Case Title: State v. Copes

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 99,403 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
MARY JEAN COPES, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited 
review.   
 
2. 
K.S.A. 22-4513(a) requires a district court to tax Board of Indigents' Defense Services 
attorney fees against a criminal defendant in appointed counsel cases and provides the fees shall 
be enforced as judgments for payment of money in civil cases.  In setting the amount of the fee, 
K.S.A. 22-4513(b) requires the district court to take into consideration the financial resources of 
the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of such sum will impose.  A district 
court must consider these factors on the record at the time of assessing the fees.   
 
3. 
A defendant may waive the right to have a district court make the findings required by 
K.S.A. 22-4513(b) and may do so in a written plea agreement.  If there is a knowing, voluntary, 
and intelligent waiver, the district court may order payment of a Board of Indigents' Defense 
Services attorney fee without making the findings required by K.S.A. 22-4513 and State v. 
Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 546, 132 P.3d 934 (2006). 
 
 
 
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4. 
Application of fundamental contract principles is generally the best means to fair 
enforcement of a plea agreement, as long as courts remain mindful that the constitutional 
implications of the plea bargaining process may require a different analysis in some 
circumstances. 
 
5. 
For a waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. 
 
6. 
The following factors are among those to be considered in determining whether the 
legislature's use of "shall" makes imposition of a fine mandatory or directory:  (1) legislative 
context and history, (2) substantive effect on a party's rights versus merely form or procedural 
effect; (3) the existence or nonexistence of consequences for noncompliance; and (4) the subject 
matter of the statutory provision.  
 
7. 
The word "shall" in K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 8-1567(g)(1) makes imposition of a $2,500 fine 
for a fourth or subsequent driving under the influence conviction mandatory, rather than 
directory, and in determining the amount of the fine a district court need not take into account the 
financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden its payment will impose, per 
K.S.A. 21-4607(3). 
 
8. 
K.S.A. 21-4607(3) requires a district court to take into account the defendant's financial 
resources and the burden of the fine when considering the method of payment of a fine for a 
fourth or subsequent offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, i.e., whether the defendant 
must pay a monetary fine or provide community service under K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 8-1567(j). 
 
  
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Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed December 19, 2008.  
Appeal from Montgomery district court; RUSSELL D. CANADY, judge.  Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming 
the district court is reversed.  Judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded with directions.  Opinion filed 
February 26, 2010. 
 
Shawn E. Minihan, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and Patrick H. Dunn, of the 
same office, was on the brief for appellant.  
 
David R. Maslen, county attorney, argued the cause, and Steve Six, attorney general, was with him on the 
brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
LUCKERT, J.:  On review of a Court of Appeals' decision, we consider two issues of first 
impression for this court.  Both arise from the district court's failure to consider a defendant's 
financial resources when imposing attorney fees and a fine.  
 
First, can a defendant waive a K.S.A. 22-4513(b) requirement that a district court take 
into consideration "the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that 
payment of such sum will impose" in setting attorney fees in Board of Indigents' Defense 
Services (BIDS) cases and, if so, can that waiver occur when a plea agreement states that the 
defense attorney will recommend payment of costs and appointed attorney fees in an "amount to 
be determined"?  The Court of Appeals held there could be a waiver through a plea agreement 
and that there was a waiver in this case.  State v. Copes, No. 99,403, unpublished opinion, filed 
December 19, 2008.  While we agree a defendant can waive his or her statutory rights under 
K.S.A. 22-4513(b), we hold there was not an intentional relinquishment of a known right in this 
case because the plea agreement merely states defense counsel will recommend that the 
defendant pay attorney fees and does not contain an explicit waiver of rights.    
 
The second issue is whether a district court must consider a defendant's financial 
resources before imposing a fine for a conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol 
(DUI), fourth offense, pursuant to K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 8-1567(g)(1)?  According to the defendant, 
the answer to this question is "yes" because K.S.A. 21-4607(3) states:  "In determining the 
4 
 
amount and method of payment of a fine, the court shall take into account the financial resources 
of the defendant and the nature of the burden that its payment will impose."  The Court of 
Appeals rejected this argument and answered the question "no," concluding K.S.A. 21-4607(3) is 
a general statute and is not applicable in light of the more specific applicability of K.S.A. 2009 
Supp. 8-1567(g)(1), which requires a $2,500 fine for a fourth or subsequent DUI conviction.  
State v. Copes, slip op. at 5-6.  On review of that decision, we agree with the Court of Appeals' 
conclusion that the mandatory nature of the fine means financial resources need not be 
considered in setting the fine amount.  Nevertheless, we disagree with the ultimate conclusion 
that K.S.A. 21-4607(3) has no application because the statute also applies to the determination of 
the method of payment, and K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 8-1567(j) provides an alternative method of 
payment by allowing the district court to order payment of a DUI fine through community 
service.   
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
On November 3, 2005, Copes entered a no contest plea to DUI, fourth offense, pursuant 
to K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 8-1567(g).  The district court sentenced Copes to 12 months in jail, with a 
postrelease supervision term of 12 months.  In addition, the court ordered Copes to pay $350 in 
BIDS attorney fees and assessed a mandatory fine of $2,500 pursuant to K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 8-
1567(g).  On direct appeal, Copes argued the district court erred by requiring her to pay the 
BIDS attorney fees and by imposing the $2,500 fine without first determining on the record 
whether she had the ability to pay.  In State v. Copes, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court.    
 
Regarding the BIDS attorney fees, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that in State v. 
Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 546, 132 P.3d 934 (2006), this court held, pursuant to K.S.A. 22-
4513(b), the sentencing court "must consider the financial resources of the defendant and the 
nature of the burden that payment will impose explicitly, stating on the record how those factors 
have been weighed in the court's decision."  (Emphasis added.)  Copes, slip op. at 3.  The 
sentencing transcript indicates the district court did not consider any of the factors listed in 
K.S.A. 22-4513. 
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The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that Copes agreed to pay BIDS attorney fees 
as part of the plea agreement.  Although the plea agreement did not specify an exact amount of 
BIDS attorney fees, Copes agreed that at sentencing her attorney "will recommend" that she be 
required to pay the costs and appointed attorney fees in "the amount to be determined."  The 
amount of $350 was written into the journal entry at sentencing.  Following the rationale of State 
v. Perry, 39 Kan. App. 2d 700, 183 P.3d 12, rev. denied 286 Kan. 1184 (2008), the Court of 
Appeals held that Copes effectively waived her statutory rights under Robinson and K.S.A. 22-
4513.  Copes, slip op. at 3. 
 
Regarding the district court's imposition of a $2,500 fine without first considering Copes' 
financial resources, the Court of Appeals held that under the circumstances—where the fine was 
mandatory and not discretionary—the district court was not required to make findings about 
Copes' ability to pay.  The panel noted that K.S.A. 21-4607(3)—which requires a district court 
determining the amount and method of payment of a fine to "take into account the financial 
resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that its payment will impose"—is a 
general statute.  The more specific statute, K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 8-1567, controls over the general 
statute, and K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 8-1567(g)(1) mandates the imposition of a $2,500 fine for a 
fourth or subsequent DUI offense and does not contain a provision for waiver of the fine.  The 
Court of Appeals held that in this situation the district court was not required to make the 
findings under Robinson and K.S.A. 21-4607(3).  Copes, slip op. at 5-6. 
 
This court granted the petition for review filed by Copes. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Both issues in this appeal involve statutory interpretation, and statutory interpretation is a 
question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review.  See State v. Raschke, 289 
Kan. 911, Syl. ¶ 3, 219 P. 3d 481 (2009) (considering K.S.A. 21-4607 and fine provision); 
Robinson, 281 Kan. at 539 (considering BIDS fees).  Because a question of law is presented and 
that question is determinative of the appellate issues (and hence the case), we are able to consider 
Copes' argument even though she did not raise the issues before the district court.  See State v. 
Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, 159, 194 P.3d 1195 (2008); see also Raschke, 289 Kan. 911, Syl. 
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¶ 2 (recognizes general rule that issue not raised in district court cannot be the basis for an appeal 
and rule's exceptions, including when newly asserted claim involves only a question of law 
arising on proved or admitted facts and is determinative of the case; applies exception to issue 
regarding interpretation of K.S.A. 21-4607); Robinson, 281 Kan. 538 (implicitly applying 
exception to issue regarding imposition of BIDS fees).   
 
BIDS ATTORNEY FEES 
 
First, Copes argues that the district court erred by ordering her to reimburse BIDS 
attorney fees without first considering her financial resources and the burden such payment will 
impose as required by K.S.A. 22-4513(b).  See Robinson, 281 Kan. 538.  In response, the State 
argues that Copes effectively contracted away her rights under K.S.A. 22-4513(b) in her plea 
agreement.  Accordingly, the district court was not required to consider Copes' financial 
resources or the burden paying the BIDS attorney fees would have on her.   
 
K.S.A. 22-4513(a) requires that BIDS attorney fees "shall be taxed" against the defendant 
and "shall be enforced" as judgments for payment of money in civil cases.  In setting the amount 
of the fee, K.S.A. 22-4513(b) requires the district court to take into consideration "the financial 
resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of such sum will impose."  
Applying that requirement, this court has held that a district court must consider these factors on 
the record at the time the fee is assessed.  Robinson, 281 Kan. at 546; see State v. Phillips, 289 
Kan. 28, 43, 210 P.3d 93 (2009).   
 
According to the Court of Appeals, these same rules do not apply if a defendant waives 
his or her statutory rights under Robinson and K.S.A. 22-4513(b) in a plea agreement.  Copes did 
so, according to the Court of Appeals, because her plea agreement stated that "[a]t the time of 
sentencing, my attorney will recommend . . . [t]hat I be required to pay the costs of this action, 
and pay appointed counsel fees in the amount to be determined."  In so holding, the panel relied 
upon Perry, 39 Kan. App. 2d 700.   
 
7 
 
In Perry, a plea agreement required the defendant to pay "'the costs of this action, and 
pay appointed counsel fees in the amount of $150.'"  Perry, 39 Kan. App. 2d at 700.  In finding 
this agreement amounted to a waiver of rights granted by K.S.A. 22-4513(b), the Court of 
Appeals first observed that a plea agreement is akin to a contract.  Perry, 39 Kan. App. 2d at 702 
(citing State v. Wills, 244 Kan. 62, 68-69, 765 P.2d 1114 [1988]).  Next, the court noted that both 
parties to a plea agreement are bound by its terms, and Kansas appellate courts have consistently 
forced the parties to abide by their agreement.  See, e.g., State v. Ratley, 253 Kan. 394, Syl. ¶ 5, 
855 P.2d 943 (1993).  The Perry court observed that Robinson recognized a criminal defendant's 
statutory right to have the district court take into account the defendant's financial resources and 
the nature of the burden that payment will impose before determining the amount and method of 
BIDS attorney fee reimbursement.  But in a plea agreement a "defendant waives statutory rights 
or constitutional rights in exchange for dismissal of other criminal charges or prosecutorial 
recommendations at sentencing."  Perry, 39 Kan. App. 2d at 702.  Consequently, the Perry court 
found "no reason that a statutory right of this nature cannot be bargained away in connection 
with a plea agreement.  Far more basic constitutional rights are validly bargained away in such 
agreements."  Perry, 39 Kan. App. 2d at 702. 
 
Applying these points, the Court of Appeals concluded that if a plea "agreement is 
entered into voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, the terms of such an agreement are clearly 
enforceable as a matter of law.  See State v. Shopteese, 283 Kan. 331, 340-41, 153 P.3d 1208 
(2007)."  Perry, 39 Kan. App. 2d at 702.  Therefore, the Perry court held that where the 
defendant has agreed, as a part of an otherwise valid plea agreement, "to pay a specific portion of 
BIDS attorney fees," the district court may forego the statutory procedure normally required by 
Robinson and order such reimbursement in the journal entry of sentencing.  Perry, 39 Kan. App. 
2d at 702. 
 
In the present case, although Copes' plea agreement did not specify an exact sum of BIDS 
fees, the Court of Appeals found Copes' situation to be comparable to that in Perry.   
 
This result is contrary to the conclusion of a different Court of Appeals panel that 
disagreed with the notion of applying Perry to a situation where the amount of BIDS fees is not 
8 
 
specified in the plea agreement.  In the unpublished opinion of State v. Gillespie, No. 100,570, 
filed September 18, 2009, a split panel found Perry to be distinguishable.  There, Gillespie's plea 
agreement contained language identical to Copes' in that it specifically stated his attorney "will 
recommend" that Gillespie be required to pay "appointed counsel fees in the amount to be 
determined."  Like the plea agreement in our case, Gillespie's agreement did not say he agrees to 
pay fees, nor was a specific amount of BIDS attorney fees mentioned in the agreement. 
 
The Gillespie majority emphasized that unlike the situation in Perry, Gillespie merely 
agreed that his attorney would make the general recommendation regarding the payment of 
BIDS attorney fees.  Further, the amount of fees was left open-ended in Gillespie's plea 
agreement.  The majority remained unconvinced that Gillespie waived his rights under Robinson 
"for the imposition of an open-ended BIDS fee."  Copes, slip op. at 7-8.  The attorney fee was, 
therefore, reversed and the case was remanded for a hearing to consider Gillespie's financial 
resources.  Copes, slip op. at 8. 
 
The dissenting judge disagreed with the Gillespie majority's decision to remand the case 
to the district court for a Robinson analysis.  The dissent would have followed the rationale of 
Perry and would have found that Gillespie bargained away his right to the financial 
considerations mandated by Robinson.  Following the reasoning in Perry, the dissent reiterated 
that a defendant can plea bargain away the most basic fundamental constitutional rights and can 
also bargain away "far less significant statutory rights."  Copes, slip op. at 9.  As for the fact that 
the amount of BIDS fees was specified in Perry's plea agreement, the Gillespie dissent observed 
that the district court was not bound by the terms of the plea agreement and, thus, was not 
obligated to impose the agreed-upon amount of fees.  For this reason, the dissent found it of no 
significance that Gillespie's plea agreement did not state a specific amount of BIDS fees.  Copes, 
slip op. at 10. 
 
Both of these Court of Appeals' decisions are consistent to the extent of accepting that a 
defendant can waive rights in a plea agreement and that the waiver may extend to the right to 
have a court consider statutory factors in setting attorney fees.  The first of these premises is 
consistent with decisions of this court.  See, e.g., State v. Patton, 287 Kan. 200, Syl. ¶ 13, 195 
9 
 
P.3d 753 (2008) (knowing and voluntary waiver of a statutory right to appeal is generally 
enforceable); State v. Robinson, 233 Kan. 384, 385, 662 P.2d 1275 (1983) (same relating to 
statutory right to jury trial).  This court has not considered the second of these premises—that the 
same rule would apply to the right to have statutory findings regarding the amount of attorney 
fees.  We note, however, other courts have reached this same conclusion.  See, e.g., People v. 
Scott, 176 P.3d 851, 853 (Colo. App. 2007) (parties to plea agreement may stipulate that the 
sentence will require reimbursement of court-appointed counsel costs); State v. Moore, 500 
N.W.2d 75, 76 (Iowa 1993) (indicating that parties are not prevented from entering into 
agreement concerning payment of costs and attorney fees); State v. Thorstad, 261 N.W.2d 899, 
902 (N.D.), cert denied 436 U.S. 906 (1978) (agreement to pay restitution for cost of court-
appointed attorney meant financial resources and other statutory factors did not have to be 
considered); State v. Thrower, 62 Ohio App. 3d 359, 376, 575 N.E.2d 863 (1989) (defendants 
failed to affirmatively show that payment of counsel fees out of forfeiture proceeds was part of 
the plea agreement which was stated on the record).   
 
We agree with these authorities in general and find no reason to distinguish a knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the statutory rights under K.S.A 22-4513(b) from waivers of 
constitutional rights through the same process.  Hence, we conclude a defendant may waive the 
right to have a district court make the findings required by K.S.A. 22-4513(b) and may do so in a 
written plea agreement.  If there is a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver, the district court 
may order payment of BIDS attorney fees without making the findings required by K.S.A. 22-
4513 and Robinson, 281 Kan. 538.   
 
In addition, we agree with the premise of Perry and Gillespie that a plea agreement is 
generally subject to contract principles.  In several cases, we have noted that application of 
fundamental contract principles is generally the best means to fair enforcement of a plea 
agreement, as long as courts remain mindful that the constitutional implications of the plea 
bargaining process may require a different analysis in some circumstances.  See State v. Boley, 
279 Kan. 989, 996, 113 P.3d 248 (2005); see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-62, 
30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 92 S. Ct. 495 (1971) (accused pleading guilty must be counseled, absent a 
waiver).    
10 
 
Nevertheless, it is a fundamental principle of contract law that there must be a meeting of 
the minds regarding essential terms in order to have a binding contract.  Mohr v. State Bank of 
Stanley, 244 Kan. 555, 572, 770 P.2d 466 (1989); see State v. Thompson, 15 Neb. App. 764, 773, 
735 N.W.2d 818 (2007) (as with other contracts, courts cannot rewrite plea agreement to include 
terms not present).  Here, there is not an agreement regarding the amount of the fees or, more 
significantly, as to a waiver of the rights granted by K.S.A. 22-4513(b).  Although Copes' written 
plea agreement contained an extensive recitation of rights and an explicit waiver of those rights, 
that recitation made no mention of attorney fees or the district court's obligation to consider 
Copes' financial resources or the burden the fees would impose.  In other words, the contract 
terms the State seeks to enforce—the agreement to waive rights under K.S.A. 22-4513(b) and the 
fee amount—are missing from the contract.   
 
The absence of an explicit waiver of the rights granted by K.S.A. 22-4513(b)―i.e., to 
have a district court consider financial resources and the burden of an attorney fee 
judgment―creates more than a contract problem for the State:  For a "'waiver to be valid under 
the Due Process Clause, it must be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right or privilege."'  [Citations omitted.]"  State v. Moses, 280 Kan. 939, 946, 127 P.3d 330 
(2006).  Under the plea agreement before us, we cannot determine that there was an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right.  Rather, Copes merely acknowledged that her attorney "will 
recommend" that she be required to pay "appointed counsel fees in the amount to be 
determined."  This portion of Copes' plea agreement placed her in the same position she would 
have been had the plea agreement never mentioned the BIDS attorney fees at all—K.S.A. 22-
4513(a) requires that all convicted indigent defendants "shall be taxed" the BIDS attorney fees.  
And with this taxing of fees comes the required consideration of the defendant's financial 
resources under K.S.A. 22-4513(b).   
 
This case is remanded to the district court with directions to consider Copes' financial 
resources and the burden of paying the BIDS attorney fees.  
 
 
 
11 
 
FINE AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
 
Next, Copes argues the district court erred by imposing the statutorily mandated fine of 
$2,500, pursuant to K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 8-1567(g)(1), for a fourth DUI conviction without first 
considering her financial resources and the burden its payment will impose.  She bases this 
argument on the language in K.S.A. 21-4607(3), which provides that the district court, when 
determining "the amount and method of payment" of a fine, "shall take into account the financial 
resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that its payment will impose."  (Emphasis 
added.)  The State argues that K.S.A. 21-4607(3) does not apply because K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 8-
1567(g)(1), a specific statute, controls and provides that upon being convicted of a fourth or 
subsequent DUI conviction, a person "shall" be fined $2,500.    
 
Relevant Statutes 
 
To resolve this issue, two statutes must be considered.  The first, K.S.A. 21-4607(3), 
provides: 
 
"In determining the amount and method of payment of a fine, the court shall take into 
account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that its payment will 
impose." 
 
The second, K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 8-1567, provides in pertinent part: 
 
"(g)(1)  On the fourth or subsequent conviction of a violation of this [DUI] section, a 
person shall be guilty of a nonperson felony and sentenced to not less than 90 days nor more than 
one year's imprisonment and fined $2,500. . . . 
 
. . . . 
"(j)  In lieu of payment of a fine imposed pursuant to this section, the court may order 
that the person perform community service specified by the court.  The person shall receive a 
credit on the fine imposed in an amount equal to $5 for each full hour spent by the person in the 
specified community service.  The community service ordered by the court shall be required to be 
performed not later than one year after the fine is imposed or by an earlier date specified by the 
court.  If by the required date the person performs an insufficient amount of community service to 
reduce to zero the portion of the fine required to be paid by the person, the remaining balance of 
the fine shall become due on that date." 
12 
 
 
These provisions raise separate considerations relating to the application of K.S.A. 21-
4607(3):  8-1567(g) relates to the amount of the fine and subparagraph (j) relates to the method 
of payment. 
 
Amount of Fine 
 
With regard to the State's argument about the mandatory nature of the amount of the fine 
for a fourth or subsequent DUI conviction, this court reviewed a similar issue in Raschke, 289 
Kan. 911, where we held:  "When a sentencing judge imposes a mandatory minimum fine, he or 
she need not take into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the 
burden that its payment will impose, per K.S.A. 21-4607(3)."  Raschke, 289 Kan. 911, Syl. ¶ 6.  
There, Raschke pleaded guilty to four counts of forgery in violation of K.S.A. 21-3710(a)(1).  
Subsections of the statute set forth fine amounts for first, second, and third or subsequent forgery 
convictions.  For a first conviction, "a person shall be . . . fined the lesser of the amount of the 
forged instrument or $500"; for a second conviction, "a person shall be fined the lesser of the 
amount of the forged instrument or $1000"; for a third or subsequent conviction, "a person shall 
be . . . fined the lesser of the amount of the forged instrument or $2,500."  K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(2), 
(3), and (4). 
 
In determining whether the legislature's use of "shall" makes the forgery fine provisions 
mandatory or directory, this court considered the following factors:  (1) legislative context and 
history, (2) substantive effect on a party's rights versus merely form or procedural effect; (3) the 
existence or nonexistence of consequences for noncompliance; and (4) the subject matter of the 
statutory provision.  We concluded that the word "shall" in K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(2)-(4) is 
mandatory rather than directory.  In other words, "[a]t least the minimum fine must be imposed 
upon every forgery conviction."  Raschke, 289 Kan. at 922. 
 
Then, we considered whether the financial consideration requirements of K.S.A. 21-
4607(3) must be applied to the mandatory minimum forgery fines.  We concluded that they do 
not.  Considering the legislative history of the forgery provisions, the Raschke court noted that 
there was no reference in the legislative committee notes to an overlay of K.S.A. 21-4607.  
13 
 
Moreover, K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(2)-(4) is the newer of the two statutes and "presumably the more 
recent statement of legislative intent."  Raschke, 289 Kan. at 923.  In addition, K.S.A. 21-
3710(b)(2)-(4) deals specifically with fines for forgery, whereas K.S.A. 21-4607(3) deals with 
criminal fines generally.  The Raschke court concluded:  "The concept of inflexible mandatory 
minimum fines . . . is incompatible with the malleability inherently injected into fine setting by 
consideration of defendant's financial circumstances."  Raschke, 289 Kan. at 924. 
 
In the present case, a similar analysis applies in considering whether a fine must be 
imposed and in determining the amount of the fine for a fourth or subsequent DUI conviction.  In 
considering whether the word "shall" in K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 8-1567(g)(1) is mandatory or 
directory, we consider the four factors laid out in Raschke.  With regard to the first factor—
legislative context and history—clearly the DUI fines are specific to the offense and correspond 
to the number of convictions.  The legislative history of subsection (g) is not particularly helpful 
but shows that the $2,500 fine was set for fourth or subsequent DUI convictions in 2001.  See L. 
2001, ch. 200, sec. 14.  Before the 2001 amendment, a fourth DUI conviction received the same 
possible fine as a third DUI conviction in that "third or . . . subsequent conviction[s]" were to be 
fined "not less than $1,000 nor more than $2,500."  See L. 1994, ch. 291, sec. 2.  By placing the 
sole fine of $2,500 on fourth or subsequent convictions, the legislature showed its intent to 
withdraw any discretionary range for this category of offenders.   
 
With regard to the second factor—substantive effect on a party's rights—it is indisputable 
that "[p]rescription of a minimum criminal sentence certainly is material; it is not simply a mode 
of procedure intended to secure order, system, and dispatch of the public business."  Raschke, 
289 Kan. at 921-22.  The Raschke analysis of the third factor—the existence or nonexistence of 
consequences for noncompliance—applies equally to the DUI fine for fourth or subsequent 
offenses:  Although the consequences for noncompliance are implicit, they are real, and at a 
minimum raise a significant question of whether a DUI sentence without a fine in some amount 
would be illegal under K.S.A. 22-3504 and subject to vacation and correction at any time.  See 
Raschke, 289 Kan. at 921-22.  Further, like the forgery statute, there is no "waiver" provision in 
the DUI statute.  Under the fourth factor, the Court of Appeals has previously concluded the 
imposition of a DUI fine is mandatory.  State v. Wenzel, 39 Kan. App. 2d 194, 202-03, 177 P.3d 
14 
 
994 (2008), aff'd in part Phillips, 289 Kan. 28; State v. Segovia, 19 Kan. App. 2d 493, 494, 872 
P.2d 312 (1994); State v. Shuster, 17 Kan. App. 2d 8, 9, 829 P.2d 925 (1992).  In Raschke, this 
court stated:  "We agree with the reasoning of Shuster and Segovia and the most recent Court of 
Appeals' case examining a mandatory fine for driving under the influence and K.S.A. 21-4607, 
State v. Wenzel, 39 Kan. App. 2d 194, 202-03, 177 P.3d 994 (2008)."  Raschke, 289 Kan. at 924.  
Hence, the precedent of Wenzel, Segovia, and Shuster establishes a pattern of demonstrating the 
mandatory, not directory, nature of DUI fines. 
 
This leads to the conclusion that the word "shall" in K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 8-1567(g)(1) 
makes imposition of a $2,500 fine for a fourth or subsequent driving under the influence 
conviction mandatory, rather than directory.  As we concluded in Raschke, the specific, more 
recent requirement of a mandatory fine leaves no room for considering financial resources.  The 
district court was required to impose a $2,500 fine against Copes for her fourth DUI conviction 
and was not required to take into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature 
of the burden its payment will impose, per K.S.A. 21-4607(3), in deciding to impose the fine and 
in deciding the amount of the fine.  
 
Method of Payment 
 
There remains, however, a question of whether the district court was required to consider 
Copes' financial resources in determining the method of payment.  Again, K.S.A. 21-4607(3) 
states the district court "shall take into account the financial resources of the defendant and the 
nature of the burden that its payment will impose" when "determining the amount and method of 
payment of a fine."  (Emphasis added.)  The community service option provided in K.S.A. 2009 
Supp. 8-1567(j) creates an alternative method of payment.   
 
The impact of the community service option was not addressed by the Court of Appeals.  
Moreover, the parties had not addressed the provision until prompted to do so by this court's 
questions at oral argument.  Nevertheless, in applying a statute, courts are required to consider a 
statute as a whole.  See Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Beachner Const. Co., Inc., 289 Kan. 
15 
 
___, 221 P.3d 588 (2009).  Consequently, we cannot ignore K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 8-1567(j) and its 
grant of discretion to order payment of a DUI fine through community service.  
 
Where the amount of fine is discretionary, this court has required the district court to 
"state on the record that he or she has taken into account the financial resources of the defendant 
and the nature of the burden that payment of the fine will impose."  State v. McGlothlin, 242 
Kan. 437, 441, 747 P.2d 1335 (1988).  We see no reason to require a different procedure when 
the method of payment is discretionary.  In doing so, we recognize there are considerations other 
than ability to pay that are relevant to the determination of whether the public service option will 
be ordered.  Nevertheless, the existence of other factors influencing a court's discretion does not 
diminish a statutory requirement that a specific factor be considered.  In addition, the method of 
payment may be equally relevant to a district court's decision in situations where a monetary fine 
imposes little or no burden on a defendant; in such a case, the court might determine the 
commitment of time to community service is a more appropriate penalty.  Consequently, 
applying K.S.A. 21-4607(3) we hold that a district court must take into account the defendant's 
financial resources and the burden of the fine when considering the method of payment of a fine 
for a fourth or subsequent DUI offense, i.e., whether the defendant must pay a monetary fine or 
provide community service under K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 8-1567(j).  Contrary holdings in Wenzel, 39 
Kan. App. 2d 194; Segovia, 19 Kan. App. 2d 493; and Shuster, 17 Kan. App. 2d 8, are overruled. 
 
In summary, regardless of Copes' financial resources, the district court was correct to 
impose the entire $2,500 fine, a mandatory fine, for her fourth DUI conviction.  But the 
legislature clearly contemplated the notion of financial hardship or the burden of payment by 
allowing the discretionary imposition of community service (credit of $5 per hour) to offset the 
total amount due.  By failing to consider Copes' ability to pay and the burden the payment will 
impose on her, the district court bypassed the consideration of whether community service was 
an option for her.   
 
The Court of Appeals' decision affirming the district court is reversed and remanded.  
The district court's decision is reversed and remanded for consideration of Copes' financial 
16 
 
resources with respect to the amount of BIDS attorney fees she is required to pay and to the 
method of payment of her DUI fine.