Case Title: Julie L. Rabideau v. City of Racine

Citation: 2001 WI 57

Docket Number: 1999AP003263

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 57 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-3263 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Julie L. Rabideau,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
City of Racine,  
 
Defendant-Respondent.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  238 Wis. 2d 96, 617 N.W.2d 678 
 
 
(Ct. App. 2000-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 12, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
February 28, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Allan B. Torhorst 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Alan D. Eisenberg and Law Offices of Alan D. Eisenberg, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Alan D. Eisenberg. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief 
and oral argument by W. Scott Lewis, assistant city attorney. 
 
2001 WI 57 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-3263 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Julie L. Rabideau, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
City of Racine, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part and remanded. 
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Dakota was shot by a City of 
Racine police officer.  He subsequently died from the injury.  
Dakota lived with Julie Rabideau (Rabideau), who witnessed the 
events leading to his death.  Rabideau subsequently filed a 
claim for damages against the City of Racine (the City).  Racine 
County Circuit Court Judge Allan B. Torhorst granted summary 
judgment to the City, and the court of appeals affirmed.1   
                     
1 Rabideau v. City of Racine, No. 99-3263, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 7, 2000), was decided by one judge 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(a)(1997-98).  
FILED 
 
JUN 12, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-3263 
 
2 
¶2 
The primary question presented in this case is whether 
Rabideau 
is 
entitled 
to 
damages 
for 
emotional 
distress.  
Although the question of whether or not a bystander may recover 
damages after witnessing an accident is a legal question that 
this court has previously addressed, this particular case is 
distinguishable from others: Dakota was a dog, a companion to 
Rabideau. 
¶3 
At the outset, we note that we are uncomfortable with 
the law's cold characterization of a dog, such as Dakota, as 
mere "property."2  Labeling a dog "property" fails to describe 
the value human beings place upon the companionship that they 
enjoy with a dog.  A companion dog is not a fungible item, 
equivalent to other items of personal property.3  A companion dog 
is not a living room sofa or dining room furniture.  This term 
inadequately and inaccurately describes the relationship between 
a human and a dog. 
¶4 
The association of dog and human is longstanding.  
Dogs have been a part of human domestic life since 6,300 B.C.  
Debra Squires-Lee, In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing 
                     
2 See Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 
1071 n.5 (Haw. 1981) ("The law clearly views a dog as personal 
property.  Thiele v. City and County of Denver, 135 Colo. 442, 
312 P.2d 786 (1957); Smith v. Costello, 77 Idaho 205, 290 P.2d 
742 (1955)").   
3 This argument concerning the distinction between companion 
animals and goods owned primarily for their economic value is 
set forth fully in Steven M. Wise, Recovery of Common Law 
Damages for Emotional Distress, Loss of Society, and Loss of 
Companionship for the Wrongful Death of a Companion Animal, 4 
Animal L. 33, 69-70 (1998). 
No. 99-3263 
 
3 
Companion Animals in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1059, 1064 (1995). 
Archaeologists have uncovered a 12,000-year-old burial site in 
which a human being and a dog lay buried together.  "The arm of 
the person was arranged on the dog's shoulder, as if to 
emphasize the bonds that existed between these two individuals 
during life."  Id.  (internal quotation marks and footnote 
omitted).  Dogs are so much a part of the human experience that 
we need not cite to authority when we note that dogs work in law 
enforcement, assist the blind and disabled, perform traditional 
jobs such as herding animals and providing security, and, of 
course, dogs continue to provide humans with devoted friendship.  
¶5 
Nevertheless, the law categorizes the dog as personal 
property despite the long relationship between dogs and humans. 
To the extent this opinion uses the term "property" in 
describing how humans value the dog they live with, it is done 
only as a means of applying established legal doctrine to the 
facts of this case. 
¶6 
Two theories are proffered by Rabideau as grounds for 
the recovery of emotional damages: negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  As to the first, as a predicate matter to bringing a 
claim for damages based upon the tort of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress the plaintiff must be related to the victim 
as spouse, parent-child, grandparent-grandchild, or sibling.4  
                     
4 Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 657, 
517 N.W.2d 432 (1994).  
No. 99-3263 
 
4 
Because the relationship between Rabideau and Dakota did not 
fall within one of these categories, we find that she cannot 
maintain a claim on this basis. 
¶7 
We further conclude that Rabideau cannot maintain a 
claim for recovery for the emotional distress caused by 
negligent damage to her property.  Our decision is based upon 
well-established public policy criteria.5  We are particularly 
concerned that were such a claim to go forward, the law would 
proceed upon a course that had no just stopping point.  Humans 
have an enormous capacity to form bonds with dogs, cats, birds 
and an infinite number of other beings that are non-human.  Were 
we to recognize a claim for damages for the negligent loss of a 
dog, we can find little basis for rationally distinguishing 
other categories of animal companion. 
¶8 
Rabideau's second theory is based upon intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  We concur with the court of 
appeals 
that 
Rabideau's 
complaint 
cannot 
survive 
summary 
judgment when examined within the framework of set forth in 
Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 359, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963).   
¶9 
In 
addition 
to 
these 
claims 
we 
address 
three 
additional 
issues. 
 
First, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Rabideau's 
complaint, liberally read, encompasses a claim for damages for 
property loss.   
                     
5 Kleinke v. Farmers Coop. Supply & Shipping, 202 Wis. 2d 
138, 144-45, 549 N.W.2d 714 (1996).    
No. 99-3263 
 
5 
¶10 Second, we find that genuine issues of material fact 
exist as to whether Officer Thomas Jacobi was entitled as a 
matter of law to shoot and kill Dakota.  See Wis. Stat. § 174.01 
(1997-98).6  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's grant of 
summary judgment on the basis of § 174.01. 
¶11 Third, we reverse the determination by the circuit 
court that this complaint was frivolous.  We conclude that 
Rabideau's complaint for damages for the intentional infliction 
of emotional distress was one that could properly be brought, 
although the elements for that claim were not satisfied so as to 
survive a motion for summary judgment.  As to Rabideau's claim 
for damages based upon the negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, her brief to the court of appeals and this court set 
forth a good faith argument for an extension of the law.  Under 
these circumstances a finding of frivolousness was erroneous.  
Standard of Review 
¶12 In this case we are reviewing the circuit court's 
grant of summary judgment to the City.7  This presents a question 
of law that we review de novo.  Strasser v. Transtech Mobile 
Fleet Serv., 2000 WI 87, ¶28, 236 Wis. 2d 435, 613 N.W.2d 142. 
                     
6 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-
98 version unless noted otherwise.  
7 The City filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted.  We agree with the 
court of appeals that because the circuit court considered 
matters outside the pleadings, the case should be treated as a 
review of a grant of summary judgment pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.06(3)  Rabideau, No. 99-3263, unpublished slip op. at 3 
(Wis. Ct. App. June 7, 2000). 
No. 99-3263 
 
6 
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), summary judgment shall be 
granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
"In analyzing whether there are genuine issues of material fact, 
we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 
party."  Strasser, 2000 WI 87 at ¶32. 
Analysis 
¶13 We begin our analysis by briefly reviewing the facts. 
 Rabideau and Officer Jacobi were neighbors.  On March 31, 1999, 
Officer Jacobi had just returned home.  Across the street, 
Rabideau was returning home as well.  Dakota jumped out of 
Rabideau's truck.  He crossed the street to the Jacobi house 
where Jed, the Jacobi's Chesapeake Bay retriever, was in the 
yard.   
¶14 There is significant disagreement between the parties 
concerning what subsequently occurred.  The City argued that 
Dakota came onto the Jacobi property and attacked Jed.  Officer 
Jacobi, it is contended, shouted at Dakota to no effect.  The 
City argues that Officer Jacobi, fearing for the safety of Jed, 
and for the safety of his wife and child who were nearby, fired 
a number of shots with his service revolver.  Dakota moved 
toward the street and turned his head and was snarling.  Officer 
Jacobi, believing the dog was about to charge, fired a third 
time and struck Dakota. 
¶15 On the other hand, Rabideau contends that Dakota was 
sniffing Jed, not biting or acting aggressively.  She asserts 
No. 99-3263 
 
7 
that she called Dakota and was crossing the street to retrieve 
him when shots rang out.   
¶16 Although both parties agree that three shots were 
fired, Rabideau maintains that Dakota was stepping off the curb 
toward her when he was hit by Officer Jacobi's second shot.  
Rabideau asserts that while Dakota was struggling to crawl away, 
Officer Jacobi fired again and missed.   
¶17 Two days after the shooting occurred, Rabideau was 
informed that Dakota died.  Upon hearing this news, she 
collapsed and was given medical treatment.  
¶18 Rabideau filed a complaint in small claims court, 
which stated:  "City of Racine Police Officer Thomas Jacobi shot 
and killed my dog, Dakota, and caused me to collapse and require 
medical attention." 
I 
¶19 The circuit court and the court of appeals both 
determined that Rabideau's complaint set forth a claim for 
emotional distress.  The circuit court addressed this complaint 
as one asserting a claim of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress.  The court of appeals addressed both negligent 
infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  In this review, we will address both 
claims. 
A 
¶20 Rabideau argues that the tort of negligent infliction 
of emotional distress to a bystander should encompass the facts 
of this case.  Our tort law recognizes a claim for damages where 
No. 99-3263 
 
8 
a bystander suffers great emotional distress after witnessing an 
accident or its gruesome aftermath involving death or serious 
injury to a close relative.  See Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. 
Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994).  The elements of 
the claim are: "'(1) that the defendant's conduct [in the 
underlying accident] fell below the applicable standard of care, 
(2) that the plaintiff suffered an injury [severe emotional 
distress], and (3) that the defendant's conduct was a cause-in-
fact of the plaintiff's injury.'"  Wis JI——Civil 1510 Comment 
(quoting Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 632.)  Rabideau's complaint sets 
forth these elements. 
¶21 Nevertheless, even if a plaintiff sets forth the 
elements of a negligence claim, a court may determine that 
liability 
is 
precluded 
by 
public 
policy 
considerations.  
Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, ¶26, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 611 
N.W.2d 906.  Before a court makes such a determination, it is 
typically the better practice to submit the case to the jury.  
Id.  If, however, the facts of the case are not complex and the 
attendant public policy issues are presented in full, then this 
court may determine before trial if liability is precluded by 
public 
policy. 
 
Id. 
 
Accordingly, 
we 
turn 
next 
to 
a 
consideration of the public policy concerns presented by this 
issue.   
¶22 The Bowen analysis noted that two concerns have 
historically shaped the development of the tort of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.  These concerns are (1) 
establishing that the claim is genuine, and (2) ensuring that 
No. 99-3263 
 
9 
allowing recovery will not place an unfair burden on the 
tortfeasor.  Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 655.   
¶23 Where, as in the present case, the issue presented is 
negligent infliction of emotional distress on a bystander, Bowen 
identified three public policy factors to be applied in an 
effort to establish that the claim is genuine, the tortfeasor is 
not unfairly burdened, and that other attendant public policy 
considerations are not contravened.  Id. at 655-58.  First, the 
victim must have been killed or suffered a serious injury.  
Second, the plaintiff and victim must be related as spouses, 
parent-child, grandparent-grandchild or siblings.  Third, "the 
plaintiff must have observed an extraordinary event, namely the 
incident and injury or the scene soon after the incident with 
the injured victim at the scene."  Id. at 633.   
¶24 We need not address each of these factors because it 
is plain that the victim in this case is not related to Rabideau 
as a spouse, parent, child, sibling, grandparent or grandchild. 
Accordingly, 
she 
cannot 
maintain 
a 
claim 
for 
negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.  
¶25 Rabideau urges that we extend this category to include 
companion animals.  In her words, "[a]nyone who has owned and 
loved a pet would agree that in terms of emotional trauma, 
watching the death of a pet is akin to losing a close relative." 
Further, she contends that we need not engage in an analysis of 
whether companion animals are "family," but should instead 
examine the rationale supporting the limitation to certain 
family members.  Rabideau argues that the limitation of claims 
No. 99-3263 
 
10
to family members is a means of assuring forseeability as well 
as a reasonable limitation of the liability of a negligent 
tortfeasor.  According to Rabideau, the bond between companion 
animals and humans is one that is sufficiently substantial to 
ensure that these concerns are met. 
¶26 We agree, as we must, that humans form important 
emotional connections that fall outside the class of spouse, 
parent, 
child, 
grandparent, 
grandchild 
or 
sibling. 
 
We 
recognized this in Bowen,8 and repeat here, that emotional 
distress may arise as a result of witnessing the death or injury 
of a victim who falls outside the categories established in tort 
law.  However, the relationships between a victim and a spouse, 
parent, child, grandparent, grandchild or sibling are deeply 
embedded in the organization of our law and society.  The 
emotional loss experienced by a bystander who witnessed the 
negligent death or injury of one of these categories of 
individuals is more readily addressed because it is less likely 
to be fraudulent and is a loss that can be fairly charged to the 
tortfeasor.  The emotional harm occurring from witnessing the 
death or injury of an individual who falls into one of these 
relationships is serious, compelling, and warrants special 
recognition.  Id. at 657.   
¶27 We concluded in Bowen that for the present time these 
tort claims would be limited; we reach the same conclusion in 
this case.  We note that this rule of nonrecovery applies with 
                     
8 Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 657.  
No. 99-3263 
 
11
equal force to a plaintiff who witnesses as a bystander the 
negligent injury of a best friend who is human as it does to a 
plaintiff whose best friend is a dog.     
¶28 Had Rabideau been a bystander to the negligent killing 
of her best human friend, our negligence analysis would be 
complete.  However, as we have previously noted the law 
categorizes dogs as property.  We turn, therefore, to consider 
whether Rabideau can maintain a claim for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress arising from property loss.   
¶29 In Kleinke v. Farmers Cooperative Supply & Shipping, 
202 Wis. 2d 138, 145, 549 N.W.2d 714 (1996), we concluded that 
under Wisconsin's formulation of tort law, "it is unlikely that 
a plaintiff could ever recover for the emotional distress caused 
by negligent damage to his or her property."  This conclusion 
was founded upon public policy.9 
¶30 The public policy analysis in Kleinke drew upon the 
reasoning of Bowen.  In Bowen this court listed six public 
policy 
factors 
addressed 
by 
courts 
when 
considering 
the 
authenticity and fairness of an emotional distress claim.  These 
                     
9 At least one other court has adopted a different approach. 
 Hawaii permits recovery for mental distress occurring as a 
result of the negligent destruction of property.  Campbell, 632 
P.2d at 1071 (citing Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 
1970)).  Based upon this principle of Hawaiian tort law, in 
Campbell the Hawaii Supreme Court allowed recovery for serious 
mental distress resulting when the plaintiffs' dog died of heat 
prostration after being loaded into an unventillated van on a 
hot afternoon, and the van was exposed directly to the sun.     
  
No. 99-3263 
 
12
various public policy considerations set forth in Bowen, and 
cited in Kleinke, are: 
 
(1) Whether the injury is too remote from the 
negligence;  (2) whether the injury is wholly out of 
proportion 
to 
the 
culpability 
of 
the 
negligent 
tortfeasor;  (3) whether in retrospect it appears too 
extraordinary that the negligence should have brought 
about the harm;  (4) whether allowance of recovery 
would place an unreasonable burden on the negligent 
tortfeasor;  (5) whether allowance of recovery would 
be too likely to open the way to fraudulent claims; or 
(6) whether allowance of recovery would enter a field 
that has no sensible or just stopping point. 
Kleinke, 202 Wis. 2d at 144-45 (quoting Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 
655). 
¶31 In this case we need only examine one of the Bowen - 
Kleinke factors to conclude that there is no basis for recovery 
here.  This factor concerns whether allowance of recovery would 
enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.  
Rabideau suggests that limiting liability to the human companion 
of a companion animal who is killed may satisfy this concern.  
We find this proposed resolution unsatisfactory.  First, it is 
difficult to define with precision the limit of the class of 
individuals who fit into the human companion category.  Is the 
particular human companion every family member?  the owner of 
record or primary caretaker?  a roommate?  Second, it would be 
difficult to cogently identify the class of companion animals 
because the human capacity to form an emotional bond extends to 
an enormous array of living creatures.  Our vast ability to form 
these bonds adds to the richness of life.  However, in this case 
the public policy concerns relating to identifying genuine 
No. 99-3263 
 
13
claims of emotional distress, as well as charging tortfeasors 
with financial burdens that are fair, compel the conclusion that 
the definition suggested by Rabideau will not definitively meet 
public policy concerns. 
¶32 Based upon all the above, we conclude that Rabideau 
cannot maintain a claim for the emotional distress caused by 
negligent damage to her property. 
B 
¶33 Next, we consider Rabideau's claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  Four elements must be 
established for a plaintiff to maintain such a claim.  A 
plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the defendant's conduct was 
intentioned 
to 
cause 
emotional 
distress; 
(2) 
that 
the 
defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the 
defendant's conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's 
emotional distress; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered an 
extreme disabling emotional response to the defendant's conduct. 
Alsteen, 21 Wis. 2d at 359-60; Wis JI——Civil 2725.  We agree 
with the court of appeals' conclusion that summary judgment is 
warranted here. 
¶34 The first Alsteen element requires the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the defendant acted with the intent to cause 
emotional harm.  "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct 
intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is 
subject to liability for such emotional distress and for bodily 
harm resulting from it."  Id. at 358 (emphasis omitted).  In 
this case, there is no material issue of fact in the record that 
No. 99-3263 
 
14
suggests that Officer Jacobi acted for the purpose of causing 
Rabideau emotional harm.   
¶35 Rabideau argues that she need only show that Officer 
Jacobi acted intentionally when he shot Dakota.  She contends 
that by shooting Dakota while she was present, Officer Jacobi 
would have known that his act would cause her severe emotional 
distress.  Rabideau argues that such knowledge is tantamount to 
intentionally causing severe emotional distress because "a 
person 
is 
presumed 
to 
intend 
'the 
natural 
and 
probable 
consequences of his acts voluntarily and knowingly performed.'" 
Haessley v. Germantown Mut. Ins. Co., 213 Wis. 2d 108, 118, 569 
N.W.2d 804 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Gould, 56 Wis. 2d 
808, 814, 202 N.W.2d 903 (1973)).   
¶36 The presumption cited by Rabideau from Haessley is 
generally applied in criminal cases.  See Hawpetoss v. State, 52 
Wis. 2d 71, 80, 187 N.W.2d 823 (1971).  Rabideau's application 
in this case of the general rule that an accused is presumed to 
intend the natural and probable consequences of his act 
obfuscates what is required by the first element of this cause 
of action.  The plaintiff must establish that the purpose of the 
conduct was to cause emotional distress.  There is no question 
that Officer Jacobi intended to fire his weapon at Dakota.  
However, there is no evidence to indicate he did so to cause 
emotional distress to Rabideau.  Certainly that was a by-
product, but that is insufficient standing alone.  This is a 
limitation upon the cause of action for the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  Anderson v. Continental Ins. 
No. 99-3263 
 
15
Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 694-95, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978).  There must 
be 
something 
more 
than 
a 
showing 
that 
the 
defendant 
intentionally engaged in the conduct that gave rise to emotional 
distress in the plaintiff; the plaintiff must show that the 
conduct was engaged in for the purpose of causing emotional 
distress.  While intent may be evidenced by inferences from 
words, conduct or the circumstances in which events occurred, in 
the present case there is no asserted fact as to this element.  
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Rabideau's argument, and we 
affirm the court of appeals' grant of summary judgment.   
II 
¶37 Although we affirm the court of appeals' decision as 
to Rabideau's claims for damages based upon emotional distress, 
we hold that the court erred in its conclusion that Rabideau's 
claim did not seek damages for lost property.  A claim for 
damages for property loss as the result of Officer Jacobi's 
action is the most conventional claim Rabideau could have 
brought, and is without doubt the most widely recognized claim 
that arises when an animal is killed.  See 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law 
of Remedies § 5.15(3), at 898 (2d ed. 1993); Robin Cheryl 
Miller, Annotation, Damages for Killing or Injuring Dog, 61 
A.L.R.5th 635 (1998).    We therefore hold that Rabideau's 
complaint, liberally construed, also encompassed a demand for 
damages for property loss.  We decline to further address the 
proper means to measure this property loss or whether other 
elements, such as veterinary expenses incurred in treating a 
companion animal's injuries, may be recovered.  These issues 
No. 99-3263 
 
16
were not thoroughly briefed by both parties.  See State v. 
Bodoh, 226 Wis. 2d 718, 737, 595 N.W.2d 330 (1999) (issues not 
raised or considered in the trial court will not be considered 
for the first time on appeal unless the new issue is a question 
of law that the parties have thoroughly briefed, and there are 
no disputed issues of fact regarding the new issue). 
III 
¶38 The next issue we consider concerns the circuit 
court's grant of summary judgment on the basis of Wis. Stat. 
§ 174.01.  As an affirmative defense, the City asserted that 
Officer Jacobi was privileged to shoot and kill Dakota pursuant 
to this statute.  Section 174.01 provides as follows: 
 
(1)  Killing a dog.  (a) Except as provided in par. 
(b), a person may intentionally kill a dog only if a 
person is threatened with serious bodily harm by the 
dog and: 
1. Other restraining actions were tried and 
failed; or 
2.  Immediate action is necessary. 
(b) A person may intentionally kill a dog if a 
domestic animal that is owned or in the custody of the 
person is threatened with serious bodily harm by the 
dog and the dog is on property owned or controlled by 
the person and: 
1.  Other restraining actions were tried and 
failed; or 
2.  Immediate action is necessary. 
 
(2)  Inapplicable to officers, veterinarians and 
persons killing their own dog.  This section does not 
apply to an officer acting in the lawful performance 
of his or her duties under s. 29.931 (2)(b), 95.21, 
174.02(3) or 174.046(9), or to a veterinarian killing 
a dog in a proper and humane manner or to a person 
killing his or her own dog in a proper and humane 
manner. 
 
No. 99-3263 
 
17
(3)  Liability and penalties.  A person who violates 
this section: 
(a) Is liable to the owner of the dog for double 
damages resulting from the killing; 
(b) Is subject to the penalties provided under s. 
174.15; and 
(c) May be subject to prosecution, depending on the 
circumstances of the case, under s. 951.02. 
¶39 The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court 
improperly applied summary judgment procedures when determining 
whether Officer Jacobi was privileged to shoot Dakota under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 174.01. 
 
However, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
further 
determined that the issue was moot because it determined that 
even if Officer Jacobi's actions were not privileged, Rabideau 
could not recover damages pursuant to her complaint.  Rabideau, 
No. 99-3263, unpublished slip op. at 9-10 (Wis. Ct. App. June 7, 
2000).  
¶40 Based upon our examination of the record we agree that 
summary judgment on this issue was improper because material 
facts pertaining to the statute are in dispute.  For example, 
although the City asserts that Dakota and Jed were fighting, 
Rabideau contends that they were not in a fight.  Rabideau 
asserts that Dakota was not threatening Officer Jacobi, his wife 
or his child.  The City disagrees.  Rabideau claims Dakota was 
on the curb; the City contends the dogs were in Officer Jacobi's 
yard.   
¶41 We also note that the exemption for police officers 
provided in Wis. Stat. § 174.01(2) requires that the officer is 
acting pursuant to one of a variety of statutes.  However, the 
No. 99-3263 
 
18
record does not establish that Officer Jacobi was acting under 
any of the enumerated statutory provisions.   
¶42 We disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that 
the granting of summary judgment on the basis of this statute 
was moot.  Wisconsin Stat. § 174.01(3) provides that an 
individual who intentionally kills a dog in violation of the 
statute is liable to the owner for double damages.  Therefore, 
because material facts are in dispute, the circuit court's order 
of summary judgment pursuant to § 174.01(1) is reversed.   
IV 
¶43 Finally, Rabideau asserts that the circuit court erred 
by finding her claim frivolous and awarding attorney fees and 
costs to the City of Racine.  We agree.   
¶44 The circuit court made a finding of frivolousness 
grounded upon Wis. Stat. § 814.025(3)(b).10  The circuit court 
noted that in this case two identical small claims complaints 
were filed.  One complaint was signed by Julie Rabideau and date 
stamped July 28, 1999, at 3:30 p.m.  A second complaint was 
signed by her attorney and date stamped July 28, 1999, at 3:33 
p.m.  The circuit court held that the attorneys for Rabideau 
were to be responsible for all costs and fees incurred by the 
City.  Under § 814.025(3)(b), costs for frivolous claims may be 
awarded upon a finding that the party or attorney "knew, or 
                     
10 The circuit court based its finding of frivolousness 
solely upon Wis. Stat. § 814.025.  We need not address the 
City's 
contention 
that 
standards 
utilized 
for 
finding 
frivolousness under Wis. Stat. § 802.05 apply to § 814.025. 
No. 99-3263 
 
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should have known" that the claim was "without any reasonable 
basis in law or equity."  
¶45 Courts tread carefully when considering a claim of 
frivolous 
action, 
for 
the 
"ingenuity, 
foresightedness and 
competency of the bar must be encouraged and not stifled."  
Radlein v. Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 605, 
613, 345 N.W.2d 874 (1984).  The statute reflects this policy by 
requiring the court to consider whether the party or attorney 
knew the action was without any reasonable basis in law, and 
could not be supported by a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law. 11  As to 
this second step, the circuit court is to consider each of the 
alternative possibilities of a good faith argument, that is, was 
                     
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 814.025 provides in relevant part: 
(1)  If an action . . . is found, at any time 
during the proceedings or upon judgment, to be 
frivolous by the court, the court shall award to the 
successful party costs determined under s. 814.04 and 
reasonable attorney fees. 
 . . .  
(3)  In order to find an action . . . frivolous 
under sub.(1), the court must find one or more of the 
following: 
 . . .  
(b)  The party or the party's attorney knew, or 
should have known, that the action, special proceeding 
counterclaim, defense or cross complaint was without 
any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be 
supported by a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law.  
No. 99-3263 
 
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the existing law ready for an extension, modification or 
reversal.  If the law is not ready for an extension, 
modification or reversal, the court is to consider whether the 
argument for the change was made in good faith.  Id. at 612.   
¶46 An 
analysis 
of 
frivolousness 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 814.025(3)(b) presents a mixed question of fact and law.  
State v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 100 Wis. 2d 582, 601-02, 
302 N.W.2d 827 (1981).  A determination of what the party knew 
or should have known is a question of fact.  Id.  A conclusion 
as to whether what was known, or should have been known, 
warrants a finding of frivolousness is a question of law which 
we review de novo.  Stern v. Thompson & Coates, Ltd., 185 
Wis. 2d 220, 241, 517 N.W.2d 658 (1994).  In this case, the 
fundamental facts were sufficiently established to render our 
analysis here to be solely a question of law.  This analysis is 
based upon an objective standard:  "'whether the attorney knew 
or should have known that the position taken was frivolous as 
determined by what a reasonable attorney would have known or 
should have known under the same or similar circumstances.'"  
Id. (quoting Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 799, 299 N.W.2d 856 
(1981)).  All doubts on this issue are resolved in favor of the 
party or attorney.  Zinda v. Krause, 191 Wis. 2d 154, 176, 528 
N.W.2d 55 (Ct. App. 1995); In re Paternity of James A.O., 182 
Wis. 2d 166, 184, 513 N.W.2d 410 (Ct. App. 1994). 
¶47 In this review, we have concluded that Rabideau's 
complaint, liberally construed, encompassed a claim for property 
loss.  Additionally, we have concluded that Rabideau's complaint 
No. 99-3263 
 
21
for damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress 
was properly brought, although the elements for that claim were 
not satisfied.  Finally, as to Rabideau's claim for damages 
based upon the negligent infliction of emotional distress, her 
brief to the court of appeals, as well as her arguments before 
this court, adequately defended her position.  We conclude that 
she has set forth a substantial argument in good faith for an 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law.  As a 
result, 
we 
reverse 
the 
circuit 
court's 
finding 
of 
frivolousness.12 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause remanded to 
the circuit court. 
 
 
 
                     
12 At oral argument counsel for Rabideau raised for the 
first time the issue of recovering damages for loss of 
companionship.  Because this issue was neither raised in the 
petition for review nor argued in the briefs, we do not address 
it. 
 
No. 99-3263.ssa 
 
1 
¶48 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  I 
agree with the majority opinion's conclusions about intentional 
infliction 
of 
emotional 
distress, 
negligent 
infliction of 
emotional 
distress, 
property 
damage, 
and 
the 
issue 
of 
frivolousness.  The only cause of action in this case is for 
property loss.  
¶49 I wish to emphasize that this case is about the rights 
of a pet owner to recover in tort for the death of her dog.  
Scholars would not classify this case as one about animal 
rights. 
¶50 Professor Martha Nussbaum has pointed out that one's 
love of a pet should not be mistaken for concern about the 
ethical rights of animals.13  Professor Nussbaum explains this 
error as follows: 
 
Commonly, we conflate two sorts of people: animal 
lovers and people who are sensitive to the ethical 
rights of animals.  This conflation is a great error. 
In human life, we can easily take its measure: men may 
be genuine lovers of women while treating them 
extremely badly. . . .  Even people who treat well the 
particular women they love may not care at all about 
women's rights generally.14 
¶51 Professor Nussbaum further explains the difference 
between animal lovers and proponents of animal rights by noting 
that while many of us have affectionate relationships with 
                     
13 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Book Review: Animal Rights: The 
Need for a Theoretical Basis, reviewing Steven M. Wise, Rattling 
the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 
1506 (2001). 
14 Id. at 1544. 
No. 99-3263.ssa 
 
2 
animals such as dogs and cats and horses, we also eat meat and 
eggs and wear leather, and we do not concern ourselves with the 
conditions under which these goods are produced.15 
¶52 For purposes of recovery for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, this court treats the death of a dog the 
same as it treats injury to or death of a best friend, a 
roommate, or a nonmarital partner: It allows no recovery. 
¶53 Having concluded that the plaintiff's only remedy is 
for loss of property, the majority opinion declines to give 
guidance to the circuit court and litigants about damages for 
the death of the dog.  This issue was not briefed.  At least one 
state has enacted a law that allows up to $4,000 recovery for 
non-economic damages such as loss of the reasonably expected 
companionship, love, and affection of a pet resulting from the 
intentional or negligent killing of the pet.16  Such a statute 
allows the legislature to make a considered policy judgment 
                     
15 Id. at 1509-10. 
16 See Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-17-403 (2001). 
No. 99-3263.ssa 
 
3 
regarding the societal value of pets as companions and to 
specify the nature of the damages to be awarded in a lawsuit.17   
¶54 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
                     
17 See 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 5.15(3), at 898-900 
(2d ed. 1993) (discussing courts' varied approaches toward 
damage awards in cases involving injuring or killing of a pet). 
No. 99-3263.ssa 
 
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