Case Title: Clark v. Connor

Citation: 1998-Ohio-385

Docket Number: 19971240

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
CLARK, APPELLANT, v. CONNOR, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Clark v. Connor (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 309.] 
Prohibition to prevent common pleas court judge from proceeding in suit 
involving a nonresident defendant — Complaint dismissed, when. 
(No. 97-1240 — Submitted May 12, 1998 — Decided July 8, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 97APD04-582. 
 
In 1996, Liqui-Box Corporation (“Liqui-Box”) filed a complaint in the 
Franklin County Common Pleas Court against appellant, Richard D. Clark.  Liqui-
Box Corp. v. Clark, Franklin C.P. No. 96CVH-12-9817.  Liqui-Box, an Ohio 
corporation with its principal place of business in Franklin County, Ohio, 
manufactures polycarbonate resin bottles for sale to others.  Liqui-Box employs a 
manufacturing process commonly referred to as “blow molding” to make 
polycarbonate resin bottles at its plants throughout the United States. 
 
Liqui-Box alleged in its complaint that Clark was employed by Liqui-Box 
or its predecessor in interest, Corco, Inc., for approximately twenty years, until 
Clark’s retirement from Liqui-Box in February 1995.  During his employment 
with Liqui-Box, Clark held various positions, including engineer and senior plant 
manager, and was involved in Liqui-Box’s blow molding operations and research 
and development.  As an employee of Liqui-Box and Corco, Clark signed 
confidentiality agreements in 1973, 1979, and 1982, in which he agreed not to 
disclose information to third persons during and after his employment relating to 
Liqui-Box and Corco’s confidential marketing and sales plans, customer lists, 
internal financial and cost data, inventions, secret processes, product formulas, 
product development, methods, and machinery.  During his employment with 
Liqui-Box and Corco, Clark was an Ohio resident. 
 
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In February 1995, Clark retired from Liqui-Box and moved to Indiana. He 
sold his Ohio residence in March 1996.  According to Liqui-Box, Clark is now 
employed as an engineer for WTR Systems International, an Illinois company.  
Like Liqui-Box, WTR Systems International and two affiliated entities are 
engaged in the business of designing and manufacturing blow molding and water 
bottling systems using polycarbonate resin.  Liqui-Box alleged that Clark was 
disclosing, misappropriating, and converting Liqui-Box’s trade secrets, in 
violation of the 1973, 1979, and 1982 employment agreements and Ohio’s 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  Liqui-Box requested an injunction to prohibit Clark 
from disclosing, misappropriating, and using Liqui-Box’s trade secrets, as well as 
damages and attorney fees. 
 
Clark filed a motion to dismiss Liqui-Box’s complaint on the basis that the 
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas lacked personal jurisdiction over him.  
Attached to his motion was an affidavit in which Clark stated that he had not had 
any contacts with or done any business in Ohio since moving to Indiana in 
February 1995.  In March 1997, appellee, Franklin County Common Pleas Court 
Judge John A. Connor II, overruled Clark’s motion to dismiss.  Judge Connor 
determined that the court had personal jurisdiction over Clark under R.C. 
2307.382(A)(1) and (A)(6), and that exercising personal jurisdiction over Clark 
did not offend constitutional due process. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Clark filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Connor from 
proceeding any further in Liqui-Box’s case, and to vacate Judge Connor’s March 
1997 order overruling Clark’s motion to dismiss Liqui-Box’s complaint.  The 
court of appeals granted Judge Connor’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss 
Clark’s prohibition complaint because it failed to state a claim upon which relief 
 
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can granted.  The court of appeals determined that Clark’s prohibition action was 
not an appropriate substitute for an appeal. 
 
The cause is now before the court upon Clark’s appeal as of right as well as 
his request for oral argument. 
__________________ 
 
James J. Schiller & Associates, James J. Schiller and Terrance L. Ryan, for 
appellant. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Anne E. Thomson, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
Oral Argument 
 
Clark requests oral argument for this appeal pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2).  
Among the factors we consider in determining whether to grant oral argument in 
appeals in which oral argument is not required is whether the case involves a 
matter of great public importance, complex issues of law or fact, a substantial 
constitutional issue, or a conflict between courts of appeals.  See State ex rel. 
McGinty v. Cleveland City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 283, 
286, 690 N.E.2d 1273, 1276. 
 
