Case Title: ROBERT DUDLEY v. EAST RIDGE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, A Utah Limited Partnership, and PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, A Utah Corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-01-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROBERT DUDLEY v. EAST RIDGE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, A Utah Limited Partnership, and PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, A Utah Corporation1985 WY 15694 P.2d 113Case Number: 84-89Decided: 01/25/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROBERT DUDLEY, APPELLANT 
(THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT), 

v. 

EAST RIDGE DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, A UTAH LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, AND PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, A UTAH 
CORPORATION, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS AND THIRD-PARTY 
PLAINTIFFS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
Les Bowron, 
Casper, for appellant.

Mark W. Gifford 
of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, Massey & Sullivan, Casper, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROONEY, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, Justice.

[¶1.]     The trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Eastridge Development Company and Price Development 
Company. Robert Dudley appeals that order and raises the following 
issues:

1. "Whether the district 
court erred in not allowing plaintiff's witnesses Pope and Woodworth to testify 
orally at the summary judgment proceeding.

2. "Whether the district 
court erred in concluding that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact."

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     The action was 
initially brought by Lower and Company, Inc., a construction firm, against 
Lowrey Organ and Piano Center, Inc., Price Development Company, East Ridge 
Development Company, and others to foreclose Lower and Company's materialmen's 
liens for work performed on the Lowrey Organ store at the Eastridge Mall in 
Casper. Appellees Price Development Company and East Ridge Development Company 
subsequently filed a third-party action against appellant Dudley, manager of 
Lowrey Organ and Piano Center, Inc., as personal guarantor of the lease between 
Lowrey Organ and Piano Center, Inc. and appellees. The foreclosure action was 
settled and the trial court dismissed that portion of the action. Appellees 
subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on the third party action 
against appellant based on his personal guarantee of the obligations of the 
Lowrey Organ and Piano Center, Inc. The trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the appellees and this appeal ensued.

I

[¶4.]     Appellant subpoenaed 
two witnesses to give oral testimony at the summary judgment hearing. The trial 
court quashed the subpoenas and did not permit the witnesses to 
testify.

[¶5.]     Rule 56, Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure, does not expressly permit nor does it prohibit oral 
testimony at a summary judgment hearing. Rule 43(e), W.R.C.P., generally allows 
oral testimony at motion hearings.1

[¶6.]     We have not had 
occasion to address the question of oral testimony at a summary judgment 
hearing. Appellant refers us to authority to the effect that allowing oral 
testimony is a discretionary matter with the court.

"Rule 43(e), which 
authorizes the use of oral testimony on motions, has been held to be applicable 
to motions for summary judgment, even though Rule 56 is silent on the point. In 
spite of its obvious advantages, the court should use oral testimony on a 
summary judgment motion sparingly and with great care. The purpose of summary 
judgment - providing a speedy adjudication in cases that present no genuine 
issue of material fact - would be compromised if the hearing permitted by Rule 
43(e) and Rule 56(c) became a preliminary trial. * * *" Wright, Miller & 
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2723, pp. 61-62 
(1983).

"* * * Our Rules are 
patterned after the Federal Rules and federal courts have ruled that oral 
testimony may be considered upon motions for summary judgment." Daniels v. Paddock, 145 Mont. 207, 399 P.2d 740, 
743 (1965).

[¶7.]     In Summers v. American Reliable Insurance 
Company, 85 N.M. 224, 511 P.2d 550, 552 (1973), the Supreme Court of New 
Mexico addressed the problem of oral testimony at summary judgment 
hearings:

"The authorities seem to 
be of two views as to whether oral testimony is proper in summary judgment 
proceedings. Rule 56 does not, in terms, authorize it, but does not prohibit it. 
But a pleading seeking summary judgment is, after all, a motion, and Rule 43(e) 
[citation] permits the court to hear oral testimony at a hearing on a motion. 
Permitting oral testimony might take the opposing party by surprise. On the 
other hand, the court would have the benefit of hearing cross examination and 
observing the witness which has certain advantages over affidavits and 
depositions. [Citations.] A decision on the propriety of using oral testimony in 
summary judgment proceedings is unnecessary here, and having confidence in the 
discretion of our trial courts, we decline to adopt any hard and fast rule. * * 
*"

[¶8.]     In the case before us 
there is no indication in the record that appellant made an offer of proof at 
the summary judgment hearing regarding the proposed testimony of the two 
witnesses. We said in Valentine v. 
Ormsbee Exploration Corporation, Wyo., 665 P.2d 452, 460 
(1983):

"This court has long 
followed the rule that the party who seeks to elicit the evidence must make an 
offer of proof showing what that party expected to prove, failing in which he 
may not assert the exclusion as error. [Citations.]"

[¶9.]     We hold that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow appellant to produce 
oral testimony at the summary judgment hearing.

II

[¶10.]  In opposition to appellees' motion for a 
summary judgment, appellant filed an instrument captioned, "Motion in 
Opposition," to which was attached "Joint Affidavits of Robert O. Dudley and 
Diane L. Dudley." This attachment appears to be notarized diary entries. This 
document is a chronology of the contacts between appellant and appellees, and 
records thoughts, feelings and how affiants viewed the legal implications of 
what had been said and done. Most of the entries in the diary are irrelevant and 
hearsay, and very little, if any, would be admissible 
evidence.

