Case Title: State v. Whitaker

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020AP000029-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2022-07-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
2022 WI 54 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP29-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Westley D. Whitaker, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 396 Wis. 2d 557, 957 N.W.2d 561 
PDC No: 2021 WI App 17 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 5, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 9, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Vernon   
 
JUDGE: 
Darcy Jo Rood   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
ROGGENSACK, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Ziegler, 
C.J., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring 
opinion.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Christopher M. Zachar and Zachar Law Office, LLC, La 
Crosse. There was an oral argument by Christopher M. Zachar.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Daniel J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Daniel J. O’Brien.  
 
 
 
2022 WI 54 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP29-CR 
(L.C. No. 
17CF163) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Westley D. Whitaker, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUL 5, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
ROGGENSACK, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Ziegler, 
C.J., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring 
opinion.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   As a teenager, Westley Whitaker 
preyed on his three younger sisters, repeatedly sexually 
assaulting them while they all were living in an Amish community 
in Vernon County.  Whitaker's parents and elders in the 
community became aware of the assaults, but failed to protect 
the victims by either stopping Whitaker from continuing his 
sexual abuse or alerting secular authorities.  A decade later, 
No. 
2020AP29-CR 
 
2 
 
Whitaker confessed, was charged with six counts of sexual 
assault, and pled no contest to one of the charges.  The circuit 
court1 sentenced Whitaker to two years of initial confinement and 
two years of extended supervision. 
¶2 
During sentencing, the circuit court addressed the 
need for the adults in the Amish community to effectively 
intervene to protect the girls in the community from sexual 
abuse.  On appeal, Whitaker contends these statements violated 
his rights to religious liberty and association protected by the 
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and thus evince the 
circuit court's reliance on improper sentencing factors.  As a 
result, he demands resentencing as a matter of due process under 
the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. 
¶3 
We conclude that nothing in the transcript suggests 
the circuit court increased Whitaker's sentence solely because 
of his religious beliefs or his association with the Amish 
community.  Instead, the transcript shows each challenged factor 
bears a reasonable nexus to proper and relevant sentencing 
factors.  Thus, we affirm his sentence. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
Whitaker sexually assaulted three of his sisters 
almost daily when he was between the ages of twelve and fifteen.  
The 
abuse 
started 
in 
2005 
when 
Whitaker 
began 
sexually 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Darcy J. Rood of the Vernon County Circuit 
Court presided. 
No. 
2020AP29-CR 
 
3 
 
assaulting his ten-year-old sister, A.B., almost every day.2  
During that time period, he also repeatedly assaulted another 
sister, C.D., beginning when she was seven years old.  Whitaker 
threatened to "kill" C.D. if she told anyone about the assaults 
and he "threatened to make her life hard if she did not 
cooperate with him."  Whitaker also sexually assaulted a third 
sister, E.F., when she was six or seven years old.  At some 
point, Whitaker's parents and elders in the Amish community in 
which Whitaker lived became aware of his ongoing assaults on his 
sisters. 
 
Although 
the 
elders 
attempted 
some 
form 
of 
intervention, it ultimately failed as Whitaker continued the 
assaults.  No one reported Whitaker's crimes to the authorities 
nor sought help from any resources outside of the community.  
Whitaker ended the attacks sometime in 2007. 
¶5 
Whitaker and his sisters were raised as part of a 
conservative family that moved often between churches.  At the 
time of the assaults, they were part of an Amish community in 
Vernon County, Wisconsin, that Whitaker characterized as having 
beliefs similar to the "Old Order Amish."  The record is sparse 
regarding that community and its relationship to the larger 
Amish community.  Whitaker explained that within his childhood 
community, "sex [was] considered off limits and taboo," feelings 
of sexual desire were viewed as sinful, and children did not 
interact with the opposite sex. 
                                                 
2 To protect the dignity and privacy of the victims, we use 
initials that do not correspond to their real names. 
No. 
2020AP29-CR 
 
4 
 
¶6 
A decade after the assaults, Whitaker confessed to his 
crimes at the urging of his sister, A.B., and was charged with 
six counts of first degree sexual assault of a child in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e) (2015-16).3  As a result 
of plea negotiations, Whitaker pled no contest to one count of 
first degree sexual assault of a child and the other five counts 
were dismissed and read-in.4 
¶7 
At 
sentencing, 
the 
circuit 
court 
first 
granted 
Whitaker's unopposed motion to be exempted from the sex offender 
registration requirement, pointing to Whitaker's young age at 
the time of the offense and its belief that Whitaker posed no 
current risk to reoffend.  The circuit court stated that 
Whitaker's behavior was "juvenile" and "in a community and a 
family that wasn't protecting the daughters."  As for the 
appropriate sentence, the victims requested that Whitaker serve 
two to five years of initial confinement.  The State argued the 
crimes' seriousness, their effect on the victims, and the need 
for punitive consequences warranted a six-year bifurcated prison 
sentence.  In turn, Whitaker asked for no incarceration time and 
no probation, emphasizing that he was remorseful and took 
responsibility for his actions when confronted by his sister.  
He argued that the strict religious culture he grew up in kept 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 A "read-in" crime is one that either is not charged or is 
dismissed as part of a plea agreement, but that the defendant 
agrees the circuit court may consider at sentencing, along with 
the underlying conduct.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(b). 
No. 
2020AP29-CR 
 
5 
 
him from "the education that a child would typically receive" 
and that "when you're an adolescent and you're going through 
something like this, and you have nobody to talk to, no peers, 
no teachers, social workers, health care providers, it's 
understandable that a kid in [this] position could have a skewed 
view of how to deal . . . with adolescent development."  He also 
noted "that there were adults who were aware of this conduct 
when it was happening . . . and it was recommended that the 
allegations remain within the community." 
¶8 
The circuit court sentenced Whitaker to a four-year 
bifurcated prison sentence with two years of initial confinement 
and two years of extended supervision.  The circuit court 
concluded that:  Whitaker's current risk of reoffending was 
"zero"; he posed no threat to the public; and he needed no 
rehabilitation. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
reasoned 
the 
State's 
recommended six-year sentence would be too long because of 
Whitaker's young age at the time of the assaults.  It then 
stated 
that 
"the 
relevant 
Galleon 
[sic][5] 
factors 
are 
punishment, and also deterrence of others, hopefully deterrence 
of others in the Amish community."  Expanding on its discussion 
of the Amish community, the circuit court stated: 
I happen to live in the midst of an Amish community.  
They're my neighbors.  And sexual assault of sisters 
is not something that is accepted.  I understand it 
often happens and that it is dealt with in the 
community.  And that's not sufficient.  That's not 
                                                 
5 State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 
N.W.2d 197. 
No. 
2020AP29-CR 
 
6 
 
sufficient when it is not a one-time thing and not 
when the women, the daughters, the wives in the Amish 
community 
are 
not 
empowered 
to 
come 
forward. . . . [E]very Amish young man is raised in 
that type of community, in that situation, and you 
aren't seeing them all sexually assault their sisters 
night after night after night. . . . I'm hoping that 
this sentence deters, as I said, the community. 
¶9 
The circuit court further emphasized the gravity of 
the offenses, stating that this was not "one act.  It was a 
thousand.  It was years of abuse."  It detailed the assaults' 
effect on A.B. who had been "destroyed" by both the abuse and 
the threats from her "beloved older brother," and how she had 
not been safe at home, "the one place where [she was] supposed 
to feel safety."  The circuit court went on to stress that "the 
actual facts of this case are abhorrent," and that a sentence of 
"no confinement would depreciate the seriousness of this 
offense."  It continued that "a prison sentence is the only way 
to send the message to Mr. Whitaker and to the community that 
this is totally unacceptable behavior.  And perhaps it now can 
help the family heal.  And I hope that the elders in the 
community pay attention to this."  Finally, the court noted that 
"punishing Mr. Whitaker for his behavior was critical." 
¶10 In reviewing the sentencing transcript, the court of 
appeals assumed that Whitaker's constitutional rights were 
implicated by the sentencing court's attention to the community 
elders' failure to involve secular authorities but concluded 
that its nexus to a proper sentencing consideration rendered the 
sentence permissible.  State v. Whitaker, 2021 WI App 17, 396 
Wis. 2d 557, 957 N.W.2d 561.  Although the sentencing court 
No. 
2020AP29-CR 
 
7 
 
identified that consideration as "general deterrence," the court 
of appeals identified "protection of the public" as the true 
consideration underlying the sentencing court's discussion.  
Id., ¶34. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SENTENCING STANDARDS 
¶11 We review a circuit court's sentencing decision for an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.  State v. Dodson, 2022 
WI 5, ¶8, 400 Wis. 2d 313, 969 N.W.2d 225.  A circuit court 
erroneously exercises its sentencing discretion when it actually 
relies 
on 
clearly 
irrelevant 
or 
improper 
factors. 
 
Id.  
Accordingly, a defendant challenging his or her sentence must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that:  (1) the challenged 
factor is irrelevant or improper; and (2) the circuit court 
actually relied on that factor.  Id. 
¶12 Sentencing factors are proper when they inform valid 
sentencing 
objectives 
including 
"the 
protection 
of 
the 
community, punishment of the defendant, rehabilitation of the 
defendant, and deterrence to others."  State v. Gallion, 2004 
WI 42, ¶40, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197; see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.017(2).  Primary factors informing those objectives 
include the gravity of the offense, the character of the 
offender, and the need to protect the public.  Dodson, 400 
Wis. 2d 313, ¶9.  Secondary factors include: 
(1) Past record of criminal offense; (2) history of 
undesirable 
behavior 
pattern; 
(3) the 
defendant's 
personality, character and social traits; (4) result 
of 
presentence 
investigation; 
(5) vicious 
or 
aggravated nature of the crime; (6) degree of the 
defendant's culpability; (7) defendant's demeanor at 
No. 
2020AP29-CR 
 
8 
 
trial; (8) defendant's age, educational background and 
employment record; (9) defendant's remorse, repentance 
and cooperativeness; (10) defendant's need for close 
rehabilitative control; (11) the rights of the public; 
and (12) the length of pretrial detention. 
Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶43 n.11. 
¶13 To prove "actual reliance" on an improper factor, a 
defendant must show that the circuit court made the improper 
factor a part of the "basis for the sentence."  Dodson, 400 
Wis. 2d 313, ¶10.  We have interpreted this to mean that a 
defendant must show that the circuit court "impose[d] 'a harsher 
sentence solely because'" of the improper factor.  State v. 
Williams, 2018 WI 59, ¶¶46, 53, 381 Wis. 2d 661, 912 N.W.2d 373 
(quoting Buckner v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 539, 550, 202 N.W.2d 406 
(1972)); see, e.g., State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, 383 Wis. 2d 
147, 914 N.W.2d 120 (holding that a circuit court impermissibly 
imposed 
a 
harsher 
sentence 
solely 
because 
the 
defendant 
exercised his constitutional right to refuse to submit to a 
warrantless blood draw).  To be the "sole" cause of a harsher 
sentence, an improper factor must "stand alone as an independent 
factor."  See Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶50.  That means a 
circuit court's reliance on an improper factor cannot be cured 
by 
additionally 
relying 
on 
other 
proper, 
but 
unrelated, 
sentencing considerations.  However, if a circuit court's 
reference to a challenged factor bears "a reasonable nexus" to a 
No. 
2020AP29-CR 
 
9 
 
proper sentencing factor, then the circuit court has not imposed 
sentence based "solely" on the improper factor.6  Id. 
                                                 
6 This case highlights some confusion regarding the correct 
approach 
to 
evaluating 
constitutionally 
protected 
conduct 
considered at sentencing.  The court of appeals, following 
guidance from federal cases, has applied a "reliable nexus" test 
in 
determining 
whether 
consideration 
of 
constitutionally 
protected conduct at sentencing is "improper."  See State v. 
Fuerst, 181 Wis. 2d 903, 913, 512 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1994) 
("[A] sentencing court may consider a defendant's religious 
beliefs and practices only if a reliable nexus exists between 
the defendant's criminal conduct and the defendant's religious 
beliefs and practices.").  This "reliable nexus" test is applied 
under the first prong of the test set out in Alexander——the 
improper-factor prong.  State v. Alexander, 2015 WI 6, ¶17, 360 
Wis. 2d 292, 858 N.W.2d 662. 
More recently, this court has applied a "reasonable nexus" 
test in the context of the second prong——the actual-reliance 
prong.  See State v. Dodson, 2022 WI 5, ¶10, 400 Wis. 2d 313, 
969 N.W.2d 225 (citing State v. Williams, 2018 WI 59, ¶53, 381 
Wis. 2d 661, 912 N.W.2d 373); State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶4, 
326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409.  But see Dodson, 400 
Wis. 2d 313, ¶¶21-23 (Hagedorn, J., concurring) (arguing that 
the reasonable nexus analysis more properly goes to whether the 
factor was "improper" rather than whether it was "actually 
relied" on).  In Williams, this court appeared to consider a 
nexus to proper sentencing factors under both analytical prongs.  
Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶¶51, 53 (saying both that when the 
"factor is inextricably intertwined with a defendant's character 
and lack of remorse, its consideration is proper," and that 
"[t]he sole reference to [the alleged improper factor] bore a 
reasonable nexus to the relevant factor of Williams' lack of 
remorse"). 
No. 
2020AP29-CR 
 
10 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶14 Whitaker argues that the circuit court relied on an 
improper sentencing factor——thereby violating his constitutional 
rights——when it:  (1) repeatedly referenced Whitaker's childhood 
Amish community; and (2) stated its intent to deter others 
within that community from failing to report or stop ongoing 
sexual assaults.  Whitaker's exact constitutional claims are 
somewhat nebulous, but they appear to boil down to freedom of 
association and the free exercise of religion.  As to the 
former, Whitaker argues that when the circuit court said it 
hoped the sentence would send a message to members of the Amish 
community, the court improperly based the sentence on his 
protected association with that community.  As for the latter, 
Whitaker argues that when the court encouraged his childhood 
Amish community to report sexual assaults to the secular 
authorities, contrary to the community's practice of avoiding 
outside societal influence, the circuit court violated his right 
to free religious exercise.  Because this case can be decided on 
                                                                                                                                                             
Thus, depending on how a court looks at it, a reasonable 
nexus 
to 
a 
proper 
and 
relevant 
sentencing 
factor 
either:  (1) renders the challenged factor proper because it is 
"inextricably intertwined" with a relevant and proper factor; or 
(2) indicates that the court was actually relying on the related 
relevant and proper factor and not solely relying on the 
challenged factor.  Either way, the analysis is equivalent.  An 
appellate court affirms the sentence if the challenged factor is 
relevant to proper sentencing considerations rather than a 
stand-alone 
factor 
untethered 
to 
the 
underlying 
criminal 
conduct.  In this case, we continue to follow this court's more 
recent guidance and apply the "reasonable nexus" test under the 
actual-reliance prong. 
No. 
2020AP29-CR 
 
11 
 
narrower grounds, as a prudential matter we assume without 
deciding that any consideration of Whitaker's childhood Amish 
community was improper.7  That said, we hold that Whitaker fails 
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the assumed 
improper factor was the sole cause of a harsher sentence because 
it bears a reasonable nexus to relevant and proper sentencing 
factors. 
¶15 We begin with the context in which the circuit court 
made the challenged comments.  Whitaker pled to only one count 
of sexual assault of a minor despite confessing to hundreds more 
and received two years of initial confinement.8  In addressing 
the egregious facts of this case, and at the behest of the 
defendant,9 the circuit court repeatedly considered the enabling 
behavior of the elder members of Whitaker's childhood community.  
The sentencing court stated that "the relevant Galleon [sic] 
factors are punishment, and also deterrence of others, hopefully 
                                                 
