Case Title: Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility v. Steven M. Lucareli

Citation: 2000 WI 55

Docket Number: 1997AP002389-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 55 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-2389-D 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Steven M. Lucareli, Attorney at Law. 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility,  
 
Complainant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Steven M. Lucareli,  
 
Respondent-Respondent-Cross-Appellant.  
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST LUCARELI 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 20, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
April 18, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the complainant-appellant-cross respondent 
there were briefs by Thomas J. Basting, Sr. and Brennan, Steil, 
Basting & MacDougall, Janesville, with oral argument by Thomas J. 
Basting, Sr. 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent-cross appellant 
there was a brief by Thomas J. Kelly, Steven M. Lucareli and 
Lucareli Law Office, Eagle River, and oral argument by Steven M. 
Lucareli. 
 
2 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Paul Bucher 
on behalf of the Wisconsin District Attorney’s Association. 
 
 
2000 WI 55 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-2389-D 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Steven M. Lucareli, Attorney at  
Law. 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional  
Responsibility,  
 
          Complainant-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Steven M. Lucareli,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent-Cross- 
          Appellant.  
 
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.  Proceeding dismissed. 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM   The 
Board 
of 
Attorneys 
Professional 
Responsibility (Board) appealed from the report of the referee 
concluding that the respondent, Attorney Steven Lucareli, had 
not engaged in professional misconduct while prosecuting a 
criminal case as the Board had alleged and recommending that the 
complaint in this disciplinary proceeding be dismissed.  The 
Board argued that the referee improperly declined to apply the 
doctrine of issue preclusion in respect to Attorney Lucareli's 
having filed immediately prior to the commencement of a jury 
No. 97-2389-D 
 
2 
trial in a sexual assault case a criminal charge against the 
defendant's attorney that in fact was not supported by probable 
cause and that the evidence does not support the referee's 
finding that when he filed the charge, Attorney Lucareli had 
forgotten 
a 
ruling 
of 
the 
circuit 
court 
on 
the 
non-
confidentiality of certain documents that rendered the criminal 
charge baseless.  Attorney Lucareli cross-appealed from the 
referee's failure to recommend that he recover statutory costs 
in the proceeding. 
¶2 
We determine that the referee did not err in declining 
to apply the issue preclusion doctrine to establish that 
Attorney Lucareli knew the criminal charge he filed against the 
defense attorney was not supported by probable cause and that 
the referee's finding that Attorney Lucareli had forgotten a 
recent court ruling that made it clear the charge was without 
probable cause has not been shown to be clearly erroneous.  
Because of its posture on appeal, we dismiss this proceeding 
solely on the allegation that Attorney Lucareli violated SCR 
20:3.8(a)1 by filing a criminal charge knowing that it was not 
supported by probable cause.  Although the Board had asserted in 
its complaint and the referee addressed in his report the 
allegations that Attorney Lucareli's conduct also constituted 
                     
1 SCR 20:3.8(a) provides: 
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:  
(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor 
knows is not supported by probable cause[.] 
No. 97-2389-D 
 
3 
filing a suit or delaying a trial when he knew or it was obvious 
that such an action would serve merely to harass or maliciously 
injure another person, in violation of SCR 20:3.1(a)(3),2 and 
maintaining a suit that appeared to him to be unjust, in 
violation of the Attorney's Oath, SCR 40.15,3 in this appeal the 
Board briefed and argued only the alleged violation of SCR 
20:3.8(a), and we reach neither of the other alleged violations. 
¶3 
The Board sought issue preclusion based on the circuit 
court's finding, affirmed by court of appeals,4 that Attorney 
Lucareli had filed the criminal charge either to disqualify 
defense counsel or to delay the jury trial scheduled to begin 
the following business day and by doing so had engaged in 
"intentional misconduct".  Each of those courts held that 
Attorney Lucareli's prosecutorial misconduct had deprived the 
defendant in the sexual assault case of a fair trial and had 
prejudiced his defense so as to warrant a new trial.   
                     
2 SCR 20:3.1(a)(3) provides: 
(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not: 
(3) file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, 
delay a trial or take other action on behalf of the client when 
the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such an action would 
serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another. 
 
