Case Title: State v. Jimmie Davison

Citation: 2003 WI 89

Docket Number: 2001AP000826-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 89 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0826-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Jimmie Davison,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 109 
Reported at:  235 Wis. 2d 715, 647 N.W.2d 390 
(Ct. App.-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 4, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
David M. Bastianelli   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed) 
WALSH BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Diane M. Welsh, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument 
by 
Keith 
A. 
Findley, 
Criminal 
Appeals 
Project, 
University of Wisconsin Law School, Madison. 
 
 
2003 WI 89 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-0826-CR   
(L.C. No. 
98 CF 636) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jimmie Davison,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.  This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Davison, 2002 WI App 
109, 255 Wis. 2d 715, 647 N.W.2d 390, which reversed the 
judgment of the Kenosha County Circuit Court, following Jimmie 
Davison's (Davison) negotiated guilty plea to one count of 
aggravated battery, one count of special circumstances battery 
(battery by prisoner), and one count of threats to injure, all 
as a repeater.  The court of appeals concluded that the 
aggravated battery and battery by prisoner punishments were 
multiplicitous, in violation of Davison's double jeopardy rights 
under the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  Id., ¶20.   
No. 01-0826-CR 
2 
 
¶2 
Two issues are presented for review.  First, does a 
criminal defendant who pleads guilty to several crimes in a 
negotiated 
plea 
agreement 
waive 
the 
right 
to 
raise 
a 
multiplicity claim against one of the resulting convictions?  
Second, did the circuit court err in entering a judgment of 
conviction for one count of aggravated battery and one count of 
battery by prisoner on the facts of this case?  More 
specifically, 
did 
the 
legislature 
intend 
in 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.66(2m) 
(1999-2000)1 
to 
prohibit 
conviction 
for 
both 
aggravated battery under Wis. Stat. § 940.19(6) and battery by 
prisoner under Wis. Stat. § 940.20(1) in the prosecution of a 
single act? 
¶3 
We hold that the legislature did not clearly intend in 
§ 939.66(2m) to bar convictions for both aggravated battery 
under § 939.19(6) and battery by prisoner under § 940.20(1) in a 
single prosecution arising out of a single act.  When the broad 
language of § 939.66(2m) is viewed in its full context, 
considering its legislative history as well as the different 
harms addressed by different battery statutes, we conclude that 
§ 939.66(2m) 
was 
intended 
to 
address 
specific 
problems 
pertaining to § 940.19 and not intended to prohibit cumulative 
punishments from convictions under the two battery statutes.     
¶4 
Davison's convictions for both aggravated battery and 
battery by prisoner were in conformity with legislative intent 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 volumes unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
3 
 
and thus did not violate his due process right against 
multiplicitous punishments.  Because we conclude that Davison's 
multiplicity objection fails on the merits, we decline to decide 
whether, by pleading guilty, he waived his right to raise this 
claim.   
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 
The facts in this case are taken from the criminal 
complaint.  In 1997, Jimmie Davison was an inmate at the Kenosha 
Correctional Center, serving a 12-year sentence for first-degree 
sexual assault.  During the day, he was assigned to a work 
release program at a farm in Franksville.  On November 11, 1997, 
Davison arranged for his wife to meet him for lunch at his work 
site.  When Mrs. Davison arrived at the grounds about noon, 
Davison got into her car and instructed her to drive to a remote 
area of the farm and park inside an isolated shed-type building.  
Once there, he pushed his food aside and began making sexual 
advances, which Mrs. Davison rejected.   
¶6 
Davison became very angry when his wife drew away.  He 
grabbed her around the neck with both hands, pulling her face 
close to his.  For the next 45 minutes or so, Davison 
intermittently choked her, attempted to kiss or grope her, 
pulled up her dress, and screamed at her when she resisted him.  
Mrs. Davison told him that he was "really hurting" her and later 
told police that she felt sure that Davison was going to kill 
her.  When she broke free and fled from the car, Davison caught 
her and forced her back into the shed and car.  He continued to 
choke her.  She said she had a hard time breathing and was 
No. 01-0826-CR 
4 
 
afraid Davison would break her neck or jaw because his grip was 
so tight.  Later, witnesses saw evidence of black and blue marks 
on Mrs. Davison's arm and of bruises, scratches, and bleeding 
around her neck.   
¶7 
At approximately 1:00 p.m., Mrs. Davison was able to 
persuade her husband that he would be in trouble if he got back 
late from lunch, and he drove the car back to the work area.  
Before exiting the car, however, Davison suddenly, violently 
punched the left side of Mrs. Davison's head.  She had a black 
eye for approximately two weeks.  A physician later noted 
bruises and tenderness around her eye, as well as handprints 
around both of Mrs. Davison's ears and under her jaw.   
¶8 
Mrs. Davison told police that one reason she visited 
her husband was that he had agreed to a divorce as soon as he 
got out of prison but had promised to fight her "all the way" if 
she filed while he was still incarcerated.  When she visited him 
on a second occasion, February 8, 1998, with their two children, 
Davison threatened to kill her if she filed for divorce.  He 
bluntly declared that he had "set a plan in motion" to have her 
killed within three days if she tried to break up their family.  
¶9 
On 
June 
26, 
1998, 
the 
Kenosha 
County 
District 
Attorney's Office filed a criminal complaint reciting these 
facts and charging Davison with one count each of kidnapping,2 
false 
imprisonment,3 
and 
aggravated 
battery 
under 
                                                 
2 Contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.31. 
3 Contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.30. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
5 
 
Wis. Stat. § 940.19(6),4 
all 
as 
a 
repeater 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1)(b). 
 
These 
charges 
related 
to 
the 
November 11, 1997, incidents.  In addition, the complaint 
contained 
one 
count 
of 
threats 
to 
injure 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 943.30(1), as a repeater, based on the separate 
February 
8, 
1998, 
incident. 
 
After 
Davison 
waived 
his 
preliminary hearing, the prosecutor added a count of special 
circumstances 
battery 
(battery 
by 
prisoner) 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 940.20(1),5 as a repeater, to the information.  This 
additional count was based on the events of November 11.   
¶10 In response to the added count, Davison filed a motion 
claiming that the two battery charges were multiplicitous under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m)6 
and 
violated 
the 
constitutional 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.19(6) 
provides 
in 
the 
relevant 
portion: "Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to another by 
conduct that creates a substantial risk of great bodily harm is 
guilty of a Class D felony." 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.20(1) 
provided, 
at 
the 
times 
relevant to this case: "Battery by prisoners.  Any prisoner 
confined to a state prison or other state, county or municipal 
detention facility who intentionally causes bodily harm to an 
officer, employee, visitor or another inmate of such prison or 
institution, without his or her consent, is guilty of a Class D 
felony."  Wis. Stat. § 940.20(1). 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.66(2m) provides: 
Conviction 
of 
included 
crime 
permitted. 
 
Upon 
prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of 
either the crime charged or an included crime, but not 
both.  An included crime may be any of the following: 
. . . .  
(2m) A crime which is a less serious or equally 
serious type of battery than the one charged. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
6 
 
prohibition against double jeopardy.  After a hearing, Kenosha 
County Circuit Judge David M. Bastianelli denied Davison's 
motion, finding that the charges were not multiplicitous or in 
violation of double jeopardy.   
¶11 Thereafter, 
Davison 
entered 
a 
negotiated 
plea, 
agreeing to plead guilty to aggravated battery as a repeater, 
battery by prisoner as a repeater, and threatening to injure as 
a repeater.  For its part, the State agreed to dismiss, but 
read-in, the charges for kidnapping as a repeater and false 
imprisonment as a 
repeater. 
 The 
plea bargain did not 
incorporate any provision forbidding Davison from making a 
multiplicity or double jeopardy claim on appeal.   
¶12 After accepting the guilty plea, the circuit court 
sentenced Davison to six years in prison for aggravated battery, 
five years to be served consecutively for battery by prisoner, 
and another five years to be served consecutively for the 
threats to injure.  Davison appealed.  During the briefing stage 
of his appeal, he complained that his appointed counsel failed 
to adequately consult with him and respond to his inquiries.  
The court of appeals granted Davison's counsel's motion to 
withdraw, directed the public defender to appoint new counsel, 
and then granted additional time for filing a postconviction 
motion and appeal.   
¶13 In 
early 
2001 
Davison's 
new 
counsel 
filed 
a 
postconviction motion reasserting the multiplicity and double 
jeopardy claim, as well as other claims not relevant to this 
appeal.  The circuit court again denied the multiplicity and 
No. 01-0826-CR 
7 
 
double jeopardy claim, finding that, while the claim might have 
merit, the issue had been waived by Davison's guilty plea.  
Davison again appealed.   
¶14 In reversing the circuit court, the court of appeals 
rejected the State's contention that Davison had waived his 
multiplicity claim by pleading guilty to the charges.  Davison, 
255 Wis. 2d 715, ¶13.  The court characterized Davison's claim 
as being one of double jeopardy and observed that double 
jeopardy claims are not governed by the guilty plea waiver rule.  
Id., ¶12.  The court also concluded that, while aggravated 
battery and battery by prisoner are offenses that are different 
in law, § 939.66(2m) applies to all battery statutes, including 
those outside of § 940.19.  Id., ¶¶18, 20.  Therefore, the court 
said, Davison could not be convicted of both § 940.19(6) 
and § 940.20(1), and the court remanded the case to determine 
the appropriate remedy under State v. Robinson, 2002 WI 9, 249 
Wis. 2d 553, 638 N.W.2d 564.  Id., ¶25.  The State petitioned 
for review, which we granted. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 This case presents several questions of law.  Whether 
an individual's constitutional right to be free from double 
jeopardy has been violated is a question of law that this court 
reviews de novo.  State v. Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d 739, 746, 580 
N.W.2d 329 (1998).  Whether a multiplicity violation exists in a 
given case, which requires a determination of legislative 
intent, is a question of law subject to independent appellate 
No. 01-0826-CR 
8 
 
review.  See State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, ¶52, 252 Wis. 2d 54, 
643 N.W.2d 437.   
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
A. Double Jeopardy 
 
¶16 The State seeks clarification of the analysis to be 
employed in multiplicity claims, including a discussion of 
multiplicity's relationship to double jeopardy.  Twenty years 
ago, in an opinion by then-Justice Abrahamson, this court 
observed that: 
 
Although the federal constitutional guarantee 
against double jeopardy has "its roots in antiquity," 
it is "one of the least understood . . . provisions of 
the Bill of Rights" and the holdings of the United 
States Supreme Court can "hardly be characterized as 
models of consistency and clarity."  Whalen v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 684, 699-700 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting).  See also Westen and Drubel, Toward a 
General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 The Supreme 
Court Review 81, 82. 
State v. Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d 402, 406-07, 338 N.W.2d 466 
(1983).  In the ensuing years, this court has wrestled 
repeatedly with the proper principles to apply to claims of 
multiplicity and double jeopardy.7   
 
¶17 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
reads in part: "nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."  Article 
                                                 
7 For example, see State v. Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d 486, 493 
n.8, 496 n.10, 485 N.W.2d 1 (1992), and compare the majority 
opinion of Justice Callow with the dissenting opinion of then-
Justice Abrahamson, 168 Wis. 2d at 501-508 (Abrahamson, J., 
dissenting). 
No. 01-0826-CR 
9 
 
I, § 8(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution provides in part that 
"no person for the same offense may be twice put in jeopardy of 
punishment . . . ." 
 
¶18 Our tradition is to view these provisions as identical 
in scope and purpose.  Day v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 588, 591, 251 
N.W.2d 811 (1977).  Consequently, this court accepts decisions 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
as 
controlling 
interpretations of the double jeopardy provisions of both 
constitutions.  State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 401 n.5, 576 
N.W.2d 912 (1998) (citing Day, 76 Wis. 2d at 591, and State v. 
Calhoun, 67 Wis. 2d 204, 220, 226 N.W.2d 504 (1975)); see also 
State v. Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d 155, 161, 378 N.W.2d 883 (1985) 
(citing cases). 
 
¶19 The United States Supreme Court has stated that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause provides three separate protections.  "It 
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal.  It protects against a second prosecution for the 
same offense after conviction.  And it protects against multiple 
punishments for the same offense."8  North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (emphasis added).  This summary has 
                                                 
8 To support this statement, the Supreme Court cited Ex 
parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1873); United States v. Benz, 282 
U.S. 304, 307 (1931); United States v. Sacco, 367 F.2d 368 (2d 
Cir. 1966); United States v. Adams, 362 F.2d 210 (6th Cir. 
1966); and Kennedy v. United States, 330 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 
1964).  Each of these five cases involves a second sentence or 
an amended sentence imposed after a first sentence was vacated 
or corrected. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
10 
 
been quoted or paraphrased many times by this court.9  It does 
not apply to cases in which a person was never put in "jeopardy" 
or in which the person is properly subject to retrial. 
 
¶20 Under 
this 
analytical 
framework, 
the 
first 
two 
protections 
involve 
"a 
second 
prosecution." 
 
The 
third 
protection involves a single prosecution.  All three protections 
implicate "the same offense." 
 
¶21 Over the years, courts have struggled with the concept 
of "the same offense."  The seminal case in this regard is 
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).  Blockburger 
was charged with five offenses for unlawfully selling drugs.  A 
jury found him guilty of three.  The three charges were 
variations on two sales of a particular drug to the same 
purchaser.  The Court had no difficulty concluding that sales 
made on consecutive days did not constitute "a single offense" 
or a "single continuing offense."  Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301-
03.10  In this facet of the case, the Court pointed to separate 
acts to distinguish the offenses.  Two offenses were committed. 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, ¶20, 244 
Wis. 2d 523, 628 N.W.2d 801; State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶26, 
236 
Wis. 2d 721, 
613 
N.W.2d 833; 
State 
v. 
Sauceda, 
168 
Wis. 2d 486, 492, 485 N.W.2d 1 (1992); State v. Rabe, 96 
Wis. 2d 48, 64, 291 N.W.2d 809 (1980). 
10 The Court stated: "[T]he first sale had been consummated, 
and the payment for the additional drug, however closely 
following, was the initiation of a separate and distinct sale 
completed by its delivery."  Blockburger v. United States, 284 
U.S. 299, 301 (1932).   
No. 01-0826-CR 
11 
 
 
¶22 More significant for our purposes, the Court addressed 
a second claim made by the defendant, "that the sale charged in 
[one] count as having been made not from the original stamped 
package, and the same sale [charged in a second count] as having 
been made not in pursuance of a written order of the purchaser, 
constitute but one offense for which only a single penalty 
lawfully may be imposed."  Id. at 301 (emphasis added).  The 
court addressed this second claim as follows: 
 
Each of the offenses created requires proof of a 
different element.  The applicable rule is that where 
the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of 
two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be 
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or 
only one, is whether each provision requires proof of 
a fact which the other does not.  Gavieres v. United 
States, 230 U.S. 338, 342 [1911], and authorities 
cited.  In that case this court quoted from and 
adopted 
the 
language 
of 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Massachusetts in Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433 
[1871]: "A single act may be an offense against two 
statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an 
additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal 
or conviction under either statute does not exempt the 
defendant from prosecution and punishment under the 
other."   . . .  Applying the test, we must conclude 
that here, although both sections were violated by the 
one sale, two offenses were committed. 
Id. at 304.  For this second facet of the case, there was only 
one act, but it violated two statutes, each of which required 
proof of a different element.  
 
¶23 There is no reference in Blockburger to the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  There is no direct 
reference to "double jeopardy" in any context, or to "cumulative 
punishment."  The Court observed that "each offense is subject 
No. 01-0826-CR 
12 
 
to the penalty prescribed; and if that be too harsh, the remedy 
must be afforded by act of Congress, not by judicial legislation 
under the guise of construction."  Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 305.  
However, the opinion cites Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 
338 (1911), which involved a 1902 Act of Congress that read: "No 
person, for the same offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy of 
punishment."  Id. at 341 (citing section 5 of the Act of 
Congress of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat., c 1369, 691).  In addition, 
the Court affirmed a decision of the Court of Appeals, 
Blockburger v. United States, 50 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1931), in 
which the dissenting judge wrote: "I do not think the penalty 
section of the statute contemplates such double punishment for 
the same transaction."  Id. at 799 (Alschuler, J., dissenting).  
Thus, 
the 
Court 
could 
not 
have 
been 
oblivious 
to 
the 
implications of its decision for future cases.   
¶24 The "elements only test" articulated in Blockburger 
has frequently been used to aid courts in determining whether a 
charge is "the same offense" for purposes of any of the 
protections embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause.11  United 
States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993).  Because the 
Blockburger test sometimes produces unsatisfactory results, 
                                                 
11 In Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 297 (1996), 
the Court stated: "For over half a century we have determined 
whether a defendant has been punished twice for the 'same 
offense' by applying the rule set forth in Blockburger v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)."  The Blockburger test is used 
also to determine "sameness" for situations involving successive 
prosecutions.  Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977). 
No. 01-0826-CR 
13 
 
however, it is "now seen as simply a rule of construction 
creating a rebuttable prescription of sameness."  Akhil Reed 
Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 Yale L. Rev. 1807, 
1819 (1997) (citing Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 778-
79 (1985); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 n.8 (1984); 
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366-67 (1983)); see also 
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 337 (1981); Whalen v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691 (1980); Iannelli v. United 
States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975). 
 
¶25 The impact of a judicial determination that a charge 
is the same offense under the Blockburger test appears to depend 
to some extent upon whether the charge comes in a "second 
prosecution" or in a single, first prosecution.  See Brown v. 
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d at 407 
n.5; Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of 
Double Jeopardy, in 1978 The Supreme Court Review 121 n.188 
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1979). 
It is important to distinguish here between the 
constitutional standards for multiple punishment and 
the distinct standards for a multiple prosecution.  
Although the Blockburger Rule operates as nothing more 
than a rebuttable presumption for purposes of multiple 
punishment, it may have a stricter and more rigid 
application in the context of multiple prosecution. 
Westen & Drubel, supra, at 121-22 n.188.  The Court appears less 
tolerant 
of 
prosecuting 
the 
same 
offense 
in 
a 
second 
prosecution. 
¶26 If 
the 
same 
offense 
is 
involved 
in 
a 
single 
prosecution, we look to whether the same offense is part of: (1) 
No. 01-0826-CR 
14 
 
a 
"second 
sentence" 
challenge, 
(2) 
a 
unit-of-prosecution 
challenge, or (3) a cumulative punishments challenge, as we have 
in the present case.  See Whalen, 445 U.S. at 702-705 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing the three "strands" of 
"multiple punishment" precedent) (citing cases). 
 
¶27 Before discussing "punishment," it should be noted 
that the Supreme Court has said that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
does not prohibit the State "from prosecuting [a defendant] for 
[ ] multiple offenses in a single prosecution," even in 
situations where it could not impose cumulative punishments for 
the same offense.  Johnson, 467 U.S. at 500 (emphasis added).  
The Johnson case 
distinguishes prosecution 
on 
overlapping 
charges for the same offense from punishment on those charges 
for the same offense and explains that prosecution does not 
equal punishment.   
¶28 Looking then solely to cumulative punishments imposed 
in a single prosecution for the same offense, "the Double 
Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court 
from 
prescribing 
greater 
punishment 
than 
the 
legislature 
intended."  Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983).  "Even 
if the crimes are the same under Blockburger, if it is evident 
that a state legislature intended to authorize cumulative 
punishments, a court's inquiry is at an end."  Johnson, 469 U.S. 
at 499 n.8; see also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 
(1985). 
 
¶29 As noted above, the United States Supreme Court 
summarized 
the 
double 
jeopardy 
protections 
as 
including 
No. 01-0826-CR 
15 
 
"multiple punishments for the same offense."  Pearce, 395 U.S. 
at 717.  For this proposition, the Court cited only cases 
involving a second sentence imposed by the court.  Id.12  Hence, 
uncertainty has developed 
whether 
the 
prohibition against 
"multiple punishments for the same offense" can be reconciled 
with the Court's conclusion that a legislative body may approve 
cumulative punishments for the same offense, even when the 
offense is identical in law and fact.13 
¶30 To 
address 
this 
uncertainty, 
the 
Court's 
rule 
prohibiting "multiple punishments for the same offense" should 
be modified in cases involving simultaneous convictions under 
more than one statute.  We read the Supreme Court as saying that 
                                                 
12 See also Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 703 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("As is borne out by 
subsequent cases, the Double Jeopardy Clause as interpreted in 
Ex parte Lange prevents a sentencing court from increasing a 
defendant's sentence for any particular statutory offense, even 
though the second sentence is within the limits set by the 
legislature."). 
13 Justice Antonin Scalia has written that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple prosecutions, "not multiple 
punishments."  Dep't of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 
U.S. 767, 798 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  He cited 
materials leading to the approval of the Fifth Amendment by 
Congress in 1789, United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 
537, 555-56 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and In re 
Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 53 (1943) (Stone, C.J., dissenting), to 
show that Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1874), the source of the 
protection against "multiple punishments for the same offense," 
should have been decided solely on due process grounds, thereby 
avoiding many decades of misinterpretation.  Id. at 798-800. 
A growing sense that the Court has been on the wrong track 
may explain its explicit recognition that legislative intent 
overrides multiple punishments for the same offense. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
16 
 
when a defendant is convicted under more than one statute for a 
single act or transaction and the charges constitute "the same 
offense" because they are identical in law and fact, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause prohibits cumulative punishments from these 
convictions unless the relevant legislative body intended to 
authorize 
cumulative 
punishments. 
 
The 
"question 
whether 
punishments imposed by a court after a defendant's conviction 
upon criminal charges are unconstitutionally multiple cannot be 
resolved without determining what punishments the Legislative 
Branch has authorized."  Whalen, 445 U.S. at 688. 
 
¶31 The Double Jeopardy Clause does not itself restrict a 
legislature's power to make law.  "Because the substantive power 
to prescribe crimes and determine punishments is vested with the 
legislature, United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 93 
(1820), the question under the Double Jeopardy Clause whether 
punishments are 'multiple' is essentially one of legislative 
intent."  Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499 (citing Hunter, 459 U.S. at 
366-368). 
 
¶32 In sum, we conclude that the imposition of cumulative 
punishments from different statutes in a single prosecution for 
"the same offense" violates double jeopardy when the cumulative 
punishments are not intended by the legislature.  See Whalen, 
445 U.S. at 689; see also Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 
292, 297 (1996).   
¶33 The "same offense" in this specific situation should 
be an offense identical in law and fact.  The imposition of 
cumulative punishments not authorized by the legislature is a 
No. 01-0826-CR 
17 
 
due process violation, not a double jeopardy violation, when the 
punishments do not spring from the same offense.  "The same 
offense" is the sine qua non of double jeopardy.  State v. 
Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, ¶22, 244 Wis. 2d 523, 628 N.W.2d 801; 
State v. Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d 156, 159 n.3, 493 N.W.2d 23 
(1992). 
B.  Multiplicity 
 
¶34 The present case involves a claim of "multiplicity."  
In State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 61, 291 N.W.2d 809 (1980), we 
stated:  
Multiplicity 
arises 
where 
the 
defendant 
is 
charged in more than one count for a single offense.  
United States v. Free, 574 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1978); 
State v. Dreske, 88 Wis. 2d 60, 74, 276 N.W.2d 324 
(Ct. App. 1979).  As we noted in State v. George, 69 
Wis. 2d 92, 
230 
N.W.2d 253 
(1975), 
multiplicitous 
charges are impermissible, because they violate the 
double jeopardy provisions of the state and federal 
constitutions. 
Id. at 815.  The Rabe statements have been repeated numerous 
times by this court.  See Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 746; Grayson, 
172 Wis. 2d at 159; Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d at 161.  In recent cases, 
the 
court 
has 
attempted 
to 
divide 
"multiplicity" 
into 
categories.  State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶27, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 
613 N.W.2d 833; Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 402 n.6.14   
                                                 
14 In State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 
N.W.2d 833, the court stated:  "Multiplicity challenges . . . 
usually arise in two different situations: 1) when a single 
course of conduct is charged in multiple counts of the same 
statutory offense (the 'continuous offense' cases), and 2) when 
a single criminal act encompasses the elements of more than one 
distinct statutory crime."  236 Wis. 2d 721, ¶27. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
18 
 
 
¶35 Some of our commentary on multiplicity must be re-
evaluated in light of the last quarter-century of United States 
Supreme Court decisions.  We know that the Blockburger court 
long ago explained that a single act may be an offense against 
two statutes.  Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.  We have learned 
since Blockburger that "the same offense" may give rise to more 
than one conviction and punishment, if cumulative punishments 
for the same offense are intended by the legislature.  Rutledge, 
517 U.S. at 303.  This is the teaching of Hunter, Johnson, and 
Garrett.  This court has heretofore acknowledged as much.  In 
Bohacheff, the court stated: 
In recent cases the United States Supreme Court 
has held that as long as the legislative intent is 
clear the federal Constitution does not bar the 
legislature from imposing multiple punishments even if 
the crimes described by the two statutory provisions 
under which two punishments are imposed are the same 
offense. 
Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d at 409 n.7 (emphasis added) (citing 
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1973), and State v. Gordon, 
111 Wis. 2d 133, 137, 330 N.W.2d 564 (1983)).15  In short, 
legislative intent to authorize cumulative punishments overrides 
a total identity of law and fact a la Blockburger. 
                                                 
15 See also State v. Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d 155, 173 n.3, 378 
N.W.2d 883 (1985) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) ("[T]he United 
States Supreme Court held that the dispositive issue in 
determining whether a court may impose multiple punishments on a 
defendant in a single trial for violating two statutory 
provisions (regardless of whether they constitute the same 
offense) 
is 
whether 
the 
legislature 
authorized 
multiple 
punishments."). 
No. 01-0826-CR 
19 
 
 
¶36 This understanding is significant because this court 
has said that if offenses "are identical in law and fact, the 
charges are multiplicitous in violation of the double jeopardy 
clauses of the federal and state constitutions."  Anderson, 219 
Wis. 2d at 747; see also Trawitzki, 244 Wis. 2d 523, ¶21; 
Derango, 236 Wis. 2d, ¶30.  Although this statement is usually 
true, it is not always true, because the legislature may have 
intended to authorize cumulative punishments for the same 
offense.   
¶37 In 
situations 
where 
the 
legislature 
intends 
to 
authorize cumulative punishments for the same offense, we may no 
longer say that the charges are "multiplicitous" or that they 
violate double jeopardy.  Use of the term "multiplicitous" 
should be limited to situations in which the legislature has not 
authorized multiple charges and cumulative punishments. 
 
¶38 In addition, in discussing multiplicity, a reference 
to 
"charges" 
must 
be 
employed 
carefully, 
because 
it 
is 
permissible to charge more than one count, even if the state may 
not punish a defendant on more than one count.  Johnson, 467 
U.S. at 500.  In Bohacheff, for instance, the state charged the 
defendant with being under the influence of an intoxicant while 
operating a vehicle, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(a) 
(1982-82), and having a blood alcohol concentration of .10 or 
more 
while 
operating 
a 
vehicle 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(b) (1981-82).  Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d at 
404.  The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on 
the ground that charging him under both sections violated 
No. 01-0826-CR 
20 
 
protections against double jeopardy.  The circuit court granted 
the motion.  Id. at 405.  This court reversed, concluding that 
the complaint did not violate double jeopardy because the 
statutes subjected the defendant to only one conviction and one 
punishment.  Id.  This court's ruling was and is consistent with 
the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Johnson. 
 
¶39 Bohacheff did not describe itself as a multiplicity 
case, although it would have been a multiplicity case if 
unauthorized cumulative punishments had been imposed.  By 
contrast, Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, did describe itself as a 
multiplicity case, based upon the charges alone, but it was not.  
Rabe involved four charges of homicide by intoxicated use of a 
motor vehicle under the same statute, as four persons were 
killed in an accident caused by the defendant's intoxication.  
Id. at 52.  The defendant filed a motion to consolidate the four 
counts into one count on grounds that the defendant's single act 
of negligently driving his vehicle while intoxicated could not 
be charged as multiple offenses.  The circuit court granted the 
motion.  Id. at 52-53. 
 
¶40 In vacating the circuit court's dismissal of three 
counts, this court adopted the "multiplicity" rhetoric employed 
by the defendant.  We cited United States v. Free, 574 F.2d 
1221, 
1224 
(5th 
Cir. 
1978), 
for 
the 
proposition 
that 
multiplicity arises where the defendant is charged in more than 
one count for a single offense.  Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 61.  In 
Free, 
the 
defendant 
claimed 
that 
his 
indictment 
was 
"multiplicitous" because one count charged him with second-
No. 01-0826-CR 
21 
 
degree murder and a second count charged him with unlawfully 
conveying a weapon designed to kill an inmate from place to 
place in a federal correctional institution.  Free, 524 F.2d at 
1224.  The court used the Blockburger test to dismiss the 
defendant's claim as meritless, making no reference to double 
jeopardy in its decision.  Id.  For its definition of 
"multiplicity," the Free court cited Gerberding v. United 
States, 471 F.2d 55, 58 (8th Cir. 1973), another case completely 
silent on double jeopardy.  Free, 524 F.2d at 1224. 
 
¶41 Both Free and Gerberding involved different charges, 
not multiple counts of the same charge.  This made them similar 
to this case, but different from Rabe.  As a general 
proposition, different elements of law distinguish one offense 
from another when different statutes are charged.  Different 
facts distinguish one count from another when the counts are 
charged under the same statute.16   
 
¶42 There is an established methodology for reviewing 
multiplicity claims.  Trawitzki, 244 Wis. 2d 523, ¶21; Anderson, 
219 Wis. 2d at 746; Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d at 402-03.   
¶43 First, the court 
determines 
whether 
the charged 
offenses are identical in law and fact using the Blockburger 
test.  Trawitzki, 244 Wis. 2d 523, ¶21; Derango 236 Wis. 2d 721, 
¶29.  If it is determined, using this test, that the offenses 
are identical in law and fact, the presumption is that the 
                                                 
16 The Rabe and Anderson cases may be compared with State v. 
George, 69 Wis. 2d 92, 230 N.W.2d 253 (1975), to illustrate 
contrasting treatment of multiple counts under the same statute. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
22 
 
legislative body did not intend to punish the same offense under 
two different statutes.  Whalen, 445 U.S. at 692.  "Accordingly, 
where two statutory provisions proscribe the 'same offense,' 
they are construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in 
the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative 
intent."  Id. (emphasis added).  
¶44 Conversely, if under the Blockburger test the charged 
offenses are different in law or fact, a presumption arises that 
the legislature did intend to permit cumulative punishments.  
See Derango, 236 Wis. 2d 721, ¶30; Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d at 407; 
Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 496; State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722, 
755, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991).  "This presumption can only be 
rebutted by clear legislative intent to the contrary."  Derango, 
236 Wis. 2d 721, ¶30; Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d at 407; Kuntz, 160 
Wis. 2d at 755 (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 469 U.S. at 367; 
Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340). 
¶45 Second, even if the charged offenses are not identical 
in law and fact, the court must still determine whether the 
legislature intended multiple offenses to be brought as a single 
count.  See Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 746.  At this juncture, 
however, 
it is the defendant's burden to 
show a 
clear 
legislative 
intent 
that 
cumulative 
punishments 
are 
not 
authorized. 
 
¶46 Applying these principles to this case, there is no 
dispute that the offense of aggravated battery is not identical 
in law to the offense of battery by prisoner.  Consequently, we 
are not dealing with a potential double jeopardy violation 
No. 01-0826-CR 
23 
 
involving "the same offense."  The cumulative punishments 
against the defendant are not "multiplicitous" either, unless 
the legislature did not intend to authorize multiple convictions 
and cumulative punishments for the two battery offenses on these 
facts.  If the legislature did not intend to authorize multiple 
convictions and cumulative punishments, Davison has a legitimate 
due process claim.  To evaluate this claim, we must concentrate 
our focus on legislative intent. 
IV. LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
¶47 Davison 
challenges 
one 
of 
his 
two 
"battery" 
convictions 
on 
multiplicity 
grounds, 
arguing 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) 
represents 
a 
clear 
expression 
of 
legislative intent not to authorize cumulative punishments in 
his situation.  Wisconsin Stat. § 939.66 reads in part as 
follows: 
 
Conviction of included crime permitted.  Upon 
prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of 
either the crime charged or an included crime, but not 
both.  An included crime may be any of the following: 
 
. . . .  
 
(2m) A crime which is a less serious or equally 
serious type of battery than the one charged. 
¶48 Davison notes that aggravated battery and battery by 
prisoner are both Class D felonies.  Thus, if measured by the 
penalty structure, each crime is an "equally serious type of 
No. 01-0826-CR 
24 
 
battery."17  As a result, he argues, Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) bars 
conviction of "[a] crime which is [an] . . . equally serious 
type of battery than the one charged." 
 
¶49 Davison does not dispute that the two offenses are not 
identical in law.  Thus, there is a presumption that the 
legislature intended to permit punishments for both offenses.  
The 
critical 
issue 
to 
be 
decided, 
then, 
is 
whether 
Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) represents a clear legislative intent to 
prohibit 
cumulative 
punishments 
on 
the 
facts 
before 
us, 
rebutting the presumption to the contrary. 
¶50 As we seek legislative intent in a multiplicity claim, 
the court does not stop at the language of the subsection.  
Instead, we analyze four factors to determine legislative 
intent: 
(1) 
all 
applicable 
statutory 
language; 
(2) 
the 
legislative history and context of the statute; (3) the nature 
of the proscribed conduct; and (4) the appropriateness of 
                                                 
17 Reference to the penalty structure is the correct way of 
determining whether a type of crime is "less or equally 
serious." 
 
State 
v. 
Lechner, 
217 
Wis. 2d 392, 
410, 
576 
N.W.2d 912 (1998) (citing State v. Davis, 144 Wis. 2d 852, 857, 
425 N.W.2d 411 (1988)). 
No. 01-0826-CR 
25 
 
multiple 
punishment 
for 
the 
conduct. 
 
See 
Grayson, 
172 
Wis. 2d at 160 (citing Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d at 165).18   
A. Statutory Language 
¶51 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.66 is the second of two sections 
that appear under the heading "Rights of the Prosecution" in 
Subchapter 
V 
of 
Chapter 
939. 
 
The 
first 
section, 
Wis. Stat. § 939.65, is entitled "Prosecution under more than 
one section permitted."  It provides that "if an act forms the 
basis for a crime punishable under more than one statutory 
provision, prosecution may proceed under any or all such 
provisions."  Wis. Stat. § 939.65(1).  This section gives a 
green light to multiple charges, which may result in multiple 
convictions, under different statutory provisions.19   
                                                 
18 This four-factor test first became part of this court's 
jurisprudence in Manson v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 413, 422, 304 
N.W.2d 729 (1981).  In Manson, we were confronted with a 
unanimous verdict challenge.  Id. at 419.  Before considering 
the defendant's contention that he was deprived of a unanimous 
verdict, this court determined whether the armed robbery 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 943.32(1), 
defined 
one 
offense 
with 
alternative 
means 
of 
being 
committed 
or 
two 
independent 
offenses.  Id.  In discerning the legislature's intent on this 
matter, the court adopted a four-factor test previously employed 
in United States v. UCO Oil Co., 546 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976), 
and concluded that there was only one legislatively intended 
offense in § 943.32.  Manson, 101 Wis. 2d at 422, 428. 
The test was first applied to a double jeopardy challenge 
in State v. Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d 402, 410, 338 N.W.2d 466 
(1983), and was directly incorporated into our multiplicity 
jurisprudence in Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d at 165. 
19 The State may file multiple charges leading to multiple 
convictions.  The comment to Wis. Stat. § 939.65 explains the 
purpose of the section as follows: 
No. 01-0826-CR 
26 
 
¶52 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.66 then speaks of an "included 
crime":   
Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be 
convicted of either the crime charged or an included 
crime, but not both.  An included crime may be any of 
the following:  
(1) a crime which does not require proof of any 
fact in addition to those which must be proved for the 
crime charged. 
Subsection (1) is a codification of the Blockburger test.   
¶53 In this case, the two battery offenses share only two 
elements: (1) the defendant caused bodily harm to the victim, 
and (2) the defendant intended to cause bodily harm to the 
victim.  Compare Wis JI——Criminal 1226, with Wis JI——Criminal 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
This section makes clear that there may be 
prosecution under more than one section for the same 
conduct.  For example, a person may be prosecuted 
under a general section even though there is a 
specific section which covers the conduct, or he may 
be prosecuted under both; a person may be prosecuted 
for an attempt rather than the completed crime; a 
person may be prosecuted for a misdemeanor even though 
some other section may make his conduct a felony. 
 
This section states a rule of pleading, and does 
not purport to state the limitations on multiple 
sentences for the same act or the limitations on 
multiple convictions and subsequent prosecutions for 
the 
same 
act 
which 
may 
be 
included 
in 
the 
constitutional double jeopardy rule.  For some of the 
limitations which have been incorporated in the code, 
see sections 339.66, 339.71 and 339.72. 
1953 A.B. 100, at 52. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
27 
 
1228.20  To prove battery by prisoner, the State must prove four 
elements that are not included in aggravated battery, namely (1) 
the defendant was a prisoner; (2) the victim was a visitor to 
the defendant's institution; (3) the defendant caused bodily 
harm without the consent of the victim; and (4) the defendant 
knew the victim was a visitor to the institution and knew that 
the victim did not consent to the causing of bodily harm.  See 
Wis JI——Criminal 1228.  To prove aggravated battery under 
§ 940.19(6), the State must prove two elements that are not 
included in battery by prisoner, namely (1) the defendant's 
conduct created a substantial risk of great bodily harm; and (2) 
the defendant knew his conduct created a substantial risk of 
great bodily harm.  See Wis JI——Criminal 1226.  The marked 
difference in the elements of the two offenses clearly supports 
a presumption that the legislature's intent was to permit 
cumulative punishments. 
 
¶54 On 
the 
other 
hand, 
§ 939.66 
also 
provides 
in 
subsection (2m) that an included crime includes "a crime which 
                                                 
20 The statutory elements of Wis. Stat. § 940.19(6) are: (1) 
the defendant caused bodily harm to the victim; (2) the 
defendant intended to cause bodily harm to the victim; (3) the 
defendant's conduct created a substantial risk of great bodily 
harm; and (4) the defendant knew that his or her conduct created 
a substantial risk of great bodily harm.  Wis JI——Criminal 1226.  
In contrast, the statutory elements of Wis. Stat. § 940.20(1) 
are: (1) the defendant was a prisoner; (2) the defendant 
intentionally caused bodily harm; (3) the victim was a visitor 
to the institution; (4) the defendant caused bodily harm without 
consent of the victim; and (5) the defendant knew the victim was 
a visitor of the institution and knew that the victim did not 
consent to the causing of bodily harm.  Wis JI——Criminal 1228. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
28 
 
is a less serious or equally serious type of battery than the 
one charged." 
¶55 Battery 
by 
prisoner 
is 
a 
crime.  
Wis. Stat. § 940.20(1).   
¶56 Battery by prisoner is arguably a "type of battery" if 
"battery" refers to statutory offenses as opposed to physical 
acts.21   
¶57 Battery by prisoner is an "equally serious type of 
battery" because both statutory offenses are Class D felonies.  
Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d at 410. 
¶58 Based on the plain language of the subsection, one 
would normally conclude that the legislature intended that the 
defendant not be convicted of both crimes.   
¶59 Supporting this conclusion is the fact that the 
legislature showed elsewhere in Wis. Stat. § 939.66 that it 
could write more narrowly than subsection (2m) when it wanted 
to.  For instance, subsection (2r) reads: "A crime which is a 
less serious type of violation under s. 943.23 than the one 
charged."  (Emphasis added).  Unlike (2m), this subsection 
confines the analysis of an included crime to a specific 
statute.  See also subsection (6c) ("A crime that is a less 
serious type of violation under s. 940.285 than the one 
charged."); subsection (6e) ("A crime that is a less serious 
type of violation under s. 940.295 than the one charged."); 
                                                 
21 If "type of battery" does not refer to statutory 
offenses, then all the "types of battery" would be covered by 
Wis. Stat. § 941.19. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
29 
 
subsection (7) ("The crime specified in s. 940.11(2) when the 
crime charged is specified in s. 940.11(1)."). 
¶60 The 
text 
also 
shows 
that 
the 
legislature 
has 
repeatedly evinced a concern about overlapping charges of 
battery.  In Wis. Stat. § 939.66, the legislature addressed 
battery in subsection (5) ("The crime of attempted battery when 
the crime charged is sexual assault, sexual assault of a child, 
robbery, mayhem or aggravated battery or an attempt to commit 
any of them.") and in subsection (6) ("A crime specified in s. 
940.285(2)(b)4. or 5. ['maltreatment' of vulnerable adults] when 
the crime 
charged 
is 
specified in 
s. 940.19(2) to (6) 
[subsections of the battery statute pertaining to substantial 
bodily harm and great bodily harm]."), 940.225(1), (2) or (3) or 
940.30. 
¶61 Finally, 
the 
court 
provided 
a 
supportive 
interpretation 
of 
the 
statute 
in 
a 
parallel 
subsection.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 939.66(2) addresses multiple convictions for 
homicide and prohibits conviction of "a crime which is a less 
serious type of criminal homicide than the one charged."  In 
Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, the defendant pled no contest to both 
second-degree reckless homicide and homicide by intoxicated use 
of a vehicle when both charges involved the death of a single 
person.  The defendant argued that he could not be convicted 
twice for killing the same person.  In rejecting his claim, the 
court stated: 
[T]he legislature, by enacting Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2), 
has specifically addressed the issue of multiple 
No. 01-0826-CR 
30 
 
homicide convictions for a criminal act causing a 
single death.  Where a single act of a defendant forms 
the basis for a crime punishable under more than one 
statutory provision, Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2) provides 
that a defendant may not be convicted for two criminal 
homicides if one is "a less serious type of criminal 
homicide."  The defendant in this case argues that 
this section "unequivocally" evinces the legislature's 
intent to allow only one homicide conviction for 
causing the death of one person.  A closer reading of 
the plain language in Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2), however, 
establishes just the opposite. 
 
The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2) does 
not prohibit multiple homicide convictions for killing 
one person.  It bars multiple convictions only when 
one of the homicide convictions is for a "less serious 
type" of homicide.  Noticeably absent from the 
prohibitions 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2) 
is 
a 
bar 
against 
multiple 
homicide 
convictions 
when 
the 
homicides are "equally serious." 
Id. at 407-08 (emphasis added). 
¶62 We went on to explain that, since the legislature 
enacted § 939.66(2) as a prohibition against multiple homicide 
convictions but "limited its application to situations where one 
homicide conviction is for a less serious type of homicide, we 
can infer a legislative intent not to prohibit multiple 
convictions when the defendant is convicted for equally serious 
types of homicide."  Id. at 408. 
 
The inference that the legislature did not intend 
to prohibit multiple convictions for "equally serious" 
homicides is supported by the fact that the statutory 
provision immediately following Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2) 
prohibits multiple convictions when one crime is a 
"less serious or equally serious type of battery."  
Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) (emphasis added). . . .  [T]he 
legislature 
apparently 
intended 
to 
bar 
multiple 
convictions for a single act of battery, regardless of 
the seriousness of the offenses. 
Id. at 408-09. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
31 
 
 
¶63 This rationale is helpful to Davison.  Turning Lechner 
on its head, "we can infer a legislative intent" to prohibit 
multiple convictions when the defendant is convicted for equally 
serious types of battery.  
 
¶64 In short, Davison is not forced to rely solely on the 
words in subsection (2m).  The words are buttressed by textual 
analysis and prior case law.   
¶65 There is, however, another side to the dispute.  A 
literal reading of subsection (2m) of § 939.66 is inconsistent 
with the general intent of § 939.65, which permits multiple 
charges under different statutes for a single act and may result 
in multiple convictions.  It is also inconsistent with the test 
set out in subsection (1) unless (2m) is narrowly construed. 
¶66 In addition, the introductory sentence and several 
subsections of § 939.66 may be read to apply only to a single 
charged offense and to a lesser-included offense that is not 
charged but is later submitted to the jury.  Section 939.66 
reads: 
Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be 
convicted of either the crime charged or an included 
crime, but not both.  An included crime may be any of 
the following: 
(1) A crime which does not require proof of any 
fact in addition to those which must be proved for the 
crime charged. 
. . . .  
(2m) A crime which is a less serious or equally 
serious type of battery than the one charged. 
Wis. Stat. § 939.66 (emphasis added). 
No. 01-0826-CR 
32 
 
¶67 This plausible reading of the statute could make the 
statute inapplicable to the present case because, in the present 
case, both battery statutes were charged.  As will be seen, the 
legislative history lends support to this interpretation of the 
statute.   
¶68 Alternatively, if subsection (2m) is interpreted to 
apply to both charged and uncharged crimes, it limits a single 
act of battery against a single victim to only one "battery" 
conviction, regardless of the circumstances.  The reason for 
this result is that all "battery" charges will either be "less 
serious or equally serious" to one of the charged offenses.  
There will never be a "more serious" battery charge that could 
simultaneously be prosecuted.  To illustrate, if a police 
officer visited a correctional institution to interview a 
prisoner and the prisoner attacked the police officer causing 
great bodily harm, the prisoner could be charged with only one 
battery offense under any statute, if we adopt the defendant's 
interpretation of (2m).  There is reason to ponder whether the 
legislature intended such a result. 
 
¶69 The plain language interpretation of subsection (2m) 
is also inconsistent with the plain language of subsection (6).  
Subsection (6) explicitly exempts simple battery, § 940.19(1), 
from 
the 
prohibition 
of 
a 
simultaneous 
prosecution 
and 
conviction 
of 
maltreatment 
under 
§§ 940.285(2)(b)4. 
 
If 
subsection (2m) is interpreted to preclude conviction of equally 
serious "types of battery," the exemption in subsection (6) is 
rendered meaningless. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
33 
 
¶70 As noted in ¶56 above, the phrase "type of battery" is 
subject to different interpretations, depending on whether 
"battery" refers to a statutory offense or a physical act.  If 
one interprets "type of battery" to refer to the "act" as 
affected by the actor's state of mind and the seriousness of the 
resulting injury, then those elements are discussed only in 
§ 941.19. 
¶71 Finally, 
the State 
makes 
two textual 
arguments.  
First, the State notes that subsection (2m) speaks simply of the 
"unadorned appellation 'battery.'"  It adds that only in 
§ 940.19 is the word "battery" applied without referring to the 
persons who commit the battery or the persons against whom the 
battery 
is 
committed.22 
 
Therefore, 
the 
State 
contends, 
                                                 
22 The other Wisconsin statutes that impose punishments for 
battery 
committed 
in 
special 
circumstances 
are 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.195 (Battery to an unborn child; substantial 
battery to an unborn child; aggravated battery to an unborn 
child), 940.20(1m) (Battery by persons subject to certain 
injunctions), 940.20(2) (Battery to law enforcement officers and 
firefighters), 
940.20(2m) 
(Battery 
to 
probation, 
extended 
supervision and parole agents and aftercare agents), 940.20(3) 
(Battery to jurors), 940.20(4) (Battery to public officers), 
940.20(5) (Battery to technical college district or school 
district officers and employees), 940.20(6) (Battery to public 
transit vehicle operator, driver or passenger), and 940.20(7) 
(Battery to emergency medical care providers).  In addition, 
other 
particularized 
battery 
offenses 
include 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.201 (Battery or threat to witnesses), 940.203 
(Battery or threat to judge), 940.205 (Battery or threat to 
department of revenue employee), and 940.207 (Battery or threat 
to department of commerce or department of workforce development 
employee).  Finally, we note that the penalty for burglary is 
enhanced from a Class C to a Class B felony when a burglar 
commits a battery while in the burglarized enclosure.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 943.10(2)(d). 
No. 01-0826-CR 
34 
 
reasonable 
doubt 
exists 
whether 
the 
word 
"battery" 
in 
§ 939.66(2m) was intended to apply to the special circumstances 
batteries created outside of § 940.19. 
¶72 Second, the State questions whether it is reasonable 
to apply § 939.66(2m) to the specific battery provisions 
relating to named actors or victims and to other similar battery 
provisions in Chapter 940, given the fact that the purpose of 
these specialized statutes is to enhance the penalties for 
committing a general battery under § 940.19.  The questionable 
interaction of statutes, the State argues, creates ambiguity as 
to the legislature's intended scope of § 939.66(2m). 
¶73 Under § 940.19, the severity of the different offenses 
is measured by the actor's intent and the seriousness of the 
injury suffered by the victim.  These factors are wholly absent 
from the special circumstances batteries in §§ 940.20, 940.201, 
940.203, 940.205, and 940.207——offenses based on the special 
status of the actor or the victim of the battery. 
¶74 To sum up, we think subsection (2m) is ambiguous.  
Read literally in one way, it is very helpful to the defendant.  
Read literally in another way, it is inapplicable to the 
defendant.  Read as the defendant wishes it read, it contradicts 
the principle of §§ 939.65 and 939.66(1) and produces some 
curious results.  Subsection (2m) is not clear enough to resolve 
the issue of legislative intent. 
B. Legislative History and Context 
 
¶75 We turn now to the legislative history and context of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m).  Both parties and the court of appeals 
No. 01-0826-CR 
35 
 
agree that subsection (2m) was created in response to this 
court's decision in State v. Richards, 123 Wis. 2d 1, 365 
N.W.2d 7 (1985).  We think it is useful, however, to examine the 
full history of Wis. Stat. § 939.66. 
 
¶76 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.66 was created in two steps in 
the early 1950s as part of the revision of the state criminal 
code.  Chapter 623, Laws of 1953; ch. 696, Laws of 1955.  The 
new text was accompanied by extensive comments.  The comment for 
the section at issue provides in part: 
 
This 
section permits 
conviction of 
a 
crime 
included within the crime charged and states what 
crimes are included crimes.  The reason behind the 
rule of this section is the state's difficulty in 
determining before a trial exactly what crime or 
degree of the crime it will be able upon the trial to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt.  There is no 
disadvantage to the defendant in such a rule, for he 
is apprised of the charges against him by reason of 
the fact that the crime charged is broader than the 
included crime. 
 
An example of an included crime under subsection 
(1) is the crime of burglary when the crime charged is 
aggravated burglary.  An example of an included crime 
under subsection (2) is homicide by reckless conduct 
when the crime charged is first-degree murder.  An 
example of an included crime under subsection (3) is 
injury by reckless conduct when the crime charged is 
battery. 
1953 A.B. 100, at 53 (emphasis added). 
 
¶77 The clear implication of the comment is that a 
defendant may be charged with one crime but ultimately convicted 
of an "included crime"——a lesser included crime that is not 
charged——when the State is unable to prove the more serious 
crime.  In these circumstances, the defendant has no complaint 
No. 01-0826-CR 
36 
 
"by reason of the fact that the crime charged is broader than 
the included crime."  Id. 
 
¶78 In 1985 this court decided State v. Richards, 123 
Wis. 2d 1, 365 N.W.2d 7 (1985).  The question presented in 
Richards was whether simple battery and intermediate battery, as 
proscribed by the version of Wis. Stat. § 940.19 applicable at 
that time,23 were lesser-included offenses of aggravated battery.  
Id. at 2.  The court applied the elements-only test articulated 
in § 939.66(1) 
and 
concluded 
that 
simple 
battery 
and 
intermediate battery were not included offenses of aggravated 
battery, because the two "lesser" crimes had different elements, 
requiring proof of nonconsent, whereas aggravated battery did 
not.  Id. at 4, 6.  As a result, we affirmed the circuit court's 
decision 
refusing 
to 
submit 
either 
simple 
battery 
or 
                                                 
23 The version of Wis. Stat. § 940.19 applicable to the 
Richards case provided: 
940.19 Battery;  aggravated battery.  (1) Whoever 
causes bodily harm to another by an act done with 
intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another 
without the consent of the person so harmed is guilty 
of a Class A misdemeanor.  
(1m) Whoever causes great bodily harm to another 
by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to 
that person or another without the consent of the 
person so harmed is guilty of a Class E felony.  
(2) Whoever causes great bodily harm to another 
by an act done with intent to cause great bodily harm 
to that person or another with or without the consent 
of the person so harmed is guilty of a Class C felony. 
State v. Richards, 123 Wis. 2d 1, 2 n.2, 365 N.W.2d 7 (1985) 
(quoting Wis. Stat. § 940.19 (1979-80)). 
No. 01-0826-CR 
37 
 
intermediate battery to the jury as lesser-included offenses of 
aggravated battery.  Id. at 4. 
¶79 While the Richards court felt bound by the statutory 
elements laid out in § 940.19, it nevertheless agreed with the 
defendant that common sense dictated that the two lower degrees 
of battery be lesser-included offenses of aggravated battery.  
Id. at 12.  Therefore, the court explained how the legislature 
could rectify the situation: 
Simply 
because 
the 
legislature 
could, 
and 
arguably 
should, 
have 
delineated 
the 
statutory 
elements differently does not permit this court to 
rewrite the elements of the crime by judicial fiat.  
It is up to the legislature, if it concludes that the 
lower battery offenses should be lesser included 
offenses, to do so within the statutory framework of 
sec. 939.66 and sec. 940.19, Stats.  The legislature 
could remedy the situation by adding a subsection to 
sec. 939.66, analogous to sec. 939.66(2), to provide 
that an included crime may be a crime which is a less 
serious 
type 
of 
battery 
than 
the 
one 
charged.  
Alternately, the legislature could remove victim non-
consent as an element of simple and intermediate 
battery and make consent a defense to sec. 940.19(1) 
and (1m) but not (2). 
Id. at 12-13 (footnote omitted).  The alternatives presented by 
the Court offered the legislature two options to eliminate the 
peculiarity of simple and intermediate battery not being lesser-
included offenses of aggravated battery.  The court made no 
mention of the effect these proposals might have on cumulative 
punishments for batteries prosecuted under both § 940.19 and one 
of the special circumstances battery offenses defined elsewhere 
in Chapter 940. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
38 
 
¶80 Two months after our decision in Richards, the 
Assembly introduced 1985 Assembly Bill 359, which ultimately 
became 1985 Wisconsin Act 144 and created § 939.66(2m).  See 
Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1985 Wis. Act 
144.  The original bill was drafted to follow the Richards 
option of removing victim nonconsent as an element of simple and 
intermediate 
battery 
and 
making 
consent 
a 
defense 
to 
§§ 940.19(1) and (1m) but not to aggravated battery under 
§ 940.19(2).  Id.  This revision would have affected only 
§ 940.19.   
¶81 The Legislative Reference Bureau's original analysis 
of 1985 Assembly Bill 359 explains that the bill's focus was on 
the degrees of general battery contained in § 940.19, not the 
special 
circumstances 
batteries 
located 
in 
Chapter 
940.  
According to the Legislative Reference Bureau: 
Under present law, Wisconsin prohibits battery 
(intentionally causing bodily harm) under a number of 
different statutes.  The potential penalties vary 
depending on the circumstances surrounding the act, 
the actor, the victim and the harm suffered by the 
victim.  This bill affects the first 2 levels of 
battery.  Under present law, the first level of 
battery 
(ordinary 
battery) 
involves 
intentionally 
causing bodily harm to a victim without the victim's 
consent.  The 2nd level of battery involves causing 
great bodily harm by an act done with intent to cause 
bodily harm without the consent of the victim.  The 
bill removes the element of "no consent" from both of 
these crimes. 
Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1985 Wis. Act 
144, Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau of 1985 A.B. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
39 
 
359 (emphasis added).24  While alluding to the existence of 
special circumstances batteries, the bill analysis specifically 
stated that the bill would only affect "the first two levels of 
battery," meaning simple and intermediate battery in § 940.19. 
¶82 In the end, the legislature approved the other option 
proposed by the Richards court.  It created subsection (2m) and 
declared a "less serious type of battery than the one charged" 
to be an included offense.  Although this option did not 
unambiguously limit the scope of change to § 940.19, there is 
nothing in the legislative history of § 939.66(2m) to indicate 
that this second option was intended to achieve different policy 
objectives from the first option.  Rather, it appears that the 
two options were anticipated to have the same narrow substantive 
effect.  This court has previously recognized that the purpose 
of § 939.66(2m) was to rectify the § 940.19 problem highlighted 
in Richards.  See State v. Vassos, 218 Wis. 2d 330, 338 n.8, 579 
                                                 
24 The drafting record for 1985 Wis. Act 144 reveals that 
considerable attention was given to how to incorporate a defense 
of consent into the simple and intermediate battery statutes.  
As originally drafted, the bill created a defense of consent 
specifically to persons who were willing participants in 
athletic events and when the harm suffered was a reasonably 
foreseeable hazard of the practice or competition.  See 
Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1985 Wis. Act 
144.  While there is nothing in the drafting record that 
explains what animated the legislature to forgo this route, it 
is reasonable to infer that concerns existed regarding either 
the interpretative confusion that might develop from this 
athletic-event exception or fear that the consent provision 
would be under-inclusive. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
40 
 
N.W.2d 35 (1998).  We find no public record in the amendment 
revealing an intent to apply § 939.66(2m) beyond § 940.19.25   
 
¶83 In 1994 the legislature added the phrase "or equally 
serious" to subsection (2m).  1993 Wis. Act 441, § 2.  The 
history of this addition also is instructive.   
¶84 1993 Assembly Bill 879, relating to battery and 
providing penalties, was introduced originally to make several 
changes to § 940.19.  The bill passed the Assembly with no 
change to § 939.66(2m).  According to a February 16, 1994, 
memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Sally Wellman to Andy 
Cohn, Executive Assistant to Attorney General James Doyle, a 
survey of state prosecutors did not like the Assembly bill.26  
Wellman wrote: 
Some questioned whether a "middle" form of battery is 
really needed.  They also made some valid suggestions 
regarding my draft, questioning which batteries will 
now be lesser included offenses, whether my proposed 
"middle" form will encompass too much of what is 
arguably only battery, whether some parts of the 
definition are too vague (i.e. multiple bruising) and 
raising the issue of which if any degrees of battery 
should have a "without consent" element.  Given the 
difficulty of the issue and the number of subissues it 
raises, my preference would be [ ] to take some more 
time with this.  If we can get it pulled out of this 
session so that we can get input from a wider range of 
people on a second draft, we will end up with a better 
                                                 
25 We observe that the Comment sections to the model 
Wisconsin Jury Instructions for battery offenses, Wis JI——
Criminal 1220 through 1244, make no mention of the effect of 
§ 939.66(2m) except in those instructions pertaining to the 
battery offenses established in § 940.19. 
26 The Wellman memorandum is part of the Legislative Council 
file on 1993 A.B. 879. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
41 
 
product.  If that is not possible, and we still need 
to 
amend 
AB 
879 
now, 
I 
suggest 
the 
following 
revisions: 
¶85 Wellman 
then 
(1) 
proposed 
a 
new 
definition 
of 
"substantial bodily harm," (2) rewrote § 940.19, and (3) 
proposed an amendment to § 939.66(2m) to read: "A crime which is 
a less serious or equally serious type of battery than the one 
charged."  Id. at 2 (emphasis added).  With only grammatical 
modifications to the definition, all these changes were adopted 
by the legislature. 
¶86 In truth, then, all critical language in the 1994 
legislation was drafted by the Wisconsin Department of Justice, 
with no indication that the language was intended to interact 
with any statute beyond § 940.19.  Rather, the new language in 
(2m) appears to reflect the changes proposed for § 940.19. 
¶87 Under the Department's 1994 proposal, § 940.19 was 
projected to contain one Class C felony, three Class D felonies, 
one Class E felony, and one Class A misdemeanor.  Without the 
Wellman 
amendment, § 939.66(2m) 
would 
not 
have 
prohibited 
simultaneous convictions of three Class D felonies under 
subsections (3), (4), and (6) of proposed § 940.19. 
¶88 We acknowledge that the legislature could have had a 
different view.  The original bill analysis, before the 
amendment, begins with the statement that: 
Under current law, battery is punishable by a 
range of crime classifications that vary from Class A 
misdemeanor to Class C felony depending on the type of 
harm the victim suffers, the type of harm the offender 
No. 01-0826-CR 
42 
 
intends to inflict and special circumstances such as 
when the victim is a peace officer.27 
Bill Analysis to 1993 Assembly Bill 879. 
 
¶89 This identical statement appears in two Legislative 
Council Staff memoranda written respectively to the chairs of 
the Assembly and Senate legislative committees that considered 
Assembly Bill 879.  See Staff Memorandum to Representative Wayne 
W. Wood from Shaun Haas, Senior Staff Attorney, Wisconsin 
Legislative Council, February 2, 1994, at 1; Staff Memorandum to 
Senator Joanne Huelsman, from Don Salm, Senior Staff Attorney, 
Legislative Council, March 14, 1994, at 1.  The two memoranda 
were accompanied by the texts of both §§ 940.19 and 940.20. 
 
¶90 Nonetheless, we believe the stronger inference to be 
drawn from the legislative history is that the legislature 
intended to apply subsection (2m) only to § 940.19 and did not 
intend 
to 
prevent 
cumulative 
punishments 
for 
a 
special 
circumstances battery. 
C.  Nature of the Proscribed Conduct 
 
¶91 The third factor, the nature of the proscribed 
conduct, requires an examination of the policy considerations 
embedded in the various battery statutes. 
 
¶92 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.19 lays out gradations of victim 
injury and offender intent and assigns punishment in accord with 
the severity of these factors.  This pattern is perfectly 
                                                 
27 Note the use of the word "type" in the Legislative 
Reference Bureau analysis and compare the phrase "type of 
battery" as it existed in Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) before and 
after the 1994 amendment. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
43 
 
illustrated by the escalating definitions of "bodily harm," 
"substantial bodily harm," and "great bodily harm": 
 
(1) "Bodily harm" means physical pain or injury, 
illness, or any impairment of physical condition.  
Wis. Stat. § 939.22(4). 
 
(2) "Substantial bodily harm" means bodily injury 
that causes a laceration that requires stitches; any 
fracture of a bone; a burn; a temporary loss of 
consciousness, sight or hearing; a concussion; or a 
loss or fracture of a tooth.  Wis. Stat. § 939.22(38). 
 
(3) "Great bodily harm" means bodily injury which 
creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes 
permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent 
or protracted loss or impairment of the function of 
any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily 
injury.  Wis. Stat. § 939.22(14). 
¶93 By contrast, the special circumstances batteries in 
Chapter 940 enhance the penalty that may be imposed for bodily 
harm 
because 
of 
the 
status 
of 
the 
offender 
or 
the 
status/vulnerability of the victim.  Plainly, the legislature 
wanted more severe punishment for intentional bodily harm to a 
law enforcement officer, a fire fighter, a judge, or a juror, 
than to the ordinary participant in a bar fight.   
¶94 This objective will be achieved when the offender 
intends and causes only "bodily harm" and is charged under a 
special 
circumstances 
battery. 
 
However, 
Davison's 
interpretation of the statute would permit an offender to be 
charged with only one battery, regardless of the aggravating 
circumstances.  See ¶68 above for discussion.  This would mean, 
for instance, that an offender who causes substantial bodily 
harm to a woman by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm, 
No. 01-0826-CR 
44 
 
will suffer no incremental punishment by virtue of the fact that 
the offender is under court injunction and the woman is the 
person who sought the injunction.  Both §§ 940.19(2) and 
940.20(2) are Class E felonies.  Likewise, an offender who 
causes substantial bodily harm by fracturing a person's bone by 
an act done with intent to cause only pain will suffer no 
incremental punishment, even though the person battered is a 
public officer and the offender battered the public officer in 
order to influence the action of the officer.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.19(2), 
940.20(4). 
 
An 
offender 
who 
succeeds 
in 
intentionally breaking a police officer's nose but stops short 
of inflicting "great bodily harm" will suffer no incremental 
punishment as a result of the officer's status.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.19(3), 940.20(2).  These results show that Davison's 
interpretation 
would 
undermine 
the 
objective 
of 
special 
circumstances batteries in a number of situations. 
¶95 A battery is an act causing a degree of bodily injury, 
whether the act is prosecuted under § 940.19 or § 940.20(1).  
But the legislature did not wish to treat all pains, all 
lacerations and broken bones, and all permanent disfigurements 
equally.  It is not merely the underlying act that distinguishes 
the offenses involved.  The circumstances in which the offender 
commits the act are also important.  State v. Selmon, 175 
Wis. 2d 155, 166, 498 N.W.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1993).  The statutes 
are designed to protect different interests.  See Tappa, 127 
Wis. 2d at 170. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
45 
 
¶96 The defendant might argue that many acts of battery 
will be more severely punished if prosecuted successfully as 
special 
circumstances 
batteries 
and 
that 
subsection 
(2m) 
therefore serves to prevent a second charge and punishment under 
a subsection of § 940.19.  In fact, however, misdemeanor battery 
is normally a lesser-included offense under §§ 940.20, 940.201, 
940.203, 940.205, and 940.207.  Cf. State v. Fitzgerald, 2000 WI 
App 55, ¶8, 233 Wis. 2d 584, 608 N.W.2d 391.  Hence, defendants 
would not be eligible for multiple convictions in these 
circumstances because of § 939.66(1), assuming subsection (1) is 
interpreted to apply to both charged and uncharged offenses.  
The problem of a true lesser-included offense under the special 
circumstances batteries was addressed by § 939.66(1) before the 
enactment of subsection (2m).28 
¶97 As a result, we believe that the nature of the 
proscribed conduct supports the position that the legislature 
did not intend to preclude prosecution and punishment under 
both §§ 940.19(6) and 940.20(1). 
D.  Appropriateness of Multiple Punishments 
¶98 Often in our multiplicity analyses, consideration of 
the appropriateness of multiple punishments is informed by our 
conclusions regarding the nature of the proscribed conduct.  
See, e.g., Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d at 168-170 (overlapping the 
discussion of the third and fourth factors); Anderson, 219 
                                                 
28 If misdemeanor battery did not require proof of any 
additional element than the special circumstances battery, it 
would presumptively create a double jeopardy violation. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
46 
 
Wis. 2d at 755-56 (same).  This is true in the present case.  
There is no need to repeat extensively the analysis from the 
previous category. 
¶99 Because different interests are protected by imposing 
punishment under both § 940.19 and § 940.20(1), see Anderson, 
219 Wis. 2d at 756, the legislature could have thought it 
appropriate to convict and punish a defendant for both offenses 
arising out of a prisoner's single act of battery. 
¶100 There is simply no symmetry between the battery by 
prisoner statute and the well-understood gradation scheme found 
in § 940.19.  If the legislature sensed that the general battery 
statute adequately punished and deterred the conduct of battery 
in all circumstances, we doubt that it would have created 
additional 
offenses 
beyond 
the 
conduct 
proscribed 
under 
§ 940.19.   
¶101 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.20(1) was passed to provide more 
severe sanctions for prisoners who commit batteries than for 
non-prisoners who commit the same batteries.  See C.D.M v. 
State, 125 Wis. 2d 170, 175, 370 N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1985).  
The harm caused by aggravated battery and the harm caused by 
battery by a prisoner "are significantly different to justify 
charging them as separate offenses," Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d at 169, 
even though the act generating these disparate harms is the 
same.  In enacting § 940.20(1) on top of § 940.19, the 
legislature intended to punish two different, albeit overlapping 
evils.  See C.D.M., 125 Wis. 2d at 175 ("The enhanced penalty of 
No. 01-0826-CR 
47 
 
[Wis. Stat. § 940.20(1)] is intended to deter batteries in 
circumstances where the usual penalty may be ineffective.") 
¶102 Davison 
contends 
that 
the 
purpose 
of 
imposing 
additional 
punishment 
when 
a 
battery 
is 
committed 
by 
a 
designated actor (e.g., a prisoner) or against a designated 
victim (e.g., a firefighter) is not undermined by barring 
multiple punishments.  He notes that, under § 940.20(1), any 
battery by a prisoner is a Class D felony, regardless of the 
degree of bodily injury caused or the level of intent to cause 
harm.  By contrast, under §§ 940.19(1) and (2), a battery that 
causes bodily harm is only a Class A misdemeanor, while a 
battery causing substantial bodily harm is only a Class E 
felony.  Therefore, Davison argues, the statute would still 
provide for additional punishment and deterrence, since any 
battery done by a prisoner would be a Class D felony.29 
¶103 Under Davison's view of § 939.66(2m), however, a 
prisoner who commits aggravated battery will be exposed to no 
greater punishment than a non-prisoner who commits this same 
offense.  Hence, the objectives of deterrence and extra 
                                                 
29 The court of appeals noted this argument and concluded: 
"Consequently, since the enhancer is the status of the actor in 
§ 940.20 and not the degree of the crime, there is not an 
ambiguity problem between the statutes with regard to the word 
'battery.'"  State v. Davison, 2002 WI App 109, ¶18, 255 
Wis. 2d 715, 647 N.W.2d 390.  We are unsure exactly what the 
court of appeals meant by this statement, but we imagine it is 
congruent with Davison's argument.  However, it is precisely 
because the enhancer is a status-based consideration that shows 
how § 940.20(1) embodies an entirely different interest than the 
general battery statute. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
48 
 
protection would be undermined.  The legislature may of course 
enact Davison's interpretation, but we are not convinced that it 
did. 
¶104 Wisconsin courts have previously valued the deterrence 
created by separate punishments for different offenses when the 
legislature was not clear whether multiple punishments were 
permitted.  In Grayson, for example, we reasoned that multiple 
punishment for each 120-day period of continual failure to pay 
child support was essential for deterring long-term failure to 
provide support in accordance with the felony non-support 
statutes.  Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d at 166.  In State v. Hamilton, 
146 Wis. 2d 426, 432 N.W.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1998), the court of 
appeals allowed multiple punishment under Wis. Stat. § 943.37(3) 
for each item a defendant possesses with altered or removed 
serial numbers, in order to make the criminal risk concomitant 
with the potential criminal profit.  Id. at 441.  If additional 
punishment for battery by prisoner is not allowed in cases of 
aggravated battery, then the greater evil of aggravated battery 
by prisoner is not punished proportionally to that greater evil.  
See Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d at 167 ("The longer the period of 
nonpayment, the greater the harm that is inflicted."). 
¶105 Inability to prosecute and punish under both statues 
permits an offender, at least in some circumstances, to inflict 
a greater degree of harm without fear of additional punishment.  
This odd result is similar to one recognized by this court in 
Anderson.  In explaining why multiple punishments under the bail 
No. 01-0826-CR 
49 
 
jumping statute were appropriate when a defendant violated 
different and distinct terms of his bail, we explained: 
Without imposing multiple punishments for violating 
the different terms of bail, a defendant may even be 
encouraged to violate multiple terms, knowing that the 
punishment will be no different whether he or she 
violates one or all terms of bail.  It is difficult to 
believe that the legislature intended this result. 
Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 756. 
¶106 In 
summary, 
considering 
the 
appropriateness 
of 
multiple punishments for committing both aggravated battery and 
battery by prisoner, we do not perceive the policy basis upon 
which the legislature would have intended to preclude multiple 
convictions for these offenses in a single prosecution. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶107 Applying our four-factor examination of legislative 
intent to this multiplicity challenge, we conclude that Davison 
has failed to meet his burden of persuasion.  Aggravated battery 
and battery by prisoner are clearly not "the same offense" as a 
matter of law.  Davison has failed to rebut the presumption in 
this specific situation that the legislature intended to 
authorize multiple prosecutions and punishments for these two 
offenses.   
¶108 If we were focusing solely on the text of subsection 
(2m), we would find this to be a much closer case, for we would 
not be seeking legislative intent outside the text of the 
statute.  We are informed, however, by our decision in Grayson, 
where we said: "If an express legislative intent or the absence 
of ambiguity were the benchmark against which the issue of the 
No. 01-0826-CR 
50 
 
allowable unit of prosecution had to be decided, consideration 
of the matter would be limited to the first two factors.  The 
last two factors would not then be relevant."  Grayson, 172 
Wis. 2d at 161.   
¶109 In applying the more expansive rules of statutory 
interpretation we have traditionally employed in multiplicity 
cases, we are convinced not only that Davison has not met his 
burden, but also that the legislature very likely intended to 
authorize multiple punishments on these facts.  The disturbing 
inconsistency 
within § 939.66 
if 
Davison's 
literal 
interpretation of subsection (2m) were adopted, the compelling 
legislative history of subsection (2m), the legislative motive 
for the proscribed conduct under the ordinary and special 
circumstances battery statutes, and the appropriateness of 
punishing more than one offense lead us to conclude that the 
legislature has not clearly intended to prohibit multiple 
punishments on these facts. 
¶110 We have analyzed this case as a single act of battery, 
because that is the way the case reached us.  We are disinclined 
to abandon the four-part analysis for statutory construction in 
a multiplicity case on the record presented here.  After all, 
the facts set out in ¶¶5-7 reveal that Davison committed 
multiple criminal acts of battery over a 45-minute period.  
Davison caused bodily harm to his wife at different times at 
different places, resulting in multiple injuries. 
No. 01-0826-CR 
51 
 
¶111 Because Davison's multiplicity objection fails on the 
merits, we need not and do not decide whether, by pleading 
guilty, he waived his right to raise this claim. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
No.  01-0826-CR.ssa 
 
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¶112 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶113 The defendant in the present case was charged with and 
convicted of two batteries: aggravated battery and battery by a 
prisoner.  Aggravated battery is a battery causing substantial 
bodily 
harm. 
 
It 
is 
a 
Class 
D 
felony 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 940.19(6).  Battery by a prisoner is a battery (by 
a prisoner) causing bodily harm.  It is a Class D felony under 
Wis. Stat. § 940.20(1).  
¶114 In the present case, everyone agrees that the two 
offenses are not the same in law.  The issue, then, is whether 
there is a clear legislative intent to prohibit multiple 
punishments.  That is, does the legislature's express bar in 
Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) 
against 
multiple 
punishments 
for 
batteries of a less serious or equally serious type apply only 
to batteries created in Wis. Stat. § 940.19, or does it apply to 
batteries created in § 940.20 as well?  The answer lies in 
legislative intent.  "[T]he question of what punishments are 
constitutionally permissible is no different from the question 
of what punishment the Legislative Branch intended to be 
imposed."30 
                                                 
30 Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983) (quoting 
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981)). 
The majority opinion is very lengthy and addresses numerous 
issues.  My failure to comment on all aspects of the opinion 
should not be interpreted as my agreeing with them.   
No.  01-0826-CR.ssa 
 
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¶115 On the basis of the language and legislative history 
of Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) and the public policy underlying 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19 and 940.20, I conclude that the legislature 
clearly expressed its intent that § 939.66(2m) applies to 
batteries created in § 940.20 as well as batteries in § 940.19.  
Therefore, multiple punishments for aggravated battery, that is, 
a battery causing substantial bodily harm, a Class D felony 
under Wis. Stat. § 940.19(2), and battery by a prisoner, that 
is, a battery causing bodily harm, a Class D felony under 
Wis. Stat. § 940.20(1), are prohibited.   
¶116 I examine first the applicable rules of statutory 
interpretation, and then in turn the language of the statute, 
the legislative history, and the legislative purpose. 
                                                                                                                                                             
For example, the majority opinion discusses multiplicity 
and double jeopardy at length, but I am not sure what conclusion 
it reaches about their relationship and what difference it makes 
in this case.  The "constitutional law" applicable in this case 
is as follows: When multiple punishments in a single prosecution 
are not for the same offense (in law and fact), a presumption 
arises 
that 
the 
legislature 
intended 
to 
permit 
multiple 
punishments. 
 
The 
presumption 
can 
be 
rebutted 
by 
clear 
legislative intent to the contrary.  State v. Derango, 2000 WI 
89, ¶30, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833.  
As another example, in ¶65 the majority opinion states that 
a literal reading of Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) "is inconsistent 
with the general intent of § 939.65, which permits multiple 
charges under different statutes for a single act and may result 
in multiple convictions."  I doubt there is an inconsistency.  A 
literal reading of § 939.66(2m) does not prohibit multiple 
charges.  Rather, it only prohibits multiple convictions.  The 
majority opinion in ¶¶66-67 intimates that the State may avoid 
all of the restrictions in § 939.66 by simply charging the 
multiple offenses at the outset.  I do not understand this 
reasoning.  The issue of charged versus uncharged offenses was 
not raised or discussed by the parties.  
No.  01-0826-CR.ssa 
 
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I 
¶117 The 
generally 
accepted 
rules 
for 
discerning 
legislative intent should apply in this case as they do in any 
other 
case. 
 
