Case Title: GRACE BUSCH V. HORTON AUTOMATICS, INC., a Division of OVERHEAD DOOR CORPORATION

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0024

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
GRACE BUSCH V. HORTON AUTOMATICS, INC., a Division of OVERHEAD DOOR CORPORATION2008 WY 140Case Number: S-08-0024Decided: 11/25/2008NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
GRACE 
BUSCH,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.HORTON AUTOMATICS, 
INC., a Division of OVERHEAD DOOR 
CORPORATION,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofWashakieCounty

The 
Honorable Gary R. Hartman, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

M. 
Jalie Meinecke of Meinecke & Sitz, LLC, Cody, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Jeffrey 
C. Brinkerhoff and Kelley A. Anderson of Gifford & Brinkerhoff, P.C., 
Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Grace 
Busch (Busch), challenges the district court's "Judgment and Final Order" 
dismissing her tort claims against Appellee, Horton Automatics, Inc. a Division 
of Overhead Door Corporation (Horton), on the basis that those claims were 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations (four years).  Busch's complaint also stated claims 
against Kent Foulger d/b/a Blair's Thriftway, a grocery market (Thriftway).  Her complaint was filed in the district 
court on May 11, 2007, and at that time Horton was identified as "John Doe 
I."  Busch suffered her injuries on 
June 3, 2003.  Because the claims 
against Thriftway remain pending, the district court included the appropriate 
W.R.C.P. 54(b) certification in its judgment.  We will reverse and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Busch raises 
these issues:

 
 
A.  The 
order does not comport with the facts presented through oral arguments;1 and

 
 
B.  The 
filing of the initial complaint was completed within the four-year period as per 
the applicable statute of limitations, W.S. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(c); 
and

 
 
C.  Service 
of the complaint was completed timely and the Court did not lack jurisdiction to 
hear [Busch's] claims; and

 
 
D.  W.R.C.P. 
15(c) is applicable to parties named fictitiously according to W.R.C.P. 17 and 
then later properly named, and cannot be used to defeat Rule 
17.

 
 
Horton 
summarizes the issues thus:

 
 
            
Whether the district court correctly ruled that [Busch's] Amended 
Complaint naming  Horton in place of the previously-named "John Doe" is time 
barred and does not relate back to the date the of filing of the original 
Complaint for statute of limitations purposes pursuant to Rule 15(c)(3) W.R.C.P. 
because Horton was not already before the Court when the amended complaint was 
filed and [Busch] did not mistakenly identify nor misname Hortonin the original 
complaint.

 
 
[¶3]      Busch asserts 
that W.R.C. P. 17(d) and 15(c)(3) must be read together in a sensible way so as 
to give full meaning to both rules.  
Boiled down to its essence, it is Horton's contention that Busch's only 
chance to prevail in this appeal depends upon her ability to:  (1) amend her original complaint to add 
Horton as a defendant against whom she has a potentially viable complaint; and 
(2) having this amended complaint "relate back" to her original complaint under 
W.R.C.P. 15(c)(3)(B) so that she overcomes the defense of the statute of 
limitations.  Rule 15(c)(3)(B) 
provides for the "relation back" of amended complaints that add or change 
parties if the party to be brought in by amendment "knew or should have known 
that, but for a mistake 
concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought 
against the party."  See Singletary v. Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections, 266 F.3d 186, 189 (3rd Cir. 2001) (wherein the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeal makes a very strong case for, and an impassioned plea 
that, construction of the Rule should be otherwise and recommended an amendment 
to clarify that).  Also see 6A 
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1498 
(Supp. 2008, p. 34); and 61B Am.Jur.2d Pleading § 872 (1999 and Supp. 2008); 
compare Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 2004) (all Federal Circuit 
Courts of Appeal which have decided the issue follow the rule articulated in Garrett, rather than the Third Circuit 
analysis).

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶4]      Busch filed her 
complaint in the district court on May 11, 2007.  In it she alleged that she was injured 
at Thriftway on June 3, 2003, when an automatic sliding door malfunctioned 
hitting her and knocking her into a row of shopping carts.  Busch claimed to have suffered severe 
injuries as a result.  She asserted 
that her injuries occurred because of negligence on the part of Thriftway and 
its owner, as well as on the part of the manufacturer of the sliding door.  The complaint also included a claim 
against a John Doe I for strict products liability with respect to the automatic 
sliding door.  Such a pleading is 
permitted by W.R.C.P. 17(d) which provides:

 
 
(d)  Suing person by fictitious name. -- When 
the identity of a defendant is unknown, such defendant may be designated in any 
pleading or proceeding by any name and description, and when the true name is 
discovered the pleading or proceeding may be amended accordingly; and the 
plaintiff in such case must state in the complaint that the plaintiff could not 
discover the true name, and the summons must contain the words, real name 
unknown', and a copy thereof must be served personally upon the 
defendant.

 
 
[¶5]      On June 28, 2007, 
after Busch discovered the name of "John Doe I," she filed an amended complaint 
identifying the previously named Defendant, John Doe I, as 
Horton:

 
 
            
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, 
Grace Busch, by and through the undersigned attorneyand pursuant to Wyoming 
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(d), and does hereby amend the original Complaint in 
Civil Action No. 2007-0058, as the Plaintiff could not discover the true name of 
Defendant John Doe I and does hereby join and sets forth her cause of action 
against the Defendants Blair's Thriftway, Horton Automatics, Inc. and Overhead 
Door Corporation, as follows:

 
 
The 
amended complaint was served on Horton on July 6, 2007, in Dallas, Texas.

 
 
[¶6]      On July 23, 2007, 
Horton filed a motion to dismiss Busch's complaint on the basis that it failed 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, because the applicable 
statute of limitations had run on June 3, 2007, and, insofar as Horton was 
concerned, Busch's complaint was not filed until June 28, 2007, some 25 days 
after the statute of limitations had expired.

 
 
[¶7]      The parties do 
not dispute that the asserted injury occurred on June 3, 2003, and that the 
statute of limitations expired on June 3, 2007.  The applicable statute of limitations is 
found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (LexisNexis 
2007):

 
 
§ 
1-3-105. Actions other than recovery of real property.

 
 
            
(a)  Civil actions other than for the recovery of real property 
can only be brought within the following periods after the cause of action 
accrues:

.

                        
(iv)  Within four (4) years, an action 
for:

            
.

            
(C)  An injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on 
contract and not herein enumerated; and

 
 
[¶8]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
5-2-114 (LexisNexis 2007) invests the Supreme Court with authority to adopt 
rules: ("The supreme court of Wyoming may from time to time adopt, modify and 
repeal general rules and forms governing pleading, practice and procedure, in 
all courts of this state, for the purpose of promoting the speedy and efficient 
determination of litigation upon its merits.").

 
 
[¶9]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
5-2-115 (LexisNexis 2007) provides:

 
 
(a)  Such 
rules may govern:

            
(i)  The forms of process, writs, pleadings and motions and the 
subjects of parties, depositions, discovery, trials, evidence, judgments, new 
trials, provisional and final remedies and all other matters of pleading, 
practice and procedure; and

            
(ii)  Any review of or other supervisory proceedings from the 
judgment or decision of any court, board, officer, or commission when such 
review is authorized by law.

(b)  Such 
rules shall neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any 
person nor the jurisdiction of any of the courts nor change the provisions of 
any statute of limitations.2

 
 
[¶10]   Horton's position in this matter 
continues, citing W.R.C.P. 15(c)(3)(B) for the proposition that Busch's amended 
complaint did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint so as to 
save her claim against Horton from the application of the statute of 
limitations.  Rule 15(c)(3)(B) 
provides:

 
 
(c)  Relation back of amendments. -- An 
amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading 
when:

                        
(1)  Relation back is permitted by the law that provides the 
statute of limitations applicable to the action; or

                        
(2)  The claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading 
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to 
be set forth in the original pleading; or

                        
(3)  The amendment changes the party or the naming of the party 
against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied 
and, within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the party to be brought 
in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action 
that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, 
and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the 
identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the 
party.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]   The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Horton based upon its conclusion that Horton was entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.  
Thus, we apply our well-known and oft-repeated standard of review for 
such a judgment.  See Jasper v. Brinckerhof, 2008 WY 32, 
¶ 10, 179 P.3d 857, 862 (Wyo. 2008). The only decision of the district 
court that is before us for review is whether or not Busch's amended complaint 
was, by operation of law, deemed to be filed within the applicable statute of 
limitations, even though it was in fact filed after the date the statute of 
limitations had run.  The 
proceedings in the district court are set out in detail above, and that is all 
there is for this Court to consider.  
That very limited set of pleadings is the grist for our review of whether 
or not the district court erred as a matter of law.

 
 
[¶12]   In light of the interplay of the 
applicable rules of civil procedure and what we view as the better reasoned case 
law, it is our conclusion that the district court erred as a matter of law in 
dismissing the complaint on the basis that the statute of limitations provided 
Horton with a complete defense against Busch's complaint and amended 
complaint.  It is our view that what 
occurred in this case is exactly what may be anticipated with respect to the 
interplay between W.R.C.P. 17(d) and 15(c)(3).

 
 
[¶13]   Interpretations of statutes, as 
well as interpretations of rules of procedure, are questions of law that we 
review de novo.  Bixler v. Oro Management, LLC, 2006 WY 
140, ¶ 5, 145 P.3d 1260, 1262 (Wyo. 2006).  In interpreting such rules, we apply the 
same rules used in statutory construction.  
Cotton v. McCulloch, 2005 WY 
159, ¶ 14, 125 P.3d 252, 257 (Wyo. 2005).  Our initial effort is directed at 
ascertaining if a statute or procedural rule is ambiguous.  If it is not, we apply the plain 
language of the statutes and/or rules.  
We begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning 
of the words employed, according to their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all 
parts of the statute in pari 
materia.  Id., 125 P.3d  at 
258

 
 
[¶14]   When this Court construes rules of 
civil procedure which are virtually identical to their federal counterparts, 
pertinent federal authority is persuasive.  
Caldwell v. Cummings, 2001 WY 106, ¶ 10, 33 P.3d 1138, 1141 (Wyo. 2001).  In 
this instance, F.R.C.P. 15 is almost identical to Wyoming's Rule 15, but 
W.R.C.P. 17(d) does not have a counterpart in the F.R.C.P.  Of course, we must also take account of 
a couple of Wyoming statutes in this case, which further 
complicates the equation and diminishes the utility of our usual deference to 
federal precedents with respect to rules of civil procedure.  We addressed this issue tangentially in 
Northern Utilities v. Evansville, 822 P.2d 829, 841-44 (Wyo. 1991), but we deem that case to be distinguishable from 
the instant circumstances and of dubious soundness in light of further 
developments of the law in this area.  
See 61B Am.Jur.2d Pleading §§ 
869-72 (1999 and Supp. 2008); 6A Wright, Miller and Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, supra, § 1498; Joel E. Smith, 
Annotation, Relation Back of Amended 
Pleading Substituting True Name of Defendant for Fictitious Name Used in Earlier 
Pleading So As to Avoid Bar of Limitations, 85 A.L.R.3d 130 (1978 and Supp. 
2008).

 
 
[¶15]   From the annotation cited above, as 
well as from much of the other material cited above, we glean this fundamental 
principle that we deem to be important to take into account here:  The purpose of W.R.C.P. 17(d) is to 
provide a plaintiff with a means to toll the statute of limitations when she 
does not know the proper designation of the defendant.  Joel E. Smith, Annotation, supra, 85 ALR 3d 130, § 2.  There is considerably more to the 
equation than just that, but that is all that is in controversy here, because 
the district court decided only that the amended complaint, identifying the 
fictitious defendant by name, was barred by the statute of limitations in that 
the amended complaint did not or could not relate back to the original complaint 
identifying the fictitious defendant.  
See Oliver v. Woodward, 824 So. 2d 693, 698-99 (Ala. 2001); In re Snow, 764 So. 2d 531, 535 
(Ala. 1999) (citing Fulmer v. Clark Equipment Co., 654 So. 2d 45, 46 (Ala. 
1995)); Farrell v. Votator Division of 
Chemetron Corporation, 299 A.2d 394, 395-400 (N.J. 
1973).

 
 
[¶16]   We embrace this modest principle 
and deem it a dispositive basis for reversing the district court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Horton.  Permitting the relation back of an 
amended complaint under the circumstances set out generally above is in accord 
with the rules and statutes which are applicable to such 
circumstances.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   The summary judgment order of the 
district court is reversed, and this matter is remanded back to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Although it 
does not make a difference in our analysis and resolution of this case, the 
"facts presented through oral argument" are not included in the record on appeal 
as no transcript of the oral arguments was included in the record on 
appeal.

 
 

2Although 
neither party cites this statute, we deem it relevant because the operation of 
W.R.C.P. 17(d) in these circumstances does not run afoul of this 
statute.