Case Title: CONNER v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, NATRONA COUNTY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 01-179

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
CONNER v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, NATRONA COUNTY2002 WY 14854 P.3d 1274Case Number: 01-179Decided: 10/02/2002
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

JACK 
M. CONNER and NANCY L.

CONNER,

 

Appellants(Defendants),

 

v.

 

THE 
BOARD OF COUNTY

COMMISSIONERS, 
NATRONA

COUNTY, 
WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Jack M. Conner and Nancy L. Conner, pro se, Evansville, 
Wyoming  

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Eric 
A. Easton, Natrona County Attorney; and William W. Harden, Deputy County 
Attorney 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference

 

 

            
KITE, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Jack M. Conner 
and Nancy L. Conner (the Conners) owned twenty acres of land near Alcova 
Reservoir burdened by an easement to Natrona County for a water system for the 
reservoir's recreational facilities.  
The parties discovered in 1997 that portions of the system were outside 
the easement boundaries.  After 
unsuccessful negotiations, the Board of County Commissioners of Natrona County 
(the board) filed an eminent domain action.  The district court ordered condemnation 
of 2.21 acres in fee simple.  A jury 
trial was held to determine the compensation the Conners should receive.  The district court granted a judgment as 
a matter of law for $3,827.72.1  We affirm. 

 

 

 

[¶2]      The Conners 
present the following issues for our review:

 

ISSUE 
I

 

Whether 
the plaintiff has the authority to file eminent domain on behalf of the federal 
government.

 

ISSUE 
II

 

Whether 
the district court failed to follow Rule 71.1(e)(1) of [the] Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure.

 

ISSUE 
III

 

Whether 
the district court erred in finding that the plaintiffs met all statutory 
requirements in filing an eminent domain action.

 

ISSUE 
IV

 

Whether 
the district court's decision was excessive and placed an unnecessary burden on 
the defendants.

 

ISSUE 
V

 

Whether 
the district court erred in dismissing the defendants['] inverse condemnation 
suit.

 

ISSUE 
VI

 

Whether 
the district court erred in not awarding legal fees and costs to defendants 
under § 1-26-506 and § 1-26-508.

 

ISSUE 
VII

 

Whether 
the district court acted properly in dismissing the jury and making a judgment 
as a matter of law.

 

The 
board phrases the issues as:

 

Issue 
I 

 

            
Whether the District Court properly found that Natrona County complied 
with the statutory requirements for an Eminent Domain Action, pursuant to W.S. § 
1-26-504 and Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 71.1.

 

Issue 
II 

 

            
Whether the District Court's granting Plaintiff's Rule 50 Motion taking 
the case from the jury was proper due to the Appellant[s'] failure to provide 
competent evidence on the value of the taking and for failure of proof for other 
damages.

 

 

 

[¶3]      The Conners' land 
was bordered on the south by federal lands controlled by the Bureau of Land 
Management and on the east by federal lands controlled by the Bureau of 
Reclamation.  Since the mid-1950s, 
Natrona County has leased Bureau of Reclamation lands pursuant to consecutive 
Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) intended to provide for the development of 
Alcova Reservoir as a recreational area as well as for other activities.2

 

[¶4]      In 1959, Miles 
Land and Livestock Company, the Connors' predecessor in interest,3 granted Natrona County a right of 
way easement, which provided in part:

 

Easement 
to Natrona County Parks and Recreation for Water Storage Tank and Water Line to 
Alcova Trailer Park, Situated in the NW¼ NE¼, Sec. 33, T30N, R83W, 
6th Principal Meridian, Natrona County, Wyoming; 
. . .

 

The 
Board of Trustees of Natrona County Parks and Pleasure Grounds does hereby grant 
unto Miles Land and Livestock Company the right to have water from [the] above 
mentioned water storage tank or pump for the purposes of stock water and/or if 
in the future, Miles Land and Livestock Company should develop lots, they will 
have water for two lots from said storage tank from a ¾ inch line. 

 

Grantor 
also grants the right of ingress and egress to and from the said land for any 
and all purposes necessary for the public.

