Case Title: Jones, Michael v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 091539

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Keenan,1 Koontz, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
MICHAEL EUGENE JONES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 091539 
 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  April 15, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a lawful traffic stop 
transformed into an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment when police seized the defendant’s wallet during a pat 
down, thereby rendering the defendant’s consent to search his 
vehicle invalid. 
BACKGROUND 
 
We will state the facts in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.  Jones v. 
Commonwealth, 279 Va. 52, 55, 688 S.E.2d 269, 270 (2010).  
Detectives I. McNett and N. L. Deluca of the Portsmouth Police 
Department were patrolling in a “high crime/high drug area” in 
Portsmouth when they saw a vehicle, with a driver and a front-
seat passenger, parked in a public roadway impeding traffic.  
The detectives observed a third individual leaning into the 
vehicle.  Detective McNett, who testified that he had observed 
over one hundred drug transactions and had been involved in over 
                                                 
1 Justice Keenan participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to her retirement from the Court on March 12, 
five hundred drug arrests during his career, saw what appeared 
to be a “hand-to-hand transaction” between the individual 
leaning into the vehicle and the driver, who the detectives 
eventually determined to be Michael Eugene Jones. 
 
Believing they had witnessed a narcotics transaction, the 
detectives stopped Jones’ vehicle.  Detective McNett approached 
the driver’s side of the vehicle and asked Jones for his 
driver’s license and vehicle registration while Detective Deluca 
approached and spoke with the front-seat passenger.  Jones did 
not produce his driver’s license or vehicle registration and was 
“visibly shaking and breathing hard.”  Detective McNett asked 
Jones to step out of the vehicle, and at that point, Detective 
Deluca began questioning Jones while Detective McNett questioned 
the passenger.  The passenger provided Detective McNett with his 
identification.  After determining that the passenger had no 
warrants, Detective McNett told him he was free to leave, and 
the passenger left.  
 
When Detective Deluca asked Jones whether he had any 
information or identification on him, Jones provided Detective 
Deluca with a purported name and social security number.2  The 
detectives provided a dispatcher with the name and social 
                                                                                                                                                             
2010. 
2 The detectives did not have the ability to verify that the 
name and social security number Jones’ provided them were his 
real name and social security number. 
 
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security number Jones gave them to check for a valid driver’s 
license and possible warrants.  While the information was being 
confirmed, Officer Deluca conducted a pat down of Jones for his 
safety based upon Jones’ nervous behavior, the nature of the 
area, and his suspicion that Jones had participated in a 
narcotics transaction.  During the pat down, Detective Deluca 
felt what he believed was a wallet.  Detective Deluca testified 
that this “shocked” him because of Jones’ statement that he did 
not have any information or identification with him.  Jones told 
Detective Deluca that the wallet belonged to his cousin.  
Detective Deluca “asked to look at the wallet, pulled it out, 
[and] found a blank check . . . with the name . . . Michael 
Eugene Jones on it.” 3 
 
The name Michael Eugene Jones was not the same name Jones 
had given the detectives.  Less than a minute later, the police 
dispatcher notified the detectives that the name Jones provided 
for the driver’s license and warrant check was “good.”  As he 
continued to tell Detective Deluca that the wallet belonged to 
his cousin, Jones remained extremely nervous, shaking, and 
breathing more heavily, and started looking around in different 
directions rather than talking to the detective.  Detective 
Deluca placed Jones in “investigative detention,” handcuffed 
                                                 
3 Detective Deluca did not testify that Jones responded in 
any way to his request to look at the wallet. 
 
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him, and placed him in the passenger side of the police vehicle.  
Because Detective Deluca was still trying to determine Jones’ 
true identity, he asked the dispatcher to have a uniformed 
officer come to the scene with a computer capable of verifying 
Jones’ identity with a picture.  
 
About 10 minutes after the initial stop, as the detectives 
were still waiting for the uniformed officer and Jones was 
handcuffed in the police vehicle, Detective McNett asked Jones 
whether he could search his vehicle.  Jones replied, “sure, no 
problem.”  A search of Jones’ vehicle yielded two firearms and a 
substance that was subsequently identified as heroin.  
 
Jones was indicted for possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon, possession with intent to distribute heroin, 
and possession of a firearm while possessing with intent to 
distribute heroin.  Jones filed a motion to suppress all 
evidence resulting from what he contended was an unlawful 
seizure.  The circuit court overruled Jones’ motion to suppress.  
After a bench trial, Jones was convicted of the offenses charged 
in the indictment.  
 
