Case Title: People v. Carlson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83093

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
People v. Carlson (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 83093-Agenda 8-May 
1998.
Opinion filed February 19, 
1999.
JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the 
court:
In People v. Ross, 168 Ill. 2d 347 
(1995), this court held that section 108-3(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/108-3(a)(1) (West 1992)) does not authorize 
issuance of anticipatory search warrants. The issue in this case is whether 
evidence seized pursuant to an anticipatory search warrant issued and executed 
prior to our decision in Ross may be admitted into evidence 
pursuant to the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. We hold that such 
evidence is admissible under the good-faith exception.
FACTS
The Illinois State Police obtained a warrant to 
search defendant Jodi Kae Carlson's residence for, inter alia, 
psilocybin mushrooms, a controlled substance. The warrant was issued based on 
the affidavit of Special Agent Joseph Bolino. According to Agent Bolino's 
affidavit, a United States postal inspector searched an express mail package 
addressed to "Jodi Davis, 804 Midway Drive, Batavia, Illinois 60510." The postal 
inspector had applied for and received a federal search warrant to search the 
package after a narcotics-trained police dog had alerted to it. The package 
contained approximately 400 grams of psilocybin. The postal inspector resealed 
the package and contacted Agent Bolino. The next day, Agent Bolino applied to 
the circuit court of Kane County for the search warrant.
Agent Bolino's affidavit further stated that he 
conducted a computer search of the Secretary of State's data base and located a 
Jodi Carlson at 804 Midway Drive in Batavia. Agent Bolino requested issuance of 
an anticipatory search warrant to be executed only upon the conditions that a 
postal inspector, posing as a postal carrier, deliver the package to 804 Midway 
Drive in Batavia, and that an occupant of the residence accept the package. The 
affidavit also described defendant's residence. The warrant was issued at 9:25 
a.m. on July 13, 1994, and executed at 10:35 a.m. that same day.
After the police executed the warrant, defendant 
was arrested and charged in the circuit court of Kane County with unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(a)(11) (West 1994)) and 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 
570/401(a)(11) (West 1994)). Defendant filed a motion to quash the search 
warrant and suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. The circuit 
court initially denied defendant's motion. Shortly thereafter, however, this 
court delivered the opinion in Ross, holding that anticipatory search 
warrants were not authorized by statute and are therefore invalid. See 
Ross, 168 Ill. 2d 347. Based on Ross, defendant moved for 
reconsideration of the denial of her motion to suppress. The circuit court 
granted the motion for reconsideration and suppressed the evidence in question. 
The State filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the evidence should be 
admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The circuit 
court denied the motion.
The State filed a certificate of impairment and 
appealed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)). 
The appellate court reversed the circuit court's suppression order. 287 Ill. 
App. 3d 700. We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 166 Ill. 2d R. 
315. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the appellate 
court.
ANALYSIS
An anticipatory search warrant is a warrant 
based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at a future time certain 
evidence of a crime will be located at a specific place. 2 W. LaFave, Search 
& Seizure §3.7(c), at 362 (3d ed. 1996). A common situation in which police 
officers seek anticipatory search warrants is where postal authorities notify 
the police that they have intercepted from the mail a package containing drugs. 
The police then seek issuance of a search warrant to be executed when the 
intercepted package is delivered. See 2 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure §3.7(c), 
at 362-63, 363 n.92 (3d ed. 1996) (collecting cases).
Section 108-3(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure of 1963 (Code) governs the issuance of search warrants in Illinois. At 
the time the anticipatory search warrant in this case was issued, section 
108-3(a)(1) authorized search warrants for the seizure of "[a]ny instruments, 
articles or things which have been used in the commission of, or which may 
constitute evidence of, the offense in connection with which the warrant is 
issued." 725 ILCS 5/108-3(a)(1) (West 1992). In Ross, we held that this 
language did not authorize the issuance of anticipatory search warrants. 
Ross, 168 Ill. 2d  at 353-54.(1)
It is undisputed that, pursuant to 
Ross, the anticipatory search warrant in this case was not authorized 
by statute. Therefore, defendant argues, the evidence seized pursuant to the 
invalid anticipatory search warrant should be inadmissible under the 
exclusionary rule. The State, however, argues that this evidence is admissible 
under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule as set forth in 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 104 S. Ct. 3405 
(1984). In Leon, the United States Supreme Court held that the fourth 
amendment exclusionary rule does not bar evidence obtained by a police officer 
who reasonably relied, in objective good faith, on a search warrant issued by a 
neutral and detached magistrate, but later found to be unsupported by probable 
cause. Leon, 468 U.S.  at 919-22, 82 L. Ed. 2d  at 696-98, 104 S. Ct.  at 
3418-20. Defendant, relying on People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60 
(1996), responds that the good-faith exception is not applicable here because of 
the nature of the holding in Ross.
A circuit court's ruling on a motion to quash 
arrest and suppress evidence is generally subject to reversal on appeal only if 
manifestly erroneous. People v. Wright, 183 Ill. 2d 16, 21 (1998). 
Where only a question of law is involved, however, the circuit court's ruling is 
subject to de novo review. See Wright, 183 Ill. 2d  at 21. In 
this case, the issue raised is a question of law, and our review is therefore 
de novo. See Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 64.
I. Constitutionality of 
Anticipatory Search Warrants
Defendant contends that evidence seized pursuant 
to an anticipatory search warrant issued and executed prior to our decision in 
Ross is not admissible under the Leon good-faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule. In support, defendant argues that the anticipatory search 
warrant in this case was void ab initio because a crime had 
not been committed when the judge issued it. This, of course, is true of all 
anticipatory search warrants. In essence, defendant contends that anticipatory 
search warrants are unconstitutional. We note that, in Ross, we held 
that anticipatory search warrants were statutorily invalid, not that 
they were constitutionally invalid. Defendant asserts, however, that 
the analysis in Ross depended in part on Illinois constitutional 
principles. Specifically, defendant points out that Ross relied upon 
legislative history indicating that the drafters of the statute governing search 
warrants intended to follow the applicable existing case law, i.e., 
Lippman v. People, 175 Ill. 101, 113 (1898). That decision, in 
interpreting the search and seizure provision of the Illinois Constitution of 
1870, stated that a search warrant may be issued only after a showing 
that a crime has been committed. See Ross, 168 Ill. 2d  at 352-53. Thus, 
defendant argues, Ross found anticipatory search warrants to be not 
only statutorily invalid, but also violative of constitutional principles. We 
disagree. We hold that anticipatory search warrants are valid under both the 
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 6, of 
the Illinois Constitution of 1970.
Initially, we note that this court has not 
previously addressed the constitutionality of anticipatory search warrants. Our 
appellate court has explicitly held that anticipatory search warrants are valid 
under the Illinois Constitution. See People v. Martini, 265 Ill. App. 
3d 698, 707 (1994). Several federal courts and other state courts have likewise 
upheld the constitutionality of anticipatory search warrants. See, 
e.g., United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 
1997); United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423 (7th Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955 (1st Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Tagbering, 985 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Wylie, 919 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195 (4th 
Cir. 1988); United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1978); United States 
ex rel. Beal v. Skaff, 418 F.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1969); State v. 
Parent, 110 Nev. 119, 867 P.2d 1143 (1994); State v. Stott, 243 
Neb. 967, 503 N.W.2d 822 (1993); State v. Engel, 465 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 
1991); Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988); Commonwealth v. 
Soares, 384 Mass. 149, 424 N.E.2d 221 (1981).
The fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const., amend. IV. The search and 
seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution similarly provides: "The people 
shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other 
possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or 
interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means. No 
warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6. Accordingly, both the fourth amendment and the 
Illinois search and seizure clause set forth two underlying requirements: 
searches and seizures must be reasonable, and probable cause must support search 
warrants. Anticipatory search warrants do not violate either 
requirement.
First, a search and seizure conducted pursuant 
to an anticipatory search warrant is reasonable. Where police officers know that 
a package containing contraband is going to be delivered to a certain residence 
at a certain time, there is nothing inherently unreasonable about allowing the 
issuance of a search warrant which will be executed only upon the occurrence of 
these conditions. The other options available in this scenario have significant 
drawbacks. For instance, the police could apply for a search warrant after the 
package is delivered, or simply conduct no search at all. Both of these options 
present the possibility that law enforcement authorities will lose track of both 
the criminal and the contraband. See Garcia, 882 F.2d  at 703. In 
addition, in some cases, the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement may allow the police to conduct a lawful search without a warrant. 
See generally People v. Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d 66, 75 (1990) (listing 
factors to consider in determining whether exigent circumstances are present 
such that a warrant is not required). A search pursuant to an anticipatory 
search warrant, however, is more reasonable than proceeding under the exigent 
circumstances exception because a neutral judge, rather than a police officer 
acting in the heat of the moment, makes the critical determination of whether 
probable cause for a search exists. See Gendron, 18 F.3d  at 965; 
Garcia, 882 F.2d at 702-03; Martini, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 706. 
Moreover, we find nothing inherently unreasonable about the option of obtaining 
an anticipatory search warrant, where, as discussed below, the police have 
probable cause to believe that a package containing contraband will be delivered 
to a certain place at a certain time.
Second, a properly issued anticipatory search 
warrant is based on probable cause. When a law enforcement official presents 
reliable evidence that a contraband delivery will occur at a certain place and 
at a certain time, and execution of the warrant is conditioned upon that 
delivery, there is sufficient probable cause to uphold the warrant. See 
Garcia, 882 F.2d  at 702. The fact that the contraband is not presently 
at the residence described in the warrant at the time the warrant is issued is 
inconsequential. See Garcia, 882 F.2d  at 702-03. The requirement that 
certain events must take place before the execution of an anticipatory search 
warrant assures that a search will take place only when justified by 
probable cause. See Gendron, 18 F.3d  at 965. Indeed, the information 
necessary to support issuance of an anticipatory search warrant, i.e., 
information regarding the known future location of the items to be 
seized, is more likely to establish that probable cause will exist at the time 
of the search than the information necessary to support issuance of a typical 
search warrant, i.e., information regarding the known prior 
location of the items to be seized. See 2 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure 
§3.7(c), at 366 (3d ed. 1996).
Nevertheless, defendant argues that language in 
Lippman v. People, 175 Ill. 101, 113 (1898), establishes that 
a search warrant may be issued only after a showing that a crime has 
been committed. The language upon which defendant relies is inapposite. The 
constitutionality of anticipatory search warrants was not at issue in 
Lippman. Rather, Lippman addressed the constitutionality of a 
statute that allowed manufacturers, bottlers, and dealers in ale and certain 
other beverages to obtain a search warrant for missing property by merely making 
an oath in writing to a judge that they have reason to believe that the 
individual whose property is to be searched is using their trademark. 
Lippman, 175 Ill.  at 110. In declaring the statute unconstitutional, 
the Lippman court reasoned in part that the statute does not even 
require the person obtaining the warrant to state that an offense has been 
committed. Lippman, 175 Ill.  at 113. A careful reading of 
Lippman, however, reveals that the court's primary concern with that 
statute was that it failed to require probable cause for a search warrant. See 
Lippman, 175 Ill.  at 112-13. As we have discussed, anticipatory search 
warrants do not suffer from a probable cause defect.
We therefore hold that anticipatory search 
warrants do not violate either the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution or the search and seizure clause of the Illinois 
Constitution.
II. Admissibility of Seized 
Evidence under the Good-Faith
Exception to the Exclusionary 
Rule
Although we hold that anticipatory search 
warrants are constitutionally valid, it is undisputed that the 
anticipatory search warrant in this case was statutorily invalid under 
our decision in Ross. Consequently, we must determine whether the 
evidence seized from defendant's residence pursuant to a statutorily invalid 
anticipatory search warrant is admissible under the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule.
The United States Supreme Court first 
articulated the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). In 
Leon, the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment exclusionary 
rule does not bar evidence obtained by a police officer who reasonably relied, 
in objective good faith, on a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached 
magistrate, but later found to be unsupported by probable cause. Leon, 
468 U.S.  at 919-22, 82 L. Ed. 2d  at 696-98, 104 S. Ct.  at 3418-20. The Court in 
Leon noted that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police 
misconduct, not to punish the errors of magistrates and judges. Leon, 
468 U.S.  at 916, 82 L. Ed. 2d  at 694, 104 S. Ct.  at 3417. The exclusionary rule 
cannot deter a police officer who reasonably believes in good faith that he 
possesses a valid search warrant from conducting a search pursuant to this 
warrant. Leon, 468 U.S.  at 918-21, 82 L. Ed. 2d  at 696-97, 104 S. Ct. 
at 3418-19. This court adopted the Leon good-faith exception for 
Illinois in People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 477 (1984). See also 
725 ILCS 5/114-12(b)(1), (b)(2) (West 1996) (codifying 
Leon).
Later, in Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 94 L. Ed. 2d 364, 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987), the United States Supreme Court 
extended the Leon good-faith exception. The Court held that the fourth 
amendment exclusionary rule does not bar evidence seized by a police officer who 
reasonably relied, in objective good faith, on a statute that authorized a 
warrantless administrative search, where the statute is later held 
unconstitutional. Krull, 480 U.S.  at 349-50, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 375, 107 S. Ct.  at 1167. The Krull majority concluded that application of the 
exclusionary rule in situations where police officers conducted a search in 
objective good faith reliance on a statute, which is only later declared 
unconstitutional, would not deter future police misconduct. Krull, 480 U.S.  at 347-49, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 373-75, 107 S. Ct.  at 1165-67.
This court in People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 73-74 (1996), however, determined that the Krull good-faith 
exception is not compatible with the exclusionary rule arising out of the 
Illinois Constitution (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6). After declaring 
unconstitutional section 108-8(b)(2) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/108-8(b)(2) (West 
1994) (allowing police to make "no-knock" entries under certain circumstances 
when executing a search warrant)), we held that evidence seized by virtue of an 
unconstitutional statute is not admissible under the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 70.
Our opinion in Krueger discussed at 
length Justice O'Connor's dissent in Krull. See Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 72-73. Justice O'Connor explained that the extended good-faith 
exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, as recognized by the 
Krull majority, provides a " 'grace period' " for 
unconstitutional search and seizure legislation, during which time the State can 
" 'violate constitutional requirements with impunity.' " 
Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 72, quoting Krull, 480 U.S.  at 361, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 382, 107 S. Ct.  at 1173 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by 
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ.). Justice O'Connor then distinguished 
Leon from the situation in Krull on the ground that there is a 
" 'powerful historical basis for the exclusion of evidence gathered 
pursuant to a search authorized by an unconstitutional statute. ' " 
Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 72, quoting Krull, 480 U.S.  at 362, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 383, 107 S. Ct.  at 1173 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by 
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ.). "Not only were such statutes 'the core 
concern of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment,' the exclusionary rule had 
regularly been applied to suppress evidence gathered under unconstitutional 
statutes." Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 72, quoting Krull, 480 U.S. 
at 362-63, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 383-84, 107 S. Ct.  at 1173-74 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ.).
Based on reasoning similar to the reasoning in 
Justice O'Connor's dissent, this court in Krueger declined to interpret 
our state constitution in lockstep with the Krull majority. 
Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 73-74. We explained that our state exclusionary 
rule has always been understood to bar evidence seized under the authority of an 
unconstitutional statute, and that to adopt Krull's extended good-faith 
exception would drastically change this state's constitutional law. 
Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 74-75, citing People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448 (1923). We then set forth the central basis for our rejection of 
Krull's extended good-faith exception: "We are not willing to recognize 
an exception to our state exclusionary rule that will provide a grace period for 
unconstitutional search and seizure legislation, during which time our citizens' 
prized constitutional rights can be violated with impunity. We are particularly 
disturbed by the fact that such a grace period could last for several years and 
affect large numbers of people. This is simply too high a price for our citizens 
to pay." Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 75. Significantly, however, we 
explicitly noted in Krueger that our decision to reject the 
Krull extended good-faith exception "does not impact the Leon 
good-faith exception." Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 76.
Defendant argues that the Krueger 
rationale should be extended to apply to the instant case. Alluding to language 
in Krueger and in Justice O'Connor's dissent in Krull, 
defendant reasons that an invalid warrant resulting from a judicial error 
affects only one individual, whereas Ross's declaration that 
anticipatory search warrants are statutorily invalid affects numerous 
individuals, including defendant. Defendant asserts that, since the reason for 
the invalidity of the warrant in her case resulted from legislative action, the 
evidence seized pursuant to this warrant should not be admissible under the 
Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Defendant's 
argument is without merit.
Most importantly, application of the 
Leon good-faith exception in the instant case does not present the 
threat to our citizens' constitutional rights that was present in 
Krueger. Both Krueger and Krull involved searches 
that were based on statutes later declared unconstitutional. Conversely, the 
instant case involves a search that was based on a constitutional anticipatory 
search warrant. This court in Ross found anticipatory search warrants 
to be statutorily invalid, not constitutionally invalid. 
Illinois citizens were never subjected to a grace period during which their 
constitutional rights could be violated with impunity-the fundamental concern 
set forth by this court in Krueger.
Furthermore, defendant's argument rests upon two 
inaccurate premises. First, defendant asserts that the warrant in her case was 
invalid as a result of legislative action. This is not correct. Anticipatory 
search warrants were declared invalid in Ross because the legislature 
had never approved of their use. This is best described as legislative 
inaction. Certainly the legislature did nothing to threaten the 
constitutional rights of Illinois citizens in this regard. Second, defendant 
contends that Krueger's rationale should apply here because large 
numbers of people may be affected by the holding in Ross. We disagree. 
The mere fact that large numbers of people may be affected was not dispositive 
in Krueger. Our concern in Krueger was that large numbers of 
people would be subjected to unconstitutional searches and seizures 
without any recourse. Defendant's argument must therefore be 
rejected.
We note that, if we were to accept defendant's 
position, we would implicitly be using Krueger's rationale to swallow 
the Leon good-faith exception. In fact, defendant contended at oral 
argument that we should reject Leon entirely. We decline to do so. In 
Krueger, this court explicitly stated that our decision had no impact 
on Leon. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 76. Defendant offers no 
persuasive reason why we should depart from our previous adherence to the 
Leon good-faith exception. Consequently, the Leon good-faith 
exception remains valid.
We therefore apply the Leon good-faith 
exception to the facts here. The Illinois legislature codified the Leon 
good-faith exception in sections 114-12(b)(1) and (b)(2) of the Code (725 ILCS 
5/114-12(b)(1), (b)(2) (West 1996)). Section 114-12(b)(1) provides that a court 
should not suppress otherwise admissible evidence if a police officer seized the 
evidence in good faith. Section 114-12(b)(2)(i) sets forth the definition of 
"good faith" applicable to the case at bar: " 'Good faith' means whenever a 
peace officer obtains evidence: (i) pursuant to a search or an arrest warrant 
obtained from a neutral and detached judge, which warrant is free from obvious 
defects other than non-deliberate errors in preparation and contains no material 
misrepresentation by any agent of the State, and the officer reasonably believed 
the warrant to be valid[.]" 725 ILCS 5/114-12(b)(2)(i) (West 1996). The actions 
of the police in this case meet this definition of good faith. The record 
reveals that the police obtained the anticipatory search warrant from a neutral 
and detached judge; the warrant was free from obvious defects; the warrant 
contained no material misrepresentations; and the police could have reasonably 
believed the warrant to be valid.
That the anticipatory search warrant was issued 
pursuant to the former section 108-3(a)(1) does not change our conclusion that 
the police acted in objective good-faith reliance on that warrant. At the time 
the police obtained the warrant, no Illinois case law held that anticipatory 
search warrants were statutorily or constitutionally invalid. Although this 
court in Ross ultimately concluded that the language of the former 
section 108-3(a)(1) did not authorize anticipatory search warrants, we 
specifically stated that this statutory provision was subject to "evenly 
plausible but divergent interpretations" as to whether it allowed anticipatory 
search warrants. Ross, 168 Ill. 2d  at 352. Therefore, the police could 
have reasonably believed that section 108-3(a)(1) specifically authorized the 
anticipatory search warrant that they executed.
Defendant nonetheless argues that the police 
could not have reasonably relied on the anticipatory search warrant because the 
warrant "was in fact not even an anticipatory warrant, listing no conditions 
whatsoever to limit the timing of its execution, in effect authorizing a search 
without probable cause and resulting in a facially invalid warrant." Defendant 
has cited no legal authority in support of this one-sentence argument. We 
therefore find the argument waived. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); People v. 
Felella, 131 Ill. 2d 525, 540 (1989).
In sum, we hold that anticipatory search 
warrants are valid under both the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution. We further 
hold that the evidence seized in this case pursuant to the anticipatory search 
warrant issued and executed prior to our decision in Ross is admissible 
pursuant to the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Accordingly, the 
circuit court erred in suppressing the evidence obtained pursuant to the 
anticipatory search warrant.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment 
of the appellate court, which reversed the judgment of the circuit court and 
remanded the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Affirmed.
JUSTICE RATHJE took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case.
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
United States postal inspectors intercepted a 
package addressed to defendant and containing psilocybin mushrooms (a controlled 
substance). Before the package was delivered, Illinois State Police requested 
and obtained a so-called "anticipatory search warrant," that is, a warrant which 
authorized police to search defendant's home only after the contraband had been 
delivered to and accepted by an occupant of the residence. After the inspector 
delivered the package, police executed the warrant and seized the illegal 
mushrooms. The trial court suppressed this evidence but was reversed by the 
appellate court, which this court now affirms. I dissent.
The warrant at issue was issued and executed 
before this court's decision in People v. Ross, 168 Ill. 2d 347 (1985). 
In that case, we held that anticipatory search warrants were not authorized by 
section 108-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as then in effect. This case 
presents the related question of whether evidence obtained pursuant to an 
anticipatory search warrant, issued and executed prior to our decision in 
Ross, is admissible against a defendant under the good-faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule.
Article I, section 6, of the Illinois 
Constitution of 1970 provides, "No warrant shall issue without probable cause." 
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6. See also U.S. Const., amend. IV. Today the 
majority construes this clear constitutional command to permit a judge to issue 
a search warrant without probable cause to believe that a crime has 
been committed. In so doing, the majority abandons more than 100 years of 
precedent interpreting the right of the people of this state "to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable 
searches, seizures [and] invasions of privacy." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 
§6.
This court has had frequent occasion to consider 
the type of probable cause necessary to support the issuance of a search 
warrant. In the past, we have identified two core requirements: "First, facts 
must be related which would cause a reasonable man to believe a crime had been 
committed. Secondly, facts must be set forth which would cause a reasonable man 
to believe the evidence was in the place to be searched." People v. 
George, 49 Ill. 2d 372, 377 (1971); see also People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378 (1983); People v. Tate, 44 Ill. 2d 432 (1970); People 
v. Dolgin, 415 Ill. 434 (1953); Lippman v. People, 175 Ill. 101 
(1898).
The warrant at issue satisfies neither of these 
requirements. At the time the warrant issued, defendant had not yet committed 
any crime, and the evidence was not located in her home. Thus, it cannot be 
disputed that there was neither probable cause to believe that a crime had been 
committed, nor probable cause to believe that the evidence was located at the 
premises to be searched. The majority dismisses these important constitutional 
infirmities, noting,"[t]his, of course, is true of all anticipatory search 
warrants." Slip op. at 4. While this statement is of course correct, it begs the 
question of the constitutionality of such warrants. Indeed, far from rebutting a 
criticism of anticipatory search warrants, the majority's statement aptly 
demonstrates why all such warrants are unconstitutional.
The majority posits that this court's prior 
holding invalidating anticipatory search warrants was decided merely as a matter 
of statutory construction; therefore, it treats the constitutionality of such 
warrants as a question of first impression. People v. Ross, 168 Ill. 2d 347 (1985). However, although we found it unnecessary to decide the 
constitutional question in Ross, our analysis in that case depended in 
large part upon Illinois constitutional jurisprudence in the area of searches 
and seizures. In concluding that section 108-3 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, as then in effect, prohibited anticipatory search warrants, we relied 
upon legislative history indicating that the drafters of that provision intended 
to follow existing case law-specifically Lippman v. People, 175 Ill. 101 (1898)-providing that a search warrant may be issued only after a 
crime has been committed. Ross, 168 Ill. 2d  at 352-53. We also cited 
Lippman's holding that " '[a] search warrant can only be granted 
after a showing made before a magistrate, under oath, that a crime has been 
committed.' " (Emphasis in original.) Ross, 168 Ill. 2d  at 353, 
quoting People v. Lippman, 175 Ill.  at 113. Finally, we concluded in 
Ross that "this court has never retreated from the principle set forth 
in Lippman, i.e., that a search warrant may only be issued 
after a crime has been committed. [Citations.]" Ross, 168 Ill. 2d  at 
353.
In addition to rewriting well-settled 
constitutional law, today's decision represents astonishingly bad public policy. 
The majority's holding allows a court to authorize the invasion of a citizen's 
constitutionally protected privacy based upon information that, at some point in 
the future, the citizen may commit a crime and may have evidence of that crime 
in his home or on his person. Just as it is impermissible for police to detain a 
citizen based upon suspicion that the citizen may commit a crime, so 
too, it is inappropriate for a court to issue a search warrant in anticipation 
of criminality which has not yet occurred. Such action constitutes an 
overreaching and gross expansion of the police powers of this state, a terrible 
invasion of a citizen's privacy, and an incompatibility with the concepts of 
ordered liberty embodied in our Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 
§6.
Finally, because the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule is not applicable to evidence seized in violation of the 
Illinois Constitution (People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60 (1996)), 
evidence seized pursuant to the anticipatory search warrant is inadmissible. For 
these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court and reverse the 
judgment of the appellate court. Accordingly, I dissent.
JUSTICE HARRISON joins in this 
dissent.
Footnote:
1. Subsequent to the issuance 
of the warrant in this case, the General Assembly amended section 108-3(a)(1) to 
additionally allow the seizure of "instruments, articles or things designed 
or intended for use *** in the commission of *** the offense in connection 
with which the warrant is issued; or contraband, the fruits of crime, or things 
otherwise criminally possessed." (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/108-3(a)(1) (West 
1996). This amendment is not at issue here.