Case Title: VANESSA SORENSEN V. STATE FARM AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0174

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
VANESSA SORENSEN V. STATE FARM AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee2010 WY 101Case Number: S-09-0174Decided: 07/20/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
VANESSA 
SORENSEN,Petitioner,v.STATE FARM AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, as Subrogee,Respondent.

 
 
Original 
Proceeding

Petition 
for Writ of Review

District 
Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Petitioner:

R. 
Todd Ingram of Clapp, Ingram & Olheiser, P.C., Casper, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Respondent:

Billie 
Ruth Edwards of Edwards & Johnson, LLC, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Vanessa Sorensen co-owned a vehicle with 
Jean C. Larramendy III.  Jean 
Larramendy Jr. was driving the vehicle when he collided with another vehicle 
being driven by State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company's (State Farm) 
insured.  The Sorensen/Larramendy 
vehicle was uninsured at the time.    

 
 
[¶2]  State Farm filed a complaint against 
Jean Larramendy III, Jean Larramendy Jr. and Ms. Sorensen.1  As to Ms. Sorensen, State Farm alleged 
that she violated Wyoming law by failing to maintain insurance on her vehicle, 
its insureds sustained damages as a result and it was subrogated to its 
insureds' right to recover the damages from Ms. Sorensen.  Ms. Sorensen moved to dismiss the 
complaint on the ground that there is no common law duty to insure a vehicle and 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-4-103 (LexisNexis 2009), the criminal statute requiring 
motor vehicle owners to maintain liability insurance, does not create a cause of 
action for negligent failure to maintain insurance.  The district court denied the motion, 
concluding § 31-4-103 establishes the minimum standard of care and imposed a 
duty on Ms. Sorensen to maintain proper insurance.  Ms. Sorensen filed a petition for writ 
of review of the district court's order denying the motion, which this Court 
granted.  We 
reverse.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]  In her petition, Ms. Sorensen asked this 
Court to review the following issues:

 
 

A.   Whether 
Wyoming recognizes a cause of action, enforceable by private parties, for 
negligent failure to maintain liability insurance on a motor vehicle; 
and

 
 

B.   Whether, 
as a matter of law, the failure to maintain liability insurance on a motor 
vehicle could be a legal cause of injuries and damages suffered in a motor 
vehicle crash.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]  On December 3, 2004, the vehicle owned 
by Ms. Sorensen collided with the vehicle owned by State Farm's insureds.  Ms. Sorensen was not in the vehicle at 
the time.  Her vehicle was 
uninsured.  State Farm's insureds 
sustained $36,521.61 in damages as a result of the collision.  Under the terms of the uninsured 
motorist provision of its policy, State Farm was obligated to pay its insureds 
that amount. 

 
 
[¶5]  State Farm, as subrogee to its insureds' 
rights, then filed its complaint against Ms. Sorensen alleging that she was 
negligent in failing to insure the vehicle as required by Wyoming law, her 
negligence was a direct and proximate cause of its insureds' damages and it was 
subrogated to its insureds' right to recover the damages from Ms. Sorensen.  Ms. Sorensen moved to dismiss the 
complaint on the grounds that, first, § 31-4-103 does not create a private right 
of action against the owner of an uninsured vehicle for damages sustained in a 
collision caused by the driver of the uninsured vehicle and, second, her failure 
to maintain insurance coverage on the vehicle was not the proximate cause of any 
damages sustained.  State Farm 
asserted in response that § 31-4-103 created a private right of action for 
parties who sustain damages in collisions with uninsured vehicles, including 
insurance companies as subrogee of the party sustaining damages.  

 
 
[¶6]  After a hearing, the district court 
denied the motion to dismiss, holding that § 31-4-103 establishes the minimum 
standard of care and imposed a duty on Ms. Sorensen to maintain insurance on the 
vehicle involved in the collision; therefore, State Farm's complaint stated a 
claim upon which relief could be granted.  Upon entry of the order denying the 
motion to dismiss, Ms. Sorensen filed a motion pursuant to W.R.A.P. 11 
requesting the district court to certify the question to this Court.  The district court denied the motion. 
 Ms. Sorensen then filed a petition 
for a writ of review in this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 13.  We granted the petition, finding that 
the questions raised in the petition involve controlling questions of law as to 
which there are substantial bases for differences of opinion and in which an 
immediate appeal from the dismissal order may materially advance resolution of 
the litigation.  W.R.A.P. 
13.02.    

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]  The district court denied Ms. Sorensen's 
motion to dismiss pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), finding that State Farm stated 
a claim upon which relief can be granted.  
Our standards for reviewing rulings on Rule 12(b)(6) motions are well 
known:  

 
 
(1) 
we accept the facts stated in the complaint as true and view them in the light 
most favorable to the [plaintiff]; (2)  [dismissal is appropriate]  if it is 
certain from the face of the complaint that the [plaintiff] cannot assert any 
facts that would entitle him to relief; (3) we employ the same standards and 
examine the same materials as did the district court; and (4) such review is de novo.  

 
 

Dowlin 
v. Dowlin, 
2007 WY 114, ¶ 6, 162 P.3d 1202, 1204 (Wyo. 2007), quoting Becker v. Mason, 2006 WY 143, ¶ 5, 145 P.3d 1268, 1270 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]  The issue before us is whether a cause 
of action exists in Wyoming for negligent failure to maintain liability 
insurance.  More specifically, we 
are asked to decide whether a party who alleges that he sustained damages in a 
collision caused by the driver of an uninsured vehicle has, in addition to his 
cause of action against the negligent driver, a cause of action in tort against 
the vehicle's owner for negligently failing to maintain liability 
insurance.  The elements necessary 
to maintain a negligence claim in Wyoming are well-established.  A plaintiff must prove:  1) the defendant was under a duty of 
care to protect the plaintiff from injury or loss; 2) the defendant breached the 
duty owed to the plaintiff; 3) the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss; and 
4) the defendant's breach of the duty proximately caused the plaintiff's injury 
or loss.  Andersen v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 
105, ¶ 11, 49 P.3d 1011, 1014 (Wyo. 2002). 

 
 
[¶9]  In the present case, the duty alleged to 
have been owed was that of Ms. Sorensen to members of the general public to 
maintain liability insurance on her vehicle.  It is undisputed that she did not 
maintain the required insurance; therefore, if a duty is found, its breach is 
established.  The injury or loss 
alleged to have been proximately caused by the breach of the alleged duty is the 
$36,521.61 in property damage State Farm's insureds sustained in the collision 
caused by the driver of Ms. Sorensen's vehicle.  Having paid its insureds that amount 
under the uninsured motorist provision of their insurance policy, State Farm 
seeks to be subrogated to any right they would have had to recover their damages 
from Ms. Sorensen because of her failure to maintain insurance.    

 
 
[¶10]  Considering the elements necessary to 
maintain a negligence action in the context of this case, in order to withstand 
dismissal of its complaint, State Farm had to establish that:  1) Ms. Sorensen was under a duty of care 
to protect its insureds from being unable to obtain compensation for their 
damages caused in the collision through an insurance policy covering her 
vehicle; 2) she breached the duty by failing to maintain liability insurance; 3) 
State Farm's insureds suffered the damages alleged; and 4) Ms. Sorensen's breach 
of the duty to maintain liability insurance proximately caused the insureds' 
damages.  We begin our discussion 
with consideration of whether State Farm established the first element of its 
claimthat Ms. Sorensen was under a duty of care to protect its insureds from 
being unable to obtain compensation for their damages through an insurance 
policy covering her vehicle.    

 
 
[¶11]  The question of whether a duty exists 
and, if so, the scope of the duty is a question of law for the court.  Andersen, ¶ 11, 49 P.3d  at 1014, citing 
Kobos By and Through Kobos v. Everts, 
768 P.2d 534, 541 (Wyo. 1989).  
Absent a duty, there is no actionable negligence claim.  Bowen v.  Smith, 838 P.2d 186, 198 (Wyo. 
1992).  A duty may arise by 
contract, statute or the common law.  
Tidwell v. HOM, Inc., 896 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Wyo. 1995), citing Brubaker 
v. Glenrock Lodge Int'l Order of Odd Fellows, 526 P.2d 52, 58 (Wyo. 
1974).   

 
 
[¶12]  There is no contract between Ms. 
Sorensen and State Farm's insureds giving rise to a duty.  The parties agree also that there is no 
recognized common law duty to maintain insurance.  Thus, we are concerned here with whether 
the duty asserted arises by statute or whether the common law should recognize 
such a duty because the relationship of the parties is such that the law will 
impose an obligation on vehicle owners like Ms. Sorensen to act reasonably for 
the protection of others like State Farm's insureds.  Hatton v. Energy Elec. Co., 2006 WY 151, 
¶ 10, 148 P.3d 8, 13 (Wyo. 2006), quoting Thomas By Thomas v. South Cheyenne Water and 
Sewer Dist., 702 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Wyo. 1985).  In deciding this issue, we note that 
Wyoming does not have an "owner liability" statute as some states do 
establishing liability on the part of a vehicle owner for the negligence of 
anyone operating it with the owner's express or implied permission.  Gill v. Schaap, 601 P.2d 545, 547 (Wyo. 
1979).  Also, this Court has said 
the owner of a vehicle who permits another to use it for his own purposes is not 
liable for the borrower's negligence in operating it.  Jack v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Los 
Angeles, 899 P.2d 891, 893 (Wyo. 1995), quoting Sare v. Stetz, 67 Wyo. 55, 214 P.2d 486 
(Wyo. 1950).     

  

[¶13]  To determine whether the duty alleged 
arises from § 31-4-103, we apply our usual rules of statutory interpretation, 
which we have stated as follows:  

 
 
Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law.  
Our paramount consideration is the legislature's intent as reflected in 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute.  Initially, we determine whether the 
statute is clear or ambiguous.  

 
 
A 
statute is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons 
are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability.  Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it 
is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.  If we determine that a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the statute.  

 
 
In 
interpreting a statute, we will not ignore other statutory provisions pertaining 
to the same subject but will, instead, consider all such provisions in pari 
materia. 

 
 

Horse 
Creek Cons. Dist. v. State ex rel. Wyoming Attorney General, 
2009 WY 143, ¶ 14, 221 P.3d 306, 312 (Wyo. 2009) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶14]  The statute at issue in the present case 
is located in Chapter 4 of Wyoming's Motor Vehicle Act, §§ 31-4-101 through 
31-4-104 (LexisNexis 2009).  Chapter 
4 is entitled "General Offenses and Penalties."  In addition to making it a crime to fail 
to maintain liability insurance, Chapter 4 makes it unlawful to operate or 
permit the operation of a vehicle without a valid certificate of title, 
registration and license plates; alter a valid license plate; sell or transfer a 
vehicle without a certificate of title; make a false statement when applying for 
a registration or license plates; or forge or counterfeit a certificate of title 
or registration.  Chapter 4 also 
sets out penalties for each of these offenses.  

 
 
[¶15]  The provision in Chapter 4 directly at 
issue in this case states in pertinent part as follows:

 
 
§ 
31-4-103. Failure to maintain liability coverage; penalties; 
exceptions.

 
 
            
(a) No owner of a motor vehicle required to be registered shall operate 
or permit the operation of his motor vehicle without having in full force and 
effect a motor vehicle liability policy . . . .  Violation of this subsection is a 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine 
of not less than two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) nor more than seven hundred 
fifty dollars ($750.00), or both.  
On a second or subsequent violation of this subsection, the person may be 
fined not less than five hundred dollars ($500.00) nor more than one thousand 
five hundred dollars ($1,500.00), imprisoned for not more than six (6) months, 
or both.  In addition to the fine or 
imprisonment imposed for a second or subsequent violation of this subsection, 
the judge shall require the defendant to deliver the registration and license 
plates of the vehicle involved to the county treasurer for the county where the 
citation was issued, and the registration and license plates shall be held by 
the county treasurer until such time as the judge determines that the defendant 
has met all obligations imposed by law.  

            
(b) Any police officer . . . issuing a citation for any moving violation 
. . . or inspecting any vehicle, shall require the operator of any motor vehicle 
required to be registered to produce evidence of whether the operator or owner 
of the motor vehicle has in full force and effect a motor vehicle liability 
policy . . . .  If the operator 
cannot show written proof of financial responsibility, the driver shall have 
seven (7) days to produce such proof.  
Any operator or owner of a motor vehicle required to be registered who is 
not able to demonstrate evidence of compliance with subsection (a) of this 
section may be charged with violating that subsection.  Additionally, the judge may order any 
driver failing to produce written proof of financial responsibility to pay 
restitution . . . .  No operator or 
owner of a motor vehicle charged with violating this section shall be convicted 
if he produces in court one (1) of the following which was valid at the time of 
arrest or at the time the citation was issued:

            
(i) A liability insurance policy previously issued to 
him;

            
(ii) Evidence of a bond on file with the department in amounts provided 
by W.S. 31-9-102(a)(xi).

            
(c) Upon receipt of a notice of a conviction under subsection (a) of this 
section, the department shall require the person convicted to file and maintain, 
for a three (3) year period, proof of financial responsibility as required by 
W.S. 31-9-401 through 31-9-414.  
Failure to provide proof of financial responsibility within thirty (30) 
days after notification shall result in the suspension of the person's driver's 
license and nonresident operating privileges.  The suspension shall remain in effect 
until the required proof of financial responsibility is received by the 
department.

 
 
[¶16]  Giving the words in the statute their 
plain and ordinary meaning, § 31-4-103 requires vehicle owners to maintain 
liability insurance on their vehicles.  The failure to comply with the statutory 
requirement constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment, a fine, or 
both.  A second violation results in 
an increased penalty.  Unless and 
until proof of insurance is provided, the owner of an uninsured vehicle must 
surrender the vehicle registration and license plates to the court.  A police officer is authorized to 
request proof of insurance in the course of issuing a citation and, in the 
absence of such proof, charge the owner or operator with violating the 
statute.  Upon conviction of 
violating the statute, the person must file proof of financial responsibility 
with the department of motor vehicles.

 
 
[¶17]  By requiring vehicle owners to maintain 
liability insurance, § 31-4-103 reflects the legislature's intent to promote the 
public policy in favor of ensuring that all of those traveling on the roads in 
this state will be compensated for injuries they sustain in motor vehicle 
collisions.2  Nothing in the plain language of the 
statute, however, suggests that in enacting the provision the legislature 
intended to impose a new tort duty 
owed by vehicle owners to the general public to maintain insurance.  The plain language of the statute also 
does not suggest the legislature intended to provide a remedy for money damages 
for violations of the statute.  
Considering § 31-4-103 in pari materia with the other provisions in 
Chapter 4, we find no suggestion of legislative intent to create a tort duty 
giving rise to a claim for money damages.  

 
 
[¶18]  When the legislature has intended a 
statute to create a new tort duty, it either has plainly stated that a violation 
gives rise to an action for damages, see, 
for example, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-11-902(o) (LexisNexis 2009) (providing 
that any person injured by a coal mining operator's violation of state 
regulations may bring an action for damages including attorney and expert 
witness fees), or has employed language leaving no room for doubt that the 
provision modifies the common law and imposes a duty not previously recognized, 
see, for example, the Residential 
Rental Property Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-1201 through § 1-21-1211 (LexisNexis 
2009) (clearly stating that landlords have a duty to maintain leased premises in 
a fit and habitable condition).  In 
contrast, § 31-4-103 does not expressly abrogate the common law nor does it 
contain any language suggesting the legislature intended to create a tort duty 
giving rise to a claim of negligence.  
To read the statute as abrogating the common law and creating a tort duty 
would require us to presume the legislature intended that result without any 
supporting statutory language.  As 
we have said:  

 
 
It 
is not to be presumed that the legislature intended to abrogate or modify a rule 
of the common law by the enactment of a statute upon the same subject; it is 
rather to be presumed that no change in the common law was intended unless the 
language employed clearly indicates such [intent] . . . .  The rules of common law are not to be 
changed by doubtful implication, nor overturned except by clear and unambiguous 
language.  

 
 

Merrill 
v. Jansma, 
2004 WY 26, ¶ 33, 86 P.3d 270, 285 (Wyo. 2004), quoting Kaycee Land and Livestock v. Flahive, 
2002 WY 73, ¶ 9, 46 P.3d 323, 327 (Wyo. 2002).  We conclude the legislature did not 
intend § 31-4-103 to impose a tort duty actionable in negligence for money 
damages for failing to maintain liability insurance.

 
 
[¶19]  Our conclusion that the statute does not 
reflect a legislative intent to impose a tort duty for failure to maintain 
insurance, however, does not end the inquiry.  The common law is dynamic and this Court 
is at liberty to recognize new common law torts when appropriate to meet 
society's changing needs.  Greenwalt v. Ram Restaurant Corp. of Wyo., 
2003 WY 77, ¶ 12, 71 P.3d 717, 723 (Wyo. 2003).  Over the years, this Court has 
recognized new common law tort claims in a number of cases.  See, for example, Briefing.com v. Jones, 2006 WY 16, 126 P.3d 928 (Wyo. 2006), recognizing misuse or misappropriation of trade secrets as 
a common law tort; Wilder v. Cody Country 
Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211 (Wyo. 1994), recognizing a cause of action 
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 
1986), recognizing a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress; McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 
666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983), recognizing a common law tort claim against a liquor 
vendor who unlawfully sells liquor to a minor who becomes intoxicated and 
injures a third party.  We have also 
declined in a number of cases to recognize new common law tort claims.  Horn v. Wooster, 2007 WY 120, 165 P.3d 69 (Wyo. 2007), declining to recognize a cause of action in negligence by an 
attorney against his co-counsel; 
Andersen, 2002 WY 105, 49 P.3d 1011, declining to impose a duty on livestock 
owners to keep livestock off highways along unfenced posted open range; Sundown, Inc. v. Pearson Real Estate Co., 
Inc., 8 P.3d 324 (Wyo. 2000), declining to recognize a cause of action for 
negligent nondisclosure.  

 
 
[¶20]  In those cases in which we have 
recognized new duties or tort claims, we sometimes have relied upon legislative 
enactments in doing so.  Merrill, 86 P.3d  at 286.  In other cases, where there has been no 
legislative activity, we have recognized new tort claims by exercising our 
authority to shape the common law as appropriate for changing circumstances and 
the needs of society.  See, for example, McClellan, 666 P.2d 408 (judicially abrogating the common law rule that the sale of alcohol was not 
the proximate cause of injury and adopting statutory provisions prohibiting the 
sale of alcohol to minors as the standard of care) and Gates, 719 P.2d 193.  Consistent with our case law 
establishing the existence of a duty as the first element of a negligence claim, 
all of the cases in which we have considered whether to recognize a new common 
law negligence claim begin with discussion of whether a legal duty existed.      

 
 
[¶21]  In its decision letter, the district 
court began not by addressing whether a duty existed, but focused instead on 
whether § 31-4-103 established the standard of care a vehicle owner owes to 
third parties.  In deciding that the 
provision established the standard of care, the district court relied on the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (2002), which 
provides:

 
 
 The court may adopt as the standard of 
conduct of a reasonable [person] the requirements of a legislative enactment or 
an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in 
part:

            
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest 
is invaded, and

            
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, 
and

            
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, 
and

            
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the 
harm results.  

 
 
Applying 
these factors, the district court concluded § 31-4-103 was intended to protect a 
class of persons that included State Farm's insureds from suffering injury or 
loss as a result of a vehicle owner's failure to maintain liability insurance. 

 
 
[¶22] 
The difficulty with the district court's approach is that it determined the 
statute established the standard of care without first determining that a duty 
existed.  The concepts of standard 
of care and duty are not synonymous.  Hamilton v. Natrona County Educ. Ass'n, 
901 P.2d 381, 384 (Wyo. 1995).  
Before a statute can be said to establish a standard of care, there must 
be a legal duty to which the statutory standard of care can be applied. Thus, in 
deciding the issue presented, we address first whether § 31-4-103 should be 
construed to establish a common law duty actionable in negligence for failure to 
maintain liability insurance.  
Stated more broadly, we consider whether such a relationship exists 
between members of the public and a vehicle owner that the law will impose a 
duty actionable in negligence on the latter to maintain insurance for the 
protection of the former.  Killian v. Caza Drilling, Inc., 2006 WY 
42, ¶ 8, 131 P.3d 975, 980 (Wyo. 2006).  
In deciding that question, we consider the following 
factors:

 
 
 (1) the foreseeability of harm to the 
plaintiff, (2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct 
and the injury suffered, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered 
injury, (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, (5) the policy 
of preventing future harm, (6) the extent of the burden upon the defendant, (7) 
the consequences to the community and the court system, and (8) the 
availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.  

 
 

Gates, 
719 P.2d  at 196.  

 
 
[¶23]  Weighing these factors, this Court has 
reached varying results when deciding whether the law supports the imposition of 
a new tort duty.  In Gates, we held Wyoming law recognized a 
cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress because it was 
foreseeable that a boy's family would experience mental shock upon arriving on 
the scene shortly after a negligent driver struck and severely injured the boy 
while he was riding his bicycle; the degree of mental shock the family members 
suffered was certain; sufficient moral blame attached to the negligent driver to 
warrant allowing the family members to recover for the shock; and the impact of 
recovery on defendants, the insurance industry, and the public would be 
relatively minor. 

 
 
[¶24]  In Pickle v. Board of County Comm'rs of Platte 
Co., 764 P.2d 262, 265 (Wyo. 1988), we concluded the board of county 
commissioners owed subdivision applicants a duty to exercise reasonable care in 
processing and reviewing their application.  Weighing the Gates factors, we said: 

 

It 
was clearly foreseeable that appellants could suffer injury if the Board allowed 
the subdivider to install an inadequate septic system, and the Board's acts or 
omissions in the subdivision review process were sufficiently close to the 
injury suffered by appellants.  The 
Board has not suggested that plaintiffs suffered no injury.  With respect to moral blame, the Board's 
purported failure to adequately process the subdivision application evokes 
something less than moral outrage.  
On the other hand, it is likely that future harm could be prevented by 
the imposition of a duty of care in this instance.  The burden on the defendant is slight--a 
duty to act reasonably is surely not onerous and is commonly applied to a wide 
range of activities.  The 
consequences to the community and the court system are difficult to predict; 
suffice it to say that we do not envision a great number of plaintiffs racing to 
the courts to file similar claims following the publication of this 
opinion.  The availability, cost and 
prevalence of insurance are valid concerns, but in this case they are not 
compelling.  As we explained below, 
the possibility of recovery in this case depends upon the existence of 
insurance.

            

Id.

 
 
[¶25]  In Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 746 
(Wyo. 1999), we held that a collection company owed a duty of care to employees 
when collecting, handling, and processing urine specimens for substance abuse 
testing.  Weighing the Gates factors, we concluded the company 
could foresee that improper collection and handling could contribute to a false 
positive result and injure an employee; the company could foresee that failing 
to inform an employer about proper interpretation and procedures when positive 
results occur could result in injury to an employee; the employee's termination 
was closely connected to the collection company's conduct; the employee was 
terminated; sufficient moral blame attached to the company's conduct because it 
benefited financially from providing the services, had direct control over the 
procedures used, had the ability to hire and train personnel to perform the 
services and could contract with the employer to ensure test results were 
properly interpreted; and holding the company accountable would likely prevent 
future harm and would not unduly burden the court system.  Id. at 745-46.  

 
 
[¶26]  Weighing these same factors in Andersen, we declined to recognize a 
duty on the part of a livestock owner to prevent livestock from wandering onto 
public highways in posted open range.  
We said:  motorists on such 
highways have a greater capacity to foresee the potential danger because open 
range signs are posted and the motorist has the opportunity to control the 
vehicle; there is little connection between a livestock owner grazing cattle on 
posted open range and a collision between a motorist and livestock; the exercise 
of the right to pasture cattle on open range is not the kind of conduct invoking 
an expanded duty of care essentially nullifying the open range doctrine; the 
plaintiffs' injuries were certain; no moral blame attaches to a livestock owner 
legally pasturing his cattle on open range; future harm could be prevented only 
by fencing, which would nullify the open range doctrine; imposing a duty on 
livestock owners to fence in their cattle would be a substantial burden; there 
are a small number of motorist/livestock collisions resulting in injury and they 
are a small percentage of all motorist collisions; insurance is likely available 
to livestock owners at a high cost while affordable insurance spreading the risk 
among a broad pool is widely available to motorists.  Andersen, ¶ 44, 49 P.3d  at 
1025-1026.  

 
 
[¶27]  In Erpelding v. Lisek, 2003 WY 80, ¶¶ 
19-29, 71 P.3d 754, 758-59 (Wyo. 2003), applying the Gates factors, we held that professional 
counselors hired by an employer to perform a psychological evaluation of an 
employee for the benefit of the employer owed no duty to the employee. We 
concluded:  it was not necessarily 
foreseeable that the counselor's evaluation would result in the employee's 
dismissal; the counselor's evaluation was not closely connected to the dismissal 
because several other factors influenced the employer's decision to dismiss the 
employee; it was certain the employee lost his job; there was no evidence the 
counselor's evaluation involved misconduct so as to justify a finding of moral 
blame; wrongful termination actions provide sufficient incentive to employers to 
hire competent counselors and prevent future harm; imposing a duty to an 
employee would place a substantial burden on counselors, impacting their 
objectivity; the potential for a stream of litigation from imposing a new duty 
poses substantial consequences to the community and court system.      

 
 
[¶28]  With these sample cases in mind, we turn 
to consideration of whether the parties' relationship in the present case is 
such that the law ought to impose a duty on Ms. Sorensen for the benefit of 
State Farm's insureds.  Beginning 
with the first Gates factor, we 
conclude it was not necessarily foreseeable that Ms. Sorensen's failure to 
maintain liability insurance would result in State Farm's insureds being struck 
by a negligent driver and being unable to obtain compensation for their damages 
from him.  Ms. Sorensen could not 
reasonably foresee whether the driver would cause a collision or whether he was 
insured or otherwise financially able to pay for the damages he caused.  The first Gates factor does not weigh in favor of 
recognizing a tort duty to maintain liability insurance.  

 
 
[¶29]  We consider next the closeness of any 
connection between the damage State Farm alleged its insureds sustained and Ms. 
Sorensen's failure to maintain liability insurance.  The damage State Farm alleged in its 
complaint was the $36,521.61 in property damages to its insureds' vehicle.  These damages were closely connected 
with the driver's failure to exercise reasonable care in operating Ms. 
Sorensen's vehicle and his failure to maintain his own liability insurance or 
otherwise pay for the damages he caused.  
They were not connected to Ms. Sorensen's failure to maintain insurance. 
 As with the first factor, the 
second Gates factor weighs against 
recognizing a tort duty.  

 
 
[¶30]  The parties do not dispute for purposes 
of deciding the issues presented that State Farm's insureds sustained damages to 
their car in the collision with Ms. Sorensen's vehicle.  The third Gates factor is satisfied.      

