Case Title: Commonwealth v. Louis

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11512

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11512 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DANIEL LOUIS. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     February 1, 2021. - June 28, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Cellular Telephone.  Probable Cause.  
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause, 
Assistance of counsel.  Search and Seizure, Probable cause, 
Affidavit.  Identification.  Evidence, Identification.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, New trial, Assistance of 
counsel. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 9, 2010. 
 
The cases were tried before Kathe M. Tuttman, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on May 16, 2018, was heard by her. 
 
 
Alan Jay Black for the defendant. 
Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  In 2012, a jury convicted the defendant of 
murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder, 
2 
 
unlawful possession of a firearm, and attempted armed robbery.1  
On appeal, the defendant argues that his cell site location 
information (CSLI) and text messages were improperly admitted at 
trial.  He further argues that he was prejudiced by defense 
counsel's failure to object to in-court and out-of-court 
identifications made by an eyewitness. 
Discerning no error, we affirm the defendant's convictions 
and the denial of his motion for a new trial.  After plenary 
review of the entirety of the record, we decline to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict of 
murder in the first degree or order a new trial. 
1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts that the jury could have 
found at the defendant's trial, reserving certain details for 
our discussion of the legal issues. 
On September 30, 2010, Wallace Duarte, Benjamin Peirce, and 
Shaquan Jacobs devised a plan to rob Lauren Lob, an individual 
from whom Duarte had purchased marijuana in the past.  At around 
3 P.M., the group visited a store to purchase supplies for the 
robbery.  Meanwhile, Jacobs told the group that they could 
secure firearms for the robbery from the defendant and indicated 
 
1 The defendant was found not guilty of armed robbery.  The 
defendant had also been charged on two indictments of conspiracy 
to commit armed robbery, but those charges were not tried before 
the jury.  At sentencing, the prosecutor suggested that those 
charges might be nol prossed, but the docket does not indicate 
any action has been taken with respect to those charges. 
3 
 
that the defendant wanted to participate in the robbery.  After 
calling the defendant, the group picked him up in the Roxbury 
section of Boston.  The defendant placed a black duffel bag 
containing firearms in the trunk of the car and joined the 
group. 
At around 8 P.M., the men and Marina Del Mar, a friend of 
Peirce, drove to Lob's address in Newton to initiate the 
robbery.  Their plot ultimately failed when Lob did not respond 
to Duarte's attempts to lure her via calls and text messages and 
did not answer her door.  When the defendant expressed 
frustration that the plan failed, Peirce suggested that the 
group instead rob the victim, Adam Coveney, for Percocet tablets 
to resell. 
Peirce initiated a text message conversation with the 
victim to lure him out of his Waltham apartment.  As they neared 
the apartment, the defendant retrieved a gun from the trunk of 
the car, and he, Peirce, and Jacobs proceeded toward the 
building. 
At approximately 11 P.M., the defendant shot and killed the 
victim outside his apartment. The victim was found on the floor 
of the vestibule area of the apartment complex with a gunshot 
wound to the abdomen, was transported by ambulance, and died in 
the hospital.  His cell phone contained a text message 
conversation with Peirce wherein Peirce sought to purchase 
4 
 
Percocet.  The last text message from Peirce was received three 
minutes before the shooting was reported in a 911 call. 
Cell phone records obtained from various cellular service 
providers established a constant stream of communications among 
the coventurers, and location data placed them in the same areas 
at relevant times.  In particular, Jacobs's and the defendant's 
cell phones showed telephone and text message communications 
between 3 P.M. and 4 P.M., with the defendant's cell phone 
sending signals to a cell tower in Roxbury.  The movements of 
the defendant's cell phone are also consistent with the 
description of the defendant's movements above:  the CSLI from 
that cell phone demonstrated that the defendant traveled towards 
Jacobs's home between 4 P.M. and 5 P.M. and stopped near 
Jacobs's home from 5:30 P.M. to 8:45 P.M.  The defendant's cell 
phone also moved towards the first attempted robbery location 
between 9:30 P.M. and 10:30 P.M. and sent a signal to a tower 
near the victim's apartment building shortly after 11 P.M. 
2.  Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant argues that his 
text messages were improperly admitted in evidence at trial, 
that CSLI data from his cell phone was unconstitutionally 
admitted at trial without a warrant or probable cause, and that 
he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to file a motion to 
suppress eyewitness Del Mar's out-of-court identification or to 
5 
 
exclude her second, in-court identification at trial.  We 
address each argument in turn. 
a.  Metro PCS records.  On November 19, 2010, ten days 
after the defendant was charged, the Commonwealth filed a motion 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 17 (a) (2), 378 Mass. 885 (1979), 
seeking third-party records from the defendant's cellular 
service provider, Metro PCS.  While the Commonwealth's motion 
originally requested production of, among other data, the 
defendant's text messages and CSLI, the prosecutor indicated at 
the start of the motion hearing that the Commonwealth was no 
longer seeking the text messages.  Upon allowing the motion, the 
motion judge mistakenly ordered Metro PCS to produce the text 
messages despite the Commonwealth's oral withdrawal of its 
request at the hearing.  As a result, Metro PCS's production 
included the defendant's text messages.  Nevertheless, the trial 
judge ultimately denied the defendant's motion in limine to 
preclude the Commonwealth from mentioning these text messages 
and permitted the Commonwealth to introduce the messages at 
trial. 
i.  Text messages.  The defendant appeals from the 
introduction of his text messages at trial.  In his motion for a 
new trial, the defendant argued that his attorney provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  On appeal, however, he 
claims that there was not probable cause to support the search 
6 
 
under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
A.  Preservation of objection and standard of review.  
Before reaching the merits of the defendant's claims, we must 
first determine the proper standard of review.  The Commonwealth 
suggests on appeal that the defendant's claims should be viewed 
as challenging ineffective assistance of counsel, while the 
defendant challenges lack of probable cause directly. 
The procedural posture of the case is somewhat complicated 
but ultimately of no import, as the affidavit submitted in 
support of the Commonwealth's rule 17 motion for production of 
the text messages, CSLI, and other data established the 
requisite probable cause.  Defense counsel initially opposed the 
motion on art. 14 and Fourth Amendment grounds.  After the 
Commonwealth withdrew its request for text messages at the 
motion hearing, the defense had no reason to continue to pursue 
any objection to the text messages.  When it was revealed that 
the text messages were produced in error, however, the defendant 
did not clearly renew his art. 14 and Fourth Amendment 
objections.  His motion in limine and oral argument at trial on 
this issue only challenged lack of notice to the defense and 
possible violation of the Massachusetts wiretap statute.  
Indeed, defense counsel appeared to expressly decline to make a 
Fourth Amendment or art. 14 challenge at that time, and did not 
7 
 
object to the trial judge's understanding that he was not 
alleging a lack of probable cause.  Because the defendant did 
not raise these issues before the trial judge, they appear not 
to have been preserved.  See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 83 Mass. 
App. Ct. 419, 424 (2013).2 
But because the defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree, our ineffective assistance analysis focuses on 
whether a motion to suppress the text messages would have been 
successful.  As we explained in Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 
Mass. 20, 29, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 330 (2017), 
"Where, as here, the defendant has been convicted of murder 
in the first degree, we review his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel to determine whether the alleged 
lapse created a 'substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice,' a standard more favorable to the defendant than 
the constitutional standard otherwise applied under 
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681-682 (1992), 
S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).  We focus more broadly on 
whether there was error and, if so, whether any such error 
'was likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion.'  Id.  
If the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is based on the failure to file a motion to 
suppress, he must 'show that the motion to suppress would 
have been successful, and that failing to bring such a 
motion . . . created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.'  Commonwealth v. Banville, 457 
Mass. 530, 534 (2010)." 
The issue here, therefore, is whether the affidavit originally 
submitted with the Commonwealth's rule 17 motion nonetheless 
 
2 He did, however, bring a motion for a new trial alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
8 
 
established probable cause as required by art. 14 and the Fourth 
Amendment.  If the affidavit established probable cause, then 
any motion to suppress would have been unsuccessful and the 
defendant cannot succeed on his ineffective assistance claim. 
B.  Probable cause.  As always, probable cause must be 
established based only on the facts contained within the four 
corners of the Commonwealth's motion and supporting affidavit, 
including reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts.  See 
Commonwealth v. Morin, 478 Mass. 415, 425 (2017).  "In 
determining whether an affidavit justifies a finding of probable 
cause, the affidavit is considered as a whole and in a 
commonsense and realistic fashion; inferences drawn from the 
affidavit need only be reasonable and possible, not necessary or 
inescapable."  Commonwealth v. Cavitt, 460 Mass. 617, 626 
(2011). 
To establish probable cause, the Commonwealth must 
demonstrate a nexus between the crime under investigation and 
the subject of its search, here, the cell phone data.  See 
Commonwealth v. Snow, 486 Mass. 582, 586 (2021); Commonwealth v. 
White, 475 Mass. 583, 589 (2016).  The Commonwealth may not 
simply rest upon the fact that the defendant owns a cell phone 
or that, in general, coventurers in crime often communicate via 
cell phone to justify a search of the defendant's text messages.  
See Snow, supra at 586, 589-590, citing Morin, 478 Mass. at 426.  
9 
 
Similarly, it is not enough to show that the defendant 
communicated with a person implicated in the crime via cell 
phone.  See Morin, supra at 428.  "Rather, even where there is 
probable cause to suspect the defendant of a crime, police may 
not seize or search his or her cellular telephone to look for 
evidence unless they have information establishing the existence 
of particularized evidence likely to be found there."  White, 
supra at 590-591. 
Here, the affidavit established the requisite nexus between 
the robbery and the defendant's telephone communications.  The 
affidavit established that the victim's cell phone had a series 
of text messages that evening from Peirce.  The affidavit 
further attested that Jacobs was heard talking on a cell phone 
with someone about bringing a gun and that Jacobs told the 
others that the person with whom he was speaking wanted to 
participate in the robbery.  Later that evening, they picked up 
the defendant, who was identified elsewhere in the affidavit as 
the person who brought the gun and shot the victim.  Jacobs also 
stated that he called Peirce and the defendant on the day of the 
shooting.  The defendant provided his cell phone number to the 
police.  Although somewhat scattershot in its presentation, the 
affidavit established that the coventurers communicated via text 
message and spoke to each other about and during the commission 
of both attempted robberies via cell phone.  They made calls and 
10 
 
sent text messages to recruit each other to assist with the 
robberies and to coordinate and plan the crimes.  The affidavit 
further established that both attempted robberies were preceded 
by telephone communications between at least one coventurer and 
the intended victim. 
All of this together created the required connection 
between communications on the defendant's cell phone and the 
crimes at issue in this case, including the text messages.  See 
White, 475 Mass. at 589.  See also Snow, 486 Mass. at 589 
(finding probable cause where "the defendant made a cell phone 
call soon after the shooting to the person who rented the car 
used in the murder, there [was] a reasonable inference that the 
crime was preplanned, and there [were] records of threatening 
cell phone communications [between the victim and a 
coventurer]").  The affidavit was therefore sufficient to 
establish the requisite nexus for probable cause. 
Because the affidavit established probable cause to support 
a search of the defendant's text messages, any motion to 
suppress the messages would have been unsuccessful.  
Accordingly, the failure to file a motion to suppress was not 
ineffective assistance of counsel and did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice in this case.  
See Fulgiam, 477 Mass. at 29. 
11 
 
ii.  CSLI data.3  The defendant also argues that the trial 
judge erroneously admitted historical CSLI data because it was 
obtained without probable cause.  "In the context of historical 
CSLI, the sought-after evidence is the location of the cell 
phone itself, not what information may be found in the cell 
phone's contents.  That location can also be reasonably expected 
to be the location of the person possessing the cell phone.  We 
have repeatedly recognized that cell phones have become 'an 
indispensable part of daily life and exist as almost permanent 
attachments to [their users'] bodies.'"  Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 
482 Mass. 538, 546 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Almonor, 482 
Mass. 35, 45 (2019).  Because this evidence was produced over 
the defendant's objection and his direct appeal was pending at 
the time of our decision in Augustine, the probable cause 
requirement first articulated in that case applies here.  See 
Hobbs, supra at 544 & n.10, citing Commonwealth v. Augustine, 
467 Mass. 230, 256-257 (2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 
448 (2015) (acquisition of historical CSLI data satisfies 
warrant requirement if affidavit established probable cause). 
In the instant case, the probable cause analysis for CSLI 
is more straightforward than for the text messages.  The 
 
3 Only historical CSLI is at issue in this case.  See 
Commonwealth v. Almonor, 482 Mass. 35, 48-49 (2019) (defining 
historical CSLI and differentiating it from real-time location 
data). 
12 
 
affidavit submitted in support of the motion to produce the CSLI 
established in great detail that the defendant was present at 
and a part of the planned robberies and subsequent shooting, 
that he owned the cell phone subject to the desired search, and 
that he communicated with another robbery suspect via cell phone 
on the date of the murder.  Even if the defendant were not using 
the cell phone to communicate, which he was, the cell phone 
itself would have tracked his location.  As the motion judge 
explained: 
"Through statements of the defendants and an examination of 
[the victim's] cell phone, [the Commonwealth] has assembled 
evidence that each defendant used his cell phone in the 
planning, execution, and aftermath of the robbery/homicide, 
as did two material witnesses (Duarte and Del Mar).  
Information as to the movements of each of these 
individuals is material to this case, though for now, the 
Commonwealth seeks orders only for the defendants' phones" 
(emphasis added). 
Therefore, the Commonwealth satisfied its burden of 
establishing probable cause to access the defendant's CSLI data.  
Accordingly, counsel was not ineffective for failing to exclude 
either the text messages or the CSLI data. 
b.  Eyewitness identification.  The defendant further 
alleges ineffective assistance as a result of trial counsel's 
failure to move to suppress eyewitness Del Mar's pretrial 
identification or to exclude her in-court identification at 
trial.  In reviewing this claim pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
we "consider whether there was an error in the course of the 
13 
 
trial (by defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the judge) and, if 
there was, whether that error was likely to have influenced the 
jury's conclusion."  Wright, 411 Mass. at 682. 
The trial judge conducted a thorough voir dire prior to 
allowing Del Mar to identify the defendant at trial.  That 
examination established the following relevant facts.  Del Mar 
viewed the defendant "several times" on the evening of September 
30, 2010; she observed the defendant on the street under lamps 
and sat beside him in the back seat of a car, where it was 
darker.  She had conversations with the defendant and heard him 
speak.  She also described two photographic array 
identifications.  In the first array, on October 1, 2010, the 
day after the shooting, she was unable to identify any of the 
photographs.  She testified that she was frightened and 
emotional at the time, having just learned that the victim had 
died from his injuries.  On October 6, 2010, however, Del Mar 
was able to identify a photograph of the defendant in the second 
array.  She stated at the time that she was sixty-five to 
seventy-five percent certain that it was the defendant.  She 
reported feeling calmer and being able to think clearly during 
the second identification.  Between her two identification 
attempts, however, Del Mar viewed an Internet video recording of 
the defendant's and Jacobs's arraignment, wherein the defendant 
obscured his face by covering it with his hands.  Del Mar 
14 
 
maintained that she recognized the defendant's photograph from 
the night of the shooting, not the video recording, and that her 
in-court identification would be based on her memory of that 
night. 
After the voir dire, the trial judge found that any 
identification that Del Mar would make at trial would be based 
on her observations of the defendant at the time of the alleged 
events in this case on September 30, 2010.  The judge credited 
Del Mar's testimony, "with respect to her observations of the 
defendant on [the video recording], that his face was covered."  
The judge concluded that any in-court identification by Del Mar 
would not be substantially tainted by anything she had seen in 
the video recording, and that any influence on her 
identification by the recording "would go to the weight not the 
admissibility of her in-court identification because there's no 
indication here that there was any improper action by the police 
in exposing her to anything." 
As a result, Del Mar identified the defendant in court as 
the individual she observed on the night of the shooting.  Trial 
counsel for the defendant questioned Del Mar extensively on 
cross-examination, addressing her inability to make an 
unequivocal positive identification of the defendant in either 
pretrial photographic array and her viewing of the video 
recording of the defendant's arraignment.  The defendant argues 
15 
 
that trial counsel was ineffective in not moving to suppress Del 
Mar's pretrial identification before trial or to exclude it at 
trial and in not properly objecting to Del Mar's in-court 
identification. 
These claims are without merit.  At the time of the 
defendant's trial, out-of-court identifications were only 
inadmissible where a defendant "prove[d] by a preponderance of 
the evidence, considering the totality of the circumstances, 
that the identification [was] so unnecessarily suggestive and 
conducive to irreparable misidentification that its admission 
would deprive the defendant of his right to due process" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 234 
(2014).  Alternatively, a defendant could challenge a pretrial 
identification arising from "especially suggestive 
circumstances" other than a tainted police procedure under 
common-law principles of fairness.  Id. at 235, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 423 Mass. 99, 109 (1996).  As for in-
court identifications, those could be excluded only where they 
were "tainted by an out-of-court confrontation . . . that is 'so 
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.'"  Crayton, supra 
at 238, quoting Commonwealth v. Carr, 464 Mass. 855, 877 (2013).  
Importantly, the absence of a positive pretrial identification 
did not preclude an in-court identification of the defendant.  
16 
 
See Crayton, supra at 237-238.4  Accordingly, in most cases, 
suggestiveness went to the weight, not the admissibility, of an 
identification.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chhoeut Chin, 97 
Mass. App. Ct. 188, 199 (2020). 
Here, the trial judge concluded that the out-of-court 
identification was not unduly suggestive.  These findings, which 
are supported by the testimony at voir dire, are dispositive.  
Specifically, the judge found that Del Mar had substantial 
exposure to the defendant on the night of the murder, allowing 
for prolonged observation.  The judge also accepted Del Mar's 
testimony explaining why she could make a positive 
identification at the second pretrial identification and not the 
first and concluded that she was not unduly influenced by the 
video recording of the arraignment.  Moreover, Del Mar's failure 
to make a positive identification during the first 
identification procedure did not prohibit her from later 
identifying the defendant.  See Crayton, 470 Mass. at 238.  See 
also Commonwealth v. Odware, 429 Mass. 231, 233, 234-236 (1999) 
 
4 Collins changed this standard.  See Commonwealth v. 
Collins, 470 Mass. 255, 265-266 (2014).  After Collins, if an 
eyewitness has not made "an unequivocal positive identification 
of the defendant before trial," the eyewitness cannot make an 
in-court identification of the defendant unless it is a rare 
case in which there is "good reason" to permit the in-court 
identification.  Id. at 265-267.  Our holding in Collins was 
prospective and does not apply to cases tried before its 
issuance.  See Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 31 (2015) 
(Collins was prospective). 
17 
 
(judge properly admitted eyewitness's identification of 
defendant at grand jury lineup notwithstanding her failure to 
identify defendant from photographic array and her earlier 
observation of police flyer containing defendant's photograph).  
Given these findings, the judge's allowance of the 
identification testimony was proper. 
Under then-controlling precedent, therefore, any attempt by 
trial counsel to exclude Del Mar's in-court or out-of-court 
identifications of the defendant would have been unsuccessful.  
As the trial judge recognized, to the extent that the video 
recording of the arraignment was suggestive and influenced 
either identification, any suggestiveness went to the weight, 
rather than the admissibility, of the evidence.5  Accordingly, 
trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to exclude Del 
Mar's identifications.6 
c.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, we have 
reviewed the entire record pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and 
we discern no other basis to set aside or reduce the verdict of 
murder in the first degree or to order a new trial.  While our 
jurisprudence has reflected greater skepticism towards 
 
5 We decline to revisit the prospective nature of Collins. 
 
6 For the same reasons, defense counsel's use of the second 
identification during his cross-examination of Del Mar was not 
improper. 
18 
 
eyewitness identifications since the defendant's trial, it is 
significant that the eyewitness testimony against which the 
defendant lodges many of his complaints was largely cumulative 
of other evidence of his guilt.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
defendant's convictions and the denial of his motion for a new 
trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.