Case Title: Kinney v. Kansas Fish & Game Comm'n

Citation: 238 Kan. 375, 710 P.2d 1290

Docket Number: 57,933

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1985-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
238 Kan. 375 (1985)
710 P.2d 1290
ROGER C. KINNEY, WILLIAM O. KINNEY, GEORGE E. KINNEY, and FRANK W. KINNEY, Appellants,
v.
STATE OF KANSAS and KANSAS FISH AND GAME COMMISSION, Appellees.
No. 57,933

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 6, 1985.
Phyllis F. Wendler, of Law Offices of Michael J. Friesen, P.A., of Garden City, argued the cause, and Michael J. Friesen, of the same firm, was with her on the briefs for appellant.
Bruce E. Miller, assistant attorney general, argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, and John W. Campbell, assistant attorney general, were on the brief for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRAGER, J.:
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendants in an action to quiet title to certain land and to recover damages, brought against the State of Kansas and the Kansas Fish and Game Commission. The plaintiffs' claim is based upon a reversion clause in a warranty deed executed by the Kinney Land and Cattle Company in 1934. The plaintiffs claim to be the survivors in interest and heirs of the stockholders of the corporation, now dissolved.
As a basis for their cause of action, the plaintiffs rely on provisions in a general warranty deed dated February 8, 1934, in which the Kinney Land and Cattle Company conveyed to the *376 State of Kansas certain real estate located in Finney County. The property conveyed contained approximately 790 acres and is currently known as the Finney County State Park. Involved in this case are the fifth and sixth clauses of the deed, which provided as follows:
"CLAUSE OF REVERSION
Chapter 124 of the Special Session Laws of 1933, referred to in clause five, provided in part as follows:
Chapter 127 of the Special Session Laws of 1933 provided in part as follows:
Simply stated, it is the claim of the plaintiffs that the warranty deed of 1934 conveyed to the State a fee simple determinable, sometimes described as a fee simple subject to a condition *377 subsequent, whereby the interest of the State was to be terminated and the title to revert to the grantor, its survivors or assigns, if the State, as grantee, failed to use and maintain the premises for the purposes set forth in the reversion clause. The plaintiffs contend that the State has failed to use and maintain the premises for the stated purposes, and, therefore, title to the land has reverted to them as the survivors in interest of the Kinney Land and Cattle Company.
At the time summary judgment was entered by the trial court in favor of the State, the case had not been tried on the merits nor had the parties been afforded an opportunity to complete their discovery. In effect, the trial court entered summary judgment without having resolved all of the issues raised in the case. In order to understand the status of the case on the appeal, the following proceedings in the trial court should be noted.
Plaintiffs filed their petition on November 21, 1980. On March 4, 1981, the plaintiffs served notice on the defendants that the case had been set for a discovery conference to be held on March 30, 1981. A discovery conference was held on the date set, and counsel for the parties made preliminary statements to the court. The trial judge raised a legal question, which he felt should be determined at the outset in order to effectuate orderly discovery in the case. The trial court noted the clause of reversion contained in the deed and directed the parties to brief the following question: Does reverter arise under the terms above set forth when the lake in question had no water prior to and subsequent to the filing of this action as same is construed with the other provisions, and its effect upon the entire grant of approximately 790 acres?
The trial court allowed counsel time to file briefs, stating that it would determine the legal question and would then schedule a subsequent discovery conference. The defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment which raised the identical legal question suggested by the trial court. The parties filed their briefs.
On December 13, 1984, the trial court filed its memorandum decision in which it made the following findings of fact:
The trial court made the following conclusions of law:
The trial court then concluded that the motion of the defendants for partial summary judgment must be granted. On January 22, 1985, a journal entry was signed by the trial court sustaining defendants' motion for partial summary judgment but at the same time making a finding that the sustaining of the defendants' motion rendered the remaining litigation moot and judgment must be in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs' cause of action. Thus, although purporting only to be an order in favor of the defendants for partial summary judgment, the court found that the defendants were entitled to judgment against the plaintiffs on their cause of action. The plaintiffs, having been placed in a position where their cause of action had been terminated, filed a timely appeal to the appellate courts. The appeal was assigned to the Supreme Court for its determination.
The basic issue raised on the appeal is this: Does the fact that the Finney County State Lake located on the land no longer contains a body of water of 150 acres serve as a basis for the activation of the reversion clause so as to terminate the State's title to the real estate and cause title to revert to the plaintiffs? In order to determine this basic issue it would be helpful to consider certain general principles of law which are applicable in cases involving reversion clauses. In this case, the State, as grantee, owns a determinable or qualified fee in real estate which has all the attributes of a fee simple except it is subject to *380 being defeated by the happening of a condition which is to terminate the estate. An estate in fee simple determinable is created by any limitation which: (1) creates an estate in fee simple and (2) provides that the estate shall automatically expire upon the occurrence of the stated event.
In the past, this court has determined issues involving estates in fee simple determinable. In Curtis v. Board of Education, 43 Kan. 138, 144, 23 Pac. 98 (1890), it was stated that the authorities are uniform that an estate upon condition subsequent, which estate after having been fully vested may be defeated by a breach of the condition, is never favored in law, and that no deed will be construed to create such an estate unless the language to that effect is so clear that no room is left for any other construction. In Ritchie v. K.N. & D. Rly. Co., 55 Kan. 36, 57, 39 Pac. 718 (1895), it was held that an instrument containing a condition subsequent, working a forfeiture of an estate, is to be strictly construed and its terms will never be extended by construction. This general rule is based upon the theory that, since a deed is the act of the grantor, it will be construed most strongly against him. See Rose v. School District No. 94, 162 Kan. 720, 726, 179 P.2d 181 (1947). Where, however, a deed clearly creates a fee simple determinable and reserves a reversionary interest in the grantor, such provisions will be enforced. See, for example, Thompson v. Godfrey, 191 Kan. 102, 379 P.2d 269 (1963).
The clause of reversion contained in paragraph six of the warranty deed requires that the premises be used by the State, as grantee, as a "public forestry, fish and game preserve and recreational state park." At the time the deed was executed, the statutes of Kansas provided for the establishment of public forestry, fish and game preserves, and recreational grounds. G.S. 1935, 32-215 authorized the forestry, fish and game commission, among other things, to establish, maintain, and provide for sanctuaries, in which game, game birds, fur-bearing animals or fish may breed or rest; to replenish hunting and trapping grounds and water or fishing waters; and to establish, maintain, and improve recreational grounds for the purpose of affording recreational facilities for the citizens of Kansas. That statute was enacted in 1927 and was in full force and effect at the time the warranty deed was executed in the present case.
These same basic powers are given to the fish and game *381 commission today by virtue of our present statutes in K.S.A. 32-201 et seq.
G.S. 1935, 32-214 gave the forestry, fish and game commission broad power and authority to acquire lands by donation or by purchase for the purpose of establishing and maintaining the same as a public forestry, recreational grounds, and fish and game preserves; to acquire or provide for the building of reservoirs, dam or lakes for impounding water and for providing for the planting of forestry trees; to supervise building and construction work of all kinds; to plant forestry trees and to make improvements on the property including the upkeep of roads and to do all and anything possible to carry out the intent of the act. Thus, by statute, the fish and game commission, acting on behalf of the State, is obviously vested with great power and discretion in using donated lands for a public forestry, fish and game preserve or a recreational state park.
In the City of Wichita v. Clapp, 125 Kan. 100, 263 Pac. 12 (1928), it was held that the use of a portion of a public park as an airport came within the proper and legitimate uses for which public parks are created. In the opinion, at page 101, the court discussed the meaning of the term "park purposes." The court stated:
In 1955, the legislature provided for a state park and resources authority (K.S.A. 74-4501 et seq). The legislature gave broad and comprehensive definitions to the terms "state park" and "park facilities." See K.S.A. 74-4502(d) and (e).
These various statutes and authorities are cited to show the broad interpretation which has been given to the terms "forestry, *382 fish and game preserve and recreational state park." The trial court in this case granted partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that the terms of the deed do not support a forfeiture of the State's interest in the property simply because the lake constructed on the premises contained a body of water of less than 150 acres prior to and subsequent to the filing of this action. We agree with the trial court. The deed should be construed to require only that the State in good faith maintain the property as a public forestry, fish and game facility and as a recreational state park. The grantor obviously had in mind an area dedicated to the protection and conservation of natural surroundings, game and fish, and a place where the people could enjoy such natural beauties. The lake is an important factor to be considered in determining whether the State in good faith has maintained the entire property for the intended uses. The maintenance of the lake, however, is not the controlling consideration but is only a part of the big picture. Under the circumstances, we hold that the trial court correctly held that the State of Kansas had not forfeited its title to the land simply because the quantity of water contained in the lake has not been sufficient to completely fill an area of 150 acres. The quantity of water contained in the lake is bound to vary from year to year depending upon the amount of rainfall and any other available sources of water in the area.
As noted above, however, the trial court, instead of restricting its decision to a partial summary judgment on the single issue presented, found that all other issues in the case were moot and that judgment should be rendered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs "on their cause of action." We hold that, in entering that judgment, the trial court committed reversible error. The final summary judgment rendered was erroneous because it was prematurely granted and denied to the parties the opportunity to complete their discovery and present evidence on the ultimate factual issue presented in the case: Whether the state has in good faith used and maintained the premises for the intended purposes.
In Lawrence v. Deemy, 204 Kan. 299, 461 P.2d 770 (1969), this court reviewed our law relating to summary judgment and stated as follows:
Although there was apparently some evidence presented to the trial court at the informal discovery conference that improvements had been made on the land and that the lake had contained water intermittently down through the years and that various sums of money have been spent on the property, such evidence has not been included in the record on appeal and the parties have not been furnished a full opportunity to complete their discovery and develop evidence to be presented on the primary issue in the case, set forth above, or on other issues raised by the parties. We have no hesitancy in holding that final summary judgment in the case was prematurely granted and that the case must be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.