Case Title: ROBERT E. BROMLEY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-229

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROBERT E. BROMLEY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 20150 P.3d 1202Case Number: 05-229Decided: 02/01/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
ROBERT 
E. BROMLEY,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ken 
Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. 
Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Roden.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Dee Morgan, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Morgan.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, Justice.

 
 
[¶1] 
Robert E. Bromley was convicted by a jury of three felonies involving 
methamphetamine:  delivery in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005); possession 
with intent to deliver also in violation of § 35-7-1031(a)(i); and possession in 
violation of § 35-7-1031(c)(ii).  He 
appeals, claiming:  1) the district 
court erred in admitting uncharged misconduct evidence; 2) the district court 
gave the jury an erroneous limiting instruction concerning the uncharged 
misconduct evidence; 3) the State presented insufficient evidence to support 
conviction of possession with intent to deliver and possession; and, 4) the 
district court imposed an illegal sentence because the sentences for the latter 
two convictions should have merged.  We find no error and affirm.   

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  Mr. Bromley presents the following 
issues for this Court's consideration:

 
 
 ISSUE I

 
 
Did the 
trial court err in admitting uncharged misconduct 
evidence?

 
 

ISSUE 
II

 
 
Did the 
trial court give an erroneous limiting instruction to the jury regarding the 
uncharged misconduct evidence?

 
 

ISSUE 
III

 
 
Does 
sufficient evidence exist in the record to support appellant's convictions for 
counts 2 and 3?

 
 

ISSUE 
IV

 
 
Is 
appellant's sentence illegal because counts 2 and 3 should have merged for 
sentencing purposes?

 
 
The 
State re-phrases the issues presented as follows:

 
 
I.          
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted the 
testimony of Ms. Huntley, Mr. DuFresne and Ms. Vigil?

 
 
II.         
Did the district court commit plain error or abuse its discretion when it 
gave the limiting instruction proffered by appellant?

 
 
III.        Were 
appellant's convictions on counts II and III supported by sufficient 
evidence?

 
 
IV.       Did the 
district court commit plain error when it failed to merge appellant's possession 
and possession with intent to deliver convictions for sentencing 
purposes?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  In the early morning hours of June 10, 
2004, a deputy from the Albany County Sheriff's Office responded to a call for 
help on Osprey 
Lane in Laramie, Wyoming.  
As the deputy approached the area, he observed someone waving a light 
along the road.  He rolled down his 
window and heard a woman's voice screaming for help.  He approached the woman and she 
identified herself as Sadie Huntley.  She appeared to be under the influence of 
a controlled substance.  The officer 
called for an ambulance to transport Ms. Huntley to IvinsonMemorialHospital where she was treated for a 
possible overdose.  At the hospital, 
blood tests were performed which showed methamphetamine in Ms. Huntley's system. 
 Ms. Huntley told police she had 
purchased methamphetamine from Mr. Bromley the night before and smoked what she 
purchased at his residence that night and the following morning. 

 
 
[¶4]  The State filed a felony information 
alleging one count of delivery of a controlled substance against Mr. 
Bromley.  The information alleged 
the facts concerning Ms. Huntley and also stated the Wyoming Division of 
Criminal Investigation (DCI) had received reports from three other individuals 
that Mr. Bromley had been selling methamphetamine from his home on Osprey Lane.  The State obtained an arrest warrant and 
arrested Mr. Bromley.  After the 
arrest, the State obtained a warrant to search Mr. Bromley's residence.  DCI agents found packaged bags of 
methamphetamine, U.S. currency, scales and other drug 
paraphernalia inside Mr. Bromley's residence.  They also found bags containing 
methamphetamine and paraphernalia secreted in several locations in the yard 
outside his residence.  On the basis 
of the evidence found in the search, the State filed an amended information 
alleging the additional counts of possession and possession with intent to 
deliver.    

 
 
[¶5]  Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a 
motion to exclude evidence of prior bad acts.  The defense sought an order prohibiting 
the admission of:  1) Ms. Huntley's 
testimony concerning her history of purchasing methamphetamine from and using 
the drug with Mr. Bromley; 2) Vince DuFresne's testimony concerning admissions 
Mr. Bromley made to him in jail after his arrest; 3) a baggie containing 
marijuana and Mr. Bromley's fingerprint; and 4) evidence of Mr. Bromley's prior 
convictions involving controlled substances.  After a hearing, the district court 
denied the motion except with respect to Mr. Bromley's prior convictions.  The district court concluded Ms. 
Huntley's and Mr. DuFresne's testimony and the baggie and fingerprint were 
admissible under W.R.E. 404(b) to show identity, lack of mistake, knowledge, and 
a pattern of conduct.  The district 
court also concluded the probative value of the evidence outweighed the 
potential for unfair prejudice.  Addressing Mr. Bromley's prior 
convictions, however, the district court concluded the risk was too great that 
the jury might convict Mr. Bromley on the current charges based on evidence that 
he was convicted of similar offenses in the past and ruled the evidence was not 
admissible. 

 
 
[¶6] 
Several days after the 404(b) hearing, the State notified the defense it would 
be calling Belle Moree Vigil to testify that she helped Mr. Bromley put drug 
paraphernalia into bags and take them outside into the backyard the night before 
his arrest; Mr. Bromley kept methamphetamine in a black fanny pack he wore 
around his neck; and after Mr. Bromley's arrest, she and others found 
methamphetamine not discovered by law enforcement at his residence.  Defense counsel did not move for 
exclusion of Ms. Vigil's testimony prior to trial, but objected to its admission 
during trial.  The district court 
overruled the objection based upon the mistaken belief it had considered the 
testimony and ruled it admissible at the 404(b) hearing. 

 
 
[¶7] On 
March 25, 2005, after three days of trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict 
against Mr. Bromley on all three counts.  Defense counsel stipulated to Mr. 
Bromley's prior controlled substance convictions for purposes of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1038 (LexisNexis 2005),  which allows imprisonment of a person 
convicted of a second or subsequent controlled substances offense for a term up 
to twice the term otherwise authorized.  The district court sentenced Mr. Bromley 
to consecutive prison terms of thirty-five to forty years on the delivery and 
possession with intent to deliver convictions and another consecutive term of 
six to seven years for possession of methamphetamine.                         

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 
1.   Admission of Uncharged Misconduct 
Evidence

 
 
[¶8]  Mr. Bromley contends the district court 
erred in admitting evidence of uncharged misconduct.  We review claims of error concerning the 
improper admission of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence for abuse of discretion and will 
not reverse the trial court's decision absent a clear abuse.  Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 10, 131 P.3d 348, 352 (Wyo. 2006).  A trial 
court abuses its discretion when it could not have reasonably concluded as it 
did.  Id.  In this context, "reasonably" means 
sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without being arbitrary or capricious.  
Id.

 
 
[¶9]  W.R.E. 404(b) 
provides:

 
 
Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

 
 
Pursuant 
to this rule, evidence of uncharged misconduct is admissible to prove things 
other than character.  Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 17, 57 P.3d 337, 339-40 (Wyo. 2002).  Evidence of specific instances of 
uncharged misconduct is admissible to prove consequential facts, such as intent, 
knowledge or identity.  Id.  The list contained in Rule 404(b) of 
purposes for which evidence of other crimes may be admissible is not exclusive. 
Blakeman v. State, 2004 WY 139, ¶ 32, 
100 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Wyo. 2004). We have recognized, for example, that course of 
conduct evidence involving uncharged misconduct is admissible if it forms part 
of the history of the event or serves to enhance the natural development of the 
facts.  Id.  Uncharged misconduct evidence is not 
admissible, however, if its only purpose is to show a defendant has a 
disposition to commit crimes.  
Id.  

 
 
[¶10]  Mr. Bromley's claim that Rule 404(b) was 
violated is two-pronged.  First, he 
claims the rule was violated by the admission of the evidence considered at the 
404(b) hearing. Second, he claims the rule was violated by the admission of Ms. 
Vigil's testimony which was not identified by the State until after the 404(b) 
hearing.  We address these 
contentions separately.

 
 

a.      
Evidence 
Considered Prior to Trial

 
 
[¶11]  Prior to trial, in its traverse to Mr. 
Bromley's motion to exclude Rule 404(b) evidence, the State informed the 
district court and the defense that it intended to call Ms. Huntley to testify 
that she purchased a gram of methamphetamine from Mr. Bromley in January 2004 to 
smoke at his house; she purchased methamphetamine from him on approximately 
fifteen other occasions between January and June 9, 2004; on approximately eight 
occasions, she accompanied Mr. Bromley to Colorado to meet with his source for 
methamphetamine; and on the day of the charged delivery Mr. Bromley threatened 
to kill her father and children if she was a "snitch."  The State argued this testimony was 
admissible under Rule 404(b) because it tended to show Mr. Bromley's intent in 
possessing the methamphetamine found in his home was to deliver it to others; 
his knowledge of the controlled substance; and the absence of mistake. 

 
 
[¶12]  The State also advised that it intended 
to call Mr. DuFresne to testify that, while he was sharing a cell with Mr. 
Bromley after his arrest, Mr. Bromley admitted he was a methamphetamine dealer, 
said he was careful and had gotten away with it for a long time, and bragged 
that he made $12,000 per month selling methamphetamine.  The State argued Mr. DuFresne's 
testimony was admissible under Rule 404(b) for the same purposes as Ms. 
Huntley's testimony. 

 
 
[¶13]  The State also gave notice of its intent 
to introduce baggies containing misdemeanor amounts of marijuana that were found 
at Mr. Bromley's residence inside packages containing methamphetamine.  Mr. Bromley's fingerprint was found on 
one of the baggies containing marijuana.  The State argued the evidence was 
admissible because it identified Mr. Bromley as being directly involved with the 
controlled substances found at his residence.    

 
 
[¶14]  At the motion hearing, after hearing 
arguments of counsel, the district court denied Mr. Bromley's motion to exclude 
the baggie and Ms. Huntley's and Mr. DuFresne's testimony.  In its oral ruling, the district court 
stated:

 
 
Using 
the factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Gleason, including those set forth in 
the numbered paragraphs on page 10, the Court's going to allow the State's 
evidence regarding the testimony of Sadie Huntley. 

 
 
. . . 
for purposes of 404(b), I will [also] admit the testimony of Mr. 
DuFresne.

* * * 
*

The 
Court will allow the admission of the defendant's fingerprint on the baggie of 
marijuana. Certainly, this evidence is prejudicial against Mr. Bromley[;] as * * 
* in any criminal case, most of the evidence the State intends to use is 
prejudicial against the criminal defendant. That does not mean it is improper 
evidence.

 
 
The 
Court is convinced that the identity and lack of mistake purpose set forth by 
the State does, in fact, justify introduction of this evidence in the case of 
Ms. Huntley, as does a full explanation for the jury's benefit of [the] 
relationship of the parties.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
Certainly, 
as to all these issues, the pattern of conduct and lack of mistake issues are 
intertwined. These things don't occur in a vacuum, and we can't expect the jury 
to make its decision in a vacuum, either without knowing most of the facts that 
appropriately go to the jury. 

 
 
In its 
written order on the motion, the district court stated:

 
 
As the 
Court orally ruled on March 15, 2005, after applying the test set forth in Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332, this Court will permit the State to present the testimony of Ms. Huntley 
and Mr. DuFresne as well as the evidence of the marijuana baggies containing 
Defendant's fingerprints, as that information goes to show "identity" with 
respect to the charged crimes.  
Additionally, that evidence demonstrates a "lack of mistake" that 
justifies its introduction into evidence pursuant to Gleason and W.R.E. 404(b). And, while 
the testimony, no doubt, is prejudicial to defendant, the Court does not find 
its prejudicial nature outweighs its probative value.

 
 
[¶15]  At trial, Ms. Huntley testified that she 
had known Mr. Bromley for eight years and obtained methamphetamine from him 
beginning in 2003; after 2003, she purchased methamphetamine from him at his 
house regularly until his arrest in June 2004; sometimes she drove Mr. Bromley 
to purchase methamphetamine from his source; and she used methamphetamine with 
Mr. Bromley frequently at his home on Osprey Lane.  The State also called Mr. DuFresne who 
testified Mr. Bromley admitted he was a drug dealer, bragged that he had been 
dealing forever, and said DCI failed to discover money and methamphetamine at 
his residence after his arrest.  The 
State also introduced as an exhibit a baggie containing marijuana found inside a 
package containing methamphetamine during the search of Mr. Bromley's yard. 
 A fingerprint inside the baggie was 
identified as Mr. Bromley's. 

 
 
[¶16]  On appeal, the thrust of Mr. Bromley's 
claim of error is that the district court failed to follow the mandatory 
procedures for determining admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence set 
forth in Gleason, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d  at 
340.  Under Gleason:  1) the evidence must be offered for a 
proper purpose; 2) the evidence must be relevant; 3) the probative value of the 
evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair 
prejudice; and 4) upon request, the trial court must instruct the jury that the 
similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the purpose for which it was 
admitted.  Id.

 
 
[¶17]  Mr. Bromley also argues the district 
court did not comply with Gleason 
because there is no indication it considered the questions this Court said trial 
courts must consider in determining the probative value of evidence offered 
under Rule 404(b):

 
 

1.      
How 
clear is it that the defendant committed the prior bad 
act?

2.      
Does the 
defendant dispute the issue on which the state is offering the prior bad acts 
evidence?

3.      
Is other 
evidence available?

4.      
Is the 
evidence unnecessarily cumulative?

5.      
How much 
time has elapsed between the charged crime and the prior bad 
act?

 

Gleason, ¶ 27, 
57 P.3d  at 342.  Mr. Bromley further 
asserts the district court did not comply with Gleason because it did not consider the 
following factors:

 
 

1.                  
The 
reprehensible nature of the prior bad act.

2.                  
The 
sympathetic character of the alleged victim of the prior bad 
act.

3.                  
The 
similarity between the charged crime and the prior bad 
act.

4.                  
The 
comparative enormity of the charged crime and the prior bad 
act.

5.                  
The 
comparable relevance of the prior bad act to the proper and forbidden 
inferences.

6.                  
Whether 
the prior act resulted in a conviction.

 
 

Id.  In Gleason, we said:

 
 
In 
future cases involving the admissibility of evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), the 
record shall reflect the trial court's identification of the purpose or purposes 
for admission of the evidence, the findings and conclusions establishing 
relevance and probative value, and the factors considered in balancing probative 
value against the potential for unfair prejudice. The "shotgun approach" of 
listing every conceivable purpose for admissibility, followed by a bald 
statement that probative value outweighs prejudicial effect will no longer be 
sufficient. While the trial court need not make an express finding on every 
factor . . . , the record must contain sufficient findings to support the trial 
court's conclusions.

 
 

Gleason, ¶ 30, 
57 P.3d  at 343. 

 
 
[¶18] 
The district court's findings concerning the Rule 404(b) evidence in the present 
case do not reflect consideration of all of the factors identified in Gleason.  The findings, for example, do not 
clearly identify the factors the district court considered in balancing the 
probative value of the evidence against the potential for unfair prejudice. 
 The findings also do not reflect 
whether the district court considered the similarity between the charged crime 
and the prior misconduct.  The 
findings also do not reflect whether the district court considered "the extent 
to which the evidence distracts the jury from the central question whether the 
defendant committed the charged crime."  Gleason, ¶ 27, 57 P.3d  at 342.  The findings are not of the sort this 
Court described in Gleason as aiding 
appellate review. 

