Case Title: State v. Williams

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016AP000883-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-05-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 59 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP883-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Jamal L. Williams, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 377 Wis. 2d 247, 900 N.W.2d 310 
PDC No:  2017 WI App 46 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 30, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 16, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy G. Dugan and Ellen R. Brostrom 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, C.J., and A.W. BRADLEY, J., did not 
participate. 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed and an oral argument by Sopen B. Shah, deputy solicitor 
general, with whom on the briefs were Brad D. Schimel, attorney 
general, and Misha Tseytlin, deputy solicitor general.  
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed and an oral argument by Christopher P. August, assistant 
state public defender. 
 
 
2018 WI 59 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP883-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2013CF2025) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jamal L. Williams, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 30, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed in 
part; affirmed in part. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   We review a petition by 
the State and a cross-petition by Jamal L. Williams challenging 
the court of appeals' decision, which held:  (1) the mandatory 
$250 DNA surcharge the circuit court ordered Williams to pay 
violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Wisconsin and United 
States Constitutions; and (2) the circuit court did not rely on 
an improper factor when it sentenced Williams.1  The State and 
                                                 
1 State v. Williams, 2017 WI App 46, 377 Wis. 2d 247, 900 
N.W.2d 310. 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
2 
 
Williams each petitioned for review on the issues decided 
against them.  The State claims the DNA surcharge statute does 
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses and Williams claims the 
sentencing court improperly increased his sentence because he 
exercised his right to object to restitution.  We reverse the 
court of appeals on the DNA surcharge issue and affirm on the 
sentencing issue. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
In April 2013, victim R.W. died during an attempted 
armed robbery of victim B.P.  Williams was arrested and told 
police the following:  Williams arranged to buy marijuana from 
B.P. and before meeting B.P. for the drug buy, Williams drove 
his car to pick up his brother, Tousani Tatum.  When Tatum 
entered Williams' car, Tatum displayed a gun and disclosed his 
plan to rob B.P.  Williams then drove to the drug-buy location.  
Williams claims he unsuccessfully attempted to change Tatum's 
mind about robbing B.P.  B.P. arrived at the drug-buy location 
in a car driven by R.W., who remained in the car.  Williams and 
Tatum got out of their car, and Williams called B.P. over.  
While B.P. began to weigh the correct amount of marijuana, Tatum 
put his gun to B.P.'s head, demanding his money and drugs.  B.P. 
broke free and fled, after which Tatum fired into R.W.'s car.  
Immediately after Tatum fired the shots, Williams and Tatum fled 
in Williams' car. 
¶3 
R.W. died from a gunshot wound.  R.W.'s three-year-old 
daughter, who was in the car at the time, was not physically 
hurt.  Williams and his brother were initially charged as co-
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
3 
 
defendants with one count of felony murder.  The cases were 
later severed, and in November 2013, the State filed an amended 
information charging Williams with four counts:  (1) first-
degree reckless homicide; (2) attempted armed robbery; (3) 
first-degree recklessly endangering safety——all three as party 
to a crime; and (4) felon in possession of a firearm.  At the 
time of the incident, Williams was on extended supervision for a 
prior conviction. 
¶4 
The State attempted to negotiate a plea with Williams, 
hoping to get him to testify against his brother.  Williams 
repeatedly rejected all offered plea bargains and insisted on 
going to trial.  Tatum's case was tried first.  The jury 
convicted him of felony murder and felon in possession of a 
firearm and the circuit court sentenced Tatum to 24 years of 
initial 
confinement, 
followed 
by 
10 
years 
of 
extended 
supervision.  Shortly thereafter, Williams agreed to plead 
guilty to the reduced charge of attempted armed robbery as party 
to a crime.  After accepting Williams' plea, the circuit court 
ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI).  The PSI agent 
met with Williams on February 19, 2014.  The report contains 
four full pages listing Williams' prior record, consisting of 35 
entries.  The PSI report emphasizes two points:  (1) Williams' 
"atrocious lack of remorse"; and (2) Williams' "very savvy" 
ability to outsmart the criminal justice system.  The PSI writer 
said Williams "minimized his behavior in every single arrest or 
placed blame on another person" and cared only about himself.  
When the agent asked if Williams had any remorse, he answered 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
4 
 
"most definitely" explaining he felt bad for his own brother, 
mother, and son——without mentioning the victims at all, until 
the PSI writer brought them up.  Williams objected to discussing 
the homicide because, according to Williams, R.W.'s death had 
nothing to do with his conviction for attempted armed robbery. 
¶5 
The report reflects that Williams' arrests began when 
he was 12 years old, and "the only significant periods he has 
had without arrest are when he was incarcerated."  The report 
also discusses Williams' repeated incidents of absconding from 
supervision, violating the rules, and dishonesty.  The writer 
noted that Williams "appeared to be proud and seemingly found it 
humorous how many times, charges [against him] have been 
dropped."  The report also points out that even after Williams 
pled guilty, he was blaming an unknown third person for the 
shooting in an attempt to exonerate himself and his brother of 
all responsibility. 
¶6 
On March 12, 2014, twenty-one days after his meeting 
with the PSI writer, Williams was sentenced.2  The prosecutor's 
remarks focused on:  (1) Williams' lack of remorse (stating in 
part:  "There's no remorse for what happened here and he's 
taking 
no 
responsibility 
for 
[R.W.'s] 
death."); 
(2) 
his 
participation in a drug deal with a gun while on extended 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Timothy G. Dugan, Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, presiding.  The Honorable Ellen R. Brostrom, Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court, presided over the Machner hearing and 
signed the final postconviction order.  See State v. Machner, 92 
Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
5 
 
supervision; (3) his criminal record; and (4) the fact that, as 
the older brother, Williams could have acted to prevent the 
homicide.  The State asked the circuit court to make Williams 
pay $794 restitution for R.W.'s burial costs, because even 
though "he wasn't convicted of the homicide," "the homicide was 
a direct extension of this armed robbery." 
¶7 
R.W.'s fiancée, the mother of the three-year-old who 
witnessed R.W.'s death, asked the circuit court to impose the 
maximum sentence.  She explained the devastating and lasting 
effects the incident had on her daughter and herself. 
¶8 
Williams' lawyer also focused on remorse, claiming 
that Williams' remorse for his own family does not mean Williams 
lacked remorse for the victims.  When asked for his position on 
restitution, Williams' lawyer responded that the shooting was 
not a foreseeable consequence of the drug deal and should be 
viewed as "a separate transaction and [Williams] should not be 
held accountable for that -- that $794." 
¶9 
In addressing the court, Williams said he was taking 
full responsibility for his actions, apologized to the victims, 
and expressed the following:   
I feel bad.  I've been feelin' bad for this whole 
year.  For something over a drug deal, somebody lost 
their life, somebody lost their father, somebody lost 
their son and somebody lost their grandson.  I ain't 
tryin' to make myself sound better even though I'm -- 
going to prison, losing my son too, but she lost her 
father forever.  So I just want to apologize to her 
and her family and the mother and father.  I feel 
remor[s]e for everything I've done. 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
6 
 
¶10 The circuit court began its sentencing remarks by 
discussing the three main sentencing factors:  (1) nature of the 
offense; (2) character of the defendant; and (3) community 
protection.3  The circuit court: 
 explained the extremely serious nature of Williams' crime 
and how Williams could have prevented R.W.'s death; 
 discussed Williams' character and how his decision to 
leave the scene instead of calling for help reflected 
poorly on his character; 
 observed 
that 
although 
Williams 
pled 
guilty, 
that 
decision appeared "strategic" since it did not occur 
until a jury convicted Williams' brother; 
 mentioned Williams' numerous contacts with the criminal 
justice system and how Williams failed to avail himself 
of its many attempts to help him; and 
 noted many of the PSI report's comments about Williams——
including his failure to accept responsibility, his 
delight 
in 
frequently 
avoiding 
punishment 
for 
his 
criminal acts, his repeated disregard for the rules while 
on electronic monitoring in the past, and his failure to 
take the  opportunities he was afforded to turn his life 
around. 
¶11 The circuit court found Williams to be "a risk and a 
danger to the community because of [his] continued conduct and 
                                                 
3 See McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 274-76, 182 
N.W.2d 512 (1971). 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
7 
 
[his] continued criminal violations."  It noted positive aspects 
of Williams' character such as his high school diploma, ability 
to read, decision to take some college classes, and self-report 
of drug avoidance except the "sporadic use of marijuana."  The 
circuit court discussed the COMPAS analysis, which put Williams 
in "a high risk for general recidivism" and in need of "a high 
level of supervision."4  It then commented on the PSI agent's 
assessment that Williams had no remorse, observing that the 
agent had been supervising Williams and trying to get him to 
turn his life around.  The circuit court noted: 
You believe your brother was unfairly treated and 
that you suggest a fair sentence would include time 
served and probation as fair punishment, that although 
a family lost their son and a father, you don't know 
how sending you to prison is going to make that any 
better. 
The crime is extremely serious.  It's had a 
profound impact on the victims, their families, the 
community, and, as you noted yourself to the [PSI] 
writer, you could have stopped this at any time but 
you didn't. 
Considering all of those factors, clearly this is 
a prison sentence.  In the circumstance[,] probation 
would 
unduly 
depreciate 
the 
seriousness 
of 
the 
offense. 
¶12 The 
circuit 
court 
next 
addressed 
Williams' 
rehabilitative 
needs 
and 
the 
conditions 
of 
his 
extended 
                                                 
4 COMPAS is the acronym for Correctional Offender Management 
Profiling for Alternative Sanctions.  See State v. Loomis, 2016 
WI 68, ¶4 n.10, 371 Wis. 2d 235, 881 N.W.2d 749. 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
8 
 
supervision.  Afterwards, for the first time, the circuit court 
commented on restitution: 
I 
don't 
think 
I 
have 
authority 
to 
order 
restitution.  Had you been convicted of the felony 
murder, party to a crime, certainly yes, but the 
nature of itself, the nature of the attempt armed 
robbery doesn't justify the restitution or give me 
authority, and I think the fact that you're not 
willing to join in on that also reflects your lack of 
remorse under the circumstances, and I'm certainly 
considering that.[5] 
¶13 The circuit court imposed the mandatory DNA surcharge, 
and "all the other mandatory assessments, surcharges and costs" 
and fees, ordering them "to be paid from 25 percent of any 
prison funds, [and] upon release to extended supervision convert 
to a civil judgment."  It then advised Williams of the 
consequences of being convicted of a felony before finally 
pronouncing the sentence: 
Considering 
all 
of 
those 
factors 
and 
circumstances, the Court is going to sentence you to 
the State Prison for a period of initial confinement 
of 10 years, extended supervision of 7.5 years for a 
total of 17.5 years consecutive to any other sentence. 
¶14 In May 2014, Williams filed a motion seeking to vacate 
the DNA surcharge.  His motion was based on the former DNA 
surcharge statute, which gave circuit courts discretion to 
impose the surcharge except with respect to certain enumerated 
                                                 
5 We are not convinced that restitution could not be ordered 
under these circumstances.  See State v. Canady, 2000 WI App 87, 
234 Wis. 2d 261, 610 N.W.2d 147 (requiring a "causal nexus" 
between crime and damage).  However, because the State forfeited 
this issue, we do not address it. 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
9 
 
sex crimes.  Williams claimed that because the circuit court 
failed to exercise any discretion, the DNA surcharge should be 
vacated.  The circuit court denied the motion, ruling that the 
surcharge was mandatory because Williams was sentenced after the 
effective date of the new DNA surcharge statute.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.046 (2013-14).6 
¶15 Williams then filed a postconviction motion seeking:  
(1) plea withdrawal based on ineffective assistance of counsel; 
(2) resentencing because the circuit court relied on Williams 
declining to stipulate to restitution, a factor Williams 
considers improper; and (3) removal of the DNA surcharge on the 
basis that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses as applied to 
him.  Ultimately, the circuit court denied Williams' motion in 
its entirety. 
¶16 Williams appealed, raising only the sentencing and DNA 
surcharge issues.  The court of appeals upheld Williams' 
sentence, concluding that the sentencing court relied on a 
proper sentencing factor——lack of remorse——and not on Williams' 
failure to stipulate to restitution.  See State v. Williams, 
2017 WI App 46, ¶19, 377 Wis. 2d 247, 900 N.W.2d 310.  The court 
of appeals reversed on the DNA surcharge issue, concluding two 
of its prior decisions, State v. Elward, 2015 WI App 51, 363 
Wis. 2d 628, 866 N.W.2d 756, and State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 
363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758, required it to remand this 
                                                 
6 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
10 
 
issue to the circuit court.  Williams, 377 Wis. 2d 247, ¶¶23-26.  
The court of appeals believed the circuit court should have 
applied the discretionary DNA surcharge statute in effect when 
Williams committed his crime, Wis. Stat. § 973.046(1g)(2011-12), 
rather than the mandatory DNA surcharge statute in effect when 
Williams 
was 
sentenced, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.046(1r)(2013-14).  
Williams, 377 Wis. 2d 247, ¶26.  The court of appeals agreed 
with Williams that Wis. Stat. § 973.046(1r), as applied to him, 
violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses.  Williams, 377 Wis. 2d 247, 
¶26. 
¶17 In a footnote, the court of appeals stated it believed 
that Elward and Radaj were wrongly decided, but it lacked the 
authority to overrule these cases.  Williams, 377 Wis. 2d 247, 
¶26 n.10 (quoting Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189-90, 560 
N.W.2d 246 (1997)). 
¶18 Judge Brian K. Hagedorn concurred, supporting the 
court of appeals' final footnote and urging us to overrule 
Elward and Radaj because both cases "sit in uneasy, unsettled 
tension" with State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 
N.W.2d 786.  Williams, 377 Wis. 2d 247, ¶43 (Hagedorn, J., 
concurring).  In Scruggs, we held that a DNA surcharge is not 
punishment under the "intent-effects" test set forth in Hudson 
v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997), and therefore Scruggs 
failed to prove that the new mandatory DNA surcharge statute 
violated ex post facto laws.  Scruggs, 373 Wis. 2d 312, ¶¶1, 16, 
50. 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
11 
 
¶19 Both the State and Williams petitioned for review.  We 
granted both petitions.  Because the State filed its petition 
first, we treat Williams' petition as the cross-petition. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  State's Petition for Review——DNA Surcharge 
¶20 The State asks us to reverse the court of appeals' 
decision on the DNA surcharge and overturn Elward and Radaj 
because the mandatory DNA surcharge statute is not punitive in 
intent or effect; therefore, the State argues, the statute is 
not an ex post facto law. 
1.  Standard of Review 
¶21 Whether a statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses 
of the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions is a question 
of law this court reviews de novo.  Scruggs, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 
¶12; U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 9-10, cl. 1; Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 12.7  The Ex Post Facto Clauses prohibit enforcement of a 
statute "which makes more burdensome the punishment for a 
crime[] after its commission."  Scruggs, 373 Wis. 2d 312, ¶14.  
To determine whether a statute is punitive, we apply the 
"intent-effects" test.  See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99. 
2.  Intent 
                                                 
7 Article I, Sections 9 and 10 of the United States 
Constitution provide:  "No bill of attainder or ex post facto 
Law shall be passed" and "No state shall . . . pass any . . . ex 
post facto Law . . . ."  Article 1, Section 12 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides:  "No . . . ex post facto law . . . shall 
ever be passed . . . ." 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
12 
 
¶22 The first part of the intent-effects test requires us 
to examine whether the legislature intended the new mandatory 
DNA surcharge, Wis. Stat. § 973.046(1r), to be punishment.  If 
the mandatory surcharge is intended to punish, it cannot be 
applied to defendants who committed crimes prior to its 
enactment.  Just last term, we answered this question in 
Scruggs.  We engaged in a thorough statutory analysis and 
concluded that the legislature did not intend § 973.046(1r) as 
punishment.  See Scruggs, 373 Wis. 2d 312, ¶¶3, 17-38.  Although 
the facts in Scruggs differ slightly from the facts in Williams' 
case,8 our statutory analysis applies equally here.  The 
statutory text imposing the mandatory DNA surcharge evinces no 
intent to punish.  The legislature termed the payment a 
"surcharge" not a "fine," it drew a distinction between "a fine 
imposed in a criminal action and a surcharge imposed in that 
action," and it linked the surcharge to legislation that 
dramatically increased the number of people required to provide 
DNA samples to be analyzed, stored, and maintained in the DNA 
databank.  See id., ¶¶17, 21, 23-26. 
¶23 The intent of the surcharge is not to punish, but to 
fund costs associated with the expanded DNA databank.  Id., 
¶¶24-26, 30.  Significantly, the surcharge imposed is not meant 
to cover the costs associated with collecting and analyzing the 
                                                 
8 Both Scruggs and Williams committed crimes before——but 
were sentenced after——the effective date of the mandatory DNA 
surcharge statute.  Unlike Scruggs, Williams already submitted a 
DNA sample in 2009 for a prior conviction. 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
13 
 
particular DNA sample from the individual convicted defendant 
standing before the sentencing court.  Indeed, the new law 
requires every person arrested for a felony to give a DNA 
sample.  See 2013 Wis. Act 20, § 2343; Wis. Stat. §§ 970.02(8), 
165.76, 165.84(7)(ab).9  But, an arrestee is not ordered to pay 
any DNA surcharge unless he is convicted.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.046(1r).  The collected surcharges cover costs associated 
with taking, processing, analyzing, and storing all the DNA 
samples of those arrested for felonies but not convicted.  The 
surcharges offset costs associated with collection, analysis, 
and maintenance of all samples.  Scruggs, 373 Wis. 2d 312, ¶27 
(citing Legis. Fiscal Bureau, DNA Collection at Arrest and the 
DNA Analysis Surcharge, Paper #410 to J. Comm. on Fin. 2-3, 8 
(May 23, 2013)). 
 
3.  Misapplication of DNA surcharge's purpose  
in Elward and Radaj 
¶24 In considering early DNA surcharge challenges, courts 
took a narrow view of the legislature's non-punitive intent.  
Some courts wrongly assumed the imposed surcharge funded only 
the collection, processing, and maintenance of the specific DNA 
sample for which the defendant paid the surcharge.  In doing so, 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 165.76(1) lists who is required to give 
a DNA sample.  Paragraph (gm) requires a person "arrested for a 
violent crime, as defined in s. 165.84(7)(ab)" to give a sample.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 165.84(7)(ab) defines "violent crime" as a 
felony violation (listing each specific felony statute) as well 
as the "solicitation, conspiracy, or attempt" to commit the 
felony violations listed in subsection (7)(ab)1. 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
14 
 
they failed to recognize the broader purpose of the expanded DNA 
databank funded by the mandatory surcharges assessed against 
convicted defendants: 
The DNA databank is a broad criminal justice tool used 
to solve old crimes, exonerate the innocent, and rule 
in and rule out suspects in criminal investigations.  
Similarly, the funding mechanism for this is, on its 
face, not directly connected to the gathering and 
analysis of samples.  It does not charge all who 
submit samples, only those convicted.  And it provides 
that repeat offenders who may have already submitted 
samples will need to pay anyway.  In short, the 
surcharge is plainly designed to function as a sort of 
tax on convicted criminals for use of the criminal 
justice system in support of broad public safety 
goals——goals far beyond any individual defendant and 
their DNA. 
Williams, 377 Wis. 2d 247, ¶32 (Hagedorn, J., concurring). 
¶25 Based 
on 
faulty 
assumptions, 
courts 
mistakenly 
attempted to correlate a particular surcharge with what they 
thought were the actual costs attributable to a defendant's 
individual DNA sample.  This led courts to declare that Wis. 
Stat. § 973.046 (2013-14) violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses and 
vacate DNA surcharges when:  (1) DNA samples were not actually 
being taken, see Elward, 363 Wis. 2d 628, ¶7; and (2) the 
statute required a defendant convicted of four crimes to pay 
four separate surcharges, even though he gave only a single DNA 
sample, see Radaj, 363 Wis. 2d 633, ¶32.  Elward and Radaj were 
wrongly decided, based on erroneous reasoning, and for the 
reasons explained below, must be overruled. 
¶26 Under the mandatory DNA surcharge statute, enacted in 
2013 Wis. Act 20, courts sentencing defendants after January 1, 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
15 
 
2014, were required to impose the mandatory DNA surcharge:  $250 
for each felony conviction and $200 for each misdemeanor 
conviction.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.046; 2013 Wis. Act 20, 
§ 9426(1)(am).  However, the Act did not permit the State to 
collect DNA samples from convicted misdemeanants until April 1, 
2014.  See 2013 Wis. Act 20, § 9426(1)(bm). 
¶27 Elward involved a defendant who was sentenced between 
January 1, 2014 and April 1, 2014.  The sentencing court imposed 
the mandatory DNA surcharge, but the court of appeals reversed.  
363 Wis. 2d 628, ¶1-2.  The court of appeals held the DNA 
surcharge statute imposed ex post facto punishment for any 
defendant sentenced for a misdemeanor conviction between January 
1, 2014, and April 1, 2014, because these defendants would pay 
surcharges "to maintain a database of which they could never be 
a part because they could never be ordered to actually provide a 
sample."  Id., ¶2.  The Elward court reasoned:   
As a result, the $200 surcharge bore no relation to 
the cost of the DNA test because he never had to 
submit to a test.  The State received money for 
nothing.  This served only to punish Elward without 
pursuing any type of regulatory goal. 
Id., ¶7.  The court of appeals misunderstood that the $200 
surcharge imposed on Elward was not to pay for his own personal 
DNA sample, but to offset the costs associated with the newly 
expanded DNA databank and other DNA-related activities within 
the State. 
¶28 The court of appeals in Radaj made a similar error in 
concluding that the surcharge-per-conviction part of Wisconsin's 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
16 
 
statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses by causing Radaj to 
pay $250 for each of his four convictions without any link 
between the surcharge and the actual costs associated with 
either "analyzing Radaj's" DNA sample or with comparing Radaj's 
DNA profile to "other biological specimens collected as part of 
a future investigation."  363 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶30-32.  The Radaj 
court based its decision in part on the fact that Radaj was not 
being ordered to provide four separate DNA specimens for 
testing.  Id., ¶32.  The Radaj court mistakenly believed the 
amount of the DNA surcharge must have a rational connection to 
the actual cost of Radaj's personal DNA sample in order for it 
to escape classification as punitive.  Although a rational 
connection between the surcharge and a non-punitive purpose is 
one factor considered in examining whether the surcharge has the 
effect of punishment (which we examine in the next section), the 
Radaj court misguidedly limited its discussion to Radaj's 
specimen specifically instead of the regulatory activities of 
the DNA database as a whole. 
¶29 The 
non-punitive 
purpose 
of 
the 
mandatory 
DNA 
surcharge statute is not to cover the DNA-analysis-related costs 
incurred for the specific conviction for which it is being 
imposed.  Rather, the non-punitive purpose is to fund the costs 
associated with the DNA databank by charging those necessitating 
its existence——convicted criminals.  That means a defendant pays 
a surcharge for every conviction irrespective of whether his DNA 
profile already exists in the databank and whether he submits 
only one DNA sample.  This is what the law says.  We overrule 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
17 
 
Elward and Radaj.  The reasoning employed in those cases was 
unsound and the cases were wrongly decided.  Because the court 
of appeals' majority opinion in this matter relied on Elward and 
Radaj, its holding on the DNA surcharge is faulty and must be 
reversed.  See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of 
Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶¶94-100, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257 
(discussing that departure from stare decisis occurs when a 
"prior decision is unsound in principle" and "may turn on 
whether the prior case was correctly decided" (first citing 
State v. Outagamie Cty. Bd., 2001 WI 78, ¶30, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 
628 N.W.2d 376; then citing Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 999 (1992)(Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part))). 
4.  Effect 
¶30 The second part of the intent-effects test requires us 
to examine the effect of the DNA surcharge statute.  See 
Scruggs, 373 Wis. 2d 312, ¶39 (citing Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104).  
Regardless of the legislature's non-punitive intent for imposing 
the mandatory DNA surcharge, we consider whether it in effect 
operates as punishment.  See id.  Only the "clearest proof" will 
"override legislative intent and transform what has been 
denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty."  Hudson, 
522 U.S. at 100.  Seven factors guide our analysis of whether 
the mandatory DNA surcharge actually punishes the defendant:  
(1) does the statute involve an affirmative disability or 
restraint; (2) has the sanction at issue historically been 
regarded as punishment; (3) will the sanction be imposed only 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
18 
 
after a finding of scienter; (4) does the statute promote the 
traditional aims of punishment——retribution and deterrence; (5) 
is the behavior to which it applies already a crime; (6) is 
there an alternative purpose to which it may be rationally 
connected; and (7) is the sanction excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned.  See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 
372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). 
¶31 We 
applied 
these 
seven 
factors 
in 
Scruggs 
and 
concluded only the fifth factor favors characterizing the 
mandatory surcharge as punitive.  Scruggs, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 
¶¶42-49.  The same is true here.10 
a.  Is the surcharge an affirmative disability or restraint? 
¶32 The State says the surcharge does not disable or 
restrain a defendant because it is not a form of imprisonment.  
Williams 
argues 
the 
surcharge 
imposes 
a 
disability 
on 
defendants, who are often indigent, by burdening them with 
"severe financial sanctions" "over and over, for each and every 
conviction."  There is certainly no evidence in this case that 
the $250 surcharge disabled or restrained Williams in any way.  
He reported to the PSI writer that his girlfriend deposits 
$200/month in his prison account and another friend deposits $50 
into his prison account "from time to time."  In any event, 
"disability" and "restraint" are normally understood to mean 
imprisonment, which the $250 surcharge cannot effectuate.  See 
                                                 
10 The fifth factor is discussed under sub-heading "e." 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
19 
 
LaCrosse v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 137 F.3d 925, 931 
(7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104). 
b.  Is the surcharge historically viewed as punishment? 
¶33 In 
Scruggs, 
we 
determined 
that 
historically, 
a 
surcharge has not been viewed as punishment.  Scruggs, 373 
Wis. 2d 312, ¶42.  Williams urges us to reconsider.  He claims 
our conclusion rested on a citation to Hudson, and Hudson relied 
on a citation to Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), and 
Helvering relied on cases that all involved non-punitive 
remedial sanctions.  Williams distinguishes the surcharge from a 
remedial sanction because the latter involves "regulatory 
takings designed to reimburse the State for some perceived 
'loss' owing to the 'defendant's' conduct" in contrast to the 
surcharge, which Williams contends is really a fine designed to 
punish the defendant. 
¶34 We 
identify 
no 
historical 
evidence 
supporting 
Williams' 
characterization 
of 
a 
surcharge 
as 
punishment.  
Although the surcharge might not align exactly with the remedial 
sanction cases from the late 1800s and early 1900s referenced in 
Helvering, 
a 
surcharge 
resembles 
a 
non-punitive 
remedial 
sanction 
much 
more 
than 
punishment. 
 
See 
Williams, 
377 
Wis. 2d 247, ¶33 (Hagedorn, J., concurring) (listing examples of 
many other surcharges in our statutes "not denominated criminal 
fines, yet are assessed against convicted criminals or those 
subject to civil forfeitures").  The DNA surcharge is money paid 
to the State to offset the costs the State incurs in maintaining 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
20 
 
the DNA databank, which exists only because defendants commit 
crimes. 
c.  Is a finding of scienter required? 
¶35 Williams concedes that no finding of scienter is 
required to impose the surcharge.  The absence of the scienter 
requirement 
shows 
"the 
statute 
is 
not 
intended 
to 
be 
retributive."  Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997). 
d.  Does a surcharge promote retribution and deterrence? 
¶36 We held in Scruggs the $250 surcharge was relatively 
small and therefore did not promote the traditional punitive 
aims of retribution and deterrence.  Scruggs, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 
¶45.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same 
conclusion regarding South Carolina's $250 DNA surcharge.  See 
In re DNA Ex Post Facto Issues, 561 F.3d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 
2009) ("[T]he relatively small size of the fee also indicates 
that it was not intended to have significant retributive or 
deterrent 
value."). 
 
Comparing 
the 
deterrent 
effect 
and 
retributive value (if any) of a $250 surcharge to the 17.5 year 
sentence Williams is serving buttresses this conclusion.  A $250 
payment is unlikely to deter anyone from engaging in illegal 
activity.  And the corrective impact of a $250 fee pales in 
comparison to the penal power of a lengthy prison sentence. 
e.  Does the surcharge apply to conduct already a crime? 
¶37 The State and Williams agree that the surcharge 
applies to conduct that was already a crime——namely, felony and 
misdemeanor convictions.  This factor weighs in favor of 
concluding that the surcharge operates as a punishment despite 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
21 
 
the legislature's non-punitive intent.  The seven Mendoza-
Martinez factors, however, are only "guideposts" and the list is 
"not exhaustive nor is any one factor dispositive."  Scruggs, 
373 Wis. 2d 312, ¶41 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99; citing 
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003)). 
f.  Is the surcharge rationally connected to 
alternative purpose? 
¶38 The text of Wis. Stat. § 973.046(3) explicitly 
broadcasts the non-punitive alternative purpose of the mandatory 
DNA surcharge statute by directing the use of the collected 
surcharges:  "All moneys collected" shall be "utilized under s. 
165.77."  Wisconsin Stat. § 165.77 provides rules relating to 
collecting, analyzing, and maintaining DNA biological specimens.  
An alternative non-punitive purpose undoubtedly exists for the 
DNA surcharges.  The only question is whether the surcharge is 
rationally connected to the DNA database activities.  Judge 
Hagedorn aptly answers this question and we adopt his reasoning: 
The DNA databank is a crime-solving, crime-fighting 
public safety tool.  It supports law enforcement 
investigatory efforts and, in so doing, saves time, 
money, and resources that might be otherwise devoted.  
It serves criminal defendants who might be wrongly  
accused, or even worse, wrongly convicted.  In short, 
the DNA databank was expanded to further support, 
assist, and improve the administration of criminal 
justice in the state of Wisconsin.  The funding 
mechanism, then, must be seen in this light.  The 
legislature needed additional funds for this broader 
cause, and decided to place the burdens not on those 
necessarily required to give a sample, but on those 
convicted of crimes.  Policy merits aside, it is 
altogether rational to assess a fee aimed at solving 
crimes against those who commit them; at the very 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
22 
 
least, it is no less rational than the multitude of 
fees and surcharges that work exactly the same way. 
Williams, 377 Wis. 2d 247, ¶41 (Hagedorn, J., concurring).  The 
legislature 
created 
a 
"user 
fee" 
assessed 
against 
those 
responsible for necessitating the databank.  The more crimes 
committed, the more times the user pays the fee.  The law does 
not require the legislature to set a surcharge with precision; 
the surcharge imposed must bear only "an approximate relation to 
the cost it is meant to offset."  Scruggs, 373 Wis. 2d 312, ¶46 
(quoting Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir. 
2014)).  The costs from the DNA surcharge are meant to offset 
all of the expenses associated with DNA-database related 
activities.  The user fees are reasonably connected to that non-
punitive purpose.  It makes sense to have those who "use" the 
criminal justice system more often——i.e., repeat offenders——
contribute more to offset the costs their actions generate. 
g. Is the surcharge excessive in relation to 
alternative purpose? 
¶39 The State says the surcharge is not excessive.  
Williams disagrees and points to what he alleges is a 
substantial State surplus stemming from paid DNA surcharges.  To 
determine whether the surcharge is excessive in relation to its 
non-punitive purpose, we must compare the amount of the 
surcharge with the overall expenses the State incurs because of 
the charged population's conduct.  See Mueller, 740 F.3d at 
1134-35; Myrie v. Comm'r N.J. DOC, 267 F.3d 251, 258 (3d Cir. 
2001).  The surcharge must be "grossly disproportionate to the 
annual cost" to prove it is excessive.  Mueller, 740 F.3d at 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
23 
 
1134; see also Myrie, 267 F.3d at 261.  We examine not "whether 
the legislature has made the best choice possible to address the 
problem it seeks to remedy," but "whether the regulatory means 
chosen are reasonable."  Smith, 538 U.S. at 105. 
¶40 Under 
this 
standard, 
we 
are 
not 
convinced 
the 
surcharge is excessive in relation to the non-punitive purpose.  
As the State points out, DNA-related activities, including 
operating and maintaining a statewide database, are expensive.  
The money generated from the surcharges pays for all the DNA 
kits used to take samples from every person arrested for a 
felony and every person convicted of a misdemeanor.  The 
surcharges cover the salaries of the analysts employed to 
perform the DNA-related work.  For one year alone, the DNA 
testing kits cost over $1 million dollars.11  
¶41 Citing a Legislative Fiscal Bureau report dated May 9, 
2017, Williams says the excessive nature of the surcharges has 
resulted in a substantial surplus.  See Legislative Fiscal 
Bureau Paper #408, Crime Laboratory and Drug Law Enforcement 
Surcharge and DNA Surcharge Overview (May 9, 2017) (projecting a 
2018-19 ending balance of $2,322,100). 
¶42 We do not view Williams' argument as the "clearest 
proof" that the current surcharges are excessive in relation to 
the non-punitive purpose.  See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100.  First, 
                                                 
