Case Title: Taylor v. Kobach

Citation: 

Docket Number: 112431

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2014-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 112,431 
 
CHAD TAYLOR, 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
KRIS KOBACH, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY 
AS SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE STATE OF KANSAS, 
Respondent. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
K.S.A. 25-306b(b) provides that no person nominated for any national, state, 
county, or township office may cause his or her name to be withdrawn from nomination 
after the primary election, except as provided by that statute. 
 
2. 
K.S.A. 25-306b(b) provides one exception. It states that any person nominated for 
any national, state, county, or township office who declares that he or she is incapable of 
fulfilling the duties of office if elected may cause such person's name to be withdrawn 
from nomination by filing with the Secretary of State a written request signed by the 
person seeking to withdraw his or her nomination and acknowledged before an officer 
qualified to take acknowledgments of deeds. 
 
3. 
K.S.A. 25-306b(b) further provides that no name withdrawn as provided by law 
shall be printed on the ballots for such office for the general election. 
 
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4. 
Based upon the challenge made in this case, a letter filed with the Secretary of 
State that recites "I, Chadwick J. Taylor, Democratic nominee for the United States 
Senate race, do hereby withdraw my nomination for election effective immediately and 
request my name be withdrawn from the ballot, pursuant to K.S.A. 25-306b(b)" complied 
with K.S.A. 25-306b(b). The Secretary of State thus has no discretion to refuse to remove 
Chadwick J. Taylor's name from the ballots, and mandamus is appropriate. 
 
Original action in mandamus. Mandamus granted. Opinion filed September 18, 2014. 
 
Pedro L. Irigonegaray, of Irigonegaray & Associates, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Elizabeth 
R. Herbert, of the same office, was with him on the petition for petitioner. 
 
Edward D. Greim, of Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause, and Thomas E. Knutzen, of the 
office of the Kansas Secretary of State, and Bradley J. Scholzman, of Hinkle Law Firm LLC, of Wichita, 
were with him on the brief for respondent. 
 
Thomas D. Haney, of Stevens & Brand, L.L.P., of Topeka, was on the brief amicus curiae for 
David Orel. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
Per Curiam:  This is an original action under Article 3, Section 3 of the Kansas 
Constitution by petitioner Chad Taylor against respondent Kansas Secretary of State Kris 
Kobach. Taylor seeks a writ of mandamus prohibiting Kobach from including Taylor's 
name on the ballot for the United States Senate in the November 4, 2014, general 
election. The heart of their controversy is whether Taylor's September 3, 2014, letter to 
Kobach requesting that his name be withdrawn from nomination for election complies 
with the requirements for withdrawal set forth in K.S.A. 25-306b(b). We hold that it 
does. 
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FACTS 
 
During the August 5, 2014, Democratic Party primary for United States Senate for 
Kansas, Taylor received the most votes and was declared the winner by the State Board 
of Canvassers. Taylor and his campaign manager, Brandon Naylor, eventually drafted a 
letter of withdrawal from the Senate race and took the unsigned original to the Secretary 
of State's office around 4 p.m. on Wednesday, September 3, which was the latest date by 
which a candidate could withdraw to be left off the ballot in the November 4 election. 
 
The body of Taylor's letter states in its entirety: 
 
"I, Chadwick J. Taylor, Democratic nominee for the United States Senate race, do hereby 
withdraw my nomination for election effective immediately and request my name be 
withdrawn from the ballot, pursuant to K.S.A. 25-306b(b)." 
 
Taylor signed the letter in front of a notary public who worked in the Secretary of 
State's office and left it for filing with that office. 
 
The next day, September 4—the day after the statutory deadline for withdrawal—
Taylor's attorney received a letter signed by Kobach. The letter stated: 
 
"The purpose of this letter is to inform you that, after conferring with the office of the 
Kansas Attorney General, I have concluded that the written request filed by Mr. Taylor 
does not meet the requirements of K.S.A. 25-306b(b) because Mr. Taylor did not 
'declare[] that [he is] incapable of fulfilling the duties of office if elected.' Therefore, Mr. 
Taylor's name will appear on the ballot for the office of United States Senator for the 
November 4, 2014, general election." 
 
On September 9, Taylor filed with this court a petition for writ of mandamus and 
emergency motion for temporary restraining order. He also filed his memorandum in 
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support of his petition as well as his affidavit. Per those pleadings, Taylor seeks (1) an 
order directing Kobach to recognize and effectuate Taylor's letter of withdrawal from the 
United States Senate race and prohibiting Kobach from including Taylor's name on the 
ballot for the 2014 general election; (2) a temporary restraining order barring Kobach 
from printing ballots that identify Taylor as a candidate; and (3) such further relief 
deemed just and proper by this court. Taylor requested the court take immediate action 
because Kobach had publicly announced that the names of the candidates for the general 
election had to be finalized by September 18. 
 
The next day, September 10, Kobach filed a notice regarding scheduling. In it, he 
confirmed that the list of candidates for the general election had to be finalized by 
September 18, because the statutory deadline for sending ballots to members of the 
United States Armed Forces serving overseas is 45 days before the general election, i.e., 
September 20. Kobach represented that ballots would be prepared and printed on 
September 19. 
 
On September 11, this court issued an order rejecting Kobach's suggestion of 
referral to a district court or commissioner and retaining our jurisdiction because of the 
expedited nature of the case and the necessity for an authoritative ruling. The court also 
stayed Taylor's emergency motion for temporary restraining order and ordered Kobach to 
file a response to Taylor's petition by noon on Monday, September 15. The court further 
ordered that any additional briefing also was required to be filed by noon that day. 
 
Taylor timely filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his petition. 
Kobach also timely filed his response to the petition, which includes a 154-page appendix 
containing affidavits from two of his employees, letters of withdrawal from other 
candidates, and legislative history materials regarding K.S.A. 25-306b(b). After the 
deadline, Kobach also filed a supplemental affidavit from one employee, to which he 
attached additional letters of withdrawal from other candidates. 
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The court held oral argument in this mandamus matter on September 16. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Issue:  The "pursuant to K.S.A. 25-306b(b)" language contained in Taylor's letter 
conforms to the statutory requirement that a withdrawing candidate declare he is 
"incapable of fulfilling the duties of office if elected." 
 
 
Nature of relief requested 
 
 
We have held that "[m]andamus is a proceeding designed for the purpose of 
compelling a public officer to perform a clearly defined duty, one imposed by law and 
not involving the exercise of discretion." State ex rel. Slusher v. City of Leavenworth, 279 
Kan. 789, Syl. ¶ 4, 112 P.3d 131 (2005). And "[u]nless the respondent's legal duty is 
clear, the writ should not issue." Kansas Medical Mut. Ins. Co. v. Svaty, 291 Kan. 597, 
620, 244 P.3d 642 (2010). "'"Whether mandamus lies is dependent upon an interpretation 
of the applicable procedural and substantive statutes, over which this court has unlimited 
review." [Citations omitted.]' [Slusher, 285 Kan. at 443]." Svaty, 291 Kan. at 620. The 
petitioner has the burden of showing a right to such relief. 291 Kan. at 620. 
 
Discussion 
 
The statutory subsection at the heart of the controversy in this mandamus action, 
K.S.A. 25-306b(b), provides in full: 
 
 
"(b) Any person who has been nominated by any means for any national, state, 
county or township office who declares that they are incapable of fulfilling the duties of 
office if elected may cause such person's name to be withdrawn from nomination by a 
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request in writing, signed by the person and acknowledged before an officer qualified to 
take acknowledgments of deeds. Any such request shall be filed with the secretary of state 
in the case of national and state offices and with the county election officer in the case of 
county and township offices. Except as provided in subsection (d), in the case of national 
and state offices, any such request shall be filed within seven days, including Saturdays, 
Sundays and holidays, after the meeting of the state board of canvassers for the final 
canvass of primary election provided for in K.S.A. 25-3205, and amendments thereto. 
Except as provided in subsection (d), in the case of county and township offices, any such 
request shall be filed within 10 days after the meeting of the county board of canvassers 
to canvass the primary election as provided in K.S.A. 25-3104, and amendments thereto. 
No name withdrawn as provided in this section shall be printed on the ballots for such 
office for the general election." (Emphasis added.) 
 
For ease of reference, we repeat the entire body of Taylor's September 3 letter of 
alleged withdrawal: 
 
"I, Chadwick J. Taylor, Democratic nominee for the United States Senate race, do hereby 
withdraw my nomination for election effective immediately and request my name be 
withdrawn from the ballot, pursuant to K.S.A. 25-306b(b)." (Emphasis added.) 
 
Taylor contends his letter fully complies with the statute, even though his letter 
failed to include a verbatim, or otherwise explicit, statement that he is "incapable of 
fulfilling the duties of office if elected." Kobach clearly disagrees, as his own letter 
states:  "I have concluded that the written request filed by Mr. Taylor does not meet the 
requirements of K.S.A. 25-306b(b) because Mr. Taylor did not 'declare[] that [he is] 
incapable of fulfilling the duties of office if elected.'" 
 
The parties make many arguments, e.g., whether substantial compliance with the 
statute suffices. But each party's threshold arguments are based upon his insistence that 
the "plain language of the statute" supports him. This approach appears to acknowledge 
that this court historically begins its statutory analysis with the plain language used by the 
legislature. 
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We have often expressed that the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the 
intention of the makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used. See 
Gannon v. State, 298 Kan. 1107, 1143, 319 P.3d 1196 (2014) (citing Wright v. Noell, 16 
Kan. 601, 607, 1876 WL 1081 [1876]); Vontress v. State, 299 Kan. 607, 611, 325 P.3d 
1114 (2014). If the makers' language is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to use 
canons of construction or legislative history or other background considerations to 
construe the legislature's intent. See In re A.M.M.-H., 300 Kan. __, 331 P.3d 775, 777-78 
(2014). 
 
Kobach argues in his response that the plain language of subsection (b) of K.S.A. 
25-306b establishes only one basis for a primary winner to request withdrawal of his or 
her name from the ballot:  That he or she admits to being incapable of fulfilling the duties 
of office if elected. Taylor does not appear to dispute this general conclusion. 
 
In Kobach's response, he further asserts that post-primary withdrawals are limited 
to this specific statutory purpose—and to the two purposes contained in subsection (c) 
("death") and subsection (d) ("successive vacancies under either or both of the first two 
provisions")—because of the legislature's plain "intent to make post-primary withdrawals 
rare and difficult." He concludes: "[T]hese three circumstances cover the entire field:  the 
legislature made Section 306b the only provision allowing post-primary withdrawal." 
Taylor does not appear to dispute this general conclusion either. And neither do we, 
based upon the plain language of the statute. See Gannon, 298 Kan. at 1143. 
 
With this as the starting point, Taylor contends that his letter's use of the phrase 
"pursuant to" subsection (b) of K.S.A. 25-306b could not help but declare that he "is 
incapable of fulfilling the duties of office if elected." He argues: 
 
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"The meaning of the phrase 'pursuant to K.S.A. 25-306b(b)' could not be clearer:  
Petitioner was withdrawing his nomination for the reason set forth in (and thus was 
incorporating by reference the language of) K.S.A. 25-306b(b)—namely, that he is 
incapable of fulfilling the duties of office if elected." 
 
Kobach responds that Taylor needs to expressly declare in writing that he 
specifically "is incapable of fulfilling the duties of office if elected." In Kobach's 
response, he contends that K.S.A. 25-306b(b) demands the withdrawing candidates 
admit—by declaring in writing—that they are in fact incapable of fulfilling the duties of 
office, and "it does not allow candidates to dodge or replace it with a legal citation, plea, 
or argument that their request simply be accepted 'pursuant to Section 306b(b)' or 
'pursuant to' or 'under' any other provision." So Kobach offers no position on what is 
meant by "pursuant to." He simply denies the phrase is sufficient to meet the statutory 
requirement that a candidate declare he or she is "incapable of fulfilling the duties of 
office if elected." 
 
To resolve this controversy and determine whether Taylor's letter sufficiently 
states he is incapable of fulfilling the duties of office if elected by using the phrase 
"pursuant to K.S.A. 25-306b(b)," we look at the plain meaning of the phrase "pursuant 
to." Black's Law Dictionary defines the phrase as "in compliance with; in accordance 
with; under [or] . . . as authorized by . . . [or] in carrying out." (Emphasis added). Black's 
Law Dictionary 1356 (9th ed. 2009) (cited with approval in United States v. Lee, 659 
F.3d 619, 622 [7th Cir. 2011]). Accord:  Black's Law Dictionary 1431 (10th ed. 2014) 
("1. In compliance with; in accordance with; under."); The American Heritage Dictionary 
of the English Language 1062 (1981) ("pursuant" is "Proceeding from and comformable 
to; in accordance with. Used with to."). 
 
An earlier decision by the United States Supreme Court described the phrase in 
similar terms. "'Pursuant to' is defined as 'acting or done in consequence or in prosecution 
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(of anything); hence, agreeable; conformable; following; according.'" (Emphasis added.) 
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 301 U.S. 379, 383, 57 S. Ct. 813, 
81 L. Ed. 1169 (1937) [Citing Webster's New International Dictionary, Unabridged (2d 
ed. 1935)] ("The words of the statute [i.e., "pursuant to"] are plain and should be 
accorded their usual significance in the absence of some dominant reason to the 
contrary."). 
 
 
In light of these authorities, we conclude the plain meaning of "pursuant to K.S.A. 
25-306b(b)" contained in Taylor's letter effectively declares he is incapable of fulfilling 
the duties of office if elected. Simply put, the phrase operates as an incorporation by 
reference of this particular requirement contained in subsection (b). See Black's Law 
Dictionary 834 (9th ed. 2009) (incorporation by reference is "[a] method of making a 
secondary document part of a primary document by including in the primary document a 
statement that the secondary document should be treated as if it were contained within the 
primary one."). 
 
 
Our determination that the uncontroverted contents of Taylor's September 3 letter 
timely satisfy the statutory requirements for withdrawal now leads us to Kobach's clearly 
defined duty imposed by the law. Kobach's attorney admitted at oral arguments that if the 
letter was held to comply with the statute, Kobach would have no discretion. This 
admission is consistent with the plain language of the last sentence of the statutory 
subsection:  "No name withdrawn as provided in this section shall be printed on ballots 
for such office for the general election." K.S.A. 25-306b(b). Accordingly, the issuance of 
a writ of mandamus is appropriate. See Slusher, 279 Kan. 789, Syl. ¶ 4 ("Mandamus is a 
proceeding designed for the purpose of compelling a public officer to perform a clearly 
defined duty, one imposed by law and not involving the exercise of discretion."); see 
State v. Becker, 264 Kan. 804, 807, 958 P.2d 627 (1998). 
 
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With this determination, we need not consider the parties' numerous other 
arguments. Nor do we need to act on Kobach's allegation that a ruling for Taylor would 
require the Kansas Democratic Party State Committee to name his replacement nominee 
per K.S.A. 25-3905. The Kansas Democratic Party is not a party to this original action, 
and this court does not issue advisory opinions. Gannon v. State, 298 Kan. at 1119. 
 
Before closing, however, we do address the issue of Kobach's late filing of the 
supplemental affidavit that attached additional letters of withdrawal from other 
candidates. Our order of September 11 was clear:  additional briefing was due at noon, 
and the court would not extend the deadline. While we have not considered the affidavits 
and attachments in reaching our decision, we regard their filing as Kobach's attempt to 
meet any ethical obligation under the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. 
 
 
Taylor's petition for writ of mandamus is granted, and Kobach is ordered to 
comply with his clearly defined duty imposed by K.S.A. 26-306b(b). He shall not include 
Taylor's name on any ballots for the office of United States Senate for the general 
election on November 4, 2014. 
 
 
MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned.1 
 
1 REPORTER'S NOTE: Senior Judge Malone was appointed to hear case No. 112,431 
to fill the vacancy on the court created by the appointment of Justice Nancy Moritz to the 
United States 10th Circuit Court of Appeals.