Case Title: STATE v SMITH

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1978-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13860 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1978 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -VS- L E O N A R D SMITH, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable James M. Salansky, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: A s t l e and A s t l e , K a l i s p e l l , Montana David A s t l e argued, K a l i s p e l l , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Brenda J. G i l m e r , A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana P a t r i c k Springer, County Attorney, K a l i s p e l l , Montana Stewart A. Pearce, I1 argued, Deputy County Attorney, K a l i s p e l l , Mont MAR 2 ? 1978 M r . Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court : Defendant Leonard Smith was charged by Information with the offenses of attempted sexual intercourse without consent upon a minor female, a felony, in violation of sectiors94-4-103 and 94-5-503(3), R.C.M. 1947, and sexual assault upon a minor female, a felony, in violation of section 94-5-502(1), R.C.M. 1947. Defendant appeals from the judgment of the District Court, Flathead County, entered pursuant t o the verdict of the jury, convicting him of both offenses. On July 10, 1976, the prosecutrix, a juvenile 15 years of age, was asked by defendant's wife t o babysit a t defendant's residence i n Kalispell, Montana. The prosecutrix arrived a t approximately 7:00 p.m., accompanied by an 1 1 year old g i r l friend. Shortly thereafter, defendant and a companion, Dennis Pruttis, arrived a t the residence. Although defendant and Pruttis i n i t i a l l y planned t o proceed to the bar where defendant's wife was employed, they remained a t defendant's residence and drank beer. The prosecutrix also admitted drinking an amount of beer. A t various times i n the evening, defendant and the prosecutrix danced with and kissed each other. The prosecutrix and Pruttis t e s t i f i e d that, while dancing, defendant forced the prosecutrix to the floor, pulled down her pants and, while restraining her, unsuccessfully attempted sexual intercourse. Both witnesses t e s t i f i e d the act was forceful, and against the w i l l of the prosecutrix. Defendant t e s t i f i e d the sexual contact was encouraged by the dress and behavior of the prosecutrix and was, a t a l l times, with her consent. A t t r i a l , defendant raised the defense that he reasonably believed the prosecutrix t o be above the age of 16, as a bar t o statutory l i a b i l i t y under section 9 4 - 5 - 5 0 2 ~ ( ~ ) , R.C.M. 1947. A t the close of testimony, the jury was instructed defendant was required t o prove the defense of reasonable belief of age by a preponderance of the evidence, and that forced nonconsent was only an issue i f defendant sustained the advanced defense. The jury found defendant did not reasonably believe the prosecutrix was above the age of 16, and returned verdicts convicting defendant of both offenses . The narrow issue on appeal is: Did the District Court e r r in instructing the jury that defendant had the burden of proving the defense of reasonable belief of age by a preponderance of the evidence? Defendant contends the instruction given by the t r i a l court concerning the defense of reasonable belief of age improperly placed the burden of both asserting and proving the defense upon defendant. Rather, it i s maintained a defendant charged with the crime of sexual intercourse without consent upon a minor, need only advance the defense, and raise a reasonable doubt regarding the issue of reasonable belief of age. W e disagree with t h i s contention. The disputed instruction states, i n part: I t * * * you are instructed that under Montana law that i n t h i s case criminality being dependent on [the prose- cutrix] having been less than 16 years old on the 10th day of July, 1976, it i s a defense for t h i s defendant t o prove that he reasonably believed [the prosecutrix] t o be above 16 years old a t the time of the commission of the alleged offense. "This burden of proof r e s t s solely upon the defendant, and must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. * * *I' P r i o r t o the adoption of the Montana Criminal Code of 1973, s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y was imposed upon a defendant upon proof of a sex crime committed by him upon a female under the age of 18. It was no defense f o r the defendant t o prove he believed the g i r l t o be older, despite the reasonableness of such b e l i e f . S t a t e v. Reid, (1954), 127 Mont. 552, 267 P.2d 986; Sections 94-4101, 94-4106, R.C.M. 1947 (repealed January 1, 1974). A majority of s t a t e s do not recognize the defense of reasonable belief of age. Anno. 8 ALR3d L100,1102. However the Montana Criminal Code of 1973 expressly recognizes such a defense, patterned a f t e r Section 213.6 of the Model Penal Code. Section 94-5-506(1), R.C.M. 1947. The s t a t e s of Kentucky and Washington have a l s o ameliorated the usual operation of the s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y s t a t u t e s punishing s t a t u t o r y rape, through enactment of the statutory defense. Ky. Rev.Stat.Ann. $ 5 500.070, 510.030; Wash.Rev.Code Ann. 59.79.160(2). The defense is available i n California, not by s t a t u t e , but by j u d i c i a l recognition. People v. Hernandez, (1964), 39 Cal.Rptr.361, 393 P.2d 673. The s t a t u t e recognizing the defense i n Montana, section 94-5-506(1), R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s i n pertinent part: "(1) When criminality depends on the victim being l e s s than sixteen (16) years old, it is a defense f o r the offender t o prove t h a t he reasonably be- lieved the child t o be above t h a t age. * * *" The United States Supreme Court, i n the 1977 case of Patterson v. N e w York, 432 U.S. 197,209, 97 S.Ct. 2319,2326, 53 L ed 2d 281, recognizes t h e t r a d i t i o n a l power of the s t a t e s t o define criminal conduct and recognize exculpatory circum- stances and, i n so doing, t o require a defendant t o prove he f a l l s within the purview of such circumstances. S p e c i f i c i a l l y regarding ameliorative o r exculpatory defenses derived from t h e Model Penal Code, including the defense of reasonable belief of age, the Court stated: "* * * I f the State nevertheless chooses t o recognize a factor that mitigates the degree of criminality o r punishment, w e think the State may assure i t s e l f that the f a c t has been established with reasonable certainty. To recognize a t a l l a mitigating circumstance does not require the State t o prove i t s nonexistence i n each case i n which the fact is put i n issue, i f i n i t s judg- ment t h i s would be too cumbersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate." 432 U.S. 209. Here, there i s no question that the s t a t e was required t o and did i n fact prove every element of the offenses charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. The s t a t e therefore satisfied the constitutional mandate that it prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary t o constitute the crime with which defendant was charged. In r e Winship, (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L ed 2d 368; Mullaney v. Wilbur, (1975), 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L ed 2d 508. The jury was duly instructed i n accordance with the s t a t u t e giving r i s e t o the exculpatory defense of reasonable belief of age. The evidence clearly failed t o convince the jury defendant had established the defense. Further, w e find the burden of proof of the defense placed on defendant i n t h i s case , i.e. by a preponderance of the evidence, t o be entirely reasonable. The Montana legislature, i n revising the criminal code, provided the existence of the defense of reasonable belief of age, a defense not previously recognized. The s t a t e , i n such circumstances, retains the power t o assure that the facts constituting the defense be established with a reasonable degree of certainty. W e find no error i n the law a s presented by the given instruction i n t h i s case. The judgment of the d i s t W e Concur: Hon. L. Gulbrandson, ~istricf Court Judge, sitting.