Case Title: JEFFREY RAYMOND STARKEY V. MICHELLE ELISE STARKEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
JEFFREY RAYMOND STARKEY V. MICHELLE ELISE STARKEY2007 WY 106161 P.3d 515Case Number: 06-256Decided: 07/11/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
JEFFREY 
RAYMOND STARKEY,Appellant(Defendant),v.MICHELLE 
ELISE STARKEY,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Gibson 
Sean Benham of Casper, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
AppelleeState of Wyoming, Department of Family 
Services:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; Dan Wilde, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Ellen Rutledge, 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In 1998, Jeffrey 
Starkey (Father) began paying an extra $50.00 per month on his child support 
obligation in an effort to pay off the obligation in advance.  Father stopped making payments in 
September 2005, when he believed he had a "credit" of approximately $4500.00 in 
child support.  At a hearing on a 
petition to modify child support filed in January 2006, the district court had 
an opportunity to consider whether or not Father should receive credit for the 
overpayments.  Ultimately, the court 
ruled that Father was not entitled to credit.  This appeal followed, and we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Father raises the 
following issues:

 
 

A.      
Whether 
a non-custodial parent is entitled to a credit against future child support 
obligations for "overpayments" he has made in the past which are in excess of 
current support and/or arrears.

 
 

B.      
Whether 
disallowing such credits for overpayments constitutes an unconstitutional taking 
of property without due process of law.

 
 

C.     
Whether 
disallowing such credits constitutes a retroactive modification of 
support.

 
 

D.     
Whether 
the State and/or the obligee is estopped from arguing against a credit for 
previous over-payments of child support where it has been their practice and 
procedure to allow and provide for such.

 
 

E.      
Whether 
the matter of disallowing the child support credit was properly before this 
Court given that it had not been previously pled.

 
 
Mother 
phrases this appeal in a single issue:

 
 
            
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in determining that [Father] 
was not entitled to credit for payments made in excess of his child support 
obligation?"

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Father and 
Michelle Elise Starkey (Mother) married in 1987.  The marriage produced one child, a 
daughter, born on January 28, 1988.  
In 1992, the parties divorced and, pursuant to a divorce decree, Mother 
was awarded custody of the child, subject to Father's visitation.  Father was ordered to pay monthly child 
support of $175.00.  In 1994, 
Father's support was increased to $250.00 per month as a result of a petition to 
modify support filed by Mother.  In 
June of 1998, Father began paying an extra $50.00 per month to the Clerk of 
District Court in an effort to pay off his child support obligation in 
advance.  Father did so of his own 
volition and not at the request of Mother.

 
 
[¶4]      In September of 
2005, Father ceased all child support payments.  At the time, he believed that he had an 
overpayment credit of approximately $4500.00.  In January of 2006, Mother, through an 
attorney at Natrona County Child Support Enforcement, filed a petition to modify 
support based upon a claim that there had been a material and substantial change 
in circumstances warranting a modification of child support.  At a hearing on the petition, the 
parties agreed that Father's child support obligation was to increase to $450.00 
per month.  Also at the hearing, the 
court had an opportunity to examine whether or not Father should receive credit 
for his overpayments.  The court 
took the matter under advisement.  
In its Order Regarding 
Overpayment, the district court noted that as of August 4, 2006, Father had 
an overpayment balance of $2885.70.  
In the end, however, the court ruled that Father was not entitled to 
credit for the overpayments.  This 
appeal followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      Father urges this 
Court to review this case de novo.  However, this Court's long 
established standard of review for child support applies here, and we review it 
below:

 
 
There 
are few rules more firmly established 
in our jurisprudence than the proposition that disposition of marital property, calculation of income for 
child support purposes, and the granting of alimony are committed to the sound 
discretion of the district court. Johnson v. Johnson, 11 P.3d 948, 950 
(Wyo. 2000). Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among 
which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising 
sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without 
doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Id.; Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998). We must ask ourselves whether the trial court could 
reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary 
or capricious. Johnson, 11 P.3d  
at 950. In accomplishing our review, we consider only the evidence in 
favor of the successful party, ignore the evidence of the unsuccessful party, 
and grant to the successful party every reasonable inference that can be drawn 
from the record. Id.

