Case Title: Holmes v. Doe

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
SAINT PAUL HOLMES 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 981428 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
April 16, 1999 
JOHN DOE 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MECKLENBURG COUNTY 
Charles L. McCormick, III, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether, in a jury trial of an 
automobile accident liability claim, the trial court properly 
permitted the introduction of expert testimony concerning the 
relationship between tire tread depth and hydroplaning. 
On July 29, 1996, pursuant to the uninsured motorist 
provisions of his insurance policy and Code § 38.2-2206, Saint 
Paul Holmes filed a “John Doe” action seeking damages for 
injuries he sustained in an automobile accident on September 1, 
1995.  In his motion for judgment, Holmes alleged that as a 
result of the negligence of John Doe, the unknown driver of a 
tractor-trailer truck, Holmes lost control of his vehicle, which 
then left the highway and collided with a tree.  Holmes sought 
$450,000 in damages. 
Government Employees Insurance Company, Holmes’s automobile 
liability insurance carrier, defended the action in the name of 
John Doe.  In the grounds of defense, Doe denied liability and 
asserted that the accident was the result of Holmes’s own 
negligence.  It was Doe’s contention that Holmes had been 
operating his vehicle too fast for the highway and weather 
conditions, causing it to hydroplane. 
During a jury trial, the trial court instructed the jury on 
the requirements for finding a “John Doe” motorist liable and on 
the effect of contributory negligence.  The jury returned its 
verdict for Doe.  We awarded Holmes this appeal. 
Upon familiar principles, we relate the essential facts 
concerning the accident in the light most favorable to Doe, the 
prevailing party in the trial court.  Immediately prior to the 
accident, Holmes was operating his 1993 Ford Mustang, a rear-
wheel drive vehicle, in the right-hand lane of Interstate 85 
behind a tractor-trailer truck.  Because Holmes did not want to 
follow the truck, he drove his vehicle into the left-hand lane.  
The truck then exhibited a left turn signal and also pulled into 
the left lane in front of Holmes’s vehicle.  There was no 
contact between the vehicles.  Holmes applied his brakes and his 
vehicle “started shaking and started sliding to the right.”  It 
then began “rotating around,” went off the right side of the 
highway, and ultimately collided with a tree. 
At the point of the accident, the highway was straight and 
level.  A heavy rain was falling and there was standing water on 
the roadway.  The posted speed limit was 65 miles per hour, and 
Holmes had been operating his vehicle at that speed.  Holmes was 
unable to identify the driver or owner of the truck. 
 
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Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that all four tires 
on Holmes’s vehicle had at least the statutory minimum tire 
tread depth of 2/32nd of an inch.  Code § 46.2-1043.  At the 
time of the accident, the two front tires had treads 9/32nd of 
an inch in depth, the left rear tire had a tread 3/32nd of an 
inch in depth, and the right rear tire had a tread 2/32nd of an 
inch in depth. 
Relevant to the issue presented in this appeal, Thomas O. 
Lee qualified as an expert to testify on the conditions under 
which there can be a loss of highway traction resulting from a 
loss of contact between an automobile tire and a wet road 
surface, commonly known as hydroplaning.  In a pre-trial 
hearing, the trial court ruled that because Lee had no specific 
knowledge of the road conditions at the time and place of 
Holmes’s accident, Lee’s testimony would be limited to “the 
principles of hydroplaning.”  Prior to permitting Lee to 
testify, the trial court reiterated that Lee would not be 
permitted “to particularize this accident.” 
At one point in his testimony, Lee stated that a tire with 
a tread 2/32nd of an inch in depth “is illegal in this state.”  
Responding to Holmes’s objection, the trial court stated that 
“[t]he jury has already been told that [2/32nd of an inch is a 
legal tire tread depth in Virginia].  I think what Mr. Lee meant 
to say was that if it’s less than 2/32.”  Lee agreed with the 
 
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trial court that he had misspoken, apologized, and corrected his 
testimony.  Holmes’s counsel responded, “Perhaps.  That’s fine.” 
Lee then testified that a tire with a tread of the minimum 
legal depth was “not safe on wet surfaces” and that a tire that 
has a tread 2/32nd of an inch in depth “should be removed.”  
Holmes again objected that this was contrary to the stipulation 
of legal minimum tire tread depth.  The trial court responded 
that “the jury understands that 2/32’s of an inch is legal in 
Virginia.”  Holmes’s counsel responded, “Absolutely.” 
The balance of Lee’s testimony was devoted to describing 
the physical circumstances of speed, condition of an 
automobile’s tires, road surface conditions, and weather 
conditions under which a vehicle might hydroplane.  More 
specifically, Lee explained that a tire is supposed to channel 
road water through circumferential voids between the ribs of the 
tire so that water can get through the tire treads when the 
tread is in motion going down the pavement.  He further 
explained that “when the vehicle is moving down the [wetted] 
pavement, it builds up a wedge of water in front of the tire” 
and “[i]f the water is sufficient enough, it will lift the tire 
off the pavement and provide an insulation between the tire and 
the pavement. . . . [W]hen that totality takes place, that’s 
called hydroplaning; in other words, skiing on water.”  Lee 
further explained that where the tread depth of a tire is low 
 
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“it would not permit the water to get through as easily and 
would thus reduce the hydroplaning speed of the tire.” 
Lee testified that hydroplaning results from a combination 
of factors including the depth of the water, the speed of the 
vehicle, the depth of the tire treads, and the type of road 
surface.  He further testified that for a rear-wheel drive 
vehicle, the tread depth of the rear tires was the essential 
factor and that when “tread depth . . . of those tires is down 
towards the minimum, the hydroplaning speed dramatically drops 
. . . [I]t can drop as much as 10 miles an hour.” 
During Lee’s testimony, Holmes asserted numerous 
objections, contending that Lee was testifying to matters within 
the common knowledge of the jury or that Lee was, without 
adequate foundation, offering speculative opinions on the 
ultimate question of fact. 
On appeal, Holmes first contends that the trial court erred 
in permitting Lee to testify that a tire tread 2/32nd of an inch 
in depth was not legal in Virginia.  The record amply 
demonstrates, however, that Lee corrected his misstatement and 
that the jury was properly instructed on several occasions on 
that issue.  Accordingly, there is no merit to this contention. 
Holmes further contends that Lee’s testimony that a tire 
tread 2/32nd of an inch in depth was unsafe for use on a wet 
road surface and that tires with the minimum tread depth should 
 
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be removed from a vehicle was inadmissible because these 
contentions were contrary to the provisions of Code § 46.2-1043.  
We disagree. 
Subsequent to the initial misstatement of the law, which 
Lee corrected, none of Lee’s statements expressed an opinion 
that a tire tread 2/32nd of an inch in depth was “illegal,” but, 
rather, that it was “unsafe.”  Code § 46.2-1043, although a 
safety-related statute, reflects a policy decision of the 
legislature in establishing the minimum tire tread depth for the 
operation of motor vehicles in this Commonwealth.  The statute 
does not purport to address the specific safety concerns for 
operating a vehicle with minimum depth treads under the 
circumstances of this case.  Lee, however, was qualified to 
offer an opinion on tire safety, his area of expertise. 
Holmes further contends that Lee’s testimony was 
speculative because Lee had no specific knowledge of the road 
and weather conditions at the time of the accident.  However, a 
careful review of the record reveals that, in accord with the 
trial court’s limitation on his testimony, Lee testified only 
about hypothetical tire, road, and weather conditions in order 
to explain “the principles of hydroplaning.”  Lee never opined 
what the conditions at the time and place of the accident were, 
nor did he offer an opinion as to the cause of Holmes’s 
accident.  Rather, Lee’s testimony was limited to explaining the 
 
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general relationship of hydroplaning to wet road conditions, 
tire tread depth, and speed.  Accordingly, there is no basis for 
Holmes’s contention that this testimony was improperly 
speculative. 
Finally, Holmes contends that Lee’s testimony was 
irrelevant because the jurors could, from their common 
experience, draw their own conclusions about the effect of the 
road conditions on Holmes’s ability to control his vehicle.  We 
disagree.  While it is certainly true that the danger of 
hydroplaning is a matter of common experience, knowledge of the 
scientific cause of hydroplaning is not.  Determining the 
conditions under which a vehicle will hydroplane requires an 
understanding of multiple variables that are not within the 
common knowledge of the average citizen.  See, e.g., Bush v. 
State of Louisiana, 395 So. 2d 916, 919 (La. Ct. App. 1981). 
Expert testimony is admissible where the jury “is 
confronted with issues that require scientific or specialized 
knowledge or experience in order to be properly understood, and 
which cannot be determined intelligently merely from the 
deductions made and inferences drawn on the basis of ordinary 
knowledge, common sense, and practical experience gained in the 
ordinary affairs of life.”  Compton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 
716, 726, 250 S.E.2d 749, 755-56 (1979)(citation omitted); see 
also Neblett v. Hunter, 207 Va. 335, 339-40, 150 S.E.2d 115, 118 
 
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(1966).  Here, the jury heard evidence from other witnesses 
concerning the weather, road, and traffic conditions and 
Holmes’s speed of travel.  Lee’s expert testimony was 
appropriate to aid the jury in putting this factual evidence 
into an appropriate context from which the jury could draw its 
own conclusions.  Code § 8.01-401.3(A); see also Lawson v. John 
Doe, 239 Va. 477, 482-83, 391 S.E.2d 333, 336 (1990).  
Accordingly, Lee’s testimony was not irrelevant and was an 
appropriate topic of expert testimony in this case. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 
court sustaining the jury’s verdict for Doe. 
Affirmed. 
 
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