Case Title: Wis. Property Tax Consultants, Inc. v. Wis. Department of Revenue

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020AP000485

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2022-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2022 WI 51 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP485 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Wisconsin Property Tax Consultants, Inc. and 
Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Inc., 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 398 Wis. 2d 654, 963 N.W.2d 103 
PDC No: 2021 WI App 47 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 30, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 5, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Sandy A. Williams    
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring opinion.  ROGGENSACK, J., 
filed a concurring opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., 
joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Don M. Millis, Karla M. Nettleson and Reinhart 
Boerner Van Deuren S.C., Madison. There was an oral argument by 
Don M. Millis.  
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Brian P. Keenan, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
 
 
2 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Brian P. Keenan.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Lucas T. Vebber, 
Anthony F. LoCoco and Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty, 
Milwaukee, for the Wisconsin Property Taxpayers, Inc.  
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 51 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP485 
(L.C. No. 
2019CV226) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Wisconsin Property Tax Consultants, Inc. and 
Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring opinion.  ROGGENSACK, J., 
filed a concurring opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., 
joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   When both a court and an agency 
may address an issue, who should decide first?  That is the 
question this case presents, and the question the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine answers.  We have held that a circuit 
court may stay its hand pending an agency's determination if the 
issue before it turns primarily on factual or technical 
No. 
2020AP485 
 
2 
 
questions within the agency's expertise.  But if the question is 
primarily 
one 
of 
law 
outside 
the 
agency's 
specialized 
competence, the circuit court should decide the question.  In 
this case, the circuit court declined to decide whether a letter 
from the Wisconsin Department of Revenue (DOR) constituted an 
unpromulgated rule, deferring instead to the Tax Appeals 
Commission to decide that question first.  We conclude that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.  Even if the 
Tax 
Appeals 
Commission 
has 
jurisdiction 
to 
address 
the 
unpromulgated rule question, it is a pure question of law 
outside the Tax Appeals Commission's expertise.  The circuit 
court should have assumed jurisdiction and decided it. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
In 2017, the Wisconsin Legislature enacted a new tax 
exemption for "machinery, tools, and patterns, not including 
such items used in manufacturing."  2017 Wis. Act 59, § 997j 
(codified at Wis. Stat. § 70.111(27)(b) (2017-18)).  Seeking 
guidance on how the new exemption would be applied, Wisconsin 
Manufactures and Commerce, Inc. (WMC) sent a letter to DOR.  In 
the letter, WMC articulated its view that "machinery, patterns 
and tools that are not used in manufacturing" are exempt even if 
that property is "located on manufacturing property."  DOR 
disagreed.  It explained by letter its view that "the new 
exemption does not apply to manufacturers." 
No. 
2020AP485 
 
3 
 
¶3 
WMC responded by filing a declaratory judgment action 
in circuit court under Wis. Stat. § 227.40 (2019-20)1 raising 
three claims:  (1) DOR's letter is an unpromulgated rule and is 
therefore invalid; (2) DOR's letter is invalid because it is 
inconsistent with the text of the new exemption; and (3) DOR's 
proffered interpretation violates various provisions of the 
Wisconsin and United States constitutions.2  Following cross-
motions for summary judgment, the circuit court dismissed all 
three claims under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.3  It 
observed that the Tax Appeals Commission was then "considering 
how to interpret and apply Wis. Stat. § 70.111(27) to property 
owned and used by the manufacturers" and was "well suited to use 
its expertise in determining this issue."  It therefore declined 
to assume jurisdiction over any of the three claims. 
¶4 
WMC appealed the circuit court's dismissal of the 
unpromulgated rule and constitutional claims only, and the court 
of appeals affirmed.  Wis. Prop. Tax Consultants, Inc. v. DOR, 
2021 WI App 47, 398 Wis. 2d 654, 963 N.W.2d 103.  WMC then 
sought this court's review, but only regarding the unpromulgated 
rule claim.  We granted the petition for review. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version. 
2 Wisconsin Property Tax Consultants, Inc. is also a 
plaintiff with WMC.  We refer to the plaintiffs collectively as 
WMC. 
3 The Honorable Sandy A. Williams of the Ozaukee County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2020AP485 
 
