Case Title: UNION TELEPHONE COMPANY, a Wyoming Corporation V. WYOMING PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION; and QWEST CORPORATION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
UNION TELEPHONE COMPANY, a Wyoming Corporation V. WYOMING PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION; and QWEST CORPORATION2006 WY 110142 P.3d 678Case Number: 05-198, 05-199Decided: 08/31/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
UNION TELEPHONE COMPANY, a Wyoming 
Corporation,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 

WYOMING PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION; and QWEST 
CORPORATION,

 
 
Appellees

(Respondents).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The Honorable Peter G. 
Arnold, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

Bruce S. Asay, of Associated Legal Group, LLC, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing Appellee Wyoming Public Service 
Commission:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Michael L. 
Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Stephanie Anesi, Assistant Attorney 
General.

 
 
Representing Appellee Qwest 
Corporation:

Paul Hickey, Roger Fransen, and Brandi L. Monger, of 
Hickey and Evans, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

                        
            

Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Union Telephone 
Company (Union) appeals from an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss in which the 
district court determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review two 
decisions of the Public Service Commission (PSC) regarding an interconnection 
agreement between Union and Qwest Corporation 
(Qwest).  The district court held 
that the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the Act)1 vests exclusive jurisdiction in the 
federal courts for judicial review of a State commission decision concerning 
interconnection agreements.  We 
agree with the finding of the district court and dismiss these appeals for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Although the 
parties present several issues for our consideration, one is 
dispositive:

 
 
Does the Federal 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 251 et seq., vest exclusive jurisdiction in 
the federal courts for judicial review of a state commission decision concerning 
interconnection agreements?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Union is a telecommunications carrier and is both an 
Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier (ILEC)2 and a wireless provider.  Qwest is a telecommunications carrier 
and is also an ILEC.  Union 
purchased PYXIS Communications (PYXIS), a provider of wireless services to 
various locations in Wyoming.  
Prior to Union's purchase, the PYXIS 
wireless network was interconnected with Qwest's network and was subject to an 
interconnection agreement between Qwest and PYXIS.  When Union purchased PYXIS, Union did not assume the interconnection agreement.  Initially, Qwest permitted Union's traffic on its network despite the lack of an 
interconnection agreement.  Numerous 
billing disputes between Union and Qwest 
ensued.  

 
 
[¶4]      On September 23, 
2003, Qwest sent Union a formal request for 
negotiations to enter into an interconnection agreement addressing the former 
PYXIS traffic.  Union did not respond to this request.  Qwest sent a second formal request for 
interconnection negotiations.  
Again, Union did not 
respond.

 
 
[¶5]      On February 4, 
2004, Union filed a complaint with the 
PSC.  In its complaint, Union 
alleged that Qwest failed to properly route the traffic of Union's newly acquired wireless system.  Union 
contended that Qwest was obligated to provide service pursuant to applicable 
tariffs.  Union sought an order from 
the PSC requiring Qwest to route Union's wireless traffic in accordance with 
Union's request.

 
 
[¶6]      On February 26, 
2004, Qwest responded by filing a motion to dismiss Union's complaint in which 
it asserted that the proper forum for resolution of Union's complaint was an 
arbitration proceeding pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 252 and that approval of an 
interconnection agreement between Union and Qwest would moot Union's 
complaint.  On the same date, in a separate action, Qwest filed a 
Petition for Arbitration with the PSC.  
In its petition, Qwest requested PSC approval of 
its proposed interconnection agreement.

 
 
[¶7]      Union did not file a response to Qwest's Petition for 
Arbitration.  Union did, however, request a hearing on the complaint 
which it had filed.  On April 23, 
2004, Qwest filed a motion seeking PSC approval of the interconnection agreement 
submitted with its Petition for Arbitration.  

 
 
[¶8]      On June 22, 2004, at an open meeting, the PSC approved the 
interconnection agreement proposed by Qwest.  On the following day, the PSC issued its 
Order Approving Interconnection Agreement.  
In its order, the PSC found inter alia that: 

   

6.                  
Qwest stated that it made 
its first request to Union for interconnection, 
under § 252 of the [F]ederal Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 151, et seq., by certified letter to Mr. 
Howard Woody dated September 23, 2003.  
A copy of that letter was submitted with Qwest's Petition.  Qwest further stated that Union subsequently refused to negotiate for the voluntary 
adoption of an interconnection agreement, and a second letter was sent on 
November 24, 2003.  A copy of the 
second letter was also submitted with Qwest's Petition.

 
 

7.                  
Following Union's repeated refusal to negotiate, Qwest filed its 
Petition for Arbitration as provided by 47 U.S.C. § 252, initiating this 
proceeding on February 26, 2004.  
Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 252(b)(3), "A non-petitioning party to a 
negotiation under this section [Union] may respond to the other party's petition 
and provide such additional information as it wishes within 25 days after the 
State commission receives the petition."  
As noted above, Union did not respond to Qwest's petition and the time 
within which Union is allowed to respond has 
passed.

 
 

8.                  
Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 
252(b)(4)(A), "The State commission shall limit its consideration of any 
petition under paragraph (1) (and any response thereto) to the issues set forth 
in the petition and in the response, if any, filed under paragraph (3) [47 
U.S.C. § 252(b)(3)]."  In addition, 
action taken by the Commission under 47 U.S.C. § 252 is to be based upon 
information provided by the petitioner (Qwest) and the "responding party."  Because Union has waived its opportunity to respond, the only 
issues to be decided are those set forth in Qwest's Petition.  Since no information was provided by 
Union, the Commission may enter its decision on 
Qwest's Petition based upon the information provided by Qwest.  47 U.S.C. § 
252(b)(4)(B).

 
 

9.                  
The wireless 
interconnection agreement template submitted by Qwest contains terms, conditions 
and rates consistent with those previously approved by the Commission for 
inclusion in Qwest's Wyoming Statement of Generally Available Terms ("SGAT") and 
in 16 Commission-approved interconnection agreements between Qwest and other 
wireless carriers in Wyoming.  
As such, Qwest's Petition and exhibits establish that Commission approval 
of the form of interconnection agreement submitted as Exhibit C to the Petition 
will meet the requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 251 and the regulations of the Federal 
Communications Commission prescribed pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 251 and that the 
rates for interconnection, services and network elements contained in Exhibit C 
are in accordance with 47 U.S.C. § 252(d).  
Approval of the agreement submitted by Qwest therefore meets the 
requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 252(c)(1) and (2).

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
11.       The 
Commission finds and concludes that Union has 
failed to negotiate in good faith pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 252(b)(5).  The Commission further finds and 
concludes that Union has waived its opportunity 
to respond to Qwest's Petition for Arbitration and bring issues to the 
Commission for resolution in this proceeding.   

 
 
The PSC ordered that the 
interconnection agreement was to become effective July 1, 
2004.

 
 
[¶9]      On July 23, 2004, Union 
filed a Petition for Rehearing.  On 
December 15, 2004, after hearing argument from the parties, the PSC denied 
Union's request for rehearing.  On the same day, the PSC also granted 
Qwest's motion to dismiss Union's 
complaint.  In its Order Dismissing 
Complaint, the PSC found that the issues presented in Union's complaint had been rendered moot by its approval 
of the interconnection agreement.  

 
 
[¶10]   On January 
14, 2005, Union filed two petitions for review 
with the district court.  In docket 
05-198, Union sought review of the PSC's 
decision to approve the interconnection agreement.  In docket 05-199, Union sought review of 
the PSC's decision to dismiss Union's 
complaint.  Qwest filed a motion to 
dismiss both petitions asserting the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
determine Union's claims because, under the 
Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, review of State commission decisions 
concerning interconnection agreements lies exclusively with the federal 
courts.  The district court granted 
the motion.  Union appealed.  

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]   We must determine whether the 
Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides exclusive jurisdiction to the 
federal courts to review the challenged decisions of the PSC.  Whether a court has subject matter 
jurisdiction presents a question of law which we review de novo.  Pawlowski v. Pawlowski, 925 P.2d 240, 
242 (Wyo. 
1996). 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶12]   Congress enacted the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 to create and encourage competitive markets in 
the telephone and wireless industry.  
As explained by the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals:

 
 
Congress passed the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the Act), which was designed, in part, to erode 
the monopolistic nature of the local telephone service industry by obligating 
the current providers of local phone service (known as "incumbent local exchange 
carriers" or "incumbent LECs") to facilitate the entry of competing companies 
into local telephone service markets across the country. Specifically, the Act 
forces an incumbent LEC (1) to permit a requesting new entrant in the incumbent 
LEC's local market to interconnect with the incumbent LEC's existing local 
network and thereby use the incumbent LEC's network to compete with the 
incumbent LEC in providing telephone services (interconnection); (2) to provide 
its competing telecommunications carriers with access to individual elements of 
the incumbent LEC's own network on an unbundled basis (unbundled access); and 
(3) to sell to its competing telecommunications carriers, at wholesale rates, 
any telecommunications service that the incumbent LEC provides to its customers 
at retail rates, in order to allow the competing carriers to resell the services 
(resale). 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(c)(2)-(4) (West Supp.1997).  A company seeking to enter the local 
telephone service market may request an incumbent LEC to provide it with any one 
or any combination of these three services. Through these three duties, and the 
Act in general, Congress sought "to promote competition and reduce regulation in 
order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American 
telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new 
telecommunications technologies." Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 
104-104, purpose statement, 110 Stat. 56, 56 
(1996).

 
 
The Act also establishes 
a system of negotiations and arbitrations in order to facilitate voluntary 
agreements between incumbent LECs and competing carriers to implement the Act's 
substantive requirements. When a competing carrier asks an incumbent LEC to 
provide interconnection, unbundled access, or resale, both the incumbent LEC and 
the competing carrier have a duty to negotiate in good faith the terms and 
conditions of an agreement that accomplishes the Act's goals. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 
251(c)(1), 252(a)(1). If the parties fail to reach an agreement through 
voluntary negotiation, either party may petition the respective state utility 
commission to arbitrate and resolve any open issues. Id. § 
252(b). The final agreement, whether accomplished through negotiation or 
arbitration, must be approved by the state commission. Id. § 
252(e)(1).

 

Iowa Utils. Bd. v. 
F.C.C., 
120 F.3d 753, 791-792 (8th Cir. 1997), rev'd in part on other grounds, AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 119 S. Ct. 721, 142 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1999) (footnotes omitted).  

 
 
[¶13]   The Act sets forth a detailed 
system under which carriers can negotiate agreements for interconnection.  The Act provides that interconnection 
agreements can be reached through negotiation or compulsory arbitration.3  The Act also 
requires that all interconnection agreements be approved or rejected by the 
State commission.  Specifically, 47 
U.S.C. § 252(e)(1) states:

 
 
(e) Approval by State 
commission

 
 
   (1) 
Approval required 

Any interconnection 
agreement adopted by negotiation or arbitration shall be submitted for approval 
to the State commission. A State commission to which an agreement is submitted 
shall approve or reject the agreement, with written findings as to any 
deficiencies. 

 
 
The Act also provides for 
judicial review of such decisions:

 
 
(4) Schedule for 
decision

If the State commission 
does not act to approve or reject the agreement within 90 days after submission 
by the parties of an agreement adopted by negotiation under subsection (a) of 
this section, or within 30 days after submission by the parties of an agreement 
adopted by arbitration under subsection (b) of this section, the agreement shall 
be deemed approved. No State court shall 
have jurisdiction to review the action of a State commission in approving or 
rejecting an agreement under this section.

 
 
. . . 

 
 
(6) Review of State 
commission actions

In a case in which a 
State fails to act as described in paragraph (5), the proceeding by the 
Commission under such paragraph and any judicial review of the Commission's 
actions shall be the exclusive remedies for a State commission's failure to act. 
In any case in which a State commission 
makes a determination under this section, any party aggrieved by such 
determination may bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to 
determine whether the agreement or statement meets the requirements of section 
251 of this title and this section.

 
 

47 U.S.C. §§ 252(e)(4) 
and 252(e)(6) (emphasis 
added).          

 
 
[¶14]   The parties dispute the proper 
interpretation and application of the Act.  
Union contends the PSC lacked authority 
to enter its order because Qwest did not have statutory authority to request 
arbitration or to demand an interconnection agreement.    The PSC and Qwest contend that 
Qwest was authorized to invoke the negotiation and arbitration procedures set 
forth in the Act.  All parties cite 
to the decision of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in In re T-Mobile, 20 F.C.C.R. 4855 (2005), 
in support of their position.  

 
 
[¶15]   In T-Mobile, the FCC stated:  

 
 

In 
light of existing carrier disputes, we find it necessary to 
clarify the type of arrangements necessary to trigger payment obligations. 
Because the existing rules do not explicitly preclude tariffed compensation 
arrangements, we find that incumbent LECs were not prohibited from filing state 
termination tariffs and CMRS providers were obligated to accept the terms of 
applicable state tariffs. Going forward, 
however, we amend our rules to make clear our preference for contractual 
arrangements by prohibiting LECs from imposing compensation obligations for 
non-access CMRS traffic pursuant to tariff. In addition, we amend our rules to 
clarify that an incumbent LEC may request interconnection from a CMRS provider 
and invoke the negotiation and arbitration procedures set forth in section 252 
of the Act.

 
 

Id., ¶ 9, 20 F.C.C.R. at 
4860 (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis added).  The FCC went on to 
explain:

 
 
In light of our decision 
to prohibit the use of tariffs to impose termination charges on non-access 
traffic, we find it necessary to ensure 
that LECs have the ability to compel negotiations and arbitrations, as CMRS 
providers may do today. Accordingly, we amend section 20.11 of our rules to 
clarify that an incumbent LEC may request interconnection from a CMRS provider 
and invoke the negotiation and arbitration procedures set forth in section 252 
of the Act.  A CMRS provider 
receiving such a request must negotiate in good faith and must, if requested, 
submit to arbitration by the state commission.

 
 

Id., ¶ 16, 20 F.C.C.R. at 
4864-65 (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis added).  

 
 
[¶16]   According to Union, in T-Mobile the FCC confirmed that, prior 
to its decision, an incumbent LEC was not authorized to request an 
interconnection agreement or demand arbitration.  Qwest and the PSC assert that, in T-Mobile, the FCC simply clarified 
section 252 and confirmed that an ILEC had authority to request interconnection 
and invoke the negotiation and arbitration procedures set forth in section 252. 

[¶17]   More significantly, however, Qwest 
and the PSC contend that resolution of this issue is unnecessary and improper 
because we lack subject matter jurisdiction to make such a determination.  They contend the language, contained in 
sections 252(e)(4) and 252(e)(6) of the Act, unambiguously provides that federal 
courts have exclusive jurisdiction to review State commission decisions 
approving an interconnection agreement.  
Because Union characterizes its argument on appeal as a challenge to the 
PSC's authority to act and not as a request for review of the PSC's decision to 
approve an interconnection agreement, Union 
contends the provisions in the Act relating to federal judicial review are not 
relevant or applicable.  We agree 
with the position espoused by Qwest and the PSC.

 
 
[¶18]   The term "subject matter 
jurisdiction" refers to "the power to hear and determine cases of the general 
class to which the proceedings in question belong."  Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. 
Blury-Losolla, 952 P.2d 1117, 1119 (Wyo. 1998).  If a court determines that it does not 
have the requisite jurisdiction, any action taken by the court, other than 
dismissing the case is null and void.  
EOG Resources, Inc. v. State, 2003 WY 34, ¶¶ 9-10, 64 P.3d 757, 
759 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Weller v. Weller, 960 P.2d 493 (Wyo. 
1998)).  "This court can have no 
greater jurisdiction of the subject matter than the district court.  Where the district court is without 
jurisdiction in an administrative appeal from an agency, this court must 
dismiss the appeal."  Wyo. Cmty. 
College Comm'n v. Casper Cmty. College Dist., 2001 WY 86, ¶ 
12, 31 P.3d 1242, 1248 (Wyo. 2001) (citing Sheridan Retirement Partners v. 
City of Sheridan, 950 P.2d 554, 556 (Wyo. 
1997); Scanlon v. Schrinar, 759 P.2d 1243, 1246 (Wyo. 1988)).  

 
 
[¶19]   Based upon our review of the 
statutory language contained in the Act and judicial precedent interpreting the 
pertinent statutory language, we conclude the district court correctly 
determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.   Section 252(e)(6) states that in 
"any case in which a State commission makes a determination under this section, 
any party aggrieved by such determination may bring an action in an appropriate 
Federal district court to determine whether the agreement or statement meets the 
requirements of section 251 of this title and this section."  Section 252(e)(4) provides, "[n]o State 
court shall have jurisdiction to review the action of a State commission in 
approving or rejecting an agreement under this section."  Reading these provisions together, the 
only logical conclusion is that Congress intended to confine review of State 
commission decisions concerning interconnection agreements to the federal 
courts.

[¶20]   The clear weight of judicial 
authority supports this conclusion.  
See, e.g., Bell Atl-Pa., 
Inc. v. The Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 295 F. Supp. 2d 529, 537-38 (E.D.Pa. 2003) (citing Verizon N., Inc. v. Strand, 309 F.3d 935, 941-42 (6th Cir. 
2002) (characterizing § 252(e)(4) as "emphasizing the importance to Congress" of 
the federal review provided for in § 252(e)(6)); S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Brooks Fiber Communications of 
Okla., Inc., 235 F.3d 493, 
497 (10th Cir. 2000) ("A rule that restricted a district court's jurisdiction to 
review of a state commission's approval or rejection of an interconnection 
agreement would lead to results that Congress could not have intended."); Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d  at 804 ("[T]he 
provision of federal district court review contained in subsection 252(e)(6) is 
the exclusive means of retaining review of state commission determinations under 
the Act.").  "Interconnection agreements are 
tools through which the [Act is] enforced.  
Thus, it is consistent with the [Act] to have state commissions interpret 
contracts and subject their interpretations to federal review in the district 
courts."  BellSouth 
Telecommunications, Inc. v. MCImetro Access Transmission Services, Inc., 317 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2003).

 
 
[¶21]   The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
explained its recognition of the exclusive nature of federal 
review:

 
 
Adoption of the PUC's 
concurrent jurisdiction argument would place this Court squarely at odds with 
the prevailing weight of federal authority.  In MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell 
Atl.-Pa., 271 F.3d 491 (3rd Cir. 2001), the Third Circuit found 
that Sections 252(e)(4) and 252(e)(6) should be read together and that, when so 
read, it is clear that "federal jurisdiction for the review of commission 
decisions on interconnection agreements is exclusive." Id. at 512 
(emphasis added).  This conclusion 
has been reached by other federal courts as well.  See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. 
v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d  at 337-38 (reading Section 252(e)(4) in 
conjunction with Section 252(e)(6) and finding that "Congress envisioned suits reviewing actions' by state 
commissions, as opposed to suits reviewing only the agreements themselves, and 
that Congress intended that such suits be brought exclusively in federal 
court."); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of 
Tex., 208 F.3d  at 481 ("federal court jurisdiction extends to review of 
state commission rulings on complaints pertaining to interconnection agreements 
and such jurisdiction is not restricted to mere approval or rejection of such 
agreements"); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Worldcom Techs., Inc., 179 F.3d 566, 570-71 (7th Cir. 1999) ("subsection 
252(e)(4), when read in conjunction with subsection 252(e)(6), shows that 
Congress contemplated suits against state defendants in federal court"); see also, e.g., Bell Atl.-Pa., Inc. v. The 
Pennsylvania 
Pub. Util. Comm'n., 295 F. Supp. 2d  at 537-38 (collecting 
cases).

 
 

MCI Worldcom, Inc. v. 
Pennsylvania Public Utility 
Commission, 844 A.2d 1239, 1248 (Pa. 2004).

 
 
[¶22]   Both decisions of the PSC 
challenged by Union involve approval of an 
interconnection agreement.  The PSC 
approved an interconnection agreement between Union and Qwest and determined the agreement complied with 
sections 251 and 252 of the Act.  
The PSC dismissed Union's complaint 
because it had been rendered moot when the PSC approved the interconnection 
agreement.  Despite Union's attempt 
to characterize its appeal as a challenge to the PSC's authority, fundamentally, 
Union is seeking review of PSC decisions 
approving an interconnection agreement.  
Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 252, Union's 
challenge must be brought in federal court.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23]   The District Court correctly 
determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  We also lack subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Accordingly, 
Union's appeals are 
dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Act of Feb. 
8, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251 et seq.).

 
 

2An Incumbent 
Local Exchange Carrier ("ILEC") is defined by the Federal Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 as the company that was providing local exchange service in a particular 
geographic area on the effective date of the Act.  47 U.S.C. § 
251(h).  Carriers entering a local 
exchange market after the effective date of the Act are referred to as 
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers ("CLECs"). 

 

3The Act 
provides, in relevant part:

 
 
§ 252. 
 Procedures for negotiation, arbitration, and approval of agreements 

(a) 
Agreements arrived at through negotiation

 
 
   (1) 
Voluntary negotiations. Upon receiving a request for interconnection, services, 
or network elements pursuant to section 251 of this title, an incumbent local 
exchange carrier may negotiate and enter into a binding agreement with the 
requesting telecommunications carrier or carriers without regard to the 
standards set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 251of this title. The 
agreement shall include a detailed schedule of itemized charges for 
interconnection and each service or network element included in the agreement. 
The agreement, including any interconnection agreement negotiated before 
February 8, 1996, shall be submitted to the State commission under subsection 
(e) of this section.

   (2) 
Mediation. Any party negotiating an agreement under this section may, at any 
point in the negotiation, ask a State commission to participate in the 
negotiation and to mediate any differences arising in the course of the 
negotiation.

(b) 
Agreements arrived at through compulsory arbitration

   (1) 
Arbitration. During the period from the 135th to the 160th day (inclusive) after 
the date on which an incumbent local exchange carrier receives a request for 
negotiation under this section, the carrier or any other party to the 
negotiation may petition a State commission to arbitrate any open 
issues.

   (2) 
Duty of petitioner

      
(A) A party that petitions a State commission under paragraph (1) shall, at the 
same time as it submits the petition, provide the State commission all relevant 
documentation concerning

 
 
         (i) 
the unresolved issues;

 
 
         (ii) 
the position of each of the parties with respect to those issues; 
and

         (iii) 
any other issue discussed and resolved by the parties.

      
(B) A party petitioning a State commission under paragraph (1) shall provide a 
copy of the petition and any documentation to the other party or parties not 
later than the day on which the State commission receives the 
petition.

   (3) 
Opportunity to respond. A non-petitioning party 
to a negotiation under this section may respond to the other party's petition 
and provide such additional information as it wishes within 25 days after the 
State commission receives the petition.

   (4) 
Action by State commission.

      
(A) The State commission shall limit its consideration of any petition under 
paragraph (1) (and any response thereto) to the issues set forth in the petition 
and in the response, if any, filed under paragraph (3).

      
(B) The State commission may require the petitioning party and the responding 
party to provide such information as may be necessary for the State commission 
to reach a decision on the unresolved issues. If any party refuses or fails 
unreasonably to respond on a timely basis to any reasonable request from the 
State commission, then the State commission may proceed on the basis of the best 
information available to it from whatever source derived.

      
(C) The State commission shall resolve each issue set forth in the petition and 
the response, if any, by imposing appropriate conditions as required to 
implement subsection (c) of this section upon the parties to the agreement, and 
shall conclude the resolution of any unresolved issues not later than 9 months 
after the date on which the local exchange carrier received the request under 
this section.

   (5) 
Refusal to negotiate. The refusal of any other party to the negotiation to 
participate further in the negotiations, to cooperate with the State commission 
in carrying out its function as an arbitrator, or to continue to negotiate in 
good faith in the presence, or with the assistance, of the State commission 
shall be considered a failure to negotiate in good faith. (c) 
Standards for arbitration. In resolving by arbitration under subsection (b) of 
this section any open issues and imposing conditions upon the parties to the 
agreement, a State commission shall

   (1) 
ensure that such resolution and conditions meet the requirements of section 251 
of this title, including the regulations prescribed by the Commission pursuant 
to section 251 of this title;

   (2) 
establish any rates for interconnection, services, or network elements according 
to subsection (d) of this section; and

   (3) 
provide a schedule for implementation of the terms and conditions by the parties 
to the agreement.

 
 
47 
U.S.C. § 252.