Case Title: Lewis v. DNR

Citation: 377 Md. 382

Docket Number: 114mr/02

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Edwin H. Lewis v. Department of Natural Resources
No. 114, September Term, 2002
Headnote:
The decision of the Wicomico County Board of Zoning Appeals was vacated
because the Board improperly denied petitioner’s variance request to build a
hunting camp within the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Buffer by utilizing
improper standards in its application of the Court of Appeals’ recent opinions
of Belvoir Farms, White and Mastandrea. Although the Court of Appeals
normally defers to an administrative agency’s decision regarding the facts of
a hearing, they do not defer to the agency when it has committed such errors
of law. The Court remanded this case to the Board for reconsideration of
petitioner’s variance request in light of the standards and guidance set forth in
the opinion.
Circuit Court for Wicomico C ounty
Case #22-C-01-00345
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 114
September Term, 2002
Edwin H. Lewis
v.
Department of Natural Resources
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Raker, Wilner and Battaglia, JJ., Dissent.
Filed: July 31, 2003
Petitioner, Edwin H. Lewis, seeks the reversal of a decision of the Wicomico County
Board of Zoning Appeals (Board) denying his request for a zoning variance to construct a
hunting camp on his property located within a Critical Area Buffer.  On judicial review, the
Circuit Court for Wicomico County, after an October 12, 2001 hearing, upheld the decision
of the Board.  Petitioner appealed and the Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion
dated October 9, 2002, affirmed the Circuit Court’s upholding of the Board’s decision.
On November 25, 2002, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this
Court and, on January 9, 2003, we granted the petition.  Lewis v. Department of Natural
Resources, 372 Md. 684, 814 A.2d 570 (2003).  Petitioner presents three questions for our
review:
“1.  Did the Board err by denying Petitioner’s Critical Area Buffer
variance request in a decision written for it by the Critical Area Commission
without considering all of the statutory factors for such a determination, by
improperly construing and applying some of the factors it did consider, and by
impermissibly applying the Critical Area Commission’s ‘cumulative impact’
argument?
“2.  Did the Board err in not finding Petitioner’s hunting camp to be a
reasonable and significant use of his property although it could not be located
out of the Buffer, would occupy less than 1.5 percent of the Buffer, would not
cause any environmental harm, and there was no evidence that its design or
size was either inappropriate or too large for the site?
“3.  Did the Board err in the decision written for it by the Critical Area
Commission by then applying the criteria for an unconstitutional taking rather
than the criteria for an unwarranted hardship in denying Petitioner’s Buffer
variance application?”
We answer in the affirmative to petitioner’s questions 1 and 3, as we hold that the Board
committed several errors of law in its decision denying petitioner’s variance request,
including not considering all of the County Code’s variance criteria and misapplying the
1 See Md. Code § 8-1812 of the Natural Resources Article.
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unwarranted hardship standard.  Accordingly, we do not answer petitioner’s question 2; we
instead vacate the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, direct that court to vacate the
decision of the Circuit Court with directions to vacate the decision of the Wicomico County
Board of Zoning Appeals and to remand the case to the Board to reconsider petitioner’s
variance request in light of our holding.
I.  Facts
A.  Critical Area Resource Protection Program Background
As we did in White v. North, 356 Md. 31, 736 A.2d 1072 (1999), we shall set out a
brief overview of the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Protection Program (Critical Area
Program) to fully understand the nature of this case.  The Critical Area Program is currently
codified in Maryland Code (1973, 2000 Repl. Vol.), sections 8-1801 to 8-1817 of the Natural
Resources Article.  Respondent is the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), the
department with the authority, through the Chairman of the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area
Commission (Commission), to enforce the Critical Area Program.1  The Commission’s
regulations are encompassed in Title 27 of the Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR).
We summarized in White:
“It is important to understand the interrelationship between the State-
imposed, but locally enforced, critical area prohibitions and local zoning
requirements generally. Section 8-1802 of the Natural Resources Article
provides:
‘(a) Definitions. . . .
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. . . .
(11)(i) “Project approval” means the approval of
development . . . in the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area by the
appropriate local approval authority.
(ii) “Project approval” includes:
. . . .
3. Issuance of variances, special exceptions, and
conditional use permits . . . .’
Section 8-1808(a)(1) requires local governments to have primary responsibility
for development of programs to regulate land use in the critical area, ‘subject
to review and approval by the Commission.’ The program, ‘[a]t a minimum,’
must include ‘[z]oning ordinances or regulations.’ § 8-1808(c). Pursuant to
these provisions, the Commission oversees the local governments in the
adoption of zoning regulations for the critical area, including variance
provisions acceptable to the Commission. Once local critical area programs are
adopted and approved, the programs can, depending upon their language,
impose additional or different limitations. . . .
“Finally, section 8-1812 confers full standing to the Chairman of the
Commission to intervene in any administrative or judicial proceeding arising
out of local project approval in the critical area, subject to withdrawal if
thirteen members of the Commission oppose the intervention within thirty-five
days. See North v. St. Mary’s County, 99 Md. App. 502, 508, 638 A.2d 1175,
1178 (noting that section 8-1812 confers ‘unrestricted’ standing upon the
Commission to appeal any administrative or judicial decision impacting the
Critical Area Program), cert. denied sub nom. Enoch v. North, 336 Md. 224,
647 A.2d 444 (1994).
“Also crucial to this case is the ‘buffer’ the Commission requires local
jurisdictions to create. See COMAR 27.01.09.01.C.(1). A buffer is defined in
COMAR 27.01.09.01.A as ‘an existing, naturally vegetated area, or an area
established in vegetation and managed to protect aquatic, wetlands, shoreline,
and terrestrial environments from man-made disturbances.’  The buffer must
extend at least 100 feet from any tidal waterway, wetland, or tributary of the
Chesapeake Bay, but localities must expand the buffer ‘to include contiguous,
sensitive areas, such as steep slopes . . . whose development or disturbance
may impact streams, wetlands, or other aquatic environments.’ COMAR
27.01.09.01.C.(1) & (7). County Code, Article 28, section 1A-104(a)(1) states:
‘If there are contiguous slopes of 15% or greater, the buffer shall be expanded
. . . to the top of the slope . . . and shall include all land within 50 feet of the
top of the bank of steep slopes.’ Within that buffer, the Commission bans any
2Additionally relevant is Md. Code § 8-1809(a) of the Natural Resources Article,
which states:
“(a) Statements of intent. – Within 45 days after the criteria adopted by
the Commission under § 8-1808 of this subtitle become effective, each local
jurisdiction shall submit to the Commission a written statement of its intent to
either:
(1) To develop a critical area protection program to control the use and
development of that part of the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area located within
its territorial limits; or 
(2) Not to develop such a program.”
3 Hereinafter, unless noted otherwise, all statutory references are to the Wicomico
County Code.
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new development of all ‘impervious surfaces’ that are not ‘water-dependent,’
. . .  COMAR 27.01.09.01.C.(2). The only way to build any impervious
structure . . . is to apply and qualify for a variance under local zoning
ordinances.”
White, 356 Md. at 36-38, 736 A.2d at 1075-76 (footnotes omitted).
Pursuant to these previously mentioned provisions of the Maryland Code,2 Wicomico
County adopted its Critical Area Program as codified in Chapter 125 of the Wicomico
County Code (County Code).  That program’s stated purpose, in reference to development
within the Critical Area, is:
“to provide special regulatory protection for the land and water resources
located within the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area in Wicomico County . . . to
foster more sensitive development activity for shoreline areas and to minimize
the adverse impacts of development activities on water quality and natural
habitats.”
County Code, § 125-1.3  The County Code specifically prohibits development inside the area
known as the Buffer.  County Code, § 125-9.  Section 125-7 defines the “Buffer” as:
“A naturally vegetated area or vegetated area established or managed to protect
4 Petitioner does not dispute that the roofs of his cabins fall within this definition. 
5 Under County Code § 125-18, some “Water-dependent facilities” may be located
inside the Buffer.  Petitioner does not contend that his buildings fall within the definition of
“Water-dependent facilities.”
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aquatic, wetland shoreline and terrestrial environments from man-made
disturbances.  In the Critical Area District, the minimum Buffer is a contiguous
area located immediately landward of tidal waters measured from the mean
high-water line, tributary systems in the critical area and tidal wetlands and has
a minimum width of 100 feet.  The Buffer shall be expanded beyond the
minimum depth to include certain sensitive areas as per requirements
established in this chapter.”
These Buffers act as a “setback” for development protecting the Chesapeake Bay’s water
quality.  Section 125-9 of the County Code set outs Wicomico County’s prohibition of
development in the Buffer as it states:
“Except as provided for in § 125-18, new development activities,
including clearing of existing natural vegetation, erection of structures,
construction of new roads, parking areas or other impervious surfaces and the
placement of sewage disposal systems, are not permitted in the Buffer, except
as provided for in § 125-11.” [Emphasis added.]
Impervious surfaces are defined as “Any man-made surface that is resistant to the penetration
of water.”4  County Code § 125-7.  If development does not fit the §125-18 criteria 5 for an
exception to §125-9, the County Code allows another avenue for possible development in the
Buffer; it authorizes the Board to grant variances in certain situations.  See County Code §§
125-35 and 36, infra.  The Board’s denial of petitioner’s variance request to build part of a
hunting camp in the Buffer of his property is the subject of this appeal.
6 The record reflects that these structures were built long before petitioner acquired
the property and are not part of this appeal.
7 See supra, for the definition of a Buffer.
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B.  Lewis’ Property
In April of 1999, petitioner purchased two tracts of land in Wicomico County located
on opposite sides of Cross Thorofare, a tributary of the Nanticoke River, which is entirely
inside the county’s Chesapeake Bay Critical Area (Critical Area).  The western tract of
218.78 acres is comprised entirely of marshland, while the eastern tract of 76.80 acres is
comprised of 69.57 acres of marshland and 7.23 acres in “three upland areas.”  The largest
of these “upland areas,” Phillips Island, is 5.30 acres in size and is the subject of the litigation
in the case sub judice.  At the time of petitioner’s purchase of these two tracts of land, the
only man-made improvements located on the property were an old boat pier and storage
building on Phillips Island6 and 12-15 duck blinds in the western tract of marshland. 
Petitioner testified that he wanted to use the property just for “recreational” use.  He stated,
“It was [used to] spend the night.  You could go out there, you could eat, spend the night,
hunt early.” (alteration added).
According to testimonial and photographic evidence, Phillips Island is shaped
relatively like a boot.  Because of the island’s irregular shape, nearly the entire island, except
for “three narrow, irregularly-shaped, and unconnected areas,” lies within the Critical Area
Buffer, as defined by the County Code.7  In fact, 5.06 of the 5.30 acres, or 95.5 percent, of
the island is within the protected Buffer.  The main vegetation of the totally wooded island
8 The understory is defined as “a layer of vegetation beneath the main canopy of a
forest.”  The Oxford American College Dictionary, 1530 (Putnam 2002).
9 After learning of the need for permits, petitioner ceased construction of the camp and
began to confer with County officials in an attempt to obtain the necessary permits.
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consists of mature oaks and loblolly pine trees.  The understory,8 except for the 20-25 feet
of the Buffer closest to the marsh, is sparse with greenbriar and sassafras.  According to
testimony, the inland portion of the island has little ground cover, i.e., shrubs, due to, in part,
the tree canopy of the wooded area blocking out sunlight and limiting this type of growth.
Later in 1999, petitioner began to build a seasonal hunting camp on Phillips Island
without gaining approval or permits from the County.9  The camp consisted of, or was to
consist of, six buildings: one main, 40' x 40' lodge with a kitchen and bath (Building 1), one
29'x 20' bath house/restroom (Building 3), one 17' x 18' bunk room (Building 2), two 14' x
16' bunk rooms (Buildings 4 and 5) and a 39' x 18' storage shed (Building 6).  Buildings 1-5
were not built on a conventional foundation; they are supported on wood posts about two to
three feet above the ground.  The total “footprint” of the six buildings is 3,636 square feet.
After halting construction, petitioner commissioned a survey of the island for the
purpose of ascertaining the location of his camp’s buildings in relation to the Critical Area
Buffer.  The survey illustrated the existence of  “three narrow, irregularly-shaped, and
unconnected areas,”  totaling 10,463 square feet (4.5 percent of the island), which were the
only areas of Phillips Island not located within the Buffer.  Of the 10,463 square feet not
located within the Buffer, 10,073 square feet was required as an area for the location of
10 Lawrence T. Whitlock, Jr., a landscape architect, environmental planner and
member of the State Water Quality Advisory Committee, gathered evidence pertaining to the
appropriateness of the hunting camp in its current location.  Edward Launay, an expert on
environmental matters, testified to matters pertaining to the possible adverse impacts the
camp may have on water quality, habitat and the possible need for mitigation.
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sewage disposal for the hunting camp.  The County’s planning staff attempted to reduce the
10,073 square foot sewage disposal area required by the State Health Department in order
to make more of the non-Buffer area available for the construction of petitioner’s hunting
cabins.  The County staff persuaded the Health Department, due in part to the hunting camp’s
seasonal and private use nature, to reduce the area needed for sewage disposal.  Thus,
petitioner received Health Department approval for a reduced sewage disposal area of
5,811.92 square feet.  As a result of that reduction, the County staff suggested that petitioner
move four of the six buildings from the Buffer to the non-Buffer area salvaged from the prior
sewage disposal area.  Petitioner then applied for a variance for a personal hunting camp with
four buildings inside the non-Buffer area previously designated for part of the sewage
disposal area, as suggested by the County planners, and two buildings inside the Buffer.  It
is uncontroverted that petitioner’s use of the property for hunting purposes would be a
permitted use in the agricultural rural zoning district where Phillips Island is located.
The county planning staff then suggested that petitioner employ an environmental
consultant.  Petitioner retained two experienced environmental consultants to assess whether
his hunting camp would have adverse impacts on the surrounding habitat and water quality.10
Although their reasoning was somewhat different, the consultants suggested that petitioner
11 This building, the only one to be moved partially out of the Buffer, is the only
building not to be supported on wood posts approximately two to three feet above the
ground.
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leave all of the camp’s buildings in their current location and not to relocate four buildings
into the non-Buffer area salvaged from the prior sewage disposal area.  They testified that
placing the camp outside of the Buffer would have a greater adverse impact on the
environment than leaving the buildings within the Buffer, as well as precluding that area
from being used as an expanded or replacement sewage disposal area should that need arise
in the future.  Given these expert opinions, on October 11, 2000, petitioner modified his
variance request, thereby requesting the Board to allow him to leave the buildings “where
they sit.”  In his “Modified Site Plan For Phillips Island,” petitioner did propose moving one
building, the storage shed,11 partially into the non-Buffer sewage disposal area.
C.  Board Hearing & Decision
Petitioner argues that at the Board’s hearing he testified that he located the buildings
in a position where he needed to remove “only two live trees, [and] that he had also cut 15-20
dead, diseased or falling-down trees” (alteration added).  He also stated that he cleared some
of the understory, mostly greenbriar, but that he left the eastern end of the island untouched,
i.e., he did not cut or clear that area.  Petitioner additionally presented expert witness
testimony regarding the island and the absence of adverse impacts on the surrounding
environment if he were allowed to retain the structures as built and use them as a private
personal hunting camp.  One of petitioner’s experts, Mr. Launay, testified that the island had
12 Petitioner’s other expert witness, Lawrence Whitlock, testified that he also saw no
problems with adverse impacts on water quality of the area as a result of the cabins.  He too
observed no drainage problems as a result of the cabin roofs, as the island’s “soil type easily
accommodates that run-off.”  In fact, he stated that, in his opinion, that boat traffic back and
forth to the many duck blinds in the marsh presents a greater danger to the area’s water
quality than do petitioner’s cabins.
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many typical characteristics of islands within marshes of Wicomico County.  He reasoned
that these characteristics, including sparse inland understory vegetation, existed because the
island is elevated, well-drained, has little nutrients reaching the understory and that the dense
tree canopy blocks out sunlight to the inner areas of the island; the existence of all of these
factors would likely inhibit dense understory growth.
In reference to the environmental impacts of the hunting cabins themselves, Mr.
Launay performed various environmental tests and assessments to discern any adverse
impacts that the cabins might have on the environment.  He testified that their construction
was placed to minimize any adverse impact on the forest.  In fact, he said that the buildings
have little, if any, adverse impact on the tree canopy.  In addition, Mr. Launay testified that
the type of soil on the island is of a consistency that would potentially absorb rain run-off
from the rooftops of the cabins, thus minimizing the adverse environmental impact of the
cabins.  When asked if the building would adversely impact the quality of the surface waters
abutting the island, Mr. Launay stated that he found no adverse effects.12  He testified as to
six reasons why the camp would not produce a “pollutant source,” including that the
construction produced no site grading, there was no meaningful excavation as five of the six
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buildings have no conventional foundation, the buildings are comprised of all natural
materials, the shingles on the cabin roofs are natural cedar and not asphalt, the camp is to
contain no concrete and all pathways in the camp are made entirely of mulch.
Mr. Launay also testified to the impervious nature of surfaces in the campsite.  He
found only the roofs to be classified as impervious, as defined by § 125-7 of the County
Code.  He found, however, that the roofs did not have the normal consequences of a typical
impervious surface, i.e., problems associated with rain run-off.  He stated, “the underneath
of the building is open . . . to accept run-off that might percolate or pass through from higher
portions of the site . . . there’s no grading, and there’s been no change in the topography.”
During his inspection of the site, as the cabins were already partially constructed, Mr. Launay
observed the actual impact of the camp’s cabins on the environment of Phillips Island.  He
observed no formation of gullies, no erosion and no other evidence that run-off from the
cabins was reaching the water protected by the Buffer.  The rain, according to Mr. Launay
and his soil tests, was absorbed into the ground, thus preventing the run-off of rain into the
streams and waterways adjacent to the camp.
Mr. Launay did testify that the camp had some impact on the surrounding habitat.  He
said that while any human presence would somewhat impact an area like Phillips Island, he
observed that petitioner’s removal of greenbriar and other understory species of plant
somewhat altered the habitat of the island.  According to Mr. Launay, however, the removal
of such species actually “improve[s] tree quality.”  He observed that the camp was in a “very
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natural state” and that “little appreciable change to the wildlife species” had occurred as a
result of the building of the cabins.  He summarized by saying, “I really can’t say that . . .
what Mr. Lewis has constructed out there has any real significant impacts on either water
quality, the wildlife value of the site or the plant habitat.”
Mr. Launay, in fact, testified that the habitat of Phillip Island would fare better with
the buildings located in their current position, rather than moving them to the inner portion
of the island, i.e., within the narrow, noncontiguous strips of land outside the Buffer.  He
stated that the habitat there differed very little from the Buffer and that the difference in a
few feet had little difference in the impact on the wildlife.  He did state that, in the context
of Phillips Island, the actual effects of moving the buildings out of the Buffer would be more
devastating to the environment than leaving the cabins in their current location as the move
would require petitioner to cut down several large, mature trees that impact large areas both
inside and outside the Buffer.  Removal of these trees, according to Mr. Launay, would open
up large portions of an otherwise undisturbed canopy, thus changing the landscape of the
forest, i.e., the oaks, pines and holly occupying the non-Buffer area.  Finally, Mr. Launay
testified that mitigation of certain native shrubs, coupled with precluding development on the
other two upland islands, would have the greatest beneficial effect on the habitat of the
property.
The Commission presented two expert witnesses to the Board.  LeeAnn Chandler, a
natural resources planner for the Commission, included testimony from a letter she submitted
13 The “Q” refers to the question asked by petitioner’s counsel and the “A” refers to
Ms. Chandler’s answer.
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to the Board comprising her review of the statutory factors to be considered by the Board in
variance cases.  She also testified as to the purpose and importance of the Buffer in the
scheme of the County Code.  Her testimony purported to refute the testimony of petitioner’s
experts’ testimony that the run-off from the cabin roofs did not adversely impact the habitat.
She testified to her observations of petitioner’s removal of the understory and of its later
recovery when new vegetation had grown in those cleared areas.  On cross-examination, the
following question was asked by petitioner’s counsel, “do you have any empirical evidence
to support the statement that there’s any increase in the volume or velocity of run-off on the
roofs on these particular structures on this site?”  Ms. Chandler answered, “I can’t quantify
a specific number, no.”  The testimony further elicited that Ms. Chandler had no factual
basis, in the form of tests, samples or data, to support her conclusions:
“Q.[13] And we don’t have any concrete or asphalt driveways or
sidewalks on the site, do we?
A.
No, we have a lot of treated lumber.
Q.
Treated lumber?  Where is that?
A.
All the cedar shakes, I’m sure they’re treated with something.
Q.
Do you know whether they’re treated?
A.
No, but –
Q.
Okay.  Did you hear Mr. Launay testify that they were natural
cedar siding and natural cedar shakes roofing?
A.
Well, they seem to be very regular for being natural.  They were
in the same shape, size, everything, so they’re not completely natural.
Q.
You mean because they’re cut the same size or shape?
A.
And I’m sure they’re treated with something.
Q.
Like what?
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A.
Chemicals that help protect it from, from degrading in the
environment over time.
Q.
But that, that is your speculation?
A.
Yes.”
Further questioning elicited that Ms. Chandler was relying on potential cumulative impacts
of development generally and not site specific data regarding the Phillips Island site.
“Q.
And you referred to cumulative impacts?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Have you determined and are you able to quantify any adverse
impact of these particular six buildings on any aspect of water quality in either
ground water or the adjacent stream waters of the tributaries of the Nanticoke
River?
A.
The whole idea of cumulative impact is not to look at each
specific little thing.  It’s the idea that over time –
Q.
No, that wasn’t my question.
A.
– it causes an effect.
Q.
My first question, though, is have you determined whether and
have you done any testing or have any quantifiable way to show that these
buildings have caused any increased levels of pollutants, nutrients or toxins to
the base system?
A.
I have not conducted any studies.
Q.
Nor do you have any such data?
A.
I know that there’s 33 -- 3370 square feet of less area of
infiltration and for habitat.
Q.
That’s correct.  The question, though, is do you have anything
from which you can show or demonstrate that that 3300 square feet has caused
an increase in the levels of pollutants, nutrients and toxins to the base system?
A.
No.
Q.
Okay.  All right.  Now, then, let’s look at what the statute says
. . . .  It doesn’t talk about just cumulative impacts, does it?  Doesn’t the word
cumulative impacts refer to human activities that have caused increased levels
of pollutants, nutrients and toxins?
A.
It states the cumulative impacts of human activity, yes, you’re
right.
Q.
Okay.  So only those . . . activities that have caused increased
levels of pollutants, etc., are the concern that brings them within this umbrella
of cumulative effects?
14 Petitioner has not requested a variance for the clearing of this vegetation; he
requests a variance only for the building of the cabins inside the Buffer.  He admits that this
clearing may subject him to penalties and/or fines.  
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A.
No, it’s the cumulative effect that causes the pollutants to have
effects.  It’s . . . the assemblage of all – I mean, if there were ten million of
these cabins, that would be cumulative effects, but we don’t have to look at
this one little, this one island when you’re talking about cumulative effects.”
[Emphasis added.]
The Commission’s other expert, Russ Hill, a Department of Natural Resources habitat
manager, testified that petitioner had cut vegetation in an area greater than needed to build
the cabins of the camp.14  Mr. Hill, however, went on to state that the vegetation was
recovering and the new vegetation will again be a source of food and cover for wildlife, after
it fully grows back.  He went on to agree with petitioner’s expert’s advice regarding
mitigation and that the species recommended by Mr. Launay would enhance the area’s
wildlife value.  He did state, however, that the buildings altered the current state of the island
as vegetation under and immediately surrounding the buildings would not likely remain the
same because of the increased human traffic.  This, he stated, could adversely affect the
native animal species in those areas of human activity.  Mr. Hill admitted, however, that this
would be true of any building placed in or outside of the Buffer.
Other testimony was brought out by members of the public.  The only part of this lay
testimony to bring out empirical data was the testimony of Don Jackson, an employee of the
Chesapeake Bay Foundation.  While the county planners themselves found that only “several
trees had been cut” by petitioner, Mr. Jackson testified that he counted 114 tree stumps of
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five inches or greater in diameter, of which 27 were dead trees.  According to Mr. Jackson,
twenty one of those stumps were under or near petitioner’s buildings although exhibits
entered into the record depict photographs of the island and its full tree canopy.  Mr. Jackson
also testified that the property was used for hunting, fishing and once as a residence, prior
to its purchase by petitioner.
At the conclusion of the testimony, several members of the Board indicated the
evidence they used in determining their decisions.  In referring to a letter Ms. Chandler
submitted to the Board, Board Member Ennis stated, in part:
“And the rest of my comments I’m going to make is in the context of
that we, or I will be trying to view this and am viewing this as if the buildings
were not already there.  However, I want to say that I think as far as my
opinion goes, ignorance of the law is not an excuse.  Somebody should have
known better, and I think somebody did know better.
“I believe that within the Chesapeake Bay critical areas report, the
cumulative impact, to me – I could be interpreting it wrong – means general
impact and not site specific.  I think we’re talking about cumulative meanings
wherever, and it’s just a, it’s just what it says.
“I think that Don Jackson made a good point that the specific impact,
negative impact, let’s just say, should be disproved by the Applicant.  It’s not
proved by the opponents, because I do also believe that the burden of proof
rests on the Applicants.
“I think that we do risk a dangerous setting of a dangerous precedent
with this case if we were to approve it.  I don’t think that this is a case of
unwarranted hardship, and I think it’s self-imposed.  This is not a home we’re
talking about building.  This is a place to go duck hunting, and in that regard,
I don’t think that this is a denial of a reasonable and significant use of property
because that’s what they want to do.  They want to have recreation . . . and if
there is to be accommodations for sleeping . . . there’s space to do that . . .
outside the buffer.
. . . 
“I generally agree with the letter that was submitted by the Chesapeake
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Bay Critical Area Commission.”
Mr. Ennis stated that if the Board denied petitioner’s variance request, he would also be
inclined not to allow petitioner to build in the narrow strips outside the Buffer because of the
evidence offered by petitioner.  Board Member Wolfe, after touting the letter submitted by
the Commission, used it to aid him in stating the Board’s reasoning in orally denying
petitioner’s variance request at the October hearing.  He relied, in part, that there was no
unwarranted hardship as the buildings’ construction without a permit was a “self-created
hardship” and granting the variance request would have given petitioner a “special
privilege.”  In reference to possible adverse impacts on water quality from rainwater run-off
on the roofs, he stated:
“There’s been testimony one way and the other regarding whether or not it
would have impacted the water quality.  Can’t help but have water impact with
six structures, six roofs, water shedding off those.  Whether or not they perk
directly into the ground or not, it would eventually find itself, it would find its
way into the ground water, and cedar shingles do have a natural cedar oil
which may or may not be toxic and cause problems.”
Board Member Baker suggested one amendment to the unanimous oral decision denying
petitioner’s variance request when he said, “In the past, the Board has on occasion, especially
when both sides are represented by attorneys, requested that draft findings be prepared by the
party in whose favor the motion goes, so if the Critical Area Commission would be willing
to draft the findings?”  Respondent’s counsel answered, “Sure.”  Four months later, on
February 13, 2001, the Board adopted the findings of fact that the Commission drafted
without substantive change or adopting any of petitioner’s comments in its written decision.
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II.  Standard of Review
We have very recently set out the standard of review for this Court’s review of zoning
board decisions in Stansbury v. Jones, 372 Md. 172, 182-85, 812 A.2d 312, 318-20 (2002),
where we said:
“Almost a half-century ago, in a case involving a denial of a use permit,
we stated: ‘It is a clearly established rule in the law of zoning that a court may
not substitute its judgment for that of the Zoning Board.’ Dorsey Enterprises,
Inc. v. Shpak, 219 Md. 16, 23, 147 A.2d 853, 857 (1959). Chief Judge
Hammond wrote for the Court in State Ins. Comm’r v. National Bureau of
Casualty Underwriters, 248 Md. 292, 309, 236 A.2d 282, 292 (1967), that
‘under . . . [either] of the standards the judicial review essentially should be
limited to whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual
conclusion the agency reached. (alteration added).’
“Whether reasoning minds could reasonably reach a conclusion from
facts in the record is the essential test.  If such a conclusion is sufficiently
supported by the evidence, then it is based upon substantial evidence. Forty
years ago in Snowden v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 224 Md. 443,
447-48, 168 A.2d 390, 392 (1961), we noted that:
‘The substantial evidence test “means that the reviewing
court’s inquiry is whether on the record the agency could
reasonably make the finding.” . . . Substantial evidence is “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” The heart of the fact finding process
often is the drawing of inferences from the facts. The
administrative agency is the one to whom is committed the
drawing of whatever inferences reasonably are to be drawn from
the factual evidence. “The Court may not substitute its judgment
on the question whether the inference drawn is the right one or
whether a different inference would be better supported. The test
is reasonableness, not rightness.”’[Citation omitted.]
Over twenty years later we opined, ‘if the evidence makes the issue of harm
fairly debatable, the matter is one for the Board’s decision, and should not be
second-guessed by an appellate court.’  Board of County Commissioners for
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Cecil County v. Holbrook, 314 Md. 210, 218, 550 A.2d 664, 668 (1988). See
also Ramsay, Scarlett & Co., Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 302 Md.
825, 490 A.2d 1296 (1985) and Comptroller of the Treasury v. World Book
Childcraft International, Inc., 67 Md. App. 424, 508 A.2d 148 (1986).
“In White v. North, 356 Md. 31, 44, 736 A.2d 1072, 1079 (1999), we
much more recently restated the general standard of review that:
‘In judicial review of zoning matters, including special
exceptions and variances, “the correct test to be applied is
whether the issue before the administrative body is ‘fairly
debatable,’ that is, whether its determination is based upon
evidence from which reasonable persons could come to different
conclusions.”  Sembly v. County Bd. of Appeals, 269 Md. 177,
182, 304 A.2d 814, 818 (1973). See also Board of County
Comm’rs v. Holbrook, 314 Md. 210, 216-17, 550 A.2d 664, 668
(1988); Prince George’s County v. Meininger, 264 Md. 148,
151, 285 A.2d 649, 651 (1972); Zengerle v. Board of County
Comm’rs, 262 Md. 1, 17, 276 A.2d 646, 654 (1971); Gerachis
v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 261 Md. 153, 156, 274
A.2d 379, 381 (1971). For its conclusion to be fairly debatable,
the administrative agency overseeing the variance decision must
have “substantial evidence” on the record supporting its
decision. See Mayor of Annapolis v. Annapolis Waterfront Co.,
284 Md. 383, 395, 396 A.2d 1080, 1087 (1979); Montgomery
County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 706, 376
A.2d 483, 495 (1977), cert. denied sub nom.  Funger v.
Montgomery County, 434 U.S. 1067, 98 S. Ct. 1245, 55 L. Ed.
2d 769 (1978); Agneslane, Inc. v. Lucas, 247 Md. 612, 619, 233
A.2d 757, 761 (1967).’
See also People’s Counsel for Baltimore County v. Mangione, 85 Md. App.
738, 743-44, 584 A.2d 1318, 1320-21 (1991); Terranova v. Board of Trustees
of the Fire and Police Employees Retirement Sys., 81 Md. App. 1, 8-9, 566
A.2d 497, 500-01 (1989) cert. denied, 319 Md. 484, 573 A.2d 808 (1990);
Tennison v. Shomette, 38 Md. App. 1, 5, 379 A.2d 187, 190 (1977), cert.
denied, 282 Md. 739 (1978); Fitzgerald v. Montgomery County, 37 Md. App.
148, 153, 376 A.2d 1125, 1128, cert. denied, 281 Md. 737 (1977), cert. denied
sub nom.  Mutyambizi v. Maryland, 439 U.S. 854, 99 S. Ct. 164, 58 L. Ed. 2d
160 (1978); Anne Arundel County v. Maryland Nat’l Bank, 32 Md. App. 437,
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440, 361 A.2d 134, 136 (1976).
“Nonetheless, we have also indicated in our cases that where an
administrative agency’s conclusions are not supported by competent and
substantial evidence, or where the agency draws impermissible or
unreasonable inferences and conclusions from undisputed evidence, such
decisions are due no deference. In Belvoir Farms Homeowners Association,
Inc. v. North, 355 Md. 259, 267-68, 734 A.2d 227, 232 (1999), we stated:
‘Generally, a decision of an administrative agency,
including a local zoning board, is owed no deference when its
conclusions are based upon an error of law.  Catonsville
Nursing Home, Inc. v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 569, 709 A.2d
749, 753 (1998) (“[W]e may reverse an administrative decision
premised on erroneous legal conclusions.” (citing People’s
Counsel v. Maryland Marine Mfg. Co., 316 Md 491, 497, 560
A.2d 32, 34-35 (1989))).’
“In Maryland Marine Mfg., supra, 316 Md. at 496-97, 560 A.2d at 34-
35, we said:
‘As we have frequently indicated, the order of an
administrative agency must be upheld on judicial review if it is
not based on an error of law, and if the agency’s conclusions
reasonably may be based upon the facts proven. But a reviewing
court is under no constraints in reversing an administrative
decision which is premised solely upon an erroneous conclusion
of law.’ [Citation omitted.] [Emphasis added.]
We noted in Washington National Arena Limited Partnership v. Comptroller
of the Treasury, 308 Md. 370, 378, 519 A.2d 1277, 1281 (1987) (quoting
Ramsay, Scarlett & Co., 302 Md. at 834, 490 A.2d at 1301), that: ‘“a
reviewing court is under no statutory constraints in reversing a Tax Court order
which is premised solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law.”’
“We said in Elliott v. Joyce, 233 Md. 76, 81-82, 195 A.2d 254, 256
(1963) that:
‘We hold that “on the record” before us, the Board could
not “reasonably make” the reclassification and grant the special
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exception. Therefore, its action in so doing was arbitrary and
capricious in a legal sense. To permit a gasoline station in the
residential surroundings of the subject property would not
promote the safety, health or general welfare of the community,
but would constitute, we think, invalid “spot zoning.” Baylis v.
City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 [1959]; Hewitt v.
County Comm’rs, 220 Md. 48, 151 A.2d 144 [1959].’
[Alterations added.]
“The standard in respect to judicial review is, generally, the same
whether the agency grants or denies relief.” [Some emphasis added.]
We also note that “‘Such [zoning] ordinances are in derogation of the common law right to
so use private property as to realize it highest utility.’”  White, 356 Md. at 48, 736 A.2d at
1082 (quoting Aspen Hill Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 265 Md. 303, 313-14, 289
A.2d 303, 308 (1972) (quoting Landay v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 173 Md. 460, 466, 196
A. 293 (1938)).
We hold that while the Board purported to use the standards set forth in Belvoir
Farms, White, and Mastandrea, in determining the fate of petitioner’s variance, the
statements by Board members and the Board’s final written decision illustrate that several
impermissible legal standards were utilized.  In addition, the record contains little or no
empirical data to support the Board’s conclusions or to refute the studies and reports of
petitioner’s experts.  The Board’s decision is thus arbitrary and capricious.  We therefore
vacate the Court of Appeals’ and the Circuit Court’s affirming of the Board’s decision and
direct the Circuit Court to remand this case to the Board for a reassessment of petitioner’s
variance request in light of our holding.
-22-
III.  Discussion
A. The Wicomico County Code
The sections of Article VI of the Wicomico County Code authorizing the Board to
grant variances and noting the criteria to be considered in determining whether to grant or
deny variance requests in the Buffer state:
“§ 125-35. Authorization.
The Wicomico County Board of Zoning Appeals is hereby empowered
to grant variances to the provisions of this chapter where, owing to special
features of a site or other circumstances, a literal enforcement of provisions
would result in unwarranted hardship.
“§ 125-36. Bases for grants.
The Board of Zoning Appeals shall examine all facts of the case and
render a decision.  Variance requests in the Critical Area District shall not be
granted unless the decision is based on the following criteria:
A.
That special conditions or circumstances exist that are unique to the
subject property or structure and that a strict enforcement of the provisions of
this chapter wold result in unwarranted hardship which is not generally shared
by owners of property in the same land use management areas . . . of the
Critical Area District.
B.
That strict enforcement of the provisions within the Critical Area
District would deprive the property owner of rights commonly shared by other
owners of property in the same management area within the Critical Area
District.
C.
That the granting of a variance will not confer upon an applicant any
special privilege that would be denied to other owners of like property and/or
structures within the Critical Area District.
D.
That the variance request is not based upon conditions or circumstances
which are self-created or self-imposed, nor does the request arise from
conditions or circumstances either permitted or nonconforming which are
related to adjacent parcels.
E.
That the granting of the variance will not adversely affect water quality
or adversely impact fish, wildlife or plant habitat within the Critical Area
District, and that the granting of the variance will be consistent with the spirit
and intent of the critical area program and associated chapters.
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F.
That greater profitability or lack of knowledge of the restrictions shall
not be considered as sufficient cause for a variance.
G.
That the proposed variance is consistent with the Wicomico County
Comprehensive Plan and Chapter 225, Zoning.”
County Code, §§ 125-35 and 125-36 (emphasis added).  The County Code continues by
placing certain conditions on the granting of a variance in § 125-38:
“§ 125-38. Conditions. . . .
A variance will not be granted by the Board of Zoning Appeals unless and
until:
A.
A completed application form for a variance is submitted which
demonstrates the applicability of the above criteria. In addition, requests for
variance in the Critical Area District shall not be heard unless the state’s
Critical Area Commission has received a copy of the variance application at
least two weeks prior to the scheduled public hearing.
B.
The Board of Zoning Appeals shall find that the reasons set forth in the
application justify the granting of the variance and that the variance is the
minimum variance that will make possible the reasonable use of land, building
or structures. In making this determination for variance requests in the Critical
Area District, the Board of Zoning Appeals shall consider the following
guidelines:
(1)
That the granting of a variance results in new structures or
impervious surfaces being located as far back from mean high water,
tidal wetlands or tributary streams in the critical area as is feasible.
(2)
That the applicant takes steps to mitigate impacts, insofar as
possible, including:
(a)
Reforestation on the site to offset disturbed forested or
developed woodlands on at least an equal-area basis.
(b)
Afforestation of areas of the site so that at least 15% of
the gross site is forested.
(c)
Implementation of any mitigation measures which relate
to habitat protection areas, as delineated in the Wicomico
County Critical Area Program, recommended by state and/or
County agencies are included as conditions of approval.
(3)
The Board of Zoning Appeals shall further find that the granting
of the variance will be in harmony with the general purpose and intent
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of this chapter, shall not result in a use not permitted in the zone in
which the property subject to variance is located and will not be
injurious to the neighborhood or otherwise detrimental to the public
welfare.
(4)
For variances in the Critical Area District, the Board of Zoning
Appeals shall find that the granting of the variance will be in harmony
with the general purpose and intent of this chapter and the Wicomico
County Critical Area Program, shall not result in a use not permitted in
the management area . . . or an increase in the number of permitted
dwelling units (i.e., density limits) in which the property subject to the
variance is located and will not be injurious to the neighborhood or
otherwise detrimental to the public welfare.
(5)
In addition, and to the extent possible based on best available
information, all property owners immediately contiguous to the
application shall be notified by certified mail and furnished a copy of
said application.
(6)
In granting the variance, the Board of Zoning Appeals may
prescribe such conditions and safeguards as it deems appropriate which
comply with the intent of this chapter and the Wicomico County
Critical Area Program. Violations of such conditions and safeguards,
when made part of the terms under which the variance is granted, shall
be deemed a violation of this chapter and punishable under Article IX.”
Section 125-35 of the County Code empowers the Board to grant variances to the
provisions of Chapter 125 where an applicant, because of “special features of a site or other
circumstances, a literal enforcement of provisions would result in unwarranted hardship.”
As a result, the ultimate inquiry is whether applicants, like petitioner, suffer an unwarranted
hardship because of special features of their property.  This Court has recently interpreted the
“unwarranted hardship” standard, as used by the County Code, as the equivalent of the
general “unnecessary hardship” standard used in zoning variance law.  See White, 356 Md.
at 46 n.12, 736 A.2d at 1081 n.12; Belvoir Farms Homeowners Association, Inc. v. North,
355 Md. 259, 275-76, 734 A.2d 227, 236-37 (1999).
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In Belvoir Farms, we ultimately held that the “unwarranted hardship” standard was
akin to the denial of a reasonable and significant use of the property, when we said:
“We reject the proposition that the unnecessary or unwarranted hardship
standard is equal to an unconstitutional taking standard. If this were true, it
would be a superfluous standard because the constitutional standard exists
independent of variance standards.  We generally avoid a construction of
statutory language that would render the statute unnecessary, meaningless, or
redundant. See Hyle v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 348 Md. 143, 149, 702 A.2d
760, 763 (1997); Board of County Comm’rs v. Bell Atlantic-Maryland, 346
Md. 160, 178, 695 A.2d 171, 180 (1997).
“We hold, therefore, that the unnecessary or unwarranted hardship
standard, or similar standards, are less restrictive than the unconstitutional
taking standard. The unwarranted hardship standard, and its similar
manifestations, are equivalent to the denial of reasonable and significant use
of the property. Whether a property owner has been denied reasonable and
significant use of his property is a question of fact best addressed by the
expertise of the Board of Appeals, not the courts. Thus, we leave the
application of this standard to petitioner’s variance application to the Board on
remand.”
Belvoir Farms, 355 Md. at 282, 734 A.2d at 240 (emphasis added).
In determining whether such an unwarranted hardship exists, i.e., whether the
applicant’s intended use is a reasonable and significant use, the Wicomico County Zoning
Board must apply the criteria enumerated in § 125-36 of the County Code to the variance
request before it.  We have recently held, in White, that these criteria must be applied in total
and generally, and that no individual factor is to be determinative.  We further explained the
application of the “unwarranted hardship” standard, when we said:
15 In fact, the construction of the Wicomico County Code supports this application of
the unwarranted hardship standard, as the County Code sets out the unwarranted hardship
determination in a separate provision, § 125-35, than the provision listing the factors to be
considered.  Section 125-35 states:
“The Wicomico County Board of Zoning Appeals is hereby empowered
to grant variances to the provisions of this chapter where, owing to special
features of a site or other circumstances, a literal enforcement of provisions
would result in unwarranted hardship.” [Emphasis added.]
The following section, § 125-36, lists those essential factors to be considered by the Board
in making the unwarranted hardship determination.  Section 125-36(A) also includes the
words “unwarranted hardship,” but the inclusion of the phrase does not eliminate the need
for the Board to consider all of the factors that follow.  Section 125-36 of the County Code,
in relevant part, states:
“The Board of Zoning Appeals shall examine all facts of the case and
render a decision.  Variance requests in the Critical Area District shall not be
granted unless the decision is based on the following criteria:
A.
That special conditions or circumstances exist that are unique to the
subject property or structure and that a strict enforcement of the provisions of
this chapter would result in unwarranted hardship which is not generally
shared by owners of property in the same land use management areas . . . of the
Critical Area District. . . .” [Emphasis added.]
Because of the existence of § 125-35, subsection (A) does not support the proposition which
respondent posits, that “Once the Board found that Mr. Lewis failed to prove an unwarranted
hardship, the Board could have stopped its analysis.”  Subsection (A)’s purpose is merely to
factor the uniqueness of the property into the criteria used in the ultimate determination of
§ 125-35, whether unwarranted hardship exists.
In addition, respondent argues that “the Board was not required to make negative
findings on each one of the variance standards.”  We agree, however, the Board still needs
to address each criterion of § 125-36 and balance both negative and positive criteria together
and use them as “part of the entire matrix that defines what information is necessary to reach
a finding as to the existence or nonexistence of an unwarranted hardship.”  White, 356 Md.
(continued...)
-26-
“[T]he essential determination is whether an unwarranted hardship exists.[15]
15(...continued)
at 51, 736 A.2d at 1083.
-27-
The specific factors that must be considered cannot be construed individually
to overrule a finding of unwarranted hardship any more than they could
overrule a finding of an unconstitutional taking of one’s property. The
individual provisions that must be considered are part of the entire matrix that
defines what information is necessary to reach a finding as to the existence or
nonexistence of an unwarranted hardship.”
White, 356 Md. at 50-51, 736 A.2d at 1083 (alteration added).
We further explained the application of the “unwarranted hardship” standard in
Mastandrea, 361 Md. 107, 760 A.2d 677 (2000).  In Mastandrea, the Mastandreas applied
for a variance for pathways they had built within the Critical Area Buffer located on their
property for the purpose of allowing their disabled, wheelchair-bound daughter to access the
waterfront of the property.  We held that strict adherence to the code would constitute an
unwarranted hardship for the Mastandreas, as their property’s subjection to other reasonable
uses did not preclude the requested variance because the proposed variance’s use was also
a reasonable use in light of the special conditions of the land and circumstances of the
daughter’s disability.  We stated:
“The Commission also argued that, ‘at most,’ the denial of the variance would
cause the Mastandreas an ‘inconvenience,’ not an unwarranted hardship,
because relocating the lateral pathways outside of the buffer area would not
prevent a reasonable and significant use of the ‘entire’ property. 
“In White v. North, we were asked whether the Anne Arundel County
Board of Appeals properly granted the Whites a variance to construct a
swimming pool in their backyard which, because of its slope, was within the
extended Critical Area buffer provided for by the Chesapeake Bay Critical
Area regulations.  After an extensive review of the Chesapeake Critical Area
-28-
Program, we focused on Anne Arundel County Code Article 3, §  2-107,
which governs the issuance of a Critical Area variance and which lists a series
of factors, similar to the ones in the present case, which an applicant must
persuade the Board are satisfied.  We initially explained that the first factor,
whether ‘strict implementation of the County’s Critical Area program would
result in an unwarranted hardship,’ was the determining consideration.  We
concluded that the other factors provided guidance for the unwarranted
hardship analysis, and resolved that the question was not whether the Whites’
variance request met every factor in Anne Arundel County Code §  2-107, but
whether the information derived from all of those factors amounted to an
unwarranted hardship.  Moreover, we added that forcing compliance with
every individual factor might have unconstitutional taking implications.
“When discussing the unwarranted hardship standard in White, we
relied on our previous analysis of a similar issue in Belvoir Farms v. North,
355 Md. 259, 734 A.2d 227 (1999). There, we defined ‘unwarranted hardship’
as ‘a denial of reasonable and significant use’ of the land.  In explaining this
standard, we made clear that unwarranted hardship is a lesser standard than
that required to prove an unconstitutional taking.  Moreover, we determined
that ‘[w]hether a property owner has been denied reasonable and significant
use of his property is a question of fact best addressed by the expertise of the
Board of Appeals, not the courts.’
“The Board in this case, therefore, did not have to consider whether
denying the variance would have denied the Mastandreas a reasonable and
significant use of the ‘entire’ lot. Rather, the Board was required to (and did)
consider whether the property owners, in light of their daughter’s disability,
would be denied a reasonable and significant use of the waterfront of their
property without the access that the path provided. There is substantial
evidence in the record establishing that, without the path, a person in a
wheelchair could not enjoy the waterfront portion of the property.
“Evidence before the Board indicated that the soil composition of the
Mastandreas’ property near the shoreline, ‘one of the heaviest clay soils’ their
expert ‘had ever tested,’ does not allow handicap access to the waterfront.  The
record indicates that the Commission neither offered any evidence to the
contrary nor questioned the Mastandreas’ expert witness on this point when he
testified before the Board. The Commission did not offer such evidence
apparently because it did not conduct any site-specific studies or project a
quantifiable adverse impact of the path on the Critical Area buffer or Glebe
Creek. In other words, there is no evidentiary refutation by the Commission on
the record that would support its argument that the Mastandreas’ property is
not unique or ‘in any way different from other properties in the neighborhood
-29-
or in the Talbot County Critical Area.’
“The record evidence supports the Mastandreas’ assertion, and
substantiates the Board’s finding, that there was a special condition or
circumstance unique to the lot. The record also supports the Board’s finding
that, without the pathway in question, Leah would not be able to access
reasonably the rear yard, view wildlife along the water’s edge, or participate
in shoreline-oriented activities.”
Mastandrea, 361 Md. at 134-37, 760 A.2d at 691-93 (citations omitted)(footnotes
omitted)(emphasis added).
In consideration of these standards, the Board in the case sub judice must use the
criteria within § 125-36 of the County Code to determine the ultimate question of whether
strict enforcement of § 125 would deny petitioner a reasonable and significant use of his
land.  In doing so, it is clear that the Board should apply a standard that does not look to
whether petitioner would be denied all reasonable uses of his entire property, but rather a
standard that should determine if petitioner’s proposed use is a reasonable and significant one
in consideration of all of the § 125-36 factors.  As we shall discuss, although the Board
purported to act otherwise, it essentially applied the incorrect “unconstitutional takings”
standard.
B. Errors of Law
In the case sub judice, petitioner argues that while the Board claimed to use the
holdings of this Court’s cases in its decision regarding petitioner’s variance, the Board, in
reality, failed to apply correctly those standards.  In addition, petitioner asserts that the Board
committed other errors of law.  The first of these other assertions, in addition to the alleged
16 This case is not governed by the recent change in the statute, because this case was
resolved prior to the effective date of the new statute.  See 2002 Md. Laws, § 2, Chapters
431, 432 (“this Act shall be construed to apply only prospectively and may not be applied or
interpreted to have any effect on or application to any variance application for which a
petition for judicial review of a decision to grant or deny a variance under a local critical area
program was filed before June 1, 2002.”)
17 The cases referred to by the Board were Belvoir Farms, White and Mastandrea.
18 “An unconstitutional taking of property generally is proved when a ‘regulation
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of the land.’”  Belvoir Farms, 355 Md.
at 281-82, 734 A.2d at 240, (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1015, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1992)).
-30-
misapplication of this Court’s holdings, is that the Board failed to apply correctly the
appropriate criteria under the § 125-36.  Petitioner further argues that the Board misconstrued
the criteria that it did apply.  We shall first address petitioner’s contention that the Board
misconstrued our recent decisions in Belvoir Farms, White and Mastandrea.16
The primary basis of the Board’s error, as argued by petitioner, is that the Board
applied the incorrect standard of unwarranted hardship in this case.  Petitioner contends that,
regardless of the Board’s statement noting that “the Board has applied the law as announced
in those cases to the facts and evidence presented to the Board,”17 the Board, at the
encouragement of the Commission, misconstrued the “unwarranted hardship” standard.
Instead, petitioner contends, the Board actually applied what was essentially akin to the
unconstitutional takings standard,18 a standard which has been specifically rejected in
variance request determinations by this Court.  See Belvoir Farms, supra.  Respondent
contends that the Board’s decision sufficiently illustrates that the correct standard was
-31-
applied, because it defined the proper standard and stated that the Board indeed “applied the
law as announced in those cases.”
In its written decision the Board, in its fifth “Specific Findings of Fact,” stated:
“After considering the evidence in accordance with the controlling legal
authority, the Board finds that the Applicant will not suffer an unwarranted
hardship without the variance for the six buildings because he will continue to
enjoy reasonable and significant use of the Island and the property without the
requested variance. At the hearing, testimony of the Applicant’s witness and
the Critical Area Commission witness, established that the Island contains over
10,000 square feet of land that does not lie within the Tidal Buffer. A
reasonably-sized structure could be sited in this non-Buffer area for the
occasional use of persons who hunt on the property. Further testimony
established that the property contained at least 12 waterfowl blinds when Mr.
Lewis purchased the land, and that the property had been used for hunting
purposes by previous owners for many years.  Accordingly, the Board finds
that denial of a variance for six new buildings will not deny to Mr. Lewis the
reasonable and significant use of the Island or of the property and that he will
not suffer an unwarranted hardship.” [Emphasis added.]
The Board misconstrues the cases.  In respect to variances in buffer areas, the correct
standard is not whether the property owner retains a reasonable and significant use for the
property outside the buffer, but whether he or she is being denied a reasonable use of
property within the buffer.  The facts used by the Board in finding that no unwarranted
hardship existed were discussed in the context of whether petitioner could still have a viable,
reasonable and productive use of his entire property without the variance.  The Board’s
reliance on facts suggesting alternative uses and possible construction outside of the Buffer
is akin to asking whether denying petitioner’s variance request will result in denying him “all
economically beneficial or productive use of the land,” i.e., the unconstitutional takings
-32-
standard.  Use of this standard is in direct opposition to our holding in Belvoir Farms.  The
Board’s decision clearly illustrates that it rested on this improper standard – whether the
Board, in the language formulated by the Commission, says so or not.
In addition, the Board also focused on petitioner’s ability to use the pre-existing 12-15
waterfowl blinds located in the marsh, i.e., the Board considered petitioner’s use of his entire
property, some of which is across the river, not merely the island where the variance was
sought.  What reasonable and significant use petitioner can make of the portions of his land
other than the specific area subject to his variance request is irrelevant to the unwarranted
hardship determination.  As we held in Mastandrea:
“The Board . . . did not have to consider whether denying the variance
would have denied the Mastandreas a reasonable and significant use of the
‘entire’ lot. Rather, the Board was required to . . . consider whether the
property owners, in light of their daughter’s disability, would be denied a
reasonable and significant use of the waterfront of their property without the
access that the path provided.”
Mastandrea, 361 Md. at 136, 760 A.2d at 693.  Thus, the Board should have considered
petitioner’s variance request in the context of whether petitioner was denied a reasonable and
significant use of Phillips Island, the area he requested to be used by the hunting camp.  In
relying on petitioner’s ability to use his property outside of Phillips Island, i.e., by
considering petitioner’s ability to use pre-existing hunting-related structures on other, remote,
across the river portions of his property, the Board’s analysis is in derogation of our holdings
in White and Mastandrea and thus constitutes legal error.
The Board also appears to have misapplied White otherwise.  In White, in the context
19 The relevant provisions of the Anne Arundel County Code in White were strikingly
similar to the ones in the case at bar, with the exception that the Wicomico County Code
includes the word “unique,” in the provision discussing unwarranted hardships.  As quoted
in White, the Anne Arundel County Code Article 3, §  2-107 stated in relevant part:
   “(b) For a property located in the Critical Area, a variance to the
requirements of the County critical area program may be granted after
determining that:
(1) due to the features of the site or other circumstances other than
financial considerations, strict implementation of the County’s critical area
program would result in an unwarranted hardship to the applicant;
(2) a literal interpretation of the Code of Maryland Regulations, Title
27, Subtitle 01, Criteria for Local Critical Area Program Development, or the
County critical area program and related ordinances will deprive the applicant
of rights commonly enjoyed by other properties in similar areas within the
critical area of the County;
(3) the granting of a variance will not confer on an applicant any special
privilege that would be denied by COMAR, Title 27, Subtitle 01 or the County
critical area program to other lands or structures within the County critical
area;
(4) the variance request:
(i) is not based on conditions or circumstances that are the result of
actions by the applicant; and
(ii) does not arise from any condition relating to land or building use,
either permitted or non-conforming, on any neighboring property; and
(5) the granting of the variance:
(i) will not adversely affect water quality or adversely impact fish,
wildlife, or plant habitat within the County’s critical area; and
(ii) will be in harmony with the general spirit and intent of the County
critical area program.
(c) A variance may not be granted under subsection (a) or (b) of this
section unless the Board finds that:
(1) the variance is the minimum variance necessary to afford relief;
(2) the granting of the variance will not:
(i) alter the essential character of the neighborhood or district in which
the lot is located;
(continued...)
-33-
of whether the Anne Arundel County Board of Zoning Appeals19 properly granted a variance
19(...continued)
(ii) substantially impair the appropriate use or development of adjacent
property;
(iii) be contrary to acceptable clearing and replanting practices required
for development in the critical area; or
(iv) be detrimental to the public welfare.”
White, 356 Md. at 44-46, 736 A.2d at 1080.
-34-
to build a swimming pool in White’s backyard that was located within the Critical Area
Buffer, we explained that the first factor, the unwarranted hardship factor, was the
determinative consideration, while the other factors merely provided the Board with guidance
in its application of the unwarranted hardship standard.  We stated:
“The specific factors that must be considered cannot be construed individually
to overrule a finding of unwarranted hardship any more than they could
overrule a finding of an unconstitutional taking of one’s property. The
individual provisions that must be considered are part of the entire matrix that
defines what information is necessary to reach a finding as to the existence or
nonexistence of an unwarranted hardship.”
White, 356 Md. at 50-51, 736 A.2d at 1083.  The Board’s analysis in this case, which claimed
to have considered each factor individually, found that petitioner would not suffer an
unwarranted hardship from the denial of the variance request before it even discussed any
of the § 125-36 factors.  This is in total disregard for our holding in White and is illustrative
of the Board’s use of legal standards contrary to this Court’s holdings; this constitutes legal
error necessitating reversal.
Another of petitioner’s main contentions is that the Board erred when it considered,
and later relied on, the Commission’s argument that petitioner’s variance request was not an
20 But for the impact of the Critical Area “buffer” regulations, the owner’s proposed
use of the property, whether through the permitted use of the existing buildings, or being
permitted to erect new buildings, would not violate the provisions of the statutes.
-35-
“unwarranted hardship,” but a self-induced hardship.  The Commission’s argument that
petitioner’s variance request fell into the category of a self-induced hardship and the Board’s
reliance on such a factor was in error.  We recently discussed the concept of self-induced
hardships in the cases of Richard Roeser Professional Builder, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County,
368 Md. 294, 793 A.2d 545 (2002), and Stansbury v. Jones, 372 Md. 172, 812 A.2d 312
(2002).  In Roeser, we held that a landowner was not precluded from seeking or receiving
an area variance for development of his property in spite of the fact that he purchased the
property with notice that it was subject to environmental regulations, including the fact that
the property was within a Critical Area Buffer.  We held that the landowner’s mere purchase
of the property, although possessed of that knowledge, was not a self-created hardship
relieving the Board of its duty to consider his variance application based on all of the
statutory criteria.  We stated:
“The types of hardships that are normally considered to be self-created
in cases of this type do not arise from purchase, but from those actions of the
landowner, himself or herself, that create the hardship, rather than the hardship
impact, if any, of the zoning ordinance on the property.” 20
Roeser, 368 Md. at 314, 793 A.2d at 558.  We then went on to discuss in detail several
Maryland cases that had spoken on the issue of self-created hardship, including, inter alia,
Ad + Soil, Inc. v. County Commissioners of Queen Anne’s County, 307 Md. 307, 513 A.2d
21 Respondent asserts that these cases are instructive to the situation at bar.  The cases
discussed in Roeser and later in Stansbury, however, are distinguishable in that Ad + Soil,
Bounds and the Court of Special Appeals case, Cromwell v. Ward, 102 Md. App. 691, 651
A.2d 424 (1995), presented situations where the landowner’s only assertion was that the
landowner’s self-created noncompliance with the regulations itself made the variance
necessary; they did not claim that any unique characteristics of the land created the hardship,
or that any regulations were responsible for the hardship.  In the case sub judice, petitioner
makes no such argument.  He merely asserts that, regardless of whether he had commenced
with construction of his hunting camp, the unique characteristics of Phillips Island, as
impacted upon by the buffer provisions of the Critical Areas law, result in an unwarranted
hardship.
-36-
893 (1986), and Salisbury Board of Zoning Appeals v. Bounds, 240 Md. 547, 214 A.2d 810
(1965).21
Later, in Stansbury, we held a landowner’s re-subdivision of her property in order to
comply with non-critical area requirements did not amount to a self-created hardship.  We
stated:
“It was clear to anyone examining the Administrative Plat that there
was only one express limitation imposed on the subject property by the re-
subdivision approval, i.e., that no residences could be built on the parcel until,
and if, it passed a percolation test. No other limitations were noted on the plat.
Our examination of the record does not reflect that any other limitations were
imposed on the parcel during the process.
“Subsequently, it was determined that there was an area within the
parcel that could, and did, pass a percolation test. However, the use of that area
for the sanitary system to be utilized for a residence on the parcel left an
insufficient remaining area to accommodate the type of structure required to
be built by covenants that affect the lots within the development and still be in
compliance with ‘yard,’ and other requirements, both critical areas and
otherwise, of the zoning ordinance. At that point, the petitioner sought the
various approvals, by way of area variances, which would be needed in order
for a residential structure to be constructed on the parcel. Because the land, or
a portion of it, was either in the critical area, or the critical area buffer zone,
review by the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Commission also was sought.
22 After the conclusion of the testimony, the comments of Board Member Ennis reflect
that while the Board purported, “on paper,” to make its decision as if the cabins had not been
(continued...)
-37-
That Commission interposed no objection to the project. Petitioner then sought
critical area and other variances necessary to accommodate her proposed
project.  The relief she sought via the variance process was of the same type,
if not scope, of the relief she might have had to seek had she never re-
subdivided the property in the first instance.”
Stansbury, 372 Md. at 208-09, 812 A.2d at 333-34 (footnotes omitted)(emphasis added).  It
is clear from these cases that a landowner purchasing a piece of property is subject to the
regulations in effect prior to any improvement or change the landowner affirmatively
effectuates on the land including provisions recognizing a land owner’s right to seek a
variance from those regulations.  The situation here presents us with a similar issue.  If
petitioner had not commenced the construction of his hunting cabins, he would have still
needed to seek a variance, as would have his predecessor, in order to build the camp, just as
Ms. Stansbury “might have had to seek [a variance] had she never re-subdivided the property
in the first instance.”  Id. at 209, 812 A.2d at 334.  (alteration added).  The existence of the
partially constructed camp, in no way, was determinative on his need for a variance.  In other
words, the sole fact that the structures are there and were not permitted when built does not
negate the argument that were he not permitted to place them there had he not already built
them, or keep them there, an unwarranted hardship would exist.  In such situations, it is
necessary to consider the application as if the structures are not there, and determine whether
an unwarranted hardship would exist if they were not permitted to be placed there.22  After
22(...continued)
built, it clearly did not do so.  Mr. Ennis said:
“And the rest of my comments I’m going to make is in the context of
that we, or I will be trying to view this and am viewing this as if the buildings
were not already there.  However, I want to say that I think as far as my
opinion goes, ignorance of the law is not an excuse.  Somebody should have
known better, and I think somebody did know better.
“I believe that within the Chesapeake Bay critical areas report, the
cumulative impact, to me – I could be interpreting it wrong – means general
impact and not site specific.  I think we’re talking about cumulative meanings
wherever, and it’s just a, it’s just what it says.
. . . 
“I think that we do risk a dangerous setting of a dangerous precedent
with this case if we were to approve it.  I don’t think that this is a case of
unwarranted hardship, and I think it’s self-imposed.  This is not a home we’re
talking about building.  This is a place to go duck hunting, and in that regard,
I don’t think that this is a denial of a reasonable and significant use of property
because that’s what they want to do.  They want to have recreation . . . and if
there is to be accommodations for sleeping . . . there’s space to do that . . .
outside the buffer.”  [Emphasis added.]
-38-
the procedures, if a variance is properly denied the buildings must be removed.  If a variance
is properly approved the buildings can remain.
In essence, the issue of petitioner’s construction of his six hunting camp buildings
prior to his applying for a variance request is a “red herring.”  As previously mentioned,
under the County Code and, more importantly, because of the physical characteristics of
Phillips Island, petitioner needed a variance to build any camp on the island regardless of
whether he had started construction before applying for the variance due to the small,
irregular, non-contiguous shape of the non-Buffer area on Phillips Island.  Petitioner does not
claim, as the Commission would have this Court believe, that it is a hardship for him to move
-39-
the buildings from where they currently sit.  Essentially, his claim is that his property has
unique physical characteristics which entitle him to receive a variance in order to avoid an
unwarranted hardship.  The Board should have analyzed petitioner’s request in this light and
not in the context of a self-created hardship.
In fact, the record reflects that petitioner and the county planning staff had originally
agreed to apply for a variance whereby some of the six hunting buildings would be moved
out of the Buffer.  It was only after petitioner had two experts conduct an environmental
assessment of Phillips Island, as suggested by the county staff, that he amended his variance
request, thereby requesting to leave the cabins “where they sit.”  The well-documented
reasons for this change were not due to any hardship that petitioner would incur as a result
of the move, but because of the harm that the move would cause on the environment.
Petitioner’s environmental experts advised him, in essence, that only three non-contiguous
strips of the island were located outside of the Buffer, that those areas were densely
populated with mature trees and flourishing holly patches, that moving and constructing his
cabins in the non-Buffer area would require harming that vegetation and that removing the
vegetation would destroy the full and thriving canopy of trees, thereby creating significant
adverse impacts on the ecosystem of Phillip Island.  Only in the context of this
recommendation, i.e., that, because of the unique configuration of petitioner’s island,
constructing his camp outside of the Buffer would be more environmentally damaging than
leaving the camp in its current location, did petitioner amend his hardship position.  As his
-40-
hardship was a result of the unique physical features of his property and not because of
actions taken by petitioner, there could be no self-created hardship.  Thus, respondent’s
attempt to focus on, and the Board’s reliance on, this issue was improper and constituted a
reversible error of law.
Petitioner additionally takes issue with the Commission’s advocating of a “cumulative
impacts” (or “cumulative effects”) of development argument to the Board.  Petitioner asserts
that this Court precluded a general “cumulative impact” argument in our Mastandrea
decision and that the Commission intentionally argued this incorrect standard to the Board.
In Mastandrea, we said:
“The Commission makes several assertions regarding the Board’s
application of this factor of the Zoning Ordinance. First, the Commission
argues that perhaps the most important of the seven variance factors is that the
variance be in ‘harmony with the general spirit and intent of the Critical Area
Law.’ This hierarchal statement is not correct. As we observed earlier in our
discussion of White v. North, supra, the other factors of a variance ordinance,
apparently including the ‘harmony’ factor here, provide illumination for the
primary unwarranted hardship analysis.
“Second, the Commission argues that the Board’s finding that the path
is in harmony with the spirit and intent of the Zoning Ordinance is arbitrary
and capricious. The foundation of its argument is that, when viewed with a
broader perspective and considered in conjunction with the impact of other
impervious structures within the buffer, granting the variance would violate
Talbot County’s intent to protect its Critical Areas. The Commission’s
argument in this regard is too extreme. With its logic, no variances would ever
be granted for fear that, one day, they could have a negative cumulative effect
on their environs. In our opinion, the intent of the Zoning Ordinance is aimed
at the cautious and thoughtful consideration and, where appropriate, granting
of variances within the Critical Area on a case-by-case basis. Under Talbot
County law, such variances are appropriate when their applications meet the
Critical 
Area 
criteria 
and, 
where 
necessary, 
create 
reasonable
accommodations for the needs of disabled citizens.
23 A more illustrative example would be to compare the cumulative impact argument
to the filling of a bucket, i.e., the Critical Area, with water, i.e., new development within the
Critical Area.  The agencies, in essence, are, under this concept, “filling” the Chesapeake Bay
Critical Area each time they approve a variance allowing development in the Buffer.  Once
the “bucket,” according to the Commission, is filled to the top or is overflowing, no more
“water” can be added.  Similarly, once the cumulative negative impacts of all development
in the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area reach a point where the Commission argues, and the
agencies agree, that those impacts are such that they are the determinative factor in the denial
of a variance request, the Commission is essentially finding that the entire area of the
Chesapeake watershed can no longer support further development.  The entire Critical Area
would then be precluded from any further variances, as the “bucket” would be full of
“water.”  In this way the Commission could close one river watershed after another or the
entire Chesapeake region to any future waterfront development that intrudes upon the Buffer.
Given this State’s long tradition of utilization of waterfront land for wharves, landings,
hunting, dockage, and the like, such drastic steps of closing down development in watersheds
should come directly from the Legislature, which is better able to assess the costs, if any, of
(continued...)
-41-
“Although the Mastandreas’ paths did create some 5000 square feet of
new impervious surface area within the buffer, the evidence indicated that the
brick-in-sand path was actually three times as permeable as the surrounding
natural lawn, and that much of the potential increase in runoff from the other
pertinent pathways was mitigated by landscaping. The Board’s conclusion that
these extensive mitigating factors do not impact adversely fish, wildlife, or
plant habitat and are in harmony with the Zoning Ordinance’s intent was
supported by the record evidence. Furthermore, the Board’s conclusions
regarding these mitigating factors are in accordance with Bill No. 741, being
‘environmentally neutral’ and not ‘substantially impair[ing]’ the intent of the
variance ordinance.”
Id. at 141-42, 760 A.2d at 695-96 (citations omitted)(footnote omitted)(emphasis added).
Mastandrea clearly illustrates the illogical result that necessarily follows an overly
generalized cumulative impact argument.  Once the Board accepts that the cumulative
impacts of further development within the Critical Area reaches a point where it would harm
the environment, no variance could be granted in the future,23 in essence eliminating the need
23(...continued)
the wholesale denial of uses throughout watersheds.
-42-
for § 125-35 through § 125-38 of the County Code.  We do not interpret provisions in a way
that would effectively render other provisions of the Code “superfluous or nugatory.”  Mid-
Atlantic Power Supply Ass’n v. Public Service Comm’n of Maryland, 361 Md. 196, 204, 760
A.2d 1087, 1091 (2000). Under respondent’s rationale, once the Board determined a
particular project had, or would exceed the Commission’s cumulative impact assessment, the
Board would be precluded from issuing any future variances throughout the entire
Chesapeake watershed.  We do not believe that the Legislature intended the Commission to
have such power.  While the general concern for the condition of the Chesapeake Bay and
how land use broadly impacts that condition may be appropriate justification for adopting the
regulations in the first instance, an individual application for a variance recognized under
those regulations deserves a specific cause and effect analysis as to how, if at all, such
proposal may contribute to adverse effects.
In this case, it is clear that the Board relied on, in part, the cumulative negative impact
theory proffered by the Commission that was specifically rejected in Mastandrea.  The
Board, in its discussion on the possible environmental adverse effects of the variance request,
said, “The witnesses also testified about the cumulative negative impact on the Bay caused
by small amounts of development on numerous shoreline properties.” The Board’s decision
was also improperly influenced by the Commission’s expert, Ms. Chandler, during her
-43-
testimony at the hearing.  Some of that testimony went as follows:
“Q[uestion of petitioner’s counsel].  And you referred to cumulative
impacts?
A[nswer if Ms. Chandler]. Yes.
Q.
Have you determined and are you able to quantify any adverse
impact of these particular six buildings on any aspect of water quality in either
ground water or the adjacent stream waters of the tributaries of the Nanticoke
River?
A.
The whole idea of cumulative impact is not to look at each
specific little thing.  It’s the idea that over time –
Q.
No, that wasn’t my question.
A.
– it causes an effect.
Q.
My first question, though, is have you determined whether and
have you done any testing or have any quantifiable way to show that these
buildings have caused any increased levels of pollutants, nutrients or toxins to
the base system?
A.
I have not conducted any studies.
Q.
Nor do you have any such data?
A.
I know that there’s 33 -- 3370 square feet of less area of
infiltration and for habitat.
Q.
That’s correct.  The question, though, is do you have anything
from which you can show or demonstrate that that 3300 square feet has caused
an increase in the levels of pollutants, nutrients and toxins to the base system?
A.
No.
Q.
Okay.  All right.  Now, then, let’s look at what the statute says
. . . .  It doesn’t talk about just cumulative impacts, does it?  Doesn’t the word
cumulative impacts refer to human activities that have caused increased levels
of pollutants, nutrients and toxins?
A.
It states the cumulative impacts of human activity, yes, you’re
right.
Q.
Okay.  So only those . . . activities that have caused increased
levels of pollutants, etc., are the concern that brings them within this umbrella
of cumulative effects?
A.
No, it’s the cumulative effect that causes the pollutants to have
effects.  It’s . . . the assemblage of all – I mean, if there were ten million of
these cabins, that would be cumulative effects, but we don’t have to look at this
one little, this one island when you’re talking about cumulative effects.”
[Emphasis added.][Alteration added.]
24 As we have indicated, the decision whether the cumulative impact of development
in a watershed has reached the point where all future development in buffer zones in the
Chesapeake Bay Critical Area is to be absolutely prohibited is a decision for the Legislature
or as it may be proven by evidence received in a specific case.  We do not perceive that the
Legislature has delegated (or could even delegate) such far reaching power to the
Commission.  Even then, such a permanent decision would be subject to review under
constitutional provisions relating to unconstitutional takings.
25 Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Launay, testified that he performed soil surveys when he
said:
“one of the things I took a look at is before going to the site, we took a look at
the County soil survey to determine what soil series had been mapped on the
(continued...)
-44-
This testimony clearly furthers, without any empirical data, an argument that petitioner’s
cabins would breach an undefined cumulative impact threshold created sua sponte by the
Commission, and, thus, for that reason, would be detrimental to the Chesapeake watershed.
Logically, any future projects would necessarily be beyond whatever threshold the
Commission is attempting to set.  Cumulative impact arguments, moreover, have been
disregarded as irrelevant to the specific finding of an unwarranted hardship in a specific case,
such as in Mastandrea.  As a result, those arguments should have been disregarded and not
relied upon by the Board in this case, or any specific case.24  To use this testimony in its
consideration of petitioner’s case constituted another error of law.
In addition, respondent’s cumulative adverse impact argument may not even be
reliable in this case.  Petitioner supplied the Board with specific scientific and observatory
data illustrating the minimal, if any, environmental adverse impact resulting from the cabins
proposed in the variance request at issue.25  Petitioner was in the unique position to gather
25(...continued)
property, and the site is basically as mapped by the USDA soil survey as
Galestown loamy sand with a clay substratum with a zero to 5 percent slope
. . . that’s important for a number of reasons, because that type of soil is a very
well drained upland type soil with a very extremely high ability for
permeability.  In other words, to absorb potentially any run-off from the
rooftops or from the small structures that perhaps Mr. Lewis constructed on
the site.
“. . . we performed a couple of soil borings to confirm the nature of and
correctness of the County soil survey and found that to be generally correct.”
Mr. Launay also observed that the buildings were constructed of natural material, thus no
pollutants would be injected into the area.  Additionally, he testified to the lack of excavation
performed by petitioner and the general lack of any erosion, ditches or pathways created by
rain run-off from the roofs.
26 We note, however, that this is a unique case.  We do not condone the construction,
without permits, of any structure within the Buffer in violation of the law.  Ignorance of the
law is no excuse.  Petitioner was not justified in clearing the understory, cutting down trees
and building within the Buffer.  He should have applied for permits in the first instance.
Nonetheless, petitioner amended his variance request originally purporting to move a
majority of his camp outside of the Buffer only at the suggestion of his environmental
experts, who the County had suggested he retain and who believed that the buildings would
have less of an environmental impact if left in their current location rather than being located
outside of the Buffer.  As the physical property in which he was building, as well as the
entire circumstances of this request, are unique, coupled with the fact that petitioner argues
that he would be entitled to the variance regardless of whether the cabins had been built, we
have treated this variance request as if the cabins were not on Phillips Island.  That is the
same position the Board stated it was taking.
27 Evidence of the cutting of trees and understory was produced.  The same testimony
(continued...)
-45-
real data, as opposed to mere speculation, with respect to the issue of environmental harm
from rain run-off from the impervious surface of the cabin roofs because the development
he was requesting via the variance was already at least partially constructed.26  The
Commission and other opposing witnesses, provided little or no data 27 revealing any actual
27(...continued)
also produced evidence that the understory had begun to recover and would likely, coupled
with petitioner’s proposed mitigation, become enhanced.  The Commission and petitioner do
not dispute this evidence.
28 In fact, Ms. Chandler’s testimony regarding the potential for the camp to inject
toxins into the system resulted in the following dialogue:
“Q[uestion of petitioner’s counsel].
And we don’t have any
concrete or asphalt driveways or sidewalks on the site, do we?
A[nswer of Ms. Chandler]. No, we have a lot of treated lumber.
Q.
Treated lumber?  Where is that?
A.
All the cedar shakes, I’m sure they’re treated with something.
Q.
Do you know whether they’re treated?
A.
No, but –
Q.
Okay.  Did you hear Mr. Launay testify that they were natural
cedar siding and natural cedar shakes roofing?
A.
Well, they seem to be very regular for being natural.  They were
in the same shape, size, everything, so they’re not completely natural.
Q.
You mean because they’re cut the same size or shape?
A.
And I’m sure they’re treated with something.
Q.
Like what?
A.
Chemicals that help protect it from, from degrading in the
environment over time.
Q.
But that, that is your speculation?
A.
Yes.”  [Alteration added.]
-46-
harm that petitioner’s camp would present to the surrounding environment.  In fact, when
Ms. Chandler was specifically asked about whether she conducted any tests on the site, she
answered in the negative.28  Ms. Chandler’s conclusions that the camp would be harmful to
the area were lacking any significant factual bases.  They were grounded, admittedly, more
in speculation than in hard fact and are thus instructive as to her lack of ability to rebut
petitioner’s experts.
Petitioner also claims that the Board erred as a matter of law in failing to consider all
29 As we previously discussed, supra, we note that in White we stated that:
“The specific factors that must be considered cannot be construed individually
to overrule a finding of unwarranted hardship any more than they could
overrule a finding of an unconstitutional taking of one’s property. The
individual provisions that must be considered are part of the entire matrix that
defines what information is necessary to reach a finding as to the existence or
nonexistence of an unwarranted hardship.”
White, 356 Md. at 50-51, 736 A.2d at 1083.  This is not meant to stand for the proposition
that the Board need not consider any additional factors once it determines there is no
unwarranted hardship.  For the unwarranted hardship determination to be made in the first
instance, all of the factors must necessarily be considered, although the Board need not find
the factors to be all  positive to grant the request, or all negative to deny it.  A balance of the
“entire matrix” is appropriate.
-47-
of the criteria listed within § 125-36.  He argues that White requires the general consideration
of all of the criteria within the county’s code in denying a variance request.  Respondent
argues that petitioner failed to prove that those factors were generally met, and also that:
“The Board had no duty to make separate findings on each one of the
remaining Wicomico County variance standards. Once the Board found that
Mr. Lewis failed to prove an unwarranted hardship, the Board could have
stopped its analysis.”
This is a total misunderstanding of our holding in White.  In order to determine whether an
unwarranted hardship exists, the Board must generally consider all of criteria of the County
Code.  It is only after all of the factors are considered that the Board can discern whether
petitioner generally met the criteria of § 125-36.29  While the Board need not find that the
applicant satisfies each and every criterion for it to grant the applicant’s variance request, or,
in the alternative, that it find negative factors for each factor in denying the request, the
Board should, at the very least, discuss, on the record, each § 125-36 criterion before making
-48-
its ultimate unwarranted hardship determination.
In the case sub judice, the Board did not make specific findings in its Findings of Fact
and Resolution of Decision with respect to all of the Code’s § 125-36 criteria.  It should have
done so.  The first factor in which there is no specific finding is in respect to the unique
character of the area in question, § 125-36(A), although there is substantial evidence on the
record regarding that criteria.  The Court of Special Appeals defined unique in terms of
Critical Area variance proceedings in North v. St. Mary’s County, 99 Md. App. 502, 514, 638
A.2d 1175, 1181 (1994), when that court said:
“In the zoning context the ‘unique’ aspect of a variance requirement
does not refer to the extent of improvements upon the property, or upon
neighboring property.  ‘Uniqueness’ of a property for zoning purposes requires
that the subject property have an inherent characteristic not shared by other
properties in the area, i.e., its shape, topography, sub-surface condition,
environmental factors, historical significance, access or non-access to
navigable waters, practical restrictions imposed by abutting properties (such
as obstructions) or other similar restrictions.  In respect to structures, it would
relate to such characteristics as unusual architectural aspects and bearing or
party walls.” [Emphasis added.]
See also, Cromwell v. Ward, 102 Md. App. 691, 721, 651 A.2d 424, 439 (1995)(stating, “a
property’s peculiar characteristic or unusual circumstances relating only and uniquely to that
property must exist in conjunction with the ordinance’s more severe impact on the specific
property because of the property’s uniqueness before any consideration will be given to
whether . . . unnecessary hardship exists”).  As the Board never made a specific finding as
to whether it considered petitioner’s land unique for the purposes of this zoning matter, it
committed legal error.  The record is replete with facts describing the island’s shape and
-49-
topography that bear on this issue.  In fact, one of the County’s staff planners stated, “We do
recognize that the configuration of the island is a unique situation and that the area outside
the Buffer equals 10,073 total square feet out of a 5.3 acre island.”  Instead, as we previously
discussed, the Board and later, respondent, focused not upon petitioner’s need for a variance
because of the uniqueness of island, but upon the notion of self-induced hardship.
Consideration of the criterion that petitioner’s variance request was consistent with
the county’s zoning code and comprehensive plan, § 125-36(G), was similarly absent from
the Board’s opinion.  While the apparent failure to consider this factor was error, whether it
was satisfied is best left for the expertise of the Board, discussed infra.
In sum, we have held that “where an administrative agency’s conclusions are not
supported by competent and substantial evidence, or where the agency draws impermissible
or unreasonable inferences and conclusions from undisputed evidence,”  Stansbury, 372 Md.
at 184, 812 A.2d at 319, or where an administrative agency’s decision is based on an error
of law, we owe the agency’s decision no deference.  Belvoir Farms, 355 Md. at 267-68, 734
A.2d at 232.  The Board in the case sub judice clearly and unequivocally utilized incorrect
standards of law throughout its Findings of Fact and Resolution of Decision denying
petitioner’s variance request; that decision was thus arbitrary and capricious.  Given the
substantial and numerous errors of law on which the Board based its decision, we direct the
Circuit Court to vacate the finding of the Board.  We have said:
“Generally, when an administrative agency utilizes an erroneous standard and
some evidence exists, however minimal, that could be considered
-50-
appropriately under the correct standard, the case should be remanded so the
agency can reconsider the evidence using the correct standard. . . . 
“This general rule regarding remand is especially applicable when the
statute authorizing the administrative action includes the requirement that the
agency consider factors of a legislative or administrative nature. . . .
“In the case sub judice, had the Board declined to grant the variance at
issue, and had the circuit court then found that the Board’s action in not
granting the variance was arbitrary and capricious because the Board had
applied the wrong legal standard, the court could not have granted a variance
sua sponte, the consideration of which had never been subjected to the proper
standard by the administrative agency. Ordinarily, courts cannot either grant
or deny variances. In those circumstances, the circuit court would have the
power to overrule the denial of the variance, but it would have to remand the
matter to the agency for further consideration using the proper standard. The
same holds true for the converse situation if the Board uses the wrong standard
in granting a variance; the matter must be remanded for further consideration
by the Board using the proper standard.”
Belvoir Farms, 355 Md. at 270-72, 734 A.2d at 234-35 (footnote omitted).  In light of the
fact that there is some, albeit minimal, evidence in opposition to petitioner’s variance request
proffered by respondent in the context of the applicable standard, we shall order a remand
of this case to the Board for further review consistent with the standards set forth in this
opinion.
C.  Guidelines on Remand
On remand, the determinative question in the case sub judice, as previously
mentioned, is not whether petitioner’s property is subject to any reasonable and significant
use without being granted a variance, but is a question of whether the requested variance is
reasonable in light of the general findings in relation to the criteria listed in § 125-36.  Once
30 The undisputed facts in this case indicate that 5.06 acres of the 5.30 acres of Phillips
Island lie within the Buffer zone.  More than ninety-five percent of the Island is within the
Buffer.  The total footprint of the proposed camp within the Buffer area constitutes
approximately 1.5 % of the island’s Buffer.  In Mastandrea, 4% of the buffer area was being
utilized.
-51-
that reasonableness determination is made in light of the § 125-36 criteria,30 the Board may
then proceed in considering the conditions outlined in § 125-38.  Therefore, if it is
determined that the specific six cabin hunting camp proposed is a reasonable and significant
use of Phillips Island, the Board then may consider whether that reasonable use is the
minimum variance needed in light of the factors of § 125-38(B)(1) through (6). As we deem
it necessary to order a remand to the Board for these considerations, we shall not specifically
address each of the Board’s factual findings.
IV.  Conclusion
In conclusion, we vacate the Wicomico County Board of Zoning Appeals’s decision
to deny petitioner’s variance request to build a hunting camp within the Chesapeake Bay
Critical Area Buffer.  Although we normally defer to an administrative agency’s decision
regarding the facts of a hearing, we do not defer to the agency when it has committed an error
of law.  Here, in its decision written by respondent, the Board committed several errors of
law in its application of this Court’s recent opinions of Belvoir Farms, White and
Mastandrea.  We order a remand of this case to the Board for reconsideration of petitioner’s
variance request in light of the standards and guidance set forth in this opinion.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
-52-
SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED AND THE
CASE IS REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THE
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR WICOMICO COUNTY AND REMAND
THE CASE TO THAT COURT WITH
FURTHER DIRECTIONS TO VACATE THE
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION AND TO
REMAND THE CASE TO THE WICOMICO
COUNTY BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS
F O R  
F U R T H E R  
P R O C E E D I N G S
CONSISTENT 
WITH 
THIS 
OPINION;
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID BY RESPONDENT.
Circuit Court for Wicomico County
Case No. 22-C-01-00345
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 114 
September Term, 2002
______________________________________
EDWIN H. LEWIS
v.
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Dissenting opinion by Wilner, J.,
in which Raker and Battaglia, JJ.,  join
______________________________________
Filed:    July 31, 2003
In 1984, after years of study and debate, the Maryland General Assembly took
decisive action to protect this State’s most valuable natural resource – the Chesapeake Bay
and its tributaries.  Although more than 30 bills were enacted in that session to ameliorate,
and hopefully reverse, environmental assaults upon the Bay, the flagship and most
comprehensive law was Chapter 794, which created the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area
Protection Program.
In enacting that program, the Legislature made certain findings that it felt important
enough to express in the law itself.  It declared in § 8-1801(a) of the Natural Resources
Article, among other things, that:
The Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries are natural resources of
great significance.
The shoreline and adjacent lands constitute a valuable, fragile,
and sensitive part of this estuarine system, where human activity
can have a particularly immediate and adverse impact on water
quality and natural habitats.
The capacity of these shoreline and adjacent lands to withstand
continuing demands without further degradation to water quality
and natural habitats is limited.
The quality of life for the citizens of Maryland is enhanced
through the restoration of the quality and productivity of the
waters of the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries.
The restoration of the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries is
dependent, in part, on minimizing further adverse impacts to the
water quality and natural habitats of the shoreline and adjacent
lands.
The cumulative impact of current development is inimical to
these purposes.
2
and
There is a critical and substantial State interest for the benefit of
current and future generations in fostering more sensitive
development activity in a consistent and uniform manner along
shoreline areas of the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries so as
to minimize damage to water quality and natural habitats.
Upon those findings, which were re-enacted and thus reconfirmed in 2002, the
Legislature stated as its purpose, “[t]o establish a Resource Protection Program for the
Chesapeake [Bay] ... and [its] tributaries by fostering more sensitive development activity
for certain shoreline areas so as to minimize damage to water quality and natural habitats.”
In striking down the Board’s determination in this case, the Court ignores those legislative
findings, misconstrues and misapplies the regulations and local laws adopted pursuant to the
statute, and seriously undermines this vital legislative program. With respect for my
colleagues who join in the majority Opinion, I dissent.  
The Resource Protection Program is a cooperative one between the State and local
governments.  The law created the Critical Area Commission, with authority to adopt
regulations and criteria that would implement the stated goals of the program, and charged
the counties within the defined critical area with developing and implementing local
programs consistent with standards expressed in the law and those promulgated by the
Commission.  Several of those regulations are important here.  In COMAR 27.01.02.02, the
Commission recognized and defined three types of development areas – intensely developed
areas, limited development areas, and resource conservation areas.  Development was to be
3
limited in the resource conservation areas, which were the most environmentally sensitive
areas and were chiefly designated for agriculture, forestry, fisheries activities, other resource
utilization activities, and habitat protection.
One of the program elements stated in the law itself was the establishment of buffer
areas along shorelines (§ 8-1808(c)(6)).  In COMAR 27.01.09.01A, the Commission defined
a “buffer” as “an existing, naturally vegetated area, or an area established in vegetation and
managed to protect aquatic, wetlands, shoreline, and terrestrial environments from man-made
disturbances.”  In COMAR 27.01.09.01C, the Commission required the local subdivisions,
in developing their critical area programs, (1) to establish a minimum 100-foot buffer
landward from the mean high water line of tidal waters, tributary streams, and tidal wetlands,
(2) to maintain the buffer in natural vegetation, and (3) except for water-dependent facilities,
not to permit new development activities, including structures and other impervious surfaces,
within the buffer.
Finally, as relevant here, in COMAR 27.01.11.01, the Commission required the
counties, in their local programs, to make provision for variances to the Commission’s
substantive criteria where, “owing to special features of a site or other circumstances, local
government implementation of [the Commission’s regulations] or a literal enforcement of
provisions within the [county’s] Critical Area program would result in unwarranted hardship
to an applicant.”  The regulation set certain minimum requirements for the local variance
program but specifically allowed the counties to establish additional and more restrictive
4
standards for the granting of variances, consistent with the intent and purposes of the
Commission’s regulations and the Critical Area program.
The land at issue here lies in Wicomico County, which is within the defined critical
area.  Wicomico County adopted a local critical area law consistent with the State law and
with the Commission’s regulations.  The county program was approved by the Commission,
and, as no complaint is made here that it is, itself, invalid in any way, it controls this case.
In conformance with COMAR 27.01.09.01C, the county law established the required
buffer (Wicomico County Code, § 125-7) and, except for water-dependent facilities,
prohibited new development activities within the buffer unless a buffer exemption was
granted by the County Council. Id, § 125-9.  The local law defined new development
activities as including “clearing of existing natural vegetation” and the “erection of structures
. . . or other impervious surfaces.”  In conformance with COMAR  27.01.11.01, §125-35
permits the County Board of Zoning Appeals to grant variances where, owing to special
features of a site or other circumstances, a literal enforcement of provisions would result in
unwarranted hardship. 
The law limits the Board’s ability to grant such a variance, although not to deny one.
Section 125-36 provides that variance requests in a critical area district may not be granted
unless the decision is based on certain enumerated criteria, including:
“A. That special conditions or circumstances exist that are
unique to the subject property or structure and that a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this chapter would result in
unwarranted hardship which is not generally shared by owners
5
of property in the same land use management areas . . . of the
Critical Area District.
B. That strict enforcement of the provisions within the Critical
Area District would deprive the property owner of rights
commonly shared by other owners of property in the same
management area within the Critical Area District.
C. That the granting of a variance will not confer upon an
applicant any special privilege that would be denied to other
owners of like property and/or structures within the Critical
Area District.
and
D. That the variance request is not based upon conditions or
circumstances which are self-created or self-imposed....
The land at issue here consists of two parcels, both of which are within the critical
area.  The western parcel, of just under 219 acres, borders the Nanticoke River on the north
and a tributary of that river on the east.  The Nanticoke flows directly into the Bay.  The
eastern parcel, comprising just under 77 acres, is separated from the western part by that
tributary.  Both parcels are within a resource conservation area.  The entire western parcel
and all but three areas of the eastern parcel, comprising a total of 7.23 acres, consists of
marshland.   The largest of the “upland” areas, comprising 5.30 acres, is known as Phillips
Island.  That area is, or at least was before Mr. Lewis went at it, totally wooded, with mature
oaks and loblolly pine.  Ninety-five percent of that area – 5.06 acres – is within the 100 foot
buffer.  Absent a properly issued variance, the clearing of vegetation and the construction of
non-water-dependent structures within that area is absolutely prohibited.
6
When Lewis bought the property in April, 1999, the only man-made improvements
on it were a boat pier, a storage building on the Phillips Island area, and approximately 12
duck blinds.  He bought the property, he said, for occasional overnight or weekend hunting
and fishing – not as a residence, not as a commercial enterprise.  Oblivious to virtually every
requirement of Federal, State, and local law, Lewis promptly began destroying vegetation and
constructing buildings and other improvements on the property, all without a permit, all
without notice, all in secret, all illegally.  The Board of Zoning Appeals found the following
uncontested facts:
“After purchasing the property, Mr. Lewis hired a contractor to
build six buildings on the island.  Mr. Lewis also had a well dug
and a pier constructed on the island.  One of the new buildings,
a structure of approximately 1,600 square feet, is located 58.79
feet from the edge of tidal wetlands, and this building contains
a kitchen and bath.  Three of the remaining buildings, smaller in
size, are intended for sleeping facilities, and one of these
contains a bathroom.  The fifth building was intended to be a
bathhouse, and the last building was intended for storage of
equipment.  Five of the six buildings are located entirely in the
100-foot Critical Area Buffer, and the sixth building is located
partially in the Buffer.  Neither Mr. Lewis nor his contractor
sought or obtained any state, federal, or local permits for any of
the site preparation or construction activity.  Testimony and
exhibits at the hearing established that this construction occurred
during summer and fall of 1999.”
A site visit in July 2000 by a Department of Natural Resources habitat manager
revealed that “a lot of vegetation had been removed.”  The county Planning Office reported
that “almost all groundcover and understory has been removed from the interior of the
island.”
7
Eventually, agencies from all three levels of Government discovered what Lewis was
doing.  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Maryland Department of Environment
informed him that construction of the pier without proper permits was in violation of Federal
and State law, and the county Planning Office informed him that the construction activity
violated several sections of the county code.  In April, 2000, the county attorney notified
Lewis that the development activity was in violation of Chapters 117 and 125 of the county
code (building without building permit and failure to obtain critical area certificate of
compliance).  That same month, the county Health Department informed him that the well,
already completed, was in violation of Maryland health regulations.  He was ordered to stop
all further activity.  The problem with the pier was corrected in June, 2000.  Lewis was
forced to abandon and seal the well.  
Lewis’s initial response was that he did not believe that he needed any permits, as he
did not anticipate receiving any county services.  Faced with the prospect of enforcement
actions, however, he ceased construction and applied for the necessary permits and variances.
Notwithstanding Lewis’s blatant defiance of Federal, State, and local law, the county
attempted to work with him so that he could develop the property as he wished, but in
compliance with applicable law.  A major problem was a State Health Department
requirement of a 10,000 square foot area, not within the buffer, for a sewage disposal system.
Only 10,463 square feet of Phillips Island were not in the buffer.  The county was able to
persuade the Health Department, in light of the seasonal and limited use intended to be made
8
of the property, to reduce the sewage disposal requirement to 5,812 square feet, which
allowed Lewis to relocate at least three and possibly four of the six buildings to a non-buffer
area.  Lewis initially agreed, and submitted an application for variance that showed four
buildings – three of the smaller cabins and the storage building -- outside the buffer and only
two within it.  It is entirely possible that a variance based on that plan, despite opposition
from the county critical area staff, may have been approved.  Lewis might have had his six
buildings and his full intended use of the property, without any serious environmental
degradation.
Having filed his application, Lewis began making arrangements to move some of the
buildings in advance of any approval of the application.  The county suggested that he defer
until after a scheduled meeting, because the locations he chose might not be the ones
approved by the zoning authority, and the staff wanted to avoid his having to move the
buildings twice.  Lewis instead consulted two environmental consultants who advised him
to leave the six illegally constructed buildings where they were.  On that advice, Lewis filed
an amended plan that left all six buildings intact.  Instead of seeking a variance for just two
buildings, he now claimed a right to have all six in the prohibited buffer.
It is true, as the Court states, that Lewis’s hired experts asserted that leaving the
buildings where they were was more environmentally sound than relocating them.  There was
much evidence to the contrary, however, and it was the contrary evidence that the Board of
Zoning Appeals credited.  The Court spends several pages summarizing the testimony of
9
Lewis’s hired experts, but, in light of the Board’s findings, that testimony, to me, is irrelevant
at this point.  It was simply not found persuasive.  Mr. Dwyer, of the county planning office,
testified that, had Lewis consulted the planning office before proceeding with construction,
“we may have been able to redesign or design the project to avoid the need for a variance or
at least to limit the amount of variance needed for the impact to the buffer.”  That conclusion
was also stated in the report and recommendations of the county critical area staff.  It was
highlighted as well in the formal recommendation of the Critical Area Commission:
“[A]ny variance should be the minimum necessary to provide
relief.  If the applicant had followed the proper procedures, the
development would have been designed to minimize impacts to
the protected 100-foot Buffer and perhaps eliminate the need for
a variance entirely.”
Apart from evidence that the variance requested was not needed – that, even at the
time of the hearing, at least some of the buildings could have been relocated to a non-buffer
area – there was evidence that approval of the request would not be consistent with the
critical area program.  Lee Anne Chandler, a natural resource planner with the Critical Area
Commission, not only testified but submitted a letter addressing each of the criteria for the
granting of a variance.  The Court, improperly in my view, denigrates her testimony and
ignores entirely her letter on behalf of the Commission.  The letter was in evidence, however,
and, among other things, it states:
(1) Denial of the requested variance would not result in an unwarranted hardship
because the project could have been designed to avoid the need for the requested variance.
10
(2) The need for the variance is a self-created hardship:
“[The applicant] went through great effort and expense to
construct six buildings on the shoreline and dig a well on an
island, accessible only at high tide by boat, without contacting
any local permitting authority.  All six buildings and the well are
located within the Buffer, a designated habitat protection area
where no new building is allowed except for water-dependent
structures.  The cabins and house are not water-dependent; thus
the applicant created the need for the variance....”
(3) Approval of the variance would give Lewis a special privilege:
“All property owners within the Critical Area are prohibited
from disturbing the Critical Area 100-foot Buffer.  In applying
for permits, property owners work with County staff to
understand the regulations and design development accordingly
in a way that minimizes impacts to Critical Area resources.
Under no circumstances would development of the subject
property be permitted as the applicant has already done.  If the
variance is granted, the applicant would reap the benefits of his
unlawful actions.”  (Emphasis added).
(4) The 100-foot buffer is the cornerstone of the Critical Area Law.  It functions to
protect water quality and provide a transitional habitat between aquatic and upland
communities.  Those functions are compromised when clearing, construction, and other
development occurs in the buffer and will continue to be compromised by the increased
human activity.
(5) The variance would be contrary to the spirit and intent of the Critical Area
Program:
“The applicant has constructed six (6) buildings totaling 3670
square feet of impervious surface within the Buffer.  Although
it is literally impossible to measure impacts to water quality
11
from these structures, it is obvious that each new impervious
surface in the Buffer reduces the area available for infiltration
and habitat....”
Ms. Chandler, a professional planner who reviews several hundred Critical Area
projects each year, had visited the site, and she described what she observed – destruction by
Lewis of the understory on the island, piles of mulch and cut-up logs, and roofs with
impervious surfaces.  Russ Hill, a habitat manager for the Department of Natural Resources,
also  visited the site, and he confirmed Ms. Chandler’s observations.  Hill testified that
removal of the vegetation would have a great effect on wildlife habitat.  He stated that many
bird and mammal species use or inhabit vegetated buffers such as that on Phillips Island for
both nesting and feeding, and that, “[b]y removing the vegetation, you remove escape cover
and nesting cover and also food sources for wildlife, whether it be the animals actually eating
the plants or eating the insects that are feeding on the plants and also the berries and seeds
that they produce.”  Don Jackson, from the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, testified that he saw
approximately 114 newly cut tree stumps of five inches or larger in diameter and, in contrast
to Lewis’s testimony that he had cut only two trees, said that he counted over 100 trees that
had recently been cut.
After listening to all of this testimony, for over six hours, the Board voted
unanimously to deny the requested variance.  In its written decision, it addressed at least four
of the six criteria set forth in §125-36 of the County Code for the granting of a variance and
found that none of them warranted the requested variance.  Mostly, however, it denied the
12
request because it concluded that (1) a variance was not necessary to avoid any hardship to
Lewis, who was free to use the property in its current form precisely as he had intended – for
hunting and fishing – and as previous owners had used it, and (2) if there was any hardship
to Lewis, it was self-created.  The Board noted first that the 100-foot buffer is “of vital
importance to the health of the Bay and is afforded strong protection from disturbance in the
County ordinance.”  It pointed out that § 125-9 of the County Code prohibits new
development activities, including clearing and the erection of impervious surfaces, in the
buffer zone and that Lewis had both cleared natural vegetation and constructed impervious
surfaces in that area.  Noting this Court’s decisions in Belvoir Farms v. North, 355 Md. 259,
734 A.2d 227 (1999), White v. North, 356 Md. 31, 736 A.2d 1072 (1999), and Mastandrea
v. North, 361 Md. 107, 760 A.2d 677 (2000), the Board found:
(1) Lewis would not suffer any unwarranted hardship from denial of the
requested variances because “he will continue to enjoy reasonable and significant use of the
Island and the property without the requested variance.”  (Emphasis added).  It noted that
Phillips Island contained over 10,000 square feet that was not in the buffer and that “[a]
reasonably-sized structure could be sited in this non-Buffer area for the occasional use of
persons who hunt on the property.”  The Board stated that the property contained at least 12
waterfowl hunting blinds and had been used for hunting by previous owners for many years.
It added that the requested variance was not the minimum necessary for reasonable use in any
event.
