Case Title: D.R.S. v. Dep't of Family Servs.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0017

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
In the Interest of: DRS, NJL, and KDL, Minor Children. RH v. THE STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2011 WY 128Case Number: S-11-0017Decided: 09/14/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
IN 
THE INTEREST OF:  DRS, NJL, and KDL, 
Minor Children.RH,Appellant (Respondent),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES,Appellee 
(Petitioner).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County
The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
John 
M. Burman, Faculty Supervisor, U.W. Legal Services Program; Tracy Racicot, 
Student Director; and Liz Minnerop, Student Intern.  Argument by Ms. 
Minnerop.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; Jill E. Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Susan K. Stipe, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Stipe.
 
Representing 
Guardian ad Litem:
            
Roxie L. Hensley, Hensley Law, Laramie, WY.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
HILL, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      RH (Mother) 
challenges the district court’s order directing that her minor children be 
placed with their grandparents and father, respectively, rather than returned to 
her custody.  We affirm the juvenile 
court.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Mother raises 
three issues before this Court:
 
1.    
Whether 
the district court committed reversible error when it ordered, without notice to 
[Mother] and without conducting any evidentiary hearing, that KL and NL remain 
with their grandparents and not be reunited with [Mother] as had been 
stipulated; and DS be placed with her father without [Mother’s] 
consent.
2.    
Whether 
the district court erred by applying Wyoming Statute § 14-3-429(a)(iv) or 
stated inversely, whether the district court erred by failing to apply Wyoming 
Statute § 14-3-405 in deciding the State’s motion to change custody and 
placement of the minor children after conducting an evidentiary 
hearing.
3.    
Whether 
the district court’s findings of fact were supported in relevant part by “clear 
and convincing evidence” as required by Wyoming Statute 
§ 14-3-429(a)(iv).
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      Mother has three 
minor children, DS (age 9), NL (age 6), and KL (age 5), who are the subject of a 
neglect petition that began this case.1  MS is the father of DS, while CL is the 
father of NL and KL.
 
[¶4]      On October 24, 
2008, the three minor children were removed from their home and Mother’s care 
after authorities observed a number of safety and sanitation concerns in 
Mother’s home while executing a search warrant.2  On October 28, 2008, the Albany County 
Attorney’s Office filed a neglect petition.  Part of the neglect petition indicated 
that the children were to be returned to their home after the identified issues 
had been corrected.  The same day 
the neglect petition was filed, the children were returned to their 
home.
 
[¶5]      On January 16, 
2009, based upon the agreement of all parties to the matter, the juvenile court 
entered a consent decree, which included an admission to the allegations of 
neglect.  Furthermore, the decree 
placed the children in the custody of Mother, under the protective supervision 
of the Department of Family Services (DFS).  A multidisciplinary team (MDT) was also 
established in order to provide recommendations to the juvenile court.  The MDT also recognized terms and 
conditions that Mother was to meet and also established that the consent decree 
would be in effect for twelve months unless Mother failed to meet the terms and 
conditions, in which case the State would file a motion to reinstate the 
juvenile action.  The juvenile court 
also entered an order accepting Mother’s admission of neglect, but holding the 
adjudication of neglect in abeyance pursuant to the terms of the consent 
decree.
 
[¶6]      Occasion to 
revisit the neglect petition occurred May 14, 2009, when the State moved to 
reinstate the proceedings alleging that Mother was interfering with CL’s 
visitation with NL and KL, that Mother had failed to consistently keep her pet 
snake locked up, that Mother failed to have the children’s babysitters approved 
by DFS, and that Mother failed to obtain a substance abuse evaluation.  An amended motion to reinstate was filed 
on May 27, 2009, containing a second allegation of an unapproved 
babysitter.  The juvenile court 
reinstated the proceedings on June 9, 2009, and found that Mother violated the 
terms of the consent decree.  
Juvenile proceedings were reinstated, and the children were adjudicated 
to be neglected after the admission of the neglect was 
entered.
 
[¶7]      Mother retained 
custody of her children throughout the proceedings while under the protective 
supervision of DFS.  The order 
reinstating the proceedings authorized DFS to remove the children from Mother’s 
custody without a subsequent order from the juvenile court.  On September 8, 2009, the court set 
forth a permanency plan of family preservation and ordered Mother to comply with 
eighteen terms and conditions to reach that goal.
 
[¶8]      Until June of 
2010, the children continued to live with Mother.  Issues continued to prevail, however, 
concerning Mother’s compliance with the orders of the juvenile court and 
concerning the welfare of the children.  
The MDT filed a report indicating its concerns regarding Mother’s and 
CL’s ability to co-parent NL and KL.  
DFS also filed a quarterly progress report in May and indicated ongoing 
concerns about the health and welfare of the minor children.  Based upon these concerns, the parties 
met with the children’s therapist, and all agreed that it was in the best 
interests of NL and KL to have extended visitation with their grandparents and 
for DS to continue her summer visitation with her father, 
MS.
 
[¶9]      On July 15, 2010, 
the MDT met and decided to recommend that the children continue with their 
grandparent visitation (for KL and NL), and that DS should be temporarily placed 
with her father.  Pursuant to that, 
the State filed a motion to change custody and placement of the minor children on July 16, 2010, and requested that 
grandparent visitation be continued for NL and KL and that DS continue 
visitation with her father.  Also on 
July 16, 2010, the juvenile court held an already scheduled review hearing on 
the matter, and after hearing recommendations from the MDT members, found it was 
in the best interests of the children to be continued to be placed away from 
Mother until the September hearing.
 
[¶10]   The juvenile court held a hearing 
on September 29-30, 2010, on the State’s motion to change custody.  After hearing from both sides, and after 
both sides were presented an opportunity to present evidence to the juvenile 
court, it ruled that the minor children should not be returned to Mother at that 
time, and that they should remain with their grandparents in the case of NL and 
KL, and DS should continue to reside with her father.  Mother timely 
appealed.
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶11]   As a preliminary issue, we must 
first address an issue brought up by the State – that the juvenile court’s 
hearing on July 16, 2010, is not properly before this Court on appeal.  Just prior to the July 16th hearing, the State filed a motion to change 
custody and placement of the minor children and served the motion on 
Mother.  The review hearing went 
forward, but no evidence was heard concerning the motion to change custody and 
placement.  After the hearing, the 
court determined that the children should not be returned to Mother, but instead 
NL and KL would be placed with their grandparents, and DS would be placed with 
her father until a full evidentiary hearing could be held on the State’s 
motion.
 
[¶12]   In her brief, Mother states that 
the issues from the July 16, 2010, hearing are “merged into the final 
judgment.”  However, the State takes 
issue with that statement, and contends that the matters addressed in the 
juvenile court’s order on review hearing are not properly before this Court, 
because no appeal was taken from that order.  However, when Mother filed a petition 
for writ of review in August of 2010, she did seek interlocutory review of the 
July 16, 2010, hearing’s order, where the juvenile court determined that the 
children at issue in this case should be placed outside of her home.3
 
[¶13]   The juvenile court made the 
following findings as a result of the July 16, 2010, review 
hearing:
 
1.            
This 
matter last came before the Court on the 17th day of August, 2009, for a Final Disposition 
Hearing, at which time physical and legal custody of the minor children was 
placed with the mother of the minor children, [Mother];
2.            
That 
this is not an Evidentiary Hearing, it is a Review 
Hearing;
3.            
The 
Court’s record shows a history of disagreement between [Mother] and [CL] and its 
effects on the stability of the minor children.  The Court recognizes that the minor 
children have been subjected to severe emotional abuse and that the “Time Out” 
visitation, per the Stipulation for 
Visitation with Grandparents, filed the 21st day of June, 2010, has been successful in 
providing stabilization for the minor children, [NL] and 
[KL];
4.            
That 
[NL] and [KL] are currently placed with their grandparents pursuant to the Stipulation for Visitation with Grandparents 
filed on the 21st day of June and approved by the 
Court’s Order Granting Stipulation for 
Visitation with Grandparents entered June 21, 2010.  That said stipulation included an 
agreement that it was in the best interests of the minor children, [NL] and 
[KL], that they visit their grandparents, from June 19, 2010 until July 18, 
2010;
5.            
That 
[DS] is currently staying with [Mother], having returned from her father’s home 
about one (1) week ago;
6.            
That 
because of the emotional stress on the minor children, it is contrary to the 
best interest of the minor children to remain in their mother’s home, at the 
present time, until the hearing on the State’s Motion to Change Custody and Placement of 
the Minor Children, filed July 16, 2010, may be held;
7.            
That 
it is in the minor children’s, [NL] and [KL], best interest [that] visitation 
shall continue with their paternal grandparents …, with respite by maternal 
grandparents …, until the hearing on the State’s Motion to Change Custody and Placement of 
the Minor Children;
8.            
That 
it is in the best interest of [DS] that she be placed with her father [MS] for 
an extended visit after remaining with [Mother] for one week from July 16, 
2010.
 
[¶14]   The State concedes that because 
this order affected a substantial right of Mother (i.e., the order addressed the 
children’s placement), it is an appealable order.  We agree.  However,  we disagree with the State’s point that 
Mother is barred from appealing this particular order in accordance with 
W.R.A.P. 1.03, which states that “[t]he timely filing of a notice of appeal, 
which complies with Rule 2.07(a), is juris]dictional.”    Accordingly, we will proceed 
to address Mother’s first issue, regarding the July 16, 2010, hearing, on the 
merits.
 
[¶15]   Mother contends that the juvenile 
court’s order after the July 16, 2010, hearing should be reversed because the 
court violated her due process rights by not giving her opportunity to present 
evidence prior to making its ruling.  
Mother also argues that the court applied the wrong statute at the review 
hearing, and finally, that these issues are not moot.  Mother’s basic complaint is that her 
children were removed from her home without an evidentiary hearing.  
 
[¶16]   This Court has previously 
considered a juvenile court’s decision made during a review hearing.  HP v. State, 2004 WY 82, ¶¶ 24-25, 
93 P.3d 982, 989-990 (Wyo. 2004).  
First, we note that we review a court’s findings in the context of a 
review hearing in a neglect proceeding under a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.  In addressing the 
findings made at the review hearing, this Court pointed out that, according to 
statute,
 
[T]he juvenile court is charged with conducting: 

 
a 
review hearing six (6) months from the date of the child’s removal from the 
home, twelve (12) months from the date of the child’s removal from the home, and 
not less than once every twelve (12) months thereafter. At each of these review 
hearings the court shall review the case plan to 
determine:
(i) The 
health and safety of the child;
(ii) The 
continuing necessity for the placement;
(iii) The 
appropriateness of the current placement;
(iv) The 
reasonableness of efforts made to reunify the family and the consistency of 
those efforts with the case plan;
(v) The 
appropriateness of the case plan and the extent of compliance with the case plan 
including the permanent placement of the child;
(vi) If 
progress has been made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating 
placement outside the home and the extent of that progress; 
and
vii) The 
date the child is expected to be returned to the home or placed for adoption or 
legal guardianship.
 
HP, 
¶ 24, 93 P.3d  at 989.
 
[¶17]   We went on to say 
that:
 
… Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. 14-3-424(a) provides that hearings under 
the Child Protection Act are to be conducted in “an informal but orderly 
manner and separate from other proceedings not included under this act.” 
(Emphasis added). Thus, the formalities of the proceedings themselves and the 
notice and opportunity to be heard provided in a neglect proceeding are not the 
same as that in a termination proceeding. Accordingly, we review the court’s 
findings only in the context of a review hearing in a neglect proceeding and 
under the preponderance of the evidence standard that is applicable to neglect 
proceedings. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-425; In re “H” Children, 
¶ 39; but see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-429(a)(iv) where clear and 
convincing evidence is required to show that reasonable efforts were made to 
prevent the initial removal from the home.  Although the juvenile court’s findings in 
this case may be similar to several of the findings required in order to 
terminate parental rights, they must be fully litigated in a termination 
proceeding under the applicable clear and convincing standard. See In re “H” 
Children, ¶ 39; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(iii).
 
HP, 
¶ 25, 93 P.3d  at 990 (footnotes omitted).
 
[¶18]   At any time prior to disposition 
under § 14-3-429, the juvenile court, on motion of any party, may 
reconsider its order regarding shelter care or conditions of release made under 
§ 14-3-409 or 414.  “Certainly, 
that is some notice to the parent that issues involving the conditions of 
shelter care may arise at any time.”  
DH v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family Servs. 
(In re “H” Children), ¶ 42, 2003 WY 155, 79 P.3d 997, 1009 (Wyo. 
2003).  For Mother, there was notice 
and a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the review hearing.  Here, a certain measure of notice that 
future hearings would occur regarding placement of the children was provided 
when the children were adjudicated as neglected.  Furthermore, the temporary nature of the 
juvenile court’s order and the subsequent evidentiary hearing, where Mother did 
produce evidence, served to eliminate any prejudice claimed by Mother.  Therefore, we find no abuse of 
discretion in the juvenile court’s order temporarily maintaining the placement 
of the children with their grandparents and father, respectively.4 
 
[¶19]   In her second issue, Mother asks 
this Court to determine if the juvenile court erred by applying § 
14-3-429(a)(iv) or failing to apply § 14-3-405 in deciding the State’s motion to 
change custody and placement of the minor children after conducting an 
evidentiary hearing.
 
[¶20]   Questions of law are reviewed de novo.  DOT v. Robbins, 2008 WY 148, 
¶ 7, 197 P.3d 1243, 1245 (Wyo. 2008).  
This issue also involves statutory interpretation.  Our 
rules of statutory construction 
are well known:
 
This 
court interprets statutes by giving effect to the legislature’s intent. . . . We 
begin by making an inquiry relating to the ordinary and obvious meaning of the 
words employed 
according to their arrangement and connection. . . .  We give effect to every word, clause, and 
sentence and construe together all components of a statute in pari 
materia. . . .  Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law. . . .  We review questions of law de novo 
without affording deference to the district court’s decision. Worcester v. 
State, 2001 WY 82, ¶ 13, 30 P.3d 47, 52 (Wyo. 2001). If a statute is 
clear and unambiguous, we simply give effect to its plain meaning. Wesaw v. 
Quality Maintenance, 2001 WY 17, ¶ 13, 19 P.3d 500, 506 (Wyo. 2001) 
(quoting In 
re Claim of Prasad, 
11 P.3d 344, 347 (Wyo. 2000)). 
Only when we find a statute to be ambiguous do we resort to the general 
principles of statutory 
construction. Wesaw, 
2001 WY 17, ¶ 13, 19 P.3d  at 506 
(quoting In 
re Claim of Prasad, 
11 P.3d at 347). 
An ambiguous statute is one whose meaning is uncertain because it is susceptible 
to more than one interpretation. Pierson 
v. State, 
956 P.2d 1119,1125 (Wyo. 1998) 
(quoting Amrein 
v. State, 
836 P.2d 862, 864-65 (Wyo. 1992)). 

 
   It 
is a basic rule of statutory 
construction that courts may try to 
determine legislative intent by considering the type of statute being 
interpreted and what the legislature intended by the language used, viewed in 
light of the objects and purposes to be 
accomplished. . . .
 
We 
are guided by the full text of the statute, paying attention to its internal 
structure and the functional relation 
between the parts and the whole. In re Worker’s Compensation Claim of 
Johnson, 2001 WY 48, ¶ 8, 23 P.3d 32, 35 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting In re 
Hernandez, 8 P.3d 318, 321 (Wyo. 2000) and Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. 
Wyoming Game and Fish Com’n, 845 P.2d 1040,1045 (Wyo. 1993)). Each word of a 
statute is to be afforded meaning, with none rendered superfluous. Jessen v. 
Burry, 13 P.3d 1118, 1120 (Wyo. 2000). Further, the meaning afforded to a 
word should be that word’s standard popular meaning unless another meaning is 
clearly intended. Soles v. State, 809 P.2d 772, 773 (Wyo. 1991). If the 
meaning of a word is unclear, it should be afforded the meaning that best 
accomplishes the statute’s purpose. Radalj v. Union Savings & Loan 
Ass’n, 59 Wyo. 140, 138 P.2d 984, 996 (1943).
 
Union 
Pac. Res. Co. v. Dolenc, 
2004 WY 36, ¶ 13, 86 P.3d 1287, 1291-92 (Wyo. 2004) 
(quoting Rodriguez 
v. Casey, 
2002 WY 111, ¶¶ 9-10, 50 P.3d 323, 326-27 (Wyo. 
2002)).
 
