Case Title: Ralph E. Beecher v. Labor & Industry Review Commission

Citation: 2004 WI 88

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 88 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1582 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Ralph E. Beecher,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor & Industry Review Commission,  
Outokumpu Copper Kenosha, Inc. and  
Fremont Indemnity Co., Insurer, c/o  
Casualty Insurance,  
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 100 
Reported at: 264 Wis. 2d 394, 663 N.W.2d 316 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 15, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Fisher   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence. 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, Labor and Industry 
Review Commission, the cause was argued by Stephen M. Sobota, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs was Peggy A. 
Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, Outokumpu Copper 
Kenosha, Inc., and Fremont Indemnity Co., Insurer, c/o Casualty 
Insurance, there were briefs by Scott E. Wade, William R. 
Sachse, Jr., Jessica M. Vianes, Heidi M. Biasi and Peterson, 
Johnson & Murray, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Scott E. 
Wade. 
 
 
2
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by Daniel J. 
Kelley and Schoone, Leuck, Kelley, Pitts & Knurr, S.C., Racine, 
and oral argument by Daniel J. Kelley. 
 
2004 WI 88 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-1582  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 1356) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Ralph E. Beecher,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor & Industry Review Commission,  
Outokumpu Copper Kenosha, Inc. and  
Fremont Indemnity Co., Insurer, c/o  
Casualty Insurance,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.     
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  In this case we revisit the so-
called "odd-lot doctrine," an aspect of worker's compensation 
law dealing with cases of permanent total disability.  The issue 
presented is whether a prima facie case for permanent total 
disability under the "odd-lot" doctrine must include evidence 
that the injured employee has made a reasonable effort to find 
suitable post-injury employment. 
No. 
02-1582   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The odd-lot doctrine is a judge-made adjunct to the 
law of worker's compensation.1  It represents a modification of 
the general rule that benefits for permanent total disability 
compensate an injured worker for loss of earning capacity.  
Whereas most recipients of permanent total disability benefits 
have lost all capacity to earn income, claimants under the odd-
lot doctrine may qualify for benefits even though they retain a 
small, residual capacity to earn income.  In essence, the odd-
lot doctrine provides that some injured workers should be 
characterized as permanently, totally disabled even though they 
are still capable of earning occasional income.   
¶3 
We recognized the odd-lot doctrine in Balczewski v. 
DILHR, 76 Wis. 2d 487, 251 N.W.2d 794 (1977): 
"Total disability" in compensation law is not to be 
interpreted 
literally 
as 
utter 
and 
abject 
helplessness.  Evidence that claimant has been able to 
earn occasional wages or perform certain kinds of 
gainful work does not necessarily rule out a finding 
of total disability nor require that it be reduced to 
partial.  
Id. at 493 (quoting 2 Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, 
§ 57.51, at 10-107).2  The doctrine operates as a rule of 
evidence:  
[W]here a claimant makes a prima facie case that he 
has been injured in an industrial accident and, 
because of his injury, age, education, and capacity, 
                                                 
1 See 4 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' 
Compensation Law § 83 (2003). 
2 The quoted passage has been renumbered and now appears at 
4 Larson, Workers' Compensation Law § 83.01 at 83-2 (2003).   
No. 
02-1582   
 
3 
 
he is unable to secure any continuing and gainful 
employment, the burden of showing that the claimant is 
in fact employable and that jobs do exist for the 
injured claimant shifts to the employer. 
Id. at 495.   
¶4 
The Labor & Industry Review Commission (LIRC) argues 
that two enactments since our adoption of the odd-lot doctrine 
in Balczewski require us to re-evaluate how the Balczewski 
burden-shifting framework is applied.  In 1985, the legislature 
enacted Wis. Stat. § 102.17(7)(a)(2001-02),3 which authorizes the 
Department of Workforce Development (DWD) to receive and 
consider expert evidence on loss of earning capacity.  In 1982, 
an administrative rule, DWD § 80.34, was adopted; it specifies 
factors the DWD is to consider in determining loss of earning 
capacity.  One of these factors is the claimant's "efforts to 
obtain suitable employment." 
¶5  LIRC does not explain precisely how the enactment of 
Wis. Stat. § 102.17(7)(a) requires this court to modify the 
Balczewski odd-lot doctrine.  With respect to DWD § 80.34, LIRC 
argues that because the administrative rule lists "efforts to 
obtain suitable employment" as one of the factors the DWD 
considers in determining loss of earning capacity, we should 
modify the formula for a prima facie odd-lot case under 
Balczewski so that the claimant is required to demonstrate that 
he has made a reasonable job search as part of his prima facie 
case.    
                                                 
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
02-1582   
 
4 
 
¶6 
We disagree, and hold that a claimant is not required 
to present evidence of a job search as part of prima facie case 
of odd-lot unemployability, provided the claimant shows that 
because of his injury and the other Balczewski factors such as 
age, education, capacity, and training, he is unable to secure 
continuing, gainful employment.  If the claimant succeeds in 
putting himself within the odd-lot category, it falls to the 
employer to rebut the prima facie case by demonstrating that the 
claimant is employable and that jobs exist for him.  In this 
case, LIRC concluded that the employee, Ralph Beecher, failed to 
make a prima facie case for odd-lot unemployability in part 
because he did not make enough effort to find a new job.  In 
reaching this conclusion, LIRC placed an evidentiary burden on 
Beecher that was not required of him, and we therefore affirm 
the court of appeals' reversal of LIRC's decision.   
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶7 
Our recitation of the facts is based upon the agency 
record, including the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of 
the DWD Administrative Law Judge, Leonard E. Martin, and the 
subsequent LIRC decision.  Beecher was born in 1942 and has a 
ninth-grade education.  He worked for Outokumpu Copper Kenosha, 
a foundry, or its corporate predecessors, for 29 years.  At the 
time of his injury, Beecher was working on a "Z-Mill" machine, 
which runs sheets of metal from one large roll to another roll 
or a spool.  The work required Beecher to lean over the first 
roll and thread the metal into a slit on the second roll.  The 
job required bending over to pick up the sheets of metal, and 
No. 
02-1582   
 
5 
 
then pulling them in order to thread the sheets onto the rolls.  
By all accounts, the work was strenuous.     
¶8 
On April 7, 1997, Beecher developed sharp pains in his 
lower back, and sought medical treatment with Dr. Christopher 
Noonan, an orthopedist.  Dr. Noonan had treated Beecher for back 
problems in the past, and had performed two prior surgeries on 
Beecher.  Beecher's back pains continued and Dr. Noonan 
eventually performed a third surgical procedure on Beecher's 
lower back on September 10, 1997.           
¶9 
 Beecher returned to light duty work in April 1998, 
but after two weeks Outokumpu ran out of work for him and he 
ceased working.  Beecher has not returned to work since that 
time.  Outokumpu moved its operations out of Wisconsin and did 
not offer to relocate Beecher.   
¶10  In September 1999, Beecher filed an application for a 
hearing at DWD pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.17, alleging that 
his day-to-day work activities up to April 7, 1997, caused a 
progression 
of 
his 
pre-existing 
back 
condition, 
leading 
ultimately to his surgery.  He sought temporary total disability 
benefits from October 14, 1998, to May 14, 1999, permanent 
partial disability benefits on a functional basis at 15 percent 
to the body as a whole, permanent disability on a vocational 
basis for loss of earning capacity, and payment of medical 
expenses.   
¶11 Administrative Law Judge Martin evaluated Beecher's 
claims on the basis of reports and testimony from several 
medical and vocational experts.  Beecher himself also testified 
No. 
02-1582   
 
6 
 
at the hearing.  The expert evidence in this case is complex.  
While we may safely pass over many of its details, the following 
is a brief description of the experts' conclusions.   
¶12 Beecher relied upon two medical experts: Dr. Noonan, 
his orthopedist, and Dr. Richard Karr, who examined Beecher in 
April and July 1998.  Dr. Noonan assessed Beecher at 15 percent 
permanent partial disability based upon his injury.  Dr. Karr 
assessed Beecher at a minimum of ten percent permanent partial 
disability.  Outokumpu offered the report and testimony of Dr. 
Thomas O'Brien, who examined Beecher in July 1997 and again in 
September 1998.  Dr. O'Brien opined that Beecher suffered no new 
injury in April 1997, but only a manifestation of symptoms from 
his pre-existing condition.   
¶13 Beecher and Outokumpu each also presented evidence 
from 
vocational 
experts. 
 
Beecher's 
expert 
was 
Charles 
McReynolds.  McReynolds testified that Beecher tested at the 
sixth-grade level for math, the seventh-grade level for reading, 
and the fifth-grade level for spelling.  McReynolds testified 
that Beecher is not a candidate for retraining, based on his 
aptitude.  McReynolds also testified that if Dr. O'Brien's 
medical assessment was correct, Beecher's loss of earning 
capacity would be approximately 20 percent.  But if Drs. Karr 
and Noonan were correct, McReynolds concluded, then at best 
Beecher could do light duty work.  McReynolds opined that given 
Beecher's age, educational level, previous training, and non-
suitability for retraining, no stable labor market existed for 
the limited type and amount of work Beecher was able to do.  
No. 
02-1582   
 
7 
 
McReynolds therefore concluded that Beecher was permanently and 
totally disabled from a vocational standpoint. 
¶14 Outokumpu's vocational expert was Leanne Panizich, who 
tested Beecher at the "high school level" for reading and the 
sixth-grade level for arithmetic and spelling.  Panizich opined 
that if Drs. Noonan and Karr were correct in their medical 
assessments, then Beecher would suffer only a 25 to 35 percent 
reduction in earning capacity, as he could perform light duty 
work 
for 
employers 
in 
Wisconsin. 
 
If 
O'Brien's 
medical 
assessment was accepted, however, the reduction would be ten to 
20 percent.  Panizich said it was rare to encounter an employer 
these days who would not accommodate Beecher's disability.     
¶15 Judge Martin found Beecher's medical experts more 
credible than Outokumpu's, and awarded Beecher temporary total 
disability benefits for the period May 14, 1998, to May 19, 
1999.  As for Beecher's claim for permanent total disability on 
a 
vocational 
basis, 
Judge 
Martin 
found 
that 
McReynolds' 
testimony was more credible than Panizich's, and he concluded 
that Beecher had sustained permanent total disability on a 
vocational basis as a result of the April 1997 injury.  Under 
Wisconsin law, when an applicant is found to be permanently and 
totally 
disabled, 
benefits 
are 
awarded 
for 
life.  
Wis. Stat. § 102.44(2).    
¶16 Outokumpu 
appealed 
the 
awards 
of 
temporary 
and 
permanent total disability, and LIRC reversed the award for 
No. 
02-1582   
 
8 
 
permanent total disability.4  LIRC's reversal was based upon its 
contrary assessment of the vocational expert evidence presented 
to the agency.  McReynolds' opinion that Beecher was permanently 
and totally disabled was premised on work restrictions imposed 
on Beecher by Dr. Noonan in March 1998, approximately one year 
before the end of Beecher's healing period.  However, in 
December 2000, Dr. Noonan adopted the findings of occupational 
therapist Ruth Meehan's Functional Capacity Evaluation (FCE) of 
Beecher.  In adopting these findings, Dr. Noonan did not 
reiterate his earlier part-time work restrictions.   
¶17 LIRC then applied the "odd-lot" doctrine to the facts 
of Beecher's case.  Citing Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 495, LIRC 
explained that "a worker makes a prima facie case of permanent 
and total disability on an odd-lot basis by showing that he or 
she is unable to obtain any continuing or gainful employment 
because of the impairment from his work injury and other factors 
such as age, training and education."  If the worker makes a 
prima facie case, LIRC continued, again citing Balczewski, the 
burden shifts to the employer to show that some kind of work is 
"regularly and continuously available to the worker."   
¶18 LIRC was struck by McReynolds' failure to explain why 
he did not adjust his vocational conclusions to account for Dr. 
                                                 
4 The award of temporary total disability was affirmed by 
LIRC and is not at issue in this appeal. 
No. 
02-1582   
 
9 
 
Noonan's adoption of the FCE.  Then, citing Larson's treatise on 
worker's compensation law,5 LIRC noted: 
While the applicant has made some effort to find work, 
the work restrictions set out in the November 2000 FCE 
suggest he could have made more of an effort, a factor 
that may be considered against him in determining 
whether he has established a prima facie case of odd-
lot unemployability. 
Accordingly, LIRC concluded that Beecher had failed to establish 
a prima facie case for permanent total disability.     
¶19 Even though LIRC did not accept McReynolds' opinion 
and concluded, based in part on the job search evidence, that 
Beecher failed to carry his evidentiary burden, the agency did 
not accept Panizich's expert opinion either.  Unlike McReynolds, 
Panizich's conclusions were based upon the results of the FCE, 
but LIRC concluded that in light of Beecher's age, education, 
skill level, and diminished capacity to retrain, Panizich's 
ultimate opinion that Beecher suffered a 35 percent loss of 
earning capacity was too conservative.  Based on all the 
evidence presented, LIRC concluded that Beecher sustained a loss 
of earning capacity of 60 percent, and awarded benefits 
accordingly.        
¶20  Beecher 
timely 
appealed 
LIRC's decision to the 
Kenosha County Circuit Court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.23.  
The scope of a circuit court's review of an order of LIRC is 
narrow; the court may only confirm or set aside an order or 
                                                 
5 4 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' 
Compensation Law § 84.01[4] (2001).   
No. 
02-1582   
 
10 
 
award, it may not amend it or substitute the court's judgment 
for the commission's.  Wis. Stat. § 102.23(1)(e); Columbia Cas. 
Co. v. Ind. Comm'n, 254 Wis. 310, 35 N.W.2d 904 (1949).  The 
circuit court, the Honorable Michael S. Fisher, affirmed LIRC's 
findings as supported by substantial and credible evidence.   
¶21 Beecher appealed to the court of appeals under 
Wis. Stat. § 102.25, contesting LIRC's conclusion that he had 
failed to establish a prima facie case of permanent total 
disability.  Beecher v. LIRC, 2003 WI App 100, ¶1, 264 
Wis. 2d 394, 663 N.W.2d 316.  The court of appeals reversed, 
holding that LIRC improperly applied the odd-lot doctrine to the 
facts of Beecher's case.  Id., ¶36.  In particular, the court 
held that LIRC improperly denied Beecher's claim for permanent 
total disability by concluding that Beecher had not demonstrated 
that he had conducted an adequate search for a new job.  Id.  
The court noted that Beecher was not required under the 
Balczewski odd-lot doctrine to bring forward any evidence 
relating to job search as part of the prima facie case.  Id., 
¶25.  The court of appeals concluded that Beecher had, in fact, 
established a prima facie case of permanent total disability 
under Balczewski, and reversed LIRC's order and remanded the 
case to the agency for the purpose of permitting Outokumpu to 
present evidence in rebuttal of Beecher's prima facie case.  We 
accepted review.   
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶22 In an appeal 
following 
an 
administrative 
agency 
decision, we review the agency's decision, not the circuit 
No. 
02-1582   
 
11 
 
court's.  Marshfield Elec. & Water Comm'n v. WERC, 2002 WI App 
68, ¶16, 252 Wis. 2d 656, 643 N.W.2d 122.  The issue in this 
case is whether LIRC properly concluded that Beecher failed to 
present a prima facie case for permanent total disability on an 
odd-lot basis.  Whether a litigant has established a prima facie 
case is a question of law.  Petrowsky v. Krause, 223 Wis. 2d 32, 
36, 588 N.W.2d 318 (1998)(citing Burg v. Miniature Precision 
Components, 111 Wis. 2d 1, 330 N.W.2d 192 (1983)).   
¶23 In the agency review context, we have recently stated 
that "labeling an issue as a question of law does not mean that 
a court may disregard an agency's determination."  Brown v. 
LIRC, 2003 WI 142, ¶12, 267 Wis. 2d 31, 671 N.W.2d 279.  We will 
accord an agency's interpretation of a statute great weight 
deference when: (1) the agency is charged with administration of 
the particular statute at issue; (2) its interpretation is one 
of long standing; (3) it employed its expertise or specialized 
knowledge in arriving at its interpretation; and (4) its 
interpretation will provide uniformity and consistency in the 
application of the statute.  Id., ¶16 (citing Harnischfeger 
Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 660 n.4, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995), 
and Lisney v. LIRC, 171 Wis. 2d 499, 505, 493 N.W.2d 14 (1992)).  
A lesser degree of deference, "due weight" deference, "is 
appropriate when an agency has some experience in the area but 
has not developed the expertise that necessarily places it in a 
better position than a court to interpret and apply a statute."  
Brown, 267 Wis. 2d 31, ¶15.  No deference is owed to an agency 
interpretation where the issue is one of first impression, where 
No. 
02-1582   
 
12 
 
the agency has no special expertise, or where the agency's 
position has been so inconsistent that it provides no real 
guidance.  Brown, 267 Wis. 2d 31, ¶14; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Hernandez, 2002 WI 76, ¶14, 252 Wis. 2d 155, 642 N.W.2d 584.    
¶24 The court of appeals gave LIRC's decision great weight 
deference, and evidently regarded this choice as too obvious to 
require explanation.  Beecher, 264 Wis. 2d 394, ¶13.  We think 
some discussion is in order.  LIRC's decision was grounded on 
its interpretation of the Balczewski case, which the agency 
supplemented by incorporating § 84.01[4] of the Larson treatise.  
Great weight or due weight deference may be given to agency 
interpretations of statutes or administrative rules because the 
basis for judicial deference is a sense of respect for the 
legislature's prerogative in conferring power on an agency.  By 
according less than the appropriate level of deference, a court 
invades, albeit indirectly, the province of the legislature.   
¶25 The legislature empowered DWD and LIRC to administer 
the 
worker's 
compensation 
statutes. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 102.01(2)(a), 
(ap); 
Wis. Stat. § 102.14. 
 
In 
Balczewski, this court adopted the odd-lot doctrine as a basis 
for the award of permanent total disability benefits to injured 
workers who fall within this judicially-recognized category.  It 
is clear that DWD and LIRC have used and applied the principles 
of Balczewski many times.6 
                                                 
6 Our research indicates that since 1982 LIRC has issued 78 
published decisions on odd-lot disability, 72 of which cited 
Balczewski v. DILHR, 76 Wis. 2d 487, 251 N.W.2d 794 (1977).     
No. 
02-1582   
 
13 
 
¶26 But while DWD and LIRC apply Balczewski in furtherance 
of their statutorily-conferred duties, it does not follow that 
we must treat LIRC's decision in this case as we would its 
interpretation of a statute.  LIRC's decision in this case was 
based upon an expansion of the Balczewski odd-lot doctrine by 
incorporation of a passage from the Larson worker's compensation 
treatise.  The agency's decision does not purport to interpret a 
statute or administrative rule.  This court retains the power to 
explain, modify, or overrule its own precedents; we need not 
defer to agency interpretations of our own decisions.  See also 
Local 60, Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO 
v. WERC, 217 Wis. 2d 602, 608, 579 N.W.2d 59 (Ct. App. 1998)(no 
deference owed to an agency interpretation of a statute that 
conflicts with an appellate decision.)  Therefore, we will 
review de novo LIRC's decision that Beecher failed to establish 
a prima facie odd-lot case under the Balczewski doctrine because 
his post-injury job search was inadequate.7        
                                                 
7 The 
chief 
justice's 
concurrence 
misperceives 
LIRC’s 
decision.  The agency did not conclude that the enactment of 
Wis. Stat. § 102.17(7)(a) and Wis. Admin. Code DWD § 80.34 
modified the odd-lot doctrine of Balczewski, as asserted by the 
chief 
justice's 
concurrence. 
 
Chief 
Justice 
Abrahamson's 
concurrence, 
¶¶61, 
77. 
 
LIRC 
cited 
the 
statute 
and 
administrative rule only after rejecting Beecher’s prima facie 
case as insufficient under Balczewski, having purported to 
modify Balczewski by incorporating § 84.01[4] of the Larson 
treatise.  LIRC’s decision simply notes that the agency 
considered 
the 
reports 
of 
the 
experts 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 102.17(7)(a) and the factors enumerated in DWD 
§ 80.34 in connection with its determination that Beecher 
sustained a loss of earning capacity of 60 percent, that is, a 
partial loss of earning capacity.  LIRC did not discuss or even 
cite the statute or administrative rule in connection with its 
No. 
02-1582   
 
14 
 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Introduction 
¶27 Worker's 
compensation 
in 
Wisconsin 
is 
governed 
primarily by the Worker's Compensation Act (WCA), chapter 102 of 
the Wisconsin Statutes, and is administered by the DWD.  The WCA 
compensates workers who are injured in the course of their 
employment.  State v. LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 281, 288, 401 N.W.2d 585 
(1987).  Benefits fall into two categories: temporary disability 
                                                                                                                                                             
evaluation of Beecher’s odd-lot prima facie case.  Accordingly, 
LIRC’s reference to Wis. Stat. § 102.17(7)(a) and DWD § 80.34 
cannot be characterized as a conclusion by the agency that the 
enactment of the statute and administrative rule modified the 
odd-lot doctrine recognized in Balczewski. 
The chief justice's concurrence also argues that the 
Balczewski odd-lot doctrine is not a judge-made adjunct to 
worker’s compensation law, but, rather, was an exercise in 
statutory interpretation, and as such, any agency interpretation 
of it is also an exercise in statutory interpretation entitled 
to 
great 
weight 
deference. 
 
Chief 
Justice 
Abrahamson's 
concurrence, ¶¶61, 88.  Justice Bradley's concurrence also takes 
issue with our characterization of the odd-lot doctrine of 
Balczewski.  Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶¶96, 97.  In this 
regard, both concurrences appear to misunderstand our discussion 
of the Balczewski odd-lot doctrine vis-à-vis the standard of 
review that is applicable to the LIRC decision in this case.  Of 
course worker’s compensation claims are statutory claims.  But 
the evidentiary rule, burden-shifting framework and prima facie 
odd-lot case requirements adopted by this court in Balczewski 
are component parts of a judge-made doctrine engrafted onto 
Chapter 102; they do not exist in the statutes.  If the 
legislature adopted a statute abrogating or altering Balczewski, 
and LIRC engaged in an interpretation of such a statute, LIRC’s 
decision may well be analyzed pursuant to one of the deferential 
standards of review, depending upon the circumstances.  As we 
have noted, however, LIRC’s decision in this case did not 
purport to interpret a statute; rather, it modified Balczewski 
by incorporating § 84.01[4] of the Larson treatise. 
No. 
02-1582   
 
15 
 
benefits, which are payable during an injured worker's healing 
period, and permanent disability benefits, which are payable if 
a worker remains disabled after the healing period has ended.  
Mireles v. LIRC, 2000 WI 96, ¶¶7-8, 237 Wis. 2d 69, 613 
N.W.2d 875; 
John 
D. 
Neal 
& 
Joseph 
Danas, 
Jr., 
Worker's 
Compensation Handbook § 5.1, at 3 (5th ed. 2003).         
¶28 The WCA distinguishes two categories of permanent 
disability benefits: benefits for "scheduled" injuries and 
benefits for "unscheduled" injuries.  Mireles, 237 Wis. 2d 69, 
¶9.  As suggested by the terminology, scheduled injuries are 
more amenable to standardized benefits calculations.  For 
example, for the loss of an arm at the shoulder, the WCA 
mandates payment of 500 weeks of benefits indexed to the 
worker's average pre-injury earnings.  Wis. Stat. § 102.52(1).  
There are many injuries, however, that do not fall into any of 
the statutory schedules.  Such "unscheduled" injuries are 
primarily injuries to the head and torso, as well as injuries to 
the mental faculties other than hearing and sight.  Neal and 
Danas, supra, § 5.20, at 15; Wis. Stat. § 102.44(3).  The 
calculation of benefits for unscheduled injuries requires a more 
individualized 
approach 
than 
is 
necessary 
for 
scheduled 
injuries.  Mireles, 237 Wis. 2d 69, ¶13.  Back injuries such as 
Beecher's are unscheduled injuries.         
¶29  In 
theory, 
all 
permanent 
disability 
benefits 
compensate an employee for the loss of future earnings.  Neal 
and Danas, supra, § 5.15, at 10.  This idea is well-rooted in 
our case law.  "[S]ince an award for permanent disability is to 
No. 
02-1582   
 
16 
 
be made for all time . . . it must be based upon some sort of 
prediction as to impairment of earning capacity."  Northern 
States Power Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 252 Wis. 70, 76, 30 
N.W.2d 217 (1947).  If a non-scheduled injury causes a total 
loss of wage earning capacity, the employee is entitled to 
permanent total disability payments.     
¶30 Determining loss of future wage earning capacity in 
non-scheduled injury cases is not an easy matter.  Given the 
highly individualized nature of such injuries, and a job market 
that is constantly transformed by economic and technological 
change, predicting how an injury will affect future earning 
capacity is not an exact science.  For this reason, worker's 
compensation law has evolved to give claimants in this type of 
case more flexibility to build a case for total permanent 
disability, and to give agency judges more discretion to rule on 
the merits of such claims.  
B.  Balczewski and the Odd-Lot Doctrine      
¶31 One important change in this direction was this 
court's recognition in Balczewski of the so-called odd-lot 
doctrine 
of 
permanent 
total 
disability. 
 
Balczewski, 
76 
Wis. 2d at 495-96.  As Balczewski explained, the odd-lot 
doctrine probably originated in an opinion by Judge Moulton in 
the King's Bench decision of Cardiff Corp. v. Hall, 1 K.B. 1009 
(1911).  Cardiff Corp., 1 K.B. at 494; see also 4 Arthur Larson 
and Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 83.02, 
at 83-3 (2003).  The essential idea behind the doctrine is that 
total disability under worker's compensation law should not be 
No. 
02-1582   
 
17 
 
taken literally to mean complete and utter helplessness, because 
some injured workers find themselves, because of their age, 
education, 
training, 
and 
overall 
capacity, 
"incapable 
of 
becoming [] ordinary work[men] of average capacity in any well 
known branch of the labour market."  Cardiff Corp., 1 K.B. at 
1020.  In the colloquial language that has come to represent 
this doctrine, some injured workers are fit only for the "odd 
lot" job that appears occasionally and for a short time.   
¶32 As Balczewski itself made clear, the odd-lot doctrine 
operates as a rule of evidence.  Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 495; 
see also Neal and Danas, supra, § 5.31, at 21.  The doctrine 
creates a burden-shifting framework that determines which party 
in 
a 
nonscheduled 
injury 
worker's 
compensation 
case 
is 
responsible for producing evidence sufficient to go forward with 
a claim for permanent total disability on an odd-lot basis.  
Paraphrasing the Larson treatise, Balczewski held: 
[W]here a claimant makes a prima facie case that he 
has been injured in an industrial accident and, 
because of his injury, age, education, and capacity, 
he is unable to secure any continuing and gainful 
employment, the burden of showing that the claimant is 
in fact employable and that jobs do exist for the 
injured claimant shifts to the employer. 
Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 495. 
 
¶33 As noted above, LIRC held that Beecher failed to make 
a prima facie case of odd-lot disability because, in part, he 
did not demonstrate sufficient efforts to find suitable post-
injury employment.  LIRC determined that Beecher's insufficient 
job search was "a factor that may be considered against him in 
No. 
02-1582   
 
18 
 
determining whether he has established a prima facie case of 
odd-lot unemployability."  In support of this proposition, LIRC 
relied on a passage in Larson's treatise not cited in the 
Balczewski decision.  LIRC also argues on appeal that the 
enactment of Wis. Stat. § 102.17(7), regarding receipt of expert 
evidence on loss of earning capacity, and DWD § 80.34, setting 
forth factors that the DWD is to consider in determining loss of 
earning capacity, support a modification of the Balczewski prima 
facie 
odd-lot 
formula 
to 
require 
the 
applicant 
to 
show 
reasonable job search efforts.  Outokumpu disagrees, and 
concedes that Beecher met his burden of demonstrating prima 
facie odd-lot status; the employer instead argues that it 
successfully rebutted Beecher's prima facie case.  Beecher 
argues that the court of appeals properly reversed LIRC's 
conclusion that he had not met his prima facie odd-lot burden 
because of an insufficient post-injury job search. 
C.  The Larson treatise, § 84.01[4] 
¶34  LIRC relied on § 84.01[4] of the Larson worker's 
compensation treatise to conclude that Beecher was required to 
demonstrate that he had engaged in a reasonable post-injury job 
search as part of his prima facie odd-lot case under Balczewski.  
In fact, however, this passage from Larson is entitled "Burden 
of Proof of Work Search on Employee in Non-Odd-Lot Cases."  
Larson, supra, § 84.01[4] (emphasis added).  This section of the 
treatise describes an applicant whose medical impairment "is so 
limited or specialized in nature that he or she is not obviously 
unemployable or relegated to the odd-lot category."  Id., 
No. 
02-1582   
 
19 
 
§ 84.01[4], at 84-8 (emphasis added).  Larson proposed that in 
such cases, it is not unreasonable to place the burden of proof 
on the employee to establish that he or she "has made reasonable 
efforts to secure suitable employment."  Id. 
 
¶35 LIRC argues on this review that since Balczewski 
adopted the odd-lot doctrine from Larson's treatise, all 
sections of the treatise dealing with the doctrine have been 
implicitly incorporated into Wisconsin law, whether or not the 
Balczewski opinion specifically mentioned them.  There are a 
number of problems with this argument.  First, there was no 
discussion in Balczewski of the issue of whether the claimant 
had conducted an adequate post-injury job search.  LIRC argues 
that had the job search issue been raised in Balczewski, this 
court would have explicitly adopted the passage from Larson that 
LIRC urges upon us in this case.   
¶36 We find this suggestion too speculative.  This court 
and the court of appeals have adopted various elements of 
Larson's treatise in the past, and the normal practice has been 
to specifically identify which aspects of the treatise are being 
No. 
02-1582   
 
20 
 
adopted.8  It is true that the Balczewski opinion incorporated 
large passages of the Larson text into its analysis.  But this 
does not warrant the conclusion that the Balczewski court 
intended to adopt everything Larson said about the odd-lot 
doctrine elsewhere in his book.       
 
