Case Title: State v. Harris

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP001767-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP1767-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Brian I. Harris, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 7, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 18, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael S. Wilk 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J. joined by GABLEMAN, J. concurs 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. dissents (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellant-petitioners, there was a brief 
by Kathleen M. Quinn and Kathleen M Quinn Attorney at Law, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Kathleen M. Quinn. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by David 
H. Perlman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP1767-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2011CF797) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Brian I. Harris, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 7, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   The question before the court is 
whether the State compelled Petitioner, Brian Harris, to be a 
witness against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.1 
                                                 
1 This is a review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals, State v. Harris, 2016 WI App 2, 366 Wis. 2d 777, 874 
N.W.2d 602, 
affirming 
the 
circuit 
court's 
judgment 
of 
conviction, Hon. S. Michael Wilk presiding. 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
2 
 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶2 
In the early morning hours of August 13, 2011, a 
Kenosha resident awoke to loud, metallic-sounding noises coming 
from an adjacent residence.  When the noises persisted for 
several minutes, a neighbor called the police. 
¶3 
Officer 
Justin 
Niebuhr 
of 
the 
Kenosha 
Police 
Department responded and met with the caller.  Both could hear 
the sound of metal clanging coming from inside the neighboring 
residence.  Officer Niebuhr approached the front door of the 
supposedly-vacant residence and found it locked, and upon 
looking through a window saw only darkness.  In the process of 
examining the exterior of the residence, Officer Niebuhr noticed 
the screen was off the unlatched kitchen window.   
¶4 
After backup arrived, Officers Niebuhr and Arturo 
Gonzalez entered the residence and traced the noises to the 
basement.  Two additional officers responded to the scene and 
"cleared" the main and upstairs floors of the residence.  
Officers Niebuhr and Gonzalez went down to the basement where 
they found Mr. Harris secreted in a crawl space under the 
stairs.  Strewn about him were copper piping, a flashlight with 
a red lens, and a duffle bag containing a saw and replacement 
blades, a bolt-cutter type instrument, and some crowbars.  Mr. 
Harris' outfit included a pair of black work gloves.  The 
officers took Mr. Harris into custody and eventually placed him 
in Officer Niebuhr's squad car. 
¶5 
While still in the squad car in front of the 
residence, Mr. Harris commenced an unprompted narrative of his 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
3 
 
criminal activities.  Mr. Harris told Office Niebuhr he had been 
homeless for approximately seven years, he frequently went into 
vacant homes to sleep, and he often committed misdemeanor crimes 
to get items to sell.  He said this was his plan for the copper 
piping.  Neither Officer Niebuhr, nor any of the other officers 
present, were questioning Mr. Harris when he made these 
statements.  Officer Niebuhr confirmed he neither said nor did 
anything of a threatening nature to prize out Mr. Harris' 
statements, nor did he promise Mr. Harris anything in exchange 
for them.  Officer Niebuhr did not give Mr. Harris a Miranda2 
warning before he made these statements. 
¶6 
Later that morning, Detective Chad Buchanan of the 
Kenosha Police Department went to the Kenosha County Jail to 
interview Mr. Harris.  He met Mr. Harris at about 9:00 a.m. in 
the common area, just outside the interview rooms.  What 
occurred next is not entirely clear, but Detective Buchanan 
asked a question to the effect of "Would you like to give me a 
                                                 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
4 
 
statement?"3  Mr. Harris responded:  "They caught me man, I got 
nothing else to say."  Detective Buchanan did not inform Mr. 
Harris of his Miranda rights prior to speaking with him. 
¶7 
The State charged Mr. Harris with burglary, possession 
of burglarious tools, criminal damage to property, and criminal 
trespass, each as a repeater.  Mr. Harris brought a suppression 
motion to prevent the State from using his "they caught me" 
statement at trial.4  The circuit court found that "Detective 
Buchanan's intent was to ask the defendant to come to the 
interview rooms for an interview and . . . the question was, 
would you like to give a statement?"  The circuit court said the 
expected response to this question would have been "yes, I'll 
give 
a 
statement 
or, 
no, 
I 
won't 
give 
a 
statement."  
Consequently, the circuit court found no violation of Mr. 
Harris's right to be free from self-incrimination, and so denied 
the suppression motion.  The State used his statement at trial, 
                                                 
3 At the suppression hearing, Detective Buchanan said he 
asked Mr. Harris "if he would like to come with me to the 
detective bureau to be interviewed."  At trial, Detective 
Buchanan testified that he "asked the defendant if he would like 
to give me a statement . . . ."  Although not entirely clear, it 
appears Mr. Harris bases his argument on Detective Buchanan’s 
trial 
testimony. 
 
This 
makes 
sense——between 
the 
two 
characterizations, the trial testimony describes a question 
closer to the Miranda line than the question described at the 
suppression hearing.  Consequently, our analysis will focus on 
the 
formulation 
presented 
at 
trial. 
 
If 
that 
passes 
constitutional muster, then so will the other. 
4 The suppression motion encompassed other statements as 
well, but the "they caught me" statement is the only one Mr. 
Harris presented for our review. 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
5 
 
following which the jury found Mr. Harris guilty on all four 
counts. 
¶8 
Mr. Harris timely appealed his conviction.  In a 
published decision, the court of appeals affirmed.  It noted the 
confusion over the precise wording of the question that preceded 
Mr. 
Harris's 
"they 
caught 
me" 
statement, 
but 
found 
it 
unimportant to the outcome.  The court of appeals concluded 
that, whatever the exact wording, it was "not reasonably likely 
to 
elicit 
an 
incriminating 
response; 
[and] 
thus, 
the 
communication did not constitute interrogation and Miranda 
warnings were not required."5 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶9 
We employ a two-step process in reviewing a circuit 
court's denial of a motion to suppress.  State v. Eason, 2001 
WI 98, ¶9, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.  First, we review 
the circuit court's factual findings and uphold them unless they 
are clearly erroneous.  Id.6  Second, we apply constitutional 
principles to those facts de novo, without deference to the 
courts initially considering the question, but benefitting from 
their analyses.  In re Commitment of Mark, 2006 WI 78, ¶12, 292 
Wis. 2d 1, 718 N.W.2d 90 ("We also review, de novo, the 
application 
of 
constitutional 
principles 
to 
established 
                                                 
5 Harris, 366 Wis. 2d 777, ¶25. 
6 Notwithstanding the uncertainty over the exact wording of 
Detective Buchanan’s question, neither party argues that any of 
the circuit court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous.  
Consequently, we do not address this step of the review process. 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
6 
 
facts."); 
State 
v. 
Hansford, 
219 
Wis. 2d 226, 
234, 
580 
N.W.2d 171 (1998) ("Although we review questions of law de novo, 
we benefit from the analyses of the circuit court and the court 
of appeals."). 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶10 Mr. 
Harris 
presents 
a 
single 
question 
for 
our 
consideration:  Whether the State compelled him to be a witness 
against himself by using his answer to Detective Buchanan's 
question at trial.7  A simple question like "Would you like to 
give me a statement?" may seem an unlikely candidate for a 
constitutional violation, but as our analysis here demonstrates, 
we are unstinting in our protection of criminal defendants' 
rights. 
¶11 There is history behind the protection against self-
incrimination, history that reminds us of why that barrier is so 
important.  It is born of experience, and responds to the 
dangers inherent in the inquisitorial method of questioning 
suspects: 
The maxim 'Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare,'[8] had its 
origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and 
manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused 
                                                 
7 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that no "person . . . [shall] be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself."  U.S. Const. 
amend. V.  The Wisconsin Constitution article I, section 8 
contains 
an 
analogous 
provision, 
which 
says 
that 
"No 
person . . . may be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself or herself." 
8 "No one is bound to accuse himself." 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
7 
 
persons, which [have] long obtained in the continental 
system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from 
the British throne in 1688, and the erection of 
additional barriers for the protection of the people 
against the exercise of arbitrary power, [were] not 
uncommon even in England.  While the admissions or 
confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and 
freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of 
incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked 
to explain his apparent connection with a crime under 
investigation, the ease with which the questions put 
to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the 
temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat 
him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a 
corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, 
which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier 
state trials, . . . made the system so odious as to 
give rise to a demand for its total abolition. 
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596—97 (1896).9  The ease with 
which innocent questions can become inquisitorial requires that 
this protection apply to criminal suspects whether they are 
inside or outside of the courtroom:  "[T]he privilege against 
self-incrimination protects individuals not only from legal 
compulsion to testify in a criminal courtroom but also from 
'informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during 
in-custody questioning.'"  Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 
589 (1990) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 
(1966)).  Thus, our constitutional protection against self-
                                                 
9 Although this excerpt from Brown specifically addressed 
coerced confessions, instead of the broader right to remain 
silent (which we address here), its condemnation of the 
inquisitorial method served as part of the motivating rationale 
for the ubiquitous Miranda warnings.  And its description of the 
inquisitorial method provides valuable insight as we consider 
what 
constitutes 
the 
"functional 
equivalent" 
of 
an 
interrogation. 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
8 
 
incrimination is called to duty whenever the State interrogates 
a suspect in police custody.  See Miranda, 384 U.S. 436; see 
also State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, ¶29, 588 N.W.2d 606 
(1999).  
¶12 This freedom from compelled self-incrimination is one 
of the nation's "most cherished principles."  Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 458.  We are sufficiently solicitous of this protection that 
we guard it by patrolling a generous buffer zone around the 
central prohibition. 
A. Procedural Requirements 
¶13 The most important aspect of that buffer is the right 
to remain silent while in police custody.  We actualize the 
right by requiring the State's agents, before conducting an in-
custody interrogation, to formally instruct the suspect of his 
constitutional rights and then conduct themselves according to 
how he elects to preserve or waive them.  Thus, a suspect must 
be warned prior to any questioning that he has the 
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be 
used against him in a court of law, that he has the 
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he 
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for 
him prior to any questioning if he so desires. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. 
¶14 This 
procedural 
safeguard 
arose 
out 
of 
an 
understanding that custodial interrogations present a uniquely 
intimidating atmosphere that can interfere with a suspect's 
exercise of his rights:  "The concern of the Court in Miranda 
was 
that 
the 
'interrogation 
environment' 
created 
by 
the 
interplay of interrogation and custody would 'subjugate the 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
9 
 
individual to the will of his examiner' and thereby undermine 
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination."  Rhode 
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299 (1980) (quoting Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 457–58).  Requiring this warning, and scrupulous 
adherence to the suspect's decisions thereafter, give us 
assurance that his decision to remain silent has not been 
overborne.  The consequence of failing to honor this safeguard 
is loss of the evidence:  "[U]nless and until such warnings and 
waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence 
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against [a 
suspect]."  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.   
¶15 There is no doubt Mr. Harris was in police custody 
when Detective Buchanan asked whether he would like to make a 
statement (he was in jail), so our inquiry focuses on whether 
that question qualifies as an interrogation.  As we discuss 
below, custodial interrogation can take the form of either 
express questioning or its functional equivalent.10  We will 
analyze Detective Buchanan's question and Mr. Harris' response 
under each rubric.  If either analysis reveals the question to 
be an interrogation, then we must suppress Mr. Harris' response 
because it was not preceded by a Miranda warning. 
                                                 
10 "[T]he term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only 
to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the 
part of the police (other than those normally attendant to 
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."  
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
10 
 
B. Express Questioning 
¶16 "Express questioning" does not encompass every inquiry 
directed to the suspect.  It covers only those questions 
"designed to elicit incriminatory admissions."  Pennsylvania v. 
Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 602 n.14 (1990).  See also Doe v. U.S., 487 
U.S. 201, 211 (1988) ("Unless some attempt is made to secure a 
communication——written, oral or otherwise——upon which reliance 
is to be placed as involving [the accused's] consciousness of 
the facts and the operations of his mind in expressing it, the 
demand made upon him is not a testimonial one." (quoting J.H. 
Wigmore, 8 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2265 (4th ed. 1988))). 
¶17 It is the nature of the information the question is 
trying to reach, therefore, that determines whether it is 
inquisitorial.  If that information has no potential to 
incriminate the suspect, the question requires no Miranda 
warnings.  Id. at 211 n.10 ("In order to be privileged, it is 
not enough that the compelled communication is sought for its 
content. 
 
The 
content 
itself 
must 
have 
testimonial 
significance."). 
¶18 Detective 
Buchanan's 
question 
did 
not 
constitute 
express questioning because it sought nothing that could be 
potentially incriminating.  Although his question was certainly 
designed to obtain a response, the only information it sought 
was whether Mr. Harris would like to make a statement; it did 
not seek the statement itself.  The response to such a question 
is either "yes" or "no," and neither would have any testimonial 
significance whatsoever.  Thus, Detective Buchanan's question 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
11 
 
did 
not 
constitute 
"express 
questioning" 
because 
the 
constitutional 
privilege 
applies 
only 
to 
the 
search 
for 
incriminating evidence. 
C. Functional Equivalence 
¶19 There are more ways than one to obtain incriminating 
evidence from a suspect.  Miranda addressed itself to the most 
obvious——express questioning.  But there are techniques of 
persuasion that, in a custodial setting, can create the same 
potential for self-incrimination even in the absence of an 
express question.  So the Innis Court expanded the prophylactic 
buffer by applying Miranda's procedural safeguards to the 
"functional equivalent" of an interrogation.  Innis, 446 U.S. at 
300–01.  Such an equivalent includes "any words or actions on 
the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to 
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."  
Id. at 301. 
¶20 The test for determining what words or behavior might 
constitute the functional equivalent of an interrogation is not 
as straightforward as it first appears.  The test (as stated 
above) inquires into what the police officer should know, 
implying the test might be conducted from his perspective.  
However, Innis requires that we account for the suspect's 
perception of events for the specific purpose of broadening the 
buffer:  "This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda 
safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an 
added measure of protection against coercive police practices, 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
12 
 
without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of 
the police."  Id. 
¶21 This means that, even where an officer's action had a 
purpose other than interrogation, the action "must be viewed 
from the suspect's perspective to determine whether such conduct 
was reasonably likely to elicit a response."  State v. 
Cunningham, 
144 
Wis. 2d 272, 
280, 
423 
N.W.2d 862 
(1988).  
Further, Innis noted that the police may need to be mindful of 
the ease with which a given suspect might be persuaded to make 
an incriminating statement:  "Any knowledge the police may have 
had concerning the unusual susceptibility of a defendant to a 
particular form of persuasion might be an important factor in 
determining whether the police should have known that their 
words 
or 
actions 
were 
reasonably 
likely 
to 
elicit 
an 
incriminating response from the suspect."  Innis, 446 U.S. at 
302 n.8. 
¶22 In 
Wisconsin, 
we 
implement 
the 
"functional 
equivalency" standard by positing a reasonable third-person 
observer and inquiring into how such a person would expect the 
suspect to react to the officer's words and actions: 
[I]f an objective observer (with the same knowledge of 
the suspect as the police officer) could, on the sole 
basis of hearing the officer's remarks or observing 
the officer's conduct, conclude that the officer's 
conduct or words would be likely to elicit an 
incriminating response, that is, could reasonably have 
had the force of a question on the suspect, then the 
conduct or words would constitute interrogation. 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
13 
 
Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 278–79.  This test is objective with 
respect to each of the participants in the interaction.  That is 
to say, we do not consider what any of the participants actually 
intended or understood.  We consider only what the objective 
third-party 
observer 
would 
conclude 
from 
the 
available 
information. 
¶23 In determining whether Detective Buchanan's dialogue 
with 
Mr. 
Harris 
is 
the 
functional 
equivalent 
of 
an 
interrogation, we consider more than just the bare words with 
which he formed his question.  We must reconstruct——as near to 
verisimilitude as possible——the entire context within which the 
dialogue took place.  Then, as described above, we ask whether a 
reasonable observer would conclude that the suspect in the 
vignette would understand the officer's words and actions as 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. 
¶24 Here is what we know about the circumstances in which 
Detective Buchanan had his brief conversation with Mr. Harris.  
In the very early hours of a morning in 2011, the police found 
Mr. Harris secreted away in the basement of a house in which he 
did not belong, with copper piping and burglarious tools arrayed 
about him.  After taking him into custody, he was placed in the 
back seat of Officer Niebuhr's patrol car, whereupon he 
commenced divulging a great deal of information, much of it 
incriminating.  For example, he said he had been homeless for 
seven years and frequently sleeps in vacant houses.  He also 
said he often commits misdemeanor crimes to obtain things to 
sell "to get by," and that is what he intended to do with the 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
14 
 
copper piping. 
¶25 Mr. Harris offered all of this information without 
prompting.  Officer Niebuhr made no threats or promises to 
obtain the statements, and in fact asked no questions of Mr. 
Harris at all (while he was in the patrol car) before he 
provided this information.  Officer Niebuhr said Mr. Harris did 
not appear to be intoxicated, overly tired, or otherwise not in 
control of his faculties.  He also appeared to be clean and 
decently attired. 
¶26 The police then transported Mr. Harris to the Kenosha 
County Jail.  Later in the morning, at about 9:00 a.m., 
Detective Buchanan (who had not been present for Mr. Harris' 
arrest), went to the jail to interview him.  A guard brought Mr. 
Harris (who was not handcuffed) to the main floor of the jail.  
Detective Buchanan met him in a common area just outside the 
interview rooms.  He did not smell alcohol on Mr. Harris or 
observe any behavior that would indicate he was intoxicated.  
Detective Buchanan then asked Mr. Harris the question at issue 
in this case.   
¶27 As all such scenarios must be, this vignette is fact-
bound, which does not make it especially amenable to fixed rules 
of interpretation.  However, past cases help sketch the boundary 
between 
"functional 
equivalents 
of 
interrogation" 
and 
constitutionally-innocent questions and acts.  We collected a 
sampling of such cases in State v. Hambly, 2008 WI 10, 307 Wis. 
2d 98, 745 N.W.2d 48, some of which we address below.   
¶28 Our 
evaluation 
of 
Detective 
Buchanan's 
question 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
15 
 
accounts for the following principles useful in identifying the 
"functional equivalent" of an interrogation.  As we consider and 
apply those principles, we keep firmly in mind that the ultimate 
purpose 
of 
our 
analysis 
is 
to 
protect 
against 
coerced 
confessions by respecting a suspect’s decision to remain silent:  
"In deciding whether particular police conduct is interrogation, 
we must remember the purpose behind our decisions in Miranda and 
Edwards [v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)]: preventing government 
officials from using the coercive nature of confinement to 
extract confessions that would not be given in an unrestrained 
environment."  Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529–30 (1987).  
Although the effect of that coercion may differ from suspect to 
suspect, a specific individual's special susceptibility enters 
the equation only if the State's agents should know of it.  See, 
e.g., Innis, 446 U.S. at 303 n.10 (the "subtle compulsion" 
associated with an unknowing appeal to the suspect's conscience 
is not an interrogation). 
¶29 From our cases addressing police statements made to a 
suspect, as opposed to questions asked of him, we confirm that 
our primary point of focus is on the reasonably likely effect of 
the officer's words on the suspect, not their grammatical 
format.  Seemingly innocuous statements, when freighted with 
subtext or inquisitorial design, can become an interrogation.  
Thus, a dialogue with a suspect can constitute an interrogation 
even when law enforcement officers ask no questions.  Hambly, 
307 Wis. 2d 98, ¶46 ("A law enforcement officer may thus be 
viewed as interrogating a suspect by a statement, without asking 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
16 
 
a single question, if the law enforcement officer's conduct or 
speech could have had the force of a question on the suspect.").  
¶30 However, to rise to the level of an interrogation, the 
officer's statements (or, in this case, question) must exert a 
compulsive force on the suspect:  "Interrogation must reflect a 
measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody 
itself."  Id. (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 300) (internal marks 
omitted).  For example, an officer's cryptic comment about 
information only the perpetrator of the crime would recognize 
may be considered functionally equivalent to an interrogation 
because of the effect the comment causes.  State v. Bond, 2000 
WI App 118, 237 Wis. 2d 633, 614 N.W.2d 552.  Similarly, giving 
unresponsive answers to questions posed by a suspect with the 
intent of provoking an incriminating response, and using 
interrogation techniques during the conversation, can serve as 
the functional equivalent of an interrogation.  Hambly, 307 
Wis. 2d 98, ¶¶63-65 (citing Hill v. United States, 858 A.2d 435 
(D.C. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that an officer telling a suspect 
that "he told us what happened" was unresponsive to the 
defendant’s question regarding another person in custody and, 
when coupled with other common interrogation techniques designed 
to elicit a response, met the functional equivalency test)).  
¶31 But police interactions with a suspect do not amount 
to interrogations so long as they are not reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response.  That is why law enforcement 
officials may make context-appropriate, and accurate, comments 
to a suspect without running afoul of Miranda and Innis.  They 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
17 
 
can, for example, provide information responsive to questions 
posed by defendants.  Hambly, 307 Wis. 2d 98, ¶¶65–66 (finding 
no functional equivalence where defendant made an incriminating 
statement after the police officer, prior to giving him the 
Miranda warnings, informed the defendant of why he was under 
arrest).  Similarly, if a suspect volunteers incriminating 
information following an officer's non-leading, direct responses 
to the suspect's questions about possible charges against him, 
there has been no functional equivalent of an interrogation.  
State v. Fischer, 2003 WI App 5, 259 Wis. 2d 799, 656 N.W.2d 503 
(finding that "an objective observer would not, on the sole 
basis of hearing [defendant's] words and observing his conduct, 
conclude that [an officer's] answers to [defendant's] direct 
questions about the evidence against him would be likely to 
elicit an incriminating response . . . .").  Nor are non-
editorialized statements of fact the functional equivalent of an 
interrogation.  Easley v. Frey, 433 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(finding no interrogation when suspect confessed after being 
accurately informed that someone had implicated him in a crime, 
and that he could be subject to the death-penalty if convicted). 
¶32 Finally, we must also pay attention to the atmosphere 
in which the suspect incriminates himself.  As Innis observed, 
the 
Miranda 
Court 
was 
concerned 
with 
the 
"interrogation 
environment" created by custodial questioning.  Innis, 446 U.S. 
at 299.  A police officer's quotidian question posed to a person 
strolling in a park may carry an objectively different import if 
growled at a manacled suspect held incommunicado for an extended 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
18 
 
period of time in a stark interview room. 
¶33 With all of this in mind, we have no difficulty 
finding 
that 
Detective 
Buchanan's 
question 
was 
not 
the 
functional equivalent of an interrogation under the Cunningham 
formulation.  There is no indication Detective Buchanan intended 
his question to elicit an incriminating statement, nor is there 
anything to suggest that asking a suspect whether he would like 
to 
make 
a 
statement 
is 
a 
police 
practice 
designed 
to 
surreptitiously cause the suspect to divulge incriminating 
evidence. 
¶34 Further, the context in which he asked the question 
conveyed a non-inquisitorial purpose.  Mr. Harris and Detective 
Buchanan were standing in a common area outside the interview 
rooms.  A reasonable observer would conclude that Detective 
Buchanan's question was diagnostic in nature:  Should he conduct 
Mr. Harris into the interview room where he would then give his 
statement, or should he instead return Mr. Harris to his cell?11  
Incidentally, Mr. Harris' response strongly suggests this is how 
he understood it, too.  He said:  "They caught me man, I got 
nothing else to say."  The latter part of his statement 
indicates he believed there was no point in proceeding to the 
interview room, and so he gave what amounted to a functional 
"no" to the Detective's invitation.  The initial clause of his 
                                                 
11 By "diagnostic" we mean a question that seeks information 
useful 
for 
a 
State 
agent’s 
functional 
(as 
opposed 
to 
inquisitorial) interaction with a suspect. 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
19 
 
statement simply (and, perhaps, unwisely) explained why he was 
declining 
the 
invitation. 
 
But 
even 
if 
he 
subjectively 
understood it otherwise, a reasonable observer would not expect 
this question, presented in this setting, to convey to Mr. 
Harris 
that 
he 
was 
being 
asked 
to 
immediately 
provide 
incriminating information.12 
¶35 This diagnostic question aligns well with situations 
in which we find no constitutional violation when police convey 
non-editorial statements of fact to suspects, or provide 
accurate responses to their questions.  In neither of those 
circumstances 
is 
there 
an 
inquisitorial 
subtext 
to 
the 
communication.  That is true here as well.  Detective Buchanan's 
                                                 
12 Mr. Harris urges us to follow the conclusion reached in 
State v. Hebert, 82 P.3d 470 (Kan. 2004).  But Messrs. Harris 
and Hebert's situations are sufficiently dissimilar that the 
Kansas Supreme Court's resolution does not counsel a different 
result here.  There, Special Agent Cordts, before giving the 
Miranda warnings, said: 
Talk to you a little bit and get both sides of the 
story. I've only heard one side of the story and, 
obviously, there's always two sides of a story here 
and I'd like in your words, your input and tell me 
what happened and explain in your words and coming 
from you. Would you like the opportunity to tell me 
your side of the story? 
Id. at 480.  Mr. Hebert then started divulging incriminating 
information. 
Agent Cordts' question is similar to that of Detective 
Buchanan.  But unlike here, it did not exist in isolation.  The 
preamble to Agent Cordts' question conveyed the idea that he 
wanted Mr. Hebert to start talking.  Agent Cordts' statement and 
question, taken together, was tantamount to an instruction to 
give a statement.  Thus, Hebert is substantively distinct from 
Detective Buchanan's isolated diagnostic question, and so can 
give Mr. Harris no support. 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
20 
 
question was not an excerpt from an extended conversation, nor 
was there any indication Detective Buchanan was pressuring Mr. 
Harris or menacing him.  There was no trickery, no good cop/bad 
cop routine, no attempt to make him contradict prior statements, 
and no evidence of any other discernible form of interrogation 
technique.13  Thus, there was no proscribed inquisitorial element 
to the question.  Sometimes, an inquiry calling for a "yes" or 
"no" answer really does seek nothing more than that. 
¶36 Finally, there is the question of what the police 
knew, or should have known, about Mr. Harris and any particular 
susceptibility he may have had to a particular form of 
persuasion.  Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.8.  This question need not 
detain us long because the record does not indicate that 
Detective Buchanan exercised any form of persuasion, either 
expressly or implicitly, when he asked if Mr. Harris wished to 
make a statement.  We will, however, briefly address Mr. Harris' 
suggestion 
that 
his 
particular 
vulnerability 
to 
police 
questioning made Detective Buchanan's question an interrogation. 
¶37 Mr. Harris says his "emotional state was one in which 
he was especially inclined to explain himself to law enforcement 
with statements that a prosecutor would want to introduce at 
trial."  He says Detective Buchanan, having read the police 
                                                 
13 We list these techniques only to identify ways in which 
police conduct may become inquisitorial, thereby serving as the 
functional 
equivalent 
of 
an 
interrogation. 
 
We 
are 
not 
suggesting there is anything amiss with these tactics when 
employed in the proper context. 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
21 
 
reports before meeting him outside of the interview rooms, would 
have known this.  He does not say what that emotional state was 
or how Detective Buchanan was supposed to infer from the 
report's recounting of events what his emotional state had been.  
Nor does he say what his emotional state at the time of arrest 
might tell Detective Buchanan about his emotional state when he 
met him outside the interview rooms.  Because so many factors 
and inputs affect one's state of mind, emotional lability is to 
be expected.  So a person's emotional condition from hours past 
is a poor predictor of what it might be presently. 
¶38 Mr. Harris points out, correctly, that the police 
reports reveal he provided several unprompted incriminating 
statements to Officer Niebuhr after he was arrested.  He says 
this should have warned Detective Buchanan that his question 
would likely result in incriminating statements.  Mr. Harris' 
conclusion, however, does not logically follow from his premise.  
One may deduce from the report that Mr. Harris may be 
loquacious, but little more.  It says nothing about how he 
responds 
to 
questioning——his 
statements 
were, 
after 
all, 
unprompted.  And neither Officer Niebuhr nor any other State 
agent had exercised any form of persuasion on Mr. Harris before 
he implicated himself.  Thus, his interaction with Officer 
Niebuhr could not instruct Detective Buchanan on how particular 
forms of persuasion might affect him.  Whatever reason Mr. 
Harris had for volunteering his statements to Officer Niebuhr, 
his behavior did not indicate he would be particularly prone to 
incriminating himself in response to Detective Buchanan's 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
22 
 
question. 
¶39 Our analysis of this factor would be incomplete if we 
did not account for both sides of the "susceptibility" ledger.  
That is to say, we should consider not just what might make him 
more susceptible to police tactics, but also what would be 
likely to make him less susceptible.  This was not Mr. Harris' 
first encounter with police questioning.  Nor was it his first 
time being arrested or convicted.  In fact, he was charged in 
this case as a repeat offender.  Repeat, indeed——the record 
discloses that this conviction makes it an even dozen for Mr. 
Harris.  His familiarity with the criminal justice system does 
not, of course, diminish the State's obligation to scrupulously 
follow constitutional mandates.  But our project at this point 
of the analysis is to discern, as accurately as possible, 
whether Detective Buchanan's question would be reasonably likely 
to elicit an incriminating response from Mr. Harris.  It is 
reasonable to believe that a person’s twelfth time through the 
criminal justice system will be less intimidating than the 
first.  Inasmuch as Mr. Harris has not identified any 
characteristic making him particularly susceptible to law 
enforcement officers' persuasion tactics, we will not infer one 
for him just because he is loquacious. 
¶40 We conclude that there was no functional equivalent of 
an interrogation because, considered in the context of all the 
circumstances described above, there was no reasonably causal 
relationship between the State's words or actions and Mr. 
Harris' incriminating statement.  A question such as "Would you 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
23 
 
like to give me a statement?", when posed in the situation 
obtaining here, would not logically cause a suspect to say 
something incriminating.  It is true that Mr. Harris' "they 
caught me" statement followed Detective Buchanan's inquiry, but 
only post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning can make the question 
the cause of the answer’s incriminating substance.  We will not 
entertain that logical error. 
¶41 Mr. Harris brings to our attention a Hawai'i case with 
a prescription that would effectively eliminate the need for our 
"functional equivalency" analysis here.  State v. Eli, 273 
P.3d 1196 (Haw. 2012).  In that case, as here, a police officer 
asked the suspect if he would like to make a statement.  Mr. Eli 
said he would, without saying anything incriminating.  The 
officer then gave him the Miranda warnings, only after which Mr. 
Eli incriminated himself.  Nevertheless, Hawai'i's Supreme Court 
said the officer's diagnostic question compelled Mr. Eli to 
serve as a witness against himself. 
¶42 The Eli court concluded that a pre-Miranda agreement 
to give a statement has an effect so coercive that the Miranda 
warnings cannot counteract it.  So the court said the Miranda 
warnings must precede any inquiry into whether the suspect would 
like to speak.  The reasoning appears to be that, once a suspect 
agrees to give a statement, his will is so completely overthrown 
that immediately instructing him he need not speak still leaves 
him unable to remain silent.  Why such an innocuous question 
would have such a catastrophic effect, and why a suspect would 
be affected more by the remote question than the immediate 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
24 
 
instruction, is unclear.  We do not, as a rule, assume that a 
suspect is so fragile that a diagnostic question such as the one 
posed by Detective Buchanan can shatter his will so thoroughly 
that it leaves him beyond the rehabilitative ministrations of 
the Miranda warnings.  In point of fact, our jurisprudence is to 
the contrary.14  
¶43 Our conclusion mirrors a recent United States Court of 
Appeals opinion (more recent than Eli) treating an almost 
identical dialogue.  United States v. Wallace, 753 F.3d 671 (7th 
Cir. 2014).  There, agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency raided 
Mr. Wallace's house, wherein they found large amounts of illegal 
drugs.  During the search, law enforcement officers had 
marshalled the house's occupants into the front room, including 
Mr. Wallace.  The lead DEA agent approached Mr. Wallace and 
asked:  "[W]ould you mind stepping out to talk about this?"  Id. 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) 
("Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be 
suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should 
turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly 
and voluntarily made."); State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 
588 N.W.2d 606 (1999) (finding oral statements made before a 
Miranda warning inadmissible, but written statements made after 
Miranda warning admissible); Briggs v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 313, 
251 N.W.2d 12 (1977) (finding that even where an initial 
statement made without 
Miranda 
warnings was inadmissible, 
subsequent statements given at a police station after Miranda 
warnings were admissible as they were the result of routine 
investigative procedures); State v. Loeffler, 60 Wis. 2d 556, 
211 N.W.2d 1 (1973) (holding that statements given after Miranda 
warnings are admissible, even when the arrest that preceded the 
statements was constitutionally deficient). 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
25 
 
