Case Title: GORE v. SHERARD

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
GORE v. SHERARD2002 WY 11450 P.3d 705Case Number: 01-136Decided: 07/19/2002

April Term, A.D. 2002

 
LESTER 
A. GORE and KATHLEEN E.

GORE, 

Appellants(Plaintiffs) 
,

 

v.

 

DONALD 
N. SHERARD, STEPHEN N.

SHERARD, 
REX E. JOHNSON;

FLYING 
13 LAND CO.; and 121 LAND

COMPANY, 
INC., 

Appellees(Defendants) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Platte County

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

Fred 
W. Phifer, Wheatland, WY.  Argument 
by Mr. Phifer. 

Representing 
Appellees Sherards and Johnson:

Paul 
J. Hickey and Roger C. Fransen of Hickey, Mackey, Evans and Walker, Cheyenne, 
WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Hickey. 

Representing 
Appellees Flying 13 Land Co. and 121 Land Co.:

Douglas 
W. Weaver, Wheatland, WY.  Argument 
by Mr. Weaver.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* and KITE, JJ., and ROGERS, D.J. 

*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.   

  

ROGERS, 
District Judge. 

[¶1]      At the 
close of appellants' case, the trial court granted the appellees' motion for a 
directed verdict, more properly referred to as a judgment as a matter of 
law.  W.R.C.P. 50(a).  From that order this appeal has been 
taken.

 

[¶2]      We affirm the 
trial court's decision as herein modified.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Appellants state 
the issues as follows:

 

1.  Did 
the Trial Court err when it directed verdict in favor of the Appellees finding 
that there were no questions of fact for a jury to decide?

 

2.  Did 
the Trial Court err when it allowed hearsay testimony from a witness which 
contradicted the sworn testimony of the individual who originally made the 
statement?

 

3.  Did 
the Trial Court err in awarding costs not allowed by the U.R.D.C. Rule 501 or 
that the Wyoming Supreme Court previously determined were not taxable as 
costs?

 

4.  Did 
the Trial Court err in finding there was no valid contract or business 
expectancy between the Appellants and Virginia Gibb after 20 years of leasing 
the property and the improvements placed on the property during that 
time?

 

Appellees 
state the issues:

 

I.  Did 
the trial court properly grant the appellees' motion for judgment as a matter of 
law at the conclusion of the appellants' direct case?

 

II.  Did 
the trial court err by allowing trial testimony of Don Sherard which was 
solicited by appellants' counsel?

 

III.  Did 
the district court err in awarding costs? 

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Appellants Lester 
and Kathleen Gore (the Gores) moved onto the Donaldson Ranch (the ranch) in 
Platte County, Wyoming in November 1973 as subleasees, and continued to live on 
the 2,339 acre ranch until the time of trial.   In 1976, the Gores executed a 
written lease with a six-year term with the then owner of the ranch, Ross 
Donaldson.  The Gores moved a mobile 
home onto a permanent foundation on the ranch in 1973 and lived there to the 
date of trial.  The Gores thereafter 
executed a series of written and oral leases with the owners of the ranch 
through the spring of 1996.  The 
last written lease executed by the Gores ended in 1993.  The ownership of the ranch changed as 
the years passed after the death of Ross Donaldson.  In 1996 and until the ranch sold in 
1997, Virginia Gibb owned a two-thirds interest in the ranch, and the remaining 
one-third interest was owned by her nephews, primarily James Donaldson, with a 
minor interest owned by Russell Donaldson (the 
Donaldsons).

 

[¶5]      The Gores used 
the ranch for a cattle operation.  
The rent paid by the Gores was gradually increased over the years to the 
annual amount of $6,000, which rent was seldom paid on time and was usually paid 
in the fall after cattle were sold.  
Some of the written leases had contained options to purchase and/or 
rights of first refusal granted to the Gores, none of which had ever been 
exercised.  The Gores made many 
improvements to the ranch over the years.  
Buildings were repaired, fences built, and wells drilled.  Some rent was excused in payment for 
some of the improvements made by the Gores.

 

[¶6]      In August of 
1996, the Gores were occupying the ranch.  
They had not paid any rent for 1996, and the leases of the ranch had 
always commenced on May 15 of each year.  
Lester Gore inquired of Virginia Gibb in August 1996 as to whether she 
was interested in selling the ranch to him, and she replied she was not.  Virginia Gibb and Lester Gore discussed 
a new written lease at lunch and then went to the office of Mrs. Gibb's 
attorney, defendant Stephen N. Sherard, where the discussion continued.  Stephen Sherard thereafter prepared a 
draft of a lease agreement which he thought contained the terms agreed to by 
Gibb and Lester Gore, including a one-year term and no option to purchase.  Lester Gore did not agree with the terms 
of the draft lease and so informed Stephen Sherard, who communicated with his 
client, Virginia Gibb, drew another lease, and wrote Lester Gore, informing him 
that Virginia Gibb insisted on a one-year lease term.  This second draft of the lease contained 
an option price of $200 per acre.  
Sherard forwarded the second draft to Virginia Gibb, Lester Gore, and 
James Donaldson.  James Donaldson 
signed the lease and returned it to Sherard.  It was never signed by Virginia Gibb and 
Lester Gore.  In the fall of 1996, 
Lester Gore had a lease drafted by his attorney and presented it to Virginia 
Gibb, who refused to sign it.  
Lester Gore never spoke to Virginia Gibb from December 1996 until April 
1997; and, by his own admission, the negotiations for a new lease had come to a 
standstill in the fall of 1996.  
Stephen Sherard never heard back from Gibb and Gore and assumed that the 
deal was over.  Stephen Sherard had 
no further contact with Virginia Gibb regarding the lease 
agreement.

 

[¶7]      In March 1997, 
Virginia Gibb went to see defendant Donald N. Sherard at his office for advice 
concerning a credit card problem.  
During their conversation, Gibb complained to Don Sherard that the Gores 
had not paid her the rent for the ranch and that she was anxious to sell the 
ranch and to separate herself from the relationship with the Gores.  Don Sherard expressed interest in the 
ranch and obtained instructions from Gibb on how to contact James Donaldson, 
which Sherard then did.  Don Sherard 
then reviewed some of the prior lease documents and consulted with his son, 
Stephen Sherard, and their law partner, defendant Rex E. Johnson, about the 
purchase of the ranch.  The three 
lawyers, through the two defendant corporations owned by them, then purchased 
the ranch from Virginia Gibb and the Donaldsons in early April 1997 for 
$350,000, paid the $6,000 rent due from the Gores, and took an assignment of the 
right to collect the rent from the Gores.

 

[¶8]      Rex Johnson then 
called Lester Gore and informed him of the sale and that $6,000 in rent was 
due.  During that conversation, 
Lester Gore acknowledged to Johnson that he did not have a lease on the 
ranch.  Johnson and Gore agreed that 
the Gores could remain on the ranch until September 1, 1997, and that Johnson 
could pasture some cattle on the ranch during the summer of 1997.  The Gores paid the rent in late April 
1997.

 

[¶9]      Lester Gore then 
obtained financing and bought the ranch from the defendant corporations in late 
June 1997 for $600,000.  The Gores 
immediately placed the ranch on the market and subsequently sold it, along with 
a small neighboring ranch, for $1,400,000, $1,100,000 of which was allocated to 
the Donaldson ranch.

 

[¶10]   The Gores thereafter filed this 
action against the three lawyers, their law firm, and the two corporations, 
seeking damages for tortious interference with a contractual relationship and 
business expectancy and punitive damages.  
Following the presentation of plaintiffs' case in chief at the trial, the 
trial court granted defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of 
law.

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶11]   This court has previously explained 
the standard that applies for review of a trial court's decision to grant a 
motion for judgment as a matter of law:

 

In 
reviewing a judgment as a matter of law, we evaluate the record without 
affording deference to the trial court's views.  John Q. Hammons Inc. v. Poletis, 
954 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Wyo. 1998);   
Hatch v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 930 P.2d 382, 395 
(Wyo. 1997).  A judgment as a matter 
of law is appropriate when reasonable jurors could reach but one conclusion as 
to the verdict.  Hatch, 930 P.2d  at 395.   We regard the 
nonmoving party's evidence as being true, and we give that party the benefit of 
all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.  Garaman, Inc. v. Williams, 912 P.2d 1121, 1123 (Wyo. 1996).  
Additionally, we do not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of 
the witnesses.  John Q. Hammons 
Inc., 954 P.2d  at 1356.   A 
judgment as a matter of law deprives the opposing party of the opportunity to 
have the jury determine the facts, and the court should, therefore, use caution 
in granting such a judgment. Id.; Hatch, 930 P.2d  at 395.  

 

Anderson 
v. Duncan, 968 P.2d 440, 442 (Wyo. 1998).  More 
recently this court has said:

 

Our 
standard of review is the same whether it arises in the procedural context of a 
motion for judgment as a matter of law prior to the submission of the case to 
the jury (formerly, a motion for a directed verdict) or in the context of a 
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law after the jury has returned a 
verdict (formerly, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict).  We undertake a full review of the record 
without deference to the views of the trial court.  The test to be applied is whether the 
evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or 
otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one 
conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable persons could have reached.  We view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, and give that party the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.  When the facts permit the drawing of 
more than one inference, it is for the jury to choose which will be 
utilized.  Since a judgment as a 
matter of law deprives the party opposing the motion of a determination of the 
facts by a jury, it should be cautiously and sparingly granted.  

 

Rudy v. 
Bossard, 997 P.2d 480, 485 (Wyo. 2000), quoting John Q. Hammons Inc. v. Poletis, 954 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Wyo. 1998) (citations and footnote 
omitted).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

1.  INTENTIONAL 
OR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A CONTRACT OR PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC 
ADVANTAGE

 

[¶12]   Intentional or tortious 
interference with a contract is defined as:

 

One who 
intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract 
(except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or 
otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to 
liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the 
failure of the third person to perform the contract.

 

Bear v. 
Volunteers of America, Wyoming, Inc., 964 P.2d 1245, 1253 (Wyo. 1998), citing Restatement, Second, Torts  § 766 at 7 (1979).  See also Davenport v. 
Epperly, 744 P.2d 1110, 1111-12 (Wyo. 1987); Toltec Watershed Improvement 
District v. Johnston, 717 P.2d 808, 813 (Wyo. 1986).

 

[¶13]   This court has previously set out 
the elements that must be proved to support a claim for tortious interference 
with a contract or business expectancy.

 

In 
Wyoming, the following elements must be demonstrated to sustain a cause of 
action for tortious interference with a contract or prospective economic 
advantage: (1) The existence of a valid contractual relationship or business 
expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the 
interferer; (3) intentional and improper interference inducing or causing a 
breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; and (4) resultant 
damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been 
disrupted.

 

Fremont 
Homes, Inc. v. Elmer, 974 P.2d 952, 955 fn.1 (Wyo. 1999); see also Examination Management 
Servs., Inc. v. Kirschbaum, 927 P.2d 686, 697 (Wyo. 1996);  Dynan v. Rocky Mountain Fed. Sav. 
& Loan, 792 P.2d 631, 641 (Wyo. 1990); Toltec Watershed Improvement 
Dist. v. Johnston, 717 P.2d  at 813-14.  

 

[¶14]   The plaintiff has the burden of 
proving the four elements of intentional or tortious interference with a 
contract.  Bear v.  Volunteers of America, Wyoming, 
Inc., 964 P.2d  at 1253.  Whether interference with a contract was 
improper is a question of fact.  
Examination Management Servs., 927 P.2d  at 698.   At trial Gores failed to present 
evidence which would support a finding that a valid contractual relationship or 
business expectancy existed for purchase of the Donaldson Ranch, much less that 
appellees knew of any such contractual relationship or business expectancy or 
intended to interfere with it.

 

[¶15]   The evidence developed by Gores at 
the trial was that the oral lease between the parties had expired, contract 
negotiations had stalled and had not proceeded for months, that there was no 
meeting of the minds or agreement on the terms of any future contract, and that 
Sherards and Johnson did not know of any contractual relationship or business 
expectancy.  The Gores' unilateral 
belief and hope that a contact would result was inadequate to sustain a cause of 
action.  A reasonable probability of 
a contract is shown if there is a reasonable assurance of a contract in view of 
all the circumstances.  In this case 
there was no such reasonable probability.

 

[¶16]   In fully reviewing the record 
without deference to the views of the trial court, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Gores, and giving Gores the benefit of all favorable 
inferences which may be drawn from the evidence, it is clear that Gores very 
simply failed to meet their burden of proof of the four elements of a cause of 
action for tortious interference with a contractual relationship or business 
expectancy.  The trial court was 
fully justified in granting the motion for judgment as a matter of law because 
reasonable jurors could have reached but one conclusion as to the 
verdict.

 

2.  HEARSAY 
TESTIMONY

 

[¶17]   Gores argue that the trial court 
erred when it allowed hearsay testimony from a witness which contradicted the 
sworn testimony of the individual who originally made the statement.  The testimony in question was elicited 
by counsel for the Gores in his cross examination of Don Sherard, during which 
counsel asked Mr. Sherard to tell him the substance of his conversation with 
Virginia Gibb about the purchase of the Donaldson Ranch.  Mr. Sherard responded to the question 
and related some of his conversation with Gibb, at which point the trial court 
interjected with the observation that the testimony was hearsay and directed 
counsel to proceed with his next question.  
After the trial court's comment, Gores' counsel elicited additional 
testimony from Don Sherard.  Counsel 
did not object in any way to this testimony at the trial, nor did he ask for it 
to be stricken.  Counsel for 
appellants now challenges the testimony for the first time on appeal.  All of the disputed testimony was a fair 
response to the questions asked by Gores' counsel.  

 

[¶18]   Hearsay evidence admitted without 
objection may be considered and given its natural probative effect.  Meredith GMC, Inc. v. Garner, 328 P.2d 371, 374 (Wyo. 1958).  Having 
elicited the "hearsay" testimony by his own questioning, without objecting 
thereto or moving to strike, counsel cannot now come to this court and complain 
about its admissibility.

 

3.  COSTS

 

[¶19]   Gores argue that the trial court 
erred in awarding certain costs.  
After the trial court granted their motion for judgment as a matter of 
law, appellees sought costs in the amount of $8,594.73.  The parties briefed the issues regarding 
costs and, after conducting a hearing, the trial court awarded appellees the sum 
of $1,728.21 in costs.  Gores now 
challenge that portion of those costs dealing with the depositions of Lester 
Gore and James Donaldson, a transcript of a motion hearing, as well as certain 
appearance fees for court reporters and duplicating costs.

 

[¶20]   An award of costs is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion.   
Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Wyo. 1999); 
Coulthard v. Cossairt, 803 P.2d 86, 93 (Wyo. 1990).  

 

We 
recently clarified the definition of abuse of discretion when we said the core 
of our inquiry must reach "the question of reasonableness of the choice made by 
the trial court."  Vaughn v. 
State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).  
"Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously."  
Id. (quoting Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wash. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Wash.App. 1985));  
Basolo [v. Basolo], 907 P.2d [348] at 353 [(Wyo. 
1995)].  We must ask ourselves 
whether the district court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any 
facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.  

 

Snyder 
v. Lovercheck, 2001 
WY 64, ¶6, 27 P.3d 695, ¶6 (Wyo. 2001), citing Cobb v. Cobb, 2 P.3d 578, 
579 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 983 P.2d 717, 719 (Wyo. 
1999)).

 

[¶21]   Gores argue that the award of the 
deposition costs was contrary to the provisions of W.U.R.D.C. 
501(a)(3)(D)(i)(I-IV).  Gores fail 
to take cognizance of the qualifying phrase that follows the enumeration in 
those subsections of the rule to the effect that those criteria are guidelines 
and are not exhaustive.  Snyder 
v. Lovercheck, 2002 WY 64 at ¶15.  
In the order awarding costs, the trial court found the costs of these 
depositions (as well as the other costs) "were reasonable and necessary in 
defending this action [and] were required for trial preparation."  The record discloses that appellees made 
use of the transcript of the Lester Gore deposition for impeachment during the 
cross examination of Mr. Gore.  The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in the award of the deposition costs 
for the Gore and Donaldson depositions.

 

[¶22]   Gores' objection to the cost of the 
transcript of the March 24, 2000 motion hearing transcribing the testimony of 
Virginia Gibb is not well taken.  
Gores had filed a motion seeking a restraining order to restrict the 
lawyers' contact with Virginia Gibb during the litigation.  The trial court held a hearing on that 
issue on March 24, 2000, and the court and counsel elicited testimony from Mrs. 
Gibb which was transcribed.  
Appellees then attached the transcript as Exhibit 2 to their Second 
Supplemental Submission in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment.  The transcript is part of 
the record on appeal before this court and appears at pages 633-658 of that 
record.  It was, therefore, not an 
abuse of discretion by the trial court to award appellees their costs in the 
preparation of the transcript of the testimony of Virginia 
Gibb.

 

[¶23]   The provisions of W.U.R.D.C. 
501(a)(3)(D)(ii) do not contain a qualifying clause and are mandatory.  The rule is specific in its provisions 
concerning the fees for depositions: "Reporters' travel, per diem expenses and 
appearance fees will not be taxed as costs."  (Emphasis added.)  Therefore, the trial court's award of 
appearance fees for court reporters at depositions in the total amount of $95.00 
was not appropriate and the award of costs should be modified and reduced by 
that amount.  There was no abuse of 
discretion by the trial court in awarding $68.26 for copy 
costs.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶24]   The trial court properly granted 
the appellees' motion for judgment as a matter of law at the conclusion of 
appellants' case in chief.  
Appellants completely failed to prove the necessary elements of a cause 
of action for tortious interference with a contract or business expectancy.  The trial court did not err in allowing 
hearsay evidence which was elicited by counsel for appellants.  The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in awarding costs for depositions, a motion hearing, and copy 
costs.  The trial court's award of 
court reporter deposition appearance fees was not appropriate, and the award of 
costs should be reduced by $95.00.

 

[¶25]   Affirmed as modified as to costs.