Case Title: NANCY HALL V. PARK COUNTY

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0015

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
NANCY HALL V. PARK COUNTY2010 WY 124238 P.3d 580Case Number: S-10-0015Decided: 09/03/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
NANCY 
HALL,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.PARK 
COUNTY,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge 

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

M. 
Jalie Meinecke of Meinecke & Sitz, LLC, Cody, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Larry 
B. Jones and William L. Simpson of Simpson, Kepler & Edwards, LLCThe 
Cody, Wyoming division of Burg Simpson Eldredge Hersh and Jardine, P.C.  Argument by Mr. 
Jones.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; KITE, C.J., files a dissenting opinion in 
which BURKE, J., joins.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      
This 
is an appeal from a district court order dismissing the appellant's complaint 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  
Finding no error, we similarly dismiss this appeal.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Whether the 
savings statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118 (LexisNexis 2009), applies to actions 
brought under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-114 (LexisNexis 2009)?

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶3]      Jurisdictional 
issues, being questions of law, are reviewed de novo.  Jauregui v. Mem'l Hosp. of Sweetwater 
Co., 2005 WY 59, ¶ 4, 111 P.3d 914, 916 (Wyo. 2005); Wilson v. Town of Alpine, 2005 WY 57, ¶ 
4, 111 P.3d 290, 291 (Wyo. 2005).  
If the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, this Court has 
jurisdiction on appeal, not on the merits, but only as to the jurisdictional 
issue.  NMC v. JLW ex rel. NAW, 2004 WY 56, ¶ 9, 
90 P.3d 93, 96 (Wyo. 2004).  The 
absence of subject matter jurisdiction makes dismissal, rather than affirmance, 
the proper course.  Motley v. Platte County, 2009 WY 147, ¶ 
3, 220 P.3d 518, 520 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶4]      In turn, our 
standard of review for questions of statutory interpretation is as 
follows:

 
 
In 
interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the 
legislature's intent.  All statutes 
must be construed in pari materia 
and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the 
same subject or having the same general purpose must be considered and construed 
in harmony.  Statutory construction 
is a question of law, so our standard of review is de novo.  We endeavor to interpret statutes in 
accordance with the legislature's intent.  
We begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning 
of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of 
the statute in pari materia.  When a statute is sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and 
do not resort to the rules of statutory construction.  Wyoming Board of Outfitters and Professional 
Guides v. Clark, 2001 WY 78, ¶ 12, 30 P.3d 36, ¶ 12 (Wyo. 2001); Murphy v. State Canvassing Board, 12 P.3d 677, 679 (Wyo. 2000).  
Moreover, we must not give a statute a meaning that will nullify its 
operation if it is susceptible of another interpretation.  Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 413 (Wyo. 
1990) (citing McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1283 (Wyo. 1980)).

 
 
            
Moreover, we will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute to 
matters that do not fall within its express provisions.  Gray v. Stratton Real Estate, 2001 WY 
125, ¶ 5, 36 P.3d 1127, ¶ 5 (Wyo. 2001); Bowen v. State, Wyoming Real Estate 
Commission, 900 P.2d 1140, 1143 (Wyo. 1995).

 
 

Loberg 
v. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 
2004 WY 48, ¶ 5, 88 P.3d 1045, ¶ 5 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Board of County Comm'rs of Teton County v. 
Crow, 2003 WY 40, ¶¶ 40-41, 65 P.3d 720, ¶¶ 40-41 (Wyo. 2003)).  Only if we determine the language of a 
statute is ambiguous will we proceed to the next step, which involves applying 
general principles of statutory construction to the language of the statute in 
order to construe any ambiguous language to accurately reflect the intent of the 
legislature.  If this Court 
determines that the language of the statute is not ambiguous, there is no room 
for further construction.  We will 
apply the language of the statute using its ordinary and obvious 
meaning.

 
 

State 
v. Hanover Compression, LP, 
2008 WY 138, ¶ 8, 196 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Wyo. Dep't of 
Revenue, 2005 WY 60, ¶ 15, 112 P.3d 596, 604 (Wyo. 
2005)).

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶5]      On October 31, 
2007, Hall's minivan was struck by a County road grader.  Hall presented a claim to the County on 
February 22, 2008, seeking compensation for personal injury and property 
damages.  On February 20, 2009, Hall 
filed a complaint against the County based upon that claim.  The County responded to Hall's complaint 
with a motion to dismiss pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), asserting that the 
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the complaint did not 
allege that Hall's claim complied with the requirements of Article 16, § 7 of 
the Wyoming Constitution.  The 
motion was heard on June 5, 2009, with a decision letter following on July 20, 
2009, and an Order Dismissing Complaint With Prejudice filed on July 28, 2009. 
 The dismissal was with prejudice 
because the one-year period of limitations for bringing an action under the 
WGCA, found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114, had passed, leaving Hall time-barred 
from bringing another action.

 
 
[¶6]      Hall did not 
appeal the dismissal of her complaint, which means, of course, that that 
dismissal is not now before this Court.  
Instead, on July 27, 2009, Hall filed a new complaint in a separate civil 
action, with the same averments of her first complaint, but with additional 
language alleging compliance with the state constitution, and with a copy of her 
governmental claim attached.  As 
before, the County responded with a motion to dismiss, this time based, inter alia, on the period of limitations 
found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114.1  The district court heard the second 
motion to dismiss on October 9, 2009, and on October 19, 2009, issued a second 
Order Dismissing Complaint With Prejudice.  The conclusions upon which the second 
dismissal was based were as follows:

 
 
            
1.   This Court does not 
have subject matter jurisdiction since the Complaint herein was not filed within 
one year of the date the Notice of Claim was submitted to Defendant Park 
County.  W.S. § 1-39-114 (LexisNexis 
2009).

 
 
            
2.   The Savings Statute 
does not apply to the facts of this case.  
The Savings Statute is not a substitute for an 
appeal.

 
 
It 
is from this order that Hall now appeals.

 
 
WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 1-39-114 

 
 
[¶7]      The relevant 
period of limitations from the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is found at Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114, which statute reads as follows:

 
 

            
Except as otherwise provided, actions against a governmental entity or a 
public employee acting within the scope of his duties for torts occurring after 
June 30, 1979 which are subject to this act shall 
be forever barred unless 
commenced within one (1) year after the date the claim is filed pursuant to W.S. 
1-39-113.  In the case of a minor 
seven (7) years of age or younger, actions against a governmental entity or 
public employee acting within the scope of his duties for torts occurring after 
June 30, 1979 which are subject to this act are forever barred unless commenced 
within two (2) years after occurrence or until his eighth birthday, whichever 
period is greater.  In no case shall 
the statute of limitations provided in this section be longer than any other 
applicable statute of limitations.  
In the absence of applicable insurance coverage, if the claim was 
properly filed, the statute shall be tolled forty-five (45) days after a 
decision by the entity, if the decision was not made and mailed to the claimant 
within the statutory time limitation otherwise provided 
herein.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 1-3-118

 
 
[¶8]      The "savings 
statute" is found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118, which statute reads as 
follows:

 
 
            
If in an action commenced in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits and the time 
limited for the commencement of the action has expired at the date of the 
reversal or failure, the plaintiff, or his representatives if he dies and if the 
cause of action survives, may commence a new action with one (1) year after the 
date of the failure or reversal.  
This provision also applies to any claim asserted in any pleading by a 
defendant.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      Before discussing 
the issue at hand, we will note briefly that, there having been no appeal from 
the dismissal of the first complaint, and the second dismissal not having been 
based upon the substance of the second complaint, the question of whether or not 
either complaint complied with statutory or constitutional requirements is not 
before the Court.  In addition, the 
determination that the savings statute does not apply to the period of 
limitations found in the WGCA forecloses any need to consider another issue 
raised by the parties, that being whether a dismissal with prejudice is an 
adjudication on the merits under the savings statute.2

 
 
[¶10]   It is uncontroverted that, under 
the WGCA, immunity is the rule, and liability the exception.  State, Dep't of Corrections v. Watts, 
2008 WY 19, ¶ 20, 177 P.3d 793, 798 (Wyo. 2008); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 646 (Wyo. 
1986); Lawrence J. Wolfe, Comment, Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act:  Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions  A 
Statutory Analysis, XV Land & Water L. Rev. 619, 623 (1980).  Specifically, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-104(a) (LexisNexis 2009), provides in pertinent part as 
follows:

 
 
            
(a)  A governmental entity 
and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted 
immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by [this Act]. 

[¶11]   This Court has not previously 
considered the issue, but other courts have held that, absent specific statutory 
provision to the contrary, the doctrine of immunity precludes application of the 
savings statute in cases involving governmental claims.  See, e.g., Davidson v. Lewis Bros. 
Bakery, 227 S.W.3d 17, 19-20 (Tenn. 2007) (sovereign immunity bars 
application of savings statute); Lynn v. 
City of Jackson, 63 S.W.3d 332, 337 (Tenn. 2001) (sovereign immunity bars 
application of savings statute); Yonkers 
Contracting Co., Inc. v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 375, 
712 N.E.2d 678, 680-81 (1999) (sovereign immunity bars application of savings 
statute); 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of 
Actions § 278 (2000); and 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 350 
(2010).  Where sovereign immunity is 
not the rule, or where a statute allows application of the savings statute to 
governmental claims, courts have allowed application of the savings 
statute.  See, e.g., Carroll v. City of Worcester, 
678 N.E.2d 1344, 1345-46 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (neither the governmental claims 
act nor the savings statue precluded application of the latter to the former); 
and Cruse v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of 
Atoka County, 910 P.2d 998, 1000-1003 (Okla. 1995) (savings statute applied 
to section of governmental claims act where phrase "shall be forever barred" was 
not used).3

 
 
[¶12]   The language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-114 could not be more clear: actions against governmental entities are 
"forever barred" unless commenced within one year after presentment of the 
claim.  There was no appeal of the 
dismissal of the first district court case filed by Hall, and the second 
district court case filed by Hall was filed outside the statutory period of 
limitations.  Under the specific 
language of the statute, and in the particular circumstance of sovereign 
immunity being the WGCA's "default position," the second suit was time 
barred.  The "closed ended" WGCA 
does not provide for liability  
beyond its specific provisions, and there is no provision within the WGCA 
for application of the savings statute, which is not part of the Act, to causes 
of action thereunder.  The 
provisions of the more specific WGCA take precedence over the provisions of the 
more general savings statute.  See Prokop v. Hockhalter, 2006 WY 75, ¶ 
14, 137 P.3d 131, 135 (Wyo. 2006) (specific statute of limitations for 
professionals governs over more general statute of limitations); see also Schafer v. State, 2008 WY 149, 
¶ 12, 197 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Wyo. 2008) (specific statute controls over general 
statute in criminal context); Qwest Corp. 
v. PSC of Wyo., 2007 WY 97, ¶ 32, 161 P.3d 495, 503 (Wyo. 2007) (PSC 
authority under specific statute controls over authority granted in more general 
statute); and Thunderbasin Land, 
Livestock & Inv. Co. v. County of Laramie, 5 P.3d 774, 782 (Wyo. 2000) 
(specific statute governing county roads controls over general administrative 
procedure statutes).  Had the 
legislature intended that the period for filing an action under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-39-114 be tolled in the circumstances covered by the savings statute, it 
would have said so in the statute, as it did for actions involving children 
seven years of age or younger, and actions involving untimely responses by 
governmental entities to presented claims.

 
 
[¶13]   As stated above, we have noted many 
times that sovereign immunity was abrogated by the Wyoming legislature only as 
strictly outlined in the WGCA.  The 
courts of Wyoming do not have jurisdiction over governmental claims that do not 
meet the conditions of the Act.4  The appellant's second complaint was not 
filed within the specific period of limitations set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-114, and therefore, the district court never obtained jurisdiction over the 
action.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶14]   The savings statute, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-3-118, does not apply to actions filed under the WGCA, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-39-114.  Consequently, the 
district court correctly determined that it did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over Hall's second civil action, and correctly dismissed the 
same.  This appeal is, likewise, 
dismissed.

  
 
 

KITE, 
Chief Justice, dissenting, 
in which BURKE, 
Justice, joins.

 
 
[¶15]   I respectfully disagree with the 
majority opinion's conclusion that the savings statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-118 (LexisNexis 2009), does not apply to cases brought under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act (WGCA).  
Section 1-3-118 provides in relevant part:

 
 
            
If in an action commenced in 
due time . . . the plaintiff 
fails otherwise than upon the merits and the time limited for the commencement 
of the action has expired at the date of the . . . failure, the plaintiff . . . 
may commence a new action within one (1) year after the date of the failure . . 
. .

 
 
(Emphasis 
added).  Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
3(b):

 
 
For 
purposes of statutes of limitation, an action shall be deemed commenced on the date of 
filing the complaint as to each defendant, if service is made on the defendant . 
. . within 60 days after the filing of the complaint.  If such service is not made within 60 
days the action shall be deemed commenced on the date when service is 
made.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added).

 
 
[¶16]  In the present case, Ms. Hall commenced her action in due time within 
the meaning of § 1-3-118 and Rule 3(b).  
That is, she presented a notice of claim to the county "as an itemized 
statement in writing" on February 22, 2008, less than four months after the 
October 31, 2007, collision and well within the two year period the legislature 
prescribed in § 1-39-113 of the WGCA.  
She then filed her action against the county on February 20, 2009, within 
one year after the date she presented the notice of claim to the county as § 
1-39-114 requires.  Because the 
county was served with the complaint on April 17, 2009, within sixty days after 
it was filed, the action was deemed commenced under W.R.C.P. 3(b) on February 
20, 2009. 

 
 
[¶17]  When the district court subsequently 
dismissed the action by order dated July 28, 2009, on the ground that the 
complaint did not allege compliance with Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming 
Constitution, the "time limited for the commencement of the action" had 
expired.  Additionally, Ms. Hall's 
action "fail[ed] otherwise than upon the merits."  See W.R.C.P. 41(b) which makes it clear 
that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication upon the 
merits.5  Under the savings statute, therefore, 
Ms. Hall was entitled to commence a new action within one year after the July 
2009 order of dismissal.  Her new 
action, filed July 27, 2009, was timely and the district court's order 
dismissing it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be 
reversed.

 
 
[¶18]  In holding otherwise, the majority 
concludes the savings statute does not apply to cases brought under the 
WGCA.  It reaches this result by 
reasoning that if the legislature had intended the savings statute to apply, it 
would have said so.  Contrary to the 
majority, I would conclude that if the legislature had intended the savings 
statute not to apply, it would have 
said so.  

 
 
[¶19]  When construing statutory enactments, 
this Court has repeatedly said:

 
 
All 
statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of 
the existing state of law with reference thereto and statutes are therefore to 
be construed in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of an overall and 
uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be 
determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but 
also with reference to the decisions of the courts.  

 
 

Hannifan 
v. American Nat'l Bank of Cheyenne, 
2008 WY 65, ¶ 7, 185 P.3d 679, 683 (Wyo. 2008), citing Voss v. Ralston, 550 P.2d 481, 486 (Wyo. 
1976).  When the legislature enacted 
the WGCA in 1979, therefore, we must presume it was aware of the savings 
statute.  It can reasonably be 
concluded that the savings statute is one of the provisions the legislature was 
referring to in § 1-39-114 when it prefaced the statute of limitations for 
governmental claims with the language "Except as otherwise provided," actions 
must be commenced within one year after presentation of the notice of claim. 

 
 

[¶20]  We must also presume that the 
legislature enacted the WGCA with full knowledge of this Court's decisions 
construing the savings statute.  
In 
Clause v. Columbia Savings & Loan Ass'n, 16 Wyo. 450, 95 P. 54 
(1908), the S&L filed suit against the administrator of the estate of one of 
its members seeking payment of a debt the member owed to the S&L.  The 
S&L also named the sheriff because the trust deed named him as successor 
trustee and he had declined to act as trustee after the initial trustee could 
not perform.  Because the sheriff was a named defendant, the coroner served 
the summons and complaint in his stead as required by statute.  The court 
granted the estate's motion to dismiss the action on the ground that the sheriff 
was not a proper party; therefore, service by the coroner was improper.  
The S&L filed a subsequent action naming just the estate.  The district 
court dismissed again.

 
 
[¶21]  Addressing on appeal the question of 
whether the first complaint and summons "commenced" the action within the 
meaning of the savings statute, the Court held that it didthe plaintiff's first 
action was "commenced in due time" and "failed otherwise than on the merits" so 
as to authorize bringing a new action within one year after the date the first 
action failed.  The Court said:

 
 
The 
[district] court had unquestioned jurisdiction of the subject matter of the 
action, so that if the service of the summons by the coroner conferred 
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the action must be held to have 
been commenced.  The mere fact that the service was quashed does not 
determine the question, for it is not every irregularity or imperfection in a 
summons or the service thereof which will deprive the court of jurisdiction, 
though it may justify or require the setting aside of service  or the reversal 
 of a judgment.  To have the effect of failing to give jurisdiction, the 
summons or service must be so radically defective that it would authorize a 
collateral impeachment of a judgment rendered thereon . . . 
.

 
 

Id. 
at 58-59.  The Court said 
further:

 
 
Where 
there has been actual personal service, and therefore notice of the action, the 
weight of authority and the better reasoning favors the theory that [misdirected 
process] renders the process voidable, but not void. *** The progressive and 
equitable idea is that in the administration of justice substance is to be held 
in higher regard than form, and technical defects should never be permitted to 
work injustice or deny substantial right.  Process that is in every other 
particular valid, should not, for any omission of or defect in the direction, be 
considered more than voidable.   

 
 

Id. 
at 59.  

 
 
 
 
[¶22]  We recently reaffirmed the principles 
enunciated in Clause in Haney v. Cribbs, 2006 WY 158, ¶ 25, 148 P.3d 1118, 1125 (Wyo. 2006) when we concluded that the savings statute allowed 
plaintiffs to re-file their personal injury case after their original complaint 
was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it was served on 
the Attorney General and Department of Employment by regular mail rather than 
certified mail as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(b).  In holding that the savings statute 
applied, we looked at W.R.C.P. 3(b) and concluded that "commencement" of an 
action relates to service which in turn relates to notice.  Finding that it is notice to the parties 
that is critical and, under the facts presented, the parties did not lack 
notice, "only the quality of the notice" was lacking, we concluded the action 
was commenced when the first complaint was served even though it was not served 
in the manner required.  See 
also Hoke v. Motel 6 Jackson, 
2006 WY 38, ¶ 16, 131 P.3d 369, 378 (Wyo. 2006), stating that the key to 
determining if service was sufficient to commence an action, and thus make the 
savings statute applicable to permit re-filing of a dismissed action, is whether 
the court obtained jurisdiction over the party.  

 
 

[¶23]  A majority of this Court has determined 
in other WGCA cases6 that the failure to allege in the 
complaint compliance with Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitution deprives a 
district court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear a governmental claim. 
Because a court's jurisdiction originates only by constitutional or statutory 
provision, a pleading requirement created by this Court cannot grant or take 
away a district court's jurisdiction.  
Consequently, the determination that a district court does not have 
subject matter jurisdiction because a complaint fails to conform to a judicially 
created jurisdictional pleading requirement is contrary to the WGCA, which, in 
§ 
1-39-117, grants jurisdiction for any claim under the Act to the district 
courts; in § 1-39-113, requires presentation of a notice of claim "as an 
itemized statement in writing" to the entity within two years; and, in § 
1-39-114, requires commencement of an action against the entity within one year 
of presenting the notice of claim.7  Once these statutory requirements are 
met, a district court has subject matter jurisdiction.  The fact that a complaint fails to 
allege that the notice of claim complied with the requirements of Article 16, § 
7, a requirement this Court and not the legislature created, does not deprive a 
district court of subject matter jurisdiction.  To the contrary, subject matter 
jurisdiction vests in the district court under the WGCA upon the filing of a 
complaint within one year after presentation of a claim complying with § 
1-39-113.  

 

[¶24]   In light of the law existing at 
the time the legislature adopted the WGCA, construing the WGCA in harmony with 
the existing law as part of a uniform system of jurisprudence, and determining 
the WGCA's meaning in connection with existing statutes, rules and court 
decisions as our rules of statutory construction require, I would hold that the 
savings statute applies to actions brought under the WGCA.  Courts in other states have reached this 
result in construing their statutes.  
In Cruse 
v. Board of County Comm'rs of Atoka County, 
910 P.2d 998, 1005 (Okla. 1995), in holding the savings statute applied to a 
complaint against a county board, the court stated: 

 
 
The 
legislature could have forbidden the application of [the savings statute] to the 
refiling of a timely-filed governmental tort claims act, but it did not.  
Reading the  Act in its entirety, we conclude that where valid notice has been 
given and the governmental tort claims action has been timely filed . . ., the 
court's power is invoked and, at that point, the governmental tort claims action 
is controlled by the laws of this state, including [the savings 
statute]. 

 
 

In 
Perez 
v. City of Meriden, 
1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2274, the court held:

 
 

any 
suit  is permissible under the savings statute and not barred by sovereign 
immunity.  So long as the original action  has failed for want of 
jurisdiction and is refiled within one year it is not barred, even if it is 
against a state or local government.

 
 

See 
also Reese v. Ohio State Univ. Hosps., 
451 N.E.2d 1196 (Ohio 1983), holding the savings statute applicable to suits 
against the state, and Carroll v. City of Worcester, 678 N.E.2d 1344 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1997), holding the savings statute applicable to suits against 
public employers and stating that if the legislature intended the savings 
statute not to apply to suits against public employers it would have said 
so.

 
 
[¶25]  I also find persuasive the following 
remarks of the Utah Supreme Court made in the context of Utah's Health Care 
Malpractice Act but generally addressing the relationship between specific 
statutes of limitations and a savings statute:

 
 

The 
legislature has enacted statutes of limitations specific to a wide variety of 
statutory and common law causes of action. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 
25-6-10 (2003) (statute of limitations on fraudulent transfer claims); 
Id. § 78-15-3 (statute of limitations on products liability claims); 
Id. § 78-12-48 (statute of limitations on asbestos damages claims). In 
each instance, the limitations period is the product of a policy assessment that 
includes consideration of the nature of the claim, the durability of evidence, 
and the impact of claims on insurance coverage, to name but a few. The savings 
statute similarly codifies a legislative policy judgment. We 
can find no clear conflict between statutes of limitation generally and the 
savings statute.  To the extent that they relate to one another, that tie 
is complementary.  Absent a clear expression of legislative intent that a 
statute of limitations ought to preempt the savings statute, we will not block 
access to it.  The 
Malpractice Act provides no clear link between its tolling provisions for 
prelitigation procedures and an intention to supplant the savings statute. We 
will not discard rule 3 and cut off access to the savings statute based on this 
tenuous inference of preemption.     

 
 

McBride-Williams 
v. Huard, 
94 P.3d 175, 178 (Utah 2004).   
Like the Utah court, absent a clear expression of legislative intent that 
a statute of limitations preempts the savings statute, I would apply the savings 
statute.  The WGCA provides no clear 
link between its tolling provisions and an intention to supplant the savings 
statute.  I would not discard 
W.R.C.P. 3(b) and cut off access to the savings statute based on the tenuous 
inference that the WGCA preempts it as the majority has done.   

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In 
the instant case, the pertinent occurrences are the presentment of the claim to 
the County on February 22, 2008, the passage of one year from that date on 
February 22, 2009, and the filing of the second complaint on July 27, 
2009.

 
 

2See 
Rawlinson v. Wallerich, 
2006 WY 52, ¶ 10, 132 P.3d 204, 207 (Wyo. 2006); Eklund v. PRI Envtl., Inc., 2001 WY 55, 
¶ 17, 25 P.3d 511, 517 (Wyo. 2001); W.R.C.P. 41(b)(1); Yonkers Contracting Co., Inc. v. Port 
Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 375, 712 N.E.2d 678, 680-81 (1999); 
Moulton-Garland v. Cabletron Sys, 
Inc., 143 N.H. 540, 736 A.2d 1219, 1221 (1999); Gilbreath v. Brewster, 250 Va. 436, 463 S.E.2d 836, 837-38 (1995); and 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 347 
(2010).

 
 

3The 
majority in Cruse did note that not 
all courts agreed with it.  Id. at 1000 n.1.  Furthermore, two justices dissented on 
the ground that the period of limitations in the governmental claims act was 
substantive in character, and was a condition upon the right created by the act, 
rather than a true statute of limitations.  
Id. at 1005-1008 (Opala, J., 
dissenting).  For this Court's 
similar analysis of the period of limitations for the presentment of 
governmental claims found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 (LexisNexis 2009), see 
Bell v. Schell, 2004 WY 153, ¶¶ 
25-36, 101 P.3d 465, 472-76 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 

4One 
brief note in regard to the dissenting opinion:  This Court has for years construed the 
WGCA as "closed-ended," with governmental liability specifically delimited by 
the mandates of the Act.  One of 
those mandates is the "forever barred" language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-114.  In the instant case, the 
majority opinion conforms to that precedent by concluding that, had the 
legislature intended for the savings statute to apply to WGCA actions, it would 
have added that exception to those set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §1-39-114.  The dissenting justices, applying rules 
of statutory construction a bit differently, conclude that, had the legislature 
not wanted the savings statute to apply to actions filed under the WGCA, it 
would have said so.  Both 
interpretations are plausible.  The 
Court would welcome legislative guidance in this regard inasmuch as it is 
legislative intent that we are trying to determine.

 
 

5Rule 
41.  Dismissal of 
actions.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
  (b)  Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. 

         (1)  By Defendant.   For failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action . . . .  
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a 
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this 
rule, other than a dismissal for lack 
of jurisdiction . . ., operates 
as an adjudication upon the merits.

 
 

6See 
for example, 
McCann v. City of Cody, 2009 WY 86, 
210 P.3d 1078 (Wyo. 2009); Beaulieu v. 
Florquist, 2004 WY 31, 86 P.3d 863 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 

7It 
has long been established in Wyoming that a lack of specificity in allegations 
does not deprive a district court of jurisdiction.   In State v. Kusel, 29 Wyo. 
287, 213 P. 367, 369 (1923), the Court said:

 
 
It 
is well settled that jurisdiction does not depend upon the sufficiency of the 
bill.  If the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the 
parties nothing further is required.  The cause of action may be 
defectively stated, but that does not destroy jurisdiction. * * *  Whether 
a complaint does or does not state a cause of action is, so far as concerns the 
question of jurisdiction, of no importance, for if it states a case belonging to 
a general class over which the authority of the court extends, then jurisdiction 
attaches and the court has power to decide whether the pleading is good or 
bad.

 
 

See 
also 
State v. District Court of Eighth Judicial Dist. in and for Natrona 
County, 33 Wyo. 281, 238 P. 545, 550 (Wyo. 1925) in which the Court 
stated:  "[J]urisdiction of the 
court does not - as most of the courts hold - depend on the sufficiency of a 
pleading."