Case Title: Oregon v. McKinney/Shiffer

Citation: 

Docket Number: S067558

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2022-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 4	
March 3, 2022	
325
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
GINA MAREE McKINNEY,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 17CR19610) (CA A168056) (SC S067558 (Control))
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
ROCKLYN MITCHEL SHIFFER,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 17CR45148) (CA A168450) (SC S067659)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 11, 2021.
Bear Wilner-Nugent, Bear Wilner-Nugent Counselor & 
Attorney at Law, Portland, argued the cause and filed the 
briefs for petitioner on review Gina Maree McKinney.
Zachary Lovett Mazer, Deputy Public Defender, Office 
of Public Defense Services, argued the cause and filed the 
briefs for petitioner on review Rocklyn Mitchel Shiffer. Also 
on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender.
Michael A. Casper, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on 
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney 
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Walters, Chief Justice, and Balmer, Flynn, Duncan, 
Nelson, and Garrett, Justices, and Nakamoto, Senior Judge, 
Justice pro tempore.**
______________
	
*   Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Andrew R. Erwin, Judge. 
State v. McKinney, 302 Or App 309, 457 P3d 377 (2020). Appeal from Multnomah 
County Circuit Court, Leslie M. Roberts, Judge. State v. Shiffer, 302 Or App 382, 
457 P3d 386 (2020).
	
**  DeHoog, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
326	
State v. McKinney/Shiffer
NAKAMOTO, S. J.
In State v. Shiffer, the decision of the Court of Appeals 
is reversed, the judgment of conviction is vacated in part, 
and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings. In State v. McKinney, the decision of the Court 
of Appeals is reversed, the judgment of conviction is vacated 
in part, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings.
Cite as 369 Or 325 (2022)	
327
	
NAKAMOTO, S. J.
	
Like the defendant in State v. Owen, 369 Or 288, 
___ P3d ___ (2022), also decided this day, defendants Shiffer 
and McKinney were each charged in independent cases 
with an assault offense requiring proof that the defen­
dant knowingly caused physical injury to another person. 
Defendant Shiffer opted for a bench trial and argued that 
the trial court had to find that he knew that his actions 
would result in serious physical injury before finding him 
guilty. Defendant McKinney’s case went to a jury, and she 
requested instructions that would have required the state to 
prove that she knew her actions would result in the requi­
site physical injury. Unlike the defendant in Owen, however, 
Shiffer and McKinney did not argue at trial that, at mini­
mum, the criminal negligence mental state attaches to the 
injurious result element. Citing State v. Barnes, 329 Or 327, 
986 P2d 1160 (1999), both trial courts rejected their argu­
ments, and in McKinney’s trial, the court declined to give 
her requested instructions and instead gave instructions 
focusing on her knowledge of the nature of her conduct. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed each of their assault convictions.
	
On review, each defendant asserts that the trial 
court erred. Defendants reassert their arguments made in 
the trial courts that a knowing mental state should have 
attached to the physical injury element, a conclusion we 
rejected in Owen. See Owen, 369 Or at 320. Additionally, 
each defendant makes the unpreserved argument that, if the 
knowing mental state does not apply to the physical injury 
element, then the minimum culpable mental state should 
be criminal negligence. In Owen, we held that the resultant 
physical injury element of the second-degree assault offense 
required a culpable mental state and, therefore, that the 
state must prove that the defendant was at least criminally 
negligent with respect to the physical injury. Id. at 322.
	
As a result, our decision in defendants’ cases initially 
is concerned with whether the holding in Owen extends to 
each defendant’s unpreserved argument on review that the 
result element of assault must have an associated culpable 
mental state. We exercise our discretion to review the error in 
each case under plain-error review, and we further conclude 
328	
State v. McKinney/Shiffer
that the error in each case was not harmless. Accordingly, 
we reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals and in part 
vacate the judgment of conviction in each case.
I.  FACTS
A.  Defendant Shiffer
	
Shiffer was involved in an altercation at a store 
when he punched the victim on his right cheek. The punch 
fractured small bones in the victim’s face and required mul­
tiple procedures to suture a deep wound that penetrated 
to the bone. As a result, the victim spent two days in the 
hospital, and the injury caused temporary vision loss and 
left a permanent scar. The charges against Shiffer included 
second-degree assault under ORS 163.175(1)(a).1 He waived 
his right to a jury.
	
In his bench trial, Shiffer argued that the state 
had to prove that he “kn[ew] that that punch [was] going to 
result in serious physical injury.” He argued that Barnes no 
longer was good law in light of State v. Simonov, 358 Or 531, 
368 P3d 11 (2016). The state responded that, as this court 
had held in Barnes, the trial court was only required to find 
that defendant was aware of the assaultive nature of his 
conduct and that a knowing culpable mental state did not 
attach to the physical injury element.
	
The trial court, which watched a video recording
of the altercation from the store’s surveillance system, 
found that Shiffer knowingly and intentionally assaulted 
the victim and that he caused the victim serious physical 
injury. The trial court rejected defendant’s argument that 
a knowing mental state applied to the nature of the resul­
tant injury. The court distinguished the offense in Simonov, 
which involved unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and the 
element of the vehicle owner’s lack of consent, from assault 
offenses. The court observed that, in the context of the 
unauthorized use of a vehicle offense, “[t]he lack of authority 
[to use the vehicle] was not in any way the result of crimi­
nal actions” taken by defendant, but rather made the defen­
dant’s actions, when taken, criminal. (Emphasis added.) 
	
1  Pursuant to ORS 163.175(1)(a), second-degree assault is defined as “[i]nten­
tionally or knowingly caus[ing] serious physical injury to another.”
Cite as 369 Or 325 (2022)	
329
The trial court concluded that Barnes was not expressly or 
impliedly overruled by Simonov and that it was “bound by 
Barnes.”
	
Shiffer appealed and reprised the argument that 
a knowing mental state had to attach to the serious phys­
ical injury element of second-degree assault. Additionally, 
he argued for the first time that, even if a knowing men­
tal state did not apply to the serious physical injury ele­
ment, the element needed at minimum the culpable mental 
state of criminal negligence. He also asserted that the trial 
court’s failure to apply a culpable mental state of criminal 
negligence to the element constituted plain error. The Court 
of Appeals affirmed without opinion. State v. Shiffer, 302 Or 
App 382, 457 P3d 386 (2020).
B.  Defendant McKinney
	
McKinney’s daughter, who was seven weeks old, 
was admitted to the hospital with a broken femur. An inves­
tigation ensued, and McKinney, a new mother, provided 
various, conflicting accounts of what had happened. In her 
final explanation to an investigator with the Tualatin police 
department, McKinney stated that she was feeding her 
daughter in the middle of the night and must have fallen 
asleep while sitting up in her bed and holding her. McKinney 
told the investigator that she remembered waking up to her 
daughter crying on the carpet, picking her up, and putting 
her back in the bed next to her. McKinney similarly testified 
at trial that she recalled waking up and finding her daugh­
ter on the floor and believed that she had fallen asleep and 
dropped her. McKinney also testified that she had not real­
ized the seriousness of her daughter’s injury before taking 
her to the hospital two days after the incident occurred.
	
A doctor who was board-certified in pediatrics and 
child abuse medicine was called to consult to help determine 
whether the fracture was caused by child abuse. He testi­
fied at trial. He related that medical personnel conducted 
a “bone survey” of the baby by taking x-rays of her whole 
body and did an MRI study of her head but did not find any 
other injuries, new or old. Other than the femur fracture, 
she appeared to the doctor to be a normal, healthy infant. 
330	
State v. McKinney/Shiffer
He testified that a fall from a bed resulting in the type of 
fracture the baby suffered would be highly unusual but not 
impossible and that an infant with a femur fracture would 
be exhibiting signs of significant pain.
	
McKinney was tried on two counts of first-degree 
criminal mistreatment under ORS 163.2052 and one count 
of third-degree assault under ORS 163.165(1)(h).3 The jury 
also considered the lesser-included offense of fourth-degree 
assault under ORS 163.160(1)(a), which provides that a per­
son commits the crime if she “[i]ntentionally, knowingly or 
recklessly causes physical injury to another[.]”
	
McKinney requested that the trial court instruct 
the jury that, to find her guilty of third-degree assault, the 
jury “must find that [defendant] knew or was aware that 
her actions would result in physical injury” and that “[i]t is 
not enough, as a matter of law, that [defendant] knew or 
was aware of a risk that her actions would result in physi­
cal injury.” (Emphasis added.) Like Shiffer, she argued that 
Barnes was no longer good law in light of Simonov. In con­
junction with her requested instructions, she argued in a 
memorandum of law that Simonov supported the conclusion 
that “cause physical injury” is a unitary element in third-
degree assault and is a “conduct” element that required the 
jury to find that she knew she would cause her daughter 
physical injury. She also noted that, in Simonov, the state 
“had argued that ‘without consent’ was a circumstance ele­
ment, and that—absent an express mental state within the 
definition of the crime—the lowest applicable mental state 
(criminal negligence) would apply * 
* 
*.” However, she did not 
expressly adopt that argument before the trial court.
	
The trial court initially was inclined to give the 
jury instructions McKinney had requested, but after the 
	
2  In those counts, the state alleged that McKinney had knowingly caused 
physical injury to a dependent person and knowingly withheld medical attention 
from a dependent person. The jury convicted her of knowingly withholding medi­
cal attention from, but acquitted her of knowingly causing physical injury to, her 
daughter.
	
3  Pursuant to ORS 163.165(1)(h), a person commits third-degree assault if, 
“[b]eing at least 18 years of age,” the person “intentionally or knowingly causes 
physical injury to a child 10 years of age or younger[.]” The state alleged that 
McKinney had acted “knowingly.”
Cite as 369 Or 325 (2022)	
331
state asked for reconsideration, the court decided to adhere 
to Barnes. Ultimately, the trial court instructed the jury 
that, to find defendant guilty of third-degree assault, “[the 
jury] must find that defendant knew or was aware of the 
assaultive nature of her conduct. [The jury] need not find 
that defendant knew her conduct would cause injury.” As 
for the lesser-included offense of fourth-degree assault, the 
court instructed the jury that the state had to prove one 
element in addition to the date of the act: “[Defendant] reck­
lessly caused physical injury to [her daughter].” The court 
instructed the jury that a person acts “recklessly”
“if that person is aware of and consciously disregards a sub­
stantial and unjustifiable risk that a particular result will 
occur or a particular circumstance exists. The risk must be 
of such nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes 
a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reason­
able person would observe in that situation. A person also 
acts recklessly if a person acts intentionally or knowingly.”
	
McKinney’s theory of defense was that the injury 
was accidental. During deliberations, the jury sent the court 
a note asking it to define the term “assaultive.” The court 
declined to provide the jury with a definition and informed 
the jury that it had already received all instructions. The 
jury acquitted McKinney of knowingly causing physical 
injury to her daughter, as alleged in one criminal mistreat­
ment count and in the third-degree assault count, but it 
found her guilty of recklessly causing physical injury to her 
daughter, the lesser included fourth-degree assault charge.
	
On appeal, McKinney argued that the jury instruc­
tions for assault were incorrect statements of law. McKinney 
asserted that Barnes incorrectly determined the number 
and nature of the elements of an assault offense. Ultimately, 
she again contended that the jury instructions incorrectly 
allowed the jury to convict her without determining whether 
she knew that her conduct would cause injury. McKinney 
suggested that, if the culpable mental state for the result 
element was not “knowingly,” then the minimum culpable 
mental state of criminal negligence applied. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed in a per curiam decision, citing Barnes. 
State v. McKinney, 302 Or App 309, 457 P3d 377 (2020).
332	
State v. McKinney/Shiffer
	
Both defendants filed petitions for review. We allowed 
review and consolidated each case with Owen for oral 
argument.
II.  ANALYSIS
A.  Plain-error Review
	
Our analysis initially focuses on whether Shiffer 
and McKinney are in a position to request relief based on 
our decision in Owen. Both defendants assert before this 
court that the injury element of assault must have a culpa­
ble mental state and that, if the knowing culpable mental 
state does not apply, then, at least, the criminal negligence 
mental state must attach to the resultant injury element of 
assault. But both defendants failed to make that argument 
at trial.
	
We begin with general principles of preservation 
and plain-error review. It is well-settled in this court’s juris­
prudence that “[t]he general requirement [is] that an issue, 
to be raised and considered on appeal, ordinarily must first 
be presented to the trial court.” Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 
209, 219, 191 P3d 637 (2008); Ailes v. Portland Meadows, 
Inc., 312 Or 376, 380, 823 P2d 956 (1991) (“Generally, before 
an appellate court may address whether a trial court com­
mitted an error in any of the particulars of the trial of a 
case, the adversely affected party must have preserved the 
alleged error in the trial court and raised the issue on appeal 
by an assignment of error in its opening brief.”).
	
Further, this court has distinguished between 
“raising an issue at trial, identifying a source for a claimed 
position, and making a particular argument.” State v. Hitz, 
307 Or 183, 188, 766 P2d 373 (1988) (emphasis in original). 
Raising an issue at trial “ordinarily is essential,” whereas 
identifying a source is less so, and making a particular 
argument is the least significant. Id. (“The first ordinarily 
is essential, the second less so, the third least.”) The court in 
Hitz recognized that “[e]fficient procedures are instruments 
for, not obstacles to, deciding the merits, particularly when 
the alternative is a criminal conviction that lacks a basis in 
law or in fact.” Id. at 188-89. In recognizing that this prin­
ciple provides “some degree of liberality to the preservation 
Cite as 369 Or 325 (2022)	
333
requirement,” this court has noted that “an appellate court 
must view the facts in light of the purposes of fairness and 
efficiency that underlie the [preservation] requirement.” 
State v. Stevens, 328 Or 116, 122, 970 P2d 215 (1998).
	
An appellate court may consider an unpreserved 
error if the error is plain. Ailes, 312 Or at 381. To constitute 
plain error, an error must (1) be one of law; (2) be obvious and 
not reasonably in dispute; and (3) appear on the face of the 
record. State v. Gornick, 340 Or 160, 166, 130 P3d 780 (2006) 
(citations omitted). Whether a plain error occurred does not 
turn on the law at the time of trial, but rather depends on 
“the law at the time of the appellate decision.” State v. Ulery, 
366 Or 500, 503, 464 P3d 1123 (2020). Even if the error is 
plain, the court must exercise its discretion whether to con­
sider the error, and such a decision “should be made with 
utmost caution.” Ailes, 312 Or at 382.
	
Turning to Shiffer’s case, although at trial Shiffer 
did not make the precise argument he now makes, Shiffer 
did challenge the viability of our decision in Barnes in light 
of Simonov and contested the culpable mental state that 
should apply to the assault charge. Then, in an assignment 
of error in the Court of Appeals, he contended that the trial 
court erred by failing to find that he acted with at least crim­
inal negligence with regard to the nature of the injury that 
he caused and requested plain error review. Shiffer again 
argues in this court that the trial court plainly erred.
	
The trial court understood that it was bound by the 
holding in Barnes and rejected Shiffer’s arguments that a 
culpable mental state as to the serious physical injury he 
caused was required to prove second-degree assault. We 
agree that the trial court’s error was one of law, is not rea­
sonably in dispute because of our decision in Owen, and 
appears on the face of the record. We choose to exercise our 
discretion to address the error. Whether any, and which, 
culpable mental state should apply to the result element of 
the second-degree assault charge has been at issue at every 
level of the case.
	
McKinney’s case is somewhat different, but the 
same dispute appears at every level of her case. Like Shiffer, 
334	
State v. McKinney/Shiffer
she argued that Barnes no longer was good law, although 
she did not preserve the specific argument that, at mini­
mum, the trial court should apply the criminal negligence 
culpable mental state to the injury element. Unlike Shiffer, 
on appeal, she did not devote an assignment of error to the 
trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that the state had 
to prove that she was criminally negligent with respect to 
the physical injury. However, she made the argument in 
the Court of Appeals. She contended that ORS 161.095(2) 
requires “some minimal culpable mental state for each 
material element” and observed that the minimal culpable 
mental state is criminal negligence. She concluded that the 
jury instructions “baselessly alleviated the state’s burden of 
proving any culpable mental state at all” as to her daugh­
ter’s physical injury.
	
In this court, McKinney does not specifically 
request plain-error review and does not make an argument 
as to why this court should exercise its discretion to review 
the error. She does, however, adopt all arguments made by 
defendants Owen and Shiffer in their briefs on the merits 
pursuant to ORAP 5.77(1) and (4), and Shiffer, of course, 
made the argument for plain-error review.4 In accordance 
with Barnes, the jury instructions the trial court gave in 
McKinney’s case did not inform the jury that the state had 
to prove that she was at least criminally negligent as to the 
physical injury that her daughter suffered. As in Shiffer’s 
case, the trial court’s error was one of law, is not reason­
ably in dispute because of our decision in Owen, and appears 
on the face of the record; and, as in Shiffer’s case, we exer­
cise our discretion to address the error in McKinney’s case 
through plain-error review.
B.  Harmlessness
	
Although an error occurred in the trial court, we 
will affirm if there is “little likelihood that the particular 
error affected the verdict.” State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32, 77 
	
4  Under ORAP 5.77(1), a party may adopt the brief of another party on the 
same side, including cases consolidated on appeal. And under ORAP 5.77(4)(a), 
a party “who concurs with all or part of a brief filed by another party and who 
has no other position to assert may adopt the other party’s brief by filing a brief 
adopting in whole or in part the brief of another party.”
Cite as 369 Or 325 (2022)	
335
P3d 1111 (2003). In Shiffer, the state argues that the trial 
court, sitting as factfinder, found that defendant was aware 
of the assaultive nature of his conduct and, indeed, was 
“seeking to injure” the victim when he punched him in the 
face, but the state does not contend that a failure to apply a 
mental state to the result element was harmless.
	
Shiffer argues that the culpable mental state mat­
ters in this case, where he was charged with “intentionally 
and knowingly caus[ing] serious physical injury” to the vic­
tim. Had the trial court applied a criminally negligent men­
tal state to the result element—the serious physical injury—
it would have had to find that, when defendant punched the 
victim, he failed “to be aware of a substantial and unjusti­
fiable risk that the result will occur” and that the risk was 
“of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that 
a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” ORS 
161.085(10). Defendant describes what happened in this 
case as not uncommon: The two men argued, and defendant 
punched the victim once in the cheek. He argues that it is 
not clear that a factfinder would find “that defendant failed 
to be aware of a substantial risk that a solitary punch would 
cause a serious physical injury, or that that risk was of such 
a nature and degree that defendant’s failure to be aware of 
it was a gross deviation from the standard of care that a rea­
sonable person would observe in the situation.” (Emphases 
in original.)
	
An instructional error is prejudicial if the absence 
of the jury instruction “probably created an erroneous 
impression of the law” in the minds of the jury members 
and “if that erroneous impression may have affected the 
outcome of the case.” Hernandez v. Barbo Machinery Co., 
327 Or 99, 106-07, 957 P2d 147 (1998) (citations omitted). 
And in a bench trial, we similarly review whether the trial 
court’s legal error regarding an element of the offense that 
the state had to prove may have affected the outcome of the 
case. Cf. State v. Marrington, 335 Or 555, 565-66, 73 P3d 911 
(2003) (evaluating whether there was little likelihood that 
the trial court’s legal error in admitting testimony affected 
the court’s verdict in a bench trial).
336	
State v. McKinney/Shiffer
	
We agree with defendant that the culpable men­
tal state for the serious physical injury element could have 
made a difference in his case. It would have changed what 
the trial court had to consider before convicting defendant 
on the second-degree assault charge, and we cannot say 
that those considerations would not have affected the court’s 
decision. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of conviction 
as to the second-degree assault count in Shiffer’s case and 
remand to the trial court for a new trial.
	
In McKinney, the state contends that any instruc­
tional error concerning the third-degree assault charge was 
harmless because McKinney was acquitted of that charge. 
And, for the fourth-degree assault of which she was con­
victed, the state was required to prove that she recklessly 
caused injury to her daughter, ORS 163.160(1)(a), and 
McKinney did not dispute the instruction for that charge.
	
McKinney responds that the instruction on third-
degree assault likely confused the jury. The trial court 
instructed the jury that it “must find that defendant knew 
or was aware of the assaultive nature of her conduct” and 
“need not find that defendant knew her conduct would cause 
injury.” The instruction on fourth-degree assault did not 
mention a culpable mental state for the physical injury ele­
ment. McKinney contends that, because the instructions as 
a whole conveyed that the culpable mental state applied to 
her conduct but no culpable mental state applied to the phys­
ical injury element for fourth-degree assault, the jury could 
have convicted her of fourth-degree assault while accepting 
that the injury was an accident that happened when she fell 
asleep.
	
We agree that the absence of an instruction on the 
mental state required for the result element could have 
made a difference. The jury’s question for the court about 
the meaning of “assaultive” is some indication that the jury 
could have been wrestling with defendant’s state of mind and 
her blameworthiness for the injury. The jury acquitted her 
on charges that required the state to prove that McKinney 
“knowingly” caused physical injury to her daughter. The 
jury’s acquittal of McKinney of third-degree assault is con­
sistent with the jury believing McKinney’s explanation that 
Cite as 369 Or 325 (2022)	
337
she fell asleep while holding her daughter. That belief also 
would be consistent with the jury’s finding that she acted 
recklessly, as required for fourth-degree assault. For exam­
ple, the jury could have reasoned that McKinney was reck­
less because she knew she was tired but consciously disre­
garded a risk that she would fall asleep and lose her grip on 
her daughter.
	
But the jury was not told that it had to find in addi­
tion that McKinney was aware of and disregarded a sub­
stantial and unjustifiable risk that her conduct would cause 
physical injury. The criminally negligent mental state that 
should have attached to the physical injury element would 
have guided the jury to deliberate in a different way and 
may have affected the outcome of the case. Although it found 
her action reckless, the jury could have found that it was not 
“a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reason­
able person would observe” for McKinney to be unaware of a 
substantial risk that, if she fell asleep, her daughter would 
suffer physical injury. See ORS 161.085(10) (defining “crim­
inal negligence”). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of 
conviction as to the fourth-degree assault count and remand 
to the trial court for a new trial.
	
In State v. Shiffer, the decision of the Court of 
Appeals is reversed, the judgment of conviction is vacated 
in part, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings. In State v. McKinney, the decision of 
the Court of Appeals is reversed, the judgment of conviction 
is vacated in part, and the case is remanded to the circuit 
court for further proceedings.