Case Title: State v. McCausland

Citation: 2009-Ohio-5933

Docket Number: 20082415

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. McCausland, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5933.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-5933 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. MCCAUSLAND, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. McCausland, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5933.] 
Criminal law — Right to counsel — Closing argument — A criminal defendant 
waives the Sixth Amendment right to present a closing argument when he 
or she neither requests a closing argument nor objects to its omission. 
(No. 2008-2415 — Submitted September 29, 2009 — Decided  
November 17, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Butler County, No. CA2007-10-254,  
2008-Ohio-5660. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A criminal defendant waives the Sixth Amendment right to present a closing 
argument when he or she neither requests a closing argument nor objects 
to its omission. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} Today this court must decide whether a defendant is denied the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel when he or she has the opportunity to request a 
closing argument but fails to do so and then fails to object to its omission.  
Because we hold that the right to closing argument can be waived, we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} The Ohio State Highway Patrol cited James C. McCausland, 
defendant-appellant, for speeding pursuant to R.C. 4511.21(C), operating a 
vehicle under the influence of alcohol pursuant to R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), and 
refusal of a chemical test with a prior conviction within 20 years pursuant to R.C. 
4511.19(A)(2)(b).  McCausland, represented by counsel, withdrew his jury 
demand and proceeded with a bench trial. 
{¶ 3} There were two witnesses.  The arresting trooper testified for the 
state, and McCausland testified on his own behalf.  As rebuttal, the state recalled 
the trooper, and McCausland’s counsel cross-examined the trooper again.  After 
the judge told the trooper he could step down from the witness stand, the 
prosecutor stated, “You Honor that’s all we have,” to which the judge replied, 
“Alright.”  The transcript indicates a “pause” in the proceedings, but neither the 
prosecution nor the defense requested the opportunity to present closing 
argument.  The judge then summarized the evidence in detail and found 
McCausland guilty on all three charges. 
{¶ 4} McCausland appealed, arguing that the trial court had erred and 
had denied him a fair trial in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution when it denied counsel the opportunity to make a 
closing argument prior to the judgment of the trial court.  The Court of Appeals 
for Butler County affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  State v. McCausland, 
January Term, 2009 
3 
 
Butler App. No. CA2007-10-254, 2008-Ohio-5660.  McCausland appealed, and 
the case is now before us upon the acceptance of a discretionary appeal.  State v. 
McCausland, 121 Ohio St.3d 1424, 2009-Ohio-1296, 903 N.E.2d 324. 
Analysis 
{¶ 5} The United States Supreme Court considered the significance of 
closing argument in the criminal case Herring v. New York (1975), 422 U.S. 853, 
95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593, which involved a New York statute that allowed a 
trial judge to deny the opportunity for any closing argument in a bench trial.  Id. at 
853-854.  When Herring’s attorney asked to “be heard somewhat on the facts” at 
the conclusion of the defense case, the trial judge replied: “Under the new statute, 
summation is discretionary, and I choose not to hear summations.”  Id. at 856. 
{¶ 6} In reversing, the United States Supreme Court held: “There can be 
no doubt that closing argument for the defense is a basic element of the adversary 
factfinding process in a criminal trial.  Accordingly, it has universally been held 
that counsel for the defense has a right to make a closing summation to the jury, 
no matter how strong the case for the prosecution may appear to the presiding 
judge.  The issue has been considered less often in the context of a so-called 
bench trial.  But the overwhelming weight of authority, in both federal and state 
courts, holds that a total denial of the opportunity for final argument in a nonjury 
criminal trial is a denial of the basic right of the accused to make his defense.”  
Herring, 422 U.S. 858-859, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593. 
{¶ 7} In quoting Yopps v. State (1962), 228 Md. 204, 178 A.2d 879, 
however, the court also indicated that this right to closing argument can be 
waived.  Id. at 207.  Whether that waiver must be express or may be by omission 
appears to divide the appellate courts in Ohio and is before the court today for 
resolution. 
{¶ 8} As the appellate decision in this case indicates, there are essentially 
two opposing positions taken by our appellate districts.  The Fifth, Sixth, and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Seventh Districts1 follow the Tenth District’s decision in Columbus v. Woodrick 
(1976), 48 Ohio App.2d 274, 2 O.O.3d 232, 357 N.E.2d 58, in concluding that 
Herring holds, “[T]he closing argument is part of a basic due process right, [and] 
there is necessarily a presumption against a waiver of such a fundamental right.”  
Id. at 277.  Thus, the waiver “must be clearly established * * *; it must be plainly 
shown that there was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right.”  Id. at 277-278.  Later, the Tenth District added that this relinquishment of 
the right to closing argument “must be express, intentional, and voluntary.”  State 
v. Garrard, 170 Ohio App.3d 487, 2007-Ohio-1244, 867 N.E.2d 887, ¶ 51. 
{¶ 9} The other approach, adopted by the court of appeals in this case, 
holds that Herring is a narrow case dealing with a statute that expressly permitted 
a trial judge to affirmatively deny defense counsel’s specific request for closing 
argument and should not be extended to cases like this one, in which counsel fails 
to request closing argument and fails to object to its omission.  This view, adopted 
by the Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and Twelfth District Courts of Appeals, holds that 
absent an express denial of closing argument, the lack of closing argument is not a 
basis for reversal.  See State v. Brown (Dec. 30, 1983), Clermont  App. No. CA-
1210, 1983 WL 6344, at *2; State v. Yoder (Feb. 5, 1986), Wayne App. No. 2099, 
1986 WL 1740, at *3; State v. Erickson (Apr. 29, 1988), Lake App. No. 12-137, 
1988 WL 41557, at *2; State v. Newton (June 27, 1997), Lake App. No. 96-L-
058, 1997 WL 401557, at *4, and Jackson v. Jackson (Dec. 16, 1993), Cuyahoga 
App. Nos. 64284 and 64873, 1993 WL 526704, at *4. 
{¶ 10} We agree with the decision to not extend Herring to create a 
presumption against waiver when a closing argument is neither requested by the 
defense nor objected to when omitted by the court.  First, we note that Herring 
                                                          
 
1.  See, e.g., State v. Hoover (May 11, 1992), Stark App. No. CA-8761, 1992 WL 127070, *2; 
State v. Patton (Dec. 30, 1983), Wood App. No. WD-83-51, 1983 WL 2346, *2; State v. Baron, 
Mahoning App. No. 05 MA 156, 2007-Ohio-4323, ¶ 37. 
January Term, 2009 
5 
 
involved a specific statute that affirmatively permitted a trial court to deny a 
defendant the opportunity to present closing argument when requested.  Herring, 
422 U.S. at 853-854, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593.  Herring’s counsel expressly 
requested closing argument, and the trial court specifically denied it.  Id. at 856.  
Here, McCausland neither requested closing argument nor objected to its 
omission. 
{¶ 11} At the close of the case, there was a “pause” noted in the record.  
Neither the state nor the defense began closing arguments or requested them.  
Moreover, after the judge began to recite the facts and evidence, the judge 
engaged in conversation with defense counsel prior to sentencing, at which time 
counsel could have requested closing argument or at the very least objected to its 
omission.  Counsel declined to do either and therefore waived the right to closing 
argument. 
{¶ 12} In State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 709 N.E.2d 484, this 
court held that a trial court is not required to conduct an inquiry with the 
defendant concerning the decision whether to testify in his or her defense, a 
decision that this court noted was an “ ‘important tactical decision as well as a 
matter of constitutional right.’ ”  Id. at 499, quoting Brooks v. Tennessee (1972), 
406 U.S. 605, 612, 92 S.Ct. 1891, 32 L.Ed.2d 358.  Surely then, the same 
conclusion is warranted in the case at bar.  Counsel’s decision not to request 
closing argument could reflect a tactical decision to omit closing argument in a 
case that involved only speeding and driving under the influence of alcohol, 
included only two witnesses, and took only an afternoon to complete.  Either 
closing argument was unnecessary given that the trial was to the bench or 
counsel’s omission of closing argument was a strategic decision not to prolong the 
conclusion of a simple case.  Regardless, we conclude that the trial judge did not 
deny counsel the opportunity to request closing argument, that counsel failed to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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request closing argument, and furthermore that counsel did not object to its 
omission.  Therefore, the defendant waived his right to closing argument. 
{¶ 13} As recently as earlier this year, this court discussed the waiving of 
various constitutional rights in State v. Pasqualone, 121 Ohio St.3d 186, 2009-
Ohio-315, 903 N.E.2d 270, including the right to cross-examine the laboratory 
analyst who authored the report on a drug found in a defendant’s possession.  We 
noted that there are some rights that can be waived only by a defendant personally 
after he or she is fully informed of them: the right to counsel, the right to plead 
not guilty, the right to waive a jury, the right to testify in his or her own behalf, 
and the right to appeal.  Id. at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 14} However, as to a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
confront witnesses, we held that “an accused’s attorney is capable of waiving his 
[or her] client’s right to confrontation by not demanding that a laboratory analyst 
testify pursuant to the opportunity afforded [the relevant statute], because whether 
to cross-examine a particular witness is properly viewed as a decision relating to 
trial tactics or strategy.”  Id. at ¶ 44.  We also held that “the procedures of [the 
statute] adequately protect an accused’s right to confrontation, so that an accused 
who fails to demand the testimony of the analyst pursuant to [the statute] validly 
waives his opportunity to cross-examine the analyst.”  Id.  We arrived at this 
conclusion after noting that the relevant question for purposes of the waiver 
inquiry under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment was whether the 
defendant had an opportunity for cross-examination.  Id. at ¶ 35. 
{¶ 15} In this case, McCausland had the opportunity to present a closing 
argument but waived his right to closing argument when he failed to request it and 
failed to object to its omission.  There is no evidence that the trial court denied 
counsel on either side the opportunity to present a closing argument.  We find that 
no plain error exists because there was no indication that the outcome of this trial 
would have been different had a closing argument been made.  State v. Barnes 
January Term, 2009 
7 
 
(2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240; Crim.R. 52(B).  As previously 
noted, there were only two witnesses, the issues were simple, and the trial was 
brief.  Accordingly, we agree with the court of appeals that even applying a plain-
error analysis, we would find nothing in the record to indicate that the outcome of 
McCausland’s bench trial would have been different had counsel presented a 
closing argument. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 16} At oral argument, McCausland’s counsel argued that this case 
turns on two words: “opportunity” and “waiver.”  He also asserted that he is 
asking trial judges to affirmatively say only one word at the close of the case: 
“Closing?”  While this practice may be the better one, the Constitution does not 
require it.  We therefore hold that a criminal defendant waives the right to present 
a closing argument when he or she neither requests a closing argument nor objects 
to its omission.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Robin N. Piper, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, Michael A. Oster Jr., 
Chief, Appellate Division, and Gloria J. Sigman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 
for appellee. 
Matthew T. Ernst and Adam Bleile, for appellant. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
Alexandra T. Schimmer, Chief Deputy Solicitor, and Eric A. Baum, Assistant 
Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General. 
______________________