Case Title: GOULART v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-100

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-09-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
GOULART v. STATE2003 WY 10876 P.3d 1230Case Number: 02-100Decided: 09/05/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                
         

 

VINCENT 
A. GOULART,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Goshen County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

James 
A. Eddington of Torrington, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Richard Rideout, 
Special Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Rideout.

 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, 
Vincent A. Goulart (Goulart), entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere1 to the crime of committing an 
immoral or indecent act with a child who was his step-daughter (victim).2  The conditions that Goulart wanted to 
appeal were that the district court erred in denying Goulart's motion to 
suppress statements made to the police, that a police officer "tainted" the 
victim's testimony by suggesting language to her during an interview, and that 
the district court erred in refusing to allow Goulart to introduce the testimony 
of the victim's sister (AG).

 

[¶2]      We will 
affirm.

 

[¶3]      Goulart poses the 
issues in these terms:

 

            
1.  Were the defendant's rights pursuant to the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 6 
of the Wyoming Constitution violated by the District Court's denial of the 
defendant's Motion to Suppress Tape recording?

 

            
2.  When a police officer provides the terms "skin-to-skin," 
"vagina" and "pelvis" to a minor child making accusations of indecent liberties, 
is a competency hearing required under Wyoming Law?

 

            
3.  Did the trial court commit reversible err[or] by denying 
the defendant the right to call [AG] as a witness?

 

The 
State, in turn, states these issues:

 

            
1.  Whether the district court committed reversible error in 
denying [Goulart's] motion to suppress his statement made to officer 
Curtis?

 

            
2.  Whether the district court committed reversible error in 
denying [Goulart's] motion to conduct a "competency hearing" on the victim's 
ability to testify?

 

            
3.  Whether the district court committed reversible error in 
granting the State's motion to preclude [Goulart] from calling the victim's 
sister as a witness?

 

 

[¶4]      Goulart was 
charged with one count of committing an immoral or indecent act with the 
victim.  The gravamen of the charge 
was that on or about October 4, 2000, Goulart touched the victim with his hand 
on her bare buttocks and that, later that same night, he touched her on her 
vaginal area, which was covered with clothing at the time.  According to the victim, she and her 
younger brother were lying on their parents' bed watching TV when Goulart 
returned home at about midnight, after a night of drinking.  The children's mother was away for the 
weekend.  Goulart got in bed with 
the two children.  The victim was 
wearing shorts and a T-shirt.  The 
victim related that Goulart first rubbed her buttocks with his hand, placing his 
hand underneath her shorts.  The 
victim then left that bedroom and went to her own room and got into the top bunk 
of a set of bunk beds.  Goulart came 
downstairs and said she should come back to bed.  She followed Goulart back to the 
parents' bed, whereupon Goulart used his hand to rub her vagina, placing his 
hand on top of her shorts.  The 
victim said, "Daddy, please stop," and then lay down on the floor by the bed to 
sleep.   The report of this 
incident to the police did not occur until several months later in February of 
2001.

 

[¶5]      On June 20, 2001, 
Goulart entered a plea of not guilty.  
On October 2, 2001, Goulart changed his plea to a plea of nolo 
contendere, reserving for appeal the issues we now have before 
us.

 

 

 

[¶6]      A trial court's 
ruling on a defendant's motion to suppress a statement on the grounds that it 
was made involuntarily is reviewed de novo.   In conducting such a review, we 
defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly 
erroneous.  This Court considers all 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination 
because the trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence and to assess 
the credibility of witnesses.  The 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Wyoming 
Constitution Article 1, §§ 6 and 11, require that confessions be voluntary.  A statement that is obtained by coercion 
is not trustworthy and may not be used at trial against the person who made 
it.  A defendant is deprived of the 
right to due process of law if an involuntary statement is admitted at his 
trial.  A statement is considered to 
be voluntary if the defendant makes it of his own free and deliberate choice, 
and not because of intimidation, coercion or deception.  The prosecution has the burden to prove, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant's statement is 
voluntary.  Lara v. State, 
2001 WY 53, ¶9, 25 P.3d 507, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001); also see Hadden v. State, 
2002 WY 41, ¶17, 42 P.3d 495, ¶17 (Wyo. 2002); and Meek v. State, 2002 WY 
1, ¶13, 37 P.3d 1279, ¶13 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶7]      A capsule 
statement of Goulart's contentions in this regard is this:  "The only issue is whether the degree of 
trickery, psychological pressure, threats, implied promises and inducements 
applied by the police officer in this case equate to 
involuntariness."

 

[¶8]      The record shows 
that Goulart was asked to come to the police station in Torrington on February 
20, 2001.  The interview began at 
10:00 a.m., and it lasted for about 90 minutes.  Goulart came to the police station at 
the request of Police Officer Curtis, but Goulart was not under arrest, nor was 
he arrested the day of the interview.  
Goulart was given Miranda warnings before the interview commenced, 
and Officer Curtis testified that Goulart waived those rights and agreed to talk 
with him about the alleged crime.  
Goulart was not informed of the subject of the interview until after the 
interview was underway.  Officer 
Curtis did not obtain a written Miranda waiver because he "had this on 
tape."3  We note that the transcript of the tape 
does not include Goulart's responses indicating that he understood the 
Miranda warnings, though it does include his agreement to talk after the 
Miranda warnings were read to him.  
The tape itself is barely audible in this regard, but what sounds like 
"uh-hum" can be heard to most of the inquiries as to Goulart's understanding of 
his rights.

 

[¶9]      Goulart relies 
principally upon our decision in Evans v. State, 944 P.2d 1120 (Wyo. 
1997), in structuring his argument.  
Indeed, that case is directly in point, although it is to the opposite 
effect.  That is, in the 
Evans case a district court ordered that a statement given to the police 
be suppressed and, thus, our analysis focused on the evidence favorable to the 
district court's ruling that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of 
demonstrating the voluntariness of the statement.  Id., at 1126-28.  That same sort of analysis, of course, 
applies equally here.  However, in 
this instance the district court concluded that the State did meet its burden of 
demonstrating that the statements obtained from Goulart were voluntary, as well 
as that the evidence presented by Goulart did not seriously refute the State's 
evidence.

 

[¶10]   The district court found that 
Goulart was asked to come to the police department for an interview.  Before the interview, Goulart was 
informed that the police were investigating an allegation that he had molested 
the victim.  The police informed 
Goulart of his Miranda rights and, in light of those warnings, Goulart 
agreed to answer questions.  Goulart 
took a cell phone to the interview with him and took a call on it during the 
interview process.  In addition, at 
one point Goulart indicated that he was going to leave but was persuaded by 
Officer Curtis to stay and complete the interview.  Although Officer Curtis was insistent 
and persistent in his questioning, he did not force Goulart to answer 
questions.  Indeed, Officer Curtis 
told Goulart he should not confess to something he did not do.  During the course of the interview, 
including one time after only a few minutes of questioning, Goulart conceded on 
several occasions that he might have touched his daughter accidentally, though 
he had no specific recollection of it.  
The district court concluded that Goulart had made his statements 
voluntarily after being given Miranda warnings.  Further, Goulart was not in custody, and 
a reasonable person, given the circumstances, would have known that he was free 
to leave and free not to answer any questions.

 

[¶11]   We have carefully reviewed the same 
materials that were available to the district court and, of course, we have done 
so considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial 
court's determination, because the trial court had the opportunity to hear the 
evidence and to assess the credibility of witnesses.  We conclude that Goulart's statements 
were not the product of trickery, psychological pressure, threats, implied 
promises, and/or inducements used by the police officer.  Thus, we also conclude that the trial 
court findings in this regard are not clearly erroneous, and we hold that the 
trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the statements at 
issue.

 

 

[¶12]   The standard of review applicable 
to a competency hearing is clearly established:

 

We 
have held that when a child is called into the courtroom to testify, and the 
child's competency is called into question by either party, it is the duty of 
the trial court to make an independent examination of the child to determine 
competency, and that determination will not be disturbed unless shown to be 
clearly erroneous.  English v. 
State, 982 P.2d 139, 145 (Wyo.1999).  
In English, we also held that an assertion that a child's 
testimony was tainted could best be comprehended as a part of the competency 
hearing and that a separate taint hearing is not required.  982 P.2d  at 146.   In English, we established 
that the requirement that a competency hearing on the issue of "taint," based on 
an assertion that the child's statements were the product of suggestive or 
coercive interview techniques, or some other potentially improper influence, is 
triggered whenever a party presents the court with "some evidence" that a child 
witness is incompetent.  982 P.2d at 
146-47;  Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 58 (Wyo.1999).

 

Alicea 
v. State, 
13 P.3d 693, 697 (Wyo. 2000) (footnote omitted); also see Billingsley v. 
State, 2003 WY 61, ¶¶9-10, 69 P.3d 390, ¶¶9-10 (Wyo. 2003); 
and Wilde v. State 2003 WY 93, ¶7, 74 P.3d 699, ¶7 (Wyo. 
2003).

 

[¶13]   At its September 14, 2001 hearing 
on motions, the district court heard Goulart's motion concerning the competency 
of the victim.  That motion was 
based on the theory that Officer Curtis "tainted" her testimony by suggesting 
the words she should use to describe what had happened to her, in particular, 
the words "skin-on-skin" with reference to Goulart rubbing his hand on the 
victim's bare buttocks, and the words "vagina" and "pelvis."  At the preliminary hearing, defense 
counsel cross-examined the victim about the interview process used by Officer 
Curtis, and the victim admitted that Curtis helped her find words to express 
what she was trying to say.  That 
testimony was tape-recorded and a transcript of it is a part of the record on 
appeal, as well as a part of the evidence the district court utilized in 
deciding the instant motion.  At the 
hearing, Goulart's attorney called Officer Curtis as a witness and examined him 
about the interview with the victim.  
As a prefatory matter, Curtis was asked if the interview was recorded and 
he answered that the interview was neither tape-recorded nor video recorded 
because two officers were present to observe the interview.  When the examination of Officer Curtis 
was complete, Goulart's attorney announced to the district court, "I have no 
more evidence, just argument."  The 
argument presented by defense counsel was based on the case English v. 
State, 982 P.2d 139 (Wyo. 1999), and, at the conclusion of that argument, 
defense counsel asked "that the written statement of  [the victim] and the testimony [of the 
victim at the preliminary hearing] be excluded."

 

[¶14]   The district court then made these 
oral findings:

 

            
With respect to the competence or any taint, Rule [WRE] 601 provides that 
all witnesses are competent unless the rules provide otherwise; and the Court 
then starts with the presumption, or at least with the suggestion under the 
rule, that this witness is competent.

            
Her competence and the lack of any taint of suggestion or ideas planted 
in her mind by Officer Curtis are also found in the fact that there were not 
leading questions asked, that she was in the fifth grade, 11 years old, that she 
seemed intelligent, that she responded appropriately to many questions, that she 
wrote out a story from beginning to end without pausing and without any input 
from the interviewer.

            
The Court finds that the consistency in her story between the verbal 
story and her written story and her testimony at preliminary hearing is an 
indication of its being independent and voluntary and being not suggested to by 
Mr. Curtis at the particular interview that he was.
  

            
The 
Court does note that this individual, this witness, used two or three terms that 
may have been beyond her years and may have not, but the court finds the 
testimony here today is very specific, that the witness had a difficult time of 
getting from her vocabulary the correct anatomical word or way to describe  
method to describe something, and so she was supplementing that description with 
physical demonstration, or showing or pointing at 
something.

            
And it was entirely reasonable and appropriate for the officer to provide 
that word once she identified the body part or the location of wherever she is 
talking about.

            
It would be quite a different thing if the officer started out suggesting 
to her that she was touched in a certain place or that it went some way, and 
then gave her the anatomical word for that place; but that's not what happened 
here.  Instead, the witness 
described what happened, struggled for a word, and Officer Curtis simply gave it 
to her.

            
That's not a taint.

 

[¶15]   The district court asked counsel if 
there was anything further and both sides indicated that there was 
not.

 

[¶16]   The record on appeal supports only 
one conclusion and that is that the district court held a competency hearing as 
contemplated by English, and that the district court's conclusion that 
the victim was competent, and that her testimony was not tainted, is not clearly 
erroneous.  Indeed, such a 
conclusion is wholly consistent with the evidentiary material brought to the 
district court's attention by Goulart.  
We hold that the district court did not err with respect to this 
matter.

 

Did 
the District Court Err by Denying Goulart the Right to Call AG as a 
Witness 

[¶17]   We have repeatedly articulated the 
standard of review for evidentiary rulings:

 

            
Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court 
and include determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, 
competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This court will generally accede to the 
trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court 
clearly abused its discretion.

 

Solis 
v. State, 
981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo.1999) (citation omitted).  We have described the standard of an 
abuse of discretion as reaching the question of the reasonableness of the trial 
court's choice.  Judicial discretion 
is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  "In the absence of an abuse of 
discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's determination."  [Griswold v. State, 2001 WY 14, 
¶7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶7 (Wyo.2001).]  
The burden is on the defendant to establish such 
abuse.

 

Skinner 
v. State, 
2001 WY 102, ¶25, 33 P.3d 758, ¶25 (Wyo.2001), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 122 S. Ct. 1554, 152 L. Ed. 2d 477, 2002 WL 205622 (2002) (some citations 
omitted).

 

Willis 
v. State, 
2002 WY 79, ¶16, 46 P.3d 890, ¶16 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶18]   Goulart proposed to call his older 
step-daughter, AG, as a witness.  We 
will not set out in detail the reasoning behind this argument because the 
district court left open the possibility that he would admit the testimony at 
trial.  The gist of the offer of 
proof was that AG would testify about the good and continuing relationship she 
had with Goulart both before and after the incident of indecency with the 
victim, as well as that she did not believe the victim.  The district court's oral ruling on this 
issue makes clear that although it deemed that the proposed testimony "would not 
make the determination of any fact at issue in this case more or less 
probable":

 

            
There are many opportunities, however, when her testimony might be or 
could be  anyhow, her testimony might be appropriate rebuttal, certainly might 
happen, if there was something particularly said that she knew 
about.

 

[¶19]   We conclude that Goulart has not 
carried his burden of establishing that the district court abused its discretion 
in making the pretrial determination it made with respect to this proffered 
evidence.

 

 

[¶20]   For the reasons set out above, the 
judgment and sentence of the district court are affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1W.R.Cr.P. 
11(a)(1)(A)(B)(2) (emphasis added) provides:

Rule 11.  
Pleas.

            
(a) Alternatives. --

            
(1) In General. --  A 
defendant may plead not guilty, not guilty by reason of mental illness or 
deficiency, guilty, or nolo contendere.  
If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to 
appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.

(A) 
Nolo Contendere. --  A defendant may 
plead nolo contendere only with the consent of the court.  Such a plea shall be accepted by the 
court only after due consideration of the views of the parties and the interest 
of the public in the effective administration of 
justice.

(B) 
Mental Illness or Deficiency. --  A 
plea of "not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency" may be pleaded 
orally or in writing by the defendant or the defendant's counsel at the time of 
the defendant's arraignment or at such later time as the court may for good 
cause permit.  Such a plea does not 
deprive the defendant of other defenses and may be coupled with a plea of not 
guilty.

(2) Conditional 
Pleas.  With the approval of the court and the consent of the attorney for the 
state, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, 
reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to seek review of 
the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion.  A defendant who prevails on appeal shall 
be allowed to withdraw the plea.

 

   2Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-3-105 (LexisNexis 2003) provides:

 

§ 14-3-105.  Immoral or indecent acts;  penalty.

            
(a) Except under circumstance constituting sexual assault in the first, 
second or third degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304, any person 
knowingly taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child or 
knowingly causing or encouraging any child to cause or encourage another child 
to commit with him any immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony.  Except as provided by subsection (b) of 
this section, a person convicted under this section shall be fined not less than 
one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or 
imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten (10) years, or 
both.

            
(b) An actor convicted under subsection (a) of this section shall be 
punished by life imprisonment without parole if:

(i) 
The circumstances of the crime involve a victim who was under the age of sixteen 
(16) at the time of the offense and an actor who was at least four (4) years 
older than the victim; and

(ii) The actor has two (2) or more previous convictions for any of the 
following designated offenses, which convictions resulted from charges 
separately brought and which arose out of separate occurrences in this state or 
elsewhere:

            
(A) A conviction under W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304 or a criminal statute 
containing the same or similar elements as a crime defined by W.S. 6-2-302 
through 6-2-304;

                                    
(B) Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 135, § 2, eff. July 1, 
1997.

                                    
(C) A conviction under W.S. 14-3-105(a), or a criminal statute containing 
the same or similar elements as the crime defined by W.S. 14-3-105(a), if the 
circumstances of the crime involved a victim who was under the age of sixteen 
(16) at the time of the offense and an actor who was at least four (4) years 
older than the victim.

            
(c) As used in this section, "child" means a person under the age of 
eighteen (18) years.

 

   3A written 
Miranda waiver constitutes "better" evidence than the tape-recorded 
waiver, and that is especially so in an instance such as this where the 
transcript does not clearly demonstrate the waiver, although the police 
officer's recollection was certain that it would.