¶37 Second, the passage in question is not really part of 
Larson's treatment of the odd-lot doctrine but is rather the 
author's 
suggested 
"corollary" 
to 
the 
"general-purpose 
principle" stated in the previous sections of the treatise——the 
sections quoted and relied upon in the Balczewski opinion.  
There was no mention of this "corollary" in the Balczewski 
opinion, nor was there any suggestion that an exception existed 
to the burden-shifting framework established by the court.  We 
therefore conclude that LIRC misread and misapplied Balczewski, 
                                                 
8 In Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 28 
Wis. 2d 89, 94-95, 135 N.W.2d 803 (1965), for example, we held, 
citing Larson, that an employee is injured "in the course of 
employment" if he is injured while doing a private errand for 
his employer.  We pointed out, however, that while "[t]he broad 
rule as stated by Professor Larson commends itself," we would 
not decide "whether to adopt it completely."  Id. at 96.  In 
Frisbie v. DILHR, 45 Wis. 2d 80, 172 N.W.2d 346 (1969), we held 
that an employee injured while walking from the employer's 
parking lot to the plant was covered by the WCA, but we 
carefully distinguished our holding, grounded in a reading of a 
state statute, from Larson's treatment of the "special hazards 
doctrine."  Id. at 91.  Finally, in Bruns Volkswagen, Inc. v. 
DILHR, 110 Wis. 2d 319, 327, 328 N.W.2d 886 (Ct. App. 1982), the 
court of appeals upheld an agency determination that an employee 
injured during horseplay at the workplace was covered.  The 
court reasoned that since this court had adopted Larson's view 
that an employee injured after leaving his post to satisfy some 
"idle curiosity" is covered, we would also agree with Larson 
that injuries sustained during horseplay should be covered, as 
well.  Id. at 324.   
No. 
02-1582   
 
21 
 
erroneously expanding its holding to incorporate elements of 
Larson's treatise not adopted by this court.  
D.  Wisconsin Stat. § 102.17(7) and DWD § 80.34 
¶38 LIRC 
also 
argues 
that 
certain 
post-Balczewski 
enactments require a re-evaluation of the components of an odd-
lot prima facie case.  Specifically, LIRC contends that 
Wis. Stat. § 102.17(7)(a), pertaining to the admission of expert 
evidence in loss of earning capacity cases, and DWD § 80.34, 
specifying factors the DWD is to consider in determining loss of 
earning capacity, require a modification of the prima facie odd-
lot showing under Balczewski to include evidence of a reasonable 
job search by the claimant. 
¶39  Balczewski was decided in 1977.  In 1985, the worker's 
compensation statutes were amended to specify the role of 
vocational experts in loss of earning capacity cases: 
Except as provided in par. (b), in a claim [for 
partial or total permanent disability], testimony or 
certified reports of expert witnesses on loss of 
earning capacity may be received in evidence and 
considered with all other evidence to decide on an 
employee's actual loss of earning capacity. 
1985 Wis. Act 83, creating Wis. Stat. § 102.17(7)(a). 
¶40  Three years earlier, DWD § 80.34 was adopted.  This 
administrative rule provides a set of factors that the DWD is to 
consider when assessing the extent of lost earning capacity in 
cases of permanent disability, both partial and total: 
Any department determinations as to loss of earning 
capacity for injuries arising under s. 102.44(2) and 
(3), Stats., shall take into account the effect of the 
injured 
employee's 
permanent 
physical 
and 
mental 
No. 
02-1582   
 
22 
 
limitations resulting from the injury upon present and 
potential earnings in view of the following factors: 
(a) Age; 
(b) Education; 
(c) Training; 
(d) Previous work experience; 
(e) Previous earnings; 
(f) Present occupation and earnings; 
(g) Likelihood of future suitable occupational change; 
(h) Efforts to obtain suitable employment; 
(i) Willingness to make reasonable change in a 
residence to secure suitable employment; 
(j) Success of and willingness to participate in 
reasonable 
physical 
and 
vocational 
rehabilitation 
program [sic]; and 
(k) Other pertinent evidence. 
DWD § 80.34(1).  
The rule 
makes 
no 
mention 
of odd-lot 
disability. 
 
¶41  LIRC does not explain why it believes the enactment of 
Wis. Stat. § 102.17(7)(a) should impel us to modify the prima 
facie case requirements or the burden-shifting evidentiary 
principle of Balczewski.  We decline to develop the agency's 
argument for it.  As to § 80.34(1), LIRC argues very generally 
that the rule "expands the analysis" required under the odd-lot 
doctrine as originally set forth in Balczewski.  But LIRC does 
not explain why evidence of a job search should now be 
considered a necessary element of a prima facie odd-lot case, 
except to point out that § 80.34 lists it as one of many factors 
No. 
02-1582   
 
23 
 
to be considered in the agency's determination of loss of 
earning capacity.  LIRC's argument on this point is almost 
entirely conclusory.  
¶42  We see no reason why the adoption of § 80.34 requires 
alteration of the odd-lot doctrine recognized in Balczewski.  
The administrative rule sets forth a list of ten factors to be 
considered by DWD in assessing loss of earning capacity, plus a 
catch-all 
category 
for 
"other 
pertinent 
evidence." 
 
DWD 
§ 80.34(1)(a)-(k).  The rule applies generally to "[a]ny 
department determinations as to loss of earning capacity" for 
injuries 
causing 
permanent 
partial 
or 
permanent 
total 
disability.  It is, however, only a list of factors to be 
considered in evaluating loss of earning capacity.  Section 
80.34 is not an evidentiary rule; neither does it purport to 
impose a burden of proof, establish a set of evidentiary 
requirements, or mandate the substantive elements of a claim.   
¶43 Taking the first factor, the applicant's age, as an 
example, § 80.34 does not eliminate applicants who are below a 
certain age or otherwise establish a particular evidentiary 
requirement regarding age that must be met in order to qualify 
for loss of earning capacity benefits.  Similarly, the fact that 
§ 80.34 lists "education" and "training" as factors to be 
considered 
does 
not 
establish 
any 
particular 
evidentiary 
threshold regarding the level or type of education or training 
that would be considered disqualifying.  The rule lists 
"[w]illingness to make reasonable change in a residence to 
secure suitable employment" as a factor to be considered; it 
No. 
02-1582   
 
24 
 
does not follow, however, that the rule's inclusion of this 
factor means that "willingness to relocate" is an element of the 
claim or that lack of evidence of willingness to relocate is by 
itself 
disqualifying. 
 
The 
catch-all 
"[o]ther 
pertinent 
evidence" obviously does not impose an elemental evidentiary 
requirement.  The relative weight of any one of the § 80.34 
factors depends upon its consideration in context with the 
others.  The factors listed in the rule thus cannot be 
considered as necessary, independent elements of a claim for 
loss of earning capacity.   
¶44  In any event, and more importantly, the odd-lot 
doctrine is a judge-made exception to the general rule that 
permanent total disability awards under worker's compensation 
law are based on proof of total loss of earning capacity.  If an 
injured employee can show that "because of his injury, age, 
education, and capacity, he is unable to secure any continuing 
and gainful employment," he has prima facie placed himself in 
the odd-lot category, and the burden shifts to the employer to 
show employability and the availability of jobs.  The import of 
this evidentiary burden-shifting rule is that if the employee 
can make out a prima facie case for odd-lot disability, then he 
need not produce evidence that he has attempted to secure 
suitable alternate employment; he has prima facie established 
his inability to secure continuing and gainful employment, and 
requiring him to produce evidence of an actual job search is an 
unnecessary exercise under this doctrine.  It is up to the 
employer under these circumstances to demonstrate that the 
No. 
02-1582   
 
25 
 
injured employee is actually employable and that there are 
actual jobs available to him:   
If 
the 
evidence 
of 
degree 
of 
obvious 
physical 
impairment, 
coupled 
with 
other 
factors 
such 
as 
claimant's mental capacity, education, training, or 
age, places claimant prima facie in the odd-lot 
category, the burden should be on the employer to show 
that some kind of suitable work is regularly and 
continuously available to the claimant.   
Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 495, quoting Larson, § 57.61, at  
10-136-37.9 
¶45 LIRC cites Advance Die Casting Co. v. LIRC, 154 
Wis. 2d 239, 453 N.W.2d 487 (Ct. App. 1989) as proof that the 
enactment of DWD § 80.34 altered the formula for establishing a 
prima facie case of odd-lot disability.  Advance Die Casting 
does not support this proposition.   
¶46 In Advance Die Casting, the LIRC decision on review 
referred to DWD § 80.34 in the course of concluding that the 
injured claimant in the case was permanently, totally disabled 
on an odd-lot basis.  The court of appeals upheld the circuit 
court's affirmance of LIRC's decision: 
The 
agency's 
finding 
that 
the 
permanent 
total 
disability for Niecko's back injury, coupled with its 
finding that such injury was permanent due to his loss 
of earning capacity under the sec. Ind. 80.34 factors, 
rendered that Niecko could not perform any services 
"other than those which are so limited in quality, 
dependability, or quantity that a reasonable stable 
market does not exist" is abundantly clear in this 
record.  At the time of his injury, Niecko was sixty-
three years old; he had the equivalent of a high 
                                                 
9 This passage has been renumbered and now appears at 4 
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 84.01[3] at 84-5.   
No. 
02-1582   
 
26 
 
school education; he had worked in [the] Advance 
foundry for thirty-five years; he was trained only to 
do heavy work as a die cast operator and setup worker 
for all of those years in the employ of Advance; and 
he had no other work training experience.  Those facts 
clearly support the agency's finding of an odd-lot 
permanent total disability due to the loss of earning 
capacity.   
Id. at 254.  The court also concluded that "[t]he agency was 
also correct in finding that Niecko met the substantial evidence 
test since he made a prima facie showing that the injury coupled 
with the odd-lot factors of sec. Ind. 80.34 rendered him 
permanently totally disabled for regular continuous employment."  
Id.   
¶47 On the basis of these generalized references to DWD § 
80.34 in an odd-lot case, LIRC now argues that the § 80.34 
factors must now be considered elements of the prima facie case 
under the odd-lot doctrine.  This is a far too sweeping reading 
of Advance Die Casting.  The court of appeals in Advance Die 
Casting said only that the agency had properly considered the 
factors listed in § 80.34; it did not declare that the claimant 
was required to bring forward evidence on each factor as part of 
his prima facie case.  More specifically, since there is no 
reference to a job search in the Advance Die Casting opinion, 
the court of appeals clearly did not regard this factor as a 
necessary element of a claimant's prima facie case under the 
odd-lot doctrine, and neither do we. 
E.  The "Prima Facie Case"  
¶48 Outokumpu offers a more nuanced view of LIRC's 
decision.  Outokumpu concedes on this review that Beecher did, 
No. 
02-1582   
 
27 
 
in fact, present a prima facie case for permanent total 
disability on an odd-lot basis under Balczewski, but argues that 
it successfully rebutted it.  Outokumpu contends that LIRC 
simply misspoke when it said that Beecher failed to present a 
prima facie case, and that when LIRC concluded that Beecher's 
job search was inadequate, it was already at the "second stage" 
of the analysis, having concluded (silently, as it were, or 
contrary to the express words of its decision), that Beecher 
presented a prima facie case and that Outokumpu rebutted it.  We 
cannot accept this interpretation of the LIRC decision's 
treatment of the job search issue.  The language of the decision 
makes it clear that the agency regarded job search evidence as 
part 
of 
Beecher's 
prima 
facie 
odd-lot 
burden, 
a 
legal 
proposition 
that 
we 
have 
rejected 
as 
inconsistent 
with 
Balczewski.         
¶49 We take this opportunity, however, to clarify the 
prima facie case and burden-shifting evidentiary rule of the 
Balczewski odd-lot doctrine.  The expression "prima facie case" 
is widely invoked in our law but rarely explained.  McCormick on 
Evidence states that courts use the concept of "prima facie 
case" in two senses: 1) evidence that is sufficient to get to 
the jury (that is, to survive a directed verdict); and 2) 
evidence that is sufficient to shift the burden of producing 
evidence.  2 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 342, n.4 
(5th ed. 1999). It is often difficult to determine which of 
these two senses is intended in a given court opinion.  Id.; see 
No. 
02-1582   
 
28 
 
also 9 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law 
§ 2494, at 378 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981).     
¶50 In Walter Kassuba, Inc. v. Bauch, 38 Wis. 2d 648, 158 
N.W.2d 387 (1968), we characterized a prima facie case as one 
"established only when evidentiary facts are stated which if 
they remain uncontradicted by the opposing party's affidavits 
resolve all factual issues in the moving party's favor."  Id. at 
655.  Thus Wisconsin's use of the term prima facie case falls 
closer to the second sense of the term noted above.  Once a 
claimant brings forward evidence sufficient to establish a prima 
facie case, the burden is on the opponent to produce sufficient 
evidence to go forward with its case.      
¶51 Perfect congruity between DWD § 80.34 and Balczewski 
is impossible because the odd-lot doctrine is in reality an 
exception to the general rule that a permanently, totally 
disabled employee has no future earning capacity.  The odd-lot 
worker may indeed have some residual earning capacity after the 
injury, but the odd-lot doctrine essentially provides that in 
certain cases the law regards that residue as insignificant.  
Permanent total disability on an odd-lot basis under Balczewski 
is a judicially-created category distinct from the general rules 
governing permanent total disability cases, which otherwise 
depend upon a determination of total loss of earning capacity. 
¶52 As a general matter, the burden of proof in a worker's 
compensation case lies with the claimant.  Leist v. LIRC, 183 
Wis. 2d 450, 457, 515 N.W.2d 268 (1994).  Burden of proof can be 
distinguished into the burden of production and the burden of 
No. 
02-1582   
 
29 
 
persuasion.  Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Evidence § 301.1 at 64 
(2d ed. 2001).  As the Kassuba holding makes clear, Wisconsin 
adheres to the view that a prima facie case represents a burden 
of production that, in the absence of adequate rebuttal 
evidence, satisfies the burden of persuasion on the issue 
involved. 
¶53   The distinction between burdens of production and 
burdens of persuasion is implicated most often in the context of 
evidentiary 
presumptions. 
 
Balczewski's 
burden-shifting 
framework can be analogized to the law of presumptions in civil 
cases, which assists in sorting through the inter-relationship 
between § 80.34 and Balczewski.  In Wisconsin, presumptions in 
civil cases are governed by Wis. Stat. § 903.01, which states:  
[A] presumption recognized at common law or created by 
statute, including statutory provisions that certain 
basic facts are prima facie evidence of other facts, 
imposes on the party relying on the presumption the 
burden of proving the basic facts, but once the basic 
facts are found to exist the presumption imposes on 
the party against whom it is directed the burden of 
proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is 
more probable than its existence.   
Wis. Stat. § 903.01.   
 
¶54 Balczewski 
holds 
that 
certain 
basic 
facts——the 
claimant's injury, age, education, capacity, and training——may 
in combination demonstrate an inability to secure continuing, 
gainful employment such that these basic facts constitute prima 
facie evidence of another (presumed) fact, namely that the 
claimant is permanently and totally incapable of earning a 
living. 
 
Ordinarily 
this 
is 
accomplished 
through 
expert 
No. 
02-1582   
 
30 
 
testimony.  The employer may introduce expert evidence in 
contradiction of the basic facts of the employee's prima facie 
case in order to prevent the presumption from arising.  Under 
Balczewski, however, if the claimant brings forward the basic 
facts sufficient to satisfy the DWD that a prima facie odd-lot 
case has been made, the presumption is triggered and an 
obligation 
is 
imposed 
upon 
the 
party 
against 
whom 
the 
presumption runs——here, the employer.  That obligation is the 
burden of proving that the non-existence of the presumed fact is 
more probable than its existence, or in other words, that it is 
more probable that the claimant is not permanently and totally 
incapable of earning a living.  Balczewski holds that this 
burden requires the employer to show that there is an actual job 
that the claimant can do.     
¶55  Accordingly, we conclude that the burden that shifts 
from the claimant to the employer under Balczewski is a burden 
of persuasion, but only as to the sub-issue of whether a job 
exists that the claimant can do.  The burden of persuasion on 
the other aspects of the claimant's case for permanent total 
disability benefits remains, as always, with the claimant.  The 
claimant must prove the industrial injury and medical aspects of 
his claim, and if the claimant makes a prima facie case for odd-
lot unemployability based upon his injury, age, education, 
training, and capacity, then it falls to the employer to show 
that there exists suitable employment for the claimant.  The 
employer does this by bringing forward evidence of actual job 
availability, making it more probable than not that the claimant 
No. 
02-1582   
 
31 
 
is able to earn a living.10  The claimant may respond with 
evidence of an actual, futile job search or rely on his expert 
evidence to defeat the employer's attempted rebuttal.  The DWD 
then determines whether the prima facie odd-lot case under 
Balczewski 
has 
been 
successfully 
rebutted. 
 
The 
factors 
enumerated in DWD § 80.34 may come into play in the agency's 
ultimate determination of eligibility for benefits, to the 
extent that they overlap with the odd-lot doctrine, or in a 
broader sense to the extent that the odd-lot case fails and 
traditional eligibility rules prevail.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
¶56 By recognizing the odd-lot doctrine as a part of 
Wisconsin's worker's compensation law, Balczewski injected a 
large dose of realism into the adjudication of disability cases.  
From the general rule that permanent total disability benefits 
                                                 
10 LIRC urges us to consider United States Postal Svc. Bd. 
of Governors v. Aiken, 460 U.S. 711 (1983), in which the United 
States Supreme Court held that under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act, once a plaintiff employee has made a prima facie 
case of employment discrimination, and the defendant employer 
has proffered a legitimate reason for the employment decision, 
the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
employer's proffered reason is pretextual.  Aiken is inapposite 
here because Wisconsin does not adhere to the same view of 
evidentiary presumptions as the federal system.  Under Fed. R. 
Evid. 903, a civil presumption "explodes" once the adverse party 
brings forward any evidence tending to rebut the prima facie 
case, and the burden of persuasion remains with the proponent of 
the presumption.  In Wisconsin, however, the party adverse to a 
civil presumption bears the burden of persuasion as to the 
presumed fact.  See generally, Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin 
Evidence §§ 301.1-301.4 (2d. ed. 2001)(explaining the difference 
between the federal rule and the Wisconsin rule).    
No. 
02-1582   
 
32 
 
compensate workers for the total loss of future earning 
capacity, Balczewski created a narrow exception for seriously-
injured workers whose ability to earn occasional, unsteady 
income does not warrant a denial of permanent total disability 
benefits or a reduction to partial disability.   
 
¶57 To establish a prima facie case for permanent total 
disability on an odd-lot basis, a claimant must present, usually 
by way of expert reports and testimony, evidence demonstrating 
to the satisfaction of the DWD that the claimant's injury, 
combined with his age, education, training, and capacity shows 
that he is unable to secure continuing, gainful employment, 
putting him into the odd-lot category.  This evidence need not 
include evidence of a post-injury job search.  Once a prima 
facie odd-lot case is made, it falls to the employer to prove 
that there is continuous and regular work available to the 
claimant in order to rebut the prima facie case of odd-lot 
unemployability.  In making the ultimate determination of 
eligibility for benefits, the agency considers any factors 
enumerated in DWD § 80.34 that are consistent with the odd-lot 
doctrine, or more broadly if the agency concludes that the 
claimant is not prima facie odd-lot or the odd-lot prima facie 
case has been rebutted. 
 
¶58  In this case, LIRC considered the job search factor to 
be 
part 
of 
Beecher's 
prima 
facie 
odd-lot 
burden 
under 
Balczewski.  We have concluded that this was legally improper.  
Outokumpu has conceded in this court that a prima facie odd-lot 
No. 
02-1582   
 
33 
 
case has been made, and asks that we conclude that the prima 
facie case was successfully rebutted. 
¶59 We do not decide here whether the now-conceded prima 
facie odd-lot case has been rebutted.  Judicial review of a 
worker's compensation award is limited to confirming or setting 
aside the award; modification, amendment or a substitution of 
the court's judgment for the agency's is improper.  See ¶20, 
supra.  Accordingly, we set aside the agency's decision and 
remand this case for rebuttal and any further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.           
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶60 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
decision of the court of appeals should be affirmed.  The court 
of appeals correctly concluded that the Labor & Industry Review 
Commission's (LIRC's) interpretation of Wisconsin's odd-lot 
doctrine did not comply with Wisconsin law and therefore was 
erroneous. 
¶61 I write separately to express my disagreement with the 
reasoning of the majority opinion on two issues:  
(1) The majority opinion errs in characterizing the odd-
lot doctrine explained in Balczewski v. DILHR11 as a 
"judge-made 
adjunct 
to 
the 
law 
of 
worker's 
compensation,"12 as "a judge-made exception to the 
general rule that permanent total disability awards 
under worker's compensation law are based on proof of 
total loss of earning capacity,"13 and as a court-
created (apparently out of whole cloth and not derived 
from the Worker's Compensation Act) rule of evidence 
to be used by LIRC.14  I conclude that the Balczewski 
case 
adhered 
to 
prior 
case 
law 
and 
correctly 
characterized 
the 
odd-lot 
doctrine 
(and 
its 
application, including the burden-shifting framework) 
                                                 
11 Balczewski v. DILHR, 76 Wis. 2d 487, 251 N.W.2d 794 
(1977). 
12 Majority op., ¶2.  See also id., ¶56. 
13 Id., ¶44. 
14 See id., ¶¶3, 32. 
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
2 
 
as an interpretation of the meaning of the phrases 
"total disability"15 and impliedly "loss of earning 
capacity" as used in Wisconsin's Worker's Compensation 
Act (WCA).  
(2) The majority opinion errs by characterizing LIRC's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
odd-lot 
doctrine 
as 
an 
interpretation of the Balczewski case not entitled to 
any deference.  I conclude that LIRC's interpretation 
of the odd-lot doctrine is an interpretation and 
application 
of 
the 
WCA 
(including 
this 
court's 
interpretations of the WCA) and is entitled to great 
weight deference.  
¶62 Although the agency's determination in this case 
should be given great weight deference, I conclude, for many of 
the reasons set forth in the majority opinion and in the opinion 
of the court of appeals,16 that LIRC's interpretation of the law 
is erroneous and therefore is unreasonable.  Accordingly, this 
court should not affirm the agency's interpretation of the law, 
but should, as the court of appeals did, reverse and remand this 
matter. 
                                                 
15 Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 493 (quoting 2 Arthur Larson, 
Workmen's 
Compensation 
Law 
§ 57.51, 
at 
10-107) 
("'Total 
disability' in compensation law is not to be interpreted 
literally as utter and abject helplessness.")). 
16 See majority op., ¶¶34-47; Beecher v. LIRC, 2003 WI App 
100, ¶¶17-26, 264 Wis. 2d 394, 663 N.W.2d 316. 
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
3 
 
 
I 
¶63 The majority opinion errs in characterizing the odd-
lot doctrine explained in Balczewski as a "judge-made adjunct to 
the law of worker's compensation,"17 as "a judge-made exception 
to the general rule that permanent total disability awards under 
worker's compensation law are based on proof of total loss of 
earning capacity,"18 and as a court-created (apparently out of 
whole cloth and not derived from the WCA) rule of evidence to be 
used by LIRC.19 
¶64 A careful examination of the Balczewski decision 
demonstrates that Balczewski's adoption of the Larson treatise 
language did not create a new judge-made common-law rule for the 
WCA.  The Balczewski decision interpreted the WCA, identified 
and labeled prior case law as the famed "odd-lot" doctrine, and 
distilled and developed prior case law into a two-step, burden-
shifting interpretation of the WCA, a more clearly enunciated 
interpretation of the WCA that the court had adopted in prior 
cases.  The Balczewski court clearly understood, and explicitly 
stated, that it was taking this approach.   
¶65 The Balczewski court unambiguously viewed the odd-lot 
doctrine as an interpretation of the WCA, stating as follows:  
"We think it clear that what Larson refers to as the 'odd-lot' 
doctrine is a statement of the Wisconsin law as it has existed 
                                                 
17 Majority op., ¶2.  See also id., ¶56. 
18 Id., ¶44. 
19 See id., ¶¶3, 32. 
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
4 
 
at least since the 1923 amendments to the Worker's Compensation 
Act."20  "'Total disability' in compensation law is not to be 
interpreted literally . . . ."21   
¶66 The existing Wisconsin case law interpreting the WCA 
and repeatedly referred to by the Balczewski court22 began in the 
1917 McDonald v. Industrial Commission23 case, one of the 
earliest Wisconsin cases considering whether claimants with 
injuries that permit them to work sporadic, odd-lot jobs 
nonetheless qualify for permanent total disability benefits 
under the WCA.  The McDonald court affirmed a finding of 
permanent total disability under the WCA despite medical 
testimony that the injured worker could perform work if it did 
not involve much walking or stooping.24  In deciding whether to 
affirm such a finding, this court considered whether the 
claimant's substantial but not total loss of earning capacity 
qualified as a compensable injury under the then permanent total 
disability statute.25  This court concluded that it did. 
                                                 
20 Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 495-96. 
21 Id. at 493 (quoting 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 
§ 57.51, at 10-107) (emphasis added). 
22 See, e.g., Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 495-96. 
23 McDonald v. Indus. Comm'n, 165 Wis. 372, 162 N.W. 345 
(1917). 
24 Id. at 373.  
25 Id. at 372.  The provision of the WCA considered in 
McDonald was section 2394-9, subdivision 2(d), and reads 
materially the same as the current Wis. Stat. § 102.44(2). 
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶67 In 1944, in Milwaukee Western Fuel Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, this court continued looking at loss of actual 
earning capacity, although the opinion did not cite McDonald or 
the statute interpreted therein.26  This court affirmed a 
permanent total disability award even though the claimant was 
able to shovel snow, run errands, and work for short periods of 
time until dizziness and weakness took hold.27 
¶68 In 1972, in Kurschner v. DILHR,28 a case expressly 
relied upon by Balczewski, this court again recognized that, in 
cases of non-schedule industrial injuries, the crucial factor in 
establishing permanent total disability is proof of impairment 
of actual earning capacity in the industrial labor market.29  The 
Balczewski court noted that Kurschner does not stand alone.  
Rather, stated the Balczewski court, the Kurschner case is 
merely "the culmination of a long line of cases interpreting the 
basis of compensation for nonschedule injuries under the 
Wisconsin Workmen's [now Worker's] Compensation Act."30 
¶69 Finally, in 1972, in Transamerica Insurance Co. v. 
DILHR,31 this court again spoke on the odd-lot doctrine, although 
                                                 
26 Milwaukee W. Fuel Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 245 Wis. 334, 13 
N.W.2d 919 (1944). 
27 Id. at 336. 
28 Kurschner v. DILHR, 40 Wis. 2d 10, 161 N.W.2d 213 (1968). 
29 Id. at 19-20. 
30 Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 492. 
31 Transamerica Ins. Co. v. DILHR, 54 Wis. 2d 272, 195 
N.W.2d 656 (1972). 
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
6 
 
again not specifically labeling the doctrine as such.  In 
Transamerica, the court affirmed a finding of permanent total 
disability because the claimant was permanently and totally 
disabled from performing labor at his trade, as well as being 
permanently and totally disabled from performing manual or other 
labor in another "suitable" employment.32  Furthermore, this 
court declared loss of earning capacity as "one important 
measuring stick as to degree of disability."33  For both 
propositions, the Transamerica court cited the cases discussed 
above. 
¶70 Not only did the Balczewski court view prior cases as  
adopting the rationale of the odd-lot doctrine as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, but also both the claimant and the 
Attorney General (representing the agency) agreed in Balczewski 
that the odd-lot doctrine was part of the WCA, just not by that 
name.  The claimant's brief in Balczewski stated that "it has 
long been recognized in Wisconsin Workers' Compensation law that 
a finding of total disability for industrial purposes can be 
proper 
despite 
the 
fact 
that 
a 
claimant 
is 
capable 
of . . . miscellaneous light work."34 The Attorney General's 
brief in Balczewski states that DILHR and the State "agree with 
                                                 
32 Id. at 
277 
(citing 
McDonald, 
165 
Wis. 
at 
375-76; 
Milwaukee W. Fuel Co., 245 Wis. at 335-36). 
33 Transamerica Ins. Co., 54 Wis. 2d at 277 (citing N. 
States Power Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 252 Wis. 70, 76, 30 
N.W.2d 217; Kurschner, 40 Wis. 2d at 18-20; Kohler Co. v. DILHR, 
42 Wis. 2d 396, 405-06, 167 N.W.2d 431 (1969)). 
34 Brief of Appellant at 13. 
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
7 
 
the claimant that [the odd-lot doctrine] is implicit" in the 
WCA, that the doctrine is but another statement of existing 
Wisconsin law, and that DILHR has made findings of permanent 
total disability based on the odd-lot doctrine.35 
¶71 By 
identifying, 
distilling, 
and 
labeling 
the 
developing statute-based rule of the McDonald line of cases, the 
Balczewski court was interpreting the foundational legal terms 
of art in the WCA: "total disability" and "loss of earning 
capacity."  The Balczewski court concluded that "'[t]otal 
disability' in compensation law is not to be interpreted 
literally as utter and abject helplessness.  Evidence that 
claimant has been able to earn occasional wages . . . does not 
necessarily rule out a finding of total disability nor require 
that it is to be reduced to partial."36 
¶72 Balczewski 
is, 
without 
doubt, 
a 
statutory 
interpretation case.  Indeed, even the cases from which 
Professor 
Larson's 
odd-lot 
doctrine 
emerges 
are 
cases 
interpreting  workers' compensation acts. 
¶73 For example, the Balczewski court referenced Lee v. 
Minneapolis Street Railway Co.,37 a case Professor Larson thinks 
                                                 
35 Brief of Respondents, Department of Industry, Labor and 
Human Relations and the State of Wisconsin at 4.  See also 
Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 496. 
36 Balczewski, 
76 
Wis. 2d at 
493 
(quoting 
2 
Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law § 57.51, at 10-107) (emphasis added). 
37 Lee v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 41 N.W.2d 433 (Minn. 
1950). 
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
8 
 
exemplary and representative of odd-lot doctrine cases.38  That 
case expressly interpreted a phrase of Minnesota's Workers' 
Compensation Act: "working at an occupation which brings him an 
income."39  The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the phrase 
implies 
"at 
least 
a 
reasonable 
degree 
of 
continuity 
of 
occupational capacity," and that sporadic work for short periods 
of time is not enough, on its own, to negate a permanent total 
disability determination.40  
¶74 Again citing the Larson treatise, the Balczewski court 
described the origins of the name "odd-lot."41  Professor Larson 
attributes the doctrine name to the British case of Cardiff 
Corp. v. Hall, a case discussed in the majority opinion.42  
Again, this case interpreted a statute, this time the British 
Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906 and the phrase "earning 
or . . . able to earn."43 
                                                 
