Case Title: Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation

Citation: 

Docket Number: S248141

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2020-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
EVAN WEISS et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
THE PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION et al.,                            
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S248141 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Three 
G052735 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
30-2012-00605637  
 
 
July 16, 2020 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, and Kruger concurred. 
 
1 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION                            
S248141 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1260.0401 authorizes a 
pretrial motion for a ruling on “an evidentiary or other legal 
issue affecting the determination of compensation.”  (Id., subd. 
(a).)  This motion is one of the special procedures set out in the 
Eminent Domain Law.  (§§ 1230.010–1273.050.)  The public 
entity2 defendants in this inverse condemnation action ask us to 
“judicially import” section 1260.040 into inverse condemnation 
procedure.  We deny this request.  The special statutory 
procedures that govern a public entity’s exercise of the power of 
eminent domain are inapplicable in inverse condemnation 
actions, which instead proceed by the rules governing ordinary 
civil actions.  We usually leave the adoption and amendment of 
statewide rules governing the conduct of trial court proceedings 
to the Legislature or the Judicial Council, and we see no reason 
to depart from our usual practice in this context. 
A trial court may, in certain circumstances, devise or 
borrow a procedure appropriate to the specific litigation before 
it.  But it may not do so when an applicable procedure is 
                                        
1 
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references 
are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 
2 
We use “public entity” as shorthand:  Certain “quasi-
public entities” are authorized by statute to utilize the eminent 
domain power as well.  (§§ 1240.040, 1245.320, 1245.326.) 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
provided by a statute or rule of court.  In this action, the public 
entities borrowed section 1260.040 from the Eminent Domain 
Law and used it to request a dispositive pretrial ruling on 
inverse condemnation liability.  We conclude the trial court 
erred in using this procedure because the summary judgment 
statute was available for that purpose and any disputes of 
material fact could have been resolved in a bench trial.  The 
Court of Appeal reached a similar conclusion and reversed the 
trial court’s judgment.  We affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Trial Court Proceedings 
This case began when the owners of three single-family 
homes and a small hotel located just to the east of the Interstate 
5 freeway (the Property Owners) filed suit against the 
Department of Transportation and the Orange County 
Transportation Authority (the Agencies).  The Agencies had 
constructed two walls on the west side of the freeway—the side 
opposite the Property Owners’ properties.  Designed as sound 
barriers, these walls were intended to reduce the level of 
freeway traffic noise audible on the west side of the freeway.  In 
their complaint, the Property Owners alleged the sound barriers 
deflected noise, vibrations, dust, and nighttime glare onto their 
properties.  On this basis, they claimed the Agencies are liable 
to them in inverse condemnation.  They also pled trespass and 
nuisance claims. 
The Agencies demurred, and the trial court sustained the 
demurrer to the trespass claim but overruled the demurrers to 
the inverse condemnation and nuisance claims.  In its demurrer 
to the inverse condemnation claim, defendant Orange County 
Transportation Authority argued the Property Owners had 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
failed to allege the sound barriers caused damage to their 
properties that was different from the damage caused to 
neighboring properties.  It contended this showing was 
necessary to prove an inverse condemnation claim based on an 
“intangible intrusion” onto a property.  In overruling the 
demurrer, the trial court concluded that such a showing is not 
necessary.  The court ruled that the Property Owners’ 
allegations relating to the deflection of noise, vibrations, dust, 
and nighttime glare onto their properties were sufficient to 
support their inverse condemnation claim.  The Agencies 
answered the complaint, and both sides conducted discovery.   
Three months before the jury trial was set to begin, the 
Agencies filed the motion at issue in this case.  Titled “Motion 
for Legal Determination of Liability re Inverse Condemnation 
Action,” it requested judgment in the Agencies’ favor on the 
Property Owners’ inverse condemnation claim.  The Agencies 
renewed their contention that the Property Owners had to show 
they had experienced damage to their properties that was 
different from the damage experienced by neighboring property 
owners—the contention the court had rejected on demurrer.  
They further argued that, as a factual matter, the Property 
Owners could not make this showing.  The Agencies also filed a 
separate “Motion for Legal Determination of Liability re 
Nuisance Claim,” claiming immunity.  In support of both 
motions, the Agencies submitted declarations, deposition 
transcripts, responses to interrogatories, planning documents, 
and documentation of complaints about the sound barrier.  The 
Agencies cited section 1260.040 as the basis of their authority to 
request a legal determination of liability on both claims.   
The Property Owners opposed the Agencies’ motion 
related to the inverse condemnation claim on three independent 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
grounds.  First, they argued that a section 1260.040 motion may 
only be brought in eminent domain actions.  Second, they argued 
that even in an eminent domain action, a section 1260.040 
motion cannot be used to request a liability determination.  
Third, they argued there was substantial evidence supporting a 
ruling in their favor on liability, such that they were entitled to 
a bench trial.  They contended that the law did not require them 
to show that their properties were the only ones in the 
neighborhood that experienced an increase in noise, vibrations, 
dust, and glare, but instead only that their properties suffered 
damage beyond what was necessarily incident to their proximity 
to the sound barriers.  To demonstrate they could make this 
showing, they submitted declarations, photographs, Google 
Street View images, expert witness declarations, deposition 
transcripts, sound measurements, and government protocols for 
noise analysis.   
On reply, the Agencies argued a bench trial was not 
needed.  They claimed that section 1260.040 authorizes the 
court to weigh competing evidence and resolve issues of fact in 
inverse condemnation and related tort actions.  They asserted 
the documents the parties had provided the court showed 
neighboring properties experienced similar damage from the 
sound barriers.  Accordingly, they argued, the Property Owners 
had not proved their inverse condemnation claim.   
The trial court granted the Agencies’ motions.  Entering 
judgment in the Agencies’ favor on the inverse condemnation 
claim, the court ruled that the Property Owners “cannot meet 
their burden [of] showing the injuries suffered were ‘peculiar’ to 
their properties” because they “cannot show they suffered a 
unique and peculiar damage ‘not such as is common to all 
property in the neighborhood.’ ”  In support of this ruling, the 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
court pointed to deposition testimony and documents tending to 
show that neighboring properties had experienced similar 
damage.  These documents included a map, from which the court 
inferred that buildings not owned by the Property Owners but 
situated between their properties were “suffering damages from 
the [s]ound wall,” and a complaint in a separate lawsuit filed by 
owners of nearby properties.  The court also entered judgment 
against the Property Owners on the nuisance claim.  The court 
did not address the Property Owners’ arguments about the 
scope of section 1260.040 or specify whether it considered that 
section to be the source of its authority to consider the Agencies’ 
motions. 
B.  The Court of Appeal’s Decision 
On appeal, the Property Owners argued that section 
1260.040 does not authorize trial courts to make dispositive 
rulings on liability in inverse condemnation actions.  In 
response, the Agencies conceded section 1260.040 does not apply 
“directly” in inverse condemnation actions.  However, they 
asked the Court of Appeal to “import” section 1260.040 into 
inverse condemnation procedure and authorize its use to 
request dispositive rulings on inverse condemnation liability, a 
use the Court of Appeal previously had approved in Dina v. 
People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 
1029 (Dina).  The Agencies told the Court of Appeal it could do 
this because the Legislature left the law of inverse 
condemnation “ ‘for determination by judicial development’ ” 
and “cross-pollination” in the area of takings law “is the general 
rule.” 
The Court of Appeal rejected the Agencies’ request, 
disagreeing with Dina, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th 1029, to the 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
extent the Dina court viewed section 1260.040 as authorizing a 
motion procedure that may be used to decide liability issues in 
inverse condemnation actions.  (Weiss v. People ex rel. Dept. of 
Transportation (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1156, 1161–1162, 1167–
1170 (Weiss).)3  The Court of Appeal concluded there was no 
reason to judicially create “a novel summary mechanism” for 
determining inverse condemnation liability.  (Weiss, at p. 1167.) 
Having rejected the Agencies’ invitation to “import” 
section 1260.040 into inverse condemnation procedure, the 
Court of Appeal concluded that reversal of the trial court’s 
judgment in the Agencies’ favor was necessary.  (Weiss, supra, 
20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1176.)  It characterized the trial court’s 
decision as, in effect, “an early summary judgment ruling,” 
entered without adherence to “the detailed statutory constraints 
governing summary judgment motions.”  (Id. at p. 1175.)  It 
observed that this procedure did not “meaningfully ‘supplement’ 
existing pretrial procedures governing a summary judgment 
motion” but simply replaced them, thereby “short circuit[ing] 
the case on liability grounds.”  (Id. at pp. 1176–1177.)  The Court 
of Appeal further rejected the Agencies’ reliance on Dina, supra, 
151 Cal.App.4th 1029 as a basis for the trial court’s authority to 
resolve the nuisance claim on a section 1260.040 motion, 
concluding that the Property Owners “were entitled to a jury 
trial absent a summary judgment motion or other statutorily 
                                        