[¶11.]  The scope of appellate review of a 
summary judgment is to examine the judgment "* * * in the same light as the 
district court, using the same material and information as did the district 
court. * * *" Lane Company v. Busch 
Development, Inc., Wyo., 662 P.2d 419, 421 (1983). The moving 
party has the burden of showing the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material 
fact. Miller v. Reiman-Wuerth Company, 
Wyo., 598 P.2d 20 (1979). A material fact has been defined as one which, if proved, would 
have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of the 
cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. Shrum v. Zeltwanger, Wyo., 
559 P.2d 1384 (1977). We look at the record from the viewpoint most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion, giving to him all favorable inferences which may 
be drawn from the facts. Bancroft v. Jagusch, Wyo., 611 P.2d 819 
(1980).

[¶12.]  Applying those principles to this case, 
we find the trial court was correct in finding there was no genuine issue of 
material fact. As stated earlier, the basis of the summary judgment was 
appellant's personal guarantee of the lease between appellees and Lowrey Organ 
and Piano Center, Inc. The trial court in its decision letter 
stated:

"* * * The Court finds 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving 
parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Third party defendant 
[appellant] does not question the allegations in the affidavit by the moving 
parties. However, a defense is made on the ground that a construction allowance 
was not paid to third party defendant. However, the contract provides that the 
payment is not due while the tenant is in default under the lease. From the 
uncontradicted allegations in the affidavit, the tenant was in default before 
the allowance was due."

Indeed, the 
affidavit filed in support of appellees' motion for summary judgment alleged 
that appellant had breached his personal guarantee of the obligations assumed by 
Lowrey Organ and Piano Center, Inc., and he was, therefore, liable for the 
construction costs and other expenses resulting from Lowrey's default of the 
lease. As the trial court found, these allegations were not denied by appellant 
in his motion in opposition to summary judgment.

[¶13.]  Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P., governing 
affidavits and other testimony in support or opposition to summary judgments 
states:

"(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; 
defense required. - Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts 
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion 
for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not 
so respond summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him."

[¶14.]  Appellant stresses that the trial court 
ruled without the benefit of the testimony of two people who were subpoenaed but 
not deposed. However, as we noted earlier, there was no offer of proof as to 
what the two witnesses would have testified to. It was not until after the trial 
court granted the summary judgment that counsel for appellant filed a motion for 
rehearing and reconsideration, and attached thereto an affidavit stating what 
the two witnesses' testimony would be. However, the trial court did not have 
this information when the summary judgment was granted. Since we look at the 
evidence in the same light as the district court, we must also find there is no 
genuine issue of any material fact.

[¶15.]  Rule 56(f), W.R.C.P., 
states:

"(f) When affidavits are unavailable. - 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is 
just."

Therefore, 
appellant could have presented reasons to the court below why such testimony 
could not be presented, but this was not done until after the trial court ruled 
on the motion for summary judgment. Appellant could also have filed a motion 
under Rule 6(b), W.R.C.P., requesting more time in which to file his affidavits. 
This also was not done. We addressed this issue in Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 625 P.2d 747, 750 
(1981):

"If opposing affidavits 
cannot be filed, the party opposing the motion for a summary judgment may file 
an affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(f), W.R.C.P., setting forth the reasons why he 
cannot file an opposing affidavit. The party opposing a motion for a summary 
judgment may also or in the alternative file a motion pursuant to Rule 6(b), 
W.R.C.P., requesting enlargement of the time in which to file the affidavits. A 
motion requesting enlargement provided for in Rule 6(b) must be filed before the 
expiration of the time originally prescribed (or extended by previous order). 
Appellant did not avail himself of the relief provided for in Rule 56(f) nor in 
Rule 6(b), W.R.C.P."

[¶16.]  When a party moving for summary judgment 
supports such motion with affidavits pursuant to Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P., and 
supplements the affidavits as provided in that rule, it is clear the other party 
may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in his pleadings to show the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. He must come forward with 
affidavits or other proof to create a genuine issue for the court. Schepps v. Howe, Wyo., 665 P.2d 504 (1983); and Hyatt v. Big Horn School 
District No. 4, Wyo., 636 P.2d 525 (1981). We hold that 
appellant did not come forth with affidavits or other proofs to adequately prove 
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. No ambiguity was found in 
appellant's personal guarantee of the lease and we have held summary judgment 
may be appropriate in cases where a contract is involved if the language of the 
contract is plain and unequivocal. Kuehne 
v. Samedan Oil Corporation, Wyo., 626 P.2d 1035 (1981); and Wyoming Machinery 
Company v. United States 
Fidelity and Guaranty Company, Wyo., 614 P.2d 716 (1980). Appellant raised 
the defense that the construction allowance promised by appellees was never 
paid, but the clear language of the lease provided that such allowance need only 
be paid if Lowrey as tenant was not in default of the lease and if no mechanics' 
or materialmen's liens were filed. The construction allowance was to be paid 
after construction was completed. However, the trial court found that appellant 
had personally guaranteed the lease and obligations of Lowrey Organ and Piano 
Center, Inc., and that appellant's defense of appellees' refusal to pay the 
construction allowance must fail since the allowance did not have to be paid if 
Lowrey was in default of the lease, which it was.

[¶17.]  We find no error in the decision of the 
trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of the appellees. The decision of 
the district court is affirmed.

1 Rule 43(e), 
W.R.C.P.:

"Evidence on motions. - 
When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the 
matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may 
direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or 
depositions."