Case Title: JEANNIE COOK, Adminstrator of the Estate of CHRISTINA PROEFROCK, Deceased; and RANDY PROEFROCK V. SHOSHONE FIRST BANK, a Wyoming corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
JEANNIE COOK, Adminstrator of the Estate of CHRISTINA PROEFROCK, Deceased; and RANDY PROEFROCK V. SHOSHONE FIRST BANK, a Wyoming corporation2006 WY 13126 P.3d 886Case Number: 05-105Decided: 01/20/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
JEANNIE 
COOK, Administrator of the

Estate 
of CHRISTINA PROEFROCK,

Deceased; 
and RANDY PROEFROCK,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
SHOSHONE 
FIRST BANK, a Wyoming

corporation,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofParkCounty

The 
Honorable Edward Grant, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Mark W. Gifford, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Scott E. Kolpitcke and Tracy J. Copenhaver of Copenhaver, Kath, Kitchen 
& Kolpitcke, LLC, Powell, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Copenhaver.  

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and KITE, VOIGT and BURKE, JJ., and SKAVDAHL, 
DJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Christina 
Proefrock was employed as a teller at Shoshone First Bank (SFB).  While she was away on vacation, SFB 
discovered $1,200 was missing from the bank.  When Ms. Proefrock returned from 
vacation, SFB questioned her about the missing money.  Ms. Proefrock denied any knowledge of 
the missing funds and SFB placed her on paid administrative leave while the 
matter was investigated.  A few 
hours later, Ms. Proefrock committed suicide.

 
 
[¶2]      Ms. Proefrock's 
mother, Jeannie Cook, as administrator of her daughter's estate, and Randy 
Proefrock, Ms. Proefrock's husband, filed a complaint against SFB alleging 
claims for "liability in tort for [Ms.] Proefrock's suicide," negligent or 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages.  In essence, they claimed SFB knew Ms. 
Proefrock did not take the money but falsely accused her and set her up to take 
the blame for it, which caused Ms. Proefrock such severe emotional distress that 
she took her own life.  

 
 
[¶3]      SFB filed a 
motion for summary judgment, claiming there were no genuine issues of material 
fact and judgment was warranted as a matter of law.  The district court granted SFB's 
motion.  We 
affirm.

  

ISSUES

 
 
[¶4]      The estate and 
Mr. Proefrock present the following issue:

 
 
            
Did the district court err when it granted summary judgment in favor of 
[a]ppellee, holding that the record is devoid of reasonable inferences to 
support [a]ppellants' legal theories?

 
 
SFB 
phrases the issue as:

 
 
            
Should the decision of the [d]istrict [c]ourt [j]udge granting summary 
judgment to [a]ppellee be affirmed for any of the reasons asserted by [a]ppellee 
in its Motion for Summary Judgment and [b]rief in support 
thereof?

 
 
FACTS

                        

[¶5]      Viewed in the 
light most favorable to the estate and Mr. Proefrock, the evidence presented was 
as follows:  In July 2001, Ms. 
Proefrock had been employed by SFB in Cody, Wyoming 
for less than a year and had worked at the Albertson's branch for only a few 
months.  She was an at-will 
employee.

 
 
[¶6]      On July 12, 2001, 
Ms. Proefrock completed her shift at 7:00 p.m. and left the bank to begin a 
ten-day vacation.  She did not 
obtain written verification of the cash balance in her teller drawer from 
another SFB employee before leaving as was required by bank policy.  While she was on vacation, another 
employee had the keys to her drawer and other employees used her password to 
sign into her teller drawer.  Also 
while she was on vacation, SFB discovered that $900 in cash was missing from the 
vault and $300 was missing from Ms. Proefrock's cash drawer.  

 
 
[¶7]      On July 23, 2001, 
Ms. Proefrock returned to work following her vacation.  She was confronted immediately by Graham 
Jackson, SFB vice president and cashier at the downtown bank, and Eric Wright, 
the assistant branch manager.  Ms. 
Jackson accused her of stealing the money.  
She denied any knowledge of the missing funds.  Ms. Jackson told Ms. Proefrock the bank 
would get the police involved and there would be lie detector tests.  She also said there were hidden cameras 
in the bank about which the employees had no knowledge, a statement that was not 
true.  Despite Ms. Proefrock's 
denial, Ms. Jackson placed her on paid administrative leave.  Ms. Jackson did not tell Ms. Proefrock 
other employees were suspects in the theft. 

 
 
[¶8]      Ms. Proefrock 
left the bank and went to her apartment.  She spoke with her husband, who came by 
the apartment, and her mother, brother and best friend.  She told them SFB accused her of 
stealing money, she had not done it, but no one believed her.  She received a telephone call from Ms. 
Jackson, asking her to prepare a written statement.  Ms. Jackson went to Ms. Proefrock's home 
and retrieved the statement from her. 

 
 
[¶9]      Shortly 
thereafter, Ms. Proefrock ingested rubbing alcohol and shot herself in the head 
with her husband's .22 caliber pistol.  
Mr. Proefrock found her body a short time later.  At the time of Ms. Proefrock's death, 
she had two children, ages 2 ½ and 1 ½. 

 
 
[¶10]   On June 2, 2003, the estate and Mr. 
Proefrock filed a complaint against SFB alleging that it knew or reasonably 
should have known at the time it accused Ms. Proefrock of taking the money that 
she did not commit the theft.1  The complaint further alleged that SFB 
knew the false accusation would cause Ms. Proefrock severe emotional distress 
and that SFB acted intentionally, recklessly and outrageously in falsely 
accusing her and inflicting severe emotional distress upon her, causing her to 
take her own life.  The estate 
sought damages for unidentified potential claimants in the amount of Ms. 
Proefrock's future lost earnings, companionship, society and comfort.  Mr. Proefrock sought damages for the 
emotional distress he suffered from finding his wife shortly after her suicide. 
 The estate and Mr. Proefrock also 
sought punitive damages. 

 
 
[¶11]   Six months later, SFB filed a 
motion for summary judgment claiming it owed no duty to Ms. Proefrock, there was 
no evidence showing SFB's conduct caused Ms. Proefrock's suicide, there was no 
evidence SFB acted outrageously, intentionally or recklessly to cause Ms. 
Proefrock severe emotional distress and the claim was barred by worker's 
compensation.  The estate and Mr. 
Proefrock filed a response in which they asserted genuine issues of material 
fact existed for trial concerning whether:

 

(1) 
SFB's false accusation of [Ms. Proefrock] was outrageous, and a willful 
departure from acceptable banking practices, and (2) SFB's false accusation 
induced in [Ms. Proefrock] a mental state that made it impossible for her to 
resist the impulse to end her own life, and was a substantial factor in [Ms. 
Proefrock]'s suicide.

 
 
The 
district court heard argument on the motion and, by order dated March 14, 2005, 
granted summary judgment in favor of SFB.  In its order, the district court 
concluded:

 
 
[T]here 
are no genuine issues as to any material facts in this case and that Defendant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and summary judgment should be 
granted to Defendant.

 
 
While 
the Plaintiffs have made numerous inferences and raised theories of conspiracy 
and cover-up, the Court finds that such inferences are not reasonable inferences 
that can be fairly drawn from the evidence or are otherwise supported by 
unwarranted and inadmissible speculation. 

         

The 
estate and Mr. Proefrock appealed the order to this Court.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
Summary 
judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law."  
W.R.C.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed 
fact, if proven, would establish or refute an essential element of a cause of 
action or a defense that a party has asserted.  

 
 
We 
evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and 
by examining the same material as the district court.  We examine de novo the record, in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, affording to that party the benefit 
of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the record. If upon review of 
the record, doubt exists about the presence of issues of material fact, that 
doubt must be resolved against the party seeking summary judgment.  We accord no deference to the district 
court's decisions on issues of law.  

 
 

Linton 
v. E.C. Cates Agency, Inc., 2005 
WY 63, ¶¶ 6-7, 113 P.3d 26, 28 (Wyo. 2005) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶12]   The standard of review is refined 
somewhat when applied to summary judgment in a negligence case.  

 
 
"Summary 
judgment is not favored in a negligence action and is, therefore, subject to 
more exacting scrutiny. We have, however, affirmed summary judgment in 
negligence cases where the record failed to establish the existence of a genuine 
issue of material fact.  See Krier v. Safeway Stores 46, Inc., 943 P.2d 405 (Wyo.1997) (failure to establish duty); Popejoy v. Steinle, 820 P.2d 545 
(Wyo.1991) (failure of proof of underlying claim of a joint venture);  
MacKrell v. Bell H2S Safety, 795 P.2d 776 (Wyo.1990) (failure of 
proof of defendant's duty); DeWald v. 
State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo.1986) (cause element was pure speculation); and Fiedler v. Steger, 713 P.2d 773 
(Wyo.1986) (failure to establish cause in a medical malpractice action). 

 
 
After a 
movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, the opposing 
party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial showing 
there are genuine issues of material fact.  
The opposing party must affirmatively set forth material, specific facts 
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, and cannot rely only upon 
allegations and pleadings . . ., and conclusory statements or mere opinions are 
insufficient to satisfy the opposing party's burden."  

 
 
            
The evidence opposing a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment 
"must be competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be 
entirely eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere 
conjecture or wishful speculation."  
Speculation, conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or 
even probability, are insufficient to establish an issue of material fact.  

 
 

Jones v. 
Schabron, 2005 
WY 65, ¶¶ 9-11, 113 P.3d 34, 37 (Wyo. 2005) (some citations 
omitted).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

1.                  
Worker's 
Compensation Immunity

 
 
[¶13]   As a preliminary matter, we address 
the fourth issue raised by the estate and Mr. Proefrockwhether SFB is immune 
from claims arising out of Ms. Proefrock's death by virtue of the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation statutes, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §  27-14-101 et seq. (LexisNexis 2005).  In addressing this issue, we note it is 
questionable whether the issue is properly before us.  SFB raised the immunity claim in its 
summary judgment motion.  In 
granting the motion, the district court did not rule on the claim.  The estate and Mr. Proefrock resurrected 
the issue on appeal, claiming SFB is not immune.  Despite the unusual manner in which the 
issue comes before us, we briefly address it.

 
 
[¶14]   In its summary judgment brief, SFB 
claimed that it was immune from tort liability for Ms. Proefrock's death by 
virtue of the worker's compensation statutes.  Citing Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885 (Wyo. 1984), SFB argued that the estate and Mr. Proefrock were claiming 
essentially that SFB's actions created such unusual employment conditions that 
they caused Ms. Proefrock's death. Like the employee's injury in Baker, therefore, the bank argued, the 
injury here, Ms. Proefrock's death, was covered by worker's compensation and the 
tort claim was barred.  Citing § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) and (J), the estate and Mr. Proefrock contended SFB was not 
immune because Ms. Proefrock suffered no compensable physical injury giving rise 
to a simultaneous or subsequent mental injury that caused her 
suicide.

 
 
[¶15]   We hold the claim is not barred by 
worker's compensation.  Section 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(B) provides in pertinent part that the term "injury" does not 
include:

 
 
(B) 
Injury caused by:

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
            
(II) The employee's willful intention to injure or kill himself . . . 
.

 
 
To the 
extent Ms. Proefrock willfully intended to kill herself, this provision barred 
recovery under the worker's compensation statutes.  Section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(J) further 
excludes coverage for:

 
 
            
Any mental injury unless it is caused by a compensable physical injury, 
it occurs subsequent to or simultaneously with, the physical injury and it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence . . . .

 
 
On the 
basis of this provision, we have held that where a claimant provides clear and 
convincing evidence that an employee's suicide or attempted suicide was the 
result of mental injury suffered subsequent to a compensable physical injury, 
the claim is covered by worker's compensation.  Brierley v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety and Comp. Div., 2002 WY 121, ¶ 12, 52 P.3d 564, 569 (Wyo. 2002).  Under the plain language of the statute, 
claims are not covered where the mental injury and resulting suicide were not 
caused by a compensable physical injury.  
There was no allegation Ms. Proefrock suffered a compensable physical 
injury.  Therefore, the claims 
arising out of her suicide were not covered.          

 
 
2.         
Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress

            

[¶16]   The estate and Mr. Proefrock claim 
the district court improperly granted summary judgment on their intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim.  The gist of their claim was that SFB 
acted outrageously by accusing Ms. Proefrock of taking the money when it knew or 
should have known that she did not.  Specifically, the complaint alleged SFB 
knew or should have known that:  the 
cash balance in Ms. Proefrock's teller drawer was not verified when she left for 
vacation as required by SFB policies and procedures; another teller was in 
possession of the keys and had access to Ms. Proefrock's teller drawer while she 
was on vacation; other employees used Ms. Proefrock's password to sign into her 
teller drawer while she was on vacation; and accounting entries were made during 
Ms. Proefrock's absence which implicated others in the missing funds.  The estate and Mr. Proefrock also claimed 
SFB acted outrageously by making material misrepresentations of fact when they 
accused Ms. Proefrock of theft, including that SFB had cameras of which 
employees were not aware; Ms. Proefrock was the only suspect; and, funds were in 
fact missing from the branch.  They 
alleged SFB acted outrageously in failing to disclose to Ms. Proefrock that 
other employees were suspects in the theft and in accusing her, sending her home 
and requiring her to immediately submit a written statement for the 
police.

