted 
errors 
pursuant to subdivisions (5) and (6) of 
subsection (b) of this section, the court 
shall conduct its review of the final 
decision using the whole record standard of 
review. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-51 (2011).  Overall, “[a]n appellate 
court’s review proceeds in two steps: (1) examining whether the 
trial court applied the correct standard of review and (2) 
whether the trial court’s review was proper.”  City of 
Rockingham v. N.C. Dept. of Env’t and Natural Res., Div. of 
Water Quality, __ N.C. App. __, __, 736 S.E.2d 764, 767 (2012).  
The proper standard of review depends on the particular issues 
presented on appeal. 
 
To this effect, our Supreme Court clarifies that: 
-11- 
these grounds for reversal or modification 
of an agency’s final decision fall into two 
conceptual 
categories. 
The 
first 
four 
grounds 
for 
reversing 
or 
modifying 
an 
agency’s decision——that the decision was “in 
violation of constitutional provisions,” “in 
excess 
of 
the 
statutory 
authority 
or 
jurisdiction of the agency,” “made upon 
unlawful procedure,” or “affected by other 
error of law,”——may be characterized as 
“law-based” 
inquiries. 
The 
final 
two 
grounds——that the decision was “unsupported 
by substantial evidence . . . in view of the 
entire record” or “arbitrary or capricious,” 
——may 
be 
characterized 
as 
“fact-based” 
inquiries.  
 
N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 
659, 
599 
S.E.2d 
888, 
894 
(2004) 
(alteration 
in 
original)(internal citation omitted). 
 
 
“Thus, where the gravamen of an assigned error is that the 
agency violated subsections 150B–51(b)(1), (2), (3), or (4) of 
the APA, a court engages in de novo review.”  Id. at 659, 599 
S.E.2d at 895.  “Under a de novo review, the court considers the 
matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of 
the Commission.” Greens of Pine Glen Ltd., 356 N.C. at 647, 576 
S.E.2d at 319 (internal citations omitted). 
 
On the other hand, when the issue is whether (i) an 
agency’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence; 
or 
(ii) 
whether 
an 
agency’s 
decision 
is 
arbitrary 
and 
capricious, we apply the “whole record” test.  See Carroll, 358 
N.C. at 659, 599 S.E.2d at 894.  “When the trial court applies 
-12- 
the whole record test, . . . it may not substitute its judgment 
for the agency’s as between two conflicting views, even though 
it could reasonably have reached a different result had it 
reviewed the matter de novo.”  Id. at 660, 599 S.E.2d at 895 
(quotation marks and citation omitted).  “Rather, a court must 
examine all the record evidence——that which detracts from the 
agency’s findings and conclusions as well as that which tends to 
support them——to determine whether there is substantial evidence 
to justify the agency’s decision.”  Watkins v. N.C. State Bd. of 
Dental Examiners, 358 N.C. 190, 199, 593 S.E.2d 764, 769 (2004).  
“Substantial evidence” is “relevant evidence a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 150B–2(8c) (2011). 
 
Here, the trial court appropriately applied de novo review 
to the Commission’s first variance factor determination.  There, 
the only issue was whether The Riggings suffered “unnecessary 
hardships” as a matter of law.  See Carroll, 358 N.C. at 659, 
599 S.E.2d at 894 (“It is well settled that in cases appealed 
from administrative tribunals, [q]uestions of law receive de 
novo review.” (alteration in original) (quotation marks and 
citation omitted)).   
 
In its review of the Commission’s fourth variance factor 
determination, the trial court noted that the Commission’s order 
-13- 
“comingles in the Conclusions of Law, many Findings of Fact that 
should not be included within the Conclusions of Law section.”  
Consequently, in its fourth variance factor analysis the trial 
court appropriately applied: (i) the whole record test to 
determine whether the facts were supported by substantial 
evidence; and (ii) de novo review to the Commission’s legal 
determinations under CAMA’s statutory framework.  On appeal, we 
apply the same standard of review. 
III. Analysis 
 
On appeal, the Commission argues the trial court erred by 
determining 
The 
Riggings 
satisfied 
the 
first 
and 
fourth 
statutory variance factors.  On cross-appeal, The Riggings 
argues: (i) the trial court erred in concluding the Commission 
did not need to make a “reasonable use” determination; (ii) the 
Commission’s actions violate the takings doctrine; and (iii) the 
Commission’s actions violate the separation of powers doctrine.  
Upon review, we affirm.   
A.  Commission’s Appeal 
 
Preliminarily, we discuss the regulatory framework behind 
the instant case.  The Commission’s rules only allow “imminently 
threatened” buildings like The Riggings to seek one permit for 
temporary sandbag structures.  See 15A N.C.A.C. 7H.1705(a)(14).  
After the permit’s expiration, “imminently threatened” buildings 
-14- 
must seek a variance to maintain temporary sandbag structures.  
CAMA clarifies that:  
(a) Any person may petition the Commission 
for a variance granting permission to use 
the person’s land in a manner otherwise 
prohibited by rules or standards prescribed 
by the Commission, or orders issued by the 
Commission, pursuant to this Article. To 
qualify for a variance, the petitioner must 
show all of the following: 
 
(1) Unnecessary hardships would result from 
strict application of the rules, standards, 
or orders. 
 
(2) The hardships result from conditions 
that are peculiar to the property, such as 
the location, size, or topography of the 
property. 
 
(3) The hardships did not result from 
actions taken by the petitioner. 
 
(4) The requested variance is consistent 
with the spirit, purpose, and intent of the 
rules, standards, or orders; will secure 
public safety and welfare; and will preserve 
substantial justice. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-120.1 (2011).   
 
In the instant case, The Riggings applied for a variance 
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-120.1.  The Commission held The 
Riggings satisfied the second and third variance factors, but 
not the first or fourth factors.  The trial court reversed the 
Commission’s first and fourth variance factor determinations, 
and the Commission appealed.  Upon review, we affirm the trial 
court’s decision. 
-15- 
1.  First Variance Factor 
 
The Commission argues the trial court erred in its first 
variance factor determination by: (i) holding the Commission’s 
statement that “erosion is stable” was prejudicial error; (ii) 
deciding the Commission improperly based its decision on the 
property-owner rather than the property; and (iii) misconstruing 
the phrase “unnecessary hardships.”  We find the Commission’s 
arguments unpersuasive. 
a. “Erosion is stable” 
 
The Commission first argues the trial court erred by 
holding the Commission’s statement that “erosion is stable” was 
prejudicial error.  We disagree.  
 
In its 21 May 2009 order, the Commission stated that 
“initially after construction of the Ft. Fisher revetment 
erosion increased at [The Riggings’] property, but now erosion 
is stable.”  It based this conclusion on the stipulated fact 
that after the stone revetment’s construction “the rate of 
erosion of the shoreline in front of The Riggings increased, but 
since then the rate of erosion has decreased.”  
 
In its 1 June 2012 order, the trial court determined the 
Commission’s statement was prejudicial error.  To support this 
holding, 
the 
trial 
court 
cited 
several 
stipulated 
facts 
indicating erosion still occurred.  For instance, the trial 
-16- 
court referenced Stipulated Fact No. 10, which stated “The 
Riggings has been threatened by erosion since 1985, and a 
sandbag revetment has been used to protect it since that time.”  
It also mentioned Stipulated Fact No. 18, which stated that 
“erosion of the shoreline in front of the Riggings increased 
[after the construction of the Fort Fisher revetment], but since 
then the rate of erosion has decreased.” 
 
Upon review, we believe any disagreement arises from mutual 
misunderstanding 
rather 
than 
disputed 
legal 
principles.  
Specifically, the Commission’s statement referenced the rate of 
erosion.  Under this interpretation, its statement is supported 
by the facts: the rate of erosion initially increased after the 
construction of the Fort Fisher revetment, but then stabilized.  
The trial court, on the other hand, interpreted the Commission’s 
statement to imply erosion no longer occurs.  It then cited 
competent evidence showing erosion still occurs.  
 
Based on this analysis, we affirm the trial court’s 
determination to the extent it reverses a statement that erosion 
no longer occurs.    
b. Property-Owner vs. Property 
 
Next, the Commission argues the trial court erred by 
holding the Commission improperly based its first variance 
-17- 
factor determination on the property-owner rather than the 
property.  We disagree. 
 
In its first variance factor analysis, the Commission may 
only consider its rules’ effect on the petitioner’s property, 
not the petitioner itself.  Williams v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t and 
Natural Res., 144 N.C. App. 479, 548 S.E.2d 793 (2001).  For 
instance, in Williams a landowner applied for a variance to 
build a “fast freezer” and storage unit on his property.  Id. at 
481–82, 548 S.E.2d at 795–96.  However, the proposed project 
would have damaged adjacent wetlands.   Id. at 488, 548 S.E.2d 
at 799.  Moreover, the petitioner owned other properties where 
he could complete the project without potential wetlands damage.  
Id.  In Williams, the Commission determined the petitioner did 
not prove “unnecessary hardships” because “alternatives for 
sitting and design of the proposed facility exist that would 
reduce or eliminate the wetlands impacts of the project.”  Id. 
at 482, 548 S.E.2d at 796.  The trial court reversed.  Id. 
 
On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court. Id. at 485, 
548 S.E.2d at 797–98.  We elaborated that: 
[w]hether strict application of the Coastal 
Area Management Act, (hereinafter “CAMA”), 
places an “unnecessary hardship” on a parcel 
of property, depends upon the unique nature 
of the property; not the landowner. If 
“hardship” stemmed from the situation of the 
landowner, then those persons owning less 
land would have an easier time showing 
-18- 
unnecessary hardship than those owning more 
than one parcel of land. Similarly situated 
persons would be treated differently, giving 
rise to equal protection of law issues.   
  
Id. at 485, 548 S.E.2d at 797. 
 
In the present case, the Commission appeals the trial 
court’s reversal of its first variance factor determination.  
Specifically, it argues any hardship The Riggings suffers is 
necessary due to the Commission’s prohibition of permanent 
erosion control structures.  Based on Williams, we affirm the 
trial court’s decision. 
 
In its 21 May 2009 order, the Commission described how The 
Riggings had maintained the sandbags since 1985, over the course 
of a permit and four variances.  Based on this length of time, 
the Commission then determined the sandbags had impermissibly 
become de facto permanent structures.  Given this conclusion, 
the Commission ultimately decided any hardship The Riggings now 
suffered was necessary to uphold the regulatory prohibition of 
permanent erosion control structures.  See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
113A-115.1(b) (2011); 15A N.C.A.C. 7M.0202(e). 
 
However, the Commission improperly focused its analysis on 
the property-owner rather than the property.  The Riggings’ 
previous permit and variances are immaterial to the Commission’s 
“unnecessary hardships” analysis.  See Williams, 144 N.C. App. 
at 485, 548 S.E.2d at 797–98.  As we held in Williams, “[i]f 
-19- 
‘hardship’ stemmed from the situation of the landowner” rather 
than the property itself, “[s]imilarly situated persons would be 
treated differently.”  Id. at 485, 548 S.E.2d at 797.  For 
instance, under the Commission’s logic someone who had not 
previously received variances but owned property identical to 
The Riggings’ property would receive different treatment.  Like 
in Williams, this would raise prima facie equal protection 
issues. 
 
Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s “unnecessary 
hardships” determination under Williams. 
c. “Unnecessary” Hardships 
 
Next, the Commission argues the trial court erred by 
determining “it is not possible to have hardships [under the 
second and third variance factors] but not unnecessary hardships 
[under the first variance factor].”  Upon review, we conclude 
any error was non-prejudicial. 
 
In its 21 May 2009 order, the Commission determined The 
Riggings suffered “hardships” under the second and third 
variance factors, but not “unnecessary hardships” under the 
first variance factor.  As discussed previously, the Commission 
based 
its 
“unnecessary 
hardships” 
determination 
on 
its 
prohibition 
against 
permanent 
erosion 
control 
structures.  
-20- 
However, the trial court determined “it is not possible to have 
hardships but not unnecessary hardships.”  
 
On appeal to this Court, the Commission contends the trial 
court’s determination would render the word 
“unnecessary” 
superfluous.  Thus, the Commission argues the trial court erred 
in its interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-120.1 (2011).  
See HCA Crossroads Residential Ctrs. v. N.C. Dep’t of Human 
Res., 327 N.C. 573, 578, 398 S.E.2d 466, 470 (1990) (“Such 
statutory construction is not permitted, because a statute must 
be construed, if possible, to give meaning and effect to all of 
its provisions.”).   
 
Since we affirm the trial court’s “unnecessary hardships” 
determination 
under 
Williams, 
any 
error 
the 
trial 
court 
committed by stating “it is not possible to have hardships but 
not unnecessary hardships” is non-prejudicial.  Rea v. Simowitz, 
226 N.C. 379, 383, 38 S.E.2d 194, 197 (1946) (“It is an 
established rule of appellate practice that the burden is on the 
appellant not only to show error but also to show that he was 
prejudiced.”).  Regardless of the trial court’s statement, The 
Riggings suffered “unnecessary hardships.”   
 
Consequently, we decline to further address this argument. 
2.  Fourth Variance Factor 
-21- 
 
The Commission next argues the trial court erred by holding 
The 
Riggings 
satisfied 
the 
fourth 
variance 
factor.5  
Specifically, The Riggings argues the trial court erred by: (i) 
failing 
to 
consider 
the 
Commission’s 
rules; 
and 
(ii) 
substituting its own judgment for that of the Commission.  Since 
both arguments concern the same variance factor, we consider 
them together.  Upon review, we affirm the result of the trial 
court’s decision. 
 
North Carolina’s Constitution recognizes the importance of 
our state’s coastal areas: 
It shall be the policy of this State to 
conserve and protect its lands and waters 
for the benefit of all its citizenry, and to 
this end it shall be a proper function of 
the State of North Carolina . . . to 
preserve as a part of the common heritage of 
this State its . . . beaches . . . and 
places of beauty. 
 
N.C. Const. art. XIV, § 5.  Accordingly, in 1974 our General 
Assembly adopted The Coastal Area Management Act because “an 
immediate and pressing need exists to establish a comprehensive 
plan for the protection, preservation, orderly development, and 
management of the coastal area of North Carolina.”   N.C. Gen. 
                     
5 The fourth variance factor states, “The requested variance is 
consistent with the spirit, purpose, and intent of the rules, 
standards, or orders; will secure public safety and welfare; and 
will preserve substantial justice.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-
120.1(a)(4) (2011).   
 
-22- 
Stat. § 113A-102(a) (2011).  CAMA has, inter alia, the following 
goal: 
(4) To establish policies, guidelines and 
standards for: 
 
a. 
Protection, 
preservation, 
and 
conservation of natural resources including 
but not limited to water use, scenic vistas, 
and fish and wildlife; and management of 
transitional or intensely developed areas 
and areas especially suited to intensive use 
or 
development, 
as 
well 
as 
areas 
of 
significant natural value; 
 
b. The economic development of the coastal 
area, 
including 
but 
not 
limited 
to 
construction, 
location 
and 
design 
of 
industries, 
port 
facilities, 
commercial 
establishments and other developments. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-102(b) (2011).  Thus, CAMA seeks to 
balance public interests with private property interests.  See 
id.   
 
To accomplish its goals, CAMA established the North 
Carolina Coastal Resources Commission.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-
104 (2011).  The Commission’s rules recognize its role in 
balancing private property interests with competing public 
interests: 
It is hereby declared that the general 
welfare and public interest require that 
development along the ocean and estuarine 
shorelines be conducted in a manner that 
avoids loss of life, property and amenities. 
It is also declared that protection of the 
recreational use of the shorelines of the 
state is in the public interest.  In order 
-23- 
to accomplish these public purposes, the 
planning of future land uses, reasonable 
rules and public expenditures should be 
created or accomplished in a coordinated 
manner so as to minimize the likelihood of 
damage 
to 
private 
and 
public 
resources 
resulting from recognized coastal hazards.     
 
15A N.C.A.C. 7M.0201.   
 
One way CAMA protects our coasts is by prohibiting the 
construction of “permanent erosion control structure[s] in an 
ocean shoreline.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-115.1(b) (2011).  
Additionally, CAMA prohibits “the construction of a temporary 
erosion control structure that consists of anything other than 
sandbags in an ocean shoreline.”  Id.  CAMA authorizes the 
Commission to regulate temporary sandbag structures.  Id. 
 
The 
Commission 
adopted 
several 
administrative 
rules 
regulating temporary sandbag structures.  See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
113A-115.1(b1) (2011).  For instance, 
[t]emporary measures to counteract erosion, 
such as the use of sandbags and beach 
pushing, should be allowed, but only to the 
extent necessary to protect property for a 
short 
period 
of 
time 
until 
threatened 
structures may be relocated or until the 
effects of a short-term erosion event are 
reversed. 
In 
all 
cases, 
temporary 
stabilization measures must be compatible 
with public use and enjoyment of the beach. 
 
15A N.C.A.C. 7M.0202(e); see also 15A N.C.A.C. 7H.1701, 15A 
N.C.A.C. 7H.1702.  The Commission’s rules further regulate 
-24- 
temporary 
sandbag 
structures 
as 
to: 
(i) 
situation; 
(ii) 
location; and (iii) time.  See 15A N.C.A.C. 7H.0308(a)(2). 
 
In the present case, the Commission argues the trial court 
erred by determining The Riggings satisfied the fourth variance 
factor.  We disagree.   
 
In its 21 May 2009 order, the Commission engaged in the 
following fourth variance factor analysis: 
The proposed variance is inconsistent with 
the spirit purpose, and intent of the 
[Commission’s] rules because sandbags are 
intended to be a temporary erosion control 
structure and this sandbag revetment has 
been in place for almost 24 years. . . .  
Additionally, the [Commission]  concludes as 
a matter of law that the situation with the 
sandbag revetment protecting [The Riggings’] 
structures does not secure public safety and 
welfare.  Depending on the variable nature 
of the beach profile sometimes the sandbags 
are buried and sometimes exposed, sometimes 
that public has to detour landward around 
the sandbags depending on the beach profile 
and the tide, and there has been at least 
one instance during this 24-year placement 
when holes in the sandbag revetment had to 
be filled with other sandbags. . . .  
Finally, allowing these sandbags to remain 
to protect [The Riggings’] structures over 
an even greater period of time will not 
preserve substantial justice because both 
the 
legislature 
and 
the 
[Commission’s] 
intent for the use of sandbags is as a 
temporary erosion control structure. 
 
The Commission based this determination on the “substantial 
evidence in the record.”  The trial court then reversed and 
remanded because it determined: (i) the Commission’s fourth 
-25- 
variance factor analysis is not supported by substantial 
evidence; and (ii) there is substantial evidence to grant the 
variance.  The Commission now contends the trial court erred 
because The Riggings’ variance request does not satisfy the 
fourth variance factor.  
 
To better analyze the Commission’s argument, we rely on 
several canons of statutory construction.  First, our Supreme 
Court describes how:  
[w]here there is one statute dealing with a 
subject in general and comprehensive terms, 
and another dealing with a part of the same 
subject in a more minute and definite way, 
the 
two 
should 
be 
read 
together 
and 
harmonized, if possible, with a view to 
giving effect to a consistent legislative 
policy; but, to the extent of any necessary 
repugnancy 
between 
them, 
the 
special 
statute, or the one dealing with the common 
subject matter in a minute way, will prevail 
over the general statute, according to the 
authorities 
on 
the 
question, 
unless 
it 
appears that the legislature intended to 
make the general act controlling[.] 
 
McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 631, 461 S.E.2d 745, 747 
(1995) (quotation marks and citation omitted)(emphasis added).  
Furthermore, “statutes in pari materia, and all parts thereof, 
should be construed together and compared with each other.”  In 
re Declaratory Ruling by N.C. Comm’r of Ins. Regarding 11 
N.C.A.C. 12.0319, 134 N.C. App. 22, 27, 517 S.E.2d 134, 139 
(1999).  “Such statutes should be reconciled with each other 
-26- 
when possible, and any irreconcilable ambiguity should be 
resolved so as to effectuate the true legislative intent.” State 
ex rel. Comm’r of Ins. v. N.C. Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 400, 
269 S.E.2d 547, 561 (1980).  Lastly, our Supreme Court expressly 
warns: 
an agency having authority to effectuate the 
policies of a particular statute may not 
effectuate such policies so singlemindedly 
that it wholly ignores other and equally 
important legislative objectives.  This is 
especially true in the case of agencies 
which have both accusatorial and judgmental 
powers. The potential for unfairness and 
abuse is obvious in a situation in which an 
administrative officer is vested with broad 
rulemaking 
powers, 
determining 
the 
admissibility and weight of evidence in 
hearings and making the final determination 
on the merits of an action. 
 
Id. at 409, 269 S.E.2d at 566.  
 
In light of this discussion, we now analyze whether the 
requested variance satisfies the fourth variance factor.   
 
CAMA establishes the Commission and expressly grants it the 
ability “to adopt rules to designate or protect areas of 
environmental concern, to govern the use of sandbags, or to 
govern the use of erosion control structures in estuarine 
shorelines.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 113A-104 and 113A-115.1(b1) 
(2011).  Thus, the Commission clearly has the authority to make 
determinations regarding temporary sandbag structures.  See id.  
However, we must analyze this statutory authority in the context 
-27- 
of CAMA’s other provisions.  See In re Declaratory Ruling, 134 
N.C. App. at 27, 517 S.E.2d at 139.  To this effect, both CAMA 
and the Commission’s own rules recognize a necessary balance 
between 
private 
property 
interests 
and 
competing 
public 
interests.  See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-102 (2011); 15A N.C.A.C. 
7M.0201.  Given this legislative intent, we recognize that the 
Commission’s fourth variance factor analysis will inherently 
contemplate some form of balancing. 
 
We acknowledge the logistical difficulties of balancing 
private property interests with competing public interests.  
Indeed, 
[i]t is important to reiterate that there 
can 
be 
no 
truly 
optimal 
environmental 
governance because resource management as 
well 
as 
public 
health 
and 
ecological 
protection involve to some degree measuring 
the 
unmeasurable 
and 
comparing 
the 
incomparable. Optimizing one set of virtues 
will often entail compromising on other 
values. Many environmental problems have at 
their core questions over which people do 
not——and need not——agree. At this level, the 
policy process is art, not science. 
 
Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1495, 1519 (1999).  However, administrative 
agencies like the Commission must engage in this type of 
balancing to promote fair governance: 
[T]he environmental policymaking process can 
be sharpened through improved governance. 
Indeed, a well-functioning regulatory system 
-28- 
will generate information and analysis to 
inform decisionmakers, isolate the value 
judgments that must be made, highlight the 
assumptions on which decisions might turn, 
and tee up the critical political questions 
for decision in a fair and unbiased way. By 
reducing the zone of technical uncertainty, 
better 
decisionmaking 
structures 
and 
procedures 
narrow 
the 
range 
of 
policy 
disputes. 
 
Id.  Otherwise, without guidance as to “the assumptions on which 
[variance] decisions might turn,” petitioners like The Riggings 
would be unable to make effective, informed variance requests.  
 
Based on this discussion, we interpret the Commission’s 
fourth variance factor analysis to implicitly balance The 
Riggings’ private property interest with 
competing public 
interests.  We construe the Commission’s balancing analysis as 
follows. 
 
First, the Commission recognized The Riggings’ private 
property interest: The Riggings has been threatened by erosion 
since 1985 and uses the sandbags to protect its condos against 
this erosion.  Next, the Commission balanced this private 
property interest with competing public interests. 
 
For instance, the Commission considered how the sandbags 
may at some point impermissibly become de facto permanent 
structures.  As a public policy determination, CAMA’s regulatory 
framework expressly prohibits permanent structures.  See N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 113A-115.1(b) (2011); 15A N.C.A.C. 7M.0202(e).  
-29- 
Furthermore, 
the 
Commission 
referenced 
aesthetic 
concerns 
because “sometimes the sandbags are . . . exposed.”  Lastly, the 
Commission described how “sometimes the public has to detour 
landward around the sandbags depending on the beach profile and 
the tide.  
 
Still, the Commission conceded that “even at high tide the 
public can get around the sandbags by going between the sandbags 
and The Riggings buildings closest to the ocean.”  Additionally, 
the Commission noted that “[a] former member of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers is on record as stating that [T]he Riggings 
sandbags have not had any deleterious effect on surrounding 
property nor have they come into contact with the Atlantic Ocean 
except during major storm events.” 
 
Given the Commission’s decision to deny the variance, it is 
clear the Commission’s order balanced these issues in favor of 
public 
interests. 
 
Since 
the 
trial 
court 
reversed 
the 
Commission, the trial court inherently balanced the competing 
interests differently.  As a question of law, we review these 
balancing determinations de novo.6  See Carroll, 358 N.C. at 659, 
                     
6 In her dissent, Judge Bryant contends both this Court and the 
trial court should have applied the whole record test, not de 
novo review, to examine the Commission’s fourth variance factor 
determination.  However, we do not dispute the Commission’s 
factual determinations.  See Carroll, 358 N.C. at 659, 599 
S.E.2d at 894 (“It is well settled that in cases appealed from 
administrative tribunals, . . . fact-intensive issues such as 
-30- 
599 S.E.2d at 895.  Upon review, we conclude The Riggings’ 
private 
property 
interest 
outweighs 
the 
public 
interests 
considered by the Commission.   
 
