Case Title: Frederick v. Pickett

Citation: 392 Md. 411

Docket Number: 74/05

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
City of Frederick, Maryland  v. Allan M. Pickett, No. 74, September Term, 2005.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS – CONDEMNATION
Petitioner sought review of the Circuit Court for Frederick County’s dismissal of the its
condemnation action with respect to Respondent’s property.  The Court of Appeals held that
the Circuit Court erroneously dismissed the condemnation action based on an incorrect
interpretation of the requirements of Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol.), Article 23A,
Section 2 (b)(37), which permits municipal corporations to condemn blighted properties
within areas that are generally non-blighted.  The Court of Appeals also held that the
dismissal may not be upheld on the ground that the City of Frederick’s Board of Aldermen’s
actions were ultra vires because the Board was not required to enact an enabling ordinance
prior to the passage of an ordinance authorizing the condemnation of a specific property.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals determined that, assuming arguendo that an enabling
ordinance was required, the Board of Aldermen was empowered to pass the second ordinance
in anticipation of the enabling ordinance’s approval by the mayor, particularly because the
parties do not dispute the fact that the mayor signed the enabling ordinance prior to signing
the ordinance specifically aimed at the condemnation of the property at issue in the case at
bar.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 74 
September Term, 2005
CITY OF FREDERICK, MARYLAND
v.
ALLAN M. PICKETT
Bell, C.J.
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Eldridge, John C.,
(retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:   April 19, 2006
The case sub judice presents this Court with the task of determining whether the
Circuit Court for Frederick County properly dismissed the City of Frederick’s (“the City”)
condemnation action with respect to Allan M. Pickett’s property.  Because we hold that
Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol.), Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37) permits a municipal
authority to condemn individual blighted properties that are not within a “blighted area” or
“slum area” for urban renewal purposes as a matter of law, we shall reverse the judgment of
the Circuit Court and remand the case to that court for further proceedings.
Background
In 1982, Allen Pickett purchased a two-story brick home located at 20 West Fourth
Street, Frederick, Maryland (“the Property”), lived there for approximately one week and
thereafter leased it until 1993 to a tenant, after which it remained unoccupied.  In 1996, the
Frederick City Police Department reported to the Office of Code Enforcement for the City
of Frederick that the Property was littered with broken glass and that the rear entrance to the
building was broken open.  The Office of Code Enforcement verified the complaint and,
upon visiting the premises, determined that vagrants were using the Property and removing
the building’s contents.  Michael Blank, a building inspector with the Office of Code
Enforcement, observed that fires were being set within the building and that the floor was
covered in trash and fecal matter.  Moreover, he noted that the foundation in the rear of the
building was sinking, which compromised its structural integrity.  On May 8, 1996, the
Property was condemned.  The City sent notice to Pickett instructing him to secure the
Property and clean it up within five days.  On May 16, 1996, Blank again visited the Property
2
and confirmed that the building was secured but that the trash on the premises remained.  The
City removed the garbage and billed the costs to Pickett.  
Two years later, the Office of Code Enforcement once again received a complaint
from the police stating that the basement door of the Property was broken open and that the
Property was covered in litter.  An inspection confirmed the allegations of the complaint, and
the Office of Code Enforcement again sent a letter to Pickett instructing him to clean up the
Property within five days.  When a subsequent inspection revealed that the Property remained
in non-compliance, the City cleaned the Property and sent a bill to Pickett for the costs as
well as a penalty of three hundred dollars.
After receiving repeated complaints from the police regarding the Property in 1998
and 1999, the Office of Code Enforcement conducted a comprehensive inspection of the
premises on September 14, 1999, and sent a Notice of Violation to Pickett informing him that
he had a month to make necessary repairs to the Property consisting of removing the garbage
from the lot and repairing the rear door to bring it into compliance with the Property
Maintenance Code.  In October, the Office of Code Enforcement inspected the Property
again; it remained in a state of non-compliance.  On January 20, 2000, Pickett was sent
seventy-seven citations for the period from October 16, 1999 through December 31, 1999.
The citations were sent to Post Office Box 378, Mount Airy, Maryland, which was an address
that the City had for Pickett.  On February 9, 2000, the citations were returned to the Office
of Code Enforcement as undeliverable.  The Office of Code Enforcement subsequently
1
See generally The Frederick City Code, Chapter 12.5, “Housing.”
2
Article 2, Section 7 of the Frederick City Charter provides in pertinent part:
All legislative powers of the city shall be vested in a board of
aldermen consisting of five (5) aldermen who shall be elected as
hereinafter provided and who shall hold office for a term of four
(4) years or until their successors are elected and qualified.
3
posted the citations on the Property.  
