Case Title: Jones v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 17, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2011-09-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
MARCELLOUS JONES, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  Nos. 16/17, 2010 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
) Cr. ID No. 0903 020716 and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 0903 010114 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  June 15, 2011 
Decided:  September 2, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, JACOBS, RIDGELY Justices and 
NOBLE, Vice Chancellor* constituting the Court en banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED. 
 
 
Thomas A. Foley, Wilmington, Delaware for appellant. 
 
 
Gregory E. Smith, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for 
appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. Art. IV Sec. 12. 
2 
 
 
The police arrested Marcellous Jones at a private party in Newark, Delaware 
for drug related offenses.  Based on evidence seized on the night of Jones’s arrest, 
a magistrate issued a warrant to search his home.  Executing this warrant, police 
discovered drugs and firearms in Jones’s residence.  Jones attempted to suppress 
all the items seized as fruit of an illegal seizure and invalid search warrant.  A 
Superior Court judge denied Jones’s motions to suppress, rejecting both 
arguments.  After a trial at which the items seized from his residence were not in 
issue, a jury convicted Jones of drug crimes committed on the evening of his arrest.  
After a separately stipulated trial, a judge convicted Jones of additional drug and 
firearm offenses relating to the items seized from his home.  Jones appeals both 
convictions, contending that the Superior Court judge erred by denying his motions 
to suppress.  In this opinion, we consider Jones’s appeals together.  Because the 
police illegally seized Jones when they obtained the drugs leading to his initial 
arrest, the evidence against him, including evidence seized from Jones’s home, 
constitutes inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree.  We accordingly REVERSE. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On the evening of March 13, 2009, Cheryl Hollingsworth held a private 
party at the Plumber and Pipefitter’s Banquet Facility in Newark to celebrate the 
release of a DVD her son had produced.  Hollingsworth arranged for volunteers 
from the Thunderguards Motorcycle Club, including Appellant Marcellous Jones, 
3 
 
to provide security at the event.  Although Hollingsworth did not pay the 
Thunderguards, she contemplated making a donation to their local chapter. 
Late that evening, Delaware State Police Corporal Chris Popp responded to 
the banquet hall because “a group of individuals [was] providing security for either 
a dance or some type of CD release party, and it was believed that these 
individuals did not possess a security license to provide or act as a security 
agency.”  When Popp arrived, several Thunderguards were already outside talking 
with other police officers.  Popp overheard his colleague, Lieutenant Ford, 
explaining that, “[w]e are just here to check security status.” 
Popp and a Lieutenant Sapp then entered the vestibule of the banquet 
facility.  Popp knew which persons were providing security because they were 
standing at the doorway checking guests as they arrived, and they were wearing the 
Thunderguards jackets and clothing.  Sapp identified these persons, including 
Jones, and asked them, “[c]ould you step outside so we [can] obtain information to 
inquire on security status?”  All of the Thunderguards—including Jones—
complied with Sapp’s request. 
Outside the banquet facility, approximately ten police officers congregated 
in the driveway in a semicircle formation surrounding the front entrance of the 
building.  About twelve to fifteen Thunderguards were standing on the sidewalk 
adjacent to that driveway.  Popp acknowledged that, “[t]he members of this 
4 
 
security detail were surrounded by law enforcement on three sides, and directly 
behind them was the building.”  The police were “obtaining and documenting [the 
Thunderguards’] information.” 
Delaware State Police Detective Dudzinski then asked Jones for his 
identification.  Jones replied, “I already provided it to somebody else.”  Jones then 
“made his way back to [a] little garden area next to the corner of the building 
behind everybody else.”  Probation Officer Mark Lewis was standing near Jones 
and “heard something, a sound like something hit the ground.”  Lewis observed 
what he believed to be a package of illegal drugs on the ground.  The package 
contained 24 grams of cocaine in 22 separate baggies.  Popp then heard Lewis 
inquire, “[d]oes anybody want this [c]ocaine that Mr. Jones dropped.”  Police 
arrested Jones, and the search incident to the arrest yielded 40 Oxycodone pills and 
$2,951 in cash. 
As a result of this arrest and the discovery of drugs, on March 24, 2009 the 
police obtained a warrant to search Jones’s home at 1003 Liberty Road in 
Wilmington.  The search warrant application identified the evidence seized at the 
banquet hall, as well as Popp’s opinion that the packaging of the drugs and 
presence of a large sum of cash indicated a drug dealing operation.  The affidavit 
supporting the search warrant application also detailed the history of drug activity 
at Jones’s home by his brother and nephew who were at that time incarcerated on 
5 
 
drug charges.  Pursuant to the search warrant, the police searched Jones’s residence 
and discovered more cocaine and two firearms with obliterated serial numbers.  
Police arrested Jones again on March 27, 2009. 
On April 13, 2009, a New Castle County grand jury indicted Jones for 
various crimes arising out of the events of March 13, 2009, including trafficking in 
cocaine (10-50 grams), possession with intent to deliver cocaine, possession of 
cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. On June 22, 2009, Jones filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence seized at the banquet hall.  A Superior Court judge 
held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress on July 17, 2009, and denied 
the motion on September 11, 2009.1  Thereafter, the State dropped the drug 
paraphernalia charge and the Superior Court judge dismissed the charge of 
possession of cocaine.  After a two day trial beginning on September 15, 2009, a 
jury found Jones guilty of trafficking in cocaine and of possession with intent to 
deliver. 
On April 27, 2009 a grand jury indicted Jones for separate crimes unrelated 
to the events of March 13, based on the evidence police later seized from his home.  
These offenses include trafficking in cocaine and other related drug and weapon 
crimes.  On June 1, 2009, Jones moved to suppress the additional drugs and 
weapons, challenging the “four corners” of the search warrant.  The Superior Court 
                                                           
1 State v. Jones, Order No. 00903020716 (Del. Super. Sept. 11, 2009). 
6 
 
judge heard oral argument related to the March 24 search warrant at the same 
hearing held to consider Jones’s previous motion to suppress.  Thereafter, the 
judge denied the motion to suppress the fruits of the search warrant.  After a 
stipulated trial on June 6, 2009, a judge convicted Jones of trafficking in cocaine 
and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited.  On December 11, 2009, a 
Superior Court judge sentenced Jones to 15 years in prison.  Jones appeals all his 
convictions, arguing that the Superior Court judge erred by denying his motions to 
suppress. 
II. JONES’S INITIAL ENCOUNTER WITH POLICE 
 
Jones argues that the police illegally seized him when officers asked the 
Thunderguards to step outside.  Consequently, Jones maintains, the bag of cocaine 
he discarded, and the evidence found during the ensuing search incident to his 
arrest, should be suppressed.  Jones further contends that he was not subject to 
administrative seizure under 24 Del. C. §1324 concerning private security agencies 
because he was not engaged in activity requiring a license under §1329. 
We review the denial of a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion.2  To 
the extent the Superior Court judge’s decision is based on factual findings, we 
determine whether the judge abused his discretion by finding sufficient evidence to 
                                                           
2 Williams v. State, 962 A.2d 210, 214 (Del. 2008) (citing Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 
1280, 1284 (Del. 2008)). 
7 
 
support his ruling and whether those findings were clearly erroneous.3  To the 
extent that we examine the Superior Court judge’s legal conclusions, we review 
them de novo for errors in formulating or applying legal precepts.4 
A. The police seized Jones because a reasonable person in his position 
would not have felt free to ignore the police presence. 
 
In California v. Hodari D., the United States Supreme Court articulated the 
test for whether an encounter with police constitutes a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment to United States Constitution.5  Under the Fourth Amendment, a 
seizure occurs when an officer applies force or, where that is absent, the defendant 
submits to an officer’s “show of authority.”6  We considered this test in Jones v. 
State, but adhered to our own precedents, concluding that the question of whether a 
seizure occurs under article I, section 6 of the Delaware Constitution “requires 
focusing upon the police officer’s actions to determine when a reasonable person 
would have believed he or she was not free to ignore the police presence.”7  
                                                           
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 499 U.S. 621 (1991). 
6 Id. at 625-26. 
7 Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 869 (Del. 1999).  See also Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169, 1173-74 
(Del. 2010); Moore v. State, 997 A.2d 656, 663-64 (Del. 2010); Williams, 962 A.2d at 215-16; 
Lopez-Vazquez, 956 A.2d at 1286 n.6; Ross v. State, 925 A.2d 489, 493-94 (Del. 2007); Harris v. 
State, 806 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. 2002); Flonnory v. State, 805 A.2d 854, 858 (Del. 2001); Woody 
v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1264 (Del. 2001). 
8 
 
