Case Title: State ex rel. Culgan v. Medina Cty. Court of Common Pleas

Citation: 2008-Ohio-4609

Docket Number: 20072433

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Culgan v. Medina Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 119 Ohio St.3d 535, 2008-
Ohio-4609.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. CULGAN, APPELLANT, v. MEDINA COUNTY 
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Culgan v. Medina Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 
 119 Ohio St.3d 535, 2008-Ohio-4609.] 
Sentencing entry — Crim.R. 32(C) — State v. Baker applied — Writs granted. 
(No. 2007-2433 ─ Submitted June 24, 2008 ─ Decided September 18, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Medina County, 
No. 07CA0104-M. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a petition for writs of 
mandamus and/or procedendo to compel a common pleas court and its judge to 
enter a judgment in a criminal case.  Because the purported judgment did not 
comply with Crim.R. 32(C) and thus did not constitute a final appealable order, 
we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and grant the writs. 
Sentencing Entry and Appeals 
{¶ 2} In August 2002, after convicting appellant, Clifford J. Culgan, of 
one count of corrupting another with drugs, two counts of unlawful sexual 
conduct with a minor, and one count of attempted pandering of obscenity 
involving a minor, Judge Christopher J. Collier of Medina County Court of 
Common Pleas journalized a judgment entry sentencing Culgan to an aggregate 
prison term of ten years.  The entry does not set forth Culgan’s plea or the verdict 
or court findings upon which the convictions were based.  The entry merely 
mentions that Culgan “has been convicted” of the specified offenses and declares 
his sentence for the convictions. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 3} Culgan appealed his convictions, and the Court of Appeals for 
Medina County affirmed.  State v. Culgan, Medina App. No. 02CA0073-M, 
2003-Ohio-2713.  We did not allow Culgan’s further appeal.  State v. Culgan, 100 
Ohio St.3d 1470, 2003-Ohio-5772, 798 N.E.2d 406. 
Common Pleas Court Motion 
{¶ 4} Four years later, Culgan filed a motion in the common pleas court 
to be resentenced so that Judge Collier could issue a judgment that complied with 
Crim.R. 32(C) by including his plea, the verdict or findings, and the sentence.  
Judge Collier denied the motion. 
Mandamus and Procedendo Case 
{¶ 5} Culgan then filed a complaint for writs of mandamus and/or 
procedendo in the Court of Appeals for Medina County to compel appellees, 
Judge Collier and the common pleas court, to enter a judgment complying with 
Crim.R. 32(C).  Appellees filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a 
motion for summary judgment.  The court of appeals dismissed the petition sua 
sponte. 
{¶ 6} This cause is now before the court upon Culgan’s appeal. 
Mandamus and Procedendo 
to Compel Compliance with Crim.R. 32(C) 
{¶ 7} Culgan asserts that the court of appeals erred in sua sponte 
dismissing his complaint for writs of mandamus and procedendo.  “A court may 
dismiss a complaint sua sponte and without notice when the complaint is frivolous 
or the claimant obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint.”  
State ex rel. Brooks v. O’Malley, 117 Ohio St.3d 385, 2008-Ohio-1118, 884 
N.E.2d 42, ¶ 5. 
{¶ 8} “[P]rocedendo and mandamus will lie when a trial court has 
refused to render, or unduly delayed rendering, a judgment.”  State ex rel. 
Reynolds v. Basinger, 99 Ohio St.3d 303, 2003-Ohio-3631, 791 N.E.2d 459, ¶ 5.  
January Term, 2008 
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Sup.R. 7(A) provides that “[t]he judgment entry specified * * * in Criminal Rule 
32 shall be filed and journalized within thirty days of the * * * decision.  If the 
entry is not prepared and presented by counsel, it shall be prepared and filed by 
the court.”  “ ‘If the trial court refuses upon request or motion to journalize its 
decision, either party may compel the court to act by filing a writ of mandamus or 
a writ of procedendo’ ” because “[a]bsent journalization of the judgment, [a 
party] cannot appeal it.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Grove v. Nadel (1998), 81 
