Case Title: Colley v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC18-2014

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2020-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-2014 
____________ 
 
JAMES TERRY COLLEY, JR., 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
November 25, 2020 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
James Terry Colley, Jr. appeals two first-degree murder convictions and two 
corresponding sentences of death.1  We affirm the convictions and sentences. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
I. 
Guilt Phase 
 
The jury in this case found Colley guilty of murdering his estranged wife, 
Amanda Cloaninger Colley, and Amanda’s friend Lindy Dobbins.  At the time of 
the murders, Colley was subject to a domestic violence injunction restricting his 
contact with Amanda.  In fact, less than two hours before committing the murders, 
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
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Colley personally appeared at a court hearing about an earlier violation of that 
injunction.  We recount the hours leading up to the murders in some detail, because 
the sequence of events is relevant to the arguments Colley raises on appeal. 
At the time of the murders, Colley was living in his sister’s house on 
Garrison Drive in St. Augustine.  Amanda still lived in the marital home on South 
Bellagio Drive, about fifteen miles away.  Although he was dating someone else, 
Colley hoped he would reconcile with Amanda.  Colley suspected that Amanda 
was dating, but she had refused to admit that to him. 
Around 4 a.m. on August 27, 2015, Colley drove to Amanda’s house, 
unaware that Amanda was not there.  Colley searched the empty home and found 
sex toys and men’s polo shirts.  His suspicions confirmed, Colley ransacked the 
house, smashing television sets and dumping trash on the floor.  Afterward, Colley 
briefly visited a friend a few houses down the street (to tell the friend what he had 
discovered), and he eventually returned to his sister’s home on Garrison Drive.  
Colley also placed multiple phone calls to Amanda, most of which went 
unanswered. 
 
Amanda returned to her home at about 9 a.m.  She FaceTimed her boyfriend, 
Lamar Douberly, to show him what Colley had done.  Lamar drove to Amanda’s 
and called the police nonemergency line to make a report.  A public service 
assistance officer arrived at 9:55 a.m. and observed the damage.  Amanda told the 
 
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officer she did not want to file any formal charges against Colley until she spoke 
with her mother and attorney, so the officer left.  Two of Amanda’s friends, Lindy 
Dobbins (the other murder victim) and Rachel Hendricks, arrived minutes later. 
 
Meanwhile, at about the same time that Amanda was returning to her home, 
Colley arrived at the courthouse for a hearing on an unrelated violation of his 
domestic violence injunction.  In video footage of the hearing, Colley appeared 
calm and cooperative.  After a colloquy in which Colley, among other things, 
denied being under the influence of any intoxicants, the trial judge allowed Colley 
to plead no contest to the charged violation. 
Colley left the courthouse a little before 9:30 a.m. and once again began 
calling Amanda.  After several calls and voicemails, Amanda finally answered at 
9:41 a.m.  She and Colley spoke for roughly fourteen minutes. 
Having departed the courthouse, Colley drove to a gas station near his 
sister’s house, went to his sister’s home, and then briefly returned to the same gas 
station, where he bought a small amount of gas and some items from the store.  
The evidence at trial supported an inference that Colley retrieved ammunition 
during his brief stop at his sister’s house.  The parties disputed whether he also 
retrieved guns there, or whether he already had guns in the car he was driving.  
Regardless, shortly after 10 a.m., Colley started the twenty-minute drive back to 
Amanda’s home. 
 
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On his way to Amanda’s, Colley had a phone conversation with his father.  
A dog walker who was near Colley’s father at the time overheard the call.  She 
testified that she heard Colley’s father pleading, “Please, please son, come back 
and get your truck.  Everybody knows what you’ve been through.”  To which the 
person on the other end of the call responded, “I just can’t f***ing take this 
anymore.” 
 
Instead of going directly to Amanda’s home, Colley drove to an adjacent 
street and parked his car at an unoccupied house.  From there, he crossed a berm 
and walked along a trail that ran parallel to Amanda’s fenced-in backyard.  He was 
armed with two handguns, a 9mm and a .45 caliber. 
Colley approached the back of Amanda’s house and began shooting from the 
outside.  Amanda, Lamar, Lindy, and Rachel were inside.  Hearing the sound of 
gunshots and the shattering back-door glass, Lamar shouted for everyone to run.  
Lamar himself ran out of the house through the garage.  Fatefully, the women all 
ran to the home’s master bedroom area.  Amanda hid in the bathroom.  Lindy and 
Rachel barricaded themselves in the closet.  At 10:36 a.m., Amanda and Lindy 
separately called 911 from their cellphones. 
 
Shouting “where is he, where is he,” Colley entered the home through the 
shattered back glass doors.  Colley first found Amanda.  He screamed at her and 
demanded to know where “he” was.  Amanda said she did not know and begged 
 
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Colley to put down his gun.  Colley then tried to open the door to the closet, but 
Rachel held the door shut with her foot.  A crying Amanda told Colley that only 
Rachel and Lindy were in the closet, which prompted Lindy to say, “It’s Lindy in 
here.  It’s Lindy!” 
 
