Case Title: Aaron T. Rouse v. Theda Clark Medical Center, Inc.

Citation: 2007 WI 87

Docket Number: 2005AP002743

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 87 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2743 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Aaron T. Rouse, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Network Health Plan, 
          Plaintiff, 
     v. 
Theda Clark Medical Center, Inc., Christopher P. 
Hugo, M.D., Mark Westfall, D.O., OHIC Insurance 
Company, Thomas L. Tolly, M.D., Jeffrey S. 
Burkett, M.D. and Injured Patients & Families 
Compensation Fund, 
          Defendants, 
 
University of Wisconsin Hospital & Clinics 
Authority, Patrick Keller, M.D., Scott Dull, 
M.D., Everett Hughes, M.D., Aaron Johnson, M.D., 
Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc., 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  297 Wis. 2d 584, 724 N.W.2d 703 
(Ct. App. 2006-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 25, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Calument   
 
JUDGE: 
Donald A. Poppy   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BRADLEY and ROGGENSACK, JJ., did not 
participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
J. Michael End, Jerome A. Hierseman, Lora A. Kaelber, and End, 
Hierseman & Crain, LLC, Milwaukee, and oral argument by J. 
Michael End. 
 
 
 
2 
For the defendants-respondents there were briefs by Michael 
B. Van Sicklen, Matthew D. Lee, and Foley & Lardner LLP, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Michael B. Van Sicklen. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Linda V. Meagher and 
Habush, Habush & Rottier, S.C., Waukesha, and Rhonda L. Lanford 
and Habush, Habush & Rottier, S.C., Madison, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Charles D. Hoornstra, 
Madison, on behalf of the Board of Regents of the University of 
Wisconsin System. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Department of Justice by Bruce A. Olsen, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney 
general. 
 
 
 
 
2007 WI 87
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2743  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV162) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Aaron T. Rouse, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Network Health Plan, 
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Theda Clark Medical Center, Inc., Christopher 
P. Hugo, M.D., Mark Westfall, D.O., OHIC 
Insurance Company, Thomas L. Tolly, M.D., 
Jeffrey S. Burkett, M.D. and Injured Patients & 
Families Compensation Fund, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
University of Wisconsin Hospital & Clinics 
Authority, Patrick Keller, M.D., Scott Dull, 
M.D., Everett Hughes, M.D., Aaron Johnson, 
M.D., Physicians Insurance Company of 
Wisconsin, Inc., 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
2 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This is a review of an unpublished 
court of appeals decision, Rouse v. Theda Clark Medical Center, 
Inc., No. 2005AP2743, unpublished slip opinion (Wis. Ct. App. 
October 4, 2006).  The court of appeals affirmed a judgment of 
the Calumet County Circuit Court, Donald A. Poppy, Judge.  Judge 
Poppy dismissed with prejudice Aaron T. Rouse's (Rouse) action 
against 
the 
University 
of 
Wisconsin 
Hospital 
& 
Clinics 
Authority; Patrick Keller, M.D.; Scott Dull, M.D.; Everett 
Hughes, M.D.; Aaron Johnson, M.D.; and Physicians Insurance 
Company of Wisconsin, Inc. (collectively UWHCA)1 because Rouse 
failed to provide notice pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80.2 
                                                 
1 Patrick Keller, M.D.; Scott Dull, M.D.; Everett Hughes, 
M.D.; and Aaron Johnson, M.D. were medical employees of the 
University of Wisconsin Hospital & Clinics Authority at the time 
relevant to this case. 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80 
provides 
the 
following 
in 
pertinent part: 
Claims against governmental bodies or officers, 
agents or employees; notice of injury, limitation of 
damages and suits. (1) Except as provided in subs. 
(1g), (1m), (1p) and (8), no action may be brought or 
maintained 
against 
any 
volunteer 
fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, 
governmental subdivision or agency thereof nor against 
any officer, official, agent or employee of the 
corporation, subdivision or agency for acts done in 
their official capacity or in the course of their 
agency or employment upon a claim or cause of action 
unless: 
(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the 
event giving rise to the claim, written notice of the 
circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent 
or attorney is served on the volunteer fire company, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
3 
 
¶2 
This case presents one issue: Is the UWHCA, as a 
statutorily-created, 
public body corporate and politic, a 
"political corporation" for the purposes of § 893.80?  We hold 
that the UWHCA is a "political corporation" because of the power 
and structure provided by the legislature in Wis. Stat. ch. 233.  
The circuit court properly dismissed Rouse's action against the 
UWHCA with prejudice.3  Accordingly, we affirm the court of 
appeals.  
                                                                                                                                                             
agency and on the officer, official, agent or employee 
under s. 801.11. Failure to give the requisite notice 
shall not bar action on the claim if the fire company, 
corporation, subdivision or agency had actual notice 
of 
the 
claim 
and 
the 
claimant 
shows 
to 
the 
satisfaction of the court that the delay or failure to 
give the requisite notice has not been prejudicial to 
the defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision 
or agency or to the defendant officer, official, agent 
or employee . . . . 
 . . . . 
(1m) With regard to a claim to recover damages 
for medical malpractice, the time period under sub. 
(1) (a) shall be 180 days after discovery of the 
injury or the date on which, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, the injury should have been 
discovered, rather than 120 days after the happening 
of the event giving rise to the claim. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version, unless otherwise stated. 
 
3 Our holding that the UWHCA falls within the scope of 
§ 893.80 means the circuit court properly dismissed Rouse’s 
action with prejudice.  Pursuant to Gross v. Hoffman, 227 
Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663 (1938), which established that only 
dispositive issues need to be addressed on appeal, we do not 
address the other issue Rouse raised in his petition for review, 
which stated the following:  
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
4 
 
I 
¶3 
On May 19, 2001, Rouse was involved in a motor vehicle 
accident.  The vehicle he was driving reportedly hit a tree, 
rolled repeatedly, and burst into flames.  Rouse suffered 
multiple fractures and burns.   
¶4 
From the scene of the accident, Rouse was transported 
to Theda Clark Medical Center in Neenah, Wisconsin.  After 
receiving some treatment, MedFlight transported Rouse to the 
University of Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics (UW Hospital) in 
Madison, Wisconsin.  At UW Hospital, Rouse received further 
treatment. 
¶5 
Over three years after receiving treatment for his 
injuries, Rouse commenced a medical malpractice action against 
                                                                                                                                                             
In light of Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation 
Fund, 2005 WI 125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440, if 
the University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics 
Authority is entitled to governmental immunity, is the 
$50,000 
damage 
cap 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) 
unconstitutional as applied to the UWHCA—a financially 
independent entity?   
The dismissal of the action against the UWHCA results in a lack 
of "a factual basis on which a judicial declaration may be made 
to guide future conduct."  See State ex. rel. La Crosse Tribune 
v. Cir. Ct. for La Crosse County, 115 Wis. 2d 220, 228-29, 340 
N.W.2d 460 (1983). 
The dissent would address Rouse's other issue, and then 
some.  Not only does the dissent delve into questions not even 
raised by the parties, it attempts to rewrite this very opinion.  
See 
dissent, 
¶¶45 
and 
8544. 
 
Despite 
the 
dissent's 
characterizations of this opinion, it is the dissent.  We hold 
that the UWHCA is a "political corporation" because of the power 
and structure provided by the legislature in Wis. Stat. ch. 233.  
Therefore, Wis. Stat. § 893.80 applies. 
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
5 
 
the UWHCA; Theda Clark Medical Center, Inc.; Christopher P. 
Hugo, M.D.; Mark Westfall, D.O.; OHIC Insurance Company; Thomas 
L. Tolly, M.D.; Jeffrey S. Burkett, M.D.; and Injured Patients & 
Families Compensation Fund.   
¶6 
The UWHCA filed a consolidated motion to dismiss.  The 
UWHCA asserted that Rouse failed to serve the notice of claim 
required by Wis. Stat. § 893.80.  In support of its motion, the 
UWHCA filed an affidavit from Rosemary Waitkus, Risk Management 
Analyst at the UWHCA.  The affidavit stated that in her position 
she maintained the files for all notices of claims received by 
the UWHCA.  The affidavit also stated that in reviewing the 
files she did not locate a notice of claim from Rouse. 
¶7 
In responding to the motion to dismiss, Rouse argued 
that § 893.80 did not apply to his case because the UWHCA does 
not fall within the scope of § 893.80.  To support his position, 
Rouse also filed an affidavit and exhibits.  The exhibits were 
the paramedics' report and the medical records from Theda Clark 
Medical Center and UW Hospital. 
¶8 
Because materials outside of the pleadings were 
submitted and considered by the court, the circuit court treated 
the UWHCA’s motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment.  
In a written decision, it concluded that the UWHCA was a 
"political corporation" as set forth in § 893.80.  The circuit 
court believed that the UWHCA’s purpose is governmental in 
nature.  In addition, the circuit court found it to be 
significant that the institution that preceded the UWHCA, the 
University of Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics, was protected by 
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
6 
 
sovereign 
immunity. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
stated 
that 
the 
legislature was aware of the predecessor’s immunity and if the 
legislature intended for the immunity not to extend to the UWHCA 
it could have easily eliminated the immunity in the new 
legislation that created the UWHCA.  The circuit court dismissed 
the action on its merits with prejudice.  Costs of $950.73 were 
assessed against Rouse. 
¶9 
Rouse appealed the circuit court’s decision to the 
court of appeals.  The court of appeals filed a certification 
with this court.  The certification noted that the legislature’s 
treatment of the UWHCA led to conflicting views as to its 
nature.  The court of appeals described the UWHCA as a body that 
possesses some qualities of a public entity, but that the 
legislature created the UWHCA as a way to make the University of 
Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics more competitive with private 
hospitals.  In addition, the court of appeals noted that in 
Takle v. University of Wisconsin Hospital & Clinics Authority, 
402 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2005), the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit concluded that the UWHCA did not have 
sovereign immunity.  This court denied the certification. 
¶10 Following this court’s denial of the certification, 
the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s order of 
dismissal.  The court of appeals noted its concerns with the 
application of § 893.80 to the UWHCA, but found itself bound by 
the judicial notice this court took in Lewis v. Physicians 
Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, 2001 WI 60, ¶25 n.18, 243 Wis. 2d 
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
7 
 
648, 627 N.W.2d 484, that the UWHCA was one of only three 
government-owned hospitals in Wisconsin.   
¶11 Rouse filed a petition for review with this court, 
which was granted. 
II 
¶12 We review a grant of summary judgment independently, 
while applying the same methodology as the circuit court.  AKG 
Real Estate, LLC v. Kosterman, 2006 WI 106, ¶14, 296 Wis. 2d 1, 
717 N.W.2d 835.  Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).   
¶13 In this case, there is no genuine issue of material 
fact.  We must interpret § 893.80 to determine whether the UWHCA 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Statutory 
interpretation presents an issue of law that we review de novo.  
Megal Dev. Corp. v. Shadof, 2005 WI 151, ¶8, 286 Wis. 2d 105, 
705 N.W.2d 645. 
¶14 Interpreting § 893.80 in this context presents an 
issue 
of 
first 
impression. 
 
Courts 
have 
addressed 
the 
predecessor of the notice of claim requirement in § 893.80.  
Townsend v. Wisconsin Desert Horse Ass’n, 42 Wis. 2d 414, 423, 
167 N.W.2d 425 (1969)(concluding the notice of claim requirement 
did not apply to the state or its agencies); Majerus v. 
Milwaukee County, 39 Wis. 2d 311, 316, 159 N.W.2d 86 (1968) 
(stating that failure to comply with the notice of claim 
requirement was not a jurisdictional defect, if it was a defect 
at all).  They have also addressed the term "political 
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
8 
 
corporation," 
but 
in 
the 
context 
of 
obtaining 
personal 
jurisdiction.  Hagen v. City of Milwaukee Employee’s Ret. Sys. 
Annuity & Pension Bd., 2003 WI 56, ¶15, 262 Wis. 2d 113, 663 
N.W.2d 268 (citing Milwaukee City Charter § 36-09-6 for the 
proposition that the City of Milwaukee Employees’ Retirement 
System/Annuity and Pension Board was a political corporation); 
Watkins v. Milwaukee County Civil Serv. Comm’n, 88 Wis. 2d 411, 
416-18, 
276 
N.W.2d 775 
(1979)(interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(4)(a), which deals with obtaining personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant that is a political corporation or 
body politic).  Courts have also addressed the status of the 
UWHCA as an entity.  Takle, 402 F.3d at 772-73 (concluding that 
the 
UWHCA 
did 
not 
have 
sovereign 
immunity); 
Lewis, 
243 
Wis. 2d 648, ¶25 n.18 (taking judicial notice that the UWHCA was 
a government-owned facility).  However, a court has not 
previously interpreted the term "political corporation" in the 
context of § 893.80 and determined whether the UWHCA falls 
within its scope. 
¶15 Our goal in interpreting statutory provisions is to 
give effect to the intent of the legislature, which we assume is 
expressed in the text of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Cir. Ct. for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  To this end, absent ambiguity in a statute, we do 
not resort to extrinsic aids of interpretation and instead apply 
the plain meaning of the words of a statute in light of its 
textually manifest scope, context, and purpose. Id., ¶¶45-46.  A 
statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one 
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
9 
 
reasonable understanding.  Id., ¶47.  If a statute is ambiguous, 
we may examine extrinsic sources in order to guide our 
interpretation.  Id., ¶50. 
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1)(a) provides the following: 
(1) Except as provided in subs. (1g), (1m), (1p) 
and (8), no action may be brought or maintained 
against any volunteer fire company organized under ch. 
213, political corporation, governmental subdivision 
or agency thereof nor against any officer, official, 
agent or employee of the corporation, subdivision or 
agency for acts done in their official capacity or in 
the course of their agency or employment upon a claim 
or cause of action unless: 
(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the 
event giving rise to the claim, written notice of the 
circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent 
or attorney is served on the volunteer fire company, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency and on the officer, official, agent or employee 
under s. 801.11. Failure to give the requisite notice 
shall not bar action on the claim if the fire company, 
corporation, subdivision or agency had actual notice 
of 
the 
claim 
and 
the 
claimant 
shows 
to 
the 
satisfaction of the court that the delay or failure to 
give the requisite notice has not been prejudicial to 
the defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision 
or agency or to the defendant officer, official, agent 
or employee . . . .  
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a) creates a notice of claim requirement 
for a plaintiff suing a "political corporation."   
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1m) relates specifically to 
medical malpractice claims, stating the following: 
With regard to a claim to recover damages for 
medical malpractice, the time period under sub. (1) 
(a) shall be 180 days after discovery of the injury or 
the date on which, in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, the injury should have been discovered, 
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
10 
 
rather than 120 days after the happening of the event 
giving rise to the claim. 
Read together, §§ 893.80(1)(a) and (1m) require that a person 
bringing a medical malpractice claim against a "political 
corporation" must serve it with "written notice of the claim," 
§ 893.80(1)(a), within "180 days after discovery of the injury 
or the date which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the 
injury should have been discovered."  Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1m).   
¶18 An 
entity 
that 
falls 
within 
the 
scope 
of 
§ 893.80(1)(a) must affirmatively plead that the plaintiff 
failed to comply with it.  Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 2000 WI 60, 
¶24, 235 Wis. 2d 610, 612 N.W.2d 59.  If the plaintiff failed to 
provide written notice, he or she may still be able to satisfy 
§ 893.80(1)(a). 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. § 893.80(1)(a) 
explicitly 
provides that the notice requirement may be satisfied by a 
plaintiff that gave the entity actual notice of the claim, as 
long as the actual notice did not cause a prejudicial impact on 
the entity.  Given that § 893.80(1m) modifies only the timing 
for the notice, the actual notice aspect of § 893.80(1)(a) would 
also apply in medical malpractice cases. 
¶19 The notice of claim statute provides a condition 
precedent that limits "'"the time within which a certain 
prescribed 
act, 
necessary 
to 
the 
enforcement 
of 
[the 
plaintiff's] cause of action, shall be done."'"  Snopek v. 
Lakeland 
Med. 
Ctr., 
223 
Wis. 2d 288, 
295, 
588 
N.W.2d 19 
(1999)(quoting Ocampo v. Racine, 28 Wis. 2d 506, 509, 137 
N.W.2d 477 (1965) and Troschansky v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light 
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
11 
 
Co., 110 Wis 570, 571, 86 N.W. 156 (1910)).  A plaintiff's 
failure to satisfy the condition precedent provided by § 893.80 
results in a loss of the right to proceed with the action 
against the governmental entity.  Id.  Requiring such notice 
enables governmental entities to "investigate a claim against an 
employee, to avoid needless litigation, and to settle all 
reasonable claims."  Riccitelli v. Broekhuizen, 227 Wis. 2d 100, 
120, 595 N.W.2d 392 (1999); see also Thorp, 235 Wis. 2d 610, 
¶23. 
¶20 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80 is entitled "Claims against 
governmental bodies or officers, agents or employees; notice of 
injury; 
limitation 
of 
damages 
and 
suits." 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. § 893.80 is part of Subchapter VIII of Wis. Stat. ch. 893, 
which is entitled, "Claims against governmental bodies, officers 
and employees."  Titles used in the statutes are not considered 
part of the statutes.  Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6).  They may, 
however, be persuasive evidence when interpreting a statute.  
Kontowicz v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 2006 WI 48, ¶35, 290 
Wis. 2d 302, 714 N.W.2d 105. 
¶21 The legislature has not provided a definition of 
"political corporation."  When giving a statute its plain and 
ordinary meaning, courts refer to dictionaries to define those 
terms not defined by the legislature.  State v. Wittrock, 119 
Wis. 2d 664, 
670, 
350 
N.W.2d 647 
(1984).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 990.01(1) 
provides 
that 
"[a]ll 
words 
and 
phrases shall be construed according to common and approved 
usage; but technical words and phrases and others that have a 
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
12 
 
peculiar meaning in the law shall be construed according to such 
meaning."   
¶22 The term "political corporation" is synonymous with 
the term "public corporation."  Black’s Law Dictionary 344 (7th 
ed. 1999).  A "public corporation" is "[a] corporation that is 
created by the state as an agency in the administration of civil 
government."  Id.  An "agency" is "[a] governmental body with 
the 
authority 
to 
implement 
and 
administer 
particular 
legislation."  Id. at 63.  Stated another way, a "political 
corporation" is an entity created by the legislature that is 
authorized to implement enactments of the legislature. 
¶23 Determining whether the UWHCA constitutes a "political 
corporation" requires an assessment of the nature of the entity.  
Assessing the nature of an entity requires a consideration of 
the power and structure of it, as conferred by the legislature.  
State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 424, 208 
N.W.2d 780 (1973).  Wisconsin Stat. ch. 233 enumerates the power 
and the structure of the UWHCA. 
¶24 After providing definitions for the chapter, the 
legislature explicitly states its intent to create "a public 
body corporate and politic to be known as the 'University of 
Wisconsin 
Hospitals 
and 
Clinics 
Authority.'"  
Wis. Stat. § 233.02(1).  Though relevant to our inquiry, we look 
beyond such a "legislative denomination" to the power and 
structure of the entity.  Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d at 424. 
¶25 In creating the UWHCA, the legislature decided that 
the board of directors would be either state employees or 
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
13 
 
appointed by government officials.  Wis. Stat. § 233.02(1).  
Specifically, the board is composed as follows:   
(a) Three members nominated by the governor, and 
with the advice and consent of the senate appointed, 
for 3-year terms. 
(am) Each cochairperson of the joint committee on 
finance or a member of the committee designated by 
that cochairperson. 
(b) Three members of the board of regents 
appointed by the president of the board of regents. 
(c) 
The 
chancellor 
of 
the 
University 
of 
Wisconsin-Madison or his or her designee. 
(d) The dean of the University of Wisconsin-
Madison Medical School. 
(e) 
A 
chairperson 
of 
a 
department 
at 
the 
University 
of 
Wisconsin-Madison 
Medical 
School, 
appointed by the chancellor of the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. 
(f) 
A 
faculty 
member 
of 
a 
University 
of 
Wisconsin-Madison health professions school, other 
than 
the 
University 
of 
Wisconsin-Madison 
Medical 
School, appointed by the chancellor of the University 
of Wisconsin-Madison. 
(g) The secretary of administration or his or her 
designee. 
(h) 
Two 
nonvoting members appointed by the 
governor, one of whom shall be an employee or a 
representative of a labor organization recognized or 
certified to represent employees in one of the 
collective bargaining units specified in s. 111.05 (5) 
(a) and one of whom shall be an employee or a 
representative of a labor organization recognized or 
certified to represent employees in one of the 
collective bargaining units specified in s. 111.825 
(1m).   
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
14 
 
Id.  The directors are not compensated, but do get reimbursed 
for actual costs they incur in performing their duties.  
Wis. Stat. § 233.02(3).  Directors are also protected from civil 
liability that may arise from the performance of their duties, 
except 
if 
it 
constitutes 
willful 
misconduct.  
Wis. Stat. § 233.02(4). 
¶26 The legislature granted the UWHCA "all the powers 
necessary or convenient to carry out the purposes and provisions 
of [ch. 233]."  Wis. Stat. § 233.03.  The UWHCA is specifically 
authorized to take actions such as adopting bylaws, policies, 
and procedures for "the regulation of its affairs and the 
conduct of its business," Wis. Stat. § 233.03(1); suing and 
being sued, Wis. Stat. § 233.03(2); accepting gifts and grants, 
"but 
not 
including 
research 
grants 
in 
which 
the 
grant 
investigator is an employee of the board of regents," id.; 
procuring insurance on debt obligations, Wis. Stat. § 233.03(5); 
engaging in collective bargaining with collective bargaining 
units 
recognized 
or 
authorized 
by 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 233.03(7); 
participating 
in 
corporations 
or 
partnerships that provide health-related services, if various 
state entities and officials are presented with the proper 
access to documents, Wis. Stat. § 233.03(9); issuing bonds in 
accordance with state statute, Wis. Stat. § 233.03(11); and 
constructing and improving facilities on state-owned land, 
provided 
statutory 
conditions 
are 
satisfied, 
Wis. Stat. § 233.03(13).  
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
15 
 
¶27 The legislature also imposed duties on the UWHCA.  
Wis. Stat. § 233.04.  Wisconsin Stat. ch. 233 details leases and 
affiliation agreements the UWHCA must enter with the University 
of Wisconsin System board of regents.  Wis. Stat. §§  233.04(7) 
and (7m).  While the leases and agreements are in place with the 
board of regents, the UWHCA must  
maintain, control and supervise the use of the 
University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics, for the 
purposes of: 
1. Delivering comprehensive, high-quality health 
care to patients using the hospitals and to those 
seeking care from its programs, including a commitment 
to provide such care for the medically indigent. 
2. 
Providing 
an 
environment 
suitable 
for 
instructing 
medical 
and 
other 
health 
professions 
students, physicians, nurses and members of other 
health-related disciplines. 
3. Sponsoring and supporting research in the 
delivery of health care to further the welfare of the 
patients treated and applying the advances in health 
knowledge to alleviate human suffering, promote health 
and prevent disease.  
4. 
Assisting 
health 
programs 
and 
personnel 
throughout the state and region in the delivery of 
health care. 
Wis. Stat. § 233.04(3b).  It must also enter into a contractual 
services agreement with the University of Wisconsin Hospital and 
Clinics Board for employees.  Wis. Stat. § 233.04(4).  In the 
event that the joint committee on finance does not approve an 
extension or renewal of a lease or agreement, the UWHCA 
facilities 
will 
transfer 
to 
the 
board 
of 
regents.  
Wis. Stat. §§ 233.04(7g)(b) and (7p)(b). 
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
16 
 
¶28 The UWHCA duties also include updating the state on 
various matters.  It must annually submit a report to the 
governor, each house of the legislature, president of the board 
of 
regents, 
and 
the 
secretary 
of 
administration.  
Wis. Stat. § 233.04(1).  The report must include an audited 
financial statement and information on patient care, education, 
research, community services activities, and accomplishments of 
the UWHCA.  Id.  In addition to the annual report, the UWHCA 
must provide on a monthly basis the secretary of administration 
with financial and statistical information that he or she 
requires.  Wis. Stat. § 233.04(9). 
¶29 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 233 also addresses issues related 
to bonds, including the issuance of bonds, Wis. Stat. § 233.20, 
the security of bonds, Wis. Stat. § 233.21, the refunding of 
bonds, Wis. Stat. § 233.26, and the amount of outstanding bonds, 
Wis. Stat. § 233.27.  The UWHCA must include a statement on the 
face of all bonds that "[t]he state is not liable on bonds and 
the bonds are not a debt of the state."  Wis. Stat. § 233.22.  
The state also  
pledges to and agrees with the bondholders, and 
persons that enter into contracts with the authority 
under this chapter, that the state will not limit or 
alter the rights vested in the authority by this 
chapter before the authority has fully met and 
discharged the bonds, and any interest due on the 
bonds, and has fully performed its contracts, unless 
adequate provision is made by law for the protection 
of the bondholders or those entering into contracts 
with the authority. 
Wis. Stat. § 233.23. 
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
17 
 
¶30 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 233 also establishes many other 
duties, which address issues ranging from how the UWHCA 
maintains records, Wis. Stat. § 233.12, to requiring it to 
operate a poison control center, Wis. Stat. § 233.04(10). 
¶31 Given the power and structure of the UWHCA, we 
conclude that it is a "political corporation."  The legislature 
created the UWHCA.  It has a statutory purpose, which includes 
providing 
high-quality 
care 
to 
the 
medically 
indigent, 
maintaining an environment for instructing future health care 
providers, leading efforts to reduce human suffering and 
promoting of health, and assisting with the delivery of health 
care around the state.  The voting members of its board of 
directors are either public officials or appointed by public 
officials.  It has a duty to engage in collective bargaining.  
It must enter into agreements and leases with the state.  It 
must update the state on a consistent basis.  The state is 
ensured access to the UWHCA’s financial statements.  In the 
event there is a failure to extend or renew an agreement or 
lease, facilities transfer to the board of regents.  The power 
granted by the legislature, and the structure it has imposed on 
the UWHCA, indicate that the legislature intended the UWHCA to 
be a political corporation.  Therefore, it falls within the 
notice requirement of § 893.80.   
¶32 Some features of the UWHCA are shared with private 
entities.  For instance, it does not receive general purpose 
revenue from the state.  It can sue and be sued.  It can buy and 
sell real estate.  Nevertheless, the legislature empowered it to 
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
18 
 
act within a framework that is closely reviewed by the state.  
The 
power 
and 
structure 
of 
the 
UWHCA 
based 
upon 
Wis. Stat. ch. 233 leads us to conclude that the legislature 
intended a plaintiff to serve it with a notice of claim.   
¶33 Because the UWHCA falls within the scope of § 893.80, 
the circuit court properly dismissed Rouse’s action against the 
UWHCA with prejudice.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80 requires that a 
person bringing a medical malpractice claim against an entity 
that falls within the scope of the statute serve it with 
"written notice of the claim," § 893.80(1)(a), within "180 days 
after discovery of the injury or the date on which, in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, the injury should have been 
discovered."  Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1m).  Rouse did not provide 
the UWHCA such notice.  The UWHCA affirmatively pled that Rouse 
failed to provide it with the proper notice.  Rouse did not 
provide the UWHCA with actual notice.  Rouse could not maintain 
his action against the UWHCA. 
¶34 Rouse argues that § 893.80 should not have even 
applied 
to 
his 
case 
because 
of 
the 
exclusivity 
of 
Wis. Stat. ch. 655 when a person brings a medical malpractice 
claim. 
¶35 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 655 does provide the exclusive 
procedure for a person to pursue a malpractice claim against a 
health care provider.  State ex. rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 
Wis. 2d 491, 499, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).  Three sections in 
particular indicate the exclusivity of Wis. Stat. ch. 655.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 655.006(1)(a) provides that "every patient, 
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
19 
 
every patient's representative and every health care provider 
shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted to be bound by 
this chapter."  Wisconsin Stat. § 655.005 provides that "[a]ny 
person listed in s. 655.007 having a claim or a derivative claim 
against a health care provider or an employee . . . for damages 
for bodily injury or death . . . is subject to this chapter."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 655.007 provides that "any patient or the 
patient's representative having a claim or any spouse, parent, 
minor sibling or child . . . having a derivative claim . . . on 
account of malpractice is subject to this chapter."  See also 
Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, ¶50, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 
866, overruled in part by Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. 
Fund and Compcare Health Servs. Ins. Corp., 2006 WI 91, 293 Wis. 
2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216. 
¶36 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 655 does not, however, provide a 
comprehensive set of procedural rules for maintaining a medical 
malpractice claim.  Storm v. Legion Ins. Co., 2003 WI 120, ¶34, 
265 Wis. 2d 169, 665 N.W.2d 353.  Wis. Stat. Ch. 655 does not 
exist in a procedural vacuum.  Other procedures governing civil 
litigation apply to medical malpractice claims, unless they 
conflict with chapter 655.  Id.  For instance, chapter 655 does 
not contain a statute of limitations provision, but the three-
year statute of limitations provided in § 893.55(1)(a) has been 
applied.  See Ocasio v. Froedtert Mem'l Lutheran Hosp., 2001 WI 
App 264, 248 Wis. 2d 932, 637 N.W.2d 459.  The five-year statute 
of repose in § 893.55(1)(b) also has been applied.  See Aicher 
v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
20 
 
N.W.2d 849; See also Halverson v. Tydrich, 156 Wis. 2d 202, 456 
N.W.2d 852 (Ct. App. 1990).  The two-year statute of limitations 
for intentional torts pursuant to § 893.57 has also been 
applied.  See Deborah S.S. v. Yogesh N.G., 175 Wis. 2d 436, 499 
N.W.2d 272 (Ct. App. 1993).  Courts also have applied statutes 
governing service of summons, Young v. Aurora Medical Center of 
Washington County, Inc., 2004 WI App 71, 272 Wis. 2d 300, 679 
N.W.2d 549, and discretionary changes of venue, Hoffman v. 
Memorial Hosp. of Iowa County, 196 Wis. 2d 505, 538 N.W.2d 627 
(Ct. App. 1995). 
¶37 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80 
provides 
a 
set 
of 
rules 
specifically 
for 
claims 
against 
governmental 
bodies 
and 
officers, agents, or employees, which broadly applies to all 
causes of action unless a further, more specific rule says 
otherwise.  See DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 183, 
515 N.W.2d 888 (1994) (concluding that § 893.80 applies to "all 
actions") overruled in part by State ex rel. Auchinleck v. Town 
of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 597, 547 N.W.2d 587 (1996) 
(stating that the "all actions" language of DNR v. City of 
Waukesha does not extend to open records and open meetings 
actions, where more specific provisions take precedence).  This 
is in accordance with the canon of statutory construction 
providing that where a general statute and a specific statute 
apply to the same subject, the specific statute controls.  State 
ex rel. Hensley v. Endicott, 2001 WI 105, ¶19, 245 Wis. 2d 607, 
629 N.W.2d 686. 
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
21 
 
¶38 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1m) requires that, "[w]ith 
regard to a claim to recover damages for medical malpractice" 
against a political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency, within 180 days of discovery of the injury, the claimant 
must serve that governmental body with written notice pursuant 
to § 893.80(1)(a).  This is a specific statute of limitations 
which applies in medical malpractice cases against enumerated 
types of governmental bodies, such as political corporations.  
The 
language 
of 
§ 
893.80(1m) 
explicitly 
anticipates 
the 
application of § 893.80 to medical malpractice claims against 
governmental bodies. 
¶39 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1m) 
applies 
to 
medical 
malpractice claims against governmental bodies that fall within 
the scope of § 893.80, such as the UWHCA.  Chapter 655 does not 
contain any statute of limitations provision that conflicts with 
§ 893.80.  The generally exclusive nature of Chapter 655 does 
not prevent the application of § 893.80 in this case. 
III 
¶40 This case presented one issue: Is the UWHCA, as a 
statutorily-created, 
public body corporate and politic, a 
"political corporation" for the purposes of § 893.80?  We hold 
that the UWHCA is a "political corporation" because of the power 
and structure provided by the legislature in Wis. Stat. ch. 233.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
2005AP2743   
 
22 
 
¶41 Justices 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY 
and 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK did not participate. 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶42 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
parties initially briefed only the issue of the application of 
§ 893.80 (2003-04)1 to the UWHCA.  But this issue is not the only 
issue in the instant case.  After oral argument the court asked 
the parties to provide supplemental briefs discussing the 
application of Chapter 655 to the UWHCA and the relationship 
between § 893.80 and Chapter 655.  Specifically, the court asked 
the parties to address the following question: 
Taking into consideration Wis. Stat. ch. 655 and the 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 893.80, as well as any 
other relevant matters, including Rineck v. Johnson, 
155 Wis. 2d 659, 456 N.W.2d 336 (1990) and Jelinek v. 
St. Paul Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, 182 
Wis. 2d 1, 512 N.W.2d 764 (1994), is Wis. Stat. ch. 
655 the exclusive procedure for pursuing malpractice 
claims against chapter 655 health care providers and 
their employees, rendering § 893.80 inapplicable? 
¶43 The plaintiffs primarily argued in their supplemental 
brief that only Chapter 655 applies to the UWHCA.  In contrast, 
the defendants primarily argued that only Wis. Stat. § 893.80 
applies to the UWHCA.  According to the majority opinion, both 
§ 893.80 and Chapter 655 apply to the UWHCA.  The majority 
opinion tersely concludes that because "Chapter 655 does not 
contain any statute of limitations provision that conflicts with 
§ 893.80," the 180-day notice of claim provision of § 893.80 
applies to the UWHCA and its employees.  Majority op., ¶39. 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶44 Properly determining whether the 180-day notice of 
claim was required under Wis. Stat. § 893.80 in the instant case 
requires the court to address three questions: 
I. Is the UWHCA (described in the statutes as a 
"public 
body 
corporate 
and 
politic") 
a 
"political 
corporation" under Wis. Stat. § 893.80 so that a medical 
malpractice claimant must comply with the 180-day notice of 
claim requirement?  
II. Are the UWHCA and its employees2 "health care 
providers" under Wis. Stat. Chapter 655, which governs 
medical malpractice suits brought against health care 
providers? and  
III. Can Wis. Stat. § 893.80 and Chapter 655 be 
harmonized so that both can apply to medical malpractice 
actions brought against the UWHCA?  
¶45 The majority opinion answers "Yes" to the first two 
questions and brushes aside the importance of answering the 
third question, which the court posed to the parties.  As a 
result, the majority opinion dismisses the action against the 
UWHCA and its employees on the ground that the plaintiff did not 
comply with the 180-day notice of claim requirement in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80. 
¶46 For the reasons set forth, I conclude as follows: 
I. The UWHCA is not a "political corporation" under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80 and claimants need not follow the 180-
                                                 
2 By "employees," I refer to those employees who are health 
care providers under Chapter 655. 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
3 
 
day notice of claim requirement.  Rather, the UWHCA is a 
hybrid organization that the legislature did not intend to 
be covered by § 893.80. 
II. The UWHCA is not an exempt "governmental agency" 
under Wis. Stat. § 655.003(2); it is a non-exempt "health 
care provider" under Chapter 655.  Even if the UWHCA itself 
were exempt from Chapter 655, its employees still are 
"health care providers" governed by Chapter 655. 
III. Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80 and Chapter 655 cannot 
readily be harmonized with regard to the commencement of a 
medical malpractice action.  It is unclear whether the 
§ 893.80 notice of claim provision can be harmonized with 
the Chapter 655 mediation provisions, whether the § 893.80 
and Chapter 655 statutes of limitations can be harmonized, 
and whether the caps on damages in these different 
statutory schemes can be reconciled.   
¶47 To determine whether Wis. Stat. § 893.80 applies to 
the UWHCA, we must read § 893.80 with Chapter 655 inasmuch as 
the legislature intended the two to be read together.  If Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80 conflicts with Chapter 655, Chapter 655 governs. 
¶48 I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and 
remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings on the plaintiff's complaint. 
¶49 Before I discuss each question presented in turn, I 
want to put the present case in context.  At least two groups of 
health care providers work at the UWHCA, side by side:  health 
care providers who are employees of the UWHCA and health care 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
4 
 
providers who are employees of the University of Wisconsin.  As 
the nonparty brief of the Board of Regents of the University of 
Wisconsin makes clear, the UWHCA and the University have a 
mutual interdependence and serve similar purposes. 
¶50 The employees of the University of Wisconsin are state 
employees, and tort claims against them are governed by Wis. 
Stat. § 893.82, not by § 893.80.  Furthermore, the employees of 
the University of Wisconsin are exempt from Chapter 655.3 
¶51 The employees of the UWHCA, on the other hand, are not 
state employees; tort claims against them are not governed by 
Wis. Stat. § 893.82.  According to the majority opinion, claims 
against them are governed by § 893.80, as well as Chapter 655. 
¶52 Often, both University state employees and employees 
of the UWHCA are defendants in the same medical malpractice 
actions.  Any interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 893.80 must operate 
harmoniously with § 893.82 and Chapter 655 so that claimants can 
proceed with their litigation.   
¶53 Furthermore, 
the 
UWHCA 
does 
business 
ordinarily 
carried on by private enterprise.  Any interpretation of 
§ 893.80 and Chapter 655 must ask the extent to which the 
legislature would have intended patients of the UWHCA be 
                                                 
3 Wis. Stat. § 655.003(1); Suchomel v. Univ. of Wis. Hosp. & 
Clinics, 2005 WI App 234, ¶¶26-29, 288 Wis. 2d 188, 203-05, 708 
N.W.2d 13. 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
5 
 
accorded less protection against medical malpractice than they 
would have had in a privately operated facility.4 
¶54 In interpreting and applying Wis. Stat. § 893.80 and 
Chapter 655 to the UWHCA health care providers, a court 
therefore must consider (1) the comparative statutory treatment 
of the University state employees and the employees of the UWHCA 
so that a single lawsuit against both groups of health care 
providers may proceed with a minimum amount of difficulty for 
both the claimant and the health care providers, and (2) the 
comparative statutory treatment of the UWHCA and its employees 
and their competitors in the private sector.5 
I 
 
¶55 The defendants insist that the UWHCA, which is 
described in the statutes as a "public body corporate and 
politic," is a "political corporation" for the purposes of  Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80 and thus claimants must follow the procedural 
notice of claim requirement set forth in § 893.80.  The majority 
opinion agrees, announcing that "[g]iven the power and structure 
of the UWHCA, we conclude that it is a 'political corporation.'"  
Majority op., ¶31. 
                                                 
4 See Lewis v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2001 WI 60, ¶25, 243 
Wis. 2d 648, 627 N.W.2d 484, in which the court refused to adopt 
the "captain of the ship" doctrine of physician liability in 
county hospitals because this doctrine did not apply in private 
hospitals and application of the doctrine would discourage 
doctors from working at government hospitals. 
5 "[W]hen the legislature enacts a new statute, it is 
presumed to know the new statute's relationship with existing 
and contemporaneously created statutory provisions, especially 
those directly affecting the statute."  Storm v. Legion Ins. 
Co., 2003 WI 120, ¶29, 265 Wis. 2d 169, 665 N.W.2d 353.   
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
6 
 
 
¶56 I conclude that a proper statutory interpretation 
leads to the opposite conclusion.  The phrase "political 
corporation" has to be defined in the context of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80 in which it is used. 
¶57 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80 establishes the procedure for 
filing a claim against a volunteer fire company, a political 
corporation, or a governmental subdivision or agency.6   
¶58 If a person or entity falls within one of these 
enumerated classifications, certain provisions apply, such as 
Wis. Stat. §§ 893.80(1)(a) and (1m), which establish a 180-day 
notice of claim requirement,7 and § 893.80(1g), which provides 
                                                 
6 Section 893.80(1) states in relevant part that: 
Except as provided in subs. (1g), (1m), (1p) and (8), 
no action may be brought or maintained against any 
volunteer 
fire 
company organized under ch. 213, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency thereof nor against any officer, official, 
agent or employee of the corporation, subdivision or 
agency for acts done in their official capacity or in 
the course of their agency or employment upon a claim 
or cause of action [unless certain provisions are 
complied with] . . . . 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1)(a) states in full that:  
Within 120 days after the happening of the event 
giving rise to the claim, written notice of the 
circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent 
or attorney is served on the volunteer fire company, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency and on the officer, official, agent or employee 
under s. 801.11.  Failure to give the requisite notice 
shall not bar action on the claim if the fire company, 
corporation, subdivision or agency had actual notice 
of 
the 
claim 
and 
the 
claimant 
shows 
to 
the 
satisfaction of the court that the delay or failure to 
give the requisite notice has not been prejudicial to 
the defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
7 
 
that an action must be commenced within six months after the 
government entity disallows the claim,8 and § 893.80(3), which 
caps damages at $50,000.9   
                                                                                                                                                             
or agency or to the defendant officer, official, agent 
or employee . . . . 
Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1m) states in full that:   
With regard to a claim to recover damages for medical 
malpractice, the time period under sub. (1)(a) shall 
be 180 days after discovery of the injury or the date 
on which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the 
injury should have been discovered, rather than 120 
days after the happening of the event giving rise to 
the claim. 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1g) states in full that:   
Notice of disallowance of the claim submitted under 
sub. (1) shall be served on the claimant by registered 
or certified mail and the receipt therefor, signed by 
the claimant, or the returned registered letter, shall 
be proof of service.  Failure of the appropriate body 
to disallow a claim within 120 days after presentation 
of the written notice of the claim is a disallowance.  
No action on a claim under this section against any 
defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision or 
agency nor against any defendant officer, official, 
agent or employee, may be brought after 6 months from 
the date of service of the notice of disallowance, and 
the notice of disallowance shall contain a statement 
to that effect. 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(3) states in full that: 
Except as provided in this subsection, the amount 
recoverable by any person for any damages, injuries or 
death in any action founded on tort against any 
volunteer fire company organized under ch. 181 or 213, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency thereof and against their officers, officials, 
agents or employees for acts done in their official 
capacity 
or 
in 
the 
course 
of 
their 
agency 
or 
employment, 
whether 
proceeded 
against 
jointly 
or 
severally, shall not exceed $50,000.  The amount 
recoverable under this subsection shall not exceed 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶59 Notably, a "public body corporate and politic," as the 
UWHCA is defined in Wis. Stat. § 233.02(1), is not included as 
such in § 893.80.  In at least two other statutes, however, the 
legislature specifically defined "governmental body" for those 
statutes or subchapters to include the "public body corporate 
and politic created by constitution, statute, ordinance, rule or 
order."  Wis. Stat. §§ 19.82(1), 895.52(1)(a)3.  Accordingly, 
the legislature's omission of the classification of "public body 
corporate and politic" from the listing of entities in § 893.80 
is telling. 
¶60 Section 
893.80 
does 
not 
define 
"political 
corporation."  The majority opinion resorts to the full panoply 
of definitions from Black's Law Dictionary to try to figure out 
what this phrase means and whether the UWHCA falls within it.  
Majority op., ¶22.  None of these definitions is persuasive; 
                                                                                                                                                             
$25,000 in any such action against a volunteer fire 
company organized under ch. 181 or 213 or its 
officers, officials, agents or employees.  If a 
volunteer fire company organized under ch. 181 or 213 
is part of a combined fire department, the $25,000 
limit still applies to actions against the volunteer 
fire company or its officers, officials, agents or 
employees.  No punitive damages may be allowed or 
recoverable in any such action under this subsection. 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
9 
 
none holds the key to interpreting Wis. Stat. § 893.80.10  
According to Black's Law Dictionary, the categories specifically 
enumerated 
in 
§ 893.80(1) 
are 
synonymous; 
a 
"political 
corporation" is an "agency."  Such an interpretation renders the 
statutory language in § 893.80(1) superfluous and therefore must 
be incorrect.  A "political corporation" must, under the 
statute, be distinct from a "governmental subdivision or 
agency." 
¶61 The majority opinion also examines the nature of the 
UWHCA 
to 
determine 
whether 
it 
constitutes 
a 
"political 
corporation."  Majority op., ¶23.  Paragraphs 24 through 30 
describe the UWHCA and its statutorily-enumerated powers and 
                                                 
10 One term the majority opinion latches onto is "public 
corporation."  The majority opinion, relying on Black's Law 
Dictionary, 
concludes 
that 
a 
"'political 
corporation' 
is 
synonymous with the term 'public corporation.'"  Majority op., 
¶22.  The term "public corporation" can be located throughout 
the statutes.  In § 19.42(5), the legislature defines the term 
"Department" for purposes of an election law to include "the 
legislature, the University of Wisconsin System, any authority 
or public corporation created and regulated by an act of the 
legislature . . . ."  An "authority" is distinguished from a 
"public corporation" in this particular statute.  An "authority" 
like the UWHCA is not the same thing as a "public corporation."  
The majority's reliance on this term is misplaced. 
The majority opinion also defines a "political corporation" 
as "an entity created by the legislature that is authorized to 
implement enactments of the legislature."  Majority op., ¶22.  
This definition is broad and lacks meaningful limitation.  
Countless bodies created by the legislature can satisfy this 
definition.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 26.02 (council on 
forestry), 38.001 (the technical college system), and 42.01 
(state fair park board).  It also sweeps up other bodies that 
have been separately listed in § 893.80(1)(a), like volunteer 
fire companies organized under Chapter 213. 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
10 
 
duties.  From this overview, the majority opinion concludes that 
the UWHCA is a "political corporation."  Majority op., ¶31.   
¶62 From this overview, I conclude only that the UWHCA is 
a unique creature, created by statute with a blend of public and 
private characteristics.  See also Takle v. Univ. of Wis. Hosp. 
& Clinics Auth., 402 F.3d 768, 769 (7th Cir. 2005) (Judge Posner 
describes the UWHCA as "a hybrid entity" with "characteristics 
of both a state agency and a private foundation.").   
¶63 Certain attributes of UWHCA reflect the legislative 
intent that the State provide some oversight of this entity.  
Other features reflect the legislative intent that the UWHCA 
operate as an independent body with freedom to make decisions to 
better compete with private hospitals and other health care 
providers.   
¶64 Whether a unique entity like the UWHCA is a "political 
corporation" under Wis. Stat. § 893.80 requires a more careful 
analysis of § 893.80 itself.  To determine whether an entity is 
a § 893.80 political corporation requires not just an analysis 
of the entity but also of the purpose of § 893.80.   
¶65 The very text of Wis. Stat. § 893.80 demonstrates that 
the statute is primarily concerned with protecting governmental 
assets.   For instance, sections 893.80(1m) requires that in 
medical malpractice claims, notice of claim must be given to the 
political corporation within 180 days of discovery of the 
injury.  This procedural hurdle not only means that otherwise 
valid claims are quickly invalidated, it also allows the 
political corporation an opportunity to settle a case without 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
11 
 
expensive litigation.  Section 893.80(1g) shortens the statute 
of limitation to six months after disallowance of the claim.  
Once again, this procedural hurdle causes otherwise valid claims 
to fail quickly.  Section 893.80(3) sets a cap on damages of 
$50,000 (or $25,000 in cases of volunteer fire companies) and 
disallows punitive damages.  Short and simple, section 893.80 is 
designed to protect the fisc.11 
¶66 As the court explained in Riccitelli v. Broekhuizen, 
227 Wis. 2d 100, 116, 120, 595 N.W.2d 392 (1999), "[t]he purpose 
of the notice of claim statute is to enable the government unit 
to investigate a claim against an employee, to avoid needless 
litigation, and to settle all reasonable claims" (applying state 
notice of 
claim statute, § 893.82(3)) (internal citations 
                                                 
11 In Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 293 
N.W.2d 504 (1980), this court explained the legislature's role 
in crafting statutory schemes to protect the public treasury:  
It is the legislature's function to evaluate the 
risks, the extent of exposure to liability, the need 
to compensate citizens for injury, the availability of 
and cost of insurance, and the financial condition of 
the governmental units.  It is the legislature's 
function to structure statutory provisions, which will 
protect the public interest in reimbursing the victim 
and in maintaining government services and which will 
be fair and reasonable to the victim and at the same 
time will be realistic regarding the financial burden 
to be placed on the taxpayers. 
Id. at 377. 
In Lewis v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2001 WI 60, ¶25 n.18, 243 
Wis. 2d 648, 627 N.W.2d 484, involving a county hospital, the 
court explained that the $50,000 cap for damages in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80 was a legislative decision regarding the financial 
burden to be placed on the taxpayers.   
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
12 
 
omitted).  See also Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 2000 WI 60, ¶¶23, 
28, 235 Wis. 2d 610, 612 N.W.2d 59.  The purpose of the cap on 
damages is to "preserve sufficient public funds to ensure that 
the government will be able to continue to provide those 
services which it believes benefits the citizenry."  Stanhope v. 
Brown County, 90 Wis. 2d 823, 842, 280 N.W.2d 711 (1979) 
(applying § 895.43(1971) with a damages cap of $25,000).12  "This 
monetary limitation is one which the legislature determines 
balancing the ideal of equal justice and the need for fiscal 
security."  Stanhope, 90 Wis. 2d at 843. 
¶67 With this purpose of Wis. Stat. § 893.80 in mind, I am 
persuaded that UWHCA is not a "political corporation" under 
§ 893.80.  The government's fisc is not at issue in an action 
against the UWHCA.  The UWHCA operates financially independent 
of the State and any other governmental entity.  No governmental 
body is financially accountable to the UWHCA and the UWHCA is 
not financially accountable to any governmental body.13  The 
                                                 
12 The Stanhope court also explained that "limited liability 
is needed to protect governmental functions."  90 Wis. 2d at 
842. 
13 The UWHCA has recognized as much in its 2005 Annual 
Report, which states that "[a]lthough the Authority remains 
closely connected to the University and the Medical School 
through its various agreements, UWHC[A] receives no financial 
support from the University or the State of Wisconsin." 
A report entitled An Evaluation: University of Wisconsin 
Hospitals and Clinics Authority (June 2001), prepared (as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 13.94) by Wisconsin's Joint Legislative 
Audit 
Committee 
describes 
the 
UWHCA 
as 
an 
"independent, 
nonprofit entity."  Takle v. Univ. of Wis. Hosp. & Clinics 
Auth., 402 F.3d 768, 770 (7th Cir. 2005). 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
13 
 
legislature expressly created the UWHCA as a financially 
independent entity.  For instance, Wis. Stat. § 233.17 provides 
that the State and any governmental bodies will not be liable 
for the debts and obligations of the UWHCA.14  Likewise, § 233.22 
provides that the bonds issued by the UWHCA do not financially 
obligate the State.15   
¶68 The UWHCA retains its own revenues.16  Its operating 
revenues 
for 
the 
fiscal 
year 
2005 
were 
in 
excess 
of 
$676,200,000.  The UWHCA is not subject to the budgeting 
approval that governmental bodies must submit to and participate 
in.  The UWHCA approves its own budget without participation by 
the governor, the Department of Administration, the joint 
committee on finance, or the legislature.  Furthermore, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also id. at 769 ("The hospital is not financed by the 
state . . . "). 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 233.17 provides that "[n]either the 
state, any political subdivision of the state nor any officer, 
employee or agent of the state or a political subdivision who is 
acting within the scope of employment or agency is liable for 
any debt, obligation, act or omission of the authority."   
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 233.22 states in pertinent part that:  
"Bonds are not public debt. (1) The state is not liable on bonds 
and the bonds are not a debt of the state." 
16 The UWHCA keeps its operating funds in its own accounts 
outside of the state treasury and invests its funds independent 
of the investment board, except that it may deposit moneys with 
the investment board for investment as part of the local 
government-pooled investment fund. 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
14 
 
UWHCA is exempt from preaudit and postaudit of its expenditures 
by the Department of Administration.17 
¶69 Consequently, the legislature does not need to limit 
the UWHCA's debt exposure out of a need to protect governmental 
assets, or the public treasury, or taxpayers.  Holding that the 
UWHCA 
is 
a 
"political 
corporation" 
and 
subject 
to 
the 
protections of Wis. Stat. § 893.80 does not comport with the 
purpose of § 893.80.18  
¶70 The legislature recreated the University of Wisconsin 
Hospitals and Clinics as UWHCA to enable the UWHCA to be 
competitive with the private sector in changing commercial 
circumstances.  But giving the UWHCA coverage under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80 is far outside what is necessary to make the UWHCA 
competitive with other hospitals.   
                                                 
17 The UWHCA does, however, have to provide periodic reports 
to the Department of Administration, the legislature, the 
governor and the Board of Regents, pursuant to § 233.04(4); 
however, no provision of Chapter 233 allows any of these bodies 
to take immediate remedial action if the UWHCA acts outside of 
its Chapter 233 powers and duties. 
18 Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in Takle 
and discussing government immunity, examined the statutes to 
determine the attributes of UWHCA.  After recounting the 
creation of the UWHCA, the court announced that the statutes 
were 
"describing 
the 
privatization 
of 
a 
formerly 
public 
function" and that "[t]he strings that tie the hospital to the 
state are found in many cases in which a state decides to 
privatize a formerly state function.  They do not require that 
privatization be treated as a farce in which the privatized 
entity enjoys the benefits both of not being the state and so 
being freed from the regulations that constrain state agencies, 
and of being the state and so being immune from suit in federal 
court." Takle, 402 F.3d at 770-71.   
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶71 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80 refers to medical malpractice 
but makes no reference to Chapter 655.  The reference to medical 
malpractice 
in 
§ 893.80 
makes 
sense 
because 
health 
care 
professionals who are county or municipal employees are covered 
by § 893.80 but are exempt from Chapter 655.19   
¶72 Had the legislature wanted to include the UWHCA within 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80, the legislature could have expressly done 
so.  In creating the UWHCA, the legislature specifically and 
expressly referred to the UWHCA in over 50 statutes.20  See 1995 
Wis. Act. 27.  Some of these amendments specifically include the 
UWHCA within a statute;21 some explicitly exempt the UWHCA from 
coverage by a statute.22 
¶73 It is telling that the legislature failed to amend 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80 to include the UWHCA, especially given the 
unique nature of the UWHCA, which blends characteristics of 
                                                 
19 Wis. Stat. § 655.003(1). 
20 See Wis. Stat. §§ 11.36, 13.094, 13.48, 13.95, 15.07, 
15.96, 16.004, 16.008, 16.15, 16.50, 16.505, 16.61, 16.611, 
16.62, 16.72, 16.73, 16.75, 16.765, 16.845, 16.85, 19.42, 19.45, 
20.921, 24.61, 25.17, 36.11, 36.25, 40.02, 40.05, 40.22, 40.52, 
40.81, 40.95, 45.03, 45.27, 46.041, 46.10, 46.115, 46.22, 
66.603, 70.11, 70.119, 71.26, 77.54, 100.45, 101.177, 103.49, 
111.02, 111.05, 111.075, 111.115, 111.17, 111.815, 111.825, 
111.92, 115.53, 137.20, 146.185, 146.59, 165.40, 219.09, 230.09, 
230.29, 230.36, 230.90, 231.01, 285.59. 
21 See, e.g., 
Wis. Stat. §§ 103.49(1)(f), 165.40(1)(f) 
(including the UWHCA as a "state agency"); § 16.004(12)(a) 
(excluding the UWHCA from the definition of "state agency" 
although specifically including "authority" and "independent 
agency"). 
22 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 16.004(12)(a)(excluding the UWHCA 
from the definition of "state agency" although specifically 
including "authority" and "independent agency"). 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
16 
 
public and private entities.  If the legislature had wanted to 
make 
sure 
that 
the 
UWHCA 
was 
considered 
a 
"political 
corporation" 
for 
section 
893.80 
purposes, 
it 
could 
have 
explicitly done so. 
 
¶74 It is clear that the UWHCA is not a "political 
corporation" subject to Wis. Stat. § 893.80.  
II 
¶75 Because the instant case is a medical malpractice 
action, I must determine, as the court asked the litigants to 
do, whether Chapter 655 applies to the UWHCA or its employees 
and examine the extent to which Chapter 655 and § 893.80 can be 
harmonized.   
¶76 Chapter 655 was enacted by the legislature to govern 
medical malpractice actions.  Participation in Chapter 655 is 
mandatory for "health care providers," unless the particular 
health care provider is expressly exempted.23   
¶77  The term "health care provider" is defined by 
statute.  The UWHCA and its employees are "health care 
providers" as defined by Wis. Stat. § 655.002.  Indeed, the 
defendants do not argue that the UWHCA and its employees do not 
satisfy these statutory provisions.  
¶78 The defendants instead insist that the UWHCA and its 
employees are exempt from Chapter 655 by virtue of Wis. Stat. 
§ 655.003(2), which exempts from Chapter 655 coverage "[a] 
facility that is . . . operated by any governmental agency."  
                                                 
23 Wis. Stat. §§ 655.006, .007. 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
17 
 
The majority opinion does not address the defendants' argument.  
I shall.24 
¶79 Not surprisingly, the defendants assert that the UWHCA 
is a "facility operated by a governmental agency" and thus that 
the UWHCA is exempt from Chapter 655.  Although the defendants' 
primary argument has been that the UWHCA is a "political 
corporation" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80 
(rather 
than 
a 
"governmental agency"), in supplemental briefs before this 
court, defendants assert that the UWHCA is a "governmental 
agency" under § 655.003(2).   
¶80 The 
defendants 
argue 
that 
the 
terms 
"political 
corporation" and "governmental agency" are used broadly and 
interchangeably.25  If the defendants were correct (which they 
are not) that the UWHCA is a "political corporation" under 
§ 893.80, then the UWHCA cannot be exempt under § 655.003(2) as 
a "governmental agency."26  Such an interpretation would render 
                                                 
24 In a footnote in Lewis v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2001 WI 
60, ¶25 n.18, 243 Wis. 2d 648, 627 N.W.2d 484, the court 
declared that it took "judicial notice" that "there are only 
three government-owned [hospital] facilities in Wisconsin," one 
of which is the UWHCA.  The court did not define "government-
owned facility."   
25 Supplemental Brief and Appendix of Defendants-Respondents 
at 3. 
26 The Analysis supplied by the Legislative Reference Bureau 
on the bill which created Chapter 233 and the UWHCA specifically 
states that "the authority is not a state agency."  See 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner's Opening Brief at A-App. 92. 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
18 
 
the classifications of "political corporation" and "governmental 
agency" in § 893.80 redundant and superfluous.27  
¶81 Further, reading together Wis. Stat. § 655.003(1) 
(exempting state, county and municipal employees from ch. 655) 
and 
§ 655.003(2) 
(exempting 
a 
facility 
operated 
by 
the 
governmental agency from ch. 655) would mean that a facility 
operated by a governmental agency under § 655.003(2) refers to a 
facility operated by the state, a county, or a municipality.  
The defendants' suggested interpretation does not make sense. 
¶82 Even if the UWHCA were a facility operated by a 
governmental 
agency 
and 
exempt 
from 
Chapter 
655 
under 
§ 655.003(2), aren't its employees still governed by Chapter 
655?  Only physicians who are state, county, or municipal 
employees are exempt in § 655.003(1); employees of governmental 
agencies or facilities are not exempt from Chapter 655.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 655.003(1).   
¶83 Notably, the legislature did not provide a specific 
exemption for the UWHCA and its employees in Chapter 655 as it 
did elsewhere in the Wisconsin statutes.  In the absence of such 
an exemption, I conclude that the legislature intended that the 
UWHCA and its employees be treated as "health care providers" 
                                                 
27 Such an interpretation is also at odds with the rest of 
the statute.  Chapter 655 specifically includes "corporations" 
within the mandatory participation provisions: "Except as 
provided in s. 655.003, this Chapter applies to all of the 
following: . . . (e) A corporation organized and operated in 
this state for the primary purpose of providing the medical 
services of physicians or nurse anesthetists."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 655.002(1)(e). 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
19 
 
and to be subject to the same provisions governing medical 
malpractice actions as private health care providers. 
¶84 It is noteworthy (but not dispositive, of course) that 
the UWHCA has treated itself as a health care provider bound by 
the terms of Chapter 655.  The UWHCA has consistently held 
itself out as a Chapter 655 health care provider and actively 
followed the requirements of Chapter 655.28  The UWHCA has issued 
public documents that acknowledge that Chapter 655 applies to it 
and its employees.  The UWHCA's own liability coverage brochure 
states that the UWHCA and employees are covered by Chapter 655.  
Chapter 655 mandates that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 655.23(4), 
each health care provider have liability insurance of one 
million dollars.  Although § 893.80(3) provides a damages cap of 
$50,000, the UWHCA and its employees carry the insurance with 
limits of one million dollars.  The UWHCA has also paid 
assessments to the Wisconsin Injured Patients and Families 
Compensation Fund ("the Fund"), as Chapter 655 health care 
providers are required to do.   
¶85 I agree with the majority opinion that the UWHCA and 
its employees are Chapter 655 health care providers.   
III 
 
¶86 Having determined that the UWHCA is not a "political 
corporation" governed by Wis. Stat. § 893.80, but rather is 
governed by Chapter 655, I would simply apply the provisions of 
                                                 
28 The UWHCA's annual report also explains that it is 
independent and receives no financial support from the state; it 
identifies the UWHCA as the "[l]argest private employer in 
Madison." 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
20 
 
Chapter 655 to the UWHCA and its employees in the instant case.  
End of story! 
¶87 Even if I were to agree with the majority opinion that 
the UWHCA is a "political corporation" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80, I would apply a more rigorous and meaningful analysis 
of the relationship between Chapter 655 and § 893.80 to 
determine whether the legislature intended that these statutory 
systems be applied simultaneously to the UWHCA.29   
¶88 The majority opinion does not engage in this inquiry.  
What the majority fails to grasp is that if Wis. Stat. § 893.80 
and 
Chapter 
655 
cannot 
be 
readily 
harmonized, 
then 
the 
legislature likely would not have intended them to be applied 
simultaneously to the UWHCA.   
¶89 As a starting point and as a comparison, I note that 
the health care providers who are University state employees are 
exempted from Chapter 655 pursuant to § 655.003(1).  As a 
result, an action brought against these individuals is subject 
to 
a 
notice 
of 
claim 
requirement 
and 
other 
procedural 
requirements under § 893.82 but is not subject to Chapter 655.  
Commencing medical malpractice claims against the University 
state employees seems straightforward and clear.  It seems a 
fair assumption that the legislature would impose a similarly 
                                                 
29 A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that 
statutes are examined in pari material, not in isolation.  "In 
construing a statute, the entire section and related sections 
are 
to 
be 
considered 
in 
its 
construction 
or 
interpretation. . . ."  State v. Clausen, 105 Wis. 2d 231, 244, 
313 N.W.2d 819 (1982) (internal citations omitted). 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
21 
 
straightforward and clear procedural framework for commencing 
medical malpractice claims against the UWHCA and its employees. 
¶90 Turning to the instant case, I agree with the majority 
opinion and our case law that provisions outside Chapter 655 can 
govern medical malpractice cases.30  The recent decision in Storm 
v. Legion Ins. Co., 2003 WI 120, ¶35, 265 Wis. 2d 169, 665 
N.W.2d 353, however, instructs that "if general statutory 
provisions conflict with Chapter 655, the latter will trump the 
general statute." 
¶91 Chapter 655 and § 893.80 both contain provisions 
governing 
the 
commencement 
of 
an 
action, 
statutes 
of 
limitations,31 and caps on damages.32  Trying to harmonize these 
statutes raises many questions.  
¶92 First, regarding the commencement of an action, 
Chapter 655 carefully enumerates the steps a claimant must 
follow in commencing a medical malpractice action.  Section 
                                                 
30 The court has explained that "Chapter 655 is not 
exclusive in the sense that it is a comprehensive set of 
procedural rules for medical malpractice claims.  Numerous 
statutes, including civil procedure and discovery statutes, that 
are not located in Chapter 655 apply to claims brought for 
medical malpractice."  Storm, 265 Wis. 2d 169, ¶34. 
31 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 893.55 
provides 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations for actions against "health care providers" and is 
applicable in Chapter 655 actions.  See, e.g., Ocasio v. 
Froedtert 
Mem'l 
Lutheran 
Hosp., 
2001 
WI 
App 
264, 
248 
Wis. 2d 932, 637 N.W.2d 459. 
32 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§§ 655.017 
and 
893.55 
provide 
the 
relevant caps on damages for Chapter 655 actions. 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
22 
 
655.009 provides instructions for how to file a complaint 
against a health care provider.33 
¶93 Section 
655.43 
provides 
that 
the 
parties 
must 
participate in mediation.34  The legislature explained its intent 
in making mediation mandatory for medical malpractice claims as 
follows:  "The legislature intends that the mediation system 
provide the persons under sub. (2) with an informal, inexpensive 
and expedient means for resolving disputes without litigation 
and intends that the director of state courts administer the 
mediation system accordingly."  Wis. Stat. § 655.42(1). 
¶94 Chapter 655 addresses the timing of the mediation vis-
à-vis a "court action."  The mediation provisions require that a 
                                                 
33 Section 655.009 provides as follows: 
Actions against health care providers.  An action to 
recover damages on account of malpractice shall comply 
with the following: 
(1) Complaint.  The complaint in such action shall not 
specify the amount of money to which the plaintiff 
supposes to be entitled. 
(2) Medical expense payments.  The court or jury, 
whichever is applicable, shall determine the amount of 
medical expense payments previously incurred and for 
future medical expense payments. 
(3) Venue.  Venue in a court action under this chapter 
is in the county where the claimant resides if the 
claimant is a resident of this state, or in a county 
specified in s. 801.50(2)(a) or (c) if the claimant is 
not a resident of this state. 
34 Wisconsin Stat. § 655.43 states in full:  "Mediation 
requirement.  The claimant and all respondents named in a 
request for mediation filed under s.655.44 or 655.445 shall 
participate in mediation under this subchapter." 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
23 
 
request for mediation be filed either before or in conjunction 
with the filing of a claim;35 they provide for tolling the 
statute of limitations;36 and they instruct how notice for 
mediation is to be provided.37 
¶95 Section 893.80(1m), on the other hand, requires that a 
notice of claim against a political corporation be filed within 
180 days of the discovery of the injury.38  No court action may 
be commenced before the claim is disallowed. 
¶96 In one sense, the Chapter 655 mediation provisions and 
the notice requirements of § 893.80 have similar purposes; both 
are motivated by a desire to have claims settled without a 
costly litigation battle.  However, the means of avoiding costly 
and contentious litigation are different: Chapter 655 mandates a 
special mediation process with a carefully designed panel of 
specialists, 
and 
§ 893.80 
requires 
notice 
to 
allow 
the 
governmental body to investigate the claim and determine whether 
to disallow it or to settle.  The former empowers both parties 
to 
reach 
a 
settlement; 
the 
latter 
gives 
the 
political 
corporation the power to choose which course to pursue.  The 
                                                 
35 Wis. Stat. §§ 655.44, .445.  
36 Id.  
37 Wis. Stat. § 655.455. 
38 The majority opinion queries the purpose of § 893.80's 
specifically addressing medical malpractice actions, if Chapter 
655 is to be exclusive.  The answer is obvious.  Chapter 655 
does not apply to state, county, and municipal employees and 
does not apply to facilities operated by a governmental agency.  
Section 893.80(1m) addresses medical malpractice claims brought 
against these individuals and entities that the legislature 
expressly and explicitly exempted from Chapter 655.   
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
24 
 
notice of claim does not mandate settlement discussions nor will 
it necessarily lead to them.  Chapter 655, however, demands that 
the parties come together and at least try to settle before the 
litigation advances. 
¶97 Furthermore, notice of claim provisions and mediation 
result in duplicitous proceedings, tending to cancel each other 
out and in combination actually defeat the purposes of each 
provision.  Requiring mediation after a claim is disallowed will 
likely increase costs and delay proceedings.  Requiring that the 
claim be disallowed while mediation proceedings are ongoing will 
likely 
undermine 
the 
effectiveness 
and 
sincerity 
of 
the 
mediation proceedings.   
¶98 Trying to harmonize these competing provisions raises 
many questions, including but not limited to the following: In 
what order shall the respective notices be filed?  Should the 
claimant file the request for mediation simultaneously with the 
notice of claim or after disallowance?  How does the mediation 
period fit within the 180-day timeframe under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80?  Does the request for mediation toll the 180-day 
notice requirement or the 6-month statute of limitations under 
§ 893.80 or both?   
¶99 One answer is certain.  If the notice of claim 
requirements under Wis. Stat. § 893.80 and the mediation 
provision under Chapter 655 must both be satisfied, litigants 
will have to engage in very careful timing to comply with both 
sets of provisions.   
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
25 
 
¶100 Second, Chapter 655 and Wis. Stat. § 893.80 have 
different statutes of limitation.   
¶101 For actions brought under Chapter 655, the general 
medical malpractice statute of limitations normally applies.  
See Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1).  The statute of limitations is 
ordinarily three years from the date of injury or one year from 
the date the injury was discovered (or with reasonable diligence 
should have been discovered) as long as it is within five years 
of the date of the act or omission.  Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1).   
¶102 On the other hand, under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1g), "no 
action on a claim under [§ 893.80] . . . may be brought after 6 
months from the date of service of the notice of disallowance, 
and the notice of disallowance shall contain a statement to that 
effect."   
¶103 Seemingly only one statute of limitations can apply.  
Which will it be?  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1g) or § 893.55(1)?   
¶104 The defendants take the position that Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1g) applies.  The defendants argue that Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1g), 
which 
provides 
for 
a 
six-month 
statute 
of 
limitations, 
is 
the 
specific 
provision 
for 
"political 
corporations" and trumps the general statute of limitations for 
Chapter 655.  But isn't it just as reasonable to assert that 
§ 893.80 is the general statute of limitations for all suits 
against "political corporations" and that § 893.55 is the 
specific statute for a medical malpractice suit and therefore 
trumps?  If the six-month statute of limitations does apply, how 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
26 
 
is it reconciled with the required mediation period under 
Chapter 655? 
¶105 Trying to answer these and other questions and map out 
exactly what steps a litigant (either the plaintiff or the 
defendant) should follow when a claim is brought against the 
UWHCA and its employees is tricky.  A skillful and very 
meticulous lawyer could probably figure out a way to meet all of 
the deadlines and comply with all of the procedures.  But when I 
tried to plot it out, I gave up after several tries. 
¶106 Third, Chapter 655 and Wis. Stat. § 893.80 provide for 
different caps on damages.  Under Chapter 655, there probably 
was no cap on damages at the time this action was commenced.39    
Under Wis. Stat. § 893.80, damages recoverable against a 
political corporation for any injuries are capped at $50,000.  
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3).  Which cap on damages governs in a 
medical malpractice action against the UWHCA or its employees? 
¶107 The defendants state that they need not address this 
issue because the only issue before the court is the 180-day 
notice of claim.  The cap on damages, however, is an "elephant" 
present in any attempt to interpret the relationship between 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80 and Chapter 655. 
¶108 In sum, Chapter 655 and Wis. Stat. § 893.80 in the 
instant case cannot easily be harmonized.  No doubt future 
                                                 
39 The court has held that the caps under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55 violated the Wisconsin Constitution.  See Ferdon ex 
rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, ¶10, 
284 
Wis. 2d 573, 
701 
N.W.2d 440 
(holding 
damage 
cap 
unconstitutional). 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
27 
 
litigation will arise as litigants will grapple with satisfying 
both Chapter 655 and § 893.80.  The court likely will manage to 
find a way to fit these two together, just like a square peg can 
eventually be hammered into a round hole.  Even though the 
resulting fit is awkward and not true to either original shape, 
nonetheless it can be accomplished. 
¶109 But whether Chapter 655 and Wis. Stat. § 893.80 can be 
forcefully "reconciled" is not the point in the present case.  
The point here is that in determining whether the 180-day notice 
provision should apply to the UWHCA and its employees requires a 
thoughtful analysis of how Chapter 655 operates with the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 893.80.  If Chapter 655 and 
§ 893.80 do not harmonize in a way that litigants can sensibly 
follow, then the legislature likely did not intend for Chapter 
655 and § 893.80 to apply simultaneously to the same entity. 
¶110 The 
majority 
opinion 
creates 
a 
confusing 
and 
conflicting maze of procedural steps and substantive provisions 
under both Wis. Stat. § 893.80 and Chapter 655 for medical 
malpractice claimants who want to file actions against the UWHCA 
and its employees.  This complexity flies in the face of the 
legislature's stated intention that Chapter 655 and its focus on 
mediation serve as "an informal, inexpensive and expedient means 
for 
resolving 
disputes." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 655.42(1). 
 
The 
difficulty of bringing these lawsuits is only multiplied when 
the suit is also against the University of Wisconsin and its 
state employees, subject to § 893.82. 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
28 
 
¶111 The court has had numerous cases over the years as 
litigants and governmental bodies have had trouble complying 
with Wis. Stat. § 893.80.  The majority opinion only adds a new 
body of cases to this mix.   
¶112  In any event, in addition to case law establishing 
that Chapter 655 trumps conflicting statutory provisions, Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(5) restricts the application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80 when it conflicts with other statutes.  This provision 
is not examined or even mentioned by the majority opinion.  
Section 893.80(5) states in pertinent part: 
When rights or remedies are provided by any other 
statute 
against 
any 
political 
corporation, 
governmental subdivision or agency or any officer, 
official, agent or employee thereof for injury, damage 
or death, such statute shall apply and the limitations 
in sub. (3) shall be inapplicable. 
 
¶113 In State ex rel. Auchinlek v. Town of LaGrange, 200 
Wis. 2d 585, 547 N.W.2d 587 (1996), this court examined and 
applied § 893.80(5).40  In Auchinlek, the plaintiffs brought suit 
under the open records and open meetings law, but did not 
provide notice to the governmental body pursuant to § 893.80.   
¶114 The Auchinlek court noted that "[b]oth the open 
records and open meetings laws set forth specific enforcement 
mechanisms to force governmental entities to comply with those 
laws."  Id. at 592.  The court reasoned that enforcing the 
                                                 
40 Compare DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 192-93, 
515 N.W.2d 888 (1994) (concluding that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(5) 
"only directs that when a claim is based on another statute, the 
damage limitations of sec. 893.80(3) do not apply.  Section 
893.80(5) does not say that the notice provisions of sec. 
893.80(1) do not apply.").   
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
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notice provisions of § 893.80 would undermine the purpose of and 
would conflict with the open meeting and open records laws.  Id. 
at 593.  The court also reasoned that "Wis. Stat. § 893.80(5) 
expressly states that specific rights and remedies provided by 
other statutes take precedence over the provisions of § 893.80."  
Id. at 596.  Accordingly, the Auchinlek court concluded that the 
plaintiff was not bound by the notice provisions of § 893.80 and 
could continue his suit without having first given notice under 
§ 893.80.41 
¶115 Likewise, 
in 
Gillen 
v. 
City 
of 
Neenah, 
219 
Wis. 2d 806, 580 N.W.2d 628 (1998), the court once again 
addressed whether the notice provisions conflicted with other 
statutory provisions and were thus inapplicable.  In Gillen, the 
plaintiff sought injunctive relief pursuant to § 30.294, which 
the court recognized as "expressly allow[ing] a plaintiff to 
seek immediate injunctive relief to prevent injury."  Id. at 
822.   
¶116 The Gillen court recognized that "[t]he enforcement 
procedures provided in § 30.294, are inconsistent with Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1)(b), which requires a plaintiff to provide a 
governmental body with a notice of claim, and to wait 120 days 
                                                 
41 The Auchinlek court specifically concluded that "The 
specific enforcement provisions of Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31 and 19.81 
take 
precedence 
over 
the 
general 
notice 
provisions 
of 
§ 893.80(1).  Accordingly, we conclude that actions brought 
under the open records and open meetings claims laws are exempt 
from the notice provisions of § 893.80(1)."  State ex rel. 
Auchinlek v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 597, N.W.2d 587 
(1996) (footnotes omitted).  Section 893.80 was amended to 
incorporate the Auchinlek decision.  See Wis. Stat. § 893.80(8). 
No.  2005AP2743.ssa 
 
30 
 
or until the claim is disallowed before filing an action."  Id.  
The court concluded, like in Auchinlek, that "the general 
application of § 893.80(1)(b) in this case frustrates the 
plaintiffs' specific right to injunctive relief under § 30.294."  
Id.   
¶117 Even if Wis. Stat. § 893.80 applies to UWHCA and its 
employees, the instant case is like Auchinlek and Gillen, in 
which the specific provisions in Chapter 655 and section 893.55 
supersede the general provisions of § 893.80. 
* * * * * 
¶118 In sum, I conclude that the UWHCA is a "health care 
provider" under Chapter 655 but not a "political corporation" 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.80.  The notice provisions of § 893.80 do 
not apply to a medical malpractice claim brought against the 
UWHCA and its employees.   
¶119 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
 
 
 
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