Although we declined to adopt the Hodari D. test for interpreting our Constitution, 
we required that a police officer and a citizen may engage in a consensual 
encounter that does not amount to a seizure.  In Williams v. State, we explained: 
Even under this more stringent standard, “law enforcement officers 
are permitted to initiate contact with citizens on the street for the 
purpose of asking questions.”  This type of interaction is an encounter 
and, if consensual, neither amounts to a seizure nor implicates the 
Fourth Amendment.  During a consensual encounter, a person has no 
obligation to answer the officer’s inquiry and is free to go about his 
business.  Only when the totality of the circumstances demonstrates 
that the police officer’s actions would cause a reasonable person to 
believe he was not free to ignore the police presence does a 
consensual encounter become a seizure.8 
 
 
The United States Supreme Court also has distinguished between seizures 
and consensual encounters.  In Muehler v. Mena, the Court explained: 
We have “held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not 
constitute a seizure.”  “[E]ven when officers have no basis for 
suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of 
that individual; ask to examine the individual’s identification; and 
request consent to search his or her luggage.”9 
 
 
Various factors are relevant to an analysis of the “totality of the 
circumstances” surrounding a police encounter.  The facts of Williams are 
                                                           
8 Williams, 962 A.2d at 215-16.  See also Ross, 925 A.2d at 494 (holding that “the presence of 
uniformed police officers following a walking pedestrian and requesting to speak with him, 
without doing anything more, does not constitute a seizure”). 
9 Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  See also 
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984); 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) 
(“Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves “seizures” of 
persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some 
way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.”). 
9 
 
instructive.  In that case, a police officer observed the defendant walking along the 
median of a road in the early morning hours.  The officer pulled his car up and 
activated his strobe light.  The police officer asked the defendant for his name and 
date of birth.  The officer also asked the defendant where he was going and 
whether he needed a ride.  The defendant declined the invitation and continued on 
his way.  We explained that “viewing the totality of the circumstances—[the 
officer]’s inquiry, [the defendant]’s voluntary response to questions, and the 
amicable end to the encounter—a reasonable person would believe he was free to 
ignore the police presence.”10 
 
Case law from other jurisdictions also is instructive.  Given the “necessarily 
imprecise” standard for determining whether an individual has been seized,11 other 
courts have developed factors to consider when evaluating whether a police 
encounter amounts to a seizure.  For example, in United States v. Mendenhall, the 
United States Supreme Court explained that four circumstances might indicate a 
seizure: (1) “the threatening presence of several officers,” (2) “the display of a 
weapon by an officer,” (3) “some physical touching of the person of the citizen,” 
                                                           
10 Williams, 962 A.2d at 216. 
11 See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988). 
10 
 
or (4) “the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the 
officer’s request might be compelled.”12 
 
In United States v. Scheets, the Seventh Circuit considered the following six 
factors in its totality-of-the-circumstances analysis: (1) “whether the encounter 
occurred in a public or private place,” (2) “whether the suspect was informed that 
he was not under arrest and free to leave,” (3) “whether the suspect consented or 
refused to talk to the investigating officers,” (4) “whether the investigating officers 
removed the suspect to another area,” (5) “whether there was physical touching, 
display of weapons, or other threatening conduct,” and (6) “whether the suspect 
eventually departed the area without hindrance.”13 
We adopt the Scheets factors here to channel the unavoidable discretion that 
is part and parcel of our totality of the circumstances inquiry.  We also note, 
however, as did the court in Scheets, that analysis of a police encounter should 
                                                           
