Case Title: People v. Helzer

Citation: 

Docket Number: S132256

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2024-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
GLEN TAYLOR HELZER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S132256 
 
Contra Costa County Superior Court 
012057-6 
 
 
January 22, 2024 
 
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in 
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 
Evans concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
S132256 
 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.  
 
Defendant Glen Taylor Helzer pleaded guilty to five 
counts of murder (Pen. Code, § 187)1 and admitted associated 
special circumstances as follows:  the murders of Ivan and 
Annette Stineman, with robbery and kidnapping special 
circumstances (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i), (ii)); the murder of 
Selina Bishop, with the special circumstance of murder to 
prevent testimony (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(10)); and the murders of 
Jennifer Villarin and James Gamble, with a multiple-murder 
special circumstance for Gamble’s murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)).  
Defendant also pleaded guilty to conspiracy (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)); 
two counts of kidnapping (§ 209); extortion (§§ 518, 520); three 
counts of robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a)); three counts of 
burglary (§§ 459, 460); attempted robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, 
subd. (a), 664); false imprisonment (§§ 236, 237); and possession 
of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378).  
He also admitted a weapons enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) 
connected with the burglary, robbery, and false imprisonment 
counts.  Following a penalty trial, a jury returned a verdict of 
death for the five counts of murder and the court imposed a 
judgment of death.  Defendant also received sentences of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the 
kidnapping counts, 25 years to life for the conspiracy count, and 
 
1  
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 
Code. 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
2 
additional determinate sentences for the remaining counts.  
This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the 
judgment. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Defendant, his brother Justin Helzer,2 and their friend 
Dawn Godman were charged as codefendants in the kidnapping 
and murders of Ivan and Annette Stineman and the murders of 
Selina Bishop, Bishop’s mother, Jennifer Villarin, and Villarin’s 
friend James Gamble.  Godman subsequently pleaded guilty to 
18 counts in exchange for her agreement to testify against 
defendant and Justin.  After the trial court denied the brothers’ 
motions for separate trials, defendant pleaded guilty to all 
charges and received a penalty phase trial.3 
A.  Prosecution Evidence 
1.  Defendant’s Background 
The prosecution presented evidence at the penalty phase 
regarding defendant’s life before he committed the charged 
crimes.  This evidence covered defendant’s experience with the 
Mormon faith and his excommunication; his work as a financial 
advisor, which was how he met the Stinemans; his drug abuse; 
and moneymaking schemes, with the crimes in this case 
resulting from one of those schemes. 
 
2  
We refer to defendant’s brother by his first name to avoid 
confusion. 
3  
Justin pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity.  After 
defendant entered his guilty pleas, the trial court severed the 
proceedings and Justin was tried before defendant’s penalty 
phase trial occurred.  A jury found Justin guilty of all charges 
and legally sane, and sentenced him to death. 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
3 
a.  The Mormon Church 
Defendant was raised in the Mormon church and practiced 
this religion into adulthood.  A former Mormon bishop testified 
regarding his understanding of the Mormon faith.  Among other 
tenets, he described the belief that individuals can receive 
revelations from God, communicate with spirits, and become a 
god.  A woman who attended church with Godman also provided 
testimony regarding Mormon beliefs, including the view that 
certain men were prophets of God. 
Defendant began to disagree with the direction of the 
church’s principles and spoke of getting messages from “Spirit.”  
He told others that killing is sanctioned if it is God’s will, and 
cited passages from the Bible and Book of Mormon for support.  
He believed there was no right or wrong, and that all people had 
the potential to become gods.  Defendant believed he was close 
to becoming a god.  He also believed he was a prophet and he 
held meetings in the church parking lot with Justin.   
Sometime in 1999 or 2000, defendant spoke at a church 
event about taking a hiatus from the Mormon church.  His 
appearance was “striking” — he had long, dark hair and facial 
hair, wore peculiar glasses, and wore a long black trench coat.  
He was eventually excommunicated from the church. 
b.  Financial work 
In 1992, defendant began working as a financial advisor 
trainee at a Morgan Stanley branch in Concord.  A stockbroker 
at the firm described defendant as “a good, clean Mormon kid” 
who was “happy-go-lucky” when he joined the team.  Defendant 
had many clients, including the Stinemans who were retired 
and financially well off.  Defendant developed a friendly 
relationship with the Stinemans and frequently visited their 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
4 
home to help with their finances.  The Stinemans spoke fondly 
of defendant. 
In 1996, after defendant got married and shortly after the 
birth of his first daughter, he began to change.  Defendant 
started smoking, staying out late at night clubs, and going into 
work late.  Clients began complaining to defendant’s manager 
that he was not returning their phone calls.  Defendant told his 
manager that he did not believe his actions would impact his life 
or his career, and when he was through having fun, he would 
come back to work and function as a financial advisor and a 
father. 
Defendant left the firm in 1998.  He told several people 
that he was faking a psychiatric illness and had himself declared 
legally insane to collect disability payments and avoid legal 
punishment.  Defendant had to visit doctors to confirm the 
existence of a disability.  In preparation for the visits, he would 
deliberately not shower or shave and would practice how to act 
in front of the doctors.  Defendant was formally terminated from 
the firm in 1999. 
c.  Drug use and moneymaking schemes 
Between 1996 and the time he was arrested, defendant 
used marijuana, Ecstasy, and methamphetamine.  He also made 
methamphetamine in his garage and sold Ecstasy at raves. 
Defendant met Godman at a church event in late 1997.  
They had extensive conversations about defendant’s philosophy 
of living one’s life in alignment with God; Godman accepted 
these principles as true.  She believed that defendant and Jesus 
Christ were brothers, and that defendant was a prophet of God.  
In February 2000, Godman joined defendant in selling drugs. 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
5 
In 1998, defendant met Keri Mendoza.  She thought 
defendant was “full of life and love.”  They began a romantic 
relationship and she eventually moved in with defendant and 
Justin.  Defendant introduced her to Ecstasy about one month 
after she moved in.  During the course of their relationship, 
Mendoza provided the primary source of income for herself and 
defendant.  She also loaned defendant money.  Despite this, 
defendant was in significant debt.  He wanted to be “set for life” 
and had several illicit moneymaking ideas to try to make that 
happen. 
In late 1998 or early 1999, defendant proposed several 
escort schemes.  Many involved throwing parties where men 
could pay to get into the party and then have their choice of the 
women in the room.  Another scheme involved tricking young 
stockbrokers into having sex with underage girls and then 
blackmailing the stockbrokers’ company for money.  None of 
these schemes came to fruition. 
At some point in 1998, defendant came up with the idea of 
“Transform America.”  The idea was to create an organization of 
people who were committed to bring Harmony, a self-help 
program he had previously attended, to the world.  The plan 
required an “inner core” of three people — defendant plus two 
others who had to earn his trust and be loyal to him.  Lina 
Richardson, who met defendant at a Harmony training, testified 
that one example of the kind of trust and loyalty defendant 
wanted was if he killed someone and brought the body home, a 
person would cut up and hide the body without asking a single 
question.  The inner core was originally defendant, Justin, and 
Mendoza.  After defendant and Mendoza ended their 
relationship around December 1999, Godman became the third 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
6 
person.  In March or April 2000, defendant, Justin, and Godman 
moved into a house located on Saddlewood Court in Concord. 
Around the time they moved to this house, defendant came 
up with a plan called “Children of Thunder.”  The plan was to 
extort money from one of defendant’s past clients to fund 
Transform America and bring about the second coming of Jesus 
Christ peacefully.  Defendant believed that the second coming 
would be preceded by darkness and apostasy, and to avoid the 
darkness, he would sacrifice a few to save billions.  According to 
Godman, defendant planned to “take one of [his] past clients . . . 
and extort them for their money that was in their [brokerage] 
account, to kill them and to have another individual take — 
deposit the money in another individual’s account, and then 
have that individual withdraw the money and give it to 
[defendant].”  The individual withdrawing the money would also 
be killed.  The Saddlewood house in Concord was going to be the 
base of operations for the first step of this scheme.  
2.  Circumstances of the Crimes 
Defendant identified former clients of his who maintained 
a brokerage portfolio of at least $100,000.  Justin purchased a 
Beretta nine-millimeter semiautomatic firearm and defendant 
removed the serial number from his own 
.22-caliber 
semiautomatic pistol. 
Defendant, Justin, and Godman thought of ideas for how 
to dispose of the bodies.  One involved getting dogs from a 
shelter and having the dogs eat the bodies.  They adopted three 
dogs for this purpose.  They gave the dogs large amounts of 
animal meat and bones to see how much they could eat; 
defendant determined they could not eat enough to consume 
three people.  Defendant, Justin, and Godman decided instead 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
7 
to dismember the bodies, put the pieces in duffel bags, and use 
a Jet Ski to dump the bags out on the Sacramento-San Joaquin 
Delta (Delta).  They purchased tools and supplies to implement 
the plan, including a reciprocating saw, a skill saw, water 
gloves, ski masks, a briefcase, duffel bags, handcuffs, and leg 
irons. 
Around May 2000, defendant began dating Selina Bishop.  
Defendant’s intention was to have Bishop deposit money from 
the Children of Thunder scheme and then kill her.  Defendant 
told her that he was going to be inheriting $125,000.  He asked 
Bishop if she would be willing to open new bank accounts and 
deposit $25,000 in each account, then transfer the money to 
defendant in $20,000 increments.  In exchange for helping him, 
Bishop could keep the remaining $5,000 from each increment. 
Defendant, 
Justin, 
and 
Godman 
thought 
about, 
considered, refined, and prayed about this scheme for at least 
three months before selecting July 30, 2000 as the date to act on 
their plan.  In early July, they scouted the residences of each 
person on defendant’s list of former clients, and defendant put 
them in order of who to attack first.  A corporate airline pilot 
was at the top of the list.  The pilot had the most money in his 
brokerage accounts, was single, and lived in a location with easy 
access that was somewhat isolated from his neighbors.  The 
Stinemans were second on defendant’s list. 
Godman testified that on the early morning of July 30, she 
gathered with defendant and Justin to declare war on Satan by 
openly stating their intent to follow through with what they 
believed was God’s will.  Defendant attempted to establish an 
alibi by asking a friend to buy four movie tickets for later that 
day and then go to a restaurant and buy enough food for four 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
8 
people.  Defendant was concerned that the friend followed 
through with the alibi and called to make sure everything went 
as planned. 
Around noon, Godman bought a bottle of wine.  
Defendant’s plan was to go to the pilot’s house with Justin, and 
say he was with a new company and had just made a lot of 
money.  Defendant would say that the wine was for a new 
customer down the road, but they did not want the bottle.  
Defendant would ask the pilot to join him in a drink to celebrate.  
If he had guests, defendant thought they could kidnap and kill 
up to five people to avoid leaving any witnesses.  If more than 
five people were present, defendant and Justin would “find a 
way out” of the house. 
That night, defendant and Justin drove to the pilot’s house 
in defendant’s car while Godman followed in Justin’s truck.  
They knocked on the door, but no one answered.  They moved on 
to the next people on the list, the Stinemans.  Defendant and 
Justin parked away from the Stinemans’ house while Godman 
parked Justin’s truck down the street to keep an eye on the 
house and look out for police.  Defendant and Justin walked up 
to the Stinemans’ house wearing business suits.  Defendant 
carried a briefcase containing handcuffs, a gun, a blowtorch to 
use for threatening, a Taser gun, and a cell phone.  Ivan 
answered the door and both men entered the home. 
Approximately one hour later, defendant drove to Godman 
in the Stinemans’ white van.  Godman saw the silhouettes of 
four people in the van.  Defendant said, “I got it,” and drove 
away.  Godman likewise drove back to the Concord house. 
Back at the house, defendant questioned Ivan while 
Godman questioned Annette, in separate rooms, about their 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
9 
plans for the next few days.  When they all reconvened, 
defendant explained to the Stinemans that he had money 
trouble and they would need to stay with him until he got the 
money out of their accounts.  While the Stinemans slept, 
defendant, Justin, and Godman took methamphetamine to stay 
awake and went over plans on how to take money out of the 
Stinemans’ accounts. 
The following morning, on July 31, Godman called Morgan 
Stanley pretending to be Annette, and directed the branch 
manager to liquidate the Stinemans’ account.  Defendant then 
had Ivan cancel appointments for the next few days and call 
family members to say they were taking a short vacation.  
Defendant forced the couple to make out checks totaling 
$100,000 to Selina Bishop. 
Defendant gave the Stinemans a drug that was supposed 
to kill them, but the drug did not work as planned.  Defendant 
and Justin carried Ivan and Annette into the bathroom.  
Defendant put a plastic bag over Annette’s face and Justin put 
a bag over Ivan’s face to suffocate them.  When that did not 
work, defendant started banging Annette’s head on the 
bathroom floor.  Justin started doing the same to Ivan.  
Defendant placed Annette partially inside the bathtub, slit her 
throat with a knife, and turned her over so the blood flow would 
suffocate her.  The Stinemans eventually died; Annette from the 
suffocation and Ivan from the beating.  Godman watched while 
the Stinemans were murdered. 
Godman changed her clothes and wrote a $10,000 check 
that she signed with Annette’s name.  She drove to the 
Stinemans’ bank and deposited the check into Ivan’s account 
“[t]o distract the police.”  Godman used a wheelchair in an 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
10 
attempt to disguise herself.  When she returned to the 
Saddlewood house, she observed several black plastic bags 
containing the Stinemans’ body parts. 
The following day, on August 1, Godman tried to deposit 
the Stinemans’ checks into Bishop’s bank account.  The branch 
manager tried to contact the Stinemans to confirm the 
transaction and left a message on their machine.  Later that day, 
defendant and Godman drove to the Stinemans’ house to 
retrieve the answering machine tape and other identifying 
information; they had already taken the Stinemans’ social 
security cards the night of the kidnapping.  Godman called 
Bishop’s bank, pretending to be Annette, and left a message for 
the branch manager with the Stinemans’ social security 
numbers.  She explained that they were visiting their sick 
granddaughter, Bishop, and they needed the money deposited 
quickly. 
The following afternoon, on August 2, Bishop visited the 
Saddlewood house.  While defendant distracted Bishop in the 
living room, Justin came up beside them and hit Bishop over the 
head with a hammer several times.  Defendant and Justin took 
Bishop into the bathroom where defendant then cut her throat 
with a hunting knife.  After watching Bishop die, Godman went 
into the living room to clean the carpet.  Godman could hear a 
saw running in the bathroom.  Defendant and Godman burned 
Bishop’s possessions in the fireplace, as they had already done 
with the Stinemans’ clothing and belongings.  While the fire was 
burning, defendant wanted to see if one of their dogs would eat 
human flesh.  He fed the dog two small pieces of Bishop’s skin. 
Defendant realized that Bishop’s mother, Jennifer 
Villarin, could identify him.  Early the next morning, on 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
11 
August 3, defendant and Godman drove to Bishop’s apartment 
in Woodacre, California, where Villarin was staying.  Defendant 
found Villarin and Gamble asleep.  He shot Villarin twice in the 
face.  Gamble managed to exit the bed before defendant shot him 
through the chest. 
Back at the Saddlewood house, defendant decided they 
needed to remove the Stinemans’ and Bishop’s teeth to prevent 
their identification.  Later that day, defendant, Godman, and 
Justin drove to the Delta with the remains of the three victims 
and a rented Jet Ski in tow.  Defendant and Justin loaded the 
bags of remains on the Jet Ski, took them into the water to 
discard the bags, and then returned for more.  They repeated 
this process several times, with Godman joining Justin for the 
last trip.  They returned to the Saddlewood house once finished. 
Defendant, who had plans to leave on a trip, left Justin 
and Godman a list of things to do, including cleaning the house 
and returning the Jet Ski.  Justin and Godman also disposed of 
several incriminating items.  Justin and Godman tried to clean 
the carpet themselves but eventually decided to hire 
professional cleaners.  The cleaners cleaned the carpet on 
August 6, leaving behind industrial-sized fans to dry the carpet.  
Defendant returned from his trip that afternoon. 
3.  The Investigation 
On August 3, the Stinemans’ daughter went to their 
house.  She had been unable to contact them for four days and 
was concerned.  After noticing several things that looked awry 
in the house, she feared her parents were missing and called the 
police.  Concord police officers responded and began to 
investigate the couple’s disappearance. 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
12 
Meanwhile, Marin County Sheriff’s deputies responded to 
a call at Bishop’s apartment.  They found Villarin’s and 
Gamble’s bodies, both with gunshot wounds.  Emergency 
medical personnel arrived and declared both victims dead.  
Marin County Sheriff’s Detective Steve Nash obtained and 
served a search warrant that morning for the Woodacre 
residence where Villarin’s and Gamble’s bodies were found. 
An autopsy revealed the cause of Villarin’s death was two 
gunshot wounds to the head.  Gamble’s cause of death was a 
gunshot wound to the upper chest.  He suffered five gunshot 
wounds. 
In an effort to find Bishop during the investigation, 
Detective Nash learned that she was dating a man who lived 
with his brother in Concord.  Detective Nash recovered Bishop’s 
pager from the café where she worked and traced a phone 
number on it to Justin.  Phone records for Justin led Detective 
Nash to the Saddlewood Court address in Concord; Detective 
Nash soon learned that defendant also lived at that address.  He 
also learned that Justin had recently purchased a gun 
consistent with the weapon used to kill Villarin and Gamble.  
Detective Nash obtained a search warrant for the Saddlewood 
premises. 
Around 4:00 a.m. on August 7, 2000, Marin County officers 
and Concord SWAT team members assembled in anticipation of 
serving the warrant approximately two hours later.  After 
officers entered the residence, defendant tried to flee out a back 
window but officers stopped him.  While a detective 
subsequently interviewed defendant in the back of a patrol car, 
he threw himself out of the partially open window and ran off.  
He ran into a neighbor’s house and threatened to kill the 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
13 
resident if he did not give defendant his keys.  When defendant 
saw the resident’s dogs running toward him, he fled from the 
house and ran into another neighboring home, this time 
threatening the resident with a knife to obtain a change of 
clothes and keys to her car.  The resident’s son called the police, 
who arrived and detained defendant when he ran out of the 
house. 
The search of the Saddlewood premises, which ultimately 
involved the execution of multiple search warrants, revealed a 
substantial amount of evidence implicating defendant, Justin, 
and Godman in the crimes.  Meanwhile, nine gym bags 
containing the victims’ remains were recovered from the Delta, 
each weighed down with stepping stones from the Saddlewood 
premises or rocks from the Delta.  Inside the gym bags, the large 
body parts and removed organs were individually wrapped in 
black plastic bags.   
The pathologist who performed the autopsies testified 
about the condition of the Stinemans’ and Bishop’s remains.  In 
addition to being dismembered, the bodies showed signs of 
stabbing and blunt force trauma that occurred before death and 
significant mutilation after death, including removal of internal 
organs, jaws, and teeth. 
4.  Victim Impact Evidence 
The Stinemans’ two adult daughters testified about their 
family life, the trusting relationship their parents had with 
defendant, and their grief.  A friend of the Stinemans, a friend 
of Villarin, several members of Villarin’s and Bishop’s family, 
and Gamble’s mother also testified about their memories of the 
victims and the pain of their loss. 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
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B.  Defense Evidence 
1.  Background Evidence 
The defense presented evidence of mental illness in 
defendant’s family, his involvement in the Mormon church 
growing up, and his kind and energetic nature. 
Several witnesses testified about defendant’s mission for 
the church in Brazil, and his return.  A fellow missionary 
described that defendant was excited, passionate, and 
hardworking when they first arrived in Brazil.  Defendant 
related well to people and was readily accepted.  Defendant had 
“some interesting ideas” about the end of the world, and they 
discussed the end of the world and the second coming of Christ.  
He believed that during the apocalypse, church leaders would 
become warrior prophets who would lead their people and 
“defend their faith as a warrior of sorts.”  Defendant believed he 
would become one of the warrior prophets. 
Defendant grew increasingly frustrated with the mission 
president and other church leaders.  If church leaders wrote 
something that defendant disagreed with, he claimed that he 
knew more than them and did not have to be accountable to 
them.  Toward the end of his mission, defendant held beliefs that 
were “totally incompatible with the scriptures and Mormon 
doctrine.”  When defendant returned from Brazil, his views on 
scripture began to change and he started to believe that the 
church “was going in the wrong direction.”  He appeared 
exhausted and depressed. 
Approximately one month after returning from his 
mission, in December 1991, defendant ran into a former 
classmate, Ann, and persuaded her to join the church.  They 
began dating after she was baptized into the church and got 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
15 
married in April 1993.  Ann’s uncle worked for Morgan Stanley 
and set up interviews for defendant; he began working there one 
week before the wedding.  Ann testified that before they got 
married, defendant had been very sheltered within the church 
and did not have a realistic view of the world. 
After defendant married and moved out of his parents’ 
house, he discovered cable television and junk food.  Their first 
daughter was born in the summer of 1995.  Defendant and Ann 
separated around one year later.  Defendant felt his life had 
been sheltered and he wanted to discover life outside of the 
church, including drinking alcohol, smoking cigarettes, and 
having a nonmonogamous lifestyle.  Their second daughter was 
born in 1998.  Ann noticed “significant” changes in defendant’s 
behavior and appearance after the birth of their second 
daughter.  When they had met, he was “really neat, really clean, 
pretty meticulous about his appearance, clean cut.”  In 1998, he 
started wearing dark and wrinkled clothing, grew his hair out, 
and looked as if he stopped showering.  He stopped working for 
Morgan Stanley the same year, though Ann did not find out he 
left his job until 1999.  Defendant was excommunicated from the 
church around the same time he left his job in 1998. 
Defendant’s sister left for her mission in 1995 and 
returned in early 1997.  Upon her return, she noticed “severe 
changes” in defendant.  He had “thrown away his religion” and 
had been experimenting with smoking and drugs.  In 1999, 
during a visit home, defendant seemed angry and his 
appearance was “scraggly.”  Defendant started fights with his 
sister because he thought she was rejecting his philosophical 
and religious ideas. 
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2.  Expert Evidence 
Clinical psychologist Richard Foster met defendant in 
1995 for counseling.  Defendant and his wife had a “discrepancy” 
in their sexual desires which created tensions in their marriage, 
and Dr. Foster sought to help defendant work through their 
issues.  Defendant believed that he was “entitled” to have “a wife 
whose sexual behavior is like what he witnesses in pornographic 
films.”  He also felt like he “was pretty much able to make 
happen whatever he wanted to happen,” and grew frustrated he 
could not make his wife do what he wanted.  During Dr. Foster’s 
second meeting with defendant, he presented the doctor with a 
“highly detailed plan” that was “infused with a lot of narcissism” 
to find an ideal woman who would have sex with him daily.  
During their final meeting, defendant was “convinced that the 
only way to avoid his misery was to leave his wife.”  Dr. Foster 
did not diagnose defendant based on their few meetings but 
later opined that defendant’s behavior was consistent with 
narcissism. 
Psychologist Jeffrey Kaye testified that he met defendant 
in early September 1998.  Dr. Kaye ran an Intensive Outpatient 
Program (IOP) at a health care facility, which involved multiple 
group therapy sessions on a weekly basis to try to reduce the 
number of hospitalized patients.  The patients in the program 
were typically diagnosed with bipolar disorder, major 
depression, schizophrenia, or posttraumatic stress disorder.  
Defendant came to the program because he was upset and not 
able to function in his job.  During their first meeting, Dr. Kaye 
believed defendant was in a manic phase.  Defendant 
complained that he could not concentrate, was irritable and 
inappropriately angry, and believed people were judging him.  
Dr. Kaye diagnosed defendant with bipolar disorder, and a 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
17 
psychiatrist on the program’s staff prescribed medications.  
After defendant stopped attending meetings, Dr. Kaye reached 
out via telephone and described defendant as paranoid, 
isolating, and refusing to take his medications.  Defendant often 
spoke about conversing with spirits. 
Defendant returned to treatment two weeks after 
Dr. Kaye’s phone call.  At a meeting in late November, Dr. Kaye 
believed 
defendant’s 
mood 
swings 
had 
worsened 
and 
recommended he voluntarily hospitalize himself, but defendant 
declined.  At a meeting in December, defendant appeared to be 
experiencing a panic attack.  In January, defendant showed up 
at the clinic dressed “very bizarrely,” looking like “some kind of 
strange cartoon character.”  In February 1999, defendant was 
involuntarily hospitalized for psychiatric treatment.  When 
Dr. Kaye saw defendant again in March, he had improved.  At 
various times, they had discussed how defendant could get 
disability payments. 
Psychologist Douglas Tucker specialized in addiction.  He 
spoke with defendant once for three hours before testifying on 
his behalf.  Prior to meeting with defendant, Dr. Tucker 
reviewed 
defendant’s 
IOP 
records 
and 
his 
psychiatric 
hospitalization records.  He diagnosed defendant with 
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type.  This meant defendant 
exhibited schizophrenic features, such as hallucinations and 
delusions, at times when he was not manic or depressed.  
Dr. Tucker 
further 
diagnosed 
defendant 
with 
smoked 
methamphetamine dependence.  The doctor testified that 
defendant believed he was hearing God’s voice, and that taking 
medication interfered with his ability to communicate with God.  
Defendant further believed he was “not actually a human being; 
that he is a manifestation of God’s consciousness that is an 
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illusion, and has the illusion of being an individual, but is 
actually a fragment of a larger whole, which has this illusion of 
individuality in order that it might distinguish good from evil 
and find . . . its way towards God.”  When discussing defendant’s 
drug abuse, Dr. Tucker explained that “a grandiose delusion or 
religious delusion that you’re God gets heightened quite a bit 
when you use a stimulant drug like methamphetamine, so it’s 
actually rewarding for the person to feel that their 
communication with God is that much better.”  Dr. Tucker 
opined that it is difficult to fake mental illness, especially mania.  
He believed defendant had a genuine mental illness because his 
symptoms were consistent. 
Psychiatrist John Chamberlain interviewed defendant 
seven times and concluded that defendant suffered from 
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type; methamphetamine 
dependence; cannabis dependence; and alcohol abuse.  He 
testified that defendant “manifested significant grandiosity.”  At 
times defendant was “wrestling with the concept” of whether he 
was becoming a divine being and spoke of himself, God, and 
Jesus as if “they were sort of brethren on the same path in 
development or that he was somehow of God.”  When 
Dr. Chamberlain would ask defendant a question or to slow 
down when discussing his religious beliefs, defendant would get 
irritable 
at 
the 
distraction 
from 
his 
own 
thoughts.  
Dr. Chamberlain 
did 
not 
believe 
that 
defendant 
was 
malingering a mental illness. 
II.  CHALLENGE TO GUILTY PLEA 
Detective Nash obtained and executed two Marin County 
Superior Court search warrants for the Saddlewood premises in 
Concord.  Detective Nash also assisted the Concord Police 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
19 
Department in obtaining and executing a third search warrant 
for the Saddlewood premises, issued by the Contra Costa County 
Superior Court.  Before trial, defendant and his codefendants 
filed a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to these 
warrants. 
Defendant now raises a blanket suppression argument on 
appeal.  He asserts that the officers who executed the Marin 
County warrants acted in flagrant disregard of the constraints 
imposed by the warrants by conducting what defendant 
characterizes as a general search of the Saddlewood premises.  
He contends that as a result of this claimed violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights, all evidence seized pursuant to the 
execution of the Marin County warrants, as well as evidence 
subsequently obtained as purported “fruits” of these seizures, 
must be suppressed, and he must be entitled to withdraw his 
guilty plea and be tried on any remaining evidence.  We reject 
defendant’s claims and conclude blanket suppression of the 
evidence is not warranted. 
A.  Trial Court Proceedings 
On November 19, 2002, Godman filed an “Omnibus Notice 
of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence and Traverse 
Various Search Warrants.” 
Godman challenged the three searches of the Saddlewood 
premises on a variety of grounds.  As relevant here, Godman 
argued that both Marin County Superior Court warrants were 
issued without probable cause, were overbroad, and were based 
on material misrepresentations and information unlawfully 
obtained during prior unlawful searches.  She argued that the 
second Marin County Superior Court warrant further exceeded 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
20 
the scope of the court’s jurisdiction, and the items seized under 
the authority of the warrant were outside its scope. 
The court began hearings on the motion on January 31, 
2003.  Regarding the initial search of the Saddlewood premises, 
the trial court found no error in the magistrate’s determination 
that probable cause existed in issuing the search warrant.  The 
court explained, “I believe, based upon what was before the 
magistrate in Marin, that there was a fair probability that 
evidence regarding the Woodacre murders could be found at 
Saddlewood Court in Concord.”  The court found that there were 
no material misrepresentations made, and the affidavit did not 
contain statements that were deliberately false or made with a 
reckless disregard for the truth. 
Regarding the second search warrant issued for the 
Saddlewood premises by the Marin County Superior Court, as 
relevant here, Godman argued the search exceeded the scope of 
the warrant and that once officers were inside the premises, 
they seized items with “virtually no limits on the extent and 
scope” of the search.  Godman further argued that officers 
collected evidence related to the Stinemans that fell outside the 
scope of the Marin County warrant.  Godman also asserted that 
the Marin County magistrate did not have authority to issue a 
warrant to seize evidence relating to the Stinemans.  The 
prosecution responded that by the time evidence related to the 
Stinemans was seized on August 7, it had become “patently 
obvious” that the Marin County investigation (for Villarin and 
Gamble) and the Contra Costa County investigation (for the 
Stinemans) 
“were 
inseparable 
and 
were 
inextricably 
interrelated.” 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
21 
The trial court concluded the Marin County magistrate 
had jurisdiction to issue the second warrant for Saddlewood, 
noting that the Woodacre murders of Villarin and Gamble were 
unsolved at the time it was issued, Bishop was still missing, and 
there was enough information to conclude that evidence of the 
murders and disappearance would be found in the Saddlewood 
premises.  The court concluded that even if the magistrate 
exceeded her jurisdiction, the good faith exception articulated in 
United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 salvaged the search 
and seizure.  The court further concluded that probable cause 
existed, the warrant was not a general warrant, and the search 
did not exceed the scope of the warrant. 
Regarding the warrant issued by the Contra Costa 
Superior Court, the trial court rejected the defense’s argument 
that it was the fruit of the previous searches.  Yet the court 
acknowledged that without knowing additional details, some of 
the items in the return — “Halloween-type costumes, kitchen 
items and home decorations” — could have been beyond the 
scope of the warrant.  The court delayed ruling on whether this 
search exceeded the scope of the warrant and withdrew its 
previous ruling on whether the search exceeded the scope of the 
second Marin County Superior Court warrant. 
The court held another hearing on February 21, 2003.  The 
prosecution argued that the defendants had the burden to prove 
which seized items, if any, fell outside the scope of the search 
warrants.  The prosecution also advised that the evidence room 
at the police station was open for counsel to go through the 
evidence that had been collected.  Noting that trial was 
scheduled to begin in September, the court set a new hearing in 
June to give the parties time to sort through the evidence. 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
22 
At some point after the February hearing, Godman’s 
counsel filed a supplemental pleading with a list of the 
challenged items; defendant joined the pleading.  The list 
included items seized pursuant to both Marin County search 
warrants. 
The parties returned on June 13, 2003.  At that hearing, 
the defense argued that all the seized evidence had to be 
suppressed because of the officers’ “flagrant disregard” for the 
terms of the warrants during the execution of the searches.  The 
court reminded the defense that it had instructed counsel, if 
they wanted, to be more specific with which items they thought 
were outside the scope of the warrants.  Defense counsel 
acknowledged the court’s request, and explained that it was 
basing its argument on a different point — namely, that “it 
doesn’t matter if the few items that we parse today are found to 
be outside the scope of the warrant[.] . . .  [T]he search was so 
flagrant in exceeding the terms of the warrants . . . that all 
evidence must be suppressed.  And that goes to volume more 
than it does to now parsing particular items.”  The prosecution 
responded that the officers had probable cause to seize every 
item retrieved from the Saddlewood premises. 
After discussing the challenges involved in having the 
court review the entire universe of seized documents, the court 
proposed that it instead address the challenged items first.  
Godman contended that going through the items labeled indicia 
would be the defense’s “biggest problem” because some items 
grouped together and described as a “single item” actually 
contained multiple documents — some that “probably” qualified 
as indicia of the crimes and others that were outside the scope 
of the warrant.  The prosecution argued that the seizures could 
be upheld by reference to the warrant, the plain view doctrine, 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
23 
and the inevitable discovery rule.  The parties then discussed 
some of the specific items challenged in Godman’s motion.  The 
prosecutor argued that the search warrants permitted the 
officers to “go virtually anywhere into any box inside the house” 
and they had the authorization to seize “not only indicia” but 
also trace evidence.  The court also noted that once information 
about the dismembered bodies came to light, and there was 
evidence that the bodies had been sawed, the officers had 
probable cause to seize items relating to the saw and the 
condition of the bodies. 
After discussing some individual items, the court asked 
the prosecution to respond to each item challenged in Godman’s 
pleading with a justification for the seizure.  The prosecution 
agreed and offered to have both primary investigating officers 
testify. 
B.  Testimony Regarding the Warrants 
Another hearing took place two weeks later on June 27, 
2003.  At that hearing, witnesses testified regarding the 
procurement and execution of search warrants for the 
Saddlewood premises.   
Detective Nash testified first.  He explained that he 
became involved with the Villarin and Gamble murders on 
August 3, 2000, and secured a warrant for the Saddlewood 
premises on the morning of August 7.  As additional information 
appeared, Detective Nash obtained a second search warrant 
later that day and then provided an oral affidavit in support of 
a third warrant requested by the Concord Police Department 
that same evening. 
The first search warrant that Detective Nash obtained 
authorized a search of the Saddlewood premises and two 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
24 
identified vehicles, and specifically listed eight categories of 
items to be searched for:  (1) a nine-millimeter semiautomatic 
handgun; (2) nine-millimeter fully copper-jacketed ammunition; 
(3) expended 
nine-millimeter 
cartridges; 
(4) receipts 
and 
documents 
related 
to 
nine-millimeter 
handguns 
and 
ammunition; (5) a light-colored woman’s T-shirt or other short-
sleeved shirt with small flowers; (6) dark or possibly black pants 
or jeans; (7) “[i]ndicia of ownership, including but not limited to 
leasing documents, Department of Motor Vehicles documents 
indicating ownership of the vehicle, letters, credit card gas 
receipts, keys and warranties”; and (8) “[i]ndicia of occupancy or 
ownership; articles of personal property tending to establish the 
identity of persons in control of the said premises, storage areas 
or containers where the above items are found consisting of rent 
receipts, cancelled checks, telephone records, utility company 
records, charge card receipts, cancelled mail, keys and 
warranties.”  Detective Nash and other officers served the 
warrant at 6:00 a.m. on August 7, 2000. 
Detective Nash and the Marin County Sheriff’s Office 
worked together with the Concord Police Department to execute 
the warrant.  The agencies held a briefing prior to the initial 
entry and then, starting on August 8, held joint briefings at least 
twice daily.  Detective Nash oversaw and coordinated crime 
scene processing and supervised the collection of evidence.  
Detective Nash testified that he made a conscientious effort to 
seize only items specifically listed in the search warrant or items 
that the officers believed they had probable cause to seize as the 
fruits or instrumentalities of the crime under investigation. 
Upon initial entry on August 7, Detective Nash did a 
cursory examination of the entire premises.  He saw two carpet 
dryers and noticed that the carpets had been recently cleaned.  
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
25 
Detective Nash also noticed staining on the carpet that 
appeared consistent with blood or another biological substance.  
After less than one hour, he left the house to secure a second 
warrant for the Saddlewood premises and the two vehicles.  
Meanwhile, the remaining officers continued to search the 
premises under the authority of the first warrant.  When officers 
located an item that they believed had evidentiary value, “[t]hey 
would stop and then . . . come take a look at it, determine if it 
was possibly going to be seized or not seized.”  If they did not 
believe an item was needed, then it was not seized.  With seized 
items, the officers photographed the item, packaged it, and then 
placed it in a U-Haul truck.  If the item contained blood or 
otherwise could not be left in the truck, it was immediately 
taken to Marin County. 
Detective Nash returned with the second Marin County 
warrant for the premises at 1:00 p.m. that afternoon.  The 
warrant identified 13 categories of items:  (1) forensic evidence; 
(2) carpet from the house; (3) blood and objects with apparent 
blood on them; (4) any object with human tissue, bone, or hair 
on it; (5) a man’s long-sleeve striped shirt that had been 
removed from a garbage can in the Saddlewood garage; (6) a pair 
of men’s low-cut work boots with small dark stains, removed 
from a garbage can in the Saddlewood garage; (7) a pair of latex 
gloves removed from a garbage can in the Saddlewood garage; 
(8) access to the house and vehicles by officers and other 
personnel for the purpose of investigating the death and/or 
disappearance of Selina Bishop; (9) “[i]tems of identification 
which might tend to establish the identity of persons who might 
have been within the premises to be searched”; (10) diaries, 
journals, lists, photographs, audio or video recordings, and any 
other materials setting forth or expressing threats, anger, or 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
26 
violence toward the victims; (11) all electronic storage devices 
capable of storing electronic data; (12) indicia of ownership of 
the vehicles; and (13) “[i]ndicia of occupancy or ownership; 
articles of personal property tending to establish the identity of 
persons in control of the said premises, storage areas or 
containers where the above items are found consisting of rent 
receipts, cancelled checks, telephone records, utility company 
records, charge card receipts, cancelled mail, keys and 
warranties.” 
Upon his return to the premises, Detective Nash held a 
briefing with the officers and provided them with copies of the 
second warrant so they could determine what fell within the 
scope of the warrant.  A deputy district attorney arrived on the 
scene around the same time, along with Concord police officers, 
because “someone saw something related to [the] Stinemans and 
was aware that they were a missing couple and that’s when 
[they] started making some links at that point.” 
In the late afternoon or evening of August 7, Detective 
Nash and his team became aware that body parts had been 
recovered in gym bags in the Delta.  The officers believed the 
remains may have belonged to the Stinemans and Bishop.  On 
the evening of August 7, Detective Nash assisted the Concord 
Police Department in obtaining a search warrant from the 
Contra Costa County Superior Court.  This warrant authorized 
a search of the Saddlewood premises for 15 categories of items:  
(1) various pieces of property stolen from the Stineman 
residence, including financial documents, a missing answering 
machine tape, and Social Security cards; (2) two men’s suits; 
(3) lime green women’s clothing; (4) women’s tan driving gloves; 
(5) a gold-colored cowboy hat, receipt for such a hat, or a photo 
of such a hat; (6) receipts for purchase or rental of a wheelchair; 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
27 
(7) handwriting and/or handprint exemplars for defendant, 
Justin, and Godman; (8) documentation of names and account 
information of persons who had accounts with Morgan Stanley; 
(9) “[d]ocumentation, such as letters, notes, diaries, journals, 
etc., which tend to prove a connection between Selina Bishop 
and [defendant], and any documentation which tends to show 
the nature of that relationship”; (10) latex gloves; (11) hair dye; 
(12) forensic testing; (13) “[a]ny item which would tend to show 
where Mr. and Mrs. Stineman are, including any documents or 
items showing travel from or within the Bay Area”; (14) latent 
print testing; and (15) any footwear with a waffle-type pattern 
on the sole.  The warrant was executed beginning on the 
morning of August 8. 
On August 10 or 11, Detective Nash and the officers 
became aware that the cut marks in the bones suggested the use 
of a power reciprocating saw.  More details about the condition 
of the bodies, and the Jet Ski rental, were discovered over the 
following few days.  Officers were still actively searching the 
Saddlewood premises pursuant to the warrants at the time. 
When asked about the seizure of receipts at the 
Saddlewood premises, Detective Nash explained that even if a 
receipt does not contain the name of the purchaser, officers 
consider that item indicia of occupancy because “we track people 
all the time . . . by receipts to identify who made the purchases.”  
Pursuant to the second search warrant, officers seized a bathtub 
after it showed a positive reaction for the presence of blood.  
They seized floorboards from the house for the same reason.  
When defense counsel questioned why officers seized certain 
items — like posters of dragons — not specifically identified in 
that warrant, Detective Nash explained that officers seized 
evidence of “witchcraft and occult type activities” that were 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
28 
found “in plain view” after they learned that the organs had 
been removed from the victims.  The officers also seized a poster 
depicting a marijuana leaf because they believed it showed drug 
usage at the residence and is “kind of a gateway drug that people 
that use higher level of drugs will start.” 
Detective 
Steve 
Chiabotti 
of 
the 
Concord 
Police 
Department also testified at the hearing.  Detective Chiabotti 
testified that he was the lead detective for the Concord 
investigation 
into 
the 
Stinemans’ 
disappearance 
and 
participated in obtaining the third Saddlewood search warrant.  
He and his team held daily briefings with the Marin County 
officers to discuss developing information and share what 
evidence had been collected.  When asked at the hearing 
whether he used a guideline to distinguish between items to be 
seized and those not to be seized, Detective Chiabotti replied 
that in his mind, “anything that was related to instrumentality 
of the crimes that [they] were investigating, evidence that would 
tend to show who committed the crimes, how the crimes were 
committed, evidence which went to state of mind rather, 
planning, preparation,” was subject to seizure. 
Marin County officers ended their search of the 
Saddlewood premises on August 15, eight days after serving the 
first search warrant.  Concord officers relinquished control of 
the premises around August 22. 
On July 25, 2003, the trial court denied the motions to 
suppress.  The court found that the detectives were credible 
witnesses, and that they had a right to search the entire house 
and look for trace evidence, which allowed them to look 
“virtually in every nook and cranny” of the premises.  The court 
found that every seized item was either within the scope of the 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
29 
warrant or within plain view and incriminating in nature.  The 
court further ruled that any item that might have been outside 
of the Marin County warrants would have been inevitably 
discovered during execution of the Contra Costa County 
warrant. 
C.  Discussion 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures 
by government officials.  “The warrant clause of the Fourth 
Amendment expressly provides that no warrant may issue 
except those ‘particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.’ ”  (People v. Bradford 
(1997) 
15 Cal.4th 
1229, 
1291 
(Bradford).) 
 
“ ‘General 
warrants,’ ” which involve “ ‘ “a general, exploratory rummaging 
in a person’s belongings,” ’ ” are prohibited by the Fourth 
Amendment.  (Bradford, at p. 1291.)  But “in a complex case 
resting upon the piecing together of ‘many bits of evidence,’ the 
warrant properly may be more generalized than would be the 
case in a more simplified case resting upon more direct 
evidence.”  (Ibid.)  “Even if the warrant is legally sufficient” 
insofar as it is based on probable cause and describes with 
sufficient particularity the place to be searched or the person or 
things to be seized, the search may still be “unreasonable” when 
“it results in the seizure of property which was not specifically 
described in the warrant and is unrelated to probable criminal 
activity.”  (People v. Cook (1978) 22 Cal.3d 67, 98; see § 1538.5, 
subd. (a)(1)(B)(ii), (iv) [a defendant may move to suppress 
evidence when the search was pursuant to a warrant and, inter 
alia, the “evidence obtained [was] not that described in the 
warrant” or the method of execution of the warrant was 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
30 
unlawful].)4  At the same time, “the mere fact a large number of 
items were seized, many of which were not listed in the warrant, 
does not establish that the search was an illegal general search.”  
(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1043 (Kraft).)   
“When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to 
suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant, ‘[w]e defer to 
the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where 
supported by substantial evidence.  In determining whether, on 
the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent 
judgment.’ ”  (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 166 
(Carrington).)  “In reviewing factual determinations for 
substantial evidence, a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the 
evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve 
evidentiary conflicts.’  [Citation.]  The determinations should ‘be 
upheld if . . . supported by substantial evidence, even though 
substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial 
court might have reached a different result had it believed other 
evidence.’ ”  (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640.)  
“Accordingly, ‘[w]e view the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the order denying the motion to suppress’ [citation], and ‘[a]ny 
conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the superior 
court ruling.’ ”  (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 979; see 
also People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 717, 723 [deferring to 
trial court’s finding regarding officer’s purpose during search]; 
People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673–674 [same].)   
 
4  
“Pursuant to article I, section 28, of the California 
Constitution, a trial court may exclude evidence under Penal 
Code section 1538.5 only if exclusion is mandated by the federal 
Constitution.”  (People v. Banks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 926, 934.) 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
31 
Defendant concedes the warrants here satisfied the 
particularity requirement and were supported by probable 
cause.  But in making his blanket suppression challenge, he 
contends the officers exceeded the scope of the two Marin 
County warrants during their search of the Saddlewood 
premises.5  He asserts that, in executing these warrants, the 
officers acted with flagrant disregard of the terms of the 
warrants and used the term “indicia” to justify seizing items 
they did not have probable cause to seize under the plain view 
doctrine.  As a consequence, defendant argues, the trial court 
should have suppressed all evidence seized pursuant to these 
warrants, as well as evidence subsequently obtained as “fruits” 
of these seizures.  Defendant further argues that the trial court’s 
error in not granting the suppression motion means that 
defendant must be allowed to withdraw the guilty pleas that he 
entered after the trial court denied the motion to suppress. 
In arguing that wholesale suppression is required here, 
defendant relies on federal precedent finding such a remedy 
appropriate in certain “ ‘extraordinary’ ” circumstances (U.S. v. 
Foster (10th Cir. 1996) 100 F.3d 846, 852 (Foster)) in which 
 
5  
Defendant bears the burden of proof on this issue.  (See 
Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 101 [“In general, 
the burden is on the defendant to raise the issue of illegally 
obtained evidence”]; see also Levenson, Cal. Criminal Procedure 
(The Rutter Group 2021) § 6:17, p. 6–19 [“If a warrant was used, 
the search or seizure is presumed to be lawful, and the burden 
of demonstrating that it was illegally executed remains with the 
defendant” (fn. omitted)]; Caskey, Cal. Search & Seizure (2023) 
§ 3:1, p. 316 [“At the hearing on the motion to suppress, who has 
the burden of proving the government did/did not violate the 
fourth amendment?  The burden of proof lies with the 
prosecution if the search was without a search warrant; with the 
defense if the search was pursuant to a search warrant”].) 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
32 
officers conducting a search exceeded the parameters of the 
authorizing search warrant to such an extent as to render the 
search a general one (ibid.; see also U.S. v. Uzenski (4th Cir. 
2006) 434 F.3d 690, 706; U.S. v. Liu (2d Cir. 2000) 239 F.3d 138, 
140; U.S. v. Chen (9th Cir. 1992) 979 F.2d 714, 716).   
“Without passing upon the question ourselves, we 
previously have acknowledged that a majority of the federal 
circuits recognize the remedy of blanket suppression in a 
sufficiently egregious case.”  (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1044, 
citing Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1304–1307.)  But as we 
explained, courts in these cases “rarely have actually concluded 
that police conduct was so extreme as to warrant total 
suppression.  The remedy has been justified when the police 
exceeded the ‘scope of the warrant in the places searched’ 
[citations], the police used the warrant as a pretext to search for 
evidence of unrelated crimes [citation], or the police were 
motivated ‘ “by a desire to engage in indiscriminate ‘fishing’ ” ’ 
rather than by ‘considerations of practicality’ [citation].  The 
mere magnitude of the seizures does not establish a violation of 
the federal Constitution.”  (Bradford, at p. 1306, fn. omitted.)   
We again assume for argument’s sake that the remedy of 
total suppression may be appropriate in extreme circumstances 
of flagrant government misconduct.  (Bradford, supra, 
15 Cal.4th at p. 1306; Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1044.)  And 
as in Bradford and Kraft, we conclude that the facts here do not 
warrant this extreme remedy.   
Defendant contends the officers deliberately disregarded 
the terms of the warrants, effectively transforming them into 
unconstitutional “general warrants.”  According to defendant, 
Detective Nash applied for a narrow, particularized warrant — 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
33 
while withholding his true “investigative purpose” and his 
subjective intent to seek a broad array of documents and 
evidence relating to the Stinemans’ murder while executing the 
warrants.  We are not persuaded that the officers converted the 
search into “ ‘ “a general, exploratory rummaging” ’ ” (Bradford, 
supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1291) in executing the two search 
warrants at issue here.   
The search warrants were obtained in the context of a 
complex, rapidly evolving investigation relating to two known 
homicides and additional missing persons.  By their plain terms, 
the warrants authorized particularized but broad seizures, 
allowing the officers to search all areas where they might find 
specified firearms, ammunition, keys, receipts, documents, and 
indicia of occupancy or ownership.  (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at 
p. 1043 [finding it permissible for officers to “look[] in a spot 
where the specified evidence of crime plausibly could be found, 
even if it was not a place where [the specific items] normally are 
stored”]; People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 563 [where search 
warrant authorized police officers to search for notes, 
memoranda, and other documents, officers properly “looked in 
places where they might expect to find the documents listed in 
the search warrant in the event defendant had attempted to 
hide them or throw them away; those places included trash 
receptacles and a bedroom closet”]; Skelton v. Superior Court 
(1969) 1 Cal.3d 144, 158 [“Since the warrant mandated a search 
for and seizure of several small and easily secreted items, the 
officers had the authority to conduct an intensive search of the 
entire house, looking into any places where they might 
reasonably expect such items to be hidden”].)  Under these 
circumstances, the officers did not exceed the scope of the 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
34 
warrant in the places searched.  (Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 
p. 1306.)   
The record also belies defendant’s claim that Detective 
Nash, or any of the other officers, used the warrants “as a 
pretext to search for evidence of unrelated crimes” (Bradford, 
supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1306).  On the contrary, the trial court 
credited Detective Nash’s testimony that they made a 
conscientious effort to seize only those items of evidence either 
listed in the warrants or those they had probable cause to seize.  
Detective Nash carefully supervised the collection of evidence 
and, along with other involved agencies, held regular briefings 
both prior to the initial entry of the premises and at least twice 
daily thereafter.  The detective’s actions do not demonstrate an 
effort to engage in a pretextual search or conceal relevant 
information from the magistrate who issued the warrants.  
When additional information was obtained following the 
detective’s initial entry, revealing a carpet stain consistent with 
blood and efforts to conceal this evidence, the detective left the 
house after less than one hour to secure a second warrant 
allowing for the seizure of forensic evidence.  He then made 
copies of the second warrant for the other investigating officers 
performing the search.  The fact that Detective Nash’s affidavit 
in support of the second warrant does not mention the 
Stinemans does not support defendant’s claim of pretext or 
flagrant disregard; it is unsurprising given the evolving 
investigation that was unfolding.6   
 
6  
As noted ante, members of the district attorney’s office and 
Concord police officers arrived at the Saddlewood premises after 
Detective Nash obtained the second search warrant.  They 
 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
35 
We also are not persuaded by defendant’s efforts to show 
that “the police were motivated ‘ “by a desire to engage in 
indiscriminate ‘fishing’ ” ’ rather than by ‘considerations of 
practicality’ ” (Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1306).  As in 
Bradford, the sequence of events we have already recounted 
here “does not demonstrate that the officers had not been briefed 
or prepared as to the objects of the search [citation], or that their 
search amounted to a ‘fishing expedition.’  [Citation.]  Nor was 
the behavior of the officers so unconscionable as to amount to a 
due process violation.”  (Id. at pp. 1306–1307.)  And defendant’s 
reliance on the “numerosity and . . . bulk” of the items seized is 
unavailing.  (See Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1043 [“the mere 
fact a large number of items were seized, many of which were 
not listed in the warrant, does not establish that the search was 
an illegal general search”]; Bradford, at p. 1296 [rejecting the 
defendant’s argument that “because the officers seized more 
items not named in the warrant than items named, this 
circumstance establishes the exploratory nature of the 
search”].)7   
 
“started making some links at that point” but did not become 
aware that body parts had been recovered in gym bags in the 
Delta until the late afternoon or evening of August 7.  Believing 
that the remains may have belonged to the Stinemans and 
Bishop, on the evening of August 7, Detective Nash assisted the 
Concord Police Department in obtaining a search warrant from 
the Contra Costa County Superior Court.  This third warrant, 
not challenged here, specifically mentioned evidence relating to 
the Stinemans’ murders.  The warrant was executed beginning 
on the morning of August 8. 
7  
Defendant 
repeatedly 
objects 
to 
Detective 
Nash’s 
treatment of the “indicia” language in the warrants, contending 
 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
36 
In addition to noting the substantial amount of material 
seized from the Saddlewood premises, defendant mentions 
certain items — the seizure of eyeglasses, a day planner, posters 
depicting a marijuana leaf and fantasy themes,8 items perceived 
to be connected to witchcraft, and various receipts — as 
purportedly indicative of a general search.  But some of these 
items could reasonably be regarded as falling within the 
warrant descriptions authorizing the seizure of indicia of 
occupancy or ownership, or as “[i]tems of identification which 
might tend to establish the identity of persons who might have 
been within the premises to be searched” — a broad description, 
 
the detective seized whatever evidence he wanted “without 
regard to how that term was defined in [the] warrants.”  
According to defendant, the “Marin detectives were not guided 
by their warrants description of indicia, but by their own 
standard operating procedures.”  The detectives never testified 
that their standard practice was to ignore the terms of the 
warrants.  As noted, Detective Nash instead explained they 
endeavored to seize items within the scope of the warrants, and 
the trial court found the testifying detectives to be credible.  
Even assuming additional evidence was obtained, blanket 
suppression is not an appropriate remedy here.  As in Bradford, 
in light of the totality of the record before us, we are not 
persuaded that the detectives’ conduct rises to the level of 
flagrant disregard that might justify defendant’s request to 
suppress all evidence seized incident to the execution of a 
warrant.  (See Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1306 [“The 
officers may have entertained the hope that evidence pertaining 
to unrelated crimes also would be discovered, but it is very 
apparent that the search was not simply a pretext for a general 
search for evidence of unrelated crimes”].)   
8  
These posters were described by the defense in 
proceedings below as featuring dragons, “Valhalla warriors 
w[ith] axes [and] sword in fight,” a “Skeleton — Grateful Dead 
type,” and “a Wonder Woman type.” 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
37 
but one that officers were entitled to rely upon.  (See 
Messerschmidt v. Millender (2012) 565 U.S. 535, 547–548; 
People v. Balint (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200, 207 [“As many 
courts have observed, ‘officers executing a search warrant are 
“required to interpret it,” and they are “not obliged to interpret 
it narrowly” ’ ”]; People v. Howard (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 373, 376 
[upholding the seizure of currency under a warrant provision 
describing “ ‘articles of personal property tending to establish 
the identification of person or persons having dominion or 
control’ of the premises”].)  In his testimony at the suppression 
hearing, for example, Detective Nash explained that officers 
seized the eyeglasses as indicia of who had been present in the 
residence.  At some point in the investigation, he testified, police 
determined that the victims wore glasses, and they determined 
“it[ was] possible that [the glasses they found during the search] 
were the victims’ glasses.”  Similarly, Detective Nash testified 
that police frequently use receipts to determine occupancy of a 
home, and that even when receipts do not contain the name of a 
purchaser, police “track people all the time by . . . receipts.”9 
 
9  
Insofar as there is any question whether certain indicia of 
occupancy were properly seized under the first warrant for the 
Saddlewood premises, given the specific phrasing of its 
provisions relating to indicia of occupancy or ownership of the 
premises, it seems clear that these items would have been 
inevitably seized under the terms of the second warrant 
concerning “[i]tems of identification which might tend to 
establish the identity of persons who might have been within 
the premises to be searched.”  The circumstances presented here 
do not reflect that either the decision to procure this warrant, or 
the inclusion of this language in the warrant, was tainted by any 
illegal conduct by law enforcement.  (See Nix v. Williams (1984) 
467 U.S. 431, 444; People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 
 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
38 
We also agree with the Attorney General that defendant’s 
argument largely overlooks the significance of the plain view 
doctrine.  “Officers executing a warrant may seize items of 
evidence or contraband not listed in the warrant but observed in 
plain view.”  (Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 166.)  “The 
plain view doctrine does not create an independent ‘exception’ to 
the warrant clause, but simply is an extension of whatever may 
be the prior justification for the officers’ ‘access to an object.’  
[Citation.]  The officers lawfully must be in a position from 
which they can view a particular area; it must be immediately 
apparent to them that the items they are observing may be 
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to lawful 
seizure, and the officers must have a lawful right of access to the 
object.”  (Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1295.)   
There is substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s 
determination that seizures of items not specifically described 
in the warrant were nonetheless appropriate under the plain 
view doctrine, and did not reflect a general, indiscriminate 
search of the premises.  Detective Nash testified that seizures 
were made in light of “[t]he entire picture of what [they] were 
getting as [they] were getting it and whether it was related to 
this series of murders and financial stuff.”  He further explained:  
“So we wouldn’t just arbitrarily say yeah, that’s related.  We 
would actually have information at some point in there that we 
felt that it was related to the series of crimes.”  And Detective 
Nash responded in the affirmative when asked whether he had 
 
1040 [“Evidence need not be suppressed if the prosecution can 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
information would inevitably have been discovered by lawful 
means”].)   
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
39 
made “every effort to try to seize only those items that were 
either specifically listed in the search warrant or items which 
[he] believed there was probable cause to believe constituted the 
fruits [or] instrumentality of the crime.”  Similarly, Detective 
Chiabotti testified that the evidence that was seized at the 
premises “related to instrumentality of the crimes [they] were 
investigating, evidence that would tend to show who committed 
the crimes, how the crimes were committed, evidence which 
went to state of mind . . . , planning, preparation.” 
There also is ample support for the trial court’s 
determination that the seizure of various items in plain view did 
not involve officers searching in places that the warrants did not 
allow.  (See Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1043 [in properly 
executing a warrant, “officers merely looked in a spot where the 
specified evidence of crime plausibly could be found, even if it 
was not a place where [such items] normally are stored”]; People 
v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 799; People v. Nicolaus (1991) 
54 Cal.3d 551, 575.)  And it would have been immediately 
apparent to officers conducting this search that many seized 
“items might have had some bearing on the current offenses” 
(Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1306), whether as relating to 
motive or to other relevant circumstances of the crimes under 
investigation.  (See, e.g., Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. 
Hayden (1967) 387 U.S. 294, 307 [“probable cause must be 
examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought 
will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction”]; People v. 
Gallegos (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 612, 623 [“the required ‘nexus’ ” 
for application of the plain view doctrine “is that between the 
item discovered and a criminal activity, though not necessarily 
the criminal activity denominated in the warrant”]; U.S. v. 
Menon (3d Cir. 1994) 24 F.3d 550, 562 [“the immediate 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
40 
apparency of criminality should be measured, at a minimum, by 
the collective knowledge of the officers on the scene”].)   
We pause here to emphasize the limited inquiry before us.  
The issue before us is not whether the officers properly seized 
every specific item of evidence (such as the posters or evidence 
of witchcraft) under the two challenged warrants.10  Rather, the 
question here is whether the unusual remedy of blanket 
suppression of all seized evidence should be applied.  A review 
of the entire record before us and the totality of the officers’ 
conduct does not reveal the kind of flagrant disregard of Fourth 
Amendment protections that might justify the extraordinary 
remedy of wholesale suppression of all seized evidence.  
Defendant’s arguments resemble the claims we considered and 
rejected in Kraft, where the defendant “vaguely assert[ed], ‘It is 
not any single item that presents the problem, but the overall 
array of items taken and the failure to present any substantial 
reason for seizing many items that highlights the overall legal 
problem.’ ”  (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 1049–1050.)  This 
court found that the argument was so lacking in specificity that 
it “virtually defies review,” and that defendant’s argument that 
the People bear the burden to justify the seizure of items in plain 
view is contrary to the established rule that “on appeal[,] all 
presumptions favor the judgment.”  (Id. at p. 1050.) 
The cases defendant relies upon to support his request for 
wholesale suppression involved substantially more egregious 
 
10  
Even if defendant had developed an argument on appeal 
challenging individual seizures, it is at the very least doubtful 
that the items mentioned in his briefing likely affected his 
decision to plead guilty.  (Cf. People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 
767, fn. 36 [noting the relevance and incriminating nature of the 
items at issue in that case].)   
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
41 
conduct by the executing officers.  (See, e.g., Foster, supra, 
100 F.3d at pp. 850–851 [complete suppression appropriate 
where officers executing search warrant engaged in “fishing 
expedition for the discovery of incriminating evidence,” 
admittedly “ ‘took anything of [monetary] value,’ ” and made “no 
attempt . . . to substantiate a connection” between items seized 
and the terms of the warrant in a “deliberate and flagrant action 
taken in an effort to uncover evidence of additional 
wrongdoing”]; U.S. v. Rettig (9th Cir. 1978) 589 F.2d 418, 421–
423 [complete suppression ordered where the warrant that the 
officers obtained from one magistrate “was used as an 
instrument for conducting the search for which permission had 
been denied [by a different magistrate] on the previous day” and 
“the agents did not confine their search in good faith to the 
objects of the warrant”].)  Also inapt is U.S. v. Sedaghaty (9th 
Cir. 2013) 728 F.3d 885, in which officers procured a warrant 
authorizing the seizure of documents relating to the preparation 
of a tax return, but ultimately seized a large volume of 
documents relating to a charity formed by the defendant which 
the United States government suspected of funding terrorist 
activities.  (Id. at pp. 891, 912.)  The federal appellate court 
determined that these seizures could not be justified by 
reference to the warrant or its affidavit.  (Id. at pp. 912–913.)  
This determination, which is not binding upon us, is in any 
event distinguishable.  The warrants here were far broader than 
the warrants involved in Sedaghaty, and that court did not 
discuss the possible application of the plain view doctrine or the 
exclusionary rule to the facts before it — except to hold that 
complete suppression of all seized evidence was unwarranted.  
(Id. at p. 915.)  Neither that decision, nor any other authorities 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
42 
cited by defendant, provides persuasive support for his position 
that total suppression is appropriate here.11 
In sum, we assume for argument’s sake that the remedy 
of 
total 
suppression 
may 
be 
appropriate 
in 
extreme 
circumstances of flagrant government misconduct.  Even so, we 
conclude defendant has not shown the drastic remedy of 
suppression of all evidence is warranted here.  He has not 
demonstrated that the executing officers grossly exceeded or 
flagrantly disregarded the terms of the warrants at issue.  Even 
assuming some of the items seized were not identified in the 
search warrants, this does not transform an otherwise valid 
search warrant into an unconstitutional general warrant.  The 
behavior of the officers, the conditions under which the evidence 
was obtained, and the nature of the evidence seized — whether 
viewed individually or collectively — does not convince us that 
this extreme remedy is warranted. 
III.  OTHER ISSUES 
A.  Jury Selection 
Defendant contends the trial court improperly excused a 
potential juror, and that it erred when it denied his request to 
 
11  
Defendant also likens the situation here to the dog sniff of 
the exterior of a residence that the United States Supreme 
Court in Florida v. Jardines (2013) 569 U.S. 1, 11–12 found to 
constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.  He reasons 
that in both that case and here, law enforcement exceeded their 
“license” vis-à-vis the premises in question.  We do not view the 
analysis in Jardines, which was concerned with the threshold 
Fourth Amendment question of whether a search occurred, as 
especially relevant to the quite different question of whether the 
officers here so exceeded the authorization conferred by the 
search warrants as to potentially call for complete suppression.   
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
43 
ask prospective jurors a question regarding the impact that 
certain evidence might have on their assessment of the 
appropriate sentence.  We find defendant’s arguments 
unpersuasive. 
1.  Excusal of Prospective Juror 
a.  Factual background 
Defendant asserts the trial court’s removal of prospective 
juror J.W. based on her views regarding the death penalty 
violated his federal constitutional right to due process and an 
impartial jury. 
In her written questionnaire, when asked to describe her 
general feelings regarding life in prison without the possibility 
of parole, prospective juror J.W. wrote, “I believe it would be a 
terrible sentence to receive.”  When asked to describe her 
general feelings regarding the death penalty, J.W. wrote, “I’m 
not sure that I believe in the death penalty.”  She opined that 
the death penalty was imposed “too often.”  When asked if she 
would be willing to listen to all of the evidence and the court’s 
instructions on the law, and give honest consideration to both 
life in prison without the possibility of parole and death before 
reaching a penalty, J.W. answered “Yes,” adding, “I think?”  In 
response to another similarly worded question, J.W. again 
answered “Yes” and added, “Hopefully.”  When asked if she had 
opinions that would cause her to never vote for the death 
penalty, regardless of the evidence presented at the penalty 
trial, she answered “No.”  J.W. indicated that she was 
“[m]oderately against” the death penalty, explaining:  “I think I 
lean toward being against the death penalty.  I’m just not sure 
what I would decide.”  When asked if it would be difficult for her 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
44 
to apply the law if the court’s instructions on the law differed 
from her own beliefs and opinions, J.W. checked “Yes.” 
During voir dire, the trial court noted J.W.’s answer that 
it might be difficult for her to disregard her own beliefs to follow 
the court’s instructions and asked her how she felt about that.  
She replied, “Still I think it would be difficult.”  The court asked 
if she would be able to follow the law even though it would be 
difficult.  J.W. replied that she “really believe[d] in the system 
that we have” and thought she could follow the law.  The court 
noted that some time had passed since J.W. filled out her 
questionnaire and asked if she still believed she could consider 
both penalties equally.  J.W. replied, “I thought about it, you 
know, I have to say that if I had to vote on the death penalty I 
would vote against it.  That being said, could I just — don’t know 
what I would do.” 
During the prosecutor’s voir dire, he first spoke to the 
group of prospective jurors, noting that some people indicated 
they were inclined to be against the death penalty, but could still 
vote for it in an appropriate case.  He then spoke to J.W., stating, 
“[Y]ou said a couple things — ‘I’m not sure I believe in the death 
penalty.’  Another point you said something like, ‘I’m inclined to 
be against it’ or something like that, that’s kind of the sentiment 
you expressed here this afternoon.  [¶]  And it also sounds like 
you’ve thought about it a little bit between when you came in 
here three weeks ago and today; is that a fair characterization?”  
J.W. confirmed it was fair.  The prosecution asked her if she 
would be able to follow the law as instructed.  J.W. explained, 
“I’m thinking that I would like to say that I would, you know, 
you just don’t know until the time comes, you know, what you’re 
going to [do].”  The prosecutor explained that the law never 
requires a juror to impose the death penalty, and that jurors are 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
45 
not expected to abandon their “morality or . . . belief structure” 
while deliberating.  He asked J.W., “If what I’m saying here is 
accurate, that you do bring your own sense of morality 
and . . . who you are as a human being to bear on this case, 
would you agree that it would be very difficult, if not impossible 
for you, given your belief structure, to ever impose the death 
penalty?”  J.W. opined that there was a one percent chance, 
based on her moral beliefs, that she would be able to impose the 
death penalty.  When the prosecution sought to clarify this 
answer by asking whether that meant that 99 out of 100 times 
J.W. would not vote for death, based on her moral or 
philosophical beliefs about the death penalty, J.W. responded in 
the affirmative. 
When defense counsel began her voir dire, she told J.W. 
that it appeared the prospective juror had “strong reservations 
about the imposition of the death penalty,” and J.W. agreed.  
When counsel asked if J.W. could see herself imposing the death 
penalty in an appropriate case, J.W. said, “I couldn’t see myself.”  
Counsel then asked if the prospective juror would consider 
death as an option during deliberations.  J.W. replied, “I just 
don’t know what I would do.  [¶] . . . [¶]  But I sincerely doubt 
that I would.”  Defense counsel asked J.W. if she felt like she 
would keep an open mind, to which J.W. answered, “I like to 
think I would.”  But when counsel again asked if J.W. could 
impose the death penalty in “the appropriate case,” the 
prospective juror said, “I doubt it.  [¶] . . . [¶]  I just don’t know.” 
The prosecution challenged J.W. for cause.  Defense 
counsel submitted the issue without argument.  The trial court 
sustained the challenge:  “I do believe that [J.W.] has a bias 
against the death penalty such that I think she said in one 
percent she might have been thinking — considering it, but in 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
46 
all reasonable likelihood, not very likely.  I will excuse [J.W.] for 
cause.” 
b.  Discussion 
“[N]ot all who oppose the death penalty are subject to 
removal for cause in capital cases; those who firmly believe that 
the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors in 
capital cases so long as they state clearly that they are willing 
to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule 
of law.”  (Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176 
(Lockhart); see People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 778.)  
To determine whether a prospective juror should be excluded for 
cause because of his or her views on the death penalty, we 
inquire “whether the juror’s views would ‘prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in 
accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ”  (Wainwright v. 
Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 (Witt); see Witherspoon v. Illinois 
(1968) 391 U.S. 510.)  A prospective juror’s bias need not be 
proven with “ ‘unmistakable clarity.’ ”  (Witt, at p. 424.)  We 
recognize that many prospective jurors “simply cannot be asked 
enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been 
made ‘unmistakably clear’ . . . [and] may not know how they will 
react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be 
unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings.”  
(Id. at pp. 424–425.)   
Recognizing that the prospective juror’s demeanor is an 
important consideration, we accord deference to the trial court 
judge “who sees and hears the juror.”  (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at 
p. 426; see People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 388 (Flores) 
[“The trial court was in the best position to observe [the 
prospective juror’s] demeanor, vocal inflection, and other cues 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
47 
not readily apparent on the record, and we reasonably infer that 
the trial court based its decision not only on what [the 
prospective juror] said, but also on how he said it”].)  In 
“situations where the trial court has had an opportunity to 
observe the juror’s demeanor, we uphold the court’s decision to 
excuse the juror so long as it is supported by substantial 
evidence.”  (People v. Spencer (2018) 5 Cal.5th 642, 659.)   
The trial court’s excusal of J.W. for cause is supported by 
substantial evidence.  As previously detailed, in her written 
questionnaire, J.W. indicated that if the court’s instructions 
conflicted with her beliefs, she would have difficulty applying 
the law.  Although some of J.W.’s answers also expressed a 
willingness to listen to all of the evidence and jury instructions 
and consider both penalty options, she also equivocated on this 
point, adding “I think?” and “Hopefully” to these expressions of 
intent.  She also responded that she was “not sure” she believed 
in the death penalty and believed it was imposed “[t]oo often.”  
Later, during voir dire, J.W. told the court that she believed she 
could follow the law but also advised that, after thinking about 
it, “I have to say that if I had to vote on the death penalty I would 
vote against it.”  She then confirmed to the prosecutor that if the 
court allowed jurors to use their moral compasses in making a 
decision, her moral compass would be inconsistent with voting 
for the death penalty, and she could impose it only one percent 
of the time.  Finally, J.W. agreed with defense counsel that even 
in an “appropriate case,” she could not see herself voting for the 
death penalty, and that she did not know but “sincerely 
doubt[ed]” that she could consider death as an option.  Upon 
further probing by defense counsel, J.W. stated that although 
she liked to think she would keep an open mind, she doubted, or 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
48 
just did not know, whether she could vote to impose the death 
penalty “in the appropriate case.” 
This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s 
excusal of J.W. as a potential juror.  “Comments that a 
prospective juror would have a ‘hard time’ or find it ‘very 
difficult’ to vote for death reflect ‘a degree of equivocation’ that, 
considered ‘with the juror’s . . . demeanor, can justify a trial 
court’s conclusion . . . that the juror’s views would “ ‘prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a 
juror . . . .’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Duenas (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1, 12.)  The 
trial court, which was in a position to observe J.W. during voir 
dire (Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 388), reasonably could have 
concluded that J.W.’s responses to the juror questionnaire and 
to questions posed by the court and counsel established such 
impairment.  (See People v. Poore (2022) 13 Cal.5th 266, 297–
298 [according substantial deference to trial court’s evaluation 
of prospective jurors’ expressions of doubt demonstrating 
substantial impairment].) 
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it excused 
J.W. because her estimation that she could vote for the death 
penalty in one percent of cases confirmed her willingness to 
engage in the weighing process and impose a death sentence if 
she thought it was appropriate.  But “the mere theoretical 
possibility that a prospective juror might be able to reach a 
verdict of death in some case does not necessarily render the 
dismissal of the juror” erroneous.  (People v. Martinez (2009) 
47 Cal.4th 399, 432.) 
Defendant also relies on People v. Pearson (2012) 
53 Cal.4th 306 (Pearson) in arguing that the trial court erred, 
but his reliance is misplaced.  In Pearson, prospective juror C.O. 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
49 
noted in her questionnaire that she could be an impartial juror 
and it would not be impossible for her to vote for or against the 
death penalty in any one case.  (Id. at p. 328.)  During voir dire, 
C.O. acknowledged that she did not know if she was personally 
for or against the death penalty, but she could nonetheless vote 
to impose the death penalty in an appropriate case.  (Id. at 
p. 329.)  And she repeatedly confirmed that she would be able to 
vote for the death penalty.  (Id. at p. 330.)  We concluded the 
trial court erred in excusing C.O. for cause, noting that “[t]o 
exclude from a capital jury all those who will not promise to 
immovably embrace the death penalty in the case before them 
unconstitutionally biases the selection process,” and a juror 
should not be disqualified for failing to “enthusiastically support 
capital punishment.”  (Id. at p. 332.)   
Pearson is readily distinguishable from the present case.  
Although C.O. was not expressly in favor of the death penalty, 
she repeatedly affirmed she could be a fair and impartial juror, 
weigh the evidence, and vote for the death penalty in an 
appropriate case.  (Pearson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 328–330.)  
Here, J.W. did not repeatedly affirm that she could be a fair and 
impartial juror.  Rather, she repeatedly expressed doubt 
regarding her ability to impose the death penalty, even in an 
“appropriate case.”12 
 
12  
In supplemental briefing, defendant asserts that People v. 
Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735 bolsters his claim that the trial 
court erred when it excused J.W. for cause.  In Armstrong, we 
concluded that the trial court improperly excused at least four 
jurors when it “applied an erroneous standard to the question of 
qualification” and “relied on factual bases not supported by the 
record.”  (Id. at p. 751.)  Neither circumstance is present here; 
 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
50 
Therefore, we reject defendant’s claim of error in 
connection with the trial court’s excusal of prospective juror 
J.W. 
2.  Denial of Voir Dire Question  
a.  Background 
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion 
when it denied his request to ask the prospective jurors whether 
evidence of dismemberment would prevent them from imposing 
a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 
At a hearing to discuss voir dire, the prosecution objected 
to two of the defense’s proposed questions.  Question 133 asked, 
“What purpose do you think the death penalty serves?”  
Question 134 asked, “In what types of cases do you think the 
death penalty should be imposed?”  The prosecution argued that 
the questions invited prospective jurors to prejudge the 
evidence, and it would be “highly inappropriate” to invite the 
jurors to speculate under which circumstances they think the 
death penalty should be imposed.  Justin’s counsel responded 
that Question 134 would “save time” because “[i]t goes right to 
the heart of a well-recognized challenge for cause . . .  potential 
jurors who would automatically impose the death penalty under 
particular circumstances.”  Defendant’s counsel offered to 
 
as discussed, the trial court applied the correct standard of law 
and the record supports its excusal of J.W.  Relatedly, defendant 
argues in his supplemental briefing that the trial court “fail[ed] 
to comply with the Legislature’s clearly expressed limitation on 
death 
qualification 
of 
California 
juries.” 
 
Defendant 
acknowledges that we rejected a similar argument in a more 
recent case, People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116 (Suarez), and 
he does not present any new argument to warrant our 
reconsideration of the constitutionality of death qualification. 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
51 
withdraw Question 133 but maintained that Question 134 was 
necessary. 
The prosecution disagreed, arguing that “it is absolutely 
inappropriate for counsel . . . to inquire of the jurors whether 
they, if they were to assume true certain facts like, for instance, 
dismembering of bodies, and in those circumstances would they 
impose the death penalty, absolutely requires them to prejudge 
the evidence, that is clearly an objectionable question.  [¶]  What 
is not objectionable, what they can ask, what this questionnaire 
does include, is inquiries into whether or not based upon the 
special circumstances themselves would those alone be enough 
or cause them to automatically vote for the death penalty in 
every case, okay, we agree with that.”  The prosecution further 
argued that the question invited the jury to speculate on areas 
where they would or would not impose the death penalty.  
Justin’s counsel argued that Question 134 did not contain any 
factual information related to the case, but rather, it asked the 
prospective jurors, “[W]hat is your view?  Do you think the death 
penalty should . . . always be applied in some situations?  What 
are they?” 
After a brief recess, the court turned to Question 135, 
which asked:  “Are there any circumstances where a person 
convicted of murder should automatically receive the death 
penalty?”  The court offered an alternative phrasing:  “Are there 
any types of factual circumstance[s] for which you feel the death 
penalty should always be imposed, if yes, please explain.”  The 
court concluded that it would not accept Questions 133 or 134, 
but would allow Question 135 in either the proposed form or its 
alternative suggestion. 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
52 
At a hearing on March 1, 2004, defendant’s counsel 
informed the court that the parties had agreed on a final 
questionnaire.  A few days later, defendant changed his plea to 
guilty and the court granted Justin’s motion to sever. 
On September 17, 2004, defendant proposed a question 
that would ask the prospective jurors if viewing photographs or 
videos would “upset you or influence you so that you would be 
unable to remain impartial to either side in this case?”  The 
prosecution objected and proposed to reword the question to ask 
the prospective jurors if they would be able to keep an open 
mind, rather than remain impartial.  The trial court noted that 
in Justin’s trial, the prospective jurors had been asked the 
following question:  “As a juror, you may be required to view 
graphic photographs of the victims and the crime scenes.  Would 
you be able to do this and continue to carry out your other duties 
in this case as a juror?”  The prosecution agreed with the 
question, but defense counsel requested more time to come up 
with a compromise. 
The defense subsequently proposed asking prospective 
jurors, “Are there any factual circumstances for which you feel 
the death penalty should automatically be imposed?”  The 
prosecution objected, arguing that the question asked the jurors 
to prejudge the evidence.  The court acknowledged that “most 
people” answer this question with a circumstance unrelated to 
defendant’s case — i.e., something related to children — and 
that the circumstances relevant to the case were covered by 
other questions.  The trial court rejected the defense’s question. 
One week later, defendant filed a motion seeking to 
conduct voir dire on case-specific evidence of mitigation and 
aggravation.  At a hearing on the matter, defense counsel 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
53 
expanded on her desire to question the prospective jurors 
regarding the photographs.  “Judge, my concern is that because 
of the gross and gruesome and horrendous and horrific nature, 
and all the other words that have been in the newspaper, facts 
of this case and the evidence . . . that the jurors have to have 
some preparation for what they’re going to see.”  The court 
confirmed that the prospective jurors would be told that they 
would see photographs depicting body parts but advised defense 
counsel that insofar as she sought to ask jurors if they would 
always impose death if the crime involved “this fact and this fact 
and this fact,” counsel was “asking them to make a 
predetermination based upon certain facts that you’re giving 
them.  And that, I don’t want to do.” 
In further argument, defense counsel stated that she 
wanted to ask the prospective jurors how they felt about 
dismemberment and whether they would “be able to sit here and 
say this man should live” after hearing that he “desecrated and 
dismembered three people’s bodies.”  After the court said such a 
question would also be asking the jurors to prejudge the case, 
defense counsel clarified that she wanted to ask if they could put 
“that” aside and not prejudge the case.  The prosecution replied 
that “[t]hey don’t have to put that aside.  That’s a circumstance 
in aggravation.”  The prosecution suggested that counsel could 
ask the prospective jurors if they could keep an open mind and 
not make any decisions about the case until they have heard all 
the evidence presented.  Defense counsel replied that it was 
important to inform the potential jurors that the pictures would 
be gruesome.   
The court told counsel that it would not allow prospective 
jurors to be shown pictures and then be asked whether they 
could be a fair juror, but stated that it would inform potential 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
54 
jurors that the case involved “gory” facts and “body parts.”  The 
court recognized that questioning on this subject involved a 
“gray area,” but added that if counsel’s questions strayed from 
the “issues” presented by the case and got “too far into a fact and 
then a juror’s opinion based upon those facts,” the court would 
sustain an objection.  The court stated that the propriety of such 
questions during voir dire would be resolved on a “question by 
question” basis, adding, “But I think everyone knows how I feel 
on that.” 
The juror questionnaire that ultimately was used stated 
that the Stinemans were an elderly couple and that 
“dismembered remains of the Stinemans and Selina Bishop 
were found floating in gym bags along the Mokelumne River 
(Delta Region) in August 2000.”  The questionnaire also 
informed prospective jurors that they would be required to view 
photographs or videos “of the people who were killed and the 
scene where it occurred,” and asked whether that would 
“influence you so that you would be unable or unwilling to 
consider any other evidence presented?”  The questionnaire did 
not otherwise discuss the dismemberment of victims, or its 
possible effect on juror deliberations.  Prospective jurors were 
also asked, “Would you always vote for the death penalty in a 
case involving more than one murder [or murder committed 
during a robbery or murder committed during a kidnapping]?  
In other words, would you automatically vote for a sentence 
imposing the death penalty regardless of what the evidence was 
during the penalty trial?” 
When the penalty phase voir dire began, the trial court 
instructed the panel that the “proper frame of mind for a juror 
entering the penalty trial would be to have an open mind, a 
willingness to consider each of the two possible penalties in light 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
55 
of all the evidence and the Court’s instructions on the law.  It 
would be unacceptable for a juror to approach the penalty phase 
having ruled out one penalty or the other.” 
During voir dire, defense counsel advised a prospective 
juror that the case “involves extreme violence” and asked 
whether the juror could still, if appropriate, return a sentence of 
life without parole.  When the prosecutor objected to the 
question, the trial court told defense counsel, “When you say 
here are specific facts[] this case involves and could you vote a 
certain way, you are asking them to prejudge the evidence.  If 
you say a case that involves extreme violence, is that going to 
cause a problem for you? . . .  You can’t ask him how specifically 
they’re going to vote.  You can’t do that, based on facts that 
you’ve given in the hypothetical.”  Later in voir dire, defense 
counsel asked a cohort of prospective jurors, “the reality is that 
you’re going to spend six or seven or eight weeks seeing 
[defendant] every day in court.  You know that he’s pled guilty 
to five murders.  You read the paragraph about the 
dismembered bodies.  [¶]  The question is . . . Could you, if you 
thought the case was appropriate, come back with a verdict of 
life without the possibility of parole[?]”   
One of the potential jurors who was asked this question 
replied, “With the little that I know about this case being 
multiple murders, being mutilation or dismemberment of 
bodies, premeditation, I would consider the life without parole, 
but that would be an uphill battle for me.”  However, this 
candidate subsequently clarified that his feelings regarding 
such evidence would not preclude him from voting for life 
without parole.  And subsequently, the trial court provided the 
following clarification to prospective jurors:  “[A]gain, we’re not 
going to be asking you . . . how you would vote.  We don’t want 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
56 
to know that because you haven’t heard the evidence yet.  If you 
have certain feelings about certain issues in this case such as 
multiple murder, you need to let us know about that.  We’re not 
going to get into specifics here.  I won’t allow that.  [¶]  We can 
ask [the prospective juror] with regard to multiple murder or 
something like that, what her feeling is with regard to the death 
penalty.” 
b.  Discussion 
Defendant contends the trial court improperly prevented 
his counsel from asking prospective jurors about the impact that 
evidence of corpse dismemberment and desecration would have 
on their deliberations, and that this alleged error violated 
settled law, had no legitimate purpose, was an abuse of 
discretion, precluded identification of jurors who would 
automatically 
impose 
death, 
and 
violated 
his 
federal 
constitutional rights.  We disagree. 
Defense counsel and the prosecution are permitted to ask 
prospective jurors questions that are specific enough to 
determine whether the juror harbors a bias, based on a 
circumstance or fact shown by the trial evidence, that would 
affect their ability to follow the court’s instructions when 
weighing aggravating and mitigating evidence and determining 
the penalty.  (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 720–721.)  
Death qualification voir dire “must not be so abstract that it fails 
to identify those jurors whose death penalty views would 
prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties 
as jurors in the case being tried.  On the other hand, it must not 
be so specific that it requires the prospective jurors to prejudge 
the penalty issue based on a summary of the mitigating and 
aggravating evidence likely to be presented.”  (Id. at pp. 721–
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
57 
722.)  A trial court has considerable discretion in determining 
what questions are permitted.  (People v. Holmes, McClain and 
Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 758.)  “Where the court 
exercises its discretion to exclude certain questions from the 
questionnaire, we will affirm unless the voir dire was so 
inadequate that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair.”  
(People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 586 (Leon).) 
We have previously rejected arguments similar to those 
raised by defendant.  In People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 
1082 (Zambrano), the defendant killed and dismembered the 
victim.  (Id. at pp. 1096–1097.)  During voir dire, defense counsel 
sought to ask the prospective jurors if the gruesome nature of 
the dismemberment might influence their views on an 
appropriate penalty.  (Id. at pp. 1118–1119.)  The trial court 
rejected the request, concluding that asking prospective jurors 
about how dismemberment might affect them would require 
them to prejudge the case.  (Id. at p. 1119.)  We affirmed the 
trial court’s ruling, holding that it did not abuse “its broad 
discretion.”  (Id. at p. 1122.)  We noted that the trial court 
permitted the defense to explore several specific circumstances 
of the case with the prospective jurors, including that the 
defendant and the victim were both members of the same city 
commission and the allegation that the defendant killed the 
victim to eliminate him as a witness in an assault case.  (Ibid.)  
Several 
times, 
counsel’s 
inquiry 
touched 
upon 
the 
dismemberment issue.  (Ibid.)   
We explained that “[i]n Cash — our only reversal of a 
death penalty judgment for failure to allow sufficient inquiry 
into jurors’ death penalty attitudes about particular facts — we 
stressed that the court had refused to allow defense counsel to 
ask prospective jurors about ‘a general fact or circumstance . . . 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
58 
that could cause some jurors invariably to vote for the death 
penalty, 
regardless 
of 
the 
strength 
of 
the 
mitigating 
circumstances.’ ”  (Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1121.)  
Unlike in Cash, “the condition of the adult murder victim’s body 
when found — was not one that could cause a reasonable 
juror — i.e., one whose death penalty attitudes otherwise 
qualified him or her to sit on a capital jury — invariably to vote 
for death, regardless of the strength of the mitigating evidence.  
No child victim, prior murder, or sexual implications were 
involved.  Nor, to the extent juror emotions might thereby be 
aroused, would there be evidence that [the victim] was 
dismembered while alive.”  (Id. at p. 1122.)  We acknowledged 
that the average juror would certainly be affected by a condition 
like dismemberment, similar to any brutal circumstance of a 
homicide.  “But the fact of dismemberment, in and of itself, does 
not appear so potentially inflammatory as to transform an 
otherwise 
death-qualified 
juror 
into 
one 
who could 
not deliberate fairly on the issue of penalty.”  (Id. at p. 1123.) 
Likewise, in People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, the 
defendant argued on appeal that the trial court should have 
inquired 
whether 
prospective 
jurors’ 
penalty 
phase 
decisionmaking would be affected by the facts “that defendant 
was close to his three alleged murder victims, that one of the 
victims was pregnant, that another was the mother of his child, 
and that two were dismembered.”  (Id. at p. 1152.)  We rejected 
the defendant’s assertion, explaining that “it was more than 
sufficient that the prospective jurors — having been informed 
that defendant allegedly murdered a male friend and two former 
girlfriends — were asked, in various ways, whether there were 
circumstances under which they would impose the death 
penalty automatically regardless of other legally relevant 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
59 
factors.”  (Ibid.)  We specifically addressed, and once again 
rejected, the position that prospective jurors must be informed 
that the charged homicide involves dismemberment, especially 
absent evidence that dismemberment occurred while the victim 
was alive.  (Ibid.)  In so holding, we explained that in such 
situations, “it is ‘not error to refuse to permit counsel to ask 
questions based upon an account of the facts of [the] case, or to 
ask a juror to consider particular facts that would cause him or 
her to impose the death penalty.’ ”  (Ibid.)   
Defendant acknowledges the holdings in Zambrano and 
Rogers, but asserts his case is different because it involved only 
a penalty phase trial and particularly gruesome facts and 
desecration beyond dismemberment of the corpse, notably the 
feeding of human flesh to animals.  We are not persuaded that 
these differences require a different outcome than in Zambrano 
and Rogers.  The trial court here provided for an adequate 
canvas of would-be jurors.  Prior to answering any questions 
regarding their opinion on the death penalty, prospective jurors 
were informed in the juror questionnaire that the case involved 
dismemberment and that remains were found floating in duffel 
bags in the Delta.  It is therefore reasonable to infer that the 
prospective jurors considered these facts when filling out the 
questionnaire, including its question regarding whether viewing 
photographs or videos of the victims and the crime scene would 
render them unable or unwilling to consider other evidence.  
(See Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 587 [although the trial court 
excluded questions about multiple murder, the jurors were 
informed of that circumstance in the questionnaire and “it is 
reasonable to believe the jurors had these charges and special 
circumstances 
in 
mind 
when 
they 
completed 
the 
questionnaire”].)  Jurors were asked in the questionnaire 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
60 
whether they would automatically vote for death in a case 
involving more than one murder, or a murder committed during 
a robbery or a kidnapping.  The court and the parties also 
repeatedly asked prospective jurors if they could keep an open 
mind and consider all evidence presented before selecting an 
appropriate penalty.  These inquiries, along with the other 
advisements given and questions posed to prospective jurors, 
were sufficient under the circumstances presented and did not 
render the voir dire “so inadequate that the resulting trial was 
fundamentally unfair.”  (Leon, at p. 586.)  We therefore find no 
abuse of discretion notwithstanding the fact that this case 
involved only a penalty phrase trial and conduct by defendant 
going beyond dismemberment. 
3.  Constitutionality of Death Qualification 
Defendant contends the exclusion of prospective jurors 
because of an unwillingness or impaired ability to impose death 
violated his right to a representative jury.  Both the United 
States Supreme Court and this court have held that death 
qualification does not unconstitutionally alter the makeup of a 
defendant’s jury.  (See Lockhart, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 175–176 
[“ ‘Death qualification’ . . . is carefully designed to serve the 
State’s concededly legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury 
that can properly and impartially apply the law to the facts of 
the case at both the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital 
trial”]; Suarez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 138 [“we have considered 
and rejected claims that the death qualification process is 
unconstitutional”].)  Death qualification did not violate 
defendant’s right to a jury selected from a cross-section of the 
community. 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
61 
B.  Admission of Evidence 
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion 
when it admitted evidence of corpse dismemberment.  He 
specifically challenges the introduction of two pieces of evidence:  
(1) photographs 
depicting 
the 
Stinemans’ 
and 
Bishop’s 
dismemberment; and (2) the sound of a reciprocating saw which 
played during the prosecution’s closing argument. 
1.  Factual Background 
After defendant pleaded guilty, he filed a motion to limit 
the photographic evidence that would be admitted at the penalty 
phase.  He argued that photographs depicting dismemberment 
should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because 
they were unduly prejudicial, irrelevant as an undisputed issue, 
cumulative, and offensive to the victims’ families.  Defendant 
argued in the alternative that if the photographs were admitted, 
they should not remain in the jury’s view “beyond its relevant 
use.”  The prosecution argued in response that the photographs 
were “the best evidence of the methodical and cold-blooded 
manner in which this defendant killed five people.”  The 
prosecution also argued that “the desecration of the 
bodies . . . [is] directly related to the enormity of the crimes 
committed.” 
At the hearing on the motion, defendant argued that 
because he had pleaded guilty, “there [was] no issue as to how 
the deaths occurred, the manner in which they occurred.”  He 
further argued that the photographs of dismemberment were 
inflammatory and lacked probative value for a penalty phase 
trial.  In response, the prosecutor argued that although 
defendant had pleaded guilty, the prosecution was entitled to 
present evidence regarding the manner in which the crimes 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
62 
were committed.  Additionally, he argued the photographs were 
“circumstantial evidence of what is inside [defendant’s mind].  
And therefore, they are very probative of the enormity of the 
crime, which directly relates to the question of whether or not 
the evidence in aggravation is so substantial that it warrants 
imposition of the death penalty.” 
The trial court noted that the prosecution had offered a 
limited number of photographs in comparison to the “enormity 
of the amount” of photographs taken, and that several 
photographs had been used in Justin’s trial.  The court opined 
that the pictures of faces were “the hardest photos to look at” 
but the fact that the jaws and teeth of the victims had been 
hammered out was relevant for the jury in deciding which 
penalty to impose.  The court found that the photos were 
relevant to the circumstances of the crime and that their 
probative value far outweighed any prejudicial effect, and 
agreed with defendant that the images should not remain in the 
jury’s view indefinitely.  During the trial, the photographs were 
displayed only during the testimony of the coroner, Dr. Gregory 
Reiber. 
Prior to Dr. Reiber’s testimony, defendant moved to 
exclude the operation and sound of the reciprocating saw, which 
was to occur during the doctor’s testimony.13  The trial court 
granted the motion to preclude activation of the saw, concluding 
“it seems to me that seeing the body in pieces tells [the] story.  
The doctor can talk about striations and we don’t need to turn it 
on to show that.” 
 
13  
The physical saw itself had already been admitted into 
evidence without objection from defendant. 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
63 
Prior to closing arguments, defendant again moved to 
preclude activation of the saw on relevance grounds.  The 
prosecutor argued that “turning on the saw gets the jury closer 
to the reality of what happened in that bathroom.”  The 
prosecutor emphasized that the saw was already in evidence 
and turning it on would demonstrate how it operated, which was 
relevant to the degree of the harm and to showing the jury the 
care and deliberation required to manipulate the saw. 
The trial court acknowledged that during Dr. Reiber’s 
testimony, activating the saw was not relevant to explain how 
the cuts were made.  The court ruled, however, that activating 
the saw during closing argument was “relevant to show and 
demonstrate to the jury the gravity of the crime” and was “not 
overly prejudicial.”  The prosecutor activated the reciprocating 
saw during his closing argument to the jury. 
2.  Discussion 
Only relevant evidence is admissible.  (Evid. Code, § 350.)  
Evidence is relevant if it has a “tendency in reason to prove or 
disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action.”  (Id., § 210.)  “The trial court has 
broad discretion to determine the relevance of evidence 
[citation], and we will not disturb the court’s exercise of that 
discretion unless it acted in an arbitrary, capricious or patently 
absurd manner.”  (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 947.)  
Evidence Code section 352 provides for the exclusion of evidence 
“if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue 
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue 
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”  We 
review a trial court’s admission of evidence under the abuse of 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
64 
discretion standard.  (People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 
339.)  The “undue prejudice” contemplated by Evidence Code 
section 352 “ ‘is that which “ ‘ “uniquely tends to evoke an 
emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which 
has very little effect on the issues.” ’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Chhoun 
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 29, italics omitted.)  “As to victim 
photographs, the court’s discretion under Evidence Code 
section 352 to exclude evidence showing circumstances of the 
crime ‘is much narrower at the penalty phase than at the guilt 
phase.  This is so because the prosecution has the right to 
establish the circumstances of the crime, including its gruesome 
consequences ([Pen. Code,] § 190.3, factor (a)), and because the 
risk of an improper guilt finding based on visceral reactions is 
no longer present.’ ”  (People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 105–
106.)  
Defendant first contends the photographs depicting 
dismemberment displayed during Dr. Reiber’s testimony were 
irrelevant because they did not address a disputed fact.  He 
argues that because he had already pleaded guilty, there was no 
need for the prosecutor to present evidence of the manner of 
death.  Defendant further argues that although dismemberment 
was evidence of defendant’s disposal of the bodies, the trial court 
incorrectly classified the photographs as evidence of the manner 
of death.  Defendant also contends that the activation of the 
reciprocating saw during closing argument was similarly 
irrelevant.  Finally, defendant contends that both the 
photographs and the sound of the saw violated his constitutional 
rights to an impartial jury and rendered his trial fundamentally 
unfair.  We conclude the trial court did not err in admitting the 
photographs, and even assuming that the prosecution should 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
65 
not have been allowed to activate the reciprocating saw during 
closing, any assumed error was harmless.   
The photographs were relevant to the circumstances of the 
crimes of conviction.  “Under section 190.3, factor (a), the trier 
of fact may consider, in aggravation, evidence relevant to ‘the 
circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted 
in the present proceeding and the existence of any special 
circumstances found to be true.’  The ‘circumstances of the 
crime’ as used in section 190.3, factor (a), ‘does not mean merely 
the immediate temporal and spatial circumstances of the crime.  
Rather it extends to “[t]hat which surrounds materially, 
morally, or logically” the crime.’ ”  (People v. Blair (2005) 
36 Cal.4th 686, 748–749.)   
Here, the disputed photographs shed light on the 
circumstances of the crimes because, as the trial court reasoned, 
they were strong evidence of defendant’s consciousness of guilt, 
the seriousness of his crimes, and the manner of death and 
subsequent disposal of the victims’ bodies.  The images depicted 
the removal of victims’ teeth and identifiable tattoos, which 
demonstrated defendant’s intent to conceal the identities of his 
victims.  The photographs also assisted the jury in 
understanding Dr. Reiber’s testimony concerning how the 
dismembering cuts and organ removal were executed, and the 
high degree of skill required to do so.  Although these 
photographs were disturbing, we cannot say that their relevance 
was substantially outweighed by a countervailing consideration, 
and thus find no error in their admission. 
This conclusion finds support from our analysis in People 
v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792 (Solomon).  There, we held 
that photographs depicting murder victims at various stages of 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
66 
decomposition were admissible at the penalty phase of a capital 
trial as evidence of the defendant’s intent and the manner of 
death.  (Id. at pp. 841–842.)  We observed that the photographs 
“were highly relevant to the circumstances of the crimes.  
[Citation.]  They disclosed the manner in which the victims died 
and substantiated that defendant intended and deliberated the 
murders.  [Citations.]  They demonstrated the callousness and 
cruelty of defendant’s acts.  [Citation.]  And they corroborated 
the 
pathologists’ 
testimony 
and 
assisted 
the 
jury’s 
understanding of it.”  (Id. at p. 842.)  The photographs 
introduced here were similarly relevant. 
Defendant argues his case is different from Solomon 
because the photographs in that case showed decomposition 
premortem and perimortem as it pertained to the manner of 
death.  In his case, he argues, the photographs concerned 
postmortem violence.  This purported distinction carries little 
weight.  We recognized in Solomon that “[t]he ‘circumstances of 
the crime’ include what happened to the victims’ bodies as a 
result of defendant’s actions.  [Citation.]  The consequences of 
criminal conduct often extend beyond the immediate result of an 
isolated act.”  (Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 842.)  Further, 
we have regularly upheld the admission of graphic postmortem 
photographs of victims during the penalty phase of a capital 
trial.  (See People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 158 [upholding 
admission of postmortem photograph of murder victim that also 
suggested molestation]; Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1149–1152 [trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
admitting graphic dismemberment photographs]; People v. 
Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 34–35 [graphic photos excluded 
during guilt phase were later admitted as penalty phase 
evidence]; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1201 [upholding 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
67 
admission of photographs that were bloody and graphic].)  
Therefore, contrary to defendant’s assertion, we have found 
photographs of both premortem and postmortem violence to be 
relevant under similar circumstances.   
While the jury must be shielded from “ ‘depictions that 
sensationalize’ ” the alleged crimes, “ ‘the jury cannot be 
shielded from an accurate depiction of the charged crimes that 
does not unnecessarily play upon the emotions of the jurors.’ ”  
(People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 238.)  In Streeter, the 
defendant poured gasoline on his son’s mother and lit her on fire; 
she suffered extensive burns on nearly 60 percent of her body 
and died 10 days later.  (Id. at pp. 212–214.)  On appeal, the 
defendant challenged the admission of three photographs 
showing the victim’s burn injuries, expert testimony concerning 
the nature and degree of the victim’s burns, and a tape recording 
of the victim screaming in the ambulance.  (Id. at pp. 234–236.)  
We held that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion, 
noting that “the evidence ‘did no more than accurately portray 
the shocking nature of the crimes.’ ”  (Id. at p. 238.)  Here, 
defendant cannot establish that the admitted photographs were 
inaccurate depictions of the charged crimes, or that they 
unnecessarily played upon the emotions of the jurors.  Again, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the 
photographs. 
Defendant challenges the activation of the reciprocating 
saw during closing argument on nearly identical relevance 
grounds.  Ruling on objections of this nature lies within the 
court’s broad discretion.  (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 
147 (Simon) [“Trial courts have broad discretion to control the 
duration and scope of closing arguments”].)  We acknowledge 
the inflammatory nature of how this evidence was used during 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
68 
closing argument.  However, the saw itself had already been 
admitted into evidence, with witnesses describing how it had 
been used to dismember multiple victims.  And the jury heard a 
significant amount of testimony regarding defendant’s scheme 
to murder the Stinemans and Bishop for money, and the manner 
in which he kidnapped, murdered, and disposed of the victims.  
Given this detailed account of the crimes, and the record as a 
whole, there is no reasonable possibility that defendant would 
have received a different outcome but for the activation of the 
saw during closing argument.  Thus, even if we were to assume 
it was error to allow the prosecutor to activate the saw during 
closing argument, defendant has failed to establish a reasonable 
possibility the penalty verdict would have been different absent 
the use of this evidence.  (See People v. Silveria and Travis 
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 266, citing People v. Lancaster (2007) 
41 Cal.4th 50, 94 [the standard that an “error is reversible if 
there is a reasonable possibility it affected the verdict . . . is 
essentially the same as the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24”]; see 
People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448 [the reasonable 
possibility standard applies “when assessing the effect of state-
law error at the penalty phase of a capital trial”].)   
C.  Asserted Instructional Error 
1.  Proposed Instructions and Closing Argument 
Defendant contends the trial court’s refusal to instruct the 
jury with certain instructions proposed by the defense, coupled 
with the prosecutor’s asserted misstatement of the law during 
closing argument, precluded the jury from considering 
applicable mitigating circumstances.  We find the prosecutor 
misstated the law when arguing the applicability of section 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
69 
190.3, factors (d) and (h) to the jury, but the prosecutor’s 
misstatements do not warrant reversal. 
a.  Background 
After the prosecution presented its case-in-chief and 
rested, the parties discussed jury instructions.  The defense 
requested 38 instructions, many of which were proposed to 
modify CALJIC No. 8.85. 
Defendant’s proposed jury instruction No. 8 informed the 
jurors that they could only consider section 190.3, factors (a) 
through (c) as aggravating factors, and the remaining factors 
could only be considered as mitigating factors.  The trial court 
rejected the proposed instruction, noting that it was not 
required to differentiate which factors are mitigating and which 
are aggravating. 
Defendant’s proposed jury instruction No. 15 informed 
jurors that they were not limited to the statutory mitigating 
factors and may consider any circumstance in defendant’s 
background, history, or character.  The court rejected the 
proposed instruction, finding it duplicative of section 190.3, 
factor (k) in the standard instruction. 
Defendant’s proposed jury instruction No. 16 expanded on 
section 190.3, factor (d), the factor that directs the trier of fact’s 
attention to whether the offense was committed while the 
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance, by informing jurors that:  (1) they could 
consider evidence of mental or emotional disturbance regardless 
of whether there was an excuse or explanation for it; (2) such 
disturbance is akin to heat of passion upon adequate 
provocation, but it need not rise to the same level to be 
considered mitigating; (3) such disturbance could be caused by 
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anything, including consumption of drugs and alcohol or mental 
illness; and (4) if they found that defendant suffered from such 
disturbance at the time of the crimes, then they must consider 
it as a mitigating circumstance.  The court rejected the 
instruction, finding it argumentative. 
Defendant’s proposed jury instruction No. 20 modified 
section 190.3, factor (h) by informing jurors that the mental 
impairment referred to in the standard instruction included 
“any degree of mental defect, disease, impairment, or 
intoxication” that jurors believed mitigated against death.  The 
court decided not to modify CALJIC No. 8.85 as requested and 
instead gave the proposed instruction as its own instruction 
immediately following CALJIC No. 8.85. 
Defendant’s proposed jury instruction No. 21, to be read 
following section 190.3, factor (h), informed jurors:  (1) “mental 
disease or defect,” as used in that factor, did not mean legal 
insanity; (2) jurors could consider whether defendant was 
unable to fully comprehend the wrongfulness of his conduct, or 
whether, knowing his conduct was wrong, he was nonetheless 
unable to fully conform his conduct to the law; and (3) the cause 
of such disease or defect could be the consumption of drugs or 
alcohol or any other reason.  The court found the proposed 
instruction to be argumentative and declined to give it. 
Defendant’s proposed jury instructions Nos. 22 and 23 
sought to categorize specific factors, or the absence of a factor, 
as aggravating or mitigating circumstances.  The court declined 
to give the instructions, reminding the defense that it “has 
already determined that it doesn’t want to designate which 
[factor] is mitigating and which is aggravating.” 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
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Defendant’s proposed jury instruction No. 24A would have 
informed the jurors that the mitigating factors enumerated by 
the court were merely examples of some of the bases on which 
jurors can decide to impose a sentence of life imprisonment, and 
that mitigating factors need not be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The court rejected the instruction, finding it duplicative 
of section 190.3, factor (k). 
During closing argument, the prosecutor explained section 
190.3, factors (a) through (k) to the jury.  He explained that 
factor (b) involved prior criminal history, a circumstance in 
aggravation “if it applied, but we don’t have it.  Factor [(b)] 
doesn’t apply.”  He continued, “Factor [(c)], similar, prior felony 
circumstances.  We don’t have any of that in this case.  So factor 
[(c)] does not apply.”  The prosecutor moved on to factor (d), 
explaining that it concerned whether defendant was under the 
influence of a mental or emotional disturbance.  He 
acknowledged the defense’s argument that methamphetamine 
use caused defendant to act impulsively, and argued, “You know 
what folks?  That doesn’t apply in this case.  Yes, the defendant 
was using methamphetamine. . . .  Not only do you not have 
[evidence of a methamphetamine crash], this crime in this case 
is as far removed from impulsivity and anger as it could be.  This 
is as cold-blooded and premeditated as it could possibly be.  This 
case is not the product of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance.  Factor [(d)] does not apply here.” 
When discussing section 190.3, factor (h), concerning 
impairment due to intoxication, the prosecutor argued that this 
factor also did not apply.  He told the jury that defendant had 
the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, as 
evidenced by defendant trying to hide the bodies and kill 
witnesses who could identify him.  He argued to the jury that if 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
72 
defendant was mentally ill and that illness prevented him from 
appreciating the criminality of his conduct, “you should see all 
kinds of criminality going on between 1990 [the time of his 
alleged diagnosis] and 1998.  And you don’t.  Why?  No matter 
what you say, in the final analysis, whether or not you accept 
the premise of mental illness, the fact of the matter is it does not 
prevent the defendant the capacity to conform to the 
requirements of [the] law.  This factor does not apply.” 
When discussing section 190.3, factor (k), the prosecutor 
noted that “it’s the kitchen sink” and any extenuating 
circumstance presented by the defense could be considered 
mitigating under factor (k).  The prosecutor reminded the jury, 
however, of one limitation on mitigating evidence; jurors could 
not consider sympathy for the defendant’s family as a factor in 
mitigation. 
Defense counsel did not object at any time during the 
prosecutor’s closing argument.  During defense counsel’s closing 
argument, she reminded the jurors of their obligation to weigh 
and consider all the evidence presented.  She explained that 
each juror had the right to give whatever weight that juror 
wanted to each mitigating factor, to decide whether any 
mitigating factor is significant enough to overcome the evidence 
in aggravation, and the right to “find your own mitigating 
factor.”  She repeatedly reminded the jury that the law does not 
require a death verdict and each juror had the right to form an 
independent opinion, regardless of what fellow jurors believed.  
She discussed defendant’s history of mental illness and drug use 
and argued that defendant committed the crimes while under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  
Counsel argued that defendant was “generous, kind, thoughtful 
and caring to everyone he came into contact with” and that his 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
73 
life was worth saving.  She concluded by reminding the jury that 
defendant took legal and personal responsibility for his actions, 
and asserted that he did not deserve to die. 
After closing arguments, the trial court read the 
instructions to the jury.  As relevant here, the court instructed 
the jury with a slightly modified version of CALJIC No. 8.85 and 
six additional instructions immediately following CALJIC 
No. 8.85.  The additional instructions informed the jurors that:  
(1) not every factor listed in CALJIC No. 8.85 would be relevant, 
a factor not relevant to the evidence presented should be 
discarded, and the absence of a mitigating factor does not 
constitute an aggravating factor; (2) circumstances of the crime 
can be considered mitigating or aggravating; (3) victim impact 
evidence is not a separate aggravating circumstance but may be 
considered as a circumstance of the crime; (4) mental 
impairment is not limited to evidence which excuses or reduces 
a defendant’s legal culpability, but includes any degree of 
mental defect, disease, impairment, or intoxication; (5) jurors 
are not allowed to consider aggravating circumstances beyond 
the enumerated factors; and (6) jurors may consider whatever 
sympathy or compassion arises from the evidence presented as 
a reason to reject the death penalty.  The trial court also 
instructed the jury that it must accept and follow the law as 
provided by the court, and if “anything said by the attorneys in 
their argument or any other time during the trial conflicts with 
[the court’s] instructions on the law, [the jury] must follow [the 
court’s] instructions.” 
b.  Discussion 
Defendant acknowledges that the trial court instructed 
the jury to consider, take into account, and be guided by the 
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74 
mitigating factors provided in CALJIC No. 8.85 as applicable to 
defendant’s case.  He is not arguing the trial court erred when 
it refused his proposed instructions, nor is he arguing that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument.  He 
is arguing, however, that the prosecutor misstated the law 
regarding aggravating and mitigating factors and that the trial 
court’s rejection of his proposed instructions, and failure to 
provide curative instructions, compounded the prosecutor’s 
error.  We agree the prosecutor misstated the law regarding 
section 190.3, factors (d) and (h), but we conclude the error was 
harmless. 
Defendant asserts that when the prosecutor argued there 
was no prior criminal history or prior felony convictions, he 
effectively told the jury that the lack of a criminal history did 
not apply as a mitigating factor.  A complete reading of the 
prosecutor’s argument, however, does not support defendant’s 
argument.  When discussing the jury’s responsibility in 
weighing the evidence presented, the prosecutor started by 
explaining that it was up to the jurors to decide what evidence 
was aggravating, what evidence was mitigating, and how much 
weight to give each piece of evidence.  When discussing 
circumstances in aggravation, the prosecutor noted that prior 
criminal history “could be a circumstance in aggravation, if it 
applied, but we don’t have it.”  He similarly said that because 
there were no prior felony circumstances, section 190.3, factor 
(c) likewise did not apply.  The prosecutor then shifted gears, 
saying, “Now, let me talk about those other factors.”  The 
prosecutor did not argue that the absence of section 190.3, 
factors (b) and (c) evidence was not mitigating.   
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor erroneously 
argued that section 190.3, factor (d) did not apply.  We agree.  
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
75 
The prosecutor suggested that factor (d) applies only to acts 
committed as a result of “impulsivity,” “extreme anger,” and 
“heat of passion.”  He further asserted that the factor “does not 
apply” in this case because defendant’s crime was “as far 
removed from impulsivity and anger as it could be” and was “as 
cold-blooded and premeditated as it could possibly be.”  The 
factor, by its terms, is not so limited; it applies if “the offense 
was committed while the defendant was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”  (§ 190.3, factor (d); 
see People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 145–146 
[prosecutor’s statement that factor (d) “ ‘exists for people who 
are psychotic’ . . . was incorrect” but prosecutor “corrected” the 
misstatement “by characterizing factor (d) more expansively as 
describing ‘people who are so badly disturbed that . . . you as a 
human being and the law and your morality says maybe we 
ought to consider how screwed up they were and give them a 
break’ ”]; but see People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 444 
[prosecution’s statement, “[w]hen discussing the applicability of 
factor (d),” that “there was no evidence defendant was ‘psychotic, 
delusional, paranoid, schizophrenic, or that he hallucinated’ . . . 
was proper argument since factor (d) concerns extreme 
emotional problems”].) 
We likewise agree that the prosecutor misstated the law 
regarding the applicability of section 190.3, factor (h).  As 
defendant notes, the prosecutor’s argument indicates that factor 
(h) requires that defendant lack the capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or conform to the requirements of the 
law.  However, factor (h) simply calls for consideration of any 
impairment of the relevant capacities by mental disease, defect, 
or intoxication.  Thus, the prosecutor’s argument incorrectly 
suggests that factor (h) does not apply because it requires 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
76 
defendant to lack the capacity to conform his conduct to the law, 
rather than that those capacities merely be “impaired.” 
However, the prosecutor’s comments regarding section 
190.3, factors (d) and (h) do not warrant reversal.  Defense 
counsel reminded the jury that defendant “was and is mentally 
disturbed,” and devoted almost her entire closing argument to 
the proposition that the murders “were an aberration, a 
culmination of mental illness and drug abuse that resulted in a 
bizarre and completely unrealistic scheme to save the world.”  
She told jurors that their “rights” included “[t]he right to give 
whatever weight [you] want[] to each mitigating fact or factors,” 
“[t]he right to decide for yourself whether any mitigating factor 
is significant enough to overcome all the aggravation,” and “[t]he 
right to find your own mitigating factor and assign to it 
whatever weight you think is sufficient for a vote for life.” 
Furthermore, following closing argument, the trial court 
instructed jurors that “[t]he mental impairment referred to in 
this instruction is not limited to evidence which excuses the 
crime or reduces the defendant’s legal culpability, but includes 
any degree of mental defect, disease, impairment or intoxication 
which the jury determines is of a nature that death should not 
be imposed.”  The court also instructed on section 190.3, factor 
(k), telling jurors that they must take into account “[a]ny other 
circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even 
though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any 
sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or 
record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less 
than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is 
on trial.”  And the prosecution reminded the jury in his 
argument that “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates” 
could be considered under factor (k).  We have consistently held 
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that this instruction allows jurors to consider mental conditions 
that do not qualify as mitigating factors under factors (d) and 
(h).  (E.g., People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 768–769.)   
Finally, we note that the trial court instructed the jurors 
that they should follow the law provided in the instructions and 
if counsel said anything conflicting, the jurors must follow the 
court’s instructions.  Nothing in the record before us suggests 
the jurors did not follow this instruction. 
In light of defense counsel’s argument and the trial court’s 
instruction, “there is not a reasonable likelihood that the [jurors] 
would have inferred that they could not consider” evidence of 
defendant’s mental state “in mitigation of penalty.”  (People v. 
Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 694.)  On the contrary, they 
“undoubtedly 
considered 
defendant’s 
mental 
state 
in 
determining the appropriate sentence” and, under our 
precedents, “whether [they] did so under” section 190.3, factor 
(k) “instead of” under section 190.3, factors (d) or (h) “is 
irrelevant.”  (People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1120.)   
2.  Impact of Execution 
Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously 
instructed the jury regarding the emotional impact of his 
execution on his family as mitigating evidence during penalty 
deliberations.  The court instructed the jury using CALJIC 
No. 8.85, subdivision (k), which states:  “Sympathy for the 
family of the defendant is not a matter that you can consider in 
mitigation.  Evidence, if any, of the impact of an execution on 
family members should be disregarded unless it illuminates 
some positive quality of the defendant’s background or 
character.”  Defendant acknowledges that this court has 
repeatedly rejected this claim.  (See People v. Battle (2021) 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
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11 Cal.5th 749; People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165 
(Williams); People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353.)  He does not 
provide a persuasive reason to revisit this precedent.   
3.  Proposed Instruction on Death Sentence  
Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously 
rejected two proposed instructions informing the jury that it 
could impose life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, 
instead of the death penalty, for any reason.  
Defendant’s proposed jury instruction No. 13 provided in 
relevant part:  “The normative function of deciding which 
penalty should actually be imposed is entirely in your hands.”  
Defendant’s proposed jury instruction No. 28 provided in 
relevant part:  “You may impose a life sentence without finding 
the existence of any statutory mitigating circumstance.  Even if 
you should find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance and find no mitigating 
circumstance, you may still decide that a sentence of life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole is the appropriate 
punishment in this case.  In other words, you may, in your good 
judgment, impose a life sentence for any reason at all that you 
see fit to consider.  [¶]  It is not essential to a decision to impose 
a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole that 
you find mitigating circumstances.  You may spare the life of 
[defendant] for any reason you deem appropriate and 
satisfactory.”  The trial judge ultimately rejected the proposed 
language of both instructions as argumentative. 
We have consistently held that CALJIC Nos. 8.85 and 8.88 
“ ‘adequately and properly instruct on the jury’s determination 
of sentence.’ ”  (People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 424.)  
Furthermore, to the extent that the proposed instructions 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
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sought to advise the jurors that they could return a verdict of 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole even if the 
aggravating 
circumstances 
outweighed 
mitigating 
circumstances, or in the complete absence of mitigating 
circumstances, we have repeatedly held a trial court is not 
required to give such instructions.  (See People v. Bryant, Smith 
and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 457 [the trial court is not 
required to instruct that the jury “could return a life verdict even 
if no mitigating factors had been established”].)   
To the extent the proposed instructions sought to advise 
the jurors that they could consider mercy or sympathy in 
weighing the circumstances presented, they were duplicative of 
CALJIC No. 8.85.  (See People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 
610.)  Furthermore, as requested by defendant, the trial court 
instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.85.6, explaining that it 
could reject the death penalty solely on the basis that mitigating 
evidence, such as testimony from defendant’s friends and 
family, gave rise to compassion or sympathy. 
D.  Challenges to the Death Penalty Law  
Defendant raises several challenges to California’s death 
penalty statute.  He acknowledges that we have previously 
rejected similar challenges to the death penalty statute and 
provides no persuasive reason to revisit these previous holdings. 
Death row delays “do not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment because they resulted from the ‘desire of our courts, 
state and federal, to get it right, to explore . . . any argument 
that might save someone’s life.’ ”  (People v. McDowell (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 395, 412.)  Further, “The slow pace of executions in 
California, . . . does not render our system unconstitutionally 
arbitrary.”  (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 654.)  
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Defendant’s argument requesting consideration of the impact of 
a death sentence on the families of both the victims and the 
condemned inmate does not alter our conclusion. 
Defendant contends the Legislature has effectively 
suspended his rights to counsel, confrontation, and other 
elements of due process by failing to provide him with habeas 
corpus counsel in a timely manner.  We have previously rejected 
these claims as “entirely speculative” and do so again here.  
(Williams, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 202.) 
“California’s death penalty law ‘adequately narrows the 
class of murderers subject to the death penalty’ and does not 
violate the Eighth Amendment.  [Citation.]  Section 190.2, which 
sets forth the circumstances in which the penalty of death may 
be imposed, is not impermissibly broad in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.”  (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 294.) 
“Allowing the jury to consider the circumstances of the 
crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)) does not lead to the imposition of the 
death penalty in an arbitrary or capricious manner.”  (People v. 
Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 641.) 
The death penalty statute “is not invalid for failing to 
require (1) written findings or unanimity as to aggravating 
factors, (2) proof of all aggravating factors beyond a reasonable 
doubt, (3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation 
beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the 
appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (People v. 
Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126.)  These conclusions are not 
altered by the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Hurst 
v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. 92, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 
584, and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466.  (People v. 
PEOPLE v. HELZER 
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81 
Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 1038; Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th 
at p. 149; People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235, fn. 16.) 
“The adjectives ‘extreme’ and ‘substantial’ in statutory 
mitigating factors (d) and (g) of section 190.3 do not prevent the 
jury from considering mitigating evidence.”  (People v. Leonard 
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1429 (Leonard).) 
“The trial court is not required to instruct the jury that 
statutory factors (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (j) in section 190.3 are 
relevant only as mitigating factors, not as aggravating factors.”  
(Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1430.) 
Finally, California’s death penalty does not violate 
international law or international norms of decency.  (People v. 
Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 837.) 
E.  Asserted Cumulative Error 
Defendant contends reversal is warranted because of the 
cumulative prejudice from the errors he identifies.  Even 
assuming the court erred in allowing the prosecutor to activate 
the reciprocating saw during closing argument, we have 
concluded it was harmless.  And although the prosecutor 
misstated the law regarding the applicability of section 190.3, 
factors (d) and (h), defendant suffered no prejudice.  Even 
considered together, these errors are harmless and there is no 
cumulative prejudice that warrants reversal.   
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment. 
 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Helzer 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding   
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S132256 
Date Filed:  January 22, 2024 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Contra Costa 
Judge:  Mary Ann O’Malley 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Jeanne Keevan-Lynch, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. 
Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald S. Matthias, 
Assistant Attorney General, Glenn R. Pruden and Sarah J. Farhat, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Jeanne Keevan-Lynch 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2433 
Mendocino, CA 95460 
(707) 895-2090 
 
Sarah J. Farhat 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 510-3792