Colley returned to the bathroom and shot Amanda—but not fatally.  He then 
went back to the closet.  Again unable to open the closet door, this time Colley 
fired a shot through the door.  The bullet grazed Rachel’s arm, causing her to let go 
of the door.  As Rachel ran out of the closet, Colley entered it and walked to where 
Lindy was crouched down, hiding behind a chest.  Colley shot and killed her. 
Amanda was still in the bathroom.  So Colley went back there and shot her 
three more times, until his 9mm was out of bullets.  Colley dropped the 9mm and 
shot Amanda five more times, using the .45. 
Colley then left the home, returned to his sister’s house on Garrison Drive, 
abandoned his cell phone, and fled the area.  Police officers arrested Colley hours 
later after a traffic stop in Norton, Virginia. 
 
Colley was charged with the first-degree murder of Amanda Colley; the 
first-degree murder of Lindy Dobbins; the attempted first-degree murder of Lamar 
Douberly; the attempted first-degree murder of Rachel Hendricks; burglary with an 
assault or battery; burglary of a dwelling; and aggravated stalking after an 
injunction. 
 
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At trial the State proved its case principally through Rachel Hendricks’ and 
Lamar Douberly’s testimony and through cell phone and video records that 
documented Colley’s actions in the hours leading up to the murders.  Dr. Predrag 
Bulic, the St. Johns County chief medical examiner, testified about the autopsies 
performed on the murder victims.  Amanda sustained nine gunshot wounds: two in 
the chest area, two in the abdomen, three in the right leg, one in the right hand, and 
one in the left hand.  Amanda’s wounds showed that the shots had traveled 
different trajectories.  Some had followed a slight downward trajectory, consistent 
with both the shooter and the victim standing up at the time of the gunshots.  Other 
bullets traveled through Amanda’s body at an upward trajectory, indicating that 
she was lying horizontal on the ground when shot. 
Dr. Bulic inferred that Amanda suffered multiple gun shots in advance of 
sustaining one shot that would have paralyzed her from the neck down and another 
that would have been instantaneously lethal.  Specifically, Amanda’s arms and legs 
showed several defensive wounds that could only have been inflicted while 
Amanda was still capable of movement.  When asked whether Amanda was 
conscious of what was happening, Dr. Bulic testified, “She was aware.  She had 
a—a knowledge of what’s happening and—through the entire shooting process.” 
 
As to Lindy, Dr. Bulic testified that she sustained three gunshot wounds: one 
on the right temple, one on the right shoulder, and one on the left foot.  The 
 
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trajectory of the shoulder and temple gunshots had followed a steep downward 
angle, consistent with the shooter being above the victim.  Both of these gunshots 
were immediately lethal. 
 
In its closing, the defense argued that the State had not proven premeditation 
and that therefore the jury should not find Colley guilty of first-degree murder and 
attempted murder.  The defense’s theory was that Colley had been on “an 
emotional rollercoaster” because of the uncertain status of his relationship with 
Amanda and that the killings were a “snap reaction.”  Defense counsel argued that 
Colley did not go to Amanda’s home with the intention of killing anyone.  Defense 
counsel speculated that something set Colley off—counsel did not know what—
only after Colley arrived at Amanda’s home. 
 
On July 18, 2018, the jury unanimously found Colley guilty of first-degree 
premeditated and first-degree felony murder of Amanda Colley; first-degree 
premeditated and first-degree felony murder of Lindy Dobbins; attempted first- 
degree murder of Lamar Douberly; attempted felony murder of Rachel Hendricks; 
burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery; burglary of a dwelling; and 
aggravated stalking after an injunction. 
II. 
Penalty Phase  
 
On July 23, 2018, the same jury returned for the penalty phase on Colley’s 
murder convictions.  The State presented four victim impact statements (two for 
 
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each victim) but did not otherwise supplement the guilt phase evidence.  The 
defense focused on Colley’s state of mind and claimed that he had been impaired 
as a result of taking Ambien early in the morning of the murders. 
Defense Penalty Phase Case 
 
Colley presented the testimony of three expert and eight lay witnesses.  The 
experts focused on Colley’s alleged impairment.  The lay witnesses testified about 
Colley’s character and reputation in the community. 
 
Through Colley’s mitigation experts, the jury heard Colley’s version of what 
happened the morning of the murders.  Colley told the experts that he had 
consumed alcohol and cocaine the night before he ransacked Amanda’s house.  
Colley said that he had spoken with Amanda in the predawn hours and offered to 
pay for the damage he had done, and that Amanda had agreed not to call the police 
to report the incident.  Colley also said that he took one or two Ambien tablets 
around 5 a.m. and that his father later woke him up to attend the 9:00 a.m. court 
hearing. 
Consistent with the State’s evidence, Colley told his experts that he had 
spoken with Amanda after the court hearing and visited a gas station and his 
sister’s house before driving to Amanda’s.  But Colley claimed that he had initially 
approached the back of the house unarmed, only to have a panic attack when he 
 
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saw a man through the window.  That prompted Colley to walk back to his car, 
retrieve his guns, and ultimately carry out the killings. 
 
Dr. Mark Mills, a forensic psychiatrist, opined that Colley was substantially 
impaired during the murders because he was experiencing an Ambien side effect 
called parasomnia.  Dr. Mills described parasomnia as a sleep disorder where 
someone seems to be acting in a rational way, but later has no recollection of his or 
her actions.  Dr. Mills based his opinion largely on the fact that, when he 
interviewed Colley in October 2017 (approximately two years after the murders), 
Colley reported having stroboscopic memory—remembering only flashes of what 
happened the day of the murders. 
Dr. Michele Quiroga, a clinical and forensic neuropsychologist, testified that 
Colley suffers from depression, anxiety, and panic attacks, and that Colley was 
taking antidepressants in August 2015 (the month of the murders) and self-
medicating with alcohol.  Dr. Quiroga did not give an opinion as to impairment.   
 
Last, Dr. Daniel Buffington, a clinical pharmacologist, gave testimony 
similar to Dr. Mills’s.  Dr. Buffington described parasomnia and opined that 
Colley’s snapshot memory from the Ambien and other prescriptions (Colley was 
taking antidepressants and sleep disorder and pain medications) showed that 
Colley was substantially impaired at the time of the murders. 
 
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As for the lay witnesses, Colley’s two sisters testified that he grew up in a 
normal home with a very close-knit family.  They described Colley as having a 
strong work ethic from a young age and being gainfully employed his entire life.  
They said that Colley was a great hands-on father to his two kids.  They described 
Colley’s volunteer work and mentorships.  They explained that Colley had 
struggled with alcohol abuse for several years.  One of the sisters mentioned that as 
a child Colley had witnessed two incidents of domestic violence between his 
parents.  Two cousins and a brother-in-law attested to Colley being a good father 
and uncle.  A neighbor explained that Colley was involved in the community by 
coaching his son’s football and baseball teams.  One of Colley’s friends testified 
that Colley had always been good to his family.  And two former coworkers 
described Colley as a good friend and very family-oriented. 
State’s Rebuttal 
 
To refute the claim that Colley was impaired at the time of the murders, the 
State presented the testimony of two witnesses: Jeffrey Danzinger, a forensic 
psychiatrist, and Judge Charles Tinlin, who presided over Colley’s injunction 
violation hearing the morning of the murders. 
 
Dr. Danzinger described parasomnia as an abnormal event or experience 
during sleep.  He explained that any side effects from Ambien are rare and 
uncommon.  He said that people in a parasomnia state sometimes are able to 
 
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engage in behaviors like sleepwalking or driving a car, but generally these 
behaviors are poorly coordinated.  And, to a layperson, those in such a state would 
appear confused, dazed, and obviously impaired. 
Dr. Danzinger explained the basis for his opinion that Colley was neither 
impaired by substances nor suffering from any parasomnia or sleep disorder at the 
time of the murders.  First, he noted that Colley’s behavior was completely normal 
from the time his medications were prescribed until the day of the murders.  
Second, he believed Colley’s behavior at the courthouse an hour before the 
murders was completely inconsistent with someone in a parasomnia state; Colley 
was able to coherently, logically, and appropriately engage in a plea colloquy with 
Judge Tinlin.  Dr. Danziger noted that at the hearing Colley asked the court several 
questions unique to his case which, to Dr. Danzinger, indicated Colley was 
clearheaded and thinking logically.  Finally, Dr. Danziger relied on the fact that, in 
an interview with a psychologist in November 2015 (approximately ninety-days 
after the murders), Colley described the murders but did not report any memory 
loss. 
 
Judge Tinlin testified that he had no concerns that Colley was impaired 
during the injunction violation hearing and that he would not have accepted a plea 
if Colley had exhibited any signs of intoxication.  The judge recalled that Colley’s 
 
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demeanor was fine.  Colley asked questions, gave appropriate responses, and 
seemed alert and intelligent. 
 
During Judge Tinlin’s testimony, the State introduced the video recording of 
the hearing.  The video showed Colley answering various questions in order to 
enter a plea of no contest.  Colley testified (under oath) about his job and education 
level, and he answered “no” when asked if he was under the influence of any 
intoxicants.  Colley also voluntarily asked several questions throughout the 
proceeding that were specific to his probation and court fees. 
Jury Findings and Recommendation 
 
The jury unanimously found four aggravating factors proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt for each of the two murder convictions: (1) Colley was 
previously convicted of another capital or violent felony (the contemporaneous 
murders and attempted murders); (2) Colley committed each murder while 
engaged in the commission of a burglary; (3) each murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel; and (4) Colley committed each murder in a cold, calculated, 
and premeditated manner, without any pretense of moral or legal justification.  The 
jury found one additional aggravating factor applicable to Amanda’s murder: (5) 
Colley committed the murder while subject to a domestic violence injunction and 
the victim of the murder was the person who obtained the injunction.  After 
performing the statutorily required assessment and weighing of aggravating factors 
 
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and mitigating circumstances, the jury unanimously recommended that the trial 
court impose a death sentence for each murder. 
III. 
Spencer Hearing  
 
The court held a Spencer2 hearing on October 2, 2018.  The State did not put 
on any additional evidence at the hearing.  The defense called one witness, Sam 
Williams, the director of corrections for the St. Johns County sheriff’s office.  
Williams testified that he had not heard of Colley causing problems while 
incarcerated, other than two minor disciplinary writeups.  The court also heard 
from Colley himself.  Colley said, “This was a horrible, terrible accident and I wish 
it was different, but it’s not.  And I’m sorry for all parties involved.”  The defense 
submitted various letters from friends and family. 
IV. 
Sentencing 
 
