Case Title: GOODNOUGH v STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1982-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 81-195 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982 GREGORY K. GOODNOUGH and COREY McMILLAN , Plaintiffs and Appellants, VS . STATE OF MONTANA, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for the County of Flathead Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: William A. Rossbach argued, Missoula, Montana Hoyt and Trieweiler, Whitefish, Montana For Respondent: Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn & Phillips, Kalispell, Montana I. James Heckathorn argued, Kalispell, Montana Filed: JuL I - 1982 Submitted: February 23, 1982 Decided: M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s is an a p p e a l of an a c t i o n i n n e g l i g e n c e a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e of Montana, a r i s i n g o u t of a c a r a c c i d e n t i n which p l a i n t i f f s ' c a r was s t r u c k by a p a s s i n g v e h i c l e while making a l e f t t u r n . P l a i n t i f f s brought t h i s a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e d r i v e r of t h e p a s s i n g v e h i c l e , Rodney Kludash, and t h e S t a t e of Montana. The p l a i n t i f f s s e t t - l e d w i t h Kludash b u t pro- ceeded t o t r i a l a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e . The j u r y r e t u r n e d a ver- d i c t f o r t h e S t a t - e , and a judgment based on t h i s v e r d i c t was i s s u e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s - t r i c t , Flathead Count-y. The p l a i n t i f f s a p p e a l . O n November 9, 1976, a t about. 4:30 p.m., t h e appel- l a n t . ~ , t w o high s c h o o l boys, were d r i v i n g s o u t h on Highway 93 from W h i t e f i s h , Mont-ana, t o a r u r a l s u b d i v i s i o n c a l l e d Happy Valley. A s a p p e l l a n t McMillan was turning l e f t o f f t h e highway i n t o t h e s u b d i v i s i o n , h i s c a r was s t r u c k by a p a s s i n g v e h i c l e d r i v e n by Rodney Kludash. Both a p p e l l a n t s i n c u r r e d s u b s t a n t - i a l i n j u r i e s . Goodnough had a badly broken femur which r e q u i r e d n e a r l y a f u l l body cast.. McMillan was i n a semi-comatose s t a t e f o r s e v e r a l weeks, had a crushed p e l v i s , and i n c u r r e d many problems wit.h h i s t r a c h e a when a tracheostomy was performed i n t h e h o s p i t a l . Happy Valley s u b d i v i s i o n is about s i x m i l e s sout-h of W h i t e f i s h . The i n t e r s e c t ion between t.he road l e a d i n g t-o Happy Valley and Highway 93 is 1 , 0 5 1 f e e t from t h e c r e s t of a h i l l . The road is s t r a i g h t , and on t.he day of t h e a c c i d e n t it was c l e a r and d r y . Double yellow, no p a s s i n g s t r i p e s yo up t h e h i l l preceding t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n and c o n t i n u e past. t h e i n t e r s e c t - i o n . Seven hundred f e e t b e f o r e t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n t h e r e is a t r a f f i c s i g n warning of a p e d e s t r i a n c r o s s i n g . Tne p l a l n t i f f s contend t h a t t h e S t a t e was negligent by using only double yellow, no p a s s i n g s t r i p e s t o warn d r i v e r s of p a s s i n g . They c l a i m t h e S t a t e had n o t i c e of t h e hazardous n a t u r e of t h e Happy Valley i n t e r s e c t i o n and, t h e r e f o r e , was under a d u t y t o p u t up a no p a s s i n g s i g n , an i n t e r s e c t i o n s i g n , o r a t u r n bay f o r l e f t - t u r n i n g c a r s . An e x p e r t f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f s t e s t i f i e d t h a t because t h e S t a t e was aware of t h e high number of a c c i d e n t s r e p o r t e d a t t h i s i n t e r s e c t i o n , i t should have known t h a t t h e yellow, no p a s s i n g s t r i p e s commanded l i t t l e r e s p e c t and were n o t e f f e c t i v e . The p l a i n t i f f s c l a i m t h a t t h e S t a t e c r e a t e d a " t r a p " f o r unwary d r i v e r s . The S t a t e e m p h a s i z e s t h e f a c t s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e a c c i d e n t i t s e l f , claiming t h a t any l i a b i l i t y of t h e S t a t e , i f any, was cut. o f f by t h e superseding cause of t h e p a s s i n g v e h i c l e . The S t a t e p r e s e n t e d evidence that. t h e d r i v e r of t h e p a s s i n g v e h i c l e , Kludash, was t r a v e l i n g between 75 and 100 m i l e s per hour and t h a t Kludash had a blood a l c o h o l l e v e l of .08 p e r c e n t a t t h e time of t h e a c c i d e n t . The D i s - t r i c t Court allowed i n t o evidence testimony t h a t Kludash' s c a r was s e e n parked a l o n g s i d e t h e road o u t s i d e of W h i t e f i s h , and s e v e r a l of t h e c a r ' s occupants were o u t s i d e r e l i e v i n g themselves. A t t h e t r i a l , t h e D i s t r i c t Court gave t h e f o l l o w i n g i n s t r u c t ion on s u p e r s e d i n g , i n t e r v e n i n g cause: "The law r e c o g n i z e s what is c a l l e d a super- seding cause. A superseding cause is a n i n t e r v e n i n g cause n o t r e a s o n a b l y f o r e s e e a b l e t h a t c u t s o f f t h e c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n between t h e a l l e g e d o r i g i n a l n e g l i g e n c e and t h e i n j u r y complained of and t h e r e b y p r e v e n t s t h e a l l e g e d o r i g i n a l n e g l i g e n c e f r o m b e i n g a proximate cause t h e r e o f . A s a p p l i e d t o t h i s c a s e , t h e law p r o v i d e s t h a t i f you should f i n d t h a t t h e S t a t e of Montana was n e g l i g e n t and t h e S t a t e ' s n e y l i g e n c e was a c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r t o t h e p l a i n t . i f f s l i n j u r i e s , but that. t h e n e g l i g e n c e of Rodney ~ l u d a s h was a super- s e d i n g c a u s e , t h e n such s u p e r s e d i n g cause p r e v e n t s any n e g l i g e n c e o f t h e S t a t e o f Montana from b e i n g a p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f c l a i m a n t s ' i n j u r i e s . " J u r y I n s t r u c t i o n No. 14. A f t e r b e g i n n i n g d e l i b e r a t i o n , t h e j u r y e v i d e n t l y became confused a s t o t h e meaning of "superseding" and wrote t h e t r i a l ludge t h i s n o t e : "We do n o t understand s u p e r s e d i n g i n I n s t r u c t i o n No. 14." The judge r e f u s e d t o g i v e t h e j u r o r s a d i c t i o n a r y and advised t h e j u r o r s t o examine and c o n s i d e r a l l of t h e o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s along with No. 14 and, i n doing so, a p p l y t h e i r judgment t o t h e f a c t s . A f t e r d e l i b e r a t i o n , which included an o v e r n i g h t re- c e s s , t h e j u r y s e n t down a v e r d i c t f o r t h e S t a t e . 'l'he a p p e l l a n t s p r e s e n t b a s i c a l l y f o u r i s s u e s on review: 1. Whether t h e j u r y was so confused by t h e i n s t r u c - t i o n s on proximate cause t h a t a v e r d i c t f o r appe1lant.s was impossible. 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by a d m i t t i n g e v i d e n c e t h a t o c c u p a n t s o f t h e Kludash c a r were s e e n r e l i e v i n g themselves. 3. Whether a highway patrolman was compet.ent t.o e s t i m a t e t h e speed of t.he Kludash v e h i c l e . 4. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n p r o h i b i t i n g counsel f o r a p p e l l a n t - s to q u e s t ion p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s a b o u t t h e i r b e l i e f s , a s t a x p a y e r s , concerning t h e i r f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t . i n t h e outcome of t.he c a s e . A p p e l l a n t s ' major c o n t e n t i o n of e r r o r is t h a t t h e j u r y was so confused by t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t a v e r d i c t f o r them was made impossible. S p e c i f i c a l l y , a p p e l l a n t s contend that. Instruction No. 1 4 was incomplete, i n t h a t s u p e r s e d i n g cause was n o t p r o p e r l y d e f i n e d , and caused p r e j u d i c i a l con- f u s i o n i n t h e j u r y . A p p e l l a n t s contend t h a t t h e c o n f u s i o n of t h i s incom- p l e t e d e f i n i t i o n was compounded by t h e g i v i n g of I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 2 which p r o v i d e s : "A p l a i n t i f f who is i n j u r e d a s a proximate r e s u l t of some n e g l i g e n t conduct on t h e p a r t of a d e f e n d a n t is e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r compen- s a t i o n f o r such i n j u r y from t h a t d e f e n d a n t . "Thus, P l a i n t i f f s a r e e n t i t l e d t o a v e r d i c t i n t h i s c a s e i f you f i n d , i n accordance w i t h my i n s t r u c t i o n s : "1. That Defendant was n e g l i g e n t , and "2. That such n e g l i g e n c e was a proximate c a u s e of i n j u r y t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s , and " 3 . That such n e g l i g e n c e was n o t superseded by t h e n e g l i g e n c e of o t h e r s a s d e f i n e d i n t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s . " A p p e l l a n t s c l a i m t h a t t h i s c o n f u s i o n could have been a l l e v i a t e d by t h e g i v i n g of t h e i r proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. " I f you f i n d t h a t t h e Defendant S t a t e o f Montana was n e g l i g e n t and t h a t its n e g l i g e n c e was a s u b s t a n t i a l f a c t o r i n b r i n g i n g about a n i n j u r y to t h e P l a i n t i f f s b u t t h a t t h e immedi- a t e cause of t h e i n j u r y was t h e n e g l i g e n t conduct of a t h i r d person t h e Defendant is n o t r e l i e v e d o f l i a b i l i t y f o r such i n j u r y i f : I t i . A t t h e t i m e o f its conduct Defendant r e a l i z e d o r r e a s o n a b l y should have r e a l i z e d t h a t a t h i r d person might a c t a s he d i d ; " 2 . A r e a s o n a b l e person knowing t.he s i t u a - t i o n e x i s t i n g a t t h e t i m e of t h e conduct o f t.he t h i r d p e r s o n would n o t have regarded it a s h i g h l y e x t r a o r d i n a r y t h a t t h e t h i r d person had s o a c t e d .'I It is w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d i n Montana t h a t when i n s t r u c - t i o n s a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t o r c o n t r a d i c t o r y t o a d e g r e e t h a t would confuse t h e average j u r o r , r e v e r s a l is r e q u i r e d . B r o t h e r s v. S u r p l u s T r a c t o r P a r t s C o r p o r a t i o n ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 1 Mont.. 412, 506 P.2d 1362, 1364. However, t h i s Court h a s a l s o r u l e d t h a t where t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , t a k e n a s a whole, s t a t e t h e law a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e c a s e , a p a r t y c a n n o t c l a i m r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r a s t o t h e g i v i n g o f c e r t a i n i n s t r u c - t ions. Kock S p r i n g s C o r p o r a t i o n v. P i e r r e ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mon t.. , 615 P.2d 206, 211, 37 St.Kep. 1378, 1383. A s not-ed by o u r sister court. i n Idaho, when c o n s i d e r i n g j u r y i n s t r u c - t i o n s , it must be remembered t h a t o f t e n a j u r y is deluged wit-h numerous i n s t r u c t i o n s , many of which a t t e m p t t o e x p l a i n complex q u e s t i o n s o f law. The court. on r e v i e w must t h e r e f o r e b a l a n c e t.he p o s s i b l e con£ u s i o n c r e a t e d by l a y e r upon l a y e r o f i n s t r u c t - i o n s and t h e n