Case Title: People v. Brown

Citation: 

Docket Number: S181963

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 6/18/12 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S181963 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C056510 
JAMES LEE BROWN III, 
) 
 
 
) 
Lassen County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CR024002 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Since 1976, Penal Code section 40191 has offered prisoners in local custody 
the opportunity to earn “conduct credit” against their sentences for good behavior.  
Conduct credits encourage prisoners to conform to prison regulations, to refrain 
from criminal and assaultive conduct, and to participate in work and other 
rehabilitative activities.  (People v. Austin (1981) 30 Cal.3d 155, 163.)  For eight 
months during 2010, a now-superseded version of section 40192 that was enacted 
during a state fiscal emergency temporarily increased the rate at which local 
prisoners could earn conduct credits.  We granted review to decide whether this 
former statute (hereafter former section 4019) retroactively benefits prisoners who 
                                              
1  
(Stats. 1976, ch. 286, § 4; all further citations to statutes are to the Penal 
Code, except as noted.)   
2  
(Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess., ch. 28, § 50, subsequently amended by Stats. 
2010, ch. 426, § 2, Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 482, Stats. 2011, ch. 39, § 53, and Stats. 
2011, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 12, § 35.)   
 
2 
served time in local custody before January 25, 2010, the date on which it became 
operative.3  We hold that former section 4019 applied prospectively, meaning that 
qualified prisoners in local custody first became eligible to earn credit for good 
behavior at the increased rate beginning on the statute‟s operative date.  We also 
hold that the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions (U.S. 
Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a)) do not require retroactive 
application.   
I. BACKGROUND 
Defendant James Lee Brown III was convicted of selling methamphetamine, 
a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), and sentenced to 
three years in state prison.  The court awarded defendant a total of 92 days of 
credits, representing 62 days of credits for actual time spent in local custody 
awaiting trial and sentencing (§ 2900.5, subd. (a)) and 30 days of conduct credits 
for good behavior (§ 4019).  The version of section 4019 in effect during 
defendant‟s local custody, and also on the date he was sentenced, entitled him to 
two days of conduct credit for every four days spent in local custody.4  Defendant 
was sentenced and committed to state prison on July 24, 2007.   
                                              
3  
 Former section 4019 remained in effect only until September 28, 2010, 
when the Legislature further amended the statute to restore the original, lower 
credit-earning rate.  (Stats. 2010, ch. 426, § 2.)  Thereafter, the Legislature 
amended the statute yet again to raise the rate.  (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 482, 
eff. April 4, 2011.)   
4  
The relevant language of the version of section 4019 in effect during 2007 
provided:  “It is the intent of the Legislature that if all days are earned under this 
section, a term of six days will be deemed to have been served for every four days 
spent in actual custody.”  (§ 4019, subd. (f), as amended by Stats. 1982, ch. 1234, 
§ 7, p. 4554, italics added [subsequently amended as noted ante, at p. 1, fn. 2].)   
 
3 
On October 11, 2009, the Governor signed the bill enacting former section 
4019, operative January 25, 2010, increasing the rate at which prisoners in local 
custody could earn conduct credits for good behavior.  Under the new formula, 
eligible prisoners could earn two days of conduct credit for every two days spent 
in local custody.5  The Court of Appeal affirmed defendant‟s conviction on 
January 13, 2010.  On January 29, 2010, four days after former section 4019 took 
effect, defendant filed a petition for rehearing claiming additional conduct credits 
under the statute.  The Court of Appeal granted the petition, vacated its earlier 
decision, and issued a new decision on March 16, 2010, awarding defendant 
additional conduct credits, retroactively covering the entire 62 days he had spent 
in local custody some two and one-half years earlier (from May 23, 2007 to July 
24, 2007) before being committed to state prison.   
We granted respondent‟s petition for review challenging the Court of 
Appeal‟s decision to apply former section 4019 retroactively.  In his answer, 
defendant raised an additional issue (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.504(c), 
arguing that equal protection also requires retroactive application.  Respondent, 
who agrees we should decide the additional issue, argues to the contrary.  We 
address that issue as well.  (Id., rule 8.516 (b)(1).)   
                                              
5  
The relevant language of former section 4019 provided:  “It is the intent of 
the Legislature that if all days are earned under this section, a term of four days 
will be deemed to have been served for every two days spent in actual custody 
. . . .”  (Former § 4019, italics added.)   
 
Prisoners who were required to register as sex offenders, had been 
committed for serious felonies, or had prior convictions for serious or violent 
felonies, were not eligible for credit at the increased rate.  (Former § 4019, 
subds. (b)(2), (c)(2).)  The Legislature deleted these restrictions in 2010.  (See 
Stats. 2010, ch. 426, § 2.)   
 
4 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Statutory Construction 
1. Section 3 and the Presumption that Statutes Operate Prospectively. 
Whether a statute operates prospectively or retroactively is, at least in the 
first instance, a matter of legislative intent.  When the Legislature has not made its 
intent on the matter clear with respect to a particular statute, the Legislature‟s 
generally applicable declaration in section 3 provides the default rule:  “No part of 
[the Penal Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.”  We have described 
section 3, and its identical counterparts in other codes (e.g., Civ. Code, § 3; Code 
Civ. Proc., § 3), as codifying “the time-honored principle . . . that in the absence of 
an express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless 
it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature . . . must have intended a 
retroactive application.”  (Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 
1208-1209 (Evangelatos); see also id., at p. 1208 [requiring “ „express language or 
[a] clear and unavoidable implication [to] negative[] the presumption‟ ”].)  In 
applying this principle, we have been cautious not to infer retroactive intent from 
vague phrases and broad, general language in statutes.  (Californians for Disability 
Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 229-230; see Evangelatos, at 
p. 1209, fn. 13.)  Consequently, “ „a statute that is ambiguous with respect to 
retroactive application is construed . . . to be unambiguously prospective.‟ ”  
(Myers v. Phillip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 841, quoting 
I.N.S. v. St. Cyr (2001) 533 U.S. 289, 320-321, fn. 45.)   
These principles require us to reject defendant‟s argument that former section 
4019 applies retroactively as a matter of statutory construction.  The statute 
contains no express declaration that increased conduct credits are to be awarded 
retroactively, and no clear and unavoidable implication to that effect arises from 
 
5 
the relevant extrinsic sources, i.e., the legislative history.  Before addressing these 
points in detail, we briefly review that history.   
On December 19, 2008, the Governor exercised his constitutional powers to 
declare a fiscal emergency and to call the Legislature into special session to 
address the emergency.  (Governor‟s Exec. Order No. S-16-08 (Dec. 19, 2008); 
see Cal. Const., art. IV, § 10, subd. (f)(1).)  The bill that would become former 
section 4019 (Sen. Bill No. 18 (2009-2010 3d Ex. Sess.)) was introduced and 
passed in special session for that purpose.  Much of the lengthy bill was directed to 
measures that would save the state money by reducing jail and prison populations.  
Increasing the rate at which prisoners in local custody could earn conduct credits 
was one such measure.6  As mentioned, however, the Legislature did not expressly 
declare whether former section 4019 was to operate prospectively or retroactively.  
We thus proceed to consider whether it is “very clear from extrinsic sources” 
(Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1209), or whether such sources support the 
“ „clear and unavoidable implication‟ ” (id., at p. 1208), that the Legislature 
intended the amendment to operate retroactively.  We find no such indicia of 
legislative intent.   
Defendant argues we can infer the Legislature‟s intent to apply former 
section 4019 retroactively from the same act‟s uncodified section 59.  Section 59 
directs “[t]he Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation [to] implement the 
changes made by this act regarding time credits in a reasonable time,” but also 
                                              
6  
Former 4019 had the additional purpose of equalizing the rate at which 
prisoners in local and state custody could earn conduct credits.  (See, e.g., Assem. 
Com. on Budget, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 18 (2009-2010, 3d Ex. Sess.), as 
amended Aug. 31, 2009, p. 1 [bill would “[e]stablish[] consistent day-for-day 
credit earning status for offenders currently eligible for earning day-for-day credit 
in both jail and prison”].)   
 
6 
recognizes and addresses the possibility that “there will be some delays in 
determining the amount of additional time credits . . . resulting from changes in 
law pursuant to this act.”7  This language, defendant contends, shows the 
Legislature intended that presentence conduct credits under former section 4019 
would apply retroactively and accepted the likelihood that retroactive application 
would entail administrative delay.  Defendant‟s argument might be plausible if the 
term “time credits” in section 59 referred to presentence conduct credits, but this 
cannot be what the Legislature meant.  The California Department of Corrections 
and Rehabilitation (CDCR) does not determine and award presentence credits; the 
sentencing court does.8  Accordingly, the Legislature‟s reference in section 59 to 
                                              
7  
In full, section 59 provides:  “The Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation shall implement the changes made by this act regarding time credits 
in a reasonable time.  However, in light of limited case management resources, it 
is expected that there will be some delays in determining the amount of additional 
time credits to be granted against inmate sentences resulting from changes in law 
pursuant to this act.  An inmate shall have no cause of action or claim for damages 
because of any additional time spent in custody due to reasonable delays in 
implementing the changes in the credit provisions of this act.  However, to the 
extent that excess days in state prison due to delays in implementing this act are 
identified, they shall be considered as time spent on parole, if any parole period is 
applicable.”  (Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess., ch. 28, § 59.)   
8  
While the CDCR does not determine and award presentence credits, the 
CDCR does determine and award credits earned in local custody, if any, after 
sentencing and before delivery to state prison.  (See § 2900.5, subd. (e).)  But 
these credits cannot have been the antecedent of section 59‟s reference to “time 
credits,” because section 59 expressly affected only “the changes made by this act 
regarding time credits” (Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess., ch. 28, § 59, italics added), 
namely, the 2009 act that also added former section 4019.  The 2009 act did not 
affect credits under section 2900.5, subdivision (e), which have existed unchanged 
since 1991.  (See Stats. 1991, ch. 437, § 9, p. 2217.)   
 
For a one-year period following the repeal of former section 4019, the 
CDCR did determine and award local conduct credits for persons eventually 
sentenced to state prison.  (See former § 2933, subd. (e)(1), added by Stats. 2010, 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
7 
“time credits” must have been to credits determined and awarded by the CDCR, 
namely post-sentence credits earned in state prison, such as the credits mandated 
by the same act retroactive to January 1, 2003, for inmates trained as firefighters.  
(§ 2933.3, subds. (a), (d), as amended by Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess., ch. 28, § 41.)    
Defendant also argues the Legislature‟s intent to apply former section 4019 
retroactively may be inferred from the circumstance that a state fiscal emergency 
prompted the legislation,9 because awarding credits retroactively would decrease 
the state‟s incarceration costs more than would awarding them prospectively.  
Certainly, as we have explained, the legislation that included former section 4019 
was most immediately intended as a response to the state‟s fiscal crisis.  But the 
method by which the Legislature chose to respond was not to grant early release or 
credits regardless of conduct, even though this would have offered the greatest 
economic benefit to the state, but rather to increase the existing incentives for 
good conduct by offering well behaved prisoners the prospect of even earlier 
release from custody. 10  Defendant suggests the Legislature might have intended 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
ch. 426, § 1, eff. Sept. 28, 2010, and repealed by Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 12, 
§ 16, eff. Sept. 21, 2011.)  The now-repealed provision giving the CDCR that 
responsibility did not exist at the time the Legislature enacted section 59 and thus 
could not have informed the meaning of that provision.   
9  
See the uncodified section 62:  “This act addresses the fiscal emergency 
declared by the Governor by proclamation on December 19, 2008, pursuant to 
subdivision (f) of Section 10 of Article IV of the California Constitution.”  (Stats. 
2009, 3d Ex. Sess., ch. 28, § 62.)   
10  
Prisoners earn such credits by not “refus[ing] to satisfactorily perform labor 
as assigned by the sheriff, chief of police, or superintendent of an industrial farm 
or road camp” (§ 4019, subd. (b)) and by “satisfactorily comply[ing] with the 
reasonable rules and regulations established by [the same authorities]” (id., subd. 
(c)).   
 
8 
former section 4019 to offer bonuses for past good behavior as well as incentives 
for future good behavior.  Such an interpretation of the statute, however, finds no 
clear support in the statute‟s language or legislative history.  To resolve such 
ambiguities in favor of prospective operation is precisely the function of section 3 
and the default rule it embodies.   
To apply former section 4019 prospectively necessarily means that prisoners 
whose custody overlapped the statute‟s operative date (Jan. 25, 2010) earned 
credit at two different rates.  Defendant contends such a result is impermissible 
because a court may apply only the version of section 4019 in effect at the time 
sentence is imposed (or modified on appeal).  Defendant bases this argument on 
section 2900.5, which requires the sentencing court to determine and include in the 
abstract of judgment the presentence credits to which a defendant is entitled (id., 
subd. (d)), including days “credited to the period of confinement pursuant to 
Section 4019” (§ 2900.5, subd. (a), italics added).  Defendant thus reads the 
italicized reference to section 4019 as meaning “the version of section 4019 
currently in effect.”  Defendant‟s reading would violate section 3 by causing any 
legislative change in the credit-accrual rate to operate retroactively without an 
express declaration of retroactive intent.  Furthermore, nothing in the legislative 
history of section 2900.5, the relevant language of which has remained unchanged 
since 1991 (see Stats. 1991, ch. 437, § 10, p. 2218), suggests the Legislature 
intended the statute to have such an effect.  Credits are determined and added to 
the abstract of judgment at the time of sentencing, but they are earned day by day 
over the course of a defendant‟s confinement as a predefined, expected reward for 
specified good behavior.  Having been earned, credits obtain a kind of 
permanency, as they may not be lost except for misconduct.  (See generally 
People v. Deusler (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 273, 275-277; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
 
9 
4.310; cf. § 2932.)  Defendant‟s reading of section 2900.5 ignores these 
considerations.11   
For all of these reasons, we conclude former section 4019 is properly 
interpreted as operating prospectively.   
2. The Estrada12 rule.   
This court‟s decision in Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, supports an 
important, contextually specific qualification to the ordinary presumption that 
statutes operate prospectively:  When the Legislature has amended a statute to 
reduce the punishment for a particular criminal offense, we will assume, absent 
                                              
11  
In his answer brief, defendant advanced the new claim that a short-lived 
2010 amendment to section 2933 entitles him to additional conduct credits for his 
time in local custody, even if former section 4019 does not.  Former section 2933, 
subdivision (e)(1) (added by Stats. 2010, ch. 426, § 1, eff. Sep. 28, 2010, and 
repealed by Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 12, § 16, eff. Sept. 21, 2011), directed 
the CDCR, “[n]otwithstanding section 4019,” to deduct one day from the sentence 
of a state prisoner “for every day he or she served in a county jail [or other local 
facility] from the date of arrest until state prison credits . . . are applicable . . . .” 
This new claim is not properly before us, and we do not address it.  Instead of 
identifying an error in the judgment on review, defendant asserts the CDCR 
violated former section 2933 by failing to award additional local conduct credits at 
the time the former section took effect.  Such a claim must logically be brought in 
a petition for habeas corpus against the official empowered to award such credits, 
namely the Director of the CDCR.   
 
In a supplemental brief, defendant contended he is entitled to retroactive 
presentence conduct credits under an amendment to section 4019 enacted in the 
2011 Realignment Legislation addressing public safety.  (See Stats. 2011, ch. 15, 
§ 482.)  This legislation does not assist defendant because its changes to 
presentence credits expressly “apply prospectively . . . to prisoners who are 
confined to a county jail [or other local facility] for a crime committed or after 
October 1, 2011.”  (§ 4019, subd. (h), added by Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 482, and 
amended by 2011, ch. 39, § 53.)  Defendant committed his offense in 2006.   
12  
People v. Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada).   
 
10 
evidence to the contrary,13 that the Legislature intended the amended statute to 
apply to all defendants whose judgments are not yet final on the statute‟s operative 
date.  (Id., at pp. 742-748.)  We based this conclusion on the premise that “ „[a] 
legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime represents a legislative 
judgment that the lesser penalty or the different treatment is sufficient to meet the 
legitimate ends of the criminal law.”  (Id., at p. 745, italics added.)   “ „Nothing is 
to be gained,‟ ” we reasoned, “ „by imposing the more severe penalty after such a 
pronouncement . . . other than to satisfy a desire for vengeance‟ ” (ibid.) — a 
motive we were unwilling to attribute to the Legislature.  On this basis we 
concluded the inference was “inevitable . . . that the Legislature must have 
intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be 
sufficient should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply.”  
(Ibid.)   
Defendant contends the special rule of Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, 
requires us to apply former section 4019 retroactively, even though the statute 
offers incentives for future good behavior in prison rather than “ „mitigat[ing] the 
penalty for a particular crime‟ ” (Estrada, at p. 745).  We conclude defendant is 
incorrect:  Estrada does not apply.  Before examining defendant‟s contention in 
detail, however, we note the limited role Estrada properly plays in our 
jurisprudence of prospective versus retrospective operation.   
As mentioned, the language of section 3 erects a strong presumption of 
prospective operation, codifying the principle that, “in the absence of an express 
                                              
13  
(E.g., In re Pedro T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1041, 1045-1046 [holding Estrada, 
supra, 63 Cal.2d 740 inapplicable to statute automatically reducing the penalty for 
an offense after three years (a “sunset provision”), given evidence the Legislature 
wished to experiment with an increased penalty during the interim].)   
 
11 
retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very 
clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature . . . must have intended a 
retroactive application.”  (Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1209; see Myers v. 
Phillip Morris Companies, Inc., supra, 28 Cal.4th 828, 841.)  Accordingly, “ „a 
statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed . . . to 
be unambiguously prospective.‟ ”  (Myers v. Phillip Morris Companies, Inc., 
supra, at p. 841.)  Sharply departing from the language of section 3, the court in 
Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, wrote that the “rule of construction [codified 
therein] . . . is not a straitjacket.  Where the Legislature has not set forth in so 
many words what it intended, the rule of construction should not be followed 
blindly in complete disregard of factors that may give a clue to the legislative 
intent.  It is to be applied only after, considering all pertinent factors, it is 
determined that it is impossible to ascertain the legislative intent.”  (Estrada, at 
p. 746.)   
One immediately sees that the quoted language from Estrada, supra, 63 
Cal.2d 740, purports (a) to justify retroactive operation on evidence of less dignity 
and reliability than the express legislative declaration, or clear implication from 
extrinsic evidence, that we now require under section 3 (see Evangelatos, supra, 
44 Cal.3d 1188, 1208, 1209), and (b) to reduce section 3‟s strong presumption of 
prospectivity to a tie-breaking principle of last resort.  Applied broadly and 
literally, Estrada‟s remarks about section 3 would thus endanger the default rule 
of prospective operation.  Recognizing this in Evangelatos, we declined to follow 
Estrada‟s remarks about section 3 and held that “language in Estrada . . . should 
not be interpreted as modifying this well-established, legislatively-mandated 
principle” (Evangelatos, at p. 1209).  (Evangelatos, at p. 1209; see generally ibid., 
at pp. 1207-1209 & fn. 11.)  Accordingly, Estrada is today properly understood, 
not as weakening or modifying the default rule of prospective operation codified 
 
12 
in section 3, but rather as informing the rule‟s application in a specific context by 
articulating the reasonable presumption that a legislative act mitigating the 
punishment for a particular criminal offense is intended to apply to all nonfinal 
judgments.  (Cf. People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 792, fn. 7 [declining 
request to reconsider Estrada].)   
This brings us to the question whether the rule of Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 
740, requires us to apply retroactively a statute increasing the rate at which 
prisoners may earn credit for good behavior.  The question can properly be 
answered only in the negative.  The holding in Estrada was founded on the 
premise that “ „[a] legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime 
represents a legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or the different treatment 
is sufficient to meet the legitimate ends of the criminal law‟ ” (Estrada, at p. 745, 
italics added) and the corollary inference that the Legislature intended the lesser 
penalty to apply to crimes already committed.14  In contrast, a statute increasing 
the rate at which prisoners may earn credits for good behavior does not represent a 
judgment about the needs of the criminal law with respect to a particular criminal 
offense, and thus does not support an analogous inference of retroactive intent.  
Former section 4019 does not alter the penalty for any crime; a prisoner who earns 
no conduct credits serves the full sentence originally imposed.  Instead of 
addressing punishment for past criminal conduct, the statute addresses future 
conduct in a custodial setting by providing increased incentives for good behavior.   
Defendant contends the rule of Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, should be 
understood to apply more broadly to any statute that reduces punishment in any 
                                              
14  
The statute at issue in Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, reduced the minimum 
term for the crime of escape without force or violence.  (See id., at pp. 743-744.)   
 
