Case Title: Miller v. Stovall

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Miller v. Stovall1986 WY 85717 P.2d 798Case Number: 85-232Decided: 04/07/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Harold I. 
MILLER and Norma J. Miller, husband and wife, Appellants 
(Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
Helen 
STOVALL, Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from District Court, GoshenCounty, John T. Langdon, 
J.

 
 
Donald E. 
Jones, of Jones & Graham Law Offices, Torrington, for appellants 
(defendants).

 
 
Michael E. 
Warren, of Sawyer, Warren & Kautz, Torrington, for appellee 
(plaintiff).

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

 
 

BROWN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellee Helen Stovall 
filed a complaint in district court alleging that appellants Harold I. and Norma 
J. Miller had ousted her from the south sixty feet of her property. Appellee 
relied on her deed and survey to support her claim. Appellants answered the 
complaint by asserting that in 1950 the disputed sixty feet had been granted to 
their predecessors in interest by an oral agreement in exchange for an easement 
over their property. Appellants also asserted that appellee was barred by the 
statute of limitations, § 1-3-103, W.S. 1977, and that they had acquired title 
to the disputed area by adverse possession. The trial court found that the 
alleged agreement was "incredulous," that even if there was such an agreement it 
was void under the statute of frauds, § 1-23-105(a)(v), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 
1985, and that appellants had not established their claim of adverse possession. 
The court enjoined each party from interfering with the others' use of their 
property as described in their deeds, and granted appellee a nonexclusive 
easement of necessity for ingress and egress to her 
property.

 
 

[¶2.]     Appellants contend that 
the judgment is based upon limited findings of material facts, which are 
basically erroneous mixtures of conclusions of fact and law. We hold that the 
trial court's findings must be sustained under the applicable standards of 
review and affirm, accordingly.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellants state the 
issue as follows:

 
 
"Whether 
an originally agreed boundary line (1) intended by the parties in good faith to 
resolve ownership interests (2) at variance with the descriptions in the deeds 
emanating from a common grantor and (3) acquiesced in and recognized as the 
boundary line between various subsequent adjoining landowners (4) for in excess 
of 25 years is binding upon the present conterminous 
owners."

 
 
This 
statement assumes factual findings that the trial court did not make. We believe 
the following questions are presented by this appeal:

 
 
I

 
 
Was there 
a valid oral agreement settling a boundary different from that stated in the 
deeds?

 
 
II

 
 
If there 
was no such agreement, is the finding by the trial court that appellants failed 
to establish their claim of adverse possession clearly 
erroneous?

 
 
III

 
 
Was 
appellee barred by estoppel or laches from asserting her claim to the disputed 
area?

 
 

[¶4.]     Dale and Hazel Davidson 
owned a tract of land measuring approximately 436' X 100'. In 1950, the 
Davidsons conveyed the north one-half of this tract to their daughter and her 
husband, the Hendricksons. As stated by appellants, the deed conveying this 
parcel "simply granted the north half of the metes and bounds description 
originally conveyed to Dale Davidson." This north half of the tract was 
subsequently conveyed to the Stewarts and finally in 1962 from the Stewarts to 
appellee. In all of these transfers, the north half of the entire tract was 
conveyed. In 1980, Hazel Davidson conveyed the south half of the tract to 
appellants.

 
 

[¶5.]     Sometime in 1975 
appellee had her parcel of land surveyed. As a result of this survey, appellee 
attempted to erect a fence on the border of the two tracts as shown by the 
survey. Mrs. Davidson tore the fence down and told appellee that the border was 
actually four feet beyond a shed on the property. According to the survey, a 
boundary along this shed would be approximately sixty feet north of the original 
boundary which divided the entire tract into two equal parcels. The following 
sketch facilitates discussion: 

 
 
Sketch

 
 

[¶6.]     When appellee attempted 
to build the fence, Mrs. Davidson told her that when the north half was first 
conveyed to the Hendricksons there was an oral agreement shifting the boundary 
to the new position Davidson now claimed. The alleged agreement was made because 
the Hendricksons, new owners of the north half, required an easement across the 
south half to reach the road. Because of this easement, and a previously 
reserved easement on the south boundary of the south half, the Davidsons and the 
Hendricksons decided that it was necessary to adjust the boundary between the 
north and south halves, so that each would have approximately the same useable 
area of land. The "agreed boundary" was settled as four feet north of the shed 
and along a fence which, in various states of repair, ran east from the 
shed.

 
 

[¶7.]     This 1975 dispute was 
the first time appellee learned of the oral agreement. The alleged agreement was 
never reduced to writing and no indication of it appeared in any of the deeds 
conveying the north half of the tract. Mrs. Davidson conveyed the south half of 
the tract to appellants in 1980, and again the deed made no mention of the 
"agreed boundary" but rather conveyed "the south half" of the entire tract. The 
day before trial Mrs. Davidson quitclaimed to appellants any interest she had in 
the disputed area.

 
 

[¶8.]     Appellee again 
attempted to fence along the surveyed boundary in 1982. This time it was 
appellants who tore down the fence and asserted ownership to the disputed area. 
Appellants later improved the old fence, which extended from the shed. Appellee 
then brought an action seeking possession of the disputed area, damages from 
appellants, and an easement over the south half appurtenant to the north 
half.

 
 

[¶9.]     A trial was held before 
the judge sitting without a jury. The court granted the disputed area to 
appellee and also gave appellee an easement of necessity for ingress and egress. 
No damages were awarded. Appellants claim that this judgment must be reversed, 
because the findings of fact supporting it are erroneous and because the 
judgment disrupts an accepted boundary line, settled in good faith and 
acquiesced in for a long period of time.

 
 
I

 
 

[¶10.]  The trial court found that the alleged 
oral agreement was "incredulous." It also found that if any oral agreement did 
exist, it was voided by the statute of frauds, specifically § 1-23-105(a)(v). 
Therefore, it held that any claim to the disputed area based on this agreement 
could not stand.

 
 

[¶11.]  We begin by looking at the statute of 
frauds, which provides in pertinent part:

 
 
"(a) In 
the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some 
note or memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith:

 
 
"(v) Every 
agreement or contract for the sale of real estate, or the lease thereof, for 
more than one (1) year." § 1-23-105, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 
1985.

 
 

[¶12.]  The contract for the sale of real estate 
as contemplated by the statute is one for the transfer of property or real 
estate, for a fixed price in money or its equivalent. Allen v. Allen, Wyo., 550 P.2d 1137 (1976). In the present 
case, the alleged oral agreement made between the Davidsons and Hendricksons 
involved a transfer of the disputed area in exchange for the easement across the 
south half. Such an agreement would fit within § 
1-23-105(a)(v).

 
 

[¶13.]  Appellants claim, however, that the 
boundary agreed to by the Davidsons and Hendricksons is binding upon their 
successors regardless of the statute of frauds. We do not agree. 6 Thompson on 
Real Property § 3035, p. 508 (1962), speaks of boundaries by agreement or 
practical location.

 
 
"In many 
states it is recognized that adjoining landowners may by an understanding not 
affected by deeds determine their boundary line in such a manner as to have it 
binding upon themselves and their successors. This is called `practical 
location.' * * *"

 
 
However, 
the doctrine of boundary by agreement is limited. Thompson, supra, states 
clearly that "[o]ral agreements changing known boundary lines violate the 
statute of frauds." The rationale is that "* * * if the boundary line is not 
doubtful or in dispute, an oral agreement for its change is invalid, this 
involving an actual transfer of land, within the statute. * * *" 2 Tiffany, The 
Law of Real Property § 653, p. 679 (3d ed. 1939).

 
 

[¶14.]  Appellants point out that this court 
recognized boundary by agreement in Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 491, 236 P. 517 
(1925). Carstensen, however, also recognized the limitation discussed above. 
There, Justice Blume stated that "want of knowledge of the true boundary, and 
uncertainty thereof, is made the very basis of the agreement." Id., 32 Wyo. at 500, 236 P.  at 520. The court in 
Carstensen did ultimately hold the parties bound by the agreed line; however, in 
that case there was no question but that the boundary line was uncertain. This 
fact distinguishes Carstensen from the present case.

 
 

[¶15.]  The court below found that there was no 
disputed boundary in this case. Appellants contest this finding, while appellee 
states that uncontroverted evidence shows there was no dispute. 

 
 

[¶16.]  In Sowerwine v. Nielson, Wyo., 671 P.2d 295, 301 (1983), a boundary 
dispute case, we stated the applicable standard of review:

 
 
"Thus, on 
appeal, it is a firmly established and oft-stated rule that we must accept the 
evidence of the successful party as true, leave out of consideration entirely 
the evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give to the 
evidence of the successful party every favorable inference that may fairly and 
reasonably be drawn from it. * * * [T]he findings and judgment of the trial 
court must be sustained unless clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight 
of the evidence. [Citations.]"

 
 

[¶17.]  On examination by appellee's attorney, 
Mrs. Davidson testified as follows:

 
 
"Q. Now, 
as I understand it, there was never any dispute between you and the Hendricksons 
as to where the property line would have been if it would not have been for this 
exchange of property?

 
 
"A. No, or 
never between any of the other purchasers of this piece of 
land.

 
 
"Q. What I 
am saying is, there was never any dispute here that this would have been the 
line until you made that exchange; is that correct?

 
 
"A. No, 
never."

 
 
In 
addition, Mr. Hendrickson testified that the agreed line was intentionally 
placed north of the true line in exchange for the 
easement.

 
 

[¶18.]  In light of the above, we cannot say that 
the trial court's determination was clearly erroneous. Appellants' theory, 
concerning the agreement, was that the disputed area was retained because of 
land lost to easements over the south half. We fail to see how the parties could 
have intended the fair exchange appellants assert if the boundary of each parcel 
was disputed. The evidence supports the conclusion that this was an exchange of 
property and not a settling of a disputed boundary, and as such, was within the 
statute of frauds.

 
 

[¶19.]  The trial court in its decision letter 
also found that despite claims from both Mr. Hendrickson and Mrs. Davidson to 
the contrary, the oral agreement was "incredulous." This characterization of the 
claimed oral agreement is imprecise. Although inartfully stated, when read in 
context, it appears that the trial court did not believe such an agreement 
existed. For example, after labelling the agreement "incredulous," the court 
stated that there was no reason "why the Davidsons would convey by deed, a piece 
of property, and simultaneously, orally, and in a separate deal, attempt to take 
back a portion of this same property." Later the decision letter stated: "The 
oral agreement, even if there was such * * * is void." Although appellants 
presented testimony alleging that there was an oral 
agreement

 
 
"this 
court has previously stated that a trial judge is entitled to disbelieve 
uncontradicted testimony, particularly that part based upon opinion where there 
were facts and circumstances tending to discredit it. [Citation.] * * *" Boode 
v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company, Wyo., 458 P.2d 653, 658 
(1969).

 
 

[¶20.]  Additionally, the trial court, in 
supporting its conclusion that no oral agreement existed, noted that subsequent 
conveyances of the north half never mentioned a "carve out" even though the 
grantors in those conveyances allegedly agreed to the "carve out," and that Mrs. 
Davidson did not attempt to convey the disputed property to appellants in the 
1980 transfer. The court also noted that the only access to the north half of 
the property after its division was by an easement over the south half. Finally, 
the court stated that although the "agreement" allegedly granted the Davidsons 
four feet north of the shed, the evidence showed that, at most, they only used 
the area up to the shed, as there existed a "fence of convenience" which 
consisted of wire strung between trees and the back wall of the 
shed.

 
 

[¶21.]  From this evidence, the trial court's 
finding that there was no agreement should be sustained. The manner in which the 
alleged agreement was made questions the existence of such an agreement, i.e., 
failure of later conveyances to mention it, and the claimed use of the property. 
This finding also distinguishes cases in which there clearly was an agreement to 
exchange land, and subsequent actions pursuant to such agreement upon which 
appellants attempt to rely. See, e.g., Rohrbaugh v. Mokler, 26 Wyo. 514, 188 P. 448 
(1920). Again, under the applicable standard of review, we sustain the trial 
court's finding concerning the alleged agreement.

 
 
II

 
 

[¶22.]  Appellants claim that if the oral 
agreement is void, then the Davidsons adversely possessed the disputed area from 
1950 to 1975.

 
 
"The 
elements of adverse possession consist of actual, open, notorious, exclusive and 
continuous possession of another's real property for the statutory period, which 
possession must be hostile, and under a claim of right or color of title. 
[Citation.]" Rutar Farms and Livestock, Inc., v. Fuss, Wyo., 651 P.2d 1129, 1132 
(1982).

 
 

[¶23.]  In order to establish title to property 
acquired by adverse possession, the claimant has the burden of proving the above 
elements. The claimant must show that these elements existed for at least ten 
years prior to the commencement of an action affecting title to or possession of 
the property. Farella v. Rumney, Wyo., 
649 P.2d 185 (1982). See § 1-3-103, W.S. 1977.1

 
 

[¶24.]  Our standard of review of evidence 
attempting to prove or disprove the existence of these elements is well settled. 
Where the evidence is conflicting or where there is evidence to sustain the 
trial court's finding, this court will not interfere with that finding unless it 
is clearly erroneous or so totally against the great weight of the evidence as 
to be manifestly wrong. In Snell v. Ruppert, Wyo., 
582 P.2d 916, 917 (1978), we noted:

 
 
"* * * 
[I]n almost every case it has been the conclusion of this court that when a 
claim such as adverse possession, which is peculiarly factual in nature, is 
questioned on appeal, the decision of the trial court, because of its proximity 
to the witnesses and evidence involved, should be given considerable 
deference."

 
 

[¶25.]  However, although findings of fact are 
presumed correct, this presumption is overcome if, on review of the entire 
evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a finding is in 
error. Findings of fact can also lose the insulation of the clearly erroneous 
standard if they are induced by an erroneous view of the law. D.A. Shores v. 
D.L. Lindsey, Wyo., 591 P.2d 895 
(1979).

 
 

[¶26.]  In this case the trial court found that 
the claimants had not carried their burden of proving the existence of all the 
elements necessary to establish adverse possession of the disputed area. 
Specifically, in its opinion letter, the court stated that there was no 
antagonistic or hostile occupation of the disputed area for the statutory 
period, and that possession under claim of right or color of title had not been 
established. Appellants claim that there "is not a single thread of evidence" 
that indicates the adjacent landowners believed the Davidsons' occupancy was 
permissive and thus not hostile. They also contend that the Davidsons occupied 
the land under a "claim of right."

 
 

[¶27.]  Appellants, having acquired the property 
some five years ago, cannot claim to have adversely possessed the same for the 
statutory period. They must rely on the doctrine of tacking in order to 
successfully claim adverse possession. In this connection, they argue that the 
Davidsons took possession of the disputed area in 1950 under claim of right and 
not by permission of the Hendricksons. According to appellants this possession 
continued until 1975.

 
 

[¶28.]  An adverse occupant cannot tack the 
possession of a prior occupant to perfect adverse title where the predecessor 
could not claim the land adversely. Tissino v. Mavraksis, 67 Wyo. 560, 228 P.2d 106 
(1951). If appellants' predecessor held the disputed territory by permission and 
not hostilely, the claim of adverse possession must fail. Johnson v. Szumowicz, 
63 Wyo. 211, 
179 P.2d 1012 (1947). This court in Johnson v. Szumowicz followed the 
well-recognized rule that when possession is taken with permission of the owner, 
the possession does not become adverse without a distinct and open disavowal of 
the title of the owner, brought home to the owner. Appellee asserts that if the 
agreement to exchange land was void, then the rule stated in Johnson v. 
Szumowicz, supra, controls. We cannot agree. Under the circumstances of this 
case the Davidsons possessed the land believing, albeit erroneously, that they 
owned the disputed tract as a result of the oral 
agreement.

 
 

[¶29.]  Pendley v. Pendley, Ala., 
338 So. 2d 405, 406 (1976), is a case that determined the question of hostility 
under similar circumstances. The question was stated by that 
court:

 
 
"* * * Is 
possession by the grantee of an oral conveyance, which is invalid to pass title, 
adverse to the grantor of such conveyance?"

 
 
The 
question was answered in the affirmative; the answer turned on the 
interpretation of "hostile." Use of land intended to be surrendered by the 
titleholder is "hostile," because the use is not in subordination to the 
titleholder. As stated in 3 Am.Jur.2d Adverse Possession § 35, p. 121 
(1962),

 
 
"[i]t is 
not necessary that he [the adverse possessor] should have intended to take away 
from the true owner * * *; it is the intention to possess, and not the intent to 
take irrespective of his right, which governs."

 
 

[¶30.]  The conclusion of the Alabama court, 
which we believe to be correct, also finds support in 4 Tiffany, The Law of Real 
Property § 1182, p. 916 (3d ed. 1975):

 
 
"One who 
goes into possession of land under a transfer of the land from the owner, * * * 
which is invalid because oral merely, may usually assert the bar of the statute 
against the owner if his possession continues for the statutory period, since 
his possession is presumed to be adverse to any right in the owner. * * 
*"

 
 

[¶31.]  Thus, if the trial court's finding of 
absence of hostility was based upon "permission" arising from a void oral 
exchange, it would be supported by an erroneous view of the law. The lack of 
hostility, however, was not based upon the court finding the agreement void, for 
the trial court found the agreement itself "incredulous," in other words, not to 
be believed. We have earlier determined that the finding must be sustained; we 
now review the trial court's determination that the Davidsons' use of the 
disputed area was not hostile or antagonistic.

 
 

[¶32.]  Mrs. Davidson, as well as appellee's 
predecessors in interest to the north half, testified below. All testified that 
the Davidsons used the disputed area and, as stated above, Mrs. Davidson and Mr. 
Hendrickson testified that the Davidsons used the area because they believed it 
belonged to them under the oral agreement. Yet, "* * * while the words of the 
claimant should be taken into consideration, intent as to the character of 
possession may be better ascertained by acts of possession. * * *" D.A.Shores v. D.L. Lindsey, supra, 591 P.2d  at 
901. A party's conduct after the time he claimed to have acquired title by 
adverse possession might be said to have little relevance, but this court 
believes that such later conduct also indicates his intent during the period of 
asserted adverse possession. Rutar Farms & Livestock, Inc., v. Fuss, 
supra.

 
 

[¶33.]  Although Mrs. Davidson claimed she held 
the disputed area as hers from 1950, the trial court found that Davidson did not 
hold hostilely. Actions of Mrs. Davidson, after the statutory period had run, 
support the court's finding. In 1967 or 1968, according to appellee's testimony, 
Mrs. Davidson asked her if she could move some of her chickens into the shed on 
the disputed property. Mrs. Davidson also failed to include the disputed area in 
her conveyance to appellants. These acts are inconsistent with Mrs. Davidson's 
contention that she always claimed to own the land. In Tissino v. Mavrakis, 
supra, we noted that if a person really claimed to own disputed property by 
adverse possession, it was strange that he would not include that property in a 
deed conveying all of the tract he clearly owned. In addition to these indicias 
of lack of hostile intent, appellee also testified that in 1975 Mrs. Davidson 
erected a stronger fence along the "oral boundary" thus causing appellee to 
speak with Mrs. Davidson regarding a survey of the property in order to 
establish the proper boundaries. Mrs. Davidson's response was alleged to be to 
the effect that appellee should have the property surveyed and the fence would 
be removed if the survey showed that the fence encroached upon appellee's land. 
Although Mrs. Davidson later refused to abide by the survey, her initial 
response also indicated that she did not claim the land to the old 
fence.

 
 

[¶34.]  This evidence is sufficient to sustain 
the trial court's finding that the property was not held hostilely by the 
Davidsons. This finding destroys the claim of adverse possession on the part of 
the Davidsons, at least until 1975, and in turn prevents appellants from 
successfully tacking to their possessory period the time the disputed area was 
allegedly adversely possessed by the Davidsons. Although appellants presented 
evidence which supports their claim that the land was under the Davidsons' 
hostile possession, and continue to pursue that claim before this court, we must 
remember the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. We do not reverse findings 
and judgments merely because this court may have decided the question 
differently. Doenz v. Garber, Wyo., 665 P.2d 932 
(1983).

 
 

[¶35.]  The question of whether the Davidsons 
held under a "claim of right"2 was also decided adversely to the 
appellants. "Claim of right" means that the entry by the claimant must be to 
claim the property as his own and to hold it for himself. 7 Powell, The Law of 
Real Property § 1013[2][f] (1982). Appellants contend that the trial court 
erroneously found that there must be a mistake in fact or belief in order to 
find a "claim of right." Whether the trial court's finding on this element was 
based upon erroneous application of the law is immaterial in light of our 
holding sustaining the finding that appellants failed to carry their burden of 
establishing the element of hostility necessary to their 
claim.

 
 
III

 
 

[¶36.]  Appellants assert that because the 
Davidsons owned both parcels at one time and established an agreed boundary, 
this practical location is binding upon the grantees and their successors who 
take with reference to that boundary. This doctrine applies only if the parcels 
are sold with reference to the boundary established by the grantor. Cunningham, 
Stoebuck & Whitman, Law of Property § 11.8 (1984). Here, appellants claim 
that the Hendricksons purchased with knowledge of the line marked by the fence. 
Although this may be true, the land was conveyed by deeds without reference to 
the fence, but rather to halves of the entire parcel. Under these circumstances 
the doctrine is not applicable.

 
 

[¶37.]  Appellants also contend that appellee 
should be barred from claiming title to the disputed area under the equitable 
doctrine of estoppel. To support a claim of estoppel the party "must establish 
two elements (1) there must be a lack of knowledge of facts and no means of 
discovering these facts; and (2) there must be detrimental reliance upon the 
representation. * * *" National Crude, Inc. v. Ruhl, Wyo., 
600 P.2d 716, 720 (1979). Here, appellee twice attempted to erect a fence along 
the surveyed boundary line. Mrs. Davidson tore the fence down the first time, as 
did appellants the second. As pointed out by the trial court, appellants did not 
rely on any representations by appellee. Their actions showed that they openly 
disputed appellee's contention as to the boundary. This boundary could easily be 
established by a survey and reference to their deed. Estoppel is not applicable 
here.

 
 

[¶38.]  Nor can we accept appellants' contention 
that laches should prevent appellee from asserting her claim. "Laches is a form 
of equitable estoppel based on an unreasonable delay by a party in asserting a 
right. * * *" Murphy v. Stevens, Wyo., 645 P.2d 82, 91 (1982). Unless the delay 
has worked an injustice, prejudice or disadvantage to the defendant it is not of 
itself laches. Id. Again, appellants cannot bring themselves 
within the protection afforded by the doctrine. After appellee had the property 
surveyed, she twice attempted to erect a fence and her attorney wrote appellants 
concerning the dispute. Although it appears appellants have made some 
improvements to the fence, we do not believe that any loss they will suffer can 
be attributed to appellee's undue delay in asserting her right to the 
property.

 
 

[¶39.]  Finally, appellants contend that it was 
error to deny their claim to the disputed area and yet grant appellee the 
easement over their property. They contend that appellee cannot refute the oral 
agreement and at the same time seek to benefit under the agreement. Appellants, 
however, misconceive the reason appellee was granted an easement. The trial 
court granted the easement not pursuant to the alleged oral agreement, but 
rather as an easement of necessity.

 
 

[¶40.]  This court has stated "that common-law 
way of necessity can be imposed in a proper case where the isolated landowner 
chooses that course." Snell v. Ruppert, supra, at 1046, n. 4.3 A way of necessity "ordinarily 
arises when one conveys to another land entirely surrounded by his, the 
grantor's land, or which is accessible only across either the grantor's land or 
the land of a stranger. * * *" 3 Tiffany, The Law of Real Property § 793, p. 284 
(3d ed. 1939). In such cases, the courts in pursuit of public policy which 
favors full utilization of the land, recognize a right of way appurtenant to the 
land conveyed in favor of the grantee. Id.

 
 

[¶41.]  In the present case there is no dispute 
that the only access to the north half of the tract is by crossing the south 
half retained by the grantors. In fact, it is clear that every occupant of the 
north half has used the drive over which appellee was granted her easement. The 
grant of this easement was proper, not in recognition of the alleged oral 
agreement, but rather in recognition of the implied intent of the grantors, the 
Davidsons.

 
 

[¶42.]  The trial court's finding that the 
alleged oral agreement did not exist is supported by sufficient evidence. We 
cannot say the court's finding that the Davidsons did not hold the land 
hostilely was clearly erroneous. Nor have appellants shown that they are 
entitled to the disputed area under any equitable 
doctrine.

 
 

[¶43.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Section 
1-3-103, W.S. 1977, provides:

 
 
"An action 
for the recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments 
can only be brought within ten (10) years after the cause of such action 
accrues."

 
 

2 This 
court has previously held that possession need not be taken under "color of 
title," since claim of right is sufficient for the purposes of initiating 
adverse possession. Doenz v. Garber, Wyo., 665 P.2d 932 
(1983).

 
 

3 We 
impliedly recognized that a common-law way of necessity exists in this state in 
Walton v. Dana, Wyo., 609 P.2d 461 (1980), when we stated that the petitioners 
in the case had their choice of pursuing their claim to a common-law way of 
necessity or proceeding under § 24-9-101, W.S. 1977.