Case Title: State v. Delisle

Citation: 162 Vt. 293, 648 A.2d 632

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_DELISLE.92-039; 162 Vt. 293; 648 A.2d 632

[Opinion Filed July 1, 1994]

[Motion for Reargument Denied ]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-039


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit

 Wayne E. Delisle                             February Term, 1993



 Michael J. Kupersmith, J.


 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant
    Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

 Peter F. Langrock and Mitchell L. Pearl of Langrock Sperry & Wool,
    Middlebury, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      MORSE, J.    Defendant appeals a jury conviction of second-degree
 murder.  The principal issue is how the jury should be instructed when a
 lesser-included offense supported by the evidence is barred by the statute
 of limitations.  We conclude that, in such a situation, the defendant should
 have a choice between foregoing an instruction on the lesser offense or
 obtaining an instruction informing the jury that, because the passage of
 time precludes prosecution for the lesser offense, it must acquit the
 defendant if it determines the evidence would support a conviction for that

 

 offense alone.  Because the court refused defendant's alternative request to
 give a similar instruction, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
                                     I.
      On November 4, 1976, Richard Gonyo reported to the Vermont State Police
 that his wife, Laurie, was missing.  Her body was found eight months later
 in the Lamoille River, wrapped in a tarp, bound with rope, and weighted down
 by cement blocks.  Although the police considered defendant a suspect, no
 charges were brought against him at that time, and the case was classified
 as unsolved.  In late 1989 or early 1990, defendant's son, Wayne "Bud"
 Delisle, who was eleven years old in 1976, went to the police with evidence
 implicating his father in Laurie Gonyo's murder.  On March 7, 1990, the
 State charged defendant with first-degree murder.
      At trial, the State presented evidence that the items used to wrap,
 bind, and weigh down the victim's body were indistinguishable from similar
 items gathered from defendant's property, which adjoined the victim's
 property.  The state pathologist testified that the cause of death was
 manual strangulation.  The State also introduced evidence that defendant and
 the victim had quarreled the night before she disappeared.  Bud testified
 that the victim threatened to tell "a dark tale" about defendant if he did
 not take her horses to be shod the next day and did not give her new horse
 blankets.  Bud also testified that during this argument defendant threatened
 to kill the victim.  Bud then testified as to defendant's activities on the
 morning of the day the victim disappeared, explaining that his father broke
 with his normal routine.  Bud testified that his father went toward the
 Gonyo residence, returned shortly thereafter, threw a tarp and some other
 items into the back of a pickup truck, and drove off.  The State also

 

 presented evidence that defendant fled the area after the victim disappeared
 and introduced arguably inculpatory statements made by defendant.  It was
 also undisputed that defendant and the victim had been involved in what the
 State described to the jury as "a torrid love affair."
      Defendant maintained that he was innocent and that somebody else had
 killed Laurie Gonyo.  He offered the alibi that he was at work in a store
 owned by his parents, which they corroborated.  Defendant also explained
 that he left the area because the victim's husband threatened him, not
 because of the victim's disappearance.
      The court instructed the jury on first-degree murder and the lesser-
 included offense of second-degree murder, but not voluntary manslaughter.
 Instead, the court instructed the jury that if the State failed to prove all
 of the elements of murder in the first or second degree, the jury must
 acquit defendant even if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he
 had killed the victim.  The jury convicted defendant of second-degree
 murder, and the court sentenced him to twenty-to-fifty years in prison.
      Defendant claims on appeal that: (1) the trial court had accepted and
 was bound by a plea agreement to voluntary manslaughter, and even if the
 trial court was not bound by the plea agreement, it abused its discretion in
 rejecting the plea; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury
 on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter; (3) the State did not
 present sufficient mens rea evidence for a second-degree murder conviction;
 (4) the court erred in allowing the State to give evidence concerning
 tangible evidence that it had lost; and (5) due process requires reversal
 because of the age of the case and inability to defend.  Defendant raises

 

 other issues that we need not reach in light of our disposition of this
 case.
                                     II.
      Defendant first argues that the trial court accepted, and thus was
 bound by, the terms of a plea agreement reached by the parties.  He also
 contends that, even if the court was not bound by the parties' agreement, it
 abused its discretion in rejecting the agreement.
      On October 15, 1990, the parties informed the court that defendant
 agreed to plead no contest to the charge of manslaughter, and, in return,
 the State agreed to recommend a sentence of not less than four nor more than
 ten years, all suspended except for two years to serve, minus credit for
 time already served.  During its colloquy with defendant to assure that the
 plea was knowing and voluntary, the court informed defendant that he would
 be given the sentence he agreed to "assuming that I'm able to consummate the
 plea agreement for you."  The court also informed defendant that he could
 withdraw the plea "right through these proceedings."  After hearing a
 rendition of the facts of the case, the court asked the State why it decided
 to enter into the plea agreement.  The State explained that it was a
 "tactical decision" motivated primarily by the age of the case, but it
 conceded that the victim's mother was frustrated by the proposed sentence.
 The court responded as follows: "Okay.  I'm going to be ordering a
 presentence report.  I think it's important in this case."  The court then
 entered an adjudication of guilt and stated that it would set a sentencing
 hearing after it had a chance to review the report.
      Before the sentencing hearing, the court advised counsel in chambers
 that it had serious reservations about accepting the plea agreement.  Both

 

 parties filed memoranda in support of the agreement, and then argued for the
 agreement at a February 28, 1991 hearing.  While conceding that it had not
 specifically informed defendant at the October 15, 1990 hearing that it was
 deferring a decision on whether to accept or reject the plea agreement, the
 court stated that "that is the fairest interpretation of what occurred at
 that time."  Noting that it had ordered the presentence report "to give me
 the advantage of having the probation officer's input and to reflect myself
 at greater length on what an appropriate sentence would be," the court
 concluded that it did not "believe that the plea agreement calls for an
 appropriate sentence given the nature of this offense."
      Defendant contends that, in failing explicitly to defer its decision on
 whether to accept or reject the agreement at the October 15, 1990 hearing,
 the court accepted the agreement and was bound by it.  In support of its
 contention, the state cites federal case law, particularly United States v.
 Holman, 728 F.2d 809, 812 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. (1984), for the
 proposition that a court's failure explicitly to reject, or defer a decision
 on, a plea agreement amounts to an acceptance of the agreement.  The State
 counters that the court was not bound by the agreement because, unlike
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(2), Vermont Rule 11(e)(2)-(3)
 explicitly provides that a plea agreement neither binds the court nor limits
 its imposition of judgment or sentence unless the court informs the
 defendant that the maximum judgment and sentence it will impose is the one
 provided for in the agreement.  We conclude the court was not bound by the
 agreement.
      Once the prosecuting attorney has disclosed the terms and reasons for a

 

 plea agreement, Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(2)-(4) sets forth
 the following procedure:
           (2) Notice of Such Agreement.  . . . . Thereupon the court,
      before entry of the plea, may accept or reject the agreement, or
      defer its decision as to acceptance or rejection until there has
      been an opportunity to consider the presentence report.  The plea
      agreement shall not be binding upon the court nor shall it limit
      the court in the judgment and sentence to be imposed unless the
      court accepts the plea agreement under subdivision (e)(3) of this
      rule.

           (3) Acceptance of Plea Agreement.  If the court accepts the
      plea agreement, the court shall inform the defendant that it will
      embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition provided for
      in the plea agreement or a less onerous disposition.

           (4) Rejection of Plea Agreement.  If the court rejects the
      plea agreement or defers decision upon it, the court shall inform
      the parties of this fact, advise the defendant personally in open
      court that the court is or may not be bound by the plea agreement,
      pursuant to Rule 32(d) afford a defendant who has already pleaded
      the opportunity to then withdraw his plea, and advise the
      defendant that if he persists in his plea the disposition of the
      case may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated
      by the plea agreement.
      Our reading of the transcript of the plea hearing leads us to conclude
 that the court intended to defer a final decision on whether to accept or
 reject the plea agreement until it had an opportunity to review the
 presentence report.  Further, because the Vermont rule states that the court
 is not bound by a plea agreement unless it informs the defendant that the
 strictest judgment and sentence it will impose is the one provided in the
 agreement, see V.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(2), (3), we reject defendant's argument that
 an acceptance must be presumed unless the court explicitly rejects the
 agreement or defers its decision.  We recognize that the court did not defer
 its decision in the exact terms provided in subsection 11(e)(4), but the
 court suggested that it had not yet decided whether to accept the agreement,
 and it informed defendant that he could still withdraw his plea.  While we

 

 encourage the courts to follow subsection 11(e)(4) to the letter, we cannot
 conclude in this instance that the court accepted the agreement.  Cf. State
 v. Whitney, 156 Vt. 301, 302, 591 A.2d 388, 389 (1991) (while it is "better
 practice" for court, when deciding whether to accept guilty plea, to
 explain to defendant elements of offense and factual allegations comprising
 offense, V.R.Cr.P. 11(f) "is not a per se rule").
      Defendant argues, however, that even if the court was not bound by the
 plea agreement, it abused its discretion by not accepting the agreement.  We
 find no abuse of discretion.  The court determined that, despite the long
 delay in bringing the prosecution, the relatively light sentence proposed
 was inappropriate given the nature of the crime.  This was a sufficient
 reason for the court to reject the agreement.  See United States v. Miller,
 722 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Rule 11 also contemplates the rejection
 of a negotiated plea when the district court believes that the bargain is
 too lenient, or otherwise not in the public interest.").  Further, the
 record does not support defendant's contention that the court capitulated to
 public pressure.
                                    III.
      Next, we address defendant's challenge to the trial court's refusal to
 charge the jury on manslaughter.  Defendant requested a jury instruction on
 manslaughter as well as first- and second-degree murder.  The requested
 charge would have allowed the jury to find defendant guilty of manslaughter,
 even though the three-year statute of limitations had run on that offense.
 See 13 V.S.A. { 4501.  In the alternative, defendant requested that the
 court charge the jurors on the definition of manslaughter, and then instruct
 them to acquit if they found that he had committed that offense only.  The

 

 trial court indicated that it would not instruct the jury on manslaughter
 unless defendant waived the statute of limitations on a manslaughter
 prosecution.  Defendant refused to waive the limitations bar, and the court
 charged the jury on first- and second-degree murder only.
      Defendant argues that the trial court erred by requiring him to waive
 the statute of limitations as a condition of having the jury instructed on
 a lesser-included offense.  He contends that the statute-of-limitations bar
 does not conflict with his right to have lesser-included offenses charged.
 Rather, defendant maintains, if the jury were instructed on manslaughter and
 returned a guilty verdict on that charge, then the statute of limitations
 would operate to prevent the court from entering judgment on the verdict.
 Thus, defendant argues, the jury charge was not sufficient and his
 conviction must be reversed.  On the other hand, the State argues that if a
 defendant is not required to elect between the two rights, then the
 defendant can "have his cake and eat it, too" by receiving the lesser-
 included-offense instruction and then avoiding punishment if convicted on
 that offense only.
      As a general rule, a criminal defendant is entitled to have the jury
 instructed on all lesser-included offenses.  State v. Bolio, 159 Vt. 250,
 252, 617 A.2d 885, 886 (1992); see Reporter's Notes, V.R.Cr.P. 31(c).
 Murder in the second degree and manslaughter are lesser-included offenses of
 first-degree murder.  See 13 V.S.A. { 2310 (second-degree murder); State v.
 Averill, 85 Vt. 115, 132, 81 A. 461, 467 (1911) (manslaughter).  A requested
 charge on a lesser-included offense will be given, however, only if the
 facts in evidence reasonably support such an instruction.  State v. Wright,

 

 154 Vt. 512, 518, 581 A.2d 720, 724-25 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1032
 (1991).
      Citing Wright, the State argues that the trial judge did not err in
 refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter because the evi-
 dence did not support such an instruction.  The State reasons that because
 defendant contended that he was not involved in the victim's death or the
 concealment of her body, there was no evidence to support a jury determin-
 ation that defendant acted with sudden passion, under great provocation, or
 diminished capacity -- the mitigating factors supporting manslaughter.
      We are reluctant to conclude that the evidence did not support an
 instruction on manslaughter.  "[V]oluntary manslaughter is an intentional
 killing committed under extenuating circumstances that would mitigate, but
 not justify, the killing, such as provocation that would cause a reasonable
 person to lose self control."  State v. Johnson, 158 Vt. 508, 518 n.4, 615 A.2d 132, 138 n.4 (1992).  The evidence showed that the victim and defendant
 were in a deteriorating love affair and the victim had threatened defendant
 that she had "a dark tale" to tell.  In addition, the manner of death was
 manual strangulation.  These facts could conceivably have led the jury to
 conclude that this was an unlawful killing committed in the heat of passion.
 Indeed, even the State, while arguing in support of the rejected plea
 agreement, conceded that this "could have been a crime of passion," and the
 trial court acknowledged that an instruction on manslaughter would have been
 appropriate if the statute of limitations had not run on that offense.
      We must address, then, the issue of how to instruct the jury when
 defendant seeks an instruction on a time-barred, lesser-included offense
 that is supported by the evidence.  In Spaziano v. Florida,