Case Title: Stufflebaum v. Panethiere

Citation: 691 S.W.2d 271

Docket Number: 

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 1985-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
691 S.W.2d 271 (1985)
Charles and Margery STUFFLEBAUM, et al., Appellants,
v.
Gary PANETHIERE, et al., Respondents.
No. 65774.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
May 29, 1985.
Rehearing Denied June 25, 1985.
Michael C. McCormick, Lee's Summit, for appellants.
Michael F. Dandino, John B. Williams, Kansas City, for respondents.
DONNELLY, Judge.
This appeal is from dismissal of a claim filed in the Circuit Court of Jackson County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for refund of 1983 taxes. Appellants assert this Court has jurisdiction because the construction of the revenue laws of Missouri is involved. We do not agree. However, we have determined, by reason of the general interest and importance of the question presented, that we will retain and decide the case. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Davis, 488 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Mo. banc 1972).
The essential question on this appeal is whether a taxpayer may bring an action in Missouri courts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress an allegedly unconstitutional imposition of a tax on real estate.
In Shapiro v. Columbia Union National Bank and Trust Co., 576 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. banc 1978), this Court held generally that a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is cognizable in Missouri courts. The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads as follows:
However, Missouri provides a specific remedy to contest the assessment of taxes. *272 Section 139.031, RSMo Supp.1984 (amended 1983), reads, in part, as follows:
In our view, § 139.031 provides a plain, adequate and complete remedy for the redress of appellants' grievances.
In Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 102 S. Ct. 177, 70 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that the principle of comity bars taxpayers' damages actions brought in federal courts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress the allegedly unconstitutional administration of a state tax system. Insofar as pertinent to this appeal, the teaching of McNary is that, given a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law (§ 139.031, supra), taxpayers may not seek relief under § 1983 because such "procedure may in every practical sense operate to suspend collection of the state taxes until the litigation is ended." Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299, 63 S. Ct. 1070, 1073, 87 L. Ed. 1407 (1943). See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 128 n. 17, 91 S. Ct. 674, 698 n. 17, 27 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). To borrow from Circuit Judge Taft in Taylor v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 88 Fed. 350, 374 (6th Cir.1898), if § 1983 could be invoked in this situation, "the obstruction to the collection of taxes would be so frequent as to be intolerable."
The judgment is affirmed.
All concur.