Case Title: Kunze and Kunze

Citation: 

Docket Number: S49796

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  June 17, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Marriage of
DAVID HENRY KUNZE,
Respondent on Review,
and
NOLA MAXINE KUNZE,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC DO99-1014; CA A112487; SC S49796)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 10, 2003.
Donald O. Tarlow, of Brown, Tarlow & Bridges, PC, Newberg,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.
William J. Howe, III, of Gervurtz, Menashe, Larson & Howe,
PC, Portland, argued the cause for respondent on review.  With
him on the brief was Robin J. Wright.
Before, Carson, Chief Justice, and Durham, De Muniz, Balmer,
and Kistler, JJ.**
CARSON, C.J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified in part and, as modified, affirmed.  The judgment of the circuit
court is modified in part and, as modified, affirmed.
*Appeal from Yamhill County Circuit Court, John W. Hitchcock, Judge. 181 Or App 606, 47 P3d 489 (2002).
**Gillette, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.  Riggs, J., did not participate in the
decision of this case.
CARSON, C.J.  
At issue in this marital dissolution action is whether
a "just and proper" division of property under ORS 107.105(1)(f)
(1997), set out post, requires the inclusion of assets that wife
had acquired separately from husband because wife integrated
those assets into the parties' joint financial affairs through
commingling. (1)  The trial court excluded certain assets from
the property division after determining that wife had proved that
husband had not contributed to them.  The Court of Appeals
modified the property division as to two of the disputed assets,
concluding that, although wife's separate funds had purchased
those assets, wife had failed to rebut the presumption of equal
contribution by husband under ORS 107.105(1)(f) because wife had
treated those assets as shared assets of the marital partnership. 
Kunze and Kunze, 181 Or App 606, 47 P3d 489 (2002).  We allowed
wife's petition for review.  For the reasons that follow, we
modify the decision of the Court of Appeals in part and, as
modified, affirm it.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In reviewing a decision of the Court of Appeals that is an appeal from a judgment in a case constituting a suit in equity
under common law, ORS 19.415(3), this court may review de novo or
may limit its review to questions of law.  ORS 19.415(4); see
also Massee and Massee, 328 Or 195, 197, 970 P2d 1203 (1999)
(stating same under former ORS 19.125(4) (1995), renumbered as
ORS 19.415(4) (1997)).  Because our resolution of this case is
fact-dependent, and because we rely upon equitable considerations
that the Court of Appeals did not discuss, we elect to review the
record de novo.  See State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 333 Or 135,
138, 36 P3d 490 (2001) (stating same approach under analogous
circumstances).  
Husband and wife married in 1980.  At the time of the marriage, wife was 29 years old and had a master's degree in
speech pathology.  Husband was 22 years old and had attended some
college, but did not have a college degree.  Wife brought into
the marriage two contiguous parcels of real property in
Portland, (2) each of which included a residence (the
"Germantown Road property" and the "Schoolhouse property").  Wife
also brought into the marriage 400 acres of farm property in
North Dakota.  Husband had no assets of significant value when
the parties married.
During the initial years of the marriage, both parties worked full time, although wife earned considerably more than
husband did.  The parties lived at the Germantown Road property
and rented out the Schoolhouse property.  Although wife did not
place husband's name on the titles to either of those properties,
wife deposited the rental income from the Schoolhouse property
into the parties' joint bank account, and the parties paid
expenses related to both properties from their joint account.
In 1983, wife's aunt, Johnson, died.  Johnson, a California resident, and wife had enjoyed a close relationship over the years.  In her will, Johnson devised to wife, among other things, a duplex residence (the "California duplex") and a commercial property (the "National City property"), both located in California.  Johnson also named wife as a copersonal
representative of her estate.   Because Johnson's estate was
complex and largely illiquid, the parties moved to California in
1984 to allow wife to perform more easily her administrative
duties related to the estate.  During the year that the parties
resided in California, wife received unemployment compensation
for two months and then worked on a part-time basis, while she
also carried out her responsibilities for the estate.  Husband
worked for some of that year, and the parties additionally relied
upon wife's savings and rental income from both the Germantown
Road property and the Schoolhouse property to pay family
expenses.
In 1985, wife received the California duplex and the
National City property in a partial distribution from Johnson's
estate.  Wife sold the California duplex that year for $450,000. 
Wife used the buyer's cash down payment of $125,000 to pay off an
encumbrance against the property and to pay costs associated with
its sale.  Wife received the $325,000 balance of the sale price
in a promissory note and trust deed that she held in her name
alone.  From 1985 to 1992, wife received monthly payments on that
note, which she regularly deposited into the parties' joint bank
account.  
At the time of its distribution to wife in 1985, the
National City property was subject to a triple-net lease to a
commercial tenant that expired in December 1999.  The lease
provided automatic rent increases at five-year intervals, with
the rent set at $1,300 per month in 1985 and at $2,551 per month
by 1999.  Because the lease placed responsibility for the
property maintenance, insurance, and taxes with the tenant, the
property required little attention from the parties.  Although
wife never deeded an interest in the National City property to
husband, she regularly deposited the lease payments from that
property into the parties' joint bank account.
In 1985, the parties moved from California to North
Dakota to allow husband to pursue a bachelor's degree in
construction management.  The parties used funds that wife had
received from Johnson's estate to purchase a residence in North
Dakota jointly.  During the next five years, husband was a
student and earned no employment income, but he made improvements
on the family residence during weekends and school holidays. 
Wife worked full time and also performed all duties relating to
the two Oregon rental properties.  The parties paid family
expenses and financed husband's education with wife's earnings,
the note payments from sale of the California duplex, the lease
payments from the National City property, and the rental income
from the Oregon properties.  
In August 1990, the parties' daughter was born. 
Shortly thereafter, the parties moved back to Oregon to live. 
The parties planned that wife would remain at home with their
child and that husband would find work in the construction field. 
After returning to Oregon, husband completed his graduation
requirements, and, in spring 1991, he obtained his bachelor's
degree.  From 1991 to 1993, husband worked with his father and
brother in a fence-building business, earning $11,865 in 1991,
$5,215 in 1992, and $4,300 in 1993.  From the time that he left
that business in 1993 until the time of trial in August 2000,
husband did not earn any further employment income.
After they had returned to Oregon, the parties sold
their residence in North Dakota.  In 1991, the parties used those
proceeds as a down payment to purchase an undeveloped parcel of
property near Newberg, upon which they had a new family home
built (the "Calkins Lane property").  In 1992, the balance of the
note from the sale of the California duplex, approximately
$315,000, was paid to wife in full.  Approximately $170,000 of
those proceeds was used to purchase a fourplex residential
property in Beaverton (the "Chaps Court property"), to which the
parties jointly held title in tenancy by the entirety.  The
remainder of the proceeds was used to pay capital gains taxes, to
pay off the encumbrance on the Germantown Road and Schoolhouse
properties, and to upgrade the home that the parties were having
built on the Calkins Lane property.  In 1992, the parties also
started a small cattle operation at the Calkins Lane property to
retain that property's tax deferral for farm use. (3)
In December 1993, husband was injured seriously when he
fell from a ladder while performing maintenance work on the
Schoolhouse property.  For the next 18 months, wife alone cared
for the parties' child, attended to husband, and managed the
Calkins Lane and investment properties.  In 1995, after husband
had recovered, the parties purchased three lots (4) in Newberg
with the intent that husband would build homes on those lots to
gain experience in construction management.  To secure financing
for the purchase of one of those lots, wife deeded to husband a
joint ownership interest in the Germantown Road property.  Rather
than have husband build the homes himself, the parties ultimately
hired a general contractor to build homes on two of the lots, and
the parties sold the third lot without making improvements.  The
parties lost money on the overall project. 
In 1997, wife began working outside the home on a part-time basis.  That year, wife also sold the Schoolhouse property. 
The proceeds from the sale of that property were deposited into a
joint account (the "PIMCO account") and were used in part for
family expenses.  
In 1999, husband filed for dissolution of the marriage. 
At the time of trial in 2000, wife was 49 years old and was
earning approximately $38,000 per year as a school speech
pathologist.  She resided at the Calkins Lane property with the
parties' daughter.  Husband was 42 years old and was unemployed.
He lived in one of the fourplex units at the Chaps Court
property.  The parties stipulated that wife would have custody of
the parties' then-10-year-old daughter, subject to husband's
parenting time, and the trial court set husband's child support
obligation at $350 per month.  Neither party sought spousal
support.  
At trial, the primary issue was the appropriate
division of the marital property.  The testimony at trial
revealed that, throughout the marriage, husband had provided
substantial labor, including improvements and repairs, for the
benefit of the parties' real properties.  The testimony also
showed that, throughout the marriage, wife had performed
considerable labor and services for those properties and also had
acted as the primary homemaker and caregiver for the parties'
daughter.  Husband testified that he was able to and planned to
work in the future, but that he did not know what type of work he
would perform.  Both parties testified that they had expected to
rely upon the investment properties for income during their
retirement.
Husband argued at trial that the parties should divide
equally all the property that the parties held. (5)  Wife
agreed that the parties should divide equally the Calkins Lane
property; the PIMCO account containing the proceeds from the sale
of the Schoolhouse property; and the appreciation in the value of
the Germantown Road property and the Chaps Court property that
had accrued during the marriage.  Wife, however, contended that
she was entitled to receive, separate from the property division,
her premarital equity in the Germantown Road property; her
contribution to the Chaps Court property that she had made with
the proceeds from the sale of the California duplex; and the
National City property.  She also argued that husband had an
enhanced earning capacity resulting from his construction
management degree that was property subject to division.  As
evidence in support of that position, wife introduced the
testimony of an expert witness who opined that, if husband made
career choices consistent with his education and training,
husband's enhanced earning capacity from his construction
management degree could be valued conservatively at $288,322.
The trial court, for the most part, agreed with wife's
view of the property dispute.  After finding that husband had not
contributed to wife's premarital equity in the Germantown Road
property and that wife had been the sole object of her aunt's
donative intent, the court excluded from the property division,
and awarded to wife separately, the values of (1) wife's
premarital equity in the Germantown Road property ($65,000); (2)
the National City property ($324,000); and (3) the part of the
Chaps Court equity attributable to the proceeds from the sale of
the California duplex ($170,000).  The court included in the
property division, and divided equally between the parties, the
values of (1) the Calkins Lane property ($174,000); (2) the PIMCO
account containing the proceeds from the sale of the Schoolhouse
property ($35,608); (3) the appreciation in the value of the
Chaps Court property ($51,225) and the Germantown Road property
($90,000) that had accrued during the marriage; and (4) the
values of the parties' vehicles, retirement accounts, and other
cash accounts (together totaling $47,465).  The court also
determined that husband had an enhanced earning capacity that was
property subject to division, and it awarded to wife
$22,616 (6) for her contributions to that capacity. (7)


Husband appealed, assigning error to the trial court's exclusion of assets from the property division and to its
inclusion of the enhanced earning capacity property award.  The
Court of Appeals determined that the trial court correctly had
awarded the National City property to wife because it concluded
that wife had overcome the presumption under ORS 107.105(1)(f)
that husband had contributed equally to that property.  Kunze,
181 Or App at 617-18.  The court, however, concluded that the
trial court had erred by excluding from the property division
wife's premarital equity in the Germantown Road property and the
equity in the Chaps Court property attributable to the proceeds
from the sale of the California duplex.  Id. at 618-19.  In so
concluding, the court determined that, although wife had
established that her separate funds had purchased those assets,
wife had not overcome the statutory presumption of equal
contribution by husband because the parties had held those assets
jointly and had commingled them with their shared financial
affairs.  Id.  The court further concluded that, because no
evidence at trial demonstrated that husband actually had or would
derive any economic benefit from his degree, the trial court had
erred by determining that husband had an enhanced earning
capacity that was property subject to division.  Id. at 620-21. 
Consistently with those conclusions, the court modified the
property division to award husband a judgment of $140,116 against
wife. (8)  Id. at 621.  
Wife petitioned this court for review, and we allowed
the petition.  As explained in more detail below, contrary to the
Court of Appeals, we conclude that the trial court correctly
determined that husband is not entitled to any of the disputed
properties by virtue of the statutory presumption of equal
contribution.  We further conclude that the trial court satisfied
the requirement of a "just and proper" division of property under
ORS 107.105(1)(f) by awarding to wife, as separate property, the
National City property and her premarital equity in the
Germantown Road property.  We, however, do not agree with the
trial court that it is "just and proper" under ORS 107.105(1)(f)
to award to wife separately the disputed equity in the Chaps
Court property because, although husband did not contribute to
that asset, he established that wife had converted that asset
into a joint asset of the marital partnership through
commingling.  Finally, because we find that wife failed to show
that husband's degree resulted, or likely would result, in higher
earnings for husband, we conclude that the trial court's property
award to wife for her contributions to husband's enhanced earning
capacity was in error.  Based upon those conclusions, we modify
the decision of the Court of Appeals in part and, as modified,
affirm it.  
II. "JUST AND PROPER" DIVISION OF PARTIES' REAL PROPERTY
We first consider the division of the real property at
issue in this case.  ORS 107.105(1)(f) governs the division of
property in a marital dissolution action.  At the time when this
action was filed, that statutory provision provided, in part:
"(1) Whenever the court grants a decree of marital
* * * dissolution * * *, it has power further to decree
as follows:
"* * * * *
"(f) For the division or other disposition between
the parties of the real or personal property, or both,
of either or both of the parties as may be just and
proper in all the circumstances. * * * The court shall
consider the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker as
a contribution to the acquisition of marital assets.
There is a rebuttable presumption that both spouses
have contributed equally to the acquisition of property
during the marriage, whether such property is jointly
or separately held."
ORS 107.105(1)(f) (1997). (9)
This court previously has observed that the legislative
intent underlying ORS 107.105(1)(f) is the formulation of a
property division at dissolution that is "just and proper in all
the circumstances."  See, e.g., Massee, 328 Or at 201 (so
stating).  Although ORS 107.105(1)(f) grants the court wide
discretion to determine what constitutes a "just and proper"
division of property in light of the individual circumstances of
the parties, that statute recites a number of specific
considerations that the court must apply in making that
determination.  See id. at 202-05 (discussing statutory
considerations).  In addition, to promote consistency and
predictability in dissolution decrees, this court has examined
the objectives underlying ORS 107.105(1)(f) and has identified
equitable considerations that, along with the statutory factors,
guide the court in achieving its task under that statute.  See
Haguewood and Haguewood, 292 Or 197, 201-04, 638 P2d 1135 (1981)
(so stating under former ORS 107.105(1)(e) (1981), renumbered as
ORS 107.105(1)(f) (1983)).  As we discuss in more detail below,
the parties' arguments in this case require that we clarify the
application of one of those equitable considerations under ORS
107.105(1)(f) –- namely, the circumstances under which equity
requires that a separately acquired asset be included in the
property division because that asset had been integrated into the
shared finances of the marital partnership through commingling.
A. Operation of ORS 107.105(1)(f)
We begin our analysis by describing the operation of
ORS 107.105(1)(f).  See generally PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (in
interpreting statute to discern legislature's intent, court first
considers text and context of statute).  As noted above, ORS
107.105(1)(f) directs the court to divide property at dissolution
in a manner that is "just and proper in all the circumstances." 
To achieve that directive, the statute empowers the court to
distribute any real or personal property that either or both of
the parties hold at the time of dissolution, including property
that the parties had brought into the marriage.  See ORS
107.105(1)(f) (granting court power to divide any real or
personal properties of parties to dissolution action); see also
Pierson and Pierson, 294 Or 117, 121-22, 653 P2d 1258 (1982)
(stating same under former ORS 107.105(1)(e) (1981)).  This court
describes that broad class of property within the court's
dispositional authority as "marital property."  Massee, 328 Or at
201 n 2, 206.
Although the statutory directive to fashion a "just and
proper" division applies to all marital property, ORS
107.105(1)(f) imposes further considerations that apply to only
real or personal property that either or both of the parties have
acquired during the marriage.  The statute describes that
subclass of marital property –- that is, property acquired during
the marriage –- as "marital assets."  ORS 107.105(1)(f); see also
Stice and Stice, 308 Or 316, 325, 779 P2d 1020 (1989) (so
stating).  The rebuttable presumption of equal contribution under
ORS 107.105(1)(f) is one statutory consideration that applies to
only marital assets. 
Because ORS 107.105(1)(f) distinguishes between
property brought into the marriage and marital assets, the
court's first step in applying that statute is to determine when
the parties acquired the property that is at issue.  If the
parties acquired the property at issue before the marriage, then
the court considers only what is "just and proper in all the
circumstances" in distributing that property.  ORS 107.105(1)(f).
If a party establishes that the property at issue is a
marital asset, however, then the court must apply the rebuttable
presumption of equal contribution under ORS 107.105(1)(f) as its
next step in the analysis.  That statutory presumption embodies a
legislative intent to recognize that, absent evidence to the
contrary, each spouse's efforts during a marriage equally
contribute to, and are made for the benefit of, the marital
estate, regardless of the nature of those efforts or how the
property is held.  See Engle and Engle, 293 Or 207, 214-15, 646
P2d 20 (1982) (discussing legislative intent underlying
presumption of equal contribution under former ORS 107.105(1)(e)
(1981)).  To effectuate that intent, the presumption directs the
court that, unless proven otherwise, the court must find that
both parties have contributed equally to the acquisition of
marital assets.  Id.  When the statutory presumption is not
rebutted, this court has determined that, absent other
considerations, the "just and proper" division of the marital
assets is an equal division between the parties.  See Haguewood,
292 Or at 206 (presumption of equal contribution suggests equal
division appropriate if division based upon presumption).
Because the presumption of equal contribution under ORS
107.105(1)(f) is rebuttable, either or both of the parties may
seek to overcome it.  Massee, 328 Or at 204.  If a party seeks to
overcome that presumption, then that party has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the other
spouse's efforts during the marriage did not contribute equally
to the acquisition of the disputed marital asset.  Id.  In
assessing whether a party has satisfied that burden, ORS
107.105(1)(f) requires the court to consider both economic and
noneconomic spousal contributions, including the contributions of
a spouse as a homemaker.  ORS 107.105(1)(f) (court shall consider
contribution of spouse as homemaker).  Cf. Denton and Denton, 326
Or 236, 243-44, 951 P2d 693 (1998) (wife's willingness to
relocate, as well as her economic and domestic efforts, were
contributions to husband's enhanced earning capacity).  If a
party ultimately rebuts the presumption that the other spouse
contributed equally to a disputed marital asset, then the court
decides how to distribute that marital asset without regard to
any presumption and, instead, considers only what is "just and
proper in all the circumstances," including the proven
contributions of the parties to the asset.  Massee, 328 Or at
205.  When a party has proved that a marital asset was acquired
free of any contributions from the other spouse, however, this
court has determined that, absent other considerations, it is
"just and proper" to award that marital asset separately to the
party who has overcome the statutory presumption.  See Pierson,
294 Or at 123 (so stating).
After the court makes its preliminary determination of
the appropriate division of the marital assets by applying the
statutory presumption, ORS 107.105(1)(f) next requires that the
court consider what division of all the marital property –- that
is, both the marital assets and any other property that the
parties had brought into the marriage -- is "just and proper in
all the circumstances."  By contrast to the focus upon the
parties' respective contributions under the statutory
presumption, the court's final inquiry as to the "just and
proper" division concerns the equity of the property division in
view of all the circumstances of the parties.  See Seefeld and
Seefeld, 294 Or 345, 351, 657 P2d 201 (1982) (so describing
court's inquiry into "just and proper" division of marital
property under former ORS 107.105(1)(e) (1981)).  Although the
inquiry into the "just and proper" division necessarily includes
consideration of the statutory factors, including the court's
determination under the presumption of equal contribution, that
inquiry also takes into account the social and financial
objectives of the dissolution, as well as any other
considerations that bear upon the question of what division of
the marital property is equitable.  See Haguewood, 292 Or at 206-07 (division of martial property under former ORS 107.105(1)(e)
(1981) requires consideration of social and financial objectives
of dissolution); Jenks and Jenks, 294 Or 236, 241-42, 656 P2d 286
(1982) (statutory presumption is only one factor in achieving
equitable division of marital property).  Although they will vary
according to the individual circumstances of the parties, this
court has identified some of the equitable considerations under
ORS 107.105(1)(f) to include the preservation of assets; the
achievement of economic self-sufficiency for both spouses; the
particular needs of the parties and their children; and, as
discussed in more detail below, the extent to which a party has
integrated a separately acquired asset into the common financial
affairs of the marital partnership through commingling.  See
Richardson and Richardson, 307 Or 370, 381-82, 769 P2d 179 (1989)
(considering economic self-sufficiency); Seefeld, 294 Or at 351
(considering needs of children); Jenks, 294 Or at 242-43
(considering integration of asset); Haguewood, 292 Or at 208
(considering preservation of assets).  The trial court's ultimate
determination as to what property division is "just and proper in
all the circumstances" is a matter of discretion.  This court
will not disturb that discretionary determination unless it
concludes that the trial court misapplied the statutory and
equitable considerations that ORS 107.105(1)(f) requires.  See
Haguewood, 292 Or at 199-204 (discussing appellate review of
discretionary determination under former ORS 107.105(1)(e)
(1981)). 
B. Commingling and Court's Inquiry Under ORS 107.105(1)(f)
With that statutory framework in mind, we now turn to
the parties' arguments concerning the significance of commingling
to the court's inquiry under ORS 107.105(1)(f).  Wife argues
that, in addition to the National City property, she has rebutted
the presumption of equal contribution to the disputed equity in
the Germantown Road property and the Chaps Court property.  She
contends that the Court of Appeals failed to follow the statutory
directive set out in ORS 107.105(1)(f) because, in reaching a
contrary conclusion, that court did not focus upon the parties'
respective contributions but, instead, relied upon the fact that
wife had commingled those assets with the parties' joint
financial affairs.  According to wife, commingling justifies the
division of a separately acquired asset only when the source of
that asset has become obscured or when the social and financial
objectives of the dissolution otherwise cannot be achieved.  In
this case, wife argues that, even if she commingled the disputed
assets, her contributions are identifiable and outweigh any other
considerations relating to the equitable division of the marital
property.
Husband responds that, when a spouse commingles a
separately acquired asset with the parties' joint assets, then
the fact that that asset was acquired separately becomes
irrelevant.  That is so, husband argues, because, by commingling
the asset, the spouse has manifested an intent to transform the
separately acquired asset into a joint asset that is subject to
equal division at dissolution.  Based upon that argument, husband
contends that, in addition to the disputed equity in the
Germantown Road property and the Chaps Court property, he also is
entitled to an equal part of the National City property because
that property generated income that the parties had shared during
their marriage and that was an integral part of the parties'
joint retirement plans.
  This court first discussed commingling as a consideration under ORS 107.105(1)(f) in Jenks, 294 Or 236.  In
that case, this court held that, although the husband had
overcome the presumption that the wife had contributed equally to
a disputed marital asset, a "just and proper" division
nevertheless required the inclusion of that asset because the
husband had integrated that asset into the parties' common
financial affairs.  Id. at 241-43.  Since that decision, this
court has not clarified further when the integration of a
separately acquired asset through commingling requires that asset
to be included in the property division under ORS 107.105(1)(f). 
In light of the parties' competing contentions in this case, we
take the opportunity to do so here. 
1. Commingling and Tracing Contributions Under ORS
107.105(1)(f)
At the outset, because it appears to underlie the Court
of Appeals' reasoning below, we observe that the parties are in
agreement as to one way that commingling may affect the court's
analysis under ORS 107.105(1)(f) -- that is, the court's
identification of the parties' respective contributions to a
disputed property in deciding whether the statutory presumption
of equal contribution is rebutted.  The parties recognize that,
as a threshold evidentiary matter in challenging the statutory
presumption under ORS 107.105(1)(f), a spouse must be able to
identify that spouse's separate contribution to claim entitlement
to a disputed asset as an asset that was acquired separately. 
The parties further agree, as do we, that, when a spouse has
commingled a separately acquired asset with the joint assets of
the marital partnership, that act of commingling may make the
identification of the separately acquired asset so unreliable as
to defeat any claim on that spouse's part of an unequal
contribution by the other spouse.  Stated differently, when a
spouse has mixed a separately acquired asset with the joint
assets of the marital partnership –- for example, by depositing
separately acquired funds into an active account that also
contains joint funds –- then that act of commingling may preclude
the court from identifying that spouse's separate contribution
with sufficient reliability to rebut the statutory presumption
that both spouses have contributed equally to the disputed asset. 
Although this court previously has not confronted such an
evidentiary defect, the Court of Appeals decision in Olinger and
Olinger, 75 Or App 351, 707 P2d 64 (1985), rev den, 300 Or 367
(1985), is illustrative of that point.
In Olinger, the husband contended that he had overcome
the presumption of equal contribution by the wife to two
businesses that the parties had purchased during the marriage
with funds from their joint bank account and from a business that
the husband had brought into the marriage.  Id. at 353.  In
rejecting that argument, the Court of Appeals refused to
speculate as to which part of the funds used to purchase the
disputed businesses had constituted the husband's separate
property.  Id. at 355.  Although it concluded that the husband's
premarital equity in the business that he had brought into the
marriage was the husband's separate property, the court observed
that it could not trace the funds taken from that business as the
husband's separate property because, during the course of the
marriage, that business had become a mix of the husband's
separate property (that is, his premarital equity) and the
parties' joint property (that is, the appreciation of the
business during the marriage).  Id. at 355-56.  In light of that
conclusion, the court awarded to the husband separately only his
premarital equity in the business that he had brought into the
marriage, and it divided equally between the parties the
remaining property.  Id. at 356-57. (10)
Although ORS 107.105(1)(f) does not require the court
to undertake the task of tracing the parties' respective
contributions when commingling has made the identification of
those contributions unreliable, the fact that a party has
commingled a separately acquired asset with the shared finances
of the marital partnership does not create that difficulty in all
circumstances.  However, even if acts of commingling do not
preclude the court from identifying the source of a disputed
asset with sufficient reliability, the integration of a
separately acquired asset into the parties' joint financial
affairs through commingling may require the inclusion of that
asset in the property division for a different reason. 
Specifically, as discussed below, acts of commingling may operate
to convert a separately acquired asset into a joint asset of the
marital partnership. (11)
2. Commingling and "Just and Proper" Distribution of
Marital Property Under ORS 107.105(1)(f)
In Jenks, 294 Or at 242, and shortly thereafter in
Seefeld, 294 Or at 350, and Miller and Miller, 294 Or 660, 665,
661 P2d 1361 (1983), this court endorsed a "rescission" approach
to the division of property –- that is, to award each spouse that
spouse's separately acquired assets –- if the dissolution
occurred before the parties' financial affairs had become
intertwined.  In each of those cases, the court explained that,
the more integrated the parties' finances become during the
course of a marriage, the less significant is the origin of each
asset in fashioning the "just and proper" division of the marital
property at dissolution.  See Jenks, 294 Or at 242 (so stating);
Seefeld, 294 Or at 350 (same); Miller, 294 Or at 665 (same).  In
explaining the rationale underlying that consideration, the court
in Jenks observed:
"When couples enter marriage, they ordinarily commit themselves to an indefinite shared future of
which shared finances are a part.  Acquisitions are
made, foregone or replaced for the good of the family
unit rather than for the financial interests of either
spouse.  Property is bought, sold, enhanced,
diminished, intermixed and used without regard to ease
of division upon termination of the marriage.  All this
may be modified by agreement, of course, but, by the
nature of the marital relationship, couples ordinarily
pledge their troth for better or worse until death
parts them and their financial affairs are conducted
accordingly."
294 Or at 242.  Stated differently, the court recognized that,
when a spouse has treated a separately acquired asset as a joint
asset of the marital partnership, then the parties' shared
financial decisions during the marriage have been made in
reliance of that asset without consideration to whether it was
separately or jointly acquired.  This court's decisions in both
Jenks and Seefeld illustrate the application of that equitable
consideration.
In Jenks, 294 Or 236, the disputed property consisted
of real property that the husband alone had acquired by gift
during the marriage.  The court concluded that, because the
husband's acquisition of that property was unrelated to any
efforts by the wife, the husband had overcome the presumption
that the wife had contributed equally to its acquisition.  Id. at
241.  In considering the "just and proper" distribution of the
marital property, however, the court determined that the
inclusion of the disputed property in the property division
nevertheless was required.  Id. at 241-43.  Specifically, the
court observed that the parties had used the disputed property as
their marital home, which had enabled the parties to devote funds
that otherwise would have used for that purpose for other things. 
Id. at 242-43.  In addition, the court noted that, although the
husband had held it in his sole name, the parties had treated the
property as a joint asset, with the parties together renovating
the property and using it to raise their children.  Id.  
Similarly, in Seefeld, 294 Or 345, this court declined
to award the equity that the husband had invested in the family
home to the husband as separate property.  The court explained
that, although the husband had proved the amount of his separate
contribution to the family home, equity required the inclusion of
that asset in the property division because the parties had
purchased the home together and had used it to raise their child. 
Id. at 350-51. 
Since those decisions, the Court of Appeals frequently has applied commingling as a consideration when dividing property
under ORS 107.105(1)(f), although not always at the same point in
its analysis and not always with consistent results.  In its
decisions, that court generally has examined the facts of each
case to discern whether a spouse had intended to retain the
separately acquired asset as separate property or whether,
instead, that spouse's treatment of the separately acquired asset
demonstrated an intent for that asset to become a joint asset of
the marital partnership.  See, e.g., Albers and Albers, 174 Or
App 243, 248-49, 23 P3d 430 (2001) (considering wife's different
treatment of separately acquired inheritances).  To discern the
spouse's intent, that court has considered a number of different
factors, including (1) whether the disputed property was jointly
or separately held; (2) whether the parties shared control over
the disputed property; and (3) the degree of reliance upon the
disputed property as a joint asset.  See, e.g., Albers, 174 Or at
249 (considering title); Budge and Budge, 150 Or App 209, 216-17,
945 P2d 1101 (1997) (reliance upon treatment of disputed asset as
shared property); Taylor and Taylor, 121 Or App 635, 639-40, 856
P2d 325 (1993), modified on recons, 124 Or App 581, 863 P2d 473
(1993), rev den, 319 Or 626 (1994) (reliance); Becker and Becker,
122 Or App 567, 571, 858 P2d 480 (1993), rev den, 318 Or 60
(1993) (reliance); Hering and Hering, 84 Or App 360, 363, 733 P2d
956 (1987), rev den, 303 Or 534 (1987) (control over asset); cf.
Hadden and Hadden, 127 Or App 483, 873 P2d 394 (1994) (applying
rescission approach when neither party benefitted from other's
contribution, and both parties kept finances segregated).
We agree with the Court of Appeals that, in deciding
whether the court should include a separately acquired asset in
the property division because of commingling, the court's inquiry
properly focuses upon whether a spouse demonstrated an intent to
retain that spouse's separately acquired asset as separate
property or whether, instead, that spouse intended for that
property to become the joint property of the marital estate.  We
further agree with the considerations, discussed above, that the
Court of Appeals has applied to decide whether equity requires
the court to include a separately acquired asset in the property
division under ORS 107.105(1)(f) because of the integration of
that asset into the shared finances of the marital partnership
through commingling.  We caution, however, that acts of
commingling do not mandate in all cases the inclusion of
separately acquired property in the property division.  Instead,
the court must evaluate the extent to which a spouse has
integrated a separately acquired asset into the joint finances of
the marital partnership and also evaluate whether any inequity
would result from the award of that asset to that spouse as
separate property. (12)  With that analysis in mind, we now
turn to the application of ORS 107.105(1)(f) to the disputed
properties in this case.
C. Application of ORS 107.105(1)(f) to Disputed Properties  
Because it is our preliminary guide to the "just and proper" division of property under ORS 107.105(1)(f), we begin by
considering the application of the presumption of equal
contribution to the disputed properties in this case –- that is,
the National City property, wife's premarital equity in the
Germantown Road property, and the equity in the Chaps Court
property attributable to the proceeds from the sale of the
California duplex. (13)  We first consider the National City
property.  As did the trial court, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the National City property was a marital asset, but that
wife had rebutted the presumption that husband had contributed
equally both to its initial acquisition and to its appreciation
of value during the marriage.  Kunze, 181 Or App at 617-18.  The
Court of Appeals based those conclusions upon its findings that
wife had been the sole object of her aunt's donative intent and
that the appreciation in the value of that property had not
resulted from any efforts by either of the parties.  Id.  
On de novo review, we agree with the Court of Appeals'
finding that wife had been the sole object of her aunt's donative
intent and, for that reason, also agree with its conclusion that
wife has overcome the presumption that husband contributed
equally to the initial acquisition of that property.  Cf.
Pierson, 294 Or at 123 (wife rebutted presumption of equal
contribution by husband because wife's acquisition of property
was by sole inheritance unaffected by husband).  In addition,
because we agree with that court's finding that the National City
property had required minimal attention from either of the
parties during the marriage, and because husband does not contend
that his contributions during the marriage either directly or
indirectly affected that property, we further agree with that
court's conclusion that wife has overcome the presumption that
husband contributed equally to the appreciation of that property
during the marriage.  Thus, although we still must consider
whether a "just and proper" division of the marital property
requires that husband be awarded a part of that marital asset, we
conclude that husband is not entitled to a part of the value of
the National City property by virtue of the statutory
presumption. 
We next consider wife's premarital equity in the
Germantown Road property and the disputed equity in the Chaps
Court property.  The trial court concluded that, because she had
brought it into the marriage, wife's premarital equity in the
Germantown Road property was not a marital asset and that,
because husband had not contributed to it, it was "just and
proper" to award that equity to wife.  As to the Chaps Court
property, the trial court concluded that, although the parties
had acquired that property during the marriage, wife had rebutted
the presumption that husband had contributed equally to its
initial equity because wife had purchased that equity with only
funds from her separate inheritance.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reached a contrary
holding as to both the disputed properties.  That court first
determined that, because wife had deeded husband a joint
ownership interest in the Germantown Road property during the
marriage, wife's premarital equity in that property was a marital
asset subject to the presumption of equal contribution.  Kunze,
181 Or App at 618.  In applying that statutory presumption to the
disputed equity in the Germantown Road property and the Chaps
Court property, the court further concluded that, although wife's
separate funds had purchased those assets, wife had failed to
prove that husband's contribution was not equal to hers.  Id. at
618-19.  The court based that conclusion upon the fact that the
parties had held those assets jointly, explaining that, unless a
spouse has segregated a separately acquired asset from the joint
assets of the marital partnership, then the court will not trace
that asset back to its original source.  Id.  Particularly as to
the Germantown Road property, the court also found it significant
as to the statutory presumption that husband had provided
considerable labor that had benefitted that property.  Id.
On de novo review, we agree with the trial court's
conclusion that wife's premarital equity in the Germantown Road
property was not a marital asset subject to the statutory
presumption under ORS 107.105(1)(f) and further agree with that
court's conclusion that, as to the disputed equity in the Chaps
Court property, wife has overcome the presumption that husband
contributed equally.  Although wife held both those properties
jointly with husband at the time of the dissolution, that fact
did not preclude the court from ascertaining wife's separate
contribution.  Indeed, wife presented undisputed evidence that
the equity at issue in the Germantown Road property and the Chaps
Court property had originated solely from her separate funds.  In
addition, husband's efforts during the marriage to improve the
Germantown Road property contributed to its increase in value
during the marriage, but did not affect the equity that wife had
in that property before the marriage.  See Jenks, 294 Or at 241 n
2 ("[E]fforts expended after acquisition are relevant to division
of the value of improvements or appreciation, but do not affect
the preceding acquisition.").  Thus, although a "just and proper"
division may require that husband be awarded a part of those
marital assets, we conclude that husband is not entitled to a
part of the premarital equity in the Germantown Road property and
the equity in the Chaps Court property attributable to the
proceeds from the sale of the California duplex as a result of
his overall contributions to the marital partnership.
Having concluded that wife has rebutted the statutory presumption of equal contribution by husband to the disputed
assets, we now must consider what division of property is "just
and proper in all the circumstances."  ORS 107.105(1)(f). 
Because she has established that husband did not contribute to
their acquisition, wife presumptively is entitled to receive
those properties separate from the property division unless other
considerations require a different result. 
We first consider the impact of wife's acts of
commingling, beginning again with the National City property. 
The trial court determined that, although husband had enjoyed the
benefit of the income from that property during the marriage,
wife had not integrated that property into the parties' joint
financial affairs such that an equitable division required the
inclusion of that property.  In that regard, the trial court
pointed out that wife had held that property separately and that
the property was not included in any formal estate planning.  On
de novo review, we find no reason to disturb the trial court's
determination.
We next consider wife's premarital equity in the
Germantown Road property.  The trial court did not make any
express findings regarding the commingling of that property, but
it awarded that property to wife separately.  As noted, the Court
of Appeals, by contrast, ordered an equal division of that
property based upon the facts that wife had added husband to its
title and that husband had expended considerable labor to that
property's benefit.  
On de novo review, we are persuaded that the trial
court's disposition should not be disturbed.  Although wife added
husband to the title of that property, she did so only four years
before the dissolution and only to secure financing for the
parties' construction project.  In addition, except during the
initial years of the marriage, the parties did not use that
property as their marital residence.  Finally, although husband
contributed labor to that property, he has received the benefit
of that contribution from the division of the appreciation of
that property that had accrued during the marriage. 
Lastly, we consider the disputed equity in the Chaps
Court property.  Although the trial court expressed some
reservation as to whether wife should receive that equity
separately, it ultimately determined that wife's contributions
outweighed commingling as an equitable concern.  Specifically,
the court found that the parties had owned that property for only
six years and that the parties' joint efforts relating to that
property did not justify a distribution of wife's separate equity
to husband.  The Court of Appeals, as noted, found that husband
was entitled to an equal part of that property because the
parties had held that property jointly.
On de novo review, we conclude that the trial court
erred in excluding the disputed equity in the Chaps Court
property from the property division.  Wife's acts of commingling
as to the Chaps Court property reveal that she intended that
property, including the equity that she contributed from the
funds from her inheritance, to be the joint property of both
parties.  Wife purchased the Chaps Court property jointly with
husband in tenancy by the entirety, and, by contrast to the
Germantown Road property, she introduced no evidence at trial
that showed that she had intended to retain her separately
acquired equity in that property as her separate property.  Under
those circumstances, we conclude that husband established that
wife had converted that asset to a joint asset of the marital
partnership through commingling, and it is "just and proper in
all the circumstances" to divide that asset equally.
Finally, we consider whether any other equitable
considerations compel the inclusion of wife's separately acquired
properties in the property division.  We find none.  Husband
testified at trial that, although he had not been employed for
the preceding seven years, nothing prevented him from working on
a full-time basis in the future.  Cf. Richardson, 307 Or at 382
(awarding wife larger share of marital assets in part because her
emotional maladies prevented her from working full time).  In
addition, husband was 42 years old at the time of the trial, and,
although he testified that he did not know what type of work he
would perform in the future, he has sufficient education and
skills to be competitive in the labor market for a long time to
come and to prepare for his retirement.  Finally, an equal
division of the jointly acquired marital assets is adequate to
enable both parties to achieve a reasonable degree of economic
self-sufficiency.  Cf. Pierson, 294 Or at 124 (unequal division
of marital assets warranted to allow both spouses to achieve
economic self-sufficiency).  In sum, we conclude that husband is
entitled to a part of the initial equity in the Chaps Court
property, but is not entitled to a part of the National City
property or wife's premarital equity in the Germantown Road 
property.
III. ENHANCED EARNING CAPACITY PROPERTY AWARD
 We next consider the trial court's property award to wife for her contributions to husband's enhanced earning
capacity.  Although the 1999 Legislative Assembly eliminated
recognition of enhanced earning capacity as a form of divisible
property at dissolution, ORS 107.105(1)(f) (1997) formerly
provided, in part:
"The present value of, and income resulting from,   the future enhanced earning capacity of either party   may be considered as property.  The presumption of   equal contribution to the acquisition of martial   property, however, shall not apply to enhanced earning  
capacity.  A spouse asserting an interest in the income 
 resulting from an enhancement of earning capacity of the other spouse must demonstrate that the spouse made  
 a material contribution to the enhancement.  Material  
contribution can be shown by, among other things,   having contributed, financially or otherwise, to the   education and training that resulted in the enhanced   earning capacity.  The contribution shall have been   substantial and of prolonged duration." (14)
As noted previously, __ Or at __ (slip op at 12), the
Court of Appeals concluded that husband did not have an enhanced
earning capacity that was property subject to division because
wife presented no evidence at trial that husband actually had or
would derive any economic benefit from his degree.  Specifically,
the court determined that, because ORS 107.105(1)(f) (1997)
describes a spouse's property interest in the other spouse's
enhanced earning capacity as "an interest in the income
resulting" from that capacity, the legislature intended that the
capacity actually must produce earnings to constitute divisible
property.  Kunze, 181 Or App at 620, 620 n 7.  In this case, the
court determined that any value that husband had in his
construction management degree was hypothetical because, although
husband had earned that degree 10 years before the trial, he
never had made use of the degree, and no evidence suggested that
he planned to make use of it in the future.  Id. at 620.  Based
upon those findings, the court concluded that the trial court had
erred by awarding wife $22,616 for her interest in husband's
enhanced earning capacity.  Id.
On de novo review, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that, because wife presented no evidence at trial that husband
had used his degree in the past or planned to use it in the
future, wife failed to establish that husband has derived any
economic benefit from his degree.  For the reasons that the Court
of Appeals articulated, we further agree that, to be entitled to
a property award for enhanced earning capacity under ORS
107.105(1)(f) (1997), a party must show that his or her
contributions resulted, or likely would result, in increased
earnings for the other spouse. (15)  Because wife has not made
such a showing here, the judgment of dissolution also is modified
to eliminate the enhanced earning capacity property award to wife
by awarding husband an additional $22,616 in the property
division.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, we conclude that the trial court correctly
determined that husband is not entitled to any of the disputed
real properties by virtue of the statutory presumption of equal
contribution under ORS 107.105(1)(f).  We further conclude that
the trial court's separate property award to wife of the National
City property and her premarital equity in the Germantown Road
property is "just and proper in all the circumstances."  As to
the disputed equity in the Chaps Court property, however, we
conclude that it is "just and proper in all the circumstances" to
divide that property equally between the parties because husband
established that wife had converted that asset into a joint asset
of the marital partnership through commingling.  Finally, because
wife failed to show that husband's degree resulted, or likely
would result, in higher earnings for husband, we conclude that
the trial court's property award to wife for her contributions to
husband's enhanced earning capacity was in error.  Consistently
with those conclusions, the judgment of the trial court is
modified to award husband a judgment in the amount of $107,616
against wife, plus simple interest at a rate of nine percent per
annum, payable in full on or before January 1, 2005.  Interest
shall accrue from the date of this decision but shall not be
payable until principle balance is due.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified in part and, as modified, affirmed.  The judgment of the circuit
court is modified in part and, as modified, affirmed.
1. As described in more detail later in our discussion, __
Or at __ n 9, __ n 14 (slip op at 14 n 9, 39 n 14), the
legislature amended ORS 107.105(1)(f) in both 1999 and 2003.  See
Or Laws 1999, ch 587, § 1; Or Laws 2003, ch 576, § 109.  Because
this dissolution action was filed before the effective date of
the 1999 amendments, the subsequent citations to ORS
107.105(1)(f) in this opinion refer to the 1997 version of that
statute.  See Or Laws 1999, ch 587, § 1 (setting out effective
date of October 23, 1999).  At the outset, however, we note that
the legislature's 1999 and 2003 amendments to ORS 107.105(1)(f)
do not affect our analysis as to the significance of commingling
in determining the "just and proper" division of marital property
under that statute.
2. Except where otherwise noted, the real property that we
refer to in this case is located in Oregon.
3. The cattle operation at the Calkins Lane property
apparently never generated a profit for the parties.
4. The parties originally purchased the properties as two
lots, but then successfully petitioned to have one of those lots
partitioned into two lots.
5. The parties stipulated that wife would retain the North
Dakota farm property that she had brought into the marriage, and
they did not assign it a value for purposes of the property
distribution.  Husband, however, requested that the trial court
consider that property in determining the "just and proper"
division of the marital property.  The parties also stipulated to
the division of certain other personal property, which the trial
court did not consider in determining the property division in
this case.
6. Before the Court of Appeals, wife asserted that the
trial court had assigned a value of $288,322 to husband's
enhanced earning capacity.  The Court of Appeals disagreed.  It
found instead that the trial court had assigned a value of only
$22,616 to wife's interest in husband's enhanced earning
capacity, which it awarded to husband to offset the shortfall to
husband that otherwise would have resulted from the trial court's
division of specific properties between the parties.  Kunze, 181
Or App at 613, 613 n 4.  Before this court, wife again asserts
that the trial court had valued husband's enhanced earning
capacity at $288,322 for purposes of the property division.  We,
however, agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court had
assigned a value of only $22,616 to wife's interest in that
capacity.
7. In sum, based upon the trial court's division of the marital
property, the trial court's judgment of dissolution awarded to
each party property with the value of $199,149 and to wife
separately property with the value of $581,616, along with the
North Dakota farm property.
8. The Court of Appeals arrived at that figure by awarding
husband one-half of the values of both wife's premarital equity
in the Germantown Road property ($32,500) and the equity in the
Chaps Court property attributable to the proceeds of the
California duplex ($85,000), as well as by increasing husband's
award by the amount that the trial court had awarded to wife for
her interest in husband's enhanced earning capacity ($22,616). 
Kunze, 181 Or App at 621.  Under the Court of Appeals'
modification of the property division, each party received a
property award with a value of $316,649, and wife additionally
received a separate property award with a value of $324,000,
along with the North Dakota farm property.
9. The 1999 Legislative Assembly amended the first sentence of
ORS 107.105(1)(f) by substituting the word "may" for "has power *
* * to."  See Or Laws 1999, ch 587, § 1.  The 2003 Legislative
Assembly changed the wording of the part of ORS 107.105(1)(f) set
out above by substituting "renders a judgment" for "grants a
decree" and "the court may provide in the judgment" for "it may
further decree as follows."  See Or Laws 2003, ch 576, § 109.  As
noted previously, __ Or at __ n 1 (slip op at 1 n 1), those
changes to the statute do not affect our analysis in this case.
10. We note that, in Stice, 308 Or 316, this court
considered commingling for a different reason under the statutory
presumption of equal contribution.  In concluding that the wife
had failed to rebut the statutory presumption in that case, the
court found it persuasive that the parties had commingled their
financial affairs and that the wife had not shown that the
husband considered the disputed assets to be the wife's separate
property.  Id. at 328-29.  Specifically, the court observed that
that evidence strengthened the presumption that the husband had
made an equal contribution by showing that the husband had
enabled the wife to devote her income to the purchase of the
disputed assets.  Id.  The reasoning in Stice, however, is
inapposite to this case, because husband here does not contend
that his efforts during the marriage contributed either directly
or indirectly to the disputed marital property; rather, as
discussed below, he argues only that he is entitled to a part of
those assets because the wife's acts of commingling converted
those assets into joint assets of the marital partnership.
11. Some jurisdictions refer to the change in the character
of separately acquired property to joint property from
commingling as "transmutation."  See, e.g., Peterkin v. Peterkin,
293 SC 311, 360 SE 2d 311 (1987); Stainbeck v. Stainbeck, 11 Va
App 13, 396 SE 2d 686 (1990).
12. In Massee, 328 Or at 210, this court stated that "[i]t
is not proper for the court to focus solely on either the
duration of the marriage or the extent to which the parties
commingle their financial affairs when dividing that marital
property."  In so stating, this court intended only to caution
that the court first must apply the statutory considerations
under ORS 107.105(1)(f), including the presumption of equal
contribution to marital assets, before applying commingling as an
equitable consideration.
13. As noted previously, __ Or at __ (slip op at 9), wife
agreed at trial that, based upon his contributions during the
marriage, husband was entitled to an equal part of the
appreciation in the values of the Germantown Road property and
the Chaps Court property that had accrued during the marriage.
14. As noted previously, __ Or at __ n 1 (slip op at 1    
n 1), ORS 107.105(1)(f) (1997) applies in this case, because this
dissolution action was filed before the effective date of the
1999 amendment.
15. At the same time that the 1999 Legislative Assembly
amended ORS 105.107(1)(f) to eliminate enhanced earning capacity
as a form of divisible property, it also enacted a new spousal
support statute that includes a provision for compensatory
spousal support.  See Or Laws 1999, ch 587, § 1.  We offer no
opinion as to whether a showing of actual or likely increased
earnings also is necessary for a compensatory spousal support
award under that statute.  See ORS 107.105(1)(d)(B) (setting out
factors to be considered in awarding compensatory spousal
support).