11 The State's attorney represented both in her brief and at 
oral argument that the DNA testing kits alone cost over $1 
million annually.  Williams' attorney did not contest the 
State's figures. 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
24 
 
the report Williams cites shows the DNA surcharge funds combined 
with the funds received from a separate surcharge.12  It is 
impossible to discern which surcharge created the surplus.  
Second, the report reflects consistently declining revenue in 
the 
fund 
holding 
the 
DNA 
surcharges 
each 
budget 
year. 
Additionally, the law does not and cannot demand mathematical 
precision in setting and collecting just the right amount of 
surcharges necessary to fund the DNA databank.  Multiple unknown 
variables——including the number of arrests, the amount of 
convictions, the volume of DNA related crimes, and the manpower 
needed to analyze the unknown——render the exact cost of 
operating the databank unpredictable year-to-year.  Judicially 
requiring the legislature to enact annual revisions to the 
actual dollar amount of a DNA surcharge to adjust for less crime 
in one year and more crime in the next would encroach on 
legislative 
policy-making 
and 
create 
administrative 
havoc.  
Accordingly, the legislature must be given broad leeway to 
select a surcharge amount. 
5.  Summary 
¶43 Applying the intent-effects test, we conclude the 
intent of the mandatory DNA surcharge was not punitive.  Rather, 
                                                 
12 The separate surcharge is identified as the "CLDLE" 
surcharge, which is the acronym for Crime Laboratory and Drug 
Law Enforcement. Joint Comm. On Fin., Legis. Fiscal Bureau, 
Paper #409, at 1 (Wis. 2017), https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/m
isc/lfb/budget/2017_19_biennal_budget/050_budget_papers/409_just
ice_crime_laboratory_dna_analysis_kits.pdf (last visited May 17, 
2018). 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
25 
 
it was intended to fund the costs associated with the broad 
expansion of the DNA databank and all the activities related to 
it.  Likewise, a review of the precedential factors guiding our 
analysis shows that the mandatory DNA surcharge statute does not 
have a punitive effect.  Accordingly, the statute does not 
violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses.  Finally, we overrule Elward 
and Radaj, and we reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
in this matter as to the DNA surcharge.13  All three opinions 
incorrectly14 held DNA surcharges to be unconstitutional ex post 
facto violations on the basis that the actual costs incurred for 
the 
individual 
convicted 
defendant 
had 
to 
be 
rationally 
connected to the non-punitive purpose.  This narrow approach 
failed to recognize the non-punitive purpose underlying the 
mandatory DNA surcharge:  to generate funds to cover costs 
incurred by the State in solving crimes utilizing a statewide 
DNA databank. 
B.  Williams' Cross-Petition for Review——Sentencing 
¶44 Williams 
contends 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised its sentencing discretion by relying on an improper 
factor.  More specifically, Williams claims the circuit court 
imposed a harsher sentence because Williams refused to agree to 
                                                 
13 As noted in part B., we affirm the court of appeals' 
decision in this case on the sentencing issue. 
14 We recognize the court of appeals in this case was bound 
to follow State v. Elward, 2015 WI App 51, 363 Wis. 2d 628, 866 
N.W.2d 756, and State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 
866 N.W.2d 758.  See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189-90, 560 
N.W.2d 246 (1997). 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
26 
 
pay restitution.  Williams argues that he has a right to object 
to paying restitution and successfully doing so should not cause 
a sentencing court to increase his sentence.  The State responds 
that:  (1) the circuit court did not actually rely on Williams' 
unwillingness to pay restitution; (2) even if it did, this was 
not an improper factor; and (3) any error was harmless.  We hold 
the circuit court may refer to a defendant's failure to 
voluntarily pay restitution when the reference is directly 
linked to a proper sentencing factor.  Because the circuit 
court's reference to restitution at Williams' sentencing was 
directly linked to a proper sentencing consideration——Williams' 
lack of remorse——the sentencing court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion. 
1.  Standard of Review & Applicable Law 
¶45 We will not disturb a sentencing decision unless the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.  State v. 
Alexander, 2015 WI 6, ¶16, 360 Wis. 2d 292, 858 N.W.2d 662.  A 
circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion in imposing a 
sentence if it "actually relies on clearly irrelevant or 
improper factors."  Id., ¶17 (quoting State v. Harris, 2010 WI 
79, ¶66, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409); see also McCleary v. 
State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 274-76, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971).  To 
establish error, a defendant must prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that a circuit court relied on improper factors.  
Alexander, 360 Wis. 2d 292, ¶17.  A defendant must prove both 
that the factor was improper and that the circuit court actually 
relied on it.  Id., ¶¶18-27. 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
27 
 
¶46 There are three main factors circuit courts must 
consider in determining a defendant's sentence:  (1) the gravity 
of the offense; (2) the character of the defendant; and (3) the 
need to protect the public.  Id., ¶22.  The circuit court may 
also consider secondary factors, including: 
(1) Past record of criminal offense; (2) history 
of 
undesirable 
behavior 
pattern; 
(3) 
the 
defendant's personality, character and social 
traits; (4) result of presentence investigation; 
(5) vicious or aggravated nature of the crime; 
(6) degree of the defendant's culpability; (7) 
defendant's demeanor at trial; (8) defendant's 
age, 
educational 
background 
and 
employment 
record; (9) defendant's remorse, repentance and 
cooperativeness; (10) defendant's need for close 
rehabilitative control; (11) the rights of the 
public; 
and 
(12) 
the 
length 
of 
pretrial 
detention. 
Id., ¶22 (quoted sources omitted).  When imposing sentence, a 
circuit court cannot rely on inaccurate information, race or 
national origin, gender, alleged extra-jurisdictional offenses, 
or the defendant's or victim's religion.  Id., ¶¶18, 23.  In 
addition, a circuit court may not impose "a harsher sentence 
solely because [a defendant] availed himself of one of his 
constitutional rights," Buckner v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 539, 550, 
202 N.W.2d 406 (1972) (emphasis added), or vindictively impose a 
harsher sentence when a defendant has succeeded in getting his 
first sentence vacated or overturned by exercising his appellate 
rights, 
State 
v. 
Church, 
2003 
WI 
74, 
¶¶1, 
28-39, 
262 
Wis. 2d 678, 665 N.W.2d 141. 
¶47 Outside of these prohibitions, the circuit court has 
"wide discretion in determining what factors are relevant" and 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
28 
 
what weight to give to each factor.  State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 
42, ¶68, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197. 
2.  Application 
¶48 There is no dispute that the circuit court considered 
the three primary sentencing factors.  It noted the serious 
nature of the crime, addressed both positive and negative 
factors regarding Williams' character, and discussed the need to 
protect the public.  We therefore turn our attention to whether 
Williams proved by clear and convincing evidence that the 
circuit court actually relied on an improper factor when 
imposing sentence. 
a. Is a position on restitution an improper factor? 
¶49 Williams insists that a sentencing court cannot 
consider 
a 
defendant's 
successful 
objection 
to 
paying 
restitution.  He argues that because he has a statutory right to 
challenge restitution, it is improper for the circuit court to 
use his successful challenge as an aggravating factor against 
him.  He also contends that successful restitution challenges do 
not reflect a lack of remorse.  Although we agree with Williams 
that a sentencing court should not vindictively increase a 
defendant's sentence based solely on his decision to challenge 
restitution, see Church, 262 Wis. 2d 678, ¶28; Buckner, 56 
Wis. 2d at 550, Williams fails to demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that his position on restitution was an 
improper sentencing factor. 
¶50 The circuit court's discussion regarding restitution 
did not stand alone as an independent factor in the sentencing 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
29 
 
transcript.  Rather, the circuit court's sole reference to 
restitution 
came 
toward 
the 
end 
of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
sentencing remarks and was intertwined with its consideration of 
Williams' character and lack of remorse, as evidenced only in 
part by Williams' position that he was not responsible for 
restitution.  It is important to note the theme permeating both 
the PSI report and the sentencing remarks——Williams was not 
sorry that his actions caused the death of another human being.  
The 
PSI 
writer 
described 
Williams' 
lack 
of 
remorse 
as 
"atrocious" and emphasized Williams' attitude that his crime had 
nothing to do with R.W.'s death.  The prosecutor and the defense 
lawyer both focused on remorse.  Williams' remorse, or lack 
thereof, dominated the sentencing hearing.  While a defendant's 
position on paying restitution is not listed among the primary 
or secondary sentencing factors, his lack of remorse, evidenced 
by his attitude regarding restitution, certainly can be relevant 
to sentencing considerations. 
¶51 Sentencing courts may not vindictively punish a 
defendant 
solely 
for 
exercising 
a 
constitutional 
right.15  
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 798-801 (1989); Church, 262 
Wis. 2d 678, ¶¶28-39.  But when the restitution factor is 
                                                 
15 To be clear, Williams' right to challenge restitution 
arises from our statutes, not the constitution.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(13)(c); Canady, 234 Wis. 2d 261, ¶9.  Defendants do, 
however, have a constitutional due process right not to be 
sentenced based on improper factors upon which a court actually 
relies.  See State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶33, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 
786 N.W.2d 409. 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
30 
 
inextricably intertwined with a defendant's character and lack 
of remorse, its consideration is proper.  The restitution factor 
at 
issue 
here 
was 
not 
Williams' 
decision 
to 
challenge 
restitution, or the fact that his challenge was successful, but 
rather Williams' disavowal of responsibility for R.W.'s death 
and unwillingness to contribute to funeral costs.  Williams 
showed no insight that his choice to drive to the drug buy, 
despite his brother's possession of a gun and his brother's 
armed robbery plan, resulted in R.W.'s death.  Under these 
circumstances, 
Williams 
failed 
to 
convince 
us 
that 
the 
sentencing court's single reference to restitution constituted 
an improper factor. 
b.  Actual reliance 
¶52 Our conclusion that the circuit court's restitution 
remark did not constitute an improper sentencing factor disposes 
of Williams' cross-petition.  For the sake of completeness, we 
briefly address the actual reliance issue.  In determining 
whether 
a 
circuit 
court 
actually 
relied 
on 
an 
improper 
sentencing factor, we review the sentencing transcript as a 
whole and consider the allegedly improper comments in context.  
Harris, 326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶45.  Actual reliance occurs only when 
the circuit court paid "explicit attention" to an improper 
factor, and when the improper factor formed the "basis for the 
sentence."  Alexander, 360 Wis. 2d 292, ¶25. 
¶53 The circuit court's remarks as a whole did not 
concentrate 
explicit 
attention 
on 
Williams' 
decision 
to 
challenge 
restitution. 
 
Rather, 
the 
sentencing 
remarks 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
31 
 
demonstrate the circuit court focused on the three primary 
sentencing factors, as well as Williams' clear lack of remorse.16  
The basis of this sentence was not Williams' decision to 
challenge restitution but rather the seriousness of the offense, 
Williams' poor character as evidenced by his lack of remorse, 
and the need to protect the public.  The sole reference to 
restitution bore a reasonable nexus to the relevant factor of 
Williams' lack of remorse.  In context, the circuit court in no 
way tied the length of the sentence to Williams' exercise of his 
statutory right to challenge restitution.  See Harris, 326 
Wis. 2d 685, ¶¶4, 59, 67 (ruling actual reliance not proven when 
improper factors "bear a reasonable nexus to proper sentencing 
factors").  Nothing in the transcript suggests the circuit court 
increased Williams' sentence solely because he challenged 
restitution.  Accordingly, Williams failed to establish actual 
reliance. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶54 We hold the mandatory DNA surcharge statute is not an 
ex post facto law because the surcharge is not punishment under 
the 
intent-effects 
test. 
 
The 
legislature 
intended 
the 
surcharges to offset the costs associated with its broad 
expansion of the statewide DNA databank, and the effect of the 
                                                 
16 The circuit court's decision suggests it saw Williams' 
last minute expression of remorse as gamesmanship and did not 
believe him.  Even in his attempt to be remorseful, Williams 
focused on himself and losing his son by going to prison. 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
32 
 
surcharges do not override the legislature's non-punitive 
intent. 
¶55 In addressing ex post facto challenges, our court of 
appeals in this case was bound to apply Elward and Radaj, which 
erroneously 
required 
the 
DNA 
surcharge 
to 
represent 
the 
particular costs associated solely with a single defendant in 
order to be declared non-punitive.  We overrule these cases 
because each is wrongly decided and based on faulty reasoning.  
The legislature's non-punitive purpose for the mandatory DNA 
surcharge was much broader; in essence it serves as the funding 
mechanism for a DNA databank that operates as a crime-solving 
and crime-fighting public safety tool.  The surcharge covers 
DNA-related expenses, including the costs of all the kits and 
tests not only for those convicted, but also for those who are 
only arrested for committing (or attempting to commit) a 
felony.17  The surcharges are also used to pay salaries of DNA 
analysts who maintain the databank as well as those who gather, 
process, and analyze DNA samples and DNA evidence. 
¶56 We also hold the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion when it referenced restitution during 
its sentencing remarks.  The single restitution reference was 
intertwined with remarks about Williams' lack of remorse, a 
proper sentencing factor.  The restitution remark focused on 
Williams' failure to accept responsibility for causing one 
                                                 
17 See supra n.9. 
No. 
2016AP883-CR   
 
33 
 
victim's 
death 
rather 
than 
Williams' 
right 
to 
challenge 
restitution.  Williams failed to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the sentencing court relied on an improper 
sentencing factor. 
¶57 Accordingly, we reverse that part of the court of 
appeals decision concluding the mandatory DNA surcharge statute 
operated as an ex post facto violation, and we reinstate the 
$250 surcharge as part of Williams' judgment.  We affirm that 
part of the court of appeals decision holding the circuit court 
properly exercised its sentencing discretion when it sentenced 
Williams. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed in part and affirmed in part. 
¶58 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J., 
and 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2016AP883-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶59 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  I largely 
agree with the analysis of the majority opinion, and I concur in 
the mandate.   
¶60 Nonetheless, I am concerned with the majority's 
discussion of the court of appeals' decision in State v. Radaj.1  
Specifically, I disagree with the majority's suggestion that 
there is never a circumstance under which the mandatory DNA 
surcharge would be considered punishment.2 
I 
¶61 Under the second part of the "intent-effects" test, 
the court determines whether the mandatory DNA surcharge has a 
punitive effect despite its non-punitive intent.3  Seven factors 
guide the analysis of whether the mandatory DNA surcharge 
actually punishes a particular defendant.  Among the seven 
factors are (1) whether the surcharge promotes the traditional 
aims of punishment——retribution and deterrence; and (2) whether 
the sanction is excessive in relation to the alternative, non-
punitive purpose assigned to the sanction.4 
¶62 Under the mandatory DNA surcharge statute in effect 
when Williams was sentenced (and still in effect today), circuit 
courts are required to impose upon defendants a surcharge of 
                                                 
1 State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 
N.W.2d 758. 
2 See majority op., ¶38. 
3 State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, ¶39, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 
N.W.2d 786. 
4 Id., ¶41. 
No.  2016AP883-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
$200 per misdemeanor conviction and $250 per felony conviction.5  
There is no maximum DNA surcharge, and because the surcharge is 
calculated on a per-conviction basis, the DNA surcharge varies 
from case to case. 
¶63 In Radaj, the defendant pleaded guilty to four 
felonies.  As required by the mandatory DNA surcharge statute, 
the circuit court imposed a $1,000 DNA surcharge (i.e., $250 per 
felony conviction).6  The court of appeals held that the $1,000 
DNA surcharge violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the 
Wisconsin and United States Constitutions because the surcharge 
was "not rationally connected and [was] excessive in relation to 
the surcharge's intended purpose, and that its effect [was] to 
serve traditionally punitive aims."7 
¶64 The court of appeals in Radaj incorrectly assumed that 
the purpose of the mandatory DNA surcharge statute was to 
reimburse the government for the cost of "DNA-analysis-related 
activities" incurred in relation to a particular defendant's 
prosecution.8  In State v. Scruggs,9 this court explained that 
                                                 
5 Wis. Stat. § 973.046(1r)(a) (2013-14).  When Williams 
committed the felony in the instant case, the DNA surcharge was 
discretionary, could only be imposed for a felony conviction, 
and could not exceed $250.  Wis. Stat. § 973.046(1g) (2011-12). 
6 Like Williams, the defendant in Radaj committed his crimes 
when the surcharge was discretionary but was sentenced when the 
surcharge was mandatory. 
7 Radaj, 363 Wis. 2d 633, ¶35 (emphasis added). 
8 See id., ¶30. 
9 State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 
N.W.2d 786. 
No.  2016AP883-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
the mandatory DNA surcharge statute serves as a funding 
mechanism for broad expansions to the government's DNA database, 
including 
additional 
costs 
associated 
with 
collecting, 
analyzing, and maintaining DNA samples of those convicted of 
misdemeanors and those arrested for, but not convicted of, 
felonies.10  Thus, the majority correctly overrules Radaj for 
having mistakenly conducted its intent-effects analysis with a 
misunderstanding of the broader funding purpose of the mandatory 
DNA surcharge statute. 
¶65 However, the majority goes too far by suggesting that 
a DNA surcharge could never be considered punishment under any 
set of circumstances.11 
¶66 In the instant case, Williams was convicted of only 
one felony.  The court does not have before it a defendant with 
multiple felony convictions as the court of appeals did in 
Radaj. 
¶67 The majority should reserve judgment on whether a DNA 
surcharge 
can 
ever 
be 
so 
expensive 
that 
it 
constitutes 
punishment under the facts of a particular case.  Without 
knowing what the DNA surcharge actually is in a particular case, 
how can a court determine whether the surcharge promotes the 
                                                 
10 Id., ¶47. 
11 See majority op., ¶38 (characterizing the per-conviction 
method of calculating a DNA surcharge as a "user fee" in which 
"[t]he more crimes committed, the more times the user pays the 
fee"). 
No.  2016AP883-CR.ssa 
 
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traditional aims of punishment?12  How can a court determine 
whether the surcharge is excessive in relation to the non-
punitive purpose assigned to the mandatory DNA surcharge statute 
without knowing what the DNA surcharge actually is?13  Because of 
the variable nature of the DNA surcharge, these questions must 
be answered on a case-by-case basis. 
II 
¶68 The majority appears to have again reached beyond the 
issues presented in order to answer a question not raised by the 
facts of the case before it.14  Due process and judicial 
restraint counsel against deciding an issue that was not briefed 
or argued by the parties. 
¶69 For the foregoing reasons, I do not join the opinion 
but concur only in the mandate. 
                                                 
12 See majority op., ¶36 (relying on Williams' single $250 
surcharge to conclude that the surcharge does not have a 
retributive or deterrent effect).  
13 See majority op., ¶¶39-42 (engaging in a fact-specific 
analysis of whether Williams' single $250 surcharge is excessive 
in relation to the broad funding purpose of the mandatory DNA 
surcharge statute). 
14 See Springer v. Nohl Elec. Prods. Corp., 2018 WI 48, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
No.  2016AP883-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
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