Case Title: Nowell v. City of Wausau

Citation: 2013 WI 88

Docket Number: 2011AP001045

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-11-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 88 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1045   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Thomas D. Nowell and Suporn Nowell, d/b/a IC 
Willy's, LLC, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
City of Wausau, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 344 Wis. 2d 269, 823 N.W.2d 373 
(Ct. App. – Published) 
PDC No: 2012 WI App 100     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 6, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 18, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon   
 
JUDGE: 
Gregory E. Grau   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Shane J. VanderWaal and Pietz, VanderWaal, Stacker & Rottier, 
S.C., Wausau, and Anne Jacobson, Wausau city attorney, and oral 
argument by Shane J. VanderWaal and Anne Jacobson.   
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants, there was a brief by Ryan D. 
Lister, Wausau, and oral argument by Ryan D. Lister. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Grant F. Langley, 
Milwaukee city attorney; Adam B. Stephens, Milwaukee assistant 
city attorney; Michael May, Madison city attorney; Roger Allen, 
Madison assistant city attorney; Robert Weber, Racine city 
 
 
2
attorney; and Nicole Loop, Racine assistant city attorney, on 
behalf of the cities of Milwaukee, Madison and Racine.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Daniel M. Olson, 
Madison, on behalf of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities. 
 
   
 
 
2013 WI 88
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2011AP1045 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV1082) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Thomas D. Nowell and Suporn Nowell, d/b/a IC 
Willy's, LLC, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants,   
 
 
v. 
 
City of Wausau,   
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
NOV 6, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The Petitioner, City of 
Wausau, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision 
that reversed a judgment entered by the circuit court affirming 
the City's decision not to renew Thomas and Suporn Nowell's 
Class B alcohol license.1  The court of appeals determined that 
the circuit court had employed an incorrect standard of review. 
¶2 
The City of Wausau argues that the error lies with the 
court of appeals and not the circuit court.  It contends that 
the de novo standard of review employed by the court of appeals 
                                                 
1 Nowell v. City of Wausau, 2012 WI App 100, 344 Wis. 2d 
269, 823 N.W.2d 373 (reversing judgment of the circuit court for 
Marathon County, Gregory E. Grau, J., presiding). 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
2 
 
is not prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) (2009-10)2 and is 
inconsistent with the statute's legislative history, our prior 
case law, and sound public policy.  Instead, it asserts that 
review 
of 
its 
licensing 
decisions 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 125.12(2)(d) is by certiorari.   
¶3 
Although the statute does not expressly address which 
standard of review is to be applied, we are persuaded that an 
examination of the legislative history, our prior case law, and 
the 
public 
policy 
underlying 
the 
deference 
due 
to 
a 
municipality's alcohol licensing decision militate in favor of 
certiorari review.  Therefore, we conclude that certiorari is 
the correct standard of review for a court to apply when, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d), it reviews a municipal 
decision not to renew an alcohol license.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals. 
I 
¶4 
The 
City 
of 
Wausau 
issued 
a 
Class 
B 
combined 
intoxicating liquor and fermented malt beverage license to IC 
Willy's on October 1, 2009. IC Willy's is a tavern owned by 
Thomas and Suporn Nowell.  Shortly after the license was issued, 
police began receiving noise complaints.   
¶5 
In November 2009, after being warned that adult 
entertainment was not permitted on the premises, IC Willy's 
hosted a "Girls Gone Wild" event.  At the event, officers 
observed nudity and lewd behavior. The Nowells agreed to a 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
3 
 
voluntary 15-day suspension of their alcohol license, in lieu of 
revocation and any other citation or fines for the nudity.  The 
City permitted the Nowells to take the suspension in January so 
that 
it 
would 
not 
conflict 
with 
their 
New 
Year's 
Eve 
commitments.  Thereafter, the Nowells submitted a 16-point plan 
to address the problems IC Willy's had encountered. 
¶6 
On May 25, 2010, the City sent the Nowells notice of 
its intent not to renew their license.  The notification 
indicated that this decision was based on numerous police 
service calls to the premises, failed compliance checks, and the 
Nowells' failure to implement the action steps put in place 
after their earlier suspension. After receiving the notice the 
Nowells requested a hearing on the non-renewal.  
¶7 
The 
City's 
Public 
Health 
and 
Safety 
Committee 
commenced that hearing on June 29, 2010, at 1:00 p.m.  The 
hearing lasted for approximately 14 hours, during which the 
Committee heard testimony from 18 witnesses and examined 42 
exhibits.   
¶8 
The 
Committee 
issued 
its 
findings 
of 
facts, 
conclusions of law, and recommendation on June 30, 2010.  It 
found that after the police received four separate complaints, a 
citation for disturbing the peace was issued to IC Willy's on 
October 25, 2009.  IC Willy's received another citation on 
November 8, 2009, for the same problem after the police had 
responded to seven additional complaints for loud music. On 
November 14, 2009, IC Willy's failed to take action to prevent 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
4 
 
nudity at its establishment after the police warned that nudity 
was not permitted.     
¶9 
The Committee further found that in February 2010 IC 
Willy's failed compliance checks involving underaged persons on 
the premises and that IC Willy's received another citation for 
disturbing the peace on May 8, 2010.  Based on these findings, 
the Committee recommended that the City Council not renew the 
Nowells' license.  After hearing additional arguments, the City 
Council voted to accept the Committee's recommendation.  
¶10 On July 12, 2010, the Nowells filed a complaint with 
the Marathon County Circuit Court requesting judicial review of 
the 
City 
Council's 
decision 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 125.12(2)(d). The complaint alleged that the City of Wausau 
denied the Nowells due process of law, unfairly discriminated 
against them, and precluded them from presenting evidence of 
disparate treatment. The Nowells sought an order renewing their 
license and damages for lost income.   
¶11 The Nowells asserted that the standard of review was 
de novo and that the circuit court should independently 
determine whether they were entitled to have their license 
renewed.  After reviewing the parties' briefs on the issue, the 
circuit court issued an oral ruling.  Citing Marquette Savings & 
Loan Assn. v. Village of Twin Lakes, 38 Wis. 2d 310, 156 N.W.2d 
425 (1968), the circuit court stated that "when a circuit court 
has the authority to review the action of a board or a 
commission, 
that 
review 
shall 
be 
one 
of 
certiorari."  
No. 2011AP1045    
 
5 
 
Accordingly, the circuit court determined that its review was 
circumscribed by the four prongs of certiorari: 
[1] 
whether 
the 
defendant 
kept 
within 
its 
jurisdiction; [2] whether it acted according to law; 
[3] whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or 
unreasonable, and represented its will and not its 
judgment; and, [4] whether the evidence was such that 
it might reasonably make the order of determination in 
question.  
It further determined that the Nowells' presentation of evidence 
would be limited to those issues.  
¶12 The circuit court held a two-day hearing on March 3 
and 4, 2011.  At the hearing, the Nowells advanced the argument 
that the City had treated it differently than other similarly 
situated establishments. The Nowells further argued that the 
City had denied their license renewal because it wanted to give 
their license to another business. In the alternative, the 
Nowells asserted that the City did not issue their renewal 
license because it disliked them and thus was exercising its 
will and not its judgment. The circuit found that these 
arguments went to the third prong of certiorari review (whether 
the City's action was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable, 
and represented its will, not its judgment), and permitted the 
Nowells to introduce extensive evidence on these points.   
¶13 After considering the evidence, the court affirmed the 
City's decision not to renew the Nowells' license. Specifically, 
the circuit court determined that the City Council had acted 
within its jurisdiction and according to law.  Noting the "Girls 
Gone Wild" event that led to the 15-day suspension, the 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
6 
 
incidents involving disturbances of the peace, the two failed 
compliance checks, and the 14 police service calls after October 
2009, 
the 
circuit 
court 
also 
determined 
that 
there 
was 
sufficient evidence for the City Council's decision.   
¶14 The circuit court then turned to the question of 
whether the City's actions were arbitrary, oppressive, or 
unreasonable, and represented its will and not its judgment.  It 
concluded that the Nowells had failed to show that there were 
similarly situated establishments that were treated differently. 
Moreover, there was no compelling evidence to support the 
Nowells' argument that the City was trying to pass their license 
on 
to 
another 
business. 
Additionally, 
the 
circuit 
court 
determined that the efforts by the City to work with the Nowells 
showed that it was not trying to drive IC Willy's out of 
business. Therefore, the Nowells' assertion that the City was 
exercising its will and not its judgment was unpersuasive.  
Accordingly, the circuit court affirmed the City's decision not 
to renew the Nowells' license. 
¶15 The court of appeals reversed.  It concluded that Wis. 
Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) requires the circuit court to employ a de 
novo standard of review, independently determining whether a 
licensee is entitled to renewal.  Nowell v. City of Wausau, 2012 
WI App 100, ¶8, 344 Wis. 2d 269, 823 N.W.2d 373.   
¶16 The court of appeals based its analysis on the 
requirement in Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) that the procedure on 
review shall be the same as in civil actions.  Id., ¶6.  It 
noted that the statute calls for pleadings, an answer, and a 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
7 
 
hearing without a jury, and permits the circuit court to issue 
subpoenas for witnesses.  Id., ¶6.  Citing State ex rel. Casper 
v. Board of Trustees, 30 Wis. 2d 170, 176, 140 N.W.2d 301 
(1966), and Merkel v. Village of Germantown, 218 Wis. 2d 572, 
577, 581 N.W.2d 552 (Ct. App. 1998), the court stated that the 
practices 
applicable 
to 
ordinary 
civil 
actions 
are 
not 
applicable to certiorari.  Id., ¶¶7, 8.  It further noted that 
statutes requiring certiorari usually specify how return of the 
record is to be made.  Id., ¶8.  Thus, the court concluded that 
the procedures in Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) were incompatible 
with certiorari review.  Id.  
¶17 Recognizing that the circuit court had relied on 
Marquette Savings & Loan, the court of appeals distinguished it 
on the basis that it was decided before 1981, when Wis. Stat. 
§ 125.12(2)(d) was enacted.  Id., ¶10.  It noted that this court 
had issued a decision after 1981, State ex rel. Smith v. City of 
Oak Creek, 139 Wis. 2d 788, 407 N.W.2d 901 (1987), applying a 
certiorari analysis to licensing decisions, but determined that 
that case was not controlling since the issue was not directly 
raised or addressed.  Id., ¶11 n.5. 
¶18 The court of appeals acknowledged that its decision 
"represents a substantial departure from ordinary judicial 
review of a municipality's exercise of police power."  Nowell, 
344 Wis. 2d 269, ¶11.  However, it stated that "[t]his was a 
policy choice the legislature was entitled to make."  Id., ¶12.  
The court of appeals asserted that the short timeframes in Wis. 
Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) supported its analysis.  Id., ¶12 n.6. 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
8 
 
II 
¶19 In this case we are asked to determine the appropriate 
standard of review for a court to apply when, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 125.12(2)(d), it reviews a municipal decision not to 
renew an alcohol license.  Resolution of this issue requires us 
to interpret the language of the statute governing revocation, 
suspension, and refusal to issue or renew alcohol licenses.  
Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review 
de novo, independently of the determinations rendered by the 
circuit court and the court of appeals.  Zwiefelhofer v. Town of 
Cooks Valley, 2012 WI 7, ¶20, 338 Wis. 2d 488, 809 N.W.2d 362. 
¶20 Statutory interpretation begins with examining the 
language of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 
110.  We interpret statutory language "in the context in which 
it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation 
to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes."  
Id., ¶46.   
¶21 When we are unable to discern the answer to our 
inquiry by an examination of the language of the statute and its 
context, we examine other interpretive aids.  Id., ¶¶50, 51.  We 
may look to legislative history to ascertain the meaning of the 
statute. Id., ¶51.  An examination of our prior case law may 
likewise illumine how we have previously interpreted or applied 
the statute.  See, e.g., State v. Robert K., 2005 WI 152, ¶30, 
286 Wis. 2d 143, 706 N.W.2d 257.  
III 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
9 
 
¶22 We begin our analysis by examining the text of the 
relevant statutory provisions.  Wisconsin Stat. § 125.12 
establishes the authority and the procedures for a municipality 
or the Department of Revenue to revoke, suspend, or refuse to 
issue or renew an alcohol license.  Subsection (3) of the 
statute gives licensees an opportunity for a hearing if a 
municipality intends not to renew their license.  It further 
states that "judicial review shall be as provided in sub. (2) 
(d)." Wis. Stat. § 125.12(3).   Subsection (2)(d) provides in 
relevant part: 
The procedure on review shall be the same as in civil 
actions instituted in the circuit court. The person 
desiring review shall file pleadings, which shall be 
served on the municipal governing body in the manner 
provided in ch. 801 for service in civil actions and a 
copy of the pleadings shall be served on the applicant 
or licensee. The municipal governing body, applicant 
or licensee shall have 20 days to file an answer to 
the complaint. Following filing of the answer, the 
matter shall be deemed at issue and hearing may be had 
within 5 days, upon due notice served upon the 
opposing party. The hearing shall be before the court 
without a jury. Subpoenas for witnesses may be issued 
and their attendance compelled. The decision of the 
court shall be filed within 10 days after the hearing 
and a copy of the decision shall be transmitted to 
each of the parties. The decision shall be binding 
unless it is appealed to the court of appeals. 
Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d).   
¶23 As noted, the parties dispute whether the standard of 
judicial review provided by Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) is 
certiorari or de novo.  "The commonly accepted meaning of a de 
novo hearing is '[a] new hearing of a matter, conducted as if 
the original hearing had not taken place.'" Stuligross v. 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
10 
 
Stuligross, 2009 WI App 25, ¶12, 316 Wis. 2d 344, 763 N.W.2d 245 
(quoting Black's Law Dictionary 738 (8th ed. 2004)). It gives no 
presumption of correctness to the record below, according no 
deference to the municipality's decision.   
¶24 Statutory 
certiorari 
review, 
on 
the 
other 
hand, 
accords a presumption of correctness and validity to the prior 
decision.  Ottman v. Primrose, 2011 WI 18, ¶48, 332 Wis. 2d 3, 
796 N.W.2d 411.  Thus, the scope of certiorari review is limited 
to: 
1) 
whether 
the 
[municipality] 
kept 
within 
its 
jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to law; 
(3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive or 
unreasonable and represented its will and not its 
judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was such that 
it might reasonably make the order or determination in 
question. 
State ex rel. Brookside Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Jefferson Cnty. 
Bd. of Adjustment, 131 Wis. 2d 101, 119-20, 388 N.W.2d 593 
(1986). 
¶25 Although 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
125.12(2)(d) 
dictates 
the 
procedure for judicial review, it is silent on which standard of 
review the circuit court is to employ.  As discussed below, an 
examination of the procedures required by the statute likewise 
does not indicate whether a de novo or certiorari review was 
intended.   
 ¶26  Wisconsin Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) states that "the 
procedure on review shall be the same as in civil actions."  
This requirement is not inconsistent with certiorari review 
because 
statutes, 
most 
notably 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
801.02(5), 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
11 
 
specifically permit the procedures for civil actions to be 
applied to certiorari proceedings. 
¶27  Wisconsin Stat. § 801.02(5) states that: "[a]n action 
seeking a remedy available by certiorari . . . may be commenced 
under sub. (1), by service of an appropriate original writ on 
the defendant . . . or by filing a complaint demanding and 
specifying the remedy . . . ."  As we have previously stated, 
the phrase "under sub. (1)" "refers to the summons and complaint 
process specified in sec. 801.02(1) for the commencement of all 
civil actions."  State ex rel. Dep't of Natural Resources v. 
Walworth Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 170 Wis. 2d 406, 415, 489 
N.W.2d 631 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Tobler v. Door Cnty., 158 
Wis. 2d 19, 23, 461 N.W.2d 775 (1990)). Thus, contrary to the 
court of appeals' assertions, practices applicable to ordinary 
civil actions may apply to certiorari proceedings. 
¶28 The court of appeals' conclusion that the procedures 
for civil actions are incompatible with certiorari review was 
based on two cases that are not persuasive here.  The court of 
appeals cited Merkel v. Village of Germantown, 218 Wis. 2d 572, 
577, 581 N.W.2d 552 (Ct. App. 1998), for its statement that 
"[t]he process for obtaining a writ of certiorari bears 'no 
resemblance to the usual processes of courts . . . .'"  Nowell, 
344 Wis. 2d 269, ¶7.  However, the discussion in Merkel was 
limited to actions commenced by a writ.3  As noted above, "[t]he 
                                                 
3 Although Merkel was decided in 1998, its discussion of the 
"processes" of a writ of certiorari relies on cases that predate 
the 1981 amendments to chapter 801 providing for an alternative 
to the writ.  Merkel v. Village of Germantown, 218 Wis. 2d 572, 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
12 
 
use of a writ is not necessary" when seeking the method of 
certiorari.  Wis. Stat. § 781.01; see also Judicial Council 
Notes to § 801.02, Stats. Ch. 289, Laws of 1981 ("Any remedy 
available by use of a writ may also be included in a judgment or 
order rendered in an ordinary action in circuit court.").  Thus, 
Merkel does not imply that the reference to procedures in civil 
actions 
contained 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 125.12(2)(d) 
precludes 
certiorari review. 
¶29 The court of appeals also cited State ex rel. Casper 
v. Board of Trustees, 30 Wis. 2d 170, 176, 140 N.W.2d 301 
(1966), for its statement that "[t]he practice[s] applicable to 
ordinary civil actions [are] not applicable to either common-law 
or statutory writs of certiorari."  Nowell, 344 Wis. 2d 269, ¶8.  
Again, Casper was about writ procedure.  Notably, it was also 
written prior to the amendments to Wis. Stat. § 801.02 that 
explicitly allowed certiorari to be commenced through a summons 
and complaint.  Ch. 289, Laws of 1981.  Thus, neither Merkel nor 
Casper provides authority for the conclusion that review under 
Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) must be de novo. 
¶30 The provision in Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) permitting 
reviewing courts to issue subpoenas for witnesses also fails to 
shed light on whether de novo or certiorari review was intended.  
Common law certiorari, which is available when there is no 
                                                                                                                                                             
577-78, 581 N.W.2d 552 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Coleman v. Percy, 
86 Wis. 2d 336, 272 N.W.2d 118 (Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 96 Wis. 
2d 578, 292 N.W.2d 615 (1980); State ex rel. Gaster v. Whitcher, 
117 Wis. 668, 94 N.W. 787 (1903)).   
 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
13 
 
express statutory method of review, is limited to the record 
compiled by the municipality.  Ottman, 332 Wis. 2d 3, ¶35.  
However, when certiorari review is conducted pursuant to a 
statute, the statute may limit or enlarge the scope of review.  
Id., ¶36; see also State ex rel. Ruthenberg v. Annuity & Pension 
Bd., 89 Wis. 2d 463, 473, 278 N.W.2d 835 (1979).  Accordingly, 
some statutes providing certiorari review explicitly permit the 
reviewing court to take evidence.  Brookside Poultry Farms, 131 
Wis. 2d at 120; see, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 88.09; Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(e)(10); Wis. Stat. § 59.694(10).   
¶31 The court of appeals relied on the "extraordinarily 
short time" in Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) to support its 
conclusion that the circuit court should have conducted a de 
novo review.  It noted that "[i]t is entirely possible that the 
legislature, recognizing [that tavern owners are at risk of 
losing 
their 
businesses], 
decided 
to 
provide 
a 
rapid, 
politically detached de novo review of municipal licensing 
decisions."  Nowell, 344 Wis. 2d 269, ¶12.  To the extent Wis. 
Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) provides a short timeframe for review, it 
is equally reasonable to interpret the timeframe as indicating 
review by certiorari, which generally involves a more truncated 
proceeding than a de novo review. 
¶32 Likewise, the lack of instruction for return of the 
record in Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) fails to indicate a 
preference for de novo review.  "'Return' is a long-standing 
term of art that refers to the official record of the body whose 
decision is being reviewed and which must be filed with the 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
14 
 
reviewing court in a certiorari action." Bergstrom v. Polk 
County, 2011 WI App 20, ¶29, 331 Wis. 2d 678, 795 N.W.2d 482.  
Wisconsin has a general statute requiring transmittal of the 
record to the reviewing court for actions seeking certiorari 
review, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
781.03(1). 
 
Accordingly, 
specific 
instructions in Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) are not required to 
ensure that the court has the record to review.  Notably, other 
statutes explicitly requiring certiorari review do not include 
such instructions.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13). 
¶33 Having determined that the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 125.12(2)(d) does not establish what method of judicial review 
to employ, we turn to its context to inform our analysis. See 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  Here, the context of Wis. Stat. 
§ 125.12(2)(d) suggests that certiorari review is appropriate. 
¶34 Wisconsin Stat. § 125.12 establishes authority and 
procedures for a municipality or the Department of Revenue to 
make alcohol licensing decisions.  The judicial review described 
in Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) covers municipality decisions 
"granting or failing to grant, suspending or revoking any 
license, or the failure of any municipal governing body to 
revoke or suspend any license for good cause."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 125.12(2)(d).   
¶35 Although this case deals with non-renewal of a 
license, the fact that Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) also covers 
decisions to grant or deny a new license is significant.  
No. 2011AP1045    
 
15 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 125.12(2)(ag)4 limits a municipality's ability 
to revoke, suspend, or not renew a license to the reasons 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 125.12(2)(ag) states that a complaint 
against a licensee may be based upon an allegation that: 
 
1. The person has violated this chapter or municipal 
regulations adopted under s. 125.10.  
 
2. The person keeps or maintains a disorderly or 
riotous, indecent or improper house.  
 
3. The person has sold or given away alcohol 
beverages to known habitual drunkards.  
 
4. The person does not possess the qualifications 
required under this chapter to hold the license.  
 
5. The person has been convicted of manufacturing, 
distributing or delivering a controlled substance or 
controlled substance analog under s. 961.41(1); of 
possessing, with intent to manufacture, distribute or 
deliver, 
a 
controlled 
substance 
or 
controlled 
substance 
analog 
under 
s. 
961.41(1m); 
or 
of 
possessing, with intent to manufacture, distribute or 
deliver, 
or 
of 
manufacturing, 
distributing 
or 
delivering 
a 
controlled 
substance 
or 
controlled 
substance analog under a substantially similar federal 
law or a substantially similar law of another state.  
 
5m. The person has been convicted of possessing any 
of the materials listed in s. 961.65 with intent to 
manufacture methamphetamine under that subsection or 
under a federal law or a law of another state that is 
substantially similar to s. 961.65.  
 
6. The person knowingly allows another person, who 
is on the premises for which the license under this 
chapter is issued, to possess, with the intent to 
manufacture, distribute or deliver, or to manufacture, 
distribute 
or 
deliver 
a 
controlled 
substance 
or 
controlled substance analog.  
 
6m. The person knowingly allows another person, who 
is on the premises for which the license under this 
chapter is issued, to possess any of the materials 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
16 
 
enumerated therein.  In contrast, a municipality's decision to 
grant or deny a new license is unconstrained.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 125.12(3m)5; see also Wis. Stat. § 125.51(1)(a) ("Every 
municipal governing body may grant and issue 'Class A' and 
'Class B' licenses . . . as the issuing municipal governing body 
deems proper.").   
¶36 The lack of restriction on municipality decisions to 
grant or deny licenses is consistent with the historic view that 
"the granting of a liquor license is a legislative function."  
State ex rel. Ruffalo v. Common Council, 38 Wis. 2d 518, 524, 
157 N.W.2d 568 (1968). It is well established that legislative 
power may not be delegated to the circuit courts.  City of 
Beloit v. Town of Beloit, 37 Wis. 2d 637, 644, 155 N.W.2d 633 
(1968).  Permitting a circuit court to determine de novo whether 
a liquor license should be granted would, in essence, improperly 
transfer that legislative function from the municipality to the 
court.  In light of this context, it appears inappropriate to 
interpret § 125.12(2)(d) to require de novo review. 
                                                                                                                                                             
listed in s. 961.65 with the intent to manufacture 
methamphetamine. 
 
 7. The person received the benefit from an act 
prohibited under s. 125.33(11). 
 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 125.12(3m) states, in full: "Refusals by 
local authorities to issue licenses. If a municipal governing 
body or duly authorized committee of a city council decides not 
to issue a new license under this chapter, it shall notify the 
applicant for the new license of the decision not to issue the 
license. The notice shall be in writing and state the reasons 
for the decision." 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
17 
 
¶37 As part of context, we also consider surrounding and 
closely related statutory provisions.  One such provision, Wis. 
Stat. § 125.12(5), empowers the Department of Revenue to revoke, 
suspend, or refuse to renew alcohol permits after a hearing.  
The statute specifies that such action is a contested case under 
chapter 227.  See Wis. Stat. § 227.52(1).  Judicial review of 
contested cases is generally by certiorari.  Wisconsin's 
Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 79 Wis. 2d 
161, 170, 255 N.W.2d 917 (1977).  It would seem inconsistent to 
interpret Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) to provide for de novo 
review of a municipality's decision on an alcohol license in 
light of the fact that Department of Revenue permit decisions 
under Wis. Stat. § 125.12(5) are reviewed via certiorari. 
¶38 Despite the indications that certiorari review is the 
appropriate method of judicial review, neither the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) nor its context is 
dispositive on whether certiorari or de novo review is required.   
¶39 Here, the legislative history is informative.  In 1981, 
the 
legislature 
created 
Chapter 
125, 
which 
combined 
the 
regulations governing fermented malt beverages (Wis. Stat. 
§§ 66.054-66.057) with the regulation of intoxicating liquors 
(ch. 176).  Prior to this combination, Wis. Stat. § 66.054(14) 
provided for judicial review and used language similar to that 
which is now found in § 125.12(2)(d).  In contrast, Chapter 176, 
which previously governed intoxicating liquors, made no mention 
of a standard for judicial review.    
No. 2011AP1045    
 
18 
 
¶40 When the legislature combined those regulations into 
Chapter 125, it included a prefatory note stating: 
This bill is the product of the legislative council's 
special committee on the recodification of alcohol 
beverage laws. The special committee was directed 
under the terms of 1977 assembly joint resolution 82, 
to undertake the recodification of the laws governing 
the sale and taxation of alcohol beverages, but to 
refrain from making substantive revisions of those 
laws. 
Ch. 79, Laws of 1981 at 649.  The note explains that the bill 
repeals the two prior chapters regulating alcohol beverages and 
combines them into the new chapter 125.  Id. at 650.  In 
addition to the reorganization, the bill made changes to 
"reflect current interpretations and practices."  Id. 
¶41  While there are no cases prior to 1981 interpreting 
the type of review courts applied to license decisions under 
Wis. Stat. § 66.054(14), courts reviewing municipal decisions on 
liquor licenses under Chapter 176 used certiorari review.  See 
Marquette Savings & Loan, 38 Wis. 2d at 316 (standard of review 
for actions of a Village relative to the issuance of a Class B 
liquor license was certiorari); State ex rel. Ruffalo, 38 Wis. 
2d at 525 (review of a denial of a renewal of a Class B liquor 
license was limited to "determining whether the action of the 
licensing 
authority 
was 
arbitrary, 
capricious 
or 
discriminatory."); Boroo v. Town Board of Barnes, 10 Wis. 2d 
153, 160-61, 102 N.W.2d 238 (1960) (courts should review a 
municipality's decision to deny a renewal Class B liquor license 
to determine if the municipality acted capriciously and there 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
19 
 
was an abuse of discretion); Rawn v. City of Superior, 242 Wis. 
632, 636-37, 9 N.W.2d 87 (1943) (the decision to grant or deny a 
Class B liquor license is committed to the sound discretion of 
the municipal governing body).   
 ¶42  In this context, the legislature's statements that it 
was not making substantive changes to the laws governing the 
sale of alcohol and that the changes were meant to reflect 
current interpretations and practices evince an intent that 
certiorari review under Wis. Stat. § 125.12(d)(2) is the proper 
standard.   
¶43 Consistent with this intent, decisions issued by this 
court and the court of appeals after Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) 
was enacted have utilized certiorari review when reviewing 
municipality licensing decisions.  See, e.g., State ex rel. 
Smith v. City of Oak Creek, 139 Wis. 2d 788, 407 N.W.2d 901 
(1987) (analyzing the definition of a habitual law offender in 
the context of a certiorari appeal from a decision to not renew 
a Class B alcohol license); Park 6 LLC v. City of Racine, 2012 
WI App 123, ¶6, 344 Wis. 2d 661, 824 N.W.2d 903 (analyzing 
validity of a liquor license revocation by the City of Racine 
under a certiorari review standard); Questions, Inc. v. City of 
Milwaukee, 2011 WI App 126, ¶13, 336 Wis. 2d 654, 807 N.W.2d 131 
(court of appeals, under the assumption that review was by 
certiorari, analyzed the renewal of a Class B alcohol license).6   
                                                 
6 Furthermore, as detailed by the amici, certiorari review 
has generally been the standard employed by the circuit courts.  
In Milwaukee, all seven of the licensees seeking judicial review 
since 2010, but prior to Nowell, received certiorari review.  In 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
20 
 
¶44 Indeed, as recently as last year, this court applied a 
certiorari analysis in a review of a municipality's decision not 
to renew an alcohol license.  Wisconsin Dolls, LLC v. Town of 
Dell Prairie, 2012 WI 76, ¶¶18-19, 342 Wis. 2d 350, 815 N.W.2d 
690.  While the standard of review was not directly at issue in 
Wisconsin Dolls, it was the basis for our analysis.   
¶45 Furthermore, those decisions are supported by strong 
public policy.  Historically, regulation of the sale of alcohol 
has been viewed as a matter of local concern.   State ex rel. 
Smith v. City of Oak Creek, 139 Wis. 2d at 800-01.  It is part 
of the police power granted to the city council under Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.11(5)7, which may "be limited only by express language." See 
Odelberg v. City of Kenosha, 20 Wis. 2d 346, 349, 122 N.W.2d 435 
(1963).   
                                                                                                                                                             
Racine, of the five appeals taken to the circuit court since 
2006, four were conducted pursuant to the certiorari standard. 
The other appeal, which was taken after Nowell, received a de 
novo review.  However, at least one case issued by the Dane 
County Circuit Court, Bourbon Street Grille, Inc. v. City of 
Monona, 09-CV-862 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Nov. 16, 2009), has 
used de novo review. 
 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.11(5) provides: "Powers. Except as 
elsewhere in the statutes specifically provided, the council 
shall have the management and control of the city property, 
finances, highways, navigable waters, and the public service, 
and shall have power to act for the government and good order of 
the city, for its commercial benefit, and for the health, 
safety, and welfare of the public, and may carry out its powers 
by license, regulation, suppression, borrowing of money, tax 
levy, appropriation, fine, imprisonment, confiscation, and other 
necessary or convenient means. The powers hereby conferred shall 
be in addition to all other grants, and shall be limited only by 
express language." 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
21 
 
¶46 As the court of appeals noted, interpreting Wis. Stat. 
§ 125.12(2)(d) to require a de novo review "represents a 
substantial departure from ordinary judicial review of a 
municipality's exercise of the police power."  Nowell, 344 Wis. 
2d 269, ¶11.  A municipality's exercise of its police power has 
traditionally been accorded deference by reviewing courts.  See 
Highway 100 Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. City of West Allis, 6 Wis. 2d 
637, 643, 96 N.W.2d 85 (1959).  As this court has explained, 
when reviewing the exercise of that power: 
It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of 
the most essential powers of government, one that is 
the least limitable. It may, indeed, seem harsh in its 
exercise, usually is on some individual, but the 
imperative necessity for its existence precludes any 
limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily.   
La Crosse Rendering Works, Inc. v. City of La Crosse, 231 Wis. 
438, 448, 285 N.W. 393 (1939) (citing Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. 
v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 78 (1915)).   
¶47 Both this court and the U.S. Supreme Court have 
recognized the particularly strong nature of the police power to 
regulate alcohol: "the states, under the broad sweep of the 
Twenty-first Amendment, are endowed with 'something more than 
the normal' police power in regulating the sale of liquor in the 
interests of the public health, safety, morals, and general 
welfare."  State ex rel. Grand Bazaar Liquors, Inc. v. City of 
Milwaukee, 105 Wis. 2d 203, 217, 313 N.W.2d 805 (1982) (citing 
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972)).  Through 
statutory authority, the State has granted this power to the 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
22 
 
municipalities.  See Wis. Stat. § 62.11(5).  This court has 
further explained that: 
[T]he justifications for the near-plenary police power 
that a unit of government has to regulate alcohol 
sales . . . may be summed up as resting upon the 
fundamental principle that society has an inherent 
right to protect itself; . . . that the sobriety, 
health, peace, comfort, and happiness of society 
demand 
reasonable 
regulation, 
if 
not 
entire 
prohibition, of the liquor traffic.  Unrestricted, it 
leads to drunkenness, poverty, lawlessness, vice, and 
crime of almost every description.  Against this 
result society has the inherent right to protect 
itself . . . . 
Eichenseer v. Madison-Dane Cnty. Tavern League, 2008 WI 38, 54, 
308 Wis. 2d 684, 716, 748 N.W.2d 154 (quoting Odelberg, 20 Wis. 
2d at 350).  These policy considerations suggest that certiorari 
review is appropriate as it serves to keep alcohol licensing 
decisions within the control of the municipality by according 
deference to its decisions. 
¶48  For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that 
certiorari is the proper standard of review for a licensing 
decision under Wis. Stat. § 125.25(2)(d).  In such proceedings, 
circuit courts are properly limited to determining: 
(1) 
whether 
the 
[municipality] 
kept 
within 
its 
jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to law; 
(3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or 
unreasonable and represented its will and not its 
judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was such that 
it might reasonably make the order or determination in 
question. 
State ex rel. Brookside Poultry Farms, 131 Wis. 2d at 119-20.  
Although Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) dictates the procedures a 
circuit court is to follow, it does not indicate that the issues 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
23 
 
the circuit court is to address have changed.  As we discussed 
in Ottman, "unless the statute providing for certiorari further 
limits or enlarges the scope of review, the reviewing court 
makes the same four inquiries that are made under common law 
certiorari review." Ottman, 332 Wis. 2d 3, ¶36.  Whereas Wis. 
Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) does not enlarge the scope of issues the 
circuit court is to address, the evidence the court takes should 
be relevant to one of the four prongs of certiorari review.8  As 
illustrated by the facts of this case, such an approach accords 
a licensee broad latitude to introduce evidence under prong 
three.  At the same time, it accords the appropriate deference 
to the municipality's exercise of its police powers. 
¶49 In this case the circuit court was correct to conduct 
a certiorari review and address each of the four prongs.  On 
                                                 
8 We note that in Klinger v. Oneida County, 149 Wis. 2d 838, 
847, 440 N.W.2d 348 (1989), we suggested that when conducting 
certiorari review under Wis. Stat. § 59.99(10) it may be 
appropriate to take evidence:  
 
when the record before the Board is incomplete because 
the aggrieved party was refused an opportunity to be 
fully heard or the Board excluded relevant evidence; 
when good and sufficient cause is shown for the 
failure to have offered the evidence to the Board; 
when the record presented to the circuit court does 
not contain all the evidence actually presented to the 
Board; when the Board's record fails to present the 
hearing in sufficient scope to determine the merits of 
the appeal; and when new evidence is discovered after 
the Board's proceedings were closed. 
 
Our decision here is not meant to affect the analysis in 
Klinger, which was based on different statutory language and 
which was discussing the circumstances in which evidence could 
be taken, as opposed to the issues the evidence should address. 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
24 
 
prongs one and two, the court determined that the City Council 
had complied with Wis. Stat. § 125.12 and, thus, had acted 
within its jurisdiction and according to law. Pursuant to prong 
four, the circuit court considered the evidence presented to the 
Committee and determined that there was sufficient evidence for 
the City Council's decision.   
¶50  The circuit court devoted a substantial amount of 
time to considering the third prong of certiorari.  Consistent 
with the statutory requirements, it gave the Nowells broad 
latitude to introduce evidence relating to their disparate 
treatment argument.  Likewise, it permitted them to present 
evidence relating to their arguments that the City did not renew 
their license because it did not like them and because it wanted 
to give their license to another business.   
¶51 After receiving this evidence, the court determined 
that the Nowells had failed to show that there were similarly 
situated establishments that were treated differently. It also 
determined that there was no compelling evidence to support the 
Nowells' argument that the City was trying to pass their license 
on to another business or that the City was trying to drive IC 
Willy's out of business. Therefore, the court concluded that the 
City had reasonably exercised its judgment, and affirmed the 
City's decision not to renew the Nowells' license. 
¶52 We agree with the circuit court.  The City Council 
acted within its jurisdiction and followed Wis. Stat. § 125.12. 
The Nowells did not show that the municipality treated them 
differently than similarly situated establishments, or show that 
No. 2011AP1045    
 
25 
 
the City Council exercised its will and not its judgment.  
Further, for the reasons stated by the circuit court we also 
conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the City 
Council's decision not to renew the Nowells' license. 
¶53 The circuit court's review was correct given the 
deference due to the municipality's exercise of its police power 
and the fact that alcohol licensing decisions are a matter of 
local concern.  As such, the court of appeals erred when it 
determined that Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) requires a circuit 
court to conduct a de novo review of a municipality's decision 
not to renew an alcohol license.    
IV 
¶54 In sum, although the statute does not expressly 
address which standard of review is to be applied, we are 
persuaded that an examination of the legislative history, our 
prior case law, and the public policy underlying the deference 
due to a municipality's alcohol licensing decisions militate in 
favor of certiorari review.  Therefore, we conclude that 
certiorari is the correct standard of review for a court to 
apply when, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d), it reviews a 
municipal 
decision 
not 
to 
renew 
an 
alcohol 
license.    
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals. 
By the Court.–The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
  
No. 2011AP1045    
 
 
 
1