Case Title: State v. Beamon

Citation: 2013 WI 47

Docket Number: 2010AP002003-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 47 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP2003-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Courtney C. Beamon, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 336 Wis. 2d 438, 804 N.W.2d 706 
(Ct. App. 2011 - Published) 
PDC No: 2011 WI App 131 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 29, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 5, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Emily S. Mueller 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
Bradley, J., dissents; Abrahamson, C. J. joins.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: Prosser, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Donna L. Hintze, assistant state public defender, and 
oral argument by Donna L. Hintze. 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Rebecca Rapp St. John and the brief was filed by Mark A. Neuser, 
assistant attorneys general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van 
Hollen, attorney general. 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert R. Henak and 
Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
 2013 WI 47
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP2003-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2007CF1499) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Courtney C. Beamon, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 29, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 that affirmed the 
judgment of conviction entered by the Racine County Circuit 
Court.2  Relevant to this appeal, defendant Courtney C. Beamon 
was convicted of fleeing or attempting to elude a traffic 
officer, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) (2009-10).3  
                                                 
1 State v. Beamon, 2011 WI App 131, 336 Wis. 2d 438, 804 
N.W.2d 706. 
2 The Honorable Emily S. Mueller presided. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009–10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
2 
 
Beamon argues that, under the particular jury instructions given 
in this case, there was insufficient evidence to convict him of 
fleeing or attempting to elude a traffic officer.  Specifically, 
Beamon claims that the jury instructions required the State to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Beamon violated § 346.04(3) 
"by increasing the speed of the vehicle to flee," and that there 
was no evidence that Beamon increased the speed of his vehicle 
after law enforcement officers began to pursue him.   
¶2 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 346.04(3) 
sets 
out 
the 
two 
requirements necessary for commission of the offense charged.  
The second requirement may be proven in three different ways.  
That is, § 346.04(3) does not require that the defendant's 
flight or attempt to elude have been accomplished by the 
defendant increasing the speed of his vehicle to flee, as the 
instructions given in this case provided.  Beamon's argument, 
therefore, rests on his contention that the sufficiency of the 
evidence 
must 
be 
evaluated 
by 
comparison 
with 
the 
jury 
instructions actually given, even though those instructions 
added a requirement to the statutory definition of the crime. 
¶3 
We 
conclude 
that 
jury 
instructions 
that 
add 
requirements to what the statute sets out as necessary to prove 
the commission of a crime are erroneous; and therefore, we 
examine the sufficiency of the evidence in this case by 
comparison to what the statute requires and not by comparison to 
an 
additional 
requirement 
in 
the 
jury 
instructions.  
Furthermore, jury instruction errors are subject to harmless 
error analysis, which we apply here.  A harmless error analysis 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
3 
 
asks whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is 
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury, properly 
instructed, would have found the defendant guilty. 
¶4 
We conclude that under the totality of circumstances, 
it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would have found 
Beamon guilty of fleeing or attempting to elude an officer 
absent the erroneous jury instruction.  The evidence at trial 
unquestionably supported the jury's verdict that Beamon violated 
the fleeing or eluding statute.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
there was sufficient evidence to convict Beamon, and we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
In the early morning hours of November 19, 2007, off-
duty Racine Police Officer Dennis Cecchini and another officer 
were working as private security guards at the American Legion 
Bar in Racine.  At approximately 12:45 a.m., the officers heard 
multiple gunshots.  After radioing police dispatch, the two 
officers left the bar to investigate.  Officer Cecchini heard 
two more gunshots, and took cover behind a parked vehicle. 
¶6 
Officer Cecchini then observed a male figure run from 
the porch of a nearby house in a crouched position and enter a 
vehicle parked near the house.  Cecchini again radioed dispatch 
to describe the vehicle and to provide information about the 
vehicle's direction of travel, noting that the vehicle was 
driving north, with its headlights extinguished. 
¶7 
As he was speaking to the dispatcher, Cecchini heard 
Racine Police Officer Frank Miller remark on the radio that he 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
4 
 
saw the vehicle that Cecchini had described.  At that point, 
Officer Miller activated his emergency lights and siren and 
began following the vehicle, which he noted was travelling 
approximately 45 to 50 miles per hour in a 30 miles-per-hour 
zone. 
¶8 
When 
Officer 
Miller 
began 
pursuit, 
he 
was 
approximately three-quarters of a block behind the speeding 
vehicle.  As the vehicle slowed to negotiate a soft right turn, 
Officer Miller closed the distance between his squad car and the 
other vehicle.  After negotiating the turn, the vehicle 
continued driving toward an intersection controlled by a four-
way stop sign.  The vehicle, still with its lights off, drove 
through the intersection without stopping or slowing down. 
¶9 
Immediately after the vehicle passed through the 
intersection, Officer Miller saw the suspect roll out of the 
driver's-side door of the vehicle, which was then travelling 
approximately 25 miles per hour.  The vehicle then ran over the 
suspect's legs and collided with a parked car. 
¶10 After the suspect was run over by his vehicle, he 
stood up and began running away from Officer Miller's squad car.  
For a short time, Officer Miller remained in his squad car as he 
pursued the suspect, with the lights and sirens still activated.  
After coming within a few feet of the suspect, Officer Miller 
exited his vehicle and began pursuing on foot.  During the 
chase, Officer Miller issued various orders to the suspect, all 
of which the suspect disregarded.  After a lengthy chase, Miller 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
5 
 
finally knocked the suspect to the ground, placed him in 
handcuffs, and took him to the hospital for medical treatment. 
¶11 The suspect, later identified as Beamon, was charged 
in an eight-count information, including repeater enhancements 
for all counts.  The charge relevant to Beamon's current appeal 
is Count 1, Vehicle Operator Flee/Elude Officer, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3).  For that charge, the information 
provided that:  "On or about 11-19-2007 . . . [defendant Beamon 
did] unlawfully and feloniously, as the operator of a vehicle, 
after having received a visual or audible signal from a traffic 
officer, or marked police vehicle, knowingly flee or attempt to 
elude any traffic officer by willful or wanton disregard of such 
signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of the 
police vehicle, or the traffic officer or other vehicles or 
pedestrians, or did increase the speed of the vehicle or 
extinguish the lights of the vehicle in an attempt to elude or 
flee . . . ." 
¶12 At trial, the jury heard testimony from Officer 
Cecchini describing the gunshots and the suspect's subsequent 
flight in a vehicle with its headlights extinguished.  The jury 
also heard Officer Miller's testimony regarding the car chase, 
the suspect's exit from his moving vehicle, and the foot chase 
ending with Beamon's arrest.   
¶13 Additionally, the jury heard Beamon's testimony, which 
generally corroborated the officers' testimonies.  For example, 
Beamon testified to having been near the location of the shots 
fired; having gotten into the car and driven away with his 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
6 
 
headlights extinguished; and having rolled out of the vehicle 
while it was still moving.  Beamon also did not challenge 
Officer Miller's testimony that Miller had activated his 
emergency lights and siren during the pursuit; instead, Beamon 
asserted that he did not remember seeing or hearing the 
emergency signals until he approached the stop sign, at which 
point he rolled out of his vehicle.  Beamon also testified that 
he had been extremely intoxicated that night. 
¶14 During the course of the trial, the jury twice heard 
the charge against Beamon for fleeing or eluding, exactly as set 
forth in the information.  The jury first heard the charge 
during jury selection, when assistant district attorney Sharon 
Riek read the entire information.  The second time the jury 
heard the information was when Judge Mueller read the charge, as 
set forth in the statute, immediately before reading the jury 
instructions for the charged offense. 
¶15 The instructions that the jury heard immediately 
following Judge Mueller's reading of the information did not 
track the language used in either Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) or in 
the information.  Instead, the instructions provided that: 
 
Sec. 346.04(3) of the Wisconsin Statutes is 
violated by a person who operates a motor vehicle on a 
highway after receiving a visual or audible signal 
from a marked police vehicle and knowingly flees any 
traffic officer by willful disregard of such signal so 
as to interfere with or endanger the traffic officer 
by increasing the speed of the vehicle to flee.  
Before you may find the defendant guilty of this 
offense, the State must prove by evidence which 
satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
following two elements were present. 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
7 
 
 
First, the defendant operated a motor vehicle on 
a highway after receiving a visual and audible signal 
from a marked police vehicle. 
 
Secondly, the defendant knowingly fled a marked 
squad car by willful disregard of the visual or 
audible signal so as to interfere with or endanger the 
traffic officer by increasing the speed of the vehicle 
to flee. 
(Emphases added.)  The jury found Beamon guilty of fleeing or 
eluding a traffic officer, as well as the other seven counts 
charged.  The circuit court subsequently entered a judgment of 
conviction on the jury verdict, and Beamon was sentenced. 
¶16 Beamon appealed his conviction for fleeing or eluding, 
alleging that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, 
based on the jury instructions.  Namely, Beamon argued that 
there was no evidence that he had increased the speed of his 
vehicle after Officer Miller began pursuing him, and that 
without such a showing, the State had failed to prove fleeing or 
eluding as that charge was stated in the jury instructions. 
¶17 In a published opinion, State v. Beamon, 2011 WI App 
131, 336 Wis. 2d 438, 804 N.W.2d 706, the court of appeals 
affirmed 
Beamon's 
conviction, 
concluding 
that 
the 
jury 
instructions on fleeing or eluding were erroneous, but that any 
discrepancy between the jury instructions and the charged 
offense was harmless.  The court also concluded that the 
evidence was sufficient to affirm the conviction when measured 
against the offense charged.  Id., ¶¶11–12.  Beamon petitioned 
this court for review, which we granted. 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
8 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶18 Beamon 
argues 
that 
the 
evidence 
presented 
was 
insufficient to convict him of fleeing or eluding a traffic 
officer under the requirements of the charge as stated in the 
jury instructions.  Because the jury instructions did not 
conform to the requirements of the offense of fleeing or eluding 
as set forth in Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3), Beamon's challenge 
requires us to determine, as a threshold matter, whether the 
jury instructions correctly stated the statutory requirements 
for conviction of the crime.  Whether jury instructions 
accurately state the applicable law presents a question of law, 
which we review independently of the circuit court and the court 
of appeals, benefiting from their analyses.  See State v. Fonte, 
2005 WI 77, ¶9, 281 Wis. 2d 654, 698 N.W.2d 594.   
¶19 Where jury instructions do not accurately state the 
controlling law, we will examine the erroneous instructions 
under the standard for harmless error, which presents a question 
of law for our independent review.  See State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 
93, ¶18, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.   
¶20 Finally, if we determine the jury instruction error 
was harmless, we will evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence 
under the correct legal standard, and when applying that 
standard, we will not overturn the jury's verdict "unless the 
evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the conviction, 
is so lacking in probative value and force that no trier of 
fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
9 
 
reasonable doubt" based on the statutory requirements of the 
offense.  See Fonte, 281 Wis. 2d 654, ¶10 (quoting State v. 
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
B.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
1.  Legal principles 
¶21 The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence is highly deferential to a jury's verdict, and provides 
that an appellate court may not overturn a jury's verdict unless 
the 
evidence, 
viewed 
most 
favorably 
to 
sustaining 
the 
conviction, "is so insufficient in probative value and force 
that it can be said as a matter of law that no trier of fact, 
acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 501.  Accordingly, a 
defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence bears a 
heavy burden to show the evidence could not reasonably have 
supported a finding of guilt.  State v. Hanson, 2012 WI 4, ¶31, 
338 Wis. 2d 243, 808 N.W.2d 390. 
¶22 This heavy burden for defendants challenging the 
sufficiency 
of 
the 
evidence, 
however, 
begs 
the 
question 
presented in this case.  Here, the question is whether the 
evidence is sufficient according to what standard:  the jury 
instructions actually used, the statutory requirements of the 
crime, or some other legal standard, such as the complaint or 
the information?  Generally, when the jury instructions conform 
to the statutory requirements of that offense, we will review 
the sufficiency of the evidence by comparison to those jury 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
10 
 
instructions.  See, e.g., State v. Witkowski, 163 Wis. 2d 985, 
991, 473 N.W.2d 512 (Ct. App. 1991).  However, where the jury 
instructions do not accurately reflect the statute enacted by 
the legislature, we cannot review the sufficiency of the 
evidence with the jury instructions as our standard.  See State 
v. Zelenka, 130 Wis. 2d 34, 48–49, 387 N.W.2d 55 (1986); see 
also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979) (recognizing 
that "the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the 
evidence . . . must be not simply to determine whether the jury 
was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record 
evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.").  
¶23 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we 
cannot rely on an erroneous statement of the statute in the jury 
instructions as our standard, because doing so would, in effect, 
allow the parties and the circuit court in that case to define 
an ad hoc, common law crime.  Cf. State v. Baldwin, 101 Wis. 2d 
441, 446–47, 304 N.W.2d 742 (1981) (holding that conviction 
required 
proof 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt 
of 
statutory 
requirements of a criminal offense, rather than requirements as 
set forth in the complaint and information).  Allowing parties 
or courts to establish the requirements necessary to constitute 
a crime is contrary to the established principle in Wisconsin 
that there are no common law crimes and that all crimes are 
defined by statute.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.10 (abolishing common 
law crimes); Wis. Stat. § 939.12 (defining crime as "conduct 
which is prohibited by state law"). 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
11 
 
¶24 Accordingly, 
a 
jury 
instruction 
that 
does 
not 
accurately state the statutory requirements for the crime 
charged constitutes an erroneous statement of the law.  See 
Zelenka, 130 Wis. 2d at 48; State v. Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, ¶44, 
317 Wis. 2d 586, 767 N.W.2d 187 (noting that even a jury 
instruction "that is incomplete, but is in all other respects a 
correct statement of the law, may be erroneous").  Such 
instructional errors are presumed to be subject to harmless 
error analysis, see Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 61 (2008) 
(noting that "while there are some errors to which harmless-
error analysis does not apply, they are the exception and not 
the rule") (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).  
Harmless error analysis is appropriate when examining erroneous 
jury instructions "so long as the error at issue does not 
categorically vitiate all the jury's findings."  Id. (quoting 
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 11 (1999)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Often, such errors involve omissions 
from the jury instructions, whereby the State is relieved of the 
burden of proving one or more requirements of an offense.  See, 
e.g., State v. Smith, 2012 WI 91, ¶¶60–63, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817 
N.W.2d 410 (reaffirming that harmless error analysis applies 
where jury instructions erroneously omitted a requirement that, 
under the Sixth Amendment, the jury should have been required to 
find), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 635 (2012). 
¶25 If an error that relieves the State of part of its 
burden can be harmless, then, logically, a jury instruction that 
directs the State to prove additional requirements also may be 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
12 
 
subjected to a harmless error analysis.  See Zelenka, 130 
Wis. 2d at 48–49; State v. Courtney, 74 Wis. 2d 705, 715–16, 247 
N.W.2d 714 (1976).  These types of errors typically attempt to 
increase the State's burden by requiring the State to prove, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, certain facts that are not part of 
the statutory definition of the relevant offense.  See Courtney, 
74 
Wis. 2d 
at 
716 
(upholding 
guilty 
verdict 
where 
jury 
instructions required additional finding, not required by the 
offense charged).4  Accordingly, as the United States Supreme 
Court has stated, because harmless error analysis can apply 
where a statutory requirement is withdrawn from the jury's 
consideration, refusing to allow harmless error analysis where 
the jury instructions include additional requirements would be 
"patently illogical."  See Hedgpeth, 555 U.S. at 61 (holding 
that harmless error analysis applies where jury was instructed 
on alternative theories of guilt). 
                                                 
4 Our discussion in State v. Courtney, 74 Wis. 2d 705, 247 
N.W.2d 714 (1976), did not decide the proper standard by which 
to 
review 
the sufficiency of the evidence when a jury 
instruction includes an additional requirement beyond those set 
forth in the statute.  Rather, in Courtney, the defendant's 
sufficiency of the evidence challenge was separate from his jury 
instruction error argument.  Id. at 713-16.  In his sufficiency 
of the evidence challenge, Courtney asserted that one of the 
requirements——as stated in the controlling administrative code 
section——had not been proved at trial.  See id. at 713–15.  His 
separate argument asserting that the jury instruction was 
erroneous simply alleged that the addition of that requirement 
entitled him to reversal.  See id. at 715–16.  We concluded that 
the evidence was sufficient to show that the offense had been 
proved, and that the additional requirement was, in effect, 
harmless.  See id. at 713–16.  Accordingly, our decision in 
Courtney supports our conclusion here. 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
13 
 
¶26 Given that harmless error analysis applies in the 
context of jury instructions that omit statutory requirements, 
see Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶47, as well as jury instructions 
that include extra considerations beyond what the statute 
requires, see Hedgpeth, 555 U.S. at 61, we conclude that 
harmless error analysis is appropriate where jury instructions 
include a requirement in addition to that set forth in a 
statute, such as occurred in Beamon's case.  To illustrate, in 
Beamon's case, the jury was asked whether Beamon interfered with 
or endangered the traffic officer "by increasing the speed of 
[his] vehicle to flee."  (Emphasis added.)  Because such a 
connection suggests that the jury had to find that the defendant 
interfered with or endangered the officer by engaging in 
particular conduct, this type of requirement is distinguishable 
from requirements that are not related to the defendant's 
conduct; for example, a requirement for an offense that would 
direct the jury to find that a firearm is a "deadly weapon."  
Cf. Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 215–16 (2006) 
(concluding that harmless error may apply where sentencing court 
determined that "firearm" enhancement applied, although jury 
found defendant had used a "deadly weapon," rather than a 
"firearm").  Nonetheless, because instructional errors are 
subject to harmless error analysis, jury instructions that add 
an additional requirement also are subject to harmless error 
analysis.5  See Hedgpeth, 555 U.S. at 61. 
                                                 
5 One persuasive rationale for applying harmless error 
analysis in this context is that many instructional errors can 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
14 
 
¶27 Therefore, where a jury instruction erroneously states 
the applicable statute, we must determine whether, under the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, 
the 
erroneous 
instruction 
constituted harmless error.  See Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶46; 
see also State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶48, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 
N.W.2d 115 (listing several appropriate considerations for 
harmless error analysis).  Under the standard for evaluating 
harmless error, when a court reviews a conviction based on a 
jury instruction that included an erroneous requirement, the 
court must ask whether it is "'clear beyond a reasonable doubt 
that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty 
absent the error.'"  See Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶49 (quoting 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 18).   
¶28 Where the erroneous instructions are determined to 
have been harmless, based on the totality of the circumstances, 
a court should review the sufficiency of the evidence by 
comparing the evidence with the statutory requirements of the 
crime.  See Zelenka, 130 Wis. 2d at 48–52.  This conclusion is 
grounded in the defendant's constitutional right of "proof 
                                                                                                                                                             
just as easily be described as mischaracterizing a statutory 
requirement as they can be described as imposing an additional 
requirement.  Cf. California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5 (1996) (per 
curiam) ("The specific error at issue here——an error in the 
instruction 
that 
defined 
the 
crime——is 
. . . 
as 
easily 
characterized as a 'misdescription of an element' of the crime, 
as 
it 
is 
characterized 
as 
an 
error 
of 
'omission.'").  
Accordingly, when a jury instruction imposes an additional 
requirement, not itself required by the statute, the instruction 
can be said to have incorrectly stated the actual requirements 
of the offense according to the statute that sets forth the 
crime.  See id. 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
15 
 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute 
the crime with which he is charged."  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 364 (1970).  The corollary to this principle is that a 
defendant does not have a right to proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt for facts that are not required by the statutory statement 
of the crime.  See United States v. Inman, 558 F.3d 742, 748 
(8th Cir. 2009).  Therefore, where a defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence and the challenge rests on an 
inaccurate statement of the law in the jury instructions, but 
the inaccurate statement of the law is determined to have been 
harmless, the defendant's sufficiency of the evidence challenge 
typically will fail.  See Zelenka, 130 Wis. 2d at 48–52. 
2.  Application 
¶29 Beamon claims that, based on the jury instructions for 
fleeing or attempting to elude in his case, there was 
insufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Because a sufficiency of the evidence review 
requires us first to ascertain whether the jury instructions 
were in accord with controlling law, we begin our analysis of 
Beamon's claim with an examination of the controlling statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3).  That statute provides, in its entirety: 
 
No operator of a vehicle, after having received a 
visual or audible signal from a traffic officer, or 
marked police vehicle, shall knowingly flee or attempt 
to elude any traffic officer by willful or wanton 
disregard of such signal so as to interfere with or 
endanger the operation of the police vehicle, or the 
traffic officer or other vehicles or pedestrians, nor 
shall 
the 
operator 
increase 
the 
speed 
of 
the 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
16 
 
operator's vehicle or extinguish the lights of the 
vehicle in an attempt to elude or flee. 
¶30 In State v. Sterzinger, 2002 WI App 171, ¶9, 256 
Wis. 2d 925, 649 N.W.2d 677, the court of appeals examined the 
statutory requirements of the offense of fleeing or eluding 
under Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3).  The court of appeals explained 
the offense as follows: 
 
(1) No operator of a vehicle, after having 
received a visual or audible signal from a traffic 
officer, or marked police vehicle, 
 
(2) shall knowingly flee or attempt to elude any 
traffic officer, 
 
(3) by wilful or wanton disregard of such signal 
so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of 
the police vehicle, or the traffic officer or other 
vehicles or pedestrians. 
Id. 
¶31 As 
the 
court 
in 
Sterzinger 
noted, 
the 
first 
requirement——having operated a vehicle after receiving a visual 
or audible signal from a traffic officer or marked police 
vehicle——corresponds to the first requirement of the crime of 
fleeing or eluding.  See id.; see also Wis JI—Criminal 2630.  
The court also noted that the second requirement "encompasses a 
knowing act (fleeing or attempting to elude the officer), which 
results in criminal liability under the statute if it is 
accompanied by one of three additional facts."  Sterzinger, 256 
Wis. 2d 925, ¶9.  That is, the second and third requirements 
explained in Sterzinger——(2) knowingly fleeing/attempting to 
elude and (3) by willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as 
to interfere with or endanger the officer, vehicles, or 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
17 
 
pedestrians——comprise one of the three methods of satisfying the 
second requirement of the offense.  See Wis JI—Criminal 2630.  
¶32 Under both the statute and the pattern instructions, 
however, there are also two other methods by which the second 
statutory requirement of the offense can be satisfied.  Each of 
these methods requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that "the 
defendant knowingly fled or attempted to elude a traffic 
officer," but each then provides a different method by which 
knowing flight or attempted eluding may be shown.  The two other 
methods of showing fleeing or attempting to elude are "by 
increasing the speed of the vehicle" or "by extinguishing the 
lights of the vehicle."  See Wis JI—Criminal 2630.  These are 
alternatives and also separate from the "disregarding the visual 
or audible signal so as to interfere with or endanger" method 
discussed previously. 
¶33 With this understanding of the statutory requirements 
of Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3), we turn to the jury instructions in 
Beamon's case to determine whether they properly stated the 
terms of the statute.  Those instructions provide, in relevant 
part: 
Statutory Definition of the Crime 
 
Section 346.04(3) of the Wisconsin Statutes is 
violated by a person who operates a motor vehicle on a 
highway after receiving a visual or audible signal 
from a marked police vehicle and knowingly flees any 
traffic officer by willful disregard of such signal so 
as to interfere with or endanger the traffic officer 
by increasing the speed of the vehicle to flee. 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
18 
 
State's Burden of Proof 
 
Before you may find the defendant guilty of this 
offense, the State must prove by evidence which 
satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
following two elements were present. 
Elements of the Crime That the State Must Prove 
 
1. The defendant operated a motor vehicle on a 
highway after receiving a visual and audible signal 
from a marked police vehicle. 
 
