Case Title: CRAWFORD v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
CRAWFORD v. STATE2000 WY 1022 P.3d 1055Case Number: 99-95Decided: 04/26/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Warren CRAWFORD, 
Appellant (Defendant),v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Washakie County, Gary P. Hartman, J.

Representing 
Appellant: Sylvia Lee Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; T. Alan Elrod, Assistant 
Appellate Counsel; Tina N. Hughes, Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Ms. 
Hughes.Representing Appellee: Gay Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney 
General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Kimberly A. Baker, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; Theodore E. Lauer, Faculty Director, and Keith A. Jones, Student 
Intern, of the Prosecution Assistant Program. Argument by Mr. 
Jones.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1] Warren 
Crawford (Crawford) appeals his conviction and sentence on one count of sexual 
assault in the third degree, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304 (a)(ii) 
(Michie 1988).1 We affirm the conviction because 
the record reveals that Crawford received both a fair trial and effective 
assistance of counsel. We agree with the State's contention that the trial court 
sentenced Crawford under an inapplicable version of the sexual assault statute, 
and remand for resentencing under the correct version.

ISSUES

[¶2] Crawford 
presents a single issue for our review:

[¶3] Does an 
inadequate record exist to determine whether Appellant received a fair trial and 
whether Appellant received effective assistance, of 
counsel?

[¶4] The State 
presents this statement of the issues:

I. Is the record on 
appeal sufficient to refute Appellant's claims that the unidentified 
venireperson was biased and prejudiced against him or his witnesses and his 
claims that trial counsel failed to provide effective 
assistance?

II. Should the sentence 
be set aside and this cause remanded to the district court for 
resentencing?

FACTS

[¶5] Early in 
1997, Crawford was living in Washakie County with his girlfriend, TP, and TP's 
seven-year-old daughter, JP. That relationship ended in April, and Crawford 
moved out. In August of that year, JP told a baby sitter that Crawford had 
sexually assaulted her. The sitter told TP, who reported the accusations to the 
police.

[¶6] Following 
an investigation, Crawford was charged with one count of sexual assault in the 
third degree, to which he pled not guilty. His trial was held on August 24 and 
25, 1998, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The trial court sentenced 
Crawford to a penitentiary term of three to seven years. He appeals to this 
Court.

DISCUSSION

Juror 
Bias

[¶7] The 
gravamen of Crawford's appeal is that the record is not sufficient to determine 
whether he received a fair trial and we must, therefore, reverse his conviction. 
He specifically contends that because the record does not identify by name a 
venireperson who indicated a possible bias, we have no way to determine whether 
that individual served on the jury that convicted him. That uncertainty, 
Crawford argues, prevents effective judicial review and requires us to grant him 
a new trial.

[¶8] The 
transcript reflects the following exchange during voir dire, while defense 
counsel was questioning the venire about their knowledge of defense 
witnesses:

[¶9] MR. 
HOPKINSON: Another potential witness that we may be calling is Mark McDuran. Do 
any of you know Mark McDuran?

[¶10] And Sharon 
Dangel, do any of you know Sharon Dangel? How about Kathy Heckert. Anybody know 
Kathy?

[¶11] PEGGY 
TRUMAN: I think I knew him.

[¶12] MRS. IHDE: 
She is Tara's mother.

[¶13] A JUROR: I 
am a case manager to Ted Heckert's son and now his 
ex-wife.

[¶14] MR. 
HOPKINSON: Do you think that that would create problems for you in evaluating 
their testimony if they were called to testify here today?

[¶15] A JUROR: I 
think it could.

[¶16] Defense 
counsel went on to question some potential jurors regarding possible biases, but 
we cannot ascertain whether the unnamed venireperson was among them. Our careful 
review of the record reveals that defense counsel challenged two prospective 
jurors for cause after the unnamed venireperson indicated a possible bias. The 
court excused both of those individuals. It follows that either the unnamed 
venireperson was one of the two excused, or defense counsel did not challenge 
the unnamed venireperson for cause. If the former occurred, then, obviously, 
Crawford was not prejudiced.

[¶17] If defense 
counsel did not challenge the unnamed venireperson for cause, we will presume 
that defense counsel believed that person to be an unobjectionable juror. State 
v. Aponte, 50 Conn. App. 114, 718 A.2d 36, 46-47 (1998), rev'd on other grounds, 
249 Conn. 735, 738 A.2d 117 (1999) ("Unless all a defendant's peremptory 
challenges have been exercised before the completion of jury selection, it is 
presumed that no juror was permitted to serve whom the defendant regarded as 
biased or unsuitable."). We further presume that a decision not to challenge the 
unnamed venireperson for cause was appropriate, based on our presumption that 
trial counsel rendered effective assistance. Mapp v. State, 953 P.2d 140, 143 
(Wyo. 1998). These presumptions lead us to conclude that Crawford has not 
demonstrated that he was prejudiced, even if the unnamed venireperson served on 
the jury that convicted him. See also State v. Hunter, 782 S.W.2d 95, 98 
(Mo.App. 1989), overruled on other grounds recognized by State v. O'Brien, 857 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. 1993) ("[T]he law attaches a strong presumption that the jury 
tendered at the outset of the trial has been properly selected."); State v. 
Reid, 40 Wn. App. 319, 698 P.2d 588, 591 (1985) ("The law presumes that each 
juror sworn in a case is impartial and above legal exception; otherwise, he or 
she would have been challenged for cause.") Because Crawford was not prejudiced, 
his claim is unavailing.

Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel

[¶18] Although 
Crawford's statement of the issue on appeal broaches the subject of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, he does not actually claim in his brief that his trial 
counsel was ineffective. Instead, he contends the record is inadequate to 
determine whether his counsel was effective.

[¶19] Our 
standard for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
is:

[¶20] First, the 
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result Is reliable. Unless a defendant 
makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence 
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable.

[¶21] Mapp v. 
State, 953 P.2d  at 143 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). We have included counsel's performance 
in the voir dire phase of trial in our previously discussed presumption of 
effective assistance and said, "Because voir dire questioning techniques are 
diverse, any alleged voir dire error must be egregious and obvious in order to 
fall below the line of competence." Arner v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 105 (Wyo. 
1994).

[¶22] The 
Supreme Court of New Mexico held that a defense attorney did not render 
ineffective assistance by failing to challenge for cause or peremptorily strike 
a venireperson whose sister worked for the district attorney as a victim's 
advocate and was involved in assisting the defendant's alleged victim. State v. 
Sanchez, 120 N.M. 247, 901 P.2d 178, 185 (1995). That court said the fact that 
the defense could have challenged or struck the venireperson but did not 
"suggests that the juror possessed qualities that defense counsel wanted 
represented on the jury." Id. Even if we assume that the unnamed venireperson 
served on the jury, Crawford cannot show that his counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance because he cannot overcome our presumption of effective 
assistance.

[¶23] Because 
Crawford has not demonstrated that he was denied a fair trial or effective 
assistance of counsel, we affirm his conviction.

Resentencing

[¶24] The State 
raises the issue that the district court sentenced Crawford under an 
inapplicable version of the sexual assault statute. The jury found Crawford 
guilty of committing sexual assault in the third degree between February 1, 1997 
and March 30, 1997. The statute in effect during those months provided a penalty 
of imprisonment for not more than five years. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306 (a)(iii) 
(Michie Cum.Supp.1996). Effective July 1, 1997, the statute was revised to 
provide for imprisonment for up to fifteen years. 1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 135 
§ 1. That act also stated that the new provisions did not apply to crimes 
committed before July 1, 1997. 1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 135 §§ 3, 4. 
Nonetheless, the district court sentenced Crawford to imprisonment for three to 
seven years. Because that sentence was not permissible under the law in effect 
at the time of the offense, we remand to the district court with instructions to 
resentence Crawford to a term not to exceed five years.

FOOTNOTES

1 § 6-2-304. 
Sexual assault in the third degree.

(a) 
Except under circumstances constituting a violation of W.S. 14-3-105, an actor 
commits sexual assault in the third degree if:

(i) 
The actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim and who inflicts 
sexual intrusion on a victim under the age of sixteen (16) years; 
or

(ii) The actor is an adult and subjects a victim under the age of twelve 
(12) years to sexual contact without inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim 
and without causing serious bodily injury to the 
victim.