Case Title: Commonwealth v. Braune

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12514

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12514 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SHEA BRAUNE. 
 
 
 
Essex.     October 4, 2018. - January 29, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Money Laundering.  Statute, Construction.  Words, "Designed to 
conceal." 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 30, 2015. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Joshua I. Wall, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Alexandra H. Deal for the defendant. 
 
Philip A. Mallard, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The defendant, Shea Braune, was convicted of 
receiving stolen property and money laundering after she and her 
girlfriend, Romi Kimell, used over $300,000 in cash that Kimell 
had stolen from her mother and stepfather to fund a lavish 
 
 
2 
lifestyle.  In an ill-fated attempt to cover their tracks, 
Kimell gave a substantial amount of the stolen cash to Braune, 
who deposited it into her checking account through a series of 
transactions, each under $10,000, later claiming to have 
received the money in an inheritance.  A subset of these 
deposits forms the basis for Braune's money laundering 
conviction.  On appeal, Braune argues that the evidence was 
insufficient as a matter of law to establish "concealment" money 
laundering, in violation of G. L. c. 267A, § 2 (2) (ii) (A), 
where she openly deposited the money into her checking account 
using her own name.  Because we conclude that the evidence was 
sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that Braune's 
deposits were designed, in whole or in part, to conceal the 
nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the stolen 
funds, we affirm. 
Background.  Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury could have found the 
following facts.  In the fall of 2013, when the victims, James 
and Janice Welling,1 went to stay at their Florida home for the 
winter, they left over $300,000 in cash (packaged in stacks of 
fifty and one hundred dollar bills), along with a few items of 
Janice's jewelry, in a box that was taped shut and stored in a 
                     
1 For clarity, we refer to the couple either collectively as 
the Wellings, or individually by their first names. 
 
 
3 
locked closet in the master bedroom of their North Andover home.2  
The only other person who knew about the box was Janice's 
daughter, Kimell. 
Kimell had enjoyed a close relationship with her mother and 
James, who was Kimell's stepfather, and the Wellings had 
provided significant financial support to Kimell throughout her 
life.  However, the relationship had soured shortly before the 
time in question.3  While the Wellings were in Florida, Kimell 
began to remove cash from the box in the Wellings' master 
closet.  Kimell provided some of the cash to Braune.  Braune 
then made a series of deposits into her checking account, each 
under $10,000,4 using the stolen money. 
At a certain point, Kimell took the remaining contents of 
the box and replaced them with a duffel bag full of copy paper, 
resealing the box and restoring it to its place in the closet.5  
                     
2 According to James, the box contained anywhere from 
$300,000 to $600,000, possibly more. 
 
3 James had made unwelcome sexual advances toward Kimell 
during an approximately eighteen-month period beginning in 2011, 
which Kimell had rejected.  In addition, James had expressed 
disapproval of Kimell's romantic relationship with Braune. 
 
4 The jury heard evidence that cash transactions over 
$10,000 must be reported to the Federal government.  See 31 
U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2013). 
 
5 The jury saw date-stamped, security-camera footage of 
Kimell leaving the Wellings' house in North Andover on April 27, 
2014, with a large black garbage bag over her shoulder. 
 
 
4 
Kimell informed her mother that she and Braune were moving to 
California and that Braune had received a large inheritance.  
During and after the move to California, Braune's pattern of 
making successive, large cash deposits -- each under $10,000 -- 
continued, as did a pattern of lavish spending by Kimell and 
Braune.6 
The Wellings did not discover that the cash and jewelry 
were missing until October 2014, and did not immediately report 
the incident to police.  Instead, they confronted Kimell about 
the missing money, and when she denied any involvement, they 
hired a private investigator to look into the matter. 
In July of 2015, Kimell filed a petition for bankruptcy in 
a Federal bankruptcy court in California.  James intervened in 
that proceeding, and his attorney deposed Kimell and Braune.  In 
their sworn deposition testimony, which was later entered as an 
exhibit in the criminal trial in Massachusetts, Kimell and 
Braune reiterated their claim that Braune had used money from an 
inheritance to support their lavish lifestyle.7 
                     
6 The two stayed at expensive hotels, took trips to Paris, 
Las Vegas, and Aruba, and purchased a new vehicle, among other 
large expenditures. 
 
