Case Title: Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Hackerd

Citation: 2019-Ohio-1340

Docket Number: 2018-1434

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Hackerd, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-1340.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-1340 
CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. HACKERD. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Hackerd, Slip Opinion No. 
2019-Ohio-1340.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct—
Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice—Public 
reprimand. 
(No. 2018-1434—Submitted January 9, 2019—Decided April 11, 2019.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct 
of the Supreme Court, No. 2017-068. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Richard Earl Hackerd, of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0055306, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1991. 
{¶ 2} In a complaint certified to the Board of Professional Conduct on 
November 30, 2017, relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, alleged that 
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Hackerd committed several ethical violations by representing the former spouse of 
a former client in a child-custody case and opposing the former client’s motion to 
disqualify him from that representation. 
{¶ 3} The parties entered into stipulations of fact and mitigating factors.  
After conducting a hearing, a panel of the board issued a report recommending that 
Hackerd be publicly reprimanded for engaging in conduct that was prejudicial to 
the administration of justice.  The panel unanimously dismissed three other alleged 
rule violations.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and recommended sanction. 
{¶ 4} We accept the board’s findings of fact and misconduct and agree that 
a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction in this case. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 5} In November 2006, Hackerd agreed to represent Rainie Krenn, the 
wife of his longtime friend and former client Tim Krenn, in a child-support and 
visitation matter involving Ms. Krenn’s daughter from a previous relationship.  Mr. 
Krenn later agreed to adopt the child, and Hackerd represented the couple in the 
stepparent-adoption proceeding.  The Krenns divorced in 2015, and Hackerd did 
not participate in those proceedings. 
{¶ 6} In January 2017, Ms. Krenn initiated postdecree proceedings seeking 
to have Mr. Krenn cited for contempt, to modify the court’s prior school-placement 
order, and to enforce the parenting-time and child-support orders.  Mr. Krenn 
retained Hackerd to represent him in the postdecree proceedings. 
{¶ 7} In March 2017, Ms. Krenn asked the trial court to disqualify Hackerd 
from representing Mr. Krenn in the proceedings.  At a hearing on the motion, Ms. 
Krenn testified that when Hackerd was representing her, she told him personal, and 
possibly inflammatory, things about her past, and she expressed concern that this 
information might be used against her in the pending litigation. 
January Term, 2019 
 
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{¶ 8} On March 15, 2017, the trial court granted Ms. Krenn’s motion.  Five 
days later, Hackerd appealed the judgment.  While that appeal was pending, the 
trial court issued an order suspending Mr. Krenn’s parenting time.  Hackerd moved 
the court of appeals to vacate that ruling and filed a brief opposing Ms. Krenn’s 
motion to dismiss the motion to vacate.  The court of appeals denied Hackerd’s 
motion and later affirmed the disqualification entry.  On October 19, 2017, Hackerd 
withdrew from the case. 
{¶ 9} The panel found that Hackerd violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice) by continuing to represent Mr. Krenn in contravention of 
the trial court’s disqualification order.  But citing the insufficiency of the evidence, 
the panel unanimously dismissed three other charges arising from allegations that 
Hackerd violated the duties he owed to his former client, Ms. Krenn, when he 
represented Mr. Krenn against her in the postdecree matters involving substantially 
similar issues to those that were the subject of Hackerd’s prior representation of 
Ms. Krenn.  See Gov.Bar R. V(12)(G).1  The board adopted the panel’s findings of 
fact and misconduct. 
Sanction 
{¶ 10} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 11} The parties stipulated and the board agreed that four mitigating 
factors are present—Hackerd has no prior disciplinary record, he acted without a 
dishonest or selfish motive, he offered full and free disclosure to the board and 
                                                 
1 We have held that a unanimous dismissal by the panel precludes further review of the dismissal 
by either the board or this court.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Maciak, 153 Ohio St.3d 185, 
2018-Ohio-544, 102 N.E.3d 485.   
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demonstrated a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and he 
presented evidence of his good character and reputation.  See Gov.Bar R. 
V(13)(C)(1), (2), (4), and (5).  The board also noted that Hackerd exhibited 
complete remorse for his misconduct.  No aggravating factors are present.  See 
Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B). 
{¶ 12} The board recommends that we publicly reprimand Hackerd for his 
misconduct.  The board notes that we have never before sanctioned an attorney for 
a stand-alone violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).  But in Akron Bar Assn. v. Fink, 131 
Ohio St.3d 34, 2011-Ohio-6342, 959 N.E.2d 1045, we publicly reprimanded an 
attorney who stipulated that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) and Gov.Bar R. 
V(4)(G) by failing to respond to letters of inquiry and two subpoenas duces tecum 
he received from a certified grievance committee of a local bar association.  And in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Smith, 146 Ohio St.3d 209, 2016-Ohio-1584, 54 N.E.3d 
1208, we publicly reprimanded an attorney who stipulated to six rule violations, 
including a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), arising from her failure to attend a 
scheduled custody hearing, failure to properly withdraw from representation, and 
initial failure to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation. 
{¶ 13} Based on our independent review of the record in this case and our 
precedent, we agree that Hackerd’s continued representation of Mr. Krenn in 
violation of the trial court’s disqualification order violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4.  Given 
this single rule violation, the absence of any aggravating factors, and the presence 
of significant mitigating factors, we agree that a public reprimand is the appropriate 
sanction in this case. 
{¶ 14} Accordingly, Richard Earl Hackerd is publicly reprimanded.  Costs 
are taxed to Hackerd. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, and STEWART, 
JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2019 
 
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DONNELLY, J., not participating. 
_________________ 
Jones Day, L.L.P., Robert S. Faxon, and Joseph Z. Czerwien; and Heather 
M. Zirke, Bar Counsel, and Kari L. Burns, Assistant Bar Counsel, for relator. 
Gallagher Sharp, L.L.P., and Monica A. Sansalone, for respondent. 
_________________