Case Title: Beck v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 962431

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1997-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
CHRISTOPHER BECK 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
v. Record No. 962431                   APRIL 18, 1997 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
 
William T. Newman, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we review the capital murder convictions and 
the death sentences imposed by the trial court, sitting without a 
jury, on Christopher Beck.  The principal issues presented are 
whether the trial court erred in receiving "victim impact 
evidence" from persons other than family members of the victims 
and in receiving "recommendations" concerning the imposition of 
the death penalty from the victims' friends and family members. 
 
I. PROCEEDINGS 
 
Beck was charged with multiple offenses including capital 
murder, burglary, rape, robbery, and use of a firearm in the 
commission of these offenses.  Prior to trial, Beck filed a 
motion to suppress the introduction of all statements made by him 
to the police and any evidence obtained as a result.  After 
reviewing the statements, receiving additional evidence, and 
hearing argument of counsel, the trial court denied this motion. 
 Beck does not assign error to this action of the trial court. 
 
Beck also filed a motion challenging the constitutionality 
of Virginia's capital murder statute and the attendant statutes 
governing trial and appellate procedures in death penalty cases. 
The trial court denied this motion without comment. 
 
At trial, Beck pled guilty to the capital murder of his 
cousin Florence Marie Marks during or subsequent to rape or in 
the commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, Code 
§ 18.2-31(4) and (5), the capital murder of William Miller in the 
commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, Code 
§ 18.2-31(4), the capital murder of David Stuart Kaplan in the 
commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, Code 
§ 18.2-31(4), as well as statutory burglary, rape, three offenses 
of robbery, and seven offenses of the use of a firearm.
*  At the 
time the pleas were taken, the Commonwealth, at the trial court's 
direction, made a proffer of the evidence of Beck's guilt.  This 
proffer referred the trial court principally to statements made 
by Beck to the police which the trial court had reviewed during 
the suppression hearing.  On the basis of this proffer, the trial 
court accepted the pleas and found Beck guilty.  
 
Following the acceptance of Beck's pleas, the trial court 
granted a continuance prior to beginning the sentencing phase of 
the trial.  During the continuance, the trial court received a 
large number of letters from family members and friends of the 
victims which contained statements concerning the impact of 
Beck's crimes and "recommendations" concerning the imposition of 
the death penalty. 
 
During the sentencing phase, the trial court heard evidence 
in aggravation and in mitigation and fixed punishment for each of 
                     
     
*Beck also pled guilty to the capital murder of the three 
victims as part of a single act or transaction, Code 
§ 18.2-31(7); that capital multiple murder charge was 
subsequently nolle prossed and Beck's plea withdrawn.  See 
Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 96, 472 S.E.2d 263, 273 
(1996). 
the three capital murders at death premised upon findings of both 
"vileness" and "future dangerousness."  The trial court sentenced 
Beck to four life terms plus a total 53 years' imprisonment for 
the remaining offenses. 
 
 II. EVIDENCE 
 
The critical facts are not in dispute and may be fairly 
summarized as follows: 
A. Beck's Statements to Police
 
Beck told police that several days before the murders he 
formulated a plan to kill Miller, Beck's former employer.  On 
Monday, June 5, 1995, Beck traveled by bus from his home in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to Washington, D.C., arriving there 
at 6 p.m.  The following morning Beck went to Arlington to the 
house shared by Marks, Miller, and Kaplan.  He arrived at the 
house at 11 a.m., "walked around the perimeter," and then broke 
in through a basement window under the porch.   
 
Wrapping a sledge hammer he found in the basement with a 
cloth to "muffle the sound," he used the sledge hammer to batter 
a hole in a door to the first floor of the house.  Beck then went 
to Miller's apartment and chose a .22 caliber semi-automatic 
pistol from several loaded guns Miller kept in the house; he 
rejected another larger caliber weapon because its report would 
be too loud.  After loading a spare magazine for the pistol, Beck 
went to the basement and waited for Miller to return home.  As 
Beck waited he became "nervous," but finally concluded, "I guess 
I'll go through [with] it." 
 
