Case Title: Williams v. Warden

Citation: 

Docket Number: 960534

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
TERRY WILLIAMS 
                        OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 960534                       June 6, 1997 
 
WARDEN OF THE MECKLENBURG 
CORRECTIONAL CENTER 
 
 
UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
 
This is the first habeas corpus petition filed by a prisoner 
held under a sentence of death that we have addressed in a 
published opinion since the applicable statute was amended 
effective July 1, 1995.  See Acts 1995, ch. 503. 
 
The 1995 amendment to Code § 8.01-654 added subsection (C). 
 It provides that this Court shall have "exclusive jurisdiction" 
to consider and award writs of habeas corpus with respect to any 
such petition filed by a convict held under a death sentence.  
§ 8.01-654(C)(1).  The amendment further provides that the 
circuit court "which entered the judgment order setting the 
sentence of death shall have authority to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing on such a petition only if directed to do so by order of 
the Supreme Court."  Id. 
 
The amendment fixes time limits within which the circuit 
court "shall conduct" a hearing on the issues enumerated in this 
Court's order and within which the circuit court "shall report 
its findings of fact and recommend conclusions of law to the 
Supreme Court."  § 8.01-654(C)(3).  Finally, the amendment 
provides that any objection to the circuit court's report must be 
filed in this Court, within a specified time limit.  Id. 
 
Petitioner Terry Williams was convicted in a jury trial in 
 
 
 
 
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the Circuit Court of the City of Danville of the capital murder 
of Harris Thomas Stone.  The crime was committed in November 
1985, the accused was indicted in July 1986, and the jury found 
him guilty in September 1986.   
 
After a separate proceeding on the issue of punishment and 
after hearing evidence of the accused's history, including 
aggravating factors and mitigating evidence, the jury fixed his 
sentence at death.  This sentence was based upon the "future 
dangerousness" predicate of the statutory scheme; the verdict 
stated there is a probability that the defendant "would commit 
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing 
serious threat to society."   
 
Following a statutorily mandated hearing before the trial 
judge on punishment, the defendant was sentenced in November 1986 
to death.  This Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence 
on direct appeal.  Williams v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 168, 360 
S.E.2d 361 (1987).  The United States Supreme Court refused 
review.  Williams v. Virginia, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988). 
 
In August 1988, the convict filed a habeas corpus petition 
in the Danville Circuit Court.  After a 1989 hearing, the court 
dismissed a number of the habeas claims.  An amended petition was 
filed in April 1995, and the court heard evidence in June 1995 on 
the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  
 
On July 1, 1995, jurisdiction over the case was transferred 
to this Court pursuant to the changes in Code § 8.01-654.  
 
 
 
 
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Subsequently, this Court directed the circuit court to "report 
its findings of fact and recommend conclusions of law regarding 
the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, as alleged in 
claim VII" of the amended petition.  In June 1996, the circuit 
court heard argument of counsel on the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim.   
 
In August 1996, the circuit court forwarded its report to 
this Court and to counsel for the parties.  The circuit court 
found that the accused's two trial counsel were effective in all 
but one stage of the trial proceedings.  The circuit court 
concluded that trial counsel's failure to present certain 
mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing before the jury 
warranted the granting of relief to the petitioner. 
 
Both the petitioner and the respondent, J. D. Netherland, 
Warden of the Mecklenburg Correctional Center, filed objections 
to the circuit court's rulings.  In a January 1997 order, this 
Court ordered briefing and argument on the issue that the circuit 
court had found warranted relief.  Petitioner's objections to the 
circuit court's findings recommending dismissal of all the other 
claims for relief were overruled.  
 
The evidence presented in the 1986 criminal trial 
established the following basic facts.  The victim, an elderly 
man, was found dead at 2:00 a.m. lying in a bed at his Danville 
home. He was fully clothed and there was no sign of a struggle.  
The victim's wallet, customarily kept fastened in his trouser 
 
 
 
 
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pocket, was missing.   
 
Later, the accused made several confessions to the murder 
and robbery of the victim.  The defendant said he had struck the 
victim on the chest, and later on the back, with a mattock and 
had removed three dollars from the victim's wallet.  The victim 
died from the blows, which fractured two ribs and displaced them 
inward, puncturing the left lung and depositing a quantity of 
blood in the left chest cavity.   
 
During the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecution 
presented evidence of the 31-year-old accused's extensive 
criminal record, beginning when he was 11 years old.  This 
included a robbery in 1976, a burglary involving an assault upon 
the victim in 1982, and a vicious and brutal malicious wounding 
of an elderly woman in March 1986 that caused brain damage and 
left her a "vegetable."  In addition, there was evidence of a 
December 1985 assault by the accused upon an elderly man while 
the accused was committing arson of the victim's home.  Two 
forensic psychological experts who examined the accused testified 
there was a high probability that he would commit future criminal 
acts of violence and that he constituted a continuing threat to 
society.   
 
The accused's mother testified that he was never violent at 
home and that she did not believe he was a threat to others.  A 
female acquaintance of the accused who had known him for 11 years 
testified he was never violent in her presence.  Another witness, 
 
 
 
 
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whose foster daughter had dated the accused, testified he was not 
a violent person.   
 
Based on the June 1995 habeas evidentiary hearing and the 
subsequent argument of counsel, the circuit judge, who had 
presided at the trial, made a number of "findings of fact" and 
"recommended conclusions of law."  The court found that the 
convict's "trial attorneys were both experienced in criminal 
defense work and thoroughly prepared the case in defense of 
capital murder."  In this connection, the court concluded that 
counsel's "performance at the guilt phase of the trial was both 
professional and competent." 
 
Elaborating, the court stated that counsel "properly 
explored the mental competency of" the accused, who, according to 
the evidence at trial, had a "borderline level of intellectual 
functioning."  Also, the circuit court found that trial counsel 
"adequately investigated the issues of robbery and cause of 
death"; that counsel "was justified in relying on" the 
conclusions of the medical examiner regarding the cause of death; 
that counsel's "conduct with regard to the confession and 
suppression hearing was competent and professional"; and that 
they were not ineffective for their failure to investigate 
whether the accused suffered from a so-called "Fetal Alcohol 
Syndrome."  Further, the court concluded that counsel performed 
adequately regarding voir dire, evidentiary objections, and jury 
instructions. 
 
 
 
 
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Additionally, the circuit court found that the performance 
of defense counsel, in the main, during the penalty phase 
proceedings did not warrant habeas relief.  And, the court 
determined counsel was effective on appeal.  
 
The court reported, however, that certain actions of counsel 
during the trial's penalty phase were "the only real concern."  
"Specifically," the court said, "little evidence was presented on 
the issue of mitigation, and there exists evidence that 
petitioner had a deprived and abused upbringing; that he may have 
been a neglected and mistreated child; that he came from an 
alcoholic family; and that he was borderline mentally retarded." 
 
Continuing, the court said there also exists "evidence that 
petitioner's conduct had been good in certain structured settings 
in his life (such as when he was incarcerated) and there were 
friends, neighbors and family of petitioner who would have 
testified that he had redeeming qualities."  The court was of the 
view that some of this testimony "such as [from] petitioner's 
wife, daughter and Bruce Elliott, was worthy of a jury's 
consideration on mitigation.  However, none of this testimony was 
developed and presented at the sentencing phase of the trial."  
 
The court stated:  "Probably the most persuasive mitigating 
evidence which was not tendered to the jury involved the failure 
to interview and call Bruce Elliott as a witness during the 
sentencing phase."  Elliott, a certified public accountant, 
contacted defense counsel prior to trial and offered his help, 
 
 
 
 
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but, according to the court, "counsel never followed up by 
talking to the witness."  The court found that Elliott had known 
the accused since 1978 and would have portrayed the accused "as a 
decent human being who struggled to prove his worth in spite of 
his being somewhat disadvantaged mentally, emotionally and 
financially."  Elliott, who did not testify at the habeas 
hearing, stated in an affidavit that the accused "took pride in 
his achievements," such as graduation from carpentry school while 
incarcerated in a correctional facility.   
 
The court found that trial counsel "made a tactical decision 
to focus attention at the penalty phase" on the accused's 
confession, which was unsolicited and volunteered.  Counsel's 
strategy, the court concluded, was to convince the jury that the 
accused's life should be spared, and that he should be given a 
life sentence, because of the unsolicited confession. 
 
 Also, the court said that counsel "made a tactical decision 
not to put certain witnesses before the jury to prevent the 
Commonwealth from reminding the jury of the `horrible and 
terrible crimes'" committed by the accused.  Nevertheless, the 
court said, "it is troubling . . . that favorable evidence was 
not pursued and introduced for `whatever it was worth' when the 
decision which was to be made by the jury involved life or 
death."  
 
Summarizing, the court opined that at "a capital murder 
sentencing, any evidence which might be favorable or mitigating 
 
 
 
 
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can mean the difference between `life or death.'"  Continuing, 
the court stated that "mitigating testimony is absolutely crucial 
and if none is offered, this amounts to prejudice."  In addition, 
the court said that a failure "to present favorable mitigation 
evidence which was available upon investigation and development 
falls below the range expected of reasonable, professional 
competent assistance of counsel, and because this evidence is so 
crucial to the outcome of the jury's ultimate decision of life or 
death, it is prejudicial to a defendant when it is not presented 
at the sentencing phase."  This is such a case, according to the 
court, because "Terry Williams needed anything and everything 
that might be available as favorable evidence to persuade the 
jury to save his life.  Anything less was not enough."  
 
Therefore, the court recommended that a writ of habeas 
corpus be granted and that the convict be granted a rehearing on 
the sentencing phase of his trial.   
 
The right to counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution and made applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, includes the right to effective 
assistance of counsel.  Murray v. Griffith, 243 Va. 384, 388, 416 
S.E.2d 219, 220 (1992) (citing Virginia Dep't of Corrections v. 
Clark, 227 Va. 525, 533, 318 S.E.2d 399, 403 (1984)).  This 
constitutional guarantee "includes the right to the care and 
skill which a reasonably competent attorney would exercise for 
similar services under the circumstances."  Stokes v. Warden, 226 
 
 
 
 
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Va. 111, 116-17, 306 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1983).  In other words, the 
accused is entitled to counsel who is a reasonably competent 
attorney and to advice that is within the range of competence 
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 
In a collateral attack on a conviction, however, "a prisoner 
not only has the burden of proving ineffective assistance of 
counsel, but also must prove actual prejudice as a result."  
Stokes, 226 Va. at 118, 306 S.E.2d at 885.  Accord Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687; Murray, 243 Va. at 388, 416 S.E.2d at 221.  In 
order to establish prejudice, there must be a showing "that 
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a 
fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687.  "An error by counsel, even if professionally 
unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a 
criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment." 
 Id. at 691. 
 
In sum, Strickland requires a prisoner to "show that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  Id. at 694. 
 And, in determining the existence of prejudice, the court must 
consider the totality of the evidence presented at the criminal 
trial.  Id. at 695.  Accord Strickler v. Murray, 249 Va. 120, 
 
 
 
 
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128, 452 S.E.2d 648, 652, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 
146 (1995). 
 
"As is obvious, Strickland's standard, although by no means 
insurmountable, is highly demanding."  Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 
U.S. 365, 382 (1986).  Accord Strickler, 249 Va. at 128, 452 
S.E.2d at 652.  Moreover, "an analysis focusing solely on mere 
outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of 
the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is 
defective."  Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993).  
And, "[t]o set aside a conviction or sentence solely because the 
outcome would have been different but for counsel's error may 
grant a defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle 
him."  Id. at 369-70. 
 
Further, we have adopted the Strickland suggestion, 466 U.S. 
at 697, that if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness 
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course 
should be followed.  Strickler, 249 Va. at 128, 452 S.E.2d at 
652.  We shall employ that procedure in the present case. 
 
This brings us to a determination of the standard of review 
that we shall apply to the circuit court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  We hold that, under the 1995 amendment to 
Code § 8.01-654, the issue whether a prisoner held under a death 
sentence is entitled to habeas relief is a mixed question of law 
and fact.  Therefore, a circuit court's finding and conclusion on 
the issue is not conclusive and binding upon this Court but is 
 
 
 
 
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properly subject to judicial review.  See The Stenrich Group v. 
Jemmott, 251 Va. 186, 192, 467 S.E.2d 795, 798 (1996).  Indeed, 
this is the standard of review employed in similar cases in the 
federal system.  The Supreme Court has said "that both the 
performance and the prejudice components of the ineffectiveness 
test are mixed questions of fact and law" and that "a state 
court's ultimate conclusions regarding competence and prejudice 
are not findings of fact binding on the federal court."  
Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 388-89 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
698). 
 
In the present case, the factual part of the mixed question 
is whether there was evidence in mitigation that was available 
but not presented at the criminal trial.  There is no doubt there 
was such evidence; the facts really are not in dispute.  The 
legal part of the mixed question is whether this deficient 
performance constitutes "prejudice" within the meaning of that 
term as defined by the decided cases.  In resolving this part of 
the question, the crucial inquiry is whether the circuit court 
correctly applied the law to the established facts.  We hold that 
it did not. 
 
In his brief filed in this Court in support of the circuit 
court's conclusions, the prisoner dwells upon the facts relating 
to the performance prong of the Strickland test, and has 
comparatively little to say about circumstances relating to the 
prejudice prong.  He says there is "no merit" to the respondent's 
 
 
 
 
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contention "that presentation of any additional witnesses would 
have done Petitioner more harm than good as each new witness 
would only give the prosecutor a renewed opportunity to hammer 
home the details of Petitioner's checkered criminal past."   
 
Reverting to a discussion of performance in a prejudice 
section of his brief, the prisoner states:  "In any event, even 
if counsel had sought to discover [available mitigation evidence 
of which counsel was ignorant], fear of `opening the door' with 
each witness - to a repetition of Petitioner's criminal history - 
is not a reasoned decision given the facts of this case."  
Continuing, he argues that the prosecutor's "relentless 
recitation of Petitioner's bad acts had already been detailed for 
the jury through twelve different witnesses before Petitioner's 
counsel even stepped up to the plate.  Any door that trial 
counsel feared would be opened by the presentation of additional 
mitigation witnesses had already been swung wide with gusto," and 
no amount of vigorous cross-examination by the prosecutor "could 
have left the jury feeling any worse about Petitioner than they 
had at the conclusion of the prosecutor's case."   
 
The prisoner argues there "is a `reasonable probability' 
that at least one juror would have been moved to spare 
Petitioner's life had he heard" the mitigation evidence developed 
at the habeas hearing that was not presented at the trial.  
Summarizing, he contends there "is a `reasonable probability' 
that had at least one juror heard any of this evidence -- let 
 
 
 
 
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alone all of this evidence -- the outcome of this case would have 
been different."   
 
We reject these contentions.  The prisoner's discussion 
flies in the face of the Supreme Court's admonition in Lockhart, 
supra, that "an analysis focusing solely on mere outcome 
determination, without attention to whether the result of the 
proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective." 
 
We shall demonstrate that the criminal proceeding sentencing 
defendant to death was not fundamentally unfair or unreliable, 
and that the prisoner's assertions about the potential effects of 
the omitted proof do not establish a "reasonable probability" 
that the result of the proceeding would have been different, nor 
any probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.  Therefore, any ineffective assistance of counsel did 
not result in actual prejudice to the accused. 
 
The jury was presented with the murder of an intoxicated, 
elderly person in his own bedroom committed by a 31-year-old man. 
 The murder weapon was a tool customarily used to dig stumps.  At 
the time, defendant had been out of the penitentiary for only 
seven months, released on parole for convictions of burglary and 
grand larceny.   
 
The accused was in the midst of a crime spree, preying upon 
defenseless individuals.  Following commission of these crimes of 
murder and robbery in November 1985, the defendant savagely beat 
an elderly woman about her head in March 1986, leaving her lying 
 
 
 
 
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in the street unconscious with multiple injuries.  At the time of 
trial, she was in a nursing home "vegetating" from a brain injury 
with no hope of recovery.   
 
Upon being questioned in April and May 1986 about the 
November 1985 crimes, the defendant admitted to the recent theft 
of two motor vehicles.  He also admitted setting fire to clothes 
on the porch of a residence late one night in December 1985, 
luring the occupant outside, and stabbing him with a knife in 
order to rob him.  The accused later was convicted of the vehicle 
thefts and, at the time of trial for the present crimes, had been 
convicted of an arson that took place in the city jail.   
 
While held in jail on the present offenses, he related to a 
police officer "that he wanted to just choke some of the guys in 
the jail cell, and one day some had gone to the library and one 
guy was laying on the bed, and he got the urge to just go over 
and choke him.  Another time he was playing cards and he thought 
he could just hit someone and break that person's jaw without him 
ever knowing what hit him."   
 
The jury also heard that defendant had served time in the 
penitentiary for an armed robbery committed when he was about 20 
years old.  The jury did not know of 14 criminal offenses 
committed by defendant from 1966 to 1975.  
 
Drawing on Strickland, we hold that, even assuming the 
challenged conduct of counsel was unreasonable, the prisoner 
"suffered insufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside his 
 
 
 
 
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death sentence," 466 U.S. at 698-99, the predicate of which was 
that there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of 
violence which would constitute a continuing serious threat to 
society.  The mitigation evidence that the prisoner says, in 
retrospect, his trial counsel should have discovered and offered 
barely would have altered the profile of this defendant that was 
presented to the jury.  At most, this evidence would have shown 
that numerous people, mostly relatives, thought that defendant 
was nonviolent and could cope very well in a structured 
environment.  Of course, those assumptions are belied by the 
four-month crime spree beginning with the present crimes and by 
the defendant's current attitude while in jail toward other 
inmates.   
 
What the Supreme Court said in Strickland applies with full 
force here:  "Given the overwhelming aggravating factors, there 
is no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have 
changed the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating circumstances and, hence, the sentence 
imposed."  466 U.S. at 700.  Indeed, disclosure of the 
defendant's juvenile history might even have been harmful to his 
case. 
 
Unfortunately, the circuit court appears to have adopted a 
per se approach to the prejudice element.  The court opined that 
"any evidence which might be favorable or mitigating can mean the 
difference between `life or death'"; that "mitigating testimony 
 
 
 
 
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is absolutely crucial and if none is offered, this amounts to 
prejudice"; and that the accused "needed anything and everything 
that might be available as favorable evidence to persuade the 
jury to save his life.  Anything less was not enough."  This 
demonstrates an emphasis on mere outcome determination, without 
proper attention to whether the result of the criminal proceeding 
was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. 
 
In conclusion, employing the language of Strickland, the 
prisoner "has made no showing that the justice of his sentence 
was rendered unreliable by a breakdown in the adversary process 
caused by deficiencies in counsel's assistance.  [The prisoner's] 
sentencing proceeding was not fundamentally unfair."  466 U.S. at 
700. 
 
Accordingly, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as 
amended, will be denied. 
 
Writ denied.