Case Title: Shafer v. TNT Well Serv., Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0258

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-09-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
RODNEY SHAFER, individually and d/b/a/ RENO TRANSPORT, and BRENDA SHAFER v. TNT WELL SERVICE, INC.2012 WY 126Case Number: S-11-0258Decided: 09/26/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction can be made before final publication in the permanent volume. 
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2012 

RODNEY SHAFER, 
individually and d/b/a RENO TRANSPORT, and BRENDA SHAFER,
 
Appellants
(Plaintiffs),
 
v.
 
TNT WELL SERVICE, 
INC.,
 
Appellee
(Defendant).
 
Appeal from the 
District Court of Weston County
The Honorable Michael 
N. Deegan, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellants:
Brian J. Marvel and 
Ryan J. Schwartz, Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. Schwartz.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Terry 
L. Armitage and Curtis B. Buchhammer, Buchhammer 
& Kehl, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Armitage.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Appellant, Rodney 
Shafer, was injured when his tractor-trailer collided with a pickup owned by 
Appellee, TNT Well Service, Inc. (“TNT”), and driven by Melvin Clyde. 
 Mr. Shafer and his wife, Brenda, brought suit against TNT, 
asserting theories of negligence and vicarious liability for damages resulting 
from the accident.  The district court granted summary 
judgment to TNT on all of the Shafers’ claims.  
The Shafers challenge that decision in this 
appeal.  We reverse.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]        
The parties raise the 
following issues:
 
1.    
Did the district 
court properly determine there was no genuine issue of material fact that Mr. 
Clyde’s employment with TNT Well Service, Inc. was terminated prior to the 
accident?
 
2.    
Should this Court 
adopt the duty recognized in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 and, if so, 
whether a duty of reasonable care can be imposed on the Appellee 
under the facts of this case?
 
3.    
Did the district 
court properly determine that the entrustment of a vehicle to Mr. Clyde was 
terminated prior to the accident and, if not, is there a genuine issue as to 
whether the entrustment was negligent?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
Mr. Clyde was hired 
as a rig operator by TNT in early 2008.  In order to perform 
his duties, Mr. Clyde was required to travel to various well sites within 
approximately 100 miles of Gillette, Wyoming.  He was provided 
with a TNT pickup, which he also used to travel to and from his home in Upton. 
 
 
[¶4]        
On February 12, 2009, 
at approximately 5:30 p.m., Mr. Clyde was driving to Newcastle, Wyoming in the 
TNT pickup when it crossed the centerline of Highway 16 and collided head-on 
with Mr. Shafer’s tractor-trailer.  Mr. Clyde was pronounced 
dead at the scene.  A post-accident blood test revealed the 
presence of controlled substances in his blood.  Mr. Shafer 
was injured in the collision, and his tractor-trailer was damaged beyond 
repair.
 
[¶5]        
The Shafers 
brought suit against TNT claiming that (1) TNT was vicariously liable for Mr. 
Clyde’s negligence under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior, (2) TNT was negligent in hiring and supervising Mr. Clyde, and (3) 
TNT was negligent in entrusting a company vehicle to Mr. Clyde.  
Following discovery, TNT filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming 
that Mr. Clyde was not employed by TNT at the time of the accident. 
 TNT asserted that Mr. Clyde’s employment had been terminated 
“at least one hour before the subject collision occurred.”  
TNT also claimed that it could not be vicariously liable for Mr. Shafer’s 
damages because Mr. Clyde was not acting within the course and scope of his 
employment at the time of the accident. 
 
[¶6]        
The district court 
granted TNT’s motion for summary judgment on all of the Shafers’ claims. 
 With regard to the respondeat 
superior claim, the court concluded that there was no genuine issue as to 
whether Mr. Clyde’s employment had been terminated prior to the accident. 
 Additionally, after finding that “it is undisputed that Mr. 
Clyde was traveling in a direction in which his employer conducted no business, 
outside of working hours, on a day he had been absent from work and after he had 
been informed someone from the company was coming to collect the truck and he 
was to leave the truck in Upton,” the court held that “even if an 
employer-employee relationship had existed between Mr. Clyde and TNT at the time 
of the accident, the undisputed facts would lead to only one reasonable 
inference – Mr. Clyde had deviated from the course and scope of his employment 
and was upon a personal errand when the accident occurred.”
 
[¶7]        
The district court 
also granted summary judgment on the Shafers’ direct liability claims. 
With respect to the Shafers’ claim of negligent supervision, the court 
concluded that summary judgment was appropriate because no employment 
relationship existed at the time of the accident.  Similarly, 
the court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate on the Shafers’ 
negligent entrustment claim because Mr. Clyde’s authorization to use the TNT 
pickup terminated concurrently with the termination of his 
employment.  The Shafers filed a timely 
appeal.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶8]        
Motions for summary 
judgment are governed by W.R.C.P. 56(c), which provides that “The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.”  We apply the following standard of review to the 
decision to grant summary judgment:
 
We treat the summary 
judgment movant’s motion as though it has been presented originally 
to us. We use the same materials in the record that was before the district 
court. Using the materials in the record, we examine them from the vantage point 
most favorable to the nonmoving party opposing the motion, giving that party the 
benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
materials. . . . If doubt exists about the presence of genuine issues of 
material fact after we have reviewed the record, we resolve that doubt against 
the movant. 
 
Lamar Outdoor 
Adver. v. Farmers Co-Op Oil Co., 2009 WY 112, ¶ 10, 
215 P.3d 296, 300 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting Bangs v. 
Schroth, 2009 WY 20, ¶ 20, 201 P.3d 442, 452 (Wyo. 2009)) 
(internal citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
 
[¶9]        
The district court 
granted summary judgment after determining there was no genuine issue as to 
whether Mr. Clyde’s employment with TNT had been terminated prior to the 
collision with Mr. Shafer’s vehicle.  The Shafers 
contend that Mr. Clyde’s employment had not been terminated prior to the 
accident.  The Shafers 
do not, however, challenge the district court’s conclusion that Mr. Clyde was 
not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the 
accident in this case, and, accordingly, they do not pursue their claim for 
recovery under a respondeat superior theory of 
vicarious liability.  Rather, Appellants assert that TNT is 
directly liable, first, based on a duty to supervise Mr. Clyde’s use of the TNT 
vehicle, founded in Restatement (Second) Torts § 317, and second, under a theory 
of negligent entrustment.  The Shafers assert that 
these claims are viable despite the fact that an employee acts outside the scope 
of his employment when harm is caused.  We examine the 
appropriateness of summary judgment on each of these theories in turn, focusing 
on whether the Shafers have raised a genuine issue with respect to 
each of the elements of their respective claims.
 
I.      
Negligent 
Supervision
 
[¶10]     
The Shafers 
contend that TNT is subject to direct liability for its own negligence in 
failing to adequately supervise Mr. Clyde.  Relying on 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317, the Shafers urge this Court to 
hold that TNT is directly liable for failing to exercise due care when Mr. Clyde 
was acting outside the scope of his employment.  Section 317 
provides as follows: 
 
            
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to 
control his servant while acting outside the scope of his 
employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or from 
so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, 
if  
 
(a) the 
servant          

(i) is 
upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the servant is 
privileged to enter only as his servant, or
(ii) is 
using a chattel of the master, 
and            

(b) the 
master           

(i) knows 
or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his servant, 
and       
(ii) knows or 
should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such 
control.
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Unlike a claim of respondeat 
superior, a negligent supervision claim under Section 317 is not based on 
imputed or vicarious liability, but rather on the employer’s own negligence in 
failing to exercise due care to protect third parties from the 
foreseeable tortious acts of an employee.  
E.g., Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 
14 P.3d 1074, 1080 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000).  
Essentially, the Shafers contend that TNT is an “actor” whose 
fault must be apportioned along with the fault of all other actors in this case 
pursuant to Wyoming’s system of comparative fault, set forth at Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-1-109 (LexisNexis 2011).
 
[¶11]     
In Killian 
v. Caza Drilling, Inc., 2006 WY 42, ¶¶ 28 n.5, 32, 
131 P.3d 975, 987 n.5, 988 (Wyo. 2006), we acknowledged that 
“imposition of employer liability for employee negligence has been recognized 
under [Section 317],” but we did not adopt or reject the duty because we 
determined that it was not applicable to the facts of that case. 
 In keeping with our approach in Killian, before we 
determine whether to recognize a duty of reasonable care under the specific 
circumstances identified in Section 317, we first consider whether those 
circumstances are present in this case.  Our initial task is 
to determine whether TNT has demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue as to 
the existence of each of the elements set forth in Section 317.
 
A.   
Termination of Mr. 
Clyde’s Employment
 
[¶12]     
Because Section 317 
assumes the existence of an employment relationship as a predicate to liability, 
we first examine whether Mr. Clyde was a TNT employee when the harm in this case 
occurred.  It is undisputed that Mr. Clyde was hired by TNT in 
2008 and had worked for TNT for approximately one year before the accident 
occurred.  It is also undisputed that TNT provided a pickup to 
Mr. Clyde.  TNT contends, however, that Mr. Clyde’s employment 
was terminated in a phone conversation initiated by Damion Black, 
Mr. Clyde’s supervisor, on the day of the accident.  In 
support of this claim in its motion for summary judgment, TNT presented 
deposition testimony from Mr. Black, as well as Tim Greene, TNT’s owner and 
president, and Christina Greene, a former secretary at TNT. 
 Each stated that Mr. Clyde’s employment had been terminated 
prior to the accident.
 
[¶13]     
The Shafers, 
however, contend that the testimony of these witnesses is not 
credible.  They point to inconsistencies in and among the 
testimonies of Mr. Greene, Mr. Black, and Ms. Greene, as well as to the 
testimony of Christina Anfinson, Mr. Clyde’s fiancée prior to the 
accident.  The Shafers assert that the testimony 
of the TNT witnesses was a “post-hoc fabrication” made to avoid liability for 
the harm caused by Mr. Clyde.  We conclude that 
the Shafers raise an issue of credibility that is supported by 
specific facts and evidence, and which should be reserved for consideration by 
the trier of fact.  
 
[¶14]     
In articulating the 
proper standard for summary judgment in a negligence case, we have often stated 
that “Summary judgment is not favored in a negligence action and is, 
therefore, subject to more exacting scrutiny. We have, however, affirmed summary 
judgment in negligence cases where the record failed to establish the existence 
of a genuine issue of material fact.”  Cook v. Shoshone 
First Bank, 2006 WY 13, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo. 2006) 
(quoting Jones v. Schabron, 2005 WY 65, ¶ 9, 113 P.3d 34, 37 (Wyo. 2005)). We have also stated that a motion for summary 
judgment “should be sustained in the absence of a real and material fact issue 
considering movant’s burden, respondent’s right to the benefit of 
all favorable inferences and any reasonable doubt, with credibility 
questions to be resolved by 
trial.”  Eathorne 
v. Bd. of Trustees of the Mem’l Hosp., 2001 WY 36, 
¶ 6, 21 P.3d 745, 748 (Wyo. 2001) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 640 (Wyo. 
1986)); see also Bodily v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & 
Comp. Div. (In re Worker’s Comp. Claim of Bodily), 2011 WY 149, 
¶ 16, 265 P.3d 995, 1000 (Wyo. 2011) (holding that the Office of 
Administrative hearings “erroneously strayed from its function at the summary 
judgment stage to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact as to 
causation existed” and “erroneously engaged in weighing all the evidence and 
making credibility determinations”).  Indeed, we have 
consistently held that it is the factfinder’s duty to assess the 
credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence.  See 
Shaw Constr., LLC v. Rocky Mt. Hardware, Inc., 2012 WY 60, ¶ 19, 
275 P.3d 1238, 1243 (Wyo. 2012); In re Campbell County, 
731 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Wyo. 1987).  

 
[¶15]     
We find that the 
record reveals specific facts and 
evidence which undermine the credibility of Mr. Greene, Mr. Black, and Ms. 
Greene, and could influence the factfinder’s assessment of their 
testimony.  Mr. Greene testified that he attempted to contact 
Mr. Clyde several hours before the accident to inform him that his employment 
was terminated, but stated that he did not personally speak with him at any time 
prior to the collision.  He stated that, after unsuccessfully 
trying to reach Mr. Clyde, he told Mr. Black to contact him. 
 According to Mr. Greene, Mr. Clyde’s employment was 
terminated pursuant to a TNT policy providing that any employee with a “one-time 
no call, no show” incident would be discharged.  Mr. Greene 
acknowledged, however, that Mr. Clyde had not been terminated when he did not 
appear at work on February 10, two days prior to the accident, and stated that 
he could not recall the reason for Mr. Clyde’s absence from work on that day. 
 Further, TNT did not produce any documentation indicating 
that it had a “one-time no call, no show” termination policy.
 
[¶16]     
Mr. Black also 
testified that Mr. Clyde’s employment had been terminated on the day of the 
accident.  His testimony, however, was also 
contradicted.  Mr. Black stated that he called Mr. Clyde and 
told him that his employment was terminated because he had not been to work that 
day.  According to Ms. Anfinson, however, she had been 
at home cleaning from 8:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., and, although Mr. Clyde was also 
at home, his phone never rang.  Indeed, she testified that Mr. 
Clyde called Mr. Black around 3:00 p.m. on the day of the accident and requested 
a few days off to work on his house in Upton.  She stated that 
“They [Mr. Greene and Mr. Black] never called [Mr. Clyde] until he called 
them.”  Further, neither party produced any phone records and 
there is nothing in TNT’s employment records reflecting that Mr. Clyde’s 
employment had been terminated prior to the collision.
 
[¶17]     
The testimony of Mr. 
Greene and Mr. Black was further contradicted by the testimony of Ms. Greene. 
 Although Mr. Greene and Mr. Black both indicated that they 
had called Mr. Clyde on the day of the accident, and that the decision to 
terminate Mr. Clyde’s employment had been made several hours before the 
collision, Ms. Greene testified that neither herself, nor Mr. Black or Mr. 
Greene, had spoken to Mr. Clyde on February 10, 11, or 12, but that the decision 
to fire Mr. Clyde had been made on the night of February 11, prior to Mr. 
Clyde’s absence on February 12.  The testimony relating to Mr. 
Clyde’s termination was also undermined by the fact that Mr. Clyde was listed as 
a TNT employee on the highway patrol accident report, even though Mr. Black had 
arrived at the scene after the accident and had spoken to the investigating 
officer at that time. 
 
[¶18]     
Finally, a more 
general credibility issue was raised in the testimony relating to TNT’s drug 
testing policies.  Ms. Greene testified that she had been 
responsible for coordinating a drug testing program for TNT through Occupational 
Testing, Inc., and unequivocally stated that TNT did not require prospective 
employees to submit to a pre-employment drug test.  Mr. 
Greene, however, testified that “When each employee is hired they’re taken down 
for a urine test. . . . And if they fail the test, or it’s inconclusive, they’re 
not hired at TNT Well Service.”  He stated that Mr. Clyde had 
submitted to a drug test prior to his employment.  Further, 
TNT asserted in its Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment that “The 
records from Occupational Testing, Inc. in Gillette, Wyoming indicate that 
Clyde’s pre[-]employment urinalysis was negative.  See 
Exhibit 'G’ attached hereto.  In other words, the urinalysis 
revealed that Clyde did not have any controlled substances in his system as of 
the date of hire.”  The exhibit referenced by TNT, however, is 
a drug test conducted for a different employer, approximately eight months prior 
to Mr. Clyde’s employment with TNT.1
 
[¶19]     
In sum, 
the Shafers have raised credibility issues with respect to TNT’s 
reason for terminating Mr. Clyde’s employment, the circumstances and content of 
the phone conversation between Mr. Clyde and Mr. Black on the day of the 
accident and alleged termination, documentation of Mr. Clyde’s employment 
status, and whether Mr. Black indicated to the responding officer at the scene 
of the accident that Mr. Clyde was a TNT employee.  Viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Shafers, and reserving 
the necessary credibility determinations for the trier of fact, we 
find the Shafers have raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether 
Mr. Clyde’s employment had been terminated prior to the accident at issue in 
this case.
 
B.   
Ability and Necessity 
to Exercise Control
 
[¶20]     
The district court’s 
analysis ended with its consideration of whether Mr. Clyde was employed by TNT 
at the time of the accident.  However, because we evaluate 
TNT’s motion for summary judgment as if it were presented originally to us, we 
proceed to determine whether the Shafers have established a 
genuine issue of material fact with respect to the remaining elements of Section 
317.  We note first that it is undisputed that Mr. Clyde was 
using TNT’s vehicle at the time of the accident, which satisfies the first prong 
of Section 317.  Under the second prong of Section 317, 
a plaintiff must show that the employer (i) knows or has reason to 
know that he has the ability to control his servant, and (ii) knows or should 
know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.  
We examine each of these elements in turn.
 
[¶21]     
With regard to an 
employer’s “ability to control” its employee, the Supreme Court of Illinois has 
noted that 
 
[T]he term “control” 
is used in section 317 “in a very real sense.” 43 Yale L.J. at 891. 
Under section 317, “the essential basis of liability [is] the practical 
opportunity for effective control arising from the general master-servant 
relationship and from the connection between the dangerous conduct and the 
employment.” (Emphasis added.) F. James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 778, 812 n.183 (1953).
Hills v. 
Bridgeview Little League Ass’n, 745 N.E.2d 1166, 1185 
(Ill. 2000) (emphasis in original).  We note that neither 
party introduced evidence to suggest that Mr. Clyde had independent authority to 
determine his employment responsibilities.  On the contrary, 
the evidence presented suggests that Mr. Clyde’s duties were prescribed and 
controlled by Mr. Black and Mr. Greene.  The evidence 
introduced by the Shafers was sufficient to raise a genuine issue as 
to whether Mr. Black, as Mr. Clyde’s supervisor, and certainly Mr. Greene, as 
the owner and president of TNT, had knowledge of their ability to control Mr. 
Clyde and his use of the TNT vehicle.
 
[¶22]     
We also conclude that 
the Shafers have raised a genuine issue as to whether TNT knew or 
should have known of the necessity and opportunity for exercising control over 
Mr. Clyde.  Ms. Greene testified that “DUIs . . . are a 
huge concern” in assessing the fitness of a TNT employee, and that “we shouldn’t 
hire anybody with a DUI.”  Although the testimony of Mr. and 
Ms. Greene indicates that TNT tested its employees for drug use, their 
testimonies diverge with respect to the character of TNT’s drug-testing program 
and whether Mr. Clyde was tested at the time he was hired.  
Although Mr. Greene stated that every prospective employee must pass a 
drug test as a condition of employment at TNT, and that Mr. Clyde had done so, 
Ms. Greene testified that employees were not subject to a pre-employment drug 
test, and that Mr. Clyde had not been tested.  

 
[¶23]     
Although Ms. Greene 
became aware that Mr. Clyde was on probation after he was hired, she did not 
make an inquiry as to the offense giving rise to Mr. Clyde’s 
probation.  In the proceedings below, the Shafers 
produced documentary evidence indicating that, prior to his employment with TNT, 
Mr. Clyde had received two DUI convictions; one in 1999 and another in 
2000.  He had also been convicted of possession of a 
controlled substance in 2005.  This evidence indicates that 
Mr. Clyde had a history of substance abuse issues and calls into question his 
fitness as a TNT employee.  Despite the fact that Mr. Clyde’s 
DUI convictions were several years old, it is the responsibility of 
the factfinder to determine whether those convictions could give 
rise to knowledge of the necessity of exercising control over Mr. Clyde’s use of 
the TNT vehicle.  In light of Ms. Greene’s testimony that 
“DUIs . . . are a huge concern” and that TNT “shouldn’t hire anybody with 
a DUI”; the Greenes’ apparent agreement that a drug-testing policy was 
prudent; and the character of Mr. Clyde’s prior criminal offenses, we find 
the Shafers have raised a genuine issue with regard to whether TNT 
should have known of the necessity of controlling Mr. Clyde’s use of a company 
vehicle. 
 
C.   
Duty to Exercise 
Reasonable Care Under § 317
 
[¶24]     
As the discussion 
above indicates, the Shafers have raised a genuine issue with 
respect to each of the elements identified in Section 317.  
Because we have concluded that the duty is applicable to the facts of the 
present case, our next task is to consider whether this duty should be 
recognized in Wyoming.  Whether a legal duty exists is a 
question of law.  Killian, ¶ 8, 131 P.3d  at 
979.  As noted in Killian, 
 
            
Duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum 
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the 
plaintiff is entitled to protection. . . . A duty may arise by contract, 
statute, common law, or when the relationship of the parties is such that the 
law imposes an obligation on the defendant to act reasonably for the protection 
of the plaintiff. The legal question to be answered by the court is
 
[w]hether, 
upon the facts in evidence, such a relation exists between the parties that the 
community will impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the other - 
or, more simply, whether the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered 
invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the defendant. This is 
entirely a question of law, to be determined by reference to the body of 
statutes, rules, principles and precedents which make up the law; and it must be 
determined only by the court.
 
Id., ¶ 8, 
131 P.3d  at 979-80 (quoting Borns ex rel. 
Gannon v. Voss, 2003 WY 74, ¶ 30, 70 P.3d 262, 273 (Wyo. 2003)) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
 
[¶25]     
Generally, in 
determining whether a duty exists, we employ the factors set forth in Gates 
v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 196 (Wyo. 1986), including 
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the closeness of the 
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, and the 
consequences to the community and the court system.  In this 
case, however, we need only return to the original inquiry of whether the 
relationship between these parties is such that “the community will impose a 
legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the other.”  In 
Killian, we noted that the law “generally recognizes” that liability may 
be imposed when an employee “is acting outside the scope of his employment but 
is on the employer’s premises or is using the chattel of the employer and the 
employer knows or has reason to know that it has the ability and opportunity to 
control the employee pursuant to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
317.”  Id., ¶ 28, 131 P.3d  at 
987.  Consistent with the statement in Killian, 
our research confirms that the question of “whether the interest of the 
plaintiff which has suffered invasion [is] entitled to legal protection at the 
hands of the defendant” has been answered affirmatively in the great majority of 
jurisdictions that have considered whether to impose the duty identified in 
Section 317.  See, e.g., Svacke v. Shelley, 
359 P.2d 127, 131 (Alaska 1961); Keller v. Koca, 
111 P.3d 445, 448-49 (Colo. 2005); Murdock v. 
Croughwell, 848 A.2d 363, 369 (Conn. 
2004); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 361-62 (Fla. 2002); Wong-Leong v. Hawaiian Indep. Refinery, 
879 P.2d 538, 550 (Haw. 1994); Rausch, 14 P.3d  at 
1080; Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass’n, 
745 N.E.2d 1166, 1180-81 (Ill. 2000); Sandage 
v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 897 N.E.2d 507, 511-12 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2008); D.W. v. Bliss, 112 P.3d 232, 239 
(Kan. 2004); Dragomir v. Spring Harbor Hosp., 
970 A.2d 310, 315 (Me. 2009); Farr v. Cambridge Co-operative Oil 
Co., 81 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Neb. 1957); Trahan-Laroche v. 
Lockheed Sanders, 657 A.2d 417, 419 (N.H. 1995); 
Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 515 (N.J. 1982); 
Ford v. Grand Union Co., 197 N.E. 266, 270-71 (N.Y. 1935); 
Nelson v. Gillette, 571 N.W.2d 332, 340-41 (N.D. 
1997); Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 
575 N.E.2d 428, 432 (Ohio 1991); Dempsey 
v. Walso Bureau, Inc., 246 A.2d 418, 420-22 (Pa. 
1968); Degenhart v. Knights of Columbus, 
420 S.E.2d 495, 496 (S.C. 1992); Kirlin v. 
Halverson, 758 N.W.2d 436, 449-51 (S.D. 2008); Kelsey-Seybold 
Clinic v. MacLay, 466 S.W.2d 716, 720 (Tex. 1971); 
Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387, 1392 (Utah 1995); 
Bradley v. H.A. Manosh Corp., 
601 A.2d 978, 981 (Vt. 1991); Niece v. Elmview Group 
Home, 929 P.2d 420, 427 (Wash. 1997).  

 
[¶26]     
We find no reason to 
depart from the conclusions reached in these jurisdictions as to whether 
societal norms impose a duty upon an employer to exercise reasonable care for 
the benefit of third parties in supervising employees while on the employer’s 
premises or using the employer’s chattel.  Further, we are 
satisfied that the policy considerations relevant to imposition of a duty are 
weighted in favor of recognizing an employer’s duty to supervise its employees 
as set forth in Section 317.  Accordingly, we agree with 
the Shafers that an employer’s failure to supervise an employee 
using an employer’s chattel while acting outside the scope of his employment 
gives rise to the potential for liability.  Because 
the Shafers have demonstrated a genuine issue as to the existence of 
each of the elements identified in Section 317, we reverse the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment with respect to the Shafers’ claim of negligent 
supervision.
 
II.    
Negligent 
Entrustment
 
[¶27]     
The Shafers 
also contend that TNT was negligent in entrusting the vehicle to 
Mr. Clyde.  We explained the theory of negligent 
entrustment in Moore v. Kiljander, 604 P.2d 204, 206 
(Wyo. 1979) as follows:
 
            
The general rule is that in order to establish liability under the theory 
of negligent entrustment the plaintiff must prove that the entruster 
was negligent in supplying the instrumentality to an incompetent person. 
Upland Mutual Insurance, Inc. v. Noel, 214 Kan. 145, 519 P.2d 737, 742 (1974). To meet this burden the plaintiff must show that 
the entruster either knew or should have known that the person to 
whom the instrumentality was entrusted was incompetent. Finch v. 
Canaday, 75 Wyo. 472, 297 P.2d 594, 598 (1956); Second 
Restatement of Torts, § 390 (1965). The authors of the Second Restatement of 
Torts have described the tort of negligent entrustment in the following manner: 

 
“1. 'One who supplies 
directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of another whom the 
supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, 
inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of 
physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in 
or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm 
resulting to them.’ (Rest.Torts 2d, § 390.)”
 
The determination of 
liability for negligent entrustment is not tied to the existence of an 
employment relationship, and does not depend on whether an employee is acting in 
the course and scope of his employment when harm occurs. 
 Liability for negligent entrustment arises from the act 
of entrustment, not the relationship of the 
parties.  57A Am. 
Jur. 2d Negligence § 319 (citing Todd v. Dow, 
19 Cal. App. 4th 253 (2d Dist. 1993); Mathis v. Stacy, 
606 S.W.2d 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)).  
Consequently, in light of the standards set forth above, we need only 
determine whether a genuine issue exists as to (1) whether TNT supplied the 
chattel to Mr. Clyde, and (2) whether TNT knew or should have known that Mr. 
Clyde was likely to use the TNT pickup in a manner involving an unreasonable 
risk of harm.
 
[¶28]     
With regard to the 
first element of negligent entrustment, it is undisputed that TNT supplied the 
pickup that Mr. Clyde was driving at the time of the accident.  
Accordingly, we find the Shafers have satisfied this 
element.  Further, we find that the Shafers have 
presented a genuine issue as to whether TNT knew or should have known that the 
vehicle was entrusted to an incompetent person.  Our analysis 
of this element is similar to the determination of whether TNT knew or 
should have known of the necessity and opportunity for exercising control, as 
set forth in the above discussion of liability under Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 317.  As in that analysis, we find that Ms. 
Greene’s testimony relating to the relevance of DUI convictions to employee 
fitness, the existence of a drug-testing program at TNT, and Mr. Clyde’s prior 
DUI and controlled substance convictions constitute specific facts and evidence 
which raise a genuine issue as to whether TNT should have known that entrustment 
of a vehicle to Mr. Clyde was likely to involve an unreasonable risk of 
harm.
 
[¶29]     
The district court 
did not address the elements of negligent entrustment in granting TNT’s motion 
for summary judgment.  Instead, the court 
determined that the claim for negligent entrustment was not viable because Mr. 
Clyde’s employment had been terminated prior to the accident.  
The district court cited 23 Causes of Action 2d 265 (2003) 
for the proposition that 
 
The entrustment must 
be voluntary on the part of the owner, or other person in control, and effective 
to give possession and control of the motor vehicle to the 
entrustee.  An unauthorized, non-permissive use of 
another’s motor vehicle is, as a matter of law, insufficient to establish the 
owner’s liability for negligent entrustment.
 
The district court 
concluded that, because TNT had “put forward evidence showing Mr. Clyde’s 
employment with TNT was terminated prior to the accident and Mr. Clyde had no 
authorization to use the TNT vehicle at the time the accident occurred,” TNT 
could not be liable for negligent entrustment.
 
[¶30]     
As our previous 
discussion indicates, we have already determined that a genuine issue of 
fact remains as to whether Mr. Clyde’s employment with TNT had, in fact, been 
terminated prior to the accident.  Because it is not clear 
that Mr. Clyde’s employment had been terminated before the collision, we must 
reject the district court’s analysis of the Shafers’ negligent 
entrustment claim.  We also note that the district court’s 
analysis assumes that an entrustment may be terminated by 
the entrustor prior to the point at which the entrustor 
regains possession of the property.  We need not decide 
whether that assumption is correct in this appeal.  However, 
we note that the cases relied upon by the district court for the 
proposition that “An unauthorized, non-permissive use of another’s motor vehicle 
is, as a matter of law, insufficient to establish the owner’s liability for 
negligent entrustment,” are distinguishable.  This rule finds 
its origins in cases in which the entrustment was not authorized at its 
inception; i.e. where property was taken without the consent of the 
owner.  See, e.g., Beckendorf v. Simmons, 
539 S.W.2d 31 (Tenn. 1976) (involving an unauthorized taking 
of the vehicle from the custody of the owner); Central Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Cain, 377 So. 2d 579, 581 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 
1979) (noting that the owner of the vehicle “steadfastly refused to voluntarily 
turn over the keys” to the negligent driver); State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. of Bloomington, Illinois v. Dellwo, 220 N.W.2d 367 (Minn. 1974) (owner of vehicle was not aware that drivers were starting and 
using the vehicle by means of a knife or the removal of the ignition 
cylinder).  In the present case, however, the evidence 
indicated that Mr. Clyde had express authorization to use the TNT vehicle at the 
time that it was initially entrusted to him.
 
[¶31]     
For the foregoing 
reasons, we find that summary judgment was erroneously granted with respect to 
the Shafers’ claims of negligent supervision and negligent 
entrustment.  Reversed and remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.
[¶32]     
FOOTNOTES
 
1The exhibit 
also includes the results of a random drug test conducted approximately four 
months after his employment with TNT began.