3 The Attorney's Oath provides, in pertinent part: 
I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which 
shall appear to me to be unjust, or any defense, except such as 
I believe to be honestly debatable under the law of the land[.]  
SCR 20:8.4 defines professional misconduct to include a 
lawyer's violation of the Attorney's Oath.  
4 State v. Lettice, 205 Wis. 2d 347, 556 N.W.2d 376 (1996). 
No. 97-2389-D 
 
4 
¶4 
While 
the 
referee 
properly 
declined 
the Board's 
request to preclude litigation in this disciplinary proceeding 
of the issue of Attorney Lucareli's knowledge of the lack of 
probable cause for the criminal charge he filed against defense 
counsel by reason of the circuit and appellate court decisions, 
the referee could have considered those decisions as evidence on 
the issue of credibility to the extent Attorney Lucareli might 
have testified in the circuit court concerning his knowledge at 
the time he filed the criminal charge.  However, the referee did 
not give those decisions any consideration, except as the likely 
reason for the Board's having brought the instant proceeding. 
¶5 
Indeed, the referee granted Attorney Lucareli's motion 
to strike the three paragraphs of the Board's complaint setting 
forth those decisions "for the reason . . . that [they] all 
occurred after the fact, i.e., after the actions by Mr. Lucareli 
which are alleged to have been violations of the Rules Of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys" and were "irrelevant as 
evidentiary matters . . . as far as any proof of the facts 
underlying the [Board's] complaint."  As a consequence, the 
Board was precluded from offering "documentary evidence at the 
time of the [new trial motion] hearing" that the Board believed 
would 
verify 
Attorney 
Lucareli's 
misconduct -- evidence 
it 
asserted the referee could consider, even if issue preclusion 
were held inapplicable. 
¶6 
Because the referee's decision on issue preclusion 
meant, in the referee's words, "[that] there will be no 
investigation of the process which led to the grant of a new 
No. 97-2389-D 
 
5 
trial . . . ," the record of the hearing on the new trial motion 
is not before us, but the court's decision suggests that it was 
substantially 
different 
from 
the 
record 
made 
in 
this 
disciplinary proceeding.  The determinative issues in the 
circuit court were Attorney Lucareli's motivation in filing the 
criminal charge against defense counsel immediately prior to the 
commencement of his client's criminal trial and the prejudicial 
effect the filing of that charge had on the client's right to 
counsel and to a fair trial.  Here, the issue to be decided for 
purposes of SCR 20:3.8(a) is whether, when he filed the criminal 
charge against defense counsel, Attorney Lucareli knew it was 
not supported by probable cause. 
¶7 
The 
circuit court 
held 
that 
Attorney 
Lucareli's 
motivation in bringing the charge was either to disqualify 
defense counsel from continuing to represent the defendant or to 
delay the trial and that the client was sufficiently prejudiced 
so as to be entitled to a new trial.  To the issue of Attorney 
Lucareli's knowledge, however, the trial court gave only passing 
mention in its decision:  "[A]ssuming the District Attorney had 
forgotten about the court's ruling [on the non-confidentiality 
of a psychologist's notes], there still was no probable cause 
for the charge."  On review, the court of appeals explicitly 
rejected such a proffered defense:  "The suggestion in the 
state's brief that Lucareli 'may have forgotten' about the 
court's ruling is an unacceptable excuse for his behavior."  
State v. Lettice, 205 Wis. 2d 347, 353-54, 556 N.W.2d 376 
(1996). 
No. 97-2389-D 
 
6 
¶8 
The issues of motivation and prejudice arose again 
when the State attempted to retry the defendant after a new 
trial was granted.  Although not considered by the referee, we 
take judicial notice of the published court of appeals opinion 
affirming the decision of the circuit court, with a judge other 
than the one who granted the new trial presiding, that double 
jeopardy barred retrial.  State v. Lettice, 221 Wis. 2d 69, 585 
N.W.2d 171 (1998).  The court of appeals referred to the trial 
court's 
findings 
that 
the 
timing 
and 
focus 
of 
Attorney 
Lucareli's "truly evil scheme" in filing the criminal charge 
against defense counsel and then seeking his removal from the 
sexual assault case deprived the defendant of the effective 
assistance of counsel, that the criminal charge against defense 
counsel constituted a "specious lawsuit" having the purpose of 
interfering with the defendant's right to counsel, that Attorney 
Lucareli "achieved his purpose to either get an adjournment or 
to put a cloud over the defense in the form of impairing defense 
counsel and that the defense was in fact impaired as a result." 
 Id. at 76. 
¶9 
The appellate court held that double jeopardy was 
applicable in light of Attorney Lucareli's conduct "undertaken 
out of fear that the defendant would be acquitted in the first 
scheduled trial if he did not either obtain a continuance or 
upset defense counsel to the extent that his effectiveness would 
certainly be thwarted, and where the defendant was unaware until 
after conviction of the perverse effect Lucareli's actions had 
No. 97-2389-D 
 
7 
on his defense."  Id. at 89.  The court of appeals based its 
holding on a record showing  
 
that Lucareli believed he needed an adjournment of the 
scheduled 
trial; 
he 
attempted 
to 
postpone 
the 
proceedings by motion which was denied; he then 
searched his file for another mode by which to avoid 
going to trial.  He brought specious charges against 
the defense attorney and attempted to have him 
disqualified, which, if successful would have achieved 
his purpose.   
Id.   
¶10 Notwithstanding our concerns with the twice litigated 
and twice reviewed prosecutorial conduct of Attorney Lucareli 
that is before us, our determination that the referee properly 
concluded that the Board had failed to show by clear and 
satisfactory evidence that Attorney Lucareli knew when he filed 
the criminal charge against the defense attorney that it was not 
in fact supported by probable cause compels the dismissal of 
this proceeding.  As the Board did not argue in this appeal the 
other professional conduct rule violations it had alleged in its 
complaint, we do not address them.  In respect to the cross-
appeal, we determine that the referee's recommendation that each 
party bear its own costs incurred in this proceeding is 
appropriate. 
 
There 
is 
no 
merit 
to 
Attorney 
Lucareli's 
contention that he is entitled to have costs assessed against 
the Board. 
¶11 Attorney Lucareli was licensed to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1984 and has not been disciplined previously for 
professional misconduct.  He currently practices in Eagle River, 
No. 97-2389-D 
 
8 
but at the time relevant to this proceeding, he was serving 
first as special prosecutor to fill the vacancy left by the 
district attorney for Vilas county, to which office Attorney 
Lucareli was elected in November 1992, and subsequently as 
district attorney, commencing the following January.  He was 
defeated when he sought a second term in 1994.  The referee in 
this disciplinary proceeding, Attorney John Schweitzer, made the 
following findings of fact. 
¶12 In late 1992, during the investigation of sexual 
assault allegations, the alleged victim identified two different 
persons, one of them her father, as the alleged perpetrator.  
Attorney Lucareli retained a psychologist to interview the 
alleged victim but did not ask for a written report of that 
interview, with the result that no documents regarding the 
interview were provided to counsel for the father, against whom 
Attorney Lucareli filed a criminal complaint in mid-March 1993.  
¶13 Counsel for that defendant, Attorney Dennis Burgy, 
filed a motion seeking access to the psychologist's notes of the 
interview, arguing that they were confidential patient health 
care records to which the father of the minor child was entitled 
by statute.  At the hearing on that motion, Attorney Lucareli 
told the court that the child had not seen the psychologist for 
purposes of treatment, rehabilitation or therapy but that he had 
asked the psychologist to conduct an evaluation to determine 
whether the child was truthful about what had happened to her, 
whether she was a victim of sexual assault, and whether her 
behavior was consistent with that of other sexual assault 
No. 97-2389-D 
 
9 
victims. 
 
Following 
an 
in 
camera 
inspection 
of 
the 
psychologist's notes, the court released a complete set of the 
notes to Attorney Lucareli and to Attorney Burgy on September 
24, 1993.   
¶14 In mid-February 1994 Attorney Burgy filed with the 
court an offer of proof and a memorandum in support of a motion 
for the admission of evidence, to which he attached, among other 
exhibits, the page of the psychologist's interview notes that 
recorded the victim's mention of a person other than her father 
as a possible perpetrator of the assault.  Among the other 
attachments were numerous documents not protected by privilege 
or rule of confidentiality, some of which contained information 
from which the victim's identity could be surmised.  At the end 
of the hearing on Attorney Burgy's motion, Attorney Lucareli 
requested and received time to address the issue in writing, and 
he filed a brief on February 25, 1994.   
¶15 The trial of the sexual assault case was scheduled to 
begin Monday, March 7, 1994, and a final hearing on pretrial 
motions was set for late afternoon the preceding Friday.  
Attorney Strong, assistant district attorney for Vilas county, 
overheard Attorney Lucareli make statements twice on Monday, 
February 28, 1994, and once on Tuesday, March 1, 1994, to the 
effect that he wished he had an adjournment of the trial. 
¶16 While preparing the case during the week preceding the 
trial, Attorney Lucareli discovered that the copy of the 
psychologist's notes the court had released was not in his file. 
 When he went to the court file to get a copy and found that the 
No. 97-2389-D 
 
10
notes were in a sealed envelope, he obtained a copy by applying 
to the judge on March 3, 1994.  That afternoon, Assistant 
District Attorney Strong observed Attorney Lucareli pull out the 
page of the psychologist's notes that had been attached to 
Attorney Burgy's motion and state, "This is it."  Attorney 
Lucareli then discussed with Attorney Strong whether the 
psychologist's notes constituted confidential patient health 
care records and whether the trial might be adjourned owing to 
Attorney Burgy's potential conflict of interest by having 
released them in violation of the law.   
¶17 Later that day, Attorney Lucareli asked a sheriff's 
detective to verify facts essential to a criminal charge, 
namely, that a copy of a licensed psychologist's notes was 
attached to Attorney Burgy's motion that was contained in a 
court file accessible to the public.  Attorney Lucareli then 
prepared a criminal complaint alleging that by attaching the 
psychologist's notes to his February 17, 1994, motion for 
admission of evidence, Attorney Burgy had "unlawfully, knowingly 
and willfully" violated the statute prohibiting disclosure of 
confidential 
patient 
health 
care 
records. 
 
The 
criminal 
complaint referred specifically to the psychologist's "care and 
treatment of [the child]."   
¶18 At the final hearing on pretrial motions held the 
following day, March 4, 1994, Attorney Burgy's motion for 
admission of the psychologist's notes remained pending.  At the 
outset of that hearing, Attorney Lucareli served the criminal 
complaint on Attorney Burgy and filed a motion that he be 
No. 97-2389-D 
 
11
removed from further representation of the defendant.  That 
motion was based in part on the allegation that Attorney Burgy's 
defense of the criminal charge filed against him would conflict 
with the defense of his client.  Attorney Lucareli then told the 
court that he would not object to an adjournment of the sexual 
assault trial.  The court denied Attorney Lucareli's motion to 
remove Attorney Burgy as the defendant's counsel, and over the 
ensuing weekend, Attorney Lucareli unsuccessfully sought a stay 
of the trial from the court of appeals so he could file an 
interlocutory appeal of the court's decision.   
¶19 At the start of the trial on March 7, 1994, the court 
again denied Attorney Lucareli's motion to remove Attorney 
Burgy, after questioning the client at length and receiving what 
it considered a knowing waiver of any conflict.  Attorney 
Lucareli then asked the court to seal Attorney Burgy's February 
17, 
1994, 
motion 
with 
its 
attachments, 
including 
the 
psychologist's 
notes, 
and 
the 
court 
granted 
the 
motion.  
However, all of the psychologist's notes were admitted into 
evidence during the first two days of trial.  
¶20 While the trial was in progress, Attorney Lucareli 
learned in a conversation with Attorney Burgy that Attorney 
Burgy's son was hospitalized in the same facility where Attorney 
Lucareli's 
son previously 
had been 
hospitalized 
following 
premature birth.  While awaiting the jury's verdict, Attorney 
Lucareli told Attorney Burgy that he had decided to dismiss the 
criminal charge he had filed against him.  
No. 97-2389-D 
 
12
¶21 After the jury convicted the defendant, Attorney 
Lucareli filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charge against 
Attorney Burgy and subsequently asked the clerk of courts to 
withhold action on the motion while he attempted to have the 
criminal complaint withdrawn.  When that attempt failed, 
Attorney Lucareli's motion to dismiss was granted.   
¶22 On the basis of those facts, the referee concluded 
that the criminal charge Attorney Lucareli issued against 
Attorney Burgy stated probable cause as written but that it was 
based on two incorrect premises: that the minor victim was a 
patient of the psychologist and that the page of notes Attorney 
Burgy had appended to his motion was a confidential patient 
health care record.  While he found that those were facts 
Attorney Lucareli should have known and that they resulted in 
the criminal charge having been wrongly issued, the referee 
found that Attorney Lucareli was not actually aware of the 
incorrect premises of the charge he filed, for he had forgotten 
the argument he had made at the hearing on the psychologist's 
notes six months earlier and the court's ruling.  Consequently, 
the referee concluded that Attorney Lucareli did not issue a 
criminal charge he knew was not supported by probable cause and 
thus did not violate SCR 20:3.8(a).   
¶23 The referee concluded further that Attorney Lucareli's 
filing of an unfounded criminal charge against defense counsel 
on the eve of trial and concurrent filing of a motion for that 
counsel's disqualification based on a conflict allegedly created 
by the criminal charge were not actions taken merely to harass 
No. 97-2389-D 
 
13
or maliciously injure Attorney Burgy and therefore did not 
violate SCR 20:3.1(a)(3).  The referee noted Attorney Lucareli's 
testimony that his motivation for issuing the criminal charge 
against Attorney Burgy was to protect the child victim from 
further disclosure of her identity by Attorney Burgy's use of 
the psychologist's notes.  At the same time, the referee pointed 
out that the victim's identity already had been evident from 
other unprotected documents that were attached to Attorney 
Burgy's motion and that the criminal charge was counter-
productive to accomplishing its professed purpose.  Indeed, the 
referee termed the decision to charge Attorney Burgy "especially 
unwise" because the page of the psychologist's notes that was in 
the court's file had not been discovered by anyone likely to 
publish it, and a criminal charge against a local attorney 
making specific reference to the allegedly confidential document 
and its location would do just the opposite of keeping the 
document from discovery and disclosure. 
¶24 The referee considered that the only explanation for 
Attorney Lucareli's precipitous filing and then dismissing the 
criminal charge against Attorney Burgy, other than the one that 
led the circuit court, the court of appeals and others to 
conclude that he had done so maliciously, was that his judgment 
"was clouded by emotion."  The referee referred to Attorney 
Lucareli's testimony that he decided to file the charge in large 
part because he was "incensed" by the thought of how the child 
victim and her mother would feel if intimate details of the 
alleged sexual assault were made public by the media as a result 
No. 97-2389-D 
 
14
of Attorney Burgy's having filed the psychologist's notes, as 
well as by how he would feel if that had happened to his own 
child.  In regard to his decision at the end of the trial to 
dismiss the criminal charge, he testified that he had developed 
a sympathy for Attorney Burgy as a father struggling with his 
child's hospitalization where Attorney Lucareli's son had been 
hospitalized earlier.   
¶25 While acknowledging "nagging uncertainty over the true 
nature of [Attorney Lucareli's] motivation" in filing the 
criminal charge, the referee concluded that the evidence was not 
clear and satisfactory that Attorney Lucareli's motivation was 
improper.  The referee found the lack of clear and satisfactory 
evidence on that issue equally applicable to the allegations 
that Attorney Lucareli had filed the charge merely to harass or 
maliciously injure a person and that he maintained a proceeding 
that appeared to him to be unjust.  Accordingly, the referee 
recommended that the allegations that Attorney Lucareli violated 
SCR 20:3.1(a)(3) and SCR 40.15 be dismissed. 
¶26 The referee declined Attorney Lucareli's request to 
recommend assessment of costs he incurred in the disciplinary 
proceeding against the Board, having considered the disciplinary 
proceeding a justifiable response to the decisions of the trial 
court and the court of appeals holding that Attorney Lucareli 
had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct that warranted setting 
aside a sexual assault of a child conviction and granting a new 
trial.  The referee also considered that Attorney Lucareli's 
legal error in filing the criminal charge against defense 
No. 97-2389-D 
 
15
counsel justifiably resulted in the Board's filing the complaint 
in this proceeding, as well as the necessity of a full 
evidentiary hearing for both parties to examine and present 
evidence regarding Attorney Lucareli's motivation.   
¶27 In this appeal, the Board first argued that the 
referee erred in refusing to apply the doctrine of issue 
preclusion to establish Attorney Lucareli's motivation in filing 
the criminal charge against defense counsel and moving to 
disqualify him.  The Board asserted that the circuit and 
appellate court decisions on the motion for new trial should 
have been given conclusive effect to establish that Attorney 
Lucareli did not have probable cause to file a criminal charge 
against Attorney Burgy, that he issued that charge knowing it 
was not supported by probable cause, and that his doing so 
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys.  It 
was the Board's position that the "identical issues" had been 
litigated in the circuit court and in the court of appeals, not 
only by the named party to those proceedings -- the State -- but 
also by Attorney Lucareli, who testified in the trial court that 
he had filed the charge in order to protect the sexual assault 
victim and to ensure that defense counsel filed no additional 
medical reports identifying her. 
¶28 The Board's argument fails.  As the referee concluded, 
Attorney Lucareli did not have a full and exhaustive opportunity 
to litigate those issues in the trial court proceeding on the 
new trial motion or on review in the court of appeals.  He was 
not personally a party to either of those proceedings and, as a 
No. 97-2389-D 
 
16
result, did not have an adequate opportunity to present evidence 
on his own behalf or to litigate the issue of the motivation for 
his conduct.  Moreover, because he was not himself a party, he 
had no right to seek review of the decision of the court of 
appeals.  Under the two-step analysis discussed in Paige K.B. v. 
Steven G.B., 226 Wis. 2d 210, 224, 594 N.W.2d 370 (1999), 
Attorney Lucareli was not in privity or did not have sufficient 
identity of interest with the State in the proceedings on the 
new trial motion, with the result that applying issue preclusion 
to him on the basis of those proceedings would violate his due 
process rights.   
¶29 The Board's second argument is that the referee 
applied an erroneous standard in concluding that Attorney 
Lucareli did not "know" that the criminal charge he filed 
against Attorney Burgy was not in fact supported by probable 
cause.  The Board argued that the appropriate standard to 
determine whether Attorney Lucareli had the knowledge required 
for  a  violation of  SCR 20:3.8(a) is a negligence-type 
standard -- what he "should have known" or "should have been 
expected to know."  In that respect, the Board pointed to the 
referee's finding that when he filed the criminal charge, 
Attorney Lucareli "should have known" that the circuit court had 
determined that the psychologist's notes were not confidential 
patient 
health 
care 
records 
statutorily 
entitled 
to 
confidentiality. 
¶30 That argument ignores or, at least, urges a departure 
from the explicit provision of the Terminology section of the 
No. 97-2389-D 
 
17
Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, SCR chapter 20:  
"'Knowingly,' 'Known,' or 'Knows' denotes actual knowledge of 
the fact in question.  A person's knowledge may be inferred from 
circumstances."  Notwithstanding the referee's findings that the 
issuance of the criminal charge against Attorney Burgy was wrong 
because Attorney Lucareli should have known that one of the 
elements of the crime charged was not present and that therefore 
the complaint was not supported by probable cause, the referee 
concluded that Attorney Lucareli did not "know," that is, did 
not have actual knowledge, at the time he filed the criminal 
charge that it was defective.   
¶31 The Board in effect has asked the court to replace 
"knows" with "reasonably should know" for purposes of SCR 
20:3.8(a).  Yet, the Terminology section of SCR chapter 20 
separately 
addresses 
the 
term 
"reasonably 
should 
know": 
"'Reasonably 
should 
know' . . . denotes 
that 
a 
lawyer 
of  
reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in 
question."  In light of the trial court's holding that the 
psychologist's notes were not confidential patient health care 
records -- a decision reached less than six months prior to the 
filing of the criminal charge and only after Attorney Lucareli 
presented argument on the issue -- the referee found that 
Attorney Lucareli should have known that the criminal charge was 
improper, but he applied the correct standard when he concluded 
that for purposes of SCR 20:3.8(a), he did not have "actual 
knowledge" of that fact, nor was such knowledge to be inferred 
from the surrounding circumstances.   
No. 97-2389-D 
 
18
¶32 The Board has not shown the referee's findings in 
respect to Attorney Lucareli's knowledge of the non-confidential 
nature of the psychologist's notes to be clearly erroneous.  
They were based on his assessment of the credibility of Attorney 
Lucareli's testimony and on the testimony of several character 
witnesses.  A reviewing court defers to the finder of fact on 
matters decided on the basis of witness credibility, absent an 
erroneous exercise of discretion or an error of law. 
¶33 In its final argument, the Board contended that the 
evidence in the record does not support the referee's finding 
that when filing the criminal charge against defense counsel, 
Attorney Lucareli had forgotten the trial court's ruling that 
the psychologist's notes were not confidential.  We find no 
merit to the Board's contention that because Attorney Lucareli 
never used the word "forgot" in any of its forms while 
testifying, his testimony was "evasive and incomplete."  The 
referee 
explicitly 
found 
persuasive 
Attorney 
Lucareli's 
testimony that he "did not remember" the trial court ruling on 
the nature of the psychologist's notes when he prepared and 
filed the criminal complaint against defense counsel, that he 
was "not conscious of the ruling," that he "did not know -- he 
had forgotten -- that the [confidential patient health care 
record statute] did not apply," and that he "did not 'know' at 
the time that the criminal complaint was defective."  The 
referee also considered Attorney Lucareli's testimony that when 
he went to the clerk of court's office to review the 
psychologist's notes, he found them sealed, as if they were 
No. 97-2389-D 
 
19
confidential records.  Here, too, the referee's finding was 
based 
on 
his 
assessment 
of 
the 
credibility 
of 
Attorney 
Lucareli's testimony.  
¶34 Having determined, then, that the referee did not err 
in refusing to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion in respect 
to Attorney Lucareli's conduct in filing the criminal charge, 
that 
the 
referee 
applied 
the 
correct 
standard -- actual 
knowledge -- to the "knowledge" element of SCR 20:3.8(a), and 
that the referee's finding that Attorney Lucareli did not know 
at the time he filed the criminal charge that it was not 
supported by probable cause has not been shown to be clearly 
erroneous, we turn to the remaining issue raised in the cross-
appeal: whether Attorney Lucareli is entitled to statutory 
costs.  Attorney Lucareli argued that the rules of civil 
procedure, specifically, Wis. Stat. § 814.03,5 provide that if a 
plaintiff in a proceeding is not entitled to costs, costs shall 
be allowed to the defendant.  He noted that, pursuant to SCR 
22.23(2),6 the rules of civil procedure apply in attorney 
disciplinary proceedings "except as otherwise provided in the 
rules [governing disciplinary proceedings]." 
                     
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 814.03 provides, in pertinent part: 
Costs to defendant. (1) If the plaintiff is not entitled to 
costs under s. 814.01 (1) or (3), the defendant shall be allowed 
costs to be computed on the basis of the demands of the 
complaint. 
6 SCR 22.23(2) provides: 
 
(2) The rules of civil procedure apply in disciplinary 
proceedings except as otherwise provided in the rules. 
No. 97-2389-D 
 
20
¶35 There is no merit to Attorney Lucareli's argument, as 
one of the rules of procedure governing attorney disciplinary 
proceedings, SCR 22.20,7 makes specific provision for the 
assessment of costs.  It makes no provision, however, for an 
award of costs to the respondent attorney when the disciplinary 
proceeding is dismissed.  Moreover, Attorney Lucareli presented 
no persuasive argument that he is entitled to statutory costs 
merely 
because 
the 
dismissal 
of 
this 
proceeding 
renders 
assessment 
of 
costs against 
him 
in 
favor 
of 
the 
Board 
unwarranted.  The referee made specific findings that court 
decisions 
holding 
that 
Attorney 
Lucareli 
engaged 
in 
                     
7 SCR 22.20 provides: Assessment of costs.  
(1) The supreme court may assess all or part of the costs 
of the proceeding against the respondent and enter a judgment 
for costs. The board may assess all or part of the costs of a 
proceeding in which the board imposes discipline pursuant to SCR 
21.09(2). Costs are payable to the board.  
(2) In seeking the assessment of costs by the supreme 
court, the board shall file a statement of costs within 20 days 
of the filing of the referee's report with the court, provided 
that, in the event an appeal of the referee's report is filed or 
the supreme court orders briefs to be filed in response to the 
referee's report, the statement of costs shall be filed within 
14 days of the date on which the appeal is assigned for 
submission to the court or the briefs ordered by the court are 
filed. Objection to the statement of costs shall be filed by 
motion within 10 days of service of the statement of costs. 
(3) Upon the assessment of costs by the supreme court, the 
clerk shall issue a judgment for costs and furnish a transcript 
of the judgment to the board. The transcript may be filed and 
docketed in the office of the clerk of court in any county and 
shall have the same force and effect as judgments docketed 
pursuant to ss. 809.25 and 806.16 of the statutes.  
No. 97-2389-D 
 
21
prosecutorial misconduct justified the Board's commencing this 
proceeding and that it was Attorney Lucareli's legal error in 
filing 
the 
criminal 
charge 
against 
defense 
counsel 
that 
necessitated full litigation of the issues.  
¶36 We 
adopt 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law that the Board failed to establish by clear 
and satisfactory evidence that Attorney Lucareli filed a 
criminal charge knowing it was not supported by probable cause. 
 We 
also 
accept 
the 
referee's 
recommendation 
that 
this 
proceeding be dismissed without costs to either party. 
¶37 IT IS ORDERED that the disciplinary proceeding is 
dismissed. 
¶38 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
 
 
 
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