Case Title: Austin J. Fox v. Catholic Knights Insurance Society

Citation: 2003 WI 87

Docket Number: 2001AP001469

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 87 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1469 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Austin J. Fox, a minor, by Matthew T.  
Fricker, guardian ad litem,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Catholic Knights Insurance Society, 
a Wisconsin corporation,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 117 
Reported at:  254 Wis. 2d 632, 649 N.W.2d 307 
(Ct. App.-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 17, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy G. Dugan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed) 
BABLITCH, J., joins the concurrence. 
BABLITCH, J., concurs (opinion filed)   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Paul J. Pytlik, Michelle M. Stoeck, and Hills Legal Group, 
Ltd., Waukesha, and oral argument by Paul J. Pytlik. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by George P. 
Kersten and Kersten & McKinnon, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by George P. Kersten. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Anne Berleman Kearney 
and 
Appellate 
Consulting 
Group, Milwaukee; Christopher W. 
Brownell and Thrivent Financial for Lutherans, Appleton; and 
Paul F. Heaton and The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance 
 
 
2
Company, Milwaukee, on behalf of the Northwestern Mutual Life 
Insurance Company and Thrivent Financial for Lutherans. 
2003 WI 87 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1469  
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 8152) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Austin J. Fox, a minor, by Matthew T.  
Fricker, guardian ad litem,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Catholic Knights Insurance Society, a  
Wisconsin corporation,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   Catholic Knights Insurance Society 
(CKIS) petitions this court for review of a published opinion of 
the court of appeals, Fox v. Catholic Knights Insurance Society, 
2002 WI App 117, 254 Wis. 2d 632, 649 N.W.2d 307.  The court of 
appeals, in a split decision, reversed an order of the Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court, Timothy G. Dugan, Judge, that granted 
summary judgment in favor of CKIS.  The court of appeals held 
that coverage existed under an insurance policy even though the 
policyholder died before completing a required blood test and 
No. 
01-1469   
 
2 
 
that under Wis. Stat. § 631.11(3) (1997-98),1 CKIS is prevented 
from refusing to pay benefits claimed under the insurance 
policy. 
¶2 
Austin Fox (Fox), a minor, through his guardian ad 
litem, brought suit against CKIS, alleging breach of contract 
after CKIS denied his claim for benefits under the life 
insurance policy for which his father had applied.  Patrick Fox 
(Patrick), Fox's father, applied for a life insurance policy and 
listed Fox as the primary beneficiary.  Patrick filled out the 
application and paid the initial premium.  The application 
included a section entitled "Receipt for Payment and Conditional 
Insurance Agreement."  This section noted that coverage under 
the agreement would not begin until certain conditions were 
satisfied.  One of these was completion of a medical study, a 
blood test.  Unfortunately, Patrick was killed in an automobile 
accident before completing the blood test.  Because the blood 
test was never done, CKIS denied coverage, claiming that the 
policy had never gone into effect. 
¶3 
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment in the 
circuit court.  The circuit court ruled in favor of CKIS, 
finding that no insurance policy was in effect and that 
Wis. Stat. § 631.11(3) only related to conditions subsequent 
and, as such, did not apply.  Fox appealed, and a divided court 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-1469   
 
3 
 
of appeals reversed.  CKIS then petitioned this court for 
review, which we granted.   
¶4 
Two related issues arise before this court:  (1) 
whether there was an effective conditional insurance agreement 
in place at the time of Patrick's death; and (2) whether 
Wis. Stat. § 631.11(3) applies in this case such that in order 
to avoid coverage, CKIS must show the failure to complete the 
blood test increased its risk.  We now reverse the court of 
appeals' decision and hold that the circuit court's granting of 
summary judgment in favor of CKIS was appropriate.  We hold that 
no effective insurance policy was in place at the time of 
Patrick's death and that, as a result, Wis. Stat. § 631.11 is 
inapplicable. 
I 
¶5 
The relevant facts of this case are undisputed.  On 
May 21, 1997, Patrick completed an "Application for Membership 
and Life Insurance" for a $150,000 term life insurance policy 
from CKIS.  In the application, Patrick named Austin Fox, his 
then two-year-old son, as the primary beneficiary.  On that 
date, Patrick also paid $31.94 as a first premium. 
¶6 
The application contains a section titled "Receipt for 
Payment and Conditional Insurance Agreement."  This section 
provides, in relevant part: 
Terms and Conditions of Agreement 
A.  Coverage Amount. 
The amount of insurance that is in effect by this 
Agreement for each Proposed Insured is the amount 
No. 
01-1469   
 
4 
 
shown in the application, but in no event shall 
CKIS' 
liability 
under 
this 
and 
any 
other 
Agreements 
be 
more 
than 
$300,000 
for 
each 
Proposed Insured. 
B.  Coverage Limitations 
. . . .  
2.  No coverage shall be in force if the 
person(s) proposed to be insured is not a risk 
insurable in accordance with CKIS rules, limits 
and standards for the plans and amounts applied 
for without any modification as to plan, amount, 
riders and/or the rate of premium paid. 
3.  No coverage shall be in effect if there is 
any 
material 
misrepresentation 
in 
the 
application. 
. . . .  
C.  When Coverage Begins (subject to the Limitations 
in section B above) 
Coverage under this Agreement begins on the latest of 
the following dates: 
——The date of this application 
——The date of this Agreement 
——The effective date specifically requested in 
the application 
——The date of completion of all examinations and 
medical 
studies 
required 
by 
the 
rules 
and 
practices of CKIS. 
. . . .  
(Bold and italics in original.) 
¶7 
Another section of the application entitled "Agent's 
Report" required the agent to mark which of several medical 
requirements 
applied 
to 
the 
applicant. 
 
