Case Title: Westphal v. Amco Insurance Company

Citation: 209 N.W.2d 555

Docket Number: 11164

State: south-dakota

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1973-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
209 N.W.2d 555 (1973) Marvin WESTPHAL, Special Administrator of the Estate of Elsie Westphal, Deceased, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants. v. AMCO INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, and Dairyland Insurance Company, a corporation, Defendant and Respondent. No. 11164. Supreme Court of South Dakota. July 26, 1973. Dana, Golden, Moore & Rasmussen, and Richard W. Sabers, Sioux Falls, for plaintiffs and appellants. Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, and Ellsworth E. Evans, Sioux Falls, for defendant and respondent, Amco Ins. Co. WINANS, Justice. This is an action for declaratory relief declaring that defendant, Amco Insurance Company, under its uninsured motorist coverage, should pay damages in excess of the limits of defendant Dairyland Insurance Company's policy insuring motorist coverage with respect to the automobile in which plaintiffs were riding. The trial was held to the court and the facts stipulated. *556 The lower court held that plaintiffs had no right of recovery from Amco under the terms and conditions of its liability policy. We reverse. The controversy arises out of a motor vehicle collision occurring April 26, 1970 near Fort Pierre, South Dakota, involving a motor vehicle operated by Robert McInnis, an uninsured motorist, and a motor vehicle owned and operated by plaintiff, Marvin Westphal, in which the other three plaintiffs were occupants. McInnis was not injured. Marvin Westphal received injuries necessitating medical and hospital care; Elsie Westphal, his wife, sustained personal injuries causing her death on May 7, 1970. Leslie Hoyt and Evelyn Hoyt, his wife, sustained personal injuries necessitating hospital and medical attention. It is stipulated that Robert McInnis carelessly and negligently drove his motor vehicle into and against the Westphal motor vehicle with great force and violence; that plaintiffs' injuries were the proximate result of the negligence and carelessness of Robert McInnis; that the forms contained in the insurance policies of the defendants, Amco and Dairyland, including endorsements, were filed with and had the approval of the South Dakota Commissioner of Insurance prior to the date of the accident; and that the plaintiffs, Marvin Westphal and Leslie Hoyt are brothers-in-law and on April 26, 1970 the said Leslie and Evelyn Hoyt were in Fort Pierre visting Marvin and Elsie Westphal. Plaintiff Westphal and his automobile were insured under a policy of automobile liability insurance issued by defendant Dairyland which included "uninsured motorist coverage". Dairyland deposited its uninsured-motorist coverage limits in the amount of $20,000 in court, and consequently is not a party to this appeal. Amco had in force a policy of automobile liability insurance describing a 1963 Pontiac motor vehicle owned by plaintiff, Leslie Hoyt, the named insured in such policy. Its uninsured-motorist coverage has limits of liability of $10,000 each person and $20,000 each accident which are the limits of liability specified in Dairyland's policy. The defendant Amco bases its defense of nonliability on Condition 7 of its policy relating to its uninsured-motorist coverage which reads in part: The condition cited in Amco's policy is identical with the provision relating to "other insurance" in Dairyland's policy. It is also a part of the stipulation of facts, "That the aggregate amount of the general and special damages, including the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit an action may be brought under the wrongful-death statute of the State of South Dakota, exceeds the sum of $20,000, which has heretofore been deposited herein with the Clerk of this Court by defendant Dairyland Insurance Company." It is thus apparent that the actual damages suffered by plaintiffs have yet to be determined. Respondent Amco presents the question involved in this appeal in the following succinct language: "The controversy presented boils down to the question of whether Amco is free to contract as it did with respect to `other insurance' applicable to its uninsured motorist coverage." *557 When the policies involved were issued, SDCL 58-11-9, adopted in 1966, was in effect,[*] providing in part: SDCL 32-35 is an act entitled "FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF VEHICLE OWNERS AND OPERATORS." Section 17 of that act in pertinent parts provides as follows: The question posed by respondent was answered in the case of Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Insurance Company, 1973, Minn., 207 N.W.2d 348, by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, as follows: The restrictive policy provisions in each of the policies involved in the Minnesota case were practically identical with Condition 7 of the policy involved in our case. The relevant provisions of the Minnesota statute, while not the same, are similar in intent. The Minnesota court, quoting from the annotation in 28 A.L.R.3d 551, 554, quoted as follows: The Minnesota court, after quoting from other cases and authority, aligned itself with the majority, holding in the following language: We have quoted rather extensively from the Minnesota case because it is of recent origin. However, Michigan in three cases, Blakeslee v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Mich., 388 Mich. 464, 201 N.W.2d 786; Rowland v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 388 Mich. 476, 201 N.W.2d 792, and Boettner v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, 388 Mich. 482, 201 N.W.2d 795, all decided in the latter part of 1972 by unanimous decisions of the Supreme Court of that state, have adopted the same rule. In Rowland, supra, combined recovery was not allowed because the insurance policy was issued prior to the effective date of the Michigan statute, which statute was controlling in both Blakeslee and Boettner, supra. In Blakeslee the court in a footnote to its decision cited 18 jurisdictions holding "other insurance" provisions invalid when contained in a policy providing protection against injuries caused by uninsured motorists. There were eight jurisdictions cited with a contrary doctrine but even then as Blakeslee stated, of that eight "only 3 of them are directly on pointin 3 there is no uninsured motorist statute involved, in 2 the statute itself allows prorating." There can be added to the jurisdictions cited for disallowing "limitations" contrary to the statute, the states of Minnesota (Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Insurance Company, supra) and Connecticut (Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Darrow, 1971, 161 Conn. 169, 286 A.2d 288). The court in Blakeslee, supra, said: Blakeslee quotes with approval, "the rule stated in Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Jones, 286 Ala. 606, 614, 243 So. 2d 736, 742 (1971) represents the better reasoning as well as the majority rule, which we now adopt." That rule is set forth in the following language: We adopt in this case the rule announced in Safeco Insurance Company as set forth and adopted by Michigan in the Blakeslee decision, supra, and direct the circuit court to enter its judgment accordingly. Reversed. All the Justices concur. [*] Subsequently amended by Ch. 261, S.L.1972.