Here, The Riggings has a substantial private property 
interest.  If the sandbags are removed, the condos face 
potential destruction from erosion.  We now weigh this private 
property interest against the public interests considered by the 
Commission: (i) CAMA’s prohibition of permanent erosion control 
structures; (ii) aesthetic concerns; and (iii) public beach 
access.   
 
First, 
although 
CAMA’s 
framework 
prohibits 
permanent 
structures, the sandbags have not yet become de facto permanent 
structures.  We do not dispute the importance of CAMA’s 
prohibition against permanent erosion control structures.  See 
Pamlico Marine Co. v. N.C. Dep’t of Natural Res. & Cmty. Dev., 
80 N.C. App. 201, 206, 341 S.E.2d 108, 112 (1986) (“[A]n 
administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is 
to be given due deference by the courts unless it is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”).  However, in 
                                                                  
sufficiency of the evidence to support [an agency’s] decision 
are reviewed under the whole-record test.” (alteration in 
original)(quotation marks and citation omitted)).  Instead, we 
analyze as a matter of law whether the Commission appropriately 
balanced competing policy concerns under CAMA’s  statutory 
framework.  See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-51(b)(2) and (4) (2011)  
Consequently, we apply de novo review.  See Carroll, 358 N.C. at 
659, 599 S.E.2d at 894. 
-31- 
its latest variance petition, The Riggings proposed a new beach 
renourishment solution, the Habitat Enhancement Project.  If 
this solution is successful, The Riggings would no longer need 
the sandbags.  When The Riggings still seeks alternative erosion 
solutions, the Commission’s prohibition of permanent structures 
does not outweigh The Riggings’ private property interest. 
 
Second, we acknowledge the intrinsic natural beauty of our 
state’s coasts.  See N.C. Const. art. XIV, § 5.  However, this 
aesthetic importance does not override all competing interests.  
With 98% of Kure Beach renourished, the public has ample 
opportunity to enjoy nearby beaches.  The public’s interest in 
enjoying the aesthetics of The Riggings’ beachfront does not 
outweigh The Riggings’ private property interest. 
 
Lastly, we consider the public’s interest in beach access.  
Here, although the public may have to walk around the sandbags, 
the sandbags do not completely prohibit beach access.  Indeed, 
“even at high tide, the public can get around the sandbags by 
going between the sandbags and The Riggings buildings closest to 
the ocean.”  Furthermore, the Fort Fisher stone revetment blocks 
the public from proceeding beyond The Riggings’ beachfront.  
Thus, the public’s need to pass through The Riggings’ beachfront 
is minimal. 
-32- 
 
In sum, we believe The Riggings’ substantial private 
property interest outweighs the competing public interests 
considered by the Commission.  Consequently, we affirm the trial 
court’s reversal of the Commission’s fourth variance factor 
determination in result. 
B.  Petitioner’s Cross-Appeal 
 
On cross-appeal, The Riggings argues: (i) the trial court 
erred in concluding the Commission did not need to make factual 
findings regarding reasonable use of the property; (ii) the 
Commission’s actions violate the takings doctrine; and (iii) the 
Commission’s actions violate the separation of powers doctrine.  
Upon review, we affirm. 
1.  Reasonable Use 
 
The Riggings first argues the trial court erred by deciding 
the Commission did not need to make factual findings regarding 
the reasonable use of the property.  We disagree. 
 
The 
Riggings 
primarily 
relies 
on 
Williams 
for 
this 
argument.  In Williams, the petitioner appealed the Commission’s 
denial of his variance request.  144 N.C. App. at 481, 548 
S.E.2d at 795.  There, we determined the Commission erred in its 
first variance factor analysis because it failed to “make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the impact of the 
-33- 
act on the landowner’s ability to make a reasonable use of his 
property.”  Id. at 487, 548 S.E.2d at 798.   
 
However, in Williams we applied an older version of N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 113A-120.1 that stated: 
Any person may petition the Commission for a 
variance granting permission to use his land 
in a manner otherwise prohibited by rules, 
standards, or limitations prescribed by the 
Commission, 
or 
orders 
issued 
by 
the 
Commission, pursuant to this Article.  When 
it finds that (i) practical difficulties or 
unnecessary 
hardships 
would 
result 
from 
strict application of the guidelines, rules, 
standards or other restrictions applicable 
to the property [and makes other specific 
findings, a variance may be granted.] 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-120.1 (1989) (emphasis added).  Shortly 
after we decided Williams, our General Assembly amended N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 113A-120.1 to state: 
Any person may petition the Commission for a 
variance granting permission to use the 
person’s 
land 
in 
a 
manner 
otherwise 
prohibited by rules or standards prescribed 
the Commission, or orders issued by the 
Commission, pursuant to this Article.  To 
qualify for a variance, the petitioner must 
show all of the following: (1) Unnecessary 
hardships 
would 
result 
from 
strict 
application of the rules, standards, or 
orders. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-120.1(a) (2011) (emphasis added).  This 
amendment shifted the burden of proving the four variance 
factors to petitioners.  Consequently, now the Commission does 
-34- 
not need to make a “reasonable use” determination before denying 
a variance request. 
 
