Case Title: DeWall v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
DeWall v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div.1998 WY 77960 P.2d 502Case Number: 97-260Decided: 06/22/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

In 
the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of Wayne C. DeWALL, Appellant 
(Petitioner/Employee-Claimant),

v.

STATE of Wyoming ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee

(Respondent/Objector-Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District Court, Teton County, D. 
Terry Rogers, J.

 

Robert A. Nicholas of 
Nicholas Law Office, LLC, Riverton, for Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant Attorney General, 
for Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

MACY, Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant Wayne DeWall (the claimant) appeals 
from the district court's order which affirmed the hearing examiner's decision 
to deny his claim for worker's compensation benefits.

 

[¶2] We 
affirm.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶3] The claimant presents 
the following issues for our review:

 

1. 
Is the decision of the hearing [examiner] arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise 
not supported by the evidence, and contrary to law?

 

2. 
More specifically, does the Order incorrectly set forth fundamental 
uncontroverted facts and thereby arbitrarily deny [the claimant] worker['s] 
compensation benefits?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶4] The claimant worked for 
the Jackson Hole Ski Corporation (the employer) as a ski instructor for 
physically challenged skiers. The claimant himself was physically challenged, 
having lost his right leg in 1976 as a result of an automobile 
accident.

 

[¶5] The physically 
challenged program was set up so that the instructors who were scheduled to 
teach on a particular day reported to the chalet for the morning line up. When 
physically challenged individuals were signed up for lessons, the instructors 
taught and were paid an hourly wage. When no physically challenged people were 
in need of lessons, the instructors were free to do whatever they wanted until 
one o'clock in the afternoon unless someone requested a lesson before the 
afternoon line up was held, in which event a supervisor would contact an 
instructor, directing him to report to the ski school to give the lesson. At the 
afternoon line up, if students were waiting for lessons, the instructors would 
take them up on the mountain and give them special instruction. If no students 
were waiting, the instructors would be free for the rest of the day unless they 
were notified that they were needed to teach late arrivals. The supervisors had 
more responsibility in that they were required to remain in close contact with 
the ski school throughout the day so that, if someone showed up at an off hour 
in need of a lesson, they could attempt to arrange for an instructor to give the 
lesson. The instructors were paid a wage 
for the time that they spent teaching lessons and were given free ski passes for 
showing up when no students had signed up for a lesson.

 

[¶6] On December 11, 1995, 
the claimant reported to the morning line up to find out whether he would be 
needed to teach a lesson.  His 
services were not required that morning, so he went skiing with a friend. While 
he was skiing, he felt a pop and immediate tightening in his lower back. He 
tried to stretch it out and continued to ski. He later felt another pop and more 
tightening in his lower back. At that point, he decided to quit skiing for the 
day.

 

[¶7] On December 16th, the 
claimant went skiing again. Although he felt another pop in his back, he 
stretched and continued to ski.  His 
back subsequently went into spasms, and he collapsed on the trail. After about 
ten minutes, he was able to ski to the clinic at the bottom of the 
mountain.

 

[¶8] The claimant filed an 
injury report on January 23, 1996, requesting benefits for the December 11th 
injury. On January 30, 1996, the Division of Workers' Safety and Compensation 
(the division) denied the claimant's request for benefits, reasoning that the 
injury did not occur while the claimant was working. A hearing was conducted, 
and the hearing examiner denied the claim for worker's compensation benefits. 
The claimant sought review in the district court. The district court affirmed 
the hearing examiner's decision, and the claimant appeals to this 
Court.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

[¶9] The claimant contends 
that he was injured in the course of his employment because skiing between 
lessons enabled him to maintain his skills, stay physically fit, and become 
familiar with the snow conditions in case he needed to take a student up on the 
mountain for a lesson. The division counters that the claimant was not on duty 
when he was injured because he was not teaching and because he was not required 
to ski between line-up calls.

 

[¶10] Judicial review of an 
agency's action is governed by WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) (1997). W.R.A.P. 
12.09(a). Whether or not an employee's injury occurred in the course of his 
employment is a question of fact. Latimer v. Rissler & McMurry Co., 902 P.2d 706, 708 (Wyo. 1995). We review an administrative agency's findings of fact by 
applying the substantial evidence standard. Id. Our task is to examine the 
entire record to determine whether substantial evidence supported the hearing 
examiner's findings. 902 P.2d  at 708-09. We will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the hearing examiner when substantial evidence supports his decision. 
902 P.2d  at 709. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable 
mind might accept in support of the agency's conclusions. 
Id.

 

[¶11] To qualify for 
benefits, the claimant must have sustained an injury pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi) (1997). Section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(H) excludes injuries from the 
definition of "injury" which were incurred by an individual who was engaging in 
recreational activities when the injury occurred. It provides that, for purposes 
of compensability, an injury does not include:

 

Any injury sustained while engaged in recreational or 
social events under circumstances where an employee was under no duty to attend 
and where the injury did not result from the performance of tasks related to the 
employee's normal job duties or as specifically instructed to be performed by 
the employer[.]

 

Section 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(H).

 

[¶12] In Cronk v. City of 
Cody, 897 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1995), this Court considered a similar situation in 
which Cronk was employed as a police officer by the City of Cody. 897 P.2d  at 
477. Cronk injured himself while he was working out in a gym located in the Law 
Enforcement Center. Id. Although Cronk was off duty at the time of his injury, 
he claimed that working out made him a better police officer and that, 
therefore, he was injured in the course of his employment. Id. Because the 
officers were not required to use the gym or engage in any type of fitness 
program as a condition of their employment, we affirmed the district court's 
decision that a nexus between the injury 
and Cronk's employment did not exist and that, therefore, Cronk was not injured 
in the course of his employment. 897 P.2d  at 477-78.

 

[¶13] In the case at bar, 
the evidence indicates that the claimant was acting as a supervisor on the day 
that he was injured. He, however, was not technically on duty because he was not 
giving a lesson. Although he needed to be as available as possible, he was not 
required to ski as a condition of his employment unless he was instructing a 
student. The fact that he was wearing his uniform at the time of his injury does 
not convince us otherwise. The ski area implemented a policy beginning with the 
1995-96 ski season which prohibited instructors from wearing uniforms except 
during lessons. Additionally, the claimant received a wage only if he taught a 
lesson.

 

[¶14] Keeping in good 
physical condition, maintaining good skills as a skier, and knowing the snow 
conditions on any runs where the claimant might take a student would enhance his 
performance at his job and benefit his employer. However, because the employer 
did not require, as a condition of employment, its instructors to ski unless 
they were giving a lesson, we cannot agree that such activity was within the 
course of the claimant's employment even though it might have made him better at 
his job.

 

[¶15] The claimant asserts 
that the hearing examiner "inadvertently reversed the facts when drafting his 
decision two months after the hearing." He claims that the hearing examiner 
mischaracterized the facts when he said that the claimant "appeared at the ski 
area on a day he was not scheduled to appear for the line up and received his 
free ski ticket. The fact he was there on a day that he was not regularly 
assigned and was not acting in a ski instructor capacity is of significance." 
The claimant maintains that the testimony presented at the hearing proved that 
he was scheduled to instruct on December 11, 1995, and that he was also the 
supervisor on that date.

 

[¶16] In writing this 
decision, we assumed that, on December 11, 1995, the claimant was on duty as an 
instructor and that he was also the acting supervisor. It does not matter 
whether or not the claimant was scheduled to work because he was not giving a 
lesson when his injury occurred. His employer did not require him to ski between 
lessons as a condition of his employment so he was engaged in recreational 
activity when he was injured. That activity was outside the scope of his 
employment, and his injury was, therefore, not 
compensable.

 

[¶17] 
Affirmed.