Case Title: Edison v. Anderson

Citation: 208 Or. 470, 302 P.2d 561

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1956-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Reversed October 17, 1956.
*471 Ben Anderson argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Anderson, Franklin & Landye and James K. Navarra, all of Portland.
Orval N. Thompson argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Weatherford & Thompson, of Albany.
Before WARNER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, LUSK, BRAND, PERRY, and McALLISTER, Justices.
REVERSED.
ROSSMAN, J.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment, based upon a verdict, which the circuit court entered in favor of the defendant.
The action which culminated in the entry of the challenged judgment was instituted to recover damages for a personal injury which the complaint says the plaintiff sustained January 4, 1951, when an automobile in which she was riding collided with one operated by the defendant. The car in which the plaintiff was riding was driven by her husband and was owned by one James L. Tucker, who was also riding in it at the time of the mishap.
The plaintiff-appellant submits only one assignment of error. It charges that error was committed when the trial judge gave an instruction upon the subjects of joint adventure and imputed negligence. The instruction is too long to render convenient its quotation in full, but the following excerpts reveal its nature:
The plaintiff, her husband, and Mr. Tucker lived in the city of Coos Bay. The Edisons [plaintiff and her husband] owned no automobile, but Tucker had one. At Valley Junction, about 150 miles north of Coos Bay, Edison had some camping equipment which he wished to bring to Coos Bay. Tucker, upon discovering Edison's wishes, loaned him his car. So far as can be learned from the record, Tucker's act was one of friendship. When the trip was planned, Tucker decided to go along with Edison, evidently for the pleasure of the ride. The plaintiff, rather than be left alone at home, decided that she, too, would make the trip, especially in view of the fact that she had a sister at Nelscott with whom she could visit when the car passed through that place. February 3, 1951, the journey was undertaken. When Nelscott was reached, the plaintiff left the car and visited her sister. The two men continued to Valley Junction where they secured the equipment and when they returned to Nelscott the next day they and the plaintiff had dinner in the home of the plaintiff's sister, after which all three re-entered the car for the journey home. Sometime later the accident occurred. The record does not disclose whether the plaintiff or her husband paid for the gasoline consumed on the trip, nor does it indicate *474 whether or not other expenses were shared in any manner. If the plaintiff knew how to drive a car or was given any voice in the control of the one in which the three rode, the evidence does not reveal the fact.
1. Ordinarily, the negligence of the driver is not imputed to a mere guest. Andersen v. Southern Pacific Co., 165 Or 368, 106 P2d 1048. It will be seen that the challenged instruction imputed the husband's negligence to his wife by deeming the two as joint venturers.
The parties, in debating the validity of the challenged instruction, dwell upon Robison v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 90 Or 490, 176 P 594. That decision, which was announced in January of 1919, was concerned with a crossing accident which happened in the days when there were no parking problems and when cars did not travel upon the fine thoroughfares which have induced the motorists of this day to coin the term "superhighways," but had to contend with the ruts and other hazards of wagon roads  the latter term was used in the Robison decision. That opinion pioneered with the problem of applying the rules of joint adventure and imputed negligence, as developed in the horse and buggy days, to the more vexing questions which were arising out of the operation of motor vehicles. In performing that task, the court was confronted with such a dearth of decisional law arising out of the driving of motor cars that it was compelled to resort in part to cases which were based upon horse-drawn conveyances. The Robison decision forecast the fundamental principles which are today employed. Extensive experience with those rules in the succeeding years has enabled the courts to express them with more *475 clarity, precision and certainty. At the very outset, the decision declared:
Presently it pointed out the bases whereby, in occasional cases, the driver's negligence is imputed to his companion. It said:
It thought that a joint venture could be viewed as a partnership, and added that if the evidence indicates that "the terms of this so-called partnership provide that each party to it may control the vehicle or direct its movements," a finding of imputed negligence would be warranted.
Counsel in the case sub judice evidently failed to realize that since Robison v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., supra, was decided, this court had occasions to resolve other cases which were governed by the rules applicable to joint ventures and imputed negligence. At any rate, their briefs leave the recent decisions unmentioned.
Holzhauser v. Portland Traction Co., 178 Or 607, 169 P2d 127, in referring to the operator of the automobile involved in that case as "her son," declared:
After citing supporting authorities, the opinion quoted from a textbook the following:
In Bartholomew v. The Oregonian Publishing Co., 188 Or 407, 216 P2d 257, the plaintiff, a member of the Portland Police Bureau, was riding, at the time of the accident, in a city-owned police car which was being operated by another police officer, F.O. Hutchins. The defendant, driver of the car with which the police car collided, pleaded that (1) the officers were engaged in a joint enterprise, (2) Hutchins was negligent, and (3) Hutchins' alleged negligence was imputable to the plaintiff. In rejecting those contentions, the court accepted the following as the controlling principle of law:
*477 The decision explained:
The decision rejected the contention that since both occupants of the police car had the same employer, a conclusion of joint control was warranted. It concluded:
Prosser on Torts, 2d ed, expresses the same rule in a manner which stresses well the element of control. We quote from page 299:
Restatement of the Law, Torts, p 1273, § 491, employs substantially the same language as Prosser. It follows:
2. The negligence of a husband, if he is driving the car in which his wife is riding, is never imputed to his wife merely because the two are spouses. Southern Railway Co. v. Priester, 289 F 945; Bartlett v. Mitchell, 113 W Va 465, 168 SE 662; Brubaker v. Iowa County, 174 Wis 574, 183 NW 690. In the case last cited, husband and wife were moving to another city where the husband expected to teach and the wife to study.
3. It will be seen from the above authorities that, in order for a trip to constitute a joint enterprise, there must be, not only a community of interest in its purposes, but also a joint right of control over the vehicle. Other holdings, to like effect, are W.W. Clyde & Co. v. Dyess, 126 F2d 719; Murphy v. Keating, 204 Minn 269, 283 NW 389; Bowley v. Duca, 80 NH 548, 120 A 74. As we have said, community of interest does not suffice to impute negligence to the passenger. In Parker v. Ullom, 34 Colo 433, 271 P 187, the guest and the driver were on their way to a poker game when the accident happened. Since the guest had no right to participate in the control or operation of the car, the court held that the driver's negligence could not be imputed to him.
Accordingly, both community of interest and joint control are essential to a joint enterprise. If a defendant depends upon joint enterprise as the basis of imputing the driver's negligence to the passenger, community of interest and joint control must appear.
In Gregory v. Jenkins (Mo App), 43 SW2d 877, the *479 facts present many parallels to those before us. We quote from the decision as follows:
4, 5. The challenged instruction was in error. The facts upon which it was based did not establish a joint enterprise. The record wholly fails to indicate that the plaintiff had any voice in the control or management of the car. In any event, the challenged instruction was erroneous since it failed to mention the essential element of control. In construing and applying Robison v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., supra, one must consider our more recent holdings.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed.