Case Title: SULLIVAN MILLER v DOE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1972-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12003 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE OF M O N T A N A 1972 JOHN T, SULLIVAN, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- JOHN DOE, GLACIER GENERAL ASSURANCE C O M P A N Y , A Montana Corporation; and H A R T F O R D ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY C O M P A N Y , a Corporation, Defendants and Appellants. WILLIAM F, MILLER, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, JOHN DOE, GLACIER GENERAL ASSURANCE C O M P A N Y , a Montana Corporation and STATE F A R M INSURANCE C O M P A N Y , a Corporation, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable John B. McClernan, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Poore, McKenzie & Roth, Butte, Montana. James A. Poore, 1 1 1 argued, Butte, Montana. John L. McKeon, Anaconda, Montana. Michael J, McKeon argued, Anaconda, Montana. Knight, Dahood & Mackay, Anaconda, Montana. For Respondents: Burgess, Joyce,Prothero, Whelan & ear^, Butte, Montana, Thomas F. Joyce argued, Butte, Montana. Robert OILeary argued, Butte, Montana. Submitted: January 12, 1972 Decided : MAR 2 O 1972 Filed: MAR 2 O 1 9 7 2 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of t h e Court. This i s a consolidated appeal on behalf of an unidentified uninsured motorist and t h r e e insurance companies from two per- sonal i n j u r y judgments entered a g a i n s t t h e respective insurers pursuant t o "uninsured motorist" provisions of t h e i r p o l i c i e s . The judgments were i n the amount of $20,000 each, one i n favor of the policeman d r i v e r and t h e other i n favor of t h e policeman passenger, of a c i t y of Butte police c a r which was involved i n a c o l l i s i o n with an automobile a l l e g e d l y driven by an unknown and uninsured d r i v e r , without the permission or consent of t h e owner. The f a c t s r e l a t i n g t o the accident i t s e l f a r e not complex. A t about 6:45 a.m. on October 21, 1969, t h e two p l a i n t i f f s , John T. Sullivan and t h e l a t e William F. M i l l e r , policemen f o r the c i t y of Butte, were on duty p a t r o l l i n g the warehouse d i s t r i c t i n Butte. Patrolman Sullivan was driving t h e police c a r n o r t h on Arizona S t r e e t i n t h e northbound lane of t r a v e l a t a speed of about 15 t o 20 miles an hour, with p l a i n t i f f Miller beside him i n t h e f r o n t s e a t a s a passenger. The s t r e e t was s t r a i g h t , lighted with overhead l i g h t s , t h e r e was no obstruction t o v i s i - b i l i t y , nor was t h e r e any t r a f f i c other than the two vehicles involved i n the accident. The headlights of the police c a r were on and i n good working order. The weather was good and t h e s t r e e t was c l e a r . Immediately preceding the a c c i d e n t , the two p l a i n t i f f s were engaged i n a conversation concerning two suspects they thought would be burglarizing a drug s t o r e . A s the p l a i n t i f f s proceeded north on Arizona S t r e e t , p l a i n t i f f Miller &outed a warning t o p l a i n t i f f Sullivan t o "watch outi'. Immediately thereafter a head-on c o l l i s i o n occurred between the police car and a 1968 Pontiac 4--door automobile. The point of impact was i n the northbound lane of travel. P l a i n t i f f Sullivan t e s t i f i e d that he did not s e e the Pontiac automobile a t a l l prior t o impact although he had been looking s t r a i g h t ahead and t o the s i d e for a t l e a s t a half block prior t o impact. After the c o l l i s i o n p l a i n t i f f Sullivan was semiconscious, but managed t o c a l l f o r help on the police car radio. When the police o f f i c e r who had been called arrived a t the scene of the accident, there was no one i n the Pontiac, its l i g h t s and en- gine were shut off and i t was locked. The driver of the Pontiac has never been located or identified. The Pontiac had apparently been taken from the Leskovar Motors used car l o t by an unknown person without the permission or consent of the owner. Both p l a i n t i f f s were severely injured i n the accident. A t the time of t r i a l , p l a i n t i f f Sullivan had incurred medical expenses of $1,026.10 and a salary loss of $4,548. P l a i n t i f f Sullivan was s t i l l permanently disabled a t the time of t r i a l , the extent and duration of h i s future d i s a b i l i t y and future medical expenses being uncertain. As a r e s u l t of h i s i n j u r i e s , he incurred considerable pain and suffering of a continuing nature. Sullivan had received a t o t a l of $14,0b1.05 i n medical expenses and compensation benefits under the Montana workmen's Compensation Act, a s a r e s u l t of h i s i n j u r i e s and d i s a b i l i t y . P l a i n t i f f Miller likewise was permanently disabled with medical expenses of $1,405.30 and a salary loss of $5,003. The extent of h i s future d i s a b i l i t y and medical expenses was undetermined. A s a r e s u l t of h i s i n j u r i e s , he suffered extensive pain and suffering which w i l l continue i n the future. H e r e - ceived a t o t a l of $13,735.30 in medical expenses and compensation - 3 - benefits under the Montana workmen's Compensation Act. A t t h e time of the accident, t h e c i t y of Butte c a r r i e d an automobile insurance policy on t h e involved police c a r containing an "uninsured motorist" endorsement with defendant Glacier General Assurance Company and both Sullivan and Miller I1 were insureds'' within t h e meaning d the policy. In a d d i t i o n , p l a i n t i f f Sullivan c a r r i e d h i s own policy with an "uninsured motorist'' endorsement with defendant Hartford Accident & In- demnity Company, while p l a i n t i f f Miller c a r r i e d h i s own policy with an "uninsured motorist" endorsement with defendant S t a t e Farm Mutua 1 Automobile Insurance Company. P l a i n t i f f Sullivan f i l e d a persona 1 i n j u r y a c t i o n a g a i n s t John Doe, the unidentified and uninsured d r i v e r of the Pontiac automobile; Glacier General Assurance Company, the insurer of the c i t y of Butte; and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, h i s i n s u r e r . I n t h i s a c t i o n Sullivan sought judgment t h a t t h e unidentified and uninsured driver of t h e Pontiac was l i a b l e f o r h i s i n j u r i e s ; t h a t he was e n t i t l e d t o damages of $20,000; and, t h a t e i t h e r Glacier General o r Hartford or both must pay him t h i s sum under t h e "uninsured motorist" provisions of t h e i r respective p o l i c i e s . The defense was d e n i a l of l i a b i l i t y on t h e p a r t of the d r i v e r of t h e Pontiac, together with various policy defenses under the "uninsured motorist'' endorsements on the respective p o l i c i e s . The Sullivan case came on f o r t r i a l before t h e d i s t r i c t court s i t t i n g without a jury on A p r i l 29, 1970. Immediately p r i o r t o t r i a l , a l l p a r t i e s t o t h e Sullivan case agreed t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t court would t r y only t h e issues of l i a b i l i t y of t h e uninsured motorist t o Sullivan and the damages Sullivan incurred. The p a r t i e s a l s o agreed t h a t a separate t r i a l would be held t h e r e a f t e r i n which the policy defenses of the i n s u r e r s under the "uninsured motorist" coverage would be determined by the d i s t r i c t court and judgment entered accordingly. Following t r i a l , the d i s t r i c t court entered findings of f a c t and conclusions of law i n favor of p l a i n t i f f Sullivan. In substance, t h e d i s t r i c t court found t h e uninsured motorist negligent; found t h a t Sullivan was n o t c o n t r i b u t o r i l y negligent; found the uninsured motorist l i a b l e t o Sullivan; and, fixed S u l l i v a n ' s damages a t $20,000. Thereafter, the Miller case was submitted t o t h e d i s t r i c t court f o r determination o f t h e i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y of the uninsured motorist t o Miller and the extent of ~ i l l e r ' s damages, on t h e basis of an agreed statement of f a c t . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t entered findings of f a c t and conclusions of law t o the e f f e c t t h a t t h e uninsured motorist was l i a b l e t o Miller and fixed ~ i l l e r ' s damages a t $20,000. Thereafter, the d i s t r i c t court ordered t h e t h r e e defendant insurance companies t o f i l e t h e i r motions and b r i e f s i n support of t h e i r policy defenses under t h e i r "uninsured motor is t" en- dorsements. The insurers d i d s o and a l s o f i l e d a s t i p u l a t i o n and agreed statement of f a c t s entered i n t o by a l l p a r t i e s t o both a c t i o n s . The substance of t h e s t i p u l a t i o n and agreed statement of f a c t s s e t s f o r t h the applicable policy provisions i n t h e policy of each insurer. It provided t h a t Glacier General had "the primary coverage" on t h e police c a r involved i n t h e a c c i - dent; t h a t each policy provided l i m i t s of l i a b i l i t y of $10,000 with respect t o each person and $20,000 with respect t o each accident under t h e "uninsured motorist" endorsement ; and, t h a t Sullivan had received $14,051.05 i n medica 1 and compensation' benefits under the workmen's Cornpansation Act and Miller had received $13,735.50. O n November 6 , 1970, the d i s t r i c t court entered judgment i n both cases. The substance of t h e c o u r t ' s findings was t h a t t h e "uninsured motorist" provisions i n each policy authorizing an of £set of other insurance benefits and workmen's compensation benefits against l i a b i l i t y was void a s a g a i n s t public policy and, accordingly, the insurance commissioner's approva 1 of the policy forms containing such o f f s e t s could not v a l i d a t e such void pro- visions. The judgment held Glacier General and Hartford l i a b l e t o Sullivan for $10,000 each, and Glacier General and S t a t e Farm l i a b l e t o Miller i n t h e amount of $10,000 each. A l l defendants appeal from t h i s consolidated judgment a g a i n s t them. The t h r e e basic issues on appeal may be summarized a s follows: 1. Should p l a i n t i f f s ' claims have been barred by reason of contributory negligence a s a matter of law? 2. Are t h e policy provisions o f f s e t t i n g workmen's com- pensa t i o n benefits against "uninsured motorist" coverage void a s against public policy? 3 . D o any other exclusions i n t h e i r respective -policies preclude l i a b i l i t y on t h e p a r t of any of t h e insurers? In discussing t h e f i r s t issue f o r review,we find it neces- sary t o consider the Sullivan and Miller cases separately. Directing our a t t e n t i o n f i r s t t o the Sullivan case, we note t h a t t h i s case was t r i e d t o the d i s t r i c t court wikhout a jury. Three witnesses t e s t i f i e d on behalf of the p l a i n t i f f : p l a i n t i f f Sullivan; Officer Tromley of t h e Butte Police Depart- ment; and Butte Chief of Police Clark. In addition, t h e deposi- t i o n of Ben F. Bentley, t h e used c a r salesman a t the Leskovar Motors used car l o t , was admitted i n evidence by s t i p u l a t i o n a s were records of medical expense and other special damages and f i v e photographs of the accident scene. Defendants called no witnesses but cross-examined the witnesses of the p l a i n t i f f . The key finding of f a c t by the d i s t r i c t court on the issue of l i a b i l i t y reads: "That a t about 6:30 A.M. on October 21, 1969, while it was s t i l l dark, a City of Butte police patrol car driven by p l a i n t i f f , John T. Sullivan and occupied by William F. Miller, another police o f f i c e r , was proceeding north on South Arizona S t r e e t a t a speed of 15 t o 20 m.p.r. i n its own and proper lane of t r a f f i c when a 1968 Pontiac automobile crossed over the center l i n e of said Arizona s t r e e t from i t s own lane of t r a f f i c and struck head on the police car operated by p l a i n t i f f . " The d i s t r i c t court concluded t h a t the accident and the resulting i n j u r i e s t o Sullivan were proximately caused by the negligence of the unidentified and unknown motorist, and that Sullivan was not contributorily negligent. There i s no evidence supporting a finding t h a t the Pontiac automobile crossed over the center l i n e of Arizona s t r e e t from i t s own lane of t r a f f i c and struck the police car head-on. In f a c t there i s no evidence t h a t it was moving a t a l l a t the time of the accident, or t h a t it was anything other than an abandoned vehicle obstructing the s t r e e t . The uncontradicted evidence shows t h a t the doors of the Pontiac were found locked a t t h e time the f i r s t investigating police o f f i c e r arrived a t the scene of the accident following h i s summons there) by Sullivan. The uncontradicted evidence a l s o shows there were no skid marks from the Pontiac on the pavement. It is likewise uncontradicted t h a t Miller, the police o f f i c e r passenger i n the police c a r , saw the Pontiac and shouted a warning. H e was not called a s a witness by the p l a i n t i f f upon whom the burden of proof of negligence of the uninsured motorist rested, although he was the one witness who presumably could t e s t i f y as t o whether the Pontiac was being driven or whether i t was parked and abandoned a t the time of the accident. Miller was a l i v e a t the time of the Sullivan t r i a l , but is now deceased. The evidence further shows there was no other t r a f f i c on the s t r e e t and t h a t the s t r e e t was wide enough t o permit passage of the police car around any obstruc- t i o n , such a s the Pontiac automobile. The uncontradicted evidence further shows t h a t a t the time and place of the accident the s t r e e t was s t r a i g h t , there were overhead l i g h t s illuminating the s t r e e t , the headlights of the police vehicle were on, i n good working order, and illuminated the area ahead. Sullivan himself t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was looking s t r a i g h t ahead and t o t h e s i d e without d i s t r a c - t i o n for a t l e a s t half a block prior t o the point of impact. Under such circumstances, p l a i n t i f f Sullivan i s g u i l t y of contributory negligence a s a matter of law barring any recovery by him. Whether the Pontiac was moving or stopped, Sullivan should have seen it i n time t o avoid an accident i n the exercise of ordinary care on h i s part. It i s important t o note t h a t here there i s no evidence t h e Pontiac was moving a t a l l , much l e s s t h a t it suddenly swerved i n his path without s u f f i c i e n t time t o enable him t o avoid the accident. In Autio v. Miller, 92 Mont. 150, 165, 1 1 P.2d 1039, t h i s Court said: "The driver must look 'not only s t r a i g h t ahead, but l a t e r a l l y ahead' * * * oreo over, a person i s presumed t o see t h a t which he could see by looking.* * * He w i l l not be permitted t o say t h a t he did not s e e what he must have seen, had 1 he looked, a s M r . J u s t i c e Toole s a i d in Grant v. Chicago, M.& St.Pau1 Ry. Co., 78 Mont. 97, 252 Pac. 382, 386. he duty t o keep a lookout in- cludes the duty t o see t h a t which is i n plain s i g h t . ' [Citation] '' The f a i l u r e of p l a i n t i f f Sullivan t o exercise reasonable him care for h i s own safety precludes any recovery bylagainst the "uninsured motorist" herein. In Sullivan v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 109 Mont. 93, 108, 94 P.2d 651, we held: very person i s bound t o an absolute duty t o exercise h i s intelligence t o discover and avoid dangers t h a t may threaten him. When, therefore, a p l a i n t i f f a s s e r t s the r i g h t of recovery on the ground of culpable negligence of the defendant, he is bound t o show t h a t he exercised h i s intelligence t o discover and avoid the danger, which he alleges was brought '* * *" ' 1 ' about by the negligence of the defendant. . , A Montana case d i r e c t l y in point i s Boepple v. Mohalt, 101 Mont. 417, 435, 54 P.2d 857. In t h a t case the defendant's road grader was on the wrong s i d e of the road but it was v i s i b l e and there was room f o r the p l a i n t i f f t o g e t past it. This Court held t h a t p l a i n t i f f was contributorily negligent a s a matter of law, reversed i n favor of the defendant, and in dismissing the action, said: he duty t o keep a lookout implies the duty t o see what is i n plain view, and the driver o t an automobile i s bound t o operate h i s con- veyance with reference, not only t o the pedestrians and conditions he actually sees, but a l s o t o those he should see i n the exercise of reasonable care * * *. H e [a driver] could not escape the penalty of h i s negligence by saying t h a t he did not see t h a t which was i n plain s i g h t . I l l Finally, i n Hall v. United S t a t e s , 407 F.2d 849, a Montana case decided by the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth C i r c u i t , i n 1969, the p l a i n t i f f collided with an A i r Force t r a c t o r - t r a i l e r which negligently blocked or obstructed t h e highway. The Federal court held t h a t the p l a i n t i f f was barred by h i s contributory negligence i n driving f a s t e r a t night than h i s l i g h t s would safely permit or a f a i l u r e t o look, since the adverse vehicle was on the highway and i n plain sight. Accordingly, the judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i n favor of p l a i n t i f f Sullivan i s vacated and the action dismissed. Turning our a t t e n t i o n t o p l a i n t i f f ~ i l l e r ' s case, there is no question of contributory negligence involved. There is simply no basis f o r imputing the negligence of p l a i n t i f f Sullivan, the d r i v e r , t o Miller, the passenger, nor is there any evidence of contributory negligence on the part of Miller himself. of Accordingly, the d i s t r i c t court's fi-ndinglliability on the part of the uninsured motorist t o p l a i n t i f f Miller is affirmed. Whatever Sullivan did or f a i l e d t o do i n regard t o the accident cannot bar p l a i n t i f f ~ i l l e r 's recovery herein. The second issue f o r review presents an important question 1 l r e l a t i n g t o uninsured motorist" coverage i n Montana. Stated broadly, the question posed i s whether it i s permissible for an I t insurance company i n Montana t o place limitations i n its unin- sured motoristr' coverage which reduce o r eliminate i t s l i a b i l i t y below the s t a t u t o r y l i m i t s . Section 40-4403, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "Motor vehicle l i a b i l i t y policies t o include uninsured motorist coverage---rejection of coverage by insured. N o automobile l i a b i l i t y or motor vehicle l i a b i l i t y policy insuring against loss resulting from l i a b i l i t y imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person a r i s i n g out of the ownership, mainten- ance, or use of a motor vehicle, s h a l l be delivered or issued f o r delivery i n t h i s s t a t e , with respect t o any motor vehicle registered o r principally garaged in t h i s s t a t e , unless coverage i s provided therein or supplemental thereto, i n l i m i t s f o r bodily injury or death s e t f o r t h i n section 53-422, under provisions f i l e d with and approved by the insurance commissioner, f o r the protection of persons insured thereunder who a r e legally e n t i t l e d t o recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; provided, t h a t the named insured s h a l l have the r i g h t t o r e j e c t such coverage; and, provided further, t h a t unless the named insured re- quests such coverage i n writing, such coverage need not be provided i n or supplementa 1 t o a renewal policy where the named insured had rejected the coverage in connection with the policy previously issued t o him by the same insurer." There is a divergence of authority i n other jurisdictions with respect t o whether an insurance company may reduce its L i a b i l i t y under i t s uninsured motor is t coverage below the statutory l i m i t by substracting workmen's compensation benefits received. Our reading of section 40-4403, R.C.M. 1947, leads us t o the conclusion t h a t its language i s both c l e a r and d i r e c t . That section s t a t e s t h a t no l i a b i l i t y policy can be issued for any 11 motor vehicle which is registered i n t h i s s t a t e unless unin- sured motorist" coverage is a l s o provided i n a minimum amount of $10,000, which s t a t u t o r y minimum is fixed i n section 53-422, R.C.M. 1947. The basic purpose of t h i s s t a t u t e is obvious--- t o provide protection for the automobile insurance policyholder against the r i s k of inadequate compensation for i n j u r i e s or death caused by the negligence of financially irresponsible motorists. The l e g i s l a t i v e purpose behind t h e enactment of such s t a t u t o r y provisions on "uninsured motorist" coverage is equally c l e a r . It i s simply t o place the injured policyholder i n the same position he would have been i f t h e uninsured motorist had l i a b i l i t y insurance and, accordingly, the amount of plain- t i f f ' s recovery from "uninsured motorist" coverage cannot be reduced by any workmen s compensation benefits r g e i v e d by him. In the Miller case, Glacier c en era 1's insurance policy contained "uninsured motorist" coverage; i t applied here because the police car of the c i t y of Butte was being operated by i t s policemen i n the course and scope of t h e i r employment, with the permission of the c i t y . In addition, p l a i n t i f f Miller was a naded insured under h i s own policy with S t a t e Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company t o the extent of coverage under the $10,000 uninsured motorist endorsement therein. The insurers concede section 40-4403, R.C.M. 1947, does not expressly authorize a deduction of workmen's compensation benefits from the $10,000 coverage afforded under the "uninsured motorist" coverage, but argue instead t h a t t h a t section authorizes the insurance commissioner t o approve the form of t h e i r policies containing such deductions and he has done so. W e cannot agree with insurers' position. W e view the i n t e n t and construction of section 40-4403, R.C.M. 1947, t o mean t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e simply authorized the insurance com- missioner t o approve those policies of insurance which complied with the clear terms of the s t a t u t e . In approving insurance policies a t variance with the s t a t u t e , the commissioner un- doubtedly exceeded h i s authority and h i s approval i n nofi%idates provisions a t variance with t h i s s t a t u t e . This Court has previous ly declared void c e r t a i n clauses contained in insurance policies which were a t variance with applicable s t a t u t e s of t h i s s t a t e . See Dominici v. S t a t e Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 143 Mont. 406, 390 P.2d 806. In Peterson v. S t a t e Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 238 Ore. 106, 393 P.2d 651, 655, we find a s i t u a t i o n similar t o the one now before t h i s Court. The Oregon s t a t u t e on unin- sured motorist coverage is very similar in language t o our section 40-4403, R.C.M. 1947. In Peterson,the Oregon Supreme Court held t h e i r s t a t u t e did not authorize t h e insurance commis- sioner t o approve an insurance policy which permitted a deduction of workmen's compensation benefits from uninsured motorist coverage i n t h i s language: t B y approving the insurance policy provisions here i n question, the Insurance Commissioner has made such a decision. The Commissioner's decision goes beyond the mere approval of the language o t forms drafted t o accomplish the basic legis la t i v e purpose of the uninsured motorist s t a t u t e . In s o doing, the Commissioner has acted beyond the scope of h i s authority, and the provision of the insurance policy i n question is void." Directing our a t t e n t i o n t o the t h i r d issue f o r review, defendant S t a t e Farm contends t h a t defendant Glacier General is the primary insurer under the agreed s t i p u l a t i o n , and where the Glacier Genera 1 policy provides t h e s t a t u t o r y minimum coverage of $10,000, there i s no reason why S t a t e Farm should be required t o pay an additional $10,000 under its %ninsured motoristtt coverage, over and above Glacier ~ e n e r a l ' s l i a b i l i t y . The clause i n i t s policy upon which S t a t e Farm r e l i e s reads : 1 t Other insurance: With respect t o bodily injury t o an insured while occupying an automobile not owned by the named insured, the insurance under Section 111 s h a l l apply only a s excess insurance over any other similar insurance available t o such insured and applicable t o such automobile a s primary insurance, and t h i s insurance s h a l l then apply only i n the amount by which the l i m i t of l i a b i l i t y f o r t h i s coverage exceeds the applicable l i m i t of l i a - b i l i t y of such other insurance. "Except a s provided i n t h e foregoing paragraph, i f the insured has other similar insurance available t o him and applicable t o the accident, the damages s h a l l be deemed not t o exceed the higher of the ap- plicable l i m i t s of l i a b i l i t y of t h i s insurance and such other insurance, and the company s h a l l not be l i a b l e for a greater proportion of any loss t o which t h i s Coverage applies than the l i m i t of l i a b i l i t y hereunder bears t o the s u m of applicable l i m i t s of l i a b i l i t y of t h i s insurance and such other insurance." This contention is without merit. In the f i r s t place, the s t a t u t o r y requirement of $10,000 "uninsured motorist'' coverage prescribes a minimum amount only and does not purport t o f i x a statutory maximum. Secondly, Miller bought and paid f o r the additional "uninsured motor is t" coverage a fforded by h i s own policy with S t a t e Farm. Finally, the adjudicated Liability of the "uninsured motorist" t o Miller i n the i n s t a n t case is $20,000, which requires application t o both the $10,000 coverage of the "primary i n s u r e r ' 2 l a c i e r General and the $10,000 coverage of the "excess insurer" S t a t e Farm, t o s a t i s f y such l i a b i l i t y . The nondeductibility of other insurance benefits applies for the same reasons t h a t workmen's benefits a r e not deductible. The majority of jurisdictions outside Montana declare void those clauses which purport t o l i m i t l i a b i l i t y not expressly authorized by s t a t u t e . The leading decision i s Peterson, here- tofore c i t e d . W e r e f e r a l s o t o Bryant v. S t a t e Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817,819, wherein the Supreme Court of Virginia inva lida ted an "other insurance" clause a s being i n violation of Virginia's "uninsured motorist" s t a t u t e . In Bryant, the Virginia Supreme Court stated: "These cases a l l e s t a b l i s h t h a t the controlling instrument is the s t a t u t e and t h a t provisions in t h e insurance policy t h a t c o n f l i c t with the requirements of the s t a t u t e , e i t h e r by adding t o or taking from its requirements, a r e void and in- effective. I I In addition, the decision of Simpson v. S t a t e Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 318 F.Supp. 1152 (1970), i s important. There the United States D i s t r i c t Court held t h a t under Indiana law an insurer was not e n t i t l e d t o reduce or l i m i t its !'uninsured motorist" coverage by deduction of payments from other similar insurance even though clauses containing such provisions had been approved by the s t a t e commissioner of insurance. Simpson indi- cates how the minority l i n e of authority holding such clauses valid emerged from the tenuous precedent of decisions decided before the enactment of s t a t e s t a t u t e s similar t o our section 40-4403, R.C.M. 1947. Additionally, defendants contend t h a t the judgment of the d i s t r i c t court against them i n the amount of $10,000 each has the e f f e c t of granting p l a i n t i f f s a "double recovery" i n view of the workmen's compensation benefits previously awarded. A s a general r u l e , it has been held t h a t the f a c t t h a t a person receives from a c o l l a t e r a l source payments which have a tendency t o mitigate t h e consequences of h i s injury, which he suffered a s a r e s u l t of defendant's t o r t , may not be appropriated by the defendant a s an o f f s e t t o damages which defendant would otherwise be required t o pay. There has always been a wide- spread j u d i c i a l r e f u s a l t o c r e d i t t o the benefit of t h e wrong- doer money received i n reparation of the victim's injury from sources other than the wrongdoer himself. See Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule i n t h e American Law of Damages, 46 Minn.- Law Review 669; Annotations, 75 ALR2d 885 and 4 ALR3d 535. It is axiomatic t h a t benefits payable under Montana's workmen's Compensation Act do not represent f u l l payment of damages occasioned by the injury . For example, Montana 's Work- men's Compensation Act provides only f o r payment of a percentage of the injured workman's a c t u a l wage loss i n most cases; nor is there any compensation payable for pain and suffering, i n t e r - ference with the workman's established course of l i f e , nor any other elements of general damages ; workmen's compensation benefits f o r d i s a b i l i t y , p a r t i a l or t o t a l , a r e limited t o s t a t u t o r y maxi- mums without regard t o additional damages actually suffered. Accordingly where, a s here, there is no evidence t h a t t h e victim has received a "double recoveryrYor the damages he suffered, the insurer's contention is nothing but a puff of smoke. W e s p e c i f i c a l l y point out, however, t h a t nothing said herein i s t o be construed a s authorizing recovery of any amount i n excess of the t o t a l damages suffered regardless of the number of insurers involved or the aggregate amount of coverage afforded. Such a r e not the f a c t s of the i n s t a n t case, however. The judgment i n favor of t h e e s t a t e of William F. Miller against Glacier General Assurance Company and S t a t e Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company i n the amount of $10,000 against each defendant i s affirmed. The judgment i n favor of John T. Sullivan against Glacier General Assurance Company and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company i s reversed and dismissed. Associate J u s t i c e Assoc 4 t e Justices.