Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE CANCELLATION DEED FROM LEWEN BILL STREET, a/k/a LEWEN B. STREET, JR. V. WILLIAM CLARK STREET; JACQUELINE LOUISE MENKE; and JONATHAN RAY MENKE

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0107

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE CANCELLATION DEED FROM LEWEN BILL STREET, a/k/a LEWEN B. STREET, JR. V. WILLIAM CLARK STREET; JACQUELINE LOUISE MENKE; and JONATHAN RAY MENKE2009 WY 85211 P.3d 495Case Number: S-08-0107Decided: 07/01/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE CANCELLATION DEED FROM LEWEN BILL STREET, a/k/a LEWEN B. 
STREET, JR.,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.WILLIAM CLARK 
STREET; JACQUELINE LOUISE MENKE; and JONATHAN RAY 
MENKE,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Patrick 
Dixon of Chapin & Dixon, LLP, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Cameron 
S. Walker of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After Lewen Bill 
Street (appellant) became extremely ill and hospitalized, he entered into a 
number of transactions conveying items of personal and real property to his 
children.  When the appellant 
recovered, he claimed that he had no memory of the conveyances.  He brought a declaratory judgment action 
to have the transactions set aside, asserting that they were invalid as he 
lacked the requisite mental capacity.  
The district court upheld the validity of the transactions, finding that 
the appellant was mentally competent at the time the documents were 
executed.  We will affirm the 
district court's decision.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The overriding 
issue in this appeal is whether the district court's finding that the appellant 
possessed the necessary mental capacity to make the conveyances was clearly 
erroneous or contrary to law.  The 
appellant breaks that issue down into four sub-issues:

 
 

1.    
Did 
the district court improperly apply a presumption of validity to the notarized 
deed?

 
 

2.    
Did 
the district court fail to apply the correct standard for the determination of 
capacity to execute a deed?

 
 

3.    
Did 
the district court apply the proper burden of proof?

 
 

4.    
Were 
the district court's factual findings clearly erroneous?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The appellant 
has four children:  William C. 
Street, Clyde R. Street, Debra Herrera, and Jackie Menke.  During most of his life, the appellant 
lived on Casper Mountain and owned real and personal property there.  He owned a one-acre lot on which his 
house sat (Tract 3).  He also owned 
a barn and land across the street on a similar parcel (Barn Parcel).  Tract 3 and the Barn Parcel were part of 
the Wa Wa Subdivision.  The 
appellant owned a six-eighths interest in a pipeline that distributed water to 
the Wa Wa Subdivision (Wa Wa Pipeline).  Immediately adjacent to these properties 
he owned an 18½ acre tract (18½ acre tract).  Finally, he owned a one-quarter 
undivided interest in a contiguous 460 acre tract of undeveloped land on Casper 
Mountain (Homestead).

 
 
[¶4]      On November 21, 
2004, the appellant became gravely ill and was admitted to the Wyoming Medical 
Center with what appeared to be pneumonia.  
He was then transferred to the intensive care unit (ICU) with symptoms of 
congestive heart failure.  His 
condition improved and on December 6, 2004, he was transferred to the 
transitional care unit, with anticipation that he might go home within one or 
two weeks.  The next day, the 
appellant conveyed Tract 3 to himself and Debra as joint 
tenants.

 
 
[¶5]      On December 11, 
2004, the appellant's condition deteriorated and he once again was admitted to 
the ICU with a diagnosis of respiratory failure secondary to severe congestive 
heart failure secondary to severe aortic regurgitation.  That evening the family was told that the 
appellant's heart condition was inoperable, that he was terminal, and that he 
had a 5% chance of survival that night.  The appellant did survive the night and 
returned to the medical floor where he remained until December 21, 2004, when he 
was transferred to the Central Wyoming Hospice for end of life care.  The day before the appellant was 
transferred to the hospice, he conveyed the Barn Parcel to 
Debra.

 
 
[¶6]      According to 
nurses' notes and other medical records the appellant's health continued to 
improve while at the hospice.  On 
December 27, 2004, the appellant signed a bill of sale conveying his interest in 
the Wa Wa Pipeline to William.  On 
January 7, 2005, the appellant conveyed the 18½ acre tract to William and 
Debra.  On that same day, the 
appellant conveyed his one-quarter undivided interest in the Homestead to 
William, Jackie and Clyde, one-third each.  
The appellant was discharged from the hospice on March 18, 
2005.

 
 
[¶7]      On March 9, 2006, 
the appellant filed a petition for declaratory judgment naming three of his 
children, William, Clyde, and Jackie as defendants.1  In his petition, the appellant requested 
that title to the Homestead property be quieted in his favor and the transfer to 
William, Clyde and Jackie be set aside.  
As grounds for his petition, the appellant alleged that he was not 
competent to execute the documents transferring the property.  On January 9, 2008, the appellant moved 
to amend the petition, adding a claim that the bill of sale transferring the Wa 
Wa Pipeline to William was invalid, again on the ground that he lacked mental 
capacity to make the conveyance.  
That motion to amend was granted by oral ruling.

 
 
[¶8]      A bench trial 
commenced on January 14, 2008, and continued for three days.  On February 6, 2008, the district court 
issued an oral ruling finding the appellant failed to show "by a preponderance 
of the evidence that at the time the deeds in question and the bill of sale in 
question were executed, that [the appellant] lacked capacity to understand in 
accordance with the requirements under Wyoming law."  A judgment in favor of the appellees was 
entered on February 20, 2008, affirming the validity of the deed to the 
Homestead property and the bill of sale for the Wa Wa Pipeline.  This appeal timely 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]                              
After a bench trial, we review the trial court's factual findings under a 
clearly erroneous standard and its legal conclusions de novo.  Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel 
Corp., 2003 WY 165, ¶ 13, 
81 P.3d 215, 218 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Rennard v. Vollmar, 977 P.2d 1277, 1279 (Wyo. 1999)). 
We do not substitute ourselves for the trial court as a finder of facts; 
instead, we defer to the trial court's findings unless they are unsupported by 
the record or erroneous as a matter of law. Deroche v. R.L. Manning 
Co., 737 P.2d 332, 336 
(Wyo. 1987).  Although the factual 
findings of a trial court are not entitled to the limited review afforded a jury 
verdict, the findings are presumptively correct. Piroschak v. Whelan, 2005 WY 26, ¶ 7, 106 P.3d 887, 890 
(Wyo. 2005).

 
 

This 
Court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record, but we 
do not reweigh the evidence. Forshee, et ux. v. Delaney, et ux., 2005 WY 103, ¶ 6, 118 P.3d 445, 448 
(Wyo. 2005). Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess 
the credibility of the witnesses. We accept the prevailing party's evidence as 
true and give to that evidence every favorable inference which may fairly and 
reasonably be drawn from it. Harber v. Jensen, 2004 WY 104, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d 57, 60 
(Wyo. 2004) (quoting Life Care Centers of America, Inc. v. Dexter, 2003 WY 38, ¶ 7, 65 P.3d 385, 389 
(Wyo. 2003)).  Findings may not be 
set aside because we would have reached a different result. Harber, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d  at 60 (citing 
Double Eagle Petroleum & Mining Corp. v. Questar Exploration & 
Production Co., 2003 WY 
139, ¶ 6, 78 P.3d 679, 681 (Wyo. 2003)). A finding will only be set aside if, 
although there is evidence to support it, this Court on the entire evidence is 
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. 
 Mullinnix LLC v. HKB Royalty 
Trust, 2006 WY 14, ¶ 12, 
126 P.3d 909, 916 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 

Snelling 
v. Roman, 
2007 WY 49, ¶¶ 7-8, 154 P.3d 341, 345 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   The prevailing question in this 
appeal is whether the appellant had the requisite mental capacity to execute the 
documents conveying his property.  
The burden to show a lack of mental capacity is on the party challenging 
the validity of the deed.  Strom v. Felton, 302 P.2d 917, 
922 (Wyo. 1956).  The standard 
for determining mental capacity is well established:

 
 
Testator 
must have sufficient strength and clearness of mind and memory, to know, in 
general, without prompting, the nature and extent of the property of which he is 
about to dispose, and nature of the act which he is about to perform, and the 
names and identity of the persons who are to be the objects of his bounty, and 
his relation towards them.  He must 
have sufficient mind and memory to understand all of these facts, and to 
comprehend these elements in their relation to each other, and a charge, in 
negative form, that capacity is lacking if testator is not able to know all of 
these facts, is erroneous, since he lacks capacity if he is unable to understand 
any one of them. He must be able to appreciate the relations of these factors to 
one another, and to recollect the decision which he has 
formed.

 
 

In 
re Estate of Morton, 
428 P.2d 725, 729 (Wyo. 1967).  
"In judging a grantor's capacity to execute a deed, the point of time to 
be considered is the time of the execution of the deed."  23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 23 (2002); see also In re Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo. 1988); In re Estate of 
Schlueter, 994 P.2d 937, 939 (Wyo. 2000).  Mental incapacity is not always 
permanent and a person may have lucid moments or intervals when that person 
possesses the necessary capacity to convey property.  See Schlueter, 994 P.2d  at 940. 

 
 
The 
Wyoming court adheres to the general principle that "Mere weakness of body or 
mind, or of both, do not constitute what the law regards as mental incompetency 
sufficient to render a contract voidable.  * * *  A condition which may be described by a 
physician as senile dementia may not be insanity in a legal sense."  Kaleb v. Modern Woodmen of America, 51 
Wyo. 116, 64 P.2d 605, 607 [(1937)].

 
 

Cundick 
v. Broadbent, 383 F.2d 157, 160 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 948, 88 S.Ct. 
1037 (1968).

 
 
1.   Did the district court improperly 
apply a presumption of validity to the notarized 
deed?

 
 
[¶11]   We have held that a presumption of 
testamentary capacity attaches to a properly executed will.  Schlueter, 994 P.2d  at 939; Roosa, 753 P.2d  at 1032; Morton, 428 P.2d  at 729.  However, we have not recognized the same 
presumption of validity in an inter vivos 
conveyance, such as the deeds and bill of sale here.  The appellant contends that the district 
court improperly applied such a presumption, quoting the following language from 
the district court's oral ruling:

 
 
The 
Court and the parties have also noted that "Courts recognize a presumption of 
testamentary capacity, which attaches to a duly executed and attested will, 
unless the testator's incompetency has been established by proof or admission." 
 That's In Re Estate of Schlueter, . . . found 
at 994 P.2d 937 at 939.

 
 
 [¶12]  The appellees respond that the district 
court did not apply a presumption of validity.  Rather, the appellees contend that when 
the district court made the above statement, it was merely reciting the 
Stipulated Conclusions of Law submitted by the parties, which is why the 
statement begins "The Court and the parties have also noted that . . . ."  The appellees insist that nothing in the 
record suggests that the district court premised its decision upon a presumption 
that the deed was valid.

 
 
[¶13]   Our review of the district court's 
holding supports the appellees' position.  
The district court clearly articulated the proper legal 
standard:

 
 
            
The standard that this Court must apply in this matter is noted by the 
Supreme Court in, In re: Estate of 
Morton.  And it's noted that, 
"One who seeks to challenge the validity of a deed or will has the burden of 
proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence the lack of testamentary 
capacity."

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
A 
competent grantor is essential for a proper deed.  When it can be established that a 
grantor lacked legal capacity to make a conveyance, his purported deed may be 
avoided or set aside or regarded as null and of no consequence in 
law.

 
 
            
One who lacks testamentary capacity also lacks the necessary capacity to 
execute a deed.  A deed may be 
deemed invalid and canceled in equity on the ground of mental incapacity if the 
grantor is shown to be entirely without an understanding of the deed at the time 
of the execution.

