Case Title: Martin v. Naik

Citation: 

Docket Number: 101146

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2013-05-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 101,146 
 
MACIE MARTIN, Individually and as Representative 
of the ESTATE OF CURLEY MARTIN, Deceased, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
SANDIP NAIK, M.D., 
 
and 
 
SPECIALTY HOSPITAL OF MID-AMERICA, 
Appellees. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
 
In a negligence action, summary judgment is generally proper if the only questions 
presented are questions of law. 
 
2. 
 
An appellate court's review of a district court's grant of summary judgment where 
the facts are uncontroverted, including one based on a statute of limitations defense, is 
unlimited and de novo. 
 
3. 
 
A cause of action for wrongful death accrues on the date of death unless 
information regarding the fact of death or the wrongful act that caused the death was 
concealed, altered, falsified, inaccurate, or misrepresented. Crockett v. Medicalodges, 
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Inc., 247 Kan. 433, 799 P.2d 1022 (1990), which held a wrongful death action accrues at 
the time of the wrongful act that causes the death, is overruled. 
 
4. 
 
In K.S.A. 60-513(c), which controls when a statute of limitations begins to run in a 
medical malpractice action, the legislature stated an objective standard when it provided 
that a cause of action accrues at the time of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the 
cause of action "unless the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable." Consequently, 
the fact a particular patient is incapacitated, which would be a subjective factor, does not 
affect whether the fact of injury was reasonably ascertainable.  
 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 43 Kan. App. 2d 591, 228 P.3d 1092 (2010). 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; ERNEST L. JOHNSON, judge. Opinion filed May 3, 2013. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
 
 
Stephen G. Dickerson, of The Dickerson Law Group, of Olathe, argued the cause and was on the 
briefs for appellant Macie Martin. 
 
 
Timothy P. McCarthy, of Gilliland & Hayes, P.A., of Overland Park, argued the cause and was on 
the briefs for appellee Sandip Naik, M.D. 
 
 
Roger W. Slead, of Horn, Aylward & Brandy, LLC, of Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause, 
and Richard M. Acosta, of the same firm, was with him on the briefs for appellee Specialty Hospital of 
Mid-America. 
 
 
Per Curiam:  This appeal raises issues regarding when the statute of limitations 
begins to run in a wrongful death and survival action brought against a physician and 
hospital. We first determine that a cause of action for wrongful death accrues on the date 
of death unless information regarding the fact of death or the wrongful act that causes the 
death was concealed, altered, falsified, inaccurate, or misrepresented. Second, in 
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construing K.S.A. 60-513(c), which controls when the statute of limitations period begins 
to run in a medical malpractice action, we hold that the legislature stated an objective 
standard when it provided that a cause of action accrues at the time of the occurrence of 
the act giving rise to the cause of action "unless the fact of injury is not reasonably 
ascertainable." Consequently, the fact a particular patient is incapacitated, which would 
be a subjective factor, does not affect whether the fact of injury was reasonably 
ascertainable.  
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
Macie Martin, both individually and as the representative of the estate of her 
husband, Curley Martin (Curley), filed a lawsuit against defendants Sandip Naik, M.D., 
and Specialty Hospital of Mid-America (Hospital), in which she raised wrongful death 
and survival claims based on alleged medical malpractice. Both defendants filed motions 
for summary judgment in which they argued the statute of limitations barred both causes 
of action. The relevant facts were uncontroverted for purposes of the motions. In the 
order granting the defendants summary judgment, the district court made the following 
findings and conclusions:  
 
 
On March 31, 2004, Curley, who was diabetic, was admitted to the Hospital under 
Naik's care. At that time, Curley "was unable to participate in his care" because of his 
medical condition.  
 
 
On April 7, 2004, a nurse who was an employee of the Hospital administered 
insulin to Curley. Martin, who was at Curley's bedside, observed the nurse having 
difficulty and then heard another nurse say that the nurse who administered the insulin 
"did not know how to perform that care for him or was struggling to competently perform 
that care." Curley's condition became more serious, and Martin alleges the Hospital's 
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employees failed to competently assess Curley's condition after the faulty insulin 
administration and failed to notify Naik of the deterioration in Curley's condition.  
 
 
Nevertheless, "[t]hese perceived deficiencies did not . . . result in actionable harm 
until the morning of April 8, 2004, when [Curley's] condition[] had greatly deteriorated." 
Curley "suffered irreversible brain damage and other injuries." On April 8, Martin and 
her daughters had Curley "emergently transferred" to Shawnee Mission Medical Center 
(SMMC). It is alleged the Hospital and Naik negligently delayed the transfer.  
 
 
While Curley was at SMMC, a physician told Martin and her family that the 
Hospital's staff allowed Curley to go into a diabetic coma and essentially killed him. 
Although Curley's "catastrophic conditions were stabilized at SMMC and he was 
subsequently moved to at least one other care facility before his death, he remained from 
April 8, 2004, until his death [on] October 25, 2004, incapacitated." 
 
 
On the second anniversary of Curley's death, Martin filed suit. After limited 
discovery, the Hospital and Naik filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that 
Martin's claims were barred by the 2-year limitation period provided by K.S.A. 60-
513(a)(5) and (a)(7).  
 
 
In granting the Hospital's and Naik's motions, the district court concluded Martin's 
"causes of action here for medical negligence in the survival action and the wrongful 
death claim accrued April 8, 2004," the last date on which the defendants' negligence 
could have occurred and the date on which Curley's injuries were first reasonably 
ascertainable. Further, the court found a 2-year statute of limitations applied under K.S.A. 
60-513(a)(5) and (a)(7). As a result, the court concluded that, unless the statute of 
limitations was tolled, both the survival and wrongful death claims expired on April 8, 
2006, more than 6 months before Martin filed suit. The district court noted there was a 
potential for tolling because Curley was disabled. Nevertheless, the court concluded that 
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K.S.A. 60-515, the tolling provision relating to disabled parties, would only have 
extended the limitation period 1 year past Curley's death—to October 25, 2005. Because 
the tolling provision effectively shortened the limitation period, the district court 
concluded the tolling provision should not be applied. Consequently, the district court 
agreed with the Hospital's and Naik's assertions and found that the wrongful death and 
survival causes of action were barred when this case was filed on October 25, 2006.  
 
Court of Appeals' Decision 
 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order in Martin v. Naik, 43 Kan. 
App. 2d 591, 228 P.3d 1092 (2010). The court held that neither Martin's wrongful death 
action nor the survival action was barred by the 2-year limitation period provided by 
K.S.A. 60-513(a)(5) and (a)(7).  
 
 
With regard to the wrongful death claim, the Court of Appeals concluded that the 
basis for Martin's lawsuit did not accrue, and thus the statute of limitations did not begin 
to run, until Curley's death. Martin's wrongful death action, therefore, was timely because 
it was filed within 2 years of the death. Martin, 43 Kan. App. 2d at 602.  
 
 
As to the survival action, the Court of Appeals determined Curley's medical 
condition rendered him unable to reasonably ascertain the fact of his injury. 
Consequently, the court considered the disability tolling provision in K.S.A. 60-515. The 
court concluded:  
 
"[B]ecause Curley could not reasonably ascertain the fact of his injury, his medical 
malpractice claim (the survival action) did not accrue so as to start the statute of 
limitations clock running until his death, so the 2-year limitation period of K.S.A. 60-513 
did not commence to run at any time during the period of Curley's incapacity. The 
relevant portion of K.S.A. 60-515, its tolling provision, stops the clock that is running on 
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an accrued but unfiled cause of action. Here, the clock was not running. It had not yet 
started. There was nothing for the statute to toll." Martin, 43 Kan. App. 2d at 600.  
 
 
The court held that Naik and the Hospital were not entitled to summary judgment 
on either claim. Based on its ruling, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case 
for further proceedings. Martin, 43 Kan. App. 2d at 605. 
 
 
Naik and the Hospital filed petitions for review, which this court granted. This 
court has jurisdiction under K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (petition for review). 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
In a negligence action, summary judgment is generally proper if the only questions 
presented are questions of law. Thomas v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 293 Kan. 
208, 220-21, 262 P.3d 336 (2011). Here, the district court granted summary judgment to 
the defendants by applying legal conclusions regarding the application of the statute of 
limitations to uncontroverted facts. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, neither party 
contended there was a genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment, 
leading the Court of Appeals to consider only issues of law under a de novo or unlimited 
standard of review. Martin, 43 Kan. App. 2d at 593. 
 
 
In supplemental briefs filed after the petition for review was granted, Martin 
argues there is a question of fact. She now suggests Curley's injury was not reasonably 
ascertainable until the physician at SMMC told Martin and other family members of the 
long-lasting effects of Curley's injury. This point in time—the date on which a reasonable 
person would have ascertained Curley's injury—is the date on which the statute of 
limitations began to run, at least according to the defendants and the district court. Hence, 
this potential question of fact is material. Yet, Martin did not make this contention in her 
briefs before the Court of Appeals or in her petition for review. Consequently, it is not 
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properly before us. State v. Kelly, 295 Kan. 587, 600, 285 P.3d 1026 (2012) (waiver of 
issue and preclusion of appellate review can occur by failure to raise issue before lower 
court, failure to raise issue in appellate brief, or failure to raise issue in petition for 
review). As such, we accept the district court's use of April 8, 2004, as the date on which 
the defendants' alleged malpractice was reasonably ascertainable, that is when viewed 
from an objective standard of a reasonable person. We also note that Martin does not 
suggest that using this later point in time would make the filing of this action timely if the 
defendants and district court are correct about the statute of limitations beginning to run 
on the date a reasonable person—as opposed to an incapacitated person such as Curley—
would have ascertained the existence of the injury.  
 
 
For his part, Naik does not suggest that there are controverted and material facts, 
but he does suggest that the Court of Appeals erred in applying a de novo standard of 
review to this case. He contends an appellate court "should be limited to determining 
whether it was reasonable to grant summary judgment based upon the uncontroverted 
statements of fact. . . . [R]eview should be limited to conclusions of law." For support 
Naik cites Nicholas v. Nicholas, 277 Kan. 171, 83 P.3d 214 (2004). 
 
 
Examination of Nicholas reveals that it does not support Naik's invocation of a 
reasonableness standard of review implying district court discretion. Instead, the Nicholas 
court stated:  "In this case, the material facts are not in dispute. Rather, it is the legal 
conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that are at issue. Our review of 
conclusions of law is unlimited." Nicholas, 277 Kan. at 177. This conclusion is consistent 
with a long line of cases that establish an appellate court's review of a district court's 
grant of summary judgment where the facts are uncontroverted, including one based on a 
statute of limitations defense, is unlimited and de novo. Godley v. Valley View State 
Bank, 277 Kan. 736, 741, 89 P.3d 595 (2004); Duarte v. DeBruce Grain, Inc., 276 Kan. 
598, 602, 78 P.3d 428 (2003); see Kelly v. VinZant, 287 Kan. 509, 514-15, 197 P.3d 803 
(2008) (application of statute of limitations).  
8 
 
 
 
Naik also contends the Court of Appeals went outside the record to conclude 
Curley was comatose and then repeatedly referred to his comatose state. See, e.g., 
Martin, 43 Kan. App. 2d at 598-99. Even if the Court of Appeals' description of Curley's 
condition was improper, the significant point was that Curley was incapacitated, and Naik 
does not dispute the district court's determination that Curley was incapacitated from 
April 8, 2004, until his death. 
 
 
We, therefore, begin our analysis with five essential and, for purposes of analyzing 
the district court's summary judgment decision, undisputed facts in mind. Those are:  (1) 
The first date on which there was alleged negligence that caused injury to Curley was 
April 7, 2004; (2) alleged acts of negligence occurred on April 8, 2004, when there was a 
failure to properly diagnose Curley's condition and to expediently arrange his transfer to 
SMMC; (3) the fact of injury was reasonably ascertainable on April 8, 2004; (4) Curley 
was unable to personally ascertain his injury because he was incapacitated from April 8, 
2004, until his death on October 25, 2004; and (5) this wrongful death and medical 
malpractice survival action was filed by Martin on October 25, 2006.  
 
 
The controversy in this appeal is how to apply the statute of limitations in K.S.A. 
60-513 to those facts. Issues of statutory interpretation and construction raise questions of 
law reviewable de novo on appeal. Shrader v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 296 Kan. ___, 
Syl. ¶ 1, 290 P.3d 549 (2012); State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181, 193-94, 284 P.3d 977 
(2012). 
 
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION 
 
 
The statute of limitations for a wrongful death action is found in K.S.A. 60-
513(a)(5). That provision simply states:  "The following actions shall be brought within 
two years:  . . . [a]n action for wrongful death." The question of when that time period 
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begins to run is answered by K.S.A. 60-513(b), (c), or (d). K.S.A. 60-513(c) applies in 
this case because it relates to causes of action arising from alleged medical malpractice. It 
states:   
 
 
"A cause of action arising out of the rendering of or the failure to render 
professional services by a health care provider shall be deemed to have accrued at the 
time of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action, unless the fact of 
injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period 
of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably 
ascertainable to the injured party, but in no event shall such an action be commenced 
more than four years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action."  
 
 
Clearly, there are different points in time at which a cause of action could accrue 
under this subsection, which means that there are different points in time at which the 
statute of limitations could begin to run. It is equally clear that one of those points in time 
is the "occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action."  
 
 
What is not clear in a wrongful death action is whether the act that gives "rise" to 
the cause of action is the death itself or the wrongful act that caused the death. The 
plaintiff and the Court of Appeals took the position that the cause of action did not arise 
until the date of Curley's death or, alternatively, that the fact of injury, while previously 
predictable, was not actually ascertainable until that date. For support, the Court of 
Appeals primarily relied on Natalini v. Little, 278 Kan. 140, 92 P.3d 567 (2004); 
Davidson v. Denning, 259 Kan. 659, 914 P.2d 936 (1996); Mason v. Gerin Corp., 231 
Kan. 718, 721, 647 P.2d 1340 (1982); and Nesbit v. City of Topeka, 87 Kan. 394, 124 P. 
166 (1912). On the other hand, the defendants and the district court took the position that 
the act giving rise to the cause of action occurred on April 7, 2004, the date of the first act 
of alleged negligence or, alternatively, on April 8, 2004, when it was reasonably 
ascertainable by others that Curley had been injured by that negligence. This court's 
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decision in Crockett v. Medicalodges, Inc., 247 Kan. 433, 799 P.2d 1022 (1990), supports 
this position.  
 
 
In the face of conflicting decisions by this court, we begin our determination of 
which line of cases is correct by considering the oldest of these cases—Nesbit. There, we 
find a clear statement that a wrongful death action accrues at the time of the decedent's 
death. In Nesbit, the issue was whether a wrongful death action was barred because the 
City of Topeka had not been timely notified of the accident that eventually caused the 
death. The City argued notice was required by a statute that declared no person could file 
suit for damages against a city unless notice of the injury had been given to the city 
within 4 months of the injury. Neither the injured party nor his surviving spouse had filed 
a notice within 4 months of the accident that caused the initial injury, and the death that 
resulted from the injury occurred more than 4 months after the accident. To determine 
whether the surviving spouse was required to give notice within 4 months of the fatal 
injury, this court reviewed the wrongful death statutes and, based on the wording of those 
statutes, concluded:   
 
"The damages recoverable by a widow in such an action are for her loss caused by the 
death of her husband. A cause of action accrued to him when he was injured. A cause of 
action accrued to her at his death. [Citations omitted.] She was not the person injured and 
so was not required to give the notice provided by the statute within the four months' 
period." Nesbit, 87 Kan. at 395-96.  
 
 
In this discussion, the Nesbit court discussed a version of the wrongful death act 
that predates the current act found at K.S.A. 60-1901 et seq. Nevertheless, Nesbit is 
helpful to our analysis because the two versions of the wrongful death act are 
substantively the same in all respects material to the question before us. K.S.A. 60-1902 
states that a wrongful death action "may be commenced by any one of the heirs at law of 
the deceased who has sustained a loss by reason of the death." (Emphasis added.) In 
addition, the recoverable losses, as defined by the Kansas Legislature, are not those 
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suffered by the deceased but are the pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages incurred by an 
heir at law, including such things as bereavement, loss of society, loss of marital care, 
loss of filial care, loss of parental care, and reasonable funeral expenses that result from 
the decedent's death. K.S.A. 60-1903; K.S.A. 60-1904. Under these statutes, it is the 
decedent's death that gives rise to the cause of action and it is the heir's injury that must 
be ascertainable.  
 
 
Applying these clear legislative statements and relying on Nesbit, this court has 
repeatedly held that a right of action under K.S.A. 60-1901 et seq. for wrongful death 
accrues no earlier than the date of the decedent's death, even though the decedent's cause 
of action for an underlying tort accrued at an earlier point in time. In these cases, we 
distinguished between the accrual of a survival action, which is brought on behalf of the 
decedent's estate, and the accrual of a wrongful death action, which is brought by the 
decedent's heirs at law. For example, in Mason, this court stated:  
 
"A survival action allows the personal representative to recover damages accrued by the 
injured party between the date of injury and death for the benefit of the decedent's estate. 
On the other hand, the wrongful death action authorized by 60-1901 et seq., is for the 
exclusive benefit of the heirs, and allows them to recover damages accruing after death 
for such things as loss of support, companionship and mental anguish." Mason, 231 Kan. 
at 721.  
 
See Ingram v. Howard-Needles-Tammen & Bergendoff, 234 Kan. 289, 301, 672 P.2d 
1083 (1983) (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting) ("survival action compensates the decedent for 
the injuries for which he could have recovered had he survived, whereas the wrongful 
death action compensates the heirs for such things as loss of support, companionship and 
comfort"); Farm & City Ins. Co. v. American Standard Ins. Co., 220 Kan. 325, 337, 552 
P.2d 1363 (1976) (survival and wrongful death actions are "separate and distinct types of 
action"; the "survival statute authorizes recovery of damages accruing between the injury 
12 
 
and the death of the injured person", and the wrongful death action is "for the exclusive 
benefit of all the heirs who have sustained loss, and damages . . . accruing after death"). 
 
 
Despite these attempts at clarification, confusion has persisted, apparently because 
of the impact of a qualifying condition—or condition precedent—to a wrongful death 
action. This condition is stated in K.S.A. 60-1901, which provides: 
 
 
"If the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, an 
action may be maintained for the damages resulting therefrom if the former might have 
maintained the action had he or she lived, in accordance with the provisions of this 
article, against the wrongdoer, or his or her personal representative if he or she is 
deceased." (Emphasis added.) 
 
 
In Mason, this court explained that the qualifying condition stated in the 
emphasized phrase means "that where the injured party could not have brought an action 
for his personal injuries because the statute of limitations had run against his claim prior 
to his death, a wrongful death action cannot be maintained." Mason, 231 Kan. at 725. 
Under the facts of the case, the statute of limitations had run on the decedent's cause of 
action before his death. Hence, the qualifying condition was not met and a wrongful 
death action could not be brought. 
 
 
In discussing the impact of the qualifying condition, the Mason court explained 
that the application of the qualifying condition was a different question than the accrual 
of the cause of action for wrongful death. The court emphasized the "decision does not 
involve the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff's wrongful death action" 
because the wrongful death cause of action "accrues to the heirs at the death of the 
injured party." Mason, 231 Kan. at 722. This point was reiterated 14 years later in 
Davidson.  
 
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The Davidson court considered two consolidated wrongful death appeals in which 
there arose a question of whether the 2-year statute of limitations began to run at the date 
of death or sometime later, when investigations into the causes of death were under way. 
One case arose from medical malpractice and another from a car accident. In both cases, 
it was alleged that the fact of injury was not reasonably ascertainable at the time of death 
but at a later point in time.  
 
 
The Davidson court recognized two points at which a wrongful death action can 
accrue:  The first was the time of death and the second was after death when the fact of 
injury became reasonably ascertainable. The court explained that the fact of death should 
be a "'starting point for inquiry,'" and "[t]he limitations period should start on the date of 
death unless the information from which the fact of death or negligence can be 
determined was either concealed, altered, falsified, inaccurate, or misrepresented." 
Davidson, 259 Kan. at 678; see, e.g., P.W.P. v. L.S., 266 Kan. 417, 425, 969 P.2d 896 
(1998) (citing Davidson with approval); Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 1151, § 5 (in most wrongful 
death cases decided under statutes providing that the period of limitation shall be 
computed from "'accrual of the cause of action' or from the 'time the cause of action 
accrues,'" the view is that the cause of action accrues at time of death). The court 
concluded that under the facts of both cases, there was no reason to believe there had 
been an alteration or concealment of records or any other misrepresentation. Thus, the 
causes of action accrued on the date of death. Davidson, 259 Kan. at 671-72, 676, 678. 
 
 
These decisions in Nesbit, Mason, and Davidson are consistent with the wrongful 
death act provisions found in K.S.A. 60-1901 et seq. Nevertheless, this court reached a 
different conclusion in Crockett, 247 Kan. 433, the case relied on by the defendants and 
the district court, when it held the statute of limitations period that applies to a wrongful 
death action can begin to run before the death. 
 
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Crockett arose from a lawsuit alleging negligence in the care of a nursing home 
resident. The petition was filed more than 2 years from the last date of treatment at the 
nursing home—the last date on which negligence could have occurred—but within 2 
years of the date of death.  
 
 
On appeal, this court acknowledged the holding in Mason and stated that the 
qualifying condition in K.S.A. 60-1901 was not an obstacle to the success of the lawsuit 
because the statute of limitations had not expired at the time of the death. Crockett, 247 
Kan. at 440 (citing Mason, 231 Kan. at 725). Nevertheless, instead of applying the 
statement in Mason that a wrongful death action accrues at the date of death, the Crockett 
court discussed a federal district court case, Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 542 F. Supp. 944 
(D. Kan. 1982), aff'd 741 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1984), and concluded:  "Under Brubaker, 
the latest date the wrongful death claim could have accrued in the present case was not 
the date of [the decedent's death], but . . . the date [the decedent] was discharged by" the 
defendants from their medical care. Crockett, 247 Kan. at 441.  
 
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Crockett court not only strayed from this court's 
prior analysis, it misread Brubaker. The outcome in Brubaker was not determined by the 
2-year statute of limitations on wrongful death claims, see K.S.A. 60-513(a)(5), but on 
the qualifying condition in K.S.A. 60-1901 and the 4-year repose provision in K.S.A. 60-
513(c). The Brubaker court first determined when the act that gave rise to the cause of 
action occurred. Then, because there were arguments regarding the potential tolling of the 
statute of limitations, the court determined the latest date on which a lawsuit could have 
been filed without being barred by the statute of repose in K.S.A. 60-513(c). This date 
was several years before the decedent's death. Brubaker, 542 F. Supp. at 947. Finally, the 
court concluded that K.S.A. 60-1901 created an "interface" between K.S.A. 60-513(c) 
and the wrongful death action because the qualifying condition in K.S.A. 60-1901 
required an analysis of when the decedent's cause of action accrued and whether the 
statute of limitations had run by the date of death. Brubaker, 542 F. Supp. at 948. 
15 
 
Brubaker did not link this analysis to the statute of limitations that applies to a wrongful 
death action, however.  
 
 
Consequently, as to wrongful death actions, Brubaker simply reaffirmed that a 
wrongful death action cannot be brought if the decedent's medical malpractice action was 
barred at the time of his or her death. The Brubaker court did not conflate the 
determination of whether the qualifying condition was met with the determination of 
when a wrongful death action accrued as did the Crockett court. Hence, the Crockett 
court's reliance on Brubaker for the concept that a wrongful death action accrues before 
death was misplaced. Additionally, the Crockett court failed to recognize that Brubaker 
was consistent with Mason in its application of the qualifying condition in K.S.A. 60-
1901 and in distinguishing the qualifying condition from the accrual of the wrongful 
death action for statute of limitations purposes. See Brubaker, 542 F. Supp. at 948. As a 
result, Crockett cannot be reconciled with the holdings in Nesbit, Mason, and Davidson, 
i.e., the starting point for the accrual of a wrongful death action is the date of death. 
 
 
The Court of Appeals in this case resolved the conflict in the decisions of this 
court by focusing on Natalini, which was decided after Crockett and which followed the 
line of cases holding that a wrongful death action accrues at the date of death. Natalini 
did not explicitly overrule Crockett, however. Natalini, 278 Kan. at 142-43. 
 
 
Natalini arose after Joseph Natalini brought a medical malpractice action for 
failure to diagnose his lung cancer. In November 1996, while monitoring nodules in 
Natalini's lung, the defendant doctor negligently failed to follow up with Natalini about a 
computerized tomography scan in which a new nodule was revealed. Natalini was 
eventually diagnosed with lung cancer. He filed a lawsuit in July 2000 when the 4-year 
repose period in K.S.A. 60-513(c) was about to expire. By the time of trial in June 2002, 
Natalini was predicted to have only 8 months to live. Therefore, Natalini sought damages 
at trial for his family's bereavement, mental anguish, loss of protection and advice, and 
16 
 
the loss of his support and household services which he anticipated would be suffered 
upon his death—damages characterized as part of an "'anticipatory wrongful death' 
claim." Natalini, 278 Kan. at 142. 
 
 
On appeal, this court determined the anticipatory wrongful death damages were 
not recoverable in Natalini's medical malpractice action. In doing so, this court 
recognized the qualifying condition in K.S.A. 60-1901 and the previous holding in 
Mason—if the injured person's personal injury claim is time barred before his or her 
death, the heirs' wrongful death claim is also barred—and refused Natalini's request to 
fashion a way around the combined effect of K.S.A. 60-513(c) and K.S.A. 60-1901, in 
hopes of permitting Natalini's family to somehow collect on an anticipatory wrongful 
death claim. The Natalini court stated: 
 
"In circumstances like Natalini's, even if a malpractice plaintiff's premature death is 
highly likely to be caused by the malpractice, plaintiff's survival for more than 4 years 
[repose period] beyond the negligent act means no wrongful death action will ever be 
possible. K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 60-513(c) and K.S.A. 60-1901 will combine to cut it off 
before it can accrue, i.e., before the death giving rise to the action has occurred. 
Although family members of the patient would qualify at the time of death as heirs at law 
entitled to seek recovery in a wrongful death suit, see K.S.A. 60-1902, they would be 
prevented from bringing an action because 60-513(c)'s repose language would have 
barred the injured patient's own [underlying] lawsuit before his or her death. [Citations 
omitted.]" (Emphasis added.) Natalini, 278 Kan. at 143. 
 
 
In this appeal, the Court of Appeals focused on the words emphasized in this 
quotation—"before it can accrue, i.e., before the death giving rise to the action has 
occurred"—that linked accrual of a wrongful death action with the date of death, not 
before. In light of those words, the Court of Appeals concluded Natalini supported the 
validity of the principle declared in Davidson—the fact of death should be a "'"starting 
point for inquiry"'"—and concluded that the limitation period simply cannot begin to run 
17 
 
before the wrongful death cause of action comes into being. Martin v. Naik, 43 Kan. App. 
2d 591, 605, 228 P.3d 1092 (2010) (quoting Davidson, 259 Kan. at 666). The Court of 
Appeals further distinguished the qualifying condition in K.S.A. 60-1901 and concluded 
that "once the wrongful death condition precedent is met (the decedent's right to sue had 
he or she lived), the statute of limitations for the decedent's personal injury action has no 
further effect on the wrongful death action, which has its own statute of limitations and 
which begins to run on the date of death." (Emphasis added.) Martin, 43 Kan. App. 2d at 
604.  
 
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals panel in this case reached a 
different conclusion from that of other Court of Appeals panels who have applied 
Crockett's holding that the wrongful death statute of limitations begins running before 
death if the injury is reasonably ascertainable before that time. See, e.g., Kelley v. 
Barnett, 23 Kan. App. 2d 564, 571, 932 P.2d 471, rev. denied 262 Kan. 961 (1997); 
Yadon v. Dennett, No. 99,247, 2008 WL 5401419, at *21 (Kan. App. 2008) (unpublished 
opinion). 
 
 
Despite this growing line of cases, we agree with the Martin court that the 
wrongful death action does not accrue before the death that is the basis for the action. 
There are several reasons for our conclusion.  
 
 
First, while a wrongful death claim is conditioned on the ability of the decedent to 
bring an action, such a claim is distinct from the claims the decedent could have brought 
had he or she lived. Natalini, 278 Kan. at 143. A wrongful death action is a claim of the 
heirs at law, and neither the plaintiffs—the heirs at law—nor the nature of their damages 
can be determined until the death occurs. Hence, an action brought before the death 
would be brought by potential heirs, not known heirs. Further, an action brought before 
death would necessarily be seeking speculative or conjectural damages, which as a 
general rule are not recoverable, while an action brought after death could seek damages 
18 
 
that are reasonably certain and, therefore, recoverable. See Miller v. Johnson, 295 Kan. 
636, 677, 289 P.3d 1098 (2012) (stating general rules regarding degree of certainty 
required for damages to be recoverable).  
 
 
Second, because an anticipatory wrongful death action cannot be brought, an 
accrual of the action before death would be unreasonable. For example, if a decedent 
passed away just 1 day before the statute of limitations expired, an heir at law would have 
only 1 day to file his or her cause of action. This would be an unreasonable interpretation 
of the accrual provision in K.S.A. 60-513(c), and it is a fundamental rule of statutory 
construction that courts are to avoid unreasonable results when applying statutory 
language. Kansas One-Call System v. State, 294 Kan. 220, 233, 274 P.3d 625 (2012).   
 
 
Finally, the rule reiterated in multiple Kansas cases—indicating that the date of 
death begins the inquiry unless the date is extended because of factors such as 
concealment of the fact of death, or concealment or falsification of, or alteration or 
misrepresentation in the decedent's medical records—would be placed by the wayside. 
See, e.g., Davidson, 259 Kan. 659, Syl. ¶ 2. Yet, the Crockett court did not overrule these 
cases.  
 
 
Consequently, we conclude the decision in Crockett was an aberration in this long 
line of cases and its reasoning was faulty. We overrule Crockett and disapprove of any 
language in that opinion and its progeny, including Kelley, 23 Kan. App. 2d 564, and 
Yadon, 2008 WL 5401419, stating that the statute of limitations on wrongful death 
actions begins to run before the date of death. The inquiry into whether the wrongful 
death qualifying condition in K.S.A. 60-1901 is met—whether the decedent would have 
had a right to bring an underlying tort action had he or she lived—is a separate inquiry 
from determining the date that triggers the wrongful death action. We reiterate and hold 
that the 2-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(5) that governs a wrongful 
death action "should start on the date of death unless the information from which the fact 
19 
 
of death or negligence can be determined was either concealed, altered, falsified, 
inaccurate, or misrepresented." Davidson v. Denning, 259 Kan. 659, Syl. ¶ 2, 914 P.2d 
936 (1996); see Mason v. Gerin Corp., 231 Kan. 718, 722, 647 P.2d 1340 (1982).  
 
 
As applied to the facts of this case, the underlying medical malpractice claim was 
not time barred at the time of Curley's death; hence, the wrongful death qualifying 
condition was met. The limitation period for Martin's wrongful death action began 
running on the date of Curley's death because there was no allegation of concealment or 
misrepresentation. Consequently, Martin's wrongful death action was not time barred 
when filed 2 years to the day after Curley's death.  
 
 
We, therefore, affirm the Court of Appeals' holding on this point and reverse the 
district court. 
 
SURVIVAL ACTION 
 
 
Both defendants also contend that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that 
the medical malpractice survival action was not time barred. See Martin, 43 Kan. App. 2d 
at 597-98. According to the defendants, the district court was correct in its conclusion 
that the limitation period began to run approximately 6 months before Curley's death, on 
April 8, 2004, when the fact of injury—that Curley "had suffered substantial and 
catastrophic injures"—was objectively ascertainable and actually known to Curley's wife 
Martin. Thus the survival action had to be brought by April 8, 2006, regardless of the fact 
that Curley was incapacitated on the date of injury. 
 
 
Martin responds by agreeing with the Court of Appeals and contending that before 
the statute of limitations could start to run on the underlying medical malpractice action, 
the injury had to be reasonably ascertainable to Curley. See Martin, 34 Kan. App. 2d at 
599. Because Curley was incapacitated from April 8, 2004, until his death, the period of 
20 
 
limitation on this survival action could not have started until his death on October 25, 
2004. Thus, according to Martin, because the survival action was filed within 2 years of 
Curley's death, it was timely.  
 
 
Although the parties take different roads of analysis, they begin at the same point 
and in agreement that the date on which a statute of limitations runs for a survival cause 
of action is the date the decedent's cause of action for medical malpractice accrues. This 
is because, unlike a wrongful death action, a "survival action, as it is called, is not a new 
cause of action. It is rather the cause of action held by the decedent immediately before or 
at death, now transferred to his personal representative." Prosser & Keeton, Law of Torts 
§ 126, p. 942 (5th ed. 1984); see Ingram, 234 Kan. at 301 (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting); 
Mason, 231 Kan. at 721. The decedent's estate has the right to bring the claim on the 
decedent's behalf because the Kansas Legislature, through K.S.A. 60-1801, declared that 
the decedent's claim survived, providing: 
 
 
"In addition to the causes of action which survive at common law, causes of 
action for mesne profits, or for an injury to the person, or to real or personal estate, or for 
any deceit or fraud, or for death by wrongful act or omission, shall also survive; and the 
action may be brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the 
same." 
 
 
Consequently, as we apply K.S.A. 60-513(c), we must consider Curley to be the "injured 
party."  
 
 
To better understand the implications of Curley being the injured party, it is 
helpful to break K.S.A. 60-513(c) into three parts. The first states a general rule:  A 
medical malpractice action "shall be deemed to have accrued at the time of the 
occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action." The second part states an 
exception:  The statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the act "unless the fact 
of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act." The third 
21 
 
part provides the test for when the statute of limitations begins to run if the exception 
applies:  "[T]hen the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury 
becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party." (Emphasis added.) While each of 
these provisions seems clear when read separately, when they are read together the 
legislative intent is far from clear. Because the statute's language is ambiguous, we 
"employ canons of construction, legislative history, or other background considerations 
to divine the legislature's intent and construe the statute accordingly. [Citation omitted.]" 
Stewart Title of the Midwest v. Reece & Nichols Realtors, 294 Kan. 553, 564-65, 276 
P.3d 188 (2012). 
 
 
Construing K.S.A. 60-513(c), the district court reasoned that an objective standard 
should be applied to determine both when the exception applies and when the fact of 
injury became ascertainable to the injured party. Under this analysis, the district court, in 
essence, placed a reasonable person—one who was not incapacitated—in place of Curley 
and asked if that reasonable person would have ascertained the fact of injury. This led to 
the conclusion the survival action accrued on April 8, 2004.  
 
 
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, concluded the cause of action did not 
accrue on that date because "Curley had no capacity to apprehend that he had a claim and 
no ability to do anything about it." Martin, 43 Kan. App. 2d at 598. The Court of Appeals 
reasoned that Curley's incapacity was significant because it is one of the surrounding 
circumstances that should be considered in determining whether the fact of injury was 
reasonably ascertainable under this court's analysis in Davidson and other cases. In 
Davidson, for example, this court explained:  "'The term "reasonably ascertainable" as 
applied in 60-513(b) and (c) in a wrongful death action suggests an objective standard 
based on an examination of the surrounding circumstances.'" Martin, 43 Kan. App. 2d at 
599 (quoting Davidson, 259 Kan. at 669).  
 
22 
 
 
The defendants, in urging us to agree with the district court, argue the Court of 
Appeals made the second part of K.S.A. 60-513(c)—the "unless the fact of injury is not 
reasonably ascertainable" phrase—into a subjective test. The defendants note that this 
phrase does not mention the injured party. They further argue that the legislature's failure 
to mention the injured party means an objective standard is used to determine if the fact 
of injury was reasonably ascertainable at the time of the occurrence of the act giving rise 
to the cause of action. Under this interpretation of the statute, Curley's incapacity does 
not come into play in determining if the exception applies.  
 
 
Further, the defendants note that the legislature has provided that a cause of action 
may accrue while a person is under a legal disability. K.S.A. 60-515(a) states in part that 
"if any person entitled to bring an action . . . at the time the cause of action accrued or at 
any time during the period the statute of limitations is running, is . . . an incapacitated 
person, . . . such person shall be entitled to bring such action within one year after the 
person's disability is removed." (Emphasis added.) Likewise, under K.S.A. 60-515(b), if 
"any person entitled to bring an action dies during the continuance of any disability 
specified in subsection (a) and no determination is made of the cause of action accrued to 
the deceased," a claim may be filed by the appropriate representative within 1 year of the 
decedent's death. (Emphasis added.) See Bonin v. Vannaman, 261 Kan. 199, 205, 929 
P.2d 754 (1996) (where medical malpractice occurred when plaintiff was a minor, K.S.A. 
60-515[a] allows filing within 1 year of reaching majority; no consideration of whether 
plaintiff's legal disability meant statute of limitations did not begin to run during 
minority).  
 
 
The defendants argue there was no reason for the legislature to enact K.S.A. 60-
515 if the statute of limitations, K.S.A. 60-513, would never run during a period of legal 
disability. This argument ignores the reach of K.S.A. 60-515, which is broader than 
K.S.A. 60-513. K.S.A. 60-515 applies to all actions except those covered by a similar 
statute, K.S.A. 60-508; actions to recover damages as a result of childhood sexual abuse 
23 
 
subject to K.S.A. 60-523; actions to recover real property; actions to recover a penalty, or 
actions to recover a forfeiture. K.S.A. 60-515(a). Thus, it applies to statutes that do not 
include an ascertainment-of-injury or discovery provision. See, e.g., K.S.A. 60-511; 
K.S.A. 60-512; K.S.A. 60-514; cf. Law v. Law Company Building Assocs., 295 Kan. 551, 
575, 289 P.3d 1066 (2012) (holding that discovery exception of K.S.A. 60-513[a][3] does 
not apply to a claim for reformation of a contract based on mutual mistake).  
 
 
The defendants' arguments have merit, however, because, at least as to the 
application of the second part of K.S.A. 60-513(c), which creates the exception, they 
argue for a plain reading of the statute as it is written. Thus, the argument applies a well-
known rule of statutory interpretation and construction, which is that we consider the 
plain language of the statute, giving ordinary words their ordinary meanings. Eastman v. 
Coffeyville Resources Refining & Marketing, 295 Kan. 470, 473, 284 P.3d 1049 (2012). 
In contrast, Martin and the Court of Appeals suggest a reading of the statute that requires 
adding the words "to the injured party" into the second part of K.S.A. 60-513(c). 
Generally, we ascertain the legislature's intent through the statutory language it uses, and 
we will not read a statute to add something not readily found in it. State v. Guder, 293 
Kan. 763, 766-67, 267 P.3d 751 (2012). This court's decision of Seymour v. Lofgreen, 
209 Kan. 72, 495 P.2d 969 (1972), which is not cited or discussed by the parties or the 
Court of Appeals, supports the conclusion that the words "to the injured party" should not 
be read into the second part of K.S.A. 60-513(c). 
 
 
Instead, the Seymour court explained that the use of the words "reasonably 
ascertainable" in the exception "was obviously intended to apply to situations where the 
injury itself is of such a nature that it could not reasonably be ascertained until sometime 
after the commission of the act which caused it. [Citation omitted.]" Seymour, 209 Kan. 
at 79. The court distinguished between injuries that are "'progressive in nature, without 
external or visible sign, and . . . latent'" and those that are "'manifest'" or "acute." 
24 
 
Seymour, 209 Kan. at 79 (quoting Miller v. Breech Aircraft Corporation, 204 Kan. 184, 
188-89, 460 P.2d 535 [1969]). 
 
 
The Seymour court noted that the situation in the case it was deciding did not 
involve progressive or latent injuries. Instead, "the injuries alleged . . . were by their 
nature acute and easily ascertainable. The allegations in the petition merely show that the 
plaintiff was unable to ascertain them because of mental illness." Seymour, 209 Kan. at 
79. The mental illness meant the plaintiff was an incapacitated person, which caused the 
court to consider the application of K.S.A. 60-515. The court held that K.S.A. 60-515 
defined the applicable limitation period when a plaintiff is unable to ascertain the fact of 
injury because he or she is under a legal disability or is an incapacitated person as defined 
in K.S.A. 77-201, Thirty-first. The court concluded: 
 
 
"The legislature in recognizing the need to protect persons in a case such as this, 
where the fact of injury is reasonably ascertainable by others but not by the injured party, 
provided that persons under a legal disability shall be entitled to bring their action within 
one year after such disability has been removed. (K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 60-515 [a].)" 
Seymour, 209 Kan. at 78. 
 
See Fletcher v. Holcomb, 142 Kan. 177, 181-82, 45 P.2d 1053 (1935) (legal disability 
"does not operate to prevent a cause of action from arising in favor of the one under 
disability"; instead, there is a "specific statute applicable to persons under disability 
which permits the action to be brought within one year after the disability is removed"). 
 
 
Because Seymour did not file her cause of action within 1 year of the removal of 
her disability or within 2 years of the defendant's alleged malpractice, the court held her 
action was barred by the statute of limitations. Seymour, 209 Kan. at 79.  
 
 
In Seymour, the court applied K.S.A. 60-513(b) rather than K.S.A. 60-513(c), 
which applies in this case. This is because K.S.A. 60-513(c) had not yet been adopted. 
25 
 
See Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 118, 631 P.2d 222 (1981) (discussing 
legislative history of K.S.A. 60-513[c]). Because of the differences between K.S.A. 60-
513(b) and (c), some portions of the Seymour decision no longer apply in actions against 
health care providers; for example, K.S.A. 60-513(c) does not trigger the running of the 
limitation period upon "substantial" injury. Nevertheless, the exception regarding 
reasonable ascertainment of injury in both K.S.A. 60-513(b) and (c) are substantially the 
same. Therefore, the Seymour decision provides persuasive, if not binding, authority for 
the conclusion that the exception requires application of an objective standard to 
determine whether the fact of injury is reasonably ascertainable. 
 
 
In this case, the date on which the fact of injury was reasonably ascertainable was 
April 8, 2004. This is also the last date on which alleged malpractice occurred and thus 
was the date on which at least some of the acts giving rise to the action occurred. Because 
the dates coincide, we conclude the exception was not triggered under the unique facts of 
this case—the fact of injury was reasonably ascertainable when the act that gave rise to 
the cause of action occurred. Consequently, we need not examine the third part of K.S.A. 
60-513(c) to determine whether an objective standard applies or whether the words "the 
injured party" in this portion of the statute are to be read out of the provision as was 
effectively done by the district court in this case and this court in Seymour.  
 
 
Further, we need not resolve whether the specific provisions of K.S.A. 60-515 
mean the action had to be brought within 1 year of Curley's death or whether the action 
could be brought within 2 years of April 8, 2004, under K.S.A. 60-513(c). Either way, the 
survival action in this case was barred by the statute of limitations.  
 
 
We, therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals' holding regarding the statute of 
limitations applicable to the survival action and affirm the district court.   
 
26 
 
 
The Court of Appeals' reversal of the district court's order granting summary 
judgment for the defendants on the wrongful death claim is affirmed and remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals' reversal of the district court's 
order granting summary judgment for the defendants on the medical malpractice survival 
claim is reversed. 
 
* * * 
 
JOHNSON, J., concurring:  I concur in the results reached by the majority on both 
the wrongful death and survival actions. I write separately with respect to the survival 
action and the interpretation of K.S.A. 60-513(c) for two reasons. First, I disagree with 
the apparent holdings of the majority that the period of limitation was running against 
Curley while he was in a coma and that the provisions of K.S.A. 60-515 were not 
applicable here. Second, I perceive some fallacies in the reasoning of the Court of 
Appeals opinion and the dissent in this case which the majority opinion did not address.   
 
 
My fundamental disagreement with both the majority and dissent is that they 
equate the accrual of a cause of action with the running of a statute of limitations on that 
cause of action. The plain language of K.S.A. 60-513(c) speaks to both the time when the 
"cause of action . . . shall be deemed to have accrued" and when the "period of limitation 
. . . shall . . . commence." Moreover, using the Court of Appeals' own language, albeit in 
a different context, we commonly think of a cause of action accruing "'when the plaintiff 
first had the right to file and prosecute the action to a successful conclusion.'" Martin v. 
Naik, 43 Kan. App. 2d 591, 597, 228 P.3d 1092 (2010) (quoting Mason v. Gerin Corp., 
231 Kan. 718, 722, 647 P.2d 1340 [1982]). Then, we frequently deal with scenarios 
where a cause of action has accrued but the statute of limitations has been tolled. In other 
words, they are different concepts. Moreover, it would seem to me that K.S.A. 60-513(c) 
contains a great deal of surplus language if the legislature simply intended the period of 
27 
 
limitation for a medical malpractice action to always commence at the same time that the 
cause of action accrued.   
 
 
I read the majority opinion as conflating the concepts of cause of action and period 
of limitation when it parses K.S.A. 60-513(c) into three parts and suggests that they all 
deal with when the "statute of limitations begins to run." ____ Kan. at ____ (slip op. at 
21). My question is, if the legislature intended K.S.A. 60-513(c) to address the sole 
question of when the period of limitation begins, why did it specifically speak to the time 
when the cause of action was deemed to have accrued and why did it include two 
consecutive phrases about the fact of injury not being reasonably ascertainable? 
Ordinarily, we presume the legislature does not intend to enact superfluous, meaningless, 
or redundant legislation. See Board of Miami County Comm'rs v. Kanza Rail-Trails 
Conservancy, Inc., 292 Kan. 285, 322, 255 P.3d 1186 (2011).  
 
 
In my view, it is more logical to divide the statute into two parts, one dealing with 
the accrual of the cause of action and the other establishing the running of the limitation 
period. The first part would read, in relevant part, that "[a] cause of action . . . [for 
medical malpractice] . . . shall be deemed to have accrued at the time of the occurrence of 
the act giving rise to the cause of action, unless the fact of injury is not reasonably 
ascertainable until some time after the initial act." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 60-513(c). 
After one has determined when the cause of action accrues—either when the act occurred 
or when the fact of injury was reasonably ascertainable—the next inquiry is laid out in 
the second part:  "[T]hen the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of 
injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 
60-513(c). Pointedly, the statute does not say that the period of limitation commences 
when the cause of action is deemed to have accrued.  
 
 
By utilizing the plain language approach, i.e., the first part deals with the "cause of 
action" and the second part addresses the "period of limitation," we can avoid the 
28 
 
objective versus subjective dilemma that troubles my colleagues and we can give 
meaning to the redundant phrases about the fact of injury being reasonably ascertainable. 
We do that by reading the statute as establishing an objective criterion for the accrual of 
the cause of action, the same way that this court did in Seymour, when it held that "[t]he 
belated discovery provision in 60-513 . . . was obviously intended to apply to situations 
where the injury itself is of such a nature that it could not reasonably be ascertained until 
sometime after the commission of the act which caused it." Seymour v. Lofgreen, 209 
Kan. 72, 79, 495 P.2d 969 (1972). If the fact of injury is reasonably ascertainable by 
anyone, e.g., a duly appointed conservator for a disabled injured party, then the cause of 
action against the health care provider has accrued so that an action could be filed and 
successfully prosecuted.  
 
 
But the commencement of the period of limitation (as opposed to the accrual of 
the cause of action) is based on the subjective knowledge of the injured party, i.e., the 
time during which the lawsuit must be filed does not begin to run on the accrued cause of 
action until the fact of injury is reasonably ascertainable to the injured party. Here, that 
would mean that the statute of limitations was tolled for Curley as long as he was in a 
coma and unable to know he had been injured. That is not to say that Curley's 
representative, next friend, or guardian ad litem could not file and successfully prosecute 
a medical malpractice suit while Curley is still alive, but comatose, because the cause of 
action had accrued on April 8, 2004. See, e.g., K.S.A. 60-217(c) ("If a minor or 
incapacitated person does not have a duly appointed representative the minor or 
incapacitated person may sue by the minor or incapacitated person's next friend or by a 
guardian ad litem."). But as the Court of Appeals declared, the cause of action belongs to 
Curley, not his wife or representative, so that he could not be personally barred by the 
statute of limitations while he is unable to ascertain the fact of injury. Martin, 43 Kan. 
App. 2d at 599. 
 
29 
 
 
This interpretation is not only what the statute plainly says, but it comports with 
the provisions of K.S.A. 60-515, which address the running of the statute of limitations 
for persons under legal disability. See Redd v. Kansas Truck Center, 291 Kan. 176, 195, 
239 P.3d 66 (2010) (appellate courts must consider various provisions of an act in pari 
materia with view of reconciling and bringing provisions into workable harmony, if 
possible). That statute provides, in relevant part: 
 
 
"(a)  Effect  Except as provided in K.S.A. 60-523, if any person entitled to bring 
an action, other than for the recovery of real property or a penalty or a forfeiture, at the 
time the cause of action accrued or at any time during the period the statue of limitations 
is running, is . . . an incapacitated person . . . , such person shall be entitled to bring such 
action within one year after the person's disability is removed, . . . . 
 
"(b)  Death of person under disability. If any person entitled to bring an action 
dies during the continuance of any disability specified in subsection (a) and no 
determination is made of the cause of action accrued to the deceased, any person entitled 
to claim from, by or under the deceased, may commence such action within one year 
after the deceased's death." K.S.A. 60-515. 
 
 
The majority notes that K.S.A. 60-515 has broad application beyond the type of 
action involved in this case, at least intimating that it might not apply to a medical 
malpractice action because of the specific provisions in K.S.A. 60-513(c). But the plain 
language of K.S.A. 60-515(a) only excludes the application of its provisions from one 
statute, K.S.A. 60-523, and only excludes specified causes of action which are not 
applicable here. It makes no difference whether K.S.A. 60-515 was intended to apply to 
more than just medical malpractice actions, so long as the plain language of the statute 
makes a medical malpractice action one of those to which its provisions apply. 
 
 
In the case before us, K.S.A. 60-515(a) does not control because Curley's 
disability was not removed, prior to his death. Rather, Curley or his representative was 
"entitled to bring an action" after the April 8, 2004, act of malpractice, but he died while 
30 
 
under a disability set forth in subsection (a) and with "no determination . . . made of the 
cause of action accrued to [Curley]," which gave "any person entitled to claim from, by 
or under [Curley]" the right to "commence such action within one year after [Curley's] 
death." K.S.A. 60-515(b). Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run on the 
survival action for Curley's damages on the date of his death but ran for only 1 year 
thereafter.  
 
 
Accordingly, I would interpret K.S.A. 60-513(c) and K.S.A. 60-515(b) in harmony 
and apply them to the facts of this case as follows:  Curley's cause of action accrued on 
April 8, 2004, because the fact of his injury was objectively ascertainable on that date; 
the period of limitation did not begin to run against Curley personally while he was alive 
but comatose because the fact of injury was not subjectively ascertainable by him; the 
period of limitation began to run against the person who succeeded to Curley's cause of 
action on the date of Curley's death and expired 1 year after death. Therefore, the 
successor's filing of the survival action approximately 1 1/2 years after Curley's death 
was barred by the plain language of K.S.A. 60-515(b). 
 
 
The dissent does not apply K.S.A. 60-515(b) as it is plainly written because it 
believes that the provision cannot be employed to shorten the limitation period of K.S.A. 
60-513(c). I would submit that 60-515 would not operate to shorten the 60-513(c) 
limitation period for Curley, because under the dissent's subjective interpretation of 60-
513(c), no limitation period ever commenced against him personally. Indeed, under the 
Court of Appeals' rationale, the cause of action did not even accrue until death. If Curley 
is deemed to have been incapable of reasonably ascertaining the fact of his injury while 
in a coma, his death did not cure that disability. A dead person can no more ascertain the 
fact of injury than a person who is in a coma, which would mean that the limitation 
period never begins to run.  
 
31 
 
 
I do not discern an explanation by the dissent as to why death triggers the 
commencement of the 60-513(c) 2-year limitations period. Similarly, the dissent does not 
say why the legislature must give a person that inherits or acquires a cause of action the 
same limitation period as the decedent would have had if alive and not under disability. A 
rather fundamental principle of statutory construction is that we are to apply provisions as 
they are written, not as we think they should be applied to achieve the results we would 
like to see. See Kenyon v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 254 Kan. 287, 292-93, 864 P.2d 
1161 (1993) (courts cannot delete vital provisions or supply vital omissions in statute; 
only legislature can correct such defects). Furthermore, we have demonstrated recently 
that we need not follow prior caselaw that ignored, contradicted, or misconstrued plain 
statutory language. See, e.g., State v. Berry, 292 Kan. 493, Syl. ¶ 6, 254 P.3d 1276 (2011) 
(rejecting court-made rule that contradicted plain language of statute); Casco v. Armour 
Swift-Eckrich, 283 Kan. 508, 525, 154 P.3d 494 (2007) (rejecting 80-year-old precedent 
that did not follow key tenet of statutory construction prohibiting adding language not 
found in statute). 
 
 
The Court of Appeals' explanation was that  
 
"[u]pon Curley's death, his medical negligence claim became an asset of his estate. At the 
time the fact of injury was reasonably apparent to the estate, the successor-injured party, 
thereby causing the survival action for medical malpractice to accrue and the running of 
the period of limitation to commence pursuant to K.S.A. 60-513(c)." Martin, 43 Kan. 
App. 2d at 597.   
 
While it may sound good at first, that rationale cannot withstand closer scrutiny.  
 
 
I will begin by presuming that the term "estate" was intended to refer to a 
decedent's estate, as opposed to a conservatorship estate, trust estate, partnership estate, 
etc., because, otherwise, the knowledge acquisition that the panel attributes to the "estate" 
would have occurred during Curley's lifetime. Next, the panel's rationale that Curley's 
32 
 
"estate" had the legal responsibility to pursue the collection of Curley's personal assets 
only works if one assumes that death automatically gives rise to the creation of a legal 
entity that is entitled to hold and administer all of the decedent's assets on behalf of the 
ultimate heirs and legatees. But that is not the case, as evidenced by the plethora of 
provisions contained in the Kansas Probate Code, K.S.A. 59-101 et seq., where actions 
are commenced by a petition. K.S.A. 59-103(b). Indeed, in today's world of probate-
avoidance estate planning it is probably the exception, rather than the rule, for a surviving 
spouse to instigate formal probate administration proceedings that would result in the 
appointment of an executor or administrator. In other words, the establishment of a 
decedent's estate for Curley upon his death was no more required, or even likely, than the 
establishment of a conservatorship estate while he was living, but comatose.  
 
 
Even if a personal representative is created for a decedent, the panel does not 
explain why that invests the estate with the requisite legal knowledge of the fact of injury. 
Here, if that personal representative is Curley's wife, she had the same knowledge when 
she was a potential conservator as when she became a potential executrix or 
administratrix. Moreover, a personal representative steps into the shoes of the person 
represented, but the panel would have it the other way around, with the deceased person 
acquiring the representative's personal knowledge.   
 
 
More importantly, the panel's theory of knowledge acquisition by a deceased 
injured party through the personal knowledge of a putative personal representative of a 
potential decedent's estate is not founded on any statute, but rather it is a fabrication to 
justify declaring that the cause of action did not accrue during Curley's lifetime. That 
declaration is necessary to refute the plain language of K.S.A. 60-515, but it cannot 
survive scrutiny either. If the cause of action did not accrue until the statute of limitations 
began to run and the statute of limitations did not begin to run until Curley's death, then 
Curley's wife could not have brought suit while her husband was still alive. As the Court 
of Appeals declared, Curley is the injured party in the survival action, not his wife. 
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Martin, 43 Kan. App. 2d at 597. Therefore, the wife would have to find some resource, 
other than the tortfeasor, to provide the wherewithal to pay for her husband's assisted 
living care for however long he might linger before his death triggered the accrual of a 
medical malpractice claim. But, of course, as noted above, that is simply not true; a suit 
could have been filed and prosecuted to a successful conclusion any time from and after 
April 8, 2004, by Curley's representative, next friend, or guardian ad litem. K.S.A. 60-
217.  
 
 
To reiterate, I would find, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-513(c), that Curley's medical 
malpractice claim accrued when the fact of injury was objectively ascertainable, which 
was on April 8, 2004, but that the period of limitation in that statute never commenced 
because the fact of injury was never reasonably ascertainable by the injured party, 
Curley. Instead, because Curley died while suffering under a disability contemplated by 
K.S.A. 60-515(a), the period of limitation set forth in K.S.A. 60-515(b) applied, giving 
those entitled to claim from, by, or under the deceased 1 year from the date of death to 
commence the action. Because the action was not commenced within that statute of 
limitations, it was barred. 
 
 
NUSS, C.J., joins in the foregoing concurring opinion. 
 
* * * 
 
 
LUCKERT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:  I concur with the majority's 
holding that Macie Martin's cause of action for wrongful death was not barred by the 
statute of limitations. However, I respectfully dissent from the holding that the survival 
action she brought as a personal representative of the Estate of Curley Martin is barred. 
 
 
In my view, K.S.A. 60-513(c) must be read as a whole and the words "the injured 
party" must be given meaning. The majority's construction of the statute, following 
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Seymour v. Lofgreen, 209 Kan. 72, 495 P.2d 969 (1972), makes these words meaningless. 
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals gave the words meaning by applying Davidson 
v. Denning, 259 Kan. 659, 914 P.2d 936 (1996), and its holding that "'[t]he term 
"reasonably ascertainable" as applied in 60-513(b) and (c) in a wrongful death action 
suggests an objective standard based on an examination of the surrounding 
circumstances.' 259 Kan. at 669." Martin v. Naik, 43 Kan. App. 2d 591, 598, 228 P.3d 
1092 (2010).  
 
 
Davidson and similar decisions harmonize the seemingly disparate concepts 
contained in the phrase "reasonably ascertainable to the injured party." The words 
"reasonably ascertainable" suggest an objective standard, while the phrase "to an injured 
party" suggests a subjective one. When faced with such a disparity and resulting 
ambiguity, "it is the duty of the court, as far as practicable, to reconcile the different 
provisions so as to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible." State ex rel. 
Morrison v. Oshman Sporting Goods Co. Kansas, 275 Kan. 763, Syl. ¶ 2, 69 P.3d 1087 
(2003). While the majority determines that this reconciliation would require adding the 
words "to the injured party" into the exception stated in the second part of K.S.A. 60-
513(c), the majority's analysis is equally objectionable because it essentially deletes those 
same words from the third part of the statute. The construction of the statute adopted by 
this court in Davidson does neither and reconciles the provisions by allowing 
consideration of the injured party's circumstances.  
 
 
In examining Curley's circumstances, one of the obvious considerations was his 
incapacity. Considering all of the circumstances, the fact of injury was not reasonably 
ascertainable by someone in Curley's situation. Consequently, I would conclude that the 
statute of limitations for Curley's cause of action for medical malpractice did not 
"commence" on April 8, 2004, and was not running before Curley's death. I reach this 
conclusion by applying each of the three parts of K.S.A. 60-513(c) as written.  
 
35 
 
 
The first part of the statute instructs us that a medical malpractice action "shall be 
deemed to have accrued at the time of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of 
action." While this phrase does not explain what is meant by "the act giving rise to the 
cause of action," the second phrase directs us to look at the initial act by stating "unless 
the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act." 
(Emphasis added.) By delaying the accrual of the cause of action, K.S.A. 60-513(c) 
deviates from the general rule that "a cause of action accrues, so as to start the running of 
the statute of limitations, as soon as the right to maintain a legal action arises." Pancake 
House, Inc. v. Redmond, 239 Kan. 83, 87, 716 P.2d 575 (1986); see Puckett v. Mt. 
Carmel Regional Med. Center, 290 Kan. 406, 420, 228 P.3d 1048 (2010) (elements of 
medical malpractice action are:  [1] health care provider/patient relationship giving rise to 
duty of care; [2] provider's breach of duty by deviation from applicable standard of care; 
[3] injury to patient; and [4] proximate relationship between breach of duty and injury). 
In this case, this means the action did not accrue at the initial act. 
 
 
By operation of the first two parts of K.S.A. 60-513(c), Curley's cause of action 
did not accrue at the time of the occurrence of the initial act of negligence because, under 
the uncontroverted facts, the fact of injury was not reasonably ascertainable until some 
time later—the next day. Then, because the exception stated in the second part of the 
statute is triggered, we must consider the third part of the statute. This part of the statute 
directs that "the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes 
reasonably ascertainable to the injured party." (Emphasis added.) It is uncontroverted that 
the fact of injury was not reasonably ascertainable to Curley before his death. Hence, I 
would hold that the limitation period was not commenced before that date.   
 
 
This reading of K.S.A. 60-513(c) reconciles the language of each part of the 
provision and does not frustrate the purpose of the statute of limitations, which is to 
"preclud[e] presentation of stale claims and encourag[e] diligence on the part" of the 
injured party. Welch v. City of Kansas City, 204 Kan. 765, 771, 465 P.2d 951 (1970). The 
36 
 
statute of repose embedded in K.S.A. 60-513(c), which provides for a relatively short 
time period of 4 years, is designed to prevent that from occurring while allowing for 
situations such as this case where the cause of action does not accrue and the period of 
limitation does not commence for a significant period of time after the initial wrongful 
act is committed.  
 
 
Additionally, I disagree with the concurring justices' reliance on K.S.A. 60-515. 
The plain language of K.S.A. 60-515 limits the statute's application to situations where 
the injured party is incapacitated "at the time the cause of action accrued or at any time 
during the period the statute of limitations is running." (Emphasis added.) Here, because 
the fact of injury was not reasonably ascertainable to Curley, the cause of action did not 
accrue, the period of limitation had not commenced, and the period of limitation was not 
running.  
 
 
Even if K.S.A. 60-515 applies, it should not be used to shorten the statute of 
limitations to 1 year after Curley's death. In Smith v. Yell Bell Taxi, Inc., 276 Kan. 305, 
308-09, 75 P.3d 1222 (2003), this court held that "K.S.A. 60-515 extends the statute of 
limitations . . . and cannot be applied to shorten it.  . . . [P]laintiffs suffering from a short-
term legal incapacity, such as being in a coma, need not apply K.S.A. 60-515 unless it 
will extend the statute of limitations." Following the Smith court's analysis, I would 
reconcile K.S.A. 60-515 and the otherwise applicable statute of limitations—in this case 
K.S.A. 60-513(a)(7), (c). In doing so, I would hold that those who were entitled to make a 
claim on behalf of Curley had 2 years from the date his disability no longer tolled the 
commencement of the statute of limitations in which to file this action. In summary, 
because the estate's representative filed this action within 2 years of Curley's death, I 
would affirm the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the survival action was not barred by 
the statute of limitations and would reverse the district court.  
 
 
ROSEN and BILES, JJ., join in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion. 
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