Case Title: Campbell v. Department of Family Services

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Campbell v. Department of Family Services1994 WY 86881 P.2d 1066Case Number: 93-269Decided: 09/14/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Deborah 
CAMPBELL,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

DEPARTMENT 
OF FAMILY SERVICES, State of Wyoming,

Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Uinta County, John D. Troughton, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Walter 
Urbigkit, Cheyenne.

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Michael L. Hubbard, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Rowena Heckert, 
Sr. Asst. Deputy Atty. Gen., D. Stephen Melchior, Asst. Atty. 
Gen.,.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* MACY,** 
and TAYLOR, JJ.

* 
Retired July 6, 1994.

** 
Chief Justice at time of oral argument.

GOLDEN, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      In this case, we 
consider whether Appellant Deborah Campbell, a recipient of benefits from Aid to 
Families With Dependent Children (AFDC), was entitled to a hearing following 
notification that her AFDC benefits would be reduced. The Department of Family 
Services (DFS) denied her request for a hearing and the district court affirmed 
that denial. We affirm the district court's judgment. Campbell also challenges 
the legality of the standard of need established by the legislature for 1993. We 
hold that issue cannot be determined by an administrative hearing and the proper 
forum is by a declaratory judgment action.

[¶2]      Appellant 
Campbell presents these issues:

1. 
Legal error in the July 6, 1993 denial of any hearing by the Wyoming Department 
of Family Services (DFS), which hearing was requested by the benefit recipient 
following agency notice of reduction in her benefit payment 
amounts.

2. 
Legal error in the hearing held by the District Court on the noticed issue of 
requested appointment of counsel to represent Petitioner on her petition for 
review from the administrative agency, which hearing then proceeded to a 
disorganized substantive analysis and discussion of a multitude of issues at a 
time before the administrative agency had filed any agency record pursuant to 
Wyo.R.App.P. 12.07, which "hearing" included subjects that were not included in 
the initially filed and amended petitions for review.

3. 
Legal error in determination that Davidson v. Sherman, 848 P.2d 1341 
(Wyo. 1993) provided no rights to the AFDC benefit recipient for which an 
administrative hearing could be requested or legal review by a petition to the 
District Court be pursued because of conclusion of the Attorney General's 
Office, the administrative agency and the district court that Davidson v. 
Sherman was improperly decided by the Wyoming Supreme Court and 
consequently, ineffective to provide benefits to a Wyoming recipient of Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children.

FACTS

[¶3]      Deborah Campbell 
is a recipient of AFDC. In 1993, the Wyoming Legislature enacted changes in the 
AFDC program which resulted in the DFS notifying Campbell that her benefits 
would be reduced to a total payment of $590. Campbell requested a hearing 
because she felt this was an "intrusion into legislative and executive matters." 
DFS sent Campbell a second notice informing her that her gap state payment1 for the month of July 1993 would be 
$230. Campbell also requested a hearing with regard to this notice to find out 
why there was a decrease when the state "owe[d] [her] money from 
1986-1990."

[¶4]      Without 
distinguishing between the two requests, DFS denied Campbell's request for a 
hearing in a letter dated July 6, 1993. In that letter, DFS indicated it 
understood appellant's purpose for requesting a hearing was to appeal the 
reduction in the amount of AFDC grant resulting from the new legislatively 
established payment standard. DFS informed her that federal regulations permit 
the agency to deny or dismiss a request for a hearing where the sole issue is 
one of state law requiring automatic grant adjustments for class recipients. On 
this basis, DFS denied Campbell's request for a hearing.

[¶5]      Campbell wrote 
another letter to DFS on July 15, 1993, and was referred to the District Court. 
Campbell sent the court a letter with a Petition for Hearing heading and 
indicated that she was appealing the denied hearing for both notices. The letter 
also indicated that Campbell was requesting court appointed legal counsel. 
Campbell then filed documents entitled Petition for Review and a Request for 
Setting in district court. The documents requested: "want available counsel be 
provided by the state of Wyo. which is provided by Wy. statute 1957 as annexed 
by law." The court set a hearing for August 11, 1993.

[¶6]      On August 2, 
1993, Campbell filed an amendment and supplement to her petition for review 
specifying three issues of law to be addressed. The first issue alleged that a 
computation error occurred because

the 
state agency kept more of her child support payments which were being made for 
Petitioner's dependents for the state's expenses, operational costs and computer 
expenditures rather than having the money made available for the children for 
whom the payments had been made.

The 
second issue alleged that any "ratable reduction from a Standard of Need was 
applied to an illegal and inappropriate Standard of Need * * * as established by 
* * * Davidson v. Sherman, 848 P.2d 1341 (Wyo. 1993)." The third issue 
alleged that petitioner was immediately entitled to a supplemental payment as 
required by 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(28).

[¶7]      At the hearing, 
the court found that Campbell was not entitled to court appointed counsel, 
accepted the amended petition, and ordered a filing of the record and other 
evidence from both parties for the petition for review. After reviewing the 
materials, the court entered on Order Denying Petition for Review on October 26, 
1993. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Standard 
of Review

[¶8]      An appeal from an 
agency decision which is affirmed by the district court is reviewed under WYO. 
STAT. § 16-3-114(c) (1990). In this case, the agency denied Campbell her 
requests for a hearing concerning her benefits reduction. The statute requires 
this court to review whether the hearing was unlawfully withheld. WYO. STAT. § 
16-3-114(c)(i). We accord no deference to the district court's decision; 
instead, our judicial review of agency decisions is as a reviewing court of the 
first instance. Matter of Nyquist, 870 P.2d 360, 362 (Wyo. 
1994).

[¶9]      DFS denied 
Campbell a hearing upon finding that under the relevant federal regulation a 
hearing was not mandated. Our review of an agency's conclusion of law is also 
governed by WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c). If the conclusion of law is in accordance 
with law, it is affirmed; if it is not in accordance with law, it is to be 
corrected. Nyquist at 362. That regulation states:

(a) 
State plan requirements. A State plan under title * * * IV-A * * * of the Social 
Security Act shall provide for a system of hearings under 
which:

(5) 
An opportunity for a hearing shall be granted * * * any recipient who is 
aggrieved by any agency action resulting in * * * reduction * * * of assistance 
* * * A hearing need not be granted when either State or Federal law requires 
automatic grant adjustments for classes of recipients unless the reason for an 
individual appeal is incorrect grant computation.

(v) 
The agency may deny or dismiss a request for a hearing * * * where the sole 
issue is one of State or Federal law requiring automatic grant adjustments for 
classes of recipients * * *.

45 
C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5) (1993).

[¶10]   Campbell disputes that this 
regulation applies to this situation. She contends the legislation and 
department action did not involve a grant adjustment, but instead was a change 
in law related only to the standard of need. Although the Wyoming statute 
clearly refers to AFDC financial assistance as a "grant," what is important for 
our purposes is Campbell's acknowledgement that there was a change in the 
law.

[¶11]   This federal regulation applies 
when recipients' benefits are reduced as a result of changes in controlling 
federal and state statutes. See Rosas v. McMahon, 945 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 
1991). The regulation indicates an intent to distinguish the right to a hearing 
to contest an agency action on the basis of an individual's specific facts from 
the right to a hearing as a means of contesting issues of state or federal law 
or policy. Benton v. Rhodes, 586 F.2d 1, 3 (6th Cir. 1978); see 
Aid Paid Pending the Hearing Decision, 38 Fed.Reg. 22,006 (1973); Methods for 
Determination of Eligibility, 51 Fed.Reg. 9193 (1986); (distinguishing between 
results when the sole issue is one of a change in state or federal law). 
Campbell relies upon the United States Supreme Court decision in Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970) as establishing 
her right to a hearing. Goldberg, however, was limited in its holding to 
cases where the recipient has raised factual issues. Goldberg, 397 U.S. 
at 267-71, 90 S. Ct.  at 1020-22, 25 L. Ed. 2d  at 298-300. And see Walker v. 
Karpan, 726 P.2d 82, 87 (Wyo. 1986) (discussing the limited nature of 
Goldberg). There is no obligation for the state to provide an evidentiary 
hearing when an individual is challenging a proposed termination or reduction 
based solely on questions of policy or law. Walker, 726 P.2d  at 87 
(citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 
(1976)).

[¶12]   Although Campbell characterizes her 
benefits reduction as a computational error, the record does not reflect nor 
does Campbell enumerate any facts or numbers demonstrating any computational 
error in DFS' determination of her benefits.2 Campbell is receiving the maximum 
amount permitted under the statute, but still contends the computational error 
occurs because the legislature illegally reduced the benefits. Campbell's 
illegality argument is based upon our opinion in Davidson v. Sherman, 848 P.2d 1341 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶13]   That opinion clarified that because 
Wyoming's participation in the federal government program, AFDC, is partially 
funded by the federal government, Wyoming's program is subject to federal law 
concerning the program. See Davidson v. Sherman, 848 P.2d 1341 (Wyo. 
1993). Davidson also explained that while federal law requires Wyoming to 
adopt a standard of need which reflects actual need, Wyoming is permitted to 
make payments less than that standard of need to accommodate the state's 
budgetary constraints. Davidson, 848 P.2d  at 1344. In 1990, the 
Legislature established the standard of need as $674 for a family of three. 1990 
WYO. SESS. LAWS ch. 109, § 071(8).

[¶14]   In 1993, the Legislature determined 
that as of July 1, 1993, the level of benefits would be 87.5 percent3 of the standard of need, which 
effectively reduced the assistance payment standard to $590 for a family of 
three. 1993 WYO. SESS. LAWS ch. 227 § 049(3). Campbell contends this reduction 
is illegal. She contends that our decision in Davidson requiring the legislature 
to set the standard of need on actual need requires cost of living adjustments. 

[¶15]   Campbell's argument is not a 
factual dispute of her specific benefits' computation made by DFS, but an attack 
of the state law which lowered benefits for all of those recipients situated 
similarly to Campbell. Or, in the words of the regulation, the new state law 
automatically adjusted grants for a class of recipients. The questions of fact 
which Campbell would present for determination at a hearing relate to whether 
the legislature legally enacted the reduction in benefits. In Walker, 726 P.2d  at 86-87, this court explained that such an argument involved legislative 
facts.

[¶16]   Legislative facts cannot usually be 
resolved in a hearing because legislative facts are ordinarily general and do 
not concern the immediate parties but help the tribunal determine the content of 
law and of policy. Walker, 726 P.2d  at 86. Legislative facts must be 
distinguished from adjudicative facts which relate to identifiable parties and 
specific situations and would require a hearing. Id. at 87. Campbell 
presents no authority which would permit a hearing to resolve the legislative 
facts she presents. The applicable authority is the federal regulation cited 
above and Campbell is not entitled to a hearing.

[¶17]   Campbell contends that state law 
affords her a hearing because this is a contested case. Walker is also 
dispositive of this contention. As explained in Walker, a challenge that 
the legislatively adopted standard of need violates state and/or federal law 
cannot be made in a contested case administrative hearing because it involves 
legislative facts. Id. at 87. Relying on previous decisions, this court 
held that only adjudicative facts are addressed in a contested case proceeding. 
Appellant's appropriate remedy for a challenge of legislative action is a 
declaratory judgment action. Walker, 726 P.2d  at 
86.

[¶18]   Campbell next contends that she was 
denied due process at the district court hearing. Her specific complaint appears 
to be that the court heard arguments on issues besides whether the court should 
appoint her counsel and denied her petition for review without receiving the 
administrative record or briefs. The record does not support this contention at 
all. It clearly indicates that the court clarified Campbell's action as a 
petition for review and only denied her request for court-appointed counsel. No 
decision concerning the petition for review was made at the 
hearing.

[¶19]   Campbell next contends that the 
notice she received failed to comply with 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(4)(iii) (1993). 
Because this issue was not raised in the proceedings below and is presented for 
the first time in this appeal, it is not considered. Iberlin v. TCI 
Cablevision, 855 P.2d 716, 726 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶20]   Finally, Campbell contends that the 
legislature illegally set a standard of need without first determining actual 
need. Since we have already determined that a petition for review is an improper 
forum for this legal question, we do not address the merits of this 
issue.

CONCLUSION

[¶21]   The Department of Family Services 
may deny a request for a hearing where the sole issue is one of state or federal 
law requiring automatic grant adjustments for classes of recipients. Campbell's 
challenge to the legislature's 12.5 percent reduction in AFDC assistance 
payments was a challenge to a change in law and DFS properly denied her request 
for a hearing.

[¶22]   Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Wyoming is a "gap" state. Gap states are those states which cannot 
afford to fund the entire need of a family; a gap existed between the standard 
of need and the amount of assistance the state provided. Private income, 
including child support payments, may fill the gap without affecting eligibility 
for AFDC assistance. Davidson v. Sherman, 848 P.2d 1341, 1345 (Wyo. 
1993). Since child support is assigned to the state, federal law requires that 
any portion of the amounts collected in any particular month as child support 
which will not cause ineligibility shall be added to the amount of aid paid to 
the family. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(28).

2 Campbell's second request for a hearing was to receive an accounting 
concerning the amount of child support the state was receiving on behalf of her 
children and using in the computations of her total assistance payment. Campbell 
does not explain how such information would be useful to her when she is already 
receiving the maximum statutory amount and cites no authority which permits a 
hearing for that type of information. It is inadequate simply to allude to an 
issue or identify only a potential issue. Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 
622 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring). It is not the function of this court 
to frame a party's argument. Id. This court has consistently refused to 
consider positions which are not supported by cogent argument or pertinent 
authority. Id.

3 This type of an adjustment is called a "ratable reduction." Here, the 
ratable reduction was 12.5 percent. As noted by this court in Davidson v. 
Sherman, 848 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Wyo. 1993), such a ratable reduction is 
permissible under federal law as a means of adapting state payment obligations 
to budgetary and financial realities of the states. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(ii) 
(1992).