Case Title: People v. Wiley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86557

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 86557-Agenda 1-May 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								HOWARD WILEY, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 25, 2001.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a trial in the circuit court of Cook County, a jury
convicted defendant, Howard Wiley, of three counts of murder and
armed robbery. Defendant waived his right to a jury for the
ensuing capital sentencing hearing, and the circuit court sentenced
him to death on the murder counts. The circuit court also
sentenced defendant to consecutive 30-year sentences for the
armed robbery convictions. Defendant appealed, and this court
remanded the cause with directions to conduct further proceedings
under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). People v. Wiley, 156 Ill. 2d 464 (1993) (Wiley I).
After the circuit court concluded that the State had not violated the
principles enunciated in Batson, the cause returned to this court for
further review, and this court affirmed the convictions and death
sentence. People v. Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d 259 (1995) (Wiley II). The
United States Supreme Court subsequently denied defendant's
petition for writ of certiorari. Wiley v. Illinois, 516 U.S. 923, 133 L. Ed. 2d 223, 116 S. Ct. 322 (1995).
	Defendant thereafter filed a petition, which was later amended
and supplemented, for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994)). The circuit court
dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing, and this
appeal followed. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651. On November 16, 2000, this
court issued an opinion affirming the circuit court's order of
dismissal. Defendant filed a petition for rehearing (155 Ill. 2d R.
367), which this court allowed on January 29, 2001. Both parties
have submitted further briefing materials in accordance with the
order of this court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing.


BACKGROUND
	The testimony presented at trial was recounted by this court
in Wiley II, 165 Ill. 2d  at 267-71, and we will detail here only
those facts relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On
approximately December 2, 1985,(1) Donna Rucks, Carla Williams,
and Adrienne Parham were murdered in Rucks' apartment. Their
bodies were discovered on the morning of December 3 by
employees of the building where the apartment was located, and
the police were summoned. All three deaths were the result of
gunshot wounds to the head. The subsequent police investigation
led to defendant's arrest. Defendant was ultimately tried,
convicted, and sentenced to death for the crimes.
	After the completion of the direct appeal proceedings,
defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The petition
was improperly denied, and this court reinstated defendant's
petition. Defendant filed an amended post-conviction petition and
later filed a supplement to that petition. The State then moved to
dismiss.
	The trial court dismissed defendant's post-conviction petition
without a hearing, stating both that the petition was untimely and
that the petition did not necessitate an evidentiary hearing.
Additional facts will be supplied, where necessary, in our analysis.
ANALYSIS
	On appeal, defendant maintains that the circuit court's order
must be reversed because the circuit court erred in finding that the
petition was time-barred. Defendant also maintains that the circuit
court's alternative ruling-that the issues raised did not warrant an
evidentiary hearing-was improper.
	We begin by noting that a post-conviction action is a
collateral attack on a prior conviction and sentence. People v.
Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 242 (1995); People v. Free, 122 Ill. 2d 367, 377 (1988). As such, the remedy "is not a substitute for, or an
addendum to, direct appeal." People v. Kokoraleis, 159 Ill. 2d 325,
328 (1994). The scope of the proceeding is limited to
constitutional matters that neither have been, nor could not have
been, previously adjudicated. Any issues which could have raised
on direct appeal, but were not, are procedurally defaulted (People
v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1989)) and any issues which have
previously been decided by a reviewing court are barred by the
doctrine of res judicata (People v. Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d 357, 365
(1987)).
	In addition to these procedural bars, a defendant is not entitled
to an evidentiary hearing unless the allegations set forth in the
petition, as supported by the trial record or accompanying
affidavits, make a substantial showing of a constitutional
violation. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 381 (1998). In
making that determination, all well-pleaded facts in the petition
and affidavits are to be taken as true, but nonfactual and
nonspecific assertions which merely amount to conclusions are not
sufficient to require a hearing under the Act. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 
at 381. The dismissal of a post-conviction petition is warranted
only when the petition's allegations of fact-liberally construed in
favor of the petitioner and in light of the original trial record-fail
to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 382. On appeal, the circuit court's decision
to dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing is subject to
plenary review. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 388.

Timeliness of the Petition
	We note the State concedes that the circuit court improperly
dismissed, as untimely, defendant's post-conviction action. After
reviewing the record, we agree and accept the State's concession.
Therefore, we turn to defendant's other assertions of error.

Sufficiency of the Death Eligibility Verdict
	Defendant maintains that his appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to argue that the evidence was insufficient to prove him
eligible for the death penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. This
court has held that this type of claim is cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. See People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 434-35 (1999). Such a claim is measured against the same standard as
those dealing with ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See West,
187 Ill. 2d  at 435 (and cases cited therein). A defendant who
contends that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance
must show that the failure to raise the issue was objectively
unreasonable and that the decision prejudiced the defendant. West,
187 Ill. 2d  at 435. In other words, we must determine whether
appellate counsel would have presented a successful challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to defendant's death
eligibility on direct review, had he raised the claim at that time.
	A defendant can be found eligible for the death penalty only
if the finder of fact finds that the State has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant was at least 18 years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense and that at least one
statutory aggravating factor exists. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38,
pars. 9-1(f), (g). In this case, defendant's death eligibility was
predicated upon the statutory aggravating factor set out in section
9-1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code of 1961.
	At the time of defendant's trial, section 9-1(b)(6) authorized
the imposition of the death penalty when the murdered individual
was killed in the course of another felony "if: (a) the murdered
individual: (1) was actually killed by the defendant, or (ii) received
physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant substantially
contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by one or more
persons for whose conduct the defendant is legally accountable
*** and the physical injuries inflicted by either the defendant or
the other person or persons for whose conduct he is legally
accountable caused the death of the murdered individual." Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(a). The section also required that
the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual
or with knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(b). During the eligibility
phase of the death sentencing hearing, the State must prove all of
the elements of the aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(f).
	Defendant waived his right to a jury for sentencing. At the
eligibility phase of the hearing, the State presented a certified copy
of defendant's birth certificate as proof that defendant was over
the age of 18, and the parties stipulated that defendant was born on
June 7, 1946. The parties also stipulated to the trial testimony, the
trial exhibits, and the special verdicts of the jury, which found that
defendant was guilty of murder and of armed robbery and that
defendant "performed the acts which caused the death" of each
victim. No other evidence was introduced. The court found
defendant eligible for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(6) of
the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par.
9-1(b)(6), now 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 2000)) because he
had committed the murders knowingly or intentionally and in the
course of another felony. The court declined to find defendant
eligible under any other factor.
	According to defendant, the eligibility finding in this case is
constitutionally deficient because the State never proved that
defendant's conduct fell within the class of culpable conduct
which would warrant the imposition of the death penalty.
Defendant contends that there is simply no proof that his conduct
was within the ambit of section 9-1(b)(6) because the evidence
does not reflect that he actually murdered the victims or that he
inflicted physical injuries upon the victims in the manner required
by the statute. Defendant points out that his confession, relied
upon by the State during the guilt phase of the trial, coupled with
the rest of the evidence presented by the State, proves only guilt of
felony murder or guilt on the basis of accountability. Stated
differently, defendant argues that there is no evidence of record
which supports the inference that he actually killed the victims or
that he inflicted injuries substantially contemporaneously with
physical injuries caused by one or more persons for whose conduct
defendant is legally accountable, as is required under the felony-murder aggravating factor. Thus, the crux of defendant's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that the evidence was
insufficient to support the circuit court's finding of death
eligibility.
	In light of defendant's contentions, the State argues that the
evidence presented at trial was sufficient to find that defendant
committed the murders. The State points out that the trier of fact
was entitled to reject the self-serving portions of defendant's
confession on the basis of the circumstantial evidence which
supported the inference that defendant acted alone in committing
the murders.
	In addressing this claim, we must necessarily review the
evidence adduced at trial because both the State and defendant, at
the eligibility phase of the hearing, stipulated to that evidence. In
addition, the trial judge, sitting as the trier of fact at sentencing,
referred specifically to the evidence at trial when he found
defendant eligible for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(6).
	The evidence presented at the guilt phase of defendant's trial
revealed the following.  One of the victims, Donna Rucks,
normally worked a morning shift at a hotel near the murder scene.
A coworker became concerned when Rucks failed to report for
work on the morning of December 3, 1985. The coworker went to
Rucks apartment and asked the building manager to enter the
apartment. The building manager went to get the passkey to the
apartment, but the key would not work. Police eventually were
called to the scene, and it was decided that a window would be
broken by the building maintenance man in order to gain access to
Rucks' apartment.
	The maintenance man broke the window and entered into the
apartment's living room. There he saw two bodies and smelled
something burning. Police instructed him to open the front door.
The front door had two types of locks on it-one attached to the
doorknob and a dead-bolt. The door was both locked and dead-bolted. The door could be locked from the inside of the apartment
by throwing the deadbolt. The door could be dead-bolted from the
outside only by the use of a key.
	While police were investigating the crime scene, the phone in
the apartment rang. After receiving the phone call, police went to
the home of defendant's father. There, they spoke with defendant,
who told them that he knew the victims, was concerned about
them, and would be happy to help with the police investigation.
Defendant agreed to accompany them to the police station.
	At the station, defendant acknowledged to Detective Ptak that
he had been at Rucks' apartment on December 2, and that he had
become concerned when no one answered his knocks on the door.
Defendant said that he had called the police, but that the officers
who had responded to his call refused to break into the apartment
because it looked secure from the outside.
	Defendant further revealed to Ptak that he had spoken to his
parole officer. Ptak then consulted with the parole officer. Ptak
subsequently resumed his interview with defendant and advised
him of his Miranda rights. After having waived his rights,
defendant changed his story. Defendant admitted that he had been
at Rucks' apartment around 10 a.m. on the morning of December
2. He knocked on the door, and it suddenly swung open. He
entered the apartment and saw the bodies of Rucks and Parham on
the living room floor. He then went upstairs and found Carla
Williams' body. All of the victims were dead. Defendant then left
the apartment and closed the door, realizing that the door would
lock behind him. He did not call police because he was afraid that
he would be blamed for the murders because he was on parole. At
that point, Detective Ptak informed defendant that one of the
victims, Carla Williams, had been raped. Defendant told Ptak that
he "kn[e]w" that Williams had not been raped, and the detective
asked defendant how he could have known that.  Police arrested
defendant at that point for the murder of the three victims.
	Subsequent to the arrest, Detective Ptak learned that
defendant might have fired a weapon, a few days earlier, at a
grocery store located in the vicinity of the murder scene. Ptak went
to the store and recovered a bullet that was embedded in a cooler.
