Case Title: WILSON v SWANSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-02-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13010 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE OF M O N T A N A ALLEN I..JELLS WILSON, a minor by and through h i s Guardian, Gloria Roche, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, JAMES H. SWANSON, J R . and JAMES H. SWANSON, III., Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Morrison and Hedman, Whitefish, Montana Frank B. Morrison argued, Whitefish, Montana For Respondents: Warden, Walterskirchen & Christiansen, K a l i s p e l l , Montana Merritt N. Warden argued and Gary L. Christiansen, argued, K a l i s p e l l , Montana Submitted: December 12, 1975 FER 11 195 F i l e d : Decided: FEE 1 I j175 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s a personal i n j u r y a c t i o n by a 1 4 year o l d passenger i n a panel truck a g a i n s t t h e 15 year o l d d r i v e r and h i s f a t h e r . P l a i n t i f f appeals from a judgment entered on a jury v e r d i c t i n favor of both defendants and from d e n i a l of t h e i r motion f o r a new t r i a l . P l a i n t i f f i s Gloria Roche, mother and guardian of t h e 1 4 year o l d passenger, Allen W e l l s Wilson. Defendants a r e James H. Swanson 111, t h e 15 year o l d d r i v e r , and James H. Swanson, Jr., h i s f a t h e r . The f a t h e r ' s l i a b i l i t y is predicated on signing h i s s o n ' s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e . The accident forming t h e b a s i s of t h i s a c t i o n occurred about 7:00 p.m. on May 18, 1972. P l a i n t i f f ' s son, Allen W e l l s Wilson, was a g u e s t passenger i n a 1953 GMC panel t r u c k driven by defend- a n t James H. Swanson 111. The v e h i c l e was being driven on a " t r a i l " through t h e woods i n t h e a r e a of Glen Lake, s o u t h e a s t of Eureka, Montana. After descending a h i l l , t h e v e h i c l e h i t a d i t c h i n t e r s e c t i n g t h e t r a i l , l e f t t h e t r a i l , h i t a t r e e , and propelled p l a i n t i f f p a r t i a l l y through t h e windshield. According t o p l a i n t i f f , he sustained a f r a c t u r e of t h e r i g h t femur, has had a cup mold a r t h r o p l a s t y performed t o temporarily a l l e v i a t e complications involving h i s r i g h t h i p j o i n t , and i n t h e f u t u r e w i l l r e q u i r e a t o t a l h i p replacement. The primary battleground a t t h e t r i a l was t h e speed a t which t h e panel t r u c k was t r a v e l i n g p r i o r t o and a t t h e t i m e of t h e accident. The t r u c k had no speedometer and opinion evidence of t h e occupants of t h e v e h i c l e varied. Following t h e a c c i d e n t , t h e t r u c k ' s gear s h i f t was ob- served t o be locked i n second gear. Defendant James H. Swanson, Jr. was permitted t o t e s t i f y t h a t i n h i s experience with a s i m - i l a r t r u c k , a 1951 GMC f l a t b e d , t h e maximum speed i n second gear was 1 8 mph. On r e b u t t a l t h e previous owner of t h e a c c i d e n t v e h i c l e , Harry Fowler, t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had conducted a t e s t with an i d e n t i c a l 1953 GMC panel t r u c k and t h e maximum speed was 23 mph i n second gear. The jury was i n s t r u c t e d , i n e f f e c t , t h a t Fowler's re- b u t t a l testimony was l i m i t e d t o a f f e c t i n g t h e weight and cred- i b i l i t y of defendants' evidence and f o r impeachment purposes of defendants' witnesses. Another p o i n t of c o n f l i c t a t t h e t r i a l w a s what s t e p s p l a i n t i f f had taken f o r h i s own s a f e t y and whether o r n o t any of h i s a c t s o r omissions rendered him c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t and barred recovery of damages. Four i s s u e s a r e presented f o r review on appeal: (1) Should t h e i s s u e of c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence have been submitted t o t h e jury? (2) The a d m i s s i b i l i t y of James H. Swanson, Jr.'s testimony concerning t h e maximum speed i n second gear of a 1951 GMC f l a t b e d t r u c k , ( 3 ) Error i n g i v i n g i n s t r u c t i o n No. 6 on r e b u t t a l testi- mony. ( 4 ) C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e Montana g u e s t s t a t u t e . It is conceded t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t submitted t h e i s s u e of c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence t o t h e jury and i n s t r u c t e d them t h a t i f they found p l a i n t i f f was c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t h i s a c t i o n was barred. P l a i n t i f f contends t h a t t h e r e is no evidence on which t o base such an i n s t r u c t i o n , while defendants contend t h e r e is. W e hold t h a t submission of t h e i s s u e of c o n t r i b u t o r y neg- l i g e n c e was r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r under t h e evidence a t t h e t r i a l . Montana's g u e s t s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s g r o s s negligence and r e c k l e s s o p e r a t i o n before l i a b i l i t y a t t a c h e s t o t h e d r i v e r , o r d i n a r y negligence being insufficient to render the driver liable to the passenger. Section 32-1113, R.C.M. 1947. Thus as a general rule, ordinary negligence on the part of the guest passenger will not bar his claim. 5 Blashfield Automobile Law Practice, Third Edition, Secs.215.51, 215.3 and 215.4; 44 ALR2d 1342, Sec. 2; 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles & Highway Traffic, Sec. 362, p. 909; 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles & Highway Traffic, Sec. 525, p. 82; Restatement 2d, Torts, Sec. 482, p . 538. Contributory negligence is allowed as a complete defense or bar, under the doctrine of comparative misconduct, only when the guest's lack of care for his own safety equals the recklessness or willful- ness of the driver. 8 Am Jr 2d, Automobiles & Highway Safety, Sec. 525, p. 82; 44 ALR2d 1342, Sec. 4. A review of the record discloses no evidence of gross negligence or reckless conduct on & & ' - & % p d the part of the passenger permitting a basis for a d - of the issue of contributory negligence to the jury. The prejudi- cial effect of such submission is obvious. The plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in per- mitting James H . Swanson, Jr. to testify as to the maximum speed in second gear of a 1951 GMC flatbed truck. The truck involved in the accident was a 1953 GMC panel truck. Plaintiff objected to this testimony on the basis that it relates to an experiment or test and no foundation was laid to show that the 1951 GMC flatbed was substantially similar to the 1953 GMC panel truck. We find that the district court was not in error. First, plaintiff misconstrues the nature of the evidence presented by James H. Swanson, Jr. His testimony relates to his experience with a similar vehicle and is not a report as to the results of a test or experiment. In Irion v. Hyde, 110 Mont. 570, 105 P.2d 666, this Court said that a witness with special knowledge on a subject outside the experience of the ordinary man may be permitted t o s t a t e h i s conclusion a s t o what happened based on f a c t s he has observed. A witness of t h i s type possesses an a r e a of superior knowledge which enables him t o understand, a s one with- o u t t h i s s p e c i a l knowledge could not, what he has observed. M r . Swanson has had extensive experience with a s i m i l a r v e h i c l e and h i s testimony was properly offered a s an a i d t o t h e jury i n deter- mining t h e speed t h e truck was t r a v e l i n g p r i o r t o t h e accident. Second, a foundation was properly l a i d f o r t h e admission of t h i s testimony. O n d i r e c t examination M r . Swanson t e s t i f i e d t h a t he has been a truck d r i v e r f o r many years, i s experienced with a v a r i e t y of vehicles, and has driven a 1951 GMC f l a t b e d w e l l over one hundred thousand m i l e s . H e s t a t e d t h a t both t h e panel and f l a t b e d trucks have i d e n t i c a l four speed transmissions and gearing. I f any f u r t h e r foundation was needed it was completed on cross- examination when he t e s t i f i e d t h a t both trucks had i d e n t i c a l 248 cubic inch s i x cylinder engines. W e hold t h e testimony admissible. P l a i n t i f f presented t h e testimony of Henry Fowler, t h e former owner of t h e accident vehicle, i n r e b u t t a l . The substance of h i s testimony was t h a t he had conducted a t e s t with a 1953 GMC panel truck i d e n t i c a l t o t h e accident v e h i c l e and had achieved a speed of 23 mph i n second gear. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t gave t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n t o t h e jury concerning Fowler's testimony: "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f presented c e r t a i n testimony a s r e b u t t a l . Such evidence i s limited t o a f f e c t i n g t h e weight and c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e defendants' evidence and f o r impeachment purposes of defendants' witnesses." The reason t h e c o u r t gave t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n i s indicated i n i t s memorandum attached t o i t s order denying p l a i n t i f f a new t r i a l . P l a i n t i f f d i d not a t t h e t i m e of t h e p r e t r i a l conference o r a t any t i m e p r i o r t o t r i a l i n d i c a t e an i n t e n t i o n t o c a l l Fowler as a witness. The s p i r i t of t h e Rules of C i v i l Procedure and t h e p r a c t i c e of t h e d i s t r i c t judge r e q u i r e f u l l d i s c l o s u r e of witnesses i n advance of t r i a l . Thus Fowler could n o t be used a s a witness i n p l a i n t i f f ' s case-in-chief t o f u r n i s h s u b s t a n t i v e proof of a f a c t i n i s s u e . But n e i t h e r t h e Rules of C i v i l Procedure nor t h e d i s t r i c t judge's p r a c t i c e r e q u i r e s advance d i s c l o s u r e of r e b u t t a l witnesses f o r obvious reasons. Thus Fowler could t e s t i f y on re- b u t t a l , b u t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was necessary t o prevent h i s testi- mony being considered on t h e same b a s i s as those witnesses who w e r e d i s c l o s e d i n advance of t r i a l and gave testimony i n p l a i n t i f f ' s case-in-chief. So went t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s reasoning. I n our view, t h e l i m i t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n was applied here a s a sanction t o promote t h e s a l u t a r y o b j e c t i v e of f u l l d i s c l o s u r e of witnesses i n advance of t r i a l a s required by t h e Rules of C i v i l Procedure. Nonetheless, t h e s u b s t a n t i v e e f f e c t of r e b u t t a l evi- dence cannot be diminished i n t h i s manner t o accomplish even t h e most laudable purpose. The c o r r e c t r u l e i s summarized i n t h e follow- i n g language from 31 C.J.S. Evidence 5 2: "Rebutting evidence is t h a t which i s given t o explain, r e p e l , counteract, o r disprove f a c t s given i n evidence by t h e adverse p a r t y . It i s t h a t evidence which has become r e l e v a n t o r im- p o r t a n t only as an e f f e c t of some evidence i n t r o - duced by t h e o t h e r s i d e . Rebutting evidence means n o t merely evidence which c o n t r a d i c t s t h e witnesses on t h e opposite s i d e , but a l s o evidence i n d e n i a l of some a f f i r m a t i v e f a c t which t h e answering p a r t y has endeavored t o prove. It embraces a l l testimony which tends t o counteract o r overcome t h e l e g a l e f f e c t of t h e evidence f o r t h e adverse party." Also see S t a t e v. H e w e t t , 73 Idaho 452, 254 P.2d 677; S t a t e v. Mundell, 66 Idaho 339, 158 P.2d 799; S t a t e v. Gish, 87 Idaho 341, 393 P.2d 342; 29 Am J u r 2d, Evidence S 250, p. 298; 4 Jones on Evidence, 6 t h ed, 5 24:1, p. 74. I n our view, t h e l i m i t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n should n o t have been given under those circumstances. The f i n a l question concerns t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of Montana's guest s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 32-1113: "Owner o r operator of v e h i c l e r e l e a s e d from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i n j u r i e s of q u e s t , when. The owner o r operator of a motor v e h i c l e s h a l l n o t be l i a b l e f o r any damages o r i n j u r i e s t o any passenger o r person r i d i n g i n s a i d motor v e h i c l e as a guest o r by i n v i t a t i o n and not f o r h i r e , nor f o r any damages t o such passenger's o r person's parent o r guardian, u n l e s s damage o r i n j u r y i s caused d i r e c t l y and proximately by t h e g r o s s l y negligent and r e c k l e s s operation by him of such motor v e h i c l e . " The same, s i m i l a r , and d i s s i m i l a r g u e s t s t a t u t e s have been declared both c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l by various s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o u r t s f o r a v a r i e t y of reasons. For represen- t a t i v e d e c i s i o n s holding g u e s t s t a t u t ~ u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l see Brown v. Merlow, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212; Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362; Johnson v . Hassett, N.Dak. Q974), 217 N.W. 2d 771; Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365; Primes v. 331 N.E.2d 723 Tyler, 43 Ohio St.2d 195,/(1975); Manistee v. McGowan, 394 Mich. 655, 232 N.W.2d 636; Laakonen v. Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court, Nev. (1975), 538 P.2d 574. Contra: S i l v e r v. S i l v e r , 280 U.S. 117, 50 S.Ct. 57, 74 L.ed 221; Cannon v. O v i a t t , Utah (1974), 520 P.2d 883; J u s t i c e v. Gatchell, D e l . (1974), 325 A.2d 97; Keasling v. Thompson, Iowa (1974), 217 N.W.2d 687; Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581; Delany v. Badame, 49 I11.2d 168, 274 N.E.2d 353. Montana's g u e s t s t a t u t e has been i n e f f e c t f o r over 40 years. It was created by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e (Ch. 195, Laws of 1931) and has now been annulled by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e (Ch. 236, Laws of 1975). Its r e p e a l became e f f e c t i v e J u l y 1, 1975. Under t h e s e circumstances we d e c l i n e t o hasten i t s demise by j u d i c i a l decision. W e d e c l i n e t o l e g i s l a t e r e t r o a c t i v e l y as condemned i n Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 91 Mont. 194, 7 P.2d 919; Sunburst 0. & R. Co. v. Great North. Ry. Co., 91 Mont. 216, 7 P.2d 927, a f f f d 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L.ed 360, 85 ALR 254; 10 ALR3d 1371, Sec. 7 ( a ) . The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s reversed and t h e case remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r a new t r i a l . L J u s t i c e W e concur: - 1 6 - Chief J u s t i c e J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s s p e c i a l l y concurring: I concur i n t h e r e s u l t but n o t i n a l l t h a t i s s a i d t h e r e i n .