Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Runyan

Citation: 2006-Ohio-80

Docket Number: 20051183

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Runyan, 108 Ohio St.3d 43, 2006-Ohio-80.] 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. RUNYAN. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Runyan, 108 Ohio St.3d 43, 2006-Ohio-80.] 
Judges — Misconduct — Violation of Judicial Canons promoting public 
confidence in judiciary and requiring impartial performance of judge’s 
public duties and judge’s avoidance of appearance of impropriety — DR 
1-102(A)(5) — Misconduct warrants public reprimand. 
(No. 2005-1183 — Submitted August 23, 2005 — Decided January 25, 2006.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 04-070. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Jeffrey Lynn Runyan of Newark, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0004873, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1979.  In 
November 1998, respondent was elected to the Ashland County Court of 
Common Pleas.  In February 1999, he began serving as the sole general-division 
judge in that court. 
{¶ 2} On February 4, 2005, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged 
respondent in an amended, two-count complaint with violations of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility.  A panel of the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard the cause and made 
findings of misconduct and a recommendation, which the board adopted. 
Misconduct 
Count I 
{¶ 3} The charges of misconduct in Count I arose from respondent’s 
attempts to take “corrective action” toward a police detective whose conversation 
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with a potential witness led respondent to declare a mistrial in the prosecution of a 
multiple-felony-count indictment. 
{¶ 4} Keith Songer was indicted on theft, grand theft, and forgery 
charges in December 2002.  Beginning on August 5, 2003, respondent presided 
over Songer’s jury trial.  Songer’s defense counsel anticipated calling as witnesses 
Songer and his brother, who allegedly had some knowledge of the events 
underlying the indictment.  Defense counsel expected the brother to testify that 
Songer had lacked the requisite intent to have committed the charged offenses. 
{¶ 5} Before he was called to testify, however, a detective spoke with the 
brother outside the courtroom and mentioned that similar charges might be 
brought against the brother.  Songer’s brother thereafter exercised his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination and declined to testify.  Respondent 
later granted the defense’s motion for mistrial, explaining that due process 
considerations “compel a finding that an agent of the State should not be 
permitted to silence the defendant’s witness in the hallway of this courthouse just 
prior to [the witness’s] testimony.” 
{¶ 6} On August 8, 2003, an article appeared in the Ashland Times-
Gazette that quoted the Ashland County Prosecutor and the city of Ashland Chief 
of Police to the effect that the detective had not acted improperly by advising 
Songer’s brother of his possible prosecution.  On the same day, respondent wrote 
to the county prosecutor and police chief in an effort to initiate a formal 
investigation of the incident that led to the mistrial. 
{¶ 7} On August 29, 2003, respondent overruled Songer’s motion to 
dismiss and bar retrial, finding that retrial was not barred by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause because although the detective did intimidate the brother, he had done so 
unintentionally, and therefore the state did not “goad” the defendant into seeking 
a mistrial.  In overruling the motion, however, respondent ordered the county 
prosecutor’s office, as the representative of the state, to post a $2,500 bond to pay 
January Term, 2006 
3 
some of the costs of retrying the case and warned that the indictment against 
Songer would be dismissed if the state did not pay.  The county prosecutor 
refused to post the bond.  Respondent then granted Songer’s motion to dismiss the 
indictment, defending his placing of financial burdens on the state as part of the 
court’s “inherent power to regulate and control its proceedings” and citing the 
“well-accepted doctrine that the State is responsible in such matters, for the 
conduct of its representatives.” 
{¶ 8} In dismissing the Songer indictment, respondent’s order also 
vacated the order setting the September 4, 2003 jury trial to retry Songer.  The 
county prosecutor nevertheless appeared at the courthouse on that day and 
announced to the media present that he was prepared to go to trial but was unable 
to do so because of respondent’s dismissal order. 
{¶ 9} During August, September, and October 2003, respondent, the 
county prosecutor, and the city police chief exchanged letters concerning law-
enforcement investigations into the detective’s conduct prior to the Songer 
mistrial.  In his letters, respondent declared his “obligation to take corrective 
action,” referring to appointing a special prosecutor or initiating contempt 
proceedings, unless sufficient disciplinary measures were taken against the 
detective whose conversation prompted the mistrial.  On October 15, 2003, one 
month after the state appealed the dismissed indictment, respondent tried to 
broker a deal between the police, the county prosecutor, the detective, and the 
common pleas court that he claimed would provide a satisfactory resolution to the 
ordeal. 
{¶ 10} Respondent’s deal proposed terms well beyond his judicial 
authority and ethical constraints.  He promised to “accept” the discipline that the 
police chief intended to impose for the detective’s mistake and to forgo contempt 
or special-prosecutor proceedings if, in exchange, the prosecutor dismissed the 
appeal in the Songer case and the police chief made a public statement 
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characterizing the detective’s conversation as wrong and declaring that the court 
ordered the mistrial “properly.”  Respondent also proposed as part of the deal that 
(1) he would not permit cross-examination of the detective concerning the mistrial 
during retrial in the Songer case because the detective’s mistake was unintentional 
and therefore irrelevant, (2) in the event that officer misconduct ever leads to 
another mistrial, the county prosecutor, police, and individual officer would 
accept joint and several liability for the costs of retrial, and (3) neither the county 
prosecutor nor his assistants would stage a “symbolic” protest of the court’s 
decisions in the future. 
{¶ 11} Respondent sent a signature page with his letter and gave the 
parties ten days to agree to his terms.  The county prosecutor and police chief 
declined his proposal, and the prosecutor reported respondent’s conduct to relator.  
On October 24, 2003, the same day that respondent received relator’s letter of 
inquiry about the grievance, respondent wrote to the prosecutor, with copies to the 
police chief and others to whom respondent had sent his previous letter, thanking 
all concerned for their “settlement efforts.”  His letter further advised that because 
the matter remained unresolved, the terms expressed in his October 15 letter were 
“merely suggestions” and were “not binding upon the Court in any way, if and 
when those same issues come before the Court in this or other future cases.” 
{¶ 12} On March 18, 2004, the Court of Appeals for Ashland County 
reversed and remanded respondent’s order dismissing the Songer indictment for 
the prosecution’s failure to pay costs of retrial.  State v. Songer, Ashland App. No. 
03COA051, 2004-Ohio-1281, 2004 WL 540305.  On October 13, 2004, we 
denied leave to appeal.  State v. Songer, 103 Ohio St.3d 1477, 2004-Ohio-5405, 
816 N.E.2d 254. 
{¶ 13} Based on these facts, the parties stipulated and the board found that 
respondent had violated Canons 2 (a judge shall respect and comply with the law 
and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
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integrity and impartiality of the judiciary), 3 (a judge shall perform the duties of 
judicial office impartially and diligently), 3(B)(9) (“While a proceeding is 
pending or impending in any court, a judge shall not make any public comment 
that might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or 
make any nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or 
hearing”), and 4 (a judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety in all the judge’s activities), and DR 1-102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not 
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
Count II 
{¶ 14} The parties also stipulated and the board found that respondent had 
violated Canon 3(E)(1)(b) (a judge shall disqualify himself in a proceeding in 
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including, but not 
limited to, instances where the judge served as a lawyer in the matter in 
controversy).  Respondent committed this misconduct by ruling on a former 
client’s motion to terminate his prison sentence. 
{¶ 15} Respondent represented Charles A. Miller, an indicted defendant, 
in 1991.  Respondent negotiated a plea agreement for Miller; the attorney-client 
relationship, however, was not completely satisfactory.  In January 1992, 
respondent was granted leave to withdraw from the case.  At the same time, 
Miller was appointed new counsel and pleaded guilty to two counts of the 
indictment, including specifications, which respondent claims was essentially the 
plea agreement that he had negotiated.  Miller was sentenced to prison. 
{¶ 16} When respondent was elected to the common pleas bench, a 
visiting judge was assigned to hear motions filed in the Miller case.  The visiting 
judge remained on the case for several years, but he was physically unable to rule 
when Miller filed a motion to terminate his sentence in February 2004.  
Respondent overruled the motion the day after receiving the state’s response.  
Miller later wrote to respondent, objecting to his ruling on the ground that 
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respondent had once represented him and that respondent had “quit[ ] on” him.  In 
November 2004, respondent also overruled Miller’s second motion to terminate 
his sentence. 
Sanction 
{¶ 17} In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the board 
weighed the mitigating and aggravating factors of respondent’s case.  See Section 
10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and 
Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
(“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). 
{¶ 18} The board found, consistent with the parties’ stipulations, that 
respondent had no prior disciplinary record and had cooperated completely in the 
disciplinary proceedings, both of which are mitigating factors under BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and (d).  Respondent also recognized with remorse the 
gravity of his mistakes, conceding that he should never have proposed his terms to 
resolve his differences with the county prosecutor and the police chief.  
Acknowledging this apology, the board found that respondent genuinely believed 
that the public would be served by his solution to the Songer situation and 
therefore that he did not act out of self-interest.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(b).  Respondent further conceded that he should have recused himself 
from Miller’s motions, which relator agrees had no merit; he misguidedly 
thought, however, that as the only judge in a small county, his rulings were 
appropriately expedient.  Finally, the board accepted testimonials as to 
respondent’s good reputation and character, mitigating factors under BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(e), observing that respondent is held in high esteem by many 
for his work ethic as a lawyer and a judge, his professional competence, and his 
integrity apart from the mistakes that he made in this case.  The board found no 
aggravating factors. 
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{¶ 19} The board recommended that respondent be publicly reprimanded 
for his misconduct based on Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Vukelic, 102 Ohio St.3d 421, 
2004-Ohio-3651, 811 N.E.2d 1127, and Disciplinary v. Christ (1996), 74 Ohio 
St.3d 308, 658 N.E.2d 746.  In Vukelic, a part-time magistrate in mayor’s court 
was publicly reprimanded for failing to immediately transfer a misdemeanor case 
against one of his clients in a domestic relations case and allowing the case to be 
discussed in his presence.  In Christ, a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for 
having represented a woman in a parental rights case after he signed the decree in 
her divorce from the child’s father.  The board also cited Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Medley (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 474, 756 N.E.2d 104, in which a judge was publicly 
reprimanded because he gave a defendant a ride home from the police station, 
suggesting to onlookers that she might receive special treatment, and did not 
promptly recuse himself from her case. 
{¶ 20} Neither relator nor respondent, who is no longer a judge, has 
objected to the recommendation that respondent receive a public reprimand. 
Review 
{¶ 21} “When deciding what sanction to impose, we consider the duties 
violated, respondent’s mental state, the injury caused, the existence of aggravating 
or mitigating circumstances, and applicable precedent.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Evans (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 497, 501, 733 N.E.2d 609.  The board made 
determinations concerning all these factors.  We therefore agree that respondent 
committed the violations as found by the board and that a public reprimand is 
appropriate. 
{¶ 22} Respondent is therefore publicly reprimanded for his violations of 
Canons 2, 3, 3(B)(9), 3(E)(1)(b), and 4, and DR 1-102(A)(5).  Costs are taxed to 
respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
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MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Brian E. Shinn, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson and George D. Jonson, for respondent. 
_______________________