Case Title: Ririe v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. One, Crook County, Wyo.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-40

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ririe v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. One, Crook County, Wyo.1983 WY 126674 P.2d 214Case Number: 83-40Case Number: 83-40Decided: 12/09/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROGERS 
RIRIE, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 
BOARD OF 
TRUSTEES OF SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ONE, CROOK COUNTY, WYOMING; CLELL CLAAR; KELLY 
DENNIS; DAN VORE; DONALD ANDERSON; ROXANNE PETERS; DAN NEIMAN; GERALD POPHAM; 
LINDA McAMIS; R. REYNARD MILLS; AND OTTLIN WEGNER, (INDIVIDUALLY), APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court, Crook County, Paul T. Liamos, Jr., 
J.

 
 
Richard S. 
Dumbrill of Jones, Dumbrill & Hansen, Newcastle, for 
appellant.

 
 
Mark L. 
Hughes of Hughes & Dumbrill, Sundance, for appellees.

 
 
A.G. 
McClintock, Atty. Gen., Edgar Young, Asst. Atty. Gen., Herbert K. Doby, Legal 
Intern, Cheyenne, for the State of Wyo.

 
 
Before 
ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

 
 
Rooney, 
C.J., concurred in part and dissented in part with 
opinion.

 
 
ROSE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Rogers Ririe appeals 
from the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the Board of 
Trustees of School District No. One, Crook County, Wyoming, to terminate his 
contract after five years of employment with the school district. We will 
affirm.

 
 

[¶2.]     In the fall of 1977, 
Mr. Ririe was hired as an Educational Resource Center (ERC) facilitator to 
implement and monitor the instructional programs for handicapped children 
throughout the Crook County School District. He held a continuing contract in 
that position at the time of his discharge in 1982.

 
 

[¶3.]     The position of ERC 
facilitator is a relatively recent innovation in this state, having originated 
in the 1970's along with the concept of locally-based resource centers. 
According to the position description prepared by the Wyoming Department of 
Education,1 the facilitator is expected to 
promote the development and implementation of the ERC program, to assist the ERC 
staff and to organize educational services to meet their needs, to aid in the 
identification of children with learning disabilities, and to participate in the 
development of appropriate curricula for these children. The position 
description specifies the educational background and prior experience required 
of an ERC facilitator and lists as additional qualifications the ability to 
relate to others and to communicate effectively.

 
 

[¶4.]     In the summer of 1980 
the school board hired Dr. Ottlin Wegner as district superintendent. Dr. Wegner 
conducted his first administrative evaluation of Rogers Ririe in November, 1980, 
at which time he rated appellant's performance level as satisfactory or better. 
He noted, however, that his opportunity for observation had been inadequate. A 
second evaluation of appellant was made in January, 1982. At this time Dr. 
Wegner provided written comments concerning deficiencies in Mr. Ririe's 
professional relationship with the ERC staff and the administration. He noted 
that no improvements had been made in these areas since their discussion the 
previous spring. Dr. Wegner recommended that appellant be placed on probationary 
status and not retained on the staff.

 
 

[¶5.]     At a school board 
meeting conducted March 8, 1982, Dr. Wegner recommended that appellant's 
contract be terminated. The board accepted his recommendation by a vote of seven 
to two, and a timely notice, specifying the reasons for termination, was 
subsequently given to Mr. Ririe. At appellant's request, a hearing was held 
before the board. Pursuant to agreement of the parties, the proceedings were 
conducted by an independent hearing examiner.

 
 

[¶6.]     Prior to the 
presentation of evidence at the hearing, an extensive voir dire of the members 
of the school board took place. The board was questioned first as a group and 
then individually, in chambers, to determine whether they could function as an 
impartial tribunal in appellant's case. Counsel for appellant challenged the 
entire board on the ground that their previously recorded vote to accept the 
superintendent's recommendation of termination precluded a fair and impartial 
decision based on the evidence presented at the hearing. The hearing examiner 
denied appellant's request to disqualify the board as a whole and refused to 
appoint himself as final decision maker.

 
 

[¶7.]     Counsel for appellant 
then challenged three board members on the ground that they were biased as a 
result of their knowledge of an alleged agreement between Dr. Wegner and the 
board to hire Dr. Wegner's wife and their awareness of Mr. Ririe's refusal to 
hire Mrs. Wegner in the ERC program. The hearing examiner again denied 
appellant's requested relief, asserting that while such an agreement might 
reflect on the motive of Dr. Wegner in recommending termination, it did not 
indicate prejudice on the part of the board members.

 
 

[¶8.]     Finally, the 
appellant's attorney subpoenaed the three challenged board members and advised 
that they would be called to testify concerning the alleged agreement to employ 
Mrs. Wegner in the school district. The hearing examiner refused to permit the 
board members to testify along these lines, ruling that such evidence was 
irrelevant.

 
 

[¶9.]     At the close of the 
hearing the school board voted to support the termination of Rogers Ririe as ERC 
facilitator. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the board determined 
that Mr. Ririe was incompetent to continue in his position and sustained the 
superintendent's recommendation of termination on the following 
grounds:

 
 
"a) Rogers 
Ririe has a demonstrated inability to communicate effectively with the 
professional staff with whom he must work as facilitator including building 
principals, special education staff, and specialized staff to the special 
education program. This demonstrated inability to communicate effectively has 
caused Rogers Ririe to lose the trust of many staff members and this lack of 
trust in him and his communication problems inhibit his proper functioning and 
capacity to perform his duties. Rogers Ririe's inability to effectively 
communicate as demonstrated to the Board of Trustees at the hearing in this 
matter has caused the Board of Trustees to lack confidence in Rogers Ririe's 
ability to perform his job.

 
 
"b) Rogers 
Ririe's failure to communicate registration procedures to the special education 
staff for the State Department Of Education Computerized Registration plan in a 
timely and precise manner and allowing the registration to be forwarded with two 
major errors which could have been costly to the School 
District.

 
 
"c) Rogers 
Ririe is lacking in those qualities of leadership which are necessary to 
facilitate the program staff he must work with on a continuing basis. The 
leadership problems stem from Rogers Ririe's inability to communicate 
effectively, loss of trust by many staff members and his few contacts with the 
Hulett Center, Sundance Center and country schools.

 
 
"d) Rogers 
Ririe has provided a divisive influence in contacts with staff members and many 
of his actions have been detrimental to establishment of a harmonious 
relationship with and among the staff."

 
 

[¶10.]  The district court affirmed the board's 
order of termination. The court ruled that the school board had observed all 
statutory and procedural requirements of law, that no constitutional rights of 
appellant had been denied and that the board's finding of incompetency was 
supported by substantial evidence. With respect to this last ruling, the 
judgment of the court provides:

 
 
"The Board 
of Trustee's decision to terminate the employment of Rogers Ririe for 
incompetency in that Rogers Ririe has a demonstrated inability to communicate 
effectively with the professional staff with whom he must work including 
building principals, special education staff, and specialized staff involved 
with the special education program and that Rogers Ririe lacks those qualities 
of leadership necessary to facilitate the program staff he must work with on a 
continuing basis is supported by substantial evidence and is good cause for 
termination."

 
 
THE 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶11.]  The appellant raises in his brief the 
following issues for our consideration on appeal:

 
 
"I. Can a 
School District Board or members of that Board act as fair and impartial 
examiners of the evidence at an administrative hearing to retain or terminate a 
`continuing contract teacher' after having voted, by recorded vote at a previous 
meeting, to fire the teacher?

 
 
"II. Is 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act unconstitutional in that the act fails 
to provide a means by which a fair and impartial hearing officer or tribunal can 
be provided when the administrative board is shown to be biased or prejudiced, 
or does W.S. 1977 § 16-3-112(e) allow for the appointment of a hearing examiner 
to try the final issue in such a case?

 
 
"III. Did 
the hearing examiner err in refusing to disqualify three board members from 
hearing the case, members who were parties to an agreement with Superintendent 
Wegner that his wife would be given a job in the School District if one were 
available, and did the hearing examiner err in refusing to allow Mr. Ririe's 
attorney to call the same three board members as witnesses to show that Dr. 
Wegner's motive in firing the Appellant was that the Appellant had refused to 
hire Dr. Wegner's wife to fill a vacant position in the Appellant's 
department?

 
 
"IV. Is 
W.S. 1977, 16-3-107(h) unconstitutional because it provides that no member of an 
administrative body can be compelled to testify as a witness in a hearing before 
that agency when the member is a material witness to an element of the defense 
of the person whose rights are being determined?

 
 
"V. As a 
matter of law, did Dr. Wegner, the superintendent, and the Board take the steps 
and observe the procedures that are necessary under the Administrative 
Procedures Act and the Wyoming laws dealing with continuing contract teachers, 
or did they act arbitrarily and capriciously in terminating his contract in 
which he had a property right?

 
 
"VI. As a 
matter of law does the charge or allegation of an `inability to communicate 
effectively with the professional staff' present a standard of conduct that is 
sufficiently clear so that a teacher can be expected to conform to a standard, 
or is such a standard impossible for one person to control since communication 
takes action by both the one who speaks and the one who 
listens?

 
 
"VII. As a 
matter of law, are the findings of fact which remained in issue at the close of 
the proceeding, and which were necessary to support the termination of a 
continuing contract teacher, supported by substantial 
evidence?"

 
 
Before 
addressing the issues presented by appellant, it is necessary to consider a 
preliminary matter raised by appellees in their motion to dismiss this 
appeal.

 
 
RULE 5.07, 
W.R.A.P. CONSIDERATIONS

 
 

[¶12.]  After the appellant had timely filed 
copies of his brief with this court and had served a copy on opposing counsel, 
appellees filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that appellant 
failed to serve a copy of his brief on the state attorney general as required by 
Rule 5.07 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellant responded to 
appellees' motion by serving a copy of his brief upon the attorney general and 
moving this court to allow time for the attorney general to reply. Appellant, in 
his motion, questioned the applicability of Rule 5.07 to an appeal from a 
district court judgment affirming an administrative action. We issued an order 
granting the attorney general an opportunity to intervene as an appellee and to 
file a brief. We reserved the question of the jurisdiction of this court to hear 
the appeal until after oral arguments.

 
 

[¶13.]  The threshold questions which we must now 
consider are (1) whether Rule 5.07 applies to all cases in which a party on 
appeal challenges the constitutionality of a statute, and (2) whether failure to 
comply with Rule 5.07 deprives this court of jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal.

 
 

[¶14.]  All appeals to this court are governed by 
the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 5.07, W.R.A.P. 
provides:

 
 
"In all 
cases both criminal and civil, in which the state is a party, or in which any of 
its property is involved, or in which a statute, ordinance or franchise is 
alleged to be unconstitutional, including criminal cases upon reserved 
questions, and cases arising upon exceptions taken in a criminal case by the 
prosecuting attorney, counsel shall also serve a copy of their brief upon the 
attorney general."

 
 
Despite 
the plain language which says that the rule governs "in all cases," appellant 
argues that the rule applies only to declaratory-judgment actions and to cases 
covered by former Supreme Court Rule 12(e). Appellant premises his assertion on 
the following publisher's note to Rule 5.07:

 
 
"Source. - 
Rule 12(e), Sup.Ct. - with minor addition based on § 
1-37-113."

 
 

[¶15.]  Rule 12(e), formerly applicable to 
appeals to this court, provided:

 
 
"Service 
of briefs upon attorney general. - In all cases both criminal and civil, in 
which the state is a party, or in which any of its property is involved, 
including criminal cases upon reserved questions, and cases arising upon 
exceptions taken in a criminal case by the prosecuting attorney, counsel shall 
also serve a copy of their brief upon the attorney 
general."

 
 
Under this 
rule, an appellant challenging the constitutionality of a statute was not 
required to serve a copy of his brief on the state attorney 
general.

 
 

[¶16.]  Section 1-37-113, W.S. 1977 prescribes 
the procedure to be followed in declaratory-judgment cases and has nothing to do 
with appeals:

 
 
"When 
declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or 
claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no 
declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. 
In any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal ordinance or 
franchise, the municipality shall be made a party and may be heard. If the 
statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney 
general of the state shall be served with a copy of the proceeding and may be 
heard."

 
 
It is 
evident that by adopting the current Rule 5.07, W.R.A.P., this court intended to 
expand Rule 12(e), Sup.Ct., to include any appeal in which a party questions the 
constitutionality of a statute. The fact that the language of the rule parallels 
the language of § 1-37-113 does not imply any intent to limit the scope of the 
rule to constitutional challenges which arise by way of declaratory 
judgments.

 
 

[¶17.]  In Tobin v. Pursel, Wyo., 539 P.2d 361 (1975), this court 
discussed the purpose of the requirement that a copy of appellant's brief be 
served upon the attorney general when statutory constitutional questions are 
raised. There we said:

 
 
"The 
attorney general, being the chief legal officer of the State, has a duty to 
protect the interests and the welfare of the people in declaratory judgment 
actions where statutory constitutional questions are in issue. 539 P.2d  at 
365."

 
 
Although 
Tobin was concerned with an appeal from a declaratory-judgment action, the need 
for the state's chief legal officer to protect the public interest does not 
depend upon the classification of the proceeding in which the constitutional 
challenge arises. Accordingly, Rule 5.07 was adopted to permit the attorney 
general to react to all challenges to the constitutionality of Wyoming statutes. 
We hold that Rule 5.07, W.R.A.P., means what it says - in all cases in which a 
statute is alleged to be unconstitutional, including the case at bar, counsel is 
required to serve a brief upon the attorney general.

 
 

[¶18.]  We now consider whether appellant's 
failure to serve a copy of his brief upon the attorney general in a timely 
fashion is fatal to this appeal. In Tobin v. Pursel, supra, we considered the 
consequences of appellant's failure to serve the attorney general with a copy of 
the proceeding in a declaratory-judgment action. There we dismissed the appeal, 
holding

 
 
"* * * 
that the requirements of [the Declaratory Judgments Act], directing that the 
attorney general shall be `served with a copy of the proceeding' and `be 
entitled to be heard' are mandatory and go to the jurisdiction of the court, and 
that the failure to comply with the mandates renders any lower court order 
void." 539 P.2d  at 366.

 
 

[¶19.]  We relied, in Tobin, on State v. Kelly, 
33 Wyo. 420, 240 P. 207 (1925), 
a criminal case, and In the Matter of the Claim of Hughes, Wyo., 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P.2d 204 (1960), a workmen's compensation case. In both instances this 
court held that the failure to serve a brief upon the attorney general in 
compliance with court rules is sufficient ground for dismissal of the appeal. In 
Tobin we determined that a remand to the district court was appropriate to 
permit compliance with the Declaratory Judgments Act and to give the attorney 
general an opportunity to be heard prior to the lower court's ruling on the 
validity of the challenged statute.

 
 

[¶20.]  In the instant case, the attorney general 
has submitted a brief which addresses the constitutional issues raised in this 
appeal. We see no prejudice to appellee as a result of appellant's belated 
compliance with Rule 5.07. More importantly, this court is not asked to render a 
decision on the constitutionality of a state statute without the benefit of the 
viewpoint of the representative of the people of this state. Therefore, we hold 
that the failure of appellant to comply with Rule 5.07 was cured in this case, 
and this court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. We would, however, admonish 
counsel in the future to submit required briefs to the attorney general in a 
timely fashion, since failure to do so can render an appeal vulnerable to 
dismissal.

 
 
I

 
 
"Can a 
School District Board or members of that Board act as fair and impartial 
examiners of the evidence at an administrative hearing to retain or terminate a 
`continuing contract teacher' after having voted, by recorded vote at a previous 
meeting, to fire the teacher?"

 
 

[¶21.]  The Wyoming Teacher Employment Law, §§ 
21-7-101 to 21-7-114, W.S. 1977, specifies the procedure for terminating the 
contract of a continuing contract teacher. If either the superintendent or a 
school board member recommends that a contract be terminated, the teacher must 
be notified of the recommendation and the reasons therefor.2 Under § 21-7-108, a continuing 
contract teacher, upon timely request, is entitled to a hearing before the board 
with respect to the recommended termination.3

 
 

[¶22.]  Pursuant to statutory and constitutional 
mandates such hearings are to be conducted in a fair and impartial manner. 
Section 16-3-112(a) of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act specifies in 
part:

 
 
"* * * The 
functions of all those presiding in contested cases shall be conducted in an 
impartial manner."

 
 
Constitutional 
concepts of due process which require a fair hearing before an impartial 
tribunal have been held to apply to administrative agencies which adjudicate as 
well as to courts. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579, 93 S. Ct. 1689, 1698, 
36 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1973); Fallon v. Wyoming State Board of Medical Examiners, Wyo., 
441 P.2d 322, 327 
(1968).

 
 

[¶23.]  When Rogers Ririe received the notice 
that Superintendent Wegner had recommended his termination, the school board had 
already voted to approve that recommendation. The question, therefore, arises as 
to whether the agency which reached an earlier decision to terminate Ririe's 
contract is capable of functioning as a fair and impartial tribunal to rule on 
the merits of its own prior decision.

 
 

[¶24.]  We observe at the outset that the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 
43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975), has rendered invalid any per-se rule to the effect that 
federal due process is violated whenever an agency hears a contested case 
subsequent to rendering an initial decision on the merits of that case. In 
Withrow the examining board, charged with licensing physicians in Wisconsin, 
presided at an extensive investigative hearing prior to notifying appellee that 
a "contested hearing" would be held to determine whether his license should be 
suspended. The board later issued "`Findings of Fact,' `Conclusions of Law,' and 
a `Decision'" in which the board found that probable cause existed to believe 
that appellee had engaged in prohibited conduct. In reversing the district 
court's holding that board action to suspend Dr. Larkin following its own 
investigative determination would violate constitutional due process, the United 
States Supreme Court said:

 
 
"The 
contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions 
necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative 
adjudication * * * must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those 
serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal 
of psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and 
adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or 
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process 
is to be adequately implemented." 421 U.S.  at 47, 95 S. Ct.  at 
1464.

 
 
The Court 
went on to say:

 
 
"* * * The 
mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is 
insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of the Board members at a later 
adversary hearing. Without a showing to the contrary, state administrators `are 
assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging 
a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.' United 
States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421, 61 S. Ct. 999, 1004, 85 L. Ed. 1429 (1941)." 
421 U.S.  at 55, 95 S. Ct.  at 1468.

 
 

[¶25.]  Withrow was followed in Vanelli v. 
Reynolds School District No. 7, 667 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1982), a case in which a 
school board, after a full evidentiary hearing, affirmed its earlier decision to 
dismiss a high school teacher. The court held that the board's prior decision 
did not render the subsequent hearing constitutionally 
inadequate:

 
 
"Appellant 
characterizes the April 7 hearing as a mere review of the March 11 termination 
decision and, accordingly, claims his right to a de novo trial was violated. 
Under the circumstances of this case, however, we cannot agree that the April 7 
hearing was unconstitutionally infirm because of the board's participation in 
the prior termination decision. Irrespective of whether the April 7 hearing is 
labeled a review of a prior hearing or a de novo hearing, the critical inquiry 
is whether it comported with due process. The key component of due process, when 
a decisionmaker is acquainted with the facts, is the assurance of a central 
fairness at the hearing. See Withrow, supra, 421 U.S.  at 46, 95 S. Ct.  at 1463; 
Vance v. Chester County Bd. of School Trustees, 504 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 
1974). * * *

 
 
* * * * * 
* 

 
 
"The April 
7 post-termination hearing met the standards of fairness required by the due 
process clause. Appellant's counsel was present, he was permitted to 
cross-examine all the witnesses (except for one who was ill), and was given 
ample opportunity to rebut all evidence which the school board had heard on 
March 11. No issues were raised at the prior meeting which were not thoroughly 
examined at the subsequent hearing. The board members did not have any personal 
or financial stake in the action, nor was any personal animosity alleged. For 
these reasons, we uphold the validity of the subsequent dismissal action. See 
Bignall v. North Idaho College, 538 F.2d 243, 247 (9th Cir. 1976)." 667 F.2d  at 
779-780.

 
 

[¶26.]  In the present case the superintendent of 
the school district, Dr. Wegner, investigated the performance of Mr. Ririe as 
ERC facilitator and recommended that Ririe's contract be terminated at the close 
of the school year. His recommendation was approved by the school 
board.

 
 

[¶27.]  In our consideration of whether the board 
was capable of conducting a fair and impartial hearing following its earlier 
vote to terminate appellant's contract, we look at the extent to which the board 
was bound by its initial decision. The board's vote of approval may properly be 
viewed as a determination that, based upon the evidence assembled as a result of 
the superintendent's investigation, probable cause existed to terminate Ririe's 
contract. Absent a timely request for a hearing, Ririe's contract would 
automatically terminate as a result of the board's action.

 
 

[¶28.]  Under the Supreme Court's holding in 
Withrow, the exposure to the evidence presented by the superintendent in a 
nonadversary, investigative forum for the purpose of rendering an initial 
termination decision is insufficient in itself to undermine the fairness of the 
board members at the later adversary hearing. The justification for this rule is 
that the adversary-type hearing afforded the board a complete view of the 
evidence and, based upon the additional information, the board was free to 
reverse or affirm its earlier decision. The following analogies were cited by 
the Supreme Court in Withrow v. Larkin, supra, 421 U.S.  at 56-57, 95 S.Ct. at 
1469:

 
 
"Judges 
repeatedly issue arrest warrants on the basis that there is probable cause to 
believe that a crime has been committed and that the person named in the warrant 
has committed it. Judges also preside at preliminary hearings where they must 
decide whether the evidence is sufficient to hold a defendant for trial. Neither 
of these pretrial involvements has been though to raise any constitutional 
barrier against the judge's presiding over the criminal trial and, if the trial 
is without a jury, against making the necessary determination of guilt or 
innocence. Nor has it been thought that a judge is disqualified from presiding 
over injunction proceedings because he has initially assessed the facts in 
issuing or denying a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. It 
is also very typical for the members of administrative agencies to receive the 
results of investigations, to approve the filing of charges or formal complaints 
instituting enforcement proceedings, and then to participate in the ensuing 
hearings. This mode of procedure does not violate the Administrative Procedure 
Act, and it does not violate due process of law. We should also remember that it 
is not contrary to due process to allow judges and administrators who have had 
their initial decisions reversed on appeal to confront and decide the same 
questions a second time around. See [F.T.C. v.] Cement Institute, 333 U.S. [683] 
at 702-703, 68 S.Ct. [793] at 804 [92 L. Ed. 1009; N.L.R.B. v.] Donnelly Garment 
Co., 330 U.S. [219] at 236-237, 67 S.Ct. [756] at 765 [91 L. Ed. 854]."

 
 
The Court 
went on to say with respect to the agency's decision-making 
process:

 
 
"* * * 
Here, if the Board now proceeded after an adversary hearing to determine that 
appellee's license to practice should not be temporarily suspended, it would not 
implicitly be admitting error in its prior finding of probable cause. Its 
position most probably would merely reflect the benefit of a more complete view 
of the evidence afforded by an adversary hearing." 421 U.S.  at 57-58, 95 S. Ct. 
at 1469-70.

 
 

[¶29.]  We think the reasoning in Withrow is 
sound and agree with that which was said in Hortonville Joint School District 
No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Association, 426 U.S. 482, 493, 96 S. Ct. 2308, 
2314, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1976):

 
 
"* * * 
Mere familiarity with the facts of a case gained by an agency in the performance 
of its statutory role does not, however, disqualify a decisionmaker. Withrow v. 
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 1464, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975); FTC v. 
Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 700-703, 68 S. Ct. 793, 803-804, 92 L. Ed. 1010 
(1948)."

 
 
Therefore, 
we hold that neither constitutional due process nor statutory requirements of an 
impartial hearing mandate the disqualification of the entire board as a result 
of the board's having considered the results of the superintendent's 
investigation and reached an initial decision.

 
 

[¶30.]  Our holding that the entire board was not 
subject to automatic disqualification does not mean that every individual member 
of the board was capable of rendering a decision in an unbiased manner. While 
there exists "a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as 
adjudicators," Withrow v. Larkin, supra, 421 U.S.  at 47, 95 S. Ct.  at 1464, this 
presumption may be overcome by evidence to the contrary. The Court in Withrow 
recognized as much when it said:

 
 
"That the 
combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, without more, 
constitute a due process violation, does not, of course, preclude a court from 
determining from the special facts and circumstances present in the case before 
it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high." 421 U.S.  at 58, 95 S. Ct.  at 
1470.

 
 

[¶31.]  In Board of Trustees, Laramie County 
School District No. 1 v. Spiegel, Wyo., 549 P.2d 1161 (1976), two of the 
jurists would have afforded the parties in a contested case the right to inquire 
of the members of the agency as on voir dire. After noting that the plaintiff 
carries the burden of establishing any impropriety on the part of any board 
member, the author of the opinion said:

 
 
"If the 
appellee here is guaranteed his constitutional rights of fair and impartial 
hearing and the burden of proving bias is his, but he is denied an access route 
along which he may travel in pursuit of these rights - then he has no rights. * 
* *" 549 P.2d  at 1167.

 
 

[¶32.]  We commend the hearing examiner in the 
present case for providing counsel the opportunity to engage in voir dire. We 
recognize this procedure as a valuable means of discovering individual 
prejudices - perhaps hidden to all, including the holder - and of emphasizing to 
the board the importance of conducting a fair and impartial 
hearing.

 
 

[¶33.]  As noted above, the school board was 
subjected to an extensive voir dire. From the responses to this inquiry, the 
hearing examiner determined that the board members were capable of rendering an 
impartial decision based on the evidence presented at the hearing. In denying 
appellant's motion to disqualify all of the board members, the examiner 
said:

 
 
"* * * All 
the board at this point has affirmatively stated that they would be willing to 
change their mind if the evidence convinced them to change their mind today, and 
I think that's the important thing."

 
 
We 
therefore hold that the vote to terminate appellant's contract did not prevent 
the school board from acting as fair and impartial examiners of the evidence at 
the subsequent hearing.

 
 
II

 
 
"Is the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act unconstitutional in that the act fails to 
provide a means by which a fair and impartial hearing officer or tribunal can be 
provided when the administrative board is shown to be biased or prejudiced, or 
does W.S. 1977 § 16-3-112(e) allow for the appointment of a hearing examiner to 
try the final issue in such a case?"

 
 

[¶34.]  Appellant's second argument depends upon 
a finding that the entire board was unqualified to serve as a fair and impartial 
tribunal. He urges that to the extent that the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act fails to provide, in such cases, for a fair and impartial decision maker, 
the act is unconstitutional. In view of our holding that the board as a whole 
was not subject to disqualification, we will not consider appellant's second 
issue. To do so would be to render an impermissible, advisory opinion. Tobin v. 
Pursel, supra, 539 P.2d  at 363. Consequently, we reserve the question whether 
the rule of necessity4 permits an admittedly biased 
administrative board to preside at a hearing, Board of Trustees, Laramie County 
School District No. 1 v. Spiegel, supra, 549 P.2d  at 1168 (Rose, J., and 
Armstrong, D.J., Retired, separate opinion) or whether § 16-3-112(e),5 enacted subsequent to our decision 
in Spiegel, allows a hearing examiner to render a decision when the requirements 
of due process so dictate.

 
 
III

 
 
"Did the 
hearing examiner err in refusing to disqualify three board members from hearing 
the case, members who were parties to an agreement with Superintendent Wegner 
that his wife would be given a job in the School District if one were available, 
and did the hearing examiner err in refusing to allow Mr. Ririe's attorney to 
call the same three board members as witnesses to show that Dr. Wegner's motive 
in firing the Appellant was that the Appellant had refused to hire Dr. Wegner's 
wife to fill a vacant position in the Appellant's 
department?"

 
 

[¶35.]  Appellant first contends that the hearing 
examiner erred in refusing to disqualify three board members from hearing the 
case because of their participation in an agreement to hire Dr. Wegner's wife. 
Because the board was subjected to voir dire, information is available to assist 
us in our review of appellant's contention. The hearing examiner, in chambers, 
questioned each board member individually concerning his or her involvement in 
the agreement and awareness of Ririe's refusal to hire Mrs. Wegner in the ERC 
program. Each member was questioned as to the effect such an agreement would 
have on his or her ability to render a decision based on the evidence presented 
at the hearing. Ruling that voir dire had revealed no disqualifying prejudice, 
the examiner denied appellant's challenge of three particular board members. Our 
review of the record indicates that the board informed Dr. Wegner, at the time 
of his hiring, that district rules did not preclude the employment of his wife 
within the school district and that she was free to apply for available 
positions. Only one of the challenged members indicated an awareness of 
allegations that Dr. Wegner had sought to have Mrs. Wegner hired in the ERC 
program and that Mr. Ririe had refused. We conclude that the hearing examiner's 
refusal to disqualify three board members for cause is supported by substantial 
evidence in the record.

 
 

[¶36.]  Appellant also urges that the hearing 
examiner erred in refusing to allow appellant to call the challenged board 
members as witnesses to prove an improper motive on the part of Dr. Wegner in 
recommending termination. The examiner disallowed such testimony as being 
irrelevant.

 
 

[¶37.]  Under § 16-3-108(a) of the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act, irrelevant and unduly repetitious evidence is 
inadmissible. That section provides in part:

 
 
"(a) In 
contested cases irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence shall be 
excluded and no sanction shall be imposed or order issued except upon 
consideration of the whole record or such portion thereof as may be cited by any 
party and unless supported by the type of evidence commonly relied upon by 
reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their serious 
affairs."

 
 

[¶38.]  A review of the record indicates that 
both Dr. Wegner and Mr. Ririe testified concerning the alleged agreement, 
thereby providing ample evidence of any possibly improper motive underlying Dr. 
Wegner's recommendation. The record also indicates that Mr. Ririe's decision not 
to hire Mrs. Wegner preceded Dr. Wegner's initial evaluation, in which Ririe 
received a rating of satisfactory, a fact which goes to the relevancy of the 
information. Furthermore, appellant himself testified that he did not believe 
that his failure to hire Mrs. Wegner had any bearing on the superintendent's 
recommendation. We conclude that substantial evidence exists in the record in 
support of the hearing examiner's disallowance of the offered 
testimony.

 
 
IV

 
 
"Is W.S. 
1977, 16-3-107(h) unconstitutional because it provides that no member of an 
administrative body can be compelled to testify as a witness in a hearing before 
that agency when the member is a material witness to an element of the defense 
of the person whose rights are being determined?"

 
 

[¶39.]  The hearing examiner did not rely on § 
16-3-107(h)6 as a basis for excluding the 
testimony of the three board members, but concluded, instead, that the testimony 
was irrelevant. Since § 16-3-107(h) was not invoked against appellant, we 
decline to issue an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of the statute as 
applied to suppress the testimony of a material witness.

 
 
V

 
 
"As a 
matter of law, did Dr. Wegner, the superintendent, and the Board take the steps 
and observe the procedures that are necessary under the Administrative 
Procedures Act and the Wyoming laws dealing with continuing contract teachers, 
or did they act arbitrarily and capriciously in terminating his contract in 
which he had a property right?"

 
 

[¶40.]  Appellant asserts the following reasons 
in support of his allegation that the superintendent and the board acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in terminating his contract: (1) good cause for 
termination did not exist; (2) the evaluator-superintendent failed to furnish 
appellant adequate guidance; and (3) the termination is not supported by 
substantial evidence and may have been due to an improper motive on the part of 
the superintendent. We defer consideration of the substantiality of the evidence 
until part VII of this opinion.

 
 
Good 
Cause

 
 

[¶41.]  We have interpreted the Wyoming Teacher 
Employment Act as requiring the existence of good cause in order for the school 
board to terminate the contract of a continuing contract teacher. Board of 
Trustees of Weston County School District No. 1 v. Holso, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1009, reh. denied 587 P.2d 203 (1978); Powell v. 
Board of Trustees of Crook County School District No. 1, Wyo., 550 P.2d 1112 (1976); Monahan v. 
Board of Trustees of Elementary School District No. 9, Wyo., 486 P.2d 235 (1971). We set out a 
definition of good cause in Powell v. Board of Trustees of Crook County School 
District No. 1, supra, and said that the facts underlying the reason for 
dismissal

 
 
"* * * 
must bear reasonable relationship to the teacher's fitness or capacity to 
perform his duties in that position." 550 P.2d  at 1119.

 
 
In Powell 
we said that an "`inability to establish rapport with his students'" was not the 
sort of good cause contemplated by the Wyoming Teacher Employment Law and our 
prior cases:

 
 
"* * * 
[W]e hold that a general charge of `inability to establish rapport with his 
students,' unsupported by definition and specific facts going straight to the 
charge, is insufficient, standing alone, to constitute `other good or just 
cause' under the statute, or the good cause which is necessary to insulate the 
order of termination or dismissal against capriciousness and arbitrariness." 550 P.2d  at 1119.

 
 

[¶42.]  In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, the school board in the instant case specified incompetency as the 
ground for termination and defined incompetency to mean (a) the inability to 
communicate effectively with the professional staff; (b) the failure to 
communicate registration procedures in a timely and precise manner with the 
result that inaccurate information was submitted to the state department of 
education; (c) the absence of leadership qualities; and (d) the presence of 
divisive tendencies in contacts with staff members. The district court affirmed 
the board's finding of incompetency as demonstrated by appellant's inability to 
communicate effectively and lack of leadership qualities.7

 
 

[¶43.]  Incompetency is specified in § 21-7-1108 as proper cause for the 
termination, dismissal or suspension of a teacher. In exercising our appellate 
duties, however, we must review the specific charges and underlying facts which 
constitute the allegation of incompetency to determine whether they are related 
to the teacher's ability to perform the duties of his particular 
position.

 
 

[¶44.]  The duties of an ERC program facilitator 
as developed by the Wyoming department of education 
include:

 
 
(1) 
"Facilitates development and implementation of ERC goals, objectives, activities 
and program accountability."

 
 
(2) 
"Facilitates activities of ERC staff and other personnel assigned to work out of 
the ERC to meet educational needs within the district."

 
 
(3) 
"Organizes pre-service and in-service education needs as identified by the ERC 
staff in cooperation with local district personnel and 
parents."

 
 
(4) 
"Develops publicity and information regarding services and functions of the ERC 
and disseminates within the ERC service area."

 
 
The 
qualifications necessary to perform these duties are also specified by the 
department of education and include:

 
 
(1) 
"Demonstrated competency in relating effectively with educators, parents, 
community organizations and agency personnel." 

 
 
(2) 
"Ability to communicate effectively the services of the ERC to professional and 
lay individuals and groups."

 
 

[¶45.]  Based on these operational guidelines we 
conclude that the ability to lead the ERC staff and communicate effectively with 
the staff and other educators are essential attributes for the performance of 
the facilitator position. We hold that a demonstrated absence of these abilities 
in one holding the position of ERC facilitator is good cause for termination of 
his contract.

 
 
Guidance 
from Evaluator

 
 

[¶46.]  Appellant states in his 
brief:

 
 
"It is 
also a fundamental principle that the continuing contract teacher should be 
given guidance by the evaluator."

 
 
Appellant 
cites no authority for this "fundamental principle." Furthermore, the record 
indicates that Ririe was provided some guidance in that the 
superintendent-evaluator had discussed with him a number of perceived 
deficiencies prior to the formal evaluation in January, 1982. We conclude that 
any failure of Dr. Wegner to provide more complete direction does not amount to 
a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act or any other Wyoming 
law.

 
 
VI

 
 
"As a 
matter of law does the charge or allegation of an `inability to communicate 
effectively with the professional staff' present a standard of conduct that is 
sufficiently clear so that a teacher can be expected to conform to a standard, 
or is such a standard impossible for one person to control since communication 
takes action by both the one who speaks and the one who 
listens?"

 
 

[¶47.]  Appellant cites Powell v. Board of 
Trustees of Crook County School District No. 1, supra, for the proposition that 
the termination of a teacher's contract must be based upon the violation of "a 
definitive acceptable standard of professional conduct." 550 P.2d  at 1118. We 
agree that a clear standard of conduct must be furnished to the teacher and its 
violation relied upon in order to justify termination. Under the circumstances 
of the present case, we believe that appellant was furnished such a 
standard.

 
 

[¶48.]  The duties and qualifications embodied in 
the position description (appended to this opinion), and furnished to appellant, 
emphasize that the facilitator is expected to impart his knowledge and provide 
direction to those with whom he works in a manner susceptible of being 
understood. Indeed, the essence of the ERC facilitator position depends upon the 
ability to enlighten and assist others. We therefore hold that Ririe was 
furnished a standard sufficiently clear to enable him to conform his conduct to 
that standard.

 
 
VII

 
 
"As a 
matter of law, are the findings of fact which remained in issue at the close of 
the proceeding, and which were necessary to support the termination of a 
continuing contract teacher, supported by substantial 
evidence?"

 
 

[¶49.]  We said in Monahan v. Board of Trustees 
of Elementary School District No. 9, supra, 486 P.2d at 
237:

 
 
"* * * [A] 
hearing on termination of a continuing contract teacher involves the question of 
whether there is good cause for termination. There must not only be good cause 
but there must be substantial evidence before the board to show that there is 
good cause. Absent either, a decision on the part of the board to terminate will 
be arbitrary." (Emphasis added.)

 
 
Section 
16-3-114(c)9 of the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act directs this court upon review to determine that the findings of 
fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record. We have defined 
substantial evidence to mean such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Board of Trustees, Laramie County 
School District No. 1 v. Spiegel, supra, 549 P.2d  at 1178.

 
 

[¶50.]  Our review of the record convinces us 
that the conclusions by the school board that appellant lacked the ability to 
communicate effectively and to provide adequate leadership are supported by 
substantial evidence. All five district principals testified in support of the 
termination of Ririe's contract. They stated that they had received complaints 
from staff members with respect to the guidance received from appellant and his 
ability to explain procedures. Many members of the ERC staff testified that they 
could not understand appellant, that he did not adequately explain procedures, 
and that they felt confused following contact with him. They testified that they 
had no confidence in information supplied by appellant and had looked to outside 
sources for help. One staff member testified that she had threatened to resign 
because of her frustration in dealing with Ririe.

 
 

[¶51.]  Based upon our independent review of the 
record, we hold that the board had before it substantial evidence of good cause 
to justify its decision to terminate appellant's contract. We therefore affirm 
the judgment of the district court affirming the termination of appellant's 
continuing contract of employment.

 
 
APPENDIX

 
 
Position 
Description

 
 
1. 
Position Title: ERC Program Facilitator

 
 
2. 
Fundamental Objective: Develop, organize and facilitate implementation of the 
ERC program. Monitor and improve the respective services.

 
 
3. Reports 
to: Administrator or other person designated by the local school superintendent. 
Coordinates with district school principals and support services 
personnel.

 
 
4. 
Supervisory - Consultant Responsibility: Monitors services provided by ERC 
staff. Consultative responsibility to ERC staff and district 
personnel.

 
 
5. 
Duties:

 
 
a. 
Facilitates development and implementation of ERC goals, objectives, activities 
and program accountability.

 
 
b. Assists 
in identifying handicaps which interfer with or impair 
learning.

 
 
c. 
Facilitates activities of ERC staff and other personnel assigned to work out of 
the ERC to meet educational needs within the district.

 
 
d. 
Facilitates identification and coordination of resources useful for educational 
purposes.

 
 
e. 
Organizes pre-service and in-service education needs as identified by the ERC 
staff in cooperation with local district personnel and 
parents.

 
 
f. 
Participates in curriculum modification and development of programs for children 
with learning problems.

 
 
g. 
Develops publicity and information regarding services and functions of the ERC 
and disseminates within the ERC service area.

 
 
h. 
Coordinates ERC services with the Wyoming State Department of Education and 
other appropriate organizations.

 
 
i. 
Establishes an effective system for cataloging, disseminating and retrieving 
instructional materials and equipment.

 
 

Limits of 
Authority: Position 
is subject to policies and procedures as set forth for the ERC by the 
administering school district and the state ERC 
guidelines.

 
 

Qualifications: 

 
 
a. At 
least five years of instructional supervisory and/or related educational 
experiences in the field of exceptionality.

 
 
b. Have 
experience in at least four of the seven ERC functions, one of which must be 
educational programming.

 
 
c. 
Demonstrated competency in relating effectively with educators, parents, 
community organizations and agency personnel.

 
 
d. Ability 
to identify and utilize resources to develop, implement and improve services of 
the ERC.

 
 
e. Ability 
to communicate effectively the services of the ERC to professional and lay 
individuals and groups.

 
 
f. Masters 
Degree in exceptionality (preferred) or in an area relating to exceptional 
children.

 
 
ROONEY, 
Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

 
 

[¶52.]  I dissent from only that part of the 
majority opinion which turns on the fact that voir dire was conducted of the 
board members. The quotation concerning the position of two jurists in Board of 
Trustees, Laramie County School District No. 1 v. Spiegel, Wyo., 549 P.2d 1161 (1976), has reference 
to the minority position in that case on this point. Footnote 1 to the 
discussion of voir dire in that case reads:

 
 
"1. The 
voir dire section of this opinion represents only the expressions of Justice 
Rose and Judge Armstrong and is not the majority opinion on the subject of voir 
dire." 549 P.2d  at 1165.

 
 
The 
dissent of Chief Justice Guthrie, in which Justice Thomas joined, sets forth the 
rationale for not allowing voir dire of the board. The majority opinion 
adequately resolved the first issue without reference to voir 
dire.

 
 

[¶53.]  Also included in the voir dire section of 
Board of Trustees v. Spiegel, supra, (and thus not the majority holding) is a 
discussion on the rule of necessity which is referred to in the majority opinion 
but not addressed as a necessary issue. I agree that it need not be addressed in 
this case.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 A copy of the 
position description is appended to this opinion.

 
 

2 Section 21-7-106, 
W.S. 1977, provides:

 
 
"(a) A continuing 
contract teacher shall be notified of a recommendation of termination by the 
superintendent or any member of the board by giving such teacher written notice 
thereof, together with written reasons therefor on or before March 15 of any 
year.

 
 
"(b) Termination 
under such recommendation if approved by the board will be effective at the end 
of the contracted school year in the year in which notice of such termination is 
given."

 
 

3 Section 21-7-108, 
W.S. 1977, provides:

 
 
"A continuing 
contract teacher shall be entitled to a hearing before the board within thirty 
(30) days after receipt of notice of a recommendation of termination by 
requesting same in writing within at least ten (10) days after receiving said 
notice."

 
 

4 Under the rule of 
necessity, an entire board is not subject to disqualification if it is the only 
tribunal with jurisdiction to hold the hearing. Board of Trustees, Laramie 
County School District No. 1 v. Spiegel, supra, 549 P.2d  at 
1167.

 
 

5 Section 16-3-112(e), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

 
 
"When required by law 
an agency shall adopt rules and regulations providing a procedure for the use 
and the selection of an administrative hearing officer. An agency shall not 
delegate the authority to make final decisions to an independent administrative 
hearing officer unless required by law."

 
 

6 Section 16-3-107(h), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

 
 
"(h) The agency in a 
contested case is subject to the discovery provisions of this section but 
neither the agency, nor any member, officer or employee shall be required to 
disclose information which is confidential or privileged under the law and no 
member of the agency shall be compelled to testify or give a deposition in a 
contested case. Evidence and discovery sought from the agency shall be by 
written application. If the agency refuses to allow discovery in whole or in 
part the aggrieved party may apply to the district court for the district in 
which the hearing, deposition or other proceeding is being or is to be conducted 
for an order directed to the agency compelling discovery. The court shall enter 
such order as may be appropriate. The procedure provided for in this subsection 
for obtaining discovery from the agency is exclusive."

 
 

7 We note that the 
board's conclusion (b) - the failure to communicate registration procedures - is 
embodied in the more general conclusion (a) - the inability to communicate 
effectively. In addition, conclusion (d) - the presence of divisive tendencies - 
is a component of conclusion (c) - the absence of leadership. Therefore, we will 
treat, as did the district court, the inability to communicate effectively and 
the lack of leadership qualities as the operative causes for the termination of 
appellant's contract.

 
 

8 Section 21-7-110(a), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

 
 
"The board may 
suspend or dismiss any teacher for incompetency, neglect of duty, immorality, 
insubordination, or any other good or just cause."

 
 
We said in Powell v. 
Board of Trustees of Crook County School District No. 1, supra, 550 P.2d  at 
1114, n. 3, that § 21-7-110 applies to termination as well as dismissal and 
suspension cases.

 
 

9 Section 16-3-114(c), 
W.S. 1977, provides in pertinent part:

 
 
"The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(ii) Hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute."