Case Title: Loss v. DeBord

Citation: 407 P.2d 421, 67 Wash. 2d 318

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1965-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
67 Wn.2d 318 (1965) 407 P.2d 421 ROBERT E. LOSS et al., Appellants, v. GLENN W. DeBORD et al., Respondents.[*] No. 37896. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. November 4, 1965. Joseph P. Delay and J. Donald Curran (of Delay & Curran), for appellants. Fred W. Gilbert and Harold D. Clarke (of Hamblen, Gilbert & Brooke), for respondents. SHORETT, J.[] This is an automobile accident case in which the trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the appellants' complaint on the ground that the appellant *319 driver's contributory negligence was established beyond controversy. Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 56(c) permits summary judgment where "... the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law...." Subdivision (e) of the same rule further provides: "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein...." The basis of the trial court's finding of contributory negligence was that Mrs. Loss, the appellant driver, intending to turn left, had stopped her car at a point where the highway lanes for traffic in opposite directions were divided by yellow lines spaced 4 inches or more apart. When stopped, her car was struck by respondent's automobile, which was changing lanes. The applicable statute is RCW 46.60.020, which provides: Appellants concede that Mrs. Loss should be held contributorily negligent if she stopped her car intending to turn left across visible double lines. See Guerin v. Thompson, 53 Wn.2d 515, 335 P.2d 36 (1959). But appellants maintain that the relevant portions of the depositions and affidavits present a question of fact as to the visibility of the double yellow lines at the point of the accident. The application of *320 the doctrine of last clear chance is also suggested in one of the affidavits, but appellants' counsel has not presented any such question by brief or argument and we deem it waived. In order to determine if there is a "genuine issue" of fact, it is necessary to examine the depositions and affidavits. The foreman of the sign and paint department for Spokane County stated that double yellow lines were renewed at the point in question about 1 year and 4 months before the accident, and that "these lines are continuous except at intersections. These lines are painted four inches in width and four inches apart." The state patrolman who investigated the accident stated by affidavit: "At this place on Sprague Avenue the North and South lanes are divided by double yellow lines more than 4 inches apart." A truck driver who was at the scene of the accident stated that he recalled that the highway was divided by double yellow lines. Five and one-half months after the accident, Mrs. Loss testified on deposition as follows: We turn now to the affidavits of appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Loss, having in mind that to raise "a genuine issue as to any material fact" such affidavits "shall be made on personal knowledge" and "show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify in the matters stated therein." Less than 30 days after testifying as above at her deposition, Mrs. Loss and her husband made the following statement in a joint affidavit: A few days later, the appellant driver filed a supplemental affidavit to which she attached two photographs taken of the highway 6 months after the accident. In this affidavit, she states: Although the street in question is a busy one and many persons must have been familiar with the condition of the yellow lines, no other evidence was presented to the trial court by appellants in support of their contention that the double yellow lines were obliterated. [1] The record clearly shows Mrs. Loss' lack of personal knowledge concerning the condition of the yellow lines at the time of the accident. Personal knowledge being a requirement of Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 56(e), her affidavits deserve no consideration in determining whether a genuine issue of fact is present. *322 The appellant husband's statement in the joint affidavit adds nothing, for there is no showing of personal knowledge on his part. No "genuine issue as to any material fact" is presented by appellants' affidavits. Judgment affirmed. ROSELLINI, C.J., HILL, OTT, and HALE, JJ., concur. [*] Reported in 407 P.2d 421. [] Judge Shorett is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution.