Case Title: Associated Risk Management, Inc. v. Ibanez

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 91

Docket Number: 80480

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
196 Nev., Advance Opinion 41
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ASSOCIATED RISK MANAGEMENT, No. 80480
INC,

Appellant,

vs FILED
MANUEL IBANEZ, DEC 31 2000

 

Respondent. | a)

© oferoroT
Appeal from a district court order denying a petition for judicial
review in a workers’ compensation matter. Eighth Judicial District Court,
Clark County; Tierra Danielle Jones, Judge.
Affirmed.

Law Offices of David Benavidez and David H. Benavidez, Henderson,
for Appellant.

Bertoldo Baker Carter & Smith and Javier A. Arguello, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.

BEFORE GIBBONS, STIGLICH and SILVER, JJ.

20-4700]

 
OPINION*
By the Court, STIGLICH, J.:

‘Twenty years ago, we held that the federal Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA) preempts Nevada's workers’ compensation laws
that would otherwise provide undocumented aliens with employment
within the boundaries of the United States. Tarango v. State Indus. Ins.
Sys., 117 Nev. 444, 448-50, 25 P.3d 175, 178-79 (2001). We further held
that, as a matter of state law, undocumented aliens were not entitled to
vocational training that would “only be available... because of [the
worker's) undocumented status.” Id. at 450-53, 25 P.3d at 179-81.
However, we affirmed an award of permanent partial disability benefits to
an undocumented alien. Id. at 456-57, 25 P.3d at 183. These monetary
benefits, paid by the insurer, do not conflict with federal law or undermine
the Legislature's intent. In this appeal, we reaffirm that undocumented
aliens who are injured while working for a Nevada employer may be eligible
for monetary disability benefits.

BACKGROUND

Respondent Manuel Ibanez is an undocumented Nevadan. In
2014, while working as a carpenter for High Point Construction, a Nevada
employer, he sustained severe injuries when a falling two-by-four struck
him in the head, shoulder, and back. He was treated for these injuries over
the next several years, which included multiple surgeries. Even after these

1We originally resolved this appeal in an unpublished order of
affirmance. Respondent moved to publish the order as an opinion. Cf.
NRAP 36(f). We granted that motion by order entered December 24, 2020,
and we accordingly issue this opinion in place of our November 23, 2020,
unpublished order.

 

 
oe

 

surgeries, he continued to suffer both physical pain and mental trauma
related to the accident.

Tbanez’s injuries proved debilitating, and so he applied for
permanent total disability (PTD) status in June 2018. Appellant Associated
Risk Management (ARM), High Point's insurance administrator, denied
this request. It determined that Ibanez’s disability was only temporary and
that he would be able to return to light duty. Further, it determined that
Ibanez would be employable if he were eligible to work in the United States.

Ibanez sought review of ARM's determinations pursuant to
RS 616C.320. The hearing officer initially affirmed ARM's denial of
benefits, but the appeals officer reversed, granting Ibanez PTD status
pursuant to the “odd-lot doctrine.” This established doctrine permits a
finding of PTD when a worker, “while not altogether incapacitated for work,
lis] so handicapped that they will not be employed regularly in any well-
known branch of the labor market.” Nev. Indus. Comm'n v. Hildebrand,
100 Nev. 47, 51, 675 P.2d 401, 404 (1984) (quoting 2.A. Larson, The Law of
Workmen's Compensation, § 57.51 (1981)); see NRS 616C.435(2). The
appeals officer relied on Tbanez’s well-documented physical impairment
traceable to the 2014 accident and subsequent surgeries, which
documentation included written opinions by Ibanez’s treating physicians.
Further, the appeals officer found that Ibanez’s lack of a valid work visa
‘was “not relevant” to the determination of PTD status.

‘ARM petitioned for judicial review. When the district court
denied review, ARM appealed to this court. On appeal, ARM argues that
the appeals officer committed legal error by granting PTD to an
undocumented alien.

 
DISCUSSION
‘Standard of review

“When reviewing a district court’s order denying a petition for
judicial review of an agency decision, we engage in the same analysis as the
istrict court: ‘we evaluate the agency's decision for clear error or an
arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion.’ We defer to an agency's
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and will ‘not

reweigh the evidence or revisit an appeals officer's credibility

 

determination.
of Las Vegas v. Lawson, 126 Nev. 567, 571, 245 P.3d 1175, 1178 (2010)
(quoting Law Offices of Barry Levinson v. Milko, 124 Nev. 355, 362, 184 P.3d
378, 383-84 (2008)) (internal citations omitted). Unlike pure legal
‘questions, “the agency's conclusions of law, which will necessarily be closely

- However, questions of law are reviewed de novo.” City

 

related to the agency's view of the facts, are entitled to deference, and will
not be disturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence.” State Indus.
Ins. Sys. v. Montoya, 109 Nev. 1029, 1031-32, 862 P.2d 1197, 1199 (1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The appeals officer did not commit legal error

Relying on our opinion in Tarango, ARM argues that IRCA
preempts Nevada's workers’ compensation statutes whenever an
undocumented alien is involved and that the appeals officer therefore erred
by granting Ibanez PTD benefits. Reviewing this question of law de novo,
see Lawson, 126 Nev. at 571, 245 P.3d at 1178, we conclude that IRCA does
not preempt an award of monetary benefits to an undocumented alien.

Nevada's industrial insurance system covers “every person in

the service of an employer . . . whether lawfully or unlawfully employed,’
including “{alliens.” NRS 616A.105(1). ‘When a statute is clear and

 

 
unambiguous, this court will ‘give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning
of the words.” Reif ex rel. Reif v. Aries Consultants, Inc., 135 Nev. 389, 391,
449 P.3d 1253, 1255 (2019) (quoting Cromer v. Wilson, 126 Nev. 106, 109,
225 P.3d 788, 790 (2010)). NRS 616A.105(1) could hardly be clearer, and so
we concluded in Tarango that “Nevada's workers’ compensation laws apply
to all injured workers within the state, regardless of immigration status.”
Tarango, 117 Nev. at 448, 25 P.3d at 178. Accordingly, the issue in Tarango
was “not whether [an undocumented alien] can receive workers’
compensation under our laws... {but] whether an injured undocumented
worker's access extends to the full depths of the workers’ compensation
scheme.” Id. Specifically, we examined the conflict between federal law and
the statutory priorities for returning an injured employee to work.

Under our workers’ compensation statute, an insurer is
directed to prioritize returning an injured worker to similar employment if
possible and to vocational training if not. See NRS 616C.530. At the same
time, federal law positively prohibits any employer from knowingly
employing an undocumented alien. Tarango, 117 Nev. at 450, 25 P.3d at
179 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)). We could not “require[} the employer to
knowingly violate the IRCA and incur substantial penalties.” Id. at 453, 25
P.34 at 180. Instead, we concluded that “IRCA preempts Nevada's workers’
compensation scheme in so far as it provides undocumented aliens with
employment within the boundaries of the United States.” Id. at 456, 25
P.3d at 183; of: Renfroe v. Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC, 133 Nev. 358, 360,
398 P.3d 904, 906 (2017) (explaining that a state law is preempted if
“compliance with both federal and state requirements is impossible or
whether, in light of the federal statute's purpose and intended effects, state

law poses an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's objectives”)

 

 
(quoting Nanopierce Techs., Inc. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 123
Nev. 362, 372, 168 P.3d 73, 80 (2007).

We then turned to vocational training, as opposed to
employment. We concluded that even if the provision of vocational training
was not technically preempted, such training would be contrary to the
legislative intent, in light of our conclusion that a return to employment
was preempted. It would make no sense to “allow{) an undocumented
worker to skip through the priority scheme” to undertake “training [which]
would only be available . . . because of [the worker's] undocumented status.’
Tarango, 117 Nev. at 453, 25 P.3d at 181.

Our opinion in Tarango clearly held that undocumented
workers cannot obtain reemployment or vocational training pursuant to
NRS 616C.530. But our opinion did not bar “compensatory benefits which
award monetary relief.” Id. at 448, 25 P.3d at 178. Far from holding those
benefits preempted, we expressly affirmed an award of such benefits. Id. at
456-57, 25 P.3d at 183. That result was, and is, sound. IRCA makes it
unlawful to knowingly employ an undocumented alien, but IRCA says
nothing about paying an undocumented alien benefits that compensate for

2A state law may also be preempted if “congressional enactments so
thoroughly occupy a legislative field, or touch a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant, that Congress effectively leaves no room for states
to regulate conduct in that field.” Renfroe, 133 Nev. at 360, 398 P.3d at 906.
In Tarango, we discussed Congress's “plenary power” over aliens, but we
did not hold that Congress had preempted states from providing any
benefits to aliens. See Tarango, 117 Nev. at 448-49, 25 P.3d at 178-79; cf.
Asylum Co. v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 10 A.3d 619, 631 (D.C. 2010)
(holding that IRCA does not preempt the field of workers’ compensation
schemes).

  

 

 
an injury. Therefore, there is no conflict with federal law when an insurer
pays compensatory benefits. Furthermore, those benefits are not only
available because of the worker’s undocumented status; they are available
to any worker, lawfully or unlawfully employed, “who is injured by accident
arising out of and in the course of employment.” See NRS 616C.440(1).
Accordingly, we hold that undocumented aliens are not precluded from
receiving disability benefits under Nevada's workers’ compensation laws.
The appeals officer's decision was based on substantial evidence

ARM also argues that the appeals officer misapprehended the
facts and that Ibanez is not in fact permanently and totally disabled. We
decline to disturb the appeals officer's evaluation of the evidence. Although
the record contained some evidence that might have tended to show Ibanez
could work light duty, the appeals officer based his decision on other
substantial evidence in the record, including professional medical
evaluations. He specifically noted “the credible reporting of Dr.
Cestkowski,”

 

‘who had opined, after a physical examination, that Ibanez was
permanently disabled. We do not reweigh the evidence or revisit credibility
determinations. Lawson, 126 Nev. at 571, 245 P.3d at 1178. Accordingly,
the appeals officer's conclusion was not clear error or an abuse of discretion.
Even if ARM's view of the evidence might have been a permissible one, the

agency evaluated the evidence differently and came to a different

conclusion. That conclusion, which is “closely related to the agency's view
of the facts, lis] entitled to deference.” Montoya, 109 Nev. at 1031-32, 862
P.2d at 1199.

 

 
CONCLUSION

Nevada's workers’ compensation statute clearly and
unambiguously protects every person in the service of an employer, whether
lawfully or unlawfully employed, including aliens. Although federal law
prohibits employers from knowingly employing an undocumented alien, it
does not prohibit insurers from compensating undocumented aliens for
injuries they sustain while working. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
of the district court.

Stiglich