Case Title: DONALD P. HUNTER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84-216

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
DONALD P. HUNTER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 110704 P.2d 713Case Number: 84-216Decided: 08/14/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
DONALD P. HUNTER, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne and K. Leslie Delk, Asst. Public Defender, 
Laramie, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Karen Maurer, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ. 

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant was convicted 
after a trial to the court of a violation of § 6-3-403(a), W.S. 1977, (June 1983 
Pamphlet), and sentenced to one to three years in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.

[¶2.]     Appellant's issues on 
appeal concern the warrantless search and seizure of the car and appellant's 
personal effects found within the car, and also the sufficiency of the evidence 
as to concealment.

[¶3.]     We 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶4.]     In the early morning 
hours of May 6, 1984 a police officer saw appellant driving a new model Cadillac 
Seville with Michigan license plates in the 
downtown area of Laramie. The officer ran a NCIC check on the 
car. Before the report came back, appellant flagged down the officer to inquire 
where he could purchase motor oil at that hour. The officer gave appellant a few 
suggestions, and appellant drove off. The report eventually came back that the 
car appellant was driving was stolen, and the officer put out an alert to watch 
for the vehicle. Appellant was arrested off the interstate at the summit rest 
area a few miles east of Laramie, and the car was 
impounded.

[¶5.]     When the police 
lieutenant came on duty the next morning, he reviewed the report on appellant. 
He was told that Michigan would probably not extradite 
appellant, but that the sheriff's office was requested to keep appellant in 
custody until official notification to that effect was received. The officer 
then telephoned the owner of the Cadillac, Ms. Martin. He informed her of the 
location of the car and was in turn advised that several personal belongings of 
Ms. Martin had been in the car at the time it was stolen.

[¶6.]     The officer obtained 
the keys to the vehicle from the sheriff's office and searched the car to see if 
any of Ms. Martin's things were still there. None of Ms. Martin's effects were 
recovered, but several containers were found, containing many items commonly 
used in the falsification of car titles. Prior to trial, and again at trial, 
appellant moved to have these items excluded from trial on the basis that either 
the search was illegal or the evidence had no probative value. The motions were 
denied, the judge ruling that appellant had no standing to object to the search 
of a stolen car. The items were admitted to prove knowledge that the car was 
stolen.

SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE

[¶7.]     Appellant contends that 
the search of the Cadillac violated his rights, both under the United States 
Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution. It is recognized that warrantless 
searches and seizures are unreasonable per se under both the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 4, of the Wyoming Constitution. Ortega v. State, Wyo., 669 P.2d 935 
(1983). This rule is subject only to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions. Kish v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 453, 455 (1982); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). The search and/or seizure of an automobile upon probable 
cause is one of the recognized exceptions, Ortega v. State, supra; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543, 
39 A.L.R. 790 (1925).

[¶8.]     The general rule as to 
the warrantless search of automobiles, for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States, was stated in Carroll v. United States, supra. There 
the Court held that the warrantless search of an automobile which was stopped by 
police who had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband was 
not unreasonable. In the case at bar, the police knew that the car was stolen. 
Clearly it was proper for the police to search and seize a vehicle which it knew 
to be stolen. The car itself was contraband, and it very possibly could also 
contain contraband, i.e., the personal belongings which were stolen along with 
the car. 

[¶9.]     Appellant then argues 
that even if the search and seizure of the car itself were proper, the search 
and seizure of his belongings, in closed containers, were not proper. Appellee, 
in turn, argues that the search and seizure of the closed containers were proper 
upon any of three bases. First, that appellant consented to the search by 
turning over the car keys; second, that the officers were merely looking for the 
items which belonged to Ms. Martin, the owner of the car, and this necessitated 
opening the containers; and third, that the search was for the purposes of 
completing an inventory of a lawfully impounded car. Appellant finds fault with 
each of these three bases. He alleges that the consent was not voluntary because 
he turned over the car keys after being told that Michigan was not 
interested in extraditing him and that, therefore, he was to be released from 
custody shortly. He refers us to the testimony of the officer who searched the 
car wherein he stated that none of the closed containers resembled any of Ms. 
Martin's description of her property and that, therefore, he assumed the 
containers to contain the personal property of appellant. Lastly, he contends 
that the caretaking function of an inventory includes removing valuables from a 
car for safekeeping, but does not include searching through closed containers 
which can be stored safely within police headquarters without ever being 
opened.

[¶10.]  In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982), the Supreme Court considered the permissible scope of a search such 
as in the Carroll case. Ross involved 
the search of a car which was stopped after a tip that the car contained 
narcotics. The informant in the case had previously proven to be reliable, and 
the information given matched that observed by the officers. The officers 
stopped the car, and searched it. They found a bullet on the front seat, a 
pistol in the glove compartment and a closed brown paper bag in the trunk. Upon 
opening the paper bag, a number of glassine bags containing a white powder were 
discovered. The car was then removed to police headquarters, where another 
search was performed. A zippered red leather pouch containing $3,200 in cash was 
found in the trunk. The white powder was later determined to be heroin. There 
was no question but what the officers could stop and search the car, including 
its trunk, because the requisite probable cause was evident. The question arose 
as to the search of the paper bag and leather pouch.

[¶11.]  The Court, in Ross, noted the ruling of United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 
(1977), that the general principle was that closed packages and containers may 
not be searched without a warrant.

"* * * In sum, the Court 
in Chadwick declined to extend the rationale of the `automobile exception' to 
permit a warrantless search of any movable container in a public place." 
(Footnote omitted.) United States v. 
Ross, supra, 102 S. Ct.  at 2166.

However, 
Chadwick can be distinguished from Ross because it involved suspicion 
directed only at a footlocker, which was at some point placed in a car, unlike 
Ross where the suspicion was that the 
car contained narcotics within it. Thus, in Ross, the officers had probable cause to 
search the entire vehicle.

[¶12.]  In reaching its result in Ross, the Court, noted 
that:

"* * * Indeed, prior to 
the decisions in Chadwick and Sanders, courts routinely had held that containers 
and packages found during a legitimate warrantless search of an automobile also 
could be searched without a warrant." (Footnote omitted.) 102 S. Ct.  at 
2170.

[¶13.]  Further, the Court indicated that the 
practical consequences of the Carroll 
decision would be nullified if the permissible scope of such a search did not 
include containers found within the vehicle.

"* * * Contraband goods 
rarely are strewn across the trunk or floor of a car; since by their very nature 
such goods must be withheld from public view, they rarely can be placed in an 
automobile unless they are enclosed within some form of container. * * *" 
(Footnote omitted.) 102 S. Ct.  at 2170.

[¶14.]  Finally, the Court determined that the 
scope of a warrantless search of a vehicle is not defined by the nature of the 
container in which the contraband is held. It is instead defined by the object 
of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe it may 
be found.

"The exception recognized 
in Carroll is unquestionably one that is `specifically established and well 
delineated.' We hold that the scope of the warrantless search authorized by that 
exception is no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legitimately 
authorize by warrant. If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully 
stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its 
contents that may conceal the object of the search." 102 S. Ct.  at 
2173.

[¶15.]  In the case at bar, there was probable 
cause to believe that the car was stolen, and that it could contain stolen 
personal property of the vehicle's owner. The car also could have contained 
evidence which tended to show that a crime had been committed or which tended to 
show that a particular person had committed a crime.

[¶16.]  Rule 40, W.R.Cr.P., provides in 
part:

"(b) Grounds for issuance. - A warrant may be 
issued under this rule to search and seize any property

"(1) Stolen or embezzled 
in violation of law; or

* * * * * 
*

"(4) When the property or 
things to be seized consist of any item, or constitute any evidence which tends 
to show a crime has been committed, or tends to show that a particular person 
has committed a crime."

If a warrant had 
been issued, it certainly would have directed the officers to search for Ms. 
Martin's personal belongings which were stolen along with the car. Lieutenant 
Puls testified on cross-examination that he believed that the items he found in 
the vehicle belonged to the appellant, and that none of them resembled anything 
Ms. Martin had described to him. However, even though the officer might not have 
said so, there was no way to know whether or not Ms. Martin's belongings had 
been put in with the items that were believed to belong to Mr. Hunter, until 
they were opened. Once lawfully opened, the contents which did belong to Mr. 
Hunter were in plain view and subject to search.

[¶17.]  Because there was probable cause to 
search the car and any closed containers found within the car, the search and 
seizure were not unreasonable, under either the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution or Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. Thus, the proceeds of 
the search and seizure were properly admitted into court.

CONCEALMENT

[¶18.]  Appellant's last issue is whether there 
is sufficient evidence to support the judge's finding that appellant concealed 
stolen property in the state of Wyoming. In making this determination, we view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, i.e., 
the State. Cutbirth v. State, 
Wyo., 663 P.2d 888 (1983).

[¶19.]  Concealment is generally defined to mean 
"to prevent disclosure or recognition of" or "to place out of sight." Webster's 
New Collegiate Dictionary (1979). Appellant contends that there was no evidence 
that he concealed the vehicle in question as he drove it through downtown 
Laramie and 
flagged down a policeman; the license plate had not been changed, and no other 
alterations had been made to disguise the car or hide its 
whereabouts.

[¶20.]  When used in a legal sense, the word 
concealment means more than to place out of sight or to prevent recognition. It 
means to place out of sight of the owner, or to prevent recognition by the 
owner.

"The word `conceals' in 
the statute was not used in a technical sense but includes all acts done which 
render the discovery or identification of property more difficult. State v. Ward, 49 Conn. 429, 442; Wertheimer v. State, 201 Ind. 572, 169 N.E. 40. The court's charge that the jury could conclude that the TV set was 
concealed if it believed testimony that the television set was placed by the 
defendant in a sun porch of his private home out of the view of the general 
public was correct. Concealment is not limited to proof that the stolen property 
was hidden or kept out of sight, it is enough if it is proven that the property 
was withheld from the owner and made difficult for the owner to discover and 
this includes acts or conduct which enables the one who received the stolen 
goods to convert the property to his own use. Commonwealth v. Matheson, 328 Mass. 371, 
103 N.E.2d 714; State v. Crum, 255 
La. 60, 229 So. 2d 700; Wertheimer v. 
State, supra; 66 Am.Jur.2d, Receiving Stolen Property, § 4." State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 325 A.2d 199, 
212 (1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 976, 94 S. Ct. 291, 38 L. Ed. 2d 219 
(1973).

[¶21.]  Certainly appellant was concealing the 
stolen vehicle from its lawful owner, who lived in Michigan, by driving said vehicle to Wyoming. It was unlikely 
that the owner would discover its whereabouts. There was more than sufficient 
evidence of concealment.

[¶22.]  Affirmed.

THOMAS, Chief Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶23.]  I have no essential disagreement with the 
disposition of this case as the majority has done. I would, however, be disposed 
to support the district judge in his conclusion that the appellant had no 
standing to object to the search and seizure of evidence in this case. It is my 
view that the focus in the context of standing to object to a search has come to 
be the legitimate expectation of privacy of the accused in the premises or 
articles which are searched. Rakas v. 
State of Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978), reh. denied 439 U.S. 1122, 99 S. Ct. 1035, 59 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1979); 
Parkhurst v. State, Wyo., 628 P.2d 1369, 1374 
(1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 899, 102 S. Ct. 402, 70 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1981). If the 
legitimate expectation of privacy is a threshold concept with respect to 
standing then I contend that one in possession of a stolen motor vehicle must 
bear the burden at a suppression hearing, with respect to evidence obtained from 
that stolen motor vehicle, of demonstrating a legitimate expectation of privacy 
with respect to the stolen motor vehicle and its contents. I do not understand 
the record in this case as containing a satisfaction of that burden by the 
appellant. Furthermore, I think it is questionable whether one in possession of 
a stolen motor vehicle could in most instances establish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.