 
 
[¶31]  For purposes of the fourth factor, we 
have said that serious misconduct may increase the scope of the persons who are 
entitled to protection afforded by the imposition of a duty.  Erpelding, ¶ 25, 71 P.3d  at 759.  We also have said: 

 

Moral 
blame generally results from situations in which the defendant had direct 
control over establishing and ensuring proper procedures to avoid the harm 
caused or where the defendant is the party best in the position to prevent the 
injury. 

 
 

Larson 
v. Banner Health System, 
2003 WY 167, ¶ 30, 81 P.3d 196, 205 (Wyo. 2003).  The driver of a vehicle is in the best 
position to prevent damages caused by a collision.  The vehicle owner is in the position to 
prevent the damages that may result from a lack of insurance.  However, the prevalence of uninsured 
motorist coverage reduces the chance of such harm.  Any moral blame attached to Ms. 
Sorensen's conduct is not of sufficient magnitude to entitle State Farm's 
insureds to the protection afforded by imposing a new tort duty to maintain 
liability insurance.  This factor 
weighs against imposing a duty to maintain insurance.

 
 
[¶32]  The fifth Gates factor looks to the policy of 
preventing future harm.  Imposing a 
tort duty to maintain liability insurance might prevent some vehicle owners from 
failing to maintain insurance.  However, criminal sanctions are likely 
more effective in encouraging owners to obtain the required insurance. The 
legislature has also acted to prevent future harm by requiring liability 
insurance policies for bodily injury or death delivered or issued for delivery 
to Wyoming to include an uninsured motorist provision.  See ¶ 17, n.2 above.  The fifth factor does not warrant 
imposing a duty actionable in tort to maintain liability 
insurance.

 
 
[¶33]  Looking at the sixth factor, the burden 
placed on vehicle owners to maintain liability insurance is arguably relatively 
minor and we have said a defendant must pay for his wrongs.  Gates, 719 P.2d  at 197.  However, the legislature has imposed a 
penalty for the wrong Ms. Sorensen is alleged to have committed.  We are not persuaded that such a legal 
relationship exists between the owner of an uninsured vehicle and those harmed 
by another's negligent operation of the vehicle to warrant imposing the burden 
on the owner to pay for the independent wrongs of the operator.  Although there may be positive 
consequences from recognizing a tort duty to maintain insurance actionable in 
negligence, we are not convinced they outweigh the negative consequences of 
imposing tort liability on one individual for the more direct negligence of 
another.    

 
 
[¶34]  The final factor requires consideration 
of the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk 
involved.  In this case, there is 
insurance covering the risk involved.  
The insurance policy State Farm issued to its insured entitled the 
insured to uninsured motorist coverage in the event of a collision with an 
uninsured vehicle.  The premiums the 
insured paid for the policy undoubtedly were based in part on the fact that it 
included uninsured motorist coverage.  
Given the availability of insurance to cover the damages caused in the 
collision, the final Gates factor 
does not weigh in favor of creating of a new tort duty on the basis of § 
31-4-103.     

 
 
[¶35]  As we have said before, duty is an 
expression of the sum total of those policy considerations that lead the law to 
say the plaintiff is entitled to protection.  Andersen, ¶ 44, 49 P.3d  at 1024, quoting 
Gates, 719 P.2d  at 196.  Absent a duty, there is no actionable 
negligence claim.  Bowen, 838 P.2d  at 198.  Having balanced the factors set out in 
Gates for determining whether or not 
recognition of a tort duty is appropriate, we decline to recognize a new common 
law cause of action by a party sustaining damages in a motor vehicle collision 
against the owner of a vehicle involved in the collision for negligent failure 
to maintain liability insurance.  

 
 
[¶36]  We are not alone in reaching this 
result.  Courts in other states have 
likewise rejected claims arising out of motor vehicle collisions against vehicle 
owners for failure to maintain liability insurance, although they have reached 
that result through different reasoning.  
In Branscumb v. Freeman, 200 S.W.3d 411 (Ark. 2004), for example, the Arkansas Supreme Court declined to 
impose civil liability on a motor vehicle owner solely for failing to insure his 
or her vehicle in part because the owner's "failure to insure the vehicle could 
never be the proximate cause of the accident and resulting injuries."  Id. at 416.  See also Palermo v. Faure, 1996 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 
668, holding that the violation of the mandatory insurance statute was not the 
proximate cause of the harm another sustained in a collision with the uninsured 
vehicle, and State Farm Ins. Co. v. 
Wood, 567 N.E.2d 1040, 1041 (Ohio Ct. App.), holding the violation of the 
mandatory insurance statute was not the proximate cause of the damage suffered 
by State Farm's insured, to whose rights State Farm was subrogated.3  

 
 
[¶37]  Similarly, in Hondros v. Morton, 1995 Del. Super. 
LEXIS 209 (Del. Super. Ct. May 3, 1995), the court held the causal connection 
between an owner's failure to insure her vehicle and the medical bills another 
incurred in a collision involving the vehicle was too remote to constitute 
proximate cause.  The Hondros court also concluded the 
legislature did not intend the mandatory insurance statute to protect third 
parties from medical expenses occurring as a result of a violation of the 
statute.  In Wise v. Crump, 978 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1998), the court declined to recognize a cause of action under the 
financial responsibility statute, stating:

 
 
While 
the statute is silent on the existence of a private cause of action, it does 
specify that any person who violates the statute is guilty of a criminal act, 
namely a class C misdemeanor.  When 
the legislature has established other means of enforcement of a statute, we will 
not recognize a private civil action unless such appears by clear implication to 
have been the legislative intent.  Here, instead of subjecting the vehicle 
owner to civil liability, the General Assembly has chosen to criminalize the 
failure to maintain financial liability.  
On this basis, we see no clear implication to create a private cause of 
action.  

 
 
(Citations 
omitted).

     

[¶38]  Our determination that § 31-4-103 does 
not give rise to a cause of action in negligence for failure to maintain 
liability insurance is based primarily on our conclusion that neither the 
statute nor the common law impose a tort duty on vehicle owners owed to the 
general public.  Because there is no 
duty, there is no actionable claim for negligence, and a discussion of the issue 
of proximate cause is not required.  
We note, however, our agreement with the cases cited in the forgoing 
paragraphs in which other state courts concluded the failure to maintain 
insurance was not the proximate cause of the injury.  We note further that Wyoming, like Ohio, 
follows the economic loss rule, which bars recovery in tort when a plaintiff 
claims purely economic damages unaccompanied by physical injury to persons or 
property.  Rissler & McMurry v. Sheridan Area Water 
Supply Joint Powers Bd., 929 P.2d 1228, 1234 (Wyo. 1996).  Therefore, as in Hundemer, to the extent the injury State 
Farm alleged was its insureds' inability to recover under an insurance policy 
issued to Ms. Sorensen, the injury is purely economic and is prohibited under 
the economic loss rule.              

 
 
[¶39]  Reversed and remanded with instructions 
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1On State Farm's motion, the district court dismissed the Larramendys and 
the caption was reformed to reflect Ms. Sorensen as the only 
defendant.

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-10-101 (LexisNexis 2009) further demonstrates the 
legislative intent to promote this policy by requiring all insurance liability 
policies for bodily injury or death delivered or issued for delivery in Wyoming 
to include uninsured motorist coverage.  
Although the provision authorizes the named insured to reject the 
uninsured motorist coverage, it still reflects the legislature's efforts to 
protect those traveling in Wyoming from injuries sustained in motor vehicle 
collisions for which there is no means of compensation.   The section provides as 
follows:

 
 
§ 31-10-101. Required coverage;  
rejection

 
 
            
No policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law 
for bodily injury or death suffered by any natural person arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued 
for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or 
principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or 
supplemental thereto, in limits for bodily injury or death as provided by W.S. 
31-9-102(a)(xi), under provisions approved by the insurance commissioner for the 
protection of persons insured thereunder or legally entitled to recover damages 
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom.  The named insured may reject the 
coverage.  Unless the named insured 
requests the coverage in writing, the coverage need not be provided in or 
supplemental to a renewal policy where the named insured had rejected the 
coverage in connection with the policy previously issued to him by the same 
insurer.

 
 

3A different Ohio court disagreed with Wood.  In Fontaine v. Hairston, 2000 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 414 (Ohio Ct. App.), the court characterized the "injury" as the inability 
to be compensated, not the actual collision, and concluded the injury was 
directly related to the duty imposed by the statute.  Therefore, the court concluded, the 
breach of the duty was the proximate cause of the injury.  More recently, however, the Fontaine analysis was rejected by yet 
another Ohio court in Hundemer v. 
Partin, 2007 Ohio 5631 (Ohio Ct. App.) in which the court said:  

 
 
If the inability to recover under the statute is the injury . . ., the 
injury is purely economic and the claim is prohibited under the economic loss 
rule [applicable in Ohio].  On the 
other hand, if the accident itself is the injury the failure to maintain 
insurance in compliance with the statute is not the proximate cause of the 
injury.