Case Title: Pucinski v. County of Cook

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88441

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 88441-Agenda 18-March 2000.
AURELIA PUCINSKI, Petitioner, v. THE COUNTY OF COOK 								et al., Respondents.


Opinion filed July 6, 2000.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the
court:
	Aurelia Pucinski, clerk of the circuit court of Cook County,
brings this original action for mandamus (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,
§4(a)) to compel Cook County and its treasurer to pay Real
Applications, Ltd., for a mainframe computer and related software
purchased by Pucinski for the circuit clerk's office. Real
Applications, Ltd., initially named as a respondent, has been
redesignated as a petitioner on the court's own motion and seeks
the same relief as Pucinski. For the reasons that follow, the writ is
denied.
	The verified mandamus petition filed by Pucinski indicates that
she accepted a proposal from Real Applications, Ltd., to purchase
a new computer and related software for approximately $501,000.
Pucinski accepted the proposal in her capacity as clerk of the
circuit court of Cook County, and acquired the computer and
software for the sole purpose of enabling her to perform her official
duties as clerk.
	Pucinski believed that payment for the computer and software
should be made using money retained by Cook County in its
"Court Document Storage Fund." The Court Document Storage
Fund was established by the county treasurer pursuant to section
27.3c of the Clerks of Courts Act (705 ILCS 105/27.3c (West
1998)). It was funded by court document fees charged and
collected by the clerk of the circuit court to defray the expense of
establishing and maintaining a document storage system in the
circuit clerk's office.
	According to section 27.3c of the statute, "any costs relative
to the storage of court records, including hardware, software,
research and development costs, and related personnel" were
payable from the Court Document Storage Fund. 705 ILCS
105/27.3c (West 1998). There is no dispute that the items
purchased by Pucinski fell within these categories. There is also no
dispute that the county's Court Document Storage Fund contained
sufficient funds to cover the purchase. According to the verified
petition, more than $7 million remained in the fund unencumbered
at the time Pucinski bought the computer and software from Real
Applications, Ltd.
	The problem with Pucinski's purchase is that it was not made
in accordance with the provisions of the Counties Code (55 ILCS
5/1-1001 et seq. (West 1998)) and Cook County Ordinances,
chapter 10, sections 17 and 18. Specifically, the contract signed by
Pucinski with Real Applications, Ltd., did not have the prior
approval of the Cook County board of commissioners and was not
signed by the president of the board, the county purchasing agent
and the comptroller (55 ILCS 5/5-36001 (West 1998); Cook
County Ordinances, ch. 10, §17) and it was not the subject of
competitive bidding (55 ILCS 5/5-36006 (West 1998); Cook
County Ordinances, ch. 10, §18).
	According to the mandamus petition, Pucinski requested
board approval, but the president of the board declined to put her
request on the board's agenda. Exhibits attached to the petition
indicate that the county opposed Pucinski's plan because it was
inconsistent with the county's efforts to upgrade its own
computing facilities and to consolidate county users on a single
system.
	When the board failed to consider Pucinski's request, she
executed the purchase contract herself in her official capacity. She
did so on the grounds that the purchase was necessary in order for
her office to perform its statutory and constitutional obligations.
Pucinski believed that her solution to her office's computing
problems was superior to the county's and that she had ultimate
authority for determining how her office should be run.
	Pucinski accepted a proposal from Real Applications, Ltd., on
September 13, 1999. She then sent a letter to the president of the
Cook County board advising him of her actions. One week later,
on September 20, 1999, Pucinski signed the actual purchase
contract. At the direction of the board president, the Cook County
State's Attorney promptly notified Pucinski and Real Applications,
Ltd., that the contract was not authorized and that no invoices
issued under that contract would be paid. The same day, the new
equipment was delivered and installed in Pucinski's office. When
Real Applications, Ltd., failed to receive payment in accordance
with the contract, its attorneys sent a demand letter to Pucinski
asking for the contract price plus late fees. This litigation followed.
	The standards governing Pucinski's petition are well
established. The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to
enforce, as a matter of public right, "the performance of official
duties by a public officer where no exercise of discretion on his
part is involved." Madden v. Cronson, 114 Ill. 2d 504, 514 (1986).
It will not be granted unless the petitioner can show a clear,
affirmative right to relief, a clear duty of the respondent to act, and
clear authority in the respondent to comply with the writ. Lewis E.
v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229 (1999).
	These requirements were not met here. Although clerks of the
circuit courts are nonjudicial officers of the judicial branch of state
government and not employees of the counties (Ill. Const. 1970,
art. VI, §18(b); County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186, 200
(1987)), responsibility for maintaining the clerks' offices belongs
to the counties, not the state. The county boards provide the
necessary rooms and office furniture for the clerks, and the cost is
paid from the county treasuries. 705 ILCS 105/20 (West 1998).
The county boards provide the clerks' compensation and the
"amount necessary for clerk hire, stationery, fuel and other
expenses." 705 ILCS 105/27.3 (West 1998). The county boards
bear the expense of establishing and maintaining automated record
keeping systems and document storage systems in the clerks'
offices (705 ILCS 105/27.3a, 27.3c (West 1998)), and the clerks'
offices are subject to annual audits by the county boards (705 ILCS
105/27.8 (West 1998)).
	Because operations of the circuit clerks' offices are paid for by
the counties, any payments made from the county treasuries on
behalf of the clerks' offices must comport with the requirements of
the Counties Code. In Cook County, the clerk must also meet the
requirements of the applicable Cook County ordinances. As
previously indicated, the Counties Code and Cook County
ordinances expressly require competitive bidding and prior
approval by the board for contracts of the magnitude of the one at
issue in this case. In addition, section 3-10014 of the Counties
Code explicitly states that "[n]o money or funds shall be paid out
of any county treasury, except in accordance with an order of the
county board, or when payment is specially authorized by law to be
made." 55 ILCS 5/3-10014 (West 1998). 
	Pucinski contends that subjecting her computer purchase to
the requirements of the Counties Code and Cook County
ordinances would unduly infringe on her right to run her own
office. She likens the situation to one where a county attempts to
interfere with the hiring and classification of a circuit clerk's
employees. In such a case, our appellate court has held that the
Clerks of Court Act does not empower county boards to control
the hiring, firing, promotion, or compensation of deputy clerks
hired by the circuit court pursuant to statute. See Kotche v. County
Board, 87 Ill. App. 3d 1127, 1131 (1980). 
	The situation here is distinguishable. Personnel matters are not
at issue. This dispute involves the Court Document Storage Fund,
and a circuit clerk's authority with respect to that fund is defined
by section 27.3c(c) of the Clerks of Courts Act (705 ILCS
105/27.3c(c) (West 1998)). Section 27.3c(c) does not confer on
circuit court clerks the right to direct how monies in the Court
Document Storage Fund should be expended. Appropriate
expenditures from the fund for the storage of court records,
including expenditures for computer hardware and software, is a
matter to be determined by the county in the first instance. Under
the express terms of the law, the circuit clerks' authority is limited
to approving such expenditures.
	There is likewise no merit to Pucinski's argument that placing
her contracts for computer-related purchases under the control of
the county contravenes article II, section 1, of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970, which provides that the legislative, executive
and judicial branches of government are separate and that "no
branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another." Ill.
Const. 1970, art. II, §1. The separation of powers provision does
not create rigid boundaries prohibiting every exercise of functions
by one branch of government which ordinarily are exercised by
another. People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 367 (1996). It does
prohibit the other branches of government from taking action
which unduly infringe upon the inherent powers of judges. See Best
v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 411 (1997). That,
however, is not an issue here.
	The right to impose and expend court document storage fees
does not derive from the inherent power of the court. It is purely
statutory. Absent statutory authorization, the fees could not be
collected. Under the terms of the Clerks of Courts Act, which
governs the fees, the fees can only be collected if the county board
requires them to be. 705 ILCS 105/27.3c(a), (b) (West 1998).
Judges have nothing to do with establishment or expenditure of the
fees. All judges can do is waive the fee in a particular case. 705
ILCS 105/27.3c(c) (West 1998). After a fee is assessed, it must be
remitted to the county treasurer, and the power to make
expenditures is vested in the county board, not the judiciary. 705
ILCS 105/27.3c(c) (West 1998). Under these circumstances,
requiring expenditure of the funds to comply with the Counties
Code and Cook County ordinances does not implicate separation
of powers concerns.
	In reaching this conclusion, we are aware that the freedom of
circuit clerks to spend public money for their offices is more
circumscribed than some holders of that office would prefer. That,
however, is a matter for the legislature. The legislature has
determined that counties should fund the operations of the circuit
clerks and that expenditures for the circuit clerks' offices should
meet the same requirements as other expenditures from the county
treasury. Under the Illinois Constitution, that is the legislature's
prerogative. As long as spending decisions by the counties do not
imperil the operation of the courts, separation of powers principles
do not warrant intervention by the court.
	For the foregoing reasons, Pucinski has no basis for
compelling Cook County and its treasurer to pay Real
Applications, Ltd., for the mainframe computer and related
software she purchased for her office. Because the purchases were
not made in accordance with the Counties Code and the pertinent
Cook County ordinances, any such payments would be contrary to
law. The writ is therefore denied.
	A motion by Cook County and the county treasurer to strike
part of Pucinski's brief, which we took with the case, is denied as
moot.
Writ denied.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.