Case Title: Rodriguez v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 603, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2011-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
VICTOR RODRIGUEZ, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 603, 2010 
 
Defendant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
§ 
for Sussex County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
ID No. 0904025840 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted:  September 14, 2011 
   Decided: November 8, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Santino Ceccotti, Esquire, of the Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, 
Delaware for Appellant. 
 
Amy Adams, Esquire, of the Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware for 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
RIDGELY, Justice: 
 
2
Defendant-Below/Appellant, Victor Rodriguez, appeals from his convictions 
in Superior Court for Reckless Burning, Burglary in the Third Degree, two counts 
of Criminal Trespass in the Third Degree, and three counts of Arson in the Second 
Degree.  At issue is the trial judge’s decision allowing a latent fingerprint 
examiner, who had also been trained in tire track and shoeprint analyses, to testify 
as an expert that boot and tire tracks at arson scenes were consistent with 
Rodriguez’s boot and the tire on his mountain bike.  The trial judge found the 
examiner to be qualified by his knowledge, skill, training, experience or education 
under Rule 702 of the Delaware Rules of Evidence.  We find no abuse of 
discretion and affirm.   
Facts 
 
On April 13, 2009, at approximately 5:30 a.m., the Milford Fire Company 
responded to a fire reported at the Hampton Inn.  Heavy flames were consuming 
the first floor and extending to the second and third floors.   Approximately 
twenty-five fire engines and one hundred firefighters were called to the scene.  
Assistant Chief Fire Marshall Richard Ward determined that the Hampton Inn fire 
had been set deliberately.  
That same morning, at approximately 4:10 a.m., authorities responded to a 
house fire at the intersection of Cedar Creek Road and Reynolds Pond Road in 
 
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Milton.  After investigation, Ward determined that this fire also had been set 
deliberately.    
A Milton police officer leaving the Reynolds Pond fire received a dispatch 
regarding another house fire, this time at a model home in a new building site 
called Milton Meadows.  The 911 call regarding this fire came in at approximately 
4:50 a.m.  The officer arrived to find flames rolling out the back of the home and 
along the siding.  After investigation, authorities determined that this fire also had 
been set deliberately.  At the scene of the Milton Meadows fire, Deputy Fire 
Marshall Harry Miller discovered and photographed two sets of fresh, undisturbed 
bicycle tracks that led from the road to the area where the fire had originated.   
On April 24, 2009, at approximately 3:50 a.m., another fire was reported at 
the Heritage Creek Development.  Responders arrived to find 104 Heritage 
Boulevard “engulfed in flames.”  Shortly after, the house at 102 Heritage 
Boulevard caught fire.  While searching the area for evidence, a fire marshal found 
a third house fire, at 113 Arch Street. 
 
Investigators found tire tracks and shoeprints in an alleyway between the 
Heritage Boulevard house and the Arch Street house.  Investigators took two 
castings of the tracks, and Ward took pictures of the track impressions on his cell 
phone.  Tire tracks and shoeprints were also found at the rear of the Arch Street 
house and by a nearby dumpster.  
 
4
Investigators determined that the April 13, 2009 fires followed a single line 
of travel stretching sixteen miles from the Hampton Inn to Milton Meadows.   
After the fires, investigators canvassed the area for a bicycle with tires that 
matched the tire tracks found at the Milton Meadows scene.  On April 15, Miller 
found a green mountain bike belonging to Victor Rodriguez outside of Allen 
Family Foods, a facility located 1.9 miles from Milton Meadows.  The width and 
tread of the bike tires appeared similar to those indicated by the tracks at the 
Milton Meadows fire.  
Rodriguez worked at Allen Family Foods.  On April 13, 2009, he clocked in 
late to work at 4:59 a.m.  Rodriguez’s roommate testified that Rodriguez used his 
bike to get around and to work.  Investigators calculated the distance between the 
April 13, 2009 fires, and determined that someone travelling on a bicycle at fifteen 
miles per hour could have set the three fires and arrived at Allen Family Foods by 
5:00 a.m.    
On April 23, 2009, Rodriguez was seen riding his bicycle on Route 5, 
approximately one-half of a mile north of where the Heritage Creek fires would 
occur one day later.  Rodriguez’s most direct route from his residence in Milton to 
Allen Family Foods would have taken him on Route 5 past the Heritage Creek 
Development.  On April 24, 2009, Rodriguez rode his bike to work.  He arrived 
between 4:05 a.m. and 4:10 a.m., and had bags with him. Ward estimated that the 
 
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Heritage Boulevard fire had been set that morning between 3:00 and 3:15 a.m. and 
that the Arch Street fire had been burning since approximately 3:15 a.m.   
Based on comparisons of Rodriguez’s bike tires to the tire impressions found 
at the Milton Meadows fire and the Heritage Creek fire, and knowledge of 
Rodriguez’s route of travel between his residence and Allen Family Foods, Deputy 
Ward decided to charge Rodriguez with setting the fires.  Officials awaited 
Rodriguez at his residence in Milton to arrest him.   Rodriguez arrived in a white 
pickup truck driven by his coworker and roommate.  Rodriguez’s mountain bike, 
which had been observed at Allen’s earlier that day, was in the back of the truck.  
Rodriguez was also wearing the same rubber boots he wore for work.  Ultimately, 
the boots and the mountain bike were seized as evidence for later analysis. 
During a search of Rodriguez’s rented room with his consent, officials found 
four to seven bags full of newspapers in the room and a laptop computer.  No shoes 
were found.    The newspapers appeared to have been discarded by stores and did 
not appear to have been read.  Later investigation of the laptop revealed that, prior 
to April 23, 2009, a user of Rodriguez’s laptop had viewed an April 14, 2009 
Milton Beacon article describing the Milton fires.   
At trial, the State proffered Rodney B. Hegman as an expert whose 
testimony would connect Rodriguez’s bicycle and boots to the tire tracks and 
shoeprints found at the scenes of the Milton Meadows fire and the April 24 fires.  
 
6
Rodriguez objected to the presentation of Hegman as an expert and challenged 
Hegman’s qualifications.  
During voir dire outside the presence of the jury, Hegman testified that he 
had been a Delaware State Police employee for thirty-five years.  Since 1981, he 
had worked in the Latent Print Section of the State Bureau of Identification.   
Ninety percent of his cases involved testimony on fingerprints. 
Hegman acknowledged that training for fingerprint analysis differed from 
training for tire track and shoeprint analysis.  He explained that in 1981, he 
completed a Scientific Crime Detection correspondence course through the 
American Institute of Applied Science, which covered shoeprints.  In 1991, he 
participated in a three-week training from the Federal Bureau of Identification 
Training Academy at Quantico, Virginia on “Latent Fingerprint Contemporary 
Approaches.” The FBI course focused on “evidence processing, arson 
investigations, footwear impressions, tire impressions, and ear identification; the 
use of laser technology and courtroom testimony,” so only a portion of the course 
covered tire tracks and shoeprints.  Hegman also testified that he read the first and 
second editions of “Footwear Impression Evidence” by William Bodziak, a former 
member of the FBI who Hegman described as “one of the leaders of forensic 
experts in the country for footwear impressions.”     
 
7
Hegman stated that he had previously testified in Superior Court as an expert 
in tire print analysis in New Castle and Kent Counties, and as an expert in 
shoeprint analysis in Sussex County.  He also worked recently as a certified 
instructor for a crime scene investigation class at the Delaware State Police 
Academy. 
 
On cross examination, Hegman acknowledged that (1) he had not been 
certified by the FBI with respect to shoeprint and tire track identification; (2) he 
had no special education or degree regarding shoeprint or tire identification; (3) he 
did not belong to any professional association regarding shoeprint and tire marks; 
and (4) he has not authored any papers or books in those specific fields.  Hegman 
also admitted that he was not familiar with how many types of bicycle tracks there 
are or the companies that make bicycle tires.  
At the conclusion of the voir dire, defense counsel renewed his objection to 
Hegman’s testimony on grounds that he was not qualified to render an opinion 
about tire tracks and shoeprints.  The trial judge overruled the objection and 
relevantly explained: 
The witness is offering an opinion that the boot and the tire 
tracks are consistent with, probably made by the boot and bike 
belonging to the defendant.  The witness cannot say it’s a match 
because of the absence of such distinctive characteristics for 
which such an opinion would be made, by way of example a 
DNA opinion. 
* 
* 
* 
 
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I am finding that the witness is certainly qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, training, experience, or education under 
Delaware Rules of Evidence 702.  He has for well over 30 years 
been involved as a forensic-type examiner, that he has testified 
many times in the field of fingerprints, and he has also offered 
opinions on footprint and bicycle comparisons, certainly not as 
often as the fingerprints but certainly he has done it, been 
recognized to be an expert by the courts in this State. 
From what the witness has testified to, I am satisfied that he has 
the training and experience to make an opinion.  He is even an 
instructor, and to be an instructor, it just doesn’t come to 
anyone.  He has a defined trained eye in making these kind of 
comparisons that there is the trained eye is a standard way that 
this is done from his experience that he is applied to other cases 
as well as this case as well, and that in the field there is a peer 
review. 
I am finding that evidence is otherwise admissible, relevant, 
and reliable as to the kind of information that should reasonably 
be relied upon in this profession considering everything that he 
has shared with us.  I don’t believe this would create unfair 
prejudice or mislead the jury.  This is fairly similar to the lay 
opinion offered under Rule 701, and I am finding the probative 
value of the evidence substantially outweighs the risk of the 
prejudice under Rule 703. 
* 
* 
* 
Shoeprint testimony satisfied with reliability of doubt or offered 
testimony comparison of the print required a trained eye.  
Techniques were generally accepted in the forensic community, 
and methodology is subject to peer review, and the witness has 
provided information that satisfies these concerns as well.  So 
all in all, I believe that enough has been raised to have him be 
admitted as an expert so the defense objection is overruled. 
 
Hegman testified before the jury that investigators brought him casts of 
footwear and tire impressions, as well as physical evidence in the form of a pair of 
rubber work boots and two bicycle tires.  He “examined the bottom of each boot to 
 
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determine or look for any unusual characteristics or individual characteristics that 
would be unique to each boot.”  The only distinctive characteristic or mark on the 
boots that Hegman could detect was excessive wear on the left boot.   He opined 
that “the impression on the cast was made by a boot similar or almost similar” to 
Rodriguez’s boot.  Hegman also opined that Rodriguez’s bike tire and boots were 
“consistent” with the prints left in the casting, but not a definitive match.   
On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited that ninety percent of 
Hegman’s work focused on fingerprints, that he had testified only four to five 
times on tire tracks, that his 1981 class was by correspondence, and that the FBI 
training class he attended in 1991 also covered other impression evidence.   When 
questioned, Hegman agreed that weight, force, and pace may affect shoeprint 
analysis.  He also agreed that “the condition of the soil, the nature of the soil, and 
the pressure” could affect the cast made from an impression. 
The fire marshals who responded to and investigated the fires also testified 
at trial.  Miller provided a lay opinion that the tire tracks he found at Milton 
Meadows appeared similar to the tread of Rodriguez’s bike tires.  Rodriguez did 
not testify.   
Rodriguez moved for a judgment of acquittal on three counts of arson and 
two counts of trespass, all of which related to the April 13, 2009 fires.  The trial 
judge granted the motion as to two counts of arson and one count of trespass 
 