 
 

Shelhamer 
v. Shelhamer, 2006 WY 
83, ¶ 15, 138 P.3d 665, 672 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Belless v. Belless, 2001 WY 41, 
¶ 6, 21 P.3d 749, 750-51 (Wyo. 2001)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      Although Father 
parses out five separate issues in his brief, there will be one core discussion 
including in it points directed at those separate issues.  Fundamentally, Father's argument is that 
his overpayment of $50.00 per month in child support should be credited to his 
current obligation.  Mother, 
however, believes this to be incorrect and argues that Father is not owed a 
credit.

 
 
[¶7]      Because this is 
an issue of first impression in Wyoming, we begin by looking outside our 
borders to other states' treatment of the issue of overpayment of child support 
in an effort to gain a so-called "credit."  
For the most part, "[c]ourts generally do not allow a credit to the 
obligor spouse for voluntary expenditures made on behalf of a child in a manner 
other than that specified by a decree."  24A Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and 
Separation § 1067, at 474 (1998).  
In fact, the proverbial general rule is that payments made for the 
benefit of a child, which are voluntary and not pursuant to a divorce decree, 
may not be credited against other amounts due under the decree.  Harner v. Harner, 105 Ill. App. 3d 430, 
434 N.E.2d 465, 468, 61 Ill. Dec. 312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); In re Marriage of 
McCurnin, 681 N.W.2d 322, 328 (Iowa 2004) (holding obligor was not entitled 
to credit for overpayment of support because he was a volunteer); Webb v. 
Webb, 475 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (" Decrees for child support 
should be strictly complied with and credit should not be allowed for 
overpayments voluntarily made.' "); Horne v. Horne, 22 N.Y.2d 219, 239 N.E.2d 348, 350, 292 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. 1968) ("[P]ayments made by a father to 
or for the benefit of his children voluntarily and not pursuant to a divorce 
decree may not be credited by him against other amounts due and owing under the 
decree."); Newton v. Newton, 202 Va. 515, 118 S.E.2d 656, 659 (Va.1961) 
("[I]t is the obligation of the divorced husband to pay the specified amounts 
according to the terms of the decree and that he should not be permitted to vary 
these terms to suit his convenience. . . .  
To permit him to increase the amount of the specified payments at one 
time, reduce them at another, and require an adjustment of the differences in 
the future, would lead to continuous trouble and turmoil."); and see Robert A. Brazener, Right to 
Credit on Accrued Support Payments for Time Child is in Father's Custody or for 
Other Voluntary Expenditures, 47 A.L.R.3d 1031, 1037 (1973) ("Generally 
speaking, a father is not entitled to credit against arrearages for overpayments 
in support money which he made to the mother.").  See generally Alice Wright Cain, 
Right to Credit on Child Support for Previous Overpayments to Custodial 
Parent for Minor Child While Child Is Not Living with Obligor Parent, 7 
A.L.R.6th 411 (2005). 

 
 
[¶8]      As in most states 
and as demonstrated above, in Nebraska the general rule is that no credit is 
given for voluntary overpayments of child support, even if they are made under a 
mistaken belief that they are legally required.  Palagi v. Palagi, 10 Neb. App. 231, 627 N.W.2d 765 (Neb. 2001).  In Palagi, a father's voluntary payments of 
his child's college-related expenses did not offset accrued child support 
payments.  That being said, there 
are exceptions to the general rule above stated.  In fact, Griess v. Griess, 9 
Neb. App. 105, 
608 N.W.2d 217, 224 (Neb. App. 2000), demonstrates instances wherein exceptions 
are allowable:

 
 
"Voluntary 
overpayments" have included many items that were not ordered by a court via the 
parties' decree. See, Ardizzone v. 
Bailey, 542 A.2d 806 
(Del. Fam. 1987) (travel expenses); Onley v. 
Onley, 540 So. 2d 880 (Fla. App. 1989) (automobile purchased for child); 
Henderson v. Henderson, 166 Ga. App. 412, 304 S.E.2d 517 (1983) (tuition 
or educational expenses); Harner v. 
Harner, 105 Ill. 
App. 3d 430, 434 N.E.2d 465, 61 Ill. Dec. 312 (1982) 
(continued child support payments under mistaken belief that payments were 
required after child reached majority); Whitman v. 
Whitman, 405 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. App. 
1980) (clothing, gifts, food, entertainment); Finley v. Morrow, 697 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. App. 1985) (erroneous interpretation or recollection of 
terms of contract for child support approved by court).

 
 

Griess, 
608 N.W.2d  at 224.  See also, State ex rel. DHR v. Scott, 637 So. 2d 892 (Ala. App. 1994); see generally, 24A Am. Jur. 2d, 
supra, § 1068.  However, 

 
 
[n]ormally, 
exceptions are made only "when the equities of the circumstances demand it and 
when allowing a credit will not work a hardship on the 
minor children."  
Griess, 608 N.W.2d  at 224 (citations omitted); see also 24A Am. 
Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 1068, at 
476-77.

 
 

In re 
Marriage of Pals, 714 N.W.2d 644, 651 (Iowa 2006).

 
 
[¶9]      Even though this 
is an issue of first impression, Wyoming law is nevertheless instructive in 
this case, as both statutes and case law indicate a clear aversion to the 
unilateral modification of child support orders.  First, Wyoming statutes are clear that child support 
orders are always modifiable, in light of parents' ever 
changing circumstances, financial and otherwise.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-311 (LexisNexis 
2007).  However, such modification 
is to be done following the strict procedures elucidated in our statutes.  Wyoming case law is also helpful.  For instance, although it contains a 
very different factual situation, Kimble 
v. Ellis, 2004 WY 161, ¶ 13, 101 P.3d 950, 954 (Wyo. 2004), stands for 
an important proposition.  In Kimble, father offered to pay mother 
$4500.00, along with the children's college and wedding expenses, if she would 
forego all claims against him for past child support, health care costs, and the 
amount of marital indebtedness that he had been required to pay.  Mother agreed and accepted the offer, 
which was not put into writing nor submitted to a court for approval.  The district court upheld the parties' 
agreement; however, on appeal, this Court held that "any agreement that purports 
to waive unpaid child support or the custodial parent's right to enforce the 
support order without proper approval from a court of competent jurisdiction is 
void ab initio."  Id.¶ 14, 111 P.3d 954.  In reaching our decision in Kimble, 
we clearly stated that "[t]he thrust of our precedent is that parties may not unilaterally or jointly modify or abrogate the 
terms of a child support order."  
Id. ¶ 13, 111 P.3d 954. 

 
 
[¶10]   Although the facts of Kimble and this case differ, Kimble's lesson still holds true 
here.  However, rather than 
"bargaining away" his child support obligation, Father, to his credit, overpaid 
the obligation intentionally.  
Nevertheless, he unilaterally modified that obligation without court 
approval.  The record shows that 
Father admitted that he paid extra so that it would "save [him] a year or two 
years of paying child support."  
Additionally, Father testified that he paid voluntarily  that is, Mother 
never asked him for the extra payments, nor did his daughter.  However, the record also shows that 
Father believed that in doing so, he would not be penalized, according to 
employees in the Clerk of Court's office.

 
 
[¶11]   The circumstances here do not 
warrant application of the exception to the general rule.  "Credit is more likely to be appropriate 
for expenses incurred with the consent or at the request of the parent with 
custody.  Payments made under 
compulsion of circumstances are also more likely to merit credit for equitable 
reasons."  In re Pals, 714 N.W.2d  at 651.  We do not doubt that these overpayments 
made by Father were made with the best of intentions.  However, it is Father's obligation to 
pay the specified amounts according to the decree, and orders modifying it 
thereafter.  Allowing an increase at 
one time and a reduction at another would simply lead to incongruity and 
disorder in the child support system.

 
 
[¶12]   We conclude that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Father credit for overpayment 
of his child support obligation, and that the Order Regarding Overpayment is affirmed 
in all respects.