 
 
[¶17]   SFB argues Ms. Proefrock's 
intentional and voluntary act in taking her own life was an intervening cause, 
which broke the chain of causation and precluded a finding of liability.  SFB also asserts even if the chain of 
causation had not been broken, its actions in confronting Ms. Proefrock about 
the missing funds, placing her on paid administrative leave, and asking her to 
provide a written statement were not extreme and outrageous.  Applying the rule that the court 
determines in the first instance whether conduct was extreme and outrageous, SFB 
asserts summary judgment was proper.  SFB also contends the district court's 
order must be affirmed because there was no evidence SFB intended to cause harm 
to Ms. Proefrock and because a reasonable person would have had no way of 
knowing that confronting Ms. Proefrock and placing her on paid administrative 
leave would cause her to take her own life.  

 
 
[¶18]   In Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1065 (Wyo. 1986), this Court recognized a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress as stated in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, § 46 (1965), which provides:

 
 
"Outrageous 
Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress

 
 
(1) One 
who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe 
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional 
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily 
harm."

 
 
We 
adopted the definition of extreme and outrageous conduct found in comment "d" of 
the Restatementconduct "which goes beyond all possible bounds of decency, is 
regarded as atrocious, and is utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community."  Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 1066.  We also recognized the separate functions 
of the court and jury described in comment "h" of the 
Restatement:

 
 
"It is 
for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's 
conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit 
recovery, or whether it is necessarily so.  
Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the 
control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct 
has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in 
liability."

 
 

Id.

 
 
[¶19]   Since Leithead, we have applied these 
principles with varying results in a number of employment cases.  In three of those cases, we held the 
evidence established a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of 
outrageousness.  Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 868 P.2d 211 (Wyo. 1994) (employer placed the employee on 
probation, cut his pay, altered his employment status, required him to publicly 
accept responsibility for the employer's financial problems, terminated him 
without conducting the audit that was promised and then publicly objected to his 
employment by other employers); Kanzler 
v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337 (Wyo. 1997) (repeated incidents in which employee 
was subjected by co-employee to being stared at, followed, subjected to 
sexually-motivated advances and physically intimidating behavior); Worley v. Wyoming Bottling Co., Inc., 1 P.3d 615 (Wyo. 2000) (repeated threats of termination, demands for impossibly 
large increases in sales, withholding pay raise, vilification for minor 
infractions despite stellar work performance, demotion and, finally, 
termination.)  In two other 
employment cases, we held the evidence did not establish a genuine issue of 
material fact concerning outrageousness.  
Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc., 
947 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1997) (summary judgment proper despite allegations of 
termination when superiors knew employee was vulnerable due to the death of a 
long-time friend; had a close personal relationship with one of his superiors; 
and his own son was hired to replace him); Hoflund v. Airport Golf Club, 2005 WY 
17, 105 P.3d 1079 (Wyo. 2005) (no competent evidence that termination was in 
retaliation for reporting sexual harassment.)       

 
 
[¶20]   We have also recognized the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress in contexts other than termination 
cases.  In Bevan v. Fix, 2002 WY 43, 42 P.3d 1013 
(Wyo. 2002), we reversed a district court ruling granting summary judgment on an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in a case involving a 
domestic altercation.  We held 
evidence showing the defendant beat, kicked, punched and choked the mother in 
the presence of her two children while screaming he wanted to kill her was 
sufficient to defeat summary judgment on the issue of outrageousness. 

 
 
[¶21]   Of the cases in which we have 
considered claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26 (Wyo. 1994) is most 
closely on point.  In that case, the 
husband of a woman who committed suicide claimed her stepfather caused her death 
by sexually abusing her as a child and adolescent and providing her with the 
means to kill herself when he knew she was suicidal.  We expressly recognized a claim for third 
party intentional infliction of emotional distress as described in § 46 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts:

 
 
            
"(2) Where [extreme and outrageous] conduct is directed at a third 
person, the actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly 
causes severe emotional distress 

 
 
                        
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the 
time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, 
or

 
 
                        
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress 
results in bodily harm."

 
 

R.D., 875 P.2d  at 32.  

 
 
In 
accordance with comment "l" of the Restatement, we also recognized a narrow 
exception to the language in § 46(2) requiring presence at the time of the 
outrageous conduct.  In his 
complaint, the decedent's husband alleged the sexual abuse by her stepfather 
throughout her childhood, adolescence and early adulthood caused her psychiatric 
difficulties and to attempt suicide.  
In 1990, decedent borrowed a firearm from her stepfather and used it to 
attempt suicide.  Five days later, 
decedent asked her stepfather to help her obtain a prescription for Elavil, a 
drug she previously used to attempt suicide.  Her stepfather obtained the prescription 
for her. She ingested an overdose and died several days later.  Although her husband and his minor child 
were not present when the alleged outrageous conduct occurred, we held the facts 
presented demanded special consideration.  We said:

  

[Husband] 
and the minor child were present in the immediate aftermath of the tragic 
results of [stepfather]'s outrageous conduct, and the suicide was the final 
result of a continuing course of conduct instigated by [stepfather]. 
Accordingly, [husband] sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and his claim should not have been dismissed. 

 
 

R.D., 875 P.2d  at 33-34.  

            

[¶22]   With this precedent in mind, we 
turn to consideration of the evidence presented.  As the estate and Mr. Proefrock correctly 
point out, our first task is to determine whether SFB's conduct in accusing Ms. 
Proefrock of theft and sending her home was extreme and outrageous, that is, 
whether it went beyond all bounds of decency such that it could be regarded as 
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.  As mentioned above, this determination 
is for the court in the first instance; it is only where reasonable minds may 
differ as to whether conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous that the 
determination is for the jury.  
Applying this standard, we conclude summary judgment was proper. 

 
 
[¶23]   Viewed in the light most favorable 
to the estate and Mr. Proefrock, the evidence showed that upon discovering that 
$900 was missing from the vault at the Albertson's branch, Ms. Jackson asked Mr. 
Wright to audit each teller drawer.  
Initially, the audit revealed a $500 shortage in teller Katie Clucas's 
drawer.  Ms. Jackson spoke with Ms. 
Clucas about the shortage in her drawer and the vault.  Ms. Clucas denied any knowledge of the 
missing funds but, in reference to the shortage in her drawer, asked if the coin 
she had purchased from Ms. Proefrock had been counted in the audit.  Ms. Jackson did not know but said she 
would ask Mr. Wright; meanwhile, Ms. Clucas was placed on paid administrative 
leave.  She was told the bank would 
involve the police and that lie detector tests would be given.   She was also asked to provide a written 
statement.

 
 
[¶24]   After meeting with Ms. Clucas, Ms. 
Jackson informed Mr. Wright about the coin purchase Ms. Clucas mentioned.  He recounted the drawer, this time 
including the coin, and determined rather than being short Ms. Clucas's drawer 
contained $136 more than it should have.  
There being no shortage in her drawer after all, Ms. Clucas was allowed 
to return to work the following day.      

 
 
[¶25]   In the meantime, Mr. Wright and 
another employee audited the other teller drawers at the Albertsons branch and 
found the $300 shortage in Ms. Proefrock's drawer.  Mr. Wright informed Ms. Jackson of the 
$300 shortage and told her $100 was missing from three different bundles in Ms. 
Proefrock's drawer, similar to the way in which bills of different denominations 
had been removed from individual strapped bundles in the vault.   

 
 
[¶26]   When Mr. Wright's audit was 
completed, another SFB employee performed a second audit.  On July 20, 2001, Ms. Jackson reported 
the results of the audits to the bank president.  Together they decided Ms. Jackson should 
be at the branch bank with Mr. Wright to talk with Ms. Proefrock when she 
returned to work from vacation on Monday morning, July 23, 2001.  

 
 
[¶27]   As planned, Ms. Jackson arrived at 
the bank shortly after 8:00 a.m. on July 23. Ms. Proefrock arrived a few minutes 
later.  According to Ms. Proefrock's 
family and friend, Ms. Jackson accused her of taking the money.  Ms. Proefrock denied it.  Ms. Jackson told her to go homeshe would 
be on paid administrative leave until the matter was resolved.  She told Ms. Proefrock there would be an 
investigation involving law enforcement, lie detector tests and a review of the 
security tapes.  According to Mr. 
Wright, Ms. Jackson asked Ms. Proefrock several times if there was anything she 
wanted to tell them and told her there were cameras located in the branch bank 
about which the employees were not aware.     

 
 
[¶28]   After Ms. Proefrock left, Ms. 
Jackson called her to obtain the written statement. Ms. Proefrock said she would 
prepare one.  Ms. Jackson drove to 
her apartment and obtained the statement.2   Ms. Proefrock handed her the statement 
through the partially opened door. 

 
 
[¶29]   Sometime that morning, Ms. 
Proefrock spoke with her husband, who came by the apartment, and her mother, 
brother and best friend by telephone.  
She told them SFB had accused her of taking the money, she did not do it, 
but no one believed her.  All of the 
people to whom Ms. Proefrock spoke said she seemed upset, but sounded like she 
was in control and could handle the situation.  Within a couple of hours, however, Ms. 
Proefrock was dead from a self-inflicted gunshot wound. 

 

[¶30]   This evidence would not lead 
reasonable minds to conclude SFB's conduct was extreme and outrageous.  Upon learning that over $1,000 was 
missing from the Albertson's branch, SFB conducted an investigation involving 
the audit of all of the teller drawers and questioning those tellers whose 
drawers did not balance.  Contrary 
to the assertion of the estate and Mr. Proefrock, Ms. Proefrock was not singled 
out as the only suspect.  The 
undisputed evidence showed that other branch employees were also considered 
suspects.  On its face, this does 
not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct.

 
 
[¶31]   The estate and Mr. Proefrock 
assert, however, genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether SFB's 
conduct was extreme and outrageous because they presented evidence, gathered 
after Ms. Proefrock's death, showing SFB knew or should have known she did not 
take the money and intentionally accused her anyway, knowing the accusation 
would cause severe emotional distress.  
They presented detailed and lengthy argument and documentation concerning 
the intricacies of teller operations at SFB.  They asserted it was SFB policy for a 
teller who was leaving for vacation to balance her drawer at the end of her 
shift and have her supervisor or a co-employee verify the balance.  The balance sheet Ms. Proefrock filled 
out at the end of her shift on July 12, 2001, is missing the verification.  Pursuant to SFB procedures, they argue, 
the omission should have been caught first by Mr. Wright on July 13 and, if not, 
then by Susan Beatty the following Monday.  Mr. Wright and Ms. Beatty testified they 
did not catch the omission.  The 
estate an Mr. Proefrock contend Mr. Wright and Ms. Beatty either failed to 
follow internal control procedures designed to cross-check and verify teller 
drawer balances, or they are lying, they did follow correct procedure, Ms. 
Proefrock's drawer balanced, and they willfully withheld evidence of Ms. 
Proefrock's innocence and falsely accused her of taking the money when they knew 
she did not.   

 
 
[¶32]   The difficulties with this argument 
are several.  First, there is no 
evidence SFB knew on the date of Ms. Proefrock's suicideor indeed knows even 
nowthat she did not take the money.  
After a lengthy and thorough investigation involving potential suspects, 
the prosecuting attorney concluded he did not have sufficient evidence to charge 
anyone with the theft and declined to prosecute.  Thus, there is no evidence SFB falsely accused Ms. Proefrock. The 
efforts of the estate and Mr. Proefrock to prove otherwise are purely 
speculative and require the court to believe Ms. Jackson and Mr. Wright knew Ms. 
Proefrock's drawer balance was not verified, balanced it themselves, lied about 
having done so, willfully withheld that information and set Ms. Proefrock up to 
take the blame for the missing funds.  
These assertions are unsupported by any evidence and require a leap we 
are not willing to make.    

 
 
[¶33]   Second, there is no evidence 
supporting the claim Mr. Wright and Ms. Beatty willfully withheld information which 
would have shown Ms. Proefrock's innocence.  Their undisputed testimony was they did 
not catch the missing information on the balance sheet Ms. Proefrock filled out 
before leaving for vacation.  The 
assertion that they reviewed the form, it was properly filled out and they are 
hiding evidence is based entirely on accusation and conjecture, which is not 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact and overcome summary 
judgment. 

 
 
[¶34]   This leaves the estate and Mr. 
Proefrock with the contention that SFB, and specifically Ms. Beatty and Mr. 
Wright, failed to follow internal control procedures by checking the teller 
balance sheet and following up when they discovered the balance had not been 
verified.  Throughout their 
appellate brief, they refer to "suspicious events," "breaches of policy," 
"improprieties," and "surprising entries."  Such assertions are not sufficient to 
show that SFB intentionally and recklessly engaged in conduct so extreme and 
outrageous as to cause Ms. Proefrock such severe emotional distress that she 
took her own life.  At most, the 
accusations suggest at the point when Ms. Proefrock committed suicide, SFB had 
not followed up on all possible avenues for investigating the missing 
funds.  Ms. Proefrock's tragic and 
almost immediate action in taking her life likely disrupted those efforts and 
the matter was turned over to the police.      

 
 
[¶35]   Giving the estate and Mr. Proefrock 
all favorable inferences, SFB's actions after discovering the missing money may 
have been unfinished.  By the time 
of Ms. Proefrock's suicide, SFB personnel may not have performed a complete 
investigation.  Such is not 
sufficient to show extreme and outrageous conduct.  As quoted above, comment "d" of the 
Restatement section states:  

 
 
Generally, 
the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the 
community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to 
exclaim, "Outrageous!" 

 
 
[¶36]   Having exhaustively reviewed the 
record in this case, we are unable to conclude an average member of the 
community confronted with these facts would find SFB's conduct extreme and 
outrageous.  Ms. Proefrock's drawer 
was found not to balance while she was away on vacation.  She, along with other branch employees, 
was considered a suspect.  She, like 
Ms. Clucas, was questioned and advised an investigation would be conducted, law 
enforcement would be involved and polygraphs would likely be given.  She, like Ms. Clucas, was placed on paid 
administrative leave and asked to submit a written statement. 

 
 
[¶37]   Ms. Proefrock's almost immediate 
reaction was to take her own life, an act which those closest to her who talked 
to her that morning in essence said was totally out of character and 
unforeseeable.  She did so before 
law enforcement began its investigation and thus before it had the opportunity 
to discover the evidence the estate and Mr. Proefrock gathered in the months 
following her death.  Giving all 
favorable inferences to the estate and Mr. Proefrock, the evidence simply does 
not raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial, and summary judgment was 
proper.             

 
 
[¶38]   The estate and Mr. Proefrock also 
contend SFB acted outrageously by misrepresenting or failing to disclose facts 
to Ms. Proefrock, including that SFB had cameras of which employees were not 
aware; she was the only suspect; and, funds in fact were missing.  Although the evidence indicates Ms. 
Proefrock was the only employee who was told there were hidden cameras, that 
alone is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue 
of outrageousness.  The second 
assertionthat Ms. Jackson failed to disclose that there were other suspectsis 
likewise insufficient to create a factual question showing outrageousness.  The assertion that SFB made a material 
misrepresentation by telling Ms. Proefrock money was missing is perplexing.  From our review of the record, we see no 
evidence suggesting funds were not missing.  

 
 
[¶39]   Comment "g" of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, § 46 states that an actor is never liable where he has done 
no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even though 
he is aware it is certain to cause emotional distress.  To illustrate, the Restatement describes 
a landlord who threatens to evict a mother and her children, knowing they are 
destitute and ill.  The Restatement 
explains:  "Although B's conduct is 
heartless, he has done no more than the law permits him to do, and he is not 
liable to A for her emotional distress." 

 
 
[¶40]   Analogizing this illustration to 
the present case, we are unable to conclude even that SFB's actions were 
heartless.  No evidence was 
presented showing SFB did anything more than it was legally entitled to do in 
questioning Ms. Proefrock about the missing funds.  This is not a case like Crump v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 
576 A.2d 441 (Vt. 1990), where an employee of eighteen years was summarily 
dismissed after being falsely accused of theft, kept in a three-hour meeting 
with no opportunity to leave or have lunch, badgered to sign a confession and 
called a thief in published reports.  There simply is no evidence of outrageous 
conduct. 

 

3.         
Foreseeability of Suicide v. Foreseeability of 
Harm

 
 
[¶41]   The estate and Mr. Proefrock claim 
next that they were not required to show Ms. Proefrock's suicide was 
foreseeable, they were only required to show it was foreseeable SFB's conduct 
would cause injury to her.  In the 
context of the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the 
question of foreseeability becomes relevant only upon finding that SFB's actions 
were extreme and outrageous.  
Because we hold that no genuine issue of material fact was presented on 
the issue of outrageousness, we do not address the foreseeability issue in the 
context of the intentional infliction claim.

 
 

4.                  
Negligently 
Caused Suicide

 
 
[¶42]   The estate and Mr. Proefrock assert 
that Wyoming 
has recognized a claim for negligently-caused suicide.  They cite R.D., 875 P.2d  at 28, in which we 
recognized an exception to the general rule that a decedent's intentional and 
voluntary suicide is an intervening cause which precludes liability for 
negligence.  That exception, adopted 
from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 455,3 applies when the tortfeasor's 
wrongful act causes the decedent to become insane and the decedent's insanity 
prevents him from realizing the nature of his act or from controlling his 
conduct.  In such cases, the suicide 
will not be considered as being an intervening cause and the tortfeasor may be 
held liable for the suicide. The estate and Mr. Proefrock contend the exception 
applies hereSFB falsely accused Ms. Proefrock of theft which caused her to 
become insane and unable to realize the nature of her suicidal act or control 
her behavior.

 
 
[¶43]   SFB responds that the exception 
recognized in R.D. should not be 
applied here because:  1) to do so 
would make employers potentially liable for unintended and unforeseeable 
consequences of employment decisions; 2) the facts surrounding Ms. Proefrock's 
suicide bear no similarity to the facts in R.D.; 3) the expert psychiatrist 
retained by the estate and Mr. Proefrock testified  there was no evidence Ms. Proefrock was 
insane prior to or at the time she spoke to family members on July 23 and he 
could only speculate as to whether anything occurred thereafter to change her 
mental state.      

 
 
[¶44]   Again, there are several 
difficulties with the assertions made by the estate and Mr. Proefrock. First and 
foremost, in order for liability to attach for a decedant's suicide, there must 
be a wrongful act.  As we said in R.D., 875 P.2d  at 28, "when the 
tort-feasor's wrongful act causes the 
decedent to become insane and the decedent's insanity prevents him from 
realizing the nature of his act or from controlling his conduct, the suicide 
will not be considered as being an intervening cause and the tort-feasor may be 
held liable for the suicide."  Reviewing the evidence presented on the 
claim that SFB negligently caused Ms. Proefrock's suicide, we hold the trial 
court properly granted summary judgment.  The estate and Mr. Proefrock failed to 
present facts from which a jury could conclude SFB committed a wrongful act that 
led to the suicide.  As was stated 
in Jones v. Schabron, ¶ 23, 113 P.3d 
at 39-40:

 
 
A 
person, no doubt, could create many "what if" scenarios that, in hindsight, 
might have prevented this tragic incident.  
But, negligence and proximate cause are never presumed from the happening 
of an accident, and mere conjecture cannot form the basis of liability.  Guesswork is not a substitute for 
evidence or inference, and inference cannot be based on mere possibility.  General or conclusory allegations cannot 
establish a genuine issue of material fact.  (Citations 
omitted).

 
 
The 
record in this case shows only that SFB did what an employer is entitled to do 
when funds are found to be missing.  
Despite their efforts, the estate and Mr. Proefrock failed to establish a 
genuine issue of material fact showing SFB committed a wrongful act.  One must guess, or speculate, or surmise 
in order to conclude SFB was negligent.  
The facts presented by the estate and Mr. Proefrock are not facts, but 
conclusions without any factual basis. They require a leap of faith we are not 
willing to make.  Consequently, the 
district court's decision granting summary judgment is 
affirmed.

 
 
5.         
Mr. Proefrock's Emotional Distress

 
 
[¶45]   Mr. Proefrock claims he has 
separate claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  We addressed these claims 
previously in this opinion.  A 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim requires proof of 
negligence.   We find no genuine issue of material fact 
showing SFB was negligent.  An 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim requires proof of extreme and 
outrageous conduct.  No genuine 
issue of material fact was presented on that element.   

 
 
6.         
Punitive Damages     

 
 

[¶46]   Finally, the estate and Mr. 
Proefrock claim the facts of this case support a jury finding that the conduct 
of Mr. Wright and Ms. Jackson was willful and wanton so as to support an award 
of punitive damages.  A claim for 
punitive damages is an element of a cause of action; it does not constitute a 
separate claim or cause of action.  
Errington 
v. Zolessi, 
9 P.3d 966, 969 (Wyo. 2000). Summary judgment on the underlying claims effectively 
disposed of the punitive damages claim and no further discussion is 
necessary. 

 
 
[¶47]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1An amended 
complaint was filed on April 27, 2004.

 
 

2The 
handwritten statement reads:

 
 
            
"I have no knowledge of any missing money from the Albertson's vault or 
from my drawer.  I will do anything 
in my power to help search for the money, or aid in any way 
possible."

 
 

3Section 455 
provides:

 
 
If the 
actor's negligent conduct so brings about the delirium or insanity of another as 
to make the actor liable for it, the actor is also liable for harm done by the 
other to himself while delirious or insane, if his delirium or 
insanity

(a)     
prevents him 
from realizing the nature of his act and the certainty or risk of harm involved 
therein, or

(b)                 
makes it 
impossible for him to resist an impulse caused by his insanity which deprives 
him of his capacity to govern his conduct in accordance with 
reason.