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relating to the Hampton Inn fire and the Reynolds Pond Road fire, in part because 
there was nothing to identify Rodriguez as present at the scenes of those fires.  The 
trial judge denied the motion in all other respects. 
Rodriguez presented one alibi witness at trial and also argued there was 
insufficient evidence to convict him.  He did not testify.  The jury found Rodriguez 
guilty of Reckless Burning, Burglary in the Third Degree, two counts of Criminal 
Trespass in the Third Degree, and three counts of Arson in the Second Degree. 
After a presentence investigation, the trial judge sentenced Rodriguez as an 
habitual offender.  On each of the arson convictions he was sentenced to life 
imprisonment.  This appeal followed. 
Discussion 
 
Rodriguez contends that the trial judge committed reversible error by 
allowing Hegman to testify as an expert in tire track and shoeprint analysis.  
Rodriguez argues that tire track and shoeprint analysis are part of a “separate and 
distinct forensic science discipline” as compared to fingerprint analysis and that 
“as experienced as Hegman may be in many aspects of fingerprint analysis, he was 
not qualified to be an expert in the field of footprint and tire track identification.”  
Rodriguez also challenges the trial judge’s description of Hegman as having a 
“trained eye.”   
 
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Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admission of expert witness 
testimony.  “If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”1  We have adopted the 
interpretation of Rule 702 set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert 
and Kumho Tire for Federal Rule of Evidence 702.2  Thus, we recognize that the 
trial judge has a responsibility to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony . . . is 
not only relevant, but reliable.”3  Daubert identified four factors that the trial judge 
may consider in exercising this gatekeeping function: “testing, peer review, error 
rates, and ‘acceptability’ in the relevant scientific community.”4   
The purpose of the trial judge’s gatekeeping role “is to make certain that an 
expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, 
employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the 
practice of an expert in the relevant field.”5   When the foundation of an expert’s 
opinion is challenged, the trial judge must decide if the expert’s testimony “has a 
                                          
 
1 D.R.E. 702. 
2 See M.G. Bancorporation v. Le Baue, 737 A.2d 513, 522 (Del. 1999).   
3 Id. at 521 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S. Ct. 
2786 (1993)). 
4 M.G. Bancorporation v. Le Baue, 737 A.2d at 521 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. at 593–94, 113 S. Ct. 2786)). 
5 Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999). 
 
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reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline.”6   We 
review a trial judge’s decision to admit expert testimony for abuse of discretion 
“because trial judges, as gatekeepers, ‘must have considerable leeway in deciding 
in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert 
testimony is reliable.’”7   
Here, the record shows that Hegman participated in an FBI course of 
instruction that covered tire track and shoeprint analysis, independently studied a 
leading treatise on the discipline, and previously testified on the analysis of tire 
tracks and shoeprints in Delaware courts.  Hegman also demonstrated knowledge 
of the variables that could affect impressions, including the type of surface and 
degree of tire inflation.   
Rodriguez relies upon Reynolds v. State8 to support his argument that 
Hegman’s qualifications were insufficient.  In Reynolds, this Court held that a 
chief investigating officer could not testify as a fingerprint expert where the officer 
had never worked with fingerprints or classified them and cross-examination of the 
officer “demonstrated scant knowledge at best.”9  Reynolds is distinguishable.  
Unlike the witness in Reynolds, Hegman had both training and actual field 
                                          
 
6 M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 523 (Del. 1999) (quoting Daubert, 509 
U.S. at 589, 113 S. Ct. 2786)). 
7 Rivera v. State, 7 A.3d 961, 972 (Del. 2010) (quoting Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 338 (Del. 
2003)).   
8 424 A.2d 6 (Del. 1980).   
9 Id. at 8.   
 
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experience in tire track and shoeprint analysis, demonstrated his knowledge of  the 
variables that would affect the creation of impression evidence, and he had testified 
as an expert before on both tire track and shoeprint analysis. 
Moreover, Hegman’s expertise in fingerprint analysis was relevant to his 
experience with impression evidence.  While tire track and shoeprint analysis may 
be viewed as a distinct forensic discipline from fingerprint analysis because it 
involves mass-produced items, the analytic process is similar.  Specifically, tire 
tracks, shoeprints, and fingerprints are all forms of impression evidence.10  
Forensic analysis of fingerprints “consists of experience-based comparisons of 
impressions left by the ridge structures” of hand surfaces.11  Tire track and 
shoeprint analysis, like fingerprint analysis, seeks to identify the source of the 
impression by identifying and comparing particular characteristics.12  Hegman 
compared castings of the tracks and prints found at the fires to direct physical 
evidence: Rodriguez’s boots and bike tires.  He explained his process of measuring 
and then comparing specific characteristics between the impressions and the 
physical evidence.  Thus, while Hegman’s substantial experience in fingerprint 
analysis does not alone support his admission as an expert in other forms of 
                                          
 
10 See Hon. Donald E. Shelton, Forensic Science in Court: Challenges in the Twenty-First 
Century, at 40 (2011); National Research Council of the National Academies, Strengthening 
Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, at 136, 145 (2009) (“NAS Report”). 
11 NAS Report, at 136. 
12 NAS Report, at 146.   
 
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impression analysis, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in considering that 
experience and training as relevant.  
Finally, the defense had the opportunity to cross-examine Hegman on the 
stand regarding his background, experience, and methodological approach.  
“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful 
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of 
attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”13  “Like expert witnesses generally, an 
analyst’s lack of proper training or deficiency in judgment may be disclosed in 
cross-examination.”14  By probing Hegman on his particular experience in tire 
track and shoeprint analysis, defense counsel challenged his credibility before the 
jury and the weight to be given the impression evidence.   Once Hegman had been 
qualified under Rule 702 and his testimony met the threshold for admissibility, it 
was for the jury to determine the weight to be given his testimony.    
We find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in finding Hegman 
qualified as an expert in tire track and shoeprint analyses by knowledge, skill, 
training, experience or education under Rule 702 of the Delaware Rules of 
                                          
 
13 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595–96.   
14Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2537 & n.6 (U.S. 2009) (rejecting suggestion 
that forensic evidence is uniquely reliable and cross-examination of forensic analysts futile). 
 
15
Evidence.  This conclusion is also consistent with that of other jurisdictions 
addressing the admissibility of expert testimony regarding impression evidence.15 
Conclusion 
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
                                          
 
15 See Wade v. State, 490 N.E.2d 1097, 1104–05 (Ind. 1986) (holding that trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in qualifying witness as expert in shoeprint identification where witness was 
“assigned to laboratory work on ‘trace evidence,’ including physical comparisons”); 
Commonwealth v. Cortez, 777 N.E.2d 1254, 1258 (Mass. 2002) (holding trial court did abuse its 
discretion in allowing officer to provide expert testimony that shoeprints found at scene were 
“consistent with” defendant’s shoeprints where officer was recognized as fingerprint expert, and 
had received training and testified as an expert in shoeprint analysis); Doisher v. State, 632 P.2d 
242, 256 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981) (concluding lab technician with expertise in fingerprint analysis 
was qualified to testify on shoeprint analysis and stating that “a witness need not devote full time 
to an area of knowledge in order to qualify as an expert[;] it suffices if the witness has the 
requisite intelligence and reasonable contact with the subject matter to demonstrate expertise 
with reasonable skill”); State v. Jeter, 609 So.2d 1019, 1022–23 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (holding 
that trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying witness as expert in shoeprint 
identification where witness worked “for seven years in crime scene detection, which included 
processing the crime scene, lifting fingerprints, collecting evidence, taking photographs, and 
other types of analysis such as shoe prints”); Rodgers v. State,  205 S.W.3d 525, 533 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2006) (finding fingerprint expert qualified in shoeprint and tire track analysis and noting 
jury’s ability to weigh evidence).  See generally E. LeFevre, Footprints as Evidence, 35 
A.L.R.2d 856 (originally published in 1954); United States v. Ford, 481 F.3d 215, 217–21 (3d 
Cir. 2007).