Case Title: Davis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Davis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc.1997 WY 43934 P.2d 1246Case Number: 96-207Decided: 03/18/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

CONNEY L. DAVIS, 

Appellant(Plaintiff), 

 

v. 

 

WYOMING MEDICAL CENTER, INC., a Wyoming 
corporation,  

Appellee(Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court, Natrona County 

W. Thomas 
Sullins, Judge

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:
Mark W. Gifford of Gifford & Bonner, 
Casper.

 

Representing 
Appellee: 

Mark L. Carman of Williams, Porter, Day & 
Neville, P.C., Casper.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]      When appellee 
Wyoming Medical Center, Inc. (WMC) of Casper, without warning or reason 
terminated the employment of appellant Conney Davis (Davis), a surgical 
technologist, Davis sued WMC for wrongful termination, asserting claims of 
breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The district court ruled that WMC's 
written disclaimers as a matter of law defeated Davis' claim of job security and 
granted WMC's motion for summary judgment. Davis appeals.

 

[¶2]      We affirm the 
ruling of the district court.

 

[¶3]      Davis presents 
one issue for our review:

Do the materials submitted to the district court on 
Appellee's motion for summary judgment show the existence of any genuine issue 
of material fact as to the nature of Appellant's 
employment?

 

[¶4]      WMC states the 
issues to be:

Was the trial court correct in finding that the 
Appellant was an employee at-will and remained so until the point in time she 
was discharged from her employment?

Was the trial court correct in ruling that the 
Appellant did not establish a cause of action for promissory 
estoppel?

 

FACTS

 

[¶5]      In order to earn 
her applied science degree in surgical technology from Central Wyoming College 
in Riverton, Davis served a 600-hour internship without pay at WMC. At the end 
of that internship, Davis was urged to apply for and was offered one of three 
surgical technologist positions at WMC. On April 5, 1995, Davis completed a WMC 
job application form that included an at-will employment disclaimer. On April 
17, 1995, she completed a WMC job offer detail agreement which she contends 
obligated her to work for WMC for a minimum of one year and obligated WMC to 
employ her for at least one year as long as she performed satisfactorily. 
According to Davis, demand for surgical technologists is high around the country 
and her employment options outside of Casper were numerous, but she accepted 
WMC's offer because it included job security. Davis began working for WMC one 
week later. WMC earlier had offered Davis relocation assistance of $500.00 and, 
shortly after she moved, Davis accepted the money and signed an agreement 
committing to work one year. Davis attended a WMC new employee orientation 
meeting and was given an employee handbook containing a disclaimer. She was 
required to sign a separate sheet acknowledging receipt of the handbook and 
which detailed a disclaimer. In July of 1995, three months after beginning her 
employment, her supervisor evaluated Davis' performance and suggested areas of 
improvement. Davis received feedback one month later that she had improved and 
should continue her improvement.

 

[¶6]      Davis purchased a 
home on a contract which required she reside there for a minimum of two years 
and began extensive remodeling to the residence. On October 13, 1995, WMC 
terminated her employment. When Davis asked for a reason, WMC replied it did not 
have to give her a reason for the termination. Because WMC is the only employer 
of surgical technologists in Casper, Davis is now forced to take jobs outside 
her professional field at lower pay.

 

[¶7]      Davis filed suit 
for breach of contract and promissory estoppel alleging WMC had engaged in a 
course of conduct which created an understanding that she had job security. The 
district court ruled that the disclaimers were sufficient as a matter of law to 
prevent WMC's conduct from implying an employment contract containing a job 
security provision or creating a claim for promissory estoppel. The district 
court granted summary judgment to WMC and this appeal 
followed.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      Under Wyoming 
law, it is well-settled that employment for an indefinite time is presumed to be 
a contract for at-will employment which either party can terminate at any time 
for any or no reason. Mobil Coal 
Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 704 (Wyo. 1985). A subsequent 
express contract or an implied in fact contract can defeat the at-will 
presumption. Wilder v. Cody Country 
Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 217 (Wyo. 1994); Lincoln v. Wackenhut Corp., 867 P.2d 701, 703 (Wyo. 1994). Generally, it is a systematic discipline procedure or 
other language in an employee handbook implying termination may be for cause 
only which will defeat the rebuttable presumption that employment is at will. Lincoln, 867 P.2d  at 
703.

 

[¶9]      In this case, 
Davis concedes the effectiveness of the disclaimers issued to and acknowledged 
by her. She contends, however, that WMC's course of dealing with her negated the 
effect of these disclaimers and created a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether she had an implied contract for employment security. Relying upon McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 
820 P.2d 986, 990-991 (Wyo. 1991) (McDonald II), she claims that WMC's course of 
dealing included the following manifestations of assent to an employment 
relationship which could be terminated only for cause: 1) the job offer detail 
agreement, 2) the relocation expense assistance agreement, and 3) the verbal 
assurances she received as part of her performance 
evaluations.

 

[¶10]   In determining whether WMC has made 
objective manifestations of assent to an employment contract containing a job 
security provision, our analysis must figure in the effect of the disclaimers, 
the provisions of the documents issued to Davis, and WMC's course of dealing 
with Davis. McDonald II, 820 P.2d  at 
990; 1 HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:13, at 283 
(3d ed. 1992) (It should make no difference whether the statements are contained 
in a handbook, a policy, or some other form). We hold that the job offer detail 
agreement and the relocation expense assistance agreement did not require a 
disclaimer because they did not supply terms for an implied in fact contract. We 
also hold that the performance evaluations conducted according to the handbook 
were validly disclaimed by WMC causing any reliance by Davis on her supervisor's 
verbal representations during the performance evaluations to be unreasonable as 
a matter of law. Based upon our recent decision in Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706 
(Wyo. 1996) (Loghry II), we hold the 
disclaimers are effective against Davis' claim of promissory 
estoppel.

 

Standard of Review

 

[¶11]   Our review of a grant of summary 
judgment is the same as the district court. The movant has the burden of clearly 
demonstrating that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Loghry II, 927 P.2d  at 709. Once a prima 
facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to 
present specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. 
Clark v. Industrial Co. of Steamboat 
Springs, Inc., 818 P.2d 626, 627 (Wyo. 1991). We examine the record from the 
vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion and give that 
party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
record. Id.

 

Agreements

 

[¶12]   Davis contends that the job offer 
detail agreement caused her to understand that she had a contract for at least 
one year or more. She states it contained the following:

1. Offered a full-time position as an OR tech, to 
work shifts.

2. Offered pay of $8.60 per hour, with annual income 
of $17,880 based upon 2080 hours per year.

3. Indication that the director of surgical services 
had approved the offer.

4. Offered $500.00 relocation assistance which she 
initially declined.

5. Statement that she would not receive a signing 
bonus.

6. Dates to obtain a physical examination and begin 
employment.

7. Date to attend new employee 
orientation.

8. This language immediately above the signatures of 
the "HR/Recruitment" representative and Davis stated:

"Signing hereunder signifies your acceptance of the 
above stated information and serves as a binding agreement between New Employee 
and Wyoming Medical Center."

 

[¶13]   "[A] person does not have tenure in 
employment unless such tenure is established by statute or by contract or by 
rules and regulations pursuant to statute or by rules and regulations having the 
force of a contract." Mobil Coal 
Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 704 (Wyo. 1985). This agreement set 
forth the hours of work, pay scale, and dates for a physical examination, 
beginning employment and attending orientation. Limited to these subjects, the 
language that this is "a binding agreement" must be interpreted as giving Davis 
an enforceable agreement to receive employment for a specific position at a 
specific rate of pay and begin her employment on a certain date. It is our 
general rule that a hiring at so much a day, week, month, or year, no time being 
specified, is an indefinite hiring. Allen 
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 282 (Wyo. 1985). The agreement did 
not address employment for a definite period or contain any language changing 
WMC's unfettered right to discharge at any time and without cause. Mobil Coal, 704 P.2d  at 707. No 
ambiguity is presented which requires reversal of the summary 
judgment.

 

[¶14]   Our analysis and conclusion 
regarding the effect of the relocation assistance agreement are the same. It 
states in relevant part:

I, Conney L. Davis, . . . (Participant), . . . have 
accepted $500.00 from the hospital . . ., to assist in financing Participant's 
move to Casper, Wyoming.

Participant agrees to work no less than 2080 hours in 
consideration of this assistance. . . . Participant agrees that if employment 
terminates for any reason other than Participant's death, before amassing 2080 
hours I will be in default of this agreement and I shall repay the amount in 
full.

* 
* * * * *

 

[¶15]   The language obligates Davis to 
either work for one year or to repay the relocation assistance. In exchange, she 
received $500.00. The consideration exchanged by the parties does not include 
job security or her assurance that she would not resign in less than a year and 
is, therefore, not an agreement for employment for one year and does not alter 
WMC's unfettered right to discharge at any time and without cause. Mobil Coal, 
704 P.2d  at 707. Reversal of the summary judgment is not 
required.

 

Effectiveness of 
Disclaimers

 

[¶16]   Davis also contends that the verbal 
representation she received during her performance evaluations led her to 
believe that she would not be terminated without cause. WMC contends that the 
disclaimers issued to and acknowledged by her made her belief unreasonable as a 
matter of law.

 

[¶17]   "When properly drafted, a 
sufficient disclaimer constitutes an express statement in the employment 
application and subsequent relevant documents, such as an employee handbook, 
that places the employee on notice that general statements or conduct do not 
promise employment security and are not to be relied upon by the employee." Lincoln, 867 P.2d  at 703. "A conspicuous 
and unambiguous disclaimer would then make any reliance on the subsequent 
statements of the employer unreasonable." Id. To determine if a disclaimer is 
conspicuous and unambiguous as a matter of law, a reviewing court considers 
prominence, placement, and language. Id. at 703-04.

 

[¶18]   At hiring, Davis completed a job 
application form with a disclaimer. The disclaimer is on the second page of the 
form, is in the same size type as the rest of the application form but is in 
boldface and enclosed in a box. It reads as follows:

I 
understand that my employment and compensation with Wyoming Medical Center can 
be terminated, with or without cause, and with or without notice, at any time, 
at the option of either the company or myself. I also understand that an 
employee handbook is not an employment agreement, either expressed or implied, 
and that no employee or manager of Wyoming Medical Center except the Director of 
Human Resources has any authority to enter into any agreement for employment for 
any specified period of time, or to make any agreement contrary to the 
foregoing.

 

[¶19]   Davis received a copy of the 
employee handbook several weeks after she began her employment. She was required 
to sign a receipt form for the handbook. The receipt was separate from the 
handbook and stated a disclaimer which reads as follows:

I 
understand that my employment and compensation with Wyoming Medical Center can 
be terminated, with or without cause, and with or without notice at any time, at 
the option of either the company or myself. I also understand that this employee 
handbook is not an employment agreement, either expressed or implied, and that 
no employee or manager of Wyoming Medical Center except the Vice President of 
Human Resources has any authority to enter into any agreement for employment for 
any specified period of time, or to make any agreement contrary to the 
foregoing.

 

I 
hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of the Wyoming Medical Center employee 
Handbook. I understand these policies are subject to change by management, 
unilaterally and without notice.

 

[¶20]   The handbook also contained a 
disclaimer on the first page that is set out in bold, capital type and 
states:

THIS 
HANDBOOK IS INTENDED AS A GUIDE FOR THE EFFICIENT AND PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE 
OF YOUR JOB. NOTHING HEREIN CONTAINED SHALL BE CONSTRUCTED TO BE A CONTRACT 
BETWEEN THE EMPLOYER AND THE EMPLOYEE. ADDITIONALLY, THIS HANDBOOK IS NOT TO BE 
CONSTRUCTED BY ANY EMPLOYEE AS CONTAINING BINDING TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF 
EMPLOYMENT. THE COMPANY RETAINS THE ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO TERMINATE ANY EMPLOYEE, AT 
ANY TIME, WITH OR WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE. MANAGEMENT RETAINS THE RIGHT TO CHANGE THE 
CONTENTS OF THIS HANDBOOK AS IT DEEMS NECESSARY, WITH OR WITHOUT 
NOTICE.

 

[¶21]   These disclaimers are conspicuous 
and unambiguous as a matter of law because the text of the disclaimers is 
prominent; the placement of the disclaimers is such that a reasonable person 
ought to notice them; the language disclaiming the formation of any implied in 
fact contract of employment is sufficiently unambiguous to constitute an 
effective notice to a reasonable person that no promises modifying the existing 
contract for employment at will are offered; and finally, the disclaimer 
preserves WMC's right to unilaterally without notice alter the language of the 
handbook. Lincoln, 867 P.2d  at 
704-705. WMC remained free to terminate Davis' employment without cause and 
without breaching any contract of employment. Davis could not reasonably believe 
that anyone other than the vice-president or director of human resources could 
assure her that she had employment security regardless of what was said to her 
during performance evaluations. Id. 
We affirm summary judgment on the issue of breach of 
contract.

 

Promissory Estoppel

 

[¶22]   Davis contends that through the use 
of the agreements and her supervisor's verbal representations discussed above, 
WMC sought to create the understanding that the parties were mutually bound by 
the commitment of employment for one year, and thereafter, for so long as Davis 
performed satisfactorily. She contends that she relied on this promise to her 
detriment by purchasing a home which required a minimum two-year residency and 
has suffered damages because she must accept low-paying positions while she 
fulfills the residency requirement. Assuming without deciding that these 
contentions meet the elements of promissory estoppel, we will apply the 
principles established in Loghry II, 
927 P.2d  at 711.

 

[¶23]   To date, this Court has not 
recognized promissory estoppel as an exception to the at-will employment 
doctrine. Garcia v. UniWyo Federal Credit 
Union, 920 P.2d 642, 647 (Wyo. 1996). We recently decided that when an 
at-will employee presents a promissory estoppel claim, we will give effect to 
any valid disclaimers, instead of deciding under our equitable powers. Loghry II, 927 P.2d  at 711. A valid 
disclaimer is fair notice to employees of what can be expected from the 
employer. WMC's disclaimers required employment status modification by a 
director or vice-president of Human Resources. By this reservation, WMC clearly 
intended to protect itself from job security claims based upon oral 
representations made to employees. Id. Disclaimer provisions are 
enforceable against promissory estoppel claims. Id. Promissory estoppel requires the 
party invoking the doctrine to have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on 
the promise that was made. Id.

 

[¶24]   Because Davis has acknowledged that 
she knew the content of the disclaimers, we must decide that she was informed 
that statements to the contrary could not alter her at-will status and she could 
not then reasonably rely on any subsequent understanding created by the 
supervisor that she would be employed as long as her performance was 
satisfactory. Because of the specific disclaimer language, promissory estoppel 
is not available to Davis. Id.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶25]   A course of dealing which furnished 
this employee a job offer detail agreement, a relocation assistance agreement, 
and verbal encouragement during performance evaluations did not create an 
implied in fact contract requiring that Davis' employment be terminated only for 
cause. The written documents did not specify employment for a definite period 
and did not contain language which could be construed as fettering the 
employer's right to discharge without cause and at any time. The verbal 
representations were validly disclaimed and such disclaimers were effective 
against breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims. The order of the 
district court is affirmed.