Case Title: Calhoun v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC12-1086

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2013-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-1086 
____________ 
 
JOHNNY MACK SKETO CALHOUN,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[October 31, 2013] 
 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from a judgment of conviction of 
first-degree murder and a sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
BACKGROUND 
Johnny Mack Sketo Calhoun and Mia Chay Brown were both reported 
missing on December 17, 2010.  On December 20, Brown’s remains were found 
bound and burnt in her car, which had been lit on fire in the woods of Alabama.  
 
- 2 - 
Calhoun, thought to be the last person to see Brown alive, was found hiding in the 
frame of his bed inside his trailer on December 20.   
Guilt Phase 
Brown worked at Charlie’s deli and grocery store in Esto, Florida. 
Harvey Glenn Bush saw Brown working at Charlie’s deli around 1 to 1:30 p.m. on 
December 16, 2010, and knew Brown drove a white car.  Bush heard Calhoun ask 
Brown for a ride that evening and Brown responded that she would pick him up 
after work at approximately 8 to 9 p.m.   
Brown drove to Jerry Gammons’ trailer in a light colored, four-door car and 
knocked on his door at about 8:40 p.m. on December 16.  Brown asked for 
Calhoun, and Gammons told her that Calhoun did not live there.  America’s 
Precious Metals junkyard, where Calhoun’s trailer was located, is approximately 
one road down from Gammons’ trailer. 
Brandon Brown, Brown’s husband, talked with Brown at lunch time on 
December 16 while she was working at Charlie’s deli.  Brown usually got off of 
work at approximately 9 p.m.  Brandon called Brown at 10 p.m. because she was 
not home.  Brandon fell asleep on the couch at about 10:30 p.m., and when he 
woke up at 2 a.m., his wife was still not home.  It was unusual for Brown not to 
come home; Brandon started calling family members to find her.   
 
- 3 - 
Sherry Bradley, the manager at Gladstone’s convenience store located 
between Enterprise and Hartford, Alabama, testified that Calhoun came into her 
store between 5:30 and 6:00 a.m. on December 17, 2010, and bought cigarettes.  
Bradley noticed scratches and dried blood on his hands and sores on his face.  
Calhoun was wearing a white shirt that had spots of blood on it and there was 
something black underneath his fingernails.  She asked Calhoun about his 
appearance, and he responded that he had been deer hunting.  Calhoun was driving 
a white, four-door car with a Florida license plate.  Darren Bratchelor, a former 
schoolmate of Calhoun’s, also saw Calhoun at the convenience store at about 6 
a.m.  After that day, Bradley left town for a few days, but when she returned, 
another employee had posted a missing persons flyer in the store, on which she 
recognized Calhoun’s photograph. 
Chuck White, a patrol officer for Holmes County, Florida, arrived at 
America’s Precious Metals at 8 a.m. on December 17.  White looked in Calhoun’s 
trailer and found clothes and trash scattered everywhere.  Calhoun was not there.  
On cross-examination, White testified that Sketo Calhoun (“Sketo”) and Terry 
Ellenburg, co-owners of America’s Precious Metals, told him that there had been a 
break-in at the junkyard, that there were pry marks on Calhoun’s trailer door, and 
that the skid steer loader, or Bobcat, had been hot-wired and moved.  White 
 
- 4 - 
noticed many tire tracks around the yard.  White acknowledged that he did not 
secure Calhoun’s trailer before he left the yard.   
Brett Bennett, a cattle broker in Geneva, Alabama, noticed smoke from the 
highway on December 17 at approximately 11 a.m.  Keith Brinley, a school 
maintenance employee in Geneva, Alabama, also saw a big fire behind the Bennett 
residence at about that same time. 
Tiffany Brooks, a resident of Hartford, Alabama, found Calhoun in her 
family’s shed on the morning of December 18, 2010.  Calhoun was on the ground 
wrapped in sleeping bags that the family kept around the freezer.  Calhoun was 
wearing overalls and a white t-shirt and was wet and dirty.  Brooks brought 
Calhoun into the house and the family washed his clothes, gave him new clothes, 
let him shower and nap, and gave him some food.  Steven Bledshoe, Tiffany’s 
boyfriend, called the Brooks’ residence and told them about the missing persons 
flyer he saw with Calhoun and Brown’s pictures on it.  Calhoun told the Brooks he 
did not know Brown but she was probably the person who was supposed to pick 
him up at his trailer the night before.  Calhoun had the Brooks drop him off at a 
dirt road.  Glenda Brooks, Tiffany’s mother, also testified to these events. 
Brittany Mixon, Calhoun’s ex-girlfriend, testified that she went to school 
with Brown and that Brown knew Calhoun through her and from working at the 
convenience store.  On December 16, Mixon stayed at her father’s house and 
 
- 5 - 
expected Calhoun to come over that night but he never came.  Mixon drove to 
America’s Precious Metals on the morning of December 17 to find Calhoun 
because he did not have a phone to call.  Mixon used to live in Calhoun’s trailer 
with him but moved out in October of that year.  She testified that they had lost the 
key to the trailer so they had had to pry the door open to get inside the trailer.  
Mixon asked Sketo if he had seen Calhoun, but he had not.  Mixon looked inside 
Calhoun’s trailer; no one was inside, but the trailer was ransacked.   
Lieutenant Michael Raley of the Holmes County Sheriff’s Office investigated 
Brown’s missing persons report.  He called Mixon, who told Raley about a 
campsite in Hartford, Alabama, approximately ten miles from America’s Precious 
Metals, where Mixon and Calhoun would camp.  The campground was on the 
property of Charlie Skinnard, Calhoun’s brother-in-law.  Mixon met the Brooks 
family once while camping with Calhoun.  She took Raley to the campsite.  Raley 
noted that the burnt car was off of Coleman Road, approximately 1,488 feet away 
from Calhoun’s campsite.  The Brooks’ residence was approximately 1.5 miles 
from the burnt car.   
Angie Curry, Priscilla Strickland, and Mixon went to Calhoun’s trailer 
around 4 p.m. on December 17.  Mixon went into the trailer and found wine, a 
purse, and menthol cigarettes.  They took the items and called the police.  Brandon 
identified the purse as belonging to Brown.  When Mixon gave Brown’s purse to 
 
- 6 - 
Raley, Raley sent a police officer to Calhoun’s trailer to secure it until they got a 
search warrant.  On cross-examination, Mixon acknowledged that Sketo and 
Ellenburg told her that the trailer had been broken into and not to go in it, but she 
did anyway.  She stated that Calhoun did not smoke cigarettes and did not have 
cable television service in his trailer.   
Dick Mowbry, former game warden for Geneva County, Alabama, 
participated in a search for Brown and Brown’s vehicle on December 20, 2010.  
He found a burnt, white Toyota with no license plate.  The entire inside of the car 
was burnt and while he was looking through the front of the car, he saw a rib cage 
in the trunk, so he called the police. 
 
 Mike Gillis, with the Alabama Bureau of Investigation, responded on 
December 20 to the call regarding the burnt vehicle.  Remains of a body were in 
the trunk of the car.  There was what looked like coaxial cable wrapped around the 
wrists of the body; duct tape was also found in the car. 
 
On December 21, 2010, Dr. Stephen Boudreau, a medical examiner for 
Alabama, received the human remains found inside the burnt car.  The remains 
were badly burnt; the hands and lower limbs had been burnt off.  Dr. Boudreau was 
able to identify the remains as female because the uterus and vagina were not 
destroyed, but the sex organs were denatured, or heated, to such an extent that 
there was no way to analyze them.  He found coaxial cable wrapped around what 
 
- 7 - 
was left of the remains’ upper arms and tape on the neck.  Dr. Boudreau 
determined that the cause of death was smoke inhalation and thermal burns and 
that the death was a homicide.  He found soot embedded in the airway of the lungs’ 
mucus blanket and carbon monoxide in the back tissue, meaning that the victim 
had inhaled smoke.  Dental x-rays matched those of Brown’s.  On cross-
examination, the defense elicited that no foreign DNA was found in Brown’s 
vagina.  Dr. Boudreau also acknowledged that no ends of the coaxial cable were 
found, and that he could not determine whether Brown was conscious or not when 
she inhaled the smoke or at what point in time she would have lost consciousness.  
 
On December 20, 2010, Jeffery Lowry, deputy state fire marshal with the 
Alabama Fire Marshal’s Office, took debris samples from the burnt car and sent 
them to the Alabama and Florida laboratories.  Jason Deese, an arson investigator 
for the Florida Bureau of Fire and Arson, testified that on December 22, 2010, he 
inspected the car.  The vehicle identification number (VIN) was matched to a 2000 
Toyota Avalon.  Brown owned a four-door 2000 Toyota Avalon.  The fire 
originated in the driver’s seat and passenger compartment; it was not an engine 
fire.  Perry Koussiafes, senior crime laboratory analyst for the Florida Fire 
Marshal’s Office, received six samples from the car on December 30, 2010.  The 
samples from the right front quarter and left quarter of the car tested positive for 
ignitable liquid.   
 
- 8 - 
 
Trevor Seifret, a crime lab analyst for the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement (FDLE), testified that blood found on the cardboard of a roll of duct 
tape taken from Calhoun’s trailer was a major donor match to Brown and a minor 
donor partial match to Calhoun.  Blood found on blankets taken from Calhoun’s 
trailer were total matches to Calhoun and Brown.  DNA from hair found in 
Calhoun’s trailer also matched Brown; Seifret testified that DNA is found on hair 
only when the hair is pulled out of the scalp.   
 
Jennifer Roeder, a digital evidence crime analyst for FDLE, testified that an 
SD memory card found in Calhoun’s trailer was from Brown’s camera, and based 
on the time and date stamps of other pictures on the camera, the last picture was 
taken between 3:30 and 4:00 a.m. on December 17, assuming no one reset the 
clock on the camera. 
 
On December 20, 2010, Harry Hamilton, captain of the Holmes County 
Sheriff’s Department, seized Calhoun’s trailer pursuant to a search warrant.  He 
noticed that the evidence tape on the door had been broken.  He found Calhoun 
hiding under his mattress in the bed frame in his trailer.  Calhoun had scratches on 
his hands, arms, and neck. 
 
Raley executed a second search of Calhoun’s trailer on December 28 at the 
impound yard of the Holmes County Sheriff’s office after Brown’s remains had 
been found.  He found a TV face down on the mattress of the bed and a DVD 
 
- 9 - 
player.  A VCR was on the floor and the top was off, with wires tangled in the 
corner.  A converter box with outputs for a coaxial cable and a TV with a coaxial 
coupling were found, but no coaxial cable was found in the trailer.   
 
The State rested, and the defense provided witnesses as follows.  José 
Martinez, owner of the Friendly Mini-Mart, testified that Calhoun came to his store 
on December 16 and bought a pack of cigars, wine, and apple cider.  He never 
knew Calhoun to buy cigarettes.  
 
Matt Crutchfield who lived near America’s Precious Metals was awakened 
on December 17 between 1 and 3:30 a.m. by a loud bang.  He had heard the noise 
before and thought it came from the recycling plant.  Monica Crutchfield, his wife, 
was also awakened by a loud noise that came from America’s Precious Metals, but 
she testified that she had never heard that noise before.  Darlene Madden, who 
lived one block from America’s Precious Metals, awoke to a loud noise that 
sounded like cars colliding at approximately 2:30 to 3:00 a.m.  She testified that 
she may have heard a second noise but did not get up to investigate it. 
 
John Sketo, Calhoun’s father and co-owner of America’s Precious Metals, 
testified that Calhoun’s trailer was located beside the scrap yard.  Sketo arrived at 
the scrap yard at approximately 7:30 a.m. on December 17 and noticed that the 
Bobcat was missing from the place it had been the day before.  He also noticed that 
the door to Calhoun’s trailer was open.  Sketo testified that none of this was like 
 
- 10 - 
that the day before.  Ellenburg called the police.  Ellenburg and Sketo found the 
Bobcat by the loading dock, and they thought it had pushed something off of the 
dock.  Tread marks on the ground had not been there the day before.  Sketo looked 
in Calhoun’s trailer and it looked like someone had searched it; drawers were open 
and things were strewn about.  Sketo saw a small grill on Calhoun’s bed, which 
usually remained outside the trailer.  Sketo did not see anyone in the trailer.  He 
did not see a purse on the floor of the trailer.  Sketo exited the trailer and left the 
door open.   
Mixon arrived at the junkyard and asked if Sketo had seen Calhoun.  Sketo 
replied that he had not and told Mixon not to go into the trailer because someone 
had broken into it, but Mixon went into the trailer anyway.  Mixon was in the 
trailer for about one minute.  Then Mixon left the junkyard.  Sketo went back into 
the trailer and found Calhoun’s gun leaning against the couch on the floor.  Sketo 
testified that if the gun had been there the first time he went into the trailer he 
would have noticed it.  He stated that the gun was not there before Mixon went into 
the trailer.  On cross-examination, the State elicited from Sketo that he did not see 
Mixon carry the gun or anything else into the trailer.   
 
Ellenburg testified that he arrived at the junkyard at approximately 7:30 a.m. 
on December 17.  He stated that Calhoun’s door did not have pry marks on it the 
day before, and Calhoun’s trailer was not in disarray the day before.  He did not 
 
- 11 - 
see a gun in the trailer the first time he looked.  He stated that the tire tracks near 
the loading dock and next to the Bobcat looked like they were made by a dual-
wheeled vehicle.  A corner of the cement steps was also knocked off, and had not 
been like that the day before.   
 
Lieutenant Raley searched a barn in Pine Oak Community in Geneva, 
Alabama, and a license tag bracket matching the description of one on Brown’s car 
was found at the property.  There was also a piece of cardboard that had oil and tire 
marks on it.  Brown’s family told Raley that her car had a small oil leak.  However, 
Raley could not trace the oil stain or the bracket to Brown’s car.   
 
On February 28, 2012, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree 
murder and kidnapping. 
Penalty Phase 
 
The State moved for admission of all evidence from the guilt phase into the 
penalty phase and rested.   
The defense provided witnesses as follows.  Pastor A. J. Lombarin, Cliff 
Jenkins, and Ryan George, all ministers to Calhoun, each testified that Calhoun 
was devoted to Christian study and ministered to other inmates while awaiting the 
instant trial.  Patrick O’Dell, an inmate, testified that Calhoun invited him to bible 
study and was his mentor, teacher, and minister, and changed the course of 
O’Dell’s life by telling him to take responsibility for his actions.  Jerry Pappas, an 
 
- 12 - 
inmate, testified that Calhoun was like a brother to him and changed his life for the 
better.  Darryl Williams, a former inmate, testified that Calhoun helped him change 
and encouraged him to witness to others outside of the jail.   
Lieutenant Bill Pate, a security officer at the Holmes County jail, testified 
that Calhoun had no behavioral problems while incarcerated and that his only prior 
criminal record was driving while his license was suspended and violating 
probation.   
Charlie Skinner, Calhoun’s brother-in-law, testified that Calhoun was 
generous to a fault and that he had given his life to God.  Sharon Calhoun, 
Calhoun’s mother, testified that Calhoun and his father had a close relationship.  
Calhoun has a son with whom he is very close and to whom he is a good father.  
Calhoun also treated Mixon’s son like his own son.  Sharon testified that Calhoun 
was a good student, a boy scout, never got into trouble, and sends preachers to his 
father to help counsel him.   
The jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of nine to three.   
Spencer1
 
Betsy Spann, Calhoun’s sister, testified that Calhoun was like her best friend 
and kept her out of trouble while they were growing up.  Sharon Calhoun testified 
that Calhoun had found God and that Calhoun was innocent.  John Searcy, a 
 Hearing 
                                         
 
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
- 13 - 
minister who had gone to counsel Calhoun on the night of the verdict, testified that 
Calhoun had actually counseled him that night.  Following the conclusion of the 
Spencer hearing, the trial court allowed victim impact statements from Brown’s 
family members.   
 
The trial court found three aggravators: (1) cold, calculated, and 
premeditated (CCP)—very great weight; (2) during the commission of a 
kidnapping—great weight; and (3) for the purpose of avoiding arrest—very great 
weight.  The trial court found one statutory mitigator: no significant history of 
criminal activity—significant weight, and five nonstatutory mitigators: (1) good 
jail conduct pending and during trial—little weight; (2) positive role model to other 
inmates—some weight; (3) capable of forming loving relationships—little weight; 
(4) childhood history—little weight; and (5) defendant will be incarcerated for the 
remainder of his life with no danger to others—minimal weight.  The trial court 
gave the jury recommendation of death great weight.  The trial court concluded 
that the aggravating circumstances far outweighed the mitigating circumstances 
and sentenced Calhoun to death for the murder of Brown and 100 years of 
imprisonment for the kidnapping of Brown. 
 
Calhoun appeals, raising the following three issues for this Court’s review: 
(1) whether the trial court erred in excluding Calhoun’s exculpatory statements to 
police under the rule of completeness; (2) whether the trial court erred in finding 
 
- 14 - 
the aggravators of CCP and avoiding arrest; and (3) a Ring2
ANALYSIS 
 claim.  We also review 
the sufficiency of the evidence and proportionality.  For the reasons that follow, we 
affirm Calhoun’s convictions and sentences. 
I.  Rule of Completeness 
Calhoun asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State 
to ask Lieutenant Raley about statements Calhoun made to him during an interview 
without admitting the entire interview under the rule of completeness.  Calhoun 
contends that his statements that (1) he was at the Brooks’ residence on Saturday, 
December 18, 2010, and (2) Brown had never been to his trailer before, were out 
of context and, in fairness, the rest of Calhoun’s interview with Raley should have 
been admitted to provide the context of these statements.   
As a general rule of law, self-serving statements are not admissible 
under section 90.803(18), Florida Statutes (2009).  However, 
(1)  When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is 
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him or her at that 
time to introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded 
statement that in fairness ought to be considered contemporaneously.  
An adverse party is not bound by evidence introduced under this 
section. 
section 90.108 
provides: 
                                         
 
2.  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).   
 
- 15 - 
§ 90.108(1), Fla. Stat. (2009).   
The purpose of this statute, known as the rule of completeness, is to 
“avoid the potential for creating misleading impressions by 
taking statements out of context.”  Larzelere v. State, 676 So. 2d 394, 
401 (Fla. 1996).  “[P]arties may seek the introduction of other 
statements when those statements ‘in fairness ought to be considered 
contemporaneously’ with the introduction of the partial statement,” 
but “[s]uch a fairness determination falls within the discretion of the 
trial judge.”  Id. at 402.  Review of this issue is for abuse of 
discretion.  Id. 
 
Kaczmar v. State
First, this issue was not properly preserved for appellate review.  Calhoun 
never proffered the specific statements from the interview he sought to admit to the 
trial court.  See § 90.104(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009) (“A court may predicate error, set 
aside or reverse a judgment, or grant a new trial on the basis of admitted or 
excluded evidence when a substantial right of the party is adversely affected and 
[w]hen the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the court by offer of proof or was apparent from the context within 
which the questions were asked.”); see generally Blackwood v. State, 777 So. 2d 
399, 410-11 (Fla. 2000) (“In order to preserve a claim based on the court’s refusal 
to admit evidence, the party seeking to admit the evidence must proffer the 
contents of the excluded evidence to the trial court.” (citing Lucas v. State, 568 So. 
2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1990); Jacobs v. Wainwright, 450 So. 2d 200, 201 (Fla. 1984))).  
Thus, Calhoun must demonstrate that the error, if any, was fundamental, which it 
, 104 So. 3d 990, 1000-01 (Fla. 2012) (alterations in original).   
 
- 16 - 
was not.  Fundamental error is “defined as error that reaches down into the validity 
of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained 
without the assistance of the alleged error.”  Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 
403 (Fla. 2003).  
Even if Calhoun had properly preserved this claim, Calhoun would not be 
entitled to relief.  Calhoun contends that the trial court erred in finding that his 
statements were inadmissible solely on the basis that they were self-serving.  See 
Christopher v. State, 583 So. 2d 642, 646 (Fla. 1991) (“Once the officer testified in 
the state’s case-in-chief about one portion of Eberhardt’s statements to him, the 
court erred in sustaining the state’s hearsay objection for the reason that his 
statements he was ‘high’ or intoxicated were self serving.”) (quoting Eberhardt v. 
State
Nonetheless, any error in excluding these statements is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt because there is no reasonable possibility that exclusion of the 
redacted statements affected the outcome of the jury’s verdict.  
, 550 So. 2d 102, 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)).  We agree.  Here, the trial court 
erred in excluding Calhoun’s statements for the reason that they were self-serving 
without making a determination based on fairness. 
See State v. 
DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986); see also Larzelere, 676 So. 2d at 402.  
The statements with which Calhoun asserts error were only two statements out of 
 
- 17 - 
the extensive record in this case.  Additionally, both statements were cumulative to 
other information elicited during the trial.   
Calhoun’s statement that he was at the Brooks’ residence on December 18 
was cumulative to the testimonies of Tiffany and Glenda Brooks, who both 
testified that Calhoun was in their shed on the morning of December 18.  
Regarding Calhoun’s statement that Brown had never been to Calhoun’s trailer 
before, Calhoun contends that he should have been allowed to clarify that the 
statement meant any time before the night of December 16 and that he did not 
know if Brown made it to his trailer on December 16.  This information that 
Calhoun contends should have been admitted is cumulative to the testimonies of 
Glenda and Tiffany Brooks that Calhoun told the Brooks that Brown was probably 
the girl who was supposed to pick him up.  This implies that Calhoun was not at 
his trailer when Brown arrived the night she was supposed to pick him up.  
Additionally, during the defense’s case-in-chief, the defense introduced testimony 
from Sketo and Ellenburg that someone had broken into Calhoun’s trailer the night 
of December 16.  This also implies that someone other than Calhoun was at 
Calhoun’s trailer when Brown arrived and therefore, Calhoun did not know if 
Brown arrived at his trailer that night.  Thus, the information Calhoun seeks to 
introduce through the rule of completeness, that he did not know if Brown arrived 
at his trailer on December 16 and that his statement that Brown had never been to 
 
- 18 - 
his trailer before December 16, was in fact provided to the jury.  Accordingly, any 
error in not admitting these statements under the rule of completeness is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  
II.  Aggravating Factors 
Calhoun asserts that the trial court erred in finding the avoiding arrest and 
cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) aggravators.  In reviewing the trial 
court’s finding of an aggravating circumstance, this Court’s “task on appeal is to 
review the record to determine whether the trial court applied the right rule of law 
for each aggravating circumstance and, if so, whether competent substantial 
evidence supports its finding.”  McWatters v. State, 36 So. 3d 613, 641 (Fla. 2010) 
(quoting Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 368 (Fla. 2003)).  The sentencing order 
shows that the trial court applied the correct rules of law in making these 
determinations.  Thus, the only question is whether there is competent, substantial 
evidence in the record to support the findings of avoiding arrest and CCP. 
a.  Avoiding Arrest 
The avoiding arrest aggravator is applicable when “[t]he capital felony was 
committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an 
escape from custody.”  § 921.141 (5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2009).  “The avoid arrest 
aggravator focuses on the motivation for the crimes.”  Jennings v. State, 718 So. 2d 
144, 151 (Fla. 1998) (citing Stein v. State, 632 So. 2d 1361, 1366 (Fla. 1994)).   
 
- 19 - 
Where the victim is not a police officer, “the evidence 
[supporting the avoid arrest aggravator] must prove that the sole or 
dominant motive for the killing was to eliminate a witness,” and 
“[m]ere speculation on the part of the state that witness elimination 
was the dominant motive behind a murder cannot support the avoid 
arrest aggravator.”  However, 
In other cases, this Court has found it significant that 
the
this factor may be proved by 
circumstantial evidence from which the motive for the murder may be 
inferred, without direct evidence of the offender’s thought processes. 
 victims knew and could identify their killer.  While this fact alone 
is insufficient to prove the avoid arrest aggravator, 
 
we have looked at 
any further evidence presented, such as whether the defendant used 
gloves, wore a mask, or made any incriminating statements about 
witness elimination; whether the victims offered resistance; and 
whether the victims were confined or were in a position to pose a 
threat to the defendant. 
Buzia v. State, 926 So. 2d 1203, 1209-10 (Fla. 2006) (some emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Parker v. State, 
The trial court’s finding of the avoiding arrest aggravator is not supported by 
competent, substantial evidence in this case.  Most of the facts on which the trial 
court relied in support of finding this aggravator were based on Calhoun’s attempts 
to avoid arrest after Brown’s death, not on his motive to kill Brown.  Very little 
information exists about what happened between Calhoun and Brown in the events 
leading up to Brown being put in the trunk of her car and dying from smoke 
inhalation and thermal burns in the woods.  While it is true that Brown was able to 
identify Calhoun, “this alone is insufficient to support application of this 
aggravator.”  
873 So. 2d 270, 289 (Fla. 2004)). 
Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 20 (Fla. 2000) (citing Consalvo v. State, 
697 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1996)).  Based on the lack of evidence in the record of any 
 
- 20 - 
motive to kill Brown, the trial court’s finding that Calhoun’s sole or dominant 
motive for the murder was to avoid arrest is based on speculation.  Accordingly, 
we strike this aggravator. 
Nonetheless, we find that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
See DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1138; see also Zack, 753 So. 2d at 20.  Error in finding 
an impermissible aggravator can only be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if 
there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence presented in mitigation is 
sufficient to outweigh the remaining aggravators.  See Hill v. State, 643 So. 2d 
1071, 1073 (Fla. 1994).  In addition to the avoiding arrest aggravator, the trial 
court found CCP, which the trial court gave very great weight, and is considered 
one of the weightiest aggravators.  See Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 
1999) (noting that CCP is one of “the most serious aggravators set out in the 
statutory sentencing scheme . . .”).  The trial court also found the aggravator of 
kidnapping, which the trial court gave great weight.  The trial court found only one 
statutory mitigator of no significant history of criminal activity—significant 
weight, and five nonstatutory mitigators which were allotted minimal, little, and 
some weight as follows: (1) good jail conduct pending and during trial—little 
weight, (2) positive role model to other inmates—some weight, (3) capable of 
forming loving relationships—little weight, (4) childhood history—little weight, 
and (5) will be incarcerated for the remainder of his life with no danger to others—
 
- 21 - 
minimal weight.  Considering the remaining aggravators and the limited mitigation 
in this case, we find that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed 
to the sentence.  Accordingly, we find that the error in finding the avoid arrest 
aggravator is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
b.  CCP 
In order to establish the CCP aggravator, the evidence must show:  
that the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection and not an 
act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage (cold); that 
the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to commit 
murder before the fatal incident (calculated); that the defendant 
exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated); and that the 
defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification.   
Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79, 98 (Fla. 2007) (citing Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 
85, 89 (Fla. 1994)).  “ ‘CCP involves a much higher degree of premeditation’ than 
is required to prove first degree murder.”  Deparvine v. State, 995 So. 2d 351, 381-
82 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Foster v. State, 778 So. 2d 906, 921 (Fla. 2000)).   
“The focus of the CCP aggravator centers on the manner in which the 
defendant executed the crime.”  McGirth v. State, 48 So. 3d 777, 793 (Fla. 
2010) (citing Walker v. State, 957 So. 2d 560, 581 (Fla. 2007)).  While 
circumstantial evidence can be used to support an aggravating factor, “the 
circumstantial evidence must be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis which 
might negate the aggravating factor.”  Harris v. State, 843 So. 2d 856, 866 (Fla. 
 
- 22 - 
2003) (quoting Hildwin v. State, 727 So. 2d 193, 194 (Fla. 1998)).  Here, there is 
competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding of CCP. 
The first prong of the test for CCP is that the killing was the product of cool 
and calm reflection and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of 
rage.  Here, the deliberate nature of Calhoun’s actions establishes that the murder 
was not prompted by emotional panic or a fit of rage.  Brown had been bound and 
put in the trunk of her car, driven into the woods in Alabama approximately ten 
miles from Calhoun’s home and left to die of smoke inhalation and thermal burns 
after Calhoun doused the car with ignitable fluid and lit it on fire.  Based on these 
facts, this crime was not prompted by emotional frenzy, but rather a product of 
cool and calm reflection.  See generally Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 277, 299 (Fla. 
2009) (“Wright had ample opportunity during the ten-mile abduction drive to the 
orange grove to reflect on his actions and abort any intent to kill.  Instead, Wright 
chose to shoot each victim in the head at close range.  These actions establish the 
cold nature of the murders.”) (citation omitted). 
Regarding the second prong of CCP—that the defendant had a careful plan 
or prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal incident—where a 
defendant arms himself in advance, kills execution-style, and has time to coldly 
and calmly decide to kill, the element of “calculated” is supported.  Wright, 19 So. 
3d at 299.  “Taking a victim to an isolated location or choosing an isolated location 
 
- 23 - 
to carry out an attack can . . . be indicative of a plan or prearranged design to kill.”  
Franklin, 965 So. 2d at 99 (citing Thompson v. State, 648 So. 2d 692, 696 (Fla. 
1994); Wuornos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1000, 1008 (Fla. 1994)).  Here, the last 
picture on Brown’s camera was taken around 3 a.m. at Calhoun’s residence.  
Calhoun was then seen in what appears to have been Brown’s car at approximately 
6:00 a.m. at a convenience store in Alabama.  A large fire in the area in which 
Brown’s burnt car and her remains were eventually found was not seen until 
approximately 11 a.m. later that morning.  Considering all of these factors, 
Calhoun’s actions were over a long enough period of time to support a finding that 
Calhoun coldly and calmly decided to kill Brown.  See Wright, 19 So. 3d at 299 
(finding the calculated element of CCP was met and stating, “The drive to the 
orange grove afforded Wright time to coldly and calmly make the final plan and 
decision to kill the victims.”); Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423, 436 (Fla. 1998) 
(upholding CCP and stating, “Even if Knight did not make the final decision to 
execute the two victims until sometime during his lengthy journey to his final 
destination, that journey provided an abundance of time for Knight to coldly and 
calmly decide to kill.”); Fennie v. State, 648 So. 2d 95, 99 (Fla. 1994) (“The 
lengthy and drawn out nature of this crime clearly indicates [the defendant] 
carefully contemplated his actions prior to the fatal incident.”). 
 
- 24 - 
Regarding the third prong—that the defendant exhibited heightened 
premeditation, this Court has “previously found the heightened premeditation 
required to sustain this aggravator where a defendant has the opportunity to leave 
the crime scene and not commit the murder but, instead, commits the murder.”  
Lynch, 841 So. 2d at 373 (quoting Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 148, 162 (Fla. 
1998)).  Here, Brown was bound and placed in the trunk of her car.  Calhoun drove 
her at least ten miles north, across the Florida state line, into the woods of 
Alabama.  Calhoun could have left Brown bound in the trunk, but instead, he 
doused the car with an ignitable fluid and set the car on fire.  See Wright, 19 So. 3d 
at 300 (“Wright had ample opportunity, from the time he encountered the victims 
in the supermarket parking lot to when he stopped the car in the orange grove, to 
release the victims and leave the crime scene without committing two murders.”); 
see also Fennie, 648 So. 2d at 99 (“The lengthy nature of the crime also goes to the 
heightened premeditation necessary to establish this aggravating factor.”). 
Finally, it is clear that the fourth element—that the murder was committed 
with no pretext of legal or moral justification—was satisfied.  The record is devoid 
of any evidence of a threatening act by Brown prior to the murder that would 
constitute a pretext of legal or moral justification.  See generally Hertz v. State, 
803 So. 2d 629, 651 (Fla. 2001) (“As to Hertz, there is no construction of the facts 
that would support even a fragmentary claim of excuse or justification, or of a 
 
- 25 - 
defense to homicide, because the victims here were bound and helpless when 
killed.”) (citing Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381, 388 (Fla. 1994)).  
“While CCP may be established by circumstantial evidence, this Court will 
consider any reasonable hypothesis of innocence offered by the defense that might 
be inconsistent with and negate this aggravating factor.”  Wright, 19 So. 3d at 300 
(citing Gordon v. State, 704 So. 2d 107, 114 (Fla. 1997)).  Calhoun contends that 
because Brown could have already been unconscious before he put her in the 
trunk, he could have thought he was burning a dead body rather than killing Brown 
when he drove her to the woods and set the car on fire.  For support, Calhoun notes 
that the trial court found that the State did not establish the especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravator because it was unclear whether Brown was 
already unconscious by the time she was put in the trunk and burned.   
As the State contends, however, if Calhoun thought that Brown was already 
dead before being put in the trunk of her car, it would be unnecessary for him to 
bind her arms and apply duct tape around her neck as Calhoun did.  As testified to 
by the medical examiner, although he could not determine at what point Brown 
became unconscious, Brown was still breathing when the car was burned, as 
evidenced by smoke found in her lungs.  Based on these facts, the evidence is 
inconsistent with this hypothesis that might negate the aggravating factor.   
 
- 26 - 
Additionally, Calhoun’s contention that the trial court’s rejection of HAC 
necessarily negates a finding of CCP is incorrect.  Different elements must be 
satisfied for each aggravator.  Compare Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 849-50 
(Fla. 2002) (“HAC focuses on the means and manner in which the death is inflicted 
and the immediate circumstances surrounding the death, rather than the intent and 
motivation of a defendant, where a victim experiences the torturous anxiety and 
fear of impending death.”), with McGirth, 48 So. 3d at 793 (“The focus of the CCP 
aggravator centers on the manner in which the defendant executed the crime.”); see 
also Oyola v. State, 99 So. 3d 431, 443 (Fla. 2012) (“In evaluating whether HAC is 
present, a trial court focuses on the victim’s perception of the circumstances—not 
the perpetrator’s viewpoint.”) (emphasis in original).  Thus, rejection of the 
proposed HAC aggravator does not necessarily negate a finding of CCP.   
Based on the above, there is competent, substantial evidence to support the 
trial court’s finding of CCP. 
III.  Ring 
Calhoun asserts that Florida’s death penalty statute violates the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Ring.  “[W]e have repeatedly rejected constitutional 
challenges to Florida’s death penalty under Ring.”  Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 
206 (Fla. 2010) (citing Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 2003); Bottoson v. 
Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002); King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002)).  
 
- 27 - 
We decline to revisit our decisions in Bottoson and King on this issue.  Also, 
because the jury found Calhoun guilty of kidnapping, it found the facts supported 
the trial court’s application of the “during the course of a kidnapping” aggravator, 
which satisfies the requirements of Ring.  See, e.g., Salazar v. State, 991 So. 2d 
364, 378 (Fla. 2008) (“Also, because the jury found Salazar guilty of burglary and 
attempted murder, it found the facts supporting the trial court’s application of the 
‘during the course of a felony’ aggravator.”); Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938, 961 
(Fla. 2007) (“Second, Johnson is not entitled to relief under Ring because the 
‘murder in the course of a felony aggravator’ rests on the separate convictions of 
kidnapping and sexual battery, which satisfies Sixth Amendment requirements.”).   
IV.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Although not raised by Calhoun, “this Court has a mandatory obligation to 
independently review the sufficiency of the evidence in every case in which a 
sentence of death has been imposed.”  Miller v. State, 42 So. 3d 204, 227 (Fla. 
2010); Jones v. State, 963 So. 2d 180, 184 (Fla. 2007).  “In determining the 
sufficiency of the evidence, the question is whether, after viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the 
existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Miller, 42 So. 
3d at 227 (quoting Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001)).     
 
- 28 - 
“Where a conviction is based wholly upon circumstantial evidence, a special 
standard of review applies.”  McDuffie v. State, 970 So. 2d 312, 330 (Fla. 2007) 
(quoting Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 155 (Fla. 2002)).   
Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how 
strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a conviction cannot be 
sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence.  The question of whether the evidence fails 
to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for the jury to 
determine, and where there is substantial, competent evidence to 
support the jury verdict, we will not reverse.   
Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128, 1145-46 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Darling, 808 So. 
2d at 155).   
[This Court’s] view of the evidence must be taken in the light 
most favorable to the state.  The state is not required to rebut 
conclusively every possible variation of events which could be 
inferred from the evidence, but only to introduce competent evidence 
which is inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of events.  Once that 
threshold burden is met, it becomes the jury’s duty to determine 
whether the evidence is sufficient to exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt.   
McDuffie, 970 So. 2d at 330 (quoting Orme v. State
The jury in this case was instructed on both premeditated murder and felony-
murder.  Because the guilty verdict was rendered on a general form, the evidence 
must support either premeditated murder or felony-murder.  Dessaure v. State, 891 
So. 2d 455, 472 (Fla. 2004).   
, 677 So. 2d 258, 262 (Fla. 
1996)). 
 
- 29 - 
Premeditation is defined as more than a mere intent to kill; it is a “fully 
formed conscious purpose to kill.”  Evans v. State, 838 So. 2d 1090, 1095 (Fla. 
2002) (quoting Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d 980, 985 (Fla. 1999)).  “This purpose 
may be formed a moment before the act but must exist for a sufficient length of 
time to permit reflection as to the nature of the act to be committed and the 
probable result of that act.”  Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001) 
(quoting Woods, 733 So. 2d at 985).  Premeditation may be inferred from such 
facts as “the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate 
provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the 
homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted.”  Id. 
(quoting Norton v. State, 709 So. 2d 87, 92 (Fla. 1997)).  “Leaving a wounded, 
living victim trapped in a burning vehicle is sufficient evidence from which to infer 
premeditation.”  Kocaker v. State, 119 So. 3d 1214, 1226 (Fla.), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 2743 (2013). 
There is sufficient evidence to support Calhoun’s conviction for first-degree 
murder.  Harvey Glenn Bush saw Calhoun ask Brown for a ride on December 16, 
2010, and Brown responded that she would pick him up after work.  Brown drove 
a 2000 white, four-door Toyota Avalon.  Brown drove up to Jerry Gammons’ 
trailer in a light colored, four-door car and knocked on his door at about 8:40 p.m. 
 
- 30 - 
on December 16, and asked for Calhoun.  Calhoun’s trailer was located 
approximately one road from Gammons’ trailer.  
Brown’s purse was found in Calhoun’s trailer.  Blood found on a roll of duct 
tape in Calhoun’s trailer was a major donor match to Brown’s DNA and a minor 
donor partial match to Calhoun’s DNA.  Blood found on blankets taken from 
Calhoun’s trailer matched Calhoun and Brown.  DNA from hair that had been 
pulled out of the scalp and found in Calhoun’s trailer also matched Brown.   
Calhoun came into the convenience store in which Sherry Bradley worked in 
the early morning of December 17.  Bradley noticed scratches and dried blood on 
Calhoun’s hands.  Calhoun had on a white shirt that had spots of blood on it and 
his fingernails had black underneath them.  Calhoun was driving a white, four-door 
car with a Florida license plate.   
Witnesses noticed smoke from the highway in Geneva, Alabama, on 
December 17, at approximately 11 a.m.  Dick Mowbry found a burnt white Toyota 
with no license plate on December 20.  The VIN on the car was matched to a 2000 
Toyota Avalon.  Samples from the right front quarter and left quarter of the car 
tested positive for ignitable liquid.  The entire inside of the car was burnt and 
Brown’s remains were found in the trunk.  The hands and lower limbs had been 
burnt off.  Dr. Stephen Boudreau, the medical examiner, determined that the cause 
 
- 31 - 
of death was smoke inhalation and thermal burns and that the death was a 
homicide.   
Tiffany Brooks found Calhoun in her family’s shed on December 18, on the 
ground wrapped in sleeping bags.  Investigator Raley went to the site of Brown’s 
car on December 20.  Raley noted that the car was near Coleman Road 
approximately 1,488 feet from Calhoun’s campsite.  The Brooks’ residence was 
approximately 1.5 miles from Brown’s car.   
Based on the above, there is sufficient evidence to support the finding of 
first-degree murder.   
Additionally, we find that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of 
felony-murder.  Calhoun was convicted of kidnapping pursuant to section 
787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2009).  
(1)(a) The term “kidnapping” means forcibly, secretly, or by 
threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her 
or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 
2. 
 
Commit or facilitate commission of any felony. 
 
There is sufficient evidence to support the conviction of kidnapping.  As 
stated above, witnesses placed Brown as having been last seen headed toward 
Calhoun’s trailer on the night of December 16 and witnesses heard Brown tell 
Calhoun she would pick him up that night.  Her blood and hair were found in his 
trailer.  Brown’s remains were found in the trunk of her car in the woods in 
Alabama with coaxial cable wrapped around what remained of her upper arms and 
 
- 32 - 
duck tape around her neck.  The medical examiner testified that smoke and carbon 
dioxide were found in her lung tissue, indicating that Brown was alive while she 
was bound in the trunk of the car and the car was lit on fire.  As provided above, 
the medical examiner testified that Brown died as a result of smoke inhalation and 
thermal burns, and that the death was a homicide.  Therefore, there is sufficient 
evidence to support the conviction of kidnapping with intent to facilitate the 
commission of the felony of murder. 
The hypothesis of innocence that Calhoun was not at his trailer when Brown 
arrived to pick him up on the night of December 16 and someone else broke into 
Calhoun’s trailer and killed Brown is negated by the evidence presented by the 
State.  Specifically, Calhoun’s blood was found on items in his trailer that also 
contained Brown’s blood.  Sherry Bradley saw Calhoun driving a car that matched 
the description of Brown’s car in the early morning of December 17.  When 
Bradley asked Calhoun how he got scratches and blood on him, Calhoun 
responded that he had been deer hunting.  The theory that someone broke into 
Calhoun’s trailer was negated by Brittany Mixon’s testimony that she and Calhoun 
lost the key to his trailer months before and had to pry the door open each time 
they used the door.  The theory that Mixon framed Calhoun for the murder by 
planting evidence in his trailer is negated by the testimonies of other witnesses who 
watched her each time Mixon went into Calhoun’s trailer on December 17.  The 
 
- 33 - 
witnesses testified that Mixon never brought anything into Calhoun’s trailer and 
only stayed inside about one minute each time she went inside the trailer.  Thus, 
the evidence was inconsistent with Calhoun’s hypothesis of innocence that another 
individual committed the murder.   
In light of the foregoing, we find that the evidence sufficiently established 
each element of premeditated first-degree murder and felony-murder.   
V.  Proportionality 
“[T]o ensure uniformity in death penalty proceedings, ‘we make a 
comprehensive analysis in order to determine whether the crime falls within the 
category of both the most aggravated and the least mitigated of murders, thereby 
assuring uniformity in the application of the sentence.’ ”  Floyd v. State, 913 So. 
2d 564, 578 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 407-08 (Fla. 
2003)).  We have described our “proportionality review” as involving “a 
thoughtful, deliberate proportionality review to consider the totality of 
circumstances in a case, and to compare it with other capital cases.”  Tillman v. 
State, 591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1991) (quoting Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 
1064 (Fla. 1990) (emphasis omitted)).  “This entails ‘a qualitative review by this 
Court of the underlying basis for each aggravator and mitigator rather than a 
quantitative analysis.’  In other words, proportionality review ‘is not a comparison 
 
- 34 - 
between the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.’ ”  Offord v. 
State, 959 So. 2d 187, 191 (Fla. 2007) (citations and emphasis omitted).   
As discussed above, we have stricken the trial court’s finding of the avoiding 
arrest aggravator.  The trial court appropriately found two aggravators: (1) cold, 
calculated, and premeditated (very great weight), and (2) during the commission of 
a kidnapping (great weight).  The trial court also gave the jury recommendation of 
death by a vote of nine to three great weight.  The trial court found one statutory 
mitigator: no significant history of criminal activity (significant weight), and five 
nonstatutory mitigators: (1) good jail conduct pending and during trial (little 
weight), (2) positive role model to other inmates (some weight), (3) capable of 
forming loving relationships (little weight), (4) childhood history (little weight), 
and (5) will be incarcerated for the remainder of his life with no danger to others 
(minimal weight).   
The death sentence is proportional in this case.  See Hayes v. State, 581 So. 
2d 121, 127 (Fla. 1991) (affirming death sentence where evidence established two 
aggravating circumstances of CCP, and commission during a robbery and 
pecuniary gain merged as one, one statutory mitigator of age, and nonstatutory 
mitigators of low intelligence, learning disabled, and deprived background); see 
generally Foster, 778 So. 2d at 920-22 (finding the death penalty proportional 
where the trial court found two aggravators, avoid arrest and CCP, both accorded 
 
- 35 - 
great weight, no statutory mitigators and twenty-three nonstatutory mitigators, 
assigned very little to no weight); Sliney v. State, 699 So. 2d 662, 671-72 (Fla. 
1997) (finding death penalty proportional with two aggravating circumstances, 
commission during a robbery and avoid arrest, two statutory mitigators, age and 
lack of criminal history, and several nonstatutory mitigators, good prisoner, 
politeness, good neighbor, caring person, good school record, gainful 
employment).     
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Calhoun’s convictions of kidnapping and 
first-degree murder and his respective sentences of 100 years of imprisonment and 
death. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
 
PARIENTE, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.  
POLSTON, C.J., and CANADY, J., concur in result. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion.   
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
LEWIS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur in the opinion with regard to all phases of the analysis except 
striking the “avoid arrest” aggravating factor.  The sole, dominant, and 
 
- 36 - 
fundamental motive for the actual death here was to avoid arrest, the proof of 
which was supported by competent, substantial evidence. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Holmes County,  
Christopher Nida Patterson, Judge - Case No. 302011CF00011A 
 
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and W. C. McLain, Assistant Public Defender, 
Tallahassee, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Stephen R. White, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida,   
 
 
for Appellee