Case Title: STATE v FINLEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-07-12T00:00:00Z

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No. 13358 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- JOHN LeROY FINLEY, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, Honorable Gordon R . Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Small, Cummins and Hatch, Helena, Montana Gregory A. Jackson argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Charles Graveley, County Attorney, argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: May 11, 1977 Decided: JUL f 2 1 ! 3 n Clerk M r . Chief J u s t i c e Paul G. Hatfield delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant John Leroy Finley appeals from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t court,Lewis and Clark County, of conviction f o r d r i v i n g a motor v e h i c l e upon t h e highways while under t h e influence of intoxicating liquor. O n t h e n i g h t of January 18, 1976, defendant's wife l e f t t h e i r family home a f t e r an argument with defendant. Defendant drove h i s automobile on t h e c i t y s t r e e t s of Helena, Montana, i n an attempt t o l o c a t e h i s wife. When defendant's wife discovered defendant w a s driving t h e family c a r , she telephoned t h e Helena c i t y p o l i c e and reported defendant was d r i v i n g while intoxicated. The p o l i c e responded t o t h e c a l l , stopped defendant as he w a s returning t o h i s house, concluded he w a s indeed d r i v i n g while intoxicated, and placed him under a r r e s t f o r t h e offense of driv- ing a motor vehicle, while under t h e influence of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r . The a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r s , according t o uncontroverted testimony a t t r i a l , then advised defendant of h i s Miranda r i g h t s , took him i n t o custody, and transported him t o t h e Helena c i t y jail. From t h e t i m e defendant entered t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n t o t h e t i m e he w a s placed i n a j a i l c e l l , h i s words and a c t i o n s w e r e recorded on an audio-video t a p e recording. Defendant d i d not give h i s consent t o t h e recording; nor d i d t h e p o l i c e inform him they were audio-video taping h i s a c t i o n s and speech. Defendant, who had two previous d r i v i n g under t h e i n f l u - ence convictions, w a s charged under s e c t i o n 32-2142(d), R.C.M. 1947, and arraigned i n d i s t r i c t court, L e w i s and Clark County. Defendant, i n a p r e t r i a l motion, moved t o exclude t h e audio-video tape recording from admission i n t o evidence a t t r i a l . The d i s - t r i c t c o u r t denied defendant's motion and a t t r i a l admitted t h e tape i n t o evidence, over defendant's objections, t o a i d t h e jury i n understanding t h e testimony of eyewitnesses. A t least s i x p o l i c e o f f i c e r s and employees observed defendant while he w a s audio-video taped, and t h r e e of those witnesses t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l . A s i x person jury found defendant g u i l t y a s charged. Defendant w a s t h e r e a f t e r sentenced t o one year i n Montana S t a t e Prison. Defendant appealed h i s conviction, contending t h a t p o l i c e use of audio-video t a p e recording without h i s consent, and ad- mission of t h e t a p e i n t o evidence a t t r i a l , v i o l a t e s t h e s e con- s t i t u t i o n a l l y protected r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s : 1. The p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t self-incrimination, protected by t h e F i f t h Amendment, United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , and by A r t . 11, Section 25, 1972 Montana Constitution. 2 . The r i g h t t o not be deprived of l i b e r t y without due process of law, recognized i n t h e Fourteenth Amendment, United S t a t e s Constitution, and i n A r t . 11, Section 17, 1972 Montana Constitution. 3. The r i g h t t o be secure from unreasonable searches and s e i z u r e s , guaranteed by t h e Fourth Amendment, United S t a t e s Con- s t i t u t i o n , and A r t . 11, Section 11, 1972 Montana Constitution. Defendant's primary contention is t h a t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y protected p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t self-incrimination was abridged when h i s words and a c t i o n s w e r e recorded on audio-video t a p e without h i s consent o r knowledge, and then submitted t o t h e jury as evi- dence a t t r i a l . Defendant claims t h e audio-video t a p e was in- criminating evidence obtained from him by compulsion, and must be supressed under t h e r u l e of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L ed 2d 694. Under t h e F i f t h Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s Consti- t u t i o n , and under t h e s u b s t a n t i a l l y i d e n t i c a l l y worded A r t . 11, Section 25, 1972 Montana Constitution, no person may be compelled t o t e s t i f y a g a i n s t himself i n a criminal proceeding. This Court has held the Montana constitutional guarantee of the privilege against self-incrimination affords no broader protection to an accused than does the Fifth Amendment. State v. Armstrong, Mont . , 552 P.2d 616, 33 St.Rep. 688. The opinions of the United States Supreme Court, therefore, delineate the maximum breadth of the privilege against self-incrimination in Montana. The Supreme Court has distinguished between testimonial compulsion and compulsion which does not force the accused to be a witness against himself, but merely requires him to be the source of real or physical evidence. Testimonial compulsion is proscribed by the Fifth Amendment and by Art. 11, Section 25, 1972 Montana constitution. The Court in Miranda stated that, to safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination, police must, prior to in- terrogation of a suspect in custody, inform the accused he has the right to remain silent; that anything he says may be used as evidence against him in court; that he has the right to consult a lawyer and have the lawyer present with him during the interro- gation; and, if he is indigent, he may obtain court appointed counsel. Without the Miranda warning or other equally effective measures, the person in custody would not be deemed to have in- telligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination, and any evidence of a testimonial nature obtained from the accused would be inadmissible at trial. The privilege against testimonial compulsion extends to the defendant's written and oral statements as well as to communicative gestures, such as a nod of the head in response to a question. "It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they might take * * *." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L ed 2d 908, 916. Real or objective evidence taken from the accused, how- ever, is not protected by Art. 11, Section 25, or by the Fifth Amendment. In Schmerber, results of a test for alcohol in blood taken from defendant despite his refusal to consent to the test, were admissible at trial and did not violate defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. The Court in Schmerber followed a long line of Supreme Court decisions when it held: " * * * The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling 'cornrnunications' or 'testimony', but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does not violate it." 16 L ed 2d 916. This Court, too, has long and consistently recognized that, while testimonial compulsion is constitutionally prohibited, the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to real or objective evidence. State v. Fuller, 34 Mont. 12, 85 P. 369; State v. Campbell, 146 Mont. 251, 405 P.2d 975; State ex rel. Sikora v. Dist. Ct., 154 Mont. 241, 462 P.2d 897. The crucial inquiry, therefore, is whether the audio-video taping of the speech and actions of defendant in the police station constituted con- stitutionally prohibited testimonial compulsion or whether his words and actions recorded on the tape were merely real, physical, or objective evidence. We hold that the audio-video taping in this case was ob- jective evidence and, therefore, outside the scope of Art. 11, Section 25 and Fifth Amendment protection. There is no evidence in the record which indicates the recording contained any speech or gesture of defendant which was testimonial in nature. The tape did not contain defendant's responses to interrogation by police. The audio-video tape was introduced into evidence not for the incriminating content of the words uttered by defendant, but as evidence helpful to the jury in understanding the testimony of the police officers and employees who observed defendant's unsteady walk and slurred speech in the police station. While t h i s Court has n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y r u l e d on t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of video t a p e s we now join o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s which have held, provided t h e proper foundation is l a i d , t h a t both motion pic- t u r e s and video t a p e s r e l e v a n t and m a t e r i a l t o contested i s s u e s may be admitted i n t o evidence i n t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge. See Annot., 62 ALR2d 686, 701-703 87. This i s a l o g i c a l extension of t h i s C o u r t ' s holdings t h a t sound recordings, S t a t e v. Warwick, 158 Mont. 531, 494 P.2d 627, and photographs, S t a t e v. Harney, 160 Mont. 55, 499 P.2d 802, may be admissible i n evidence. The d e c i s i o n s of c o u r t s i n s e v e r a l o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s support t h e holding t h a t t h e audio-video t a p e involved i n t h i s c a s e w a s o b j e c t i v e , r a t h e r than t e s t i m o n i a l evidence, and as such, d i d not i n f r i n g e defendant's p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n - crimination. I n Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506, 507, wherein t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of an audio-video t a p e of a defendant's murder confession was i n i s s u e , t h e Eighth C i r c u i t Court of Appeals s t a t e d : " A s t o whether t h e use of such t a p e comes danger- ously c l o s e t o r e q u i r i n g t h e defendant t o incrim- i n a t e himself, w e t h i n k t h i s no more incriminates him t h a t t h e taking of still p i c t u r e s o r blood o r u r i n e samples. Such procedure does not v i o l a t e t h e F i f t h Amendment. [Citing cases.] W e conclude t h a t a video t a p e incriminates t h e defendant only i f t h e statement i t s e l f i s incriminating. I f t h e proper foundation has been l a i d , t h e reception i n evidence of a video t a p e should a i d t h e trier of f a c t . " 456 F.2d 506. The c o u r t s of s e v e r a l s t a t e s have r u l e d on t h e p r e c i s e question of t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of motion p i c t u r e s , video t a p e s , and audio-video t a p e s of defendants who have been a r r e s t e d f o r d r i v i n g motor v e h i c l e s while under t h e influence of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r . The c o u r t s i n t h e following c a s e s held t h a t such t a p e s o r motion p i c t u r e s a r e o b j e c t i v e , r a t h e r than t e s t i m o n i a l evidence, and a r e admissible a t t r i a l without v i o l a t i n g defendants' p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t self-incrimination. S t a t e v. Fellows, 4 7 Ohio App.2d 154, 352 N.E.2d 631, 635 (video t a p e ) ; C i t y of Piqua v. Hinger, 15 Ohio St.2d 1 1 0 , 238 N.E.2d 766, c e r t . den., 393 U.S. 1 0 0 1 , 89 S.Ct. 484, 21 L ed 2d 466 (motion p i c t u r e s ) ; Thompson v. People, 181 Col. 1 9 4 , 510 P.2d 311, (video t a p e ) ; Lanford v. People, 159 Col. 36, 409 P.2d 829, (sound motion p i c t u r e s ) ; People v. Fenelon, 1 4 Ill.App.3d 622, 303 N.E.2d 38, (video t a p e ) ; S t a t e v. S t r i c k l a n d , 276 N.C. 253, 173 S.E.2d 129, (sound motion p i c t u r e s ) ; Carpenter v. S t a t e , 169 Tex. C r i m . App. 283, 333 S.W.2d 391, (motion p i c t u r e s ) ; Housewright v. S t a t e , 154 Tex. C r i m . App. 101, 225 S.W.2d 417 (motion p i c t u r e s ) . Only one s t a t e has r u l e d t h a t motion p i c t u r e s of a de- fendant who w a s a r r e s t e d on a d r i v i n g while under t h e influence of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r charge c o n s t i t u t e d t e s t i m o n i a l evidence. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals i n Spencer v. S t a t e , Okla. 4 0 4 P.2d 46, C r i m . App. 1965,/ruled t h a t Oklahoma's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t self-incrimination provision was broad enough t o p r o h i b i t use, a s evidence, of motion p i c t u r e s taken of t h e defendant with- o u t h i s knowledge. The c o u r t r e l i e d on Spencer a s a u t h o r i t y f o r its holdings i n two subsequent cases. R i t c h i e v. S t a t e , Okla. C r i m . App. 1966, 415 P.2d 176; Stewart v. S t a t e , Okla. C r i m . App. 1967, 435 P.2d 191. Other j u r i s d i c t i o n s , however, have expressly declined t o follow t h e reasoning of t h e Oklahoma c o u r t i n Spencer. S t a t e v. S t r i c k l a n d , 276 N.C. 253, 173 S.E.2d 129; S t a t e v. Faidley, 202 Kan. 517, 450 P.2d 20. I n a r e c e n t opinion, t h e Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals expressly overruled Spencer. Ross v. S t a t e , Okla. C r i m . App. 1976, 556 P.2d 638, 640, c i t i n g S t a t e v. Thomason, Okla. C r i m . App. 1975, 538 P.2d 1080. Because w e hold t h e audio-video t a p e of defendant i n t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n was o b j e c t i v e evidence, unprotected by defendant's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t self-incrimination, t h e holding i n Miranda is inapplicable t o t h e f a c t s of t h i s case. W e need not i n t h i s case, t h e r e f o r e , d i s c u s s whether t h e Miranda warning given by t h e p o l i c e t o defendant a t t h e t i m e of h i s a r r e s t would have s u f f i c e d t o s u s t a i n defendant's incriminating t e s t i m o n i a l statements made a t t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n and recorded without h i s knowledge. Defendant r a i s e d two o t h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s which he apparently abandoned, s i n c e he f a i l e d t o d i s c u s s them i n h i s b r i e f . W e s h a l l , however, d e a l with those i s s u e s i n t h i s opinion t o provide guidance i n f u t u r e appeals. Defendant s t a t e d t h e in- troduction of t h e audio-video t a p e i n t o evidence v i o l a t e d t h e due process and search and s e i z u r e c l a u s e s of t h e Montana and United S t a t e s Constitutions. The p r o t e c t i o n s of A r t . 11, Section 17 and A r t . 11, Section 11, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , a r e i d e n t i c a l t o t h o s e of t h e Fourteenth Amendment due process c l a u s e and t h e Fourth Amendment p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t unreasonable searches and s e i z u r e s , r e s p e c t i v e l y . For t h e reasons s t a t e d h e r e a f t e r , defendant's due process and search and s e i z u r e claims a r e without m e r i t . This Court has noted t h a t even where evidence obtained from a defendant is " r e a l " o r "objective" evidence, and t h u s out- s i d e t h e coverage of t h e F i f t h Amendment, " t h e manner i n which such evidence i s obtained must be c o n s i s t e n t with t h e require- ments of due process." S t a t e v. Campbell, 146 Mont. 251, 259, 405 P.2d 978, 983. H e r e , t h e procedure of audio-video taping defend- a n t w a s not " b r u t a l " o r "offensive" conduct s i m i l a r t o t h e f o r c i b l e opening of a defendant's mouth and t h e f o r c i b l e pumping of h i s stomach which "shocked t h e conscience" and v i o l a t e d t h e defend- a n t ' s due process r i g h t s i n Rochin v. C a l i f o r n i a , 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183. The audio-video taping of defendant was a l e s s e r personal invasion than t h e forced blood tests upheld by t h e Court i n Schmerber and i n Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L ed 2d 448, 452-53, where t h e Court s t a t e d : " * * * Modern community l i v i n g r e q u i r e s modern s c i e n t i f i c methods of crime d e t e c t i o n lest t h e public go unprotected * * * "As a g a i n s t t h e r i g h t of a n i n d i v i d u a l t h a t h i s person be held i n v i o l a b l e * * * must be s e t t h e i n t e r e s t s of s o c i e t y i n t h e s c i e n t i f i c determination of i n t o x i c a t i o n * * *. And t h e more so s i n c e t h e t e s t likewise may e s t a b l i s h innocence, thus afford- ing p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e treachery of judgment based on one o r more of t h e senses." Neither does defendant's Fourth Amendment r i g h t t o be secure from unreasonable searches and s e i z u r e s p r o t e c t him from having h i s words and a c t i o n s audio-video taped i n a p o l i c e sta- t i o n , a f t e r he had been a r r e s t e d . Although t h e Fourth Amendment may p r o t e c t what an indi- v i d u a l seeks t o preserve a s p r i v a t e , even when he is i n a public what place,/a person " * * * knowingly exposes t o t h e p u b l i c , even i n h i s own home o r o f f i c e , is not a s u b j e c t of Fourth Amendment p r o t e c t i o n . " Katz v. United S t a t e s , 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 1 9 L ed 2d 576, 582. Defendant i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e d i d not j u s t i f i a b l y r e l y on h i s privacy a s d i d t h e defendant i n Katz, whose conversations were recorded when he placed phone c a l l s i n a glass- enclosed telephone booth. Here defendant was i n a p o l i c e s t a t i o n where he knew p o l i c e o f f i c e r s and employees were observing h i s words and a c t i o n s . The United S t a t e s Supreme Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y upheld t h e use i n evidence of recorded conversations between defendants and t h e p o l i c e informants whom they mistakenly believed t o be compatriots. I n such c a s e s , defendants' misplaced confidences i n p o l i c e informants are not protected by t h e Fourth Amendment. United S t a t e s v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L ed 2d 453; Hoffa v. United S t a t e s , 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L ed 2d 374; Lopez v. United S t a t e s , 373 U.S. 427, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 10 L ed 2d 462. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , defendant d i d not t a l k and walk in the presence of police informants, but in the presence of police officers, while in the police station. Defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy to be protected by Art. 11, Section 11, 1972 Montana Constitution or by the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 4 i Chief Justice 3 We concur: .............................. Justices