The Riggings also erroneously relies on Elkins v. City of 
Greensboro, Bd. of Adjustment, 2005 WL 2429808 (N.C. Ct. App. 4 
Oct. 2005), and Robertson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment for 
Charlotte, 167 N.C. App. 531, 605 S.E.2d 723 (2004).   
 
In Elkins, the petitioner appealed the denial of a zoning 
variance to build a church parking lot.  2005 WL at *1.  There, 
we reversed and remanded because the zoning board did not make a 
“reasonable use” determination.  Id. at *4.  However, Elkins is 
inapplicable to the instant case for two reasons.  First, since 
Elkins is an unpublished case, it “is not controlling legal 
authority.”  Cary Creek Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Cary, 203 N.C. 
App. 99, 106, 690 S.E.2d 549, 554 (2010) (quotation marks and 
citation omitted); see also N.C. R. App. P. 30(e)(3).  Second, 
the regulation at issue in Elkins, Greensboro Ordinance § 30-9-
6.10(D), provided that “The Board may [grant a variance] if it 
finds that: (a) If the applicant complies with the provisions of 
this Ordinance, he can make no reasonable use of his property.”  
2005 WL at *2 (emphasis added).  There, unlike in the instant 
case, the zoning board was required to make a “reasonable use” 
determination. 
-35- 
 
In Robertson, the petitioner appealed a city zoning board’s 
denial of his variance request.  167 N.C. App. at 531, 605 
S.E.2d at 724.  There, the petitioner erroneously relied on 
Williams to argue the zoning board did not need to make an 
“unnecessary hardships” determination.  Id. at 538, 605 S.E.2d 
at 728.  On appeal, this Court cited Williams to support its 
holding that the zoning board had to make an “unnecessary 
hardships” determination.  Id.  Since the Robertson court did 
not 
cite 
Williams 
for 
its 
“reasonable 
use” 
proposition, 
Robertson is not applicable here. 
 
Consequently, 
Williams, Elkins, and Robertson 
do not 
support The Riggings’ argument.  The trial court did not err in 
determining the Commission did not need to make a “reasonable 
use” determination. 
2.  Takings Doctrine 
 
Next, The Riggings contends the Commission’s denial of its 
variance request constitutes an impermissible taking.  Upon 
review, we determine this issue is not ripe for review. 
 
In North Carolina, “land-use challenges are not ripe for 
review until there has been a final decision about what uses of 
the property will be permitted.”  Messer v. Town of Chapel Hill, 
125 N.C. App. 57, 61, 479 S.E.2d 221, 223, vacated on other 
-36- 
grounds, 346 N.C. 259, 485 S.E.2d 269 (1997).  For takings 
claims,  
[t]his rule is compelled by the very nature 
of 
the 
inquiry 
required 
by 
the 
Just 
Compensation Clause, because the factors 
applied in deciding a takings claim simply 
cannot be evaluated until the administrative 
agency has arrived at a final, definitive 
position regarding how it will apply the 
regulations at issue to the particular land 
in question. 
 
Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
In the present case, we have affirmed the trial court’s 
decision to reverse and remand.  As such, The Riggings’ takings 
claim is not ripe because there has not yet been a final 
variance decision.  See Cary Creek Ltd. P’ship, 203 N.C. App. at 
102, 690 S.E.2d at 552; Cardwell v. Smith, 92 N.C. App. 505, 
508, 374 S.E.2d 625, 627 (1988) (“As of the date of the case sub 
judice being filed on appeal, the Zoning Board had not complied 
with this Court’s mandate . . . .  To answer [a question of 
ripeness], it is necessary to have a final determination of the 
validity of the special use permit originally granted.”). 
 
Consequently, since there has not yet been a final variance 
decision, the trial court did not err by determining The 
Riggings’ takings claim is not yet ripe.   
-37- 
3.  Separation of Powers Doctrine 
 
Lastly, The Riggings argues the Commission violated the 
separation of powers doctrine because it acted in a quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial capacity.  We disagree. 
 
In 
North 
Carolina, 
it 
is 
well-established 
that 
our 
legislature may delegate rule-making power to administrative 
agencies as long as it provides sufficient guiding standards.  
See Adams v. N.C. Dep’t of Natural & Econ. Res., 295 N.C. 683, 
697, 249 S.E.2d 402, 410 (1978).  In Adams, our Supreme Court 
explicitly determined the Commission’s creation under CAMA is a 
constitutional delegation of legislative power.  See id. at 702, 
249 S.E.2d at 413.  Similarly, in In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 
373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989), our Supreme Court determined Article 
IV, § 3 of our state’s Constitution allows an administrative 
agency 
to 
take 
on 
discretionary 
judicial 
authority 
when 
“reasonably necessary to accomplish the agency’s purposes.”  Id. 
at 379, 379 S.E.2d at 34.   
 
Given the clear precedent of Adams and Civil Penalty, we 
determine The Riggings’ separation of powers argument is without 
merit.  See Dunn v. Pate, 334 N.C. 115, 118, 431 S.E.2d 178, 180 
(1993) (“[The Court of Appeals] has no authority to overrule 
decisions of [the] Supreme Court and [has] the responsibility to 
follow those decisions until otherwise ordered by the Supreme 
-38- 
Court.” (quotation marks and citation omitted) (second and third 
alterations in original)).  First, Adams already determines the 
Commission’s creation under CAMA is a constitutional delegation 
of legislative power.  See Adams, 295 N.C. at 702, 249 S.E.2d at 
413.  Second, since N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-120.1(a) explicitly 
contemplates the Commission’s issuance of variances, we believe 
it is self-evident that judicial authority to rule on variance 
requests 
is 
“reasonably 
necessary” 
to 
accomplish 
the 
Commission’s statutory purpose.    
 
Therefore, we hold the trial court did not err in 
determining the Commission’s actions did not violate the 
separation of powers doctrine. 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 With a rock revetment to the south, and depleted coquina 
formations to the north, The Riggings truly is caught between a 
rock and a hard place.  In this scenario, we must balance The 
Riggings’ private property interest with competing public 
interests to determine whether a variance is consistent with the 
“spirit, purpose, and intent” of CAMA’s framework.  Without a 
variance, The Riggings’ condos will likely be destroyed by 
erosion.  We believe this private property interest outweighs 
competing public interests.  Consequently, the trial court’s 
decision is 
-39- 
 
AFFIRMED. 
Judge McCULLOUGH concurs. 
Judge BRYANT concurs in part and dissents in part by 
separate opinion. 
 
 
 
 
NO. COA12-1299 
                    
 
 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Filed:  6 August 2013 
 
RIGGINGS HOMEOWNERS, INC., 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
New Hanover County  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 09 CVS 2761 
COASTAL RESOURCES COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
BRYANT, Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part. 
 
The majority opinion reviews and affirms the order of the 
trial court reversing and remanding the denial of a variance to 
the North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission (“CRC”) for a 
new hearing.  In so doing the majority determines that the trial 
court applied the correct standard of review to the issues 
before it, and that the trial court’s review of these issues was 
properly conducted.  While I believe the trial court applied the 
correct standard of review and did so properly as to the first 
issue we review on appeal, I do not believe the trial court 
properly applied the correct standard of review to the second 
issue.  Therefore, I concur in the portion of the majority 
opinion affirming the trial court’s review and determination as 
to the first variance factor.  However, I must dissent from the 
-2- 
 
portion of the majority opinion affirming the trial court’s 
analysis and ruling as to the fourth variance factor. 
In the portion of its order regarding “The Issues for 
Appeal,” the trial court set out the standard of review it used 
for each issue as follows: 
(I) Whether the CRC erred in its Conclusion 
of Law 3(b) that the Petition did not 
demonstrate that strict application of 15A 
NCAC 7H.1705 (a)(7) would result in an 
unnecessary 
hardship 
to 
the 
Riggings 
Property 
per 
N.C. 
Gen. 
Stat. 
113A-
120.1(a)(1). On this issue the Court used 
the de novo review standard. 
 
(II) Whether the CRC erred in its Conclusion 
of Law 6 that the Petitioners did not meet 
the fourth requirement of a variance request 
that 
the 
granting 
of 
the 
variance 
is 
consistent with the spirit, purpose and 
intent of the rules, standards, or order; 
will secure public safety and welfare; will 
preserve substantial justice per N.C. Gen. 
Stat. 
113A-120.1(a)(4); 
and 
that 
the 
decision 
of 
the 
CRC 
is 
supported 
by 
substantial evidence. On this issue the 
Court used the Whole Record review standard 
on the issues of substantial evidence and de 
novo standard on the other issues. 
 
(emphasis added). 
As to Issue I, I agree that the trial court used the 
correct standard of review – de novo.  However, as to Issue II, 
the trial court stated that it would use both whole record 
review and de novo review in analyzing the fourth variance 
factor.  Based on the trial court’s analysis, almost all of 
-3- 
 
which 
related 
to 
stipulated 
findings 
of 
fact 
from 
the 
Commission’s order as well as the trial court’s independent 
findings of fact, it appears the trial court used the whole 
record test exclusively.  Notwithstanding the trial court’s 
statement that it would use both de novo and whole record review 
in analyzing the requirements of the fourth variance, I see 
nothing to indicate the trial court used anything other than 
whole record review.  And, while I think the whole record review 
is the correct standard to use, I do not think the trial court 
used it correctly. 
Under whole record review the trial court must examine the 
whole record to determine whether there is substantial evidence 
to support the agency’s decision.  ACT-UP Triangle v. Commission 
for Health Servs., 345 N.C. 699, 706, 483 S.E.2d 388, 392 (1997) 
(citation omitted).  Unlike de novo review, under whole record 
review the trial court is not allowed to substitute its judgment 
for that of the agency.  Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs. & Div. of 
Med. Assistance of the N.C. HHS, 364 N.C. 61, 69-70, 692 S.E.2d 
96, 102 (2010).  Even if, as here, the trial court could have 
reached a different result de novo, it “may not substitute its 
judgment for the agency’s as between two conflicting views[.]”  
Id. 
-4- 
 
Because it appears the trial court improperly substituted 
its own judgment on whole record review, I believe the decision 
was reached under a misapprehension of the correct standard of 
review. Further, a correct application of a whole record review 
to the facts of this case could result in a determination that 
there exists substantial evidence to justify upholding the 
agency decision.  
Therefore, I would reverse and remand to the trial court to 
properly apply the correct standard of review.