7 Braune claimed to have received $75,000 in cash as an 
inheritance from her grandfather in 1998.  She further claimed 
that she kept the money in a box and did not spend any of it 
until 2014, when she began to use it, along with about $15,000 
in savings and other inheritance money, to pay for the expenses 
she and Kimell incurred during and after their move to 
 
 
5 
Shortly after the defendant filed the petition for 
bankruptcy, the Massachusetts State police worked with law 
enforcement officials in California to execute a search of the 
home that Braune and Kimell shared in San Diego.  Among other 
things, the police recovered, from Kimell's bedroom, jewelry 
matching that which Janice had reported missing; and from the 
closet in Braune's bedroom, a total of $130,110 in United States 
currency, stored in a backpack and a cardboard box and packaged 
mainly in stacks of fifty and one hundred dollar bills, 
consistent with James's description of the missing money. 
Discussion.  In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, 
we ask "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt" (emphasis in original).  Commonwealth v. 
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).  Circumstantial evidence may 
be sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 141 (2001), and the 
inferences drawn from such evidence "need not be necessary 
and inescapable, only reasonable and possible."  Commonwealth v. 
                     
California.  However, Braune and Kimell's spending during the 
relevant time period exceeded $250,000, not including over 
$130,000 in cash that the police later recovered from Braune. 
 
 
6 
Goddard, 476 Mass. 443, 449 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Jones, 432 Mass. 623, 628 (2000). 
The Massachusetts money laundering statute, G. L. c. 267A, 
§ 2, provides in relevant part:8 
"Whoever knowingly . . . (2) engages in a transaction 
involving a monetary instrument or other property 
known to be derived from criminal activity . . . (ii) 
knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or 
in part either to:  (A) conceal or disguise the 
nature, location, source, ownership or control of the 
property derived from criminal activity; or (B) avoid 
a [Federal or State] transaction reporting requirement 
. . . shall be guilty of the crime of money laundering 
. . ." 
 
Braune was convicted of concealment money laundering in 
violation of G. L. c. 267A, § 2 (2) (ii) (A).9 
                     
8 The first prong of G. L. c. 267A, § 2, omitted in the 
text, deals, broadly speaking, with "transportation" money 
laundering, rather than "transaction" money laundering.  Under 
the umbrella of "transaction" money laundering, there are two 
broad subcategories:  § 2 (2) (i), omitted in the text, which 
deals with "promotion" money laundering; and § 2 (2) (ii), 
reproduced in the text, which itself has two subparts:  subpart 
(A), which deals with "concealment" money laundering; and 
subpart (B), sometimes referred to as the "structuring" prong, 
which deals with transactions designed to avoid a State or 
Federal reporting requirement. 
 
9 The Commonwealth originally proceeded under subparts (A) 
and (B) of G. L. c. 267A, § 2 (2) (ii).  But after the trial 
judge found that there was insufficient evidence under subpart 
(B) (the "structuring" prong) as to any transaction occurring 
prior to the date that Kimell was recorded leaving the house 
with the garbage bag, the Commonwealth elected to proceed under 
subpart (A) (the "concealment" prong) as its sole theory of 
liability. 
 
 
7 
Here, at least three forms of evidence typically 
associated with concealment money laundering were present:  
(1) the false statements made by the defendant and Kimell, 
initially to Kimell's mother and then later in sworn 
deposition testimony, that the money was part of an 
inheritance that Braune received from her grandfather, 
suggested an intent to conceal; (2) the structure of the 
defendant's deposits, which were staggered over time and 
confined to amounts below the reporting threshold, 
supported an inference of a design to conceal; and (3) the 
use of the defendant as a third party to deposit the money 
supported an inference of an intent to distance the money 
from Kimell and the Wellings, in other words, an intent to 
conceal the nature, source, ownership, or control of the 
stolen funds.  As discussed below, the combination of these 
factors persuades us that the evidence was sufficient to 
establish a design to conceal under G. L. c. 267A, § 2 (2) 
(ii) (A).10 
The language of § 2 (2) (ii) mirrors the language of the 
Federal money laundering statute, in particular its requirement 
that the defendant engage in the subject transaction "knowing 
that the transaction is designed in whole or in part . . . (i) 
                     
10 We need not consider whether any one of these factors, in 
isolation, would be sufficient to convict. 
 
 
8 
to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the 
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful 
activity; or (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement 
under State or Federal law."  18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B) (2012).  
Where, as here, our State statute "largely replicates" a cognate 
provision of Federal law, we consider the Federal courts' 
interpretation of the Federal statute "highly persuasive" in 
interpreting our own law.  Commonwealth v. Eberhart, 461 Mass. 
809, 815 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Colon, 81 Mass. App. 
Ct. 8, 12, 14 (2011). 
In Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550, 556-557 (2008), 
the United States Supreme Court interpreted the "designed . . . 
to conceal" requirement of a neighboring provision of the 
Federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), 
which applies to transportation money laundering rather than 
transaction money laundering.11  More specifically, the Court 
addressed whether evidence that the defendant hid the proceeds 
                     
11 Because the language of the "designed . . . to conceal" 
requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) is identical to that 
in § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), United States Courts of Appeals have 
consistently held that the holding in Cuellar v. United States, 
553 U.S. 550 (2008), applies equally to cases involving 
transaction money laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).  See, 
e.g., United States v. Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d 573, 586 (6th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Cedeno-Perez, 579 F.3d 54, 60-61 (1st 
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1127 (2010); United States v. 
Brown, 553 F.3d 768, 786 n.56 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 558 
U.S. 897 (2009). 
 
 
9 
of illicit drug transactions in a secret compartment of a 
vehicle while transporting the funds across the border to Mexico 
was sufficient to establish a design to conceal.  Id. at 553-
554, 561. 
The Court observed that "when an act is 'designed to' do 
something, the most natural reading is that it has that 
something as its purpose."  Id. at 563-564.  Thus, in the 
context of concealment money laundering, "'design' means purpose 
or plan; i.e., the intended aim of the transportation."  Id. at 
563.  Accordingly, the Court held that concealment money 
laundering "requires proof that the purpose -- not merely 
effect -- of the transportation was to conceal or disguise a 
listed attribute" of the funds.  Id. at 567. 
In so holding, the Cuellar Court rejected the proposition 
that the "designed . . . to conceal" element of the Federal 
money laundering statute requires the prosecution "[to] prove 
that the defendant attempted to create the appearance of 
legitimate wealth."  Id. at 557.  Rather, in Cuellar, "what the 
Government had to prove was that [the defendant] knew that 
taking the funds to Mexico [i.e., the transportation] was 
'designed,' at least in part, to conceal or disguise their 
'nature,' 'location,' 'source,' 'ownership,' or 'control.'"  Id. 
at 562. 
 
 
10 
On the facts presented in Cuellar, the Court held that 
although evidence of the secretive manner in which the funds 
were transported "was plainly probative of an underlying goal to 
prevent the funds from being detected while he drove them from 
the United States to Mexico," id. at 566, that evidence was 
insufficient, standing alone, to establish that the 
transportation of the money was designed to conceal a listed 
attribute of the funds, especially where the government's own 
expert witness had testified that the purpose of the 
transportation was to compensate the leaders of the drug 
operation.  Id. at 566-568.  Simply put, "[t]here is a 
difference between concealing something to transport it, and 
transporting something to conceal it, . . . that is, how one 
moves the money is distinct from why one moves the money" 
(emphasis in original; quotation and citation omitted).  Id. at 
566. 
To be clear, "[c]oncealing or disguising a listed attribute 
need be only one of the purposes of the transportation [or 
transaction]."  Id. at 566 n.7.  See United States v. 
Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d 573, 586 (6th Cir. 2010), quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B) (holding, post-Cuellar, in case of 
transaction money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956[a][1][B], 
that concealment need not "be the only purpose of the 
transaction," where "the statute requires only that the 
 
 
11 
transaction be designed 'in whole or in part' to conceal" 
[emphasis in original]).  So it is with G. L. c. 267A, 
§ 2 (2) (ii), which replicates the phrasing "in whole or in 
part" in its "designed . . . [to] conceal" requirement.12 
Still, taken to the extreme, almost any transaction 
involving stolen funds could be characterized as designed, at 
least in part, to conceal a listed attribute of the funds, 
because every transaction takes the money one step further from 
its illicit source.  Cf. United States v. Valdez, 726 F.3d 684, 
690 (5th Cir. 2013), quoting United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 
1374, 1384 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1029 (1995) ("In 
one sense, the acquisition of any asset with the proceeds of 
illegal activity conceals those proceeds by converting them into 
a different and more legitimate-appearing form" [emphasis in 
original]). 
Recognizing this, United States Courts of Appeals in 
several circuits have taken different approaches to grafting a 
workable limiting principle onto the "designed . . . to conceal" 
element of the Federal money laundering statute.13  We find the 
                     
12 Thus, Braune's assertion, even if true, that the deposits 
were designed to allow the defendants to spend the money, does 
not end the inquiry. 
 
13 See, e.g., United States v. Cessa, 785 F.3d 165, 175-176 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Trevino Morales v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 522 (2015), quoting Brown, 553 F.3d at 787 
(holding, post-Cuellar, that "the government must demonstrate 
 
 
12 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's 
formulation, which holds that concealment must be "an animating 
purpose" of the transaction, Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d at 586, to 
be instructive in this regard.  In such an analysis, 
"[c]oncealment -- even deliberate concealment -- as mere 
facilitation of some other purpose, is not enough to convict" 
(emphasis in original).  Id.  Rather, what the prosecution must 
show is that concealment was one of the purposes that motivated 
or "drove [the defendant] to engage in the transaction in the 
first place."  Id.  See Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 85-86 (1969) (defining "animate" as "to move to 
action:  motivate, prompt, incite:  stir up").14 
                     
that the charged transactions had the purpose -- not merely the 
effect -- of 'mak[ing] it more difficult for the government to 
trace and demonstrate the nature of th[e] funds'"); 
Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d at 586 (holding, post-Cuellar, that 
concealment must be "an animating purpose" of transaction); 
United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(per curiam) (holding, pre-Cuellar, that "[t]here must be some 
evidence that the funds are more concealed after the transaction 
is completed than before"); United States v. Esterman, 324 F.3d 
565, 573 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding, pre-Cuellar, that conviction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1956[a][1][B][i] requires "concrete evidence" 
of intent to conceal, whether direct or circumstantial); United 
States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1474, 1476 (10th Cir. 
1994) (identifying, pre-Cuellar, "two disciplines" that courts 
enforce with respect to Federal money laundering statute:  [1] 
"this is a concealment statute -- not a spending statute," and 
[2] "evidence of concealment must be substantial"). 
 
14 As noted above, this does not require that concealment be 
the sole purpose -- or even the dominant or primary purpose -- 
of the transaction.  See Cuellar, 553 U.S. at 566 n.7; 
Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d at 586. 
 
 
13 
Moreover, evidence of the "structure" of a transaction, 
that is, evidence of the manner in which a transaction was 
carried out, in terms of timing, amount, complexity, use of a 
third party, or some other relevant aspect, may be probative of 
whether the transaction had concealment as one of its purposes.  
See Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d at 586, quoting Cuellar, 553 U.S. at 
565 (noting that because "'purpose and structure are often 
related[,]' . . . proof that a transaction was structured to 
conceal a listed attribute of the funds can yield an inference 
that concealment was a purpose of the transaction").  See also 
United States v. Elder, 682 F.3d 1065, 1072 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(evidence sufficient for concealment money laundering where, 
among other things, defendant "instruct[ed] his intermediary 
. . . to limit bank deposits to amounts less than $10,000"); 
Brown, 553 F.3d at 787 (evidence sufficient for concealment 
money laundering where "transactions were in cash so that they 
were not easily tracked" and "[m]ost deposits were below ten 
thousand dollars so as to avoid setting off any reporting 
requirements that might then lead to unwanted attention 
concerning the funds' nature"); United States v. Villarini, 238 
F.3d 530, 533 (4th Cir. 2001) (evidence sufficient for 
concealment money laundering where defendant "did not deposit 
the entire $83,000 in a single bank transaction, and instead 
 
 
14 
made four transactions, each involving less than $3,000, at two-
to-four-week intervals"). 
In sum, we conclude that to satisfy the requirement under 
G. L. c. 267A, § 2 (2) (ii) (A), that a transaction be "designed 
in whole or in part . . . [to] conceal or disguise the nature, 
location, source, ownership or control" of stolen funds, the 
Commonwealth must demonstrate that concealment was an animating 
purpose of the transaction.  In other words, concealment must be 
proved to have been one of the purposes that motivated or drove 
the defendant to engage in the transaction, not merely an 
incidental attribute or effect of the transaction.  In making 
this determination, evidence that the structure of the 
transaction served to conceal a listed attribute of the funds 
will be probative of whether concealment was an animating 
purpose of the transaction. 
The defendant suggests that allowing evidence of structure 
to support an inference of a design to conceal improperly 
conflates subparts (A) (the "concealment" prong) and (B) (the 
"structuring" prong) of G. L. c. 267A, § 2 (2) (ii), and is 
contrary to legislative intent.  We disagree.  That the evidence 
used to convict under subparts (A) and (B) may overlap does not 
vitiate the Legislature's intent to create two separate crimes.  
This is so because, although evidence of structure, in and of 
itself, may be sufficient to show an intent to avoid a reporting 
 
 
15 
requirement under G. L. c. 267A, § 2 (2) (ii) (B), such evidence 
is probative, but generally not sufficient, standing alone, to 
establish a design to conceal under G. L. c. 267A, 
§ 2 (2) (ii) (A).  Cf. Cuellar, 553 U.S. at 566 (noting that 
"secretive aspects" of transportation "may be circumstantial 
evidence that the transportation itself was intended to avoid 
detection of the funds," but that "its probative force, in that 
context, is weak"); Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d at 586 (noting that, 
while evidence of structure "can yield an inference" of design 
to conceal under 18 U.S.C. § 1956[a][1][B], it is not "enough" 
that transaction was "structured to conceal the nature of the 
illicit funds" [emphasis in original]); United States v. Garcia-
Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1478 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that 
evidence of "pattern of deposits," each under $10,000, would 
provide "straightforward" proof under § 1956[a][1][B][ii], and 
although inference is "considerably weaker" under 
§ 1956[a][1][B][i], it is "[n]evertheless" evidence of design to 
conceal). 
In this respect, our holding is consistent with the 
familiar and well-established principle of criminal law that 
"[i]ntent is a factual matter that may be proved by 
circumstantial evidence" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Walters, 472 Mass. 680, 693 (2015).  See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 
356 Mass. 574, 578–579 (1970) ("A person's . . . intent . . . is 
 
 
16 
a matter of fact, which may not be susceptible of proof by 
direct evidence.  In that event resort must be had, and 
frequently is had, to proof by inference from all the facts and 
circumstances developed at the trial" [citation omitted]); 
Commonwealth v. Hayes, 114 Mass. 282, 285 (1873) ("intent may, 
and generally must, be proved by circumstantial evidence"). 
Moreover, to be relevant and admissible, there is no 
requirement that an individual piece of circumstantial evidence 
be sufficient, standing alone, to prove a material fact.  See 
Commonwealth v. Pickering, 479 Mass. 589, 597 (2018); 
Commonwealth v. Gerhardt, 477 Mass. 775, 782 (2017); 
Commonwealth v. Sicari, 434 Mass. 732, 750 (2001), cert. denied, 
534 U.S. 1142 (2002).  "An item of evidence, being but a single 
link in the chain of proof, need not prove conclusively the 
proposition for which it is offered" (footnote omitted).  1 
McCormick on Evidence § 185, at 999 (K.S. Broun ed., 7th ed. 
2013).  "A brick is not a wall."  Id. at 1000. 
The question we must consider is whether the circumstantial 
evidence in this case, taken together, was sufficient to permit 
a rational jury to conclude that an animating purpose of the 
 
 
17 
alleged money-laundering deposits was to conceal a listed 
attribute of the funds.15  We conclude that it was.16 
In Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d at 1475, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted that "a variety of types 
of evidence have been cited by this and other circuits as 
supportive of evidence of intent to disguise or conceal," 
including 
"statements by a defendant probative of intent to 
conceal; unusual secrecy surrounding the 
transaction; structuring the transaction in a way to avoid 
attention; depositing illegal profits in the bank account 
of a legitimate business; highly irregular features of the 
transaction; using third parties to conceal the real 
owner; a series of unusual financial moves cumulating in 
the transaction; or expert testimony on practices of 
criminals" (footnotes omitted). 
 
Id. at 1475-1476.  Here, as noted above, the Commonwealth's case 
included at least three of the categories of evidence typically 
                     
15 The defendant originally challenged the Commonwealth's 
proof on multiple elements of the crime of money laundering.  
However, the defendant conceded certain points in her reply 
brief and indicated at oral argument that the only remaining 
question was whether the evidence was sufficient to show a 
design to conceal.  To the extent the defendant continues to 
press any of the other arguments made in her opening brief, we 
reject them. 
 
16 While the evidence here was legally sufficient to prove 
concealment money laundering under G. L. c. 267A, 
§ 2 (2) (ii) (A), it could well be described as overwhelming 
with respect to a charge of receiving stolen property over $250, 
in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 60.  Here, the Commonwealth 
apparently inadvertently charged the defendant with receiving 
stolen property of $250 or less, rather than the more 
appropriate charge of receiving stolen property over $250. 
 
 
18 
associated with concealment money laundering:  (1) "statements 
by a defendant probative of intent to conceal"; (2) "structuring 
the transaction in a way to avoid attention"; and (3) "using 
third parties to conceal the real owner".17  Id.  We conclude 
that this evidence, taken together, was sufficient to establish 
                     
17 The defendant resists the characterization of her role as 
that of a third party to the underlying crime and argues that 
her straightforward, and easily traceable, deposits of the money 
into an account bearing her name constituted "transparent 
division or deposit" of the proceeds of their joint crime, not 
money laundering.  United States v. Adefehinti, 510 F.3d 319, 
322 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  See United States v. Stephenson, 183 F.3d 
110, 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1013 (1999) 
(gathering cases in support of proposition that "[s]ubsection 
[i] of the money laundering statute does not criminalize the 
mere spending of proceeds of specified unlawful activity").  
However, based on this record, a rational jury could have 
concluded that it was Kimell who stole the cash from her mother 
and stepfather, and that Kimell then gave some of the cash to 
the defendant to deposit, in an attempt to conceal the source 
(or another listed attribute) of the funds.  The fact that the 
defendant did not conceal her own identity when making the 
third-party deposit does not defeat the Commonwealth's claim 
that the transaction was designed to conceal a listed attribute 
of the funds in violation of the money laundering statute.  See 
United States v. Tekle, 329 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 540 U.S. 960 (2003), citing Hollenback v. United 
States, 987 F.2d 1272, 1278–1280 (7th Cir. 1993), and United 
States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1034 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
506 U.S. 85 (1992) ("The necessary concealment . . . is that of 
the source of the funds, not the identity of the money-
launderer").  See also United States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 50-51 
(1st Cir. 2006) ("The [money laundering] statute criminalizes 
conduct designed to conceal or disguise the source of the drug 
proceeds even if the defendant does not conceal his own identity 
in the process"; collecting cases).  To be sure, the defendant's 
efforts at concealment in this case did not succeed.  But the 
relevant inquiry is one of purpose, not merely effect.  Cuellar, 
553 U.S. at 567. 
 
 
19 
the "designed . . . [to] conceal" element under G. L. c. 267A, 
§ 2 (2) (ii) (A). 
Our conclusion finds support in cases from several Federal 
Courts of Appeals that were decided on similar facts.  See 
Brown, 553 F.3d at 787 (evidence sufficient for concealment 
money laundering where defendant engaged in cash transactions, 
most of which were below $10,000, "to avoid setting off any 
reporting requirements"); United States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 50 
(1st Cir. 2006) (evidence sufficient to support concealment 
money laundering counts where defendant made loans to third 
parties, including his girlfriend, falsely representing that 
money came from inheritance, and in one instance, stating 
purpose of loan was to "get some of his money more legal"); 
Willey, 57 F.3d at 1387 (evidence sufficient to support 
concealment money laundering counts where defendant used 
transfers to and among third parties, including his girlfriend, 
to "move[] the money further away from [himself]"). 
Finally, we reject the defendant's argument that the rule 
of lenity requires us to rule in her favor.  The rule of lenity 
"is a guide for resolving ambiguity, rather than a rigid 
requirement that we interpret each statute in the manner most 
favorable to defendants."  Commonwealth v. Roucoulet, 413 Mass. 
647, 652–653 (1992), quoting Edgartown v. State Ethics Comm'n, 
391 Mass. 83, 90 (1984).  We find no ambiguity to resolve in the 
 
 
20 
terms of G. L. c. 267A, § 2 (2) (ii) (A), which closely track 
the cognate provisions of the long-standing and much interpreted 
Federal money laundering statute. 
Conclusion.  For these reasons, we conclude that the 
evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's money 
laundering conviction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.