Case Title: AUBREY LASHAWN LAWSON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0061

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-11-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
AUBREY LASHAWN LAWSON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 145Case Number: No. S-09-0061, S-09-0209, S-10Decided: 11/09/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

AUBREY 
LASHAWN LAWSON,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Alden.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Craig.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court; GOLDEN, J., files a specially 
concurring opinion.

 
 
 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1] 
A jury found Aubrey Lashawn Lawson guilty of possessing cocaine and 
methamphetamine with intent to deliver.  
He appeals, claiming the district court should have granted him a new 
trial because the prosecutor suppressed exculpatory evidence.  He also claims the prosecutor engaged in 
misconduct by soliciting false testimony.  
We affirm.  

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  Mr. Lawson presents two issues for this 
Court's determination:

 
 

I.              
Did 
the trial court improperly deny the new trial motion for Brady violations?

 
 

II.            
Did 
the prosecutor engage in misconduct by eliciting false 
testimony?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]   In January of 2008, a Cheyenne 
resident informed the police department of suspected drug activity at a nearby 
house.  Detective Russell Edwards 
began conducting surveillance of the residence and observed a high volume of 
traffic coming and going at all hours.  
Among those coming and going, Detective Edwards identified individuals 
known to law enforcement as drug users, some of whom had been involved in past 
drug investigations.  Among those 
residing at the home, he identified Mr. Lawson; his girlfriend, Amanda Torres; 
her sister, Robyne Varela; and Angila Bolton.    

 
 
[¶4]  On February 21, 2008, Detective Edwards 
spoke to a confidential informant, later identified as Ashley Plavsik, who was 
in the detention center at the time on grand larceny charges. She informed 
Detective Edwards that Ms. Torres had been selling methamphetamine and cocaine 
from the residence.  Ms. Plavsik 
said she had purchased cocaine from Ms. Torres on a daily basis between October 
and December of 2007.  She also 
indicated Ms. Torres kept controlled substances in a pink 
backpack.

 
 
[¶5]  After speaking with Ms. Plavsik, 
Detective Edwards learned that Mr. Lawson and the others had been evicted from 
the residence.  He subsequently 
learned they had moved to another Cheyenne neighborhood.  In March of 2008, Detective Edwards met 
with a second confidential informant (CI2), whose identity was never disclosed, 
who said Ms. Torres was the leader of a drug trafficking organization and the 
others, including Mr. Lawson, sold drugs for her.  CI2 claimed to have witnessed both Mr. 
Lawson and Ms. Bolton selling cocaine for Ms. Torres. 

 
 
[¶6]  During this time frame, two residents in 
the neighborhood contacted Detective Edwards to report suspected drug activity 
at the home occupied by Mr. Lawson and Ms. Torres.  Detective Edwards began surveillance and 
on one occasion observed Mr. Lawson and Ms. Torres in the front yard.  He saw Ms. Torres retrieve a pink 
backpack from a vehicle in the driveway and carry it into the 
residence.

 
 
[¶7]  On March 31, 2008, Detective Edwards saw 
a man leave the residence in a vehicle with a Nebraska registration.  Detective Edwards informed the patrol 
division and a few minutes later a patrol officer stopped the vehicle for a 
traffic violation.  A canine unit 
arrived at the scene and the dog alerted to a container inside the vehicle.   Inside the container, the patrol 
officer found 7 grams of methamphetamine and 1 gram of cocaine.  The driver of the vehicle was identified 
as Steven Giatroudakis.  He stated 
that he had gotten the drugs from Mr. Lawson and Ms. Torres approximately 15 
minutes before the traffic stop.  He 
also said Mr. Lawson and Ms. Torres had an additional 2 ounces of 
methamphetamine in their possession and had indicated they would be getting more 
early that morning.                  

 
 
[¶8]  After speaking with Mr. Giatroudakis, 
law enforcement obtained a warrant to search the residence in the early morning 
hours of April 1, 2008.  Upon 
entering one of the bedrooms, they found Ms. Torres in bed.  Mr. Lawson appeared to have just gotten 
up and was standing next to the bed.  
Under Ms. Torres' pillow, they found a pink backpack containing over 
$2,000.00.  Under the bed, they 
found zip-lock bags containing over 40 grams of cocaine and 7 grams of 
methamphetamine.  Near the bed on an 
entertainment center, they found a digital scale, spoons and a white 
residue.   They found more drug 
paraphernalia in other parts of the residence.  Law enforcement arrested Mr. Lawson, Ms. 
Torres, Ms. Bolton and Ms. Varela.  

 
 
[¶9]  Based upon the drugs found under the bed 
in the April 1, 2008, search, Mr. Lawson was charged with one count of 
possession with intent to deliver cocaine in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2009); one count of possession with intent to 
deliver methamphetamine in violation of the same statutory provision; one count 
of possession of cocaine in violation of § 35-7-1031(c)(ii); and one count of 
possession of methamphetamine also in violation of § 35-7-1031(c)(ii).  Prior to his trial, Mr. Lawson filed a 
demand for disclosure of all exculpatory or impeachment evidence known to the 
State.  Over the next four months, 
the State provided fifty-some pages of investigative reports to the 
defense.  

 
 
[¶10] 
The matter went to trial in October of 2008.  For its case, the prosecution relied on 
Ms. Plavsik and Mr. Giatroudakis to implicate Mr. Lawson in the drug 
activity.  Ms. Plavsik testified 
that she purchased cocaine between October and December of 2007, generally from 
Ms. Torres but also from Mr. Lawson.  
She testified that on two or three occasions, she traded items she had 
stolen at Mr. Lawson's request for cocaine.  She testified that one time Mr. Lawson 
asked her to steal a PlayStation 2 for him and gave her cocaine in 
exchange.  Another time she stole 
video games for him in exchange for cocaine.  Mr. Giatroudakis testified that he 
purchased methamphetamine from Mr. Lawson five or six times in the six months 
leading up to the traffic stop, search and his arrest.  He testified that on the night of his 
arrest, he purchased 7 grams of methamphetamine from Mr. Lawson and Mr. Lawson 
gave him a gram of cocaine. 

 
 
[¶11]  Mr. Lawson's sole defense was that he 
was not involved in the drug activity engaged in by his girlfriend, her sister 
and the others who shared the residence but lived in the house because he was in 
love with Ms. Torres.  Ms. Torres 
testified that Mr. Lawson never used, sold or even touched controlled substances 
and did not approve of her use of drugs or involvement in selling them.  Defense counsel called Ms. Plavsik to 
testify about a letter she wrote to Ms. Torres in April of 2008 stating that she 
and Ms. Bolton had obtained the cocaine found in the search from Mr. 
Giatroudakis and Ms. Bolton had hidden it under the bed.   In the letter, Ms. Plavsik stated 
she was sorry that Ms. Torres and Mr. Lawson "got caught up in all of this 
mess."  On cross-examination by the 
State, however, Ms. Plavsik testified that nothing she had written in the letter 
was true; Ms. Torres had asked her to write it and told her what to write.  She testified Ms. Torres obtained a 
similar letter from Ms. Bolton in which Ms. Bolton took responsibility for the 
cocaine found in the search.       

 
 
[¶12]  Other than Ms. Plavsik's letter and Ms. 
Torres' testimony, Mr. Lawson's defense focused on discrediting Mr. Giatroudakis 
and Ms. Plavsik, the only witnesses directly implicating him in the drug 
activity.  Through 
cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to show that Mr. Giatroudakis 
received favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony against Mr. 
Lawson.  Specifically, defense 
counsel questioned Mr. Giatroudakis about his plea agreement in which the 
prosecutor agreed to recommend dismissal of one of the counts against him.  Defense counsel also questioned Mr. 
Giatroudakis about the prosecution's agreement to the reduction of his bond from 
$15,000.00 to $100.00.  Defense 
counsel also attempted to show that despite having admitted to law enforcement 
that she had stolen 300 to 400 items of property valued at $100,000.00 in 
exchange for drugs, Ms. Plavsik had not been charged with any crime for those 
thefts.  

 
 
[¶13]  The jury found Mr. Lawson guilty on all 
four counts.  The district court 
concluded that counts I and III and counts II and IV merged and sentenced Mr. 
Lawson to two terms of two to four years in prison.  Mr. Lawson filed a notice of appeal. He 
subsequently filed a motion in district court to supplement the record on appeal 
to include copies of the documents the State had produced in discovery prior to 
trial.  The district court granted 
the motion.  

 
 
[¶14]  Mr. Lawson next filed a motion for new 
trial in district court in which he asserted that after his sentencing he had 
discovered a number of pieces of exculpatory and impeachment evidence the State 
had in its possession during or before the trial that it had not disclosed to 
him.  Mr. Lawson also asserted the 
prosecutor solicited false testimony from Mr. Giatroudakis concerning the nature 
of promises the prosecutor made to him in exchange for his testimony.  In a later pleading, Mr. Lawson 
identified the undisclosed exculpatory evidence as 
follows:

 
 

1.            
A 
report of police interviews of Ms. Varela and Ms. Torres on April 3 and 4, 2008, 
in which they stated the cocaine found under the bed during the search belonged 
to Ashley Plavsik and they had obtained the methamphetamine from someone named 
Chris Carney.   

 
 

2.            
A 
September 1, 2008, report relating to Mr. Giatroudakis' August 2008 arrest for 
possession of methamphetamine, after entry of his plea to the charge arising out 
of his April 1, 2008, arrest. 

 
 

3.            
A 
July 15, 2008, e-mail from the prosecutor to Ms. Bolton's defense counsel 
regarding the State's offer to recommend probation for her on the condition that 
she retract an earlier statement she had made indicating that she, and not Mr. 
Lawson, owned the drugs found at the residence.  

 
 

4.            
A 
November 10, 2008, e-mail from the prosecutor to Mr. Giatroudakis' defense 
counsel acknowledging that Mr. Giatroudakis had received promises of probation 
in exchange for his testimony against Mr. Lawson and had "performed 
satisfactorily." 

 
 

5.            
A 
page from the State's November 4, 2008, pretrial memorandum in State v. Torres stating that, if called, 
Chris Carney was expected to testify that he delivered approximately ¼ ounce of 
methamphetamine to Ms. Torres at the residence a short time before her 
arrest.   

 
 

6.            
A 
page from the State's November 4, 2008, notice of intent to introduce uncharged 
misconduct evidence in State v. 
Torres describing Mr. Carney's testimony concerning his delivery of 
methamphetamine to Ms. Torres the night before her arrest. 

 
 

7.            
A 
plea agreement in State v. 
Giatroudakis, in which the State agreed to recommend a suspended sentence 
with supervised probation in exchange for Mr. Giatroudakis' guilty plea to one 
count of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine and to dismiss a 
second charge in exchange for his testimony against Mr. Lawson.   

8.            
A 
page from a presentence investigation report in State v. Giatroudakis also reflecting 
the State's agreement to dismiss a charge against Mr. Giatroudakis in exchange 
for his testimony against Mr. Lawson and others.  

 
 

9.            
A 
plea agreement in State v. Bolton in 
which the State agreed to recommend first offender treatment in exchange for Ms. 
Bolton's guilty plea to felony possession of methamphetamine and her agreement 
to give a truthful factual basis for her plea.   

 
 

10.         
The 
transcript of Ms. Bolton's re-arraignment in which she testified that on the 
night of March 31, 2008, she was in possession of over 3 grams of 
methamphetamine, it was her methamphetamine and she had used part of it before 
the search.  

 
 

11.         
 Part of an affidavit of probable cause in 
State v. Torres suggesting that Ms. 
Torres owned the cocaine and methamphetamine found under the bed and stating 
confidential sources had identified her as the seller of methamphetamine and 
cocaine.    

 
 

12.         
 Part of an affidavit of probable cause in 
State v. Bolton attributing ownership 
of the methamphetamine and cocaine found in the residence to Ms. Bolton and 
stating that confidential informants had identified Ms. Bolton as having sold 
methamphetamine and cocaine.   

 
 
[¶15]  At the hearing on his motion, Mr. Lawson 
also asserted the prosecution improperly withheld evidence that in an April 15, 
2008, interview with the prosecution Ms. Bolton had admitted the methamphetamine 
seized at the residence on April 1, 2008, was hers and said Mr. Lawson did not 
use or sell drugs.  Mr. Lawson 
asserted the prosecution intentionally omitted those details from a report 
initially provided in discovery and had disclosed the full report only after 
securing a letter from Ms. Bolton in which she retracted her earlier statement 
that the drugs were hers.  Mr. 
Lawson also claimed the same day Ms. Bolton retracted her statement the 
prosecutor reduced the charges against her.  The very next day, Ms. Bolton entered a 
guilty plea to the reduced charges and, when asked to provide a factual basis 
for her plea, admitted the drugs were hers in direct contradiction to her 
retraction.  Mr. Lawson also 
asserted that the prosecutor had maintained during trial that Ms. Bolton had the 
right to assert her Fifth Amendment right not to testify without disclosing to 
the defense or the district court that Ms. Bolton had waived her Fifth Amendment 
right as part of her plea agreement.  
Mr. Lawson asserted, considered cumulatively, the undisclosed evidence 
supported his defense that the drugs belonged to others, provided further basis 
for impeachment of the State's witnesses and showed that some of the State's 
witnesses gave false testimony at trial.

 
 
[¶16]  After a hearing, the district court 
denied Mr. Lawson's motion.  While 
stating that it "would vastly have preferred that all of the evidence . . . have 
been made available to the defense in advance of trial," the district court 
determined that it could not conclude any material exculpatory evidence was 
suppressed.  The district court 
entered an order to that effect on July 22, 2009.  

 

[¶17]  On August 7, 2009, Mr. Lawson filed a 
motion for rehearing in which he asserted that after the district court's denial 
of his earlier motion, the State had disclosed another report containing 
exculpatory evidence.  The report 
was of an interview Detective Edwards conducted with an inmate in the Laramie 
County Detention Center in June of 2008, three months before Mr. Lawson's trial, 
who stated as follows:

 
 
[S]he 
was tired of all the lies and wanted to tell the truth about an investigation 
Detective Edwards had conducted on [her] boyfriend, Steven Giatroudakis.  [She] advised Giatroudakis had purchased 
methamphetamine from Amanda Torres  in the past and that [Mr.] Lawson was not 
involved. 

 
 
[¶18]  The district court convened a hearing on 
the motion.  Mr. Lawson presented 
three witnesses:  his trial counsel, 
the woman who made the above statement and Detective Edwards.  After hearing their testimony and the 
arguments of counsel, the district court concluded the evidence was not material 
or exculpatory and denied the motion.   

            

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 

1.    
Suppression 
of Exculpatory Evidence

 
 
[¶19]  Mr. Lawson asserts the prosecutor failed 
to disclose the documents identified in paragraphs 14 through 17 above and that 
those documents contained exculpatory evidence material to his defense.  We generally review a district court's 
denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.  Hicks v. State, 2008 WY 83, ¶ 30, 187 P.3d 877, 883 (Wyo. 2008).  However, 
an improper suppression of exculpatory evidence violates a defendant's 
constitutional right to due process, and constitutional issues are usually 
subject to de novo review.  Id.  Accordingly, we will review de novo the district court's decision to 
deny Mr. Lawson's motion for a new trial on the grounds that the State 
improperly suppressed exculpatory evidence.  Id. 

 
 

[¶20]  "The right to a fair trial, guaranteed 
to state criminal defendants by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, imposes on States certain duties consistent with their sovereign 
obligation to ensure that justice shall be done' in all criminal 
prosecutions."  Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, 173 L. Ed. 2d 701 (2009), citing United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976). 
 The 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to a defendant and material 
to his guilt violates due process.  
Hicks, ¶ 31, 187 P.3d  at 883, 
citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1963).  This is true irrespective of whether the 
prosecution acted in good or bad faith in suppressing the evidence.  Chauncey v. State, 2006 WY 18, ¶ 12, 127 P.3d 18, 21 (Wyo. 2006), citing United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 
(1985).  The rule exists to "ensure 
that a miscarriage of justice does not occur."  Brady, 373 U.S.  at 87, 83 S. Ct.  at 
1196-97.

 
 
[¶21]  In order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must 
demonstrate that the prosecution suppressed evidence, the evidence was favorable 
to the defendant, and the evidence was material.  Id.  Favorable evidence includes impeachment 
evidence.  Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 676, 105 S. Ct.  at 
3380; Davis v. State, 2002 WY 88, ¶ 
18, 47 P.3d 981, 986 (Wyo. 2002).  
Brady also extends to evidence 
gathered by investigating officers but not actually known to the 
prosecutor.  Id., ¶ 14, 47 P.3d  at 985.  Brady imposes an affirmative duty on the 
prosecutor to learn of favorable evidence in the State's control and divulge 
such evidence to the defendant.  Id.  However, Brady does not "automatically require a 
new trial whenever a combing of the prosecutor's files after the trial discloses 
evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have changed the 
verdict."  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 
154, 92 S. Ct. 763, 766, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972).  A finding that the undisclosed evidence 
is material is required.  Id.  

 
 
[¶22]  Evidence is material under Brady only when a reasonable probability 
exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the 
evidence been disclosed.  Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 682, 105 S. Ct.  at 
3383; Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 
15, 131 P.3d 348, 353 (Wyo. 2006).  
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome of the trial.  
Id.  When the defense makes a specific 
request and the prosecution fails to respond fully, the reviewing court may 
consider directly any adverse effect the failure to respond might have had on 
the preparation or presentation of the defendant's case.  Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 683, 105 S. Ct.  at 
3384.  "The reviewing court should 
assess the possibility that such effect might have occurred in light of the 
totality of the circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of 
reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the 
trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor's 
incomplete response." Id.  In judging materiality, the focus is on 
the cumulative effect of the withheld evidence, rather than on the impact of 
each piece of evidence in isolation.  
Id.; United States v. Nichols, 2000 U.S. App. 
Lexis 33183, 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 6735.  

 
 
[¶23]  A review of cases in which courts have 
considered whether a Brady violation 
occurred illustrates the fact dependent nature of the inquiry.  In Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 669-70, 105 S. Ct.  at 
3377, the defendant had filed a discovery motion requesting "any deals, promises 
or inducements made to witnesses in exchange for their testimony."  The Government did not disclose any 
deals, promises or inducements had been made to its principal witnesses, state 
law enforcement officers James O'Connor and Donald Mitchell, but did disclose 
affidavits signed by O'Connor and Mitchell describing their dealings with Bagley 
and concluding with the statement, "I made this statement freely and voluntarily 
without any threats or rewards, or promises of reward having been made to me in 
return for it."  Id.  Bagley was tried and 
convicted.

 
 
[¶24]  Bagley subsequently received copies of 
contracts O'Connor and Mitchell had signed entitled "Contract for Purchase of 
Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefor."  The contracts stated the undersigned 
would provide information and "upon receipt of such information" and "upon the 
accomplishment of the objective sought to be obtained by the use of such 
information to [its]  satisfaction ," the United States would pay "a sum 
commensurate with services and information rendered."  Id. at 671, 105 S. Ct.  at 3378.  According to a typewritten description 
added to each contract, O'Connor and Mitchell were to provide information 
concerning tobacco and firearms violations committed by Bagley and testify 
against him in court.  On a line 
entitled "Sum to be Paid to Vendor," the figure $300.00 was handwritten.  Id. 

 
 
[¶25]  Because the contracts were not disclosed 
to Bagley in pretrial discovery, he filed a motion to vacate his sentence 
alleging a Brady violation of his 
right to due process.  The Court 
concluded:

 
 
[T]here 
is a significant likelihood that the prosecutor's response to respondent's 
discovery motion misleadingly induced defense counsel to believe that O'Connor 
and Mitchell could not be impeached on the basis of bias or interest arising 
from inducements offered by the Government.  Defense counsel asked the prosecutor to 
disclose any inducements that had been made to witnesses, and the prosecutor 
failed to disclose that the possibility of a reward had been held out to 
O'Connor and Mitchell if the information they supplied led to "the 
accomplishment of the objective sought to be obtained  to the satisfaction of 
[the Government]."  This possibility 
of a reward gave O'Connor and Mitchell a direct, personal stake in respondent's 
conviction.  The fact that the stake 
was not guaranteed through a promise or binding contract, but was expressly 
contingent on the Government's satisfaction with the end result, served only to 
strengthen any incentive to testify falsely in order to secure conviction.  

 
 

Id. 
at 684, 105 S. Ct.  at 3384.  

 
 
[¶26]  More recently, in Cone, 129 S. Ct. 1769, the Court 
considered a claimed Brady violation 
in the context of evidence the State had withheld tending to support the 
defendant's insanity defense.  
Charged with two counts of first-degree murder, Cone's sole defense at 
trial was that he was not guilty by reason of insanity resulting from acute 
amphetamine psychosis.  Id. at 1772-73.  His defense was supported by the 
testimony of three witnesses:  his 
mother, who testified that after his service in Vietnam her son had changed, 
slept restlessly and sometimes yelled out in his sleep and began using drugs; a 
clinical psychologist, who testified that Cone's substance abuse and 
posttraumatic stress disorder from Vietnam rendered him substantially incapable 
of conforming his conduct to the law; and a neuropharmacologist, who testified 
that Cone's history of illicit drug use beginning in the Army had led to chronic 
amphetamine psychosis, a disorder manifested through hallucinations and paranoia 
that prevented him from obeying the law and appreciating the wrongfulness of his 
actions.  Id. at 1173-74.  The State's strategy was "to present Mr. 
Cone as a calculating, intelligent criminal who was fully in control of his 
decision and actions at the time of the crimes.  A key component of that strategy 
involved discrediting Cone's claims of drug use."  Id. at 1174.  To that end, the State presented expert 
and lay witnesses to establish that he was not addicted to drugs, including a 
former heroin addict with whom he had spent time a few months before the murders 
who testified that she no longer used drugs, stayed away from people who did, 
had never seen Cone use drugs and had never seen him show signs of 
paranoia.  The jury convicted Cone 
on all counts.

 
 
[¶27]  Subsequently, Cone learned about 
evidence the State possessed but had not disclosed, including statements by 
witnesses that he appeared "drunk or high," "acted real weird," and "looked wild 
eyed" in the two days before the murders, statements of police officials that he 
was a serious drug user, and undisclosed notes of a police interview with the 
former heroin addict showing discrepancies between her initial statement and her 
trial testimony.  Id. at 1783-84.   While taking exception to the 
appellate court's failure to assess the effect of the suppressed evidence 
collectively, rather than item by item, the Supreme Court concluded that even 
when assessed collectively, the suppressed evidence was not sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the verdict.  
The Court stated:

 
 
Cone's 
experts testified that his drug addiction and posttraumatic stress disorder 
originated during his service in Vietnam, more than 13 years before the 
[murders].  During those years, 
despite Cone's drug use and mental disorder, he managed to successfully complete 
his education, travel, and (when not incarcerated) function in civil 
society.  The suppressed evidence 
may have strengthened the inference that Cone was on drugs or suffering from 
withdrawal at the time of the murders, but his behavior before, during and after 
the crimes was inconsistent with the contention that he lacked substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law.  
The likelihood that the suppressed evidence would have affected the 
jury's verdict on the issue of insanity is remote.           

 
 

Id. 
at 1785.  The Court held the 
appellate court did not err by denying habeas relief on the ground that the 
suppressed evidence was immaterial to the jury's finding of guilt.1  

 
 

[¶28]  In a double homicide case, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals applied Brady to conclude its confidence in the 
outcome of the trial had been seriously undermined by the cumulative effect of 
evidence the prosecution had not disclosed.  Smith v. New Mexico Dep't of 
Corrections, 50 F. 3rd 801, 828 
(10th Cir. 1995).  Smith was convicted of first degree 
murder in the deaths of two women.  
At the time he was being investigated in connection with the deaths, law 
enforcement officials were also investigating another suspect, Randy Newell, the 
boyfriend or common law husband of one of the victims.  Id. at 810.  The prosecution did not disclose to 
Smith the investigative reports relating to Mr. Newell.  After a jury found Smith guilty of 
murder, he sought post-conviction relief claiming the prosecution violated Brady when it failed to disclose 
evidence relating to his defense that someone else committed the murders.  The 
specific evidence in question included women's clothing with what appeared to be 
blood stains taken from Mr. Newell's car a few days after the bodies were found; 
police reports indicating Mr. Newell's status as a suspect in the other 
investigation; Mr. Newell's presence on two separate occasions near the location 
where the bodies were found; Mr. Newell's use of "Randy" Newell as an alias for his true name, 
Samuel J. Newell; the prior conviction record of Samuel J. Newell and his status 
as a fugitive with an outstanding arrest warrant; and several statements Mr. 
Newell made to law enforcement personnel.  
Concluding that the undisclosed evidence "would have provided important 
investigative leads and impeachment evidence to the defense," "was highly 
probative with respect to Mr. Smith's defense at trial and could very well have 
resulted in an acquittal," and, considered cumulatively, undermined confidence 
in the outcome of the trial, the Court held Smith was denied his right to a fair 
trial.  Id. at 829, 833, 834, 835.  

 
 
[¶29]  In contrast to the result reached in Smith, themarker1fn0 
Tenth Circuit held in United States v. 
Nichols, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33183, 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 6735, that no Brady violation occurred when the 
prosecution failed to disclose sixty-two FBI documents prior to Nichols' trial 
for conspiring to bomb the Oklahoma City federal building.  Some of the documents concerned contacts 
co-defendant Timothy McVeigh had with known militia groups; others concerned 
Michael Fortier, who pleaded guilty to crimes related to the bombing; still 
others concerned a possible additional conspirator.  Id.  After reviewing the documents, the Court 
found that none of them cast doubt on Mr. Nichols' participation in the bombing; 
therefore, "[w]hen considered with the whole of the evidence, [they] bear 
insufficient probative value to suggest, if disclosed, they reasonably would 
have changed the outcome."  Id.       

 
 

[¶30]  This Court, like the United State 
Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, has addressed claims of Brady violations with varying results 
depending on the evidence at issue.  
In Davis, ¶ 
1, 47 P.3d  at 982, the defendant was convicted of delivery of and conspiracy to 
deliver methamphetamine.  At trial, 
the prosecution introduced a tape recording made by Morris, a confidential 
informant, of the transaction in which Davis allegedly participated in 
purchasing methamphetamine.  Id., ¶ 7, 47 P.3d  at 983.  Because Davis's voice could not be heard 
clearly on the recording, the crux of the State's case was the informant's 
testimony that the recorder malfunctioned and, although Davis's voice could not 
be heard, he had in fact participated in the delivery.  Id.  Thus, Morris's credibility was central 
to the State's case.  In addition to 
her testimony implicating Davis in the drug deal, the State solicited testimony 
from Morris that she was a recovering drug addict and wanted to change her life 
and escape from the drug world.   
Id., ¶ 9, 47 P.3d  at 
984.

 
 
[¶31]  After Davis's conviction and sentencing, 
another informant notified defense counsel that approximately a month before 
Davis's trial, she had recorded a conversation with Morris in the course of an 
unrelated investigation.  On the 
recording, Morris could be heard consuming methamphetamine and making statements 
indicating she was not a reformed drug addict trying to escape the drug 
world.  Id., ¶ 11, 47 P.3d  at 984.  At a hearing on Davis's motion for a new 
trial, the defense presented the tape recording of Morris and the informant 
testified that Morris had told her the recorder used in the earlier transaction 
had not malfunctioned; rather, she had deliberately turned it off.  Id., ¶ 12, 47 P.3d  at 
985.

 
 
[¶32]  On appeal from the district court's 
determination that no Brady violation 
occurred, this Court reversed, finding that the prosecution suppressed the tape 
of Morris, the tape was the only evidence the defense had to impeach the State's 
principal witness, and because no evidence other than Morris's testimony 
implicated Davis in the drug transaction, the undisclosed impeachment evidence 
was material.  Id., ¶ 14, 47 P.3d  at 986.   

 
 
[¶33]  More recently, we addressed a Brady claim in a case somewhat similar 
to Mr. Lawson's case.  In Chauncey, the State presented the 
testimony at trial of CS that she had purchased methamphetamine from Chauncey 
and his girlfriend at the home where they lived together.  CS testified that her initial 
conversations about methamphetamine were with the girlfriend, but that she spoke 
with Chauncey on the telephone about whether to come to the house to pick up the 
drugs and when she arrived at the house, he met her at the door and took her 
into a bedroom where the girlfriend told him to give her the methamphetamine. 
 Id., ¶ 6, 127 P.3d  at 20.  CS testified that she and Chauncey 
agreed on what looked like about a quarter-gram and she left the residence and 
was arrested a short time later after using part of the methamphetamine.  Id.  The defense relied on the girlfriend's 
testimony that she sold the methamphetamine to CS and Chauncey was not involved 
in the transaction.  Id., ¶ 10, 127 P.3d  at 21.  

 
 
[¶34]  The jury found Chauncey guilty of one 
count of delivery of, and one count of conspiracy to deliver, a controlled 
substance to a person under eighteen years of age.  Id., ¶ 11, 127 P.3d  at 19.  After the trial, Mr. Chauncey obtained 
two documents not disclosed previously:  
a summary of a DCI interview of CS in which she identified twenty-seven 
people to whom she or another woman, Leanne Richardson, had sold methamphetamine 
and a summary of a DCI interview of Richardson in which she stated she knew 
Chauncey, sometimes babysat his and the girlfriend's child, and never saw him 
sell any drugs.   Id., ¶ 15, 127 P.3d  at 22.  

 
 
[¶35]  On appeal to this Court from the 
district court's denial of his motion for new trial, we concluded that because 
the CS interview reflected the names of people she provided drugs to and not her 
sources for obtaining drugs it did not tend to prove that Chauncey was not 
involved in delivering controlled substances.  Id.  Responding to the argument that Davis controlled, we 
said:

 
 
            
This case presents a much different situation than Davis.  Whereas in Davis, Morris could not effectively be 
impeached without the suppressed information, in the instant case, CS's 
credibility was extensively challenged.  
*** Specifically, the jury had been told that CS was a "worldly young 
lady" who received special deals from methamphetamine dealers because she was 
able to set the dealers up with other buyers.  On direct and cross-examination, CS's 
past use of methamphetamine, marijuana, and cocaine was explored, as were her 
previous drug-related arrests and convictions and her difficulty abstaining from 
narcotics.  CS was also questioned 
about her mental state on the night in question, to which she replied that she 
had used methamphetamine earlier on October 27 and that night she was "[n]ot 
really high, but more just coming down."  
The appellant was also given extensive discovery materials that included 
statements by CS and another individual tending to show she was heavily involved 
in using and selling narcotics.  
Finally, the appellant had CS's testimony from [his girlfriend]'s trial 
which detailed CS's drug use and which was also used at the appellant's trial to 
impeach CS.

 
 

Id., 
¶ 20, 127 P.3d  at 23.  We 
concluded:  

 
 
Where, 
as in the instant case, a witness for the State has been exhaustively impeached, 
both generally and as to the specific issue addressed by the suppressed 
evidence, we do not believe that one additional piece of cumulative information 
makes the verdict unworthy of confidence.        

 
 

Id., 
¶ 21, 127 P.3d  at 24.  With these 
fact specific applications of Brady 
in mind, we turn to consideration of Mr. Lawson's claim.

 
 
[¶36]  Mr. Lawson has identified thirteen 
documents that the State did not disclose to him.  The documents vary in kind but fall 
mostly into two categories:  
documents providing support for Mr. Lawson's claim that he was not 
involved in drug activity and documents providing information he could have used 
to impeach the State's witnesses.  
The documents falling into the first category include the interview 
statements of Ms. Varela and Ms. Torres that they had obtained the 
methamphetamine found under the bed from Mr. Carney, and Ms. Plavsik had left 
the cocaine at the residence.  Also 
included are pages from the court file in State v. Torres indicating that Mr. 
Carney delivered methamphetamine to Ms. Torres the night before her arrest, she 
owned the drugs found under the bed and confidential sources had identified her 
as selling methamphetamine and cocaine.  Similarly, a page from the court file in 
State v. Bolton attributed ownership 
of the drugs to Ms. Bolton and stated that confidential informants had 
identified her as selling methamphetamine and cocaine.  Another document falling into the first 
category is the statement of the detention center inmate and girlfriend of Mr. 
Giatroudakis that she was tired of all the lies and wanted to tell the truth, 
Mr. Giatroudakis had purchased methamphetamine from Ms. Torres in the past and 
Mr. Lawson was not involved with illegal drugs. 

 
 
[¶37]  Mr. Lawson also makes much of reports 
Detective Edwards prepared of an April 15, 2008, interview of Ms. Bolton.  In its initial discovery responses, the 
prosecution produced a partial report of the interview, dated April 23, 2008, 
which stated only that Detective Edwards and the prosecution met with Ms. Bolton 
and her attorney and Ms. Bolton made statements concerning four children who 
lived in the Lawson/Torres residence, two of whom were Ms. Torres' children, and 
slept in the room where the drugs were found.  Nearly three months later, and six weeks 
before trial, the prosecution disclosed another report dated August 6, 2008, 
reflecting that Ms. Bolton also had stated during the April 15, 2008, interview 
that she had started using methamphetamine when she was thirteen years old, she 
began selling it in January of 2008, her primary source for the drug was Mr. 
Giatroudakis and she had sold methamphetamine to Ms. Plavsik approximately 
twenty times.  The later report also 
indicated Ms. Bolton had said during the interview that the drugs found under 
Ms. Torres' and Mr. Lawson's bed on April 1, 2008, were hers, she and Ms. 
Plavsik had stolen them from Mr. Giatroudakis the night before and she hid them 
under the bed so no one would steal them.  
Additionally, the report indicated Ms. Bolton stated during the interview 
that Mr. Lawson did not use or sell drugs.   

 
 
[¶38]  The State offers no explanation for the 
two reports but asserts that, rather than being inconsistent with Detective 
Edwards' earlier report, the second report merely sets forth in more detail Ms. 
Bolton's statements during the interview.  Although the reports raise serious 
questions about the State's actions, the issue presented for this Court's 
determination is whether the prosecution's failure to disclose the full report 
of the Bolton interview until six weeks before trial constitutes a Brady violation.  As we have said,    

 
 
[t]he 
essence of Brady is the discovery of 
information after the trial, which was known to the prosecution but unknown to 
the defense during the trial. . . . Thus, where exculpatory evidence is 
discovered during the trial and defense counsel has the opportunity to use it in 
cross-examination, closing argument, or other parts of the defense case, courts 
generally do not find a due process violation.

 
 

Thomas, 
¶ 16, 131 P.3d  at 353.  Given that 
the defense had the full report of the Bolton interview six weeks before trial, 
we conclude there was no Brady 
violation with respect to the Bolton interview documents.      

 
 
[¶39]  The second category of undisclosed 
documents includes pages from the State 
v. Giatroudakis court file and e-mails between Mr. Giatroudakis' defense 
counsel and the prosecutor.  In an 
undisclosed e-mail to Mr. Giatroudakis' counsel, the prosecutor 
stated:

 
 
On 
Docket 29-889, the agreement was for probation due to his helping the police and 
for agreeing to testify against others.  
He held-up his end of that deal by testifying against Aubrey Lawson.  I think [Mr. Giatroudakis'] cooperation 
was very helpful and he's done a good job.  
I think that finishes that docket for now.

 
 
Additionally, 
the undisclosed documents include a presentence investigation report (PSI) 
stating that a plea agreement was filed in August of 2008, two months before Mr. 
Lawson's trial, in which Mr. Giatroudakis agreed to plead guilty to possessing 
methamphetamine with intent to deliver and provide testimony against Mr. Lawson 
in exchange for the State's agreement to dismiss one charge and recommend a 
suspended sentence with four years supervised probation on the second 
charge.  The undisclosed documents 
also include the actual plea agreement in which the prosecutor agreed to 
recommend the disposition described in the PSI.    The documents also include 
Detective Edwards' report of Mr. Giatroudakis' arrest in August of 2008 while he 
was out on bond on the April charges. 

 
 
[¶40]  In addition to its failure to disclose 
the documents concerning Mr. Giatroudakis' plea agreement, Mr. Lawson contends 
his due process right was violated when the prosecutor solicited false testimony 
from Mr. Giatroudakis that there was no plea agreement.  At trial, during the prosecutor's 
re-direct examination of Mr. Giatroudakis, the following exchange 
occurred:

 
 
Q. 
[By the prosecutor] . . .  [Defense 
counsel] was inquiring about your recent drug conviction . . . you were 
convicted of what?

 
 
A.  I was convicted of selling and 
delivering methamphetamine.

 
 
Q.  How many times?

 
 
A.  One.

. 
. . .

            
[Prosecutor]:  May I have 
just a moment, Your Honor?

 
 
         
The Court:  You 
may.

 
 
Q.  (By [the prosecutor])      Mr. Giatroudakis, [defense 
counsel]  and I have to admit I maybe didn't follow it exactly  but I believe 
he was inquiring about some type of arrangement with the State with your 
charges.  I mean, is there a deal 
somehow?

 
 
A.  Not that I know of, 
no.

 
 
[¶41]  In addition to this testimony and the 
undisclosed documents pertaining to Mr. Giatroudakis' plea agreement, the 
prosecution did not disclose e-mails and court documents concerning the 
disposition of the charges filed against Ms. Bolton as a result of the April 1, 
2008, search.  In mid-July of 2008, 
Ms. Bolton's attorney and the prosecutor exchanged e-mails concerning a 
potential plea agreement on the charges against Ms. Bolton.  The prosecutor's e-mail reflects that 
Ms. Bolton's "complete, truthful cooperation (including testifying) about her 
knowledge [of] and involvement in drug trafficking and associated crimes would 
mean the difference between a recommended imposed sentence and a recommendation 
for probation for her."  The e-mail 
further reflects that the prosecutor "would also expect [Ms. Bolton] to explain 
that she was not honest" when she stated in the April 15 interview that the 
drugs found in the April 1 search were hers.  On August 22, 2008, in accordance with 
the prosecutor's expectation, Ms. Bolton provided a written statement in which 
she said her earlier statements that the drugs found under the bed were hers and 
she had stolen them from Mr. Giatroudakis were not true.    

 
 
[¶42]  On September 3, 2008, the prosecution 
and Ms. Bolton entered into a plea agreement in which the State agreed to 
recommend first offender treatment, including two years probation, in exchange 
for Ms. Bolton's guilty plea to felony possession of methamphetamine and her 
agreement to give a truthful factual basis for her plea.  Contrary to the earlier e-mail, however, 
the plea agreement did not condition the recommendation for first offender 
treatment on Ms. Bolton's agreement to testify.  On the same day she signed the plea 
agreement Ms. Bolton appeared in district court for re-arraignment and entered a 
plea of guilty to the charge of felony possession of methamphetamine.  As the factual basis for her plea, Ms. 
Bolton testified that on the night she was arrested following the search she was 
in possession of over 3 grams of methamphetamine and the methamphetamine seized 
in the search of the residence was hers.  
The prosecution did not disclose the plea agreement or a transcript of 
the re-arraignment proceedings prior to Mr. Lawson's trial.      

 
 
[¶43]  Had Ms. Bolton testified at Mr. Lawson's 
trial, the circumstances surrounding her inconsistent statements, plea agreement 
and change of plea might have been helpful to his defense.  However, Ms. Bolton invoked her Fifth 
Amendment right not to incriminate herself and did not testify.  Mr. Lawson complains that at the same 
time the prosecution was supporting Ms. Bolton's right to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment the prosecution knew, and did not disclose to the defense or the 
district court, that she had given up that right as part of her plea 
agreement.  The plea agreement, 
however, does not reflect any agreement by Ms. Bolton to testify.  It states only that she agreed to give a 
factual basis for her plea.  While 
her agreement to testify may have been discussed during the plea negotiations, 
it does not appear that it was part of the actual plea agreement.  In any event, Ms. Bolton exercised her 
right not to testify and the district court ruled that she could not be required 
to testify.  The district court 
further ruled that Ms. Bolton's statements during the April 15 interview were 
not admissible because there was no corroborating evidence of their 
trustworthiness.  Because Mr. Lawson 
does not challenge the district court's rulings on those issues, we do not 
address them.  

 
 
[¶44]  Having described the undisclosed 
documents, we consider them cumulatively to determine whether the prosecution's 
failure to disclose them undermines our confidence in the outcome of the trial. 
The undisputed evidence showed Mr. Lawson lived in a house where significant 
drug activity was ongoing, all of the other residents, including Mr. Lawson's 
girlfriend, were intimately involved with drugs, and drugs and drug 
paraphernalia were found in the room and under the bed where Mr. Lawson 
slept.  Photographs the State 
introduced into evidence clearly showed a digital scale, two spoons and a white 
substance on a red entertainment center located in the bedroom occupied by Mr. 
Lawson.  Other photographs showed 
Ziploc bags found between the mattress where Mr. Lawson slept and a chest at the 
end of the bed.  The State presented 
evidence through Ms. Plavsik that Mr. Lawson had direct involvement in drug 
trafficking. Although her knowledge of his involvement was limited to the 
October through December 2007 time frame, and she did not implicate him directly 
in possessing the drugs found under the bed in April of 2008, Ms. Plavsik's 
testimony provided support for the State's case that Mr. Lawson was involved in 
drug activity.  Mr. Giatroudakis' 
statements to law enforcement prior to the search of the residence that he 
obtained the drugs from Mr. Lawson and Ms. Torres further supported the case 
against Mr. Lawson.   

 
 
[¶45]  The undisclosed statements of Ms. Torres 
and Ms. Varela that the drugs were theirs and of Mr. Giatroudakis' incarcerated 
girlfriend that Mr. Lawson was not involved with drugs were cumulative of 
evidence that was disclosed, i.e., Ms. Bolton's interview statement that Mr. 
Lawson did not use or sell drugs, and also of evidence the defense presented at 
trial, i.e., Ms. Torres' testimony that Mr. Lawson was not involved.  While the undisclosed evidence may have 
strengthened Mr. Lawson's defense that he was not involved in the drug activity, 
the likelihood that it would have changed the jury's verdict is remote.  The photographs the State introduced 
into evidence and Ms. Plavsik's testimony were strong evidence of Mr. Lawson's 
involvement.  This was not a 
situation like Smith in which 
evidence implicating another suspect necessarily exculpated Mr. Lawson.  The situation more closely resembled Nichols and Chauncey, in which the courts concluded 
evidence of the involvement of  others did little to cast doubt on the 
particular defendant's involvement.  
While some of the documents supported the inference that Ms. Torres or 
Ms. Bolton may have been the principal participants in the drug activity and the 
primary focus of the investigation, they are similar to the undisclosed evidence 
in Chauncey in that they do not tend 
to prove that Mr. Lawson was not involved in drug activity.  Given the circumstantial evidence that 
he lived in a home where drug activity was common place, and slept in a bedroom 
where drugs and drug paraphernalia were found hidden and in open view, the 
prosecution's failure to disclose evidence supporting Mr. Lawson's defense does 
not undermine our confidence in the verdict.  

 
 
[¶46]  Turning to the impeachment evidence, 
there is no question the undisclosed evidence would have been useful to Mr. 
Lawson in his efforts to impeach Mr. Giatroudakis and Ms. Bolton if she had 
testified.  However, the undisclosed 
evidence concerning Mr. Giatroudakis' plea agreement did not induce the defense 
to believe he could not be impeached as happened in Bagley.  Instead, as in Chauncey, the defense challenged Mr. 
Giatroudakis' credibility.  The jury 
heard testimony about his history of using and selling drugs.  He testified that he was addicted to 
drugs.  He testified he had sold 
methamphetamine to different people probably forty to fifty times beginning in 
December of 2007.  He testified 
about his 1999 felony conviction for taking indecent liberties with a minor. He 
testified that his most recent arrest was for possession of, and possession with 
intent to deliver, methamphetamine.  
He testified that when the police stopped him on April 1, 2008, he lied 
and tried to run away.    

 
 

[¶47]  The record is clear that during 
re-direct examination, the prosecutor solicited testimony from Mr. Giatroudakis 
that he did not know of any deal with the State with regard to the charges filed 
against him.  However, the jury also 
heard him testify on cross-examination that he had a plea agreement with the 
State to plead guilty to the delivery count in exchange for the prosecutor's 
agreement to dismiss the possession count and recommend probation.  Mr. Giatroudakis also testified that his 
original bond of $15,000.00 was reduced and he only had to pay $100.00 to get 
out of jail.  Thus, the jury heard 
evidence from which it could infer that the only witness directly implicating 
Mr. Lawson in the April 2008 drug activity had received favorable treatment from 
the State for his admitted criminal conduct.  Yet, the jury remained persuaded that 
Mr. Lawson was involved in drug trafficking.  Given that the jury heard evidence from 
which it might have concluded Mr. Giatroudakis was testifying falsely for his 
own benefit, we simply are not persuaded, as the Tenth Circuit was in Smith, that 
the undisclosed evidence "would have provided important investigative leads and 
impeachment evidence to [the defense]," "was highly probative with respect to 
Mr. [Lawson]'s defense at trial and could very well have resulted in an 
acquittal."  Smith, 50 F.3d  at 829, 833.  

 
 
 
 

2.    
Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

 
 
[¶48]  In his second issue, Mr. Lawson contends 
the prosecutor committed misconduct when she solicited false testimony from Mr. 
Giatroudakis that there was no deal.  
Defense counsel did not object at trial to the prosecutor's question or 
the witness's response.  In the 
absence of an objection, we review the claim for plain error.  Conine v. State, 2008 WY 146, ¶ 11, 197 P.3d 156, 160 (Wyo. 2008).  In order 
to establish plain error, Mr. Lawson must show:  1) the alleged error clearly appears in 
the record; 2) the error transgressed an unequivocal rule of law in a clear and 
obvious way; and 3) the error adversely affected Mr. Lawson's substantial right 
resulting in material prejudice to him.  

 
 
[¶49] 
The first prong of the plain error test is satisfied.  The error Mr. Lawson alleges clearly 
appears in the record.  The trial 
transcript reflects that the prosecutor solicited testimony from Mr. 
Giatroudakis that there was "no deal" concerning the charges against him when in 
fact a plea agreement existed in which the State dismissed one charge and 
recommended probation on the second charge in exchange for Mr. Giatroudakis' 
guilty plea and testimony against Mr. Lawson.  

 
 

[¶50]  Turning to the second prong, the United 
States Supreme Court has said:  
deliberate 
deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is 
incompatible with rudimentary demands of justice. Giglio, 
405 U.S.  at 153-54, 92 S. Ct.  at 766, citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 
(1935).  The 
same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, 
allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.  Id., citing Napue 
v. Illinois, 
360 U.S. 264 (1959).  In light of 
the evidence the defense uncovered after the trial of a plea agreement in which 
Mr. Giatroudakis agreed to plead guilty to the delivery charge, the State agreed 
to recommend probation, Mr. Giatroudakis agreed to provided testimony in Mr. 
Lawson's case and the State agreed to dismiss the possession charge, Mr. 
Giatroudakis' testimony that there was no deal that he knew of was false.  The prosecutor not only solicited the 
false testimony but allowed it to go uncorrected.  Mr. Lawson has shown that the error 
transgressed an unequivocal rule of law in a clear and obvious way.      

 
 

[¶51]  Under the third prong of the plain error 
test, a new trial is required if "the false testimony could . . . in any 
reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury . . ."  Id.  
Applying 
these principles in Giglio, where 
Taliento, the prosecution's principal witness, testified falsely that there was 
no agreement of leniency in exchange for his testimony, the Court stated:   

 
 
Here 
the Government's case depended almost entirely on Taliento's testimony; without 
it there could have been no indictment and no evidence to carry the case to the 
jury. Taliento's credibility as a witness was therefore an important issue in 
the case, and evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future 
prosecution would be relevant to his credibility and the jury was entitled to 
know of it. 

 For 
these reasons, the due process requirements enunciated in Napue and the 
other cases cited earlier require a new trial.

 
 

Id. 
 at 154-55.

 
 
[¶52]  In contrast to the situation in Giglio, the jury was aware through 
defense counsel's cross examination of Mr. Giatroudakis that he had a plea 
agreement with the State.  
Additionally, in contrast to Giglio, the State's case against Mr. 
Lawson did not depend entirely on Mr. Giatroudakis' testimony.  In addition to the circumstantial 
evidence that Mr. Lawson was involved in drug activity, Ms. Plavsik testified 
that Mr. Lawson asked her to steal items for him in exchange for drugs.  Thus, even without Mr. Giatroudakis, the 
State had evidence to support the charges against Mr. Lawson and take the case 
to the jury.  While Mr. 
Giatroudakis' credibility as a witness was an important issue, and the 
prosecutor knowingly committed misconduct in soliciting and failing to correct 
the false testimony concerning his plea agreement, Mr. Lawson has not shown that 
it materially prejudiced him.2    

 
 

[¶53]  In concluding that Mr. Lawson has not 
shown that he is entitled to a new trial for due process violations under Brady or Giglio, we do not condone the 
prosecution's failure to disclose the documents at issue or its solicitation of 
false testimony.  It appears clear 
from this record that document disclosure did not occur as required and false 
testimony was solicited in contravention of our rules of ethics. While 
transgressions of this sort should not occur in the courts of this State, 
the 
aim of due process "is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor 
but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused." Brady, 373 U.S.  at 87, 83 S. Ct.  at 1197.  Moreover,

 
 
[T]he 
constitutional obligation [to disclose unrequested information] is [not] 
measured by the moral culpability, or willfulness, of the prosecutor. If 
evidence highly probative of innocence is in his file, he should be presumed to 
recognize its significance even if he has actually overlooked it. Conversely, if 
evidence actually has no probative significance at all, no purpose would be 
served by requiring a new trial simply because an inept prosecutor incorrectly 
believed he was suppressing a fact that would be vital to the defense. If the 
suppression of the evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of 
the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor. 

 
 

Agurs, 
427 U.S.  at 110, 96 S. Ct.  at 2401 (footnote and citation omitted).  The task at hand is not punishment of 
the prosecutor, but to determine whether Mr. Lawson was materially 
prejudiced.  Given Mr. Giatroudakis' 
testimony that he had a plea agreement and the evidence implicating Mr. Lawson 
in the drug activity, we conclude Mr. Lawson has not shown material 
prejudice.  In reaching this result, 
however, we remind prosecutors that when they solicit false testimony or fail to 
disclose exculpatory evidence they not only fail in their duty and risk 
otherwise justifiable convictions, but expose themselves to the charge that they 
have violated Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8.

 
 

[¶54]  Affirmed.

 
 
  
 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice, specially concurring.

 
 
[¶55]   This opinion encompasses three 
consolidated appeals before this Court.  
I believe that each appeal should be affirmed.  I write separately because the majority 
opinion fails to distinguish between the three appeals.  This failure results in an improper 
analysis.  

 
 
[¶56]   The three appeals must be treated 
separately, with a focus on the issues appropriate to each appeal.3  I note that this is difficult because 
Lawson's appellate brief does not treat the appeals separately.  He fails to set forth specific issues 
for each appeal.  He then provides 
only one analysis without identifying to which appeal it applies.  Because the majority opinion has 
accepted Lawson's brief for consideration, I will also do so.  It is not my intent to engage in what I 
believe is the appropriate analysis on the merits.  My purpose is simply to lay out what I 
consider to be the proper approach to deciding these 
appeals.

 
 
[¶57]   As stated, each appeal must be 
addressed separately.  Appeal No. 
S-09-0061 is an appeal from the Judgment and Sentence of the district court 
filed on February 6, 2009.  After 
reviewing Lawson's brief, I find no argument presented that applies to the trial 
or other proceedings underlying that Judgment and Sentence.  I would therefore summarily affirm 
Appeal No. S-09-0061.

 
 
[¶58]   Appeal No. S-09-0209 arises from 
Lawson's Motion for New Trial that was filed on June 15, 2009.  As stated in the majority opinion, 
generally Lawson complained of certain exculpatory and impeachment evidence the 
State did not disclose before or during trial, as well as allegedly false 
testimony solicited by the prosecutor during trial.  In his appellate brief, Lawson presents 
argument that numerous Brady 
violations occurred (as further explained in the majority opinion).  Lawson also presents argument regarding 
the alleged prosecutorial misconduct in soliciting false testimony.  A review of Lawson's appellate brief, 
therefore, reveals that his argument is directly related to the district court's 
denial of this motion for a new trial.4  As such, this Court is required to 
engage in an analysis of the proceedings underlying that denial.  The proceedings included a full 
evidentiary hearing on Lawson's motion, after which the district court found 
that no Brady violation had occurred 
and also that the prosecutor had not solicited false testimony. The review by 
this Court should be of the district court's findings using the appropriate 
standards of review.5  

 
 
[¶59]   Turning to Appeal No. S-10-0001, 
this appeal is from an order denying a second new trial motion that was entered 
on September 30, 2009.  Lawson based 
his underlying motion on an alleged new Brady violation by the State.  The district court held a full 
evidentiary hearing, after which it held that the newly discovered evidence 
brought to its attention did not meet the materiality or exculpatory 
requirements of Brady.  Lawson's appellate brief addresses the 
newly discovered evidence that was at issue at this hearing.  Therefore, there is at least one issue 
to be analyzed within the context of this appeal.

 
 
[¶60]   If each appeal were analyzed 
independently as I believe should be done, the analysis would be considerably 
different.  Most importantly, 
different standards of review would be applied.  However, in the end, I am convinced by 
my own review that the ultimate result reached in the majority opinion is 
correct.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Addressing the question of whether the suppressed evidence was material 
in the sentencing phase of Cone's case, a question not at issue in Mr. Lawson's 
case, the Court concluded neither the district court nor the appellate court 
fully considered the issue.  Because 
the suppressed evidence "may well have been material to the jury's assessment of 
the proper punishment," i.e. life in prison versus a death sentence, the Court 
remanded to the district court for a full review of the suppressed evidence and 
its effect on the sentence.  Id. at 1786.  

 
 

2Mr. 
Lawson presented his claim of prosecutorial misconduct to the district court in 
his motion for new trial, which motion the district court denied.  In claiming on appeal that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct by soliciting and failing to correct false 
testimony, Mr. Lawson makes no argument that the district court abused its 
discretion in denying his motion for new trial. To the extent his argument on 
appeal incorporates by implication an abuse of discretion claim, we conclude the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial 
based upon prosecutorial misconduct.  
That is, from the evidence before it, including Mr. Giatroudakis' 
testimony on cross-examination that he had a plea agreement with the State, the 
district court reasonably could have concluded there was not a reasonable 
likelihood that his later false testimony could have affected the jury's 
judgment.       

 
 

3Consolidation of the appeals in this instance was done for the purpose of 
judicial economy.  Consolidation 
does not change the independent nature of each appeal.  See generally 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 784 
(2007).

 
 

4The majority opinion analyzes the prosecutorial misconduct allegation as 
a trial error.  It applies a plain 
error standard of review to this claim because the testimony allegedly elicited 
by the prosecutor was not objected to at trial.  Logically, Lawson could not have 
objected to the testimony at trial since he did not know it was false until he 
received the belated disclosure of the plea agreement materials from the 
State.  Thus, the issue lies firmly 
within Appeal No. S-09-0209 and not Appeal No. 
S-09-0061.

 
 

5In general, the standard of review on a motion for new trial is an abuse 
of discretion.  However, as the 
majority opinion points out, an alleged Brady violation is reviewed de 
novo.  Davis v. State, 2002 WY 88, ¶ 16, 47 P.3d 981, 985-86 (Wyo. 2002); Lacey v. 
State, 803 P.2d 1364, 1368-69 (Wyo. 1990).