Case Title: Parker v. Parker

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
#29724-r-MES 
2023 S.D. 5 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
 
DANIEL PARKER, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
 
 
 
v. 
 
CAMILLE PARKER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
* * * * 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
 
THE HONORABLE JON SOGN 
Judge 
 
* * * * 
 
 
PATRICK DOUGHERTY of 
Dougherty & Dougherty, LLP 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
Attorneys for defendant 
 
and appellant. 
 
 
VICTORIA M. DUEHR of 
Bangs, McCullen, Butler, 
     Foye & Simmons, LLP 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
 
 
 
Attorneys for plaintiff 
and appellee. 
 
* * * * 
 
 
 
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
 
MAY 25, 2022 
 
OPINION FILED 01/18/23 
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SALTER, Justice 
[¶1.]  
Camille Parker appeals from the circuit court’s judgment and decree of 
divorce, challenging the court’s division of the military retirement for her former 
spouse, Daniel Parker.  Camille argues the circuit court abused its discretion in 
determining Daniel’s military “monthly pay base” to be $1,500.94.  We vacate this 
portion of the court’s decree and remand for further proceedings. 
Facts and Procedural History 
[¶2.]  
This case comes before us with a rather sparse record.  Missing are 
transcripts from the four-day divorce trial, and nearly all of the information relating 
to the property division issue presented here was not included in the record, but 
simply attached to the appellate briefs.  See Batchelder v. Batchelder, 2021 S.D. 60, 
¶ 5 n.2, 965 N.W.2d 880, 882 n.2 (holding that the practice of attaching material not 
included in the record to briefs “does not comply with our rules for preparing 
appendices”); Klutman v. Sioux Falls Storm, 2009 S.D. 55, ¶ 37, 769 N.W.2d 440, 
454 (“Documents in the appendix must be included within, and should be cross-
referenced to, the settled record.”) (citing SDCL 15-26A-60(8)).  Nevertheless, we 
have gleaned the following facts from explicit and contextual aspects of the record 
and briefs that appear to be undisputed. 
[¶3.]  
Daniel and Camille were married in June 2010.  Prior to their 
marriage, Daniel began serving as an enlisted member of the South Dakota Air 
National Guard.  His service continued during the marriage and, indeed, continues 
to the present time. 
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[¶4.]  
At some point, Daniel also began serving in a civilian capacity for the 
National Guard.  In his civilian position, Daniel works as an avionic technician 
during the week.  In his military role, Daniel participates in guard drills and 
military training.  He is also subject to mobilization for active duty in the Air Force 
under federal authority.  See 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (authorizing the President to call 
“members and units of the National Guard of any State” to federal service). 
[¶5.]  
This “dual status,” though perhaps somewhat novel, is specifically 
authorized under federal law and was recently the subject of a helpful exposition by 
the United States Supreme Court: 
As its name suggests, this rare bird has characteristics of two 
different statuses.  On one hand, the dual-status technician is a 
“civilian employee” engaged in “organizing, administering, 
instructing,” “training,” or “maintenance and repair of supplies” 
to assist the National Guard.  § 10216(a)(1)(C); 32 U.S.C. 
§§ 709(a)(1)–(2).  On the other, the technician “is required as a 
condition of that employment to maintain membership in the 
[National Guard]” and must wear a uniform while working.  10 
U.S.C. § 10216(a)(1)(B); 32 U.S.C. §§ 709(b)(2)–(4). 
 
This dual role means that [dual-status] technicians perform 
work in two separate capacities that yield different forms of 
compensation.  First, they work full time as technicians in a 
civilian capacity.  For this work, they receive civil-service pay 
. . . .  Second, they participate as National Guard members in 
part-time drills, training, and (sometimes) active-duty 
deployment.  See 32 U.S.C. §§ 502(a), 709(g)(2).  For this work, 
they receive military pay and pension payments from a different 
arm of the Federal Government, the Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service.  See 37 U.S.C. §§ 204, 206; 10 U.S.C. § 113. 
 
