Case Title: STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. GIGER

Citation: 

Docket Number: SCBD-4796

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. GIGER  STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. GIGER 2004 OK 43 93 P.3d 32 Case Number: SCBD-4796 Decided: 06/08/2004 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association, Complainant, v. CORDES MARTIN GIGER, Respondent. BAR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING ¶0 In this disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer, the complaint alleges in two counts unprofessional conduct deemed to warrant sanctions. A trial panel of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal found clear and convincing evidence that respondent engaged in the misconduct alleged in count one of the complaint, but recommended that no discipline be imposed. The trial panel found insufficient evidence that respondent engaged in the misconduct alleged in count two of the complaint. With one member dissenting, the trial panel recommended that count two be dismissed. The dissenter recommended that the hearing on count two be continued until the Bar is prepared to present evidence. Upon de novo review of the evidence presented to the trial panel, RESPONDENT IS ORDERED DISCIPLINED BY A PUBLIC CENSURE FOR THE MISCONDUCT ALLEGED IN COUNT ONE OF THE COMPLAINT; COUNT TWO OF THE COMPLAINT IS DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Mike Speegle, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma Bar Association, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Complainant. Cordes Martin Giger, Respondent, Norman, Oklahoma, pro se. OPALA, V.C.J. ¶1 In this disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer, the issues to be decided are: (1) Does the record submitted for our examination provide sufficient evidence for a meaningful de novo consideration of the complaint and of its disposition? I INTRODUCTION TO THE RECORD ¶2 The Oklahoma Bar Association (the "Bar") commenced this disciplinary proceeding on 21 March 2003 against Cordes Martin Giger (respondent or Giger), a lawyer whose license to practice law is currently suspended, by filing a formal complaint in accordance with the provisions of Rule 6.1 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings ("RGDP"). ¶3 Upon completion of the hearing and after consideration of the testimony and exhibits on file, two members of the trial panel issued a report finding that respondent engaged in the misconduct alleged in count one of the complaint, but recommended that no additional disciplinary sanction be imposed upon respondent beyond the two-year- and-one-day suspension he is already serving under this court's order of 10 June 2003 in State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Giger ("Giger II"). II THE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT PROVIDES SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A MEANINGFUL DE NOVO CONSIDERATION OF ALL FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS PROCEEDING ¶4 In a bar disciplinary proceeding the court functions as an adjudicative licensing authority that exercises exclusive original cognizance. III RESPONDENT'S MISCONDUCT ALLEGED IN COUNT ONE OF THE COMPLAINT CALLS FOR DISCIPLINE BY PUBLIC CENSURE ¶7 The Bar alleges in count one of the complaint that respondent violated the provisions of ORPC Rule 8.4(b), ¶8 In answer to the complaint, respondent admits only that he entered the store and put the batteries in his pocket. His answer does not specifically deny the Bar's remaining allegations, but he testified at the PRT hearing that whatever he did, he did inadvertently and without the intent to steal the batteries from the store. Rather than contest the facts, respondent's answer asserts as a defense that the petty larceny incident cannot serve as the basis for discipline in this proceeding because the court has already dealt with the incident in Giger II and disposed of it. ¶9 In Giger II, the Bar sought to impose additional discipline on respondent for violating the terms of an earlier disciplinary suspension imposed on respondent in State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Giger ("Giger I"). ¶10 Respondent does not identify the legal principle upon which he rests his contention that the court cannot again consider the petty larceny matter, but we surmise that he is referring to either double jeopardy or one of the preclusion doctrines. In either case, we disagree that the petty larceny incident is now beyond the court's constitutionally vested authority to discipline wayward practitioners. ¶11 Oklahoma's prohibition against double jeopardy provides that having been acquitted by a jury, no person shall again be "put in jeopardy of life or liberty for that of which he has been acquitted. Nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense." ¶12 The doctrine of claim preclusion, formerly known at common law as res judicata, teaches that a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties from re-litigating not only the adjudicated claim, but also any theories or issues that were actually decided, or could have been decided, in that action. "a legal concept which has no separate existence in the natural order of things. It is what the makers of legal policy, the Legislature and the courts, say it is. It exists to satisfy the needs of plaintiffs for a means of redress, of defendants for a conceptual context within which to defend an accusation, and of the courts for a framework within which to administer justice." The claim in Giger II was that respondent's petty larceny at the Norman Wal Mart violated the terms of the conditioned probation imposed on respondent in Giger I. That was the only claim decided on the merits in Giger II. The Bar cannot re-litigate that claim, but it is not barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion from bringing a separate disciplinary proceeding in which we are asked to determine whether the petty larceny incident warrants independent disciplinary sanctions. ¶13 The other preclusion doctrine, formerly known at common law as collateral estoppel, is issue preclusion. Under this doctrine, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, the same parties or their privies may not relitigate that issue in a suit brought upon a different claim. ¶14 We find the evidence presented in this proceeding clear and convincing that respondent committed the offense of petty larceny at the Norman Wal Mart as alleged in count one of the complaint. In State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Bradley, ¶15 Even if the nolo contendere plea were not admissible or not sufficient in and of itself to prove the Bar's allegations, we would nevertheless find from this record sufficient evidence that respondent committed the alleged petty larceny. Respondent does not deny that he took the batteries off the shelf, put them in his pocket, and left the store without paying for them. His defense is that he did so inadvertently. We are not persuaded. One does not enter a store, remove a product from its packaging, discard the packaging, and place the item in one's clothing in the absence of an intent to abscond with the merchandise. ¶16 We find that respondent's conduct violated the provisions of ORPC Rule 8.4(b), ORPC Rule 8.4(c), and RGDP Rule 1.3. The trial panel recommended that we impose no discipline for this infraction given that respondent is already serving a two-year-and-one-day suspension. We cannot accede to this recommendation without having it appear that we view shoplifting to be of little consequence. We do not. Shoplifting, even when the items stolen are of little value, is harmful to society. When one engages in such misconduct, it indicates psychological or emotional problems or a lack of respect for the law, or both. For a lawyer, neither mental state is acceptable. In light of respondent's current suspended status, we believe a public censure suffices to vindicate the interests we are sworn to protect. Because he has already been suspended for two years and one day in Giger II, respondent must apply for reinstatement if he is to practice law again. IV COUNT TWO OF THE COMPLAINT ¶17 The Bar alleges in count two of the complaint that respondent engaged in some very serious acts of misconduct which, if true, constitute both criminal offenses as well as ethical breaches. The Bar was not prepared to offer evidence at the PRT hearing substantiating the allegations and indicated that it would dismiss the count were that course of action open to it. Two members of the trial panel recommended that the count be dismissed, while the remaining trial panel member recommended that the hearing on count two be continued until such time as the Bar is prepared to present its case. ¶18 The provisions of RGDP Rule 6.15 govern the court's options in disposing of a disciplinary proceeding. They permit the court to "impose discipline, dismiss the proceedings or take such other action as it deems appropriate." We decline to order the hearing on count two continued in the absence of a properly formulated request by the Bar to do so. V SUMMARY ¶19 The Bar has charged respondent with two counts of professional misconduct. We find clear and convincing evidence that respondent committed the offense of petty larceny from a Norman Wal Mart in violation of ORPC Rule 8.4(b), ORPC Rule 8.4(c), and RGDP Rule 1.3. In the circumstances of this case the appropriate disciplinary sanction for respondent's misconduct is a public censure. We determine that the Bar failed to prove the allegations in count two of the complaint and order that count dismissed without prejudice to its refiling should proof of the alleged misconduct become available. ¶20 RESPONDENT IS ORDERED DISCIPLINED BY A PUBLIC CENSURE FOR THE MISCONDUCT ALLEGED IN COUNT ONE OF THE COMPLAINT; COUNT TWO OF THE COMPLAINT IS DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. ¶21 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR. FOOT