Case Title: Martin v. First Nat. Bank of Mobile

Citation: 412 So. 2d 250

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1982-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
412 So. 2d 250 (1982)
Carla MARTIN
v.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MOBILE, Executor of the Estate of Carl T. Martin, Deceased, et al.
80-559.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 19, 1982.
*251 Jack W. Smith of Smith & Smith, Dothan, for appellant.
Caine O'Rear, III of Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, Mobile, for appellee First Nat. Bank of Mobile.
John T. Crowder, Jr. of Cunningham, Bounds, Byrd, Yance, & Crowder, Mobile, for appellee Christine Ethridge.
MADDOX, Justice.
The dispositive issue on this appeal is whether the trial judge, the probate judge of Mobile County in this instance, erred in considering extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the testator in using the terms "cash" and "personal property" in his will.
Carl T. Martin died testate on March 1, 1976. His will, dated November 25, 1975, naming his only child, Carla Martin Ethridge, executrix, was duly admitted to probate in the Probate Court of Mobile County. Carla was also named co-trustee under the trust provisions of the will, and was duly appointed and served as executrix until her resignation just prior to the hearing that formed the basis for this appeal. The successor executor named in the will, The First National Bank of Mobile, was then duly appointed. Counsel for the bank filed a petition for "construction" of the will and for "instructions" in the administration thereof. The petition in part requested the court to construe certain portions of the will, which was done in the Decree of Construction and Instructions issued on April 7, 1981. At the same time, the court issued an Opinion and Order on Final Settlement which adjudicated Carla's petition for final settlement of her portion of the administration of the estate.
The pertinent parts of the will read as follows:
The Court, in his "Decree of Construction and Instructions" held:
As previously mentioned, the crucial question is whether the probate judge should have considered extrinsic evidence in determining the testator's intent. The beneficiary, Carla Martin, contends that the will is not ambiguous and that the judge erred. Appellees contend that the trial judge did not err because the will contains a latent ambiguity in Article Four, because the words "personal property" are used there in a provision which "is often used in wills for the purpose of disposing of a testator's personal effects, or non-business personal property used in his everyday life."
The First National Bank of Mobile argues for an affirmance of the court's interpretation, as follows:
The bank's argument would have more persuasive force but for the fact that the testator, in the will now under consideration, vested in his daughter, as executrix, the following powers:
Whatever application the rule of ejusdem generis otherwise has in construing testamentary intent, it cannot narrow the legal definition of "personal property," especially when "full power and authority to determine what objects of property are included" is specifically vested in another, such as the executrix in this case.
The bank's argument that the gift of "personal property" in Article Five to the residuary estate is a nullity if the will is not construed as the judge construed it, needs to be addressed and we hereby address it. The argument of the bank would have some validity, but for the fact that the executrix has full power to determine which items pass under Article Four. The executrix, exercising the power granted to her under Article Four, could determine that the testator did not intend to give her certain items of personal property. In that event, the "personal property" she deemed did not pass under Article Four would pass to the residuary estate under Article Five. Also, there could be lapses of specific bequests.
The law states that the Court will not look beyond the "four corners of the instrument" unless latent ambiguities exist. *254 Achelis v. Musgrove, 212 Ala. 47, 101 So. 670 (1924); Gotlieb v. Klotzman, 369 So. 2d 798 (Ala.1979). We have applied that rule here. We have examined the "four corners of the instrument" without considering the extrinsic evidence, and we find no latent ambiguity. The words "personal property," when used as they are used in this will, could create a latent ambiguity, but for the fact that the testator specifically gave "full power" to his executrix to determine what property was included within the bequest under Article Four. Consequently, there is no room for construction. The will will be taken as written. Gotlieb v. Klotzman, supra. We hold, therefore, that the judge incorrectly admitted and considered extrinsic evidence in determining testator's intent, and because he erred, his judgment is due to be reversed and the cause remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C. J., and FAULKNER, JONES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.