Case Title: Black v. Black

Citation: 469 So. 2d 1288

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1985-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
469 So. 2d 1288 (1985)
Lewis BLACK, Napoleon Black, Mattie Black and Black Family Farm, Inc.
v.
Alexander BLACK, et al.
84-72.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 19, 1985.
*1289 Carlos A. Williams of Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Turner, Selma, for appellants.
J. Milton Coxwell, Jr. of Coxwell and Coxwell, Monroeville, for appellees.
SHORES, Justice.
The plaintiffs appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the defendants in this action to recover damages for trespass in the cutting of timber on a twenty-acre tract of land in Monroe County. We affirm.
The heirs of Napoleon Black filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Monroe County, naming the heirs of Albert Black and Pedro Bell as defendants, alleging that the defendants negligently, or willfully, knowingly, and without consent, cut timber from their land in Monroe County. The defendants answered, alleging that they, with the exception of Pedro Bell, owned the land at the time of the alleged trespass, having acquired title by adverse possession. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appeal.
The plaintiffs urge this Court to reverse on the ground that the evidence produced at trial by the defendants in support of their claim of ownership was insufficient to support the jury's verdict.
The defendants insist that a post-trial motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) is necessary to preserve the right, on appeal, to attack the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial. They argue that the plaintiffs did not move for a JNOV following the trial, thus precluding this Court's review of that issue. We agree and, therefore, pretermit any further discussion of the facts in this case.
In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Sealy, 374 So. 2d 877, 880-82 (Ala.1979), the Court stated:
"The reason for requiring a party to move for J.N.O.V. is inherent in the very nature of Rule 50. Rule 50 sets up an interlocking set of procedures that allow a party to attack the sufficiency of his opponent's evidence. Those procedures are closely related and must be followed. Their interlocking relationship is demonstrated by the fact that a post-trial motion for J.N.O.V. is really just a renewal of a party's motion for directed verdict, and the J.N.O.V. motion cannot be granted unless the motion for directed verdict should have been granted.... Also inherent in Rule 50 is the intent to place the primary responsibility on the trial judge to determine the sufficiency of the evidence. To facilitate this responsibility Rule 50(b) allows the trial court to reserve a ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence until after the jury verdict. The United States Supreme Court in Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. [330 U.S. 212, 67 S. Ct. 752, 91 L. Ed. 849 (1947)] stated:
"The time period provided in Rule 50(b) is also an integral part of the Rule. The United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. [344 U.S. 48, 73 S. Ct. 125, 97 L. Ed. 77 (1952)], stated:
The plaintiffs in this case did not move for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence and, consequently, they were precluded from later making a motion for a JNOV following the trial. Therefore, the plaintiffs waived their right to attack the sufficiency of the defendants' evidence on appeal.
Other errors argued by the plaintiffs are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court entered pursuant to the jury's verdict is due to be, and it is hereby, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.