Case Title: Columbus Bar Assn. v. Cooke

Citation: 2006-Ohio-5709

Docket Number: 20061241

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Cooke, 111 Ohio St.3d 290, 2006-Ohio-5709.] 
 
 
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. COOKE. 
[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Cooke, 111 Ohio St.3d 290, 2006-Ohio-5709.] 
Attorneys — Multiple violations of the Disciplinary Rules — Indefinite 
suspension. 
(No. 2006-1241 — Submitted August 8, 2006 — Decided November 15, 2006.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 03-095. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Reginald Alpha Cooke of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0031031, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1984. 
{¶ 2} In September 2005, relator, Columbus Bar Association, filed an 
amended complaint charging respondent with professional misconduct.  
Respondent filed an answer to the complaint, and a panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline held a four-day hearing on the 
complaint in January, February, and March 2006.  The panel then prepared 
written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation, all of which 
the board adopted. 
Misconduct 
Count I 
{¶ 3} In November 2001, Cheryl Ragland hired respondent to assist her 
with a personal bankruptcy matter, and she paid him $800 for his services.  From 
her discussions with respondent, Ragland believed that her request to file 
bankruptcy would be heard by a court and would be resolved in December 2001.  
She called respondent several times in the weeks following their initial meeting, 
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and he assured her that her case was proceeding smoothly.  Respondent did not in 
fact file a bankruptcy petition on Ragland’s behalf until April 2002. 
{¶ 4} Ragland was involved in a car accident in February 2002.  The 
following month, she signed a contingent-fee contract with respondent 
authorizing him to represent her in a personal-injury suit against the driver of the 
car that had struck hers. 
{¶ 5} The bankruptcy petition and accompanying paperwork that 
respondent filed on Ragland’s behalf in April 2002 contained factual errors and 
did not indicate that Ragland intended to pursue a personal-injury claim related to 
the car accident.  Bankruptcy attorney Pamela Maggied testified as an expert 
witness at respondent’s disciplinary hearing, and she explained that full disclosure 
of a debtor’s assets is “critical” in bankruptcy cases.  In Maggied’s expert 
opinion, respondent should have listed Ragland’s potential personal-injury claim 
arising out of the February 2002 car accident when respondent filed a list of 
Ragland’s assets with the bankruptcy court in April 2002. 
{¶ 6} At a creditors’ meeting with the bankruptcy trustee on May 9, 
2002, the trustee asked Ragland if she stood to benefit from any insurance claims 
or pending lawsuits.  Ragland said no.  That statement was inaccurate, and 
although respondent was present, he did not attempt to correct it. 
{¶ 7} In June 2002, respondent asked Ragland’s car insurance provider, 
State Farm, to compensate Ragland for the medical expenses and the pain and 
suffering that she had sustained as a result of the February car accident.  In 
August 2002, State Farm agreed to pay Ragland $17,500 under the uninsured-
motorist provision of her insurance policy. 
{¶ 8} According to attorney Maggied’s expert testimony at respondent’s 
disciplinary hearing, respondent had no authority to represent Ragland in 
connection with the personal-injury claim once Ragland’s bankruptcy petition 
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was filed in April 2002.  Instead, the authority to choose an attorney to handle the 
claim belonged exclusively to the bankruptcy trustee. 
{¶ 9} While Ragland’s bankruptcy case was pending, respondent did not 
tell the bankruptcy trustee or the bankruptcy court about Ragland’s car accident, 
about his demand to State Farm, or about State Farm’s $17,500 payment to 
Ragland.  Ragland’s debts were discharged by the bankruptcy court in September 
2002.  When the bankruptcy trustee learned about the insurance settlement that 
respondent had secured for Ragland, however, the trustee filed an adversary 
proceeding against respondent and Ragland in the bankruptcy court, asking that 
the settlement proceeds be paid to Ragland’s bankruptcy estate. 
{¶ 10} In a June 2003 letter to the bankruptcy trustee, respondent 
described the $17,500 payment to Ragland from State Farm as a “post-petition 
wage loss settlement,” even though the accident occurred before Ragland’s 
bankruptcy petition was filed and a State Farm agent had explained to respondent 
in August 2002 that the amount of the State Farm settlement attributable to 
Ragland’s lost wages was negligible. 
{¶ 11} At his disciplinary hearing, respondent testified that he did not list 
Ragland’s potential personal-injury suit on the schedules that he filed with her 
bankruptcy petition in April 2002 because he thought that she was not being 
truthful about her alleged injuries resulting from the car accident.  He nonetheless 
sought and accepted the financial settlement on Ragland’s behalf from State Farm 
in the summer of 2002 for those injuries. 
{¶ 12} Respondent’s fee agreement with Ragland for her bankruptcy case 
set a flat fee of $800 for his services and also provided that “additional fees shall 
be required if this matter develops into a contested trial or hearing.”  On 
November 29, 2002, respondent sent Ragland a bill for a $200 bankruptcy filing 
fee and for 25.3 hours of work on the bankruptcy case at a rate of $150 per hour.  
The bill noted that respondent had applied the initial $800 payment toward the 
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total fee, and respondent asked Ragland to pay the balance of $3,195, explaining 
in a letter that her case “was a contested matter that required additional time.” 
{¶ 13} At respondent’s disciplinary hearing, Ragland testified that she 
was “shocked” when the bill arrived because respondent had never discussed 
additional bankruptcy charges with her and had never told her at any time that her 
bankruptcy proceedings had become “contested.”  Attorney Maggied testified that 
much of respondent’s work on the bankruptcy case would not have been 
necessary had respondent properly disclosed all of Ragland’s assets to the 
bankruptcy court. 
{¶ 14} Respondent acknowledged that his client trust account carried a 
negative balance at various times in 2002 and 2003.  He also sometimes used that 
account as an operating account for his law practice. 
{¶ 15} Respondent did not maintain legal-malpractice insurance coverage 
during part of the time that he represented Ragland, and he did not disclose that 
information to her. 
{¶ 16} After examining respondent’s actions, the board found that 
respondent had violated the following Disciplinary Rules: DR 1-102(A)(4) 
(barring conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-
102(A)(5) (barring conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-
102(A)(6) (barring conduct that adversely reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to practice 
law), 1-104 (requiring an attorney who does not maintain adequate professional-
liability insurance to so advise his or her clients in writing), 2-106(A) (prohibiting 
a lawyer from charging a clearly excessive fee), 6-101(A)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from accepting a case that the lawyer is not competent to handle), 7-101(A)(3) 
(barring an attorney from intentionally prejudicing or damaging a client during 
the course of the professional relationship), 7-102(A)(2) (barring an attorney from 
knowingly advancing a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law), 
7-102(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from failing to disclose what he is required by 
January Term, 2006 
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law to reveal), 7-102(A)(4) (barring a lawyer from knowingly using false 
evidence or perjured testimony), 7-102(A)(5) (prohibiting an attorney from 
knowingly making a false statement of fact), and 9-102(A) (requiring a lawyer to 
maintain client funds in a separate, identifiable bank account). 
Count II 
{¶ 17} Respondent did not maintain legal-malpractice insurance coverage 
while representing his client Joshua Patterson, and respondent did not disclose 
that information to Patterson. 
{¶ 18} The board found that respondent had violated DR 1-104. 
Count III 
{¶ 19} In August 2002, Ragland signed a settlement-distribution 
authorization form prepared by respondent for the $17,500 car-accident insurance 
payment from State Farm.  That form called for the payment of $3,000 to the 
bankruptcy trustee, $4,280 to Ragland’s physician, and $10,220 to Ragland 
herself. 
{¶ 20} In his response to Ragland’s grievance concerning his fees, 
however, respondent told relator in March 2003 that Ragland had approved and 
that he had made the following distribution of the settlement proceeds: $5,400 to 
the bankruptcy trustee, $4,280 to Ragland’s physician, $4,250 to Ragland, and 
$3,195 to respondent himself for his services on the bankruptcy case. 
{¶ 21} Then in June 2003, respondent sent a letter to the bankruptcy 
trustee representing to her that the funds had been distributed as follows:  $5,400 
to the trustee, $4,000 to Ragland, $5,827.50 to respondent as a legal fee paid on a 
contingency basis, and an additional $2,272.50 as a legal fee for his services on 
Ragland’s bankruptcy case. 
{¶ 22} Ragland testified at respondent’s disciplinary hearing that she had 
not received the amounts that respondent claimed.  She testified that after the 
$17,500 settlement was paid by State Farm, respondent told her that she could not 
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have the money “because of the bankruptcy.”  She eventually received $4,250 
from respondent as a result of the settlement with State Farm, but she had 
expected to receive two-thirds of the $17,500 payment. 
{¶ 23} Respondent testified at his disciplinary hearing that he decided to 
take a contingent fee from the settlement proceeds after Ragland filed a grievance 
against him in February 2003.  At that hearing, he also admitted that he had never 
paid any of the settlement proceeds to Ragland’s physician, whose bills had been 
paid directly by State Farm in August 2002. 
{¶ 24} Although respondent deposited the $17,500 settlement check from 
State Farm in his client trust account on August 22, 2002, the balance in that 
account fell to $153.01 by October 7, 2002.  On that latter date, respondent still 
owed Ragland some of the settlement proceeds, and he had not yet told her that he 
intended to charge her additional bankruptcy fees beyond the initial $800 fee, nor 
had he told her that he intended to pay himself a contingency fee from the 
settlement proceeds. 
{¶ 25} An accountant who testified at respondent’s disciplinary hearing 
stated that the records respondent maintained for his client trust account did not 
indicate the names of the clients whose funds were in the account or the amount 
of each client’s funds in that account.  Respondent also wrote checks to himself 
from the client trust account without noting which client’s funds were being 
withdrawn or why. 
{¶ 26} The board found that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-
