Case Title: In re Ochoa

Citation: 

Docket Number: S49651

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: AUGUST 15, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

Inquiry Concerning a Judge re:
THE HONORABLE JOSEPH V. OCHOA,
	Accused.
(CJFD 01-047; SC S49651)

	On review of the Commission on Judicial Fitness and
Disability Stipulation of Facts and Consent to Censure.
	Submitted on the record June 19, 2002.
	David A. Hilgemann, Salem, attorney for accused.
	Susan D. Isaacs, Lake Oswego, and John C. Fisher, Eugene,
attorneys for Commission on Judicial Fitness and Disability.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.*
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is censured.
	*Leeson, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
		PER CURIAM
		This is a proceeding under ORS 1.420, (1) ORS 1.430, (2) and
Article VII (Amended), section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, to
inquire into the conduct of a circuit court judge.  The Oregon
Commission on Judicial Fitness and Disability (Commission) and
the accused, Honorable Joseph V. Ochoa, a judge of the Circuit
Court of the State of Oregon for Marion County, agreed to a
Stipulation of Facts and Consent to Censure (censure), in which
the accused stipulated that he engaged in conduct that violated
the Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct JR 1-101(A) (observing high
standards of conduct and acting in manner that promotes public
confidence); JR 1-101(C) (engaging in conduct reflecting
adversely on judge's character, competence, temperament, or
fitness to serve as judge); and JR 2-110(B) (acting in manner
that indicates bias or prejudice toward, e.g., lawyers).
		We set out the censure in pertinent part:
"STIPULATED FACTS
		"If a contested hearing were held in this matter,
clear, cogent and convincing evidence would be
presented sufficient to establish the following facts:
		"1.	The Honorable Joseph V. Ochoa, Respondent,
has been a Circuit Judge of the State of Oregon for the
County of Marion from March 7, 1994 to the present.
		"2.	The Respondent was assigned responsibility
for State v. Ivaschenko (Marion County Case No. 00 C
40947) on April 29, 2000.  Ivaschenko was charged with
several felonies.  If convicted on all counts, he faced
a minimum prison term of 90 months.
		"3.	The Defendant was represented by attorney
Edward Leroy Dunkerly.
		"4.	On or about March 8, 2001, Dunkerly filed a
motion to postpone the April 9, 2001 trial date.  The
motion was originally set for hearing on April 6, 2001. 
Respondent later rescheduled the hearing on Defendant's
motion to postpone for March 29, 2001.
		"5.	Respondent's judicial assistant called
Dunkerly to advise him that the hearing had been moved
to March 29, 2001 because that date had cleared on the
Respondent's schedule.  Dunkerly inquired of the
assistant about the possibility of resolving the motion
on an earlier date because he had the opportunity to go
to Europe with his wife, daughter and son-in-law if the
trial was continued.  Dunkerly was advised by the
assistant that the Respondent's schedule was full, so a
hearing on his motion could not be earlier.  When
Dunkerly inquired about a possible telephonic hearing,
he was advised to make the request in writing.
		"6.	Because Dunkerly wanted to know as soon as
possible whether the continuance would be granted, he
went personally to the Marion County Courthouse on
March 24, 2001 to deliver his motion for an accelerated
hearing.  When Dunkerly learned that Respondent had
left earlier that day and would not be returning until
March 29, 2001, he sought out the presiding judge.  The
presiding judge referred him to another judge, who
granted the motion for a continuance in Respondent's
absence.
		"7.	When Respondent returned to work on March 29,
2001, he discovered Dunkerly had obtained the
postponement in his absence.  The Respondent became
very angry.
		"8.	Respondent left a message on Dunkerly's voice
mail advising that he had rescinded the judge's order
continuing the trial and criticized Dunkerly for having
'gone behind his back.'
		"9.	Respondent required the in-custody defendant
to appear for a hearing in court without counsel on the
morning of March 29, 2001.  Respondent told the
Defendant he would insist that the trial go forward
with or without Dunkerly.
		"10.	Respondent made disparaging comments about
Dunkerly to the Defendant in court.  Respondent stated
that Dunkerly wanted a continuance so that he could go
to Europe and was probably using the thousands of
dollars paid to him by the defendant's family to go to
Europe rather than try the defendant's case.
		"11.	After receipt of Respondent's telephone
message from his office, Dunkerly changed his schedule
and returned from Europe early to deal with the
situation.  Dunkerly eventually withdrew from
representation of the defendant because he felt the
attorney/client relationship was irreparably harmed by
Respondent's conduct.
		"12.  Respondent ultimately recused himself from
the case.
		"13.	The Respondent has been forthright and
cooperative in his response to the complaint herein and
fully cooperative in the investigation.  He has
admitted the wrongful nature of his conduct.  At the
time of the incident, the Respondent was dealing with
serious health and family issues which had a negative
affect [sic] on his temperament.  Since the incident
the Respondent has taken substantial steps, including
regular consultation with colleagues, counselors and
medical professionals, in an attempt to insure that
similar conduct does not occur in the future.
"CONSENT TO CENSURE
		"1.	Respondent agrees and stipulates that the
behaviors described above are violations of Sections JR
1-101(A), JR 1-101(C) and JR 2-110(B) of the Oregon
Code of Judicial Conduct adopted by the Oregon Supreme
Court.
		"2.	Respondent agrees and stipulates that based
on such facts, the Commission could find that
Respondent's conduct justifies censure and recommend
the censure to the Oregon Supreme Court.
		"3.	Respondent agrees to execute, and does hereby
execute, this consent to censure as authorized by the
terms of ORS 1.420(c), et seq."
		Pursuant to ORS 1.430(2), the court has reviewed the
stipulation of facts and the disciplinary action to which the
accused has consented.  The court approves the consent to
censure.
		The accused is censured.


1. 	ORS 1.420(1)(c) provides:
		"The [Commission on Judicial Fitness and
Disability] may allow the judge to execute a consent to
censure * * *[.]  If a consent is entered into under
this paragraph, the judge and the commission must enter
into a written stipulation of facts.  The consent and
stipulation of facts shall be submitted by the
commission to the Supreme Court."

2. 	ORS 1.430(2) provides, in part:
		"If the [Commission on Judicial Fitness and
Disability] has agreed to allow the judge to submit a
consent to censure, * * * the Supreme Court shall
review the stipulation of facts and the disciplinary
action to which the judge has consented.  If the
Supreme Court approves the consent, the court shall
censure the judge[.]"