12 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16). 
13 United States v. Scheets, 188 F.3d 829, 836-37 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. 
McCarthur, 6 F.3d 1270, 1276 (7th Cir. 1993)).  See also United States v. Withers, 972 F.2d 837, 
842 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The factors we consider in determining whether, in the totality of the 
circumstances, a reasonable person would believe she were free to leave include: whether the 
encounter occurred in a public or private place; whether the suspect consented or refused to talk 
to the police; whether the police informed the suspect that she was not under arrest and was free 
to leave; whether the police removed the suspect to another area; whether the suspect felt capable 
of refusing to consent to the search; and whether the suspect eventually departs the area without 
hindrance.”); State v. McGinnis, 233 P.3d 246, 252 (Kan. 2010) (considering a similar set of 
factors). 
11 
 
consider “all relevant circumstances,” including these six nonexhaustive factors.14  
Courts must not rigidly apply these factors but instead should independently 
analyze the facts of each case.  In applying the totality of the circumstances test, 
“no one factor is legally determinative, dispositive, or paramount.”15  Normally, 
“we do not expect courts to merely count the number of factors weighing on one 
side of the determination or the other” because “a factor may be more indicative of 
a coercive atmosphere in one case than in another.”16  Nevertheless, giving equal 
weight to each factor and only those factors, provides needed structure to our 
totality of the circumstances analysis in a close case such as the one before us. 
Here, we should give “great weight”17 to the State’s steadfast concession that 
the police seized Jones.18  Although the State’s “confession of error does not 
require the reversal of [Jones’s] convictions,” “an independent determination 
[shows] that a reversible error was committed.”19  In Jones’s case, two of the 
                                                           
14 Scheets, 188 F.3d at 836-37. 
15 McGinnis, 233 P.3d at 253 (quoting State v. Thompson, 166 P.3d 1015, 1020 (2007)). 
16 Id. 
17 See Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258 (1942). 
18 See State’s Answering Brief, at 10 (“Certainly when the police asked Jones and his fellow 
Thunderguards members to leave the hall and provide them with identification, a reasonable 
person would not have felt free to simply ignore the police presence.”); State’s May 12, 2011 
Answering Supplemental Memorandum, at 1 (“Outside [the banquet hall], the encounter became 
less-than-consensual”). 
19 See Weddington v. State, 545 A.2d 607, 612 (Del. 1988). 
12 
 
Scheets factors favor a determination of a consensual encounter, because Jones was 
not “removed to another area,” and “there was [no] physical touching, display of 
weapons, or other threatening conduct.”20  But, four factors (a majority of the 
factors identified in Scheets) favor the determination that a seizure occurred, 
because “the encounter occurred in a…private place,” Jones “was [not] informed 
that he was not under arrest and free to leave,” Jones “refused to talk to 
[Dudzinski],” and Jones did not “eventually depart[] the area without hindrance.”21  
These factors when combined with the State’s concession, lead us to conclude that 
the police seized Jones shortly before he dropped the bag of cocaine. 
B. Police had no reasonable articulable suspicion that a violation of the 
private security services statute occurred. 
 
The police could seize Jones only if they had a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that a civil violation had occurred or was occurring.22  “Reasonable 
                                                           
20 Scheets, 188 F.3d at 836-37. 
21 Id. 
22 Title 24, chapter 13 does not impose criminal sanctions for the unauthorized delivery of 
private security services.  Rather, the Delaware Board of Examiners of Private Investigators and 
Privatre Security Agencies has the power to impose a civil penalty up to $200 per day, for each 
violation.  24 Del. C. §1311.  See also Rickards v. State, 2011 WL 153643, at *1 (Del. 2011) 
(holding that “a police officer [may] stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation”).  Rickards is arguably 
distinguishable because title 21, section 801 expressly provides: “Any police officer is 
authorized to make an administrative stop for purposes of enforcing a civil traffic statute, upon a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that a violation of such statute has occurred.” 
13 
 
suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause.”23  “It depends on ‘the 
officer’s ability to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant th[e] intrusion.’”24  In 
determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, we look at the totality of the 
circumstances, “as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, trained police officer 
in the same or similar circumstances, combining objective facts with [the] officer’s 
subjective interpretation of those facts.”25  Popp testified that “it was believed that 
the[] individuals did not possess a security license to provide or act as a security 
agency.”  The record, however, does not reflect “specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts” support Popp’s 
hunch.26  In fact, Popp testified, the officers were identifying the persons that night, 
so that they could later verify whether or not they were indeed licensed to provide 
security. 
                                                           
23 Rickards, at *1 (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)). 
24 Id. (quoting Coleman v. State, 562 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del. 1989)). 
25 Jones, 745 A.2d at 861. 
26 Id. 
14 
 
 
C. A valid administrative seizure could not have occurred because 
Jones and the Thunderguards activity did not require a license under 
the private security statute. 
 
