Case Title: Kanu v. Kanu

Citation: 

Docket Number: 175, 2004

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
EMMANUEL C. KANU, 
 
Respondent Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
SAUNTRA J. KANU, 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 175, 2004 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  File No. CN87-0082 
§  Petition No. 03-27599 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 27, 2004 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: November 12, 2004 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 12th day of November 2004, upon consideration of the parties’ 
briefs and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Emmanuel Kanu (Husband), filed this appeal 
from an order of the Family Court dated March 31, 2004.  The Family 
Court’s order denied Husband’s motion to vacate a default judgment entered 
against him but granted Husband’s motion to vacate a finding of contempt 
and the issuance of a bench warrant.  Given the unique factual circumstances 
of this case, we conclude that the Family Court’s judgment denying the 
motion to vacate the default judgment against Husband should be reversed.
 
(2) 
The record reflects that the parties were married on October 4, 
 
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1986 and separated on December 15, 1989.  Husband, through his legal 
counsel, filed a petition for divorce on March 30, 1995.  Wife, who was not 
represented by counsel, filed her answer to the petition on April 26, 1995.  
Wife requested the Family Court to retain ancillary jurisdiction over 
property division matters.   
(3) 
The Family Court entered the final divorce decree on May 22, 
1996.  In its June 4, 1996 order retaining ancillary jurisdiction, which was 
sent to Wife and to Husband’s lawyer, the Family Court placed the burden 
on Wife to provide an original notarized copy of her Rule 16(c) financial 
report to Husband’s lawyer, who was directed to complete his portion of the 
report and deliver it to the Family Court.  The June 4, 1996 order further 
provided that if both parties failed to file the financial report in a timely 
manner, then all ancillary matters would be dismissed. 
(4) 
The record reflects that Wife, still acting pro se, filed a motion 
on June 21, 1996 requesting an extension of time to file the financial report. 
The Family Court granted Wife an extension until July 20, 1996.   
(5) 
Nothing further happened in the case regarding ancillary 
matters for seven years – until March 10, 2003 when Wife filed a motion 
requesting the Court to schedule an ancillary hearing.  Attached to Wife’s 
 
3
2003 motion was a copy of her portion of the Rule 16(c) financial report.  
The attachment was dated June 24, 1996.   
(6) 
Wife served her 2003 motion on Husband by mailing a copy to 
a post office box.  It is undisputed that Wife did not serve Husband’s counsel 
of record with the motion. 
(7) 
On April 7, 2003, the Family Court, without holding a hearing, 
signed an order indicating that the trial judge would grant Wife’s request for 
division and allocation of the marital property because of Husband’s failure 
to provide his financial report by July 20, 1996.  The Family Court mailed 
the order to Husband at the post office box.  It was not sent to Husband’s 
attorney of record.   
(8) 
Wife submitted a proposed form of order, which the Family 
Court signed on May 2, 2003.  The order awarded Wife 100% of the parties’ 
personal property at the time of separation, one-half of the net income of 
Husband’s businesses, and alimony of $400 per month for five years and 
four months.  This order also was mailed to Husband at the post office box 
and was not sent to Husband’s counsel of record. 
 
(9) 
On September 8, 2003, Wife filed a petition for a rule to show 
cause.  Wife alleged that Husband had failed to pay her alimony or take any 
action consistent with the Family Court’s May 2, 2003 property division 
 
4
order.  A copy of the petition was mailed to Husband’s post office box but 
was not served on his counsel.   
(10) The Family Court apparently scheduled a hearing on Wife’s 
rule to show cause petition, although notice of the hearing is not reflected in 
the Family Court record.  There is no evidence that Husband or his counsel 
were served with notice of the hearing.   
(11) On January 20, 2004, the Family Court entered an order finding 
Husband in contempt, which it characterized as “extremely flagrant,” and 
issued a capias for Husband’s arrest.  The Family Court mailed a copy of its 
January 20 order to Husband at a Wilmington residence.   
(12) On February 5, 2004, Husband, through his counsel, filed a 
motion to vacate the default judgment and the capias.  Husband claimed that 
neither he nor his counsel had received Wife’s alleged financial report in 
1996, that Husband was not aware of the default judgment entered in May 
2003, and that he had not received notice of the rule to show cause hearing.  
The Family Court, without holding a hearing, granted Husband’s motion to 
vacate the capias on the ground of improper notice but denied Husband’s 
motion to vacate the default judgment.  This appeal followed. 
 
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(13) In general, most courts have adopted a policy in favor of 
resolving cases on their merits and against the use of default judgments.1  On 
appeal, this Court reviews the denial of a motion to vacate a default 
judgment for abuse of discretion.2  Having carefully considered the parties’ 
respective positions in this case, we conclude that the Family Court’s 
judgment denying the motion to vacate the default judgment should be 
reversed.   
(14) The circumstances of this case are unusual.  It is undisputed 
that the case lay dormant for seven years. Despite its June 4, 1996 order, 
which stated that the ancillary matters would be dismissed if both parties 
failed to file the financial report in a timely manner, the Family Court 
received Wife’s financial report in 2003 and granted her request for ancillary 
relief without ever scheduling a hearing on the matter. 
(15) Moreover, Family Court Civil Rule 5(c) provides that service of 
pleadings shall be made upon a party’s attorney of record “unless service 
upon the party is otherwise ordered by the Court.”3 It is undisputed that 
Wife’s March 2003 motion was never served upon Husband’s counsel of 
record, who had represented Husband throughout the divorce proceedings.  
                                                 
1 Apartment Comm. Corp. v. Martinelli, 2004 WL 2294574, *2 (Del. Oct. 5, 2004) 
2 Id. 
3 Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 5(c). 
 
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Neither did the Family Court send copies of its orders or notice of the rule to 
show cause hearing to Husband’s counsel.   
(16) Given the passage of so many years since the finalization of the 
parties’ divorce, Husband should not be penalized for failing to appreciate 
the implications of, or take action with respect to, papers sent directly to him 
and not his counsel in a proceeding that had been dormant for seven years.  
In light of these circumstances, we conclude that the Family Court abused its 
discretion in refusing to vacate the default judgment.  The judgment of the 
Family Court, therefore, must be reversed.  The matter will be remanded for 
the Family Court to reconsider Wife’s arguably belated claim for ancillary 
relief after the Husband has had a full and fair opportunity to respond to her 
2003 motion.   
  NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Family Court is REVERSED.  This matter is REMANDED for further 
proceedings consistent with this order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice