Case Title: State v. Pittman

Citation: 2016-Ohio-8314

Docket Number: 2015-0077

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Pittman, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8314.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-8314 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. PITTMAN, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Pittman, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8314.] 
Criminal law—R.C. 2919.21(B)—Failure to provide support pursuant to a court’s 
order—No current obligation of support—A person is not subject to 
prosecution under statute for the nonpayment of a court’s order to pay a 
child-support arrearage when the person does not have a current obligation 
of support because the child has been emancipated. 
(No. 2015-0077—Submitted October 28, 2015—Decided December 23, 2016.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Marion County, No. 9-13-65, 
2014-Ohio-5001. 
_________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we hold that a person is not subject to prosecution under 
R.C. 2919.21(B) for the nonpayment of a court’s order to pay a child-support 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
arrearage when the person has no current obligation of support because the child 
who is the subject of the order is emancipated. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} In December 1988, the Marion County Common Pleas Court, 
Juvenile Division, ordered appellee, Robert Pittman, to pay child support for his 
two children, Sade and Sate Douglas, from January 6, 1989, until the children 
attained the age of 18 years and completed their high school education or were 
otherwise emancipated. 
{¶ 3} On November 20, 2006, the Marion County Common Pleas Court, 
Family Division, issued two judgment entries, one relating to Sade and the other 
relating to Sate, stating that the children were emancipated as of August 31, 2006, 
because they had turned 18 years old and were no longer in high school.  One entry 
declared that Pittman owed $34,313.45 in child support arrearages for Sade—
$33,730.14 to Alma Douglas, the children’s mother, and $583.31 to the Job & 
Family Services of Marion County Child Support Division for ODJFS—and 
granted each a judgment against Pittman in those respective amounts.  The entry 
stated that “all current child support shall cease effective 8/31/06,” but it ordered 
Pittman to pay $236.17 plus a two-percent processing fee per month toward the 
arrearages owed.  The judgment entry relating to Sate was substantially the same. 
{¶ 4} On December 6, 2007, the family court found Pittman in contempt for 
failing to pay his arrearages and sentenced him to 30 days in jail with 25 days 
suspended.  Approximately 18 months later, the court denied a motion to impose 
the prior sentence. 
{¶ 5} Next came the criminal charges that are the focus of this case.  The 
state charged Pittman with nonsupport of his dependents in the Marion County 
Court of Common Pleas.  On July 9, 2009, an indictment was handed down against 
Pittman containing nine counts related to his failure to pay the child support 
previously ordered.  Each count in the indictment addressed a specified two-year 
January Term, 2016 
 
3
period—July 1, 2003, through June 30, 2005 (Counts 1, 2, 7, 8, and 9), July 1, 2005, 
through June 30, 2007 (Counts 3 and 4), and July 1, 2007, through June 30, 2009 
(Counts 5 and 6)—and alleged that during those periods, Pittman “did recklessly 
abandon or fail to provide support as established by a court order to, another person 
whom, by court order to decree, the Defendant is legally obligated to support,” 
pursuant to R.C. 2919.21(B). 
{¶ 6} Counts 1 through 6 alleged fourth-degree felonies under R.C. 2919.21 
because Pittman had been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a previous felony 
violation of nonsupport under R.C. 2919.21 on April 3, 2003.  Counts 7 through 9 
alleged fifth-degree felonies because Pittman had failed to provide support for more 
than 26 of 104 consecutive weeks.  Thus, Pittman was indicted for six fourth-degree 
felonies and three fifth-degree felonies. 
{¶ 7} The 2009 indictment was not served on Pittman until he voluntarily 
appeared before the court on June 11, 2013.  On July 29, 2013, Pittman filed a 
motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the state had violated his 
constitutional rights to due process of law and a speedy trial in delaying nearly four 
years before serving the indictment.  At an August 20 hearing, the motion to dismiss 
was orally amended to also seek dismissal because the six-year statute of limitations 
for felonies set forth in R.C. 2901.13(A)(1) had run.  The trial court held that the 
prosecution did not commence until July 11, 2013, and that “due diligence was not 
exercised in issuing and executing process on the indictment.”  Thus, the court held 
that Counts 1, 2, 7, 8, and 9 were barred by the statute of limitations because they 
alleged criminal conduct that occurred between 2003 and 2005, more than six years 
before Pittman was served with the indictment.  Counts 3 and 4 alleged criminal 
conduct that occurred between July 1, 2005, and June 30, 2007, and the court held 
that any “criminal conduct which occurred prior to June 11, 2007,” i.e., six years 
prior to the service of the indictment, also fell outside the statute of limitations. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
{¶ 8} Further, the court held that the nearly four-year delay in serving the 
indictment violated Pittman’s speedy-trial rights as to all counts but Counts 5 and 
6.  Counts 5 and 6 alleged that Pittman had engaged in illegal activity between July 
1, 2007, and June 30, 2009.  The court distinguished Counts 5 and 6 from the older 
counts because the delay was not as long, some civil enforcement action occurred 
in December 2007, and the likelihood of prejudice was less with respect to the more 
recent allegations. 
{¶ 9} On September 24, 2013, Pittman moved to dismiss those remaining 
counts.  He argued that because his daughters were emancipated as of August 31, 
2006, he had no duty to provide support to them after that date.  Thus, he was not 
legally obligated to pay support from July 1, 2007, through June 30, 2009, as 
alleged in Counts 5 and 6. 
{¶ 10} On October 16, 2013, the state filed a bill of particulars clarifying 
the nature of the offenses in Counts 5 and 6.  The state indicated that the charges 
were based on Pittman’s failure to provide support pursuant to the November 20, 
2006 orders, which determined that the children were emancipated and calculated 
the amount of Pittman’s arrearage.  The state also indicated that Count 5 alleged 
that Pittman had failed to provide support as established by a court order to Alma 
Douglas for Sate Douglas and Count 6 alleged that he failed to provide support as 
established by a court order to Alma Douglas for Sade Douglas.  Finally, the state 
alleged that Pittman failed to provide support for 101 weeks of the 104 consecutive 
weeks between July 1, 2007, and June 30, 2009. 
{¶ 11} The parties stipulated to the relevant facts and in a November 5, 2013 
hearing, submitted to the court the question of whether R.C. 2919.21(B) 
criminalizes the failure to pay an arrearage-only order. 
{¶ 12} On November 14, 2013, the trial court granted Pittman’s motion to 
dismiss. 
 
January Term, 2016 
 
5
With regard to R.C. 2919.21(B), some meaning must be 
given to the phrase “to another person whom * * * the person is 
legally obligated to support.”  The State’s interpretation would 
restrict the statute to the initial phrase, which provides: “No person 
shall abandon, or fail to support as established by a court order.”  
The additional meaning provided by the phrase, “to another person 
whom, by court order or decree, the person is legally obligated to 
support” is that at the time of the commission of the criminal offense 
there must be a current obligation of support. 
 
 
(Emphasis sic.)   
{¶ 13} The state appealed.  The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed 
the judgment of the trial court, holding that R.C. 2919.21 is unambiguous.  The 
court noted that the statute uses the present tense and concluded that “[s]ince 
Pittman's daughters are emancipated, he was under no current legal obligation to 
support his children at the time the State filed its indictment.”  2014-Ohio-5001, 21 
N.E.3d 1118, ¶ 19 (3rd Dist.). 
{¶ 14} The Third District found unpersuasive a decision of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeals in State v. Dissinger, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 02CA–A–02–010, 
2002-Ohio-5301 (5th Dist.), holding that an arrearage-only order “can be the basis 
of a prosecution under R.C. 2919.21.”  Id. at ¶ 12. 
{¶ 15} Upon the state’s motion, the appellate court certified that its decision 
was in conflict with Dissinger.  This court determined that a conflict exists and 
ordered briefing on this issue as stated by the court of appeals: “Is a person subject 
to prosecution under R.C. 2919.21(B) for the nonpayment of an arrearage-only 
child support order when he or she has no current legal obligation to support the 
emancipated child?”  See 141 Ohio St.3d 1487, 2015-Ohio-842, 26 N.E.3d 823. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
{¶ 16} We address whether, pursuant to R.C. 2919.21(B), the state may 
prosecute a person who failed to make the payments set forth in an arrearage-only 
order issued after the date of his children’s emancipation.  R.C. 2919.21(B) reads, 
“No person shall abandon, or fail to provide support as established by a court order 
to, another person whom, by court order or decree, the person is legally obligated 
to support.” 
{¶ 17} “Our first duty in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the 
statute is clear and unambiguous.” Estate of Heintzelman v. Air Experts, Inc., 126 
Ohio St.3d 138, 2010-Ohio-3264, 931 N.E.2d 548, ¶ 15. We examine the words 
used by the General Assembly in the statute, “and when the General Assembly has 
plainly and unambiguously conveyed its legislative intent, there is nothing for a 
court to interpret or construe, and therefore, the court applies the law as written.”  
State v. Kreischer, 109 Ohio St.3d 391, 2006-Ohio-2706, 848 N.E.2d 496, syllabus.  
Words and phrases in the statute must be read in context and accorded their 
common usage. R.C. 1.42. 
{¶ 18} R.C. 2919.21(B) is unambiguous.  It criminalizes a person’s failure 
to support—in the manner established by a court order—another person whom he 
is legally obligated to support.  Because the statute uses the present tense in the 
phrase “is legally obligated to support,” a person charged with a violation must be 
under a current obligation to provide support. 
{¶ 19} In 1988, Pittman was ordered to pay child support for Sade and Sate 
until their emancipation.  But Pittman’s criminal liability for nonpayment of 
support ended on August 31, 2006, when his children were emancipated.  Counts 5 
and 6 of the indictment alleged that Pittman violated R.C. 2919.21(B) between July 
1, 2007, and June 30, 2009, but Pittman was not under a court order to support his 
children during that time.  The 2006 orders were not for support but instead granted 
judgments against Pittman for the arrearage amounts. 
January Term, 2016 
 
7
{¶ 20} The state had ample opportunity to pursue criminal charges against 
Pittman.  Because the alleged violations of R.C. 2919.21(B) for his failure to meet 
his obligations under the 1988 orders were felonies, the applicable statute of 
limitations was six years.  But the state cannot, in effect, extend the statute of 
limitations indefinitely by memorializing in an arrearage order the previous failure 
to provide support and then seeking criminal charges on the arrearage order.  The 
state is left to its civil options. 
{¶ 21} The decision of the court below was in conflict with the Fifth 
District’s decision in Dissinger.  We address that decision briefly.  In that case, the 
court based its decision on the definition of “child support order” in former R.C. 
3115.01(B), S.B. No. 180, 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 9782, and Part V, 10035.  That 
definition includes arrearages:  
 
(B) "Child support order" means an order for the support of 
a child that provides for monetary support, whether current or in 
arrears * * *.  “Child support order” includes: 
(1) An order under which the child has attained the age of 
majority under the law of the issuing state and amounts for current 
support are required to be paid, or arrearages are owed, under the 
order. 
 
In Dissinger, the court concluded that “[b]ased upon the legislature's definition of 
‘child support order’ under R.C. 3115.01(B), * * * a support order includes an 
‘arrearage only’ order.  Therefore, an [‘]arrearage only’ order can be the basis of a 
prosecution under R.C. 2919.21.” Dissinger, 2002-Ohio-5301, at ¶ 12.  However, 
the definitions found in former R.C. 3115.01(B) were limited to the use of the 
defined words in former R.C. 3115.01 through 3115.59, the Uniform Interstate 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
Family Support Act.  The definition of “child support order,” by the terms of the 
defining statute, was not applicable to R.C. 2919.21(B). 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 22} In this certified-conflict case, we ordered briefing on the following 
question: “Is a person subject to prosecution under R.C. 2919.21(B) for the 
nonpayment of an arrearage-only child support order when he or she has no current 
legal obligation to support the emancipated child?”  We answer that question in the 
negative. 
{¶ 23} We hold that Pittman was not subject to prosecution under R.C. 
2919.21(B) for his failure to make payments on the child-support arrearage 
established in the 2006 order when he had no current legal obligation to support his 
emancipated children.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, J. 
_________________ 
LANZINGER, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 24} While I concur in the judgment in this case, I write separately to note 
that prosecution under R.C. 2919.21 for the nonpayment of child support after a 
child reaches 18 years old is not prohibited in every case.  On this point, I 
respectfully disagree with the court’s analysis.  Nevertheless, I agree with the 
majority that criminal prosecution in this case fails because the state did not 
exercise due diligence in issuing and executing process on the indictment against 
Pittman. 
{¶ 25} It is undisputed that Pittman was legally obligated to pay child 
support for his two daughters, who were born August 31, 1988, until they turned 
January Term, 2016 
 
9
18 years old in 2006.  And there is no argument that over $68,000 is still owed to 
Alma Douglas, the children’s mother, for child-support arrearages. 
{¶ 26} R.C. 2919.21(B), the section Pittman was charged with violating, 
states, “No person shall abandon, or fail to provide support as established by a court 
order to, another person whom, by court order or decree, the person is legally 
obligated to support.”  (Emphasis added.)  I can accept that this language limits 
prosecutions based on child-support orders to those with current obligations rather 
than arrearages.  But I disagree with the statement that “Pittman’s criminal liability 
for nonpayment of support ended on August 31, 2006, when his children were 
emancipated.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 19. 
{¶ 27} R.C.  2919.21(A)(2) provides, “No person shall abandon, or fail to 
provide adequate support to * * * [t]he person’s child who is under age eighteen, 
or mentally or physically handicapped child who is under age twenty-one.”  
Violation of this section is a first-degree misdemeanor or, depending upon previous 
similar convictions, a felony of the fifth or fourth degree.  R.C. 2919.21(G)(1).  The 
six- year statute of limitations for a felony did not expire in Pittman’s situation until 
August 2012.  If the state had properly brought a criminal action within that time 
under R.C. 2929.21(A), the court order could have been used as evidence of the 
nonsupport of his daughters, even though they were beyond the age of majority. 
{¶ 28} Finally, it should be noted that Alma Douglas has her rights under 
R.C. Chapter 3123 to a civil remedy.  What has been foreclosed here is criminal 
prosecution. 
{¶ 29} For these reasons, I concur only in the court’s decision to affirm the 
judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
Brent W. Yager, Marion County Prosecuting Attorney, and Megan K. 
Frericks, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
 
Rocky Ratliff and Jeff Ratliff, for appellee. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, 
Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, Hannah C. Wilson, Deputy 
Solicitor, and Jeffrey Jarosch, Assistant Attorney General, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General. 
_________________