Case Title: Rodriguez v. Mass. Parole Board

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13197

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-09-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13197 
 
JOSE RODRIGUEZ  vs.  MASSACHUSETTS PAROLE BOARD. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     March 7, 2022. – September 6, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Parole.  Imprisonment, Parole.  Administrative Law, Decision, 
Judicial review. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
May 6, 2020. 
 
The case was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J., on motions 
for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Melissa Allen Celli for the plaintiff. 
Todd M. Blume, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
Benjamin Winters, of the District of Columbia, & Caitriona 
Fitzgerald, for Electronic Privacy Information Center, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
Robert Hennessy, for private counsel division of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
BUDD, C.J.  The plaintiff, Jose Rodriguez, who is serving a 
life sentence for committing rape at the age of sixteen, sought 
review in the Superior Court of the parole board's (board's) 
fourth denial of his request for parole.  He now appeals from 
the judgment entered in favor of the board, arguing, as he did 
below, that he was denied the "meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release" that is to be afforded to juvenile offenders who have 
been sentenced to life in prison.  Diatchenko v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 12, 19 (2015) 
(Diatchenko II).  We affirm.1 
Background.  The following facts are taken from the board's 
record of decision.  The plaintiff initially was convicted of 
rape and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, 
crimes he committed when he was sixteen years old.2  Due to 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center and by the private counsel 
division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services and the 
Northeastern University School of Law Prisoners' Assistance 
Project. 
 
2 The board's decision details that 
 
"[o]n September 27, 1976, 16-year-old Jose Rodriguez raped 
and assaulted a Boston University student in Brookline.  As 
the woman walked from the train station, she soon realized 
that she was being followed.  A few minutes later, Mr. 
Rodriguez called out to her and, when she turned around, he 
pretended to ask for directions and walked toward her.  
When he arrived within a few feet of the woman, Mr. 
Rodriguez thrust a broken bottle under her throat, spun her 
 
3 
 
errors at trial, the convictions were overturned and the 
plaintiff was released on bail pending a new trial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296, 310 (1979).  The 
plaintiff thereafter fled to California, where he used an alias 
and lived as a fugitive for seven years.  During that time, the 
plaintiff was convicted of two other sexual offenses (as an 
adult).  Eventually, his parole officer discovered that the 
plaintiff had outstanding charges in Massachusetts.  On being 
extradited to Massachusetts, the plaintiff was retried and again 
convicted of rape and assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon.  He was sentenced to life in prison with the 
possibility of parole and a concurrent term of from eight to ten 
years in prison, respectively. 
At the parole hearing,3 the plaintiff apologized to the 
victim, explaining that "as a juvenile, he lived his life with 
little regard for the consequences of his actions" and "had an 
inability to cope with feelings of rejection and abandonment."  
He further "spoke of his own victimization when he was bullied" 
 
around, and pushed her up a driveway and into a backyard.  
He threw her to the ground, covered her head with his 
jacket, and raped her.  When Mr. Rodriguez left, the victim 
ran home and called the police." 
 
3 This hearing was held in 2019 and was the plaintiff's 
fourth parole hearing.  The plaintiff had his initial parole 
hearing in 2000, and he subsequently had parole hearings in 2006 
and 2013. 
4 
 
and described using drugs and alcohol from the age of twelve "to 
escape his problems." 
In its written decision, the board noted that the plaintiff 
had completed the sex offender treatment program, had been 
attending Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous, worked 
in the prison's clothing shop, and practiced Buddhism.  The 
board further noted its consideration of the testimony and 
report of Dr. Joseph Plaud and of a "risk and needs assessment." 
The board denied parole, concluding that the plaintiff 
"[was] not yet rehabilitated, and his release [was] not 
compatible with the welfare of society."  The board explained: 
"[The plaintiff] has a history of sexual assault cases.  
Most notably, he committed this brutal rape of a stranger 
and then committed two serious sexual assaults while on 
bail.  He has completed SOTP (Sex Offender Treatment 
Program), but only after several failures over the decades.  
He has made progress in his rehabilitation, but has yet to 
demonstrate a level of rehabilitative progress that would 
make his release compatible with the welfare of society." 
 
The plaintiff sought relief in the Superior Court in the 
nature of certiorari under G. L. c. 249, § 4.  The judge 
affirmed the board's decision.  The plaintiff appealed, and then 
petitioned this court for direct appellate review, which we 
granted. 
Discussion.  1.  Legal framework.  Because the granting of 
parole is a discretionary function of the executive branch, the 
role of the judiciary generally is limited to ensuring that the 
5 
 
board's decision and proceedings are constitutional and 
consistent with any applicable statutes.  Deal v. Massachusetts 
Parole Bd., 484 Mass. 457, 460 (2020).  See, e.g., Crowell v. 
Massachusetts Parole Bd., 477 Mass. 106 (2017) (reviewing claims 
that board's parole decision violated Massachusetts Constitution 
and Federal and State statutes by discriminating against 
prisoner on basis of his disability).  Our role does not extend 
to reviewing the board's highly discretionary determination 
whether "there is a reasonable probability that, if the prisoner 
is released . . . , the prisoner will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law and that release is not incompatible 
with the welfare of society."  G. L. c. 127, § 130.  "This is in 
conformity to the sharp and strict separation of the 
legislative, the executive and the judicial departments of 
government in art[.] 30 of our Declaration of Rights."  
Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 303 (2014), quoting 
Sheehan, petitioner, 254 Mass. 342, 345 (1926).  See Committee 
for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court (No. 
1), 484 Mass. 431, 451, S.C., 484 Mass. 1029 (2020), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Amirault, 415 Mass. 112, 117 (1993) ("judge 
cannot nullify the discretionary actions of the parole board"); 
Woods v. State Bd. of Parole, 351 Mass. 556, 559 (1967) ("The 
granting of a parole is discretionary. . . .  The board may not 
6 
 
be required to exercise any discretion for the benefit of a 
prisoner"). 
Consistent with these principles, we review a board's 
parole decision of a juvenile offender sentenced to life in 
prison for whether the decision is consistent with such an 
offender's right to a meaningful opportunity for parole under 
art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  See Deal, 
484 Mass. at 461.  This right derives from our holding that 
because juveniles have "diminished culpability and greater 
prospects for reform," sentencing a juvenile to life without the 
possibility of parole would violate the prohibition on cruel or 
unusual punishments in art. 26.  Id. at 460, quoting Diatchenko 
v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 659-
660 (2013) (Diatchenko I).  To ensure that juvenile offenders 
who have been sentenced to life in prison have not been 
sentenced to what functionally is life without parole, they must 
receive a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation" (alteration omitted).  
Deal, supra at 461, quoting Diatchenko I, supra at 674. 
As we announced in Diatchenko II, this requires that, when 
such offenders apply for parole, they have access to counsel 
and, in certain contexts, funds for expert witnesses.  
Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 24, 27-28.  It also means that, in 
assessing the likelihood of reoffense, see G. L. c. 127, § 130, 
7 
 
the board must take into account any youth-related factors that 
may have contributed to the offense,4 as well as whether these 
factors have fallen away through the juvenile's rehabilitative 
efforts or natural transition into adulthood.  See Deal, 484 
Mass. at 461.  Finally, it means that, if the board denies 
parole, the juvenile offender is entitled to judicial review of 
whether the board complied with its obligation to so consider 
any youth-related factors.  See id.  However, as long as the 
board did so, there is no art. 26 violation; for the reasons 
described supra, we will not second-guess the board's 
discretionary judgment that, based on all the information before 
the board, the juvenile offender's release is not compatible 
with the welfare of society. 
Two clarifications are in order regarding the Diatchenko II 
framework:  one concerning which juvenile offenders qualify for 
the protections announced therein and one concerning when those 
protections apply.  As to who qualifies, although we have 
expressly addressed juvenile homicide offenders, see, e.g., 
Deal, 484 Mass. at 460; Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 29; 
Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 672, our reasoning in the Diatchenko 
 
4 These factors include, inter alia, a "lack of maturity and 
an underdeveloped sense of responsibility," "vulnerability to 
negative influences and outside pressures," and a "unique 
capacity to change as they grow older" (quotation omitted).  
Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 30, quoting Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. 
at 660. 
8 
 
cases applies with equal or greater force to juveniles sentenced 
to life in prison for nonhomicide offenses.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Lutskov, 480 Mass. 575, 583-584 (2018) (statutorily mandated 
minimum sentence for armed home invasion presumptively violates 
art. 26 as applied to juvenile offender where sentence results 
in longer parole ineligibility period than would be imposed for 
murder committed by juvenile); Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 
677, 685-686 (2017) (Perez I), quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48, 69 (2010) ("defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, 
or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less 
deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are 
murderers"; aggregate term-of-years sentence for nonhomicide 
offenses committed by juvenile that results in longer parole 
ineligibility period than would be imposed for murder committed 
by juvenile presumptively violates art. 26).  There is no 
reasoned basis to provide the constitutional protections 
announced in the Diatchenko cases to juvenile offenders 
sentenced to life for homicide offenses but not to juvenile 
offenders sentenced to life for nonhomicide offenses.  
Accordingly, the protections outlined in Diatchenko II, 
including judicial review, apply to all juvenile offenders 
sentenced to life in prison, not only to those sentenced to life 
for homicide. 
9 
 
However, each juvenile offender is entitled to receive 
judicial review of only one parole denial (any of the offender's 
choosing).  Once judicial review confirms that the board denied 
parole after properly considering youth-related factors and 
concluding that the juvenile offender had not realized the 
"greater prospects for reform" distinctive of youth, Diatchenko 
II, 471 Mass. at 30, quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 
471 (2012), the offender has received the meaningful opportunity 
to obtain release to which he or she was entitled under art. 26.  
See Deal, 484 Mass. at 461.  Because the youth-related factors 
are static, the board need not reconsider them at subsequent 
review hearings, and judicial review of subsequent parole 
denials is therefore unnecessary.5  See Diatchenko II, supra at 
 
5 A defendant may not be sentenced to a prison term (let 
alone life in prison) unless he or she was at least fourteen 
years of age at the time of the crime.  See G. L. c. 119, §§ 52 
(defining "youthful offender" as between the ages of fourteen 
and eighteen), 58 (unlike child adjudicated delinquent, child 
adjudicated youthful offender may receive sentence provided by 
law for offense), 74 (general limitations on criminal 
proceedings against children).  In addition, the earliest such a 
juvenile offender sentenced to life is eligible to apply for 
parole is after having completed fifteen years of his or her 
sentence.  See G. L. c. 265, § 2; G. L. c. 279, § 24.  Thus, any 
juvenile offender sentenced to life in prison would be well into 
adulthood at the time of his or her first parole review hearing.  
If the juvenile offender has not rehabilitated by that time, he 
or she simply has not realized the "greater prospects for 
reform" distinctive of youth.  Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 30, 
quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.  Of course, the juvenile 
offender still may demonstrate rehabilitation at a subsequent 
 
10 
 
33 ("the judiciary's only role in these cases [is] to ensure 
. . . that the board properly has taken into account the 
offender's status as a child when the crime was committed" 
[emphasis added]).  From that point forward, like other 
offenders who seek parole, as discussed supra, juvenile 
offenders sentenced to life in prison ordinarily will not be 
entitled to judicial review of parole denials. 
Here, we have before us the board's denial of the 
plaintiff's fourth application for parole.  His previous parole 
hearings took place prior to the publication of Diatchenko II in 
2015, see note 3, supra, and the record does not reflect that he 
received judicial review in connection with any prior denial of 
parole.  Accordingly, we provide such review now. 
2.  Application.  Because the board in its decision 
considered a set of facts that reasonably may be connected to 
the various youth-related factors, we affirm.  Compare Deal, 484 
Mass. at 462-463.  The decision notes that "as a juvenile, [the 
plaintiff] lived his life with little regard for the 
consequences of his actions," which bears on the plaintiff's 
"lack of maturity" and "underdeveloped sense of responsibility."  
Id. at 460, quoting Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 30.  The 
 
review hearing; however, that rehabilitation would have occurred 
between two points in adulthood (the initial parole denial and 
the next review opportunity) and therefore be disconnected from 
the "prospects for reform" distinctive of youth.  Id. 
11 
 
decision also acknowledges that the plaintiff was "victimiz[ed]" 
and "bullied" as a child, which relates to his "vulnerability to 
. . . outside pressures."  Id.  Finally, the decision recognizes 
that the plaintiff had completed the sex offender treatment 
program and had been attending Alcoholics Anonymous and 
Narcotics Anonymous, which implicate his "capacity to change as 
[he] grow[s] older."  Id.  "[T]he decision's inclusion of these 
facts supports the board's certification that it did consider 
the [youth-related] factors in a noncursory way."  Deal, supra 
462-463. 
The plaintiff contends that the board insufficiently 
considered his advanced age and his rehabilitative efforts as 
factors weighing in favor of his release,6 insufficiently 
explained its reasons for denying him parole in its written 
decision,7 utilized an inappropriate tool (Level of Service/Case 
 
6 The plaintiff points to Plaud's conclusion that the 
plaintiff was not "a significant risk to public safety regarding 
sexual recidivism" if released, based largely on the plaintiff's 
advanced age. 
 
7 To the extent that the plaintiff argues that, as a matter 
of statutory interpretation, G. L. c. 127, § 130, requires that 
the board comprehensively detail its reasons for denying parole 
and recite each fact it considered in support of those reasons, 
we agree with the board that G. L. c. 127, § 130, requires only 
that the board indicate the reasons for its decision in summary 
form and that the board's decision here does so, if only barely.  
See G. L. c. 127, § 130 (board's written decision "shall contain 
a summary statement of the case indicating the reasons for the 
 
12 
 
Management Inventory) to perform the statutorily required "risk 
and needs assessment," and prejudiced his future attempts to 
secure parole by failing to release its decision until ten 
months after his review hearing.  These arguments fall outside 
the scope of our review.  We have emphasized that our review is 
limited to determining whether the board has taken into account 
the youth-related factors in making its decision, and that we 
will remand the decision only if the board has failed to do so.  
See Deal, 484 Mass. at 461; Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 31.  As 
explained supra, we conclude that the board has taken youth-
related attributes into account in coming to its decision; the 
plaintiff does not argue otherwise. 
Apart from his invocation of protections for juvenile 
offenders sentenced to life imprisonment flowing from art. 26 as 
 
decision"); 120 Code Mass. Regs. § 301.08 (2017) ("When release 
on parole is denied, [the board] shall provide the inmate with a 
written summary of the reasons supporting the decision . . ."). 
 
With the acknowledgment that the board released its 
decision in this case without the benefit of our decision in 
Deal, we repeat here what we emphasized there:  it would be 
better for the board to identify the facts it relies on in 
denying parole and to explain why those facts demonstrate that 
the applicant's recidivism risk is too high for release, 
notwithstanding that the applicant has aged out of childhood and 
thus potentially has outgrown any attributes of youth that may 
have contributed to the commission of the offense.  See Deal, 
484 Mass. at 464-465.  See also id. at 466-468 (Gants, C.J., 
concurring); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564, 591 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("it is not 
burdensome to give reasons when reasons exist"). 
13 
 
interpreted in Diatchenko II, the plaintiff anchors his 
challenges in vague appeals to constitutional due process 
guarantees.  However, we previously have held that prisoners in 
the Commonwealth lack due process rights in connection with 
their parole applications under the Federal Constitution.8 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
Superior Court's judgment affirming the board's decision to deny 
the plaintiff release on parole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
8 See Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987), 
quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional 
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11 (1979) (Federal due process clause 
guarantees prisoners procedurally sound parole decision only if 
State parole statute creates "expectation of parole"); 
Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 18 (Massachusetts parole statute, 
G. L. c. 127, § 130, does not create expectation of parole).  We 
have not had occasion to decide whether art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights affords prisoners generally 
any due process rights in connection with their parole 
applications, see Quegan v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 423 Mass. 
834, 836 (1996); Greenman v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 405 Mass. 
384, 388 n.3 (1989), and we decline to do so sua sponte, see 
Guardianship of Penate, 477 Mass. 268, 279 n.12 (2017) 
(declining to address issue not addressed by party in brief on 
appeal); Maxwell v. AIG Dom. Claims, Inc., 460 Mass. 91, 112 
n.14 (2011) (issues that have "not been presented by the parties 
. . . accordingly[] are not addressed [on] appeal").