Case Title: DAVID FLOYD V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-10-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
DAVID FLOYD V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 135144 P.3d 1233Case Number: 04-168, 04-169Decided: 10/24/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
DAVID 
FLOYD,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable E. James Burke, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Tonya A. 
Morse of Cheyenne, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Dee Morgan, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, JJ., and PERRY, 
D.J.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      
Petitioner/Appellant,1 David Floyd (Floyd), entered a plea 
of nolo contendere, as provided for in W.R.Cr.P. 11(a) (1)(A), to a charge of 
escape from official detention in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-206(a)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2005).  Judgment and 
sentence were entered on May 14, 2004.  Floyd's plea agreement provided that he 
could appeal this conviction "solely on the grounds of ineffective assistance of 
counsel."  We will conclude that 
Floyd did not meet his burden of establishing a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel or that he suffered prejudice as a result of ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  Hence, we affirm. 

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Floyd raises 
these issues:

 
 
I.          
Whether [Floyd] was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial due 
to ineffective assistance of counsel.

 
 
II.          
Whether [Floyd's] guilty pleas were involuntary due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel.

 
 
Respondent/Appellee, 
the State of Wyoming, rephrases those issues 
thus:

 
 

I.          
Is 
[Floyd's] conditional [nolo contendere] plea properly before this Court pursuant 
to W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2), and if the Court considers [Floyd's] claim, was he denied 
his constitutional right to a fair trial due to ineffective assistance of his 
original trial counsel?

 
 
II.          
Were [Floyd's] pleas given voluntarily?

 
 

FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      While a resident 
of Frontier Correctional Services (FCS), an adult correctional facility in 
LaramieCounty, Floyd returned to 
the facility late from work release.  Floyd failed a breath test for alcohol 
and when he was asked to give a urine sample, he became upset and left the 
facility.  Floyd was apprehended two 
days later in WashingtonState, after being involved in a high-speed chase with 
a Washington 
state trooper.  When apprehended, 
Floyd was driving a car that had been reported stolen from a Cheyenne convenience 
store.

 
 
[¶4]      Floyd was charged 
with felony larceny and escape from official detention.2  He was assigned an attorney from the 
Wyoming Public Defender's Office.  He was arraigned on October 20, 2003, and 
scheduled for trial on January 20, 2004.

 
 
[¶5]      On January 6, 
2004, an order was entered setting Floyd's cases for re-arraignment on January 
26, presumably anticipating a change of plea pursuant to a plea agreement.  On January 20, Floyd sent a letter to the 
court stating that he did not intend to change his plea.  On January 23, the court entered an order 
setting his case for trial on February 17, 2004.

 
 
[¶6]      On January 30, 
2004, Floyd asked for a new attorney.  A second attorney from the Wyoming Public 
Defender's Office was assigned to him on February 3.  On February 11, Floyd's new attorney 
filed a motion for a continuance.  
That motion was denied.  On 
February 12, the district court held a motion hearing at which his attorney 
indicated that Floyd did not want to accept a plea agreement and asked the court 
to reconsider his motion for a continuance.  The court again denied the motion. On 
February 13, Floyd appeared in the district court for a change of plea 
proceeding in which he entered pleas of guilty to the larceny charge and nolo 
contendere to the escape charge.  
With respect to the escape charge, Floyd's plea was conditioned on the 
agreement "that he may appeal this charge solely on the grounds of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  All other 
issues of appeal which may be waived are so waived."  The pleas were made in accordance with 
the plea agreement.

 
 
[¶7]      Floyd was 
sentenced to serve not less than 42 months, nor more than 60 months in the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary on the larceny charge.  He was sentenced to serve not less than 
36 months, nor more than 60 months on the escape charge, consecutive to the 
larceny sentence.  However, that 
sentence was suspended with Floyd serving 4 years on probation consecutive to 
the larceny sentence instead.