A subsequent inspection on January 2, 2002, revealed that the corner of the building
on the Property continued to sink into the ground and that the Property continued to be used
by transients for the consumption of alcohol and crack cocaine.  One week later the City took
action to reinforce the sinking foundation and declared the building “an unsafe structure”
under the Property Maintenance Code.1  
On March 21, 2002, the City’s Board of Aldermen2 passed Ordinance G-02-3, the
purpose of which was to “authorize the City to acquire blighted properties by eminent
domain and to subsequently dispose of said properties, and thereby to promote public health,
safety, and welfare, and to facilitate the use and enjoyment of property.”  Ordinance G-02-3
provided in pertinent part:
(1) Pursuant to the express authority described above, the City
may:
(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (4) of this section,
acquire, within its boundary lines, land and property of every
kind, and any right, interest, franchise, easement or privilege
therein, by purchase, lease, gift, condemnation or any other legal
means, for development or redevelopment, including, but not
limited to, the comprehensive renovation or rehabilitation
thereof; and
4
(b) Sell, lease, convey, transfer or otherwise dispose of any of
said property, regardless of whether or not it has been
developed, redeveloped, altered or improved and irrespective of
the manner or means in or by which it may have been acquired,
to any private, public or quasi-public corporation, partnership,
association, person or other legal entity.
(2) No land or property taken by the City for any of the
aforementioned purposes, or in connection with the exercise of
any of the powers authorized hereunder, shall be taken without
just compensation, as agreed upon between the parties or
awarded by a jury, being first paid or tendered to the party
entitled to such compensation.
(3) All land or property needed, or taken by the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, by the City for any of the
aforementioned purposes, or in connection with the exercise of
any of the powers authorized hereunder, is hereby declared to be
needed or taken for a public use or a public benefit.
(4) Before the acquisition of any single family or multiple
family dwelling unit, or other structure, is made under this
Chapter, a finding or determination shall be made that:
(a) The dwelling unit or structure has deteriorated to such an
extent as to constitute a serious and growing menace to the
public health, safety and welfare;
(b) The dwelling unit or structure is likely to continue to
deteriorate unless corrected;
(c) The continued deterioration of the dwelling unit or structure
will contribute to the blighting or deterioration of the area
immediately surrounding the dwelling unit or structure; and
(d) The owner of the dwelling unit or structure has failed to
correct the deterioration thereof.
(5) The City shall adopt an Ordinance for each acquisition of
land or property made under the provisions of this Chapter.
Each specific ordinance so adopted shall be maintained by the
Legislative Clerk of the City in a file titled “Eminent Domain.”
Immediately after passing Ordinance G-02-3, the Board of Alderman discussed
Ordinance ED-02-1, which permitted the City to acquire the Property at 20 West Fourth
Street through its eminent domain powers.  During the meeting the following colloquy
5
occurred:
MAYOR DOUGHERTY: . . . .  We are looking at the ordinance
to acquire real property, located at 20 West 4th Street, through
the exercise of eminent domain.
ALDERMAN M. HALL: I move for acceptance.
ALDERMAN BALDI: You have to base it on five (5) points.
ALDERMAN M. HALL: Okay.  Let’s see.  I move for
acceptance of the ordinance to acquire real property located at
20 West 4th Street through the exercise of eminent domain,
finding that the structure located at 20 West 4th Street has
deteriorated to such an extent as to constitute a serious and
growing menace to public health, safety, and welfare; that this
structure is likely to continue to deteriorate unless corrected; that
the continued deterioration of the structure will contribute to the
blighting or deterioration of the area immediately surrounding
the structure; and that the owner of the dwelling unit or structure
has failed to correct the deterioration thereof.
ALDERMAN RAMSBURG: Second.
MAYOR DOUGHERTY: We have a motion from Alderman
Marcia Hall, a second from Alderman Ramsburg.  All in favor,
signify by raising your right hand.  That is five (5) – “O” (0).
Ladies and gentlemen, congratulations.  Good work, guys.
Good job.
Pickett has conceded that on March 25, 2002, Frederick Mayor Dougherty signed the
enabling ordinance, Ordinance G-02-3, immediately prior to signing Ordinance ED-02-1,
which specifically authorized the taking of the Property.
On April 10, 2002, the City initiated condemnation proceedings in the Circuit Court
for Frederick County.  Five days later, the Circuit Court issued a summons for Pickett, which
3
The P.O. box was an address previously on file with the City, and the address
on East Watersville Road was the residence of Pickett’s father.
6
listed his address as 755 East Watersville Road, Frederick, Maryland 21701.  The City,
however, was unable to effectuate service prior to the expiration of that summons.  On June
28, 2002, the City applied to have the Circuit Court reissue the summons for Pickett with the
same address.  The court did so.  Once again, the City was unable to serve Pickett prior to
the expiration of the reissued summons.  On September 25, 2002, the City again requested
that the Circuit Court reissue a summons for service on Pickett at the same address, which
the court did.  The City attempted to effect service of process throughout the following year.
