Case Title: JOSEPH McATEER v. MAX GLENN STEWART

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOSEPH McATEER v. MAX GLENN STEWART1985 WY 36696 P.2d 72Case Number: 84-120Decided: 03/01/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOSEPH McATEER, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF BELOW) 

v. 

MAX GLENN STEWART, 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT BELOW).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, R.M. Forrister, 
J.

 
 
Michael J. 
Sullivan and Mark W. Gifford of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, Massey & Sullivan, 
Casper, for appellant.

James Owens, 
Casper, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, Justice.

[¶1.]     The issue in this 
appeal is whether an order that has not been reduced to writing or memorialized 
in any way takes precedence over a subsequent written order in the same case 
which has been properly recorded. The trial court held that the oral order 
controlled. We will reverse and remand.

[¶2.]     A lawsuit captioned 
Joseph McAteer v. Max Glenn Stewart, arising out of an automobile accident in 
1977, was filed February 13, 1981. Stewart, appellee here, filed a motion dated 
March 7, 1982, to dismiss for lack of prosecution according to Rule 14 of the 
Uniform Rules for Wyoming District Courts.1 After a hearing, Judge Forrister 
orally granted the motion to dismiss "with prejudice." However, no written order 
or documentation of Judge Forrister's oral determination was executed or filed 
of record.2

[¶3.]     On March 9, 1983, Judge 
Spangler, administering the court's civil docket, by written order dismissed the 
case without prejudice, for lack of prosecution. Rule 41(b)(2), Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure. On October 26, 1983, appellant McAteer, filed a motion to vacate 
Judge Spangler's March 9, 1983, order of dismissal. The judge denied the motion 
by order dated December 13, 1983.

[¶4.]     On January 20, 1984, a 
new action was filed, the case presently before us.3 Stewart filed a motion to dismiss 
the second action contending that Judge Forrister's previous oral dismissal of 
the first action "with prejudice" precluded McAteer from refiling the second 
action.

[¶5.]     Judge Forrister 
dismissed the second action on April 18, 1984, holding in effect that the oral 
dismissal "with prejudice" took precedence over the subsequent written order of 
dismissal - without prejudice, thereby precluding a filing of the second motion. 

[¶6.]     In this case, we deal 
with a problem that resulted from two orders in the same case that are 
inconsistent or conflicting. The first order was rendered orally but was not 
memorialized by a docket entry, formal order or any writing, and its date is 
uncertain. The second order was written, dated, signed by the judge and entered 
in the court file. Both orders pertain to the same case, and were regularly 
rendered by different judges of the same court, both having jurisdiction.4

[¶7.]     In proceedings before a 
trial court, judgments and orders are ordinarily reduced to writing and entered 
into the court file or record. Rarely do judgments or orders reside only in the 
memory of the judge.

[¶8.]     Our Rules of Civil 
Procedure and other legal rules that we live by clearly contemplate that a 
judgment or order be in writing and entered in the case file. Rule 54(a), 
W.R.C.P., provides:

"Definition; form. - A judgment is the 
final determination of the rights of the parties in action. `Judgment' as used 
in these rules includes a decree. A judgment need not contain a recital of 
pleadings, the report of a master, or the records of prior proceedings. A 
direction of a court or judge, made or entered in writing, and not included in a 
judgment, is an order."

Rule 58, 
W.R.C.P., provides:

"(a) Form and Entry. - In all cases, the 
judge shall promptly settle or approve the form of the judgment or order and 
direct that it be entered by the clerk. All judgments and orders must be entered 
on the journal of the court and specify clearly the relief granted or order made 
in the action.

"(b) Time of Entry. - A judgment or final 
order in any case shall be deemed to be entered whenever a form of such judgment 
or final order, signed by the trial judge, is filed in the office of the clerk 
of the court in which the case is pending. If no such form of judgment or final 
order is signed by such trial judge in any case, then the actual entry of the 
judgment or final order on the journal of the proper court shall 
govern."

[¶9.]     While Rules 54(a) and 
58 seem to contemplate a written judgment or order, they do not mandate written 
judgments or orders for all purposes. Rule 58 deals with the time of entry of a 
judgment for purposes of appeal.

[¶10.]  Appellee cites authority for a rule that 
a judgment of the court is what the court pronounces, and it is rendered 
whenever the trial court orally announces its decision in open court. The rule 
suggested by appellee does not solve the problem here, or other practical 
situations.5 United States v. Hunt, 513 F.2d 129 
(10th Cir. 1975); In re Forstner Chain 
Corporation, 177 F.2d 572 (1st Cir. 1949); Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. 
Griffith, 
Tex.Civ.App., 575 S.W.2d 92 (1978).

