Case Title: CARL O. CARLSON, JR. v. E. LEVA CARLSON AND CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY, A NATIONAL BANK

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
CARL O. CARLSON, JR. v. E. LEVA CARLSON AND CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY, A NATIONAL BANK1989 WY 126775 P.2d 478Case Number: 88-237Decided: 06/02/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
CARL O. CARLSON, JR., 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

E. LEVA CARLSON AND 
CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY, A NATIONAL BANK, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofGoshenCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

Raymond W. 
Martin, Godfrey, Sundahl & Jorgenson, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Raymond B. 
Hunkins, Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, for appellee, E. Leva 
Carlson.

Frank J. Jones, 
Wheatland, for appellee, Citizens Nat. 
Bank & Trust Co.

Before THOMAS, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., BROWN, J., 
Retired, and LEIMBACK, District Judge.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In this case, the court 
is asked to resolve the question of whether an ambiguity exists in two farm 
leases and an agreement providing for improvements to the farm by the tenant, 
considered separately or collectively, which inhibits the construction of the 
documents as a matter of law. Inherent to this problem is the issue of whether 
any ambiguity serves to structure a genuine issue of material fact with the 
result that deciding the case by summary judgment would be inappropriate. The 
district court entered a summary judgment in favor of the landlord, ruling that 
the documents "read separately or in conjunction with each other, are clear and 
unambiguous." A summary judgment also was entered in favor of a bank that was a 
creditor of the landlord on the ground that the bank's actions did not interfere 
with the contractual relationship between the tenant and the landlord, or that 
the bank's actions were justified by its economic interest. The court is 
convinced that an ambiguity is present in the documents, which presents a 
genuine issue of material fact as to the intent of the parties, and that genuine 
issues as to other material facts require a trial in this case. The summary 
judgment entered by the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for 
trial.

[¶2.]     The case was instituted 
by Carl O. Carlson, Jr. (Carl Carlson), the tenant in the relationship, alleging 
a contractual right to an option; breach of that contract by his mother, E. Leva 
Carlson (Leva Carlson), the landlord in the relationship; wrongful interference 
with the contractual relationship by the Citizens National Bank & Trust 
Company (Citizens Bank); and a conspiracy between Leva Carlson and Citizens Bank 
and between Citizens Bank and Leva Carlson. Carl Carlson sought damages, 
punitive damages, and a declaratory judgment with respect to his rights under 
the instruments. He did make an appropriate demand for a jury 
trial.

[¶3.]     Leva Carlson answered, 
denying those allegations of Carl Carlson's complaint upon which relief to him 
could be based, presenting affirmative defenses, and counterclaiming for damages 
for slander of title; wrongful interference with her contract for the listing of 
the farm for sale; the chilling of her sale of the farm; emotional distress; and 
economic loss for breach of the lease. Leva Carlson also alleged that the 
contractual provisions controlled the relationship of the parties, and she also 
sought a declaratory judgment of the rights under the instruments. Citizens Bank 
answered, denying liability upon any of the grounds for recovery asserted in 
Carl Carlson's complaint, and it pleaded affirmative defenses including its good 
faith protection of its economic interest.

[¶4.]     Following Carl 
Carlson's answer to Leva Carlson's counterclaims, in which he denied liability 
under any of the theories asserted by her, discovery was conducted. Then 
Defendant Citizens National Bank & Trust Co. filed its Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Several days later, Defendant E. Leva Carlson's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment was presented. About the same time, Carl Carlson moved to amend 
his complaint, and the court ultimately permitted the 
amendment.

[¶5.]     At this juncture, the 
case was interrupted by the proceedings reflected in Carlson v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 
1988). Then, following Carl Carlson's resistance to the respective motions for 
summary judgment, Citizens Bank filed a Supplemental Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The court wrote a decision letter, and entered Summary Judgments in 
favor of Leva Carlson and Citizens Bank and a Summary Judgment Order Nunc Pro 
Tunc. Carl Carlson now appeals the court's findings.

[¶6.]     In his Brief of 
Appellant, Carl Carlson offers this statement of the 
issues:

"I. Issues Pertaining to 
Appellee E. Leva Carlson:

"1. Did the 1973 
Agreement between Appellee E. Leva Carlson (hereinafter Leva) and Appellant Carl 
O. Carlson (hereinafter Carl) create merely a nonbinding `improvement 
agreement', or did the parties to the contract intend to provide for an 
exclusive binding purchase option and lifetime lease?

"2. Does an ambiguity 
exist in the 1973 agreement?

"3. Does the doctrine of 
estoppel intervene to preclude Leva Carlson's denial of her oral and written 
intentions to grant to Carl Carlson a lifetime lease with an exclusive option to 
purchase the farm upon her death?

"II. Issues Pertaining to 
Appellee Citizens National Bank and Trust Company:

"1. Is it necessary to 
find a valid contractual relationship between Leva and Carl Carlson in order to 
support an allegation of tortious interference with contractual 
relations?

"2. Can Citizens National 
Bank and Trust Company's (hereinafter CNB) actions be classified as justifiable 
under a theory of economic justification?"

In the Brief of 
Appellee submitted by Mrs. E. Leva Carlson, the following counter-statement of 
the issues appears:

"1. Are each of the three 
agreements involved in this case, considered separately, clear and 
unambiguous?

"2. If each of the three 
agreements, considered separately, are clear and unambiguous, are they 
inconsistent or mutually exclusive of each other?

"3. If both the 1973 
agreement and the 1985 lease agreement are clear and unambiguous, and are not 
inconsistent or mutually exclusive, did the trial court correctly apply their 
provisions by holding that Mrs. Carlson had a right to terminate the lease and 
sell her farm?"

In the Brief of 
Appellee submitted by Citizens Bank, only one issue is stated as 
follows:

"Did the district court 
judge err in granting summary judgment to Citizens National Bank & Trust 
Co.?"

[¶7.]     The dispute centers 
around a lease arrangement for the family farm entered into by Carl Carlson and 
his wife, as operators, and, initially, his father and his mother, Leva Carlson, 
as owners. The family moved to this farm when Carl Carlson was nine years old, 
and he lived there until he finished high school in 1954. He then left home to 
work at the Guernsey coal mine. In 1959, Carl 
Carlson was married, but he continued to contribute time to assisting with the 
farm from 1959 to 1967. In 1966, Carl Carlson's father quit farming because he 
was afflicted with multiple sclerosis. Carl Carlson's brother then operated the 
farm through 1969, but his skills were not suited to that effort. Since 1969, 
and up until this litigation, Carl Carlson has operated the farm 
continuously.

[¶8.]     In 1970, Carl Carlson 
and his wife entered into a written lease with his father and his mother, Leva 
Carlson. That lease continued in existence until 1985, pursuant to its provision 
that:

"This AGREEMENT to remain 
effective from year to year unless notice of termination is received by the 
operator [Carl O. Carlson, Jr., and Carol J. Carlson] at least 60 days prior to 
the end of crop year."

In 1973, an 
agreement was made between Carl Carlson and Leva Carlson which provided for the 
development of improvements on the farm. The recited consideration for Leva 
Carlson's promises was the improvements which were to be made by Carl Carlson. 
In addition, Carl Carlson agreed to pay any increase in real property taxes 
attributable to those improvements. That 1973 agreement identified Leva Carlson 
as the FIRST PARTY and Carl Carlson as the SECOND PARTY and provided, in 
critical part, as follows:

"3. In the event of the 
death of the FIRST PARTY, for and in consideration of the improvements placed 
upon the premises by the SECOND PARTY, the FIRST PARTY does hereby give and 
grant unto the SECOND PARTY an exclusive option to purchase the above described 
real property, together with any and all improvements thereon, for the total 
purchase price of $76,425.00, which option shall be exercised as 
follows:

* * * * * 
*

"4. In the event that the 
SECOND PARTY shall suffer death, become incapacitated or for any reason cease to 
rent the above described property, the above described option shall terminate 
and be cancelled and the value of said improvements placed upon the premises 
shall be evaluated and payment made by the FIRST PARTY to the SECOND PARTY as 
follows:"

* * * * * 
*

This 1973 
agreement encompassed a specific description of the farm property, which had not 
been included in the 1970 lease. In addition, the agreement contained the 
following language:

"* * * WHEREAS, the FIRST 
PARTY is the owner of certain real property, hereinafter described, which she 
leases and intends to continue to lease to the SECOND PARTY, * * 
*."

[¶9.]     The lease which was 
entered into in July of 1985 also included the same description of the premises 
found in the 1973 agreement. It specifically provided, in parts that are 
pertinent to this dispute, as follows:

"If lease is not renewed 
Lessee has the right to plant previous years summer fallow to spring crop and 
harvest it.

* * * * * 
*

"This lease will 
automatically renew annually on March 1 of each year unless either party gives 
written notice to the other party on or before January 1 of their intention to 
terminate the lease."

[¶10.]  Leva Carlson was indebted to Citizens 
Bank and, sometime prior to March of 1985, the bank became concerned about 
collecting the debt. It proposed that Leva Carlson should either execute a 
mortgage of the real estate to the bank; refinance her debt with another 
institution and pay the bank; or sell the farm and pay the bank. She did execute 
a mortgage to the bank in March of 1985 and, thereafter, the lease with Carl 
Carlson was executed. Then, Citizens Bank demanded that the loan be satisfied in 
full by February of 1987 and, once again, offered the proposal that Leva Carlson 
should sell the property and apply the proceeds toward her debt. Because the 
1973 agreement appeared to constitute a cloud on the title of Leva Carlson, a 
decision was made that the lease should be terminated and, in 1986, Leva Carlson 
advised Carl Carlson that she would terminate the lease as of March 1, 1987. The 
assumption in connection with the termination of the lease was that the option 
was abrogated because the termination of the lease invoked that part of the 1973 
agreement which provided:

"4. In the event that the 
SECOND PARTY shall * * * for any reason cease to rent the above described 
property, the above described option shall terminate * * 
*."

This was the 
interpretation that the district court accepted in entering the summary judgment 
in this case.1

[¶11.]  While the district court addressed the 
interpretation of these three instruments as separate documents or, 
alternatively, as documents to be read in conjunction with one another, it is 
clear that the agreement between Carl Carlson and Leva Carlson did consist of 
more than one document which is subject to construction as an integrated 
document according to our precedent. Hensley v. Williams, 726 P.2d 90 
(Wyo. 1986); Dawson v. Lohn, 705 P.2d 853 (Wyo. 1985); Marcam Mortgage Corporation v. Black, 686 P.2d 575 (Wyo. 1984); Busch Development, Inc. v. 
City of Cheyenne, 645 P.2d 65 (Wyo. 1982); Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137 (Wyo. 1976). The 1973 
agreement alludes to the fact that the property is leased by Leva Carlson to 
Carl Carlson. The only document relating to such a lease was the 1970 lease 
agreement. While the 1985 lease does not specifically allude to the 1973 
agreement, the identical real property is described. When separate documents, 
such as these, relate to the rights of the same parties in the same property, it 
is appropriate that they be treated as one agreement and construed as 
such.

[¶12.]  In the context of a summary judgment 
relating to a contract dispute, if ambiguity results in any doubt about the 
meaning of a written instrument, an issue of fact is present to be tried, and 
summary judgment is inappropriate. See Shauers v. Board of CountyCommissioners of SweetwaterCounty, 746 P.2d 444 (Wyo. 1987); Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Wyoming, 609 P.2d 984 (Wyo. 1980); Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders of Canada 
Ltd. v. Y-Tex Corporation, 590 P.2d 1306 (Wyo. 1979). Conversely, a summary judgment 
appropriately may be entered when the only issue involves the construction of a 
written agreement clearly expressing the intention of the parties. J & M 
Investments v. Davis, 726 P.2d 96 (Wyo. 1986); Ricci v. New 
Hampshire Insurance Company, 721 P.2d 1081 (Wyo. 1986); Wyoming Game 
& Fish Commission v. Mills Company, 701 P.2d 819 (Wyo. 1985); Kuehne v. Samedan Oil Corporation, 626 P.2d 1035 (Wyo. 1981); Madison v. Marlatt, 619 P.2d 708 (Wyo. 
1980).

[¶13.]  This summary judgment rule dovetails with 
our general proposition that the construction of a contract is a matter of law 
for the court if the terms of the agreement are clear. Milligan v. Big Valley 
Corporation, 754 P.2d 1063 (Wyo. 1988); Nelson v. Nelson, 740 P.2d 939 (Wyo. 
1987); Wyoming Recreation Commission v. Hagar, 711 P.2d 402 (Wyo. 1985); 
Kelliher v. Herman, 701 P.2d 1157 (Wyo. 1985); Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam 
Homes, Inc., 664 P.2d 27 (Wyo. 1983); Rouse v. Munroe, 658 P.2d 74 (Wyo. 1983); 
Tate v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Company, 647 P.2d 58 (Wyo. 1982); Amoco 
Production Company v. Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyoming, 612 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 
1980); Engle v. First National Bank of Chugwater, 590 P.2d 826 (Wyo. 1979). If, however, 
the meaning of the contract is ambiguous or not apparent, making it necessary to 
determine the intention of the parties from evidence other than the contract 
itself, interpretation then becomes a mixed question of law and fact. Mobile 
Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985); WorlandSchool 
District v. Bowman, 445 P.2d 364 (Wyo. 1968), dismissed on appeal after remand 531 P.2d 889 
(Wyo. 1975); Goodman v. Kelly, 390 P.2d 244 
(Wyo. 1964). 
In applying these rules, the question of whether there is an ambiguity is a 
question of law. Hensley; Kelliher; Burk v. Burzynski, 672 P.2d 419 (Wyo. 1983); Hursh; 
Amoco.

