Case Title: Moore v. Old Republic Insurance Co.

Citation: 512 S.W.2d 564

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1974-07-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
512 S.W.2d 564 (1974) Jimmy Ray MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee, v. OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE CO., Defendant-Appellant-Appellee, and Thomas A. Wiseman, Treasurer of the State of Tennessee, Defendant-Appellee. Alonzo MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee, v. OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE CO., Defendant-Appellant-Appellee, and Thomas A. Wiseman, Treasurer of the State of Tennessee, Defendant-Appellee. Supreme Court of Tennessee. July 29, 1974. *565 H. Calvin Walter, Knoxville, for plaintiff below. Earl R. Layman, Knoxville, David M. Pack, Atty. Gen., C. Hayes Cooney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald A. Webster, Dist. Atty. Gen., John Gill, Richard Stair, Asst. Dist. Attys. Gen., for defendant below. WILLIAM M. LEECH, Special Justice. The two above styled causes are Workmen's Compensation cases having almost identical factual and legal issues, therefore, both cases were consolidated at trial and both were heard together before this Court. Thus, it necessarily follows that only one opinion will be necessary to dispose of both cases. Both plaintiffs were coal miners suffering from coal worker's pneumoconiosis (Black Lung), which they allege caused them to be totally and permanently disabled under Tennessee's Workmen's Compensation Law. The facts were stipulated below as follows: In addition, the applicable rates were stipulated, "if the periodic benefit rates applicable to [these] cases are limited by the provisions of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended... ." From the foregoing stipulations and from arguments of counsel, the Chancellor found that the plaintiffs suffered from an occupational disease, coal worker's pneumoconiosis, which arose out of and in the course of their employment with Gay Coal Company and that as a result, they were permanently and totally disabled. He also held that due to a prior injury that these cases were within the meaning of the "Second Injury Fund". Subsequently, the Chancellor found that the maximum benefits payable pursuant to Tennessee's Workmen's Compensation Law were controlled by the applicable provisions of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. Thus, pursuant to said Federal Act, the applicable rate was found to be $339.50 per month until the number of dependents was reduced. And since the "Second Injury Fund" was applicable, the insurer, Old Republic Insurance Co., was required to make payments for three hundred weeks at the rate of $339.50 per month to Jimmy Ray Moore, and payments of $339.50 per month for two hundred weeks to Alonzo Moore. Thereupon, for the next one hundred weeks and two hundred weeks respectively, the "Second Injury Fund" would pay the plaintiffs at the rate of $55.00 per week, during which time the insurer would pay the plaintiffs the difference between $55.00 per week and $339.50 per month. At the end of said four hundred weeks, then the insurer alone would pay the remainder of the plaintiffs' period of disability at the rate of $339.50 per month or at the stipulated reduced rate should the plaintiffs have less than three dependents. As a result of the foregoing, defendants filed a petition to rehear which was subsequently overruled. Thereupon, appeal was brought direct to this Court pursuant to T.C.A. § 16-408. All of the assignments of error filed in this cause are fairly summarized as follows: In order to resolve the first issue, it is necessary to examine T.C.A. § 50-1105, which in part follows: Appellants content that the foregoing emphasized portion of T.C.A. § 50-1105 is unconstitutionally vague because "the reader... is left not knowing what the actual rate is, when it applies, or exactly what benefits and limitations ... are applicable." They contend the vagueness is further complicated by the fact that U.S.C., tit. 30 §§ 801-860 [960] has nothing to do with benefits to be paid coal miners suffering from pneumoconiosis. It is true that U.S.C., tit. 30 §§ 801-860 [960] does not refer to benefits, however, it is also true that section 6 of Chapter 699 of the Public Acts of 1972, which has been codified as T.C.A. § 50-1105, contains no reference to any United States Code section; therefore, it is obvious that the reference was added by the compiler. Since the reference to the United States Code was not in the Act passed by the Legislature and signed by the Governor, we hold it to be mere surplusage and as such it can not alter the sense or meaning of the Act in question. See T.C.A. § 1-108. As for the remainder of Appellants' vagueness argument, it is clear on the face of T.C.A. §§ 50-1102 50-1109, how, when and where to determine "what the actual rate is, when it applies, [and] exactly what benefits and limitations ... are applicable." To determine any or all of the foregoing, one must simply look to the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. We think this is in accord with the Legislature's intent, which was to adopt the Federal law concerning coal worker's pneumoconiosis as the law in Tennessee. This is evidenced by reading T.C.A. § 50-1102, which states in part that: In view of the foregoing, we find T.C.A. § 50-1105 to be constitutional, therefore, assignment one is overruled. *568 Assignment two is concerned with the language in T.C.A. § 50-1105, which states in part that "[an] employee totally disabled due to coal worker's pneumoconiosis shall be paid benefits... ." (Emphasis added). Appellants contend that the above emphasized language, in view of the stipulated facts that total disability resulted from pre-existing problems and pneumoconiosis, the two being co-mingled and combined, precludes recovery in the instant cases. In order to resolve the aforesaid issue, we must look to the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, since said Act is now Tennessee law, being incorporated by reference. Looking to U.S.C., tit. 30 § 923, we find that the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare shall by regulation prescribe the proper guideline to implement the statute. In 20 CFR Ch. III § 715.101(4), one of the regulations so promulgated, the term "total disability" is said to be defined in Subpart D of Part 410. Therein, in § 410.412 "total disability" is defined as follows: Applying this definition to the stipulated facts herein, it is clear that both plaintiffs were and are totally disabled due solely to pneumoconiosis. Notwithstanding some prior compensable dsiability, the workers were able to and did perform their duties in the coal mines and would have continued to be able to perform such duties in the absence of pneumoconiosis. It results, therefore, that assignment two is overruled. In order to resolve the third assignment, which questions the applicability of the "Second Injury Fund", it is necessary to examine T.C.A. § 50-1027. Said Code section states in applicable part that: In view of our holding that both plaintiffs are totally disabled due solely to pneumoconiosis, and in view of the foregoing Code section; it is obvious that the "Second Injury Fund" is inapplicable since the prior injuries added nothing to the worker's final disability. Moreover, the occupational disease, coal worker's pneumoconiosis, is not an "injury" or "the loss of use of another member" within the meaning of T.C.A. § 50-1027. Assuming arguendo, however, that the foregoing were not true, we must still hold that coal worker's pneumoconiosis can *569 not come within the meaning of the "Second Injury Fund", because this jurisdiction, by legislation, has taken coal worker's pneumoconiosis out of Tennessee's Workmen's Compensation Law and placed it within the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. Thus, the "Second Injury Fund" can have no applicability in pneumoconiosis cases. It results, therefore, that the Chancellor was in error when he found these cases to be within the meaning of the "Fund". In conclusion, we hold that coal worker's pneumoconiosis cases are controlled by the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 and, therefore, the "Second Injury Fund", T.C.A. § 50-1027, has no applicability in such cases. In view of this holding, we remand these cases back to the Chancery Court for Knox County for disposition consistent with this opinion. DYER, C.J., and CHATTIN, McCANLESS and FONES, JJ., concur.