Case Title: Boo'ze v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 331, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WILLIAM BOO’ZE, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 331, 2003 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID. No. 0203011805 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  January 12, 2004 
Decided:  March 25, 2004 
 
Before BERGER, STEELE, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 25th day of March 2004, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, 
it appears to the Court as follows: 
 
1. 
William Boo’ze appeals jury convictions for multiple offenses relating 
to a land investment transaction.  He seeks review of the trial judge’s denial of a 
motion for acquittal on the offenses relating to the unlawful sale of securities.  On 
appeal he also raises claims of cruel and unusual punishment, speedy trial 
violation, and unreasonable bail.  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the 
judgment of the Superior Court. 
 
2. 
In January 2002, Jean Cordell met Boo’ze, who convinced her that he 
was an experienced land developer.  Boo’ze proposed a transaction in which 
 
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Cordell would invest $40,000 (to be paid from cash advances on her credit cards) 
in land that would be sold in three months for a large profit.  She gave Boo’ze a 
certified check in that amount, which she believed would be used for the down 
payment on the land.  
  
3. 
At the meeting to sign the contract on the land, however, Boo’ze took 
Cordell’s check and then handed the realtor a $5,000 check drawn on the account 
of Boo’ze Investment and Development, Inc.1 (“BIDI”), to pay the deposit.  Boo’ze 
also gave Cordell a promissory note labeled “Promissory Note Secured by 
Collateral $40,000,” wherein he promised to pay 8.25% interest per-year until 
maturity.  Although the note recited that the BIDI stock securing the promissory 
note was worth $40,000, in fact, BIDI’s assets were less than $40,000 at all 
relevant times.  Boo’ze cashed Cordell’s check the same day and deposited 
$30,000 of the proceeds into his BIDI account.  At Boo’ze’s request, Cordell also 
telephoned one of her credit card companies to add Boo’ze as an authorized user 
on her account. 
 
4. 
In the following days, Cordell became concerned and asked Boo’ze 
for her money back.  She also demanded payment of $8,000 in unauthorized 
charges he had made on her credit card.  Boo’ze gave Cordell a ten-day post-dated 
check for $48,000 drawn on his BIDI account.  When Cordell attempted to cash 
                                          
 
1 Boo’ze’s corporation was re-incorporated in Delaware during the preceding month. 
 
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the check, the bank dishonored it because BIDI’s accounts had been closed that 
same morning with a negative balance. 
 
5. 
Boo’ze was arrested on March 19, 2002 on theft, stock, credit card, 
and bad check charges relating to Cordell, theft of services offenses relating to 
vendors from which he purchased services with Cordell’s credit card, and issuance 
of a bad check to George Chamberlain, his landlord.  Boo’ze was incarcerated in 
lieu of eleven million dollars cash bail.  Although his bail was later reduced to 
$78,500, Boo’ze has remained incarcerated since his arrest. 
 
6. 
Boo’ze’s first trial, which began January 28, 2003, ended in a mistrial.  
A second trial began March 25, 2003 and a jury convicted him of eight of the 
sixteen charged offenses.  On June 13, 2003, Boo’ze was sentenced to fourteen 
years incarceration followed by one-year work release. 
7. 
Boo’ze raises four claims of error on appeal:  (1) the trial court erred 
by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the three unlawful sale of 
securities charges, (2) the fourteen year period of incarceration violates his Eighth 
Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment, (3) his speedy trial right 
was violated, and (4) the bail set by the court violated his right against the 
imposition of excessive bail.   
8. 
We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal to 
determine “whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light 
 
4
most favorable to the state, could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”2 
 
9. 
Boo’ze argues that his act of giving a promissory note secured by 
stock in his company to Cordell did not constitute a “sale” of a “security” under the 
Delaware Securities Act.  But, 6 Del. C. § 7302(a)(11) defines a “sale” as 
“every…contract to sell or disposition of a security or interest in a security for 
value,” and 6 Del. C. § 7302(a)(13) defines a “security” as “any note.”  In addition, 
the note states that stock in BIDI was “deposited as collateral security for the 
payment of this note.”  It is settled law that a pledge of stock as collateral for a loan 
is a security for the antifraud purposes of the Delaware Securities Act.3 
10. 
Boo’ze further argues that under the “family resemblance” test set 
forth in Reves v. Ernst & Young,4 the note is not “a security” and that fact mandates 
a judgment of acquittal on the securities charges.  The Reves analysis begins with 
the presumption that all notes are securities.  If, however, a note bears a strong 
“family resemblance” to one of six enumerated types of notes, the presumption is 
overcome and the note will not be deemed a security.5 
                                          
 
2 Bryson v. State, 2003 Del. LEXIS 45 at *2-3 (Del. 2003). 
3 XComp, Inc. v. Ropp, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 79 (Del. Ch. 2000), aff’d, XComp, Inc. v. Ropp, 
825 A.2d 239 (Del. 2003), adopting United States v. Rubin, 449 U.S. 424 (1989).   
4 494 U.S. 56, (1990). 
5 These types are a “note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by a mortgage on a 
home, the short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or some of its assets, the note 
evidencing a "character" loan to a bank customer, short-term notes secured by an assignment of 
accounts receivable, or a note which simply formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the 
 
5
11. 
There are four factors that courts must consider to determine whether 
a note is a security.  The first is the motivation of the reasonable seller and buyer 
for entering into the transaction.  “If the seller's purpose is to raise money for the 
general use of a business enterprise or to finance substantial investments and the 
buyer is interested primarily in the profit the note is expected to generate, the 
instrument is likely to be a ‘security.’”6  Here, Cordell clearly entered into the 
transaction with the expectation of profit. 
12. 
Second, the court evaluates whether the instrument is one in which 
there is “common trading for speculation or investment.”7  In this case, the note 
recited that it was transferable to any third party, which would include a broad 
spectrum of individuals.  In Reves, the fact that a note was “offered and sold to a 
broad segment of the public” was all the United States Supreme Court held was 
necessary to establish the requisite "common trading" in an instrument.8 
13. 
The third factor is the reasonable expectation of the investing public.  
“The Court will consider instruments to be ‘securities’ on the basis of such public 
expectations, even where an economic analysis of the circumstances of the 
particular transaction might suggest that the instruments are not ‘securities’ as used 
                                                                                                                                        
ordinary course of business (particularly if, as in the case of the customer of a broker, it is 
collateralized).” Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976), cited 
with approval in Reves. 
6 Reves, 494 U.S. at 66. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 68. 
 
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in that transaction.”9  As stated above, Cordell expected to return a significant 
profit on her investment; she was not otherwise disposed, or in a position, to make 
a business loan to BIDI. 
14. 
Fourth, the court must determine “whether some factor such as the 
existence of another regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the 
instrument, thereby rendering application of the Securities Acts unnecessary.”10  
Boo’ze argues that Title 11 of the Delaware Code is an alternative regulatory 
scheme that makes application of the Securities Act unnecessary in this instance.  
His argument is misconceived, because the Reves court contemplates a regulatory, 
risk-reduction scheme such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or 
ERISA.  The criminal code is not designed to regulate the distribution of 
promissory notes, and therefore is not an alternative regulatory scheme. 
15. 
The promissory note pledging shares of BIDI stock as collateral for 
the $40,000 Cordell gave to Boo’ze satisfies the criteria listed above.  Therefore, 
the trial judge correctly determined it was “a security,” and did not err by denying 
Boo’ze’s motion for judgment of acquittal. 
 
16. 
This Court reviews the sentence of a defendant in a criminal case 
under an abuse of discretion standard.11  Appellate review of a sentence generally 
                                          
 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 69. 
11 Fink v. State, 817 A.2d 781, 790 (Del. 2003). 
 
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ends if the sentence falls within the statutory limits prescribed by the legislature.12  
Thus, in reviewing a sentence within statutory limits, this Court will not find error 
of law or abuse of discretion unless it is clear from the record that a sentence has 
been imposed on the basis of demonstrably false information or information 
lacking minimal indicia of reliability.13  In reviewing a sentence within the 
statutory guidelines, this Court will not find error unless it is clear that the 
sentencing judge relied on impermissible factors or exhibited a closed mind.14 
17. 
Boo’ze claims that his fourteen-year sentence violates his Eighth 
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, because his sentence is 
grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed, even when compared to those 
sentences handed down under the habitual offender statute.   
18. 
Sentences under the habitual offender statute are unconstitutional if 
they are grossly disproportionate to the conduct being punished.  Crosby v. State,15 
established a two-step analysis to determine whether an habitual offender’s 
sentence is grossly disproportionate to the conduct being punished.  First, the 
sentence is compared to the crime committed, and only if that comparison gives 
rise to an inference of gross disproportionality will the Court then proceed to the 
                                          
 
12 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d at 843. 
13 Id. 
14 Fink at 790. 
15 824 A.2d 894 (Del. 2003). 
 
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second step:  a comparison of the defendant’s sentence with similar cases.16  To 
date, this test has only been applied to habitual offenders.  The State did not 
petition to have Boo’ze declared an habitual offender pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 
4214, despite a record of 17 convictions between 1965 and 1998, which included 7 
felonies.  Boo’ze urges us to apply a disproportionality analysis here. 
19. 
The State argues that absent habitual offender status, “appellate 
review of sentences is extremely limited.”17  Because the sentence falls within the 
statutory guidelines, the State asserts, the inquiry should end there, but even if the 
Court were inclined to review the appropriateness of the sentence, it still was 
proper.  Here, the State argues that the trial judge acted appropriately by exceeding 
the presumptive sentence on each count because of aggravating factors, namely, 
(1) the severity of the offense, (2) Boo’ze’s status as a probationer, (3) his criminal 
history of conviction on seventeen sets of offenses from 1965 to 1998, and (4) the 
fact that his conduct qualified as aggravating circumstances under SENTAC 
guidelines.18 
20. 
Boo’ze was convicted of three securities-related charges, which are 
classified for sentencing purposes as Nonviolent Felony E.  That classification 
                                          
 
16 Id. at 906. 
17Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839 (Del. 1992). 
18 These are:  Repetitive criminal conduct, need for correctional treatment, undue depreciation of 
offense, major economic offense or series of offenses, custody status at the time of the offense, 
and lack of amenability. 
 
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carries a statutory range of 0-5 years, with an aggravated presumptive sentence of 
up to 12 months at level 5.19  Boo’ze received 2 years at level 5 for each offense, 
plus one-year level 4 reintegration.  Boo’ze was also convicted of two counts of 
Issuing a Bad Check Over $1,000,20 Theft of Services Over $1,000,21 Unlawful 
Use of Credit Card Over $1,000.22 Each of these offenses is classified as a 
Nonviolent Felony G, which carries a statutory range of 0-2 years and an 
aggravated presumptive sentence of up to 12 months at level 5.  Boo’ze was 
acquitted on the charge of Conspiracy Second Degree.23   
21. 
Boo’ze urges that he should have received the aggravated sentence 
only for the most serious offense.  The SENTAC guidelines provide that “[w]hen 
sentencing on multiple charges, prior criminal history should be considered only in 
determining sentence for the “lead” or most serious offense.  Sentences for other 
current charges shall be calculated on zero criminal history.”24 
22. 
A trial judge may impose a sentence outside the presumed sentence if 
there are “substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.”25  
Here the trial judge acted appropriately within his discretion by relying on the 
                                          
 
19 Appellant erroneously states that the aggravated presumptive sentence is up to 15 months; this 
was reduced to 12 months effective May 31, 2003; Boo’ze was sentenced on June 13, 2003. 
20 One of these counts was indicted as “Issuing a Bad Check Over $10,000,” however, the state 
provides no statutory authority for the distinction.  11 Del. C. § 900(a). 
21 11 Del. C. § 841, 845. 
22 11 Del. C. § 903. 
23 11 Del. C. § 512. 
24 SENTAC Benchbook, 2003-2004 (Jan. 2004) p. 67. 
25 Id. at 63. 
 
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aggravating factors as “substantial and compelling reasons” that justify sentencing 
Boo’ze outside the presumptive range.   
 