Jones appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, 
which denied his petition by order, finding that the initial 
detention had not ended and that Jones’ consent to search was 
valid.  Jones v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2050-08-1 (March 18, 
2009).  A three-judge panel affirmed the judgment denying Jones’ 
 
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petition.  Jones v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2050-08-1 (July 2, 
2009).  We awarded Jones this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
The standard of review in this case is well settled. 
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress 
evidence claiming a violation of a person’s Fourth 
Amendment rights, we consider the facts in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing 
party at trial.  The burden is on the defendant to 
show that the trial court committed reversible error.  
We are bound by the trial court’s factual findings 
unless those findings are plainly wrong or unsupported 
by the evidence.  We will review the trial court’s 
application of the law de novo. 
 
Whitehead v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 300, 306-07, 683 S.E.2d 299, 
301 (2009) (citations omitted). 
 
On appeal to this Court, Jones assigns error to the Court 
of Appeals’ approval of the circuit court’s denial of his motion 
to suppress.  Jones argues that the detectives exceeded the 
scope of the pat down for weapons by removing his wallet and 
examining the contents without probable cause or his consent.  
Jones notes that Detective Deluca knew the object was a wallet, 
and thus did not have probable cause to seize the wallet because 
he knew it was neither a weapon nor contraband. 
Jones also asserts he was illegally seized when his 
detention continued after the police dispatcher notified the 
detectives that the identification information Jones provided 
was “good,” because Detective Deluca testified that he was 
 
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detaining Jones at that point based on the conflicting 
identification information he had obtained from the illegal 
seizure of Jones’ wallet.  Jones contends that if Detective 
Deluca had not illegally seized the wallet, Jones would have 
been released upon confirmation from the dispatcher. 
Jones also argues that any consent he gave the detectives 
to search his vehicle was invalid because it was the result of 
his illegal detention after he should have been released upon 
the report from the dispatcher.  Jones asserts that he was 
seized when the detectives placed him in “investigative 
detention,” handcuffed him, and placed him in the police 
vehicle.  Jones contends that he was illegally seized by his 
continued detention at the time Detective McNett asked for his 
consent to search, and that the consent was not sufficiently 
attenuated from the illegal seizure to purge the taint of that 
illegal seizure.  According to Jones, the evidence he objected 
to in his motion to suppress is “fruit of the poisonous tree” 
that would not have been found by the detectives but for the 
exploitation of the “primary illegality,” the unconstitutional 
continued detention.  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
487-88 (1963).  Jones argues that the recovery of the gun, 
drugs, and his statements cannot be said to be “purged of the 
primary taint.”  Id. 
 
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The Commonwealth responds that Jones’ detention did not 
amount to an unlawful seizure because the detectives had 
reasonable suspicion to believe that Jones was involved in 
criminal activity throughout the entire encounter.  The 
Commonwealth argues that Detective Deluca’s subjective reason 
for the continued detention, to verify the conflicting 
identification information found on the blank check, is 
irrelevant for Fourth Amendment analysis because the 
circumstances, viewed objectively, justified Jones’ detention. 
Assuming that Detective Deluca did exceed the scope of the 
pat down and violated the Fourth Amendment when he seized Jones’ 
wallet, the Commonwealth argues that Jones’ consent to search 
the vehicle was not obtained as a result of the illegal seizure.  
According to the Commonwealth, the consent was valid because the 
continued detention was lawful and the consent was not obtained 
by an exploitation of any illegality. 
Seizure of Jones’ Wallet 
 
It is well established that during an investigative stop, a 
police officer may conduct a limited pat down for weapons if the 
officer reasonably believes that the criminal suspect may be 
armed and dangerous.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).  We 
recently stated: 
An officer who conducts a Terry pat-down search 
is justified in removing an item from a subject’s 
pocket if the officer reasonably believes that the 
 
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object might be a weapon.  Additionally, the removal 
of an item from a subject’s pocket is also justified 
if the officer can identify the object as suspicious 
under the “plain feel” variation of the plain view 
doctrine.  However, an item may not be retrieved under 
the plain view doctrine unless it is “immediately 
apparent” to the officer that the item is evidence of 
a crime. 
 
Grandison v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 316, 319-20, 645 S.E.2d 298, 
300 (2007) (citations omitted). 
 
In this case, Detective Deluca was not justified in seizing 
Jones’ wallet because Detective Deluca testified that he 
believed the item he seized was a wallet and not a weapon or 
contraband.  Based upon Detective Deluca’s testimony, we 
conclude that Detective Deluca did not have probable cause to 
retrieve the wallet from Jones’ possession.  Additionally, the 
record shows that Detective Deluca asked Jones whether he could 
“look at the wallet,” but the record does not show that Jones 
responded verbally or in any other way to this request.  Viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we 
cannot conclude that Jones consented to the seizure of his 
wallet.  Therefore, the seizure of Jones’ wallet by the 
detectives was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 
 
However, the dispositive issue in this case is not whether 
the detectives’ seizure of Jones’ wallet was an illegal seizure.  
Rather, the dispositive issue is whether the unlawful seizure of 
the wallet transformed a concededly valid investigatory stop 
 
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into an illegal detention by unlawfully extending that 
detention. 
Legality of Jones’ Detention 
 
A police officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop 
when the officer, in light of his training and experience, has 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is 
afoot.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 27, 30.  To comport with the 
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment, a traffic stop 
must be justified by an objective manifestation that the person 
stopped is engaged, or is about to be engaged, in criminal 
activity.  United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).  
The court must consider the totality of the circumstances in 
determining whether the police officer had a particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting that the person stopped may be 
involved in criminal activity.  Id. at 417-18.  “[A]n officer's 
subjective characterization of observed conduct is not relevant 
to a court’s analysis concerning whether there is a reasonable 
suspicion because the Court’s review of whether there was 
reasonable suspicion involves application of an objective rather 
than a subjective standard.”  Harris v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 
689, 697, 668 S.E.2d 141, 146 (2008). 
 
The Supreme Court recently stated: 
A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is 
pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation.  
The temporary seizure of driver and passengers 
 
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ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the 
duration of the stop.  Normally, the stop ends when 
the police have no further need to control the scene, 
and inform the driver and passengers they are free to 
leave. 
 
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 781, 788 
(2009). 
Jones does not challenge the legality of the initial stop.  
Rather, Jones argues that his seizure became illegal when the 
detectives were notified that the information Jones provided 
them concerning his name and social security number was “good.”  
Jones asserts that as soon as a dispatcher confirmed that the 
name Jones provided was a licensed driver without any 
outstanding warrants, the detectives no longer had reasonable, 
articulable suspicion justifying a continuation of Jones’ 
detention.  We disagree with Jones. 
When the detectives first observed Jones’ vehicle, it was 
parked in a public street impeding the flow of traffic.  This 
gave the detectives reasonable suspicion to effectuate a traffic 
stop because impeding the flow of traffic on a highway is 
prohibited by Portsmouth City Ordinance § 22-561(a).4  The 
detectives were justified in stopping Jones’ vehicle and 
conducting a brief, investigatory stop regarding the traffic 
                                                 
4 The ordinance states, in pertinent part, that “[n]o 
vehicle shall be stopped in such a manner as to impede or render 
dangerous the use of the highway by others, except in the case 
 
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offense as well as the apparent hand-to-hand transaction in a 
high crime, high drug area. 
Even though the information Jones provided the detectives 
was confirmed to be that of a valid driver, that confirmation 
did not prove that Jones was, in fact, the person so identified.  
Without a valid form of identification, it was impossible for 
the detectives to determine whether Jones was who he said he 
was.  It was not unreasonable for the detectives to continue to 
detain Jones for a reasonable period of time, awaiting a 
uniformed officer with a computer, in order to access a 
photograph of the person whose name Jones had provided.  
Determining Jones’ true identity was reasonably necessary to the 
traffic stop, both in investigating the apparent traffic offense 
and the suspected drug transaction.  Thus, the temporary 
continued seizure of Jones did not amount to an unlawful 
detention because determining Jones’ true identity was within 
the scope of the unchallenged investigatory stop and was not 
unreasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the seizure of Jones’ wallet was unlawful, Jones’ 
detention remained lawful because at the time of the seizure the 
detectives were still trying to ascertain Jones’ identity, which 
                                                                                                                                                             
of an emergency as the result of an accident or mechanical 
breakdown . . . .” 
 
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was within the scope of the traffic stop.  Because Jones was 
lawfully detained at the time he consented to the search of his 
vehicle, his consent was not the result of an illegal detention 
and remained valid. 
Therefore, we hold that Jones failed to show that the 
circuit court committed reversible error in denying his motion 
to suppress.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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