Case Title: State v. Elandis D. Johnson

Citation: 2009 WI 57

Docket Number: 2007AP001114-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2009-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
2009 WI 57 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Elandis D. Johnson, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2008 WI App 34 
Reported at: 307 Wis. 2d 735, 746 N.W.2d 581 
(Ct. App. 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 23, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 12, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy M. Witkowiak   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK and GABLEMAN, JJ., join the 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Meredith J. Ross and the Frank J. Remington Center, University 
of Wisconsin Law School and oral argument by Meredith J. Ross. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Pamela 
Magee, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 57
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2004CF4297 & 2005CF2217) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Elandis D. Johnson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 23, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Johnson, 2008 WI App 
34, 
307 
Wis. 2d 735, 
746 
N.W.2d 581 
[hereinafter 
Elandis 
Johnson].1  The decision affirmed an order of the Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court, Timothy M. Witkowiak, Judge, denying 
Elandis D. Johnson's (Johnson) post-conviction motion for 
additional sentence credit. 
                                                 
1 In 2007, this court decided another sentence credit case 
entitled State v. Johnson.  2007 WI 107, 304 Wis. 2d 318, 735 
N.W.2d 505 [hereinafter Marcus Johnson].  Like the present case, 
the 2007 case interpreted Wis. Stat. § 973.155 (2007-08).   
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
2 
 
¶2 
This review requires the court to interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155 (2007-08),2 Wisconsin's sentence credit statute.  The 
statute mandates that a convicted offender's sentence be 
credited with "all days spent in custody in connection with the 
course of conduct for which sentence was imposed."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a).  The question presented is whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155 requires a court to apply the same sentence credit to 
each concurrent sentence given to an offender at the same 
sentencing hearing, regardless of whether the offender's days 
spent in presentence custody were "in connection with the course 
of conduct for which [each] sentence was imposed."  See id. 
¶3 
We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 973.155 imposes no 
requirement that credit applied toward one sentence also be 
applied toward a second sentence if the basis for applying the 
same credit to both sentences is merely that the sentences are 
concurrent and are imposed at the same time.  The fact that 
sentences are concurrent and are imposed at the same time does 
not alter the statutory mandate that credit toward service of a 
sentence be based on custody that is "in connection with" the 
course of conduct giving rise to that sentence: i.e., custody 
factually connected with the course of conduct for which 
sentence was imposed. 
¶4 
Consequently, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
3 
 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 
The 
facts 
in 
this 
matter 
are 
complicated 
but 
undisputed.  On August 10, 2004, Johnson was arrested by 
Milwaukee police for possessing approximately 42 grams of 
marijuana in 64 individually wrapped baggies.  He was charged on 
August 12 with possession of marijuana (less than 200 grams) 
with intent to deliver3 (Case No. 2004CF4297), and he was 
released from jail on August 13 after posting a $1,000 cash 
bond.  Johnson pleaded guilty to this felony offense on November 
9.  His original bond was never revoked or amended.  Thus, 
Johnson remained "free on bond" for this offense until he was 
sentenced on August 31, 2005. 
¶6 
On November 18, 2004, nine days after his guilty plea 
on the drug offense, Johnson was arrested again, this time for 
possessing more than 40 grams of marijuana in 67 individually 
wrapped baggies.  He was charged in this incident with 
possession of marijuana (less than 200 grams) with intent to 
deliver4 (Case No. 2004CF6378).  He was thereafter released on a 
second $1,000 cash bond.  Johnson waived his preliminary 
examination, and the State added a count of bail jumping5 when it 
filed the information.  Johnson pleaded guilty to both of these 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 961.41(1m)(h)1. 
4 Id. 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.49(1)(b). 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
4 
 
new charges on February 2, 2005.6  There was no change in 
Johnson's second bond pending sentencing, so that he was "free 
on bond" for both sets of offenses until August 31, 2005. 
¶7 
On April 19, 2005, Johnson was arrested for possessing 
more than 16 grams of marijuana, some of which was packaged 
individually.  This arrest resulted in a third drug charge——
simple possession of marijuana (second offense)7——and eventually, 
a second bail jumping charge8 (Case No. 2005CF2217).  This time 
the court set bond at $15,000.  Johnson was unable to post this 
bond, and he remained in custody in the Milwaukee County Jail.  
As a result, a May 9 sentencing hearing for the first two cases 
was rescheduled for August 31, 2005.   
¶8 
On May 27, 2005, Johnson's attorney submitted a bail 
motion to the circuit court, requesting that Johnson's $15,000 
bond in the 2005 case be reduced to $5,000 in exchange for 
Johnson's agreement to enroll in the "In-House" monitoring 
program.  The court granted the motion.  In time, Johnson posted 
                                                 
6 Elandis Johnson entered his guilty pleas in Case No. 
2004CF4297 and Case No. 2004CF6378 before Milwaukee County 
Circuit Judge Mel Flanagan. 
7 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 961.41(3g)(e), 961.48.  
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.49(1)(b). 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
5 
 
the $5,000 bond and was turned over to the monitoring program 
pending further proceedings.9   
¶9 
On July 31, 2005, there was a rotation of judges in 
the felony division of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court.  When 
this happened, all three of Johnson's cases were transferred to 
Milwaukee County Circuit Judge William Sosnay.  Judge Sosnay 
took Johnson's pleas in the third case on August 31.  On that 
same day, in the same hearing, Judge Sosnay, with the benefit of 
a presentence investigation, imposed sentence for all five 
offenses in the three cases.   
¶10 Judge Sosnay imposed the following sentences.  In the 
first 2004 case (Case No. 2004CF4297), Johnson was sentenced to 
one year of confinement and 18 months of extended supervision, 
with four days credited for his presentence confinement between 
August 10 and August 13, 2004.   
¶11 In the second 2004 case (Case No. 2004CF6378), Johnson 
was sentenced to 18 months of confinement, plus two years of 
extended supervision, for the possession charge; and one year of 
confinement, plus one year of extended supervision, for the bail 
jumping charge.  These two sentences, which are not at issue in 
this 
appeal, 
were 
made 
concurrent 
with 
each 
other 
but 
consecutive to the sentences in the other two cases.   
                                                 
9 The record is unclear with regard to the exact date 
Johnson was released from the Milwaukee County Jail in his 2005 
case.  The record indicates that he was released on June 6, 
2005.  However, both parties have agreed that June 8, 2005, was 
the date of his release.  Therefore, we will proceed as if 
Johnson's date of release was June 8, 2005. 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
6 
 
