Case Title: Moore v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: cr94-59-0

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Oscar E. Moore v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 94-590                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 19, 1996


1.   Trial -- declaration of mistrial discussed -- trial court
     given wide discretion in granting or denying. -- Declaring a
     mistrial is a drastic remedy and proper only where the error
     is beyond repair and cannot be corrected by any curative
     relief; the trial court should resort to mistrial only where
     the error complained of is so prejudicial that justice cannot
     be served by continuing the trial or when the fundamental
     fairness of the trial itself has been manifestly affected;
     since the trial court is in a better position to determine the
     effect of a remark on the jury, it has wide discretion in
     granting or denying a motion for a mistrial and its discretion
     will not be disturbed except where there is an abuse of
     discretion or manifest prejudice to the movant; an admonition
     to the jury usually cures a prejudicial statement unless it is
     so patently inflammatory that justice could not be served by
     continuing the trial. 

2.   Trial -- testimony so prejudicial admonition to jury did not
     cure it -- trial court's denial of mistrial an abuse of
     discretion. -- The witness's unresponsive testimony that the
     appellant had admitted he killed another woman was so
     prejudicial that it could not be cured by an admonition to the
     jury, the trial court's denial of the motion for mistrial was
     abuse of discretion in the face of such a patently
     inflammatory and prejudicial statement.  

3.   Constitutional law -- taking of blood not a violation of Fifth
     Amendment -- protections of Fifth Amendment do not extend to
     demonstrative, physical tests. -- The protections of the Fifth
     Amendment do not extend to demonstrative, physical tests, but
     are intended to immunize a defendant from providing the State
     with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature; in
     determining whether evidence is testimonial in nature the
     courts look to see if the activity performed is for the
     purpose of communication, such as a gesture; if it is, the
     activity is privileged; the privilege against self-
     incrimination does not bar compelled intrusions into the body
     for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content.  

4.   Criminal law -- determination whether magistrate had a
     substantial basis for finding probable cause -- totality of
     circumstances approach used. --  The court applies a "totality
     of circumstances" approach in determining whether the neutral
     and detached magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding
     that probable cause existed; the task of the issuing
     magistrate is simply to make a practical, common sense
     decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
     affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of
     knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is
     a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
     be found in a particular place; the duty of a reviewing court
     is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial
     basis for concluding that probable cause existed." 

5.   Criminal law -- trial court had substantial basis on which to
     find probable cause to grant the order for blood withdrawal. -
     -  The trial court had a substantial basis on which to
     conclude that probable cause existed to grant the order for
     blood withdrawal where, in addition to the statement of the
     witness, the affidavit of the state police investigator in
     support of the Motion for Disclosure recited numerous facts
     upon which a finding of probable cause could be based
     including that he had been informed by a witness that the
     evening prior to the discovery of the victim's body appellant
     had informed the witness that he had killed the victim; that
     black, high top tennis shoes that had been recovered from
     appellant's bedroom matched the print of a large tennis shoe
     that was lifted and preserved from the victim's bedroom; that
     appellant was seen with a large amount of money on the night
     after the murder, which was quite unusual because appellant
     did not have a job; and that because she kept her doors locked
     and would not unlock the door unless she knew the caller, the
     killer was probably known by the victim.

6.   Witnesses -- particular facts bearing on an informant's
     reliability may be required -- no such requirement where the
     witness is a good citizen and not an informant. -- An affiant
     must demonstrate particular facts bearing on an informant's
     reliability as required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.1; however, no
     additional support for the reliability of witnesses is
     required where the witness volunteered the information as a
     good citizen and not as a confidential informant whose
     identity is to be protected.

7.   Witnesses -- witness not an informant -- court had substantial
     basis upon which to conclude that there was probable cause to
     order the taking of the appellant's blood. -- Where the
     witness, although an admitted drug seller and so perhaps not
     a model citizen, in this instance did not play the role of an
     informant, instead he voluntarily went to the police with his
     story and gave a blood sample for DNA analysis when requested
     by the police, clearly, there was a substantial basis for the
     court to conclude that probable cause existed to order the
     taking of appellant's blood.

8.   Search  & Seizure -- taking of blood sample not an
     unreasonable search -- there was no unjustified element of
     personal risk and pain. -- Appellant's contention that the
     search was not reasonable because his blood was drawn in the
     police station was without merit where he was taken from his
     cell to the sheriff's office, where his blood was drawn in
     private, by a physician; a minor intrusion into the body
     performed in a reasonable manner (by needle) in a hospital by
     a physician, meets the Fourth Amendment test of
     reasonableness; here the appellant's blood was drawn by a
     physician, not a police officer; as blood is routinely drawn
     by nurses, technicians, and other non-physicians, frequently
     in non-medical facilities, appellant was not in this instance
     subjected to an "unjustified element of personal risk and
     pain"; consequently the manner in which appellant's blood was
     taken did not constitute an unreasonable search, in violation
     of the Fourth Amendment.
                                
9.   Witnesses -- conflicts in testimony of witnesses -- trial
     court must resolve. -- Resolution of conflicts in the
     testimony of the witnesses is for the trial court to resolve. 

10.  Discovery -- discovery violations -- standard of review on
     imposing sanctions. -- The standard of review on imposing
     sanctions for discovery violations is whether there has been
     an abuse of discretion; when there has been a failure to
     comply with discovery procedures, a trial court is not
     required to suppress evidence unless prejudice will result. 

11.  Criminal procedure -- blood samples properly taken -- even
     assuming the rules were violated, appellant failed to
     demonstrate prejudice. -- Although appellant argued that he
     was deprived of counsel when his blood was drawn, it was clear
     that he initially caused the delay in the appointment of
     counsel by representing to the judge at his probable cause
     hearing that he had already hired an attorney; appellant did
     not explain how prejudice might have occurred because an
     attorney was not present when the blood samples were taken;
     nor did he explain how the detailed investigator's affidavit
     presented with the Motion for Disclosure failed to meet the
     standard for probable cause for search warrants, or could have
     been attacked; even assuming a violation of Ark. R. Crim. P.
     18.1(b) occurred, the court could not say that appellant had
     demonstrated that he suffered prejudice as a result.

12.  Appeal & error -- even constitutional arguments raised for the
     first time on appeal will not be considered. -- The court will
     not consider even constitutional arguments not raised before
     the trial court.  

13.  Evidence -- admissibility of novel scientific evidence --
     relevancy standard used. -- The relevancy standard used in
     determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence
     requires: that the trial court conduct a preliminary inquiry
     which must focus on (1) the reliability of the novel process
     used to generate the evidence, (2) the possibility that
     admitting the evidence would overwhelm, confuse or mislead the
     jury, and (3) the connection between the novel process
     evidence to be offered and the disputed factual issues in the
     particular case.

14.  Evidence -- DNA profiling no longer novel scientific evidence
     -- trial judge was correct. -- The trial judge was correct in
     his findings that DNA profiling is no longer novel scientific
     evidence requiring a preliminary inquiry to determine its
     reliability; DNA profiling evidence should no longer be viewed
     as novel scientific evidence requiring a preliminary inquiry
     beyond the showing that the expert properly performed a
     reliable methodology in creating the DNA profiles.

15.  Evidence -- trial court conducted inquiry into whether
     reliable methodology was used in creating DNA profiles -- any
     challenge to the conclusions reached should have been made at
     trial. -- In conducting his inquiry into whether reliable
     methodology was used in creating the DNA profiles, the trial
     court noted that the appellant's experts conceded that the
     laboratory protocol employed by the FBI expert was appropriate
     in determining that the evidence was relevant and would be
     admitted at trial; the trial court also correctly determined
     that any challenge to the conclusions reached by the state's
     expert, including the statistical probability of whether the
     test results constituted a match, should appropriately have
     been made at trial, by cross-examination of the state's
     experts and presentation by the defendant of his own experts
     to express differing opinions about the results of the FBI
     tests and statistical probability of a match.

16.  Witnesses -- admission of opinion testimony by lay witnesses -
     - when requirements of the rule are met. -- Rule 701 of the
     Arkansas Rules of Evidence allows admission of opinion
     testimony by lay witnesses if the opinions or inferences are
     "(1) [r]ationally based upon the opinion of the witness and
     (2) [h]elpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the
     determination of a fact in issue"; the requirements of Rule
     701 are satisfied if the opinion or inference is one which a
     normal person would form on the basis of the observed facts,
     but if an opinion without the underlying facts would be
     misleading, then the objection should be sustained. 

17.  Evidence -- admission of relevant evidence within the sound
     discretion of the trial court -- standard of review. --     
     Whether to admit relevant evidence rests in the sound
     discretion of the trial court, and the standard of review is
     abuse of discretion; Rule 701 is not a rule against opinions,
     but is a rule that conditionally favors them. 

18.  Witnesses -- admission of lay testimony not an abuse of
     discretion -- trial court's determination not in error. -- 
     The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
     officer to give lay opinion testimony to show that the
     appellant's shoe print matched the picture, because, even
     though the officer was not an expert in that field, the trial
     court made a determination that he had some experience in that
     area and he was clearly testifying that the patterns matched,
     which was not inconsistent with the crime lab report.
     

     Appeal from Calhoun Circuit Court; John M. Graves, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     Bramblett & Pratt, by:  James M. Pratt, Jr., for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Clint Miller, Deputy Att'y
Gen., Sr. Appellate Advocate for appellee.

     Andree Layton Roaf, Justice.February 19, 1996.  *ADVREP11*








OSCAR E. MOORE,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,
                    APPELLEE,






CR94-590


APPEAL FROM THE CALHOUN COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CR-90-32,
HON. JOHN M. GRAVES, JUDGE,




REVERSED AND REMANDED.



                   Justice Andree Layton Roaf


     Appellant Oscar E. Moore was convicted of capital murder and
rape of a ninety year old neighbor, and of the burglary of her
home.  He was sentenced as an habitual offender to life without
parole for the capital murder.  He raises four points on appeal of
his conviction and sentence, that the trial court erred in 1)
refusing to suppress results of testing of appellant's blood; 2)
admitting DNA matching and probability testimony without conducting
a preliminary hearing; 3) refusing to grant a mistrial when the
state's witness testified that appellant had admitted to committing
another murder unrelated to this case; and 4) permitting an
investigating officer to give lay opinion testimony that the
appellant's tennis shoes matched a footprint found at the scene of
the murder.  
     We agree that the trial court erred in not declaring a
mistrial, and reverse and remand.  Moore's remaining points are
discussed to the extent they are relevant to a second trial.

                              Facts
     On the morning of November 4, 1990, a neighbor went to the
home of Ms. Nethealve Cannon and after being unable to get a
response from her, kicked in a door and discovered her body.  Ms.
Cannon had blood on her nose, mouth and legs, and her undergarments
were removed; she had been raped, strangled and her home had been
burglarized.
     Appellant lived with his mother across the road from Ms.
Cannon and was present outside her home when her body was
discovered.  Appellant was heard to say that Ms. Cannon had only
had a heart attack and should be taken to the hospital, and that
her death would probably be pinned on him because he had been in
some trouble lately.  A tennis shoe print was discovered in Ms.
Cannon's bedroom near where her undergarments were found;  the
footprint was preserved and photographed.
     Five days after Ms. Cannon's body was discovered, Lester
"Fleabag" Parker informed police that he had gone to appellant's
home the night before Ms. Cannon's body was discovered, to collect
money from appellant for a marijuana sale.   Parker stated that
appellant told him that he did not have the money at that moment,
but that he had stolen $7200.00 from Ms. Cannon after killing her. 
Parker further contended that he did not believe that appellant had
killed Ms. Cannon until her body was discovered the next day.  
     Based on Parker's information, the appellant was arrested, a
search warrant was obtained for his home, and a pair of appellant's
tennis shoes were recovered.  The state crime lab could not
conclusively say that appellant's tennis shoes matched the print
found in Ms. Cannon's home.  
     Also, twenty days after the appellant's arrest and several
days before the information was filed by the prosecution,
investigators filed a Motion for Disclosure requesting that
appellant's blood be drawn to compare with semen found in the
decedent.  Appellant had informed the court the day after his
arrest that he was in the process of hiring an attorney,
consequently an attorney had not been appointed for him on the date
this order was issued and the blood drawn.
     The FBI laboratory concluded that the DNA in appellant's blood
matched the DNA in the semen recovered from Ms. Cannon and that the
chance of randomly selecting an unrelated individual from the black
population who would have the same DNA profile as the appellant was
1 in 500,000.  The appellant moved to suppress the evidence from
the blood alleging it was unlawfully obtained; this motion was
denied.  The appellant further moved to exclude the DNA testing
results which declared the match and calculated the probability of
a random match or, in the alternative, to require that the court 
hold a preliminary hearing, to determine whether the results of the
DNA testing should be admitted into evidence in accordance with
Prater v. State, 307 Ark. 180,