 

Natrona 
County constructed a water supply and distribution system comprised of a well, 
storage tank, supply line to the storage tank, and distribution line from the 
storage tank to the recreational facilities.  Operation of the system began in 1959 
supplying water on a seasonal basis to a marina, ski club, boat club, 155 leased 
trailer sites, 99 cabins, and five general public campgrounds.4

 

[¶5]      In 1997, after 
the Conners acquired ownership of the land burdened by the easement, the parties 
learned the well and water lines from the well to the storage tank located on 
the Conners' property were outside the boundaries of the 1959 easement.  Negotiations ensued between the parties 
but were unsuccessful.5  On April 7, 1998, the board passed a 
resolution authorizing the filing of eminent domain proceedings.  The following day, the board filed a 
complaint and a motion for immediate entry in the district court.  The Conners were served on April 9, 
1998, with an order scheduling a show cause hearing for April 14, 1998, to 
determine whether the board should be granted immediate access to the Conners' 
property.  The Conners objected 
contending W.R.C.P. 71.1(e)(1) precludes a hearing "sooner than 15 days after 
service of the order to show cause."  
The hearing went forward despite the objection, and the district court 
granted the board's motion for immediate entry.  The Conners answered and counterclaimed 
for inverse condemnation. 

 

[¶6]      A condemnation 
bench trial commenced June 18, 1999, and continued for a second day on September 
9, 1999.  In its October 28, 1999, 
"Order for Hearing on Complaint for Condemnation," the district court held the 
board had complied with both the procedural requirements of W.R.C.P. 71.1 and 
the substantive requirements of the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act and had met its 
burden of proof.  The district court 
ordered a portion of the Conners' property condemned consistent with the 
description contained in the board's Exhibit Z providing .9 acre for the 
roadway, .01 acre for the pipeline, and an additional 1.3 acres where the well 
was located.

 

[¶7]      After the 
condemnation trial, the parties participated in nonbinding mediation on the 
compensation the Conners should receive for the 2.21 acres condemned by the 
court's order and any other damage to the remainder of their parcel that might 
be caused by the taking.  An 
informal damages hearing was held pursuant to W.R.C.P. 71.1(e)(2)(C) and Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 1-26-601 through 1-26-604 (LexisNexis 2001).  The district court 
determined the Conners should be paid $5,816.67.  The Connors were not satisfied and filed a 
formal demand for a jury trial.  The jury trial commenced in April 2001.  The Conners called 
the board's appraiser, James E. Wren, who provided his conclusion the damage to 
the property was $3,827.72. They also called Mrs. Connor and their own witness 
Neil Hilston, neither of whom was able to provide an opinion concerning the 
diminution in value caused by the easement.  The district court found the testimony of the 
board's appraiser to be the only probative evidence received.  At the close of the 
Conners' case, the board moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 50(a), contending there was no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for 
a reasonable jury to find in favor of the Conners on any issue.  The board also moved 
to dismiss the Conners' inverse condemnation counterclaim for lack of 
proof.  The 
district court granted both motions on the basis of W.R.C.P. 50(a) because the 
only possible verdict that could be supported by the evidence was a judgment 
for  
$3,827.72.  
This appeal followed. 

 

 

 

[¶8]      

Eminent domain proceedings are authorized by constitutional 
and statutory provisions and governed by W.R.C.P. 71.1.  The district court 
determines all issues arising on the complaint for condemnation including 
notice, the plaintiff's right to make the appropriation, plaintiff's inability 
to agree with the owner, the necessity for the appropriation, and the regularity 
of the proceedings.  
W.R.C.P. 71.1(e)(2)(A).  Only the issue of compensation may be tried 
before a jury.  
W.R.C.P. 71.1(j).  

 

When we review the district court's determination of issues 
required by Rule 71.1(e)(2), "we uphold the judgment if there is evidence to 
support it, and in doing so we look only to the evidence submitted by the 
prevailing party and give to it every favorable inference which may be drawn 
therefrom, without considering any contrary evidence."  Town of Wheatland v. Bellis Farms, Inc., 806 P.2d 281, 
284 (Wyo. 1991).  
Where the district court's ultimate conclusions decide questions of law, 
we afford no deference to its decision.  See Coronado Oil Co. v. 
Grieves, 603 P.2d 406, 410 (Wyo. 1979); see also 
Homesite Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs of Laramie, 240 P.2d 885, 889 (Wyo. 
1952).  

 

Wyoming Resources Corporation v. T-Chair Land 
Company, 2002 WY 104, ¶¶7-8, 49 P.3d 999, ¶¶7-8, (Wyo. 
2002).  
This court reviews de novo the grant of a 
motion for judgment as a matter of law, and we accord 
no deference to the district court's decision.  Cargill, Incorporated 
v. Mountain Cement Company, 891 P.2d 57, 62 (Wyo. 1995).

 

The test to be applied is whether the evidence is such that, 
without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the 
weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that 
reasonable persons could have reached.  We view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, and give that party the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.  When the facts 
permit the drawing of more than one inference, it is for the jury to choose 
which will be utilized.  Since a judgment as a matter of law deprives 
the party opposing the motion of a determination of the facts by a jury, it 
should be cautiously and sparingly granted.  

