Case Title: Trista Auman v. School District of Stanley-Boyd

Citation: 2001 WI 125

Docket Number: 2000AP002356-FT

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 125 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-2356-FT 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Trista Auman, a minor, by her guardians, Kevin 
Auman and Rhonda Auman, and Kevin Auman and 
Rhonda Auman, in their individual capacity,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
School District of Stanley-Boyd, Employers 
Mutual Casualty Co., Security Life Insurance 
Company of America and Clark County,  
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 27, 2001   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 2, 2001 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Chippewa   
 
JUDGE: 
Roderick A. Cameron 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
CROOKS, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs by Ann N. 
Knox-Bauer and Salm & Knox-Bauer, Stanley, and oral argument by 
Ann N. Knox-Bauer. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by Joel L. 
Aberg, Thomas J. Graham, Jr., and Weld, Riley, Prenn & Ricci, 
S.C., Eau Claire, and oral argument by Joel L. Aberg. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by George Burnett and 
Liebmann, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, S.C., Green Bay, on behalf 
of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
 
 
2001 WI 125 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound volume of the official 
reports.   
No.  00-2356-FT 
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 200) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Trista Auman, a minor, by her guardians,  
Kevin Auman and Rhonda Auman, and Kevin  
Auman and Rhonda Auman, in their  
individual capacity,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
School District of Stanley-Boyd,  
Employers Mutual Casualty Co., Security  
Life Insurance Company of America and  
Clark County,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 27, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Chippewa 
County, Roderick A. Cameron, Circuit Court Judge.  Reversed and 
remanded. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This case 
comes before this court on certification by the court of appeals 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.61 (1999-2000).1  The Circuit 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-2356-FT   
 
2 
 
Court for Chippewa County, Roderick A. Cameron, Circuit Court 
Judge, granted summary judgment to the School District of 
Stanley-Boyd, Employers Mutual Casualty Company, Security Life 
Insurance Company of America, and Clark County (collectively, 
the defendants), dismissing the complaint of Trista Auman, an 
11-year-old child, and her guardians, Kevin and Rhonda Auman 
(collectively, the plaintiffs).  The circuit court concluded 
that 
the 
suit 
was 
barred 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52, 
the 
recreational immunity statute.  We reverse the order of the 
circuit court and remand the cause for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion.   
¶2 
The only question presented in this case is one of 
statutory interpretation: Is a school district immune from 
liability 
under 
Wisconsin's 
recreational 
immunity 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52, for injuries a student suffered during a 
mandatory school recess period when the injuries were caused by 
the alleged negligent inspection and maintenance of a school 
playground and alleged negligent supervision of the student?  We 
conclude that § 895.52 does not apply to the present case and a 
cause of action is stated when a student sustains injuries on a 
school playground during a mandatory school recess period as a 
result of the school district's negligence.  Section 895.52 does 
not bar the suit because the student who is injured during a 
mandatory school recess period did not "enter" the school 
district's "property to engage in a recreational activity" as 
No. 
00-2356-FT   
 
3 
 
those words are used in § 895.52(2)(a).2  Trista entered the 
school property for educational purposes as required by the 
state's 
compulsory 
school 
attendance 
and 
truancy 
laws.3  
Furthermore, her participation in recess activities was required 
as part of the school district's curriculum.4  Therefore, Trista 
was not engaging in a recreational activity under the statute. 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52(2)(a) provides, inter alia, that 
no owner owes a duty of care "to any person who enters the 
owner's property to engage in a recreational activity."  Section 
895.52(b) provides, inter alia, that no owner "is liable for the 
death of, any injury to, or any death or injury caused by, a 
person engaging in a recreational activity on the owner's 
property." 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 118.15(1)(a), 
the 
compulsory 
school 
attendance law, provides: 
Except as provided under pars. (b) to (d) and sub. 
(4), unless the child is excused under sub. (3) or has 
graduated from high school, any person having under 
control a child who is between the ages of 6 and 18 
years shall cause the child to attend school regularly 
during the full period and hours, religious holidays 
excepted, that the public or private school in which 
the child should be enrolled is in session until the 
end of the school term, quarter or semester of the 
school year in which the child becomes 18 years of 
age. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 118.16(1)(c) defines truancy as: 
any absence of part or all of one or more days from 
school during which the school attendance officer, 
principal or teacher has not been notified of the 
legal cause of such absence by the parent or guardian 
of the absent pupil, and also means intermittent 
attendance carried on for the purpose of defeating the 
intent of § 118.15. 
4 The Stanley-Boyd Elementary Student Handbook states in 
relevant part: 
No. 
00-2356-FT   
 