[¶14.]  In this instance, we are persuaded that 
an ambiguity is present when these instruments are scrutinized as one agreement. 
We cannot find assurance as to what the parties intended from the face of the 
documents, and the other evidence submitted in connection with the consideration 
of the motions for summary judgment demonstrates genuine issues as to whether 
the parties intended the lease to be terminable at the option of Leva Carlson. 
If Carl Carlson did not have a continuing right to lease this farm, then the 
option granted to him in the 1973 agreement truly is illusory. We do not favor, 
and avoid, a construction of a contract rendering a provision thereof 
meaningless because each provision is presumed to have some purpose. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission; Kuehne; Tri-County Elec. 
Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Gillette, 584 P.2d 995 
(Wyo. 
1978).

[¶15.]  Of more significance is our rule that a 
contract is ambiguous which is obscure in its meaning because of indefiniteness 
of expression or because of the presence of a double meaning. Farr v. Link, 746 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 1987); Rouse, 658 P.2d 74; Busch, 645 P.2d 65; Amoco, 612 P.2d 463; Y-Tex Corporation, 590 P.2d 1306; Bulis v. Wells, 565 P.2d 487 (Wyo. 1977). 
We note that the 1973 agreement expresses an intent on the part of Leva Carlson 
to continue to lease to Carl Carlson. That intention is expressed even though 
the then existing agreement for the lease of the farm apparently contemplated a 
notice of termination from the owner to the operator. Furthermore, it is 
impossible to tell whether the provision for a written notice to terminate the 
lease in the 1985 lease was intended to provide for termination, thereby 
invalidating the option, in the unfettered discretion of Leva Carlson. Affording 
Leva Carlson that control would make her promise of an option in favor of Carl 
Carlson illusory.

[¶16.]  The contention of Leva Carlson is that 
her right to terminate the lease under the 1985 agreement triggers the language 
of paragraph four of the 1973 agreement, in effect invoking the termination and 
cancellation of the option, because Carl Carlson ceased to rent the property 
"for any reason." In Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971), the 
verb "rent" in its transitive form connotes "to take and hold under an agreement 
to pay rent: pay rent for" or "to grant the possession or enjoyment of for rent: 
hire out." In its intransitive form, the verb "rent" means "to obtain the 
possession and use of a place or article for rent" or "to allow the possession 
and use of for rent." The word itself possesses a double meaning. In the context 
of paragraph four of the 1973 agreement, the phrase "to rent" with Carl Carlson 
as the subject relates to events that he, not Leva Carlson, would in some manner 
control. The notion that the right to terminate set forth in the 1985 lease 
agreement adjusts the meaning of the 1973 agreement, in this regard, manifests 
ambiguity.

[¶17.]  The summary judgment in favor of Leva 
Carlson entered by the trial court must be reversed. Under the cases cited 
above, ambiguity is present with respect to the meaning of the contract between 
the parties as represented by the three separate documents. That creates a 
genuine issue of fact as to what these parties intended with respect to the 
right of Leva Carlson to terminate the lease and its impact upon the option 
granted to Carl Carlson to purchase upon Leva Carlson's death. This question of 
intent is material and must be adjudicated by the finder of fact which, in this 
instance, is a jury.

[¶18.]  The summary judgment in favor of Citizens 
Bank also must be reversed. In its decision letter, the district court 
articulated two justifications for that summary judgment. The first was that an 
option in favor of Carl Carlson did not exist and, for that reason, the bank 
could not interfere with such a contractual relationship. The district court 
also said that any advice furnished by the bank to Leva Carlson could not be 
construed as interference if made by the bank for the purpose of collecting its 
own debt and, in effect, the district court found that the bank acted only for 
the purpose of collecting its own debt.

[¶19.]  In its brief, Citizens Bank correctly 
articulates the elements of a claim of tortious interference with a contract. In 
Board of Trustees of Weston County School District No. 1 v. Holso, 584 P.2d 1009, 1016-17, reh. denied 587 P.2d 203 (Wyo. 1978), we said that those 
are:

"(1) [T]he existence of a 
valid contractual relationship or business expectancy;

"(2) knowledge of the 
relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferor;

"(3) intentional 
interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or 
expectancy; and

"(4) resultant damage to 
the party whose relationship or expectancy has been 
disrupted."

These elements 
have been applied in Toltec Watershed Improvement District v. Johnston, 717 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1986); Erickson v. Magill, 713 P.2d 1182 (Wyo. 1986); Dehnert v. Arrow Sprinklers, Inc., 705 P.2d 846 (Wyo. 1985); Basin Electric Power 
Cooperative - Missouri Power Project v. Howton, 603 P.2d 402 (Wyo. 1979). In Toltec, 
717 P.2d  at 814, we adopted language from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
766 at 26-27 (1979), when we said:

"Factors to be considered 
for the action are listed as follows:

"`In determining whether 
an actor's conduct in intentionally interfering with a contract or a prospective 
contractual relation of another is improper or not, consideration is given to 
the following factors:

"`(a) the nature of the 
actor's conduct,

"`(b) the actor's 
motive,

"`(c) the interests of 
the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,

"`(d) the interests 
sought to be advanced by the actor,

"`(e) the social 
interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual 
interests of the other,

"`(f) the proximity or 
remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and

"`(g) the relations 
between the parties.'"

[¶20.]  Since we hold that the option of Carl 
Carlson cannot be disposed of as a matter of law but, instead, involves 
questions of fact, the determination of the district court, as a matter of law, 
that there was no contract to be interfered with must fall. Our general rule is 
that, in reviewing a summary judgment, we examine the record in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion and give to that party all the 
favorable inferences that might be drawn from the facts in the record. E.g., 
Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 773 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1989); Spurlock v. Ely, 707 P.2d 188 (Wyo. 1985); Minnehoma Financial Company v. Pauli, 565 P.2d 835 (Wyo. 1977); Shrum v. Zeltwanger, 559 P.2d 1384 (Wyo. 
1977). Our examination of this record persuades us that there are facts from 
which the finder of fact might infer that the 1973 agreement did, as a matter of 
valid contract, create an option in Carl Carlson not subject to revocation at 
the discretion of Leva Carlson; Citizens Bank knew of the 1973 agreement and the 
effect of it; Citizens Bank was instrumental in causing Leva Carlson to insist 
upon the new 1985 lease and then the termination of the lease with the purpose 
of eliminating the option so as to create a clear title in Leva Carlson; in 
light of the value of the farm and the amount of the indebtedness to the bank, 
this course of action was not necessary and, certainly, could result in damages 
to Carl Carlson, not only in the loss of his option, but incidental damages as 
well. We also are persuaded that the summary judgment in favor of Citizens Bank 
cannot be sustained as a matter of law on the premise of its privilege to 
protect its economic interest. First, Citizens Bank must establish that it has 
an economic interest needing protection. Then, it must demonstrate that its 
actions, including what otherwise could be found to be tortious interference 
with Carl Carlson's contract, were taken in good faith and were reasonably 
justified for the purpose of protecting its economic interest. Toltec, 717 P.2d 
at 813-15; Wartensleben v. Willey, 415 P.2d 613 (Wyo. 1966). This defense of protecting an 
economic interest is, in substance, an affirmative defense as to which Citizens 
Bank has the burden of proof. See Miller v. Badgley, 51 Wn. App. 285, 753 P.2d 530 (1988). See also DeCoria v. Red's Trailer Mart, Inc., 5 Wn. App. 892, 491 P.2d 241 (Wash. App. 1971). After affording Carl Carlson the benefit of all 
favorable inferences, we conclude that Citizens Bank has not sufficiently 
carried its burden of demonstrating a prima facie case that justified its 
summary judgment. Considering the factors articulated in Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 766, in conjunction with these propositions, the claims against Citizens 
Bank cannot be decided as a matter of law but must be submitted to the jury for 
its determination.

[¶21.]  The Summary Judgment Order Nunc Pro Tunc 
entered by the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 This record, indeed, 
engenders sympathy for both Carl and Leva Carlson. Having devoted more than 
twenty years to managing and assisting in the operation of the family farm, Carl 
Carlson was confronted with the loss of his expectation to continue operating 
the farm. This expectancy had both economic and sentimental value for him. Leva 
Carlson had no income other than a social security pension and her share of the 
farm income, which did not always meet the obligations she owed with respect to 
the farm. Her lifestyle in her declining years is aptly described as 
bleak.