e c e s s i t y o f p r o v i d i n g t h e a p p r o p r i - a t e l e g a l t h e o r i e s . Messmer v. Ker ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 96 Idaho 75, 524 Because t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n by t h e D i s t r l c t Court a r e not i n c o n s i s t e n t o r c o n t r a d i c t o r y , and because t h e y r e f l e c t , i n s u b s t a n c e , t h e a p p l i c a b l e Montana law, we c a n n o t s a y t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t s were p r e j u d i c e d by t h e g i v i n g o f t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s . I n Halsey v. Uithof ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 166 Mont. 319, 532 P.2d 6 8 6 , w e d i s c u s s e d t h e r u l e s o f c o n c u r r e n t . c a u s e a n d s u p e r s e d i n g - i n t e r v e n i n g cause and how t h e y r e l a t e to t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of proximate c a u s e : "We a g r e e w i t h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t where one h a s n e g l i g e n t l y caused a c o n d i t i o n of d a n g e r , he is n o t r e l i e v e d of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r damage caused t o a n o t h e r merely because t h e i n j u r y a l s o involved t h e l a t e r misconduct of someone else. But, t h i s is t r u e o n l y i f b o t h n e g l i g e n t a c t s a r e i n f a c t c o n c u r r i n g proxi- mate c a u s e s o f t h e i n j u r y ; and it is n o t t r u e i f t h e l a t e r n e g l i g e n c e is a n independent, i n t e r v e n i n g s o l e c a u s e o f t h e i n c i d e n t . [ C i t a t i o n o m i t t e d . 1 " I n d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e n e g l i g e n c e i n c r e a t i n g a hazard ( t h e t r u c k s t a l l e d on t h e highway) was a proximate c a u s e of t h e a c c i - d e n t , t h i s test is t o be a p p l i e d : Did t h e wrongful a c t , i n a n a t u r a l c o n t i n u o u s se- quence of event-s, which might r e a s o n a b l y b e e x p e c t e d t o f o l l o w , produce t h e i n j u r y ? I f s o , it is a c o n c u r r i n g proximate c a u s e of t h e i n j u r y even though t h e l a t e r n e g l i g e n t a c t o f a n o t h e r . . . c o o p e r a t e d t o c a u s e i t . O n t h e o t h e r hand, i f t h e l a t t e r ' s act of n e g l i g e n c e i n c a u s i n g t h e a c c i d e n t w a s o f such a charac- t e r a s n o t r e a s o n a b l y t o be e x p e c t e d t o hap- p e n i n t h e n a t u r a l s e q u e n c e o f e v e n t s , t h e n such l a t e r a c t of n e a l i a e n c e is t h e i n d e ~ e n - d e n t , i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e a n d t h e r e f o r e t h e - - - - - - - - - - - - - s o l e proximate c a u s e of t h e i n i u r y . [ C i t a - t . i o n s A o m i t t e d . ] " 532 P.2d at. 6901691. Here, I n s t r u c t i o n No. 14 p r o v i d e s t h a t a s u p e r s e d i n g c a u s e is an " i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e not. r e a s o n a b l y f o r e s e e a b l e t h a t c u t s o f f t h e c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n between t h e a l l e g e d o r i g i n a l n e g l i g e n c e and t h e i n j u r y complained of and t h e r e b y p r e v e n t s t h e a l l e g e d o r i g i n a l n e g l i g e n c e from b e i n g t h e proximate c a u s e t h e r e o f ." While t h i s is n e i t h e r t h e c l e a r - e s t n o r b e s t language p o s s i b l e , it. s t a t e s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e r u l e s set down i n Halsey. I n Halsey w e s t a t e d , i n e f f e c t , t.hat t h e i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e is t h e s o l e proximate c a u s e o f t h e i n j u r y i f it was not r e a s o n a b l y f o r e s e e a b l e . Other Montana c a s e law h a s followed t h i s p r o p o s i t - i o n and empha- s i z e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f f o r e s e e a b i 1 i t . y i n d e t e r m i n i n g whether an i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e is t h e s o l e proximate c a u s e o f i n j u r y . See S c h a f e r v. S t a t e , Dept.. of I n s t i t u t i o n s ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 1 Mont. 102, 592 P.2d 493, 36 S t .Rep. 560; and DeVerniero v. Eby ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 159 Mont.. 146, 496 P.2d 290. W e cannot s e e how p l a i n t i f f s ' proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 1 2 would have a l l e v i a t - e d any c o n f u s i o n a r i s i n g from a p p l i c a t - i o n o f t-hese complex l e g a l r u l e s t o t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e . P l a i n t i f f s ' proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 12 m e r e l y p a r a p h r a s e s t h e Restatement on T o r t s , w h i l e I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 14 r e f l e c t s p r i o r Montana law. I t d i d n o t c o n t a i n a d e f i n i - t i o n of s u p e r s e d i n g cause. The D i s t r i c t Court was t h e r e f o r e n o t i n e r r o r by r e f u s i n g t h i s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n . Because a p p e l l a n t s were n o t p r e j u d i c e d by I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 4 and t h e o t h e r i n s t - r u c t i o n s g i v e n t o t.he j u r y , w e cannot say t h a t t h e District Court e r r e d by g i v i n g I n s t r u c - t i o n Nos. 12 and 14. It should be noted h e r e t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t s d i d n o t p u t i n t h e i r b r i e f s a v e r b a t i m t e x t of t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s which t h e y claimed were i n e r r o r . In t h e f u t u r e , w e r e q u e s t t h a t when an a p p e l l a n t relies on e r r o r a r i s i n g o u t of t h e i s s u a n c e o f j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , h e should set f o r t h t h e t e x t o i t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s i n t h e b r i e f , a s w e l l a s t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s and any r e l a t e d i n s t r u c - t i o n s t h e appellant. c l a i m s should have been g i v e n . The a p p e l l a n t s next. cant-end t-hat t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by a d m i t t i n g t h e testimony of a p p e l l a n t Goodnough t h a t he had s e e n t h e Kludash c a r parked s o u t h of W h i t e f i s h on Highway 93 with p e r s o n s o u t s i d e t h e c a r going t o t h e bath- roolu. A p p e l l a n t s c l a i m t h a t such t e s t i m o n y is w i t h o u t p r o b a t i v e v a l u e because it is i m p o s s i b l e to i d e n t i f y which o c c u p a n t s were o u t s i d e of t h e c a r and because t h e i n c i d e n t was t o o remote from t h e s c e n e of t h e a c c i d e n t . A p p e l l a n t s a l s o c l a i m t h a t t h e testimony was s o h i g h l y inflammatory t h a t its p r o b a t i v e v a l u e , i f any, was outweighed by its p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t . The D i s t - r i c t Court admitted Goodnough's t e s t i m o n y because it was r e l e v a n t ". . . t o t h e mental c o n d i t i o n o f t h e d r i v e r . . . and a l s o a s t o speed o f t h e v e h i c l e . . ." Under Rule 401, Mont .R. Evid., relevant. evidence is "evidence having any tendency t o make t h e exis-kence of any f a c t t h a t is of consequence t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e a c t i o n more o r less p r o b a b l e t h a n it would be w i t h o u t t h e evidence ." The speed of t h e Kludash v e h i c l e was d e f i n i t e l y r e l e v a n t t o showing whether it w a s a s u p e r s e d i n g c a u s e o f t h e a p p e l l a n t s ' i n j u r i e s . That t h e c a r w a s parked a number o f m i l e s away from t h e a c c l d e n t and t h a t it caught up w i t h t h e McMillan v e h i c l e is t h e r e f o r e r e l e v a n t and p r o b a t i v e t o a n i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e . Under Rule 403, Mont .K. Evid., r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e may be excluded i f its p r o b a t i v e v a l u e is outweighed by u n f a i r p r e j u d i c e o r c o n f u s i o n o f t h e i s s u e s . The a p p e l l a n t s c i t e S t a t e v. B i s c h e r t ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 1 Mont. 152, 308 P.2d 969, t o s u p p o r t t h e i r argument t h a t Goodnough's t e s t i m o n y was s o inflammatory t h a t it should have been excluded. I n B i s c h e r t , t h l s Court discussed t h e p r e j u d i c i a l n a t u r e o f gruesome photographs of a five-month-old baby who had s t a r v e d t o d e a t h . B i s c h e r t is n o t a p p l i c a b l e h e r e . The t e s t i m o n y of Goodnough is n o t p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e a p p e l l a n t s ; it is no r e f l e c t i o n on them o r t h e i r a c t i o n s . While it may be c o n s i d e r e d somewhat p r e j u d i c i a l toward Kludash and t h e o c c u p a n t s of h i s car, w e a r e n o t concerned w i t h them h e r e . The p r e j u d i c i a l n a t u r e of Goodnoughls testimony, i f any, is t h e r e f o r e outweighed by ~ t s probative v a l u e . 'The a p p e l l a n t s 1 t h i r d i s s u e 1s w h e t h e r Highway Patrolman Jacobsen was competent t o t e s t i f y a s t o t h e speed o f t h e Kludash v e h i c l e . A p p e l l a n t s acknowledge t h a t t h i s Court r e c o g n i z e s t h e competency of a highway patrolman t o y l v e h i s c a l c u l a t i o n s o f t h e speed o f a v e h i c l e based on t h e v e h i c l e ' s s k i d marks. A p p e l l a n t s c l a i m , however, t h a t e s t i - mating speed i n a complicat-ed c o l l i s i o n r e q u i r e s t r a i n i n g i n p h y s i c s and mechanics which highway p a t r o l m e n d o n o t have. See, Deaver v. Hickox ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 8 1 Ill.App.2d 79, 224 N.E.2d 4611. T h i s C o u r t h a s long h e l d t h e st-andard t h a t t h e d e t e r - m i n a t i o n of t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n of a s k i l l e d o r e x p e r t w i t n e s s is a m a t t e r l a r g e l y w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l judge and, i n t h e absence o f a showing o f a b u s e , o r d i n a r i l y w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d . Graham v. Rolandson ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 150 Mont. 270, 435 P.2d 263; Workman v. McIntyre C o n s t r u c t i o n Co. ( 1 9 8 0 ) I Mont. 617 P.2d 1281, 37 St..Rep. 1637; f o r more e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n see 29 ALR3d 248. More import-ant- l y , i n a v e r y s i m i l a r c a s e i n v o l v i n g t h e same t y p e o f c o l l i - s i o n , w e s p e c i f i c a l l y allowed expert. t-est imony o f a highway pat-rolman c o n c e r n i n g t h e c a u s e o f t h e a c c i d e n t . and v e h i c u l a r speed. See, Rude v. Neal ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 165 Mont. 520, 530 P.2d 428. Here, Highway Patrolman J a c o b s e n t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had been a highway patrolman f o r twelve y e a r s , had i n v e s t i - g a t e d a b o u t 1,500 a c c i d e n t s , and had t ~ r a i n i n g i n a c c i d e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g how t o e s t i m a t e speed from t h e l e n g t h o f s k i d marks and damage t o a u t o m o b i l e s . A s we r e c o g n i z e d i n W o l l a s t o n v. B u r l i n g t o n N o r t h e r n , I n c . ( 1980) , Mont.. 612 P.2d 1277, 37 St.Rep. 1015, a s long a s - the cross-examiner is g i v e n a d e q u a t e o p p o r t u n i t y t o e l i c i t any a s s u m p t i o n s o r f a c t s u n d e r l y i n g an e x p e r t ' s o p i n i o n , t h e w e i g h t to be g i v e n t h e e x p e r t ' s t e s t i m o n y is f o r t h e j u r y to det-ermine. A s not.ed by t.he D i s t r i c t C o u r t , t h e q u e s t i o n is not one of a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f t h e pat.rolmanls test-imony, b u t t h e welcjht ~t 1s g l v e n . The D i s t r l c t C o u r t , t h e r e f o r e , d l d not err by a l l o w i n g t h e hlghway patrolman t o t e s t i f y as t o t h e speed of t h e Kludash v e h i c l e . F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t s contend t h a t t h e District Court e r r e d i n not a l l o w i n g c o u n s e l f o r t h e a p p e l l a n t s to q u e s t i o n p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s about t h e i r b e l i e f s , as t a x p a y e r s , con- c e r n i n g t h e financial outcome o f t h e c a s e . In Borkoski v. Yost ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 182 Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688, 36 St.Rep. 809, w e h e l d t h a t t h e £ a l l u r e t o permit v o i r d i r e on i s s u e s r e l a t i n g t o damages is h a r m l e s s e r r o r where t h e j u r y f i n d s a g a i n s t t h e p l a i n t i f f on t h e i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y . W e d i d n o t , however, r u l e t h a t it was n o t e r r o r . I n Kelth v. L i b e r t y County Hosp. & Nurs. Home ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont . , 598 P.2d 203, 36 St.Kep. 1378, t h e j u r y d e c i d e d a g a i n s t t h e p l a i n t i f f on t h e i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y , and t h e p l a i n t i f f contended on a p p e a l t h a t s h e should have been g r a n t e d a change o f venue because m o s t of t h e members of t h e l u r y p a n e l were c o u n t y t a x p a y e r s who had a p e c u n i a r y i n t e r e s t i n t h e outcome o f t h e a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e c o u n t y h o s p i t a l . W e h e l d t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s motion f o r change of venue was u n t i m e l y but s t a t e d t h a t t h i s Court h a s p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h a t t a x p a y e r s t a t u s is not a ground f o r j u r o r d i s - qualification. I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t s a r e ~ n t e r p r e t i n g o u r h o l d i n g s a s messages t h a t we t h i n k v o i r d l r e on t h i s s u b j e c t should n o t be p e r m i t t e d . To t h e c o n t r a r y , we t h i n k t h e t r i a l c o u r t s should permit t h i s t y p e of v o i r d i r e i f e i t h e r p a r t y r e q u e s t s i t . Although t h e s i t u a t i o n may n o t o f t e n o c c u r , we cannot o v e r l o o k t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s , because of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s as t a x p a y e r s , might n o t want t o r e a c h t h e i s s u e of ddrnayes and t h e r e f o r e might d e c i d e a g a i n s t t h e p l a i n t i f f on t-he i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y . W e can s e e no harm i n p e r m i t t i n g v o i r d i r e on t h e i s s u e o f damages, and p e r m i s s i o n by t h e t r i a l c o u r t s w i l l d i s p o s e of t h e r e c u r r i n g problem o f whether t h e f a i l u r e t o p e r m i t t.he v o i r d i r e is h a r m l e s s e r r o r . Here, s i n c e t h e j u r y ret-urned a v e r d i c t f o r t h e defendant and d i d not r e a c h t h e q u e s t i o n of damages, t h e e r r o r must be c o n s i d e r e d harmless and n o t grounds f o r r e v e r s a l . S e e , Borkoski, s u p r a ; Rule 6 1 , M. R. Civ. P. Having found no p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r , t h e judgment of t h e D l s t r i c t Court is a £ f irmed. - 2 ' ,' I w e concur : d District. Judge, s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr .