Case Title: Bearden v. J. R. Grobmeyer Lumber Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1998-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Leavon BEARDEN v. J.R. GROBMYER LUMBER CO.
and Delsondro Sims

97-571                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 12, 1998


1.   Evidence -- civil action -- evidence of conviction or bond
     forfeiture resulting from violation of traffic laws
     inadmissible. -- Evidence of a conviction or a bond forfeiture
     resulting from a violation of traffic laws is inadmissible in
     any civil action; if the record of a conviction is
     inadmissible, there is even more reason to hold that evidence
     of a traffic citation, which is a "mere charge," is
     inadmissible.  

2.   Evidence -- introduction of incompetent evidence objected to -
     - opposing party may introduce equally incompetent rebuttal
     evidence. -- The introduction of incompetent evidence, over
     objection, allows the opposing party to introduce equally
     incompetent rebuttal evidence; a plaintiff should be permitted
     to present otherwise inadmissible evidence in response to a
     defendant's incompetent and inadmissible statement. 

3.   Evidence -- relevant and damaging evidence properly objected
     to but still admitted -- adversary entitled to give answering
     evidence. -- If the evidence, though inadmissible, is relevant
     to the issues and hence probably damaging to the adversary's
     case, or though irrelevant is prejudice-arousing to a material
     degree, and if the adversary has seasonably objected or moved
     to strike, then the adversary should be entitled to give
     answering evidence as of right; by objecting, he has done his
     best to save the court from mistake, but his remedy by
     assigning error to the ruling is not adequate; he needs a fair
     opportunity to win his case at the trial by refuting the
     damaging evidence.

4.   Evidence -- neither objection nor motion to strike made at
     time of objectionable testimony -- trial court's refusal to
     admit rebuttal evidence not error. -- Where there was neither
     an objection nor a motion to strike at the time of the
     objectionable testimony, appellant did not accept the trial
     court's offer to admonish or instruct the jury to disregard
     the officer's testimony, and the statement in question came
     during direct examination in appellant's case-in-chief, the
     trial court's refusal to allow appellant to introduce rebuttal
     testimony, which would have been otherwise inadmissible, was
     not in error. 

5.   New trial -- motion denied -- no abuse of discretion found. --
     In his motion for a new trial, appellant contended that the
     verdict in favor of the appellees constituted a "miscarriage
     of justice" in view of the failure to allow him to introduce
     the otherwise inadmissible rebuttal evidence; no authority was
     cited from which the supreme court could deduce an abuse of
     discretion. 

6.   New trial -- motion made on grounds that verdict clearly
     against preponderance of evidence -- verdict affirmed if
     supported by substantial evidence. -- When a motion for a new
     trial is made on the ground that the verdict is clearly
     contrary to the preponderance of the evidence, the supreme
     court affirms if the verdict is supported by substantial
     evidence, giving the verdict the benefit of all reasonable
     inferences permissible in accordance with the proof.

7.   New trial -- only one witness as to how accident occurred --
     verdict in witness's favor not clearly against preponderance
     of evidence. -- It is within the province of the jury to
     believe or disbelieve the testimony of any witness; given the
     fact that the only evidence as to what happened to cause the
     accident was the appellee driver's version of the facts, the
     supreme court could not say that the verdict in appellees'
     favor was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.
     

     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; Frederick Ursery, Special
Judge; affirmed.
     J.R. Nash, for appellant.
     Huckabay, Munson, Rowlett & Tilley, P.A., by:  Jim Tilley and
Julia L. Busfield, for appellee J.R. Grobmyer Lumber Co.

     David Newbern, Justice.
     The main issue in this appeal is whether the Trial Court erred
in refusing to allow the appellant, Leavon Bearden, to introduce
inadmissible evidence to rebut other inadmissible evidence that was
before the jury.  We hold that the Trial Court did not err in that
respect.  We also conclude that it was not error to overrule Mr.
Bearden's motion for a new trial.  We affirm the judgment in favor
of  appellees J.R. Grobmeyer Lumber Co. ("Grobmeyer") and Delsondro
Sims.
     On a rainy day in September 1994, Leavon Bearden drove his
pickup truck west on four-lane Roosevelt Road in Little Rock. 
Delsondro Sims, driving a large, unloaded truck owned by his
employer, J.R. Grobmeyer Lumber Co., was headed east on Roosevelt. 
As the truck driven by Mr. Sims approached a curve to the right,
Mr. Sims braked and "geared down" due to the presence of a slower
tractor-trailer ahead of him.  He moved to the inside lane to pass
the tractor-trailor.  Mr. Bearden was on the inside lane going
west.
     As he was braking or gearing down, Mr. Sims felt a "twitch" in
the truck he was driving, meaning that it slid somewhat to the
left.  He felt a collision and then looked in his rear-view mirror
and could see Mr. Bearden's damaged truck crossing into the east-
bound lane.  Mr. Sims stopped, put out emergency signals, and
called his employer.
     Mr. Bearden's truck had struck, or had been struck by, the
rear tire and bed of the truck being driven by Mr. Sims.  Mr.
Bearden was seriously injured, and his truck was damaged beyond
repair.  He sued Mr. Sims and Grobmeyer, alleging that Mr. Sims had
been negligent in the operation of the Grobmeyer truck, which was
undamaged by the collision.   
       At the trial, counsel for Mr. Bearden called Mr. Sims as his
first witness.  Mr. Sims was asked if the Grobmeyer truck had
crossed the center line into Mr. Bearden's oncoming-traffic lane. 
He denied that it had.  He was questioned about the somewhat 
equivocal testimony he had given in a deposition, but he continued
to deny consistently that his vehicle had crossed the center line
and insisted that he had never said it had done so.  Then, during
continued questioning of Mr. Sims by Mr. Bearden's counsel, the
following occurred:
     
     Q: Well, where on your truck was the contact with Mr.
     Bearden's vehicle?
     A: We never established where the contact was.  No one never
     established where it was at or anything.  I mean, the police
     never, you know, gave a ticket or -- they sent me on over to
     Georgia-Pacific.

Mr. Bearden's counsel neither objected nor asked that the statement
about the ticket be stricken.  Shortly thereafter he passed the
witness to counsel for Mr. Sims and Grobmeyer.  During the ensuing
cross-examination the following occurred:

     Q: Mr Sims, you stayed and the police officer investigated
     this accident?
     A: I guess they did.
     Q: Okay.
     A: I never got, you know, anything from it.
     Q: You said, in answer to Mr. Nash's question, no citations
     were given?
     A: No, no citations.
     Q: He's asked you --

     At that point Mr. Bearden's counsel asked to approach the
bench.  He objected to the testimony concerning the officer's
failure to issue a citation.  Opposing counsel responded that the
statement had been made initially in response to direct examination
by Mr. Bearden's counsel.  Mr. Bearden's counsel said he had not
heard the earlier statement and that, in any event, it was not
responsive to any question he had asked.  The Trial Court offered
to admonish or instruct the jury to disregard the testimony, and
Mr. Bearden's counsel said he would have to think about it.
     Mr. Bearden's counsel did not seek an admonition or
instruction on the point but ultimately asked that he be allowed to
inquire of the officer who investigated the accident as to what
caused the accident and whose fault he thought the accident was and
to bring out a statement, apparently from the police report, that
Mr. Sims was speeding when the accident occurred.  The request was
refused.

                    1. Curative admissibility
     Evidence of a conviction or a bond forfeiture resulting from
a violation of traffic laws is inadmissible in any civil action. 
Ark. Code Ann.  27-50-804 (Repl. 1994); Breitenberg v. Parker, 237
Ark. 261,