Case Title: R.C.R., INC. v. DELINE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-116

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
R.C.R., INC. v. DELINE2003 WY 6270 P.3d 214Case Number: 02-116Decided: 05/22/2003

 

 
R.C.R., 
INC., a Wyoming corporation,

 

Appellant(Petitioner) 
,

 

v.

 

ROBERT 
E. DELINE and ANNABELLE M.

DELINE; 
GARY L. PALMER and

NANCY 
J. PALMER; and KIRK COMPANY,

a 
Texas Partnership,

 

Appellees(Respondents) 
.

 

 

The 
Honorable Kenneth E. Stebner, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kermit 
C. Brown of Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Brown.

 

Representing 
Appellees:

John 
A. MacPherson of MacPherson, Kelly & Thompson, LLC, Rawlins, WY, and John R. 
Vincent, Riverton, WY.  Argument by 
Mr. MacPherson.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ., and DONNELL, 
D.J.

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      We 
review the actions of the Carbon County Board of County Commissioners (Board), 
which were later affirmed by the district court, establishing a private road and 
assessing damages.  We 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant R.C.R., 
Inc. (appellant) sets forth the following issues with which appellees Robert E. 
Deline, Annabelle M. Deline, Gary L. Palmer, Nancy J. Palmer, and Kirk 
Com­pany (collectively appellees) ostensibly agree:

 

1.  Was 
the Appellant wrongfully precluded from offering evi­dence relevant to the 
value of the property on February 13, 2001?

 

2.  Did 
the Viewers improperly ignore damages to all of Appel­lant's land as 
required by Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459 (Wyo. 
1995)?

 

3.  Did 
the Viewers improperly determine the damages to Appellant's land in 
contravention of the princip[le]s enunciated in Lindt v. Murray, 
supra?

 

4.  Was 
the Appellant denied protections afforded it by the State of Wyoming and U.S. 
Constitutions?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On September 16, 
1997, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-9-101 to -103 (Lexis 1999),1 appellees filed a Petition for Private Road.  In addressing this petition, the Board 
appointed a hearing officer to preside over the proceedings.  Beginning on August 19, 1998, a two-day 
evidentiary hearing was held, culminating with the Board entering findings of 
fact and an order establishing that 1) there was no outlet to a public road; 2) 
proper notice was given; and 3) a reasonable and convenient road had been 
proposed by appellees.  The Board 
also appointed Stuart Quealy, Elmer Peterson, and James Espy as viewers and 
appraisers pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101. 

 

[¶4]      On January 15, 
1999, the viewers and appraisers met on the property and ultimately filed their 
report with the Board on June 21, 1999.  
On September 27, 1999, a second evi­dentiary hearing was held before 
the Board.  At this hearing, 
appellant did not object to the location of the road established by the viewers 
and appraisers because the location of the road was appellant's preferred route. 
Appellant did, however, contest the assessment of dam­ages made by the 
viewers and appraisers.  

 

[¶5]      On December 7, 
1999, the Board entered an order that adopted the hearing officer's recommended 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and ordered the establishment of the 
private road (Order I).  The 
established private road was consistent with that recommended by the viewers and 
appraisers.  The Board also adopted 
the assessment of damages made by the viewers and appraisers. 

 

[¶6]      Appellant filed a 
petition for review of administrative action regarding Order I.  Upon its review, the district court 
partially vacated Order I by issuance of a decision letter finding that "the 
Viewers' determination of damages must be set aside due to lack of substantial 
evi­dence" and remanded the matter back to the Board "for the sole and 
narrow issue of determining damages."  
In particular, the district court ordered that the Board either 1) have 
the viewers and appraisers resubmit a report explaining their determination of 
damages, upon which a subsequent due process hearing would be held, or 2) hold 
an additional due process hearing on the existing report of the viewers and 
appraisers whereupon the viewers and appraisers could explain their 
determination of damages and be subject to cross-examination. 

 

[¶7]      Choosing the 
latter option, a third hearing on the issue of damages was held by the Board on 
February 13, 2001.  After this 
hearing, the Board entered another Order that adopted the hearing officer's 
recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law and established the private 
road (Order II).  Appellant again 
appealed Order II to the district court.  
Ultimately, the district court entered an order affirming the actions of 
the Board.  This appeal followed. 