Ptak was told that defendant had fired the shot into the cooler. The
recovered bullet was submitted for ballistics study and was later
discovered to match those recovered from the bodies of the
victims. Chicago police detectives Rochowicz and Vallandingham
later spoke with defendant, after advising him again of his
Miranda rights. When confronted with the ballistics evidence,
defendant stated that he "needed time to think." He later agreed to
give an account of what had occurred at Rucks' apartment.
	Defendant told Detective Rochowicz that on December 2, he
telephoned Carla Williams, who was "holding" $5,000 for him.
Defendant told her that he needed the money because he was
broke, but Williams responded that he would have to wait for it.
Defendant become angry and then went to a pool hall, where he
met a man he knew by the names of Eddie Jones and Charles
Battles (hereafter Battles). Defendant told Battles about the money
and offered to pay him $1,500 if Battles would help him recover
the money. Battles agreed, and the men drove to the victims'
apartment. Defendant gave Battles a .38 revolver that defendant
had with him.
	Defendant maintained that he and Battles planned to stage a
phony "stickup." To that end, defendant knocked on the door and
was let in by one of the victims. Defendant left the door slightly
ajar so that Battles could enter behind him. According to
defendant's confession, Battles came into the apartment and
announced a "stickup." Battles, however, became startled when
one of the victims, Rucks, jumped up from a couch, and he shot
her. At this time, the second victim, Parham, started to run away,
and Battles shot her, too. The third victim, Williams, then came
down the stairs from an upper-floor bedroom. When she saw what
had happened, she ran back up the stairs. Battles ran after her, and
shot her. Defendant stated that he heard a shot, but did not know
what happened because he did not follow Battles up the stairs.
After the shooting stopped, Battles told defendant that he "better
be with" Battles, and defendant agreed. Defendant stated that he
left the apartment at that time, but that Battles stayed behind.
	After giving this verbal account to detectives, defendant gave
both oral and written statements to assistant State's Attorney
Michael Gerber. These later statements were substantially similar
to the account defendant gave Detective Rochowicz.
	Apart from defendant's statement, the State also presented
expert testimony regarding the specific characteristics of the
bullets found in the bodies of the victims. Two eyewitnesses also
testified that they saw defendant, on November 26, 1985, shoot a
weapon in a store and that the bullet fired from the gun struck and
became embedded in a cooler. Forensic evidence revealed that the
bullets from the victims' bodies shared the same characteristics as
that found in the store. The State also presented detailed testimony
from the medical examiner who performed the autopsies of the
victims. Each victim was killed by a gunshot wound to the head.
	Defendant did not present any evidence on his behalf. The
jury found defendant guilty of three counts of first degree murder
and three counts of armed robbery.
	As noted previously, the crux of defendant's ineffective-assistance claim is that the evidence of death eligibility is
insufficient to support the trial judge's finding. The standard of
review to be applied is whether, after viewing all of the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the elements necessary to establish
defendant's eligibility for the death penalty beyond a reasonable
doubt. People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 213-14 (1992). In so
doing, a reviewing court must consider that the circuit court heard
and saw the witnesses and, thus, was in a better position to judge
their credibility, to determine the weight to be accorded their
testimony, to decide the inferences to be drawn from the evidence,
and to resolve any conflicts in it. People v. Batchelor, 171 Ill. 2d 367, 376 (1996). The credibility of a defendant's confession is to
be weighed by the trier of fact, which may accept all, parts, or
none of the confession. People v. Pecoraro, 144 Ill. 2d 1, 11
(1991); People v. DiGerlando, 30 Ill. 2d 544, 551 (1964). Where
a defendant's statement is contradicted by the facts and
circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact need not believe it, even
though other witnesses do not contradict the statement directly.
Batchelor, 171 Ill. 2d at 376-77; People v. Warren, 33 Ill. 2d 168,
174 (1965).
	We have thoroughly reviewed the evidence presented at trial
and the arguments made by the parties in these proceedings. After
careful consideration, we must conclude that the State proved
defendant's death eligibility under section 9-1(b)(6) beyond a
reasonable doubt. Although we agree with defendant that, in his
confession, he denied actually killing the victims or inflicting
injuries on the victims in the manner required by section
9-1(b)(6), the trier of fact, as noted above, is not bound to accept
a confession in its entirety. Indeed, the trier of fact may accept the
damaging admissions and discredit the exculpatory assertions in
the confession.  Any discrepancy between defendant's confession
and the evidence is for the trier of fact to consider in assessing the
degree of credibility to afford the confession. People v. Hester, 39 Ill. 2d 489, 511 (1968) overruled on other grounds, People v.
Anderson, 113 Ill. 2d 1 (1986). Thus, in this case, the sentencing
judge, sitting as the trier of fact, had the right to discard
defendant's assertion that it was Battles who had fired all of the
fatal shots. After reviewing the evidence in its entirety, we believe
that this finding was supported by the evidence, as we detail
below.
	Although we acknowledge the closeness of the evidence, we
focus on several facts which we feel a trier of fact may have found
compelling. Critically, the evidence revealed that defendant
continually changed his story to the police investigators.
Defendant told several stories to the police regarding his
knowledge of the events which transpired at Rucks' apartment.
His version of the events changed each time police confronted him
with independent evidence indicating that defendant was lying to
them. As a result, the trier of fact may have believed the central
feature of defendant's confession, that the killings took place
during the course of a felony, but disbelieved the self-serving
portions in which defendant placed blame for the actual killings on
Battles. We note that defendant's confession was corroborated in
some respects by his detailed knowledge of the scene of the crime.
Moreover, the physical and forensic evidence also contradicted
some of the more self-serving portions of that confession. For
example, the circuit judge at sentencing aptly described the
murders as "executions," and our review of the forensic and
physical evidence supports that conclusion much more than it
supports the frenzied, spur-of-the-moment description of the
shootings that defendant attributes to Battles. The medical
examiner testified that Rucks's body bore traces of stippling,
which indicated that she was shot at very close range. This
testimony tends to contradict defendant's statement that Battles
shot Rucks when she was startled by his entrance into the
apartment. The medical examiner's testimony established that
Williams' body not only bore gunshot wounds, but wounds around
her neck. Defendant initially told police that he had seen Williams'
body in the upstairs bedroom and had touched her neck in order to
see if she had a pulse. In defendant's confession, he stated that he
did not go upstairs at all and did not see Battles shoot Williams.
This tends to support the inference that defendant knew facts about
the condition of Williams' body that only her killer would have
known. In our view, the inculpatory parts of defendant's
confession were corroborated by sufficient evidence to support the
judge's finding that defendant was death eligible under section
9-1(b)(6). Further, we believe that the judge's sub silentio
determination to reject the self-serving portions of the confession
is not so manifestly unreasonable as to be subject to reversal upon
review.
	In view of the foregoing, had appellate counsel challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the court's finding of
death eligibility on direct appeal, the challenge would not have
been successful; accordingly, defendant's ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel claim must fail. See West, 187 Ill. 2d  at 435. The
circuit court, therefore, did not err in dismissing this claim.

Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
	Defendant next contends that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to buttress his contention that the evidence was
insufficient to prove defendant eligible for the death penalty.
Defendant maintains that trial counsel should have used two police
reports to corroborate defendant's contention that he was not the
last person to leave Rucks' apartment.
	In determining whether a defendant has been denied effective
assistance of trial counsel, Illinois courts adhere to the test
enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525-27 (1984).  In order to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must first demonstrate that his defense
counsel's performance was deficient in that "counsel made errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland,
466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064. In so
doing, a defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the
challenged action or inaction of counsel was the product of sound
trial strategy and not of incompetence. People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 247 (1989). Secondly, a defendant must demonstrate that,
but for defense counsel's deficient performance, there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698,
104 S. Ct.  at 2068. Both prongs of the Strickland test must be
satisfied before a defendant can prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Courts, however, may resolve
ineffectiveness claims under the two-part Strickland test by
reaching only the prejudice component, for lack of prejudice
renders irrelevant the issue of counsel's performance. See People
v. Erickson, 161 Ill. 2d 82, 90 (1994); Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d  at 525-27.
	Even if this court were to assume that counsel's decision not
to use the police reports was incompetent, we do not believe that
defendant could establish the requisite prejudice. The police
reports reveal that an acquaintance of one of the victims called the
apartment on December 2 between the hours of 10 and 11:45 a.m. 
The caller spoke with Rucks at 10 a.m., but could not get through
later. Taking the affidavit as true, as we must, we still do not
believe that this evidence, if presented to the trier of fact, would
have been sufficient to instill reasonable doubt as to defendant's
death eligibility. The evidence, in and of itself, does not tend to
prove or disprove the central fact in contention, whether defendant
was the actual killer of the three victims.
	 Defendant also points to another police report that contains
observations that, at the time the police entered the apartment, they
found food smoldering in a pot on the stove and the television
turned on. We fail to see how this evidence would have supported
a finding that Battles killed the victims and not defendant. At
most, the police report corroborates the evidence that was
presented at trial, i.e., that the victims were in the middle of a
routine day when they were set upon by their killer. Again, the
evidence, in and of itself, does not tend to prove or disprove the
central fact in contention, whether defendant was the actual killer
of the three victims. Accordingly, we cannot say that the circuit
court erred in dismissing this claim.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Aggravation-Mitigation
	Defendant next asserts that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel at sentencing because trial counsel failed to
investigate potential sources of mitigation and failed to present the
evidence that such an investigation would have uncovered.
Specifically, defendant claims that trial counsel failed to discuss
any mitigation strategy with him and that counsel knew that
defendant suffered from extreme emotional and mental distress at
the time of the offense. Defendant also claims that his trial counsel
failed to contact several family members who would have
provided testimony more favorable than that of the witness
counsel did subpoena.
	We begin our review of this issue by recounting the evidence
adduced during the aggravation/mitigation phase of the capital
sentencing hearing. The State introduced evidence of defendant's
criminal history, which dated back to 1964, when defendant was
convicted of aggravated battery. Defendant was subsequently
convicted of attempted robbery, burglary, unlawful use of
weapons, robbery, aggravated battery/armed violence, and
unlawful use of weapons. The State also presented evidence that
while defendant was in the county jail, awaiting trial on the
charges at issue in this case, he received four disciplinary
violations.
	In mitigation, defendant presented the stipulated testimony of
Lt. Robert Kelly, a Cook County department of corrections officer.
Kelly would have testified, if called, that he was employed by
Cook County as a correctional officer at the county jail, the facility
where defendant had been jailed for the past year. Defendant
manned the food wagon, delivering food to the other inmates.
Defendant also mopped the floors. Defendant performed these
duties well and did not pose a threat to jail staff or inmates.
	The defense also presented the stipulated testimony of Cheryl
Winke, a psychologist with the department of corrections. Winke,
if called to testify, would have stated that she examined defendant
and found that defendant had a "beta I.Q. of 103." Moreover, it
was Winke's opinion that defendant appeared "spontaneously
aggressive" rather than "criminally oriented." Defendant did not
exhibit any psychopathology and appeared to function within the
normal range of intelligence.
	A report by another correctional officer, L.A. Jones, was also
submitted to the circuit court as evidence in mitigation. The
summary, dated in 1981, revealed that defendant was
recommended for meritorious good time by the food service
director for satisfactory work performed. A memorandum, dated
June 26, 1981, also noted that defendant had returned keys that
another inmate had given to him. Defendant told prison officials
that he did not want to become involved. Defendant also won a
trophy for weight-lifting.
	Harold Anderson testified on defendant's behalf. Anderson
stated that he knew defendant personally for 11 years and had
worked with him at a shoe store for four years. Anderson first met
defendant at the state penitentiary, while they were both
incarcerated. He knew defendant to be a "happy-go-lucky" person
who "always kept things alive." Anderson did not believe that
defendant had drug or alcohol problems.
	Defense counsel also called defendant's step-brother, Jerry, as
a witness. Jerry was a reluctant witness whose testimony was
compelled by subpoena. Jerry stated that their mother took care of
both Jerry and defendant as "best she could" and was a "good
mom."  Jerry admitted that defendant was a "good" brother, but
stated that defendant was "not his role model." Jerry did not
approve of defendant's friends. Jerry also stated that he knew that
defendant took drugs, but that he never personally saw defendant
ingest drugs. When defendant was sober, Jerry felt that he could
discuss things with him, but when defendant "was other than
sober," defendant would "get upset" and would be "pretty wild."
In one instance, defendant pulled a knife on him. Jerry knew of
defendant's past criminal history and stated that there "come[s] a
time when you just blanked out because you don't want to
continue hearing about it."
	The circuit court, in sentencing defendant to death, noted that
"the best that can be said" for the defendant was that defendant (i)
helped a fellow convict find a job, (ii) earned statutory good time
while incarcerated, and (iii) won a weight-lifting contest while in
prison. The circuit court also observed that, although defendant
had family living in the Chicago area, the only family member
who testified was his brother, Jerry. Moreover, with respect to
Jerry's testimony, the court stated that "the State could not have
found a better witness than Jerry Wiley if they wrote the script
themselves." Specifically, the court noted the following:
		"This defendant has turned on everyone. He pulls a knife
on his family, he shoots, beats and mauls the public,
establishing a criminal record of repeated violent conduct,
he robs and kills his friends ***.
			I believe the defendant Wiley is possessed of an
abandoned and malignant heart and spirit and this Court
finds no redeeming mitigating factor in this case."
The circuit court thereafter sentenced defendant to death.
	As with alleged claims of ineffectiveness occurring during the
guilt phase of the trial, the standard for determining whether a
defendant has received constitutionally deficient representation at
a capital sentencing hearing is governed by the standard
enunciated in Strickland. As such, a defendant must show that
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that, absent the errors, the judge " 'would have
concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances did not warrant death.' " People v. Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d 124, 145 (1996), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069.
	As noted, defendant claims that his attorney failed to discuss
mitigation strategy with him and that, as a result, counsel did not
call witnesses who were available and willing to testify on his
behalf. These witnesses include defendant's daughter, Gwen
Jones; his stepsister, Rosie Rhodes; and his sister, Juanita Jones.
The affidavits of each of these women indicate that they would
have testified that defendant was a good person, who had an
exemplary employment history. They would have stated that
defendant was a good relation, but that he had a strained
relationship with his stepfather. Defendant also points out that
counsel should have adduced evidence of the history of mental
illness that runs through defendant's family. Further, counsel
knew, or should have known, that defendant was psychologically
impaired, and, as a result, should have had defendant examined by
experts. In support of these allegations, defendant attached to his
petition various documents that he claims to have recovered from
his case file with the Cook County public defender's office. These
documents indicate that defendant may have been suffering from
psychological disorders at the time of the murders. Defendant also
supported his petition with the evaluations of mental health
experts, secured by post-conviction counsel, which would
corroborate the prior diagnoses of head trauma and neurological
disorders.
	It is well settled that counsel has a duty to make reasonable
investigations for potential sources of mitigating evidence to
present at the capital sentencing hearing, or must have a legitimate
reason for failing to make a particular investigation. See
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 690-91, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at
2066; People v. Howery, 178 Ill. 2d 1, 55 (1997); People v.
Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 170 (1995); People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1,
27 (1989). If mitigating evidence exists, counsel then has a duty to
introduce it in support of the defense. See Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 369 (7th Cir. 1989). However, where counsel has
conducted an adequate investigation, the failure to present
mitigating evidence does not by itself demonstrate deficient
performance. See Howery, 178 Ill. 2d  at 55; People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 385 (1997); Orange, 168 Ill. 2d  at 167-68.
	Generally, courts are highly deferential in reviewing counsel's
strategic decisions regarding the presentation of mitigating
evidence. See Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 694-95,
104 S. Ct.  at 2065; Orange, 168 Ill. 2d  at 170. In fact, strategic
choices made after a thorough investigation of the law and facts
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable. See
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at
2066. An informed decision by counsel not to present certain
mitigating evidence may represent a valid strategic choice and is
entitled to judicial deference, where the evidence is potentially
damaging to the defendant. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776,
793-95, 97 L. Ed. 2d 638, 656-57, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3125-26
(1987); Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d  at 385. Such deference is not warranted,
however, where the lack of mitigating evidence presented is not
attributable to strategy, but rather is the result of counsel's failure
to properly investigate mitigation and prepare a defense. See
Howery, 178 Ill. 2d  at 56; Orange, 168 Ill. 2d  at 170.
Consequently, counsel's presentation of mitigation is not deemed
to be a legitimate strategy without a reasonable investigation into
mitigating circumstances. See Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d  at 385; see also
Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 743, 749-50 (7th Cir. 1997).
	In our view, defendant's petition and supporting affidavits
make a substantial showing that defense counsel's limited
presentation of mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing was
not the result of a strategic decision preceded by a reasonable
investigation. The record before this court contains no evidence
that allows us to conclude that counsel's decision not to present
additional mitigating evidence was a strategic decision. We
acknowledge that when the drawbacks of potential mitigating
evidence appear obvious from the record, it can be assumed that
counsel decided not to present evidence for such reasons. See
Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d  at 26. Here, however, there appears to be no
obvious disadvantage in the additional mitigating evidence. On
this record, we reject the State's claim that trial counsel's failure
to present the additional mitigating evidence was a strategic
decision.
	The mitigating evidence offered by trial counsel at the
sentencing hearing portrayed defendant as someone who had good
parents, but who fell in with a bad crowd and got entangled in
drugs and alcohol abuse. Information regarding defendant's need
for psychiatric counseling and history of mental illness might have
provided the sentencing judge with additional information that
could have influenced the choice of sentence. See People v. Perez,
148 Ill. 2d 168, 188-89 (1992) (the State's theory that counsel
reasonably declined to introduce school reports at the sentencing
hearing because they contained aggravating evidence that the
defendant was a "troublemaker" was not reasonable strategy where
counsel did introduce a psychological report at sentencing which
portrayed the defendant as much worse than a "troublemaker").
Moreover, the record before us reveals no attempt by counsel to
secure the testimony of any member of defendant's family other
than his step-brother, Jerry. The affidavits of the family members
here reveal that they were willing to come and provide mitigating
evidence on defendant's behalf. Given the record before us, we
decline to assume that defense counsel's alleged failure to present
the additional mitigating evidence represented a legitimate
strategic decision.
	Having considered the performance prong of the Strickland
standard, we must further examine whether defendant has made a
substantial showing that he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged
deficient performance. In establishing prejudice, defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's
deficient performance, the sentencer would have concluded that
the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors did not warrant
death. See Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068-69. We note that, in the past, this court has held that
despite the violent nature of the offenses and the fact that a
defendant had been convicted of multiple murders, counsel's
failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence so prejudiced
the defendant as to warrant an evidentiary hearing. See Orange,
168 Ill. 2d  at 173; People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 167-68
(1994). While we view some of the mitigation now being
proffered as cumulative to what was presented by counsel at the
hearing, some of it was not. The only type of psychiatric testimony
adduced on defendant's behalf was the stipulated testimony of
Cheryl Winke, who stated that defendant was average in
intelligence and was aggressive. The evidence regarding
defendant's mental history that he contends was available to
counsel and should have been offered in mitigation paints a picture
that is at odds with that stipulated testimony.
	We also note that the circuit court, in sentencing defendant to
death, specifically pointed out that with the exception of Jerry,
members of defendant's family had not testified at sentencing
despite the fact that the trial took place in Chicago, where they
lived. The implication was that defendant's family did not think
enough of defendant to testify on his behalf. The affidavits here
tend to show that other members of defendant's family were
available to testify such that Jerry Wiley, an unwilling witness,
need not have provided the only mitigation voice from the family.
We also cannot ignore the fact that Jerry, the only family member
whom counsel did compel to testify in mitigation, was found by
the court to have been a perfect witness for the State.
	In light of these circumstances, we cannot say, as a matter of
law, that the outcome of the sentencing hearing would have been
the same had the additional pieces of evidence been discovered
and presented by trial counsel. We hold that defendant's post-conviction allegations, liberally construed in his favor and taken
as true in light of the original trial record, establish a substantial
showing of a violation of defendant's right to effective assistance
of counsel at the sentencing hearing. The circuit court improperly
dismissed this claim without an evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION
	The circuit court improperly dismissed defendant's claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel with respect to counsel's
failure to investigate and present evidence in mitigation at the
capital sentencing hearing. The circuit court properly dismissed
the remaining portions of defendant's petition. Accordingly, the
cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings
consonant with this opinion.
Affirmed in part;
reversed in part;
cause remanded with directions.
	The majority correctly reverses and remands this cause for a
hearing on the issue of the effective assistance of counsel. I
concur, therefore, in that narrow portion of the majority's
judgment. However, for the reasons set forth in my dissents in
People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 39-43 (September 27,
2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), and People v. Simpson, No. 85084,
slip op. at 35-38 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting),
I believe defendant's convictions and sentence should also be set
aside because the trial proceedings were conducted without the
minimum constitutional assurances established by the new
supreme court rules governing capital cases. As a result, this cause
should be remanded for a new trial conducted in compliance with
the new rules.
	Additionally, I share Chief Justice Harrison's belief that the
death sentence should not stand for at least one other reason.
Specifically, the State initially failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Wiley was guilty of armed robbery. People v. Wiley,
165 Ill. 2d 259, 303-05 (1995) (Harrison, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Thus, even if defendant were not entitled to the
constitutional guarantees established by the new rules, his death
sentence should still be vacated because it was solely predicated
upon the armed robbery convictions.
	Whether Wiley's attorney provided effective assistance at the
sentencing hearing is not the dispositive issue on this appeal.
Regardless of the effectiveness of the lawyer's representation, the
proceedings which culminated in Wiley's sentence of death were
fatally flawed because they did not comport with the new rules
enacted by our court governing the conduct of cases in which the
State is seeking the death penalty. For the reasons set forth in my
dissenting opinion in People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 35-39 (September 27, 2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting), the
procedures contained in those rules are indispensable for achieving
an accurate determination of innocence or guilt and are applicable
to all capital cases now coming before us. Because Wiley was
tried, convicted and sentenced without the benefit of the new rules,
his convictions and death sentence should be vacated, and the
cause should be remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.
	Even if Wiley were not entitled to the benefit of the new rules,
his sentence of death could not stand no matter what an
evidentiary hearing on his post-conviction petition might reveal.
That is so for two reasons. First, as I noted when this case was
before us on direct review (People v. Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d 259, 303-05 (1995) (Harrison, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part))
and as I reiterated in my dissent when we initially considered the
appeal from the circuit court's order dismissing Wiley's post-conviction petition, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Wiley was guilty of armed robbery. Because the armed
robbery convictions were the sole predicate for Wiley's death
sentence, the death sentence is invalid as a matter of law.
	Second, for the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and
partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois
death penalty law is void and unenforceable because it violates the
eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section
2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Until
defendants are permitted to avail themselves of our new rules and
until we see how those rules work in practice, there is no basis for
altering that conclusion. Wiley's sentence of death should
therefore be vacated, and he should be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(j). Because he
was convicted of murdering more than one victim, the term of
imprisonment must be natural life. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par.
1005-8-1(a)(1)(c).
	To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in
the context of a death sentencing hearing, a defendant must show
prejudice, i.e., that there is a reasonable probability that absent his
counsel's deficient conduct, the court or sentencing jury would
have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating
evidence did not warrant death. People v. Hall, 157 Ill. 2d 324,
337 (1993). I disagree with the majority that defendant in this case
made a substantial showing that he was prejudiced by his
counsel's deficient conduct at defendant's sentencing hearing. I
therefore dissent.
	Defendant claimed that his trial counsel failed to discuss any
mitigation strategy with him. Defendant further alleged that his
trial counsel knew defendant suffered from extreme emotional and
mental distress at the time of the offense because defendant's
mother was critically ill and his wife recently had left him, taking
their infant son with her. Defendant also asserted that his trial
counsel failed to contact several family members who would have
provided testimony more favorable than that of Jerry Wiley. The
evidence submitted by defendant in support of his claim included
an affidavit from his daughter, Gwen Brown, stating that Gwen's
mother told Gwen that she and defendant got along well, but that
defendant often was in and out of jail. Gwen did not have much
contact with defendant when she was a baby because defendant
was in jail. When defendant was not in jail, he would visit Gwen.
Gwen never saw a violent side to defendant. Gwen stated that
defendant always was happy, "sometimes too happy." Gwen said
that defendant always had a job when he was not in jail. With
regard to the illness of defendant's mother, Gwen said that
"[w]hen my grandmother got ill, my dad tried to handle it. We
talked about it."
	Defendant also submitted the affidavits of his sisters, Rosie
Rhodes and Juanita Jones. Rhodes stated that she and defendant
had different fathers, and that defendant's father used to drink
heavily. Rhodes did not know why defendant's father "ended up
in an institution." Defendant's mother treated her children well,
especially the boys. Defendant got along with his stepfather.
Defendant was shot when he was 13 years old, and around that
time, his mother found out that he and his friends were breaking
into parking meters. Rhodes stated that defendant "pretty much"
kept a job, that defendant liked to drink and would get "high" off
of drinking, and that she never saw defendant violent. Rhodes said
that when their mother became sick with pancreatic cancer, "he
[defendant] was hurt ***. [Defendant] pretty much kept his
feelings in. Sometimes, he would lay on the bed with her and cry."
	Jones testified that she and defendant had the same father and
were treated "different" in a small way from their other siblings by
their mother and stepfather. Jones also testified that she had a
stroke and had difficulty remembering, and that defendant was
good to her when she was in the hospital.
	Defendant also attached notes from his case file with the
Cook County public defender in support of his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Included were notes from an interview with
defendant's ex-wife, who said that defendant needed psychiatric
help because he gets angry when he drinks and is like Jekyll and
Hyde. The notes also show that defendant's mother told counsel
that defendant's father died in a mental institution. Defendant also
submitted the report of Dr. Gunn stating that when defendant
"experiences losses (as with his wife and son) he loses control and
even conscious awareness of what is taking place. His rage bursts
out and his control system fails." Dr. Gunn noted defendant's
cocaine and alcohol use, and that defendant reported blackouts and
many head injuries, and should be screened for traumatic brain
injury.
	The evidence in aggravation revealed defendant's criminal
history dating back to 1964. In 1964, defendant was convicted of
unlawful use of a weapon and aggravated battery when he was
caught shooting at a boy with a sawed-off shotgun. That same
year, he also was convicted of attempt robbery. In 1970, defendant
served five years' probation for burglary. In 1973, defendant
received five years' felony probation for unlawful use of a
weapon. In that incident, defendant raised a shotgun, rested it on
the roof of an automobile, fired in the direction of a man and shot
out a store window. When police officers ordered defendant to put
the gun down, defendant refused, but was apprehended when
another man crept up behind defendant and grabbed the shotgun.
	Defendant next served a sentence of one to four years'
imprisonment for a 1976 robbery conviction following his arrest
for the armed robbery of a grocery store. In 1978, defendant was
convicted of aggravated battery and armed violence and was
sentenced to concurrent terms of seven years and five years of
imprisonment. That conviction was based upon an incident where
defendant hit a 73-year-old woman numerous times on the face
with a gun, wrestled the woman to the floor when she tried to get
away from him, then put his knee to her chest and started choking
her.
	Defendant thereafter received a two-year sentence of
imprisonment in 1983 for unlawful use of a weapon, following an
incident where defendant was found crouched on a street corner
with a gun extended in his hand. The murders giving rise to the
instant charges occurred in 1985. In addition, while in Cook
County jail awaiting trial on the charges in this case, defendant
received four disciplinary violations.
	Given defendant's extensive criminal history, I do not believe
that any of the mitigating evidence offered by defendant would
have outweighed the aggravating evidence. This court frequently
has refused to find prejudice due to ineffective assistance of
counsel in cases involving violent crimes where a defendant's
extensive criminal history was so great that it would have been
highly improbable that proposed mitigation evidence would have
outweighed the aggravating evidence. See People v. Jones, 144 Ill. 2d 242 (1991); People v. Neal, 142 Ill. 2d 140 (1990); People v.
Owens, 129 Ill. 2d 303 (1989).
	Here, the testimony of defendant's daughter and sister that
they had never seen defendant violent would not have been
sufficient to counter defendant's lengthy and violent criminal
history. In addition, although the testimony of defendant's family
members would have shown that defendant was upset by his
mother's illness, their testimony does not establish that defendant
suffered an extreme emotional or mental disturbance as a result of
her illness. Further, while the report of Dr. Gunn suggests a brain
injury, blackouts and a loss of conscious awareness of what is
taking place when defendant experiences losses, I note that
defendant did not claim that he had no memory of the murders in
this case, and in fact was in control of his mental faculties enough
to continually change his story to the police when confronted with
evidence that he was lying. I further note that defendant also had
presented stipulated evidence at his sentencing hearing that Cheryl
Winke, a psychologist with the Department of Corrections, would
have testified that defendant did not exhibit any psychopathology
and appeared to function within the normal range of intelligence.
Consequently, I do not believe that Dr. Gunn's report would have
been sufficient to overcome the aggravating factors in this case.
	I also believe this case is distinguishable from People v.
Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138 (1995), and People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148 (1994), cited by the majority in support of their finding that
defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Slip op. at 16, 18.
In Orange, we noted that the defendant had a limited criminal
history and his prior adjudications had occurred more than 15
years earlier when the defendant was a juvenile. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d  at 171. The defendant's affiants would have provided testimony
concerning defendant's ability to maintain employment over the
past 14 years, as well as testimony concerning defendant's violent
upbringing, his ability to maintain caring relationships with family
members, and his trustworthiness in the eyes of his employers.
Orange, 168 Ill. 2d  at 171. We concluded that it was not
unreasonable that such mitigating evidence might have provided
the court "with a portrait of the defendant that may have
influenced the choice of sentence." Orange, 168 Ill. 2d  at 171.
	Similarly, in Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 165, defense counsel
argued at defendant's death penalty hearing that defendant should
not be sentenced to death because he had not been clearly
identified as the gunman. In support of his post-conviction
petition, the defendant submitted affidavits from his parents,
siblings, children and friends stating that they would have testified
on defendant's behalf had they been asked to do so. Thompkins,
161 Ill. 2d  at 166. This court found that the defendant was entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, noting that the mitigating evidence would have
complemented defense counsel's strategy at the defendant's
sentencing hearing, and that "[f]avorable testimony by the
defendant's family members would have fortified counsel's
contention that the evidence of the defendant's role in the offenses
was subject to doubt." Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d  at 167.
	Here, in contrast, there was evidence supporting a finding that
the defendant shot the victims, despite his denials. This fact,
coupled with defendant's lengthy and violent criminal history,
likely would outweigh favorable testimony from defendant's
family members. I also am not convinced that the materials
submitted by defendant in mitigation established a mental health
history that would have outweighed the aggravating factors.
Therefore, I would affirm the trial court's order dismissing
defendant's post-conviction petition without an evidentiary
hearing.
	JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this dissent.
 



1.      1This date was misstated in our previous opinions as December 2,
1986. See Wiley I, 156 Ill. 2d  at 467; Wiley II, 165 Ill. 2d  at 267.