Case Title: Matoumba v. State

Citation: 390 Md. 544

Docket Number: 47/05

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 102231012
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 47
September Term, 2005
KOBIE MATOUMBA
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J. 
Filed:   January 12, 2006
The question presented in this case is whether a police officer, testifying at a
suppression hearing, is required to be qualified as an expert witness regarding facts that gave
rise to a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop and frisk of a suspect.  We shall answer that
question in the negative and affirm.
I.
Kobie Matoumba, petitioner, was convicted in a bench trial in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City of the offense of possession of a handgun by a person previously convicted
of a crime of violence.  He filed a motion to suppress the handgun the police seized from him
following a traffic stop.  The following facts underlie the charges.  
Petitioner was a passenger in the back seat of a vehicle driven by his friend.
Lieutenant Palmero of the Baltimore City Firearms Apprehension Strike Team and Officer
Moynihan of the Tactical Quick Response Team stopped the car for exceeding the speed
limit.  Based on his observations of petitioner, Officer Moynihan ordered petitioner out of
the vehicle and then frisked him.  He recovered a handgun in petitioner’s back pocket.  
At the hearing on petitioner’s motion to suppress, both officers were questioned about
their belief that petitioner was armed.  Neither officer was qualified as an expert.  The Circuit
Court accepted the officers’ testimony, implicitly finding that Officer Moynihan had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion to frisk petitioner.  Petitioner waived a jury trial, pled not
guilty, and proceeded on an agreed statement of facts.  He was convicted and sentenced to
a mandatory term of incarceration of five years, without the benefit of parole.  
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Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  The intermediate
appellate court affirmed.  Matoumba v. State, 162 Md. App. 39, 873 A.2d 386 (2005).  We
granted certiorari to consider the question of whether a police officer is required to be
qualified as an expert when testifying at a suppression hearing as to his or her basis for
conducting a frisk pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889
(1968).  Matoumba v. State, 388 Md. 404, 879 A.2d 1086 (2005).
II.
Before this Court, petitioner argues that, based upon this Court’s recent case of
Ragland v. State, 385 Md. 706, 870 A.2d 609 (2005), in the context of a Terry frisk,
Maryland Rules of Evidence 5-104(a), 5-701, and 5-702 require that the State qualify a police
officer as an expert prior to eliciting an opinion as to the reasons justifying a frisk of a
suspect.  Petitioner reasons that in order to justify a frisk of a person, the Supreme Court has
made it clear that the officer’s articulated reasons for suspecting that an individual is armed
and dangerous must be evaluated in light of his experience.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.
Ct. at 1883.  These opinions, petitioner continues, are not within the realm of the general
knowledge of lay persons and hence, come under the ambit of Md. Rule 5-702, testimony by
experts.  Petitioner concludes that the rationale of Ragland v. State, 385 Md. 706, 870 A.2d
609 (2005) requires that, before a police officer may testify as to the reasons underlying the
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basis for conducting a frisk of a suspect, he must first be qualified as an expert witness,
because he is relying upon his specialized training, skill, and expertise to justify his actions.
The State argues that a police officer need not be qualified as an expert in order to
give testimony at a suppression hearing on whether a frisk is justified because the Rules of
Evidence do not apply to suppression hearings.  In the alternative, the State argues that, even
if the Rules of Evidence do apply, in matters concerning the determination of questions of
fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be determined by the court
under Rule 5-104(a), the trial court has the discretion under Md. Rule 5-101(c)(1) to decline
to require strict application of the Rules of Evidence.  
III.
The Court of Special Appeals rejected Matoumba’s argument, finding “nothing in
Rule 5-702, Maryland case law, or Terry that could be remotely construed to mandate that
a police officer be qualified as an expert in order to render an opinion on his or her basis for
reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a pat-down.”  Matoumba, 162 Md. App. at 51,
873 A.2d at 392.  We agree.
The genesis of petitioner’s argument is found in Ragland.  In Ragland, two police
officers testified at trial as lay witnesses that conduct they had observed amounted to a drug
transaction involving Ragland and another person.  Ragland, 385 Md. at 709-14, 870 A.2d
at 611-14.  We reversed, holding that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony as lay
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opinion evidence and that the officers should have been qualified as expert witnesses under
Rule 5-702.  See id. at 725, 870 A.2d at 620.  We reasoned as follows:
“We think the better view in interpreting the rule regarding
opinion testimony is the more narrow one, and the view as
expressed in the amended Fed. R. Evid. 701.  We also agree
with the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and those
courts that have found that by permitting testimony based on
specialized knowledge, education, or skill under rules similar to
Md. Rule 5-701, parties may avoid the notice and discovery
requirements of our rules and blur the distinction between the
two rules.  Accordingly, we will follow the approach as
reflected in the 2000 amendment to Fed. R. Evid. 701 and hold
that Md. Rules 5-701 and 5-702 prohibit the admission as ‘lay
opinion’ of testimony based upon specialized knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education.”
Id.
