Case Title: City of Madison v. State of Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development

Citation: 2003 WI 76

Docket Number: 2001AP001910

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 76 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1910 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
City of Madison, Debra H. Amesqua and the 
Madison Board of Police and Fire Commissioners,  
 
Petitioners-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
State of Wisconsin Department of Workforce 
Development, Equal Rights Division,  
 
Respondent-Appellant, 
Charles T. Wagner,  
 
Respondent-Co-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 199 
Reported at:  257 Wis. 2d 348, 651 N.W.2d 292 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 1, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 12, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Callaway   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
petitioners-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs 
by 
Scott 
Herrick 
and 
Herrick, 
Kasdorf, 
Dymzarov, 
Twietmeyer & Zarow, LLP, Madison, and Steven C. Zach, Jennifer 
S. Mirus, and Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field LLP, Madison, and 
oral argument by Scott N. Herrick and Steven C. Zach. 
 
For the respondent-appellant the cause was argued by David 
C. Rice, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2
For the respondent-co-appellant there was a brief by 
Charles W. Giesen and Giesen Law Offices, S.C., Madison, and 
oral argument by Charles W. Giesen. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Bruce F. Ehlke and 
Shneidman, 
Hawks 
& 
Ehlke, 
S.C., 
Madison, 
on 
behalf 
of 
Firefighters Local 311 and Joseph Conway, Jr. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James R. Korom, Matthew 
A. Koch, and von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of 
the Wisconsin Chiefs of Police Association. 
 
2003 WI 76 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1910  
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 2291) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
City of Madison, Debra H. Amesqua and the  
Madison Board of Police and Fire  
Commissioners,  
 
          Petitioners-Respondents- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of  
Workforce Development, Equal Rights  
Division,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant, 
 
Charles T. Wagner,  
 
          Respondent-Co-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  The issue in this case is whether 
a firefighter who is terminated from city service after a "just 
cause" hearing before a police and fire commission (PFC) 
No. 
01-1910   
 
2 
 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em)(1997-98)1 may pursue a 
discrimination complaint regarding the termination before the 
Department of Workforce Development (DWD) under the Wisconsin 
Fair Employment Act (WFEA). 
¶2  Disciplinary terminations of city firefighters are 
imposed and reviewed pursuant to the procedures established in 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5).  The statutory procedure requires the PFC 
to determine whether any proposed disciplinary termination is 
supported by just cause, which includes a determination of 
whether the rule or order allegedly violated by the firefighter 
is reasonable and is being applied without discrimination.  Wis. 
Stat. § 62.13(5)(em)2. and 6.  Any termination sustained by the 
PFC under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) and (f) is subject only to 
judicial review in circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 
62.13(5)(i), 
or 
in 
certain 
circumstances 
by 
common 
law 
certiorari. 
 
Accordingly, 
any 
claim 
that 
a 
disciplinary 
termination is discriminatory under the WFEA must be raised 
before the PFC, the agency with exclusive statutory authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) to review disciplinary actions 
against firefighters.  The DWD may not take jurisdiction over a 
WFEA complaint arising out of a decision of a PFC to terminate a 
firefighter. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 volumes unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
01-1910   
 
3 
 
¶3 
Charles T. Wagner became a Madison firefighter in 
November of 1993.  On January 13, 1997, Wagner was suspended 
with pay pending resolution of felony fraud charges filed 
against him in Dane County Circuit Court stemming from an 
incident in 1992 involving stolen merchandise.  On November 10, 
1997, Wagner entered an Alford plea and was convicted of 
misdemeanor theft.2 
¶4 
On August 10, 1998, Madison Fire Chief Debra Amesqua 
filed a statement of charges against Wagner with the City of 
Madison Police and Fire Commission, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 
62.13(5)(b), alleging 15 counts of misconduct.  The statement of 
charges was later amended to allege eight counts of misconduct 
in violation of four rules of the Madison Fire Department in 
connection with the criminal theft and related conduct.  The 
chief recommended that Wagner be terminated for this misconduct.   
¶5 
The PFC held an evidentiary hearing at which both 
parties submitted briefs, were represented by counsel, submitted 
exhibits, and examined and cross-examined witnesses.  On August 
18, 1999, pursuant to § 62.13(5)(e), the PFC discharged Wagner 
from his position with the City of Madison Fire Department. 
¶6 
On November 14, 1999, Wagner sought review of the PFC 
order in Dane County Circuit Court under § 62.13(5)(i).  The 
                                                 
 
2   See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).  An 
Alford plea has the same effect as a guilty or no contest plea, 
and "supports a fully effective criminal judgment."  State ex 
rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 631-32, 579 N.W.2d 698 
(1998).  
  
No. 
01-1910   
 
4 
 
Honorable Gerald C. Nichol dismissed the case as improperly 
commenced, and the court of appeals affirmed.   
¶7 
After the dismissal of his circuit court action 
seeking judicial review of the PFC's order, Wagner filed a 
discrimination 
complaint 
with 
DWD's 
Equal 
Rights Division 
claiming that his termination was discriminatory because of his 
conviction record in violation of the WFEA, Wis. Stat. §§ 
111.321 and 111.335.  He named the City of Madison, the PFC, and 
Chief Debra Amesqua as respondents.  The named respondents 
sought dismissal of the complaint, asserting that the DWD lacked 
jurisdiction to review the PFC order.  The DWD refused to 
dismiss the complaint.   
¶8 
The City, the PFC, and Chief Amesqua then sought a 
writ of prohibition against the DWD in circuit court.  The 
Honorable Richard J. Calloway issued the writ, concluding that 
the DWD lacked jurisdiction over Wagner's complaint because of 
the exclusive nature of PFC proceedings under Wis. Stat. § 
62.13(5).  Wagner and the DWD appealed, and the court of appeals 
reversed.  We granted review, and now reverse.      
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶9 
A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy 
traditionally employed to restrain an inferior tribunal from 
exceeding its jurisdiction.  State ex rel. Lynch v. County Ct., 
82 Wis. 2d 454, 459, 262 N.W.2d 773 (1978).  A writ of 
prohibition may issue to prevent an administrative agency from 
exceeding its statutory authority.  State ex rel. DPI v. DILHR, 
68 Wis. 2d 677, 686-87, 229 N.W.2d 591 (1975); State ex rel. St. 
No. 
01-1910   
 
5 
 
Michael's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. DOA, 137 Wis. 2d 326, 
335, 404 N.W.2d 114 (Ct. App. 1987). 
¶10  A circuit court's decision to issue a writ of 
prohibition is a discretionary determination that is reviewed 
for an erroneous exercise of that discretion.  St. Michael's, 
137 Wis. 2d at 330.  A circuit court's exercise of discretion in 
the issuance of a writ of prohibition will be affirmed if "the 
court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of 
law, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a 
conclusion which a reasonable judge could reach."  Id.  However, 
any question of law that arises in reviewing whether the circuit 
court applied a proper legal standard is subject to de novo 
review.  Id. at 330-31; see also State ex rel. DPI, 68 Wis. 2d 
at 686-87.   
¶11 This case presents a question of law regarding the 
interpretation and harmonization of two statutes, Wis. Stat. § 
62.13(5) and the WFEA.  In interpreting two statutes that are 
alleged to conflict, it is our duty to attempt to harmonize them 
in a way that will give effect to the legislature's intent in 
enacting both statutes.  Byers v. LIRC, 208 Wis. 2d 388, 395, 
561 N.W.2d 678 (1997)(citing City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 193 
Wis. 2d 168, 184, 532 N.W.2d 690 (1995)).  In this situation, 
"no special deference is due" to an administrative agency.  Id. 
at 394 (citing Boynton Cab Co. v. DILHR, 96 Wis. 2d 396, 405-06, 
291 N.W.2d 850 (1980)); see also City of Madison v. WERC, 2003 
WI 52, ¶¶9-12, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __. 
III. ANALYSIS 
No. 
01-1910   
 
6 
 
A. Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) 
¶12 Wisconsin Statute § 62.13 requires municipalities with 
populations above 4,000 to maintain a police and fire commission 
with jurisdiction over the hiring, promotion, discipline, and 
discharge of members of the police and fire departments.  Wis. 
Stat. § 62.13(1) and (2).  The statute "shall be construed as an 
enactment of statewide concern for the purpose of providing a 
uniform regulation of police and fire departments."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.13(12). 
¶13 Police and fire commissions were created and endowed 
with statutory responsibilities and prerogatives over 100 years 
ago, in 1897.  Kraus v. City of Waukesha Police Fire Comm'n, 
2003 WI 51, ¶29, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  The present 
statute establishes a comprehensive system governing employment 
matters relating to municipal police officers and firefighters, 
and subjects the decisions of police and fire chiefs and PFCs to 
report, recommendation, and review requirements.  Wis. Stat. § 
62.13(4)(a), (c) and (5); City of Madison v. WERC, 2003 WI 52, 
¶13, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __.    At issue in this case is 
whether the DWD may take jurisdiction of a WFEA complaint in 
order to review an order of a PFC issued pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.13(5).   
¶14 Wisconsin Statute § 62.13(5) governs disciplinary 
actions against police officers and firefighters, and provides 
that a police officer or firefighter may not be "suspended, 
reduced in rank, suspended and reduced in rank, or removed" 
unless the PFC "determines whether there is just cause, as 
No. 
01-1910   
 
7 
 
described in this paragraph, to sustain the charges" of 
misconduct.  Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em).  Charges of misconduct 
must be in writing and may be filed by "the chief, by a member 
of the board, by the board as a body, or by any aggrieved 
person."  Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(b).  A public hearing must then 
be held on the charges, at which the officer or firefighter may 
be represented by counsel and may compel the attendance of 
witnesses by subpoena.  Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(d). 
¶15 As we have noted, the PFC may not sustain the charges 
unless it determines that there is "just cause" to do so.  Wis. 
Stat. § 62.13(5)(em).  "Just cause" is determined by reference 
to seven factors: 
In making its determination [of just cause], the board 
shall apply the following standards, to the extent 
applicable: 
1. Whether the subordinate could reasonably be 
expected to have had knowledge of the probable 
consequences of the alleged conduct. 
2. Whether the rule or order that the subordinate 
allegedly violated is reasonable. 
3. Whether the chief, before filing the charge 
against the subordinate, made a reasonable effort to 
discover whether the subordinate did in fact violate a 
rule or order. 
4. Whether the effort described under subd. 3. 
was fair and objective. 
5. 
Whether 
the 
chief 
discovered 
substantial 
evidence that the subordinate violated the rule or 
order as described in the charges filed against the 
subordinate. 
No. 
01-1910   
 
8 
 
6. Whether the chief is applying the rule or 
order fairly and without discrimination against the 
subordinate. 
7. Whether the proposed discipline reasonably 
relates to the seriousness of the alleged violation 
and to the subordinate's record of service with the 
chief's department. 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em)1.-7. 
¶16  In short, "just cause" exists only where the officer 
or firefighter has violated a reasonable rule or order and 
should have known that the violation would have consequences, 
and where the chief has made a reasonable, fair, and objective 
effort to determine that the officer or firefighter actually 
committed the violation.  Also, the charges against the officer 
or firefighter must be supported by substantial evidence.  The 
action taken against the officer or firefighter must be 
reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense and the 
officer's or firefighter's record of service.  Finally, in 
evaluating whether "just cause" exists, the PFC must determine 
whether the action taken against the employee is "fair[] and 
without discrimination."  Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em)6. 
¶17 The statute requires that the PFC's "findings and 
determinations" be reduced to writing and filed with the 
secretary of the board within three days of the hearing.  Wis. 
Stat. § 62.13(5)(f).  The statute provides for judicial review 
of an adverse ruling in the circuit court, by service of a 
written notice of appeal within ten days after an order is 
filed.  Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(i).  Within five days of service 
of a notice of appeal, the PFC must certify the complete record 
No. 
01-1910   
 
9 
 
of the proceedings to the clerk of the circuit court.  Id.  An 
action for judicial review of a PFC's order has "precedence over 
any other cause of a different nature pending in the court," 
and, upon application, a trial must be held within "15 days 
after such application except by agreement."  Id.  The court 
"may require further return or the taking and return of further 
evidence by the board."  Id. 
¶18  At trial, the "question to be determined by the court 
shall be: Upon the evidence is there just cause, as described 
under par. (em), to sustain the charges against the accused?"  
Id.  If the circuit court reverses the PFC, "the accused shall 
be forthwith reinstated and entitled to pay as though in 
continuous service."  Id.  Finally, the statute provides that 
"[i]f the order of the board is sustained it shall be final and 
conclusive."  Id. 
¶19  We have stated that the review procedures set forth in 
§ 62.13(5)(i) reflect the legislature's intent that "judicial 
review should be limited and prompt."  State ex rel. Kaczkowski 
v. Fire & Police Comm'rs, 33 Wis. 2d 488, 504, 148 N.W.2d 44 
(1967); see also Younglove v. City of Oak Creek Police & Fire 
Comm'n, 218 Wis. 2d 133, 136-37, 579 N.W.2d 294 (Ct. App. 1998).  
A more protracted process would have a "demoralizing effect on 
the public service of long-drawn-out proceedings, during which 
time no permanent appointment could be made."  Clancy v. Fire 
and Police Comm'rs, 150 Wis. 630, 634, 138 N.W.2d 109 (1912).  
In addition to the judicial review provided by the statute, we 
have also held that certain aspects of a PFC's decision may be 
No. 
01-1910   
 
10 
 
reviewed by common law certiorari: "errors of jurisdiction and 
errors of law by a fire and police commission can be reviewed by 
a writ of certiorari," although "this remedy should be used 
sparingly 
and 
only 
when 
those 
errors 
clearly 
appear."  
Kaczkowski, 33 Wis. 2d at 504. 
B.  The WFEA 
¶20  The WFEA, Wis. Stat. §§ 111.31-111.395, was enacted in 
1945 and "is aimed at assuring equal employment opportunities 
for 
all 
persons 
by 
eliminating 
certain 
discriminatory 
practices."  Byers, 208 Wis. 2d at 396-97.  The WFEA's 
declaration of policy states that "[i]t is the intent of the 
legislature to protect by law the rights of all individuals to 
obtain gainful employment and to enjoy privileges free from 
employment discrimination."  Wis. Stat. § 111.31(2).  Prohibited 
bases of discrimination include, inter alia, "age, race, creed, 
color, disability, marital status, sex, national origin" and, as 
is pertinent here, "conviction record."  Wis. Stat. § 111.321. 
¶21  The WFEA provides that the DWD is the agency of state 
government authorized to administer the WFEA.  Wis. Stat. § 
111.375.  The complaint and investigation procedure is set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 111.39, and findings and orders emanating from a 
WFEA complaint are subject to judicial review under Chapter 227.  
Wis. Stat. § 111.395.  "The purpose of the WFEA is to deter and 
to remedy discriminatory conduct of employers which infringes 
employes' civil rights."  Byers, 208 Wis. 2d at 398. 
C. Harmonization of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) and the WFEA 
No. 
01-1910   
 
11 
 
¶22 Wagner and the DWD argue that this case is controlled 
by Byers, in which we harmonized the WFEA with the Worker's 
Compensation Act (WCA) so as to exclude claims under the WFEA 
from the WCA's exclusivity provisions.  Byers, 208 Wis. 2d at 
407-08.  There are, however, significant differences between the 
WCA and Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5), and those differences compel a 
different conclusion here. 
¶23  Byers involved a workplace sexual harassment claim by 
an employee stemming from the conduct of another employee over 
whom the employer exercised insufficient discipline or control.  
We were confronted with the question of whether the WCA's 
exclusivity 
provisions 
precluded 
the 
DWD 
from 
taking 
jurisdiction over the WFEA complaint because the claim of injury 
arose in the workplace.   Noting that the legislature enacted 
the WCA and the WFEA to address "different kinds of work-related 
harms," id. at 394, and because the WCA contained no anti-
discrimination element, we concluded that allowing a separate 
complaint for discrimination under the WFEA to proceed in the 
DWD would "best preserve the purposes of the WCA and the WFEA."  
Id. at 405. 
¶24 More specifically, we noted in Byers that the purpose 
of the WCA is to "compensat[e] persons who suffer work-related 
physical and mental injuries."  Id. at 395.  On the other hand, 
the purpose of the WFEA is to "assur[e] equal employment 
opportunities 
for 
all 
persons 
by 
eliminating 
certain 
discriminatory practices."  Id. at 397.  Important to our 
analysis here, we observed in Byers that the WCA "gives no 
No. 
01-1910   
 
12 
 
authority to the administrative agency to make a finding of 
discrimination, 
to 
order 
the 
employer 
to 
desist 
from 
discrimination, 
to 
reinstate 
an 
employe 
who 
has 
been 
discriminatorily discharged, actually or constructively, or to 
redress the discriminatory conduct that has been expressly 
defined as contrary to the public policy of this state."   Id. 
at 399.  
¶25 We concluded in Byers that because "the WCA and the 
WFEA address two separate harms," the two statutes should "be 
read so that neither statutory scheme frustrates the other's 
purposes.  The legislature's intent will be upheld by protecting 
the integrity of both statutory schemes and preserving the 
policies of both statutes to the greatest extent possible."  Id. 
at 400.  Our conclusion in Byers that the WCA did not bar a 
complainant from pursuing a separate administrative claim under 
the WFEA accomplished these goals. 
¶26 This is a markedly different case.  Wisconsin Statute 
§ 62.13 is "an enactment of statewide concern for the purpose of 
providing a uniform regulation of police and fire departments."  
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(12).  The WFEA is intended to "encourage 
employers to evaluate an employe or applicant for employment 
based 
upon 
the 
employe's 
or 
applicant's 
individual 
qualifications rather than upon a particular class to which the 
individual may belong."  Wis. Stat. § 111.31(2).  The uniformity 
of police and fire department regulation and the prerogatives of 
the PFC under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) cannot be preserved if the 
DWD has jurisdiction to review, revise, or reverse a PFC's 
No. 
01-1910   
 
13 
 
decision pursuant to a WFEA complaint.  Harmonizing the two 
statutory schemes to preserve their manifest purposes requires 
that the WFEA's anti-discrimination provisions be applied in the 
context of the PFC's review and determination of discipline 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em), and the statutory or 
certiorari judicial review that may follow. 
¶27  Here, unlike in Byers, both Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) 
and the WFEA require that an adverse employment decision not be 
taken for a discriminatory purpose.  Unlike the WCA, Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.13(5)(em) gives the administrative agency in question——the 
PFC——the authority to evaluate whether the employment action 
under review is "fair and without discrimination."  Wis. Stat. § 
62.13.(5)(em)6.  Although Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) does not 
define "discrimination," there is no reason why the PFC cannot 
apply the provisions of the WFEA in the context of its 
decisionmaking.  
¶28  As we have noted, the "just cause" inquiry requires 
the PFC to consider, among other things: whether the rule or 
order allegedly violated "is reasonable," whether the chief made 
a "reasonable effort" to investigate the alleged violation, and 
whether the proposed discipline is "reasonably related" to the 
officer 
or 
firefighter's 
service 
record. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
62.13(5)(em)2., 3., and 7.  As a matter of law, a rule, 
investigation, or discipline that violates the WFEA cannot be 
"reasonable."  A PFC proceeding under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) 
cannot impose discipline in violation of the WFEA.  An officer's 
or firefighter's claim that the proposed discipline would 
No. 
01-1910   
 
14 
 
violate the WFEA may be considered by the PFC under Wis. Stat. § 
62.12(5)(em), and reviewed by a circuit court on statutory 
appeal under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(i) or common law certiorari. 
¶29 In short, this case is different from Byers because, 
unlike 
the 
WCA, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
62.13(5) 
does 
address 
discrimination and does require the PFC, and the circuit court 
on review, to consider discrimination allegations.  We conclude 
that the proper harmonization of the WFEA and Wis. Stat. § 
62.13(5) requires that any claim that the proposed discipline 
violates the WFEA be raised before the PFC, and in the circuit 
court on statutory appeal or certiorari review. 
¶30  The "harmonization" suggested by Wagner and the DWD is 
not a "harmonization" at all, but, rather, a displacement of the 
prerogatives and authority of the PFC and the statutory 
conclusiveness of its decisions.  The statute provides that a 
PFC's order "is 'final and conclusive' unless reversed by the 
circuit court."  City of Janesville v. WERC, 193 Wis. 2d 492, 
504, 535 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1995); Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(i).  
This statutory conclusiveness "becomes meaningless" if the PFC's 
disciplinary order can be subjected to collateral agency review 
in the DWD under the WFEA.  City of Janesville, 193 Wis. 2d at 
504. The "harmonization" proposed by Wagner and the DWD would 
also have the anomalous effect of permitting an administrative 
agency to overrule the decision of the circuit court, and could 
produce conflicting circuit court orders if the DWD decision is 
itself subjected to judicial review. 
No. 
01-1910   
 
15 
 
¶31 It is now well-established that Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) 
establishes the exclusive procedures for the imposition and 
review of hiring, promotion, demotion, and termination decisions 
regarding police officers and firefighters.  City of Madison v. 
WERC, 2003 WI 52, ¶33, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __; Eau Claire 
Cty. v. General Teamsters Union Local No. 662, 2000 WI 57, ¶23 
n.11, 235 Wis. 2d 385, 399, 611 N.W.2d 744; City of Janesville, 
193 Wis. 2d at 502-504; Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of 
Milwaukee, 113 Wis. 2d 192, 196-97, 335 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 
1983).   
[T]he PFC not only has the ultimate authority to 
suspend employees and the exclusive authority to 
reduce in rank and remove subordinates, it is also 
expressly charged with determining whether the charges 
filed against a subordinate should be sustained at a 
public evidentiary hearing. It is inconsistent with 
that statutory charge to permit a subordinate who is 
dissatisfied with a PFC decision to seek [review by 
the WERC] of essentially the same issue decided by the 
PFC. 
City of Janesville, 193 Wis. 2d at 504.3   
                                                 
 
3  It is also established law that under Wis. Stat. § 62.13, 
the 
authority 
to 
make 
hiring, 
promotion 
and 
termination 
decisions is vested solely in the police or fire chief and the 
PFC, and may not be transferred to another adjudicator.  See 
City 
of 
Madison 
v. 
WERC, 
2003 
WI 
52, 
¶¶ 
27-28, 
33,  
___Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___; City of Janesville v. WERC, 193 
Wis. 2d 492, 502-504, 535 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1995); Milwaukee 
Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 113 Wis. 2d 192, 196-97, 335 
N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1983).  Any "harmonization" of the WFEA and 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13 that would allow the DWD to second-guess the 
chief and the PFC on a termination decision would effectively 
transfer this exclusive decisionmaking authority from the PFC to 
a collateral administrative agency.    
  
No. 
01-1910   
 
16 
 
¶32 Indeed, we have stated that the "appeal procedure 
under sec. 62.13(5)(i) is exclusive and conclusive, because the 
last sentence of that subsection states: If the order of the 
board is sustained it shall be final and conclusive."  State ex 
rel. Enk v. Mentkowski, 76 Wis. 2d 565, 571, 252 N.W.2d 28 
(1977); see also Kaczkowski, 33 Wis. 2d at 496; Clancy, 150 Wis. 
at 634.4  The statutory procedure ensures that police officers 
and firefighters are not "wrongfully disciplined and provides 
them with a sufficient remedial process in the event that they 
are wrongfully disciplined."  Larson v. City of Tomah, 193 Wis. 
2d 225, 232, 532 N.W.2d 726 (1995). 
¶33  As we have noted, we have held that jurisdictional and 
legal errors of a PFC are also reviewable by the circuit court 
on certiorari.  Kaczkowski, 33 Wis. 2d at 500.  Thus, we have 
stated that there are "two exclusive avenues of review of the 
determinations of a fire and police commission . . . the appeal 
procedures provided by the legislature or by means of a writ of 
certiorari."  Enk, 76 Wis. 2d at 571.  Collateral, serial review 
of PFC orders by the DWD conflicts with this principle. 
                                                 
4 [W]here the legislature provides for a final and 
conclusive judicial review of the action of a board, 
commission or other nonjudicial body, the courts have 
jurisdiction to review 
by certiorari 
only 
those 
strictly legal questions which were not or could not 
have been raised by way of the judicial review 
proceeding provided by the legislature.   
State ex rel. Smits v. City of De Pere, 104 Wis. 2d 26, 31, 
310 N.W.2d 607 (1981) (quoting State ex rel. Kaczkowski v. 
Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 33 Wis. 2d 488, 500, 148 
N.W.2d 44 (1967)). 
No. 
01-1910   
 
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¶34 The judicial review and due process requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) adequately safeguard the right of officers 
and firefighters to be free from discrimination.  The statute 
requires a hearing and allows for representation by counsel and 
the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.  
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(d).  The PFC's decision is governed by 
legal standards that allow for the consideration of whether the 
proposed discipline is discriminatory in violation of the WFEA, 
and is subject to judicial review by statutory appeal or 
certiorari in the circuit court.   
¶35 The goal of harmonization of two conflicting statutes 
is 
to 
interpret 
them 
"so 
that 
neither 
statutory 
scheme 
frustrates the other's purposes."  Byers, 208 Wis. 2d at 400.  
To permit the DWD to assert jurisdiction over a WFEA claim 
arising out of an action by the PFC under § 62.13(5) would not 
merely frustrate the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5), it would 
undermine it almost completely.  Harmonization of conflicting 
statutes seeks to "protect[] the integrity of both statutory 
schemes and preserve the policies of both statutes to the 
greatest extent possible."  Id. at 400.  Subjecting a reasoned 
decision of the PFC (and a circuit court order affirming that 
decision) to collateral review in the DWD would "effectively 
abrogate the purposes" of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5).  Id. 
¶36 Accordingly, we conclude that the conflict between the 
WFEA and Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) is properly harmonized by 
interpreting Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) to permit the PFC, and the 
circuit court on judicial review, to consider whether the 
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discipline of an officer or firefighter violates the WFEA, and 
to preclude a separate, collateral attack on the PFC's decision 
before the DWD.  An interpretation that would allow the DWD to 
review and potentially displace a decision of the PFC, and to 
effectively overrule an order of the circuit court, would 
eliminate the exclusive nature of PFC proceedings under Wis. 
Stat. § 62.13(5) and run contrary to the legislature's intent 
that 
these 
proceedings 
be 
resolved 
expeditiously 
and 
conclusively.  The DWD may not take jurisdiction over a WFEA 
complaint arising out of a decision of a PFC.5  The circuit 
court's issuance of the writ of prohibition was proper.  The 
decision of the court of appeals is reversed, and the matter is 
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
By the court.-The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
5  The court of appeals also addressed, and the parties 
briefed in this court, issues of immunity as well as claim and 
issue preclusion.  As a result of our conclusion regarding the 
conflict between the statutes, we need not address these 
additional issues.   
  
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