Case Title: Smith v. Smith

Citation: 205 Or. 650, 289 P.2d 1086

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1955-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
205 Or. 650 (1955)
289 P.2d 1086
SMITH
v.
SMITH

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Submitted on briefs November 9, 1955.
Reversed with directions November 23, 1955.
*651 O.G. Larson, of Portland, for appellant.
No appearance for respondent.
REVERSED WITH DIRECTIONS.
TOOZE, J.
This is a suit for divorce, commenced by Mary Viola Smith, as plaintiff, against Raymond L. Smith, as defendant. Defendant appeared specially by motion to quash service of summons upon him. His motion was supported by affidavit; plaintiff filed a counter-affidavit. The trial court sustained the motion to quash the service and dismissed the suit. Plaintiff appeals.
On August 31, 1954, plaintiff filed in the circuit court of the state of Oregon for Multnomah county, her complaint for divorce against defendant, charging defendant with specific acts of cruel and inhuman treatment rendering her life burdensome. The complaint states a good cause of suit. Summons was forthwith issued out of said court and personally served upon defendant in Grant county, Oregon, on September *652 3, 1954, by the sheriff of Grant county, Oregon, all in manner and form as provided by law.
On September 14, 1954, defendant filed in said court and cause the following motion (omitting formal parts):
This motion was supported by an affidavit of defendant which, omitting formal parts, reads as follows:
On September 15, 1954, plaintiff filed her own affidavit in said court and cause in opposition to said motion to quash, alleging among other things the following:
On September 27, 1954, there was entered in said court and cause the following order (omitting formal parts):
It is from the foregoing order that plaintiff appeals, contending that it was error for the trial court to sustain the motion to quash service of summons and dismiss the suit, because plaintiff was a resident of Multnomah county when she filed her complaint.
ORS 14.070 provides:
1-3. That means that the suit shall be commenced and tried in the county where one of the parties at least has his or her domicile. Ordinarily, the domicile of the husband fixes that of the wife. However, when just cause exists, a wife may acquire a domicile separate from that of her husband for the purposes of jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit by her for divorce. 17 Am Jur 281, Divorce and Separation, § 254; 17 Am Jur 619, Domicil, § 46.
In Miller v. Miller, 67 Or 359, 365, 136 P 15, we quoted with approval the following statement taken from the case of Duxstad v. Duxstad, 17 Wyo 411, 100 P 112, 129 Am St Rep 1138:
4. It is universally held that in order to acquire a domicile by choice these two essentials must concur and combine: (1) residence (bodily presence) in the new locality, and (2) an intention there to remain, to the exclusion of a domicile elsewhere. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 175 Or 585, 155 P2d 293; 17 Am Jur 599, Domicil, § 16.
*656 In 17 Am Jur 603, Domicil, § 19, it is stated:
5. The facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint which, by reference are incorporated into and made a part of her affidavit in opposition to the motion to quash service of summons show a course of misconduct toward her on the part of defendant fully justifying her leaving the home of defendant and establishing a place of residence wholly apart from him. In his affidavit defendant makes no attempt to deny the charges of misconduct made against him, nor does he allege anything affirmatively that in any way questions the truth of them.
Defendant by his affidavit admits that plaintiff left his home at Izee, in Grant county, Oregon, on August 25 (1954), and he does not allege that she has ever returned to that home, or to any other place in Grant county. His statement that plaintiff still retains her residence at Izee and is not a resident or inhabitant of Multnomah county is a mere conclusion on his part.
By her counteraffidavit plaintiff definitely alleges her physical presence in Multnomah county and her intention to make that county her permanent home, to the exclusion of a residence elsewhere. She swears positively that she has no intention of ever returning to Grant county; in fact, she alleges that "under no *657 circumstances will I go back to him [the defendant] or Grant county, Oregon."
There is nothing whatever in the record that disputes the claims made by plaintiff as to her actions and intentions. At the hearing on the motion to quash service held September 15, 1954, with both plaintiff and defendant present in person, no additional sworn testimony of any kind was offered by either party. The only evidence offered (and that by defendant) consisted of a court file in a prior divorce suit between the parties (commenced by the husband) in the circuit court for Grant county, which was terminated by the reconciliation of plaintiff and defendant. That proceeding occurred in 1952. It is obvious that the record in that suit could not have anything whatever to do with the question before the court. Moreover, the file was withdrawn as an exhibit. The only evidence before us upon the question of domicile is that contained in the affidavits of the parties. From those affidavits, it is manifest that on August 27, 1954, plaintiff acquired a separate domicile in Multnomah county. Her suit for divorce was not filed until August 31, 1954, and on that day she was a resident of Multnomah county.
6. The statute above quoted does not require that one shall reside in a particular county for any definite length of time before instituting a suit for divorce, as the statute does with respect to the time of residence within the state. ORS 106.060.
In Hubner v. Hubner, 67 Or 557, 562, 136 P 667, we quoted with approval the following from 14 Cyc., p 592:
The trial court erred in sustaining the motion to quash the service of summons and in dismissing the suit. It had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties. The decree is reversed and this cause remanded with directions to vacate the order appealed from, to reinstate the cause of suit, and for such further proceedings as may be proper, not inconsistent with this opinion.
Plaintiff shall recover costs.