102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 9-102(A), and 9-102(B)(3) (requiring a lawyer to 
maintain complete records and render appropriate accounts of a client’s property). 
Sanction 
{¶ 27} In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the board 
considered the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Section 10 of the Rules 
and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the 
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Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  As 
aggravating factors, the board found that respondent had acted with a dishonest 
and selfish motive, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, committed multiple 
offenses, gave false statements during relator’s investigation, refused to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his actions, caused harm to a vulnerable 
victim, and failed to make restitution.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (c), (d), (f), 
(g), (h), and (i).  The sole mitigating factor cited by the board was respondent’s 
lack of any prior disciplinary record.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a). 
{¶ 28} The board cited respondent’s dishonesty as the most troubling 
aspect of the case.  According to the board, respondent “lacks the basic ability to 
distinguish truth, especially when it does not serve his personal interests.”  He 
attempted, the board found, to keep as much of Ragland’s personal-injury 
settlement as he could, and he issued a bill to Ragland for additional bankruptcy 
fees as “a pretext to conceal that he had already converted” the settlement 
proceeds for his own use.  The board described respondent’s actions before the 
bankruptcy court as “fraudulent and deceitful,” and it concluded that he had lied 
to his client about his actions and her funds, lied to relator during the disciplinary 
investigation, and lied to the panel during its four-day hearing into his actions. 
{¶ 29} Relator recommended that respondent’s license to practice law be 
indefinitely suspended.  The panel and the board issued similar recommendations. 
{¶ 30} We have reviewed the board’s report, and we find that respondent 
violated all of the provisions as described above.  We also agree with the board 
that the appropriate sanction in this case is an indefinite suspension. 
{¶ 31} After four days of hearings on respondent’s misconduct, the panel 
was certainly in a good position to evaluate his credibility and the likelihood that 
he can serve his clients competently and ethically in the future.  We give 
considerable credence to the panel’s and the board’s conclusions that respondent 
was dishonest “throughout these proceedings” and that he displayed a “cavalier 
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approach” to the management of his client trust account.  We also appreciate the 
panel’s thorough analysis of this complex case and agree with its assessment that 
an indefinite suspension “is the only means to protect the public.” 
{¶ 32} Many of respondent’s ethical lapses are very serious in and of 
themselves.  Collectively, they justify the sanction that the board has 
recommended.  There is simply no place in the legal profession for those who are 
unwilling or unable to be honest with clients, the courts, and their colleagues.  
Respondent’s misrepresentations to the bankruptcy court, to his client, to relator 
during the disciplinary investigation, and to the panel during the hearing compel 
an actual suspension from the practice of law.  His assertion at the hearing that he 
is “proud” of his “aggressive” work on Ragland’s behalf shows his lack of 
integrity.  The one mitigating factor in this case pales in comparison to the many 
aggravating factors, and an indefinite suspension is appropriate in light of 
respondent’s dishonesty, his mismanagement of his client trust account, and his 
attempt to charge an excessive fee to his client. 
{¶ 33} We have imposed indefinite suspensions in similar cases.  See, 
e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Wise, 108 Ohio St.3d 381, 2006-Ohio-1194, 843 
N.E.2d 1198, ¶ 15 (explaining that the mishandling of clients’ funds is a matter of 
the gravest concern whether or not the client has been harmed); Cuyahoga Cty. 
Bar Assn. v. Kelley, 105 Ohio St.3d 55, 2004-Ohio-7009, 822 N.E.2d 351 
(attorney failed to apprise the bankruptcy court of some of his client’s assets, 
failed to maintain malpractice insurance, and mishandled the proceeds from a 
client’s personal-injury settlement); Disciplinary Counsel v. Trumbo (1996), 76 
Ohio St.3d 369, 373, 667 N.E.2d 1186 (attorney’s pattern of “continually lying to 
her clients, lying to the court, and lying to Disciplinary Counsel” showed that she 
was not fit to enjoy the privilege of practicing law in Ohio). 
{¶ 34} Accordingly, respondent is hereby indefinitely suspended from the 
practice of law in Ohio.  As a prerequisite to the filing of any petition for 
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reinstatement, respondent must prove that (1) he has satisfied any obligations 
imposed on him in the pending adversary proceeding filed by the bankruptcy 
trustee, (2) he has reimbursed Ragland for any legal expenses that she has 
incurred or may incur to defend herself in the adversary proceeding, and (3) he 
has reimbursed Ragland for any money that she may be forced to pay to the 
bankruptcy estate in the adversary proceeding.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, 
JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
Porter Wright Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., and James P. Botti; Judith M. 
McInturff; Bruce M. Campbell; and A. Alysha Clous, for relator. 
 
Moore & Yaklevich and John A. Yaklevich, for respondent. 
______________________