at 673.  Mr. Wallace answered "I don't want to waste your time, 
everything in there's mine."  Id. 
¶44 Messrs. 
Harris 
and 
Wallace 
occupy 
identical 
constitutional ground.  Both were in police custody.  Both were 
asked by law enforcement officers whether they would like to 
discuss criminal activity.  Both could have fully and accurately 
answered the question with either a "yes" or a "no."  And both 
chose, instead, to respond with incriminating statements. 
¶45 The Wallace court did not belabor the analysis.  It 
observed that "[t]he agent was just asking the defendant whether 
he wanted to make a statement, to which the expected and proper 
answer would have been yes or no."  Id. at 674.  So the court 
found no constitutional violation:  "That was not a statement 
elicited by an interrogation, or even responsive to the agent's 
question (which called for a yes or no answer, not a 
confession), and so there was no violation of the Miranda rule."  
Id.  And although the court did not explicitly address the Innis 
functional equivalency test, it relied on that case to support 
its conclusion. 
¶46 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and article I, section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution prevent 
the State’s agents from compelling a defendant to serve as a 
witness against himself.  But their protection is against the 
State.  They do not protect Mr. Harris from himself.  Whether or 
not it was wise for him to make the statement he did, he was not 
coerced into forsaking his silence.  Detective Buchanan’s 
question 
was 
not 
the 
"functional 
equivalent" 
of 
an 
No. 
2014AP1767-CR   
 
26 
 
interrogation, and so no Miranda warnings were necessary before 
he asked it.15 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
¶47 Detective Buchanan's inquiry into whether Mr. Harris 
would like to make a statement was diagnostic in nature, not 
inquisitorial, and the circumstances confirm that it was not the 
functional equivalent of an interrogation.  Thus, Mr. Harris' 
statement that "They caught me man, I got nothing else to say" 
followed a voluntary decision to speak with Detective Buchanan. 
¶48 Because the State did not compel Mr. Harris to be a 
witness against himself, the judgment of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
   
                                                 
15 The dissent is concerned that the uncertainty over the 
exact wording of Detective Buchanan’s question weakens our 
analysis.  Of all the potential ways in which the parties say he 
may have phrased his question, we opted to consider the one most 
favorable to Mr. Harris.  Indeed, it is the phrasing he adopted 
in his own briefs.  So if there is weakness-inducing uncertainty 
here, neither logic nor the dissent identifies what it might be. 
No.  2014AP1767-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶49 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion so long as it is read to answer only the 
issue presented and does not alter, change, or affect existing 
case law concerning Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), or an issue 
not present here, Goodchild (voluntariness).  See State ex rel. 
Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 262, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965).  
The question in this case is exceedingly narrow.  "Miranda 
warnings need only be administered to individuals who are 
subjected to a custodial interrogation."  State v. Armstrong, 
223 Wis. 2d 331, 344-45, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999), modified, 225 
Wis. 2d 121, 591 N.W.2d 604 (1999) (per curiam).  There is no 
dispute that Harris was in custody at the time that Detective 
Buchanan asked Harris whether he wanted to give a statement.  
Thus, the only issue this court need resolve in the present case 
is 
whether 
Detective 
Buchanan's 
question 
constitutes 
"interrogation."  Supreme Court case law, in turn, instructs 
that "the term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to 
express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the 
part of the police (other than those normally attendant to 
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." 
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnote 
omitted).  I agree with the court's determination that Detective 
Buchanan's brief interaction with Harris does not fit this 
definition and that the absence of a Miranda warning prior to 
that interaction does not, therefore, mandate reversal. 
No.  2014AP1767-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
¶50 I write separately to clarify that the court's 
additional writing beyond the narrow question to be answered 
should not be read to change the law relating to Goodchild 
inquiries, which are not at issue in this case.  A Goodchild 
analysis is distinct from a Miranda analysis: "In Miranda the 
question is, was the confession or other statement obtained 
under such circumstances of custodial interrogation as to 
require the exclusion of the statement from evidence. In 
Goodchild the question is, was the statement involuntary and 
therefore should be excluded from evidence."  Roney v. State, 44 
Wis. 2d 522, 533, 171 N.W.2d 400 (1969).  
¶51 When examining whether a declarant's statement was 
voluntary, the question is "whether [the statement] was obtained 
under such circumstances that it represents the uncoerced, free 
will of the declarant or whether the circumstances deprived him 
of the ability to make a rational choice."  Id. at 532-33.  
This 
court 
applies 
a 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances 
standard 
to 
determine 
whether 
a 
statement was made voluntarily.  We must balance the 
personal characteristics of the defendant, such as 
age, education, intelligence, physical or emotional 
condition, and prior experience with law enforcement, 
with the possible pressures that law enforcement could 
impose.  Possible pressures to consider include the 
length 
of 
questioning, 
general 
conditions 
or 
circumstances in which the statement was taken, 
whether 
any 
excessive 
physical 
or 
psychological 
pressure was used, and whether any inducements, 
threats, methods, or strategies were utilized in order 
to elicit a statement from the defendant.  
State v. Davis, 2008 WI 71, ¶37, 310 Wis. 2d 583, 751 N.W.2d 332 
(citations omitted). 
No.  2014AP1767-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
¶52 To be clear, the question in this case is not whether 
Harris' statement was voluntary; instead, the court has simply 
been asked to determine whether Detective Buchanan interrogated 
Harris.  At times, the majority opinion could be read to deviate 
from the relevant analysis and dabble with considerations 
relevant to voluntariness, conflating the analyses.  I join this 
opinion only if it is read to answer the question of whether 
this was interrogation, leaving untouched the body of case law 
which otherwise addresses Miranda or Goodchild.  Thus, I write 
to emphasize that this opinion should not be read to otherwise 
change the law. 
¶53 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶54 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this opinion. 
 
No.  2014AP1767-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶55 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  A homeless 
man, Brian Harris, was arrested late one night while he was 
sleeping off a day's drinking in the basement of an abandoned 
building.1  He was not given Miranda warnings.2 
¶56 It is easy to use soaring rhetoric promising a court's 
"unstinting" protection of a criminal defendant's constitutional 
right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself,3 "one 
of the nation's 'most cherished principles.'"4  It's harder to 
make the promise ring true, however, when a court stints in 
protecting the defendant's constitutional rights. 
¶57 I begin by briefly setting the stage underlying 
Harris's assertion that he was compelled to be a witness against 
himself.  
¶58 Both in the abandoned building's basement where Harris 
was arrested and in his ride in the back of the squad car on his 
                                                 
