Case Title: State v. Hairston

Citation: 2004-Ohio-969

Docket Number: 20021998

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. HAIRSTON, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969.] 
Criminal procedure — Indictment — R.C. 2941.401 does not require the 
prosecutor or the state to exercise reasonable diligence in locating an 
incarcerated defendant against whom charges are pending — R.C. 
2941.401, construed and applied. 
(No. 2002-1998 — Submitted November 19, 2003 — Decided March 17, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 01AP-1474. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶1} 
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether R.C. 2941.401 
places a duty of reasonable diligence on the state to discover the whereabouts of 
an incarcerated defendant against whom charges are pending. 
{¶2} 
Around 1:00 a.m. on September 27, 2000, two men, one of them 
holding a gun, burst through the back door of Ann and Mike’s Bar, shouting at 
everyone to stay still.  Richard Hairston, who had been seated at the bar, went 
behind the bar and into the kitchen. 
{¶3} 
Meanwhile, the bartender opened the cash register and the two 
men grabbed money from there and from a tip jar and then went into the kitchen 
and demanded more money.  The bartender testified that she had earlier removed 
excess cash from the cash register and had put it in a blue bag in the kitchen.  
When the robbers took her into the kitchen, she noticed that the blue bag was 
gone.  At that point, the two men left the bar. 
{¶4} 
The owner of the bar then locked the rear door while the bartender 
locked the front door and called the police.  Hairston, who could not get out 
because the doors had been locked, ran into the men’s restroom. 
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{¶5} 
Columbus police officer Dale Justice responded to the call, and the 
owner let him in and told him that one of the suspects was in the men’s restroom.  
Hairston then came out of the restroom, and Justice ordered him to the floor, 
handcuffed him, and patted him down for weapons.  The owner testified that as 
the officer lifted Hairston up, she noticed bundles of cash in Hairston’s waistband, 
which Justice retrieved and the owner identified as money that had been taken 
from the blue bag.  In addition, the blue bag was located hidden behind the tank of 
the toilet in the men’s restroom where Hairston had been hiding.  Justice then 
arrested Hairston. 
{¶6} 
The Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney proceeded by 
information charging Hairston with aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and two 
counts of robbery.  However, on October 6, the prosecutor dismissed those 
charges, anticipating a possible indictment.  On October 18, 2000, the grand jury 
returned indictments against Hairston on the same charges and filed them on 
October 25, 2000. 
{¶7} 
Because of the charges in the information, Hairston’s parole officer 
held an on-site parole revocation hearing and revoked his parole on October 24.  
A summons, sent to Hairston’s home on October 27 while he remained in the 
county jail, came back as unserved; thereafter, on October 31, 2000, Hairston was 
returned to the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.  
When Hairston did not appear at his arraignment on November 5, the trial court 
issued a capias for his arrest. 
{¶8} 
On June 12, 2001, the records supervisor at the Pickaway 
Correctional Institution delivered a detainer to Hairston advising him of the four 
charges from the October 2000 indictment.  According to affidavits, Hairston 
believed that those charges had been dismissed, and he claims that he did not 
know that they had been refiled by indictment.  He therefore filed a motion to 
dismiss, arguing that pursuant to R.C. 2941.401, the state had failed to exercise 
January Term, 2004 
3 
reasonable diligence to discover his whereabouts.  The trial court denied his 
motion and, after a bench trial, found him guilty of all charges. 
{¶9} 
The court of appeals reversed his convictions and remanded the 
matter with instructions to dismiss all charges against Hairston with prejudice. 
{¶10} The cause is now before us pursuant to our acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal.  We are called upon here to review the appellate court’s 
decision and to determine whether R.C. 2941.401 places a duty of reasonable 
diligence on the state to discover the whereabouts of an incarcerated defendant 
against whom criminal charges are pending. 
{¶11} “The object of judicial investigation in the construction of a statute 
is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law-making body which enacted 
it.”  Slingluff v. Weaver (1902), 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, paragraph one of 
the syllabus.  This court may engage in statutory interpretation when the statute 
under review is ambiguous.  Id. 
{¶12} “But the intent of the law-makers is to be sought first of all in the 
language employed, and if the words be free from ambiguity and doubt, and 
express plainly, clearly and distinctly, the sense of the law-making body, there is 
no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.  The question is not what 
did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it 
did enact.  That body should be held to mean what it has plainly expressed, and 
hence no room is left for construction.”  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶13} Therefore, the question for us to decide is whether R.C. 2941.401 
is ambiguous.  If it is ambiguous, we must then interpret the statute to determine 
the General Assembly’s intent.  If it is not ambiguous, then we need not interpret 
it; we must simply apply it.  See Sears v. Weimer (1944), 143 Ohio St. 312, 28 
O.O. 270, 55 N.E.2d 413, paragraph five of the syllabus (“An unambiguous 
statute is to be applied, not interpreted.”). 
{¶14} R.C. 2941.401 states: 
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{¶15} “When a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a 
correctional institution of this state, and when during the continuance of the term 
of imprisonment there is pending in this state any untried indictment, information, 
or complaint against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred 
eighty days after he causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney and the 
appropriate court in which the matter is pending, written notice of the place of his 
imprisonment and a request for a final disposition to be made of the matter * * *. 
{¶16} “* * * 
{¶17} “The warden or superintendent having custody of the prisoner shall 
promptly inform him in writing of the source and contents of any untried 
indictment, information, or complaint against him, concerning which the warden 
or superintendent has knowledge, and of his right to make a request for final 
disposition thereof. 
{¶18} “* * * 
{¶19} “If the action is not brought to trial within the time provided, 
subject to continuance allowed pursuant to this section, no court any longer has 
jurisdiction thereof, the indictment, information, or complaint is void, and the 
court shall enter an order dismissing the action with prejudice.” 
{¶20} This statute is not ambiguous.  Far from requiring the state to 
exercise reasonable diligence to locate an incarcerated defendant, R.C. 2941.401 
places the initial duty on the defendant to cause written notice to be delivered to 
the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court advising of the place of his 
imprisonment and requesting final disposition; the statute imposes no duty on the 
state until such time as the incarcerated defendant provides the statutory notice.  
Further, a warden or prison superintendent has a duty to inform the incarcerated 
defendant of charges only when the warden or superintendent has knowledge of 
such charges. 
January Term, 2004 
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{¶21} In applying the provisions of this statute to this case, as required by 
Sears v. Weimer, supra, we recognize that Hairston never caused the requisite 
notice of imprisonment and request for final disposition to be delivered to either 
the prosecuting attorney or the court; therefore, he never triggered the process to 
cause him to be brought to trial within 180 days of his notice and request.  
Further, the facts reveal that the warden had no knowledge of any of the charges 
pending against him. 
{¶22} Hairston, however, seeks to have us read a duty of reasonable 
diligence into the statute; to accept his interpretation, “this court must read into 
the statute language that does not exist.”  Middleburg Hts. v. Ohio Bd. of Bldg. 
Standards (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 510, 514, 605 N.E.2d 66.  We decline to do so.  
Had the legislature wanted to impose such a duty on the state in similar cases, it 
could have done so.  As our task is to apply unambiguous laws and not rewrite 
them, we decline to impose duties on prosecutors or courts not imposed by the 
legislature. 
{¶23} Hairston next compares R.C. 2941.401 with R.C. 2963.30 through 
2963.35, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”), which allows a 
defendant who is incarcerated in one state to notify other states that have charges 
pending against him of his whereabouts and to request those other states for final 
disposition.  Hairston argues that a duty of reasonable diligence under the IAD 
would be onerous because multiple states are involved.  He therefore rejects the 
state’s reliance on cases interpreting the IAD.  In contrast, he concludes that 
imposing a duty of reasonable diligence under R.C. 2941.401 on the state of Ohio 
as a collective entity is proper because only one state is involved. 
{¶24} Hairston’s argument is unpersuasive.  Both statutes unambiguously 
impose the initial duty upon the defendant to trigger action on the part of the state. 
{¶25} In its plainest language, R.C. 2941.401 grants an incarcerated 
defendant a chance to have all pending charges resolved in a timely manner, 
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thereby preventing the state from delaying prosecution until after the defendant 
has been released from his prison term.  It does not, however, allow a defendant to 
avoid prosecution simply because the state failed to locate him.  The facts here 
demonstrate that Hairston knew of his arrest, knew he had been apprehended in 
the bar, and knew that the police had removed from his waistband the money 
taken from the blue bag during the robbery.  He also knew that the prosecutor had 
charged him by information; despite this, he waited until June 2001 to seek to 
enforce R.C. 2941.401. 
{¶26} Accordingly, we hold that R.C. 2941.401 places a duty on an 
incarcerated defendant to “cause[] to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney and 
the appropriate court * * * written notice of the place of his imprisonment and a 
request for a final disposition to be made of the matter[]” and that the duty to 
bring such a defendant to trial within 180 days of the written notice and request 
arises only after receipt of that statutory notice. 
{¶27} We therefore reverse the judgment of the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals and remand the cause to that court for disposition of Hairston’s 
remaining assignments of error. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, LUNDBERG STRATTON and 
O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would affirm. 
__________________ 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 
Taylor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Donald C. Schumacher, for appellee. 
January Term, 2004 
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William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sherry F. 
McCreary, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney. 
 
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip D. 
Bogdanoff, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
______________________