Case Title: Ottema v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ottema v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div1998 WY 143968 P.2d 41Case Number: 97-119Decided: 12/04/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

In the 
Matter of the Worker's Compensation Case of Vernon D. OTTEMA, Appellant 
(Employee/Claimant),

v.

STATE OF Wyoming, ex rel., WYOMING WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee (Respondent).

 

Appeal from the District Court, Sheridan County, John 
C. Brackley, J.

 

C. John Cotton of Cotton Law 
Office, Gillette, WY, for Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General, and Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for 
Appellee.

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time of expedited case conference; 
retired November 2, 1998.

 

LEHMAN, Chief Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant Vernon D. Ottema (Ottema) seeks review 
of the hearing examiner's denial of his 1995 application for extended permanent 
total disability benefits. Ottema claims the hearing examiner erroneously 
applied the 1987 provision regarding eligibility rather than the law in effect 
in 1985, the time of his original injury. Pursuant to our holding in Rodgers v. 
State, ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 246, 249 (Wyo. 1997), we 
affirm the hearing examiner's order denying benefits.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶2] Ottema presents the 
following issues for our review:

 

A. 
Did the OAH and Division err in refusing to apply 1985 law to Mr. Ottema's 1985 
injury, and in retroactively applying 1991 law as a basis for the denial of 
extended permanent total disability benefits?

 

          
B. Did the OAH err in allowing the Division to act in excess of its own 
statutory authority?

 

C. 
Do the Principles of Res Judicata and Judicial Estoppel preclude the Division 
from asserting that 1991 law applies?

 

D. 
Do the decisions of the OAH and Division constitute a deprivation of Mr. 
Ottema's rights to due process and equal protection in contravention of Article 
1, Sections 2, 3, and 6 of the Wyoming Constitution, and the 14th Amendment of 
the United States Constitution?

 

[¶3] Appellee, Worker's 
Compensation Division (Division), condenses the issues to 
two:

 

A. 
Was the Hearing Examiner's decision to apply Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-403(g) (1987), 
to a claimant who became totally disabled in 1990, in accordance with 
law?

 

B. 
Do prior extended benefit awards, through considerations of res judicata or 
equal protection, give a claimant a right to continued extended benefit 
awards?

 

                     
                         FACTS

 

[¶4] In 1985, Ottema was 
severely injured in a logging accident, for which he received an 89.68 percent 
whole body impairment permanent partial disability award. Ottema accepted the 
payment of this award in a lump sum distribution. In 1991, Ottema submitted an 
application for permanent total disability benefits. The Division determined 
Ottema suffered additional partial disability which, combined with the 
Division's prior determination, amounted to 100 percent total permanent 
disability. In February 1992, a stipulated order was entered whereby Ottema 
accepted the additional award and the permanent total disability 
rating.

 

[¶5] In 1992, 1993, and 
1994, Ottema applied for and received extended permanent total disability 
benefits pursuant to W.S. 27-12-405(d) (1977), the statute in effect in 1985. 
Under that statute, the Division was to consider only the loss of earning power 
when determining eligibility for additional benefits. When Ottema applied for 
extended benefits in 1995, however, the Division abandoned its previous analysis 
and applied W.S. 27-14-403(g), which became effective in 1987. Under this 
provision, eligibility for extended benefits is determined after consideration 
of the employee's income from all sources, including "any monthly amount from 
any other governmental agency." W.S. 
27-14-403(g)(i)(C) (1987).

 

[¶6] In 1995, Ottema 
received social security disability benefits totaling $10,885.20. The 
subsistence level of income, as determined by the United States Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, for a family of two (Ottema and his wife) was $10,420.00. Because 
Ottema's social security benefits exceeded the subsistence level, the hearing 
examiner denied the 1995 claim for additional disability benefits.  Ottema filed a timely petition for 
review of this decision with the district court, and the case then was certified 
pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09.

 

                                  
         DISCUSSION

 

                                         
Standard of Review

 

[¶7] Under W.R.A.P. 12.09, 
our review is limited to matters specified in W.S. 16-3-114(c) (1997), which 
mandates that the reviewing court shall:

 

          
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions 
found to be:

 

          
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law[.]

 

[¶8] A hearing examiner's 
conclusions of law are afforded no special deference and will be affirmed only 
if truly in accord with the law.  
Haagensen v. State, ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 949 P.2d 865, 867 
(Wyo. 1997). Where the determination to be reviewed presents a mixed question of 
law and fact, i.e., a conclusion reached through application of legal precepts 
to the historical and narrative events of a particular case, the reviewing court 
will defer to the hearing examiner's findings of basic fact but will correct 
misapplications of the law to those facts. Rodgers v. State, ex rel. Workers' 
Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 246, 249 (Wyo. 1997).

 

Applicable 
Statute

 

[¶9] Ottema contends the 
hearing examiner erred when he found that Ottema's only injury occurred in 1985, 
but determined his 1995 application is governed by the law in effect at the time 
of the latest application. We agree that this finding was error, and take this 
opportunity to reiterate our longstanding rule that the substantive law in 
effect at the time of the injury governs the receipt of benefits. W.S. 
27-14-602(b) (1997). However, our decision in Rodgers, announced while Ottema's 
case was pending, controls the outcome of this case. Therefore, for reasons 
which depart from that of the hearing examiner, we affirm the denial of Ottema's 
benefits.

 

[¶10] In Rodgers, the 
claimant alleged that the hearing examiner applied the wrong statutory provision 
when determining eligibility for extended disability benefits. Guided by our 
determination in Claim of Nielsen, 806 P.2d 297, 299 (Wyo. 1991), where we held 
that "a single accident may give rise to more than one compensable injury," we 
applied the "two injury" analysis to Rodgers' claim for extended benefits as 
follows:

 

Rodgers correctly tells us that Shapiro ruled that 
the statute in effect at the time of the injury applies, and we are required to 
determine the date of the injury. [Matter of] Shapiro, 703 P.2d [1079] at 1082 
[(Wyo. 1985)]. Nielsen, however, held that the injury date for total disability 
can be different from the date of the accident, and this holding requires that 
we decide when the total disability occurred. [Claim of] Nielsen, 806 P.2d [297] 
at 299 [(Wyo. 1991)].  Nielsen 
states that it is Rodgers' burden to establish when the total disability 
occurred and further instructs us that the date which is established will 
determine which statute was in effect and applies. Id. * * 
*

 

Nielsen instructs that the particular facts of each 
case must be considered to determine the applicable statute, and that decision 
held that the claimant's injury is deemed to have occurred when the treating 
physician determined that the claimant was totally disabled. Id. at 300-01. In 
this case, Rodgers' injury for purposes of his new claim for permanent total 
disability and extended benefits is deemed to have occurred when he was found to 
be permanently disabled, in 1993-1994, by the parties' stipulation. We must 
affirm the order of the hearing examiner applying the 1987 statute which was in 
effect for that date.

 

Rodgers, 939 P.2d  at 249 
(emphasis added).

 

[¶11] Based on this holding, 
we are unable to uphold the hearing examiner's finding that Ottema suffered but 
one injury. Looking at the particular facts which stand uncontested in the 
record, it cannot be questioned that Ottema became permanently totally disabled 
while W.S. 27-14-403(g) (1987) was in effect. The first evidence of Ottema's 
desire to seek permanent total disability certification comes from a June 21, 
1990 letter to the Division in which Ottema's attorney requested a permanent 
total disability application form.  
On December 17, 1990, Ottema visited a doctor who found Ottema to be 
permanently totally disabled. After Ottema applied for permanent total disability certification on May 13, 
1991, the parties reached an agreement whereby Ottema would receive an 
additional partial disability award which, when combined with his previous 
awards, qualified him as permanently totally disabled. A stipulation to this 
effect was entered February 6, 1992.

 

[¶12] Each of these events 
occurred within the effective dates of the 1987 version of W.S. 
27-14-403(g)(i)(C). Consequently, the Division did not exceed its statutory 
authority in applying the 1987 provision to Ottema's 1995 claim, nor did the 
hearing examiner err in applying this law to the facts of Ottema's 
case.

 

Res Judicata and 
Estoppel

 

[¶13] Ottema contends that 
because the Division awarded extended benefits from 1992 through 1994 based on 
the 1985 provision, the Division is now precluded by the doctrines of res 
judicata or collateral estoppel from applying a different provision to his 1995 
claim. In Tenorio v. State, ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 
238 (Wyo. 1997), we said:

 

The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
incorporate " 'a universal precept of common-law jurisprudence * * * ' " that a 
right, question or fact put in issue, and directly determined by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit by the same 
parties or their privies. While the interest of finality served by these 
doctrines are the same, this court has carefully distinguished the 
two:

 

[A]lthough many cases speak of res judicata in the 
administrative context, they actually apply collateral estoppel.  Collateral estoppel is the appropriate 
doctrine since collateral estoppel bars relitigation of previously litigated 
issues. * * * Res judicata on the other hand bars relitigation of 
previously litigated claims or causes of action.

 

(Citations 
omitted.)

 

[¶14] As in Tenorio, 
Ottema's 1995 application for benefits is a new claim; therefore, the doctrine 
of res judicata does not apply. Id.  
Instead, Ottema must rely on the application of collateral estoppel, 
which we have expressly held to be "contrary to the intent of the legislature" 
as applied to the Division's uncontested award of benefits in a subsequent 
proceeding for an outstanding claim. Id., at 240. In this case, the Division did 
not contest Ottema's earlier claims and has not attempted to recoup the benefits 
paid during the previous three years. Therefore, the Division's belated 
application of the 1987 law to Ottema's 1995 application is not precluded by 
collateral estoppel.

 

[¶15] Neither is the 
Division barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Judicial estoppel is a 
doctrine which precludes a party from asserting inconsistent positions in 
different judicial proceedings. Matter of Paternity of SDM, 882 P.2d 1217, 1224 
(Wyo. 1994).  "Under this doctrine, 
a party who by his pleadings, statements or contentions, under oath, has assumed 
a particular position in a judicial proceeding is estopped to assume an 
inconsistent position in a subsequent action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 848 
(6th ed. 1990); see also Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1265-66 
(Wyo. 1991).

 

[¶16] Whether judicial 
estoppel applies to administrative proceedings remains an unanswered question in 
our court. See Erhart v. Flint Engineering & Constr., 939 P.2d 718, 723-24, 
n. 1 (Wyo. 1997). That issue is not determinative here, however, because in no 
event will judicial estoppel apply to legal conclusions based on undisputed 
facts. Bredthauer v. TSP, 864 P.2d 442, 445 (Wyo. 1993). There are no contested 
facts in Ottema's case, and his previous awards were based on the Division's 
erroneous legal conclusion that the 1985 law applied. Therefore, judicial 
estoppel is inapplicable to Ottema's claims. Moreover, we discern no public 
policy which favors the payment of a worker's compensation claim based on the 
misapplication of the law. See Tenorio, 931 P.2d  at 240. In sum, neither 
judicial estoppel nor any other preclusive doctrine prevents the Division from 
asserting that W.S. 27-14-403(g) (1987) controls Ottema's 1995 claim for 
extended benefits.

 

Constitutional 
Issues

 

[¶17] Ottema maintains the 
legislative enactment of W.S. 27-14-602(b) renders the application of the 1987 
provision to his 1995 claim a violation of his right to due process and equal 
protection of the law under WYO. CONST. Art. 1, §§ 2, 3 and 6. To prevail on his 
due process claim, however, Ottema must demonstrate a statutory entitlement to 
the benefits he seeks. Peterson v. Sweetwater County School Dist. No. One, 929 P.2d 525, 530 (Wyo. 1996). Under the Rodgers analysis, the 1987 provision was 
the applicable law governing eligibility 
for worker's compensation benefits at the time Ottema suffered his second 
injury. Therefore, he cannot show a statutory entitlement to the application of 
the 1985 provision.

 

[¶18] Similarly, Ottema is 
unable to set forth a threshold requirement for an equal protection claim. A 
party asserting a violation of equal protection must establish that the law 
treats similarly situated persons unequally. Ellett v. State, 883 P.2d 940, 944 
(Wyo. 1994). Here, every worker who is injured and certified as permanently 
totally disabled after July 1, 1987, is subject to the application of W.S. 
27-14-403. There is nothing in the record which indicates Ottema was treated 
differently than any other similarly situated worker. Therefore, his equal 
protection claim must fail.

 

                                           
CONCLUSION

 

[¶19] Under the analysis set 
forth in Rodgers, the hearing examiner did not err in applying W.S. 27-14-403(g) 
(1987) to Ottema's 1995 claim for extended benefits. Neither was the Division 
estopped from applying the correct law to this claim. Although we sympathize 
with Ottema's predicament, we must recognize that the purpose of extended 
benefits is to provide a safety net for permanently totally disabled workers. In 
compliance with the statutory language in effect at the time Ottema became 
totally disabled, the hearing examiner determined that Ottema did not qualify 
for that net. The order denying benefits is affirmed.