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      In Wagstaff v. 
Sublette County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 123, ¶7, 53 P.3d. 79, 
¶7 (Wyo. 2002), a case also involving the establishment of a private road, we 
declared:

 

            
We review the administrative order issued by the Board as if it had come 
directly to this court from the Board.  
Dunning v. Ankney, 936 P.2d 61, 63 (Wyo. 1997) (citing State ex 
rel. Workers' Compensation Div. v. Fisher, 914 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Wyo. 1996)). 
We examine the entire record to determine whether substantial evidence supports 
the administrative agency's findings of fact.  We may not substitute our judgment for 
that of the agency when substantial evidence supports its decision.  Dunning, at 63 (citing 
Celotex Corp. v. Andren, 917 P.2d 178, 180 (Wyo. 1996)).  "Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions."  Dunning, at 63 
(quoting Latimer v. Rissler & McMurry Co., 902 P.2d 706, 709 (Wyo. 
1995)).  We do not, however, defer 
to an agency's conclusions of law.  
If the correct rule of law has not been correctly applied, the agency's 
errors are to be corrected.  
Dunning, at 63; see also generally, Mayland v. Flitner, 
2001 WY 69, ¶10, 28 P.3d 838, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001) and Miller v. Bradley, 4 P.3d 882, 886 (Wyo. 2000).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Date 
of Valuation/Evidentiary Issues

 

[¶9]      Citing Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 24-9-103, appellant contends that only after the Board has determined 
that the viewers' and appraisers' reportwhich addresses the location of the 
road and the amount of damagesis "just" and payment of the assessed damages by 
the applicant of all costs of locating the road, can the road then be declared 
to be a private road.  Thus, 
appellant argues that until such time, no "taking" has occurred and, therefore, 
a date of valuation has yet to occur.  
Continuing this line of reasoning, appellant asserts that both the 
district court and the Board erred by precluding it from presenting additional 
evidence of the value of appellant's property affected by the proposed road for 
the time period of September 28, 1999, to June 20, 2001.2

 

[¶10]   Appellant's argument requires us to 
interpret certain statutes that are applicable to the establishment of private 
roads.  In State by and through 
Dep't of Rev. v. Union Pacific Rail­road Co., 2003 WY 54, ¶12, __ P.3d 
__, ¶12 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting McClean v. State, 2003 WY 17, ¶6, 62 P.3d 595, ¶6 (Wyo. 2003), we explained:

 

            
We have long recognized that conclusions of law, such as questions 
regarding statu­tory interpretation, are to be reviewed by this court de 
novo.  Hutchings v. 
Krachun, 2002 WY 98,  ¶10, 49 P.3d 176, ¶10 (Wyo. 
2002).  In Pagel v. 
Franscell, 2002 WY 169, ¶9, 57 P.3d. 1226, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Wyoming 
Cmty. College Comm'n v. Casper Cmty. Col­lege Dist., 2001 WY 86, 
¶¶16-18, 31 P.3d 1242, ¶¶16-18 (Wyo. 2001)), we stated:

 

In 
interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to deter­mine the 
legislature's intent.  Fontaine 
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 4 P.3d 890, 894 (Wyo. 2000); State ex rel. 
Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1983).  Legisla­tive intent must be 
ascertained ini­tially and primarily from the words used in the 
statute.  Allied-Signal, Inc. v. 
State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 1991); Phillips v. 
Duro-Last Roof­ing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834, 837 (Wyo. 1991).  When the words are clear and 
unambiguous, a court risks an impermissi­ble substitution of its own views, 
or those of others, for the intent of the legislature if any effort is made to 
interpret or construe statutes on any basis other than the language invoked by 
the legislature. Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d  at 219.  Moreover, "[a]ll statutes must be 
construed in pari materia; and in ascer­taining the meaning of a 
given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or hav[ing] the same 
general purpose must be con­sidered and construed in harmony."  Fontaine, 4 P.3d  at 894 
(citing State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d at 
735).

 

            
Therefore, in performing our review, we look first to the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the words to deter­mine if the statute is 
ambiguous.  Olheiser v. State ex 
rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 866 P.2d 768, 770 (Wyo. 1994) (citing 
Parker Land & Cattle Company v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Wyo. 1993)).  A 
statute is clear and unam­biguous if its wording is such that reasonable 
persons are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and 
predictability.  Parker Land 
& Cattle, at 1043. Conversely, a statute is ambigu­ous if it is 
found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.  Id.  We have said that divergent opinions 
among parties as to the meaning of a statute may be evi­dence of 
ambiguity.  Basin Electric Power 
Co-op. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d 557, 561 (Wyo. 1978).  However, the fact that opin­ions may 
differ as to a stat­ute's meaning is not conclusive of ambiguity.  Ultimately, whether a statute is 
ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court. 
Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d  at 219.

 

[¶11]   Wyo. Stat. § 24-9-101, states, in 
pertinent part:

 

Any 
person whose land has no outlet to, nor connection with a public road, may apply 
in writing to the board of county commissioners of his county for a private road 
leading from his premises to some convenient public road.  . . .  At the hearing, all parties interested 
may appear and be heard by the board as to the necessity of the road and all 
matters pertaining thereto.  Upon 
the hearing of the application, whether the owner or others interested appear or 
not, if the board finds that the applicant has complied with the law and that 
the private road is necessary, the board shall appoint three (3) disinterested 
freeholders and elec­tors of the county, as viewers and appraisers, and 
shall cause an order to be issued directing them to meet . . . on the 
proposed road, and view and locate a private road according to the 
appli­cation therefor, and to assess damages to be sustained 
thereby. . . . The viewers shall then proceed to locate and 
mark out a private road in accordance with the application or in such other 
manner and location they deem appropriate. . . . The 
viewers shall also at the same time assess the damages sustained by the owner 
over which the road is to be established and make full and true returns, 
with a plat of the road to the board of county commissioners. 

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-103, 
goes on further to state:

 

The 
viewers and appraisers so appointed, or a majority of them, shall make a report 
to the county commissioners at the next regular session, of the private road so 
located by them, and also the amount of damages, if any, assessed by them, and 
the person or persons entitled to such damages, and if the commissioners are 
satisfied that such report is just, and after payment by the applicant of all 
cost of locating such road, and the damages assessed by the viewers, the 
commis­sioners shall order such report to be confirmed and declare such road 
to be a private road, and the same shall be recorded as 
such.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶12]   Applying the plain and ordinary 
meaning to the language used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-9-101 and 24-9-103, 
we find no ambiguity.   Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 clearly man­dates that the viewers and appraisers 
assess damages at the same time they meet for the purpose of viewing the 
affected real property and locating the proposed road.  Similarly, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-103 
squarely expresses the legislature's intent that the county com­missioners 
involved would soon thereafter, at the county commissioner's next 
scheduled session, receive a report of the viewers and appraisers which 
included, in part, their assess­ment of damages made at the time of 
their viewing of the affected property so the county commissioners could 
determine if that report should be confirmed.  No significant delay or later date for 
the assessment of damages as argued by appellant can be inferred from this 
lan­guage.  

 

[¶13]   As we recognized in 
Wagstaff, at ¶12, and many other previous cases dealing with the 
establishment of private roads, the language used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101, 
discloses the legislature's intent that the procedure under the statute provide, 
in a local forum, a readily available, economically affordable, and time 
efficient method to obtain a means of access to property.  See also Martens v. Johnson 
County Bd. of Comm'rs, 954 P.2d 375, 380 (Wyo. 1998) and McGuire v. 
McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1288 (Wyo. 1980).   Appellant's reading of the statute 
frustrates this intent.

 

[¶14]   Furthermore, under appellant's 
theory, the amount of damages would be an ever-mov­ing target subject to 
potential manipulation and continual review.  Given appellant's expressed scenario, 
unless the county commissioners entered a final order on the same day as the 
damages hearing, the assessment of damages would continue to remain at 
issue.  The legislature could not 
have intended the damages valuation to change for an undefined period of time or 
that the final determination of damages be extended depending on when the county 
commissioners entered their final order or, as is pointed out by this action, 
when subsequent appeals on the county commissioners' decision are determined by 
the courts.  We have on a number of 
occasions recognized that the legislature intended that good faith and reason 
prevail in the establishment of private roads.  Wagstaff, at ¶12; Martens, 
at 380; Dunning v. Ankney, 936 P.2d 61, 64-65 (Wyo. 1997); Lindt v. 
Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 462 (Wyo. 1995); McGuire, at 1288.  We fail to see how an ever-changing 
damages assessment would promote good faith and reason.

 

[¶15]   The viewers and appraisers met with 
Mr. Jon R. Gray, president of R.C.R., Inc., on January 15, 1999, the date of 
their scheduled viewing of the real property affected by the proposed private 
road.  Mr. Gray indicated appellant 
had some general intent in the future to subdivide its property.  Further, Mr. Gray showed the viewers and 
appraisers the possible location of improvements for an anticipated subdivision 
and golf course.  At that time, 
how­ever, Mr. Gray indicated that no plans had been submitted to rezone and 
subdivide appellant's property.  The 
viewers and appraisers also confirmed that a subdivision plat had not been 
appropriately approved and recorded concerning appellant's property.  

 

[¶16]   Because appellant objected to the 
damages assessment made by the viewers and apprais­ers, the Board held a 
hearing on September 27, 1999, wherein appellant was given a full opportunity to 
present evidence and witnesses concerning damages, including appellant's desire 
to potentially subdivide its property.  
In fact, appellant presented the only witnesses at this hearing, calling 
three witnesses.  

 

[¶17]   The first witness, Jonathan Schnal, 
Planning Economic Development Director for Carbon County, testified that in 
August of 1998 his office received an imprecise sketch of a proposed rezoning 
and subdivision plan including both appellant's property as well as a 
neighboring property.  In June of 
1999, another drawing was received from appellant, but Mr. Schnal's office did 
not understand what was being proposed by this second drawing.  Mr. Schnal indicated that the rezoning 
and subdivision application of appellant was on hold and in suspense because the 
neighboring property had not been removed from the plan or authority for such 
rezoning and subdivision received from the owner of the neighboring 
property.  Furthermore, appellant 
had failed to provide additional requested information and had not completed the 
numerous and substantial steps for rezoning and subdivision.  Mr. Schnal also testified that before 
rezoning and subdivision could occur 1) reviews would have to be completed by 
the State of Wyoming, Department of Environmental Quality, and the Wyoming State 
Engineer, 2) appellant would need to prepare and submit covenants for the 
subdivision that would need to be approved, and 3) appellant would need to 
complete, after first being approved by the necessary agencies, numerous 
improvements to the property.  
Critically, Mr. Schnal also confirmed that appellant's property remained 
zoned as ranch, agricultural, and mining property. 

 

[¶18]   The second witness, Mr. Gray, 
testified about appellant's plans to subdivide its prop­erty but admitted 
that any formal steps to complete this plan were, at minimum, still in their 
infancy.  Mr. Gray's testimony 
included his opinion of the estimated value of appellant's property after 
rezoning and subdivision and his estimated damage calculations with respect to 
the proposed private road.  However, 
Mr. Gray's opinions were based only on his own general personal experiences as a 
developer and general information he stated he had received from realtors in the 
area.  As such, Mr. Gray's opinions 
are somewhat speculative and lacking in foundation.

 

[¶19]   Appellant's last witness, Thomas 
Grieve, was a real estate broker.  
Mr. Grieve con­firmed that he had experience in the sale of 
recreational type properties in Carbon County. Nevertheless, he stated he could 
neither agree nor disagree with the valuations expressed by Mr. Gray concerning 
appellant's property because he did not have sufficient foundation to do 
so.  

 

[¶20]   Reviewing the record, we conclude 
that all parties, including appellant, were allowed to fully develop their 
respective positions on damages at the September 27, 1999 hearing.  As we explained above, following the 
clear and unambiguous language of the applicable statutes, the assessment of 
damages upon the establishment of a private road must be cal­culated on the 
date of the viewing of the affected real property by the appointed viewers and 
appraisers and the circumstances that exist at that time.  Accordingly, we hold that the 
dis­trict court and the Board did not err when they precluded appellant from 
presenting any additional evidence concerning damages after the September 27, 
1999 hearing.

 

[¶21]   We further note that the position 
of appellant points out the potential for manipulation by the owner of the 
affected property if assessment of damages is not limited to the date of viewing 
by the appointed viewers and appraisers and the circumstances that actually 
exist at that time.  The evidence 
presented established that appellant did not submit its admittedly very rough 
sketch concerning rezoning and subdivision of its property and surrounding 
prop­erty until August 18, 1998, just one day before the initial hearing 
held in this case.  Subsequently, 
appellant did little more to further this application.  The fact that the same parties involved 
in this appeal were previously embroiled in contentious litigation regarding the 
attempted establishment of an easement across appellant's property also does not 
support Mr. Gray's statements regarding appellant's long-time desire to rezone 
and subdivide its property.  
Appellant took no formal actions at that time to establish its alleged 
desire to rezone and subdivide its property.  Therefore, while Mr. Gray expressed that 
appellant always desired to rezone and subdivide its property, these statements 
must be viewed as at least somewhat suspect.

 

[¶22]   Finally, our holding recognizes the 
well-established principle that evidentiary rulings are within the sound 
discretion of the administrative agency or trial court including 
determi­nations of the adequacy of foundation, relevancy, competency, 
materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This court will generally accede to such 
determinations unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown.  See Garnick v. Teton County 
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2002 WY 18, ¶13, 39 P.3d 1034, ¶13 (Wyo. 2002); Wilks 
v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶19, 49 P.3d 975, ¶19 (Wyo. 2002); McGhee v. 
Rork, 978 P.2d 577, 580 (Wyo. 1999); Goddard v. Colonel Bozeman's 
Restaurant, 914 P.2d 1233, 1238 (Wyo. 1996).  Likewise, we have also stated on a 
number of occasions that determinations concerning credibility of the evidence 
and weight of the evidence will not be disturbed by this court unless clearly 
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.  Brierley v. State ex rel. Workers' 
Safety & Compen­sation Div., 2002 WY 121, ¶16, 52 P.3d 564, ¶16 
(Wyo. 2002); Newman v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation 
Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶31, 49 P.3d 163, ¶31 (Wyo. 2002).  

 

[¶23]   In this case, the district court 
explicitly ordered that an evidentiary hearing be held by the Board "for the 
sole and narrow issue of determining damages."  This hearing afforded appellant due 
process by requiring the viewers and appraisers to explain their determination 
of damages and to be subject to cross-examination.   

 

Substantial 
Evidence Regarding Assessed Damages

 

[¶24]   In the second two issues, appellant 
essentially argues that the Board was presented with insufficient evidence to 
render an appropriate determination on the assessment of damages upon 
establishment of the private road.  
In particular, appellant proffers that the viewers and appraisers 
improperly ignored damages to all of appellant's land and improperly 
determined the damages to appellant's land within the roadway corridor, both in 
contravention of those requirements set forth in Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶25]   We have previously had occasion to 
address the issue of establishing damages as it relates to applications for a 
private road under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-9-101 et seq.  In Lindt, at 463, we 
stated:

 

            
The Lindts claim the damage award is improper.  It is evi­dent from the proceedings 
before the Board that the direc­tions given the Board by the district court 
in its remand order were not observed or understood.  Therefore, we remand to the district 
court with directions that the district court remand to the Board and the Board 
reassemble the viewers and appraisers, or if necessary a different body of 
viewers and appraisers, and those viewers and appraisers assess damages as 
follows: (1) determine the value of the entirety of the Lindts' affected land 
before the private road was established; then, (2) determine the value of the 
Lindts' remaining land after the private road is in place; (3) subtract the 
"after" value from the "before" value, which then equals the damages due the 
Lindts.  Coronado Oil Co. v. 
Grieves, 642 P.2d 423, 433 (Wyo. 1982); and see gener­ally Mettee v. 
Kemp, 236 Kan. 781, 696 P.2d 947, 949 (1985) (discussing Kansas statute 
which enumerates factors which may be considered in the "before-after" 
analysis).

 

See 
also Mayland v. Flitner, 
2001 WY 69, ¶¶32-44, 28 P.3d 838, ¶¶32-44 (Wyo. 2001) and Miller v. 
Bradley, 4 P.3d 882, 888-89 (Wyo. 2000). 

 

[¶26]   Appellant claims that the viewers 
and appraisers improperly attempted to assess dam­ages, only taking into 
account the damage to the land within the roadway corridor rather than taking 
into account the damages to the whole of appellant's property.  At the hearing held on February 13, 
2001, the viewers and appraisers specifically confirmed that they did consider 
diminution in the value of appellant's property outside the roadway 
corridor.  However, they viewed 
appellant's property as range and meadowland and, therefore, determined that the 
property outside of the roadway would be unaffected in dollar value by the 
private roadway.  

 

[¶27]   The viewers and appraisers 
correctly stated the "before" and "after" parameters for the assessment of 
damages expressed in Lindt v. Murray and explained that they applied them 
in their evaluation.  Mr. Espy 
testified as follows:

 

We just felt that it affected that corridor where the road was and 
not the property further in, because thewhen we reviewed it that day, basically 
it was rangeland and meadowland, and because we inquired and there was no 
subdivision plat on file.  So we 
didn't feel that the property further in was affected valuewise.  We just felt that the corridor was what 
was affected.
 

When 
Mr. Espy was asked to explain his understanding of what Lindt v. Murray 
required of viewers and appraisers in making a dam­ages assessment, he 
responded:

 

            
Basically, take the value of the property that was affected as a whole, 
do the damage amount, and take the value of the property again.  Basically, the difference is the 
damages.
 

Mr. Espy 
then explained the means by which the viewers and appraisers determined the 
assessment of damages in this case:

 

            
Well, when we did it, basically what we came up with wasit wassince 
basically we viewed it as rangeland and meadowland, we viewed that the property 
basically outside of the corridor would have been unaffected in dollar value 
before and after.  And it was just 
because, like [counsel] just asked us, you know, it would have been different, 
you know, if there would have been, you know, existing plats out there, or 
houses.  But since we just viewed it 
as rangeland, we didn't think that it made any difference in the value of the 
property outside the cor­ridor before and after.  We just viewed it as theright down the 
corridor were the only places that we saw that there were 
dam­ages.

 

. . .

 

            
We considered outside the corridor, but since we basi­cally 
considered it as range or meadowland, basically it was range or meadowland 
before the proposed road and it would be range or meadowland after the proposed 
road.  So we didn't view that there 
was, you know, substantialor basically hardly any change in value to that 
property before and after.
 

[¶28]   Upon our independent review of the 
record, we hold that the viewers and appraisers did consider appellant's 
property as a whole, but their conclusion was no damage would be caused to that 
property with the exception of damages sustained by the actual land taken for 
placement of the private road.  As a 
result, we conclude that the viewers and appraisers com­plied with 
applicable law in making this assessment and that substantial evidence existed 
to support their conclusion.  As 
indicated previously, at the time of viewing, appellant's prop­erty was 
zoned as ranch, agricultural, and mining property. 

 

[¶29]   Appellant also asserts that the 
viewers and appraisers erred because they failed to take into consideration the 
highest and best use of appellant's property.  Appellant posits that the viewers and 
appraisers should have utilized the valuation of its property assuming that it 
would be rezoned and subdivided. As mentioned previously, Mr. Gray testified 
about appel­lant's plans to rezone and subdivide its property and admitted 
that almost all the formal steps to complete this plan remained 
unsatisfied.  Mr. Schnal testified 
that the rezoning and subdi­vision application of appellant was on hold for 
a multitude of reasons. Appellant's property also remained zoned as ranch, 
agricultural, and mining property. Therefore, substantial evidence exists to 
support the assessment of damages of the viewers and appraisers based on 
appellant's property being used as grazing and meadowland.    

 

[¶30]   Appellant also contests the manner 
in which the viewers and appraisers estimated the damages incurred as a result 
of the placement of the private road.  
Specifically, appellant argues that no comparable property sales or 
market values were used by the viewers and appraisers in making their assessment 
and no factual basis was established for the $1.00 per running foot value used 
in their calculations.     

 

[¶31]   The viewers and appraisers utilized 
their own expertise and experience in arriving at a value.  The appointed viewers and appraisers had 
previously served in this capacity in other private road and similar 
proceedings.  They had experience in 
banking, accounting, real estate sales, and ranching.  Comparable sales in the same locality 
were unavailable.  Thus, the viewers 
and appraisers utilized their independent knowledge of a similar transaction 
regarding the valuation of a private road easement in another location and made 
adjustments considering the difference in location and other factors. The 
viewers and appraisers also utilized their general knowledge of land values and 
the real estate market for similar property in the area.  This rational and all-inclusive approach 
taken by the viewers and appraisers derived a fair and equitable assessment of 
damages.

 

[¶32]   We indicated in Carney v. Board 
of County Comm'rs of Sublette County, 757 P.2d 556, 561 (Wyo. 1988), that 
appointed viewers and appraisers must be disinterested freehold­ers and 
electors of the county who are knowledgeable of the local conditions and will 
apply that knowledge and their common sense in making their determination.  This is precisely what the viewers and 
appraisers did in this case.  The 
record before us makes it apparent that the viewers and appraisers made the 
appropriate review utilizing the required "before-after" analysis to determine 
dam­ages.  In reviewing appeals 
from administrative bodies, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency as long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence.  Hence, we hold the Board's finding of 
damages is supported by substantial evidence. 

 

Due 
Process.

 

[¶33]   Finally, appellant asserts that it 
was not afforded due process because it was not allowed to question the third 
viewer and appraiser at the February 13, 2001 hearing.  While two of the viewers and appraisers 
testified at this hearing and were subject to substantial cross-examination by 
appellant, the third viewer and appraiser, Mr. Quealy, due to a serious illness, 
was unable to attend the hearing. 

 

[¶34]   Appellant was given a due process 
hearing to address the submitted report of the view­ers and appraisers and 
utilized this hearing to extensively cross-examine two of the three viewers and 
appraisers concerning the determination of damages.  Testimony elicited from the two viewers 
and appraisers available for hearing indicated that the three viewers and 
appraisers collectively determined where to locate the private road and what 
damages should be assessed.  Nothing 
in the record even remotely reflects that Mr. Quealy dissented or dis­agreed 
in any fashion with the decision reached and detailed within the submitted 
report of the viewers and appraisers.  
Therefore, it appears that the testimony of Mr. Quealy would have been 
merely cumulative.    

 

[¶35]   Due to the fact that appellant has 
failed to demonstrate how the testimony of Mr. Quealy would have affected the 
calculation of damages or the actual award of damages and the record indicates 
appellant was afforded a fair and just opportunity to appear before the Board to 
contest the damages determined by the viewers and appraisers, we hold appellant 
was afforded requisite due process under the applicable statutes.  See Martens v. Johnson County 
Bd. of Comm'rs, 954 P.2d  at 380; Carney v. Board of County Comm'rs of 
Sublette County, at 559-60; and Gold v. Board of County Comm'rs of 
Teton County, 658 P.2d 690, 695-96 (Wyo. 1983).

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶36]   For those reasons stated above, we 
affirm the Board's establishment of the private road and assessment of damages 
in this case.   

 

FOOTNOTES

1The 
legislature amended these statutes in 2000 clarifying the procedures to 
establish a private road.  However, 
the 1999 version of statutes are applicable to this action.  Therefore all references will be made to 
the 1999 version.

 

2Appellant 
filed an Application for Leave to Present Additional Evidence with the district 
court on July 21, 2000 which was denied.  
Further, appellant opposed appellees' Amended Motion In Limine and filed 
its own Motion to Submit Additional Evidence before the Board.  Ultimately, the Board granted appellees' 
Motion In Limine and denied appellant's Motion to Submit Additional Evidence.