Case Title: Tudhope v. Riehle

Citation: 167 Vt. 174, 704 A.2d 765

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Tudhope v. Riehle  (96-229); 167 Vt. 174; 704 A.2d 765

[Filed 10-Oct-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 96-229

Mary Tudhope                                      Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Chittenden Superior Court

Theodore Riehle                                   November Term, 1996

Alden T. Bryan, J.

  Peter F. Langrock and Frank H. Langrock of Langrock Sperry & Wool,
  Middlebury, for plaintiff-appellant

  Michael S. Brow and Alan F. Sylvester of Sylvester & Maley, Inc.,
  Burlington, for defendant-appellee

PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Suntag, D.J., 
          Specially Assigned

       GIBSON, J.   Plaintiff Mary Tudhope appeals the superior court's order
  dismissing her complaint alleging that her ex-husband, defendant Theodore
  Riehle, had fraudulently induced her to accept a separation agreement later
  incorporated into the parties' final divorce order. Tudhope and Riehle
  dispute whether their agreement may be collaterally attacked on grounds of
  fraud, duress, and unconscionability in a tort action in superior court. 
  We conclude that, under the circumstances presented here, the superior
  court correctly dismissed the suit as a belated collateral attack on the
  parties' divorce judgment.

       Tudhope and Riehle married in 1979 and separated in 1990.  One month
  before filing for divorce, they executed a separation agreement "to make
  arrangements in connection [with their upcoming divorce], including the
  settlement of all questions relating to their property rights."  Under the
  stipulation, Riehle retained ownership of all assets in his name, but
  agreed to pay Tudhope $430,000, unless the parties settled on a larger sum
  before the divorce was finalized.  In May 1990, at a hearing unattended by
  Tudhope, the family court granted the

 

  parties a divorce and incorporated most of the agreement's terms into its
  judgment order.

       In January 1996, shortly before the limitations period was to expire,
  Tudhope filed suit in superior court, alleging that the separation
  agreement was unconscionable and obtained through fraud, deceit, and
  duress.  She complained that (1) Riehle had virtual control over her
  decision-making ability during their relationship and continued to exert
  substantial control while they were negotiating the settlement agreement;
  (2) he fraudulently told her that the amount of property she would receive
  under the agreement was more than she would receive through a court
  distribution; and (3) he warned her that it was in her best interest to
  sign the agreement because she would ultimately get less money from him if
  she did not do so.  Riehle moved to dismiss the action on the ground that
  the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  See V.R.C.P
  12(b)(1).  The court granted Riehle's motion, ruling that the claims should
  have been litigated before the family court in the original divorce action. 
  On appeal, Tudhope argues that the superior court has exclusive
  jurisdiction over her claims of fraud and unconscionability, which sound in
  tort; therefore, according to Tudhope, the divorce decree is not res
  judicata with respect to those claims, notwithstanding that the settlement
  agreement was incorporated into the decree.

       When the family court was created, the Legislature amended the statute
  delimiting the superior court's jurisdiction so as to deny it jurisdiction
  over actions cognizable in the family court.  4 V.S.A. § 113 (superior
  court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all original civil
  actions except "those made cognizable by . . . the family court").  The
  family court has exclusive jurisdiction over divorce proceedings, which
  includes the distribution of marital property.  4 V.S.A. § 454(4); 15
  V.S.A. § 751(a).  Within such proceedings, Vermont law allows -- in fact,
  favors -- agreements between divorcing parties to settle the distribution
  of marital property.  Bendekgey v. Bendekgey, 154 Vt. 193, 197, 576 A.2d 433, 435 (1990); see Kanaan v. Kanaan, 163 Vt. 402, 413,