Case Title: ALLSOP v. CHEYENNE NEWSPAPERS, INC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
ALLSOP v. CHEYENNE NEWSPAPERS, INC.2002 WY 2239 P.3d 1092Case Number: 00-278Decided: 02/08/2002

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                
   

 

ROGER 
ALLSOP,

Laramie 
County Sheriff, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

CHEYENNE 
NEWSPAPERS, INC.,

d/b/a 
Wyoming Tribune Eagle; and

BRIAN K. 
MARTIN, 

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Peter H. Froelicher, Laramie County Attorney.  Argument by Mr. Froelicher.

 Representing 
Appellees:

Bruce T. 
Moats, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument 
by Mr. Moats.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

HILL, 
J. 
delivered the opinion of the Court; GOLDEN, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

  

            
HILL, Justice. 

[¶1]      Laramie County 
Sheriff Roger Allsop (Allsop) seeks review of an order of the district court 
that required him to disclose, to the public and press, portions of a report 
reviewing and evaluating the Laramie County Detention Center's (LCDC)1 inmate suicide prevention 
protocols.  On the advice of 
counsel, Allsop refused to provide a copy of the report to Appellee, Cheyenne 
Newspapers, Inc. (Newspaper), and Newspaper filed a complaint seeking access to 
the report on the basis that it is a public record.  The report is referred to as the "Cox 
Report" and is so named after its author.

 

[¶2]      We will affirm 
the district court's order.

 

 

[¶3]      Allsop raises 
these issues:

 

I.          
Did the district court err when it denied Sheriff Allsop's motion to 
dismiss Appellees' claim for release of part of the Cox 
Report?

 

II.          
Did the district court err when it ordered Sheriff Allsop to release all 
but a small portion of the Cox Report to Appellees?

 

The 
Newspaper rephrases those queries:

 

I.          
Was the district court correct in finding that Wyoming law does not 
require that an entire report be withheld from public scrutiny if the disclosure 
of only a portion of information would be contrary to the public 
interest[?]

 

II.          
Was the district court correct in finding that the vast majority of the 
Cox report did not involve jail security procedures and only a small portion of 
[the] report fit within the statutory exemption to public disclosure codified at 
W.S. § 16-4-203(b)(i)[?]

 

In his 
reply brief, Allsop poses these additional questions:

 

I.          
Does the language  "or any portion thereof"  in Wyoming Statute § 
16-4-203(a) apply to the law enforcement records exception in Wyoming Statute § 
16-4-203(b)(i)?

 

II.          
May Appellees, despite having admitted that the Cox report satisfies the 
first prong of the law enforcement exception in district court, now assert that 
the Cox report does not satisfy the first prong of the law enforcement 
exception?

 

III.         
Do any of Appellees' arguments concerning the district court's 
unsupported findings in his decision letter have any 
merit?

 

 

[¶4]      Allsop became 
Laramie County Sheriff on January 4, 1999.  
Beginning in January of 1998, LCDC experienced a significant increase in 
attempted inmate suicides.  In the 
spring of 1999, two inmates succeeded in committing suicide inside LCDC.  Allsop sought assistance from the 
National Institute of Corrections to assess LCDC's suicide protocols, with a 
goal of preventing inmate suicides and suicide attempts.  The National Institute of Corrections 
provided Allsop with the expertise of Judith F. Cox for that purpose.  Cox came to Cheyenne and reviewed the 
above-described inmate suicide events, LCDC itself, and interviewed those 
persons principally charged with the responsibility for inmate well-being.  Allsop received a report of Cox's 
conclusions in the autumn of 1999.

 

[¶5]      On October 
5th and 18th, 1999, Newspaper asked Allsop for a copy of 
the report, and Allsop denied those requests.  On November 5, 1999, Newspaper filed an 
action which resulted in this appeal.  
In the course of the proceedings below, the district court indicated that 
the Cox Report "potentially fits within [the] exemption" for law enforcement 
investigatory material but did not conclude that the Cox Report was an 
investigatory record.  In addition, 
the district court stated that it was ". . . not prohibited from ordering 
partial disclosure of an investigatory record.  Rather, redaction of portions where 
disclosure would harm the public interest is a legitimate method of both 
protecting the public interest and recognizing the law's emphasis on public 
disclosure."  Based upon that 
reasoning, the district court denied Allsop's motion to dismiss the 
complaint.  That motion was premised 
on the theory that the statute is an "all or nothing" proposition.  The report was either exempt from 
disclosure or it was not, and a district court does not have statutory authority 
to excise any information from the report, the release of which might be 
contrary to the public interest, and then order the release of the remainder of 
the report.

 

[¶6]      In addition, the 
district court denied Allsop's motion for summary judgment, which was premised 
on a theory that Allsop, as a matter of law, was correct in determining that it 
was contrary to the public interest to release the report.  At that point in the proceedings, 
neither the district court nor Newspaper had seen the report.  The district court opined that it was 
not possible to make a determination of that issue without first seeing the 
report in camera.  Thus, the 
district court denied the motion for summary judgment and directed Allsop to 
provide a copy of the Cox Report to the court for its in camera 
review.

 

[¶7]      The parties 
stipulated that in lieu of a trial, the district court would conduct a hearing 
and decide the issues posed to it based upon all material in the court file, 
including affidavits submitted by Allsop, the Cox Report itself, and the 
arguments of counsel.  Newspaper, of 
course, favored release of the report, at least in a redacted form, on the basis 
that the public had a right to know if there was a need for additional staff in 
the sheriff's office or for additional jail facilities, as well as to evaluate 
election issues about taxes and the election of a sheriff.  Allsop argued that release of the report 
was contrary to the public interest because:

 

1.  Disclosure would have a chilling effect, 
discouraging law enforcement from thoroughly investigating security and/or 
safety problems.

 

2.  Disclosure would reveal security 
procedures and deficiencies in the jail's ability to monitor inmates, thereby 
increasing the risk of inmate suicide and increasing the risk of aggression by 
inmates against other inmates or jail staff.

 

3.  Disclosure would describe screening 
techniques used to assess an inmate's risk of suicide, enabling inmates to mask 
or hide their suicidal tendencies.

 

[¶8]      The district 
court determined that the evidence only justified the redaction of one small 
portion of the report and ordered the release of the remainder.  That decision was stayed pending the 
resolution of this appeal.

 

 

[¶9]      The issues raised 
by Allsop require us to construe the Wyoming Public Records Act (WPRA).  In interpreting statutes, our primary 
consideration is to determine the legislature's intent.  All statutes relating to the same 
subject or having the same general purpose must be considered and construed in 
harmony.  Statutory construction is 
a question of law, so our standard of review is de novo.  We begin by making an inquiry respecting 
the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their 
arrangement and connection.  We 
construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and 
sentence, and we construe all parts of the statute in pari materia.  Wyoming Board of Outfitters and 
Professional Guides v. Clark, 2001 WY 78, ¶12, 30 P.3d 36, ¶12 (Wyo. 
2001).

 

[¶10]   With specific respect to the WPRA, 
we have augmented that standard of review.  
The WPRA and the Federal Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) have a common objective, which is that disclosure, not 
secrecy, should prevail.  Implementation of that goal is provided by 
affording a liberal interpretation2 to the WPRA and construing its exceptions 
narrowly.  Sublette County Rural Health Care v. Miley, 942 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Wyo. 1997); Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. 
City of Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785, 794 (Wyo. 1983); Laramie River Conservation Council v. Dinger, 567 P.2d 731, 733 (Wyo. 1977).  
Indeed, we used this language in the Sheridan 
Newspapers case to further explicate the applicable standard of review:

 

            
Given the policy of the state as announced through the Public Records 
Act, the custodian, in any exercise of his right to withdraw, must confine his 
withdrawal discretion to those areas and circumstances prescribed by this 
Act.  Having 
taken this restriction into account, the custodian must then employ his 
discretion on a selective basis rather than through the withdrawal of entire 
categories of public records  as was done by the chief of police in this 
case.  Since 
the public policy which pertains to the Public Records Act speaks to the 
philosophy of disclosure, it is therefore contrary to that philosophy for the 
police chief to withdraw entire categories of public records  or any public 
records  without first addressing the issue which asks whether or not the 
withdrawal of individual 
[emphasis in original] records, documents, or portions thereof violates 
provisions of the Act.  In other words, the language of the statute 
imposes a legislative presumption, which says that, where public records are 
involved, the denial of inspection is contrary to the public policy, the public 
interest and the competing interests of those involved.  This, then, places 
the burden of proof upon the custodian to show that the exercise of his 
discretion does not run afoul of statutory limitations in any particular 
instance where custodial withdrawal is effected.

 

660 P.2d  at 795-96 (footnote omitted).

 

[¶11]   In Laramie 
River Conservation Council, 567 P.2d  at 734, we opined that:

 

There is a well-known expression applied to those in public 
office, "If you can't stand the heat, you'd better stay out of the 
kitchen."  
Confrontation has a salutary effect and causes those in positions of 
public responsibility to practice thoughtfulness and wisdom in their utterances 
and carefully weigh their decisions.  Paraphrased from Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink,[3] supra, such disclosure acts are 
broadly conceived to permit access to information long shielded unnecessarily 
from public view and create judicially enforceable rights to secure information 
from possibly unwilling hands.  The disclosure acts promote within the 
agencies affected a sensitiveness to the needs of the public and make democratic 
government function in a modern society.  With some necessary exceptions, recognized by 
Wyoming's records and meetings acts, state agencies must act in a fishbowl.

 

[¶12]   Moreover, we have also held that the 
freedom-of-the-press and due process provisions of the Federal and Wyoming 
constitutions guarantee a person's right to access public records, and absent a 
compelling State interest, the State may not exclude an entire class of records 
from public inspection.  Houghton v. 
Franscell, 870 P.2d 1050, 1053 (Wyo. 1994).

 

[¶13]   It is in light of the legislative 
presumption of openness and in keeping with the constitutional right of access 
to public records that we interpret the statutory exemption at issue in this 
case.  Department of Transportation v. Union of Operating 
Engineers, 908 P.2d 970, 972-73 (Wyo. 1995).

 

 

[¶14]   At the outset, we deem it prudent 
to declare our intention to very carefully limit our review of this matter to 
those issues which were raised in the district court and which are fleshed out 
in this appeal by cogent argument and pertinent authority.  We view the WPRA as 
a vital tool created by the legislature for the purpose of making governmental 
processes open and available to the citizens whom that government serves.  As noted above, the 
predominant feature of this legislation is that public records be open to the 
public.  In 
addition, the legislature has assigned to the courts the task of providing 
remedies, both to the public and to government, when issues under the WPRA 
arise.

 

[¶15]   To provide context for our discussion, 
we set out these statutory provisions:

 

(v) "Public records" when not otherwise specified includes 
the original and copies of any paper, correspondence, form, book, photograph, 
photostat, film, microfilm, sound recording, map drawing or other document, 
regardless of physical form or characteristics that have been made by the state 
of Wyoming and any counties, municipalities and political subdivisions thereof 
and by any agencies of the state, counties, municipalities and political 
subdivisions thereof, or received by them in connection with the transaction of 
public business, except those privileged or confidential by law;

(vi) Public records shall be classified as follows:

(A) "Official public records" includes all original 
vouchers, receipts and other documents necessary to isolate and prove the 
validity of every transaction relating to the receipt, use and disposition of 
all public property and public income from all sources whatsoever; all 
agreements and contracts to which the state or any agency or subdivision thereof 
is a party; all fidelity, surety and performance bonds; all claims filed against 
the state or any agency or subdivision thereof; all records or documents 
required by law to be filed with or kept by any agency or the state of 
Wyoming;  and 
all other documents or records determined by the records committee to be 
official public records;

(B) "Office files and memoranda" includes all records, 
correspondence, exhibits, books, booklets, drawings, maps, blank forms, or 
documents not defined and classified in subparagraph (A) of this subsection as 
official public records; all duplicate copies of official public records filed 
with any agency of the state or subdivision thereof; all documents and reports 
made for the internal administration of the office to which they pertain but not 
required by law to be filed or kept with the office;  and all other 
documents or records, determined by the records committee to be office files and 
memoranda.

            
(vii) "Writings" means all books, papers, maps, photographs, cards, 
tapes, recordings or other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or 
characteristics[.]

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-201(a) (LexisNexis 2001).

 

[¶16]   The nuts and bolts provisions of the 
WPRA are set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-4-202 and 16-4-203(a) (LexisNexis 
2001):

 

§ 16-4-202.  Right of inspection; rules and regulations; 
unavailability.

 

(a)  All public records shall be open for 
inspection by any person at reasonable times, except as provided in this act or 
as otherwise provided by law, but the official custodian of any public records 
may make rules and regulations with reference to the inspection of the records 
as is reasonably necessary for the protection of the records and the prevention 
of unnecessary interference with the regular discharge of the duties of the 
custodian or his office.

            
(b)  If the public records requested are not in the custody or 
control of the person to whom application is made, the person shall forthwith 
notify the applicant of this fact.

            
(c)  If the public records requested are in the custody and 
control of the person to whom application is made but are in active use or in 
storage, and therefore not available at the time an applicant asks to examine 
them, the custodian shall notify the applicant of this situation.

 

§ 16-4-203.  Right of inspection; grounds for denial; 
access of news media; order permitting or restricting disclosure; exception.

 

            
(a)  The custodian of any public records shall allow any person 
the right of inspection of the records or any portion thereof except on one (1) 
or more of the following grounds or as provided in subsection (b) or (d) of this 
section:

(i) The inspection would be contrary to any state 
statute;

(ii) The inspection would be contrary to any federal 
statute or regulation issued thereunder having the force and effect of law; 
or

(iii) The inspection is prohibited by rules 
promulgated by the supreme court or by the order of any court of record.

 

[¶17]   The statute most directly in contention 
in this matter is the exception to disclosure found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-4-203(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2001):

 

(b)  The custodian [of a public record] may deny 
the right of inspection of the following records, unless otherwise provided by 
law, on the ground that disclosure to the applicant would be contrary to the 
public interest:

(i) Records of investigations conducted by, or of 
intelligence information or security procedures of, any sheriff, county 
attorney, city attorney, the attorney general, the state auditor, police 
department or any investigatory files compiled for any other law enforcement or 
prosecution purposes[.]

 

[¶18]   The following subsections of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-4-203 set out the remedies available to one denied access to a public 
record:

 

            
(e)  If the custodian denies access to any public record, the 
applicant may request a written statement of the grounds for the denial.  The statement shall 
cite the law or regulation under which access is denied and shall be furnished 
to the applicant.

            
(f)  Any person denied the right to inspect any record covered 
by this act may apply to the district court of the district wherein the record 
is found for any order directing the custodian of the record to show cause why 
he should not permit the inspection of the record.

            
(g)  If, in the opinion of the official custodian of any public 
record, disclosure of the contents of the record would do substantial injury to 
the public interest, notwithstanding the fact that the record might otherwise be 
available to public inspection, he may apply to the district court of the 
district in which the record is located for an order permitting him to restrict 
disclosure.[4]  After hearing, the court may issue an order 
upon a finding that disclosure would cause substantial injury to the public 
interest.  The 
person seeking permission to examine the record shall have notice of the hearing 
served upon him in the manner provided for service of process by the Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure and has the right to appear and be heard.

 

[¶19]   In Sublette 
County Rural Health Care, 942 P.2d  at 1103-4, we were able to refer to 
persuasive federal precedents construing language very similar to a parallel 
Wyoming exemption for a different category of material exempt from public 
records disclosure.  
In this instance, the parallel FOIA provision is considerably 
different:

 

            
(7)  records or information compiled for law enforcement 
purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement 
records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with 
enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial 
or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to 
disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or 
foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished 
information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information 
compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal 
investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence 
investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would 
disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or 
prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or 
prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk 
circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the 
life or physical safety of any individual[.]

 

5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7) (West 1996).

 

[¶20]   In addition, the FOIA provides:  "Any reasonably 
segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such 
record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this 
subsection."  5 
U.S.C. § 552(b) (end).  While this is now a specific statutory 
provision under the federal statute, it represents a legislative recognition of 
a construct developed by the courts to provide remedies for violations of 
FOIA.  Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States Department of the 
Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 259-60 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  Above, we have set 
out Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203(a), and at this juncture we call attention to the 
portion of it that provides:  "The custodian of any public records shall 
allow any person the right of inspection of the records or any portion thereof 
except on one (1) or more of the following grounds or as provided in subsection 
(b) or (d) of this section: " (emphasis added).  We do not necessarily view that phrase as a 
legislative mandate, or even endorsement, of redaction,5 but neither do 
we view it as an implied limitation on the remedy of redaction.

 

[¶21]   In the context of this analytical 
process, we also take note of the statutory responsibilities of a sheriff with 
respect to the operation of a jail:  "The county sheriff or his deputy shall keep 
and maintain the jail in a safe and secure manner and is responsible for its 
operation."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-6-302 (LexisNexis 2001).  This statute is 
relied upon by both parties -- by Allsop as an articulation of his very serious 
responsibilities with respect to LCDC and by Newspaper to demonstrate that the 
public has a very legitimate interest in ensuring that the sheriff carries out 
that statutory responsibility.  In addition, to bolster its position that the 
public has a strong interest in knowing the manner in which a sheriff is 
executing the responsibilities of the office, Newspaper points to the fact that 
Allsop is an elected official.

 

Is the Report at Issue Covered by the Exemption in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203(b)(i)?

 

[¶22]   Allsop contends that the Cox Report is 
an "investigation," "intelligence information," or "security procedures" of a 
sheriff and, hence, exempt from disclosure so long as the sheriff demonstrates 
that its disclosure would be contrary to the public interest.  Newspaper contends 
that it is a "report," "assessment," "a review and critique," or some other 
similarly denominated document, but it is none of the things made 
discretionarily exempt under the statute at issue.  In his press 
release announcing that the report existed, Allsop described it as follows:  "The purpose for 
this request [the study by Cox] was to investigate, analyze, and evaluate the 
existing system [suicide prevention protocols] for the Sheriff."  We are mindful that 
labeling of a document does not make it so.  Sheridan 
Newspapers, 660 P.2d  at 802 (Rooney, C.J., and Raper, J. concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  Here, we perceive the record in the district 
court to reflect that the parties agreed that the exemption was applicable, and 
the only meaningful contest was whether Allsop produced evidence to demonstrate 
that its disclosure was contrary to the public interest.

 

[¶23]   The following comments are intended as 
guidance in the resolution of future cases analogous to the instant matter, but 
we do not offer them up as bright-line rules.  We view the use of the terms "investigation," 
"intelligence information," and "security procedures" to be words used with 
specific reference to law enforcement and/or to law enforcement and prosecution 
purposes.  
Hence, in construing their meaning in a controversy such as this, we 
would not look to the most general meaning of those terms and phrases, but 
rather, would look to their meaning in the context of this statute  and we 
would do so a fortiori in view of the liberal 
construction rules applicable to these statutes.  See generally, 
Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Validity, 
Construction, and Application of Statutory Provisions Relating to Public Access 
to Police Records, 82 A.L.R.3d 19 (1978 and 2001 Supp.); 37A Am.Jur.2d 
Freedom of Information Acts §§ 290-358 (1994 and 2001 Supp.); 76 C.J.S. Records 
§ 111 (1994).  
A more definitive resolution of this weighty issue must wait for another 
day when the issue is more clearly raised in the trial court and the pertinent 
issues thoroughly briefed by the parties.  The only thing that might be gained here 
would be to determine that the Cox Report was simply not exempt, and Newspaper 
is, therefore, entitled even to that portion of the report redacted by the 
district court.  
However, Newspaper did not cross appeal and challenge that 
redaction.  Our 
ultimate result is to affirm the district court's order and, thus, there is no 
injury to Newspaper.

 

[¶24]   For these reasons, we decline to hold 
that the Cox Report was exempt under the governing statute, but accept for 
purposes of resolution of this appeal that that result is the law of this 
case.

 

Did Allsop Demonstrate that 
Disclosure of the Report was Contrary to Public Interest?

 

[¶25]   A significant part of the reason we opt 
to narrowly restrict this opinion to those issues specifically raised is that 
the record of the proceedings below is very limited in scope because of a 
stipulation between the parties.  While the district court technically 
conducted a trial to the court, the evidence at that trial was limited to the 
report itself viewed in camera, affidavits offered 
to establish that disclosure of the report was contrary to the public interest, 
as well as limited briefing and argument of the issues by counsel for the 
respective parties.  
We do not view the record as one that lends itself to the resolution of 
the weighty and vital issues that underlie the superficial treatment given this 
case below, as well as in briefing and argument to this Court.

 

[¶26]   The pertinent portions of the 
affidavits submitted by Allsop, in support of his burden to show it was not in 
the public interest to disclose the Cox Report, are set out below.  The first affidavit 
was that of Allsop:

 

            
5)         
That, since January, 1998, the jail had experienced a significant 
increase in attempted suicides.  That in the Spring of 1999, two inmates at 
the Laramie County Jail successfully committed suicide and that the risk of 
inmate suicide is an ongoing safety and security issue for the Laramie County 
Jail.

            
6)         
That I have personal knowledge about the Cox report and the operations of 
the Laramie County Jail.

            
7)         
That, in the Spring of 1999, within several months of taking over as the 
Laramie County Sheriff, I enlisted the services of Judith F. Cox to perform an 
investigation and critique of the Laramie County Jail facility staffing and its 
procedures including those procedures concerning the prevention of inmate 
suicides.

            
8)         
That Ms. Cox is affiliated with the National Institute of Corrections and 
is a suicide prevention expert.

            
9)         
That I enlisted the services of Ms. Cox and the National Institute of 
Corrections to get an honest and complete investigation into the suicide 
prevention system at the Laramie County Jail in order to enable me to provide 
the safest and most secure jail possible.

            
10)      That Ms. Cox 
investigated the jail's suicide prevention system through an on site visit, by 
meeting with essential personnel in the Sheriff's Department and by reviewing 
the suicide prevention procedures at the jail.

            
11)      That Ms. Cox provided 
me with a written technical report based upon her investigation into the jail 
and the jail's suicide prevention system.

            
12)      That Ms. Cox's 
written technical report contains specific findings and recommendations 
concerning the physical jail building and the protocols and procedures 
concerning the prevention of suicides.  That Ms. Cox's report lists specific 
shortcomings of the physical layout of the jail for preventing suicides and for 
providing adequate security.  That Ms. Cox's report discusses the 
indicators which should be used to determine an inmate's risk of suicide.  That Ms. Cox's 
report identifies the areas and the times at the jail where and when supervision 
of inmates could be improved.

            
13)      That, based upon my 
years of experience in law enforcement, the disclosure of the investigative 
report prepared by Judith Cox evaluating and analyzing the Laramie County Jail's 
suicide prevention system would be contrary to the public interest for the 
following reasons:  
(1) disclosure of the report would cause serious harm to the safety and 
security of the inmates and deputies because the report contains a list of the 
physical limitations of the jail building for preventing suicides, e.g. areas 
out of view, and because the report discusses areas and times where staffing is 
insufficient; (2) disclosure of the report would increase the risk of successful 
suicides because the report contains a list of the physical limitations of the 
jail building for preventing suicides and because it discusses the behavioral 
indicators used to determine suicide risk, both of which could be used by 
inmates to avoid suicide detection; and (3) disclosure of the report will deter 
other sheriffs and law enforcement officials from obtaining honest critiques of 
their security operations because they will know such records will be subject to 
disclosure.[6]

 

[¶27]   The second affidavit offered by Allsop 
was from Captain August Wenzel of the Laramie County Sheriff's Office who was in 
charge of the day-to-day operation of LCDC:

 

            
4)         
That, among other duties, I am charged with maintaining the Laramie 
County Jail in a safe and secure manner and with operating the Laramie County 
Jail.

            
5)         
That I have reviewed the Cox Report and have personal knowledge about the 
operations of the Laramie County Jail.

            
6)         
That, based upon my years as a detention officer at the Laramie County 
Jail and as the Chief of Detention operations at the Laramie County Jail, the 
disclosure of the Cox Report would be contrary to the public interest for the 
following reasons:

(a)  It would cause serious harm to the safety 
and security of the inmates and deputies.  The information contained in the Cox Report  
a list of the physical limitations of the jail building for preventing suicides 
and a discussion of the areas and times where staffing is insufficient  would 
likely be used by inmates to successfully commit suicide or other illegal 
acts.

(b)  It would increase the risk of successful 
suicides because the report contains a list of the physical limitations of the 
jail building and because it discusses the behavioral indicators used to 
determine suicide risk.  That information would be used by inmates to 
avoid suicide detection.

 

[¶28]   The third affidavit offered by Allsop 
was from Michael Sandifer, who serves as the mental health coordinator at 
LCDC:

 

            
4)         
That the Cox Report points out problems in the design, building 
construction, security structure and surveillance capability of areas of the 
Laramie County Jail.  
That, the information contained in the Cox Report could serve as a 
how-to-training-manual for anyone desiring to commit suicide or perform other 
breaches of security in the jail.

            
5)         
That the Cox report exposes weaknesses in staffing and security patterns 
which could be useful to others who desire to plan an escape or otherwise 
compromise security of the facility thereby placing staff and the safety of the 
facility at risk.

 

[¶29]   As noted above, Allsop bore the burden 
of demonstrating that disclosure of the Cox Report would be contrary to the 
public interest.  
The affidavits set out above are largely conclusory and contain factually 
unsubstantiated expressions of opinion.  They obviously were of little assistance to 
the district court, and they are of little assistance to this Court in resolving 
this appeal.  
Allsop contends that the only evidence in the record that goes to that 
question is the evidence offered by Allsop and, therefore, the district court 
was bound to find in his favor and this Court is bound to reverse the district 
court's final order.  
We do not agree.  A crucial piece of evidence is the Cox Report 
itself.  The 
role of the district court was to examine that report, all of the other 
materials in the record and the applicable law, and then make a judgment as to 
whether Allsop was correct in his conclusion that disclosure of the report was 
contrary to the public interest.  It was also incumbent upon the district court 
to employ logic and reason in that process.  We conclude, based upon the record extant, 
that the district court could properly conclude that, with redaction, disclosure 
of the report would not be contrary to the public interest.

 

 

[¶30]   Allsop contends that the district court 
does not have authority to redact a public record, such as the Cox Report, so as 
to render it subject to disclosure.  Allsop maintains that the governing statutes 
do not provide for such a remedy.  Actually, the statutes do not specifically 
provide for any particular remedies.  It most certainly would run afoul of the 
applicable principles of statutory construction to conclude that the passage of 
the WPRA was for naught because the legislature failed to provide for specific 
sorts of remedies.  
We feel safe in concluding that the legislature intended for the courts 
to use those traditional judicial remedies that are available, as well as to 
fashion new ones that suit the circumstances which the statute was intended to 
remediate.  Sheridan Newspapers, 660 P.2d  at 798-99.  Redaction is one 
such remedy.  
We tacitly approved of its use in Sheridan 
Newspapers, though the precise issue raised here was not raised in that 
case.  Also see Department of Transportation, 908 P.2d  at 972 n.5.  We take this 
opportunity to hold that a district court may use redaction as one of the 
remedies to vindicate the public's interests in access to public records.  That redaction is 
an appropriate tool to be used in circumstances such as these is well 
established in case law, as well as in statutes.  See Providence 
Journal Company v. Convention Center Authority, 774 A.2d 40 (R.I. 2001); Bardes v. Todd, 746 N.E.2d 229, 234 (Ohio 2000); Press of Atlantic City v. Ocean County Joint Insurance 
Fund, 767 A.2d 533, 539 (N.J. 2000); Cowles 
Publishing Company v. Spokane Police Department, 987 P.2d 620, 622-23 (Wash. 
1999); KPNX-TV v. Superior Court in and for County of 
Yuma, 905 P.2d 598, 603 (Ariz. 1995); 37A Am.Jur.2d Freedom of Information 
Acts § 576 (1994); and 76 C.J.S. Records § 124 (1994).  Although the 
parallel federal statute specifically provides for it, that statutory provision 
represents a legislative adoption of a court created remedy.

 

 

[¶31]   The district court did not err in 
denying Allsop's motion to dismiss Newspaper's complaint, nor did the district 
court err in redacting and then ordering disclosure of the Cox Report.  For the reasons set 
out above, the order of the district court is affirmed.

  

Golden, J., dissenting. 

[¶32]       Allsop, acting in his official capacity as custodian of the 
Cox Report, determined that the report was exempt from public disclosure under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203(b)(i).  As the majority opinion points out, Newspaper 
agrees that the Cox Report falls within that exemption.1  The main issue 
argued below was whether the Cox Report could be withheld because its disclosure 
would be contrary to the public interest.  The district court ordered the disclosure of 
a redacted version of the Cox Report.  Thus, implicitly, the district court found 
that the disclosure of the Cox Report would be contrary to the public interest 
unless certain portions of the report were redacted.2  The correct narrow 
question posed in this appeal, then, concerns the statutory authority of the 
district court to order Allsop to release the Cox Report in redacted form.3  Because I do not agree that the statutory 
language at issue grants the district court authority to order redaction, I must 
respectfully dissent.  

 

[¶33]       In addition to § 16-4-203(b)(i), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-4-203(f) (LexisNexis 2001) is also pertinent to this appeal.  Subsection 203(f) 
states:

 

Any person denied the right to inspect any record covered 
by this act may apply to the district court of the district wherein the record 
is found for any order directing the custodian of the record to show cause why 
he should not permit the inspection of the record.

 

When read as a whole, the statutory language is 
unambiguous.  
The legislature has determined that the custodian makes the initial 
determination regarding the exempt status of a record, subject only to having to 
explain his reasoning to the district court via a show cause proceeding.  If the custodian 
successfully bears his burden of showing that an exemption applies to a given 
record and that the release of the record would be contrary to the public 
interest, that is the end of the judicial inquiry.  The statutes extend 
no further authority to the district court.

 

[¶34]       I fully agree that the purpose of the Wyoming Public 
Records Act (WPRA) is to allow disclosure of information.  However, the 
legislature did include several exemptions to disclosure.  While these 
exemptions must be interpreted narrowly, this Court does not have authority to 
move beyond the language selected by the Legislature.  As this Court 
stated in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Bd. of 
Equalization, 813 P.2d 214 (Wyo. 1991):

 

Legislative intent must be ascertained initially and 
primarily from the words used in the statute. Phillips 
v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834 (Wyo. 1991); Wyoming Workers' Comp. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760 (Wyo. 
1990); Halliburton Co. v. McAdams, Roux & 
Associates, Inc., 773 P.2d 153 (Wyo. 1989); Dept. of 
Revenue and Taxation of State of Wyo. v. Hamilton, 743 P.2d 877 (Wyo. 1987); 
Huber v. City of Casper, 727 P.2d 1002 (Wyo. 1986); 
In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1982); Oroz v. Hayes, 598 P.2d 432 (Wyo. 1979); Seyfang v. Board of Trustees of Washakie County School 
Dist. No. 1, 563 P.2d 1376 (Wyo. 1977).  When the words used are clear and 
unambiguous, a court risks an impermissible substitution of its own views, or 
those of others, for the intent of the legislature if any effort is made to 
interpret or construe statutes on any basis other than the language invoked by 
the legislature.  
Our precedent demonstrates that this rule also is an absolute. If the 
language selected by the legislature is sufficiently definitive, that language 
establishes the rule of law.  Any additional construction can be resorted 
to only if the wording is ambiguous or unclear to the point of demonstrating 
obscurity with respect to the legislative purpose or mandate.  Blue Cross Ass'n v. Harris, 664 F.2d 806 (10th Cir. 
1981); Johnson v. Statewide Collections, Inc., 778 P.2d 93 (Wyo. 1989); Wyoming Insurance Dept. v. Avemco 
Ins. Co., 726 P.2d 507 (Wyo. 1986); Campbell v. 
State, 709 P.2d 425 (Wyo. 1985); Tenneco.  This inhibition 
upon statutory construction offers assurance that the legislative efforts and 
determinations of elected representatives will be made effective without 
judicial adjustment or gloss.

 

Id. at 219-20.  This is a perfect example of a case in which 
judicial restraint is appropriate in order to prevent the addition of any 
"judicial adjustment or gloss" to the WPRA.

 

[¶35]       The pertinent language in the exemption is the beginning 
language stating: "[t]he custodian may deny the right of inspection of the 
following records."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203(b) (LexisNexis 2001).  Clearly, the 
initial decision regarding access to records belongs to the custodian of the 
records.  Any 
person denied the right to inspect any public record because the custodian 
thereof has invoked an exemption is limited to asking the district court for an 
"order directing the custodian of the record to show cause why he should not 
permit the inspection of the record."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203(f) (LexisNexis 
2001).  Both 
sections speak only of "the record," not portions thereof, and the district 
court's jurisdiction is specifically limited to a show cause proceeding.  Thus, the only 
function of the district court is reviewing the reasons given by the custodian 
for not releasing the record.  If the custodian adequately shows cause why 
the record should not be released pursuant to the provisions of the WPRA, that 
is the end of the judicial inquiry.

 

[¶36]       This reading of the statute becomes even clearer when the 
WPRA is compared with the Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  As the majority 
opinion points out, the FOIA contains specific provisions requiring 
redaction.  At 
the end of the section dealing with exemptions there is a general statement 
mandating that "[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be 
provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions 
which are exempt under this subsection."  5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (West 1996).  Under the section 
authorizing judicial review, the statutory language specifically states that the 
district court "shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents 
of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part 
thereof shall be withheld."  5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (West 1996).  The WPRA does not 
contain any such language.

 

[¶37]       The majority opinion seems to suggest that since the FOIA 
contains such language, we should read such language into the WPRA by 
analogy.  The 
WPRA, however, contains no such analogous language.  

 

There are . . . rules of construction which eventually 
force us into a corner from which we have little hope of escape.  The omission of 
words from a statute must be considered intentional on the part of the 
legislature.  
State v. Reese, 1974, 12 Wash. App. 407, 529 P.2d 1119.  
Words may not be supplied in a statute where the statute is intelligible 
without the addition of the alleged omission.  Ward v. Yoder, 
Wyo.1960, 355 P.2d 371, 376, reh. den., 357 P.2d 180; Montoya v. McManus, 1961, 68 N.M. 381, 362 P.2d 771.  Words may 
not be inserted in a statutory provision under the guise of interpretation.  Kirkwood v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings 
Ass'n, 1954, 43 Cal. 2d 333, 273 P.2d 532.  The Supreme Court will not read into laws 
what is not there.  
Durante v. Consumers Filling Station Company of 
Cheyenne, 1953, 71 Wyo. 271, 299, 257 P.2d 347, 356; Cook v. Hill, 1960, 224 Or. 565, 356 P.2d 1067.  This court will not 
supply omissions in a statute and redress is with the legislature.  Lo Sasso v. Braun, Wyo. 1963, 386 P.2d 630, 
631-632.  We 
are alerted by all this to the result that it is just as important to recognize 
what a statute does not say as it is to recognize what it does say.

 

Matter of Voss' Adoption, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976).  

 

[¶38]       The above-quoted FOIA language regarding redaction was 
added to the FOIA by amendment in 1974.  The Wyoming legislature has never added the 
same or even analogous language to the WPRA.  The omission of such language, especially in 
light of the presence of specific language in the FOIA, should not be treated by 
this Court as an oversight by the Wyoming legislature.  The legislature has 
never explicitly given the courts the power to order the release of portions of 
records, and such authority should not now be read into the WPRA.

 

[¶39]       The majority opinion claims that the addition of the 
language requiring redaction now found in the FOIA was simply a codification of 
a judicially created remedy.  I do not believe this to be an accurate 
statement.  In 
a decision issued before the 1974 amendments to the FOIA adding the redaction 
requirements, the United States Supreme Court determined that judicial 
inspection and redaction was not authorized under at least one exemption in the 
FOIA.  In EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 S. Ct. 827, 35 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1973), certain members of Congress were attempting to gain access to 
specific Executive Branch records concerning a scheduled underground nuclear 
test.  Access 
to these documents was denied based upon two distinct exemptions.  The first exemption 
claimed was an exemption for documents "specifically required by Executive order 
to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign 
policy."  Id. at 80, 93 S. Ct.  at 833.  The second 
exemption claimed was an exemption for "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums 
or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency 
in litigation with the agency."4  Id. at 85 n.11, 
93 S. Ct.  at 835 n.11.  The District Court found that the documents 
at issue were exempt from compelled disclosure for the reasons given.  The Court of 
Appeals reversed, holding that an inquiry into the appropriateness of redaction 
was required for records in both categories of exemptions and any information 
falling outside the stated exemption should be released.

 

[¶40]       The United 
States Supreme Court analyzed each exemption separately.  Regarding the first 
exemption, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not have authority 
to inspect or order redaction of any document falling within the first 
exemption.  The 
Supreme Court reasoned quite simply that the statutory language at issue only 
authorized the district court to determine if the record was subject to an 
appropriate Executive order.  Evidence was presented that certain documents 
were subject to an appropriate Executive order, leading the Supreme Court to 
conclude that, with regards to these documents, the "petitioners had met their 
burden of demonstrating that the documents were entitled to protection under 
[the pertinent exemption], and the duty of the District Court . . . was 
therefore at an end."  
Id. at 84, 93 S. Ct.  at 834-35.

 

[¶41]       While acknowledging that there may be room for criticism of 
the resulting limitation of judicial review, the Supreme Court deferred to what 
it considered to be Congressional intent as evidenced by the pertinent statutory 
language.  As 
Justice Stewart stated in his concurring opinion, Congress "has built into the 
Freedom of Information Act an exemption that provides no means to question an 
Executive decision to stamp a document secret,' however cynical, myopic, or 
even corrupt that decision might have been.  Congress chose, instead, to decree blind 
acceptance of Executive fiat."  Id.  at 95, 93 S. Ct.  at 
840.

 

[¶42]       Regarding the second exemption claimed, the Supreme Court 
again analyzed the precise statutory language used by Congress.  On the issue of 
redaction, the Supreme Court focused on the language of the statute that allowed 
parties to receive records under the same rules as if they were in litigation 
with the custodial agency.  The Supreme Court interpreted this statutory 
language to mean that Congress expected the rules of discovery to be applied, at 
least "by way of rough analogies."  Id. at 86, 93 S. Ct.  at 835.  In 
discovery, upon a claim of privilege, severing information from documents is 
common and "courts often [are] required to examine the disputed document in camera, in order to determine which should be turned 
over or withheld."  
Id. at 88, 93 S. Ct.  at 836.  The Supreme Court 
reasoned that Congress was expected to know of this common practice and 
therefore judicial inspection and redaction was anticipated.  Thus, any record 
for which this particular exemption is claimed potentially could be subjected to 
judicial in camera review and judicially mandated 
redaction and disclosure.

 

[¶43]       In Mink, the United States 
Supreme Court stayed true to the language employed by Congress in the FOIA.  It did not 
judicially create a remedy of inspection and redaction that had no basis in the 
language of the FOIA.  
In fact, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the suggestion that such 
a remedy was implicit in the FOIA.  Congress amended the FOIA the year after Mink was decided to include provisions for redaction 
for records sought to be withheld under all listed exemptions.  Given this 
background, I fail to see how the pertinent Congressional amendment to the FOIA 
constituted "a legislative adoption of a court created remedy" as stated in the 
majority opinion.

 

[¶44]       I find the reasoning in Mink to 
be very persuasive.  
The doctrine of separation of powers mandates that we apply the law as 
written.  The 
exemption at issue provides for the custodian to make the decision regarding 
disclosure of a record.  The custodian is not required under the terms 
of the pertinent exemption to examine the record and segregate exempt portions 
from non-exempt portions.  In terms of judicial review, the Wyoming 
legislature specifically has limited judicial review of the claim of an 
exemption under the WPRA to making a decision under an order to show cause.  There is no 
legislative authority for the district court to order redaction of portions of 
an otherwise exempt record.  This Court should restrain its statutory 
interpretation and abide by the dictates of the legislature.  Questions regarding 
the wisdom of the limits of such judicial review are for the legislature, not 
this Court, to decide.  

 

[¶45]       In the final analysis the Legislature must answer to an 
informed, and perhaps ultimately aroused, public opinion for its action.  We may not 
substitute our judgment for its own.  The forum for the correction of 
ill-considered legislation is a responsive legislature.

 

FOOTNOTES

   1LCDC is 
also referred to as the Laramie County Jail in some quoted material.

  2"By a liberal interpretation, it is only meant that 
words should not be forced out of their natural meaning and should receive a 
fair and reasonable construction so as to obtain the objects for which a statute 
is designed.  
Liberal construction does not require that words be forced out of their 
natural meaning."  
Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Committee, 
651 P.2d 778, 789 (Wyo. 1982); First National Bank & 
Trust Company of Wyoming v. Brimmer, 504 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Wyo. 1973); and see 3 Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction §§ 58:1  58:6 (6th ed. 
2001).

   3Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 
93 S. Ct. 827, 840-45, 35 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1973) (Justices Brennan and Marshall, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).

   
4Under the circumstances presented by this case 
(given the sheriff's public announcement about the report at a news conference) 
it may have been prudent for the sheriff to have initiated this process rather 
than putting the public and the press to that burden.

   
5"Redaction" is also referred to in various 
authorities as excision, deletion, alteration, expungement, etc.  For purposes of 
this specific discussion, we conclude that all of those terms refer to the same 
basic process.

   
6We do not give any credence to such an argument or 
theory.  Public 
scrutiny could never be a pretext for nonfeasance, misfeasance, or 
malfeasance.  
We trust that Appellant places no credence in it either.

 

Footnotes for the Dissent

 

1Despite the declared 
intention of the majority opinion to "very carefully limit our review of this 
matter to those issues which were raised in the district court," the majority 
opinion immediately proceeds to offer an entire section related to whether the 
Cox Report falls within the claimed exemption.  The majority opinion presents the section as 
"guidance" for future cases.  I question both the wisdom and the result of 
this "guidance." 

2The majority opinion 
offers a section regarding whether Allsop adequately demonstrated that 
disclosure of the Cox Report was contrary to the public interest.  In my view, that 
issue is not properly before this Court on appeal.  The correct narrow 
issue raised by Appellant Allsop concerns the authority of the district court to 
order redaction.  
Having said that, I will, nevertheless, briefly comment on the serious 
deficiencies that exist in the statute regarding judicial review of the 
determination whether disclosure of an exempted record is or is not contrary to 
the public interest.  
In the pertinent statutory provisions, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-4-203(e) and 
(f), the legislature has not provided the district court, before which the show 
cause proceeding is conducted, any guidance regarding the various factors, and 
the weight properly to be given to each, to consider when reviewing the 
custodian's showing that disclosure would be contrary to the public 
interest.  In 
the instant case, Allsop showed cause, presenting evidence in the form of 
affidavits of undisputed experts on jail security operations.  Newspaper did not 
present evidence contradicting Allsop's showing.  Nothwithstanding Allsop's showing, the 
district court, without evidentiary support, concluded that disclosure would not 
be contrary to the public interest.  It is elementary that a court may not 
substitute its own factually unsupported opinion for the factually supported 
showing of a party litigant.  In the absence of legislatively declared 
factors that inform judicial review of "public interest" determinations, the 
risk of arbitrary and capricious judicial decision-making is unacceptably 
high.

3This Court has never been 
faced with the issue of whether a custodian of a record is required under the 
WPRA to redact information in an individual record.  Sheridan Newspapers Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785 (Wyo. 1983), does contain language regarding redaction of information within 
individual records.  
Such language must properly be classified as dicta, as such issue was not 
properly before the Sheridan Court.

4The WPRA has a 
substantially similar exemption, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203(b)(v).  It is interesting 
that the very reason for this exemption in the FOIA is to encourage the free and 
open exchange of ideas, opinions and critiques between and within government 
agencies during the process of deliberation and policy making.  The U. S. Congress 
recognized that the desired openness and frankness of discussion within the 
government might not be achievable if all records thereof are open to public 
scrutiny.  See Mink at 87, 93 S. Ct. 
at 836.  
Footnote six of the majority opinion seems to disavow this 
reasoning.  
Because of the requirement under the WPRA that a record can be withheld 
only if it fits within a delineated exemption and 
its disclosure would be contrary to the public interest, the disavowal of the 
public policy behind the exemption calls the application of this exemption 
needlessly into question.