Case Title: People v. Vivar

Citation: 

Docket Number: S260270

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2021-05-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ROBERT LANDEROS VIVAR, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S260270 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Two 
E070926 
 
Riverside County Superior Court 
RIF101988 
 
 
May 3, 2021 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Justices Liu, Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
Justice Corrigan filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, in 
which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
S260270 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
The population of the United States includes millions of 
immigrants who arrived as children, attended schools, and 
found work here.  (See Dep’t of Homeland Security v. Regents of 
the Univ. of California (2020) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [140 S.Ct. 1891, 
1932] (conc. & dis. opn. of Kavanaugh, J.).)  Whether they 
become citizens or not, these immigrants’ ties to our country are 
evident not only in their work and schooling, but in how they’ve 
formed attachments and families of their own.  In contrast, what 
ties they once had to their country of birth — from which they 
may lack even memories — often slip away.  So when long-
standing noncitizen residents of this country are accused of 
committing a crime, the most devastating consequence may not 
be a prison sentence, but their removal and exclusion from the 
United States.  (See People v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 
563 (Martinez).)  Because the prospect of deportation “is an 
integral part,” and often even “the most important part,” of a 
noncitizen defendant’s calculus in responding to certain 
criminal charges (Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, 364 
(Padilla)), both the Legislature and the courts have sought to 
ensure these defendants receive clear and accurate advice about 
the impact of criminal convictions on their immigration status, 
along with effective remedies when such advice is deficient.  
(E.g., Pen. Code, §§ 1016.2 et seq., 1473.7; Lee v. United States 
(2017) ___ U.S. ___ [137 S.Ct. 1958] (Lee); Padilla, at p. 360; 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
Martinez, at p. 559; People v. Superior Court (Giron) (1974) 11 
Cal.3d 793, 798.)  
How these provisions apply to people like defendant 
Robert Landeros Vivar — who came to the United States at age 
six and lacked any meaningful ties to his country of birth — is 
the problem we address in this case.  Vivar was arrested in 2002 
for attempting to steal Sudafed from a grocery store.  Although 
he’d spent four decades living in this country as a lawful 
permanent resident, he lacked American citizenship.  What he 
nonetheless possessed were robust ties to the United States.  His 
mother, wife, children, and grandchildren were all citizens.  His 
son, who was serving in the United States Air Force, was about 
to be deployed to the Middle East. 
Unfortunately, as the Court of Appeal held and the 
Attorney General concedes, Vivar was never properly advised 
about the immigration consequences of his plea options.  He 
didn’t know, for example, that pleading guilty to violating 
Health and Safety Code section 11383, former subdivision (c), 
would necessarily subject him to mandatory deportation, while 
pleading guilty to violating Penal Code section 459 would not.  
Vivar took the former plea offer and rejected the latter.  His 
mistake soon became manifest:  within days, Vivar was 
subjected to an immigration hold, and a few months later he was 
deported.   
After Vivar made his way back into the United States by 
crossing the border without inspection, he sought expungement 
of his drug conviction.  He succeeded and then tried to secure 
further relief by way of a petition for writ of error coram nobis.  
Neither had any effect on his immigration status, however.  He 
was again deported in 2013.   
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
In 2018, Vivar filed a motion to vacate his 2002 conviction 
under a recently enacted statute offering relief to those who had 
already served their sentences.  (Pen. Code, § 1473.7 (section 
1473.7).)  A successful section 1473.7 motion requires a showing, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, of a prejudicial error that 
affected the defendant’s ability to meaningfully understand the 
actual or potential immigration consequences of a plea.  (Id., 
subds. (a)(1), (e)(1).)  The Court of Appeal concluded that while 
counsel had failed to offer Vivar competent advice about 
immigration consequences in 2002, Vivar failed to demonstrate 
any prejudice from the error.  (People v. Vivar (2019) 43 
Cal.App.5th 216, 225–231 (Vivar).)  Based on an independent 
review of the record, we disagree.  Vivar has demonstrated a 
reasonable probability that if he had been properly advised by 
counsel about the immigration consequences of his plea, he 
wouldn’t have pleaded guilty to an offense subjecting him to 
mandatory deportation.  We therefore reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal.    
I. 
In 1962, when Vivar was six years old, he and his family 
immigrated as lawful permanent residents from Mexico to the 
United States.  He now has two children and six grandchildren.  
All are American citizens and all reside here in California, along 
with Vivar’s two siblings.   
A. 
Upon arrival, Vivar quickly adapted to life in the United 
States.  Since early in his youth, his primary language has been 
English.  In high school, he helped establish a Reserve Officers’ 
Training Corps program and hoped to serve his country in 
Vietnam like his older brother, Martin, but the war ended a few 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
months after he graduated.  Vivar instead began working at an 
airline and was soon promoted to a management position that 
required him to work a night shift at the airport and a day shift 
in the office.  Limited to only a few hours of sleep a night, he 
turned to amphetamines to stay awake.     
Vivar first entered — and successfully completed — a 
residential drug treatment program in the late 1990s.  
Unfortunately, he relapsed in 2001.  The conviction under 
review arose from his methamphetamine addiction.  In 
February 2002, he was caught trying to steal 12 boxes of 
Sudafed from a grocery store in Corona.  Vivar told the store’s 
loss prevention officer — and later, the police — that he planned 
to provide the Sudafed to someone who would manufacture 
methamphetamine and, in turn, share some of the finished 
product with him.  The Riverside County District Attorney 
charged Vivar with possessing methamphetamine precursors 
with the intent to manufacture the drug (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 11383, former subd. (c); see id., § 11383.5, subd. (c)) as well as 
petty theft with a prior conviction (Pen. Code, § 666).     
B. 
The District Attorney offered Vivar several plea options.  
What happened next is in some dispute.  Vivar recalls his 
attorney conveying an offer of an unspecified felony plea with a 
three-year sentence.  He rejected that offer because of his 
mistaken belief — never corrected by his appointed attorney — 
that all felony convictions resulted in deportation and that the 
opposite was true for misdemeanors.  (Cf. U.S. v. Graham (3d 
Cir. 1999) 169 F.3d 787, 792 [some misdemeanors can qualify as 
an aggravated felony under federal immigration law].)  Based 
on this mistake, he asked counsel to secure a plea deal that could 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
eventually be reduced to a misdemeanor.  He also informed her 
he had a drug problem and wanted treatment, even if not 
required by the plea offer.     
Following those discussions, counsel relayed an offer for 
Vivar to plead guilty to burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) with a low-
term prison sentence.  With good-conduct credits, he could’ve 
served just a year in prison and avoided mandatory deportation.  
(See Pen. Code, §§ 461, former subd. (a), 2933, subd. (a).)  
According to Vivar, though, counsel never advised him about the 
immigration-related benefits of this plea, nor did she correct his 
misimpression about the respective immigration consequences 
of felonies and misdemeanors.  Unaware the burglary plea offer 
could be deportation-neutral, he rejected it.  He pleaded guilty 
instead to possessing methamphetamine precursors with intent 
to manufacture in exchange for an agreed-on 365-day county jail 
sentence — with a stipulation that the court would recommend 
admission to a residential drug treatment facility — and that a 
low-term, two-year prison sentence would be imposed only if he 
failed to complete the treatment program.  Vivar mistakenly 
believed this disposition would allow him both to get treatment 
and, once the conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor, avoid 
deportation.1     
Before entering his plea in March 2002, Vivar executed a 
form that required him to initial 17 separate paragraphs 
acknowledging that he understood the potential consequences of 
his plea.  One paragraph stated, “If I am not a citizen of the 
 
1  
Vivar says counsel informed him that the court could 
reduce the felony conviction to a misdemeanor — and Vivar 
believed 
that 
this 
disposition 
carried 
no 
immigration 
consequences.       
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
United States, I understand that this conviction may have the 
consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the 
United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws 
of the United States.”  Another paragraph provided, “I have had 
an adequate time to discuss with my attorney (1) my 
constitutional rights, (2) the consequences of any guilty plea, 
and (3) any defenses I may have to the charges against me.”     
Vivar’s counsel declined to submit a declaration in 
connection with the hearing on the section 1473.7 motion.  Her 
recollection was presented to the court instead through unsworn 
email correspondence and her handwritten notes.  Counsel 
stated that while she didn’t specifically remember Vivar’s case, 
her “standard practice” at the time was to “advise non-citizen 
clients of the potential for immigration consequences” of their 
convictions and that she “routinely followed that practice.”  
After reviewing her notes from the plea negotiations, counsel 
indicated that she was “confident that Mr. Vivar was ‘fully 
advised’ of the consequences of the plea,” which under the 
circumstances of the case “would have included the standard 
advisement of possible deportation.”  She also stated that she 
“believe[d]” she “specifically cautioned” Vivar “that, in spite of 
his experience” in a prior criminal proceeding, residential 
treatment “would NOT determine whether or not he would be 
deported on the new offense,” and that if Vivar had any 
questions “he should consult an immigration attorney for 
clarification.”  What she did not advise him was whether his 
understanding of felonies, misdemeanors, and immigration law 
was correct.  Nor did she advise him as to the actual 
immigration consequences of a plea to the drug charge or any 
other plea.   
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
C. 
A few days after being sentenced, Vivar was informed that 
he couldn’t be admitted to the recommended drug treatment 
program “ ‘due to an “immigration hold.” ’ ”  (Vivar, supra, 43 
Cal.App.5th at p. 221.)  As he would’ve known had he been 
properly advised, his conviction activated a tripwire in 
immigration law — it qualified as a controlled substance offense 
as well as an aggravated felony.  (See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B), 
1227(a)(2)(A), 1227(a)(2)(B).)2  Vivar promptly sent a series of 
letters to the court expressing confusion about the situation and 
requesting assistance with admission to the drug treatment 
program.  (Vivar, at p. 221.)  In those letters, he explained that 
he had been a legal resident for the past 40 years, that his family 
members were United States citizens, and that his son was 
currently serving in the United States Air Force and awaiting 
deployment to the Middle East.  He made plain that “[i]f I would 
have been made aware of these facts I would never have 
plead[ed] Guilty to this Charge.”  In the meantime, federal 
immigration authorities notified Vivar that he was subject to 
removal because of his recent criminal conviction and, in 
January 2003, deported him.  (Vivar, at p. 221.)   
Determined to rejoin and support his family — and unable 
to find work in Mexico — Vivar reentered the United States, 
without inspection, in May 2003.  In 2008, he successfully 
obtained an order to expunge his conviction under Penal Code 
 
2  
According to Vivar’s immigration law expert, this 
conviction “triggered the worst of all immigration consequences:  
mandatory deportation with a bar to almost all forms of 
immigration relief, and permanent ineligibility for U.S. 
citizenship.”     
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
section 1203.4.  It took another three years for him to learn, 
when he was again detained by immigration authorities, that 
expungement did not mitigate the immigration consequences of 
his plea.  (See Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 560.)  Vivar then 
filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, which was denied.  
In March 2013, he was again deported and has been living in 
Tijuana, Mexico ever since.  There, he works full-time at a call 
center and founded a nonprofit organization to help deported 
mothers of United States citizen children as well as deported 
mothers of children lawfully residing in the United States under 
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program.  He has 
also been volunteering with organizations to support deported 
United States veterans.  If this conviction can be vacated, Vivar 
— who has remained drug-free since 2002 — may be able to seek 
reentry to the United States and be reunited with his family.     
Vivar filed a motion in January 2018 to vacate his 
conviction under Penal Code section 1473.7 — the motion under 
review here.  He asserted, among other things, that he would 
never have pleaded guilty to violating Health and Safety Code 
section 11383, former subdivision (c), if counsel had informed 
him it would result in his deportation.  The trial court denied 
the motion, reasoning (1) that counsel made no affirmative 
misadvisement, and (2) that “nonadvisement” of immigration 
consequences didn’t qualify as ineffective assistance under 
United States Supreme Court precedent.  The trial court didn’t 
consider whether Vivar suffered prejudice from counsel’s failure 
to provide adequate advice.   
The Court of Appeal affirmed, but on different grounds.  
Contrary to the trial court, the Court of Appeal determined that 
defense counsel provided ineffective assistance.  (Vivar, supra, 
43 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.)  At a minimum, the court reasoned, 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
Vivar had asked “a specific question about deportation” (ibid.), 
a question that “required an attorney to research and apprise 
their client of the immigration consequences of a plea” (id. at 
p. 227).  To warn merely “ ‘that his plea might have immigration 
consequences,’ ” in circumstances where the consequences were 
“certain,” was “constitutionally deficient.”  (Id. at p. 228.)  What 
barred relief here, in the Court of Appeal’s view, was Vivar’s 
failure to demonstrate prejudice — in this context, a reasonable 
probability that he wouldn’t have entered the same plea if he 
had been properly advised.  (Id. at p. 229.)  The court reasoned 
that Vivar’s main priority seemed to be drug treatment, not 
immigration consequences, and asserted that this was 
corroborated by counsel’s contemporaneous notes, by Vivar’s 
rejection of the immigration-neutral burglary plea, and by the 
trial court’s finding that Vivar was “ ‘was more willing to rely on 
his experiences than he was on his counsel’s advice.’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 230.)  Despite the decades Vivar spent in this country, his 
family members’ American citizenship, and his prompt objection 
to the federal immigration hold, the Court of Appeal insisted 
there was “no contemporaneous evidence in the record” to 
corroborate Vivar’s claim that he would’ve preferred an 
immigration-neutral disposition.  (Ibid.)   
We granted Vivar’s petition to review two rulings made by 
the Court of Appeal:  first, its conclusion that he suffered no 
prejudice within the meaning of section 1473.7, subdivision 
(a)(1); and second, its conclusion that appellate courts must 
review deferentially factual findings made by the trial court 
concerning prejudice under section 1473.7, even if those findings 
are based on a cold record consisting solely of documentary 
evidence.  Because no one sought review to challenge the Court 
of Appeal’s finding that Vivar’s counsel was ineffective, we 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
assume for purposes of this proceeding that counsel failed to 
properly advise Vivar about the immigration consequences of 
his plea or of the plea offers he rejected.  After we granted review 
— and after receiving a 30-day extension to file his brief on the 
merits — the Attorney General has undertaken a “fresh look” at 
the Court of Appeal’s analysis and now concedes that the Court 
of Appeal erred in applying a deferential standard of review to 
the trial court’s prejudice findings.  He further concedes that, 
under independent review, Vivar has demonstrated prejudice 
and is entitled to relief.  We have retained the case for decision 
to resolve a conflict in the Court of Appeal concerning the 
standard of review governing prejudice findings under section 
1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) and to clarify more generally what 
demonstrates prejudice under that provision.  (See People v. 
Maya (2020) 9 Cal.5th 239, 241.)     
II. 
It took less than a month for Vivar to realize the dire 
ramifications of his mistaken embrace of a felony drug 
possession plea.  What ensued in the 18 years that followed 
underscores how much Vivar consistently valued his presence 
on American soil, and how likely it is that — properly advised  
— he would have prioritized a resolution of his case allowing 
him to stay in the country.  Mere weeks after entering his plea, 
when he learned that he was subject to an immigration hold and 
thus ineligible for a residential drug treatment program, he sent 
the sentencing judge a handwritten letter “to seek the court’s 
mercy.”  Vivar informed the court that he was “a legal resident 
and ha[s] been for the past 40 years”;  that his mother and wife 
were American citizens; that his children and grandchildren, all 
born in Riverside County, were likewise citizens; and that his 
oldest child and only son was in the United States military 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
awaiting deployment to the Middle East.  He “fully accept[ed]” 
responsibility for his actions but “would like to change my life 
for good and become a productive member of society.”  Two 
months later, after he was transferred to a federal immigration 
facility, he reiterated his willingness “to do whatever it takes to 
once again be an asset to my community and not a liability” and 
asked the court to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor.  (See 
Pen. Code, § 17, subd. (b).)     
A few months later, in October 2002, Vivar asked that his 
case “be Re-opened” on due process grounds.  The legal advice 
he received at the time of his plea never conveyed, Vivar 
insisted, that he was accepting responsibility for “an Aggravated 
Felony for Immigration purposes and thus would warrant 
Immediate Deportation.”  Had he been so advised, he “would 
have never plead[ed] Guilty to this Charge.”  He was deported a 
few months later.   
In 2008, Vivar successfully moved to expunge his 
conviction through another pro se filing.  Only later did he learn 
that expungement hadn’t erased or even mitigated the 
immigration consequences of his plea.  (See Martinez, supra, 57 
Cal.4th at p. 560.)  In 2012, a lawyer advised Vivar he could 
obtain relief on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel by 
filing a petition for writ of error coram nobis.  Vivar hired the 
lawyer to file such a petition.  Yet this filing, too, proved 
fruitless:  This court had already held, in 2009, that a 
defendant’s ignorance of a plea’s immigration consequences — 
or counsel’s failure to negotiate a different plea — constituted a 
mistake of law and thus did not qualify as a ground for relief on 
coram nobis.  (People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1102–1104 
(Kim).)  In a companion case, we also held that persons in federal 
immigration custody after completing their state sentences, as 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
well as any probation or parole period, are no longer in state 
custody.  (People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063.)  So their state 
convictions are beyond the reach of habeas corpus.     
But they are not beyond the reach of remedies recently 
enacted by the Legislature.  As Vivar was running out of options, 
lawmakers considered the problem faced by Vivar and so many 
others who were unaware of the immigration consequences 
posed by a plea entered many years earlier.  (See Kim, supra, 45 
Cal.4th at p. 1107 [“the Legislature has been active in providing 
statutory remedies when the existing remedies . . . have proven 
ineffective”; “the Legislature remains free to enact further 
statutory remedies for those in defendant’s position”].)  They did 
so by enacting section 1473.7, which “create[d] an explicit right 
for a person no longer imprisoned or restrained.”  (Legis. 
Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 813 (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.).)  
Under this new provision, a court “shall” vacate a conviction or 
sentence upon a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, of 
“prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to 
meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept 
the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a 
plea of guilty or nolo contendere.”  (§ 1473.7, subds. (e)(1), (a)(1).)  
A finding of prejudicial error under this provision may, but need 
not, be based on ineffective assistance of counsel.  (Id., subd. 
(a)(1).)  If the motion is meritorious, “the court shall allow the 
moving party to withdraw the plea.”  (Id., subd. (e)(3).)   
The Court of Appeal determined that trial counsel failed 
to advise Vivar of “the certain immigration consequences of his 
plea.”  (Vivar, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.)  This rendered 
counsel’s representation “constitutionally deficient.”  (Ibid.)  
Because no party challenged this finding — and the question of 
counsel’s deficient performance falls outside the issues 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
presented for review — we accept it as true for purposes of this 
proceeding.  We review only the Court of Appeal’s finding that 
Vivar suffered no prejudice on account of counsel’s error.  In 
examining that finding, we consider first what is the applicable 
standard of review.  Then we apply that standard to the record 
here.  Reviewing the record independently, we conclude Vivar 
was prejudiced within the meaning of section 1473.7, 
subdivision (a)(1).   
A. 
When a trial court grants or denies a motion to vacate a 
conviction under section 1473.7, the parties can appeal.  
(§ 1473.7, subd. (f).)  Both parties acknowledge, though, that the 
standard for reviewing such orders is “unsettled.”  (People v. 
Rodriguez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 971, 977.)  In the Court of 
Appeal, the Attorney General analogized section 1473.7 motions 
to other statutes authorizing withdrawal of a plea — despite 
their different wording (see, e.g., Pen. Code, § 1018 [a trial court 
“may” permit a defendant to withdraw a plea “for a good cause 
shown”]) — and argued that denial of the motion should be 
reviewed deferentially for abuse of discretion.  (See, e.g., 
Rodriguez, at p. 977.)  Vivar disagreed, making the case that his 
prejudice claim raised a mixed question of law and fact that 
should be reviewed independently.  (See, e.g., People v. DeJesus 
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1133.)  Unsatisfied with these two 
possibilities, the Court of Appeal proposed yet another option:  a 
complicated framework in which the standard of review 
governing a trial court’s section 1473.7 prejudice ruling would 
vary depending on the basis of the claimed error.  Under this 
option, the trial court’s ruling would be reviewed independently 
where the prejudicial error consists of constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel but would be reviewed for abuse 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
14 
of discretion where the claim rests merely on “ ‘statutory 
error.’ ”  (Vivar, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 224.)   
The Attorney General reversed course in the proceedings 
before us.  He no longer advocates the abuse of discretion 
standard — even in the context of mere statutory error.  Instead, 
he urges us to apply the independent standard of review to all 
prejudice determinations under section 1473.7, subdivision 
(a)(1).  Although we are not “bound” to accept a party’s 
concession on a question of law (Desny v. Wilder (1956) 46 Cal.2d 
715, 729), after careful review we accept the Attorney General’s 
concession.  (See In re McKinney (1968) 70 Cal.2d 8, 14.) 
Our case law has applied the independent review standard 
— which accords substantial weight to the trial court’s 
credibility findings — in analogous circumstances.  Whether 
counsel’s advice regarding immigration was inadequate and 
whether such inadequacy prejudiced the defense, while mixed 
questions, are predominantly questions of law.  (See In re 
Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 248–249 (Resendiz) (lead opn. of 
Werdegar, J.).)3  Accordingly, we review such rulings 
independently (Resendiz, at p. 248), and rightly so, given the 
profound and substantial consequences of a prejudicial 
misadvisement on a defendant’s life.  (Cf. People v. Ault (2004) 
33 Cal.4th 1250, 1265 (Ault) [“the proper review standard is 
influenced in part by the importance of the legal rights or 
interests at stake”]; id. at p. 1266 [“another important 
consideration in determining the appropriate standard of review 
 
3  
Because Justice Mosk concurred in Justice Werdegar’s 
lead opinion in all respects relevant here (see Resendiz, supra, 
25 Cal.4th at p. 255 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.)), we cite only 
to the lead opinion. 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
15 
is the consequences of an erroneous determination in the 
particular case”].) 
Nothing in section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) or elsewhere 
gives us a reason to deviate from this template.  Indeed, prior to 
section 1473.7’s amendment in 2018 — which clarified that the 
“legal invalidity” of a conviction or sentence “may, but need not, 
include a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel” (§ 1473.7, 
subd. (a)(1); Stats. 2018, ch. 825, § 2) — our courts had 
“uniformly assumed” that relief was available only to those who 
had demonstrated constitutionally ineffective assistance (People 
v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998, 1005 (Camacho)).  And 
to the extent those courts considered the question, they applied 
a standard of independent review to such claims.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Ogunmowo (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 67, 75–76 
(Ogunmowo); accord, People v. Tapia (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 942, 
950 (Tapia) [following Ogunmowo]; People v. Olvera (2018) 24 
Cal.App.5th 1112, 1115–1116 (Olvera) [same].)  A standard of 
independent review — the same standard governing our review 
of these claims on habeas corpus — is most consistent with 
section 1473.7’s purpose:  to offer relief to those persons who 
suffered “prejudicial error” but are “no longer imprisoned or 
restrained” and for that reason alone are unable to pursue relief 
on habeas corpus.  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 813 
(2015–2016 Reg. Sess.).) 
When the Legislature amended section 1473.7 in 2018, 
nowhere did it “signal an intent to supersede” the standard of 
review the Court of Appeal had already articulated (In re W.B. 
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 57; see, e.g., Ogunmowo, supra, 23 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 75–76), nor did it propose that appellate 
courts adopt a more deferential standard of review.  To the 
contrary:  the Legislature explicitly stated its intended purpose 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
16 
was to make relief more broadly available to deserving 
defendants, given the critical interests at stake.  (See Assem. 
Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2867 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 5, 2018, pp. 2, 4 [this bill helps 
achieve the original goal of “creating a process for individuals to 
erase the catastrophic consequences . . . that can attach to even 
very old criminal 
convictions” 
by “clearing up 
minor 
discrepancies that have arisen since implementation”].)  The 
2018 amendment expanded the category of defendants who 
could obtain relief by eliminating any requirement that the 
defendant establish ineffective assistance of counsel.  An 
uncodified section of the 2018 amendment declared that the 
expanded language in subdivision (a)(1) provided “clarification 
to the courts regarding Section 1473.7 of the Penal Code to 
ensure uniformity throughout the state and efficiency in the 
statute’s implementation.”  (Stats. 2018, ch. 825, § 1, subd. (b), 
italics added.)  Moreover, the Legislature instructed courts to 
interpret section 1473.7 “consistent with the findings and 
declarations made in section 1016.2 of the Penal Code” (Stats. 
2018, ch. 825, § 1, subd. (c)) — which in turn articulated a 
purpose “to codify . . . related California case law and to 
encourage the growth of such case law in furtherance of justice” 
(Pen. Code, § 1016.2, subd. (h), italics added).  Under these 
particular circumstances — where legislators expressed keen 
awareness of how section 1473.7 was being implemented and 
viewed the 2018 amendment as a clarification and codification 
of existing law — we see no reason to disturb the prevailing 
independent standard of review.    
The Court of Appeal posited that a different standard 
should apply when the moving party relies on a mistake of law 
under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) that does not rise to the 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
17 
level of ineffective assistance of counsel.  (See Vivar, supra, 43 
Cal.App.5th at p. 224.)  But that approach would cut against the 
Legislature’s stated goals of codifying existing law and ensuring 
uniformity.  (Stats. 2018, ch. 825, § 1, subd. (b).)  What’s more, 
it would endow with determinative significance the precise 
distinction — whether the asserted error constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel — that the Legislature sought to erase by 
amending section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) to provide that “[a] 
finding of legal invalidity may, but need not, include a finding of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.”  Overburdened trial courts 
might well choose to consider only whether there was 
“prejudicial error” damaging the moving party’s ability to 
understand actual or potential immigration consequences 
without deciding whether such an error actually rose to the level 
of constitutionally deficient performance.  (§ 1473.7, subd. 
(a)(1).)  Or courts may fail to make the latter finding simply 
because of the happenstance that no party provided trial counsel 
with “timely advance notice of the motion hearing,” which is a 
prerequisite to “a specific finding of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.”  (Id., subd. (g).)  It would make little sense to make the 
standard of review hinge on these trivial choices.4  (See People 
v. Bravo, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1180 (conc. opn. of Raphael, 
J.).) 
Our embrace of the independent standard of review also 
fits with how section 1473.7 motions generally arise.  Only 
 
4  
Because we adopt an independent standard of review for 
all claims made under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), we 
disapprove People v. Bravo (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1161, 1167, 
People v. Jung (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 842, 853, and People v. 
Rodriguez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 971, 977 to the extent they are 
inconsistent with this opinion.          
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
18 
defendants who have already completed their sentences may 
even seek relief under section 1473.7.  So these motions — as 
the separate opinion acknowledges — are ordinarily brought 
many years after the plea.  (Compare Pen. Code, § 1018 
[allowing a plea to be withdrawn only “before judgment or 
within six months . . . if entry of judgment is suspended”].)  
Vivar, for example, brought his motion nearly 16 years after 
entering his plea.  Years later, the judge adjudicating the 
resulting motion may never have participated in any of the 
underlying proceedings and must rely entirely on a cold record.  
(Cf. Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711, fn. 
3; see id. at p. 713 [motions to recuse the prosecutor are 
reviewed for abuse of discretion because trial courts “are in a 
better position than appellate courts to . . . evaluate the 
consequences of a potential conflict in light of the entirety of a 
case, a case they inevitably will be more familiar with than the 
appellate courts”].)5  Indeed, that’s what happened here:  the 
judge hearing the section 1473.7 motion had no firsthand 
familiarity with the circumstances surrounding Vivar’s plea. 
So our embrace of independent review in this context is a 
product of multiple factors with special relevance here:  the 
history of section 1473.7, the interests at stake in a section 
1473.7 motion, the type of evidence on which a section 1473.7 
ruling is likely to be based, and the relative competence of trial 
courts and appellate courts to assess that evidence.  (See Ault, 
supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1260–1261, 1265–1266.)  The fact that 
 
5  
Despite the passage of time, a trial court nonetheless 
retains the discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing to 
resolve disputes of fact.  (See People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 201.) 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
19 
the motion is reviewed by way of appeal does not necessarily 
dictate a particular standard of review.  (See id. at pp. 1266–
1267.) 
“[U]nder independent review, an appellate court exercises 
its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy 
the rule of law.”  (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 634.) 
When courts engage in independent review, they should be 
mindful that “ ‘[i]ndependent review is not the equivalent of de 
novo review . . . .’ ”  (People v. Jackson (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 
1009, 1021.)  An appellate court may not simply second-guess 
factual findings that are based on the trial court’s own 
observations.  (See In re Ernesto H. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 298, 
306; cf. George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 634 [under a de novo 
standard, “ ‘a reviewing court makes an original appraisal of all 
the evidence’ ”].)  In reviewing the constitutional claim raised in 
Resendiz, we explained that factual determinations that are 
based on “ ‘the credibility of witnesses the [superior court] heard 
and observed’ ” are entitled to particular deference, even though 
courts reviewing such claims generally may “ ‘reach a different 
conclusion [from the trial court] on an independent examination 
of the evidence . . . even where the evidence is conflicting.’ ”  
(Resendiz, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 249 (lead opn. of 
Werdegar, J.).)6  In section 1473.7 proceedings, appellate courts 
 
6  
The separate opinion correctly characterizes substantial 
evidence review as “deferential.”  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 
10.)  But it doesn’t follow that every time a court extends 
deference to a trial court’s factual findings, it’s engaging in 
substantial evidence review.  (See, e.g., Resendiz, supra, 25 
Cal.4th at p. 249 (lead opn. of Werdegar, J.); Ogunmowo, supra, 
23 Cal.App.5th at p. 76 [citing Resendiz]; Tapia, supra, 26 
 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
20 
should similarly give particular deference to factual findings 
based on the trial court’s personal observations of witnesses.  
(See, e.g., Tapia, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at pp. 948–950 
[deferring where the trial judge hearing the § 1473.7 motion also 
presided over the plea hearing].)  Where, as here, the facts 
derive entirely from written declarations and other documents, 
however, there is no reason to conclude the trial court has the 
same special purchase on the question at issue; as a practical 
matter, “[t]he trial court and this court are in the same position 
in interpreting written declarations” when reviewing a cold 
record in a section 1473.7 proceeding.  (Ogunmowo, supra, 23 
Cal.App.5th at p. 79.)7  Ultimately it is for the appellate court to 
decide, based on its independent judgment, whether the facts 
establish prejudice under section 1473.7.   
 
Cal.App.5th at p. 950 [citing Resendiz and quoting Ogunmowo]; 
Olvera, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1116 [citing Resendiz and 
Ogunmowo].)  What’s distinctive about substantial evidence 
review is that adequately supported factual findings not only 
merit deference, but are binding, on appeal.  (See People v. 
Schultz (2020) 10 Cal.5th 623, 647; cf. In re Lewis (2018) 4 
Cal.5th 1185, 1191 [while courts “ ‘generally defer to the 
referee’s factual findings,’ ” they “are not binding”].)      
7  
Our decision addresses only the independent standard of 
review under section 1473.7.  Nothing we say here disturbs a 
familiar postulate:  when reviewing a ruling under the 
substantial evidence standard, “an appellate court should defer 
to the factual determinations made by the trial court,” 
regardless of “whether the trial court’s rulings are based on oral 
testimony or declarations.”  (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 
Cal.3d 474, 479; see Haraguchi v. Superior Court, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at pp. 711, 713.) 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
21 
B. 
The Legislature made relief available only to certain 
immigrants who accepted pleas without understanding the 
immigration-related consequences of such decisions.  What 
someone seeking to withdraw a plea under section 1473.7 must 
show is more than merely an error “damaging the moving 
party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or 
knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration 
consequences” of the plea.  (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).)  The error 
must also be “prejudicial.”  (Ibid.)  Although the statute doesn’t 
itself define what “prejudicial” means, we can glean the meaning 
from its context.  (See Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co. (2000) 
11 Cal.4th 1049, 1055.)     
  In People v. Superior Court (Zamudio), supra, 23 Cal.4th 
183, we considered what constituted prejudice when a trial court 
failed to advise a defendant of the plea’s potential immigration 
consequences as required by Penal Code section 1016.5.  
Prejudice in such circumstances depended on “ ‘whether it is 
“reasonably probable” the defendant would not have pleaded 
guilty if properly advised.’ ”  (Zamudio, at p. 210.)  The focus on 
“what the defendant would have done, not whether the 
defendant’s decision would have led to a more favorable result” 
derived from the fact that a defendant “ ‘may view immigration 
consequences as the only ones that could affect his calculations 
regarding the advisability of pleading guilty to criminal 
charges.’ ”  (Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 562, 563.)  A 
decision to reject a plea bargain, we explained, “might be based 
either on the desire to go to trial or on the hope or expectation of 
negotiating 
a 
different 
bargain 
without 
immigration 
consequences.”  (Id. at p. 567.)  When a court weighs whether a 
defendant would have taken the latter path, it need not decide 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
22 
whether the prosecution would actually “have offered a different 
bargain” — rather, the court should consider “evidence that 
would have caused the defendant to expect or hope a different 
bargain would or could have been negotiated.”  (Ibid., italics 
added.) 
We embraced a similar approach when deciding whether 
a lawyer’s deficient advisement on immigration consequences 
amounts to prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel.  A 
defendant in those circumstances must demonstrate a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s incompetence, the 
defendant “ ‘would not have pled guilty.’ ”  (People v. Patterson 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 901 (Patterson), quoting Resendiz, supra, 
25 Cal.4th at p. 253 (lead opn. of Werdegar, J.).)  The United 
States Supreme Court, too, undertakes a similar analysis.  In 
Lee, supra, ___ U.S. at page ___ [137 S.Ct. at page 1967], the 
prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance inquiry turned on 
whether the defendant had “adequately demonstrated a 
reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea had 
he known that it would lead to mandatory deportation.”   
Section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) fits this definition of 
“prejudicial error,” and we discern no reasons lurking in its 
provisions to concoct a different one.  (See Camacho, supra, 32 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1010.)  Indeed, the current version of the 
statute acknowledges that prejudicial error “may, but need not, 
include a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.”  (§ 1473.7, 
subd. (a)(1).)  The statutory findings for the 2018 amendment 
also declared that the statute “shall be interpreted in the 
interests of justice and consistent with the findings and 
declarations made in Section 1016.2” (Stats. 2018, ch. 825, § 1, 
subd. (c)), which in turn articulate the Legislature’s intended 
purpose:  to codify Supreme Court “and related California case 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
23 
law and to encourage the growth of such case law in furtherance 
of justice” (Pen. Code, § 1016.2, subd. (h)).  
So:  showing prejudicial error under section 1473.7, 
subdivision 
(a)(1) 
means 
demonstrating 
a 
reasonable 
probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if 
the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential 
immigration consequences.  When courts assess whether a 
petitioner has shown that reasonable probability, they consider 
the totality of the circumstances.  (Lee, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ 
[137 S.Ct. at p. 1966].)  Factors particularly relevant to this 
inquiry include the defendant’s ties to the United States, the 
importance the defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the 
defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the 
defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral 
negotiated disposition was possible.  (See id. at p. ___ [137 S.Ct. 
at pp. 1967–1969]; Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 568.)   
The Court of Appeal found it “not reasonably probable that 
[Vivar] would have rejected the plea but for his counsel’s failure 
to properly advise him.”  (Vivar, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 
229.)  Two premises supported its conclusion:  (1) that “no 
contemporaneous evidence” corroborated Vivar’s claim that he 
wouldn’t have entered the plea had he known the plea would 
lead to his deportation (id. at p. 230), and (2) that Vivar 
“prioritized drug treatment over potential immigration-neutral 
pleas.”  (Id. at p. 229.)  Neither premise, though, withstands 
scrutiny.  What we find, reviewing the record independently, is 
that Vivar was prejudiced.   
1 
In a declaration submitted with his section 1473.7 motion, 
Vivar claims he would never have entered this plea had he 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
24 
understood that it would require his deportation.  But when a 
defendant seeks to withdraw a plea based on inadequate 
advisement of immigration consequences, we have long required 
the defendant corroborate such assertions with “ ‘objective 
evidence.’ ”  (Resendiz, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 253 (lead opn. of 
Werdegar, J.).)  That’s what Vivar has done here.  Time and 
again, the record readily conveys how Vivar would have 
considered his immigration status “the most important part” of 
his decision to plead.  (Padilla, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 364.)  Vivar 
was brought to this country at age six as a lawful resident, and 
he attended schools, formed a family, and remained here for 40 
years.  At the time of his plea, he had two children, two 
grandchildren, and a wife, all of whom are citizens and all of 
whom resided in California.  By the time he was deported, his 
wife was undergoing radiation treatment for a thyroid condition.  
By contrast, Vivar had virtually no ties to Mexico, spoke Spanish 
“like an American,” and found it “difficult to function in Mexican 
society because people treat [him] like an outsider.”  Trial 
counsel’s recollection and contemporaneous notes reflect that 
Vivar was indeed concerned about the “consequences” of his 
plea.  All of these constitute contemporaneous objective facts 
that corroborate Vivar’s concern about the immigration 
consequences of his plea options.  (See People v. Mejia (2019) 36 
Cal.App.5th 859, 872.)   
Also revealing is the objective evidence of Vivar’s state of 
mind reflected in uncounseled letters he wrote to the court at or 
near the time of his plea.  In his first letter, written just a month 
after his March 2002 plea, Vivar objected to his immigration 
hold and emphasized that “I am a legal resident and have been 
for the past 40 years”; noted that not only his wife and mother 
are citizens, but his children and grandchildren were all “born 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
25 
here in Riverside County”; and explained that his oldest child 
and only son was serving in the United States Air Force and 
awaiting deployment to the Middle East.  He reiterated these 
concerns in another letter from federal immigration custody a 
month later, pleading that he be allowed to become “an asset to 
my community and not a liability.”  Three months after that, 
Vivar said that counsel never advised him that his plea would 
result in his deportation and declared that “[i]f I would have 
been made aware of these facts I would have never plead[ed] 
Guilty to this Charge.”     
The Court of Appeal neglected to explain why these facts 
at or near the time of Vivar’s plea failed to provide adequate 
corroboration that he wouldn’t have pleaded guilty had he 
known it would result in his deportation.  Indeed, the court’s 
analysis failed to mention these facts at all.  This was error.  In 
our 
view, 
these 
objective 
and 
contemporaneous 
facts 
corroborate, in a most convincing way, the statement in Vivar’s 
declaration that he “would never have pleaded guilty” if his 
attorney had informed him of the plea’s consequences.  (See 
Camacho, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1011–1012 [finding prejudice 
where the defendant was brought to the United States as a 
child, had lived here for over 30 years, and his spouse and 
children were citizens]; accord, Lee, supra, ___ U.S at p. ___ [137 
S.Ct. at p. 1968] [finding prejudice where the defendant was 
brought to the United States as a child, had lived here for nearly 
30 years, and his parents were citizens].)     
2 
What the record also shows — and neither the Court of 
Appeal nor the Attorney General disputes — is that Vivar could 
have entered a plea avoiding mandatory deportation.  Trial 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
26 
counsel’s contemporaneous notes indicate the prosecution 
offered a deal under which Vivar would plead guilty to a single 
count of burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) with a recommendation that 
he serve the low term of two years in state prison.  With credits, 
Vivar could have cut that term in half.  (See Pen. Code, § 2933, 
subd. (a).)  At the time of his plea, burglary in California was a 
deportable felony only in particular situations (see Kim, supra, 
45 Cal.4th at pp. 1089–1090, 1098), and the uncontradicted 
declaration from Vivar’s immigration expert stated that Vivar 
could’ve entered such a plea without subjecting himself to 
mandatory deportation.  Under these circumstances, we find at 
least “ ‘a reasonable probability’ ” that he could have tried “to 
obtain a better bargain that [did] not include immigration 
consequences.”  (Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 567.)   
Concluding otherwise, the Court of Appeal relied 
principally on the fact that Vivar rejected the burglary plea.  The 
court pointed in particular to counsel’s notes, where she had 
written that Vivar “ ‘[w]ants help w/ [his] drug problem.’ ”  
(Vivar, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 229.)  Because Vivar “was 
offered and rejected a plea agreement that would have 
completely avoided any immigration consequences,” the court 
inferred “that immigration consequences were not defendant’s 
primary consideration in accepting or rejecting any plea offer, 
and that further advice on this front was not reasonably 
probable to change his decisionmaking.”  (Id. at pp. 229–230.)   
The Court of Appeal’s inference fails to persuade.  Vivar’s 
rejection of a potentially deportation-neutral plea can hardly 
serve as evidence that he didn’t care about immigration 
consequences when it is undisputed that Vivar was not properly 
advised — and thus was ignorant — of the immigration 
consequences attached to his various plea options.  So the fact 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
27 
that he unknowingly rejected an immigration-neutral option 
cannot, in itself, demonstrate that “immigration consequences 
were not defendant’s primary consideration.”  (Vivar, supra, 43 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 229–230.)     
Even less supports the Court of Appeal’s contention that 
Vivar “prioritized drug treatment over potential immigration-
neutral pleas.”  (Vivar, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 229.)  Indeed, 
it doesn’t make sense to say that Vivar would’ve chosen a plea 
that triggered mandatory deportation just so he could 
participate in drug treatment when that plea rendered him 
ineligible for the program.   
According to his declaration, Vivar told counsel that he 
was interested in a drug treatment program even if it was not 
required by the terms of his plea — and counsel’s notes 
corroborate his interest in such a program.  Vivar, then, did not 
perceive a conflict or tradeoff between the goal of drug treatment 
and the goal of a deportation-neutral disposition.  What stands 
out most clearly from the record is that he was never properly 
advised of the role his immigration status would play either in 
assessing the attractiveness of his plea options or in his 
eligibility for a drug treatment program.  In fact, the record 
shows he was upset to learn, just a few days after his plea, that 
he was ineligible for the recommended treatment program 
precisely because of the plea’s impact on his immigration status.  
And it was scarcely a month after his plea, having heard no 
response from his lawyer, that he wrote a letter to the court 
seeking its help.  Had he been properly advised, it’s reasonably 
probable Vivar would’ve sought a disposition — like the 
burglary plea — where he could remain in this country and 
undergo drug treatment.  The Court of Appeal failed to explain 
why Vivar, if properly advised, would’ve viewed these goals as 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
28 
incompatible — or why, if properly advised, he would’ve insisted 
on a strategy that prevented him from achieving either of his 
goals.   
The Court of Appeal tried to buttress its conclusion that 
Vivar suffered no prejudice by highlighting “a factual inference 
the trial court was entitled to draw” and then deferring to that 
inference.  (Vivar, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 230.)  The trial 
court’s “ ‘finding’ ” was that Vivar “ ‘was more willing to rely on 
his experiences than he was on his counsel’s advice.’ ”  (Ibid.)  As 
we explained in part II.A., ante, the Court of Appeal was 
mistaken in believing the trial court’s factual findings, which 
were based entirely on a cold record, “must be accorded 
deference.”  (Vivar, at p. 231.)  An appellate court should instead 
review such findings independently where, as here, the factual 
record consists entirely of written documents.  Reviewing this 
cold record under that standard, we reject the trial court’s 
finding.  If Vivar acted under the misimpression that he could 
avoid immigration consequences so long as his ultimate 
sentence was a year or less, it likely was because he failed to 
receive adequate and accurate advice from counsel about the 
immigration consequences attached to his plea options.  Without 
proper advice, Vivar had no choice but to rely on his own 
experiences and judgment, no matter how uninformed they 
might be.  Had he truly been “unwilling to listen to the advice of 
counsel” (id. at p. 230), he never would’ve expressed to her his 
concern about the consequences of his plea.  And had he been 
correctly advised about those consequences, it’s reasonably 
probable he wouldn’t have entered the plea that triggered his 
deportation.  The Court of Appeal erred in holding otherwise. 
Finally, we conclude that the advisements in Vivar’s plea 
form did not mitigate the prejudice from counsel’s deficient 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
29 
immigration advice.  What the plea form stated was that 
deportation was a possibility.  (Vivar, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 228.)  The problem for Vivar, though, was that deportation in 
these circumstances was mandatory — and when he accepted 
the plea deal, he remained unaware of that crucial fact.  (See 
Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 896, 898.)  In light of Vivar’s 
extensive ties to the United States, the generic advisements in 
the plea form do not undermine our conclusion that he was 
prejudiced by counsel’s failure to inform him that his plea would 
result in his deportation.  (See In re Hernandez (2019) 33 
Cal.App.5th 530, 547–548; People v. Espinoza (2018) 27 
Cal.App.5th 908, 916–917; Ogunmowo, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 80–81.)   
III. 
Defendants who lack United States citizenship sometimes 
face not only penal sanctions but also harsh immigration 
consequences if convicted.  Because of this, pleas accepted in the 
shadow of deficient advice about the risks of deportation can 
have “dire” repercussions.  (People v. Superior Court (Giron), 
supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 798.)  Section 1473.7 offers a remedy in 
the form of permission to withdraw a plea.  But it’s a remedy 
available only to some:  those who have completed their 
sentences and who suffered a prejudicial error that damaged 
their ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or 
knowingly accept the plea’s actual or potential immigration 
consequences.  (§ 1473.7, subds. (a)(1), (e)(3).)  A moving party 
demonstrates prejudice by showing that in the absence of the 
error regarding immigration consequences, it’s reasonably 
probable the moving party would not have entered the plea.  
Courts should subject the trial court’s prejudice finding under 
this statute to independent review, a standard that heavily 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
30 
weighs trial court factual findings based on the court’s own 
observations, but not trial court findings arising only from a cold 
record. 
The Court of Appeal failed to review the record 
independently.  Nor did it take into account the substantial 
contemporaneous evidence at or near the time of Vivar’s plea 
corroborating his claim that he wouldn’t have pleaded guilty if 
he’d known it would result in his deportation from his home of 
40 years.  We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the 
Court of Appeal with directions that it remand the case to the 
trial court for it to enter an order granting Vivar’s section 1473.7 
motion to withdraw his plea.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
We Concur: 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
1 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
S260270 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Corrigan 
 
I concur in the disposition and fully agree that defendant 
Robert Landeros Vivar should be allowed to withdraw his plea 
under Penal Code section 1473.7.1  Defense counsel’s failure to 
properly advise Mr. Vivar about the immigration consequences 
of his plea options was plainly prejudicial, entitling him to relief 
under the statute.  I join in Justice Cuéllar’s majority opinion to 
the extent it rejects the notion that the standard of review 
applied to rulings under section 1473.7 differs depending upon 
the nature of the claimed error.  (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 16–17.) 
However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s 
holding that a form of “independent review” typically applied in 
habeas corpus proceedings should be applied in assessing a trial 
court’s prejudice finding under section 1473.7.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
pp. 15, 29.)  While the majority opinion endeavors to distinguish 
independent review in this context from de novo review (id. at 
p. 19), as a practical matter this will be a distinction without a 
difference in most cases brought under section 1473.7.  That is 
so because, as the majority acknowledges, the evidence 
considered by the trial court will often consist entirely of 
declarations and documentary evidence.  (See maj. opn., ante, 
pp. 17–18.)  Under the version of independent review articulated 
in the majority opinion, no deference is owed to the trial court’s 
factual findings except when credibility determinations are 
 
1  
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
2 
based upon live testimony.  (Id. at pp. 19–20.)  Consequently, in 
a great number of appeals challenging section 1473.7 rulings, 
reviewing courts will assume the role of fact finder, requiring 
courts to resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and engage in 
the type of factual inquiry ordinarily reserved for trial courts.  
This would constitute a departure for review of a ruling on a 
statutory motion.  I would hold that appellate courts should 
apply a conventional substantial evidence standard when 
reviewing a trial court’s factual findings that bear upon the 
prejudice analysis under section 1473.7. 
This court granted review to resolve a conflict over the 
standard of review governing prejudice findings under the 
statute and to clarify what constitutes prejudice under section 
1473.7.  (Maj. opn., ante, p. 10.)  In the Court of Appeal, the 
defense argued that all aspects of the trial court’s ruling, 
including 
its 
factual 
findings, 
should 
be 
reviewed 
independently.  The Attorney General contended that the trial 
court’s ruling should be reviewed for abuse of discretion but that 
its factual findings were owed deference, even if made on a cold 
record consisting entirely of documentary evidence.2   
The Court of Appeal created a hybrid standard turning on 
the asserted basis for relief.  According to the appellate court, if 
the section 1473.7 motion raised a constitutional challenge due 
to ineffective assistance of counsel, a reviewing court should 
“ ‘independently review the order.’ ”  (People v. Vivar (2019) 43 
Cal.App.5th 216, 224.)  This standard requires courts to “ ‘accord 
deference to the trial court’s factual determinations if supported 
 
2  
In this court, the Attorney General takes the position that 
appellate courts should independently review rulings under 
section 1473.7.   
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
3 
by substantial evidence in the record, but [to] exercise . . . 
independent 
judgment 
in 
deciding 
whether 
the 
facts 
demonstrate trial counsel’s deficient performance and resulting 
prejudice to the defendant.’ ”  (Ibid.)  By contrast, the court held 
that the denial of a section 1473.7 motion is “ ‘reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion’ ” if the basis for the motion is “ ‘statutory 
error or a deprivation of statutory rights’ ” not rising to the level 
of a constitutional violation.  (Vivar, at p. 224.) 
In my view, the majority opinion correctly rejects the 
bifurcated approach adopted by the Court of Appeal.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, pp. 16–17.)  Such an approach would afford undue 
significance to a distinction the Legislature sought to erase.  It 
extended relief to all defendants when legal error prevented 
meaningful understanding of immigration consequences, 
regardless of whether the error constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  (Id. at p. 16; see § 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).)  
The bifurcated approach would also have the standard of review 
turn on a specific finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
which a trial court might not otherwise reach for reasons 
unrelated to the merits of the claim.  (Maj. opn., ante, p. 17.) 
However, I part ways with the majority conclusion that 
the trial court’s prejudice finding under section 1473.7 is subject 
to a form of “independent review” that does not defer to the trial 
court’s factual findings under conventional substantial evidence 
review.  (See maj. opn., ante, pp. 29–30.)  The majority holds that 
the independent review standard affords deference to the trial 
court’s factual determinations only if “based on ‘ “the credibility 
of witnesses the [superior court] heard and observed.” ’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 19.)  Under that view, no deference is owed to the trial court’s 
factual findings when the “facts derive entirely from written 
declarations and other documents.”  (Id. at p. 20.) 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
4 
My disagreement is not with applying independent review 
to the trial court’s ultimate legal ruling but with adopting a form 
of review that largely dispenses with the deference normally 
afforded to a lower court’s factual findings.  (See People v. 
Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 298–299; People v. Alvarez 
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182.)  A substantial evidence inquiry 
examines the record in the light most favorable to the judgment 
and upholds a finding “if the record contains reasonable, 
credible evidence of solid value upon which a reasonable trier of 
fact could have relied in reaching the conclusion in question.  
Once such evidence is found, the substantial evidence test is 
satisfied.  [Citation.]  Even when there is . . . significant . . . 
countervailing evidence, the testimony of a single witness that 
satisfies the standard is sufficient to uphold the finding.”  
(People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052.)  There is no 
reason to dispense with this conventional appellate approach to 
reviewing findings of fact. 
The standard of review described in the majority opinion 
is not completely unheard of, but its extension to review of 
statutory claims may well be.3  The standard articulated by the 
majority derives primarily from the lead opinion in In re 
Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 249 (lead opn. of Werdegar, J.) 
(Resendiz).4  (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 14, 19.)  Resendiz considered 
 
3  
It should be noted that the majority explicitly limits its 
holding to review under section 1473.7.  (Maj. opn., ante, p. 20, 
fn. 7.) 
4  
The “independent review” standard described in the 
majority opinion also is applied to cases raising First 
Amendment issues in which an appellate court is charged with 
ensuring that a ruling does not intrude on constitutional free 
 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
5 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim involving affirmative 
misadvice about the immigration consequences of a plea.  
(Resendiz, at p. 235.)  The claim was raised on habeas corpus.  
Accordingly, the lead opinion recited the standard applicable to 
review of factual findings in habeas corpus proceedings.  (Id. at 
p. 249.)  Of course, in such a context the inquiry goes beyond the 
trial record to consider facts and assertions not before the 
original trial court.  In such circumstances, a court considering 
a habeas petition is not simply reviewing the decisions made at 
the trial level.  It is exercising its own authority based on its own 
review of new facts and claims.  Those are two very different 
tasks.  We should be hesitant here to uncritically apply a habeas 
corpus standard of review to appellate review of statutory 
claims. 
The review of factual findings in habeas corpus matters 
arises 
from 
the 
procedural 
posture 
of 
those 
cases.  
Constitutionally, the courts of review are granted original 
jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus claims.  (Cal. Const., art. 
VI, § 10.)  Because appellate courts are not well suited to 
conduct evidentiary hearings, however, a referee will typically 
be appointed to make recommended findings of fact.  (See Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 8.386(f)(2).)  But reviewing courts are not 
required to accept the referee’s recommended findings.  (In re 
Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 109.)  While those findings are 
entitled to “ ‘great weight’ ” when supported by substantial, 
 
speech rights.  (See People v. Jackson (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 
1009, 1020 [cited by maj. opn., ante, p. 19]; see also Bose Corp. 
v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. (1984) 466 U.S. 485, 499.)  
Because this case does not involve a First Amendment issue, 
these cases do not bear upon the standard of review that should 
be applied here. 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
6 
credible evidence (ibid.), they are not binding upon the court as 
they would be under the substantial evidence standard.  A court 
may “ ‘ “reach a different conclusion on an independent 
examination of the evidence produced at the [reference hearing] 
even where the evidence is conflicting.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  Further, no 
deference is afforded to factual findings unless “ ‘based on the 
credibility of live testimony.’ ”  (Resendiz, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 
249 (lead opn. of Werdegar, J.), citing In re Arias (1986) 42 
Cal.3d 667, 695; accord, In re Long (2020) 10 Cal.5th 764, 774.)   
When an appellate court exercises original jurisdiction in 
a habeas matter, it makes sense to give limited deference to the 
referee’s recommended findings.  In keeping with its original 
jurisdiction, the reviewing court is the ultimate fact finder.  The 
same review principles apply to a successive writ situation in 
which a petitioner files a new habeas corpus petition in the 
appellate court when the superior court has denied habeas 
corpus relief after an evidentiary hearing.  (In re Wright (1978) 
78 Cal.App.3d 788, 801.)  In such a case, the appellate court 
again exercises original jurisdiction. 
The situation is different, however, when the matter 
comes to the appellate court as an appeal.  When the superior 
court grants habeas corpus relief and the People appeal, the 
Court of Appeal exercises its appellate jurisdiction over the 
superior court rulings.  (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11.)  “The 
posture of [a] case as a People’s appeal is to be differentiated 
from a situation in which an appellate court, reviewing a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus as a matter of original 
jurisdiction, assigns a referee to take evidence on the matter.”  
(In re Pratt (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1314, fn. 16, italics 
added.)  In an appeal from a habeas corpus grant, a reviewing 
court applies the conventional substantial evidence standard to 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
7 
questions of fact, just as with any other appeal.  (Id. at p. 1314.)  
In other words, it applies “ ‘ “basic principles of appellate 
review.” ’ ”  (In re Butler (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 614, 648.)  
Findings of fact are accorded due deference under the 
substantial evidence standard, while questions of law are 
reviewed independently.  (Ibid.) 
An appeal from a ruling under section 1473.7 is just that:  
an appeal.  (§ 1473.7, subd. (f).)  It is not an equitable habeas 
corpus proceeding in which the appellate court possesses 
original jurisdiction.  Indeed, the statutory remedy in section 
1473.7 is necessary because habeas corpus writ relief is not 
available when, as here, the defendant is no longer in actual or 
constructive custody.  (See People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 
1063, 1066.)  In creating an opportunity for legal relief under 
section 1473.7, the Legislature also provided for conventional 
appellate review.  It did not expand the jurisdiction of the courts 
reviewing the trial court’s ruling on the motion.  Basic principles 
of appellate review should apply, not principles imported from 
writ proceedings. 
“[A]ppellate court deference to the trial court’s resolution 
of fact issues is warranted by jurisdictional considerations and 
a recognition of the distinctive roles of trial and appellate courts:  
Trial courts decide questions of fact and appellate courts decide 
questions of law.”  (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide:  Civil 
Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2019) ¶ 8:42, p. 8-21.)  
Whether substantial evidence supports a judgment or ruling is 
a question of law reposing with the appellate court.  (Ibid.)  
Further, as a general matter, because of the jurisdictional roles 
of the trial and appellate courts, deference to trial court 
credibility determinations is the same for both written 
declarations and oral testimony.  (Haraguchi v. Superior Court 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
8 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711 & fn. 3; Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 
44 Cal.3d 474, 479; Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 
1159.)  
The argument that the reviewing court is “ ‘in the same 
position’ ” as the trial court in assessing documentary evidence 
is inaccurate.  (Maj. opn., ante, p. 20, quoting People v. 
Ogunmowo (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 67, 79.)  A reviewing court 
exercising appellate jurisdiction is not in the same position as 
the trial court.  Their respective roles are different.  The trial 
court decides questions of fact in the first instance.  The 
reviewing court defers to those findings and only considers legal 
holdings de novo.  By declining to give deference to the trial 
court’s findings when based on documentary evidence, a 
reviewing court simply assumes for itself the role of fact finder.  
For this reason, we confirmed over a decade ago that even when 
“the trial court’s findings were based on declarations and other 
written evidence[, that fact] does not lessen the deference due 
those findings.”  (Haraguchi v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.4th 
at p. 711, fn. 3.)  Indeed, in clarifying that deference is owed 
“whether the trial court’s ruling is based on oral testimony or 
declarations,” this court has expressly disapproved authority 
suggesting otherwise.  (Shamblin v. Brattain, supra, 44 Cal.3d 
at p. 479; see id. at p. 479, fn. 4.) 
In its adoption of independent review like that described 
in Resendiz, the majority opinion cites a number of factors, 
including the “history of section 1473.7.”  (Maj. opn., ante, p. 18.)  
That history purportedly reflects that the standard articulated 
by the majority was the “prevailing independent standard of 
review” applied to section 1473.7 when the Legislature amended 
the law in 2018.  (Maj. opn., ante, p. 16.)  However, the precise 
contours of the standard were far from clear at that time.  In 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
9 
People v. Olvera (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1112, although the court 
cited Resendiz and referred to independent review of the section 
1473.7 ruling, it characterized the standard as follows:  “We 
defer to the trial court’s factual determinations if supported by 
substantial evidence, but exercise our independent judgment to 
decide whether the facts demonstrate deficient performance and 
resulting prejudice.”  (Olvera, at p. 1116, italics added.)  
Likewise, in another 2018 case involving section 1473.7, People 
v. Tapia (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 942, the court cited the 
independent 
review 
standard 
but 
applied 
conventional 
substantial evidence review to the trial court’s factual findings, 
even though the record apparently consisted entirely of 
declarations and documents.5  (Tapia, at pp. 946–948, 951, 953.)  
Indeed, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s implied 
finding that the defendant’s declaration was not credible, 
stating:  “We do not reevaluate witness credibility.”  (Id. at p. 
953.) 
The standard described in People v. Olvera and applied in 
People v. Tapia is not the standard advocated by the majority.  
The majority approach does not involve substantial evidence 
review of factual findings, even as applied to findings based on 
live testimony.  According great weight to findings is not the 
same as being bound by findings supported by substantial 
evidence.  A court applying the standard adopted by the majority 
 
5  
In Tapia, the trial judge who heard the section 1473.7 
motion also presided over the plea hearing.  (See People v. Tapia, 
supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 948.)  While the majority opinion 
notes this fact (maj. opn., ante, p. 20) and presumably would give 
some degree of deference to the trial court’s factual findings in 
such a case, that deference still would not be the equivalent of 
the substantial evidence standard applied in Tapia. 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
10 
is free to reach its own conclusions even when the evidence is 
conflicting and “ ‘great weight’ ” is afforded to certain findings.  
(Resendiz, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 249 (lead opn. of Werdegar, 
J.).)  Simply put, it is incorrect to say the independent review 
standard adopted by the majority was the “prevailing” one. 
As further support for dispensing with deferential review 
of factual findings, the majority cites “the interests at stake in a 
section 1473.7 motion.”  (Maj. opn., ante, p. 18.)  It may be 
appropriate to apply de novo review to mixed questions of law 
and fact that raise constitutional concerns or that would 
constitute a final determination of a party’s rights.  (People v. 
Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1266.)  Nevertheless, simply 
because independent review should be applied to the ultimate 
ruling does not justify giving factual findings less deference than 
they are owed under the substantial evidence test.  Further, 
courts should not be free to disregard factual findings because 
they conclude the “interests at stake” in a particular case justify 
that approach.  In most criminal cases, the “interests at stake” 
are high.  Questions of guilt or innocence or touching on personal 
freedom are profoundly consequential.  But reviewing courts are 
not free to disregard settled authority, or to expand the nature 
of their jurisdiction, simply by pronouncing:  “This is really 
important.” 
The majority opinion asserts that “ ‘ “[i]ndependent review 
is not the equivalent of de novo review. . . .” ’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, 
p. 19, quoting People v. Jackson, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1021.)  Yet it does little to explain how, in practice, the 
standards will differ as applied to section 1473.7 rulings.  The 
majority opinion distinguishes the original appraisal of all the 
evidence under the de novo standard from deference given to 
“factual findings that are based on the trial court’s own 
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
11 
observations” under independent review.  (Maj. opn., ante, p. 
19.)  But many section 1473.7 proceedings will be based on 
documentary evidence without live testimony.  Under those 
circumstances, the form of independent review described by the 
majority will for all practical purposes be de novo review 
involving an original appraisal of all the evidence.  Then, a 
reviewing court will be thrust into the role of fact finder, 
requiring credibility assessments and a weighing of the 
evidence.  A simple statement that the standards will somehow 
be different provides no guidance and sows confusion.  We 
should hesitate to adopt a rule placing the reviewing court into 
a fact finder’s position. 
As the majority opinion notes, in this case the trial court 
did not even consider whether Mr. Vivar suffered prejudice, 
instead basing its ruling on the finding that his counsel did not 
provide ineffective assistance.  (Maj. opn., ante, p. 8.)  Simply 
put, the court made no express or implied factual findings with 
respect to prejudice.  As a result, there is no finding to which to 
defer.  To the extent the trial court might arguably have made 
findings bearing on prejudice, they would be easily dismissed. 
The prejudice question turns on whether Mr. Vivar would 
not have entered the plea had he been properly informed and 
advised.  This is a credibility question.  The trial court found his 
credibility wanting because, it determined, he “ ‘was more 
willing to rely on his experiences than he was on his counsel’s 
advice.’ ”  (People v. Vivar, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 230.)  The 
appellate court concluded, “This was a factual inference the trial 
court was entitled to draw. . . .”  (Ibid.)  Perhaps, but appellate 
review of that inference is not meaningless.  The Court of Appeal 
was required to examine whether the inference found 
substantial support in the record.  It does not.   
PEOPLE v. VIVAR 
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
12 
There was no evidence that counsel ever gave Mr. Vivar 
advice regarding immigration.  Indeed, there is no evidence 
counsel understood the potential consequences herself or that 
she had made it her “business to discover what impact his 
negotiated sentence would have on his deportability.”  (People v. 
Soriano (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1470, 1480.)  The public defender 
did not claim she gave him any substantive information at all 
about immigration consequences.  Indeed, she made no 
assertion as to any advice she provided Mr. Vivar.  She said that 
she customarily told her noncitizen clients about “ ‘possible’ ” 
immigration consequences.  (People v. Vivar, supra, 43 
Cal.App.5th at p. 222.)  But here, the unrebutted evidence was 
that she never asked Mr. Vivar about his immigration status.  
(Ibid.)  Even if she had told him that he “might” get deported 
and, if he had further questions he should consult an 
immigration attorney, essentially that was no advice at all.  (See 
id. at pp. 222–223.)  This evidence, together with the record as 
whole, does not support an inference that Mr. Vivar would have 
ignored his counsel’s advice on the immigration consequences of 
his plea.  He received no such advice, and if he had, the proper 
inference to be drawn from his concern about deportation is that 
he would have accepted it or at least given it a fair degree of 
consideration.  He was forced to rely on his own experiences only 
because counsel gave him no alternative.  Because the record 
does not support the trial court’s factual conclusions, a 
conventional substantial evidence review suffices here.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
I Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Vivar 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 43 Cal.App.5th 216 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S260270  
Date Filed:  May 3, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior       
County:  Riverside       
Judge:  Bambi J. Moyer         
 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Counsel: 
 
Munger, Tolles & Olson, Joseph D. Lee, William Larsen and Dane P. 
Shikman for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Kahn A. Scolnick, Daniel R. Adler and 
Jason S. Kim for Alyssa Bell, Reuven Cohen, Ingrid V. Eagly, Gilbert 
Garcetti, Meline Mkrtichian, Ronald J. Nessim, Gabriel Pardo, 
Jennifer Resnik and David J. Sutton as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Jennifer L. Pasquarella, Eva L. Bitran; Vasudha Talla; and  David Loy 
for ACLU Foundation of Southern California, ACLU Foundation of 
Northern California and ACLU Foundation of San Diego and Imperial 
Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
O’Melveny & Myers and Catalina J. Vergara for The Immigrant Legal 
Resource Center, Public Counsel, University of California Irvine Law 
Immigrant Rights Clinic, University of California Irvine Law Criminal 
 
 
Justice Clinic, East Bay Community Law Center, Community Legal 
Services in East Palo Alto and University of California Davis 
Immigrant Rights Clinic as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Michael J. Mongan, State Solicitor 
General, Lance E. Winters and Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 
Attorneys General, Samuel P. Siegel, Deputy State Solicitor General, 
Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and 
Adrian R. Contreras, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent.  
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Dane Shikman 
31 Mullen Ave. 
San Francisco, CA 94110 
(415) 512-4092 
 
 
Samuel P. Siegel 
Deputy State Solicitor General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 210-6269