Ragland was directed to trial proceedings, and not pretrial proceedings.  Petitioner
asks us to extend our Ragland holding to suppression hearings.  We decline to do so. 
Md. Rule 5-101 establishes the applicability and scope of the Rules of Evidence.  The
2003 version of the Rule, effective at the time of petitioner’s hearing, provides as follows:
“(a) Generally.  Except as otherwise provided by statute or rule,
the rules in this Title apply to all actions and proceedings in the
courts of this State.
(b) Rules inapplicable.  The rules in this Title other than those
relating to the competency of witnesses do not apply to the
following proceedings:
(1) Proceedings before grand juries;
(2) Proceedings for extradition or rendition;
(3) Direct contempt proceedings in which the
court may act summarily;
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(4) Small claim actions under Rule 3-701 and
appeals under Rule 7-112 (c)(2);
(5) Issuance of a summons or warrant under Rule
4-212;
(6) Pretrial release under Rule 4-216 or release
after conviction under Rule 4-349;
(7) Preliminary hearings under Rule 4-221;
(8) Post-sentencing procedures under Rule 4-340;
(9) Sentencing in non-capital cases under Rule
4-342;
(10) Issuance of a search warrant under Rule
4-601;
(11) Detention and shelter care hearings under
Rule 11-112; and
(12) Any other proceeding in which, prior to the
adoption of the rules in this Title, the court was
traditionally not bound by the common-law rules
of evidence.
(c) Discretionary application.  In the following proceedings,
the court may, in the interest of justice, decline to require strict
application of the rules in this Title other than those relating to
the competency of witnesses:
(1) The determination of questions of fact
preliminary to admissibility of evidence when the
issue is to be determined by the court under Rule
5-104 (a);
(2) Proceedings for revocation of probation under
Rule 4-347;
(3) Hearings on petitions for post-conviction
relief under Rule 4-406;
(4) Plenary proceedings in the Orphans' Court
under Rule 6-462;
(5) Waiver hearings under Rule 11-113;
(6) Disposition hearings under Rule 11-115;
(7) Modification hearings under Rule 11-116; and
(8) Any other proceeding in which, prior to the
adoption of the rules in this Title, the court was
authorized to decline to apply the common-law
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rules of evidence.”
Md. Rule 5-104(a), Preliminary Questions, provides as follows:
“(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally.  Preliminary
questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of section (b).  In making its determination, the court
may, in the interest of justice, decline to require strict
application of the rules of evidence, except those relating to
privilege and competency of witnesses.”
This Court adopted the Maryland Rules of Evidence in 1994.  Prior to the adoption
of the Rules of Evidence, evidentiary rules did not apply strictly in suppression hearings.
See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-73, 94 S. Ct. 988, 994, 39 L. Ed. 2d
242 (1974); Farrow v. State, 233 Md. 526, 532-33, 197 A.2d 434, 437-38 (1963).  Although
suppression hearings are important proceedings, and  a significant part of the criminal
adjudicatory process, “[t]he process due at a suppression hearing may be less demanding and
elaborate than the protections accorded the defendant at the trial itself.” United States v.
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679, 100 S. Ct. 2406, 2414, 65 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1980).  The Supreme
Court noted as follows:
“This Court on other occasions has noted that the interests at
stake in a suppression hearing are of a lesser magnitude than
those in a criminal trial itself.  At a suppression hearing, the
court may rely on hearsay and other evidence, even though that
evidence would not be admissible at trial.”
1The same rule applied in federal and other state courts.  See, e.g., United States v.
Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 679 n.12 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 530 U.S. 428,
120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000); United States v. Killebrew, 594 F.2d 1103, 1105
(6th Cir. 1979); United States v. De La Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 532-33 (5th Cir. 1977); State
v. Pena-Lora, 710 A.2d 1262, 1264 (R.I. 1998); State v. Towne, 615 A.2d 484, 493 n.1 (Vt.
1992); State v. Wright, 843 P.2d 436, 439 (Or. 1992); Vincent v. State, 349 So.2d 1145, 1146
(Ala. 1977); State v. Domicz, 873 A.2d 630, 651 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005);
Commonwealth v. Bunch, 477 A.2d 1372, 1376 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).  
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Id. at 679, 100 S. Ct. at 2414.  In Maryland, the law was the same.1  We said in Farrow,
“On the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant it
clearly is hearsay and hence is inadmissible; but on the issues of
probable cause and the lawfulness of arrest and of the
admissibility of evidence obtained through any search made in
connection with the arrest, such testimony, even if hearsay, is
directly relevant and is admissible.  Therefore, the determination
of the admissibility of evidence which is dependent upon the
lawfulness of an arrest should be made by the trial judge as a
preliminary matter quite apart, of course, from the question of
the guilt or innocence of the accused; and if the case is being
tried before a jury, such a matter should be heard out of the
presence of the jury.  Such a question may be raised, before trial
by a motion to exclude any evidence claimed to have been
improperly obtained.  Maryland Rule 725 b and c; Rizzo v. State,
201 Md. 206.  Cf. Asner v. State, 193 Md. 68.  See also Martelly
v. State, 230 Md. 341, 346-48, where a motion before trial to
suppress evidence was in effect withdrawn by the defendant's
trial counsel's express waiver of objection to the admissibility of
the same evidence when offered at the trial.”
Farrow, 233 Md. at 532-33, 197 A.2d at 437-38.
Officer Moynihan did not have to be qualified as an expert witness at the hearing on
the motion to suppress before the court heard evidence as to the officer’s basis for conducting
a frisk of petitioner.  Because the common-law rules of evidence did not apply to suppression
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proceedings before the adoption of the Maryland Rules of Evidence, it follows that, pursuant
to Md. Rule 5-101(b)(12), the Rules now in effect are inapplicable to suppression hearings.
In addition, under Rule 5-101(c)(1), the trial court has broad discretion, in the interests
of justice, to decline to apply the Rules of Evidence in “[t]he determination of questions of
fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be determined by the court
under Rule 5-104(a).”  Pursuant to Rule 5-104(a), in determining preliminary questions
concerning the admissibility of evidence, the court may decline to require strict application
of the Rules of Evidence, except those relating to privilege and competency of witnesses.
Because suppression hearings involve the determination of preliminary questions concerning
the admissibility of evidence, the language of  Rule 5-101(c)(1) grants the court broad
discretion to decline to strictly apply the Rules of Evidence.  See In re Ashley E., 387 Md.
260, 279-80, 874 A.2d 998, 1010 (2004) (stating that to “‘decline to require strict application
of the rules’ appears to have been intended to mean that the application of the various rules
of evidence in a proceeding listed in subsection (c) is entrusted to the discretion of the
court”).  Such evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of
discretion which materially prejudices the defendant.  A trial court abuses its discretion when
it acts without reference to any guiding principles or rules of law or where no reasonable
person would take the view adopted by the trial court.  See Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 385
Md. 185, 198, 867 A.2d 1077, 1084 (2005).  Petitioner has made no argument that the trial
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court abused its discretion by refusing to require the officers to be qualified as experts to
testify at the suppression hearing.
Instead, petitioner argues that the issue before this Court is one of competency of a
witness to testify, and that therefore the Maryland Rules of Evidence must be applied to a
suppression hearing when a police officer is testifying as an expert witness.  Just as the Rules
of Evidence may not be waived or relaxed in matters relating to privilege, so too, they may
not be relaxed or waived when related to competency.  He argues that the Rules of Evidence
do not permit the trial court to decline to apply the Rules in matters involving competency
of a witness, and that unless police officers are qualified as experts, they are not competent
to express opinions as to why certain conduct gave them reasonable articulable suspicion to
believe that a person is armed prior to conducting a frisk.
Petitioner misconstrues the meaning of “competency” as used in Rules 5-101 and 5-
104.  The Reporter’s Note to Rule 5-101 explains that the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure , in drafting the proposed rule, saw “a need to make clear that courts
cannot allow persons who are legally incompetent as witnesses to testify even if the rules of
evidence generally are inapplicable, and so [the Committee]  included an exemption for the
rules dealing with competency.”  One Hundred Twenty-Fifth Report of the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 5-101, Reporter’s Note, at 6 (1992).
It is clear that the Rule refers to the traditional notion of competency, i.e., that the witness
has sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature and obligation of an oath and is
2Our opinions in the past occasionally have used the term “competency” in the context
of discussing expert testimony.  See, e.g., Air Lift, Ltd. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of
Worcester County,  262 Md. 368, 401, 278 A.2d 244, 261 (1971) (stating that “[t]he
competency of an expert to testify is largely within the discretion of the trial court”).  In such
contexts, “competency” is used to refer to the qualifications of the proposed expert that are
necessary for the expert testimony at issue to be admissible, not to the legal competency of
the proposed expert to take the stand and offer testimony of any type.  This distinction is
reflected in the Rules of Evidence.  Rule 5-702 is a rule that excludes certain kinds of
testimony if the testifying witness does not possess the requisite qualifications to offer it.  If
an expert does not possess the requisite qualifications under Rule 5-702 to offer certain kinds
of testimony, the witness is not thereby rendered incompetent to testify as to other matters
on which testimony is permitted under the Rules of Evidence.
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possessed of sufficient mind and memory to observe, recollect, and narrate the things he or
she has seen or heard.  See generally Perry v. State, 381 Md. 138, 848 A.2d 631 (2004)
(discussing traditional notion of competency).  The Rule does not contemplate the so-called
“competency” of an expert witness to testify and the witness’s possession of knowledge
sufficient to enable him or her to testify concerning a specified matter.2 
The Circuit Court was not required to qualify the police officers as expert witnesses
before the officers were permitted to testify as to the reasons underlying and justifying the
frisk of petitioner.  Moreover, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply
strictly the Rules of Evidence.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED.
C O S T S  
T O  
B E  
P A I D  
B Y
PETITIONER.