Case Title: Ex Parte Dan River, Inc.

Citation: 794 So. 2d 386

Docket Number: 1990894

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
794 So. 2d 386 (2000)
Ex parte DAN RIVER, INC.
(In re Dan River, Inc. v. James V. Higgins).
1990894.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 14, 2000.
Opinion Overruling Rehearing November 22, 2000.
*387 John W. Clark, Jr., and Tommy C. Ritter, Jr., of Clark & Scott, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner.
William P. Boggs and Amy J. Hayes of Boggs & Hayes, Clanton, for respondent.
HOUSTON, Justice.
On April 26, 1995, James Higgins sued for workers' compensation benefits, alleging that he had "become totally disabled as a result of occupational byssinosis, a disease of the lungs, caused by inhalation of minute particles of dust over a period of time and which ... dust is due to causes and conditions arising out of and in the course of plaintiff's employment [with Dan River, Inc., the defendant]." (Plaintiff's complaint, p. 2, R.7.) (Emphasis added.) Between 1954 and 1977, and on one occasion after 1977,[1] Higgins was exposed to cotton dust and fibers as part of his work environment at Dan River, and Higgins alleges that these materials, the dust and fibers, caused his byssinosis. Byssinosis was the only disease Higgins claimed to have contracted because of his work at Dan River.[2]
*388 Three doctors who had examined Higgins testified by deposition. Dr. Brian G. Forrester, a specialist in occupational and environmental medicine, testified as follows, in response to what the attorney for Dan River called "the ultimate question":
Dr. Gaeton D. Lorino also testified that Higgins did not suffer from byssinosis:
The third doctor, Dr. Robert Fort Hambaugh, Jr., testified that he had been treating Higgins since 1992. Dr. Hambaugh attributed Higgins's breathing problem to his work conditions and exposures to the cotton dust and fibers at work. He treated Higgins for upper and lower respiratory illnesses that he said always followed the same pattern: chronic sinusitis with acute exacerbations, chronic bronchitis with acute exacerbations, always in close proximity to exposure to inhalants while working at Dan River. This same pattern repeated until Higgins retired from Dan River, he said, and the condition then began to improve. Dr. Hambaugh stated that textile fibers are known to cause very serious pulmonary diseases that are chronic, progressive, and even fatal. However, Dr. Hambaugh did not diagnose Higgins with byssinosis:
(Emphasis added.)
Based upon these doctors' depositions and the testimony of the plaintiff, the trial judge entered this final judgment:
(Emphasis added.) The basis for the finding is found in the paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of the judgment (quoted above), which all refer specifically to byssinosis.
Dan River appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, based upon the fact that not one of the three doctors diagnosed Higgins with byssinosis. The Court of Civil Appeals held, in a 3-2 decision (Robertson, P.J., and Yates and Monroe, JJ., concurring; Crawley and Thompson, JJ., dissenting):
Dan River, Inc. v. Higgins, 794 So. 2d 382 (Ala.Civ.App.1999). (Emphasis added.) We granted Dan River's petition for certiorari review.
Dan River contends, and we agree, that it was error for the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals to diagnose Higgins as suffering from byssinosis. The record contains no testimony of a doctor willing to diagnosis Higgins with byssinosis. Even Higgins's own doctor, Dr. Hambaugh, testified, "I have never made the specific diagnosis of byssinosis in this person."
To prevail on this workers' compensation claim, Higgins must first prove that he is suffering from an occupational disease, specifically byssinosis. Alabama Code 1975 § 25-5-110, defines "occupational disease":
Higgins presented no testimony indicating that he has been diagnosed with byssinosis. Not a single medical expert diagnosed byssinosis; it was error for the trial court to make a diagnosis that the medical experts were not willing to make. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.
By this holding today we limit the holding in 3-M Co. v. Myers, 692 So. 2d 134 (Ala.Civ.App.1997), which stated:
692 So. 2d  at 137. The holding in 3-M has no application to this present case because the trial court in 3-M resolved conflicting testimony. We generally agree that a trial court can synthesize a wide range of medical testimony, even conflicting medical testimony, to reach its own conclusions on medical matters. However, trial courts cannot go so far as to find that a plaintiff has a particular disease without the testimony of at least one medical expert, qualified to make such a diagnosis, who is willing to testify that the plaintiff is actually suffering from that disease. Not one doctor diagnosed Higgins's problem as byssinosis. Therefore, it was error for the trial court to find that Higgins had that disease.
Our holding here is to be distinguished from the holding in Dan River Mills, Inc. v. Foshee, 365 So. 2d 1232 (Ala.Civ.App. 1979). In that case, the Court of Civil Appeals, affirming a trial court's finding that a plaintiff was suffering from byssinosis after having worked for Dan River, wrote:
365 So. 2d  at 1234-36.
This present case is distinguishable from Foshee. In Foshee, the trial court heard conflicting testimony from medical experts as to whether the worker was suffering from byssinosis. However, the worker did present a medical doctor who testified that he had diagnosed the worker with byssinosis. If Higgins had presented such testimony in the present case, we would affirm; however, without a byssinosis diagnosis, there is no evidence, much less the "substantial evidence" required by Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-81(e)(2), to support the trial *393 court's finding that Higgins suffered from byssinosis.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.
COOK, J., concurs in the result.
HOUSTON, Justice.
APPLICATION OVERRULED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, SEE, and BROWN, JJ., concur.
LYONS, JOHNSTONE, and ENGLAND, JJ., dissent.
JOHNSTONE, Justice (dissenting).
On original submission we reversed the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court awarding the plaintiff workers' compensation for byssinosis arising out of his employment with the defendant Dan River, Inc., where he had breathed textile fibers for about 23 years. Our rationale was that the plaintiff did not prove that his employment had caused his byssinosis inasmuch as he had not proved that he even had byssinosis. While I concurred on original submission, on application for rehearing, my review of Ex parte Price, 555 So. 2d 1060 (Ala.1989), persuades me that the plaintiff did prove that he had contracted byssinosis and that his employment had caused his byssinosis. In Price, this Court stated:
555 So. 2d  at 1061-62 (quoting 3 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 79.51(a), at p. 15-426.128 (1988), and Fruehauf Corp. v. Prater, 360 So. 2d 999, 1002 (Ala.Civ.App.1978)) (emphasis added). The trial court apparently based its judgment on the testimony of Dr. Robert Ford Hambaugh, Jr., who had treated the plaintiff for the last five or six years or so. Dr. Hambaugh testified in pertinent part:
The emphasized language in Dr. Hambaugh's first and last answers quoted above supports the judgment of the trial court. In the context of the law as explained by Price, supra, Dr. Hambaugh's statement that he had never made the specific diagnosis of byssinosis in the plaintiff and his explanation that making such a diagnosis would require taking biopsies from the plaintiffs chest and lungsa procedure he had been unwilling to perform do not detract from the plaintiffs proof enough to invalidate the judgment of the trial court. Rather, Dr. Hambaugh's having "never made the specific diagnosis of byssinosis in" the plaintiff, in the context of Dr. Hambaugh's explanation, imply that he is a cautious, conservative person and a credible witness.
We are bound to accept the tendencies of the evidence most favorable to the winner of a judgment based on evidence ore tenus. See Cooper v. Peturis, 384 So. 2d 1087 (Ala.1980). Moreover, such a judgment should not be reversed unless it is palpably wrong and manifestly unjust. Torsch v. McLeod, 665 So. 2d 934 (Ala. 1995). The reason for these rules is that the fact-finder has observed the witnesses' demeanor and the inflections and emphases of the witnesses' delivery of their testimony. Justice v. Arab Lumber & Supply, Inc., 533 So. 2d 538 (Ala.1988). These rules are reinforced by the rule that the beneficent purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act requires all reasonable doubts to be resolved in favor of the employee. Riley v. Perkins, 282 Ala. 629, 213 So. 2d 796 (1968). Thus, I respectfully dissent from the reversal of the judgment of the trial court.
LYONS and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.
[1]  The particular date on which Higgins was last exposed to these materials, which he alleges were toxic, was not established in the record. Dan River contends that the statutory limitations period had expired before Higgins filed this action. However, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. Therefore, the burden was on Dan River to show that Higgins had not been exposed to the materials for more than two years before the filing of the complaint. "It is not necessary for the plaintiff to anticipate [the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations] and plead facts in avoidance thereof." Ellis v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co., 265 Ala. 264, 267, 90 So. 2d 770, 773 (1956).
[2]  The evidence in the record indicates that Higgins may have suffered occupational diseases other than byssinosis. Because no claims related to diseases other than byssinosis are now before us, we express no opinion as to whether any such claims would be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act or whether they would be barred by the statute of limitations; nor will we otherwise discuss any such claims.