2. The defendant knowingly fled a marked squad 
car by willful disregard of the visual or audible 
signal so as to interfere with or endanger the traffic 
officer by increasing the speed of the vehicle to 
flee. 
(Emphases added.) 
¶34 Upon review of the instructions used in this case, we 
conclude that the instructions did not properly state the 
statutory requirements for fleeing or eluding under Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.04(3).  First, the instructions required that the jury 
find that the defendant received "a visual and audible signal 
from a marked police vehicle."  Section 346.04(3), however, does 
not phrase the requirement in the conjunctive, and instead may 
be satisfied by a finding that the defendant received either a 
visual or an audible signal. 
¶35 Second, 
and 
more 
importantly, 
the 
instructions 
combined 
two 
alternative 
methods 
of 
proving 
the 
second 
requirement 
of 
the 
offense. 
 
To 
reiterate, 
the 
second 
requirement of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3)——that the defendant 
knowingly fled or attempted to elude an officer——may be 
demonstrated in one of three ways:  (1) willful disregard of the 
signal so as to interfere with or endanger the officer, 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
19 
 
vehicles, or pedestrians; (2) increasing the speed of the 
vehicle; or (3) extinguishing the lights of the vehicle.  In the 
instructions in Beamon's case, the first and second methods of 
showing that the defendant knowingly fled or attempted to elude 
were erroneously set out as though both were required.  The jury 
was therefore asked not only whether Beamon fled or attempted to 
elude by his willful disregard of the signal so as to interfere 
with or endanger, but also whether such interference or 
endangerment was in turn caused by Beamon having increased the 
speed of his vehicle. 
¶36 The jury instructions directions for proving the 
second statutory requirement by two different factual predicates 
had the effect of creating an additional requirement for the 
offense of fleeing or eluding.  This is contrary to the 
legislature's clear separation of the methods by which the State 
could show that a defendant's conduct satisfied the second 
statutory requirement of fleeing or attempting to elude an 
officer.  The legislature chose alternative methods by which 
Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) may be contravened; and therefore, we 
conclude that the instructions requirement of proof by two 
methods was erroneous. 
¶37 Because the jury instructions were erroneous, we 
determine whether the error was harmless.  Under the totality of 
the circumstances, as shown in the record, we are satisfied that 
the erroneous jury instructions were harmless:  it is clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
20 
 
Beamon of fleeing or eluding if proper instructions had been 
given. 
¶38 We first note that the erroneous jury instructions 
were not the only statement of the law of fleeing or eluding 
that the jury received; and therefore, it may be said that the 
effect of the erroneous instructions were ameliorated by the 
jury having heard multiple correct statements of the law.  That 
is, the jury was twice read the charge as set forth in the 
information, which properly stated the statutory requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3).  Notably, one of those readings came 
immediately before the court read the erroneous instructions.  
This is noteworthy because the verdict form that the jury was 
required to submit directed the jurors' attention to the 
criminal information, rather than the jury instructions, and 
stated that "We the jury find the defendant, Courtney C. Beamon, 
Guilty of Operating a Motor Vehicle to Flee or In an Attempt to 
Elude an Officer as charged in Count One of the Information."  
(Emphasis added.)  Accordingly, the multiple instances in which 
the jury was properly told the statutory requirements are a 
factor in our harmless error analysis. 
¶39 Furthermore, the jury heard in-depth accounts of the 
events of November 19, including Officer Miller's statements 
about seeing Beamon's vehicle speeding away from the shooting 
scene with its lights extinguished; the officer's activating the 
squad's emergency lights and siren; and his following Beamon's 
vehicle closely during the car chase.  Officer Miller related 
Beamon's rolling out of his moving car after running a stop sign 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
21 
 
and then seeing the driverless car run into a parked car.  The 
jury also heard Beamon's version of the events, which did not 
attempt to discredit the officers' accounts of the chase, but 
instead simply attempted to cast Beamon's actions in a more 
favorable light by suggesting that, when he left the scene of 
the shooting he was merely trying to get home to his family.  In 
light of all the testimony, we conclude that it is clear beyond 
a reasonable doubt that a rational jury, properly instructed on 
the statutory requirements of fleeing or eluding, would have 
found Beamon guilty.   
¶40 Accordingly, as we shift our analysis to Beamon's 
sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we conclude that the jury 
instructions cannot provide the proper standard for analysis.  
Rather, Beamon's challenge must be reviewed in the context of 
the statutory requirements of fleeing or eluding under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.04(3). 
 Applying those requirements, Beamon's 
challenge does not meet the high standard for reversal of a 
jury's verdict under a sufficiency of the evidence review.  That 
is, in light of the facts adduced at trial, it cannot reasonably 
be said "as a matter of law that no trier of fact, acting 
reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" 
for the alleged violation of § 346.04(3).  See Poellinger, 153 
Wis. 2d 
at 
501. 
 
Therefore, 
Beamon's 
challenge 
to 
the 
sufficiency of the evidence must fail. 
¶41 Nonetheless, we briefly address Beamon's two primary 
arguments, which are that (1) our decision in State v. Wulff, 
207 Wis. 2d 143, 557 N.W.2d 813 (1997), requires reversal of 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
22 
 
Beamon's conviction; and (2) the State's proffering of the 
erroneous instructions constituted forfeiture of its challenge 
to the instructions as erroneous. 
¶42 First, Beamon argues that reversal is required based 
on our statement in Wulff that, in the context of a sufficiency 
of the evidence challenge, we would uphold the defendant's 
conviction  "only if there was sufficient evidence to support 
guilt on the charge submitted to the jury in the instructions."  
Id. at 153.  Although our statement in Wulff seems facially 
contradictory to our holding today, our decision in Wulff is 
distinguishable from this case on at least two bases. 
¶43 In Wulff, the jury was presented with evidence 
regarding an alleged sexual assault, including some evidence 
that the defendant had attempted fellatio with the victim, which 
constitutes sexual intercourse under Wis. Stat. § 940.225(5)(b).  
However, there was no evidence that the defendant had attempted 
genital or anal intrusion.  See id. at 152.  Notwithstanding the 
trial testimony, the jury instructions asked whether the 
defendant committed second-degree sexual assault by attempted 
genital or anal intrusion, but not whether the assault was 
committed 
by 
attempted 
fellatio. 
 
See 
id. 
at 
147–49.  
Nonetheless, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charge 
of attempted sexual assault by genital or anal intrusion.  See 
id. at 149.  Based on the lack of any evidence of attempted 
genital 
or 
anal 
intrusion, 
this 
court 
reversed 
Wulff's 
conviction.  See id. at 154. 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
23 
 
¶44 The primary distinction between Wulff and our decision 
today is the nature of the jury instructions in each case.  In 
Wulff, the instructions did not add a requirement to the 
applicable law; instead, the instructions properly stated one of 
the methods by which a defendant could commit second-degree 
sexual assault and completely omitted the method for which there 
was testimony.  Therefore, in Wulff, the jury was asked to apply 
the correct law to the facts adduced at trial, and reached a 
conclusion contrary to the evidence.  In that situation, the 
proper standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence 
was the jury instructions, because the instructions conveyed a 
correct statement of the law, and thereby informed the jury of 
the requirements of an actual statutory offense.  Under that 
standard, the court concluded that "no trier of fact, acting 
reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" 
for the offense upon which the jury was instructed.  Poellinger, 
153 Wis. 2d at 507. 
¶45 In contrast to Wulff, in which we stated that we could 
uphold the conviction "only if there was sufficient evidence to 
support guilt on the charge submitted to the jury," 207 Wis. 2d 
at 153, here, the addition of a requirement created a charge 
that does not exist in the statutes.  If we evaluated 
sufficiency of the evidence against the instructions given, we 
would be sanctioning the creation of a new crime that was not 
created by the legislature.  This is contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.10, 
which 
outlaws 
common 
law 
crimes. 
 
Therefore, 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
24 
 
sufficiency of the evidence in Beamon's case cannot justifiably 
be measured against the jury instructions. 
¶46 Second, Wulff is distinguishable because the decision 
did not address harmless error.  Although we need not decide 
here whether the jury instructions in Wulff would be subject to 
harmless error analysis, we note that Wulff preceded our 
decision in Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶49, in which we adopted 
the 
now-controlling 
standard for harmless error analysis.  
Indeed, our analysis in this case rests largely on the 
harmlessness of the erroneous jury instructions, in that it is 
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury, properly 
instructed on the statutory requirements of the offense of 
fleeing or eluding, would have found Beamon guilty.6  Therefore, 
the evidence was sufficient to convict him on that charge. 
¶47 Beamon's final argument in support of analyzing his 
sufficiency of the evidence challenge under the erroneous jury 
instructions is that the State forfeited its argument that the 
instructions 
were 
erroneous, 
first 
by 
proffering 
the 
instructions and then by failing to object at the instructions 
conference.  Beamon relies upon Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3),7 which is 
                                                 
6 The 
applicability 
of 
the 
harmless 
error 
doctrine 
distinguishes this criminal case from the multiple civil cases 
in which we may have suggested that sufficiency of the evidence 
"is evaluated in light of the jury instructions."  See D.L. 
Anderson's Lakeside Leisure Co. v. Anderson, 2008 WI 126, ¶22, 
314 Wis. 2d 560, 757 N.W.2d 803.   
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.13(3) is made applicable to criminal 
cases by operation of Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1).  
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
25 
 
entitled "Instruction and Verdict Conference," and provides that 
"[f]ailure to object at the conference constitutes a waiver of 
any error in the proposed instructions or verdict."8  We decline 
to adopt Beamon's forfeiture argument for two reasons. 
¶48 First, allowing the instructions to control would 
cause the instructions erroneous statement to create a criminal 
statute.  This is contrary to the legislature's exclusive 
authority to enact criminal statutes, and would undermine the 
precept that there are no common law crimes in Wisconsin.  
Second, as the state court of last resort, our responsibility is 
"to oversee and implement the statewide development of the law."  
See State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 405, 424 N.W.2d 672 
(1988) (quoting State v. Mosley, 102 Wis. 2d 636, 665, 307 
N.W.2d 200 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  As we 
recognized in Schumacher, the "power to review an error, even 
one technically waived, is essential for this court to properly 
discharge its functions."  Id. at 406.  Therefore, we have a 
responsibility to declare what the correct law is, and we need 
not deny review of an important question of law based on a 
party's failure to raise the issue below.  See id.  "This does 
                                                 
8 Based on our case law discussing the doctrines of waiver 
and forfeiture, we conclude that such failure to object is more 
properly labeled forfeiture than waiver.  See State v. Ndina, 
2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 ("Whereas 
forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a 
right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment 
of a known right.") (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 
725, 733 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
26 
 
not mean, however, that we will use this broad discretionary-
review power indiscriminately."  Id. at 407. 
¶49 Accordingly, an unobjected-to but erroneous statement 
of the law in the jury instructions is not per se unreviewable 
by this court where the parties failed to raise the issue in the 
trial court.  See Zelenka, 130 Wis. 2d at 43–45.  Rather, we 
have discretion to disregard alleged forfeiture or waiver and 
consider the merits of any issue because the rules of forfeiture 
and waiver are rules of "administration and not of power."  See 
State v. Riekkoff, 112 Wis. 2d 119, 124, 332 N.W.2d 744 (1983); 
see also Zelenka, 130 Wis. 2d at 44.  Therefore, we decline to 
apply the doctrine of forfeiture to the situation presented in 
this case. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶50 We 
conclude 
that 
jury 
instructions 
that 
add 
requirements to what the statute sets out as necessary to prove 
the commission of a crime are erroneous; and therefore, we 
examine the sufficiency of the evidence in this case by 
comparison to what the statute requires and not by comparison to 
an additional requirement in the jury instructions actually 
given.  Furthermore, jury instruction errors are subject to 
harmless error analysis, which we apply here.  A harmless error 
analysis 
asks 
whether, 
based 
on 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury, properly instructed, would have found the 
defendant guilty. 
No. 
2010AP2003-CR   
 
27 
 
¶51 We conclude that under the totality of circumstances, 
it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would have found 
Beamon guilty of fleeing or attempting to elude an officer 
absent the erroneous jury instruction.  The evidence at trial 
unquestionably supported the jury's verdict that Beamon violated 
the fleeing or eluding statute.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
there was sufficient evidence to convict Beamon, and we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶52 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
 