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court filed its Judgment and Sentence in both cases on May 14, 2004. Floyd filed 
a pro se Notice of Appeal on June 17, and his counsel filed a Motion for Leave 
to File Late Notice of Appeal and Notice of Appeal on July 9.  The district court granted Floyd's 
request to file his late notice of appeal and his case made its way to this 
Court.

 
 
[¶9]      This Court 
initially dismissed Floyd's appeals, but after considering a petition for 
reinstatement, converted the appeals to writs of review.  Floyd became dissatisfied with his 
appellate counsel and, eventually, new appellate counsel was assigned.  We now consider the merits of his claim 
that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

 
 
PREFATORY 
MATTER

 
 
[¶10]   The State asserts that we should 
not consider Floyd's contention that his counsel was ineffective because that 
issue was not preserved as required by W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2).  That subsection 
provides:

 
 
(2)  Conditional 
Pleas.  With the approval of the 
court and the consent of the attorney for the state, a defendant may enter a 
conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right, 
on appeal from the judgment, to seek review of the adverse determination of any 
specified pretrial motion.  A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the 
plea.

 
 
[¶11]   The State contends that Floyd filed 
no "pretrial motion" that received an "adverse determination" from the district 
court.  We conclude that Rule 
11(a)(2) has no application here and that Floyd did not waive his right to 
challenge whether his trial counsel was ineffective with respect to the 
voluntariness of his plea of nolo contendere to the escape charge (an arguably 
non-jurisdictional defect).  Kitzke v. State, 2002 WY 147, ¶ 9, 
55 P.3d 696, 699 (Wyo. 2002). 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶12]   In Leyva v. State, 2005 WY 22, ¶ 19, 
106 P.3d 873, 878 (Wyo. 2005), we set out this summary of the applicable 
standards to be applied:

 
 
In 
reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, our paramount 
consideration is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsels' 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.  Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, 
¶ 44, 57 P.3d 332, ¶ 44 (Wyo. 2002).  An appellant claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance 
was deficient.  Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)).  Ordinarily, he must 
also demonstrate that prejudice resulted.  
Under this test, the inquiry is whether or not counsel rendered the 
assistance a reasonably competent attorney would have offered and, if not, 
whether his failure to do so prejudiced the defense of the case.  Id. 
 

 
 
            
We examine the conduct of defense counsel in light of all the 
circumstances in determining whether the identified acts or omissions fall 
outside the ambit of professionally competent assistance, bearing in mind the 
function of counsel is to make the adversarial testing process work in every 
case.  Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 609 
(Wyo. 
1992).  The benchmark for judging 
any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied 
upon as having produced a just result.  
Gleason, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332.  We do not evaluate the efforts 
of counsel from a perspective of hindsight but endeavor to reconstruct the 
circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct and evaluate the professional 
efforts from the perspective of counsel at the time.  Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 609.   We invoke a strong presumption 
that counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance making all decisions 
within the bounds of reasonable professional judgment.  Id. 
The burden is on the defendant to overcome this presumption that, in light of 
the circumstances, the challenged action or failure of the attorney might be 
considered sound trial strategy.  
Id.

 
 
Also see 
CLC v. State, 2004 WY 2, ¶ 11, 
82 P.3d 1235, 1238-39 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶13]   Moreover, we have trod almost 
exactly this same ground before:

 
 
With 
regard to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel occurring prior to the 
defendant's guilty plea, the only ineffective assistance of counsel claims that 
survive [a defendant's] guilty pleas are claims directly related to the 
voluntariness of the pleas entered:

 
 
[W]here 
a defendant has entered a guilty plea, he may challenge his subsequent 
conviction on appeal only with respect to matters which affect the voluntariness 
of his plea or the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court.  Zanetti v. State, 783 P.2d 134, 137-38 
(Wyo. 
1989).  When a guilty plea has been 
entered upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of that plea may depend on 
the extent to which that advice comports with the constitutional guarantee to 
the effective assistance of counsel.

 
 

Lower v. 
State, 786 P.2d 346, 348-49 (Wyo. 1990) [FN 7].  See generally Wilson v. State, 2003 WY 
59, 68 P.3d 1181 (Wyo.2003).

 
 
            
In order to prevail on any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant bears the burden to establish both that counsel's performance was 
deficient and that the deficient performance produced actual prejudice.  Daniel v. State, 2003 WY 132, ¶ 36, 
78 P.3d 205, ¶ 36 (Wyo. 2003);  
see also Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  The United 
States Supreme Court has accepted that the performance of defense counsel can be 
evaluated in broad terms:

 
 
      The principal 
value of counsel to the accused in a criminal prosecution often does not lie in 
counsel's ability to recite a list of possible defenses in the abstract, nor in 
his ability, if time permitted, to amass a large quantum of factual data and 
inform the defendant of it.  
Counsel's concern is the faithful representation of the interest of his 
client, and such representation frequently involves highly practical 
considerations as well as specialized knowledge of the law.  Often the interests of the accused are 
not advanced by challenges that would only delay the inevitable date of 
prosecution, see Brady v. United 
States, supra, 397 U.S. [742] at 751-752, 90 S.Ct. [1463] at 1470-1471 [25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970)], or by contesting all guilt, see Santobello v. New 
York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971).  A prospect of plea 
bargaining, the expectation or hope of a lesser sentence, or the convincing 
nature of the evidence against the accused are considerations that might well 
suggest the advisability of a guilty plea without elaborate consideration of 
whether pleas in abatement, such as unconstitutional grand jury selection 
procedures, might be factually supported.

 
 

Tollett 
v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267-68, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 
1608, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1973).

 
 
            
To show prejudice, [a defendant] must demonstrate that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pled 
guilty, would have insisted on going to trial, and the results of the trial 
would have been more advantageous than the results of the plea agreement.  This Court has described the 
circumstances warranting allowing a criminal defendant to withdraw his guilty 
plea because of ineffective assistance of counsel at 
length:

 
 
      To warrant 
reversal on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must 
demonstrate some deficiency in the representation received from his 
attorney.  Counsel must have failed, 
in light of all circumstances existing at the time of the challenged act or 
omission, to employ such judgment or to render such assistance as would have 
been offered by a reasonably competent attorney under like circumstances.  In addition, appellant must demonstrate 
that counsel's deficiency prejudiced the defense of his case.  He must demonstrate the existence of a 
reasonable probability that, absent that deficiency, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different.  
Counsel's ineffectiveness must be so serious as to undermine this court's 
confidence that the outcome was fair.  
Laing v. State, 746 P.2d 1247, 
1248-49 (Wyo. 1987);  Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 342 
(Wyo. 1987);  Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145-47 
(Wyo. 
1986).

 
 
      When an attorney 
has allegedly misadvised his client with respect to the entry of a guilty plea, 
a determination must be made of whether the decision to plead and forego the 
defense of his case resulted in prejudice to the client.  That determination involves two 
interrelated questions:  whether, in 
the absence of counsel's error, the recommendation of a reasonably competent 
attorney concerning the plea would differ from that given;  and whether, absent the error, the 
outcome of a trial would have been more advantageous to the client than the 
result of his plea.  Hill [v. Lockhart], 474 U.S. [52] at 
59-60, 106 S.Ct. [366] at 370-71 [1985][88 L. Ed. 2d 203].  The defendant may also establish the 
necessary prejudice by proof of circumstances indicating that, in deciding 
whether or not to plead guilty, he placed special emphasis on the challenged 
aspect of his attorney's advice.  He 
must suggest to the reviewing court a plausible reason why, had his 
representation been as he claims it should have been, he would have chosen to 
forsake the benefits of his plea agreement for the risks of 
trial.

 
 

Lower, 786 P.2d  at 349-50.

 
 
            
The Lower court specifically 
held that one of the elements of prejudice is "whether, absent the error, the 
outcome of a trial would have been more advantageous to the client than the 
result of his plea."  Id. The Lower court cited to Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985), in support of this contention.  
We recognize that this Court held in Brock v. State, 981 P.2d 465 (Wyo.1999) 
that, under certain circumstances, "the defendant is not required to demonstrate 
a probability that the result of the trial would be different, but instead must 
only demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have 
entered the plea except for the presence of the errors made by counsel."  Id. 
at 469.   The 
Brock Court 
also cited to Hill to support its 
holding.

 
 
            
The 
Hill Court 
determined that a prejudice analysis was required in the context of withdrawing 
a guilty plea.  Pursuant to Hill:

 
 
The 
second, or "prejudice," requirement, on the other hand, focuses on whether 
counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the 
plea process.  In other words, in 
order to satisfy the "prejudice" requirement, the defendant must show that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.

 
 
      In many guilty 
plea cases, the "prejudice" inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in 
by courts reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained 
through a trial.  For example, where 
the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or discover potentially 
exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the error "prejudiced" the 
defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on 
the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change 
his recommendation as to the plea.  
This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction 
whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial.  Similarly, where the alleged error of 
counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense 
to the crime charged, the resolution of the "prejudice" inquiry will depend 
largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at 
trial.  See, e.g., Evans v. Meyer, 742 F.2d 371, 375 
(C.A.7 1984) ("It is inconceivable to us ... that [the defendant] would have 
gone to trial on a defense of intoxication, or that if he had done so he either 
would have been acquitted or, if convicted, would nevertheless have been given a 
shorter sentence than he actually received").  As we explained in Strickland v. Washington, supra, 
these predictions of the outcome at a possible trial, where necessary, should be 
made objectively, without regard for the "idiosyncrasies of the particular 
decision maker."  Id., 466 U.S.  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2068.

 
 

Hill, 474 U.S.  at 59-60, 106 S. Ct.  at 370-71 
(footnote omitted).  Reading the 
entire passage, it is clear that the 
Hill 
Court was not lessening the prejudice requirements of 
Strickland, but rather simply 
suggesting ways the Strickland 
standard might apply to guilty plea situations.  If a defendant refuses to plead guilty, 
he ultimately must face trial.  
Thus, an objective showing of a reasonable probability that, but for the 
errors made by counsel, a defendant would not have accepted a plea bargain, 
ultimately rests on whether there is an objectively reasonable probability that 
the outcome at trial would have been more advantageous to the defendant.  Thus, in reality, Brock requires the same analysis as Lower.  As Hill states, "the defendant must show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."  Id. 
at 59, 106 S. Ct.  at 370.

 
 
            
If we conclude that a defendant fails to satisfy the prejudice prong, we 
need not address the performance of counsel prong:

 
 
      Although we have 
discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness claim prior to the 
prejudice component, there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective 
assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address 
both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on 
one.  In particular, a court need 
not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the 
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged 
deficiencies.  The object of an 
ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's performance.  If it is easier to dispose of an 
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we 
expect will often be so, that course should be followed.  Courts should strive to ensure that 
ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the 
entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.

 
 

Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 697, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069.  This Court, on prior occasions, has 
determined a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon only the 
prejudice prong.  For example, in Olsen v. State, 2003 WY 46, 67 P.3d 536 
(Wyo.2003), we assumed that Olsen's counsel rendered deficient legal assistance 
but reasoned:

 
 
Despite 
the lack of record, we do not find that the assumption that counsel's 
performance was deficient leads to the conclusion that the defense was 
prejudiced.  To show that deficient 
performance prejudiced his defense, the defendant must demonstrate that, when 
the totality of the circumstances is considered, there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome of the trial.

 
 

Id. at ¶ 
81.

 
 
.

 
 
            
The definitive problem with Rutti's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims is that he has not presented any objectively plausible argument 
supporting the prejudice prong.  
Rutti does not argue that "absent the error, the outcome of a trial would 
have been more advantageous to the client than the result of his plea."   In his affidavit submitted to this 
Court in support of his motion for partial remand, Rutti does not even make a 
claim that he would not have accepted the plea agreement had his counsel's 
performance been different, let alone that the ultimate outcome of the 
proceedings would have been more favorable to him.  While Rutti suggests errors, Rutti makes 
no allegation of specific prejudice in his affidavit.  Even in his brief, Rutti only presents 
conclusory allegations of prejudice.

 
 
Because 
Rutti has failed to present to this Court serious and specific allegations 
supporting both prongs of the Strickland test for ineffectiveness, 
there is no support for a remand.  
The allegations Rutti has presented to this Court, even if true, simply 
do not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Further, because this case does not 
present even a close argument on whether a remand is required, we determine that 
it is not appropriate for this Court to use this appeal to analyze the remand 
procedure generally.  Thus, we will 
not further address Issue V as presented by Rutti.

                        

            
(FN7.) To the extent Rutti requested this Court remand this case for an 
evidentiary hearing relating to his counsels' alleged deficiencies in not 
pursuing a possible motion to suppress his confession or pursuing Rutti's right 
to a speedy trial, such issues were waived by Rutti's guilty plea.  "[A] counseled plea of guilty is an 
admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it 
quite validly removes the issue of 
factual guilt from the case.  In 
most cases, factual guilt is a sufficient basis for the State's imposition of 
punishment.  A guilty plea, 
therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not 
logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which 
do not stand in the way of conviction if factual guilt is validly 
established."  Menna v. New 
York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 n.2, 96 S. Ct. 241, 242 
n.2, 46 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1975).  See generally Davila v. State, 831 P.2d 204, 206 
(Wyo.1992) (examples of non-jurisdictional defects waived by a guilty plea 
include use of inadmissible evidence (claim of unlawful search and seizure, 
claim of unlawfully obtained statements);  
and claim of violation of the right to speedy 
trial).

 
 

Rutti v. 
State, 2004 
WY 133, ¶¶ 21-29, 100 P.3d 394, 404-08 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶14]   As suggested by the Rutti decision, if we determine that 
there could be no prejudice, i.e., that the outcome of trial would not have been 
more advantageous than the benefits of his plea bargain, then we need not 
evaluate trial counsels' performance in detail.  Those are the exact circumstances we 
detect here.  Floyd first contended 
that his counsel did not investigate the case or prepare for trial, but rather 
negotiated a plea bargain without Floyd's consent.  However, after that event, Floyd asked 
for and received the assistance of replacement counsel (two attorneys were 
appointed).  He next contended that 
he complained on February 12, 2004, about the amount of time replacement counsel 
spent in preparation.  However, that 
transcript also reveals that the matter was resolved, and it was agreed that any 
issue in that regard would be broached at another hearing to be held on February 
13, 2004.  At the February 13th hearing the matter was not further 
pursued.

 
 
[¶15]   At his pretrial hearing, Floyd 
complained that he was not aware of the evidence against him.  At least with respect to the escape 
charge, such a contention is a nonstarter.  
Floyd was supposed to be at FCS in Cheyenne but was arrested in WashingtonState driving a stolen car  that was the 
gravamen of the charge against him.  
Floyd continues his argument by speculating about what evidence there 
"might have been" but does not suggest the existence of any such evidence.  So far as prejudice is concerned, 
Floyd's argument simply fails, and that is dispositive of this 
appeal.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶16]   We conclude that Floyd has failed 
to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice from any shortcomings in counsels' 
performance.  The judgment and 
sentence of the district court are, therefore, affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Floyd's 
notice of appeal was not timely filed.  
As a result, this Court dismissed his appeal but converted the untimely 
notices of appeal to petitions for writ of review.

 
 

2Floyd 
entered a guilty plea to the larceny charge, but he did not pursue his appeal 
from that conviction in this matter.  
Although this case was assigned two docket numbers, we do not consider 
any issues that directly relate to Case No. 04-169.