Case Title: Commonwealth v. Magdalenski

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11701

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11701 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CHRISTOPHER G. MAGDALENSKI. 
 
 
May 22, 2015. 
 
 
Evidence, Cross-examination, Bias, Impeachment of credibility.  
Witness, Cross-examination, Bias, Impeachment. 
 
 
 
After a jury trial in the Northampton Division of the 
District Court Department, the defendant, Christopher 
Magdalenski, was convicted of one count of assault and battery 
in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13A, against his sister, Bethany 
Magdalenski.1  In an unpublished memorandum and order pursuant to 
Appeals Court rule 1:28, the Appeals Court affirmed the 
conviction.  Commonwealth v. Magdalenski, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 1104 
(2014).  We granted Christopher's application for further 
appellate review to address whether the trial judge abused his 
discretion in excluding evidence of the Commonwealth witnesses' 
alleged bias, prejudice, and motive to prevaricate.  We reverse 
and remand for a new trial. 
 
 
Christopher claims that he did not assault Bethany.  
Instead, he alleges that he was the victim of an unprovoked 
attack by Bethany's boyfriend, William Graham, an off-duty 
Worthington police officer, and that Bethany was accidentally 
injured in the process.  His principal contention is that 
Bethany and Graham fabricated their allegations against him in 
order to justify Graham's actions, specifically, that they were 
motivated to prevaricate because of Graham's concern that his 
own actions would have criminal consequences and professional 
consequences for his career as a police officer.  The trial 
judge, however, precluded Christopher from impeaching Bethany's 
                                                          
 
 
1 Because the defendant and his sister have the same last 
name, we refer to them by their first names. 
2 
 
 
 
and Graham's testimony with an application for a criminal 
complaint that was filed at Christopher's behest against Graham 
regarding the incident; evidence suggesting that Christopher was 
coerced to withdraw the application because of threats and other 
statements made essentially by Bethany and Graham; and related 
evidence.  The trial judge ruled that, because no criminal 
charges were pending against Graham, there was no occasion to 
consider the application, the circumstances under which it was 
withdrawn, or related matters. 
 
 
"It is a basic rule that reasonable cross-examination for 
the purpose of showing bias and prejudice is a matter of right."  
Commonwealth v. Martin, 434 Mass. 1016, 1017 (2001), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 384 Mass. 377, 380 (1981).  Although a 
trial judge has discretion to limit cross-examination when 
necessary, "he or she has no discretion to prohibit all inquiry 
into [a subject that could show bias or prejudice on the part of 
the witness]" (citation omitted), Commonwealth v. Tam Bui, 419 
Mass. 392, 400, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 861 (1995), even where 
the possibility of bias is remote, provided that the theory of 
bias is not "too tenuous."  Id. at 401.  See Martin, supra.  In 
this case, irrespective of whether criminal charges were pending 
against Graham at the time of trial, evidence that Bethany and 
Graham were aware of the application, that they coerced 
Christopher to withdraw his application, that they made false 
statements to police officers and others, and that it was Graham 
who was the aggressor was relevant to Christopher's theory that 
both Bethany and Graham had a motive to prevaricate about the 
events in question and were biased and prejudiced against him. 
It was error for the judge to prohibit all questioning along 
these lines. 
 
 
This case is markedly similar to Martin, supra.  In that 
case, we held that the complainant's knowledge that the 
defendant previously applied for a complaint against her was 
relevant to show bias, and that "[i]t was error to bar all 
inquiry into the complainant's knowledge that the defendant 
previously applied for a complaint against her."  Id. at 1017.  
Although the application for the criminal complaint against 
Graham had been withdrawn by the time of trial, the judge should 
have permitted inquiry into Christopher's theory that he had 
been coerced to do so, not because his allegations were untrue, 
but because of threats and false statements made by Bethany and 
Graham.  See Commonwealth v. Ahearn, 370 Mass. 283, 286 (1976).  
As in Ahearn, the trial judge should have allowed Christopher to 
pursue this theory through extrinsic evidence and examination of 
witnesses because, if the evidence was credited by the jury, it 
3 
 
 
 
would have supported an inference of bias, prejudice, and motive 
to prevaricate. 
 
 
The defendant should have been permitted to question the 
prosecution witnesses, and offer evidence, concerning their 
bias, prejudice, and motive to prevaricate.  The judgment is 
reversed, the verdict is set aside, and the case is remanded for 
a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Jessica LaClair for the defendant. 
 
Cynthia M. Von Flatern, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth.