Case Title: Bradley v. H,A. Manosh Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-202


Kimberlee Bradley                            Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             Lamoille Superior Court
H.A. Manosh Corporation
                                             December Term, 1990


Shireen Avis Fisher, J.

Robert D. Rachlin and Margaret H. O'Donnell of Downs Rachlin & Martin and
  Norman R. Blais of Blais, Cain, Keller & Fowler, Burlington, for
  plaintiff-appellee

Michael B. Clapp of Dinse, Erdmann & Clapp, Burlington, for defendant-
  appellant


PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley and Johnson, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.) and Springer,
          D.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned


     GIBSON, J.   Plaintiff Kimberlee Bradley brought this suit against
defendant H.A. Manosh Corporation, a construction company, for injuries
incurred at defendant's maintenance garage when an automobile defendant's
employee was repairing lurched forward, crushing her leg against another
vehicle.  The jury found plaintiff had suffered damages totaling $245,000,
but awarded only $122,745 after finding plaintiff had been 49.9% negligent
herself.
     Defendant appeals from the trial court's denial of its motions for
directed verdict, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for reduction
of damages by the amount of uninsured motorist payments received by plain-
tiff.  Plaintiff appeals the court's denial of her motion for additur or a
new trial on damages.  We affirm the jury's award.
                                    I.
     On a Sunday morning in August 1983, plaintiff visited the garage owned
by defendant.  Randy Manosh was working on his Chevrolet Vega, although the
garage was not open for business that day.  Defendant allowed its employees
to use its facilities in off-hours to work on their automobiles or otherwise
use the equipment in the garage for their own purposes.  Defendant was aware
that Randy had used the garage at such times in the past.  Howard Manosh,
president, chief executive officer and sole shareholder of defendant corpor-
ation, testified that he had the authority to control the employees, includ-
ing Randy, during off-hours when they were using the garage.  Employees did
not have to seek permission to use the garage, and the corporation had no
objection to employees bringing non-employees into the garage during off-
hours.  Howard Manosh also testified that employees were representatives of
the company while using the garage, and had the authority to grant or deny
others access to the garage.
      Plaintiff sat on a roller board in front of Randy's car as he worked.
At one point, Randy told plaintiff that he was about to start the car.  She
asked whether it would move, and Randy told her that it could not move
because the transmission fluid had been drained.  He then started the car by
wiring it from outside the vehicle.  He had forgotten, however, to engage
the emergency brake and disengage the transmission, and the car jumped
forward, crushing plaintiff's leg against another vehicle.  As a result,
plaintiff's lower leg and knee had to be amputated.  Defendant has conceded
that Randy's actions were negligent and led to plaintiff's injuries.
     There was evidence that Randy was a safe and prudent mechanic.  There
was also evidence that Randy had been convicted of careless and negligent
driving in 1978, and of driving while under the influence in April of 1983.
At the time of the accident, Howard Manosh was aware of these convictions.
     The case was tried on the theories of unsafe premises and negligent
supervision and control.  At the close of plaintiff's evidence, the court
directed a verdict for defendant on the issue of unsafe premises.  Plaintiff
does not appeal that ruling.  The issues on appeal concern the sufficiency
of the evidence and the damage award.
                                    II.
     We find that the evidence was sufficient to establish a duty on the
part of defendant to supervise and control its employee, Randy Manosh.  It
is well established that generally "there is no duty to control the conduct
of another in order to protect a third person from harm."  Poplaski v.
Lamphere, 152 Vt. 251, 256, 565 A.2d 1326, 1329 (1989).  We have recognized
certain exceptions to this general rule, however, "'where there is . . . a
special relationship between two persons which gives the one a definite
control over the actions of the other . . . .'"  Peck v. Counseling Service
of Addison County, Inc., 146 Vt. 61, 65,