4 
 
 
I 
 
¶3 
For the purposes of summary judgment, the facts are 
not in dispute.  Trista Auman, an 11-year-old child, broke her 
leg during a mandatory school recess period while sliding down a 
snow pile located on the school playground.  According to 
Trista's deposition, she was running, jumping, and sliding on 
the snow pile because it was fun.  Ms. Patricia LaMarche, a 
playground aide, stated that about three days before Trista was 
injured, the playground supervisors agreed that the snow pile 
presented a safety issue and that the children should not be 
allowed to play on it.  Nevertheless, Ms. Diana Halterman, the 
playground supervisor on duty when Trista was injured, did not 
stop Trista from sliding on the snow pile. 
¶4 
The plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the school 
district negligently inspected and maintained its premises and 
failed to provide adequate supervision during the mandatory 
recess period.  The defendants moved for summary judgment, 
claiming governmental immunity and recreational immunity.  The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
summary 
judgment 
on 
the 
ground 
of 
governmental immunity and granted summary judgment in favor of 
                                                                                                                                                             
All children are expected to go outdoors for play when 
the weather permits.  It is the responsibility of the 
parent to see that the child comes to school properly 
dressed for the season of the year.  We feel that if a 
child is well enough to come to school, he/she is well 
enough to go outdoors. 
No. 
00-2356-FT   
 
5 
 
the defendants on the ground that the recreational immunity 
statute barred the plaintiffs' claims.5   
¶5 
This court reviews the grant of summary judgment 
independent of the determination rendered by the circuit court, 
applying the same methodology as the circuit court.  Summary 
judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue about any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.6  The parties agree that for purposes of the 
summary judgment the facts are not in dispute. 
 
II 
 
¶6 
The issue presented in this case is one of statutory 
interpretation; we apply the statute to the undisputed facts.  
This court determines this question of law independent of the 
circuit court, but benefits from its analysis. 
¶7 
Section 895.52(2) of the statutes provides, in part, 
that a property owner does not owe to any person who enters the 
owner's property to engage in a recreational activity a duty to 
keep the property safe for recreational activities and is 
                                                 
5 The issue of governmental immunity was not raised by the 
parties on appeal and is not addressed by this court.  The 
circuit court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment 
on the ground of governmental immunity, concluding that whether 
the actions of the school district were discretionary and 
whether the accident in question represented a known danger were 
disputed issues of fact.   
6 Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2); Meyer v. Sch. Dist. of Colby, 226 
Wis. 2d 704, 708, 595 N.W.2d 339 (1999). 
No. 
00-2356-FT   
 
6 
 
otherwise immune from liability for injuries to any person 
engaged in recreational activities on the owner's property. 
¶8 
Section 895.52(1)(g) of the statutes sets forth a 
three-part definition of recreational activity.7  The first part 
of the section defines recreational activity as "any outdoor 
activity undertaken for the purpose of exercise, relaxation or 
pleasure, 
including 
practice 
or 
instruction 
in 
any 
such 
activity."  The second part of the statutory definition of 
recreational activity lists 29 specific activities denominated 
as recreational, including tobogganing and sledding.  The third 
part of the statutory definition broadly adds "and any other 
outdoor sport, game or educational activity." 
¶9 
It is immediately clear that sliding down a snow pile 
is not one of the activities listed in § 895.52(1)(g).  The fact 
that Trista's activity is not a listed recreational activity 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52(1)(g) provides: 
"Recreational activity" means any outdoor activity 
undertaken for the purpose of exercise, relaxation or 
pleasure, including practice or instruction in any 
such 
activity. 
 
"Recreational 
activity" 
includes 
hunting, 
fishing, 
trapping, 
camping, 
picnicking, 
exploring caves, nature study, bicycling, horseback 
riding, bird-watching, motorcycling, operating an all-
terrain vehicle, ballooning, hang gliding, hiking, 
tobogganing, sledding, sleigh riding, snowmobiling, 
skiing, skating, water sports, sight-seeing, rock-
climbing, 
cutting 
or 
removing 
wood, 
climbing 
observation towers, animal training, harvesting the 
products of nature, sport shooting and any other 
outdoor 
sport, 
game 
or 
educational 
activity. 
"Recreational activity" does not include any organized 
team sport activity sponsored by the owner of the 
property on which the activity takes place. 
No. 
00-2356-FT   
 
7 
 
does not determine whether the activity is a recreational 
activity under the statute.  The legislature recognized that it 
would be impossible to list in the statute every recreational 
activity.  The legislature therefore provided examples of the 
kinds 
of 
activities 
that 
are 
included 
as 
recreational 
activities.  The legislature also expressed its intent that 
courts interpret the statutory definition 
of 
recreational 
activity to include those activities that are substantially 
similar 
to 
the 
listed 
activities 
or 
undertaken 
under 
substantially similar circumstances as the listed activities.  
Thus, the legislature inferentially excluded activities from the 
statutory definition that lack commonality with the listed 
activities.8 
¶10 Sliding down a snow pile is, in the abstract, 
substantially similar to sledding and tobogganing, which are 
                                                 
8 Linville v. City of Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 715, 516 
N.W.2d 427 (1994). 
The legislature expressed its intent in 1983 Wis. Act 418, 
§ 1, stating: 
The legislature intends by this act to limit the 
liability of property owners toward others who use 
their 
property 
for 
recreational 
activities 
under 
circumstances in which the owner does not derive more 
than a minimal pecuniary benefit.  While it is not 
possible to specify in a statute every activity which 
might constitute a recreational activity, this act 
provides examples of the kinds of activities that are 
meant to be included, and the legislature intends 
that, where substantially similar circumstances or 
activities exist, this legislation should be liberally 
construed in favor of property owners to protect them 
from liability. 
No. 
00-2356-FT   
 
8 
 
among 
the 
29 
listed 
activities 
in 
the 
statute 
at 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g), and Trista stated she was "having 
fun."  Sliding on the snow pile is an outdoor activity and is 
undertaken for pleasure.  "With limited exception, all outdoor 
activities that children engage in during their idle hours might 
constitute a recreational activity under § 895.52(1)(g)."9  That 
Trista's activity is similar to one of the listed recreational 
activities and that Trista was having fun does not end our 
inquiry to determine the application of the recreational 
immunity statute.   
¶11 This court has wrestled with applying the recreational 
immunity statute to varied fact situations since its enactment.  
The line between recreational and non-recreational activities is 
difficult to draw under Wis. Stat. § 895.52, and the issue has 
been litigated with some frequency.10  We continue to be 
frustrated in our efforts to state a test that can be applied 
easily 
because 
of 
the 
seeming 
lack 
of 
basic 
underlying 
principles in the statute.11   
                                                 
9 Minn. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Paper Recycling of La 
Crosse, 2001 WI 64, ¶43, 244 Wis. 2d 290, 627 N.W.2d 527 
(Bradley, J., concurring). 
10 See, e.g., Minn. Fire, 2001 WI 64; Urban v. Grasser, 2001 
WI 63, 243 Wis. 2d 673, 627 N.W.2d  511; Waters ex rel. Skow v. 
Pertzborn, 2001 WI 62, 243 Wis. 2d  703, 627 N.W.2d 497; Meyer, 
226 Wis. 2d  704; Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 
Wis. 2d 624, 547 N.W.2d 602 (1996); Seivert v. Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 190 Wis. 2d 623, 528 N.W.2d 413 (1995); Szarzynski v. 
YMCA, 184 Wis. 2d 875, 517 N.W.2d 135 (1994); Linville, 184 
Wis. 2d 705.  See also cases cited in Seivert, 190 Wis. 2d at 
627 n.2. 
11 Urban, 2001 WI 63 at ¶12. 
No. 
00-2356-FT   
 
9 
 
¶12 We have recognized that each recreational immunity 
case poses an intensely fact-driven inquiry.12  We have in 
previous cases stated the test to determine a recreational 
activity in a number of different, but similar, ways.  We repeat 
the tests we have stated before.  Although the injured person's 
subjective assessment of the activity is pertinent, it is not 
controlling.13  A court must consider the nature of the property, 
the nature of the owner's activity, and the reason the injured 
person is on the property.14  A court should consider the 
totality of circumstances surrounding the activity, including 
the 
intrinsic 
nature, 
purpose, 
and 
consequences 
of 
the 
activity.15  A court should apply a reasonable person standard to 
determine whether the person entered the property to engage in a 
recreational activity.16  Finally, a court should consider 
whether the activity in question was undertaken in circumstances 
substantially similar "to the circumstances of recreational 
activities set forth in the statute."17 
                                                 
12 Urban, 2001 WI 63 at ¶12; Verdoljak, 200 Wis. 2d at 636. 
13 Minn. Fire, 2001 WI 64 at ¶¶21, 29. 
14 Minn. Fire, 2001 WI 64 at ¶23; Urban, 2001 WI 63 at ¶14; 
Meyer, 226 Wis. 2d at 712. 
15 Minn. Fire, 2001 WI 64 at ¶21; Urban, 2001 WI 63 at ¶13; 
Meyer, 226 Wis. 2d at 712; Verdoljak, 200 Wis. 2d 624; Seivert, 
190 Wis. 2d at 631; Linville, 184 Wis. 2d 705. 
16 Minn. Fire, 2001 WI 64 at ¶21; Meyer, 226 Wis. 2d at 712. 
17 Seivert, 190 Wis. 2d at 630 (quoting 1983 Wis. Act 418, 
§ 1); Minn. Fire, 2001 WI 64 at ¶20. 
No. 
00-2356-FT   
 
10 
 
¶13 In the present case it is helpful to consider the 
totality of the circumstances and whether the activity in 
question was undertaken in circumstances substantially similar 
to the circumstances of recreational activities set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52.  Trista entered the school district's 
property to attend school for educational purposes in compliance 
with Wisconsin law.  A critical circumstance is that the 
compulsory school attendance law requires that "any person 
having under control a child who is between the ages of 6 and 18 
years shall cause the child to attend school regularly during 
the full period and hours."18  An adult's failure to comply with 
the compulsory school attendance law subjects the adult to 
criminal penalties.19  Children who do not attend school are 
truants and are also subject to penalties.20  In addition, 
Trista's participation in recess was mandatory.  The school 
district required Trista to participate in recess out of doors 
as a part of its curriculum.  The circumstances surrounding 
Trista's sliding down the snow pile are not substantially 
similar to the circumstances of the voluntary recreational 
activities set forth in Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g).   
                                                 
18 See 
Wis. Stat. § 118.15(1)(a) 
(entitled 
"Compulsory 
School Attendance"). 
19 See Wis. Stat. § 118.15(5)(a); State v. Pamela White, 180 
Wis. 2d 203, 
509 
N.W.2d 434 
(1993) 
(mother 
convicted 
of 
misdemeanor for failing to take measures to assure the child's 
regular attendance at school in compliance with the compulsory 
education statute).   
20 See 
Wis. Stat. § 118.16(6)(a) 
(stating 
potential 
penalties to children for truancy). 
No. 
00-2356-FT   
 
11 
 
¶14 The defendants contend that Trista's sliding on the 
snow pile during recess at the Stanley-Boyd Elementary School 
falls within "educational activity" as that phrase is used in 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g).  But the context in which the term 
"educational activity" is used in § 895.52(1)(g) does not 
include the activities of an elementary school student during a 
mandatory school recess period while attending school on a 
compulsory basis.  An educational activity in the context of 
§ 895.52(1)(g) refers to participation in an outdoor learning 
experience voluntarily entered into by the individual. 
¶15 The defendants also argue that Trista's attendance at 
the Stanley-Boyd Elementary School where the injury occurred is 
not compulsory.  They assert that only her attendance at some 
school is compulsory.  We are not persuaded by this argument.  
The critical factor in the present case that renders her 
activity 
during 
recess 
as 
non-recreational 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52 is that Trista's attendance at some school 
is mandatory, with adverse consequences for both Trista and her 
parents for Trista's failure to attend school.   
¶16 When we apply the totality of the circumstances and 
the objectively reasonable person tests to determine whether 
Trista's activity is recreational under the statute, we conclude 
that the small part of Trista's school activity that could be 
considered "recreational" in ordinary parlance does not render 
her entering the school district's property as entering the 
property for the purposes of a recreational activity under the 
recreational immunity statute.  Under the objective reasonable 
No. 
00-2356-FT   
 
12 
 
person test, not every outdoor activity is a recreational 
activity nor is every form of child's play a recreational 
activity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52.21 
¶17 The defendants make a final argument.  They rely on 
Ervin v. City of Kenosha, 159 Wis. 2d 464, 464 N.W.2d 654 
(1991), to support their claim of immunity.  They contend that 
in Ervin the court recognized that the legislature expressly 
intended to supplant the established common law by enacting 
§ 895.52.22   
¶18 In Ervin, two minors drowned while swimming at a 
municipal beach in the City of Kenosha.  The City of Kenosha was 
not required to provide lifeguards, but nevertheless employed 
lifeguards.  The City did not train the lifeguards in rescue 
techniques or emergency care.  Ervin argued that the City of 
Kenosha was negligent in failing to train its lifeguards and 
that the lifeguards were negligent in performing their duties.23   
¶19 The 
Ervin 
court 
recognized 
that 
applying 
the 
recreational immunity statute conflicted with the City of 
Kenosha's common-law duty to provide lifeguards in a non-
negligent manner.  Nonetheless, this court concluded that the 
                                                 
21 Minn. Fire, 2001 WI 64 at ¶30. 
22 The court in Ervin stated that, although the provisions 
of Wisconsin's recreational immunity statute conflict with 
established common-law rights 
of 
injured individuals, the 
statutorily granted immunity supersedes the common law.  See 
Ervin v. City of Kenosha, 159 Wis. 2d 464, 476, 464 N.W.2d 654 
(1991).  See also 1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1. 
23 See Ervin, 159 Wis. 2d at 469-71. 
No. 
00-2356-FT   
 
13 
 
City 
of 
Kenosha 
had 
immunity 
from 
liability 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52 because the "legislature clearly expressed 
an intent to change conflicting common law" when it enacted the 
recreational immunity statute.24   
¶20 The defendants seek to apply the same reasoning in the 
present case.  They recognize that under common law, school 
districts and their employees owe schoolchildren a duty of 
reasonable care.  They argue that Wis. Stat. § 895.52 clearly 
expresses the legislature's intent to supersede the conflicting 
common law regarding the duty of reasonable care.  They further 
argue that schools want their students to go outside and play 
during recess, that immunity under § 895.52 encourages outdoor 
activity, and that a school district's liability for injuries 
sustained 
during 
recess 
could 
cause 
school 
districts 
to 
eliminate recess.  Thus the defendants conclude that the 
legislature intended § 895.52 to apply in the present case and 
that § 895.52 trumps the common law when a schoolchild engages 
in outdoor recess.   
¶21 We agree with the defendants that Wis. Stat. § 895.52 
supplants the common law, but Ervin does not govern the present 
case.  The facts of Ervin are unlike those in this case.  In 
Ervin, the boys entered the beach owned by the City of Kenosha 
to swim at their leisure.  The recreational immunity statute 
clearly identifies swimming as a recreational activity.25  The 
                                                 
24 See Ervin, 159 Wis. 2d at 476. 
25 Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g). 
No. 
00-2356-FT   
 
14 
 
boys' sole purpose in entering the City's property was to 
participate in a recreational activity listed in the statute.   
¶22 In contrast to Ervin, Trista went to school for 
educational purposes in compliance with state law.  Her 
participation in what is a "recreational activity" in common 
parlance during a mandatory school recess period does not 
convert the educational purpose of school attendance into a 
recreational activity under the statute.  Furthermore, we are 
not persuaded, as the defendants argue, that the legislature 
intended Wis. Stat. § 895.52 to encourage a mandatory recess 
outside school buildings by giving school districts immunity 
from liability for an injury to a schoolchild.  Recess is a 
long-standing school activity that predates the enactment of the 
recreational immunity statute.  No reason exists to immunize 
school districts from liability for not exercising reasonable 
care in the maintenance of school facilities or supervision of 
schoolchildren during regular school hours.  In earlier versions 
of the recreational immunity statute the legislature's focus was 
on owners opening their property for recreational purposes by 
removing the potential for liability.  This focus on opening the 
property has apparently been de-emphasized by the legislature.  
The concept of opening the property for recreational purposes 
has only limited usefulness in applying § 895.52.26  For the 
                                                 
26 Urban, 2001 WI 63 at ¶12. 
No. 
00-2356-FT   
 
15 
 
reasons set forth, we do not find Ervin persuasive authority in 
the present case.   
¶23 Applying 
our 
established 
fact-specific 
test, 
we 
conclude that the defendants in this case are not immune from 
liability under the recreational immunity statute.  We reverse 
the circuit court's order dismissing the complaint and remand 
the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this court's holding. 
By the Court.-The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Prior to 1984, the legislative intent was different.  
Recreational immunity was created by § 29.68, ch. 89, Laws of 
1963, 
which 
explained 
the 
statute 
as 
"relating 
to 
the 
limitations on liability of landowners who open private lands 
for recreational purposes."  Although the legislature redefined 
the intended scope of the statute several times, it remained 
specific to "opened" property.  See Verdoljak, 200 Wis. 2d at 
633.  The legislature repealed Wis. Stat. § 29.68 (1963) and 
enacted Wis. Stat. § 895.52 (1983).  The 1983 statute no longer 
described the recreational immunity statute as limiting the 
liability of landowners who open private lands for recreational 
purposes and focused instead on limiting the liability of a 
landowner to a person who enters the owner's property to engage 
in a recreational activity.  See Verdoljak, 200 Wis. 2d at 632-
634.   
This case once again demonstrates the need for the 
legislature 
to 
review 
this 
statute. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 13.83(1)(c)1, 13.93(2)(d); see also Minn. Fire, 
2001 WI 64 at ¶¶37-45 (Bradley, J., concurring, joined by 
Abrahamson, C.J.), ¶69 (Wilcox, J., dissenting); Waters, 2001 WI 
62 at ¶¶52-53 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
No. 00-2356.jpw 
 
1
¶24 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring).  I agree with the 
majority's reasoning and holding in this case.  I write 
separately only because I think that the majority has failed to 
discuss a particularly strong reason for not immunizing schools 
under the recreational immunity statute.  Wis. Stat. § 120.12 
(1999-2000)27 provides in part: 
 
The school board of a common or union high school 
district shall: 
 
. . .  
 
(5) REPAIR OF SCHOOL BUILDINGS. Keep the school 
buildings 
and 
grounds 
in 
good 
repair, 
suitably 
equipped and in safe and sanitary condition at all 
times.  The school board shall establish an annual 
building maintenance schedule. 
Likewise, Wis. Stat. § 121.02(1)(i) provides that "[E]ach school 
board 
shall . . . [p]rovide 
safe 
and 
healthful 
facilities . . . ." 
 
These 
two 
statutes 
demonstrate 
the 
legislature's support for upholding the duty of reasonable care 
for schools and school districts, and they bolster our refusal 
to immunize the school district from liability in the present 
situation. 
¶25 These 
statutes, 
which direct schools 
and 
school 
districts to keep their property safe and healthful, are in 
conflict with the recreational immunity statute, which would 
provide that the school, as a property owner, does not owe, "to 
any person who enters the [school's] property to engage in a 
                                                 
27 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 00-2356.jpw 
 
2
recreational activity . . . [a] duty to keep the property safe 
for recreational activities . . . [a] 
duty 
to 
inspect the 
property, . . . [or a] duty to give warning of an unsafe 
condition, 
use 
or 
activity 
on 
the 
property."  
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2). 
¶26 When statutes conflict, we must attempt to reconcile 
them if possible.  Bingenheimer v. DHSS, 129 Wis. 2d 100, 107-
08, 383 N.W.2d 898 (1986).  Here, the simplest and most obvious 
way to reconcile these statutes is to find, as the majority 
does, that the legislature could not have intended to consider 
mandatory recess a "recreational activity" under § 895.52, see 
Majority op. at ¶2, and that the recreational immunity statute 
therefore does not apply. 
¶27 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.   
¶28 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this concurrence. 
 
No. 00-2356.jpw 
 
 
1