Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID PERKINS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 126727

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 29, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 126727 
DAVID MICHAEL PERKINS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
PER CURIAM 
We granted leave in this case to consider two issues 
involving MCL 750.224f, which sets forth restrictions 
concerning the possession1 of firearms by persons having 
been convicted of a felony. 
The first is whether larceny 
from the person is a “specified felony” for the purposes of 
MCL 750.224f(6)(i), thus subjecting defendant to more 
stringent requirements in order to regain his right to 
possess a firearm. 
We conclude that larceny from the 
1 Although we mention only possession in this opinion,
MCL 750.224f does not pertain only to the possession of
firearms, but also to the use, transportation, sale, 
purchase, carrying, shipping, receiving, or distribution of
firearms. 
 
 
 
 
 
person involves a substantial risk that force will be used 
during its commission and, therefore, hold that it is a 
specified felony. 
The second issue is whether the prosecution is always 
required to show that a person convicted of a specified 
felony has not had his or her right to possess a firearm 
restored pursuant to MCL 750.224(2)(b), or whether the 
prosecution’s burden to disprove restoration only arises if 
the 
defendant 
first 
introduces 
evidence 
that 
the 
defendant’s right to possess a firearm has been restored. 
We conclude, on the basis of MCL 776.20 and People v 
Henderson, 391 Mich 612, 616; 218 NW2d 2 (1974), that the 
defendant has the burden of producing evidence to establish 
that his or her right to possess a firearm has been 
restored. 
Once the defendant meets this burden of 
production, the prosecution bears the burden of persuasion 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In this case, defendant failed 
to produce evidence that his firearm rights were restored, 
and the prosecution thus was not required to prove the lack 
of restoration. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1977, defendant David M. Perkins was convicted of 
the felony offense of larceny from the person in violation 
of MCL 750.357. 
In 2001, Perkins was involved in an 
2  
 
 
 
                                                 
altercation where he pointed a gun at another person, and, 
in the subsequent struggle, the gun discharged. 
As a 
result, Perkins was charged with, among other things,2 being 
a felon in possession of a firearm (felon in possession) in 
violation of MCL 750.224f(2). 
This statute makes it a 
crime for a person who has been convicted of a “specified 
felony”-one that either involves a substantial risk of, or 
contains as an element the threatened, attempted, or actual 
use of, physical force against a person or property–to 
possess a firearm until that person has had the right to 
possess a firearm restored pursuant to MCL 28.424 and 
fulfilled certain other requirements. 
The trial court, after a bench trial, concluded that 
the 1977 conviction for larceny from the person was a 
specified felony and, thus, MCL 750.224f(2) could apply to 
Perkins. 
Moreover, the court construed the statute as 
requiring the prosecution to prove that Perkins’s right to 
possess a firearm had not been restored only if Perkins 
first affirmatively produced evidence that his right to 
possess had been restored by a proper concealed weapons 
licensing board. 
Therefore, the trial court convicted 
2 Defendant was also charged with felonious assault in
violation of MCL 750.82, and possession of a firearm while
committing or attempting to commit a felony in violation of
MCL 750.227b. 
These charges are not at issue in this
appeal. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
Perkins of the offense because he had not produced any such 
evidence, thus relieving the prosecution of the burden of 
proving that Perkins’s right to possession had not been 
restored. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed.3
 It concluded that 
larceny from the person constitutes a specified felony 
within the meaning of MCL 750.224f, and that a defendant 
must present evidence of a claimed restoration of the right 
to possess a firearm before the prosecution’s burden of 
proving a lack of restoration arises. 
We granted defendant’s application for leave to 
appeal.4 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case involves issues of statutory construction. 
These are issues of law that we review de novo. 
People v 
Koonce, 466 Mich 515, 518; 648 NW2d 153 (2002). 
When 
interpreting statutes, our goal is to give effect to the 
intent of the Legislature by reviewing the plain language 
of the statute. Id. 
III. LARCENY FROM THE PERSON IS A “SPECIFIED FELONY” 
3 People v Perkins, 262 Mich App 267; 686 NW2d 237
(2004). 
4 471 Mich 914 (2004). 
4  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MCL 
750.224f5 
places 
felons 
in 
two 
different 
5 This statute provides, in part: 
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a
person convicted of a felony shall not possess,
use, transport, sell, purchase, carry, ship,
receive, or distribute a firearm in this state
until the expiration of 3 years after all of the
following circumstances exist: 
(a) The person has paid all fines imposed 
for the violation. 
(b) The person has served all terms of 
imprisonment imposed for the violation. 
(c) The person has successfully completed
all conditions of probation or parole imposed for
the violation. 
(2) A person convicted of a specified felony
shall 
not 
possess, 
use, 
transport, 
sell,
purchase, carry, ship, receive, or distribute a
firearm in this state until all of the following
circumstances exist: 
(a) The expiration of 5 years after all of
the following circumstances exist: 
(i) The person has paid all fines imposed 
for the violation. 
(ii) The person has served all terms of
imprisonment imposed for the violation. 
(iii) The person has successfully completed
all conditions of probation or parole imposed for
the violation. 
(b) The person’s right to possess, use,
transport, sell, purchase, carry, ship, receive,
or 
distribute 
a 
firearm 
has 
been 
restored 
pursuant to section 4 of Act No. 372 of the
Public Acts of 1927, being section 28.424 of the
Michigan Compiled Laws. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
categories. 
The first category consists of persons 
convicted of a “felony.” 
These persons regain their right 
to possess a firearm three years after paying all fines 
imposed for their violations, serving all jail time 
imposed, and successfully completing all conditions of 
parole or probation. MCL 750.224f(1). The second category 
consists of persons convicted of a “specified felony.” 
These persons must wait five years after completing the 
same requirements and, moreover, must have their right to 
possess a firearm restored. MCL 750.224f(2). 
The 
term 
“specified 
felony” 
is 
defined 
in 
MCL 
750.224f(6), which provides: 
As 
used 
in 
subsection 
(2), 
“specified
felony” means a felony in which 1 or more of the
following circumstances exist: 
(i) An element of that felony is the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person or property of another,
or that by its nature, involves a substantial
risk that physical force against the person or 
property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense. 
(ii) An element of that felony is the 
unlawful manufacture, possession, importation, 
exportation, distribution, or dispensing of a 
controlled substance. 
(iii) An element of that felony is the 
unlawful possession or distribution of a firearm. 
(iv) An element of that felony is the 
unlawful use of an explosive. 
6  
 
 
 
                                                 
(v) The felony is burglary of an occupied
dwelling, or breaking and entering an occupied
dwelling, or arson. [Emphasis added.] 
The prosecution in this case has neither alleged that 
an element of larceny from the person is “the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 
the person or property of another,” MCL 750.224f(6)(i), nor 
that any of the criteria in subsections ii through v apply 
in this case. 
Therefore, the inquiry is whether larceny 
from the person is a crime that “by its nature, involves a 
substantial risk that physical force against the person or 
property of another may be used in the course of committing 
the offense.” We hold that it does. 
The crime of larceny from the person consists of a 
larceny effectuated by “stealing from the person of 
another.”6  The defendant acknowledges that there is a risk 
of force inherent in the crime of larceny from the person 
because of the potential for the victim to notice the 
taking of his or her personal property and use force to 
prevent it.7
 However, he claims that such a risk is not 
substantial. We disagree. 
6 MCL 750.357. 
7 At oral argument, defense counsel stated, “I 
certainly don’t dispute that there’s a risk in any larceny
from a person because of the requirement that the larceny
has to occur either from the person or near the person,
there is a risk. . . . As I said, there is always a risk,
(continued…)
7 
 
 
                                                 
 
“Substantial” is defined as “of ample or considerable 
amount, quantity, size, etc.” 
Random House Webster’s 
College Dictionary (1995). Therefore, the issue is whether 
larceny 
from 
the 
person 
by 
its 
nature 
involves 
a 
substantial or considerable risk that physical force will 
be used. 
We believe that it does. 
In order to commit a 
larceny from the person, the defendant must steal something 
from a person in that person’s presence. 
That is, the 
victim must be present when the defendant steals something 
from the victim. Unless the victim submits to the theft or 
does not notice the theft, physical force will almost 
certainly be used in response.8
 As the Court of Appeals 
explained: 
(…continued) 
and nobody could deny there is always a risk in larceny 
from a person that violence may occur.”  
8 Justice Cavanagh posits that “every felony” involves
a risk of force. 
Post at 2 
However, Justice Cavanagh
fails fully to appreciate that not all felonies require the
defendant to steal something from the victim’s presence. 
Because a defendant must steal something from the victim’s
presence in order to commit a larceny from the person, a
larceny from the person does not just pose a risk of force,
it poses a substantial risk of force. 
Justice Cavanagh also contends that, if detected, a 
perpetrator could “choose to avoid confrontation if it
becomes apparent that force or the threat of force must be
used to complete the intended act.” 
Post at 3. 
However,
if the perpetrator chooses to abandon the attempt to steal
the property from the victim once detected, the perpetrator
has not committed a larceny from the person. 
In order to 
commit a larceny from the person, the perpetrator would, in
(continued…)
8 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
[T]he offense of larceny from a person is 
separated from other larceny offenses because it
is committed in the immediate presence of another
person. 
The “Legislature decided that larceny
from a person presents a social problem separate
and apart from simple larceny.” 
Specifically,
“the invasion of the person or immediate presence
of the victim.” 
Because a person whose property
is stolen from his presence may take steps to
retain possession, and the offender may react
violently, we conclude that the offense of 
larceny from a person, “by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the 
course of committing the offense.” 
We therefore 
hold that larceny from a person is a specified
felony within the meaning of MCL 750.224f. 
[Perkins, 
supra 
at 
272 
(citations 
omitted;
emphasis in the original).] 
That the Legislature has recognized that larceny from 
the person involves a substantial risk of physical force is 
demonstrated by the different punishments that it has 
chosen to impose for larceny9 and larceny from the person. 
If a defendant10 steals property from another outside the 
person’s presence and the property is worth less than 
$1,000, the defendant is only guilty of a misdemeanor. MCL 
(…continued)
all likelihood, have to use force or the threat of force to
steal the property from the victim. 
Therefore, a larceny
from the person involves more than a “mere potential” of 
force or threat of force; post at 2, rather, it involves a
“substantial” risk of force or threat of force. 
9 A larceny is committed when one steals the property
of another outside the person’s presence. MCL 750.356. 
10 All of the following hypothetical examples involve a
defendant who does not have any prior larceny convictions. 
9  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
750.356(4)(a).11  If the property is worth less than $200, 
the defendant cannot be imprisoned for more than ninety­
three days. 
MCL 750.356(5).12
 On the other hand, if the 
same defendant steals the same property directly from the 
person, the defendant can be imprisoned for ten years. 
A 
defendant who steals property from a person outside the 
person’s presence can only face a ten-year sentence if the 
property is worth $20,000 or more. 
MCL 750.356(2)(a). 
That the Legislature has chosen to subject a defendant who 
steals property from a person in that person’s presence to 
a ten-year sentence, regardless of the value of the 
property, and has chosen to subject a defendant who steals 
property worth less than $200 from a person outside that 
person’s 
presence 
to 
a 
ninety-three-day 
sentence 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
Legislature 
recognized 
the 
substantial risk of force that is involved when one steals 
something from somebody’s person, a risk that is absent 
when one steals something outside the person’s presence.13 
11 A defendant who steals property from another outside
the person’s presence is only guilty of a felony if the
property is worth $1,000 or more. 
MCL 750.356(2)(a) and
(3)(a). 
12 If the property is worth $200 or more, but less than
$1,000, the defendant cannot be imprisoned for more than
one year. MCL 750.356(4)(a). 
13 Although it is not necessary to our analysis, we
note that the federal courts have held that larceny from
(continued…)
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Therefore, we hold that larceny from the person is a 
“specified felony” under MCL 750.224f(6)(i). 
IV. THE DEFENDANT BEARS THE BURDEN OF PRODUCING EVIDENCE THAT THE  
DEFENDANT’S FIREARM RIGHTS HAVE BEEN RESTORED  
Subsection 
2 
of 
the 
felon-in-possession 
statute 
prohibits a person convicted of a specified felony from 
possessing 
a 
firearm 
“until” 
certain 
conditions 
are 
satisfied. 
MCL 750.224f(2). 
One of the conditions set 
forth in the statute is that the defendant’s right to 
possess a firearm must have been legally restored. 
MCL 750.224f(2) provides: 
A person convicted of a specified felony
shall 
not 
possess, 
use, 
transport, 
sell,
purchase, carry, ship, receive, or distribute a
firearm in this state until all of the following
circumstances exist: 
(a) The expiration of 5 years after all of
the following circumstances exist: 
(i) 
The person has paid all fines imposed
for the violation. 
(ii) 
The person has served all terms of
imprisonment imposed for the violation. 
(iii) The person has successfully completed
all conditions of probation or parole imposed for
the violation. 
(…continued)
the person is a “crime of violence” for the purpose of the
federal sentencing guidelines, which define a crime of
violence as a crime that “involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”
USSG 4B1.2(a)(2); United States v Payne, 163 F3d 371, 375
(CA 6, 1998). 
11  
 
 
 
 
(b) The person’s right to possess, use,
transport, sell, purchase, carry, ship, receive,
or 
distribute 
a 
firearm 
has 
been 
restored 
pursuant to section 4 of Act No. 372 of the
Public Acts of 1927, being section 28.424 of the
Michigan Compiled Laws. [Emphasis added.] 
Thus, the statute provides that a person convicted of 
a specified felony may not possess a firearm “until” all 
the listed circumstances exist. 
Specifically, the felon 
may not possess a firearm “until” (1) five years have 
expired from the payment of all fines, the service of all 
terms of imprisonment, and the successful completion of all 
conditions of probation or parole, and (2) the person’s 
right to possess a firearm has been restored. 
In this 
case, as noted in our discussion of the first issue, the 
prosecution established that the defendant was convicted of 
a specified felony and that he possessed a firearm. 
The question remains, however, whether the prosecution 
must prove that the defendant’s possession of the firearm 
occurred before the restoration of firearm rights where, as 
here, the defendant produced no evidence that his firearm 
rights had been restored. 
In answering this question, we 
must consider MCL 776.20, which states: 
In any prosecution for the violation of any
acts of the state relative to use, licensing and
possession of pistols or firearms, the burden of
establishing any exception, excuse, proviso or
exemption contained in any such act shall be upon
the defendant but this does not shift the burden 
of proof for the violation.
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  
 
It appears that the Legislature enacted this statute 
in response to People v Schrader, 10 Mich App 211, 217; 159 
NW2d 147 (1968). 
In People v Jiminez, 27 Mich App 633, 
635; 183 NW2d 853 (1970), the Court of Appeals stated: 
Prior to 1968, we would have given serious
consideration to such an objection. 
People v
Schrader (1968), 10 Mich App 211. 
However, in
that year, the legislature took notice of our
decisions holding that it was the burden of the
prosecutor to prove that the defendant did not
come 
within 
a 
statutory 
exception. 
The 
legislature responded by enacting a law [MCL
776.20] which held that, in trials for carrying
concealed weapons, the burden is on the defendant
to 
show 
that 
he 
comes 
within 
one 
of 
the 
exemptions.[14] 
The broad language used in MCL 776.20 plainly extends 
to the felon-in-possession statute, MCL 750.224f, because 
it 
is 
a 
statute 
regarding 
the 
use, 
licensing, 
and 
possession of firearms. 
We must therefore give effect to 
the plain language of MCL 776.20 requiring the defendant to 
establish “any” exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption 
14 We disagree with Justice Kelly’s assertion that MCL
776.20 cannot alter what the prosecution has to prove in
order to obtain a conviction under MCL 750.224f. 
Post at 
18. The Legislature has the authority to change the law if
it wishes, and this is what it did by enacting MCL 776.20.
After 
its 
enactment, 
MCL 
776.20 
was 
controlling.
Moreover, contrary to Justice Kelly’s statements, MCL 
776.20 never altered MCL 750.224f because it predated it.
This fact also undercuts Justice Kelly’s rule of lenity and
due process arguments because, when enacted, MCL 750.224f
had to be read as fitting into the legal context already
created by MCL 776.20. 
13  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
contained in any statute “relative to use, licensing and 
possession” of firearms. 
In applying the text of MCL 776.20, we adhere to this 
Court’s interpretation in Henderson. 
In Henderson, this 
Court considered the effect of MCL 776.20 in a prosecution 
for carrying a pistol in a motor vehicle in violation of 
MCL 750.227. 
The issue was whether the prosecution or the 
defendant bore the burden of establishing whether the 
defendant had a license to carry a pistol. 
After 
considering the text of MCL 776.20, this Court concluded 
that the defendant bore the burden of producing evidence 
regarding 
licensure, 
while 
the 
prosecution 
bore 
the 
ultimate 
burden 
of 
persuasion.15
 
Specifically, 
the 
Henderson Court stated: 
Accordingly, we hold that upon a showing
that a defendant has carried a pistol in a 
vehicle operated or occupied by him, [a] prima
facie case of violation of the statute has been 
made out. Upon the establishment of such a prima
facie case, the defendant has the burden of 
injecting the issue of license by offering some 
proof–not necessarily by official record—that he
has been so licensed. 
The people thereupon are
obliged to establish the contrary beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
[Henderson, supra at 616 
(emphasis added).] 
15 Justice Kelly asserts that Henderson “cannot be 
correct” because it would mean that there are only two, not
three, elements to the crime of carrying a concealed weapon
in a vehicle. 
Post at 21-22. 
We are puzzled by this
argument because we know of no requirement for a minimum,
or a maximum, number of elements. 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The interpretation set forth in Henderson accords with 
the well-established principle that “[c]ourts must give 
effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute, and 
must avoid an interpretation that would render any part of 
the statute surplusage or nugatory.” 
Koontz v Ameritech 
Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). 
The 
Henderson Court gave effect to the entirety of MCL 776.20. 
By recognizing that the defendant bore the burden of 
producing or going forward with evidence that he was 
licensed, the Henderson Court gave effect to the statutory 
phrase “the burden of establishing any exception, excuse, 
proviso or exemption contained in any such act shall be 
upon the defendant . . . .” 
And by concluding that the 
prosecution bore the ultimate burden of persuasion beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the Henderson Court avoided rendering 
nugatory the phrase “but this does not shift the burden of 
proof for the violation.”16 
We thus adhere to the framework established in 
Henderson. 
Like 
the 
firearms 
offense 
considered 
in 
16 While it is not necessary to our analysis, we note
that the majority of courts in other states that have
considered this issue has similarly allocated at least the
burden of production regarding the lack of license to the
defendant. See Anno: Burden of proof as to lack of license
in criminal prosecution for carrying or possession of 
weapon without license, 69 ALR3d 1054. 
15  
 
 
 
 
Henderson, the offense of felon in possession falls within 
the strictures of MCL 776.20 requiring the defendant to 
establish “any exception, excuse, proviso or exemption 
. . . .”  We may consult dictionary definitions of terms 
that are not defined in a statute. 
Koontz, supra at 312. 
The 
dictionary 
definition 
of 
the 
term 
“proviso” 
is 
instructive. 
A “proviso” is “an article or clause that 
introduces a condition: stipulation.” 
Webster’s Seventh 
New Collegiate Dictionary (1967). MCL 750.224f(2) contains 
a clause that introduces conditions that must be met before 
a person convicted of a specified felony may possess a 
firearm. 
Specifically, the five-year period from the 
specified events described in the statute must have 
expired, and the felon’s firearm rights must have been 
restored. 
Until those conditions are satisfied, the felon 
may not possess a firearm. 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
felon-in-possession 
statute 
contains a proviso. Thus, we are bound to follow the plain 
language 
of 
MCL 
776.20 
and 
the 
analytic 
approach 
established in Henderson. 
Defendant here produced no evidence to establish that 
his right to possess a firearm had been restored. 
Because 
defendant failed to meet his burden of production, the 
prosecution 
was 
not 
required 
to 
prove 
the 
lack 
of 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
restoration of firearm rights beyond a reasonable doubt. 
MCL 776.20; Henderson, supra at 616. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We conclude that larceny from the person is a crime 
that carries a substantial risk that physical force will be 
used or threatened against another. 
Therefore, we agree 
with the Court of Appeals that it qualifies as a specified 
felony under MCL 750.224f(6)(i). 
Also, a defendant bears the burden of producing 
evidence to establish that his or her right to possess a 
firearm has been restored, in light of MCL 776.20 and this 
Court’s decision in Henderson. 
Because defendant failed 
to meet his burden of production in this case, the 
prosecution 
was 
not 
required 
to 
prove 
the 
lack 
of 
restoration of firearm rights beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 126727 
DAVID MICHAEL PERKINS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
KELLY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
We granted leave to appeal in this case to address two 
questions: 
(1) whether larceny from a person is a 
“specified felony” for the purposes of MCL 750.224f(6)(i) 
and (2) whether, under MCL 750.224f(2)(b), the lack of 
restoration of the right to possess a firearm is an element 
of the offense. 471 Mich 914 (2004). 
With regard to the first question, I believe that 
larceny from a person is a specified felony. 
Therefore, I 
concur in the result of the majority opinion on this issue. 
With respect to the second question, I believe that the 
lack of restoration of the right to possess a firearm is an 
element of the offense of felon in possession (possession 
of 
a 
firearm 
by 
someone 
convicted 
of 
a 
felony). 
Accordingly, I would hold that, to secure a conviction, the 
prosecution must show the lack of restoration of that 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
right. 
MCL 750.224f. 
Consequently, I dissent from the 
portion of the majority opinion dealing with that issue. 
I would affirm in part the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, reverse it in part, and vacate defendant’s 
convictions and sentences. 
I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant was arrested after a dispute involving a 
firearm. 
He was charged with felonious assault,1 felon in 
possession,2 and possession of a firearm when committing or 
attempting to commit a felony (felony-firearm).3 
The court acquitted him of the assault charge, 
concluding that, at the time of the offense, he was too 
intoxicated to formulate the intent necessary for the 
crime. 
Defendant stipulated that he had been convicted in 
1977 of larceny from a person. 
MCL 750.357. 
The court 
convicted him of the two firearm charges. 
It ruled that 
defendant’s admissions of the 1977 felony conviction and of 
possessing a firearm provided sufficient evidence to 
convict him of the offense of felon in possession. 
1 MCL 750.82. 
2 MCL 750.224f. 
3 MCL 750.227b. 
2  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed4 the trial 
court’s rulings stating: 
“The prosecutor must prove that 
the defendant’s right to possess a firearm has not been 
restored only if the defendant produces some evidence that 
his right has been restored.” 
Id. at 271. 
It also 
concluded 
that 
larceny 
from 
a 
person 
constitutes 
a 
specified felony within the meaning of MCL 750.224f. 
It 
reasoned: 
Because a person whose property is stolen
from his presence may take steps to retain 
possession, and the offender may react violently,
we conclude that the offense of larceny from a
person, “by its nature, involves a substantial 
risk that physical force against the person or 
property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.” 
[Id. at 272, quoting
MCL 750.224f(6)(i) (emphasis in original).] 
We granted leave to appeal. 
II. FELONIES AND SPECIFIED FELONIES 
Both questions before this Court involve issues of 
statutory construction. 
Hence, we review them de novo. 
People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 308-309; 684 NW2d 669 
(2004). 
The first question is whether larceny from a 
person is a specified felony under the felon-in-possession 
statute. MCL 750.224f. 
4 People v Perkins, 262 Mich App 267; 686 NW2d 237
(2004). 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
statute 
divides 
felonies 
into 
two 
types, 
“felonies” and “specified felonies.” A person convicted of 
a “felony” can legally possess a firearm three years after 
(a) completing all terms of imprisonment imposed for the 
violation, (b) paying all fines imposed for the violation, 
and (c) completing all conditions of probation or parole. 
MCL 750.224f(1). 
A person convicted of a “specified felony” must 
satisfy the same requirements and must obtain restoration 
of the right to possess a firearm pursuant to MCL 28.424. 
Also, the person must wait five years after completion of 
the statutory requirements, as compared to three years for 
other felonies. 
The Legislature defines “specified felony” in MCL 
750.224f(6). It provides: 
As 
used 
in 
subsection 
(2), 
“specified
felony” means a felony in which 1 or more of the
following circumstances exist: 
(i) An element of that felony is the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person or property of another,
or that by its nature, involves a substantial
risk that physical force against the person or 
property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense. 
(ii) An element of that felony is the 
unlawful manufacture, possession, importation, 
exportation, distribution, or dispensing of a 
controlled substance. 
(iii) An element of that felony is the 
unlawful possession or distribution of a firearm.
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(iv) An element of that felony is the 
unlawful use of an explosive. 
(v) The felony is burglary of an occupied
dwelling, or breaking and entering an occupied
dwelling, or arson. [Emphasis added.] 
All parties agree that subsections ii through v do not 
apply to this case. 
Therefore, to constitute a specified 
felony, defendant’s 1977 conviction of larceny from a 
person must fall within the definition in subsection i. 
The use, attempted use, and threatened use of force 
are not elements of larceny from a person. 
In fact, the 
absence of force and the absence of the threat of force are 
what distinguish larceny from a person from robbery. 
People v Randolph, 466 Mich 532, 544; 648 NW2d 164 (2002). 
But subsection i includes more crimes than just those 
in which force is an element. 
It includes crimes that, by 
their nature, involve a substantial risk of the use of 
force. 
III. A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF FORCE 
In this case, defense counsel conceded at oral 
argument that larceny from a person involves a risk that 
force will be used. 
However, he asserted that the risk is 
not “substantial.” 
“Substantial” is defined as “of ample or considerable 
amount, quantity, size, etc.” 
Random House Webster’s 
College Dictionary (2001). 
The question becomes whether,
5 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
during the commission of a larceny from a person, there is 
an “ample or considerable amount” of risk that force will 
be used. 
The 
statute 
prohibiting 
larceny 
from 
a 
person 
provides: 
Any person who shall commit the offense of
larceny by stealing from the person of another 
shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by 
imprisonment in the state prison not more than 10
years. [MCL 750.357 (emphasis added).] 
Hence, larceny from a person requires direct contact with 
the victim. 
The perpetrator must take personal property 
from the victim while it is in the victim’s possession. 
This increases the risk that force will be used. 
A 
perpetrator is obliged to use force or threaten the use of 
force to obtain the property unless the victim willingly 
submits to or remains ignorant of the theft.5  Larceny from 
a person quickly evolves into robbery when force is 
employed to complete the theft. 
Physical force may be used during the commission of 
many felonies, especially if the perpetrator is caught in 
5 Justice Cavanagh argues that the perpetrator could
abort the attempt to obtain the property when it becomes
apparent that he may need to use or threaten force to
obtain the property. 
But if the perpetrator aborts the
attempt to obtain the property, larceny from a person will
not be committed. I center my analysis on what may occur
if the perpetrator does not abort the attempt. Under those 
circumstances, I believe that the risk of force is 
“substantial.” 
6  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
the act. 
However, the risk that force will be used during 
a larceny from a person is considerably greater than the 
risk of force in many other felonies. 
This is because the 
crime, by its nature, is often confrontational and always 
involves the presence of the victim. 
Its perpetration 
requires either direct contact with or the actual presence 
of the victim. 
Also, the risk of detection is heightened. 
With an ample risk of confrontation and detection comes an 
ample risk of the use or threatened use of force to 
complete the crime.6
 Therefore, larceny from a person 
involves a “substantial” risk of the use or threat of 
physical force. 
Additionally, the very structure of the larceny 
statute, 
when 
compared 
with 
the 
larceny-from-a-person 
statute, 
supports 
a 
conclusion 
that 
the 
Legislature 
recognized 
that 
larceny 
from 
a 
person 
involves 
a 
substantial risk that force will be used. 
The general 
larceny statute7 allocates punishment according to the value 
of the property taken. 
For example, if the property is 
6 Justice Cavanagh notes that almost every felony runs
some risk of the use of force. 
But his analysis does not
consider the fact that larceny from a person requires
contact with or the presence of the victim every time the
crime is committed. 
This distinguishes it from many
felonies that can be committed without the victim being in
harm’s way. 
7 MCL 750.356. 
7  
 
 
 
 
valued at from $200 to $1,000, the thief is guilty of a 
misdemeanor punishable by as much as one year in jail, a 
$2,000 fine, or both. 
MCL 750.356(4). 
But if it has a 
value of from $1,000 to $20,000, the crime is a felony 
punishable by as much as five years’ imprisonment, a 
$10,000 fine, or both. MCL 750.356(3). 
This contrasts with larceny from a person, which 
abandons a gradation of punishment. 
The defendant is 
subject to a possible ten years in prison without regard to 
the value of the property stolen. MCL 750.357. 
The only difference between the crimes of larceny and 
larceny from a person is the presence of the victim. 
Without question, the possibility of harm to the victim is 
greater 
if 
the 
property 
is 
taken 
from 
his 
person. 
Consequently, it appears that the threat to the victim was 
of greater concern to the Legislature than the loss of the 
property, and hence, it provided a greater penalty for 
larceny from a person. 
The 
magnitude 
of 
the 
difference 
in 
penalties 
demonstrates just how seriously the Legislature viewed the 
risk of force against the victim of a larceny from a 
person. 
If the value of the property taken in a normal 
larceny is less than $200, the defendant is subject to no 
more than ninety-three days in jail. But, if the defendant 
takes that same property directly from a person, he is
8 
 
 
 
 
 
guilty of a felony and subject to potentially ten years in 
prison. MCL 750.356(5); MCL 750.357. 
The only logical reason for the great difference in 
penalties is that a significant danger exists that force 
will be used, injuring the victim of a larceny from a 
person. 
Therefore, the Legislature viewed that crime as 
involving a substantial risk that physical force will be 
employed against another. This qualifies it as a specified 
felony under MCL 750.224f(6)(i). 
IV. RESTORATION OF RIGHTS IS AN ELEMENT OF MCL 750.224f(2) 
A. THE LANGUAGE AND STRUCTURE OF MCL 750.224f(2) 
Section 2 of the felon-in-possession statute indicates 
the circumstances under which a person convicted of a 
specified felony may possess a firearm. 
MCL 750.224f(2). 
One of the requirements contained in that statute is that 
the defendant must have had his right to possess a firearm 
legally restored. 
But in this case, the prosecution argues that it need 
not show that restoration has not occurred in order to 
establish the elements of the crime. 
Rather, it asserts 
that it is defendant who bears that burden. 
Neither the 
9  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
language nor the structure of the statute supports the 
prosecution’s contention.8 
MCL 750.224f(2) provides: 
A person convicted of a specified felony
shall 
not 
possess, 
use, 
transport, 
sell,
purchase, carry, ship, receive, or distribute a
firearm in this state until all of the following 
circumstances exist: 
(a) The expiration of 5 years after all of
the following circumstances exist: 
(i) The person has paid all fines imposed 
for the violation. 
(ii) The person has served all terms of
imprisonment imposed for the violation. 
(iii) The person has successfully completed
all conditions of probation or parole imposed for
the violation. 
(b) The person’s right to possess, use,
transport, sell, purchase, carry, ship, receive,
or 
distribute 
a 
firearm 
has 
been 
restored 
pursuant to section 4 of Act No. 372 of the
Public Acts of 1927, being section 28.424 of the
Michigan Compiled Laws. [Emphasis added.] 
8 I would hold that the prosecution must show the lack
of restoration contingent on its failure to show that (1)
five years have not passed since all fines were paid, (2)
five years have not passed since all jail time was served,
or (3) five years have not passed since the defendant
successfully completed all conditions of probation or 
parole. 
The prosecution would have the option of carrying
its burden on only one of the four subparts of MCL 
750.224f(2). 
Once it proves one of the four, it need not
go further. 
Therefore, I believe that the Legislature
intended the prosecution to choose which element of MCL
750.224f(2) to address. 
But the contingent nature of the
element should not change on whom the burdens of production
and persuasion lie. 
10  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
In interpreting MCL 750.224f(2), our goal is to give 
effect to the Legislature’s intent. 
People v Koonce, 466 
Mich 515, 518; 648 NW2d 153 (2002). 
We start with the 
language of the statute itself. 
The language of MCL 
750.224f(2) demonstrates a clear intent to include among 
the prosecution’s proofs a showing that the right to 
possess a firearm was not restored to the defendant. 
B. CREATION OF AN EXCEPTION BY USE OF THE TERM “UNLESS” 
The Legislature has demonstrated that it knows how to 
create an exception, and it created one in subsection 4 of 
the very statute in question. MCL 750.224f(4) provides: 
This section does not apply to a conviction
that has been expunged or set aside, or for which
the 
person 
has 
been 
pardoned, 
unless 
the 
expunction, order, or pardon expressly provides
that the person shall not possess a firearm.
[Emphasis added.] 
By using the term “unless,” it demonstrated its intent 
to create an exception.9  “Unless” is an exclusionary term. 
By contrast, in subsection 2 of the felon-in-possession 
statute, the Legislature chose not to use an exclusionary 
term. Instead, it used the phrase “until all.” 
9 The Legislature has repeatedly used the term “unless”
to create an exception in the Penal Code. 
Examples are:
MCL 750.14, MCL 750.42b(2), MCL 750.50(2)(g), MCL 750.51,
MCL 750.61, MCL 750.115(2), MCL 750.141, MCL 750.144, MCL
750.147a(1), MCL 750.197(3), and MCL 750.216. 
11  
 
 
 
Looking at the definition of “until” helps demonstrate 
that “until all” is an inclusive phrase. The definition is 
“1. up to the time that or when; till.  2. before . . . 3. 
onward to or till . . .” 
Random House Webster’s College 
Dictionary (2001). 
Applying this definition to the 
statute, the defendant is guilty of the offense of felon in 
possession only if he (1) was convicted of a specified 
offense and (2) possessed a firearm “before” (a) the 
passage of five years from the time he paid all pertinent 
fines, or he served his term, or he successfully completed 
all conditions of probation or parole, or (b) his right to 
possess a firearm was not restored. MCL 750.224f(2). 
Therefore, to prove the crime, the prosecution must 
demonstrate that the possession occurred “before” one of 
the specified events. 
If the prosecution fails to prove 
this, it has not met the burden created by the Legislature. 
The 
result 
would 
be 
quite 
different 
had 
the 
Legislature chosen to use an exclusionary term like 
“unless.” 
“Unless” is defined as “1. except under the 
circumstances that . . . 2. except; but; save[.]” 
Random 
House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). 
Substituting this word into the statute would change 
the statute’s meaning, so that the prosecution would need 
to prove only that the defendant (1) had been convicted of 
a specified offense and (2) possessed a firearm. 
The 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
  
defendant would be left to produce evidence that, more than 
five years before, he had (1) paid all pertinent fines, (2) 
served his term, (3) successfully completed all conditions 
of probation and parole, and that (4) he currently had the 
right to possess the firearm. 
Hence, the difference in the burden of production on 
the prosecution and on the defense is enormous depending on 
whether “until” introduces an element or an exception. 
Accordingly, we should assume that the decision to use 
“until” rather than “unless” was carefully made. 
We presuppose that the words the Legislature uses have 
a 
purpose. 
And 
we 
should 
not 
speculate 
that 
it 
inadvertently used one word or phrase when it intended 
another. 
The chosen wording is presumed intentional. 
Detroit v Redford Twp, 253 Mich 453, 456; 235 NW 217 
(1931). 
When 
writing 
this 
statute, 
the 
Legislature 
demonstrated a clear knowledge of how to create an 
exception, but it chose not to do so. Its use of the term 
“until” is a strong indication that it intended the 
restoration of rights to be a contingent element of the 
offense. 
Because the Legislature chose to use the term “until,” 
the prosecution bears the burden of production for MCL 
750.224f(2). 
Here the prosecution failed to present any
13 
 
 
 
evidence that defendant’s right to possess a firearm had 
not been restored. And it made no effort to show that any 
of the three other factual circumstances listed in MCL 
750.224f(2) had not occurred. 
Hence, it did not satisfy 
its burden, and defendant’s convictions were in error. 
C. MCL 776.20 
The majority asserts that MCL 776.20 controls this 
case and holds that it requires that defendant bear the 
burden of production regarding the restoration of the right 
to possess a firearm. MCL 776.20 provides: 
In any prosecution for the violation of any
acts of the state relative to use, licensing and
possession of pistols or firearms, the burden of
establishing any exception, excuse, proviso or
exemption contained in any such act shall be upon
the defendant but this does not shift the burden 
of proof for the violation. 
MCL 776.20 comes into play only after the prosecution 
proves all the elements of a crime. 
Therefore, for the 
majority’s argument to have merit, I would have to accept 
the conclusion that MCL 750.224f(2)(b) is an exception. As 
discussed above, this conclusion is implausible given the 
language and structure chosen by the Legislature. 
I find MCL 776.20 inapplicable to this case. 
believe that, if the Legislature had intended MCL 776.20 to 
apply, it specifically would have used a term contained in 
that statute. 
Alternatively, it would have used its often 
14  
I 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
repeated term “until,” or a similarly clear expression, to 
create an exception or a proviso. 
The 
words 
“exception,[10] 
excuse,[11] 
proviso[12] 
or 
exemption[13]” in MCL 776.20 apply to situations where all 
the elements of a crime have been established. 
Once the 
prosecution has satisfied all the elements, it is for the 
defendant to produce evidence showing the existence of a 
circumstance excusing him from culpability.14 
10 “Except” means “to exclude; leave out.” Random House 
Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). 
11 “Excuse” means “to release from an obligation or
duty.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). 
12 A “proviso” is “a clause, as in a statute or
contract, by which a condition is introduced” or “a 
stipulation or condition.” 
Random House Webster’s College 
Dictionary (2001). 
13 “Exempt” means “to free from an obligation or
liability to which others are subject; release.” 
Random 
House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). 
14 Some may argue that the definition of “proviso”
could apply to any clause. 
But I believe that the 
Legislature intended it to apply only to clauses relieving
a defendant of liability. 
This is indicated by its 
placement in a list with “exception,” “excuse,” and 
“exemption.” 
The doctrine of noscitur a sociis requires
that this Court interpret terms in context with the other
words around them. 
G C Timmis & Co v Guardian Alarm Co,
468 Mich 416, 420-422; 662 NW2d 710 (2003). When words are 
grouped in a list, they must be given related meaning.
Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville v Impac, Ltd, Inc, 432 US
312, 322; 97 S Ct 2307; 53 L Ed 2d 368 (1977).
Interpretive aids, such as the doctrine of noscitur a 
sociis, are meant to aid us in arriving at the meaning
intended by the Legislature. 
By using a term in a list,
the Legislature gave this Court a legitimate means of
(continued…)
15 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
An example of a situation in which MCL 776.20 would 
apply can be seen in MCL 750.224f(4): 
“This section does 
not apply to a conviction that has been expunged or set 
aside, or for which the person has been pardoned . . . .” 
This subsection creates an exception to the felon-in­
possession crime. 
Under MCL 776.20, the defendant would 
have the burden of producing evidence to prove the 
exception.15 
In MCL 776.20, the Legislature demonstrated its 
ability 
to 
use 
the 
terms 
“exception,” 
“excuse,” 
“exception,” and “proviso.” 
But in 750.224f(2), it used 
none of them. It could have stated in MCL 750.224f(2): 
A person convicted of a specified felony
shall 
not 
possess, 
use, 
transport, 
sell,
purchase, carry, ship, receive, or distribute a 
(…continued)
finding its intent. 
The main goal in interpreting any
statute 
is 
to 
ascertain 
and 
give 
effect 
to 
the 
Legislature’s intent. 
People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446, 451;
697 NW2d 494 (2005). By interpreting the word “proviso” in
the context it was used, I have chosen to give effect to
the Legislature’s demonstrated intent. 
15 Some may claim that my analysis renders sections of
MCL 776.20 nugatory. But this is not true. I simply find
the statute inapplicable to this case. 
It would fully
apply to other statutes actually containing an exception,
excuse, proviso, or exemption. MCL 750.224f(4) provides an
example of when I would apply MCL 776.20. 
A defendant 
would bear the burden of proving that his crime had been
expunged, set aside, or pardoned. 
Just because I disagree
with the application of MCL 776.20 to this case does not
mean that my reading renders it nugatory. 
16  
 
 
 
   
 
   
                                                 
 
firearm in this state providing the following
circumstances do not exist. 
Or: 
A person convicted of a specified felony
shall 
not 
possess, 
use, 
transport, 
sell,
purchase, carry, ship, receive, or distribute a
firearm in this state, except when all of the
following circumstances exist. 
Or: 
A person convicted of a specified felony
shall 
not 
possess, 
use, 
transport, 
sell,
purchase, carry, ship, receive, or distribute a
firearm in this state, but the person is excused
when the following circumstances exist. 
Instead of any of these or other wordings, the 
Legislature chose to use “until all.” 
I believe this is a 
strong indication that it intended that MCL 776.20 should 
not apply to MCL 750.224f(2). 
In interpreting statutes, we are reluctant to assume 
that the Legislature wrote what it did by accident or 
error. 
But this is what the majority presumes in its 
holding 
today. 
I 
support 
giving 
effect 
to 
the 
Legislature’s chosen phrasing rather than changing it to 
fit within MCL 776.20.16 
16 I believe that the majority has misunderstood my
argument in n 14 of its opinion, ante at 13. 
Of course I 
know that the Legislature can change the law. 
My point is
that the Legislature intentionally drafted MCL 750.224f(2)
so that MCL 776.20 would not apply to it. 
The Legislature
enacted MCL 750.224f(2) after it enacted MCL 776.20. 
Hence, it knew when it wrote MCL 750.224f(2) that MCL
776.20 requires the defendant to shoulder the burden of
(continued…)
17 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
The existence of MCL 776.20 does not alter what the 
prosecution has to prove in order to obtain a conviction 
for felon in possession. But reading MCL 750.224f(2)(b) as 
a proviso does shift the burden of production from what the 
Legislature intended, because it turns what is an element 
of the crime into a proviso. 
D. PEOPLE V PEGENAU 
The prosecution relies on People v Pegenau17 to support 
its argument. This reliance is misplaced. In Pegenau, the 
defendant was charged with unlawful possession of Xanax and 
Valium pursuant to MCL 333.7403(1).18 
People v Pegenau, 447 
Mich 278, 281; 523 NW2d 325 (1994). 
The only question at 
trial was whether the defendant had a valid prescription, 
(…continued) 
production in matters involving a proviso. Accordingly, if 
it had wanted to make a proviso in MCL 750.224f(2), it knew 
it had to write the statute to clearly contain a proviso. 
Since it did not do that, we must conclude that it did not 
intend a proviso.  
17 People v Pegenau, 447 Mich 278; 523 NW2d 325 (1994). 
18 MCL 333.7403(1) provides: 
A 
person 
shall 
not 
knowingly 
or 
intentionally possess a controlled substance, a
controlled substance analogue, or a prescription
form unless the controlled substance, controlled
substance analogue, or prescription form was 
obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid
prescription or order of a practitioner while
acting in the course of the practitioner’s
professional practice, or except as otherwise 
authorized by this article. 
18  
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
which would exclude him from prosecution under the language 
of MCL 333.7403 and MCL 333.7531.19 
Pegenau, supra at 282. 
This Court held that the burden of proof regarding the 
existence of a valid prescription was on the defendant. 
Pegenau is distinguishable from the present case 
because MCL 333.7403 expressly uses a term creating an 
exception. 
In fact, MCL 333.7403 uses the term “unless.” 
As discussed above, “unless” is defined as “1. except under 
the circumstances that . . . 2. except; but; save[.]” 
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). 
Because 
an exception is specifically created, the defendant bears 
the burden of production under MCL 333.7531. 
19 MCL 333.7531 provides: 
(1) It is not necessary for this state to
negate any exemption or exception in this article
in a complaint, information, indictment, or other
pleading or in a trial, hearing, or other 
proceeding under this article. The burden of 
proof of an exemption or exception is upon the
person claiming it. 
(2) In the absence of proof that a person is
the authorized holder of an appropriate license
or order form issued under this article, the
person is presumed not to be the holder of the
license or order form. The burden of proof is
upon the person to rebut the presumption. 
(3) A liability is not imposed by this 
article or an authorized state, county, or local
officer, engaged in the lawful performance of the
officer's duties. 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
In contrast, MCL 750.224f(2) does not provide an 
exception or exemption to felon-in-possession prosecutions. 
The Legislature did not use a term that would create an 
exception. 
It used the inclusive phrase “until all.” 
Therefore, the subsections are elements of the crime rather 
than exceptions, and MCL 776.20 does not apply. 
Pegenau is inapplicable and is in clear contrast to 
this case. 
Therefore, I find it of no support to the 
prosecution’s argument. 
E. PEOPLE V HENDERSON 
The majority finds People v Henderson20 persuasive on 
the issue whether restoration of the right to possess a 
firearm is an element of felon in possession. 
I believe 
that this decision does not aid the majority’s position.21 
Moreover, I find that Henderson was wrongly decided. 
Henderson dealt with MCL 750.227, which, at that time, 
provided: 
Any person who shall carry a dagger, dirk,
stiletto or other dangerous weapon except hunting
knives adapted and carried as such, concealed on 
20 391 Mich 612; 218 NW2d 2 (1974). 
21 I also find Henderson simply inapplicable to this
case because it does not analyze the core question before
us. 
That question is what language in a statute 
constitutes an exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption.
Henderson becomes relevant only after a determination is 
made that an exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption
exists. 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
or about his person, or whether concealed or
otherwise in any vehicle operated or occupied by
him, except in his dwelling house or place of
business or on other land possessed by him; and
any person who shall carry a pistol concealed on
or about his person, or, whether concealed or
otherwise, in any vehicle operated or occupied by
him, except in his dwelling house or place of
business or on other land possessed by him, 
without a license to so carry said pistol as
provided by law, shall be guilty of a felony,
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
for not more than five years, or by fine of not
more than two thousand five hundred dollars. 
The Henderson Court concluded that, as regards the 
facts of that case, the only elements of the crime were: 
(1) the defendant was carrying a pistol and (2) he was in a 
vehicle operated or occupied by him. 
It ruled that the 
language “without a license to so carry said pistol” did 
not add an element to the offense. People v Henderson, 391 
Mich 612, 616; 218 NW2d 2 (1974). 
This conclusion cannot be correct. 
If only two 
elements 
existed, 
the 
sole 
defenses 
available 
to 
a 
defendant would be (1) that he did not carry a pistol or 
(2) that he was not in a vehicle with it. 
Whether the 
defendant was licensed to carry that pistol would not 
matter. 
He would be guilty of the crime, even though 
licensed, because he (1) carried a pistol (2) in a vehicle. 
21  
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
It is obvious that there is a third key element. 
It is 
found in the statute’s language “without a license.”22 
My interpretation is strengthened by the fact that, in 
writing MCL 750.227, the Legislature did not use any of the 
terms listed in MCL 776.20. The clause “without a license” 
is not prefaced by anything signaling or otherwise phrased 
to signal that it constitutes an exception, excuse, 
proviso, or exemption. 
Contrast this with the language “except in his 
dwelling house or place of business or on other land 
possessed by him” that is also contained in the statute. 
The Legislature knew how to create an exception, excuse, 
proviso, or exemption when it wrote MCL 750.227. 
And, in 
fact, it did so in that statute by explicitly using the 
term “except.” But it did not use any of those terms with 
respect to the lack of a license. Again, the Legislature’s 
choice of wording should not be presumed accidental. 
Redford Twp, supra at 456. 
To rule as it did, the Henderson Court had to read 
words into the statute. 
Specifically, it had to read in 
some form of exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption 
22 Contrary to the majority’s contention, I do not
suggest that there are a minimum number of elements that
must be contained in a criminal statute. 
Rather, I am
pointing out that this statute has three elements. 
The 
Henderson Court recognized only two of them. 
22  
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
before the language “without a license.” But this violates 
the well-established rule of statutory construction that a 
court cannot read into a statute what is not there. AFSCME 
v Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 412; 662 NW2d 695 (2003).23 
Therefore, the Henderson Court failed to construe the 
language actually chosen by the Legislature. 
Instead, it 
added language to change the burden of production. 
The 
majority today falls into the same trap. 
And in doing so, 
it violates its own repeatedly stated rule of statutory 
construction. 
F. THE MAJROITY’S PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRADICTIONS 
The justices of the majority have departed from their 
own rules of statutory construction in construing MCL 
750.224f(2). During this very court term, most of the same 
justices stated: 
Fundamental 
canons 
of 
statutory
interpretation require us to discern and give
effect to the Legislature’s intent as expressed
by the language of its statutes. 
If such 
language is unambiguous, as most such [sic]
language is, we presume that the Legislature
intended the meaning clearly expressed—no further
judicial construction is required or permitted,
and the statute must be enforced as written. 
23 This is a principle often repeated by this majority.
See Halloran v Bhan, 470 Mich 572, 577; 683 NW2d 129
(2004), People v Phillips, 469 Mich 390, 395; 666 NW2d 657
(2003), People v Davis, 468 Mich 77, 79; 658 NW2d 800
(2003), Lesner v Liquid Disposal, Inc, 466 Mich 95, 101;
643 NW2d 553 (2002), and Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466
Mich 57, 63; 642 NW2d 663 (2002). 
23  
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Garg 
v 
Macomb 
Co 
Community 
Mental 
Health 
Services, 472 Mich 263, 281; 696 NW2d 646 (2005)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).] 
There is no suggestion that the majority finds the 
language in MCL 750.224f(2) ambiguous. 
Hence, it violates 
its own rules of statutory interpretation when it relies on 
decisions in sister states to interpret the intent of the 
Michigan Legislature. 
Under the majority’s judicial 
philosophy, reference to outside material is of no value in 
the face of a clear text. 
Moreover, the citation of the annotation at 69 ALR3d 
1054 adds nothing to the majority’s analysis of the statute 
in this case. 
The decisions cited in the annotation are 
based on widely divergent statutory language in other 
states. 
Because that language is so different from the 
language of MCL 750.224f(2), conclusions in the annotation 
are of no assistance in determining what the Michigan 
Legislature intended when enacting our statute. 
Beyond this, at least some of the cases cited in the 
annotation demonstrate that a legislature can create an 
easily recognizable exception or proviso when it desires to 
do so. For example, the Pennsylvania statute provides that 
no person shall carry a firearm in public “‘unless . . . 
such 
person 
is 
licensed 
to 
carry 
a 
firearm[.]’” 
Commonwealth v Bigelow, 250 Pa Super 330, 332; 378 A2d 961 
(1977), quoting 18 Pa Consol Stat 6108 (emphasis added).
24 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
Clearly the Michigan Legislature could have done what the 
Pennsylvania legislature did: 
it explicitly created an 
exemption.24 
Furthermore, even under the analysis offered by the 
majority, Henderson was wrongly decided. One thing the 
majority and I agree about in the instant case is that an 
exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption has to be clearly 
indicated by the language of the statute. 
In the statute 
before us, MCL 750.224f(2), the majority argues that the 
word “until” introduces a proviso. 
In 
contrast, 
the 
statute 
involved 
in 
Henderson 
contains nothing preceding the language “without a license” 
that could be argued to introduce an exemption, excuse, 
proviso, or exemption.25
 Therefore, I believe that, under 
the majority’s analysis, Henderson must be found to have 
been wrongly decided. 
In addition, its reliance on 
Henderson contradicts the majority’s analysis discussing 
exceptions, excuses, provisos, and exemptions. In the end, 
24 As noted above, the Legislature used the same
“unless” 
language 
to 
create 
an 
exception 
in 
MCL 
750.224f(4). 
25 “Without” does not qualify. 
“Unless the defendant 
possesses” would qualify. 
As with the statute at issue in 
this case, the Legislature could have phrased the critical
language as an exemption, but it chose not to do so. 
25  
 
 
 
Henderson offers nothing supportive of the majority’s 
construction of MCL 750.224f(2). 
Again, the Legislature knows how to use the terms 
“exception,” “excuse,” “proviso,” or “exemption.” 
And it 
knows how to create exceptions by the use of the term 
“unless,” as it has repeatedly done throughout the Penal 
Code. 
But the Legislature chose not to use any of those 
terms in either MCL 750.224f(2) or MCL 750.227, the statute 
analyzed in Henderson. 
I would not turn a blind eye to 
those choices. 
Instead, I would enforce the statutes as 
the Legislature wrote them. 
In this case, it requires 
finding that the restoration of the right to possess a 
firearm is an element of the offense of felon in 
possession. 
G. THE BURDEN PLACED ON THE PROSECUTION 
The prosecution asserts that, if it must initially go 
forward with evidence that defendant’s right to possess a 
firearm has not been restored, its burden of proof will be 
rendered too difficult. 
It argues that, to make this 
showing, it would have to obtain certificates showing no 
restoration of defendant’s right to possess firearms from 
all eighty-three counties in Michigan. 
I believe that this is a wildly exaggerated approach 
to the situation. 
Normally, to satisfy MCL 750.224f(2), 
the prosecution would have to show simply that five years
26 
 
 
    
had not passed since the defendant served his term or 
completed probation or paid his fines. 
Only if none of 
those situations existed would it become necessary to 
address whether the right to carry a firearm had been 
restored. 
And then, in almost every case, the prosecution 
could show that the defendant resided in one or two 
counties while eligible to have the right restored and that 
those counties had not restored the right. 
My reading of the statute requires more proofs from 
the prosecution then it would prefer. But the fact that it 
may find difficulty in proving a crime does not provide a 
reason for this Court to rewrite the law to change the 
Legislature’s intent. 
I am satisfied that the language of 
the statute demonstrates that a showing of no restoration 
of the right to possess a firearm is an element of the 
crime. Hence, the burdens of production and persuasion are 
on the prosecution. 
H. THE RULE OF LENITY 
A consistent textualist would have to admit that no 
language in MCL 750.224f(2) or MCL 750.227 creates an 
explicit exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption. 
At 
most, those statutes could be read to infer an exception or 
proviso by adding words to them. 
By finding an exception 
and a proviso, the majority violates its textualist 
philosophy. 
Its holding today seems to require that any
27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
time words can be added to a statute to form an exception 
or proviso, those words should be added. Surely, this does 
not give effect to the text of the statute as written. 
Rather, it reads into the statute what the Legislature did 
not include and perhaps chose not to include. 
Not only is 
this inconsistent with the majority’s “plain language” 
textualist approach, it also violates the rule of lenity. 
Courts have long held that any ambiguity regarding the 
scope of criminal statutes must be resolved in favor of 
lenity. 
Huddleston v United States, 415 US 814, 830-831, 
94 S Ct 1262; 39 L Ed 2d 782 (1974), quoting Rewis v United 
States, 401 US 808, 812; 91 S Ct 1056; 28 L Ed 2d 493 
(1971). 
This is part of the time-honored rule that penal 
statutes are construed in favor of the defendant. As Chief 
Justice Marshall of United States Supreme Court stated in 
1820: 
The rule that penal laws are to be construed
strictly, is perhaps not much less old than 
construction 
itself. 
It 
is 
founded 
on 
the 
tenderness 
of 
the 
law 
for 
the 
rights 
of 
individuals; and on the plain principle that the
power of punishment is vested in the legislative,
not in the judicial department. It is the 
legislature, not the Court, which is to define a
crime, and ordain its punishment. [United States 
v Wiltberger, 18 US (5 Wheat) 76, 95; 5 L Ed 37
(1820).] 
I believe that a court may go beyond the text of a 
statute when it is ambiguous or when serious questions 
arise regarding the reasonable meaning of its language.
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But when weighing the words of a criminal statute, the 
court must place on the scales the rule of lenity. 
This 
rule requires that the statute be construed strictly in 
favor of the defendant. 
Here, the majority disregards the language contained 
in MCL 776.20 and effectively finds that, if certain words 
are added to form an exception or proviso, the statute 
should be read that way. 
This interpretation violates the 
rule of lenity. 
Far from reading the statute in favor of 
defendant, it requires that the statute be read to disfavor 
him. 
I believe that my interpretation of the statute best 
gives effect to the Legislature’s intent. 
And it best 
adheres to the long-established tradition of applying the 
rule of lenity to criminal statutes. 
The majority’s 
construction violates the spirit of the rule of lenity. 
And it turns a hardened eye on the “tenderness of the law 
for the rights of individuals . . . .” 
Wiltberger, supra 
at 95. 
Instead of following this longstanding rule, the 
majority focuses on the potential burden placed on the 
prosecution. 
I continue to adhere to the rule of lenity. 
Therefore, I would hold that the prosecution bears the 
burden of production regardless of whether it might, at 
times, find that burden difficult. 
29  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
I. THE DUE PROCESS PROBLEM 
This Court has ruled that exemptions and provisos in 
criminal statutes must be defined with specificity. 
Exemptions and provisos within a criminal
statute must be defined with the same specificity
as the prohibitive language of the statute. 
This court is not able, within the bounds of
due process, to “interpret” a criminal statute
which contains an ambiguous exemption such that
it results in conviction of the defendant charged
in the specific case. 
That is not the “fair 
warning” demanded by the Constitution. [People v
Dempster, 396 Mich 700, 715; 242 NW2d 381 (1976)
(citation omitted).] 
Therefore, when a “clarifying gloss” is placed on a statute 
by a court, it can apply only to future violations.  It 
cannot apply retroactively. 
This includes cases that 
clarify when an exemption or proviso exists. 
Id. at 715­
717. 
This case constitutes the first instance when the 
“clarifying gloss” in question has been placed on MCL 
750.224f(2). 
Therefore, at the least, the majority’s 
interpretation of the statute cannot apply retroactively. 
Because the majority finds for the first time that the 
statute 
contains 
a 
proviso, 
defendant 
did 
not 
have 
constitutional fair warning of what he would have to prove. 
Accordingly, his conviction cannot stand. 
Dempster, supra 
at 717-718. 
30  
 
 
 
  
 
 
J. MY CONCLUSION REGARDING THE FELON-IN-POSSESSION STATUTE 
The felon-in-possession statute indicates clearly that 
the prosecution has the burden of showing that five years 
have not passed (1) since the defendant paid all fines, or 
(2) since the defendant served his term of imprisonment, or 
(3) 
since 
the 
defendant 
successfully 
completed 
all 
conditions of probation or parole, or of showing (4) that 
the defendant’s right to possess a firearm has not been 
restored. 
In this case, the prosecution concedes that it 
presented no evidence showing that one of the four 
occurrences did not take place. 
Therefore, it failed to 
satisfy its burden. 
Accordingly, I would reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals in part and vacate 
defendant’s convictions and sentences. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The risk that force will be used during a larceny from 
a person is considerably greater than the risk of force in 
many other felonies. 
This is because the crime, by its 
nature, is often confrontational and always involves the 
presence of the victim. 
Therefore, I concur with the 
majority that larceny from a person is a specified felony. 
But I dissent from the majority’s holding on the 
second issue. 
The felon-in-possession statute indicates 
clearly that the prosecution has the burden of production 
and persuasion on all the elements of the offense. 
This 
31 
 
 
 
includes the lack of restoration of the right to possess a 
firearm. 
I would affirm in part the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, reverse it in part, and vacate defendant’s 
convictions and sentences. 
Marilyn Kelly 
32  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 126727 
DAVID MICHAEL PERKINS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
I disagree with the majority’s position that the crime 
of larceny from the person is a specified felony pursuant 
to MCL 750.224f(6). 
Because I believe that larceny from 
the person is not a specified felony under MCL 750.224f(6), 
I do not reach the issue whether the lack of restoration of 
firearm 
rights 
is 
an 
element 
of 
MCL 
750.224f(2). 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
The Legislature has defined a “specified felony” as 
including a felony in which the following circumstance 
exists: 
An element of that felony is the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person or property of another,
or that by its nature, involves a substantial
risk that physical force against the person or 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense. [MCL 750.224f(6)(i).][1] 
Larceny from the person is defined as follows: 
“Any 
person who shall commit the offense of larceny by stealing 
from the person of another shall be guilty of a felony, 
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more 
than 10 years.” 
MCL 750.357. 
Larceny from the person 
differs from robbery because larceny from the person is 
committed without the use of force or the threat of force. 
“[R]obbery is a larceny aggravated by the fact that the 
taking is from the person, or in his presence, accomplished 
with force or the threat of force.” People v Randolph, 466 
Mich 532, 544; 648 NW2d 164 (2002). 
By its very nature, 
larceny from the person involves the absence of force or 
threat of force. 
While I agree with the majority that there is a risk 
of force or threat of force when larceny from the person is 
committed, this is essentially the case with every felony. 
Indeed, one can conceive of a risk of force in almost every 
situation in which a felony is committed. 
However, I do 
not believe that the mere potential for force or threat of 
force, or the mere potential that a perpetrator may become 
1 
Other 
subsections 
of 
the 
statute 
specifying
additional circumstances that also define a specified
felony are not applicable in this case. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
confrontational if detected, means larceny from the person 
presents a “substantial risk” of force or threat of force. 
A perpetrator could just as likely choose to avoid 
confrontation if it becomes apparent that force or the 
threat of force must be used to complete the intended act. 
Therefore, because there is not a “substantial risk” of 
force or threat of force when larceny from the person is 
committed, I respectfully dissent. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
3