Case Title: Smith v. Richmond Newspapers Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 000337

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
YVONNE G. SMITH 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 000337        JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
                            January 12, 2001 
RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 
George F. Tidey, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether audio tape recordings 
of a felony criminal trial are open to inspection by the public 
under Code § 17.1-208 and, if so, whether mandamus is the proper 
remedy to compel the clerk of the trial court to allow such 
inspection. 
BACKGROUND 
 
 
The facts have been stipulated.  Yvonne G. Smith (the 
Clerk) is the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Henrico County.  It 
is the practice of that court to record audio tapes of felony 
criminal trials when a court reporter is not present.  These 
audio tapes are recorded on equipment kept in the courtrooms and 
operated by court personnel.  When the trials are concluded, the 
audio tapes are kept in the Clerk’s office.  Should a written 
transcript be required of a trial recorded on one of these audio 
tapes, a court reporting service will prepare the transcript.  
Otherwise, the only record of the trial are the audio tapes 
themselves. 
 
On June 2, 1999, Thomas C. Campbell, a reporter for 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc., which publishes the Richmond Times-
Dispatch, asked the Clerk if he could listen to the audio tapes 
of a specific trial for which no written transcript had been 
prepared.  The Clerk denied this request. 
 
On June 3, 1999, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. and Campbell 
(the petitioners) petitioned the circuit court for a writ of 
mandamus directing the Clerk to allow them, or any person, to 
listen to the audio tapes.1  In addition to her answer to the 
petition for mandamus, the Clerk filed a demurrer to the 
petition, asserting that the audio tapes are not a record open 
to inspection pursuant to Code § 17.1-208.  The Clerk further 
asserted that mandamus does not lie because the duty sought to 
be enforced is discretionary and that the petitioners do not 
have a clear right to the relief sought.  Thereafter, the 
circuit court conducted a hearing on the pleadings, supporting 
briefs, and the stipulated facts. 
 
By order dated November 19, 1999, the circuit court 
concluded that a “tape recording of [a] felony trial[] is a 
record of the trial and thus open for public inspection.”  
                     
1In the petition for mandamus, the petitioners made 
reference to Code § 17-43, the predecessor statute to Code 
§ 17.1-208.  Title 17 was superseded by Title 17.1 effective 
October 1, 1998 without material change concerning the issue 
presented by this appeal.  Accordingly, we will address the 
current statute in this opinion. 
 
2
Accordingly, the trial court awarded mandamus and directed that 
the Clerk “allow the petitioners, or any person, to listen to 
requested audio tapes of felony trials conducted in the Circuit 
Court of Henrico County that are maintained in her office.”  We 
awarded the Clerk this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
 
In support of her position that audio tape recordings of 
felony criminal trials are not records of the circuit court 
within the purview of Code § 17.1-208, the Clerk places primary 
reliance upon our decision in Shenandoah Publishing v. Fanning, 
235 Va. 253, 368 S.E.2d 253 (1988).  She asserts that Shenandoah 
Publishing stands for the proposition that the records which are 
required to be open for inspection pursuant to this statute are 
those “records as that term is defined in Rule 5:10,” which 
provides for the contents of the record on appeal from the trial 
court to this Court.  Rule 5:10, however, was not discussed in 
the Shenandoah Publishing opinion, and the Court nowhere in that 
decision defined the trial court records that must be open for 
inspection by reference to the components of the appellate 
record listed in that rule.  Nonetheless, the Clerk asserts that 
because audio tape recordings are not mentioned in Rule 5:10, 
such recordings are not included within the meaning of records 
of the circuit court under Code § 17.1-208. 
 
3
 
The Clerk’s reliance upon Shenandoah Publishing is 
misplaced.  There, in a medical malpractice case, we were 
concerned with public access, under the predecessor of Code 
§ 17.1-208, to certain data sealed by the trial court after the 
parties reached a compromise settlement.  “To facilitate our 
analysis, we separate[d] the data sealed by the trial court into 
two classes[:]” pretrial documents and judicial records.  
Shenandoah Publishing, 235 Va. at 256-57, 368 S.E.2d at 254-55.  
The documents classified as judicial records were held to 
“include the pleadings and any exhibits or motions filed by the 
parties and all orders entered by the trial court in the 
judicial proceedings leading to the judgment under review.”  Id. 
at 257, 368 S.E.2d at 255.  Pursuant to the “broad sweep” of the 
language contained in what is now Code § 17.1-208 and the 
generally accepted common-law rule of openness of judicial 
proceedings and judicial records, we concluded that the trial 
court erred in sealing these judicial records.  Id. at 258-60, 
368 S.E.2d at 255-56.  No audio tape recordings or transcripts 
of the proceedings were involved in Shenandoah Publishing.  
Moreover, nothing in that case even suggests that we intended 
our classification of the data involved in that case to be a 
comprehensive and exclusive definition of “records” for purposes 
of determining the application and scope of Code § 17.1-208. 
 
4
 
Finally, the Clerk asserts that Code § 8.01-420.3 and Rule 
1:3 support her position.  She argues that a transcript of the 
trial is the most apt analogue to the tape recording at issue 
here.  Thus, because this statute is consistent with the 
provision of Rule 1:3 that trial transcripts may be made 
available to interested persons “upon terms and conditions to be 
fixed in each case by the judge,” trial transcripts, or audio 
tape recordings, are not “open to inspection” under Code § 17.1-
208.  We disagree with this reasoning.  Code § 8.01-420.3 and 
Rule 1:3 specifically address transcripts of the proceedings and 
the circumstances under which copies may be obtained.  Audio 
tape recordings are not transcripts of the proceedings, and here 
we are concerned only with the inspection of these tapes and not 
a request to obtain copies of them. 
 
While we disagree with the Clerk’s reasoning above, this 
does not resolve the question whether these audio tape 
recordings of felony criminal trials are “records” of the 
circuit court open to inspection as contemplated by the 
provisions of Code § 17.1-208, and we now turn to our analysis 
of that question.  Although not cited by either party, we begin 
that analysis with the provisions of Code § 19.2-165, which are 
particularly relevant to the inquiry sub judice.  This statute 
specifically directs that “[i]n all felony cases, the court or 
judge trying the case shall by order entered of record provide 
 
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for the recording verbatim of the evidence and incidents of 
trial either by a court reporter or by mechanical or electronic 
devices approved by the court.”  (Emphasis added).  This statute 
further provides that the expense of recording the trial shall 
be paid by the Commonwealth to the localities that maintain 
mechanical or electronic devices for this purpose, unless the 
defendant is convicted and, thus, required to bear that expense.  
Pursuant to this statute, no transcript is prepared unless the 
defendant appeals his conviction.  In addition, the statute in 
broad terms directs the individual designated to record the 
trial to file the “original records” with the clerk of the 
circuit court “who shall preserve them in the public records of 
the court for not less than five years if an appeal was taken 
and a transcript was prepared, or ten years if no appeal was 
taken.” 
 
In the instant case, the audio tapes are the only verbatim 
recording of the evidence and incidents of the felony criminal 
trial in question.  There is no dispute that the audio tapes 
were produced by a mechanical or electronic device approved by 
the court and that court personnel designated to record the 
trial operated that device.  Furthermore, there is no dispute 
that the audio tapes were properly filed with the Clerk who, 
pursuant to this statute, must preserve it in the public record 
of the circuit court for at least five years.  Under such 
 
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circumstances, and in view of the undisputed tradition of 
openness to criminal proceedings in this Commonwealth, we are of 
opinion that when, as here, the audio tape recording of a felony 
criminal trial is the only record of that trial, it is a 
“record” of the court as contemplated by the provisions of Code 
§ 17.1-208 and, thus, open to inspection by any person.  
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court properly so 
determined.2
 
We turn now to the issue whether the mandamus was properly 
issued by the circuit court.  We recognize that mandamus is an 
extraordinary remedy that lies only where there is a clear and 
unequivocal duty of a public official to perform the act in 
question.  Hertz v. Times-World Corp., 259 Va. 599, 607, 528 
S.E.2d 458, 462 (2000); see also Early Used Cars, Inc. v. 
Province, 218 Va. 605, 609, 239 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1977).  In 
support of her position that mandamus is not the proper remedy 
in this case, the Clerk reasserts that the petitioners do not 
have a clear right to be permitted inspection of the audio tape 
recordings.  For the reasons previously stated herein there is 
no merit to this assertion. 
                     
2However, to the extent that the phase “open to inspection” 
in the context of audio tapes needs any clarification, we hold 
that this phrase means that one inspects audio tapes by 
listening, and not merely by viewing. 
 
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The Clerk further reasserts that to the extent that she has 
a duty to permit inspection of the audio tape recordings 
pursuant to Code § 17.1-208, that duty is discretionary, not 
ministerial.  This is so, she contends, because she “would be 
undertaking a judicial role were she to permit the tape 
recordings to be released, inasmuch as Rule 1:3 permits 
transcripts of proceedings to be released only pursuant to terms 
fixed by a judge.”  We disagree. 
 
The release of the audio tapes is not at issue in this 
case.  The petitioners requested permission to listen to the 
tapes; they did not request copies or to remove the tapes from 
the clerk’s office.  Similarly, the mandamus merely directed the 
Clerk to allow the petitioners, or any person, “to listen” to 
these tapes. 
 
Finally, the Clerk makes the following assertion: 
 
In addition, § 17.1-208 prohibits persons from 
using the clerk’s office as will interfere with the 
business of the office.  The petitioners’ request 
would require [her] to make the discretionary decision 
whether permitting a person to listen to a tape 
recording of a trial would interfere with her office’s 
business.  For example, if the petitioners intended to 
use their own tape recorder to listen to the tape, the 
noise and disturbance therefrom (unlike the situation 
where a document is being inspected) could result in 
such interference.  And if petitioners intended to use 
a county tape recorder, that, too, could result in 
interference with the operations of the Clerk’s 
office.  Either way, [she] would be obligated to make 
a discretionary decision as to whether the 
petitioners’ request would interfere with her office’s 
business. 
 
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The pertinent language from Code § 17.1-208 states that:  
“[n]o person shall be permitted to use the clerk’s office for 
the purpose of making copies of records in such a manner, or to 
such extent, as will interfere with the business of the office 
or with its reasonable use by the general public.”  As 
previously noted, we are not here concerned with a request to 
make copies.  Moreover, while we agree that the Clerk certainly 
has the discretion to determine the manner in which a person may 
be permitted to listen to the audio tape recordings so that such 
does not interfere with the business of the office, that 
discretion simply does not extend to a complete denial of the 
right to listen to the tapes.  And we are confident that the 
clerks of the circuit courts are entirely adept in making the 
necessary ministerial decisions to strike a reasonable balance 
between providing the public the right to listen to these audio 
tape recordings of felony criminal trials and avoiding any 
interference with the other business of their offices. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we hold that the circuit 
court properly concluded that the audio tape recordings were 
records of the circuit court and open to inspection pursuant to 
Code § 17.1-208 and that mandamus was the proper remedy to 
direct the Clerk to permit the petitioners to listen to these 
 
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tapes.  Accordingly, we will affirm the issuance of the writ of 
mandamus by the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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