Case Title: State v. Manago

Citation: 

Docket Number: caap-15-0000367

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-15-0000367
18-MAY-2016
09:10 AM
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORT!

 

in its jury instructions; (2) the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney's
(DPA's) comments during closing argument constituted
prosecutorial, misconduct; and (3) the Circuit Court erred when it
neglected to rule on a defense counsel objection.

Upon careful review of the record and the briefs

submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to

 

the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we

xesolve Manago's points of error as follows
(1) HRS § 708-810(1) (c) states, in relevant part:

{2) A person comnts the offense of burglary in the
first degree’ if the person intentionally enters oF renaine
unlawfutiy in a building, with intent to commit therein a
‘rine against a person of against property rights, and:

(c) the person recklessly disregards a risk that the
Daiiding ie the Gwelling of ancther, and the bailéing
5 auch a dwelling

 

 

HRS § 708-800 (2014) defines building as "any

 

structure, and the term also includes any vehicle, railway car,
aircraft, or watercraft used for lodging of persons therein; each
unit of a building consisting of two or more units separately
secured or occupied is a separate building."

Consistent with these statutes, the Circuit court

instructed the jury as follows:

 

A. person comite the oftense of Burglary in the first
Degree if he intentionally enters a building valawfully,
with intent to comit therein a erine against a person oF,

inst property rights, and he recklessly disregards a risk
Chat the buliding is the dwelling of another, and ene
building fe such a dwelling

    

There are four material elements of the offense of
Burglary in the First Degree, each of which the prosecstion
SUSE prave beyond a reasonable doubt:

oh

 

fe four elements ar

 

1. That on or about April 10, 2012, on the island of
anu, the defendant intentionally entered a building
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unlawfully, to wit, the residence of Eduardo Viranonte:
and/or Teodoro Domingues Delgado, situated at 94-289 Leonus
Street, apartment 917 and

2. That the defendant had the intent to commit therein
crime ‘against a person or against property rights; and

3. That the defendant recklessly disregarded the ri
that thd Bullaing was ehe dvelling of another, and

   

 

4. That the building was the dwelling of another.

 

Building includes any etructure.

Dwelling means a building which ie used or usually
used bya person for lodging.

Manago argues that the Circuit Court plainly erred when
it failed to include the complete statutory definition of the
term "building" in ite jury instructions. specifically, Manago
argues that the instruction was erroneous because it did not
include the language of HRS § 708-800, that “each unit of a
building consisting of two or more unite separately secured or
occupied is a separate building."

‘The Hawai'i Supreme Court has recognized that the
“trial court is not required to instruct the jury in the exact
words of the applicable statute but to present the jury with an
understandable instruction that aids the jury in applying that
law to the facts of the case." State v, Metcalfe, 129 Hawai'i
206, 230, 297 P.3d 1062, 1086 (2013) (citation omitted).
Moreover, “jury instructions ‘should not merely parrot the
language of the statute,‘ but should also adequately apprise the
jury, in easily understandable language, the law to be applied in
its deliberation." State v. Kajama, 81 Hawai'i 15, 27, 911 P.2d
738, 747 (1996).
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We conclude that the Circuit Court did not err in
giving the above instruction. The Circuit Court's inetruction

communicated the four material elements of Burglary in the First
Degree, that: (1) Manago intentionally entered a building i.e.,

94-289 Leonui Street, apartment 91, unlawfully; (2) Manago had

 

the intent to commit therein a crime against a person or property
rights; (3) Manago recklessly disregarded the risk that the
building was the dwelling of another; and (4) that the building
was the dwelling of another. The Circuit Court's instruction
also aided the jury in applying the law to the evidence presented
at trial. Eduardo Viramontes (Viramentes) and Teodoro Dominguez-
Delgado (Delgado) testified that they lived at 94-289 Leonui
Street, apartment 91 on April 10, 2012. Viramontes testified
that a male, later identified as Manago, entered his apartment on
April 10, 2012. Viramontes and Delgado testified that they did
not give Manago permission to enter their residence. Delgado
testified that $400.00 was missing from his bedroom. As part of
his investigation, Honolulu Police Department Officer Roberto
cadiz (Officer Cadiz) determined that the “suspect had cut the
screen and then reached inside. Reached inside and unlocked the
door from there." A stipulation provided that Manago's DNA
Profile matched the DNA recovered from a watch found inside
apartment 91. Manago's DNA profile also matched the DNA
recovered from the glass jalousie louver of apartment 91.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Circuit Court provided the jury

