Case Title: Igor Misicki v. Salvatore Caradonna

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 68  
Igor Misicki, 
            Appellant, 
        v. 
Salvatore Caradonna, 
            Defendant, 
430-50 Shore Road Corporation,
            Respondent. 
(And a Third-Party Action.)
David H. Perecman, for appellant.
Deborah A. Summers, for respondent.
New York State Trial Lawyers' Association, amicus
curiae.
READ, J.:
On October 26, 2001, plaintiff Igor Misicki, a laborer
employed by Upgrade Contracting Company, was injured while
working on a construction project at a two-building cooperative
residential apartment complex located at 430 Shore Road in Long
Beach, New York.  The buildings were owned by defendant 430-50
Shore Road Corporation, which had retained an architect and hired
Upgrade to carry out the work, which involved renovating the
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buildings' pool deck.  
In July and August, plaintiff and another Upgrade
employee changed out the sleeves of the air-conditioning units in
the buildings' apartments.  After Labor Day, plaintiff began
working on the pool deck job, which first required him and his
fellow workers to remove bricks from the base of the buildings'
exterior walls next to the deck so as to lay bare the underlying
concrete.  On the day of his accident, plaintiff was "cutting"
exposed concrete with a handheld 9-inch electrically-driven angle
grinder.  Specifically, his foreman directed him to "cut" (more
accurately, abrade) a slot 2½-inches deep into a line marked on
the wall, about a foot or two above the deck. 
When plaintiff retrieved the grinder from the toolbox
maintained by Upgrade at the jobsite, he could not find the side
handle for it.  He described this handle as removable, and
designed to be fitted onto the grinder in any one of two or three
different positions.  According to plaintiff, he complained to
his foreman -- three times -- that the handle was unavailable;
and his foreman repeatedly instructed him "to go back to work and
. . . work[] without [the] handle."  Plaintiff testified that he
"didn't feel safe" using the grinder without the handle because
he did not have "control over the machine."
After "cutting the line" for two hours with the grinder
sans the side handle, plaintiff reached a point where a balcony
projected from the building's exterior.  The balcony was roughly
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three or four feet above the pool deck.  In order to continue
with his task, plaintiff stretched out on the deck underneath the
balcony, resting on his right side; his headroom was limited, and
he was lying about two feet away from the wall.  Plaintiff
testified that after working in this position for 20 or 30
minutes -- with at least one interruption to get up and search
again for a handle -- the grinder "kicked back" and the grinding
wheel struck his face, deeply lacerating his upper lip, cheek and
right nostril and causing him to lose consciousness momentarily.
Plaintiff was immediately taken by ambulance to a
nearby hospital, where his wounds were sutured.  During the
ensuing year, he underwent two surgeries to relieve breathing
problems that he attributes to what his doctor described as a
"complicated laceration of the nose."  He complains of continuing
adverse health consequences, including headaches and difficulty
breathing and sleeping.  At the time of his deposition in April
2004, plaintiff had not worked since the accident.
In July 2002, plaintiff sued Shore and the architect
for damages; he asserted common-law negligence and violations of
Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1) and 241 (6).  After the close of
discovery in the summer of 2004, plaintiff withdrew his section
200 and 240 (1) claims, and discontinued the action against the
architect.  On March 3, 2003, Shore brought a third-party action
against Upgrade, which subsequently agreed to defend and
indemnify Shore.  As a result, Shore's third-party action was
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discontinued with prejudice on March 16, 2005. 
In September 2005, Shore moved for summary judgment
dismissing plaintiff's complaint, which by that point consisted
solely of his claim under Labor Law § 241 (6).  This provision
"requires owners and contractors to provide reasonable and
adequate protection and safety for workers and to comply with the
specific safety rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commissioner of the Department of Labor" (Ross v Curtis-Palmer
Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501-502 [1993] [quotation marks
omitted]).  The duty to comply with the Commissioner's safety
rules, which are set out in the Industrial Code (12 NYCRR), is
nondelegable.  In order to support a claim under section 241 (6),
however, the particular provision relied upon by a plaintiff must
mandate compliance with concrete specifications and not simply
declare general safety standards or reiterate common-law
principles (id. at 504-505).  Contributory and comparative
negligence are valid defenses to a section 241 (6) claim;
moreover, breach of a duty imposed by a rule in the Code is
merely some evidence for the factfinder to consider on the
question of a defendant's negligence (see Long v Forest-
Fehlhaber, 55 NY2d 154, 159-160 [1982]).  
Plaintiff alleged that Shore violated two of the
Commissioner's rules -- 12 NYCRR 23-1.12 (c) (Power-driven saws)
and 12 NYCRR 23-9.2 (a).  In support of its motion for summary
judgment, Shore argued that section 23-1.12 (c) was inapplicable
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No. 68
1 These are sections 23-9.3 (Conveyors and cableways); 23-
9.4 (Power shovels and backhoes used for material handling); 23-
9.5 (Excavating machines); 23-9.6 (Aerial baskets); 23-9.7 (Motor
trucks); 23-9.8 (Lift and fork trucks); 23-9.9 (Power buggies);
23-9.10 (Pile drivers); and 23-9.11 (Mixing machines).
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because it covered portable, handheld circular saws, which
Shore's expert opined are not the same as portable, handheld
grinders; and that section 23-9.2 (a) was not sufficiently
specific and concrete.
Subpart 23-9 of the Code is entitled "Power-Operated
Equipment."  Section 23-9.1 (Application of this Subpart)
specifies that "[t]he provisions of [subpart 23-9] shall apply to
power-operated heavy equipment or machinery used in construction,
demolition and excavation operations" with certain exclusions. 
This statement of applicability is followed by section 23-9.2
(General Requirements), and nine sections covering specific kinds
of power-operated heavy equipment or machinery.1  Section 
23-9.2 (a) states in its entirety as follows:
"(a) Maintenance.  All power-operated equipment
shall be maintained in good repair and in proper
operating condition at all times.  Sufficient
inspections of adequate frequency shall be made of such
equipment to insure such maintenance.  Upon discovery,
any structural defect or unsafe condition in such
equipment shall be corrected by necessary repairs or
replacement.  The servicing and repair of such
equipment shall be performed by or under the
supervision of designated persons.  Any servicing or
repair of such equipment shall be performed only while
such equipment is at rest."
In its motion papers, Shore took the position that the
Second Department -- where this lawsuit was brought -- had
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already "held that 23-9.2(a) [was] a general requirement within
the meaning of Ross, . . . [and did] not give rise to the
nondelegable duty under § 241 (6)."  Shore adduced Phillips v
City of New York (228 AD2d 570, 572 [2d Dept 1996] [referring to
section 23-9.2(a), court noted, in dicta, that "the specific
provisions relied upon (by the plaintiff) merely established
general safety standards . . . which do not give rise to a
nondelegable duty"]); Thompson v Ludovico (246 AD2d 642, 643 [2d
Dept 1998] [court stated, in dicta, that certain sections cited
by the plaintiff, including 12 NYCRR 23-9.2 (a), "did not support
his claim under Labor Law § 241 (6) because [they] were . . .
merely general safety standards"]); and Anarumo v Slattery Assoc.
(298 AD2d 339, 340 [2d Dept 2002] [court denied summary judgment
to the plaintiffs on their section 241 (6) cause of action
because "12 NYCRR 23-9.2 (a) merely establishes general safety
standards which do not give rise to a nondelegable duty"]).  
In April 2006, Supreme Court granted Shore's motion and
dismissed plaintiff's Labor Law § 241 (6) claim.  The trial judge
concluded that plaintiff had failed to rebut Shore's prima facie
showing that section 23-1.12 (c) was inapplicable to a handheld
electrically-driven grinder.  As for section 23-9.2 (a), Supreme
Court noted that Shore relied on Anarumo, Phillips, and Thompson
-- all Second Department cases -- while plaintiff cited the
Fourth Department's decision in Zacher v Niagara Frontier Servs.
(210 AD2d 897 [4th Dept 1994]).  In Zacher, the Fourth Department
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decided that 
"[t]he requirement that a plaintiff must allege
violation of a specific safety regulation promulgated
by the Commissioner . . . was satisfied by the
assertion . . . that defendants violated 12 NYCRR 23-
9.2 (a).  That regulation, promulgated under Labor Law 
§ 241 (6), imposes upon owners, contractors and their 
agents an affirmative duty of maintenance and 
inspection of power-operated equipment" (id. at 897-898
[internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see
also Piccolo v St. John's Home for Aging, 11 AD3d 884,
886 [4th Dept 2004] ["We have previously determined
that 12 NYCRR 23-9.2 (a) is sufficiently specific to
support a claim pursuant to section 241 (6)"]).
  
The trial judge determined that because this case was being
litigated "within the confines of the Second Department," he was
compelled to "follow [the Second Department's] holding that 12
NYCRR 23-9.2 is not specific enough to support a Labor Law 
§ 241 (6) violation."
Plaintiff moved to reargue, protesting that the Second
Department cases were distinguishable because they interpreted
only the first sentence of section 23-9.2 (a), and "no specific
structural defect or unsafe condition in the power equipment was
alleged" in those cases.  By contrast, he contended, in Zacher
"the plaintiff was injured as a result of a broken handle on
power equipment (a sander) . . . just like the Plaintiff herein
was injured due to . . . defects in the equipment," including a
missing handle.  
Supreme Court was persuaded.  In March 2007, the trial
judge granted reargument, vacated his April 2006 decision and
order, and denied Shore's motion for summary judgment.  Supreme
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Court decided that the provision in section 23-9.2 (a)
"requir[ing] the repair or replacement of unsafe equipment [was]
a specific positive command . . . applicable to the facts of the
instant case."  In June 2007, the judge clarified that his April
2006 order remained in effect except insofar as modified by his
March 2007 decision regarding section 23-9.2 (a).  Supreme Court
further noted that there was "a question of fact whether section
23-9.2 (a) was violated." 
In May 2008, the Appellate Division reversed. 
"Contrary to the Supreme Court's determination," the court
opined, "12 NYCRR 23-9.2 (a) does not support the plaintiff's
claim under Labor Law § 241 (6), as that provision merely
establishes general safety standards which do not give rise to a
nondelegable duty" (51 AD3d 644, 645 [2d Dept 2008]).  The
Appellate Division cited its previous decisions in Anarumo,
Thompson and Phillips as well as the First Department's decision
in Hassett v Celtic Holdings (7 AD3d 364, 365 [1st Dept 2004]
["12 NYCRR 23-9.2 (a) . . . is a general requirement to maintain
power equipment in good operating order"]).  
Plaintiff sought to appeal to us.  Because the First,
Second and Third Departments (see e.g. Fairchild v Servidone
Constr. Corp., 288 AD2d 665, 667-668 [3d Dept 2001]) have ruled
that section 23-9.2 (a) does not support a claim under Labor Law 
§ 241 (6) and the Fourth Department has ruled otherwise, we
granted plaintiff permission to appeal to resolve the apparent
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conflict.  We now reverse for the reasons that follow.
I.  
As an initial matter, we note that subpart 23-9 applies
to "power-operated heavy equipment or machinery" (12 NYCRR 23-9.1
[emphasis added]) such as excavating machines, pile drivers and
motor trucks (see 5, n 1, supra).  Shore never argued that the
grinder was a hand tool subject to other provisions of the Code
(see e.g. 12 NYCRR 23-1.10 (b) [Electrical and pneumatic hand
tools]) or, in any event, was not "power-operated heavy equipment
or machinery" within the meaning of subpart 23-9.  For purposes
of this appeal, we therefore assume, without deciding, that
section 23-9.2 (a) applies to a handheld 9-inch electrically-
driven angle grinder.
Judge Smith objects to this assumption.  While
acknowledging the general rule that we do not resolve cases on
grounds raised for the first time on appeal, he points to a
concededly rarely invoked exception for a "newly raised point of
law" that is "decisive" in a civil case and "could not have been
obviated by factual showings or legal countersteps if it had been
raised below" (Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals 
§ 17.2, at 591-592 [3d ed rev] [quotation marks and footnote
omitted]).  Declaring that the exception "fits this case
perfectly," Judge Smith would affirm the Appellate Division's
order in light of the "plain inapplicability of the regulation
plaintiff relies on" (Smith, J. dissenting op at 2).
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This case does not fit the exception at all.  We are
not faced with a situation where a litigant "newly raise[s]" on
appeal a "point of law" not put forward in the trial court --
that is, we are not talking about an exception to the
preservation requirement as it is classically defined.  Here,
Shore never so much as hinted much less claimed before us that
section 23-9.2 (a) is inapplicable to the grinder involved in
plaintiff's accident.  For us now to decide this appeal on a
distinct ground that we winkled out wholly on our own would pose
an obvious problem of fair play.  We are not in the business of
blindsiding litigants, who expect us to decide their appeals on
rationales advanced by the parties, not arguments their
adversaries never made.  In sum, plaintiff deserves an
opportunity to refute the proposition on which the dissent would
decide this appeal against him.  And the opportunity may well be
realized since our decision today certainly does not foreclose
Shore, if it so chooses, from taking the position at trial that
section 23-9.2 (a) is inapplicable to the grinder.
While appellate judges surely do not "'sit as
automatons'" (Smith, J., dissenting op at 1, quoting Karger, §
17.1 at 591), they are not freelance lawyers either.  Our system
depends in large part on adversary presentation; our role in that
system "is best accomplished when [we] determine[] legal issues
of statewide significance that have first been considered by both
the trial and the intermediate appellate court" (People v
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Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 493 [2008], Kaye, Ch. J.).  Here, the
specificity of section 23-9.2 (a) has, in fact, been considered
by all four departments of the Appellate Division, with differing
results; by contrast, its applicability to a grinder was not
briefed or argued by the parties to this appeal, and, insofar as
we can tell, the general issue of whether section 23-9.2 (a)
applies to an electrically-powered hand tool has not yet been
addressed by any lower court.
II.  
When analyzing section 23-9.2 (a)'s specificity, the
parties focused on the regulation's first three sentences, which
are, in order, as follows:
(1) "All power-operated equipment shall be maintained
in good repair and in proper operating condition at all
times."
(2) "Sufficient inspections of adequate frequency shall
be made of such equipment to insure such maintenance."
(3) "Upon discovery, any structural defect or unsafe
condition in such equipment shall be corrected by
necessary repairs or replacement."
Plaintiff concedes that the first sentence is
"undoubtedly general and unenforceable."  In his view, however,
the second and third sentences, which he reads together, do more
than "merely restate[] the common law duty to keep the worksite
reasonably safe."  Instead, he contends, "what makes the second
and third sentences of the regulation specific" is that they
"say[] inspect (that's a command), then upon discovery (that's
the when) of a structural defect or unsafe condition (that's the
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circumstances calling for action . . . )[,] repair or replace
(that's the action or positive concrete command)."  Citing our
decision in Morris v Pavarini Constr. (9 NY3d 47, 50 [2007]),
plaintiff points out that specific provisions in a Code
regulation are enforceable notwithstanding the general nature of
other portions of the same regulation.  Shore counters that the
first three sentences in section 23-9.2 (a), considered together,
"say[] nothing more than 'tools shouldn't be broken; you must
check to make sure tools aren't broken; and when you find that
tools are broken, you must fix or replace them.'"
In our view, the first two sentences of section 23-9.2
(a) -- which employ only such general phrases as "good repair,"
"proper operating condition," "[s]ufficient inspections," and
"adequate frequency" -- are not specific enough to permit
recovery under section 241 (6) against a nonsupervising owner or
general contractor.  We reach the opposite conclusion about the
third sentence, however.  This portion of the regulation imposes
an affirmative duty on employers to "correct[] by necessary
repairs or replacement," "any structural defect or unsafe
condition" in equipment or machinery "[u]pon discovery," or
actual notice of the structural defect or unsafe condition.  As a
result, the third sentence of section 23-9.2 (a) "mandates a
distinct standard of conduct, rather than a general reiteration
of common-law principles, and is precisely the type of 'concrete
specification' that Ross requires" (Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Contr.
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2 Judge Graffeo suggests that we are departing from our
precedent of "assess[ing] whether a regulation [is] specific
enough to support Labor Law § 241 (6) liability by examining the
language used in the regulation, without regard to the facts
alleged in a particular case" (Graffeo, J. dissenting op at 4). 
We disagree.  We conclude that 12 NYCRR  23-9.2 (a) is specific
enough to permit recovery under Labor Law § 241 (6) because the
language of the regulation mandates particular conduct "[u]pon
discovery" -- or actual notice -- of a structural defect or
unsafe condition.  An allegation that the plaintiff told his or
her supervisor about the defective condition before the injury is
simply one way of demonstrating the actual notice required by the
language of the regulation.  
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Co., 91 NY2d 343, 351 [1998]).  The next two sentences of the
regulation describe requirements for servicing and repairing the
equipment.  In sum, an employee who claims to have suffered
injuries proximately caused by a previously identified and
unremedied structural defect or unsafe condition affecting an
item of power-operated heavy equipment or machinery has stated a
cause of action under Labor Law § 241 (6) based on an alleged
violation of 12 NYCRR 23-9.2 (a).2 
Here, plaintiff claims that there was no side handle
available for the grinder on the day of his accident; that he
complained to his supervisor about the missing handle -- i.e.,
his employer had actual notice; that the absence of a handle
constituted a structural defect in or an unsafe condition of the
grinder; that his employer did not provide him with a handle or
replace the allegedly defective grinder; and that the absence of
the handle -- i.e., the claimed structural defect or unsafe
condition previously pointed out to his employer -- proximately
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caused his injuries.  Assuming that section 23-9.2 (a) is
applicable, plaintiff has thereby alleged a breach of this
provision of the Code.  It would then remain for a jury to decide
whether a violation, in fact, occurred; and whether the
negligence of some party to, or participant in, the construction
project caused plaintiff's injuries.  If negligence is
established, Shore would be vicariously liable for plaintiff's
injuries without regard to fault.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed, with costs, and that branch of defendant's motion
for summary judgment seeking dismissal of plaintiff's Labor Law 
§ 241 (6) cause of action against it should be denied.
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Misicki v Caradonna
No. 68 
GRAFFEO, J. (dissenting):
Because I believe that Subpart 23-9.2(a) does not
contain a command that is sufficiently specific to support
liability under Labor Law § 241(6), I respectfully dissent.  This
Court has distinguished between Industrial Code provisions that
merely reiterate the common-law standard of care and those that
mandate compliance with concrete specifications (Ross v Curtis-
Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 504-505 [1993]).  Only the
latter impose a non-delegable duty on an owner or general
contractor who does not actually control the injured party's
work, giving rise to a Labor Law § 241(6) claim.  I agree with
the First, Second and Third Departments that Subpart 23-9.2(a)
does not contain the requisite specificity necessary for Labor
Law § 241(6) liability (see Hassett v Celtic Holdings, 7 AD3d
364, 365 [1st Dept 2004]; Fairchild v Construction Equip. Co.,
288 AD2d 665, 667-668 [3d Dept 2001]; Anarumo v Slattery Assoc.,
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No. 68
* Because the majority bases its decision on the fact that
plaintiff allegedly informed his employer of a defect in the tool
before he was injured and the employer failed to remedy that
defect, I presume the holdings in these Appellate Division
decisions remain viable in circumstances where the plaintiff was
unaware of the defective condition before the injury occurred
and/or did not notify the employer.
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298 AD2d 339, 340 [2d Dept 2002]).*  
Although other subsections of Subpart 23-9.2 include
detailed specifications, such as 23-9.2(e) (certain power-
operated machines that do not run on diesel fuel must be stopped
during refueling), Subpart 23-9.2(a) does not.  In Ross v Curtis-
Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co. (81 NY2d at 504), we held that a
regulation that imposed a "duty to provide materials and
equipment of such kind and quality as a reasonable and prudent
person experienced in construction *** operations would require
in order to provide safe working conditions" was too general to
create a non-delegable duty (see 12 NYCRR 23-1.4[a]).  In
contrast, in Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Contr. Co. (91 NY2d 343
[1998]), a regulation that stated that "[i]ce, snow, water grease
and any other foreign substance which may cause slippery footing
shall be removed, sanded or covered to provide safe footing" (12
NYCRR 23-1.7[d]) was determined by us to be sufficiently
specific.  Similarly, in Morris v Pavarini Constr. (9 NY3d 47
[2007]), we concluded that a regulatory provision requiring that
forms be "braced or tied together so as to maintain position and
shape" was sufficiently specific, while the portion of the
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regulation that directed that forms be "structurally safe" was
not (see 12 NYCRR 23-2.2[a]).
The provisions deemed actionable in Rizzuto and Morris
each involved hazards identified with particularity in the
regulation (e.g. slippery foreign substances on floors, forms
that were not tied or braced to maintain position and shape) and
concrete commands concerning how to remedy or avoid the
identified hazards (e.g. the "foreign substance *** shall be
removed, sanded or covered;" "Forms *** shall be properly braced
or tied together to maintain position and shape").  But the
regulation here contains no such directive.  It broadly states
that machines must be kept in "good repair" and "proper operating
condition," and that unspecified "structural defect[s] or unsafe
condition[s]" be remedied in some unidentified manner upon
discovery.  
As I see it, there is no distinction between the
requirement that forms be kept structurally safe (which we deemed
not sufficiently specific in Morris) and that structural
defects/unsafe conditions be remedied.  After all, the mandate
that forms be "kept" safe necessarily incorporates the command
that a structural defect be remedied if it is discovered -- yet
we held in Morris that this part of the regulation was not
actionable, and we did so even though the provision related to a
specific construction element -- forms.  Because Subpart 23-
9.2(a) does not identify a particular hazard with specificity or
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contain a concrete command relating to such a hazard, I believe
it does nothing more than restate the common-law standard of care
and does not give rise to a non-delegable duty on the part of an
owner who did not control the project.  I would, therefore,
affirm the order of the Appellate Division, which granted summary
judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) claim.
I am also unpersuaded that the allegation that
plaintiff told his supervisor about the tool's defective
condition before the injury occurred alters the resolution of
this case.  Until today, we have assessed whether a regulation
was specific enough to support Labor Law § 241(6) liability by
examining the language used in the regulation, without regard to
the facts alleged in a particular case.  While the actions
plaintiff took after he discovered the alleged defect may be
pertinent to a comparative fault defense, they are not relevant
to the threshold question of whether the regulation on which he
relies contains the concrete mandate required to impose a non-
delegable duty on an owner or general contractor.
As an alternative basis for affirmance, Judge Smith
makes a compelling argument that Subpart 23-9.2(a) does not apply
to the power hand-tool involved in plaintiff's injury.  But I
cannot join in his dissent because this contention was neither
preserved for review in the trial court nor raised by defendants
in this Court.  I view the preservation requirement as a
constitutional limitation on this Court's jurisdiction (see NY
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Const, art VI, § 3[a] ["The jurisdiction of the court of appeals
shall be limited to review of questions of law except where the
judgment is of death, or where the appellate division *** finds
new facts"]).  With very few exceptions not relevant here, a
party must raise an argument in the trial court to create an
issue of law that can be reviewed in this Court (see e.g. Bingham
v New York City Transit Auth., 99 NY2d 355 [2003]).  While we
have recognized that some contentions present issues of law even
if not preserved -- such as errors so egregious that they affect
the "mode of proceedings" -- the possible inapplicability of the
regulation in this case does not fall into any recognized
exception.  And even if the preservation hurdle could be
surmounted, for purposes of this appeal, defendants waived the
argument by not raising it in their briefs in this Court.  It
would therefore be improper to dismiss plaintiff's claim based on
an issue that he has not had an opportunity to address. 
1I acknowledge, however, that the majority has a point when
it says it would be unfair to decide a question not argued in
this Court.  If I could persuade my colleagues not to require
preservation here, I would favor inviting the parties to comment
on the issue before we decided it.
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Igor Misicki v Salvatore Caradonna, 430-50 Shore Road Corporation
No. 68
SMITH, J.(dissenting):
Subpart 23-9 of the Industrial Code is limited by its
terms to "heavy equipment or machinery" (12 NYCRR 23-9.1, quoted
in majority op at 5).  Thus Section 23-9.2, which is part of
Subpart 23-9, is plainly inapplicable to the hand tool involved
in this case.  Yet, because defendant did not raise that point,
the majority feels compelled to decide whether, if the regulation
were applicable to hand tools, it would be specific enough to
support plaintiff's claim -- an exercise akin to deciding whether
I would be a bicycle if I had wheels.  I think it is unwise to
decide such hypothetical questions, and I do not think our
preservation jurisprudence requires it.1
The authoritative work on practice in our Court,
Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals, states the
"general rule" that "the Court of Appeals will not review a
question raised for the first time on appeal" (§ 17:1 at 589 [3d
ed rev]).  Karger adds:
   "Manifestly, however, if any such rule
were to be applied in every case without
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qualification, it would often be stultifying. 
Thus, it might require appellate judges to
sit as automatons, merely to register their
reactions to the arguments which counsel had
made below.  The fortunes of litigation might
then turn, not on the merits of a case, but
on the skill or prescience of counsel in the
court of first instance.
   "An exception to the general rule has
accordingly long been applied, subject to
certain qualifications, that a newly raised
point of law may be entertained on appeal
where it is one which is decisive of the
appeal and which could not have been obviated
'by factual showings or legal countersteps'
if it had been raised below."
(Id. at 591-592 [footnotes omitted].)  The exception stated by
Karger fits this case perfectly.  The plain inapplicability of
the regulation plaintiff relies on is decisive of this appeal,
and could not have been obviated by any factual showings or legal
countersteps if raised below.
Our preservation rule is an important one -- so
important that we have occasionally referred to it as a matter of
"jurisdiction" (see e.g., People v Turriago, 90 NY2d 77, 80
[1997]).  But it is not truly jurisdictional, in the sense of
being a limitation on our power.  We review unpreserved questions
when common sense and practical necessity dictate that we should. 
Thus, in criminal cases, we review claimed "mode of proceedings"
errors without regard for preservation (e.g., People v Ahmed, 66
NY2d, 307, 310 [1985]); we review unpreserved claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, since it would be absurd to
insist on preservation by the very counsel claimed to be
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ineffective (e.g., People v Lewis, 2 NY3d 224 [2004]); we review
unpreserved claims relating to the sufficiency of accusatory
instruments (e.g., People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 135, 139
[1987]) and the legality of sentences (e.g., People v Samms, 95
NY2d 52, 55-57 [2000]); and we review other claims where it is
unreasonable to expect them to have been preserved below (e.g.,
People v Louree, 8 NY3d 541, 545-546 [2007]).  We could do none
of these things if the preservation rule were truly
jurisdictional; common sense and practical necessity would be
irrelevant.
Exceptions to the preservation requirement in civil
cases (apart from quasi-criminal matters, like juvenile
delinquency proceedings) are, for understandable reasons, much
more rare than in criminal cases, but they do exist (see Rivera v
Smith, 63 NY2d 501, 516 n 5 [1984] ["a new argument may be raised
for the first time in the Court of Appeals if it could not have
been obviated or cured by factual showings or legal countersteps
in the court of first instance"]; American Sugar Ref. Co. of N.
Y. v Waterfront Commn. of N. Y. Harbor, 55 NY2d 11, 25 [1982]
[same]; Telaro v Telaro, 25 NY2d 433, 439 [1969] ["the general
rule concerning questions raised neither at the trial nor at
previous stages of appeal is far less restrictive than some case
language would indicate"]).  I do not suggest that we should make
a regular practice of dispensing with the preservation
requirement.  But we clearly have the power to do so, and I think
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it is better to exercise that power in this case than to struggle
with the difficult question of whether the regulation at issue,
if it applied to the hand tool plaintiff used (which it does
not), would entitle him to sue.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Order reversed, with costs, and that branch of defendant 430-50
Shore Road Corporation's motion for summary judgment seeking
dismissal of plaintiff's Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action
against it denied.  Opinion by Judge Read.  Chief Judge Lippman
and Judges Ciparick and Jones concur.  Judge Graffeo dissents and
votes to affirm in an opinion.  Judge Smith dissents in an
opinion in which Judge Pigott concurs.
Decided May 12, 2009