LM 
v. Laramie County Dep’t of Family Servs. (In re MN), 2007 WY 189, ¶ 4, 171 P.3d 1077, 1079-80 (Wyo. 2007).
 
[¶21]   We first turn to the statutes at 
issue.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-429(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2011) states:
 
§ 
14-3-429.  Decree where child adjudged neglected; dispositions; terms 
and conditions; legal custody.(a) In determining the 
disposition to be made under this act in regard to any 
child:
….
(iv) When 
a child is adjudged to be neglected the court shall ensure that reasonable 
efforts were made by the department of family services to prevent or eliminate 
the need for removal of the child from the child's home or to make it possible 
for the child to return to the child’s home. Before placing a child outside of 
the home, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that to return 
the child to the child’s home would not be in the best interest of the child 
despite efforts that have been made;
 
[¶22]   In comparison, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-405 (LexisNexis 2011) states:
 
§ 
14-3-405.  Taking of child into 
custody; when permitted.
(a)  A 
child may be taken into custody by a law enforcement officer without a warrant 
or court order and without the consent of the parents, guardians or others 
exercising temporary or permanent control over the child 
when:
(i)  There 
are reasonable grounds to believe a child is abandoned, lost, suffering from 
illness or injury or seriously endangered by his surroundings and immediate 
custody appears to be necessary for his protection; 
or
(ii)  The 
child’s conduct or behavior seriously endangers himself and immediate custody 
appears necessary.
(b)  A 
child may be taken into temporary protective custody by a physician, physician’s 
assistant or nurse practitioner without a warrant or court order and without the 
consent of the parents, guardians or others exercising temporary or permanent 
control over the child when the physician, physician’s assistant or nurse 
practitioner treating the child, or a hospital in which the child is being 
treated, finds that there is reasonable cause to believe an imminent danger to 
the child’s life, health or safety exists unless the child is taken into 
protective custody, whether or not additional medical treatment is required, and 
there is not time to apply for a court order.
(c)  A 
district attorney may file an emergency petition, or the department of family 
services, a local law enforcement officer, an administrator of a hospital in 
which a child reasonably believed to have been abused or neglected is being 
treated, or any physician, physician's assistant or nurse practitioner who 
treated the child may request the court for a protective order. After 
considering the emergency petition or request, the judge or commissioner, upon 
finding that there is reasonable cause to believe that a child has been abused 
or neglected and that the child, by continuing in his place of residence or in 
the care and custody of the person responsible for his health, safety and 
welfare, would be in imminent danger of his life, health or safety, 
may:
(i)  Issue 
an ex parte order or search warrant. The order shall place the child in the 
temporary protective custody of the local child protection 
agency;
(ii)  Issue 
an emergency order or search warrant upon application and hearing, authorizing 
ordinary or emergency care of the child or authorizing a forensic examination to 
collect evidence.
(d)  Temporary 
protective custody shall not exceed forty-eight (48) hours, excluding weekends 
and legal holidays.
(e)  When 
necessary for the best interest or welfare of the child in temporary protective 
custody, a court may order medical or other necessary health care, including 
mental health and substance abuse care, notwithstanding the absence of a prior 
finding of child abuse or neglect.
 
[¶23]   
Here, Mother contends that the court applied the wrong statute in the 
September 29-30, 2010, evidentiary hearing.  The court applied 
§ 14-3-429(a)(iv), which relates to disposition determinations.  However, Mother argues that the court 
should have applied the temporary custody statute, § 14-3-405, because it 
provides a higher imminent danger standard for removal of children from the 
home.
 
[¶24]   The plain language of 
§ 14-3-405 references the appropriate standard for taking a juvenile into 
temporary custody prior to any action by the juvenile court.  Law enforcement, a physician (and 
others), or the filing of an emergency petition by the district attorney for 
temporary custody not to exceed 48 hours are methods listed in the statute.  The statute also addresses an emergency 
situation wherein access to the court may be limited, and the duration of the 
emergency custody taken is temporary and brief before due process is 
afforded.
 
[¶25]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-3-401 
through 14-3-440 (LexisNexis 2011) provide a procedural chronology for actions 
brought under the Child Protection Act.  
The procedures outlined in the Act include: (1) temporary protective 
custody (14-3-405); (2) shelter care hearing (14-3-409); (3) the filing of the 
petition (14-3-412); (4) initial appearance advisements (14-3-422); and (5) 
adjudicatory hearing (14-3-426).  At 
§ 14-3-429, the Act addresses what occurs following an adjudication of 
neglect or abuse, and outlines the requirements for a disposition hearing, 
including requiring a determination of the placement of a child found to be 
abused or neglected.
 
[¶26]   
Although § 14-3-405 clearly references an emergency situation 
where there is no opportunity for a hearing, the juvenile court here was not 
holding an emergency temporary protective custody hearing on September 29-30, 
2010.  Rather, the court held a 
scheduled hearing, on motion, reviewing the children’s placement needs over the 
course of two days.  The September 
29-30 hearing on the State’s motion to change custody and placement of the minor 
children was used to determine what custody and placement would be in the best 
interests of the children, supporting the use of § 
14-3-429.
 
[¶27]   The required findings contained in 
§ 14-3-429 have more applicability when the parent has already been 
adjudicated as neglectful, as is the case here.  Without adjudication of neglect, a 
parent’s fundamental right to associate with his or her children is 
implicated.  Hall v. Hall, 708 P.2d 416, 421 (Wyo. 
1985).  The best interests of 
children have “constitutional preeminence,” and where there has been an 
adjudication of neglect or abuse, this “preeminence” elevates the children’s 
best interest above the parent’s rights.  
KO v. LDH (In re MEO), 2006 WY 87, ¶ 53, 138 P.3d 1145, 
1160 (Wyo. 2006) (citing In Interest of 
MKM, 792 P.2d 1369, 1375 (Wyo. 1990)).  
The requirement found in § 14-3-405(c) of imminent danger to a child 
before taking custody gives credence to the concept that children should not be 
removed unless circumstances exist that would place the child’s health and 
safety at risk.  Section 
14-3-429(a)(iv) shifts the focus from imminent danger to the children to an 
inquiry of what would be in the best interests of the children, all because the 
application of this statute necessarily occurs after an adjudication of neglect 
or abuse.
 
[¶28]   The juvenile court reasoned in its 
decision that the plain language of § 14-3-429(a)(iv) provides that it is 
to be used after an adjudication of neglect; that this statute incorporates the 
best interests of the child which are now of “constitutional preeminence.”  The alternative statute proposed by 
Mother, § 14-3-405(c), demonstrates through its plain language that it 
applies to emergency situations; and the relief provided in § 14-3-405(c) 
includes ex parte relief, an emergency order, or a search warrant, none of which 
is alleged as necessary in light of the two-day evidentiary hearing held in this 
case.
 
[¶29]   The juvenile court’s conclusions of 
law were decided under the correct statute.  Section 14-3-429(a)(iv) provided the 
correct framework for the court, as it designates the structure for disposition 
of children who are adjudicated as neglected.
 
[¶30]   Moving to the third and final issue 
on appeal, Mother asserts that there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile 
court to determine, by clear and convincing evidence, that placement of the 
children should be with relatives rather than with Mother.
 
[¶31]   As we stated in HP, ¶ 17, 93 P.3d at 
987:
 
When 
reviewing a record for sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of neglect, we: 

 
1.  Give 
considerable deference to the trial court’s determination because it has the 
advantage to judge the demeanor and intelligence of the 
witnesses;
2.  Examine 
the evidence in the light most favorable to appellee and resolve all conflicts 
in evidence for appellee;
3.  Assume 
as true the evidence in appellee’s favor, disregard entirely appellant’s 
evidence in conflict with appellee’s evidence, and give to appellee’s evidence 
every favorable inference that may fairly be drawn.
 
DH 
v. Dep’t of Family Servs. 
(In re “H” Children), 2003 WY 155, ¶ 54, 79 P.3d 997, ¶ 54 (Wyo. 2003) 
(quoting MP v. State in Interest of CP, 965 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Wyo. 
1998)).
 
Also, 
§ 14-3-429(a)(iv) states that clear and convincing evidence is required to show 
that reasonable efforts were made to prevent the initial removal from the home. 

 
[¶32]   Here, the issue is whether the 
juvenile court had sufficient evidence to find that DFS made reasonable efforts 
to prevent removal of the children from Mother’s home, and that the best 
interests of the children would not be served by allowing them to remain in the 
home.
 
[¶33]   Reasonable efforts are determined 
on a case-by-case basis.  See HP, ¶ 26, 93 P.3d 990 (reasonable 
efforts sufficient where six MDT meetings were held at which mother was 
encouraged to complete her case plan, four case plans entered, children allowed 
to live with mother after release from prison, DFS offered transportation to 
visitation, DFS recommended counseling services, and assisted mother in 
procuring suitable housing); SD v. Carbon 
County Dep’t of Family Servs. (In re SED), 2002 WY 168, ¶¶ 16-23, 57 P.3d 1235, 1239-41 (Wyo. 2002) (reasonable efforts demonstrated by community-wide 
approach to assisting parents to learn how to properly care for an infant by DFS 
attempts to make requirements of case plan clear and understandable to parents 
and by providing psychological evaluations to assist in determining how to teach 
parents).
 
[¶34]   Here, we note that the juvenile 
court held a two-day evidentiary hearing where, after hearing numerous witnesses 
testify, it issued detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Mother’s arguments were not only heard 
but she was also given the opportunity to dispute the State’s evidence.  The juvenile court made 72 findings of 
fact to support its conclusions that both elements of § 14-3-429(a)(iv) 
were met.  Significantly, the 
juvenile court’s order notes the following efforts made by DFS to preserve and 
reunify the family:
 
55.  The 
Court finds that the following reasonable efforts were made by DFS to prevent or 
eliminate the need for removal of the minor children from [Mother]’s 
home:
a.  When 
the minor children were first taken into protective custody, DFS directed and 
informed [Mother] regarding what she needed to do so that her home would be safe 
and clean in order to have the children released from DFS’ protective custody 
and returned to [Mother]’s home.  
DFS oversaw the repairs made to [Mother]’s home, including filling the 
holes in the walls, repairing loose wiring, covering electrical outlets, caging 
the pet boa constrictor snake, and general cleanup/disinfection. (See also Order on Initial Appearance and 
Shelter Care Hearing [sic] 2. [Mother] completed these repairs in just a couple 
of days and DFS then returned the minor children to 
[Mother].)
b.  DFS 
contacted [Mother’s] mortgage company and convinced them to allow her more time 
to become current with her mortgage payments.
c.  DFS 
put [Mother] in contact with a loan modification company in an attempt to keep 
from losing her home to foreclosure.  
[Mother] completed some initial paperwork, but did not follow 
through.  [Mother] thereafter lost 
her home to foreclosure.
d.  After 
receiving notice that [Mother] had to leave her home within 30 days, [a DFS 
caseworker] convinced that same mortgage company to give her $1,000.00 as 
start-up money for a new apartment.
e.  DFS 
then helped [Mother] find a new apartment that would accommodate her and the 
minor children.
f.  DFS 
also contacted Interfaith and the organization paid [Mother]’s rent on three 
occasions.  Interfaith also paid her 
utilities on several occasions at [a DFS caseworker’s] 
request.
g.  DFS 
facilitated and Medicaid paid for [Mother’s] court-ordered Substance Abuse 
Evaluation.
h.  DFS 
facilitated and Medicaid paid for the court-ordered Psychological Evaluation for 
[Mother].
i.  DFS 
facilitated and Medicaid paid for solo and joint counseling for [Mother], which 
included parenting education and co-parenting counseling. 
j.  In 
early 2009, [Mother] was not complying with the Consent Decree.  (See Motion to Reinstate Proceedings 
[sic] 2.) DFS met with [Mother] to counsel her on how to comply with the Consent 
Decree in an effort to avoid adjudication in the court system.  [Mother] did not comply with the Consent 
Decree, despite DFS’s efforts, and the children were adjudicated as 
neglected.  (Order on State’s 
Amended Mot. To Reinstate and [CL] Mot. For Order to Show Cause 
2-3.)
k.  DFS 
facilitated and Medicaid paid for counseling for [NL] and [KL] with [a 
counselor].  [A DFS caseworker] 
asked [a counselor] to provide the counseling despite her busy schedule and [a 
counselor] agreed.
l.  [Mother] 
was arrested on a warrant and taken to the Albany County Detention Center.  DFS ensured that the children were cared 
for overnight until [Mother] was released the next day.
m.  DFS 
worked with [Mother] to ensure that she completed her court-ordered urinalysis 
requirements, including calling her phone, visiting her home, and contacting her 
attorneys.
n.  DFS 
facilitated and supervised visits between [CL] and [NL] and [KL] to ensure the 
children’s safety and determine [CL]’s parenting skills and 
ability.
o.  DFS 
ensured that the children were cared for during the birth of [Mother’s] youngest 
child in March 2010.
p.  DFS 
provided [Mother] with financial aid including food stamps and 
Medicaid.
q.  DFS 
set up numerous case plans for [Mother] to help her provide a safe home for her 
children and remove herself from DFS’ oversight.
r.  DFS 
has facilitated at least four MDT meetings in an attempt to ensure that [Mother] 
cooperates with [the] Court’s orders and DFS’ case plans.
s.  Since 
the minor children went on their “Vacation Visitation” in Rock Springs, [Mother] 
has not visited them in person as much as possible due to her limited 
resources.  DFS counseled [Mother] 
and her attorneys that Interfaith was willing to fill her gas tank in Laramie 
and then she could receive a voucher in Rock Springs that would allow her to 
fill her gas tank to return to Laramie.  
However, DFS itself does not have a fund to provide this sort of 
assistance for children who are not in DFS’ custody.
 