7 See Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 
Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 ("Typically, an appellate court 
should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds."). 
8 Under Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)1. and (2)(d)1., a Class B 
felony 
carries 
a 
maximum 
sentence 
of 
40 
years 
initial 
confinement and 20 years of extended supervision. 
9 Whitaker asked the circuit court to consider how his 
upbringing affected his socialization as a mitigating factor.  
Specifically, Whitaker blamed his upbringing for limiting his 
sexual education, isolating him from resources, and contributing 
to a "skewed view" of adolescent development.  He also said that 
it was "important to note that there were adults who were aware 
of 
this 
conduct 
when 
it 
was 
happening . . . and 
it 
was 
recommended that the allegations remain within the community." 
No. 
2020AP29-CR 
 
12 
 
deterrence of others in the Amish community."  It repeated, "I'm 
hoping that this sentence deters, as I said, the community," and 
continued, "a prison sentence is the only way to send the 
message to Mr. Whitaker and to the community that this is 
totally unacceptable behavior. . . . And I hope that the elders 
in the community pay attention to this." 
¶16 Whitaker argues that these references to his childhood 
Amish community lack congruity to his offense and therefore lack 
a sufficient nexus to relevant and proper sentencing objectives.  
We disagree.  Read in context, the circuit court's efforts to 
encourage Whitaker's childhood community to report child sexual 
assaults wholly relate to relevant criminal conduct, both 
generally 
and 
specifically. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
was 
not 
addressing a failure to report a one-off crime after the fact; 
the community elders knew the assaults were ongoing.  Their 
failure to meaningfully intervene directly enabled Whitaker to 
commit hundreds of additional assaults on his sisters and 
greatly compounded their harm.  As the circuit court stated, it 
is insufficient to address these crimes internally in the 
community "when it is not a one-time thing and . . . the women, 
the daughters, the wives in the Amish community are not 
empowered to come forward." 
¶17 This reasoning touches on valid considerations of 
general deterrence and protection of the public.  We have long 
accepted that general deterrence is an appropriate sentencing 
consideration.  See Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶61.  Here, the 
sentencing court expressed its desire to generally deter others, 
No. 
2020AP29-CR 
 
13 
 
specifically others in Whitaker's childhood community, from both 
committing sexual assaults and refusing to protect victims in 
the community from sexual violence.  This sentiment was directed 
at the community members to encourage them to meaningfully 
intervene 
by 
reporting 
sexual 
abuse 
and 
holding 
abusers 
accountable rather than continuing to ignore or conceal the 
abuse.  Should the community protect victims and hold abusers to 
account, future potential abusers are likely to be deterred from 
engaging in this type of abusive conduct.  In other words, the 
community's meaningful intervention directly relates to the 
sentencing goal of deterring similar crimes. 
¶18 Here, general deterrence logically ties in with a 
second sentencing goal:  public protection.  Much like the goal 
of deterrence, public protection can be applied both to the 
individual defendant specifically and to the larger community 
generally.  This means the court may consider: (1) the need to 
protect the public from the individual defendant; (2) the need 
to protect the public from those like the defendant; or (3) 
both.  See Id., ¶61 (the court properly "took into account the 
need to protect the public from Gallion and others like him").  
As with deterrence, the circuit court in this case was focused 
on public protection in the general sense.  As noted above, 
deterring 
sexual 
assault 
through 
effective 
community 
intervention protects victims.  As this case exemplifies, 
victims 
of 
sexual 
abuse 
are 
often 
powerless 
to 
protect 
themselves.  And in this case the victims' powerlessness was 
compounded when the family and community elders did little to 
No. 
2020AP29-CR 
 
14 
 
protect A.B., C.D., and E.F. from Whitaker's unrelenting abuse 
even after learning of the ongoing assaults.  The three victims 
were left completely defenseless.  The circuit court recognized 
that the victims' protection was dependent on help from the 
community and encouraged community members to hold offenders 
like Whitaker to account.  In doing so, the circuit court sought 
to protect victims from further trauma and abuse.  The circuit 
court acted within its discretion to address this failure of 
protection in hopes of both preventing others from engaging in 
similar abuse and protecting potential victims in that community 
from similar conduct.10 
¶19 For the sake of completeness, we understand the 
remainder of the court's discussion to be addressing the 
offenses' seriousness, the effects on the victims, and the need 
for punishment.  The circuit court repeatedly referenced these 
valid considerations, stating that the "relevant Galleon [sic] 
factors are punishment, and also deterrence of others," that 
"punishing Mr. Whitaker for his behavior was critical," that "no 
confinement would depreciate the seriousness of this offense," 
and that "a prison sentence is the only way to send the message 
                                                 
10 The sentencing court made other limited references to 
Whitaker's childhood community unrelated to general deterrence 
or protection of the public.  However, Whitaker does not allege 
that these limited comments served as anything other than a 
basis for leniency.  For example, the circuit court exempted 
Whitaker from the sex offender registration requirement, in part 
because it shifted the blame from Whitaker onto "a community and 
a family that wasn't protecting the daughters."  It also stated 
that "[Whitaker] was in an Amish community.  And so . . . I 
don't believe he poses a risk." 
No. 
2020AP29-CR 
 
15 
 
to 
Mr. 
Whitaker . . . that 
this 
is 
totally 
unacceptable 
behavior."  The circuit court sought to address the sheer number 
of crimes Whitaker committed, emphasizing that "[i]t was a 
thousand.  It was years of abuse."  The circuit court also 
focused on the victims, calling the facts of their abuse 
"abhorrent," saying A.B. was "destroyed" by her brother's 
actions, and stating its hope that Whitaker's sentence may "help 
the family heal." 
¶20 Having reviewed the entire sentencing transcript, we 
conclude that the circuit court's challenged statements bore a 
reasonable nexus to the relevant and proper sentencing factors 
of general deterrence and protection of the public.  Nothing in 
the transcript suggests the circuit court increased Whitaker's 
sentence solely because of his religious beliefs or his 
association with the Amish community.  See Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 
331, ¶53.  Therefore, we will not disturb the circuit court's 
wide sentencing discretion.  Id., ¶45. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶21 Whitaker fails to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the sentencing court erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  His sentence stands. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
No.  2020AP29-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶22 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   (concurring).  There 
are two constitutionally protected interests presented by the 
matter before us:  Whitaker's associational interest in his 
childhood community and his interest in the Amish religion.   
¶23 The majority opinion assumes, without deciding, that 
"any consideration of [Westley D.] Whitaker's childhood Amish 
community was improper" but that its "reasonable nexus to 
relevant and proper sentencing factors" prevent consideration of 
Whitaker's childhood community from being the sole cause of a 
harsher sentence.1  Although I join the majority opinion in 
affirming the court of appeals' conclusion that Whitaker's 
sentence was a proper exercise of the circuit court's sentencing 
discretion, I write in concurrence.   
¶24 The 
circuit 
court 
identified 
the 
secretive 
characteristics of the community in which Whitaker was raised. 
The circuit court's discussion linked Whitaker's repetitive 
sexual assaults to the community association established for 
Whitaker by his parents' choice of where to raise their family.  
In addition, the circuit court took care to separate the court's 
understanding that Amish religious principles did not tolerate 
sexual assault of sisters, as the secretive nature of Whitaker's 
childhood community had done.     
¶25 In this concurrence, I separate what the majority 
lumps together and characterizes in a general way as "improper" 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶14.  On review, Whitaker claimed that his 
sentence was more harsh because the circuit court improperly 
considered constitutionally protected conduct.    
No.  2020AP29-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
consideration 
into 
two 
constitutional 
interests:  
characteristics of association with the secretive community and 
Amish religious principles.  I do so for two reasons.  First, I 
conclude 
that 
the 
secretive 
characteristic 
of 
Whitaker's 
childhood community is a proper factor to consider at sentencing 
because 
evidence 
of 
his 
association 
with 
this 
childhood 
community was relevant to the repetitive nature of the sexual 
assaults.  Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 160 (1992) 
(explaining that introduction of evidence that Dawson was a 
member of the Aryan Brotherhood was prohibited by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments because it had no relevance to the issues 
being decided in the proceeding in which the evidence was 
admitted).  In addition, unless specific evidence about the 
secretive characteristics of Whitaker's childhood community are 
identified, establishing a sufficient relationship between a 
constitutionally protected associational or religious interest 
and the crime of conviction would be difficult to prove.  As the 
United States Supreme Court has explained, "the Constitution 
does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence 
concerning one's beliefs and associations at sentencing simply 
because those beliefs and associations are protected by the 
First Amendment."  Id. at 165.  However, the evidence must be 
relevant to the sentencing proceeding.  Id.    
¶26 Second, 
the 
difference 
between 
associational 
characteristics of Whitaker's childhood community and Amish 
religious principles is important.  The majority opinion's lack 
of separation of two constitutionally protected interests could 
No.  2020AP29-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
be interpreted in a way that disparages Amish religious 
principles.  This could occur even though the circuit court did 
not discuss Amish religious principles, except to say that, 
"[S]exual assault of sisters is not something that is accepted."   
¶27 The freedom to peaceably assemble and to exercise 
one's choice of religion are protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and by 
Article I, Sections 4 and 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  In 
order to introduce evidence of associational characteristics of 
Whitaker's childhood community or of religious practices, such 
evidence must be relevant to the sentencing proceeding at which 
it was introduced.  Id. at 160.    
¶28 In regard to the association of Whitaker as a child in 
the community in which his family placed him, the secretive 
characteristics of the community likely had connection to the 
repetitive nature of his sexual assaults.  Apparently, some 
members of the community knew of the assaults when they were 
occurring, and they made some attempt to stop them.  However, 
when their efforts were unsuccessful, they took no further 
action.  They did not report the assaults to law enforcement or 
seek outside help in terminating Whitaker's victimization of his 
sisters.   
¶29 As Whitaker was sentenced, the circuit court took the 
secretive nature of the community into account in the court's 
efforts to protect others from similar victimization.  The court 
explained how harmful community silence had been to A.B.  "She's 
No.  2020AP29-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
in bed.  She can't go to sleep comfortably in her own house.  
Mr. Whitaker can.  Her parents can.  But [A.B.] couldn't."   
¶30 In 
order 
to 
employ 
constitutionally 
protected 
principles at sentencing for criminal conduct, there must be a 
reliable 
connection 
between 
constitutionally 
protected 
principles and the crime of conviction.  State v. J.E.B., 161 
Wis. 2d 655, 673, 469 N.W.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1991) (explaining 
that "the test is whether there is a reliable showing of a 
sufficient relationship" between a protected principle and the 
crime).  This relationship has been referred to as "congruity" 
with the crime.  Id.   
¶31 In the case presented, there is nothing in the record 
of 
Whitaker's 
sentencing 
that 
describes 
Amish 
religious 
principles so as to support a factual foundation for concluding 
that there is "congruity" between Amish religious principles and 
Whitaker's sexual assaults of his sisters.  Furthermore, the 
circuit court explained that the court was very familiar with 
the Amish community in which Whitaker was raised, and "sexual 
assault of sisters is not something that is accepted."   
¶32 The circuit court found that the community was 
secretive, but the court did not imply that this quality was 
grounded in Amish religious principles rather than community 
association.  There was no expression in the circuit court's 
sentencing remarks, either overtly or covertly, that Amish 
religious principles tolerated sexual assault of sisters.   
¶33 By contrast, the record is replete with evidence of 
the secretive characteristics of the community.  "So not only 
No.  2020AP29-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
was [A.B] destroyed by these acts night after night after night, 
but she was destroyed by the threats of her beloved older 
brother.  But also she couldn't raise it in her family, or she 
would be blamed."  The circuit court further explained, "I'm 
hoping that this sentence deters, as I said, the community."   
¶34 However, 
notwithstanding 
the 
circuit 
court's 
sentencing remarks, the majority concludes by combining both 
"his religious beliefs" and "his association with the Amish 
community" into one sentence with one conclusion.2  Religious 
principles and associational characteristics do not stand on the 
equal factual footing in this record.  Stated otherwise, there 
is no factual foundation in the record for treating community 
associational characteristics and Amish religious principles as 
interchangeable.  Evidence of secretive characteristics of the 
community was relevant to Whitaker's sentencing; therefore, it 
was properly admitted and employed by the circuit court in its 
sentencing decision.  Dawson, 503 U.S. at 165.  Because the 
majority opinion does not address the two constitutional 
interests that were identified based on the factual record 
presented, I respectfully concur.   
¶35 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this concurrence. 
 
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶20.   
No.  2020AP29-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶36 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  This court 
correctly concludes the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its sentencing discretion.  The majority reasons 
"nothing in the transcript suggests the circuit court increased 
Whitaker's sentence solely because of his religious beliefs or 
his association with the Amish community."1  Phrasing a court's 
sentencing discretion in such terms suggests a court may 
consider 
religious 
beliefs, 
the 
exercise 
of 
any 
other 
constitutional right, or some other improper factor as a basis 
for enhancing a sentence.  Doing so would be improper.  "When 
imposing sentence, a circuit court cannot rely on inaccurate 
information, race or national origin, gender, alleged extra-
jurisdictional 
offenses, 
or 
the 
defendant's 
or 
victim's 
religion."  State v. Williams, 2018 WI 59, ¶46, 381 Wis. 2d 661, 
912 N.W.2d 373 (citing State v. Alexander, 2015 WI 6, ¶¶18, 23, 
360 Wis. 2d 292, 858 N.W.2d 662); see also State v. Dalton, 2018 
WI 85, ¶61, 383 Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120 ("Established case 
law indicates that [it] is impermissible" for a defendant to be 
"criminally punished for exercising his constitutional right"); 
State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ¶96, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 797 
N.W.2d 451 ("[A] circuit court may not base its sentencing 
decision upon the defendant's or the victim's religion.").   
¶37 To the extent the "solely because of" language could 
be misconstrued to sanction a sentencing court's reliance on an 
improper factor so long as it is bundled with proper factors, I 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶¶3, 20 (emphasis added). 
No.  2020AP29-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
disagree with the majority's application of the phrase.2  An 
improper factor such as a defendant's religious beliefs or 
exercise of a constitutional right may not form even part of the 
basis for a sentence, and a bundling approach does not 
ameliorate the resulting constitutional infringement.   
¶38 We first applied this language in Buckner v. State, 
reasoning, "A defendant cannot receive a harsher sentence solely 
because he availed himself of one of his constitutional rights."  
56 Wis. 2d 539, 550, 202 N.W.2d 406 (1972) (citing Baker v. 
United States, 412 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1969), certiorari denied, 
396 U.S. 1018 (1970)).  In that case, the defendant alleged his 
sentence 
violated 
his 
constitutional 
right 
against 
self-
incrimination "due to the trial court's remarks concerning 
defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent."  Id.  We 
concluded the trial court's comments about the defendant's 
initial failure to cooperate were not an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.3  We explained:   
"Where the judicial sentencing discretion is exercised 
on the basis of clearly irrelevant or improper 
                                                 
2 Id., ¶¶3, 20.  See also id., ¶14 ("[W]e hold that Whitaker 
fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the assumed 
improper factor was the sole cause of a harsher sentence because 
it bears a reasonable nexus to relevant and proper sentencing 
factors."). 
3 We also concluded the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion by mentioning that the defendant was 
from Chicago, because the defendant "cites no authority and 
attempts no showing that the trial court relied, in its 
determination of the proper sentence," upon that fact, and 
because the record showed "the trial court was making a general 
protestation against the rise in callousness for human life."  
Buckner v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 539, 552, 202 N.W.2d 406 (1972). 
No.  2020AP29-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
factors, an abuse of discretion also results."  It 
does not automatically follow, however, that an off-
hand reference to a consideration indicates the trial 
court 
must 
have 
utilized 
it 
in 
his 
sentencing 
deliberations.  The quoted exchange was probably 
prompted by defense counsel's plea for a minimal 
concurrent 
sentence. 
 
Nowhere 
is 
it 
indicated 
"clearly" that the trial court increased defendant's 
sentence because the defendant exercised his right to 
remain silent. 
Id. at 550–51 (quoting McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 278, 
182 N.W.2d 512 (1971)).   
¶39 Notably, the only case Buckner cited in support of its 
"solely because" language——Baker——neither used those terms nor 
stood for that proposition at all.  In Baker, two men captured 
after a bank robbery pleaded guilty and were given ten year 
sentences, while a third man pleaded not guilty and received a 
fifteen year sentence for aiding and abetting the robbery.  
Baker, 412 F.2d at 1070.  The third man challenged his 
conviction on multiple grounds, including that he received a 
longer sentence because he decided to stand trial.  Id. at 1073.   
¶40 Declining to review the sentence, the Fifth Circuit 
explained, "An accused cannot be punished by a more severe 
sentence because he unsuccessfully exercised his constitutional 
right to stand trial rather than plead guilty."  Id. (citing 
Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966); United 
States v. Martell, 335 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1964); United States 
v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960)).  The court reasoned the 
sentence was within the statutory limits and "no showing [was] 
made that appellant received a longer sentence because he 
required the government to try him.  He relies on the fact that 
he, an aider and abettor who pleaded not guilty, received a 
No.  2020AP29-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
longer sentence than the two men who pleaded guilty to actually 
going into the bank.  But an aider and abettor is a principal to 
the crime."  Id.  There is nothing in Baker about the 
appellant's exercise of his right to trial forming a basis of 
the sentence. 
¶41 Despite its suspect origin and overall inaccuracy, 
this language persists in some of our sentencing cases.  See, 
e.g., State v. Dodson, 2022 WI 5, ¶10, 400 Wis. 2d 313, 969 
N.W.2d 225 ("Therefore, a defendant will fall short of proving 
actual reliance if the transcript lacks clear and convincing 
evidence that the factor was the sole cause of a harsher 
sentence." (citing Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶¶45-46, 53)).   
¶42 In this case, the majority relies in part on State v. 
Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, in which we used the "solely because" 
language in the context of restitution.  The defendant in 
Williams alleged "the sentencing court improperly increased his 
sentence 
because 
he 
exercised 
his 
right 
to 
object 
to 
restitution."  Id., ¶1.  We held the sentencing court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion "[b]ecause the circuit 
court's reference to restitution at Williams' sentencing was 
directly linked to a proper sentencing consideration——Williams' 
lack of remorse[.]"  Id., ¶44.  We explained, "[w]hen imposing 
sentence, a circuit court cannot rely on inaccurate information, 
race or national origin, gender, alleged extra-jurisdictional 
offenses, or the defendant's or victim's religion."  Id., ¶46 
(citing Alexander, 360 Wis. 2d 292, ¶¶18, 23).  "In addition, a 
circuit court may not impose 'a harsher sentence solely because 
No.  2020AP29-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
[a defendant] availed himself of one of his constitutional 
rights,' . . . or vindictively impose a harsher sentence when a 
defendant has succeeded in getting his first sentence vacated or 
overturned by exercising his appellate rights."  Id. (citing 
Buckner, 56 Wis. 2d at 550; State v. Church, 2003 WI 74, ¶¶1, 
28–39, 262 Wis. 2d 678, 665 N.W.2d 141).  "Outside of these 
prohibitions, 
the 
circuit 
court 
has 
'wide 
discretion 
in 
determining what factors are relevant' and what weight to give 
to each factor."  Id., ¶47 (quoting State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 
42, ¶68, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197). 
¶43 Williams 
did 
not 
involve 
the 
exercise 
of 
any 
constitutional right, but instead centered on the defendant's 
refusal to stipulate to restitution.  Because the right to 
challenge restitution is statutory, we explained "a sentencing 
court should not vindictively increase a defendant's sentence 
based solely on his decision to challenge restitution," but 
"Williams fail[ed] to demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that his position on restitution was an improper 
sentencing factor."  Id., ¶49 (internal citations omitted).  The 
circuit court's restitution discussion "did not stand alone as 
an independent factor in the sentencing transcript.  Rather, the 
circuit court's sole reference to restitution came toward the 
end 
of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
sentencing 
remarks 
and 
was 
intertwined with its consideration of Williams' character and 
lack of remorse, as evidenced only in part by Williams' position 
that he was not responsible for restitution."  Id., ¶50. 
No.  2020AP29-CR.rgb 
 
6 
 
¶44 We emphasized in Williams that "[s]entencing courts 
may not vindictively punish a defendant solely for exercising a 
constitutional right."4  Id., ¶51 (citing Alabama v. Smith, 490 
U.S. 794, 798–801 (1989); Church, 262 Wis. 2d 678, ¶¶28–39).  
"But when the restitution factor is inextricably intertwined 
with 
a 
defendant's 
character 
and 
lack 
of 
remorse, 
its 
consideration is proper."  Id.  "The restitution factor at issue 
here was not Williams' decision to challenge restitution, or the 
fact that his challenge was successful, but rather Williams' 
disavowal of responsibility . . . .  Under these circumstances, 
Williams failed to convince us that the sentencing court's 
single reference to restitution constituted an improper factor."  
Id. 
¶45 Although we determined the restitution remark in 
Williams did not constitute an improper sentencing factor, we 
also concluded "Williams failed to establish actual reliance" 
because "[n]othing in the transcript suggests the circuit court 
increased Williams' sentence solely because he challenged 
restitution."  Id., ¶53.  Instead, "[t]he sole reference to 
restitution bore a reasonable nexus to the relevant factor of 
Williams' lack of remorse.  In context, the circuit court in no 
way tied the length of the sentence to Williams' exercise of his 
statutory right to challenge restitution."  Id. (citing State v. 
                                                 
4 The "right to challenge restitution arises from our 
statutes, not the constitution," but we acknowledged in Williams 
that defendants "have a constitutional due process right not to 
be sentenced based on improper factors upon which a court 
actually relies."  State v. Williams, 2018 WI 59, ¶51 n.15, 381 
Wis. 2d 661, 912 N.W.2d 373 (citations omitted). 
No.  2020AP29-CR.rgb 
 
7 
 
Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶¶4, 59, 67, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 
N.W.2d 409).   
¶46 With this background in mind, we arrive at the present 
case.  The majority explains its rationale as follows: 
To prove "actual reliance" on an improper factor, a 
defendant must show that the circuit court made the 
improper 
factor 
a 
part 
of 
the 
"basis 
for 
the 
sentence."  Dodson, 400 Wis. 2d 313, ¶10.  We have 
interpreted this to mean that a defendant must show 
that the circuit court "impose[d] 'a harsher sentence 
solely because'" of the improper factor.  State v. 
Williams, 2018 WI 59, ¶¶46, 53, 381 Wis. 2d 661, 912 
N.W.2d 373 (quoting Buckner v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 539, 
550, 202 N.W.2d 406 (1972)); see, e.g., State v. 
Dalton, 2018 WI 85, 383 Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120 
(holding that a circuit court impermissibly imposed a 
harsher 
sentence 
solely 
because 
the 
defendant 
exercised his constitutional right to refuse to submit 
to a warrantless blood draw).  To be the "sole" cause 
of a harsher sentence, an improper factor must "stand 
alone as an independent factor."  See Williams, 381 
Wis. 2d 661, ¶50.  That means a circuit court's 
reliance on an improper factor cannot be cured by 
additionally relying on other proper, but unrelated, 
sentencing considerations.  However, if a circuit 
court's reference to a challenged factor bears "a 
reasonable nexus" to a proper sentencing factor, then 
the circuit court has not imposed sentence based 
"solely" on the improper factor.  Id.5 
¶47 The majority understandably attempts to cabin the 
"solely because of" language in order to avoid implying that the 
circuit court may rely on an improper factor in sentencing, but 
in the context of a defendant's religious beliefs or exercise of 
a constitutional right, the majority's efforts fall short.  The 
majority's conclusion that "nothing in the transcript suggests 
the circuit court increased Whitaker's sentence solely because 
                                                 
5 Majority op., ¶13. 
No.  2020AP29-CR.rgb 
 
8 
 
of his religious beliefs or his association with the Amish 
community[,]"6 could be misconstrued to authorize a circuit 
court's reliance on an improper factor if that factor is not the 
only one upon which the sentence is based.  The Constitution 
does not permit a court to increase a sentence because of a 
defendant's exercise of his First Amendment rights——regardless 
of how many proper factors contribute to the sentencing 
decision. 
¶48 In Ninham, this court correctly stated the test:  "[A] 
circuit court may not base its sentencing decision upon the 
defendant's or the victim's religion."  Ninham, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 
¶96.  Even more recently, we said "[w]e have already decided 
that certain factors are improper for the circuit court to 
consider at sentencing and therefore violate a defendant's right 
to due process:  race or national origin, gender,  alleged extra-
jurisdictional 
offenses, and 
the 
defendant's 
or 
victim's religion.  Alexander, 360 Wis. 2d 292, ¶23.  Neither 
case suggested a circuit court may increase a sentence based on 
a defendant's religion so long as the sentencing decision 
encompasses valid factors. 
¶49 In this case, nothing in the sentencing court's 
remarks suggests the court increased Whitaker's sentence because 
of his religious beliefs.  Far from indicating any hostility 
toward the Amish religion, the sentencing judge mentioned that 
she lived "in the midst of an Amish community.  They're my 
neighbors" and "sexual assault of sisters is not something that 
                                                 
6 Id., ¶3. 
No.  2020AP29-CR.rgb 
 
9 
 
is accepted."  Neither Whitaker nor the State suggests the Amish 
religion tolerates either child sexual assault or the failure to 
protect children from it.  Whitaker was sentenced based on his 
conduct, not because he happened to be Amish when he sexually 
assaulted his sisters.  The circuit court's sentence was 
designed to deter others from committing child sexual assaults 
or from facilitating such crimes by their silence or inaction—
whether Amish or atheist.  There is nothing improper about such 
a sentencing objective. 
¶50 For the foregoing reasons, I concur. 
 
 
No.  2020AP29-CR.bh 
 
1 
 
¶51 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  The analytical 
framework utilized in sentencing cases like this one deserves a 
closer look.  Nevertheless, I join the majority opinion because 
it correctly applies our precedent and reaches the correct 
outcome. 
 
No.  2020AP29-CR.bh 
 
 
 
1