Case Title: First Commercial Bank of Huntsville v. Nowlin, III.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1110910

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2013-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: 3/15/13
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013
____________________
1110910
____________________
First Commercial Bank of Huntsville
v.
Henry Moore Nowlin III et al.
Appeal from Morgan Circuit Court
(CV-2009-900267)
BRYAN, Justice.
First Commercial Bank of Huntsville ("the Bank") appeals
from a summary judgment in favor of various defendants on
claims alleged by the Bank against those defendants.  Because
the summary judgment did not resolve all claims against all
1110910
parties and because no part of the summary judgment was
certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
the appeal is due to be dismissed as being from a nonfinal
judgment.
The evidence below reveals the following facts.  Quincy
Wiggins applied to the Bank for a second-mortgage loan to
finance the purchase of certain real property in Decatur. 
According to the Bank, Wiggins represented to the Bank that
the purchase of the property would be further financed by a
first-mortgage loan from First Franklin Financial Corporation
("FFF") in the amount of $472,500.  The property was appraised
at a value of $730,000.  The Bank approved the loan to Wiggins
in the amount of $202,500.  Henry Moore Nowlin III, Douglas
Ray Bachuss, Jr., Nowlin & Associates, LLC, and First American
Title Insurance Company ("FATIC") participated in various
capacities in closing the loan.  The Bank and Wiggins closed
the loan in April 2007.  
In September 2008, the Bank refinanced Wiggins's loan. 
The refinanced loan was secured by the same mortgage as was
the original loan.  In August 2008, during the process of
refinancing the loan, the Bank learned that 
the 
first-mortgage
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loan from FFF was actually in the amount of $607,500 rather
than $472,500, as previously represented by Wiggins to the
Bank.   Wiggins later defaulted on the refinanced loan.  
In August 2009, the Bank sued Wiggins, Nowlin, Bachuss,
Nowlin & Associates, and FATIC.   With respect to Wiggins, the
Bank alleged breach of contract, "amounts owed pursuant to a
loan," 
open 
account, 
account 
stated, 
unjust 
enrichment, 
fraud,
misrepresentation, fraudulent suppression, and negligence. 
The Bank sued Nowlin & Associates, a law firm, and Nowlin and
Bachuss, lawyers who were employed by the firm, under the
Alabama Legal Services Liability Act, § 6-5-570 et seq., Ala.
Code 1975, alleging fraud, misrepresentation, fraudulent
suppression, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty/duty of
loyalty as an agent and/or attorney; the Bank also sought to
hold Nowlin & Associates vicariously liable for the conduct of
Nowlin and Bachuss.  With respect to FATIC, the Bank alleged
fraud, 
misrepresentation, 
fraudulent 
suppression, 
and
negligence; the Bank also sought to hold FATIC vicariously
liable for the conduct of Nowlin & Associates, Nowlin, and
Bachuss.  
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The Bank moved for a partial summary judgment against
Wiggins on its breach-of-contract claim and against the other
defendants on all claims against them.  Nowlin, Bachuss,
Nowlin & Associates, and FATIC moved for a summary judgment on
all of the Bank's claims against them.  On January 25, 2012,
the trial court entered an "order on motions for summary
judgments," in which it stated, in pertinent part:
"(I)
This matter came before the Court on a
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by [the
Bank] against ... Wiggins.  The Court did not
receive any response from ... Wiggins.  After
consideration of the matters submitted, the Court
finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the [Bank] is entitled to a Judgment as a
matter of law.
"Accordingly, it is Ordered, Adjudged and
Decreed that the Judgment be and the same is hereby
entered in favor of the [Bank] and against ...
Wiggins ....
"(II)
This matter is also presented to the Court
on Motion of [the Bank] for Partial Summary Judgment
against 
the 
remaining 
defendants. 
 
After
consideration of the matters presented, it is
Ordered that said Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment be and the same is hereby denied.
"(III)
This matter is also presented to the Court
on Motion[s] of the Defendants ... Nowlin, ...
Bachuss, ... Nowlin & Associates, ... and [FATIC]
for Summary Judgment in their favor against the
claims of the [Bank].  After consideration of all
matters submitted, the Court finds that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that the said
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1110910
Defendants are entitled to a Judgment as a matter of
law.
"It is therefore Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed
that Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby
entered in favor of the Defendants ... Nowlin, ...
Bachuss, ... Nowlin & Associates, ... and FATIC."
With some exceptions not applicable here, an appeal lies
only from a final judgment.   Ex parte Green, 58 So. 3d 135,
1
144 (Ala. 2010); see also Bean v. Craig, 557 So. 2d 1249, 1253
(Ala. 1990); § 12-22-2, Ala. Code 1975.  "The general rule is
that a trial court's order is not final [for purposes of
appeal] unless it disposes of all claims as to all parties." 
Dickerson v. Alabama State Univ., 852 So. 2d 704, 705 (Ala.
2002).  Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., establishes an exception
to the general rule.  Rule 54(b) provides, in pertinent part:
"When more than one claim for relief is presented in
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry
of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than
all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment."
In this case, the Bank's partial-summary-judgment motion
requested a judgment on the breach-of-contract claim against
See Rules 4(a), 4(d), and 5, Ala. R. App. P.
1
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Wiggins and on all the claims against the other defendants. 
However, the Bank's motion did not request a summary judgment
as to the remaining claims against Wiggins.  Thus, the trial
court's order with regard to the motion did not dispose of all
of the Bank's claims against Wiggins, and the order was not
final in regard to Wiggins.  
The motions for a summary judgment filed by Nowlin, 
Bachuss, Nowlin & Associates, and FATIC did request a judgment
in their favor on all of the Bank's claims against them, and
the trial court's order with regard to that motion did dispose
of all pending claims against those defendants.  However,
because claims remain pending against Wiggins and the record
does not contain a Rule 54(b) certification as to those –– or
any –– claims, the order is not final as to Nowlin, Bachuss,
Nowlin & Associates, and FATIC as well.  As noted, a nonfinal
judgment will not support an appeal. See Ex parte Green,
supra. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as being from a
nonfinal judgment.
APPEAL DISMISSED. 
Moore, C.J., and Bolin, Murdock, and Main, JJ., concur.
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