Case Title: ULTRA RESOURCES, INC. v. McMURRY ENERGY COMPANY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 03-216

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-10-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
ULTRA RESOURCES, INC. v. McMURRY ENERGY COMPANY2004 WY 12199 P.3d 959Case Number: 03-216Decided: 10/27/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

ULTRA 
RESOURCES, INC., a Wyoming

corporation,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

McMURRY 
ENERGY COMPANY, a Wyoming

corporation; 
McMURRY OIL COMPANY, a

Wyoming 
corporation; NERD ENERGY, INC., a

Wyoming 
corporation; and FORT COLLINS

CONSOLIDATED 
ROYALTIES, INC., a Colorado

corporation,

 

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sublette County

 

Representing 
Appellants:

T. 
Brooke Farnsworth and Bennett S. Bartlett of Farnsworth & vonBerg, LLP, 
Houston, Texas; John R. Vincent, Riverton, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Vincent.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Mark 
W. Gifford, Casper, Wyoming; Phillip D. Barber, Denver, Colorado.  Argument by Mr. 
Barber

 

 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
Ultra 
Resources, Inc. ("Ultra") appeals a district court order confirming an 
arbitration award.  The district 
court confirmed the arbitration award ruling the parties had agreed, in a 
settlement agreement, that the outcome of the arbitration proceeding would be 
binding and non-appealable.  The 
district court also ruled that Ultra failed to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence the merits of its motion to vacate the arbitration award.  On appeal, Ultra only argues that, on 
the merits, the arbitration award should have been vacated.  Since Ultra does not designate as an 
issue on appeal the dispositive ruling of the district court that the settlement 
agreement precludes further judicial review, we will dismiss this 
appeal.

 

 

ISSUES

                

[¶2]           
Ultra 
presents one issue for review by this Court: 

 

[S]hould 
the trial court have vacated the arbitration award submitted to it for 
confirmation because the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded settled 
Wyoming law by writing a contract for the parties that they did not 
make?

 

McMurry 
Energy Company and the other appellees (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"McMurry") divide Ultra's one issue into several issues:

 

1.  Whether the appeal is moot because 
Appellant Ultra Resources, Inc. ("Ultra") has failed to challenge the District 
Court's determination that Ultra contractually waived its right to appeal the 
arbitration decision?

 

2. 
 If Ultra's appeal here is not moot, 
whether the District Court correctly entered judgment and confirmed the 
arbitration award on the grounds that Ultra and its co-defendant Lance Oil & 
Gas Company ("Lance") had waived any right to appeal the ruling of the 
arbitration panel?

 

3.  Whether Ultra's additional agreement not 
to appeal the District Court's judgment should be enforced, and this appeal 
dismissed?

 

4.  Whether the District Court's judgment 
confirming the arbitration award and denying Ultra's application to vacate 
should be affirmed on the grounds that Ultra's appeals are nothing more than an 
attempt to relitigate the merits of the dispute that were decided by the 
arbitrators?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
For 
contextual purposes, we include the following limited factual background.  Ultra and McMurry entered into a Farmout 
Agreement in 1996.  Various disputes 
arose and, in 2000, McMurry sued Ultra in Wyoming district court.  Ultimately, the parties, within the 
framework of the ongoing litigation, entered into a settlement agreement.  Certain issues remained outstanding so 
as part of the settlement agreement the parties included a provision that 
required the remaining issues be resolved by binding arbitration.  Ultra is not satisfied with the 
arbitration award and has refused to accept the award as binding.  McMurry moved the district court for 
enforcement of the settlement agreement and confirmation of the award, while 
Ultra moved the district court to vacate the award.  The district court determined that the 
parties had agreed to binding arbitration in their settlement agreement and 
therefore granted McMurry's motion to enforce the settlement agreement and 
confirm the arbitration award.  The 
district court denied Ultra's motion to vacate the arbitration award on the 
grounds that Ultra had voluntarily, contractually relinquished any right of 
judicial review of the award.  The 
district court also held that Ultra had failed to adequately prove the existence 
of any grounds justifying the vacation of the arbitration award.  Ultra has appealed the order of the 
district court to this Court.

 

[¶4]           
After 
Ultra filed its notice of appeal, McMurry filed with this Court a motion to 
dismiss the appeal.  McMurry argued 
that Ultra, pursuant to the settlement agreement, contractually had waived its 
right to appeal both the award to the district court and the district court 
order to this Court.  This Court 
denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice.  The appeal was then briefed and 
argued.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶5]           
The 
order of the district court being appealed in pertinent part states: 

 

1.  In the November 2, 2001 Mutual Release 
and Settlement Agreement ("Settlement Agreement") the parties in this case 
agreed to submit all of their unresolved disputes to binding arbitration.  They stated that it was their intent 
that the decision of the Arbitration Panel  which was appointed by the parties 
 would fully and finally resolve all of the disputed claims, and that the 
arbitration decision would be binding upon the parties and could not be 
appealed.  Defendants are bound by 
this agreement. . . .

* 
* * *

 

3.  . . . Plaintiffs and Defendants agreed 
in their Settlement Agreement that there would be no further proceedings in this 
case except for the right of a party to file a motion to enforce the 
arbitrator's decision.  Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Confirmation of Arbitration Award is consistent with the Settlement 
Agreement, and is hereby GRANTED.  
The January 29, 2003 Arbitration Award is hereby confirmed and entered as 
a final Judgment and Order of this Court.

 

4.  Defendants' Applications to Vacate 
Arbitration Award are DENIED on the grounds that Defendants have contractually 
waived any right to contest the arbitration award found in the Arbitrator's 
January 29, 2003 Opinion.  
Furthermore, Defendants have failed to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence the grounds on which they seek to vacate the award; namely, that the 
arbitration award contains a manifest mistake of fact or law appearing on the 
face of the award.  Defendants have 
not alleged any other grounds for challenging the award.  Having committed their disputes to 
binding arbitration, this Court will not review the merits of the decision of 
the arbitrators, which is what Defendants seek.

 

The 
order reflects that the district court offered two alternative reasons for 
denying Ultra's motion to vacate the arbitration award.  In paragraph four the district court 
states that it did consider the merits of Ultra's motion to vacate and 
determined that Ultra did not adequately prove a manifest mistake of law or fact 
appearing on the face of the award.  
The district court also grounded its ruling upon the language of the 
settlement agreement, finding that Ultra had agreed to binding arbitration that 
would fully and finally resolve all disputed claims between the 
parties.

 

[¶6]           
Ultra's 
sole issue on appeal regards the merits of the denial of its motion to 
vacate.  In its reply brief, Ultra 
admits that the district court held that Ultra was contractually precluded from 
seeking judicial review of the arbitration award.  Ultra also admits that it deliberately 
ignored this holding in designating and arguing its issues in its opening brief: 
"Ultra's principal brief focused exclusively on the arbitration majority's 
manifest disregard of Wyoming law.  
Appellees correctly point out that the trial court also cited the 
parties' agreement not to appeal as an alternative reason for its ruling."  

 

[¶7]           
Rule 
7.01 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure requires an appellant to 
include in its opening brief a statement of the issues presented for 
review.  W.R.A.P. 7.01(d).  Rule 7.01(f), W.R.A.P., requires an 
appellant to present argument on every issue it is requesting this Court to 
review on appeal.  

 

[I]t 
ought not to be difficult in the first instance to ascertain just what questions 
are properly before us and merit consideration.  It is counsel's job to point them up, 
and if it is not done with preciseness and supported by cogent argument and 
pertinent available authority there [is] little we can do to aid counsel in 
their effort to rectify claimed error on the part of the trial court.  

 

Marion 
v. City of Lander, 
394 P.2d 910, 914-15  (Wyo. 
1964).  When the jurisdiction of 
this Court is invoked, it is the responsibility of the appellant to specify 
clearly defined issues for this Court's review.  "Assignments of errors control the scope 
of an appeal."  4 C.J.S. Appeal 
and Error § 578, at 580 (1993).  
"Issues that are not clearly designated in the appellant's brief are 
normally deemed abandoned or waived."  
5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 544, at 245 (1995).  

 

[¶8]           
Ultra's 
opening brief does not designate as an issue or present any argument concerning 
the holding by the district court that Ultra is precluded from challenging the 
arbitration award because it had voluntarily, contractually waived the right to 
seek judicial review pursuant to the settlement agreement.  "Under this court's long-standing 
precedent, this court will not frame the issues for the litigants and will not 
consider issues not raised by them and not supported by cogent argument and 
authoritative citation."  State 
v. Campbell County School District, 2001 WY 90, ¶35, 32 P.3d 325, ¶35 (Wyo. 
2001).  

 

[¶9]           
Ultra, 
in its reply brief, presents limited argument on the merits of the district 
court's determination that Ultra contractually waived its right to judicially 
challenge the arbitration award.  
This is an improper argument to present in a reply brief.  "A reply brief is limited to such new 
issues and arguments" raised by the brief of appellee.  W.R.A.P. 7.03.  McMurry was not raising a new issue, it 
was pointing out the failure by Ultra to challenge a dispositive ruling by the 
district court, thus making any other issue moot.  McMurry's argument did not open the door 
for Ultra to argue the merits of an issue that was its responsibility to 
designate in its opening brief.  The 
only appropriate response in the reply brief is an explanation as to why Ultra 
failed to designate the district court's ruling on the settlement agreement as 
an issue on appeal. 

 

[¶10]      Oddly 
enough, in its reply brief Ultra states that it did not frame and argue the 
issue because this Court had denied McMurry's motion to dismiss the appeal.  As stated above, however, this Court 
denied the motion without prejudice.  
In other words, we did not decide the merits of the arguments.  We simply left them for full 
briefing.  See e.g. Black's 
Law Dictionary 1437 (5th ed. 1979) (when the words "without 
prejudice" are used in an order "it shows that the judicial act is not intended 
to be res judicata of the merits of the controversy").  The denial by this Court of McMurry's 
motion to dismiss in no way relieved Ultra of its obligation as appellant to 
call to the attention of this Court all alleged errors in the district court's 
ruling that it wishes this Court to review.

 

[¶11]      Presenting 
argument in a reply brief is not equivalent to framing the issues in an opening 
brief.  A reply brief is not a 
second chance to raise an issue or present argument that the appellant had the 
responsibility, but failed, to address in its opening brief.  Generally, any issue not raised by an 
appellant in its opening brief is deemed waived:

 

[Q]uestions 
not raised in the original brief are deemed waived and will not be 
considered when raised for the first time in the reply brief. 

 

Lunney 
v. Southern Ry. Co., 
133 So. 2d 247, 249 (Ala. 1961).

 

[¶12]      The 
Supreme Court of Indiana provided the following explanation for the general rule 
that any issue not raised by an appellant in its opening brief is deemed waived 
and cannot be raised in a reply brief:

 

It 
is evident that appellant, in his original brief, has failed to comply with the 
rule so firmly settled by the authorities, and has left this court unaided to 
discover, if possible, wherein the ruling of the court which he calls in 
question under the first or second assignment of error is wrong.  It is true that six months and over 
after the submission of this cause appellant, by his attorneys, Elliott & 
Elliott, who apparently came into the case after the filing of the original 
brief, filed what we previously said was denominated "a reply brief." While this 
latter document professes to be a reply to the brief of appellee, it is, in 
fact, however, intended thereby to perform or discharge the duty which appellant 
omitted in his original brief; and in this brief, for the first time, an 
argument is advanced and authorities cited to show that the court erred in 
awarding judgment upon the special verdict in favor of appellee.  Appellant was, under the rule, required 
to file his first or original brief within sixty days after the submission of 
the cause, and, as previously stated, it was not sufficient for him merely to 
assert therein, in general averments, that the ruling of the trial court was 
wrong, without making any effort to prove this bare assertion. Such assertions, 
in the absence of some argument or discussion in respect to the infirmity of the 
ruling of the trial court, are worthless. Ligget v. Firestone, 102 Ind. 
514, 26 N.E. 201; Acra v. Conforth, 4 Ind. App. 496, 31 N.E. 212. His 
failure to discharge the duty required of him in the first instance until long 
after the filing of appellee's brief, wherein the infirmity of the original 
brief in this respect was urged, may well be deemed such a waiver of the errors 
in question as will serve to preclude him from demanding that his argument in 
relation thereto, in his reply brief, be considered.

 

. 
. . The rule which affirms that alleged errors not argued by appellant in his 
original brief shall be deemed waived is reasonable and necessary in order that 
the court and counsel for appellee may be seasonably informed of the questions 
to be considered and decided, and also in order that the business of the court 
may not be impeded or interrupted by a continued exchange of arguments upon the 
part of the respective counsel. Ewbank, Ind. App. Proc., § 191. It follows that 
appellant, having waived all questions arising out of his first and second 
assignments of error, and also questions relative to the alleged error of the 
court in admitting certain evidence, by reason of his failure to argue or 
discuss them in his original brief, cannot demand that these alleged errors be 
considered under the argument presented in his reply brief, and, in obedience to 
the well settled rule mentioned, they are dismissed without 
consideration.

 

Gates 
v. Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co., 
56 N.E. 722, 723-24 (Ind. 1900), overruled in part on other grounds, 
Heekin Can Co. v. Porter, 46 N.E.2d 486 (Ind. 
1943)).

 

[¶13]      Since 
Ultra failed in its opening brief to designate or argue the issue of the 
propriety of the holding by the district court that it contractually waived its 
right to seek judicial review of the arbitration award, the holding is 
uncontested.  "The points presented 
in this court on behalf of the plaintiff in error are very limited, and it is, 
of course, elementary that points not urged in this court are deemed to be 
waived."  Automobile Ins. Co. of 
Hartford, Conn. v. Lloyd, 40 Wyo. 44, 49, 273 P. 681, 682 (1929).  Ultra's opening brief raises no issue 
that would support reversal of the district court order.  Ultra's issue regarding the merits of 
its motion to vacate the arbitration award is moot.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶14]      The 
district court held that Ultra was precluded from challenging the arbitration 
award because Ultra had contractually waived its right to judicial review of the 
award.  Ultra has not challenged 
this ruling in this appeal.  The 
order of the district court is therefore dispositive of all issues concerning 
the arbitration award.  The issue 
brought by Ultra is moot, and this appeal is dismissed.