Case Title: Leslie S. Osborne v. Denise J. Dumoulin

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC09-751

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2011-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC09-751 
_____________ 
 
 
LESLIE S. OSBORNE, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
DENISE J. DUMOULIN, 
Appellee. 
 
 
[February 3, 2011] 
 
 
CANADY, C.J. 
 
In this case we consider the circumstances under which a debtor is entitled to 
the statutory $4000 personal property exemption from legal process for debtors 
who do not claim or receive the benefit of a homestead exemption.  We have for 
review a question certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit regarding the meaning of section 222.25(4), Florida Statutes (2007)—
which contains the personal property exemption—that is determinative of an issue 
in a bankruptcy case pending in that court and for which there appears to be no 
controlling precedent from this Court: 
 
- 2 - 
Whether a debtor who elects not to claim a homestead exemption and 
indicates an intent to surrender the property is entitled to the 
additional exemptions for personal property under Fla. Stat. § 
222.25(4). 
Osborne v. Dumoulin (In re Dumoulin), 326 Fed. App‟x 498, 502 (11th Cir. 2009).  
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const.  In line with the legal 
analysis we adopt, we clarify the issue presented by rephrasing the certified 
question as follows:  
Whether for the purpose of the statutory personal property exemption 
in section 222.25(4), a debtor in bankruptcy receives the benefits of 
Florida‟s article X, section 4, constitutional homestead exemption 
where the debtor owns homestead property but does not claim the 
homestead exemption in bankruptcy and the trustee‟s administration 
of the property is not otherwise impeded by the existence of the 
homestead exemption. 
For the reasons explained below, we answer the question in the negative. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
The parties previously stipulated to the essential facts of the case.  Denise 
Dumoulin (Debtor) filed a voluntary chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in federal court.  
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 701-07 (2006).  In her petition, she claimed her Fort 
Lauderdale home as exempt under article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution, 
thus removing it from the bankruptcy estate.  She also indicated her intent to 
surrender the real property.  At the time of filing, the Debtor planned to sell her 
home and lease it back from the purchaser.  The sale transaction, however, was not 
consummated. 
 
- 3 - 
After the creditors‟ meeting, see 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2006), Osborne, the 
bankruptcy trustee (Trustee), demanded the sum of $4000 in assets from the 
Debtor‟s personal property that exceeded the amount of the allowed exemptions 
under the Bankruptcy Code.  (This amount represented most of the Debtor‟s equity 
in her car.)  The Debtor then filed amendments to her bankruptcy petition, deleting 
the homestead exemption and newly claiming the $4000 personal property 
exemption of section 222.25(4), Florida Statutes (2007), the statute at issue in this 
case.  The Trustee objected to the claimed exemption, arguing that the Debtor was 
not entitled to claim it because she had a homestead.  The bankruptcy court, 
however, overruled the objection and denied the motion for turnover of the 
personal property.  The bankruptcy judge held that the Debtor was not precluded 
from claiming the statutory personal property exemption, noting that the Debtor 
intended to surrender the real property and no longer claimed the constitutional 
homestead exemption. 
 
The Trustee appealed the ruling, and the federal district court affirmed the 
order overruling the Trustee‟s objection.  The Trustee then appealed to the circuit 
court.  Osborne, 326 Fed. App‟x at 500.  Confronted with the question of how to 
interpret section 222.25(4), the Eleventh Circuit reviewed several bankruptcy cases 
that offered conflicting views regarding its meaning and certified a question to this 
Court.  Id. at 501-02. 
 
- 4 - 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
This case presents an issue of first impression in our state courts regarding 
the meaning of section 222.25(4), and our answer to the certified question will 
resolve an ongoing conflict in the bankruptcy courts.1  The determination of the 
meaning of a statute is a question of law and thus is subject to de novo review.  To 
give effect to the meaning intended by the Legislature, courts begin by examining 
the words of a statute to determine its plain and ordinary meaning.  Holly v. Auld, 
450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (citing A. R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 
157, 159 (Fla. 1931)).  Only when the statutory language is unclear or ambiguous 
is it necessary to apply principles of statutory construction to discern its meaning.  
Tropical Coach Line, Inc. v. Carter, 121 So. 2d 779, 782 (Fla. 1960). 
 
We begin our analysis with a review of the text of section 222.25(4) and 
section 4 of article X of our constitution as well as the rules of construction that 
apply to such exemptions.  We then examine the legal context of the exemption 
statute.  Next, we describe the basic conflict in the bankruptcy courts over the 
statute‟s meaning and, finally, we resolve the conflict and answer the rephrased 
certified question. 
A.  The Statutory Personal Property Exemption 
                                          
 
 
1.  The parties acknowledge that the Debtor in this case is now deceased but 
state that the issue regarding the meaning of section 222.25(4) nevertheless 
requires resolution in light of the conflicting opinions in the federal courts. 
 
- 5 - 
and the Constitutional Homestead Exemption 
 
Section 222.25, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part as follows: 
 
222.25.  Other individual property of natural persons 
exempt from legal process.—The following property is exempt from 
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process: 
 
. . . . 
 
(4) A debtor‟s interest in personal property, not to exceed 
$4,000, if the debtor does not claim or receive the benefits of a 
homestead exemption under s. 4, Art. X of the State Constitution.  
This exemption does not apply to a debt owed for child support or 
spousal support. 
(Footnote omitted.)  Section (4) was added to the statute in 2007.  Ch. 2007-185, 
§1, Laws of Fla. (effective July 1, 2007).  This exemption, sometimes referred to as 
the “wild card” exemption, permits an individual to exempt $4000 in personal 
property from the reach of creditors as long as the individual “does not claim or 
receive the benefits of” the article X homestead exemption.  This statutory personal 
property exemption is distinct from the personal property exemption provided in 
our constitution.  Art. X, § (4)(a)(2), Fla. Const. (exempting from forced sale or 
levy “personal property to the value of one thousand dollars”).  Only the statutory 
exemption is at issue here.  
 
Section 4, article X of the Florida Constitution provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
SECTION 4.  Homestead; exemptions.—  
(a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any 
court, and no judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, 
except for the payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations 
 
- 6 - 
contracted for the purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or 
obligations contracted for house, field or other labor performed on the 
realty, the following property owned by a natural person:  
(1) a homestead . . . .  
 
With regard to the homestead exemption, this Court “has long been guided 
by a policy favoring the liberal construction of the exemption . . . .  A concomitant 
in harmony with this rule of liberal construction is the rule of strict construction as 
applied to the exceptions.”  Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So. 2d 1018, 
1021 (Fla. 2001) (citing Milton v. Milton, 58 So. 718, 719 (Fla. 1912)).  We apply 
the same rule of liberal construction in favor of the statutory exemption to 
determine when a debtor “receive[s] the benefits” of the homestead exemption and 
thus becomes ineligible to claim the section 222.25(4) personal property 
exemption. 
B.  The Legal Context of the Statute 
 
Before we examine the conflict in the bankruptcy courts regarding section 
222.25(4), we outline the context of the statute within Florida and federal law.  
First, the constitutional homestead exemption to which the statute refers “protects 
the homestead against every type of claim and judgment except those specifically 
mentioned in the constitutional provision itself.”  Olesky v. Nicholas, 82 So. 2d 
510, 513 (Fla. 1955).2  “According to the plain and unambiguous wording of article 
                                          
 
 
2.  Another article in the state‟s constitution provides homestead property 
with tax exemptions.  See art. VII, § 6, Fla. Const.  
 
- 7 - 
X, section 4, a homestead is only subject to forced sale for (1) the payment of taxes 
and assessments thereon; (2) obligations contracted for the purchase, improvement 
or repair thereof; or (3) obligations contracted for house, field or other labor 
performed on the realty.”  Havoco, 790 So. 2d at 1022 (quoting Butterworth v. 
Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56, 60 (Fla. 1992)); see Wilhelm v. Locklar, 35 So. 6, 6 (Fla. 
1903) (“No judgment is a lien on said property unless it come[s] within the 
exceptions of the Constitution.”); see, e.g., Ilkanic v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 705 
So. 2d 1371, 1373 (Fla. 1998) (“[T]he civil restitution lien [§ 960.293, Fla. Stat. 
(Supp. 1994)] cannot be a cloud on homestead property.”); Demura v. County of 
Volusia, 618 So. 2d 754, 756 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (“Although the statute [§ 
162.09, Fla. Stat. (1991)] merely provides that any lien created pursuant to an 
administrative fine may not be foreclosed on real property which is homestead, the 
Constitution itself goes much farther:  No such lien exists as to such homestead 
property.”). 
 
When a person acquires property and makes it his or her home, the property 
is “impressed with the character of a homestead, and no action of the Legislature or 
declaration or other act on [the owner‟s] part [is] required to make it [the owner‟s] 
homestead, for it [is] already such in fact.”  Hutchinson Shoe Co. v. Turner, 130 
So. 623, 624 (Fla. 1930) (citing Baker v. State, 17 Fla. 406, 408-09 (Fla. 1879) 
(stating that under the constitutional provision, the homestead is “exempt from 
 
- 8 - 
forced sale, whether [the owner] has or has not been threatened with executions or 
other process”)).  Further, we have stated that “where a homestead has been 
acquired it can be waived only by abandonment or by alienation in the manner 
provided by law.”  Olesky, 82 So. 2d at 512; see Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York 
v. Magwood, 145 So. 67, 68 (Fla. 1932) (“As the right of homestead once acquired 
continues until terminated in the manner provided by law, the protection of the 
right may be exercised by one entitled thereto so long as the homestead character 
and attributes of the property exist.”); see also Chames v. DeMayo, 972 So. 2d 
850, 862 (Fla. 2007) (holding waiver of the homestead exemption from forced sale 
in an unsecured agreement is unenforceable). 
Chapter 222, Florida Statutes (2007), which is entitled “Method of Setting 
Apart Homestead and Exemptions,” includes both the statutory exemption at issue 
and other provisions pertinent to both the statutory personal property exemption 
and the constitutional homestead exemption.  Sections 222.01 and 222.02 provide 
a means whereby a person may claim property as homestead and notify judgment 
creditors of the property‟s exempt status under article X, section 4, either pre- or 
post-levy.  See Grant v. Credithrift of America, Inc., 402 So. 2d 486, 488 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1981).  Failure to employ these statutory methods for asserting a homestead 
exemption claim, however, does not waive the right to the homestead exemption.  
Albritton v. Scott, 74 So. 975, 975 (Fla. 1917) (“When a homestead to which the 
 
- 9 - 
exemption from forced sale is attached is sold in violation of the exemption rights 
conferred by the Constitution, such sale is void.  A mere failure to resist the sale is 
not a waiver of the exemption rights.”); see Magwood, 145 So. at 68 (“It is true 
that the appellee here could have interposed his claim of homestead exemption in 
that [earlier] suit, but, having failed to interpose it there, he is not precluded from 
exercising his constitutional right to contest his ouster from his homestead.”). 
Finally—and importantly—another provision in chapter 222 explains why 
the Eleventh Circuit has asked this Court essentially to resolve a conflict in the 
bankruptcy courts over the applicability of the section 222.25(4) exemption.  
Bankruptcy is governed by federal law, but states may opt out of the federal 
bankruptcy exemptions of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2006) and determine the 
exemptions allowed to debtors.  See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).  Florida has done so in 
section 222.20, Florida Statutes.3  Accordingly, when a Florida resident files for 
                                          
 
 
3.  Section 222.20 provides as follows: 
 
In accordance with the provision of s. 522(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C. s. 522(b)), residents of this state shall not be 
entitled to the federal exemptions provided in s. 522(d) of the 
Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C. s. 522(d)).  Nothing herein shall 
affect the exemptions given to residents of this state by the State 
Constitution and the Florida Statutes. 
But section 222.201, Florida Statutes (2007), expressly allows individual debtors to 
exempt “in addition to any other exemptions allowed under state law, any property 
listed in section (d)(10) of s. 522,” which in turn exempts debtors‟ rights to receive 
 
- 10 - 
bankruptcy, Florida law determines which property the debtor may exempt from 
the bankruptcy estate and administration by the trustee. 
C.  The Conflict in the Bankruptcy Courts 
 
Under section 222.25(4), the $4000 personal property exemption is available 
to any debtor who “does not claim or receive the benefits” of the article X 
homestead exemption.  Since this statutory exemption became effective in 2007, 
the bankruptcy courts have struggled with its application as evidenced by the many 
cases exhaustively outlining the conflicts that have arisen over the meaning of the 
statute.  See, e.g., In re Abbott, 408 B.R. 903, 909 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009); In re 
Hernandez, 21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B299, B300 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2008); 
In re Magelitz, 386 B.R. 879, 880-81 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2008).  The nub of the 
problem is that—as evidenced by the foregoing discussion—under Florida law the 
homestead exemption does not have to be claimed to be effective against creditors.  
The bankruptcy courts have differed on the role that this aspect of Florida law 
plays in bankruptcy proceedings.  As a result, the bankruptcy courts have 
expressed disparate views on whether and how a debtor with a Florida homestead 
is entitled to the section 222.25(4) personal property exemption.  Two decisions 
well illustrate the differing approaches to this problem. 
1.  In re Magelitz 
                                                                                                                                        
certain benefits, such as social security benefits, veterans‟ benefits, and 
unemployment compensation. 
 
- 11 - 
In Magelitz, the debtor filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy, and his 
Florida homestead automatically became property of the bankruptcy estate.  386 
B.R. at 883; see 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006).  The debtor did not, however, claim the 
homestead exemption to remove the property from the bankruptcy estate.  Instead, 
he claimed the section 222.25(4) personal property exemption.  In re Magelitz, 386 
B.R. at 881.  When the trustee objected to the debtor‟s claim of the personal 
property exemption, the debtor argued that by not claiming his home as exempt, he 
did not receive the benefits of the article X exemption and was thus eligible for the 
section 222.25(4) exemption.  Id. at 880. 
After reviewing Florida case law on the article X homestead exemption, the 
bankruptcy judge concluded that “[s]ince the Debtor in this case owns the home, 
lives in it, and intends to continue to reside there, the property has homestead 
status under Florida law and therefore receives constitutional protection from 
creditors regardless of the Debtor‟s failure to claim the homestead exemption.”  In 
re Magelitz, 386 B.R. at 883 (emphasis added).  The court discounted the debtor‟s 
decision in bankruptcy not to exempt an asset from administration by the trustee, 
concluding that in cases in which an asset has no equity the trustee typically 
abandons the property to the debtor.  Id.  Thus, the court concluded that the 
debtor‟s failure to claim the homestead exemption in bankruptcy had no effect on 
 
- 12 - 
the debtor‟s receipt of the benefits under the article X exemption.  The court 
reasoned as follows: 
Before the Debtor filed his bankruptcy petition, creditors were 
prevented from executing or obtaining judgment liens against his 
homestead by Art. X, § 4, Fla. Const.  Now that the petition has been 
filed, the creditors are stayed from taking such action by 11 U.S.C. § 
362, and since a debtor‟s exemptions in bankruptcy are determined as 
of the date of the filing of the petition, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A); In re 
Peterson, 897 F.2d 935, 937 (8th Cir.1990), a debtor who owns 
property that has the status of homestead on the petition date is 
entitled to assert the constitutional homestead exemption in the 
bankruptcy case.  Then, after the debtor is discharged, in spite of the 
fact that the homestead was not claimed as exempt on Schedule C, 
post-petition creditors would be [sic] not be able to pursue the 
homestead because of the protection afforded by the self-executing 
constitutional homestead exemption provision.  Thus, by retaining the 
home, the debtor effectively receives the benefits of the homestead 
exemption.  If the Debtor retains possession of the homestead while 
also claiming the additional wildcard personal property exemption, he 
would be able to shield the home from creditors under Art. X, § 4, Fla. 
Const. and protect additional personal property under Fla. Stat. § 
222.25(4) at the same time.  The Florida Legislature did not intend 
this result—a debtor cannot keep a home and also receive the 
enhanced personal property exemption under Fla. Stat. § 222.25(4). 
Id. at 883-84 (emphasis added). 
The court then ruled that the debtor received the benefit of the homestead 
exemption by staying in the home and could not claim the statutory exemption.  
Accordingly, the bankruptcy court held that “in order for a debtor who has an 
interest in a homestead to claim the $4,000 personal property exemption under Fla. 
Stat. 222.25(4), the debtor must (1) not claim the property as exempt, and (2) 
timely and properly show a clear and unambiguous intent to abandon the 
 
- 13 - 
property.”  Id. at 884; see In re Gatto, 380 B.R. 88, 95 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) 
(“Because the Debtors did not claim their homes as exempt, and because they are 
surrendering their respective homes, they will receive no benefit of the homestead 
exemption under section 4, article X of the Florida Constitution.  As a result, they 
are entitled to the Statutory Personal Property Exemption provided for by section 
222.25(4), Florida Statutes.”).  Under the reasoning in Magelitz, the debtor‟s 
election not to claim the homestead as exempt from administration by the 
bankruptcy trustee had no effect on the debtor‟s eligibility to claim the statutory 
personal property exemption. 
2.  In re Bennett 
 
About six months after Magelitz issued, a different bankruptcy judge also 
addressed the problem of applying section 222.25(4) in light of Florida‟s history 
regarding the article X homestead exemption.  In re Bennett, 395 B.R. 781, 784 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008).  That court held that in federal bankruptcy proceedings a 
debtor may cease to receive the benefits of the article X homestead exemption 
without abandoning the real property. 
In Bennett, a consolidated case, none of the debtors claimed the homestead 
exemption.  395 B.R. at 784.  Further, although several debtors indicated an intent 
to abandon their homestead, others did not.  Id.  After reviewing Florida law, the 
court acknowledged—as had other bankruptcy courts—that “there is little that a 
 
- 14 - 
homeowner can do under Florida law to lose the protection of homestead [under 
article X].”  Id. at 789 (emphasis added) (citing Magelitz).  The court, however, 
determined that a debtor in bankruptcy who continues to occupy homestead 
property may nonetheless cease to receive the benefits of the exemption. 
As some courts have noted, it is not possible under Florida law 
to stop receiving the benefits of the Homestead Exemption without 
abandonment or alienation.  If all who could claim the exemption 
were to automatically receive the benefits of the Homestead 
Exemption in the context of a bankruptcy, then the decisions in 
Magelitz, Franzese [383 B.R. 197 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008)] and 
Morales [381 B.R. 917 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008)] would be persuasive 
in holding that mere eligibility is sufficient and the language of the 
Statutory Exemption provision would be largely unnecessary.  
However, it is clear to this Court that a debtor in bankruptcy may 
cease to receive the benefits of the Homestead Exemption regardless 
of whether that protection could cease under the operation of Florida 
law alone. 
 
Pursuant to § 522(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, “an individual 
debtor may exempt from property of the estate” various items or 
amounts specified under either the federal or state scheme of 
exemptions.  The term “may” indicates that the debtor is not required 
to claim exemptions.  If the debtor does not choose to exempt the 
homestead under the Florida Homestead Exemption, the real property 
remains property of the estate under § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code 
and is subject to administration by the trustee.  As a non-exempt asset, 
any equity left in the property after the secured claims have been 
satisfied could be used to satisfy the claims of unsecured creditors.  In 
that situation, a debtor is not receiving the benefits of the Homestead 
Exemption‟s protection of the homestead from forced judicial sale. 
. . . [I]t is this Court‟s conclusion that debtors who do not 
affirmatively exempt their homestead under § 522(b)(1) and the 
Homestead Exemption, but instead leave it available for 
administration by the Chapter 7 trustee, neither have claimed nor 
received the benefits of the Homestead Exemption found in Article X 
of the Florida Constitution.  It is important to note that the Chapter 7 
trustee need not actually administer the homestead for it to lose the 
 
- 15 - 
protection of the Article X Homestead Exemption.  That the 
homestead would not be protected were the trustee to decide to 
administer it is sufficient, because this means that the protection 
afforded by the Homestead Exemption has ceased. 
In re Bennett, 395 B.R. at 789-90 (citations omitted) (emphases added). 
 
 
Both the Magelitz and the Bennett courts agree that under Florida law the 
article X homestead exemption is effective against creditors in all but the three 
express instances described in the Florida Constitution and is lost only through 
abandonment of the homestead.  On the basic issue of the effect this has in 
bankruptcy proceedings, however, the courts have arrived at opposite conclusions.  
For the court in Magelitz, the homestead debtor in bankruptcy cannot claim the 
section 222.25(4) exemption absent abandonment of the homestead property.  The 
court in Bennett, however, concluded that bankruptcy is different.  Failure to claim 
a homestead exempt in bankruptcy proceedings necessarily makes the homestead 
subject to administration for the benefit of creditors.  Thus, under Bennett, absent 
other factors not relevant here, a debtor with a homestead is eligible to claim the 
section 222.25(4) personal property exemption without abandoning the homestead 
property. 
D.  Resolving the Conflict and Answering the Question 
The persons excluded from using the section 222.25(4) personal property 
exemption are those who “claim or receive the benefits of a homestead exemption 
under s. 4, Art. X of the State Constitution.”  To give full effect to the statute, we 
 
- 16 - 
read the personal property exemption liberally and thus read narrowly the phrase 
restricting the availability of the statutory exemption to those who do not receive 
the benefits of the homestead exemption. 
1.  What Are the “Benefits”? 
Section 222.25(4) expressly states that the “benefits” are those of the 
homestead exemption of article X, section 4 of this state‟s constitution.  As we 
have previously stated, with three express exceptions this constitutional homestead 
exemption protects a person‟s homestead against forced sale and levy.  See art. X, 
§ 4, Fla. Const.  Thus, the protection of the homestead from creditors constitutes 
the only “benefits” of the article X homestead exemption.  See  In re Abbott, 408 
B.R. at 908 (“The benefits contemplated under the statute are those derived from 
the constitutional homestead exemption, i.e., protecting the home from forced sale 
by creditors.”).  The express limitation of “benefits” to this constitutional provision 
necessarily excludes other constitutional or statutory tax exemptions related to 
one‟s homestead, see art. VII, § 6, Fla. Const., and any other advantages of owning 
or occupying a home.  See Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. v. Cauley, 666 So. 2d 
898, 900 (Fla. 1996) (stating statutory construction principle of “expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius,” i.e., “the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of 
another”). 
 
- 17 - 
Several of the federal bankruptcy courts reached this same conclusion based 
on the limiting language within the statute.  See, e.g.,  In re Bennett, 395 B.R. at 
788 (“Whether a debtor has equity in the property, lives in the home, or enjoys any 
other types of tax benefits has no relevance to the question of whether a debtor 
receives the benefits of the Florida Homestead Exemption.”); In re Hernandez, 21 
Fla. L. Weekly Fed. at B300 (“If the legislature meant to exclude from the 
Statutory Personal Property Exemption all homeowners who owned homes on the 
petition date which met the constitutional definition of a homestead, the statute 
could have plainly and easily been written to exclude all individuals owning homes 
eligible for the constitutional exemption.  That, of course, is not what the statute 
says.  Rather, it excludes only those who receive the benefits of the constitutional 
exemption.”); In re Gatto, 380 B.R. 88, 93 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (“[The 
Trustees] point to benefits that are incidental to the ownership of a home such as 
the acquisition of owner‟s equity, the ability to deduct mortgage interest, and the 
exemption and cap on real estate taxes.  None of these benefits derive from the 
exemption for a homestead from the reach of creditors under section 4, article X of 
the Florida Constitution.”). 
2.  Receiving the Benefits 
 
Having established that the “benefits” cited in section 222.25(4) refer only to 
the protection of the homestead from the reach of creditors provided by the article 
 
- 18 - 
X homestead exemption, we now determine what it means to “claim or receive” 
those benefits within the meaning of the personal property exemption statute.  As 
acknowledged by the courts in both Magelitz and Bennett, under Florida law a 
debtor need not claim the article X exemption to obtain its protections—the 
provision is self-executing.  Further, the benefits of the constitutional exemption 
ordinarily cannot be waived or lost absent abandonment or alienation of the 
homestead property.  However, as one court has stated, “[B]ankruptcy adds 
another dimension to the analysis.”  In re Abbott, 408 B.R. at 909. 
In bankruptcy, a debtor‟s property becomes property of the bankruptcy 
estate.  See 11 U.S.C. § 541.  A debtor, however, “may exempt from property of 
the estate” the property permitted under Florida and federal law.  11 U.S.C. § 522.  
Thus, the debtor in bankruptcy has the option of claiming the homestead as exempt 
from the bankruptcy estate.  In re Bennett, 395 B.R. at 790; accord In re Abbott, 
408 B.R. at 910.  If a debtor claims the homestead exemption, then he or she 
receives the benefits—the homestead‟s protection from creditors.  Alternatively, 
the debtor may choose not to exempt the homestead from the bankruptcy estate.  
When the debtor in bankruptcy does not claim the homestead exemption, the 
debtor effectively surrenders the homestead to the trustee for administration.  In re 
Bennett, 395 B.R. at 790-91.  Thus, the additional step of actual abandonment of 
the real property or an expression of intent to abandon the homestead is not 
 
- 19 - 
required to bring the debtor within the category of those debtors who do “not claim 
or receive the benefits of [the article X] homestead exemption.”  As the Bennett 
court correctly concluded, when the real property which has been occupied by a 
debtor as his homestead becomes subject to administration by the bankruptcy 
trustee, the debtor has lost the benefits of the homestead exemption. 
In some cases, a bankruptcy trustee may decide not to administer the 
homestead property but to leave the home in the debtor‟s possession because, for 
example, there is little or no equity in the home.  This decision by the trustee, 
however, does not negate the debtor‟s loss of the benefits of the homestead 
exemption.  Whatever benefits may flow to the debtor as a consequence of the 
trustee‟s decision, those benefits are not “benefits of a homestead exemption.”  
Because the debtor did nothing to prevent the administration by the trustee of the 
real property which constituted the debtor‟s home, the homestead exemption has 
ceased to have any legal effect with respect to that property, and the debtor has lost 
the benefits of the homestead exemption.  Id. at 790; see In re Abbott, 408 B.R. at 
910 (“By not claiming the homestead exemption in bankruptcy, the debtor ceases 
to receive the benefit of protecting the home from the claims of creditors and takes 
the chance that the trustee may administer the property.”).  Contra In re Brown, 
406 B.R. 568, 571 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (“Unless the facts in a particular case indicate 
more—that the trustee is likely to administer and sell the home, or that foreclosure 
 
- 20 - 
or surrender of the home to the mortgagee is likely—the mere act of exposing an 
over-encumbered home to the trustee is a temporary and meaningless event.”).   
Some courts examining the “claim or receive the benefits” language of the 
personal property exemption statute have focused on the limiting nature of these 
verbs.  As the court in Gatto observed, the “word „receive‟ is in the present tense.”  
In re Gatto, 380 B.R. at 91.  The court found this “consistent with the general 
proposition that a debtor‟s entitlement to an exemption is determined as of the date 
of the [bankruptcy] petition.”  Id.; see In re Morales, 381 B.R. at 920 (“A striking 
feature of the language of the statute is that it is written in the present tense.  
Therefore, the fact that a debtor may have claimed or received the benefits of a 
homestead exemption in the past would appear to have no bearing on the 
application of the statute to a debtor‟s present situation.”). 
We agree that use of the present tense of the verbs in section 222.25(4) 
narrows the relevant time that a debtor receives the benefits of the article X 
homestead exemption to the period when the debtor asserts the personal property 
exemption.  The personal property exemption is unavailable to a debtor asserting 
that exemption who is contemporaneously claiming or receiving the benefit of the 
homestead exemption.  Accordingly, whether a debtor in bankruptcy could claim 
the homestead exemption, previously received the benefits of the homestead 
exemption, or may receive such protection after discharge from bankruptcy does 
 
- 21 - 
not constitute receiving the benefits of the article X homestead exemption within 
the meaning of the personal property exemption.  See In re Bennett, 395 B.R. at 
788 (“There would be no reason for the legislature to have allowed the exemption 
for a debtor who „does not claim or receive the benefits of‟ if it truly meant merely 
that a debtor „could claim‟ or „is eligible to claim‟ the Homestead Exemption.”); 
see also In re Abbott, 408 B.R. at 910 (“Therefore, whether a debtor acquires 
equity in the property in the future is irrelevant to the issue of whether the debtor 
receives the benefits of the homestead exemption as of the petition date.”); In re 
Hernandez, 21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. at 300 (“In allowing or disallowing a debtor‟s 
attempt to claim the Statutory Personal Property Exemption in a bankruptcy case, 
the focus is solely on the exemptions which will affect creditors in the case.  The 
fact that the debtor is keeping his home and may use the constitutional shield to 
protect against execution by future creditors is not relevant.”).  
3.  Otherwise Receiving the Benefits 
 
In the foregoing analysis, we have explained that the only “benefits” referred 
to in section 222.25(4) are protections of the homestead against forced sale and 
levy and that by not claiming the article X, section 4, homestead exemption, a 
debtor in bankruptcy may lose that protection.  This does not mean, however, that 
every debtor who does not assert the homestead exemption in bankruptcy is not 
receiving the benefits of the exemption. 
 
- 22 - 
As several courts have explained, each case must be decided on its own facts 
because the debtor in bankruptcy may still receive the homestead exemption‟s 
protections despite failing to assert the homestead exemption.  In re Bennett, 395 
B.R. at 790 (“A debtor who does not claim the Homestead Exemption may still 
receive its benefits in certain limited circumstances that can only be determined on 
a case-by-case basis, after a fact-intensive inquiry.”).  For example, in Hernandez, 
the debtor husband filed individually for bankruptcy and claimed entitlement to the 
section 222.25(4) personal property exemption.  In re Hernandez, 21 Fla. L. 
Weekly Fed. at B299.  The trustee objected, arguing that because the husband‟s 
nondebtor spouse retained the right to the homestead exemption, the debtor 
continued to receive the benefits of the homestead protection against creditors as 
well.  The bankruptcy court determined that the wife‟s retention of the homestead 
right would “prevent the trustee from administering the TBE [tenants by the 
entirety] property to pay any joint creditors,” which in turn meant that “the Debtor 
is receiving the benefits of the constitutional protection by shielding TBE assets 
from the reach of his joint creditors.”  Id. at B300.  Accordingly, the court held that 
the debtor could not claim the statutory personal property exemption. 
In light of the potential for debtors in bankruptcy who do not assert the 
homestead exemption to nevertheless receive its benefits, we do not hold that a 
debtor‟s not claiming the homestead exemption in bankruptcy is sufficient 
 
- 23 - 
evidence that a debtor is not receiving the benefits of the homestead exemption to 
allow a debtor to claim the section 222.25(4) personal property exemption.  
Consideration of the facts in each case to determine whether a debtor is otherwise 
receiving the homestead exemption‟s legal benefits is necessary to ensure that the 
statutory personal property exemption is available only to those who meet the 
statute‟s terms. 
4.  Answering the Question 
 
As we explained above, we construe the “claim or receive the benefits” 
language narrowly, consistent with providing the broadest reasonable application 
of the statutory personal property exemption.  Further, we rephrased the question 
certified by the Eleventh Circuit to better address the conflict in the federal 
bankruptcy courts regarding the application of section 222.25(4).  Accordingly, we 
now answer the rephrased question in the negative and hold that where a debtor in 
bankruptcy elects not to claim the article X, section 4, homestead exemption and 
the trustee‟s administration of the bankruptcy estate is not otherwise obstructed by 
the existence of the homestead exemption, the debtor does not receive the benefits 
of the homestead exemption and may claim the section 222.25(4) personal 
property exemption of $4000. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
- 24 - 
 
In summary, a debtor in a federal bankruptcy proceeding may cease to 
receive the constitutional protection from forced sale or levy by not claiming 
homestead property as exempt.  Accordingly, if under the facts of the case the 
article X homestead exemption does not otherwise present an obstacle to the 
bankruptcy trustee‟s administration of the estate, then the debtor in bankruptcy is 
not receiving the benefits of the homestead exemption and is eligible to claim the 
statutory personal property exemption of section 222.25(4).4 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit - Case No. 08-15355-AA 
 
Leslie S. Osborne, Trustee, Rappaport, Osborne and Rappaport, PL, Boca Raton, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Patrick S. Scott and Jeffrey T. Kuntz of GrayRobinson, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
                                          
 
 
4.  In this case, we have limited our opinion to answering the certified 
question regarding a Florida statute.  Accordingly, we did not address other issues 
raised that pertain to the federal bankruptcy proceeding.  Such issues are more 
appropriately addressed by the Eleventh Circuit. 
 
- 25 - 
Paul Steven Singerman, Ilyse M. Homer and Paul A. Avron of Berger Singerman, 
P.A., Miami, Florida, on behalf of  the Business Law Section of The Florida Bar, 
 
 
as Amicus Curiae