Case Title: Taylor v. Com.

Citation: 545 S.W.2d 76

Docket Number: 

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 1976-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
545 S.W.2d 76 (1976) Larry TAYLOR, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. Supreme Court of Kentucky. April 16, 1976. Rehearing Denied August 20, 1976. Jack Emory Farley, Public Defender, Paul F. Isaacs, Asst. Public Defender, Frankfort, for appellant. Robert F. Stephens, Atty. Gen., Mary Ann Delaney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant Larry Taylor was convicted of rape of a child under twelve years of age and sentenced to life imprisonment. He contends on this appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance. An indictment under KRS 435.080 was returned against the appellant on July 25, 1974. Although an arrest warrant was issued on July 29, 1974, appellant was at that time incarcerated in a federal prison in Texas and he was not formally arrested until he was returned to London, Kentucky, on December 2, 1974. He was assigned counsel and arraigned on December 3, 1974, at which time trial was set for December 5, 1974. On the trial date, appellant, through counsel, moved for a continuance on the basis that appointed counsel had only talked *77 with the appellant for two brief intervals and that he had been given insufficient time to prepare the defense and subpoena possible witnesses. His motion was denied. RCr 9.04 specifies that a motion by the defendant for a postponement of the trial "may be made only upon affidavit showing the materiality of the evidence expected to be obtained, and that due diligence has been used to obtain it. If the motion is based on the absence of a witness, the affidavit must show what facts the affiant believes the witness will prove, and not merely the effect of such facts in evidence, and that the affiant believes them to be true. * * *." Appellant's oral motion was not accompanied by the required affidavit. Moreover at no time, before, during or after trial did appellant specify any evidence bearing on appellant's guilt or innocence which might have been presented had a continuance been granted. Indeed there is no showing in the record that counsel could have presented any additional evidence had a continuance been granted. Inherent in the concept of right to counsel is a reasonable time and opportunity for counsel to prepare. Roberts v. Commonwealth, Ky., 339 S.W.2d 640 (1960); Turner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 485 S.W.2d 511 (1972). Nevertheless, the granting of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and a conviction will not be reversed for failure to grant a continuance unless that discretion has been plainly abused and manifest injustice has resulted. Adams v. Commonwealth, Ky., 424 S.W.2d 849 (1968); Stewart v. Commonwealth, Ky., 479 S.W.2d 23 (1972); Thacker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 306 S.W.2d 292 (1957). The evidence of the appellant's guilt was overwhelming. The defense admitted that the victim had indeed been raped. The appellant was identified by the victim as the man who attacked her and witnesses placed appellant and his car in the vicinity of the crime. Not only did the victim positively identify the appellant but prior to his apprehension she described the clothes he was wearing as a blue Levi jacket, blue Levi breeches, a white tee shirt, a blue hat and red tennis shoes. When appellant was apprehended on another charge the night of the rape he was wearing a blue denim jacket and jeans and red tennis shoes. Medical and scientific evidence also pointed strongly to the guilt of appellant. Appellant took the stand, denying commission of the crime, and presented his uncle as an alibi witness. The record does not indicate and appellant does not claim the existence of any other particular witnesses not called at trial who could have aided in the defense. This court is unanimously of the opinion that defense counsel in a rape case is entitled to more than one day in which to prepare for trial. Conceding error in the denial of the continuance, we are not convinced from the showing made here that the error resulted in any manifest injustice in prejudice to appellant. The defense presented was alibi. There is no suggestion in appellant's brief that had additional time been granted a different or more effective defense could have been presented. Only one witness, an uncle, supported appellant's alibi testimony although according to appellant's testimony several of his kinfolk were present with him on the afternoon in question. The names and addresses of these kinfolk were known to appellant and his counsel. The fact that no effort was made to secure their attendance as witnesses does not give much credence to the idea that they would have supported appellant's testimony. In the motion and grounds for new trial there is no allegation that any additional witnesses could have been obtained if more time had been granted nor does counsel suggest any way in which the grant of additional time would have been beneficial to appellant. Under these circumstances we are not constrained to hold the failure to grant a continuance to be a prejudicial error. Appellant also argues that he was denied the opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice. We fail to see any merit in *78 this contention. Appellant never asserted that he had the funds to hire a private attorney nor did he tell the court he wanted to hire private counsel. The fact that the public defender is still representing appellant on appeal is further evidence that the appellant did not truly intend to retain private counsel. Finally appellant claims he was prejudiced by improper questions addressed to him by the attorney for the Commonwealth. This argument is devoid of merit as well as unpreserved for judicial review. Although he now contends the Commonwealth's questions were calculated to inflame and prejudice the jury, he did not object to them at trial nor move for a mistrial or an admonition to the jury. An examination of the entire record has disclosed no basis for reversal of the judgment. The judgment is affirmed. All concur except REED, C. J., and LUKOWSKY and PALMORE, JJ. LUKOWSKY, J., dissents and files a written dissenting opinion in which REED, C. J., and PALMORE, J., concur. LUKOWSKY, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the opinion of my brothers. The alchemy by which they transmute an admitted flagrant abuse of judicial discretion into harmless error would do credit to a Merlin. This legerdemain is so expedient and appealing that I am required to expose the illusion lest the goddess of justice be transformed into a sorcerer's apprentice. Although the crime was committed and the indictment returned several months prior to trial, counsel was not appointed until December 3, 1974. The trial began on December 5, 1974. If the day counsel was appointed and the day of trial are not counted, cf. Turner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 485 S.W.2d 511 (1972), counsel for appellant had one full day in which to prepare for trial of this serious offense.[1] To suggest that counsel could investigate a crime occurring several months earlier, consult fully with the accused, seek discovery, interview prospective witnesses, examine and study medical and laboratory reports obtained by the prosecution, research the applicable law, prepare jury instructions, prepare his opening statement and summation, and plan a strategy of defense in one day is to ignore reality. United States v. Miller, 508 F.2d 444 (1974). In Nelson v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 641, 175 S.W.2d 132 (1943), this court wrote: Also see Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446, 60 S. Ct. 321, 84 L. Ed. 377 (1940). I am not insensitive to the heinous nature of the crime perpetrated on the innocent young victim in this case. But the fact that the crime is so heinous is all the more reason that one accused of such a crime, who may be deprived of his liberty forever, *80 should be given adequate time and opportunity to prepare his defense. As the Supreme Court of the United States said in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932): I do not think the appellant in this case was given time for adequate preparation or that this error can be considered harmless. The harmless error doctrine applies with diminished rigor when the right to counsel is at stake. United States v. Robinson, 502 F.2d 894 (1974). The right is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial. See concurring opinion of Stewart, J. in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 43, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967). Once the malignancy of inadequate preparation time is established its metastasis is subtle, unpredictable, unidentifiable and necrotic. The virulence of the disease demands the radical surgery of a reversal and a new trial. No court possesses the omniscience required to pronounce that it is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such an error did not contribute to conviction. The burden is not as my brothers imply, on the appellant to convince the court that this type of error resulted in manifest injustice to his prejudice. The burden is upon the appellee to satisfy the court beyond a reasonable doubt that such an error did not contribute to conviction. Since the mind of man is too imprecise to trace and measure the effect of this error in regard to every aspect of the trial with the required certainty, the decision of my brothers, like the peace of God, passeth all understanding. The majority also relies on the failure of the appellant to comply with the affidavit requirements of RCr 9.04. Since defense counsel was asking for time to investigate the case, interview possible witnesses and prepare the defense, RCr 9.04 governing continuance on the ground of the absence of known evidence or witnesses is not applicable. The judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. REED, C. J., and PALMORE, J., concur in this dissenting opinion. [1] This would have been a capital crime if it were not for the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972).