Case Title: People v. Pitsonbarger

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89368

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 89368-Agenda 5-May 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								JIMMY RAY PITSONBARGER, Appellant.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Petitioner, Jimmy Ray Pitsonbarger, appeals from orders of
the circuit court of Peoria County dismissing 34 of the 35 claims
raised in his second post-conviction petition and denying the sole
remaining claim after an evidentiary hearing. Because petitioner
was sentenced to death for the underlying convictions, his appeal
lies directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

I. BACKGROUND
	This court has previously described the facts underlying
petitioner's conviction and sentencing in our opinion on his direct
appeal. See People v. Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill. 2d 353 (1990). Thus,
we will summarize here only the proceedings that have occurred
since his conviction.
	In 1988, petitioner was convicted in a bench trial of the
murders of Claude and Alta Brown. The death penalty hearing was
held before a jury, which found the petitioner eligible for the death
penalty based on the presence of two aggravating factors, and
further found that no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude
imposition of the death penalty were present. The circuit court
sentenced petitioner to death. On direct appeal, this court
addressed 14 separate claims of error, affirmed two convictions for
intentional murder, vacated four convictions for felony murder,
and affirmed the sentence of death. Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill. 2d 353.
Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court was denied. Pitsonbarger v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 871,
116 L. Ed. 2d 163, 112 S. Ct. 204 (1991).
	In April 1992, petitioner filed a post-conviction petition
pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 1992)). The circuit court dismissed the
petition without an evidentiary hearing, finding that all seven of
the claims raised were either barred by res judicata, because they
had already been addressed on direct appeal, or waived, because
they had not been raised on appeal even though they were
available to be raised. Counsel filed a "Motion to Reconsider and
Vacate" in May 1992, which the circuit court denied almost 11
months later. The clerk of the court did not give notice of this
decision to counsel. Thus, when counsel filed a "Motion to File
Late Notice of Appeal" in November 1993, the motion was
granted. However, after counsel failed to timely file a brief, this
court denied various motions for extensions of time and for
reconsideration and eventually dismissed the matter for want of
prosecution in June 1994.
	Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in March
1995, in the United States District Court for the Central District of
Illinois, raising 11 claims. The district court issued an unpublished
decision on October 5, 1995, denying habeas relief. On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision. Pitsonbarger v. Gramley, 103 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1997). That judgment was vacated by the United
States Supreme Court in Pitsonbarger v. Gramley, 522 U.S. 802,
139 L. Ed. 2d 6, 118 S. Ct. 37 (1997) (vacating and remanding for
reconsideration in light of Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 138 L. Ed. 2d 481, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997)). The court of appeals
thereafter entered a revised decision, again affirming the denial of
habeas relief. Pitsonbarger v. Gramley, 141 F.3d 728 (7th Cir.
1998). The Supreme Court denied petitioner's petition for a writ
of certiorari. Pitsonbarger v. Gramley, 525 U.S. 984, 142 L. Ed. 2d 402, 119 S. Ct. 448 (1998).
	On February 28, 1996, while his appeal was pending before
the Seventh Circuit, petitioner filed a second post-conviction
petition in the circuit court of Peoria County, raising 35 claims of
error. The State responded by filing a motion to dismiss on the
basis that the entire petition was time-barred under the statute of
limitations contained in section 122-1 of the Act (725 ILCS
5/122-1 (West 1996)). In the alternative, the State argued that all
35 claims were either waived by petitioner's failure to raise them
in earlier proceedings or barred by res judicata. Petitioner
responded that his first post-conviction proceeding was
"fundamentally flawed" due to its virtual "abandonment" by post-conviction counsel and, thus, consideration of the claims raised in
his second post-conviction petition was not barred by section
122-1 or by the waiver provision contained in section 122-3 of the
Act (725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1996)). Therefore, he argued, all 35
issues should be addressed. In addition, petitioner argued that one
claim in particular-his claim that he was denied a fitness hearing
in 1988 due to ineffective assistance of counsel-should be
addressed on the merits. Following a hearing on the State's motion
on October 31, 1997, the circuit court ruled that "only those
paragraphs in the Petition that are directed toward *** the issue of
fitness need be answered and the Petition is dismissed in other
regards." The State then filed an answer addressing the sole
surviving claim, which was the subject of an evidentiary hearing
on April 11, 2000.
	At the evidentiary hearing, the parties stipulated that prior to
and during petitioner's bench trial he was taking psychotropic
medication, specifically 10 milligrams of Librium three times a
day. Petitioner argued that this fact alone is sufficient to put the
burden on the State to prove that he had been fit to stand trial in
1988. Further, petitioner argued that he should be given a new trial
because a retrospective fitness hearing more than a decade later
could not meet due process standards. Other than stipulating to the
contents of the medication records, the petitioner introduced no
evidence and presented no testimony.
	The State argued that the mere fact petitioner was receiving
medication is not sufficient to require a new trial. Rather, he must
demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request
a fitness hearing and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
to raise the issue on direct appeal. According to the State,
petitioner could prevail on these claims only by demonstrating he
would have been found unfit to stand trial if he had been given a
fitness hearing in 1988, and he had failed to make the required
showing. When the circuit court again denied the State's request
to dismiss this claim, the State called two witnesses.
	Robert E. Chapman, M.D., a psychiatrist who interviewed
petitioner in 1988 to evaluate his fitness to stand trial and the
applicability of insanity or intoxication as defenses, testified that
he was aware during his interview with petitioner that he had been
receiving three 10-milligram doses of Librium per day. Chapman
described Librium as "an anti-anxiety medication" and "a minor
tranquilizer." During the interview, Chapman found petitioner
"oriented, alert, cooperative, [and] inquisitive." Petitioner "showed
no evidence of psychosis or other symptoms of a severe mental
disease or mental disorder." Further, he showed no evidence of
drug side effects such as slurring of speech or staggering or other
gait disturbance. Petitioner did not report insomnia or other sleep
disturbances. Chapman found petitioner's behavior appropriate
and his thought processes intact. Asked for his opinion, within a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, of petitioner's fitness to
stand trial in 1988, Chapman testified that petitioner "was fit."
When specifically asked if that opinion took into account that
petitioner was taking Librium at the time, Chapman responded,
"Yes."
	On cross-examination, Chapman stated that his opinion as to
petitioner's fitness for trial in 1988 would not be altered by
learning that he subsequently attempted suicide. He also
acknowledged that one of the effects of Librium is to cause the
patient to be subdued or quiet or to have an emotionless
expression, and that the patient might tend to become withdrawn
from other people. However, Chapman explained that these effects
occur only if the dosage of Librium is "approaching toxic levels."
When asked by the court to clarify, Chapman explained that one
would have to take "hundreds of milligrams a day" before
experiencing these effects.
	Phillip Jobe, Ph.D., a professor of pharmacology at the
University of Illinois College of Medicine in Peoria, explained that
Librium is used primarily for treatment of anxiety as well as to
treat insomnia. Jobe was asked to describe, to a reasonable degree
of scientific certainty, the effect on a 24- to 25-year-old male,
weighing approximately 165 pounds, of three 10-milligram doses
of Librium per day. Jobe stated that such a dosage would not
impair that person's ability to understand the nature of charges
against him or to understand legal proceedings. Further, it would
not impair the person's abilities to communicate with counsel, to
observe, recollect, or relate occurrences, or to control his motor
processes, including facial expressions. Jobe was also asked how
long Librium would remain in the system of a 165-pound male
after the medication was discontinued. Jobe explained that the
drug, including its metabolites, would "essentially [be] gone from
most people in ten days to 15 days" and that the drug would be
"active" for a much shorter period.
	Jobe acknowledged on cross-examination that Librium's side
effects include confusion, drowsiness, fainting, and nausea, and
"[i]f the dose were sufficiently high," Librium could cause an
impairment in decisionmaking ability. When asked if Librium
could have a "different effect" on a person, such as petitioner, with
a history of alcohol dependence or in alcohol withdrawal, Jobe
explained that Librium is actually "useful in the management of
alcohol abstinence syndrome."
	Following the testimony of these two witnesses, the court took
judicial notice of the testimony of Mortimer Beck, M.D., in the
transcript of petitioner's sentencing hearing. Beck, who conducted
a psychiatric evaluation of petitioner prior to Chapman's
evaluation, is the doctor who prescribed the Librium. Petitioner
began receiving the medication the day after his interview with
Beck. Thus, Beck's evaluation of petitioner occurred prior to his
receiving any medication. Beck found petitioner fit to stand trial.
	The record before the circuit court as it considered the
testimony of the State's witnesses documented the following
sequence of events regarding petitioner's treatment with Librium:
April 21, 1988, evaluation by Dr. Beck, who found petitioner fit
to stand trial and prescribed the medication; April 22, 1988,
medication began; June 13, 1988, evaluation by Dr. Chapman,
who also found petitioner fit to stand trial; June 22-23, 1988,
bench trial; June 29, 1988, medication terminated because
petitioner refused further doses; July 4, 1988, petitioner attempted
suicide by ingesting caustic cleaning fluid; September 17, 1988,
sentencing hearing began. The court also took judicial notice of
records indicating petitioner's age, height, and weight at the time
he was taking Librium, which were consistent with the
hypothetical questions posed to the witnesses.
	Based on this evidence, the circuit court concluded that
"[t]here never was a bona fide doubt of the petitioner's fitness to
stand trial raised at the time of the trial or the sentencing hearing."
The court stated that it would find trial counsel ineffective for
failing to request a fitness hearing only if petitioner demonstrated
"a reasonable probability that if a fitness hearing had been held
back in 1988, he would have been found unfit to stand trial." The
court then held that petitioner had not only failed to show a
reasonable probability, he offered "no evidence at all that he
would have been found unfit." Finally, appellate counsel's failure
to raise this issue on direct appeal was "not objectively
unreasonable." "Accordingly," the court ruled, "all of the claims
that survived [the] October 31, 1997, order are now denied."
	In the present appeal, petitioner raises three claims of
constitutional error, having abandoned 32 of the 35 claims
contained in his second post-conviction petition. First, he argues
that his sentencing hearing was unfair because the State
improperly used peremptory challenges to excuse jurors who
expressed reservations about imposing the death penalty. Second,
he claims he was deprived of a fair sentencing hearing because
two members of the jury engaged in private deliberations. Third,
petitioner asserts that the circuit court erred when, after holding an
evidentiary hearing, it rejected his claims of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel based on failure to request a fitness hearing and
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on failure to raise
that issue on appeal.
	These three issues are before this court for the first time, over
10 years after we affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence on
direct appeal. The State urges us to find petitioner's entire second
post-conviction petition time-barred under section 122-1 of the
Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1996)) and to find further that
consideration of these three issues is barred by the waiver
provision of section 122-3 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West
1996)). The State also argues that the circuit court properly
concluded petitioner would not have been found unfit to stand trial
if a fitness hearing had been held at that time. Petitioner responds
that his first post-conviction proceeding was fundamentally flawed
because he did not receive a reasonable level of assistance of
counsel and, therefore, it should not stand as a bar to a subsequent
petition, the Act's limitations and waiver provisions
notwithstanding.

II. ANALYSIS
	The Act provides a remedy to a criminal defendant whose
federal or state constitutional rights were substantially violated in
his original trial or sentencing hearing. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502 (1998). In capital cases, post-conviction proceedings
are governed by section 122.2-1(b) of the Act (725 ILCS
5/122.2-1(b) (West 1996)), which requires the circuit court to
initially determine "whether the petitioner, if indigent, wants to be
represented by counsel. After the petitioner makes that choice, the
matter is then docketed for further proceedings." People v.
Thomas, 195 Ill. 2d 37, 40 (2001). The State must then either
answer the petition or move to dismiss it. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West
1996); Thomas, 195 Ill. 2d  at 40. Unless the petition is disposed of
on a motion to dismiss, the circuit court, considering the petition
and the State's answer, determines whether a hearing is required
because the allegations of the post-conviction petition, supported
by the trial record and accompanying affidavits, make a substantial
showing of a violation of a constitutional right. If not, the petition
may be dismissed. If the petition does make a substantial showing
of a constitutional violation, the matter proceeds to an evidentiary
hearing. People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 428 (1998). For
purposes of determining whether an evidentiary hearing is
warranted, all well-pleaded facts in the petition and in any
supporting affidavits are to be taken as true. People v. Caballero,
126 Ill. 2d 248, 259 (1989).
	Because this is a collateral proceeding, rather than an appeal
of the underlying judgment, a post-conviction proceeding allows
inquiry only into constitutional issues that were not, and could not
have been, adjudicated on direct appeal. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 502.
Thus, issues that were raised and decided on direct appeal are
barred from consideration by the doctrine of res judicata; issues
that could have been raised, but were not, are considered waived.
Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 502-03. In addition, two provisions of the Act
may bar consideration of the claims raised in the present petition.
First, section 122-1(c) establishes a limitations period (People v.
Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1999)), beyond which a post-conviction
petition will not be heard unless the petitioner "alleges facts
showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable
negligence." 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 1996). Second, at all
times relevant to this case, the Act has also provided that "[a]ny
claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the
original or an amended petition is waived." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch.
38, par. 122-3; 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1996). Thus, although
exceptions may be made in certain circumstances, the Act
contemplates the filing of only one post-conviction petition.
People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 273 (1992).
	A trial court's dismissal of a post-conviction petition without
an evidentiary hearing is reviewed de novo. People v. Coleman,
183 Ill. 2d 366, 389 (1998). Dismissal of a post-conviction petition
following an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for manifest error.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 385.

A. Second Post-Conviction Petition
	The State argues that any consideration of petitioner's second
post-conviction petition is barred by section 122-3 of the Act.
Petitioner argues that he was deprived of his appeal of the
dismissal of his initial petition due to the virtual abandonment of
his case by counsel. Thus, he urges this court to find that his first
post-conviction proceeding was deficient and that he is, therefore,
entitled to consideration of his second petition. Neither party has
addressed this question in terms of the cause-and-prejudice test
that this court has frequently employed to determine whether
making an exception to section 122-3 is warranted.
	Review of our prior case law suggests a reason for the parties'
oversight-we have been less than crystal clear about whether the
cause-and-prejudice test must be applied to the claims raised in a
successive post-conviction petition and how the test relates to
claimed flaws in the initial post-conviction proceeding. See, e.g.,
Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 278-79 (discussing the cause-and-prejudice
test "parenthetically"); People v. Szabo, 186 Ill. 2d 19, 23 (1998),
quoting Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 273-74 (successive petition may go
forward "only when" proceedings on the initial petition were
" 'deficient in some fundamental way,' " but not applying the
cause-and-prejudice test); Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 12 (same); People
v. Jones, 191 Ill. 2d 194, 199 (2000) (stating that Flores "adopted"
the cause and prejudice test "as the proper means of identifying the
extremely narrow class of cases in which a defendant's successive
post-conviction petition is entitled to consideration on the
merits"); People v. Holman, 191 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (2000) (noting
that this court "has previously referred to the cause and prejudice
standard as an aid in determining whether a successive post-conviction proceeding may proceed"); People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437, 449 (2001) (holding that successive petitions may be
allowed where proceedings on the initial petition were deficient
and noting that the cause-and-prejudice test has been used "as an
aid" to determine whether a successive post-conviction petition
may proceed).
	This case presents the opportunity to clarify two areas of
confusion. First, is the cause-and-prejudice test merely an aid that
courts may use to determine whether a claim raised in a successive
petition should be allowed to proceed, or is it the analytical tool
that has been adopted by this court for use in all such cases?
Second, is a successive post-conviction petition permitted only
when the first proceeding was fundamentally deficient, or is a
flawed first proceeding but one of the circumstances that may
justify consideration of a successive petition?
1. The Cause-and-Prejudice Test
	In an initial post-conviction proceeding, the common law
doctrines of res judicata and waiver operate to bar the raising of
claims that were or could have been adjudicated on direct appeal.
Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 502-03. The doctrine of waiver, however, "is
a rule of administrative convenience, not a jurisdictional or
absolute bar to procedurally defaulted claims." People v. Hawkins,
181 Ill. 2d 41, 53 (1998). Exceptions to this common law principle
of judicial administration are made in three situations: "where
fundamental fairness so requires; where the alleged waiver stems
from the incompetence of appellate counsel; or where facts
relating to the claim do not appear on the face of the original
appellate record." People v. Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d 154, 171 (2000).
And although the "fundamental fairness" exception " 'escapes
precise definition' " (Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d  at 173, quoting People
v. Porter, 164 Ill. 2d 400, 408 (1995)), we have long defined the
fundamental fairness exception in the context of an initial post-conviction petition in terms of the cause-and-prejudice test (see
People v. Owens, 129 Ill. 2d 303, 317 (1989)).
	In the context of a successive post-conviction petition,
however, the procedural bar of waiver is not merely a principle of
judicial administration; it is an express requirement of the statute.
725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1996). Only when fundamental fairness
so requires will the strict application of this statutory bar be
relaxed. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 274.
	In Flores, we referred "parenthetically" (Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at
278-79) to the United States Supreme Court decision in
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991), in which the Court adopted the same cause-and-prejudice test for determining whether successive habeas corpus
petitions would be allowed that it had previously adopted to
determine whether to permit habeas adjudication of claims that
had been procedurally defaulted in state court. We acknowledged
that this test is as appropriate for determining whether
fundamental fairness requires relaxation of the statutory bar to a
successive petition as it is to determine whether fundamental
fairness requires relaxation of the procedural bar of waiver in an
initial post-conviction proceeding. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 278-79.
We also noted that the cause-and-prejudice test "is similar to, and
accomplishes no more than" the concept of fundamental fairness.
Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 279.
	Since Flores, we have at times used less than explicit
language when referring to the cause-and-prejudice test, describing
the test as "an aid" or otherwise suggesting that its application is
not mandatory. We hold today that the cause-and-prejudice test is
the analytical tool that is to be used to determine whether
fundamental fairness requires that an exception be made to section
122-3 so that a claim raised in a successive petition may be
considered on its merits. We reaffirm that even if the petitioner
cannot show cause and prejudice, his failure to raise a claim in an
earlier petition will be excused if necessary to prevent a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. To demonstrate such a
miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must show actual innocence or,
in the context of the death penalty, he must show that but for the
claimed constitutional error he would not have been found eligible
for the death penalty. See Hudson, 195 Ill. 2d  at 124, citing Sawyer
v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 120 L. Ed. 2d 269, 112 S. Ct. 2514
(1992).
	As applied to the present case, because this is a successive
petition in which petitioner makes no claim of actual innocence or
of ineligibility for the death penalty, the claims raised in his
petition must be considered waived unless application of the
cause-and-prejudice test dictates otherwise.

2. Fundamental Deficiency in the Initial Post-Conviction
Proceeding
	"Cause," for purposes of the cause-and-prejudice test, has
been defined as " ' "some objective factor external to the defense
[that] impeded counsel's efforts" to raise the claim' " in an earlier
proceeding. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 279, quoting McCleskey, 499 U.S.  at 493, 113 L. Ed. 2d  at 544, 111 S. Ct.  at 1470, quoting
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397, 408, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986). We have frequently observed that a
fundamental deficiency in the initial post-conviction proceeding
may constitute cause for consideration of issues raised in a
subsequent petition. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d  at 449; People v.
Erickson, 183 Ill. 2d 213, 223 (1998); Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 273-74. On occasion, however, we have said that "only if" the first
proceeding was deficient will a successive petition be considered.
See, e.g., Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 12; Szabo, 186 Ill. 2d  at 23.
	Recently, the United States Supreme Court, whose lead we
followed in adopting the cause-and-prejudice test, observed:
		" 'Without attempting an exhaustive catalog of such
objective impediments to compliance with a procedural
rule [of waiver], we note that a showing that the factual or
legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to
counsel *** would constitute cause under this standard.' "
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 n.24, 144 L. Ed. 2d 286, 303 n.24, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1949 n.24, quoting
Murray, 477 U.S.  at 488, 91 L. Ed. 2d  at 408, 106 S. Ct. 
at 2645, citing Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1, 15, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2910 (1984).
The specific claim raised in Strickler, to which the cause-and-prejudice test was applied, was a claim that conduct by the State
had impeded counsel's access to the factual basis for making a
Brady claim. The Court stated that such conduct would "ordinarily
establish the existence of cause for a procedural default." Strickler
v. Greene, 527 U.S.  at 283, 144 L. Ed. 2d  at 303, 119 S. Ct.  at
1949. Yet the State's failure to disclose Brady material prior to
trial does not indicate a fundamental deficiency in the first post-conviction proceeding.
	In Reed, which Strickler cited with favor, the Court said:
			"Because of the broad range of potential reasons for an
attorney's failure to comply with a procedural rule, and
the virtually limitless array of contexts in which a
procedural default can occur, this Court has not given the
term 'cause' precise content. *** Underlying the concept
of cause, however, is at least the dual notion that, absent
exceptional circumstances, a defendant is bound by the
tactical decisions of competent counsel." Reed, 486 U.S. 
at 13, 82 L. Ed. 2d  at 13, 104 S. Ct.  at 2909.
Further,
			"[T]he cause requirement may be satisfied under certain
circumstances when a procedural failure is not attributable
to an intentional decision by counsel made in pursuit of
his client's interests. And the failure of counsel to raise a
constitutional issue reasonably unknown to him is one
situation in which the requirement is met." Reed, 486 U.S. 
at 14, 82 L. Ed. 2d  at 14, 104 S. Ct.  at 2909.
The Court held that "where a constitutional claim is so novel that
its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel, a defendant
has cause for failure to raise the claim in accordance with
applicable state procedures." Reed, 486 U.S.  at 16, 82 L. Ed. 2d  at
15, 104 S. Ct.  at 2910. Thus, the Supreme Court has not limited
the scope of "cause" to situations in which the earlier habeas
corpus proceeding was deficient.
	Some of our prior decisions have suggested that, unlike the
Supreme Court, we intended to limit the cause element of the
cause-and-prejudice test to a showing of a fundamental deficiency
in the initial post-conviction proceeding. See, e.g., Szabo, 186 Ill.
2d at 23-24; Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 12. In other decisions, we have
noted that a successive petition may be allowed "when" the initial
proceedings were deficient (see, e.g., Orange, 195 Ill. 2d at 449),
but we did not use the words "only when." To resolve this
apparent inconsistency, we reiterate that "cause" in this context
refers to any objective factor, external to the defense, which
impeded the petitioner's ability to raise a specific claim in the
initial post-conviction proceeding. Thus, when "cause" is based on
a fundamental deficiency in the first post-conviction proceeding,
the petitioner must show that the deficiency directly affected his
ability to raise the specific claim now asserted.

3. Application of the Cause-and-Prejudice Test
	Section 122-3 of the Act does not forbid the filing of a
successive petition. Rather, it provides that "[a]ny claim" not
raised in the original or an amended petition is waived. 725 ILCS
5/122-3 (West 1996). Thus, the fundamental fairness exception
applies to claims, not to petitions, and the cause-and-prejudice test
must be applied to individual claims, not to the petition as a
whole. See Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 36 (Freeman, C.J., specially
concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.) (noting that each claim in a
successive petition must be reviewed individually to ascertain
whether the claim is barred by section 122-3; if it is barred, the
court must then determine whether an exception applies to that
claim).
	Petitioner argues that his first proceeding was fundamentally
flawed by counsel's abandonment of his case on appeal and that
he is, therefore, entitled to consideration of all of the claims raised
in his second petition. This is, essentially, an argument that the
flaw was so pervasive that it undermined the entire proceeding,
rendering it entirely unreliable as a means of vindicating his
constitutional rights.
	Our prior case law does offer some support for applying the
"cause" element of the test to the petition as a whole. In People v.
Free, 122 Ill. 2d 367, 376 (1988), we discussed several older cases
in which the prior post-conviction proceedings had been "virtual
nullities" and successive petitions had been allowed. We
concluded, however, that because the defendant had already been
given " 'one complete opportunity to show a substantial denial of
his constitutional rights,' " his second post-conviction petition was
properly dismissed. Free, 122 Ill. 2d  at 376-77, quoting People v.
Logan, 72 Ill. 2d 358, 370 (1978). See also Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 
at 369 (treating third petition as an amended petition rather than a
successive filing "to ensure that defendant obtain[ed] one
complete opportunity to show a substantial denial of constitutional
rights").
	Petitioner claims that dismissal of his first post-conviction
appeal as a result of counsel's failure to file a brief denied him
"one complete opportunity," so that all issues raised in his second
petition should be considered. Nevertheless, because section
122-3 applies to claims and not to petitions, we hold that a
petitioner must establish cause and prejudice as to each individual
claim asserted in a successive petition, even if he demonstrates
that his initial post-conviction proceeding was deficient in some
fundamental way. That is, he must show how the deficiency in the
first proceeding affected his ability to raise each specific claim.
We need not decide whether an initial proceeding could be so
pervasively flawed that cause and prejudice are evident without
individual claim-by-claim consideration, because this is not such
a case.
	In People v. Johnson, 192 Ill. 2d 202, 207 (2000), post-conviction counsel filed a brief with this court, but we found the
brief to be "so fundamentally deficient that it preclude[d] review."
We granted a remedy in that case, ordering appointment of new
counsel and rebriefing of the issues. We did not, however, order
that new counsel take the matter back to the starting point and file
an amended post-conviction petition. Similarly, in the present
case, although we agree with the petitioner that post-conviction
counsel's failure to file a brief at all rendered the initial proceeding
deficient, we reject his contention that the deficiency was so
fundamental that the initial proceeding must been deemed a
nullity. Thus, the three issues raised in this appeal should be
considered waived unless petitioner demonstrates cause as to each
one.
	The cause-and-prejudice test, like the test for ineffective
assistance of counsel (Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)), is
composed of two elements, both of which must be met in order for
the petitioner to prevail. Because the petitioner did not frame his
argument in terms of cause and prejudice, we will not attempt an
item-by-item assessment of any cause he might have for raising
these three specific issues in his second petition. Instead, we will
consider whether prejudice would result from application of the
waiver provision of section 122-3 to these claims. Prejudice, in
this context, would occur if the petitioner were denied
consideration of an error that so infected the entire trial that the
resulting conviction or sentence violates due process. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 279.

a. State's Use of Peremptory Challenges
	At trial, defense counsel did not object when the State
exercised peremptory challenges to excuse certain jurors who
expressed mild misgivings about imposing the death penalty. On
direct appeal, petitioner questioned whether other jurors were
properly excused for cause, an argument that we rejected, but did
not question the State's use of peremptory challenges. See
Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill. 2d  at 381-88. Petitioner now asserts that
nine jurors were excused "simply because" they expressed some
reservations about the death penalty. He argues that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to object and thus preserve this issue for
appeal and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to include
this issue among the 14 claims of error in his direct appeal.
Petitioner finally raised this issue in his habeas corpus petition
and, while that matter was still pending in federal court, included
it among the 35 claims of error contained in his second post-conviction petition. The circuit court dismissed this claim without
an evidentiary hearing.
	Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on
direct appeal are evaluated under the standard set forth in
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at
2064, which requires the defendant to demonstrate both deficient
performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. Accordingly, if
the underlying claim has no merit, no prejudice resulted, and
petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and
on direct appeal must fail. See People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509,
523 (1995).
	We addressed a similar claim in Coleman:
			"Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing
the state to exercise peremptory challenges against certain
prospective jurors who expressed some reservations about
the death penalty, but whose views did not rise to the
level of cause under Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770, and its
progeny. Under Witherspoon, a prospective juror may not
constitutionally be excused for cause based on general
objections to the death penalty on moral or religious
grounds. Defendant contends that through the use of
peremptory challenges the State was able to achieve what
it could not achieve through the use of challenges for
cause: 'a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to
die' [citation]. On several occasions, this court has held
that Witherspoon does not limit the use of peremptory
challenges. [Citations.] Defendant acknowledges these
decisions but urges us to reconsider them." Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 548-49.
	In the present case, petitioner would have us reconsider our
holding in Coleman by reading Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), which prohibits the State
from exercising peremptory challenges purely on the basis of the
prospective juror's race, in conjunction with Witherspoon, as
creating a similar limitation on the State's power to exercise
peremptory challenges on the basis of an opinion or point of view
expressed by a prospective juror. Batson does not support such a
reading. Batson was decided entirely on equal protection
principles (Batson, 476 U.S.  at 84 n.4, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 79 n.4, 106 S. Ct.  at 1716 n.4 (declining to consider sixth and fourteenth
amendment arguments)). Although Batson has been applied to bar
other discriminatory practices in jury selection (see J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 144-45, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89,
106-07, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429 (1994) (applying Batson doctrine
to gender-based peremptory challenges)), it does not apply when
peremptory challenges are used to excuse venire members on the
basis of an opinion they express during voir dire.
	We conclude, as we did in Coleman, that "we find no
persuasive reason to depart from this court's holdings in this area."
Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 549. Because our prior decisions are clear
pronouncements on this issue (see Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 549,
People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 55-56 (1994), People v. Howard,
147 Ill. 2d 103, 136-38 (1991), People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463,
481-82 (1984)), not only did no prejudice result from failure to
raise this issue, neither trial counsel's lack of objection nor
appellate counsel's decision not to raise the issue on direct appeal
constituted deficient performance.
	As a result, we hold that consideration of this claim in a
successive petition is barred by section 122-3 of the Act because
petitioner cannot show that prejudice would result from
application of the bar. The circuit court properly declined to
consider this claim in a successive petition.

b. Jury Deliberations
	For purposes of determining whether consideration of this
issue is warranted, we take as true all well-pleaded facts in the
petition and in the supporting affidavits. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d  at
259. During the sentencing phase of petitioner's trial, when
deliberations were suspended for the night, the trial court
instructed the jurors that "you are most certainly not to deliberate
any further tonight and not to start deliberations until you're back
here in your jury room tomorrow morning." The affidavits reveal
that despite this instruction, two jurors who shared a hotel room
discussed the case. One of the jurors, who favored imposing the
death penalty, "was able to dispel some of [the other juror's]
anxieties and help [her] sort through the confusion that surrounded
[her] decision." The next morning, after an hour and fifteen
minutes of deliberations, the jury announced its verdict sentencing
petitioner to death.
	Based on affidavits obtained from these two jurors, petitioner
argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair
trial. In addition to revealing improper deliberation, the affidavits
also reflect some misunderstanding by these jurors about the
proceeding. For example, these jurors believed that all members
of the jury had to agree on what specific evidence constituted
mitigation sufficient to preclude imposing the death penalty; they
believed that a vote of 10 to 2 (as the jury then stood) would result
in a "hung" jury and that they had to reach a unanimous decision;
and the juror who had already decided in favor of the death penalty
advised the undecided juror that the defendant had the burden of
proving why he should not be sentenced to death. Finally, they
believed that a sentence of natural life imprisonment would not
guarantee defendant would never go free.
	In general, a jury verdict is not subject to impeachment by the
testimony of the jurors. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 457. Thus, a
statement by a juror, taken after the jury has rendered a verdict,
been polled in open court, and been discharged, is not admissible
to impeach the verdict. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 457. Strong public
policy considerations underlie this rule, which prevents the
admission of a juror's affidavit to show the " 'motive, method or
process by which the jury reached its verdict.' " Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 
at 457, quoting People v. Holmes, 69 Ill. 2d 507, 511 (1978). As
the United States Supreme Court has noted:
		" '[If it is] established that verdicts solemnly made and
publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside
on the testimony of those who took part in their
publication [then] all verdicts could be, and many would
be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering
something which might invalidate the finding. Jurors
would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an
effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might
establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If
evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would
be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation,
the constant subject of public investigation-to the
destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and
conference.' " Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107,
119-20, 97 L. Ed. 2d 90, 105-06, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2747
(1987), quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68, 59 L. Ed. 1300, 1302, 35 S. Ct. 783, 784 (1915).
This rule, preventing admission of juror testimony to impeach the
verdict, does not preclude admission of testimony offered as proof
of improper extraneous influences on the jury. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 
at 458.
	The distinction between "motive, method or process" and
"improper extraneous influence" is illustrated in Hobley. We
determined that Hobley was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing
on his claim that he was prejudiced by the conduct of the jury
foreperson, a police officer, who allegedly "sought to intimidate
other jurors," claimed to be an expert in proper police conduct,
showed the other jurors his gun, " 'elected himself as foreman,' "
and, according to one juror, " 'wore her down' " and persuaded her
to vote guilty, even though she was not convinced of defendant's
guilt. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 463. Because no improper extraneous
influence penetrated the jury's deliberations, we found that this
claim was properly dismissed by the circuit court as an attempt to
impeach the method and process by which the jury reached its
verdict. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 465.
	We did, however, determine that Hobley was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his claim that jury deliberations were
influenced by an incident in the hotel dining room while the jury
was sequestered. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 462. Several men who were
also dining in the hotel recognized the jury and shouted out
remarks about the defendant and their belief that he was guilty and
should be executed. The jurors stated that they were " 'upset,' "
" 'scared,' " and felt their lives threatened. Another juror described
those who had heard the remarks as " 'extremely shaken' " by the
incident. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 459.
	In the present case, the affidavits offered by petitioner deal
exclusively with the content of private jury deliberations, albeit
deliberations engaged in improperly and in violation of the court's
instructions. This information purports to describe the jury's
"motive, method or process." It does not present any evidence of
an improper extraneous influence and, thus, may not be used to
impeach the verdict.
	Petitioner would not have been entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on this claim even if he had raised it in his initial post-conviction petition. He, therefore, will suffer no prejudice if the
procedural bar of section 122-3 is strictly applied. The circuit
court properly declined to consider this claim.

c. Petitioner's Fitness to Stand Trial
	Petitioner also alleges that the Librium he was taking may
have affected his ability to understand and participate in his bench
trial and sentencing hearing and may also have affected his
appearance and demeanor in the court room, influencing how the
judge and jury perceived him. Based on the statute that was in
effect at the time of his trial ("A defendant who is receiving
psychotropic drugs or other medications under medical direction
is entitled to a hearing on the issue of his fitness while under
medication" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 104-2(a))), he argues
that he is entitled to a new trial because the lack of a fitness
hearing at the time of trial cannot be remedied by a retrospective
fitness hearing conducted more than a decade after the fact.
Recognizing that we have previously held that a defendant's right
to a fitness hearing on the basis of his ingestion of psychotropic
drugs is purely statutory, and, as such, is not cognizable in a post-conviction proceeding (People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 327
(2000)), he has framed his claim in terms of ineffective assistance
of counsel at trial and on direct appeal.
	In addition, petitioner urges this court to retreat from our
holding in Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d  at 338, that a post-conviction
petitioner "must show a reasonable probability that, if a section
104-21(a) fitness hearing would have been held, he would have
been found unfit to stand trial," and return to the approach of
People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450, 461 (1994), and its progeny,
under which a defendant in his situation would be automatically
entitled to a new trial. Finally, petitioner claims that Mitchell,
which places the burden on the petitioner to prove that he would
have been found unfit had a fitness hearing been held in the
original proceeding (Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d at 334), is inconsistent
with our more recent decision in People v. Johnson, 191 Ill. 2d 257, 271 (2000), which held that once the defendant has raised a
bona fide question of fitness, the State has the burden of proving
the defendant to be fit. We reject each of these arguments in turn.
	To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show both that counsel's representation was so
deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms and that the deficient
performance so prejudiced defendant as to deny him a fair trial.
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at
2064. In Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d  at 334, we set out the test for
evaluating the prejudice prong of the Strickland test when a post-conviction petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel on
the basis that he was receiving psychotropic drugs at the time of
trial or sentencing, but did not receive the fitness hearing he was
entitled to by statute. With regard to the performance of trial
counsel, the petitioner must show a "reasonable probability that he
would have been found unfit if counsel had requested a fitness
hearing." Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d  at 334. As applied to a claim that
appellate counsel failed to raise the issue on direct appeal, the
petitioner "must show that the failure to raise the issue was
objectively unreasonable and that, but for this failure, a reasonable
probability exists that the sentence or conviction would have been
reversed." Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d  at 332.
	A defendant is unfit to stand trial "if, because of his mental or
physical condition, he is unable to understand the nature and
purpose of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense."
725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 1996). The fundamental purpose of a
fitness hearing, therefore, is "to determine a person's ability to
function within the context of a trial." Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d  at 335.
In Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d  at 337, and later in People v. Jones, 191 Ill. 2d 194, 200-01 (2000), we examined the trial record for evidence
of the defendant's demeanor during trial and his participation in
his own defense. We concluded in each case that even if defense
counsel had requested a fitness hearing, there was no reasonable
probability that the defendant would have been found unfit.
Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d  at 337; Jones, 191 Ill. 2d  at 201. In the present
case, however, we do not have the benefit of the trial record, so we
cannot utilize this approach. We do, however, have the record of
the evidentiary hearing, which the petitioner characterizes as a
"retrospective fitness hearing."
	Before addressing the merits of this claim, we will respond to
petitioner's argument that a retrospective fitness hearing cannot
remedy the lack of a fitness hearing at the time of his trial. Once
a defendant has raised a bona fide doubt as to his fitness to stand
trial, the State has the burden of proving him fit. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d  at 328-29. Petitioner did not raise a bona fide doubt; he merely
offered evidence that he had been receiving psychotropic
medication at or near the time of trial. See Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d  at
330-31 (stating that the mere ingestion of psychotropic drugs does
not create bona fide doubt). Thus, the burden did not shift to the
State. The purpose of the evidentiary hearing was not to
retrospectively determine petitioner's fitness, but to determine the
probability that if a fitness hearing had been held in 1988, he
would have been found unfit to stand trial. The circuit court
understood that the precise question before it was whether the
petitioner had met the prejudice prong of the Strickland test and
that the burden was, therefore, on petitioner.
	The evidence presented at the hearing demonstrates that
almost three months elapsed between the date of petitioner's last
dose of Librium and his sentencing hearing. Based on the
testimony of Dr. Jobe, the circuit court could reasonably have
concluded that there was no possible psychotropic effect at that
time. With regard to petitioner's fitness at the time of the bench
trial, two psychiatrists who evaluated him at the time had found
him fit, one before he began taking the medication and one while
he was taking it. The circuit court could reasonably have
concluded, based on the evidence presented, that the small dosage
of Librium petitioner was taking had no discernable effect on his
demeanor or on his ability to participate in his defense. Therefore,
it was not manifestly erroneous for the circuit court to conclude
that petitioner would not have been found unfit had a fitness
hearing been held in 1988.
	As to the performance of trial counsel, the circuit court stated:
"[M]y understanding of the law is that today the defendant had to
show a reasonable probability that if a fitness hearing had been
held back in 1988, he would have been found unfit to stand trial,
and I think they not only failed to show a reasonable probability,
but really have shown no evidence at all that he would have been
found unfit." Regarding the performance of appellate counsel, the
circuit court denied petitioner's claim, finding the failure to raise
the fitness issue "not objectively unreasonable." Indeed, because
the petitioner offered absolutely no evidence in support of his
claim, and merely cross-examined the State's witnesses, the circuit
court could not possibly have found that he had met his burden.
	Thus, we affirm the finding of the circuit court that petitioner
has failed to establish that trial counsel's failure to request a
fitness hearing and appellate counsel's failure to raise that issue on
direct appeal infected his trial and appeal to such a degree that his
conviction and sentence violate due process.
	Anticipating this result, petitioner urges this court to reject our
holding in Mitchell and to return to the previous approach of
People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450 (1994). In Mitchell, as in the
present case, the issue presented was whether counsel had been
ineffective for failing to obtain a fitness hearing. We rejected our
earlier "automatic reversal" rule that had its origin in Brandon and
replaced it with a prejudice inquiry.
	The present case illustrates the logic of the rule articulated in
Mitchell. Under the old rule, petitioner would have been entitled
to a new trial, despite the fact that the evidence adduced at the
hearing overwhelmingly demonstrates that his fitness to stand trial
was not affected by the medication. In this case, however,
application of the Mitchell prejudice inquiry as part of the cause-and-prejudice test protects both the State's interest in finality and
the petitioner's interest in fairness. We, therefore, decline to
reconsider our holding in Mitchell.
	Petitioner also argues that our recent decisions in Mitchell and
Johnson reach contradictory results regarding the burden of proof
as to a defendant's fitness to stand trial. The two cases are not
contradictory. Although both cases involved post-conviction
proceedings, they were fundamentally different. In Johnson, the
issue presented was not the defendant's fitness at the time of trial
but, rather, his fitness to proceed with his post-conviction
proceedings. We held that on post-conviction, as at trial, the
defendant has the initial burden of raising a bona fide doubt as to
his fitness. Once a bona fide doubt is created, the burden then
shifts to the State to prove him fit. Johnson, 191 Ill. 2d  at 269. In
the present case, because there is no question of petitioner's fitness
at this time and because he must demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel, he carried the burden of proof, a burden he
failed to meet.
	In sum, we conclude that the circuit court properly granted an
evidentiary hearing to explore the factual basis for petitioner's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the circuit court concluded that petitioner had not
demonstrated any prejudice as a result of trial or appellate
counsels' actions. The prejudice prong of the cause-and-prejudice
test was not shown and the circuit court was correct to dismiss the
claim.

B. Timeliness of Petitioner's Second Post-Conviction Petition 
	Because we have determined that the petitioner's claims are
barred by section 122-3 of the Act, we need not address the
additional question posed by the State, that is, whether the
limitations period of section 122-1 applies to bar a successive
petition, if the claims that are raised in that petition are otherwise
justified by the petitioner's demonstration of cause and prejudice.

III. CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
circuit court. We direct the clerk of this court to enter an order
setting Wednesday, November 13, 2002, as the date on which the
sentence of death entered by the circuit court of Peoria County
shall be carried out. Petitioner shall be executed in the manner
provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 2000). The clerk of this
court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the
Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional
Center, and to the warden of the institution where petitioner is now
confined.



Affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	The proceedings which culminated in Pitsonbarger's
convictions and sentence of death were fatally flawed because they
did not comport with the new rules enacted by our court governing
the conduct of cases in which the State is seeking the death
penalty. For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in
People v. Hickey, No. 87286 (September 27, 2001) (Harrison, C.J.,
dissenting), the procedures contained in those rules are
indispensable for achieving an accurate determination of
innocence or guilt and are applicable to all capital cases now
coming before us. Because Pitsonbarger was tried, convicted and
sentenced without the benefit of the new rules, his convictions and
death sentence should be vacated, and the cause should be
remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.
	Even if Pitsonbarger were not entitled to the benefit of the
new rules, his sentence of death could not stand. For the reasons
set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v.
Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law is void
and unenforceable because it violates the eighth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,
amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Absent the new rules,
there is no basis for altering that conclusion. At a minimum,
Pitsonbarger's sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and
he should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Ill. Rev. Stat.
1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(j). Because he was convicted of murdering
more than one victim, the term of imprisonment must be natural
life. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(1)(c).
	I respectfully dissent. For the reasons set forth in my dissents
in People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 39 (September 27,
2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), and People v. Simpson, No. 85084,
slip op. at 35 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I
believe this cause should be remanded for a new trial conducted in
compliance with the new rules governing capital cases. As I stated
in my dissents, the procedures in capital cases prior to this court's
adoption of the new rules were inherently unreliable and did not
sufficiently protect a defendant's constitutional rights. For this
reason, I believe that the new rules should be applied retroactively.
People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 220-21 (1997).
	In addition, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that
defense counsel's failure to file any post-conviction brief is not a
fundamental deficiency deeming the initial proceeding a nullity.
Instead, the majority holds that defendant must satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test on each issue. Slip op. at 14. I believe that the
pervasive flaws in defendant's initial proceeding make this
precisely the type of case that demands consideration of the claims
made in defendant's first petition without application of the cause-and-prejudice test to each individual claim. Contra slip op. at 13-14.
	In part, the majority's conclusion relies upon People v.
Johnson, 192 Ill. 2d 202, 207 (2000). In Johnson, we ordered new
briefs when post-conviction counsel failed to comply with our
various briefing rules. The majority notes that Johnson did not
direct the filing of an amended post-conviction petition. It reasons
that the failure to file proper briefs in Johnson did not open the
door for a defendant to raise constitutional claims in a second
post-conviction petition. Therefore, the majority concludes that in
this case the issues in defendant's second post-conviction petition
are waived unless each satisfies the cause-and-prejudice test.
	While I agree that Johnson does not open the door for a
defendant to assert new constitutional claims not previously raised
in the initial post-conviction petition, the majority overlooks the
plain logic of Johnson's applicability to issues that were actually
asserted in the initial post-conviction petition. In Johnson, we
stated that "[a]n attorney who files a brief that is so fundamentally
deficient that it precludes review by the supreme court has not
provided a reasonable level of assistance." Johnson, 192 Ill. 2d  at
207. The fundamental deficiency in the Johnson brief was the
failure to comply with citation rules and record cites, among other
meaningful but technical rules. Johnson, 192 Ill. 2d  at 204-07.
Here, post-conviction counsel abandoned the proceedings and
filed no brief at all. Simply put, it defies logic to conclude that a
technically incomplete brief is fundamentally deficient but the
failure to file any brief whatsoever and the utter abandonment of
the entire proceeding is not just as fundamentally deficient.
	Thus, I believe the majority opinion ignores a key issue
squarely before us: whether an initial proceeding may be so
pervasively flawed as to warrant consideration of those same
claims in a subsequent petition without subjecting the individual
claims to the cause-and-prejudice test. I believe that it can be and
that defense counsel's complete abandonment of the initial post-conviction proceedings is one such circumstance.
	" 'Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be
represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects
his ability to assert any other rights he may have.' " United States
v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 664, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2044 (1984), quoting W. Schaefer, Federalism and State
Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1956). A defendant is
entitled to a reasonable level of assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings to assure "one complete opportunity to
show a substantial denial of constitutional rights." People v.
Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 369 (1996). Moreover, defense
counsel's performance may be so inadequate that defendant's right
to assistance of counsel has effectively been denied. Cronic, 466 U.S.  at 654 n.11, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 665 n.11, 104 S. Ct.  at 2044 n.11.
If an accused does not receive actual assistance, then the
constitutional guarantee of the right to effective assistance of
counsel is violated. Cronic, 466 U.S.  at 654, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 664-65, 104 S. Ct.  at 2044.
	Although we generally presume defense counsel to be
competent, there are instances where prejudice to the accused is so
likely that inquiry into the precise effect of counsel's conduct
cannot be justified. Cronic, 466 U.S.  at 658, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 667,
104 S. Ct.  at 2046.  The most obvious of these is the complete
absence of assistance from counsel. See Cronic, 466 U.S.  at 659,
80 L. Ed. 2d  at 668, 104 S. Ct.  at 2047.
	Here, counsel's abandonment of the first post-conviction
proceedings denied defendant even a single complete opportunity
to demonstrate his alleged constitutional deprivations and left him
without effective assistance of counsel. " 'While a criminal trial is
not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring
with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed
prisoners to gladiators.' " Cronic, 466 U.S.  at 657, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at
667, 104 S. Ct.  at 2046, quoting United States ex rel. Williams v.
Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 1975). The majority's
conclusion that the flaws in this case were not so pervasive as to
obviate the need for the cause-and-prejudice test is the culmination
of defendant's judicial sacrifice. Slip op. at 14.
	In view of counsel's complete abandonment of the first post-conviction proceedings, I believe that it is improper to apply the
cause-and-prejudice test to defendant's entire second post-conviction petition. Accordingly, to the extent defendant's second
post-conviction petition claims mirror those raised in his first post-conviction petition, those repeated claims should be considered
without application of the cause-and-prejudice test.
	Thus, I respectfully dissent.