On 
Patrick's 
No. 
01-1469   
 
5 
 
application, the agent marked only the box for the blood test.2  
In that section, the agent also affirmed that he had explained 
the Conditional Insurance Agreement to the applicant.  The agent 
working with Patrick noted in the Agent's Report that he 
explained the Conditional Agreement.  Later, this agent also 
submitted an affidavit to the circuit court in which he stated 
that he had fully explained to Patrick the terms and conditions 
of the Conditional Insurance Agreement and specifically informed 
him of "the need to complete the required medical studies before 
the insurance would begin." 
¶8 
Patrick initially set an appointment to get the 
required medical examination on May 30, 1997.  Prior to the 
appointment, however, he canceled and rescheduled the testing 
for the afternoon of June 6, 1997.   
¶9 
Unfortunately, early on June 6, 1997, Patrick was 
killed in a motor vehicle accident.  The accident occurred 
before he completed the required medical testing.  However, 
shortly after his death, the coroner drew a blood sample from 
Patrick's body and sent it to the Wisconsin State Laboratory of 
Hygiene for evaluation to determine if alcohol was involved in 
the accident.   
                                                 
2 CKIS asserts that a urine test was also required, despite 
the fact it was not marked in the Agent's Report.  Several 
affidavits included in the record affirm that Patrick was to 
complete both blood and urine tests.  Because we find the blood 
test issue alone to be dispositive in the case, this dispute is 
not material and we do not reach a conclusion about whether a 
urine test was required. 
No. 
01-1469   
 
6 
 
¶10 After receiving notice of Patrick's death, CKIS denied 
coverage and refused to pay any benefits based on Patrick's 
application.  CKIS wrote to Patrick's father and explained that 
because the blood draw never took place, the life insurance 
policy never took effect.  CKIS refunded the initial premium 
paid. 
¶11 On August 19, 1997, at the request of Patrick's 
family, Attorney Thomas Graham wrote CKIS to request that the 
insurance company use the post-mortem blood sample to test the 
insurability of Patrick.  CKIS declined the request on the basis 
that the blood draw was required before the policy could go into 
effect and that blood drawn after death was not usable for the 
purpose of determining insurability.  A CKIS Vice President, 
Fred Muenkel, wrote: 
Based 
on 
the 
language 
of 
the 
life 
insurance 
application which Mr. Fox signed, no policy was ever 
in place for Mr. Fox before he died, and, therefore, 
Catholic Knights has no coverage obligations.  The 
Application for Membership and Life Insurance which 
was signed by Mr. Fox and witnessed by Catholic 
Knights' Agent, Larry Hopke, required Mr. Fox to 
acknowledge that "the Society reserves the right to 
require a medical examination and medical studies of 
any person proposed for coverage."  Moreover, Mr. Fox 
gave his written authorization in the Application for 
Catholic Knights to obtain medical and non-medical 
information 
which 
"the 
Society 
will 
use . . . to 
determine 
eligibility 
for 
insurance 
coverage."  
Finally, and most importantly, Mr. Hopke states that 
he gave Mr. Fox a Receipt for Payment and Conditional 
Insurance Agreement which clearly states that coverage 
will [not] begin until "the date of completion of all 
examinations and medical studies required by the rules 
and practices of CKIS." 
No. 
01-1469   
 
7 
 
The Catholic Knights Rate Book . . . specifies 
that a blood profile is a routine requirement for all 
applications for coverage in excess of $99,999.  Mr. 
Fox applied for $150,000 in coverage, and, therefore, 
a blood profile was a condition of our Conditional 
Insurance 
Agreement form, 
without 
which 
a 
final 
decision for insurance coverage could not be made.  
The [R]ate Book explains that the blood profile is to 
be done by one of our paramedical providers, with a 
complete analysis done according to our prescribed 
protocol by Osborne Laboratories. 
The agent, Mr. Hopke, attests that he fully 
explained the terms of the Conditional Agreement to 
Mr. Fox, including the requirement that a blood draw 
would be needed from Mr. Fox before coverage could 
become effective. . . .  
Based on the above, we must decline your request 
that we contact the state crime lab to obtain a blood 
sample taken [from] Mr. Fox after his death to 
determine insurability of Mr. Fox.  The purpose of the 
blood profile is to determine insurability of an 
applicant. . . .  There is no basis in law or under 
the Insurance Application that would obligate Catholic 
Knights to have blood drawn and profiled after an 
applicant's death to determine insurability. . . .  
¶12 Austin Fox, through a guardian ad litem, then brought 
an action against CKIS to recover the benefits under the policy.  
Both parties brought motions for summary judgment in the circuit 
court.  Fox claimed that the policy's condition of the blood 
test was fulfilled when blood drawn from Patrick after his death 
was made available to the insurance company.  He also argued 
CKIS could not avoid its obligation because the company could 
not prove any increased risk from the unfulfilled condition 
under Wis. Stat. § 631.11(3).  CKIS, on the other hand, asserted 
that there was no policy in effect because Patrick failed to 
complete the medical exam before his death, and that the blood 
No. 
01-1469   
 
8 
 
drawn after Patrick's death was not usable for the purpose of 
determining insurability. 
¶13 The circuit court ordered summary judgment in favor of 
CKIS, finding that Patrick died before coverage began.  The 
court also found that the blood draw was a condition precedent 
to coverage and that § 631.11(3) related only to conditions 
subsequent. 
¶14 In a divided opinion, the court of appeals reversed 
the order of the circuit court.  The majority held that 
§ 631.11(3) was unambiguous and applied to conditions precedent.  
Specifically, the court stated:  "In this case, however, 
Wis. Stat. § 631.11(3) trumps 
what 
otherwise 
might be the 
preclusive effect of [the requirement of a medical exam in the 
Conditional Insurance Agreement]."  Fox, 254 Wis. 2d 632, ¶14.  
The court went on to find that because CKIS could not prove that 
the failure to complete the blood draw and medical studies 
contributed to or increased the risk of loss, it was required to 
provide 
coverage 
under 
the 
policy. 
 
The 
majority 
found 
unpersuasive CKIS's arguments that a urine test was required in 
addition to the blood test and that the post-mortem blood sample 
would be insufficient for testing insurability. 
¶15 Judge Ted Wedemeyer Jr., dissented.  He agreed with 
the circuit court's analysis and found that § 631.11(3) was 
inapplicable.  Further, he held that because no blood was drawn 
from Patrick until after his death, the life insurance policy 
did not go into effect. 
No. 
01-1469   
 
9 
 
¶16 Upon review, we reverse the holding of the court of 
appeals.  We agree with Judge Wedemeyer's dissenting opinion, 
finding that under the facts of this case, no effective policy 
of insurance coverage yet existed and, as such, § 631.11(3) does 
not apply. 
II 
¶17 This case arose as a review of a grant of summary 
judgment.  "[W]e review a grant of summary judgment by applying 
the same methodology as the circuit court."  Farm Credit Servs. 
v. Wysocki, 2001 WI 51, ¶7, 243 Wis. 2d 305, 627 N.W.2d 444.  
Under Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), summary judgment is proper "if the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, 
and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."   
¶18 Neither party here argues that material issues of fact 
remain.  Determining whether summary judgment was appropriately 
granted here requires us to interpret both an insurance contract 
and a statute.  The interpretation of an insurance contract is a 
question of law subject to de novo review.  Wisconsin Label 
Corp. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 26, ¶22, 233 
Wis. 2d 314, 607 N.W.2d 276 (citation omitted).  "Insurance 
policies are contracts and are governed by the same rules that 
govern interpretation of contracts in general."  Id., ¶23.  We 
interpret contracts with the goal of determining and giving 
effect to the parties' intentions.  Id.   
No. 
01-1469   
 
10 
 
¶19 Statutory interpretation also raises a question of law 
that we review de novo.  Gloudeman v. City of St. Francis, 143 
Wis. 2d 780, 784, 422 N.W.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1988).  Statutory 
construction has the purpose of assisting the court to discern 
and apply legislative intent.  State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 
893, 
470 
N.W.2d 900 
(1991). 
 
If 
statutory 
language 
is 
unambiguous, we apply the statute using the common and generally 
accepted meanings of the terms.  DNR v. Wisconsin Power and 
Light Co., 108 Wis. 2d 403, 408, 321 N.W.2d 286 (1982).  We may 
refer to a recognized dictionary to determine the common meaning 
of terms.  Id.  Although the rules of statutory construction 
preclude us from using legislative history to uncover ambiguity 
where otherwise none exists, we are not precluded from looking 
to legislative history "'to reinforce and demonstrate that a 
statute plain on its face, when viewed historically, is indeed 
unambiguous.'"  Resp. Use of Rural & Agric. Land v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm., 2000 WI 129, ¶41, 239 Wis. 2d 660, 619 N.W.2d 888 
(internal citations omitted). 
III 
¶20 We begin our analysis with the language of the 
statute.  Wisconsin Statute § 631.11(3) provides: 
Effect of Failure of Condition or Breach of Promissory 
Warranty.  No failure of a condition prior to a loss 
and no breach of a promissory warranty constitutes 
grounds for rescission of, or affects an insurer's 
obligations under, an insurance policy unless it 
exists at the time of the loss and either increases 
the risk at the time of the loss or contributes to the 
loss.  This subsection does not apply to failure to 
tender payment of premium. 
No. 
01-1469   
 
11 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The court of appeals found that, contrary to 
the assertions by CKIS, the phrase "no failure of a condition 
prior to a loss" was unambiguous and clearly applied to the 
policy at issue in this case.  See Fox, 254 Wis. 2d 632, ¶15 
n.5.  The majority held that the language of the statute 
operated to "trump[] what otherwise might be the preclusive 
effect" of the requirement for a medical examination.  See id., 
¶14.   
¶21 We disagree with this interpretation.  The court of 
appeals' interpretation overlooks several important words in the 
statute.  The statute discusses the failure of a condition in 
the context of rescission and "an insurer's obligations under[] 
an insurance policy."  Wis. Stat. § 631.11(3).  Both of these 
contexts require an effective policy to be in existence, or they 
make no sense.  For example, a policy that does not yet exist 
cannot be rescinded.   
¶22 CKIS asserts that the term "condition" is not clearly 
defined in the statute.  We agree to the extent that the statute 
does not reference the terms conditions precedent or conditions 
subsequent.  However, the language of the statute makes the 
correct interpretation clear.  Based on the language of 
§ 631.11(3), we believe that the statute only applies to 
conditions subsequent, not conditions precedent.   
¶23 Our 
interpretation 
of the 
statutory 
language is 
supported in a variety of ways.  First, as we have noted, the 
statute, by its own terms, applies only when there is an 
No. 
01-1469   
 
12 
 
insurance policy in effect.3  "Rescission" and "obligations 
under[] an insurance policy" cannot apply unless that is the 
case.  As such, conditions to the making of the contract, 
"conditions precedent,"4 cannot be implicated by the statute 
because the policy has not yet come into existence.  As has been 
noted:  "Conditions may be imposed in the application whereby no 
binding contract of insurance is effected until the conditions 
                                                 
3 We note that Wis. Stat. § 600.03(35) defines the word 
"policy" as "any document other than a group certificate used to 
prescribe in writing the terms of an insurance contract, 
including endorsements and riders and service contracts issued 
by motor clubs."  While this definition may well include 
temporary insurance agreements such as the one at issue here, it 
does nothing to resolve the underlying question of whether an 
effective policy exists. 
4 The Restatement of Contracts has avoided the use of the 
terms "condition precedent" and "condition subsequent," noting 
that the terminology has historically been a source of some 
confusion.  Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 224 Reporter's 
Note.  Instead, the Restatement refers to "conditions precedent" 
only as "conditions."  Id.   
While the Restatement expresses some dissatisfaction with 
the particular terminology utilized, it recognizes that courts 
have found that there may be events that must occur before a 
contract will exist.  Id., cmt. c (noting that "[w]hen an event 
that is not normally part of the process of formation of 
contract is made an event upon which the performance of the 
contract is dependent, courts often describe it as a condition 
that 
must 
be 
performed 
before 
the 
contract 
comes 
into 
existence").  The Restatement concludes that what it terms 
"conditions to the parties' performance" are not substantively 
different from "what are often called conditions to the 
existence of the contract."  Id.   
We use the terms "condition precedent" and "condition 
subsequent" for convenience, but note that however described, 
conditions may be put upon contracts, such that the existence of 
the contract depends upon satisfaction of the condition. 
No. 
01-1469   
 
13 
 
have been met."  Couch on Insurance § 11:6 (3d ed. 1999).  One 
insurance scholar has made the importance of a condition 
precedent in the context of temporary insurance quite clear: 
The effectiveness of a contract of temporary insurance 
may 
be 
made 
dependent 
upon 
the 
fulfillment 
of 
specifically named conditions, such as payment of the 
first full premium, approval or acceptance of the 
application by the insurer, completion of a medical 
examination, insurability, issuance or delivery of the 
policy, or any combination of the above.  As with any 
such contractual qualifications, the conditions must 
be met in order for a contract of temporary insurance 
to exist. 
Couch 
on 
Insurance 
§ 13.10 
(3d 
ed. 
1999) 
(emphasis 
added)(footnoted citations omitted).5 
¶24 A condition precedent relates to the very attachment 
of risk, whereas a condition subsequent "pertain[s] to the 
contract of insurance after the risk has attached and during the 
existence thereof."  Couch on Insurance § 81:19 (3d ed. 1999).  
Because conditions precedent relate to the attachment of risk 
and precede the existence of the policy, application of the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 631.11(3) would make no sense.  It 
would place an impossible burden on insurers.  Insurers cannot 
show, under § 631.11(3), that the failure of such a condition 
                                                 
5 See also Arnold P. Anderson, Life Insurance Conditional 
Receipts and Judicial Intervention, 63 Marq. L. Rev. 593, 595 
(1980) (noting that some courts have recognized a showing that 
certain conditions were met prior to finding interim insurance 
coverage existed); Alan I. Widiss, Life Insurance Applications 
and Interim Coverage Disputes:  Revisiting Controversies About 
Conditional Binding Receipts, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 1097, 1098 (1990) 
(noting that an insurer can agree to have coverage begin after a 
condition is met, such as after application is made or upon 
completion of a medical exam). 
No. 
01-1469   
 
14 
 
increased the risk at the time of the loss or contributed to the 
loss because risk has not yet attached.  Therefore, we find that 
if the conditional insurance agreement in this case was not yet 
in effect, § 631.11(3) is inapplicable. 
¶25 Fox counters this statutory language argument by 
noting that the statute specifically excludes one condition 
precedent, payment of premiums.  He argues that the specific 
exclusion of one such condition means that all other conditions 
precedent are necessarily included within the bounds of the 
statute.  We cannot agree.  We find that the payment of premiums 
is different from all other types of conditions in that it 
recurs.  As such, it may not always be a condition precedent.  
Although payment of an initial premium is certainly a condition 
preceding an insurance policy, premiums are typically due 
periodically without a lapse in coverage.  For example, 
Wis. Stat. § 632.44(2) 
requires 
that 
every 
life 
insurance 
policy, except group policies, "contain a provision entitling 
the policyholder to a grace period of not less than 31 days for 
the payment of any premium due except the first, during which 
the death benefit shall continue in force."  As such, payment of 
premiums is an altogether different type of condition and is 
appropriately addressed separately in the statutes.   
¶26 The court of appeals has recognized the difference 
between conditions under a contract and conditions to the making 
of a contract: 
There is a distinction (often blurred) between a 
condition under a contract (where, though there is a 
No. 
01-1469   
 
15 
 
binding contract, performance is delayed until the 
condition is satisfied) and a condition to the making 
of a contract (where there is no contract until the 
condition is satisfied).   
Kocinski v. Home Ins. Co., 147 Wis. 2d 728, 738, 433 N.W.2d 654 
(Ct. App. 1988), aff'd by 154 Wis. 2d 56, 452 N.W.2d 360 (1990).  
Thus, Wis. Stat. § 631.11(3) may apply differently depending on 
the specific condition in the context of an insurance policy or 
conditional insurance agreement.  The court of appeals provided 
a good example:  "'Where the parties to the proposed contract 
have agreed that the contract is not to be effective or binding 
until certain conditions are performed or occur, no binding 
contract will arise until the conditions specified have occurred 
or been performed.'"  Id. at 739 (quoting Parkview Gen. Hosp., 
Inc. v. Eppes, 447 S.W.2d 487, 490-91 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969)).   
¶27 Having examined conditions precedent generally, we now 
look for more specific support of our interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 631.11(3).  Wisconsin Civil Jury Instruction 3105 
indicates that § 631.11(3) was intended to apply only to 
conditions after an effective policy is in place.  Wis JI-Civil 
3105 is entitled "Insurance Contract:  Failure of Condition or 
Breach of Promissory Warranty," nearly identical to the statute.  
Further, the Comment to the instruction notes that it was 
patterned, at least in part, after § 631.11(3).  The Comment's 
explanation is especially helpful to our analysis: 
Failures 
of 
condition 
and 
breach 
of 
promissory 
warranty are closely related and for most purposes can 
be treated as synonymous.  Promissory warranties are 
those that require that something shall or shall not 
be done after the policy takes effect.  Therefore, the 
No. 
01-1469   
 
16 
 
above instruction is framed in terms of failure to 
have a night watchman on the premises and storage of 
inflammables so as to give examples of what breach of 
promissory warranty or condition might give rise to 
the "increase in risk" and "contribution to the loss" 
the statute speaks of. 
Comment to Wis JI-Civil 3105 (emphasis added).  The Comment 
makes clear that the terms are related to the time after the 
policy takes effect. 
¶28 The jury instruction comment that promissory warranty 
and failure of condition have been generally treated as 
synonymous takes us back to the plain language of the statute.  
The titles of the subsections of Wis. Stat. § 631.11 (1997-98), 
separating 
affirmative 
and 
promissory 
warranties, 
lend 
additional support to our finding that § 631.11(3) was intended 
to deal only with conditions subsequent.  Since 1975, when the 
statute was created, Wis. Stat. § 631.11 has 
had separate 
provisions for "breach of affirmative warranty" and "breach of 
promissory warranty."  See § 41, ch. 375, Laws of 1975.  At 
first, 
affirmative 
warranties 
were 
dealt 
with 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 631.11(2).  Id.  Then, in 1995, Wis. Stat. § 631.11 
was amended and § 631.11(2) became part of the section for 
"Effect of Negotiations for Contract," § 631.11(1)(b).  1995 
Wis. Act 259, §§ 1, 6.  Meanwhile, promissory warranties have 
always been dealt with separately, under § 631.11(3).  See § 41, 
ch. 375, Laws of 1975; 1995 Wis. Act 259, § 7.   
¶29 This separation is important.  Black's Law Dictionary 
differentiates between promissory and affirmative warranties.  
See Black's Law Dictionary 1583 (7th ed. 1999).  An affirmative 
No. 
01-1469   
 
17 
 
warranty is defined:  "A warranty——express or implied——that 
facts are as stated at the beginning of the policy period.  An 
affirmative warranty is usu[ally] a condition precedent to the 
policy taking effect."  Id. (emphasis added).  In contrast, a 
promissory warranty is defined:  "A warranty that facts will 
continue to be as stated throughout the policy period, such that 
a failure of the warranty provides the insurer with a defense to 
a claim under the policy.——Also termed continuing warranty."  
Id.  (emphasis added) (italics in original).  These definitions 
make clear that affirmative warranties typically refer to 
conditions precedent, while promissory warranties refer to 
conditions subsequent, conditions relevant to the period after 
an effective policy exists.  Therefore, it appears that the 
terms of § 631.11(3) only relate to conditions subsequent. 
¶30 In addition to the plain language of the statute, we 
find that the legislative history of the statute also supports 
limitation of the applicability of § 631.11(3).  Despite 
commentary from this court in Brown v. Equitable Life Insurance 
Company of Iowa, 60 Wis. 2d 620, 630, 211 N.W.2d 431 (1973) 
suggesting distaste for insurance industry tools such as 
conditional receipts,6 there is no indication in the drafting 
                                                 
6 The court stated: 
It is not within the province of this court to 
determine what coverage, in its good conscience, the 
life insurance industry should be required to offer 
under a conditional receipt.  Nor is this court 
empowered under secs. 601.41(1) and 206.17, Stats., to 
regulate and approve policies of life insurance.  That 
function is vested by the legislature in the office of 
No. 
01-1469   
 
18 
 
history of § 631.11(3) that the provision, or others in chapter 
631 for that matter, were created or revised to eliminate or 
severely restrict such types of insurance.7  See § 41, ch. 375, 
Laws of 1975; Drafting Record for ch. 375, Laws of 1975.  The 
creation of § 631.11(3) was part of a broad revision to the 
insurance laws of the state started by the legislature's 
organization of an Insurance Laws Revision Committee.8  The first 
                                                                                                                                                             
the commissioner of insurance.  We do not have the 
power to create a new contract for the parties.  Thus, 
while we may not approve of such a sales device as a 
conditional receipt and would like to see interim 
insurance afforded, we are powerless to so legislate. 
Brown v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, 60 Wis. 2d 620, 630, 
211 N.W.2d 431 (1973). 
7 In 1977, George Hardy, legislative counsel for The 
Northwestern 
Mutual 
Life 
Insurance 
Company 
in 
Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, and member of the Industry Advisory Committee that 
assisted the Insurance Laws Revision Committee in revamping 
Wisconsin's insurance laws, commented on Brown in a paper 
presented to The Association of Life Insurance Counsel, stating:   
The 
decision 
is 
sound 
and 
well-reasoned; 
unfortunately, the Court felt impelled to invite the 
Legislature to consider changing the law as the Court 
found it, in the following gratuitous remarks . . . . 
See George A. Hardy, The Life Insurance Law of Wisconsin:  
Revision of 1967-1977 425, 467 (1977)(hereinafter Life Insurance 
Law of Wisconsin).  Hardy then went on to cite language from the 
Brown decision.  Id.  Notably, however, this commentary does not 
indicate that the legislature responded to this court's remarks. 
8 As noted in 1967 Wisconsin Legislative Council Report:  
"The 1965 legislature created the insurance laws revision 
committee as an interim study committee of the legislative 
council to provide a thorough, careful study and modernization, 
revision and codification of the insurance laws."  Report of the 
Wisconsin 
Legislative Council, Volume 
III, 
Insurance 
Laws 
Revision Committee, at 87 (Nov. 1967) (hereinafter 1967 Report). 
No. 
01-1469   
 
19 
 
draft of what became chapters 631 and 632 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes was completed in 1970.  See V Legislative Council and 
Council Committees, 1969-71, Insurance Contracts (Aug. 1970) 
(hereinafter First Draft).  In this draft, the provisions of 
what 
became 
section 
631.11(3) 
were 
included 
in 
section 
631.31(3).  Id. at 27.  The language of that provision has 
remained much the same since its inception.9  As such, the 
language chosen for § 631.11(3) preceded this court's decision 
in Brown. 
¶31 The note to § 631.11 provides some insight into the 
purposes of revising these insurance provisions.  In one of its 
early reports, the ILRC noted that it intended to draft comments 
for the purpose of assisting, among others, the legislature and 
the courts.  See Report of the Wisconsin Legislative Council, 
Volume III, Insurance Laws Revision Committee, at 90 (Nov. 1967) 
(hereinafter 1967 Report).  The first draft of the statute 
                                                                                                                                                             
The efforts of the Insurance Laws Revision Committee (ILRC) 
were led by Professor Spencer L. Kimball, project director.  See 
1967 Report, at 87; see also Hardy, The Life Insurance Law of 
Wisconsin, at 426-27. 
9 Section 631.31(3) of this first draft stated: 
No failure of a condition prior to the loss and no 
breach of a promissory warranty shall affect the 
insurer's obligations under the policy unless it 
exists at the time of the loss and either increases 
the risk at the time of the loss or contributes to the 
loss.  Failure to tender payment of premium is not 
subject to this section but to s. 631.36. 
V Wisconsin Legislative Council and Council Committees, 1969-71, 
Insurance Contracts, at 27 (Aug. 1970). 
No. 
01-1469   
 
20 
 
contains essentially the same comment that now accompanies the 
text of the statute.  See First Draft, at 27-28.  Thus, these 
comments provide helpful insight into the drafting process for 
this statute.  For instance, the commentary noted that the new 
section, Wis. Stat. § 631.11(3), "explicitly brings failures of 
condition within the statutory provision."  However, the 
comments continue:  "Whether this actually changes anything is 
less certain."  § 41, ch. 375, Laws of 1975.  Thus, as noted in 
the comments to Wis JI-Civil 3105, failures of condition and 
promissory warranties were brought together under the new 
statute to receive similar treatment.   
¶32 The note also points out that Wis. Stat. § 631.11 
(1975) was intended to replace section 209.06 of the previous 
statutes and broaden it to expressly bring failures of condition 
within the statute.  See § 41, ch. 375, Laws of 1975.  The note 
suggests the reason for the explicit "failure of condition" 
language is to ensure that courts treat the failures of 
condition and promissory warranties the same, because a line of 
cases from other states, particularly Massachussetts, treated 
them differently and allowed insurers to "evade a warranty 
statute by couching the provision in conditional language."  Id.   
¶33 The ILRC comments also show a concern in policies both 
for the insurers and the insured: 
This draft seeks a better balance, protecting the 
insurer against fraud and violations of conditions 
that would preclude acceptance of the risk, and giving 
it access to the information it needs to underwrite, 
without giving it arbitrary power over the insured 
through application of the harsh common law doctrines. 
No. 
01-1469   
 
21 
 
§ 41, ch. 375, Laws of 1975.  This comment suggests that 
although 
protection 
of potential 
policyholders 
was 
deemed 
important, so, too, was the ability of insurance companies to 
get the information they need to underwrite policies.  Were we 
to rule that interim insurance is automatically provided upon 
payment of a first premium, potential insureds would have no 
incentive to fulfill requirements such as medical examinations 
which assist insurers with underwriting. 
¶34 Finally, we note that one federal court in Wisconsin 
has already had the opportunity to interpret the language of 
Wis. Stat. § 631.11(3).  In LaBonte v. Connecticut General Life 
Insurance Company, 723 F. Supp. 392, 395-96 (E.D. Wis. 1989), a 
federal district court in Wisconsin held that § 631.11(3) only 
applied to conditions after a policy takes effect, not before.  
In the case, the court was faced with a claim for coverage of a 
person under a group policy, where the person was not an 
employee.  Id. at 393.  The court found that membership was a 
condition precedent and, as such, there was no policy and 
§ 631.11(3) did not apply.  Id. at 395-96.   
¶35 Based on all of the above, we find that § 631.11(3) 
only applies to conditions subsequent to a policy becoming 
effective.  Thus, we proceed to the next issue raised in this 
case——whether an effective policy existed.  Fox asserts that 
there was a binding contract in place at the time Patrick signed 
the application and paid the initial premium.  He further 
asserts that the condition of a blood test was satisfied by the 
blood drawn from Patrick after his death.  The court of appeals 
No. 
01-1469   
 
22 
 
majority agreed, and found that the policy went into effect on 
May 21, 1997, the day Patrick submitted his application and paid 
the initial premium.  This court does not agree. 
¶36 We find that there is a great deal of authority for 
the proposition that the requirement of a medical examination 
may be made a condition precedent to coverage.  Whether a 
condition is a condition precedent to coverage depends on the 
language of the contract itself.  If the proposed insured does 
not then get an examination required for coverage to take 
effect, there is no contract for insurance.  See Couch on 
Insurance § 13.10.  In discussing conditions typically regarded 
as precedent to coverage, one leading scholar of insurance law 
has noted:  "Of course, where the applicant becomes ill or dies 
prior 
to 
completing 
a 
precedent 
condition 
of 
medical 
examination, recovery will be denied."  Couch on Insurance 
§ 13:11, at 13-32 (internal citations omitted).   
¶37 This type of condition has been examined by numerous 
courts.  In Protective Life Insurance Company v. Robinson, 387 
S.E.2d 603, 604-05 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989), for example, the Georgia 
Court of Appeals held that coverage under a conditional receipt 
for life insurance never became effective where the policy 
explicitly required a medical exam and the applicant died before 
submitting to the exam.  Similarly, in Roscoe v. Bankers Life 
Insurance Company of Nebraska, 526 P.2d 1080, 1083-84 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1974), the Arizona Court of Appeals found that where a 
required medical exam was not taken, the application for 
insurance was incomplete and no contract for temporary insurance 
No. 
01-1469   
 
23 
 
existed.  See also Gladney v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 895 
F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that failure to satisfy 
condition precedent means that policy never became effective); 
Wolters v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 296 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 
1961) (application 
incomplete 
because 
applicant 
failed to 
complete medical examination before death); Roy v. Northwestern 
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 974 F. Supp. 508 (D. Md. 1997); Corn v. 
United Am. Life Ins. Co., 104 F. Supp. 612, 615-16  (D. Colo. 
1952) ("Diligent search has failed to reveal a single authority 
which recognizes the existence of interim insurance where the 
alleged insured himself had failed to take steps upon which the 
agreement of the parties conditioned liability."); Fabrizio v. 
Fid. and Guar. Ins. Co., 494 P.2d 953 (Utah 1972). 
¶38 Although this court has not previously decided a case 
regarding failure to get a medical examination prior to death, 
this court has decided a case raising a similar question 
regarding a condition precedent to coverage.  In Brown, 60 
Wis. 2d at 628, this court determined that, under the facts of 
the case, insurability was a condition precedent to coverage 
under the conditional receipt at issue.  In the case, the 
deceased had applied for a life insurance policy.  Id. at 622-
23.  He had a cancerous skin condition of which the agent was 
aware.  Id.  As a condition to insurance, the applicant was 
required to have a medical examination.  Id. at 623.  He did so, 
but soon after, died of a heart problem that was unforeseen and 
unrelated to the skin condition.  Id. at 623-24.  The court 
found that a reasonable insured would understand that the policy 
No. 
01-1469   
 
24 
 
was conditioned upon a determination of insurability.  Id. at 
627-29.  Since the insurance company determined in good faith 
that the deceased was uninsurable, this court concluded that 
there was no interim insurance coverage.  Id. at 630-31. 
¶39 In Smith v. North American Company for Life and Health 
Insurance, 775 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1985), the Seventh Circuit 
refused to allow collection on a policy where the applicant 
misrepresented 
the 
state 
of 
his 
health 
and 
died 
before 
submitting to the medical examination requested by the insurance 
company.  The circumstances and issue in that case were 
different than those faced here, however.  In Smith, 775 F.2d at 
778, the court noted that the parties agreed that the contract 
did not "lapse."  In that case, then, an effective policy for 
coverage was in place.  There, the court found that the insurer 
had a duty to complete its investigation.  Id.  A medical 
examination was not a condition precedent to coverage in that 
case.  Id. at 778-781.  Here, though, the conditional insurance 
agreement makes absolutely clear that coverage is not effective 
until the required medical examination has taken place.   
¶40 There can be no doubt about the terms of the agreement 
between Patrick Fox and the insurance company.  The agent 
testified that he explained the necessity of the blood test and 
Patrick's actions toward getting the test taken care of indicate 
that he understood there was no coverage until the test was 
completed.  Section C of the Conditional Insurance Agreement 
specifically 
states 
that 
coverage 
under 
the 
conditional 
agreement will be effective on the last of several listed dates.  
No. 
01-1469   
 
25 
 
Here, the last relevant date is the date of the medical exam.  
The agreement unambiguously states that no coverage is in effect 
until the examination (blood test) is taken.  The court of 
appeals suggests that the post-mortem blood sample should 
suffice.  Even putting aside the insurer's concerns about 
whether the blood could be adequately tested for insurance 
purposes, the test taken by the coroner after death is 
insufficient.  Life insurance is to be paid upon the death of 
the applicant.  Fox's claim arises from his father's death.  
There was no effective policy at the time of Patrick's death, 
however, because he had not yet submitted to the blood test. 
¶41 We agree with CKIS that were we to decide that a 
policy did arise in this case, there would be a danger of absurd 
results.  In Brown, 60 Wis. 2d at 625, this court noted that 
conditional receipts benefit the applicant as well as the 
insurer.  Here, the burden would have shifted to the insurance 
company to prove a lack of insurability as soon as Patrick took 
the medical examination.  Were we to decide that unconditional 
interim insurance arises where an applicant pays a premium with 
his application but dies before fulfilling conditions precedent 
to coverage, insurers would either have to charge high rates to 
cover the risk of providing interim insurance or stop providing 
it altogether.  As we have noted, applicants would have no 
incentive to actually get the required medical examinations or 
fulfill other required conditions of coverage if even the 
uninsurable were guaranteed coverage for some period of time 
before the insurability determination.  As noted by the Arizona 
No. 
01-1469   
 
26 
 
Court of Appeals, such a determination "would allow one who is 
not insurable for medical reasons to obtain coverage without 
knowledge of the company until it discovered the true condition 
of the insured."  Roscoe, 526 P.2d at 1083.  This court cannot 
condone such results. 
¶42 Obviously, the facts of this case are tragic and we 
sympathize with Patrick Fox's family.  Yet the law rules with an 
even hand and we cannot be controlled by such sympathies.  This 
case implicates basic principles of contract and insurance law.  
The terms of the "Receipt for Payment and Conditional Insurance 
Agreement" in this case are clear.  We have no doubt that 
Patrick understood that certain requirements, including the 
blood test, had to be fulfilled before he would have coverage.  
However, he died before the requirements were met.  As a result, 
we must conclude that there was no insurance policy in effect at 
the 
time 
Patrick 
Fox 
died 
and 
that, 
therefore, 
Wis. Stat. § 631.11(3) does not apply. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  01-1469.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶43 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring).  
I write separately to highlight that this is another case in 
which the court mouths the exclusive plain meaning rule10 and 
then properly looks beyond the "plain language" of the statute 
without finding that the statutory language is ambiguous.11  
Indeed, the majority construes Wis. Stat. § 631.11(3) by looking 
to the language of the statute itself,12 the statute's place in 
the broader context of insurance law generally,13 the surrounding 
                                                 
10 Majority op., ¶19. 
11 For discussions and criticisms of the plain meaning rule 
in Wisconsin, see, e.g., State v. Peters, 2003 WI 88, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); 
State v. Byers, 2003 WI 86, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring; Crooks, J., dissenting); State v. 
Davison, 2003 WI 89, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; Bruno v. 
Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 600 N.W.2d 656; 
State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶¶38-40, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 
N.W.2d 416 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); State v. Sample, 215 
Wis. 2d 487, 508, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998) (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring). 
This court has also espoused an alternative rule to plain 
meaning.  See, e.g., City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 112 
Wis. 2d 224, 236, 332 N.W.2d 782 (1983) ("[T]he spirit or 
intention of a statute should govern over the literal or 
technical meaning of the language used.").  
I declared in 1983 that I am a critic of the plain meaning 
rule and that the court may examine material outside the statute 
to determine whether persuasive evidence exists of a "clear 
legislative intention different from that to which an ordinary 
reading of the plain words of the statute would lead."  Id. at 
243-44 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).  I maintain this position 
today. 
12 Majority op., ¶¶20-24. 
13 Id., ¶24.  
No.  01-1469.ssa 
 
2 
 
language of other statutes,14 jury instructions,15 legislative 
history,16 and case law.17  As the majority acknowledges, "Our 
interpretation of the statutory language is supported in a 
variety of ways."18 
¶44 I write further, however, to stress that courts, when 
looking to evidence of legislative intent in the history, 
context, subject matter, and object of a given statute, must 
engage in an analysis of both the evidence that supports a given 
interpretation as well as the evidence that contradicts a given 
interpretation.19  Courts must look at all relevant available 
evidence 
of 
legislative 
intent, 
with 
no 
single 
factor 
controlling, and interpret a statute consistently with the 
preponderance of that evidence.20  "[A] court should never 
exclude relevant and probative evidence from consideration."21 
                                                 