3 
As the Court of Appeal recognized, the property owners in 
Dina, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th 1029 did not object to the use of 
section 1260.040 on the ground that the action “ ‘involved 
inverse condemnation rather than eminent domain.’ ”  (Weiss, 
supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1170.) 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
authorized manner of case disposition.”  (Weiss, supra, 20 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1162.) 
The Agencies petitioned for review of the Court of Appeal’s 
ruling on their inverse condemnation cause of action only, citing 
the Court of Appeal’s disagreement with Dina, supra, 151 
Cal.App.4th 1029.  We granted review.  
II. DISCUSSION 
 
The Agencies concede here, as they did in the Court of 
Appeal, that section 1260.040 applies in eminent domain actions 
only.  They acknowledge that “the statutory language and 
legislative history express no intent that section 1260.040 
should apply in inverse condemnation cases.”  Nevertheless, the 
Agencies urge us, as they urged the Court of Appeal, to “import” 
section 1260.040 into inverse condemnation procedure “as a 
matter of judicial development” and to sanction their reliance on 
it to request entry of judgment on an inverse condemnation 
claim without a bench trial.  They contend we can do this 
because the Legislature has left the development of inverse 
condemnation law to the judicial branch.  And they argue we 
should do this because the use of the section 1260.040 procedure 
in inverse condemnation actions would promote the same broad 
policy objective it does in the eminent domain context:  timely 
resolution.  For the reasons discussed below, we decline this 
request and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
A.  Section 1260.040 Was Not Intended To Provide 
for a Case-dispositive Motion in Eminent 
Domain Actions 
To frame our consideration of the Agencies’ request that 
we “import” section 1260.040 into inverse condemnation 
procedure, we begin with some background on the procedures 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
governing liability and compensation determinations in 
eminent domain and inverse condemnation actions, with a focus 
on the specific purpose section 1260.040 serves in eminent 
domain proceedings.  
1.   Determining Just Compensation for a Taking  
The 
California 
Constitution 
guarantees 
“just 
compensation” whenever private property is “taken or damaged 
for a public use.”  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 19, subd. (a).)  Eminent 
domain and inverse condemnation are distinct procedures for 
ensuring that property owners receive just compensation 
whenever public entities take or damage their property. 
Certain aspects of eminent domain law and procedure are 
codified in the Code of Civil Procedure.  These provisions—
among them section 1260.040—make up the Eminent Domain 
Law.  (§ 1230.010.)  By contrast, the Legislature generally has 
left inverse condemnation law “ ‘for determination by judicial 
development.’ ”  (Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Los 
Angeles (2006) 39 Cal.4th 507, 530 (Regency Outdoor 
Advertising).)  And the special procedures of the Eminent 
Domain Law do not apply to inverse condemnation actions. 
In an eminent domain action, a public entity exercises its 
authority to condemn private property.  This exercise of 
authority involves a “quite elaborate and lengthy process 
established by the Eminent Domain Law and related statutes.”  
(Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 151, 
188 (Property Reserve).)  Before filing the complaint that 
initiates an eminent domain action, a public entity must have 
an appraisal performed, make an offer to the property owner for 
the property’s fair market value as established by the appraisal, 
and adopt a resolution of necessity through a noticed hearing.  
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
(§ 1245.220; Gov. Code, § 7267.2.)  To take possession of the 
property before judgment, the public entity must make a motion 
for an order of possession and deposit probable compensation 
with the state treasury.  (§§ 1255.010, 1255.410.)   
The public entity concedes liability at the outset of an 
eminent domain action, so “there is ordinarily no question that 
[the public entity] has ‘taken or damaged’ ” the property at issue.  
(San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 893, 939 (San Diego Gas).)  For this reason, “[e]minent 
domain actions typically focus on the amount of compensation 
owed the property owner.”  (Regency Outdoor Advertising, 
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 530; see People v. Ricciardi (1943) 23 
Cal.2d 390, 400; 1 Matteoni, Condemnation Practice in Cal. 
(Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 2005) § 9.26 (rev. 9/17) (Matteoni).) 
By contrast, an inverse condemnation action proceeds 
under the rules governing ordinary civil actions.  A property 
owner initiates an inverse condemnation action by filing a 
complaint in the trial court after the alleged taking has already 
occurred.  (Regency Outdoor Advertising, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 
530.)  As is true of the present action, most inverse 
condemnation actions involve disputed claims that the public 
entity has damaged or constructively taken, rather than directly 
taken, the property at issue.  (Property Reserve, supra, 1 Cal.5th 
at pp. 189–190; Matteoni, supra, § 13.1.)  In such actions, “ ‘the 
property owner must first clear the hurdle of establishing that 
the public entity has, in fact, taken [or damaged] his or her 
property’ ” before the issue of just compensation comes into play.  
(San Diego Gas, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 940.)  Issues of inverse 
condemnation liability may be addressed on demurrer, through 
a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or at 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
a bench trial.  (§§ 430.30, 437c; Healing v. California Coastal 
Com. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1170 (Healing).) 
The California Constitution gives property owners the 
right to have a jury determine the compensation they are owed 
when a public entity takes or damages their property.  (Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 19, subd. (a).)  But “[w]e have long held that this 
jury right applies only to determining the appropriate amount 
of compensation . . . .”  (City of Perris v. Stamper (2016) 1 Cal.5th 
576, 593 (City of Perris).)  All other questions of fact or mixed 
questions of law and fact are decided by the court.  (Metropolitan 
Water Dist. of So. California v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc. 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 954, 971 (Metropolitan Water Dist.).) 
In 
both 
eminent 
domain 
actions 
and 
inverse 
condemnation actions, the key evidence in a jury trial is expert 
testimony concerning the valuation of the property at issue.  
(Recommendation: Early Disclosure of Valuation Data and 
Resolution of Issues in Eminent Domain (Oct. 2000) 30 Cal. Law 
Revision 
Com. 
Rep. 
(2000) 
p. 
573 
(CLRC 
Valuation 
Recommendations); Matteoni, supra, § 9.29.)  The Eminent 
Domain Law provides special pretrial procedures for the 
exchange of valuation data used by each side’s experts and the 
making of final offers and demands.  (§§ 1258.210–1258.300.)  If 
at the time of this exchange the trial court has not yet ruled on 
evidentiary and legal issues affecting the determination of 
compensation, the experts’ competing valuations of the 
condemned property will be further apart from each other and 
the 
case 
less 
likely 
to 
settle. 
 
(CLRC 
Valuation 
Recommendations, supra, at pp. 584–587.)  As with other 
provisions of the Eminent Domain Law governing the unique 
course of eminent domain proceedings, the Legislature has not 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
made these exchange procedures applicable in inverse 
condemnation actions. 
2.   Evidentiary and Legal Issues Affecting the 
Determination of Compensation 
Before the jury trial on compensation, legal issues and 
mixed questions of law and fact frequently arise concerning the 
proper measure of compensation or concerning whether the 
property owner is entitled to compensation for a specific kind of 
damage, loss, or injury.  (City of Perris, supra, 1 Cal.5th 576, 
593–596; Metropolitan Water Dist., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 971.)  
In eminent domain cases, these issues often relate to severance 
damages—compensation for damage to, or diminished value of, 
the remainder of a parcel of land when the public entity 
condemns only part of the parcel.  (City of Perris, at pp. 593–594; 
Matteoni, supra, § 5.1.)  For example, a court may decide 
whether compensation is due for interference with access to the 
remainder of the parcel, for temporary loss of use of the 
remainder, or for damage from noise, dust, fumes, or vibrations 
caused by the public use of the condemned portion of the parcel.  
(Metropolitan Water Dist., at p. 971; Matteoni, supra, §§ 5.21, 
5.26, 5.28.)  Similar issues arise in the inverse condemnation 
context, such as whether compensation is due for impaired 
access to a parcel neighboring the condemned property, for 
unreasonable interference with neighboring property during 
construction of a public improvement, or—as in the present 
case—for damage from noise, dust, fumes, or vibrations caused 
by the public use of nearby property.  (Matteoni, supra, §§ 5.21, 
13.4.)  
The court decides these issues in the liability phase of an 
inverse condemnation action—on demurrer, at summary 
judgment, or in a bench trial held prior to any jury trial on 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
compensation.  (§§ 430.30, 437c; Orpheum Bldg. Co. v. San 
Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 
863, 868.)4  The resolution of these issues is often dispositive of 
inverse condemnation actions, in which claims of property 
damage or constructive taking frequently are the sole basis of 
liability.  (San Diego Gas, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 939–940.) 
In eminent domain actions, by contrast, where the public 
entity concedes at least partial liability at the outset of the case, 
a court’s ruling on an issue concerning entitlement to a 
particular category of compensation is seldom case dispositive.  
Instead, the ruling “affect[s] the landowner’s compensation by 
permitting the jury to consider or preventing it from considering 
certain types of recovery” and “frame[s] the ultimate factual 
inquiry into the amount of compensation owed.”  (City of Perris, 
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 596; see, e.g., People ex rel. Dept. of 
Transportation v. Hansen’s Truck Stop, Inc. (2015) 236 
Cal.App.4th 178, 182–183 [court determined property owners 
could pursue damages for impairment of access and loss of 
business goodwill, allowing question of amount of compensation 
due for these categories of harm to go to jury].) 
                                        
4 
Because inverse condemnation actions usually involve 
issues of liability (on which there is no jury trial right) in 
addition to issues concerning the amount of compensation due 
(on which there is a right to a jury trial), trial courts often 
bifurcate inverse condemnation actions and decide them in two 
phases.  In the first phase, the court determines whether the 
public entity’s actions have resulted in compensable taking or 
damage via dispositive motions or, when necessary, a bench 
trial.  In the second phase, if there is one, a jury determines the 
amount of compensation due.  (Matteoni, supra, § 17.8; Healing, 
supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1170.) 
 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
Before section 1260.040 was enacted, disputes about 
which categories of alleged damage, loss, or injury a jury should 
be allowed to consider in an eminent domain action were often 
resolved via motions in limine seeking the exclusion of certain 
expert testimony or in connection with disputes over the 
formulation of jury instructions.  (Van Alstyne, Statutory 
Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope of Legislative 
Power (1967) 19 Stan. L.Rev. 727, 748; CLRC Valuation 
Recommendations, supra, at p. 585.)  This practice of resolving 
evidentiary and legal issues concerning the determination of 
compensation on the eve of trial, or sometimes even during trial, 
impeded early resolution of eminent domain actions.  (CLRC 
Valuation Recommendations, at p. 585.)  Section 1260.040 
addresses this problem. 
3.  Code of Civil Procedure, Section 1260.040 
The Legislature enacted section 1260.040 to promote 
earlier resolution of issues affecting the determination of 
compensation, thereby preventing these issues from improperly 
going to the jury and increasing the likelihood of pretrial 
settlement.  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 237 (2000–
2001 Reg. Sess.) 428 Stats. 2001, Summary Dig., pp. 181–182; 
Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 19 West’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc. 
(2007 ed.) foll. § 1260.040, p. 623.)  Section 1260.040 authorizes 
a party to an eminent domain action to file a motion requesting 
a ruling on “an evidentiary or other legal issue affecting the 
determination of compensation” and provides that the trial 
court may postpone the deadlines for final settlement offers “for 
a period sufficient to enable the parties to engage in further 
proceedings before trial” after receiving the court’s ruling on the 
motion.  The section specifies that it “supplements, and does not 
replace any other pretrial or trial procedure otherwise available 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
to resolve an evidentiary or other legal issue affecting the 
determination of compensation.”  (Id., subd. (c).)   
The California Law Revision Commission proposed 
section 1260.040 as part of a package of reforms to the Eminent 
Domain Law designed to “facilitate resolution of eminent 
domain cases without the need for trial.”  (CLRC Valuation 
Recommendations, supra, at p. 571.)  Under the amended 
eminent domain procedures, valuation data and expert lists are 
exchanged 90 days before trial, and final offers of and demands 
for compensation are exchanged 20 days before trial.  
(§§ 1258.220, subd. (a), 1250.410.)  The section 1260.040 
motion—to be filed 60 days before trial—was intended to allow 
the isolation and decision of evidentiary and legal issues 
affecting the determination of compensation well before the eve 
of trial, and even before the parties exchange final offers and 
demands. 
 
(§ 1260.040, 
subd. 
(c); 
CLRC 
Valuation 
Recommendations, at pp. 584–585, 573–574; see Dept. 
Transportation, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 237 
(2001–2002 Reg. Sess.) Oct. 2001, p. 3 [legislation would provide 
“[t]he ability to challenge by pretrial motion improper valuation 
methods used by appraisers . . . that, under current practice, are 
often improperly sent to juries”].)  In recommending the 
Legislature adopt section 1260.040, the Law Revision 
Commission expressed its hope that earlier decision of these 
issues would narrow the gap between competing expert 
valuations, thereby facilitating settlement through alternative 
dispute resolution.  (CLRC Valuation Recommendations, supra, 
at pp. 584–587.)  Because the public entity’s liability is 
established at the outset of an eminent domain action, the 
Legislature did not contemplate that a section 1260.040 motion 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
would be used to dispose of an eminent domain action in its 
entirety. 
B.  We Decline To Import Section 1260.040 into 
Inverse Condemnation Procedure 
 
With this understanding of the purpose of section 
1260.040 in mind, we turn to the Agencies’ request that we 
“import” section 1260.040 into inverse condemnation procedure.  
Some general practices and principles guide our consideration 
of this request.  To begin, as a general practice, we leave to the 
Legislature the adoption and amendment of statewide rules 
governing trial court proceedings.  (See In re Cook (2019) 7 
Cal.5th 439, 459 (Cook) [“[T]he Legislature is in a superior 
position to consider and implement rules of procedure in the 
first instance.”].)  Gaps in statutory rules may be filled by the 
Judicial Council, which the California Constitution vests with 
the authority to “adopt rules for court administration, practice 
and procedure” that are consistent with statutory procedures.  
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 6, subd. (d).)  Courts also have the 
authority to adopt local rules, so long as those rules are 
consistent with statutory procedures adopted by the Legislature 
and the Rules of Court adopted by the Judicial Council.  (§ 575.1; 
Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 
(Rutherford); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.20 [preempting 
certain categories of local rules].)  And, as the Agencies point 
out, when no procedure is specified by statute or rule, judges 
may fashion nonstatutory procedures suitable to the specific 
cases before them.  (Citizens Utilities Co. v. Superior Court 
(1963) 59 Cal.2d 805, 812–813 (Citizens Utilities Co.).)  Courts, 
however, do not have the authority to adopt procedures or 
policies that conflict with statutory law or the Rules of Court.  
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 612.) 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
 
Considering these general practices and principles, the 
Agencies’ request that we “import” section 1260.040 into inverse 
condemnation procedure is unusual.  As the Agencies have 
conceded, nothing in section 1260.040’s language or legislative 
history suggests that the Legislature intended the motion 
procedure it authorizes to be used in inverse condemnation 
actions.  And the Agencies have not suggested that any other 
statutory or constitutional rule requires such a procedure to 
exist in inverse condemnation practice.  (Cf. Cook, supra, 7 
Cal.5th at pp. 458–459 [adopting evidence preservation 
procedure to give effect to right recognized in People v. Franklin 
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 261].)  Instead, the Agencies suggest that by 
leaving inverse condemnation law “for determination by judicial 
development” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 19A West’s Ann. 
Code Civ. Proc. (2019 ed.) foll. § 1263.010, p. 6), the Legislature 
authorized appellate courts to “judicially import” the special 
procedural rules in the Eminent Domain Law into inverse 
condemnation procedure.  The Agencies contend that, pursuant 
to this purported authorization, we may “import” any provision 
of the Eminent Domain Law into the inverse condemnation 
context unless the Legislature has created a specific obstacle to 
our doing so. 
We understand this statement of legislative intent more 
narrowly than the Agencies do—namely, as a recognition that 
certain rules must apply equally in eminent domain and inverse 
condemnation actions to ensure that any differences do “not 
yield different results in terms of compensation.”  (Mt. San 
Jacinto Community College Dist. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 
Cal.App.4th 98, 105 (Mt. San Jacinto).)  Because inverse 
condemnation and eminent domain actions both give effect to 
the same underlying right to compensation, California courts 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
have long applied principles affecting the amount of 
compensation due to a property owner equally in the eminent 
domain and inverse condemnation contexts.  (Matteoni, supra, 
§ 13.1.)  Indeed, before the Eminent Domain Law’s enactment, 
we applied in an inverse condemnation action a judicial rule 
developed in eminent domain cases for determining when 
impairment of right of access constitutes a compensable taking, 
reasoning that “[t]he principles which affect the parties’ rights 
in an inverse condemnation suit are the same as those in an 
eminent domain action.”  (Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co. (1964) 
61 Cal.2d 659, 663, fn. 1.)   
The 
Law 
Revision 
Commission 
seems 
to 
have 
acknowledged this when, in 1975, it noted that while the “rules 
of compensation” provided by the new Eminent Domain Law 
were intended only “for eminent domain proceedings[,] the law 
of inverse condemnation [was] left for determination by judicial 
development.”  (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 19A West’s Ann. 
Code Civ. Proc., supra, foll. § 1263.010, p. 6.)  This comment 
suggests the commission contemplated that courts presiding 
over inverse condemnation actions would continue to apply rules 
of eminent domain law affecting the amount of compensation 
due.  However, nothing in the legislative history of the Eminent 
Domain Law’s enactment suggests the Legislature intended to 
authorize 
appellate 
courts 
to 
“import” 
into 
inverse 
condemnation procedure the statutory rules setting out the 
special procedures unique to eminent domain actions. 
 
Decisions issued after the Eminent Domain Law’s 
enactment have likewise recognized that, while inverse 
condemnation actions and eminent domain actions involve 
different procedures, certain rules of eminent domain law must 
apply in inverse condemnation actions to give equal effect to the 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
right to compensation.  (Mt. San Jacinto, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 105.)  For example, in Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial 
Irrigation Dist. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 914, 948, the Court of 
Appeal held that the “measure of damages in inverse 
condemnation, as in eminent domain actions, is ‘market value.’ ”  
And in Jefferson Street Ventures, LLC v. City of Indio (2015) 236 
Cal.App.4th 1175, 1198, the Court of Appeal applied in an 
inverse condemnation action a rule for determining when “de 
facto taking” occurs that had been developed in eminent domain 
cases.   
 
The case on which the Agencies primarily rely for the 
proposition that an appellate court can “import” provisions of 
the Eminent Domain Law into inverse condemnation law, 
Chhour v. Community Redevelopment Agency (1996) 46 
Cal.App.4th 273 (Chhour), is consistent with these decisions.  
The plaintiff in Chhour was the owner of a seafood restaurant 
in a shopping center that had been condemned by a community 
redevelopment agency.  (Id. at p. 277.)  The owner filed suit after 
the agency refused to initiate eminent domain proceedings 
against the seafood restaurant or provide compensation for 
injury to the restaurant’s business resulting from forced 
relocation.  (Ibid.)  The agency argued that it was not liable to 
the business owner for these damages because the entitlement 
to compensation for loss of business goodwill was statutory, not 
constitutional, and the statute at issue—part of the Eminent 
Domain Law—applied only to eminent domain proceedings.  (Id. 
at pp. 278–279.)  The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that 
loss of business goodwill is compensable in an inverse 
condemnation action to the same extent as it is compensable, by 
statute, in eminent domain actions.  (Id. at p. 282.)  It observed 
that the “only distinction” between the restaurant owner’s case 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
and the case of a person whose property had been condemned in 
an eminent domain proceeding is that the restaurant owner 
“has been forced to initiate a legal proceeding to recover.”  (Id. 
at p. 279.)  Because inverse condemnation and eminent domain 
procedures give effect to “ ‘the same limitation on governmental 
power’ ” (id. at pp. 279–280), the court reasoned, it makes sense 
for the judiciary and the Legislature to “cross-pollinate in this 
area” (id. at p. 279).  Chhour is thus consistent with the 
proposition that the differences between eminent domain law 
and inverse condemnation law should not “yield different results 
in terms of compensation.”  (Mt. San Jacinto, supra, 117 
Cal.App.4th at p. 105.)  
 
While the “cross-pollination” embraced by Chhour, supra, 
46 Cal.App.4th 273, may make sense with respect to provisions 
of the Eminent Domain Law that affect the amount of 
compensation due to a property owner, the special rules 
governing the procedure by which a public entity exercises the 
eminent domain power are another matter.  As noted above, 
inverse condemnation actions proceed by the rules governing 
ordinary civil actions, not the special rules that apply to eminent 
domain proceedings.  Indeed, much of the “elaborate and 
lengthy process established by the Eminent Domain Law and 
related statutes”—would serve no purpose in an inverse 
condemnation action.  (Property Reserve, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 
188; see, e.g., §§ 1245.220 [requiring resolution of necessity], 
1255.410 [authorizing motion for order of possession].)  Chhour 
does not suggest that an appellate court may “import” into the 
inverse condemnation context provisions of the Eminent 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
Domain Law that set out the special procedures applicable to 
eminent domain actions, such as section 1260.040.5     
We recognized the distinction between rules governing the 
right to compensation and rules governing the general course of 
proceedings in Regency Outdoor Advertising, supra, 39 Cal.4th 
507, where we considered whether a statutory carve-out for 
eminent domain proceedings should be interpreted to 
encompass inverse condemnation proceedings as well.  (Id. at p. 
529.)  At issue in Regency Outdoor Advertising was whether a 
party to an inverse condemnation action was entitled to an 
award of expert witness fees under section 998, subdivision (c).  
That provision authorizes courts to award such fees “in any 
action or proceeding other than an eminent domain action.”  (§ 
998, subd. (c)(1).)  We concluded this carve-out for eminent 
domain actions did not encompass inverse condemnation 
actions, reasoning that “the Legislature perceives a difference 
between eminent domain and inverse condemnation,” based on 
the special nature of eminent domain proceedings.  (Regency 
                                        
5 
The Agencies also rely on Dina v. People ex rel. Dept. of 
Transportation, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th 1029, at pp. 1044–1045 
in support of their argument that the authority to “judicially 
import” provisions of the Eminent Domain Law into the inverse 
condemnation context extends to section 1260.040.  Although 
Dina may be correct that “[n]othing in the language of section 
1260.040 or its legislative history bars a party from seeking an 
order on a legal issue that disposes of an inverse condemnation 
action” (id. at p. 1044), that does not mean we should “import” 
section 1260.040 into inverse condemnation procedure.  As the 
Agencies acknowledge, nothing in the statutory language or 
legislative history suggests the Legislature intended section 
1260.040 motions to be used in inverse condemnation 
proceedings. We disapprove Dina to the extent it is inconsistent 
with our reasoning. 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
Outdoor Advertising, at p. 530.)  With this difference in mind, 
there is no reason to think the Legislature contemplated that an 
appellate court would “import” section 1260.040 into inverse 
condemnation procedure.  
Nevertheless, the Agencies urge us to “import” section 
1260.040 into inverse condemnation procedure because, they 
contend, doing so would promote timely resolution—the same 
broad objective the Legislature intended it to promote in the 
eminent domain context.  Relying on Dina, supra, 151 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1043–1045, they urge us to interpret section 
1260.040’s provision for a motion to decide “other legal issues” 
affecting the determination of compensation to encompass 
issues of liability that in inverse condemnation actions normally 
would be raised on demurrer, at summary judgment, or in a 
bench trial.  The Agencies point out that liability determinations 
in inverse condemnation actions often involve disputed factual 
questions and so are not amenable to resolution on summary 
judgment.  They explain that the use of section 1260.040 
motions in inverse condemnation proceedings would promote 
timely resolution by providing a different and more expedient 
method of summary disposition than those provided for by 
statute, one that serves as a “substitute for a bench trial.”  They 
assert we should “import” section 1260.040 into inverse 
condemnation procedure because, in their view, summary 
judgment 
proceedings 
and 
bench 
trials 
are 
unduly 
“cumbersome.” 
To begin, we note that although the same arguments 
might be made for “importing” section 1260.040 into many types 
of civil actions, the Agencies do not argue the provision should 
be made generally available to civil litigants.  Indeed, they have 
now abandoned their contention that it was proper for the trial 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
court to use a section 1260.040 proceeding to issue a dispositive 
ruling on the Property Owners’ nuisance claim.  (See Dina, 
supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1039, 1052–1054 [concluding such 
a use was proper].)  As is true of other types of civil actions, the 
Legislature’s specific reasons for wanting to encourage prompt 
resolution of eminent domain actions do not necessarily carry 
over to the inverse condemnation context.  (Regency Outdoor 
Advertising, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 530.)  When a public entity 
condemns property, speedy resolution allows the public entity to 
expeditiously put the property to public use and facilitates 
prompt compensation of the property owner.  The same need for 
speedy resolution is not present in inverse condemnation 
actions, in which the government entity’s liability is contested 
and the property owner typically claims entitlement to 
compensation for property damage or diminution in value 
resulting from a taking or damage that already has occurred.  
Perhaps for this reason, the Legislature has chosen to give 
calendar preference to eminent domain actions but not inverse 
condemnation actions.  (§ 1260.010.)   
 
Moreover, the Agencies’ arguments for importing section 
1260.040 into inverse condemnation procedure ignore the 
specific function section 1260.040 was designed to serve in 
eminent domain proceedings:  to facilitate the decision of issues 
“affecting the determination of compensation” (§ 1260.040, subd. 
(a)) or otherwise put, “affecting valuation” (Cal. Law Revision 
Com. com., 19 West’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc., supra, foll. 
§ 1260.040, p. 623).  As described above, the Legislature’s 
purpose in adopting section 1260.040 was to provide a 
mechanism to resolve discrete evidentiary and legal questions 
concerning the proper valuation of condemned property—
questions that, before section 1260.040’s enactment, parties had 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
been presenting to the court in motions in limine seeking to limit 
testimony or disputes about jury instructions.  (CLRC Valuation 
Recommendations, supra, at p. 585.)  As we have explained, the 
section 1260.040 proceeding was intended to facilitate prompt 
resolution by allowing the parties, before the compensation 
trial, to evaluate competing expert valuations of the condemned 
property based on a shared understanding of which categories 
of 
alleged 
loss 
are 
compensable. 
 
(CLRC 
Valuation 
Recommendations, supra, at p. 584.)6  Section 1260.040 thus 
promotes the early resolution of eminent domain actions not by 
providing a procedure for disposing of a case that is less 
“cumbersome” than a summary judgment proceeding or bench 
trial, but instead by providing a procedural tool for trial courts 
to make evidentiary and legal rulings on questions related to the 
valuation of the condemned property before the parties engage 
in final pretrial settlement efforts.  (See § 1250.430 [authorizing 
postponement of trial for alternative dispute resolution].)7 
                                        
6  
The ways in which trial courts in eminent domain actions 
have used the section 1260.040 motion procedure are consistent 
with this specific purpose.  For example, they have used the 
procedure to determine whether to exclude expert testimony 
based on a disputed valuation method and to determine whether 
a business owner is entitled to compensation for loss of business 
goodwill.  (Central Valley Gas Storage, LLC v. Southam (2017) 
11 Cal.App.5th 686, 689–691 (Gas Storage); Los Angeles Unified 
School Dist. v. Pulgarin (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 101, 104 
(Pulgarin).)   
7 
The Agencies argue that importing section 1260.040 into 
inverse condemnation procedure would promote settlement 
because the prospect that public entities might be required to 
pay prevailing property owners’ litigation expenses under 
section 1036 provides public entities an incentive to settle once 
 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
 
Considering this specific function, it is unsurprising that 
the language of section 1260.040 does not appear to contemplate 
that the procedure would be used to request entry of judgment.  
Subdivision (b) of section 1260.040, allowing courts to postpone 
trial “to enable the parties to engage in further proceedings 
before trial in response to [the trial court’s] ruling on the 
motion,” suggests that the Legislature thought eminent domain 
proceedings would generally continue after a decision on a 
section 1260.040 motion.  The absence of any language 
concerning entry of judgment in section 1260.040 indicates the 
same.  And perhaps most significantly, section 1260.040 states 
that it “supplements, and does not replace any other pretrial or 
trial procedure otherwise available to resolve an evidentiary or 
other legal issue affecting the determination of compensation.”  
(§ 1260.040, subd. (c).)  In eminent domain actions—in which 
liability is established at the outset—there is little risk that a 
section 1260.040 motion would replace a dispositive motion or a 
bench trial.  While a court may determine that one of multiple 
                                        
liability is found.  This argument, too, ignores the specific way 
in which section 1260.040 was intended to promote settlement 
of eminent domain actions, i.e., by clarifying the range of 
compensation a jury could award.  To the extent section 
1260.040 and section 1036 would operate in conjunction to 
promote settlement of inverse condemnation actions, they would 
do so by making it clear before trial that a public entity will have 
to pay the property owner’s litigation expenses.  Section 
1260.040 does not serve that function in eminent domain 
proceedings for two reasons.  First, the public entity’s liability is 
established at the outset of an eminent domain action.  And 
second, section 1036 does not apply in eminent domain 
proceedings, where the award of litigation expenses is instead 
governed by section 1250.410. 
 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
25 
property owner defendants is not entitled to compensation (cf. 
Pulgarin, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 104) or that a public 
entity is not liable for a particular type or category of damages 
the property owner has claimed (see Gas Storage, supra, 11 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 690–693), a ruling on a section 1260.040 
motion would rarely, if ever, be case dispositive.8  In the inverse 
condemnation context, by contrast, in which the entire action 
may be based on an issue such as loss of business goodwill, 
impairment of access, or—as in this case—the intrusion of noise, 
dust, fumes, and vibrations onto private property, such issues 
frequently will be resolved by dispositive motion or bench trial 
before the jury trial on compensation.  Used for this purpose, a 
section 1260.040 motion would, as the Court of Appeal observed, 
replace, not supplement, existing procedures.  (Weiss, supra, 20 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1176.)   
 
 
The Agencies complain that existing procedures are 
inadequate 
for 
their 
purposes 
because 
most 
inverse 
condemnation liability issues involve factual questions or mixed 
questions of law and fact of a sort that could not be resolved on 
summary judgment.  They observe that section 1260.040 “does 
not require that the trial [court] make its ruling based solely on 
declarations and documents” and “[i]f the judge finds that 
witness testimony is required, the judge may set an early bench 
trial.”  But used in this way, a section 1260.040 motion would 
take the place of the bench trial on liability to which an inverse 
                                        
8  
We offer no view on whether, in an eminent domain action, 
a section 1260.040 proceeding may properly be used in the 
manner the Agencies have asserted it can be used in the instant 
inverse condemnation proceedings—to weigh evidence and 
resolve factual disputes material to liability issues without a 
bench trial.  
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
26 
condemnation plaintiff normally would be entitled.  (Cf. 
Skoumbas v. City of Orinda (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 783 
[reversing summary judgment on takings liability in inverse 
condemnation case]; Odello Bros. v. County of Monterey (1998) 
63 Cal.App.4th 778 [same].)   
At bottom, the Agencies’ request is that we create a new, 
uncodified dispositive motion procedure specific to inverse 
condemnation actions that serves the same function as a motion 
for summary judgment or a bench trial but is less “cumbersome.”  
Because such a procedure would not give effect to a property 
owner’s right to compensation and would simply supplant 
existing procedures, we decline this request. 
C.  The Trial Court Erred in Entering Judgment in 
Response to the Agencies’ “Motion for Legal 
Determination of Liability”  
Our decision to decline the Agencies’ request does not 
necessarily mean it will always be error for a trial court to use a 
procedure modeled on a provision of the Eminent Domain Law 
in the inverse condemnation context.  Trial courts have inherent 
and statutory authority to devise and utilize procedures 
appropriate to the specific litigation before them.  (§ 187; 
Rutherford, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 967; Citizens Utilities Co., 
supra, 59 Cal.2d at pp. 812–813.)  This authority “ ‘arises from 
necessity where, in the absence of any previously established 
procedural rule, rights would be lost or the court would be 
unable to function.’ ”  (James H. v. Superior Court (1978) 77 
Cal.App.3d 169, 175.)  In the inverse condemnation context, we 
have held that trial courts have the authority “to provide for the 
assessment of just compensation in situations not within the 
purview of existing statutory provisions.”  (Citizens Utilities Co., 
at p. 812.)  In Citizens Utilities Co., we upheld a trial court’s use 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
27 
of a novel procedure for valuing a property owner’s water 
system, observing that since “the Legislature has failed to 
provide a procedure to cover the contingency involved, pursuant 
to its inherent powers the court had the power to devise a proper 
procedure.”  (Ibid.)  And as particularly relevant in this case, we 
have held that trial courts may, when necessary, “follow 
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which are harmonious 
with the objects and purposes of the proceeding although those 
provisions are not specifically made applicable by the statute 
which creates the proceeding.”  (Tide Water Associated Oil Co. 
v. Superior Court (1955) 43 Cal.2d 815, 825.)  However, when a 
statute or rule of court provides an applicable procedure, a trial 
court may neither substitute a procedure it has itself devised 
nor adopt an existing procedural provision that is inapplicable 
to the case before it.  (Rutherford, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 967; 
see Hernandez v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 285, 
296 
[trial 
court 
exceeded 
its 
authority 
by 
ordering 
nonsimultaneous exchange of expert witness information where 
statute required simultaneous exchange].)   
 
