Case Title: Commonwealth v. Barbosa

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11720

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-08-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11720 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JASON BARBOSA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 10, 2017. - August 25, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Hines, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Joint Enterprise.  Evidence, Joint venturer, Expert 
opinion, Hearsay, Spontaneous utterance, Opinion.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Opening statement, 
Argument by prosecutor, Assistance of counsel, Indictment. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 23, 2012. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Charles J. Hely, J., and 
the case was tried before Christine M. McEvoy, J. 
 
 
 
Patricia A. DeJuneas for the defendant. 
 
Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney (Patrick M. 
Haggan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  On February 23, 2012, Anthony Depina was shot 
and killed outside a bar in the Roxbury section of Boston.  The 
defendant, Jason Barbosa, was indicted on the charges of murder 
                     
 
1 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case and authored this opinion prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
in the first degree and unlawful possession of a firearm as an 
armed career criminal2.  The Commonwealth proceeded against him 
on the theory of deliberate premeditation.  Specifically, the 
Commonwealth's theory at trial was that the shooting was 
committed as part of a joint venture wherein the defendant was a 
knowing participant, either as the shooter or as an accomplice.  
The jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree, 
and did not specify whether they found the defendant guilty as a 
principal or as a joint venturer. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the Commonwealth 
presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction as 
both the shooter and as a knowing participant with shared intent 
to kill; (2) the judge abused her discretion in admitting 
prejudicial gang evidence; (3) the prosecutor's opening 
statement and closing argument were improper; (4) the judge 
allowed inadmissible statements, which unfairly bolstered the 
Commonwealth's theory of gang retaliation and allowed improper 
interpretive testimony; (5) trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel; and (6) the motion judge erroneously 
denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictments.  We 
affirm the conviction and decline to grant relief pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
                     
 
2 Prior to trial, the Commonwealth entered a nolle prosequi 
as to the firearm charge. 
3 
 
 
Background.  We recite the relevant facts the jury could 
have found.  We reserve certain details of the evidence 
presented to the grand jury for later discussion of the 
defendant's motion to dismiss.  The defendant and the victim had 
ties to rival Cape Verdean gangs.  The defendant was a member of 
the Woodward Avenue gang, and the victim was associated with the 
Wendover Street gang.  Although the groups were aligned at one 
point, around 2005, the relationship between them deteriorated 
and they became involved in an ongoing feud active through 
February, 2012, when the victim was murdered. 
 
On December 24, 2011, the defendant and two other members 
of the Woodward Avenue gang, Kenneth Lopes and Manuel Montrond, 
were involved in an altercation with several members of the 
Wendover Street gang, including the gang's leader, at a gasoline 
station in Boston.  The defendant and Lopes were injured during 
the altercation, but neither cooperated with the police 
investigation. 
 
Two months later, on February 23, 2012, around 9:30 P.M., 
the defendant, who was on probation and wearing a global 
positioning system (GPS) tracking bracelet, and Montrond arrived 
at a bar near the intersection of Burrell Street and Norfolk 
Avenue in Roxbury in a black Cadillac CTS rented by Montrond.  
Minutes later, Lopes alighted from a different vehicle.  
Montrond signaled Lopes by flashing his headlights twice.  The 
4 
 
three men entered the bar.3  The actions of the defendant, 
Montrond, and Lopes were captured by the bar's eleven video 
surveillance cameras.  The cameras inside the bar were 
continuously recording, while the cameras outside the bar were 
motion-activated.  Analysis of the time stamp on the video 
surveillance and the defendant's GPS data4 revealed that the time 
stamp on the video recordings was approximately four minutes and 
thirty seconds fast.  Other actions that were relevant were 
tracked by the coordinates of the GPS and involved streets that 
were near the bar. 
 
Once inside the bar, the men socialized with the 
defendant's ex-girl friend, and her cousin.  A few minutes after 
the men arrived, Montrond left the bar and went outside to sit 
in the Cadillac.  The victim walked by and waved at Montrond on 
his way into the bar. 
 
Although the bar is located in territory claimed by 
Woodward Avenue gang members, members of the Wendover Street 
gang, including the victim, also patronized the bar.  The 
defendant and the victim grew up together and were friends when 
                     
 
3 Montrond and Lopes were mentioned by name at trial as 
possible joint venturers.  However, it appears that neither man 
was ever charged in connection with the murder. 
 
 
4 A representative from the Department of Probation, which 
administered the defendant's GPS monitoring, testified that the 
time stamp on the GPS data points use the atomic clock, which is 
more accurate than the time stamp from the bar's video 
surveillance footage. 
5 
 
they were younger, but their relationship changed when the 
defendant, who had been affiliated with the Wendover Street 
gang, began to associate with members of the Woodward Avenue 
gang.  Despite the change in their relationship, when the victim 
arrived at the bar just before 10 P.M. with Maria Teixeira, the 
victim greeted the defendant with a handshake and then walked to 
the end of the bar. 
 
The defendant and the victim each left the bar at different 
times and returned without incident, including when the 
defendant was in Montrond's vehicle while the victim walked by. 
 
At one point, however, the defendant left the bar and drove 
around, returning to the area of the bar at around 10:20 P.M., 
and then drove to Woodward Avenue.  The defendant returned to 
Burrell Street and walked toward the bar.  The victim and 
Teixeira left the bar just before 10:30 P.M. and stopped by the 
victim's home before leaving again.  Meanwhile, the defendant 
appeared to be searching the area; he walked down Burrell 
Street, where the victim's vehicle had been parked, and then 
turned around, returning to his vehicle and driving to Albion 
Street, where Teixeira lived.  At around 10:45 P.M., the 
defendant returned to the area of Burrell Street and Norfolk 
Avenue, followed by Montrond's rented black Cadillac.  The 
defendant alighted from a small, dark-colored sport utility 
vehicle (SUV) and went inside the bar.  A black Cadillac 
6 
 
followed the vehicle the defendant had been in.  Once inside the 
bar, the defendant looked around the interior of the 
establishment, searching the bar area, pool room, lounge, and 
bathroom before leaving less than a minute after arriving. 
 
At around 11 P.M., the victim and Teixeira returned to the 
area of Burrell Street and Norfolk Avenue near the bar.  The 
victim previously had made plans with Joseph Rosa, a member of 
the Wendover Street gang, and two women to meet at the bar for 
drinks.  The victim and Teixeira arrived in the victim's vehicle 
and parked on Burrell Street, with the driver's side of the 
vehicle next to the sidewalk, near a dark alley.  Although the 
plan was to go have drinks at the bar, the people the victim was 
meeting decided not to go inside.  Instead, the victim and 
Teixeira walked over to Rosa's vehicle and spoke with the 
occupants through the passenger-side window while standing on 
the sidewalk.  While the group was talking, the defendant pulled 
up driving a small black SUV, and stopped alongside Rosa's 
vehicle.  The defendant said something to the effect of, "You 
don't belong here."   The victim said something back to the 
defendant, and the defendant quickly drove away, followed by the 
black Cadillac. 
 
As a result of the interaction with the defendant, Rosa and 
one of the women encouraged the victim to leave, but he refused, 
insisting that he was a "tough kid" and that no one could tell 
7 
 
him where he can go.  Rosa and the two women left.  The victim 
and Teixeira went back to the bar, intending to have a drink.  
Teixeira went inside the bar to use the bathroom; the victim 
stayed outside and smoked a cigarette.  The defendant drove past 
the bar slowly in the small black SUV.  As the defendant drove 
by, the victim stood by the front door of the bar and pointed at 
the defendant. 
 
Seconds later, the victim went inside the bar; he first 
went to the bathroom and then waited for Teixeira at the bar, 
declining a drink.  When Teixeira joined him at the bar, he told 
her that he had changed his mind and wanted to leave.  The 
victim did not tell Teixeira why he had changed his mind and 
appeared normal, but a little "mad."  As the victim and Teixeira 
left the bar and walked to his vehicle, they had a conversation 
about the earlier interaction with the defendant at Rosa's 
vehicle.  As Teixeira and the victim approached his vehicle, 
headlights from a vehicle up the street flashed four times.  The 
victim looked toward the street.  Teixeira heard him use the 
defendant's nickname and say, "Are you for real, Little J?"  
Teixeira looked down the street and saw an individual walking in 
the middle of the street, but she could not see the individual's 
face.5  Immediately thereafter, another individual fired multiple 
                     
 
5 On cross-examination, Teixeira noted that the individual 
appeared to be male, with short braids.  The defendant had 
8 
 
gunshots at the victim from the nearby alley.6  The victim was 
shot in the head and torso, and he fell to the ground, face up, 
in between the driver's side door of his vehicle and the curb. 
 
At or about the time of the shooting, which was 
approximately 11:10:43 P.M., the defendant's GPS data points7 
established that at 11:10:05 P.M., he was located on Burrell 
Street, near Batchelder Street, traveling zero miles per hour.  
At 11:10:36 P.M., the defendant was on Burrell Street headed 
toward Norfolk Avenue, near the bar, traveling two miles per 
hour.  There was a missing data point directly after the murder, 
which should have recorded at 11:11:06 P.M.  Seconds after the 
shooting, the dark-colored SUV drove down Burrell Street, turned 
right on Norfolk Avenue, and then took another right onto 
Marshfield Street.8  At that time, 11:11:35 P.M., the defendant's 
GPS coordinates show him traveling on Marshfield Street at 
                                                                  
short, braided hair.  She also acknowledged that she did not see 
a gun in the individual's hands. 
 
 
6 Teixeira testified that she did not see another individual 
besides the person in the middle of the street and that the 
shots rang out within a second of the victim's statement, "Are 
you for real, Little J." 
 
 
7 A GPS data point with the defendant's location was to be 
recorded every thirty seconds and included information about his 
location and speed and the strength of the GPS signal; the 
location information is accurate to within fifteen feet. 
 
 
8 A neighbor who lived on Norfolk Street near the bar 
testified that he heard gunshots at around 11 P.M. that night 
and then saw a black "SUV-type car" driving "way too fast" on 
Norfolk Avenue. 
9 
 
thirty-eight miles per hour.  Minutes after the shooting, the 
defendant returned to a house on Woodward Avenue.9 
 
After Teixeira heard the gunshots, she ran across the 
street and back inside the bar.  Although Teixeira saw the 
victim go down, she did not realize he had been shot when she 
fled the gunfire.  As she re-entered the bar, Teixeira kept 
saying "shots fired, shots fired."  Eventually, she went back 
outside to discover the victim's body, lying face-up between his 
vehicle and the curb.  The bartender telephoned 911. 
 
When police officers arrived at around 11:15 P.M., Teixeira 
was hysterical.  Officers had to physically restrain her as well 
as hold her upright because she was distraught, screaming, and 
crying.  She was transported to Boston police headquarters.  On 
the way, she stated, "They're going to kill me for this."  In 
the interview room at the police station, she was still so 
emotionally upset that she became physically ill.  Shortly 
thereafter, she was asked some questions.  She stated, "These 
people want to kill people because of the fucking street."  
After she identified the victim, Teixeira announced, "I'm going 
to die for this.  I'm going to tell you anyway."  In response to 
the detective's question "Who shot?," Teixeira replied, "Little 
J, Jason." 
                     
 
9 The house was a "clubhouse" and hang out spot for Woodward 
Avenue gang members. 
10 
 
 
The victim suffered gunshots wounds to the head and torso, 
both of which were independently fatal and caused his death 
within seconds.  Although ballistics evidence was recovered from 
the victim's body and the crime scene, analysis was inconclusive 
as to whether the bullet fragments were fired from the same 
weapon.  The shell casings were identified as nine millimeter 
Lugar caliber and were fired from the same semiautomatic pistol.  
No firearm was recovered in connection with the victim's 
shooting. 
 
As part of the investigation, detectives sought to identify 
and locate the Cadillac that Montrond had rented and the small 
black SUV the defendant was driving on the night of the 
shooting.  The small black SUV was never located.  Although the 
rental contract on the Cadillac was set to end on February 29, 
2012, Montrond returned the vehicle the day after the shooting, 
canceled the contract, and established a new rental contract for 
a 2012 Buick Lacrosse.10 
 
Two days after the shooting, the defendant and Montrond 
were stopped by police, who seized the defendant's cellular 
telephone.  Pursuant to a search warrant, detectives searched 
                     
 
10 A representative of the rental company testified that 
this situation was unusual.  Generally where a customer is 
unhappy with a rental car, the company merely switches out that 
vehicle without closing the rental contract and notes the 
customer-service issue, rather than establish a new rental 
contract.  The representative also confirmed that there were no 
mechanical issues or damage to the Cadillac. 
11 
 
the defendant's cellular telephone and telephone records.  The 
telephone records established that approximately two minutes 
before the shooting, the defendant telephoned one of the leaders 
of the Woodward Avenue gang, and that approximately one minute 
after the shooting, at 11:12 P.M., the defendant made a 
telephone call to another leader of the Woodward Avenue gang.   
Between 11:13 P.M. and 11:20 P.M., the defendant received a 
telephone call from Lopes, made an outgoing call to Montrond, 
and received another incoming call from Lopes. 
 
The defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty at 
the close of the Commonwealth's case, which was denied.  The 
judge also denied the defendant's renewed motion for a required 
finding of not guilty at the close of all evidence. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The 
defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his 
conviction.  Specifically, he argues that because the jury 
returned a general verdict, and the Commonwealth proceeded on 
mutually exclusive theories of joint venture liability, his 
conviction must be reversed where the Commonwealth failed to 
present sufficient evidence to prove that he was both the 
shooter and a knowing participant with the shared intent to 
kill, beyond a reasonable doubt.  In support of his argument, 
the defendant's relies on Commonwealth v. Akara, 465 Mass. 245, 
254-256 (2013), for the proposition that where the Commonwealth 
12 
 
proceeds on mutually exclusive theories of joint venture, it 
must prove the sufficiency of the evidence as to each theory.  
We disagree. 
 
The rule we apply in analyzing the sufficiency of the 
evidence was articulated in Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 
449, 468 (2009): 
"we will examine whether the evidence is sufficient to 
permit a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant knowingly participated in the 
commission of the crime charged, with the intent required 
to commit the crime, rather than examine the sufficiency of 
the evidence separately as to principal and joint venture 
liability." 
 
As we noted in Akara, 465 Mass. at 254, the circumstances of 
that case were "unusual," such that we departed from our 
traditional analysis under Zanetti, supra.  In Akara, supra at 
254-255, two defendants were tried jointly, but the evidence 
presented did not support the conclusion that both defendants 
could have fired the weapon.  Paradoxically, the strongest 
evidence against each defendant was that he knowingly 
participated in the charged crime by pulling the trigger.  Id. 
at 254.  Given the unique factual circumstances of the case, 
this court considered "whether the evidence, . . . in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, support[ed] the conclusion 
that each defendant, although not the shooter, participated in 
and shared the requisite intent to commit the crime" to ensure 
that each conviction was legally supportable.  Id. 
13 
 
 
This case, however, does not call for such a departure from 
Zanetti.  Although the defendant correctly notes that here, as 
in Akara, the Commonwealth proceeded on mutually exclusive 
theories of joint venture (e.g., the defendant as the shooter 
and as a coventurer), there was no codefendant upon whose 
actions the defendant's conviction relies.  See Akara, 465 Mass. 
at 254.  Thus, the Commonwealth's burden here is to demonstrate 
that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, supported the conclusion that the defendant 
"knowingly participated in the commission of the crime charged, 
alone or with others, with the intent required for that 
offense," Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 468, rather than prove each 
"theory" separately. 
 
"In order to have committed murder in the first degree with 
deliberate premeditation, a defendant must have had or shared an 
'intent to kill or cause death,' [Commonwealth v. Norris, 462 
Mass. 131, 139 (2012)], which was the 'product of "cool 
reflection."'"  Commonwealth v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 430, 434-435 
(2015), quoting Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 455.  "In evaluating 
whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support these 
elements, we 'view the evidence presented in the Commonwealth's 
case-in-chief in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth 
and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  
14 
 
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 475 Mass. 396, 407 (2016), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Simpkins, 470 Mass. 458, 461 (2015).  
"[C]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt[, and t]o the extent that conflicting 
inferences may be drawn from the evidence, it is for the jury to 
decide which version to credit" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 113 (2010), cert. 
denied, 565 U.S. 1013 (2011), S.C., 474 Mass. 1008 (2016). 
 
From the evidence, a reasonable jury could have found that 
the defendant was motivated by anger at the ongoing feud between 
the Woodward Avenue gang and the Wendover Street gang, 
especially after the altercation at the gasoline station between 
the defendant, Lopes, and Montrond, and members of the Wendover 
Street gang, which occurred two months prior to the murder, 
resulted in the injury to the defendant and Lopes.  The jury 
also could have found that the defendant's threat, "You don't 
belong here," was evidence of his motivation to kill because the 
victim, an associate of the Wendover Street gang, was present in 
Woodward Avenue gang "territory." 
 
Based on the surveillance footage from the interior and 
exterior of the bar and the defendant's GPS data, the jury also 
could have found that after the defendant left the bar the first 
time, he began stalking the victim, thus demonstrating his 
knowing participation and shared intent to commit the 
15 
 
premeditated murder.  See Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 455.  
Specifically, the defendant traveled to the area near the bar 
around 10:20 P.M., before returning to Woodward Avenue.  
Approximately ten minutes later, after the victim and Teixeira 
left the bar, the defendant walked to Burrell Street where the 
victim had been parked and then turned around.  Thereafter, the 
defendant drove to Albion Street, where Teixeira lived, and 
later returned to the bar and searched for the victim at 10:45 
P.M.  At around 11 P.M., the defendant threatened the victim, 
stating, "You don't belong here," and approximately eight 
minutes later, he slowly drove by the bar where the victim was 
smoking a cigarette outside.  This interaction made the victim 
change his plan of getting a drink at the bar, and instead he 
insisted that he and Teixeira leave the bar.  Finally, a 
vehicle's headlights flashed four times signaling the victim's 
arrival at his vehicle. 
 
The inference of the defendant's participation in the joint 
venture is even stronger based on the victim's statement as he 
approached his vehicle, "Are you for real, Little J?," and 
Teixeira's observation of a man in the middle of the street with 
short braided hair, which matched the description of the 
defendant.  Also, the defendant's GPS data places him walking on 
Burrell Street, near the victim's vehicle, at or about the time 
16 
 
of the murder.  Seconds later, gunshots rang out from the alley, 
killing the victim. 
 
The defendant's flight from the scene less than a minute 
after the shooting, traveling thirty-eight miles per hour on 
Marshfield Street and eventually arriving on Woodward Avenue, 
and telephone calls with his suspected coventurers immediately 
before the shooting and in the thirty minutes after, allow the 
reasonable inference of the defendant's participation in and 
shared intent to commit the murder.  See Miranda, 458 Mass. at 
113; Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 455. 
 
Therefore, the jury could reasonably have found that the 
defendant knowingly participated in the premeditated murder, 
with the requisite shared intent.  See Zanetti, supra at 468. 
 
2.  Gang opinion testimony.  The judge conducted a voir 
dire to assess -- and to allow the defendant to challenge -- the 
foundation for the opinions of the Commonwealth's gang expert, 
Detective Martin O'Malley.  At trial, the jury heard about 
O'Malley's background and experience with Cape Verdean gangs.  
The defendant contends that the judge abused her discretion in 
allowing this testimony, both because O'Malley was not qualified 
and because his testimony was based on inadmissible hearsay.  
The Commonwealth argues that the evidence was properly admitted 
to prove motive, and was based on the qualified expert's 
personal knowledge.  There was no error. 
17 
 
 
Expert opinion testimony "must rest on a proper basis, else 
inadmissible evidence might enter in the guise of expert 
opinion."  Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 803 (1996). 
Proper bases include facts within the witness's direct personal 
knowledge, or unadmitted but independently admissible evidence.  
See Mass. G. Evid. § 703 (2017); Department of Youth Servs. v. A 
Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516, 531 (1986).  Here, O'Malley's extensive 
experience with Cape Verdean gangs generally, and with the 
victim and defendant specifically, qualified him as an expert 
and provided direct personal knowledge for the testimony he 
offered.  O'Malley served as lead investigator from the Boston 
police department in an approximately two-year joint 
investigation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation into 
Woodward Avenue gang members, which concluded in January, 2013.  
Before that, he was a patrolman in the Dorchester section of 
Boston for seven years, and assigned to the youth violence 
strike force gang unit for another two.  In both capacities, 
O'Malley logged countless conversations with Cape Verdean 
residents -- including concerned citizens, cultivated 
informants, and admitted gang members -- and from these 
interactions, he made determinations of gang affiliation.  He 
testified to individual affiliations within the Woodward Avenue 
and Wendover Street gangs; to the territorial reach of each 
gang; and to the history of the gangs as aligned until about 
18 
 
2005, when a split gave rise to a feud active at the time of the 
victim's death.  O'Malley knew the victim since about 2005, and 
had observed him with Wendover Street gang associates and at the 
addresses of the gang's headquarters on several occasions.  He 
was similarly familiar with the defendant, whom he had observed 
wearing Woodward Avenue gang colors and in the presence of 
Woodward Avenue gang leaders on multiple occasions.  O'Malley 
also testified that the defendant had left the Wendover Street 
gang for the Woodward Avenue gang in 2006 and that, as a result, 
animosity remained between the defendant and a leader of the 
Wendover Street gang. 
 
O'Malley's testimony, based on his personal knowledge, was 
admissible.  Mass. G. Evid. § 703.  See Commonwealth v. Smith, 
450 Mass. 395, 399, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 893 (2008) (rejecting 
hearsay challenge to officer's gang opinion testimony based on 
"use of informants, street sources of information, the school 
police, teachers, probation officers, enemies," where officer 
had personal familiarity with victim, defendant, and their 
respective gangs). 
 
The Commonwealth's theory was that there was a joint 
venture motivated by this ongoing rivalry between the Woodward 
Avenue and Wendover Street gangs.  Evidence of the defendant's 
affiliation with the Woodward Avenue gang was probative of 
motive, and provided necessary context for the defendant's 
19 
 
statement to the victim ("You don't belong here").  See 
Commonwealth v. Correa, 437 Mass. 197, 201 (2002) ("[W]here 
evidence of gang affiliation is relevant to the defendant's 
motive, it is within the discretion of the judge to weigh the 
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial 
effect"). 
 
Moreover, the judge took precautions to minimize any 
prejudicial impact of the gang opinion testimony.  She conducted 
individual voir dire with each juror, using three agreed-upon 
questions to confirm the juror's capacity to consider the 
evidence only for its limited purpose.  Each time the evidence 
was introduced, it was accompanied by a thorough limiting 
instruction, which was repeated in the final charge.  Especially 
where the judge carefully cabined properly admitted testimony 
with limiting instructions, voir dire, and exclusion of any 
references to prior acts of gang-related violence, admitting 
that testimony in evidence was not an error.  See Smith, 450 
Mass. at 400, and cases cited. 
 
3.  Prosecutor's opening statement and closing argument.  
The defendant argues that the prosecutor's opening statement and 
closing argument, to which the defendant did not object, were 
improper.  "Although not dispositive, we consider the fact that 
the defendant did not object to the statements at trial as 'some 
indication that the tone [and] manner . . . of the now 
20 
 
challenged aspects of the prosecutor's argument were not 
unfairly prejudicial.'"  Commonwealth v. Lyons, 426 Mass. 466, 
471 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 380 
(1995).  We conclude that there was no error. 
 
"The proper function of an opening is to outline in a 
general way the nature of the case which the counsel expects to 
be able to prove or support by evidence."  Commonwealth v. 
Croken, 432 Mass. 266, 268 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Fazio, 375 Mass. 451, 454 (1978).  "[A] claim of improper 
[opening statement] by the prosecutor must be judged in light of 
the entire [statement], the judge's instructions to the jury, 
and the evidence actually introduced at trial."  Commonwealth v. 
Jones, 439 Mass. 249, 260-261 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Thomas, 429 Mass. 146, 158 (1999).  Here, the defendant argues 
that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jury's emotions 
by reminding them that they saw where the shooter emerged from 
the alley during the view of the crime scene, and by using 
phrases such as "killing team" and "stalking and hunting," 
during his opening statement.  The prosecutor's statements were 
not improper, as they were merely "enthusiastic rhetoric."  See 
Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434 Mass. 570, 586 (2001).  Moreover, 
"to the degree the recitation of the evidence was inflammatory, 
that was inherent in the odious . . . nature of the crime[] 
committed" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 429 
21 
 
Mass. 745, 749 (1999).  The jury were properly instructed before 
the opening statements, and in the final charge, that the 
statements were not evidence. 
 
Similarly, "[c]losing arguments must be viewed 'in the 
context of the entire argument, and in light of the judge's 
instruction to the jury, and the evidence at trial.'"  
Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 328-329 (2007), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 533, 553 (1990).  The 
defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the 
jury's emotions when he encouraged the jurors to use their 
recollections of the view to evaluate the evidence.  He also 
claims that the prosecutor used improper forceful rhetoric in 
describing the victim's murder and the defendant's actions and 
that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he asked the 
jurors to hold the defendant accountable for his actions. 
 
The prosecutor properly encouraged the jury to use their 
observations from the view to evaluate the evidence and aid in 
reaching their verdict.  See Commonwealth v. Corliss, 470 Mass. 
443, 448 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 
199 (2011) ("[a]lthough what is seen on the view may be used by 
the jury in reaching their verdict, in a 'strict and narrow 
sense a view may be thought not to be evidence'").  Similarly, 
the prosecutor's forceful rhetoric was based on the evidence 
without focusing on any unnecessarily emotional or inflammatory 
22 
 
aspects of the evidence.  See Lyons, 426 Mass. at 472.  
Moreover, the prosecutor's description of the victim's murder 
was based on the evidence and was relevant to establish the 
nature of the crime.  See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 405 Mass. 
369, 376 (1989), quoting Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 
521 (1987) ("Although this line of argument may evoke sympathy 
for the victim[], the argument went to the issues in the case 
and was 'based on what the jury saw and heard'").  The judge 
instructed the jury prior to the arguments and in the final 
charge that closing statements were not evidence, and 
specifically instructed the jury to "not decide this case in any 
way based on sympathy towards the victim or the victim's family 
or any sympathy towards the defendant."  The prosecutor's 
statement reminding the jury that the victim's murder occurred 
nearly two years prior to the trial and that the time for the 
defendant's accountability is now, was not improper.  Although 
the statement regarding the defendant's accountability was 
better left unsaid, "[t]he prosecutor's remarks were 
characteristic of 'enthusiastic rhetoric, strong advocacy, and 
excusable hyperbole,' and did not cross the line between fair 
and improper argument."  Lyons, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Sanna, 424 Mass. 92, 107 (1997).  Contrast Commonwealth v. 
Torres, 437 Mass. 460, 464-465 (2002) (improper argument where 
prosecutor asked jury to "answer the call for justice and hold 
23 
 
[the defendant] accountable for what he did").  The prosecutor's 
statement "falls within the category of permissible rhetoric and 
. . . there was no error."  Commonwealth v. Mejia, 463 Mass. 
243, 255 (2012). 
 
The defendant claims that the prosecutor also improperly 
encouraged the jurors to use evidence that Montrond returned the 
rented Cadillac the day after the murder as evidence of the 
defendant's participation in the joint venture.  We do not 
agree.  The prosecutor was entitled to argue inferences from the 
evidence that are favorable to the Commonwealth's case.  See 
Lyons, 426 Mass. at 472.  The jury reasonably could infer that 
in order to cover up his participation in the joint venture, 
Montrond returned the Cadillac the day after the murder, before 
the end of his rental contract.  The jury could further infer 
the defendant's knowing participation based on his presence in 
the Cadillac that evening and the surveillance footage depicting 
the Cadillac following the defendant's vehicle on multiple 
occasions that evening.  See id. 
 
Finally, the defendant's argument that the prosecutor 
improperly suggested that the jury's job was "easier" because 
they could find the defendant guilty of joint venture without 
determining whether he was the shooter or a coventurer is 
without merit.  The prosecutor correctly stated the law of joint 
venture and the Commonwealth's burden.  See Commonwealth v. 
24 
 
Deane, 458 Mass. 43, 50-51 (2010) ("the Commonwealth is not 
required to prove exactly how a joint venturer participated in 
the murder[], . . . or which of the [coventurers] did the actual 
killing" [citation omitted]). 
 
4.  Evidentiary rulings.  The defendant argues that the 
judge committed reversible error in (1) allowing inadmissible 
statements that unfairly bolstered the Commonwealth's theory of 
gang retaliation and (2) allowing improper "interpretive" 
testimony from the lead homicide detective.  We address these 
arguments in turn. 
 
a.  Statements by the victim's friends.  The defendant 
challenges the admission of statements from Rosa and one of the 
women who were with him that night describing their concern for 
the victim after the defendant's statement, "You don't belong 
here."  The admission of the statements was not improper, as 
they were not admitted for their truth and, thus, not hearsay.  
See Mass. G. Evid. § 801 (2017).  The judge noted that the 
witnesses' statements were admissible "to put in context" the 
victim's statement of intent to go inside the bar and have a 
drink.  There was no error or abuse of discretion in admitting 
these statements.  See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 
n.27 (2014). 
 
b.  Teixeira's statements.  The defendant challenges three 
of Teixeira's statements, made after she discovered that the 
25 
 
victim had been murdered, admitted under the excited or 
spontaneous utterance hearsay exception through the testimony of 
a police officer.  As Teixeira was being transported to Boston 
police headquarters, she exclaimed, "They're going to kill me 
for this."  Thereafter, while she was waiting to be interviewed 
by homicide detectives, Teixeira stated, "These people want to 
kill people because of the fucking street."  And during her 
interview with homicide detectives, Teixeira said, "I'm going to 
die for this."  There was no error. 
 
A statement is "[a] spontaneous utterance if (A) there is 
an occurrence or event sufficiently startling to render 
inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the 
observer, and (B) the declarant's statement was a spontaneous 
reaction to the occurrence or event and not the result of 
reflective thought."  Mass. G. Evid. § 803(2) (2017).  See 
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 437 Mass. 620, 623 (2002).  "[T]here 
can be no definite and fixed time limit [between the incident 
and the statement].  Each case must depend upon its own 
circumstances."  Mass. G. Evid. § 803(2) note, quoting 
Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 364 Mass. 211, 223 (1973).  "[T]he 
nexus between the statement and the event that produced it is 
but one of many factors to consider in determining whether the 
declarant was, in fact, under the sway of the exciting event 
when she made the statement."  Santiago, supra at 625.  A trial 
26 
 
judge's determination that an utterance meets the test of 
admissibility should be given deference and "only in clear cases 
. . . of an improper exercise of discretion should [the judge's] 
ruling be revised" (citation omitted).  McLaughlin, supra. 
 
Here, the Commonwealth used Teixeira's statements to 
support its theory that the victim's murder was motivated by the 
ongoing feud between the Wendover Street and Woodward Avenue 
gangs and by retaliation for the defendant's and Lopes's 
injuries from the December, 2011, altercation with a leader of 
the Wendover Street gang.  Her statements occurred after she 
discovered the body of the victim, whom she had been seeing 
romantically, after he had been shot to death.  Teixeira was 
hysterical.  Prior to her first challenged statement, she was 
found by police lying on the sidewalk screaming and crying.  
Officers had to physically restrain Teixeira from returning to 
the victim's body and hold her up so that she did not collapse, 
as she was unable to stand on her own.  Based on her behavior 
and body language, it was plain that her presence during the 
victim's shooting and the discovery of his body was a 
sufficiently startling event.  See Commonwealth v. Irene, 462 
Mass. 600, 607, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 968 (2012) ("We have 
viewed the circumstances of being shot, or witnessing a 
shooting, as sufficiently startling to impede normal reflective 
thought processes").  Additionally, just prior to Teixeira's 
27 
 
statements at police headquarters, she was so emotional that she 
became physically ill.  Teixeira's emotional demeanor and 
physical illness shortly after the victim's murder and the 
discovery of his body are sufficient to demonstrate that 
Teixeira's statements were "a spontaneous reaction to the 
[victim's murder] and not the result of reflective thought."  
Mass. G. Evid. § 803(2).  "Because both criteria of the 
spontaneous utterance exception were satisfied, the testimony 
was admissible."  Irene, supra. 
 
c.  "Interpretive" testimony.  The defendant challenges the 
admission of the testimony of Detective Brian Black, one of the 
lead investigators on the case, on the ground that it was 
improper interpretive testimony that went beyond the bounds of 
proper lay witness testimony.  Because the defendant objected to 
Black's testimony, we review any error for prejudicial error.  
See Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 545 (2013). 
 
Here, Black testified regarding the approximately four 
minute and thirty second time discrepancy between the bar's 
video surveillance footage and the defendant's GPS data.  The 
judge allowed Black to review a compilation of the video 
surveillance footage side-by-side with the GPS data to help 
explain the investigative significance of the evidence when the 
time discrepancy is accounted for.  Black testified that he had 
assisted in the creation of the compilation, discerned the 
28 
 
extent of the time discrepancy between the video surveillance 
footage and the defendant's GPS data, and had detailed 
familiarity with the evidence.  His testimony properly assisted 
the jury in evaluating the evidence and understanding the time 
discrepancy.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 701 & note (2017).  Moreover, 
the defendant was not prejudiced by Black's testimony regarding 
the time discrepancy because the defendant's own witness gave 
similar testimony, opining that the time discrepancy was 
approximately four minutes and thirty-five seconds.  The 
defendant's witness also attempted to resolve the time 
discrepancy by synchronizing the bar's surveillance footage and 
the defendant's GPS data.  There was no error. 
 
5.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
argues that trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective 
assistance in failing to present evidence that would have 
countered the Commonwealth's theory of gang retaliation.  
Specifically, the defendant asserts that trial counsel should 
have "offered or directed the jury's attention to" (1) a Boston 
police memorandum detailing the December 24, 2011, altercation, 
which included a nonexhaustive list of active Wendover Street 
gang and Woodward Avenue gang associates, and which failed to 
list the victim as a Wendover Street gang associate; (2) the 
voir dire testimony of the victim's sister that he was an 
"associate," not a member, of the Wendover Street gang; and (3) 
29 
 
the defendant's GPS data and cellular telephone evidence that 
would counter the Commonwealth's theory that the defendant had 
been stalking or searching for the victim. 
 
"Where, as here, the defendant has been convicted of murder 
in the first degree, we review his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel to determine whether the alleged lapse 
created a 'substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice,' 
a standard more favorable to the defendant than the 
constitutional standard otherwise applied under Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974)."  Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 
477 Mass. 20, 29 (2017), quoting Wright, 411 Mass. at 681-682.  
"We focus more broadly on whether there was error and, if so, 
whether any such error 'was likely to have influenced the jury's 
conclusion.'"  Fulgiam, supra, quoting Wright, supra.  "The 
burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that something 
inappropriate was likely to have unfairly influenced the jury's 
verdict."  Commonwealth v. Painten, 429 Mass. 536, 550 (1999). 
 
Here, the defendant argues that counsel's failure to direct 
the jury's attention to the aforementioned pieces of evidence or 
seek their admission likely influenced the jury's verdict.  We 
disagree.  The defendant failed to establish how admission of 
the police memorandum and the testimony of the victim's sister 
that the victim was not a full-fledged member of the Wendover 
Street gang would have countered the Commonwealth's theory of 
30 
 
gang retaliation.  See id.  The Commonwealth provided evidence 
that the victim was an "associate" of the Wendover Street gang 
and that he had a friendship with a leader of that gang, who was 
involved in the December 24, 2011, altercation with the 
defendant, Lopes, and Montrond.  Similarly, evidence that the 
defendant traveled in the same area prior to seeing the victim 
at the bar does not counter the reasonable inference that after 
the defendant left the bar, having seen the victim, the 
defendant was searching the area for the victim as part of a 
joint venture to commit premeditated murder.  See id.  The 
defendant's assertion that trial counsel was ineffective is 
unavailing. 
 
6.  Motion to dismiss indictments.  The defendant argues 
that the motion judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss 
indictments, pursuant to Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 
160, 161-163 (1982), because the Commonwealth failed to 
establish probable cause to believe that the defendant committed 
the victim's murder.  This argument has no merit. 
 
"Probable cause to sustain an indictment is a decidedly low 
standard."  Commonwealth v. Hanright, 466 Mass. 303, 311 (2013).  
"[A]t the very least the grand jury must hear sufficient 
evidence to establish the identity of the accused, . . . and 
probable cause to arrest him" (citation omitted).  McCarthy, 385 
Mass. at 163.  "Probable cause has been defined as 'reasonably 
31 
 
trustworthy information . . . sufficient to warrant a prudent 
man in believing that the defendant had committed or was 
committing an offense.'"  Hanright, supra at 311-312, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Stevens, 362 Mass. 20, 26 (1972).  "Where, as 
here, the liability of a joint venturer is at issue, the 
Commonwealth must present the grand jury with evidence that the 
defendant both participated in, and shared the requisite mental 
state for, each crime charged."  Hanright, supra at 312.  When 
reviewing the sufficiency of an indictment, the grand jury 
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. Moran, 453 Mass 880, 885 
(2009). 
 
Here, the Commonwealth presented to the grand jury 
sufficient evidence to sustain an indictment for the murder in 
the first degree of the victim as part of a joint venture.  The 
evidence established that the defendant, Lopes, and Montrond 
were at the bar on the night of the murder.  Video surveillance 
footage from the bar established that the SUV driven by the 
defendant and the Cadillac driven by Montrond were circling the 
area of the bar that night.  Thirty minutes before the shooting, 
the defendant searched the bar.  Prior to the shooting, the 
defendant told the victim he should not be in the area before 
speeding off, which made some of the victim's friends concerned.  
Despite Rosa's suggestion otherwise, the victim decided to go 
32 
 
into the bar and have a drink.  The victim changed his mind 
after smoking a cigarette outside the bar and decided to leave.  
The victim told Teixeira about the defendant's threat as they 
were walking toward the victim's vehicle and confirmed that the 
defendant was the person who made the threat.  Teixeira saw a 
man with braids, who she identified as the defendant, walking 
toward the vehicle and heard the victim say something like, "You 
gonna do me like this, J?" before the victim was shot.  Finally, 
the defendant's GPS data placed him within fifteen feet of the 
victim at or about the time of the shooting.  Based on the 
evidence presented to the grand jury, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, there was probable cause to 
believe that the defendant knowingly participated and shared in 
the intent to commit the premeditated murder of the victim.  See 
Hanright, 466 Mass. at 312. 
 
7.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After a full 
review of the trial record, we affirm the conviction and decline 
to grant extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.