14 Id., ¶¶25, 28. 
15 Id., ¶¶27-28. 
16 Id., ¶¶30-33. 
17 Id., ¶34. 
18 Id., ¶23. 
19 See, e.g., State v. Davison, 2003 WI 89, ¶¶ 75-90, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (looking to legislative history and 
other extraneous evidence that contradicts the plain meaning of 
a statute to discern legislative intent). 
20 See, e.g., State v. Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d 66, 75-82, 396 
N.W.2d 177 (1986) (language, legislative history, purpose, and 
object of statute all bear on the interpretation of a statute, 
and 
legislative 
intent 
is 
determined 
by 
considering 
the 
direction in which all of these different factors point). 
21 Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction, 
§ 45.02 (6th ed. 2000).   
No.  01-1469.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶45 In the present case, the majority announces as a rule 
of statutory construction that courts may examine legislative 
history when a statute is plain on its face only if that 
legislative history supports the court's "plain" reading of the 
statute.22  Specifically, the majority writes, "Although the 
rules 
of 
statutory 
construction 
preclude 
us 
from 
using 
legislative history to uncover ambiguity where otherwise none 
exists, we are not precluded from looking to legislative history 
'to reinforce and demonstrate that a statute plain on its face, 
when viewed historically, is indeed unambiguous.'"23 
                                                                                                                                                             
For my analytical framework for statutory interpretation, 
see State v. Byers, 2003 WI 86, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d 
___(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); State v. Peters, 2003 WI 88, 
¶¶ 27-34, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring).  
22 As Justice Stevens of the United States Supreme Court 
notes, 
"Justice 
Aharon 
Barak 
of 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Israel . . . has perceptively noted that the 'minimalist' judge 
'who holds that the purpose of the statute may be learned only 
from its language' has more discretion than the judge 'who will 
seek guidance from every reliable source.'  A method of 
statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, and 
hence unconstrained, may produce a result that is consistent 
with a court's own views of how things should be, but it may 
also defeat the very purpose for which a provision was enacted." 
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 133 (2001) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Richard 
A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation——In the Classroom and in the 
Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 816-17 (1983) ("By making 
statutory interpretation seem mechanical rather than creative, 
the canons conceal . . . the extent to which the judge is making 
new 
law 
in 
the 
guise 
of 
interpreting 
a 
statute 
or 
a 
constitutional provision."). 
23 Majority op., ¶19 (quoting Resp. Use of Rural & Agric. 
Land v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 2000 WI 129, ¶41, 239 Wis. 2d 660, 619 
N.W.2d 888). 
No.  01-1469.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶46 This "rule" is absurd.  How does a court know whether 
legislative history reinforces unambiguous language until it 
closely examines that legislative history?  What is it about 
legislative history that makes it relevant evidence when it is 
in accord with a court's interpretation of a statute but 
irrelevant and inadmissible evidence when it is contrary to the 
court's interpretation?  If legislative history can "reinforce 
and demonstrate" that a statute, "when viewed historically," is 
capable of a particular meaning, then there is no rule of law 
that prohibits a court from considering it when discerning the 
meaning of that statute.24  Moreover, a court would be negligent 
in its duty to discern the intent of the legislature if it 
refused to consider legislative history that proved to be so 
probative.25     
                                                 
24 See Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 
426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976) ("When aid to construction of the meaning 
of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly 
can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the 
words may appear on 'superficial examination.'") (quoting United 
States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940)).   
Importantly, the Wisconsin "rule" forbidding a court from 
looking to legislative history except in instances where the 
legislative history supports an already unambiguous statute, 
"plain on its face," flatly contradicts the Train decision.  It 
is no wonder that the Wisconsin version of the Train rule was 
announced in a footnote without any citation.  See State v. 
Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 897 n.5, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991). 
25 W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 113-15 
(1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out many instances in 
which the Supreme Court has done a "disservice" to the country 
by putting on "thick grammarian's spectacles" and needlessly 
ignoring "persuasive evidence of Congress' actual purpose," only 
to force Congress "to take the time to revisit the matter" and 
correct the Court's mistake). 
No.  01-1469.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶47 The majority opinion does a good job in the present 
case considering many different factors that bear on legislative 
intent.  Yet the majority does not include in its analysis those 
factors that run counter to its construction.  For example, 
despite all of the attention given to the statutory phrase "an 
insurer's 
obligations 
under 
an 
insurance 
policy" 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 631.11(3) as requiring the existence of a policy 
before the statute becomes applicable, the majority opinion 
relegates to a footnote the fact that the legislature has given 
"policy" a particular statutory definition for purposes of this 
provision 
that 
is 
very 
broad 
and 
arguably 
includes 
the 
conditional agreement signed by the parties in the present 
case.26    
¶48 Ultimately, 
I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 631.11(3) is properly construed to apply only to 
conditions subsequent, not to conditions precedent.  The 
preponderance of the evidence bearing on legislative intent 
supports the majority's conclusion.  Yet this conclusion can, 
and should, be reached only after considering all relevant 
evidence of legislative intent, not merely that evidence which 
supports the interpretation that the court favors after looking 
to the statutory language in isolation. 
¶49 For the foregoing reasons, I concur. 
                                                 
26 See Wis. Stat. § 600.03(35) (1997-98) ("'Policy' means 
any document other than a group certificate used to prescribe in 
writing the terms of an insurance contract . . . ."). 
No.  01-1469.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶50 I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  01-1469.WAB 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
¶51 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   (Concurring).  "That depends 
on what the meaning of the word 'is' is."  William Jefferson 
Clinton.   
¶52 I write only to emphasize that canons of statutory 
construction, such as the "plain meaning" rule, are tools, not 
rules.  They are all designed to reach one fundamental goal: 
discerning legislative intent.  Ignoring relevant evidence on 
legislative 
intent 
in 
the 
name 
of 
"plain 
meaning" 
will 
necessarily 
at 
times 
lead 
to 
an 
interpretation 
that 
is 
completely contrary to what the legislature intended.   
¶53 Language 
is 
inherently 
ambiguous——perhaps 
not 
as 
ambiguous as the quotation above would have us believe, but the 
quote makes a point: plain meaning is frequently in the eye of 
the beholder.  What is plain to one may be ambiguous to another.  
If good evidence as to legislative intent is present, why not 
use it?  Accordingly, I join Chief Justice Abrahamson's 
concurrence.    
 
 
 
No.  01-1469.WAB 
 
 
 
1