1 At trial, Harris testified that he was too intoxicated to 
have any memory of the night's events other than glimpses of 
waking up in a mysterious basement with a police officer 
standing over him and arresting him. 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).   
3 Majority op., ¶¶10-14.  
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that no "person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ."  U.S. 
Const. amend. V.  This provision is made applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 
U.S. 1 (1964).   
4 Majority op., ¶12.   
No.  2014AP1767-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
way to jail, Harris was loquacious.  The talkative Harris told 
the 
arresting 
officers 
that 
he 
had 
been 
homeless 
for 
approximately seven years; that he frequently went into vacant 
buildings to sleep; that he was going to take copper piping from 
the building in which he was arrested and sell it for money for 
food; that he often commits misdemeanor crimes to get items to 
sell for food to get by; and that he was alone.  Harris's 
statements at his arrest that were admitted at trial are not at 
issue in this court.5     
¶59 In the morning, Harris was led by jail guards to an 
area in the jail outside of an interview room.  He met up with 
Detective Buchanan.  No one disputes that Harris was in custody.  
No one disputes that the Detective asked Harris one question and 
                                                 
5 Citing 
State 
v. 
Wedgeworth, 
100 
Wis. 2d 514, 
302 
N.W.2d 810 (1981), the circuit court ruled that the basement and 
squad car statements "were voluntary, and they appear to me to 
be the product of free and unconstrained will, reflecting 
deliberate 
choice, 
not 
coerce 
[sic] 
of 
improper 
police 
pressure."   
Harris appealed the circuit court's decision admitting 
these statements.   
The court of appeals ruled that Harris' statements made in 
the basement were the result of custodial interrogation and 
should be suppressed.  The court of appeals ruled, however, that 
Harris's statements in the squad car were not the result of 
interrogation and were sufficiently attenuated from the improper 
questioning in the basement.  State v. Harris, 2016 WI App 2, 
¶¶11-19, 366 Wis. 2d 777, 874 N.W.2d 602.  Harris did not appeal 
this ruling and does not challenge before this court the 
admissibility of the statements in the basement or in the squad 
car. 
No.  2014AP1767-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
that Harris made an incriminating response before any Miranda 
warnings were given.6   
¶60 The incriminating response to the Detective was not 
suppressed by the circuit court.7  It was introduced at trial 
during the State's case-in-chief.  Harris testified at trial, 
and the jury found him guilty of all charges.8  Majority op., ¶7. 
¶61 The admissibility of Harris's response at the jail is 
at issue in the instant case.  The relatively straightforward 
legal issue presented is whether the Detective's question was 
interrogation under the Fifth Amendment.  The State must prove 
by a preponderance of evidence that the Detective's question was 
not an express question or the functional equivalent of an 
express question for Fifth Amendment purposes.9  If the 
Detective's question was either, Harris's response should have 
been suppressed.      
                                                 
6 "[T]he words 'incriminating response' mean any response——
whether 'inculpatory or exculpatory——that the prosecution may 
seek 
to 
introduce 
at 
trial.'" 
State 
v. 
Cunningham, 
144 
Wis. 2d 272, 279, 423 N.W.2d 862 (1988) (quoting Rhode Island v. 
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 n.5 (1980)).  
7 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Harris was not 
subject to interrogation at the jail.  Harris appealed the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
8 Harris was charged (as a repeater) with 
burglary, 
possession of burglarious tools, criminal damage to property, 
and criminal trespass. The jury convicted him of all four 
counts.  The circuit court withheld sentence on all counts and 
put Harris on probation for many months. 
9 State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 345, 588 N.W.2d 606 
(1999); State v. Fischer, 2003 WI App 5, 259 Wis. 2d 799, 656 
N.W.2d 503. 
No.  2014AP1767-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶62 My dissent takes two approaches, each considering the 
case "upon its own facts," as the case law instructs.10  
¶63 Under the first approach, I probe whether the majority 
opinion can or should reach a decision when the record does not 
reveal the precise words of the question the Detective posed to 
Harris that prompted Harris to respond with an incriminating 
statement.   
¶64 Under the second approach, I take the same tack as the 
majority opinion.  I apply the rule of law set forth in State v. 
Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d 272, 423 N.W.2d 862 (1988), to the 
facts.  Majority op., ¶¶21-22.  Although I use a Cunningham 
analysis as does the majority opinion, I reach a different 
result.   
¶65 I avoid, however, addressing the majority opinion's 
belabored 
account 
of 
the 
applicable 
law 
on 
custodial 
interrogations.  The legal principles set forth in the majority 
opinion would be easier to understand and apply if the opinion 
stayed with the Cunningham analysis.   
I 
¶66 The first approach examines the record to reveal that 
the court does not know the Detective's precise word choice for 
his question to Harris.  Exactly what did Detective Buchanan say 
to Harris that brought forth Harris's incriminating statement?  
We do not know.  Indeed the case is awash with different 
narratives about the Detective's question to Harris. 
                                                 
10 Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 274.  
No.  2014AP1767-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶67 At the suppression hearing, the Detective testified as 
follows about his question to Harris and Harris's response: 
I went there [to the jail] with the intention of 
asking Mr. Harris if he would like to come with me to 
the detective bureau to be interviewed.  I asked him 
if he would, and he stated to me something to the 
effect that they caught me, what's the point. 
¶68 At trial, the Detective altered his testimony somewhat 
from the motion hearing and testified as follows about his 
question to Harris and Harris's response: 
I reviewed the reports and went to jail. . . . I asked 
the defendant if he would like to give me a statement, 
and he said, they caught me man, I got nothing else to 
say. 
¶69 The question was not recorded or videotaped and the 
Detective's communication with Harris ended right then and 
there. 
¶70 The 
State's 
brief 
explains 
that 
"the 
altered 
testimony" does not "materially alter the terrain" and for 
"purposes of clarity and consistency" it "will go with Detective 
Buchanan's testimony at trial as the operative fact."11   
¶71 The majority opinion uses the words the circuit court 
used:  "Would you like to give a statement?"  Majority op., ¶6. 
¶72 With regard to this wording and to add to the 
confusion about the words the Detective used to communicate with 
Harris, the court of appeals concluded that the words "would you 
like to give a statement" were "never used at trial."  The court 
of appeals assures the reader, however, that the circuit court's 
                                                 
11 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 5 n.2. 
No.  2014AP1767-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
"mischaracterization" of the Detective's words did not affect 
the decision of the court of appeals.  The court of appeals 
explained its position as follows: 
The circuit court indicated in its ruling that 
Buchanan asked Harris "would you like to give a 
statement"——words 
Buchanan 
never 
used 
in 
his 
testimony, but which, in one sense reasonably could be 
considered 
a 
shorthand 
phrasing 
of 
Buchanan's 
testimony.  Thus whether as a summary of Buchanan's 
actual testimony or as an erroneous recollection of 
it, the [circuit] court chose to use specific words 
Buchanan never actually spoke in his testimony.12 
¶73 Regardless of the precise words the Detective used, 
the State argues, as might be expected, that the Detective's 
question can reasonably be interpreted as an inquiry into 
whether Harris wished to talk with the police, was answerable 
with a "yes" or "no," and was not the functional equivalent of 
an express question.  In contrast, as might be expected, Harris 
views the Detective's question as an express question or the 
functional equivalent of an express question.     
¶74 Cunningham directs a court to view the law enforcement 
officer's communication from the suspect's perspective.13  It is 
therefore important for a Miranda analysis to know the officer's 
                                                 
12 Harris, 366 Wis. 2d 777, ¶22.  The court of appeals 
further explained that the circuit court's mischaracterization 
of the Detective's testimony was not drawn from "whole cloth" 
but was probably based on the prosecutor's and defense counsel's 
frequent restating of the Detective's communication in argument 
as "Would you like to give a statement?"  Harris, 366 
Wis. 2d 777, ¶22 n.2.    
13 Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 279 ("[T]he focus of the Innis 
test is primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect.") 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
No.  2014AP1767-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
exact language and the context in which the communication 
occurred.  A law enforcement officer's choice of words might 
have material bearing on how a suspect will understand the 
officer's communication.  Wording can be dispositive.      
¶75 Different words may evoke different responses from a 
suspect, and the same words or substantially the same words may 
evoke different responses from different justices and different 
courts.14   
¶76 Not knowing what the Detective said to Harris renders 
the court's analysis in the instant case weak.  
II 
¶77 The second approach is the one the majority opinion 
takes:  Apply the rule of law set forth in State v. Cunningham, 
144 Wis. 2d 272, 423 N.W.2d 862 (1988), to the record to 
determine whether the communication at issue is, for Fifth 
Amendment purposes, an express question or the functional 
equivalent that must be prefaced by Miranda warnings.  I do not 
reach the same conclusion as the majority opinion. 
¶78 Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 278-79, sets forth the 
objective observer test to determine whether a law enforcement 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., the discussions in the majority opinion and in 
the State's brief in State v. Hebert, 82 P.3d 470 (Kan. 2004), 
and State v. Eli, 273 P.3d 1196 (Hawai'i 2012).   
No.  2014AP1767-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
officer's conduct or words constitutes interrogation of a 
suspect.  Cunningham directs courts to consider the following:15  
• The Miranda procedures are designed to protect a 
suspect in custodial situations where the compulsion 
to confess may be present.  When a custodial suspect 
is interrogated by law enforcement officers without 
Miranda warnings, there is a presumption that any 
ensuing statements of the suspect resulting from the 
unwarned interrogation were compelled and must be 
suppressed.16 
• The focus is primarily upon the perception of the 
suspect to determine whether the officer's words or 
conduct was reasonably likely to elicit a response. 
• The test is not directed at the subjective intent of 
the officer. 
• The officer's communication is judged from the 
standpoint of an objective observer who has the same 
knowledge of the suspect as the police officer. 
• The objective observer would have the officer's 
knowledge of a suspect's unusual susceptibility to a 
particular form of persuasion.17 
                                                 
15 Cunningham's 
objective 
observer 
foreseeability 
test 
involves a review of many fact-intensive factors: the suspect's 
perspective, the officer's intent, the length of the discussion, 
the officer's knowledge of the suspect's susceptibility, the 
suspect's emotional state, and the purpose behind the Miranda 
and Innis decisions.  Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 278-80. 
16 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471–72; Dickerson v. United States, 
530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309, 
310, (1985) ("Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must 
be suppressed . . . ."  This is true even though "[t]he failure 
of police to administer Miranda warnings does not mean that the 
statements received have actually been coerced, but only that 
courts will presume [that] the privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination has not been intelligently exercised.").    
17 Confinement might increase a suspect's anxiety and make 
him more likely to seek discourse with others and more 
susceptible to talking.  See 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal 
Procedure § 6.7(c), at 877 (4th ed. 2015). 
No.  2014AP1767-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
• The objective observer would determine whether the 
officer's conduct or words play on the suspect's 
unusual susceptibility. 
• The objective observer could, on the sole basis of 
hearing the officer's remarks or observing the 
officer's conduct, conclude that the officer's 
conduct or words would have had the force of a 
question on the suspect.  
• The objective observer could, on the sole basis of 
hearing the officer's remarks or observing the 
officer's conduct, conclude that the officer's 
conduct or words would be likely to elicit an 
incriminating response.  
• Officers 
cannot 
be 
held 
accountable 
for 
the 
unforeseeable results of their words or actions.  
¶79 The determination of whether the facts of a case 
satisfy the legal standard articulated in Cunningham is a 
question of law that this court determines independently of the 
circuit court.18  I therefore apply the objective observer test 
to the facts as a matter of law.  
¶80 Before meeting Harris in a jail hallway outside of an 
interrogation room, the Detective had read the reports on Harris 
and was familiar with Harris's conduct of the previous night.  
The Detective was well aware that Harris was a very garrulous 
repeat offender who had already made numerous admissions to the 
arresting officer.   
¶81 Thus, the objective observer was on alert that Harris 
was "unusually susceptible" to the coercive nature of police 
custody and questioning.  The objective observer would have to 
                                                 
18 Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 282. 
No.  2014AP1767-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
determine whether the Detective's conduct or words played on the 
suspect's unusual susceptibility. 
¶82 The objective observer could, on the sole basis of 
hearing the Detective's remarks or observing the Detective's 
conduct, conclude that the Detective's conduct or words would 
have had the force of a question on the suspect or would be 
likely to elicit an incriminating response.19  The objective 
observer could have concluded that Harris would have perceived 
the Detective's communication as having the force of a Fifth 
Amendment interrogation.20  See majority op., ¶34 & n.12.   
¶83 Informing my conclusions is the principle that the 
Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination calls on 
courts 
to 
be 
"unstinting 
in 
our 
protection 
of 
criminal 
defendants' rights."  Majority op., ¶10.   
¶84 Accordingly, I conclude in this close case that the 
Detective's words constituted interrogation that should have 
been (but was not) preceded by Miranda warnings and should have 
been suppressed.   
                                                 
19 See Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.8 (recognizing that an 
officer's knowledge "concerning the unusual susceptibility of a 
defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an 
important factor in determining whether the [officer] should 
have known that [his] words or actions were reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response"). 
20 I would not introduce the idea of a "diagnostic" question 
into Miranda law.   
No.  2014AP1767-CR.ssa 
 
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¶85 Finally, I conclude that, had my view prevailed, 
Harris would be entitled to a remand for a Harrison/Anson 
hearing to fully assess harmless error.21  
¶86 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
 
                                                 
21 Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968); State v. 
Anson, 2005 WI 96, 282 Wis. 2d 629, 698 N.W.2d 776. 
No.  2014AP1767-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
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