Legislative 
intent 
is 
legislative 
intent, 
regardless of the context in which it is examined.  The four 
factors upon which the majority opinion relies represent a 
restatement of the traditional rules for discerning legislative 
intent.31  
¶118 The majority suggests that it is bound by State v. 
Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d 156, 493 N.W.2d 23 (1992), to apply a 
different, more expansive form of statutory construction in the 
present case.32  The majority's citation to Grayson, however, is 
inapplicable.  In Grayson the accused urged that because the 
plain language of the statute was ambiguous, the court should 
apply the rule of lenity.  The Grayson court concluded that the 
rule of lenity was not appropriately invoked when although the 
plain language of the statute was ambiguous, resorting to 
traditional rules of statutory interpretation enabled the court 
to 
discern 
a 
reasonable, 
common-sense 
interpretation 
of 
                                                 
31  State v. Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d 402, 410, 338 N.W.2d 466 
(1983), instructs: "To determine whether or not the legislature 
intends multiple convictions . . . we look to the language of 
the statute, the nature of the proscribed conduct, and the 
appropriateness of multiple punishments.  We are also aided in 
our search for legislative intent by canons of statutory 
construction." (emphasis added).  In keeping with traditional 
rules of statutory interpretation, a fourth factor, legislative 
history, appears in cases in which it was available.  
32 Majority op., ¶¶108, 110. 
No.  01-0826-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
legislative intent.33  The Grayson case did not determine that 
multiplicity 
analysis 
requires 
some 
alternative 
rules 
of 
statutory construction.  
II 
¶119 The first place to look for legislative intent is in 
the language of the statute.34  In Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) the 
legislature expressly stated its intent to prohibit multiple 
punishments for certain batteries as follows:  If an accused is 
convicted of battery, the accused may not be punished for a 
battery "which is a less serious or equally serious type of 
battery than the one charged."35  In Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19 and 
940.20, the legislature labeled both offenses of which the 
defendant was convicted as batteries and established that both 
                                                 
33 "[B]ecause the legislature failed to expressly state the 
allowable unit of prosecution under sec. 948.22, Stats., this 
court must determine its intent as to that issue according to 'a 
common sense reading of the statutes' that will give effect to 
'the object of the legislature' and produce a result that is 
'reasonable and fair to offenders and society.'  . . . To 
determine 
legislative 
intent 
we 
will 
examine 
the 
four 
factors . . . ."  State v. Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d 156, 162, 493 
N.W.2d 23 (1992) (quoting State v. Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d 155, 170-
71, 378 N.W.2d 883 (1985)).   
34 For discussions of plain meaning and the rules of 
statutory interpretation in Wisconsin, see Fox v. Catholic 
Knights Ins. Soc'y, 2003 WI 87, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; 
State v. Byers, 2003 WI 86, ___ Wis. 2d ___; ___N.W.2d ___ 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring; Crooks, J., dissenting); Bruno v. 
Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656; 
State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶¶38-40, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 
N.W.2d 416 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); State v. Sample, 215 
Wis. 2d 487, 508, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998) (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring). 
35 The statute is quoted at ¶10 n.6 and ¶66 of the majority 
opinion. 
No.  01-0826-CR.ssa 
 
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batteries are equally serious types of battery; both are class D 
felonies, each carrying a maximum penalty of 10 years.   
¶120 It is rare that the plain language of a statute covers 
the fact situation in issue as clearly as it does in this case.  
According to the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m), the 
legislature plainly intended not to permit conviction and 
punishment for both batteries.  Indeed, the majority opinion 
concedes 
that 
based 
on 
the 
"plain 
language" 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m), "one would normally conclude that the 
legislature intended that the defendant not be convicted of both 
crimes."36   
¶121 Despite this conclusion, the majority decides that the 
statute is ambiguous by reading Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) in the 
context of other statutes and case law, much of which supports 
the literal reading of the statutory language and some of which 
supports alternative readings.37   
¶122 I applaud the majority's decision to test the "plain 
meaning" of the statute in this way and do not dispute that 
                                                 
36 Majority op., ¶58. 
37 See majority op., ¶74.  Apparently the majority opinion 
is using a rule of interpretation that counterbalances the plain 
meaning rule:  When separate statutes are read together, rather 
than in isolation, a plain meaning statute may be rendered 
ambiguous. State v. Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d 366, 370-71, 498 
N.W.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Almost every rule of interpretation can be countered by an 
opposing rule.  For the lead article discussing the "thrust and 
parry" of contradictory rules of statutory interpretation, see 
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions 
and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 
3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950). 
No.  01-0826-CR.ssa 
 
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there is some support for an alternative reading.  Yet it should 
not get lost in the majority's discussion of ambiguity that the 
support 
for 
the 
literal 
reading 
of 
§ 939.66(2m) 
greatly 
overwhelms any support for a contrary reading of the statute. 
III 
¶123 The majority opinion then turns to the legislative 
history, the context, and the purpose of the statute to clarify 
the ambiguity it created.38  It is clear on examining these 
factors that the legislature did not intend the multiple 
punishments imposed in this case.  
¶124 The 
majority opinion 
examines the 
1985 proposed 
amendment to Wis. Stat. §§ 939.66 adopting subsection (2m).  The 
majority concludes that the 1985 amendment does "not reveal[] an 
intent to apply Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) beyond § 940.19."39  I 
disagree.   
¶125 In 1985, in response to State v. Richards, 123 
Wis. 2d 1, 365 N.W.2d 7 (1985), the legislature considered an 
amendment to Wis. Stat. § 939.66 to bar multiple punishments for 
batteries.  The Richards case involved only the first two of the 
three subsections of § 940.19.  The Legislative Reference 
Bureau's analysis of the proposed amendment noted that although 
"a number of different statutes" proscribe battery and that the 
potential 
penalties 
vary 
depending 
"on 
the 
circumstances 
                                                 
38 The court's usual statement is that if a statute is 
ambiguous, the court examines the history, context, subject 
matter and object of the statute to discern legislative intent.  
See Heaton v. Larsen, 97 Wis. 2d 379, 394, 294 N.W.2d 15 (1980). 
39 Majority op., ¶82. 
No.  01-0826-CR.ssa 
 
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surrounding the act, the actor, the victim and the harm suffered 
by the victim, the proposed amendment affects only "the first 2 
levels of battery," referring to subsections (1) and (2) of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.19.40  That proposed amendment was not adopted, 
however.   
¶126 The proposed amendment that was eventually adopted was 
silent in language and legislative history regarding any intent 
to limit the application of  § 939.66(2m) to § 940.19.41  
Obviously, a strong inference can be drawn that by not adopting 
the 
first 
proposed 
amendment 
with 
its 
limitation, 
the 
legislature refused to limit § 939.66(2m) to the first two 
subsections of § 940.19.  Nonetheless, the majority opinion 
projects, without any supporting documentation or reasoning, 
that the defeated version and the adopted version "were 
anticipated to have the same narrow substantive effect."42     
¶127 In 1994, 
additional 
amendments were proposed to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 939.66(2m) and 940.19.43  The Legislative Reference 
Bureau's analysis of the bill that was put before the entire 
legislature expressly includes within the crime of "battery," 
those batteries committed under "special circumstances such as 
when the victim is a peace officer."44  Battery to a police 
                                                 
40 Quoted at majority op., ¶81. 
41 See majority op., ¶80. 
42 See id., ¶82. 
43 See id., ¶84-89. 
44 Quoted at majority op., ¶88. 
No.  01-0826-CR.ssa 
 
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officer was not then (and is not now) set forth in § 940.19.  
Rather, battery to a police officer is set forth in § 940.20, 
entitled "Battery: Special Circumstances."  Why does the 
Legislative Reference Bureau's analysis of an amendment to 
§ 939.66(2m) refer to battery against a police officer, if the 
proposed amendment to § 939.66(2m) does not affect § 940.20?   
¶128 Furthermore, as the majority opinion carefully notes, 
two Legislative Council memoranda explaining the 1994 amendments 
included the texts of both Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19 and 940.20.  Why 
does the Legislative Council, on two occasions, include the text 
of § 940.20, along with the text of § 940.19, if the proposed 
amendment to § 939.66(2m) affects only § 940.19, not § 940.20? 
¶129 It is rare to get a clearer expression of legislative 
intent from legislative history.  This legislative history 
unambiguously demonstrates that the legislature was advised that 
the 1994 amendment to Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) affects batteries 
set forth in both Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19 and 940.20.  Applying the 
approach courts take to the legislative process, we assume that 
the legislature read and understood the materials presented and 
adopted the amendment understanding that § 939.66(2m) affects 
batteries set forth in both §§ 940.19 and 940.20.  The majority 
opinion, in contrast, shrugs off this conclusion, stating, 
"Nonetheless, we believe the stronger inference to be drawn from 
the legislative history is that the legislature intended to 
apply subsection (2m) only to § 940.19 and did not intend to 
No.  01-0826-CR.ssa 
 
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prevent 
multiple 
cumulative 
punishments 
for 
a 
special 
circumstances battery."45 
IV 
¶130 Finally, the majority opinion turns to the purpose of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m), that is, to the policy considerations 
underlying 
the 
statute, 
by 
exploring 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
proscribed 
conduct 
and 
the 
appropriateness 
of 
multiple 
punishments.  The majority concludes that the legislature 
intended 
to impose 
multiple 
punishments because 
different 
interests 
are 
protected 
under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19 
and 
940.20(1), and that if the legislature concluded that the 
general battery statute adequately punished the conduct of 
battery 
in 
all 
circumstances 
it 
would 
not 
have 
created 
additional battery offenses beyond § 940.19.  I disagree.  The 
statutes do not support this conclusion.  
¶131 The majority is correct that the legislature intended 
to increase the penalty for certain batteries depending on the 
"special circumstances" of the battery.  The legislature's 
intent to increase the penalties applies, however, only to 
batteries inflicting "bodily injury," the first level of harm.   
¶132 Battery committed without any "special circumstances" 
is a Class A misdemeanor subject to a penalty of nine months.  
In contrast, Wis. Stat. § 940.20(1) makes it a Class D felony 
for a prisoner to commit a battery inflicting "bodily injury."  
Increased penalties for batteries committed under other "special 
circumstances" in § 940.20 similarly apply only to those 
                                                 
45 Majority op., ¶90. 
No.  01-0826-CR.ssa 
 
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batteries that inflict bodily injury, not to those that inflict 
more serious injuries.46  The legislature could have increased 
the penalty for batteries under these "special circumstances" 
that inflicted "substantial bodily injury" or "great bodily 
harm" or "substantial risk of great bodily harm," but it did 
not.47 
¶133 Contrary to the majority opinion, I read these 
statutes to express a legislative purpose to deter batteries 
causing the least serious harm and committed under "special 
circumstances" by dramatically increasing the penalty for bodily 
injury from nine months (a Class A misdemeanor) to ten years (a 
Class D felony), not to create avenues for imposing multiple 
punishments for equally serious or less serious batteries.  The 
legislature concluded that the significant prison penalties in 
Wis. Stat. § 940.19 for equally serious or more serious bodily 
injuries 
would 
be 
a 
sufficient 
deterrent 
under 
any 
circumstance.48 
                                                 
46 See also Wis. Stat. §§ 940.201 (increased penalty for 
battery to a witness causing bodily harm), 940.203 (increased 
penalty for battery to a judge causing bodily harm), 940.205 
(increased penalty for battery to a department of revenue 
employee causing bodily harm), 940.207 (increased penalty for 
battery to a department of commerce or a department of workforce 
development employee causing bodily harm). 
47 Compare Wis. Stat. § 940.195. 
48 See State v. Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d 133, 141, 330 N.W.2d 564 
(1983) ("The legislature apparently adopted sec. 939.66(1) 
because the penalty set by the legislature for the greater 
offense takes into account the fact that the defendant has also 
committed a lesser-included offense.  Remington and Joseph, 
Charging, Convicting, and Sentencing the Multiple Criminal 
Offender, 1961 Wis. L. Rev. 528, 546."). 
No.  01-0826-CR.ssa 
 
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¶134 In sum, the majority opinion offers little, if any, 
trustworthy evidence clearly contradicting the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) in which the legislature barred multiple 
punishments for batteries that are less serious or equally 
serious. 49  
¶135 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶136 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
                                                 
49  The majority suggests that its decision in the present 
case is, at least in part, motivated by the bad acts committed 
by the defendant.  See majority op., ¶110.  When balancing 
competing arguments about the proper construction of the law it 
is essential that the defendant's blameworthiness not tip the 
balance. 
No.  01-0826-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
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