"The rendition of a 
judgment is the judicial act of the court, whereas the entry of a judgment by 
the clerk on the records of the court is a ministerial, and not a judicial, act. 
Hence, the rendition of a judgment is usually distinguished from its filing or 
entry in the records, which should not be confused with the judgment itself. The 
judgment itself is not that which may be entered or recorded, but that which is 
considered and delivered by the court." 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 154, pp. 
414-415 (1969).

"In harmony with the 
distinction between the rendition of a judgment and its entry, it has been 
adjudged that as soon as a judgment is rendered, the rights of the parties 
become established, and as between the litigants, it is not necessary that it be 
entered of record or docketed. * * *" 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 158, p. 417 
(1969).

[¶11.]  Appellant, on the other hand, contends 
that there can be no judgment until it is entered in the proper record of the 
court, and that it cannot exist in the memory of officers of the court. In 
support of this contention, he cites State v. Scott, 35 Wyo. 108, 247 P. 699 (1925), which case cited a 
104-year-old Iowa case, Balm v. Nunn, 63 Iowa 641, 19 N.W. 810 
(1881).

[¶12.]  Counsel have not cited any case or other 
authority that addresses the precise question before us, nor has our research 
found any. In Jackson v. State, 
Wyo., 547 P.2d 1203 (1976), appellant filed a notice of appeal following the court's oral 
pronouncement of the judgment. The issue on appeal was whether the judge's oral 
decision from the bench constituted a final order from which an appeal could be 
taken. This court held that appellant's notice of appeal was premature and 
ineffective because it had been filed prior to the official entry of the 
judgment. We stated that only the official entry of judgment on the court's 
record pursuant to Rule 58, W.R.C.P., triggered the 30-day time period within 
which to appeal the case. Jackson v. 
State, supra.6 The holding in Jackson v. State is not dispositive of 
the case before us, however. That case dealt only with the incident which 
triggered the time period within which to appeal.

[¶13.]  In Lane v. State, Wyo., 663 P.2d 175 
(1983), the judgment and sentence pronounced from the bench and the mittimus 
provided that such sentence run consecutively with an anticipated federal 
sentence. However, the written judgment and sentence made no mention of the fact 
that the sentence was to be served consecutively with a federal sentence. We 
held in Lane that the judgment and sentence pronounced from the bench controlled 
and that there was an oversight and omission in the written judgment and 
sentence. We further held that a nunc pro tunc judgment and sentence was 
properly entered to correct the oversight and omission.

[¶14.]  Lane v. State, supra, is distinguishable 
from the case before us. In Lane the transcript of the oral judgment and 
sentence and the mittimus were unambiguous and plain. The error in the written 
judgment and sentence was the result of an oversight and omission. In the case 
here there was no transcript of the oral order; neither was there an oversight 
or omission. The orders in the case here are entirely different and were entered 
independently of each other.

[¶15.]  A general rule that permits an order to 
reside only in the memory of the judge to take precedence over a later order, 
regularly rendered and entered, would lend itself to uncertainty and have the 
potential for mischief. We hold that under the circumstances of this case, an 
order regularly rendered, signed and recorded takes precedence over a prior oral 
order not entered in the court files or records.7

[¶16.]  Reversed and remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion.

1 Now Rule 203(c), Uniform 
Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming:

"(c) Cases on the docket 
in which no substantial and bona fide action of record towards disposition has 
been taken for 90 days are subject to dismissal for lack of 
prosecution."

2 Stewart's attorney made 
considerable effort to get McAteer's attorney to approve, as to form, an order 
reflecting Judge Forrister's decision.

3 McAteer attempted to 
breath life into his cause of action by virtue of § 1-3-118, W.S. 1977, which 
provides:

"If in an action 
commenced in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the 
plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits and the time limited for the 
commencement of the action has expired at the date of the reversal or failure, 
the plaintiff, or his representatives if he dies and if the cause of action 
survives, may commence a new action within one (1) year after the date of the 
failure or reversal. This provision also applies to any claim asserted in any 
pleading by a defendant."

4 In our discussion of the 
issue here, we make no distinction between orders and judgments. Any subtle 
difference is not important in this case.

5 The rule cited by 
appellee would not be practical if an attempt were made to execute on an oral 
judgment or file it in another court or another state. Likewise, we do not see 
how an oral judgment or order could ever be a lien on 
property.

6 Since Jackson v. State, the Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure have been adopted (effective August 1, 1978). Rule 2.01, 
W.R.A.P., provides in part, "a notice of appeal, in a civil or criminal case, 
filed prematurely shall be treated as filed on the same day as the entry of 
judgment or final order."

7 It is noted that the 
order of Judge Spangler dated March 9, 1983, was never vacated, nor was the 
prior oral order of Judge Forrister ever entered nunc pro tunc. We need not 
consider what the result might have been had Judge Spangler's order been vacated 
and/or Judge Forrister entered a nunc pro tunc order.