Case Title: Davis v. Circuit Court for Dane County

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2022AP001999-W

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2024-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
2024 WI 14 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2022AP1999-W 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Antonio S. Davis, 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, Honorable Ellen 
K. Berz and  
State of Wisconsin, 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 26, 2024   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 9, 2023   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Ellen K. Berz   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
PROTASIEWICZ, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, 
in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion.  
HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion.  ZIEGLER, C.J., filed 
a dissenting opinion. 
  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioner, there were briefs filed by Kelsey 
Loshaw, assistant state public defender. There was an oral 
argument by Kelsey Loshaw, assistant state public defender.  
 
For the respondents, there was a brief filed by Jennifer L. 
Vandermeuse, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument 
by Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, assistant attorney general, and 
Abigail C.S. Potts, assistant attorney general. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Ellen Henak, Robert R. 
Henak, and Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of 
Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Kelli S. Thompson, Faun 
M. Moses, and Office of the State Public Defender, Madison, on 
behalf of Wisconsin State Public Defender. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2024 WI 14
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2022AP1999-W 
(L.C. No. 2022CM1737) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Antonio S. Davis, 
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Circuit Court for Dane County, Honorable Ellen 
K. Berz and State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 26, 2024 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
PROTASIEWICZ, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J., 
filed 
a 
concurring 
opinion.  
HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion.  ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
JANET C. PROTASIEWICZ, J.   The State charged Antonio 
Davis with misdemeanor battery and disorderly conduct.  Before 
the State Public Defender (SPD) could appoint counsel for Davis, 
a court commissioner conducted a combined initial appearance and 
arraignment, entered a not guilty plea on Davis's behalf, and 
No. 
2022AP1999-W   
 
2 
 
scheduled further proceedings before Judge Ellen K. Berz.  
Sixty-five days later, the SPD appointed counsel for Davis.  Six 
days later, Davis filed a request for substitution of judge.  
The circuit court denied the request as untimely. 
¶2 
Davis filed a petition for supervisory writ arguing 
that the circuit court had a plain duty to treat his request for 
substitution of judge as timely.  The court of appeals denied 
the petition,1 and we review that denial here. 
¶3 
Under Wis. Stat. § 971.20(4) (2021-22),2 a defendant 
must request substitution "before making any motions to the 
trial court and before arraignment."  In Dane County, where 
Davis's case is pending, a local rule purportedly extends that 
deadline in misdemeanor cases to "20 days after the initial 
appearance."3 
                                                 
1 Davis v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., No. 2022AP1999-W, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2022). 
2 The full text of Wis. Stat. § 971.20(4) is:  "Substitution 
of trial judge originally assigned. A written request for the 
substitution of a different judge for the judge originally 
assigned to the trial of the action may be filed with the clerk 
before making any motions to the trial court and before 
arraignment." 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2021-22 version. 
3 See Dane County Local Rule 208, which reads:  "In all 
[Criminal 
Traffic] 
and 
[Criminal 
Misdemeanor] 
cases 
the 
defendant shall have 20 days after the initial appearance to 
file a request for substitution of the assigned judge." 
No. 
2022AP1999-W   
 
3 
 
¶4 
Here, Davis made his request after both of those 
deadlines had expired.  He argues that the circuit court should 
have nevertheless treated his request for substitution of judge 
as timely based on the "government-created obstacle" exception 
outlined in 
State v. Zimbal, 2017 WI 59, ¶¶40-47, 375 
Wis. 2d 643, 896 N.W.2d 327.  Alternatively, he argues that the 
circuit court should have treated his request as timely based on 
the doctrine of equitable tolling. 
¶5 
This case presents us with two questions: 
¶6 
First, did Davis forfeit the issues he brings to this 
court?  Specifically, did he forfeit the "government-created 
obstacle" issue by changing his identified obstacle between his 
petition for review and initial brief?  And did he forfeit the 
equitable tolling issue by failing to raise it below? 
¶7 
Second, is Davis entitled to a supervisory writ 
directing 
the 
circuit 
court 
to 
treat 
his 
request 
for 
substitution of judge as timely? 
¶8 
We answer the questions presented as follows: 
¶9 
First, assuming without deciding that Davis forfeited 
the issues that he now presents to this court, we exercise our 
discretion to address them.  Doing so allows us to clarify the 
procedure for appealing a circuit court order denying a request 
for substitution of judge as untimely. 
No. 
2022AP1999-W   
 
4 
 
¶10 Second, Davis is not entitled to a supervisory writ.  
We conclude that the circuit court did not have a plain duty to 
treat Davis's request as timely under Wis. Stat. § 971.20(4), 
Dane County Local Rule 208, a government-created obstacle 
exception, or a theory of equitable tolling.   
¶11 We also take this opportunity to clarify that a 
petition for supervisory writ is not the preferred vehicle for 
appellate review of a judge's ruling on the timeliness of a 
request 
for 
substitution 
of 
judge 
that 
was 
filed 
after 
arraignment. 
¶12 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶13 We do not have a complete record of the circuit court 
proceedings concerning Davis's initial appearance, arraignment, 
and request for substitution of judge.  Indeed, while our rules 
contemplate a full record and creation of a transcript for 
appeals, they do not require such a record for supervisory writ 
actions.4 
¶14 Here, the record shows that Antonio Davis was arrested 
on August 16, 2022, and he applied for representation through 
                                                 
4 Compare 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ (Rule) 
809.11(4) 
(mandating 
transcript requests for appeals), 
and (Rule) 
809.15(1)(a) 
(listing components of a full record on appeal), with (Rule) 
809.51 (not requiring such a record for supervisory writ 
actions). 
No. 
2022AP1999-W   
 
5 
 
the SPD the next day.  Two weeks later, on August 30, 2022, the 
State filed a complaint5 charging Davis with misdemeanor battery 
and 
disorderly 
conduct, 
and 
Davis 
made 
his 
first 
court 
appearance. 
¶15 At the August 30, 2022 appearance, a Dane County court 
commissioner held both an initial appearance and an arraignment.  
Notably, a court6 is not required to hold both proceedings at the 
same appearance.  Our statutes set out requirements for an 
initial appearance——a defendant's first court appearance after 
arrest——and for an arraignment——where a defendant enters a plea.7  
While Wis. Stat. § 971.05 allows arraignments to be held in "the 
court which conducted the initial appearance," our statutes do 
not require that the initial appearance and arraignment happen 
at the same appearance.8 
                                                 
5 The complaint did not identify Davis's judge. 
6 These proceedings may occur in front of a judge or a 
commissioner. 
7 See Wis. Stat. §§ 970.01-02 (setting out procedures for an 
initial appearance, including delivery of the complaint and 
informing defendants of the charges against them and of their 
rights); 971.05 (setting out procedures for an arraignment, 
including entry of a plea). 
8 In felony cases——not at issue here——a court cannot hold 
arraignment until after a preliminary examination or waiver of 
preliminary examination.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 971.02; 971.05.  And 
a defendant has a right to counsel at the preliminary 
examination. 
 
State 
v. 
O'Brien, 
2014 
WI 
54, 
¶40, 
354 
Wis. 2d 753, 850 N.W.2d 8.  Thus, a defendant in a felony case 
who seeks appointed counsel will typically have counsel prior to 
arraignment. 
No. 
2022AP1999-W   
 
6 
 
¶16 At the time of Davis's combined initial appearance and 
arraignment, the SPD had not yet appointed counsel.  So, Davis 
received limited-scope representation from an SPD attorney who 
was assigned to argue bail and receive the complaint.  We do not 
have a transcript of this court appearance, but we know the 
court commissioner entered a not guilty plea on Davis's behalf 
and scheduled further proceedings before Judge Ellen K. Berz. 
¶17 On the day of his combined initial appearance and 
arraignment, Davis received two documents identifying his judge:  
a bail bond form, which noted that his case was assigned to 
"Trial Judge – Br 11," and a Notice of Hearing, which identified 
his judge as "Ellen K Berz." 
¶18 Sixty-five 
days 
after 
Davis's 
combined 
initial 
appearance and arraignment, on November 3, 2022, the SPD 
appointed counsel.9  Six days later, on November 9, 2022, Davis 
filed a request for substitution of judge.  Davis argued that 
the request should be considered timely, citing Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.20(4), Dane County Local Rule 208, and a series of cases 
from this court and the court of appeals.  The circuit court 
nevertheless denied Davis's request as untimely. 
                                                 
9 By chance, the appointed counsel was the same attorney who 
provided limited-scope representation for Davis at his combined 
initial appearance and arraignment. 
No. 
2022AP1999-W   
 
7 
 
¶19 Davis filed a petition for supervisory writ in the 
court 
of 
appeals. 
 
He 
argued 
that 
a 
government-created 
obstacle10——the SPD's inability to appoint counsel before the 
statutory deadline for filing a request for substitution——
prevented him from timely filing.  So, he argued, the circuit 
court had a plain duty to treat his request for substitution as 
timely.  The court of appeals denied the writ. 
¶20 Davis petitioned this court for review.  In his 
petition for review, he again argued that the SPD's inability to 
appoint counsel was a government-created obstacle.  He also 
raised an alternative theory:  that the circuit court should 
have applied equitable tolling.  We granted his petition.  In 
his briefing, Davis argued that the government-created obstacle 
was the court's sua sponte arraignment before Davis had notice 
of his judge and before appointment of counsel. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
A. 
Forfeiture 
¶21 The respondents ask us to dismiss this appeal because 
Davis forfeited the issues raised in his initial brief.  First, 
respondents argue that Davis is procedurally barred from 
                                                 
10 See State v. Zimbal, 2017 WI 59, ¶40, 375 Wis. 2d 643, 
896 N.W.2d 327 (allowing an "exception to the rule of strict 
adherence" to substitution-request deadlines when "a government-
created obstacle prevents a defendant from complying with the 
statutory deadline"). 
No. 
2022AP1999-W   
 
8 
 
bringing his government-created obstacle argument.  They argue 
that Davis's identified government-created obstacle changed 
between his petition for review and brief.  They compare Davis's 
petition for review, which identified one government-created 
obstacle——"the SPD's inability to appoint counsel before the 
deadline for requesting a substitution"——with Davis's brief, 
where he said the obstacle was "the court['s] sua sponte ent[ry 
of] a plea" before Davis was appointed counsel and before he 
knew his assigned judge.  Second, the respondents argue that 
Davis forfeited his equitable tolling argument because he failed 
to raise it in any lower court. 
¶22 But forfeiture "is a rule of judicial administration," 
and courts "may disregard a forfeiture and address the merits of 
an unpreserved issue in an appropriate case."  State v. 
Counihan, 2020 WI 12, ¶27, 390 Wis. 2d 172, 938 N.W.2d 530.  
Assuming, without deciding, that Davis is procedurally barred 
from making these arguments, we exercise our discretion to 
address them in order to clarify the procedure for challenging a 
circuit court's order denying a request for substitution of 
judge as untimely.  See State v. Wilson, 2017 WI 63, ¶51 n.7, 
376 Wis. 2d 92, 896 N.W.2d 682 (opting to address an "important 
issue" despite alleged forfeiture). 
¶23 With regard to Davis's government-created obstacle 
argument, we address the version of the argument that Davis 
No. 
2022AP1999-W   
 
9 
 
presents in his briefing——namely, that the government-created 
obstacle was the timing of Davis's arraignment.  See State v. 
Wilson, 2015 WI 48, ¶86 n.15, 362 Wis. 2d 193, 864 N.W.2d 52 
("[I]t is within our discretion to review any substantial and 
compelling issue which the case presents." (quoting Univest 
Corp. v. Gen. Split Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 29, 32, 435 N.W.2d 234 
(1989))). 
B. 
Timeliness of Requests for Substitution 
¶24 This court and the court of appeals have said that a 
defendant should seek review of a judge's ruling on the form and 
timeliness of a request for substitution "preferably" by 
bringing a petition for supervisory writ.  Clark v. State, 92 
Wis. 2d 617, 631, 286 N.W.2d 344 (1979); State ex rel. Tessmer 
v. Cir. Ct. for Racine Cnty., 123 Wis. 2d 439, 441, 367 
N.W.2d 235 (Ct. App. 1985) ("A petition for a supervisory writ 
is the preferable route for review of the trial court's ruling 
on the form and timeliness of a request for substitution of 
judge."). 
¶25 A supervisory writ is "an extraordinary and drastic 
remedy" which serves a "narrow function."  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶17, 24, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoted source omitted).  A party 
seeking a supervisory writ must show that:  (1) an appeal is an 
inadequate remedy; (2) grave hardship or irreparable harm will 
No. 
2022AP1999-W   
 
10 
 
result; (3) the trial court had a plain duty to act and violated 
that duty; and (4) the petitioner requested relief promptly.  
State ex rel. DNR v. Wis. Ct.  App., Dist. IV, 2018 WI 25, ¶9, 
380 Wis. 2d 354, 909 N.W.2d 114 (citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶17). 
¶26 This case hinges on the third requirement——plain duty.  
A circuit court has a plain duty when its "responsibility to act 
[is] imperative."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶22 (quoted source 
omitted).  The court's duty must be "clear and unequivocal."  
Id. (quoted source omitted).  As such, courts grant supervisory 
writs only for "non-discretionary" duties.  See id., ¶24. 
¶27 We are sympathetic to the fact that Davis did not have 
the full assistance of counsel at the time of arraignment 
despite his efforts to seek SPD representation.  Further, we are 
mindful of the stresses to the criminal justice system caused by 
heavy caseloads and delays in SPD appointments. 
¶28 Nonetheless, we hold that the circuit court did not 
have a plain duty to treat Davis's request for substitution of 
judge as timely.  And we take this opportunity to clarify the 
preferred route for reviewing a circuit court's ruling on the 
timeliness of a request for substitution that was filed after 
arraignment. 
No. 
2022AP1999-W   
 
11 
 
1. 
Government-Created Obstacle 
¶29 In Wisconsin, a criminal defendant has "a right 
to . . . one substitution of a judge."  Wis. Stat. § 971.20(2).  
The defendant must request substitution of judge "before making 
any motions to the trial court and before arraignment."  
§ 971.20(4).  In an attempt to extend this deadline, Dane County 
courts created a rule allowing misdemeanor defendants "20 days 
after 
the 
initial 
appearance 
to 
file 
a 
request 
for 
substitution."  See Dane County Local Rule 208. 
¶30 Here, all parties agree that Davis filed his request 
after the deadlines in the statute and local rule expired.11  
Davis argues that his request should nevertheless be considered 
timely under our precedent. 
¶31 We have said that a request for substitution may 
sometimes be treated as timely, even if it is untimely under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.20(4).  See Zimbal, 375 Wis. 2d 643, ¶¶40-47 
(identifying "exception[s] to the rule of strict adherence" to 
statutory substitution-request deadlines).  In particular, we 
have said that an untimely request may be considered timely when 
"a government-created obstacle" 
prevents a defendant from 
                                                 
11 Since there is no dispute that the request was filed 
after both deadlines had expired, we need not decide here 
whether the local rule may extend the time for filing a 
substitution 
request 
beyond 
that 
provided 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.20(4). 
No. 
2022AP1999-W   
 
12 
 
meeting the statutory deadline.  Id., ¶40.  One such government-
created 
obstacle 
comes 
from 
the 
"Baldwin-Tessmer-Tinti 
arraignment cases."  Id., ¶41 (citing State ex rel. Tinti v. 
Cir. 
Ct. 
for 
Waukesha 
Cnty., 
159 
Wis. 2d 783, 
790, 
464 
N.W.2d 853 (Ct. App. 1990); Tessmer, 123 Wis. 2d at 443; Baldwin 
v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 521, 530-32, 215 N.W.2d 541 (1974)). 
¶32 Under Baldwin-Tessmer-Tinti, an untimely request for 
substitution may be treated as timely "when a criminal defendant 
is arraigned before he receives notice of which judge will hear 
his case."  Id.  In each of the Baldwin-Tessmer-Tinti cases, the 
defendant did not know the identity of his judge until after 
arraignment.  Tinti, 159 Wis. 2d at 790; Tessmer, 123 Wis. 2d at 
443; Baldwin, 62 Wis. 2d at 529.  Without that information, 
those courts concluded that the defendant could not exercise the 
right of substitution intelligently.  See Tinti, 159 Wis. 2d at 
790; Tessmer, 123 Wis. 2d at 443; Baldwin, 62 Wis. 2d at 531; 
see also Clark, 92 Wis. 2d 617, 628 ("[T]he key to the statutory 
No. 
2022AP1999-W   
 
13 
 
right of substitution [is] the defendant's ability to exercise 
his right of substitution intelligently.").12 
¶33 
Here, Davis argues that he faced a similar government-
created obstacle.  A court commissioner arraigned him before the 
SPD appointed counsel and before he knew his assigned judge.  
Thus, Davis says, under Baldwin-Tessmer-Tinti the circuit court 
had a plain duty to treat his request for substitution as 
timely.13  We disagree for two reasons. 
¶34 First, although Davis asserts that he did not know his 
assigned judge until after he entered his plea, the record is 
unclear.  We have no transcript, and there has been no 
evidentiary hearing on this point.  All we know is that Davis 
                                                 
12 Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's concurrence advocates 
for 
"overrul[ing] 
Baldwin." 
 
See 
Justice 
Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley's concurrence, ¶47.  No party has asked us to overrule 
Baldwin, and "[w]e do not step out of our neutral role to 
develop or construct arguments for parties; it is up to them to 
make their case."  Doe 1 v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 2022 WI 
65, ¶35, 403 Wis. 2d 369, 976 N.W.2d 584 (quoting Serv. Emps. 
Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶24, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 
N.W.2d 35). 
13 Davis also argues that the court had a plain duty to 
treat the request as timely because it had a general duty to 
apply the law to the facts.  We have said that such a command is 
too vague and malleable to create a plain duty.  See State ex 
rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 2015 WI 85, ¶81, 363 
Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 165 ("The obligation of a judge to 
correctly find facts and apply the law is not the type of plain 
legal duty contemplated by the supervisory writ procedure, 'as 
it 
would 
extend 
supervisory 
jurisdiction 
to 
a 
virtually 
unlimited range of decisions . . . .'" (quoting State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶24, 271 Wis. 2d 
633, 681 N.W.2d 110)). 
No. 
2022AP1999-W   
 
14 
 
received two relevant documents on the day of his arraignment:  
a notice of hearing which named Judge Berz and a bail bond form 
which identified the assigned judicial branch.  We do not know 
if 
Davis 
received 
these 
documents 
before 
or 
after 
his 
arraignment.  And we do not know whether the court commissioner 
told Davis who his assigned judge would be during the 
arraignment.  Without evidence that Davis knew his assigned 
judge only after arraignment, the obstacle from the Baldwin-
Tessmer-Tinti cases does not exist here.  See Zimbal, 375 
Wis. 2d 643, ¶41 (identifying the obstacle). 
¶35 Second, even if we accept Davis's assertion that he 
did not know his assigned judge before arraignment, the court 
did not have a plain duty to treat his request as timely under 
our precedent.  Davis made his request 71 days after his 
combined initial appearance and arraignment.  None of the 
Baldwin-Tessmer-Tinti cases say a request would be timely under 
such a delay.  See Tinti, 159 Wis. 2d at 791 (deciding a request 
was timely when it was filed four days after arraignment); 
Tessmer, 123 Wis. 2d at 444 (seven days).14 
                                                 
14 Likewise, our decision in Baldwin does not suggest that a 
request filed 71 days after arraignment is timely.  There, we 
found Baldwin's request untimely.  Baldwin v. State, 62 
Wis. 2d 521, 532-33, 215 N.W.2d 541 (1974).  Moreover, we 
suggested Baldwin's request would have been timely under 
deadlines specific to Milwaukee County's calendaring system.  
See id. at 530. 
No. 
2022AP1999-W   
 
15 
 
¶36 We recognize that Davis was unrepresented during the 
first 65 days of the 71-day delay, but this does not change our 
conclusion that there was no plain duty.  We have never held 
that a circuit court must consider whether a defendant is 
represented when assessing the timeliness of a request for 
substitution.15  It may be the case that a circuit court should 
consider a defendant's lack of representation when assessing the 
timeliness of a request for substitution.  But we cannot say 
that the circuit court here had a plain duty to do so, because 
no law requires it.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶25 ("[A] 
plain, 
clear, 
non-discretionary, 
and 
imperative 
duty" 
is 
"necessary for a supervisory writ."). 
¶37 We conclude that under these facts and our precedent, 
the circuit court had no plain duty to treat the request for 
substitution as timely because of a government-created obstacle. 
2. 
Equitable Tolling 
¶38 Davis also argues that his request for substitution 
should have been treated as timely based on the equitable 
tolling doctrine.  We conclude that the circuit court did not 
                                                 
15 Even in Zimbal, where we "restart[ed]" the statutory 
clock after assignment of counsel, we did so "[u]nder the unique 
facts of [that] case," which included the circuit court telling 
the defendant to wait to file a request for substitution of 
judge.  See Zimbal, 375 Wis. 2d 643, ¶52.  That unique factual 
situation is not present here. 
No. 
2022AP1999-W   
 
16 
 
have a plain duty to treat the request as timely under a theory 
of equitable tolling. 
¶39 Equitable tolling is a remedy that courts use to toll 
statutory deadlines when justice requires.  See State ex rel. 
Griffin v. Smith, 2004 WI 36, ¶¶36-37, 270 Wis. 2d 235, 677 
N.W.2d 259 (listing examples of when our courts have tolled 
deadlines due to "equitable considerations").  Courts may invoke 
equitable tolling when a party misses a deadline due to factors 
outside the party's control.  See id., ¶37.  For instance, we 
have said equitable tolling applies in the context of a pro se 
prisoner who properly deposits a court document in an outgoing 
prison mail system, but misses a filing deadline due to prison 
mail processing times.  See State ex rel. Nichols v. Litscher, 
2001 WI 119, ¶32, 247 Wis. 2d 1013, 635 N.W.2d 292. 
¶40 Here, the circuit court did not have a plain duty to 
equitably 
toll 
the 
substitution-request 
deadline 
for 
two 
reasons.  First, no court has said that equitable tolling 
applies to Davis's situation.  Davis cites the concurrence in 
Zimbal as authority that equitable tolling should apply to his 
request.  See Zimbal, 375 Wis. 2d 643, ¶¶54-73 (Roggensack, J., 
concurring).  But that concurring opinion is not binding 
precedent.  And even if it were, the concurrence argued for 
tolling in the context of a judge directing a defendant to wait 
to file a request for substitution——a circumstance that is not 
No. 
2022AP1999-W   
 
17 
 
present here.  See id., ¶72.  Thus, it is not a clear and 
unequivocal mandate.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶22 ("A plain 
duty 'must be clear and unequivocal.'" (quoted source omitted)). 
¶41 Second, Davis seeks application of an equitable 
doctrine——a poor fit with the concept of a plain duty.  
Equitable tolling inherently requires a case-by-case exercise of 
discretion.  See Williams v. Kaerek Builders, Inc., 212 
Wis. 2d 150, 162, 568 N.W.2d 313 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The decision 
to provide an equitable remedy rests within the circuit court's 
discretion.").  Short of a judicial mandate to apply equitable 
tolling in a specific situation, a circuit court will never have 
a plain duty to apply a discretionary remedy.  Without such a 
duty, the failure to exercise discretion in a particular way 
cannot support the issuance of a supervisory writ.  See Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶24 (holding that supervisory writs are for 
"non-discretionary duties").  In short, the circuit court here 
had no plain duty to apply equitable tolling. 
3. 
Procedure for Appellate Review 
¶42 
In the past, we have said a petitioner should seek 
review of a judge's ruling on the form and timeliness of a 
request for substitution "preferably" by bringing a petition for 
supervisory writ.  Clark, 92 Wis. 2d at 631; see also Tessmer, 
123 Wis. 2d at 441 (suggesting petitions for supervisory writ 
are the "preferable route" for review). 
No. 
2022AP1999-W   
 
18 
 
¶43 But our analysis here illustrates why a supervisory 
writ can be a poor vehicle for reviewing a circuit court's 
decision to deny a request for substitution that was filed after 
arraignment.  Davis's claims fail in this supervisory writ 
posture due to factors that could undermine review for future 
petitioners.  To start, in a supervisory writ posture, appellate 
courts may decide a case based on the existence of a plain duty 
rather than address the substantive issue.  Indeed, we have done 
so here.  Similarly, appellate courts may be reluctant to find a 
plain duty when doing so requires mandating application of an 
equitable doctrine.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶25 ("[A] 
plain, 
clear, 
non-discretionary, 
and 
imperative 
duty" 
is 
"necessary for a supervisory writ.").  Last, we are more likely 
to have incomplete records under a supervisory writ posture.16 
¶44 We clarify that a petition for supervisory writ is not 
the preferred vehicle for appellate review of a judge's ruling 
on the timeliness of a request for substitution of judge that 
was filed after arraignment.  In that situation, a petitioner 
should file a petition for interlocutory appeal or an appeal 
from a final judgment or order, not a petition for supervisory 
writ. 
III. CONCLUSION 
                                                 
16 See supra note 4. 
No. 
2022AP1999-W   
 
19 
 
¶45 In sum, the circuit court had no plain duty to treat 
Davis's request for substitution of judge as timely, and the 
court of appeals correctly denied the petition for supervisory 
writ. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceeding consistent with this opinion. 
 
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
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¶46 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  Presented 
with a simple question, this court should provide a simple 
answer.  Davis asks whether the circuit court violated a plain 
duty when it denied his request to substitute the judge 
originally assigned to his case.  It did not.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 971.20(4) requires a defendant who wishes to substitute the 
judge originally assigned to his trial to file a substitution 
request "before arraignment."  Davis filed his substitution 
request 71 days after his arraignment.  The circuit court does 
not have a plain duty to accept an untimely substitution 
request.  Although this court comes to the right conclusion, it 
does nothing to address the errors this court made interpreting 
§ 971.20 in Baldwin v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 521, 215 N.W.2d 541 
(1974).1        
                                                 
1 Justice Brian Hagedorn correctly observes that Davis 
forfeited all the arguments he made before this court.  He also 
correctly notes that the majority's reason for reaching the 
merits is nonsense——the majority does not need to reach the 
merits to address the court's preferred method of receiving 
claims like Davis's.  Because the majority needlessly addresses 
the merits and applies prior cases that are unsound in 
principle, I also address the merits, applying the statute's 
text. 
The majority opts to apply Baldwin and its progeny because 
"[n]o party has asked us to overrule Baldwin."  Majority op., 
¶32 n.12.  The majority forgets that "[l]itigants do not dictate 
the decisions of this court; the law does.  As proclaimed over 
160 years ago, '[w]e sit here to decide the law as we find it, 
and not as the parties or others may have supposed it to be.'"  
St. Augustine Sch. v. Taylor, 2021 WI 70, ¶102, 398 Wis. 2d 92, 
961 N.W.2d 635 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Ross v. Bd. of Outagamie Cnty. 
Supervisors, 12 Wis. 26, 44 (1860) (Dixon, C.J., dissenting)).    
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
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¶47 In Baldwin, this court improperly rewrote Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.20.  The Baldwin decision gives a defendant a "reasonable 
time" to exercise his substitution right after he discovers the 
identity of the judge, even if the statutory deadline has 
already lapsed.  Baldwin has repeatedly led courts to ignore the 
text of § 971.20.  E.g., State ex rel. Tinti v. Cir. Ct. for 
Waukesha Cnty., Branch 2, 159 Wis. 2d 783, 464 N.W.2d 853 (Ct. 
App. 1990).  Instead of applying Baldwin, as the majority does, 
I would overrule Baldwin and simply apply the statute's text.     
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶48 Officers arrested Davis for two offenses, and the 
state charged him with misdemeanor disorderly conduct and 
misdemeanor battery.  At Davis's initial appearance, the court 
entered a plea of not guilty on his behalf.  Seventy-one days 
after 
his 
initial 
appearance, 
Davis 
filed 
a 
request 
to 
substitute the judge originally assigned to his trial, Judge 
Ellen K. Berz, who denied the request as untimely. 
¶49 Davis 
petitioned 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
for 
a 
supervisory writ directing the circuit court to grant Davis's 
request for judicial substitution.  The court of appeals denied 
the petition.  This court correctly affirms the court of 
appeals, 
but 
misguidedly 
applies 
Baldwin's 
erroneous 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 971.20.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Methodology 
¶50 In Kalal this court "confirmed textualism is the 
correct methodology for statutory interpretation," "binding" all 
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
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courts in Wisconsin to adhere to it when interpreting statutes.  
Sanders v. State of Wis. Claims Bd., 2023 WI 60, ¶13, 408 Wis. 
2d 370, 992 N.W.2d 126 (lead opinion).  As explained in Kalal, 
the goal of statutory interpretation is to determine a statute's 
objective meaning, focusing primarily on the words of the 
statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 
WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  This court has 
held time and time again that if the meaning of a statute is 
plain, our interpretive inquiry ends.  E.g., id., ¶45; Wis. 
Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, ¶18, 373 Wis. 2d 
543, 892 N.W.2d 233 (calling this rule the "the bedrock of the 
judiciary's methodology").  "Statutory language is given its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 
(citations omitted).  A text's scope, context, and purpose "are 
perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an 
unambiguous statute as long as" they are "ascertainable from" 
the statute's text and structure.  Id., ¶48.   
¶51 This court's adherence to textualism is grounded in 
and fundamental to the rule of law and democratic governance.  
Textualism is the only method of statutory interpretation that 
properly respects the legislature's authority to make policy 
choices.  "[T]he object of interpretation is to enforce a 
decision that is attributable to the legislature."  See John F. 
Manning & Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislation and Regulation 22 
(1st ed. 2010).  The people never gave this court "the power to 
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
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second-guess 
the 
legislature's 
policy 
choices[,] 
[and] 
[j]udicial deference to the policy choices enacted into law by 
the legislature requires that statutory interpretation focus 
primarily on the language of the statute."  Sanders, 408 Wis. 2d 
370, ¶48 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
"While textualism cannot prevent the incursion of policy 
preferences into legal analysis[,] . . . without textualism, 
such encroachment is certain."  Wis. Jud. Comm'n v. Woldt, 2021 
WI 73, ¶92, 398 Wis. 2d 482, 961 N.W.2d 854 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49 n.8 (A "methodology . . . that calls for 
consultation of extrinsic, non-textual sources of interpretation 
in every case, regardless of whether the language of the statute 
is clear[,] . . . subordinates the statutory text and renders 
the analysis more vulnerable to subjectivity.").  "[D]iscovering 
the meaning of a statute is not just a worthy endeavor, but also 
an exhaustive recitation of the judiciary's authority when 
interpreting a statute."  Wis. Carry, 373 Wis. 2d 543, ¶20 n.15.  
Applying our longstanding interpretive methodology to Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.20 
illustrates 
how 
Baldwin 
rewrote 
the 
statute, 
impermissibly altering the policy determinations made by the 
legislature.   
B.  Wis. Stat. § 971.20 
¶52 The legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 971.20 in 1969.  
See § 63, ch. 255, Laws of 1969.  Although the legislature has 
modified § 971.20 over the years, the words of the statute 
pertinent to this decision have remained the same.  In its 
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
5 
 
original iteration, Wis. Stat. § 971.20(1) (1969-70) provided 
that a "defendant may file . . . for a substitution of a new 
judge for the judge assigned to the trial of that case.  Such 
request shall . . . be made before making any motion or before 
arraignment."2  Notably, the statute required the request to be 
filed "before arraignment" regardless of whether the judge was 
the judge originally assigned to the trial.  Over time, the 
legislature added new deadlines for filing a substitution 
request.  For example, Wis. Stat. § 971.20(1) (1975-76) allowed 
a defendant to substitute the judge assigned to his trial if the 
request 
was 
filed 
"before 
making 
any 
motion 
or 
before 
arraignment."  If a new judge was assigned to his trial, the 
defendant could file his request "any time before making any 
motion before such new judge or before commencement of any 
proceeding before such new judge."  § 971.20(1).     
¶53 With § 3, ch. 137, Laws of 1981, the legislature 
repealed and recreated Wis. Stat. § 971.20.  Obtaining a 
substitution of the judge originally assigned to a trial is 
currently governed by § 971.20(4).  The legislature has not 
altered § 971.20(4) since its creation.  Although Baldwin 
interpreted Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.20(1) (1971-72), 
Baldwin has 
bearing on this court's interpretation and application of 
§ 971.20(4) because courts have applied its reasoning to 
                                                 
2 The statute also provided, "a request for the substitution 
of a judge may also be made by the defendant at the preliminary 
examination except that the request must be filed at the initial 
appearance or at least 5 days before the preliminary examination 
unless the court otherwise permits."  Wis. Stat. § 971.20(3) 
(1969-70).   
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
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§ 971.20(4), as well as other subsections of § 971.20.  State ex 
rel. Tessmer v. Cir. Ct. Branch III, In & For Racine Cnty., 123 
Wis. 2d 439, 367 N.W.2d 235 (Ct. App. 1985); Tinti, 159 Wis. 2d 
783; State v. Zimbal, 2017 WI 59, 375 Wis. 2d 643, 896 N.W.2d 
327.   
¶54 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.20(4) creates a simple rule for 
a defendant who wants to substitute the judge originally 
assigned to his trial:  "A written request for the substitution 
of a different judge for the judge originally assigned to the 
trial of the action may be filed with the clerk before making 
any motions to the trial court and before arraignment."3  
Unsurprisingly, dictionaries define "before" to mean "previous 
to" or "earlier than."  Before, Random House Dictionary of the 
English Language 134 (1st unabridged ed. 1966).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 971.05 provides that an arraignment has four elements:  (1) 
the arraignment occurs in open court; (2) if the defendant 
appears to not have counsel, "the court shall advise the 
defendant of the defendant's right to counsel"; (3) the 
defendant shall be read the information or complaint unless the 
                                                 
3 The original iteration of Wis. Stat. § 971.20 required a 
defendant to file the substitution request "before making any 
motion or before arraignment."   Wis. Stat. § 971.20(1) (1969-
70) (emphasis added).  Since 1981, the statute has allowed for 
the 
substitution 
of 
the 
judge 
originally 
assigned 
to 
a 
defendant's trial if requested "before making any motions to the 
trial court and before arraignment."  Wis. Stat. § 971.20(4) 
(1981-82) (emphasis added).  It doesn't appear that changing the 
"or" to an "and" makes any interpretive difference because 
courts interpreted the "or" as an "and" in the prior iterations 
of the statute.  Clark v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 617, 626, 286 N.W.2d 
344 (1979).   
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
7 
 
defendant waives such a reading; and (4) the defendant makes his 
plea unless the defendant has filed a motion that requires a 
determination before the entry of a plea.  Under the current 
iteration 
of 
the 
§ 971.20(4), 
a 
defendant 
must 
file 
a 
substitution request before the statutorily defined arraignment 
occurs.  The statute provides no other means to substitute the 
judge originally assigned to the trial; indeed, the statute 
declares, "The right of substitution shall be exercised as 
provided in this section."  § 971.20(2).  In short, the current 
version of § 971.20(4) does not authorize this court to create 
an ever-evolving common law of judicial substitution; it 
provides an easy-to-apply rule:  A defendant must file a 
substitution request before making any motions to the circuit 
court and before arraignment or the request must be denied.   
¶55 Applying the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 971.20(4), 
the circuit court properly denied Davis's substitution request.  
Because Davis filed his request 71 days after his arraignment, 
his request was untimely.  See State v. Beaty, 57 Wis. 2d 531, 
542, 205 N.W.2d 11 (1973).  A circuit court does not have a 
plain duty to accept untimely substitution requests.  See State 
v. Bell, 62 Wis. 2d 534, 536, 215 N.W.2d 535 (1974) (citations 
omitted) (holding a circuit court properly denied a substitution 
request because it was filed after the statutory deadline); 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶22-24 (defining what constitutes a 
plain duty).  This case should end there; no further analysis is 
required.  Because of Baldwin, however, the majority opinion 
does not end there——despite the clarity of the statutory text.       
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
8 
 
¶56 The Baldwin court rewrote Wis. Stat. § 971.20 under 
the veneer of statutory interpretation.  The Baldwin court held 
a defendant must have a "reasonable time" to exercise the 
statutory right to substitution after the defendant learns the 
identity of the judge assigned to his trial.  Baldwin, 62 Wis. 
2d at 530-33.  To afford the defendant a reasonable time to 
exercise the statutory right, the court gave an "enlarged 
definition" to the word "arraignment," unsupported by the text 
of the statute.  Id. at 532.  Courts have applied Baldwin's 
tortured analysis of § 971.20 without critical thought.  This 
court should overturn Baldwin and return to applying the plain 
meaning of § 971.20.   
C.  The Baldwin Decision 
¶57  In Baldwin, the defendant filed his substitution 
request on the date of his trial.  The court in Baldwin was 
asked whether the defendant's substitution request, under Wis. 
Stat. § 971.20(1) (1971-72), was timely.  Id. at 526-28.  At the 
time, Milwaukee County used calendaring judges for arraignments.  
If a guilty plea were entered at the arraignment, the case would 
conclude; if a not guilty plea were entered, the court would 
assign the case to a judge, who might not be the calendaring 
judge presiding over the entering of a plea.  Id. at 529.  In 
Baldwin, the defendant was arraigned, after which the judge 
originally assigned to the defendant's trial disqualified 
himself and a new judge was assigned to the defendant's trial.  
Id. at 526-28.   
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
9 
 
¶58 The Baldwin court interpreted Wis. Stat. § 971.20(1) 
(1971-72), which provided that a "defendant may file with the 
clerk a written request for a substitution of a new judge for 
the 
judge 
assigned 
to 
the 
trial 
of 
that 
case. 
 
Such 
request . . . shall be made before making any motion or before 
arraignment."  The Baldwin court acknowledged a plain-meaning 
interpretation of the statute "requires that [a substitution] 
request be made prior to arraignment."  Baldwin, 62 Wis. 2d at 
529; see also Clark v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 617, 626, 286 N.W.2d 
344 (1979).  However, the Baldwin court decided this clear rule 
does not "work[] well" when a county's calendaring procedure 
prevents a defendant from knowing the identity of the judge 
assigned to his trial prior to arraignment.  Baldwin, 62 Wis. 2d 
at 529.  The court also determined the plain meaning of the 
statute would violate the right to a fair trial for some 
defendants.  Id. at 530.   
¶59 To fix these perceived infirmities, the court altered 
the statute.  The court held, "The right to the substitution of 
a judge must have a reasonable time limit for its exercise."  
Id. at 532.  Toward that end, the court created an "enlarged 
definition 
of 
'arraignment'" 
to 
apply 
under 
similar 
circumstances.  Id.  "[I]n a calendaring procedure, such as is 
used in Milwaukee [C]ounty, the arraignment is only initiated at 
the calendaring of the case and the plea of not guilty entered 
then is for the purpose of obtaining a judge who will actually 
hear the case," and "[t]he arraignment is completed upon the 
confirmation of the plea of not guilty before the judge to whom 
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
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the case is assigned for trial when he sets the date for trial."  
Id. at 530.4   
¶60 According to the court, its proffered interpretation 
"witnesse[d] and g[ave] effect to the predominant intention of 
the legislature" to "'afford a substitution of a new judge 
assigned to the trial of that case.'"  Id.  Like its predecessor 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.20 (1971-72) was "an expression of the 
'legislative intent that a person's right to a fair trial 
(should) be observed.'"  Id. at 532 (quoting Meverden v. State, 
258 Wis. 628, 634, 46 N.W.2d 836 (1951)).  According to the 
Baldwin court, a plain-meaning interpretation would make "it 
impossible to obtain the objective of this section and would 
frustrate the objective of this statute."  Id. at 530.  
Overriding the text with its ostensible "intent," the court 
decided to "apply as reasonably as possible [the language of the 
statute] to all cases to attain its object."  Id. at 532.  
Finally, the court discovered "support [for its interpretation] 
in the history of the section."  Id. at 530.  The judicial 
committee's comments to the statute "reference[d]" the Illinois 
and Montana substitution statutes, which set the filing date at 
a time when the defendant would know the identity of the judge.  
Id. at 530-31.   
                                                 
4 The court deemed the defendant's substitution request late 
even 
under 
its 
expansive 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.20(1) (1971-72) because he waited until the day of trial 
to make his request.  Baldwin v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 521, 532-33, 
215 N.W.2d 541 (1974).   
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
11 
 
¶61 Baldwin's policy-driven interpretation of the original 
iteration of Wis. Stat. § 971.20 invited courts to ignore the 
text of the statute, and the text of other substitution 
statutes,5 during the ensuing decades.  Over the years, courts 
have relied on Baldwin for the proposition that "a defendant 
[must have] an opportunity to request a substitution for a 
reasonable period of time after he learns specifically which 
judge will be assigned to his case."  State ex rel. Akavickas v. 
Cnty. Ct. of Marathon Cnty., 77 Wis. 2d 297, 298-99, 252 N.W.2d 
386 (1977) (per curiam); see also Tessmer, 123 Wis. 2d 443-44; 
Tinti, 159 Wis. 2d 789-90.  Baldwin convinced courts there may 
be 
"exceptions" 
to 
§ 971.20(4)'s 
unambiguous 
"before 
arraignment" requirement, such as if the defendant does not know 
the identity of the judge assigned to his trial.  See Zimbal, 
375 Wis. 2d 643, ¶3 n.2.  Baldwin must be overturned.   
D.  The Interpretive Errors of the Baldwin Court 
1.  The Right to an Unbiased Judge 
¶62 The court in Baldwin erred when it refused to apply 
the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 971.20(1) (1971-72) because 
such an application "would deny in many cases the constitutional 
right to a fair trial . . . ."  Baldwin, 62 Wis. 2d at 530.  The 
court never cited a single source for its claim that the statute 
violates the right to an impartial judge for some defendants.  
Nor did the court explain how the right to an unbiased judge 
                                                 