For the following reasons, oral argument is not warranted here.  First, this 
appeal does not involve a matter of great public importance.  Second, the legal and 
factual issues are not complex.  Third, while Clark raises a constitutional issue 
concerning whether the common pleas court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over him comports with due process, this issue is not substantial and can be 
resolved without oral argument.  Fourth, Clark does not assert any conflict 
 
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between courts of appeals.  Finally, Clark does not specify any reason why oral 
argument would be beneficial to a resolution of this appeal.  Id. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we deny Clark’s request for oral argument and 
proceed to the merits of his appeal. 
Prohibition 
 
Clark asserts in his propositions of law that the court of appeals erred in 
granting Judge Connor’s motion and dismissing his complaint for a writ of 
prohibition.  Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted is appropriate if, after all factual allegations of the complaint are 
presumed true and all reasonable inferences are made in relator’s favor, it appears 
beyond doubt that relator can prove no set of facts warranting relief.  State ex rel. 
Lanham v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 425, 426, 687 N.E.2d 
283, 284. 
 
Extraordinary relief in prohibition is not routinely or easily granted.  State 
ex rel. Barclays Bank PLC v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1996), 74 
Ohio St.3d 536, 540, 660 N.E.2d 458, 461.  In order to be entitled to a writ of 
prohibition, a relator must establish that (1) the court or officers against whom it is 
sought are about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of such power is 
unauthorized by law, and (3) the denial of the writ will cause injury for which no 
other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law exists.  State ex rel. White v. 
Junkin (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 335, 336, 686 N.E.2d 267, 268.  It is undisputed that 
Judge Connor overruled Clark’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 
and that he was proceeding to try Liqui-Box’s suit. 
 
As to the remaining requirements for a writ of prohibition, absent a patent 
and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a postjudgment appeal from a decision 
overruling a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction will generally 
 
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provide an adequate legal remedy, which warrants denial of the writ.  Fraiberg v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Div. (1996), 76 Ohio 
St.3d 374, 375, 667 N.E.2d 1189, 1191. 
 
Clark asserts that the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacks 
personal jurisdiction over him.  When determining whether a state court has 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, courts are obligated to 
determine (1) whether the state’s “long-arm” statute and applicable rule of civil 
procedure confer personal jurisdiction, and if so, (2) whether granting jurisdiction 
under the statute and rule would deprive the defendant of the right to due process 
of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  U.S. 
Sprint Communications Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Mr. K’s Foods, Inc. (1994), 68 
Ohio St.3d 181, 183-184, 624 N.E.2d 1048, 1051. 
 
Clark initially contends that Ohio’s long-arm statute, R.C. 2307.382, does 
not permit in personam jurisdiction to be based on a defendant’s former Ohio 
residency if the complaint’s allegations relate only to events occurring after the 
Ohio residency was terminated.  Judge Connor concluded that the common pleas 
court has personal jurisdiction over Clark pursuant to R.C. 2307.382(A)(1) and 
(A)(6).  Because Judge Connor did not hold an evidentiary hearing on Clark’s 
Civ.R. 12(B)(2) dismissal motion, Judge Connor was required to view the 
allegations in the pleadings and documentary evidence most strongly in Liqui-
Box’s favor.  Goldstein v. Christiansen (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 232, 236, 638 
N.E.2d 541, 544. 
 
R.C. 2307.382(A) provides that “[a] court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action 
arising from the person’s:  (1) Transacting any business in this state * * * [or] (6) 
Causing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act outside this state 
 
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committed with the purpose of injuring persons, when he might reasonably have 
expected that some person would be injured thereby in this state.”  See, also, 
Civ.R. 4.3(A)(1) and (A)(9). 
 
R.C. 2307.382(A)(1) and Civ.R. 4.3(A)(1) authorize a court to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant and provide for service of 
process to effectuate that jurisdiction if the cause of action arises from the 
nonresident defendant’s “[t]ransacting any business in this state.”  The phrase 
“transacting any business” is broad and encompasses more than “contract.”    
Kentucky Oaks Mall Co. v. Mitchell’s Formal Wear, Inc. (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 
73, 75, 559 N.E.2d 477, 480.  Due to the breadth of the phrase “[t]ransacting any 
business,” questions concerning the applicability of R.C. 2307.382(A)(1) and 
Civ.R. 4.3(A)(1) have been resolved on “ ‘highly particularized fact situations, 
thus rendering any generalization unwarranted.’ ”  U.S. Sprint, 68 Ohio St.3d at 
185, 624 N.E.2d at 1052, quoting 22 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1980) 430, Courts 
and Judges, Section 280. 
 
R.C. 2307.382(A)(6) and Civ.R. 4.3(A)(9) permit a court to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant and provide for service of 
process to effectuate that jurisdiction if the cause of action arises from a tortious 
act committed outside Ohio with the purpose of injuring persons, when the 
nonresident defendant might reasonably have expected that some person would be 
injured thereby in Ohio. 
 
Contrary to Clark’s assertions on appeal, considering the complaint and 
documentary evidence before Judge Connor, personal jurisdiction over Clark 
based on R.C. 2307.382(A)(1) and (A)(6) was not patently and unambiguously 
lacking.  Clark entered into contracts with Liqui-Box and its corporate predecessor 
in which he agreed not to disclose certain confidential information during and 
 
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after his employment.  All contracts were executed in Ohio between Ohio 
corporations and Clark when he was an Ohio resident.  Clark was employed by 
Liqui-Box and Corco for approximately twenty years and was an Ohio resident 
during this lengthy period.  He presumably performed in accordance with the 
agreements during his employment.  Clark, by entering into the nondisclosure 
agreements with Liqui-Box, could have reasonably expected that breaching the 
agreements by disclosing the confidential information to an Illinois company in 
the same business as Liqui-Box would injure Liqui-Box.  Similarly, in Innovative 
Digital Equipment, Inc. v. Quantum Technology, Inc. (N.D.Ohio 1984), 597 
F.Supp. 983, the federal district court determined that it had personal jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant under, among other provisions, R.C. 2307.382(A)(1) 
and (A)(6), where the Ohio plaintiff alleged that theft and conversion of its 
catalogue and customer lists occurred upon the nonresident defendant’s departure 
from employment with the Ohio plaintiff and where a secrecy and no-competition 
agreement that was allegedly breached by the nonresident defendant had been 
executed in Ohio. 
 
Clark’s contention that his departure from Ohio in 1995 and the lack of 
contacts with Ohio thereafter preclude personal jurisdiction by the common pleas 
court lacks merit.  He cites no applicable authority for this broad proposition.  In 
fact, if Clark’s contention were adopted, Ohio employees who decide to breach 
nondisclosure agreements negotiated, executed, and partially performed in Ohio 
could avoid the jurisdiction of Ohio courts by simply moving to another state.  
Neither case law nor logic dictates this unreasonable result. 
 
Clark next asserts that Judge Connor patently and unambiguously lacks 
personal jurisdiction over him in the underlying action because there do not exist 
minimum contacts between him and Ohio.  Under the second part of the personal 
 
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jurisdiction analysis, a state court may assert personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant if the nonresident possesses certain minimum contacts with 
the state so that the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.  Internatl. Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 66 
S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed 95; Goldstein, 70 Ohio St.3d at 237, 638 N.E.2d at 545.  “The 
constitutional touchstone is whether the nonresident defendant purposefully 
established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum state; purposeful establishment exists 
where, inter alia, the defendant has created continuing obligations between 
himself and residents of the forum.”  Goldstein, citing Kentucky Oaks Mall.  The 
evidence before Judge Connor indicated that Clark entered into agreements with 
Liqui-Box that created continuing obligations on his part to Liqui-Box not to 
disclose certain confidential information that he obtained during his employment 
with Liqui-Box. 
 
