Case Title: Short v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 228, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2013-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LAKISHA SHORT,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 228, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 9711007629 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                      Submitted: June 24, 2013 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: July 18, 2013 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 18th day of July 2013, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Lakisha Short, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s April 8, 2013 order denying her motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
 
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Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in May 1998, Short entered a plea of 
guilty to Assault in the Second Degree in Superior Court Criminal 
Identification Number 9711007629.  She was sentenced to 3 years of Level 
V incarceration, to be suspended on August 20, 1998 (her 18th birthday) for 
3 years of Level II probation.  Short committed violations of probation 
(“VOPs”) on three occasions.  On April 23, 2001, upon her third VOP, the 
Superior Court discharged her from probation.  Short’s case was closed in 
2001.   
 
(3) 
 In March 2004, a Superior Court jury found Short guilty of 
Robbery in the First Degree, two counts of Possession of a Firearm During 
the Commission of a Felony and one count of Aggravated Menacing in Cr. 
ID No. 0308021919A.  The State filed a motion to have Short declared a 
habitual offender based on her most-recent robbery and weapon charges, as 
well as her 1998 second degree assault conviction.  The Superior Court 
granted the State’s motion and Short was sentenced to a total of 55 years at 
Level V.  This Court affirmed Short’s convictions on direct appeal.2   
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Short v. State, 865 A.2d 512 (Del. 2004). 
 
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(4) 
In an apparent attempt to attack her status as a habitual offender 
in Cr. ID 0308021919A, Short filed a motion for postconviction relief 
arguing that her guilty plea in Cr. ID No. 9711007629 was involuntary.  The 
Superior Court denied Short’s motion on the ground of mootness, since Cr. 
ID No. 9711007629 had been closed since 2001. 
 
(5) 
In this appeal, Short claims that the Superior Court erred and 
abused its discretion when it denied her postconviction motion because a) 
the Superior Court’s denial deprived her of a factual record to present on 
appeal and deprived her of the means to demonstrate that her plea was 
involuntary; and b) the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to accept her plea. 
 
(6) 
The Superior Court correctly ruled that Short’s postconviction 
motion was moot.  In order to seek postconviction relief, a defendant must 
either be “in custody or subject to future custody.”3  Short was discharged 
from probation in Cr. ID No. 9711007629 in 2001.  As such, she is neither 
“in custody” nor “subject to future custody” in that case and, therefore, lacks 
standing to move for postconviction relief in connection therewith.4   
 
(7) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
                                                 
3 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a) (1). 
4 Ruiz v. State, 2011 WL 2651093 (Del. July 6, 2011) (ten years after his case was closed, 
the defendant lacked standing to seek postconviction relief since the Superior Court had 
discharged him from probation and he was not subject to any future custody in 
connection with his original charges). 
 
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settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice