Case Title: DAY & NIGHT HEATING COMPANY v. Ruff

Citation: 19 Utah 2d 412, 432 P.2d 43

Docket Number: 

State: utah

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Date: 1967-09-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
19 Utah 2d 412 (1967) 432 P.2d 43 DAY & NIGHT HEATING COMPANY, INCORPORATED, A UTAH CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, v. C.M. RUFF, DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT. No. 10811. Supreme Court of Utah. September 22, 1967. Watkins, Pace & Watkins, Lorin N. Pace, Salt Lake City, for appellant. Roe, Jerman & Dart, B.L. Dart, Jr., Ralph L. Jerman, Salt Lake City, for respondent. HENRIOD, Justice: Action to recover a balance due for material and labor furnished for a home, where the court granted a motion to dismiss. Affirmed with costs to Ruff. The action was based on the statute allowing recovery by a materialman against the owner who failed to require a bond from the contractor.[1] In this case the contractor went bankrupt, hence this suit. At the time plaintiff's cause of action arose, on December 1, 1964, a three-year statute of limitations within which one must file his complaint[2] was extant. Early in 1965, the legislature passed an act requiring the filing of such a complaint within one year after the effective date of the act which was May 15, 1965. Thus it is obvious that plaintiff had from December 1, 1964 to May 15, 1966, within which to file its complaint, a period of 17 1/2 months, which would seem to be a sufficient period within which to protect its claim. Nonetheless, plaintiff did not file suit until September 9, 1966, some four months after the statutory deadline. Plaintiff says 1) it should be entitled to rely on the three-year statute, and 2) that the 1965 legislation operated retroactively on the former, and destroyed some right plaintiff had. Not so. The question of retroactivity is not involved in this case at all. The retroactivity argument has to do with legislation that at the time of enactment chops off forever a right subsisting under a previous statute at the chop-off time. In the instant case the right asserted was not chopped off at all, but the time to assert it may have been shortened. Certainly a person who is given 17 1/2 months to assert it is not precluded from pursuing it. One of the clearest expressions on the subject, to which we subscribe, was given in Earle v. Froedtert Grain & Malting Co.,[3] where the court said: The question raised as to whether Title 78-12-29, U.C.A. 1953, having to do with a one-year limitations statute with respect to penalty or forfeiture need not be canvassed in light of our conclusion hereinabove stated. CROCKETT, C.J., and CALLISTER, TUCKETT and ELLETT, JJ., concur. [1] Title 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953. [2] Title 78-12-26, Utah Code Annotated 1953. [3] 197 Wash. 341, 85 P.2d 264 (1939). [4] See also: 34 Am.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 7; O'Donoghue v. State, 66 Wash. 2d 787, 405 P.2d 258 (1965); State Tax Comm. v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 100 P.2d 575, 131 A.L.R. 816 (1940).