As described above, this case comes to us on appeal from 
the trial court’s order granting the Agencies’ “Motion for Legal 
Determination of Liability re Inverse Condemnation Action”—
styled as a section 1260.040 motion—and entering judgment on 
the Agencies’ behalf.  The Agencies asked the trial court to 
decide a mixed question of law and fact:  whether the damage 
the Property Owners claimed was “peculiar” to their properties, 
making the damage compensable under our decision in 
Varjabedian v. Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 298 (Varjabedian).  
The 
Agencies 
supported 
their 
motion 
with 
extensive 
documentary evidence and, in their briefing, urged the trial 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
28 
court to weigh their evidence against the competing evidence 
submitted by the Property Owners. 
 
In ordinary civil actions such as this one, the procedure by 
which to request a pretrial entry of judgment on the ground that 
there is no dispute of material fact is summary judgment, or 
when the request is for a dispositive ruling on one of multiple 
claims within an action, summary adjudication.  (§ 437c; Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 3.1350.)  Courts deciding motions for 
summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the 
evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to 
the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
of that party.  (§ 437c, subd. (c); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  To ensure that the opposing party 
has notice of the factual issues in dispute and an opportunity to 
present the evidence needed to defeat the motion, the statute 
requires that the parties submit separate statements of 
undisputed facts.  (§ 437c, subd. (c); United Community Church 
v. Garcin (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 327, 335.)  These separate 
statements also help the court isolate and identify the facts that 
are in dispute, which facilitates the court’s determination 
whether trial is necessary.  (United Community, at pp. 335–
337.)  When a court grants a motion for summary adjudication 
on the ground that there is no triable issue of material fact, the 
statute requires the court to “specify the reasons for its 
determination,” with reference to “the evidence proffered in 
support of and, if applicable, in opposition to the motion that 
indicates no triable issue exists.”  (§ 437c, subd. (g).)  Adherence 
to these provisions safeguards the rights of the party opposing 
summary adjudication and allows for meaningful appellate 
review.   
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
29 
 
The procedure the trial court employed in this case was 
improper because it supplanted a motion for summary 
adjudication on the Property Owners’ inverse condemnation 
claim or, to the extent the trial court weighed the evidence, a 
bench trial on liability.9  Indeed, this case illustrates some of the 
hazards of using a nonstatutory motion to request entry of 
judgment.  The Agencies’ motion presented a mixed question of 
law and fact concerning whether the damage was “peculiar” to 
the Property Owners’ properties, the answer to which turns on 
whether the properties were “ ‘singled out’ ” to suffer the 
detrimental effects of the sound barriers, making “the policy 
favoring distribution of the resulting loss” strong and “the 
likelihood that compensation will impede necessary public 
construction [] . . . relatively slight.”  (Varjabedian, supra, 20 
Cal.3d at p. 298.)  On the face of the trial court’s decision, it is 
not clear whether it resolved factual disputes material to this 
determination in reaching its conclusion that the Property 
Owners “cannot meet their burden [of] showing the injuries 
suffered were ‘peculiar’ to their properties.”10  Had the Agencies 
filed a motion for summary adjudication rather than a “Motion 
for Legal Determination of Liability,” the parties would have 
been required to submit separate statements clarifying which 
facts were disputed and which were undisputed.  The trial 
                                        
9  
The Agencies do not argue that, if the trial court erred in 
entering judgment in response to their nonstatutory motion, 
that error was harmless.  We therefore do not consider that 
question. 
10  
We note the Property Owners argued in the Court of Appeal 
that the trial court erred by requiring them to show that their 
properties were the only ones in the neighborhood that 
experienced an increase in noise, vibrations, dust, and glare.  
This question is not before us and we express no view on it. 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
30 
court’s order would have employed the familiar summary 
judgment standard, specifying the reasons for its decision with 
reference to the evidence showing whether a triable issue of fact 
exists.  And the parties would have avoided all that has ensued 
on appeal. 
 
There may be cases in which the use of a nonstatutory 
motion procedure to dismiss a cause of action before trial is 
called for, but courts should be wary of such requests.  As the 
Court of Appeal warned, the incautious use of such a procedure 
risks providing inadequate procedural protections, infringing on 
the jury trial right, and unnecessary reversal.  (Weiss, supra, 20 
Cal.App.5th 1175, citing Amtower v. Photon Dynamics, Inc. 
(2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1582, 1594; Department of Forestry & 
Fire Protection v. Howell (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 154, 170–173.)  
Courts should be careful not to prioritize efficiency and 
conservation of judicial resources over access to justice and 
procedural fairness.  (Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 
1337, 1353.)  Though limited use of nonstatutory motion 
procedures may be appropriate in inverse condemnation actions, 
it is important to remember that summary judgment, summary 
adjudication, and bench trials play a central role in our civil trial 
system.  Trial courts should exercise caution before dispensing 
with these procedures.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
We deny the Agencies’ request that we “judicially import” 
section 1260.040 into inverse condemnation procedure.  Because 
the trial court erred in entering judgment on the Agencies’ 
“Motion for Legal Determination of Liability” rather than 
requiring them to file a motion for summary adjudication or 
WEISS v. PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
31 
proceed to a bench trial, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal. 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur:  
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XX 20 Cal.App.5th 1156 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S248141 
Date Filed: July 16, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:   Superior 
County:  Orange 
Judge:   Kirk H. Nakamura 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Peterson Law Group, John S. Peterson, Joseph A. Schwar, Stacy W. Thomsen; Law Office of Martin N. 
Buchanan and Martin N. Buchanan for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Matteoni, O’Laughlin & Hechtman and Norman E. Matteoni as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
 
Woodruff, Spradlin & Smart, Gary C. Weisberg, Laura A. Morgan and Esther P. Lin for Defendants and 
Respondents Orange County Transportation Authority and Department of Transportation. 
 
Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, Michael G. Colantuono, Jennifer L. Pancake and Andrew C. Rawcliffe 
for Defendant and Respondent Orange County Transportation Authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John S. Peterson 
Peterson Law Group, PC 
19800 MacArthur Blvd., Suite 290 
Irvine, CA 92612 
(949) 955-0127 
 
Michael G. Colantuono 
Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, PC 
790 E. Colorado Blvd., Suite 850 
Pasadena, CA 91101-2109 
(213) 542-5700 
 
Gary C. Weisberg 
Woodruff, Spradlin & Smart, APC 
555 Anton Blvd., Suite 1200 
Costa Mesa, CA 92626-7670 
(714) 558-7000