Case Title: People v. Miracle

Citation: 

Docket Number: S140894

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2018-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JOSHUA MARTIN MIRACLE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S140894 
 
Santa Barbara County Superior Court 
1200303 
 
 
December 3, 2018 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye filed the opinion of the court, in 
which Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, Kruger and Ikola* 
concurred.   
 
 
Justice Liu filed a dissenting opinion. 
 
                                        
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, 
Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 
6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
S140894 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
Defendant Joshua Martin Miracle pleaded guilty to the 
first degree murder of Elias Raymond Silva (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 
subd. (a), 189; further undesignated statutory references are to 
the Penal Code), and to assault with a deadly weapon, a knife, 
on Jaime Alfaro Lopez (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)).  He admitted two 
special circumstances:  that he intentionally killed Silva by 
means of lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)), and that he 
intentionally killed Silva while defendant was an active 
participant in a criminal street gang and the murder was 
carried out to further the activities of the gang (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(22)).  In connection with the murder of Silva, he admitted 
the allegations that he personally used a deadly or dangerous 
weapon, a knife, (§ 12202, subd. (b)(1)), and that the murder 
was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in 
association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent 
to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang 
members (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).  In connection with the 
assault on Lopez, he admitted the allegations that he 
personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon, a knife, 
(§ 12202, subd. (b)(1)), and that he personally inflicted great 
bodily injury (§ 12202.7, subd. (a)).  At the penalty trial, the 
jury returned a verdict of death.  This appeal is automatic.  
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; § 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the 
judgment. 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
I.  STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Evidence of the Charged Crimes 
1. Murder of Elias Silva 
Because defendant pleaded guilty to the charges and 
allegations, evidence related to the crimes was submitted at 
the penalty phase to establish the circumstances of the crimes.  
(§ 190.3, subd. (a).)   
Elias Silva was killed on Saturday night or Sunday 
morning (October 2 or 3, 2004) in Robert Galindo’s apartment.  
Galindo agreed to testify pursuant to an agreement that he 
plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter in connection with the 
death of Silva.  As described below, defendant and Robert 
Ibarra spent several days in Galindo’s apartment, coerced and 
threatened Galindo to lure Silva to the apartment, and then 
stabbed Silva 48 times.   
Galindo and Ibarra had been friends for about three 
years, and in the days before Silva was killed, they consumed 
methamphetamine together in Galindo’s apartment.  Galindo 
was also friends with Danny Ramirez, who had arranged with 
Galindo to come to Galindo’s apartment on Thursday night, 
September 30, to give Silva a tattoo.  When Ramirez arrived at 
the apartment, defendant was with him.  Galindo had not met 
defendant before that evening.  Silva also came to the 
apartment, and he and Ramirez discussed the tattoo, but 
apparently agreed to do the tattoo the next day.  Ramirez then 
asked if he and defendant could stay at Galindo’s apartment 
overnight.   
The morning of Friday, October 1, while Galindo was 
showering, Silva came by the apartment and picked up 
Ramirez, leaving Galindo, Ibarra, and defendant in the 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
apartment.  Galindo asked defendant why he was still there, 
and defendant told him Ramirez would come back for him.  
Ibarra left the apartment Friday night, but Galindo let 
defendant stay, because Galindo assumed Ramirez would 
eventually come back to get defendant.    
On either Friday or Saturday, Galindo went to see Silva, 
bothered by the fact that when Silva came to the apartment to 
discuss the tattoo, he did not say “hi” to Galindo like he usually 
did.  When Galindo asked Silva to explain, Silva told him that 
defendant was no good and that Galindo should get him out of 
his apartment.    
Saturday morning, Ibarra returned to the apartment.  
During the day, defendant and Ibarra spent a substantial 
amount 
of 
time 
in 
Galindo’s 
bathroom, 
consuming 
methamphetamine.  Ibarra left the apartment at some point, 
and when he returned at around 8:30 or 9:00 p.m., the mood in 
the apartment changed.  Ibarra was “wired,” “antsy,” in “a very 
hyper mood.”  Galindo inquired regarding the purpose of a 
duffel bag Ibarra brought back with him, and Ibarra said it 
was for Ibarra’s and defendant’s clothes.  Galindo heard 
defendant talking about needing to take care of a “rat,” which 
Galindo understood to refer to someone who was cooperating 
with law enforcement.    
At some point, either defendant or Ibarra asked Galindo 
to call Silva, who sold methamphetamine, to bring drugs to the 
apartment.  Galindo did not have a telephone, so he used 
Ibarra’s mobile phone.  Galindo called Silva, and Silva told 
Galindo that he did not want to have anything to do with 
“them,” and that Galindo should “get them out of your house.”  
Thereafter, Ibarra told Galindo to call Silva again.  Because 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
Ibarra’s telephone had to be charged, Ibarra suggested that 
Galindo go to a payphone to make the call.    
Galindo left, but did not call Silva.  When he returned to 
his apartment, defendant and Ibarra were in the bathroom, 
apparently consuming more methamphetamine.  Defendant 
and Ibarra asked Galindo to call Silva again.  Galindo then 
called wrong numbers a few times on Ibarra’s telephone, and 
acted like he was calling Silva.  Defendant and Ibarra told him 
to keep trying, and at some point, Galindo said he would go out 
to get some cigarettes and would try calling from the payphone 
again.  When Galindo returned, Ibarra continued to urge him 
to call, and Galindo told him that he had left voicemail 
messages.    
At this point, defendant was in the kitchen, taping the 
loose handle on a butcher knife from Galindo’s kitchen.  
Defendant and Ibarra continued to tell Galindo to call Silva, 
and Galindo responded that he had already called Silva too 
many times.  Ibarra was becoming more persistent about 
calling Silva, and both defendant and Ibarra were becoming 
agitated with Galindo.  Galindo asked, “Why are you doing this 
to me?”  Ibarra told him to “just shut the fuck up and call him.”  
Galindo then said he would go to the payphone and call Silva 
one more time, but he did not call Silva.    
When Galindo returned, his furniture had been moved 
from the living room to the kitchen area, leaving more open 
space in the living room.  Galindo asked why his belongings 
had been moved, and Ibarra told him to shut up and call Silva.  
Defendant then brought out the butcher knife, stood behind 
Galindo, put his arm around Galindo, and held the knife by 
Galindo’s throat or upper chest.  Defendant told Galindo, “You 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
need to call.”  In addition, defendant wanted to listen to 
Galindo’s call because he and Ibarra did not believe that 
Galindo was calling Silva.  Yelling back and forth ensued, and 
Galindo was crying.  Defendant told Galindo, “I don’t care what 
you say to him to get him over here, you just need to get him 
over here.”    
Galindo called Silva and left a message that Galindo’s 
cousins were in town, they wanted to party, and Silva should 
bring some drugs.  Within a few minutes, Silva called back, 
and Galindo spoke to Silva while defendant continued to hold a 
knife to him.  After confirming that his cousins were still there, 
Galindo told Silva to meet him in the back.  Galindo had never 
before told Silva to meet him in the back, and he thought Silva 
might guess that something was amiss.  When Silva called 
again and said he was two minutes away, defendant told 
Galindo not to go out, and instead to meet Silva at the 
apartment door.  Silva called again, asked why Galindo did not 
come out, and said he was coming to the door.   
Ibarra then stood in a position to be the first person Silva 
would see when the door opened.  Defendant stood behind 
Galindo to make sure Galindo opened the door.  As Silva 
started to enter, Ibarra pulled him inside.  Defendant pushed 
Galindo to the side, rushed at Silva, and helped Ibarra drag 
him into the center of the room.  When defendant pushed 
Galindo to the side, defendant still had the knife in his hand.  
Defendant closed the door and told Galindo to lock it, but 
Galindo left the apartment to look for Silva’s “homeboys.”    
Galindo did not find them.  He then went to look for his 
roommate Phillip, because Ibarra had said that he was going to 
kill anyone who came through the apartment door.  About 20 
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6 
or 25 minutes after leaving the apartment, Galindo headed 
back to the apartment, and saw a trail of blood drops and 
bloody footprints in the direction of the parking lot where Silva 
would have parked his car.  Galindo returned to his apartment, 
and discovered broken furniture and Silva lying in blood.  
Galindo fled again, looking for Phillip.    
Deputy Sheriff Lawrence Hess and a second deputy 
arrived at the apartment in response to a later 911 call.  They 
saw a trail of blood leaving the apartment, and when they 
entered the apartment, they saw that furniture had been 
moved and tipped over, there was a “large amount of blood in 
the living room area,” and Silva’s body was on the carpet.    
Defendant and Ibarra were arrested in San Diego, 
driving Silva’s car.  Ibarra had a puncture or stab-type wound 
to his leg, and there appeared to be a fresh blood stain on the 
floor of the car.  Photographs taken after defendant was 
arrested showed “ESG” tattooed on the back of defendant’s 
head, and a number of small tattoos on his chest.  
The parties stipulated that Silva was stabbed 48 times.  
Photographs of many of the stab wounds were admitted, 
including a photograph of Silva’s heart with a stab wound in it.   
Lisa Hemman, a senior identification technician in the 
forensics unit of the Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s 
Department, identified various objects found in a duffel bag in 
the apartment, including a hammer or hatchet-looking item, 
two tarps, plastic sheeting, duct tape, pliers, and a workman’s 
knife.  Galindo identified Ibarra in a videotape, purchasing 
items at a Home Depot.  A receipt from the Home Depot 
reflected the purchase of a poly sheet, vinyl gloves, and a tarp.  
Hemman also identified in photographs wounds on the side 
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7 
and front of Silva’s neck, and numerous other injuries, most 
consisting of puncture or stabbing wounds.    
Finally, Detective Gary Siegel testified as a gang expert.  
In his opinion, the murder of Silva was for the benefit of the 
Eastside Gang.  
2. Assault with a Deadly Weapon on Jaime Lopez 
Jaime Lopez testified that he was a member of the 
Eastside Gang, and that the “ESG” tattoo on the back of 
defendant’s head stood for “Eastside Gang.”  He admitted 
driving to a Circle K store on September 23, 2004, but stated 
that he did not see defendant there, and did not remember 
telling a grand jury that he saw defendant in the parking lot.  
Lopez further testified that he did not know how he got a stab 
wound on his back or a cut over his eye, and that he did not 
say anything to the contrary to the investigating detective, 
Gary Siegel.    
Detective Siegel testified that Lopez and defendant were 
members of the Eastside Gang, and that Lopez told him that 
defendant stabbed him on September 23, 2004, at a Circle K 
store.  He also testified that Lopez was very worried about the 
ramifications of testifying.  Finally, Siegel testified that, in his 
opinion, the assault on Lopez was for the benefit of the 
Eastside Gang.   
B. Other Evidence 
The People presented testimony concerning a violent 
incident in the holding cell at the courthouse and two violent 
incidents in the county jail.  They also presented a stipulated 
list of more than two dozen incidents of violence or threats by 
defendant from 1993 to 2005.  This evidence is described below, 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
in connection with the discussion of defendant’s contention 
that he was subjected to excessive restraints in the courtroom.   
In addition, James Nalls, an investigator with the 
district attorney’s office, testified that he heard defendant 
make the following statements while in the courtroom on 
October 25, 2005.  “I believe in accepting the consequences of 
my actions, good or bad, and maintaining my princip[les] 
regardless of the cost, including death.  I feel that if I’m willing 
to kill I should also be willing to die.”  He also heard defendant 
state, “I didn’t show any mercy, so I’m not going to ask for any 
mercy.”  Similarly, on August 9, 2005, Nalls heard defendant 
state during a telephone conversation, “The way I see it, if I’m 
willing to kill I should be willing to die, too.”   
Silva’s widow, Deanna Garcia testified that she and Silva 
were together for 12 years, and had three children, ages nine, 
five, and three.  Their children missed their father and asked 
about him every day.  She tries to be strong for their children.  
Silva’s mother, Suzanne Silva, testified that she was close to 
her son.  He had left behind his life with the Goleta 13 gang in 
Santa Barbara.  He had a good job at the University of 
California, Santa Barbara, and spent time with his children, 
taking them fishing and camping.  The events had been very 
hard for her grandchildren.  She missed her son very much.   
Defendant’s advisory counsel engaged in some cross-
examination, but defendant did not present any evidence at 
the penalty phase and declined to make a closing argument.  
At a pretrial hearing on October 25, 2005, defendant 
personally described at length his reasons for not presenting 
mitigating evidence, including the point that the jury may 
decide that he does not deserve the death penalty because he 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
was not making excuses for his actions and was willing to 
accept responsibility.  His advisory counsel then asked him to 
make clear for the record that he was not seeking the death 
penalty and would be pleased if the jury sentenced him to life 
without the possibility of parole.  Defendant responded, “It 
would be correct to assume that I’m not seeking the death 
penalty.”  On November 21, 2005, the trial court held an in 
camera hearing with defendant and his advisory counsel to 
review all of the mitigating evidence obtained by the defense, 
and to confirm that defendant did not want the evidence 
presented.   
II.  PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS 
As described more fully below, defendant sought to plead 
guilty to the capital murder charge and to admit a special 
circumstance allegation from the outset of the proceedings in 
March 2005.  When his appointed counsel was unwilling to 
consent to a guilty plea, defendant asserted his right to 
represent himself.  (See Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 
806 (Faretta).)  The trial court granted defendant’s motion, and 
appointed advisory counsel to assist him.  Advisory counsel 
reviewed all of the evidence with defendant, and eventually 
concluded that entering an unqualified guilty plea to the 
murder charge and admitting the special circumstance 
allegations was an intelligent tactic to try to avoid a death 
sentence.  The trial court confirmed that advisory counsel had 
effectively acted throughout his appointment as counsel to 
defendant.  The court allowed defendant to plead guilty to the 
capital charge and to admit the two special circumstance 
allegations.  
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
A. Procedural History 
Defendant’s first appearance in court following the grand 
jury indictment was in early March 2005, when he agreed to 
continue his arraignment to later that month.  At the later 
hearing, defendant’s counsel, Michael Carty, informed the 
court that defendant intended to make a motion to represent 
himself, and that defendant was aware that the court might 
want to research the implications of his proceeding in propria 
persona in a capital case.  The trial court cautioned defendant 
regarding the serious and complex nature of the case, directed 
Carty to discuss all of the implications with defendant, and 
continued the matter.  Carty disclosed that he had discussed 
the issue with defendant for three hours, and was of the 
opinion that defendant was capable of making that decision 
under Faretta.  (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835.)  The trial 
court asked defendant to confer further with Carty, and to 
consider what the court had said.   
In early April, Carty informed the court that defendant 
had indicated to him on multiple occasions that he intended to 
plead guilty at the earliest possible time to counts 1 (murder) 
and 2 (attempted murder), and to admit at least one of the 
special circumstance allegations.  Carty further disclosed that 
he had discussed with defendant section 1018, which prohibits 
a plea of guilty to a capital offense unless the defendant 
appears with counsel who consents to the plea.  Although 
defendant wanted his counsel to consent to the plea that day, 
Carty declined to do so, principally because he was still 
reviewing the grand jury transcript and investigating 
witnesses.  Therefore, Carty did not believe he could ethically 
support a change in defendant’s plea that day.  He further 
explained that because he would not support defendant’s 
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desire to plead guilty that day, it was defendant’s wish to 
proceed with his motion to represent himself.  Carty reiterated 
that he found no evidence of a mental incapacity that would 
preclude defendant’s self-representation.    
Carty then advised the court that if it granted 
defendant’s motion to represent himself, the court would be 
called upon to provide defendant with advisory counsel.  He 
further informed the court that it was required “to set the 
scope and the functions of advisory counsel. . . .  And I think 
that the Court ought to authorize advisory counsel to be 
involved in the change of plea so that you could satisfy Penal 
Code Section 1018.”  In response to questioning by the court, 
Carty confirmed that the court could set the terms of the 
appointment of advisory counsel to require advisory counsel’s 
consent in order to enter a guilty plea.    
The court then obtained defendant’s confirmation that he 
wanted to enter a guilty plea.  Defendant further confirmed 
that he was comfortable with Carty’s representation of him, 
but because Carty was not willing to consent at that point in 
time to a guilty plea and an admission of the special 
circumstance allegations, defendant wanted to represent 
himself.  Carty stated that his primary objection to defendant’s 
desire to plead guilty and admit the special circumstance 
allegations was that this course would make him eligible for 
the death penalty.  The court explained to defendant that 
counsel was still reviewing the grand jury transcript and other 
materials, and was not yet in a position to consent to or oppose 
a guilty plea.  The court further stated that if it granted a 
Faretta motion and appointed advisory counsel, “I can 
condition the appointment of advisory counsel on compliance 
with Penal Code Section 1018 which requires consent of that 
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advisory counsel.”  The court declined to take defendant’s 
guilty plea or admissions to the special allegations, stating 
that the case was “far too serious,” and that defendant’s 
counsel needed more time to review the record.   
Defendant responded that he wanted “to pursue the 
Faretta motions with the conditions Carty stipulated before.”  
Carty then stated that defendant “has very strong opinions 
about what type of evidence should be presented on his behalf 
at the penalty phase,” which would “pose a real problem to 
counsel.  Because case law says that a defendant cannot 
prohibit counsel from presenting mitigation evidence over the 
objection of the defendant, that decision is placed entirely with 
trial counsel.”  He further explained that “[a] facet of this 
Faretta decision is allowing Mr. Miracle to present or to limit 
evidence at the penalty phase that he’s never going to get me, 
or probably any other ethical lawyer, to go along with unless 
there’s some sort of agreement reached, and I think that Mr. 
Miracle is concerned that he wants to control what sort of 
mitigation evidence is presented with Judge or jury.  That 
argues, I believe, for the Faretta position, the pro per position, 
and I’ve discussed that with Mr. Miracle at length.”  The court 
reiterated that it would not rule on defendant’s motion to 
represent himself until Carty finished reviewing the entire 
record.   
In mid-April, at the continued arraignment hearing, 
Carty stated that he had reviewed all relevant materials, had 
discussed his review with defendant, and would not consent to 
a guilty plea or admission of the special allegations.  He 
explained that “the question is not limited to whether or not he 
should admit guilt or enter guilty pleas to the charged count 
and admit the special allegations, a big part of the picture has 
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to do with Mr. Miracle’s very strong preferences as to what 
material, if any, should be permitted at the penalty phase on 
the case, and whether or not he should cooperate with 
investigation and any expert witnesses that might be used in 
mitigation.”  He stated that he did not want to “reveal 
confidential communications, but Mr. Miracle and I cannot 
agree on the presentation of penalty phase material.”  Carty 
added that he did not think defendant would be able to find an 
attorney who would agree not to present evidence in 
mitigation.  The trial court then explained to defendant that he 
had a right to have counsel represent him at the guilt phase, 
and could then decide to represent himself at the penalty 
phase.  Defendant confirmed that he understood that 
possibility, and Carty confirmed that he had explained that 
approach to defendant.  In addition, Carty had provided 
defendant with a copy of section 1018 and had spent hours 
discussing its impact on defendant’s options.  Carty also stated 
that defendant wanted to make an unequivocal request to 
proceed in propria persona at both phases of the trial.   
The court then turned to defendant, who confirmed that 
he wanted to represent himself, that he had reviewed the 
indictment with his attorney, and that he understood the 
nature of the charges and potential penalty.  In response to 
further questioning, defendant stated that he had been 
through the court system in other cases, but he had never 
represented himself and had no legal training.  With respect to 
his understanding of how the court system works, he felt he 
could become familiar with each stage as the case proceeded 
and educate himself.  He stopped regularly attending school at 
about age 11, when he was first sent to juvenile hall, and did 
not thereafter attend a full school year.  He attended school at 
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the California Youth Authority beginning at age 14, taking 
both high school and college classes, and he could read and 
write.   
Defendant stated that he wanted to represent himself 
because Carty was interfering with his desire to plead guilty, 
and Carty disagreed with defendant regarding the mitigating 
evidence to be presented.  Defendant explained that he did not 
intend to cooperate with any professional investigators or 
psychologists, and did not intend to present any defense.  The 
court asked defendant whether he understood that even if he 
represented himself, state law prohibited a plea of guilty, so he 
would not be able to avoid a trial.  Defendant responded that 
he had been led to believe that if the court appointed an 
“assistant counsel,” and that counsel was willing to consent to 
a guilty plea, that consent would be “just as legitimate as” 
Carty’s consent.  The court responded that it was highly 
unlikely that advisory counsel would be in a position to consent 
to a guilty plea and admission of special allegations, so there 
would be a trial regardless of whether he represented himself.  
The court asked if he understood that he would be better off 
having counsel, and defendant disagreed, noting that he did 
not intend to offer any defense.     
Carty stated that defendant “has the mental capacity to 
waive the constitutional rights to counsel, he realizes the 
probable risk and consequences of his action, and his decision 
is voluntary and intelligent.”  Carty further stated that he 
could not formally oppose defendant’s request to represent 
himself, but he had “spent hours and hours with Mr. Miracle 
suggesting to him that this Faretta motion is ill-advised.”  The 
court agreed that it was ill-advised, but granted the Faretta 
motion.  It stated that it would “appoint stand-by counsel, 
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sometimes called advisory counsel, to assist you.”  It added 
that it was for the court to determine the parameters of 
counsel’s role, and that the issue was one that “we can explore 
in terms of exactly what role advisory counsel will play.”  After 
the court twice referred to stand-by counsel, Carty stated that 
he had explained to defendant the difference between stand-by 
and advisory counsel, and that defendant was seeking advisory 
counsel.  The court then inquired whether Carty might serve 
as advisory counsel, but he asked not to be appointed in light of 
defendant’s opposition to his continued representation.  Carty 
observed that another attorney, Joe Allen, had considerable 
experience with respect to homicide and death penalty issues, 
and the court appointed Allen as advisory counsel in late April.   
Over the following weeks, as the court addressed the 
issue of the extent to which defendant would be allowed to 
review discovery materials that included witnesses’ names and 
contact information, Allen took an active role in the 
proceedings.  The court took note of Allen’s active role, but 
informed defendant that it would be directing its comments to 
defendant, and that defendant should respond to the court.  
Thereafter, however, defendant continued to look to Allen to 
represent him.  When confusion regarding the court’s order 
concerning redaction and the defense investigator’s access to 
the materials arose, defendant asked the court to allow Allen 
to explain the matter to the court, and the court agreed.  Allen 
then handled most of the discussions concerning the 
circumstances under which defendant would be allowed to 
review the materials.  When the court explained to defendant 
that the decision regarding expenditures for investigative 
tasks was up to defendant, defendant asked whether he could 
give Allen permission to spend the investigative funds as Allen 
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saw fit, as defendant did not “want to be bothered with that.”  
Allen stated that defendant, the defense investigator, and 
Allen had been working together well in this regard, and the 
court responded that it wanted to make it clear to defendant 
that he was representing himself.   
At the continued arraignment in mid-June, defendant 
stated that he wanted to plead guilty to all of the charges and 
to admit the special allegations.  The court reiterated that it 
could not accept a guilty plea from him, and Allen stated that 
he had not found any case law related to whether the 
concurrence of advisory counsel to a guilty plea would satisfy 
section 1018.  Defendant asked the court it if would be inclined 
to accept his plea with advisory counsel’s consent, and the 
court stated it was not prepared to do so.  It further explained 
that if defendant wanted to expedite the process, he could do so 
by asking for “a court trial within a relatively short period of 
time.  And you can testify at your own trial.  You can say to the 
Court whatever you desire.  You’re also entitled to have a jury 
trial, you can ask for that jury trial within sixty days of today.  
You can tell the jury whatever you wish to that might assist 
them in making a determination as to your guilt or innocence.”  
It added that by choosing to represent himself, he had more 
limited options than he might have had with appointed counsel 
“at some point in time.”   
Defendant then asked if he could waive his right to 
continue to represent himself and have Allen appointed to 
represent him so that he could proceed with the arraignment.  
The court said it would not take that action that day.  It stated 
that it had taken his decision to represent himself seriously, 
that they had discussed it and defendant had indicated why he 
wanted to represent himself.  “You can’t just . . . flip back and 
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forth between representing yourself and having someone 
represent you.  You now have advisory counsel and he’s there 
to advise you as you feel it necessary, but you’re representing 
yourself.  I’m giving you your options now as an attorney and 
as a defendant.  As an attorney representing yourself and as a 
defendant.”   
The court clarified that it was not suggesting that it 
would not allow defendant to withdraw his in propria persona 
status in the future if he was sincere in wanting the assistance 
of counsel, but if his intent was “to play games with the Court, 
or to seek some other objective other than to have counsel 
appointed to assist you in preparing a competent defense, then, 
you know, we’re in a different posture.  I may not grant that 
request.”  The court then asked defendant why he wanted 
Allen to represent him when he had repeatedly indicated he 
wanted to represent himself.  Allen interjected that the 
question elicited information related to defense strategy and 
defendant’s approach, and should occur in chambers.  The 
court asked Allen if defendant wanted him appointed as 
counsel so Allen could concur in his guilty plea.  Allen 
confirmed that was defendant’s purpose, and said he could not 
discuss in the presence of the prosecution defendant’s reasons 
or why Allen’s position was different from Carty’s with respect 
to whether counsel should agree to a guilty plea.   
The court then held an in camera hearing, at which Allen 
stated that he had discussed with defendant his reasons for 
wanting to plead guilty and to admit the special allegation of 
lying in wait.  Allen stated that defendant was “correct in two 
fundamental points that are motivating his desire to enter this 
set of guilty pleas and admissions.”  First, defendant believed 
that the evidence against him was very strong, and that it was 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
highly likely that a judge or jury would find him guilty and 
find the special allegations to be true, but “[f]or reasons 
connected with his personal beliefs and outlook on life, he is 
not interested in plea bargaining with the District Attorney’s 
office.”  Allen explained that defendant wanted the record to 
reflect that he had “not received any guarantees of any kind of 
consideration, leniency, or anything else in exchange for the 
plea.  That the plea is what he wants to do to take 
responsibility for what he feels he did.”  Second, defendant 
believed that his acceptance of responsibility through his plea 
and admissions was his best strategy for avoiding a death 
sentence, and Allen agreed that this strategy, “even though it’s 
highly risky, is the best strategy available on the facts of his 
particular case.”  Allen further explained, “obviously if that 
acceptance of responsibility is something less than completely 
free and unconditional it loses its moral strength as an 
argument . . . .”   
With respect to his ethical situation, Allen stated that if 
a client’s motive “makes no sense or is contrary to the client’s 
best interests, then you have an ethical obligation not to 
cooperate,” but here, given the strength of the evidence, Allen 
thought a jury would be irritated that it had to “hear several 
weeks of, essentially, uncontestable evidence.”  He stated that 
the evidence was “extremely strong,” and “the likelihood of a 
conviction is extremely high.”  He also informed the court that 
he had tried about 65 murder cases, including 15 which 
potentially involved a death penalty, and had tried three 
capital penalty phases.  He added, “I think I understand what 
I’m doing when I appraise the evidence in Mr. Miracle’s case.  
[¶]  Mr. Miracle doesn’t have on the guilt phase a reasonable 
defense to any, except as I say, one minor allegation, which if it 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
were resolved in his favor wouldn’t change the capital charge 
or any of the allegations connected to it.”  The trial court 
responded that the trial would not appear pointless if 
codefendant Ibarra pursued a jury trial.   
Allen then explained defendant’s intentions with respect 
to Ibarra:  defendant felt that he dragged Ibarra into 
defendant’s plan, and that defendant had led them to killing 
the victim; Ibarra had no intent to kill the victim, but 
defendant pulled Ibarra too far for him to back out.  Defendant 
wanted to describe to the prosecutor and Ibarra’s attorneys 
what defendant’s testimony would be at Ibarra’s trial, and 
wanted to testify at Ibarra’s trial.  Defendant felt that his 
obligation to take responsibility for his actions included 
accepting responsibility for what he led Ibarra to do, and that 
pleading guilty without any consideration would cause his 
testimony to have more weight with the factfinder in Ibarra’s 
trial.  Finally, Allen stated that he wanted defendant to testify 
in Ibarra’s trial prior to the penalty phase in defendant’s trial, 
and that he would “argue very strongly” in defendant’s penalty 
phase that defendant’s “willingness to tell the truth and help 
Mr. Ibarra” was also a point in favor of a sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole rather than a sentence of 
death.   
The 
court 
then 
inquired 
whether 
the 
defense 
contemplated a jury trial at the penalty phase.  Defendant said 
he did not, and explained that his only reason for pleading 
guilty was because he thought he was responsible, and he 
“want[ed] to do the right thing and take responsibility and 
offer exonerating testimony on behalf of Mr. Ibarra.”  He added 
that he “just want[ed] to make clear that . . . using that as 
mitigating evidence at the penalty trial is not my motive for 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
pleading guilty.”  The court sought to clarify that it was not 
defendant’s main motive, and that the fact of his plea would be 
used at the penalty phase.  Defendant responded, “[t]ell you 
the truth, I’m not concerned about it at all.”  Allen interjected 
that “[i]t would be fair to say that it is a very important factor 
for me in agreeing to go along with this proposal.”   
The court then attempted to clarify how the case would 
proceed.  It stated that if it appointed Allen to represent 
defendant, and if Allen consented to defendant’s guilty pleas 
and admissions of special allegations, the court would not let 
defendant represent himself at the penalty phase.  Defendant 
stated that he wanted to waive his right to a jury trial at the 
penalty phase, and not to offer any mitigating evidence at that 
phase.  He added that “I just don’t believe in doing that, I 
believe the right thing for me to do is take responsibility.”  The 
court pointed out to defendant that Allen had indicated that he 
intended to present mitigating evidence, including the fact of 
defendant’s admission.  Defendant did not respond, but Allen 
explained that he had advised defendant that he was willing to 
help present an argument based on defendant’s acceptance of 
responsibility, and that there might be other evidence that 
could be presented, but that defendant “has a very strong 
desire to limit that.”   
The court then explained to defendant that if it allowed 
defendant to withdraw his decision to represent himself, and 
thereby allow Allen to concur in his decision to plead guilty, 
the court would not allow him to represent himself at the 
penalty phase, and counsel would present mitigating evidence 
that might exceed what defendant wanted presented.  It stated 
it would continue the matter for two weeks to allow defendant 
and Allen to think about whether Allen should be appointed to 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
represent defendant.  Defendant asserted that the court was 
interfering with his right to take responsibility for his actions.  
The court responded that it was bound by state law regarding 
the entry of a guilty plea.  Defendant then asked the court to 
research the possibility of accepting defendant’s plea with the 
consent of advisory counsel.  The court reiterated its view that 
defendant could plead guilty only with the consent of appointed 
counsel.  The arraignment was continued for two weeks during 
which time Allen and defendant would review the rest of the 
evidence.   
At the next hearing, in late June, the court asked 
defendant if he wanted to proceed with the arraignment, and 
defendant asked if he could have Allen address the court.  
Allen reiterated defendant’s desire to plead guilty and to admit 
the special allegations, and argued, among other points, that 
there was a conflict between section 1018, which prohibits a 
defendant from pleading guilty to a capital offense without the 
consent of counsel, and the right under the Sixth Amendment 
to represent oneself.  After articulating his legal arguments, 
Allen stated that if defendant could not establish the right to 
enter a guilty plea while representing himself, his second 
choice would be to have Allen represent him.  The court stated 
that it was troubled by the reference to a second choice or 
preference, because the court had explained to defendant that 
he could not plead guilty if he represented himself, and had 
also explained that defendant could not go back and forth 
between representing himself and having legal representation.  
It indicated that it would probably grant a request to appoint 
Allen as his counsel, but would not then allow defendant to 
represent himself again if he did not like how Allen was 
representing him at either stage.  The court then granted 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
Allen’s request to brief the court regarding defendant’s rights 
under Faretta.   
In mid-July, Allen filed a brief in which he argued that 
defendant had a right to plead guilty and admit the special 
circumstance allegations with the consent of his advisory 
counsel, “at least where the record shows that advisory counsel 
is fully informed of the facts and the law, and has the 
experience and training to function as appointed defense 
counsel on a capital case. . . .  The concurrence of advisory 
counsel under such circumstances fulfills all the policy 
objectives and protects against miscarriages of justice, to 
exactly the same extent as if defendant were ‘represented’ by 
counsel.”  Alternatively, he argued that the right of self-
representation recognized in Faretta takes precedence over the 
restrictions of section 1018.   
At the next hearing, a few days later, defendant 
confirmed that he still desired to plead guilty to the capital 
charge and all other charges except the charge of attempted 
murder.  The court acknowledged defendant’s brief concerning 
his asserted right to plead guilty, and addressed the role of 
advisory counsel, stating that a court may expand the roles 
and responsibilities of an advisory counsel at the request of the 
defendant.  It also stated that it was clear over the preceding 
several weeks that defendant had desired Allen to play a more 
active role, and Allen interjected that he was “happy to 
perform that expanded role at Mr. Miracle’s request.”  The 
court then explained that during trial, Allen’s role would be 
limited in order to avoid conflicts concerning the presentation 
of the case, but these risks were not present during pretrial 
proceedings.  Therefore, the court concluded, it could permit 
Allen to have a more active role prior to trial.     
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
The court then turned to section 1018, noting that it 
prohibits a guilty plea in a capital case without the consent of 
counsel.  It stated that it wanted “to be very clear in terms of 
the role that Mr. Allen is assuming in terms of duties and 
responsibilities at this stage of the proceedings because I want 
to make sure that we comply with the spirit of Penal Code 
Section 1018.”  It asked Allen whether he was willing, “at least 
up to this point in the proceedings, . . . to accept the duties and 
responsibilities of counsel for Mr. Miracle within the meaning 
of Penal Code section 1018?”  Allen responded, “Absolutely,” 
and added that he had discharged those duties during his 
service as advisory counsel.  Allen stated that “[w]e have 
explored all the facts relating to the capital charge and I’m 
satisfied that Mr. Miracle’s decision is a tactically intelligent 
one.  It’s not only voluntary and intelligent on his part in that 
he understands what his legal alternatives are, but it’s an 
intelligent one in that I think it plays a proper role in an 
intelligent penalty phase strategy.”  He explained that he was 
referring to the matters discussed in the in camera hearing 
held in mid-June.   
The court asked counsel if he would characterize his 
representation of defendant up to that point “as being one of 
counsel and not advisory counsel in terms of the duties and the 
functions that you’ve performed for him, and the assistance 
that you’ve provided to him.”  Allen responded that he had 
“spent the same time and diligence and explored the same 
information and issues to the same extent as if I had been 
appointed to represent him.”  The court confirmed with Allen 
that his statement was “with particular reference to the spirit 
of Penal Code Section 1018.”  The court also confirmed that 
Allen understood that his conduct to date would be examined, 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
for purposes of determining whether he provided effective 
assistance of counsel, in the same manner as if he were 
appointed counsel.  Finally, defendant confirmed that he 
continued to desire to represent himself, stated that he 
accepted what the trial court described as Allen’s “greatly 
expanded role,” and added that he had encouraged Allen to 
take on the expanded role.   
The court then stated that “the label that I’m going to 
continue to use with respect to you, Mr. Allen, will be advisory 
counsel.  But I don’t want there to be any ambiguity in the 
record, and I don’t think there is, in terms of the greatly 
expanded 
role 
that 
you’ve 
assumed 
in 
discharging 
responsibilities as the functional equivalent as of counsel for 
Mr. Miracle.”  The court then continued the arraignment for 
two weeks to make certain that Allen and defendant had 
reviewed all of the discovery, and to give them additional time 
to think about the decision to enter pleas and admissions.  
Allen stated that he would review the plea form with 
defendant at the jail.   
Defendant entered his plea at a hearing in late July.  
Defendant was present, as was Allen, his advisory counsel.  
The court reiterated that at a prior hearing in mid-July, the 
court wanted to ensure that defendant and Allen had reviewed 
all of the District Attorney’s materials and all of the discovery.  
Allen confirmed that he had met with the prosecutor and was 
satisfied that he had received all of the discovery.  In addition, 
defendant confirmed that he had reviewed all of the materials 
along with Allen.   
The court asked defendant if it was still his desire to 
enter a guilty plea to Count 1, the murder of Elias Silva, and to 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
admit all of the special allegations.  Defendant stated that was 
still his desire.  The court asked Allen if he was prepared to 
consent to the guilty plea and the admissions to the special 
allegations, and he responded, “Yes.”  Allen also confirmed that 
he was doing so unequivocally, and that he had explained to 
defendant the consequences of pleading guilty and admitting 
the special allegations.  The court asked defendant if he was 
proceeding without any equivocation, without any question in 
his mind that he wanted to enter a guilty plea to the capital 
charge, and he responded, “Yes.”  Defendant also confirmed 
that he had thoroughly discussed this course with Allen.  The 
court then stated that it was “going to accept the consent to the 
guilty pleas as is required by Penal Code section 1018.”   
As the prosecutor was about to review the felony plea 
form and waiver of rights form with defendant, the court 
stated, for the benefit of “anyone who is reading this 
transcript,” that at least part of Allen’s justification for 
consenting to the plea was articulated at the earlier in camera 
hearing.  After the prosecutor asked Allen to indicate on the 
waiver form that defendant was proceeding in propria persona 
and was represented by advisory counsel, the court interjected 
that “anyone reviewing last week’s transcript and proceeding 
would certainly understand that your role as advisory counsel 
at least through this proceeding today is really the role of 
counsel.  We’re not relieving or withdrawing Mr. Miracle’s pro 
per status.  He’s entitled to that and he retains it both now and 
in future proceedings.  [¶]  But your role as advisory counsel 
has been greatly expanded.  In effect, you’re proceeding as 
counsel to Mr. Miracle.  You’ve represented on the record . . .  
in the last couple proceedings and today that you’ve been 
treating your role as advisory counsel as if you were appointed 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
counsel; is that correct?”  Allen responded, “And by the same 
standards of behavior, exactly.  That’s correct, your Honor.”  
The prosecutor then confirmed with defendant that “you’re 
represented by your advisory counsel Joe Allen.”   
In the course of reviewing his plea and waiver of rights, 
defendant confirmed that he was pleading guilty to the murder 
charge, and admitting two special circumstance allegations, 
murder committed by means of lying in wait and murder by an 
active participant in a criminal street gang to further the 
activities of a criminal street gang.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15), 
(22).)  He also admitted enhancements for use of a deadly 
weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and commission of the murder 
while he was an active participant in a criminal street gang to 
further activities of the criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. 
(b)(1)).  The court found that “the plea and admissions are 
knowing, intelligent, and made understandably and that they 
are free and voluntary.”  At the late July hearing, defendant 
pleaded not guilty to count two, the attempted murder charge.  
On September 8, 2005, the court granted the prosecutor’s 
motion to amend the second count to allege assault with a 
deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), a knife, rather than 
attempted murder.  Defendant then changed his plea on the 
second count to guilty, and admitted the allegations that he 
personally used a knife and personally inflicted great bodily 
injury. 
B. Validity of Defendant’s Guilty Plea  
Defendant contends through counsel on appeal that his 
plea of guilty to the capital charge was precluded by section 
1018, which provides in pertinent part:  “No plea of guilty of a 
felony for which the maximum punishment is death, or life 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, shall be 
received from a defendant who does not appear with counsel, 
nor shall that plea be received without the consent of the 
defendant’s counsel. . . .  This section shall be liberally 
construed to effect these objects and to promote justice.”   
We have previously upheld section 1018’s prohibition on 
the entry of a guilty plea to a capital offense without the 
consent of counsel.  (People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739 
(Chadd).)  In Chadd, the defendant wished to plead guilty, but 
his counsel would not consent, observing that defendant 
desired to commit suicide.  The trial court ruled that if it found 
the defendant competent to act as his own attorney under 
Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, it would accept his guilty plea 
without the consent of the defendant’s counsel of record.  It 
thereafter found him competent, and allowed him to plead 
guilty to the charges and to admit the special circumstance 
allegations.   
On appeal, the Attorney General urged the court to 
construe section 1018 to allow a capital defendant to choose to 
represent himself and enter a guilty plea.  We noted that this 
scenario was “entirely hypothetical:  although he well knew of 
his right to do so, defendant never made an unequivocal 
request to discharge [his counsel] Mr. Pitkin and represent 
himself, and hence was never granted that status; on the 
contrary, with defendant’s agreement Mr. Pitkin continued to 
act as his counsel throughout the proceedings.  [Citation.]  We 
will not, of course, adjudicate hypothetical claims or render 
purely advisory opinions.”  (Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 746.)  
Despite our observation, we articulated two additional reasons 
for rejecting the contention.  First, section 1018 plainly stated 
“that no guilty plea to a capital offense shall be received 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
‘without the consent of the defendant’s counsel.’ ”  (Ibid.)  
Second, the proposed interpretation would render the statute’s 
third sentence, which allows noncapital defendants to waive 
counsel and plead guilty, redundant.  (Id. at p. 747; see also 
§ 1018 [“No plea of guilty of a felony for which the maximum 
punishment is not death or life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole shall be accepted from any defendant who 
does not appear with counsel unless” specified conditions are 
met], italics added.) 
In the alternative, the Attorney General contended the 
statute was unconstitutional.  He appeared to concede that the 
state could entirely bar guilty pleas in capital cases, but 
argued that the state could not impose the lesser restriction of 
requiring consent of counsel.  More particularly, he asserted 
that a requirement of consent “disturbs the ‘uniquely personal’ 
nature of the defendant’s decision to plead guilty, denies him 
his ‘fundamental right’ to control the ultimate course of the 
prosecution, and destroys the constitutionally established 
relationship of counsel as the defendant’s ‘assistant’ rather 
than his master.”  (Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 747.)  We 
responded that this contention “fails to recognize the larger 
public interest at stake in pleas of guilty to capital offenses.”  
(Ibid.; see id. at pp. 747-754 [analyzing issue].) 
We considered section 1018 again in People v. Alfaro 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, in which counsel for the defendant 
declined to consent to her desire to enter an unconditional 
guilty plea.  Like the defendant in Chadd, Alfaro did not 
invoke her right to self-representation.  (Id. at p. 1298.)  On 
appeal, she asserted that she sought to plead guilty to support 
her strategy at the penalty phase of demonstrating remorse, in 
contrast to the defendant in Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d 747, who 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
sought to commit suicide.  We did not decide whether our 
reasoning in Chadd would apply to the asserted facts, because 
the record did not substantiate her claim.  The record reflected 
that she sought to plead guilty because she feared for the 
safety of her family and herself if, through her defense, she 
implicated a particular person in the crime.  Her counsel 
believed that the evidence she sought to avoid presenting 
“would mitigate her culpability for the murder.”  (Id. at 
p. 1301.)  Therefore, “defendant’s plea would have cast doubt 
on potentially critical mitigating evidence.  A guilty plea 
entered under such circumstances might very well lead to the 
erroneous imposition of the death penalty — precisely the 
outcome section 1018 is intended to prevent.”  (Ibid.)   
The facts in the present case are distinguishable from 
those in Chadd and Alfaro.  Here, when defendant’s counsel 
would not consent to a guilty plea and defendant pursued self-
representation, his counsel proposed that the trial court 
appoint advisory counsel, authorize such counsel to participate 
in evaluating the appropriate plea, and require such counsel’s 
consent to a guilty plea.  Following his appointment, 
defendant’s advisory counsel reviewed all of the discovery with 
defendant and concluded that pleading guilty was defendant’s 
best strategy for avoiding the death penalty.  Thereafter, the 
court 
clarified 
that 
advisory 
counsel’s 
duties 
and 
responsibilities encompassed the duties of counsel under 
section 1018.  Advisory counsel confirmed that he had accepted 
and discharged those duties and responsibilities, repeated that 
he thought a guilty plea was an intelligent strategy, and 
further stated that he had performed in the same manner as if 
he had been appointed counsel.  The trial court characterized 
the role advisory counsel had assumed as “the functional 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
30 
equivalent” of counsel.  Finally, in accepting defendant’s guilty 
plea, the court reiterated and advisory counsel confirmed that 
he had been acting as he would if he had been appointed 
counsel.   
Defendant contends that his advisory counsel’s consent 
could not satisfy the requirements of section 1018 because 
there is a clear line between representation by counsel and 
self-representation.  He is correct that a defendant may not 
both represent himself and be represented by counsel.  (People 
v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1218-1219 [rejecting claim 
that a motion to proceed in propria persona sought only 
cocounsel status].)  However, “trial courts retain the discretion 
to permit the sharing of responsibilities between a defendant 
and a defense attorney when the interests of justice support 
such an arrangement.”  (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 
1104, 1120.)  Although a self-represented defendant is 
responsible for his defense, “the court is not foreclosed from 
permitting a greater role for counsel assisting a Faretta 
defendant, so long as defendant’s right to present his case in 
his own way is not compromised.”  (People v. Hamilton (1989) 
48 Cal.3d 1142, 1164, fn. 14.)   
We 
have 
recognized 
several 
forms 
of 
hybrid 
representation, including “advisory counsel, in which the 
attorney actively assists the defendant in preparing the 
defense case by performing tasks and providing advice 
pursuant to the defendant’s requests, but does not participate 
on behalf of the defense in court proceedings.”  (People v. 
Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th. at p. 1119, fn. 7.)  When a trial court 
assigns responsibilities to advisory counsel, “the defendant is 
entitled to expect professionally competent assistance within 
the narrow scope of advisory counsel’s proper role.”  (People v. 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
31 
Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 145; see People v. Hamilton, 
supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1164-1165, fn. 14 [a self-represented 
defendant may raise ineffective assistance claims that “arise 
directly from assisting counsel’s breach of the limited authority 
and responsibilities counsel has assumed”]; see also McKaskle 
v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 182 [“Even when he insists 
that he is not waiving his Faretta rights, a pro se defendant’s 
solicitation of or acquiescence in certain types of participation 
by counsel substantially undermines later protestations that 
counsel interfered unacceptably”].)  These principles reflect 
that when an attorney is assigned responsibilities as advisory 
counsel, he or she performs as the defendant’s counsel for those 
purposes.   
Defendant contends that the language of section 1018 is 
clear, unambiguous, and not reasonably susceptible to a 
construction that allows advisory counsel to satisfy the 
statutory requirements imposed on counsel.  We disagree.  The 
operative portion of section 1018 provides that a capital 
defendant who seeks to plead guilty must “appear with 
counsel” and have “the consent of the defendant’s counsel.”  As 
discussed above, advisory “counsel” may be appointed to 
handle responsibilities associated with the defense of a case 
and is expected to perform the assigned responsibilities in a 
professionally competent manner.  On its face, the operative 
portion of section 1018 does not foreclose an interpretation of 
“counsel” that encompasses advisory counsel who has been 
assigned to fulfill the responsibilities of counsel under section 
1018. 
The dissent observes that the phrase “ ‘right to counsel’ ” 
as used elsewhere in section 1018 must “mean[] the right ‘to be 
represented by counsel’ ” because the constitutional “ ‘right to 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
32 
counsel’ ” sweeps only that far.  (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at 
p. 2, quoting § 1018; id. at p. 3).  True enough.  But it does not 
follow that the meaning of the word “counsel” is equally 
circumscribed.  The constitutional “right to counsel” may 
contemplate only a particular kind of counsel, but as a 
linguistic matter, the word “counsel” (standing alone or in 
other contexts) may carry a more expansive meaning.  (See, 
e.g., McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 181-183 [using 
“counsel” as a shorthand for “standby counsel”].)  So the 
phrase “appear with counsel,” as used throughout section 1018, 
is susceptible to a broader interpretation than the dissent 
suggests –– even if the phrase “right to counsel” does not 
encompass advisory counsel. 
Moreover, “a statute must be construed, if reasonably 
possible, in a manner that avoids a serious constitutional 
question.”  (People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1161.)  
We are presented in this case with a defendant who invoked 
his right to represent himself and whose best strategy to avoid 
the death penalty was arguably a guilty plea.  As we discussed 
in Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d 739, 751, the high court in Faretta, 
supra, 422 U.S. 806, recognized the right of a pro se defendant 
to make a defense.  Interpreting the operative portion of 
section 1018 to bar defendant from pleading guilty would raise 
a serious question about whether section 1018 is compatible 
with defendant’s constitutional rights under Faretta.  By 
contrast, if “counsel” is construed to include advisory counsel, 
then section 1018 did not forbid defendant’s plea, and we need 
not resolve whether it could have done so constitutionally. 
Assigning the responsibilities of counsel under section 
1018 to advisory counsel in the case of a defendant who has 
exercised the right to self-representation is not inconsistent 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
33 
with the purposes of section 1018.  “ ‘[S]ection 1018 is obviously 
designed to protect defendants by assuring that such a serious 
step is a fully informed and competent one, taken only after 
consideration with and advice by counsel.’ ”  (Chadd, supra, 
28 Cal.3d at p. 749.)  In addition, the amendment that added 
the requirement that counsel consent did so to provide “a 
further independent safeguard against erroneous imposition of 
a death sentence.”  (Id. at p. 750.)  By evaluating a case and 
advising the defendant with respect to his or her desire to 
plead guilty, advisory counsel safeguards against an ill-
considered entry of a guilty plea.  Therefore, we conclude that 
the term “counsel” in the operative portion of section 1018 is 
susceptible of a construction that includes advisory counsel — 
and adopt that construction.2 
                                        
2  
As noted, the word “counsel” appears in portions of 
section 1018 not applicable here.  Although we ordinarily 
construe terms to have the same meaning throughout a 
statute, there is no categorical requirement that “ ‘identical 
words used in different parts of the same act’ ” must have the 
same meaning.  (General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline 
(2004) 540 U.S. 581, 595; see also People v. Hernandez (1981) 
30 Cal.3d 462, 468.)  Accordingly, we express no opinion 
concerning whether other portions of section 1018 can or 
should be construed similarly — let alone how the term 
“counsel” should be construed in other contexts.  (Cf. People v. 
Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 692-699 [holding that statute 
requiring representation by counsel during competency 
proceedings did not violate defendant’s right to self-
representation and concluding, without identifying any serious 
constitutional question to be avoided, that the statutory 
requirement was not satisfied by appointment of advisory 
counsel].)  
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
34 
This case well-illustrates that accepting the consent of 
advisory counsel is compatible with the interests served by 
section 1018.  The court appointed Allen to be defendant’s 
advisory counsel and assigned him the responsibility to 
evaluate whether defendant should be allowed to plead guilty 
to the murder charge and to admit the special circumstance 
allegations.  Allen, whom the court described as “a very 
experienced criminal defense lawyer” and “[m]aybe the most 
experienced that we have in Santa Barbara County,” advocated 
on behalf of defendant with respect to his access to discovery 
materials and the assistance of an investigator.  He reviewed 
all of the discovery with defendant and evaluated the strength 
of the evidence.  He presented his views and defendant’s views 
to the court, and the court explored those reasons with 
advisory counsel and defendant.  After months of discussions, 
when the trial court finally allowed defendant to plead guilty 
and admit the special circumstance allegations, it confirmed 
with advisory counsel that he had performed as he would if he 
had been appointed as counsel.  This process assured that 
defendant’s plea was fully informed by advisory counsel’s 
evaluation of the case, and the process served as a safeguard 
against an erroneous judgment.  That defendant conducted the 
penalty phase differently than counsel may have (see dis. opn. 
of Liu, J., post, at pp. 5, 13) casts no doubt on the reliability of 
defendant’s conviction nor on the truth of the special 
circumstance allegations that made him eligible for the death 
penalty.  And section 1018 does not require that the attorney 
who consents to a plea may do so only if he or she retains 
control over the balance of the proceedings; nothing in section 
1018 prohibits a capital defendant who has pleaded guilty from 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
35 
substituting counsel or electing self-representation at the 
penalty phase.3 
III.  PENALTY TRIAL 
Defendant contends that the restraints placed on him 
during the penalty trial and the denial of any writing 
instrument violated his right to participate in his own defense, 
and his rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable 
sentencing determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments 
and 
the 
correlative 
state 
constitutional provisions. 
A. Proceedings Concerning Defendant’s Restraints 
Prior to jury selection, county counsel filed on behalf of 
the Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department a motion for 
an order that defendant be physically restrained during the 
trial “by having both of his hands handcuffed within a lockbox, 
and to a waist chain, and having both of his legs attached to 
leg shackles.”  The sheriff’s department also planned to have 
additional officers in the courtroom.   
                                        
3  
Our conclusion also resolves defendant’s contention that 
the failure to prohibit him from entering a guilty plea deprived 
him of his right under the Eighth Amendment to a reliable, 
nonarbitrary sentencing determination, and his due process 
liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
enforcement of state statutory rights.  As explained above, the 
process followed by the trial court afforded defendant the 
assistance and advice of counsel contemplated by section 1018 
in connection with his desire to plead guilty, fulfilling the 
Legislature’s purpose of ensuring adequate assistance and 
avoiding arbitrary results. 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
36 
The motion was supported by declarations of three 
corrections officers of the Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s 
Department, and copies of inmate discipline reports.  Wendy 
Shannon’s declaration stated that in mid-October 2004, after 
defendant was searched and handcuffed in preparation for 
transport to court, he slipped one of his hands out of the 
handcuffs, held down another inmate, and repeatedly punched 
him.  Douglas Todaro’s declaration stated that in late April 
2005, defendant had to be extracted from his cell.4  “In order to 
subdue Inmate Miracle, the extraction team had to use 
chemical spray, a pepperball gun, and two shots from a 50,000-
volt TASER.  Later that day, . . . [defendant] told [the 
declarant], ‘I will keep fighting you, until I kill you or until you 
kill me.’  [¶]  Because of Inmate Miracle’s history of being 
aggressive with Corrections Officers, he is housed in a single 
person cell and is required to be moved by two Corrections 
Officers, and a Corrections Sergeant armed with a TASER, any 
time he is removed from his cell.”  (Emphasis in original.)  
Trevor Carpenter’s declaration stated that in mid-May 2005, 
after defendant had refused to comply with Carpenter’s orders, 
defendant stated, “ ‘I’m glad that it’s you that fucked with me, 
cause I always wanted to slice you up.’ ”  The next day, 
                                        
4  
A recording of the April extraction was played at the 
hearing on the motion.  Sergeant Tim Morgan, the supervisor 
of the special operations team that extracted defendant from 
his cell, testified that once the team moved defendant to 
another cell, defendant “repetitively asked who we were, that 
he was going to get us back, that he was going to, I want to say 
use a knife to get us, and I don’t remember the exact wording 
of slashing, or something of that nature.”  
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
37 
Carpenter moved defendant from his cell to a shower.  As 
Carpenter removed defendant’s handcuffs, defendant pulled a 
razor blade from the waistband of his pants, “then turned on 
us and slashed out with the razor blade.”  With the assistance 
of other corrections officers, Carpenter pushed defendant into 
the shower room.  A team was assembled to extract defendant 
from the shower room, but defendant “complied with their 
instructions, and turned over a razor and two razor blades that 
had been broken out of razor handles and wrapped in tape.”   
At the hearing on the motion, Allen stated that county 
counsel had indicated that defendant could have his writing 
hand free, but Allen was concerned that defendant could not 
hold paper steady while writing unless his other hand was 
free, and that having a hand shackled to his stomach for long 
hearings would be very uncomfortable.  Allen also stated that 
defendant had been polite and well behaved in the courtroom.  
The court directed defendant to raise his arms, and observed 
that defendant would not be able to write with the lockbox on 
him.  It then asked county counsel whether he was concerned 
about defendant having a sharp object for writing, and county 
counsel indicated that the risk could be mitigated with a short 
pencil.  Before taking a break to allow defendant to read the 
motion, the court commented that based on what it had read, it 
was not inclined to allow defendant to have either hand free.  
Instead, short breaks could be taken when defendant wanted 
to communicate with Allen.  Thereafter, county counsel stated 
that if the court concluded that defendant needed to have a 
hand free for writing, the sheriff’s department believed 
defendant could be adequately restrained with his nonwriting 
hand handcuffed to a waist belt and his legs shackled, with the 
presence of additional deputies near him.   
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
38 
Following these discussions and after a video recording of 
the April cell extraction was played for the trial court, county 
counsel urged that there was a manifest need for defendant to 
be shackled and for one hand to be cuffed and attached to a 
waist belt.  He added that the sheriff’s department did not 
think these restraints could be concealed from the jury, given 
the position of the jury box in relation to defendant’s chair, and 
the fact that defendant intended to wear his jail uniform.  
Allen noted that although the recorded cell extraction was 
“fairly violent,” the court should keep in mind that the incident 
had occurred in April, defendant had behaved like a 
“gentleman” in court, and it had been the officers, not 
defendant, who used force in the recorded incident.   
The court observed that there must be a manifest need 
for shackling, and noted the concern about the visibility of 
shackles during the penalty phase.  It stated that “by his own 
choice and decision, he’s going to be wearing jail clothing.  So 
the jury is obviously going to know that he’s in shackles.”  It 
explained to defendant, “You’ve attacked fellow inmates, you’ve 
attacked corrections officers, you’ve threatened to kill 
correction 
officers, 
you’ve 
actually 
either 
created, 
manufactured or found a razor blade and attempted to slash 
officers with a razor blade.  So there is just no question 
whatsoever in my mind that there is an exceedingly compelling 
manifest need and special need for shackling in this case.  
There’s just absolutely no question about it.”  It added that it 
was “quite concerned about putting any sort of an instrument 
in your hand that can be used in any form or fashion as a 
weapon, and at this point in the proceedings I’m not going to 
permit it.”  It further noted that the courtroom was small; it 
estimated that defendant was about eight feet from the court 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
39 
reporter and about ten feet from the clerk.  It ordered that 
defendant be shackled as proposed in county counsel’s motion, 
and stated that perhaps the issue could be revisited during the 
trial.  With respect to defendant’s need to communicate with 
his advisory counsel, the court stated that he could whisper to 
him or more frequent breaks could be taken.   
Allen informed the court that the lockbox was 
“particularly uncomfortable for long periods of time,” and 
asked that defendant instead be placed in handcuffs “threaded 
through the waist chain.”  County counsel responded that the 
lockbox would prevent defendant from escaping from his 
handcuffs.  The court concluded that in light of the incident in 
which defendant escaped from his handcuffs and battered a 
fellow inmate, he should be in a lockbox while in the 
courtroom, and that if it was uncomfortable, breaks could be 
taken.   
Allen then informed the court that defendant suggested 
the alternative of an electric belt.  County counsel observed 
that the use of such belts was criticized in People v. Mar (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 1201, and the sheriff’s department had chosen not 
to obtain such belts.  Allen responded that he thought a belt 
could be borrowed from Los Angeles County, and that this case 
differed from People v. Mar because defendant was requesting 
a belt as a preferred alternative.  In response to an inquiry 
from the court, Allen confirmed that he thought the court 
should allow defendant’s hands to be free if he wore an electric 
belt.  The court responded that it was concerned for Allen’s 
safety because he was in close proximity to defendant, so it 
would not permit defendant to have his hands free to write.  
Allen then asked the court to consider the approach taken in a 
prior case in which the defendant’s hands were free, but the leg 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
40 
chain was fastened to the underpinnings of the table so that 
the defendant could not get up without taking the table with 
him.  The court stated that if defendant wanted to make a 
written motion to change the restraints, the motion should 
focus on why oral communication between Allen and defendant 
was not effective.  The discussion concluded with Allen stating 
for the record that he trusted defendant “absolutely not to hurt 
me.  He knows I’m on his side, he knows I’m not going to 
betray him or do something evil to him.  And I feel likewise 
about him.”   
At a subsequent pretrial hearing, Allen voiced his 
concern that defendant would be unable to take notes, and 
suggested adjustments in the shackles that might allow him to 
write.  Following discussions, the court suggested that the 
defense investigator sit by defendant and write down whatever 
comments he made to her.  Allen stated that the investigator 
would be happy to do that.  The court stated that it would not 
allow defendant to have a pen or pencil, but it would take steps 
to insure defendant could have notes taken, including taking 
more frequent breaks.  Allen then expressed concern that the 
shackling configuration caused defendant muscle cramps, and 
defendant added that “[t]his is a very stiff position for me to be 
in for any length of time.”  County counsel suggested that the 
lockbox could be removed during breaks, and the court 
suggested that the way the lockbox was affixed could be varied 
over the course of a day.  Defendant suggested fastening an eye 
bolt to the table and running his chain through it, which would 
allow him a greater range of motion.  He stated that the 
lockbox forced him to lean forward, and that his body, 
especially his neck, was stiff after one or two hours.  Defendant 
confirmed that it helped to stand, and the court once again 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
41 
proposed that they take more frequent breaks.  The court 
added that based on its observations of defendant over a 
number of days, it did not appear to the court that his 
discomfort rose to the level of a violation of his legal rights.    
With respect to defendant’s proposal to be bolted to the 
table, county counsel opined that the one-inch piece of wood 
would not hold defendant.  The court added that it was 
concerned about what the jury would see if defendant were 
chained to the table.  “You’ve chosen here to be in jail clothing, 
so they’re going to know you’re in custody, and they’re going to 
know that you’ve been convicted of first degree murder with 
special circumstances.  To have handcuffs on your hands, and 
that’s really all that appears to look like to me, to have 
handcuffs on your hands and a chain around your legs I don’t 
think causes the sort of prejudice in the eyes of the jury that 
chaining you to a table might do.”  In the court’s view, chaining 
him to the table would be like chaining a rabid dog to a fence.  
The court also observed that defendant could raise both hands 
together, move his feet back together, and separate his knees.   
A week later, Allen asked to have the lockbox removed 
when defendant was in his cell during court breaks, because 
the box caused muscle cramps.  The court stated that removal 
of the box was not necessary “in terms of the representation of 
himself,” and left it to the sheriff’s department to decide if the 
box could be moved without security concerns.  The bailiff 
stated that they did not always have a key available, and a 
deputy stated that three bailiffs were required to unlock him 
and lock him again, which would hold up the proceedings.  The 
court then stated, “I think that’s your answer.”   
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
42 
Two days later, defendant threatened corrections officers 
and acted violently when he was being moved from the holding 
cell to the courtroom, and he was returned to jail rather than 
brought to court.  Voir dire was cancelled for the day.  The next 
day, the court warned defendant that it was considering 
revoking his in propria persona status.  Allen stated that 
defendant wanted to know if he could choose not to be present 
at some points in order to avoid being in restraints.  The court 
expressed concern with his desire to avoid court, given that he 
was representing himself.  The defense investigator stated that 
she had bought thermal shirts with thick wristbands to 
alleviate the pain, but defendant was not allowed to wear 
them.  She had also obtained thicker socks and shoes that 
would be more comfortable.  The court directed that defendant 
wear the shirt and wristbands to the next court session, unless 
county counsel wanted to explain to the court how these 
articles would impact security, and stated that it would 
address the issue of shoes later.    
The following week, a deputy described to the court 
defendant’s earlier misconduct in the courthouse holding cell, 
and stated that defendant’s grievance that day had been 
related to discomfort from the shackles, which he claimed were 
too tight.  County counsel informed the court that the proposed 
padding on defendant’s wrists, with long sleeves or wristbands, 
would substantially increase the risk of escape from the 
lockbox.  He further reported that defendant was restrained 
with a new system that day, employing hand restraints at each 
side of the waist chain and another set of handcuffs attached at 
the front of the waist chain.  He also had ankle cuffs attached 
by chain.  If this setup was to be used rather than the more 
secure lockbox, counsel explained, an additional deputy would 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
43 
be present.  At the court’s request, defendant demonstrated his 
range of motion, and the court expressed concern “about any 
system of restraints that allows any possibility of violence 
occurring in this courtroom.”  County counsel responded that 
the new configuration “would provide adequate, although less 
security than the lockbox,” and suggested that the court accept 
the new configuration, but further provide that “if there’s any 
further nonconforming behavior” by defendant, the lockbox 
would be used.  The court agreed with this proposal, and also 
allowed defendant to wear thicker socks.   
In sum, defendant was shackled with a lockbox through 
all but one day of jury selection, and was shackled with triple 
handcuffs, a waist chain, and leg chains for the rest of the 
proceedings.  The shackles were visible to the jury.  The court 
instructed the jury that “[t]he fact that physical restraints 
have been placed on defendant . . . must not be considered by 
you for any purpose.  You must not speculate as to why 
restraints have been used in determining the issues in this 
case.  Disregard this matter entirely.” 
B. Analysis of the Propriety of Defendant’s 
Restraints 
“In general, the ‘court has broad power to maintain 
courtroom security and orderly proceedings’ [citation], and its 
decisions on these matters are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  
[Citation.]  However, the court’s discretion to impose physical 
restraints is constrained by constitutional principles.”  (People 
v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 558-559.)  The federal 
“Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during the 
penalty phase, as it forbids their use during the guilt phase, 
unless that use is ‘justified by an essential state interest’ — 
such as the interest in courtroom security — specific to the 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
44 
defendant on trial.”  (Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 
624.)  Similarly, “[u]nder California law, ‘a defendant cannot 
be subjected to physical restraints of any kind in the courtroom 
while in the jury’s presence, unless there is a showing of a 
manifest need for such restraints.’ ”  (People v. Lomax, supra, 
49 Cal.4th at p. 559.)   
“ ‘[W]e will not overturn a trial court’s decision to 
restrain a defendant absent “a showing of a manifest abuse of 
discretion.” ’ [Citation.]  To establish an abuse of discretion, 
defendants must demonstrate that the trial court’s decision 
was so erroneous that it ‘falls outside the bounds of reason.’  
[Citations.]  A merely debatable ruling cannot be deemed an 
abuse of discretion.  [Citations.]  An abuse of discretion will be 
‘established by “a showing the trial court exercised its 
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd 
manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ”  
(People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 
390.) 
Defendant does not establish that the trial court abused 
its discretion in finding a manifest need for the physical 
restraints based on security concerns particular to defendant.  
When the trial court made its initial ruling, it had before it 
evidence of four violent incidents while defendant was in 
custody.  In October 2004, defendant had slipped out of one 
handcuff and attacked another prisoner.  In April 2005, in 
separate incidents, he had to be extracted from his cell, and he 
attempted to attack another inmate.  In May 2005, defendant 
stated that he wanted to slice a corrections officer, and the 
next day, he slashed at officers with a razor blade.  Because of 
his aggressive behavior in jail, he was accompanied by two 
corrections officers and a sergeant with a Taser whenever he 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
45 
was moved.  The fact that these incidents occurred outside of 
the courtroom does not diminish their relevance or their 
support for the trial court’s order.  (People v. Hawkins (1995) 
10 Cal.4th 920, 944 [evidence need not show disruption in 
courtroom proceedings or attempt to escape; when there were 
“multiple instances of violent and nonconforming behavior 
while in jail, as well as an extensive background of criminal 
and violent activity, we will generally not second-guess the 
trial court’s decision”].)  Finally, the trial court was aware that 
the shackles would be visible, and acknowledged this fact when 
it made its ruling.5  (See Deck v. Missouri, supra, 544 U.S. 622, 
629 [use of physical restraints “visible to the jury” must be 
justified].)   
Defendant contends the restraints were excessive.  He 
cites county counsel’s statement that “we believe that with the 
combination of legs shackled together and Mr. Miracle’s non-
writing hand restraining to a waist belt, his writing hand could 
be free so long as there were additional deputies nearby.”  The 
court inquired whether county counsel had any concern with 
respect to the fact that defendant would have a sharp object.  
Counsel responded, “We do have that concern, . . . and believe 
that we can mitigate that by providing him with, essentially, a 
golf pencil, a short object that wouldn’t be as effective as a 
stabbing weapon.”  The trial court responded that it was “not 
                                        
5  
The trial court observed when it made its ruling that 
defendant’s choice to wear prison clothes made it impossible to 
hide the shackles.  With respect to his choice of clothing, 
defendant asserts only that the fact he “chose to appear in his 
prison clothes did not diminish the prejudicial effect of his 
shackles.” 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
46 
inclined to allow Mr. Miracle to have any hand free based on 
what I’ve read.”  When the possibility of giving defendant a golf 
pencil was raised again a few weeks later, the court stated that 
golf pencils “may be short, but I think they can be gripped 
enough to cause fairly significant damage or injury.”   
The trial court has broad discretion to evaluate the 
evidence and determine the appropriate security measures in 
the courtroom.  (People v. Stevens (2009) 47 Cal.4th 625, 642.)  
The fact that the sheriff or county counsel believed that the 
risk of freeing one hand and giving defendant a writing 
instrument could be adequately mitigated by providing 
additional deputies and giving defendant a short pencil does 
not establish that the trial court abused its discretion in 
deciding that defendant’s hands should be restrained and he 
should not have any sharp object in his hand.   
Defendant also contends that restraining his hands and 
wrists interfered with his ability to participate in his defense.  
First, he cites a statement by Allen that it was very difficult for 
defendant to handle and read papers in his holding cell with 
the lockbox on.  The discussion that followed, however, focused 
solely on whether defendant could write.  The trial court 
examined the restraint, and noted that defendant’s hands and 
fingers were free, but agreed that he could not write with the 
lockbox on.  Thereafter, the court suggested that the defense 
investigator could sit by defendant and transcribe his 
comments, and Allen stated that the investigator would be 
happy to do so.  The record does not establish that defendant 
could not review documents or dictate notes while the lockbox 
was on his wrists.  In addition, at the hearing when the court 
decided to allow the use of three handcuffs instead of the 
lockbox, the trial court asked defendant to take his hands 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
47 
apart and move them up and down to demonstrate the 
additional range of motion.  Following this demonstration, 
county counsel observed that defendant could raise the waist 
chain “some inches” and had “some arc with each hand.”     
Second, defendant asserts that he “had reason to believe 
his privileged, oral communications with Mr. Allen or [the 
defense investigator] would be overheard.” In support, he cites 
the trial court’s description of the courtroom as being small, 
with defendant seated “in very close proximity” to court 
personnel.  The court’s comments, which noted that the bailiffs 
were “close by,” the court reporter was “probably eight feet 
away from you,” and the clerk was “probably ten feet away 
from you,” were made in the course of explaining why it would 
be dangerous to give defendant a pencil.  There is no evidence 
that others would overhear if defendant whispered to the 
defense investigator or spoke to Allen and the investigator 
during breaks.   
Third, defendant focuses on the physical discomfort he 
experienced as a result of the shackles.  The discomfort was 
apparently due in part to the fact that the sheriff’s department 
did not remove the lockbox while defendant was in a holding 
cell.  In general, security arrangements in the custodial setting 
are determined by the officials who run the institution, not the 
court.  (See People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 307.)  Here, 
however, the use of the lockbox in the holding cell arguably 
may be attributed to the trial court’s order, because the 
sheriff’s department apparently would not have used a lockbox 
absent the trial court’s order; the lockbox remained on due to 
the procedures required to remove it, not necessarily due to 
security concerns in the jail.   
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
48 
Given the evidence presented to the trial court 
concerning defendant’s violent behavior, the trial court’s 
decision to continue the use of the lockbox, despite the fact it 
would remain on defendant while he was in the holding cell, 
was not an abuse of discretion.  The trial court articulated its 
concrete concerns regarding the risk of allowing defendant to 
have a free hand.  In addition, it noted that “just based on my 
observations in court and having watched you over a number of 
days it doesn’t appear to be that it’s the type of discomfort or 
pain that rises to the level of a violation of due process or a 
violation of your legal rights.”  Finally, use of the lockbox was 
discontinued as of the last day of jury selection, and defendant 
did not thereafter complain of pain.  He asserts it would have 
been futile to complain about the new configuration of 
shackles, but the record reflects that the court was open to 
considering adjustments to the security measures. 
Even if any aspect of the security arrangements had been 
excessive, defendant fails to establish prejudice under any 
standard.6  Prejudice may be shown if shackles impaired or 
                                        
6  
“[W]here a court, without adequate justification, orders 
the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, 
the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make 
out a due process violation.  The State must prove ‘beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did 
not contribute to the verdict obtained.’  Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18.”  (Deck v. Missouri, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 635.)  
The Attorney General observes that we have never held that 
excessive shackling alone establishes prejudice, and he 
contends that where there is adequate justification for 
restraints, and the claim is that the restraints are excessive, 
the Chapman standard does not apply.  Instead, the Attorney 
General urges us to apply the Watson standard — whether “it 
 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
49 
prejudiced a defendant’s right to participate in the trial.  
(People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 596 (Anderson).)  As 
we have noted, defendant wore the lockbox only until the last 
day of jury selection.  Five days before jury selection began, he 
informed the court that “I still have no intention of taking an 
active role in the selection of the jury.”  The court observed 
that there might be times when Allen offered his opinion to 
defendant that some question should be asked of a prospective 
juror, and stated that “anytime you want a moment so that the 
two of you can talk I’ll give you that moment,” but in response 
to a question from the prosecutor, the court confirmed that it 
was not likely that the court would allow both Allen and 
defendant to engage in voir dire.  As noted above, once use of 
the lockbox was discontinued, the shackles did not appear to 
cause pain or interfere with defendant’s participation.   
With respect to the fact the shackles suggested to the 
jury that defendant was a dangerous person, we note that the 
jury was presented with extensive and dramatic evidence of 
defendant’s violent conduct while incarcerated.  Testimony was 
presented concerning three violent incidents that occurred in 
the seven months before jury selection was completed.  In 
addition, the parties stipulated to a summary description of 27 
other incidents of violence or threats.  This evidence of his 
violent tendencies, which is summarized below, was far 
                                                                                                           
 
is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the 
appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the 
error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)  Here, it is 
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that no aspect of the shackling 
affected the judgment.  Therefore, we need not resolve this 
contention.  
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
50 
stronger than any inference the jury might have drawn from 
the shackles regarding his dangerous character. 
The most recent episode occurred in late November 2005, 
in the holding facility at the courthouse during the jury 
selection phase.  Jesse Ybarra, a senior deputy with the Santa 
Barbara County Sheriff’s Department, testified that defendant 
was in an individual holding cell for his safety and the safety of 
others.  When the officers were ready to transport him, they 
put shackles on him.  When defendant complained that the 
shackles were too tight, Ybarra had an officer re-check them.  
That officer thought the shackles were on properly, and that 
“Mr. Miracle was just playing a game to get the shackles real 
loose.”  As the officers completed putting the shackles on 
defendant, defendant began swearing and threatening to hurt 
the officers.  The officers then escorted him down the hallway 
to be taken to court.  Ybarra testified that “we had a minimum 
of three people moving Mr. Miracle at one time, if not four, just 
due to safety and precautions . . . .”  Defendant continued to 
yell loudly, use profanity, and make threats, and he was 
returned to his cell rather than taken to court.7   
Four days earlier, defendant’s misconduct led to a violent 
cell extraction.  Defendant had put up a sheet that prevented 
                                        
7  
On cross-examination, Ybarra confirmed that on the day 
of the incident defendant was complaining that he was in pain 
from the shackles.  Ybarra further confirmed that adjustments 
had subsequently been made to address the issue, with the 
result that “everybody [was] getting along a little better . . . .”  
The problem on that particular day apparently had been that 
the waist chain was too tight, rather than that the lockbox was 
placed on defendant incorrectly.   
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
51 
officers from seeing him.  Jeffrey Bradshaw, a corrections 
officer, testified that when he opened the outer door, he “felt a 
gush of liquid all over my body and Mr. Miracle said, ‘Get the 
fuck out of my cell.’ ”  David Panel, a senior corrections officer 
at the jail, testified that defendant refused to come out of his 
cell peacefully, and “had actually prepared himself for battle.  
He had put a sheet around his property box lid . . . to block 
anything that may be coming his way.  He used plastic . . . that 
he got from a sandwich bag or something, [to make] goggles 
. . . .”  In addition, he tied the door shut with blankets and 
sheets.  Defendant told staff that they were not allowed to go 
into his “private” cell.  When defendant refused to lie down, 
Officer Panel fired numerous pepper balls at defendant’s legs, 
and then at defendant’s shoulders when defendant pulled up a 
mattress to protect his body.  Panel continued to fire pepper 
balls as four officers entered the cell to try to restrain 
defendant.  Defendant continued to fight, and Officer Panel 
entered the cell with a Taser.  Using the drive stun, he stunned 
defendant for five seconds, and was able to get defendant’s 
right arm behind his back.  He stunned defendant for two more 
seconds and got his other hand behind his back and cuffed him.   
The most dramatic evidence of defendant’s violent 
conduct was related to the cell extraction that occurred in April 
2005.8  The jury was shown the recording of the incident, 
                                        
8  
At one point in the proceedings, the prosecutor referred 
to the cell extraction video as being of an event in May, and the 
briefing refers to a video of an extraction in May, but the 
recorded extraction took place in April 2005. 
 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
52 
which had earlier been shown to the trial court in support of 
the motion for restraints.  The recording reflected a very 
violent confrontation with six officers.  As the recording was 
played, Officer Panel explained that defendant had put items 
on the window to his cell, obscuring the officers’ view.  
Approximately eight hours after negotiations were initiated 
with defendant, Panel administered a chemical agent through 
the slot in the cell.  The chemical agent makes skin feel hot 
and attacks the mucous membranes of the mouth and nose.  
Defendant used a box lid to keep Panel from putting more of 
the chemical through the slot.  In response, an officer used a 
baton to keep the slot from being blocked.  The officers waited 
to allow the chemical to have some effect, and then opened the 
cell door.  Defendant rushed out and attempted to strike 
officers, one of whom used a Taser against him.  Handcuffs 
were placed on his wrists, and a hobble was placed on his legs 
so he could not kick or pull his feet apart.   
Finally, an investigator with the district attorney’s office 
read a stipulated list of 27 incidents in which defendant acted 
in a violent or threatening manner,9 and then read more 
                                        
9  
The list identified the following incidents.  (1)  January 
1993, defendant fought with another inmate in a juvenile 
placement.  (2)  July 1993, defendant and other inmates 
attacked a rival gang member in a juvenile placement.  
(3)  January 1994, defendant was involved in a gang fight in 
custody.  (4)  February 1994, defendant challenged another 
inmate to a fight.  (5)  August 1994, defendant threatened an 
inmate with violence.  (6)  August 1994, defendant threatened 
a rival gang member with violence.  (7)  August 1994, 
defendant fought with another inmate, and struggled and 
physically resisted when staff took him to his room.  
 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
53 
                                                                                                           
 
(8)  August 
1994, 
defendant 
assaulted 
another 
inmate.  
(9)  October 1994, defendant assaulted a corrections officer, 
and was convicted of felony battery on a peace officer with 
injury.  (10)  and (11)  April 1995 and May 1995, defendant 
fought with another inmate at the California Youth Authority 
(CYA).  (12)  December 1995, defendant stated that he enjoys 
physical violence and physical altercations.  (13)  December 
1995, defendant committed battery on emergency personnel, 
and was convicted of felony assault causing great bodily injury 
on a youth counselor/peace officer at CYA.  (14)  August 1999, 
defendant attacked another inmate.  (15)  October 2000, 
defendant threatened a member of the staff of the Department 
of 
Corrections 
and 
Rehabilitation 
with 
bodily 
injury.  
(16)  October 2000, defendant slipped handcuffs, attacked an 
inmate, and caused injury to the corrections officer who 
subdued him.  (17)  September 2001, defendant and two others 
attacked a fourth inmate.  (18)  November 2003, defendant 
committed spousal battery on his girlfriend, and pleaded guilty 
to willful infliction of corporal injury (§ 273.5).  (19)  May 2004, 
defendant was convicted of threatening a witness to an 
Eastside Gang crime.  (20)  October 2004, defendant slipped a 
handcuff while in line for the bus to court, and assaulted and 
injured another inmate in line, who was handcuffed.  
(21)  October 2004, defendant stated to correctional officers in 
county jail, “if I’m going to do what I need to do, I don’t care 
what you fuckers do, this is my fucking house, you 
motherfuckers just work here.”  (22)  April 2005, defendant 
tried to attack another inmate in the county jail.  (23)  April 
2005, defendant barricaded himself in his cell, was extracted 
by pepper spray and force, and tried to assault correctional 
officers during extraction.  (24)  April 2005, defendant told 
corrections staff that he would keep fighting them until he 
killed all of them or they killed him.  (25)  May 2005, in the 
county jail, defendant threatened to “slice up” corrections staff.  
(26)  May 2005, while being escorted to the shower, defendant 
tried to assault county jail corrections staff with razor blades 
he hid in his underwear.  (27)  August 2005, defendant stated 
 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
54 
detailed descriptions of some of the incidents.  The 27 
incidents, spanning from 1993 to August 2005, included the 
incident in May 2005 involving razor blades.  The evidence also 
reflected statements defendant made regarding his intention to 
kill all of the corrections staff, to “go off on random corrections 
officers,” and to build a reputation for when he was sent to 
prison.   
In advancing his argument that he was prejudiced by the 
shackling, 
defendant 
focuses 
on 
the 
evidence 
of 
the 
circumstances of the crime, particularly Ibarra’s role in the 
murder, and the fact that the jury sent the court a note with 
nine 
questions 
regarding 
the 
crimes 
and 
defendant’s 
background.10  He contends that these factors demonstrate 
                                                                                                           
 
that he was willing to “go off on random corrections officers,” 
and was building his reputation to go with him to state prison.   
 
10  
The questions from the jury were received by the court on 
December 19, 2005, and were not answered before the jury 
returned its verdict the same day.  The jury’s questions were: 
“1.  Is there a document signed by Mr. Miracle that says he 
was the one who used the knife to kill Mr. Silva? 
“2.  What day was Mr. Miracle apprehended and where (city)? 
“3.  Can you give us Mr. Miracle’s age and the year he first 
started disobeying the laws?  What was the offense? 
“4.  Can you give us some personal background on Mr. Miracle? 
(family life, schooling, his children [and] wife, if any, family 
support system)? 
“5.  Where does Mr. Gilrada [sic] (witness that Mr. Miracle had 
at knifepoint to his throat) work?  What type of work does he 
do? Was he employed at the time of the murder? 
 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
55 
that the jury might have returned a sentence of life without 
the possibility of parole absent the shackling.  Certainly, the 
death verdict was not a foregone conclusion, but in light of the 
extensive and graphic evidence of defendant’s violence while 
incarcerated, the inference to be drawn from the shackling 
regarding defendant’s violent tendencies could not have made 
any difference in the jury’s evaluation of the evidence.  
Defendant also cites the prosecutor’s argument to the jury that 
defendant was dangerous, but as noted above, the evidence 
presented at the penalty trial that defendant was dangerous 
provided compelling support for the argument, regardless of 
whether defendant was in visible restraints.  
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
ordering the shackling used in this case, and defendant does 
not establish that the shackles impaired his ability to 
participate in the proceedings or prejudiced him in the eyes of 
the jury.  (Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 596 [because the 
                                                                                                           
 
“6.  What happens when you use crystal meth? How long does 
it impact a person?  Does it agitate someone?  Would a person 
know what they’re doing while under its influence? 
“7.  Will the testimony of this trial be used in the trial of Mr. 
Ybarra [sic]? 
“8.  You showed a video of Mr. Ybarra [sic] in a grocery store 
picking up various items. Were the items important to this 
case?  Other than Gil stating it was Mr. Ybarra [sic] was there 
any other importance to this video? 
“9.  What holds more weight — what a witness states under 
oath or what a witness signs as to what happened to be the 
truth?”   
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
56 
physical restraints did not impair the fairness of the trial, they 
caused no prejudice].)   
IV.  CHALLENGES TO CALIFORNIA’S JURY  
INSTRUCTIONS AND DEATH PENALTY STATUTE 
Defendant raises a number of challenges to California’s 
death penalty scheme and standard jury instructions that, he 
acknowledges, we have previously considered and rejected. 
Because he identifies no reason to reconsider our prior 
holdings, we will briefly reiterate our relevant holdings below.   
“The death penalty is not unconstitutional for failing to 
meaningfully narrow the class of murderers eligible for the 
death penalty.”  (People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 45 
(Henriquez).) 
“Section 190.3, factor (a), which permits the jury to 
consider the circumstances of a defendant’s crime in 
determining whether to impose the death penalty, does not 
license the jury to impose death in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.”  (People v. 
Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 149 (Simon).) 
The death penalty is not unconstitutional on the ground 
that it does not require “findings beyond a reasonable doubt 
that an aggravating circumstance (other than Pen. Code, 
§ 190.3, factor (b) or factor (c) evidence) has been proved, that 
the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, or 
that death is the appropriate sentence.”  (People v. Rangel 
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235.)  “This conclusion is not altered 
by the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Apprendi v. 
New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 . . . and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 
536 U.S. 584 . . . .”  (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 149.) 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
57 
“The federal Constitution does not require that a burden 
of proof be placed on the prosecution at the penalty phase.  
[Citation.]  Nor did the trial court err by failing to tell the jury 
that there was no burden of proof.  [Citation.]  ‘Unlike the guilt 
determination, “the sentencing function is inherently moral 
and normative, not factual” [citation] and, hence, not 
susceptible to a burden-of-proof quantification.”  (Henriquez, 
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 45.)   
“The federal Constitution does not require that the jury 
agree unanimously on which aggravating factors apply.  
[Citation.]  This does not violate a capital defendant’s right to 
equal protection of the laws.  ‘[C]apital and noncapital 
defendants are not similarly situated and therefore may be 
treated differently without violating constitutional guarantees 
of equal protection of the laws or due process of law.’ ”  
(Henriquez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 45.) 
“ ‘CALJIC No. 8.88 properly instructs the jury on its 
sentencing discretion and the nature of its deliberative 
process.’  [Citation.]  Its instruction that ‘jurors may impose a 
death 
sentence 
only 
if 
the 
aggravating 
factors 
are 
“ ‘so substantial’ ” is not impermissibly vague or ambiguous.’  
[Citation.]  ‘CALJIC No. 8.88 is not constitutionally flawed 
because it “uses the term ‘warrants’ instead of ‘appropriate.’ ” ’  
[Citation.]  Nor is it ‘unconstitutional for failing to inform the 
jury that if the mitigating circumstances outweigh those in 
aggravation, it is required to return a sentence of life without 
the possibility of parole.’ ”  (People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 
583, 619-620 (Jones).) 
“ ‘CALJIC 
No. 8.85 is both correct 
and 
adequate.’  
[Citation.]  Its inclusion of such adjectives as ‘extreme’ and 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
58 
‘substantial’ in the list of potential mitigating factors did not 
prevent the jury from considering mitigating evidence.  
[Citation.]  The trial court properly instructed ‘the jury in the 
language of CALJIC No. 8.85 without deleting certain factors 
that were inapplicable to defendant’s case.’  [Citation.]  The 
trial court had no obligation to advise the jury which 
sentencing factors were aggravating, which were mitigating, or 
which could be either aggravating or mitigating depending on 
the jury’s appraisal of the evidence.”  (Jones, supra, 3 Cal.5th 
583, 620.)  “The phrase ‘whether or not’ in section 190.3, 
factors (d)–(h) and (j) does not unconstitutionally suggest that 
the absence of a mitigating factor is to be considered as an 
aggravating circumstance.”  (People v. Wall (2017) 3 Cal.5th 
1048, 1073; see People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 618.) 
“We have repeatedly held that ‘ “[t]he trial court’s failure 
to [instruct] the jury that there is a presumption of life does 
not violate a defendant’s constitutional rights to due process, to 
be free from cruel and unusual punishment, to a reliable 
determination of his sentence, and to equal protection of the 
law under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the federal Constitution.” ’ ”  (People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 
256, 293-294.)    
“The penalty phase jury is not required by the federal 
Constitution to make written findings.  [Citation.]  This 
conclusion is not altered by the high court’s decision in Hurst v. 
Florida (2016) 577 U.S. ___ [136 S.Ct. 616].”  (Henriquez, 
supra, 4 Cal.5th 1, 45-47.) 
“The federal Constitution does not require intercase 
proportionality review.”  (Henriquez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 46.) 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
59 
“ ‘California does not deny capital defendants equal 
protection of the law by providing certain procedural 
protections to noncapital defendants that are not afforded to 
capital defendants.’ ”  (Henriquez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 46.) 
“ ‘International norms and treaties do not render the 
death penalty unconstitutional as applied in this state.’ ”  
(Henriquez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 47.) 
V.  CUMULATIVE ERROR 
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of errors 
requires reversal.  We have found no errors.  In addition, the 
only prejudice we have analyzed is the prejudice defendant 
claims exists with respect to his shackling, and we have 
concluded that he suffered no prejudice.   
VI.  RESTITUTION FINE 
The trial court ordered defendant to pay an aggregate 
amount of $3,401.12 to four victim restitution funds.  It also 
ordered two restitution fines of $10,000 each, pursuant to 
sections 1202.4 and 1202.45.  The fine imposed under section 
1202.4, which relates to postrelease supervision, was stayed.  
In a separate case arising from defendant’s conduct while in 
jail, the court ordered him to pay restitution fines of $2,400 
each pursuant to sections 1202.4 and 1202.45, with the fine 
under section 1202.45 stayed.  The total amount of fines that 
are not stayed is $15,801.12.  Defendant did not object to these 
orders. 
Defendant contends the restitution fines under section 
1202.4 should be reduced to the statutory minimum of $200 
because the trial court did not consider whether defendant was 
able to pay the sums imposed, and he is unable to pay a fine of 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
60 
more than $200.  At the time the fines were imposed, section 
1202.4 provided that “[t]he restitution fine shall be set at the 
discretion of the court and commensurate with the seriousness 
of the offense, but shall not be less than two hundred dollars 
($200), and not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), if 
the person is convicted of a felony.”  (Former § 1202.4, subd. 
(b)(1), Stats. 2005, ch. 240, § 10.5, p. 2516.)  It further provided 
that “[t]he court shall impose the restitution fine unless it finds 
compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and 
states those reasons on the record.  A defendant’s inability to 
pay shall not be considered a compelling and extraordinary 
reason not to impose a restitution fine.  Inability to pay may be 
considered only in increasing the amount of the restitution fine 
in excess of the two-hundred dollar ($200) . . . minimum.”  
(Former § 1202.4, subd. (c).) 
Because defendant did not object to the fine at his 
sentencing hearing, he has forfeited his challenge.  (People v. 
Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 409.)  Furthermore, as in 
Gamache, we find that the claim fails on the merits because 
defendant does not establish an inability to pay.  He contends 
his indigence is established by the fact that he was appointed 
counsel and provided funds for expert witnesses and 
investigators, and because he assertedly has no earning 
potential.  However, the fact that he could not afford the cost of 
the defense in a capital case does not establish that he cannot 
pay these fines.  As in Gamache, defendant does not “identify 
anything in the record indicating the trial court breached its 
duty to consider his ability to pay” (ibid.), and because “the 
trial court was not obligated to make express findings 
concerning his ability to pay, the absence of any findings does 
not demonstrate it failed to consider this factor.  Thus, we 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
61 
cannot say on this record that the trial court abused its 
discretion” (ibid.). 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The judgment is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
IKOLA, J.* 
 
                                        
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, 
Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 
6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
S140894 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
Penal Code section 1018 says no guilty plea to an offense 
punishable by death or life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole “shall be received from a defendant who 
does not appear with counsel, nor shall that plea be received 
without the consent of the defendant’s counsel.”  Today’s 
opinion concludes that the word “counsel” in this sentence 
encompasses advisory counsel, such as the attorney appointed 
to advise the capital defendant in this case.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 26–35.)  But it is evident from a careful reading of the 
entire statute that the word “counsel” has its natural meaning.  
It means an attorney who represents the defendant; it does not 
encompass advisory counsel.  Because the court’s contrary 
construction erodes the important safeguard against erroneous 
imposition of the death penalty that section 1018 provides, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I. 
Penal Code section 1018 provides in full:  “Unless 
otherwise provided by law, every plea shall be entered or 
withdrawn by the defendant himself or herself in open court.  
No plea of guilty of a felony for which the maximum 
punishment is death, or life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole, shall be received from a defendant who 
does not appear with counsel, nor shall that plea be received 
without the consent of the defendant’s counsel.  No plea of 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Liu, J., dissenting 
2 
guilty of a felony for which the maximum punishment is not 
death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 
shall be accepted from any defendant who does not appear with 
counsel unless the court shall first fully inform him or her of 
the right to counsel and unless the court shall find that the 
defendant understands the right to counsel and freely waives 
it, and then only if the defendant has expressly stated in open 
court, to the court, that he or she does not wish to be 
represented by counsel.  On application of the defendant at any 
time before judgment or within six months after an order 
granting probation is made if entry of judgment is suspended, 
the court may, and in case of a defendant who appeared 
without counsel at the time of the plea the court shall, for a 
good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn 
and a plea of not guilty substituted.  Upon indictment or 
information against a corporation a plea of guilty may be put 
in by counsel.  This section shall be liberally construed to effect 
these objects and to promote justice.”  (All undesignated 
statutory references are to the Penal Code.) 
Let us focus on the second and third sentences of the 
statute.  These sentences have parallel structure.  The second 
sentence applies to defendants facing the death penalty or life 
imprisonment without parole, whereas the third sentence 
applies to defendants facing lesser sentences.  The third 
sentence speaks of “the right to counsel” and waiver of that 
right by a defendant’s informed, voluntary, and express 
statement in open court that “he or she does not wish to be 
represented by counsel.”  In other words, “the right to counsel” 
means the right “to be represented by counsel.”  Further, a 
defendant seeking to plead guilty must “appear with counsel 
unless” the defendant validly waives “the right to counsel.”  
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Liu, J., dissenting 
3 
The text of the statute leaves no doubt that “counsel,” in all of 
its usages in the third sentence, means an attorney who 
represents the defendant.  “Attorneys serving in an advisory or 
standby capacity do not ‘represent’ the defendant . . . .”  (People 
v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 692; see ibid. [interpreting 
the phrase “represented by counsel” in section 1368 to exclude 
advisory counsel].)  And there is no such thing as a right to 
advisory counsel.  (See People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 
1119–1120 [“[A] defendant has no right, under either the 
federal or state Constitution, to ‘hybrid representation.’  
Criminal defendants have the constitutional right to have an 
attorney represent them, and the right under the federal 
Constitution to represent themselves, but these rights are 
mutually exclusive.” (fn. omitted)].) 
In light of the unambiguous meaning of “counsel” in 
section 1018’s third sentence, the term “counsel” in the second 
sentence is most naturally read to have the same meaning.  
(See People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1113 [“ ‘It is an 
established rule of judicial construction that when a term 
appears in different parts of the same act . . . , the term should 
be construed as having the same meaning in each instance.’ ”].)  
This reading is further bolstered by the fact that we are 
construing the same term in neighboring sentences that 
address “ ‘the same or an analogous subject’ matter.”  (Kibler v. 
Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 
192, 201; see People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1168 
[“ ‘when statutes are in pari materia similar phrases appearing 
in each should be given like meanings’ ”]; id. at p. 1167.)  
Moreover, the neighboring sentences have parallel structure, 
and they share an identical usage (“appear with counsel”) that 
was originally enacted as parts of a single sentence.  
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Liu, J., dissenting 
4 
(Stats. 1949, ch. 1310, § 1, p. 2298 [“No plea of guilty of a 
felony for which the maximum punishment is death, or life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, shall be 
received from a defendant who does not appear with counsel, 
nor shall any plea of guilty of any other felony be accepted from 
any defendant who does not appear with counsel unless the 
court shall first fully inform him of his right to counsel and 
unless the court shall find that the defendant understands his 
right to counsel and freely waives it.” (italics added)].) 
Today’s opinion acknowledges that the phrase “right to 
counsel” in the third sentence of section 1018 must mean the 
right “to be represented by counsel,” as the statute plainly 
says.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 31–32.)  From there, the court 
says “the word ‘counsel’ (standing alone or in other contexts) 
may carry a more expansive meaning.”  (Id. at p. 32; see id. at 
p. 33, fn. 1.)  But the court makes no effort to examine the 
context in which the word “counsel” appears in section 1018.  
How could the word “counsel,” as used in the third sentence, 
mean something different in the phrase “appear with counsel” 
than in the phrase “right to counsel” or “represented by 
counsel”?  After all, the third sentence says that a defendant 
seeking to plead guilty must “appear with counsel unless the 
court shall first fully inform him or her of the right to counsel 
and unless the court shall find that the defendant understands 
the right to counsel and freely waives it, and then only if the 
defendant has expressly stated in open court, to the court, that 
he or she does not wish to be represented by counsel.”  (Italics 
added.)  In addition, how could the phrase “appear with 
counsel” mean something different in the second sentence than 
in the third sentence, in light of the fact that both usages were 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Liu, J., dissenting 
5 
originally enacted as part of a single sentence?  The court 
simply ignores these obvious linguistic clues. 
In addition to defying ordinary rules of construction, the 
court’s interpretation of section 1018 is problematic for reasons 
that are apparent in this case.  Defendant Joshua Miracle was 
initially represented by Michael Carty.  When Miracle decided 
he wanted to plead guilty to special-circumstance murder, 
Carty refused to consent.  Miracle then sought to represent 
himself in order to plead guilty.  The trial court granted 
Miracle’s request and appointed Joe Allen as advisory counsel.  
Allen consented to Miracle’s guilty plea because he believed 
Miracle’s acceptance of responsibility would serve as important 
mitigating evidence in an “intelligent penalty phase strategy.”  
Allen told the trial court that the fact that Miracle’s plea would 
be used at the penalty phase “is a very important factor for me 
in agreeing to go along with this proposal.”  But Miracle told 
the trial court that he “just want[ed] to make clear that . . . 
using that as mitigating evidence at the penalty trial is not my 
motive for pleading guilty.”  And in fact, Miracle “did not 
present any evidence at the penalty phase and declined to 
make a closing argument.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.) 
From this sequence of events, it is clear that Allen’s 
consent to Miracle’s guilty plea did not serve as the 
“independent safeguard” that section 1018 requires (People v. 
Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 750 (Chadd)) because Allen, as 
advisory counsel, did not and could not exercise control over 
trial strategy.  That control belonged exclusively to Miracle 
after the trial court allowed him to represent himself.  The 
clear disconnect between the rationale for Allen’s consent and 
Allen’s inability to direct a defense in accordance with that 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Liu, J., dissenting 
6 
rationale illuminates why the term “counsel” in the second 
sentence of section 1018 does not encompass advisory counsel. 
In response to this disconnect, today’s opinion says 
“nothing in section 1018 prohibits a capital defendant who has 
pleaded guilty [with counsel’s consent] from substituting 
counsel or electing self-representation at the penalty phase.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 34–35, fn. omitted.)  But, as the trial 
court in this case recognized, self-representation after the guilt 
phase of a capital proceeding is a matter within the trial 
court’s discretion (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 
1220), as is substitution of appointed counsel at any point 
(People v. Walker (1976) 18 Cal.3d 232, 238).  In discussing 
with Miracle his desire to plead guilty, the trial court 
considered the option of appointing Allen as counsel but made 
clear that if it did so, it “would not then allow defendant to 
represent himself again if he did not like how Allen was 
representing him at either stage.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.)  
Section 1018 is properly construed against the backdrop of 
trial courts’ authority to prevent capricious or manipulative 
behavior by defendants. 
Today’s holding is in significant tension with Chadd, 
where we held that “the trial court had no authority to accept 
[the defendant’s] guilty plea to a capital offense in the face of 
his counsel’s express refusal to consent to the entry of such a 
plea.”  (Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 746.)  There, the 
Attorney General had argued that “section 1018 can be 
‘construed’ to permit a capital defendant to discharge his 
attorney, represent himself, and enter a guilty plea.”  (Ibid.)  
“But,” we said, “that is precisely what the third sentence of 
section 1018 expressly authorizes noncapital defendants to do.  
The proposal would thus obliterate the Legislature’s careful 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Liu, J., dissenting 
7 
distinction between capital and noncapital cases, and render 
largely superfluous its special provision for the former.  Such a 
construction would be manifestly improper.”  (Id. at p. 747, 
fn. omitted.) 
The scenario we disapproved in Chadd is essentially the 
scenario the court approves today in light of the appointment 
of advisory counsel who, although well-meaning, had no 
authority to direct Miracle’s defense and whose advice on 
penalty-phase strategy ultimately went unheeded.  This is an 
end run around section 1018’s clear prohibition on accepting a 
guilty plea to a capital offense unless the defendant “appear[s] 
with counsel” and has “the consent of [his] counsel.”  As we 
said in Chadd and reaffirmed in People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 1277 (Alfaro), “ ‘it is difficult to conceive of a plainer 
statement of law than the rule of section 1018 that no guilty 
plea to a capital offense shall be received “without the consent 
of the defendant’s counsel.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 1298, quoting Chadd, 
supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 746.)  The Legislature need not abide the 
erosion of this important safeguard in capital cases; it can 
correct today’s decision by expressly stating that the word 
“counsel” in section 1018 means an attorney who represents 
the defendant and does not include advisory or standby 
counsel. 
II. 
The Attorney General, taking a view contrary to his 
position in another pending case (Respondent’s Answering Br. 
at p. 34, People v. Frederickson (S067392)), argues that reading 
section 1018 to mean what it plainly means would run afoul of 
a capital defendant’s constitutional right to refuse counsel and 
represent himself.  (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Liu, J., dissenting 
8 
(Faretta).)  Today’s opinion says its construction of section 1018 
has the virtue of avoiding this constitutional issue.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 32.)  But we construe statutes to avoid serious 
constitutional questions only when doing so is “reasonably 
possible.”  (People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1161; see 
Warger v. Shauers (2014) 574 U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 521, 529] 
[the avoidance canon “ ‘has no application in the absence 
of . . . ambiguity’ ”].)  Like this court in Chadd and Alfaro, I see 
no ambiguity here, especially when the second sentence of 
section 1018 is read together with the third sentence.  And in 
any event, like this court in Chadd and Alfaro, I see no 
constitutional infirmity in section 1018, at least as applied to 
the facts here. 
In Chadd, the Attorney General argued that if section 
1018 cannot be construed to permit a capital defendant to 
discharge counsel, represent himself, and enter a guilty plea, 
then “it is unconstitutional because it allows counsel to ‘veto’ a 
capital defendant’s decision to plead guilty.”  (Chadd, supra, 28 
Cal.3d at p. 747.)  We rejected the argument, explaining that it 
“fails to recognize the larger public interest at stake in pleas of 
guilty to capital offenses.  It is true that in our system of 
justice the decision as to how to plead to a criminal charge is 
personal to the defendant:  because the life, liberty or property 
at stake is his, so also is the choice of plea.  [Citation.]  But it is 
no less true that the Legislature has the power to regulate, in 
the public interest, the manner in which that choice is 
exercised.  Thus it is the legislative prerogative to specify 
which pleas the defendant may elect to enter (Pen. Code, 
§ 1016), when he may do so (id., § 1003), where and how he 
must plead (id., § 1017), and what the effects are of making or 
not making certain pleas. 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Liu, J., dissenting 
9 
“A plea of guilty, of course, is the most serious step a 
defendant can take in a criminal prosecution.  It operates first 
as a waiver of formal defects in the accusatory pleading that 
could be reached by demurrer.  [Citations.]  Next, because 
there will be no trial the plea strips the defendant of such 
fundamental protections as the privilege against self-
incrimination, the right to a jury, and the right of 
confrontation.  [Citations.]  As to the merits, the plea is 
deemed to constitute a judicial admission of every element of 
the offense charged.  [Citation.]  Indeed, it serves as a 
stipulation that the People need introduce no proof whatever to 
support the accusation:  the plea ipso facto supplies both 
evidence and verdict.  [Citation.]  ‘A plea of guilty is more than 
a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it 
is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and 
determine punishment.’  [Citation.]  Finally, it severely 
restricts the defendant’s right to appeal from the ensuing 
judgment.  [Citation.]”  (Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 747–
748.) 
Section 1018’s prohibition on pleading guilty to capital 
charges without the consent of counsel, Chadd explained, “was 
an integral part of the Legislature’s extensive revision of the 
death penalty laws in response to the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 
238.  (Stats. 1973, ch. 719, §§ 2–6, pp. 1297–1300.)  That 
revision, of course, was an effort to eliminate the arbitrariness 
that Furman found inherent in the operation of prior death 
penalty legislation.  [Citation.]  The fact that the requirement 
of counsel’s consent to guilty pleas in capital cases was enacted 
as part of that statutory scheme demonstrates that the 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Liu, J., dissenting 
10 
Legislature intended it to serve as a further independent 
safeguard against erroneous imposition of a death sentence. 
“Two years later the United States Supreme Court 
decided Faretta, holding that defendants in state criminal 
trials have a federal constitutional right of self-representation.  
But that decision did not strip our Legislature of the authority 
to condition guilty pleas in capital cases on the consent of 
defense counsel. . . . [¶] . . . The opinion first categorizes the 
several 
pretrial 
and 
trial 
rights 
guaranteed 
by 
that 
amendment as ‘necessary to a full defense’ ([Faretta, supra, 
422 U.S.] at p. 818), and observes that the amendment 
‘constitutionalizes the right in an adversary criminal trial to 
make a defense as we know it.’  (Ibid.; italics added.)  The 
opinion then reiterates (at p. 819) that the amendment grants 
to the accused personally ‘the right to make his defense,’ and 
concludes:  ‘Although not stated in the Amendment in so many 
words, the right to self-representation — to make one’s own 
defense personally — is thus necessarily implied by the 
structure of the Amendment.  The right to defend is given 
directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the 
consequences if the defense fails.’  (Italics added; fn. omitted.) 
(Id. at pp. 819–820.) 
“The Attorney General in effect stands Faretta on its 
head:  from the defendant’s conceded right to ‘make a defense’ 
in ‘an adversary criminal trial,’ the Attorney General attempts 
to infer a defendant’s right to make no such defense and to 
have no such trial, even when his life is at stake.  But in 
capital cases, as noted above, the state has a strong interest in 
reducing the risk of mistaken judgments.  Nothing in Faretta, 
either expressly or impliedly, deprives the state of the right to 
conclude that the danger of erroneously imposing a death 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Liu, J., dissenting 
11 
sentence outweighs the minor infringement of the right of self-
representation resulting when defendant’s right to plead guilty 
in capital cases is subjected to the requirement of his counsel’s 
consent.”  (Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 750–751.) 
Just as a state may prohibit all guilty pleas to murder 
charges or may prohibit capital defendants from waiving an 
automatic appeal without running afoul of Faretta (see Chadd, 
supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 751–752), the requirement of counsel’s 
consent to a guilty plea to a capital offense is a “ ‘reasonable’ ” 
means of protecting the state’s interest in the accuracy and 
fairness of its proceedings (id. at p. 753).  It serves “as a filter 
to separate capital cases in which the defendant might 
reasonably gain some benefit by a guilty plea from capital 
cases in which the defendant, as here, simply wants the state 
to help him commit suicide.”  (Ibid., fn. omitted.) 
In 2007, we reaffirmed this understanding of section 
1018 in Alfaro.  There, a capital defendant sought to enter a 
guilty plea not with the goal of committing suicide but “to 
avoid testifying against ‘Beto,’ whom her counsel sought to 
implicate as an accomplice in the murder.”  (Alfaro, supra, 41 
Cal.4th at p. 1300.)  Defense counsel refused to consent to the 
plea, and the trial court determined that under section 1018 it 
lacked authority to accept the plea absent counsel’s consent.  
We held that counsel’s refusal to consent was reasonable 
(Alfaro, at pp. 1300–1301), and we rejected the defendant’s 
argument that her desire to plead guilty “concerned a 
fundamental aspect of her defense that . . . must remain within 
defendant’s control” (id. at p. 1302).  Relying extensively on 
Chadd, we concluded that “nothing in the record supports 
defendant’s contention that her desire to plead guilty was 
motivated by a desire to establish a defense of remorse or to 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Liu, J., dissenting 
12 
demonstrate her acceptance of responsibility for the murder so 
that a lesser punishment might be imposed at the penalty 
phase.  Accordingly, the trial court reasonably concluded that 
the dispute between defendant and her counsel did not 
implicate a constitutionally protected fundamental interest 
that might override the plain terms of section 1018.”  (Alfaro, 
at p. 1302, fn. omitted; see id. at pp. 1298–1301.) 
Our unanimous opinion in Alfaro reaffirmed that “[t]he 
consent requirement of section 1018 has its roots in the state’s 
strong interest in reducing the risk of mistaken judgments in 
capital cases and thereby maintaining the accuracy and 
fairness of its criminal proceedings.”  (Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th 
at p. 1300, citing Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 750, 753.)  We 
explained that “[t]he statute constitutes legislative recognition 
of the severe consequences of a guilty plea in a capital case, 
and provides protection against an ill-advised guilty plea and 
the erroneous imposition of a death sentence.”  (Alfaro, at 
p. 1300; cf. Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 638 (Beck) 
[Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment requires a heightened degree of reliability in 
capital cases not only in sentencing but also in “the guilt 
determination”].)  And recently, we again recognized that “[a] 
societal interest in the integrity of the capital process may at 
times outweigh a defendant’s stated preferences in controlling 
his or her own case.  For example, . . . state law prevents any 
defendant from pleading guilty to capital charges without 
consent of counsel, in light of ‘the state’s strong interest in 
reducing the risk of mistaken judgments in capital cases and 
thereby maintaining the accuracy and fairness of its criminal 
proceedings.’  (Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1300.)”  (People v. 
Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 1005 (Daniels); see also People v. 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Liu, J., dissenting 
13 
Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1055 [citing section 1018 as an 
example of the “limited circumstances in which, as a matter of 
fundamental public policy, rights and decisions that are 
normally personal to a criminal defendant may be limited or 
overruled in the service of death penalty reliability”].) 
Like Chadd and Alfaro, this case presents no occasion to 
decide whether section 1018 unconstitutionally restricts a 
capital defendant’s right to make fundamental decisions about 
his or her defense when the defendant, against the advice of 
counsel, wishes to plead guilty as part of a strategy to avoid 
the death penalty.  In such a case, the disagreement between 
the defendant and counsel arguably goes to the right to “make 
one’s own defense personally.”  (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at 
p. 819.)  Here, by contrast, Miracle told the trial court that he 
“want[ed] to do the right thing and take responsibility and 
offer exonerating testimony on behalf of Mr. Ibarra,” and that 
he “just want[ed] to make clear that . . . using that as 
mitigating evidence at the penalty trial is not my motive for 
pleading guilty.”  Although Allen said a “very important factor” 
for him (Allen) in agreeing with the plea was its utility as 
mitigating evidence in the penalty phase, Miracle consistently 
told the trial court that he did not wish to offer any mitigating 
evidence at the penalty phase (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 12–14, 
19–20), and in fact he did not put on any mitigating evidence 
(id. at p. 8).  As in Alfaro, the record does not show that 
defendant’s “desire to plead guilty was motivated by a desire to 
establish a defense of remorse or to demonstrate [his] 
acceptance of responsibility for the murder so that a lesser 
punishment might be imposed at the penalty phase.”  (Alfaro, 
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1302, italics added.) 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Liu, J., dissenting 
14 
Miracle may have believed, according to his own ethical 
code, that accepting responsibility — with no further 
instrumental purpose — was “the right thing” to do for himself 
and for his codefendant Ibarra.  But the state has a strong 
interest in the operation of its criminal justice system in 
accordance with applicable law, not the ethical code of a 
particular defendant.  This interest is at its apex in capital 
cases due to the severity and finality of the death penalty.  (See 
Beck, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 637.)  To be sure, a self-represented 
defendant may decide not to mount any defense in a capital 
trial.  (Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 984–985.)  “But a trial, 
even one where a defense is voluntarily forgone, is 
fundamentally different from a guilty plea.  In [a trial], the 
state [is] put to its burden of proof as to the murder charges 
and related counts.  A plea, on the other hand, ‘serves as a 
stipulation that the People need introduce no proof whatever to 
support the accusation’ and ‘ “is itself a conviction.” ’  (Chadd, 
supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 748.)  Moreover, a guilty plea severely 
limits the right to appeal.  (See ibid.)”  (Id. at p. 983.) 
It is true that Allen believed the prosecution’s evidence 
was very strong and advised Miracle to that effect.  But Allen’s 
support for Miracle’s plea as part of “an intelligent penalty 
phase strategy” provided no check on whether the plea, shorn 
of any use at the penalty phase, would heighten the risk of a 
mistaken judgment in this capital case.  The attorney who had 
considered that question, Carty, refused to consent to the plea.  
Here, as in Chadd and Alfaro, the application of section 1018 
as an “independent safeguard against erroneous imposition of 
a death sentence” does not impermissibly compromise the 
constitutional right to self-representation or the right to 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Liu, J., dissenting 
15 
control a fundamental aspect of the defense.  (Chadd, supra, 28 
Cal.3d at p. 750; see Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1302.) 
The Attorney General cites McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 
584 U.S. __ [138 S.Ct. 1500]), which held that defense counsel 
cannot concede a capital defendant’s guilt over the defendant’s 
objection.  The high court reasoned that a defendant’s decisions 
to “refuse to plead guilty in the face of overwhelming evidence 
against her” and to “maintain[] her innocence at the guilt 
phase of a capital trial” are “not strategic choices about how 
best to achieve a client’s objectives; they are choices about what 
the client’s objectives in fact are.”  (Id. at p. 1508.)  I 
acknowledge that aspects of McCoy may be read to suggest 
that a defendant retains the ultimate right to decide whether 
to plead guilty to capital charges.  (See, e.g., ibid. [“whether to 
plead guilty” is a decision “reserved for the client”].)  But 
McCoy did not weigh a defendant’s autonomy interests against 
countervailing reliability interests; it did not address whether 
a capital defendant may enter a guilty plea against the advice 
of counsel in the face of a state statute requiring counsel’s 
consent as a measure to lessen the risk of a mistaken 
judgment.  (See People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 285 
[“ ‘a 
decision 
is 
not 
authority 
for 
propositions 
not 
considered’ ”].) McCoy’s holding is that “it is the defendant’s 
prerogative, not counsel’s, to decide on the objective of his 
defense:  to admit guilt in the hope of gaining mercy at the 
sentencing stage, or to maintain his innocence, leaving it to the 
State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (McCoy, at 
p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1505].)  The case before us does not 
involve a defendant who sought “to admit guilt in the hope of 
gaining mercy at the sentencing stage.”  (Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. MIRACLE 
Liu, J., dissenting 
16 
In sum, the trial court should have followed its initial 
instinct not to accept Miracle’s guilty plea without the consent 
of counsel.  The discharge of Miracle’s attorney and 
appointment of advisory counsel who subsequently agreed with 
the plea did not satisfy section 1018’s plain requirement that a 
defendant who wishes to plead guilty to a capital offense must 
“appear with counsel” and have the “consent of the defendant’s 
counsel.”  The constitutionality of applying section 1018 might 
be a more difficult question if Miracle had chosen to plead 
guilty in order to improve his penalty-phase defense, as Allen 
had advised.  But the application of section 1018 to the 
circumstances here presents no constitutional infirmity.  The 
trial court’s error under section 1018 requires reversal of the 
judgment on the counts to which Miracle pleaded guilty.  (See 
Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 754–755.) 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Miracle 
_______________________________________________________________________________
___ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________
___ 
 
Opinion No. S140894 
Date Filed: December 3, 2018 
_______________________________________________________________________________
___ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Barbara 
Judge: Brian E. Hill 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________
___ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek and Mary K. McComb, State Public Defenders, and Andrea G. Asaro, Deputy 
State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Law Offices of John T. Philipsborn, John T. Philipsborn; Sanger Swysen & Dunkle and Stephen 
K. Dunkle for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant 
and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster, Joseph P. Lee, 
Peggy Z. Huang, James William Bilderback II and Blythe J. Leszkay, Deputy Attorneys General, 
for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Andrea G. Asaro 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, Suite 1000 
Oakland, CA  94607 
(510) 267-3300 
 
Blythe J. Leszkay 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 269-6191