Later that afternoon, Beck heard the sound of someone 
entering the basement.  Beck raised the pistol to "arm level," 
and, as the door opened, he closed his eyes and fired two shots. 
 When Beck opened his eyes, he saw Marks on the basement floor.  
Beck said, "you stupid bitch, why did you have to come home?"  In 
an attempt to make it appear that Marks had been raped and 
robbed, Beck cut off most of her clothes and stabbed her in the 
right buttock.  He threw a condom he had found in the washer onto 
the floor and, in a further effort to make it appear that Marks 
had been sexually assaulted, he kicked her and penetrated her 
vagina with a hammer.  Beck reasoned that sexual assault evidence 
would lead the police to believe that the crime had been 
committed by a stranger and not by a family member.  Beck then 
went back upstairs to the first floor.  
 
About one hour later, Miller returned home.  Beck was on the 
stairs leading to the second floor and hid behind the bannister. 
 Miller remained downstairs for a while and then started up the 
stairs.  Beck shot Miller in the face as he mounted the stairs.  
Miller fell down the stairs as Beck continued to shoot him, 
firing a total of five rounds at him.  Beck put Miller's body in 
Kaplan's apartment and threw a blanket over the body, "because I 
got sick and tired looking" at it.   
 
Later that evening, but while it was still light outside, 
Kaplan returned home to find Miller's body lying in his room, 
Beck with a gun in his hand, and blood "all over."  As Kaplan 
stared at the scene, Beck shot Kaplan in the back of the head.  
Beck fired "several times and [Kaplan] just wouldn't die."  As 
Kaplan lay on the floor, he talked to Beck, saying, "hello, I'm 
awake, hello."  Beck fired what he believed was a full magazine 
at Kaplan and then stabbed him in the head.  Beck stated that he 
"just wanted [Kaplan] to stop having the pain."  After he was 
stabbed, Kaplan appeared to have a "seizure" and then died. 
 
Beck went back through the house taking several guns and two 
bicycles.  He also took cash from each of the victims.  He took 
the keys to Miller's car, changed his clothes, loaded the car 
with the guns and bicycles, and drove to Washington, D.C., to see 
a girl.  As he left the house, Beck waved to the next door 
neighbor. 
 
After a parking mishap in the District of Columbia in which 
Beck parked the car but neglected to engage the parking brake, 
and the car rolled into another vehicle, Beck drove home to 
Pennsylvania.  Once there he hid the guns and "stashed" the 
bicycles with a friend.  He "cleaned the car of all prints[,] 
wiped it all down," and abandoned it after covering the license 
plates.  
 
Beck was initially interviewed by Arlington County Police 
officers at his mother's home in Philadelphia.  Beck at first 
claimed to have been transporting bicycles from Tennessee at the 
time of the murders.  When a friend failed to corroborate Beck's 
alibi, Beck admitted to police that he had killed Marks, Miller 
and Kaplan.  After his arrest, Beck was returned to Arlington, 
where he gave a full statement concerning the murders to police. 
 During his statement to the police, Beck was given a chance to 
say something for himself; he said: 
 
 
That ah I know what is like to kill somebody, its 
one of the worst feelings you can live with that I 
don't know that it is pretty painful that is one of 
those things that you can't go to sleep and I'm so 
sorry that I did, I'm so sorry that I had all that 
anger built up, I should had went to a counselor or 
something could have prevented it.  I don't know, I'm 
sorry but I know this is going to be pretty hard for 
people to believe what happened.  
 
 
In addition to giving that statement, Beck assisted the 
police in the recovery of the stolen car, guns, and bicycles. 
B. Additional Evidence
 
Autopsies of the three victims revealed that each had 
suffered multiple gunshot wounds to the head which had resulted 
in rapid, if not immediate death.  Dr. Frances Patricia Field, an 
assistant chief medical examiner, testified that Marks had 
sustained two gunshot wounds to the head.  Dr. Field concluded 
that either of these gunshot wounds could have been lethal.  In 
addition, the autopsy revealed that Marks had sustained multiple 
bruises on her body, a stab wound in the right buttock, and 
"hyperemia or redness in the left back part of the entrance to 
the vagina." 
 
Miller's autopsy revealed bruises and abrasions of the lower 
extremities and several gunshot wounds to the face.  Dr. Field 
concluded that the bullet which entered the left side of the head 
would have caused death "relatively quick[ly] if not 
instantaneously." 
 
Kaplan's autopsy revealed the presence of seven gunshot 
wounds.  Kaplan had sustained wounds to the left side of the 
head, the left and right sides of the face, the left side of the 
chin, the top and right side of the nose, and the left upper 
chest.  In the medical examiner's opinion, only the bullets which 
entered the chest and the head below the ear would have been 
immediately or rapidly fatal.  Dr. Field was unable to determine 
the order in which the wounds had been inflicted. 
 
At the time the plea was taken, in addition to referring the 
trial court to Beck's statements, the Commonwealth made the 
proffer that a used condom found in the house was analyzed and 
that genetic material of both Marks and Beck was found.  This 
evidence was in direct conflict with Beck's statement concerning 
the rape of Marks. 
 
At sentencing, the trial court received evidence of Beck's 
prior criminal history.  Beck, at the age of 14 years, was 
charged with aggravated assault after he pushed his high school 
teacher, Joyce Leff, as he left her class.  According to Ms. 
Leff, Beck was "hostile towards authority, didn't want to do any 
class work."  Beck wore "a jacket with swastikas on it" until a 
school vice principal asked him not to wear it.  When Beck told 
Leff that he had guns he "used to target shoot the neighbor's 
house," she became "very afraid" and re-arranged her classroom so 
that she was not visible from outside the classroom.  Leff 
further testified that Beck was in a special education class and 
read on a first or second grade level; she felt he was 
"emotionally disturbed . . . [v]ery hostile, full of rage and 
anger."  Beck subsequently was committed to the Pennsylvania 
Department of Welfare in 1991 after an incident in which he 
threatened to harm his former girlfriend and her parents.  While 
in the jail segregation unit awaiting the present trial, Beck 
substituted disinfectant for mouthwash belonging to one inmate 
and struck another inmate.  In addition, Beck wrote a document 
describing his feelings in which he incorporated the phrase: "I'm 
sorry but I love killing."   
 
Dr. Dewey G. Cornell, a clinical psychologist and professor 
at the University of Virginia, diagnosed Beck as learning 
disabled, suffering from attention deficit and hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD), and antisocial personality disorder.  Dr. Evan 
Nelson, a licensed clinical psychologist specializing in forensic 
psychology, also concluded that Beck suffers from ADHD and a 
learning disability.  Dr. Nelson did not conclude that Beck 
suffers from antisocial personality disorder, but conceded that 
he met all the criteria for such a diagnosis.  He opined that 
neglect by Beck's mother was the primary cause of Beck's 
pathology.  According to Dr. Nelson, Beck is able to express 
regret but lacks the capacity to experience remorse. 
C. Victim Impact Evidence
 
Prior to sentencing, Beck's attorney asked the trial court 
not to consider "victim impact" type evidence submitted by 
persons other than members of the victims' families.  The trial 
court observed that the decision in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808 (1991), permitted it to "go either way."  The trial court 
indicated that it would be necessary to review the materials to 
make a determination of their admissibility, and that the court 
would make its decision based upon the closeness of the 
relationship between the victim and the witness.  Beck renewed 
the objection to non-family victim impact evidence at the outset 
of the sentencing hearing, but did not raise express objections 
to any specific evidence or testimony.   
 
Among the documents received by the trial court were letters 
from family members, co-workers, and friends of the victims, and 
numerous letters sent to Kaplan's parents.  Included with these 
were news accounts and essays written by co-workers of Kaplan, 
who was a journalist.  Some of the letters included the authors' 
views favoring imposition of a death sentence or life 
imprisonment. 
 
III. ISSUES WAIVED 
 
Beck assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motion 
to declare Virginia's death penalty statute unconstitutional and 
to prohibit imposition of the death penalty on the ground that 
Virginia's procedures for trial and appellate consideration of 
the death sentence are also unconstitutional and violate the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment and the 14th Amendment's guarantee of due process.  
These assignments of error seek to raise issues that Beck waived 
by the entry of his guilty pleas and, thus, they are not 
cognizable in this appeal.  See Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 
136, 141, 431 S.E.2d 48, 51, cert.denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1993); 
Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 539, 391 S.E.2d 276, 278-79, 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 882 (1990); Stout v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 
126, 131-32, 376 S.E.2d 288, 291, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 
(1989). 
 
IV.  VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE 
 
Beck asserts that it was improper for the trial court to 
receive victim impact evidence from persons not related to the 
victims.  Beck's initial position is that such evidence is 
constitutionally barred because it exceeds the scope of victim 
impact testimony permitted by the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Payne.  Beck further asserts that even if not 
constitutionally barred, admission of such evidence is not 
permitted under Virginia's criminal procedure code.  We will 
consider each of these assertions in turn. 
A. Constitutional Admissibility
 
We have previously decided that "victim impact testimony is 
relevant to punishment in a capital murder prosecution in 
Virginia."  Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460, 476, 450 S.E.2d 
379, 389-90 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 100 
(1995).  There, we relied on the statement in Payne that "[a] 
State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim 
and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is 
relevant to the . . . decision as to whether or not the death 
penalty shall be imposed."  501 U.S. at 827. 
 
Citing the foregoing language in Payne, Beck maintains that 
Payne limits the source of victim impact evidence to family 
members.  We disagree.  No such limitation is either express or 
implied by this language.  To the contrary, the Court was 
describing the nature, not the source, of victim impact evidence. 
 Indeed, it has been expressly recognized that the impact of the 
loss of the victim of a murder may extend beyond the victim's 
family members to the victim's friends and community.  Id. at 830 
(O'Connor, J., concurring).  Human experience and common 
knowledge support this recognition of the unique worth of the 
individual.  Thus, there is no merit to Beck's assertion that 
victim impact evidence is constitutionally limited to that 
received from the victim's family members. 
 
We hold that the admissibility of victim impact evidence 
during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial is limited 
only by the relevance of such evidence to show the impact of the 
defendant's actions.  While statements from the immediate family 
members of the deceased will normally be the best source of such 
evidence, the Eighth Amendment does not restrict the trial court 
from looking to statements of others well acquainted with the 
victim.  Such evidence provides the sentencing authority with an 
understanding of the individualized circumstances present in the 
life of the victim and the specific harm caused by the crime in 
question.  Id. at 825.  So long as its prejudicial effect does 
not outweigh its probative value, such evidence is beneficial to 
the determination of an individualized sentence as is required by 
the Eighth Amendment.  Id.; see also Wesley v. State, 916 P.2d 
793, 804 (Nev. 1996)(victim impact evidence from neighbors, 
co-workers and others did not violate defendant's Eighth 
Amendment rights). 
B. Statutory Admissibility
 
Beck asserts that even if constitutionally permissible, the 
criminal procedure provisions within Title 19.2 of the Virginia 
Code limit victim impact evidence in a capital murder case to 
that received from the victim's family members.  In support of 
this position, Beck relies upon Code §§ 19.2-11.01, 19.2-264.5 
and 19.2-299.1.  Beck asserts that, when read in concert, these 
three statutes provide only for gathering and presentation of 
evidence from those persons designated as "victims" under the 
Crime Victim and Witness Rights Act (the Act).  Code § 19.2-11.01 
to -11.4.  We disagree. 
 
Pertinent to our resolution of this issue, the code 
prescribes: 
 
§ 19.2-11.01. Crime victim and witness rights. 
 
 
 
A.  In recognition of the Commonwealth's concern 
for the victims and witnesses of crime, it is the 
purpose of this chapter to ensure that the full impact 
of crime is brought to the attention of the courts of 
the Commonwealth;  
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
4. Victim input.  
 
 
 
a. Victims shall be given the opportunity, 
pursuant to § 19.2-299.1, to prepare a written victim 
impact statement prior to sentencing of a defendant and 
may provide information to any individual or agency 
charged with investigating the social history of a 
person or preparing a victim impact statement under the 
provisions of §§ 16.1-273 and 53.1-155 or any other 
applicable law.  
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
B.  For purposes of this chapter, "victim" 
means. . . a spouse, parent or legal guardian of such a 
person who . . . was the victim of a homicide. 
 
 
§ 19.2-264.5. Post-sentence reports. 
 
 
 
When the punishment of any person has been fixed 
at death, the court shall, before imposing sentence, 
direct a probation officer of the court to thoroughly 
investigate the history of the defendant and any and 
all other relevant facts, to the end that the court may 
be fully advised as to whether the sentence of death is 
appropriate and just.  Reports shall be made, presented 
and filed as provided in § 19.2-299 except that, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, such 
reports shall in all cases contain a Victim Impact 
Statement.  Such statement shall contain the same 
information and be prepared in the same manner as 
Victim Impact Statements prepared pursuant to 
§ 19.2-299.1.  After consideration of the report, and 
upon good cause shown, the court may set aside the 
sentence of death and impose a sentence of imprisonment 
for life.  
 
 
§ 19.2-299.1. When Victim Impact Statement required; 
contents; uses. 
 
 
 
The presentence report prepared pursuant to 
§ 19.2-299 shall, with the consent of the victim, as 
defined in § 19.2-11.01, in all cases involving 
offenses other than capital murder, include a Victim 
Impact Statement.  Victim Impact Statements in all 
cases involving capital murder shall be prepared and 
submitted in accordance with the provisions of 
§ 19.2-264.5.  
 
 
 
A Victim Impact Statement shall be kept 
confidential and shall be sealed upon entry of the 
sentencing order.  If prepared by someone other than 
the victim, it shall . . . provide such other 
information as the court may require related to the 
impact of the offense upon the victim. 
 
 
Beck asserts that by limiting the definition of "victim" in 
the Act to the "spouse, parent or legal guardian" of the 
deceased, the legislature implicitly intended to limit the 
admissibility of victim impact evidence to that provided by such 
persons for the reports described in Code §§ 19.2-264.5 and 
19.2-299.1.  There is no merit to this assertion. 
 
While the Act provides for the right of victims, as defined 
therein, to prepare a written impact statement, nothing within 
the Act limits the nature of victim impact evidence to such 
statements alone.  Similarly, the reference to the Act in Code 
§ 19.2-299.1 merely defines the person or persons whose consent 
the Commonwealth must obtain in order to include the victim 
impact statement in the sentencing report.  Moreover, by its 
express terms Code § 19.2-299.1 exempts the Commonwealth from 
having to obtain such consent in capital murder trials, and the 
preparation of a victim impact report in a capital murder trial, 
though done in the same manner as other such reports under Code 
§ 19.2-299.1, is mandated by Code § 19.2-264.5. 
 
The clear import of the Act is to preserve the right of 
victims of crimes to have the impact of those crimes upon their 
lives considered as part of the sentencing process, if that is 
their wish, and to protect their privacy thereafter.  The 
requirement in Code § 19.2-299.1 of obtaining victim consent to 
include the statement of the victim in the pre-sentence report is 
further recognition of the right of victims to maintain their 
privacy if they so desire.  By exempting the Commonwealth from 
having to seek such consent when presenting victim impact 
evidence during capital murder trials, the legislature has 
recognized expressly that the impact of such crimes is of such 
magnitude as to require the consideration of victim impact 
evidence even at the risk of intruding upon the sensibilities of 
those closest to the victim. 
 
Nothing in Code § 19.2-299.1 expressly or implicitly limits 
the sources on which the Commonwealth may draw in its preparation 
of the victim impact portion of the presentence report.  Rather, 
the report is to contain whatever information the trial court 
"may require related to the impact of the offense upon the 
victim." 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the statutes do not limit evidence 
of victim impact to that received from the victim's family 
members.  Rather, the circumstances of the individual case will 
dictate what evidence will be necessary and relevant, and from 
what sources it may be drawn.  In a capital murder trial, as in 
any other criminal proceeding, the determination of the 
admissibility of relevant evidence is within the sound discretion 
of the trial court subject to the test of abuse of that 
discretion.  See Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 
820, 823 (1986); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 269-70, 
257 S.E.2d 808, 815-16 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980). 
C. Admissibility and Consideration of Evidence Received
 
We now turn to the victim impact evidence actually received 
by the trial court during the sentencing phase of Beck's trial.  
In doing so, we stress that this was a trial without a jury.  In 
responding to Beck's generalized objections to its receiving 
victim impact evidence, the trial court stated that it would 
assess each statement to determine whether the relationship of 
the declarant to the victims was sufficient to warrant the trial 
court's consideration, limiting that consideration to the 
testimony of family members and close friends of the victims.  
The trial court further stated that it was "mindful of the types 
of statements that would be inappropriate for its consideration." 
 
Although provided with the opportunity to review the victim 
impact evidence prior to sentencing, Beck did not raise any 
particularized objection to the admission of any statement or 
testimony.  Accordingly, we need only consider whether the trial 
court erred in considering the evidence received. 
 
As noted above, the determination of admissibility of 
relevant evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court.  In order to exercise that discretion, the trial court 
must weigh the relevance and probative value of the evidence 
against its potential undue prejudice to the defendant.  "A 
judge, unlike a juror, is uniquely suited by training, experience 
and judicial discipline to disregard potentially prejudicial 
comments and to separate, during the mental process of 
adjudication, the admissible from the inadmissible, even though 
he has heard both."  Eckhart v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 213, 216, 
279 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1981); see also Williams v. Commonwealth, 
234 Va. 168, 182, 360 S.E.2d 361, 369 (1987), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 1020 (1988).  Here, the trial court's statements clearly 
establish its awareness of this responsibility. 
 
In reviewing an exercise of discretion, we do not substitute 
our judgment for that of the trial court.  Rather, we consider 
only whether the record fairly supports the trial court's action. 
 We find that none of the declarants of the victim impact 
evidence received by the trial court was so far removed from the 
victims as to have nothing of value to impart to the court about 
the impact of these crimes.  Thus, the determination that this 
evidence was relevant and probative of the issue under 
consideration was clearly within the trial court's discretion.  
Similarly, our review of the content of the victim impact 
evidence reveals no statement concerning the impact of the crimes 
so inherently prejudicial that its admission would constitute an 
abuse of discretion.  Accordingly, to whatever extent that the 
trial court chose to consider the evidence it received, we cannot 
say that doing so constituted an abuse of its discretion. 
D. Evidence of "Recommendations" for Imposition of Death Penalty
 
 
Beck further asserts that the trial court erred in 
considering statements contained within the victim impact 
evidence which "recommended" the imposition of the death penalty. 
 The mere fact that the trial court received statements from 
family and friends of the victims in which the imposition of the 
death penalty was urged as an appropriate sentence does not 
establish that the trial court relied upon those statements in 
reaching its judgment.  See Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 
268, 389 S.E.2d 871, 885, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990).  
Moreover, the trial judge, by virtue of his training and 
experience, is presumed to have separated the permissible victim 
impact evidence from any potentially prejudicial statements, if 
any, concerning sentencing and to have considered only the 
former.
**  The record amply supports the conclusion that this was 
done in this case and that the trial court's judgment was not 
made in an arbitrary manner. 
 
V.  SENTENCE REVIEW 
 
Beck's remaining assignments of error challenge the 
imposition of the death sentences on the ground that the evidence 
failed to establish the predicate determinations of future 
dangerousness and vileness and that the sentences were excessive 
and were imposed under undue influence of passion. 
                     
     
**We do not mean to suggest that we agree with Beck's 
characterization of the lay witnesses' statements with regard to 
the imposition of the death sentence in this case as 
"recommendations" to the trial court, or that the trial court 
received them as such.  Rather, we believe these statements were 
received by the trial court as expressions of the depth of the 
witnesses' feelings concerning the impact of these crimes. 
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Predicate Determination
 
The record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial 
court's finding of future dangerousness.  Beck attempts to 
minimize the evidence of his prior criminal history and 
subsequent violent acts while incarcerated.  This evidence, 
however, must be considered not in isolation, but in the context 
of the present offenses.  The circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the capital murder of Miller were sufficient to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Beck would commit future 
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing 
threat to society.  See Code § 19.2-264.4(C); Murphy, 246 Va. at 
144, 431 S.E.2d at 53.  By his own admission, Beck planned and 
executed that murder, in the process killing his cousin Marks, 
and then remaining at the crime scene to kill Kaplan.  These 
facts, along with the evidence of Beck's prior and subsequent 
actions, provided sufficient evidence from which the trial court 
could conclude that Beck placed no value on human life and would 
kill others whenever it suited him to do so.  See Goins v. 
Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 468, 470 S.E.2d 114, 131, cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 222 (1996). 
 
Beck's sole contention with respect to the determination of 
vileness is that the term is unconstitutionally vague.  We have 
already addressed and rejected this argument in Breard v. 
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 74, 445 S.E.2d 670, 675, cert. denied, 
513 U.S. 971 (1994).  A finding of "vileness" must be based on 
conduct which is "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or 
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an 
aggravated battery to the victim."  Code § 19.2-264.2.  Proof of 
any one of these three components will support a finding of 
vileness.  Id.; Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386, 411, 422 
S.E.2d 380, 395 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1043 (1993).  We 
hold that the evidence sufficiently established Beck's depravity 
of mind to warrant a finding of vileness. 
B. Proportionality Review
 
Code § 17-110.1(C) requires us to review the death sentences 
imposed on Beck to determine whether (1) they were imposed under 
the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary 
factor; or (2) they are excessive or disproportionate to the 
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crimes and 
the defendant.  We will combine the review required by statute 
with the identical issues raised by Beck in his appeal. 
 
In support of his contention that the death sentences were 
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other 
arbitrary factor, Beck asserts that the trial court failed to 
give consideration to mitigating evidence.  This argument is 
merely conclusory and we find nothing in the record to support 
it.  To the contrary, the record contains the trial judge's 
statement that he "carefully considered the aggravating and the 
mitigating circumstances found to exist in this case," and the 
judgment orders state that the trial court took into 
consideration "all of the evidence in the case."  See Boggs v. 
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 501, 522, 331 S.E.2d 407, 422 (1985), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986).  Additionally, our independent 
review of the trial record fails to disclose that the sentences 
of death were imposed under the influence of any of the statutory 
factors. 
 
In conducting our proportionality review, we must determine 
"whether other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction generally 
impose the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes, 
considering both the crime and the defendant."  Jenkins v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 461, 423 S.E.2d 360, 371 (1992), cert. 
denied, 507 U.S. 1036 (1993); see also Code § 17-110.1(C)(2).  We 
have examined the records of all capital murder cases reviewed by 
this Court, under Code § 17-110.1(E), including those cases in 
which a life sentence was imposed.  We have given particular 
attention to those cases in which the death penalty was based on 
both the "future dangerousness" and the "vileness" predicates.  
 
Based on this review, we conclude that Beck's death 
sentences are not excessive or disproportionate to penalties 
generally imposed by other sentencing bodies in the Commonwealth 
for comparable crimes.  See, e.g., Jenkins, supra; Briley v. 
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 563, 273 S.E.2d 57 (1980); Stamper, supra. 
 
VI.  Conclusion  
 
We find no reversible error in the judgments of the trial 
court.  Having reviewed Beck's death sentences pursuant to Code 
§ 17-110.1, we decline to commute the sentences of death.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's judgments.  
 
Affirmed.