¶12 In the 2005 case (Case No. 2005CF2217), Johnson was 
sentenced on two charges, possession of marijuana and bail 
jumping.  Johnson was sentenced to one year of confinement and 
one year of extended supervision on each charge, with 45 days 
credited for his presentence confinement between April 19 and 
June 8, 2005.  Both sentences were made concurrent with each 
other and concurrent with the sentence in the first 2004 case.   
¶13 On March 24, 2007, Johnson submitted a pro se motion 
for sentence credit, arguing that the 45 days of presentence 
credit he received for the sentence in the 2005 case also should 
be credited toward the sentence in the first 2004 case.   
¶14 Shortly thereafter, Johnson acquired an attorney who 
submitted a revised motion for sentence credit and a motion for 
an amended judgment of conviction.  The revised motion argued 
that Johnson was entitled to 50 days of credit, rather than 45, 
for the sentence in the 2005 case and that those 50 days also 
should be credited toward the sentence in the first 2004 case.   
¶15 Specifically, Johnson argued that State v. Ward, 153 
Wis. 2d 743, 452 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1989), and State v. 
Yanick, 2007 WI App 30, 299 Wis. 2d 456, 728 N.W.2d 365, direct 
that "'[w]hen concurrent sentences are imposed at the same 
time . . . sentence credit is to be determined as a total number 
of days and is to be credited against each sentence imposed'" 
regardless of whether the sentences are "'in connection with' 
the same course of conduct."  Ward, 153 Wis. 2d at 746; see 
Yanick, 299 Wis. 2d 456, ¶¶16-17.  Johnson contended that, 
because the sentence in the first 2004 case and the sentences in 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
7 
 
the 2005 case were imposed at the same time and were made 
concurrent with each other, he was entitled to 50 days of 
sentence credit toward all three sentences.   
¶16 On 
April 
23, 
2007, 
the 
circuit 
court10 
granted 
Johnson's request to change the 45 days of credit for the 
sentences in the 2005 case to 50 days, but it denied his request 
to apply those 50 days of credit to the sentence in the first 
2004 case.  The circuit court explained its denial as follows: 
As the court explained in its March 29, 2007 decision, 
the defendant was not in custody in connection with 
[the first 2004 case] for the period April 19, 2005 to 
June 8, 2005 because bail was posted in that case on 
August 13, 2004 and he was released from custody at 
that time. 
A broad reading of the above-referenced jury 
instruction[, Wis JI——Criminal SM-34A (1995)11,] might 
suggest 
that 
a 
defendant 
who 
is 
sentenced 
to 
concurrent prison terms is entitled to receive equal 
credit against each concurrent sentence regardless of 
the number of days he or she actually spent in custody 
in connection with each concurrent sentence.  The 
court 
rejects 
such 
an 
interpretation 
of 
the 
Committee's comments because the Committee further 
observed that in circumstances such as this where the 
custodial period from multiple charges is not the 
same, different amounts of credit will be due. . . .  
This is exactly the kind of situation that is 
presented here.  Defendant Johnson was in custody in 
connection with each of these cases for different 
custodial periods (i.e. 4 days in [the first 2004 
case] and 50 days in [the 2005 case]).  Consequently, 
he is only entitled to receive four days of credit in 
                                                 
10 Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Timothy M. Witkowiak was 
assigned to review Johnson's motion on March 28, 2007. 
11 All 
subsequent 
references 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Jury 
Instructions are to the 1995 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
8 
 
[the first 2004 case] and 50 days of credit in [the 
2005 case], even though the sentences for these 
separate offenses were ordered concurrent.   
¶17 Johnson appealed the circuit court's decision to the 
court of appeals.  The court of appeals, building on the circuit 
court's analysis, denied Johnson's request to have the 50 days 
of credit from the sentence in the 2005 case applied to the 
sentence in the first 2004 case.  Elandis Johnson, 307 Wis. 2d 
735, ¶9. 
¶18 In its opinion, the court of appeals began its 
discussion of Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) by stating that 
"[t]here is nothing in the statute suggesting an exception to 
the 'in connection with' requirement when credit is due against 
a concurrent sentence imposed at the same time."  Id., ¶11.  
Ultimately, the court affirmed the circuit court's approach, 
asserting 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
"decision 
tracks 
the 
statutory requirements."  Id., ¶12. 
¶19 The court of appeals also clarified Ward and the 
Criminal Jury Instructions Committee's special materials on 
sentence credit.  Id., ¶¶19-29.  It pointed out that Johnson's 
reading of Ward——for the proposition that time in presentence 
custody due as credit against one sentence must be credited 
against all other concurrent sentences imposed at the same time, 
regardless of whether the presentence custody is "in connection 
with" all the concurrent sentences——was based on the incorrect 
assumption that the presentence custody time credited in Ward 
was not "in connection with" all the concurrent sentences 
imposed.  Id., ¶¶15-16.  The court of appeals referenced the 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
9 
 
parties' briefs in Ward to show that the presentence custody 
credited against all three concurrent sentences imposed in Ward 
was, in fact, "in connection with the [same] course of conduct 
for which [the] sentence[s were] imposed."  Id., ¶¶11, 16.  In 
other 
words, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
determined 
that 
the 
presentence 
custody 
was 
"in 
connection 
with" 
all 
three 
sentences.  Id.  
¶20 Moreover, the court of appeals stated that "there is 
no reason to suppose that the Criminal Jury Instructions 
Committee intended to convey the rule urged by Johnson."  Id., 
¶21.  Specifically, the court of appeals concluded that "the 
committee did not anticipate that the [imposed-at-the-same-time] 
language was susceptible to being read as saying credit must be 
awarded against all concurrent sentences imposed at the same 
time, regardless whether each sentence meets the 'in connection 
with' requirement."  Id., ¶25.  Therefore, the court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's decision to deny Johnson credit of 
50 additional days on the sentence in the first 2004 case.  Id., 
¶33. 
¶21 Johnson petitioned this court for review, and his 
petition was granted on April 14, 2008. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶22 The issue in this case requires us to decide the 
amount of sentence credit that Johnson must receive for 
presentence custody under Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).  To do 
this, we must interpret the language of the statute.  Statutory 
interpretation presents a question of law that we review de 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
10 
 
novo.  State v. Marcus Johnson, 2007 WI 107, ¶27, 304 
Wis. 2d 318, 735 N.W.2d 505.  To the extent that statutory 
interpretation raises a constitutional issue, this issue also 
presents a question of law that we review de novo.  See State v. 
Anderson, 2006 WI 77, ¶37, 291 Wis. 2d 673, 717 N.W.2d 74. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶23 Determining the result in this case is relatively 
easy.  Producing a rationale for this result in terms that 
reconcile and synthesize existing case law and anticipate the 
almost endless variety of fact patterns that tend to emerge 
under 
the 
sentence 
credit 
statute 
is 
considerably 
more 
difficult. 
¶24 Putting aside the second 2004 case for which Johnson 
received 
consecutive 
sentences, 
Johnson 
was 
given 
three 
concurrent sentences at the same sentencing hearing.  These 
three sentences came from two separate cases.  Johnson seeks 
identical sentence credit on all three sentences, even though 
the two cases at issue arose out of events that are separated by 
more than eight months, his presentence custody came at two 
different times, and each period of custody is tied directly to 
only one case. 
¶25 Johnson contends that Wis. Stat. § 973.155 must be 
construed to require that, in the limited circumstance where a 
court imposes multiple, equal length concurrent sentences at the 
same time, the court must apply the same sentence credit toward 
all the sentences.  He insists that Ward requires this result 
and that this result is prescribed by Wis JI——Criminal SM-34A.  
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
11 
 
Johnson also suggests that identical sentence credit in this 
circumstance is essential to avoid a constitutional violation of 
equal protection of the law.   
A. 
Wisconsin Statute § 973.155(1)(a) 
¶26 We begin our analysis with the language of the 
sentence credit statute.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155 reads, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
(1)(a) A convicted offender shall be given credit 
toward the service of his or her sentence for all days 
spent in custody in connection with the course of 
conduct for which sentence was imposed.  As used in 
this 
subsection, "actual days spent in custody" 
includes, 
without 
limitation 
by 
enumeration, 
confinement related to an offense for which the 
offender is ultimately sentenced, or for any other 
sentence arising out of the same course of conduct, 
which occurs: 
 
1. 
While the offender is awaiting trial; 
 
2. 
While the offender is being tried; and 
 
3. 
While the offender is awaiting imposition of 
sentence after trial. 
 
(b) The categories in par. (a) and sub. (1m) 
include custody of the convicted offender which is in 
whole or in part the result of a probation, extended 
supervision or parole hold under s. 302.113(8m), 
302.114(8m), 304.06(3), or 973.10(2) placed upon the 
person for the same course of conduct as that 
resulting in the new conviction.   
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) (emphasis added). 
¶27 In deciding whether an offender is entitled to a 
particular amount of sentence credit under the statute, a court 
must make two determinations: (1) whether the offender was "in 
custody" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a); and 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
12 
 
(2) whether all or part of the "custody" for which sentence 
credit is sought was "in connection with the course of conduct 
for which sentence was imposed."  Id.; see Marcus Johnson, 304 
Wis. 2d 318, ¶31; State v. Thompson, 225 Wis. 2d 578, 582, 593 
N.W.2d 875 
(Ct. 
App. 
1999); 
State 
v. 
Beiersdorf, 
208 
Wis. 2d 492, 496-97, 561 N.W.2d 749 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. 
Gavigan, 122 Wis. 2d 389, 391, 362 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1984).  
After making these determinations, "the court shall make and 
enter a specific finding of the number of days for which 
sentence credit is to be granted."  Wis. Stat. § 973.155(2).12   
¶28 There is no dispute that Johnson was "in custody" for 
a total of 54 days on these cases before he was sentenced on 
August 31, 2005.  Consequently, our principal focus is in how 
                                                 
12  
After the imposition of sentence, the court shall 
make and enter a specific finding of the number of 
days for which sentence credit is to be granted, which 
finding 
shall 
be 
included 
in 
the 
judgment 
of 
conviction.  In the case of revocation of probation, 
extended supervision or parole, the department, if the 
hearing is waived, or the division of hearings and 
appeals in the department of administration, in the 
case of a hearing, shall make such a finding, which 
shall be included in the revocation order. 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(2). 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
13 
 
credit for these 54 days13 should be applied, given the statutory 
language that an offender's sentence "shall" be credited "for 
all days spent in custody in connection with the course of 
conduct 
for 
which 
sentence 
was 
imposed." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a) (emphasis added).  More specifically, we must 
determine whether four days of presentence custody directly 
related to the first 2004 case should be applied as credit 
toward the concurrent sentences in the 2005 case, and whether 50 
days of presentence custody directly related to the 2005 case 
should be applied as credit toward the concurrent sentence in 
the 
first 
2004 
case. 
 
The 
answer 
will 
depend 
on 
the 
interpretation of the "in connection with" clause in Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a).  
¶29 We 
note 
that, 
in 
interpreting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a) to resolve the proper amount of sentence credit 
for an offender, some Wisconsin courts have determined that the 
statutory language is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation and is thus ambiguous.  See, e.g., Marcus 
                                                 
13 At 
oral 
argument, 
Johnson's 
attorney 
altered 
her 
position, asking that 54 days of credit be applied to each of 
Johnson's concurrent sentences.  This position is logically 
consistent with Johnson's oral argument but inconsistent with 
Johnson's brief: "Mr. Johnson never argued that all of the 
credit from each concurrent sentence should be added together.  
Rather, . . . he argued that the greater amount of credit (here, 
50 days) should be applied to both sentences in order to give 
effect to that credit."  The outcome of this case is not 
affected by whether Johnson requests that 50 days or 54 days of 
credit 
be 
applied 
to 
each 
of 
his 
concurrent 
sentences; 
therefore, we proceed under Johnson's request for 54 days of 
credit.  
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
14 
 
Johnson, 304 Wis. 2d 318, ¶¶34, 68; State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, 
¶13 n.6, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155; State v. Tuescher, 226 
Wis. 2d 465, 471, 595 N.W.2d 443 (Ct. App. 1999); Gavigan, 122 
Wis. 2d at 392.  Other Wisconsin courts have determined that the 
same statute is unambiguous.  See, e.g., State v. Beets, 124 
Wis. 2d 372, 377, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985); State v. Gilbert, 115 
Wis. 2d 371, 377, 340 N.W.2d 511 (1983).   
¶30 Whether this statute is deemed ambiguous is likely to 
depend on the difficulty of applying its language to complex or 
unusual facts and the existence of reasonable competing views on 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
15 
 
how the statute should be interpreted.14  Statutory text that is 
clear in most circumstances may not always provide the answer 
                                                 
14 See Marcus Johnson, 304 Wis. 2d 318, ¶¶34, 63-68 (finding 
ambiguity when determining whether extension of a juvenile 
commitment is considered custody for which credit against an 
adult sentence is required); State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, 232 
Wis. 2d 767, ¶¶13 n.6, 18, 606 N.W.2d 155 (finding ambiguity 
when determining whether presentence confinement for a dismissed 
charge that is read in at sentencing for a previously unrelated 
charge results in the two charges being "related to one another" 
and ultimately "in connection with" each other); State v. 
Tuescher, 226 Wis. 2d 465, 470-71, 475, 479, 595 N.W.2d 443 (Ct. 
App. 1999) (finding ambiguity when interpreting Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a) 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
phrase, 
"confinement . . . for any other sentence arising out of the 
same course of conduct," refers to a "criminal episode" or 
something more narrow, such as the "same specific acts"); State 
v. Gavigan, 122 Wis. 2d 389, 392, 362 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(finding ambiguity in the language, "in connection with the 
course of conduct for which sentence was imposed," when 
determining whether a robbery charge was "in connection with" a 
fleeing charge that resulted from a high-speed chase roughly 24 
hours after the robbery took place).  These cases should be 
compared with State v. Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 372, 376-78, 369 
N.W.2d 382 (1985) (finding no ambiguity when determining whether 
presentence credit continues to apply to an unresolved charge 
after the defendant begins to serve his sentence in an unrelated 
case) and State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d 371, 377-78, 340 
N.W.2d 511 (1983) (finding no ambiguity when determining whether 
time spent in custody as a condition of probation on a charge 
the defendant is later convicted of is "in connection with" the 
course of conduct for which that sentence was imposed). 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
16 
 
for unanticipated fact patterns.15  We conclude that, under the 
specific facts of this case, there is only one reasonable 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a): 
Johnson's 
presentence custody related to his first 2004 case is not "in 
connection with" the course of conduct for which his sentences 
in his 2005 case were imposed, and Johnson's presentence custody 
related to his 2005 case is not "in connection with" the course 
of conduct for which his sentence in his first 2004 case was 
imposed.  Therefore, Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) is not ambiguous 
as applied to this case.  Nonetheless, because Johnson bases 
much of his argument on non-statutory authorities, we will 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Kenosha v. Unified Sch. Dist., 55 Wis. 2d 642, 
644-48, 201 N.W.2d 66 (1972) (finding ambiguity in the phrase, 
"at a price equal to the principal amount of the then 
outstanding obligations of such city issued for such school 
purposes," "as applied to the facts" when determining the method 
of accounting to be used for calculating outstanding bond 
obligations); Honeycrest Farms v. Brave Harvestore Sys., 200 
Wis. 2d 256, 264-66, 546 N.W.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1996) ("Because 
the two subsections are inconsistent regarding when waiver 
occurs, we conclude the statute is ambiguous as applied to the 
facts of this case. . . .  Moreover, the statutory language does 
not appear to contemplate the facts of this case where two 
different 
insurers 
file 
answers 
on 
behalf 
of 
a 
single 
defendant.") (citation omitted); Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168, 
1172, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding the term, "served in the 
Republic of Vietnam," as stated in 38 U.S.C. § 1116(a)(1) 
(2000), to be ambiguous when applied to a Vietnam Veteran who 
was stationed on a Navy ship off the coast of Vietnam within its 
territorial waters); United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 1190, 
1191, 1193 (7th Cir. 1991) ("As applied to the facts before us, 
the phrase 'may not turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a 
roadway or change lanes' is ambiguous, because it does not 
answer the question of whether a highway on-ramp is a 'lane' 
considered part of the 'roadway' itself."). 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
17 
 
examine those other sources and show how they support our 
interpretation of the statute. 
¶31 In general, Wis. Stat. § 973.155 is designed to 
prevent a defendant from serving more time than his sentence or 
his sentences call for.  Beets, 124 Wis. 2d at 379; see also 
Klimas v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 244, 248-49, 249 N.W.2d 285 (1977) 
(holding, prior to Wis. Stat. § 973.155's enactment, that courts 
must credit a defendant's sentence with all time spent in 
presentence custody on that charge).16  "The clear intent of sec. 
973.155, Stats., is to grant credit for each day in custody 
regardless of the basis for the confinement as long as it is 
connected to the offense for which sentence is imposed."  
Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d at 380 (emphasis added); see also 71 Wis. 
Op. Att'y Gen. 102, 106 (1982) ("Section 973.155, Stats., 
provides credit for all designated periods spent in custody for 
a particular course of conduct.").   
¶32 To be eligible for sentence credit in Wisconsin, a 
defendant's presentence custody must be "in connection with the 
course of conduct for which sentence was imposed."  Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
16 In an earlier case, Byrd v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 415, 424, 
222 N.W.2d 696 (1974), the court stated as follows: 
 
We hold that a defendant must be given credit for time 
spent in custody prior to conviction to the extent 
such time added to the sentence imposed exceeds the 
maximum sentence permitted under the statute for such 
offense, provided such time spent in custody was a 
result of the criminal charge for which a prison or 
jail sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct 
on which such charge is based . . . . 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
18 
 
§ 973.155(1)(a).  Neither the statute nor the case law that 
precedes today's version of Wis. Stat. § 973.155 justifies 
crediting a defendant's sentence for time spent in presentence 
custody that is not related to the matter for which sentence is 
imposed.  See Beets, 124 Wis. 2d at 379-80.  
¶33 Moreover, the presentence custody's "connection with" 
the sentence imposed must be factual; a mere procedural 
connection will not suffice.  Floyd, 232 Wis. 2d 767, ¶¶15-17 
("[A] factual connection fulfills the statutory requirement for 
sentence credit, and . . . a procedural or other tangential 
connection 
will 
not 
suffice.") (citing 
Beiersdorf, 
208 
Wis. 2d at 498).   
¶34 To illustrate, in Beiersdorf, the defendant was 
arrested and charged with bail jumping after violating the 
conditions of his personal recognizance bond, which was in place 
as a result of his unresolved sexual assault case.  Beiersdorf, 
208 Wis. 2d at 494-95.  After pleading guilty and being 
sentenced on both charges, he requested that his presentence 
custody resulting from the bail jumping charge, for which his 
sentence was stayed in favor of probation, be applied to the 
sentence imposed for his sexual assault charge.  Id. 
¶35 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
order denying this request: "Although a defendant may perceive 
that custody is at least partly in connection with another 
crime, that does not mean that the custody, for credit purposes, 
is related to the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed."  Id. at 498 (internal citations and quotations 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
19 
 
omitted).  Because the sentence imposed was "in connection with" 
the sexual assault charge, but the presentence custody was "in 
connection with" the bail jumping charge, there was no factual 
connection between the presentence custody and the sentence 
imposed.  Id. at 498-99.  This was true despite the obvious 
procedural connection between the bail jumping charge and the 
original sexual assault charge: i.e., without the sexual assault 
charge there would have been no personal recognizance bond, and 
thus, no bail jumping.  See id. at 498.  Consequently, no time 
was credited to the sexual assault sentence.  Id. at 496.   
¶36 Similarly, in Marcus Johnson, this court denied the 
defendant's sentence credit request because there was no factual 
connection between the sentence imposed and the presentence 
custody at issue.  Marcus Johnson, 304 Wis. 2d 318, ¶¶63-76.  In 
June 2001, after being adjudicated delinquent, the defendant 
began serving a juvenile commitment.  This commitment was 
extended in May 2002, and again in May 2003, because of 
Johnson's 
poor 
behavior 
and 
a 
plethora 
of 
commitment 
infractions.  Id., ¶¶11, 16-20.  Less than two weeks after his 
May 2002 commitment extension, the defendant battered another 
juvenile in the same facility.  Id., ¶12.  This resulted in the 
defendant being arrested and charged with a felony.  Id.  The 
defendant was "free" on the felony battery charge after posting 
a signature bond, but he was returned to a juvenile facility.  
Id., ¶13.   
¶37 The defendant remained in custody at the juvenile 
facility under his juvenile commitment for most of the time 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
20 
 
until his sentencing in February 2004 for the 2002 battery 
charge.  Id., ¶¶12-15.  Following his sentencing, the defendant 
requested that the time he served in the juvenile facility after 
his arrest for battery be credited against the battery sentence.  
Id., ¶21.  The circuit court disallowed such credit, reasoning 
that the defendant's custody under juvenile commitment was in no 
way connected with his sentence for battery.  Id., ¶¶23-25.   
¶38 On appeal, this court affirmed the circuit court's 
denial, noting that Marcus Johnson's signature bond in the 
battery case remained in effect until the time his sentence was 
imposed for that charge, and his extended commitment in the 
juvenile facility would have occurred regardless of the battery 
incident.17  Id., ¶76.  As a result, this court held that the 
defendant's 
presentence 
custody 
in 
the 
juvenile 
facility 
following the battery was not "in connection with" the battery 
sentence.  Id., ¶81; cf. Thompson, 225 Wis. 2d at 586 (crediting 
time spent in presentence custody under a juvenile commitment 
because the juvenile commitment was a direct result of the 
"conduct for which sentence was imposed").  
                                                 
17 The Marcus Johnson court had extensive support in the 
record for its conclusion that the defendant's commitment would 
have been extended in May 2003 even if the battery had not 
occurred.  For example, "in June 2002, Johnson accumulated nine 
additional charges for disobeying orders, disruptive conduct, 
threats to staff, attempted battery to staff, creating an 
unsanitary condition, and inappropriate sexual conduct."  Marcus 
Johnson, 304 Wis. 2d 318, ¶16.  Also, "[b]etween July 2002 and 
December 2002, Johnson accumulated 45 additional charges," 
including an additional battery charge in November 2002.  Id.   
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
21 
 
¶39 In contrast to these two cases, sentence credit must 
be applied when the defendant's presentence custody is factually 
"in connection with" the course of conduct for which sentence 
was imposed.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).  
¶40 For example, in Floyd, this court credited the 
defendant's sentence for reckless endangerment with the time he 
spent in presentence custody for an unrelated armed robbery 
because the armed robbery charge was read in at the sentencing 
for reckless endangerment.  Floyd, 232 Wis. 2d 767, ¶¶1-2.  The 
court 
reasoned 
that 
read-in 
charges 
are 
considered 
at 
sentencing; therefore, the read-in charges become a factual 
consideration in the sentencing determination.  Floyd, 232 
Wis. 2d 767, ¶¶25-26.  Consequently, the read-in charges were 
determined 
to 
be 
"related 
to" 
the 
reckless 
endangerment 
sentence, and therefore, confinement on the read-in charges was 
factually "in connection with the course of conduct for which 
sentence was imposed."  Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a); Floyd, 232 
Wis. 2d 767, ¶¶18, 31-32.18    
                                                 
18 In 
Floyd, 
the 
defendant 
asserted 
an 
alternative, 
procedurally based argument for sentence credit as well.  Floyd, 
232 
Wis. 2d 767, 
¶14. 
 
The 
defendant 
asserted 
that 
the 
presentence custody for his armed robbery charge was "in 
connection 
with" 
the 
sentence 
imposed 
for 
his 
reckless 
endangerment charge because he agreed to a guilty plea for 
reckless endangerment in exchange for a dismissal of the armed 
robbery charge.  Id.  This court unanimously rejected the 
defendant's argument, stating that "the proposition that a 
procedural connection may satisfy the statutory requirement has 
already been rejected."  Id., ¶15 (referring to State v. 
Beiersdorf, 208 Wis. 2d 492, 561 N.W.2d 749 (Ct. App. 1997)).  
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
22 
 
¶41 In Gilbert, a consolidated appeal concerning two 
cases, the defendants each had their sentences stayed and were 
given probation, but as a condition of probation, they were 
required to spend some time in the county jail.  Gilbert, 115 
Wis. 2d at 373-76.  After serving this time and being released, 
each defendant had his probation revoked and was sentenced on 
the convictions for which sentence had been stayed.  Id. at 374, 
376.  The circuit courts denied each defendant's request to 
apply those days spent in jail as a condition of probation to 
the sentences imposed after probation was revoked.  Id. at 374-
76.  This court reversed the decisions of the two circuit courts 
and credited the jail time to the defendants' sentences because 
the presentence custody was "in connection with" the same crime 
for which each sentence was imposed.  Id. at 376, 380.  This 
court saw a direct, factual connection between the defendants' 
time in presentence custody and the course of conduct for which 
the respective sentences were imposed. 
¶42 Similarly, 
in 
Yanick, 
299 
Wis. 2d 456, 
¶1, 
the 
defendant was in custody as a condition of his probation, which 
was later revoked.  After the revocation, he was sentenced for 
the underlying crime and his sentence was credited for the time 
he spent in presentence custody, even though that time was 
served concurrent with another recently imposed sentence for an 
unrelated crime.  Id.   
¶43 The Yanick court distinguished Beets, 124 Wis. 2d at 
378-79, where this court held that the imposition of a sentence 
on one charge severs any further credit for pending charges that 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
23 
 
may later result in a sentence, by stating that "Beets does not 
address service of a sentence and concurrent service of custody 
time pursuant to a disposition, which is the sort of concurrent 
custody time at issue here."  Yanick, 299 Wis. 2d 456, ¶22.   
¶44 Because 
the 
defendant 
in 
Yanick 
was 
ultimately 
sentenced for the same crime for which he was in custody as a 
condition of his probation, the court of appeals determined that 
time in custody was "in connection with the course of conduct 
for which sentence [was] imposed."  Id., ¶24; Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a).   
¶45 In applying Wis. Stat. § 973.155, these cases attempt 
to distinguish time spent in presentence custody that is 
factually "in connection with the course of conduct for which 
sentence was imposed" from time spent in presentence custody 
that is not factually "in connection with the course of conduct 
for which sentence was imposed."  The statute does not provide 
sentence credit for time in custody that is not related, or is 
only procedurally related, to the matter for which sentence is 
imposed.  See Floyd, 232 Wis. 2d 767, ¶¶15-17; Beiersdorf, 208 
Wis. 2d at 498. 
¶46 The statute poses a simple test: whether the custody 
for which sentence credit is sought was "in connection with the 
course of conduct for which sentence was imposed."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a).  Admittedly, the answer to this statutory test 
is not always simple. 
¶47 Calculating the correct number of days that need to be 
credited to each of Johnson's concurrent sentences requires that 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
24 
 
we examine separately each sentence and the time spent in 
presentence custody "in connection with" each sentence.  We 
cannot, as Johnson's argument attempts to do, conflate all the 
concurrent sentences imposed on the same day and make a credit 
determination as if there were only one overall sentence 
imposed.   
¶48 There is no dispute that the four days of presentence 
custody resulting from Johnson's arrest in the first 2004 case 
is factually "in connection with the course of conduct for which 
[the] sentence [in that case was] imposed."  Id.  Likewise, 
there is no dispute that the 50 days of presentence custody 
resulting from Johnson's arrest in the 2005 case is factually 
"in connection with the course of conduct for which [the] 
sentence[s in the 2005 case were] imposed."  Id.   
¶49 However, there is no factual connection between the 
four days of presentence custody in 2004 and the course of 
conduct for which the sentences in the 2005 case were imposed, 
nor is there a factual connection between the 50 days of 
presentence custody in 2005 and the course of conduct for which 
the sentence in the first 2004 case was imposed.  See Floyd, 232 
Wis. 2d 767, ¶¶15-17; Beiersdorf, 208 Wis. 2d at 498.  Thus, 
only four days of presentence custody must be credited to the 
sentence in the first 2004 case, and only 50 days of presentence 
custody must be credited to the sentences in the 2005 case.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).  No other sentence credit is due for 
either case. 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
25 
 
 
B. 
State v. Ward and Wis JI——Criminal SM-34A 
¶50 In the present case, Johnson is not relying on the 
plain language of the statute because, as demonstrated, he 
cannot satisfy its requirements for sentence credit.  Instead, 
he is relying on an alternative test: whether a defendant 
received concurrent sentences and whether those concurrent 
sentences were imposed at the same time.  If this two-part test 
is satisfied, he argues, any time in presentence custody 
credited toward one of the concurrent sentences must be credited 
toward all the concurrent sentences imposed at that time.  To 
support this alternative test, Johnson relies heavily on Ward, 
the cases following Ward, and Wis JI——Criminal SM-34A.     
¶51 The Ward case requires close examination because the 
facts of the case do not support Johnson's position.  The court 
of appeals stated the facts as follows: 
 
Following 
the 
revocation 
of 
his 
probation, 
Houston Ward was sentenced to indeterminate terms of 
three years incarceration on each of three convictions 
for delivery of marijuana.  The trial court directed 
that each sentence be concurrent with the others and 
with a three-year sentence imposed by a different 
judge in an unrelated case. . . .  The trial court 
granted Ward 233 days of credit as the result of 
Ward's pre-sentence incarceration, but applied the 
credit only to the first of the three concurrent 
sentences.  Ward argues that he is entitled to have 
the 
credit 
applied 
to 
each 
of 
the 
concurrent 
terms. . . .  The state concedes error.  We agree, and 
reverse. 
Ward, 153 Wis. 2d at 744 (internal citation and footnote 
omitted). 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
26 
 
 
¶52 The Ward court thereafter explained that applying 
"pre-sentence credit against only one of the concurrent three-
year terms defeats the concurrent nature of the sentence because 
the first term is reduced to two years and 132 days, while the 
remaining two terms stand at three full years."  Id. at 745.  
The court then noted that its result was consistent with the 
conclusion 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Criminal 
Jury 
Instructions 
Committee, which opined that "'When concurrent sentences are 
imposed at the same time or for offenses arising from the same 
course of conduct, sentence credit is to be determined as a 
total number of days and is to be credited against each sentence 
imposed.'"  Id. at 746 (quoting Wis JI——Criminal SM-34A at 11 
(1982) (emphasis added)).  
¶53 Confronted with Johnson's reliance on Ward, the court 
of appeals went to the briefs in Ward to obtain a more complete 
statement of the facts.  The briefs revealed the following: 
Houston Ward was arrested on September 19, 1988.  At that time, 
he was on probation for a 1984 conviction for three counts of 
delivering marijuana.  Following his arrest, Ward was charged 
with delivery of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent 
to deliver.  On September 20, 1988, a probation hold was placed 
on Ward.  Later his probation on the 1984 conviction was 
revoked.  As a result, Ward was in custody in connection with 
both the three 1984 marijuana charges and the two 1988 cocaine 
charges from his arrest until he was sentenced in each of the 
two cases. 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
27 
 
 
¶54 The cocaine sentences came first.  On February 7, 
1989, Ward pleaded guilty to the cocaine charges, and on each of 
the two counts, he received a three-year term.  The sentences 
were concurrent with each other, and on both sentences, Ward 
received 
credit 
for 
142 
days 
of 
presentence 
custody, 
representing the time he was in custody from September 19, 1988, 
to February 7, 1989. 
 
¶55 On February 9, 1989, Ward was sentenced on the 
marijuana charges.  On each of the three charges, he was 
sentenced to a term of three years in prison, but the court 
determined that the three sentences should be concurrent with 
each other and also with the sentences previously imposed on the 
cocaine charges. 
 
¶56 Ward had spent 91 days in jail before he was placed on 
probation for the three marijuana charges in 1984.  Thus, he was 
entitled to 91 days of credit on each marijuana sentence.  He 
also was in custody on the probation hold from September 20, 
1988, until February 9, 1989, when he was sentenced.  All 
parties agreed that Ward had spent 233 days in custody prior to 
the sentences on the three marijuana charges.  However, the 
circuit court awarded credit on only one of those sentences.  
Ward contended that he should have received full credit on all 
three marijuana sentences. 
 
¶57 As noted, the State conceded error.  It conceded that 
Ward was entitled to 233 days of credit on all three marijuana 
sentences.  There was no dispute that Ward was entitled to 142 
days of credit on all five sentences in the two cases, but the 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
28 
 
full 233 days of credit applied only to the marijuana sentences.  
In his brief, Ward's attorney, Michael Hicks, explained as 
follows: 
 
[I]f the sentence credit were properly allowed on 
[the 
concurrent 
sentences] 
for 
the 
marijuana 
convictions, then the sentences imposed [in the 
cocaine case] would control, as they would be the 
longest concurrent sentences since only 142 days of 
credit applies on those sentences.  Under this 
computation, Ward still loses the 91 days that he 
spent in jail in connection with the marijuana cases.  
However, that is the penalty he must suffer for 
violating his probation by committing a new crime. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶58 This solid analysis was undercut by the court of 
appeals when it relied on a passage in the special materials 
from the Criminal Jury Instructions Committee: 
 
When concurrent sentences are imposed at the same 
time or for offenses arising from the same course of 
conduct, sentence credit is to be determined as a 
total number of days and is to be credited against 
each sentence imposed.  Credit against each sentence 
is required because credit against only one sentence 
would be negated by the concurrent sentence.  Thus, if 
the credit was not awarded against both sentences, the 
offender would not receive the credit to which he is 
entitled. 
Wis JI——Criminal SM-34A at 11 (1982) (emphasis added). 
 
¶59 This whole paragraph is unfortunate because it is too 
broad.  The Criminal Jury Instructions Committee's use of the 
word "or" in the first sentence of the paragraph implicitly 
creates two distinct theories of sentence credit, only one of 
which is grounded in Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  If the first theory 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
29 
 
(standing alone) were valid, it would wipe out the need to 
adhere to the language of the statute. 
¶60 In Tuescher, the court of appeals referenced Ward's 
use of this suspect paragraph: "The application of the statute 
is . . . relatively straightforward when multiple sentences are 
imposed at the same time.  If the sentences are concurrent, time 
spent in presentence custody is credited toward each sentence.  
See State v. Ward . . . ."  Tuescher, 226 Wis. 2d at 469.  This 
reliance continued in Yanick, 299 Wis. 2d 456, ¶¶16-18. 
¶61 The 
unfortunate 
paragraph, 
read 
in 
context, 
is 
understandable, if not totally accurate.  It is followed by an 
example in which the language about concurrent sentences makes 
sense: 
 
 
1. 
Multiple counts in a single judgment 
 
Example 
Smith was arrested for two burglaries, charged in 
a two count information, and convicted of both 
charges on the same day.  He spent one year in 
jail awaiting disposition.  He was sentenced to 
serve five years on each count, the sentences to 
run concurrently with one another. 
 
The judgment of conviction should order that 
credit is due for 365 days pursuant to § 973.155. 
 
When 
the 
judgment 
reaches 
the 
prison, 
the 
registrar will credit each of the concurrent sentences 
with 365 days, thus computing the sentences as though 
they had begun 365 days earlier. 
Wis JI——Criminal SM-34A at 9. 
¶62 This 
"example" 
fully 
satisfies 
the 
statutory 
requirement that a convicted offender be given credit "for all 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
30 
 
days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct 
for which sentence was imposed."  Wis. Stat. § 973.155. 
¶63 Taking the suspect paragraph out of this factual 
context ignores other explanations and examples in the special 
materials.  To wit: 
III. Determining the Number of Days for Which Credit 
is Due 
 
Section 
973.155(1)(a) 
requires 
two 
determinations: first, whether the offender was "in 
custody"; 
second, 
whether 
the 
custody 
was 
"in 
connection with the course of conduct for which 
sentence was imposed." 
Wis JI——Criminal SM-34A at 4. 
 
 
4. 
Concurrent 
sentences 
on 
unrelated 
charges for which different amounts of credit are 
due[.] 
 
There will also be situations where the periods 
of 
time 
for 
which 
credit 
is 
due 
on 
unrelated 
concurrent sentences will not line up with each other.  
Some credit will be due on one sentence and a 
different amount of credit will be due on another.  If 
different judges are involved, it will be unlikely 
that each judge will be aware of the sentence credit 
situation in the other case when completing his or her 
own judgment, but the judge imposing the second 
sentence should try to become informed of the credit 
awarded against the first sentence. 
 
In such cases, the registrars shall properly 
compute the credit ordered against each sentence.  If 
a defendant is entitled to 10 days of credit on one 
two-year sentence and 150 days of credit on a 
concurrent 
two-year 
sentence, 
the 
registrar 
will 
compute each sentence separately and the defendant's 
controlling sentence will be the two-year sentence 
with the lesser amount of credit. 
Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
31 
 
¶64 Properly interpreted, neither Ward nor the special 
materials leads to the result sought by Johnson.  Both the facts 
in Ward and the examples in the special materials provide 
support for the court of appeals' interpretation of the statute 
in this case.   
¶65 Ward demonstrates that when a defendant spends time in 
presentence custody and the reason for that presentence custody 
is "in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence 
was imposed," then the time spent in presentence custody must be 
credited against the ultimate sentence imposed.  See Ward, 153 
Wis. 2d at 744-45 (crediting each marijuana sentence imposed 
with the same amount of time because those sentences were "in 
connection with the [same] course of conduct").   
¶66 However, Ward also demonstrates that, in order for 
time in presentence custody to be credited to the sentence 
imposed, there must be a factual connection between the 
presentence custody and the sentence.  See id. at 744 (crediting 
each marijuana sentence with 233 days for time spent in 
presentence custody, but not crediting the unrelated cocaine 
sentences with the same 233 days because not all 233 days of 
presentence custody were spent "in connection with" the cocaine 
sentences).  Although Ward's cocaine sentences and his marijuana 
sentences were equal in length, concurrent with each other, and 
imposed at nearly the same time, Ward's 91 days of presentence 
custody from his 1984 marijuana arrest were effectively erased 
because, at the time Ward's marijuana sentences were complete, 
he still had 91 days remaining on his cocaine sentences.  Ward 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
32 
 
lost out on those 91 days of credit since those days were in 
connection with only the marijuana cases, not the cocaine 
cases.19 
¶67 In sum, neither Ward nor the special materials 
displace the "in connection with" requirement under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155. 
¶68 It must be acknowledged that, like Houston Ward, 
Johnson "loses" credit for 46 days he spent in presentence 
custody.  But he loses this time because he benefits from being 
given concurrent sentences, thereby reducing the overall amount 
of time that he might have been required to spend in post-
sentence custody.  He cannot complain that his unrelated 
concurrent sentences do not line up perfectly to avoid this 
loss.  The result upholds the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a) and ensures that Johnson spends the requisite 
365 days in custody for each unrelated sentence imposed. 
¶69 If we were to decide otherwise and credit each of 
Johnson's sentences with 54 days, we would be allowing Johnson 
to spend less than 365 days in custody for each sentence 
imposed.   
¶70 While we must ensure "that a person not serve more 
time than that for which he is sentenced," Beets, 124 Wis. 2d at 
379, we must also ensure that a person actually serves the 
requisite number of days to which he was sentenced.  Our ruling 
today accomplishes that result.   
                                                 
19 Supra, ¶¶56-57. 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
33 
 
C. 
Equal Protection of the Law 
¶71 There were passing references to equal protection of 
the law in the defendant's brief and more emphasis on equal 
protection in his oral argument.  Equal protection also was the 
gist of Judge Charles Dykman's dissent in the court of appeals.  
See Elandis Johnson, 307 Wis. 2d 735, ¶¶34-36 (Dykman, J., 
dissenting).  However, an equal protection argument has not been 
fully developed or briefed, and thus, the court is not required 
to issue a comprehensive response.  See State v. Franklin, 2004 
WI 38, n.5, 270 Wis. 2d 271, 677 N.W.2d 276 ("[B]ecause the 
applicability of [the statute] was not fully briefed by the 
parties, we do not further address it."); State v. Jeremy P., 
2005 WI App 13, ¶22, 278 Wis. 2d 366, 692 N.W.2d 311 ("Because 
this issue is not fully briefed, we need not address it." 
(citation omitted)). 
¶72 Nonetheless, we will comment briefly on one point made 
by Judge Dykman in his dissent. 
¶73 Judge Dykman suggested that Johnson's trial attorney 
may have "performed deficiently by failing to ask the circuit 
court to revoke [Johnson's] bail in the 2004 case," so that he 
would have been "in custody" in that case when he was "in 
custody" on the 2005 case.  Elandis Johnson, 307 Wis. 2d 735, 
¶35 (Dykman, J., dissenting).  Judge Dykman asked that the case 
be remanded for an evidentiary hearing: "If his attorney was 
ineffective by failing to assist Johnson in taking the necessary 
steps to make his custody 'in connection with' his 2004 case, 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
34 
 
[Johnson] is entitled to relief in the form of sentence credit."  
Id., ¶36. 
¶74 We note, in response, that at the time Johnson was 
taken into custody on his 2005 case, he had already pleaded 
guilty to three felonies and was awaiting sentencing on them.  
The court imposed a $15,000 cash bond in the face of two new 
felony charges.  Johnson's trial attorney later persuaded the 
court to reduce this bond, and ultimately, Johnson was released 
for 84 days before his August 31, 2005 sentencing.20   
¶75 Asking an attorney to seek the revocation of his 
client's bail on three felonies and then turn around and obtain 
his client's presentence release on those felonies, and two more 
(which were committed when the client was on bail), is asking 
more than the court can reasonably expect from trial counsel.  
Presentence release is what Johnson wanted.  His presentence 
release may have benefitted him at sentencing.  Second-guessing 
counsel's performance on these facts would be speculative, at 
best. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶76 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 973.155 imposes no 
requirement that credit applied toward one sentence also be 
                                                 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 969.08 is entitled "Grant, reduction, 
increase or revocation of conditions of release."  Subsection 
(5) describes what a district attorney must show in a motion to 
revoke the conditions of pretrial release.  Although a defendant 
is probably entitled to move for revocation of his own 
presentence release, see Wis. Stat. § 969.08(9), he would have 
difficulty reversing course, see Wis. Stat. § 969.08(5)5. 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR 
 
35 
 
applied toward a second sentence if the basis for applying the 
same credit to both sentences is merely that the sentences are 
concurrent and are imposed at the same time.  The fact that 
sentences are concurrent and are imposed at the same time does 
not alter the statutory mandate that credit toward service of a 
sentence be based on custody that is "in connection with" the 
course of conduct giving rise to that sentence: i.e., custody 
factually connected with the course of conduct for which 
sentence was imposed.  Because Johnson cannot satisfy this 
requirement, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2007AP1114-CR & 2007AP1115-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶77 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.     (concurring).  In her oral 
argument to the court, the defendant's attorney, Meredith Ross, 
proposed the "Bill Gates Rule," which she defined as a rule that 
no defendant spend more time in custody, pre-sentence and post-
sentence, than billionaire Bill Gates would have to spend for 
the same conduct.  In formulating this "rule," Attorney Ross 
assumed that Mr. Gates would always be able to make bail at the 
earliest opportunity. 
¶78 Attorney Ross argued that a failure to apply at least 
50 days of sentence credit to each of Johnson's three concurrent 
sentences meant that Johnson had to spend 46 more days in 
custody than Bill Gates would have spent, thereby violating the 
"Bill Gates Rule" and denying Johnson equal protection of the 
law.  
¶79 Attorney Ross's ingenious argument is grounded on the 
questionable 
premise 
that 
showing 
a 
disparity 
between 
a 
hypothetical situation and a real situation exposes a violation 
of equal protection of the law.  It may well be that our 
hypothetical Mr. Gates would have been in a position to post any 
amount of cash bond in any of his three cases if he were in the 
same position as Johnson.  However, a person of Mr. Gates' 
notoriety would have captured a good deal more attention than 
Johnson, and thus, there is a good chance that his bond would 
have been revoked if he had appeared on a second charge of 
felony drug dealing in Milwaukee County Circuit Court. 
¶80 In any event, defendants do not have a "right" to 
concurrent sentences when those sentences arise out of separate, 
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unrelated cases.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  Concurrent 
sentences entail an exercise of sound judicial discretion.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 973.15.  It was a matter of discretion that Judge 
William Sosnay made Johnson's sentences in the 2005 case 
concurrent with his sentence in the first 2004 case.  Moreover, 
it was merely fortuitous that Johnson was sentenced in the first 
2004 case by Judge Sosnay rather than Judge Mel Flanagan, the 
judge who took his plea.  This is significant because Attorney 
Ross did not insist that the "Bill Gates Rule" apply to 
situations involving different judges. 
¶81 In effect, Johnson served 50 days for the two felonies 
in the 2005 case inasmuch as all his post-sentence time on those 
felonies overlapped the 361 days he served post-sentence on the 
first 2004 case.  This can hardly be described as a severe 
sentence. 
¶82 The circuit court might have determined that the 
hypothetical Mr. Gates, having spent zero time in presentence 
custody and having badly abused his privileged position by 
committing additional felonies while on bail, should receive 
longer sentences in the 2005 case than Johnson did to emphasize 
the seriousness of his crimes, the protection of the public, and 
his defiance of the conditions of his pretrial release. 
¶83 The "Bill Gates Rule," if we ever adopted it, would 
gut a rationally based statute that requires an offender be 
given credit toward service of his sentence "for all days spent 
in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which 
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sentence was imposed."  Wis. Stat. § 973.155 (2007-08)1 (emphasis 
added).  The "Bill Gates Rule," extended to its logical 
conclusion, would appear to require that a court stack up the 
presentence custody from all concurrent sentences from all 
relevant cases and apply the resulting number of days as credit 
to all those sentences.  But the fact that Mr. Gates would make 
bail in all his cases, both related and unrelated, would not 
change the requirement in the statute that credit toward a 
sentence be tied, factually, to custody in connection with each 
sentence.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a); State v. Floyd, 2000 
WI 14, ¶¶15-17, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155; State v. 
Beiersdorf, 208 Wis. 2d 492, 498, 561 N.W.2d 749 (Ct. App. 
1997).  The so-called "Bill Gates Rule" must be rejected. 
¶84 For the reasons stated, I must respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
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¶85 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I write 
separately to address the "Bill Gates Rule" and also to clarify 
that the majority's cite to State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, 232 
Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155, is not to be construed as authority 
for the proposition that a read-in offense entitles one to 
sentence credit for that read-in offense as a matter of law 
under all circumstances. 
I 
¶86 In the defense counsel's oral argument and in Justice 
Prosser's concurrence, references are made to the "Bill Gates 
Rule."  Counsel defines that "rule" as one which should ensure 
that no defendant spend more time in custody than billionaire 
Bill Gates would spend in custody for the same conduct.   
¶87 This argument assumes that Bill Gates would always be 
able to post bail at the earliest opportunity.  This argument 
also assumes that the other defendant would be unable to post 
bail.  We also must assume for the sake of this argument that 
Bill Gates and any other defendant received the exact same 
sentence.  Even assuming these factors to be the case, however, 
the "Bill Gates Rule" does not, in reality, forward the defense 
counsel's argument. 
¶88 In reality, some defendants, here Bill Gates, are able 
to post bail and thus, would not spend time in custody pre-
sentencing.  Other defendants, who cannot post bail, would 
indeed spend time in custody pre-sentencing.  Thus, Bill Gates 
may spend zero days in custody pre-conviction and the other 
defendant may spend, for example, 50 days in custody pre-
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conviction.  However, assuming that both defendants receive the 
same period of incarceration at sentencing, Mr. Gates would 
actually serve 50 days more time in custody post-sentencing than 
the other defendant because of sentence credit.  Under Wis. 
Stat. § 973.155, sentence credit is awarded for pre-sentence 
incarceration.  In this example, Bill Gates is not entitled to 
receive credit post-sentencing and the other defendant then 
would receive credit relief post-sentencing of 50 days.  The 
credit given is the great equalizer. 
¶89 I write this concurrence to outline the fatal flaw of 
the defense counsel's argument.  That is, credit is due for 
those who deserve credit for pre-sentence incarceration.  Such 
credit is not due for those who do not spend time in custody 
pre-sentencing.  As a result, because of sentence credit, each 
defendant will ultimately serve the exact same amount of time in 
custody. 
II 
¶90 I write separately to clarify that the majority's use 
of Floyd is as an example but not as authority for the 
proposition that time served for a read-in offense will always 
be given as sentence credit.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) 
entitles an offender to credit "for all days spent in custody in 
connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed."  However, whether credit is due for the same course of 
conduct may depend on the facts of the case and whether State v. 
Straszkowski, 2008 WI 65, ¶95, 310 Wis. 2d 259, 750 N.W.2d 835 
changed the analysis in Floyd.  When Floyd was decided, a read-
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in offense was deemed admitted for the purposes of sentencing.  
Now, under Straszkowski, a read-in offense is no longer deemed 
admitted.  This new analysis now leaves open the question of 
whether the defendant is being sentenced for the same "course of 
conduct" because under Straszkowski, read-in offenses are not 
admitted.  As a result, I write to clarify that this issue was 
not briefed or argued by the parties in this case and we do not 
decide that question today.  This court then appropriately waits 
to decide these questions raised by this concurrence until we 
have the full benefit of the adversarial process to guide our 
decision.   
¶91 For the foregoing reasons I concur. 
¶92 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
 
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