 
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶53 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
precipitating error at trial lies not in the wording of a jury 
instruction.  Rather, the precipitating error at trial lies in 
the State's decision to request a jury instruction that contains 
a factual theory of prosecution for which there was no 
supporting evidence. 
¶54 The majority compounds that error by treating a 
factual theory of prosecution as an element of the offense, thus 
concluding that the jury instruction is erroneous.  It is not.   
¶55 Week in and week out, courts throughout this state 
regularly give jury instructions that contain factual theories 
of prosecution.  To transform a factual theory of prosecution 
into an element of the offense calls into question the 
legitimacy of that regular statewide practice. 
¶56 Even if the jury instruction is to be considered 
erroneous, the majority additionally compounds any error by 
changing the law when it untethers the sufficiency of the 
evidence analysis from the jury's verdict by measuring the claim 
against 
the 
statutory 
elements 
rather 
than 
the 
given 
instruction.  Thus, it affirms a criminal conviction not by 
reviewing the jury's verdict but on the basis of a theory not 
presented to the jury.   
¶57 In addition to the flaws of altering statewide 
practice 
and 
changing 
the 
law, 
the 
consequences 
of 
the 
majority's misplaced analysis are substantial: (1) it undermines 
the integrity of the judicial process because it permits the 
jury to ignore the circuit court's instruction so long as an 
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
appellate court at some later date determines that the given 
instruction is erroneous and (2) it violates the constitutional 
right to a trial by jury which requires that a jury, rather than 
a subsequent appellate court, reach the requisite finding of 
"guilty."   
¶58 This case is challenging.  Because it is clear that 
there was sufficient evidence to prove the elements required by 
the underlying criminal statute, it is tempting to conclude that 
the instruction is not harmful and then proceed to measure the 
sufficiency of the evidence against the elements required by the 
statute rather than those given by the court to the jury.  Such 
an analysis, however, undermines the integrity of the process 
and is not the law in Wisconsin.   
¶59 I conclude that the integrity of the process depends 
on the jury following the court's instruction which establishes 
the law of the case.  As judges, we expect and indeed command 
the jury to follow the instruction of the law as given to it by 
the court.  Now the majority is saying that, in essence, 
"sometimes you have to follow the court's instruction on the 
law, and sometimes you don't."  The integrity of the process 
also requires that as courts we act as guardians charged with 
protecting the basic constitutional right of trial by jury.  The 
majority fails in both regards.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I 
¶60 After 
correctly 
identifying 
the 
standard 
for 
a 
sufficiency of the evidence analysis, the majority opinion turns 
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
to evaluating whether the sufficiency of the evidence claim 
should be measured against the given instruction or the 
statutory elements.  Majority op., ¶22.  It acknowledges that 
the general rule is to compare the evidence to the instruction 
used at trial.  Id.   
¶61 However, it states that "where the jury instructions 
do 
not 
accurately 
reflect 
the 
statute 
enacted 
by 
the 
legislature, we cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence 
with the jury instructions as our standard."  Id., ¶22.  This is 
because relying on an "erroneous statement of the statute . . . 
would, in effect, allow the parties and the circuit court in 
that case to define an ad hoc, common law crime."  Id., ¶23.   
¶62 Upon reviewing the elements of Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) 
and comparing them to the jury instruction, the majority 
determines that "the instructions [in this case] did not 
properly state the statutory requirements for fleeing or eluding 
under Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3)."  Id., ¶34.  It concludes that the 
instruction effectively added an element to the offense when it 
set forth an additional requirement of proving interference or 
endangerment "by increasing the speed of the vehicle to flee."  
Id., ¶¶33, 35.  Consequently, the majority opines that the 
instruction is erroneous because it creates "an additional 
requirement for the offense of fleeing or eluding" that is 
contrary to the legislature's clear intent.  Id., ¶36.   
¶63 In its subsequent analysis of whether the evidence is 
sufficient, the majority determines that Beamon's challenge 
fails when it compares the evidence to the elements of Wis. 
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
Stat. § 346.04(3).  Id., ¶40.  Ultimately, it concludes that the 
erroneous jury instruction is harmless.  Id., ¶51. 
II 
A. 
¶64 Although 
the 
majority 
opinion 
refers 
to 
the 
constituent parts of the crime of fleeing or eluding as 
"requirements," its use of the word "requirements" obfuscates 
what it is really doing.  The word "requirement" is synonymous 
with what are commonly defined as "elements" of the crime.  See 
Black's Law Dictionary 538 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "elements of 
crime" as "[t]he constituent parts of a crime . . . that the 
prosecution must prove to sustain a conviction."); majority op., 
¶23 (describing the constituent parts of a crime as "the 
requirements necessary to constitute a crime"). 
¶65 The majority errs when it treats a factual theory of 
prosecution as an element of the offense and thus erroneously 
concludes that something is wrong with the jury instruction.   
¶66 Beamon was charged with a violation of fleeing or 
eluding an officer contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.40(3).1  The 
instruction requested by the State provided that the second 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.04(3) states the following: 
(3) No operator of a vehicle, after having 
received a visual or audible signal from a traffic 
officer, or marked police vehicle, shall knowingly 
flee or attempt to elude any traffic officer by 
willful or wanton disregard of such signal so as to 
interfere with or endanger the operation of the police 
vehicle, or the traffic officer or other vehicles or 
pedestrians, nor shall the operator increase the speed 
of the operator's vehicle or extinguish the lights of 
the vehicle in an attempt to elude or flee. 
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
element of the offense may be proven only if the jury found that 
Beamon acted in "willful disregard of the visual or audible 
signal so as to interfere with or endanger the traffic officer" 
and that he did so "by increasing the speed of the vehicle to 
flee."2   
¶67 Even though it may not be required by the statute, the 
factual theory of prosecution requested by the State was that 
Beamon interfered with or endangered the traffic officer "by 
increasing the speed of the vehicle to flee."  The State could 
have employed other factual theories of prosecution.  As the 
court of appeals observed, the State could have argued that the 
traffic officer was interfered with or endangered by Beamon 
failing to "stop, yield or slow when [the officer] was pursuing 
him" or by Beamon "blast[ing] right through[] a four-way stop 
sign."  State v. Beamon, 2011 WI App 131, ¶9 n.2, 336 Wis. 2d 
438, 804 N.W.2d 706.  The State, however, chose this one 
instead.  Subsequent insufficient evidence to support this 
factual 
theory 
of 
prosecution 
does 
not 
render 
the 
jury 
instruction incorrect. 
¶68 The following exchange from oral argument underscores 
that the request made by the State subsequently proved to be 
contrary to its interest.  It chose to request a jury 
instruction with a factual theory of prosecution that required 
it to prove the manner in which Beamon interfered with or 
                                                 
2 The second element of the offense of fleeing or eluding an 
officer is that the defendant must "knowingly flee or attempt to 
elude any traffic officer."  Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3). 
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
endangered the traffic officer——"by increasing the speed of his 
vehicle": 
Justice Ziegler: 
Why do you think the State would 
want to tie its hands like that? . . . . I mean, you – 
as a prosecutor, you could prove this case five, six 
different ways, I think.  Why would they limit it to 
increased speed?  I don't get that.  
Defense Counsel:  I can't read the district attorney's 
mind.  I don't know why.  The only thing I can think 
of is that the district attorney anticipated . . . 
that 
there 
would 
be 
testimony 
that 
he 
further 
increased his speed once the warning signals were 
given.  That didn't happen. . . . It may be that the 
district attorney anticipated testimony that didn't 
come.  But then what she should have done is ask to 
have the jury instruction changed at the end and did 
not. 
Justice Ziegler:  Right, the instructions come at the 
end, after all the testimony is in.  A lot of times, 
they conform to the testimony as it comes in.  I just 
don't get why they would want to stick with this one 
way to prove the case.  You don't know?  
Defense Counsel:  I don't know.3    
¶69 Week in and week out, circuit courts throughout this 
state give tailored jury instructions that contain factual 
theories 
of 
prosecution. 
 
Questions 
at 
oral 
argument 
appropriately recognized that tailoring a jury instruction to 
fit the theory of prosecution does not make the instruction 
erroneous: 
Justice Ziegler:  The only thing that's different, I 
mean if it stopped after "police or traffic officer," 
period, and didn't have the phrase "by increasing the 
                                                 
3 A video recording of oral argument is available at 
http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?
evhdid=6868 (last visited May 3, 2013).  The quoted exchange 
occurs at 1:08:40. 
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
speed of the vehicle to flee," that would be basically 
a standard instruction.   
Counsel for the State:  Right. 
Justice Ziegler:  So isn't it just that they are 
explaining to the jury []"here's the State's theory of 
the case?"  I mean, a lot of times you have to pick 
specific language to conform to the facts of the case 
or to show how the State's going to prove its case.  
That happens in a lot of different trials.  So, why 
does that make it wrong?4   
¶70 The majority's analysis calls this common practice 
into question.  It is now unclear to what extent circuit courts 
should deviate from a standardized, pattern jury instruction in 
each individual case lest the factual theory of prosecution be 
transformed into an element of the offense and the instruction 
thereby be deemed erroneous.5  
B. 
¶71 Even if the jury instruction is to be considered 
erroneous, the majority compounds any error by untethering the 
sufficiency of the evidence analysis from the jury's verdict by 
measuring the claim against the statutory elements rather than 
the given instruction.  A court "cannot affirm a criminal 
conviction on the basis of a theory not presented to the jury."  
                                                 
4 A video recording of oral argument is available at 
http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?
evhdid=6868 (last visited May 3, 2013).  The quoted exchange 
occurs at 1:12:20. 
5 Circuit courts have been cautioned against relying solely 
on a pattern jury instruction instead of fashioning a specific 
jury instruction: "Standard jury instructions are to assist the 
court but should not be used as a substitute for the court 
developing appropriate instructions relating to the specific 
facts of each case."  Anderson v. Alfa-Laval Agri, Inc., 209 
Wis. 2d 337, 345-46, 564 N.W.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1997).     
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236 (1980).  Yet that 
is exactly what the majority appears to do by ignoring the law 
of the case in favor of a sufficiency of the evidence analysis 
that uses another theory of prosecution not presented to the 
jury. 
¶72 A court's instruction to the jury establishes the law 
of the case, which the jury must accept in making its findings.  
State v. Truax, 151 Wis. 2d 354, 362, 444 N.W.2d 432 (Ct. App. 
1989) ("We presume that the jury follows the instructions given 
to it.").  Indeed, the jury in this case was instructed to base 
its verdict on the law that the circuit court set forth in its 
instructions:   
Members of the jury, the court will now instruct you 
upon the principles of law which you are to follow in 
considering the evidence and in reaching your verdict.  
It is your duty to follow all of these instructions, 
regardless of any opinion you may have about what the 
law is or ought to be. You must base your verdict on 
the law I give you in these instructions.   
Apply that law to the facts in the case which have 
been properly proven by the evidence.  Consider only 
the evidence received during this trial and the law as 
given to you by these instructions and from these 
alone, guided by your soundest reason and best 
judgment, reach your verdict. 
If any member of the jury has an impression of my 
opinion as to whether the defendant is guilty or not 
guilty, disregard that impression entirely and decide 
the issues of fact solely as you view the evidence.  
You, the jury, are the sole judges of the facts, and 
the Court is the judge of the law only. 
The circuit court's instruction followed Wis-JI Criminal 100 
(2000), a pattern jury instruction that is regularly given in 
criminal trials throughout the state.   
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
¶73 In State v. Courtney, 74 Wis. 2d 705, 247 N.W.2d 714 
(1976), the court conducted a sufficiency of the evidence 
analysis 
against 
a 
jury 
instruction 
even 
when 
the 
jury 
instruction added an element to the offense.  It applied the 
principle that juries must follow the law as they are instructed 
by the circuit court.  Id.  Likewise, as State v. Wulff, 207 
Wis. 2d 143, 557 N.W.2d 813 (1997) demonstrates, a jury 
instruction should be the basis for a sufficiency of the 
evidence analysis even if the evidence is sufficient to support 
a conviction under another theory of prosecution not given to 
the jury.   
¶74 In Wulff, which involved an allegation of second-
degree sexual assault, the jury was instructed to return a 
verdict of "guilty" if it found that the defendant had attempted 
one of multiple methods by which a person can commit sexual 
assault.  Id. at 149.  The State presented three different 
theories of prosecution at trial, but none of them was related 
to the theory on which the jury was instructed.  Id.  As a 
result, the State did not meet its burden to produce sufficient 
evidence at trial.  Id.  The jury convicted Wulff despite the 
State's failure to meet its burden.  Id.   
¶75 In analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence, this 
court acknowledged that had the jury been instructed on the 
State's alternative theories, there was sufficient evidence to 
sustain the conviction.  Id. at 152.  However, despite the fact 
that a broader sufficiency of the evidence analysis would 
require it to affirm the conviction, the Wulff court explained 
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
that it could "uphold Wulff's conviction only if there was 
sufficient evidence to support guilt on the charge submitted to 
the jury in the instructions."6  Id. at 153. 
¶76 As recently as last year, this court explained that 
even where a jury instruction is "misleading," the sufficiency 
of the evidence must be considered in the context of the 
instruction given to the jury where the instruction received no 
objection at trial.  Best Price Plumbing, Inc. v. Erie Ins. 
Exchange, 2012 WI 44, ¶40, 340 Wis. 2d 307, 814 N.W.2d 419 
(citing Kovalic v. DEC International, Inc., 161 Wis. 2d 863, 873 
n.7, 469 N.W.2d 224 (Ct. App. 1991)); see also D.L. Anderson's 
Lakeside Leisure Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 2008 WI 126, ¶22, 314 
Wis. 2d 560, 757 N.W.2d 803 (when the accuracy of a jury 
instruction is not properly contested on appeal, a challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence is evaluated "in light of the 
jury instruction[]."). 
¶77 Without 
any 
citation 
to 
authority 
the 
majority 
suggests that the law of the case doctrine does not apply in 
criminal cases in Wisconsin.  Majority op., ¶46 n.6.  As 
                                                 
6 The United States Supreme Court recently analyzed a 
similar situation in the context of a double jeopardy issue in 
Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. ___ (2013).  In that case, the trial 
court, using an erroneous interpretation of the law, determined 
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction.  Id. 
at 6.  The trial court's ruling was predicated on a "clear 
misunderstanding" of the law because it required an element of 
an offense that "was not actually a required element at all."  
Id. at 1, 6.  Despite the error that added an element to the 
offense, the United States Supreme Court determined that the 
trial court's ruling constituted an acquittal that precluded 
retrial.  Id.   
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
explained above, both Courtney and Wulff are criminal cases that 
rely on law of the case principles.  Additionally, this court 
has acknowledged in criminal proceedings that a previous court 
of appeals decision or a previous decision of this court may 
establish the law of the case.  State v. Moeck, 2005 WI 57, 280 
Wis. 2d 277, 695 N.W.2d 783; State v. Stuart, 2003 WI 73, 262 
Wis. 2d 620, 664 N.W.2d 82.  Likewise, the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that in criminal cases, the law of the case 
may be established by instructing the jury.  U.S. v. Wells, 519 
U.S. 582, 487 (1997) (acknowledging that the law of the case may 
be established by jury instructions); see also United States v. 
Killip, 819 F.2d 1542, 1548-49 (10th Cir. 1987); United States 
v. Tapio, 634 F.2d 1092, 1094-95 (8th Cir. 1980); United States 
v. Spletzer, 535 F.2d 950, 954 (5th Cir. 1976).7 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.18, a civil procedure statute, sets 
forth a harmless error standard.  It is made applicable to 
criminal cases by Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1).  In State v. Harvey, 
2002 WI 93, ¶39, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189, a criminal 
case, this court recognized that Wisconsin's harmless error 
standard flows from Wis. Stat. § 805.18.  See also State v. 
Sherman, 2008 WI App 57, ¶8, 310 Wis. 2d 248, 750 N.W.2d 500. 
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
¶78 All of the above cases indicate that jury instructions 
become the law of the case in Wisconsin.8  This court should not 
change the law and should not affirm a conviction based upon a 
theory of prosecution that was never heard by the jury.  
Erroneous or not, the jury instruction is the law of the case 
and must be the basis for evaluating the sufficiency of the 
evidence.         
C. 
 
¶79 The consequences of the majority's misplaced analysis 
are substantial.  To begin, it undermines the integrity of the 
judicial process because it permits the jury to ignore the 
circuit court's instruction so long as an appellate court at 
some later date determines the given instruction is erroneous.   
¶80 The circuit court clearly and forcefully advised the 
jury that "you must base your verdict on the law that I give to 
you in these instructions" and that in reaching a verdict the 
jury shall consider only the evidence and "the law as given to 
                                                 
8 Multiple state and federal courts have additionally 
concluded that the law of the case may be established even where 
a jury instruction is erroneous.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Zanghi, 189 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Johnson, 
652 F.3d 918, 922 n.2 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Williams, 
376 
F.3d 
1048, 
1051 
(10th 
Cir. 
2004) 
("[T]he 
government [has] the burden of proving each element of a crime 
as set out in a jury instruction to which it failed to object, 
even if the unchallenged jury instruction goes beyond the 
criminal statute''s requirements."); State v. Azure, 186 P.3d 
1269, 1275 (Mont. 2008) (a failure to object to a proposed jury 
instruction becomes the law of the case once delivered, whether 
or not it includes an unnecessary element); State v. Willis, 103 
P.3d 1213, 1217 (Wash. 2005); State v. Rogers, 730 N.W.2d 859, 
863 (N.D. 2007) (an unchallenged jury instruction becomes the 
law of the case); see also Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 
(2000) ("A jury is presumed to follow its instructions."). 
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
you by these instructions."  Nevertheless, the majority in 
essence concludes that sometimes a jury has to follow the 
instructions and sometimes it doesn't——and here, it need not 
follow the circuit court's instruction.   
¶81 The premise that it is the court's responsibility to 
instruct the jury on the law, and that the jury must apply the 
law as instructed, is a firmly-established principle of American 
jurisprudence, and we should continue to follow that principle.  
As early as 1895, Justice Harlan, writing for the United States 
Supreme Court, warned against the perils of allowing a jury to 
ignore the court's instruction of the law: 
Public and private safety alike would be in peril if 
the principle be established that juries in criminal 
cases may, of right, disregard the law as expounded to 
them by the court, and become a law unto themselves.  
. . . . 
We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts 
of the United States it is the duty of juries in 
criminal cases to take the law from the court, and 
apply that law to the facts as they find them to be 
from 
the 
evidence. 
Upon 
the 
court 
rests 
the 
responsibility of declaring the law; upon the jury, 
the responsibility of applying the law so declared to 
the facts as they, upon their conscience, believe them 
to be.  
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 101-03 (1895).   
 
¶82 In this case, some of Justice Harlan's admonitions are 
on full display.  All acknowledge that there is no evidence 
whatsoever of an increase in speed after the siren and lights 
were activated.  The only question at trial which addressed the 
issue resulted in a resounding negative: 
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
14 
 
Defense Counsel: And you stated that the car was 
already speeding.  So in your opinion, did the car 
speed up any quicker once you got behind the car? 
Officer Miller:  No, it was -– it's – I don't believe 
it sped up any more once I got behind the vehicle.  
No, sir. 
Although there was a complete absence of any testimony or other 
evidence indicating that Beamon increased the speed of his 
vehicle, the jury still returned a verdict of "guilty."9  It did 
so despite the circuit court's instruction that in order to find 
Beamon "guilty," it must find that Beamon increased the speed of 
his vehicle after the lights and sirens were activated. 
¶83 Under the majority's analytical framework, the jury is 
free to disregard the circuit court's instruction.  How can such 
sanctioned disregard be harmless to the integrity of the 
judicial process? 
¶84 Likewise, how can it be harmless when there is a 
violation of Beamon's right to have a jury determine whether he 
is 
guilty? 
 
The 
majority's 
analysis 
has 
the 
additional 
consequence of violating the constitutional right to a trial by 
jury which requires that a jury, rather than a subsequent 
appellate court, reach the requisite finding of "guilty."  The 
Sixth Amendment right of trial by jury includes "as its most 
important element, the right to have the jury, rather than the 
judge, reach the requisite finding of 'guilty.'"  State v. 
Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶20, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 
(quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993)).     
                                                 
9 The State has conceded on appeal that the evidence at 
trial did not satisfy the jury instruction.  State v. Beamon, 
2011 WI App 131, ¶6, 336 Wis. 2d 438, 804 N.W.2d 706. 
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
15 
 
¶85 It is the jury that ultimately found Beamon "guilty," 
supposedly on the evidence presented.  Accordingly, an appellate 
court should affirm his conviction in a sufficiency of the 
evidence analysis only if the evidence at trial was sufficient 
to convict on the theory of prosecution as set forth in the jury 
instruction that was requested by the State.  Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d 
at 152.   
¶86 Affirming the conviction on a theory of prosecution 
not presented to the jury requires the majority to speculate 
what the jury might have done if given another hypothetical 
instruction.  In essence it allows the appellate court to make 
the finding of "guilty" on behalf of the jury.   
¶87 The 
jury 
found 
Beamon 
"guilty" 
based 
on 
the 
instruction of the circuit court, not on any other theory of 
prosecution.  This court may not affirm a verdict that the jury 
did not render.  To do so violates Beamon's right to a finding 
of "guilty" by the jury itself.   
¶88 The 
substantial 
consequences 
of 
the 
majority's 
misplaced analysis are all the more glaring because of the 
extraordinary steps it takes in order to review the accuracy of 
the jury instruction in the first place.  Here, the State 
requested the instruction it now argues is erroneous.  The 
purported error received no objection before the circuit court.  
Furthermore, Beamon never asserted any error in the instruction 
and in fact relies on it.  On appeal, he asserted only an 
insufficiency of the evidence.  Curiously, it is the State that 
raised the issue before the court of appeals, abandoning the 
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
16 
 
same 
instruction 
that 
it 
previously 
embraced 
when 
it 
specifically requested that the circuit court tailor the 
instruction to fit the State's factual theory of prosecution.   
¶89 The legislature has mandated that a "[f]ailure to 
object at the [jury instruction] conference constitutes a waiver 
of any error in the proposed instructions or verdict."  Wis. 
Stat. § 805.13(3).  However, rather than follow that statutory 
directive, 
the 
majority 
takes 
the 
extraordinary 
step 
of 
exercising this court's power of discretionary review.  State v. 
Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 407, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988).  The 
power of this court to review issues that are waived is not to 
be used "indiscriminately," but instead "it is a power to be 
used sparingly, and only in exceptional circumstances."  Id. 
(emphasis added).   
¶90 It is the majority's decision to review the jury 
instruction 
in 
this 
case 
that 
is 
exceptional, 
not 
the 
circumstances of the case itself.  Beamon was charged with eight 
counts arising from the automobile chase and its aftermath.  He 
was convicted on all eight counts and challenges only one on 
appeal.  Of the eight counts, the fleeing or eluding charge 
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
17 
 
ranks among the least egregious examples of Beamon's criminal 
conduct.10     
¶91 By choosing to review the jury instruction, the 
majority lowers the bar, effectively defining an "exceptional 
circumstance" to include a mine-run criminal conviction.  It 
indiscriminately utilizes this court's discretion in order to 
affirm 
what 
is 
arguably 
the 
least 
egregious 
of 
eight 
convictions.  This court should not go to such extraordinary 
lengths to avoid a sufficiency of the evidence analysis measured 
against a jury instruction that is, in the end, a correct 
statement of the law. 
III 
¶92 The issue that Beamon raised on appeal, whether the 
evidence is sufficient to convict him, is easily addressed.  
Here, the jury was instructed that in order to return a verdict 
of "guilty" for fleeing or eluding an officer, it must find that 
Beamon "knowingly fled a marked squad car by willful disregard 
of the visual or audible signal so as to interfere with or 
endanger the traffic officer by increasing the speed of the 
vehicle to flee."  There is no evidence suggesting that Beamon 
increased the speed of his vehicle.    
                                                 
10 Beamon was charged with the following: fleeing or eluding 
an officer contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3), possession of a 
short-barreled shotgun contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.28(2), 
resisting an officer contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1), 
attempting to disarm a peace officer contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.21, 
obstructing 
an 
officer 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 946.41(1), 
unauthorized 
use 
of 
an 
entity's 
identifying 
information contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.203, possession of a 
firearm by a felon contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2), and 
criminal damage to property contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.01(1). 
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
18 
 
¶93 The evidence here, viewed most favorably to sustaining 
the conviction, is so insufficient that as a matter of law no 
trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 
451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).  Because the evidence is insufficient, I 
conclude that Beamon's conviction on this offense must be 
reversed.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶94 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.  
No.  2010AP2003-CR.awb 
 
1