38 Balczewski, 
76 
Wis. 2d at 
493 
(quoting 
2 
Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law § 57.51, at 10-107).  Professor 
Larson describes the case as "the rule followed by most modern 
courts." 
39 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 176.11, subd. 5.  This section has 
been renumbered as Minn. Stat. Ann. § 176.101, subdivision 5 
(2004). 
40 Lee, 41 N.W. 2d at 436-37 (quoting Green v. Schmahl, 278 
N.W. 157, 
158 
(Minn. 1938) 
(also interpreting 
Minnesota's 
Workers' Compensation Act)). 
41 Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 494. 
42 Cardiff Corp. v. Hall, 1 K.B. 1009, 1911 WL 15472 (K.B. 
1911). 
43 Cardiff Corp., 1 K.B. at 1017-18, 1025-27. 
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶75 Finally, the Balczewski court looked to Judge Benjamin 
N. Cardozo although not cited by the Larson treatise for further 
guidance in expressing the odd-lot doctrine.44  That case, Jordan 
v. Decorative Co.,45 was also a statutory interpretation case, 
discussing the parameters of the phrase "wage earning capacity" 
in the New York workers’ compensation statute.46   
¶76 I therefore conclude that Balczewski and the odd-lot 
doctrine are judicial interpretations of the WCA, not judge-made 
rules that are adjunct to the WCA or an exception to the WCA.   
¶77 LIRC perceived Wis. Stat. § 102.17(7)(a), Wis. Admin. 
Code § DWD 80.34, and Professor Larson's text (§ 84.01[4]) as 
altering the Balczewski line of cases interpreting the WCA.  I 
therefore turn to the question of whether LIRC's interpretation 
of the odd-lot doctrine of the WCA is entitled to great weight 
deference. 
II 
¶78 I agree with the court of appeals that LIRC's 
interpretation of the odd-lot doctrine is entitled to great 
weight deference.  Thus this court will not overturn LIRC's 
determination unless it is unreasonable.  I agree with the court 
of appeals that because LIRC did not adhere to the WCA as 
interpreted by the court, LIRC's determination was unreasonable.  
                                                 
44 Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 494-95. 
45 Jordan v. Decorative Co., 130 N.E. 634 (N.Y. 1921). 
46 Id. at 635-36. 
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
10 
 
 
A 
¶79 Wisconsin courts must afford great weight deference to 
LIRC's statutory interpretation of the odd-lot doctrine in the 
present case because the following conditions have been met:47  
(1) the agency is charged with administration of the particular 
statute at issue;48 (2) its interpretation is one of long 
standing;49 
(3) 
it 
employed 
its 
expertise 
or 
specialized 
knowledge in arriving at its interpretation;50 and (4) its 
interpretation will provide uniformity and consistency in the 
application of the statute at issue.   
¶80 The majority opinion concludes that no deference at 
all is owed to LIRC in the present case.  The majority opinion 
                                                 
47 Brown v. LIRC, 2003 WI 142, ¶16, 267 Wis. 2d 31, 671 
N.W.2d 279 (2003) (citing Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 
Wis. 2d 650, 660, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995); Lisney v. LIRC, 171 
Wis. 2d 499, 505, 493 N.W.2d 14 (1992)). 
"In other words, when a legal question calls for value and 
policy judgments that require the expertise and experience of an 
agency, the agency's decision, although not controlling, is 
given great weight deference."  Brown, 267 Wis. 2d 31, ¶16 
(citing Harnischfeger Corp., 196 Wis. 2d at 659; Nottelson v. 
DILHR, 94 Wis. 2d 106, 117, 287 N.W.2d 763 (1980); Kimberly-
Clark Corp. v. LIRC, 138 Wis. 2d 58, 64, 405 N.W.2d 684 (Ct. 
App. 1987)). 
48 See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 102.14(1), 
102.15; 
Brown, 
267 
Wis. 2d 31, ¶17 n.17. 
49 As the majority opinion noted, since 1982, when the WCA 
was amended by Wis. Stat. § 102.17(7)(a), LIRC has interpreted 
Balczewski 72 times in odd-lot cases.  See majority op., ¶25 
n.6.   
50 Brown, 267 Wis. 2d 31, ¶¶12, 16. 
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
11 
 
reaches this conclusion because it erroneously conflates a 
court's deference to the agency's interpretation of a statute 
with a court's determination of the reasonableness of the 
agency's interpretation of a statute.  A court may give an 
agency great weight deference and yet conclude that the agency's 
determination of law is unreasonable and should be reversed.51 
¶81 The majority opinion's discussion of the appellate 
standard of review for LIRC's decision in the present case52 is 
apparently based on the premise that the odd-lot doctrine is a 
judge-made doctrine created by this court in Balczewski and that 
the odd-lot doctrine is not based on the WCA or on prior case 
law interpreting the WCA, but is based on the common practice of 
other states (as set forth in Professor Larson's Workmen's 
Compensation Law).53    
¶82 Using this faulty underlying assertion, the majority 
opinion summarily concludes that even if LIRC's interpretation 
of Balczewski is of long standing, no deference is owed to LIRC 
because LIRC is interpreting a decision of this court, not a 
statute or administrative rule.54  Not only does the majority 
opinion refuse to accord the agency's interpretation of the WCA 
                                                 
51 Brown, 267 Wis. 2d 31, ¶19. 
52 Majority op., ¶¶22-26. 
53 2 Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 57.51, at 
10-107.  As the majority opinion explains, majority op., ¶3 n.2, 
the cited Larson passage has been renumbered and now appears at 
4 Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 83.01, at 83-2 
(2003). 
54 Majority op., ¶¶25-26.  
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
12 
 
any deference, but the majority opinion also goes even further 
and expansively asserts that "we need not defer to agency 
interpretations of our own decisions."55   
¶83 As support for its erroneous broad legal proposition, 
the majority cites Local 60, American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees v. WERC.56  The court of appeals 
in Local 60 opined that "it is well established that the general 
deference given to an agency's application of a particular 
statute does not apply when the agency's determination conflicts 
with prior case law established by our supreme court."  The 
Local 60 court of appeals cited Doering v. LIRC57 as authority 
for this proposition, and Doering in turn cites the Pabst58 and 
Klusendorf59 cases.  
¶84 Neither Pabst nor Klusendorf supports the statement of 
law set forth in Local 60, in Doering, and in the majority 
opinion.  Rather, both Pabst and Klusendorf (cases decided 
before this court adopted the levels of deference) stated the 
law correctly:  "[C]ourts should not substitute their judgment 
for the agency's application of a particular statute to the 
                                                 
55 Id., ¶26. 
56 Local 60, Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. 
WERC, 217 Wis. 2d 602, 579 N.W.2d  59 (Ct. App. 1998). 
57 Doering v. LIRC 187 Wis. 2d 472, 523 N.W.2d 142 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
58 Pabst v. Dep't of Taxation, 19 Wis. 2d 313, 323-24, 120 
N.W.2d 77 (1963). 
59 Klusendorf 
Chevrolet-Buick, 
Inc., 
v. 
LIRC, 
110 
Wis. 2d 328, 328 N.W.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1982). 
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
13 
 
found facts if a rational basis exists in law for the agency's 
interpretation and it does not conflict with the statute's 
legislative 
history, 
prior 
decisions 
of 
this 
court, 
or 
constitutional prohibitions."60   
¶85 I agree that if an agency's interpretation of law 
conflicts with prior decisions of this court interpreting the 
law, then, even with great weight deference, the agency's 
interpretation is not rational and a court need not follow the 
interpretation regardless of the deference accorded the agency's 
determination.61  
¶86 The court of appeals recently refused to follow the 
"no deference rule" pronounced in Local 60 and Doering and 
granted great weight deference to a DWD determination based on a 
court case, reasoning as follows:62 
The fact that the [DWD] also looked to the supreme 
court's discussion in [Richland School District v. 
DILHR, in addition to a statutory provision] in 
deciding this [claim] does not mean that we may 
deprive the department of the deference it is due on 
                                                 
60 Pabst, 19 Wis. 2d at 323-24; see also Klusendorf, 110 
Wis. 2d at 331-32. 
61 "When an agency's conclusions of law are entitled to 
great weight deference . . . [a]n agency's conclusion of law is 
unreasonable and may be reversed by a reviewing court if it 
directly contravenes the words of the statute or the federal or 
state constitution, if it is clearly contrary to the legislative 
intent, history, or purpose of the statute, or it is without 
rational 
basis." 
Brown, 
267 
Wis. 2d 31, 
¶19 
(citing 
Harnischfeger Corp., 196 Wis. 2d at 662; Barron Elec. Co-op. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 212 Wis. 2d 752, 766, 569 N.W.2d 726 (Ct. 
App. 1997)). 
62 Kraft 
Foods, 
Inc. 
v. 
DWD, 
2001 
WI 
App 
69, 
242 
Wis. 2d 378, 625 N.W.2d 658. 
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
14 
 
account of its expertise, experience and legislatively 
delegated authority.63 
¶87 The standard of review in the majority opinion and 
Local 60 is not supported by Wisconsin law and is simply 
illogical and wrong.  Agencies interpret and apply court 
interpretations of statutes all the time.  By failing to afford 
LIRC the proper level of deference in such cases, the majority 
opinion enables the courts of this state to usurp legislative 
power.64  The majority opinion's change in the level of deference 
afforded an agency's interpretation of a statute undermines the 
stability and uniformity that is necessary in the administration 
of the WCA.    
B 
 
¶88 The majority opinion's characterization of LIRC's 
determination as one based purely on Balczewski and § 84.01[4] 
                                                 
63 Id., ¶8 n.8.   
64 See majority op., ¶24 (stating that "the basis for 
judicial deference is a sense of respect for the legislature's 
prerogative in conferring power on an agency" and "[b]y 
according less than the appropriate level of deference, a court 
invades, albeit indirectly, the province of the legislature").  
In its opinion, the majority recognizes the individualized 
nature 
of 
disability 
determinations, 
and 
even 
notes 
the 
flexibility and discretion needed for agencies to effectively 
administer the program:  "Given the highly individualized nature 
of such 
injuries, 
and 
a 
job market 
that 
is 
constantly 
transformed by economic and technological change, predicting how 
an injury will affect future earning capacity is not an exact 
science.  For this reason, workers' compensation law has evolved 
to give claimants . . . more flexibility to build a case for 
total permanent disability, and to give agency judges more 
discretion to rule on the merits of such claims."  Majority op., 
¶30. 
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
15 
 
of Larson's Workers' Compensation Law,65 and one that "does not 
purport to interpret a statute or administrative rule,"66 is 
erroneous.  LIRC,67 Beecher,68 the court of appeals,69 and I 
interpret 
the 
LIRC 
decision 
as 
relying 
on 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.17(7)(a), 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ DWD 
80.34, 
case 
law 
interpreting the WCA (Balczewski), and the Larson treatise.  The 
majority opinion protests.70   
¶89 The majority opinion parses the LIRC decision to 
reinterpret it so that it does not rely on anything but 
Balczewski and the Larson text to justify according the LIRC 
decision no deference. 
                                                 
65 4 Arthur Larson and Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' 
Compensation Law § 84.01[4] (2001). 
66 Majority op., ¶26.   
67 See Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner 
LIRC at 14-16.  
68 See Brief and Appendix of Plaintiff-Appellant Ralph E. 
Beecher at 34-37. 
69 See Beecher v. LIRC, 2003 WI App. 100, ¶¶9, 16, 264 Wis. 
2d 394, 663 N.W.2d 316 (2003). 
In their Worker's Compensation Handbook (5th ed. 2003) at 
April 2004 Summary-1, John D. Neal and Joseph Danas, Jr., view 
the court of appeals decision in Beecher as offering guidance in 
odd-lot cases as to the impact of statutory and administrative 
code amendments enacted after Balczewski.  
70 See majority op., ¶25 n.7. 
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
16 
 
¶90 Not only does a reading of the LIRC decision itself 
demonstrate the majority opinion's error,71 but numerous LIRC 
cases that preceded the present case regularly rely on Wis. 
Admin Code § DWD 80.34, Balczewski, and Larson,72 as supporting 
                                                 
71 See Beecher v. Outokumpu Cooper Kenosha Inc., No. 
1997028765, 
at 
9 
(LIRC, 
Dec. 
18, 
2001), 
available 
at 
www.dwd.state.wi.us/lirc/wcdecsns/726.htm.  In the section of 
LIRC's decision entitled "Extent of permanent disability on a 
vocational basis," LIRC stated, citing § 84.01[4] of the Larson 
treatise, that "while the applicant has made some effort to find 
work, the work restrictions set out in the November FCE suggest 
he could have made more of an effort, a factor that may be 
considered against him in determining whether he has established 
a prima facie case of odd-lot unemployability.  In short, the 
commission cannot conclude that the applicant has made a prima 
facie case."  
LIRC's decision then summarized the testimony of an 
employer's witness who estimated a 35% loss of earning capacity 
and concluded that the witness underestimated the obstacles to 
Beecher finding employment.   
LIRC then concluded this section of its decision as  
follows: "In short, after considering the factors set out in 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.34 and giving the reports of the 
vocational experts due weight under Wis. Stat. § 102.17(7)(a), 
the commission  concludes that the applicant has sustained a 
loss of earning capacity at 60 percent." See Beecher, No. 
1997028765, at 9 (LIRC, Dec. 18, 2001). 
72 These LIRC decisions consistently quote § 57.61(d) of the 
Larson text (1993 and 1998) as follows (rather than § 84.01[4], 
a newly numbered section of the Larson treatise (2001) that is 
referred to in Beecher):   
"Professor Larson has noted that in odd-lot cases 'it is 
not unreasonable to place the burden of proof on [the employee] 
to establish the unavailability of work to a person in his 
circumstances, which normally would require a showing that he 
has made reasonable efforts to secure suitable employment.'"   
See, e.g., Herdt v. Lincoln Wood Products, No. 1979018557 (LIRC, 
June 
30, 
1999), 
available 
at 
www.dwd.state.wi.us/lirc/wcdecsns/345.htm; 
Krezman 
v. 
Fleet 
Mortgage Corp., No. 1993016147 (LIRC, Nov. 20, 1998), available 
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
17 
 
the proposition that "to make the prima facie case of odd-lot 
unemployability, the commission requires applicants undertake 
reasonable efforts to find work."73 
C 
¶91 Under the great weight deference standard of review 
this court's task should have been to determine whether LIRC's 
conclusion of law that an injured worker must demonstrate that 
he or she made a reasonable post-injury job search as part of 
his 
or 
her 
prima 
facie 
odd-lot 
case 
is 
a 
reasonable  
                                                                                                                                                             
at www.dwd.state.wi.us/lirc/wcdecsns/267.htm.  In the present 
case, the LIRC decision refers to a newer edition of Larson and 
to § 84.01[4]. 
 
I have made attempts through the late Professor Larson's 
editors and publishers to locate a full copy of § 57.61(d) (1993 
and 1998) and to track the revisions made to and renumbering of 
that section.  No copy of the old text was found.  As best as I 
can determine, § 57.61(d) is now encompassed in § 84.01[4]. 
73 Herdt, No. 1979018557 (LIRC, June 30, 1999), available at 
www.dwd.state.wi.us/lirc/wcdecsns/345.htm.  See also Krezman, 
No. 
1993016147, 
available 
at 
www.dwd.state.wi.us/lirc/wcdecsns/267.htm; 
Morford 
v. 
Pub. 
Instruction Dep't, No. 92073132 (LIRC, Oct. 3, 1996), available 
at www.dwd.state.wi.us/lirc/wcdecsns/32D135Fmor.htm.  
Some LIRC decisions do not cite the Larson treatise at all, 
relying only on Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.34 and Balczewski.  
See, e.g., Cole v. Roadmaster Corp., No. 1996022902 (LIRC, July 
29, 
1999), 
available 
at 
www.dwd.state.wi.us/lirc/wcdecsns/355.htm. 
For a LIRC case subsequent to the court of appeals decision 
in the present case, explaining the two meanings of prima facie 
case and applying both, and using Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.34 
in determining whether the worker has made the prima facie case, 
see Istvanek v. County of Kenosha, No. 2000045183 (LIRC, March 
25, 
2004), 
available 
at 
www.dwd.state.wi.us/lirc/wcdecsns/804.htm.    
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
18 
 
interpretation of Balczewski, Wis. Stat. § 102.17(7)(a), and 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.34.  Great weight deference requires 
this court to sustain LIRC's interpretation of the law "even if 
an alternative view of the law is just as reasonable or even 
more reasonable," but requires this court to overturn LIRC's 
determination 
if 
LIRC's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
law 
is 
unreasonable.74   
¶92 Great 
weight deference is 
not a 
result-oriented 
standard of review and its use does not mean that a court must 
rubber-stamp an agency decision.  Applying the "great weight" 
deferential standard of review, I agree with the court of 
appeals and the majority opinion that LIRC's interpretation of 
the odd-lot doctrine cannot be sustained.  For substantially the 
same reasons as the court of appeals and the majority opinion 
set 
forth, 
I 
conclude 
that 
LIRC's 
interpretation 
is 
unreasonable.   
 
¶93 For the reasons set forth, I would affirm the court of 
appeals decision.  I write separately in order to clarify the 
statutory basis of the odd-lot doctrine and the level of 
                                                 
74 Brown, 267 Wis. 2d 31, ¶19.  See also UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 
201 Wis. 2d 274, 287, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996); Harnischfeger Corp., 
196 Wis. 2d at 660. 
The levels of deference were an attempt by this court to 
reduce the confusion arising from our prior statements of the 
standard for review of agency interpretations of statutes in 
Wisconsin.  For an explanation and criticism of the court's 
"formalistic" approach, see Salvatore Massa, The Standards of 
Review for Agency Interpretations of Statutes in Wisconsin, 83 
Marq. L. Rev. 597 (2000) (supporting a test of institutional 
competence).  
No.  02-1582.ssa 
 
19 
 
deference that the majority opinion should have afforded LIRC's 
statutory interpretation. 
¶94  I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence.   
 
No.  02-1582.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶95 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
write 
separately to highlight my concerns with the majority opinion.  
Once again, the majority reaches out and needlessly addresses an 
issue that was neither raised by the parties nor briefed and 
argued.  If the majority is going to go down this path, it is 
best that it get it right.  
¶96 Here the majority reaches out and introduces a concept 
foreign to our jurisprudence:  that judge-made common law plays 
a role in worker's compensation decisions.  Neither of the 
parties advance the issue nor make the argument that the odd-lot 
doctrine explained in Balczewski v. DILHR, 76 Wis. 2d 487, 251 
N.W.2d 794 
(1977), 
is 
anything 
other 
than 
a 
judicial 
interpretation of the relevant provision in the worker's 
compensation act.  Nevertheless, the majority tackles the issue. 
¶97 I believe that the rule of law is generally best 
developed when issues are raised by the parties and then tested 
by the fire of adversarial briefs and oral arguments.  Indeed, 
"[t]he fundamental premise of the adversary process is that 
these advocates will uncover and present more useful information 
and arguments to the decision maker than would be developed by a 
judicial officer acting on his own in an inquisitorial system."  
Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look 
At Sua Sponte Decisions By Appellate Courts, 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 
245, 247 (2002) (citing United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 
246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
No.  02-1582.awb 
 
2 
 
¶98 Additionally I am suspect of the majority's new 
concept.  As aptly described in the concurrence above, worker's 
compensation is not an outgrowth of our judge-made common law.  
Rather 
it 
is 
a 
carefully 
crafted 
and 
uniquely 
balanced 
legislative act.  All of our judicial decisions represent the 
court's application and interpretation of the act together with 
its attendant administrative regulations.  There exists no 
common law in our worker's compensation jurisprudence. 
¶99 For the above stated reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
No.  02-1582.awb 
 
 
 
1