Case Title: Brokenbrough v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 322, 2012

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RORY BROKENBROUGH,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 322, 2012 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0308021468 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                         Submitted: August 20, 2012 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: October 10, 2012 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 10th day of October 2012, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Rory Brokenbrough, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s May 18, 2012 order adopting the February 23, 
2012 report of the Superior Court Commissioner, which recommended that 
Brokenbrough’s second motion for postconviction relief pursuant to 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 be denied.1  The plaintiff-appellee, the 
State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §512(b); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62. 
 
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the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening brief that the appeal 
is without merit.2  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in April 2005, Brokenbrough 
was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of Assault in the First Degree, 
Assault in the Third Degree, Attempted Robbery in the First Degree and 
Conspiracy in the Third Degree.  He was sentenced to a total of 52 years of 
Level V incarceration, to be suspended after 35 years for decreasing levels 
of supervision.  Brokenbrough’s convictions were affirmed by this Court on 
direct appeal.3  The Superior Court’s denial of Brokenbrough’s previous 
motion for postconviction relief also was affirmed by this Court.4    
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Brokenbrough claims that there was insufficient 
evidence presented by the State supporting his convictions of first degree 
assault and first degree attempted robbery5 and that the indictment and jury 
instructions incorrectly interpreted the felony assault statute.6  Therefore, 
Brokenbrough argues, it was an abuse of discretion for the Superior Court 
                                                 
2 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
3 Brokenbrough v. State, Del. Supr., No. 432, 2005, Ridgely, J. (Apr. 11, 2006). 
4 Brokenbrough v. State, Del. Supr., Nos. 614, 2007 and 262, 2008, Ridgely, J. (Nov. 25, 
2008).  
5 While Brokenbrough characterizes his claim as one of “actual innocence,” the substance 
of the claim reflects that it is more properly treated as a claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence. 
6 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §613(a) (4).  
 
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not to apply Rule 61(i) (5)’s “miscarriage of justice” exception to the time 
and procedural bars to reach the merits of his claims.   
 
(4) 
The Superior Court is required to first ascertain whether any of 
the procedural bars of Rule 61 apply prior to considering the merits of a 
defendant’s postconviction claims.7  In this case, Brokenbrough’s conviction 
became final in April 2006.  His latest postconviction motion, which was 
filed in September 2011, clearly is time-barred pursuant to Rule 61(i) (1).  
Brokenbrough’s motion also is procedurally barred pursuant to Rules 61(i) 
(2) and (3) because his claim of insufficiency of the evidence was not 
asserted either in his first postconviction motion or in the proceedings 
leading to the judgment of conviction.  Brokenbrough’s claim that the 
indictment and jury instructions were defective was previously asserted in 
his first postconviction motion and, therefore, is procedurally barred under 
Rule 61(i) (4). 
 
(5) 
Brokenbrough argues that the time and procedural bars should 
not apply pursuant to Rule 61(i) (5)’s “miscarriage of justice” exception.  
However, the record before us does not reflect any basis for applying the 
exception.  There is no evidence that Brokenbrough’s convictions were 
                                                 
7 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
 
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supported by insufficient evidence,8 no evidence of any defect in the 
indictment,9 and no evidence of error on the part of the Superior Court in its 
instructions to the jury.10  Thus, Brokenbrough’s attempt to cast his claims 
as cognizable under Rule 61(i) (5) fails.  We, therefore, conclude that the 
judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed. 
 
(6) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
     
                                                 
8 Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345, 1355 (Del. 1991) (on a claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence, this Court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt). 
9 Mayo v. State, 458 A.2d 26, 27 (Del. 1983) (an indictment should be a plain, concise 
and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offenses charged, as 
required by Superior Court Criminal Rule 7(c)). 
10 Green v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 791 A.2d 731, 741 (Del. 2002) (a jury instruction 
should be reasonably informative, not misleading and not undermine the jury’s ability to 
intelligently perform its duty).