An in-state plaintiff’s contract with an out-of-state defendant, standing 
alone, does not establish sufficient minimum contacts to justify exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.  Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz (1985), 471 U.S. 462, 478, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2185, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, 545.  
Instead, we must evaluate “prior negotiations and contemplated future 
consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual course of 
dealing” to determine whether Clark purposefully established minimum contacts 
with the forum.  Id., 471 U.S. at 479, 105 S.Ct. at 2185, 85 L.Ed.2d at 545. 
 
Evaluation of these factors supports Judge Connor’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over Clark.  The nondisclosure agreements were presumably 
negotiated, executed, and partially performed in Ohio when the parties were an 
Ohio corporation and an Ohio resident.  See Reynolds v. Internatl. Amateur 
Athletic Federation (C.A.6, 1994), 23 F.3d 1110, 1118, citing LAK, Inc. v. Deer 
 
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Creek Enterprises (C.A.6, 1989), 885 F.2d 1293, 1300, for the proposition that the 
place where the contractual obligation is incurred is an important factor for 
determining personal jurisdiction.  This litigation directly relates to the contracts 
executed by Clark and Liqui-Box.  See Alaska Telecom, Inc. v. Schafer (Alaska 
1995), 888 P.2d 1296, 1301, where the Alaska Supreme Court found sufficient 
minimum contacts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 
who had worked for an Alaska corporation because the Alaska corporation’s 
breach of contract action directly related to the defendant’s contract not to 
compete with the Alaska corporation. 
 
In addition, exercising personal jurisdiction over Clark in the underlying 
action appears to comport with fair play and substantial justice.  Kentucky Oaks 
Mall, 53 Ohio St.3d at 77, 559 N.E.2d at 481.  As Judge Connor determined in 
overruling Clark’s motion to dismiss: 
 
“First, Defendant did engage in significant activities, which would establish 
a substantial connection and minimum contacts with Ohio.  The Defendant was 
employed and resided in Ohio for at least twenty years.  Second, Defendant had 
fair notice when he signed the employment agreement so that he might reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court in Ohio for a cause of action arising out of the 
agreement.  Third, the allegations which form the basis of the Plaintiff’s 
Complaint arose from the Defendant’s extensive business transactions in Ohio.  
Therefore, based upon the nature of Defendant’s conduct and notice, maintenance 
of this suit in Ohio would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”  See, e.g., Innovative Digital Equipment, 597 F.Supp. at 987 (“Since a 
state may assert jurisdiction over a nonresident who engages in a single isolated 
transaction in a state out of which a tort arises * * * it is not manifestly unfair and 
 
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unreasonable to expect Defendants to defend themselves in Ohio given Defendant 
Manfroni’s past relationship and Quantum’s business relationship with IDE.”). 
 
Judge Connor’s decision to exercise personal jurisdiction over Clark is 
further supported by Ohio’s unquestioned interest in enforcing the rights of an 
Ohio corporation specified in a nondisclosure agreement executed in Ohio with an 
Ohio resident, as well as the relatively minimal burden placed on Clark to defend 
himself in Ohio given modern transportation and communication.  Goldstein, 70 
Ohio St.3d at 237, 638 N.E.2d at 545.  As we emphasized in Fraiberg, 76 Ohio 
St.3d at 378, 667 N.E.2d at 1193, issuance of a writ of prohibition based on an 
alleged lack of personal jurisdiction is an extremely rare occurrence.  Cf. State ex 
rel. Connor v. McGough (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 188, 546 N.E.2d 407.  This case is 
not one of those rare cases that merits issuance of the writ. 
 
Based on the foregoing, it appears beyond doubt that Clark can prove no set 
of facts showing that the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacks 
jurisdiction over Liqui-Box’s complaint.  The court of appeals properly granted 
Judge Connor’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion and dismissed Clark’s complaint for 
extraordinary relief in prohibition.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.