5 State ex rel. Akavickas v. Cnty. Ct. of Marathon Cnty., 77 
Wis. 2d 297, 298-99, 252 N.W.2d 386 (1977) (per curiam) (Wis. 
Stat. § 345.315(1)); State ex rel. Tarney v. McCormack, 99 Wis. 
2d 220, 235, 298 N.W.2d 552 (1980) (Wis. Stat. § 801.58(1)).   
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
12 
 
would be violated by applying the plain meaning of the statute.  
While every defendant is entitled to a trial before an impartial 
judge, Wis. Const. art. I, § 8; State ex rel. Mitchell v. 
Bowman, 54 Wis. 2d 5, 6-7, 194 N.W.2d 297 (1972) (per curiam), 
the ability to exercise a peremptory judicial substitution is 
unrelated to judicial bias against the defendant.  See Mitchell, 
54 Wis. 2d at 6-7.  It is similarly unrelated to whether a judge 
has a personal interest in the case's outcome.  Tumey v. Ohio, 
273 U.S. 510 (1927).  Exercising the statutory right of 
substitution without knowing the identity of the judge assigned 
to the trial does not make it any more or less likely that 
"there is 'a serious risk of actual bias . . . .'"  Miller v. 
Carroll, 2020 WI 56, ¶24, 392 Wis. 2d 49, 944 N.W.2d 542 
(quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 
(2009)).  The unavailability of peremptory judicial substitution 
does not deprive a defendant of his right to an impartial judge. 
¶63 There is "no constitutional right to the peremptory 
substitution of a judge."  State ex rel. Garibay v. Cir. Ct. for 
Kenosha Cnty., 2002 WI App 164, ¶9, 256 Wis. 2d 438, 647 N.W.2d 
455 (citing State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 46, 315 N.W.2d 703 
(1982)).  The legislature provided the statutory right of 
substitution to protect the right to an unbiased judge.  Holmes, 
106 Wis. 2d at 38, 46-47, 55.  The statutory right to 
substitution 
serves 
as 
a 
prophylactic 
protection 
of 
the 
constitutional right to an unbiased judge and does not embody 
the right itself.  See id. at 46; Zimbal, 375 Wis. 2d 643, ¶74 
(Ziegler, J., concurring).  The statutory right of substitution 
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
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is a "matter of legislative grace, not constitutional mandate.  
As such, the legislature may limit or qualify that right" as it 
sees fit.  Garibay, 256 Wis. 2d 438, ¶9.   
¶64 Even if applying the plain meaning of the statute 
would violate due process when the defendant doesn't know the 
identity of the assigned judge prior to arraignment, the Baldwin 
court erred by impermissibly rewriting the statute.  State v. 
Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 116, 140, 589 N.W.2d 370 (1999) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. X–Citement 
Video, 513 U.S. 64, 86 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) 
("[A]lthough 
this 
Court 
will 
often 
strain 
to 
construe 
legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack, it 
must 
not 
and 
will 
not 
carry 
this 
to 
the 
point 
of . . . judicially rewriting it.").  Under the constitutional-
doubt 
canon, 
if 
a 
statute 
raises 
serious 
constitutional 
questions, a court should interpret the statute to avoid those 
constitutional questions.  State v. Hager, 2018 WI 40, ¶31, 381 
Wis. 2d 74, 911 N.W.2d 17.  "[I]t is a cardinal rule that courts 
should avoid interpreting a statute in a way that would render 
it unconstitutional when a reasonable interpretation exists that 
would render the legislation constitutional."  State v. Hamdan, 
2003 WI 113, ¶27 n.9, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785 (citation 
omitted).  Critically, the court can apply only reasonable or 
plausible interpretations to the text under these rules of 
interpretation.  Id.; Hager, 381 Wis. 2d 74, ¶31.  This court 
can avoid questions of unconstitutionality only if the statute 
is ambiguous.  Fleming v. Amateur Athletic Union of U.S., Inc., 
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
14 
 
2023 WI 40, ¶31 n.10, 407 Wis. 2d 273, 990 N.W.2d 244 (citations 
omitted).  It isn't.   
¶65 The Baldwin court did not supply a reasonable or 
plausible interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 971.20(1) (1971-72); it 
supplied a contrived, textually unsupportable interpretation.  
The Baldwin court assigned the word "arraignment" different 
meanings depending on the facts of a particular case, lending 
the word a chameleon-like character.  Baldwin, 62 Wis. 2d at 
530, 532 (providing an "enlarged definition of 'arraignment'" 
only when "a calendaring procedure, such as is used in Milwaukee 
[C]ounty," is used).  Not only is it confounding that the court 
gave "arraignment" different meanings depending on the facts of 
the 
case, 
the 
Baldwin 
court's 
"enlarged 
definition" 
of 
arraignment conflicts with the statutory definition.  Compare 
id. at 530, with Wis. Stat. § 971.05 (1971-72).   
¶66 Baldwin turned the statute's clear rule (file "before 
arraignment") into a vague standard (file within a "reasonable 
time") without any explanation or textual support.  The words of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.20, taken collectively or individually, do not 
give a defendant a "reasonable time" to file a substitution 
request after learning the identity of the judge assigned to his 
case.  The Baldwin court added words to the text of the statute 
because it felt the legislature's rule didn't "work[] well."  
Baldwin, 62 Wis. 2d at 529.  "One of the maxims of statutory 
construction is that courts should not add words to a statute to 
give it a certain meaning."  Fond Du Lac Cnty. v. Town of 
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
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Rosendale, 149 Wis. 2d 326, 334, 440 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(citation omitted).   
2.  Legislative Intent and Statutory Purpose 
¶67 The Baldwin court justified its interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 971.20(1) (1971-72) on the ground it gave effect to the 
legislature's "intent" while a plain-meaning interpretation of 
the statute frustrated the objective of the statute.  Baldwin, 
61 Wis. 2d at 530.  Statutory interpretation is not a quest to 
effectuate the legislature's intent; its goal is to ascertain 
the objective meaning of a statute and apply that meaning in the 
case at hand.  "This court has long disavowed reliance on so-
called 'legislative intent,' the search for which leads to pure 
judicial activism."  Cobb v. King, 2022 WI 59, ¶44, 403 Wis. 2d 
198, 976 N.W.2d 410 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) 
(citing Townsend v. ChartSwap, LLC, 2021 WI 86, ¶24, 399 Wis. 2d 
599, 967 N.W.2d 21); accord Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶43-44.  
Although the objectives of a statute are valid considerations in 
a plain-meaning analysis to the extent they can be ascertained 
from the words of the statute, Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶48, 
statutory "purpose[s] cannot produce an interpretation that the 
statute's language rules out of bounds."  Stephen Breyer, Making 
Our Democracy Work: A Judge's View 98 (2010).  A statute's 
manifest objectives may help a court choose between "textually 
permissible interpretation[s]." see Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 63 
(2012).  But a statute's objectives cannot give "a word [or] 
sentence . . . a meaning that it cannot bear."  Id. at 31; State 
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
16 
 
v. Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, ¶28, 389 Wis. 2d 1, 935 N.W.2d 271 
(quoting Scalia & Garner, supra, at 57).  After all, "no 
legislation pursues its purposes at all costs."  Rodriguez v. 
United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987) (per curiam).  The 
Baldwin court violated these fundamental rules of interpretation 
by adding words to a statute and stretching the existing words 
of the statute past their breaking point.   
3.  The History of Wis. Stat. § 971.20 
¶68 Contrary to the claims of the Baldwin court, the 
"history of [Wis. Stat. § 971.20]" does not "support" its 
interpretation of the statute.  Baldwin, 62 Wis. 2d at 530.  
Although the judicial committee's note to the statute did 
"reference" the Illinois and Montana judicial substitution 
statutes, id., the Baldwin court misused that reference to 
support its conclusion.  The reference to the Illinois and 
Montana substitution statutes was made in the context of 
changing the terminology used to describe the right to judicial 
substitution; the new statute would not use the term "affidavit 
of prejudice," which the prior substitution statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 956.03(1) (1967-68), used:   
Note:  This is new terminology replacing present s. 
956.03 (1).  'Affidavit of Prejudice' has normally not 
meant 
prejudice 
since 
most 
defendants 
have 
no 
knowledge of the judge and have filed the affidavit 
solely for tactical purposes usually on an attorney's 
advice.  This terminology is felt to be more accurate.  
(See Ill. Rev. Code Chap. 38, s. 114-5, Mont. Rev. 
Code 95-1709.) 
Note, § 63, ch. 255, Laws of 1969.  Despite the fact the 
reference made to the Illinois and Montana statutes was about 
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
17 
 
terminology, the court cited the Illinois and Montana statutes 
as support for the claim that a defendant needs to know the 
identity of the judge assigned to his trial prior to the 
substitution deadline.   
¶69 Not only did the court in Baldwin deceptively misuse 
the judicial committee's note, the statutory history of Wis. 
Stat. § 971.20 reveals the legislature denied the court any 
authority to provide exceptions to the statute's deadline.  
"Unlike 
legislative 
history, 
prior 
versions 
of 
statutory 
provisions 
were 
enacted 
law; 
as 
such, 
statutory 
history 
constitutes an intrinsic source that 'is part of the context in 
which we interpret the words used in a statute.'"  Brey v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2022 WI 7, ¶20, 400 Wis. 2d 417, 970 
N.W.2d 1 (quoting Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, 
¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581).  Prior to the creation of 
§ 971.20, Wis. Stat. § 956.03 (1967-68) gave defendants the 
right of substitution.  Section 956.03(1) provided that in 
felony cases, the request needed to be made "within 20 days 
after [the defendant's] arraignment and before the case is 
called for trial."  For misdemeanors, the request needed to be 
made "at arraignment or at the time the defendant demands a jury 
trial if one is demanded."  § 956.03(1).  Importantly, the 
statute had an exception——the deadline could be "extended for 
cause but not more than 10 days."  § 956.03(1).  The enactment 
of § 971.20 eliminated the "for cause" exception.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 971.20 (1969-70).  Likewise, the current iteration of 
the statute does not include any exceptions for the statutory 
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
18 
 
deadline.  "[A] change in the language of a prior statute 
presumably connotes a change in meaning."  Scalia & Garner, 
supra, at 256.  The removal of the "for cause" exception to the 
deadline suggests the deadlines in § 971.20 are to be enforced 
as they are written, and this court cannot extend the deadline 
in 
§ 971.20(4) 
for 
filing 
a 
substitution 
request 
past 
arraignment.  This court cannot restore what the legislature 
specifically removed from a statute.   
4.  Policy 
¶70 Buried beneath the Baldwin court's handwringing over 
fair trials, legislative intent, statutory objectives, and 
legislative history lies the obvious truth:  The court simply 
disagreed with the policy decisions made by the legislature.  
The court did not think the statute's deadline "works well" in 
all cases.  Baldwin, 62 Wis. 2d at 529.  The Baldwin court's 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 971.20(1) (1971-72) was designed 
to improve what the court regarded as the legislature's 
imperfect 
work. 
 
The 
Baldwin 
court 
"observed 
what 
the 
legislature had written, decided it didn't like it, and replaced 
the 
statutory 
text 
with 
what 
the 
court 
deemed 
to 
be . . . preferable . . . ." 
 
Town 
of 
Wilson 
v. 
City 
of 
Sheboygan, 2020 WI 16, ¶73 n.12, 390 Wis. 2d 266, 938 N.W.2d 493 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  But the court's role 
is not to reweigh the pros and cons of a policy and correct any 
perceived errors in the legislature's judgments, especially when 
it comes to deadlines:  "Deadlines are inherently arbitrary; 
fixed 
dates, 
however, 
are 
often 
essential 
to 
accomplish 
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
19 
 
necessary results."  United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 249 
(1985).   
¶71 Courts act beyond their authority by adding words to a 
law, even when they believe their handiwork will make the law 
better accord with justice.  "The problem is that although 
properly informed human minds may agree on what a text means, 
human hearts often disagree on what is right."  Scalia & Garner, 
supra, at 348.  "[I]t is precisely because people differ over 
what is sensible and what is desirable that we elect those who 
will write our laws——and expect courts to observe what has been 
written."  Id. at 22.  That is why "[o]ur unwillingness to 
soften the import of [the legislature's] chosen words even if we 
believe the words lead to a harsh outcome is longstanding."  See 
Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004); Mannino v. 
Davenport, 99 Wis. 2d 602, 615, 299 N.W.2d 823 (1981).  The 
appropriate judicial response to a law that leads to harsh 
results is not to legislate from the bench, but to "take the 
statute as we find it."  Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27 
(1933).   
¶72 By adding words to Wis. Stat. § 971.20, the Baldwin 
court not only violated foundational principles of statutory 
interpretation, it invaded the legislature's constitutionally 
assigned domain, "arrogating to itself the power to make law."  
St. Augustine Sch. v. Taylor, 2021 WI 70, ¶116, 398 Wis. 2d 92, 
961 N.W.2d 635 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting).  The 
court's decision in Baldwin "reflects the philosophy that judges 
should endure whatever interpretive distortions it takes in 
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
20 
 
order to correct a supposed flaw in the statutory machinery."  
King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
Our constitution counters that dangerous philosophy, enshrining 
a separation of powers between the three branches of government.  
The people of Wisconsin gave the legislature——not this court——
"[t]he legislative power."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1.  The 
legislature 
is 
the 
only 
body 
in 
this 
state 
with 
the 
constitutional authority to make and modify laws.  See League of 
Women Voters v. Evers, 2019 WI 75, ¶35, 387 Wis. 2d 511, 929 
N.W.2d 209.  In contrast, the people gave this court "[t]he 
judicial power of this state."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 2.  This 
court does not create laws, nor does it fix laws that fail to 
meet their objectives.  State ex rel. Rose v. Superior Ct. of 
Milwaukee Cnty., 105 Wis. 651, 675, 81 N.W. 1046 (1900).  
Instead, this court has a more modest and circumscribed 
constitutional role——interpreting and applying laws as written.  
Gabler v. Crime Victims Rts. Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶37, 376 Wis. 2d 
147, 897 N.W.2d 384.  This court in Baldwin overstepped its 
constitutionally assigned role by rewriting § 971.20 without any 
authority to do so.  
5.  Baldwin's Progeny 
 
¶73 Courts applying Baldwin showcase the extent to which 
the Baldwin court usurped the legislature's policy-making role.  
Following Baldwin, the court of appeals held that if a defendant 
does not receive "adequate notice of the assigned judge in 
advance of arraignment, the statute's filing deadlines are 
relaxed in order to allow a defendant to intelligently exercise 
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
21 
 
the right of substitution."  Tinti, 159 Wis. 2d at 789-90 (first 
citing Tessmer, 123 Wis. 2d at 443; and then citing Baldwin, 62 
Wis. 2d at 529).  In Zimbal, this court added to Baldwin's 
atextual interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 971.20.  The Zimbal 
court held § 971.20's deadlines are not to be enforced if a 
circuit court told the defendant the substitution issue would be 
addressed only after trial counsel is appointed.  375 Wis. 2d 
643, ¶40.  According to the Zimbal court, this exception to the 
deadlines aligns with Baldwin, Tessmer, and Tinti, which allow 
for an exception to the deadline "when a government-created 
obstacle prevents a defendant from complying with the statutory 
deadline."  Id.  Under such circumstances, the court proclaimed 
it too "problematic" to apply the statute's actual deadline, 
id., ¶48; instead, the court engaged in a balancing test to 
determine if the defendant filed his substitution request within 
a reasonable time:  "We again look to the arraignment cases, 
which have balanced the importance of giving effect to the 
legislative intent expressed in Wis. Stat. § 971.20 and 
preventing a defendant from using a request as a technique to 
disrupt scheduled calendaring or delay a scheduled trial."  Id., 
¶50 (citations omitted).  Such balancing belongs to the 
legislature, which already balanced those interests in the text 
of § 971.20.  The judiciary lacks any authority to reweigh those 
interests and create case-by-case exceptions to 
statutory 
deadlines.  See Flynn v. DOA, 216 Wis. 2d 521, 529, 576 N.W.2d 
245 (1998).6     
                                                 
6 The Zimbal court euphemistically stated it would not 
require the defendant to "strict[ly] adhere[]" to the statutory 
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
22 
 
 
¶74 The majority follows 
Zimbal's lead, stating "an 
untimely request may be considered timely when 'a government-
created 
obstacle' 
prevents 
a 
defendant 
from 
meeting 
the 
statutory deadline."  Majority op., ¶31 (quoting Zimbal, 375 
Wis. 2d 643, ¶40).  But nowhere in Wis. Stat. § 971.20 is there 
any reference to "government-created obstacles."  It is a court-
created criterion at odds with the law's text.  Instead of 
applying Baldwin and its progeny, this court should overrule the 
decision.                                 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶75 The majority correctly concludes the circuit court did 
not have a plain duty to accept Davis's tardy substitution 
request.  But the majority errs by perpetuating the Baldwin 
court's 
usurpation 
of 
legislative 
power 
by 
atextually 
interpreting the judicial substitution statute.  "Rather than 
rewriting the law under the pretense of interpreting it," King, 
576 U.S. at 516 (Scalia, J., dissenting), this court should 
leave it to the legislature to fix any infirmities in Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.20's text.  Section 971.20(4) requires a defendant to file 
a 
substitution 
request 
"before 
arraignment." 
 
Only 
the 
legislature possesses the authority to change that.  Baldwin 
should be overruled and its reasoning abandoned.    I would 
apply the statute's plain meaning and hold the circuit court 
                                                                                                                                                             
deadline.  State v. Zimbal, 2017 WI 59, ¶40, 375 Wis. 2d 643, 
896 N.W.2d 327.  Such language disguises the fact that the court 
would not require the defendant to adhere to the statute's 
deadline at all.     
No.  2022AP1999-W.rgb 
 
23 
 
properly denied Davis's substitution request because it was 
filed after arraignment.  I respectfully concur in the judgment.     
 
No.  2022AP1999.bh 
1 
 
 
 
 
¶76  BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  In a petition for 
a supervisory writ, the question is whether we should force the 
circuit court to do something it had a plain duty to do.  Yet 
before us, the legal theory Davis presents for why the circuit 
court had such a duty is entirely different than the one he 
argued below and in his petition for review.  He also adds a 
brand new argument regarding equitable tolling not raised below 
at all.  Davis forfeited these arguments, full stop.  The best 
course of action would be to hold him to his forfeiture and call 
it a day.     
¶77 The majority disagrees, however, and overlooks the 
forfeiture——ostensibly to clarify the proper procedure for 
raising judicial substitution questions.  But it doesn't need to 
overlook the forfeiture to address this point.  And while I 
agree that a supervisory writ is particularly ill-suited to the 
kind of claims raised here,1 the majority attempts to do more.  
It dives head-first into the merits and seems to blaze at least 
some new legal ground on the forfeited questions.   
¶78 Forfeiture should not be overlooked so easily though; 
it is not just procedural nitpicking.  When we allow litigants 
to present a wholly different case to us than they did below, we 
put ourselves in the awkward position of "telling a lower court 
                                                 
1 I'm not sure whether this court should tell parties how 
best to press their claims.  In any event, a supervisory writ is 
a poor fit for the claims raised here, as the majority 
emphasizes.       
No.  2022AP1999.bh 
2 
 
it was wrong when it was never presented with the opportunity to 
be right."2  This is especially so in this request for a 
supervisory writ where we are asked to order the circuit court 
to comply with a legal command that it was never asked to obey 
in the first place.  In the end, although well-intentioned, the 
majority says more than it should, and risks confusing the law 
rather than clarifying it.  I respectfully concur in the 
judgment. 
 
 
  
                                                 
2 Tory A. Weigand, Raise or Lose: Appellate Discretion and 
Principled Decision-Making, 17 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 
179, 186 (2012) (cleaned up). 
No.  2022AP1999-W.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶79 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (dissenting).  The 
majority answers a question of its own choosing, rather than the 
question presented in the petition for review.  The majority 
could, as Justices Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Brian Hagedorn do 
in their respective concurrences, answer questions that meet the 
criteria for this court's review.  But the majority chooses 
instead to merely restate prior law.  I dissent because this 
case should have been dismissed as improvidently granted.  We 
accept cases based on statutory criteria which require that 
there be "real and significant question of federal or state 
constitutional law" or that lead to "develop[ing], clarify[ing], 
or harmon[izing] the law."  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r).  
There is no new law development in the majority opinion.  
Additionally, Davis argues different issues than that presented 
in his petition for review.  Because neither the majority nor 
Davis follow the court's order to answer the question presented 
in the petition for review, and the majority opinion develops no 
new law, this case should be dismissed as improvidently granted.  
¶80 This court does not grant every petition for review.  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
809.62(1r) 
instructs 
that 
when 
exercising our discretion to grant or deny a petition for 
review: 
CRITERIA FOR GRANTING REVIEW.  Supreme court review is a 
matter of judicial discretion, not of right, and will 
be granted only when special and important reasons are 
presented.  The following . . . indicate criteria that 
will be considered: 
(a) 
A real and significant question of federal or state 
constitutional law is presented. 
No.  2022AP1999-W.akz 
 
2 
 
(b) 
The petition for review demonstrates a need for the 
supreme 
court 
to 
consider 
establishing, 
implementing or changing a policy within its 
authority. 
(c) 
A decision by the supreme court will help develop, 
clarify or harmonize the law, and  
1. The case calls for the application of a new 
doctrine rather than merely the application of 
well-settled 
principles 
to 
the 
factual 
situation; or 
2. The question presented is a novel one, the 
resolution of which will have statewide impact; 
or  
3. The question presented is not factual in nature 
but rather is a question of law of the type 
that is likely to recur unless resolved by the 
supreme court. 
(d) 
The court of appeals' decision is in conflict with 
controlling opinions of the United States Supreme 
Court or the supreme court or other court of 
appeals' decisions. 
(e) 
The court of appeals' decision is in accord with 
opinions of the supreme court or the court of 
appeals but due to the passage of time or changing 
circumstances, 
such 
opinions 
are 
ripe 
for 
reexamination.  
§ (Rule) 809.62(1r).  Davis argued that our review was proper 
because he satisfied at least two of those criteria.1  
¶81 In granting Davis's petition for review, our order 
stated that "the petition for review is granted and that 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(6), the petitioner may 
                                                 
1 Davis argued that the question presented was "a purely 
legal issue that is likely to recur unless the Supreme Court 
grants review and develops the law governing exceptions to the 
deadline for filing requests for substitution of judge."  Davis 
also argued that our review was proper "because there was a need 
for the supreme court to consider establishing policy within its 
authority."  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r)(b), (c). 
No.  2022AP1999-W.akz 
 
3 
 
not raise or argue issues not set forth in the petition for 
review unless otherwise ordered by the court".2  Davis v. Cir. 
Ct. for Dane Cnty., No. 2022AP1999-W, unpublished order (Wis. 
Mar. 31, 2023) (granting petition for review).  The issue 
presented was 
[w]hether the [State Public Defender's] inability to 
appoint counsel before the deadline for requesting a 
substitution of judge expires is a "government created 
obstacle" that interferes with defendant's intelligent 
exercise 
of 
his 
right 
of 
substitution[.]  
Alternatively, 
whether 
the 
doctrine 
of 
equitable 
tolling tolls the deadline for filing a request for 
substitution of judge until the defendant is appointed 
counsel[.]  
But Davis, in his briefing and at oral argument, argued a 
different issue than the one ordered by the court, namely, 
"[w]hen the court sua sponte entered a plea on behalf of an 
unrepresented defendant awaiting appointment of counsel before 
giving notice of assignment of judge, did that procedure result 
in a government-created obstacle that deems Mr. Davis' request 
for substitution timely?"  The majority may begin to consider 
portions of Davis's newly developed issue, but it does not 
definitively answer it, and that was not the issue for which 
review was granted.3  Instead, the majority dodges the issue 
                                                 
2 See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(6) ("If a petition . . . is 
granted, the petitioner . . . cannot raise or argue issues not 
set forth in the petition . . . ."). 
3 See, e.g., majority op., ¶23 ("With regard to Davis's 
government-created obstacle argument, we address the version of 
the argument that Davis presents in his briefing——namely, that 
the government-created obstacle was the timing of Davis's 
arraignment."). 
No.  2022AP1999-W.akz 
 
4 
 
presented and proceeds to the merits anyway, merely restating 
existing law.   
¶82 We are not an error-correcting court; we are a law-
developing court.4  This case is not law-developing.  I would 
dismiss this case as improvidently granted.  
¶83 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
                                                 
4 See State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 407-08, 424 
N.W.2d 672 (1988) (noting that the court of appeals is an error-
correcting court while the supreme court is a law-developing or 
law-declaring court); see also State v. Lee, 197 Wis. 2d 959, 
970, 542 N.W.2d 143 (1996) ("The rules of appellate practice 
applicable to the court of appeals are not always applicable to 
this court, which functions primarily as a law-developing 
court."). 
No.  2022AP1999-W.akz 
 
1