Case Title: Robert Rester v. McWane, Inc., et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1050787

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 01/12/2007
Rester v. McWane
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1050787
_________________________
Robert Rester
v.
McWane, Inc., et al.
Appeal from Calhoun Circuit Court
(CV-05-630)
SEE, Justice.
Facts and Procedural History
Robert Rester worked as a millwright at a foundry owned
and operated by McWane, Inc., and its subsidiary, Union
Foundry Company, for 24 years until his employment was
terminated on September 19, 2002.  During his employment,
Rester witnessed numerous safety and environmental hazards,
1050787
2
including the lack of doors on control panels, exposed wires
in the ceilings, the lack of safety switches on overhead
cranes, and the lack of belt guards on conveyers.  Rester
reported these violations to his direct supervisor, John
Norris, and also to Norris's superior, John Ballion.
In May and June 2002, Rester took a medical leave of
absence.  During this time he was interviewed by James
Sandler, a reporter for the New York Times, presumably about
safety violations at the foundry at which Rester worked.
Rester was fired when he returned to work after his medical
leave of absence.  After Rester was fired, a corporate
official for McWane, Jim Proctor, set up a meeting with
Ballion 
and 
with 
McWane's 
attorney 
"to 
rectify 
the 
situation."
Following the meeting, McWane gave Rester the option of
returning to work at a different location.  Rester was then
interviewed by a reporter for the Canadian Broadcasting
Company 
about 
the 
numerous 
safety 
and 
environmental 
hazards 
at
McWane.  After the interview, Rester left several messages
with Proctor regarding the option of returning to work, but
Proctor never responded.
1050787
Rester asserted in the federal action that he was over
1
40 years old at the time his employment was terminated.
3
On August 15, 2003, Rester sued McWane in federal court
alleging three counts of wrongful termination: disability
discrimination 
in 
violation 
of 
the 
Americans 
with 
Disabilities
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); age discrimination in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.;  and employment discrimination in
1
violation of the Alabama 
Age 
Discrimination 
in 
Employment Act,
Ala. Code 1975, § 25-1-20 et seq.  In a second amended
complaint, filed on February 10, 2005, Rester alleged three
additional counts against McWane: violation of the False
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(7); violation of the False Claims
Act Whistleblower Protection Provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h);
and wrongful termination of employment.  Apart from his
Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim, Rester's
sole mention of state law in his complaint in the federal
action was that "[o]n or about September 19, 2002, [Rester]
was discharged from his employment as a result of his refusal
to violate federal and state law."  Apparently,  two years
later the federal court dismissed the federal claims with
1050787
Rester's brief states: "A copy of Judge Propst's March
2
22, 2005 Order is attached hereto as Exhibit A"; however, no
such exhibit is attached to Rester's brief.
4
prejudice 
and 
dismissed 
the 
state-law 
claims 
without
prejudice.   Rester then filed an action in the Calhoun
2
Circuit Court against McWane, Union Foundry, and two
individual defendants, asserting state-law claims.  The trial
court granted the defendants' 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
motion and dismissed the action on the basis that the statute
of limitations had expired.  Rester appealed.
The applicable statute of limitations for Rester's state-
law claims is two years.  Rester now seeks to bring his state-
court action three years after the statute of limitations
began to run.  Rester contends that his claims are nonetheless
timely because, he argues, under the theory of pendent
jurisdiction the statute of limitations for those claims was
tolled when they were pending in the federal court.
Issue
The issue in this case is whether, under 28 U.S.C. §
1367, 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations 
for 
Rester's 
state-law 
claims
was tolled while his claims were pending in the federal court.
Standard of Review
1050787
5
The appropriate standard of review of a trial court's
grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is 
"'"whether, when the allegations of the complaint
are viewed most strongly in the pleader's favor, it
appears that the pleader could prove any set of
circumstances that would entitle [him] to relief.
In making this determination, this Court does not
consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately
prevail, but only whether [he] may possibly prevail.
We note that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper
only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of the claim
that would entitle the plaintiff to relief."'" 
EB Invs., L.L.C. v. Atlantis Dev., Inc., 930 So. 2d 502, 507
(Ala. 2005) (quoting Beckerle v. Moore, 909 So. 2d 185, 187
(Ala. 2005), quoting in turn Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d
297, 299 (Ala. 1993)) (citations omitted).
Analysis
Rester alleges four separate counts in his state-court
action, each subject to a two-year statute of limitations.  He
claims (1) wrongful termination in violation of Ala. Code
1975, § 25-5-11.1; (2) unsafe working conditions in violation
of Ala. Code 1975, § 25-1-1; (3) the tort of outrage and
intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4)
termination 
of 
his employment 
"in violation 
of 
public policy."
1050787
6
Although Rester filed his complaint in the state court
nearly a year beyond the two-year statutory deadline for
filing such an action, he argues that his action is
nonetheless timely because, he argues, the statute of
limitations was tolled by the federal pendent-jurisdiction
provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, when his state-law claims were
pending in the federal court.  Section 1367 states, in
pertinent part:
"(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and
(c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal
statute, in any civil action of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction, the district
courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all
other claims that are so related to claims in the
action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution.  Such
supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that
involve the joinder or intervention of additional
parties. 
"....
"(d) The period of limitations of any claim
asserted under subsection (a), and for any other
claim in the same action that is voluntarily
dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal
of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled
while the claim is pending and for a period of 30
days after it is dismissed unless State law provides
for a longer tolling period."
1050787
7
Section 1367(d) thus tolls state-law claims when those same
claims are pending in federal court.  This Court applied §
1367(d) in Roden v. Wright, 611 So. 2d 333 (Ala. 1992).  Roden
filed a § 1983 action in federal court, which gave the federal
court 
pendent 
jurisdiction 
over 
Roden's 
state-law 
claims. 
 
The
federal court entered a summary judgment as to Roden's federal
claim, thus removing its pendent jurisdiction of Roden's
state-law claims.  The federal court dismissed Roden's state-
law claims without prejudice; Roden then sought to revive his
state-law claims in the state court.  The state trial court
dismissed his claims 
as 
untimely, 
including in its calculation
the time the state-law claims were pending in the federal
court.  This Court reversed its judgment, holding that under
28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) the statute of limitations was tolled
while the state-law claims were pending in the federal court.
Rester contends that, like Roden, he sought to refile in
the state court his state-law claims, which the federal court
had dismissed without prejudice.  We disagree; Roden is
distinguishable from this case.  The claims Roden refiled in
the state court were the same state-law claims he had brought
in the federal court; the claims Rester filed in the state
1050787
8
court are distinct from the state-law claim he asserted in the
federal court.  
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the statute of limitations for
state-law claims is tolled only when a party seeks to refile
in the state court the same state-law claims the party
asserted in the federal court.  Rester currently avers four
counts against the defendants.  First, he alleges that he was
fired in violation of Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-11.1, for making
safety complaints to his superiors. Second, he alleges that
the defendants violated Ala. Code 1975, § 25-1-1, and
"undertook to compel [him] to work in an unsafe and/or
hazardous work area" and that the defendants "refused to
eradicate" 
the 
dangerous 
work 
conditions, 
including
"electrical cords in water, [lack of] doors on control panels,
[and] exposed ceilings with no insulation," among other
things. 
 
Third, 
Rester 
states 
that 
the 
defendants
intentionally 
and/or 
recklessly 
caused 
him 
to 
suffer 
emotional
distress in that it "compelled or otherwise forced [him] to
work in a known hazardous area."  Fourth, he argues that the
defendants "cannot and should not be able to terminate [his
employment] 
because 
he 
expressed 
a 
legitimate 
and 
well-founded
1050787
9
concern about his health, welfare and safety with respect to
his work area in which he was expected or otherwise required
to perform his job duties."
The state-law claims Rester asserted in his complaint in
the federal court were that the defendants violated the
Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1997, Ala.
Code § 25-1-20 et seq. and that he was wrongfully terminated
"as a result of his refusal to violate federal and state law."
This claim is wholly distinct from the state-law claims he now
brings in the state court.  None of the four claims upon which
Rester now attempts to proceed relates to his refusal to
violate state law; on the contrary, each of his current state-
law 
claims 
involves 
the 
defendants' 
alleged 
violation 
of 
state
law.  Because § 1367 makes no allowance for tolling the
statute of limitations for state-law claims that are not
asserted in the federal action, we hold that the statute of
limitations for Rester's current state-law claims was not
tolled, and his action is thus untimely.  Miller v. American
Int'l Group, Inc., (Ms. No. 3:04-CV-1417-P.  May 9, 2005)
(N.D. Tex. 2005) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d) (disallowing
1050787
10
the tolling of a claim under § 1367 because the claim "was
never pending as a supplemental claim in federal court").
Conclusion
Because Rester's action is untimely, "'"it appears beyond
doubt that [Rester] can prove no set of facts in support of
the claim that would entitle [him] to relief."'" EB
Investments, 930 So. 2d at 507 (quoting Beckerle, 909 So. 2d
at 187, quoting in turn Nance, 622 So. 2d at 299).  Thus, we
affirm the trial court's dismissal of Rester's action under
Rule 12(b)(6).  Tucker v. Nichols, 431 So. 2d 1263, 1265
("[A]n appellate court ... will affirm the judgment appealed
from if supported on any valid legal ground.").
AFFIRMED.
Nabers, C.J., and Harwood, Stuart, and Bolin, JJ.,
concur.