Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Sommers

Citation: 2014 WI 103

Docket Number: 2012AP001965-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-08-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 103 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP1965-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Joseph L. Sommers, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Joseph L. Sommers, 
          Respondent.   
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SOMERS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
AUGUST 5, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents. (Opinion filed.) 
CROOKS, J., dissents. (Opinion filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ZIEGLER, GABLEMAN, JJ., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 103
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP1965-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Joseph L. Sommers, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph L. Sommers, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
AUG 5, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.  We review, pursuant to SCR 22.17(2),1 the 
report of Referee John B. Murphy recommending the court suspend 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) states:  
 
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2012AP1965-D   
 
2 
 
Attorney Joseph L. Sommers' license to practice law for a period 
of 60 days for professional misconduct.  This was a default 
proceeding.  No appeal was filed.  
¶2 
We approve and adopt the referee's findings of fact 
and conclusions of law.  We agree that Attorney Sommers' 
misconduct warrants public discipline, but deem a public 
reprimand sufficient.  We impose the full costs of the 
proceeding on Attorney Sommers, which total $5,033.16 as of 
August 8, 2013.2    
¶3 
Attorney Sommers was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1992.  His Wisconsin law license is currently 
suspended for nonpayment of State Bar dues and for noncompliance 
with continuing legal education (CLE) requirements.  Attorney 
Sommers was previously suspended for 30 days as discipline in a 
matter that is intertwined with the allegations in the pending 
complaint.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sommers, 2012 
WI 33, 339 Wis. 2d 580, 811 N.W.2d 387.  
¶4 
In 2001 A.R. was charged, and later acquitted of, 
homicide by negligent operation of a motor vehicle.  The case 
was initially prosecuted by Assistant District Attorney Paul 
Humphrey.  Attorney Sommers defended A.R.  Interactions between 
the two lawyers were contentious. 
¶5 
In November 2006 the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
charged both Attorney Sommers and Attorney Humphrey with 
                                                 
2 The OLR has also filed a statement indicating no 
restitution is warranted in this matter. 
No. 
2012AP1965-D   
 
3 
 
professional misconduct based on incidents that occurred during 
the prosecution of A.R.  
¶6 
On January 2, 2007, Attorney Sommers announced his 
candidacy for the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  On January 4, 2007, 
Attorney Sommers wrote a letter to the Chief Justice of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court.  He provided copies of this letter to 
all of the Wisconsin Supreme Court justices and to the OLR.  
Attorney Sommers did not provide a copy to counsel for Attorney 
Humphrey. 
¶7 
In the January 4, 2007 letter Attorney Sommers advised 
the court of his supreme court candidacy.  He also claimed that 
Attorney Humphrey engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in the 
A.R. case and in several other cases.  His allegations far 
exceeded the scope of the official court record in the then-
pending Humphrey disciplinary matter.  The letter was posted to 
Attorney Sommers' web site, www.sommersforsupremecourt.com.  
¶8 
Counsel for Attorney Humphrey filed a grievance with 
the OLR asserting, inter alia, that Attorney Sommers did not 
contemporaneously provide a copy of this letter and accompanying 
materials to him.  
¶9 
On February 5, 2007, Attorney Sommers issued a press 
release entitled, "Corruption in Wisconsin Courts——Supreme Court 
Candidate Speaks Out" (hereinafter "Press Release").  The Press 
Release describes Attorney Sommers' reasons for seeking election 
to the court and purports to explain, as relevant here, "How 
innocent defendants plead out every day in Wisconsin courts," 
No. 
2012AP1965-D   
 
4 
 
and "[h]ow judges are permitted to get away with falsifying the 
record."  
¶10 Counsel for Attorney Humphrey filed another grievance 
alleging this Press Release constituted an unsubstantiated 
attack on the courts and judges of Wisconsin and was designed to 
undermine public confidence in the judiciary in violation of the 
Attorney's Oath. 
¶11 Following 
receipt 
of 
these 
grievances, 
the 
OLR 
directed Attorney Sommers to respond, in writing, to the 
assertion that his letter and the Press Release violated rules 
of professional conduct.  Attorney Sommers sent his written 
response to the OLR's inquiry, a letter dated May 21, 2007, 
directly to the supreme court, rather than to the OLR.  
¶12 Counsel for Attorney Humphrey filed a third grievance 
asserting that this letter was an improper attempt to influence 
the supreme court and constituted an ex parte communication. 
¶13 On January 9, 2008, the OLR provided Attorney Sommers 
with a preliminary investigative report relating to the above-
mentioned grievances.  On January 24, 2008, Attorney Sommers 
sent another letter to the chief justice, with copies to the 
other justices and to various other individuals and entities in 
addition to the OLR.  
¶14 On September 6, 2012, the OLR filed the pending 
disciplinary complaint alleging that the three letters sent 
January 4, 2007, May 21, 2007, and January 24, 2008, each 
constitute an impermissible ex parte communication with a judge 
or 
other 
official 
in 
violation 
of 
former 
or 
current 
No. 
2012AP1965-D   
 
5 
 
SCR 20:3.5(b)3 (Count One); that by publishing or allowing to be 
published on his web page the January 4, 2007 letter to the 
supreme court, Attorney Sommers made extrajudicial statements 
that he knew or reasonably should have known would have a 
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative 
proceeding in the matter, in violation of (former) SCR 20:3.6(a)4  
                                                 
3 Former SCR 20:3.5(b) (effective through June 30, 2007) 
applied to the first two letters and stated:   
 
A lawyer shall not: . . . (b) communicate ex 
parte with such a person except as permitted by law or 
for scheduling purposes if permitted by the court.  If 
communication between a lawyer and judge has occurred 
in order to schedule a matter, the lawyer involved 
shall promptly notify the lawyer for the other party 
or 
the 
other 
party, 
if 
unrepresented, 
of 
such 
communication; . . . . 
Current SCR 20:3.5(b) (effective as of July 1, 2007) 
applies to the third letter and states:   
 
A lawyer shall not: . . . (b) communicate ex 
parte with such a person during the proceeding unless 
authorized to do so by law or court order or for 
scheduling purposes if permitted by the court.  If 
communication between a lawyer and judge has occurred 
in order to schedule the matter, the lawyer involved 
shall promptly notify the lawyer for the other party 
or 
the 
other 
party, 
if 
unrepresented, 
of 
such 
communication; . . . . 
4 Former 20:3.6(a) (effective through June 30, 2007) stated:  
 
A lawyer who is participating or has participated 
in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall 
not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable 
person would expect to be disseminated by means of 
public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should know that it will have a substantial likelihood 
of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding 
in the matter. 
No. 
2012AP1965-D   
 
6 
 
(Count Two); and that by publishing the Press Release on an 
Internet web site, Attorney Sommers violated the Attorney's 
Oath, SCR 40.15, by failing to maintain the respect due to 
courts of justice and judicial officers, made actionable via SCR 
20:8.4(g)5 (Count Three). The OLR asked the court to suspend 
Attorney Sommers' license for 60 days. 
¶15 The 
court 
appointed 
Referee 
John 
Murphy 
on 
November 19, 2012.  Attorney Sommers did not participate in the 
proceeding and, on January 10, 2013, the OLR moved for a default 
judgment.  After ordering a continuance to ensure that Attorney 
Sommers was properly served, the referee found that Attorney 
Sommers had failed to appear and that default judgment was 
appropriate.  Accordingly, the referee's findings of fact are 
based on the allegations of the complaint filed by the OLR.  
¶16 The referee requested the parties brief the issue of 
discipline.  The OLR filed a brief reiterating its request for a 
60-day suspension and imposition of full costs.  Attorney 
Sommers did not respond.  On July 22, 2013, the referee filed a 
report recommending a 60-day suspension.  
¶17 Neither party appealed.  The court is now tasked with 
considering whether the referee's factual findings are clearly 
erroneous and considering, de novo, whether the conclusions of 
law are correct.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  We 
                                                 
5 SCR 20:8.4(g) states it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "violate the attorney's oath; . . . ." 
No. 
2012AP1965-D   
 
7 
 
are free to impose whatever discipline we deem appropriate, 
regardless 
of 
the 
referee's 
recommendation. 
 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.  In light of Attorney Sommers' 
failure to appear or participate in this case, default judgment 
is appropriate.  Neither party challenged the referee's findings 
of fact.  We adopt those findings, which are based on the 
allegations in the OLR's complaint.  
¶18 The complaint alleges that the three above-mentioned 
letters sent by Attorney Sommers to the supreme court were 
impermissible ex parte communications in violation of current or 
former SCR 20:3.6.  
¶19 To ensure the record is clear, we note that the 
January 
4, 
2007 
letter 
was 
not 
filed 
in 
the 
Humphrey 
disciplinary case file.  The letter was addressed to the chief 
justice and did not include a case number.  The court construed 
the letter as a complaint against the OLR filed pursuant to 
SCR 22.25(8)6 because, in addition to the myriad of accusations 
regarding Attorney Humphrey, Attorney Sommers asked the court to 
investigate the OLR's handling of his own disciplinary case.  He 
                                                 
6 SCR 22.25(8) states:   
 
Allegations of malfeasance against the director, 
retained counsel, a member of a district committee, a 
member of the preliminary review committee, a member 
of the board of administrative oversight, a special 
investigator, a member of the special preliminary 
review panel, or a referee shall be referred by the 
director to the supreme court for appropriate action. 
No. 
2012AP1965-D   
 
8 
 
asserted in the letter that the complaint filed against him was 
"falsified," and that the OLR had failed to pursue allegations 
he made concerning Attorney Humphrey's conduct.  
¶20 Regardless of how the January 4, 2007 letter was 
construed for filing purposes, it contained sweeping accusations 
regarding Attorney Humphrey.  Attorney Sommers sent the letter 
to all members of this court while Humphrey's disciplinary 
proceeding was pending before this court.  Attorney Sommers did 
not provide counsel for Attorney Humphrey with a copy of the 
letter.  The referee correctly concluded that this letter was an 
impermissible ex parte communication, and we accept that 
conclusion.   
¶21 Attorney Sommers' letter dated May 21, 2007, also 
contained statements concerning Attorney Humphrey and was sent 
to the court during the pendency of Humphrey's disciplinary 
proceeding.  Although several public officials are copied on the 
letter, counsel for Attorney Humphrey is not.  Again, we agree 
with 
the 
referee's 
conclusion 
that 
this 
letter 
was 
an 
impermissible ex parte communication.   
¶22 Finally, we note that Attorney Sommers' January 24, 
2008 letter indicates several individuals were "copied" on the 
letter, including counsel for Attorney Humphrey.  The OLR's 
complaint, however, avers that counsel did not contemporaneously 
receive a copy of this letter.  The referee deemed the 
allegations in the complaint as true and thus concluded that 
this letter was another impermissible ex parte communication.  
We accept that conclusion. 
No. 
2012AP1965-D   
 
9 
 
¶23 We 
next 
consider 
whether 
Attorney 
Sommers 
made 
extrajudicial statements that he knew or reasonably should have 
known 
would 
have 
a 
substantial 
likelihood 
of 
materially 
prejudicing 
an 
adjudicative 
proceeding 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 20:3.6(a) when he published or allowed to be published his 
January 4, 2007 letter on his webpage.  The rule then in effect, 
SCR 20:3.6(a) provided:   
 
A lawyer who is participating or has participated 
in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall 
not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable 
person would expect to be disseminated by means of 
public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should know that it will have a substantial likelihood 
of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding 
in the matter. 
¶24 We accept the referee's uncontested findings and 
conclusion that by posting the January 2007 letter on his 
website, Attorney Sommers violated the aforementioned rule.  
¶25 The OLR alleges and the referee agreed that Attorney 
Sommers violated the Attorney's Oath, SCR 40.15, made actionable 
via SCR 20:8.4(g) when he posted a press release on a web site 
established to promote Attorney Sommers' candidacy for judicial 
office in which he sweepingly asserts, inter alia, that "judges 
are permitted to get away with falsifying the record." 
¶26 In State v. Eisenberg, 48 Wis. 2d 364, 180 N.W.2d 529 
(1970), this court stated: 
 
License to practice law in this state is granted 
on implied understanding that an attorney shall at all 
times demean himself in proper manner and refrain from 
such practices which bring disrepute upon himself, the 
profession and the courts.  This implied understanding 
No. 
2012AP1965-D   
 
10 
 
is also affirmed by the oath taken by the attorney on 
admission to practice.  
Id. at 380-81.  The Attorney's Oath states, in pertinent part: 
 
I will maintain the respect due to courts of 
justice and judicial officers; 
 
. . . .  
 
I will abstain from all offensive personality and 
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation 
of a party or witness, unless required by the justice 
of the cause with which I am charged; . . . .  
See SCR 40.15.   
¶27 Thus, a lawyer may violate the Attorney's Oath by 
conduct that occurs out of court as well as by in-court conduct. 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Johann, 
216 
Wis. 2d 118, 574 N.W.2d 218 (1998) (disciplining attorney for 
distributing a handout strongly critical of the man who was her 
child's father and the man's wife).  Often, alleged violations 
of SCR 40.15 involve the "offensive personality" component of 
the oath.  Here, the OLR alleges that Attorney Sommers failed to 
abide by that component of the oath that requires lawyers 
maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial 
officers.   
¶28 We must take care to limit the scope and application 
of the Attorney's Oath so that it does not reach a substantial 
amount of constitutionally protected conduct or significantly 
inhibit an attorney's exercise of the right of free speech.  We 
are reluctant to deem that statements made during a judicial 
election violate the Attorney's Oath.  The Attorney's Oath 
No. 
2012AP1965-D   
 
11 
 
should not be invoked to stifle legitimate critique of judicial 
administration or process. 
¶29 However, Attorney Sommers' sweeping assertion that 
"judges are permitted to get away with falsifying the record" 
reflects outspoken contempt for the entire court system.  He has 
declined 
to 
participate 
in 
this 
proceeding. 
 
The 
facts 
underlying the referee's conclusion that Attorney Sommers 
violated that portion of the Attorney's Oath requiring an 
attorney licensed by this court to maintain the respect due to 
courts and judicial officers are a matter of record and are not 
disputed.  We emphasize that this determination is made in the 
context of a default proceeding and our holding is limited to 
the facts of this case.  In sum, the referee's findings of fact 
on this point have not been shown to be clearly erroneous, and 
we adopt them as well as his conclusion of law. 
¶30 The referee recommends a 60-day suspension.  As the 
referee observes, improper ex parte communications typically 
result in a range of sanctions from a private reprimand to a 
one-year suspension.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Ragatz, 146 Wis. 2d 80, 86, 429 N.W.2d 488 (1988) 
(concluding that an attorney's written ex parte communications 
with a judge was deemed "an advocacy piece" designed to 
influence 
the 
outcome 
of 
litigation 
justifying 
a 
60-day 
suspension).  Similarly, discipline for improper publicity has 
resulted in discipline ranging from private reprimands to 
lengthy suspensions.  See, e.g., Private Reprimand No. 1994-17 
(district attorney violated SCR 20:3.6 with statements to press 
No. 
2012AP1965-D   
 
12 
 
about 
defendant); 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Eisenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 284, 423 N.W.2d 867 (1988).  Violation of 
the Attorney's Oath also yields sanctions ranging from a private 
reprimand to a six-month suspension.  See, e.g., Johann, 216 
Wis. 2d at 120-21, 128 (six-month suspension for attorney who 
made inflammatory statements about her estranged husband during 
a custody battle); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Blask, 
216 Wis. 2d 129, 573 N.W.2d 835 (1998) (publicly reprimanding 
lawyer who engaged in separate physical altercations with 
people).  
¶31 Attorney Sommers has previously been disciplined in a 
matter that included a violation of the Attorney's Oath.  As an 
experienced 
lawyer, 
Attorney 
Sommers 
should 
know 
that 
contemporaneously copying opposing counsel on correspondence 
relating to the matters at issue is not a mere courtesy but an 
ethical requirement.  Without excusing the misconduct, which is 
serious, we are mindful that this proceeding stems from and is 
intertwined with the underlying disciplinary proceedings and 
prosecution of A.R., which elicited extraordinary and, we hope, 
unusual 
animosity 
between 
opposing 
counsel. 
 
On 
careful 
consideration, we deem a public reprimand sufficient to address 
Attorney Sommers' misconduct in this matter.   
¶32 No objection to costs was filed.  We accept the 
referee's 
recommendation 
that 
Attorney 
Sommers 
should 
be 
required to pay the full costs of this proceeding which total 
$5,033.16.   
No. 
2012AP1965-D   
 
13 
 
¶33 IT IS ORDERED that Joseph L. Sommers is publicly 
reprimanded for professional misconduct. 
¶34 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Joseph L. Sommers shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
¶35 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the director of the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation shall advise the court if there has not 
been full compliance with all conditions of this order. 
¶36 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J., 
and 
MICHAEL 
J. 
GABLEMAN, J., did not participate. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2012AP1965-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶37 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
allegations in the pending complaint are intertwined with 
matters for which Attorney Sommers and Attorney Humphrey have 
each been suspended for 30 days.  
¶38 I do not condone Attorney Sommers' conduct, but I do 
grasp his distress about what he views as injustices to his 
client and slip-ups in the disciplinary proceeding against him.   
¶39 Attorney Sommers is presently not eligible to practice 
law.  He has not paid State Bar dues; he has not complied with 
continuing legal education requirements.  Attorney Sommers 
advised the court in the previous disciplinary proceeding that a 
suspension might mean that he could never practice law.   
¶40 The court has discretion whether to impose discipline.  
SCR 21.16.  I would not impose any discipline in the present 
matter.   
 
 
No.  2012AP1965-D.npc 
 
1 
 
¶41 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  I respectfully 
dissent in regard to the discipline imposed.  Rather, I would 
follow the recommendation of the Referee, John B. Murphy, and 
impose a 60-day suspension and require the respondent to pay the 
full costs of the proceedings. 
   
 
 
No.  2012AP1965-D.npc 
 
 
 
1