Babcock v. Kijakazi, 142 S. Ct. 641, 644, 211 L. Ed. 2d 424 (2022) (first brackets in 
original); see also Moore v. Pa. Dep’t of Mil. & Veterans Affs., 216 F. Supp. 2d 446, 
450 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (explaining the concept of dual-status, hybrid employees). 
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[¶6.]  
In any event, Daniel filed for divorce in May 2019, citing irreconcilable 
differences.  As a result of either the parties’ agreement or the circuit court’s 
decision, all of the issues related to the equitable division of the marital estate were 
resolved following the court trial, with the exception of the division of Daniel’s 
military retirement.  It appears that the circuit court took this remaining issue 
under advisement at the completion of the trial, and the parties submitted 
argument to the court via email. 
[¶7.]  
Strictly speaking, Daniel’s military retirement is a potential marital 
asset because it is conditioned upon him becoming eligible for retirement, which is 
most commonly associated with completing twenty years of satisfactory service.  A 
spouse’s prospective military retirement is subject to equitable division under state 
law as part of a divorce or legal separation proceeding, but the ultimate amount of 
the military retirement is controlled by federal law.  Because Daniel serves in the 
National Guard, his service is classified as “non-regular,” which is contrasted with 
the “regular” service of active duty military members.  See 10 U.S.C. § 12739 
(stating the formula for computing monthly retired pay for non-regular service 
members). 
[¶8.]  
Calculating monthly retired pay is different in some key respects for 
National Guard and reserve service members than it is for their active duty 
counterparts.  Though a National Guard or reserve member’s eligibility for 
retirement is most often determined by years of service, the amount of monthly 
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retired pay is significantly influenced by the number of military retirement points 
they accrue for drill and intermittent periods of active duty.1 
[¶9.]  
In general terms, these retirement points are converted to 
corresponding years when a National Guard or reserve member begins to draw 
monthly retired pay using a statutory formula.  See 10 U.S.C. § 12739.  These years 
are then multiplied by a Guard or reserve member’s “retired pay base,” id., also 
termed the “high-three average.”  See 10 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (defining high-three 
average).  Commonly known simply as the “high-3,” this amount is the 36-month 
average of the non-regular member’s “monthly basic pay[,]” as explained more fully 
below.  See 10 U.S.C. § 1407(d)(1). 
[¶10.]  
A circuit court’s effort to equitably divide a divorcing military spouse’s 
future retirement in cases such as this one implicates these retirement rules as the 
court seeks to isolate and divide the service time that corresponds with the parties’ 
marriage.  Consequently, the number of a military spouse’s retirement points along 
with the military paygrade and the years of service at the time of the divorce are all 
important to the retirement calculus for non-regular service. 
[¶11.]  
Here, the parties agree that Daniel accrued 913 retirement points 
during his marriage to Camille and had earned a total of 2,370 retirement points as 
 
1. 
Retirement points are accrued as follows: one point for each day of active 
service, one point for each attendance at a four-hour drill period, one point for 
each day of performing funeral honors duty, and fifteen points for each year 
of membership in a reserve component.  See Reserve Retirement, Military 
Compensation, U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
https://militarypay.defense.gov/Pay/Retirement/Reserve.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2023). 
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of July 2019.2  Also undisputed is the fact that Daniel was serving as an Air Force 
master sergeant in the E-7 enlisted paygrade with sixteen years of service.  And 
significantly, the parties also seem to agree in principle that Camille should share 
equally in the portion of Daniel’s military retirement attributable to the years they 
were married.  The parties disagree, however, about the correct amount of Daniel’s 
high-3, and this is the principal issue before us in this appeal. 
[¶12.]  
For her part, Camille asserts the high-3 amount should be $4,895, 
citing the military’s 2021 Monthly Basic Pay Table.  Camille justifies her position 
under the theory that Daniel is effectively serving on active duty given his dual-
status role and proposed the following language for the circuit court’s divorce 
decree: 
The former spouse is awarded 50% of the disposable military 
retired pay the member would have received had the member 
become eligible to receive military retired pay with retired base 
(High-3) of $4,895 and with 913 Reserve retirement points on 
July 31, 2019, the date of separation.  On the date of separation, 
July 31, 2019, the member’s military pay grade (rank) was E7 
and the member had Reserve retirement points 913, and the 
member had 16 years and XX months of service for basic pay 
purposes. 
 
 
2. 
For reasons that are not clear in the record, the parties and the circuit court 
used the amount of retirement points as of July 2019, not the amount earned 
as of the time of the divorce in July 2021.  This appears inconsistent with 
both state and federal law.  See Ahrendt v. Chamberlain, 2018 S.D. 31, ¶ 20, 
910 N.W.2d 913, 921 (“[A]bsent special circumstances, assets and liabilities 
are valued at the time of trial rather than the time of separation.”); see also 
10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B)(ii) (defining disposable retired pay as total monthly 
retired pay to which “the member would have been entitled using the 
member's retired pay base and creditable service points on the date of the 
decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation”) (emphasis 
added). 
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[¶13.]  
Daniel suggested a much lower high-3 amount of $1,500, which 
represented the average of his actual earnings as a National Guard member over 
the course of the previous thirty-six months.  He offered a different 50% formulation 
for the decree: 
The former spouse is awarded 50% of the disposable military 
retired pay the member would have received had the member 
become eligible to receive military retired pay with a retired 
base (High-3) of $1,500 and with 913 Reserve retirement points 
on July 31, 2019 . . . . 
 
[¶14.]  
Using the parties’ somewhat incomplete legal arguments contained in 
emails, the circuit court opted for a third method which it included in the decree: 
If Daniel receives disposable military pay, Camille is awarded a 
percentage of Daniel’s disposable military retired pay, to be 
computed by multiplying 50% times a fraction, the numerator of 
which is 913 retirement points earned during the period of the 
marriage, divided by the member’s total number of reserve 
points earned.  On the date of the decree of divorce, July 6, 2021, 
Daniel’s military pay base (high-3) was $1,500.94 and the 
member had 2370 retirement points total at the time of 
valuation of July 2019.  
 
[¶15.]  
Camille appeals, and in her initial appellate briefing, her argument 
remained fixed, incorrectly, on the idea that Daniel’s dual-status role equates to 
him actually serving on active duty and not as a part-time member of the National 
Guard.  Daniel’s initial brief centered on his perspective of the equities, stating, “To 
use the income of $4,895.10 as set forth in the table submitted by Camille as Dan’s 
base high 3, when he has only had an actual earned average of $1,500.94, is unjust 
and defeats the intent of the . . . federal government.”  Neither party cited any 
applicable federal statutes or controlling decisional law addressing the topic of 
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military retirement benefits or the selection of a high-3 figure ancillary to divorce or 
legal separation proceedings. 
[¶16.]  
Seeking further development of the parties’ legal arguments and 
recalling our decisional law applying the federal Uniformed Services Former 
Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA),3 we ordered simultaneous supplemental briefing 
to address “[t]he application, if any, of 2017 and 2018 amendments to the 
[USFSPA], codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B), and any related provisions of 
federal law (including 10 U.S.C. 1407(d)(1)), to the circuit court’s division of Daniel 
Parker’s military pension.” 
[¶17.]  
Both parties augmented their original briefs with citations to 
applicable federal statutory authority.  The parties each remained committed to 
their respective arguments concerning Daniel’s correct high-3, but Camille appears 
to have pivoted to a textual analysis of 10 U.S.C. § 1407(d)(1) as the reason for 
using the $4,895.10 from the Monthly Basic Pay Table, rather than claiming 
Daniel’s dual-status role equated to him serving on active duty. 
Analysis 
Calculating Disposable Retired Pay for Non-Regular Service 
[¶18.]  
We have treated “military retirement benefits . . . like any other asset 
of the marriage and . . . subject to equitable distribution.”  Porter, 1996 S.D. 6, ¶ 9, 
542 N.W.2d at 450; see also Gibson v. Gibson, 437 N.W.2d 170, 172 (S.D. 1989) 
(holding that a military pension is a marital asset subject to equitable division upon 
 
3. 
See, e.g., Porter v. Porter, 1996 S.D. 6, 542 N.W.2d 448; Hisgen v. Hisgen, 
1996 S.D. 122, 554 N.W.2d 494; Urbaniak v. Urbaniak, 2011 S.D. 83, 807 
N.W.2d 621; see also Cook v. Cook, 2022 S.D. 74, ¶ 22, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
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divorce).  The division of marital assets upon divorce is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.  Gibson, 437 N.W.2d at 171.  We have held that an error of law in a 
circuit court’s equitable division of property “is never within the [discretionary] 
range of permissible choices and necessarily constitutes an abuse of discretion.”  
Field v. Field, 2020 S.D. 51, ¶ 15, 949 N.W.2d 221, 224 (citation omitted). 
[¶19.]  
But the fact that a military retirement is subject to equitable division 
“like any other asset of the marriage” does not mean it is actually like other assets.  
Military retirements are, in many ways, unique even within the class of pension 
and retirement assets.  We believe, therefore, that it is useful to first discuss the 
authority of state courts to divide a divorcing spouse’s military retirement before we 
consider whether the circuit court abused its discretion when it fixed Daniel’s high-
3 at $1,500. 
[¶20.]  
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in 
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S. Ct. 2728, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1981), holding 
that “the federal statutes then governing military pay prevented state courts from 
treating military retirement pay as community property.”  Mansell v. Mansell, 490 
U.S. 581, 584, 109 S. Ct. 2023, 2026, 104 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1989).  “In direct response 
to McCarty, Congress enacted the [USFSPA],” codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408, “which 
authorizes state courts to treat ‘disposable retired or retainer pay’ as community 
property.”  Mansell, 490 U.S. at 584, 109 S. Ct. at 2026 (emphasis added) (citing 10 
U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1)). 
[¶21.]  
The USFSPA is, therefore, both the source and the ceiling of a state 
court’s authority to divide a spouse’s military retirement.  And though it neutralized 
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the essential holding in McCarty, the USFSPA did not vest state courts with 
unlimited authority to divide military retirements.  Instead, the USFSPA 
authorizes state courts to divide “disposable retired pay,” which is a specific 
statutorily defined term under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A).  See 
Mansell, 490 U.S. at 589, 109 S. Ct. at 2029 (holding that “under the [USFSPA’s] 
plain and precise language, state courts have been granted the authority to treat 
disposable retired pay as community property; they have not been granted the 
authority to treat total retired pay as community property”) (emphasis added). 
[¶22.]  
In cases such as this one where a divorcing military spouse is a 
member of the National Guard with non-regular service and not yet eligible for 
retirement, the USFSPA defines disposable retired pay as follows: 
[T]he total monthly retired pay to which the member is entitled 
shall be . . . the amount of retired pay to which the member 
would have been entitled[,] using the member’s retired pay base 
and creditable service points on the date of the decree of divorce, 
. . . under chapter 1223 of this title . . . . 
 
10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B)—§ 1408(a)(4)(B)(ii) (emphasis added); see also DoD FMR 
7000.14-R, vol. 7B, ch. 29, paragraph 8.2.1 (“The amount of retired pay is limited to 
that which the member would have been entitled using the member’s retired pay 
base (rank or high-3) and years of service on the date of the final decree of divorce 
. . . .”). 
[¶23.]  
Established through congressional amendments in 2017 and 2018, this 
has become known as the “frozen benefit rule.”  172 Am. Jur. Trials § 271 (2022).  
Under the frozen benefit rule, the date of divorce serves as a hypothetical 
retirement date for the purpose of calculating the former spouse’s equitable share of 
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a military spouse’s retirement, the rationale being that it would be inequitable for 
the former spouse to receive a share of the retired pay based upon pay increases 
that occurred between the date of divorce and the member’s actual date of 
retirement “to which the former spouse made no contribution.”  Fulgium v. 
Fulgium, 203 A.3d 33, 40 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2019).4 
[¶24.]  
Freezing a military spouse’s potential disposable retired pay at the 
time of the divorce implicates, according to the express terms of § 1408(a)(4)(B), the 
retirement rules for calculating “retired pay” for non-regular service set out in 
chapter 1223 of Title 10.  In particular, 10 U.S.C. § 12739 describes monthly retired 
pay as the product of “(1) the retired pay base” and “(2) 2 ½ percent of the years of 
service credited . . . .”  10 U.S.C. § 12739(a). 
[¶25.]  
The retired pay base is also known as the high-3 figure, which 
permeates this case.  For non-regular service, the high-3 is “the total amount of 
 
4. 
Many military retirement awards to non-military spouses are administered 
through the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), see infra 
¶¶ 33–35, and DFAS recognizes several accepted methods for segregating the 
portion of a military spouse’s retirement that corresponds to the marriage 
before applying the “frozen benefit rule,” which then functions as a cap on the 
share that the non-military divorcing spouse will receive.  For instance, the 
“formula award” utilized by the circuit court here takes points accumulated 
during the marriage over total points at the time of divorce and is specifically 
contemplated according to guidance from DFAS.  See DoD FMR 7000.14-R, 
vol. 7B, ch. 29, fig.29-2 (listing four types of sample awards, including a 
“formula award” for a “Military Retired Pay Division Order . . . that occur[s] 
after December 23, 2016”).  However, the recent amendments to the USFSPA 
provide for a compensation rate that has been “frozen” based on a member’s 
high-3 and points at the time of the divorce, rather than as a percentage of 
the military spouse’s ultimate monthly disposable retired pay based upon 
longevity and promotions occurring after the termination of the marriage.  
Compare 10 U.S.C. § 1408 with Hautala v. Hautala, 417 N.W.2d 879, 880 n.1 
(S.D. 1988) (describing a “time” formula for dividing a military spouse’s 
retirement that does not freeze the benefit at the time of divorce). 
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monthly basic pay to which the member or former member was entitled during the 
member or former member’s high-36 months (or to which the member or former 
member would have been entitled if the member or former member had served on 
active duty during the entire period of the member or former member’s high-36 
months), divided by . . . 36.”  10 U.S.C. § 1407(d)(1)(A)-(B).  The correct 
interpretation of this statute represents a critical juncture in our analysis. 
[¶26.]  
Based on his supplemental briefing, Daniel reads the parenthetical 
information within this statutory language disjunctively—i.e. he can elect to use as 
his high-3 amount either the higher compensation rates that he would have earned 
on active duty, or the lower compensation amount represented by his actual drill 
pay.  But we believe this interpretation is unsustainable and too expedient given 
the text of the statute and accepted rules of statutory construction.5 
[¶27.]  
Textually, Daniel’s argument that the parenthetical phrase allows him 
to calculate his high-3 based upon the money he actually earned as a drilling 
National Guard member overlooks the critical term “monthly basic pay.”  When 
Daniel completes standard monthly part-time drills, he is not earning monthly basic 
pay as provided in 10 U.S.C. § 1407(d)(1)(A)—he is earning military reserve drill 
pay commensurate with his rank/paygrade and years of service.  The distinction is 
illustrated by the fact that the Department of Defense publishes two military pay 
tables, one the “Monthly Basic Pay Table” and the other detailing “Military Reserve 
 
5. 
Daniel’s position also seems improvident over the long term.  If he was truly 
convinced his high-3 should be based on the lower compensation rates 
represented by his drill pay, his view would artificially, and significantly, 
reduce his ultimate monthly retired pay amount. 
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Drill Pay.”6  As a result, his actual earnings derived from drills do not constitute the 
“monthly basic pay” explicitly referenced in the text of 10 U.S.C. § 1407’s definition 
of high-3. 
[¶28.]  
In addition, the use of parentheses in 10 U.S.C. § 1407(d)(1)(A) is 
relevant to its interpretation.  Though all judicial efforts to construe statutes must 
be singularly focused upon ascertaining legislative intent, the fact that Congress 
included parentheses counsels against Daniel’s disjunctive interpretation which 
omits them entirely.  See Peters v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 302, 309 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that “Congress . . . reduced the grammatical import” of statutory text 
“when it replaced commas . . . in the predecessor provision with the parentheses 
that now appear”).  Indeed, Congress’s use of parenthetical phrases may be 
descriptive of an antecedent term or provision and not a limitation of it.  See 
Germain v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 9 F.4th 1319, 1326 (11th Cir. 2021) (noting that 
Congress’s use of parentheticals in the Immigration and Naturalization Act “are 
merely descriptive—rather than limiting”). 
[¶29.]  
Drawing upon this persuasive authority, we view the parenthetical 
used in 10 U.S.C. § 1407(d)(1)(A) as illustrative of the previous phrase and not an 
entirely new disjunctive provision, as Daniel asserts.  The parenthetical phrase is 
 
6. 
The Monthly Basic Pay Table is updated annually, as authorized by 37 
U.S.C. § 203 and 37 U.S.C. § 1009, and published online in “monthly basic 
pay tables” by DFAS oftentimes at the direction of a Presidential Executive 
Order.  See Adjustments of Certain Rates of Pay, 86 Fed. Reg. 73601 (Dec. 22, 
2021); Military Pay Tables & Information, Def. Fin. & Acct. Serv., 
https://www.dfas.mil/militarymembers/payentitlements/Pay-Tables/.  The 
Military Reserve Drill Pay chart lists one- and four-drill pay amounts that 
are proportionate increments of the corresponding monthly basic pay amount. 
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particularly helpful as a means of clarifying the use of the term “monthly basic pay” 
to mean the amount a member of the National Guard or reserve would earn if 
serving on active duty.  Read in this way, the statute defines high-3 as “the total 
amount of monthly basic pay to which the member or former member was entitled 
during the member or former member’s high-36 months” or, in other words, the 
amount “to which the member or former member would have been entitled if the 
member or former member had served on active duty during the entire period. . . .”  
(Emphasis added.) 
[¶30.]  
In sum, then, a circuit court can only divide disposable retired pay, 
which can, in turn, only be calculated using a service member’s correct high-3.  For 
service members with non-regular service, this number is based upon the applicable 
Monthly Basic Pay Tables as if the service member was on active duty, whether 
they were or not. 
The Circuit Court’s Order 
[¶31.]  
After tracing the definition of “disposable retired pay” through a 
succession of statutory provisions to the point it intersects with a service member’s 
high-3 amount, we conclude the circuit court’s division of Daniel’s military 
retirement includes a legal error.  The court’s order reflects Daniel’s incorrect legal 
interpretation of his high-3 amount. 
[¶32.]  
This error has the effect of undervaluing Daniel’s potential military 
retirement at the time of divorce, resulting in what we would expect to be a 
significantly smaller share for Camille than would be the case if Daniel’s high-3 
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were accurately calculated.7  Nothing in the record indicates the circuit court 
intended this result.  To the contrary, all appearances are that the court intended to 
award Camille one-half of Daniel’s retirement for the time that corresponded to the 
years of their marriage.  Under the circumstances, we must vacate the portion of 
the court’s divorce decree dividing Daniel’s military retirement and remand the case 
for further proceedings. 
The Payment Mechanism of the USFSPA 
[¶33.]  
In addition to conferring a certain degree of authority upon state 
courts to treat “disposable retired pay” as marital property, the Mansell Court 
described a second major feature of the USFSPA that has potential utility in 
dividing Daniel’s military benefit: 
The Act also creates a payments mechanism under which the 
Federal Government will make direct payments to a former 
spouse who presents, to the Secretary of the relevant military 
service, a state-court order granting her a portion of the military 
retiree’s disposable retired or retainer pay.  This direct 
payments mechanism is limited in two ways.  § 1408(d).  First, 
only a former spouse who was married to a military member “for 
a period of 10 years or more during which the member 
performed at least 10 years of service creditable in determining 
the member’s eligibility for retired or retainer pay,” § 1408(d)(2), 
is eligible to receive direct community property payments.  
Second, the Federal Government will not make community 
property payments that exceed 50 percent of disposable retired 
or retainer pay.  § 1408(e)(1). 
 
 
7. 
The record does not, at this point, contain sufficient information to precisely 
calculate Daniel’s high-3 using the annual Monthly Basic Pay Tables for the 
thirty-six months preceding the parties’ July 2021 divorce.  But using the 
“most recent” basic pay amount from the 2021 Monthly Basic Pay Table 
suggests that the current calculation using actual drill pay may reduce 
Camille’s award by approximately two-thirds of what it would be using the 
correct high-3 amount. 
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Mansell, 490 U.S. at 585, 109 S. Ct. at 2027. 
[¶34.]  
The Supreme Court clarified that “state courts have been granted the 
authority to award a portion of disposable military retired pay to former spouses 
who were married to the military member for less than 10 years, but such former 
spouses may not take advantage of the direct payments mechanism.”  Id., 490 U.S. 
at 591 n.13, 109 S. Ct. at 2030 n.13.  Several courts have extended similar 
reasoning to the former spouse’s 50% cap, holding that state courts maintain 
discretion to award more than 50% of retirement benefits to a military spouse but 
such an order will not be paid directly, at least in its entirety, by the Federal 
Government.  See Meyer v. Meyer, 952 So. 2d 384, 387 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006), 
Deliduka v. Deliduka, 347 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), In re Marriage of 
Bocanegra, 792 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). 
[¶35.]  
Here, the parties were married for more than ten years, and it does not 
seem that Daniel, Camille, or the circuit court envision a property award that 
exceeds 50% of Daniel’s disposable retired pay.  Therefore, it appears DFAS could 
provide direct payments to Camille, and if the court is inclined to explore utilizing 
this payments mechanism on remand, Volume 7B, Chapter 29 of the Department of 
Defense rules and regulations, entitled “Former Spouse Payments From Retired 
Pay,” provides instruction on how DFAS interprets division of military retirement 
court orders and provides sample court orders that are routinely accepted by DFAS.  
See DoD FMR 7000.14-R, vol. 7B, ch. 29. 
 
 
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Conclusion 
[¶36.]  
The abridged record here, “insofar as it exists[,]” reveals a legal error 
in the application of federal law to determine Daniel’s high-3 amount.  See Graff v. 
Children’s Care Hosp. & Sch., 2020 S.D. 26, ¶ 16, 943 N.W.2d 484, 489 (holding 
“appellate review in the absence of a transcript is not categorically precluded in all 
cases,” but rather may be undertaken “insofar as [the record] exists”).  This error 
prejudiced Camille because it substantially reduced what we believe the circuit 
court intended to be a true reflection of an equal share of Daniel’s disposable retired 
pay attributable to time he and Camille were married.  We, therefore, vacate the 
portion of the court’s divorce decree dividing Daniel’s military retirement and 
remand the case for further proceedings.8 
[¶37.]  
JENSEN, Chief Justice, and KERN, DEVANEY, and MYREN, 
Justices, concur. 
 
8. 
Both parties have submitted requests for appellate attorney’s fees which are 
authorized in the circuit court and on appeal, so long as they are reasonable.  
See SDCL 15-17-38, 15-26A-87.3.  However, we decline to grant attorney’s 
fees here.