Case Title: UNION PACIFIC RESOURCES COMPANY v. DOLENC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 03-75

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
UNION PACIFIC RESOURCES COMPANY v. DOLENC2004 WY 3686 P.3d 1287Case Number: 03-75Decided: 04/02/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

UNION 
PACIFIC RESOURCES COMPANY,

 

Appellant(Cross-Claim 
Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

WILLIAM 
DOLENC, d/b/a DOLENC WELDING

SERVICE,

 

Appellee(Cross-Claim 
Defendant).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

The 
Honorable Jere Ryckman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Richard H. Honaker of Honaker Law Offices, LC, Rock Springs, 
Wyoming.  

 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
J. Kent Rutledge and Kevin C. Cook of Lathrop & Rutledge, P.C., 
Cheyenne,

            
Wyoming.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

KITE, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Union Pacific 
Resources Company (UPRC) sought indemnification from Dolenc Welding Service 
(Dolenc) when an injured employee of a subcontractor working on a UPRC water 
line sued to recover for his injuries.  
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dolenc holding 
the indemnification provision of the contract between UPRC and Dolenc was void 
and unenforceable pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-1-131 (LexisNexis 2003).  We reverse and hold that the 
anti-indemnity statute did not cover a contract involving work on a water plant 
used for purposes of secondary recovery in an oil field because it was not an 
agreement pertaining to an oil or gas well within the meaning of the statute. 

 

 

 

[¶2]      UPRC states the 
issue as:

 

Is 
the modification of water piping in a water plant directly related to an oil, 
gas or water well itself, such that Wyoming's anti-indemnity statute applies to 
void an agreement indemnifying an indemnitee against its own 
negligence?

 

[¶3]      The issues as 
stated by Dolenc are:1

 

1.         
Does the agreement for services pertain to any well for oil, gas, or 
water, as described in W.S. § 30-1-131?

 

2.         
Is the provision in the contract between the parties void and 
unenforceable because it is otherwise against public 
policy?

 

 

[¶4]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, 
56(c).  A genuine issue of material 
fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense 
asserted by the parties.  Baker 
v. Pena, 2001 WY 122, 36 P.3d 602 (Wyo. 2001).  This case involves cross-motions for 
summary judgment in which neither party disputes the relevant facts.  Therefore, this Court must only 
determine whether summary judgment was proper as a matter of law.  Cities Services Oil and Gas Corp. v. 
State, 838 P.2d 146 (Wyo. 1992).  
We review matters of law de novo without affording any deference 
to the decision of the district court.  
Wadi Petroleum, Inc. v. Ultra Resources, Inc., 2003 WY 41, 65 P.3d 703 (Wyo. 2003).

 

 

 

[¶5]      UPRC operates an 
oil field near Patrick Draw in southwest Wyoming.  As is typical in many oil fields, water 
known as "raw water" is produced with the oil.  One way of handling the raw water is to 
treat it and then re-inject it into the field as part of a water flood 
operation, which improves and enhances the production of oil.  During such an operation, the raw water 
is separated from the oil and transported from the field to a water plant 
through a system of pipes.  The 
plant combines the raw water with fresh water produced from a water well, treats 
the water to remove excess sediment, and then stores it in a clear water 
tank.  Pipes then carry the water to 
injection pumps where it is pumped under high pressure back to the oil field and 
down into the formation.  The 
re-injection accomplishes two purposes - disposal of the raw water and 
enhancement of oil production by moving oil through the formation to a producing 
well bore where it can be brought to the surface.  In a water flood operation, the operator 
takes steps to prevent bacteria, which can produce dangerous hydrogen sulfide 
gas, from forming in the water.  
This is accomplished by injecting chemicals into the raw water tanks, and 
keeping oxygen out of the tanks by piping natural gas into the water tanks to 
form a blanket on top of the water.

 

[¶6]      UPRC's operation 
included a water plant, however, it had not been functioning consistently due to 
leaking and dilapidated tanks and engines.  
Two of the engines had been out of service for over ten years because the 
clear water tank they were connected to had developed leaks and, therefore, UPRC 
had the pipelines leading to and from the tank blocked off with valves.  The other three engines were either out 
of service or in such a state of disrepair that they were frequently shut 
down.  In an effort to improve 
operation of the plant, UPRC decided to modify the piping so that engines one 
and two could be connected to the functional tank, thus relieving the other 
three dilapidated engines.   

 

[¶7]      Dolenc contracted 
with UPRC through a Master Service Contract to perform welding services as 
necessary.  The terms of the 
contract provided Dolenc would indemnify UPRC for any "loss, cost, damage or 
expense . . . arising out of bodily injury   . . .  to . . . any subcontractor . . . arising 
out of the performance of the work, WHETHER OR NOT RESULTING IN WHOLE OR IN PART 
FROM THE SOLE, CONCURRENT, OR COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, OR STRICT LIABILITY OF THE 
UPRC GROUP."  Another contractor, 
Elkhorn Construction, entered into a similar contract with UPRC to provide labor 
on an as-needed, day-to-day basis.    

 

[¶8]      Pursuant to the 
contract, UPRC directed Dolenc to make the piping changes required in the water 
plant.  Before welders undertook 
work in which they could potentially come into contact with hydrocarbons or 
other explosive material, UPRC typically issued them a "hot work permit."  None was issued for Dolenc's work on the 
water plant piping because UPRC did not consider the water plant "a hot work 
permit area in that it was a water facility."  Ordinarily, when a welder like Mr. 
Dolenc performs work, he has an assistant called a firewatch, who is equipped 
with a fire extinguisher.  One of 
the firewatch's job duties is to make sure sparks thrown from the welder's torch 
do not start a fire.  On this job, 
Luis Gomez, an employee of Elkhorn Construction, served as Mr. Dolenc's 
firewatch.  When Mr. Dolenc started 
to cut the first pipe with his welding torch, there was an explosion.  Mr. Gomez was knocked unconscious and 
suffered lacerations, burns, and other injuries.  He filed suit against Dolenc and UPRC 
alleging both were negligent in failing to discover the water lines contained 
hydrocarbons and claiming damages for the injuries he suffered in the 
explosion.  

 

[¶9]      UPRC filed a 
cross-claim against Dolenc seeking indemnification pursuant to the Master 
Service Contract in effect at the time of the explosion.  Mr. Gomez entered into a stipulation 
with UPRC to dismiss it from the case leaving Dolenc as the only defendant.  Dolenc then moved for summary judgment 
against UPRC claiming the anti-indemnification statute prevented UPRC from 
enforcing the indemnification provision of the contract.  UPRC filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment seeking a determination that the statute did not apply and the contract 
was enforceable.  The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Dolenc and UPRC filed this 
appeal.

 

 

 

[¶10]   UPRC argues the anti-indemnity 
statute does not apply to the facts in this case because the work being 
performed was not "in connection with any well" drilled for purposes of 
producing oil, gas or water as required by the anti-indemnification statute, 
which it asserts must be strictly construed because it constricts the common law 
right of freedom to contract.  UPRC 
relies upon Reliance Insurance Co. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 713 P.2d 766 
(Wyo. 1986) and Gainsco Insurance Co. v. Amoco Production Co., 2002 WY 
122, 53 P.3d 1051 (Wyo. 2002), in which we held contracts for work related to 
oil and gas production, but not to the wells themselves, were not covered by the 
statute.

 

[¶11]   In response, Dolenc contends the 
language of the statute, which includes work done "in connection with" oil and 
gas wells, is broad enough to cover work performed on the water plant because 
the ultimate purpose was enhancement of oil production.  With regard to Reliance and 
Gainsco, Dolenc claims they are factually different from this case and 
are not controlling. 

 

[¶12]   The anti-indemnification statutes 
provide:

 

§ 
30-1-131.  Provisions for 
indemnity in certain contracts; invalidity   (a) All 
agreements, covenants or promises contained in, collateral to or affecting any 
agreement pertaining to any well for oil, gas or water, or mine for any mineral, 
which purport to indemnify the indemnitee against loss or liability for damages 
for:

   (i) Death 
or bodily injury to persons;

   (ii) Injury 
to property; or

   (iii) Any 
other loss, damage, or expense arising under either 

(i) 
or (ii) from:

      (A) The 
sole or concurrent negligence of the indemnitee or the agents or employees of 
the indemnitee or any independent contractor who is directly responsible to such 
indemnitee; or      (B) From any accident 
which occurs in operations carried on at the direction or under the supervision 
of the indemnitee or an employee or representative of the indemnitee or in 
accordance with methods and means specified by the indemnitee or employees or 
representatives of the indemnitee, are against public policy and are void and 
unenforceable to the extent that such contract of indemnity by its terms 
purports to relieve the indemnitee from loss or liability for his own 
negligence. This provision shall not affect the validity of any insurance 
contract or any benefit conferred by the Worker's Compensation Law [§§ 27-14-101 
through 27-14-805] of this state.

 

§ 
30-1-132.  Provisions 
for indemnity in certain contracts; definition

 

The 
term "agreement pertaining to any well for oil, gas, or water, or mine for any 
mineral" as used in section 1 hereof [§ 30-1-131], means any agreement or 
understanding, written or oral, concerning any operations related to drilling, 
deepening, reworking, repairing, improving, testing, treating, perforating, 
acidizing, logging, conditioning, altering, plugging, or otherwise rendering 
services in or in connection with any well drilled for the purpose of 
producing or disposing of oil, gas or other minerals, or water, and designing, 
excavating, constructing, improving, or otherwise rendering services in or in 
connection with any mine shaft, drift, or other structure intended for use in 
the exploration for or production of any mineral, or an agreement to perform any 
portion of any such work or services or any act collateral thereto, including 
the furnishing or rental of equipment, incidental transportation, and other 
goods and services furnished in connection with any such service or 
operation.  (emphasis 
added)

[¶13]   In interpreting these statutes, we 
apply well-known and accepted rules of statutory construction.  

 

This 
court interprets statutes by giving effect to the legislature's intent. . . 
.  We begin by making an inquiry 
relating to the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to 
their arrangement and connection. . . .  
We give effect to every word, clause, and sentence and construe together 
all components of a statute in pari materia.   . . .  Statutory interpretation is a question 
of law. . . .  We review questions 
of law de novo without affording deference to the district court's 
decision."  Worcester v. 
State, 2001 WY 82, ¶ 13, 30 P.3d 47, 52 (Wyo. 2001).  If a statute is clear and unambiguous, 
we simply give effect to its plain meaning.  Wesaw v. Quality Maintenance, 
2001 WY 17, ¶ 13, 19 P.3d 500, 506 (Wyo.2001) (quoting In re Claim of Prasad, 11 P.3d 344, 347 (Wyo.2000)).  Only 
when we find a statute to be ambiguous do we resort to the general principles of 
statutory construction.  
Wesaw, 2001 WY 17, ¶ 13, 19 P.3d  at 506 (quoting In re Claim of 
Prasad, 11 P.3d at 347).  An 
ambiguous statute is one whose meaning is uncertain because it is susceptible to 
more than one interpretation.  
Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Wyo.1998) (quoting 
Amrein v. State, 836 P.2d 862, 864-65 (Wyo.1992)).

 

It 
is a basic rule of statutory construction that courts may try to determine 
legislative intent by considering the type of statute being interpreted and what 
the legislature intended by the language used, viewed in light of the objects 
and purposes to be accomplished. . . . 

 

We 
are guided by the full text of the statute, paying attention to its internal 
structure and the functional relation between the parts and the whole. In re 
Worker's Compensation Claim of Johnson, 2001 WY 48, ¶ 8, 23 P.3d 32, 35 
(Wyo.2001) (quoting In re Hernandez, 8 P.3d 318, 321 (Wyo.2000) and  Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming 
Game and Fish Com'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Wyo.1993)).  Each word of a statute is to be afforded 
meaning, with none rendered superfluous. Jessen v. Burry, 13 P.3d 1118, 
1120 (Wyo. 2000).  Further, the 
meaning afforded to a word should be that word's standard popular meaning unless 
another meaning is clearly intended. Soles v. State, 809 P.2d 772, 773 
(Wyo.1991).  If the meaning of a 
word is unclear, it should be afforded the meaning that best accomplishes the 
statute's purpose. Radalj v. Union Savings & Loan Ass'n, 59 Wyo. 140, 
138 P.2d 984, 996 (1943).

 

Rodriquez 
v. Casey, 
2002 WY 111,  ¶¶ 9-10, 50 P.3d 323, 
¶¶ 9-10 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶14]   Applying these rules, we conclude 
the anti-indemnity statute is awkward and contains an ambiguous description of 
the nature of the work or services to which it applies.  Section 30-1-131(a) of the statute 
states that it applies to "any agreement pertaining to any well for oil, gas or 
water", suggesting the work or activity must be involved with the well 
itself.  Section 30-1-132, however, 
defines the term "agreements pertaining to any well" as including any operations 
related to specific work, such as drilling, repairing, testing or plugging, "or 
otherwise rendering services in or in connection with any well drilled."  Dolenc argues this catch-all phrase 
broadens the scope of the statute to include work beyond the well itself.  Section 30-1-132 goes on to create even 
further ambiguity by including in the definition, "an agreement to perform any 
portion of any such work or services (referring back to the list and the 
catchall phrase) or any act collateral thereto, including the furnishing or 
rental of equipment, incidental transportation, and other goods and services 
furnished in connection with any such service or operation."  This last provision inserts the concept 
of any act "collateral" to work on the well, including the use of rental 
equipment and "incidental transportation" presumably of equipment and services 
to the well.  The plain language of 
the statute fails to unambiguously answer the question presented by this case of 
how far beyond the well the anti-indemnity statute reaches.  We, therefore, must resort to the rules 
of statutory construction to determine its meaning.

 

[¶15]   The legislative history of the 
statutes sheds little light on the question of legislative intent.  The statute was adopted in 1969 and 
amended in 1977.  (1969 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws, ch. 46, § 1; 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 145, § 1).  However, the amendment is not relevant 
to the issue before us.  The bill 
contained no statement of purpose.  
As we noted in Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351, 1354 (Wyo. 1978), the mineral industry 
in general involves ultrahazardous work, and by adoption of this statute the 
legislature was most likely addressing the safety issues raised by contracts 
which indemnify the indemnities from their own negligence which could have the 
effect of insulating persons responsible for such work from the consequences of 
unsafe practices in the workplace.  
However, we can only speculate as to why the legislature limited the 
statute to contracts for work performed on oil, gas and water wells.  Absent legislative history, a statement 
of purpose or some other evidence of legislative intent, we are left to examine 
the statutory language to discern legislative 
intent.

 

[¶16]   This is not the first time this 
Court has considered the language of the anti-indemnity statutes in the context 
of determining the scope of the work and services intended to be covered.  In Reliance, 713 P.2d 766, we 
determined work performed to construct holding ponds for collecting waste oil 
and water on the site of an oil and gas separator that had exploded and burned 
was not work "pertaining to" an oil and gas well and, therefore, the statute did 
not apply.  The contract in that 
case was similar to the UPRC-Dolenc Master Service Contract in that it did not 
specify the type of work to be performed, only that the contractor would provide 
labor, materials and equipment "as needed."  Chevron directed the contractor to dig 
holding ponds to prevent waste water and  
oil from entering adjacent drainages.  In the performance of that work, the 
contractor struck a high-pressure propane line, which caused a fire, damaged 
equipment, and caused personal injuries to the contractor's employee.  Id. at 768, 769.  We concluded the work was not covered by 
the statute, stating:

 

The 
relevant first portion of  § 
30-1-132 contains a list of activities to which an agreement must "relate" 
before that agreement can be said to pertain to a well for oil or gas.  At the end of the list, the statute 
includes a catchall phrase which indicates that some unlisted contractual 
activities could also be included.  
Reliance does not attempt to link Searle's pit digging activities to any 
of the specifically listed activities.  
Instead, Reliance argues that by digging the pits Searle was "otherwise 
rendering services in or in connection with any well drilled for the purpose of 
producing or disposing of oil, gas or other minerals, or 
water."

 

We 
disagree.  We do not think that one 
who digs pits to collect waste fluids from a fire at a separation plant is 
rendering services in connection with an oil well.  This is true even if the separation 
plant processes gas which is eventually reinjected into the oil field to 
repressurize oil wells.  Searle 
was digging the pits so that waste from the fire 

would 
not flow into local drainages.  It 
was not involved in actual fire fighting which would enable the plant to resume 
repressurization.

 

The 
catchall phrase, "rendering services * * * * in connection with any well," 
follows a list of specific activities which are closely related to well 
drilling.  Under the rule of 
statutory construction, ejusdem generis, a general term, which concludes a list 
of specifically enumerated terms, should be restricted to the same genus as the 
things enumerated. Green River Development Company v. FMC Corporation, 
Wyo., 660 P.2d 339, 353 (1983).  
Therefore, the phrase, "rendering services * * * in connection with any 
well," should be construed to cover only those services closely related to well 
drilling.  Not covered are services 
or activities having a remote or indirect connection to the kinds of services 
enumerated in § 30-1-132, supra 

 

Finally, 
we note that the statutory scheme created by §§ 30-1-131 and 30-1-132 restricts 
the freedom to contract, a common law right.  Statutes, which preempt common law 
rights, must be strictly construed.  
Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc., Wyo., 426 P.2d 442, 444 
(1967).  

 

Id. 
at 772 (emphasis added).

 

[¶17]   Our reasoning in Reliance 
remains sound and compels us to reach the same conclusion in this case.  When the catch-all phrase is considered 
in the context of the list of specific activities preceding it, all of which are 
activities conducted upon the well itself, the intent of the legislature is 
clear.  The anti-indemnity statute 
applies only to contracts for work performed directly on oil, gas, and water 
wells.  No valid distinction can be 
drawn between the facts in this case and those present in Reliance.  
That case involved work performed on a plant that separated gas 
from the produced oil and then returned the gas to the field to be reinjected 
for purposes of enhancing production.  
Dolenc performed the welding work in this case on piping in a water plant 
that separated water from produced oil and then returned the water to the field 
for reinjection for disposal of the water and enhancement of production.  In either case, we cannot determine what 
distance the plants were located from the wells, but we can assume those plants 
were centrally located some distance away from the wells they served.  The statutory construction rule of 
ejusdem generis instructs us that the legislature must have intended the 
catch-all phrase to include work similar to the activities specifically listed, 
all of which are performed on the well itself, not on processing equipment 
downstream of the well.  In 
Reliance, we held work that was remote or indirectly related to work on 
the well itself was not covered by the language of the statute and we see no 
reason to deviate from that reasoning in this case.

 

[¶18]   Reliance refers to the fact 
that the work did not involve actual fire fighting "which would enable the plant 
to resume re-pressurization."  
Dolenc further argues this language suggests that if the work somehow 
affects oil and gas well production, it is covered.  Dolenc argues that because the work in 
this case improved and enhanced oil production, it should be considered "in 
connection with" the oil well.  We 
see two problems with Dolenc's argument.  
First, it ignores the specific types of well work listed by the 
legislature as being covered, none of which relate to the processing of gas or 
water after production from the well has occurred.  Second, the interpretation urged by 
Dolenc would extend coverage of the statute to any work, no matter how distant 
from the well or how indirectly related to the well.  Under that theory, work anywhere in the 
course of oil and gas production, processing, transportation or distribution 
could be covered.  We find no 
indication in the language of the statute that the legislature contemplated that 
result.

 

[¶19]   We also addressed the reach of this 
statute in Gainsco, in which the work in question involved transporting 
oil skimmed from settling ponds to an oil storage tank.  Again applying the rule of ejusdem 
generis, we held "'or otherwise rendering services in or in connection with 
any well' was limited to those services similar to 'drilling, deepening, 
reworking, repairing, improving, testing, treating, perforating, acidizing, 
logging, conditioning, altering, [or] plugging' Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-1-132.  Without doubt, those terms are directly 
related to the well itself, and not to general oil field work."  Id. at ¶ 88.  The similarities between the 
Gainsco facts and those before us in this case are also striking.  The Gainsco contractor performed 
work on facilities that handled oil after it was produced from the well and 
separated from drilling fluids. Likewise, Dolenc was working on water lines that 
transported water after it had been separated from oil produced at the 
well.

 

[¶20]   In both Reliance and Gainsco, we noted the statute restricts the common 
law right to contract and, therefore, must be strictly construed Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc., 
426 P.2d 442, 444 (1967).  Limiting the statute's application to 
only contracts for work performed on the wells follows that rule.  

 

[¶21]   Dolenc raises, and we recognize, 
the public policy concerns associated with contracts purporting to indemnify 
parties against their own negligence.  
In Mountain 
Fuels Supply Co., 
578 P.2d  at 1354, we noted such contracts may remove or reduce the incentives to 
protect workers and others from personal injury and the anti-indemnity statute 
would help to insure that persons responsible for the work were properly 
motivated to provide safe working conditions. In finding the anti-indemnity 
statute constitutional, we  
concluded the legislature had a reasonable basis for singling out the 
mineral business as particularly hazardous and declaring unenforceable contracts 
involving that type of work which purported to relieve parties from liability 
for their own negligence. 

 

It 
is generally known that the minerals industry is the single most dominant 
economic factor in the state.  
([FN4]) There were projected to be 22,991 workers in the "Mining" sector 
in Wyoming in 1977, representing 11.5% of the total state work force. Mining 
employment figures were exceeded only by the services, trade and government 
sectors. ([FN5]) The growing significance of energy development in the state, 
and the parallel increase in the relative importance of mining employment are 
also noted.  ([FN6]) It is also 
generally known that the drilling and completion of oil and gas wells is always 
a hazardous undertaking (Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Like, 
Wyo., 381 P.2d 70, 74), and that it can be characterized as a particularly 
hazardous type of work. 

 

Id. 
at 1355 (footnotes omitted).  See 
Davis v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 
336 N.E.2d 881 (Ill. 1975).  For 
those reasons, we joined the many jurisdictions that require contracts 
purporting to indemnify parties against their own negligence to be strictly 
construed.  Wyoming Johnson, Inc. v. Stag Industries, 
Inc., 662 P.2d 96, 99 (Wyo. 1983); Northwinds of Wyoming, Inc. v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 779 P.2d 753 (Wyo. 1989).  However, we decline Dolenc's invitation 
to declare all contracts indemnifying parties against their own negligence void 
as against public policy.  We do so 
for two reasons: first, Dolenc did not raise the issue in the district court, 
and second the legislature has established public policy in this arena and we 
will not second guess the wisdom of their decisions in that regard.  Whether the statute represents sound 
public policy is not our concern.  
As we noted in Gainsco, "We 
are not free to legislate.  While 
the public policy of worker safety might be enhanced if the anti-indemnity 
statute applied to all work done in the oil field, or elsewhere, for that 
matter, the legislature has not chosen to take that step.  We certainly cannot do so in its 
stead."2  Gainsco, ¶ 88, n. 13.  Also, we have consistently refrained 
from invalidating contracts between competent parties on the basis of public 
policy "unless the policy is well settled, unambiguous and not in conflict with 
another public policy equally or more compelling."  Goglio v. Star Valley Ranch Association, 
2002 WY 94, 48 P.3d 1072 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶22]   Reversed and 
remanded.

 

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1In 
its reply brief, UPRC raises the issue of whether Mr. Gomez was an "Employee," 
"Subcontractor", "Invitee" or "Licensee" of  Dolenc.  The district court found questions of 
material fact existed on this issue. In addition, the summary judgment in favor 
of Dolenc was limited to the application of §§ 30-1-131 and 132.  Therefore, the issue of Mr. Gomez' 
status is not properly before us and we will not address 
it.

 

2If 
we had misinterpreted the legislature's intent in either Reliance (1986) 
or Gainsco (2002), we presume the legislature would have acted to correct 
our interpretation and it has not done so.  
We also note Northwinds of Wyoming, Inc., 779 P.2d 753, dealt with 
a contract indemnifying the indemnitee against its own negligence and no 
suggestion was made that work on a natural gas pipeline would trigger the 
anti-indemnification statute.