Case Title: State of Alabama ex rel. Burkes v. Franklin

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC-2023-0496

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2024-03-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: March 8, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
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errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0496 
_________________________ 
 
State of Alabama ex rel. Frederick Burkes, Sr. 
 
v.  
 
James Franklin 
 
 
 
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court 
(CV-22-18.80) 
 
STEWART, Justice. 
 
 
SC-2023-0496 
2 
 
 
The State of Alabama, on the relation of Frederick Burkes, Sr., 
initiated a quo warranto action in the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial 
court") challenging Governor Kay Ivey's appointment of James Franklin 
to the office of constable for the District 59 election precinct in Jefferson 
County.  The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Franklin, which, 
for the reasons stated below, we affirm. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
Burkes defeated Franklin in the 2020 Democratic party primary for 
the office of constable for District 59 in Jefferson County, with a term of 
office beginning on January 18, 2021.  Burkes had no opposition in the 
general election, and he was declared and certified as the winner of the 
election on Friday, November 13, 2020.  Section 36-23-4, Ala. Code 1975, 
requires that, before entering the duties of his or her office, a constable 
must first give a bond in the amount of $1,000. 
On January 4, 2021, Burkes filed such a bond with the Jefferson 
Probate Court.  Also on January 4, 2021, Burkes was administered his 
oath of office by Jefferson Probate Judge James Naftel.  On January 6, 
2021, Franklin sent a letter to Judge Naftel asserting that Burkes's bond 
had not been timely filed because it had not been filed within 40 days of 
SC-2023-0496 
3 
 
the declaration of Burkes's election.   On January 8, 2021, Judge Naftel 
sent a letter to Governor Kay Ivey, stating, in pertinent part: 
"Under Ala[.] Code [1975,] § 11-2-3, the official bonds of 
all county officials (except for the judge of probate) are to be 
recorded in the office of the judge of probate.  This includes 
the official bonds of duly elected county Constables. 
 
"Alabama Code [1975,] § 36-5-2[,] provides that '[i]n all 
cases, official bonds must be filed in the proper office within 
40 days after the declaration of election ….'  Alabama Code 
[1975,] § 36-5-15[,] provides in turn that '[i]f any officer 
required by law to give bond fails to file the same within the 
time fixed by law, he vacates his office.  In such case, it is the 
duty of the officer in whose office such bond is required to be 
filed at once to certify such failure to the appointing power, 
and the vacancy must be filled as in other cases.'  Finally, 
Alabama Code [1975,] § 36-23-2[,] provides that '[v]acancies 
in the office of constable shall be filled by appointment of the 
Governor, and the person appointed shall hold office for the 
unexpired term and until his successor is elected and 
qualified.' 
 
"…. 
 
"It is this office's understanding that by statute it is 
required to notify the Governor (as the 'appointing power') of 
any duly elected Constable failing to file his or her bond 
within 40 days after the election results are declared, as the 
office is then, by statute, vacated.  Please consider this letter 
to be such declaration and certification with respect to 
Constable for District 59, Jefferson County, Alabama.  This 
office takes no position with respect to any appointment to fill 
any vacancy; I would note, however, that Mr. Burkes, the duly 
elected Constable for District 59, ran unopposed in the 
November 2020 General Election." 
 
SC-2023-0496 
4 
 
On February 26, 2021, the governor appointed Franklin to the office of 
constable for District 59. 
 
On April 22, 2021, Burkes, acting pro se, initiated a quo warranto 
action against Franklin in the trial court.  The trial court entered a 
summary judgment in favor of Franklin, and Burkes appealed that 
judgment to this Court.  Because Burkes had not given security for the 
cost of the action as required by § 6-6-591(b), Ala. Code 1975, this Court 
concluded that the trial court had never obtained subject-matter 
jurisdiction over the action and, accordingly, dismissed the appeal.  
Burkes v. Franklin, 370 So. 3d 235, 241 (Ala. 2022) ("Burkes I").  While 
the appeal in Burkes I was pending, Burkes obtained counsel and 
initiated a new quo warranto action against Franklin in the trial court.  
The trial court dismissed that action on res judicata grounds. Given that 
the trial court in Burkes I had not obtained subject-matter jurisdiction 
over the quo warranto action, however, the doctrine of res judicata did 
not apply to the second quo warranto action.  Accordingly, in Burkes v. 
Franklin, [Ms. SC-2022-0649, Nov. 18, 2022] __ So. 3d __, __ (Ala. 2022) 
("Burkes II"), this Court reversed the trial court's judgment dismissing 
SC-2023-0496 
5 
 
Burkes's second quo warranto action and remanded the action for further 
proceedings. 
 
Following our remand of the action in Burkes II, the trial court 
conducted a bench trial on the issues raised in Burkes's quo warranto 
action on June 6-7, 2023.  On June 20, 2023, the trial court entered a final 
judgment in favor of Franklin and against Burkes.  This appeal followed. 
Standard of Review 
 
In this case, the trial court entered a judgment following a bench 
trial.  "The ore tenus standard of review generally applies to judgments 
entered following a bench trial."  R&G, LLC v. RCH IV-WB, LLC, 122 So. 
3d 1253, 1256 (Ala. 2013).  In this appeal, however, the material facts are 
undisputed, and the issues raised on appeal are legal questions 
concerning the application and interpretation of various statutes 
regarding the bonding requirements for public officials.  We review such 
questions of law de novo.  See Ruttenberg v. Friedman, 97 So. 3d 114, 134 
(Ala. 2012) ("Although the ore tenus standard of review is applicable 
here, because this issue presents a question of law and does not concern 
a disputed issue of fact, our review is de novo."). 
Analysis 
SC-2023-0496 
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As is the case with numerous other public officials in Alabama, a 
constable is required to give an official bond before entering into the 
duties of his or her office.  Section 36-23-4, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in 
pertinent part, that "[b]efore entering upon the duties of his office, the 
constable must give bond as prescribed by law."  The purpose of such 
bond is to serve as "'collateral security for the faithful performance of 
[the] official duties [of the office].'"  State v. Alabama Power Co., 230 Ala. 
515, 516, 162 So. 110, 112 (1935) (quoting Walton v. United States, 22 
U.S. 651, 656 (1824)); see also § 11-2-1(b), Ala. Code 1975.   
 
Article 1 of Chapter 5 of Title 36 of the Code of Alabama 1975 
provides generally applicable provisions governing official bonds.  See 
Ala. Code 1975, § 36-5-1 et seq.  Section 36-5-2, Ala. Code 1975, provides 
the time when official bonds must be filed: 
 
"In all cases, official bonds must be filed in the proper 
office within 40 days after the declaration of election or after 
the appointment to office, except bonds of tax assessors and 
tax collectors which shall be filed on or before September 1 
next after their election or appointment." 
 
Section 36-5-15, Ala. Code 1975, provides that an officer who fails to file 
a bond within the time required by law vacates his or her office: 
 
"If any officer required by law to give bond fails to file 
the same within the time fixed by law, he vacates his office.  
SC-2023-0496 
7 
 
In such case, it is the duty of the officer in whose office such 
bond is required to be filed at once to certify such failure to 
the appointing power, and the vacancy must be filled as in 
other cases." 
 
 
As indicated by his letter to the governor quoted above, Judge 
Naftel interpreted the above statutory language as requiring him to 
certify that the office of constable for District 59 was vacant because 
Burkes, although he had filed a bond, had not filed that bond within 40 
days of the declaration of his election.  Based on that certification of 
vacancy, the governor appointed Franklin to fill the office of constable.1  
In issuing that certification of vacancy, Judge Naftel was apparently not 
aware that § 11-2-6, Ala. Code 1975, provides the time for which a 
constable is required to file his or her official bond.  Section 11-2-6, as 
amended in 2009, expressly provides that § 36-5-2 does not apply to 
county officials required to file an official bond.  That section states, in 
pertinent part: 
"Section 36-5-2 notwithstanding, the bond for a county official 
shall be filed no later than the date that the official takes 
 
1In Ex parte Harris, 52 Ala. 87, 93 (1875), this Court noted that a 
commission from the governor filling a duly certified vacancy "is 
conclusive evidence of the title to office, until it is impeached on quo 
warranto," and that, in a quo warranto proceeding, "it is only prima facie 
evidence, liable, like other prima facie evidence, to be countervailed." 
SC-2023-0496 
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office or, in the case of appointment to an office, within five 
working days of the date the appointment is made."  
 
§ 11-2-6 (emphasis added).  Furthermore, the term "county official" is 
defined to include the office of constable.  § 11-2-1(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975.  
Thus, because Burkes filed his official bond before the date he took office, 
it was not untimely.  The certification of vacancy was in error. 
 
Notwithstanding our recognition that the office of constable was 
incorrectly declared vacant, this Court does not have the authority or the 
ability to right all wrongs.  Rather, we are an appellate court called to 
review the judgment of the trial court.  Such review is guided by certain 
bedrock principles, including the rule that we will not reverse a trial 
court's judgment on a ground or issue not presented to the trial court.2  
See, e.g., Lloyd Noland Hosp. v. Durham, 906 So. 2d 157, 165 (Ala. 2005).  
As the United States Supreme Court has explained: 
 
"In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal 
cases, in the first instance and on appeal, we follow the 
principle of party presentation.  That is, we rely on the parties 
to frame the issues for decision and assign to the courts the 
role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present." 
 
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008). 
 
2A narrow exception to this principle is the plain-error review 
permitted in death-penalty cases.  See Rule 45A, Ala. R. App. P.  
SC-2023-0496 
9 
 
 
In the trial court, Burkes framed the issue as one of conflict between 
§ 36-5-2 and § 36-23-4.  Burkes argued, as he does now on appeal, that 
the 40-day filing requirement established in § 36-5-2 conflicts with the 
language of § 36-23-4, which provides that constables must file a bond 
"[b]efore entering upon the duties of [their] office."  Burkes contends that 
this purported conflict must be resolved by applying the provision 
specifically applicable to constables, i.e., § 36-23-4, and he cites the rule 
of construction that provides that, "[i]n the event of a conflict between 
two statutes, a specific statute relating to a specific subject is regarded 
as an exception to, and will prevail over, a general statute relating to a 
broad subject."  Ex parte Jones Mfg. Co., 589 So. 2d 208, 211 (Ala. 1991). 
 
Burkes's argument, however, is not correct.  Sections 36-5-2 and 36-
23-4 are not conflicting -- rather, those sections (and their predecessors) 
long formed part of a harmonious plan relating to official bonds that dates 
to the adoption of Alabama's first code in 1852.  See Ala. Code 1852, § 717 
(requiring constables to file a bond with the judge of probate before 
entering into the duties of their office), and Ala. Code 1852, § 123 
(providing that bonds required to be filed with the judge of probate must 
be filed 15 days from election or appointment); see also Ex parte Harris, 
SC-2023-0496 
10 
 
52 Ala. 87, 92-93 (1875) (construing two statutes -- one, like § 36-23-4, 
which required a sheriff to file a bond with the probate judge before 
entering the duties of his office, and the other, like § 36-5-2, which 
required that all bonds to be filed with the probate judge be filed within 
a certain time following the election or else the office would be deemed 
vacated -- as part of a single harmonious plan).  We cannot, therefore, 
fault the trial court for rejecting the sole argument Burkes presented 
below. 
 
Regardless, it is § 11-2-6 that now specifies the time in which a 
constable must file his or her official bond, not § 36-23-4 or § 36-5-2.  
Unfortunately, no argument addressing § 11-2-6 was presented to the 
trial court or raised on appeal.  Accordingly, we are compelled to affirm 
the trial court's judgment. 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the arguments of the parties and the record before us, the 
judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Fridy,* Special Justice, concur. 
 
Mitchell, J., concurs specially, with opinion. 
SC-2023-0496 
11 
 
 
Shaw, J., concurs in the result, with opinion. 
 
Bryan, J., dissents, with opinion, which Wise, Sellers, and 
Mendheim, JJ., join. 
 
Cook, J., recuses himself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Judge Matthew D. Fridy of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals 
was appointed to serve as a Special Justice in regard to this appeal. 
 
 
 
 
SC-2023-0496 
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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring specially).  
As Justice Shaw explains in his special writing, our precedents 
leave little room for appellate courts to exercise discretion in considering 
unpreserved arguments.  I write separately to express my willingness to 
reconsider those precedents in cases where the controlling law is clear 
beyond doubt, as it is here.  In those narrow circumstances, I believe it 
may be proper for appellate courts to apply that law even though the 
parties have "fail[ed] to invoke it."  E.E.O.C. v. Federal Lab. Rels. Auth., 
476 U.S. 19, 23 (1986). 
I agree with Justice Shaw that, in most cases, it is not appropriate 
for our appellate courts to consider waived arguments.  See, e.g., Ex parte 
Riley, 464 So. 2d 92, 94 (Ala. 1985) (explaining reasons for the general 
raise-or-waive rule).  But it appears that, at common law, courts had 
"inherent authority" to forgive waiver and reach the merits of an 
unpreserved issue, 7 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 
27.5(c)-(d) (4th ed. 2015), especially when the law was "clear and 
overwhelming in its impact."  Allan D. Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration 
in Appellate Review, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 477, 510 (1958-59); accord 
Rentways, Inc. v. O'Neill Milk & Cream Co., 308 N.Y. 342, 349, 126 N.E. 
SC-2023-0496 
13 
 
2d 271, 274 (1955) (observing that "[t]o say that appellate courts must 
decide between two constructions proffered by parties, no matter how 
erroneous both may be, would be to render automatons of judges").  
In keeping with that principle, the United States Supreme Court 
has recognized that federal appellate courts have the power to eschew 
the "general rule" that reviewing courts will "not consider an issue not 
passed upon below."  Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976).  
Whether federal appellate courts should deviate from this rule is "left 
primarily to the[ir] discretion …, to be exercised on the facts of individual 
cases."  Id. at 121; cf. Huntress v. Estate of Huntress, 235 F.2d 205, 209 
(7th Cir. 1956) (explaining that "[t]he party's failure to call the trial 
court's attention to a relevant statute does not preclude the appellate 
court from considering it").  One instance in which courts may be 
"justified in resolving" an issue not raised below is "where the proper 
resolution" of a case is clear "beyond any doubt."  Singleton, 428 U.S. at 
121; see also Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 41 n.2 
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part) (arguing that a party's failure to invoke the correct interpretation 
SC-2023-0496 
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of a law "does not relieve [courts] of [their] responsibility to interpret the 
law correctly").   
But our cases do not seem to acknowledge that courts have 
discretion to overlook waiver in the civil context.  Instead, this Court has 
applied a seemingly blanket prohibition on considering unpreserved or 
unbriefed arguments.  See, e.g., Thompson v. Skipper Real Estate Co., 
729 So. 2d 287, 289 n.2 (Ala. 1999) (plurality opinion) (noting that "this 
Court will not reverse a trial court's judgment on a ground that has never 
been raised"). 
Because the parties to this case have not asked us to depart from 
our normal approach to waiver, I concur with the main opinion.  See Ex 
parte McKinney, 87 So. 3d 502, 509 n.7 (Ala. 2011) (noting that "this 
Court has long recognized a disinclination to overrule existing caselaw in 
the absence of either a specific request to do so or an adequate argument 
asking that we do so").  But if a litigant in a future case raises this issue, 
I would be willing to revisit our approach.   
 
 
 
SC-2023-0496 
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SHAW, Justice (concurring in the result). 
 
I respectfully concur in the result.  The appellant, Frederick 
Burkes, Sr., challenges whether he timely filed the bond required for him 
to assume the office of constable.  He argues that under § 36-23-4, Ala. 
Code 1975, he was required to file the bond only before he entered office.  
That Code section states: 
 
"Before entering upon the duties of his office, the 
constable must give bond as prescribed by law.  
 
 
"The official bonds of constables shall be $1,000.00, the 
premiums on said bonds to be paid by the persons making 
such bonds without expense to the county." 
 
Burkes filed the bond before he assumed office; thus, he argues that the 
bond was timely filed under § 36-23-4.   
 
The appellee, James Franklin, argues that there is another Code 
section that governs when the bond must be filed.  Section § 36-5-2, Ala. 
Code 1975, states: 
 
"In all cases, official bonds must be filed in the proper 
office within 40 days after the declaration of election or after 
the appointment to office, except bonds of tax assessors and 
tax collectors which shall be filed on or before September 1 
next after their election or appointment." 
 
SC-2023-0496 
16 
 
Franklin asserts that, although Burkes filed a bond, it was not filed 
within 40 days after the declaration of his election.  Thus, he argues, the 
bond was untimely filed. 
 
The issue, as framed in the trial court and on appeal, is whether 
there is a "conflict" between these two Code sections and whether § 36-5-
2 is general in nature and § 36-23-4, being specifically applicable to 
constables, acts as an exception.  See Ex parte Jones Mfg. Co., 589 So. 2d 
208, 211 (Ala. 1991) ("In the event of a conflict between two statutes, a 
specific statute relating to a specific subject is regarded as an exception 
to, and will prevail over, a general statute relating to a broad subject.").  
I see it the other way around: § 36-23-4 is simply a general requirement 
that a constable must give a bond before assuming office.  That the bond 
must be given "[b]efore entering upon the duties of his office" reads as a 
prerequisite to assuming the office, not a specific mechanism regulating 
the timing of the filing of the bond.  Further, the section provides no 
details, such as how and to whom the bond would be given.  Section 36-
5-2, on the other hand, specifically regulates the timing of the filing of 
SC-2023-0496 
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bonds in "all cases."3  Further, filing a bond within 40 days after the 
declaration of the election under that Code section does not conflict with 
§ 36-23-4 if that bond is given before the constable enters office.   
 
I am not convinced by Burkes's arguments on appeal that § 36-5-2 
does not apply in this case.  Because Burkes did not file his bond within 
the time limit prescribed by § 36-5-2, he has not shown that the trial court 
erred in holding that, under that Code section, he failed to timely file the 
bond, which resulted in Burkes's being deemed to have vacated the office.  
§ 36-5-15, Ala. Code 1975 ("If any officer required by law to give bond 
fails to file the same within the time fixed by law, he vacates his office.").   
 
That said, according to the main opinion, § 36-5-2 does not appear 
to apply in the first place.  Instead, under § 11-2-6, Ala. Code 1975, 
Burkes was required to file his bond "no later than the date … [he] takes 
office."  This is consistent with § 36-23-4, which requires the constable to 
provide the bond before entering office.  If § 11-2-6 applies, then Burkes's 
bond was timely filed under that section and also was given in accord 
with § 36-23-4.  Burkes, however, did not argue that § 11-2-6 applied in 
 
3Whether § 36-5-2 is applicable only to bonds filed pursuant to § 36-
5-1, Ala. Code 1975, and whether the bond at issue in this case is not one 
of those bonds are issues not raised by the parties. 
SC-2023-0496 
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this case to show that § 36-5-2 was inapplicable and that his bond was 
timely filed.  Therefore, it cannot form a basis for reversing the trial 
court's judgment.    
 
It might appear hypertechnical for this Court to rule against 
Burkes simply because he relied on § 36-23-4 instead of § 11-2-6, but it is 
not.  It is well-established that the burden is on an appellant to show this 
Court that the trial court erred.  Johnson v. Life Ins. Co. of Alabama, 581 
So. 2d 438, 444 (Ala. 1991).  Appellants do so by presenting in their briefs 
to this Court the issues, arguments, authorities, and portions of the 
record supporting their positions.  Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.  In turn, 
when determining whether a lower court's judgment should be reversed, 
"we address only the issues and arguments the appellant chooses to 
present."  Hart v. Pugh, 878 So. 2d 1150, 1157 (Ala. 2003).  With some 
very specific exceptions not applicable here, the grounds argued on 
appeal must first be raised in the trial court.  Thompson v. Skipper Real 
Estate Co., 729 So. 2d 287, 289 n.2 (Ala. 1999) (plurality). 
 
Both in the trial court and on appeal, the parties' dispute revolved 
around the interaction between § 36-23-4 and § 36-5-2 and which of those 
Code sections controls in this case.  Although that framing of the issue is 
SC-2023-0496 
19 
 
misguided in light of § 11-2-6, which was never addressed below or on 
appeal, that is the issue presented for this Court to decide in this appeal.  
See Reed v. Madry, 585 So. 2d 909, 909 (Ala. 1991) (holding that, where 
the parties had tried a case under a certain legal theory that the Court 
"d[id] not necessarily agree … [was] determinative," that theory was 
treated as the law of the case), and Alabama Forest Prods. Indus. 
Workmen's Comp. Self-Insurers' Fund v. Harris, 194 So. 3d 921, 924-25 
(Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (holding that the court on appeal would apply the 
version of the Alabama Workmen's Compensation Act under which the 
case was tried, despite the fact that a prior version of that law was 
applicable under the facts of that case).  As presented on appeal, Burkes's 
arguments do not convince me that the trial court erred.  
 
 
 
SC-2023-0496 
20 
 
BRYAN, Justice (dissenting). 
 
I respectfully dissent from this Court's decision affirming the 
judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of James Franklin in this 
quo warranto action initiated by Frederick Burkes, Sr.   
The effect of the circuit court's judgment is that Franklin is deemed 
to be the lawful holder of the office of constable for District 59 in Jefferson 
County.  The basis for this judgment is the circuit court's apparent 
determinations that Burkes, although elected to that office, vacated the 
office by failing to timely give a bond under § 36-5-2, Ala. Code 1975, and 
that Franklin was thereafter appointed by the governor to fill the vacancy 
under § 36-5-15, Ala. Code 1975. 
 
Section 36-5-2 provides: "In all cases, official bonds must be filed in 
the proper office within 40 days after the declaration of election or after 
the appointment to office, except bonds of tax assessors and tax collectors 
which shall be filed on or before September 1 next after their election or 
appointment."  Section 36-5-15 provides:  
"If any officer required by law to give bond fails to file 
the same within the time fixed by law, he vacates his office. 
In such case, it is the duty of the officer in whose office such 
bond is required to be filed at once to certify such failure to 
the appointing power, and the vacancy must be filled as in 
other cases." 
SC-2023-0496 
21 
 
 
However, as Burkes has correctly pointed out, § 36-5-2 is a statute 
of general applicability and does not specifically address the office of 
constable.  Instead, a separate statute deals specifically with that office.  
In relevant part, § 36-23-4, Ala. Code 1975, provides: "Before entering 
upon the duties of his office, the constable must give bond as prescribed 
by law."  (Emphasis added.)   
Title 11, Chapter 2, the portion of the Alabama Code of 1975 that 
provides for bonds of county officers and employees, confirms that § 36-
23-4 means precisely what it says.  In particular, § 11-2-1(a)(2), Ala. Code 
1975, includes constables in the definition of "county official or county 
officer."  Section 11-2-6, Ala. Code 1975, then provides, in relevant part: 
"Section 36-5-2 notwithstanding, the bond for a county official shall be 
filed no later than the date that the official takes office or, in the case of 
appointment to an office, within five working days of the date the 
appointment is made."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
The main opinion reasons that this Court cannot reverse the circuit 
court's judgment in this case because Burkes has not cited § 11-2-6 in 
support of his position in either the circuit court or in this Court.  
Admittedly, the provisions of § 11-2-6 clearly demonstrate the 
SC-2023-0496 
22 
 
inapplicability of the bond-filing deadline set forth in § 36-5-2 to the office 
of constable.  However, § 11-2-6 is entirely consistent with the plain 
meaning of § 36-23-4, which deals specifically with the office of constable, 
and upon which Burkes has relied throughout this litigation.   
 
This Court has repeatedly held that "'[w]ords used in a statute 
must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood 
meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret 
that language to mean exactly what it says.'"  Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
of Alabama, Inc. v. Nielsen, 714 So. 2d 293, 296 (Ala. 1998)(quoting IMED 
Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992)).   
Moreover, 
"'[t]his court has the duty to construe provisions within a 
statutory plan in harmony with each other.  J.N.H. v. N.T.H., 
705 So. 2d 448 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).   In interpreting 
statutory language, a court does not look at one word or one 
provision in isolation, but rather looks to a whole statutory 
scheme for clarification and contextual reference.'" 
 
Ex parte S.C.W., 826 So. 2d 844, 850 (Ala. 2001)(citation omitted). 
Under the plain meaning of § 36-23-4, Burkes timely gave his bond 
before entering upon the duties of the office of constable.  Therefore, 
Burkes did not vacate the office of constable under § 36-5-15, and there 
was no vacancy in the office for the governor to fill by appointing 
SC-2023-0496 
23 
 
Franklin.  Consequently, the circuit court erred by entering a judgment 
in favor of Franklin in this case.  In my opinion, this Court should reverse 
the circuit court's judgment. 
 
My conclusion in this regard is bolstered by this Court's precedent 
in this area.  In Sharp v. State ex rel. Elliott, 217 Ala. 265, 115 So. 392 
(1928), this Court explained the proper procedure in quo warranto 
actions involving gubernatorial appointments to public offices.  The 
Court stated: "As repeatedly held by this court, the information in cases 
of this sort is sufficient, if it avers in general terms that the respondent 
usurps, intrudes into, and unlawfully holds a designated public office."  
217 Ala. at 266, 115 So. at 393.  The Court further stated: 
"In this proceeding, when the state has shown, or the 
respondent has admitted, that the respondent is holding and 
exercising the powers and duties of a public office under the 
state, he must then show 'by what authority he holds the 
office, and that he is in the rightful exercise of its duties and 
powers.'  Montgomery v. State ex rel. Enslen, 107 Ala. 37[2], 
384, 385, 18 So. 157 [(1895)]. 
 
"In accordance with this rule as to the burden of proof, 
the respondent's answer must assume the burden, and must 
allege the facts which are necessary to show that he lawfully 
holds the office, and rightfully exercises its duties and powers.  
As said in Jackson v. State ex rel. Tillman, 143 Ala. 145, 148, 
42 So. 61, 62 [(1905)]: 
 
SC-2023-0496 
24 
 
"'In such a case it is not enough to show what 
might be termed a bare prima facie right to the 
office, such as would be evidenced by the holding 
of a commission from the Chief Executive, but the 
inquiry reaches further than this, and requires 
that it be shown that the Governor thereunto was 
lawfully authorized to act.  State ex rel. Little v. 
Foster, 130 Ala. 154 [30 So. 477 [(1901)].'" 
 
217 Ala. at 267, 115 So. at 393 (emphasis added). 
 
Thus, Sharp indicates that, in a quo warranto proceeding, it is not 
enough for a respondent whose gubernatorial appointment to a public 
office has been challenged to answer the petition by simply relying on the 
commission itself.  Under the procedure described by Sharp, the 
respondent also bears of the burden of proving that the gubernatorial 
appointment itself was valid.  Sharp goes on to describe potential 
scenarios under which the burden of pleading or the burden of proof, 
depending on the circumstances, may be shifted back to the petitioner. 
In my opinion, Franklin's continued reliance on § 36-5-2 in this case 
did not meet his initial burden of demonstrating that his commission was 
valid.  As explained above, under clear Alabama law, the bond-filing 
deadline set forth in § 36-5-2 does not apply to the office of constable; the 
deadline set forth in § 36-23-4 does, and § 11-2-6 settles the issue beyond 
SC-2023-0496 
25 
 
question.  Therefore, Burkes never vacated the office of constable, and 
there was no vacancy for the governor to fill by appointing Franklin. 
In interpreting and applying the statutes at issue in this case, I 
believe it is this Court's duty to enforce their plain meaning "'look[ing] to 
[the] whole statutory scheme for clarification and contextual reference.'"  
Ex parte S.C.W., 826 So. 2d at 850 (citation omitted).  In so doing, I 
conclude that the circuit court's judgment in favor of Franklin should be 
reversed.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
Wise, Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.