Case Title: State v. Williams

Citation: 2004-Ohio-4747

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Williams, 103 Ohio St.3d 112, 2004-Ohio-4747.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. WILLIAMS, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Williams, 103 Ohio St.3d 112, 2004-Ohio-4747.] 
Criminal law – Sentencing – Death penalty – Resentencing after reversal or 
vacating of death penalty — R.C. 2929.06(B) applies prospectively only – 
Death penalty not available option for resentencing on remand for 
offenses committed before October 16, 1996. 
(No. 1999-1218 – Submitted June 29, 2004 – Decided September 22, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County, No. CR97-2268. 
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 
________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Because the Revised Code is silent as to whether current R.C. 2929.06(B) applies 
retroactively, it applies only prospectively.  Therefore, current R.C. 
2929.06 is inapplicable for resentencing an offender whose offenses 
occurred prior to the statute’s effective date of October 16, 1996.  Rather, 
the law in effect at the time of the offenses applies. 
_________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶1} 
For the December 1995 rape and murder of Catrise Gregory, 
defendant-appellant, Shawn C. Williams, was tried by jury, convicted of 
aggravated murder with a rape-murder capital specification, and sentenced to 
death.  He appealed the judgment to this court as a matter of right. 
{¶2} 
On September 3, 2003, we affirmed Williams’s convictions but 
found reversible error in the penalty phase of his trial.  See State v. Williams, 99 
Ohio St.3d 493, 2003-Ohio-4396, 794 N.E.2d 27.  Accordingly, we vacated 
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Williams’s death sentence and remanded the cause to the trial court for 
resentencing pursuant to current R.C. 2929.06, which provides: 
{¶3} 
“(B) If the sentence of death that is imposed upon an offender is 
vacated upon appeal because of error that occurred in the sentencing phase of the 
trial and if division (A) of this section does not apply, the trial court * * * shall 
conduct a new hearing to resentence the offender.  If the offender was tried by a 
jury, the trial court shall impanel a new jury for the hearing. * * * At the hearing, 
the court shall follow the procedure set forth in [R.C. 2929.03(D)] in determining 
whether to impose upon the offender a sentence of death, life imprisonment 
without parole, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty-five 
full years of imprisonment, or life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 
serving thirty full years of imprisonment.” 
{¶4} 
At the time Williams raped and murdered Gregory, however, this 
version of R.C. 2929.06 was not yet in effect, and the then current version did not 
permit impaneling a new jury to reconsider imposing a death sentence after the 
original death sentence was vacated for penalty-phase error.  See 146 Ohio Laws, 
Part IV, 7820; State v. Penix (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 369, 513 N.E.2d 744.  
Williams moved this court for reconsideration, arguing that current R.C. 2929.06 
is inapplicable because he committed his crime before the statute’s October 16, 
1996 amendment permitting the impaneling of a new jury and the reimposition of 
the death sentence.  See 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10548, adding subsection R.C. 
2929.06(A)(2), now (B).  Moreover, he asserted that the prior version of R.C. 
2929.06 controls, and thus he cannot be resentenced to death. 
{¶5} 
On December 8, 2003, we granted Williams’s motion for 
reconsideration and ordered briefing on the following question: “Following 
remand and a new penalty hearing, may a sentence of death be imposed upon the 
appellant under the current version of R.C. 2929.06, or does the version of R.C. 
2929.06 in effect at the time of the offense, which would preclude a death 
January Term, 2004 
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sentence, apply upon remand of this case?”  State v. Williams, 100 Ohio St.3d 
1525, 2003-Ohio-6510, 800 N.E.2d 43. 
{¶6} 
We now hold that current R.C. 2929.06 does not apply 
retroactively, and therefore the version of R.C. 2929.06 in effect at the time of 
Williams’s offenses applies upon remand. 
{¶7} 
A statute is retroactive if it penalizes conduct that occurred before 
its enactment.  Retroactivity is unconstitutional if it “ ‘takes away or impairs 
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a 
new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations 
already past.’ ”  Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 
106, 522 N.E.2d 489, quoting Cincinnati v. Seasongood (1889), 46 Ohio St. 296, 
303, 21 N.E. 630. 
{¶8} 
R.C. 1.48 provides: “A statute is presumed to be prospective in its 
operation unless expressly made retrospective.”  Thus, a statute may not be 
applied retroactively unless the court finds a “clearly expressed legislative intent” 
that the statute so apply.  State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 410, 700 
N.E.2d 570. 
{¶9} 
Because the Revised Code is silent as to whether current R.C. 
2929.06(B) applies retroactively, it applies only prospectively.  Therefore, current 
R.C. 2929.06 is inapplicable for resentencing an offender whose offenses 
occurred prior to the statute’s effective date of October 16, 1996.  Rather, the law 
in effect at the time of the offenses applies. 
{¶10} Nonetheless, amicus curiae the Franklin County Prosecuting 
Attorney invites us to overrule Penix, 32 Ohio St.3d 369, 513 N.E.2d 744, and 
hold that former R.C. 2929.06 would permit imposition of the death penalty upon 
remand.  We decline. 
{¶11} We recently held that a prior decision may be properly overruled 
“where (1) the decision was wrongly decided at that time, or changes in 
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circumstances no longer justify continued adherence to the decision, (2) the 
decision defies practical workability, and (3) abandoning the precedent would not 
create an undue hardship for those who have relied upon it.”  Westfield Ins. Co. v. 
Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, paragraph one 
of the syllabus.  In light of this standard, we conclude that Penix cannot be 
properly overruled because, counter to amicus’s arguments, it was not improperly 
decided and it does not defy practical workability. 
{¶12} To support its argument that Penix was improperly decided, 
amicus cites Mast v. Doctor’s Hosp. North (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 539, 75 O.O.2d 
556, 350 N.E.2d 429, in which we interpreted App.R. 12(D) to permit “retrial of 
only those issues, claims or defenses the original trial of which resulted in 
prejudicial error, and to allow issues tried free from error to stand.”  Id. at 541, 75 
O.O.2d 556, 350 N.E.2d 429.  Unlike Penix, however, Mast did not involve a 
statute that specifically required the acquiescence of a trial jury in order to impose 
particular consequences on the defendant.  Therefore, we reject amicus’s 
argument that reimposition of a death sentence on remand is authorized by App.R. 
12(D). 
{¶13} Amicus also asserts that Penix was wrongly decided because R.C. 
2953.07(A) permits an appellate court to reverse a criminal judgment in part and 
to remand for the sole purpose of correcting an improperly imposed sentence.  
Penix, however, does not contradict R.C. 2953.07.  Rather, Penix states that, in a 
capital case tried by jury, correction of the sentence on remand may not be 
accomplished by impaneling a new jury with the power to impose a new death 
sentence, because R.C. 2929.03 reserves that power to the trial jury.  Id., 32 Ohio 
St.3d at 372, 513 N.E.2d 744.  Therefore, we reject amicus’s argument that 
reimposition of the death penalty on remand is authorized by R.C. 2953.07(A). 
{¶14} Even were we persuaded that the Penix rule is unsound, the 
decision does not defy practical workability.  Penix has created no confusion in 
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the courts of Ohio, we fully explained our rationale, and it did not depart from 
precedent.  Cf. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, 
at ¶ 51.  Neither has Penix spawned a complex body of law characterized by “a 
patchwork of exceptions and limitations.”  Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-
Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, at ¶ 57.  Its application is straightforward and its 
scope is clear: reimposition of the death penalty on remand is precluded in capital 
cases in which the defendant’s aggravated-murder conviction has been affirmed, 
but the death sentence has been vacated on the ground of penalty-phase error.  
This simple rule applies to all cases in which the capital crime was committed 
before October 16, 1996, the effective date of the amendment to R.C. 2929.06 that 
permitted the death sentence to be reimposed on remand. 
{¶15} We reaffirm Penix, and we hold that current R.C. 2929.06(B) may 
be applied prospectively only.  Further, we remand this cause to the trial court for 
resentencing pursuant to the law that existed at the time of Williams’s offenses.  
Accordingly, on remand the trial court shall, pursuant to former R.C. 2929.06(B), 
conduct a new sentencing hearing and choose from the life-sentencing options 
available in December 1995: life with parole eligibility after 20 full years or life 
with parole eligibility after 30 full years. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and CELEBREZZE, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
 
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE JR., J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for 
O’DONNELL, J. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶16} I reluctantly agree with the ultimate conclusion reached by the 
majority but do not concur in its reasoning.  Therefore, I concur in judgment only 
and do not join in the syllabus paragraph. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶17} My perception of the issue raised by this case starts with the view 
that the syllabus of State v. Penix (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 369, 513 N.E.2d 744, was 
wrongly decided.  I find persuasive the dissenting opinion of Justice Robert 
Holmes in Penix, who reasoned that neither R.C. 2929.03 nor 2929.06, as they 
then existed, prohibited the state from seeking the death penalty upon remand 
when the original death sentence was vacated due to penalty-phase error.  See id. 
at 375-379, 513 N.E.2d 744 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
{¶18} Current R.C. 2929.06(B), effective October 16, 1996, as amended, 
now explicitly reflects the position of Justice Holmes that the death penalty 
should be available in this situation.  See 1996 Sub.S.B. No. 258, 146 Ohio Laws, 
Part VI, 10539, 10548, 10554.  In amending the statute, the General Assembly did 
not specify that it was to operate retroactively.  Neither did the General Assembly 
choose to specifically address the effect the amended statute had on Penix, 
although the holding of Penix was clearly abrogated. 
{¶19} Like the majority, I find that the General Assembly’s failure to 
specify within current R.C. 2929.06(B) that the statute operates retroactively leads 
to a presumption that the statute is prospective only and that the presumption has 
not been overcome in this case.  Unlike the majority, however, because I agree 
with Justice Holmes in his dissent that Penix is an inaccurate interpretation of 
prior law, I believe that a statutory amendment was not necessary to subject 
Williams to the death penalty on remand.  In different circumstances, I would 
support the overruling of Penix and its syllabus, and would therefore dissent from 
the majority’s holding, finding that Williams should be eligible to receive a death 
sentence on remand. 
{¶20} My chief reasons for not advocating the overruling of Penix 
involve two different passages of time.  Penix was decided in 1987 and continued 
to be fully valid until the General Assembly enacted current R.C. 2929.06(B) in 
1996.  If the General Assembly felt that Penix was wrongly decided, it could have 
January Term, 2004 
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acted more quickly than that to do away with it, instead of allowing the decision 
to control on the issue for approximately nine years.  Also, it would seem that if 
the General Assembly disagreed with the Penix court’s interpretation of prior law, 
it could have specified so somewhere within 1996 Sub.S.B. No. 258, as it has 
commented on past decisions of this court within other bills that have been 
reviewed by this court.  The failure to comment on Penix, considered along with 
the failure to explicitly make current R.C. 2929.06(B) retroactive, could easily be 
viewed as acquiescence by the General Assembly in its holding. 
{¶21} The second passage of time that affects my view of whether Penix 
should be overruled involves the almost eight years that have passed from the 
1996 amendment of R.C. 2929.06 until the issue now comes before us in this 
case.  It is apparent that R.C. 2929.06(B)’s reach is limited to a small number of 
cases, and for that reason it is not surprising that it has taken this long for the issue 
to be raised, especially given that death-penalty cases frequently progress at a 
very deliberate pace.  See State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 
776 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 218 (Resnick, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
Nevertheless, when these two time periods are added together, Penix has 
ostensibly survived for almost 17 years to apply to death-penalty cases in which 
the capital offense occurred prior to October 16, 1996.  I am loath to overrule 
settled law that has continued unquestioned for this length of time and that applies 
to such a limited number of cases, even if I believe that it was wrongly decided. 
{¶22} Because, like the majority, I conclude that Penix should not be 
overruled and so controls, I agree with the majority that on remand the trial court 
must choose from the sentencing options available when Williams committed his 
capital offense, in December 1995.  Life imprisonment without parole and life 
imprisonment with parole eligibility after 25 full years were not available as 
sentences for a capital case until R.C. 2929.03 was amended, effective July 1, 
1996 (1995 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136, 7454-7456, 7810, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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and 1996 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 269, 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10752, 10926-10927, 
11099), and so appellant is not eligible to receive either of those sentences.  See 
Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 220 (Resnick, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), citing State v. Madrigal (2000), 87 Ohio 
St.3d 378, 399, 721 N.E.2d 52, and State v. Raglin (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 253, 
259-260, 699 N.E.2d 482. 
{¶23} Since the death penalty was a sentencing option at the time 
Williams committed his capital offense, Madrigal and Raglin do not themselves 
prevent its imposition on remand in this case.  For that reason, if the General 
Assembly had expressly made current R.C. 2929.06(B) retroactive, those 
decisions would play no role in our inquiry into the constitutionality of the 
statute’s application to Williams.  Williams’s arguments in this regard, premised 
on this court’s possible acceptance of the state’s position that R.C. 2929.06(B) 
can be applied retroactively, strike me as less than convincing.  However, because 
this court has not accepted the state’s threshold proposition that the statute can be 
applied retroactively, there is no occasion to consider whether retroactive 
application would offend constitutional provisions. 
{¶24} For all the foregoing reasons, I concur in judgment only. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Craig T. Pearson, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Jeffrey M. Gamso and David L. Doughten, for appellant. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, Christopher 
D. Stock, Deputy Solicitor, and Matthew Chamberlain, Assistant Attorney 
General, for amicus curiae Attorney General of Ohio. 
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9 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 
Taylor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for amicus curiae Franklin County 
Prosecuting Attorney. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, Pamela J. Prude-Smithers and 
Siobhan R. Clovis, Assistant Public Defenders, for amicus curiae Ohio Public 
Defender. 
 
Michael J. Benza and Carrie L. Davis, for amicus curiae American Civil 
Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc. 
 
David C. Stebbins; Law Office of S. Adele Shank and S. Adele Shank, for 
amicus curiae Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
__________________