The trial court held a sentencing hearing on November 30, 2018.  The court 
found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt all five aggravating 
 
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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factors3 for Amanda Colley’s murder (count I) and all four aggravating factors4 for 
Lindy Dobbins’s murder (count II).  The court further found that the defense had 
established twenty-three mitigating circumstances by the greater weight of the 
evidence.5  The court concluded that the proven aggravators in the case “far 
 
 
3.  The trial court assigned the following weight to the aggravating factors 
for Amanda’s murder: (1) Colley was previously convicted of another capital or 
violent felony (the contemporaneous murder and the attempted murders) (great 
weight); (2) the capital felony was committed while Colley was engaged in the 
commission of a burglary (great weight); (3) the capital felony was especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel (great weight); (4) the capital felony was a homicide 
and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any 
pretense of moral or legal justification (moderate weight); (5) the capital felony 
was committed by a person subject to an injunction and was committed against the 
petitioner who obtained the injunction (great weight). 
 
 
4.  The trial court assigned the following weight to the aggravating factors 
for Lindy’s murder: (1) Colley was previously convicted of another capital or 
violent felony (the contemporaneous murder and the attempted murders of Lamar 
Douberly and Rachel Hendricks) (great weight); (2) the capital felony was 
committed while Colley was engaged in the commission of a burglary (great 
weight); (3) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (great 
weight); (4) the capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, 
calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal 
justification (moderate weight). 
 
 
5.  The trial court assigned the following weight to the mitigating 
circumstances: (1) Colley was a good father to his children (very slight weight); (2) 
Colley was a good worker (slight weight); (3) Colley was a good son (slight 
weight); (4) Colley was a good brother (slight weight); (5) Colley was gainfully 
employed at the time of his arrest (slight weight); (6) Colley has maintained stable 
employment (slight weight); (7) Colley was a mentor to fellow employees (slight 
weight); (8) Colley did various charitable works through his employment (slight 
weight); (9) Colley was a great uncle (slight weight); (10) Colley witnessed 
domestic violence by his mother on his father as a child (slight weight); (11) 
Colley has a history of drug and chronic alcohol abuse (moderate weight); (12) 
 
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outweigh[ed]” the mitigating circumstances.  Accordingly, the court sentenced 
Colley to death for each murder and imposed sentences for Colley’s other 
convictions, to run concurrently with the death sentences.6  This direct appeal 
followed. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Colley raises the following claims on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in 
instructing on and finding the CCP aggravator; (2) the trial court erred in 
instructing on and finding the HAC aggravator; (3) Florida’s death penalty statute 
 
Colley is impulsive (slight weight); (13) Colley loves animals (very slight weight); 
(14) Colley was a positive influence on other children in the neighborhood (very 
slight weight); (15) Colley volunteered as a baseball coach (slight weight); (16) 
Colley volunteered as a football coach (slight weight); (17) Colley was previously 
active in race car driving (slight weight); (18) Colley tried to go through marriage 
counseling with his wife (slight weight); (19) Colley was taking pain, 
antidepressant, and sleep disorder medications at the time of the homicides (slight 
weight); (20) Colley had previously been diagnosed with depression (moderate 
weight); (21) Colley has adjusted well to his incarceration since being arrested in 
this case (slight weight); (22) Colley has no prior felony convictions prior to the 
date of the incidents in this case (moderate weight); (23) the existence of any other 
factors in Colley’s character, background, or life or the circumstances of the 
offense that would mitigate against the imposition of the death penalty (slight 
weight). 
 
 
6.  For the attempted first-degree murder of Lamar Douberly (count III), the 
court sentenced Colley to life in prison, with a twenty-year mandatory minimum.  
For the attempted first-degree felony murder of Rachel Hendricks (count IV), the 
court sentenced Colley to life in prison, with a twenty-year mandatory minimum.  
For burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery with a firearm (count V), the 
court sentenced Colley to life in prison, with a lifetime mandatory minimum.  For 
burglary of a dwelling (count VI), the court sentenced Colley to fifteen years.  And 
for aggravated stalking (count VII), the court sentenced Colley to five years. 
 
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fails to genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and is 
therefore unconstitutional; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting 
Colley’s two proposed impairment mitigators; (5) the trial court erred in allowing 
victim impact evidence in general and in allowing the victim impact statement 
“think of all of the lives she has blessed” to be read to the jury; (6) the prosecutor’s 
penalty phase closing argument violated Colley’s constitutional rights; and (7) 
Colley’s death sentences are a disproportionate punishment.7  As we must, we also 
consider whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain Colley’s murder 
convictions. 
I. 
CCP 
 
Colley challenges the trial court’s finding that the murders were committed 
in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or 
legal justification (CCP).  § 921.141(6)(i), Fla. Stat. (2019). 8  We have held that, 
in order to establish the CCP aggravator, the evidence must satisfy a four-part test: 
(1) [T]he killing must have been the product of cool and calm reflection 
and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage 
(cold); and (2) the defendant must have had a careful plan or 
prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal incident 
 
 
7.  We recently held in Lawrence v. State, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S277 (Fla. Oct. 
29, 2020), that this Court lacks constitutional or statutory authority to conduct 
proportionality review.  Therefore, we deny Colley’s proportionality claim without 
further discussion. 
 
8.  In his argument, Colley does not distinguish between the CCP findings as 
applied to each of the two murder victims. 
 
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(calculated); and (3) the defendant must have exhibited heightened 
premeditation (premeditated); and (4) there must have been no pretense 
of moral or legal justification. 
 
Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 371 (Fla. 2003) (citing Evans v. State, 800 So. 2d 
182, 192 (Fla. 2001)); see § 921.141(6)(i), Fla. Stat. (2018).  Our task here is not to 
reweigh the evidence before the trial court.  Instead, the scope of our review is 
limited to whether the trial court applied the correct rule of law and, if so, whether 
competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding.  See England v. 
State, 940 So. 2d 389, 403 (Fla. 2006).  “A determination of whether CCP is 
present is properly based on a consideration of the totality of the circumstances.”  
Gill v. State, 14 So. 3d 946, 962 (Fla. 2009) (citing Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96, 
116 (Fla. 2008)). 
 
Colley claims that two of the four CCP elements were not met here.  First, 
Colley maintains that the murders were not “cold” because he committed the 
murders during the emotional upset of his deteriorating marriage and while he was 
under the influence of the alcohol and drugs he had consumed in the hours before 
the killings.  He characterizes the murders as having been committed “in the heat 
of passion.”  Second, Colley speculates that he was set off by a phone call with 
Amanda less than an hour before the murders, and that this period of time is 
insufficient to establish heightened premeditation.  We disagree with both 
arguments. 
 
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To begin, “we have explicitly held that a finding of mental and emotional 
distress and the domestic nature of a murder do not preclude a finding of CCP.”  
Kopsho v. State, 84 So. 3d 204, 216 (Fla. 2012).  And even accepting Colley’s 
contention that he had less than an hour to reflect on his plan to kill, under our case 
law that amount of time can satisfy the CCP aggravator’s heightened premeditation 
requirement.  In Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 373 (Fla. 2003), for example, the 
defendant arrived armed at the victim’s apartment and waited “thirty to forty 
minutes” for her to arrive.  We held that this supported a heightened premeditation 
finding “regardless of what [the defendant’s] intentions might have been prior to 
[the victim’s] arrival.”  Id.  In Lynch we further found heightened premeditation 
because five to seven minutes elapsed between the first injury to the victim and the 
firing of the fatal shot, enough time for the defendant to “reflect” and “leave the 
scene.”  Id; see also Brown v. State, 126 So. 3d 211, 218-19 (Fla. 2013) (finding 
heightened premeditation where defendant had “forty-five minutes to an hour” to 
reflect on contemplated murder).  By citing these cases here, we do not suggest 
that there is any bright-line rule for how much reflection suffices to establish a 
defendant’s heightened premeditation; the point is simply that our case law does 
not support Colley’s argument on this issue. 
 
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, as we must, we conclude that 
competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding of the CCP 
 
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aggravator.  The State presented evidence that Colley calmly and rationally 
participated in a court hearing less than two hours before the murders; that Colley 
calmly shopped at a gas station less than a half hour before the murders; that 
Colley armed himself in advance of traveling to the murder location; that Colley 
had a twenty-minute car drive during which to contemplate his intended actions; 
that Colley rejected his father’s plea shortly before the murders to turn back; that 
Colley approached the murder scene in a manner designed to conceal himself; that 
Colley began shooting from outside his estranged wife’s home; and that the 
victims of Colley’s rampage did not provoke him in any way.  Collectively, these 
facts easily establish that competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 
findings on the CCP aggravator.  See Marquardt v. State, 156 So. 3d 464, 487 (Fla. 
2015) (the “cold” element was satisfied where the evidence showed that “Marquart 
began shooting [the victim] even before he entered the house, and thus, there was 
no opportunity for provocation”). 
 
Indeed, we find this case closely analogous to Silvia v. State, 60 So. 3d 959 
(Fla. 2011).  Like Colley, the defendant in Silvia murdered his estranged wife.  The 
couple had separated two months before the murder, and Silvia had repeatedly 
tried to reconcile with his wife.  The day of the murder, Silvia purchased a shotgun 
and ammunition.  Hours later he went to his wife’s home and made a final plea for 
reconciliation.  When the wife refused, Silvia walked one hundred feet to his car, 
 
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retrieved his shotgun, and returned to carry out the killing.  Concluding that 
Silvia’s actions “reflect[ed] a deliberate and conscious choice to commit murder,” 
id. at 970, we found that the evidence satisfied the CCP aggravator.  So too here.9 
II. 
HAC 
 
Next, Colley claims that the trial court erred in finding that the murders were 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC).  We disagree. 
 
 The HAC aggravator applies to murders that are “both conscienceless or 
pitiless and unnecessarily torturous to the victim.”  Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 
110, 134 (Fla. 2001).  The focus is on the means and manner by which death is 
inflicted and on the immediate circumstances surrounding the death.  Buzia v. 
State, 926 So. 2d 1203, 1211 (Fla. 2006).  Gunshot murders can qualify as HAC if 
the events preceding the death cause the victim fear, emotional strain, and terror.  
See Marquardt, 156 So. 3d at 488; Lynch, 841 So. 2d at 369.  To support HAC, the 
evidence must show that the victim was conscious and aware of impending death.  
King v. State, 130 So. 3d 676, 684 (Fla. 2013).  “However, the victim’s perception 
 
9.  Given our conclusion that competent, substantial evidence supports the 
trial court’s CCP finding, Colley’s claim that the trial court erred by instructing the 
jury on this aggravator necessarily fails.  See Diaz v. State, 860 So. 2d 960, 965 n.6 
(Fla. 2003) (trial court may give a requested jury instruction on an aggravating 
factor if the evidence adduced at trial is legally sufficient to support a finding of 
that factor.) 
 
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of imminent death need only last seconds for this aggravator to apply.”  Gonzalez 
v. State, 136 So. 3d 1125, 1162 (Fla. 2014); see also Buzia, 926 So. 2d at 1214. 
 
Colley claims that HAC does not apply to either victim’s murder because 
there is no evidence that the victims experienced terror and fear prior to their 
deaths.  He maintains that “all of the killing was accomplished in under a minute,” 
so neither murder victim had much time to agonize over her impending death.  
Colley also disputes the trial court’s finding that Colley shot Amanda once, then 
killed Lindy, then returned to kill Amanda.  He claims that the evidence shows that 
he shot and killed Lindy first and only then proceeded to shoot and kill Amanda.  
Colley’s takeaway is that Lindy therefore did not hear her friend being shot and 
that Amanda had only seconds to contemplate Lindy’s shooting before being shot 
herself.  Colley says that if this Court upholds HAC here, the aggravator will be so 
broad as to apply in every case. 
 
Colley’s arguments are unpersuasive.  For starters, this Court’s role is not to 
reweigh the evidence, and the trial court’s findings as to the sequence of the 
shootings are supported by testimony from Rachel Hendricks and the medical 
examiner.  And their testimony strongly supports an inference that the murder 
victims experienced terror in the moments preceding their deaths.  Both women 
fled to the master bedroom area only after being shot at by Colley from outside the 
house.  They knew that Colley was on a murderous rampage.  After Colley found 
 
- 22 - 
Amanda, he shot her once, left her to kill Lindy, and then returned to inflict the 
gunshots that caused Amanda’s death.  The medical examiner testified that 
Amanda likely sustained painful wounds before the shot that killed her.  Similarly, 
Lindy cowered in fear behind a chest, heard her friend being shot, and then was 
executed upon Colley’s return to the closet.  The totality of these circumstances 
demonstrates that both murder victims experienced exceptional anguish before 
their deaths.  See Allred v. State, 55 So. 3d 1267, 1280 (Fla. 2010) (upholding 
HAC where the defendant entered victim’s home by shooting the glass doors, 
causing the victim to hide in the bathroom, where she “undoubtedly heard the 
screams of her helpless friends and [the defendant]’s repeated gunshots” before 
being shot six times).  Colley’s argument that facts like these are common to all 
first-degree murders is untenable.  We deny relief on this claim.10 
III. 
Constitutionality of Florida’s Capital Sentencing Scheme 
 
Colley next claims that Florida’s current death penalty statute is 
unconstitutional because it fails to genuinely narrow the class of cases eligible for 
death.  He argues that legislative enactments have expanded the number of 
 
 
10.  Given our conclusion on the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the 
trial court’s finding, we necessarily reject Colley’s argument that the court erred by 
instructing the jury on the HAC aggravator.  Similarly, we need not address 
Colley’s argument that his Sixth and Eighth Amendment rights were violated when 
the penalty phase jury was instructed on an assertedly unsupported statutory 
aggravator (either CCP or HAC). 
 
- 23 - 
aggravating factors to the point where every first-degree murder conviction is 
eligible for a death sentence, in violation of the Supreme Court’s mandate in 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  Colley also challenges the HAC 
aggravator as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 
 
Colley’s arguments are ones that this Court has repeatedly rejected.  See 
Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243, 1260 (Fla. 2006) (rejecting the argument that 
“Florida’s capital felony sentencing statute is unconstitutional because every 
person who is convicted of first-degree felony murder automatically qualifies for 
the aggravating circumstance of commission during the course of an enumerated 
felony.”);  Ault v. State, 866 So. 2d 674, 686 (Fla. 2003) (rejecting the argument 
that the murder in the course of a felony aggravator is unconstitutional because it 
constitutes an automatic aggravator and does not narrow classes of persons eligible 
for the death penalty); see also Victorino v. State, 23 So. 3d 87, 104 (Fla. 2009) 
(rejecting the claim that the HAC aggravator is unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad).  We decline to revisit these precedents here. 
IV. 
Impairment Mitigation 
 
Colley next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting his 
two proposed mitigators, namely that (1) Colley was impaired at the time of the 
murders and (2) Colley’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired, see 
 
- 24 - 
§ 921.141(7)(f), Fla. Stat.  Colley argues that the evidence shows that he was 
impaired by a combination of stress and alcohol and drug use, including being in a 
state of parasomnia from having taken Ambien early in the morning of the 
murders.  Colley claims that the trial court failed both to take into consideration his 
alcohol and prescription drug intake and to point to any evidence contradicting the 
proposed impairment mitigators. 
 
A trial court must expressly evaluate all statutory and nonstatutory 
mitigators a defendant has proposed.  Allen v. State, 137 So. 3d 946, 964 (Fla. 
2013).  It must find a proposed mitigating circumstance when the defendant has 
established that mitigator by the greater weight of the evidence.  See Campbell v. 
State, 571 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1990).  However, a trial court may reject a 
mitigator if the defendant fails to prove the mitigating circumstance, or if the 
record contains competent, substantial evidence supporting that rejection.  See Ault 
v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 186 (Fla. 2010).  A mitigator may also be rejected if the 
testimony supporting it is not substantiated by the actions of the defendant, or if the 
testimony supporting it conflicts with other evidence.  See Douglas v. State, 878 
So. 2d 1246, 1257 (Fla. 2004).  Even expert evidence can be rejected if that 
evidence cannot be reconciled with other evidence in the case.  Bright v. State, 299 
So. 3d 985 (Fla. 2020). 
 
- 25 - 
 
Here we find that competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 
rejection of Colley’s two proposed impairment mitigators.  Colley sought to 
establish these mitigators through the testimony of Drs. Mills and Buffington.  
These experts based their opinions largely on interviews with Colley a couple of 
years after the murders, in which Colley self-reported memory loss. 
But the State rebutted that evidence with testimony from Dr. Danzinger and 
Judge Tinlin.  Dr. Danzinger testified that the side effects of Ambien are rare and 
that a person in a parasomnia state “would not be able to engage in very complex 
discussions, such as behaving themselves and acting appropriately in a courtroom.”  
Judge Tinlin, who went through an in-person plea colloquy with Colley only ninety 
minutes before the murders, testified that he had no concerns that Colley was 
impaired that day.  He asked Colley a series of questions, all while Colley was 
under oath.  One of the questions was whether he was under the influence of any 
intoxicants, to which Colley responded “no.”  During Judge Tinlin’s testimony, the 
State introduced the video recording of Colley’s injunction violation proceeding.  
In the video, Colley stands alert and focused next to his attorney, and throughout 
the proceeding Colley voluntarily asks and answers questions. 
 
We find that competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 
rejection of Colley’s proposed impairment mitigators.  Specifically, we note 
Colley’s demeanor at the injunction hearing, his normal behavior at the gas station 
 
- 26 - 
minutes before the murders (also recorded on video), and his actions after the 
murders (abandoning his cell phone and fleeing the state).  All of this evidence is 
inconsistent with a person being in a state of parasomnia and unable either to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his behavior to the 
requirements of the law.  We also note the trial court’s finding that Colley’s own 
penalty phase experts testified that any alcohol and cocaine that Colley consumed 
in the predawn hours were no longer affecting him at the time of the murders.   We 
deny this claim. 
V. 
Victim Impact Statements 
 
Colley next challenges the trial court’s admission of victim impact 
statements.  First, he argues that all victim impact evidence should be 
impermissible.  And second, he argues that the trial court here abused its discretion 
by allowing the jury to hear the following statement from Beth Kennedy, one of 
the victim impact witnesses: “Please think about Amanda and all of the lives she 
has blessed.”  We review a trial court’s decision to admit victim impact testimony 
for abuse of discretion.  Kalisz v. State, 124 So. 3d 185, 211 (Fla. 2013). 
 
First, this Court already has rejected similar constitutional challenges to the 
admissibility of victim impact evidence in the penalty phase of a trial.  See Stein v. 
State, 632 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1994); Windom v. State, 656 So. 2d 432, 438 (Fla. 
 
- 27 - 
1995); Floyd v. State, 850 So. 2d 383, 407 (Fla. 2002).  We decline to revisit these 
precedents here. 
 
Second, we see no infirmity in Ms. Kennedy’s victim impact statement, 
which was read to the jury in the penalty phase.  In the statement, Ms. Kennedy 
described Amanda’s unique qualities as a mother and a friend, as well as the 
traumatic effects of her death (especially to Amanda’s two children).  The disputed 
sentence—“Please think about Amanda and all of the lives she has blessed.”—
comes at the very end of the statement.  Colley complains that this statement (to 
which he lodged a timely objection) “inserted a religious obligation to the jury” 
and unconstitutionally tainted the jury’s sentencing recommendation.  He 
implausibly maintains that Ms. Kennedy’s words were “highly inflammatory.”  We 
disagree.  The challenged statement was entirely innocuous and did not come close 
to prejudicing Colley’s constitutional rights.  See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808, 825 (1991) (test is whether victim impact evidence is so “unduly prejudicial” 
as to render the trial “fundamentally unfair”). 
VI. 
Prosecutor’s Comments 
 
Colley next alleges constitutional injury stemming from two unobjected-to 
comments during the State’s penalty phase closing argument.  We review such 
claims for fundamental error, defined as error that reaches down into the validity of 
the trial itself to the extent that the jury’s recommendation of death could not have 
 
- 28 - 
been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.  Smiley v. State, 295 So. 
3d 156 (Fla. 2020).  We do not examine each of the allegedly improper comments 
in isolation.  Rather we look at the argument as a whole (including any objected-to 
statements) to determine whether the cumulative effect of any impropriety 
deprived the defendant of a fair penalty phase.  Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 622 
(Fla. 2001). 
 
First, Colley challenges the prosecutor’s statement about the jury’s role: “It 
is a job that requires great courage.”  In full context, this is what the prosecutor 
said: 
 
The choices that he made for his own selfish desires because he 
couldn’t let things go, because he was losing control, and this was the 
only way that he could regain control. 
 
Now, your job is a – nobody is going to put it lightly.  It’s going 
to be a difficult job.  Nobody envies the job you’re being asked to do 
in this particular case.  It is a solemn one, but it is an important one.  It 
is a job that requires great courage.  So what is your role today in this 
phase of the trial? 
 
It all starts with the law.  Now, it is true and I’m sure the 
defense will tell you when they get up here, that there will be no 
requirement at any point in time, legally, that you return a verdict for 
the death penalty.  However, it is the law.  And we talked about this 
during this jury selection, and each of you agreed and took an oath 
that you would do that.  You would consider, you would consider in 
this case, the death penalty.  You also said you would consider life 
without the possibility of parole.  And so I’d like to spend some time 
with you, talk to you first about your role in this particular case, and 
then talk to you about the law that applies in this particular case and 
sort of how you go about looking at the evidence that the State has 
 
- 29 - 
presented to you in this case and how to weigh the difference pieces 
of evidence. 
Colley likens the challenged statement to telling the jurors not to “tak[e] the easy 
way out,” which this Court found improper in Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 421 
(Fla. 1998). 
We see no similarity between the prosecutor’s statement here and the one in 
Urbin.  Here the prosecutor referred to “great courage” in the context of the jurors’ 
duty to follow the law.  By contrast, the prosecutor in Urbin told the jury:  “[M]y 
concern is that some of you may be tempted to take the easy way out, to not weigh 
the aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances and not want to fully 
carry out your responsibility and just vote for life . . . I’m going to ask you not to 
not to be swayed by pity or sympathy.”  Id. at 421.  Nothing about the prosecutor’s 
argument in this case suggested to the jury that a vote for life would be a copout. 
 
Colley’s second challenge is to this statement, made near the end of the 
State’s penalty phase closing argument: 
 
He may have had a right to be upset, but not like this, not like 
this.  The defendant was on a mission.  Whatever he thought about 
Amanda Colley, he was not the judge, jury, and executioner of her 
character.  That was not his job.  What she did was – did not deserve a 
death sentence.  What he did, in shooting her down the way he did and 
shooting Lindy Dobbins and killing her, that does deserve a death 
sentence. 
 
Colley suggests that this argument inflamed the jurors’ passions and encouraged 
them to base their recommendation on illegitimate considerations.  We disagree. 
 
- 30 - 
As we have explained, one of the defense’s principal themes in mitigation 
was to argue that Colley suffered from emotional strain and upset as a result of 
being estranged from his wife.  In its guilt phase closing argument, the defense 
suggested that Amanda herself bore partial responsibility for Colley’s fragile 
mental state, because she allegedly had lied to him about dating Lamar Douberly 
and led Colley on.  Defense counsel said: “She kept bringing him back in and not 
allowing him to move on.” And: “[I]t was this emotional roller coaster, back and 
forth, back and forth, that led to these terrible, terrible events.”  Against this 
backdrop, the prosecutor’s statements simply anticipated Colley’s mitigation 
argument and properly argued the State’s theory of Colley’s culpability.  We see 
no violation of Colley’s constitutional right to a fair trial and reject the argument 
that the State sought a verdict on a non-evidentiary ground. 
VII. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
Finally, even where the defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence, this Court has a mandatory obligation in death penalty cases to determine 
whether competent, substantial evidence supports a murder conviction.  Kirkman v. 
State, 233 So. 3d 456, 469 (Fla. 2018); Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5).  That standard 
is easily satisfied in this case. 
 
As to each victim, Colley was convicted of both premeditated and felony 
murder, and the convictions can be upheld on appeal if the evidence is sufficient to 
 
- 31 - 
support either theory.  Rogers, 285 So. 3d at 891.  Rachel Hendricks testified that 
she saw Colley in the backyard with a gun shooting into the house and that he 
entered Amanda’s home through the shattered glass doors.  She also said that 
Colley followed his murder victims into the master bedroom and that she saw him 
raise his gun to Lindy Dobbins’ head.  Uniquely colored bullets found in Colley’s 
bedroom matched the ones found inside both murder victims’ bodies.  And already 
we have explained that Colley’s actions—including arming himself in advance, 
approaching Amanda’s home in a manner calculated to avoid detection, and 
shooting into the house from outside without any provocation—show not just 
premeditation but heightened premeditation.  Competent, substantial evidence 
overwhelmingly supports Colley’s two first-degree murder convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm Colley’s convictions for first degree murder and his sentences of 
death. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
- 32 - 
LABARGA, J., concurring in result. 
 
In light of this Court’s decision in Lawrence v. State, 45 Fla. L. Weekly 
S277 (Fla. Oct. 29, 2020) (receding from proportionality review requirement in 
death penalty direct appeal cases), and for the reasons expressed in my dissent in 
Lawrence, id. at S279-82, I can only concur in the result. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for St. Johns County, 
Howard M. Maltz, Judge - Case No 552015CF001248XXAXMX 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, Steven N. Gosney and George D.E. Burden, 
Assistant Public Defenders, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Patrick Bobek, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee