Case Title: Lincoln Interagency Narcotics Team v. Kitzhaber

Citation: 

Docket Number: S50900

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2006-10-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: October 19, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
LINCOLN INTERAGENCY NARCOTICS TEAM (LINT),
a law enforcement agency created by
intergovernmental agreement,
Respondent on Review,
and
LINCOLN COUNTY,
a political subdivision of the State of Oregon,
Plaintiff,
and
ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND,
OREGON  HUMANE SOCIETY,
HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE WILLAMETTE VALLEY,
STEPHAN K. OTTO, SHARON M. HARMON
and WAYNE S. GEIGER,
Respondents on Review,
v.
JOHN KITZHABER, M.D.,
Governor of the State of Oregon,
BILL BRADBURY,
Oregon Secretary of State,
and the STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioners on   Review, 
and
RAY HESLEP
and SANDRA ADAMSON,
Petitioners on Review.
(CC 00C-19878; CA A115401;
SC S50900 (control), S50904)
(Consolidated for Argument and Opinion)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 4, 2004.
Philip Schradle, Special Counsel to the Attorney General,
Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioners on
review John Kitzhaber, M.D., Bill Bradbury and State of Oregon. 
With him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Eli D. Stutsman, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
brief for petitioners on review Ray Heslep and Sandra Adamson.
Robert E. Bovett, Newport, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review LINT.
B. Carlton Grew, Portland, filed the brief for respondents
on review Animal Legal Defense Fund, Oregon Humane Society,
Humane Society of the Willamette Valley, Stephan K. Otto, Sharon
M. Harmon, and Wayne S. Geiger.
Before Carson, Chief Justice,** and Gillette, Durham, De
Muniz,*** Balmer, and Kistler, Justices, and Riggs, Justice pro
tempore.****
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Durham, J., specially concurred and filed an opinion.
Kistler, J., dissented and filed an opinion in which De Muniz, C.J., and Balmer, J., joined.
*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Pamela L. Abernethy, Judge. 188 Or App 526, 72 P3d 967 (2003).
**Chief Justice when case argued.
***Chief Justice when decision rendered.
****The Honorable R. William Riggs, Senior Judge, sitting by designation.  Walters, J., did not participate in the  consideration or decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
The issue in this case is whether Ballot Measure 3
(2000) (Measure 3), a constitutional amendment that the people
adopted pursuant to the initiative process, actually contains two
or more constitutional amendments in violation of Article XVII,
section 1, of the Oregon Constitution. (1)  A divided panel of
the Court of Appeals held that the measure does contain two or
more amendments because it makes at least two substantive changes
to the constitution that are not closely related.  Lincoln
Interagency Narcotics Team v. Kitzhaber, 188 Or 526, 72 P3d 967
(2003).  For the reasons that follow, we disagree with that
conclusion and therefore reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The voters adopted Measure 3 at the November 7, 2000,
general election.  The measure adds a new section dealing with
forfeitures to Article XV of the Oregon Constitution.  Measure 3
provides:
"Article XV of the Constitution of the State of
Oregon is amended by a vote of the People to include
the following new section:
"Section 10.  The Oregon Property Protection Act
of 2000.  (1) This section may be known and shall be
cited as the 'Oregon Property Protection Act of 2000.'
"(2) Statement of principles.   The People, in the
exercise of the power reserved to them under the
Constitution of the State of Oregon, declare that:
"(a) A basic tenet of a democratic society is that
a person is presumed innocent and should not be
punished until proven guilty;
"(b) The property of a person should not be
forfeited in a forfeiture proceeding by government
unless and until that person is convicted of a crime
involving the property;
"(c) The value of property forfeited should be
proportional to the specific conduct for which the
owner of the property has been convicted; and
"(d) Proceeds from forfeited property should be
used for treatment of drug abuse unless otherwise
specified by law for another purpose.
"(3) Forfeitures prohibited without conviction.  
No judgment of forfeiture of property in a civil
forfeiture proceeding by the State or any of its
political subdivisions shall be allowed or entered
until and unless the owner of the property is convicted
of a crime in Oregon or another jurisdiction and the
property is found by clear and convincing evidence to
have been instrumental in committing or facilitating
the crime or to be proceeds of that crime.  The value
of the property forfeited under the provisions of this
subsection shall not be excessive and shall be
substantially proportional to the specific conduct for
which the owner of the property has been convicted. 
For purposes of this section, 'property' means any
interest in anything of value, including the whole of
any lot or tract of land and tangible and intangible
personal property, including currency, instruments or
securities or any other kind of privilege, interest,
claim or right whether due or to become due.  Nothing
in this section shall prohibit a person from
voluntarily giving a judgment of forfeiture.
"(4) Protection of innocent property owners.  In a
civil forfeiture proceeding if a financial institution
claiming an interest in the property demonstrates that
it holds an interest, its interest shall not be subject
to forfeiture.
"In a civil forfeiture proceeding if a person
claiming an interest in the property, other than a
financial institution or a defendant who has been
charged with or convicted of a crime involving that
property, demonstrates that the person has an interest
in the property, that person's interest shall not be
subject to forfeiture unless:
"(a) The forfeiting agency proves by clear and
convincing evidence that the person took the property
or the interest with the intent to defeat the
forfeiture; or
"(b) A conviction under subsection (3) is later
obtained against the person.
"(5) Exception for unclaimed property and
contraband.  Notwithstanding the provisions of
subsection (3) of this section, if, following notice to
all persons known to have an interest or who may have
an interest, no person claims an interest in the seized
property or if the property is contraband, a judgment
of forfeiture may be allowed and entered without a
criminal conviction.  For purposes of this subsection,
'contraband' means personal property, articles or
things, including but not limited to controlled
substances or drug paraphernalia, that a person is
prohibited by Oregon statute or local ordinance from
producing, obtaining or possessing.
"(6) Law enforcement seizures unaffected.  Nothing
in this section shall be construed to affect the
temporary seizure of property for evidentiary,
forfeiture, or protective purposes, or to alter the
power of the Governor to remit fines or forfeitures
under Article V, Section 14, of this Constitution.
"(7) Disposition of property and proceeds to drug
treatment.  Any sale of forfeited property shall be
conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. 
Property or proceeds forfeited under subsections (3),
(5), or (8) of this section shall not be used for law
enforcement purposes but shall be distributed or
applied in the following order:
"(a) To the satisfaction of any foreclosed liens,
security interests and contracts in the order of their
priority;
"(b) To the State or any of its political
subdivisions for actual and reasonable expenses related
to the costs of the forfeiture proceeding, including
attorney fees, storage, maintenance, management, and
disposition of the property incurred in connection with
the sale of any forfeited property in an amount not to
exceed twenty-five percent of the total proceeds in any
single forfeiture;
"(c) To the State or any of its political
subdivisions to be used exclusively for drug treatment,
unless another disposition is specially provided by
law.
"(8) State and federal sharing.  The State of
Oregon or any of its political subdivisions shall take
all necessary steps to obtain shared property or
proceeds from the United States Department of Justice
resulting from a forfeiture.  Any property or proceeds
received from the United States Department of Justice
by the State of Oregon or any of its political
subdivisions shall be applied as provided in
subsection (7) of this section.
"(9) Restrictions on State transfers.  Neither the
State of Oregon, its political subdivisions, nor any
forfeiting agency shall transfer forfeiture proceedings
to the federal government unless a state court has
affirmatively found that:
"(a) The activity giving rise to the forfeiture is
interstate in nature and sufficiently complex to
justify the transfer;
"(b) The seized property may only be forfeited
under federal law; or
"(c) Pursuing forfeiture under state law would
unduly burden the state forfeiting agencies.
"(10) Penalty for violations.  Any person acting
under color of law, official title or position who
takes any action intending to conceal, transfer,
withhold, retain, divert or otherwise prevent any
proceeds, conveyances, real property, or any things of
value forfeited under the law of this State or the
United States from being applied, deposited or used in
accordance with subsections (7), (8) or (9) of this
section shall be subject to a civil penalty in an
amount treble the value of the forfeited property
concealed, transferred, withheld, retained or diverted. 
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to impair
judicial immunity if otherwise applicable.
"(11) Reporting requirement.  All forfeiting
agencies shall report the nature and disposition of all
property and proceeds seized for forfeiture or
forfeited to a State asset forfeiture oversight
committee that is independent of any forfeiting agency. 
The asset forfeiture oversight committee shall generate
and make available to the public an annual report of
the information collected.  The asset forfeiture
oversight committee shall also make recommendations to
ensure that asset forfeiture proceedings are handled in
a manner that is fair to innocent property owners and
interest holders.
"(12) Severability.  If any part of this section
or its application to any person or circumstance is
held to be invalid for any reason, then the remaining
parts or applications to any persons or circumstances
shall not be affected but shall remain in full force
and effect."
(Emphasis in original).
Measure 3 follows the unfortunate practice, sometimes
questioned, of inserting provisions in the state constitution
that have more in common, both in appearance and in substance,
with legislation than with constitutional amendments.  See Olsen
v. State ex rel Johnson, 276 Or 9, 19, 554 P2d 139 (1976)
(recognizing practice).  The measure begins, for example, by
stating that it "may be known and shall be cited as the 'Oregon
Property Protection Act of 2000'" -- a designation more typically
associated with legislation than with constitutional
amendments. (2)  See Christ/Tauman v. Myers, 339 Or 494, 499,
123 P3d 271 (2005) (explaining that "[a]cts are different from
constitutional amendments").  The fact that Measure 3 adds almost
two pages of provisions dealing with forfeitures to a single
section of the Oregon Constitution is consistent with that
designation.  The measure imposes various procedural and
substantive limitations on forfeiture proceedings, establishes
priorities for and limitations on the distribution of forfeiture
proceeds (including proceeds from federal forfeiture proceedings
that are available to the state), creates a state agency to
monitor and report on forfeitures, and provides a civil penalty
for violating its provisions. 
After the people adopted Measure 3, plaintiffs Lincoln
Interagency Narcotics Team (LINT) and Lincoln County filed a
declaratory judgment action against the Governor, the Secretary
of State, and the State of Oregon (collectively the "state"),
seeking a declaration that the measure contained two or more
amendments in violation of Article XVII, section 1. 
Alternatively, plaintiffs sought a declaration that Measure 3
embraced more than one subject, in violation of Article IV,
section 1(2)(d), of the Oregon Constitution. (3)  The chief
petitioners of Measure 3 (interveners) intervened in defense of
the measure. (4)  On cross-motions for summary judgment, the
trial court ruled that Measure 3 contained only one amendment to
the constitution and embraced only a single subject, and entered
judgment accordingly.
Plaintiff LINT appealed, and a divided panel of the
Court of Appeals reversed.  The majority concluded that, under
the analysis in Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 959 P2d 49
(1998), subsections (3) and (7) of Measure 3 made two substantive
changes to the constitution that were not closely related. 
Lincoln Interagency Narcotics Team, 188 Or App at 538-43, 546-48.
Judge Armstrong dissented.  In his view, the majority's
decision failed to give effect to this court's decisions in Baum
v. Newbry et al., 200 Or 576, 267 P2d 220 (1954), and Hartung v.
Bradbury, 332 Or 570, 33 P3d 972 (2001).  The dissent reasoned
that the changes that Measure 3 made to the Oregon Constitution
were as closely related as the changes that the court upheld in
Baum and that they were the type of changes that "would commonly
be placed in a single section of the constitution."  Id. at 570
(Armstrong, J., dissenting).  It followed, the dissent concluded,
that Measure 3 did not contain two or more amendments to the
constitution.  Id.  We allowed the state's petition for review to
consider this recurring issue.
As noted, Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon
Constitution provides that, "[w]hen two or more amendments shall
be submitted in the manner aforesaid to the voters of this state
at the same election, they shall be submitted so that each
amendment shall be voted on separately."  In Armatta, this court
undertook, for the first time, a comprehensive examination of the
meaning of that separate-vote requirement. (5)  Following the
methodology in Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 840 P2d 65 (1992),
the court considered the wording of Article XVII, section 1, its
history, and the cases interpreting it.  See Armatta, 327 Or at
256-77 (undertaking that analysis).  The court drew three
conclusions from those sources.  First, looking primarily to the
debates on the Indiana Constitution, the court concluded that the
word "amendment" refers to a specific or particular change to the
constitution.  Id. at 265-66; see Lehman v. Bradbury, 333 Or 231,
239, 37 P3d 989 (2002) (drawing that conclusion from Armatta). 
Citing historical examples, the court observed that "a single
'amendment,' such as one concerning the establishment of a state
bank or the rights of married women, was intended to encompass a
particular constitutional change."  Armatta, 327 Or at 265-66.
Second, the court concluded that the separate-vote
requirement for initiated laws and constitutional amendments
imposes a more restrictive test than the single-subject
requirement set out in Article IV, section 1(2)(d), of the Oregon
Constitution.  Id. at 276.  The court noted that the single-subject requirement focuses on the content of a proposed law or
amendment, while the separate-vote requirement focuses on the
"potential change to the existing constitution" and the degree to
which "a proposed amendment would modify the existing
constitution."  Id. (emphases in original).  More significantly,
the court explained that
"the separate-vote requirement applies to only
constitutional amendments, while the single-subject
requirement applies equally to constitutional
amendments and legislation.  It follows, we believe,
that the separate-vote requirement of Article XVII,
section 1, imposes a narrower requirement than does the
single-subject requirement of Article IV, section
1(2)(d).  Such a reading of the separate-vote
requirement makes sense, because the act of amending
the constitution is significantly different from
enacting or amending legislation. * * * Indeed, because
the separate-vote requirement is concerned only with a
change to the fundamental law, the notion that the
people should be able to vote separately upon each
separate amendment should come as no surprise.  In
short, the requirement serves as a safeguard that is
fundamental to the concept of a constitution."
Id. (emphases in original; citation omitted).
Third (and most important to the task we face in this
case), the court recognized that, although the separate-vote
requirement is more restrictive than the single-subject
requirement, it is not inflexible.  The court recognized that two
or more changes will not violate the separate-vote requirement if
the relationship between the two changes is a close one.  Id. at
277.  As the court phrased the test, the question whether a
measure contains two or more amendments in violation of Article
XVII, section 1, turns on whether the measure, if adopted, "would
make two or more changes to the constitution that are substantive
and that are not closely related."  Id.  Or, as this court
recently summarized the Armatta methodology:
"To implement th[e] * * * requirement of [Article XVII,
section 1], we do not search simply for a unifying
thread to create a common theme, thought, or purpose
from a melange of proposed constitutional changes. 
Instead, we inquire whether, if adopted, a proposal
would make two or more changes to the constitution that
are substantive and are not closely related.  If so,
the proposal violates the separate-vote requirement of
Article XVII, section 1, because it would prevent
voters from expressing their opinions as to each
proposed change separately."
Meyer v. Bradbury, 341 Or 288, 296-97, ___ P3d ___ (2006).
In Armatta, the court held that the measure at issue
there contained multiple substantive changes to the constitution
and that those changes were not closely related.  More
specifically, the court identified two pairs of changes to the
constitution that were not closely related:
"For example, the right of all people to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures under Article I,
section 9, has virtually nothing to do with the right
of the criminally accused to have a unanimous jury
verdict rendered in a murder case under Article I,
section 11.  The two provisions involve separate
constitutional rights, granted to different groups of
persons.  Similarly, the right of the criminally
accused to bail by sufficient sureties under Article I,
section 14, bears no relation to legislation concerning
the qualifications of jurors in criminal cases under
Article VII (Amended), section 5(1)(a)."
Id. at 283-84. 
In deciding whether the changes in Armatta were closely
related, the court "considered both the relationship among the
constitutional provisions affected by [the measure] and the
relationship of the constitutional changes that were made in
those provisions to one another."  See Lehman, 333 Or at 245
(explaining Armatta).  In some cases, however, the court has
looked solely to the relationship between two or more changes
that a measure effects in holding that the changes were not
closely related.  See Swett v. Bradbury, 333 Or 597, 608, 43 P3d
1094 (2002) (employing that methodology).  But, beyond
identifying those two methodologies for testing whether
constitutional changes are closely related, the court has
declined one party's proposal to reformulate the "closely
related" standard announced in Armatta.  See Lehman, 333 Or at
242 (explaining that party's proposed reformulation of "closely
related" test would not advance inquiry).  Indeed, this court has
observed recently that, "if this court has written little on the
subject, it is because there have been few instances in which the
constitutional changes before the court presented a close
question on that issue."  Meyer, 341 Or at 300.
Finally, we add to the foregoing overview of our
"separate-vote" jurisprudence the following observation from
Swett, which (as will be seen) is particularly applicable here:
"Ordinarily, we begin any separate-vote inquiry by
identifying the changes, both explicit and implicit,
that the ballot measure purports to make to the Oregon
Constitution.  We then determine if those changes are
substantive.  If they are, we then determine if those
substantive changes are 'closely related.'  In Lehman,
we described that analytical process this way:
"'* * * First, we examine the
relationship among the constitutional
provisions that the measure affects
* * *.  If the affected provisions of the
existing constitution themselves are not
related, then it is likely that changes to
those provisions will offend the separate-vote requirement. * * * [T]he fact that a
proposed amendment asks the people, in one
vote, substantively to change multiple
provisions of the Oregon Constitution that
are not themselves related is one indication
that the proposed amendment might violate the
separate-vote requirement.
"'Next, we must consider the
constitutional changes themselves.  That is, * * * we must determine whether the changes
made to those * * * constitutional provisions
are closely related.  If they are closely
related, the measure under consideration
survives scrutiny under Article XVII, section
1.  If they are not, it does not.'
"The foregoing statement from Lehman was
descriptive, not prescriptive.  That is, it is equally
valid analytically to start the inquiry by focusing on
the changes themselves.  This case illustrates the
point.  We need not discuss each of the steps described
above, because the parties' arguments narrow the focus
of our inquiry.* * *"
Swett, 333 Or at 607 (citations omitted) (quoting Lehman, 333 Or
at 246 (ellipses and modifications in original)).  As we shall
identify, the parties to the present case have, like the parties
in Swett, attempted to short-cut the process here by focusing
their arguments primarily on the issue whether the multiple
changes that Measure 3 effects are "closely related." 
We turn to the various provisions of Measure 3.  The
parties focus, as the Court of Appeals did, on two subsections in
Measure 3 -- subsection (3) and subsection (7).  The parties
agree that subsection (3) makes three substantive changes to the
Oregon Constitution:  (1) it makes a criminal conviction a
prerequisite for a civil forfeiture; (2) it requires that proof
of the elements necessary to establish forfeiture be by clear and
convincing evidence; and (3) it provides that the value of the
forfeited property "shall not be excessive and shall be
substantially proportional to the specific conduct for which the
owner of the property has been convicted."  The parties disagree,
however, as to whether those three substantive changes are
closely related.  
For the sake of the present argument, we will assume
that the foregoing three statements in fact do reflect three
separate substantive changes to the Oregon Constitution. 
However, that assumption does not assist plaintiffs in their
claim that Measure 3 violates the separate-votes requirement of
Article XVII, section 1.  That is so because the identified
changes all are "closely related."
Our analysis in that regard ordinarily would begin with
an examination of the relationship among any existing
constitutional provisions that the three identified changes
affect to determine if those provisions themselves are closely
related.  See ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 12) (quoting Swett). 
However, we find that the three changes are additions to the
Oregon Constitution and have no effect on any existing
constitutional provision in that document.  The first change --
making criminal conviction a prerequisite of civil forfeiture --
requires no discussion in that regard:  Neither party has made
any claim that the change relates to any existing provision in
the state or federal constitution.  As to the second change --
requiring forfeitures to be proved by clear and convincing
evidence -- there is some suggestion that the change alters
constitutional provisions pertaining to standards of proof in
criminal and other proceedings.  We note, however, that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United State
Constitution generally is accepted as the source of the various
constitutional standard-of-proof requirements recognized by the
courts, see, e.g., In re Winship, 397 US 354, 364, 90 S Ct 1068,
25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970) (holding that Due Process Clause requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal proceeding), and that
the Oregon Constitution contains no due process clause or
anything comparable to it,  State v. Miller, 327 Or 622, 635 n
10, 969 P2d 1006 (1998).
Finally, we conclude that the third identified change -- the requirement that the value of forfeited property be
substantially proportional to the predicate offense -- also is an
addition to, and does not affect any existing provision in, the
Oregon Constitution.  We reject plaintiffs' suggestion that the
change affects Article I, section 16, which provides that "all
penalties shall be proportional to the offense."  Article I,
section 16, applies only in criminal proceedings, Oberg v. Honda
Motor Co., 316 Or 263, 274-75, 850 P2d 371 (1993), reversed and
remanded on different grounds, Honda Motor Co v. Oberg, 512 US
415, 114 S Ct 2331, 129 L Ed 2d 336 (1994), while the
proportionality requirement at issue speaks to a civil
proceeding.   
Having determined that the three identified changes do
not alter or affect different provisions of the existing
constitution, we may proceed to consider whether the three
changes are themselves closely related.  We think that it is
clear that the changes are all parts of an effort to define the
judicial process for forfeiture in constitutional terms.  The
first part of subsection (3) describes that judicial process as
requiring a predicate conviction to justify commencing the
process.  The second part sets out the permissible standard of
proof in that process.  Finally, the third part of subsection (3)
provides that the forfeiture process may proceed only to the
extent that the forfeiture is proportional to the underlying
criminal conviction.  Seen in that way, the close, interconnected
relationship between the three parts is clear.
Plaintiffs also point to subsection (7) of Measure 3. 
They contend (and, again, we assume for the sake of argument)
that that subsection contains two separate substantive changes to
the Oregon Constitution: (1) it prohibits using forfeited
property and proceeds for "law enforcement purposes"; and (2) it
establishes a priority for distributing forfeited property or
proceeds.  Plaintiffs recognize that neither part has any analog
in the Oregon Constitution and, thus, that neither changes any
existing provision of the constitution.  As before, then, we need
not consider whether existing provisions affected by those
changes are closely related to one another:  We may proceed to
the question of whether the changes identified in subsection (7)
are themselves closely related.
We conclude that the two changes are closely related,
if they are separate at all.  A brief illustration suffices, in
that regard:  If one looks at the two parts of subsection (7) in
reverse order, one first considers the subsection's direction
that forfeiture proceeds be distributed to "the State or any of
its political subdivisions to be used exclusively for drug
treatment" and then its prohibition on the use of proceeds for
"law enforcement purposes."  Viewed from that perspective, the
latter provision may be seen for what it is -- a limitation on
what otherwise would be considered a proper distribution of
forfeited money "to the State or any of its political
subdivisions to be used exclusively for drug treatment, unless
another disposition is specially provided by law."  See Meyer,
341 Or at 301 (explaining similar relationship).  So understood,
the two concepts are not separate at all; one merely delimits the
other.  At the very least, they are "closely related."  
Finally, we turn to consider whether the changes
effected by subsection (3) and the changes effected by subsection
(7) are also "closely related to each other" (as before, our
determination that those changes do not affect any existing
provisions of the Oregon Constitution obviates any need to
consider the relationship between existing provisions). 
Plaintiffs contend that they are not, arguing as follows: 
Subsection (3) provides increased procedural and substantive
protections for property owners to ensure against premature,
inaccurate, or excessive forfeitures.  Subsection (7), on the
other hand, prohibits the executive and legislative branches from
using the proceeds of forfeitures for law enforcement purposes
and directs how forfeiture revenues shall be used.  Plaintiffs
argue that the right of property owners to require the state to
prove its case by clear and convincing evidence is no more
closely related to the prohibition against using forfeiture
proceeds for law enforcement purposes than the right of all
people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, at
issue in Armatta, was closely related to the right of the
criminally accused to have a unanimous jury.  It follows,
plaintiffs reason, that, as the court held in Armatta, the
changes contained in subsections (3) and (7) of Measure 3 are not
closely related and, accordingly, constitute two or more
amendments under Article XVII, section 1.
Again, we are unpersuaded.  Indeed, it seems to us that
plaintiffs' analysis works only if one stands as close as
possible to each provision and ignores the others.  To us, it is
perfectly clear that the administrative detail provided in
subsection (7) is closely related to the substantive changes made
in subsection (3):  Not only do the people wish to be assured
that forfeitures are reined in, they shall encourage it by
removing the carrot which otherwise would tempt the two political
branches of government to treat the criminal law as a revenue-raising source.  The measure's sponsors included a wealth of
detail in the measure, perhaps suspecting darkly that, unless
they did, the legislature and the executive somehow would attempt
to avoid their policy concern.  But we need not agree with that
idea, which appears to have motivated the measure's sponsors, in
order to resolve plaintiffs' claims. 
Although the foregoing discussion of subsections (3)
and (7) disposes of the subsections at the heart of the
disagreement between the parties, we add a further and more
general set of observations.  Although it has several provisions,
Measure 3 itself can be viewed essentially as containing two
parts:  the first part, encompassing subsections (3) through (6),
sets out constitutional protections for property owners by
creating a constitutional concept of civil forfeiture proceedings
and by imposing a number of procedural protections (and
accompanying limitations) in such proceedings); the second part,
encompassing subsections (7) through (11), sets out an
administrative process for collecting and disbursing funds
derived from forfeited property.  Both parts add new provisions
to the Oregon Constitution; neither changes existing rights or
other constitutional provisions.  And, as we will discuss, the
two parts reasonably can be characterized as containing various
provisions that are closely related to each other under the
reasoning set out in Armatta.
Turning to the "closely related" question, it is
undeniable that a relationship exists between the two parts:  The
administrative funding and disbursal scheme (the second change
just identified) has a place in the constitution because of the
new civil forfeiture process (the first change), and it concerns
the disbursal of funds derived from that process.  In our view,
that relationship is a stronger one than the relationships (or
lack thereof) between the constitutional changes at issue in
Swett and Armatta.  See Swett, 333 Or at 608-09 (although changes
purportedly shared same subject matter of limiting influence of
money in elections, change that imposed contribution disclosure
requirement was not closely related to change that imposed
eligibility requirement on initiative signature-gatherers);
Armatta, 327 Or at 283-84 (although disparate changes, including
right to unanimous jury verdict in murder trials, search-and-seizure protections, right to bail, and juror qualifications were
related in sense that they pertained to rights implicated during
criminal investigation or prosecution, that relationship was
insufficient to render them closely related for separate-vote
purposes).
From the foregoing, we think that it also is
permissible to conclude that the relationship between the two
parts of Measure 3 just discussed is sufficiently "close" to pass
muster under Article XVII, section 1.  That is, the
administrative scheme set out principally in subsections (7) to
(11) of Measure 3 bears a close relationship to the civil
forfeiture proceeding provisions set out in subsections (3) to
(6), because it would have no reason for existence were it not
for those provisions.  The former (i.e., the administrative
scheme and money flowing into and out of it) wholly derives from
the latter (i.e., the forfeiture proceeding provisions) and from
no other source.
For the reasons stated, we hold that Measure 3 does not
contravene the "separate-vote" requirement of Article XVII,
section 1.  The contrary holding of the Court of Appeals was
error.  It must be reversed. (6)
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
DURHAM, J., specially concurring.
I concur with the decision of the plurality that the
Court of Appeals erred in holding that Ballot Measure 3 (2000)
was invalid under Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon
Constitution, which provides, in part:
"When two or more amendments shall be submitted in
the manner aforesaid to the voters of this state at the
same election, they shall be so submitted that each
amendment shall be voted on separately."
However, I do not agree with all the reasoning that the
plurality employs to reach its conclusion.  I write separately to
explain my reasons for agreeing with the plurality's ultimate
conclusion.
The plurality notes that the question here, i.e.,
whether Measure 3 contains two or more amendments to the Oregon
Constitution, is a "recurring issue."  Lincoln Interagency
Narcotics Team v. Kitzhaber, ___ Or ___, ___, ___ P3d ___, (2006) 
(plurality opinion) (slip op at 8).  I agree that Oregon's courts
and many litigants continue to struggle with the correct
application of Article XVII, section 1.  The problem, however,
lies at least in part in the difficulty that judges and litigants
face in applying this court's case law under that provision. 
Inconsistent and unexplained conclusions and analytical models
based on subjective criteria exacerbate that problem.  I discuss
below some of those sources of confusion.  Although analytical
simplicity in this area probably is not possible, the court must
be willing to examine its evolving case law to ensure that the
various "tests" that it has developed continue to apply the
constitution's terms faithfully.  It is in the interest of that
ultimate goal -- accurate constitutional interpretation -- that I
offer the observations below.
This court has noted that Article XVII, section 1,
partially shares the objective of another constitutional
provision, Article IV, section 1(2)(d), which provides, in part:
"A proposed law or amendment to the Constitution
shall embrace one subject only and matters properly
connected therewith."
In Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 275-76, 959 P2d 49
(1998), this court stated with regard to the separate-vote and
single-subject requirements:
"First, the purposes behind the two requirements are
similar:  Both serve to ensure that the voters will not
be compelled to vote upon multiple 'subjects' or
multiple constitutional changes in a single vote.
"However, it is significant that, from the
beginning of statehood, the single-subject and
separate-vote requirements have been worded
differently.  As we have discussed, the single-subject
requirement * * * focuses upon the content of a
proposed law or amendment, by requiring that it embrace
only one subject and matters properly connected
therewith. * * *
"The separate-vote requirement, by contrast,
focuses upon the form of submission of an amendment, as
well as the potential change to the existing
constitution, by requiring that two or more
constitutional amendments be voted upon separately. 
That is, in addition to speaking to the form of
submission, the separate-vote requirement addresses the
extent to which a proposed amendment would modify the
existing constitution.  That is significantly different
from the wording of the single-subject requirement,
which focuses in isolation upon only the text of a
proposed amendment in requiring that it embrace a
single subject.
"* * * Indeed, because the separate-vote
requirement is concerned only with a change to the
fundamental law, the notion that the people should be
able to vote separately upon each separate amendment
should come as no surprise.  In short, the requirement
serves as a safeguard that is fundamental to the
concept of a constitution."
(Emphasis in original.)
Consistently with that passage from Armatta, we must
bear in mind the different ways in which the separate-vote and
single-subject provisions apply.  In particular, we must endeavor
not to blur the distinctive protections that those provisions
impose on the process of amending the constitution by initiative.
Armatta drew attention to the fact that the
constitution does not define the term "amendment":
"Although Article XVII, section 1, does not define
what is meant by 'two or more amendments,' it is
important to note that the text focuses upon the
potential change to the existing constitution, by
requiring that two or more constitutional amendments be
voted upon separately."
Id. at 263 (emphasis in original.)  That statement is undoubtedly
correct.  However, it leaves open the question of the correct
application of Article XVII, section 1, in two separate contexts
that are pertinent to the problem in this case: (1) an amendment
that modifies or repeals existing constitutional wording either
expressly or by implication; and (2) an amendment that adds new
wording to the constitution that does not modify or otherwise
affect the operation of existing constitutional provisions.
The Armatta court's discussion of two early Oregon
cases sheds at least some light on the answer to that issue.  The
court noted that State of Oregon v. Payne, 195 Or 624, 635, 244
P2d 1025 (1952), confirmed that "the fact that a proposed
constitutional amendment contains more than one section does not
preclude its submission as a single amendment."  Armatta at 268.
Additionally, in Armatta the court observed that, in
Baum v. Newbry et al, 200 Or 576, 581, 276 P2d 220 (1954), the
court had stated:
"[The separate vote requirement] does not prohibit
the people from adopting an amendment which would
affect more than one article or section by implication.
* * * At most it prohibits the submission of two
amendments on two different subjects in such manner as
to make it impossible for the voters to express their
will as to each.  The fact, if it be one, that the
reapportionment amendment may have amended more than
one section of the constitution, would be immaterial."
In summarizing the Baum holding, the court in Armatta
stated:
"Baum stands for the following principles.  First,
it demonstrates that the purpose of the separate-vote
requirement is to allow the voters to decide upon
separate constitutional changes separately.  Stated
differently, Article XVII, section 1, imposes a
requirement aimed at ensuring that the voters are able
to express their will in one vote as to only one
constitutional change.  That is consistent with our
textual analysis of the separate-vote requirement,
which noted that the requirement focuses upon the
nature of the change to the existing constitution, as
well as the procedural form that an amendment takes
when it is submitted to the people.  Second, Baum
demonstrates that, by implication, a single
constitutional amendment may affect one or more
constitutional provisions without offending the
separate-vote requirement.  Finally, Baum suggests that
the separate-vote requirement encompasses, to some
extent, the notion that a single amendment must contain
a single 'subject.'"
Armatta, 327 Or at 269.
The conclusion that Armatta drew from Payne, quoted
above, seems unremarkable:  A permissible single amendment may
contain multiple sections.  The summary of Baum in Armatta is
more problematic, in part because it repeated certain conclusory,
ambiguous statements of the court in Baum.  For example, both
Baum and Armatta indicate that a single constitutional amendment
may "affect" one or more constitutional provisions without
violating the separate-vote requirement.  Baum, 200 Or at 581;
Armatta, 327 Or at 269.  That does not explain, however, whether
the term "affect" refers to (1) a modification or repeal of one
or more existing constitutional provisions; or (2) an addition of
wording to an existing constitutional provision without repealing
or modifying existing wording; or (3) both of the above.
Moreover, it appears that the Armatta court, in
summarizing the final principle that it drew from Baum, i.e., "a
single amendment must contain a single 'subject[,]'" 327 Or at
269, modified the statement in Baum that "[a]t most [the separate
vote requirement] prohibits the submission of two amendments on
two different subjects in such manner as to make it impossible
for the voters to express their will as to each."  Baum, 200 Or
at 581.  That restatement of the holding in Baum is notable, and
correct in my view, because it did not repeat the notion from
Baum that the separate-vote requirement applies solely to
multiple amendments that concern different "subjects." (7)  The
constitutional source for the requirement that a proposed
amendment contain one subject and matters properly connected
therewith is Article IV, section 1(2)(d), not Article XVII,
section 1.
Armatta itself illustrates that point.  In Armatta, the
proposed constitutional amendments changed the effect of the
existing terms of several constitutional provisions.  The court
held that the proposal violated the separate-vote requirement. 
Armatta, 327 Or at 284.  The fact that the proposed
constitutional amendments probably were germane to one subject,
i.e., the rights of crime victims, and thus probably satisfied
the single-vote requirement in Article IV, section 1(2)(d), was
beside the point.  As the court in Armatta put it,
"Although the court in Baum referred to a hypothetical
amendment containing multiple 'subjects,' the court did
not state that, if a proposed amendment contains a
single subject, then it also must be deemed to be a
single amendment."
Id. at 274.  Armatta went on to expressly reject the state's
argument that a proposed amendment satisfies the separate-vote
requirement if it satisfies the single-subject requirement.  Id.
at 277.
After observing that the prior Oregon cases were
"lacking in detailed analysis[,]" id. at 275, the Armatta court
stated:
"We conclude that the proper inquiry is to determine
whether, if adopted, the proposal would make two or
more changes to the constitution that are substantive
and that are not closely related.  If the proposal
would effect two or more changes that are substantive
and not closely related, the proposal violates the
separate-vote requirement of Article XVII, section 1,
because it would prevent the voters from expressing
their opinions as to each proposed change separately."
Id. at 277.  The court had no difficulty applying that test in
Armatta, because the initiative measure clearly changed the
substance of numerous provisions of the state constitution.
Because Armatta was an "easy" case, the court spent no
time in its opinion attempting to explain how it arrived at the
two announced separate-vote criteria  "substantive" and "closely
related," or how they applied.  However, it soon became evident
that those criteria were causing confusion.
In Dale v. Keisling, 167 Or App 394, 999 P2d 1229
(2000), the Court of Appeals opined that, to satisfy the two
criteria announced in Armatta, two or more substantive changes to
the constitution would have to be so closely related that a vote
in favor of one proposed amendment necessarily would imply a vote
in favor of the other.  Id. at 401.  I refer to that test as the
"necessary implication" test.
In 2002, this court addressed a challenge to Measure 3
(1992) under the separate-vote provision.  In Lehman v. Bradbury,
333 Or 231, 37 P3d 989 (2002), this court concluded that Measure
3, which concerned term limits for various public officials,
embodied multiple amendments to the constitution in violation of
the separate-vote requirement.
The trial court in Lehman had attempted to apply the
"necessary implication" test from Dale.  On appeal, the Secretary
of State complained that the "closely related" criterion from
Armatta required clarification.  Id. at 242.  The Secretary of
State urged the court to adopt the following test for determining
whether multiple amendments to the constitution are "closely
related":
"[T]wo or more changes to the constitution are
'closely related' if they are so logically interrelated
as to present one specific, discrete, cohesive policy
choice."
Id.
This court refused to accept the test that the
Secretary of State offered, stating:
"Defendant apparently believes that Armatta needs
clarification.  However, adopting defendant's
'clarification' would mean that we potentially were
permitting our task under Article XVII, section 1, to
degenerate into an endless war of adjectives and
adverbs, each battle of which would involve further
efforts to explain and elaborate on whichever set of
adjectives and adverbs has been used in the next
preceding case.  That does not mean that we would not
accept a party's proposed reformulation of an existing
analytical test, if it appeared that the proposed test
would be a better tool to use in future cases. 
Defendant's proffered test simply does not appear to us
to be a better tool."
Id.  Lehman rejected the "necessary implication" test from Dale
as well as the adjective-laden test that the Secretary of State
offered.
I agree that those proffered tests were flawed.  In
addition to their subjective and, thus, standardless character,
they did not reflect the core requirement that Armatta correctly
had discerned in the separate-vote requirement:  A measure must
embody "a particular constitutional change" that will allow
voters to "express their will in one vote as to only one
constitutional change."  Armatta, 327 Or at 269.
Lehman easily concluded that Measure 3 proposed
multiple substantive changes to the wording of different
provisions of the constitution.  Lehman, 333 Or at 244.  The
analysis could have stopped there, because, under the core
requirement of the separate-vote rule, as this court construed
that rule in Armatta, Measure 3 failed to offer voters "a
particular constitutional change" about which the voters could
express their will in one vote.
However, Lehman proceeded to inquire whether the
multiple substantive constitutional amendments were "closely
related."  Id.  The court acknowledged that Armatta had not
explained what the "closely related" criterion meant.  Id. 
However, the court took note of several of the observations that
the Armatta court made about the proposed measure that it
examined and concluded that those comments were themselves
additional legal tests regarding the "closely related" criterion.
As a consequence of that conclusion, Lehman announced
that the court would apply the "closely related" criterion on two
separate levels.  First, the court would ask whether the multiple
constitutional provisions that the measure modified are
themselves "closely related."  Id. at 246.  Second, the court
would ask whether the constitutional changes embodied in the
proposed measure are themselves "closely related."  Id.  After
applying those multiple tests, the court concluded that Measure 3
violated the separate-vote requirement.  Id. at 250.
The court's ultimate conclusion in Lehman remains
persuasive to me.  In many ways, Measure 3 was as plainly
violative of the separate-vote requirement as was the measure
addressed in Armatta.  However, the Lehman court's elaboration of
the "closely related" criterion deserves reconsideration for
several reasons.
First, Article XVII, section 1, prohibits the
submission to the voters of more than one amendment to the
constitution for a single vote.  It does not invite the
submission of multiple amendments for one vote if judges decide
that the affected constitutional provisions or the proposed
amendments themselves have a relationship that is "close."  By
opening the door to the submission of multiple substantive
constitutional amendments for a single vote, the court risks the
emasculation of the important protection that Article XVII,
section 1, embodies.
Second, the court's reliance on a test that
incorporates multiple applications of a subjective, court-created
phrase simply feeds an unfortunate public perception that judges
execute only their personal predilections in applying the
constitution.  One can hardly imagine a phrase more elastic, or
more lacking in some objective foundation, than "closely
related."  The court originally (and correctly) intended that
criterion as a means of disposing of the argument that any change
to more than a single word in the constitution would violate
Article XVII, section.  As Lehman stated,
"[I]n any separate-vote inquiry, it is imperative that
we remain aware that any amendment to the constitution
involves some change to the wording of that document. 
However, not every one-word change to the wording of
the constitution is a separate 'amendment.'  If it
were, then amendments to the constitution would have to
happen word-by-word, and the people's power to amend
the constitution would be hamstrung."
Id. at 240.  The court should restore that focus to its analysis
of whether a proposed change in constitutional wording is a
separate amendment.
Third, asking whether several proposed amendments to
different constitutional provisions share a "close relationship"
is, in substance, an inquiry into whether the proposals embrace
one subject and matters properly connected to that subject. 
Stated differently, any attempt to compare and contrast the
content of multiple proposed amendments to multiple
constitutional provisions will quickly devolve into an effort to
discover a common theme or policy choice that the component parts
tend to promote.  The differences in the points of discussion
offered by the plurality and the dissent in this case are a good
example.  The respective opinions differ over whether the
elements of the instant measure are or are not germane to a
common subject.  But that inquiry properly results from the
single-subject provision, not the separate-vote provision.  The
plurality's present conception of the "closely related" test thus
blurs the line that separates those distinctive constitutional
requirements.  To repeat, we must avoid confusing those separate
legal requirements.
Two later cases further illustrate the difficulty that
litigants face in attempting to comply with the court's "closely
related" criterion.  In Swett v. Bradbury, 333 Or 597, 43 P3d
1094 (2002), the defendants sought to defend a campaign finance
disclosure measure from a challenge under Article XVII, section
1.   They agreed that the proposed measure changed the operation
of multiple provisions of the constitution.  Id. at 607. 
However, they endeavored to point out that the measure's
provisions shared a common subject, i.e., "'they are regulations
designed to prevent, control, or expose the influence of money in
the initiative [and] referendum * * * process.'"  Id. at 608. 
The court began by noting, correctly, that:
"More importantly, however, defendants' argument
fails because it is an attempt to show that sections 1
and 3 of Measure 62 share the same subject matter. 
That may or may not be true, but it is beside the point
in an analysis under Article XVII, section 1. 
Defendants do not focus, as they must in a separate-vote challenge, on the particular changes made to the
constitution.  See Lehman at 241-42 (separate-vote
requirement, in contrast to single-subject requirement,
focuses on extent to which proposed amendment modifies
existing constitution)."
Id. at 609 (emphasis in original).  The court also noted,
correctly, that, as the parties agreed, the proposed measure
altered the wording of more than one provision of the
constitution.  But the court then went on to assess whether those
multiple alterations of the constitution bore a "close"
relationship to each other.  Despite the court's attempted
explanation to the contrary, that assessment consisted of
determining only whether the disparate changes nevertheless
shared some similar policy goal or subject.  The court concluded
that no such relationship was present.  To adopt the court's own
words, that inquiry was "beside the point."  Id.
In Meyer v. Bradbury, 341 Or 288, ___ P3d ___, (2006),
this court decided a separate-vote question involving a proposed
measure that changed the substantive operation of two different
constitutional provisions.  However, the court majority concluded
that the measure's alteration of the power of the Oregon
legislature to enact laws regulating campaign finance was
"closely related" to the measure's alteration of the people's
constitutional right of free speech.  Id. at 301.  Even though
the measure would not permit the voters to vote separately on
those multiple, important changes to the constitution, the
majority's discovery of a "relationship" that was "close" allowed
it to sidestep the separate-vote requirement.
The plurality and the dissent in this case continue
that kind of debate.  They differ about whether the various
elements of Measure 3 do or do not share a policy theme or
advance a discernible lawmaking objective.  But any
constitutional amendment of any degree of complexity (and most
legislation for that matter) almost always will embody multiple
policy objectives.  Analyzing a measure for the common objectives
among its parts only amounts to an assessment of whether it
embraces one subject and properly connected matters, not whether
it contains more than one particular constitutional change, as
Armatta stated the issue.
The plurality is correct in observing that Measure 3
adds new wording to the constitution without altering the
operation of any existing provision of the constitution.  The
dissent's claim that Measure 3's parts affect several
constitutional provisions, or analogues of those provisions, is
unpersuasive.  Measure 3 creates one new, albeit complex,
amendment to the existing constitution.  The fact that Measure 3
contains several clauses that address distinctive policy goals
that are germain to its subject is beside the point.  
The plurality continues to search for close
relationships between the parts of Measure 3.  That search fails
to advance the separate-vote inquiry.  The fact that Measure 3's
parts contain "a unifying principle logically connecting all
provisions" in the amendment demonstrates only that Measure 3
satisfies the single-subject requirement.  See State ex rel Caleb
v. Beesley, 326 Or 83, 91, 949 P2d 724 (1997) (stating test for
single-subject requirement).  Rather, Measure 3 satisfies the
separate-vote requirement because it embodies one constitutional
change even though that change appears in a proposal with
multiple parts.  Measure 3 does not compel voters to engage in a
single vote on two or more changes to the existing state
constitution.  It does not combine in one measure multiple
alterations of the constitution's terms, either expressly or by
implication.  Thus, Measure 3 satisfies Article XVII, section 1.
I also join in the plurality's conclusion that Measure
3 passes muster under the single-subject requirement in Article
IV, section 1(2)(d).
For the reasons stated above, I concur in the
plurality's decision to reverse the Court of Appeals and to
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
KISTLER, J., dissenting.
The plurality's decision marks an abrupt departure from
this court's cases applying the separate-vote requirement of
Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution.  Today, the
plurality concludes that all the various parts of Ballot Measure
3 (2000), which adds almost four pages of text to the Oregon
Constitution, are "closely related" to each other and thus comply
with Article XVII, section 1.  It is worth pausing to consider
the breadth of that conclusion.  Among other things, Measure 3
enacts new substantive and procedural protections for persons
whose property is subject to forfeiture, it prohibits the
legislature from using forfeiture proceeds for law enforcement
purposes, it imposes new limits on state and federal cooperation,
and it creates a new, constitutionally-based agency to monitor
forfeiture proceedings.
The plurality concludes that all those various
provisions are closely related to each other.  In my view, not
only is the plurality's decision incorrect on its own terms, but
the plurality cannot fairly reconcile its decision today with the
decisions in Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 959 P2d 49 (1998),
and Lehman v. Bradbury, 333 Or 231, 37 P3d 989 (2002).  This
court held in Lehman that a measure imposing term limits on state
and federal officials made two changes to the constitution that
were not closely related.  Measure 3 contains more numerous and
more varied provisions than the measure at issue in Lehman.  If a
measure imposing term limits on government officials did not
survive scrutiny under Article XVII, section 1, then neither
should Measure 3.  I respectfully dissent.
Article XVII, section 1, provides that, "[w]hen two or
more amendments shall be submitted * * * to the voters of this
state at the same election, they shall be so submitted that each
amendment shall be voted on separately."  This court carefully
reviewed the text and history of that provision in Armatta and
clarified the principles that govern our analysis of separate-vote claims.  The plurality's restatement of those principles is
accurate as far as it goes, but it omits a distinction that was
critical to the court's holding in Armatta and consequently, I
believe, misapplies Article XVII, section 1, in this case.
As the plurality recognizes, the separate-vote
requirement imposes a stricter standard on constitutional
amendments than the single-subject test imposes on legislation. 
As the court explained in Meyer v. Bradbury, 341 Or 288, 296, ___
P3d ___ (2006), the separate-vote requirement "has a different
application and is driven by a decidedly different rationale.  *
* * [T]he separate-vote requirement serves as a safeguard that is
fundamental to the concept of a constitution."
The difference between those two standards is the level
of generality at which they operate.  Armatta held, and this
court reaffirmed in Meyer, that "a separate-vote analysis must
focus on the 'particular changes made to the constitution." 
Meyer, 341 Or at 297 (quoting Swett v. Bradbury, 333 Or 597, 609,
43 P3d 1094 (2002)) (emphasis in original); Armatta, 327 Or at
278.  Unlike the single-subject test, which permits courts to
define the subject of a measure at a relatively high level of
generality, the separate-vote requirement requires courts to
focus on the specific changes to the constitution and ask whether
those specific changes are closely related.  Meyer, 341 Or at
297.
In Armatta, the court explained that the various
changes that Measure 40 made could be grouped under the subject
of criminal procedure but that the specific changes that measure
made had little relationship to each other.  327 Or at 283-84. 
For example, the court held that two changes to criminal
procedure that Measure 40 made -- involving the right to bail and
juror qualifications -- were not "closely related" for the
purposes of the separate-vote requirement.  Similarly, as noted,
the measure at issue in Lehman imposed term limits on state and
federal officials.  333 Or at 234-35.  The court explained that
imposing term limits on each group of officials constituted two
constitutional changes and that those changes "had little or
nothing to do" with each other.  Id. at 250.  That was true even
though both changes could be described, at only a slightly higher
level of generality, as limiting the terms that all government
officials could serve.
Following those decisions, I would hold that Measure 3
makes at least four changes to the constitution that are not
closely related.  As the plurality recognizes, subsection (3)
makes three changes to the constitution.  __ Or at __ (slip op at
13).  Two of those changes bear no greater relation to each other
than the changes at issue in Armatta and Lehman.  Subsection 3
requires, among other things, that the state prove forfeitures by
clear and convincing evidence.  It also requires that the
forfeiture be proportional to the crime that gave rise to it.  As
the plurality notes, the first change finds an analogue in the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and focuses
on the degree of certainty that the trier of fact must possess
before he or she can forfeit property.  __ Or at __ (slip op at
14-15).  The other change finds analogues in Article I, section
16, of the Oregon Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and seeks to ensure that the sanction
is proportional to the crime that led to the forfeiture.
Both changes are substantive.  See Meyer, 341 Or at 298
(defining "substantive" changes).  Neither is closely related;
each addresses separate concerns.  The standard of proof goes to
the determination whether property meets the criteria necessary
for forfeiture in the first instance.  The requirement that the
value of the forfeited property be substantially proportional to
the crime goes to the sanction that a court may impose after it
finds that a forfeiture should occur.  Stated more succinctly,
one change goes to liability while the other goes to the
sanction.
Eighth Amendment limitations on punishment present
separate concerns from due process requirements of standards of
proof.  The two changes that subsection (3) makes to the Oregon
Constitution present equally separate concerns.  If the changes
to two aspects of criminal procedure -- bail and juror
qualifications -- were not sufficiently related for the purposes
of the separate-vote requirement, as this court held in Armatta,
then the procedural and substantive changes that subsection (3)
makes are equally unrelated.
Those two changes should be sufficient, standing alone,
to say that Measure 3 makes two substantive changes that are not
closely related.  Were there any doubt about the matter, however,
subsection (7) resolves it.  Among other things, subsection (7)
modifies the authority of the legislative and executive branches;
it prohibits them from using the proceeds of forfeitures for law
enforcement purposes.  See Armatta, 327 Or at 283 (holding that
provision prescribing juror qualifications "limit[ed] the
legislature's ability to establish juror qualifications in
criminal cases").  Prohibiting the government from using the
proceeds of forfeitures for law enforcement purposes arguably
removes an incentive for the police to pursue criminal
investigations that could lead to forfeitures.  Subsection (7)
thus could result in reducing the number of forfeitures, but it
would do so without regard to the validity of any particular
forfeiture.
Subsection (3) is directed at a different target.  It
grants specific substantive and procedural protections to persons
whose property is subject to a forfeiture.  It seeks to protect
those persons from forfeitures that precede a criminal
conviction, that are not proven to a specific level of certainty,
or that are excessive.  To be sure, those two constitutional
changes are not completely unconnected.  If there are fewer
forfeitures, then there will be fewer opportunities for any
particular forfeiture to be premature, unproven, or excessive. 
But the relationship among the nature of the particular changes
that subsections (3) and (7) make is far too tenuous to qualify
as "close."
The plurality offers three rationales for reaching a
different conclusion.  None withstands scrutiny.  Perhaps the
most telling rationale is the one that the plurality offers at
the end of its decision.  The plurality begins its explanation of
that rationale by stating that Measure 3 contains "essentially * * * two parts."  __ Or at __ (slip op at 19).  The plurality
reasons:
"[T]he first part, encompassing subsections (3) through
(6), sets out constitutional protections for property
owners by creating a constitutional concept of civil
forfeiture proceedings and by imposing a number of
procedural protections (and accompanying limitations)
in such proceedings; the second part, encompassing
subsections (7) through (11), sets out an
administrative process for collecting and disbursing
funds derived from forfeited property."
Id.
As an initial matter, in describing the "two parts" of
Measure 3, the plurality does not "focus on the particular
changes made to the constitution," as our cases direct us to do
in analyzing a separate-vote claim.  See Meyer, 341 Or at 297
(stating principle) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis
in original).  Rather, the plurality groups numerous changes
under two broad headings -- "procedural protections" and
"administrative process." (8) 
Not only does the plurality's analysis operate at too
high a level of generality, but its conclusion that the two parts
of the measure are closely related rests on an incorrect premise. 
In concluding that the "two parts" of Measure 3 are closely
related, the plurality states initially:
"The administrative funding and disbursal scheme (the
second change just identified) has a place in the
constitution because of the new civil forfeiture
process (the first change), and it concerns the
disbursal of funds derived from that process."
__ Or at __ (slip op at 20).  It then concludes that "the
administrative scheme set out principally in subsections (7) to
(11)" is closely related to "the civil forfeiture proceeding
provisions set out in subsections (3) to (6), because [the
administrative scheme] would have no reason for existence were it
not for those provisions."  Id. (slip op at 20-21) (emphasis
added.)
The premise that underlies the plurality's conclusion -- that the administrative scheme set out in subsections (7) to
(11) "would have no reason for existence" were it not for the
civil forfeiture proceedings set out in subsections (3) to (6) --
is incorrect in two respects.  First, civil forfeiture is a
creature of the common law, which the legislature has codified. 
See, e.g., State v. Curran, 291 Or 119, 127-29, 628 P2d 1198
(1981) (discussing common-law forfeitures and legislative
codification); ORS 475 A. 020 (authorizing forfeiture of property
used to manufacture, contain, and transport controlled
substances).  Second, and relatedly, subsections (3) to (6) do
not create a cause of action for forfeitures.  Rather, those
subsections impose, as a matter of constitutional law,
substantive and procedural protections on existing statutory
causes of action for civil forfeitures.  Contrary to the premise
that underlies the plurality's reasoning, forfeiture proceedings
would occur regardless of whether subsections (3) to (6) existed.
It follows that the plurality errs in asserting that
the "administrative scheme" set out in subsections (7) to (11)
would have no reason for existence without the forfeiture
provisions in subsections (3) to (6).  Even without subsections
(3) to (6), there still would be an equal need (at least from the
drafters' perspective) for an administrative scheme to regulate
statutory forfeiture proceedings.  Indeed, if the existing
statutory forfeiture proceedings continued unchecked by the
procedural and substantive protections set out in subsections (3)
to (6), then the need for an administrative scheme (an oversight
agency and so forth) to regulate statutory forfeiture proceedings
would be all the greater.
The plurality's alternative rationale for holding that
subsections (3) and (7) are closely related is no more
persuasive.  The plurality begins its alternative rationale by
observing that one can say that subsections (3) and (7) are not
closely related only if "one stands as close as possible to each
provision and ignores the others."  __ Or at __ (slip op at 18). 
The difficulty with the plurality's use of that metaphor is that
its own analysis works only if one stands as far away as possible
from the specific provisions of Measure 3 and describes those
provisions in only the most general terms.  For example, the
plurality's alternative rationale recasts the specific changes
that subsection (3) makes as an "assur[ance] that forfeitures are
reined in," id.; that is, it reduces the specific changes to a
goal of limiting forfeitures.  It then describes subsection (7)
as "removing the carrot" from government "to treat the criminal
law as a revenue-raising source."  Id. at 18-19.
That is precisely what Armatta, Swett, and Meyer
explain that a court must not do when it engages in a separate-vote analysis; it may not limit its analysis to searching for a
common theme or policy that unites disparate parts of a proposed
measure.  See Meyer, 341 Or at 297 (explaining that "a separate-vote analysis must focus on the particular changes made to the
constitution") (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in
original).  Otherwise, a court reduces the separate-vote
requirement for constitutional amendments to a single-subject
test for legislation and, in doing so, removes "a safeguard that
is fundamental to the concept of a constitution."  See id. at 296
(explaining purpose of separate-vote requirement). (9)
Finally, the plurality holds that the three changes
that subsection (3) makes are themselves closely related.  It
reasons:
"We think that it is clear that the changes are all
parts of an effort to define the judicial process for
forfeiture in constitutional terms.  The first part of
subsection (3) describes that judicial process as
requiring a predicate conviction to justify commencing
the process.  The second part sets out the permissible
standard of proof in that process.  Finally, the third
part of subsection (3) provides that the forfeiture
process may proceed only to the extent that the
forfeiture is proportional to the underlying criminal
conviction.  Seen in that way, the close,
interconnected relationship between the three parts is
clear."
__ Or at __ (slip op at 15-16).
The plurality's reasoning proves too much.  Using that
reasoning, the court could have held in Armatta that the various
changes to criminal procedure that Measure 40 made were, to
borrow the plurality's words, "all parts of an effort to define
the judicial process for [criminal trials] in constitutional
terms."  One part of Measure 40 described the procedures that
were appropriate in setting bail; another described the types of
evidence that would be admissible in criminal trials, and yet
another described the number of jurors necessary to convict for
certain crimes.  Armatta, 327 Or at 278-80.  To use the
plurality's reasoning, "Seen in that way, the close,
interconnected relationship between the three parts is clear." 
In my view, the changes that subsection (3) makes to forfeiture
proceedings are no more closely connected than the changes that
Measure 40 made to criminal proceedings.  If the latter changes
were not closely connected, then neither are the changes here. 
The plurality errs in holding otherwise. 
The concurrence takes a different tack.  It would hold
that Measure 3 is a single amendment because it does not modify
existing constitutional provisions.  Instead, it merely adds new
limitations to the constitution concerning a single subject --
forfeitures.  Before turning to the concurrence's reasoning, it
is important to note that the plurality does not accept the
concurrence's position.  Rather, the plurality's decision rests
on the premise that Measure 3 makes more than one change to the
constitution, and the plurality asks a question that the
concurrence finds it unnecessary to reach -- whether those
changes are closely related.
The concurring opinion rests on the proposition that a
measure that adds new matter to the constitution, as opposed to
changing existing provisions, results in only one constitutional
change.  This court's decision in Lehman poses a hurdle for the
concurrence.  The measure at issue in Lehman added new provisions
to the Oregon Constitution.  333 Or at 234 (quoting statement
that measure creates "new Sections 19 and 20 in Article II"). 
One added a new limitation on the number of years that state
representatives and senators could serve and also changed the
number of years that certain statewide officials could hold
office.  Id. at 243-44.  The other added a new provision
regarding the number of terms that federal officials could serve. 
Id. at 244.  In holding that the measure made two changes to the
constitution, the court explained that the fact that the second
change did not modify an existing constitutional provision was of
no moment.  Id. at 250 (explaining that the problem was not that
one change was new).  Rather, the problem was that the two
changes had "little or nothing to do" with each other.  Id.
Lehman thus stands for the proposition that the fact
that a measure adds new matter to the constitution does not bear
on the question whether it contains more than one amendment. 
But, if Lehman were not enough, the text of the constitution also
is at odds with the concurrence's position.  The Oregon
Constitution provides that both the Legislative Assembly and the
people may propose amendments to the constitution.  Article XVII,
section 1, provides that the Legislative Assembly may propose
"[a]ny amendment or amendments to this Constitution," and Article
IV, section 1(2)(a) provides that the people, using the
initiative power, may "propose * * * amendments to the
Constitution."  Article XVII, section 1, also provides that,
"[w]hen two or more amendments shall be submitted * * * to the
voters of this state at the same election, they shall be so
submitted that each amendment shall be voted on
separately." (10)
The constitutional text does not distinguish between
amendments that modify existing provisions and amendments that
add only new material to the constitution.  Rather, the
constitutional text refers to "amendment" and "amendments"
without distinction.  The concurring opinion does not identify
any history that would support the limitation that it would read
into Article XVII, section 1, nor am I aware of any.  The fact
that a measure adds only new matter to the constitution does not
provide any basis for saying that it adds only a single amendment
to that document.
Having held in Armatta that the separate-vote
requirement in Article XVII, section 1, sets a higher standard
for constitutional amendments than the single-subject test sets
for legislation, we should apply that holding consistently to all
the cases that come before us.  Article XVII, section 1, should
not expand and contract like an accordion from one case to the
next.  The plurality, however, would uphold Measure 3 only by
effectively employing a single-subject test and, in doing so, it
would depart from this court's application of the separate-vote
requirement in Armatta, Lehman, and Meyer.  If we apply those
decisions consistently, we should affirm the Court of Appeals
decision.  I respectfully dissent.
De Muniz, C.J., and Balmer, J., join in this dissenting
opinion.
1. Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides: 
"When two or more amendments shall be
submitted * * * to the voters of this state, they shall
be submitted so that each amendment shall be
voted on separately."
2. And, that provision notwithstanding, we shall continue
to refer to the measure as "Measure 3" throughout this opinion.
3. Article IV, section 1(2)(d), of the Oregon
Constitution, provides, in part:
"* * * A proposed * * * amendment to the
Constitution shall embrace one subject only
and matters properly connected therewith."
4. Various organizations and individuals also intervened
as plaintiffs.  Because their arguments essentially track
plaintiffs' arguments, we do not refer to those interveners
separately.
5. Before Armatta, this court had applied the separate-vote requirement without considering either the wording of the
requirement or its history.  See Baum, 200 Or at 580-81 (stating,
without explanation, that a 1952 constitutional amendment "did
not submit 'two or more amendments' to the voters" in violation
of Article XVII, section 1).
6. As noted, plaintiffs also advanced the notion in the
Court of Appeals that Measure 3 violated the "single-subject"
limitation found in Article IV, section 1(2)(d), of the Oregon
Constitution.  However, that subsection, which applies to
statutory enactments as well as constitutional amendments, is
less demanding than the separate-vote requirement of Article
XVII, section 1.  See Armatta, 327 Or at 276 (so stating).  In
fact, a constitutional amendment that passes muster under Article
XVII, section 1, almost by definition will pass muster under
Article IV, section 1(2)(d).  See id. at 277 (stating that
separate-vote requirement encompasses notion that a single
constitutional amendment must contain a single subject).  We
therefore hold that plaintiffs' arguments under Article IV,
section 1(2)(d), also are not well taken.  It follows that the
case need not be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.  Instead, we can affirm the judgment of the trial
court by this opinion.
7. Notwithstanding the selective restatement in Armatta of
the comments in Baum, this court said in Hartung v. Bradbury, 332
Or 570, 579 n 5, 33 P3d 972 (2001), that it declined the
petitioners'
"invitation to revisit this court's decision
in Baum in light of Armatta v. Kitzhaber
[citation omitted].  Contrary to petitioners'
arguments, nothing in Armatta suggests that
Baum was decided incorrectly; indeed, Armatta
cites Baum favorably for the proposition that
Article XVII, section 1, 'imposes a
requirement aimed at ensuring that the voters
are able to express their will in one vote as
to only one constitutional change.'  Armatta,
327 Or at 269."
It is true that Armatta neither overtly criticizes
nor overrules Baum.  However, the court's summaries of the Baum
case in Armatta and Hartung demonstrate the court's
disinclination to endorse all that Baum had to say about the
scope of the separate- vote requirement.
8. To illustrate, the plurality groups a prohibition
against using forfeited property for law enforcement purposes and
a limitation on federal-state cooperation under the heading of
"administrative process for collecting and disbursing funds
derived from forfeited property."  And it groups "a number of"
discrete rights under the heading of "procedural protections" in
forfeiture proceedings.
9. For the reasons explained above, a proper focus leads
to the conclusion that subsections (3) and (7) are not closely
related.  The latter change prohibits the use of forfeiture
proceeds for law enforcement purposes.  The former grants
procedural and substantive protections to persons whose property
is subject to forfeiture.  A constitutional change that limits
the instances in which forfeitures occur has only the most
tenuous relationship to a change that grants separate
constitutional protections to those persons whose property is
subject to forfeiture.
10. This court explained in Armatta that the separate-vote requirement applies to both initiated and legislatively
proposed amendments.  327 Or at 261.