Case Title: Wardyga v. Wardyga

Citation: 

Docket Number: 214, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
  
MARGARET WARDYGA, 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STEPHEN WARDYGA, 
 
Respondent Below- 
Appellee. 
 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 214, 2002 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  File No. CN98-07211 
§  Petition No. 01-36314 
§ 
 
Submitted: July 26, 2002 
  Decided:   August 28, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 28th day of August 2002, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The petitioner-appellant, Margaret Wardyga, filed an appeal from 
orders of the Family Court dated December 13, 2001 and April 1, 2002.  In the 
first order, the Family Court denied Ms. Wardyga’s petition for attorney’s fees 
and an expert fee.  In the second order, the Family Court modified its previous 
order and ordered the respondent-appellee, Stephen Wardyga, to pay 50% of Ms. 
 
 
-2- 
Wardyga’s attorney’s fees attributable to her current attorney.1  We find no merit 
to the appeal.   Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
(2) 
In her appeal, Ms. Wardyga claims that the Family Court 
committed legal error and abused its discretion by denying her petition for 
payment of the fees of her previous attorneys and an expert.   
                                                 
1It appears that Ms. Wardyga has had three different attorneys during the course of this 
Family Court litigation. 
 
 
-3- 
(3) 
On October 11, 2001, the Family Court issued a decision regarding 
certain ancillary matters in this litigation, concluding, among other things, that it 
would be inequitable for Ms. Wardyga to pay all of her attorney’s fees in light of 
her financial position.2  The Family Court awarded Ms. Wardyga 50% of all of 
her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs and directed her to submit the 
appropriate petition.  Ms. Wardyga’s attorney requested two extensions of time 
to submit the petition, which the Family Court granted.  The petition, with 
supporting documentation, was filed on November 8, 2001.  On December 13, 
2001, upon its review of the petition and supporting documentation, the Family 
Court denied Ms. Wardyga all the requested attorney’s fees and costs on the 
ground that the petition was inadequately supported by affidavits.3 
(4) 
On December 26, 2001, Ms. Wardyga filed a motion for 
reargument of the Family Court’s December 13, 2001 decision.  In the motion, 
Ms. Wardyga argued, among other things, that the Family Court had improperly 
failed to determine whether her fees should be awarded utilizing an equitable 
                                                 
2Specifically, the Family Court modified one of its original property division 
calculations and found that Ms. Wardyga actually would owe Mr. Wardyga $19, 582.00.   
3FAM. CT. CIV. PROC. R. 88.  Specifically, the Family Court found that the fees 
requested with respect to Ms. Wardyga’s two prior attorneys and her expert were not 
supported by properly executed affidavits attesting to the validity of the requested fees. 
 
 
-4- 
analysis.4  In its April 1, 2002 decision on the motion for reargument, the Family 
Court agreed with Ms. Wardyga and applied an equitable analysis to her petition 
for fees and costs.  The Family Court awarded Ms. Wardyga 50% of the fees 
incurred by her current counsel, but declined to award any other counsel fees or 
the expert fee.     
                                                 
4DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 925 (15) (1999).  
 
 
-5- 
(5) 
A motion for attorney’s fees in the Family Court must be supported 
by an affidavit from counsel stating (1) time and effort expended; (2) an 
itemization of services rendered; (3) relevant hourly rates; (4) itemization of 
disbursements claimed; (5) any sums received or that will be received with respect 
to legal services and/or disbursements; and (6) any information that will enable 
the Family Court to properly weigh the relevant factors set forth in Rule 1.5 of 
the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct.5   
(6) 
An award of attorney’s fees is determined by the Family Court as an 
exercise of discretion.6  Accordingly, the applicable standard of review is whether 
the Family Court abused that discretion.  If the award of attorney’s fees is the 
result of a logical deductive process and is supported by the record evidence, it 
will not be disturbed on appeal.7 
                                                 
5FAM. CT. CIV. PROC. R. 88. 
6DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1515 (1999).  Wheeler v. Wheeler, 636 A.2d 888, 892 (Del. 
1993). 
7Gray v. Gray, 503 A.2d 198, 204 (Del. 1986). 
 
 
-6- 
(7) 
We find no basis to overturn the Family Court’s award of attorney’s 
fees in this case.  While the attorney’s fees expended by Ms. Wardyga’s current 
counsel were properly attested to by affidavit, the fees incurred by her two 
previous counsel and her expert were not.  The Family Court’s decision to limit 
Ms. Wardyga’s fee award to 50% of the fees incurred by her current counsel after 
weighing the equities involved is supported by a logical deductive process and by 
record evidence and will not be disturbed by this Court. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED.8 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ E. Norman Veasey 
Chief Justice   
 
                                                 
8In his answering brief, Mr. Wardyga argues that the Family Court made a number of 
erroneous calculations in its orders and that the Family Court erred in requiring him to pay 
50% of Ms. Wardyga’s current counsel’s fees.  All such matter contained in Mr. Wardyga’s 
answering brief is hereby stricken, since he did not take an appeal from these rulings.  SUPR. 
CT. R. 34.  Also, Mr. Wardyga’s request that this Court apply sanctions against Ms. Wardyga 
for violating the Supreme Court Rules is denied.