 
 
Further, 
nothing in the language of the district court's holding indicates that it 
applied a presumption of validity when determining whether the appellant had the 
requisite mental capacity to execute the deed.

 
 
[I]n 
looking at the medical records and in considering the standards that this Court 
must apply -- and I've also reviewed In 
re: Estate of Short, found at 785 P.2d 1167; as well as the Estate of Waters at 629 P.2d 470; and In re: Estate and Guardianship of 
Andrews, found at 39 P.3d 1021.

 
 
The 
Court concludes that there has not been a showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence that at the time the deeds in question and the bill of sale in question 
were executed, that [the appellant] lacked capacity to understand in accordance 
with the requirements under Wyoming law.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
That 
is how I find the evidence to be in this case.  And for those reasons, I would find that 
a judgment in favor of the defendants should be entered in this matter; that the 
plaintiff has failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence that at the 
time the deeds and the bill of sale in question were executed that he was 
incompetent.

 
 
We 
find that the district court did not apply a presumption of validity when 
reviewing and upholding the transactions at issues here.  

 
 
2.   Did the district court fail to 
apply the correct standard for the determination of capacity to execute a 
deed?

 
 
[¶14]   The appellant asserts that when the 
district court determined that he possessed mental capacity, it "overlooked the 
requirement that the grantor must have the ability to recollect the decisions 
which he has made."  Essentially, 
the appellant argues that for a deed to be valid, the grantor must have the 
present ability to recollect the decisions he made when he executed the 
deeds.  In support, the appellant 
quotes and emphasizes the following from In re Estate of 
Morton:

 
 
He 
must have sufficient mind and memory 
to understand all of these facts, and to comprehend these elements in their 
relation to each other, and a charge, in negative form, that capacity is lacking 
if testator is not able to know all of these facts, is erroneous, since he lacks 
capacity if he is unable to understand any one of them.  He must be able to appreciate the 
relations of these factors to one another, and to recollect the decision which he has 
formed.

 
 

Morton, 
428 P.2d  at 729 (emphasis added).  
The appellant claims to have limited recollection of many of the events 
that occurred while he was hospitalized and during his stay at the hospice and 
"absolutely no memory of any of the conveyances made during his illness."  As such, the appellant insists that the 
conveyances were invalid.    

 
 
[¶15]   The appellant's argument is simply 
incorrect.  As we noted above, when 
determining a grantor's mental capacity, the point of time to be considered is 
the time of execution of the deed.  See supra ¶ 10.  We found no authority to support the 
proposition that post-execution memory is a requirement to a determination of 
mental capacity.  The appellee aptly 
points out that such a rule would create legal chaos, as the nursing homes of 
this country are full of individuals who have no recollection of wills or deeds 
they signed.

 
 
3.   Did the district court apply the 
proper burden of proof?

 
 
[¶16]   In this issue, the appellant urges 
this Court to address a question that was not presented to the district court  
that is whether the conveyances should be set aside because the appellant was 
subjected to undue influence.  The 
appellant raises this argument on appeal because unlike the analysis of mental 
capacity, when challenging a conveyance on grounds of undue influence, the 
burden of proof may shift to the recipient of the property to prove that the 
transaction was valid. 

 
 
Once 
the person who is seeking to void the transaction on the basis of undue 
influence has established that a confidential relationship existed between the 
grantor and the grantee, the burden of proof shifts to the recipient of the 
property to prove that the transaction was fair and conducted in good 
faith.

 
 

Krafczik 
v. Morris, 
2009 WY 53, ¶ 20, 206 P.3d 372, 377 (Wyo. 2009), quoting Marchant v. 
Cook, 967 P.2d 551, 557 (Wyo. 1998); In re Estate of Short, 785 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Wyo. 
1990).  The appellant contends that 
permitting him to argue undue influence on appeal (thereby shifting the burden 
to the appellees to prove that the transactions were proper) is appropriate 
because the questions of mental capacity and undue influence are so closely 
related.

 
 
[¶17]   With the exception of certain 
jurisdictional or fundamental issues, we will not consider issues raised for the 
first time on appeal.  Meima v. Broemmel, 2005 WY 87, 
¶ 56, 117 P.3d 429, 447 (Wyo. 2005).  
Because the claim of undue influence was not raised below, the appellees 
had no opportunity to address that question.  If the burden of proving the validity of 
the transactions shifts to the appellees, as appellant urges, significant due 
process issues would arise as the appellees were not given the opportunity to 
present arguments and evidence to meet that burden.  Furthermore, it is questionable whether 
the appellant would have a legitimate claim for undue influence under the facts 
presented in the record.  Because we 
do not find it to be a jurisdictional or fundamental issue, we will not address 
the appellant's undue influence claim on appeal.

 
 
4.   Were the district court's factual 
findings clearly erroneous?

 
 
[¶18]   The appellant's burden at trial was 
to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that at the time he entered into 
the transactions in question, he was not mentally competent to do so.  The district court found that he failed 
to satisfy that burden.  On appeal, 
the appellant must demonstrate that the district court's findings are 
unsupported by the record.  To that 
end, the appellant points to a number of areas where he contends that the 
evidence did not support the district court's decision.

 
 
[¶19]   First, the appellant asserts that 
the only evidence the appellees presented regarding the appellant's state of 
mind when he made the conveyances was the testimony of his son William, who 
testified that the appellant was doing "very well."  The appellant next claims that the 
appellees presented no medical evidence bearing on the question of the 
appellant's competence.  Finally, 
the appellant points to the testimony of his expert, who expressed the opinion 
that the appellant suffered severe cognitive impairment from November 21, 2004 
to January 7, 2005, and it was highly unlikely the appellant could form the 
mental capacity necessary to convey property.

 
 
[¶20]   Our review of the record reveals 
that the evidence was more than sufficient to support the district court's 
decision.  While the appellant 
claims that the appellees presented inadequate evidence to demonstrate he was 
mentally competent, we find the opposite to be true.  The appellant, who had the burden, 
presented no compelling evidence demonstrating that he lacked capacity.  The only evidence he provided bearing on 
the relevant time frame (when the documents were executed) was his own testimony 
that he did not remember executing any of the documents and the testimony of his 
daughter, Debra.  The appellant's 
testimony is of very little, if any, value as it gives no insight into his state 
of mind when the documents were executed.  
He simply says he does not remember.  Although Debra insists that the 
appellant was not mentally competent when he executed the documents, her 
testimony is contradictory and, like the testimony of the other sibling, appears 
to have been largely disregarded by the district court.2  Although Debra was present when a number 
of the transactions occurred, she raised no concerns regarding the appellant's 
mental competence or understanding.  See generally Cundick, 383 F.2d  at 
159 (court upheld validity of contract where, although wife later claimed her 
husband was mentally incapable of entering into the transactions, she was 
present when the contracts were executed and never objected).  Also, Debra testified at trial that she 
agreed that from the time he was admitted to the hospice, the appellant was 
aware of people, read newspapers, watched television, carried on conversations 
and was generally oriented to person, place and time.  The appellant's granddaughter, April 
Bender, also testified for the appellant.  
She said that she visited the appellant often and "[h]e was with it 
sometimes and other times he wasn't."  However, Ms. Bender was not present when 
any of the documents were executed and thus her testimony is also of limited 
significance.

 
 
[¶21]   In contrast, the appellees 
presented the testimony of witnesses who were actually present and observed the 
appellant when the documents were executed.  In addition to the testimony of his 
children who were present and testified that the appellant was of sound mind, 
the appellees called the individuals who notarized the documents, Karen Harrison 
and Tera Gillett.  Ms. Harrison, an 
employee at the hospice, notarized the January 7 deeds.  Ms. Gillett, a social worker at the 
hospice, notarized the December 27 bill of sale.  While neither specifically recalled 
notarizing the documents, they verified their signatures and testified that 
before notarizing any document they would ask questions to verify that the 
person signing was aware of what he was signing and understood what it 
meant.

 
 
[¶22]   The medical records offered by the 
appellees also provide compelling evidence that the appellant was mentally 
competent at the time he entered into the transactions.  The nursing flow sheets indicate that the 
appellant was alert and oriented to person, time and place on the days in 
question.  While the appellant 
acknowledges these records, he claims that the charting "defies common sense in 
view of the nature and extent of Appellant's illness, casts doubt on the 
reliability of the record."  This 
claim is presumably based largely on the opinion of the appellant's expert 
witness, whose opinion we will now examine.  

 
 
[¶23]   The appellant's expert, Bruce Kahn, 
M.D., J.D., was not the appellant's treating physician but was hired by the 
appellant to give an opinion on the matter.  Dr. Kahn testified that as a result of a 
severe hypoxic episode which resulted in brain damage and delirium, the 
appellant did not have the requisite mental capacity to execute the documents. 
 With regard to Dr. Kahn's opinion, 
the district court found as follows:

 
 
However, 
Dr. Kahn's testimony and his review was based upon facts that, frankly, are not 
supported in the record.  He 
testified as to hypoxic events that are not documented.  And I went through carefully the medical 
records and the nurse progress notes to note the oxygen  the O2 
levels at various times  and that was an issue that was addressed by 
counsel during the testimony of [the appellant's treating physician], as well as 
Dr. Kahn  and there are no indications of any significant hypoxic events that 
would have resulted in incapacitation that would have prevented Mr. Street from 
being competent on the dates in question.

 
 
We 
have said:

 
 
The 
trier of fact must decide what weight is to be given to expert testimony, and it 
still remains the duty of the trier of the factual issues, whether jury or 
judge, to determine the credibility of all witnesses, including expert 
witnesses, and to evaluate the testimony of each in reaching its 
verdict.

Reed v. Hunter, 663 P.2d 513, 
518 (Wyo. 1983).  Further, 
"[t]he trial judge who heard and saw the witnesses and felt the pulse beat of 
the lawsuit is, to be sure, the first and best judge of the weight and value to 
be given to all of the evidence, both expert and non-expert."  Cundick, 383 F.2d  at 162.  

 
 
[¶24]   Our review of the medical records 
reveals no evidence of the severe "hypoxic events" described by Dr. Kahn during 
the relevant time periods.  Even Dr. 
Kahn acknowledged a lack of evidence in the medical 
records:

 
 
            
Q.    Okay.  Did you see reference in the medical 
records that you reviewed to the extent or severity of [the appellant's] 
hypoxemia?

 
 
            
A.     You 
know, I scoured the records very thoroughly and could not see a blood gas where 
his oxygen level would have been consistent with that diagnosis.  

 
 
The 
testimony and opinion of Dr. Kahn, upon which the appellant relies almost 
exclusively, fell short of satisfying his burden at trial to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was mentally incompetent to enter into the 
transactions.  Likewise, when Dr. 
Kahn's opinion is viewed in conjunction with all of the evidence in the record 
on appeal, we cannot say with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was 
made. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶25]   We find that the district court 
applied the proper standards when determining whether the appellant had the 
requisite mental capacity to enter into the transactions at issue here.  We will not consider the appellant's 
claim of undue influence, as that issue is raised for the first time on 
appeal.  Finally, after reviewing 
the record and considering the facts in light of our articulated standard of 
review, we find that the district court's factual findings are not clearly 
erroneous.  We affirm the district 
court's decision.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Although 
the appellant claims he does not remember entering into the transactions 
conveying property to Debra, he affirmed those conveyances and she was not a 
named party to the lawsuit

 
 

2With 
regard to the testimony of the children, the district court 
said:

 
 
There 
was testimony by all the children, -- with the exception of Mr. Clyde Street -- 
as well as the son-in-law, Mr. Menke, regarding their observations of Mr. Lewen 
Street while he was hospitalized during this period of 
time.

 
 
I 
have discounted that testimony a great deal.  And the reason why I've discounted that 
testimony is because, frankly, both sides want to maintain their property that 
was given to them by their father.