Case Title: Department of Revenue and Taxation of State of Wyo. v. Hamilton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1987-10-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Department of Revenue and Taxation of State of Wyo. v. Hamilton1987 WY 137743 P.2d 877Case Number: 87-50Decided: 10/08/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
ITHE DEPARTMENT OF 
REVENUE AND TAXATION OF THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLANT 
(RESPONDENT),

 
 
v.

 
 
FLEET HAMILTON, APPELLEE 
(PETITIONER).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

 
 
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. 
Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Mark Quiner, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
for appellant.

 
 
John M. Scorsine, 
Rock Springs, for appellee.

 
 
Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

 
 

MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The question we must 
decide in this case is whether a hearing to review a driver's license suspension 
can be held more than 45 days after appellant Department of Revenue and Taxation 
of the State of Wyoming receives the request for a hearing under the 1985 
version of Wyoming's implied consent law, § 31-6-101 et seq., W.S. 
1977.

 
 

[¶2.]     We reverse the district 
court's ruling that a hearing must be held within 45 days.

 
 

[¶3.]     On October 10, 1985, 
appellee Fleet Hamilton was arrested and charged with driving while under the 
influence of alcohol in violation of § 31-5-233, W.S. 1977. Pursuant to the 
provisions of § 31-6-102(e), W.S. 1977 (now § 31-6-102(f), W.S. 1977), the 
arresting officer confiscated appellee's license and issued a temporary license 
which contained a notice advising of the procedure for requesting a review 
hearing.

 
 

[¶4.]     On October 30, 1985, 
appellant received appellee's request for a hearing and his request that the 
arresting officer be subpoenaed to testify. The hearing was first scheduled for 
December 4, 1985, which date was within 45 days of receipt of the hearing 
request. On November 27, 1985, still within the 45-day limit, the arresting 
officer notified the hearing examiner that he had to attend three court trials 
on December 4. Immediately, appellee's attorney was informed, and the hearing 
was continued to January 7, 1986, some 69 days after the request was 
received.

 
 

[¶5.]     At the January 7 
hearing, apparently for the first time, appellee's attorney argued that the 
hearing examiner lacked jurisdiction because of the delay in holding the 
hearing. The hearing examiner rejected this argument and upheld the driver's 
license suspension. The district court, relying on § 31-7-105(d), W.S. 1977, 
reversed the hearing examiner because the hearing was held more than 45 days 
after the request was received.

 
 

[¶6.]     Section 31-7-105(d) is 
not controlling in this case. As demonstrated by the notice of suspension, 
appellee's license was suspended "under provisions of the WYOMING IMPLIED 
CONSENT LAW (W.S. 31-6-101 to 31-6-106)." Thus, the statute which controls in 
this instance is § 31-6-102(e). At the time in question and through two 
subsequent amendments, this statute provided that a hearing shall be scheduled 
within 45 days after the request is received. In construing statutes, this Court 
gives primary consideration to legislative intent. Huber v. City of Casper, Wyo., 727 P.2d 1002 (1986); City of Evanston v. Griffith, Wyo., 715 P.2d 1381 (1986). The intention of 
the law-making body must be ascertained as nearly as possible from the language 
of the statute. Wyoming Department of Revenue and Taxation-Excise Tax Division 
v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A.-Kemmerer, Wyo., 718 P.2d 31 (1986). Schedule means: 
"[T]o appoint, assign, or designate to do or receive something at a fixed time 
in the future." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, p. 2028 (1971). 
This Court will not read into laws what is not there. Wilcoxson v. Employment 
Security Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 741 P.2d 611 (1987); Johnston v. Board of 
Trustees, School District # 1 West, Sheridan County, Wyoming, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1045 (1983). The clear intent of the provision at issue here is that the hearing 
must be scheduled within 45 days of receipt of the request. There is no 
requirement that the hearing be held within 45 days. In the instant case, the 
January 7 hearing was scheduled before the 45-day period had 
run.

 
 

[¶7.]     We reverse the district 
court's order and reinstate the license suspension.

 
 

CARDINE, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶8.]     I am convinced that a 
hearing to review a driver's license suspension must be held within 45 days after 
request therefor.

 
 

[¶9.]     Section 31-6-102(e), 
W.S. 1977 (now § 31-6-102(f)), in effect at the time demand for hearing was made 
in this case, provided as follows:

 
 
"If * * * demand for 
hearing is made, the department shall forward the demand to the independent 
hearing examiner who shall schedule a hearing within forty-five (45) days after 
receipt of the request and provide the arrested person at least ten (10) days 
notice of the hearing."

 
 

[¶10.]  The single question presented for our 
determination is whether § 31-6-102(f), supra, requires that the examiner 
schedule a hearing to be held within 45 days or, within 45 days, schedule a 
hearing for some undefined future date.

 
 

[¶11.]  Legislative intent is the primary and 
foremost consideration in statutory construction. State Board of Equalization v. 
Tenneco Oil Company, Wyo., 694 P.2d 97 (1985). It is a well-settled 
rule of statutory construction that the legislature will not be presumed to 
intend futile things. Haddenham v. City 
of Laramie, Wyo., 648 P.2d 551 (1982).

 
 

[¶12.]  We have repeatedly stated 
that

 
 
"[i]t is this court's 
obligation to make sense out of a statute and give full force and effect to the 
legislative product. In construing statutes, the intention of the lawmaking body 
must be ascertained from the language of the statute as nearly as possible. We 
must not give a statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is 
susceptible of another interpretation." (Citations omitted.) McGuire v. 
McGuire, Wyo., 608 P.2d 1278, 1285 
(1980).

 
 

[¶13.]  The hearing provided in § 31-6-102(f) 
will determine whether the person charged will have the privilege of operating 
his automobile. This is a matter of serious concern to citizens of this state. 
The automobile is considered a necessity for everyday living, for traveling to 
and from work, to and from the grocery store, school, college, church, and a 
multitude of other activities and places we must be every day. But if we 
conclude, as in the majority opinion, that the license suspension hearing be scheduled within 45 days for some future 
date beyond the 45-day period, it could be six months, one year, or ten 
years after the request. It is, therefore, unreasonable for us to conclude that 
the legislature intended that one whose license has been suspended might wait a 
year or two years for a hearing. The legislative intent is to the contrary. This 
intent is clearly demonstrated by the general tenor of the driver's license 
revocation statutes. Thus, § 31-6-104, W.S. 1977, before amendment, required 
that the district court "shall advance the matter on its docket" and, after 
amendment, provides that the district court "shall immediately set the matter 
for determination." This legislative intent was reaffirmed when, in 1987, § 
31-6-102(f) was amended to provide that rather than dismissing for failure to 
hear the matter within 45 days, the licensee

 
 
"be given credit against 
any action upheld at the hearing for the time between the expiration of the 
forty-five (45) day period and the date the hearing was first 
scheduled."

 
 
The statute, as amended, 
makes sense only if the word "scheduled" means "heard on the date scheduled." 
Thus, "the date the hearing was first scheduled" means the date on which the 
hearing was scheduled to be held. If the hearing were scheduled to be held 60 
days after receipt of request, the licensee would receive 15 days credit against 
a suspension and if held a year and 45 days later, a year's credit. To effect a 
suspension of a driver's license for the full period prescribed, there must be a 
hearing within 45 days. A speedy trial upon the question of suspension of 
drivers' licenses is clearly required.

 
 

[¶14.]  I have no quarrel with the opinion of the 
court when it states that to schedule means to do "something at a fixed time in 
the future." When a request for hearing is received, the examiner has the 45-day 
period in the future in which to schedule the hearing. But, the future date 
fixed may not be beyond the 45-day period provided in the 
statute.

 
 

[¶15.]  I would affirm the district court's order 
of dismissal.