Ohio St.3d 325, 327, 691 N.E.2d 275, quoting Kennedy v. Cleveland (1984), 16 
Ohio App.3d 399, 401-402, 16 OBR 469, 476 N.E.2d 683; Cleveland v. 
Trzebuckowski (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 524, 527, 709 N.E.2d 1148. 
{¶ 9} Therefore, if Culgan is correct that appellees’ sentencing entry 
violated Crim.R. 32(C), which would render the entry nonappealable, his claims 
for writs of mandamus and procedendo would have merit, and the court of appeals 
erred in sua sponte dismissing his complaint. 
{¶ 10} In State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 
N.E.2d 163, syllabus, we held that Crim.R. 32(C) requires that a judgment of 
conviction set forth the following to be a final appealable order:  “(1) the guilty 
plea, the jury verdict, or the finding of the court upon which the conviction is 
based; (2) the sentence; (3) the signature of the judge; and (4) entry on the journal 
by the clerk of court.”  Appellees’ sentencing entry did not constitute a final 
appealable order because it did not contain a guilty plea, a jury verdict, or the 
finding of the court upon which Culgan’s convictions were based.  Culgan is 
entitled to a sentencing entry that complies with Crim.R. 32(C). 
{¶ 11} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals erred in dismissing 
Culgan’s complaint.  We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and grant 
the writs of mandamus and procedendo to compel appellees to issue a sentencing 
entry that complies with Crim.R. 32(C) and constitutes a final appealable order. 
Judgment reversed 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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and writs granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 12} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 13} Crim.R. 32(C) provides, “A judgment of conviction shall set forth 
the plea, the verdict or findings, and the sentence.” 
{¶ 14} Here, Culgan seeks writs of mandamus and/or procedendo to 
compel the trial court to resentence him, asserting that the judgment entry signed 
by the court makes no mention of his plea or the manner in which the conviction 
occurred and is therefore not a final appealable order. 
{¶ 15} The facts of this case, however, belie Culgan’s claims.  Not only 
did Culgan appeal from the court’s sentencing entry, but in that appeal, he 
presented only two assignments of error:  (1) error in imposing consecutive 
sentences and (2) error in finding him to be a sexual predator.  State v. Culgan, 
Medina App. No. 02CA0073-M, 2003-Ohio-2713, ¶ 5, 15.  In that appeal, Culgan 
never raised the issue of a final appealable order, and unlike the appellant in State 
v. Baker,119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 3, he was not 
deprived of the opportunity to appeal his conviction.  Moreover, in rejecting his 
appeal, the appellate court noted that Culgan had pleaded guilty to the counts for 
which he was convicted.  Culgan, 2003-Ohio-2713, ¶ 3. 
{¶ 16} In order to obtain an extraordinary writ, Culgan must demonstrate 
that he has no adequate remedy at law.  State ex rel. Weaver v. Adult Parole 
Auth., 116 Ohio St.3d 340, 2007-Ohio-6435, 879 N.E.2d 191, ¶ 8.  He patently 
fails in this regard because the discussion of the appellate court reveals that he has 
been afforded this relief.  Mandamus will not issue to compel a vain act.  State ex 
rel. Moore v. Malone, 96 Ohio St.3d 417, 2002-Ohio-4821, 775 N.E.2d 812, ¶ 38.  
January Term, 2008 
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Accordingly, neither mandamus nor procedendo is a proper form of relief in this 
instance. 
{¶ 17} The trial court entry as contained in the record before us reveals 
Culgan’s convictions for corrupting another with drugs, two counts of unlawful 
sexual conduct with a minor, and attempted pandering obscenity involving a 
minor.  Requiring the trial court to resentence Culgan to achieve literal 
compliance with Crim.R. 32(C) elevates form over substance. 
{¶ 18} Thus, I do not believe that Culgan’s position is well taken, and I 
would deny the writs. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Clifford J. Culgan, pro se. 
 
Dean Holman, Medina County Prosecuting Attorney, and Russell A. 
Hopkins, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. 
_____________________