23. 
Boo’ze next claims that his right to a speedy trial was violated.  The 
standard of review for a legal determination that a defendant did not establish a 
violation of his speedy trial right is de novo.  “[T]he factual underpinnings of these 
legal conclusions are reviewed for clear error.”26 
 
24. 
In Delaware, the four-part Barker27 test applies to determine whether a 
defendant received a speedy trial.  The court evaluates:  (1) the length of the delay, 
(2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial rights, 
and (4) prejudice to the defendant.28  If, however, the length of the delay is not 
presumptively prejudicial, the court will not examine the remaining three factors.29  
25. 
Boo’ze’s first trial began just over ten months after his arrest, and the 
case was concluded within one year and fifteen days.  The case was a complex 
financial case that involved one mistrial, which the trial court did not attribute to 
intentional conduct by the State.  A delay of this length might be considered 
presumptively prejudicial in some circumstances.30  Accordingly, the remaining 
factors will be considered. 
                                          
 
26 Burkett v. Fulcomer, 951 F.2d 1431, 1437 (3d Cir. 1991). 
27 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 
28 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002), citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 
530 (1972). 
29 Id. 
30 Tramill v. State, 425 A.2d 142 (Del. 1980). 
 
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26. 
The reasons for the delay included a defense request for a continuance 
in September 2002, the withdrawal of five attorneys representing the defendant due 
to conflicts, and then two continuances in January 2003 because of the recent 
appointment of acceptable defense counsel.  Where, as here, the reason for the 
delay is attributable to the defendant, then defendant has waived speedy trial 
claims for that delay.31 
 
27. 
The next Barker factor is the defendant’s assertion of his rights.  
Boo’ze did not assert his speedy trial rights until January 27, 2003, after he had 
already received the benefit of the delay.  Waiting until the day before trial to 
assert speedy trial rights is at best impermissible and at worst a waiver of this 
claim. 
 
28. 
Finally, Boo’ze fails to demonstrate prejudice.  He does not claim that 
any defense witness died or became unavailable because of the delay, or that he 
was unable to present a defense, or that witness recollections had faded.  Minimal 
prejudice to a defendant weighs against a claim of speedy trial violation.32  We find 
none here. 
 
29. 
A trial judge has discretion to set bail and to modify bail conditions 
for a defendant charged with noncapital felonies.33  We review a trial judge’s bail 
                                          
 
31 Id. at 143-4. 
32 Barker at 534. 
33 See 11 Del. C. ch. 21.  Moxley v. State, 1995 Del. LEXIS 452  *4-5 (Del. 1995). 
 
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determination for abuse of discretion.34  Here, the trial judge evaluated the 
statutory factors in setting Boo’ze’s bail and properly denied his motion for 
reduction of bail found in 11 Del. C. § 2105: 
(b) In determining whether the accused is likely to appear as required 
and that there will be no substantial risk to the safety of the 
community the court shall, on the basis of available information, take 
into consideration the nature and circumstances of the crime charged, 
the family ties of the accused, the accused's employment, financial 
resources, character and mental condition, the length of residence in 
the community, record of convictions, record of appearances at court 
proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at 
court proceedings.35 
 
 
30. 
Boo’ze had no residence or address in Delaware at the time of his 
arrest.  He also had a history of non-appearance (from 12/28/98 until 3/14/01 he 
was on outstanding capias status in an unrelated fraud case and had to be 
extradited to Delaware).  In the 1998 case, the victim had lost $30,000 in a nearly 
identical scheme.  Boo’ze had an extensive criminal history and had continued to 
commit crimes of theft and dishonesty despite periods of incarceration and 
probation.  Finally, the crimes charged constituted a major economic crime; and 
the crimes against Cordell occurred while Boo’ze was on probation status for a 
virtually identical crime. 
31. 
Given these factors, the trial judge acted appropriately within his 
discretion by setting the cash bond at a high level designed to ensure that Boo’ze 
                                          
 
34 State v. Flowers, 330 A.2d 146 (Del. 1974). 
35 11 Del. C. § 2105. 
 
13
would appear for trial.  Furthermore, Boo’ze offers no basis for his argument that, 
had the bail been excessive, it would justify reversal of his convictions.  The only 
prejudice claimed is that “defendant’s release from custody was vital to the 
understanding of those [thousands of] documents and the assistance he could have 
rendered counsel in preparing for trial.”  It is difficult to imagine what additional 
assistance in understanding documents Boo’ze could have provided if released on 
bail, that he could not have provided while he was incarcerated. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the judgment of the Superior 
Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice