Case Title: State v. Petruccelli

Citation: 170 Vt. 51, 743 A.2d 1062

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1999-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Petruccelli (98-106); 170 Vt. 51; 743 A.2d 1062

[Filed 24-Sep-1999]

       NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 98-106

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.		                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

Michael B. Petruccelli	                         January Term, 1999

Robert Grussing III, J.

       William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

       Peter F. Langrock and Kevin E. Brown of Langrock, Sperry & Wool,
  Middlebury, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       AMESTOY, C.J.   Following a bench trial in Windham District Court,
  defendant Michael  Petruccelli was convicted of kidnapping, aggravated
  assault, custodial interference, and two charges  of simple assault on an
  officer.  On appeal, defendant argues that (1) as joint guardian of his
  child,  he could not be guilty of custodial interference or kidnapping; (2)
  evidence supporting assault  charges should have been suppressed as
  stemming from an unconstitutional warrantless entry of his  home; and (3)
  the state failed to prove the correct mens rea standard for the aggravated
  assault  charge.  We vacate the custodial interference conviction, and
  affirm the four remaining convictions. 

 

       The trial court found that on October 23, 1994, police were called to
  the residence of  defendant Michael Petruccelli and his girlfriend, Heidi
  Dlubac, to investigate a domestic disturbance.  Two officers found
  defendant outside his condominium unit and encountered Dlubac walking along 
  a roadway nearby.  Dlubac told officers that she and defendant had been
  fighting over defendant's  contacts with his ex-girlfriend.  The
  disagreement had escalated to a physical altercation.  Dlubac  had told
  defendant that she wanted to leave him, and take the couple's five-week old
  baby, Kristen,  with her.  Outside the condominium, the two had argued over
  who would take the baby.  Dlubac  indicated to the officers that she was
  tired of being abused by defendant and wanted to leave, but  defendant
  would not allow her to take the baby.  She returned to the condominium with
  the officers,  and entered the residence to attend to the baby.  An officer
  saw defendant in the front yard and  informed him that, as the couple was
  unmarried, Dlubac had the right to take the baby with her, and  defendant
  had no right to interfere, even though he was the natural father of the
  child.  Defendant  disagreed and threatened to kill Dlubac or anyone else
  who tried to take the baby away, and then kill  himself.  Defendant became
  increasingly agitated and stated he did not care if Dlubac left, but would 
  prevent anyone from taking the child.  He then went inside the condominium. 
  A German Shepard  blocked entry to the condominium.  A posted sign read
  "guard dog on duty."

       The police remained outside and conversed with Dlubac through a
  bedroom window.  She  reported that defendant was loading clips into a .22
  caliber rifle.  One officer recommended that  while defendant was in the
  next room, Dlubac get the baby and pass her through the window.   Dlubac
  responded that she could not, as she feared defendant's reaction.  She
  suggested that the  officers leave and that she would escape with Kristen
  at a later time.  Believing that there would be  a dangerous confrontation
  between the defendant and Dlubac if they left, officers continued to 

 

  monitor the situation.  Through the window, officers were able to hear
  Dlubac tell defendant to stop  threatening her.

       Officers proceeded to the entrance of the condominium.  Dlubac's 
  mother arrived and tried  to persuade defendant to allow Dlubac to leave
  with the baby, but was unsuccessful.  At one point,  Dlubac opened the
  front door with the baby in her arms, but defendant came from behind her,
  seized  the baby, and attempted to shut the door.  An officer put his foot
  in the doorway to hold it open, but  defendant struggled and closed the
  door.  After warning Dlubac, officers attempted to forcibly enter.  As the
  officers entered, the dog remained in the living area in a crouched
  position baring its teeth  and growling at the officers.  Officers sprayed
  the dog with pepper spray, and Dlubac pulled the dog  into the bathroom and
  left the condominium.  As officers entered, defendant went into a back 
  bedroom with the baby and closed the door.    

       Positioned on either side of the bedroom door, officers with weapons
  drawn reminded  defendant that no one had yet been hurt, and insisted he
  surrender.  Defendant responded with  obscenities and ordered the officers
  to leave.  Officers heard the action of a firearm, and defendant  yelled,
  "I'm locked and loaded and I'm coming out."  He opened the door and slowly
  emerged with  the baby in one arm and the rifle at a forty-five degree
  angle toward the ceiling in the other.  One  officer grasped the rifle, and
  a struggle ensued, during which a shot was discharged into the floor.  An
  officer seized the gun, while other officers continued to grapple with
  defendant, who retreated  into the bedroom with the baby.  Defendant
  released the baby onto the bed, and an officer carried  the baby out of the
  room to safety.  Defendant continued to resist against three officers, two
  of whom  were cut during the struggle.  After defendant scraped his teeth
  against the head of another officer,  he was sprayed with pepper spray, but
  this had no noticeable effect on him.  Defendant and officers 

 

  fell onto the bed, where defendant wrapped his arm around the neck of
  Officer Merrigan and secured  a choke hold.  When Officer Merrigan called
  for help from another officer standing nearby,  defendant tightened his
  grip until Officer Merrigan was unable to breath or speak, and his vision 
  began to fade.  Another officer attempted to free Officer Merrigan by
  pulling on defendant's head  and arm, but was unsuccessful.  The officers
  threatened to strike defendant, and as one officer left  the room to obtain
  a baton, defendant loosened his grip and was handcuffed.  Officer Merrigan 
  sustained several cuts during the struggle and suffered a sore neck.  

       Defendant was originally charged with eight crimes, only five of which
  are relevant to this  appeal.  Prior to trial, the State dismissed an
  unlawful restraint charge and one of three charges of  simple assault; upon
  motion for acquittal at trial, defendant was acquitted of reckless
  endangerment.  After a bench trial in district court, defendant was found
  guilty of kidnapping, custodial interference,  aggravated assault, and two
  charges of simple assault on a police officer.  He was sentenced to four-
  to-six years for kidnapping, and up to two years for custodial interference
  to run concurrently with  the kidnapping sentence.  Consecutive to the
  above sentence, defendant was also sentenced to serve  concurrently
  two-to-three years for the aggravated assault conviction and up to a year
  each for the  simple assault convictions.  

       Defendant appeals the denial of his motion for acquittal on the
  custodial interference and  kidnapping charges, arguing that as lawful
  guardian of Kristen, he could not, as a matter of law, be  convicted of
  those crimes.  Defendant renews his argument, first presented during a
  pretrial motion  to suppress, that the police officers' warrantless entry
  into his home violated both the Fourth  Amendment of the United States
  Constitution and Article Eleven of the Vermont Constitution.   Defendant
  claims that because the evidence obtained once the officers entered the
  condominium is 

 

  the fruit of a warrantless entry and therefore should have been suppressed,
  the district court erred in  denying defendant's motion for acquittal on
  the aggravated and simple assault charges.  On the  aggravated assault
  charge, defendant alternatively argues that the court erred in denying his
  motion  for acquittal because the State failed to prove defendant acted
  with the requisite intent to sustain a  conviction.(FN1)

       Prior to trial and at the close of the State's evidence, defendant
  moved to dismiss the  kidnapping and custodial interference charges on the
  grounds that he had established the requisite  "custodial, personal, or
  financial relationships with [the baby] to have acquired the status of her 
  lawful custodian."  Defendant reasserts the argument on appeal contending
  that as a biological father  who has accepted the responsibilities of
  parenthood, he is "constitutionally imbued" with the de facto  status of a
  father of a child born in wedlock.  See In re S.B.L., 150 Vt. 294, 304,