Case Title: JAY D. HOUX v. KATHY HOUX

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
JAY D. HOUX v. KATHY HOUX2006 WY 102140 P.3d 648Case Number: No. 05-260Decided: 08/15/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
JAY D. 
HOUX,                                   

Appellant 
(Defendant),

 
 
                   
v.

                                                                                                                        

KATHY 
HOUX,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff). 

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofPlatteCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
James A. 
Eddington, Jones & Eddington Law Offices, Torrington, Wyoming. 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Tracy L. 
Zubrod, Zubrod Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.           

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL9*9, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
9*9Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

[¶1] 
     Jay D. Houx 
(Husband) and Kathy Houx (Wife) were divorced in 2005.  In dividing the marital property, the 
trial court awarded the marital home to Husband and ordered him to pay Wife for 
her share of the home.  The trial 
court valued the marital home at $356,000the midpoint between the amount of an 
unaccepted purchase offer made on the property and the appraised value.  Husband appeals, claiming the district 
court abused its discretion in considering the purchase offer as evidence of the 
value of the home because the offer:  
1) was not accepted by the parties; 2) violated the statute of frauds; 
and 3) was not introduced as evidence at trial.  We affirm.  

  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Husband states 
the issue for our consideration as follows:

 
 
Did the 
trial court abuse its discretion in its valuation of the parties' real estate by 
considering an offer to purchase real estate that:

 
 
1.   was not accepted by either 
party;

2.   violates the statute of frauds; 
and

3.   was not offered nor accepted into 
evidence.

 
 
Wife 
states the issue as follows:

 
 
Did the 
district court properly distribute the marital property?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

            

[¶3]   Husband and Wife were married in 
1981.  In 1994, they purchased a 
home located at 216 East Cole 
Road in Wheatland, Wyoming, together with 154 acres of land.  In 2004, Wife filed for divorce.  Husband accepted service of the 
complaint for divorce and summons but did not file an answer.  The trial court entered an entry of 
default.  Two weeks later, the trial 
court entered a decree of divorce.  
In Husband's absence, the trial court accepted the values Wife placed on 
the property and her suggested division.1  Husband filed a motion to set aside the 
default and for relief from the decree.2  Following a hearing, the trial court 
ordered the default judgment set aside on the grounds Husband had now made an 
appearance and the divorce involved property of undetermined value requiring an 
evidentiary hearing prior to entry of a decree.    

 
 
[¶4]  In the meantime, Husband hired an 
appraiser to assess the value of the property. Husband's appraiser valued the 
home and 154 acres at $332,000.  
Wife also hired an appraiser.  
Based upon her understanding Husband might keep the home and twenty acres 
and sell the remainder of the property, she asked her appraiser to value only 
the home and twenty acres.  He 
valued that portion of the property at $204,000. 

 
 
[¶5]  Husband then listed the property for 
sale in three different parcels:  
the east end consisting of eighty acres at $1,800 per acre (a total list 
price of $144,000); the west end consisting of forty acres at $3,000 per acre (a 
total list price of $120,000); and the entire 154 acres and the home at a total 
list price of $395,000.  Husband 
quickly received a purchase offer of $380,000 for the entire property.  Husband and Wife mutually agreed not to 
accept the offer because they did not agree with the contingencies placed on the 
offer.3 

 
 
[¶6]  Thereafter, the trial court held an 
evidentiary hearing on Wife's complaint for divorce.  The parties presented evidence 
concerning the reasons for the divorce, their respective employment, retirement 
accounts, and life insurance policies, Husband's 401K, a time share in which 
Husband and Wife owned one-half interest, dental and vision insurance and the 
cost of the appraisals.  From the 
record before us, it appears the primary dispute concerned the value of the home 
and 154 acres of real property and how to equitably divide it between the 
parties.  Husband and Wife appear to 
have reached substantial agreement as to how to divide other assets and 
liabilities within the marital estate.

 
 
[¶7]  During the divorce trial, Wife called 
her appraiser to testify concerning his valuation of the home and twenty 
acres.  She also introduced the 
written appraisal as an exhibit.  
Wife then called Husband to testify.  Among other matters, he testified about 
listing the property for sale.  He 
testified he determined the price at which each parcel was listed himself, and 
received offers on the property.  
When Wife's counsel asked him about the offers, Husband's counsel 
objected on relevance grounds, asserting offers had no bearing on the issue 
before the court.  The trial court 
overruled the objection and Husband testified about the offers he received on 
the parcels, including the $380,000 offer for the entire property.   Although Wife's counsel referred 
to a copy of the written purchase offer during her examination of Husband, she 
did not attempt to introduce it into evidence and the individuals who made the 
offer were not called to testify.  
The only evidence concerning the $380,000 purchase offer was the 
testimony of Husband and Wife. 

 
 
[¶8]  During his testimony, Husband stated he 
believed the minimum fair market value for the entire property was $332,000, the 
amount at which his appraiser valued the property.  He stated he believed the maximum fair 
market value of the entire property was $395,000, the amount at which he listed 
the property.   

 
 
[¶9]  Wife testified and then rested her 
case.  Husband called his appraiser 
who testified he valued the entire property at $332,000.  Husband introduced a copy of the written 
appraisal as an exhibit.  Husband 
testified he calculated the value of the entire property at $332,000 based upon 
the appraisal.  From that amount he 
deducted the outstanding mortgage to arrive at a total equity of 
$102,258.38.  Dividing that figure 
in half, he testified he believed the party's respective equity in the property 
was $51,129.19.  From that amount, 
he deducted various expenses he believed were attributable to Wife, resulting in 
a proposed payment to Wife of $33,507.67 to equalize the property distribution. 

 
 
[¶10]  In rebuttal, Wife's counsel recalled 
Wife to the witness stand and introduced as an exhibit a summary of Wife's 
computation of her equity in the property.  
Wife valued the property at $468,000, the combined total of the $204,000 
appraisal of the house and twenty acres and Husband's list prices of $144,000 
for the eighty acre parcel and $120,000 for the forty acre parcel.  From the $468,000, she deducted the 
outstanding mortgage, divided the resulting figure by two and arrived at a 
figure of $128,000 for her equity in the property.  

 
 
[¶11] In 
its ruling at the close of the evidence, the trial court valued the property at 
$356,000, the mid-point between the $380,000 purchase offer and the $332,000 
appraisal value.  From that figure, 
the district court deducted the outstanding mortgage and divided the resulting 
figure of $143,774.15 in half, leaving $71,887.07 in  equity for each party.  The trial court then deducted other 
expenses attributable to each party and arrived at a figure of $54,896.80 to be 
paid by Husband to Wife in exchange for Husband receiving the home and 
acreage.  Husband appeals the 
property division, claiming evidence of the unaccepted purchase offer was not 
admissible. 

 
 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶12]  The disposition of marital property is 
committed to the sound discretion of the district court.  DeJohn v. DeJohn, 2005 WY 140, ¶ 11, 121 P.3d 802, 807 (Wyo. 2005).  In 
considering whether a district court abused its discretion, we ask whether the 
trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether or not any facet of 
its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.  Id.  We 
consider only the evidence in favor of the successful party, ignore the evidence 
of the unsuccessful party, and grant to the successful party every reasonable 
inference that can be drawn from the record.  Id.   
We evaluate whether the trial court's property division is, in fact, 
equitable from the perspective of the overall distribution of marital assets and 
liabilities rather than from a narrow focus on the effects of any particular 
disposition.  DeJohn, ¶ 
12, 121 P.3d  at 807-08.   We do 
not disturb the division of property except on clear grounds as the trial court 
is usually in a better position than the appellate court to judge the parties' 
respective merits and needs.  
Id.

 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶13]  Husband contends the district court 
abused its discretion in considering the purchase offer as evidence of the value 
of the marital home.  Citing State Highway Comm'n v. Triangle Dev. 
Co., 369 P.2d 864, 868 (Wyo. 1962), he asserts the law is clear that 
an offer to purchase is inadmissible for purposes of establishing value.  Given this clear rule of law, Husband 
argues, the district court committed an error of law and thereby abused its 
discretion in considering the purchase offer as evidence of the property's 
value.

 
 
[¶14]  In response, Wife asserts State Highway Comm'n was a condemnation 
case and the rule making purchase offers inadmissible to establish value applies 
only in that context.  She further 
contends the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the 
purchase offer given she had no input on the listing price and Husband believed 
the listing price represented fair market value.  Additionally, she argues the district 
court may have appropriately discounted Husband's appraisal because the 
appraiser's report incorrectly stated the home had not been listed for sale in 
the last three years and may have relied on comparable sales over three years 
old.  In any event, Wife contends, 
there was no abuse of discretion because the district court looked at a number 
of indications of value, not just the purchase offer. 

 
 
[¶15]  We begin our discussion with State Highway Comm'n, an eminent domain 
case in which the State Highway Commission condemned land belonging to Triangle 
Development Co.  A jury was asked to 
determine the value of the property for purposes of compensating the owner for 
the condemned property.  At trial, 
the district court admitted into evidence over the State's objection a written 
offer to purchase the property for a specified amount which the owner 
rejected.  The State claimed on 
appeal it was error to admit the offer as evidence of value.  We agreed, holding unaccepted offers to 
purchase land inadmissible to prove value in condemnation proceedings. 

 
 
[¶16]  In reaching this result, we adopted the 
view held by many courts that have considered the issue.  As stated in Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annot., 
Unaccepted Offer For Purchase of Real 
Property as Evidence of its Value, 25 A.L.R.4th 571 (1983):

 
 
Although 
it has been frequently held that the price at which property is bought and sold 
is admissible upon the issue of value, many courts have adopted the general view 
that evidence of unaccepted offers to purchase the property in question is not 
admissible as evidence of the property's value in condemnation cases . . . and 
in other cases involving a question as to the property's value. . . . As support 
for this view, courts have noted the uncertain and speculative nature of 
testimony of offers to purchase, the hearsay problems associated with testimony 
relating to such offers, and the collateral nature of the issues raised in the 
course of evaluating an offer to purchase.

 
 

Id. at 
575.  We found this reasoning 
persuasive in State Highway Comm'n 
and we have adhered to the rule in subsequent condemnation cases.  We have not, however, considered its 
application in other contexts. 

 
 
[¶17]  Courts that have considered the rule in 
other types of cases requiring property valuation have reached varying 
results.  See Gilbus, Annot., 25 A.L.R.4th 571, §§ 4 and 8.  Of the cases cited in the Annotation, 
only one involved a divorce proceeding.  
In Elrod v. Elrod, 517 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. 
1974), the court held without discussion that unaccepted offers to purchase a 
homestead tract were inadmissible.  
Other courts addressing the issue in other contexts have held to the 
contrary, usually allowing the evidence because the party making the offer 
testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination and the testimony showed 
the offer was not speculative or ill-informed.  See Evans v. Sawtooth Partners, 723 P.2d 925 
(Idaho App. 1986), where the court upheld admission of the evidence because the 
offerer testified in person, there was no hearsay or confrontation problem, the 
offer was detailed and accompanied by earnest money and there was no indication 
the offer was frivolous, speculative or ill-informed.  Evans and other cases applying this 
reasoning are not helpful to the current analysis because in the instant case 
the individuals who made the offer on the Houx property did not testify at 
trial.  For other reasons, however, 
we find no error of law or abuse of discretion in admission of the purchase 
offer and uphold its admission into evidence in the divorce trial.  In reaching this result, we do not 
overrule State Highway Comm'n.  We simply decline to apply the rule 
established there to the particular facts of this case.

 
 
[¶18]  Our conclusion that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion is based upon two interrelated factors.  First, as will be explained more fully 
in the next paragraph, the particular facts of this case do not give rise to the 
same hearsay and speculation concerns that led to our holding in State Highway Comm'n.  Second, our statutory scheme for 
distribution of marital property requires our courts to consider the respective 
merits of the parties in forming a distributive scheme appropriate to the 
particular circumstances of each individual case.  Under the particular circumstances 
presented here, we find the trial court acted appropriately and within its 
discretion in considering each party's valuation of the property and weighing 
the merits of those valuations in forming a just and equitable disposition of 
the property.  Inherent in that 
statutory balancing process is the task of weeding out frivolous, speculative 
and ill-informed claims.  

 
 
[¶19]  As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, 
we do not have the same hearsay or speculation concerns that we had in State Highway Comm'n.  In the instant case, the party now 
claiming error in the admission of the testimony is the same party who listed 
the property for sale, determined the list price and listed the property at a 
price higher than the purchase offer which he claims the trial court erred in 
considering.  Additionally, the 
party now claiming error is the same party who testified he believed the 
purchase offer was within the minimum and maximum range of the property's fair 
market value. Under our statutory scheme for the distribution of property in a 
divorce proceeding, this testimony was relevant and admissible. 

 
 
[¶20]  Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 20-2-114 (LexisNexis 2005) 
provides:

 
 
            
In granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the 
property of the parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the 
respective merits of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by 
the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens 
imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and children.  The court may decree to either party 
reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for the other's 
ability to pay and may order so much of the other's real estate or the rents and 
profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either party for 
life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either 
party.

 
 
Regarding 
this provision, we have said:

 
 
The 
division of marital property is within the trial court's sound discretion, and 
we will not disturb that division absent an abuse of discretion. A just and 
equitable distribution is as likely as not to be unequal. We evaluate whether 
the trial court's property division is, in fact, equitable from the perspective 
of the overall distribution of marital assets and liabilities rather than from a 
narrow focus on the effects of any particular disposition. From that 
perspective, we afford the trial court considerable discretion to form a 
distributive scheme appropriate to the particular circumstances of each 
individual case, and we will not disturb such a scheme absent a showing that the 
trial court clearly abused its discretion. The division of property in a divorce 
case should not be disturbed except on clear grounds as the trial court is 
usually in a better position that the appellate court to judge the parties' 
respective merits and needs.

 
 

Sweat v. 
Sweat, 2003 
WY 82, ¶ 6, 72 P.3d 276, 278(Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶21]  As set forth in detail in the fact 
section above, the trial court had before it evidence of an appraisal valuing 
the property at $332,000.  It also 
had before it evidence showing Husband listed the property for $395,000 and 
believed that amount represented the maximum fair market value of the 
property.  Evidence was also 
presented that Husband received an offer on the property of $380,000.  In addition to this evidence, the trial 
court heard testimony from Wife showing she valued the property at $468,000 
based in part on Husband's list price for two of the parcels.  The trial court also heard testimony 
concerning the parties' respective employment, earnings, retirement accounts, 
insurance policies, a 401K, a time share and other assets and liabilities.  Finally, the trial court heard testimony 
and considered exhibits reflecting each party's calculations of the amount 
Husband owed Wife in exchange for keeping the marital home and acreage.  Wife presented the figure of 
$128,000.00; Husband presented the figure of $33,507.67. 

 
 
[¶22]  The trial court considered all of this 
evidence in an effort to arrive at a "just and equitable" distribution, "having 
regard for the respective merits of the parties and the condition in which they 
[would] be left by the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired 
and the burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party."  Section 20-2-114.  Based upon the testimony and evidence 
presented, the trial court determined Husband owed Wife $54,896.80 in exchange 
for receiving the home and real property -- $73,103.32 less than Wife requested 
and $21,389.13 more than Husband claimed he should be required to pay.  

 
 
[¶23]   We have said:  

 
 
[W]ith 
respect to the valuation of marital assets, trial courts must exercise 
discretion and adjudicate marital property dispositions on a case-by-case basis 
using the best possible valuation method appropriate for that particular 
case.  

 
 

Wallop 
v. Wallop, 2004 
WY 46, ¶ 5, 88 P.3d 1022, 1024 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
Moreover, 
issues of credibility and the weight to be given to testimony are matters to be 
resolved by the trier of fact, not an appellate court.  Thus, we may not substitute our judgment 
for that of a trial court with respect to issues concerning credibility.  

 
 

Id., ¶ 10, 
88 P.3d  at 1025.

 
 
We are 
not convinced that it is appropriate, let alone prudent, to tie the hands of the 
trial courts in their efforts to comply with the statute and make a just and 
reasonable division of property.  
Each divorce case is different, and we believe the longstanding rule 
which affords the trial court broad discretion . . . . is the appropriate 
one.  This court has recognized on 
numerous occasions the importance in allowing a trial court broad discretion in 
determining what is just and reasonable in the division of marital 
property.   

 
 

Id., 
¶ 12, 88 P.3d  at 1027.  We hold the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in considering evidence concerning the 
unaccepted purchase offer.

 
 
[¶24]  Husband also claims the admission of 
evidence concerning the purchase offer violated the statute of frauds.  Section § 1-23-105(a)(v) 
provides:

 
 
(a)  In the following cases every agreement 
shall be void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof be in 
writing, and subscribed by the party to be charge 
therewith:

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
(v)Every 
agreement or contract for the sale of real estate, or the lease thereof, for 
more than one (1) year.

 
 
This 
statute comes into play to prevent enforcement of an unwritten agreement.  It has no bearing here where no one is 
seeking to enforce the purchase offer.

 
 
[¶25]  Husband also argues the trial court 
abused its discretion in considering the testimony about the purchase offer when 
no documentary evidence of the offer was introduced for the court's 
consideration.  He argues his 
appraisal was the only admissible evidence of value introduced, that evidence 
showed the property value was $332,000, and the trial court was limited to 
consideration of admissible evidence in determining the property value.  Husband's testimony concerning the 
$380,000 purchase offer was undisputed.  
Had Husband or Wife contested the existence or amount of the purchase 
offer, documentary evidence would have been helpful and may have been given 
greater weight than the testimony.  
The issue of documentary versus oral testimony is one of weight, not of 
admissibility.  The district court 
did not err in considering the oral testimony. Under the circumstances, there 
was no requirement that Husband's testimony be supported by documentary 
evidence.  

 
 
[¶26]  Affirmed.     

 
 
   

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In the 
original decree, the trial court awarded the property to Husband, valued the 
property at $468,000, and subtracted from that value the outstanding mortgage of 
$212,000, resulting in a net equity figure of $256,000. The trial court divided 
the net equity in half and ordered Husband to pay Wife $128,000 for her equity 
in the property.

 
 

2In his 
motion, Husband claimed he did not file an answer in reliance on Wife's 
counsel's statement in a letter to him that she would be forwarding to him a 
proposed settlement agreement. 

 
 

3The 
contingencies were:  the dining room 
table would stay with the house; seller would complete a turbulent fountain; 
seller would provide for inspections on the home and sprinklers; seller would 
instruct the buyer on how to operate and repair the pivots; seller would repair 
the east end pivot; and, seller would instruct buyer concerning the septic 
system.