Case Title: PEARL v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98-80

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-02-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
PEARL v. STATE2000 WY 21996 P.2d 688Case Number: 98-80Decided: 02/17/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
JASON W. PEARL, Appellant 
(Defendant), v.THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Campbell County, Dan R. Price II, J.

Representing 
Appellant: Steven W. Holland, 
Casper, WY.Representing Appellee: William U. Hill, Attorney General; 
Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; and Donald Gerstein, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1] Relying on 
W.R.Cr.P. 44(a)(2), the district court refused to appoint counsel at appellant's 
probation revocation hearing. Because we hold that appointed counsel is 
constitutionally required under Wyoming's judicial probation revocation 
procedure, we reverse.

ISSUES

[¶2] Appellant, 
Jason Pearl, presents one issue for review, an issue upon which we requested and 
received supplemental briefing:

Was the Appellant denied 
his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel when the trial court failed to appoint counsel to represent the 
Appellant at his probation revocation hearing?

[¶3] The State 
rephrases the issue as:

Whether the trial court 
exercised proper discretion in determining that the Appellant was not entitled 
to court-appointed counsel for his probation revocation 
proceeding.

FACTS

[¶4] After 
passing a total of 49 bad checks in Campbell County and 14 in Weston County, 
Pearl pled guilty to a charge of check fraud in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-702(a) and (b)(iii) (Lexis 1999). On August 28, 1997, he was sentenced to a 
term of one to four years, but that term was suspended and a split sentence 
imposed, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-107 (Lexis 1999). The split sentence 
consisted of 120 days in the Campbell County jail, with credit for 75 days 
served, followed by a four-year term of probation. After sentencing, the public 
defender assigned to represent Pearl was permitted to withdraw from the case. 
Pearl served his jail time and was released.

[¶5] On January 
22, 1998, the State petitioned the district court to revoke Pearl's probation, 
alleging violations of several terms of probation. At a February 4, 1998 
first-appearance hearing, the district court advised Pearl of the allegations 
contained in the petition and also informed Pearl of his rights at the probation 
revocation hearing. The district court informed Pearl that he was entitled to be 
represented by an attorney and asked Pearl if he had given any thought to having 
an attorney represent him. Pearl responded that he was trying to engage an 
attorney, but did not yet have a definite answer. The district court also 
informed Pearl that he was not entitled to court-appointed counsel. The court 
stated:

Under the rules, you 
would only be entitled to a court-appointed attorney if there was something 
complex factually or legally or something else unusual about the 
case.

[¶6] As I review 
the Affidavit, it doesn't seem that there's really anything factually complex or 
legally complex.

[¶7] And based 
on that, unless there was some other information available, it would seem that 
the only way you would be able to have an attorney would be if you could hire 
one yourself, or your family or someone else made arrangements for 
that.

[¶8] The 
district court proceeded to enter, on Pearl's behalf, a denial of the 
allegations contained in the petition to revoke probation. A probation 
revocation hearing was scheduled for February 12, 1998.

[¶9] The day 
before the scheduled hearing, Pearl informed the district court he had been 
unable to obtain counsel, and he requested a continuance. The continuance was 
denied, and the probation revocation hearing was held as scheduled, with Pearl 
representing himself. The district court found by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Pearl violated the terms of his probation and subsequently revoked 
Pearl's probation. The underlying sentence of one to four years was re-imposed. 
This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

[¶10] The Sixth 
Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right *** to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. 
amend. VI. In Gideon v. Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and 
accordingly required the states to make appointed counsel available to indigent 
defendants in all "criminal prosecutions." 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963). Article 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution likewise provides for 
the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions and tracks the federal 
provision.

[¶11] The Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel accrues at the time adversary judicial proceedings 
are initiated against the defendant. Counsel is required not just at trial, but 
at "critical stages" both before and after trial in which the substantial rights 
of the accused may be affected. Wyoming Statute 7-6-104(c)(i) (1995) 
specifically addresses representation of indigents in probation revocation 
proceedings. That provision entitles an indigent defendant to representation in 
a probation revocation proceeding "when it is determined by the court to be 
statutorily or constitutionally required."

[¶12] Nelson v. 
State, 934 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Wyo. 1997) (selected citations 
omitted).

[¶13] The 
question in this case is whether counsel is constitutionally required under 
Wyoming's judicial probation revocation scheme. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973), the United States Supreme Court 
considered whether an indigent probationer has the right to be represented by 
appointed counsel at revocation proceedings. The Court's consideration of the 
right to counsel at revocation proceedings was inextricably bound to the nature 
of the administrative procedure involved. The Court first discussed the role of 
parole or probation officers in the system under scrutiny.

[¶14] While the 
parole or probation officer recognizes his double duty to the welfare of his 
clients and to the safety of the general community, by and large concern for the 
client dominates his professional attitude. The parole agent ordinarily defines 
his role as representing his client's best interests as long as these do not 
constitute a threat to public safety.

[¶15] Gagnon, 
411 U.S.  at 783-84, 93 S. Ct.  at 1760 (quoting F. Remington, D. Newman, E. 
Kimball, M. Melli & H. Goldstein, Criminal Justice Administration, Materials 
and Cases, 910-11 (1969)).

[¶16] The Court 
then discussed other differences between a criminal trial and an administrative 
revocation proceeding.

[¶17] In a 
criminal trial, the State is represented by a prosecutor; formal rules of 
evidence are in force; a defendant enjoys a number of procedural rights which 
may be lost if not timely raised; and, in a jury trial, a defendant must make a 
presentation understandable to untrained jurors. In short, a criminal trial 
under our system is an adversary proceeding with its own unique characteristics. 
In a revocation hearing, on the other hand, the State is represented, not by a 
prosecutor, but by a parole officer with the orientation described above; formal 
procedures and rules of evidence are not employed; and the members of the 
hearing body are familiar with the problems and practice of probation or 
parole.

Gagnon, 411 U.S. 
at 789, 93 S. Ct.  at 1763.

[¶18] 
Recognizing these differences, the Court expressed concern that introduction of 
counsel would alter the delicate balance found in the administrative 
proceeding:

[¶19] The 
introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding will alter significantly 
the nature of the proceeding. If counsel is provided for the probationer or 
parolee, the State in turn will normally provide its own counsel; lawyers, by 
training and disposition, are advocates and bound by professional duty to 
present all available evidence and arguments in support of their clients' 
positions and to contest with vigor all adverse evidence and views. The role of 
the hearing body itself, aptly described in Morrissey [v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972)] as being "predictive and discretionary" as 
well as factfinding, may become more akin to that of a judge at a trial, and 
less attuned to the rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or 
parolee. In the greater self-consciousness of its quasi-judicial role, the 
hearing body may be less tolerant of marginal deviant behavior and feel more 
pressure to reincarcerate than to continue nonpunitive rehabilitation. 
Certainly, the decisionmaking process will be prolonged, and the financial cost 
to the State - for appointed counsel, counsel for the State, a longer record, 
and the possibility of judicial review - will not be 
insubstantial.

411 U.S.  at 
787-88, 93 S. Ct.  at 1762.

[¶20] The Court 
ultimately determined that due process did not demand per se appointment of 
counsel at administrative revocation proceedings. It provided the following 
guidelines:

[¶21] The facts 
and circumstances in preliminary and final hearings are susceptible to almost 
infinite variation, and a considerable discretion must be allowed the 
responsible agency in making the decision. Presumptively, it may be said that 
counsel should be provided in cases where, after being informed of his right to 
request counsel, the probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on a 
timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation 
of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the 
violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial 
reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation 
inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to 
develop or present. In passing on a request for the appointment of counsel, the 
responsible agency also should consider, especially in doubtful cases, whether 
the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself. In 
every case in which a request for counsel at a preliminary or final hearing is 
refused, the grounds for refusal should be stated succinctly in the 
record.

Gagnon, 411 U.S. 
at 790-91, 93 S. Ct.  at 1764.

[¶22] Under 
Wyoming law, W.R.Cr.P. 44(a)(2),1 governs appointment of counsel at 
probation revocation proceedings. Amended in 1993,2 this rule now mirrors the 
constitutional floor established in Gagnon. Pearl contends that the extension of 
Gagnon's holding to Wyoming's judicial revocation proceeding via Rule 44 is 
inconsistent with the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Gagnon. We 
agree.

[¶23] An 
administrative probation revocation system, similar to the one discussed in 
Gagnon, is contemplated by Wyoming law. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-408 (Lexis 
1999). However, there is no indication that this administrative procedure has 
ever been utilized. Instead, we have made it clear that

revocation of probation 
is a judicial responsibility and jurisdiction of an individual granted probation 
remains vested in the judicial branch of government during any probationary 
period of non-incarceration. Smith v. State, 598 P.2d 1389 (Wyo. 
1979).

[¶24] Except as 
Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-408 supports the foundational supervisory responsibility of 
probation agents for probation revocation cases, the statute has been nullified 
and superseded by Wyoming case law and W.R.Cr.P. 393 for all aspects of probation 
revocation. See Weisser v. State, 600 P.2d 1320 [(Wyo. 1979)]; Smith [v. State], 
598 P.2d 1389 [(Wyo. 1979)]; and Knobel [v. State], 576 P.2d 941 [(Wyo. 1978)]. 
The exclusive process for probation revocation is judicially handled by a filing 
through the office of the prosecuting attorney by either an order to show cause 
and summons or a petition to revoke enforced by an application and the issuance 
of a bench warrant for arrest.

[¶25] Wlodarczyk 
v. State, 836 P.2d 279, 293 (Wyo. 1992). We have also made it clear that the 
constitutional due process rights found in Gagnon and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972), must be afforded in judicial 
revocation proceedings. Swackhammer v. State, 808 P.2d 219, 222 n. 1 (Wyo. 
1991); Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051, 1055-56 (Wyo. 1981).

[¶26] Given 
Wyoming's judicial revocation procedure, we must determine if W.R.Cr.P. 44(a)(2) 
remains consistent with the reasoning found in Gagnon as it pertains to 
appointment of counsel. Gagnon considered the right to counsel in terms of an 
administrative process where a probation officer brought a petition to revoke 
probation before the Board of Probation and Parole. The probation officer, 
although acting in a prosecutorial capacity, was nevertheless motivated by the 
desire to rehabilitate the probationer. Gagnon, 411 U.S.  at 789, 93 S. Ct.  at 
1763. The hearing was informal, and no rules of evidence were employed. Id. The 
Board and the probation officer were not necessarily trained in the law, but 
were familiar with the sociological aspects of probation and 
parole.

[¶27] Current 
probation revocation procedures in Wyoming stand in stark contrast to the 
informal administrative system considered by the United States Supreme Court in 
Gagnon. Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 39, all petitions for probation revocation must be 
brought in district court by a prosecuting attorney who, unlike the probation 
officer, does not serve two masters. The prosecutor speaks neither for the 
probationer nor his interests in the manner the Gagnon Court envisioned 
probation officers would in an administrative system. Moreover, the Wyoming 
Rules of Evidence apply to the adjudicative phase of the revocation hearing. 
W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(5)(B). Thus, a probationer "enjoys a number of procedural rights 
which may be lost if not timely raised." Gagnon, 411 U.S.  at 789, 93 S. Ct. 1763. 
In short, a probation revocation proceeding "under our system is an adversary 
proceeding with its own unique characteristics." Gagnon, 411 U.S.  at 789, 93 S. Ct. 1763.

[¶28] We find 
that revocation proceedings in Wyoming are fundamentally different than the 
administrative process upon which Gagnon is based. We do not read Gagnon as a 
universal limitation of the right to counsel regardless of the nature of the 
process involved. Consideration of the foregoing characteristics of our system 
illustrates no meaningful distinction between a probation revocation hearing and 
other portions of a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, under Wyoming's judicial 
revocation procedure where the State is represented by a prosecutor and the 
rules of evidence apply to a portion of the proceedings, we hold that the Sixth 
Amendment requires appointment of counsel for indigent probationers when the 
indigent probationer was entitled to be represented by an attorney under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104(a).4 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104(c) (Lexis 
1999). See Hicks v. State, 452 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla.App. 1984) opinion adopted 
478 So. 2d 22, 23-24 (Fla. 1985). An inescapable corollary to such a holding is 
the invalidation of W.R.Cr.P. 44(a)(2), in the context of judicial revocations. 
Our holding necessitates reversal and remand for a probation revocation hearing 
with the aid of court-appointed counsel, as denial of an appellant's right to 
counsel can never be treated as harmless error. Nelson v. State, 934 P.2d  at 
1241; Gentry v. State, 806 P.2d 1269, 1272 (Wyo. 1991); Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1341, 1345 (Wyo. 1979).

[¶29] Our 
holding requires that we harmonize this case with our most recent pronouncement 
in this area, Nelson v. State. There, we concluded Nelson was entitled to 
counsel at his probation revocation hearing because the proceeding at issue "was 
more than a probation revocation - it also involved the adjudication of Nelson's 
guilt of a felony and sentencing." 934 P.2d  at 1241. In so concluding, we relied 
on Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S. Ct. 254, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967), which 
"holds that the Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to court-appointed counsel 
in the specific circumstance when the proceeding includes sentencing." Nelson, 
934 P.2d  at 1241. Therefore, although the district court in Nelson relied on 
Rule 44(a)(2) in denying counsel, the issue presently before this court, the 
constitutionality of Rule 44(a)(2), was clearly not at issue in 
Nelson.

[¶30] Finally, 
we do not believe that a uniform requirement of counsel at probation revocations 
will unduly tax the resources of the public defender system. Instead, we believe 
it will result in a more orderly and uniform administration of the criminal 
justice system, as well as ensuring fundamental fairness, the touchstone of due 
process, in revocation proceedings. Gagnon, 411 U.S.  at 790, 93 S. Ct.  at 1763. 
Along with this reduced uncertainty and enhanced consistency comes the reduction 
of the possibility of reversible error and appellate review. State v. Hicks, 478 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1985).

CONCLUSION

[¶31] Our rule 
dictating when indigent probationers are entitled to counsel was derived from an 
opinion which set the constitutional minimum for administrative revocation 
proceedings; therefore, it has no applicability to Wyoming's current procedure. 
We conclude that the Sixth Amendment dictates that counsel be appointed for all 
indigent probationers in Wyoming's judicial proceedings. As Pearl was denied his 
right to counsel, we reverse and remand to the district court to conduct a 
probation revocation hearing in accordance with this 
opinion.

1 W.R.Cr.P. 
44(a)(2) provides:

Any adult 
probationer or adjudged delinquent juvenile who is alleged to have violated the 
terms of a probation order, for which violation incarceration is a practicable 
possibility, and who is financially unable to obtain adequate representation is 
entitled to appointed counsel if, after being informed of the right to request 
appointed counsel, the probationer makes a request based upon a timely and 
colorable claim that the probationer did not violate probation terms or that, if 
the violation is a matter of public record or admitted, there are substantial 
reasons which justified or mitigated the violation, making revocation 
inappropriate and the reasons are complex or difficult to develop or present. In 
deciding whether to appoint counsel, the judicial officer should consider the 
probationer's ability to think clearly and speak effectively. If appointment of 
counsel is denied, the grounds for refusal must be succinctly stated in the 
record.

2 Prior to 
its amendment, Rule 44 read:

(a) When 
right attaches. - Every defendant who is unable to obtain counsel is entitled to 
be represented by assigned counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the 
filing of an indictment, information or citation through appeal, unless that 
right is waived.

3 W.R.Cr.P. 
39(a), provides in pertinent part:

Proceedings 
for revocation of probation shall be initiated by a petition for revocation 
filed by the attorney for the state, setting forth the conditions of probation 
which are alleged to have been violated by the probationer and the facts 
establishing the violation.

4 The State 
relies upon Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 105 S. Ct. 2254, 85 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1985), to support the proposition that counsel is not 
required in all circumstances in a judicial proceeding to revoke probation. In 
that case, the Supreme Court was concerned only with a claim that due process 
required the court to consider further probation as an alternative to 
incarceration and articulate its reasons for choosing incarceration. Nothing 
indicates that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was perceived to be in issue 
in that case.