‘with an understandable instruction that aid[ed) the jury in
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applying [the] law to the facts of the case." Metcalfe, 129
Hawai'i at 230, 297 P.3d at 1086 (citation omitted).

Manago argues that “the fact that the defense was based
on the admission that Mr. Manago was on the premises but did not
enter'the unit, an idea consistently advanced to the jury, makes
the omission of the full definition of ‘building’ clearly
prejudicial to Mr. Manago." ‘The Circuit Court instructed the
jury that the state must prove all four elements of Burglary in
the First Degree beyond a reasonable doubt. In reaching its
guilty verdict, the jury determined that the state proved all
four elements of Burglary in the First Degree beyond a reasonable
doubt. The jury determined that Manago entered apartment 91, and
that apartment 91 was Viranontes and Delgado's dwelling. The
Cixcuit Court defined dwelling as a “building which ie used or
usually used by a person for lodging." Despite Manago's
arguments to the contrary, the jury could not have found Manago
guilty of Burglary in the First Degree based on his adnission

that he was on the premist

 

, but did not enter apartment 91.
Therefore, we are not persuaded by Manago's argument.

In sum, the Circuit Court's definition of "building"
was not erroneous. ‘The Circuit Court's definition of the term
and its Burglary in the First Degree instruction "adequately and
understandably apprised the jury of the law to be applied in its
deliberation(.J" State v. Lagat, 97 Hawai'i 492, 500, 40 P.34
894, 902 (2002).

(2) Manago argues that the DPA committed prosecutorial

misconduct by: (1) "introducing a speculative and prejudicial
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theory of the case for the first time during closing argument
that was not based on facts in evidence"; and (2) misstating the
definition of "building."

"in order to determine whether the alleged
prosecutorial misconduct reached the level of reversible error,
[appellate courts] consider the nature of the alleged misconduct,
the promptness or lack of a curative instruction, and the
strength or weakness of the evidence against defendant." state
MW Agrabante, 73 Haw. 179, 198, 830 P.24 492, 502 (1992)
(citation omitted). "Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are
reviewed under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard,
which requires an examination of the record and a determination
of ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error
complained of might have contributed to the conviction.'" state
vw. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 412, 984 P.2a 1231, 1238 (1999)
{citations omitted) .

During the State's closing argument, the following
exchange took place:

(DPA): Now, we have two different stories. the state
will eubmit ‘to you our theory of the cage. in thie trial, in
Ehis case, ve have three key players. We have defendant,
Bouglas Manago. We have natalie Woods. And we have
vizanontes!

 

Now, defendant and Natalie Woods, they had known each
other for'a long tine. They were dating. Obviously they care
for each other. (Virawontes) and Matalie, they knew each
Gther too. They vere friends. Ouviously {Viramontes) tikes
(Woods) ue Woods) as Using him for money. She kept
borrowiig money from hin. But maybe he wanted sore. Re
wanted sexual favors, or a relationship. Sut she didn't want
Ter She was upset.

0 what did she Go? she asked (Manago}, who didn't
know [Vixanontes), to go inaide to his piace, te burgiarize
his place, to take money.

(etense counsel]: objection. Facts not in evidence.
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WPA): Te'e argument.

Why? Because he knew [Viranontes) had a job. ie knew
where he lived. And he know he had money, boca
been borrowing noney from him. Now, if you eae ehat theory,

  
 

 

siii’sina chat it eite perfectly,

Manago argues that "the idea that Natalie Woods had put
Mr. Manago up to burglarizing the unit was never introduced in
testimony or exhibits. As such the defense had no opportunity to
adduce evidence or testimony to rebut the same." In response,
the State contends that "the evidence revealed that the [DPA's]
remarks were legitimate comments based upon the evidence and the
reasonable inference that could be drawn therefrom."

Closing argument is an opportunity for both parties to
"persuade the jury that ite theory of the case is valid, based
upon the evidence adduced and all reasonable inferences that can
be drawn therefrom." Rogan, 91 Hawai'i at 413, 984 P.2d at 1239
(citing State v. Quitog, 85 Hawai'i 128, 145, 93@ P.2d 559, 576
(1997)). During closing argument, it is "within the bounds of
legitimate argument for prosecutors to state, discuss, and
comment on the evidence as well as to draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence." State v, Clark, 83 Hawai'i 299,
304, 926 P.24 194, 209 (1996). The supreme court has recognized
that:

sAalthough a prosecutor has wide latitude in commenting on
the evidence during closing argument, it ie

Rie comments ave based on testimony ‘in
Gonmenta must also be ‘legitimste.'= TA pre
conmente are legitimate when they draw "rea
inferences fron the evidence." Finally, it se "generally
recognised under Hawai cage lav that prosecutors ave bound
fo retrain from expreasing their personal views a t0 a
defendant's guilt or the credibility of witnesses."

       

 
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State v. Tuya, 125 Hawai'i 10, 14, 250 P.34 273, 277 (2022)
(citations omitted) .

In determining whether an inference is reasonable, the
"most obvious consideration" is *[w)hether the evidence bears a
logical and proximate connection to the point the prosecutor
wishes to prove[.]" State v. Basham, 132 Hawai'i 97, 112, 319
P.34 1105, 1120 (2014) (citation omitted). ‘The pivotal issue at
trial was whether Manago entered 94-289 Leonui Street, apartment
91. Vixamontes testified that a male, later identified as
Manago, entered his apartment on April 10, 2012. Viramontes
testified that Woods was not at his apartment on April 10, 2012.
Woods testified that she was at the apartment and Manago did not
enter apartment 91. Manago also testified that he did not enter
apartment 91.

Based on Woods's testimony, the DPA could properly
infer that Woods was upset because Viramontes did not agree to
loan her money. Woods testified that she yelled at Viramontes
because he wanted sexual favors. The DPA's comment that Woods
asked Manago to “burglarize [Viramontes's] place, to take
toney[,]* appears to be a reasonable inference as to how the
events unfolded, based on Woods's testimony that Viramontee
refused to loan her money, as well as the other evidence
presented at trial. The DPA's comments were within the bounds of
legitimate argument, and “constituted permissible commentary on
the evidence." State v. Hauge, 103 Hawai'i 38, 54, 79 P.34 132,
247 (2003).
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As to the second Agrabante factor, the Circuit Court
did not provide a curative instruction despite Defense's
objection,

‘The third Agrabante factor requires consideration of
the weight of the evidence against Manago. As noted above,
Viramontes testified that a male entered his apartment on April
10, 2012. Viramontes testified that the long-sleeve t-shirt

covering the male's face became loose in the hallway. Viramontes

 

was able to see the male's face, but did not recognize him at
that time. At trial, Vixamontes identified Manago as the male
who entered his apartment on April 10, 2012. On the morning of
April 10, 2012, Harold Viernes (Viernes), who lived on Leonui
Street and was responsible for building maintenance, observed a
male, later identified as Manago, “looking up and down, 1ike
casing the place." In the afternoon, Viernes heard the tenant in

apartment 91 yell, "What are you doing here? Get the £.

 

out."
Viernes testified that the male told him "oh, that's just my
braddah. He just mad." Viernes noticed a long-sleeve t-shirt in
the male's hand. After the male left, Viernes testified that the
tenant in apartment 91 cane onto his balcony, and yelled "that £-
s-er just ripped me off. Break into my house." At trial,
Viernes identified Manago as the male he observed on April 10,
2012. Viramontes and Delgado testified that they did not give
Manago permission to enter their apartment. A stipulation
provided that Manago's DNA profile matched the DNA recovered from

the watch found inside apartment 91 and the DNA recovered from
 

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the glass jalousie louver of apartment 91. The weight of the
evidence against Manago ie strong.

Manago argues that a second instance of prosecutorial
misconduct occurred when the DPA defined ‘building’ in his
closing argument. The DPA stated:

Now, roow, vetze here for burglary in the pirt

Degree against defendant, Douglas Manago. duage told you
there are four elements in thie charge’

 

The first one being on or about April 10, 2012, on the
seland of Oahs, the defendant intentionally entered &
Daciding uniawéully.

 

heard that throughout the trial. It's not dvepuved. We a1
know that that's true: So what are we really Looking at?
Whether or not the defendant intentionally entered ehe
Building.

 

‘The State submits to you the state has proven beyond
reasonable doubt that it was intentional. Because, as you
saw, that the screen was cut, it wasn't anyone stumble into
the’ apartment. ‘Soneone went inside with a purpose. It wae
intentional. And that the fingerprint wae found

 

Second, it was a building. Well, using your common
sense you know that this was  buliding indeed.

And third, whether it wae unlawful, (Delgado) and
} told you that they didn't know [Manage]. And no
‘ver was given for him to go inside. Go it waa

 

‘The DPA's comment, when viewed in context, encouraged
the jurors to use their common sense in evaluating the evidence.
See, 2.9. State v. Sawer, 08 Hawai'i 225, 329 n.6, 966 P.2a
637, 641 n.6 (1996); gee State v. Nakoa, 72 Haw. 360, 371, 817
P.24 1060, 1066 (1991). Despite Manago's arguments to the
contrary, the DPA's comment did not "compound[] the anbiguity in
the Court's insufficient Jury Instructions with regard to the
definition of ‘building(.)'" As discussed above, the circuit
court properly instructed the jury that it must determine whether
the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Manago
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IC REPORTER

 

intentionally entered a building i.e., 94-289 Leonui street,
apartment 91, unlawfully; (2) he had the intent to comit therein
a crime against a person or property rights; (3) he recklessly
disregarded the risk that the building was the dwelling of
another; and (4) that the building was the dwelling of another.
‘The jury could not find Manago guilty of Burglary in the First
Degree simply based on his admission that he was on the premises,
but did not enter apartment 91. Therefore, we conclude the DPA's
comment was not improper.

‘There was no objection to the DPA's remark and, thus,
there was no curative instruction. As noted above, the evidence
against Manago was strong.

We conclude that there was no prosecutorial misconduct
in this case

(3) Manago argues that the Circuit court erred when it
neglected to rule on the Defense's objection during the exchange,
quoted above, concerning the State's theory of the case, i.e.,
that Woods asked Manago to burglarize Viramontes's apartment.

Manago argues that the “dismissive stance by the Court
in response to a legitimate objection substantially prejudiced
Mr, Manago by first lending credence to the prosecutions [sic]
Amproper statenent and then denigrating the defense while
elevating the prosecution." Although it is somewhat unclear, we
construe this to be an argument that the Circuit Court
Aisregarded its duty to "maintain the attitude and appearance of
impartiality." State v. Pokini, 55 Haw. 640, 645, 526 P.2d 94,
101 (1974). We conclude that Manago reads too much into a silent

u
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record and, upon review of the record of the Circuit Court.

 

conduct of the trial in thie case, that thie argument is wholly
without merit.

For these reasons, the Circuit Court's March 25, 2015
Judgment ie affixmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, May 18, 2016.
on the briefs

David A. Fanelli,
for Defendant-Appellant.

Donn Fudo,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
City and County of Honolulu,
for Plaintift-Appellee.

 

Associate Judge