Case Title: STATE EX REL DEPT HEALTH v LIVIN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 13125

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13125 I N T H E SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M O N T A N A 1976 STATE OF M O N T A N A ex r e l . Department of Health and Environmental Sciences, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, CITY OF LIVINGSTON, County of Park, S t a t e of Montana, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Sixth J u d i c i a l District, Honorable Jack D. Shans trom, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Richard D. Klinger argued, Helena, Montana A. Michael Salvagni appeared, Helena, Montana For Respondent : Robert L. Jovick argued, Livingston, Montana Submitted : February 2, 1976 Decided : 4p)i. 1 - 1976 Filed: ij.'t -: *LJ?~ M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. The S t a t e of Montana f i l e d a c i v i l a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e C i t y of Livingston i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Park County, seeking recovery of a monetary penalty and a compliance order from t h e c o u r t f o r alleged v i o l a t i o n s of Montana's Water P o l l u t i o n A c t , T i t l e 69, Chapter 48, R.C.M. 1947. The C i t y moved t o dismiss t h e complaint f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a c l a i m . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t granted summary judgment i n favor of t h e City. The S t a t e appeals. According t o t h e complaint, t h e S t a t e Department of Health and Environmental Sciences (Department) issued t h e C i t y a permit on November 21, 1973, which authorized a l i m i t e d d i s - charge of l i q u i d wastes from t h e C i t y ' s sewage treatment p l a n t i n t o t h e Yellowstone River. "Special conditions" of t h e permit required t h e C i t y t o immediately n o t i f y t h e Department and t h e f e d e r a l Environmental P r o t e c t i o n Agency (EPA) of any a c c i d e n t a l o r unplanned discharge o r d i v e r s i o n of wastes which would tend t o v i o l a t e t h e conditions of t h e permit. The complaint f u r t h e r a l l e g e s t h a t on o r about September 6 , 1974, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e Department and t h e EPA observed a bypass of raw sewage from t h e C i t y ' s sewage treatment p l a n t i n t o t h e Yellowstone River. The C i t y d i d not n o t i f y t h e Department o r t h e EPA as required by its permit. The complaint s t a t e s t h e Department issued a compliance order which it served on t h e c i t y c l e r k of Livingston. The com- p l i a n c e order was issued pursuant t o s e c t i o n 69-4820.1(2), R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , and ordered t h e C i t y t o submit t o t h e Department within f i f t e e n days an eight-point r e p o r t r e l a t i n g t o t h e cause of t h e bypass and t h e c o r r e c t i v e and preventive measures taken by t h e City. The C i t y f a i l e d t o respond t o t h e compliance order. The complaint a s s e r t e d two v i o l a t i o n s of Montana's Water P o l l u t i o n A c t by t h e City: (1) f a i l u r e t o immediately n o t i f y t h e Department and t h e EPA of t h e sewage bypass i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 69-4806(3), R.C.M. 1947, and ( 2 ) f a i l u r e t o r e p l y t o t h e Department's compliance order i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 69- 4820.1(2), R.C.M. 1947. The complaint seeks a c i v i l penalty of $3,000 and a c o u r t order d i r e c t i n g t h e C i t y t o maintain f u l l compliance with a l l terms and conditions of i t s permit. The C i t y f i l e d a motion t o dismiss t h e complaint f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a claim on which r e l i e f can be granted. The motion was submitted f o r d e c i s i o n on b r i e f s . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t entered an order s t a t i n g i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " * * * it appearing t o t h e Court t h a t t h e Complaint f a i l s t o s t a t e a claim upon which r e l i e f can be granted and t h a t t h e r e is no genuine i s s u e as t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t ; "IT I S H E R E B Y ORDERED t h a t Judgment be entered i n favor of Defendant, C i t y of Livingston * * *." The S t a t e appeals. The u l t i m a t e i s s u e on appeal i s whether summary judgment was properly granted. This t u r n s on two underlying questions: (1) Does t h e complaint s t a t e a claim on which r e l i e f can be granted? (2) Can summary judgment be granted on a motion t o d i s - m i s s t h e complaint f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a claim? I n its f i r s t claim f o r r e l i e f , t h e S t a t e a l l e g e s t h a t agents of t h e Department and t h e EPA observed t h e bypass of r a w sewage from t h e C i t y ' s sewage treatment p l a n t i n t o t h e Yellowstone River and t h a t t h e C i t y d i d n o t "immediately n o t i f y " t h e Depart- ment and t h e EPA of such bypass a s required by its permit. Assum- ing t h a t t h e s e a l l e g a t i o n s a r e t r u e , is t h e S t a t e e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f ? W e think n o t , and so hold. The Department had a c t u a l n o t i c e of t h e bypass. Telephone o r w r i t t e n n o t i c e by t h e C i t y under t h e s e circumstances would have been a u s e l e s s g e s t u r e . Section 49-124, R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s : "The law n e i t h e r does nor r e q u i r e s i d l e a c t s . " N o claim f o r r e l i e f on t h i s b a s i s i s s t a t e d . I n i t s second claim f o r r e l i e f , t h e S t a t e a l l e g e s i s s u - ance of an appropriate compliance order i n accordance with s e c t i o n 69-4820.1(2), R.C.M. 1947; personal s e r v i c e thereof on t h e c i t y c l e r k of Livingston pursuant t o s e c t i o n 69-4820(1), R.C.M. 1947; and f a i l u r e of t h e C i t y t o r e p l y t h e r e t o within f i f t e e n days a s required by t h e compliance order. The C i t y contends t h e s e r v i c e of t h e compliance o r d e r was d e f e c t i v e i n t h a t personal s e r v i c e on t h e C i t y could only be accomplished by personal s e r v i c e on t h e Mayor under p r i n c i p l e s of common l a w and Rule 4 , M.R.Civ.P. I n our view, t h e c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e does n o t r e q u i r e s e r v i c e on t h e mayor. Service may be made on any agent of t h e City, e i t h e r personally o r by mail a s s t a t e d i n s e c t i o n 69-4820(1), R.C.M. 1947: "When t h e department has reason t o believe t h a t a v i o l a t i o n of t h i s chapter o r a r u l e made under it has occurred, it may have w r i t t e n n o t i c e served personally o r by mail on t h e a l l e g e d v i o l a t o r o r h i s aqent. The n o t i c e s h a l l s t a t e t h e provision a l l e g e d t o be v i o l a t e d , t h e f a c t s a l l e g e d t o con- s t i t u t e t h e v i o l a t i o n , t h e n a t u r e of c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n which t h e department r e q u i r e s , and t h e t i m e within which t h e a c t i o n is t o be taken. For t h e purposes of t h i s chapter, s e r v i c e by mail i s com- p l e t e on t h e d a t e of mailing." (Emphasis supplied.) The express provisions of t h i s s p e c i a l s t a t u t e r e l a t i n g t o s e r v i c e under t h e Montana Water P o l l u t i o n A c t c o n t r o l over general s t a t u t e s r e l a t i n g t o s e r v i c e of process i n a c i v i l a c t i o n upon a municipal- i t y under Rule 4 , M.R.Civ.P., t o t h e e x t e n t of any inconsistency. Teamsters e t a l . v. Montana Liquor Control Board, 155 Mont. 300, 421 P.2d 541; I n r e Stevenson's E s t a t e , 87 Mont. 486, 289 P. 566. The same can be s a i d of s t a t u t o r y enactments vis-a-vis i n c o n s i s t e n t common law p r i n c i p l e s . W e t h e r e f o r e hold t h a t s e r v i c e of t h e compliance o r d e r on t h e City was l e g a l l y made, and a claim f o r r e l i e f a g a i n s t t h e C i t y f o r v i o l a t i o n thereof was s t a t e d i n t h e complaint. The second i s s u e concerns whether e n t r y of summary judgment i n favor of t h e C i t y was c o r r e c t . Here summary judgment was based on t h e complaint alone. Nothing o u t s i d e t h e bare a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e complaint was before t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t t r e a t e d t h e C i t y ' s motion t o dismiss under Rule 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) , M.R.Civ.P., a s a motion f o r summary judg- ment under Rule 5 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., without n o t i c e thereof t o t h e S t a t e . This was e r r o r . The treatment of a motion t o dismiss as a motion f o r summary judgment is governed by Rule 1 2 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., which provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " * * * I f , on a motion a s s e r t i n g t h e defense numbered (6) t o dismiss f o r f a i l u r e of t h e pleading t o s t a t e a claim upon which r e l i e f can be granted, matters o u t s i d e t h e pleadings a r e presented t o and not excluded by t h e c o u r t , t h e motion s h a l l be t r e a t e d a s one f o r summary judg- ment and disposed of a s provided i n Rule 56, and a l l p a r t i e s s h a l l be qiven reasonable oppor- t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t a l l m a t e r i a l made p e r t i n e n t t o such motion by Rule 56. " (Emphasis supplied. ) Here, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t r e a t e d t h e C i t y ' s motion t o dismiss f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a claim as a motion f o r summary judgment without n o t i c e and without affording t h e S t a t e a reason- a b l e opportunity t o oppose it. The S t a t e was n o t "given reason- a b l e opportunity t o p r e s e n t a l l material p e r t i n e n t t o such motion by Rule 56" a s required by Rule 1 2 (b) , M.R.Civ.P. The r a t i o n a l e supporting t h i s requirement has been s t a t e d i n t h i s language: " A s soon a s a motion t o dismiss under Rule 12 (b) (6) i s converted i n t o a motion f o r summary judgment, t h e requirements of Rule 56 become operable. It is important t h a t t h e c o u r t g i v e t h e p a r t i e s n o t i c e of t h e changed s t a t u s of t h e motion and a 'reasonable opportunity t o present a l l m a t e r i a l made p e r t i n e n t t o such motion by Rule 56.' I n t h i s way no one w i l l be taken by s u r p r i s e by t h e conversion. Once t h e proceeding becomes one f o r summary judgment, t h e moving p a r t y ' s burden changes and he i s obliged t o demonstrate t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s no genuine i s s u e a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h a t he i s e n t i t l e d t o a judgment a s a matter of law." 5 Wright & Miller, Federal P r a c t i c e & Procedure: C i v i l § 1366, p. 683. This i d e n t i c a l r a t i o n a l e i s expressed i n t h e advisory committee n o t e s t o t h e 1 9 4 8 amendment t o Federal Rule of C i v i l Procedure 12 ( b ) , from which Montana ' s r u l e i s modeled. Thus it was e r r o r f o r t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o g r a n t summary judgment t o t h e C i t y without a f f o r d i n g t h e S t a t e n o t i c e and a reasonable o p p o r t u n i t y t o be heard. W e v a c a t e t h e summary judgment h e r e i n and remand t h i s c a s e t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r f u r t h e r proceedings. J u s t i c e ' J u s t i c e s