After repeatedly being unable to effect service upon Pickett, on July 7, 2003, the City
filed a motion for alternate service, which the Circuit Court granted, thereby permitting the
City to serve process upon Pickett through mailing him a copy of the summons, complaint
and other relevant papers at his last known address, which was listed with the State Motor
Vehicle Administration as 170 Baughman’s Lane, Frederick, Maryland.  The City also served
Pickett through regular mail at two other addresses: P.O. Box 378, Mount Airy, Maryland;
and 755 East Watersville Road, Frederick, Maryland.3  Thereafter, on October 10, 2003, the
City obtained a default judgment against Pickett based on his failure to respond to the
complaint. 
On November 10, 2003, Pickett filed a motion to strike service of process and to
vacate the default judgment entered against him.  On December 12, 2003, the Circuit Court
4
We have defined ultra vires as “denot[ing] some act or transaction on the part
of a corporation which, although not unlawful or contrary to public policy if done or
executed by an individual, is yet beyond the legitimate powers of the corporation as they are
defined by the statutes under which it is formed or which is applicable to it, by its charter or
incorporation paper.”  Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Minis, 120 Md. 461, 488, 87 A. 1062, 1072
(1913).  We have recognized the application of the doctrine of ultra vires to municipal
corporations.  See Boitnott v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, 356 Md. 226, 738
A.2d 881 (1999); Inlet Associates v. Assateague House Condominium Ass’n, 313 Md. 413,
545 A.2d 1296 (1988).
7
vacated the default judgment entered against Pickett, but denied his motion to strike service
of process.  One month later, Pickett filed his answer, wherein he raised the affirmative
defenses of ultra vires,4 lack of in personam jurisdiction over him, collateral estoppel,
estoppel, and illegality, and asserted the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted as a ground for dismissal.  
On April 26, 2005, the Circuit Court held an evidentiary hearing addressing the City’s
entitlement to condemn the Property.  At the hearing, Pickett made an oral motion to dismiss
the City’s condemnation action based on several grounds.  He asserted that the City’s action
was ultra vires because Article 23A of the Maryland Code did not empower the City to
condemn an individual property within a non-blighted area, and the Board of Aldermen acted
beyond its authority when it passed the ordinance applicable to the Property prior to the
mayor’s approval of the enabling ordinance.   He contended that the City could condemn only
those properties located within a “blighted area,” to which end he introduced testimony from
a appraiser that his property was not located in a “blighted area” or “slum area.”  Pickett also
presented portions of Michael Blank’s deposition testimony regarding his knowledge of
5
In Mr. Blank’s deposition testimony, Mr. Blank conceded that he had received
a motion for injunction from Pickett that listed his current address as Route 2, Box 31,
Clearville, Pennsylvania prior to the City’s initiation of condemnation proceedings involving
Pickett’s property.
6
Pickett also argued that the City was collaterally estopped from condemning
the Property based on the Circuit Court’s previous denial of the City’s request for an
injunction to allow for a demolition of a balcony on the building on the Property because the
City believed that it constituted an imminent danger.  The Circuit Court denied relief based
on collateral estoppel because the issues were sufficiently different.
8
Pickett’s actual address in support of his argument that the City was acting in bad faith when
it claimed to be unable to provide him with notice of the citations issued concerning the
Property and to effectuate service of process in the condemnation proceeding.5  As his final
argument, Pickett asserted that the City never obtained in rem jurisdiction over him because
the City was not entitled to substituted service because of the bad faith that he alleged formed
the basis for its previous attempts to effect service; Pickett contended that the City was aware
of an accurate address at which service could have been made.  After hearing argument from
both sides, the Circuit Court explicated the reasoning for its decision on the record as
follows:
I heard today attacks on these proceedings on a number of bases.
I’ve made one ruling[6] and I’ve heard attacks on the basis that
the ordinance upon which this condemnation proceeding is
based is itself ultra vires in the way that it was enacted and in
accordance with the charter.  Or, the argument would actually be
that it was not enacted in accordance with the charter, and
therefore, the action taken was ultra vires.
I’ve heard testimony with regard to whether or not there is blight
at this property; argument on the issue of constructive fraud as
to the information given to the Court to obtain service of process
and whether or not the City knew of or had within its grasp
9
information as to he correct address of Mr. Pickett, and then,
finally, I don’t believe I’m excluding anything, arguments on
constitutional defects of the proceedings in terms of vagueness
of the language of the ordinance, the absence of public benefit,
and probably a little more, but I’m clear.  Okay.