13 
manner, and that to increase credits is to reduce punishment.  Defendant‟s 
argument fails for two reasons:  First, the argument would expand the Estrada 
rule‟s scope of operation in precisely the manner we forbade in Evangelatos, 
supra, 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1209.  Second, the argument does not in any event 
represent a logical extension of Estrada‟s reasoning.  We do not take issue with 
the proposition that a convicted prisoner who is released a day early is punished a 
day less.  But, as we have explained, the rule and logic of Estrada is specifically 
directed to a statute that represents “ „a legislative mitigation of the penalty for a 
particular crime‟ ” (Estrada, at p. 745, italics added) because such a law supports 
the inference that the Legislature would prefer to impose the new, shorter penalty 
rather than to “ „satisfy a desire for vengeance‟ ” (ibid.).  The same logic does not 
inform our understanding of a law that rewards good behavior in prison.15   
Various older decisions address claims that statutes affecting credits should 
be applied retroactively.  In none do we find a sufficient justification for applying 
the rule of Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, to former section 4019.   
Cases involving custody credit — credit for time served (In re Kapperman 
(1974) 11 Cal.3d 542, People v. Sandoval (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 73, and People v. 
Hunter (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 389) — may properly be distinguished as 
                                              
15  
Defendant suggests the Legislature‟s desire to reduce punishment through 
former section 4019 can be inferred from its intent to equalize the credit-earning 
ability of state and local prisoners.  (See ante, at p. 5, fn. 6.)  As noted above, we 
do not take issue with the proposition that to increase credits reduces punishment.  
The question is whether such a law falls within the rule of Estrada, supra, 63 
Cal.2d 740.  It does not, as we have explained.  Furthermore, to recognize the 
Legislature wished to equalize credits does not, by itself, provide a logical basis 
for inferring the Legislature wished to do so retroactively.   
 
14 
irrelevant.16  Credit for time served is given without regard to behavior, and thus 
does not implicate the distinction between statutes that provide behavioral 
incentives (e.g., conduct credits) and statutes that “mitigat[e] . . . the penalty for a 
particular crime” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, 745).   
Of the prior cases involving conduct credits, the two most closely on point 
conflict.  Defendant relies on People v. Doganiere (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 237 
(Doganiere), which cited Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, as authority for applying 
a statute authorizing conduct credits retroactively.  The defendant in Doganiere, 
who was serving a sentence in state prison, had previously served time in county 
jail as a condition of probation, earning local conduct credits under section 4019 
and thus release from jail a month before the end of his probationary term.  He 
subsequently violated the terms of his probation and was committed to state 
prison.  Applying the version of section 2900.5 then in effect (§ 2900.5, as 
amended by Stats. 1976, ch. 1045, § 2, p. 4465), the court gave defendant credit 
against his prison sentence for the time he had actually served in jail but not for 
the conduct credits he had there earned.  While the appeal was pending, the 
Legislature amended section 2900.5 to require the deduction of local conduct 
credits under section 4019.  (See former § 2900.5, as amended by Stats. 1978, 
                                              
16  
California law did not always give, to all persons serving sentences in state 
prison, credit for time served in local custody before sentencing.  Effective 1972, 
in a statute that was expressly prospective, the Legislature extended such credits to 
persons convicted of felonies.  (Former § 2900.5, as added by Stats. 1971, 
ch. 1732, § 2, p. 3686.)  In In re Kapperman, supra, 11 Cal.3d 542, this court held 
the statute‟s prospectivity provision violated equal protection and applied the 
statute retroactively.  The court distinguished Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, as 
irrelevant, reading that opinion, as do we, to affect only “the application to 
previously convicted offenders of statutes lessening the punishment for a 
particular offense.”  (In re Kapperman, supra, at p. 546, italics added.)   
 
15 
ch. 304, § 1, p. 632.)  In deciding to apply Estrada, the Court of Appeal 
perfunctorily rejected the argument that the rule of that case does not apply to a 
statute “designed to control future prison inmate behavior” (Doganiere, at p. 239), 
as opposed to a statute reducing the punishment for a specific offense.  We find 
Doganiere unpersuasive because it offers no authority for its conclusion other than 
an irrelevant decision involving custody credits.  (See Hunter, supra, 68 
Cal.App.3d 389, cited in Doganiere, at p. 239; but see Kapperman, supra, 11 
Cal.3d 542, 546; ante, at p. 13 & fn. 16.)  A subsequent decision that merely 
accepted Doganiere‟s holding without examination (People v. Smith (1979) 98 
Cal.App.3d 793, 799) adds no force to defendant‟s position.   
More persuasive is In re Strick (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 906 (Strick), a case 
that, while ultimately decided under the equal protection clause, necessarily 
examined the legislative purpose underlying conduct credits and concluded that 
statutes authorizing such credits must logically apply prospectively.   
The petitioner in Strick, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d 906, who had served two and 
one-half years of a six-year sentence, had earned conduct credits under a former 
statute permitting the Director of the former Department of Corrections to reduce a 
prisoner‟s sentence by one-third for good behavior.  (See former § 2931, subd. (a), 
as amended by Stats. 1979, ch. 319, § 1, p. 1141.)  During defendant‟s prison 
term, the Legislature adopted a new statute offering conduct credits at a higher 
rate.  (See former § 2933, subd. (a), as added by Stats. 1982, ch. 1234, § 4, 
p. 4551.)  The director, exercising his statutory authority to make rules governing 
the transition of inmates from the old to the new credit systems, determined that 
credit at the new, higher rate would be granted prospectively but not retroactively.  
The Court of Appeal rejected the petitioner‟s claim that the Director‟s decision 
violated equal protection.  Prisoners whose incarcerations began before and after 
the new law took effect, the court reasoned, were not similarly situated with 
 
16 
respect to the purpose of the law:  “The obvious purpose of the new section,” the 
court explained, “is to affect the behavior of inmates by providing them with 
incentives to engage in productive work and maintain good conduct while they are 
in prison. . . .  [¶]  It is fair to observe that this incentive purpose has no meaning if 
an inmate is unaware of it.  The very concept demands prospective application.  
„Reason dictates that it is impossible to influence behavior after it has occurred.‟ ”  
(Id., at p. 913, quoting In re Stinnette (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 800, 806.)17   
Arguing his point a bit differently, defendant suggests the Legislature has 
acquiesced in prior judicial decisions retroactively applying statutes increasing 
credits and, as a result, generally intends that such statutes apply retroactively 
unless the legislation expressly requires prospective operation.  The argument is 
unpersuasive for several reasons.  First, we have recognized that the doctrine of 
legislative acquiescence is not properly invoked to show the Legislature has 
acquiesced in judicial decisions applying judicial doctrines, such as the rule of 
Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740.  When a precedent is challenged as incorrectly 
extending such a doctrine, “it is primarily up to the courts to reconsider its 
correctness.”  (People v. Superior Court (Sparks) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 1, 21.)  
Second, the “proverbial „weak reed‟ ” of legislative acquiescence (In re 
Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1107) cannot reasonably be stretched so far 
as to abrogate another statute, such as section 3 and the default rule of prospective 
                                              
17  
In re Stinnette, supra, 94 Cal.App.3d 800, the decision quoted in Strick, 
supra, 148 Cal.App.3d 906, held that equal protection did not require the 
retroactive application of a provision (former § 2931, subd. (a), as amended by 
Stats. 1977, ch. 165, § 38, p. 661) of the newly enacted Determinate Sentencing 
Act (Stats. 1976, ch. 1139) authorizing the award of conduct credits for good 
behavior to persons sentenced under that act but not to persons committed under 
the prior Indeterminate Sentence Law (Stats. 1917, ch. 527, § 1, p. 665).   
 
17 
operation the statute embodies, in an entire category of cases.  Third, the only 
cases that might conceivably support defendant‟s argument, as applied to conduct 
credits, are Doganiere, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d 237, and People v. Smith, supra, 98 
Cal.App.3d 793.  But one might with equal validity argue the Legislature has 
acquiesced in the more recent conclusion in Strick, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d 906, 
913, that the “[t]he very concept [of conduct credits] requires prospective 
application.”   
In conclusion, we see in the relevant prior decisions no justification for 
applying the rule of Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, to former section 4019.  We 
therefore turn to defendant‟s argument that equal protection principles require 
retroactive application regardless of legislative intent and statutory construction.   
B. Equal Protection 
Defendant contends that to apply former section 4019 prospectively violates 
the equal protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions.  (U.S. Const., 
14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).)  The argument lacks merit.   
 The concept of equal protection recognizes that persons who are similarly 
situated with respect to a law‟s legitimate purposes must be treated equally.  
(Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253.)  Accordingly, “ „[t]he first 
prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing 
that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly 
situated groups in an unequal manner.‟ ”  (Ibid.)  “This initial inquiry is not 
whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but „whether they are 
similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.‟ ”  (Ibid.)   
As we have already explained, the important correctional purposes of a 
statute authorizing incentives for good behavior (see People v. Austin, supra, 30 
Cal.3d 155, 163) are not served by rewarding prisoners who served time before the 
 
18 
incentives took effect and thus could not have modified their behavior in response.  
That prisoners who served time before and after former section 4019 took effect 
are not similarly situated necessarily follows.  On this point we find the decision in 
Strick, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d 906, persuasive.  In that case, as noted (ante, at 
p. 15 et seq.), the Court of Appeal rejected the claim that an expressly prospective 
law increasing conduct credits violated equal protection unless applied 
retroactively to prisoners who had previously earned conduct credits at a lower 
rate.  “The obvious purpose of the new section,” the court reasoned, “is to affect 
the behavior of inmates by providing them with incentives to engage in productive 
work and maintain good conduct while they are in prison.”  (Strick, at p. 913.)  
“[T]his incentive purpose has no meaning if an inmate is unaware of it.  The very 
concept demands prospective application.”  (Ibid.)  “Thus, inmates were only 
similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the [new law] on [its effective 
date], when they were all aware that it was in effect and could choose to modify 
their behavior accordingly.”  (Ibid.)   
Defendant and amicus curiae contend this court‟s decision in People v. Sage 
(1980) 26 Cal.3d 498 (Sage), implicitly rejected the conclusion the Court of 
Appeal would later reach in Strick, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d 906, that prisoners 
serving time before and after a conduct credit statute takes effect are not similarly 
situated.  We disagree.   
The defendant in Sage, supra, 26 Cal.3d 498, a case decided three years 
before Strick, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d 906, had been committed to the state hospital 
under the mentally disordered sex offender law (former Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 6316 et seq., repealed by Stats. 1981, ch. 928, § 2, p. 3485) and, after being 
found not amenable to treatment, sentenced to state prison for a felony.  The 
question before the court was whether the defendant was entitled to conduct credit 
for the time he had spent in county jail before being sentenced.  The version of 
 
19 
section 4019 then in effect (§ 4019, as amended by Stats. 1978, ch. 1218, § 1, 
p. 3941) authorized presentence conduct credit for misdemeanants who later 
served their sentences in county jail but not for felons who were eventually 
sentenced to state prison.  Finding no “rational basis for, much less a compelling 
state interest in, denying presentence conduct credit to detainee/felons” (Sage, at 
p. 508, fn. omitted), the court held the statute‟s unequal treatment of felons and 
misdemeanants for this purpose violated equal protection.  (Ibid.)   
To be sure, one practical effect of Sage, supra, 26 Cal.3d 498, was to extend 
presentence conduct credits retroactively to detainees who did not expect to 
receive them, and whose good behavior therefore could not have been motivated 
by the prospect of receiving them.  But amicus curiae reads too much into Sage by 
suggesting the opinion thereby implicitly foreclosed the Court of Appeal‟s later 
conclusion in Strick, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d 906, that prisoners serving time 
before and after incentives are announced are not similarly situated.  The unsigned 
lead opinion “by the Court” in Sage does not mention the argument that conduct 
credits, by their nature, must apply prospectively to motivate good behavior.  A 
brief allusion to that argument in a concurring and dissenting opinion (see Sage, 
supra, at p. 510 (conc. & dis. opn. of Clark, J.)) went unacknowledged and 
unanswered in the lead opinion.  As cases are not authority for propositions not 
considered (e.g., People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 566), we decline to read 
Sage for more than it expressly holds.   
Defendant and amicus curiae also contend the present case is controlled by In 
re Kapperman, supra, 11 Cal.3d 542, in which this court concluded that equal 
protection required the retroactive application of an expressly prospective statute 
granting credit to felons for time served in local custody before sentencing and 
commitment to state prison.  We disagree.  Credit for time served is given without 
regard to behavior, and thus does not entail the paradoxical consequences of 
 
20 
applying retroactively a statute intended to create incentives for good behavior.  
Kapperman does not hold or suggest that prisoners serving time before and after 
the effective date of a statute authorizing conduct credits are similarly situated.   
For these reasons, we conclude that equal protection does not require former 
section 4019 to be applied retroactively.   
 
III. DISPOSITION 
The Court of Appeal‟s judgment is reversed and the case remanded to that 
court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.   
  
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v Brown 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 182 Cal.App.4th 1354 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S181963 
Date Filed: June 18, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Lassen 
Judge: Stephen Douglas Bradbury 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Mark J. Shusted, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Dallas Sacher for Sixth District Appellate Program as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell and Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorneys General, Carlos A. 
Martinez, Marcia A. Fay, Steven T. Oetting and Meredith S. White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mark J. Shusted 
P.O. Box 1076 
Roseville, CA  95678 
(916) 804-5106 
 
Meredith S. White 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2297