Case Title: State v. Maugaotega. Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba, with whom J. Duffy joins [pdf]. S.Ct. Opinion, filed 06/29/2005 [pdf], 107 Haw. 399. Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba, with whom J. Duffy joins [pdf]. By a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Hawaii Supreme Court, filed 02/20/2007. S.Ct. Notice Regarding Reopening of Appeal No. 26657 and Order to Transmit Trial Records to the Hawaii Supreme Court, filed 05/15/2007 [pdf].

Citation: 115 Haw. 432

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW LIBRARY

06 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *+*

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT':

 

--— 000

 

STATE OF HAWAT'I, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Defendant-Appellant .

MITI MAUGAOTEGA, JR.,
a
No. 26657 g

ORIGINAL APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CR. NOS. 03-1-1897, 03-1-2724, 03-1-2725, 03-1-2726, 03-1-2727)

I 190 cong

O27,

OCTOBER 1, 2007

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, AND NAKAYAMA, JJ.,
J., CONCURRING ‘AND DISSENTING SEPARATELY

AND ACOBA,
WITH WHOM DUFFY, J., JOINS

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEVINSON, J.

on February 20, 2007, on petition for a writ of
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment

of this court in State v, Maugaoteaa, 107 Hawai'i 399, 114 P.3d

905 (2005) (Maugactega I), in which this court affirmed the
defendant-appellant Miti Maugaotega, Jr.‘s extended terms of

imprisonment, and ordered that we reconsider Maugaotega’s appeal

in light of Cunningham v, California, 549 U.S. __, 127s. ct.
856 (2007). Maugaotega v, Hawai'i, 549 U.S. __, 127.5. Ce. 1210

(2007).
For the reasons discussed infra, we vacate Maucaotega’s

original extended term sentences and remand to the circuit court

 

for non-extended term sentencing.
‘** FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *:

T. BACKGROUND
On June 16, 2004, Maugactega appealed from the extended

 

term sentences imposed upon him pursuant to Hawai'i Revised

Statutes (HRS) § 706-661 (Supp. 1999)! and HRS § 706-662(4) (a)

 

* tn 2004, HRS § 706-661 provides

In the cases designated in (HRS $} 706-662 (zee infra

ote 2}, 2 person who has been convicted of @ felony nay be

Sentenced to an extended indeterminate term of imprisonment, When

Ordering such a sentence, the court shall impose the maximum

length of imprisonment which shall be as follow

(2)"""Fer murder in the second degree -- life without the
possibility of parcler

(2) Fora class & felony

 

 

 

Andeterninate Life term of

 

     

oe B felony =~ indeterminate twenty-year term of
ona
w © felony -- indeterminate ten-year term of
Imprisonment

‘The minimum length of imprisonment for sections 2, 3, and 4
shall be determined by the Hawai[]1 pareling authority in
accordance with (HRS 5] 706-669.

 

Effective June 22, 2006, the Legislature amended HRS $§ 706-661 and ~662, see
2006 Haw. Sess. L. Act 230, $§ 23, 24, and S4 at 1012-13, 1025, to addre:
Concerns raised by the Hawai'i Judicial Council that Hawaii's extended term
Sentencing schene faced challenges in federal court that it viclated &

sndant's right to # jury trial, protected under the sixth amendnent, to the

 

 

 

United States Constitution, as articulated in agprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000), and its progeny. See
naive Review g ae 21-274 (2008); Sen Stand.

Conn. Rep. No. 3215, in 2008 Senate Journal, at 1557; Hse. Stand. Coun. Rep.
No. 665-06, in 2006'House Journal, at 1359. The amended version of HRS
§ 706-561 provided in relevant part:

 

The court may sentence 2 person who satisfies the criteria
for any of the categories set forth in’ (HRS $). 706-662 to an
extended term of imprisonment, which shall have a maximum length

 

   

8 follow
(2)""" for murder in the second degree ~~ life without the
possibility of pero
(2) Fora class A felony =~ indeterminate 1ite ter of
imprisonment?
(3) For a cless B felony -- indeterminate twenty-year term
of imprisonment; and
(4) For class C felony ~~ indeterminate ten-year tern of
imprisonment.
In_exercising ite discretion on whether to innose the
suterded term of inprigonsent of to use other available sentencing

(continued...)
'** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

(1993 6 Supp. 2003),?

 

 

-continued)

When ordering an extended term sentence, the court shall
impose the maximus length of imprisonment...

(Emphasis added.) Effective June 30, 2007, the amended version of HRS
$ 706-661 expired and the Supp. 2003' version, supra this note, was reenacted.
See 2006 Hau. Seas. L. Act 230, § S¢ at 1025:

 

+ tn 2004, HRS § 706-662 provided in relevant part:

A convicted defendant may be subject to an extended term of

imprisonment under (HRS §] 706-661{, gg8 aupta note 1], if the

convicted defendant satisfies one of nore of the following

(a) "The defendant is a persistent offender shose imprisonment,
for_an extended term is necessary for crotection of the

‘public. the

Sefendant nas previously been convicted of two felonies
Committed at different tines when the defendant was eight
years of age or older.

(2) The defendant is a professional criminal whose imprisonpent
for an extended term is necessary for the protection of the

 

public. The court shail not make this finding unless:

(a) the eizcunstances of the crine show that the defendant
has knowingly engaged in criminal activity as a major
Source of Livelshosdy oF

(b) The Gefendant has substantial income or resources not
explained to be derived fron a source other than
criminal activity.

(3) The defendant is 2 dangerous person whose imorisonment for
an_extended term ie necessary for the protection of the
Bublic. the court shail not mate this findsng uniese the

Gefendant has been subjected to a psychiatric or
paychological evaluation that docunents a significant
history of dangerousness to others resulting in crinii
vielent conduct, and this history makes the defendant @
serious danger to others.

(4) The defendant 1s a multiple offender vhose cripina) actions
sere so extensive that a sentence of imeriscoment for an

 

 

ty

 

he court stall not sake this finding unless!
(a) The Gefendant_is being sentenced for two or more
felonies or is already Under sentence of inprisonsent
for felony: of
(b) The maxinum terme of imprisonment authorized for each
Gf the defencant’s crimes, if ade to ron
Consecutively, would equai or exceed in length the
maximum of the extended term inposed or would equal or
(Cont ined...)

 
‘#% FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*

 

21, ssontinued)
‘exceed forty years if the extended term inposed is for
Selase A felony.
(5) The defendant is an offender against the elderly,
handicapped, or a minor under the age of eight, whose

rotection of che sublic. he court shall aot make this

‘finding unless:
(a) The defendant attempts or commits any of the following
crines: murder, manslaughter, a sexval offense that
constitutes a felony under [HRS] chapter 701, robbery,
felonious assault, burglary, or kidnapping; and
(b) The defendant, in’ the course of committing oF
attempting to’ conait the crine, inflicts sericus or
Gubstantial bodily injury upon’ a perton who i
Ui) Sixty years of age of olders
(41) Blind, "a paraplegic, or a quadripl
(EL) Elghe’ years of age or younger
(c) Such'dissniaity ie known or Feasonably should be known
to the defendant.
(6) The defendant is's hate crime offender whose imprisonment

[uslle. the coure shell not mene this finding unless’

(G) the defendant is convicted of a crime under [ARS
chapter 107, 708, or 711) and

(b) The aefendane intentionally selected a victim, or in
the case of a property crime, the property that w
the object of a crime, because of hostility toward the
actual of perceived race, religion, disability,
Ethnicity, national origin, gender identiey of
expression, of sexual orientation of any person...

 

 

 

 

(Emphases added.) In section 24 of Act 230, effective June 22, 2006, the
Legislature amended HRS § 706-662 to address the same alleged constitutional,
infirmities discussed supra in note 1. Act 230 amended HRS § 706-662 to
provide in relevant part:

 

[A defendant who has been convicted of @ felony qualifis
fan extended term of inprisonsent under (MRS $] 706-66) if the
Convicted defendant satisfies one or nore of the following
eriteria:

{1} The defendant is @ persistent offender in that the defendant
has previously been convicted of tho felonies committed at
different times when the defendant has eighteen years of age
or older

(2) The defendant is a professional criminal in that:

(2) The circumstances of the crime show that the defendant
has knowingly engaged in criminal activity as a major
source of Livelihoods oF

(b) The defendant has substantial income or resources not
explained to be derived from 2 source other than
Eriminal activity:

(3) The defendant is a dangerous person in that the defendant

(continved,

for

 

 

 

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *¥*

by the circuit court of the first circuit, the Honorable Patrick

Border presiding, following Maugactega’s conviction of twenty-two

w

6)

«

esfects

 

Supp. 2003 version, gupta this note, was reenacted. See 2006 Haw. 5

continues
hhas been subjected to @ psychiatric or psychological
evaluation that docunents @ significant history of

Sangerousness to others resulting in criminally violent

conduct, and this history makes the defendant & serious

Sanger to others.

‘The defendant is a'muliiple offender in that:

(a) "The defendant is being sentenced for two or more
felonies or is already under sentence of imprisonment
for felony: oF

(b) The maxinun Lerme of imprisonment authorized for each
ef the defendant's crimes, if made to run
Eonsecutively, would equal or exceed in length the
aximun of the extended term inposed or would equal or
Gaceed forty years if the extended term imposes 1s fOr
selass A felony?

The defendant is an offender against the elderly,

handicapped, or a minor under the age of eight, in that

(a). The defendant attempts or commits any of the
following crines! murder, manslaughter, a
Sexual offense that constitutes @ felony under
[HRS] chapter 707, robber
Burglary, oF kidnopping; end

(b) The defoncant, in the course of committing or
Attempting to conait the crine, inflicts serious
Gr substantial oily injury upon a person who

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

[4) Sixty years of age or olders
(1d) Bling, a paraplegic, or a quadriplegic; or
(L4) Eight’ years of age or younger and

(e) Such disability is know oF reasonably should be
known to the defendant; oF

‘The defendant is a hate crime offender in that

(a) The defendant is convicted of @ crime under (HRS)
Ghapter 10,708, or 1117 and

(b) The defendant intentionally selected a victim or, in
the case of @ property crine, the property that was
the object of s crime, because of hostility toward the
actual oF perceived race, religion, disability,
ethnicity, national origin, gender identity or
expression, oF sexual oflentation of any person...

pired and the
ue

 

one 30, 2007, the amended version of HRS § 706-662

 

 

Act 230, § 54 at 1025.
‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST'S HAWAL'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER +4
offenses alleged in five separate indictnents. see
Mausaoteaa I, 107 Hawai'i at 401-03, 114 P.3¢ at 907-09
(detailing a total of twenty-two counts of which Maugactege was
convicted, including one count of attempted murder in the second
degree, in violation of HRS $$ 707-701.5 (1993) and 707-500
(4993), five counts of robbery in the first degree, in violation
of HRS § 708-840(2) (b) (1) and/or (14) (1993 & Supp. 2003), three
counts of burglary in the first degree, in violation of HRS
§ 708-810(1) (c) (1993), two counts of sexual assault in the first
degree, in violation of HRS § 707-730(1) (a) (1993 6 Supp. 2003),
and two counts of promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree,
in violation of HRS § 712-1243 (1993 & Supp. 2003)). The
prosecution filed five separate motions for extended tems of
imprisonment. Id, at 402-03, 114 P.3d at 908-09.

on May 17, 2004, the circuit court conducted a
ventencing hearing during which 1t concluded that Maugaotega
qualified as a multiple offender under HAS § 706-662(4) (a), a2
supra note 2. In Cr. No, 03-1-1897, the court ruled:

onder 706-6624) (a) the requirement

LMprlsctert ff a anand tem To acenary for he

defendant {2 being sentenced for two or move felonies:

sesaye"thagecteggs ta being senvencee forte

felonies, 14 of which involved the named victin,
thelve of those involving the use of a firesrm in the

      
 

 

  

 

> the allegations against Naugactega were contained in five criminal
cases, namely, Cr. Nos. 031-1897, 031-2726, 031-2125, 03-1-2726, and
031-2727. For the details of the counts contained within each indictment,
soe Maugactegs 2, 107 Hawai"! at 402-03, 114 F.3¢ at 908-09. None of the
indictnents sileged that, if convicted, Maugactega could be subject to
extended sentencing as multiple offender for whom extended terms of
imprisonment were necessary for the protection of the public.

6

 

 

 

    
‘86 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

connission of the offence. Yet another offence,
(p}romoting (p}rison (contraband in the (f)irst
(Glegree, involves the use or introduction into the
prison of a device which is dangerous in nature, to
Mitr a shank(,] and (this) represents a heightened
Sanger, particularly when introduced ints a prison
setting.

careful examination of [Maugsotega}’s conduct
An the period between May and June of 2003)
Gencnstrates a pattern of escalating violence
The... first offenses in late May were burglaries,
prinieiiy involving 2 risk to property. The second
Eluster of offenses involved -r escalated to robbers
With the use of 2 seni-suvonatic weapon in furtherance
of crines!

The ‘third cluster of offenses involved [s)exual
[a}esaule and (xJobbery, once again facilitated by the
Use of a firearm. The most violent of the offenses
followed in June 26th with the attenpted murder of
Eric Kawanoto. There were a total of
victims of wiolent or potentially vio
‘thin the relative short period between late May and
the end of June, 2003.

‘Given the facts of these offenses, the court
concludes that. (Maugsctega] is 2 multiple offender
Snder (aks §) 706-6424) (a).

 

   

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

were 20 extensive that the sentence of amoc.scnnenk

ST ee a erates

Hf the publics Conscasent ies the forcseeueaent =
Hamer Ossieies? te erences.”

Maugactege I, 107 Hawai'i at 403-04, 114 P.3d at 909-10 (quoting

May 17, 2004 circuit court proceedings) (brackets in

Mauaacteas I) (some emphasis added and some in original). The

circuit court rendered similar findings of fact regarding

 

Maugactega’s multiple-offender status and the necessity of
extended terms for the protection of the public (hereinafter,
“the necessity finding”) in granting the other four motions for
extended terms of imprisonment and proceeded to sentence
Maugactega to extended terms on all twenty-two counts. Id. at
403-05, 114 P.3d at $08-11. On May 17 and May 18, 2004, the

circuit court entered judgments convicting Maugaotega of and
‘** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*
sentencing him for the twenty-two counts charged in the five
criminal cases. Id. at 401, 114 P.3d at 907.

on September 8, 2004, the circuit court entered written
findings of facts (FOFs) and conclusions of law (COLs) and orders
granting the prosecution's motions for extended terms of
imprisonment as a multiple offender. Id. at 405, 114 P.3d at
911. The circuit court found, inter alia that:

=, Maugactega . . . is a multiple offender” whose
Commitment for an extended term is necessary for the
protection of the public because of the following

‘races

‘2. [Maugactega) has an extensive juvenile
criminal history.

., -[Maugactega]’s criminality has continued
despite his prior contacts with the criminal justice
systen.

.  {Maugactega] has failed to benefit from the
criminal justice systen.

@.  (Maugactega] has demonstrated a total
disregard for the rights of others and & poor attitude
tonara the law.

‘e., (Maugaotega) has denonetrated a pattern of
criminality which indicates thet he is Likely to be a
Fecidivist in that he cannot conform his behavior to
the reguirenents of the lax.

£. Due to the quantity and seriousness of the
instant offense, (Maugactega) poses a serious threat
to the community and nis leng(*]term incarceration is
necessary for the protection of the public.

 

Id. at 405, 114 P.3d at 911 (some brackets added).
Maugaotega timely appealed from the May 17 and 18, 2004
judgments, arguing that

tthe circuit court erred in granting each of the
prosecution's five notions for extended terms of
inprisonnent because the [FOF] that extended terns
were necessary for the protection of the public was
fot, subaitted toa Jury and proved beyond’ a reasonable
Goubt, in violation of the sixth anendnent to the
United States Constseueion,

Id. at 407, 114 P.3d at 913. He contended that “*{aJllowing a

judge to pick and choose which factors [a]re “intrinsic” or
#4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*

“extrinsic” leads to the same type of arbitrariness and
absurdity’ that the United States Supreme Court sought to curb in
Apprendif v. New Jersev, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),] and Blakely
Washineton, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)].” Maugaotega I, 107 Hawai'i at
407, 114 P.3d at 913. A majority of this court rejected
Maugaotega’'s arguments and, on July 29, 2005, entered a notice
and Judgment on appeal, affirming the circuit court’s May 17
and 18, 2004 judgment and sentences.

on October 27, 2005, Naugactega filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which,
on November 2, 2005, docketed the application as No. 05-7309. on
February 20, 2007, the Court granted the application and entered
a mandate and judgment, vacating our July 28, 2005 judgment and
remanding the matter to this court for reconsideration in light
of Cunningham.

II. pEscussION
the 1 si Court's Inte:

Distinction And Jones v. United States, Apprendi, And
Thesr Progeny

 

1. This court's anal oteaa I
In State v. Kava, 102 Hawai'i 1, 72 P.3d 473 (2003),
this court drew a clear distinction between findings that
qualified a defendant for an extended term of imprisonment and
findings that a sentencing judge made in the traditional exercise
of discretion in deciding whether to impose an extended term
pursuant to HRS § 706-662(4). Id, at 9-10, 72 P.3d at 481-82.

The former determination -- i.e,, that the defendant was a
++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER *#*
multiple offender -- arose out of multiple felony convictions
obtained by proof beyond @ reasonable doubt in adjudicative
proceedings, before a trier of fact, subject to criminal due

due, the

necessity finding -- entailed a traditional exercise of

process protections, while the latter determination

 

discretion by the sentencing judge, reviewable for abuse of

discretion:

 

Tt is settled that an extended term sentencing
hearing is "a separate criminal proceeding apart. trom
the trial of the underlying substantive offense,”
wherein “all relevant iaaues should be established by
the state beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. famae,
56 Maw. 626, 635, S40 P.20 632, 63) (1976). In Seaee’
wHusleman) €0 Haw. 71, S88 2.24 394. (1975), this
Court addressed the procedural protections to be
accorded criminal defendants at’ an extended ter
Sentencing hearing and announced 9 two-step process in
which a sentencing court must engage in order to
Impose an extended term sentence. id. at Je, £68 P.2d
at 356. For purposes of a motion for en extended term
Of imprisonment under HRS § 706-662(4), the first step
Eeguires @ finding beyond a reasonable doubt “tnat the
Gefendant is a multiple offender, which finding may
hot be made unless the defendant is being sentenced
for two or more felonies or is under sentence fers
felony ang the maxinun terns of imprisonment
authorized for the defendant's crines meet certain
Fequisites.” Jd. In the event that the sentencing
court finds that the defendant is a miltiple offender
Under subsection (4), the second step requires the
Sentencing court to determine whether “the cefendant’s
connitment for an extended term is necessary for the
protection of the public.” Ig, at 77, 588 F.20 at

Soe

 

 

 

 

   

     

 

 

 

 

 

The deternination that the defendant is =
nenber of the class of offenders to which
the particular subsection of [ARS]
§ (706-1662 applies involves “historical
facts,” the proof of hich exposes the

int to. punishment by an extended
term sentence, similarly to the menner in
hich the proof of hie quilt exposes him
to ordinery sentencing... But when
the status of the defendant has been
established, the process by uhich the
court deternines that the defendant's
Commitment for an extended term i
necessary for the protection of the public

 

   

10
‘00 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*

=. Ae one which deals with the subject
matter of ordinary sentencing.

 

Ids at 79°60, $88 P.2d at 400. As such, the first
phase of the Huslenan twowstep process must afford a
Sefendant "the full panoply of constitutional
protections guaranteed in criminal proceedings,” ses

; 63 Haw. 488, 498-99, 630 P.2d" 619,
ELT TSEI), which includes the rights to notice and an
opportunity fo be heard, cross-examination of
Witnesses appearing at the sentencing hearing, and the
Gvidentiary safeguards set forth in the Hawai'i Rules
Of Evidence (HRE). Son Kamas, 56 Haw. at 638, 548
Piz at 638-39. By contrast, the procedual
"afeguards to which the second phase of the uelsnan
tnorstep process is subject are those applicable to
ordinary Sentencing, and, therefore, “the NRE are not
Controlling.” Stas v. Loa, 63 Hawat'l 335, 355, 926
P-2a 1258, i278 (1996), Moreover, “(under ordinary
sentencing procedures, the court is ‘afforded wide
Iatitude in the selection of penalties fron those
Brescrited and in the determination of their severity.
his authority is normally undisturbed on review in
the absence of an apparent abuse of siscretion or
Unless applicable statutory and constitutional
consande have not been cbserved.’” State v, Okumura,
‘8 Hawai'i 363, 423, 894 F.2d 80, 110 (1995)

 

 

 

 

Kaua, 102 Hawai'i at 9-10, 72 P.3d at 481-82. We explained that
the two-stage extended term sentencing process articulated in
Huelsman

Ag Limited to enhanced sentencing, such as
extended prison terms. pursuant to. HRS

$5 106-661, 106-682, and 706-664 (2993)*],
in which the “determination that the
Getendant 1s a menber of the class of
offenders to which the particular
statute) applies snvolves ‘historia

 

 

 

+ Rs $ 706-664 provides:

Hearings to determine the grounds for inposing extended
terme of inprisonsent may be initiated by the prosecutor or by the
court on its own notion. The court shall not impose an extended
term unless the ground therefor has been established at a hearing
after the conviction of the defendant and on written notice to the
Gefendant of the ground proposed. subject to the provisions of
[HRS'§} 706-6041, pertaining to notice and opportunity to be heard
ith Feepect to tentence], the defendant shall have the right to
hear and controvert the evidence against the defendant and te
offer evidence upon the issue.

 

 

 

a
‘** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*

facts.‘ uelsnan, 60 Haw. at 79, 568
P2aat 400. Thi ds because such
“historical facts” are wholly extrinsic to
the specific cireunstances of the
Gefendant’s offense and therefore have no
Dearing on the issue of guilt per ae. By
contrast, if the “aggravating
Circumstances” justifying the imposition
of an enhanced sentence are “enmeshed in,"
or, put differently, sntrineic £0 the
“commission of the crime charged,” then,
An accordance with the
69

812. (is87)1, such agers
circunstances "must be alleged in the
indictment in order to give the defendant
notice that they will be relied on to
Prove the defendant's guilt and support
the sentence £0 be imposes, and they must,
be determined by the trier of fact.”
State vl Scnraeser, [10 Haw. App. $35,
545, 880 Pz (208, 212 (1992)]

 

    

 

  

ve , 76 Hawal"s (517,] 528, 880 P20
1192/1 203 (1994) hereinafter, Schiceder I1}) (sone
brackets added and soe in eriginal) (enshaeis sn
original)

Ady at 10-11, 72 P.3d at 482-83 (some brackets added and some in
original).

Prior to Kaua, in State v, Tafova, 91 Hawai'i 261, 982
P.2d 890 (1999), this court had augmented the groundwork for the
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, noting that

iin reviewing ovr previous case law, it is apparent
that “intrinsic” factors, required to be plea in the
indictment and found by the jury, are distinguishable
in that they are contemporaneous with, and enmeshed
in, the statutory elements of the proscribed offen
Contrarily, “extrinsic” factors are separable from the
offense itself in that they involve consideration of
collateral events or inforaetion. Occurrence at a
pricr tine is indicative, although not dispositive, of
S conclusion that s factor is “extrinsic.”

 

Id. at 271, 982 P.2d at 900. We held that the factors set forth
in HRS § 706-662(5), see supra note 2, involving offenses against
the elderly, handicapped, or very young, were intrinsic to the

a2
‘+0 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*

offense charged and, therefore, had to be pled and proved to the
trier of fact, overruling Huelsman to the extent it permitted all.
facts enumerated in HRS § 706-662 to be found by the sentencing
judge. Id, at 271-72, 982 P.2d at 900-01.

We reached the foregoing result in part based upon our
concerns that the United States Supreme Court, in Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), “called into question the
constitutional vitality of allowing a sentencing judge to make
[POFs} leading to an extended term of imprisonment.” Tafova, 91
Hawai'i at 272, 982 P.2d at 901. As we later noted in Kaua,
however, the reasoning articulated in Jones could ultinately be

reconciled with this court's intrinsic/extrinsic analysis:

In Jones | the United States Supreme Court
Addressed’ the question whether certain provisions of =
careJacking statste, which prescribed enhanced
sentencing penalties, creates acditionsl elenents of
the offense, which would have to be found by the Jury,
of rerely sescribed sentencing considerations, which
Could permissibly be determined by the sentencing
Sudge.” in conelding the former, the Jones Court
jssentsally drew 2 distinction, 25 this court did in
Schicadert “111 and Tafova, between (1) factual
Findings thet were inextricably enmeshed in the
Charged offense and therefore probative of the
Gefendant’ s commission of thet offense and (2) factual
Fingings that were wholly independent of the offense
in'the indicenent and spoke coly to
Setice of the defendant that were pertinent
fo the appropriate degree of punishment, The Jones
Court noted that “{mJuch turns on the determination
that a fact io sn elenent of an offense rather than @
sentencing consideration, given that elesents must be
Charged in the indictment, submitted to a Jury, and
proven by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt.”
foe ues. at 232... Thos, Jones declares that
Many fact’ (other thai [e) prior conviction) that
increased the maxinon penalty for 2 crime must be
Charged in an indictment, suemitted to a Jury, and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt." [Idi] at
243...  Zafoua recognized, however, ‘that to extend
the jones tationale to “extrinsic” facts "would
contaminate the jury's required focus on the factual
Circumstances surrounding the (charged) offense and

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

13
‘#+ FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*
potentially require the introduction of inadnissible

rior bad act(s] oF overly prejudicial evidence to

Fequire the jury to make such findings.” Tafova, 91

Hawai" ae 273 nei, 902 P-24 at 902 ne15.

Kaua, 102 Hawai'i at 11-12, 72 P.3d at 483-84 (some brackets
added and some in original). In short, in Kaua we concluded that
songs (1) merely confirmed our analysis that, where a fact was
intrinsic to the offense charged, it had to be proved to the
trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) left unchanged
the rule that the sentencing court, not the trier of fact,
Weighed extrinsic facts in an exercise of its traditional
discretionary sentencing authority, Id.

We further concluded in Kaua that, insofar as the
“hate-crime” law at issue in Apprendi -- establishing an extended
term for a defendant who committed a crime motivated by an
improper bias toward, inter alia, the victim's race, gender, or
religion® -- was clearly intrinsic in nature, Apprendi, like
Jones, comported with our intrinsic/extrinsic analysis in Tafova
and Schroeder It and did not require that extrinsic facts,
including those extrinsic facts implicated in HRS § 706-662(4),

* Ids at

 

 

be found by the trier of fact rather than the judge

+ tn so concluding, we noted the similarity between the New Jersey
statute at iseue in Aporendi and HRS § 706-€62(6) (Supp. 2001), se

ote 2; which established a similar racial basis for sn extended sentence, if
the crine in question were motivated by an improper bias. Id, at 12.9.8, 72,
Pidd at 484 m6

 

‘Moreover, we concluded that the factors set out in HRS
$ 206-662 (5) and (6), in contrast to those erticslated in ARS § 706-662 (2),
(3), and (4), 98 supra note 2, were intrinsic co the crine charged and,
hence, had to be pied in the charging instrunent and proved beyend a
Feaschable doubt to the trier of fact. Kaua, 102 Havait at 13, 72 P.3d at
485 (citing Tafoya, 91 Hawai'i at 271-72, 982 P.2d at 900-01; Schroeder I], 76
Hawai'i at 258; 680 P.24 at 203).

 

 

4
 

/+ POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HANAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
12-13, 72 P.3d at 484-85 (citing Tafova, 91 Hawai'i at 271-72,
982 P.2d at 900-01; Schroeder II, 76 Hawai'i at $28, 880 P.2d at
203; State v. Carvalho, 101 Hawai'i 97, 63 P.3d 405 (App. 2002)
(holding that HRS § 706-662 was not constitutionally infirm and
reading Tofova in harmony with Apprendi).

In the years following Apprendi, the United States
Supreme Court refined its sixth amendment analysis in, inter
alia, Blakely and United States v, Booker, $43 U.S. 220 (2005);

neither case altered our conclusion that Hawaii’s extended term

   

sentencing regime complied with Apprendi and a criminal
defendant’s constitutional right to @ jury trial.

In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court overturned
a Washington state determinate-sentencing-guideline scheme
wherein the defendant's conviction of kidnapping rendered him

Liable to a “presumptive guideline range” sentence of betu

 

forty-nine and fifty-three months of imprisonment. 542 U.S. at
298. The Washington court, however, had sentenced Blakely to an
exceptional “upper range” term of ninety-months’ imprisonment by
making a required judicial finding that Blakely had committed the
crime with “deliberate cruelty.” Id, On Blakely’s appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, Washington argued that the statutory
maximum for Blakely’s offense was, in fact, 120 months, dependent

upon the appropriate findings being made, and, therefore, that

 

the sentencing court had acted within its legitimate
discretionary authority in sentencing Blakely to ninety month
imprisonment. Id, at 303. The Blakely majority rejected this

argument, concluding that “[the Court's] precedents make clear .

as
‘+ FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HANAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER *#+
+ that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant.” Id. (citing Ring vs Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602
(2002); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 563 (2002);
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488) (emphasis in Blakely). Insofar as the
Washington court could exceed the presumptive range only by
relying on additional, judicially-determined facts such as that
the defendant had acted with “deliberate cruelty,” Blakely’s
sentence violated the Apprendi rule because “the relevant
‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may

impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may

 

impose without any additional findings.” Id. at 303-04 (emphasis
in original)”
In State v, Rivera, 106 Hawai'i 146, 102 P.3d 1064

(2004), we distinguished Blakely on the grounds: (1) that our

indeterminate sentencing scheme contains no presumptive guideline

 

> Relevant to our statutory structure, wherein the inposition of an

extended term sentence is discretionary, sg8, ide, MKS 106-66) ("(A) person
Who has been convicted of 2 felony pay be sentenced to an extended
Andeterminate term of imprisonnent."} (emphasis added), the Blakely Court also
conclused that

 

nlor does it matter that the judge must, after finding
eqgravating facts, make a judgment that they present compelling
(ground for departure. Me cannot sake that judgment without
Hinding some facts to support. it beyond the bare elements of the
offense. Whether the judicially deteraines facta requie ®
Sentence enhancerent of merely allow it, ‘the verdict alone does
Rot authorize the sentence

   

 

542 0,5. at 305 n.8, quoted in Cunningham, 549 0.8. at _, 127s. ce
(chardcterizing the foregoing lenguage asa holding snd"Féiteraticg thet
“road discretion. ... to determine whether an enhanced sentence is warranted
in any particular Case{) does not shield a sentencing system fren the force of
our decisions”) (brackets and emphasis added)

16

 

 

 

 
‘48* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

ranges? and (2) that the facts at Sssue in Blakely ~~ i.e, that

 

Blakely had acted with deliberate cruelty -- were intrinsic to
the charged offense, which, under our precedent, would be for the
trier of fact, rather than the sentencing judge, to find in any
event. See id. at 159-60, 102 P.3d at 1057-58. We affirmed
Rivera's extended term sentences, imposed pursuant to HRS

$ 706-662(1) and (4), see supra note 2, as a persistent and

multiple offender because the facts upon which the sentence

 

relied -- i.e., prior and concurrent convictions -- were “outside
the purview of the jury’s fact-finding function.” Id. at 160,
102 P.3d at 1058. With regard to the necessity finding, we
reasoned that, insofar as a sentencing judge was required to
consider the same factor during standard sentencing, pursuant to
HRS § 706-606(2) (c) (1993),* the necessity finding was not

requisite for imposing an extended term but, rather, was an

 

+ ars § 706-606 (39!
Amposing a sentence,” provide

+ entitled "Factors to be considered in

 

‘The court, in determining the particular
shall consiges

 

mntence to be imposed,

 

 

  

(iy The nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant?
(2) The need for the sentence impos
(ay “"Zo reflect the seriousness of the offense, to

promote respect for law, and to provide just
Punishment for the offense;

() ‘To afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct

(c) __Tovprotect the public from further crimes of the
Gefendant; and

(4) To provide the defendant with needed educational

 

or vocational training, medical care, or other
Correctional treatment’ in the most effective
(3) The kinds of sentences availabley and
(4) The need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
rong defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct.

 

vv
‘+# FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HANAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*

expression of traditional judicial sentencing discretion and,
therefore, did not implicate or violate Blakely. Id, at 161-64,
102 P.3d at 1059-62.

2. Maugaotega I

In Maugacteaa I, we opined at the outset that both Kaua
and Rivera confirmed that Hawaii's extended term sentencing
scheme comported with Apprendi and, therefore, disposed of
Maugactega’s point of error. 107 Hawai'i at 402, 114 P.3d at
908. Nevertheless, being aware of the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Booker, we took the “opportunity to reassert
the viability of this court's analytical ‘intrinsic/extrinsic’
approach to Hawaii's statutory extended term sentencing schene.”
Is

In Booker, the United States Supreme Court analyzed the
federal sentencing guidelines in light of Apprendi and its
progeny. $43 U.S. 226-44. The Court concluded that the
mandatory nature of the guidelines violated Apprendi because they
required the sentencing judge to find additional facts before a
sentence could be extended beyond the standard prescribed range,
which was based on the elements of the crime proved beyond @
reasonable doubt to a jury. $43 U.S. at 235 (quoting Blakely,
542 U.S. at 305) (reiterating that no matter whether the judge
must make a specific finding -- e.a., in Apprendi, of racial bias
“+ or any additional finding, a defendant's right to a jury trial
is violated when “*the jury's verdict alone does not authorize
the sentence( but, rather, tJhe judge acquires that authority
usted in

only upon finding some additional fact.’”!

 

18
‘s+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

Maugotega I, 107 Hawai'i at 408, 114 P.3d at 914. The United
States Supreme Court explained that

LiJE the Guidelines as currently written could be read

a5 rerely advisory provisions that reconnensed, rather

than required, the selection of particular sentences

in respense to differing sets of facts, their use

would hot implicate the sixth Anendment. We have

ever doubted the authority of 2 judge to exercise

broad discretion in inposing « sentence within a

statutory range.
Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Booker
Court's solution was to excise the mandatory portion of the
sentencing guidelines in order to render them actually
discretionary, thereby establishing a true sentencing range up to
the absolute maximum authorized by the elements of the charged

offense, within which a judge was fre

 

to select a just sentence
in the exercise of traditional discretion. Booker, 543 U.S. at
234-35, 245.

In Maugacteaa I, we held that “inasmuch as (1) Booker’s
holding is limited to the federal sentencing guidelines, and (2)
Hawaii's extended term sentencing structure is not mandatory, ”*
“Booker has no bearing on this court’s disposition (of
Maugactega’s appeal].” 107 Hawai'i at 402, 409, 114-P.3d at 908,

In Cunningham, the Court emphasized that “Lalay fact that
increases the pensity for a crine beyond the prescribed statutory naxinun must
be'submitted toa jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt-" 5490.5. at
we etiié, 127 8. Cey a¢ B69 nile. (quoting Acprengi, 530 0.8. at 430)
Tacketed saterial altered) lesphasis odded in cuaninahaa). “Noreover, the
Court held that whether an extended tere sentence was manaatory oF
Siscretionory was irrelevant for purposes of Auarendi coupiiance so long ae
the extended sentence peauited a Judicis! finding of fect. ide ay 22? 5.
Ge. SE'865. (quoting Blaney. 542 vs. at 305.n-6). In Light of ehiF end ovr
Conclusion ‘hat the Cunpinatan saJority would view the necessity finaing
inhether in SRS § 106-€e2 oF enscenced sn HRS § 7067606) ae a predicate
required findingy gee infea section if.0rl, it 1a unlikely that the
tadzacteas | distinction would survive scrutiny under Conninahan

   

 

 

 

 

 

1s.
 

‘4+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER
915. In reaching this conclusion, we again relied on the
distinction between intrinsic factors, such as those found in HRS
§ 706-662(5) and (6), see supra note 2, involving factors
pertaining to the age, race, or other characteristics of the
victim, which are enmeshed in the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the charged offense, and extrinsic factors
pertaining to the character of the defendant and reaffirmed our
conclusion that the necessity finding remained the province of
the sentencing court in the traditional exercise of its
discretion. 107 Hawai'i at 408-10, 114 P.3d at 914-16 (citing
Rivera, 106 Hawai'i at 150, 157, 163, 102 P.3d at 1048, 1055,
1061).

8. Cunningham Leaves No Doubt That A Majority of The

United States Supreme Court Rejects The

Intrinsi inct ion.

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Breyer in his
dissenting opinion in Cunningham, eloquently articulated an
iteration of this court's intrinsic/extrinsic distinction and the
compelling rationale underlying it:

In my view the Auprendi line of cases remains
incorrect.” Yet there my be @ principled rationale
Permitting those cases to control within the central
Sphere of their concern, while reducing the
collateral, widespread harm to the criminal justice
system and the corrections process now resulting from
the Court’ s wooden, unyielding insistence on expanding
the Aporends doctrine far beyond ite necessary,
boundaries. The Court could distinguish between
Sentencing enhancenents based on the nature of the
offense, where the Apprendi principle would spply, and
Sentencing enhancenents cased on the nature of the
offender, where it would not. California ateenpted to

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

make this initial distinction. Compare Cal. Rule of
Court 4.423 (a) (Criminal Cases) (West 2006) (24aeing
aggravating *[fJacts relating to the crime”),

 

Rule 4-421 ib) (iisting aggravating “(flacte relating
to the defendant”). The Court should net foreclose

20
‘s4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ¥*

ite efforts
ie’ distenting opinions have suggested before,
‘the Constitution ought not to be interpreted to strike
Soen sli aspects of sentencing systens that grant
Sudielal discretion with sone legislative direction
and control. dodges and legislators must have the
Capacity to develop consistent standards, standards
thet individual juries enpanelea for only 2 short tine

 

  

Cannot elaborate in any permanent way. 9a, g.du,
Blakely, 542 U.s.[] at 314... (opinion of O'Connor,
Sei dda{] at. 326-327... (opinion of Kennedy, J.)

(explaising that "[slentencing guidelines are a prine
Gnanple of [the] collaborative process” between courts
Gna Legislatures). Judges and sentencing officials
have a broad view and long-term commitment to
Correctional systems. Juries do not. Judicial
officers and corrections professionals, under the
Guidance and control of the legislature, should be
Gheouraged to participate in an ongoing manner ‘to
Improve the various sentencing scheses in our country.
ais aysten of guided discretion would be

permitted to a large extent if the Court confined the

‘role to sentencing enhancenente based on the
fature of the offense. These would include, Tor
example, the fact that @ Weapon was used; violence was
Cnployeds a stated amount of aruge of other contraband
as involved; or the crime was motivated by the
vicein's race, gender, or other status protected by
Statute. ‘Juries could consider these setters without
Serious disruption because these factors often are
pare of the statutory definition of an sggravates
Erine in any event and becouse the evidence to support
these enhancements iz Likely to be # central part of
the prosecution's case.

Ge the other hand, Judicial determination is
appropriate with regard to factors exhibited by the
Gefendant.. These would include, for example, prior
convictions; cooperation or noncooperation with law
Snforcenent) renorse o the lack of it; or cther
Sopects of the defendant's history bearing upon his
Background and contribution to the conmunity. This is
bo even if the relevant facts were to be found by the
jucge by # preponderance of the evidence. These are
Zacks that should be taken into account at sentencing
but have little if any significance for whether the
Gefendant committed the crime. Sas Berman ¢ Bibas,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Heking Sentencing Sensible, ¢ Onie st. J. Crim. L. 37,
55-57 (2006)

The Line between offense and offender would not
always be clear, bot in most inevances tne nature oF
the Offense is defined in a manner that ensures the
problem of categories would not be difficult.
Koprends suffers fron @ similar line-drawing problen
Between facts that must be considered by the jury and
other coneiderations that @ judge can take into

 

2
‘**% FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *+¢

account. The main part of the Aucrendi holding could
bbe retained with far less systemic disruption. It is
to be regretted that the Court's decision today
appears to foreclose consideration of this spproach or
other reasonable efforts to develop systens of guided
Giscretign within the general constraint that 2oprends
imposes

 

Cunningham, 549 U.S: at |, 127 S. Ct. at 872-73 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting, with whom Breyer, J., joined) (some underscoring in
original and sone added). The majority tersely rejected what it
called “the bifurcated approach Justice Kennedy proposes.” Id.
at __n.14, 127 S.Ct. at 869 n.14 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
490) (“JAlny fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond

the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and

Proved beyond a reasonable doubt.) (brackets and enphasis in
Sunningham) .
©. Cunnin inated The Th
act Th on 0
Extended Term Of Inprisonment Outside The Maximum
uth a 7s Verdi

Cunningham addressed California’s determinate
sentencing law (DSL), which allowed a sentencing judge to depart
from a presumptive middie-range sentence and increase a
Gefendant’s sentence if the court found, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that additional facts in aggravation, relating
either to the crime or the character of the defendant, were
present that justified an upper range sentence. 549 U.S. at __
6 nul, 127 S, Ct. at 860-62 6 n.1. The DSL expressly required
that no elenents necessary to convict the defendant of the
underlying offense could be relied upon to impose an enhanced
term. id at __, 127 S.Ct. at 263.

 

22
‘444 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, made it clear

at the outset of Cunningham that

the Federal Constitution's jury-trial guarantee
proscribes a sentencing schene that allows a judge to
Tnpose a sentence sbove the statutory asximin based oo
a'fact, other than a prior conviction, not found by a
Jury of sdniteed by the defendant. "(T]he relevant
setatutory maximum,’ this Court has clarified, "is
not the maximum sentence a judge may inpose afte:
Finding additional facts, bot the maximun he may
Impose without any additional findings.”

549 U.S. at __, 127.8. Ct. at 860 (citing Booker; Blakely; Ring
Apprendi) (quoting Blakely, $42 U.§. at 303-04) (internal
citations omitted) (emphasis in Blakely). Moreover, by its

rejection of Justice Kennedy's intrinsic/extrinsic compromise,

 

 

supra, the majority nailed down the proposition that “facts”
included any findings of fact made by a judge -- even those
pertaining to matters within the traditional sphere of judicial
sentencing discretion -- that were prerequisites to the
imposition of an extended term sentence. See 549 U.S. at __
n.14, 127 8, Ct. at 869 n.14.

‘This court has consistently asserted that the necessity
finding, strictly speaking, is not a “fact” subject to
determination by the trier of fact but, rather, a traditional
expression of a sentencing court's expertise in weighing the
factors set forth in HRS § 706-606, see supra note 8, which
include the protection of the public, in order to determine the
appropriate punishment. See State v. White, 110 Hawai'i 79,
89-90, 129 P.3d 1107, 1117-18 (2006); Rivera, 106 Hawai'i at
162-64, 102 P.3d at 1060-62. We reasoned that only after the

sentencing judge has determined that imprisonment, not probation,

23
 

‘s** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HANAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

is necessary for the protection of the public do the factors
enumerated in HRS § 706-662(4) -- i.e., prior convictions
expressly exempted from the Apprendi rule -- authorize the
imposition of an extended term sentence. white, 110 Hawai‘i at
89-90, 129 P.3d at 1117-18; Rivera, 106 Hawai'i at 163, 102 P.2¢
at 1061.

Justice Alito made much the same argument in
Gunningham, 5490.8. at __ 6 n.2, 127 S. Ce. at 873-74 € 0.2
(Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the Court has consistently
stated that when a trial court makes a fully discretionary
sentencing decision . . . the Sixth Amendment permite the court
to base the sentence on its own factual findings” and noting that
four of the justices on the Court when Booker was issued
concurred that “history does not support a right to jury trial
in respect to sentencing facts’) (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at
328 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part)) (some internal quotation
signals and brackets omitted). He questioned, first, whether
determination that an aggravating factor justified an extended
sentence was, indeed, 2 “fact” for sixth anendnent purposes:

[2)t is not at all clear that 2 California court must

opposes to identifying & relevent policy

iat California sentencing Goure fist fing is's

s Sanioh, California's

Court fules make cleat, can include any “criteria
reasonably related to the decision being made.”

Cunningham, 5490.8. at __, 127 8. Ct. at 879 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (quoting California Penal Code Ann. § 1170(b):

 

 

 

California Rule of Court 4.408(a)) (emphasis in Cunningham).
Justice Alito then noted that:

24
s** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HANAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

California courte are thus enpowered to take
inte account the full panoply of factual and policy
Considerations that have traditionally been considered
By Judges operating under fully discretionary.
sentencing regines ~~ the constitutionality of which
the Court hes repeatedly resffirgd. California law
explicitly authorizes @ sentencing court to take into

account, for exemple, broad sentencing objectives like
Punishnent, deverrence, restitution, ana uniformity,

   

 

fee Rule 4-410, and even a judge's “subjective belief”
Seto the

‘of the

 

tence, a8 long a
° Policy considerations
‘been outside the province of
the jury and do not implicate the Sixth Amendnent

concerns expressed in Anorendi.

    

Id, (some internal citations omitted) (emphasis added) .

In Hawai'i, our “broad sentencing objectives,” set
forth in HRS § 706-606, see supra note 8," encompass, like Cal.
Court Rule 4.410, the traditional sentencing objectives of
punishment, deterrence, restitution, rehabilitation, and
uniformity. As noted, we have long concluded: (1) that the
necessity finding, as articulated throughout HRS § 706-662, is,
in fact, merely an expression of a sentencing judge’s traditional
application of HRS § 706-606 to determine that a period of
imprisonment was warranted as provided by HRS §§ 706-656(2)

(Supp. 1996) (terms of imprisonment for second degree murder and

 

Compare HRS $ 706-606, supEa note €, with Cal, Rule of Court
4.101)

(a) General objectives of sentencing include:

(1) Protecting society?

(2) Punishing the defendant:

(3) Encouraging the defendant to lead @ law-abiding life in the
foture and deterring him oF her fron future offensi

(4) Deterring others fren criminal conduct by
consequenc

(5) Ereventing the defendant from conmitting new crimes by
{golating him or her for the period of incarceration:

(6) Securing restitution for the victims of criney and

(7) Achieving uniformity in sentencing

    

 

25
‘**+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
attempted second degree murder},"" -659 (Supp. 1994) (terms of
imprisonment for a class A felony), and ~660 (1993) (terms of
imprisonment for a class 8 or class C felony}; (2) that any
extended term sentence was separately predicated upon the other
“facts” articulated in HRS § 706-662(1) to (6); and (3) that,
insofar as the necessity finding was not a finding made solely
within the extended sentencing statute, it was not dissonant with
Apprendi and its progeny. white, 110 Hawai'i at 89-90, 129 P.34
at 1117-18; Rivera, 106 Hawai'i at 162-64, 102 P.3d at 1060-62.

 

% RS § 706-656(2) provides in relevant part

Except 28 provided in (HRS $1 706-657, pertaining to
enhanced sentence for second degree murder, persons convicted of
Second degree murder and attenpted second degree mirder shall be
Sentenced to 1ife imprisonment with possibility of parol

 

 

 

URS § 106-659 provides in relevant part:

Notwithstanding part TZ{, pertaining to probation] [HRS $6)
706-605, 106-606, 70€-606.5, 7066.1, T06-G61, and 106-662) and
any other law to’ the contrary, a person who has been convicted of
2 Glass A felony, except class A felonies defined in chapter 122,
[pertaining te drugs and intoxicating compounds), shall
be sentenced to on indeterminate term of inpriscnment of twenty
years without the possibiiicy of suspension of sentence or
Probation...

 

 

URS § 706-660 provides in relevant part:

A person who has been convicted of s class B or class C
felony may be sentenced to an indeterminate tem of inprisonment
except a8 provided for in [HRS §) 706-660.1 relating to the use of
Hirearms in certain felony offenses and (iiRS $).106-606.5 relating
to repeat offenders. When ordering such a sentence, the court
shall inpose the maxinun length of impriscnment which shall be
follows:

 

 

 

  

ony “= 10 years; and
fC felony =- § yea

 

26
#44 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **4
Sunnincham rejected our long-held belief. California's
DSL system created @ presumptive middie term from which the
sentencing court could not depart without first entering into the
zecord findings of circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, to
be determined by considering all aspects of the defendant's case,
including statements submitted by the victim or the victin's
family." Id. at __
in aggravation were defined as “‘facts which justify the

127 S. Ct. at 861-62. The circumstances

 

Amposition of the upper prison term.'" Id. at __, 127 8. Ct. at
862 (quoting Cal. Court Rule 4.405(d)) (emphasis in Cunningham) .

‘The Cunningham majority relied on the California

 

language defining the circumstances in aggravation as “facts,”
distinguished those findings from the general sentencing factors
enunerated separately in Rule 4.410(a), and concluded that, in
determining that an aggravating circumstance justified an upward
departure fron the default middle term of imprisonment, the
Californie sentencing court was engaging in fact-finding that
increased the defendant's sentence beyond that authorized by the
jury’s verdict, thereby offending the Apprendi rule. Id. at __,
127.8. ct. at 863, 870-71.

In considering whether “(t]he defendant is 2 multiple
offender whose criminal actions were so extensive that a sentence
‘of imprisonment for an extended term is necessary for the

protection of the public[,]” HRS § 706-662(4) expressly

 

M the noneshaustive list of aggravating circumstances are provided

in Cal, Court Rule 4.421 relating to the defendant, the crime, and "*{alny

other facte statutorily declared to be circumstances in aggravation,” id. at
127 S. Ce, at 662,

2
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prescribes certain criteria. As directed by the plain language
of HRS § 706-662(4), see supra note 2, the circuit court in the
present matter expressly entered the necessity finding in its
written orders granting all five motions for extended term
sentencing. Although the necessity finding is also a traditional
sentencing’ consideration articulated in HRS § 706-606(2) (c), see
supra note 8, as was true in California’s system, the reasoning
of the Cunningham majority leaves no doubt that, like
California’s DSL system, a majority of the United States Supreme
Court would consider the necessity finding set forth in HRS

$ 706-662(4) as separate and distinct from traditional sentencing
considerations and, instead, as a predicate to imposing an
extended prison term on @ defendant that, under Aporendi and its
progeny, must either be adnitted by the defendant or be proved

 

beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact, $30 U.S. at 490.
Moreover, it is a near certitude that the
Cunningham majority would deem HRS $$ 706-656(2), -659, and -660,

nee supra notes 11, 12, and 13, as the presumptive, standard
felony sentences, akin to the middie term in Cunningham, 549 U.S.
at __, 1278, ct, at 861-62, and the standard range in Blakely,
$42 U.S. at 299. The Cunningham majority reiterated what it
perceived as a core message of Apprendi and its progeny:

Sour precedent makes clear... that the ‘statutory
erinun’ for auocandd purposes is the naximun sentence
4 judge may impose golely on the

~ sin other words, the Felevant
“statutory Saxisun’ is net the naxinum senvence 2
guge may impose after finding sdditional facts, but
the maximum he sey inpose sachout any additional
Hindings. when a judge inflicts punishment that the
jury's vercict alone does not allow, the jury has not
Found sil the facts ‘which che law make essential to

28
‘* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*

the punishment,’ . . . and the judge exceeds nie
proper authority.”

Cunningham, $49 U.S. at __, 127.8. Ct. at 865 (quoting Blakely,
542 U.S. at 303 (quoting 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure § 67
at 55 (2d ed. 1872)) (citing, inter alia, Ring, 536 U.S. at 6027
Harris, 536 U.S. at 563)) (emphasis in Blakely). Later in the

opinion, the Cunningham majority repeated the point:

We cautioned in Blakely that broad
discretion to decide what facts may support an
enhanced sentence, or to determine whether an enhanced
sentence is warranted in any particular case, doe!
Shield 2 sentencing system from the force of our
decisions. If the jury's verdict alone does not
Buthorize the sentence, if, instead, the Judge must
find an additional fact to'inpose the longer term, the
Sixth Amendment requirement 12 not satisfied,

 

       

Id. at __, 127 8. Ct. at 869 (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 &
1.8). In light of our conclusion, supra, that a majority of the
United States Supreme Court would characterize the necessity
finding in HRS § 706-662(4) as a predicate judicial finding for
Apprendi purposes, the statutory maximum under our current law
would be the standard indeterminate maximum sentences set forth
in HRS §§ 706-656, -659 and -660, insofar as they represent “the
maximum [2 judge] may impose without any additional findings,”
ide

Inasmuch as (1) HRS § 706-662, in all of its
manifestations, authorizes the sentencing court to extend a
defendant’s sentence beyond the “standard term” authorized solely
by the jury’s verdict (2) by requiring the sentencing court,
rather than the trier of fact, to make an additional necessity
finding that (3) does not fall under Apprendi’s prior-or-

29
‘#* FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
concurrent-convictions* exception, we hold that the statute is
unconstitutional on its face." Therefore, Maugactega’s extended
term sentences imposed by the circuit court violated his sixth
amendment right to a jury trial and were illegal. Moreover,
similar constitutional infirmities infect HRS § 706-662 as a
whole, to the extent that each subsection requires the sentencing
court to make the offending necessity finding." See supra note
2.

 

 

The United states Supreme Court has always exempted prior
convictions from the Acprengi rule: "(t]he Federal Constitution's)
Guarantee proscribes a sentencing schene that silos a judge to, inp
Sentence above the statutory maximum based upon a fact, gther than's friox
sonviction, not found by a jury or adnitted by the defendant.” cunningham,
569 Us. at“, 127s. ct. at 860 (citing Bosker Blakely; Rings Arorendt)
(enphasis added), “the Court beses the exception on the fact that prior
convictions have thenselves been subject to the sixth snendnent Fight to a
uty telal’ and the accompanying reguirenent of proot beyond a reasonable
Goubt.” See Auorandi, 530 U.8. at 487, 497. Although, to cur knowledge, the
Court nas never cirectly addvessed the issue, we see No reason uhy the seme
gxception would not apply to multiple concurrent convictions under HRS
$'706-662(¢), insofar as they are subject to the sane sixth ameninent
protections.

    

As noted, the 2006 session of the legislature, through Act 230,
temporarily excised the lenguage offensive to Cunninghas from HRS § 706-663,
see SubEa note 2, and inserted it into HRS § 706-661, sg0 supra note 1.
However, for the’ reasons discussed infra in section I1:D:1, we do not believe,
An Light of Cunninahan, that sections 23 and 24 of Act 230 wale survive
scrutiny in the federai courte.

 

 

 

© fy aggravating fact that HRS § 706-662 requires the sentencing
court to find as a precondition to an extended prison term 1s now
constitutionally infirm if not exempt under Cunningham, such as prior or
Gencurrent convictions or fact adnitted by the defendant. S49 U.S. at
127°. Ct. at 860; see also supra note 15.
‘This court recognized the constitutional infirmities contained in
HRs § 206-€62(5) and (6) in Tafoya, 91 Hawai at 272-72, 982 .24 at 800-01
(holding that the facts pertaining to the victin’s special status and the
defendant's knowledge of that status were intrinsic to the erine and, hence,
that ‘the sixth anendnent required that the facts be found by the trier of
fact) and in Kaya, 102 Hawai'i at 13, 72 P.3d at 405 (holding that the facts
set forth in HRS $ 706-662 (5) and (€) were intrinsic to the crime and for

 

 

 

 

 

 

determination by the trier of fact). The legislature did not, however, amend
the language of HRS § 706-662(S) and (6) to reflect the requirenents of Zafeva

 

or Kaua.
30
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D. ‘The Task Of Conforming The Extended Term Sentencing
‘Statutes To Cunningham Lies With The Leaislature,

Justice Ginsburg suggested two remedies available to
the states with respect to their extended term sentencing schemes

in the aftermath of Cunningham:

1 States have modified their
of Aoprendi and Blakely to retain
‘hey, have dane 49 by calling
pen the jury ~~ either at trial or ina
‘sentencing proceeding —— to find any fact
the inposition of an elevated :
States have chosen to permit jusges genuinely “to
exercise broad discretion... within s statutory
ange, "which, “everyone agrees," encounters no Sixth
Amendment shoal.

We note thet
systens in tl
Seterminate

  
  
  

 

      

 

 

 

549 U.S. at 127 8. Ct. at 872 (quoting Backer, 543 U.S. at
233) (footnotes omitted) (some ellipsis points added and sone in
original): see alse Smylie v. State, 823 N.£.2d 679, 685 (Ind.

2005) (recognizing two solutions in a sentencing scheme very

 

similar to Hewaii’s: (1) the present system of fixed terms, with

 

fact-finding assigned to a jury or (2) reform of the system to
create a true sentencing range). Our legislature attempted to
chart a third course by enacting amendments to HRS $§ 706-661 and
~662 in Act 230 of the 2006 legislative session, see supra notes
a and 2.

7 repeal ne Act 230 woul
likely survive review post= 7

In light of the Cunningham majority's insistence that

as a basis for an extended

 

any fact, however labeled, that serv
term sentence must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the
trier of fact, we believe that the United States Supreme Court

(or, at least, @ majority of it) would give short shrift to the

3
#4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
“solution” offered in Act 230, which relocated the necessity
Einding from HRS § 706-662 to HRS § 706-661 and cross-referenced
it to the traditional sentencing factors contained in HRS

§ 106-606. The Cunningham majority would obviously characterize
any extended term sentence based upon a sentencing court’s
necessity finding -- regardless of the particular statutory

source of that finding

 

a8 an unconstitutional denigration of
the jury’s role, because such a system would be deemed to

“allocate{] to judges sole authority to find facts permitting the

imposition of an upper term sentence, . . . violat{ing] the
Sixth Amendment.” Cunningham, 549 U.S. at __, 127 8. ct. at
870.

It ds noteworthy that the Cunningham majority rejected

California’s attempt to analogize its three-tier sentencing
structure to the newly discretionary federal sentencing
guidelines scheme established and sanctified in Booker:

California’ s OSL does not resemble the advisory
system the Booker ‘Court had in view. Under
California's systen, judges are not free to exercise
their “discretion to select a specific sentence within
a defined range.” California's Legislature has
adopted sentencing triads, three fixed sentences with
no anges between then. Cunninghan’s sentencing jusge
had no discretion to select a sentence within « range
of 6 to 16 years. Mis instruction was to select 12
years, nothing less and nothing more, unless he found
facta’ allowing the imposition af a sentence of € or 16
years.  Factfinding to elevate 2 sentence from 12 to
16 years, cur decisions make plain, falls within the
province’ of the Jury employing s beyond-a-reasonable
Goubt standard, not the bailiwick of a judge
Geternining where the preponderance of the evidence
ies

 

   

 

 

 

 

Id at __, 127 S. Ct. at 870 (quoting Booker, $43 U.S. at 233).
‘The Cunningham majority would no doubt similarly find

the Hawai'i extended term sentencing scheme constitutionally

32
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wanting. We are convinced that it would view our sentencing
structure, like California’s, as failing “to permit judges
genuinely ‘to exercise broad discretion . . . within a statuory
range,’ which, ‘everyone agrees,’ encounters no [s]ixth
{almendnent shoal." Cunningham, $49 U.S. at __, 1278. Ct. at
871 (quoting Booker, $43 U.S. at 233) (ellipses in original) ."
2. In Light of the expressly stated legislative

rt 230, we dec
our inhere: der, on ©:

hata jury be empaneled
In State v. Peralto, 95 Hawai'i 1, 18 P.3d 203 (2001),

this court recognized its inherent judicial power to authorize,

 

‘upon remand, the enpaneling of a jury to serve as the trier of
fact in the event that the prosecution sought extended term
sentencing of a criminal defendant. In considering whether newly
established procedures for extended term sentencing ~~ fashioned
during the pendency of the defendants’ appeal -- should appiy to
the defendants’ own cases, we concluded that

(abeots *Sfettan eettoact ively, he.

Sentences ist te tocated sed the cases remanded #08"

few sentencing Rearing? in which a jury would be
Instructed according to Young.

  

 

 

© tn mnite, we concluded that Hawai'i had a range system, “(t]he
range inherent in Heusii's indeterminate sentencing schene (being)

SNSe between probation and the statutory meximim prison term, But, rather
indn’the sentencing Jodge setting the specific term that a defendant 1s £0
Serve, the minimum time served 3 set by the parole board.” 110 Hawai'i at
85, 129 P.34 at 1117. Our conclusion today is not necessarily irreconcilable
mith our reasoning in Woite but, insofer a® the statutory maximum is clearly,
ow the “standard tern” set forth in HRS § 706-656, ~659, and ~S€0, seg guna
notes il, 12, ond 13, any upvara departure to an extended term sentence would
implicate Cunninghas because the sentence would not be authorized solely by
the juryeveraice. Seg, gcg., Cunninoham, 549 Urs. ats 127 S.Ct. ae
Bes.

 

 

 

33
‘** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*
> For examples of bifurcated adjudicative and

penalty proceedings where the court may enpanel a new

Jury after the appellate court remands the case for a

pew penalty proceeding, gee, fay, Ala. Code

$ Ish-s-46(b) (1994), bel. Coae Ann. tie. 12

§ 4209(9) (4) (1995), ueah ‘Code Ann. §76-3-207 5) (a)

(1399), Wash. Rev, Code Ans. § 10-95-050(4) (West

180).
«os. Because the sufficiency of the jury
instruction is procedural error, renand for
§ 706-657 hearing is posaible in the present case.
Gefendant’™ tence’

 

 

 

  

 

old that
§ 206=857 hearing or nav consent to-cesentencing

Eh Stesee
ies ork ed 5 ‘hal
‘the court.

Peralto, 95 Hawai'i at 6, 18 P.3d at 208 (emphasis added); see
also id. at 7, 18 P.3d at 209 (“Any prejudice that [the
defendants] may have suffered can be cured by granting them a new
HRS § 706-657 hearing in which the parties and the jury are
required to address the Young standards.”).

A number of foreign jurisdictions similarly recognize
that empaneling juries to accommodate Apprendi requirements
implicates an inherent power of the judiciary. See Aragon v.
Wilkinson ex rel, County of Maricopa, 97 P.3d 886, 891 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2004) (*[A]ithough the statutory sentencing scheme does not
currently provide for convening @ jury trial during the
sentencing phase of a non-capital case, nothing in our rules or
(citing Acker v.
CSO Chivera, 934 P.2d 616, 818 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting

rior C jaricos 1» 5 P.2d 192, 194

statutes prohibits the court from doing so.

 

(Ariz. 1931) ("A court’s inherent authority may be defined

 

such powers as are necessary to the ordinary and efficient

34
‘** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
exercise of jurisdiction.”))}; Galindez v, State, 955 So. 2d 517,
27 (Fla. 2007) (Cantero, J., concurring) ("To remedy the
violations of Apprendi and Blakely, we would be entirely
justified in adopting a procedure for the empaneling of new
juries on resentencing. Nor would we be the first court to do
State v. Schofield, 895 A.2d 927, 937 (Me. 2005)
("Although state law does not specifically provide for a jury

 

trial on sentencing facts, our recognition of such a procedure is
well within our inherent judicial power to ‘safeguard and protect
within the borders of this State the fundamental principles of
government vouchsafed to us by the State and Federal

Constitutions.’”) (quoting Morris v. Goss, 83 A.2d 556, 565
(1951)). But see State ex. rel, Mason v. Griffin, 819 N.E.2d

644, 647-48 (Chic 2004) (concluding that, in light of
constitutional reasons unique to Ohie and statutory language
similar to Hawaii's requiring the sentencing court, not a jury,
to find aggravating factors for an extended sentence, the trial
court “patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to hold a
jury sentencing hearing” and granting a writ of prohibition).
Nevertheless, in Act 230, the legislature expressed its
intent regarding how best to conform our extended term sentencing
regime to the requirements of Apprendi and its progeny and, in so
doing, did not vest in the jury the power to find the requisite
aggravating facts but, rather, directed that the sentencing court

should retain that responsibility. See 2006 Haw. Sess. L. Act

35
‘** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#¢
230, $§ 23 and 24 at 1012-13; notes 1 and 2, supra.” We
therefore do not believe it to be appropriate for this court to

assert its inherent authority to empanel a jury on remand

 

In the wake of Blakely, a number of states reformed their
sentencing systems to comport with the Apprendi Line of cases by assigning the
necessary fact-finding responsibilities to jury. Ses, fads Aris. Rev

Stat. Ann. §13-702.02 (2006); Minn. state. Anns § 244,10" (West 2007)7 Hash
Rev. Code Ann. § 9.348.537 (Mest 2007). Both Minnesota's and Hashington's
statutes allow for bifurcated trials 1h cases in which notions for extended
term sentencing would inplicate evidence that would be prejedicial or
otherwise inadaiseible during the guilt adjudication phase. See Hino. State
nny § 248.10(5) (e? Wash: Rev. Code Ann. § 9-34A.537(0)

This court hae already articulated the manner in which = trial
would be conducted in connection with a motion for an extended term sentence
Based upon facts intrinsic to the offense charged. “see Stare v. Jena, 32
Hawat's 18, 34-38, 986 P.24 306, 321-22 (1999) (addresting the prosecution’ «
notion for an enhanced sentence pursuant to HRS § 706-65) (1993) for murder
especially heinous and cruel"). Cunningham, however, by rejecting the
Antrinsle/extrinsic distinction, seg 349 U-8. at faldy 127 8. te at B69
B.ld, essentially reinstates the role asserted in Eateada’ for boch intrinsic
Abd Gxtringic facts: "a defendant [must] have ‘fair notice of the charge
Sgsinst™ hint the aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the indictment
fand found by the jury,” Eatrada, 69 Haw. at 223, 738 P.2d at 029. (quoting
stew node, 59 Haw. 625, 635-36, 586 Pr2d 250, 258" (2578)).. "[Siuch
augravating circumstances “gust be’ alleged in the indictment in order to give
the defendant notice that they will be Felied on to prove the defendant’ =
guilt and support she sentence tobe inposed .. . .'* Tafoya, $1 Hawai'i at
270, 982 P24 at 099 (quoting Schroeder IL, 76 jiawai'i at 28,80 P.2d at 203
(ciscussing intrinsic aggravating factors) (some enphasis in Schroeder fi and
gone added). tt is therefore noteworthy that the indicenents against
Mevgactega dia not allege that, if convicted, he would be subject te extended
term sentencing nor allege the’ facts upon which the prosecution would base its
notions for extended terms. See susra note 3.

Without deciding the issue, we foresee that, in a reformed
extended term sentencing achene in uhich the jury is vested with the
Tesponsibility of making the requisite findings, notice of the prosecution's
intention to seek an extended sentence and the facts requisite to that
extended sentence ~~ but irrelevant and potentially prejudicial to the
defendant during the guilt phase of the trial -- would be included in the
Andictment but withheld from the Jury until the second phase of the trial,
@aring which the motion for extended term sentencing would be considered.” In
that Ranner, both the defendants due process right to notice of the potential
sentence to’be imposed ang the right te a fsir trial on the charged offense
before an impartial jury would be preserved. But geo Gtate ©, Chauvin, 123
Now.2d 20, 28-30 (Winn. 200€) (cefendent’s Apprends rights and right to ave
process were not violated by the prosecution's failure to include aggravating
Circumstances in the complaint, particularly in light of the fact thats three
weeks prior to trial, the prosecution provided the defendant separate notice
Of Ste intention to seek an extended term sentence and notice ef the facts
‘upon which it would rely in Seeking the sentence).

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

36
 

‘** FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

because, as a rule,

Ipleudentiat rules of judicial self-governance
Properly limit the role of the courts ina democratic
Socteey es S65 haw.
iS0,Ti, S57 Pataca, abe 907) aatevae the: Land
$3 same 106, 198, e28 Foe
498 izet) (esting Marchi. Saidin, 422 0.5, 490,
UStb)s so. MGnal“aoch ie is that,
Sesen_in'ehe sbennce £ constitutional restrictions,
(courte) most still ‘carefully weigh the sisson,
cfficacy, and finelinest of an'exereiee of thelr power
Sefore acting, sapecially share there-may-be an
strusisn into Stans sean Stes ce athe bretches of
“Tas tenphaste added) (citation

     

 

 

Saittedl
{ Atthough judicial review serves as a check
fon the unconstitutional exercise of power by the
executive and legislative branches of government, “the
only check upon (the Judicial branch’ a) exerci:
power ts: {ste) own sene of selivrestraine,” Des
Butter, 257 U.s. 1, 70-79. « . (1936) (Stone,
Sissenting) -

 

   

In_re Attorney's Fees of Mohr, 97 Hawai'i 1, 9-10, 32 P.3d 647,
655-86 (2001) (some brackets added and some in original) (some
ellipses added and some in original) (emphasis in original). See
also Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 76 Hawai'i 454, 467, 879 P.2d
1037, 1080 (1994) (Klein, J., concurring and dissenting) (“*{T)he
[clourt’s function in the application and interpretation of .
laws must be carefully limited to avoid encroaching on the power
of (the legislature] to determine policies and make laws to carry
them out.‘) (quoting Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,
cal 770, 398 U.S. 235, 256-57 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting);
Bremer v. City ¢ County of Honolulu, 96 Hawai'i 134, 139, 28
P.3d 350, 355 (App. 2001) (quoting Life of the Land, 63 Haw. at
171-72, 623 P.2d at 438).

®  sunsequent action by the legislature during its 2007 session

bolsters our conclusion. House Bill Ne. 1152, introduced on Januery 24,2007,
Sought to amend HRS $$ 706-662 and -668 to assign to the Jury the role of
(continsed.

 

7
‘+48 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Wie are not alone in exercising such self-restraint.
See State v. Brown, 99 P.3d 15, 18-19 (Ariz. 2004) (declining to
prescribe a solution for aspects of Arizona’s extended term
sentencing scheme that viclated Apprendi, in part to allow the
legislature the opportunity to address the issue); State v.
Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 148 (Minn. 2005) (concluding that the
court “has the authority to establish procedures to apply the
requirements of Apprendi and Blakely to sentencing,” but
declining to impose a jury solution because “[i]t is the
legislature that created the [sJentencing . . . system and
retains authority over its development. For us to engraft
sentencing-jury or bifurcated-trial requirements onto the .
sentencing statutes would require rewriting them, something our
severance jurisprudence does not permit.”); State v. Dilts, 103
P.3d 98, 100-01 (Or. 2004) (declining to address the issue of
empaneling @ jury upon remand in order to allow the parties to
develop arguments at the new sentencing hearing); State v.
Exovest, 896 A.2d 55, 66-67 (Vt. 2005) (Ndeclin[ing] to follow
the example of those courts that have created their own
sentencing procedures to replace legislative schemes held
unconstitutional in the ake of Apprendi and Blakely”); State v.
Hughes, 110 P.3d 192, 208 (Wash. 2005), abrogated on other

(.. .continued)
aking the Findings requisite for the imposition of an extended term of
Smpriscnnent. gg H.B. 1152, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2007), available at
etp://eapitol .nawaii.gov/sessioncurrent /bilis/HB1i82_S02_<hem: Haw. state
Leg. Bill Status for HB, Mo, 1152, available at httpi//eapitol -nawall
(gov/sitel /docs/getstatus?.asprbilliossstisz. On August 27, 2007, following
House disagreements with Senate anendnents to the bill, the measure was
Gelayed until the 2008 legislative session. Seg Haw. State Leg. Bi] status
for it-b. No. 2152, available at http: //capitol hawaii.
gov/siter/docs/getstatusz.asprbiline-#Bi 182.

38

 

 

   

 

 

 
‘4¢ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'E REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*

grounds by Recuenca, 126 S. Ct. at 2553, (noting that the
relevant extended sentencing statute “does not include any
provision allowing a jury to make [the required findings) during
trial, during a separate sentencing phase, or on remand” and
concluding that “[t]o allow exceptional sentences here, we would
need to imply a procedure by which to empanel juries on remand to
find the necessary facts, which would be contrary to the explicit
language of the statute.”).” But see Svlie, 623 N.E.2d at
685-86, 691 (remanding to allow the prosecution “to prove
adequate aggravating circumstances before a jury or accept the
statutory fixed tern”).
TIT, CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, we vacate the May 17 and 18,
2004 judgments and sentences of the circuit court and remand this
matter to the circuit court for resentencing consistent with this
opinion.
on the briefs

James M. Anderson,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,

ree ye piatne etappel ice
Stee oe taxes Rss Oden

Karen T. Nakasone,
Deputy Public Defender

for the defendant-appellant
Miti Maugaotega, Jr.

 

the second renedy sanctioned by the Cunninsham majority -- Les,
the creation of a true sentencing range which "permit (s] Judges genuinely “to
tnereise broad discretion... within # statutory range,’ which, "everyone

Sores,’ encounters no Sixth Avendrent shosl," 549 0.8. at, 127.5. Cr. at
B51 (quoting Booker, "5¢3 U.S. at 233) (footnote omitted) =~ "would require us
to rewrite HRS ch. 706 in such a way as to transform it from an indeterns
yntencing schene. Sich wholesale reform, and the asce
rly best left te the legislature.

 

 

         

 

39