 
 
[¶19]  Additionally, the purposes the district 
court identified for admitting the evidence, i.e., proof of identity and absence 
of mistake, are less precise than Gleason instructed.  The uncharged misconduct evidence at 
issue seems more suggestive of a "plan" to possess methamphetamine with an 
intent to deliver or "knowledge" concerning the use and delivery of 
methamphetamine.  The evidence does 
not suggest an "absence of mistake or accident," particularly since Mr. Bromley 
claimed he did not possess the methamphetamine, by mistake or otherwise.  The evidence also was not of the sort 
typically admitted to show "identity" because the prior acts were not peculiar 
or unique enough to show a personal "signature."   Suliber v. State, 866 P.2d 85, 88 
(Wyo. 
1993).  However, the district 
court's failure to define its ruling as precisely as Gleason instructed does not rise to the 
level of an abuse of discretion.  It 
is clear from the record that the evidence was not admitted to prove Mr. 
Bromley's character in order to show action in conformity therewith.  Therefore, admission of the evidence did 
not violate Rule 404(b).  

 
 
[¶20]   In addition to being properly 
admitted to show a plan or knowledge, the evidence was, as the district court 
stated, admissible and relevant to show a course of conduct.  Although the district court did not use 
the words "relevant" or "relevancy", it emphasized the jury's need to have a 
full explanation of the relationship between Mr. Bromley and Ms. Huntley in 
order to decide the case.  
Referencing all of the disputed evidence, the district court stated, 
"These things don't occur in a vacuum and we can't expect the jury to make its 
decision in a vacuum." 

 
 
[¶21]  We have said, "[C]ourse of conduct 
evidence . . . is admissible to give a jury a complete story when it is relevant 
and necessary to tell the complete story for the jury's understanding."  Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 13, 42 P.3d 483, 487 (Wyo. 2002) (citation omitted).  Events do not occur in a vacuum and the 
jury has the right to have the offense placed in its proper setting.  Miller v. State, 755 P.2d 855, 861 
(Wyo. 1988). 
 The district court properly 
admitted the evidence to show Mr. Bromley's course of conduct. 

 
 
[¶22]  Mr. Bromley also asserts the district 
court should have excluded the evidence because its prejudicial effect far 
outweighed its probative value.  He 
claims "the State's case was based upon inferences stacked upon inferences from 
circumstantial evidence"; therefore, a reasonable probability existed that 
without the uncharged misconduct evidence, the verdict may have been more 
favorable.  We have concluded the 
uncharged misconduct evidence was properly admitted under Rule 404(b) to prove a 
plan, knowledge or course of conduct.  The main factor the district court 
considered in concluding the evidence was more probative than prejudicial was 
the jury's need to know the context in which the charges arose.  Considering this factor, we hold the 
district court reasonably concluded the probative value of the evidence 
outweighed its potential for prejudicing the jury.

 
 

b.     
Testimony 
Not Considered Prior to Trial

 
 
[¶23]  Prior to trial, but after the district 
court's ruling on the motion to exclude Rule 404(b) evidence, the State filed an 
amended witness list identifying Belle Moree Vigil as a potential witness.  The State indicated that, if called, Ms. 
Vigil was expected to testify:

 
 
[T]hat 
in the days prior to the Defendant's arrest she assisted the Defendant in 
packing paraphernalia into trash bags and a duffel bag and that the Defendant 
took the bags into the back yard. Vigil could testify that the Defendant kept 
methamphetamine in a black fanny pack that he kept around his neck. Vigil could 
testify that after the Defendant's arrest, that she went to Bromley's house with 
others and removed methamphetamine that the police had not found. 

 
 
The 
defense did not move to exclude the witness or her testimony prior to trial and 
the district court did not conduct a Gleason hearing concerning this 
evidence.  

 
 
[¶24]  During Ms. Vigil's trial testimony, the 
following exchange occurred:

 
 
Q.  So with Mr. Bromley, you had been using 
regularly for about a year?

A.  Uh-huh, a good 
year.

Q.  Had you gotten methamphetamine from Mr. 
Bromley during that time?

[Defense 
counsel]:  Your Honor, at this 
point, may I approach the bench with [the prosecutor]?

The 
Court:  You 
may.

(Whereupon, 
the following proceedings were had at the bench, outside the hearing of the 
Jury.)

[Defense 
counsel]:  Your Honor, I know that 
you've already ruled on it, but I wish to renew my objection to the entry of 
other acts for which he's not charged on the grounds that it's being used for 
purposes other than those that are permitted in 404(b). It is inflammatory and 
prejudicial.

The 
Court:  And this is the same issue 
that was ruled upon in my written pretrial rulings?

[Defense 
counsel]:  That's 
right.

The 
Court:  Your objection is noted and 
the ruling stands.

 
 
As this 
excerpt reflects, defense counsel suggested that Ms. Vigil's testimony was 
considered at the 404(b) hearing when in fact it was not.  The State stood silent and did not advise 
the court that Ms. Vigil's testimony was not considered at the 
hearing.

 
 
 
 
[¶25]  After this exchange, Ms. Vigil testified 
she obtained methamphetamine from Mr. Bromley during the year they were using it 
together, describing Mr. Bromley as "very generous."  She loaned her car to him and in return 
she "could have $100 worth of drugs, speed, whatever."  Ms. Vigil also testified that the night 
before Mr. Bromley's arrest, she helped him put paraphernalia in bags and carry 
them outside the house.  After Mr. 
Bromley's arrest she and another woman went back to his house and found 
methamphetamine not discovered by law enforcement.  Mr. Bromley contends the admission of 
Ms. Vigil's testimony without the mandatory Gleason hearing requires reversal. 

 
 
[¶26]   The State claims the doctrine of 
invited error applies to preclude Mr. Bromley from complaining on appeal about 
any error in the admission of Ms. Vigil's testimony because the defense induced 
the error by telling the district court it had already decided the issue at the 
pretrial motion hearing.  We 
disagree.  In James v. State, 998 P.2d 389, 392 (Wyo. 
2000), we made clear that for the doctrine of invited error to apply the defense 
must have solicited or consented to the admission of inadmissible evidence. 
 In James, defense counsel objected to a 
witness reading from a journal that had not been admitted into evidence.  The State offered the journal into 
evidence and the trial court twice asked the defense if there were any 
objections to its admission.  Defense counsel answered no both times 
and the journal was admitted.  We 
said:

 
 
The 
doctrine of "invited error" has long been recognized in Wyoming and "embodies the 
principle that a party will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which 
he himself induced or provoked the court or the opposite party to commit."  Schott v. State, 864 P.2d 38, 39 
(Wyo.1993) (quoting 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 713, at 159 (1962)).  Generally, defense counsel must have 
solicited or otherwise acted affirmatively for the invited error doctrine to 
apply.  Id. In this 
case, James' defense counsel failed to object to the error at trial, but did not 
solicit or consent to admitting the hearsay evidence, and we will not apply the 
invited error doctrine to these facts.

 
 

Id. at 
393.  In Mr. Bromley's case, defense 
counsel not only did not solicit or consent to Ms. Vigil's testimony, she 
objected to it.  Under these 
circumstances, the invited error doctrine does not apply.

 
 
[¶27]  The State contends next that Ms. Vigil's 
testimony was not uncharged misconduct evidence; therefore, no Gleason hearing was required.  The State points to Ms. Vigil's testimony 
that she helped Mr. Bromley load paraphernalia into bags and move it out of the 
house the night before his arrest.  We agree with the State that this part of 
Ms. Vigil's testimony was not uncharged misconduct evidence.  Rather, her testimony in this regard 
presented an account of Mr. Bromley's activities related to the crimes charged. 
 It was relevant to refute his claim 
that the paraphernalia found outside his house was not his and to prove his 
knowledge that he illegally possessed controlled substances.  Additionally, some of the charges against 
Mr. Bromley arose from the discovery of the items Ms. Vigil helped hide.  Because this testimony did not concern 
uncharged misconduct, Rule 404(b) does not apply to this part of her 
testimony.  However, Ms. Vigil also 
testified concerning her history of using methamphetamine with Mr. Bromley and 
obtaining it from him.  She further 
testified concerning methamphetamine she and others retrieved from his residence 
after the search by law enforcement.  This testimony clearly constituted 
uncharged misconduct evidence.  
   

 
 
[¶28]  With respect to this part of Ms. Vigil's 
testimony, we consider Mr. Bromley's claim that reversal is required because no 
Gleason hearing was held to determine 
its admissibility. In Gleason, the 
Court addressed a similar claim that testimony was improperly admitted because 
it was not listed in the State's notice of uncharged misconduct and was not the 
subject of an appropriate Gleason 
hearing.  Gleason, ¶ 24, 57 P.3d  at 341.  We considered the claim under the plain 
error standard because the defense did not object to the testimony.  We concluded there was no plain error 
because the State listed the testimony in its pretrial memorandum so it was not 
a surprise and the testimony was brief and did not reveal any new information. 
 Id.  We did 
not hold the failure to conduct a Gleason hearing on the testimony 
required reversal.     

 
 
[¶29]  For similar reasons we conclude the 
district court's failure to conduct a Gleason hearing on Ms. Vigil's testimony 
does not require reversal.  Ms. 
Vigil's testimony concerning uncharged misconduct was of the same nature as 
other testimony the district court considered at the Gleason hearing.  Like Ms. Vigil, Ms. Huntley testified 
about her history of using methamphetamine with Mr. Bromley and obtaining it 
from him.  Like Ms. Vigil, Mr. 
DuFresne testified that DCI failed to discover methamphetamine in its search of 
Mr. Bromley's property.  Ms. Vigil's 
testimony was not a surprise to the defense because the State identified the 
witness and the substance of her testimony in its amended witness list.  The uncharged misconduct portions of Ms. 
Vigil's testimony were brief.  The 
only part of her testimony that was new to the jury, in the sense that no other 
witness gave similar testimony, was her testimony that she helped Mr. Bromley 
package and remove paraphernalia from his home the night before his arrest. 
 As we stated above, this testimony 
was not uncharged misconduct evidence and did not require a Gleason hearing.  Given the brevity and cumulative nature 
of the remainder of her testimony, we hold the district court's failure to 
conduct a Gleason hearing to 
determine its admissibility does not require reversal.

 
 

2.              
Limiting 
Instruction

 
 
[¶30]  Mr. Bromley claims the district court 
erred in instructing the jury it could consider the uncharged misconduct 
evidence to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.  Mr. Bromley claims the district court 
should have instructed the jury it could consider the evidence only for the 
purposes specified in its Rule 404(b) order.  

 
 
[¶31] 
When reviewing questions involving jury instructions, we afford the trial court 
significant deference.  Farmer v. State, 2005 WY 162, ¶ 20, 124 P.3d 699, 706 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
 
A trial 
court is given wide latitude in instructing the jury and, as long as the 
instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge covers the relevant 
issue, reversible error will not be found.  
Instructions must be considered as a whole, and individual instructions, 
or parts of them, should not be singled out and considered in isolation.  Prejudice will be determined to exist 
only where an appellant demonstrates that the instruction given confused or 
misled the jury with respect to the proper principles of law.  

 
 

Luedtke 
v. State, 2005 
WY 8, ¶ 28, 117 P.3d 1227, 1232 (Wyo. 2005) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶32]  The instruction about which Mr. Bromley 
complains read as follows:

 
 
During 
the course of the trial, you have heard evidence that, at a time other than the 
times alleged in the State's Information, the Defendant committed acts similar 
to the acts charged here.  You may 
not consider such evidence as proof of the Defendant's character in order to 
show he acted in conformity with such character.

 
 
If, 
however, you find, first that the State of Wyoming has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the Defendant has committed the other acts, you may 
consider those similar acts in determining whether they are relevant to those 
for which the Defendant is accused by proving motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident in 
determining whether or not the State has proved the allegations of its 
Information beyond a reasonable doubt.

 
 
[¶33]  On appeal, Mr. Bromley contends this 
instruction was not a limiting instruction at all because it failed to instruct 
the jury that it could consider the evidence only for the purposes for which the 
district court admitted it under Rule 404(b). Mr. Bromley contends he was 
substantially prejudiced by this error and a reasonable probability exists that 
in the absence of the erroneous instruction the verdict might have been more 
favorable.  The State argues the 
doctrine of invited error applies to preclude Mr. Bromley from claiming error in 
the instruction because the instruction was proposed and not objected to by the 
defense. 

 
 
[¶34]  Our rules governing the admission of 
uncharged misconduct evidence include the requirement that upon request the 
trial court must instruct the jury the evidence is to be considered only for the 
proper purpose for which it was admitted.  
Gleason, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d  at 
340.  In Mr. Bromley's case, upon 
ruling the evidence admissible, the district court informed the defense it was 
entitled to a specific instruction concerning the purpose of the evidence.  Defense counsel responded that she had 
prepared a general instruction addressing Rule 404(b) evidence but would submit 
a revised one reflecting the court's ruling.  Apparently, defense counsel failed to do 
so.  During the instruction 
conference, the court read the instruction about which Mr. Bromley now complains 
and asked whether either counsel objected. Defense counsel replied, "I do 
not."  Mr. Bromley asked about the 
instruction and defense counsel responded:

 
 
This is 
an instruction, that says if they heard testimony that you did other things, 
they have to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that you did it, and they can't 
 they can't use the fact that that you might have done something else in the 
past to say that you did this, just because you're a bad character.  And if they do decide to take it into 
consideration for some other purpose, they have to be satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that it occurred.

 
 
Defense 
counsel went on to explain that the instruction was a combination of two 
instructions she had submitted because:

 

I want 
the Jury to proceed with caution. For example, Sadie Huntley testified that you 
had given her methamphetamine in the past. * * * And so this is to make sure the 
Jury takes that in the right way and gives it the right weight. * * * Doesn't 
give it weight when it's not supposed to give it weight.

 
 
[¶35]  As the record clearly reflects, defense 
counsel not only failed to object to the instruction which now forms the basis 
for Mr. Bromley's claim of error on appeal, she proposed it, failed to revise it 
and then argued in favor of it.  The 
doctrine of invited error prohibits a party from raising error on appeal that 
was induced by the party's own actions.  
Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, 
¶ 29, 123 P.3d 543, 552 (Wyo. 2005).  
As applied to jury instructions, the invited error doctrine provides that 
use of an instruction proposed by the appellant may not be grounds for reversal 
unless the instruction was necessarily prejudicial.  Id. We hold the doctrine applies, 
precluding reversal based upon the improper instruction absent a showing by Mr. 
Bromley that the instruction was necessarily prejudicial.  We are at a loss to see how the 
instruction prejudiced Mr. Bromley, and he provides no assistance, stating in 
his brief only that the prejudice to him was "so substantial, there is a 
reasonable probability that in the absence of this error the verdict might have 
been more favorable to him." We hold Mr. Bromley has failed to meet his burden 
of showing the instruction was necessarily prejudicial.1  

 
 

3.              
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶36]  Mr. Bromley claims the evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions for possession 
with intent to deliver and possession.  He contends the State failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt necessary elements of those offenses.  Specifically, he claims the State failed 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed a felony amount of 
methamphetamine and, if he did possess it, that he intended to deliver 
it.

 
 
[¶37]  When reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence, this Court accepts as true the State's evidence and affords it those 
inferences which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it.  Jones v. State, 2006 WY 40, ¶ 9, 132 P.3d 162, 165 (Wyo. 2006).  We do 
not consider conflicting evidence or inferences that can be drawn from such 
evidence.  Id. Our duty is to determine whether a quorum 
of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the 
same result as the jury actually did.  
Id.

 
 
[¶38]  Applying these standards, we review the 
evidence presented by the State, and inferences that may be drawn from it, to 
determine whether a reasonable jury could have concluded the State proved the 
charges against Mr. Bromley beyond a reasonable doubt.  The State presented Ms. Huntley's 
testimony that on June 9, 2004, she went to Mr. Bromley's house "to get high." 
 Mr. Bromley loaded a pipe with 
methamphetamine, handed it to her and she smoked it.  Ms. Huntley began to feel sick, left the 
house and ran to the neighbor's where she called for help.  

 
 
[¶39]  During her testimony, Ms. Huntley 
identified one of the State's exhibits as a glass pipe that she and Mr. Bromley 
purchased a few weeks before his arrest.  
She testified Mr. Bromley wore a black fanny pack containing 
methamphetamine around his neck.  She also testified Mr. Bromley kept track 
of individuals who purchased methamphetamine from him, how much they purchased 
and how much they owed on a sheet of glass found in his bedroom and introduced 
as an exhibit.  She identified the 
black fanny pack Mr. Bromley wore around his neck and described how he kept the 
money he was paid for methamphetamine in $500 bundles. 

 
 
[¶40]  Ms. Vigil testified that the night 
before Mr. Bromley's arrest, she helped him put drug paraphernalia in bags, 
including a trash bag and a duffle bag.  
She testified she and Mr. Bromley smoked methamphetamine, which he 
provided, that night. 

 
 
[¶41] 
The State presented evidence that, in executing the search warrant inside Mr. 
Bromley's residence, agents found a black fanny pack containing several bags of 
U.S. currency, metal tins containing 
bags of methamphetamine and marijuana, a propane lighter and a glass pipe of the 
sort commonly used to smoke methamphetamine.  Agents found approximately 2.36 grams of 
methamphetamine in the bags inside the fanny pack.  

 
 
[¶42]  Agents also found a large brown garbage 
bag and a blue duffle bag underneath a stock tank outside Mr. Bromley's 
residence.  Ms. Vigil identified the 
garbage bag and the duffle bag as the ones she had packed the night before Mr. 
Bromley's arrest.  Inside the 
garbage bag, agents found a security box containing various sized plastic 
packaging bags of the type commonly used for packaging methamphetamine.  They also found an electronic scale, a 
mirror, a sifter commonly used to sift controlled substances, a cookie can 
containing several pill bottles and small plastic containers with 
methamphetamine residue, a screen, butane torches and lighters, smoking papers, 
a broken pipe, funnels, and glass beakers.  
Inside the duffle bag, agents found an oxygen tank, pieces of sheet 
metal, two black fanny packs, tongs and a tape entitled "Secrets of Making Glass 
Pipes."   

 
 
[¶43]  Agents also searched a storage shed 
outside the residence and found a brown trash sack containing boxes and more 
bags.  Inside the boxes and bags, 
agents found pill bottles containing methamphetamine and methamphetamine 
residue, a vial, a small bag containing marijuana, a scale, a calculator, glass 
pipes used for smoking methamphetamine, torches, lighters, and other controlled 
substances paraphernalia.  One of 
the pill bottles contained nine grams of methamphetamine.  

 
 
[¶44] 
Inside the residence in Mr. Bromley's bedroom, agents found scales and other 
paraphernalia and a surveillance tape showing Mr. Bromley wearing a black fanny 
pack around his neck.  Agents also 
found a scale in the dining room and a glass pipe in the living room.  The State introduced evidence showing 
that Mr. Bromley's fingerprints were found on a number of the items seized from 
his residence.   

 
 
[¶45]  Accepting this evidence as true and 
giving it all reasonable inferences, we hold a quorum of reasonable and rational 
individuals could have concluded Mr. Bromley was guilty of possession and 
possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance.  The State presented evidence from which 
the jury could have reasonably concluded Mr. Bromley had methamphetamine in his 
possession and shared it with others on the night before his arrest.  The State presented evidence from which 
the jury could have reasonably concluded he had the accoutrements commonly 
associated with the sale of methamphetamine.  Although no evidence directly showed Mr. 
Bromley possessed the nine grams of methamphetamine found outside his residence, 
the State presented ample circumstantial evidence from which the jury could 
reasonably conclude it was Mr. Bromley's.  The evidence was sufficient to support 
the jury's verdict of guilty of possession and possession with intent to 
deliver.     

 
 
4.         
Merger of Sentences

 
 
[¶46]  Mr. Bromley claims his convictions for 
felony possession of methamphetamine and possession with intent to deliver were 
based upon the same evidence and should have merged for sentencing purposes. 
 He claims the sentence to 
consecutive terms of imprisonment on the two convictions was illegal.  Addressing claims of illegal sentences, 
we have said:

 
 
An 
illegal sentence is one that exceeds statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of 
imprisonment for the same offense, or otherwise violates constitutions or the 
law.  The determination of whether a 
sentence is illegal is made by reference to the authorizing statute or 
applicable constitutional provisions and is, therefore, a matter of statutory 
interpretation.  Interpretation of 
statutes is a question of law, which we review de novo.

 
 

Brown v. 
State, 2004 
WY 119, ¶ 7, 99 P.3d 489, 491 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶47]  Addressing the concept of merger of 
sentences, we have said:

 
 
            
As a practical matter, in appeals alleging imposition of multiple 
sentences for a single act, the focus is on those facts proven at trial.  The ultimate question is whether those 
facts reveal a single criminal act or multiple distinct offenses against the 
victim.  Where the acts required for 
the commission of one offense are a necessary and indispensable precursor to 
commission of a second offense, the offenses merge for purposes of 
sentencing.  Such merger is 
mandatory where the second offense cannot be committed absent commission of the 
first offense.  If the statutory 
elements test reveals disparate component parts to the two charged offenses, it 
may be presumed that the legislature intended separate or cumulative punishments 
upon convictions of both. 

 
 

Sincock 
v. State, 2003 
WY 115, ¶ 11, 76 P.3d 323, 329-30 (Wyo. 2003) (citations omitted).  With these principles in mind, we turn 
to the specifics of the charges on which Mr. Bromley was convicted and 
sentenced.

 
 
[¶48]  Mr. Bromley was charged with possession 
of a felony amount of a controlled substance in violation of § 35-7-1031(c)(ii), 
which provides as follows:

 
 
(c) It 
is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled 
substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to a 
valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this act. Any person 
who violates this subsection:

            
            
(i)  And has in his 
possession a controlled substance in the amount set forth in this paragraph is 
guilty of a misdemeanor * * *. For purposes of this paragraph, the amounts of a 
controlled substance are as follows:

 
 
            
* * *

            
            
            
(C)  For a controlled 
substance in powder or crystalline form, no more than three (3) 
grams;

(ii) And 
has in his possession methamphetamine or a controlled substance classified in 
Schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug in an amount greater than those set 
forth in paragraph (c)(i) of this section, is guilty of a felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than seven (7) years, a fine of not more than ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both; 

 
 
Pursuant 
to this provision, the jury was instructed that it could find Mr. Bromley guilty 
of felony possession if it found that he knowingly and intentionally possessed 
more than three grams of methamphetamine.  

 
 
[¶49] 
Mr. Bromley was also charged with possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to deliver in violation of § 35-7-1031(a)(i), which 
provides:

 
 
(a)  Except as authorized by this act, it is 
unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to 
manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.  Any person who violates this subsection 
with respect to:

       (i)  Methamphetamine or a controlled 
substance classified in Schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, is guilty of 
a crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than twenty (20) 
years, or fined not more than twenty-five thousand ($25,000.00), or both.     

 
 
Pursuant 
to this provision, the jury was instructed it could find Mr. Bromley guilty of 
possession with intent to deliver if the evidence showed beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he possessed methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it to another 
person.    

 
 
[¶50]  The jury found Mr. Bromley guilty of 
possession and possession with intent to deliver.  The district court sentenced him to a 
term of years on the possession conviction and to a separate term of years to be 
served consecutively on the possession with intent to deliver charge.  It is these two sentences that Mr. 
Bromley argues are illegal because possession was a necessary and indispensable 
precursor to possession with intent to deliver and the offenses merged for 
purposes of sentencing. 

 
 
[¶51]  The State argues the sentences did not 
merge because different facts supported the possession conviction than supported 
the possession with intent to deliver conviction.  The State claims the felony possession 
conviction was supported by the evidence of nine grams of methamphetamine and 
paraphernalia used to consume it found outside Mr. Bromley's house.  The State claims the possession with 
intent to deliver conviction was supported by the evidence of 2.94 grams of 
methamphetamine and paraphernalia used to sell it found inside his house.  

 
 
[¶52]  It has long been the rule in Wyoming 
that if a person is charged with delivery of a controlled substance and 
possession with intent to deliver precisely the same substance, 
the possession with intent to deliver charge merges with the delivery charge for 
sentencing purposes.  Boyd v. State, 528 P.2d 287, 289 
(Wyo. 1974). 
 This is so because possession with 
intent to deliver a controlled substance is a necessary and indispensable 
precursor to delivery when the latter charge involves precisely the same 
controlled substance as the former charge.  Thus, where the defendant was convicted 
of one count of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and another count 
of delivery of the same cocaine which gave rise to the possession conviction, 
the two convictions merged for sentencing purposes.  Id.  Stated more 
generally,

 
 
[W]hen 
the facts show that the defendant's act in violation of crime B could not have 
been accomplished in any way other than through prior violation of crime A, the 
two charges must merge for purposes of sentencing.  

 
 

Bilderback 
v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 254 (Wyo. 2000). 

 
 
[¶53]  Applying these principles to Mr. 
Bromley's claim, it is clear he could not be sentenced separately for the 
possession conviction and for the possession with the intent to deliver 
conviction if the two convictions involved precisely the same 
methamphetamine.  The evidence 
presented at trial, however, showed that Mr. Bromley possessed methamphetamine 
both for his own use and for delivery to others.  The evidence also showed agents found 
separate packages of methamphetamine in different quantities in several 
locations in and around Mr. Bromley's residence.  Under these circumstances, separate 
sentences for possession and possession with intent to deliver were proper.   

 
 
[¶54]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In his reply brief, Mr. 
Bromley raises a new issue.  In the 
event this Court concludes invited error occurred, he claims defense counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.  To demonstrate ineffectiveness, an 
appellant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that 
prejudice resulted.  Hirsch v. State, 2006 WY 66, ¶ 15, 135 P.3d 586, 593-94 (Wyo. 
2006).  Because we conclude Mr. Bromley has not 
shown prejudice resulted from the limiting instruction, his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim fails.