* * *
Fundamentally, the Maryland General Assembly provided in
Article 23(a), Section 2 (b), that municipalities have these
express powers, and, frankly, we know that the municipality has
certain express powers, its has certain implied powers, it has
certain powers necessary to carry out that authority, but for
purposes of today’s proceeding, we’re focused on the express
power provided by the General Assembly in item 37 of
subsection 2 (b) of Article 23 (a) . . . .  It says in addition to the
authority provided elsewhere in this subsection, subsection 2 (b),
and provided the municipal corporation has urban renewal
authority granted under Article 3, Section 61 of the Maryland
Constitution, and there’s provision in that article for acquisition
of property by condemnation, and subject to the provisions of
subparagraph (iv) to acquire within the boundary lines of the
municipal corporation . . . land and property of every kind by
condemnation or development or redevelopment, including, but
not limited to, the comprehensive renovation or rehabilitation
thereof.  Now, that subsection (iv) says that before the
acquisition of a single family or multiple family dwelling unit or
structure, other structure is made under this paragraph, certain
findings have to be made, four findings.
* * *
What’s at issue in this case is a single property. . . .  In other
words, the City has exercised its discretion to an appropriate
extent as to this single property, but I’m – I keep harking back
to the definitions which talk about slum area, blighted area, and
within each definition of area there are references to dwellings
predominate, majority buildings.  It nowhere says a slum
property, a blighted property.  In fact, to step back, it talks about
carrying out urban renewal projects and it keeps then referring
10
to slum clearance and slum or blighted areas and redevelopment
or the rehabilitation of slum or blighted areas.  It doesn’t talk
about even a renewal, a suburban renewal project which affects
one property.  I don’t think I – I’m not going to say it again
because I hope I’ve made my point.  The authority granted in
Article 3, Section 61, which is the enabling cornerstone, refers
to blighted area and slum area, which in turn, refer to multiple
buildings.  
* * *
I realize that the authority the Constitution grants and which the
general assembly exercised and which the City has attempted to
invoke is that authority to take private property through
condemnation, eminent domain, when it’s necessary for slum
clearance, for the purpose of carrying out urban renewal
projects, but limited to slum clearance in slum or blighted areas,
which, in turn, are area – which are areas, first of all, I can stop
there – but area specifically defined to include multiple
dwellings, or, in the case of blighted areas, multiple buildings or
a place where a majority of buildings have declined in
productivity.
* * *
With all of that, I must dismiss these proceedings.  Mr. Winters,
I’m going to ask you to submit an order.  I think you can merely
say for the reasons stated, or words to that effect, from the
bench, the Court’s oral opinion, the matter will be dismissed.
Thank you.
On May 26, 2005, the City filed its notice of appeal, and thereafter, this Court issued,
on its own initiative, a writ of certiorari, Frederick v. Pickett, 389 Md. 398, 885 A.2d 823
(2005), prior to any proceedings in the intermediate appellate court.  The City’s  brief
presented the following issue:
Whether under Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol.), Article
7
When we assume jurisdiction over an appeal pending, but undecided, before
the Court of Special Appeals, we “consider those issues that would have been cognizable by
the Court of Special Appeals.”  Md. Rule 8-131(b)(2).  Thus, we rely on the question or
questions in both the appellant’s brief and the appellee’s brief to present the issue or issues
we consider.  See de la Puente v. County Commissioners of Frederick County, 386 Md. 505,
508 n.4, 873 A.2d 366, 368 n.4 (2005); Converge Servs. Group, LLC v. Curran, 383 Md.
462, 467 n.1, 860 A.2d 871, 874 n.1 (2004).  See also Dual Inc., v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
383 Md. 151, 161 n.3, 857 A.2d 1095, 1100 n.3 (2004). 
11
23A, Section 2 (b) (37), the Appellant’s legislature was required
to determine that the Subject Property was within a “slum area”
or “blighted area” as those terms are defined in Maryland
Constitution, Article 3, Section 61 to acquire the Subject
Property for the public purpose of development or
redevelopment. 
In his responsive brief in this Court, Pickett also raised the following issues for our
consideration:7
1.  Was the trial court legally correct in dismissing Appellant’s
Amended Complaint because Appellant’s simultaneous
enactment of both the enabling ordinance and the ordinance
specific to Appellee’s property rendered both the specific
ordinance and Appellant’s subsequent actions in seeking to
condemn Appellee’s property ultra vires, illegal acts?
2.  Was the trial court legally correct in dismissing Appellant’s
Amended Complaint because the Circuit Court never acquired
in rem jurisdiction over Appellee’s property?
3.  Was the trial court legally correct in dismissing Appellant’s
Amended Complaint because Appellant’s action in determining
the necessity for condemning Appellee’s property was so
oppressive, arbitrary, and unreasonable as to suggest bad faith?
We hold that the Circuit Court erroneously dismissed the City of Frederick’s
condemnation action based on an incorrect interpretation of the requirements of Maryland
12
Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol.), Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37).
Although the Circuit Court relied solely on its erroneous interpretation of Maryland
Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol.), Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37) as the basis for its dismissal
of the City’s complaint for condemnation of the Property, we could affirm the dismissal “on
any ground adequately shown by the record, whether or not relied upon by the trial court.”
Berman v. Karvounis, 308 Md. 259, 263, 518 A.2d 726, 728 (1987), citing Robeson v. State,
285 Md. 498, 502, 403 A.2d 1221, 1223 (1979) (and cases cited therein), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1021, 100 S.Ct. 680, 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980).  As we noted in Robeson, 
[c]onsiderations of judicial economy justify the policy of
upholding a trial court decision which was correct although on
a different ground than relied upon.  This was explained by the
Supreme Court in Securities and Exchange Com. v. Chenery
Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 459, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943):
‘It would be wasteful to send a case back to the lower court to
reinstate a decision which it had already made but which the
appellate court concluded should properly be based on another
ground within the power of the appellate court to formulate.’
Robeson, 285 Md. at 502, 403 A.2d at 1223.  Therefore we may consider whether the Circuit
Court’s dismissal could be affirmed on alternate grounds adequately shown in the record.
Of the three alternate grounds presented by Pickett for our consideration, only the issue of
whether the Board of Aldermen’s approval of the ordinance applicable to the Property was
an ultra vires action was adequately developed in the record.  The Circuit Court’s dismissal
of the City’s condemnation action, however, may not be upheld on the ground that the Board
of Aldermen’s actions were ultra vires because the Board was not required to enact an
8
Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol.), Article 23A, Section 2 (b) (37)
provides in pertinent part:
(b) Express powers. – In addition to, but not in substitution of,
the powers which have been, or may hereafter be, granted to it,
such legislative body also shall have the following express
ordinance-making powers:
* * *
(37)(i) In addition to the authority provided elsewhere in this
subsection, and provided the municipal corporation has urban
renewal authority granted under Article III, Section 61 of the
Maryland Constitution:
1.  Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (iv) of this
13
enabling ordinance prior to the passage of an ordinance authorizing the condemnation of a
specific property.  Moreover, assuming arguendo that an enabling ordinance was required,
the Board of Aldermen was empowered to pass the second ordinance in anticipation of the
enabling ordinance’s approval by the mayor, particularly because the parties do not dispute
the fact that the mayor signed the enabling ordinance prior to signing the ordinance
specifically aimed at the condemnation of the property at issue in the present case.  The
remaining two issues, lack of in rem jurisdiction and bad faith, were not adequately
developed in the record and as such, we may not rely upon them as grounds to uphold the
Circuit Court’s dismissal.
Discussion
The City argues that the language of the controlling statute, Maryland Code (1957,
2001 Repl. Vol.), Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37),8 is clear and unambiguous.  According to
paragraph, to acquire, within the boundary lines of the municipal
corporation, land and property of every kind, and any right,
interest, franchise, easement or privilege therein, by purchase,
lease, gift, condemnation or another other legal means, for
development or redevelopment, including, but not limited to, the
comprehensive renovation or rehabilitation thereof; and
* * *
(iv) Before the acquisition of any single family or multiple
family dwelling unit, or other structure, is made under this
paragraph, a finding or determination shall be made that:
1.  The dwelling unit or structure has deteriorated to such extent
as to constitute a serious and growing menace to the public
health, safety, and welfare;
2.  The dwelling unit or structure is likely to continue to
deteriorate unless corrected;
3.  The continued deterioration of the dwelling unit or structure
will contribute to the blighting or deterioration of the area
immediately surrounding the dwelling unit or structure; and
4.  The owner of the dwelling unit or structure has failed to
correct the deterioration thereof. 
14
the City, the purpose of Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37) is to empower municipalities to
condemn individual blighted properties even within a non-blighted area.  Therefore, the City
concludes that the Board of Aldermen properly exercised its power to do so when it passed
an ordinance authorizing the condemnation of Pickett’s property.  Moreover, the City asserts
that even if the language were ambiguous, the legislative history and the context surrounding
the enactment of Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37) support the interpretation that the statute
does not require the finding of a “slum area” or “blighted area” for the City to be able to
condemn the Property.  
15
Pickett concedes that Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37) empowers municipalities to
condemn individual blighted properties within a non-blighted area; however, he asserts that
the dismissal may be upheld on appeal regardless of the fact that the Circuit Court’s
interpretation of Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37) was erroneous.  To that end, Pickett argues
that the simultaneous enactment of both the enabling ordinance and the ordinance specific
to the Property rendered the specific ordinance and all of the actions arising thereunder ultra
vires.  Specifically, Pickett contends that the City’s Board of Aldermen lacked the legal
authority to conduct a fact-finding hearing regarding his property and to pass the ordinance
providing for the condemnation of his property on March 21, 2002, because the enabling
ordinance was not effective. 
The City rejoins that the condemnation action with respect to the Property was not
ultra vires because the Board of Aldermen properly approved the ordinance and had the
authority to conduct the necessary fact-finding hearing under Maryland law.  According to
the City, under the applicable statute, the Board of Aldermen was not required to approve an
enabling ordinance prior to being able to exercise its power to conduct fact-finding
proceedings or prior to passing the ordinance specifically directed at Pickett’s property. 
Our resolution of whether the Circuit Court properly dismissed the Amended
Complaint turns on our construction of the provisions of the Maryland Code.  When
construing a statute we first look to the normal, plain meaning of the language.  Davis v.
Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604, 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004); Fish Market Nominee Corp. v. G.A.A.,
16
337 Md. 1, 8, 650 A.2d 705, 708 (1994); Luppino v. Gray, 336 Md. 194, 204 n.8, 647 A.2d
429, 434 n.8 (1994); Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 511, 374 A.2d 900, 902 (1970); Balto. Gas
& Elect. Co. v. Board, 278 Md. 26, 31, 358 A.2d 241, 244 (1976);  Johnson v. State, 360 Md.
250, 265, 757 A.2d 796, 804 (2000).  If that language is clear and unambiguous, we need not
look beyond the provision’s terms to inform our analysis, Davis, 383 Md. at 604, 861 A.2d
at 81; Fish Market, 337 Md. at 8, 650 A.2d at 708; Rand, 280 Md. at 511, 374 A.2d at 902;
Johnson, 360 Md. at 265, 757 A.2d at 804; however, the goal of our examination is always
to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied
by a particular provision.  Davis, 383 Md. at 604, 861 A.2d at 81; Morris v. Prince George’s
County, 319 Md. 597, 603-04, 573 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1990), citing Dept. of the Environment
v. Showell, 316 Md. 259, 270, 558 A.2d 391, 396 (1989); Harford County v. Edgewater, 316
Md. 389, 397, 558 A.2d 1219, 1223 (1989). 
In 1995, the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 379, which added Subsection 2
(b)(37) to Article 23A of the Maryland Code, and provided in pertinent part:
(37)(i) In addition to the authority provided elsewhere in this
subsection, and provided the municipal corporation has urban
renewal authority granted under Article III, Section 61 of the
Maryland Constitution:
1.  Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (iv) of this
paragraph, to acquire within the boundary lines of the municipal
corporation, land and property of every kind, and any right,
interest, franchise, easement or privilege therein, by purchase,
lease, gift, condemnation or any other legal means, for
development or redevelopment, including, but not limited to, the
comprehensive renovation or rehabilitation thereof;
17
* * *
(iv) Before the acquisition of any single family or multiple
family dwelling unit, or other structure, is made under this
paragraph, a finding or determination shall be made that:
1.  The dwelling unit or structure has deteriorated to such an
extent as to constitute a serious and growing menace to the
public health, safety, and welfare;
2.  The dwelling unit or structure is likely to continue to
deteriorate unless corrected;
3.  The continued deterioration of the dwelling unit or structure
will contribute to the blighting or deterioration of the area
immediately surrounding the dwelling unit or structure; and 
4.  The owner of the dwelling unit or structure has failed to
correct the deterioration thereof.
1995 Md. Laws, Chap. 519, codified as Md. Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol.), Art. 23A § 2
(b)(37).  The inclusion of the language “[b]efore the acquisition of any single family or
multiple family dwelling unit, or other structure, is made under this paragraph” clearly
evidences the General Assembly’s intention to grant municipalities the power to condemn
an individual blighted property.  The statute does so without any condition that the specific
property is within a “slum area” or “blighted area,” or any requirement that the particular
property or land is condemned in conjunction with the condemnation of the surrounding
parcels.  Moreover, the provision does not encompass a municipality’s ability to condemn
“slum areas” or “blighted areas” as it presumes that the municipality has already been granted
such authority pursuant to Article III, Section 61 of the Maryland Constitution.  
This conclusion is bolstered further by the inclusion of a list of four factual
determinations that must be made prior to condemning an individual blighted property.
9
Maryland Constitution Article III, Section 61 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The General Assembly may authorize and empower any
county or any municipal corporation, by public local law:
(1) To carry out urban renewal projects which shall be limited
to slum clearance in slum or blighted areas and redevelopment
or the rehabilitation of slum or blighted areas, and to include the
acquisition, within the boundary lines of such county or
municipal corporation, of land and property of every kind and
every right, interest, franchise, easement or privilege therein, by
purchase, lease, gift, condemnation or any other legal means.
The term “slum area” shall mean any area where dwellings
predominate which, by reason of depreciation, overcrowding,
faulty arrangement or design, lack of ventilation, light or
sanitary facilities, or any combination of these factors, are
18
Although the statute requires the municipality to make certain findings regarding the
deterioration of the property and give notice to the owner, it does not mandate that the
municipality make any determinations concerning whether the immediate area surrounding
the property in question is currently blighted.  The focus is on the specific property at issue:
whether it is currently blighted, will continue to be blighted, and will contribute to the
blighting of the surrounding locality in the future.  Rather than empowering the municipality
to take remedial measures to fight blight as Article III, Section 61 does, Article 23A, Section
2 (b)(37) enables the municipality to take preemptive actions to stop the spread of blight
within an area by condemning properties that are, in and of themself, blighted.  
The express language of Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37) requires that the municipality,
prior to exercising the power granted by the statute,  must have urban renewal authority under
Article III, Section 61 of the Maryland Constitution.9  The General Assembly granted the
detrimental to the public safety, health or morals.  The term
“blighted area” shall mean an area in which a majority of
buildings have declined in productivity by reason of
obsolescence, depreciation or other causes to an extent they no
longer justify fundamental repairs and adequate maintenance.
* * *
(b) The general Assembly may grant to any county or any
municipal corporation, by public local law, any and all
additional power and authority necessary or proper to carry into
full force and effect any and all of the specific powers
authorized by this section and to fully accomplish any and all of
the purposes and objects contemplated by the provisions of this
section, provided such additional power or authority is not
inconsistent with the terms and provisions of this section or with
any other provision or provisions of the Constitution of
Maryland.
19
City of Frederick urban renewal authority in 1961.  1961 Md. Laws, Chap. 632.  It is
apparent from the General Assembly’s use of the phrase:
In addition to the authority provided elsewhere in this
subsection, and provided the municipal corporation has urban
renewal authority granted under Article III, Section 61 of the
Maryland Constitution,
Md. Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol.), Art. 23A, §2 (b)(37) (emphasis added), that the General
Assembly intended the grant of urban renewal authority under Article III, Section 61 to be
a prerequisite to the municipality being able to condemn a blighted property within a non-
blighted area.  Therefore, the condition precedent enumerated in Section 2 (b)(37) of Article
23A that the municipality be empowered to condemn “slum areas” or “blighted areas”
pursuant to Article III, Section 61 of the Maryland Constitution is satisfied in the present
20
case, and the City was empowered to condemn individual blighted properties located within
non-blighted areas.  
Pickett presents us with three alternate bases for upholding the Circuit Court’s
dismissal of the condemnation action: the action was ultra vires because of the manner in
which the ordinance regarding the Property was approved by the Board of Aldermen; the
Circuit Court lacked in rem jurisdiction over the Property; and the City’s actions throughout
the condemnation process were motivated by bad faith.  We shall address each in turn.
At argument before this Court and by implication in his brief, Pickett conceded that
the enabling ordinance was signed by the Mayor of the City of Frederick prior to the signing
of the ordinance that applied specifically to the Property; however, he continued to maintain
that because the enabling ordinance was not in effect prior to the Board of Aldermen’s fact-
finding hearing regarding the condemnation of the Property, the Board was acting beyond
its authority and the ordinance condemning his property was ultra vires.  We disagree.
Pickett argues that an effective enabling ordinance was required before the City could
properly exercise the authority to condemn individual property under Article 23A, Section
2 (b)(37).  The express language of Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37) does not enumerate the
enactment of an enabling ordinance among the conditions precedent to the municipality
exercising its authority to condemn a blighted property within a non-blighted area.  As we
recently noted, where the legislature intends to include a particular provision within a statute,
it generally does so expressly.  See Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City,
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387 Md. 1, 16 n.9, 874 A.2d 439, 448 n.9 (2005).  The General Assembly has expressly
required enabling ordinances or resolutions in other circumstances such as the issuance of
bonds by municipal corporations, see Md. Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol.), Art. 23A §§ 33 and
34, yet has not done so in Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37).  Therefore, because the General
Assembly did not expressly require that the municipality enact an enabling ordinance in
Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37), we conclude that an enabling ordinance is not required to
utilize the powers explicated in that statute.  We hold that the Board of Aldermen possessed
the authority to conduct a fact-finding hearing when it did so and was empowered to pass the
ordinance applicable to the property at issue in the case at bar prior to the Mayor’s approval
of the enabling ordinance.  
Furthermore, assuming that the City was required to enact an enabling ordinance to
exercise its condemnation power under Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37), the ordinance
permitting it to condemn the Property was not ultra vires.  We addressed the similar issue of
a legislature’s ability to pass legislation prior to an enabling statute’s effective date in
Blumenthal v. Clerk of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, 278 Md. 398, 365 A.2d
279 (1976).  The action in Blumenthal arose out of legislation enacted by the General
Assembly that permitted the counties and Baltimore City to establish through ordinance or
resolution their own tax rate for the “recordation of instruments conveying title and securing
debts.”  Id. at 400, 365 A.2d at 281.  The statute provided that it would become effective on
July 1, 1968.  Id. at 409, 365 A.2d at 286.  The counties and Baltimore City, however,
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enacted tax rate ordinances prior to the effective date of the statute.  Mr. Blumenthal and his
co-plaintiffs argued that even if the statute “permit[ted] Baltimore City and the counties to
fix the recordation tax rate, the ordinances enacted by Baltimore City and by Baltimore and
Charles Counties, though adopted after [the statute] was signed and though not themselves
to become effective until July 1, are void because they were promulgated prior to the
effective date” of the enabling statute.  Id.  
We determined that “the County Commissioners may exercise ‘the authority with
which (they have) been expressly, or as a reasonable implication, invested by law.’” Id.
(additions in original), quoting Montgomery Co. v. Met. District, 202 Md. 293, 304, 96 A.2d
353, 357 (1952).  Concomitantly, we stated our conclusion that “by reasonable implication
[the statute] conferred upon the political subdivisions the power to adopt, prior to the
effective date of the statute, implementing legislation which itself was not to become
operative until that very same effective date.”  Blumenthal, 202 Md. at 409, 365 A.2d at 286.
We also quoted with approval from the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Druggan v. Anderson,
269 U.S. 36, 46 S.Ct. 14, 70 L.Ed. 151 (1925).  In Druggan, Congress enacted the National
Prohibition Act before Prohibition went into effect, but after the Eighteenth Amendment was
ratified.  Justice Holmes, writing for the Supreme Court, observed that Congress has “a
present power to enact laws intended to carry out constitutional provisions for the future
when the time comes for them to take effect.”  Id. at 39, 46 S.Ct. at 15, 70 L.Ed. at 153.  
This reasoning is controlling in the case sub judice.  Assuming arguendo, that the City
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was required to enact an enabling ordinance prior to exercising its power to condemn
individual blighted properties within a non-blighted area, the Board of Aldermen could
nevertheless engage in a fact-finding hearing and pass an ordinance in anticipation of the
Mayor’s approval of the enabling ordinance under the rationale explicated in Blumenthal.
Moreover, as Pickett conceded, the enabling ordinance was approved by the Mayor prior to
her approval of the ordinance specifically applicable to the Property, and therefore, the
ordinance permitting the condemnation of the Property was not effective before the enabling
ordinance was given effect.  Thus, pursuant to our reasoning in Blumenthal, the Board of
Aldermen did not act beyond the scope of its authority in passing the ordinance authorizing
the condemnation of Pickett’s property prior to the mayor’s signing of the enabling ordinance
because the specific ordinance was not in effect prior to the enabling ordinance.
Pickett also presents lack of in rem jurisdiction and bad faith as alternate grounds for
affirming the Circuit Court’s dismissal of the City’s condemnation action.  During the
evidentiary hearing, the majority of both parties’ argument focused on the construction of
Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37) and the issue of whether the Board of Aldermen’s passage of
the ordinance condemning Pickett’s property was ultra vires.  Beyond Michael Blank’s
deposition testimony concerning the issuance of the citations with respect to the Property and
his awareness of an accurate address for service of process, which was read into the record,
the issue of in rem jurisdiction was not developed.  Moreover, it is unclear whether Pickett
was arguing that the findings made by the Board of Aldermen were made in bad faith or that
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the City’s efforts to effect service of process to obtain in rem jurisdiction were made in bad
faith, or both.  Furthermore, the Circuit Court, although presented with argument concerning
in rem jurisdiction and bad faith, did not specifically address the contentions.  Therefore,
because there is a dearth of necessary factual detail in the record regarding these contentions,
we will not affirm the Circuit Court’s decision on those grounds.  See Berman, 308 Md. at
263, 518 A.2d at 728; see also Robeson, 285 Md. at 502, 403 A.2d at 1223 (and cases cited
therein), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1021, 100 S.Ct. 680, 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980). 
Conclusion
Based on the plain language of Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol.), Article 23A,
Section 2 (b)(37), we conclude that the City of Frederick is empowered to condemn
individual blighted properties within a non-blighted area.  Moreover, although we may affirm
the dismissal of the City’s condemnation action on alternate grounds, we determine that the
Board of Aldermen’s passage of the ordinance condemning Pickett’s property was not an
ultra vires action and thus, the dismissal may not be upheld on that ground.  Furthermore,
because the issues of lack of in rem jurisdiction or bad faith were not adequately developed
in the record, we will not affirm the dismissal on those grounds and leave those issues open
for the Circuit Court to address on remand if necessary.  Therefore, we reverse. 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR FREDERICK COUNTY REVERSED.
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT
WITH THIS OPINION.  COSTS TO BE PAID
BY THE APPELLEE.
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