 

John Q. Hammons Inc. v. Poletis, 954 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Wyo. 1998) (citations omitted); see also Rudy v. Bossard, 997 P.2d 480, 485 (Wyo. 
2000).            

 

 

 

 

[¶9]      In footnote two of its 
brief, the board objected to this court considering transcripts not previously 
designated by the Conners to be included in the record on appeal.  The board 
specifically objected to consideration of the June 18, 1999, condemnation bench 
trial transcript.  
W.R.A.P. 3.05 requires parties, simultaneously with the filing of their 
appellate briefs, to designate those portions of the district court record upon 
which they have relied.  This court's docket reflects the Conners' 
brief was filed on January 29, 2002, without a designation of record.  The Conners had a 
second opportunity to file a designation of record with a reply brief, but they 
did not do so.  

  

[¶10]   On April 3, 2002, the Conners filed a 
designation request with the district court asking that all available 
transcripts in the file be transmitted to the Supreme Court.  On the same day, the 
board filed an objection in the district court to the transcript of the June 18, 
1999, proceedings being included because the Conners did not designate it as a 
portion of the record on appeal. The caption of the board's pleading read "IN 
THE SUPREME COURT[,] STATE OF WYOMING" and recited both the district court and 
the Supreme Court docket numbers.  It appears the district court clerk 
subsequently transmitted all available transcripts to this court, including the 
transcript for the June 18, 1999, condemnation trial.  The board filed no 
motion in this court to strike the transcript. 

 

[¶11]   W.R.A.P. 3.04 requires all questions as 
to the form and content of the record, except differences which may arise as to 
whether the record discloses what occurred in the trial court, to be presented 
to the appellate court by motion.  The board did not follow this procedure 
because it filed its motion objecting to the transcript with only the district 
court.  Though 
the caption referred to the Supreme Court, the motion was never filed with the 
clerk of this court.

 

Failure to comply with our rules of appellate procedure is 
ground for "such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, including but 
not limited to:  
refusal to consider the offending party's contentions; assessment of 
costs; dismissal;  
and affirmance."  W.R.A.P. 1.03. We . . . expect 
litigants who choose to proceed pro se to comply with 
the Wyoming appellate rules just as we expect trained lawyers to comply with 
those rules. 

 

Basolo v. Gose, 994 P.2d 968, 969 (Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶12]   Both parties failed to fully comply with 
our rules of appellate procedure with regard to including the transcript in the 
appellate record.  
It would be unreasonable to grant the board's objection and disregard the 
transcript when the board itself failed to properly raise the issue.  Therefore, we deem 
it appropriate to disregard the mutual errors and consider the certified record 
as submitted.

 

 

[¶13]   For the first time on appeal, the 
Conners assert the board's exercise of its eminent domain power is defective 
because the water system benefits federally owned lands, the MOUs require 
certain federal authorizations which were not obtained, and the state eminent 
domain statutes do not provide the federal government the power to condemn 
property.  They 
did not raise this issue in the district court.  Further, they have not provided reasonable 
argument or authority here in support of their assertion.  We will not consider 
issues presented for the first time on appeal or unsupported by cogent argument 
and pertinent authority.  Metz Beverage Company v. Wyoming Beverages, Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶35, 39 P.3d 1051, ¶35 (Wyo. 2002); Shumway v. 
Worthey, 2001 WY 130, ¶16, 37 P.3d 361, ¶16 (Wyo. 2001); Statezny v. State, 2001 WY 22, ¶11, 18 P.3d 641, ¶11 
(Wyo. 2001); Oatts v. Jorgenson, 821 P.2d 108, 111 (Wyo. 
1991).

 

C.        Notice of 
W.R.C.P. 71.1(e)(1) Hearing for Immediate Entry

 

[¶14]   W.R.C.P. 71.1(e)(1) directs that a 
hearing to determine whether an immediate need exists for the condemnor to enter 
the condemnees' property shall be held not sooner than fifteen days from the 
date the hearing order is served on the condemnees.  No one disputes the 
Conners were served the show cause hearing order on April 9, 1998, and the 
hearing was held on April 14, 1998, only five days later in violation of the 
rule.  We cannot 
and do not condone such violation of the rules which are intended to provide an 
opportunity to all parties to fully participate in the proceedings.  However, in this 
instance, although the breach is undeniable, we cannot discern what harm the 
Connors suffered from the error.  

 

[¶15]   The Conners maintain the district 
court's decision to hold the hearing over their objection was an "exertion of 
arbitrary power."  
We cannot confirm whether the issue was even raised at the hearing 
because there is no transcript in the record and the order following the hearing 
does not mention any such objection.  Conceivably, the Conners could have been 
harmed by not being able to properly conduct an investigation, contact 
witnesses, or otherwise prepare for the hearing.  However, they have not addressed the nature of 
any harm they may have incurred, and we cannot rely upon speculation to 
determine harm occurred.  

 

[¶16]   For an error to warrant reversal, it 
must be prejudicial and affect an appellant's substantial rights.  ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 934 (Wyo. 
1981).  The 
Conners' ownership interest in their property is unquestionably a substantial 
right.

 

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, binding upon the states, provides "nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."  In Article 1, § 6 of 
the Constitution of the State of Wyoming, a parallel provision appears, "[n]o 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law." . . . "It is basic that, before a property interest can be 
terminated, except in emergency situations, due process must be afforded to 
litigants in the form of notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.'"  Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 106 (Wyo. 1994) 
(quoting Lawrence-Allison and Associates West, Inc. v. 
Archer, 767 P.2d 989, 997 (Wyo. 1989)) . . . .

 

Loghry v. Loghry, 920 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo. 1996); see 
also Murray v. Murray, 894 P.2d 607, 608 (Wyo. 1995).  

 

[¶17]   Where there is no injury to the 
appellant, this court will overlook errors.  ABC Builders, Inc., 
632 P.2d  at 935.  
For an error to be harmful, there must be a reasonable possibility that, 
in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to a 
defendant.  Id.

  

            
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no 
error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the 
court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting 
aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or 
order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with 
substantial justice.  
The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties.

 

W.R.C.P. 61.  W.R.A.P. 9.04 provides:  "Any error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded by the reviewing court."

 

[¶18]   Though a substantial right was at issue, 
the district court's order merely maintained the status quo as it had existed 
since 1959 pending resolution of the eminent domain proceedings.  It is reasonable to 
infer some urgency existed because Natrona County was contractually obligated to 
provide water to the Alcova Reservoir recreational facilities when the new 
season began on April 15th.  That water was necessary for the members of 
the general public who would be using those facilities.  We cannot verify 
what occurred in the district court because the Conners did not designate the 
hearing transcript.  
Consequently, no evidence exists in the record demonstrating harm 
occurred or the district court acted unreasonably.  Therefore, we must 
assume the district court acted in a reasonable manner and this error was 
harmless.  Cottonwood Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Roberts, 874 P.2d 897, 
899 (Wyo. 1994).

 

D.        Attorney 
Fees for Violation of Immediate Entry Order

 

[¶19]   Following the hearing, the district 
court issued an order permitting the board to enter the Conners' property to 
operate and maintain the water system.  However, the order required the board to give 
the Conners notice prior to going onto the property.  The Connors 
subsequently filed a motion for an order to show cause regarding an alleged 
violation of that requirement, and the court held the board in contempt.  Neither the Connors' 
motion nor the hearing transcript was designated, and neither is in the 
record.  The 
Connors argue they should be entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 1-26-506 and 1-26-508 (LexisNexis 2001) because the board failed to 
comply with this order.6  However, the district court made no findings 
that the board had violated the provisions of § 1-26-508(b) making an award of 
litigation costs mandatory and expressly declined to award the Connors' fees and 
costs "at this time." 

 

In considering the claim for attorney fees, the district 
court appropriately would be guided by the propositions that the statutory 
provision should be given a liberal interpretation to effectuate its salutary 
purposes and a prevailing plaintiff ordinarily should be awarded compensating 
attorney fees unless special circumstances would render the award unjust.  Bueno v. CF & I Steel Corporation, 773 P.2d 937 
(Wyo. 1989); State ex[] rel. 
Scholl v. Anselmi, 640 P.2d 746 (Wyo. 1982), appeal 
dismissed, cert. denied 459 U.S. 805, 103 S. Ct. 28, 74 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1982); 
[Board of Trustees of Weston County School District No. 
1, Weston County v.] Holso, 584 P.2d 1009 [(Wyo. 
1978)]; Annotation, Construction and Application of Civil 
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (Amending 42 USCS § 1988), Providing 
That Court May Allow Prevailing Party, Other Than United States, Reasonable 
Attorney's Fee In Certain Civil Rights Actions, 43 A.L.R.Fed. 243 
(1979).  In 
determining the reasonableness of that award, the district court will be guided 
by our Wyoming precedents.  See, e.g., Delgado v. Delgado, 773 P.2d 446 (Wyo. 1989).

 

Town of Upton v. Whisler, 824 P.2d 545, 552 (Wyo. 1992).

 

[¶20]   The Conners presume that, because the 
board was held in contempt, it should have been ordered to pay their fees and 
costs under the statute, and they claim the district court was "biased."  These arguments 
present only bare assertions without evidentiary or legal support.  Further, we have no 
means to review the district court proceedings and must assume the decision was 
in accord with the law.  Cottonwood Valley 
Ranch, Inc., 874 P.2d  at 899.

 

E.        Statutory 
Requirements of Eminent Domain

 

[¶21]   The Conners maintain the district court 
erred in finding the board met all the requirements of the eminent domain 
statutes:

 

            
(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, the power of eminent domain may 
be exercised to acquire property for a proposed use only if all of the following 
are established:

 

(i) The public interest and necessity require the project or 
the use of eminent domain is authorized by the Wyoming Constitution;

                                                  

            
(ii) The project is planned or located in the manner that will be most 
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury; and

 

            
(iii) The property sought to be acquired is necessary for the 
project.

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-504(a) (LexisNexis 2001).  In reviewing 
findings, we have said:

 

When a condemnor seeks to establish the requirement of 
necessity in an eminent domain proceeding, it need only show a reasonable 
necessity for the project.  As explained by one court, the term 
"necessity," when used in the context of an eminent domain proceeding, means 
"reasonably convenient or useful to the public."  City of Dayton v. 
Keys, 21 Ohio Misc. 105, 252 N.E.2d 655, 659 (1969).  A showing that the 
project will increase public safety is sufficient.  See Greasy Creek Mineral Company v. Ely Jellico Coal 
Company, 132 Ky. 692, 116 S.W. 1189 (1909).

 

Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County v. 
Atter, 734 P.2d 549, 553 (Wyo. 1987).  And further:

 

To comply with W.S. 1-26-504(a)(ii), the [board] needs to 
present evidence that it has planned or located the project in a manner most 
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.  The district court 
then reviews the evidence and decides whether the [board] has met its 
burden.  Once 
W.S. 1-26-504(a)(ii) has been complied with and the landowners still wish to 
contest the action, the burden shifts to them to show that the condemnor acted 
in bad faith or abused its discretion as to that particular determination.

 

Town of Wheatland v. Bellis Farms, Inc., 806 P.2d 281, 283 (Wyo. 1991) (footnotes omitted).  Before filing an 
eminent domain complaint, a condemnor must make reasonable, diligent, and good 
faith efforts to negotiate with the condemnee.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-509 (LexisNexis 
2001).  Efforts 
made in compliance with the statutes constitute prima facie evidence of the 
condemnor's good faith.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-510 (LexisNexis 2001). 

 

[¶22]   After a two-day trial,7 the district 
court announced detailed findings in open court on each of the procedural 
requirements of W.R.C.P. 71.1 and the substantive requirements of the eminent 
domain statutes including Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-26-504, 1-26-509, and 1-26-512 
(LexisNexis 2001).8  The findings included the project was in the 
public interest and necessity because water has special uses and needs wherever 
people are located; the water benefited many uses in the Alcova Reservoir area 
accessed by both members of the general public and private individuals; though 
there might be ways to relocate the water system, at that time its use in place 
was compatible with the greatest public good; though the board had argued 
condemnation of the entire twenty-acre parcel would eliminate future disputes, 
the least private injury would be incurred through condemnation of only the 2.21 
acres affected by the existing system and described in the board's Exhibit Z; 
and, because the board met its burden of proof, the burden shifted to the 
Connors to show the board's bad faith or abuse of discretion.  Although the parties 
were unable to agree, the court found the board complied with the negotiation 
requirements of § 1-26-509 through discussions, meetings, proposals, and 
counterproposals and no bad faith or abuse of discretion was shown.9  

 

[¶23]   Our review of the transcripts and 
exhibits confirms the district court fairly and accurately considered the 
evidence and issued findings consistent with that evidence addressing all the 
requirements of the eminent domain statutes.  This decision did not unnecessarily impact the 
Conners because the district court determined a fee simple grant of only 2.21 
acres was sufficient to meet the governmental needs.  Although the Connors 
take issue with those findings, the district court is the fact-finder assigned 
with the task of resolving the conflicts in the evidence.  Leavell v. Linn, 884 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Wyo. 1994).

 

[W]e cannot retry this case on appeal.  Deference must be 
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses, and a reviewing court will not set aside the court's findings merely 
because it might have reached a different result.  The trial judge is in the best position to 
assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh their testimony, and, thus, this 
Court accords considerable deference to the trial judge's findings. 

 

Drake v. McCulloh, 2002 WY 50, ¶18, 43 P.3d 578, ¶18 (Wyo. 2002).  The findings were 
not clearly erroneous or against the great weight of the evidence; therefore, we 
will not disturb them.  

 

F.         
W.R.C.P. 50(a) Motion 

 

[¶24]   The Conners contend the district court 
erred when, at the close of their case at the April 2001 damages trial, it 
dismissed their inverse condemnation claim, granted the board's W.R.C.P. 50(a) 
motion for judgment as a matter of law, and dismissed the jury.  The purpose of this 
jury trial was to determine the amount of "just compensation" the Conners were 
entitled to receive because of the condemnation of 2.21 acres of their 
property.  
"[J]ust compensation equals the fair market value of all property rights 
lost or taken, measured by the difference between the fair market value of the 
property before the taking and of the remainder after the taking."  Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 69, ¶39, 28 P.3d 838, ¶39 
(Wyo. 2001).  
The "before and after test" at a minimum requires that the dispossessed 
landowner receive the fair market value of the acreage taken.  The damages may also 
include any additional reduction of the remaining property's fair market value 
attributable to the nature  of the taking.  

 

[¶25]   The burden of proof for condemnation 
damages is well established:

 

The landowners in eminent domain cases have the burden of 
proving the just compensation to which they are entitled.  This is the general 
rule.

 

This is not an idle statement of a rule meant to be 
disregarded.  
The burden is placed on landowners because they have turned down the 
offer deemed fair by the condemnor and created the issue, even though raised 
somewhat differently than through the pleadings in the usual civil case.  It would be of no 
use to even state the rule if not put into practice.  It is designed for 
the use of the fact finder to aid in decision making in the face of a conflict 
of evidence which is usually the case in critical evidentiary areas in jury 
tried litigation.

 

Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. v. 
Mackey, 650 P.2d 1152, 1157 (Wyo. 1982) (citations omitted).  The Conners 
presented the testimony of Mrs. Conner, one of the property owners; Mr. Hilston, 
a realtor and appraiser; and Mr. Wren, the appraiser hired by the board.  We have previously 
considered the weight and relevancy of an owner's testimony:

 

While an owner may testify to the value of his property, 
that does not make it competent.  An owner is only qualified to express an 
opinion of value in a reasonable way and in accordance with the proper standards 
for determining fair market value; what it is worth to him is not a correct 
basis.  If the 
owner's opinion is not within these rules, it has no probative value in a 
condemnation case.  

 

Id. at 1156.  We have likewise 
noted the trial court's broad discretion in permitting testimony regarding 
valuation.  
"Whether or not a witness has sufficient knowledge or special experience 
to testify as to his opinion on valuation is within the discretion of the trial 
court and will be disturbed on appeal only if clearly and prejudicially 
erroneous and then only in extreme cases."  Ely v. Kirk, 707 P.2d 706, 712 (Wyo. 1985).

 

[¶26]   Our review of the hearing transcript 
shows Mrs. Conner provided vague, unsupported estimates as to the property's 
value.  She had 
no particular knowledge or training that might qualify her opinion.  She did not explain 
the time frames she used for showing comparable values.  It was also unclear 
whether she was estimating the value of the condemned 2.21 acres or the 
remaining parcel.  
Mrs. Conner never testified as to the amount originally paid for the 
land.  She did 
testify that each trailer lot on the adjacent property appraised at $7,000 and 
at least ten such lots could fit on the 1.3-acre condemned portion.  However, she also 
expressed the unsupported opinion that the 1.3-acre plot could be sold for 
$30,000 to $40,000.  
Mrs. Conner provided no explanation on how she obtained this information 
except that she had conducted a land value study.  

 

[¶27]   Mr. Hilston was an appraiser and realtor 
with a number of years' experience who testified he agreed to help the Conners 
without charge.  
Mr. Hilston stated he could find no comparable properties in the area 
with condemned portions taken in the same manner and was, therefore, unable to 
perform an appraisal.  
Because he could not perform an appraisal, he concluded he could not 
provide an opinion concerning the impact of the condemnation on the property's 
value.  In his 
capacity as a realtor, Mr. Hilston stated he thought he could list the Conners' 
property for sale in "probably [the] 22 to $23,000 an acre range."  He did not explain 
whether this reference meant the entire twenty-acre parcel, just the condemned 
portion, or the remainder after condemnation, nor did he provide a foundation 
for his opinion.  

 

[¶28]   During Mrs. Conner's and Mr. Hilston's 
testimony, the district court repeatedly reminded the parties, and particularly 
the Conners' attorney, that it was the condemnees' burden to prove damages by 
establishing by competent evidence the values of their property before and after 
the taking.  The 
court also offered to recess briefly and provide Wyoming case law on the before 
and after damages test and the burden of proof to the Conners' counsel.  The district court 
went to extraordinary lengths to ensure the Conners' attorney understood the 
evidence that was required to prove the condemnation damages and that Mrs. 
Conner's and Mr. Hilston's unsubstantiated statements did not constitute such 
evidence.

 

[¶29]   As their last witness, the Conners 
called Mr. Wren who had prepared a complete appraisal for the board "in 
accordance with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice" in 
order "to arrive at a supportable and defensible estimate of the market value 
for the whole parcel of the subject property, the market value of the proposed 
taking, and the estimate of any damages, if any."  Mr. Wren testified he had twenty-six years of 
appraisal experience, had various appraisal designations, and was associated 
with many state and national appraisal and real estate organizations.  He explained the 
appraisal process and reviewed the four comparable properties he used to value 
the Conners' land.  
The comparable property valuations ranged from $1,400 to $1,625 per acre 
without adjustments to more accurately reflect the Conners' property and from 
$1,732 to $1,746.10 per acre with those adjustments.  The adjusted values 
were reached with the understanding the Conners could build a home and use the 
entire twenty-acre parcel.  Mr. Wren concluded the Conners incurred no 
damages beyond the loss of value of the land condemned.  He valued the whole 
twenty-acre parcel before the taking at $35,000, the condemned 2.21 acres at 
$3,827.72 (2.21 x $1,732), and the parcel after the taking at $31,172.28.  Mr. Wren concluded 
the only damage that would occur from the taking was the loss of the 2.21 
acres.  The 
Connors presented no evidence concerning any damages they may have incurred due 
to the board's alleged inverse condemnation of their property prior to the 
eminent domain action.

 

[¶30]   At the close of the Conners' case, the 
court removed the jury while the board moved for dismissal of the inverse 
condemnation counterclaim10 and judgment as a matter of law on the damages 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 50(a)(1).  The court granted judgment as a matter of law 
on both motions holding the Conners did not present competent evidence upon 
which a jury could rely to determine eminent domain damages other than the 
expert opinion of the board's appraiser.  Nor did they present evidence to support their 
inverse condemnation counterclaim.  Following its ruling, the district court 
brought the jury back in and explained the motions and its ruling that the 
jury's role as fact-finder was no longer necessary because the only competent 
evidence consistent with the established legal standard proved the Conners 
should be awarded $3,827.72 in damages.

  

We undertake a full review of the record without deference 
to the views of the trial court.  The test to be applied is whether the evidence 
is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise 
considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to 
the verdict that reasonable persons could have reached.  We view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and give that party the 
benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.  When the facts 
permit the drawing of more than one inference, it is for the jury to choose 
which will be used.  
If the inferences favorable to the movant are subject to doubt, or if 
parallel inferences can be drawn, the motion appropriately is denied.

 

Wyoming Medical Center, Inc. v. Murray, 2001 WY 63, ¶7, 27 P.3d 266, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001) (citations 
omitted).

 

[¶31]   The district court's reasons for 
dismissal are borne out by our de novo review.  We concur with the 
district court's remarks on the record regarding the eminent domain damages:

 

The Supreme Court has noted that there has to be proper 
foundation for the opinions relative to the before and after taking approach, 
and that it needs to be presented by competent evidence. 
. . . 

 

We do not have that here, however.  We have 
. . . Mrs. Conner espousing some very loose estimates and 
valuations as to the value of the property I think before the taking, with an 
estimate of what that property might be with water and electric.

 

We had some information from Mr. Hilston as to what he might 
list the property before but we have little or no other appraisal information 
from him and surely no opinion testimony given in accord with the requirements 
that there be competent evidence set forth within the structures of the before 
and after taking.

 

So we have the [Conners] calling Mr. Wren and he is the sole 
source . . . of proper appraisal information to aid the Court and 
the jury in what that taking should be. . . . [H]is 
evaluation was based upon the taking of the entire 2.21 acres, but basing it 
upon the value of the full 20-acre parcel before and after the taking, based 
upon comparables and accepted real estate appraisal information 
. . . .

 

"Despite the fact that judgment as a matter of law should be 
granted cautiously and sparingly, the district court has an obligation to direct 
entry of such a judgment where there is legally insufficient evidence to support 
a verdict on a particular issue."  Sayer v. Williams, 
962 P.2d 165, 167 (Wyo. 1998); see also Rudy, 997 P.2d  at 485.  We conclude the district court properly 
granted judgment as a matter of law on the inverse condemnation counterclaim and 
the damages valuation.

 

[¶32]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

1The Conners were 
represented by counsel in the district court and appear pro se on appeal.

 

2Negotiations were initially 
conducted between the Bureau of Reclamation and the Wyoming Parks 
Commission.  
Natrona County was involved as a licensee of the Wyoming Parks 
Commission.  By 
the 1966 MOU, Natrona County was a direct party to the agreement.

 

3Miles Land and Livestock 
Company owned the property at the time the easement was originally granted and 
recorded.  The 
property was sold to Keith V. Asbell, W. R. Asbell, and Henry A. Hitch, Jr. in 
1975 and then to Mr. Conner and Garry A. Frank in 1996. In October of 1997, Mr. 
Conner and Mr. Frank transferred the property to the Conners.

 

  4Natrona 
County is contractually obligated to have the water system operational from 
April 15th through October 15th, and the 
water system is shut down in the off season.

 

5Proposals and 
counterproposals were exchanged including in part the Conners' requests that 
Natrona County install equipment to provide a year round water source to the 
property, clean up the trailer court, install electric fences, and pay various 
sums of money for installing a water line to a work shop and grading a road 
without permission.

6Section 1-26-506 
provides:

 

            
(a)  A condemnor and its agents and employees may enter upon 
real property and make surveys, examinations, photographs, tests, soundings, 
borings and samplings, or engage in other activities for the purpose of 
appraising the property or determining whether it is suitable and within the 
power of the condemnor to condemn if the entry is:

 

            
(i)  Preceded by prior notice to and written authorization from 
the owner or his agent;

 

            
(ii)  Undertaken during reasonable hours, normally during 
daylight;

 

            
(iii)  Accomplished peaceably and without inflicting 
substantial injury.

 

            
(b)  The entry and activities authorized by this section do not 
constitute a trespass.

 

            
(c)  The condemnor is liable under W.S. 1-26-508 for damages 
resulting from activities authorized by this section.

 

Section 1-26-508 
provides:

 

            
(a)  A condemnor is liable for physical injury to, and for 
substantial interference with possession or use of, property caused by his entry 
and activities upon the property.  This liability may be enforced in a civil 
action against the condemnor or by application to the court as provided by 
subsection (c) of this section unless voluntarily paid by the condemnor.

 

            
(b)  In an action or other proceeding for recovery of damages 
under this section, the prevailing party shall be allowed his costs.  In addition, the 
court shall award the condemnee his litigation expenses incurred in any 
proceeding under W.S. 1-26-507 if it finds that the condemnor:

 

            
(i)  Entered the property unlawfully;

 

            
(ii)  Entered upon the property lawfully but thereafter engaged 
in activities upon the property which caused significant damage to the property 
not reasonably necessary to the purposes of the entry; or

 

            
(iii)  Failed substantially to comply with an order made under 
W.S. 1-26-507.

 

            
(c)  If funds are on deposit under W.S. 1-26-507, the owner or 
other person entitled to damages under subsection (a) of this section may apply 
to the court for an award of the amount he is entitled to recover.  The court shall 
determine the amount and award it to the person entitled thereto and direct that 
its payment be made out of the money on deposit.  If the amount on deposit is insufficient to 
pay the full amount, the court shall enter judgment against the condemnor for 
the unpaid portion.

 

7Only a partial transcript 
of the September 9, 1999, proceedings was included in the record on appeal.  The portion provided 
is an excerpt of the district court's oral ruling.  

 

  8Section 
1-26-512 provides:

 

            
(a)  A public entity may not commence a condemnation action 
until it has first adopted a written resolution in substantial conformity with 
this section, authorizing commencement and prosecution of the action.  The authorization 
may be amended or rescinded at any time before or after commencement of the 
condemnation action but if rescinded the public entity shall pay the litigation 
expenses of the condemnee.

 

            
(b)  In addition to other requirements imposed by law, the 
condemnation authorization required by subsection (a) of this section shall 
include:

 

            
(i)  A general statement of the proposed public use for which 
the property is to be taken and a reference to the specific statute that 
authorizes the taking of the property by the condemnor;

 

            
(ii)  A description of the general location and extent of the 
property to be taken, with sufficient detail for reasonable identification; 
and

 

            
(iii)  A declaration that a taking of the described property is 
necessary and appropriate for the proposed public use. 

 

9These findings are also reflected in the written order in a 
more abbreviated form.  

 

10Inverse condemnation is distinct from eminent domain. 2A 
Julius L. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 6.14 (3d ed. 2001).  Eminent domain 
refers to the legal process by which the government asserts its authority to 
condemn property. Id.  Inverse condemnation is a cause of action a 
landowner may pursue to recover just compensation for a taking of his or her 
property when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted.  Id.; Cheyenne Airport Board v. 
Rogers, 707 P.2d 717 (Wyo. 1985), dismissed, 476 U.S. 1110 (1986).  
The Conners' answer and counterclaim filed April 13, 1998, sets forth a 
counterclaim for inverse condemnation pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-516 
(LexisNexis 2001).