Case Title: Irlbeck v. Pomeroy

Citation: 210 N.W.2d 831

Docket Number: 

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1973-09-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
210 N.W.2d 831 (1973) Leonette IRLBECK, Appellee, v. Lee Ann POMEROY and Harold L. Pomeroy, Appellants. No. 55822. Supreme Court of Iowa. September 19, 1973. Edward S. White, Carroll, for appellants. Claus H. Bunz, Manning, for appellee. Heard before MOORE, C.J., and MASON, REYNOLDSON, HARRIS and McCORMICK, JJ. McCORMICK, Justice. The issue in this case is whether the guest statute is a defense to a negligence claim by the parent of a minor guest under *832 rule 8, Rules of Civil Procedure, against the owner and operator of the motor vehicle in which the child was riding. Trial court sustained plaintiff's motion to strike the defense from defendants' answer. We granted interlocutory appeal. We affirm the trial court. Plaintiff Leonette Irlbeck alleged in her petition that she is the mother of Mary Schoeppner who was fatally injured December 22, 1970, at the age of 18. The child was a passenger in an automobile owned by defendant Harold L. Pomeroy and driven with his consent by defendant Lee Ann Pomeroy when the Pomeroy vehicle collided with another. Plaintiff further alleged her daughter's death was proximately caused by negligence of Lee Ann Pomeroy in the operation of the car in several particulars. She asked damages for lost services, companionship and society from the child's date of death until she would have reached her majority. Defendants specifically denied the negligence, proximate cause and damage allegations of plaintiff's petition and, in addition, alleged "at the time of said collision Mary Schoeppner was riding in said vehicle as a guest passenger and that because of that fact the petition does not as a matter of law state a cause of action against the defendants." Trial court struck this guest statute defense. In their single assignment of error defendants assert the guest statute is a defense to plaintiff's claim. I. Defendants do not contend the guest statute directly reaches plaintiff. She was not riding in the Pomeroy car and the statute applies directly only to "any passenger or person riding in said motor vehicle": We agree with defendants' concession that the statute does not directly bar plaintiff's claim. II. Defendants do contend the guest statute indirectly reaches plaintiff. They argue that because the statute would bar negligence recovery to an injured child guest it necessarily bars the parent's negligence claim for loss occasioned by the same injury. They say the parent's claim is a "derivative action" and could only be maintained if a suit for wrongful death of the child could have been successfully prosecuted in the face of a guest statute defense. We have never previously met this precise question. A true derivative action is one which a person may institute to redress a wrong done to another. Our survival statute Code § 611.20 is an example. The cause of action accruing to a fatally injured person survives his death and is maintainable by his estate representative, subject to any defense which could have been raised against the decedent. See, e.g., Wymore v. Mahaska County, 78 Iowa 396, 399, 43 N.W. 264, 266 (1889) ("If the facts are such that the child could have recovered had his injuries not been fatal, his administrator may recover the full amount of damages which the estate of the child sustained"). The present case is not that kind of derivative action. It is based on rule 8, R.C. P., (as it read prior to amendment, not here relevant, on July 1, 1973): Rule 8 was analyzed in Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, 190 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1971). *833 We noted the common law roots of the rule insofar as it governs actions by a parent for non-fatal injuries to his child and observed that it extends recovery to situations where death results. Under rule 8 the parent has a cause of action for a legal wrong to himself independent of that of the child. It is derivative only in the sense it is based on injury to or death of the child: Nothing in rule 8 suggests actions by the parent are subject to a guest statute defense that might be urged against the child. The rule is remedial. Id. Its provisions are to be liberally construed in furtherance of its objects. Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc., 260 Iowa 556, 558, 149 N.W.2d 789, 790 (1967). Defendant relies upon Shiels v. Audette, 119 Conn. 75, 174 A. 323 (1934) which involves the availability of a guest statute defense in facts analogous to those here. The court denied parental recovery on the rationale that "an essential element of the cause of action vested by law in the parent is that the compensation recoverable by him for expenses flows from a personal injury for which, under the law, the child would be entitled to recover compensation." Shiels was followed in Hall v. Royce, 109 Vt. 99, 192 A. 193 (1937) and Arritt v. Fisher, 286 Mich. 419, 282 N.W. 200 (1938). The Shiels case is indistinguishable from the present case, so we must decide whether to accept or reject its reasoning. A dissent in Shiels makes this argument: However, defendants allege we accepted the concept expressed by the majority in Shiels in Ziegler v. United States Gypsum Company, 251 Iowa 714, 102 N.W.2d 152 (1960). There we held a wife was not entitled to recover for loss of consortium when her husband was negligently injured in the course of his employment while covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. We said the wife could not recover because her husband's *834 right to recover was limited to workmen's compensation, and if his common law remedy was barred hers was also. Id. at 154. ("Where the direct action cannot be maintained it follows the action for consequential damages cannot be maintained."). Unlike the guest statute, the workmen's compensation statute involved in Ziegler purports by its terms to bar actions by family members based on the employee's injury: Therefore the result in Ziegler is consistent with the legislative policy manifest in the workmen's compensation statute. On that basis we limit our approval of Ziegler to its facts. Cf. Smither and Comny, Inc., v. Coles, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 68, 242 F.2d 220 (1957). We are persuaded that the dissent in Shiels conforms to our view of the guest statute defense as it relates to the parental cause of action under rule 8, R.C. P. The rule antedates the guest statute. It recognizes parent and child have separate causes of action. In enacting the guest statute the legislature restricted its application to motor vehicle guests. In the absence of language in the statute comparable to that in § 85.20, we see no reason to believe the legislature also intended, without saying so, to bar rule 8 claims by parents of minor guests. We hold the guest statute is not a defense to plaintiff's cause of action in this case. Trial court did not err in sustaining the motion to strike. Affirmed.