Case Title: Hall v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 113, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-10-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GRAYLIN L. HALL, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 113, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0001001994A 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 29, 2006 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: October 27, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 27th day of October 2006, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Graylin L. Hall, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s February 3, 2006 order denying his motion for 
correction of an illegal sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 
35(a) and from the Superior Court’s February 23, 2006 order denying his 
motion to alter or amend the judgment or, in the alternative, for reargument.  
We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
 
(2) 
In 2000, Hall was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of 
Assault in the Second Degree, Burglary in the Second Degree and 
Possession of Burglar’s Tools.  He was sentenced as a habitual offender1 to 
life in prison on the burglary conviction and was sentenced on the remaining 
convictions to a total of 6 years of Level V incarceration.  This Court 
affirmed Hall’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal.2  
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Hall claims that: a) his burglary sentence is 
illegal because there was insufficient evidence to support his status as a 
habitual offender; b) his burglary sentence is unconstitutional because the 
Superior Court judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the element of 
physical injury; c) the Superior Court improperly ruled that his Rule 35(a) 
motion should have been brought as a postconviction motion pursuant to 
Rule 61; and d) the Superior Court abused its discretion by denying his 
motion to alter or amend the judgment or, in the alternative, motion for 
reargument as untimely. 
 
(4) 
Hall’s first claim is that his sentence as a habitual offender is 
illegal because the State presented insufficient evidence of the requisite 
number of predicate offenses.  This claim was subjected to extensive 
analysis in Hall’s direct appeal.  There, this Court held that, under Morales 
v. State,3 “the State need offer only unambiguous documentary evidence of a 
                                          
 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(b). 
2 Hall v. State, 788 A.2d 118 (Del. 2001).   
3 696 A.2d 390 (Del. 1997). 
prior predicate conviction, not live witnesses, and not a particular or 
exclusive type of documentary evidence. . . . Here, . . . it is clear . . . that 
Hall pleaded guilty to two specific counts of burglary in the second degree, 
which are indeed enumerated offenses under Section 4214(b). . . . [T]here 
was substantial evidence to support the Superior Court’s conclusion that the 
State had met its burden of proof in establishing beyond a reasonable doubt 
the predicate offenses required under [the habitual offender statute].”4  This 
holding of the Court constitutes the law of the case unless Hall can 
demonstrate clear error or an important change in circumstances.5   In the 
absence of any such evidence, we conclude that Hall’s first claim is without 
merit.         
 
(5) 
Hall’s second claim is that his sentence is unconstitutional 
because the Superior Court judge failed to instruct the jury on the element of 
physical injury.  This claim is incorrect as a matter of law.  Second degree 
burglary is a predicate offense for purposes of the habitual offender statute 
regardless of whether it involves physical injury.6  Moreover, evidence of 
prior convictions for purposes of habitual offender status is not submitted to 
                                          
 
4 Hall v. State, 788 A.2d at 125-29. 
5 Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1093 (Del. 1987). 
6 Williams v. State, 539 A.2d 164, 174-75 (Del. 1988). 
the jury, but, rather, to the judge.7  We, therefore, conclude that Hall’s 
second claim is without merit. 
 
(6) 
Hall’s third claim is that the Superior Court improperly ruled 
that his Rule 35(a) motion should have been brought as a postconviction 
motion pursuant to Rule 61.  Even assuming error on the part of the Superior 
Court, there was no prejudice to Hall.  Because Hall has failed to 
demonstrate that his sentence exceeds the statutorily-authorized limits, 
violates double jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner 
in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required 
to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that 
the judgment of conviction did not authorize, he is not entitled to relief 
under Rule 35(a).8  We, therefore, conclude that Hall’s third claim is without 
merit.9 
 
(7) 
Hall’s fourth, and final, claim is that the Superior Court abused 
its discretion by denying as untimely both his motion to alter or amend the 
judgment and his motion for reargument.  If viewed as a motion for 
                                          
 
7 Morales v. State, 696 A.2d 390 (Del. 1997). 
8 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
9 Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995) (This Court 
may affirm a judgment of the Superior Court on grounds different from those relied upon 
by the Superior Court). 
 
reargument, Hall’s motion was untimely.10  If viewed as a motion to alter or 
amend the judgment, Hall’s motion was timely.11  However, because there is 
no merit to Hall’s claim that his habitual offender sentence was illegal and 
unconstitutional, there were no valid grounds for that motion and the 
Superior Court properly denied it.  We, therefore, conclude that Hall’s fourth 
claim is also without merit.12 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
10 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(e) and 6(a). 
11 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(d) and 6(a). 
12 Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d at 1390.