Case Title: State ex rel. Marchiano v. School Emps. Retirement Sys.

Citation: 2009-Ohio-307

Docket Number: 20081301

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Marchiano v. School Emps. Retirement Sys., 121 Ohio St.3d 139, 2009-
Ohio-307.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. MARCHIANO, APPELLANT, v. SCHOOL EMPLOYEES 
RETIREMENT SYSTEM, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Marchiano v. School Emps. Retirement Sys., 
 121 Ohio St.3d 139, 2009-Ohio-307.] 
Appeal from court of appeals’ judgment denying writ of mandamus to compel 
SERS to vacate its decision denying disability-retirement benefits — Court 
of appeals’ judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2008-1301 — Submitted January 21, 2009 — Decided February 3, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 07AP-486, 2008-Ohio-2798. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment denying a writ of mandamus to 
compel appellee, School Employees Retirement System (“SERS”), to vacate its 
decision denying the application of appellant, Barbara Marchiano, for disability-
retirement benefits.  Because SERS did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
application, we affirm. 
Injury and Initial Treatment 
{¶ 2} In December 1997, while employed as an elementary school 
instructional aide, Marchiano was injured when, as she was standing up from a 
squatting position, an autistic child jumped on her, knocking her backwards.  As 
she fell, she struck the back of her head on a desk.  Marchiano’s original medical 
evaluation indicated that she had strained her neck and back.  She was given pain 
medication, and no further treatment was recommended.  She returned to work 
shortly thereafter.  When her pain did not go away, she received chiropractic 
treatment.  An MRI in 2001 revealed that Marchiano had a “small central disc 
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protrusion at C6-7” with “minimal cord impingement.”  Marchiano was then 
given epidural steroid injections and also received physical therapy, which was 
partially successful in relieving her pain.  Since receiving an occipital nerve block 
in April 2004, however, she has experienced numbness and constant pain.  She 
has been prescribed many medications, including a narcotic pain reliever.  She 
last worked in April 2004. 
Disability-Retirement Application and Administrative Proceedings 
{¶ 3} Marchiano filed an application for disability-retirement benefits 
with SERS in July 2005.  Her treating physician, Christopher Sweeney, M.D., 
listed Marchiano’s disabling medical condition as cervical disc disease, with 
underlying medical conditions of occipital neuralgia, opioid tolerance, and 
myofascial pain.  Dr. Sweeney certified that Marchiano “is physically and/or 
mentally incapacitated for a period of at least the next 12 months and is unable to 
perform the duty for which [she was] formerly responsible as a school employee.”  
(Emphasis sic.) 
{¶ 4} Marchiano also submitted a report of Ann Tuttle, M.D., whose 
diagnosis was similar to that of Dr. Sweeney.  But Dr. Tuttle also diagnosed 
“[s]ignificant psychosocial distress related to [Marchiano’s] pain and disability,” 
prompting her to recommend reevaluation of Marchiano “from both a surgical as 
well as a psychological standpoint.” 
{¶ 5} SERS ordered an independent medical examination for Marchiano 
by Paul J. Cangemi, M.D., an orthopedist.  Dr. Cangemi noted that his physical 
examination revealed that most of Marchiano’s functions were within normal 
limits.  He diagnosed her with “[a]cute cervical strain, resolved,” “[m]ild 
degenerative disc disease cervical spine with no evidence of radiculopathy or 
myelopathy noted,” “[o]pioid tolerance,” “[s]omatoform pain disorder,” and 
“[o]ccipital neuralgia, moderate in severity.”  Dr. Cangemi further noted that 
Marchiano had been “taking rather large doses of Kadian without significant pain 
January Term, 2009 
3 
relief,” that he agreed that Marchiano “shows evidence of a significant psycho-
social distress related to her pain and disability,” and that she was disabled: 
{¶ 6} “Dr. Christopher Sweeney has indicated * * * that he considers her 
to be disabled for at least the next 12 months as a result of he following 
conditions:  1) Cervical disc diseases,  2) Occipital neuralgia,  3) Opioid 
tolerance,  4)  Myofascial pain.  Considering the fact that these are conditions for 
which I was asked to make a determination, I would concur that she is disabled on 
this basis.  I realize that the main symptom is that of pain which is very difficult to 
measure.  I would not state that she is disabled on the basis of cervical disc 
diseases but, since I am forced to consider the other conditions listed above, I 
think therefore that the pain has to be considered a disabling feature.” 
{¶ 7} After a review of the medical records, the members of the medical 
advisory committee were concerned about the lack of objective medical findings 
to support the claimed disability.  The committee recommended a psychiatric 
evaluation of Marchiano.  SERS referred her to James Hawkins, M.D., a 
psychiatrist, for an evaluation. 
{¶ 8} According to Hawkins’s report, during the evaluation, Marchiano 
“expressed an interest to get off her medications because she doesn’t believe they 
are helping the pain” and she said that they make her “feel stupid.”  Dr. Hawkins 
concluded that Marchiano did not meet the medical criteria to support a diagnosis 
of somatization disorder and made the following additional findings: 
{¶ 9} “1.  Medical records do not provide objective findings to support 
her chronic pain complaints.  Typically, acute cervical strain will resolve within a 
few months to a year.  The symptoms attributed to occipital neuralgia seem 
extreme. 
{¶ 10} “2.  Mrs. Marchiano is taking significant amounts of narcotics and 
other medications that are causing cognitive slowing and her depressed mood.  
She believes the medications are not effective and would like to discontinue them.  
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I would concur and believe that detoxification from these substances would give a 
more accurate picture of her true disabilities. 
{¶ 11} “3.  I have read the job description of an Instructional Aide.  Her 
cognitive dysfunction would likely prevent completion of her duties.  I think it is 
possible that she could return to work within 12 months if she were detoxified, 
thus I cannot support her disability. 
{¶ 12} “4.  Certification of Medical Examiner ─ I hereby certify that the 
applicant is not incapacitated (physically and/or mentally) as an Instructional Aide 
and is able to perform the duty for which [she was] formally responsible as a 
school employee as of 7/11/05 and for a continued period of at least 12 months. 
{¶ 13} “5.  I would be happy to re-exam[ine] Mrs. Marchiano once she is 
detoxified from addictive substances.” 
{¶ 14} The medical advisory committee recommended that Marchiano’s 
application be denied.  The SERS retirement board then denied her application. 
{¶ 15} Marchiano appealed the decision and submitted additional 
evidence in support of her appeal.  In a letter submitted by her attorney over five 
months after her evaluation by Dr. Hawkins, Marchiano claimed that Dr. Hawkins 
had appeared predisposed to think she was a “junkie,” as he had repeatedly called 
her that during his examination of her and had treated her in a demeaning manner, 
including asking Marchiano if her lawyer, and not a doctor, had sent her to a 
psychologist to treat her depression.  In her personal appearance before the board, 
Marchiano testified that Dr. Hawkins had treated her in an unprofessional manner 
during the examination, being “really nasty” to the point that she simply agreed 
with him to get out of the room. 
{¶ 16} The medical advisory committee unanimously recommended that 
Marchiano’s appeal be denied.  In December 2006, the SERS retirement board 
upheld its original decision to deny her disability-retirement application. 
Mandamus Case 
January Term, 2009 
5 
{¶ 17} In June 2007, Marchiano filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals 
for Franklin County for a writ of mandamus to compel SERS to vacate its 
decision denying her application and to grant her claim for disability-retirement 
benefits.  After SERS filed an answer, Marchiano filed a motion to allow 
additional discovery in the case, which the court of appeals denied.  Marchiano 
had sought to conduct the discovery to demonstrate Dr. Hawkins’s alleged bias.  
After the parties filed a certified record of the administrative proceedings and 
briefs, the court denied the writ. 
{¶ 18} This cause is now before the court upon Marchiano’s appeal as of 
right. 
{¶ 19} Marchiano requests a writ of mandamus to vacate the SERS 
decision denying her application for disability-retirement benefits.  “The Public 
School Employees Retirement System was established for the purpose of 
providing retirement allowances and other benefits to public school employees 
other than teachers.”  State ex rel. McMaster v. School Emps. Retirement Sys. 
(1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 130, 133, 630 N.E.2d 701, citing 1 Baker & Carey, Ohio 
School Law (1993) 399, Section 8.25.  Under R.C. 3309.39(C), to be entitled to 
disability-retirement benefits, an SERS member must be “mentally or physically 
incapacitated for the performance of the member’s last assigned primary duty as 
an employee by a disabling condition either permanent or presumed to be 
permanent for twelve continuous months following the filing of an application.”  
“Because there is no provision for appealing a final SERS decision, mandamus is 
available to correct any abuse of discretion by SERS.”  State ex rel. Stiles v. 
School Emps. Retirement Sys., 102 Ohio St.3d 156, 2004-Ohio-2140, 807 N.E.2d 
353, ¶ 13.  “An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or unconscionable.”  Id. 
Additional Standard of Review 
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{¶ 20} Marchiano does not challenge the foregoing standard for reviewing 
an appeal from a final SERS decision.  Instead, she argues that the court of 
appeals erred in applying an additional “some evidence” standard of review. 
{¶ 21} Marchiano’s claim lacks merit.  We have recognized that “[a]s 
long as there is sufficient evidence to support [a] retirement-system board’s 
decisions, we will not disturb them.”  State ex rel. Grein v. Ohio State Highway 
Patrol Retirement Sys., 116 Ohio St.3d 344, 2007-Ohio-6667, 879 N.E.2d 195, ¶ 
9; see also Kinsey v. Bd. of Trustees of Police & Firemen’s Disability & Pension 
Fund of Ohio (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 224, 225, 551 N.E.2d 989 (“A clear legal 
right exists where the [retirement] board abuses its discretion by entering an order 
which is not supported by ‘some evidence’ ”); State ex rel. Schaengold v. Pub. 
Emps. Retirement Sys., 114 Ohio St.3d 147, 2007-Ohio-3760, 870 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 
19 (same). 
{¶ 22} Marchiano alleges that fiduciary duties imposed on SERS require 
the application of the general abuse-of-discretion standard, but she cites no 
relevant authority supporting her claim.  Notably, as SERS persuasively argues, 
although Marchiano suggests that the application of the “some evidence” standard 
as an adjunct to the general standard could lead to affirmance of SERS decisions 
that would be reversed under an abuse-of-discretion standard, she cites no case in 
which this outcome has occurred.  In fact, in disability-retirement cases, we 
continue to apply the general abuse-of-discretion standard to determine whether 
SERS has abused its discretion on legal issues that do not involve the resolution 
of conflicting evidence.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Lecklider v. School Emps. 
Retirement Sys., 104 Ohio St.3d 271, 2004-Ohio-6586, 819 N.E.2d 289, ¶ 24-29 
(SERS did not abuse its discretion in denying disability-retirement applicant’s 
request for a personal appearance); Stiles, 102 Ohio St.3d 156, 2004-Ohio-2140, 
807 N.E.2d 353, ¶ 14-15 (SERS did not abuse its discretion by not including a 
vocational analysis in its disability-retirement determination). 
January Term, 2009 
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Lack of Administrative Duty to Explain Decision 
{¶ 23} Marchiano claims that she is entitled to the requested writ of 
mandamus to compel the SERS retirement board to specifically state the evidence 
it relied upon and explain its reasons for denying her application for disability-
retirement benefits.  As we recently reiterated, however, there is no duty to do so 
under existing statutes and “[a]lthough it may be preferable from a policy 
standpoint that a retirement board explain its reasoning for its decision, the 
General Assembly is the final arbiter of public policy.”  State ex rel. VanCleave v. 
School Emps. Retirement Sys., 120 Ohio St.3d 261, 2008-Ohio-5377, 898 N.E.2d 
33, ¶ 26-27.  “It is axiomatic that in mandamus proceedings, the creation of the 
legal duty that a relator seeks to enforce is the distinct function of the legislative 
branch of government, and courts are not authorized to create the legal duty 
enforceable in mandamus.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Pipoly v. State Teachers 
Retirement Sys., 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 2002-Ohio-2219, 767 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 18.  
Therefore, SERS has no duty to specify the evidence it relied upon and explain its 
reasons for denying Marchiano’s application. 
Denial of Discovery 
{¶ 24} Marchiano asserts that the court of appeals erred in denying her 
motion to conduct limited discovery in the mandamus case for the purpose of 
establishing that Dr. Hawkins is not a competent and disinterested physician as 
required by R.C. 3309.39(C).  To be sure, discovery is generally permissible in 
mandamus actions.  See State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1996), 
75 Ohio St.3d 82, 85, 661 N.E.2d 728, quoting R.C. 2731.09 (“Issues of fact 
raised by the pleadings in mandamus actions ‘must be tried, and further 
proceedings thereon had, in the same manner as in civil actions’ ”). 
{¶ 25} But in a mandamus proceeding challenging a retirement system’s 
denial of disability-retirement benefits, the applicable inquiry is whether the 
retirement system abused its discretion in denying the benefits.  See VanCleave, 
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120 Ohio St.3d 261, 2008-Ohio-5377, 898 N.E.2d 33, at ¶ 22.  SERS could not 
have abused its discretion based on evidence that was never presented to it.  Cf. 
State ex rel. Stoll v. Logan Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-
333, 881 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 40 (“a claim that the board of elections abused its 
discretion or clearly disregarded applicable law could not be based on evidence 
that was never presented to it”). 
{¶ 26} Moreover, Marchiano had an adequate remedy by way of the 
administrative proceedings before the SERS retirement board to raise her claim 
that Dr. Hawkins was not competent or disinterested, and did so, at least in part.  
See State ex rel. Pontillo v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., 98 Ohio St.3d 500, 2003-
Ohio-2120, 787 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 25 (disability-retirement claimant had adequate 
remedy by way of administrative proceedings before retirement board to submit 
additional medical evidence in support of claim and thus was not entitled to a writ 
of mandamus to compel the board to accept this evidence). 
{¶ 27} Therefore, the court of appeals did not err in denying Marchiano’s 
request for limited discovery. 
Competent and Disinterested Physician 
{¶ 28} Under R.C. 3309.39(C), a “[m]edical examination of [an SERS] 
member who has applied for a disability benefit shall be conducted by a 
competent disinterested physician or physicians selected by the retirement board 
to determine whether the member is mentally or physically incapacitated for the 
performance of the member’s last assigned primary duty as an employee by a 
disabling condition either permanent or presumed to be permanent for twelve 
continuous months following the filing of an application.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Although “competent” and “disinterested” are not defined in the statute, the 
“ordinary meaning of ‘competent’ is ‘possessed of or characterized by marked or 
sufficient aptitude, skill, strength, or knowledge,’ and ‘disinterested’ means 
‘[f]ree from bias, prejudice, or partiality.’ ”  See Pontillo, 98 Ohio St.3d 500, 
January Term, 2009 
9 
2003-Ohio-2120, 787 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 41 (interpreting a similarly worded statute for 
a disability-retirement claim under the Public Employees Retirement System), 
quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) 463, and Black’s 
Law Dictionary (7th Ed.1999) 481. 
{¶ 29} Marchiano claims that SERS abused its discretion in relying on Dr. 
Hawkins’s report because he was neither competent nor disinterested.  Marchiano 
contends that Dr. Hawkins was not competent to render opinions outside his area 
of expertise (psychiatry), i.e., he was not competent to suggest that Marchiano’s 
pain medications should be discontinued.  As the court of appeals correctly 
observed, however, “Dr. Hawkins did not offer an opinion on the necessity of 
pain medication for relator.  Rather, he opined that the medications were 
impeding any ability to accurately determine if there was an underlying disabling 
condition because the medications were causing relator’s cognitive dysfunction 
and depressed mood.”  State ex rel. Marchiano v. School Emps. Retirement Sys., 
10th Dist. No. 07AP-486, 2008-Ohio-2798, ¶ 13.  In fact, Marchiano herself 
opined that she did not think the medications were helping her pain and were 
making her “feel stupid.” 
{¶ 30} Insofar as Dr. Hawkins may have provided opinions outside his 
expertise concerning when Marchiano’s acute cervical strain should have resolved 
or the apparent extreme symptoms attributed to her occipital neuralgia, there is no 
evidence that the SERS retirement board relied on those opinions.  In fact, the 
medical advisory committee confined its discussion of Dr. Hawkins’s report to (1) 
his conclusions that Marchiano did not meet the medical criteria for somatization 
disorder and that she was not incapacitated, which are opinions that he clearly was 
competent to give, and (2) his recommendation of detoxification. 
{¶ 31} Marchiano next claims that Dr. Hawkins was biased against her 
because he is a professional witness whose testimony in previous cases indicates 
that he shapes his testimony in favor of the party paying him and that he exhibited 
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hostility toward Marchiano during his evaluation of her.  But Marchiano waived 
any argument concerning her contention that Dr. Hawkins was not a disinterested 
medical examiner due to a financial relationship with SERS because she never 
raised it in the proceedings before the retirement system.  As we previously 
stated, SERS could not have abused its discretion based on an argument that was 
never presented to it.  See Stoll, 117 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-333, 881 N.E.2d 
1214, ¶ 40. 
{¶ 32} And although Marchiano did raise before the SERS retirement 
board her contention that Dr. Hawkins’s treatment of her during his consultative 
examination showed that he was biased, nothing in Dr. Hawkins’s report indicates 
that he considered her to be a junkie or treated her in an unprofessional manner, 
and the retirement board was free to reject Marchiano’s contention. 
{¶ 33} Therefore, SERS did not abuse its discretion insofar as it 
determined that Dr. Hawkins was a competent and disinterested physician 
qualified to conduct an examination of the disability-retirement applicant. 
Dr. Hawkins’s Medical Opinion 
{¶ 34} Finally, Marchiano argues that SERS could not have relied on Dr. 
Hawkins’s report, because his medical opinions were equivocal.  We have 
previously held in the context of a workers’ compensation case that “equivocal 
medical opinions are not evidence.”  State ex rel. Eberhardt v. Flxible Corp. 
(1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 649, 657, 640 N.E.2d 815.  “[E]quivocation occurs when a 
doctor repudiates an earlier opinion, renders contradictory or uncertain opinions, 
or fails to clarify an ambiguous statement.  Ambiguous statements, however, are 
considered equivocal only while they are unclarified.”  Id. 
{¶ 35} But as the court of appeals correctly held, Dr. Hawkins’s opinion 
that Marchiano’s cognitive dysfunction was caused by the medications she was 
taking was unequivocal and was supported by Marchiano’s own statements to 
him.  Marchiano states that Dr. Hawkins’s report ambiguously referred to 12 
January Term, 2009 
11 
months as a date of possible return to work if she were detoxified.  Even if there is 
ambiguity as to whether the 12 months was tied to the date of the evaluation 
instead of the date of her disability-retirement application, Dr. Hawkins ultimately 
clarified this by certifying that Marchiano was not incapacitated physically and/or 
mentally as an instructional aide and is able to perform her previous duty as a 
school employee as of the date of her application and for a continued period of at 
least 12 months. 
{¶ 36} Therefore, SERS did not abuse its discretion in relying on Dr. 
Hawkins’s medical opinions. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 37} Based on the foregoing, because Marchiano failed to establish that 
SERS abused its discretion in denying her application for disability-retirement 
benefits, the court of appeals properly denied the requested extraordinary relief in 
mandamus.  Thus, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.1 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents with opinion. 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 38} I believe that the School Employees Retirement System (“SERS”) 
acted unreasonably in denying Barbara Marchiano’s application for disability-
retirement benefits.  I would reverse the court of appeals and grant the writ of 
mandamus. 
                                                 
1.  We deny appellant’s motion for oral argument.  The parties’ briefs are sufficient to resolve this 
appeal.  State ex rel. Mowen v. Mowen, 119 Ohio St.3d 462, 2008-Ohio-4759, 895 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 
18, fn. 1. 
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{¶ 39} As the majority acknowledges, Marchiano’s treating physician, 
Christopher Sweeney, M.D., concluded that Marchiano “is physically and/or 
mentally incapacitated for a period of at least the next 12 months and is unable to 
perform the duty for which [she was] formerly responsible as a school employee.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Marchiano also submitted the medical opinion of Ann Tuttle, 
M.D., which, according to the majority opinion, “was similar to that of Dr. 
Sweeney.”  Nevertheless, SERS ordered another medical examination.  Paul J. 
Cangemi, M.D., was selected by SERS to examine Marchiano.  He concluded that 
she was disabled for at least the next 12 months.  Confronted with three 
independent medical diagnoses, all reaching the same conclusion — that 
Marchiano was disabled — it would have been reasonable for the members of 
SERS’s medical advisory committee to conclude that Marchiano was disabled for 
at least 12 months.  Instead, they recommended a psychiatric evaluation of 
Marchiano. 
{¶ 40} Accordingly, James Hawkins, M.D., evaluated Marchiano and 
found, among other things, that Marchiano’s “cognitive dysfunction would likely 
prevent completion of her duties.”  Even so, he also stated:  “I think it is possible 
that she could return to work within 12 months if she were detoxified, thus I 
cannot support her disability.” 
{¶ 41} I conclude that the medical advisory committee’s decision to rely 
on one psychiatrist’s conclusion that Marchiano’s medical condition might 
improve under certain circumstances instead of on the definitive conclusions 
reached by three independent doctors that Marchiano was disabled was 
unreasonable.  The  SERS retirement board denied Marchiano’s application 
without explanation.  I conclude that that decision was unreasonable because of 
the board’s unstated reliance on the medical advisory committee’s unreasonable 
decision; there was no other evidence that supported denying Marchiano’s 
application before the board.  I dissent. 
January Term, 2009 
13 
__________________ 
 
Law Offices of Tony C. Merry, L.L.C., and Tony C. Merry, for appellant. 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Todd A. Nist, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
______________________