[¶35]   After carefully considering two 
full days of evidence before it, the juvenile court concluded that the statutory 
requirements were met for the children to be placed outside of Mother’s 
home.  This Court, having examined 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, upholds the juvenile 
court’s decision.
 
[¶36]   In reaching our decision, we point 
to the following support.  The 
juvenile court heard evidence that Mother was using DS to coach her younger 
siblings, NL and KL, that their father, CL, molested them, an allegation that is 
otherwise wholly unsupported.  NL 
and KL repeatedly alleged that their father was sexually molesting them.  However, no counselor involved in the 
case could substantiate any sexual abuse ever occurring.  To the contrary, NL’s and KL’s counselor 
specifically testified that she did not believe the children were molested at 
any time.  Instead, Mother was 
coaching the children to assert that they had been molested by their father, 
despite the fact that the counselor and DFS instructed Mother that this activity 
was contrary to the welfare of her children.5  As to each of the minor children, the 
juvenile court heard evidence from two counselors that “coaching” on the part of 
the parent is considered severe emotional abuse from which the children may not 
be able to recover.
 
[¶37]   As the coaching would suggest, 
Mother and CL had extremely negative interactions with each other.  Even though this was damaging to her 
children, Mother persisted in this behavior.  In fact, specialized counseling was also 
provided to encourage co-parenting.  
Counselors testified that negative co-parenting is harmful to children 
because it undermines the relationship the children have with the other 
parent.
 
[¶38]   Two full days of testimony took 
place in this case.  After examining 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we uphold the juvenile 
court’s findings that the statutory requirements for out of home placement were 
met.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶39]   This Court upholds the juvenile 
court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law and order entered on October 22, 
2010, directing Mother’s minor children to be placed with their grandparents and 
father, respectively, rather than returned to her custody.
FOOTNOTES
1Mother also has an infant son who was born after this case 
began.
 
2While executing the warrant, detectives found dried and rotting food, 
feces, trash, cigarette butts, drug paraphernalia and marijuana, a loose boa 
constrictor, and damages to the walls and a light 
fixture.
3This Court denied 
Mother’s petition for writ of review on the merits after careful review of the 
petition for writ of review, the response, and the 
file.
4Although DS was technically visiting Mother during the July 16, 2010, 
hearing, the juvenile court’s decision to place her with her father on “extended 
visitation” was appropriate under the court’s purview.  The juvenile court is required at a 
review hearing to determine, among other things, health and safety of the child, 
the continuing necessity for placement and the appropriateness of current 
placement according to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-431(c)(i)-(iii) (2011).  This is always an option of the juvenile 
court when a child is adjudicated to be neglected.  Accordingly, the decision of the 
juvenile court to place DS with her father was not against any legal 
standard.
5The Laramie Police Department also investigated the allegations of sexual 
abuse and found no evidence of impropriety.