Case Title: Stevens v. Czerniak

Citation: 

Docket Number: S50103

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2004-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  February 5, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
Petitioner-Relator,

v.
STAN CZERNIAK, Superintendent 
of Oregon State Penitentiary,

 Defendant-Adverse Party.
(CC 99C20086; SC S50103)

En Banc

Original proceeding in mandamas.*

Argued and submitted November 7, 2003.

Kenneth Lerner argued the
cause and filed the briefs for petitioner-relator.

Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for defendant-adverse party.  With him on the
brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.

Marc Sussman, P.C., Portland, filed the brief for amicus
curiae Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association.

David Sugerman, Paul and Sugerman, P.C., Portland, filed the
brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.

KISTLER, J.

Peremptory writ to issue.

*On petition for a writ of mandamus from an order of Marion
County Circuit Court, Dennis Graves, Judge.
KISTLER, J.
This mandamus case arises out of a post-conviction
proceeding.  Petitioner (the relator in the mandamus case)
contends that the trial court impermissibly required him to rely
on written submissions to prove his case and to provide pretrial
disclosure of his expert witnesses' names and testimony.  We
conclude that the premise of petitioner's first objection -- that
the court required him to prove his case by written submissions -- is not well taken.  We agree, however, that the court lacked
authority to order pretrial disclosure of petitioner's expert
witnesses' names and testimony.  We conclude that a peremptory
writ should issue directing the trial court to delete or modify
that portion of its order.

Although this litigation has a lengthy history, the
dispute that gives rise to this mandamus proceeding can be
summarized fairly simply.  Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his trial counsel had been
constitutionally inadequate.  In an effort to make the hearing
more efficient, the trial court limited the parties' ability to
call witnesses at the hearing.  The court directed the parties to
submit their evidence in written form unless an assessment of a
witness's credibility was necessary to resolve a factual dispute. 
Petitioner objected, explaining that his post-conviction case
involved complex factual issues that should be explored through
in-court testimony rather than written submissions.  He also
argued that the court's order impermissibly required pretrial
disclosure of his expert witnesses' names and testimony. (1)
To clarify its ruling, the trial court entered a trial
management order and later an amended trial management order. 
After the trial court entered the amended trial management order,
petitioner asked this court to issue an alternative writ of
mandamus.  Specifically, petitioner sought relief from the
rulings in the amended trial management order that
(1)
"compell[ed] pretrial disclosure of attorney-client
privileged information in the form of affidavits of expert
witnesses' opinions and required deposition testimony";
(2)
directed that "the record [be] held open after the trial date
to permit Defendant-Adverse Party additional time in which to
take further depositions and produce responsive evidence"; and
(3)
"refus[ed] Petitioner-Relator the right to present relevant
live expert witness testimony at his post-conviction hearing."
This court issued an alternative writ of mandamus
directing the trial court "to vacate the Amended Trial Management
Order of December 2, 2002, and enter a trial management order
consistent with the relief sought in the petition, or in the
alternative to show cause for not doing so."  In response to the
alternative writ, the trial court issued a second amended trial
management order.  In a cover letter to counsel, the court stated
that it believed that the second amended trial management order
"is consistent with the relief sought in the Petition for
Alternative Writ of Mandamus."
The second amended trial management order begins by
reciting a series of findings.  The fifth finding provides that,
"[w]here a specific credibility question exists between two
witnesses on a factual matter, live testimony will be allowed." 
The order then states in part:
"1.  Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is
granted in part.  The findings and Orders announced on
August 14, 2002 and on November 6, 2002 are clarified
and supplemented as indicated herein.
"* * * * *
"3.  The parties are ordered within 21 days to
supply the court with the names of the witnesses to be
called at trial.  Counsel shall summarize the substance
of each witness’ expected testimony with an explanation
of how that testimony relates to the issues raised by
the pleadings.  The summary will be used by the court
in working with the parties to make a determination
whether the witness should appear and testify in
person, or whether a stipulation of counsel as to the
witness' testimony can be achieved, or an affidavit of
the witness would be sufficient.
"4.  Prior to trial, opposing counsel may depose
any witness who has provided an affidavit, and so
perpetuate the witness’ cross-examination for the
consideration of the court at the post conviction
trial.  As in any other case, the court may order that
the record be left open at the conclusion of trial for
the receipt of additional evidence in the event of any
unexpected or surprise witness.
"* * * * *
"7.  At trial, testimony shall be presented in the
form of affidavits, deposition testimony and live
testimony as described herein, except as expressly
provided otherwise by further order of this court, and
upon good cause shown."

The trial court also issued an order vacating the amended trial
management order and replacing it with the second amended trial
management order.

Although the trial court thought that the second
amended trial management order complied with the alternative
writ, petitioner argues that it does not do so.  He raises two
objections to the order.  First, he contends that the order
impermissibly limits his right to call live witnesses.  He argues
that, under the terms of the order, he can call live witnesses
only if an assessment of the witness's credibility is necessary
to resolve a disputed issue of material fact.  Second, petitioner
argues that the second amended trial management order
impermissibly requires pretrial disclosure of his expert
witnesses' names and testimony. (2)
We begin with petitioner's first objection. 
Paragraph
3 of the second amended trial management order sets out
a process for the court and counsel to follow in determining the
form in which the parties will submit their evidence.  That
paragraph directs counsel to "summarize the substance of each
witness' expected testimony with an explanation of how that
testimony relates to the issues raised by the pleadings."  The
paragraph then provides that the summaries "will be used by the
court in working with the parties to make a determination whether
the witness should appear and testify in person, or whether a
stipulation of counsel as to the witness' testimony can be
achieved, or an affidavit of the witness would be sufficient."
Having considered the terms of the second amended trial
management order, we conclude that it does not have the effect
that petitioner perceives.  Paragraph 3 describes a general
process by which the court and the parties will work together to
identify which testimony the parties will present through live
witnesses, by stipulation, and in writing.  Unlike the trial
court's earlier orders, the terms of the second amended trial
management order leave the result of that process open.

Petitioner argues, however, that we should read the
order in light of the findings that precede it.  As noted, one
finding states that, "[w]here a specific credibility question
exists between two witnesses on a factual matter, live testimony
will be allowed."  Given that finding, petitioner argues that the
apparently open-ended process described in paragraph 3 will lead
ineluctably to one conclusion:  He may not call a witness to
testify unless the witness's credibility bears on a disputed
factual issue.  Petitioner reads too much into the court's
finding.  That finding states one circumstance in which the court
will allow live testimony; it does not exhaust those
circumstances.  Given the wording of the second amended trial
management order, (3) we decline to assume that the trial court
will permit live testimony only in the one circumstance that it
mentioned.

Petitioner also argues that we should read paragraph
3
in light of earlier statements that the court made.  Those
statements make clear, he contends, that the court will allow
witnesses to testify only in very limited circumstances.  The
terms of the written order, however, control over the court's
earlier statements.  See State v. Swain/Goldsmith, 267 Or 527,
530, 517 P2d 684 (1974) (stating principle).  Moreover, the court
entered the second amended trial management order in response to
the alternative writ and in the stated belief that the order
complied with the writ.  Even if we were to consider the order's
context, we cannot ignore the fact that the second amended trial
management order reflects the court's stated intent to provide
petitioner with the relief that he sought in the alternative
writ. (4)

In short, the second amended trial management order
leaves the trial court with discretion to determine the form in
which the parties will submit "each witness['s]" testimony; it
does not predetermine how the court will exercise its discretion. 
We assume that, consistently with paragraph 3 of the second
amended trial management order, the trial court will not impose
the blanket limitation on calling live witnesses that the amended
trial management order did.  We also assume that the trial court
will exercise sound discretion in implementing the second amended
trial management order to ensure that the parties have a full and
fair opportunity to present their evidence.  At this point in the
process, we cannot say that this aspect of the second amended
trial management order is unlawful. (5)
Petitioner challenges a second aspect of the second
amended trial management order.  He contends that the order
impermissibly requires pretrial disclosure of the identity of his
expert witnesses and the substance of their testimony.  Defendant
does not contend that the trial court may require that
disclosure; rather, he argues that the order does not have that
effect.  We begin with the terms of the order and then turn to
the question whether the court had authority to enter it.

As noted, the second amended trial management order
requires both parties, in advance of trial, to supply the court
with the names of the witnesses to be called at trial, to
summarize the substance of "each witness’ expected testimony,"
and to explain how that testimony relates to the issues raised by
the pleadings.  It then provides that the court and the parties
will work together to determine the form that the evidence will
take.  The second amended trial management order contains no
exception for expert witnesses; it requires the parties to
disclose the names and a summary of the testimony of "each
witnes[s]" that they expect to call. (6)

By its terms, the second amended trial management order
requires pretrial disclosure of petitioner's experts' names and
the substance of their testimony.  Defendant argues, however,
that the second amended trial management order "expressly
incorporates the 'findings and orders' contained" in the amended
trial management order.  Specifically, defendant contends that a
paragraph in the amended trial management order that treated
expert witnesses differently (7) remains in effect, and he
argues that that paragraph cures the defect that petitioner
identifies.  Defendant misperceives what the second amended trial
management order says.

Paragraph 1 of the second amended trial management
order states:  "The findings and Orders announced on August 14,
2002 and on November 6, 2002 are clarified and supplemented as
indicated herein."  The trial court announced its findings orally
during a hearing on August 14, 2002, and issued a letter to the
parties on November 6, 2002.  The trial court did not issue the
amended trial management order until December 2, 2002.  The
second amended trial management order does not refer to, much
less incorporate, the terms of the amended trial management
order. (8)  Rather, the trial court entered an order vacating
the amended trial management order.
Because the second amended trial management order
requires pretrial disclosure of petitioner's experts' names and
the substance of their testimony, we turn to the question whether
Oregon law authorized the trial court to require petitioner to
disclose that information in advance of trial.  Petitioner
contends, and defendant does not dispute, that the trial court
lacked authority to do so.  For the reasons set out below, we
agree.
We note, as a threshold matter, that the Oregon Rules
of Civil Procedure apply to post-conviction proceedings.  Mueller
v. Benning, 314 Or 615, 621 and n 6, 841 P2d 640 (1992).  We also
note that, in a civil action, a party has no obligation to
disclose information to another party in advance of trial unless
the rules of civil procedure or some other source of law requires
the disclosure.  See State ex rel Union Pacific Railroad v.
Crookham, 295 Or 66, 68-69, 663 P2d 763 (1983) (stating
principle).  We accordingly turn to the question whether the
rules of civil procedure require pretrial disclosure of an
expert's name and the substance of the expert's testimony.
Both petitioner and amicus Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association focus on ORCP 36, and we begin with the text and
context of that rule.  See Pamplin v. Victoria, 319 Or 429, 433,
877 P2d 1196 (1994) (applying statutory construction methodology
to rules of civil procedure).  Petitioner notes that, although
the text of ORCP 36 does not address expert discovery
specifically, one subsection of the rule bears on that issue. 
That subsection defines the scope of discovery and provides that,
"[f]or all forms of discovery, parties may inquire regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the claim or defense
of the party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any
other party."  ORCP 36 B(1).
It may be that the text of that subsection, if read in
isolation, could be interpreted to permit expert discovery if it
is (1) relevant and (2) not privileged.  As the court has
reiterated, however, text should not be read in isolation but
must be considered in context.  State v. Barrett
, 331 Or 27, 32,
10 P3d 901 (2000); PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or
606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  In this case, the context cuts
in a different direction.
Context includes other provisions of the same statute,
the session laws, and related statutes.  Owens v. Maass, 323 Or
430, 434, 918 P2d 808 (1996); PGE, 317 Or at 611.  It also
includes "the preexisting common law and the statutory framework
within which the law was enacted."  Denton and Denton
, 326 Or
236, 241, 951 P2d 693 (1998).  In interpreting the rules of civil
procedure, context may include the federal counterparts of the
Oregon rules.  See Pamplin, 319 Or at 433 (considering, at first
level of analysis, United States Supreme Court cases interpreting
federal rule on which Oregon based its rule).


A related statute and the session laws combine to
provide relevant context.  ORS 1.735(1) directs the Council on
Court Procedures to promulgate rules of civil procedure.  It then
provides that those rules "shall be submitted to the Legislative
Assembly at the beginning of each regular legislative session"
and "shall go into effect on January 1 following the close of
that session" unless the legislature, "by statute, amend[s],
repeal[s] or supplement[s]" them.  ORS
1.735(1).  In this
instance, the session laws reveal that the 1979 Legislative
Assembly enacted a statute to amend ORCP 36.  See
Or Laws 1979,
ch 284, §
23 (amending ORCP 36 by deleting ORCP 36 B(4)). (9) 
Specifically, the legislature passed a statute deleting ORCP 36
B(4).  Id.  Had the legislature not acted, ORCP 36 B(4) would
have gone into effect and would have required a party to
disclose, upon request, "the name and address of any person [that
the] party reasonably expects to call as an expert witness at
trial and the subject matter upon which the expert is expected to
testify."  Id.  At a minimum, this legislative action undercuts
the suggestion that the phrase "any matter" in ORCP 36 B(1)
necessarily includes expert witnesses.  See
State ex rel Juv.
Dept. v. Ashley, 312 Or 169, 179, 818 P2d 1270 (1992) (explaining
that legislature's decision to amend proposed evidence rule by
deleting "drug addiction" from "mental or emotional condition"
differs from situation in which legislature fails to adopt
proposed amendment). (10)

Another contextual clue points in the same direction. 
ORCP 36 essentially tracks FRCP 26(b), with one major exception. 
Compare ORCP 36 with
FRCP 26(b); see Fredric R. Merrill, Oregon
Rules of Civil Procedure 1992 Handbook 97 (staff comment)
(explaining that council generally modeled ORCP 36 on FRCP
26(b)).  FRCP 26(b)(1) defines the "scope of discovery" in much
the same terms as ORCP 36 B(1). (11)  FRCP 26(b)(4) then
specifically authorizes expert discovery.  Although ORCP 36 and
FRCP 26(b) contain similar definitions of the scope of discovery,
ORCP 36 omits the specific authorization for expert discovery
that FRCP 26(b) includes.  The presence of a specific provision
authorizing expert discovery in FRCP 26 and the omission of a
similar provision in ORCP 36 suggest that Oregon intended to
depart from the federal model and not authorize expert discovery.

Although it appears that the legislature deleted ORCP
36 B(4) because it disagreed with the Council on Court
Procedures's decision to authorize expert discovery, another
inference is possible.  The legislature could have concluded that
specific authorization for expert discovery was unnecessary in
light of ORCP 36 B(1), which provides for discovery of any
relevant matter that is not privileged.  The latter inference is
a weak one, however.  We assume that, if the legislature had
intended to depart from Oregon's longstanding practice of not
allowing expert discovery, it would have said so specifically. 
We cannot, however, discount the latter inference completely and
look to the legislative history to determine the legislature's
intent.  See PGE, 317 Or at 611-12 (explaining when courts may
look to legislative history). (12)

As noted, the Council on Court Procedures promulgated a
rule authorizing expert discovery.  Council on Court Procedures,
Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure 94 (Nov 24, 1978).  Fredric
Merrill, the council's executive director, had explained to the
council that initially the federal rules lacked a section that
specifically addressed expert discovery.  Fredric Merrill,
Memorandum on the Discovery of Experts 1-3, Council on Court
Procedures (1978). (13)  The resulting federal decisions on
that issued had been varied, if not inconsistent, and the federal
government had resolved that inconsistency by adding FRCP
26(b)(4).  Id.  After considerable debate, a divided council
agreed to adopt a variation of FRCP 26(b)(4).  Minutes, Council
on Court Procedures (Apr 1, 1978).  ORCP 36 B(4), as finally
promulgated by the council, required the parties, upon request,
to disclose their experts' names and addresses and the subject
matter upon which the parties expected their experts to testify. 
Council on Court Procedures, Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure 94
(Nov 24, 1978).
Consistently with ORS 1.735(1), the council submitted
that and other procedural rules to the legislature.  Or Laws
1979, ch 284.  Before the legislature, Frank Pozzi appeared on
behalf of the council members who had opposed permitting expert
discovery.  Minutes, Joint House-Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, HB 3131, Feb 6, 1979, 7.  He focused on the increased
costs that expert discovery brings and on the peer pressure
against testifying that can occur when a party discloses his or
her expert's name.  Id. at 9; Minutes, Joint House-Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, HB 3131, Apr 5, 1979, 10.  Pozzi
reasoned that the current system, which he described as not
permitting expert discovery, was an efficient and fair way to try
civil cases.  Id.  Garr King testified on behalf of the committee
members who had supported expert discovery; he maintained that
disclosure allows the parties to prepare their cases more
thoroughly.  Minutes, Joint House-Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, HB 3131, Mar 8, 1979, 1.  After both sides explored
that debate over several hearings, a majority of the joint
committee found the opponents' arguments persuasive and voted to
delete the section authorizing expert discovery.  Minutes, Joint
House-Senate Committee on the Judiciary, HB 3131, Apr 5, 1979,
11.
Consistently with ORS 1.735(1), the bill, as it came
out of the joint committee, affirmatively deleted ORCP 36 B(4),
and a majority in both houses voted in favor of the bill.  Or
Laws 1979, ch 284, §
23.  The debates surrounding the bill reveal
that the legislature neither understood nor intended that ORCP 36
B(1) would authorize discovery of nonprivileged expert testimony. 
Rather, in deleting ORCP 36
B(4), the legislature made a policy
choice to continue the practice of not authorizing expert
discovery in civil actions in state courts.
Having considered the text, context, and legislative
history of ORCP 36, we agree with petitioner that the legislature
did not intend to authorize pretrial disclosure of either an
expert's name or the substance of the expert's testimony. 
Without a specific provision authorizing expert discovery, the
trial court lacked authority to require the parties to disclose
that information in advance of trial.  State ex rel Union Pacific
Railroad v. Crookham, 295 Or at 68-69.  A peremptory writ shall
issue directing the trial court to correct that aspect of the
second amended trial management order.
Peremptory writ to issue.
1. Petitioner's counsel told the trial court that he
intended to offer expert testimony on three issues:  (1)
the
adequacy of petitioner's legal representation below; (2)
whether
the conduct of prior counsel conformed to bar disciplinary rules
and ethical requirements; and (3)
battered women's syndrome.
2. Petitioner raises another issue in his opening brief.  He asks us to order
that the trial judge recuse himself.  That separate issue is not fairly within the scope of the
alternative writ.  See State ex rel Kashmir Corp. v. Schmidt, 291 Or 603, 606 n 1, 633 P2d 791
(1981) (stating that alternative writ functions as complaint).  Neither is it a matter that fairly can
be said to lie within the expected relief from the matters that are within the scope of the writ. 
Therefore, we do not address it.
3. The amended trial management order contained the following finding: 
"Where a specific credibility question exists between two witnesses on a factual matter, live
testimony will be allowed.  Otherwise, testimony will be by deposition and affidavit."  (Emphasis
added.)  The finding in the second amended trial management order omits the underscored
sentence, supporting the conclusion that the trial court will allow live testimony in other
circumstances.
4. We also note that, in entering the amended trial management order, the
trial court agreed with defendant that ORS 138.580 authorized it to require petitioner to submit
his evidence solely in written form unless a disputed factual issue turned on a witness's
credibility.  Defendant now acknowledges that neither ORS 138.580 nor ORS 138.620(2) gives a
trial court authority to tell the parties how to present their evidence.
5. We recognize that the trial court may deny petitioner the right to call some
of his witnesses to testify.  We also recognize that, depending on the circumstances, such rulings
may be erroneous.  At this juncture, however, it would be premature to speculate on what the
court's specific rulings will be or whether the circumstances will justify them.  If the court errs,
appeal remains an important avenue for resolving any remaining or nascent issues.
6. Paragraph 4 of the order provides that "the court may order that the record
be left open at the conclusion of the trial for the receipt of additional evidence in the event of an
unexpected or surprise witness."  Petitioner's expert witnesses, however, are neither unexpected
nor a surprise.
7. Paragraph 4 of the amended trial management order provided:
8. In its November 6, 2002, letter, the trial court recognized that it could not
require petitioner to disclose his expert witnesses in advance of trial.  The terms of the second
amended trial management order are inconsistent with that recognition, however, and we are left
with the terms of the order.  See Swain/Goldsmith, 267 Or at 530 (stating principle).
9. Section 6 of the act notes that, in amending the Oregon Rules of Civil
Procedure, "matter in italic and bracketed i[s] existing matter to be deleted."  Or Laws 1979, ch
284, § 6.  Section 23 of the act then sets out ORCP 36 B(4) in italics and brackets.  Or Laws
1979, ch 284, §
23.
10. Ordinarily, the legislature's failure to enact legislation does not provide
persuasive evidence of its intent.  See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 US 367, 381-82 n
11, 89 S Ct 1794, 23 L Ed 2d 371 (1969) (observing that "unsuccessful attempts at legislation are
not the best guides to legislative intent"); Berry v. Branner, 245 Or 307, 311, 421 P2d 996 (1966)
(same).  This is not a case, however, in which the legislature failed to act.  Rather, it is a case in
which the legislature passed a law deleting a subsection of ORCP 36 that, had the legislature not
acted, would have gone into effect.  The legislature's action and the reasons for it thus provide
valuable evidence of the legislature's intent.  See
Ashley, 312 Or at 179 (recognizing principle).
11. FRCP 26(b)(1) provides that the "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding
any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party."
12. Because we conclude that the text and context of ORCP 36 are sufficiently
ambiguous to look to the legislative history, we need not decide whether the 2001 amendments to
ORS 174.020 apply to this mandamus proceeding.  See
Or Laws 2001, ch 438, §
1 (directing
court to "give the weight to the legislative history that the court considers to be appropriate"). 
Those amendments apply only to "actions commenced on or after" the act's effective date.  Or
Laws 2001, ch 437, §
2.  More specifically, we need not decide whether the term "action" refers
in this case to the underlying post-conviction action, which began before the act's effective date,
or the mandamus proceeding, which began after it. 
13. The memorandum is not dated.  It appears, however, to have been
submitted to the council sometime after February 18, 1978.  See Minutes, Council on Court
Procedures (Feb 18, 1978) (deferring motion to reject proposed rule permitting expert discovery
until Merrill had had a chance to research issue).