13
(2) Strict enforcement of the buffer restrictions would not deprive Lewis of
rights commonly shared by owners of other property in the county’s resource conservation
areas.  The Board acknowledged testimony regarding structures in the buffer zones of other
properties but distinguished those situations on the ground that the uses there were associated
with the residential use of the property.
(3) The variance request was based on circumstances and conditions that were
self-created or self-imposed and that could have been avoided.
(4) There was conflicting evidence regarding the actual and potential
environmental impacts of the construction and use of the six buildings.  The Board
summarized some of that evidence and concluded that it was “unable to find that the granting
of this variance will not adversely affect water quality or adversely impact fish, wildlife, or
plant habitat within the County’s Critical Area District.” 
The Board made no express finding whether the variance would confer any special
privilege on Lewis that would be denied to other owners of like property in the Critical Area
District or whether the proposed variance was consistent with the county comprehensive
plan.  It does not appear that any question was ever raised about consistency with the
comprehensive plan.
The Court directs that the Board’s denial of the requested variance be vacated because
(1) the Board used “impermissible legal standards” in determining that there was no
unwarranted hardship, and (2) “the record contains little or no empirical data to support the
14
Board’s conclusions or to refute the studies and reports of petitioner’s experts” and, as a
result, the Board’s decision is “arbitrary and capricious.”  In reaching those conclusions, the
Court seems to complain that the Board did not consider all of the statutory criteria, that in
examining whether denial of the variance would deny Lewis reasonable and significant use
of the property, the Board erroneously considered the entire property rather than just the
Phillips Island part of it, and that the Board erred in considering and giving any credence to
Lewis’s patently unlawful activity in constructing the six buildings in determining that his
need for a variance was self-created. 
The Court’s decision rests largely on four recent cases, three  involving Critical Area
variances and one involving a traditional zoning variance.  In the three Critical Area cases,
the local board granted the requested variances, and what we had before us were challenges
to the administrative decision.  In Belvoir Farms v. North, 355 Md. 259, 734 A.2d 227
(1999), the variance permitted the applicant to construct 14 more boat slips at a community
pier than were otherwise allowed by the critical area regulations.  The Board granted the
variance on the ground that denial of the request would create “practical difficulties” and, for
that reason, would constitute an unwarranted hardship.  We concluded that the Board had
effectively equated unwarranted hardship with “practical difficulties,” that “practical
difficulties” was not the proper standard upon which to grant a critical area variance, and that
the case therefore had to be remanded to the Board so that it could apply the correct standard.
To guide the Board, we pointed out that the “unwarranted hardship” standard
15
applicable in the critical area variance context was less restrictive than the “denial of
reasonable use” or “denial of a reasonable return” standards that had been applied in
Constitutional taking cases.  We held that the “unwarranted hardship” standard, and its
similar manifestations, “are equivalent to the denial of reasonable and significant use of the
property” and that “[w]hether a property owner has been denied reasonable and significant
use of his property is a question of fact best addressed by he expertise of the Board of
Appeals, not the courts.”  Id. at 282, 734 A.2d at 240.
In White v. North, 356 Md. 31, 736 A.2d 1072 (1999), the local board granted a
critical area variance to permit residential owners to construct an in-ground swimming pool
in their back yard.  The applicants purchased an unimproved lot that had a gradual slope of
less than 15%.  The back of the lot led down to Martins Cove, a tributary within the
Chesapeake Bay Critical Area.  In grading the lot for their house, they pushed dirt from the
excavation to the rear of the lot and thereby created a slope in that area exceeding 15%.  Five
years later, they decided to build a pool, deck, and patio in the back.  Had they built those
accessories there before they re-graded that area, there would have been no problem, as the
area was not within the 100-foot buffer.  Under the county critical area law, however, where
there was a contiguous slope of 15% or more, the buffer was extended to include all land
within 50 feet of the top of the slope, and that brought the back of the lot within the extended
buffer.  Because the pool, deck, and patio clearly were impervious surfaces, that necessitated
a variance. 
16
On evidence that, because of restrictive covenants and other topographical features,
there was no other place on the lot to build the pool, the Board granted the variance,
concluding (1) that as a result of “unique physical conditions,” there was no reasonable
possibility of developing the lot in the manner the owners proposed without a variance and
that a strict implementation of the critical area law would result in an unwarranted hardship,
(2) because neighbors had pools in their yards, denial of a variance would deprive the
applicants of rights commonly enjoyed by others, (3) the pool would not negatively impact
the critical area because it would catch rainwater and lessen the natural runoff, and (4) the
applicants did not create the hardship.  White was a companion case to Belvoir, and we
effectively vacated the Board’s decision because, in finding a hardship, it had applied the
wrong standard of “unique physical conditions” rather than the standard we enunciated in
Belvoir.  The “uniqueness” standard, we said, was not part of the county ordinance.  We
remanded for the Board to reconsider the application in light of Belvoir – whether denial of
the variance would deprive the applicants of reasonable and significant use of their property.
We confirmed that “[a]s long as evidence exists before the agency that would make its
factual determination as to reasonableness and significance fairly debatable, its determination
ordinarily should be upheld . . . Generally, it is only when an agency’s factual determinations
are unsupported by substantial evidence that the courts may vacate an otherwise proper
agency decision.”  Id. at 50, 736 A.2d at 1082-83.
 We noted in White that the ordinance in question, and most local critical area
17
ordinances, include “a list of other factors that must be considered with respect to the grant
or denial of a variance,” id. at 50, 736 A.2d at 1083. Citing the various criteria that were
modeled on the requirements in COMAR 27.01.11, supra, we observed that, if total
compliance with each of those standards was required, a variance would be nearly impossible
and thus would present some serious “taking” questions.  To avoid that, we concluded that
those standards must be considered in the context of the entire variance ordinance, “to the
end that, when interpreted as a whole, either they are or are not generally met.”  Id.  We then
added:  
“Moreover, the essential determination is whether
an unwarranted hardship exists.  The specific
factors that must be considered cannot be
construed individually to overrule a finding of
unwarranted hardship any more than they could
overrule a finding of an unconstitutional taking of
one’s property.  The individual provisions that
must be considered are part of the entire matrix
that defines what information is necessary to
reach a finding as to the existence or nonexistence
of an unwarranted hardship.”
Id. at 50-51, 736 A. 2d at 1083.
That statement needs to be applied with some care.  COMAR 27.01.11.01 requires
local programs to make provision for variances where, owing to special features of a site or
other circumstances, literal enforcement would result in unwarranted hardship and it lists
certain criteria that, at a minimum, the local plans must contain with respect to variances.
One of those criteria is that the variance request not be based on conditions or circumstances
18
which are the result of actions by the applicant.  That is the foundation for the self-created
hardship provision found in most, if not all, of the local critical area ordinances.  Perhaps it
is a matter of semantics, in the sense that, if the hardship claimed by the applicant is self-
created, it is, ipso facto, not unwarranted, but if not viewed that way, then the self-created
hardship criterion necessarily must stand on its own as an independent basis for denying a
variance.  That, to me, has enormous significance, because once the Board, on substantial
evidence, finds that the hardship claimed by the applicant as a basis for the requested
variance was self-created, the Board need do no more in order to deny the variance.  Upon
that finding, there exists no basis upon which to grant the variance.  The other factors, which
are relevant only in determining whether a hardship exists in the first instance, then become
irrelevant.  It was at least an arguable issue in White, and, since the Board there had not
applied the correct standard for determining hardship, remand was appropriate.  
The third case, Mastandrea v. North, 361 Md. 107, 760 A.2d 677 (2000), also
involved the granting of a variance – to construct a sloping brick-in-cement pathway from
the applicant’s house to a pier extending into Glebe Creek.  The gradually sloping pathway
was needed to accommodate the homeowner’s child, who suffered from muscular dystrophy
and was confined to a wheelchair.  Because of the steep slope of the land, the pathway was
necessary to provide access for the child to the waterfront.  A variance was needed for that
part of the path traversing the 100-foot buffer, and the Board granted it, finding, among other
things, that as the pathway was the only means of access for the child, denial of the variance
19
would deny her reasonable use of the property.  There was no issue of the hardship being
self-created, and our affirmance of the Board’s decision rested on our conclusion that there
was sufficient evidence in the record to support that decision.
With the caveat noted as to some of the language in White, it seems to me that these
three cases mandate an affirmance of the judgment here.  I find nothing in them that would
support a reversal.  The only case that might provide some support for the Court’s
unfortunate ruling is Stansbury v. Jones, 372 Md. 172, 812 A.2d 312 (2002) which itself was
wrongly decided and should not even be followed, much less extended.
Turning to the Court’s rationale in this case, the Court first holds that the Board used
the wrong standard in determining that there was no unwarranted hardship.  That, it seems,
rests on the conclusion that the Board looked at the hardship question in terms of the property
as a whole, rather than that part of the Phillips Island area within the buffer.  There are two
problems with that ground.  First, it is factually incorrect. The Board found that Lewis would
“continue to enjoy reasonable and significant use of the Island and the property without the
requested variance.”  (Emphasis added).  Second, there is no basis in the State statute, the
Commission’s regulations, or the local ordinance for limiting the Board’s focus only to the
part of Phillips Island within the buffer.  Section 125-36 of the county ordinance states that
a variance request “shall not be granted” unless the decision is based on the stated criteria,
the relevant one of which, in this context, is that “special conditions or circumstances exist
that are unique to the subject property or structure and that a strict enforcement of the
20
provisions of this chapter would result in unwarranted hardship which is not generally shared
by owners of property in the same land use management areas.”  (Emphasis added).  That
criterion speaks of “the subject property,” not just the piece of it that is within the buffer area.
Ignoring the language of the ordinance, the Court improperly extends, and therefore
misapplies, what we actually said and held in Mastandrea.  Keeping in mind that the Board
there granted the variance upon a finding that the pathway provided reasonable access to the
waterfront for the handicapped child and was a reasonable accommodation for her disability,
we said that the Board “did not have to consider whether denying the variance would have
denied the Mastandreas a reasonable and significant use of the ‘entire’ lot” (emphasis added)
but was instead required to consider only whether, in light of their daughter’s disability, they
“would be denied a reasonable and significant use of the waterfront of their property without
the access that the path provided.”  Mastandrea, 361 Md. at 136, 760 A.2d at 693.  The real
issue in Mastandrea, which we found unnecessary to address in the appeal, was whether the
Board would have been required under the Americans With Disabilities Act to make such
an accommodation.  It is evident that, whether or not the Board had that Act in mind, it
clearly relied on the child’s disability when it granted the variance.  Id. at 126, 760 A.2d at
687.
It is impermissible, in my opinion, to stretch that statement, made in the context of the
peculiar circumstances of Mastandrea, into a proposition that the focus in every case must
be limited to the buffer area.  One need only consider the implication of such a holding to
21
understand its fallacy.  If a lot contains ample non-buffer area on which to build the structure
thought required to provide a reasonable and significant use of the property, the owner cannot
demand the right to build that structure in a buffer area on the lot and insist that, in
determining whether denial of a variance would constitute an unwarranted hardship, the
Board look only at the buffer area.  That is what the Court seems to hold, and that cannot be
right.  
The Court also finds that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because
the record contains “little or no empirical data to support the Board’s conclusions or to refute
the studies and reports of petitioner’s experts.”  Where that test came from is a mystery to
me.  The standard we have always applied (until today) is whether “there is substantial
evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s finding and conclusions.”  Board
of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 67-68, 729 A.2d 376, 380 (1999);
Mehrling v. Nationwide, 371 Md. 40, 57, 806 A.2d 662, 672 (2002).  In that regard (until
today), we have followed the principle that “a reviewing court decides ‘whether a reasoning
mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached’” and that it
should “defer to the agency’s fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by
the record.”  Banks, 354 Md. at 68, 729 A.2d at 380-81; Mehrling, 371 Md. at 57, 806 A.2d
at 672.  We have also followed (until today) the rule that the court must review the agency’s
decision in the light most favorable to it, that the agency’s decision is presumed correct, and
that it is the agency’s province to resolve conflicting evidence and draw inferences from that
22
evidence.  Id.
There is nothing in that traditional test that requires “empirical data” to support the
agency’s findings, and there is certainly no requirement that there be “empirical data” to
refute evidence offered by the party having the burden of proof and persuasion.  There was
ample evidence in the record to demonstrate that Lewis would be able to enjoy the reasonable
and significant use of his property, including the Phillips Island part of it, without the need
for the variance he requested.  Testimony and letters from both the county planning office
and the Critical Area Commission documented that some of the buildings could be located
outside the buffer zone – that it was not necessary to have all six in the buffer.  Lewis simply
threw the gauntlet down and insisted that he was entitled to have all six illegally constructed
buildings remain where they were.  Lewis bought the property to use for weekend or
occasional hunting and fishing – the same use to which it previously had been put. There is
no evidence in the record – none whatever – that even suggests, much less demonstrates, that
six buildings in the buffer zone are required in order for Lewis to use the property for that
purpose.  
Finally, the Court wrongly dismisses Lewis’s unlawful construction of the six
buildings as a “red herring.”  It is not a “red herring” at all.  The importance, which the Court
blindly overlooks, is not just the illegality of what Lewis did, but in the uncontradicted
evidence that, had he applied for the permits in advance, as the law required him to do, the
project could have been revised at that point so that either a variance would not have been
23
necessary or that the need for one could have been limited.  There can be little doubt that, had
Lewis applied initially for a variance for six buildings in the buffer, it would have been
denied as unnecessary.  Lewis built the structures and then demanded a right to retain them
as a hardship.  He should receive no reward for his unlawful behavior.
In its inexplicable effort to allow property owners such as Lewis to do whatever they
wish on environmentally sensitive property, without regard to legal constraints or public
policy, the Court throws established principles of administrative law to the wind,
misconstrues the relevant statutes and regulations, and views the evidence not in a light most
favorable to the agency but in a light most favorable to the losing applicant.  It is not only
wrong in this case but sets a most unfortunate precedent.  
Judges Raker and Battaglia have authorized me to state that they join in this dissent.
Circuit Court for Wicomico C ounty
Case #22-C-01-00345
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 114
(On Motion For Reconsideration)
September Term, 2002
Edwin H. Lewis
v.
Department of Natural Resources
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia,
JJ.
Per Curiam
Raker, J., Dissents
Wilner, J., Dissents
Battaglia, J., Dissents
Filed: October 10, 2003
1 Certain non-parties who had not sought previously to participate as amici curiae on
the merits (the governments of Anne Arundel, Carroll, Harford, Montgomery, and Worcester
Counties, State Senator Roy P. Dyson, State Delegate Barbara A. Frush, and the Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, Inc.) moved for recognition to file, as amici, their support for the
Respondent’s motion. 
2 No motion for reconsideration was filed by the Commission (or anyone) following
the filing of our opinion in Mastandrea.  Moreover, the Mastandrea opinion spoke for a
unanimous Court.
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Per Curiam.
Respondent, the State Department of Natural Resources, Critical Area Commission
for the Chesapeake and Atlantic Coastal Bays (the Commission), filed a Motion for
Reconsideration regarding the Court’s opinion in this matter filed on July 31, 2003.1  In that
motion, several principal arguments were advanced upon which we shall comment in denying
the motion.
“1.  Contrary to precedent of the United States Supreme Court
and this Court, the Court [of Appeals] rejected the General
Assembly’s legislative findings that the cumulative impact of
development harms the bay.”
The Court did no such thing.  The Court in the present matter, as well as in
Mastandrea v. North, 361 Md. 107, 760 A.2d 677 (2000),2 was not called upon directly to
consider the accuracy, substance, or scope of vitality of the relevant legislative findings and
declarations upon which the creation of the Commission and its powers was predicated.
Rather, the Court noted in both cases that the Commission’s misuse of those findings and
declarations in each case was not a substitute for adducing evidence that the respective
variance proposals might “have a particularly immediate and adverse impact on water quality
and natural habitats.”  Md. Code (1990 Repl. Vol., 2002 Supp.), Nat. Res. Art., Nat. Res.
-2-
Art., § 8-1801 (a)(2).
From the legislative inception of the Commission in 1984 through the most recent
pertinent re-enactment in 2002, the Legislature’s relevant “findings” regarding the conditions
of and about the Chesapeake Bay have been substantively the same:
§ 8-1801.  Declaration of public policy.
(a) Findings. – The General Assembly finds and declares that:
(1) The Chesapeake and the Atlantic Coastal Bays and their
tributaries are natural resources of great significance to the State
and the nation;
(2) The shoreline and adjacent lands constitute a valuable,
fragile, and sensitive part of this estuarine system, where human
activity can have a particularly immediate and adverse impact
on water quality and natural habitats;
(3) The capacity of these shoreline and adjacent lands to
withstand continuing demands without further degradation to
water quality and natural habitats is limited;
(4) National studies have documented that the quality and
productivity of the waters of the Chesapeake Bay and its
tributaries have declined due to the cumulative effects of human
activity that have caused increased levels of pollutants,
nutrients, and toxics in the Bay System and declines in more
protective land uses such as forestland and agricultural land in
the Bay region; 
(5) Those portions of the Chesapeake and the Atlantic Coastal
Bays and their tributaries within Maryland are particularly
stressed by the continuing population growth and development
activity concentrated in the Baltimore-Washington metropolitan
corridor and along the Atlantic Coast;
(6) The quality of life for the citizens of Maryland is enhanced
through the restoration of the quality and productivity of the
waters of the Chesapeake and the Atlantic Coastal Bays, and
their tributaries;
(7) The restoration of the Chesapeake and the Atlantic Coastal
Bays and their tributaries is dependent, in part, on minimizing
further adverse impacts to the water quality and natural habitats
of the shoreline and adjacent lands;
(8) The cumulative impact of current development is inimical to
-3-
these purposes; and
(9) There is a critical and substantial State interest for the
benefit of current and future generations in fostering more
sensitive development activity in a consistent and uniform
manner along shoreline areas of the Chesapeake and the
Atlantic Coastal Bays and their tributaries so as to minimize
damage to water quality and natural habitats. [Emphasis  added.]
Patent in these findings is that the Legislature was commenting retrospectively as to the
cumulative impact upon the Bay of existing development, thereby necessitating close scrutiny
of individual future development proposals so that any particular immediate and adverse
impact on water quality and natural habitat from each development was minimized.  Of
course, if no adverse impact was shown, nothing required minimization.  Presumably because
the Legislature was aware of constitutional implications were it to preemptively foreclose all
future development in the areas tributary to the Chesapeake Bay (and being unwilling to
sustain the financial costs of such a potential “takings” situation), it is equally clear from
these findings that it was not the Legislature’s intent that no development be permitted
henceforth in areas tributary to the Bay.  The necessary consequence of the tension between
the legitimate environmental protective regulatory effort of the statute and the constitutional
consequences of a “taking” leads to a case-by-case, quasi-adjudicatory process where each
new development proposal is analyzed in terms of whether it would affect adversely the Bay,
i.e., the variance process.
To the extent that the Court’s opinions in the present case and Mastandrea address a
“cumulative effects” argument mounted by the Commission, it was only to point out that the
Commission, in lieu of adducing evidence as to how the respective variance proposals
3 In Mastandrea, the applicants adduced specific evidence that the bricks-in-sand
pathway in question there was actually more permeable to rainfall than the six inch deep
excavated “natural” clay subsoils underlaying the residential lawn disturbed by installation
of the pathway.  No habitat for wildlife was disturbed.  361 Md. at 116-117, 760 A.2d at   
      .  Rather than offer contradictory evidence, or even to cross-examine the Mastrandreas’
expert witnesses regarding the studies they made that led to the foregoing conclusions, the
Commission generally argued that the variance should not be granted because, when
considered with the impact of other existing impervious structures within the Critical Area
buffer in Talbot County (“the cumulative effects argument”), approval of the variance would
violate Talbot County’s intent to protects its critical areas.  Rejection of the Commission’s
argument by the Talbot County Board of Appeals (and this Court) was the result.  Neither
rejection, however, represented repudiation of the Legislature’s retrospective legislative
findings, only the Commission misapplication of them in specific cases.
-4-
impacted adversely on water quality or natural habitats, misused the Legislature’s
retrospective-looking finding as to cumulative effects of past development over the entire
drainage basin of the Bay as a substitute for any meaningful analysis on the Commission’s
part of the particular uses involved in the quasi-adjudicatory processes at issue in those cases.
This should not be misunderstood to mean that the Commission, or any one save the
applicant in a variance case, has a legally cognizable burden to adduce evidence in support
of its position.  On the other hand, where an applicant, such as here and in Mastandrea,
adduces competent and admitted evidence amounting to a prima facie case as to the required
elements necessary to grant its application, opposing parties must accept a practical risk when
they fail to produce any evidence, other than naked opinions, to the contrary.  If, as was the
case in Mastandrea, the administrative body making the decision is persuaded by the
applicant’s evidence,3 and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the obvious
consequence is that it may be more likely that the decision-maker may find for the applicant.
That is the risk the Commission takes when it fails to adduce evidence to rebut an applicant’s
-5-
prima facie case.
In the present case, the Commission essentially repeated its misplaced cumulative
effects argument from Mastandrea, which, even when coupled with its witness’s opinion
testimony that was supported only by mere speculation, rather than facts, amounted to no
contradictory evidentiary predicate vis à vis Lewis’ prima facie case in support of his
variance application.  To be sure, there existed actual evidence in the record before the
Wicomico County Board of Zoning Appeals introduced by other parties before that
administrative agency opposing Lewis’ application.  It is that evidence, which the Board
presumably will weigh against Lewis’ evidence, when it reconsiders this matter on remand
from this Court.
The Respondent/Movant then argues:
“2.  The Court failed to follow its own legal precedents, by re-
evaluating the evidence and usurping the role of the fact-finding agency.  The
Court further erred by mis-characterizing lay testimony as ‘expert,’ by
ignoring the testimony of the State’s expert on plant and wildlife habitat, and
by failing to defer to the Board of Appeals’ assessment of all the evidence
presented in the six-hour hearing.”
Initially, we note that we did not reverse the agency’s decision and direct it to issue
a variance.  We merely vacated its decision, and remanded the case back to the agency for
it to reconsider the request without utilizing improper considerations.  We applied the
precedents that existed at the time of the 2001 Wicomico County Board of Zoning Appeals’s
hearing in this matter.  We found that the applicant had presented sufficient evidence from
its witnesses, including its experts, that might have justified the issuance of a variance if
improper considerations had not been taken into account.  We note now, as we noted in the
-6-
majority opinion, that one of the specific improprieties in this  case was the acceptance by
the Board of the general cumulative impact argument and its application to a specific
variance proposal thereby, in effect, closing an entire watershed when the General Assembly
had not delegated that power to the Commission, not that the public policy declaration
as to cumulative impact from past development that serves as the stated justification
for creation of the critical area legislative scheme as a whole was improper.  We were
not asked in this case to consider the constitutionality of the Critical Area legislative scheme
and the statutes then in effect, nor have we ever resolved such issues.  Any assertion to the
contrary is simply incorrect.
We did not ignore the evidence presented by the Movant and other parties before the
Board.  We merely held that the witnesses, including the experts, for the applicant had
opined as to the lack of endangerment to the environment based upon actual site specific
inspections of the subject property and that the witness offered by the Movant testified as
to development in general, and then presented only conjecture as to the subject property.
We held that conjecture was insufficient to rebut site specific fact based expert opinion.
Even then, we merely remanded the case back to the agency.  Generally, it is the function
of this Court to review the evidence in matters calling for review of administrative agency
actions.  That does not change when the Commission is a party before the respective agency.
Respondent/Movant presents a third issue:
“3. The Court imposed on local jurisdictions a new and costly
requirement to conduct empirical studies, produce reports, and present expert
testimony in order to support denial of a variance to the local zoning laws.”
4 Petitioner proposes a hunting camp.  Hunting is permitted in Maryland.  One of the
purposes of a hunting camp is to kill ducks, geese, rabbits, squirrels, deer, i.e. wildlife. 
5 The expert admitted that she did not know whether the cedar shake shingles were
treated.
-7-
We proposed no such requirement.  What we held, as we have in other adversarial
proceedings, is that when an applicant (or a plaintiff) presents evidence sufficiently
favorable to him or her to meet the burden the applicant must meet, a generalized opinion
“that wildlife will be harmed”4 or “All the cedar shakes, I’m sure they’re treated with
something,”5 without any supporting evidence (site specific or otherwise), may not be
sufficient to rebut an the applicant’s prima facie case. Generally, when an applicant in an
administrative proceeding presents evidence that, standing alone, sufficiently supports the
granting of an application, protestants present evidence (as opposed to mere conjecture) to
the contrary.  That does not change just because one of the protestants is the Critical Area
Commission.  And in any event, this Court has not ordered that the application be granted.
The agency’s decision was vacated, and the matter remanded for further consideration. 
The Respondent’s/Movant’s fourth issue is really twofold. 
“4.  The Court dismissed the illegal construction of hunting cabins in
the sensitive 100-foot Chesapeake Bay buffer as a ‘red herring,’ even though
the law clearly requires the fact-finder to consider whether the hardship from
which the applicant seeks relief is self-imposed.  By dismissing as not relevant
the fact that Lewis built the cabins illegally, the Court condoned 
law-breaking,
and encouraged future non-compliance.
“The Commission respectfully requests that the Court reconsider this
decision which inexplicably throws into turmoil well-settled principles of
administrative and zoning law.  Alternatively, the Court should clarify that the
decision is limited to the narrow circumstances presented by this case, and
acknowledge that the cases upon which the decision rests were legislatively
overruled in 2002.”
6 This may well be as a result of the interactions with various public entities as the
application progressed.
-8-
We did not condone any illegal conduct.  We addressed this case as it was presented
before the agency.  We noted on page 16 of our opinion how the agency addressed the case
by quoting from the comments of a member of the Board.  He said:  “And the rest of my
comments I’m going to make is in the context of that we, or I will be trying to view this and
am viewing this as if the buildings were not already there.” Moreover, the Board, while
mentioning that the fact that if the buildings had to be moved, that move would be a self-
created hardship, went on to decide the case as if the buildings were not there and as if the
application was for new structures.6  The Board’s finding included:
“. . . . [T]he Board finds that the Applicant will not suffer an unwarranted
hardship without a variance for the six buildings because he will continue to
enjoy reasonable and significant use of the Island and the property without the
requested variance. . . . [T]he island contains over 10,000 square feet of land
that does not lie within the Tidal Buffer.  A reasonably-sized structure could
be sited in this non-Buffer area . . . .  Accordingly, the Board finds that denial
of a variance . . . will not deny . . . the reasonable and significant use of the
Island . . . and that he will not suffer an unwarranted hardship.”
We merely addressed the decision of the Board as it made it.  More important, we
noted in footnote 26 on page 45 of the majority opinion:  “. . . we have treated this variance
request as if the cabins were not on Phillips Island.  That is the same position the Board
stated it was taking.”  If the Board wanted to decide the case on the basis of the fact that the
existing cabins were a self-created hardship, it should not have addressed the issue
7 A fair reading of the proceedings below, with the various interactions of officials and
applicant and its experts, appeared to us, and still appears to us, to have been a situation
where all parties addressed the application as if the cabins were proposed, as opposed to
existing. 
-9-
differently.7  We merely resolved it the way it was presented.
Addressing the fourth issue further, obviously this case is limited to its own facts and
the rather unique procedural posture of the case as it arrived before us, i.e. as if it was an
application for proposed cabins.  Moreover, we applied the law as utilized by the parties in
this pre-2002 case.  The Commission, in its prepared findings for the Board, purported to
be applying the law as it existed in 2001.  
Chapter 431 of the Laws of Maryland of 2002, the new law, as relevant to this issue
provides:
“SECTION 2. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That this Act shall
be construed to apply only prospectively and may not be applied or
interpreted to have any effect on or application to any variance application
for which a petition for judicial review of a decision to grant or deny a
variance under a local critical area program was filed before the effective
date of this Act.” 
Accordingly, in not applying the new statute in deciding the present case, we were
complying with the dictates of the Legislature.  It directed that we not apply the new statute
to this case and we followed that direction. 
To the extent that it is argued that we should nonetheless have applied the new
statute, in the face of the Legislature’s express prohibition that we not apply it in such  cases,
another problem also would exist.  There was no challenge to the constitutionality of the
applicable law as existing in 2001 when the variance was acted on by the local
-10-
administrative body.  To now apply, sua sponte,  a new, presumably stricter, law to a  prior
application, when the new law says it does not apply, would create due process concerns.
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
DENIED, WITH COSTS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 114
September Term, 2002
EDWIN H. LEWIS
v.
DEPARTMENT OF
 NATURAL RESOURCES
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia,
JJ.
On Motion for Reconsideration
Dissenting Opinion by Raker, J.
              Filed: October 10, 2003
Raker, J., dissenting:
I joined the well-reasoned dissent authored by Judge Wilner, filed on July 31, 2003.
I continue to adhere to the views expressed therein.
In the Circuit Court for Wicomico County
Case No. 22-C-01-00345
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 114
September Term, 2002
______________________________________
EDWIN H. LEWIS
v.
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
   JJ.
______________________________________
On Motion for Reconsideration
Dissenting Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed:   October 10, 2003
-1-
I do not, as a rule, write to protest the denial of a motion for reconsideration, even
when I dissented from the original decision.  Indeed, I cannot immediately recall any instance
in my 26 years as an appellate judge when I have done so.  If I have expressed my
disagreement with the decision and set out the reasons for it in a dissenting opinion, my point
has been made, and if it remains unpersuasive to my colleagues, there is nothing more to do.
This case is different.  This was not just a disagreement over a point of law.  In my
view, notwithstanding the explanations offered in the opinion denying the motion for
reconsideration, the majority Opinion was deliberately designed, and, unless the General
Assembly acts swiftly and decisively, may be effective, not only to dismantle the critical
areas program but to seriously weaken fundamental zoning and land use controls generally.
This case has a triple significance.  The first is in its substantive effect on those
programs.  The Court’s Opinion is not a narrow one, as the Court now suggests, simply
examining, in a neutral way, whether the evidence produced before the Wicomico County
Board of Zoning Appeals was legally sufficient to support its denial of Lewis’s belated
demand to build six hunting cabins in a legally created buffer zone.  It seems clear to me that
both the holding of the Court and the language used to justify it attack the very heart of land
use controls, and specifically the critical areas program.  They are an invitation to the very
kind of lawless behavior that occurred in this case – ignore the law, destroy the habitat and
build where the law does not permit, do it all in secret, and then claim hardship.
Second, in its determination to cripple the critical areas program by overturning a
-2-
perfectly rational and well-supported administrative decision, the Court has not just ignored,
but has, in fact, mutilated, fundamental principles of administrative law well established in
our case law and in the case law throughout the country.  The unsupported and wholly
unprecedented statements made by the Court regarding the need for “empirical evidence” to
combat testimony offered by the party having the burden of proof which the agency simply
found non-credible and unpersuasive will come back to haunt the Court in other
administrative law cases, having nothing to do with land use issues.  I expect that, when that
happens, the Court will quickly retreat and disavow what it has said in this case, but, in the
meanwhile, it has thrown a major part of basic administrative law into a cocked hat. The
Court continues to maintain that, if an applicant having the burden of proof produces
evidence that is perhaps legally sufficient, the opponents must rebut that evidence, even when
the agency finds that the applicant’s evidence is unpersuasive.  That is simply not the law.
The applicant has the burden of both production and persuasion, and, even if he met the
former in this case, he clearly did not meet the latter.  Without explanation, the Court
continues to ignore that very basic premise of administrative law.
The third significance is a jurisprudential one – a “political” one in the broad, non-
partisan, sense of the term.  The Court’s decision purports to rest on three earlier decisions
that (1) as noted in my earlier dissent, do not support the result reached in this case, and (2)
in 2002, the General Assembly specifically declared, in duly enacted legislation, were no
longer the law of Maryland.  In confirming the findings it initially made in 1984, the
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Legislature declared that those decisions were “contrary to the intent of the General
Assembly in enacting the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Program” and that it was the
Legislature’s intent “to overrule these recent decisions . . . regarding variances to Critical
Area regulations.”  Even if the substantive provisions of the 2002 law are not applicable to
this case, the Court should not be extending those cases in light of the Legislative declaration
that they were contrary to the General Assembly’s intent.  In relying on those cases, as
though they were still valid, the Court, is in effect, thumbing its nose at the General
Assembly.  The issues before us were not Constitutional ones, although the Court now hints
that some Constitutional defect may lurk somewhere.   Lewis never claimed a Constitutional
right to build six hunting cabins in a protected buffer zone, and, if, on the facts of this case,
he did so, the assertion would carry the concept of chutzpah to a new plateau.  The issues
were ones of statutory construction and basic administrative and land use law, as to which
the Legislature’s pointed statement, made in statutory form, was entitled to respect and
deference.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the Department of Natural Resources,
formally supported by Anne Arundel, Harford, Montgomery, and Worcester Counties, the
Chairs of the Legislature’s Joint Committee on the Chesapeake and Atlantic Coastal Bays
Critical Area, and the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, and no doubt being watched with both
hope and alarm by virtually every person and organization knowledgeable and concerned
about the health and viability of the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries, gives the Court an
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opportunity to recognize that it was wrong – that it went too far, that its ruling is not only an
embarrassment but may have caused great harm and will undoubtedly create unnecessary
friction with the Legislature.
The motion should be granted.  The Court should withdraw its Opinion, act
responsibly, and affirm the judgment.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 114
September Term, 2002
______________________________________
EDWIN H. LEWIS
v.
DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
   JJ.
______________________________________
On Motion for Reconsideration
Dissenting opinion by Battaglia, J.
______________________________________
Filed:    October 10, 2003
Battaglia J., dissenting.
I do not join either the Court’s opinion in denying the Motion for Reconsideration, nor
Judge Wilner’s dissent from the denial.  I would grant the Motion for Reconsideration and
set the case in for a hearing.