Case Title: Board of Supervisors of Stafford County v. Crucible, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 081743

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2009-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF  
STAFFORD COUNTY, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      OPINION BY 
v. 
 
Record No. 081743 
 
   JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 
 
     JUNE 4, 2009 
CRUCIBLE, INC. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF STAFFORD COUNTY 
Randy I. Bellows, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court erred 
in holding that a zoning verification letter constituted a 
significant affirmative governmental act under Code § 15.2-2307.  
We also consider whether a party must first seek a vested rights 
determination from the zoning administrator before seeking such 
relief from a circuit court. 
Crucible, Inc. (“Crucible”) filed a complaint in the 
Circuit Court of Stafford County against the Board of 
Supervisors of Stafford County, Virginia and Stafford County, 
Virginia (collectively “the Board”), seeking a declaratory 
judgment and injunctive relief concerning Crucible’s purported 
vested right to use property it owned in Stafford County.  The 
circuit court overruled the Board’s demurrer, which contained an 
allegation that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because 
Crucible failed to exhaust administrative remedies and, after a 
trial, concluded that Crucible had a vested right in the use of 
its property.  The Board appeals. 
FACTS 
 
Crucible operates a security training facility in Stafford 
County, Virginia and sought to acquire land in order to expand 
its training facility.  Crucible primarily trains government 
agents and employees in “individual protective measures,” 
including “firearms training,” “unarmed combative defensive 
tactics,” “surveillance detection,” and “anti-terrorist evasive 
driving.”  By letter dated March 3, 2004, Crucible requested a 
zoning verification for certain property in Stafford County.  
The property was zoned A-1 (Agricultural), and the zoning 
verification request included an inquiry into whether the 
facilities that Crucible proposed to erect on the property met 
the definition of a “school” under the zoning ordinance; schools 
could be constructed in A-1 zones on a “by right” basis, i.e., 
without additional discretionary approval by the County. 
In May 2004, a meeting was held for the specific purpose of 
determining whether Crucible’s proposed project and facility met 
the definition of “school” under the zoning ordinance.  The 
meeting was attended by the zoning administrator, planning 
staff, and Crucible personnel.  Crucible presented documentation 
concerning the facility, and the zoning administrator posed 
questions. 
In a document titled “Zoning Verification” dated May 11, 
2004 (zoning verification letter), the zoning administrator 
 
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stated that, based on the presentation given, the “facility 
would be classified a ‘school’ by definition in the Stafford 
County Zoning Ordinance,” and that “[v]erification is valid as 
of May 11, 2004 and is subject to change.”  On July 26, 2005, 
Crucible purchased the property for $2,250,000. 
On August 24, 2005, the Board of Supervisors of Stafford 
County adopted Zoning Ordinance O05-37, requiring a conditional 
use permit for the location of a school in an A-1 zoning 
district.  After the adoption of Ordinance O05-37, Crucible, 
which did not have an approved site plan, could no longer 
operate a school on its property on a “by right” basis, absent a 
determination that it had a vested right to do so.  Without 
requesting a vested rights determination from the zoning 
administrator, Crucible filed a declaratory judgment proceeding 
in the Circuit Court of Stafford County requesting that the 
court determine whether Crucible had a vested right, pursuant to 
Code § 15.2-2307, to develop a school on its property on a “by 
right” basis. 
Over the Board’s objection, the circuit court held that 
Crucible was not required to seek a vested rights determination 
from the zoning administrator before filing a complaint in the 
circuit court.  The circuit court further concluded that 
considering the terms of Crucible’s request, the seriousness 
with which the County considered the request, and the ultimate 
 
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finality of the decision, the zoning administrator’s zoning 
verification letter was “substantially similar and equally 
serious” as the six significant affirmative governmental acts 
enumerated in Code § 15.2-2307.  Thus, it held that the zoning 
verification letter constituted a significant affirmative 
governmental act.  Finding that Crucible satisfied all the 
elements set forth in Code § 15.2-2307, the circuit court held 
that Crucible had a vested right to develop a school on its 
property on a “by right” basis. 
ANALYSIS 
The Board argues that the circuit court erred because 
Crucible was required to seek a vested rights determination from 
the zoning administrator before seeking relief from the circuit 
court, and as Crucible failed to do so, the circuit court lacked 
jurisdiction to consider the case.  Crucible argues that it did 
not have to obtain a “vested rights” determination from the 
zoning administrator before it could seek relief in the circuit 
court, because both the zoning administrator and the circuit 
court have concurrent jurisdiction to make vested rights 
determinations. 
In Holland v. Johnson, 241 Va. 553, 556, 403 S.E.2d 356, 
358 (1991), this Court stated that a zoning administrator did 
not have the statutory authority to make a vested rights 
determination. Further, we stated, “A vested right in a land use 
 
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is a property right which is created and protected by law.  An 
adjudication regarding the creation, existence, or termination 
of that right can be made only by a court of competent 
jurisdiction.”  Id. at 556, 403 S.E.2d at 358. 
Thereafter, the General Assembly amended former Code 
§ 15.1-491, the predecessor of current Code § 15.2-2286, to 
grant zoning administrators the authority to make vested rights 
determinations.  See 1993 Acts ch. 672.1  Thus, the issue of 
whether a party must seek a vested rights determination from a 
zoning administrator before seeking relief from a circuit court 
concerns statutory interpretation; such a holding is subject to 
de novo review on appeal.  See Conyers v. Martial Arts World of 
Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007).   
 
It is an established principle of statutory interpretation 
that “[a] statute prescribing a new remedy for an existing right 
should never be construed to abolish a pre-existing remedy in 
the absence of express words or necessary implication.”  Levy v. 
Davis, 115 Va. 814, 821, 80 S.E. 791, 794 (1914).  Further, 
“ ‘[w]hen a statute gives a new remedy, and contains no 
negative, express or implied, of the old remedy, the new one 
                     
1 Former Code § 15.1-491 was repealed effective December 1, 
1997, and its provisions were partially incorporated into Code 
§ 15.2-2286 by 1997 Acts ch. 587.  Code § 15.2-2286 currently 
provides zoning administrators with statutory authority to make 
vested rights determinations.  Because the constitutionality of 
 
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provided by it is cumulative, and the party may elect between 
the two.’ ”  Id. (citations omitted). 
Historically, circuit courts have been empowered to make 
vested rights determinations.  See Holland, 241 Va. at 555-56, 
403 S.E.2d at 357-58.  Code § 15.2-2286 did not divest the 
circuit court of this power; Code § 15.2-2286 does not state 
that a zoning administrator is required to make a vested rights 
determination before a party can seek a vested rights 
determination from a circuit court nor does it make the zoning 
administrator’s authority exclusive.  Thus, the circuit court 
did not err in allowing Crucible to obtain a vested rights 
determination from the circuit court without first obtaining a 
vested rights determination from the zoning administrator. 
 
The next issue we consider is whether Crucible acquired a 
vested right in its planned use of its property as a result of 
the zoning verification letter.  Code § 15.2-2307 states that a 
land owner may establish a vested right when the landowner “(i) 
obtains or is the beneficiary of a significant affirmative 
governmental act which remains in effect allowing development of 
a specific project, (ii) relies in good faith on the significant 
affirmative governmental act, and (iii) incurs extensive 
obligations or substantial expenses in diligent pursuit of the 
                                                                  
Code § 15.2-2286 has not been raised as an issue in this appeal, 
we do not consider the issue.  
 
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specific project in reliance on the significant affirmative 
governmental act.” 
 
The three specific conditions stated in Code § 15.2-2307 – 
that the landowner has been the beneficiary of a significant 
affirmative governmental act allowing development of a specific 
project, that the landowner relied upon that governmental act in 
good faith, and that the landowner has incurred extensive 
obligations or substantial expenses in pursuit of the specific 
project – must each be met before the right to maintain a 
permissible use in the future will be deemed to have vested.  
Hale v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 277 Va. 250, 272, 673 S.E.2d 
170, 181 (2009).  “ ‘[T]he mere reliance on a particular zoning 
classification, whether created by ordinance or variance, 
creates no vested right in the property owner.’ ”  City of 
Suffolk v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 266 Va. 137, 145, 580 S.E.2d 
796, 799 (2003) (quoting Snow v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 248 
Va. 404, 408, 448 S.E.2d 606, 608-09 (1994)). 
 
A specific affirmative governmental act is a prerequisite 
to the acquisition of a vested right in a land use.  Code 
§ 15.2-2307.  Regarding specific affirmative governmental acts, 
the Code states as follows: 
For purposes of this section and without 
limitation, the following are deemed to be significant 
affirmative governmental acts allowing development of 
a specific project: (i) the governing body has 
accepted proffers or proffered conditions which 
 
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specify use related to a zoning amendment; (ii) the 
governing body has approved an application for a 
rezoning for a specific use or density; (iii) the 
governing body or board of zoning appeals has granted 
a special exception or use permit with conditions; 
(iv) the board of zoning appeals has approved a 
variance; (v) the governing body or its designated 
agent has approved a preliminary subdivision plat, 
site plan or plan of development for the landowner's 
property and the applicant diligently pursues approval 
of the final plat or plan within a reasonable period 
of time under the circumstances; or (vi) the governing 
body or its designated agent has approved a final 
subdivision plat, site plan or plan of development for 
the landowner's property. 
 
Code § 15.2-2307 (emphasis added). 
Crucible admits that the zoning administrator’s zoning 
verification letter is not encompassed within any one of the six 
enumerated examples of significant affirmative governmental 
acts.  The parties agree, however, that the list is not 
exhaustive due to the “without limitation” language included in 
the statute. 
Prior to the amendment of Code § 15.2-2307 by 1998 Acts ch. 
801, a vested rights determination was made purely in reliance 
on this Court’s developed body of jurisprudence.  Board of 
Zoning Appeals v. CaseLin Sys., Inc., 256 Va. 206, 210-11, 501 
S.E.2d 397, 400 (1998).  Code § 15.2-2307 sets forth six actions 
that, as a matter of law, constitute a significant affirmative 
governmental act.  When an act does not fall within one of the 
enumerated significant affirmative governmental acts in Code 
§ 15.2-2307, we rely on this Court’s case law to determine 
 
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whether a particular act constitutes a significant affirmative 
governmental act. 
The alleged significant affirmative governmental act should 
be interpreted according to the plain meaning of the language 
used in the act.  See Hale, 277 Va. at 273-74, 673 S.E.2d at 
182.  The rights that vest as a result of a significant 
affirmative governmental act are only those rights that the 
government affirmatively acts upon, and the evidence to support 
the claim to those rights must be clear, express, and 
unambiguous.  Id. at 274, 673 S.E.2d at 182.  “[W]hen a 
landowner has only a future expectation that he will be allowed 
to develop his property in accord with its current 
classification under the local zoning ordinance, there is ‘no 
vested property right in the continuation of the land’s existing 
zoning status.’ ”  Id. at 271, 673 S.E.2d at 180 (quoting 
CaseLin Sys., 256 Va. at 210, 501 S.E.2d at 400).  Also, 
statements of the zoning board’s general support of the plan and 
informal assurances of future approval are not enough to 
constitute a significant affirmative governmental act.  CaseLin 
Sys., 256 Va. at 212-13, 501 S.E.2d at 401-02. 
The zoning administrator stated in the verification letter, 
“Your presentation that was given [in] Stafford County [on] May 
6, 2004, demonstrated that your facility would be classified a 
‘school’ by definition of Stafford County Zoning Ordinance.  
 
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Verification is valid as of May 11, 2004 and is subject to 
change.”  According to the plain meaning of the language used in 
the zoning verification, the zoning administrator did not 
affirmatively approve the project.  There was no commitment 
contained within the zoning verification.  The zoning 
administrator simply answered the question concerning the 
classification of Crucible’s project according to the Stafford 
County Zoning Ordinance in place on the date the request was 
made.  The zoning administrator specifically stated that the 
verification was subject to change.  A statement of zoning 
classification, such as contained in the zoning verification 
letter, is not a significant affirmative governmental act.  See 
City of Suffolk, 266 Va. at 145, 580 S.E.2d at 799. 
Crucible also argues that because the Board did not 
challenge on appeal the circuit court’s finding that the zoning 
verification was a “determination” of the zoning administrator, 
Code § 15.2-2311(C)2 establishes an alternative basis for vesting 
                     
2 Code § 15.2-2311(C) states in part: 
 
In no event shall a written order, requirement, 
decision or determination made by the zoning 
administrator or other administrative officer be 
subject to change, modification or reversal by any 
zoning administrator or other administrative officer 
after 60 days have elapsed from the date of the 
written order, requirement, decision or determination 
where the person aggrieved has materially changed his 
position in good faith reliance on the action of the 
zoning administrator or other administrative officer 
 
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in addition to Code § 15.2-2307.  Crucible bases this argument 
on language from Goyonaga v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 275 Va. 
232, 244, 657 S.E.2d 153, 160 (2008), stating “Code § 15.2-
2311(C) . . . provide[s] for the potential vesting of a right to 
use property in a manner that ‘otherwise would not have been 
allowed.’ ”  (quoting Snow, 248 Va. at 407, 448 S.E.2d at 608.) 
Crucible’s reliance on Goyonaga is misplaced.  The zoning 
verification letter merely stated that Crucible’s facility fell 
within the definition of “school” according to the then-current 
zoning laws and that those laws were subject to change.  The 
zoning verification letter did not permit Crucible to use its 
property in a way that was otherwise not allowed under then-
current zoning laws, and Crucible cannot establish a right to 
proceed based upon Code § 15.2-2311(C). 
We hold that the zoning administrator’s zoning verification 
letter was not a significant affirmative governmental act, and 
the circuit court erred in holding that Crucible had a vested 
right to develop its new training facility on the property that 
was the subject of the zoning verification letter.  Accordingly, 
we will affirm that portion of the circuit court’s judgment 
concerning jurisdiction to make a vested rights determination, 
                                                                  
unless it is proven that such written order, 
requirement, decision or determination was obtained 
through malfeasance of the zoning administrator or 
other administrative officer or through fraud. 
 
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and reverse the circuit court’s judgment that Crucible has a 
vested right in a land use.  We will enter final judgment for 
the Board. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and final judgment. 
 
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