Case Title: Lott v. Circuit Court

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-05-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mikel D. LOTT and Luyen Lott v. The CIRCUIT
COURT of Benton County, et al.

97-16                                              ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered May 27, 1997


1.   Civil procedure -- transfer of interest -- substitution of
     real party in interest permitted. -- Pursuant to Ark. R. Civ.
     P. 17(a) and 25(c), a substitution of the real party in
     interest, upon a transfer of interest, is permitted as a
     procedural matter. 

2.   Appeal & error -- petitioners' argument without merit -- no
     assertion that claim in any way differed from proceeding as it
     was in circuit court. -- Petitioners' argument that, when a
     case is appealed, new claims may not be permitted at the
     appellate level, was inapplicable to the facts; there was no
     assertion that the claim had increased or that it differed
     from the original in any way or that there were new pleadings
     to be considered by the circuit court. 

3.   Prohibition, writ of -- when granted. -- The writ of
     prohibition is an extraordinary writ that is only granted when
     the lower court is wholly without jurisdiction, there are no
     disputed facts, there is no adequate remedy otherwise, and the
     writ is clearly warranted.

4.   Prohibition, writ of -- circuit court not shown to be wholly
     without jurisdiction -- writ denied. -- Where an order
     allowing a new owner of the property, which was the subject of
     the litigation, to be joined with the original owner as a
     party was entered in circuit court, the petitioners' attempt
     to obtain a writ of prohibition, claiming that the joinder
     deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction because the claim
     was not the same as the one tried by county court, was
     unsuccessful; nothing showed that claim was in any way
     different due to the joinder, nor was there any showing that
     the Circuit Court was wholly without jurisdiction; the writ of
     prohibition was denied. 


     Petition for writ of prohibition; denied.
     Mashburn & Taylor, by:  Scott E. Smith, for petitioners.
     Howard L. Slinkard, P.A., by:  Howard L. Slinkard and Pat
Moran, for respondents.

     David Newbern, Justice.
     Cooper Communities, Inc., petitioned the Benton County Court
for the establishment of a private road for purposes of gaining
access from public roads to a tract of land it owned.  The proposed
road crosses properties owned by others, including that of the
petitioners, Mikel D. and Luyen Lott.  The County Court ordered the
road established and ordered payment to the Lotts of damages of
$798.  The Lotts and other landowners whose property would be
crossed by the proposed road appealed to the Circuit Court.  
     Cooper Communities, Inc., sold its tract of land to the Seth
Family Trust and, pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 25(c), moved the
Circuit Court for an order joining or substituting the Trust in its
place in the litigation.  An order allowing the Trust to be joined
with Cooper Communities, Inc., as a party was entered.  The Lotts
seek a writ of prohibition, claiming that the joinder deprives the
Circuit Court of jurisdiction because the claim is not the same as
the one tried by the County Court.  We deny the writ.
     The initial, exclusive jurisdiction of county courts with
respect to matters related to county roads is conferred by Ark.
Const. art. 7,  28.  Appeals from decisions of the county courts
are taken to the circuit courts.  Ark. Const. art. 7,  33.  In
support of their claim that the Circuit Court in this case had no
jurisdiction, the Lotts cite art. 7,  28, and two cases.  The more
recent of the two cited cases is Sharp County v. Northeast Arkansas
Planning and Consulting Co., 275 Ark. 172, 628 S.W.2d 559 (1982). 
There, the claim was for a fee said to be owed by Sharp County to
Northeast Arkansas Planning and Consulting Company ("Northeast"). 
The County Court denied the claim.  Northeast appealed, and in the
Circuit Court the County alleged lack of jurisdiction because
Northeast's claim was based upon a payment order of a date
different from the one alleged in the County Court and because it
had reduced the amount of its claim.  We held the claim was the
same, and we could see no reason for holding that a reduction in
the amount sought was prejudicial to the County.  Although the case
did not involve substitution, or even joinder, of a new party, we
wrote the following obiter dictum:

          We have held that on appeal from the county court, the
     circuit court could not allow a substitution of parties since
     this would permit the circuit court to exercise original
     jurisdiction,  McLain v. Miller County, 180 Ark. 828, 23 S.W.2d 264 (1930) ....

Sharp County v. Northeast Arkansas Planning and Consulting Co., 275
Ark. at 173-74, 628 S.W.2d  at 560.
     In the McLain case, which is the other decision cited by the
Lotts, the original claimant against Miller County was the Miller
County Judge who, not surprisingly, was granted relief on his claim
by the County Court, which consisted of himself.  In the Circuit
Court it became apparent that the County Judge had collected from
the County a debt that was not even ostensibly owed to him but was
owed to his sisters.  The Circuit Court overruled the County
Judge's motion to substitute his sisters as the proper claimants
because the procedural code did not allow for such a substitution
and because original jurisdiction lay in the County Court.  We
affirmed.
     As to the first holding in the McLain case, the law has
changed.  It is now clear that a substitution of the real party in
interest, upon a transfer of interest, is permitted as a procedural
matter.  Ark. R. Civ. P. 17(a) and 25(c).  As to the second
holding, concerning jurisdiction of a county court, there is an
important distinction between the McLain case and this one. 
     The original plaintiff in the McLain case had no claim in
either the County Court or the Circuit Court.  He was not even a
party to the notes he sought to enforce.  To the contrary, the case
now before us was prosecuted originally in the County Court by
Cooper Communities, Inc., whose standing at that stage of the
proceedings is not questioned. 
     The essence of the Lotts' argument is that, when a case is
appealed, new claims may not be permitted at the appellate level. 
There is no assertion that the claim has increased or that it
differs from the original in any way or that there are new
pleadings to be considered by the Circuit Court.  While the Lotts
offer speculation that the Seth Family Trust may have access needs
that differ from those of Cooper Communities, Inc., or may seek a
different route for the road, we see no evidence of it.
     The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary writ that is only
granted when the lower court is wholly without jurisdiction, there
are no disputed facts, there is no adequate remedy otherwise, and
the writ is clearly warranted.  Bonnell v. Smith,  322 Ark. 141,
908 S.W.2d 74 (1995); State v. Pulaski County Circuit-Chancery
Court, 316 Ark. 473,