Case Title: IN THE INTEREST OF WM, A MINOR CHILD. JW v. STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. Laramie Country Department of Public Assistance and Social Servides

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-88-13

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE INTEREST OF WM, A MINOR CHILD. JW v. STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. Laramie Country Department of  Public Assistance and Social Servides1989 WY 167778 P.2d 1106Case Number: C-88-13Decided: 08/01/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE INTEREST OF WM, A 
MINOR CHILD. JW, APPELLANT (RESPONDENT),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. LARAMIE 
COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SERVICES, APPELLEE 
(PETITIONER). No. C-88-13

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Nicholas G. 
Kalokathis, J.

Douglas J. 
Mickey, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard E. Dixon, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., for 
appellee.

Rodger McDaniel, 
McDaniel & Tiedeken, Cheyenne, guardian ad 
litem.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The issue to be 
resolved in this case is whether a misinterpretation or misapplication of a 
statute relating to the entry of a decree of disposition placing a child in 
accordance with the statutes relating to juvenile courts deprived the court of 
jurisdiction and caused its decree to be void. The question is presented in the 
context of the claim of the appellant, the child's grandmother, that the 
district court sitting as the juvenile court erred in denying her motion to 
vacate the decree pursuant to Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P.1 After entering the decree, which 
placed the child with his great-aunt, the appellant's sister, in Arizona, the juvenile 
court judge denied the relief sought by appellant. No appeal was taken from the 
decree itself and, in accordance with the rule, it became final. The only 
question is raised by the denial of the motion for relief under Rule 60(b), 
W.R.C.P. We hold that the juvenile court was vested with jurisdiction in this 
case, and nothing occurred in the proceeding to deprive that court of 
jurisdiction. The ruling of the juvenile court in its Order Denying Motion to 
Vacate Orders is affirmed.

[¶2.]     In her brief, the 
appellant states the issues to be:

"1. Whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in failing to vacate its Order for Custody entered 
July 24, 1987, on the ground that said Order is void as a result of the trial 
court's failure to adhere to the requirements of WYO. STAT.ANN. § 14-6-229(a), as 
amended.

"2. Whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in failing to vacate its Amended Order of Custody 
Order to Dismiss entered May 5, 1988, on the ground that said Order is void as a 
result of the trial court's failure to adhere to the requirements of WYO. STAT.ANN. § 
14-6-229(a), as amended.

"3. Whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in failing to vacate its Order of October 23, 1986 
and all subsequent orders of the trial court, on the ground that said orders are 
void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as required under WYO. STAT.ANN. § 
14-6-203."

As appellee, the 
Laramie County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services (DPASS) 
responds by stating the following propositions:

"I. The juvenile court 
exercised its powers in compliance with statutory charter following an 
adjudication of neglect which appellant does not contest.

"II. The juvenile court 
has jurisdiction in all matters commenced therein concerning a minor alleged to 
be delinquent, which jurisdiction persists until dismissal or 
discharge.

"III. Appellant has 
benefited from all process due such a litigant; her appeal is occasioned not by 
a search for equity but by the desire for a different 
result."

The guardian ad 
litem appeared on behalf of the juvenile, WM, and, in a brief, posed these 
responses to the issues stated by the appellant:

"I. Is the order of the 
district court of October 23, 1986 subject to challenge under Rule 60(b) of the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure?

"II. Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to vacate its orders of 
October 23, 1986?

"III. Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to vacate its orders of July 
24, 1987 and May 5, 1988?"

[¶3.]     The length of this 
proceeding in the juvenile court has resulted in the facts being both intricate 
and complex. On October 5, 1984, a petition was filed in the juvenile court by 
the district attorney's office alleging that WM was a neglected child as defined 
by § 14-6-201(a)(xvi)(B), W.S. 1977 (1984 Cum.Supp.).2 The specific conduct alleged in the 
petition was that: 

"* * * [O]n or 
about the 2nd day of September, 1984, [RC], the boyfriend of [JW, the child's 
mother], spanked said child with a hard object resulting in several serious 
bruises to the minor child's buttocks and [JW] knew of said abuse and failed to 
report the same or to take proper measures to protect her minor 
child."

The allegations 
of the petition were admitted, and the juvenile court ordered DPASS to prepare 
pre-disposition studies on both the mother and appellant, who is the mother's 
mother. After considering the studies, the juvenile court, on April 15, 1985, 
entered its order finding that WM was a neglected child and placing him in the 
custody of his mother, subject to the protective supervision of DPASS. This 
order was not challenged by appeal or otherwise, and that was the status quo 
until March 21, 1986.3

[¶4.]     On March 21, 1986, WM's 
mother was killed in a motorcycle/automobile accident. WM, together with two 
siblings, was taken in by the appellant, although she never became the formal 
custodian of the children by guardianship, adoption, or otherwise. Appellant had 
cared for her daughter's children previously, and she simply continued to do so 
after her daughter's death. Ultimately, other arrangements were made for the 
care of the two siblings, and only WM remained with appellant. DPASS continued 
its protective supervision under the April 15, 1985 order of the juvenile court, 
and it soon concluded that appellant was not able to furnish proper care for WM. 
On September 4, 1986, DPASS filed an Amended Petition in the same case file as 
the original neglect petition in which it alleged that WM was a neglected child 
as defined by § 14-6-201(a)(xvi)(A) (July 1986 Repl.).4 Summarized briefly, the allegations 
of the Amended Petition were:

1. WM's mother was 
deceased, and her husband, the boyfriend who had abused WM, was in 
prison.

2. WM's putative natural 
father also was in prison.

3. WM had no natural 
guardian to provide care for him.

4. No person, 
institution, or agency having any responsibility for WM's welfare and also 
having legal custody pursuant to court order was available to provide for his 
care, custody, and control.

5. DPASS was required by 
the existing court order to supervise WM's care. 

6. DPASS had concluded 
that appellant was unable to provide proper care for WM.

7. In the five months 
since the death of WM's mother, no provision had been made to more permanently 
place him with a legal custodian.

[¶5.]     A copy of this Amended 
Petition was served upon the appellant, and she appeared to defend her 
interests. On October 23, 1986, the juvenile court entered an order in which it 
found that WM was a neglected child, and it placed him temporarily in the 
custody of appellant, pending completion of studies of several prospective 
homes. These studies, conducted by both DPASS and the guardian ad litem, 
supported a conclusion that it would not be in the best interests of WM to place 
him with appellant. A hearing was held and, on July 24, 1987, the juvenile court 
entered an order providing that WM should be placed with his great-aunt, the 
appellant's sister, still under the continued supervision of DPASS. The 
designated custodian lived in Arizona with her 
husband.

[¶6.]     On March 28, 1988, the 
guardian ad litem filed a motion seeking final disposition of WM's case. The 
juvenile court, with all parties except the appellant in agreement, concluded 
that any additional legal proceeding such as the seeking of a guardianship or 
adoption would have to be pursued in Arizona 
and that the case, therefore, was ripe for final disposition by dismissal by the 
Wyoming court. 
The appellant filed a resistance to the guardian ad litem's motion in which she 
asserted that the juvenile court was without subject matter jurisdiction to 
enter the requested order. At a hearing conducted before the juvenile court on 
April 8, 1988, appellant argued at length her theories for the lack of 
jurisdiction in the district court. Through counsel, she contended that the 
court was without jurisdiction because there was no finding in the order entered 
on July 24, 1987 that WM was neglected. The second theory presented was that the 
juvenile court was without jurisdiction to place the child in the permanent 
custody of the great-aunt. Having considered these arguments, the juvenile court 
rejected them and, on April 21, 1988, entered an Order Continuing Custody Order 
to Dismiss, that was followed by an Amended Order of Custody Order to Dismiss, 
pursuant to which WM was placed in the physical and legal custody of the 
great-aunt and her husband, and the juvenile petition in the case was dismissed. 
No appeal was taken from either order.

[¶7.]     On July 12, 1988, 
appellant filed a Motion to Vacate Orders accompanied by a Brief in Support of 
Motion to Vacate Orders in which the orders of the court entered on July 24, 
1987 and May 5, 1988 were attacked relying upon Rule 60(b), clause (4), W.R.C.P. 
In its opinion letter, in which the history of the proceeding was reviewed, the 
juvenile court concluded it had jurisdiction to enter the challenged orders and, 
on October 14, 1988, it entered its order denying the relief requested by 
appellant. This appeal is taken from the latter order.

[¶8.]     Appellant invokes the 
abuse of discretion standard for testing the order of the juvenile court from 
which the appeal was taken. That claim is bolstered by arguments addressed to 
the impropriety of the orders attacked by the motion for relief under Rule 
60(b), W.R.C.P., urging an abuse of discretion with respect to those orders. The 
normal standard for testing orders denying relief under Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P., is 
abuse of discretion. R.L. Manning Company v. Millsap, 687 P.2d 252 (Wyo. 1984); C. Wright and 
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2862 (1973). When the claim 
for relief is premised under Rule 60(b), clause (4), W.R.C.P., however, the rule 
is different. As the text says, "[e]ither a judgment is void or it is valid. 
Determining which it is may well present a difficult question, but when that 
question is resolved, the court must act accordingly." C. Wright and A. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2862 at 197. Because Rule 60(b), 
W.R.C.P., is the same as Rule 60(b), F.R.C.P., we consider federal precedent 
highly persuasive. 2-H Ranch Company, Inc. v. Simmons, 658 P.2d 68 (Wyo. 1983). Consistently 
with federal precedent, we have held that a court has no discretion in granting 
or denying relief pursuant to a motion brought under Rule 60(b), clause (4), if 
it determines the judgment or order was void. Once that determination is made, 
the court must vacate the order or judgment. State of Wyoming, ex rel. TRL by Avery v. RLP, 772 P.2d 1054 
(Wyo. 1989); Lawrence-Allison & Associates 
West, Inc. v. Archer, 767 P.2d 989 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶9.]     The burden is upon the 
movant, in this instance the appellant, seeking relief under Rule 60(b), clause 
(4), W.R.C.P., to establish entitlement to the relief of vacation of a void 
order or judgment. Atkins v. Household Finance Corporation of Casper, Wyoming, 581 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1978); Martellaro v. Sailors, 515 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1973); Turnbough v. 
CampbellCountyMemorialHospital, 499 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 1972). A party 
cannot carry that burden by establishing no more than that the orders sought to 
be attacked were erroneous, and they could only be considered void if the court 
lacked jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter of the dispute, or if 
it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. Williams v. Life Savings 
& Loan, 802 F.2d 1200 (10th Cir. 1986); V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1979); In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Ohio v. Arthur Anderson and 
Company, 419 U.S. 1034, 95 S. Ct. 516, 42 L. Ed. 2d 309 (1974); 7 J. Moore & J. 
Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 60.25[2], at 60-236 (2d ed. 1987); C. Wright 
& A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Civil § 2862 at 
198-200.

[¶10.]  The legal principles invoked to determine 
the issues raised in this case are summarized in Kansas City Southern Railway 
Company v. Great Lakes Carbon Corporation, 624 F.2d 822 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied 449 U.S. 955, 101 S. Ct. 363, 66 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1980). The essence of that 
summary is that a judgment is void only when there has been a plain usurpation 
of power, or the extension of jurisdiction beyond the scope of the court's 
authority. That is to be distinguished from an error in the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of the court, which must be addressed by appeal rather than a 
motion under Rule 60(b). The competing policies are a disciplined observance of 
jurisdictional limits coupled with the need for finality of judgments. If the 
court concludes that the challenge is simply to an erroneous interpretation of 
the statutory grant of jurisdiction, then, in favor of the policy of certainty 
and finality, the judgment becomes final unless appealed.

[¶11.]  It is our conclusion that, in this case, 
the question presented by the appellant reaches, at most, the level of error in 
the exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, the principles articulated in United Mine 
Workers of America Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Company, 774 P.2d 1274 (1989), 
relating to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction need not be invoked. The 
essence of appellant's position is that the district court misconstrued the 
language of the pertinent statutes. Reliance is premised upon the requirement 
found in § 14-6-229(a), W.S. 1977, that "[w]hen a child is adjudged to be 
neglected or in need of supervision, the court shall insure that reasonable 
efforts were made by the field office of the Division of Public Assistance and 
Social Services to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from 
his home or to make it possible for the child to return to his home. Before 
placing a child outside of the home, the court shall find by clear and 
convincing evidence that to return the child to his home would not be in the 
best interest of the child despite efforts that have been made." (Emphasis 
added.) Appellant contends that the record contains no clear and convincing 
evidence that leaving the child with her would be contrary to his best 
interests.

[¶12.]  Appellant's position depends upon her 
assumption that the reference in the statute to "his home" and "the home" define 
his living situation with her. She argues in support of this position that 
because the district court did not have before it sufficient facts to permit the 
findings required by § 14-6-229(a), W.S. 1977, it did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over the custody of WM. The statute upon which the appellant relies 
encompasses the following provisions: 

[¶13.]  "When a child is adjudged by the court to 
be neglected, delinquent or in need of supervision, the court shall enter its 
decree to that effect and make a disposition as provided in this section that 
places the child in the least restrictive environment consistent with what is 
best suited to the protection of the public safety and interest, the public 
interest of preserving families, the physical, mental and moral welfare of the 
child and in accord with the actual facilities presently available when the 
decree is entered. When a child is adjudged to be neglected or in need of 
supervision, the court shall insure that reasonable efforts were made by the 
field office of the division of public assistance and social services to prevent 
or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home or to make it 
possible for the child to return to his home. Before placing a child outside of 
the home, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that to return 
the child to his home would not be in the best interest of the child despite 
efforts that have been made." Section 14-6-229(a), W.S. 
1977.

[¶14.]  Appellant seeks to categorize the problem 
as a procedural deficiency which is so serious as to void the orders attacked by 
the motion for a new trial. When her position is stripped of its verbiage and 
sophistry, however, it raises only the question of whether the juvenile court 
properly construed the meaning of the phrase "his home" or "the home." Appellant 
does not contend that the court failed to make any findings pursuant to § 
14-6-229(a), but she only insists that it erred in making those findings with 
respect to the home that she provided for WM. In essence, her argument is that 
the statutory term is limited in its meaning to the most recent residence of the 
child found to be neglected. She presents a similar argument with respect to the 
jurisdiction of the court to issue any of its orders regarding the amended 
petition. Her contention that the court could only assume jurisdiction if WM 
were alleged to be a "neglected child" as that term is defined by § 
14-6-201(a)(xvi) is correct. This contention, though, ignores the continuing 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court under the original petition. Appellant argues 
that, because the amended petition failed to allege neglect and because it 
should have alleged that she, as WM's most recent caretaker, had neglected the 
child, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court was not invoked by the amended 
petition. This argument again is premised upon her construction of the statutory 
terminology. The juvenile court adopted a contrary 
construction.

[¶15.]  The district court, sitting as the 
juvenile court, had jurisdiction over the subject matter, in this instance, 
pursuant to § 14-6-203, W.S. 1977 (July 1986 Repl.).5 The juvenile court had the power to 
hear and determine the general class of cases to which this proceeding belongs. 
SeeState v. Board of CountyCommissioners of JohnsonCounty, 642 P.2d 456 (Wyo. 1982); Fuller v. State, 568 P.2d 900 (Wyo. 1977). It did have 
personal jurisdiction over WM. Consequently, appellant raises simply an issue of 
an erroneous interpretation of the statutes found in Title 14 relating to the 
jurisdiction of the district court in juvenile matters.

[¶16.]  We are sensitive to the fact that the 
appellant wants to complain of an abuse of discretion by the juvenile court with 
respect to the custody orders relating to WM. While that matter is not in issue 
before us, we have failed to perceive any abuse of discretion by the district 
court in disposing of this case on the merits.

[¶17.]  The district court properly denied the 
appellant's motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P., because the errors upon 
which appellant premises her contentions could not reach the status of a 
jurisdictional defect. Those asserted errors constitute nothing more than an 
erroneous application of the law in the exercise of the court's jurisdiction. An 
erroneous application of the law does not serve to justify a conclusion that the 
order of the district court is void within the meaning of Rule 60(b). The 
appropriate remedy for such a mistake of law is an appeal and, as we noted 
above, none was taken from the final order of May 5, 1988.

[¶18.]  The order of the juvenile court is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P., 
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

"(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; 
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. - On motion, and upon such terms as 
are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: * * * (4) the judgment 
is void; * * *. The motion shall be made within one (1) year after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation."

2 Section 
14-6-201(a)(xvi), W.S. 1977 (1984 Cum.Supp.), provides, in pertinent 
part:

"(a) As used in this 
act:

* * * * * 
*

"(xvi) `Neglected child' 
means a child:

* * * * * 
*

"(B) Who has been abused 
by the inflicting or causing of physical or mental injury, harm or imminent 
danger to the physical or mental health or welfare of the child, other than by 
accidental means, including abandonment, excessive or unreasonable corporal 
punishment, malnutrition or substantial risk thereof by reason of intentional or 
unintentional neglect, and the commission or allowing the commission of a sexual 
offense against a child as defined by law:

"(I) `Mental injury' 
means an injury to the psychological capacity or emotional stability of a child 
as evidenced by an observable or substantial impairment in his ability to 
function within a normal range of performance and behavior with due regard to 
his culture;

"(II) `Physical injury' 
means death or any harm to a child including but not limited to disfigurement, 
impairment of any bodily organ, skin bruising, bleeding, burns, fracture of any 
bone, subdural hematoma or substantial malnutrition;

"(III) `Substantial risk' 
means a strong possibility as contrasted with a remote or insignificant 
possibility;

"(IV) `Imminent danger' 
includes threatened harm and means a statement, overt act, condition or status 
which represents an immediate and substantial risk of sexual abuse or physical 
or mental injury."

3 Section 14-6-231, W.S. 
1977, (1985 Cum. Supp.), provides, in pertinent part:

* * * * * 
*

"(b) An order of 
disposition shall remain in force for an indefinite period until terminated by 
the court whenever it appears the purpose of the order has been achieved and it 
is in the child's best interest that he be discharged from further court 
jurisdiction.

"(c) Unless sooner 
terminated by court order, all orders issued under this act [§§ 14-6-201 through 
14-6-243] shall terminate with respect to a child 
adjudicated:

"(i) Neglected, when he 
reaches eighteen (18) years of age or has graduated from high school; * * 
*."

4 Section 
14-6-201(a)(xvi)(A), W.S. 1977 (July 1986 Repl.), 
provides:

"`Neglected child' means 
a child:

"(A) Whose custodian has 
failed or refused to provide adequate care, maintenance, supervision, education 
or medical, surgical or any other care necessary for the child's well being. 
Treatment given in good faith by spiritual means alone, through prayer, by a 
duly accredited practitioner in accordance with the tenets and practices of a 
recognized church or religious denomination is not child neglect for that reason 
alone; * * *."

5 Section 14-6-203, W.S. 
1977 (July 1986 Repl.), provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) The court has 
general jurisdiction in all matters and proceedings commenced therein or 
transferred to it by order of the district court 
concerning:

"(i) Any minor alleged to 
be delinquent, neglected or in need of supervision as defined in W.S. 
14-6-201;

"(ii) Any minor alleged 
to have committed a delinquent act before attaining the age of majority; 
and

"(iii) The parents, 
guardian or custodian of any minor alleged to be delinquent, neglected or in 
need of supervision.

"(b) Coincident with 
proceedings concerning a minor alleged to be delinquent, neglected or in need of 
supervision, the court has jurisdiction to:

"(i) Determine questions 
concerning the right to legal custody of the minor;

"(ii) Order any party to 
the proceedings to perform any acts, duties and responsibilities the court deems 
necessary; or

"(iii) Order any party to 
the proceedings to refrain from any act or conduct the court deems detrimental 
to the best interest and welfare of the minor or essential to the enforcement of 
any lawful order of disposition of the minor made by the 
court."