Case Title: Murphy Truck Lines v. Brown

Citation: 313 S.W.2d 440

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1958-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
313 S.W.2d 440 (1958) MURPHY TRUCK LINES v. Wesson Earl BROWN et ux. Supreme Court of Tennessee. April 9, 1958. Rehearing Denied May 2, 1958. Glenn M. Elliott and James N. Clay, III, Memphis, for defendant-petitioner. George E. Morrow and Martin & Tate, Memphis, for plaintiffs-respondents. NEIL, Chief Justice. This appeal presents the following question for decision: where the trial judge has approved the verdict of the jury for and on behalf of the plaintiffs, but suggests *441 a remittitur of 50 per cent of the verdict which is accepted under protest, what supervisory authority does the Court of Appeals have with respect to a restoration of the original verdict, or a part of the remittitur suggested by the trial court? We granted certiorari and filed with the record the following Per Curiam Opinion: We will refer to the parties as they appeared in the trial court, Mr. and Mrs. Brown as plaintiffs (parents of the little girl who was killed in this accident) and Murphy Truck Lines as the defendant. The trial judge suggested the remittitur on the ground that the verdict for the plaintiffs in the sum of $25,000 was excessive. There is material evidence in the record to show that the plaintiffs, who are the beneficiaries of this judgment were guilty of contributory negligence in sending the deceased, a six and one-half year old child, to the store for a ten cent package of starch, knowing she would have to cross and recross a dangerous street intersection. All the facts, including pictures of this intersection, show that it was a heavily traveled street crossing. So much so that *442 it required a traffic light to control the movement of automobiles and pedestrians. However, the question of contributory negligence of the plaintiffs was submitted to the jury over the objection of the defendant, the latter insisting that such negligence was proximate as a matter of law and barred the plaintiffs' suit. But the courts below concurred in holding that the alleged contributory negligence of the parents was remote rather than proximate. We feel bound by this concurrent finding, at least to the extent that we cannot deal with the defendant's contention that its motion for a directed verdict should have been sustained. Contention is made by defendant's counsel that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in not sustaining the action of the trial judge in suggesting the remittitur and (2) in restoring a part of it. On the contrary the plaintiffs' counsel insist that it was the duty of the Court of Appeals to restore the entire amount of the jury's verdict of $25,000 and erred in not doing so. There are no issues of fact to be dealt with in this case. The legal questions presented in the assignments of error relate solely to the authority of the trial judge to suggest a remittitur and the authority of the Court of Appeals to set aside such a remittitur and approve the original verdict or to suggest an additional sum as a remittitur. It is settled law in this State that a trial court may suggest a remittitur in any case involving unliquidated damages where the amount of the verdict is excessive. Thus in Grant v. Louisville & N. Railroad Co., 129 Tenn. 398, 165 S.W. 963, the Court held: Many decisions are cited with approval which reflect the great weight of authority. Our cases are well nigh unanimous in holding that where the Court of Appeals concurs with the trial judge as regards the verdict, that is, in approving the suggested amount of the remittitur by the trial judge and not otherwise disturbing it, the question is thus practically foreclosed. Lambert Bros. v. Larkins, Tenn., 296 S.W.2d 353, citing Section 27-119, T.C.A. Of course, where the amount of the remittitur is approved by the Court of Appeals, the party aggrieved thereby is entitled to have this Court review and correct the error, if any, by petition for certiorari. (Section 27-119, T.C.A.) The statutes controlling the right to an appellate review of errors in suggesting a remittitur appear in Sections 27-118 and 27-119, T.C.A. Code Section 27-118 reads, as follows: *443 Section 27-119, referred to herein, provides for the right of review by this Court on petition for certiorari to consider if error was committed with regard to suggesting a remittitur, or increasing the amount of the trial judge's remittitur. The pertinent part of Section 27-119 reads as follows: Now in the case at bar we cannot say "that the verdict should not have been reduced". It conclusively appears that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed that the verdict of the jury should have been reduced, the former in the amount of $12,500 while the latter held this to be excessive and suggested remitting $7,500 of this amount. We feel that we are bound by their respective opinions, holding that the verdict should have been reduced. Lambert Bros. v. Larkins, supra. In considering the point of disagreement between the two courts the only problem before this Court is the extent of the Court of Appeals' authority to revise the judgment, i.e. to deduct $7,500 from the $12,500 and affirm a major part of the original judgment of $25,000. Under the statute (Section 27-119) conferring power upon the court to restore the original judgment, upon finding that the trial court's suggested remittitur was error, would not the Court of Appeals have the power to reinstate a part of the original judgment? We think this inquiry must be answered in the affirmative. We reach this conclusion based upon the sound hypothesis that if the Court of Appeals can correct the error of the trial judge in declining to suggest any remittitur (Section 27-119, T.C.A.), does not the authority exist, by clear implication, that the trial court was in error in suggesting a remittitur that was excessive? This is indeed a most delicate question for us to decide. However, we think the over all purpose of the foregoing Sections of the Code require this interpretation. The revisory authority of the appellate courts, the Court of Appeals in the instant case, was to avoid repeated trials of factual issues and at the same time do equal justice to the parties. The clear legislative intent, as reflected in the foregoing Sections of the Code, was to confer upon the appellate courts full power and authority to revise and correct all errors consistent with recognized rules of appellate practice and procedure. It is true that the final judgment, after a reduction by the appellate court, does not have the approval of the trial judge, as in the case at bar, but the plaintiffs' right to a recovery had his approval. The situation is analogous to that of the appellate court's authority to reinstate a judgment claimed to be valid in a wayside bill of exceptions, and which on the first trial had been disapproved by the trial court. We cannot agree with the plaintiffs' contention that it was error for the Court of Appeals not to reinstate the original judgment. While there is an expression in Lambert Bros. v. Larkins, supra, which suggests that this was its duty pursuant to its right of revision to correct errors, we feel that the authority to do so, as well as to correct other errors, rests within the sound discretion of the court. It was not the intention of the Legislature to set up an arbitrary rule to be followed by the courts in every case. Any such attempt to limit the judgment of the courts would *444 come close to the exercise of a judicial function. We do not think the case of Waller v. Skelton, 186 Tenn. 433, 211 S.W.2d 445, controls the case at bar. In that case the plaintiff was free from any and all negligence. The learned trial judge suggested a remittitur on the ground that the verdict of the jury was the result of passion, prejudice and unaccountable caprice. This Court held that there was no evidence to support the reasons for suggesting the remittitur, and that the Court of Appeals was correct in reinstating the verdict of the jury. The case has not been without its difficult aspects. But, for reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, we are constrained to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and it is so ordered. The Murphy Truck Lines has filed its petition to rehear in this case complaining: We think the counsel is mistaken in the foregoing insistence, since the original opinion discusses every issue made on this appeal. We not only considered every fact and the ruling of the Court of Appeals as disclosed in the majority opinion of the court, but gave due consideration to the thoughtful dissenting opinion of Judge Avery. The petition to rehear is a review and reargument of cases which were considered in the original opinion, except possibly Management Services v. Hellman, Tenn.App., 289 S.W.2d 711. However, this case was cited in the briefs of both the petitioner and the respondents. It was duly considered, although not distinguished by us from other cases which we thought controlling. Responding to the argument of counsel that the final award in the case at bar is grossly excessive when compared to an award in Cheek v. Fox, 7 Tenn.Civ.App. 160; and Koehn v. Hooper, 193 Tenn. 417, 246 S.W.2d 68, we cannot consider the facts appearing in those and other cases as persuasive on the question of contributory negigence in the case at bar and what amount should be deducted from the amount of damages the plaintiff would otherwise be entitled to recover and thus decide the case. We feel that every material issue in the case was given full, fair and impartial consideration by the Court, and the petition for rehearing should be denied. It is so ordered.