Case Title: Hinrichs v. DOW Chemical Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017AP002361

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2020-01-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2020 WI 2 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP2361 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Chris Hinrichs and Autovation Limited, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
The DOW Chemical Company d/b/a Dow Automotive, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 386 Wis. 2d 351,927 N.W.2d 156 
(2019 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 9, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 3, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Kathryn W. Foster   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER and DALLET, JJ., 
joined and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined with respect to 
Parts I, II, and III.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed an 
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
KELLY and HAGEDORN, JJ.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Patrick M. Harvey, Gabrielle Baumann Adams, and Husch 
Blackwell LLP, Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Patrick M. 
Harvey. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Terry J. Booth and Rogahn Jones LLC, Waukesha. There was 
an oral argument by Terry J. Booth. 
 
 
2020 WI 2
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP2361 
(L.C. No. 
2016CV1544) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Chris Hinrichs and Autovation Limited, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
The DOW Chemical Company d/b/a Dow Automotive, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 9, 2020  
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, 
in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER and DALLET, JJ., joined and 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined with respect to Parts I, II, 
and III.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed an opinion concurring 
in part and dissenting in part.  
 
KELLY and HAGEDORN, JJ., did not participate. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   In this case we are asked to 
address a multitude of issues that arise out of common law and 
statutory misrepresentation claims.  Along the way, we discuss the 
economic loss doctrine together with its exceptions and examine 
statutes and their applications. 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Both parties to this case seek review of aspects of an 
unpublished, per curiam decision of the court of appeals.1  The 
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Chris 
Hinrichs and Autovation Limited's (collectively, Hinrichs) common 
law misrepresentation claims against the DOW Chemical Company 
(Dow) and reversed the circuit court's dismissal of Hinrichs' 
statutory claim made pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 100.18 (2015-16).2 
¶3 
Hinrichs appeals the dismissal of his common law 
misrepresentation claims.  Specifically, he contends that the 
court of appeals erred by applying the economic loss doctrine to 
bar such claims.  He argues that the "fraud in the inducement" and 
"other property" exceptions to the economic loss doctrine apply 
and that as a result his common law claims should go forward. 
¶4 
Dow cross-petitioned for review of the court of appeals' 
determination that Hinrichs' Wis. Stat. § 100.18 claim survives 
its motion to dismiss.  It asserts first that Hinrichs' statutory 
claim is barred by the economic loss doctrine.  Next, it contends 
that Hinrichs is not "the public" within the meaning of § 100.18 
and that this court should overrule its previous decision in State 
v. Automatic Merchs. of Am., Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 659, 221 N.W.2d 683 
(1974).  Finally, Dow contends that the heightened pleading 
standard set forth by Wis. Stat. § 802.03(2) for claims of fraud 
                                                 
1 Hinrichs v. The DOW Chemical Co., No. 2017AP2361, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2019) (per curiam) 
(affirming in part and reversing in part an order of the circuit 
court for Waukesha County, Kathryn W. Foster, Judge). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
3 
 
applies to claims made under § 100.18, and that Hinrichs' complaint 
fails to meet those heightened standards. 
¶5 
In examining Hinrichs' common law claims, we conclude 
that the "fraud in the inducement" exception to the economic loss 
doctrine does not apply to allow Hinrichs' common law claims to go 
forward because the alleged misrepresentation is related to the 
quality and characteristics of the product in question and is thus 
not extraneous to the contract.  We further conclude that the 
"other property" exception to the economic loss doctrine does not 
apply to allow Hinrichs' common law claims to go forward because 
the JeeTops and adhesive are components of an integrated system. 
¶6 
With regard to Hinrichs' statutory claim, we conclude 
first that the economic loss doctrine does not serve as a bar to 
claims made under Wis. Stat. § 100.18.   We conclude second that 
one person can be "the public" for purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18(1) and decline Dow's invitation to overrule Automatic 
Merchandisers.  The court of appeals correctly determined that 
dismissal for failure to meet "the public" component of a § 100.18 
claim in this case was in error.  Finally, we conclude that the 
heightened pleading standard set forth by Wis. Stat. § 802.03(2) 
for claims of fraud does not apply to claims made under Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18 and that Hinrichs' complaint states a claim under the 
general pleading standard. 
¶7 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
4 
 
I 
¶8 
The facts set forth below are taken from Hinrichs' 
complaint.  Because we are reviewing the circuit court's 
determination of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
we must assume that these facts are true.3 
¶9 
Hinrichs developed a product called JeeTops, which he 
manufactures and installs through his company, Autovation Limited.  
He obtained a patent for the JeeTops in 2010.  
¶10 JeeTops are acrylic skylights installed aftermarket in 
the roofs of Jeep Wrangler vehicles equipped with a certain type 
of hardtop.  The complaint describes the JeeTops as giving "front-
seat passengers unparalleled views of the outdoors" and rear-seat 
passengers "unprecedented panoramic views."  After installation, 
"[t]he cumulative effect is to give the Wrangler's occupants the 
sensation of directly experiencing the environment through which 
they are driving." 
¶11 Installation of JeeTops is accomplished using an 
adhesive manufactured by Dow.  The adhesive performs a dual role, 
attaching the JeeTops to the existing Jeep and maintaining a 
watertight seal. 
¶12  In 2013, Mark Formentini, an agent for Dow, informed 
Hinrichs that Dow had a new primer available for use with the 
adhesive employed in installing JeeTops panels.  Formentini 
                                                 
3 See Yacht Club at Sister Bay Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Village of Sister Bay, 2019 WI 4, ¶4, 385 Wis. 2d 158, 922 
N.W.2d 95. 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
5 
 
further informed Hinrichs that the primer would be tested with the 
acrylic used in JeeTops. 
¶13 Shortly thereafter, Hinrichs relayed to Dow that 
customers were experiencing cracks in their JeeTops panels.  Dow 
responded that the acrylic used in the JeeTops had been sent to 
its labs for testing. 
¶14 After completing testing, Dow sent a report to Hinrichs 
claiming that the adhesive was properly functioning.  The report 
further indicated that Dow found "[n]o evidence of any crazing or 
surface cracking . . . ." 
¶15 Hinrichs continued purchasing and using Dow adhesives to 
install JeeTops, but customers continued to observe crazing and 
fracturing of the acrylic.  By October of 2014, one-third of all 
JeeTops panel installations using the Dow adhesive system had 
failed. 
¶16 Investigation eventually revealed that the Dow adhesive 
was attacking the integrity of the acrylic, which caused the panels 
to leak, and subsequently to craze and fracture.  By this time 
JeeTops had received extensive negative publicity, high profile 
customers had stopped purchasing the product, and dealers had 
dropped JeeTops from their product lines. 
¶17 In time Hinrichs was able to identify a suitable 
replacement adhesive, but by then the product had suffered a rash 
of negative publicity.  As a result, Hinrichs alleges that despite 
the warm reception JeeTops initially received, he is unable to 
sell them because of the perception that they are unreliable. 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
6 
 
¶18 Following these events, Hinrichs brought four causes of 
action against Dow:  negligent misrepresentation, intentional 
misrepresentation, strict responsibility misrepresentation and 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1).4  Dow moved to dismiss the 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.5   
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 100.18(1) provides: 
No person, firm, corporation or association, or agent or 
employee thereof, with intent to sell, distribute, 
increase the consumption of or in any wise dispose of 
any real estate, merchandise, securities, employment, 
service, or anything offered by such person, firm, 
corporation or association, or agent or employee 
thereof, directly or indirectly, to the public for sale, 
hire, use or other distribution, or with intent to induce 
the public in any manner to enter into any contract or 
obligation relating to the purchase, sale, hire, use or 
lease of any real estate, merchandise, securities, 
employment or service, shall make, publish, disseminate, 
circulate, or place before the public, or cause, 
directly 
or 
indirectly, 
to 
be 
made, 
published, 
disseminated, circulated, or placed before the public, 
in this state, in a newspaper, magazine or other 
publication, or in the form of a book, notice, handbill, 
poster, bill, circular, pamphlet, letter, sign, placard, 
card, label, or over any radio or television station, or 
in any other way similar or dissimilar to the foregoing, 
an 
advertisement, 
announcement, 
statement 
or 
representation of any kind to the public relating to 
such purchase, sale, hire, use or lease of such real 
estate, merchandise, securities, service or employment 
or 
to 
the 
terms 
or 
conditions 
thereof, 
which 
advertisement, 
announcement, 
statement 
or 
representation contains any assertion, representation or 
statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or 
misleading. 
5 See Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(a)6. 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
7 
 
¶19 The circuit court granted Dow's motion to dismiss.  As 
relevant here, the circuit court determined first that the economic 
loss doctrine barred Hinrichs' common law misrepresentation 
claims.  It characterized Hinrichs' losses as purely economic in 
nature and rejected Hinrichs' argument that either the "fraud in 
the inducement" exception or "other property" exception applied. 
¶20 Second, the circuit court determined that Hinrichs' Wis. 
Stat. § 100.18 claim must fail because Hinrichs is not "the public" 
within the meaning of the statute.  Specifically, the circuit court 
based 
its 
conclusion 
on 
the 
"plain 
inference 
from 
the 
complaint . . . that Dow's agent had already been dealing with 
Plaintiff, and was merely offering another product to them."   
¶21 Hinrichs appealed and the court of appeals affirmed in 
part and reversed in part.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court's determination that the economic loss doctrine bars 
Hinrichs' common law misrepresentation claims.  Like the circuit 
court, the court of appeals concluded that neither of the claimed 
exceptions to the economic loss doctrine applied.  Hinrichs v. The 
DOW Chemical Co., No. 2017AP2361, unpublished slip op., ¶¶14-16 
(Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2019) (per curiam). 
¶22 However, the court of appeals reversed the circuit 
court's determination with regard to the Wis. Stat. § 100.18 claim.  
It concluded that "dismissal of the Wis. Stat. § 100.18 claim based 
upon the failure to meet 'the public' component of the first 
element was improper.  The issue requires further exploration 
through the discovery process."  Id., ¶22.  Hinrichs petitioned 
for review of the court of appeals' conclusion regarding the common 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
8 
 
law misrepresentation claims, and Dow cross-petitioned for review 
of the § 100.18(1) issue. 
II 
¶23 We 
are 
asked 
to 
review 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
determination affirming in part and reversing in part the circuit 
court's grant of Dow's motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim.  Whether a motion to dismiss was properly granted is a 
question of law this court reviews independently of the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court and court of appeals.  
Town of Lincoln v. City of Whitehall, 2019 WI 37, ¶21, 386 
Wis. 2d 354, 925 N.W.2d 520.   
¶24 A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the 
complaint.  Meyers v. Bayer AG, Bayer Corp., 2007 WI 99, ¶21, 303 
Wis. 2d 295, 735 N.W.2d 448.  Under our established methodology 
for review of a motion to dismiss, we accept all facts pleaded in 
the complaint as true.  Id. 
¶25 In our review, we are called upon to review the court of 
appeals' determination that the economic loss doctrine bars 
Hinrichs' common law misrepresentation claims.  The application of 
the economic loss doctrine to a set of facts presents a question 
of law we review independently from the determinations of the 
circuit court and court of appeals.  Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. 
Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶15, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 688 
N.W.2d 462. 
¶26 Next, we are asked to review the court of appeals' 
conclusion that Hinrichs' claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) may 
proceed.  In our review, we must interpret §§ 100.18(1) and Wis. 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
9 
 
Stat. 802.03(2).  Statutory interpretation likewise presents a 
question of law we review independently without deference to the 
interpretations of the circuit court or court of appeals.  Maple 
Grove Country Club Inc. v. Maple Grove Estates Sanitary Dist., 
2019 WI 43, ¶25, 386 Wis. 2d 425, 926 N.W.2d 184. 
III 
¶27 We address first whether the economic loss doctrine bars 
Hinrichs' common law misrepresentation claims.  For context, we 
initially set forth the legal principles underlying the economic 
loss doctrine.  Subsequently, we address the applicability of the 
"fraud in the inducement" and "other property" exceptions to the 
economic loss doctrine in this case.   
¶28 Second, we address whether the court of appeals properly 
determined that Hinrichs' Wis. Stat. § 100.18 claim survives Dow's 
motion to dismiss.  In our review, we analyze whether the economic 
loss doctrine can bar claims made pursuant to § 100.18(1).  Next, 
we examine whether Hinrichs is properly "the public" for purposes 
of § 100.18(1).  We then address whether a claim pursuant to 
§ 100.18(1) is subject to the heightened pleading standard set 
forth by Wis. Stat. § 802.03(2) for claims of fraud and whether 
Hinrichs' complaint meets the applicable standard.  
A 
¶29 The economic loss doctrine is a judicially created 
doctrine with three primary purposes.  Van Lare v. Vogt, Inc., 
2004 WI 110, ¶17, 274 Wis. 2d 631, 683 N.W.2d 46 (citing Daanen & 
Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 403, 573 
N.W.2d 842 (1998)).  First, the doctrine exists to "maintain the 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
10 
 
fundamental distinction between tort law and contract law . . . ."  
Id.  Second, it protects "commercial parties' freedom to allocate 
economic risk by contract . . . ."  Id.  Third, the doctrine 
encourages "the party best situated to assess the risk [of] 
economic loss, the commercial purchaser, to assume, allocate, or 
insure against that risk."  Id.  The doctrine has been part of our 
jurisprudence since it was first adopted by this court in 
Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford and Risberg, Inc., 
148 Wis. 2d 910, 437 N.W.2d 213 (1989).  
¶30 We have described the economic loss doctrine as holding 
that "a commercial purchaser of a product cannot recover solely 
economic losses from the manufacturer under negligence or strict 
liability theories . . . ."  Van Lare, 274 Wis. 2d 631, ¶18.  
"Economic loss" in the context of the doctrine is defined as "the 
loss in a product's value which occurs because the product is 
'inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes 
for which it was manufactured and sold.'"  Insurance Co. of N. 
Am., 276 Wis. 2d 361, ¶23 (quoting Wausau Tile, Inc. v. Cty. 
Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 246, 593 N.W.2d 445 (1999)).  Both 
direct and consequential economic loss are encompassed within this 
definition.  Daanen & Janssen, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d at 401. 
¶31 The upshot of the economic loss doctrine is that it 
"requires transacting parties in Wisconsin to pursue only their 
contractual remedies when asserting an economic loss claim, in 
order to preserve the distinction between contract and tort."  Ins. 
Co. of N. Am., 276 Wis. 2d 361, ¶24 (quoting Digicorp, Inc. v. 
Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI 54, ¶34, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 662 N.W.2d 652).  
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
11 
 
It "precludes parties under certain circumstances from eschewing 
the more limited contract remedies and seeking tort remedies."  
Id. 
B 
¶32 We have recognized several exceptions to the economic 
loss doctrine, two of which are at issue here.  See John J. 
Laubmeier, Demystifying Wisconsin's Economic Loss Doctrine, 2005 
Wis. L. Rev. 225, 228 (2005).  First, we address the "fraud in the 
inducement" exception.  Subsequently, we turn to the "other 
property" exception. 
¶33 This court has recognized "a narrow fraud in the 
inducement exception" to the economic loss doctrine.    Kaloti 
Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶42, 283 
Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205.  We have emphasized the limited nature 
of this exception.  See id. 
¶34 As explained by the Michigan court of appeals, on whose 
opinion we relied in Kaloti Enters.,  
Fraud in the inducement presents a special situation 
where parties to a contract appear to negotiate freely—
—which normally would constitute grounds for invoking 
the economic loss doctrine——but where in fact the 
ability of one party to negotiate fair terms and make an 
informed decision is undermined by the other party's 
fraudulent behavior.   
Huron Tool and Eng'g Co. v. Precision Consulting Servs., Inc., 532 
N.W.2d 541, 545 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). 
¶35 Pursuant to this exception, "a fraud in the inducement 
claim is not barred by the economic loss doctrine where the fraud 
is extraneous to, rather than interwoven with, the contract."  
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
12 
 
Kaloti Enters., 283 Wis. 2d 555, ¶42 (citations and internal 
quotation omitted).  To invoke the "fraud in the inducement" 
exception, a plaintiff must demonstrate three elements:  (1) that 
the defendant engaged in an intentional misrepresentation; (2) 
that the misrepresentation occurred before the contract was 
formed; and (3) that the alleged misrepresentation was extraneous 
to the contract.  Id.  Stating the third element differently, the 
misrepresentation 
must 
"concern[] 
matters 
whose 
risk 
and 
responsibility did not relate to the quality or the characteristics 
of the goods for which the parties contracted or otherwise involved 
performance of the contract."  Id. 
¶36 A 
misrepresentation 
relates 
to 
the 
quality 
or 
characteristics of the goods sold if it is expressly dealt with in 
the contract's terms.  Id., ¶43.  If not addressed explicitly in 
the contract, a misrepresentation is still related to the quality 
or characteristics of the goods sold, precluding the application 
of 
the 
"fraud 
in 
the 
inducement" 
exception, 
if 
the 
misrepresentation informs the reasonable expectations of the 
parties to the risk of loss in the event the goods purchased did 
not meet the purchaser's expectations.  Id. (citations omitted). 
¶37 Hinrichs urges us to apply the "fraud in the inducement" 
exception here to preclude application of the economic loss 
doctrine.  He contends that his prior purchases of adhesive from 
Dow do not preclude a claim where a subsequent purchase is induced 
by a misrepresentation. 
¶38 We disagree with Hinrichs.  His argument ignores a fatal 
shortcoming:  that the alleged misrepresentation regarding the 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
13 
 
effectiveness of Dow's adhesive is related to the quality and 
characteristics of the product in question and is thus not 
extraneous to the contract.  As the court of appeals correctly 
stated, "[w]hether the Dow adhesive was properly functioning on 
the acrylic used in JeeTops directly relates to its quality and 
characteristics——in particular its ability to maintain a water-
tight seal, which was one of its main functions."  Hinrichs, No. 
2017AP2361, unpublished slip op., ¶14.  Hinrichs therefore cannot 
fulfill the third necessary element for application of the "fraud 
in the inducement" exception. 
¶39 Therefore, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
"fraud 
in 
the 
inducement" exception to the economic loss doctrine does not apply 
to allow Hinrichs' common law misrepresentation claims to go 
forward because the alleged misrepresentation is related to the 
quality and characteristics of the product in question and is thus 
not extraneous to the contract. 
C 
¶40 We turn now to the "other property" exception to the 
economic loss doctrine.  Pursuant to this exception, the economic 
loss doctrine "does not bar a commercial purchaser's claims based 
on personal injury or damage to property other than the product, 
or economic loss claims that are alleged in combination with 
noneconomic losses."  Daanen & Janssen, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d at 402; 
Grams v. Milk Products, Inc., 2005 WI 112, ¶24, 283 Wis. 2d 511, 
699 N.W.2d 167.  In other words, the economic loss doctrine bars 
"the recovery of purely economic losses in consumer transactions 
through tort remedies where the only damage is to the product 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
14 
 
purchased by the consumer."  State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Hague 
Quality Water, Int'l, 2013 WI App 10, ¶6, 345 Wis. 2d 741, 826 
N.W.2d 412 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor 
Co., 225 Wis. 2d 305, 341, 348, 592 N.W.2d 201 (1999)). 
¶41 To determine whether the "other property" exception 
applies, we apply a two part test.  Id.  First, we consider whether 
the defective product and the damaged property are part of an 
"integrated system."  Id., ¶7.  If the product and damaged property 
are part of such a system, then any damage to that property is 
considered to be damage to the product itself.  Id.  That is, "once 
a part becomes integrated into a completed product or system, the 
entire product or system ceases to be 'other property' for purposes 
of the economic loss doctrine."  Selzer v. Brunsell Bros., Ltd., 
2002 WI App 232, ¶38, 257 Wis. 2d 809, 652 N.W.2d 806 (citations 
omitted).6 
                                                 
6 Hinrichs urges us to adopt a new test he terms the "product 
bargained for" test in determining whether products constitute an 
"integrated system."  He explains such a test as based on "what 
the buyer agreed to buy and what the seller agreed to sell."  In 
Hinrichs' view, the adhesive and JeeTops were not an integrated 
system because the bargain he entered into with Dow was for the 
purchase of the adhesive as a standalone product and not as part 
of a fully integrated system. 
We decline to adopt Hinrichs' "product bargained for" 
analysis.  Hinrichs does not identify any infirmity in the current 
test that would require us to depart from our prior case law.  
Further, we observe that the Wausau Tile court rejected a similar 
contention that the "integrated system" rule does not apply where 
a party buys only a component and not the fully integrated system.  
See Wausau Tile, Inc. v. Cty. Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 252 
n.10, 593 N.W.2d 445 (1999).   
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
15 
 
¶42 If the damaged property and the defective product are 
not part of an integrated system, we then apply the second part of 
the "other property" test——the "disappointed expectations" test.  
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 345 Wis. 2d 741, ¶7.  In doing so, 
we focus on the product's expected function and whether the 
purchaser should have foreseen that the product could cause the 
damage at issue.  Id.  When claimed damages are merely the result 
of disappointed expectations of a product's performance, the 
exception will not apply and the economic loss doctrine will bar 
recovery in tort.  Grams, 283 Wis. 2d 511, ¶3. 
¶43 The court of appeals here concluded that the JeeTops and 
the adhesive were components of an integrated system.  Hinrichs, 
No. 2017AP2361, unpublished slip op., ¶15.  It reasoned that 
"[t]hey became components of an integrated system once the adhesive 
was applied to bond the JeeTops to the motor vehicle.  At that 
point, they were integral parts of a greater whole and did not 
serve an independent purpose."  Id.  Accordingly, the court of 
appeals concluded that the "other property" exception did not 
apply.  Id. 
¶44 We agree with the court of appeals that the JeeTops and 
the adhesive formed an integrated system.7  Wausau Tile, 226 
                                                 
7 Because we determine that the JeeTops and adhesive were 
components of an integrated system, we need not consider the second 
part of the "other property" test——disappointed expectations.  See 
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Hague Quality Water, Int'l, 2013 
WI App 10, ¶7, 345 Wis. 2d 741, 826 N.W.2d 412 ("If the damaged 
property is not part of an integrated system with the defective 
product, then courts apply the 'disappointed expectations' 
test . . . .") (emphasis added). 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
16 
 
Wis. 2d 235, provides a useful analogy.  In that case, Wausau Tile 
purchased cement from Medusa Corporation for use in manufacturing 
concrete paving blocks.  Id. at 241.  Wausau Tile claimed that the 
concrete it received from Medusa was defective and brought claims 
against Medusa sounding in both contract and tort.  Id. at 242. 
¶45 This court determined that the economic loss doctrine 
barred Wausau Tile's tort claims.  Id. at 241.  Rejecting Wausau 
Tile's argument that the "other property" exception applies, this 
court reasoned that "the pavers were integrated systems comprised 
of several component materials, including Medusa's cement."  Id. 
at 251.  "[V]arious substances incorporated into finished products 
constitute integral components of those products."  Id. (citation 
omitted). 
¶46 Similarly here, when the adhesive joins a JeeTops to the 
body of a Jeep, it creates an integrated system.  An adhesive does 
not function on its own——its basic purpose is to integrate two 
parts by adhering them together.  Like the court of appeals did, 
we see no relevant difference between the products here and others 
that courts have determined to be components of an integrated 
system, such as the cement in a concrete paving block in Wausau 
Tile, a window in a house,8 a gear in a printing press,9 a generator 
                                                 
8 Selzer v. Brunsell Bros., Ltd., 2002 WI App 232, ¶38, 257 
Wis. 2d 809, 652 N.W.2d 806. 
9 Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. AM Int'l, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 456, 463, 
591 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1999). 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
17 
 
connected to a turbine,10 and a drive system in a helicopter.11  
Hinrichs, No. 2017AP2361, unpublished slip op., ¶15 n.2 (citing 
Selzer, 257 Wis. 2d 809, ¶¶38-39).    
¶47 Accordingly, we conclude that the "other property" 
exception to the economic loss doctrine does not apply to allow 
Hinrichs' common law misrepresentation claims to go forward 
because the JeeTops and adhesive are components of an integrated 
system. 
IV 
A 
¶48 We address next Hinrichs' claim under Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18.  Section 100.18(1) provides in relevant part: 
No person, firm, corporation or association, or agent or 
employee 
thereof, 
with 
intent 
to 
sell . . . merchandise . . . or with intent to induce 
the public in any manner to enter into any contract or 
obligation relating to the purchase, . . . shall make, 
publish, disseminate, circulate, or place before the 
public, or cause, directly or indirectly, to be made, 
published, disseminated, circulated, or placed before 
the 
public, . . . an 
advertisement, 
announcement, 
statement or representation of any kind to the 
public . . . contain[ing] any assertion, representation 
or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or 
misleading. 
¶49 This section is part of Wisconsin's Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act, the purpose of which is "to protect consumers from 
                                                 
10 Midwhey 
Powder 
Co., 
Inc. 
v. 
Clayton 
Indus., 
157 
Wis. 2d 585, 590-91, 460 N.W.2d 426 (Ct. App. 1990). 
11 Midwest Helicopters Airways, Inc. v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 
Div. of United Technologies Corp., 849 F. Supp. 666, 672 (E.D. 
Wis. 1994), aff'd Nos. 94-1645, 94-1700, 1994 WL 682906 (7th Cir. 
1994). 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
18 
 
untrue, deceptive or misleading representations to promote the 
sale of a product."  Bonn v. Haubrich, 123 Wis. 2d 168, 173, 366 
N.W.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1985).  It is also intended "to deter sellers 
from making false and misleading representations in order to 
protect the public."  Novell v. Migliaccio, 2008 WI 44, ¶30, 309 
Wis. 2d 132, 749 N.W.2d 544. 
¶50 As a threshold matter, we consider whether the economic 
loss doctrine bars claims made pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 100.18.  
The court of appeals has previously concluded that the economic 
loss doctrine does not serve as such a bar.  Kailin v. Armstrong, 
2002 WI App 70, ¶43, 252 Wis. 2d 676, 643 N.W.2d 132. 
¶51 In Kailin, the court of appeals rejected an argument 
that Wis. Stat. § 100.18 does not create a new cause of action, 
but instead provides a remedy for common law claims.  Id., ¶42.  
Because Wis. Stat. § 100.18 creates a new cause of action, the 
court of appeals therefore saw "nothing supporting [the] 
conclusion that the economic loss doctrine applies to claims under 
§ 100.18."  Id.  The Kailin court further found "no argument to 
link the rationale for the economic loss doctrine to the purpose 
of § 100.18 . . . ."  Id.   
The legislature has plainly chosen in § 100.18 to 
provide protection and remedies for false advertising 
that do not exist at common law.  The underpinnings of 
the economic loss doctrine——protecting parties' freedom 
to allocate economic risk by contract, encouraging the 
purchaser to assume, allocate, or insure against that 
risk, and maintaining the fundamental distinction 
between tort and contract law——are either irrelevant to, 
or inconsistent with, that legislative choice. 
Id. 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
19 
 
¶52 Dow urges us to reject Kailin's approach and apply the 
economic loss doctrine to bar the Wis. Stat. § 100.18 claim in 
this case.  It contends that Kailin was decided in the context of 
a consumer relationship, and is therefore distinguishable from the 
sophisticated commercial relationship in which the claim arises 
here. 
¶53 For support, Dow turns to two federal district court 
cases.  First, in MBI Acquisition Partners, L.P. v. Chronicle 
Publ'g Co., 301 F. Supp. 2d 873, 885-86 (W.D. Wis. 2002), the court 
granted the defendants summary judgment on the plaintiff's Wis. 
Stat. § 100.18 claims on the basis of the economic loss doctrine.  
Second,  in Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. v. PPG Indus., Inc., No. 97-
C-707-S, 1998 WL 469913, at *6 (W.D. Wis. June 11, 1998), the court 
applied the economic loss doctrine to § 100.18 claims, reasoning, 
"exempting § 100.18 claims from the effects of the economic loss 
doctrine would virtually nullify the doctrine since § 100.18 is 
broad enough to encompass nearly every misrepresentation claim in 
the commercial sales context, and claims arising from product 
failure can readily be recast as misrepresentation claims." 
¶54 The federal court cases on which Dow relies are not 
binding on this court.  State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶18, 323 
Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63.  Further, MBI Acquisition Partners, 
the one published case Dow cites in support, applied the economic 
loss doctrine to § 100.18 claims with little in the way of 
analysis.  See MBI Acquisition Partners, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 885-
86. 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
20 
 
¶55 We reject Dow's argument.  Rather than adopting 
nonbinding authority with scant analysis, we instead reaffirm the 
Kailin court's determination on this issue.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 100.18 created a new cause of action, providing "protection and 
remedies for false advertising that do not exist at common law."  
Kailin, 252 Wis. 2d 676, ¶42; see also K & S Tool & Die Corp. v. 
Perfection Mach. Sales, Inc., 2007 WI 70, ¶36, 301 Wis. 2d 109, 
732 N.W.2d 792 (determining that "the legislature created a 
distinct cause of action" pursuant to § 100.18).  As the Kailin 
court stated, the policies underlying the economic loss doctrine—
—the allocation of risk and the distinction between tort and 
contract law——are irrelevant to the legislature's choice to 
provide a purely statutory cause of action and remedy by way of 
§ 100.18.  Kailin, 252 Wis. 2d 676, ¶42.  A common law restriction 
like the economic loss doctrine therefore does not apply to 
Hinrichs' statutory claim. 
¶56 Therefore, we conclude that the economic loss doctrine 
does not serve as a bar to claims made under Wis. Stat. § 100.18. 
B 
¶57 Having determined that the economic loss doctrine does 
not bar claims made pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 100.18, we turn now 
to Dow's assertion that Hinrichs is not "the public" for purposes 
of the statute.   
¶58 To prevail on a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18, a 
plaintiff 
must 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
defendant 
made 
a 
representation to "the public."  K & S Tool & Die Corp., 301 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
21 
 
Wis. 2d 109, ¶19.  "The public" is not defined in § 100.18, 
although courts have interpreted the term.  Id., ¶20. 
¶59 In 
the 
seminal 
case 
on 
the 
subject, 
Automatic 
Merchandisers, a company was alleged to have engaged in a marketing 
scheme to sell vending machines at prices in excess of their actual 
value.  64 Wis. 2d at 660.  The company placed classified 
advertisements in newspapers, and subsequently contacted those who 
responded to the advertisement at their homes with deceptive 
promotional materials and oral representations.  Id. 
¶60 In its analysis, the Automatic Merchandisers court 
examined "whether or not Sec. 100.18(1), Stats. applies to oral 
representations made in private conversations to prospective 
purchasers of the defendants' products."  Id. at 662.  The court 
determined that the statute applies in such a situation:  "While 
the representations were made privately to prospective purchasers 
their only relationship to the defendants was that they had 
responded to advertisements in the classified sections of 
newspapers.  These persons were members of 'the public' as that 
term is used in this statute."  Id. at 663. 
¶61 Further, the court recognized that "the number of people 
involved is not controlling and that 'the public' may be only one 
person."  Id. at 664 (citing Ford Hydro-Electric Co. v. Town of 
Aurora, 206 Wis. 489, 240 N.W. 418 (1932)).  "The use of the term 
'the public' does not mean that the statements be made to a large 
audience."  Id.  Indeed, the use of the term "contemplates the 
individual action of one member of the public."  Id.  Rather than 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
22 
 
the number of people involved, "[t]he important factor is whether 
there is some particular relationship between the parties."  Id.   
¶62 Following Automatic Merchandisers, Wisconsin courts have 
consistently applied the "particular relationship" test in 
determining whether a plaintiff is a member of "the public" for 
purposes of Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1).  See, e.g., K & S Tool & Die 
Corp., 301 Wis. 2d 109, ¶27; Kailin, 252 Wis. 2d 676, ¶44.  The 
test provides that "a plaintiff remains a member of 'the public' 
unless a particular relationship exists between him or her and the 
defendant."  K & S Tool & Die Corp., 301 Wis. 2d 109, ¶27.  Whether 
such a relationship exists is a question of fact that depends on 
the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.  Id., ¶¶27, 30 
(citing Cawker v. Meyer, 147 Wis. 320, 326, 133 N.W. 157 (1911)). 
¶63 Dow contends that our previously established framework 
of analysis strays from the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18(1).  Specifically, it asserts that one person cannot be 
"the public" and that consequently we should overrule Automatic 
Merchandisers.  In Dow's view, Automatic Merchandisers is 
inconsistent with the plain meaning of "public." 
¶64 We decline Dow's invitation to overrule Automatic 
Merchandisers.  First, as Automatic Merchandisers states, the use 
of "the public" in Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) "contemplates the 
individual action of one member of the public."  Automatic Merchs., 
64 Wis. 2d at 664; see also Wis JI——Civil 2418 (2017) (referring 
to a representation made to "one or more members of the public").  
"While the readily apparent legislative goal underlying the 
enactment of § 100.18 is to protect all members of [the] public 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
23 
 
from fraudulent advertisements and deceptive marketing practices, 
in its practical application, the section individually protects 
each member of the public."  Jersild v. Aker, 775 F. Supp. 1198, 
1205 (E.D. Wis. 1991). 
¶65 For 
example, 
in 
Automatic 
Merchandisers, 
the 
misrepresentation induced action when any individual member of the 
public entered into a private interaction with the vending machine 
company.  See Automatic Merchs., 64 Wis. 2d at 660.  If only one 
person saw the newspaper ad at issue, responded, and formed a 
relationship with Automatic Merchandisers, Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) 
was implicated.  Similarly here, a single representation to a 
single person is enough to trigger § 100.18(1)'s protections. 
¶66 Second, the doctrine of stare decisis12 militates against 
the precipitous change in the law that Dow seeks.  Stare decisis 
is fundamental to the rule of law.  Johnson Controls, Inc. v. 
Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 655 
N.W.2d 227.  Indeed, "[t]his court follows the doctrine of stare 
decisis scrupulously because of our abiding respect for the rule 
of law."  Id. 
¶67 "Fidelity to precedent ensures that existing law will 
not be abandoned lightly.  When existing law is open to revision 
                                                 
12 "Stare decisis" refers to the principle that requires 
courts to "stand by things decided."  State v. Harrell, 199 
Wis. 2d 654, 
667, 
546 
N.W.2d 115 
(1996) 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
concurring); see Black's Law Dictionary 1626 (10th ed. 2014) 
(defining "stare decisis" as "[t]he doctrine of precedent, under 
which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same 
points arise again in litigation"). 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
24 
 
in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial 
will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results."  Schultz v. 
Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶37, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 N.W.2d 266 (internal 
quotation and citations omitted).  Accordingly, any departure from 
stare decisis requires "special justification."  Id. 
¶68 Our case law has identified several criteria for 
overturning prior cases.  Johnson Controls, Inc., 264 Wis. 2d 60, 
¶98.  "First, changes or developments in the law have undermined 
the rationale behind a decision."  Id.  "Second, there is a need 
to make a decision correspond to newly ascertained facts."  Id.  
"Third, there is a showing that the precedent has become 
detrimental to coherence and consistency in the law."  Id.  We 
also consider "whether the prior decision is unsound in principle, 
whether it is unworkable in practice, and whether reliance 
interests are implicated."  Id., ¶99. 
¶69 In this case, these criteria do not support overturning 
Automatic Merchandisers.  As analyzed above, its interpretation is 
consistent with both the plain language and the purpose of Wis. 
Stat. § 100.18(1).  Cases subsequent to Automatic Merchandisers 
have consistently and coherently followed it.  See, e.g., K & S 
Tool & Die Corp., 301 Wis. 2d 109, ¶¶23-27; Bonn, 123 Wis. 2d at 
173 n.4.  The particular relationship test is clear and workable. 
¶70 Accordingly, we reaffirm that one person can be "the 
public" for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) and decline Dow's 
invitation to overrule Automatic Merchandisers.  The court of 
appeals correctly determined that dismissal for failure to meet 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
25 
 
"the public" component of a § 100.18 claim in this case was in 
error. 
¶71 We emphasize that we are not determining in this opinion 
whether Hinrichs is in fact a member of "the public," but rather 
that we agree with the court of appeals that dismissal on that 
ground was in error.  See Hinrichs, No. 2017AP2361, unpublished 
slip op., ¶22.  Whether Hinrichs and Dow were in a "particular 
relationship" so as to remove Hinrichs from the realm of "the 
public" pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) remains an open question 
to be determined by the circuit court after further discovery.  
See K & S Tool & Die Corp., 301 Wis. 2d 109, ¶27.  
C 
¶72 Finally, we address whether Hinrichs' claim pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 100.18 is subject to the heightened pleading standard 
set forth by § 802.03(2) for claims of fraud and whether Hinrichs' 
complaint states a claim under the appropriate standard.  This is 
an issue of first impression that was not addressed by the court 
of appeals in this case. 
¶73 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.03(2) provides in relevant part:  
"In all averments of fraud . . . the circumstances constituting 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
26 
 
fraud . . . shall be stated with particularity."13  To put 
defendants on notice so that they can prepare meaningful responses, 
this statute requires that allegations of fraud specify the 
particular individuals involved, where and when misrepresentations 
occurred, and to whom the misrepresentations were made.  Kaloti 
Enters., Inc., 283 Wis. 2d 555, ¶21 (citations omitted).  In other 
words, "[p]articularity means the 'who, what, when, where and 
how.'"  Ferris v. Location 3 Corp., 2011 WI App 134, ¶10, 337 
Wis. 2d 155, 804 N.W.2d 822 (citing Friends of Kenwood v. Green, 
2000 WI App 217, ¶14, 239 Wis. 2d 78, 619 N.W.2d 271). 
¶74 Dow asserts that Wis. Stat. § 802.03(2)'s heightened 
pleading requirements apply to Hinrichs' claim under Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18(1).  Hinrichs apparently concedes this point and 
accordingly contends that his complaint was sufficient to meet the 
heightened standard. 
¶75 However, we are not bound by Hinrichs' apparent 
concession of law.  See Fletcher v. Eagle River Memorial Hosp., 
Inc., 156 Wis. 2d 165, 179, 456 N.W.2d 788 (1990).  Consequently, 
                                                 
13 The Wis. Stat. § 802.03(2) pleading standard for fraud 
claims is more stringent than the standard employed for most other 
claims.  Generally, for claims not subject to § 802.03(2) a 
plaintiff need only plead "[a] short and plain statement of the 
claim, identifying the transaction or occurrence or series of 
transactions or occurrences out of which the claim arises and 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.02(1)(a); see Cattau v. Nat'l Ins. Servs. of Wis., 2019 WI 
46, ¶4, 386 Wis. 2d 515, 926 N.W.2d 756 (per curiam); Data Key 
Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶21, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 
849 Wis. 2d 693 (citing Strid v. Converse, 111 Wis. 2d 418, 422-
23, 331 N.W.2d 350 (1983)).  Thus, we refer to § 802.03(2) as 
creating a "heightened" standard. 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
27 
 
we examine the question Dow poses and arrive at a contrary 
conclusion. 
¶76 By its terms, Wis. Stat. § 802.03(2) applies to "all 
averments 
of 
fraud." 
 
Although 
entitled 
"Fraudulent 
representations," the text of Wis. Stat. § 100.18 does not include 
the word "fraud."  The title of a statute may be helpful in 
resolving ambiguities in a statute, but it is not part of the 
statute.  State v. Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, ¶30, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 906 
N.W.2d 158; Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6).  Therefore, we cannot rely on 
the title of "fraudulent representations" to determine that 
§ 100.18 is a "fraud" statute to which § 802.03(2) applies. 
¶77 Case law has previously indicated that Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18 creates a new cause of action and does not simply provide 
a remedy for common law fraud claims.  See Kailin, 252 Wis. 2d 676, 
¶42.  Through the enactment of § 100.18, "[t]he legislature has 
plainly chosen . . . to provide protection and remedies for false 
advertising that do not exist at common law."  Id.  Kailin thus 
indicates that common law restrictions do not apply to § 100.18.  
See id.  That Wis. Stat. § 802.03(2) may apply to common law fraud 
claims therefore does not affect our determination of whether it 
also applies to purely statutory claims under § 100.18.   
¶78 Further, considering the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 100.18 
we arrive at the conclusion that the application of heightened 
pleading standards would run counter to that purpose.  As stated, 
§ 100.18 serves a dual purpose of protecting consumers and 
deterring sellers from making deceptive representations.  See 
supra, ¶49; Bonn, 123 Wis. 2d at 173; Novell, 309 Wis. 2d 132, 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
28 
 
¶30.  It is aimed at preventing "certain activities deemed harmful 
to citizens' economic and social well-being."  Tim Torres Enters., 
Inc. v. Linscott, 142 Wis. 2d 56, 72, 416 N.W.2d 670 (Ct. App. 
1987). 
¶79 "Section 100.18 has maintained its central importance in 
consumer protection for more than a century since its enactment."  
John S. Greene, Navigating Wisconsin's Consumer Protection System, 
90 Wis. Law. 22, 24 (Sept. 2017); see also James D. Jeffries, 
Protection for Consumers Against Unfair and Deceptive Business 
Practices in Wisconsin, 57 Marq. L. Rev. 559, 595-605 (1974).  "The 
state, individual consumers, and business consumers regularly 
invoke Wis. Stat, section 100.18 to pursue claims of deceptive 
representations."  Greene, supra, at 24. 
¶80 Consistent with this history and purpose, Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18(11)(b)2. provides for a private cause of action.14  As 
                                                 
14 Wis. Stat. § 100.18(11)(b)2. provides: 
Any person suffering pecuniary loss because of a 
violation of this section by any other person may sue in 
any court of competent jurisdiction and shall recover 
such pecuniary loss, together with costs, including 
reasonable attorney fees, except that no attorney fees 
may be recovered from a person licensed under ch. 452 
while that person is engaged in real estate practice, as 
defined in s. 452.01(6).  Any person suffering pecuniary 
loss because of a violation by any other person of any 
injunction issued under this section may sue for damages 
therefor in any court of competent jurisdiction and 
shall recover twice the amount of such pecuniary loss, 
together with costs, including reasonable attorney fees, 
except that no attorney fees may be recovered from a 
person licensed under ch. 452 while that person is 
engaged in real estate practice, as defined in s. 
452.01(6). 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
29 
 
such, a successful plaintiff is entitled to recover pecuniary 
losses, costs, and reasonable attorney fees.  § 100.18(11)(b)2.; 
see Mark R. Hinkston, Protecting Consumers in the Modern Age:  
Wisconsin's Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 81 Wis. Law. 14, 16 
(Oct. 2008).  Double damages are available for any violation of an 
injunction 
previously 
issued 
pursuant 
to 
§ 100.18.  
§ 100.18(11)(b)2.; see Wis. Stat. § 100.18(11)(d) (authorizing the 
Department of Agriculture, Trade, and Consumer Protection, the 
Department of Justice, or any district attorney to seek a temporary 
or permanent injunction of "any violation of this section"). 
¶81 "We have previously recognized that an individual who 
brings an action to enforce a statutory right may be acting as a 
'private attorney general' to enforce the public's rights under 
the statute."  Watkins v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm'n, 117 
Wis. 2d 753, 764, 345 N.W.2d 482 (1984) (citing Shands v. 
Castrovinci, 115 Wis. 2d 352, 358, 340 N.W.2d 506 (1983)).  Absent 
such a private right of action and the prospect of attorney fees, 
many victims of deceptive representations "would not be in an 
economic position to advance the private and public interest at 
stake."  Estate of Miller v. Storey, 2017 WI 99, ¶58, 378 
Wis. 2d 358, 903 N.W.2d 759.  We must look at Wis. Stat. § 100.18 
through this lens when examining the applicable pleading standard. 
¶82 Heightened pleading requirements may prevent private, 
pro se parties from seeking redress for deceptive representations.  
Such a requirement would run counter to Wis. Stat. § 100.18's 
purpose as a consumer protection statute with a broad scope.  See 
Tim Torres Enters., Inc., 142 Wis. 2d at 72 ("The broad remedial 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
30 
 
scope of sec. 100.18 and its protective purpose make it similar to 
the remedial provisions of the federal antitrust laws in that to 
eliminate or rectify a wrong the traditional standards of proof 
may be relaxed if necessary.").   
¶83 Accordingly, we conclude that the heightened pleading 
standard set forth by Wis. Stat. § 802.03(2) for claims of fraud 
does not apply to claims made under Wis. Stat. § 100.18. 
¶84 We therefore apply general pleading standards to 
determine if Hinrichs' complaint states a claim.  Thus, we must 
examine whether Hinrichs' complaint pleads facts, which if true, 
would entitle him to relief.  See Cattau v. Nat'l Ins. Servs. of 
Wis., 2019 WI 46, ¶4, 386 Wis. 2d 515, 926 N.W.2d 756 (per curiam); 
Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶21, 356 
Wis. 2d 665, 849 Wis. 2d 693 (citing Strid v. Converse, 111 
Wis. 2d 418, 422-23, 331 N.W.2d 350 (1983)).   
¶85 Specifically with regard to a claim made pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1), a plaintiff must allege facts that would 
fulfill three elements:  (1) the defendant made a representation 
to one or more members of the public with the intent to induce an 
obligation; (2) the representation was untrue, deceptive or 
misleading; and (3) the representation materially induced a 
pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.  Novell, 309 Wis. 2d 132, ¶49; 
see Wis JI——Civil 2418 (2017) (referring to "one or more members 
of the public[,]" consistent with this court's conclusion in 
Automatic Merchs., 64 Wis. 2d at 663-64).  Hinrichs' complaint 
alleges facts that, if true, meet each of these elements. 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
31 
 
¶86 First, as analyzed above, the complaint alleges that Dow 
made a representation to "the public" within the meaning of Wis. 
Stat. § 100.18.  The complaint further alleges that the 
representation was made "with the intent of inducing Mr. Hinrichs 
to continue purchasing Dow adhesives." 
¶87 Second, as the court of appeals determined, "the 
complaint sufficiently alleges that Dow made representations that 
were untrue, deceptive or misleading."  Hinrichs, No. 2017AP2361, 
unpublished slip op., ¶23.  Specifically, the complaint alleges 
that "[t]he report prepared and produced by Dow claimed the Dow 
adhesive was properly functioning on the acrylic used by Mr. 
Hinrichs in the JeeTops panels . . . ."  The complaint further 
alleges that this representation was untrue, deceptive, or 
misleading in that the Dow adhesive actually was the cause of the 
structural breakdown of the JeeTops panels. 
¶88 Finally, 
the 
complaint 
amply 
alleges 
that 
the 
representation materially induced a pecuniary loss to Hinrichs.  
Hinrichs alleges that Dow's representations destroyed his ability 
to sell further JeeTops panels by negatively affecting the 
product's reputation.  The complaint specifically references 
negative commentary on social media and elsewhere within the Jeep 
enthusiast community, as well as allegations that high profile 
customers stopped purchasing the product and that dealers dropped 
JeeTops from their product lines. 
¶89 We therefore conclude that Hinrichs' complaint states a 
claim under the general pleading standard. 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
32 
 
V 
¶90 In sum, with regard to Hinrichs' common law claims, we 
conclude that the "fraud in the inducement" exception to the 
economic loss doctrine does not apply to allow Hinrichs' common 
law claims to go forward because the alleged misrepresentation is 
related to the quality and characteristics of the product in 
question and is thus not extraneous to the contract.  We further 
conclude that the "other property" exception to the economic loss 
doctrine does not apply to allow Hinrichs' common law claims to go 
forward because the JeeTops and adhesive are components of an 
integrated system. 
¶91 Concerning Hinrichs' statutory claims, we conclude first 
that the economic loss doctrine does not serve as a bar to claims 
made under Wis. Stat. § 100.18.   We conclude second that one 
person can be "the public" for purposes of § 100.18(1) and decline 
Dow's invitation to overrule Automatic Merchandisers.  The court 
of appeals correctly determined that dismissal for failure to meet 
"the public" component of a § 100.18 claim in this case was in 
error.  Finally, we conclude that the heightened pleading standard 
set forth by Wis. Stat. § 802.03(2) for claims of fraud does not 
apply to claims made under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 and that Hinrichs' 
complaint states a claim under the general pleading standard. 
¶92 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
2017AP2361   
 
33 
 
¶93 DANIEL 
KELLY 
and 
BRIAN 
HAGEDORN, 
JJ., 
did 
not 
participate.    
 
 
No.  2017AP2361.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶94 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  I agree with the majority's decision to 
affirm the court of appeals' dismissal of Hinrichs'1 common law 
misrepresentation claims because the economic loss doctrine bars 
them, and the "other property" and "fraudulent inducement" 
exceptions to that doctrine do not apply.  Accordingly, I join 
parts I, II, and III of the majority opinion.  However, the 
majority's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) (2015-2016)2 
does not apply the plain meaning of "the public," which would 
exclude Hinrichs based upon the particularized statements Dow made 
solely to Hinrichs within the context of the ongoing business 
relationship between the parties.  I would therefore reverse the 
court of appeals' decision, which allows Hinrichs' § 100.18 
fraudulent representation claim against Dow to proceed despite the 
absence of any "advertisement, announcement, statement or 
representation" "to the public" or "to induce the public" as 
required under the statute.  Accordingly, I dissent from part IV.B 
of the majority opinion.3 
                                                 
1 Like the majority, I use "Hinrichs" to refer to Chris 
Hinrichs and Autovation Limited collectively. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Because I conclude Hinrichs is not a member of "the public" 
within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) and the statute 
therefore does not provide an avenue for Hinrichs' claim, I need 
not address whether the economic loss doctrine bars a claim under 
this statute (part IV.A of the majority opinion) or whether the 
heightened pleading requirements apply to § 100.18(1) (part IV.C 
of the majority opinion). 
No.  2017AP2361.rgb 
 
2 
 
I 
¶95 The foundation for Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) arose in 1913, 
when the Wisconsin Legislature first enacted a law prohibiting 
untrue and deceptive advertisements to induce the purchase of a 
good.  See § 1, ch. 510, Laws of 1913.  In 1925, the legislature 
adopted the precursor to the current version of § 100.18(1).  See 
§ 2, ch. 264, Laws of 1925.  In the text of the original Act, like 
the current language of § 100.18(1), the phrase "the public" 
appeared five times.  See § 100.18(1); § 2, ch. 264, Laws of 1925.  
The text of § 100.18(1) currently comprises a single lengthy 
sentence, prompting one court to remark "its length would put even 
Dickens to shame."4  Eliminating repetitive words, as well as those 
portions inapplicable in this case, condenses the statute to the 
following more readable statement:  
No . . . corporation . . . with intent to  sell . . . 
any . . . merchandise . . . to the public . . . or with 
intent to induce the public . . . to enter into any 
contract or obligation relating to the purchase . . . of 
any . . . merchandise . . . shall make . . . or place 
before the public, or cause . . . to be made . . . or 
placed 
before 
the 
public, in this state . . . an advertisement . . . 
statement or representation of any kind to the public 
relating 
to 
such 
purchase . . . which 
advertisement, . . . statement 
or 
representation 
contains any assertion, representation or statement of 
fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading. 
§ 100.18(1) (emphasis added).  Based merely on the number of times 
the phrase appears in the statutory text, "the public" has manifest 
importance to the law's meaning. 
                                                 
4 Uniek, Inc. v. Dollar General Corp., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 
1036 (W.D. Wis. 2007). 
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¶96 This court's first interpretation of the meaning of the 
phrase "the public" appeared in State v. Automatic Merchandisers 
of Am., Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 659, 663-64, 221 N.W.2d 683 (1974).  A 
full recitation of that case is unnecessary here, as the majority 
already outlined it.  See majority op., ¶¶59-61.  In Automatic 
Merchandisers, the court held Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) reaches 
private face-to-face oral representations between a seller and 
prospective purchasers responding to newspaper advertisements.  
Automatic Merchs. of Am., Inc., 64 Wis. 2d at 663.  The court 
recognized that "in some situations one person can constitute the 
public" and the alleged misrepresentation need not be communicated 
to a wide audience.  Id. at 664.  Generally, the court concluded 
§ 100.18 "protect[s] the residents of Wisconsin from any untrue, 
deceptive or misleading representations made to promote the sale 
of a product."  Id. at 663.  The court identified as "[t]he 
important factor" in defining "the public" whether there is a 
"particular relationship" between the parties.  Id. at 664 (citing 
Cawker v. Meyer, 147 Wis. 320, 326, 133 N.W. 157 (1911)). 
¶97 In 
this 
case, 
the 
majority 
expands 
Automatic 
Merchandisers' interpretation of "the public" beyond the plain 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 100.18.  While just a single individual 
may receive a representation prohibited under § 100.18, in order 
for the representation to run afoul of that statute, it must have 
been "made . . . or placed before the public."  See Automatic 
Merchs., 64 Wis. 2d at 664; majority op., ¶¶64-65.  In Automatic 
Merchandisers, "the representations were made privately to 
prospective purchasers" whose "only relationship" to the sellers 
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consisted of responding "to advertisements in the classified 
sections of newspapers."  Automatic Merchs., 64 Wis. 2d at 663.  
The court's statement that "'the public' may be only one person" 
simply recognized that even if only one prospective purchaser 
responded to the advertisement and heard the misrepresentation 
from the seller, then that person would have a claim under 
§ 100.18(1) as a member of "the public."  See id. at 664 (citations 
omitted).  In contrast, at the time Hinrichs alleges Dow made a 
misrepresentation regarding its adhesive, Hinrichs and Dow were 
businesses in a commercial relationship.  Because Hinrichs alleges 
Dow's misrepresentation was made solely to Hinrichs, and in regard 
to Hinrichs' unique application of Dow's adhesive to Hinrichs' 
particular product, unlike the generalized representations made 
privately in Automatic Merchandisers to anyone responding to 
classified advertisements, Dow's representation was not made to 
"the public," and therefore does not fall within the scope of 
§ 100.18. 
¶98 A textual approach to statutory interpretation gives 
language "its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning . . . ."  
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We presume the "legislature 
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it 
says there."  Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cty., 2019 
WI 24, ¶25, 385 Wis. 2d 748, 924 N.W.2d 153 (quoting Connecticut 
Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)); see also 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶39 (quoting the same).  As a fundamental 
tenet of statutory interpretation, where possible, we render no 
No.  2017AP2361.rgb 
 
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word in a statute surplusage, but instead give meaning to every 
word.  See, e.g., Enbridge Energy Co., Inc. v. Dane Cty., 2019 WI 
78, ¶28, 387 Wis. 2d 687, 929 N.W.2d 572 (Statutory construction 
should not "create[] an avoidable surplusage problem[;]" rather, 
"'[i]f possible, every word and every provision is to be given 
effect (verba cum effectu sunt accipienda).  None should be 
ignored.  None should needlessly be given an interpretation that 
causes it . . . to have no consequence.'"  (quoting Antonin Scalia 
& Bryan Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 
174 (2012))); see also Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("Statutory 
language is read where possible to give reasonable effect to every 
word, in order to avoid surplusage."  (citations omitted)); State 
v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 894, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991) ("A statute 
should be construed so that no word or clause shall be rendered 
surplusage and every word if possible should be given effect."  
(quoting Donaldson v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 306, 315, 286 N.W.2d 817 
(1980))). 
¶99 "[T]he ordinary and common meaning of a doubtful word 
may be established by the definition of a recognized dictionary."  
In re Nottingham's Estate, 46 Wis. 2d 580, 588, 175 N.W.2d 640 
(1970).  Wisconsin Stat. § 100.18(1) uses the word "public" as a 
noun.  When used in this manner, the word "public" refers to people 
in the general community.  See Public, Black's Law Dictionary (11th 
ed. 2019) ("The people of a country or community as a 
whole . . . ."); Public, American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 
2011) ("The community or the people as a whole."); Public, Oxford 
Dictionary (6th ed. 2007) ("People collectively; the members of 
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6 
 
the community.");  see also Public, Funk & Wagnalls New Standard 
Dictionary (1923) ("The people collectively, or in general, as of 
a particular locality, state, or nation, or of the world at 
large . . . ."); Public, Black's Law Dictionary (2d ed. 1910) ("As 
a noun, the word 'public' denotes the whole body politic, or the 
aggregate of the citizens of a state, district, or municipality."  
(citations omitted)).  Read in conjunction with Automatic 
Merchandisers, these definitions inform the interpretation of "the 
public" under § 100.18(1), indicating that the prohibited 
"representation" must be "made" or "placed before" people within 
the general community.  See Automatic Merchs., 64 Wis. 2d at 664.  
In Automatic Merchandisers, the prohibited representations were 
made to whomever responded to the seller's classified newspaper 
advertisements published to the general community.  Id. at 664. 
¶100 The majority's construction of "the public," as used in 
Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1), would include a business in an ongoing 
commercial relationship with another business whose alleged 
misrepresentation relates to a particularized use of the product 
and was directed at no one other than that purchaser.  Automatic 
Merchandisers does not support this reading.  Instead, that case 
interpreted 
§ 100.18(1) 
as 
protecting 
"the 
residents 
of 
Wisconsin"——meaning anyone who happened to respond to classified 
advertising directed at the community in general.  Automatic 
Merchs., 64 Wis. 2d at 663-64.  In similar fashion, "[t]he word 
'public' has been construed under comparable statutes to mean that 
any person who invites the trade of the general populace in a given 
area, or who is engaged in his principal business, is dealing with 
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7 
 
the 'public.'"  James D. Jeffries, Protection for Consumers Against 
Unfair and Deceptive Business Practices in Wisconsin, 57 Marq. L. 
Rev. 559, 561 n.14 (1974) (emphasis added) (citing to cases in 
Texas, Michigan, Missouri, and Wisconsin).  The email from Dow's 
agent to Hinrichs conveyed lab testing reports and results——
requested by Hinrichs——regarding the application of Dow's adhesive 
to Hinrichs' product.  The representation in that email responded 
to Hinrichs' unique concerns and in no way invited the trade of 
the general populace in a given area. 
¶101 The majority broadens the meaning of a "representation" 
"made . . . or placed before the public" to encompass an email 
between two businesses in a commercial relationship.  See majority 
op., ¶70.5  Under the majority's interpretation, "the public" means 
everyone and therefore has no meaning, which creates an avoidable 
surplusage problem:  the majority causes "the public" to have no 
operative effect whatsoever in the statute.  As the District Court 
for the Western District of Wisconsin has recognized, this court's 
ever-expanding construction of "the public" under Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
5 The majority blurs the boundary between statutory claims 
under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) (the Deceptive Trade Practices Act) 
and breach of contract claims under general contract law.  See 
generally Donald R. Stroud III, Beyond Deception:  Finding 
Prudential Boundaries Between Breach of Contract and Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act Violations in Wisconsin, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 1157 
(2010) (criticizing this court's decision in K & S Tool & Die Corp. 
v. Perfection Machinery Sales, Inc., 2007 WI 70, 301 Wis. 2d 109, 
732 N.W.2d 792, allowing for the possible extension of § 100.18(1) 
claims to commercial parties, and discussing the impact on contract 
law).  The majority in this case permits commercial parties to 
avoid negotiated contract terms by bringing DTPA claims in lieu of 
breach of contract actions, thereby escaping bargained-for 
liability limitations and remedies and upending the parties' 
allocation of risk.  See Stroud, supra at 1159, 1164-72. 
No.  2017AP2361.rgb 
 
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§ 100.18(1) renders it "anachronistic to interpret 'the public' as 
having any limitation" and now "any person or entity is a member 
of the public."  Uniek, Inc. v. Dollar General Corp., 474 F. Supp. 
2d 1034, 1038 (W.D. Wis. 2007).  However outmoded under this 
court's errant jurisprudence, "the public" must have some 
parameters in order to avoid being rendered superfluous.  Excising 
"the public" from the statutory text yields the same meaning the 
majority gives it: 
No . . . corporation . . . with intent to sell . . . 
any . . . merchandise . . . shall make . . . in this 
state . . . an advertisement . . . statement or 
representation of any kind . . . relating to such 
purchase . . . which advertisement, . . . statement or 
representation contains any assertion, representation or 
statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or 
misleading. 
The majority reads "the public" out of the statute entirely by 
"needlessly" giving that phrase "an interpretation that causes 
it . . . to have no consequence."  See Scalia & Garner, supra ¶98, 
at 174. 
¶102 In cases with similar facts, other courts concluded that 
"the public" cannot mean two businesses in an ongoing commercial 
relationship.  For example, the Uniek court held a distributor was 
not a member of "the public" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18(1) because it had a 13-year business relationship with 
the defendant.  Uniek, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1039-40.  The Uniek court 
reasoned that if anything were to distinguish the distributor from 
"the public," surely this longstanding business relationship 
would.  Id. at 1040.  Although not specifically based on 
§ 100.18(1), our court of appeals clarified the common, ordinary, 
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9 
 
and accepted meaning of "the public" by differentiating private 
clubs patronized by members only, from restaurants "open to the 
public."  See City of Wausau v. Jusufi, 2009 WI App 17, ¶¶14-16, 
315 Wis. 2d 780, 763 N.W.2d 201.  In Jusufi, the court of appeals 
concluded a smoking ban ordinance did not violate equal protection 
even though it treated restaurants differently than private clubs.  
See id., ¶1.  The court of appeals held there was a rational basis 
for "distinguishing private clubs from other restaurants," namely, 
the protection of "the greatest number of restaurant patrons, while 
preserving the right to associate in truly private clubs that are 
not open to the public."  Id., ¶14 (emphasis added).  The court of 
appeals recognized that while restaurants are open to everyone in 
the community, i.e. "the public," private clubs are not.  See id., 
¶16.  While the canons of statutory construction compel giving 
"the public" this common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, the 
majority instead continues the capricious approach of supplanting 
the text of § 100.18(1) with a judicially-preferred standard. 
II 
¶103 
The 
majority 
perpetuates 
the 
judicially-created 
"particular relationship" test for determining whether a person is 
part of "the public" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1).  
Majority op., ¶62.  This test has no foundation in the statutory 
text.  
Automatic Merchandisers 
introduced the "particular 
relationship" test in attempting to divine "the intent of the 
legislature," in particular whom "the legislature intended to 
protect." 64 Wis. 2d at 663.  The court's entire analysis in that 
case rests on the defective foundation of the fiction commonly 
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called "legislative intent."6  "An interpretation based on what 
the legislature intended a statute to mean is improper."  State v. 
Lopez, 2019 WI 101, ¶39, __ Wis. 2d __, 936 N.W.2d 125 (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  Aside from the impossibility of 
assigning a collective "intent" motivating a body of individual 
lawmakers, "[i]t is the enacted law, not the unenacted intent, 
that is binding on the public."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44.  "It 
is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver[,]" and 
"[m]en may intend what they will; but it is only the laws that 
they enact which bind us."  Id., ¶52 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:  Federal Courts and 
the Law 17 (Princeton University Press 1997)).  "[I]t is the text's 
meaning, and not the content of anyone's expectations or 
intentions, that binds us as law."  Id., Lawrence H. Tribe, Comment 
in Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 66; see also Winebow, 
Inc. v. Capitol-Husting Co., 2018 WI 60, ¶40, 381 Wis. 2d 732, 914 
N.W.2d 631 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting) 
("[L]egislative intent behind enactment of a law . . . cannot 
govern statutory interpretation.  Rather, our analysis must focus 
on the statutory language itself[.]"); State v. Grandberry, 2018 
WI 29, ¶55, 380 Wis. 2d 541, 910 N.W.2d 214 (Kelly, J., concurring) 
                                                 
6 See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 391-96 (2012) ("[C]ollective intent 
is pure fiction because dozens if not hundreds of legislators have 
their own subjective views on the minutiae of bills they are voting 
on[.]"); see also Robert E. Keeton, Keeton on Judging in the 
American Legal System 210-11 (Lexis Pub. 1999) ("'[L]egislative 
intent' . . . is a legal fiction.  Only a natural person can have 
a state of mind such as intent.  No legal entity such as a 
legislature can have an 'intent' in a strictly factual sense."). 
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("[W]e give effect only to what the legislature does, not what it 
tried to do."  (footnote omitted)). 
¶104 Rather than displacing the actual text of the statute 
with a judicially-created "particular relationship" test to define 
"the public" in the context of Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1), courts 
should instead determine who constitutes "the public," based on 
the plain meaning of § 100.18(1).  See supra ¶¶98-102.  Using the 
"particular relationship" test in the context of § 100.18(1) 
inappropriately adds words to the statutory text that the 
legislature did not write into the law, while introducing 
additional ambiguity into the meaning of "the public."  In 
construing a statute, "we interpret the words the legislature 
actually enacted into law" and "[u]nder the omitted-case canon of 
statutory interpretation, '[n]othing is to be added to what the 
text states or reasonably implies (casus omissus pro omisso 
habendus est).'"  State v. Fitzgerald, 2019 WI 69, ¶30, 
Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165 (quoting Lopez-Quintero v. Dittman, 
2019 WI 58, ¶18, 387 Wis. 2d 50, 928 N.W.2d 480 (quoting Scalia & 
Garner, Reading Law at 93)); see also Fond du Lac Cty. v. Town of 
Rosendale, 149 Wis. 2d 326, 334, 440 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1989) 
("One of the maxims of statutory construction is that courts should 
not add words to a statute to give it a certain meaning."  (citation 
omitted)). 
¶105 Instead of analyzing the words the legislature actually 
wrote in Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1)——whether a person is a member of 
"the public"——courts have digressed into a consideration of 
whether the parties have a "particular relationship."  Applying 
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this test only raises additional questions, such as whether the 
parties have a contractual relationship or (as Hinrichs advances) 
an "effective contractual relationship," thereby disconnecting the 
analysis even further from the actual statutory text.  For example, 
in K & S Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection Machinery Sales, Inc., the 
court stated that "a plaintiff is no longer a member of 'the 
public' for the purpose of § 100.18(1) once he or she has entered 
into a contract to purchase the offered item."  2007 WI 70, ¶26, 
301 Wis. 2d 109, 732 N.W.2d 792 (citation omitted).  K & S Tool & 
Die Corp. relied on Kailin v. Armstrong for this proposition.  Id.  
In Kailin, the court of appeals held "[o]nce the contract was made, 
the 
Kailins 
were 
no 
longer 
'the 
public' 
under 
[§ 100.18(1)] . . . ."  Kailin, 2002 WI App 70, ¶44, 252 
Wis. 2d 676, 643 N.W.2d 132.  However, "[i]f the Wisconsin courts 
had intended to exclude from the law only contracting parties, it 
could have stated the rule as whether the parties had a 
'contracting relationship,' but they have employed the more 
general language, 'particular relationship.'"  Uniek, 474 F. Supp. 
2d at 1039.  This muddying of the plain language of the statute 
prompted one federal court, struggling to discern a clear rule of 
law by which to apply § 100.18(1), to "question whether" Wisconsin 
courts' adoption of the extra-textual "particular relationship" 
test "leads to the most logical distinctions between those 
plaintiffs that fall within the statute and those that are 
excluded."  Id.  It doesn't, but returning to the proper plain 
meaning approach certainly would. 
III 
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¶106 Even if Hinrichs did constitute a member of "the public" 
under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1), Dow's statement to Hinrichs cannot 
be deemed "untrue, deceptive or misleading," as required by the 
statutory text.  The majority does not address this requirement in 
its analysis of § 100.18(1).  See majority op., ¶¶57-71.  Nothing 
in the Complaint creates even an inference of this element.  The 
Complaint characterizes as "untrue, deceptive or misleading" Dow's 
statement that "[n]o evidence of any crazing or surface cracking 
was observed."  Complaint, ¶¶24-25 (emphasis added).  Hinrichs 
does not allege that Dow disclaimed its adhesive as the cause of 
the cracking.  To the contrary, Hinrichs alleges Dow advised "we 
are assisting in determining the root cause of the issue and 
apologize for the inconvenience."  Complaint, ¶27.  Hinrichs 
alleges only that Dow stated it did not observe any crazing or 
cracking during testing.  Nothing in the Complaint supports even 
an inference that at the time Dow made this statement, it knew the 
statement was "untrue", or that the statement was "deceptive or 
misleading."  Accordingly, Hinrichs' § 100.18(1) claim should not 
be allowed to proceed. 
IV 
¶107 The plain meaning of "the public" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18(1), as confirmed by dictionaries, common parlance, and 
cases, means people in the general community, not businesses in an 
ongoing commercial relationship.  "On its face, a statement made 
to 'the public' suggests an attempt to communicate with a large 
audience rather than a private message directed at one party."  
Uniek, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1037 (citing to an additional dictionary 
No.  2017AP2361.rgb 
 
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beyond those mentioned in ¶99, referring to "public" as a 
collective entity).  As the majority acknowledges, statutory 
interpretation presents a question of law and it is therefore 
beyond the province of the factfinder to determine the meaning of 
"the public" as used in § 100.18(1).  Majority op., ¶26 ("Statutory 
interpretation likewise presents a question of law we review 
independently . . . .").  As a matter of law, Hinrichs was not a 
member of "the public" under § 100.18(1) when Dow made the 
statement Hinrichs alleges to be a misrepresentation because Dow 
directed the statement to Hinrichs alone, not "the public" 
generally.  Because the majority's interpretation of "the public" 
empties the phrase of any meaning, I respectfully dissent. 
 
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