4 
 
II.  PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOCTRINE 
¶5 
The primary jurisdiction doctrine comes into play when 
"both a court and an administrative agency have jurisdiction 
over resolution of issues in a dispute."  City of Brookfield v. 
Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 171 Wis. 2d 400, 420, 491 
N.W.2d 484 (1992).  It is "a doctrine of comity" and judicial 
efficiency, 
with 
the 
purpose 
of 
promoting 
"the 
proper 
relationship between administrative agencies and courts."  Id.  
Thus, primary jurisdiction deals not with the court's ability to 
decide the matter, but with "which portion of the dispute-
settling apparatus——the courts or the agency——should, in the 
interests 
of 
judicial 
administration, 
first 
take 
the 
jurisdiction that both the agency and the courts share."  Gen. 
Tel. Co. of Wis. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 2d 10, 23, 
409 N.W.2d 133 (Ct. App. 1987).  Where both the court and the 
agency have authority to answer the question presented, the 
circuit court has discretion to allow the agency to address the 
matter in the first instance or decide the question itself.  
Sawejka v. Morgan, 56 Wis. 2d 70, 78-79, 201 N.W.2d 528 (1972). 
¶6 
One 
of 
the 
primary 
considerations 
for 
a 
court 
determining whether to let an agency address a question first is 
the nature of the issue raised.  City of Brookfield, 171 
Wis. 2d at 420-21; Wis. Collectors Ass'n, Inc. v. Thorp Fin. 
Corp., 32 Wis. 2d 36, 44-45, 145 N.W.2d 33 (1966).  Where 
factual 
or 
technical 
issues 
predominate, 
our 
cases 
have 
counseled that "the better course may be" deferring to the 
No. 
2020AP485 
 
5 
 
agency.4  City of Brookfield, 171 Wis. 2d at 421.  This 
recognizes that the legislature creates agencies "to afford a 
systematic method of factfinding and policymaking," typically in 
areas that involve technical expertise.  McEwen v. Pierce 
County, 90 Wis. 2d 256, 271, 279 N.W.2d 469 (1979).  Agencies 
are designed to "provide uniformity and consistency in the 
fields of their specialized knowledge."  Thorp, 32 Wis. 2d at 
44.  So when the issue involves factual or specialized questions 
that fit "squarely within the very area for which the agency was 
created," it is appropriate to allow the agency to address the 
matter first.  Id.  On the other hand, "when statutory 
interpretation or issues of law are significant," the circuit 
court will have less reason to let the agency decide the 
question first.  City of Brookfield, 171 Wis. 2d at 421.  This 
is particularly so where the controlling issue is primarily a 
question of law that "rests within the special expertise of the 
circuit court," rather than the agency.  State v. Dairyland 
Power Coop., 52 Wis. 2d 45, 56, 187 N.W.2d 878 (1971). 
¶7 
Our cases have consistently drawn the line between 
fact-bound and agency-specialized questions (which may warrant 
deference) and predominately legal or nonspecialized questions 
(which do not).5  Recent developments in our approach to 
                                                 
4 By "deferring" to an agency, we refer only to allowing the 
agency to address the matter first, not deferring to the 
agency's legal conclusions, which we no longer do.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 227.57(11); Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, 382 
Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21. 
5 Besides the cases already cited, see Beal v. First Fed. 
No. 
2020AP485 
 
6 
 
reviewing the work of administrative agencies reinforce this 
distinction. 
¶8 
When we review an agency decision, we defer to the 
agency's 
factual 
findings 
unless 
they 
are 
insufficiently 
supported.  Wis. Stat. § 227.57(6).  Furthermore, as the law 
instructs, we give "due weight" to "the experience, technical 
competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency involved, as 
well 
as 
discretionary 
authority 
conferred 
upon 
it."  
§ 227.57(10). 
 
Until 
recently, 
we 
also 
deferred 
to 
administrative 
agencies' 
conclusions 
of 
law 
in 
many 
circumstances.  See, e.g., Milwaukee Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. 
DOR, 2010 WI 33, ¶¶34-37, 324 Wis. 2d 68, 781 N.W.2d 674 
                                                                                                                                                             
Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Madison, 90 Wis. 2d 171, 198, 279 
N.W. 2d 693 (1979); Browne v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 83 
Wis. 2d 316, 
329-30, 
265 
N.W.2d 559 
(1978) 
("The 
issues 
remaining unresolved . . . must be mainly factual, rather than 
legal or constitutional.  If not, the transfer was erroneous."); 
Kaski v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Madison, 72 
Wis. 2d 132, 
143-44, 
240 
N.W.2d 367 
(1976) 
("The 
discretion . . . is usually predicated upon whether there is a 
substantial factual dispute which should first be resolved by 
the administrative agency."); Browne v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. 
Dirs., 69 Wis. 2d 169, 176, 230 N.W.2d 704 (1975) ("[W]here 
there is no factual issue to be decided under the pleadings of 
the case and 'issues of law are significant,' the court may 
properly in its discretion entertain the proceedings."); City 
Firefighters Union, Loc. No. 311 v. City of Madison, 48 
Wis. 2d 262, 270, 179 N.W.2d 800 (1970); Noonan v. Nw. Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 2004 WI App 154, ¶29, 276 Wis. 2d 33, 687 N.W.2d 254 
("[T]his case involves statutory and contract interpretation, 
which fall within the province of the court."); Providence Cath. 
Sch. v. Bristol Sch. Dist. No. 1, 231 Wis. 2d 159, 172, 605 
N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. 1999); Madison Tchrs., Inc. v. Madison 
Metro. Sch. Dist., 197 Wis. 2d 731, 746-47, 541 N.W.2d 786 (Ct. 
App. 1995); Wis. Bell, Inc. v. DOR, 164 Wis. 2d 138, 144, 473 
N.W.2d 587 (Ct. App. 1991). 
No. 
2020AP485 
 
7 
 
(describing "three levels of deference to be granted to agency 
interpretations" of statutes).  In 2018, however, we ended that 
practice.  Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, 382 
Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21.  Since our decision in Tetra Tech, 
the legislature has codified our approach, directing that when 
reviewing "an agency action or decision, the court shall accord 
no 
deference 
to 
the 
agency's 
interpretation 
of 
law."  
§ 227.57(11). 
¶9 
This shift in our approach to reviewing the legal 
interpretations of administrative agencies further strengthens——
and deepens——the historical distinction in our cases between 
issues raising factual and technical questions uniquely within 
the purview of an agency's expertise, and those raising 
predominantly legal and nonspecialized issues that are properly 
questions for the judicial branch.  Although the analysis will 
depend on the specifics of each case, courts generally should 
decide 
pure 
questions 
of 
law 
when 
they 
are 
presented, 
particularly when those questions lie outside an agency's area 
of expertise.  With this in mind, we examine the single claim 
WMC raises before us. 
III.  APPLICATION 
¶10 WMC 
contends 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
improperly 
dismissed 
its 
claim 
that 
the 
letter 
response 
from 
DOR 
constitutes an unpromulgated rule in violation of Wis. Stat. ch. 
227.  We review the circuit court's decision to dismiss this 
claim under the primary jurisdiction doctrine for an erroneous 
No. 
2020AP485 
 
8 
 
exercise of discretion.  City of Brookfield, 171 Wis. 2d at 423.  
"We will sustain a discretionary act if we find the trial court 
examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, 
and using a demonstrative rational process, reached a conclusion 
that a reasonable judge could reach."  Lane v. Sharp Packaging 
Sys., Inc., 2002 WI 28, ¶19, 251 Wis. 2d 68, 640 N.W.2d 788. 
¶11 In briefing and oral argument, WMC contended the 
primary jurisdiction doctrine is inapplicable here "because the 
tax appeals commission lacks jurisdiction over Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.40(1) declaratory judgment actions."  Because other 
independently sufficient grounds are available to resolve this 
case, 
we 
do 
not 
address 
the 
Tax 
Appeals 
Commission's 
jurisdiction over the unpromulgated rule claim in this opinion.  
In particular, we received amicus briefing from Wisconsin 
Property Taxpayers, Inc. suggesting the primary jurisdiction 
doctrine was improperly applied for another reason.  It argues, 
"When it comes to rulemaking challenges, such as the one brought 
in this case, the question presented is essentially a purely 
legal one," which the circuit court should decide in the first 
instance.  Our analysis proceeds under this second argument. 
¶12 WMC initially brought three claims against DOR:  an 
unpromulgated rule claim, an inconsistent interpretation claim, 
and a constitutional claim.  The circuit court dismissed all 
three under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.  It explained: 
At this time, there are numerous similar cases pending 
before the Tax Appeal Commission.  The Commission is 
considering how to interpret and apply Wis. Stat. 
70.111(27) 
to 
property 
owned 
and 
used 
by 
the 
No. 
2020AP485 
 
9 
 
manufacturers.  That is the exact issue in this case.  
The Commission is well suited to use its expertise in 
determining this issue.  Therefore, this court will 
not assume jurisdiction. 
Regardless of whether this rationale had some relevance to the 
other claims originally filed, it is insufficient with respect 
to the only claim now before us——the unpromulgated rule claim.6 
¶13 Under our cases, the primary jurisdiction doctrine 
should generally be analyzed claim-by-claim.  See City of 
Brookfield, 171 Wis. 2d at 424 (analyzing claims individually).  
The unpromulgated rule claim in this case would not benefit from 
the Tax Appeals Commission's specialized expertise in tax law or 
its fact-finding capabilities.  Rather, it requires only 
interpreting 
and 
applying 
the 
statute 
that 
defines 
an 
administrative rule (Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13)) and its related 
procedural prerequisites.  This presents a pure question of law.  
Indeed, recognizing the absence of any significant factual 
dispute, WMC and DOR both moved for summary judgment on the 
claim.7  It is a question that does not draw upon the Tax Appeals 
Commission's expertise in tax matters; it goes to the authority 
and process by which an agency must adopt and administer the 
law.  Whatever the Tax Appeals Commission would conclude 
                                                 
6 WMC's petition for review did not challenge the circuit 
court's dismissal of the inconsistent interpretation claim or 
the constitutional claim.  We therefore offer no opinion on 
whether the circuit court properly exercised its discretion by 
dismissing those claims. 
7 See Providence Cath. Sch., 231 Wis. 2d at 172 ("Factual 
issues are nonexistent; indeed, both parties moved the court for 
summary judgment, asserting that there were no material issues 
of fact."). 
No. 
2020AP485 
 
10 
 
(assuming it can opine on this question), the determination of 
whether DOR's letter constitutes an unpromulgated administrative 
rule would ultimately be decided independently by a court, 
without deference to the Tax Appeals Commission.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.57(11); Tetra Tech, 382 Wis. 2d 496. 
¶14 In view of this, and considering the circuit court's 
reasoning, we conclude the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion because it did not apply the proper standard of 
law.  Lane, 251 Wis. 2d 68, ¶19.  The circuit court's reasoning 
was brief; it did not examine the unpromulgated rule claim at 
all.  As best we can tell, it appears the court focused on the 
other claims presented to it——in particular, the interpretation 
of Wis. Stat. § 70.111(27)(b) DOR offered in its letter.  So 
while the circuit court explained its decision to defer to the 
Tax Appeals Commission regarding the proper interpretation of 
§ 70.111(27)(b), it gave no justification for its decision to 
defer 
on 
the 
question 
of 
whether 
DOR's 
letter 
was 
an 
unpromulgated rule.  See City of Brookfield, 171 Wis. 2d at 423 
(reversing when a court "failed to engage in a reasoned 
consideration" regarding a particular claim).  Nor did the court 
observe the distinction our cases have made between factual and 
technical issues on the one hand, and pure questions of law 
outside 
the 
expertise 
of 
agencies 
like 
the 
Tax 
Appeals 
Commission on the other. 
¶15 As we have explained, the unpromulgated rule claim in 
this case involves the interpretation and application of a 
statute to undisputed facts.  As a pure question of law in a 
No. 
2020AP485 
 
11 
 
nonspecialized area, this is an issue properly addressed to the 
court's expertise.  Noonan v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2004 
WI App 154, ¶29, 276 Wis. 2d 33, 687 N.W.2d 254 (rejecting a 
claim that the primary jurisdiction doctrine required deference 
to the agency because the case was one of "statutory and 
contract interpretation, which fall within the province of the 
court").  By contrast, the Tax Appeals Commission interprets and 
administers the tax code and adjudicates taxpayer claims.  Wis. 
Stat. § 73.01(4).  It has no unique expertise over whether a 
letter fits the definition of a rule.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 227.01(13), which defines a rule, is a broadly applicable 
administrative law statute falling outside the tax code and 
beyond the Tax Appeals Commission's specialized knowledge.  And 
although 
we 
express 
no 
opinion 
on 
the 
merits 
of 
the 
unpromulgated rule claim, which remains to be adjudicated by the 
circuit court on remand, it presents a question that fits 
squarely within the expertise of the judicial branch.  We 
conclude the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
when it dismissed this claim.  Applying our precedents to the 
unpromulgated rule claim in this case, we conclude deference to 
the Tax Appeals Commission is not warranted under the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine. 
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
No.  2020AP485.akz 
 
1 
 
¶16 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (concurring).  The 
Department 
of 
Revenue 
("DOR") 
provided 
the 
Wisconsin 
Manufacturers and Commerce ("WMC") an interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.111(27)(b), 
a 
statute 
governing 
taxes 
for 
manufacturing 
properties. 
 
In 
response, 
WMC 
brought 
a 
declaratory judgment suit challenging the DOR's interpretation.  
The circuit court dismissed WMC's claims under the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine.  The majority concludes that the circuit 
court erred because the issue presented, i.e., whether the DOR 
followed proper rulemaking procedures, is one that falls 
squarely within the province and expertise of the courts.  See 
majority op., ¶15 (reasoning that the issue presented is "a pure 
question of law in a nonspecialized area" and is "properly 
addressed to the court's expertise").  While the majority's 
reasoning may very well be correct, it is unnecessary.  The 
majority fails to recognize that WMC could not bring their 
claims before the Tax Appeals Commission ("TAC").  WMC has no 
assessment that could be appealed; they are not a manufacturer.  
When a party could not possibly proceed before the TAC, the 
primary jurisdiction doctrine does not apply.  There is only one 
jurisdiction for WMC to bring their claims:  the courts.  As a 
result, I respectfully concur. 
¶17 The primary jurisdiction doctrine applies only where 
"a court and an administrative agency have jurisdiction over 
resolution of issues in a dispute."  City of Brookfield v. 
Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 171 Wis. 2d 400, 420, 491 
N.W.2d 484 (1992).  The doctrine cannot apply when the party 
No.  2020AP485.akz 
 
2 
 
bringing the issue cannot bring the matter before the agency.  
See, e.g., Ryan v. Chemlawn Corp., 935 F.2d 129, 131-32 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (explaining that the plaintiff must be allowed "the 
opportunity to [obtain relief] from the only forum that can 
provide [it], the court" and declining to apply the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine); United States v. Haun, 124 F.3d 745, 
750-52 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that the primary jurisdiction 
doctrine does not apply where the plaintiff could not go before 
the relevant agency, reasoning that "[i]f no administrative 
forum is available . . . a court should reassert or, as the case 
may be, retain its jurisdiction"); City of Brookfield, 171 
Wis. 2d at 416-24 (applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine 
where the plaintiffs could present their dispute to the relevant 
agency). 
¶18 I do not join Justice Roggensack's concurrence because 
it goes too far to answer questions not before the court.  
Justice Roggensack may very well be correct that the TAC lacks 
jurisdiction to resolve whether a DOR interpretation is an 
unpromulgated rule.  See Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶¶30-
34.  But I am hesitant to answer an issue so broadly such that 
it appears that a litigant might be precluded from even raising 
that as a part of their broader argument before the TAC.  For 
example, perhaps a litigant should be able to argue that an 
assessment is faulty for a variety of reasons, one of which 
being that the assessment stems from an unpromulgated rule.  
Even if the TAC does not have jurisdiction over rulemaking, Wis. 
Stat. § 227.40(2)(e) seems to suggest that persons who challenge 
No.  2020AP485.akz 
 
3 
 
administrative decisions under Wis. Stat. § 227.52 may be 
statutorily required to present rulemaking arguments to the TAC.  
See § 227.40(2)(e) (stating that persons bringing a § 227.52 
claim may dispute the "validity of [a] rule or guidance 
document" if that rule or guidance document was "duly challenged 
in the proceeding before the agency in which the order or 
decision sought to be reviewed was made or entered").  Here, we 
need not decide that issue because WMC could not have brought 
this challenge before the TAC.   
¶19 To apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine to a party 
that cannot go before the TAC is an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  Employing the primary jurisdiction doctrine against 
WMC would deny them their day in court and require WMC to sit 
idly by while they await another party to bring the issues 
presented to the TAC.  Accordingly, I join the majority's 
mandate.   
¶20 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
No.  2020AP485.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶21 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   (concurring).  The 
majority opinion concludes that, under the primary jurisdiction 
doctrine, the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
because 
Wisconsin 
Manufacturers 
and 
Commerce's 
(WMC) 
unpromulgated rule challenge turns on a question of law, which 
the circuit court should have decided.  While I agree with the 
bottom line conclusion that the circuit court should have 
decided WMC's unpromulgated rule challenge, I part ways with the 
majority opinion's reasoning.  The circuit court should have 
decided WMC's challenge to the Department of Revenue's (DOR) 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 70.111(27)(b) (2017-18) claiming 
it was an unpromulgated rule, because jurisdiction did not exist 
in the Tax Appeals Commission to decide whether DOR's response 
to WMC was an unpromulgated rule.  Because the majority misses 
step one in analyzing a question of primary jurisdiction, i.e., 
whether the Tax Appeals Commission and the circuit court both 
had jurisdiction to decide whether DOR's letter-response to WMC 
was an unpromulgated rule, I respectfully concur.   
I.  BACKGROUND1 
¶22 In 2017, the Wisconsin Legislature enacted a new tax 
exemption for "machinery, tools, and patterns, not including 
such items used in manufacturing."  2017 Wis. Act 59, § 997j 
(codified at Wis. Stat. § 70.111(27)(b) (2017-18)).  Seeking a 
determination on how the new exemption would be applied, WMC 
sent a written inquiry to the DOR.  WMC's inquiry expressed its 
                                                 
1 The majority opinion capably sets out the background 
underlying this controversy.  Therefore, I describe here only 
that which is necessary to understand my writing below. 
No.  2020AP485.pdr 
 
2 
 
view that "machinery, patterns and tools that are not used in 
manufacturing" are exempt even if that property is "located on 
manufacturing property."  WMC asked for DOR's interpretation of 
§ 70.111(27)(b) under those proposed facts.  In a letter-
response, DOR disagreed with WMC's interpretation and said that 
the new exemption does not apply to manufacturers, even though 
the property is not used in manufacturing.   
¶23 WMC then filed a declaratory judgment action in 
circuit 
court 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.40 
asserting 
that:  (1) DOR's response to WMC was an unpromulgated rule and 
is therefore invalid; (2) DOR's response is invalid because it 
is inconsistent with the text of the new exemption; and 
(3) DOR's response violates various provisions of the Wisconsin 
and United States Constitutions.   
¶24 Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the 
circuit 
court 
dismissed 
WMC's 
claims 
under 
the 
primary 
jurisdiction doctrine.  The circuit court observed that the Tax 
Appeals Commission was then "considering how to interpret and 
apply Wis. Stat. § 70.111(27) to property owned and used by the 
manufacturers" and was "well suited to use its expertise in 
determining this issue."  Accordingly, it declined to exercise 
jurisdiction over WMC's claims. 
¶25 WMC appealed the court's dismissal of only the 
unpromulgated rule claim and the constitutional claims.  The 
court of appeals affirmed.  Wis. Prop. Tax Consultants, Inc. v. 
DOR, 2021 WI App 47, 398 Wis. 2d 654, 963 N.W.2d 103.  WMC then 
No.  2020AP485.pdr 
 
3 
 
sought our review of only the unpromulgated rule claim.  We 
granted review.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review  
¶26 We review whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in not exercising its jurisdiction.  
McEwen v. Pierce Cnty., 90 Wis. 2d 256, 268, 279 N.W.2d 469 
(1979).  In so doing, we review, as a matter of law, whether the 
Tax Appeals Commission had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.  
Id.  We further interpret and apply Wis. Stat. § 73.01(4) and 
Wis. Stat. § 227.40.  We independently interpret and apply 
statutes as questions of law.  Townsend v. ChartSwap, LLC, 2021 
WI 86, ¶11, 399 Wis. 2d 599, 967 N.W.2d 21.   
B.  Primary Jurisdiction 
¶27 When both a court and an administrative agency have 
jurisdiction over resolution of issues in a dispute, courts may 
look to the primary jurisdiction doctrine to determine who 
should decide the case first.  City of Brookfield v. Milwaukee 
Metro. Sewerage Dist., 171 Wis. 2d 400, 420, 491 N.W.2d 484 
(1992).  As we have concluded in the past, the doctrine is not 
one of "power[,] but comity."  Wis. Collectors Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Thorp Fin. Corp., 32 Wis. 2d 36, 44, 145 N.W.2d 33 (1966).  "The 
purpose of the primary-jurisdiction rule is to promote proper 
relationships between the courts and administrative agencies."  
Id.  However, the question of primary jurisdiction does not 
arise until there first has been a conclusion that both the 
agency and the court have jurisdiction over the dispute.  Beal 
No.  2020AP485.pdr 
 
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v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Madison, 90 Wis. 2d 171, 197, 
279 N.W.2d 693 (1979).  If the administrative agency does not 
have jurisdiction to decide the question presented, the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine is not implicated.  See Ass'n of Career 
Emps. v. Klauser, 195 Wis. 2d 602, 612-13, 536 N.W.2d 478 (Ct. 
App. 
1995) 
(explaining 
that 
primary 
jurisdiction 
assumes 
jurisdiction in both a court and an agency, and if that does not 
exist, primary jurisdiction is not at issue). 
¶28 Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides that:  "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the 
circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal within this state."  Accordingly, we have 
stated that "in Wisconsin, 'no circuit court is without subject 
matter 
jurisdiction 
to 
entertain 
actions 
[on 
state 
law 
claims].'"  Vill. of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶8, 273 
Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190 (quoting Mueller v. Brunn, 105 
Wis. 2d 171, 176, 313 N.W.2d 790 (1982)).   
¶29 Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1) states that "the 
exclusive means of judicial review of the validity of a rule or 
guidance document shall be an action for declaratory judgment as 
to the validity of the rule or guidance document brought in the 
circuit court for the county where the party asserting the 
invalidity of the rule . . . resides or has its principal place 
of business . . . ."  § 227.40(1). 
¶30 The 
Tax 
Appeals 
Commission 
also 
was 
granted 
jurisdiction by the legislature in Wis. Stat. § 73.01(4)(a), 
which states that, 
No.  2020AP485.pdr 
 
5 
 
Subject to the provisions for judicial review in 
s. 73.015, the commission shall be the final authority 
for the hearing and determination of all questions of 
law and fact arising under sub. (5) and s. 72.86(4), 
1985 stats., and ss. 70.38(4)(a), 70.397, 70.64,  
and 
70.995(8), 
s. 76.38(12)(a), 
1993 
stats., 
ss. 76.39(4)(c), 76.48(6), 77.26(3), 77.59(5m) and 
(6)(b), 78.01, 78.22, 78.40, 78.555, 139.02, 139.03, 
139.06, 
139.31, 
139.315, 
139.33, 
139.76, 
139.78, 
177.1103, 177.1206(3), 341.405, and 341.45, subch. XIV 
of ch. 71, and subch. VII of ch. 77. 
§ 73.01(4)(a).  No administrative remedy was provided therein to 
the Tax Appeals Commission to review the validity of a DOR rule.  
Generally, when a statute sets forth a procedure by which to 
provide review of administrative agency decisions and states 
that the procedure is the final review, other forms of remedy 
are not available in addition to the listed procedure.  Nodell 
Inv. Corp. v. City of Glendale, 78 Wis. 2d 416, 422, 254 N.W.2d 
310 (1977).   
¶31 If an agency is interpreting its own declaration that 
is being characterized as a rule made in contravention of its 
own rule-making procedures, the agency has jurisdiction to 
review that claim.  County of Dane v. DHSS, 79 Wis. 2d 323, 331-
33, 255 N.W.2d 539 (1977).  However, here, it is DOR who has 
responded to WMC in a way that is challenged as a DOR 
unpromulgated rule, and it is the Tax Appeals Commission who is 
asked 
to 
decide 
whether 
DOR 
followed 
proper 
rule-making 
procedures in making its letter-response to WMC.   
¶32 In order for Tax Appeals Commission to decide whether 
DOR followed proper rule-making procedures in its letter-
response to WMC, Tax Appeals Commission must have the authority 
to say, "yes," DOR did or "no," DOR didn't.   
No.  2020AP485.pdr 
 
6 
 
¶33 Administrative 
agencies 
are 
creations 
of 
the 
legislature and have only those powers expressly given to them 
by the legislature.  Heritage Credit Union v. Office of Credit 
Unions, 2002 WI App 213, ¶12, 247 Wis. 2d 589, 634 N.W.2d 593.  
No authority to judge whether DOR followed proper rule-making 
procedures in issuing its letter-response is granted to the Tax 
Appeals Commission by Wis. Stat. § 73.01(4)(a).  Further, no one 
has provided us with a statute or other grant of authority that 
gives the Tax Appeals Commission the power to decide whether DOR 
properly exercised its rule-making authority.  I have searched 
and searched, but I have found none.  Without such a grant of 
authority from the legislature, there is no jurisdiction in the 
Tax Appeals Commission to decide the dispute at issue here.   
¶34 Under Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1), only the circuit court 
had jurisdiction to decide whether DOR's letter-response to WMC 
was a rule that was created without following required rule-
making procedures.  Accordingly, I conclude that, because the 
Tax 
Appeals 
Commission 
had 
no 
jurisdiction 
over 
WMC's 
unpromulgated rule claim, reliance on the primary jurisdiction 
doctrine to decide this case is inappropriate.  Only the circuit 
court had the power to review WMC's unpromulgated rule claim 
against DOR.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶35 It is DOR who has responded to WMC in a way that is 
challenged by WMC as a DOR rule, and it is the Tax Appeals 
Commission who is asked to decide whether DOR followed proper 
rule-making procedures in making its response to WMC.  The 
No.  2020AP485.pdr 
 
7 
 
circuit court should have decided WMC's challenge to the DOR's 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 70.111(27)(b) (2017-18) claiming 
it was an unpromulgated rule, because jurisdiction did not exist 
in the Tax Appeals Commission to decide whether DOR's response 
to WMC was an unpromulgated rule.  Because the majority misses 
step one in analyzing a question of primary jurisdiction, i.e., 
whether the Tax Appeals Commission and the circuit court both 
had jurisdiction to decide whether DOR's letter-response to WMC 
was an unpromulgated rule, I respectfully concur. 
¶36 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
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