Case Title: Ohio v. Chambliss

Citation: 2011-Ohio-1785

Docket Number: 20082251

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Chambliss, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-1785.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-1785 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CHAMBLISS ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Chambliss, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-1785.] 
Appellate procedure — Final orders — Removal of retained counsel of criminal 
defendant. 
(No. 2008-2251 — Submitted March 1, 2011 — Decided April 19, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 91272,  
2008-Ohio-5285. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A pretrial ruling removing a criminal defendant’s retained counsel of choice is a 
final order subject to immediate appeal. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} Today, this court must decide whether the denial of retained 
counsel of choice prior to trial in a criminal case is a final, appealable order.  As a 
general matter, we first caution that this case is limited to the issue of removal of 
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retained counsel of choice.  The issue of whether the removal of appointed 
counsel is a final, appealable order may involve different considerations that have 
not been briefed in this case.  We leave that issue for another day. 
{¶ 2} Further, we are examining only the issue of whether the denial of 
retained counsel of choice is a final, appealable order.  The merits of the trial 
court’s decision in removing retained counsel of choice in this case are not before 
us.  Because we hold that the denial of retained counsel of choice in a criminal 
proceeding is a final, appealable order, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the court of appeals for further proceedings on 
the merits of the appeal. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} Dantae Chambliss, James Bennett, and Travis Sanders, defendants-
appellants, were indicted on several drug-related offenses.  Each defendant 
retained his own attorney, pleaded not guilty, and filed a request for discovery.  
Several pretrials were held and continued. 
{¶ 4} Each defendant filed a motion to compel production of a search 
warrant affidavit and a motion for discovery.  Each defendant filed at least one 
motion to continue trial based on denial of access to the requested affidavit, which 
remained sealed.  In addition, each defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence 
and a motion for a trial separate from the other defendants.  After the defendants’ 
motions for separate trials were denied, they filed motions to continue based on 
the fact that they had not yet received the search warrant affidavit despite repeated 
requests. 
{¶ 5} All three defendants pleaded guilty.  A few weeks later, when the 
trial court refused to accept the agreement between the state and defense, 
defendants moved to withdraw their pleas.  The trial court vacated the pleas of all 
three defendants, set trial, and granted a motion to unseal the search warrant 
affidavit. 
January Term, 2011 
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{¶ 6} It is unclear from the record as to whether or when the search 
warrant affidavit was unsealed, but during a hearing on the day of trial, it became 
clear that the attorneys had not yet received the search warrant affidavit, and as a 
result, if required to proceed to trial without the necessary information, they 
claimed they would be ineffective as counsel within the meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment.  The trial court removed all three retained counsel, remanded all 
three defendants to the custody of the sheriff, ordered all three defendants to 
retain new counsel in less than two weeks, and set trial for the following month. 
{¶ 7} The defendants’ retained attorneys filed a motion with the court of 
appeals to stay execution of the order pending appeal and attached their affidavits.  
The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals stayed execution of the trial court’s order 
pending appeal, vacated the trial court’s order remanding Chambliss, Bennett, and 
Sanders to jail, affirmed that the bonds remained in effect, and released the 
defendants.  On appeal, the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals vacated the trial 
court’s remand order but concluded that the removal of retained counsel of choice 
was not a final and appealable order.  Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal 
as to that issue. 
{¶ 8} The case is now before this court pursuant to a discretionary 
appeal. 
Analysis 
R.C. 2505.02 
{¶ 9} R.C. 2953.02 provides for appellate review of the judgment or 
final order of a trial court in a criminal case.  R.C. 2505.02 defines whether a 
particular order is final and appealable: 
{¶ 10} “(B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, 
modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following: 
{¶ 11} “* * * 
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{¶ 12} “(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to 
which both of the following apply;  
{¶ 13} “(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the 
provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the 
appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy. 
{¶ 14} “(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or 
effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, 
issues, claims, and parties in the action.” 
Three-Part Test for Final Order 
{¶ 15} In State v. Muncie (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 440, 446, 746 N.E.2d 
1092, this court described the analysis for determining whether a decision 
granting or denying a provisional remedy is a final order:  “R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) 
now provides that an order is a ‘final order’ if it satisfies each part of a three-part 
test: (1) the order must either grant or deny relief sought in a certain type of 
proceeding—a proceeding that the General Assembly calls a ‘provisional 
remedy,’ (2) the order must both determine the action with respect to the 
provisional remedy and prevent a judgment in favor of the appealing party with 
respect to the provisional remedy, and (3) the reviewing court must decide that the 
party appealing from the order would not be afforded a meaningful or effective 
remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, 
claims, and parties in the action.” 
Meaningful or Effective Remedy 
{¶ 16} The state concedes that the removal of retained counsel meets the 
first two prongs of the analysis.  Therefore, the only question before us is whether 
a postconviction appeal in this instance would be effective and meaningful.  The 
court of appeals noted the quandary.  By asserting that this is not a final, 
appealable order, it said, the state was left in a position where, should it obtain a 
conviction at trial, that conviction would be subject to automatic reversal.  
January Term, 2011 
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Further, defendants could not lose, since they would either win the case or it 
would be reversed due to structural error. 2008-Ohio-5285, 2008 WL 4531965, ¶ 
15.  Noting the waste of judicial resources, the appellate court still held that this 
court’s decision in State ex rel. Keenan v. Calabrese (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 176, 
631 N.E.2d 119, warranted a conclusion that the order removing appellants’ 
retained counsel was not a final, appealable order.  We now conclude that it is a 
final, appealable order. 
{¶ 17} In Keenan, we held that a pretrial order granting disqualification of 
counsel in a criminal case is not a final, appealable order, id. at 178, because “[a]n 
appeal following conviction and sentence would be neither impractical nor 
ineffective since any error in granting the motion would, in certain circumstances, 
be presumptively prejudicial,” id. at 179, citing Flanagan v. United States (1984), 
465 U.S. 259, 268, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 79 L.Ed.2d 288.  However, Keenan was 
decided before R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) was in existence. 
{¶ 18} Moreover, several years after this court’s per curiam decision in 
Keenan, the United States Supreme Court considered the issue and held that “the 
erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice, ‘with consequences that 
are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as 
“structural error.” ’ ” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006), 548 U.S. 140, 150, 
126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409, quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993), 508 U.S. 
275, 282, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182.  This is because “[d]ifferent attorneys 
will pursue different strategies with regard to investigation and discovery, 
development of the theory of defense, selection of the jury, presentation of the 
witnesses, and style of witness examination and jury argument.  And the choice of 
attorney will affect whether and on what terms the defendant cooperates with the 
prosecution, plea bargains, or decides instead to go to trial.  In light of these 
myriad aspects of representation, the erroneous denial of counsel bears directly on 
the ‘framework within which the trial proceeds,’ [Arizona v.] Fulminante [(1991), 
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499 U.S. 279] at 310 [111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302]—or indeed on whether it 
proceeds at all.”  Id. at 150.  Thus, the erroneous deprivation of a defendant’s 
choice of counsel entitles him to an automatic reversal of his conviction. 
{¶ 19} The state argues that in addition to this court’s decision in Keenan, 
Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 79 L.Ed.2d 288, 
controls.  Flanagan held that a district court’s pretrial disqualification of defense 
counsel in a criminal prosecution was not immediately appealable.  However, just 
like Keenan, Flanagan was decided prior to Gonzalez-Lopez, which clearly holds 
that the erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice qualifies as 
structural error.  When Keenan was decided, the erroneous denial of retained 
counsel was presumptively prejudicial.  However, in Gonzalez-Lopez, the United 
States Supreme Court went further to conclude that the erroneous denial of the 
right to retained counsel of choice constitutes structural error, which would mean 
that the court of appeals would automatically reverse the conviction.  Gonzalez-
Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148,126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409. 
{¶ 20} As the court in Gonzales-Lopez held, “It is impossible to know 
what different choices the rejected counsel would have made, and then to quantify 
the impact of those different choices on the outcome of the proceedings.  Many 
counseled decisions, including those involving plea bargains and cooperation with 
the government, do not even concern the conduct of the trial at all. Harmless-error 
analysis in such a context would be a speculative inquiry into what might have 
occurred in an alternative universe.”  Id. at 150. 
Chambliss, Bennett, and Sanders 
{¶ 21} Turning to the case at bar, the trial court ordered that all three 
retained counsel be removed as counsel and remanded defendants to the custody 
of the sheriff.  The court of appeals concluded that the order removing counsel 
was not a final, appealable order, thus potentially forcing the defendants to run the 
gauntlet of trial twice.  
January Term, 2011 
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{¶ 22} A postconviction reversal of the trial court’s judgment would not 
be automatically effective.  A criminal defendant might exhaust his or her 
resources during the first trial, thereby denying that defendant the counsel of his 
or her choice.  Further, if counsel of choice were later deemed to have been 
erroneously removed, the subject matter of the first trial, including the strategy 
employed, witnesses cross-examined, etc., would be stale and likely weakened.  
This, in addition to the waste of scarce judicial resources, satisfies the third prong 
of R.C. 29505.02(B)(4)—rendering a postconviction appeal ineffective or  
meaningless—and compels a conclusion that a pretrial ruling disqualifying a 
criminal defendant’s retained counsel of choice is a final order, subject to 
immediate appeal. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 23} Not every issue in a criminal case is subject to an interlocutory 
appeal.  Moreover, not every trial court decision to remove retained counsel will 
be found to have been erroneous.  However, because the United States Supreme 
Court has held that the erroneous denial of counsel of choice is a structural error 
that occurs at the very moment counsel is removed, an immediate appeal to avoid 
a potential retrial is practical and warranted. 
{¶ 24} The dissent in Keenan captured the depth of the issue:  
{¶ 25} “A post-conviction appeal does not offer Keenan an adequate 
remedy at law, nor does it suit an orderly and efficient judicial system. 
{¶ 26} “The question of Keenan’s right to the counsel of his choice is 
necessarily most critical prior to the beginning of his trial.  A post-conviction 
appeal may offer a remedy, but not an adequate one—the choice of counsel is 
fundamental and impacts the entirety of the case.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Keenan, 69 
Ohio St.3d at 180, 631 N.E.2d 119 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 27} We hold that a pretrial ruling removing a criminal defendant’s 
retained counsel of choice is a final order, subject to immediate appeal.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause 
to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and 
MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Thorin 
Freeman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Marein & Bradley and Steven L. Bradley, for appellant Dante Chambliss. 
Marein & Bradley and Mark B. Marein, for appellant James Bennett. 
Robey & Robey and Gregory Scott Robey, for appellant Travis Sanders. 
______________________