Case Title: Earl Posey, Jr. v. Bordentown Sewerage Authority

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-98-00

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). COLEMAN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The issue before the Court is whether, under the Tort Claims Act (TCA), the Township of Bordentown (Township) and/or the County of Burlington (County) may be held liable for injuries sustained on private property that receives water from a stream located in an adjacent public park. Bossert Park is located in, and owned by, the Township. Thorntown Road separates the park from private property owned by Henry and Ruth Marken. Thorntown Creek, a stream, flows from the park into the Markens' property through a culvert under Thorntown Lane. The culvert, built by the County in 1920, is a concrete tunnel six-feet high and five-feet-four inches wide. Once past Thorntown Lane, the stream immediately exits the culvert into a pond on the Marken property. Water flows from the pond into another stream also on the Marken's property. The pond varies in depth from four to twelve feet, depending on the amount of precipitation. Both the pond and the connecting shallow stream are traditional congregating points for children to fish, play, and wade on both sides of the culvert There are no physical barriers to the entrance to the culvert or warning signs indicating the water depth of the pond. Until this lawsuit, the Markens were not aware that the pond or the stream were on their property. On March 20, 1994, twelve-year-old Earl Posey, Jr. and two friends walked through the culvert toward the pond, which they believed was only four or five feet deep. When the boys exited the culvert onto the Marken property, the water level began to change quickly. Earl was swept into the pond and under the water about nine feet from the culvert. By the time rescue personnel reached the scene and pulled Earl from the water, he had suffered significant brain damage. Earl remained in a coma until his death in May or June of 2001. Earl's parents sued the Markens, the Bordentown Sewerage Authority, the Township, and the County. The Poseys' settled their claims against the Markens in 199 and the Sewerage Authority was dismissed from the case. The Poseys' claims against the public-entity-defendants, the Township and the County, remained. The Poseys allege that the pond was unnaturally and unexpectedly deep and, as such, constituted a dangerous condition under the TCA for which the Township and County should be held liable. The Poseys do not dispute that neither the Township nor the County own the pond. Rather, they contend that the pond is part of an integrated storm-water drainage system for which the Township and County are responsible. Under the Poseys' theory, the integrated drainage system consists of the stream in the park, three storm-water drainage pipes that empty into the stream, and storm-water grates on Thorntown Lane, all of which empty into the pond on the Marken property by way of the culvert. The Poseys claim that the storm-water run-off into the stream is partially responsible for creating the pond on the Marken property, thereby significantly and artificially increasing the depth of the water immediately downstream from the culvert. In addition, the Poseys' expert concludes that the construction of the sewer line by the Township under neath the stream and the culvert's effect on the speed of the water combined to create a scouring effect whereby a deep depression was left on the pond side of the culvert. The trial court decided this case on a motion filed by the Township and County for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, dismissing the Poseys' complaint on the basis of a recent case, holding that as a matter of law, a public entity cannot be liable for a dangerous condition on private property. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court granted certification. HELD: A public entity may be liable for a dangerous condition on private property that is proximately caused by the public entity's activities on public property, in this case, directing storm-drainage water onto private property. 1. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Poseys, the Township and the County each had a role in constructing and maintaining portions of the alleged integrated drainage system. The County owns and maintains the culvert. At some point, either the County or the Township installed storm-water pipes that feed into the stream and storm-water grates on Thorntown Lane. Thus, triable issues of material fact exist concerning which public entity installed the storm-water drainage pipes, whether an integrated drainage system exists, and whether it is maintained by the Township or the County. (Pp. 7-11) 2. Under the TCA, immunity is the rule and liability is the exception. The exception to the rule relevant to this case concerns dangerous conditions on public property. A public entity may be liable if the dangerous condition exists on public property at the time of the injury; the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition; the dangerous condition created a foreseeable risk of injury; and the entity has notice of the dangerous condition. (Pp. 11-14) 3. Although regulatory control is insufficient to establish control within the meaning of the TCA, possessory control is satisfied where a public entity treats private property as its own by using it for public purposes. Here, the public entities treated the pond as if they owned it by using it for storm-water drainage and by maintaining at least some of the adjacent land, thus making it an integral part of the property of the public entities. Viewing all the facts in a light most favorable to the Poseys and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, the alleged integrated storm-water drainage system could reasonably be found to exist. It may also be reasonably inferred, for purposes of defending against a summary judgment motion, that the excess water from the drainage system either created or substantially contributed to an unexpectedly deep and sudden drop-off that otherwise would not have existed. (Pp. 14-20) 4. The Court does not conclude that the Poseys have established a prima facie case. This holding should not be understood to extend unreasonably the concept of control by the public entity. The Court's holding is restricted to the unique facts presented here. Summary judgment was inappropriately granted to the Township and the County; whether a dangerous condition exists is a question for the jury on remand. (Pp. 20-21) 5. Summary judgment was also inappropriate because a jury reasonably could find that the Township and County knew or should have known that children play in and around the stream, culvert, and pond, and that it was reasonably foreseeable that those children may walk through the culvert. In addition, a jury could conclude that it was palpably unreasonable for the Township or the County not to warn or otherwise protect against the dangerously deep pond of which they had actual notice. (Pp. 21-27) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, LONG, VERNIERO, LAVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE COLEMAN'S opinion. EARL L. POSEY, JR., by his guardian ad litem, EARL L. POSEY, SR., and EARL L POSEY, SR., and GALE POSEY, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BORDENTOWN SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, HENRY E. MARKEN and RUTH V. MARKEN, ABC, INC., MARTIN SACHS, ESQ., and SACHS & SACHS, P.A., Defendants, and TOWNSHIP OF BORDENTOWN and COUNTY OF BURLINGTON, Defendants-Respondents. Argued November 26, 2001 -- Decided March 18, 2002 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Evan Edward Laine argued the cause for appellants (Gold & Laine, attorneys). F. Herbert Owens, III, argued the cause for respondent Township of Bordentown (Owens & Wolf, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. This sad case involves the near drowning and subsequent death of a twelve-year old boy. The accident occurred in a pond that is located on private property and receives water from a stream in an adjacent public park. Plaintiffs allege that the stream and pond are not natural bodies of water, but rather are part of an integrated storm-water drainage system for which the Township of Bordentown and the County of Burlington are responsible. The legal issue presented is whether either or both of the public entities may be liable for the injuries sustained on private property under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3. The trial court found that liability could not be imposed on either public entity and granted summary judgment to the Township and to the County. The Appellate Division affirmed. We hold that a public entity may be liable for a dangerous condition on private property that is proximately caused by the public entity's activities on public property, in this case, directing storm-drainage water onto private property. The Township, however, points to the County as being responsible for the storm-water pipe that is inside the culvert. In addition to installing the storm-water pipes, either the Township or the County installed storm-water grates on Thorntown Lane to drain rain water and melting snow into the culvert. The County contends that the Township is responsible for storm-water run-off from Thorntown Lane because Thorntown Lane is a Township road. As noted above, however, the trial court indicated that the County had installed the storm grates. Therefore, although it is clear that water empties into the pond, at least by way of the grates on Thorntown Lane, triable issues of material fact exist concerning which of the two defendants installed the storm- water drainage pipes, whether an integrated drainage system exists, and whether it is maintained by the Township or the County. As far as the sanitary sewer pipe is concerned, the trial court concluded during the summary judgment proceedings that the Township installed it. The trial court described the installation of the sanitary sewer pipe as follows: At some unknown time, but inferentially when houses were being built on the lands surrounding the downstream end of the stream, an easement was secured from the Markens or a predecessor in title whereby the Township acquired the right to install and maintain a sewer pipe running beneath the Marken property, essentially perpendicular to the stream. This easement cuts across the stream at about the location of the deeper ponding water as it exits the culvert and the pipe was laid under the bed of the pond and the stream. Sewage is carried eventually to the treatment plant. In 1986 this easement and the pipe was [sic] conveyed to the Bordentown Township Sewer Authority which now has jurisdiction over sewer facilities within the Township. Although the Sewer Authority was granted summary judgment and is no longer a party, plaintiffs contend that the Township is responsible for the installation of that sewer pipe and the alleged improper backfilling. The Township, on the other hand, contends that the stream and pond are natural bodies of water that are not part of an integrated storm-water drainage system. The Township therefore argues that the depth of the water in the Marken pond resulted from natural causes. On the day in question, the temperature was approximately fifty degrees Fahrenheit and there recently had been a heavy snowfall. The Township therefore argues that the depth of the pond that day was due to melting snow. The trial court initially denied the Township's motion for summary judgment based on disputed material facts. On the legal issue presented, it recognized that a public entity could be liable for a dangerous condition of public property which causes injury on private property under Saldana v. DiMedio, 275 N.J. Super. 488, 495 (App. Div. 1994). That case denied immunity where a fire spread from public property and caused damage to adjacent private property. On rehearing, however, the trial court retreated from the idea that a dangerous condition of private property could render public property also dangerous. Apparently believing that summary judgment was premature at that point, the trial court allowed discovery to continue based on the theory that the Township contributed to the creation of the pond . . . by permitting water to discharge into a stream in greater than natural quantity; that it improperly constructed the area of the easement [the sewer pipe]; and that it maintains the stream and its banks on both sides of the culvert. After completion of discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment to both the Township and the County. The court felt constrained by an interim decision issued by the Appellate Division, Roe ex rel. M.J. v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 317 N.J. Super. 72 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 160 N.J. 89 (1999), that addressed the issue whether a public entity can be liable for injuries sustained on private property. Although Roe denied immunity to the public entity, the trial court here held that the present case is distinguishable from Roe and more akin to Levin v. County of Salem, 133 N.J. 35 (1993), in which this Court granted immunity. The trial court therefore granted summary judgment to the Township and to the County, holding that as a matter of law a public entity cannot be liable for a dangerous condition on private property. The Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The appellate court found that liability in Roe for injuries occurring on private property was nonetheless predicated on the fact that the dangerous condition that led to the injuries was on public property. The court therefore concluded: We are satisfied that Roe provides no authority to warrant imposing liability upon public entities for a dangerous condition of private property. The trial court was entirely correct in its grant of summary judgment. We granted certification, 168 N.J. 293 (2001), and now reverse. NO. A-98 EARL L. POSEY, JR., by his guardian ad litem, EARL L. POSEY, SR., and EARL L. POSEY, SR., and GALE POSEY, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BORDENTOWN SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, HENRY E. MARKEN and RUTH V. MARKEN, ABC, INC., MARTIN SACHS, ESQ., and SACHS & SACHS, P.A., Defendants, and TOWNSHIP OF BORDENTOWN and COUNTY OF BURLINGTON, Defendants-Respondents. DECIDED March 18, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz