Case Title: State v. Butler

Citation: 655 So. 2d 1123

Docket Number: 83752

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1995-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
655 So. 2d 1123 (1995)
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Yama BUTLER, Respondent.
No. 83752.

Supreme Court of Florida.
June 1, 1995.
*1124 Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., James W. Rogers, Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals, and Sonya Roebuck Horbelt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Abel Gomez, Asst. Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for respondent.
ANSTEAD, Justice.
We have for review Butler v. State, 634 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), which certified conflict with State v. Flowers, 566 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), and State v. Brown, 556 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We quash the decision below and approve State v. Flowers, 566 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), and State v. Brown, 556 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
Respondent Yama Butler was charged with possession of cocaine in violation of section 893.13(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1991). Butler claimed that his arrest was illegal because the officer arresting him lacked probable cause for believing Butler had committed a crime. Butler filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized upon his arrest. When the motion was denied, Butler pled nolo contendere, expressly reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. On appeal, the district court reversed the trial court's denial of Butler's motion to suppress, but certified conflict with other district court opinions.
The evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing, considered in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the State, reflects that at about 11:30 p.m. on April 25, 1992, Officer Putnam was contacted by a known confidential police informant. Putnam had used information from this informant on at least twenty occasions since February 1, 1992, and sixty to seventy percent of these tips had resulted in felony arrests. The informant told Putnam that a black male, about 5'10" tall, wearing a black jacket, white t-shirt, and blue jeans, was selling *1125 powdered cocaine on the sidewalk in front of 726 West Beaver Street, a location known to Putnam to be part of an area with a high volume of street level drug sales. Putnam had seized crack cocaine two months earlier at this exact location. The informant told Putnam that the described drug seller wrapped cocaine inside rolled-up one-dollar bills and placed them in his pants pocket, ready to sell.
Within fifteen minutes of receiving this tip, Putnam and another officer saw Butler standing on the sidewalk in front of 726 West Beaver Street. Butler's clothes and appearance exactly matched the description given by the informant, and Putnam noted that the only other person located in the vicinity did not meet this description. Putnam then approached Butler who initially turned as if to walk away, but then stopped. Putnam patted Butler down on the outside of his clothing and felt a large, soft bulge in Butler's left front pants' pocket, which he believed to be money. Putnam asked Butler about the bulge, and Butler responded that it was twenty-eight one-dollar bills. Putnam then reached into Butler's pocket and retrieved the folded money (i.e., twenty-seven or twenty-eight bills), but found no cocaine. However, when Putnam reached into the pocket again, he retrieved another folded dollar bill which contained powdered cocaine as the informant had described. Putnam then formally took Butler into custody.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding there was probable cause for a warrantless arrest and search predicated on the information received from the informant and considering the totality of the circumstances known to the police officer.
This Court is bound, on search and seizure issues, to follow the opinions of the United States Supreme Court regardless of whether the claim of an illegal arrest or search is predicated upon the provisions of the Florida or United States Constitutions. See Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const.; Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 990-91 (Fla. 1988). Accordingly, we must determine whether the First District's analysis is consistent with the "totality of circumstances" analysis for determining probable cause as adopted in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983).
Prior to Gates, the United States Supreme Court established a probable cause analysis that came to be known as the "Aguilar-Spinelli two-prong test." This analysis was formulated in the decisions in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969).
At issue in Aguilar was the sufficiency of a search warrant affidavit which stated:
378 U.S.  at 109, 84 S. Ct.  at 1511. The Court found the affidavit inadequate, reasoning:
Id. at 113-15, 84 S. Ct.  at 1513-14 (footnotes & citations omitted). This last quoted paragraph contains what became known as "Aguilar's two-pronged test."[4]
Under the first or "basis of knowledge" prong of the Aguilar analysis, facts must be disclosed demonstrating the basis of a police informant's knowledge that evidence of crime would be found. Under the second, "veracity" prong, facts must be revealed which indicate either the credibility of the informant or the reliability of his information on the particular occasion. Thus, the second or veracity prong was said to have a "credibility spur" and a "reliability spur." 1 Wayne R. Lafave, Search and Seizure § 3.3(a), at 613 (2d ed. 1987). Both prongs of the Aguilar test needed to be satisfied for a finding of probable cause.
The "veracity" prong of the Aguilar test was usually established by the prior record of the informant in providing reliable tips that proved accurate. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (officer testified that he had been acquainted with informant for about a year and that during this period informant had supplied him with information 15 or 16 times which resulted in numerous arrests and convictions; another officer also testified that he had used the same informant 20 to 25 times which led to many convictions). Only if the informant's credibility could not be established was it necessary to consider the alternative reliability spur of the veracity prong of Aguilar. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1971) (holding that declaration against interest meets reliability spur).
The most direct way of establishing the basis of knowledge prong of the Aguilar test was by explicitly setting out how the informant claimed to have come by the information he gave to the officer. Lafave, supra, at 615; see Spinelli, 393 U.S.  at 425, 89 S. Ct.  at 593 (White, J., concurring). However, the Spinelli Court also held that the absence of a direct showing as to the informant's knowledge was not necessarily fatal, if a basis of knowledge could be established from the wealth of detail provided in the tip:
393 U.S.  at 416-17, 89 S. Ct.  at 589-90 (footnote omitted).[5]
Justice White, in his concurring opinion in Spinelli, provided a further explanation for this "self-verifying detail method" of satisfying the "basis of knowledge" prong of Aguilar:
Id. at 425-26, 89 S. Ct.  at 594 (citation omitted).
Following Aguilar and Spinelli, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly relied on a variety of relevant corroborating facts known by the police in evaluating the use and sufficiency of an informant's tip as a primary basis for establishing probable cause. 1 Wayne R. Lafave, Search and Seizure § 3.3(f), at 677 (2d ed. 1987). Sometimes the court utilized evidence of corroboration where there was no explicit showing of the informant's basis of knowledge, see Draper, 358 U.S.  at 313, 79 S. Ct.  at 333; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 36, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1631, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 739-40 (1963); while at other times it appears the Court was using evidence of corroboration because the informant's veracity was not otherwise established. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1971); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1980). And sometimes it appears the Court used evidence of corroboration for both reasons. See Aguilar; Spinelli; Gates. One legal commentator has observed: "Moreover, the type of information considered as tending to corroborate has ranged from the innocent conduct in Draper to that which itself created `strong suspicion' in Ker." Lafave, supra, at *1128 681.[6]
The Aguilar-Spinelli structure for analysis was reconsidered in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), where the majority decided
462 U.S.  at 238-39, 103 S. Ct.  at 2332 (citations omitted). Ultimately, the Court held that, with respect to the two prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, an informant's veracity or reliability and his basis of knowledge are merely "relevant considerations" in an overall totality of circumstances analysis. Id.[7]
The Gates opinion also addresses the role that corroboration of innocent details plays in the probable cause analysis. The Court first rejects the argument that corroboration of innocent activity, alone, may not be sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. 462 U.S.  at 244 n. 13, 103 S. Ct.  at 2335 n. 13. It notes that "probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity."[8]*1129 The Court then states that it "is perfectly reasonable" for innocent behavior to
Id.
In its analysis, the District Court invalidated Butler's search and arrest on two grounds. First, it found that there was insufficient detail in the CI's tip as to the source of the CI's knowledge. And, second, it found that the police failed to corroborate the information in the tip through independent police work. The District Court fleshed out the basis for its conclusion as follows:
634 So. 2d  at 704 (citations omitted). As indicated earlier, the District Court certified conflict with two cases: State v. Flowers, 566 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), and State v. Brown, 556 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). Those cases followed State v. Edwards, 547 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
In Edwards, the Second District was faced with a CI's tip[9] which provided the following information:
Id. at 184. After the police verified every detail of this tip, the CI called again and told the police that the pickup would leave the ABC Lounge in five minutes. Approximately five minutes later, the police observed the vehicle leaving with Edwards driving. The truck was stopped and the police searched Edwards and the truck. Cocaine was seized. In its analysis, the Edwards court noted the factual similarity to Draper, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327 (1959). The court also concluded that:
Id. at 185 (citation omitted).
Subsequently, in Brown the Second District was confronted with the following circumstances:
556 So. 2d 790. The Brown Court upheld the search and arrest by relying on the Edwards holding that "once police verified all but the `final detail' of the informant's tip they had probable cause to arrest and thus to search." Id.
In the third case, Flowers, a detective received a telephone call from an informant who had previously proven reliable and with whom the detective had worked for years:
566 So. 2d  at 51. The district court then reasoned:
Id. The court upheld the arrest and search because the details of the tip in the case "are easily as detailed, if not more so, than in Brown and Edwards." Id.
In this case, we have an informant whose veracity (i.e., credibility and reliability) is unquestioned. Officer Putnam had used information from this informant at least 20 times, and 60 to 70% of the tips resulted in felony arrests. As the district court acknowledged, the informant's reliability is "fairly well established." See Butler, 634 So. 2d  at 704. We agree there is a "strong showing" in support of the informant's veracity.
As the district court correctly notes, the informant's tip did not contain the precise basis of his knowledge. See id. However, the informant's tip did provide an abundance of overall detail. Cf. Holmes v. State, 549 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). The informant told the police the following information about Butler: his height (5' 10"), race (African-American), *1131 type of clothing (black jacket, white t-shirt, and blue jeans), location (on the sidewalk in front of 726 Beaver Street), type of drugs sold (cocaine), location of drugs sold (pants pocket), and method of delivery (rolled-up one-dollar bills). Even under the prior rigid requirements of Spinelli, a sufficient basis of personal knowledge may be inferred from the wealth of detail that the informant provided.
In addition to the Draper-type detail, it is possible to infer personal knowledge from the detail of the informant's description of the manner of packaging of the drugs and their exact location on Butler's person. When construed in the State's favor, the detail in the informant's tip also precludes characterizing it as a "meager report [that] could easily have been obtained from an offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar." See Spinelli, 393 U.S.  at 417, 89 S. Ct.  at 589. Further, any weakness on this issue may be bolstered in part by the strong showing of the informant's prior veracity.
Similarly, under Gates and its progeny, we conclude that the seemingly innocent activity observed here could be used by the police to verify the informant's tip. Within minutes of receiving the tip, the police corroborated every item in the tip except the ultimate determination of whether Butler had any drugs on his person. In this respect, this case can be likened to Draper where the police verified all of the information in the tip except whether the defendant would have heroin with him. There were also other "circumstances within the Officer's knowledge" that, while perhaps not significant in isolation, appear to bolster a probable cause determination: the house in front of which Butler was standing was a house from which Putnam had seized crack cocaine two months earlier and was located in a "high drug area," Butler, 634 So. 2d  at 701; and, upon arriving at the scene of the arrest, Putnam observed Butler turn and attempt to walk up a set of stairs. Id. at 707 (Lawrence, J., dissenting).
Under the totality of the circumstances, including the credible informant, the detailed tip, and the corroborating circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court erred in determining that Officer Putnam possessed sufficient knowledge to conclude that there was a probability of criminal activity on the part of Butler.
Our decision should not be understood to undercut the importance of the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement. Likewise, we caution that in many instances a tip from an informant, standing alone, will not justify a finding of probable cause for an arrest or search. However, as the Gates Court emphasized: "an informant's `veracity,' `reliability' and `basis of knowledge' are highly relevant in determining the value of [an informant's] report." 462 U.S.  at 230, 103 S. Ct.  at 2328. Our decision is also influenced by the great deference we accord a trial court's determination on a motion to suppress, and the presumption of fair inferences in favor of the prevailing party. See Doctor v. State, 596 So. 2d 442, 447 (Fla. 1992).
Because we conclude the district court's analysis is inconsistent with the controlling decision of the United States Supreme Court in Gates, we quash the decision below and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., concur.
[1]  These facts are taken substantially from the district court opinion. See Butler, 634 So. 2d  at 701-02.
[2]  See Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 54 S. Ct. 11, 78 L. Ed. 159 (1933) (holding that lawful search warrant may not issue upon affidavit which simply says that affiant "has cause to suspect and does believe that certain merchandise" held in violation of law is to be found on certain premises).
[3]  See Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S. Ct. 1245, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1503 (1958) (holding insufficient arrest warrant complaint which simply said that on specified date "Giordenello did receive, conceal, etc., narcotic drugs, to-wit: heroin hydrochloride with knowledge of unlawful importation.").
[4]  This test was applied to either an arrest or search without a warrant. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967).
[5]  Although the Spinelli Court uses the facts in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327 (1959), to illustrate the self-verifying detail situation, it is important to note that Draper was not decided upon such a basis. Rather, Draper was based upon another device for "rehabilitating" what would otherwise be an insufficient or incomplete report of an informant: partial corroboration.
[6]  Because of its factual similarity, Draper is illustrative of the nature and use of "partial corroboration" by the Court. In Draper, an informant who had given reliable information in the past indicated to the police that Draper would be returning from Chicago by train with three ounces of heroin. The informant described Draper and his clothing, and also noted that Draper would be carrying a tan zipper bag and that he habitually walked fast. When a person so described got off the train, he was arrested and searched, resulting in the discovery of heroin. The Court upheld the seizure and reasoned that "with every other bit of [the informant's] information being thus personally verified," the surveilling agent had probable cause "that the remaining unverified bit of [the informant's] information  that Draper, would have heroin with him  was likewise true." 358 U.S.  at 313, 79 S. Ct.  at 333. "The Draper Court did not indicate specifically what defect the corroboration remedied, but inasmuch as the basis of the informant's knowledge was never revealed it seemed that the Court somehow thought that the corroboration ... sufficed in lieu of his failure to explain its source." Lafave, supra, at 678.
[7]  The Court's rationale for abandonment of the Aguilar-Spinelli test was premised on a number of considerations, including: (1) the "totality of-the-circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause" as a "practical, nontechnical conception," "a fluid concept ... not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules," 462 U.S.  at 230-31, 232, 103 S. Ct.  at 2328, 2329; (2) the two elements of the Aguilar-Spinelli test should not have an "independent status"; instead, "a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability," id. at 233, 103 S. Ct.  at 2329; (3) the "`two-pronged test' has encouraged an excessively technical dissection of informants' tips, with undue attention being focused on isolated issues," id. at 234, 103 S. Ct.  at 2330; and (4) "an informant's `veracity,' `reliability' and `basis of knowledge'" are not "entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case;" "[r]ather, ... they should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is `probable cause'." Id. at 230, 103 S. Ct.  at 2328.

For proposition two above the Court offers two examples. The first example is particularly instructive in our case:
If, for example, a particular informant is known for the unusual reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal activities in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly set forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not serve as an absolute bar to a finding of probable cause based on his tip.
462 U.S.  at 233, 103 S. Ct.  at 2329-30.
[8]  In making this statement, the Court is referring to its earlier assertion that "only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause." Gates, 462 U.S.  at 235, 103 S. Ct.  at 2330 (quoting Spinelli, 393 U.S.  at 419, 89 S.Ct. at 590).
[9]  The CI had previously given the police information concerning names and locations of drug suppliers and drug locations, but this information never served as a basis for a warrant. Edwards, 547 So. 2d  at 184 n.[*].