Case Title: Nudo Holdings, LLC v. Board of Review for the City of Kenosha

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019AP001618

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2022-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2022 WI 17 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1618 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Nudo Holdings, LLC, 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Board of Review for the City of Kenosha, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 395 Wis. 2d 261,952 N.W.2d 816 
PDC No:2020 WI App 78 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 12, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 1, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Anthony G. Milisauskas   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER, 
C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Paul W. Zimmer and O’Neil, Cannon, Hollman, DeJong & 
Laing S.C., Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Paul W. 
Zimmer. 
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Robert I. DuMez, Gino M. Alia, J. Michael McTernan and Alia, 
DuMez & McTernan, S.C., Kenosha. There was an oral argument by 
J. Michael McTernan. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the League of 
Wisconsin 
Municipalities, 
Wisconsin 
Towns 
Association 
and 
Wisconsin Association of Assessing Officers by Julie M. Gay and 
Law Office of Julie M. Gay, Waukesha. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
REALTORS® Association, Wisconsin Builders Association and NAIOP-
WI by Thomas D. Larson, Madison. 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 17 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP1618 
(L.C. No. 
2018CV896) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Nudo Holdings, LLC, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Board of Review for the City of Kenosha, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 12, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER, 
C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
BRIAN 
HAGEDORN, 
J.   This 
is 
a 
property 
tax 
classification case.  The property at issue was mostly raw and 
covered in underbrush, but also included several walnut and pine 
trees.  The assessor classified the property as residential.  
Before the board of review, the landowner maintained the 
property should be classified agricultural (and therefore 
receive a lower tax rate).  The board sustained the assessor's 
No. 
2019AP1618   
 
2 
 
classification, which the circuit court and the court of appeals 
affirmed. 
¶2 
Before us, the landowner contends the board did not 
act according to law because the current use of the property met 
the definition of agricultural, and the board's consideration of 
prospective residential use was improper.  The landowner further 
argues the classification is not supported by sufficient 
evidence.  We hold:  (1) The board acted according to law when 
it understood that the land should be classified as agricultural 
only if it is devoted primarily to agricultural use——meaning the 
property is chiefly given to agricultural purposes; (2) The 
board did not err when it considered the prospective residential 
use of the property; and (3) The board's determination to 
sustain 
the 
residential 
classification 
was 
supported 
by 
sufficient evidence. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On September 11, 2017, Nudo Holdings, LLC (Nudo) 
purchased an 8.9-acre parcel of wooded, unused land in the City 
of Kenosha from Kenosha County for $100,000.  Anthony Nudo, the 
owner of Nudo Holdings, LLC, testified before the Board of 
Review for the City of Kenosha (the Board) that he purchased the 
property to develop it.  The property was part of the St. 
Peter's Neighborhood Plan——indicating the City saw its highest 
and best use as residential.  Indeed, the City was aware Nudo 
planned to subdivide the property into as many as 18 residential 
lots. 
No. 
2019AP1618   
 
3 
 
¶4 
At the time of purchase, the property was zoned A-2 
agricultural, lacked access to sewer and water service, and 
contained no habitable structures.  It consisted mostly of 
underbrush with pine and walnut trees scattered across the land.  
The trees were not planted in rows; rather, they grew at random 
on the property. 
¶5 
By January 1, 2018——the relevant timeframe for the 
property assessment——Mr. Nudo testified that "a bit of tilling" 
was done, but when pressed for more detail, stated only "not 
much."  Trails were cut on the property to reach the "walnut 
groves" and the pine trees (described by Mr. Nudo as "Christmas 
trees").  Mr. Nudo explained to the Board that he and his wife 
walked the trails to harvest walnuts.  Mr. Nudo gave the walnuts 
to his mother, who distributed some to her clients and "made 
some stuff" with the rest.  Mr. Nudo also stated that the 
property was registered as a livestock premises and that he 
obtained permits and licenses to cut timber and keep up to 25 
chickens on the property.  But as of January 1, 2018, no pine 
trees were cut, nor had any chickens or other livestock been 
kept on the property.1 
¶6 
In 2018, the City assessor valued the property at 
$89,800 
($10,000 
per 
acre) 
and 
classified 
the 
property 
residential for property tax purposes.  The assessor testified 
                                                 
1 Mr. Nudo also explained that he purchased 300 trees from 
the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources in part to protect 
the walnut trees on his property from the wind.  However, these 
trees were not planted until the spring of 2018——outside of the 
relevant timeframe. 
No. 
2019AP1618   
 
4 
 
before the Board that he classified the property this way 
because, "What we see is truly a -- a fairly, if not all raw 
piece of land.  I don't see any effort, any action, any plan in 
terms of agricultural.  This is a piece of land that has some 
things growing on it."  The assessor further explained: 
There is extremely heavy underbrush on a majority of 
this parcel, and it remains there.  There is no 
evidence of livestock being allowed or able to roam 
free on the parcel.  There is no evidence of furrows 
or 
harvesting 
of 
anything 
and 
no 
evidence 
was 
presented in terms of how much was done.  There is no 
evidence, and in fact, I believe, in one of the 
documents we got, that any Christmas trees were taken 
from this property or how many nuts were taken from 
here. 
The assessor asked Nudo for additional evidence of harvesting, 
furrows, crops, or fencing, but Mr. Nudo indicated he did not 
have any additional information to provide. 
¶7 
Nudo 
timely 
objected 
to 
the 
residential 
classification, contending the property should be classified 
agricultural.  The Board unanimously sustained the assessor's 
classification.  Nudo petitioned for certiorari, and the circuit 
court2 ordered the Board to reconvene and reconsider the 
classification in light of our decision in Ogden.3  On remand, 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Anthony G. Milisauskas of the Kenosha County 
Circuit Court presided. 
3 In particular, the circuit court instructed the Board to 
reconsider the classification in light of our conclusion "that a 
business purpose is not required in order for land to be 
classified as 'agricultural land' for property tax purposes."  
State ex rel. Peter Ogden Fam. Tr. v. Bd. of Rev., 2019 WI 23, 
¶46, 385 Wis. 2d 676, 923 N.W.2d 837. 
No. 
2019AP1618   
 
5 
 
the Board reconsidered and again sustained the assessor's 
residential classification, this time by a vote of 4 to 1.  Both 
the circuit court and court of appeals affirmed the Board's 
determination.  State ex rel. Nudo Holdings, LLC v. Bd. of Rev. 
for City of Kenosha, 2020 WI App 78, ¶1, 395 Wis. 2d 261, 952 
N.W.2d 816.  We granted Nudo's petition for review. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Challenging the Classification of Real Property 
¶8 
Property assessment for taxation purposes takes place 
"as of the close of January 1 of each year."  Wis. Stat. § 70.10 
(2019-20).4  This assessment involves both valuation and 
classification of property.  Wis. Stat. § 70.32.  Wisconsin law 
requires the assessor to segregate land "on the basis of use" 
into 
one 
of 
the 
following 
eight 
classifications: 
 
(1) 
"Residential"; 
(2) 
"Commercial"; 
(3) 
"Manufacturing"; 
(4) 
"Agricultural"; (5) "Undeveloped"; (6) "Agricultural forest"; 
(7) "Productive forest land"; and (8) "Other."  § 70.32(2)(a).  
Nudo's 
petition 
for 
certiorari 
challenges 
the 
Board's 
determination to sustain the residential classification. 
¶9 
An aggrieved property owner like Nudo may file an 
objection to an assessment with the municipal board of review.  
Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7).  When the board receives an objection 
within the statutory time frame, the board sets a hearing.  
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version. 
No. 
2019AP1618   
 
6 
 
§ 70.47(7)-(8).  At the hearing, the assessor is required to 
"provide to the board specific information about the validity of 
the valuation to which objection is made" and "provide to the 
board the information that the assessor used to determine that 
valuation."  § 70.47(8)(h).  The assessor's valuation is 
entitled to a presumption of validity by the board, but "may be 
rebutted by a sufficient showing by the objector that the 
valuation is incorrect."  § 70.47(8)(i).  If the property owner 
desires to challenge the board's decision, it may, among other 
options, 
seek 
certiorari 
review 
by 
the 
circuit 
court.  
§ 70.47(13); State ex rel. City of Waukesha v. City of Waukesha 
Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI 89, ¶17, 399 Wis. 2d 696, 967 N.W.2d 460 
(listing the three options for appeal). 
¶10 This court sits in the same posture as the circuit 
court, and therefore we review the Board's determination, not 
that of the circuit court or court of appeals.  Our review "is 
limited to whether the board's actions were:  (1) within its 
jurisdiction; (2) according to law; (3) arbitrary, oppressive, 
or unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; 
and (4) supported by evidence such that the board might 
reasonably make the order or determination in question."  State 
ex rel. Collison v. City of Milwaukee Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI 48, 
¶20, 397 Wis. 2d 246, 960 N.W.2d 1. 
¶11 Nudo asserts that the Board's determination was not 
according to law for two independent reasons and that it was not 
supported by sufficient evidence. 
 
No. 
2019AP1618   
 
7 
 
B.  According to Law 
1.  Devoted Primarily to Agricultural Use 
¶12 Nudo first argues that the Board did not act according 
to law because it improperly discounted the agricultural use 
present on the property.  Nudo contends that because those 
activities were the only uses the property was put to, the 
property was devoted primarily to agricultural use.  That is 
not, however, what the law says. 
¶13 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 70.32(2)(c) 
provides 
two 
key 
definitions that assist in determining whether Nudo's land could 
be classified as agricultural.  "'Agricultural land' means land, 
exclusive of buildings and improvements and the land necessary 
for their location and convenience, that is devoted primarily to 
agricultural 
use." 
 
§ 70.32(2)(c)1g. 
(emphasis 
added).  
"Agricultural use" is also a defined term.  Its meaning is 
"defined by the department of revenue by rule and includes the 
growing of short rotation woody crops, including poplars and 
willows, using agronomic practices."5  § 70.32(2)(c)1i. 
¶14 Following the statutory instruction to promulgate a 
rule, the Department of Revenue defines "agricultural use" as 
"any of the following": 
(a) 
Activities 
included 
in 
subsector 
111 
Crop 
Production, set forth in the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS), United States, 1997, 
                                                 
5 The statute also defines "Agronomic practices"; it "means 
agricultural practices generally associated with field crop 
production, including soil management, cultivation, and row 
cropping."  Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)1k. 
No. 
2019AP1618   
 
8 
 
published by the executive office of the president, 
U.S. office of management and budget. 
(b) Activities included in subsector 112 Animal 
Production, set forth in the North American Industry 
Classification System, United States, 1997, published 
by the executive office of the president, U.S. office 
of management and budget. 
(c) Growing Christmas trees or ginseng. 
Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 18.05(1)(a)-(c) (July 2018).6 
¶15 The administrative code goes on to explain what 
assessors must look for when determining if land is devoted 
primarily to agricultural use:  "Land devoted primarily to 
agricultural use shall typically bear physical evidence of 
agricultural use, such as furrows, crops, fencing or livestock, 
appropriate to the production season."  Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 
18.06(1).  In addition, "Land devoted primarily to agricultural 
use" in this chapter of the tax code "means land in an 
agricultural use for the production season of the prior year, 
and not in a use that is incompatible with agricultural use on 
January 1 of the assessment year."  Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 
18.05(4). 
¶16 Another 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.32(1), 
requires 
assessors to comply with the Wisconsin Property Assessment 
                                                 
6 Agricultural use also includes unimproved land subject to 
or enrolled in certain state or federal easements or programs.  
Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 18.05(1)(d). 
All subsequent references to the Wis. Admin. Code ch. Tax 
18 are to the July 2018 register date. 
No. 
2019AP1618   
 
9 
 
Manual (WPAM) when assessing property.7  The WPAM in turn 
provides further instructions on how to determine when land is 
devoted primarily to agricultural use.  In one particularly apt 
example, it provides: 
Since walnut trees do not produce walnuts until 10 
years of age and maximum production does not occur 
until 20 to 30 years of age, there may be instances 
where agricultural use is questionable.  If a stand of 
walnut trees is in its early stages of development and 
not producing walnuts, the assessor should evaluate if 
the number of walnut trees is sufficient enough such 
that 
it 
represents 
the 
land's 
primary 
use.  
Additionally, the assessor should determine if there 
is adherence to the walnut industry standards.  The 
following questions should assist an assessor in 
determining 
adherence 
to 
the 
walnut 
industry 
standards.  Please note:  This should not be construed 
as an all-inclusive list. 
 What is the number of walnut trees per acre? 
 Are there other types of trees intermixed with 
the walnut trees?  And to what extent? 
 What is the spacing between the trees? 
 Were the trees thinned? 
 Are 
the 
soil 
types 
conducive 
to 
walnut 
production? 
 Are the site characteristics conducive to walnut 
production? 
                                                 
7 "Real property shall be valued by the assessor in the 
manner 
specified 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
property 
assessment 
manual . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1); see also State ex rel. 
Collison v. City of Milwaukee Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI 48, ¶29, 397 
Wis. 2d 246, 960 N.W.2d 1. 
No. 
2019AP1618   
 
10 
 
 Have measures been taken to ensure proper tree 
growth, which can include tree pruning, weed 
control, animal control, etc.? 
 If the trees are producing walnuts, are the 
walnuts being harvested? 
1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual (WPAM) 14-19 (2017).8 
¶17 Returning to the principal statutory question, in 
order for land to be classified agricultural, and therefore 
receive a potentially sizable tax break,9 the land must be 
"devoted 
primarily 
to 
agricultural 
use." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.32(2)(c)1g.; Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 18.06(1).  Admittedly, 
some of the activity on Nudo's property could be described as 
agricultural.  Walnut farming is included in subsector 111 Crop 
Production set forth in the NAICS 1997 publication as one kind 
of "agricultural use."10  Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 18.05(1)(a).  
                                                 
8 All subsequent references to the WPAM are to the 2017 
publication, https://www.revenue.wi.gov/documents/wpam17.pdf. 
9 The general rule is that taxation must be uniform.  Wis. 
Const. art. VIII, § 1.  However, "Taxation of agricultural land 
and undeveloped land, both as defined by law, need not be 
uniform with the taxation of each other nor with the taxation of 
other real property."  Id.  Thus, certain classifications of 
property change the valuation otherwise assigned to the property 
under Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1).  Agricultural land is "assessed 
according to the income that could be generated from its rental 
for agricultural use."  § 70.32(2r).  Agricultural forest land 
and undeveloped land are "assessed at 50 percent of its full 
value."  § 70.32(4).  Land classified residential is afforded no 
discount; it is assessed at its full value determined under 
§ 70.32(1). 
10 The NAICS is reproduced in full in the WPAM.  See 1 WPAM 
14-A-20. 
No. 
2019AP1618   
 
11 
 
And 
"[g]rowing 
Christmas 
trees" 
can 
also 
constitute 
"agricultural use."  § Tax 18.05(1)(c).11 
¶18 However, some agricultural use——even if it is the only 
"use" the land is put to——does not mean the land is "devoted 
primarily to agricultural use."  Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)1g.; 
Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 18.06(1).  "[D]evoted primarily" is the 
key phrase here.  Being "devoted" to something means to be given 
over to and committed to that thing.12  And "primarily" means 
chiefly or mainly.13  As a matter of plain English, an 
agricultural classification is only proper if the land is 
chiefly given over to agricultural use. 
¶19 This understanding is reflected in the administrative 
rules and the WPAM.  The administrative rules explain that land 
devoted primarily to agricultural use often leaves physical 
marks——"furrows, crops, fencing or livestock"——on the land.  
Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 18.06(1).  The land should bear witness 
to its use in the prior production season, in whatever form that 
evidence is demonstrated.  Wis. Admin. Code §§ Tax 18.05(4), 
18.06(1).  And as the WPAM's specific instructions on walnut 
                                                 
11 As previously noted, Nudo obtained a license to keep up 
to 25 chickens, but as of January 1, 2018, no chickens were kept 
on the property.  Therefore, Nudo was not engaging in activity 
included in subsector 112 Animal Production set forth in the 
NAICS.  See Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 18.05(1)(b). 
12 American Heritage Dictionary 512 (3d ed. 1992) ("1. To 
give or apply (one's time, attention, or self) entirely to a 
particular activity, pursuit, cause, or person.  2. To set apart 
for a specific purpose or use:  land devoted to mining."). 
13 Id. at 1438 ("Chiefly; mainly."). 
No. 
2019AP1618   
 
12 
 
trees demonstrate, the existence of some walnut trees is not 
enough.  The WPAM tells the assessor to go further and "evaluate 
if the number of walnut trees is sufficient enough such that it 
represents the land's primary use," and determine "if there is 
adherence to the walnut industry standards."  1 WPAM 14-19.  So 
minimal harvesting of walnuts, even in the absence of other 
activity, generally will not by itself establish that land is 
devoted primarily to agricultural use.  If it did, even an empty 
and otherwise unused piece of property with a solitary wild 
raspberry bush harvested once a year would fit the bill. 
¶20 Here, the Board correctly understood that whether the 
property was "devoted primarily to agricultural use" looks to 
whether the land is chiefly given over to agricultural use.  
Just because the sole productive activities, however small, 
could be described as agricultural does not mean the land's main 
use was agricultural.  The Board's determination in this regard 
was according to law. 
 
2.  Prospective Residential Use 
¶21 Nudo next argues that the Board did not act according 
to law by considering prospective residential use when it 
sustained the assessor's residential classification.  In Nudo's 
view, the residential classification violated the statutory 
directive that property must be classified "on the basis of use" 
because the land neither was nor imminently would be used for 
housing.  See Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(a).  Nudo's interpretation 
is incorrect. 
No. 
2019AP1618   
 
13 
 
¶22 "Residential" property under the law "includes any 
parcel or part of a parcel of untilled land that is not suitable 
for the production of row crops, on which a dwelling or other 
form of human abode is located and which is not otherwise 
classified under this subsection."  Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)3. 
(emphasis added).  It is certainly true that no dwelling or 
human abode was on the property at the time of the assessment.  
But notably, this definition is inclusive, not comprehensive.  
This is in contrast to the statutory definitions of every other 
classification, each of which begin with the word "means," 
rather than "includes."14  Taking this distinction to mean what 
it says, the "residential" classification includes, but is not 
                                                 
14 The definitions in Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c) begin: 
1d.  "Agricultural forest land" means . . . . 
1g.  "Agricultural land" means . . . . 
1i.  "Agricultural use" means . . . . 
1k.  "Agronomic practices" means . . . . 
1m.  "Other," . . . means . . . . 
2.  "Productive forest land" means . . . . 
3.  "Residential" includes . . . . 
4.  "Undeveloped land" means . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
No. 
2019AP1618   
 
14 
 
limited to, land that currently has on it a "dwelling or other 
form of human abode."15  § 70.32(2)(c)3.   
¶23 Statutory 
history 
confirms 
the 
import 
of 
this 
distinction.16  The definition of "residential" was created in 
1986 and has remained unchanged since then.  Compare 1985 Wis. 
Act 153, § 12 with Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)3.  The same act that 
created 
the 
definition 
of 
"residential" 
also 
defined 
"agricultural," "productive forest land," and "swampland or 
wasteland."  1985 Wis. Act 153, § 12.  While the definitions of 
"productive forest land" and "swampland or wasteland" began with 
"means," "agricultural" was defined as, "includes any body of 
water on private premises that is used as a part of a private 
fish hatchery licensed under s. 29.52."  Id. (emphasis added).  
The definition of "agricultural" was later repealed and the 
definition 
of 
"agricultural 
land" 
was 
created 
to 
read, 
"'Agricultural land' means land, exclusive of buildings and 
improvements, that is devoted primarily to agricultural use, as 
defined by rule."  1995 Wis. Act 27, § 3362F (emphasis added).  
This change in language from "includes" to "means" confirms the 
legislature's 
word 
choices 
here 
reflect 
a 
difference 
in 
                                                 
15 "When the legislature uses different terms in the same 
act, we generally do not afford them the same meaning."  State 
ex rel. DNR v. Wis. Ct. of App., 2018 WI 25, ¶28, 380 
Wis. 2d 354, 909 N.W.2d 114. 
16 An inquiry into statutory history is part and parcel of a 
plain meaning analysis.  Fabick v. Evers, 2021 WI 28, ¶30 n.12, 
396 Wis. 2d 231, 956 N.W.2d 856. 
No. 
2019AP1618   
 
15 
 
statutory meaning.  This is no mere accident of legislative 
drafting. 
¶24 Therefore, by use of the word "includes," Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(2)(c)3. contemplates that land other than the type 
described in § 70.32(2)(c)3. could still be classified as 
residential.  Residential "use" is not, under any statutory 
language, limited to property with habitable homes currently or 
imminently on the property.  This begs the question of what else 
might fall within a residential classification.   
¶25 Fortunately, we are not left without additional 
direction.  The WPAM——guidance that is required by law to be 
given and followed (Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1))——tells us the 
residential classification "includes vacant land in cities and 
villages where the most likely use would be for residential 
development."  1 WPAM 7-14.  And when assessors are determining 
whether vacant land should be classified residential, the 
assessor is instructed to consider the following: 
 Are the actions of the owner(s) consistent with 
an intent for residential use? 
 Is the size of the parcel typical of residential 
or developing residential parcels in the area? 
 Is the parcel zoned residential or is residential 
zoning likely to be allowed? 
 Is the parcel located in a residential plat, 
subdivision, 
CSM 
or 
near 
other 
residential 
development? 
 Does the parcel's topography or physical features 
allow for residential use? 
No. 
2019AP1618   
 
16 
 
 Is the parcel located in an urban or rapidly 
changing to urban area, as contrasted with a 
location 
distant 
from 
much 
residential 
activity[?] 
 Are there any other factors affecting the parcel 
which 
would 
indicate 
residential 
use 
is 
reasonably likely or imminent[?] 
Id. at 12-1. 
¶26 As these required considerations make clear, future 
planned residential development is a permissible basis on which 
to rest a residential classification.  Just as by statute 
residential use includes land where a human abode is currently 
located (Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)3.), so too the statutory 
command to follow the WPAM (§ 70.32(1)) means a residential 
classification also "includes vacant land in cities and villages 
where the most likely use would be for residential development" 
and land where "residential use is reasonably likely."  1 WPAM 
7-14 (emphasis added); id. at 12-1.  Accordingly, when the law 
says property must be classified "on the basis of use" on 
January 1 of the assessment year, land has a current residential 
"use" not only if human dwellings are present, but also if they 
are reasonably likely or planned.17  The Board therefore acted 
                                                 
17 The dissent is premised on the faulty and unsupported 
assumption that land planned for future residential development 
cannot constitute current residential "use" for property tax 
purposes.  But the dissent points to no statutory language that 
limits 
a 
residential 
classification 
in 
this 
way, 
and 
conspicuously avoids giving any effect to the legislature's 
choice to use "includes" and not "means" in its definition of a 
residential classification.  Resting on this error, the dissent 
fashions a conflict between the statutes and the WPAM that does 
not exist.   
No. 
2019AP1618   
 
17 
 
according to law when it considered the prospective residential 
use of Nudo's property. 
 
C.  Supported by Sufficient Evidence 
¶27 Finally, Nudo asserts the Board's determination to 
sustain the residential classification was not supported by 
sufficient evidence.  On certiorari review, the test "for 
sufficiency of the evidence is the substantial-evidence test."  
Stacy v. Ashland Cnty. Dept. of Public Welfare, 39 Wis. 2d 595, 
602, 159 N.W.2d 630 (1968).  Perhaps misnamed in view of modern 
parlance, the substantial evidence test is not a high bar.  
"Substantial evidence is evidence of such convincing power that 
reasonable persons could reach the same decision as the board."  
Clark v. Waupaca Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 186 Wis. 2d 300, 304, 
519 N.W.2d 782 (Ct. App. 1994).  In light of our "highly 
deferential" approach "to the board's findings, we may not 
substitute our view of the evidence for that of the board."  Id. 
¶28 The evidence here comfortably meets this standard.  
The Board heard evidence from both Mr. Nudo and the assessor.  
Combined, this testimony established that the 8.9-acre property 
consisted mostly of underbrush.  It was essentially vacant and 
raw with several walnut and pine trees scattered throughout.  
Nudo purchased the property to develop it into residential lots.  
And the property was in a neighborhood plan for future 
development in the City of Kenosha.  The evidence reflects that 
any agricultural uses were minor and isolated, not the primary 
use of the land.  Taken together, reasonable persons could 
No. 
2019AP1618   
 
18 
 
certainly reach the same decision as the Board.  The Board's 
determination to sustain the residential classification was 
supported by sufficient evidence. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶29 Nudo challenges the Board's classification of the 
property as residential.  We conclude the Board acted according 
to law when it looked for more than some minimal agricultural 
use in evaluating whether the property was devoted primarily to 
agricultural use, and when it considered the prospective 
residential development of the property.  Finally, the Board's 
determination to sustain the residential classification was 
supported by sufficient evidence.  For these reasons, we affirm. 
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2019AP1618.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶30 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   (dissenting).  The 
majority opinion errs because it fails to recognize and analyze 
the connection between the relevant statutes and the relevant 
administrative rule and how their connection bears on the 
question of whether Nudo Holdings, LLC's property qualified for 
an agricultural classification on January 1, 2018.  Because I 
conclude that an understanding of this connection shows that the 
Board of Review incorrectly applied the law, which error the 
majority affirms, I respectfully dissent.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶31 Nudo Holdings, LLC purchased the subject property on 
September 11, 2017, when it was zoned agricultural.  On January 
1, 2018, Kenosha reclassified the land as residential for 
assessment appraisal purposes, on which Nudo was taxed.  
¶32 Nudo objected to the reclassification and asked for a 
hearing before the Kenosha Board of Review, claiming that the 
assessor did not act according to law.  At the hearing, he 
explained that on January 1, 2018,1 the date for which 
classification was determined, he had continued to use the 
property agriculturally.  He explained that there had been no 
residential use of the property; it contained no access to sewer 
or water service and no habitable structures.  There was no 
evidence presented that the property was "not suitable" for the 
production of row crops.   
                                                 
1 Property is valued as of January 1 of each calendar year.  
Wis. Stat. § 70.10 ("The assessor shall assess all real and 
personal property as of the close of January 1 of each year."). 
No.  2019AP1618.pdr 
 
2 
 
¶33 The records from hearings before the Board of Review 
show that in 2017 Nudo ordered 300 pine trees to plant as wind-
breaks to protect 120 walnut trees.  It shows that walnuts were 
harvested in December of 2017; that Nudo had a timber cutting 
notice approved on December 4, 2017; that permission to harvest 
Christmas trees was obtained in 2017; that the state registered 
livestock approval for the property on December 8, 2017.    
¶34 Nudo owned the property for only 3.5 months before it 
was reclassified as residential.  Of those 3.5 months, two 
months, November and December, were winter months when most 
agricultural activities in Wisconsin are quiescent.   
¶35 The Board of Review affirmed the assessor's decision; 
the circuit court and the court of appeals affirmed as well.  
The majority opinion, once again, affirms.  All missed how 
important January 1, 2018, is to a competent analysis of the 
case before us, except for the thoughtful discussion in the 
court of appeals dissent.2  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶36 This case is before us on certiorari review of the 
decision of the Board of Review.  Wis. Stat. § 59.694(10).  
Accordingly we review whether:  (1) the Board remained within 
its jurisdiction; (2) the Board acted according to law; (3) the 
Board's action was arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable and 
represented its will and not its judgment; (4) the Board could 
                                                 
2 State ex rel. Nudo Holdings, LLC v. Bd. of Rev. for City 
of Kenosha, 2020 WI App 78, ¶38, 395 Wis. 2d 261, 952 N.W.2d 816 
(Reilly, J. dissenting). 
No.  2019AP1618.pdr 
 
3 
 
reasonably 
make 
its 
determination 
based 
on 
the 
evidence 
presented.  FAS, LLC v. Town of Bass Lake, 2007 WI 73, ¶8, 301 
Wis. 2d 321, 733 N.W.2d 287.    
¶37 Although an assessor's valuation is entitled to a 
presumption 
of 
correctness, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.49(2), 
the 
classification of property underlying this assessment appraisal 
derives from statutory and administrative rule interpretation.  
Therefore, classification is a question of law wherein we 
independently 
review 
the 
assessor's 
interpretation 
and 
application of relevant statutes and administrative rules to 
determine classification.  Regency W. Apartments, LLC v. City of 
Racine, 2016 WI 99, ¶22, 372 Wis. 2d 282, 888 N.W.2d 611.   
B.  Statutory and Administrative Rule Interpretation 
¶38 Determining 
whether 
Nudo's 
property 
was 
lawfully 
classified as residential requires us to interpret and apply 
several statutes.  We interpret statutes to determine what they 
mean so they may be given their proper effect upon the facts 
presented.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 
WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We begin with the 
statutory language, which we give its common, ordinary accepted 
meaning unless it involves technical or specially-defined words 
or phrases to which we give defined meanings.  Id., ¶45.   
¶39 Statutes should be read to give reasonable effect to 
every word so that no word or phrase becomes surplusage.  
Warehouse II, LLC v. DOT, 2006 WI 62, ¶16, 291 Wis. 2d 80, 715 
N.W.2d 213.  When statutory terms are capable of differing 
reasonable interpretations they are ambiguous.  Id., ¶17.   
No.  2019AP1618.pdr 
 
4 
 
¶40 This decision also involves the interpretation and 
application of an administrative rule.  Generally, we use the 
same rules of construction and interpretation for administrative 
rules as we do with statutes.  Voces De La Frontera, LLC v. 
Clarke, 2017 WI 16, ¶13, 373 Wis. 2d 348, 891 N.W.2d 803.     
1.  Wisconsin Stat. § 70.32 
¶41 Correctly interpreting and applying Wis. Stat. § 70.32 
is critical to this controversy.  Section 70.32(2)(a)1. requires 
the assessor to classify land on the basis of use, separate from 
improvements.  It provides: 
(a)  The 
assessor 
shall 
segregate 
into 
the 
following classes on the basis of use and set down 
separately in proper columns the values of the land, 
exclusive of improvements, and, except for subds. 5., 
5m., and 6., the improvements in each class: 
1.  Residential. 
2.  Commercial. 
3.  Manufacturing. 
4.  Agricultural. 
5.  Undeveloped. 
5m. Agricultural forest. 
6.  Productive forest land. 
7.  Other. 
§ 70.32(2).  Of the statutory classifications provided, the 
parties have focused only on residential and agricultural.  
Therefore, I will as well.   
¶42 In the matter before us, classifications are based on 
the use to which the land is placed as of January first of the 
No.  2019AP1618.pdr 
 
5 
 
taxation year.  Wis. Stat. §§ 70.10, 70.32(2)(a) and Wis. Admin. 
Code § Tax 18.05(4).  The assessor classified Nudo's property as 
residential.   
¶43 Residential land is defined by statute.  It "includes 
any parcel or part of a parcel of untilled land that is not 
suitable for the production of row crops, on which a dwelling or 
other form of human abode is located and which is not otherwise 
classified under this subsection."  Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)3.  
¶44 "Not suitable" is not a specially defined phrase, and 
"suitable" is not a specially defined term.  Therefore we use 
common, acceptable definitions, as can be found in a dictionary.  
Tele-Port, Inc. v. Ameritech Mobile Commc'ns, Inc., 2001 WI 261, 
¶17, 248 Wis. 2d 846, 637 N.W.2d 782.  Webster defines 
"suitable" as "adapted to a use or purpose" and its antonym as 
"unsuitable."  Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1165 (1974).  
Webster 
defines 
"unsuitable" 
as 
"not 
fitting" 
or 
"inappropriate."  Id., 1283.    
¶45 Employing those common definitions, there was no 
testimony at the Board of Review hearings that Nudo's property 
was "not fitting" or "inappropriate" for the production of row 
crops.  The assessor said only that it was largely brush 
covered.  He said nothing about the lack of suitability for the 
production of row crops.  Nudo said that he had cut paths in the 
brush to access the walnut and Christmas trees and that he had 
ordered 300 trees to plant as wind-breaks for the walnut trees.   
¶46 It was undisputed that no dwelling or other building 
sufficient for human occupancy existed on the property.  In 
No.  2019AP1618.pdr 
 
6 
 
addition, Nudo testified that there was no sewer or water 
service on the property, which would be necessary to begin to 
make it suitable for home construction.   
¶47 So what use had been made of Nudo's property that 
supports its classification as residential when Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(2)(a) requires that classification be based on use and, 
in the dispute before us, use as of January 1, 2018?  Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.10; Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 18.05(4).  The majority opinion 
asserts that the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual (WPAM), 
which assessors are required to consult via § 70.32(1), permits 
classifications based on possible prospective uses.3  However, 
the majority opinion goes further than that.  It concludes that 
"Nudo's interpretation is incorrect" when he claims that 
classifications must be "on the basis of use."4   
¶48 While I of course agree that WPAM says what it says, 
when WPAM conflicts with a statute, the statute controls.  
Metro. Holding Co. v. Bd. of Rev., 173 Wis. 2d 626, 632-33, 495 
N.W.2d 314 (1993).  Here, there is an administrative rule, as 
well as a statute, that drives the decision on classification 
and the correct date for determining it, which is January 1, 
2018 as I explain below.  
¶49 The majority reasons that because the definition of 
"residential" begins with the word, "includes," rather than the 
word, "means," "the 'residential' classification includes, but 
is not limited to, land that currently has on it a 'dwelling or 
                                                 
3 Majority op., ¶¶16, 25, 26.   
4 Id., ¶21.   
No.  2019AP1618.pdr 
 
7 
 
other form of human abode.'"5  The majority concludes its 
reasoning with "by the use of the word 'includes,' Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(2)(c)3. contemplates that land other than the type 
described 
in 
§ 70.32(c)3. 
could 
still 
be 
classified 
as 
residential."6   
¶50 In addition, just as the majority's reasoning negates 
the statutory requirement for a structure that could be used as 
a human abode, it also ignores the statutory requirement that 
residentially 
classified 
land 
is 
"not 
suitable 
for 
the 
production of row crops."  Wis. Stat. § 70.32(c)3.  Setting land 
outside of the residential classification if it could be used 
for the production of row crops certainly meant something to the 
legislature that drafted § 70.32(2)(c)3.   
¶51 Furthermore, ignoring a criterion for land that cannot 
be classified as residential makes the statutory requirement 
about row crops mere surplusage, contrary to the rules by which 
we construct statutes.  Warehouse II, 291 Wis. 2d 80, ¶16.  
Nevertheless, the majority opinion does not mention that 
limitation on residential classifications, possibly because 
there was no evidence presented to the Board of Review that 
Nudo's land was not suitable for the production of row crops.  
¶52 The date for classifying Nudo's property was January 
1, 2018.  Wis. Stat. § 70.10.  As of that date, there was no 
testimony that anyone had ever lived on Nudo's land; there was 
no testimony that the land was not suitable for row crops.  It 
                                                 
5 Id., ¶22.   
6 Id., ¶24.  
No.  2019AP1618.pdr 
 
8 
 
appears 
the 
assessor 
chose 
residential 
classification, 
notwithstanding Nudo's land's failure to satisfy the statutory 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)3., believing that all 
this could occur in the future because WPAM permitted future 
uses.  However, the assessor's selection ignores January 1, 
2018, in regard to that date's relevance when considering a 
dispute involving a claimed agricultural classification.  
¶53 Let 
us 
begin 
by 
looking 
at 
the 
agricultural 
classification and whether the law and the testimony support it.  
Agricultural land is defined by statute and by administrative 
rule.  They work together to inform our understanding of the 
parameters of the agricultural classification in this dispute.  
¶54 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 70.32(2)(c)1g. 
provides 
that 
"Agricultural land" is land "that is devoted primarily to 
agricultural use."  Section 70.32(2)(c)li. defines "Agricultural 
use" as that use that is "defined by the department of revenue 
by rule."   
2.  Wisconsin Admin. Code § Tax 18.05 
¶55 Wisconsin Admin. Code § Tax 18.05 combines with the 
statutory directives, as it contains important Department of 
Internal Revenue definitions.  It provides in relevant part: 
(1)  "Agricultural 
use" 
means 
any 
of 
the 
following: 
(a)  Activities included in subsector 111 Crop 
Production, set forth in the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) . . . . 
(b) . . . . 
(c)  Growing Christmas trees or ginseng. 
No.  2019AP1618.pdr 
 
9 
 
. . . . 
(4)  "Land devoted primarily to agricultural use" 
means land in an agricultural use for the production 
season of the prior year, and not in a use that is 
incompatible with agricultural use on January 1 of the 
assessment year.   
§ Tax 18.05. 
¶56 I follow the requirements of Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 
18.05, which are directed by Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)li., to 
determine 
whether 
Nudo's 
land 
was 
"devoted 
primarily 
to 
agricultural use."  The majority opinion makes up its own 
definition of "devoted primarily to agricultural use" instead of 
interpreting § 70.32(2)(c)li and § Tax 18.05 as required by the 
rules of statutory interpretation.7  Section Tax 18.05(4) 
provides that we determine whether the land was in "an 
agricultural use" in the prior season and whether its use on 
January 1 was "incompatible with agricultural use."   
¶57 "Incompatible" 
is 
not 
a 
defined 
term 
in 
the 
administrative rule.  Because we generally apply the same rules 
of construction to interpreting administrative rules as we apply 
to statutes, I consult a dictionary for a plain meaning 
definition of incompatible.  Voces De La Frontera, 373 Wis. 2d 
348, 
¶13. 
 
"Incompatible" 
is 
defined 
as 
"incapable 
of 
association because incongruous, discordant, or disagreeing; 
unsuitable for use together because of undesirable chemical or 
physiological effects."  Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 
581. 
                                                 
7 Id., ¶¶23, 24. 
No.  2019AP1618.pdr 
 
10 
 
¶58 Wisconsin 
Admin. 
Code 
§ Tax 
18.05(4) 
expressly 
confirms that "January 1 of the assessment year," not some 
future year, is the controlling date when evaluating a claimed 
agricultural 
classification. 
 
Notwithstanding 
this 
clear 
directive, the majority opinion is based on future use, not on 
January 1, 2018.8  The majority opinion simply finds the plain 
words of § Tax 18.05(4) inconvenient, so it ignores them.   
¶59 Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 70.10 connects with the 
administrative rule to confirm the date on which claimed 
agricultural classifications must be made.  The classification 
decision was an integral component of the assessment accepted by 
the Board of Review; therefore, recognizing and understanding 
this connection is critical to evaluating whether the Board of 
Review's decision followed the law.  
¶60 Statutory classification directives provide a level 
playing field for citizens and municipalities because they 
provide 
the 
process 
that 
both 
parties 
are 
to 
use 
in 
classification disputes.  When this court does not follow the 
required date of classification set by statute and instead 
affirms a classification decision at a date contrary to the 
dates set out in Wis. Stat. §§ 70.109 and 70.32(2)(c)li10 and 
contrary to Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 18.05(4),11 the court's 
                                                 
8 Id., ¶¶2, 24, 25, 26, 29. 
9 "The assessor shall assess all real and personal property 
as of the close of January 1 of each year."  Wis. Stat. § 70.10.  
10 "'Agricultural use' means agricultural use as defined by 
the 
department 
of 
revenue 
by 
rule . . . ." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.32(2)(c)li.     
No.  2019AP1618.pdr 
 
11 
 
decision harms both the citizen and the municipality because its 
decision changes the process the legislature created to resolve 
classification disputes.     
¶61 Nudo's land was owned by Kenosha County when he 
purchased it on September 11, 2017.  There were walnut trees and 
Christmas trees growing on it then.  Growing walnuts is a 
subsector 111 Crop Production, set forth in the NAICS, and 
therefore 
an 
agricultural 
use. 
 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ Tax 
18.05(1)(a).  Growing Christmas trees is also an agricultural 
use.  § Tax 18.05(1)(c). 
¶62 Walnut trees do not bear fruit until they are 
approximately 10 years of age.  WPAM at 14-19.  Nudo testified 
that he harvested walnuts in 2017, so the trees were mature and 
bearing fruit in the production season prior to his purchase.   
¶63 Nudo also ordered 300 trees to plant as wind-breaks to 
protect the walnut trees; he obtained permits to harvest 
Christmas trees and to raise livestock.  There was no testimony 
that anything about his use of the property on January 1, 2018, 
was incompatible with the agricultural use that occurred the 
prior production season.   
¶64 Instead, the uncontradicted testimony showed Nudo's 
use of the land was similar to the agricultural use to which it 
was placed in the prior production season.  He cut paths to more 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 "'Land devoted primarily to agricultural use' means land 
in an agricultural use for the production season of the prior 
year, and not in a use that is incompatible with agricultural 
use on January 1 of the assessment year."  Wis. Admin. Code 
§ Tax 18.05(4).   
No.  2019AP1618.pdr 
 
12 
 
easily get to the walnut trees, ordered trees to plant as wind-
breaks for the walnuts, obtained permits to raise cattle and 
obtained needed approvals to cut Christmas trees.  There was no 
testimony 
that 
any 
of 
these 
uses 
was 
incompatible 
with 
agricultural use of the land.   
¶65 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 70.10, 70.32(2)(c)li. and Wis. 
Admin. Code § Tax 18.05(4) connect to require the claimed 
agricultural use be evaluated as of January 1, 2018.  The Board 
of Review relied on some potential future use due to the 
recommendation of the assessor.  The assessor relied on a 
statement from WPAM.  However, for this dispute, employing a 
future use conflicts with both statutes and the administrative 
code.  Failing to follow what they direct and relying on WPAM is 
an error of law.  Metro. Holding Co., 173 Wis. 2d at 632-33.  
¶66 The majority errs in the same way when it relies on 
WPAM's 
guidance 
that 
an 
assessor 
can 
look 
forward 
into 
prospective use when classifying property.12  When property for 
which agricultural classification is claimed, January 1 of the 
assessment year must be the classification date in order to 
comply with Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 18.05(4), Wis. Stat. §§ 70.10 
and 70.32(2)(c)1i.  Ignoring January 1 as the dispositive date, 
is in conflict with both the administrative code and statutes.  
As we long ago explained, when WPAM and statutes conflict, 
statutes control.  Id. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
                                                 
12 Majority op., ¶¶25, 26. 
No.  2019AP1618.pdr 
 
13 
 
¶67 The 
majority 
opinion 
errs 
because 
it 
fails 
to 
recognize and analyze the connection between the relevant 
statutes and the relevant administrative rule and how that 
connection bears on the question of whether Nudo Holdings, LLC's 
property qualified for an agricultural classification on January 
1, 2018.  Because I conclude that an understanding of this 
connection shows that the Board of Review incorrectly applied 
the law, which error the majority affirms, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶68 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this 
dissent. 
 
No.  2019AP1618.pdr 
 
1