Case Title: BOSTWICK v DEPT OF HIGHWAYS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
,NO. 14893 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 GERALD H. BOSTWICK and MARJORIE E. BOSTWICK, Plaintiff and Respondent, THE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, Honorable Frank E. Blair, Judge presiding. Cou-.~:~el of Record : For Appellant: Terry Clausen, Dept. of Highways, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Frank Davis, Dillon, Montana Submitted on briefs: April 3, 1980 ~ecided: JUN i 1 Filed: JUFt ' M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant Department of Highways appeals from an i n t e r - locutory d e c i s i o n of t h e Beaverhead County D i s t r i c t Court, s i t t i n g without a jury, t h a t p l a i n t i f f s were e n t i t l e d t o compensation f o r t h e l o s s of reasonable access t o t h e i r property. W e dismiss t h e appeal without prejudice on t h e grounds t h a t a f i n a l judgment has n o t y e t been entered i n t h i s case and t h e i n t e r l o c u t o r y o r d e r i s n o t appealable. P l a i n t i f f s are t h e owners 3f a warehouse located on E a s t Helena and Washington S t r e e t s i n Dillon, Montana. The warehouse serves t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' own trucking needs and pro- v i d e s r e n t a l space f o r various t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and moving l i n e s . Trucking firms which use t h e warehouse unload t h e i r s t o r a g e through a f r e i g h t door facing East Helena S t r e e t . Approaching t r u c k e r s e i t h e r back t h e i r t r u c k s t o t h e f r e i g h t door o r p a r a l l e l park on t h e sidewalk between East Helena S t r e e t and t h e door. I n 1977 defendant Department of Highways placed s i g n a l p o l e s on t h e sidewalk and t r a f f i c i s l a n d near t h e door. These poles prevent approaching t r u c k s from parking p a r a l l e l t o t h e warehouse. Since t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of t h e s e poles, v i r t u a l l y a l l of p l a i n t i f f s ' customers have sought s t o r a g e space elsewhere. On January 25, 1978, p l a i n t i f f s f i l e d a complaint seeking damages of $100,000 f o r t h e Department of Highway's d e n i a l of access t o t h e i r warehouse. The Department f i l e d a n answer which admitted t h a t t h e s i g n a l poles were e r e c t e d on E a s t Helena S t r e e t b u t denied t h a t a taking of p l a i n t i f f s ' property had occurred. A t t r i a l p l a i n t i f f Gerald Bostwick t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e warehouse would be worth $100,000 i f it could be used t o r e n t s t o r a g e space. H e s t a t e d t h a t he averaged $600 per month from r e n t a l s p r i o r t o 1965 and $1,000 per month be- tween 1965 and 1970. Since 1977 a l l b u t one of p l a i n t i f f s ' customers have stopped using t h e warehouse and, according t o p l a i n t i f f s , t h e value of t h e warehouse now is only $20,000. P l a i n t i f f Bostwick on cross-examination t e s t i f i e d t h a t he maintained a r e g u l a r set of books which would support h i s testimony a s t o business l o s s . He d i d not, however, produce t h e books. Counsel f o r t h e Department moved the t r i a l c o u r t t o s t r i k e Bostwick's testimony because t h e w r i t t e n records were t h e b e s t evidence of business p r o f i t s and l o s s e s . The t r i a l c o u r t denied t h e motion. The case was t r i e d on t h e i s s u e of whether p l a i n t i f f s w e r e e n t i t l e d t o compensation, and i f s o , how much. Both p a r t i e s submitted proposed f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law a t t h e end of t h e t r i a l , and t h e t r i a l c o u r t adopted verbatim t h e f i n d i n g s and conclusions submitted by p l a i n - t i f f s . These findings and conclusions admitted t h a t testi- mony concerning damages was general and somewhat speculative. They a l s o contained a provision, however, t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t reserved t h e r i g h t t o conduct a s p e c i a l hearing on damages, i f a f t e r n i n e t y days t h e p a r t i e s were unable t o reach agreement on t h i s amount. The l a s t paragraph of t h e f i n d i n g s and conclusions s t a t e d , " l e t judgment be entered accordingly." The t r i a l c o u r t later denied t h e Department's motion t o amend t h e f i n d i n g s and conclusions. Judgment was never entered. The Department has appealed from t h e so-called f i n d i n g s and conclusions entered by t h e t r i a l court. The e s s e n t i a l i s s u e s r a i s e d the Department a r e i t s contentions t h a t p l a i n t i f f s f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h e i t h e r a compensable taking o r damages. I n t h e absence of a f i n a l judgment, w e w i l l n o t reach e i t h e r of these i s s u e s . The t r i a l & o h r t l s order determined cornpensability b u t reserved t h e question of damages f o r a l a t e r hearing. A s such, t h e order w a s i n t e r l o c u t o r y and n o t appealable. See S t a t e ex rel. Great F a l l s Nat. Bank v. ~ i s t r i c t Court (1969), 154 Mont. 336, 463 P.2d 326; Rule 1, M.R.App.civ.~. The appeal i s dismissed without prejudice. 2 & g p . a k d 4 Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: .,-:, ; < , y k% L . ~ - - - Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea concurring: I concur with the dismissal of this appeal upon the grounds that it is not ready for review. Rule 1, M.R.App. Civ.P. coupled with the failure to comply with Rule 54(b) (certification of questions for appeal which are not otherwise final), clearly requires this result. See Rob Roy v. Neibauer (19801, - Mont. - I - P.2d - , 37 St.Rep. 897, where this Court, because of the persistent failure of the district courts and the attorneys of this state to comply with Rule 1 and Rule 54(b), we set out the procedures and requirements for obtaining certification. It is clear that the District Court proceeded in blatant violation of the procedural rules governing trials. In essence, he granted the plaintiffs two bites of the apple. I am aware of no powers of the trial court to in effect open the trial up for an additional hearing on damages in the event the parties cannot reach agreement as to the damages. The question of damages was fully litigated at trial and the trial court has no right to impose an additional evidentiary hearing on the state in the event it does not capitulate to the plaintiffs' demands. Either the record before the trial court establishes the right to com- pensation and the amount to which plaintiffs are entitled, or it does not. For this reason, upon this dismissal without prejudice, and remand to the District Court, I would direct the District Court to enter judgment based on the record before it. This court should not ignore the fact that the State of Montana also has rights in condemnation actions, and they have been manifestly abused in this case.