Without a reasonable articulable suspicion that Jones violated the private 
security statute, his seizure was only legal if it was a valid administrative seizure 
pursuant to New York v. Burger.27  In this case, Jones’ and the Thunderguards 
conduct did not even come within the law’s purview.  Under §1329, “No person 
shall engage in the business of a private…security guard, [or] guard 
company…without first obtaining a license.”28  Consequently, to be subject to a 
valid administrative search or seizure either the Thunderguards or Jones must be 
“engaged in the business” of private security services.  That implies a pattern of 
business activity beyond a mere one time offering.  Being “engaged in the 
business” of private security requires carrying on a commercial security enterprise 
for profit.29  Neither Jones nor the Thunderguards fit this definition.  No one paid 
Jones for his efforts on the evening of March 13, 2009, nor does the record indicate 
that Cheryl Hollingsworth’s potential donation to the local chapter of the 
Thunderguards actually induced the group to provide security services at the party.  
                                                           
27 482 U.S. 691 (1987). 
28 24 Del. C. §1329 (emphasis added). 
29 If this construction of §1329 is inconsistent with the legislature’s intent, the Delaware General 
Assembly is of course free to amend the statute to cover the activity. 
15 
 
In other words, the record does not demonstrate that the Thunderguards offered 
their services in consideration of a donation from Hollingsworth.  The facts 
actually lean in the opposite direction toward two separate gratuitous transfers 
rather than one unified contract.  As a result, Jones’ and the Thunderguards’ 
actions cannot support an administrative search under §1329.  We accordingly 
need not proceed to apply or analyze the test for a valid administrative search 
under Burger. 
D. The drugs and other evidence seized on the night of Jones’s initial 
arrest are fruits of the illegal seizure and thus are inadmissible. 
 
Since the police illegally seized Jones, any evidence gathered as a result of 
that seizure must be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”30  The traditionally 
recognized exceptions to this doctrine are limited to “attenuation, inevitable 
discovery, independent source, or some intervening act or event sufficient to purge 
the taint of the illegal stop.”31 
The United States Supreme Court has never held that abandonment of 
evidence in response to unlawful police action (e.g., an illegal seizure) constitutes 
                                                           
30 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963). 
31 United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 269 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Murray v. United States, 
487 U.S. 533 (1988) (noting the “independent source” exception); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 
(1984) (discussing the “inevitable discovery” exception); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 
268, 274-75 (1978) (summarizing the legal question in Wong Sun to be whether the connection 
between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence had 
“become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975) (identifying “intervening act” exception). 
16 
 
an exception to the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine.  Nor has this Court 
specifically addressed whether evidence that was abandoned as a result of an 
illegal seizure must be suppressed.  Courts that have addressed this question have 
concluded that suppression is required if the abandonment was a direct 
consequence of the illegal seizure.32  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit has held that “when the abandonment of property is precipitated by 
an unlawful seizure, that property also must be excluded.”33  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has similarly ruled that “[w]hile it is true that 
a criminal defendant’s voluntary abandonment of evidence can remove the taint of 
an illegal stop or arrest, it is equally true that for this to occur, the abandonment 
must be truly voluntary and not merely the product of police misconduct.”34  Thus, 
a defendant does not voluntarily abandon property where the abandonment is in 
                                                           
32 These other courts include the United States Court of Appeals for the Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, as well as other state courts.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 652 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 127 (4th 
Cir. 1991); United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Gilman, 684 
F.2d 616, 620 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Barber, 557 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1974); Fletcher v. Wainwright, 399 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 
1968); Erickson v. State, 181 P.3d 1117 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008); State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 
1300, 1314 (Conn. 1992); State v. Parks, 977 So. 2d 1015 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Commonwealth 
v. Jeffries, 311 A.2d 914, 918 (Pa. 1973). 
33 Coggins, 986 F.2d at 652. 
34 United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726, 729-30 (5th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Pirolli, 
673 F.2d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 1982) (same). 
17 
 
response to, because of, or as a direct result of, the unlawful police conduct.35  
Given this authority, the question regarding Jones’s first motion to suppress 
becomes whether his abandonment of the drugs was a result of the unlawful 
seizure.   
The United States Supreme Court has set forth several factors that are 
relevant to determining whether a defendant’s behavior was a result of illegal 
police action.36  Those factors include: “(1) the temporal proximity of the arrest 
and the defendant’s response, (2) the presence or absence of intervening 
circumstances, and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.”37  Put 
another way, there must be a “causal nexus between the unlawful police conduct 
and [the defendant’s] abandonment of his [property].”38 
All three factors point to a conclusion that the illegal seizure provoked 
Jones’ actions.  On the first factor, the record reflects that after Detective 
Dudzinski asked Jones for his identification, Jones refused and immediately began 
walking away towards the rear where the other members had been gathered 
                                                           
35 See, e.g., Fletcher, 399 F.2d at 64 (holding that “since the [police’s] inbitial entry was 
improper and the items were thrown out the window as a direct result of that illegality, the police 
were not entitled to the fruits.”); Jeffries, 311 A.2d at 918 (concluding that suppression is 
warranted when the “causative factor in the abandonment” is the police’s unlawful action). 
36 See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 
603-04 (1975). 
37 United States v. Bailey, 691 F. 2d 1009, 1015 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Dunaway and Brown). 
38 United States v. Roman, 849 F.2d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 1988). 
18 
 
outside.39  Jones dropped the bag of cocaine in the garden while doing so.40  As for 
the second factor, no intervening act or event appears that would have severed the 
causal connection between when Dudzinski seized Jones and when Jones 
abandoned the drugs.  The trial testimony suggests that nothing else occurred in 
that short interval of time.41  Thus, this is not a situation where Jones’ response to 
the illegal stop was “itself a new, distinct crime” that would constitute an 
intervening act that purged the taint of the unlawful seizure.42  Finally, nothing in 
the record suggests that Jones’ decision to walk away from Dudzinski and discard 
the drugs was simply “a mere coincidental decision,” or “caused by anything other 
than the illegal stop.”43  Thus, the third factor also weighs in favor of concluding 
that the abandonment was a direct consequence of the illegal seizure.  This 
                                                           
39 Case No. 17, 2010, App’x to App. Open. Br. At A21. 
40 Id.  
41 Id. 
42 Bailey, 692 F.2d at 1017 (holding that if a suspect’s response to an illegal stop “is itself a new, 
distinct crime, then the police constitutionally may arrest the [suspect] for that crime.”).  In 
Bailey, the suspect had fled from the police after being illegally “seized,” and during that flight, 
pulled out a gun and fired shots at the police.  Id. at 1018-19; see also United States v. Castillo, 
238 F.3d 424 (Table), 2000 WL 1800481, at *6 (6th Cir. 2000) (concluding that defendant’s 
“high-speed [car] flight from [the police] constituted an intervening act that purged the taint of 
his detention.”); United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613, 619 n.4 (citing cases where there had 
been an intervening criminal act subsequent to the initial illegal police stop). 
43 United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726, 730 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Bailey, 691 F.2d at 1015 
(“We cannot say that [defendant’s] flight in the face of and only after his illegal arrest represents 
a mere coincidental decision to run unrelated to the police conduct; it would be sheer fiction to 
presume that [defendant’s] flight was caused by anything other than the illegal stop.” (internal 
quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted)). 
19 
 
outcome is consistent with those reached by other courts that have addressed 
similar facts.44  Having applied the United States Supreme Court’s three factors, 
we conclude that Jones abandoned the drugs in response to his illegal seizure.  The 
drugs and the fruits of the ensuing arrest should, accordingly, have been 
suppressed. 
III. 
THE WARRANT TO SEARCH JONES’S HOME 
 
Turning to the legality of the search of his home, Jones claims that the four 
corners of the affidavit in support of the search warrant do not establish probable 
cause.  We agree.  A search warrant is constitutionally deficient45 if it does not “set 
forth facts adequate for a judicial officer to form a reasonable belief that an offense 
has been committed and the property to be seized will be found in a particular 
place.”46   
We review a magistrate’s probable cause determination with great 
deference.47  Where the parties do not dispute the facts and only a constitutional 
claim of probable cause is presented, we review the Superior Court’s application 
                                                           
44 See supra note 43 (citing cases); see also United States v. Jones, 374 F.Supp.2d 143, 156 (D. 
D.C. 2005) (discussing cases). 
45 DEL. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
 
46 LeGrande v. State, 903 A.2d 288, 296 (Del. 2006).   
 
47 Id. at 1108 (quoting Jensen v. State, 482 A.2d 105, 111 (Del. 1984)).     
 
20 
 
of the law of probable cause de novo.48  We review the affidavit supporting the 
search warrant as a whole and not based on separate, discrete allegations.49  The 
affidavit must set forth facts permitting an impartial judicial officer to reasonably 
conclude that the items sought would be found at the location.50  The 
determination of whether the facts in the affidavit demonstrate probable cause 
requires a logical nexus between the items being sought and the place to be 
searched.51 
Here, the search warrant sought to find drugs, paraphernalia, and firearms at 
Jones’s residence.  The information in the affidavit falls into three categories:  (1) 
the information relating to Jones’s arrest on March 13, 2009; (2) the criminal 
history at 1003 Liberty Road relating to the other residents, Marcus Jones and 
Andre Hickson, in 2003 and 2007; and (3) the criminal history at 1003 Liberty 
Road relating to Jones.  As discussed in Part II, supra, the police illegally seized 
Jones on March 13th and the subsequent fruits of that illegal seizure must be 
suppressed.  As a result, the police could not use the illegally seized evidence in 
the affidavit to support their application for a search warrant.  Delaware has not 
                                                           
48 Id. 
 
49 Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 811 (Del. 2000).   
 
50 Id. 
 
51 Id. 
 
21 
 
adopted the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule52 and continues to 
require exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Delaware Constitution’s 
protection against illegal searches and seizures.53  Thus, we must exclude from the 
affidavit the tainted information relating to the March 13th arrest.  Even so, 
tainted allegations in an affidavit “do not vitiate a warrant which is otherwise 
validly issued upon probable cause reflected in the affidavit.”54  Rather, a 
reviewing court must “excise the tainted evidence and determine whether the 
remaining, untainted evidence would provide a neutral magistrate with probable 
cause to issue [the] warrant.”55 
After excision of the tainted information in the affidavit, this Court has 
before it the last two categories of information in the affidavit detailing searches 
and arrests in 2003 and 2007.  If the information in the affidavit for a search 
warrant is stale, it will not support a finding of probable cause.56   
                                                           
52 Id. at 820.   
 
53 Id. at 814 (explaining a search warrant issued without probable cause violates a defendant’s 
rights under Art. 1 Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution and 11 Del. C. §§ 2306 and 2307). 
 
54 United States v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 60, 63 (3d Cir. 1982); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 
171-172 (1978). 
 
55 United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1138 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Vasey, 
834 F.2d 782, 788 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 
56 Jensen v. State, 482 A.2d 105, 111 (Del. 1984).   
 
22 
 
The criminal history information in the affidavit regarding Marcus Jones and 
Andre Hickson related to incidents during 2003 and 2007 at 1003 Liberty Road.  
Importantly, the affidavit also stated that Andre Hickson has been incarcerated in 
federal prison since 2004 and Marcus Jones has been incarcerated since 
September 2007.   
The criminal history directly relating to Marcus Jones occurred during two 
searches in May 2003.  During one of those searches, the police found a stolen 
firearm in a bedroom shared by Jones and Hickson.  As a result of those searches, 
the State charged Jones with possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, 
possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia.   
Probable cause must be manifest at the time the police seek the search 
warrant, not at some earlier point in time. 57  Here, all of the information relating 
to searches and arrests in 2003 was stale.  Drugs and weapons charges dating back 
approximately six years before do not support a factual inference that the police 
will find contraband at Jones’s residence in 2009.  Likewise, the 2007 information 
was stale and could not support a reasonable inference that linked Marcellous 
Jones to any ongoing criminal conduct.  Rather, the 2007 information directly 
relateed to Jones’s brother, who because of the 2007 search, remained 
                                                           
57 Id.   
 
23 
 
incarcerated.  Given the affidavit facts that a magistrate could lawfully consider, 
under a totality of the circumstances review, it would be unreasonable to conclude 
that evidence of current criminal activity would be found at Jones’s residence. 
Therefore, we hold that the search violated Jones’s constitutional rights 
under Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution and the evidence seized 
without probable cause should have been suppressed.  Accordingly, the Superior 
Court erred by denying Jones’s motion to suppress. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, the judgments of the Superior Court are reversed.