Case Title: Home Ins. Co. v. Elston Equipment Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Home Ins. Co. v. Elston Equipment Co.1991 WY 67810 P.2d 992Case Number: 90-208Decided: 05/09/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
The HOME INSURANCE 
COMPANY, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

ELSTON EQUIPMENT COMPANY, 
Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

Reversed and 
remanded.

Mark L. Carman of 
Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, for 
appellant.

William M. McKellar of 
Boley & McKellar, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Home Insurance Company 
(Home Insurance) appeals from summary judgment granted to Elston Equipment 
Company (Elston) on Home Insurance's strict liability and negligence claims for 
property damage arising from a tractor-trailer fire. The trial court determined 
no genuine issues as to any material fact existed and Elston was entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. The sole issue on appeal is whether the 
summary judgment was properly granted. Finding an issue of material fact exists, 
we reverse and remand.

FACTS

[¶2.]     This case arises from a 
fire in a semitractor trailer outside of Buffalo, Wyoming, on May 1, 1986. Marten Transport had 
contracted with Russell Trucking to deliver a cargo of Monsanto Landmaster 
herbicide from Billings, Montana, to Greeley, Colorado. A portable propane heater, 
manufactured by Elston, was rented from Molerway Freight Lines, Inc. to protect 
the cargo from freezing. In the past, the heater had been serviced by Texas Eastern d/b/a/ 
Petrolane Gas Service.

[¶3.]     To insure a stable 
temperature during the trip, the heater was placed on a wooden pallet in the 
right front of the trailer with the cargo containers filling the rest of the 
truck. The heater thus sat against the front trailer wall, held in place by 
pressure from a screw-type jack.

[¶4.]     En route to Colorado, driver Keith 
Daniels saw smoke and a brown spot on the front of the trailer. He pulled over 
and upon opening the trailer door saw smoke and flames in the front of the 
trailer. The cargo was destroyed, the trailer damaged, but the heater was 
salvaged structurally intact. It was fire damaged, with burn patterns on the 
right side where the supply hose connected the propane bottle compartment to the 
heater control.

SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

On appeal from a grant of 
summary judgment, we review the judgment in the same light as the district 
court, using the same materials and following the same standards. The party 
moving for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine 
issues of material fact exist and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. We have defined a material fact as one which, if proved, would have the 
effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the claim of defense 
asserted by the parties. We review the record from the vantage point most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, giving that party the benefit of every 
favorable inference which may be drawn from the facts in the materials submitted 
in the record. Even if the evidence in the case is not significantly in dispute, 
if that evidence is subject to differing interpretations or if reasonable minds 
might disagree as to its significance, summary judgment is not 
proper.

Stephenson v. Pacific 
Power & Light Company, 779 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Wyo. 1989) (citations 
omitted).

[¶5.]     With our standard of 
review in mind, we must remember that until the moving party has established 
with its supporting evidence that there are no genuine issues of material fact 
requiring a trial, the nonmoving party has no obligation to support his 
pleadings with any evidence. Matthews v. Wyoming Department of Agriculture, 719 P.2d 216, 220 (Wyo. 1986).

DISCUSSION

[¶6.]     In its complaint, Home 
Insurance alleged that Elston negligently manufactured the heater and that the 
heater caused the fire. In its strict liability claim, Home Insurance alleged 
Elston was engaged in the business of selling heaters, the subject heater 
reached the user without substantial change in condition from when it was sold, 
and the heater was in a defective condition that was unreasonably dangerous to 
the user and his property.

[¶7.]     In support of Elston's 
motion for summary judgment, Elston relied principally on certain portions of 
the deposition testimony of Home Insurance's expert witness Dick Thatcher. 
Elston admitted that it manufactured and sold the heater and, so far as we can 
tell from the record and argument of counsel, did not challenge the allegation 
that the subject heater reached the user without substantial change in 
condition. As a result, Elston focused its motion on establishing, through 
Thatcher's deposition, no genuine issues of material fact existed concerning 
whether Elston negligently manufactured the heater and whether the heater was in 
a defective condition that was unreasonably dangerous to the user. We shall 
review Thatcher's testimony in that context.

[¶8.]     In his deposition 
testimony, Thatcher described his area of expertise as a consultant in 
litigation involving gas fires and explosions. He stated that in general terms 
he is knowledgeable about propane heaters and he investigates and reconstructs 
accidents involving propane fires and explosions. After investigating this fire 
and examining the heater and the supply hose, he prepared a report containing 
his findings and opinions concerning the cause and origin of the 
fire.

[¶9.]     In Thatcher's opinion 
there was a small gas leak in the gas line between the propane bottle 
compartment and the heater control. It was his belief that injury developed 
"prior to this incident." He stated he had no certain way of knowing when the 
hole developed; it was more likely that the hose failure developed over a period 
of time. In his opinion, "the hole very possibly occurred as a result of injury 
to the inner liner of the hose at some previous time when it was 
assembled."

[¶10.]  Thatcher described the hose as being 
about a foot long, with barbed fittings at each end and consisting of two layers 
of rubber with fabric in between. He explained that Underwriters Laboratories 
(UL) publishes an approved method for placing the barbed end fittings into the 
hose. The attachment of UL's tinfoil-like metal band on the supply hose 
signifies the hose is UL approved. According to Thatcher, there was no UL band 
attached to the heater hose in question; therefore, he assumed the hose assembly 
may not have been done under a quality controlled system. It was his opinion 
that if the inner layer or liner is damaged during assembly, then the outer 
layer is the only surface that keeps the hose from leaking. If the outer layer 
is damaged or deteriorates, a leak will then occur.

[¶11.]  Thatcher pointed out that he was not 
allowed to remove the hose from the heater and more closely examine it. Since he 
was not allowed to do that, he has no evidence to support his opinion, other 
than the physical evidence he could visually observe by looking at the hose with 
his naked eye aided by a magnifying glass. In his opinion, the hose failure 
occurred due to the possibility it was damaged during assembly, combined with 
progressive deterioration from aging and heat from the burner positioned 
nearby.

[¶12.]  Elston's counsel elicited testimony from 
Thatcher that he is not an expert in the area of design and manufacture of cargo 
heaters and does not have an opinion on whether or not the subject heater was 
designed or manufactured in a negligent or improper manner. Thatcher also 
testified that he does not know whether the hose was even assembled by Elston. 
He conceded he has no evidence to prove that damage to the hose occurred when it 
was assembled by Elston.

[¶13.]  Elston maintains that Thatcher's 
testimony establishes that no genuine issues of material fact exist concerning 
the negligence and strict liability claims. To be more specific, Elston 
maintains Thatcher's testimony shows that Home Insurance has no evidence to 
support its allegations of negligence and strict liability. Viewing Thatcher's 
testimony in the light most favorable to Home Insurance, we disagree with 
Elston's contentions. At best, all that Elston accomplished in Thatcher's 
deposition was discovery of Thatcher's opinions, or absence thereof, and the 
evidence, or lack thereof, which supports those opinions. In that regard, 
Thatcher explained that since he had not been allowed to disassemble the hose, 
examine and test it, he did not have certain evidence to support his opinions. 
We do not believe that a nonmovant can be deprived of access to evidence and 
then, in defending against summary judgment, face the assertion that he has no 
evidence to support the complaint allegations.

[¶14.]  That point aside, Elston's discovery of 
Thatcher's opinions and evidence or lack of opinions and evidence falls short of 
showing that Home Insurance has no evidence to support its allegations that 
Elston negligently manufactured the heater or that Elston's heater was in a 
defective condition.

[¶15.]  We find missing from Elston's summary 
judgment materials any evidence refuting those central allegations. In 
particular, Elston has not presented any material, by deposition testimony, 
affidavit, admissions, answers to interrogatories, or otherwise, which shows 
that Home Insurance has no evidence to support its allegations. Whatever 
deficiencies may have been revealed in Thatcher's deposition, Elston has failed 
to demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact about Home 
Insurance's allegations that Elston failed to exercise care in manufacturing the 
heater and that Elston's heater was in a defective condition. Until Elston 
carries that initial burden Home Insurance need do no more than rest on its 
complaint allegations. According to the summary judgment analysis in Cordova v. 
Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 634 (Wyo. 1986), Elston's motion has failed to 
provide substantively sufficient materials to initially support its 
motion.

[¶16.]  Thatcher may have only limited opinions; 
he may lack evidence to support those few he has formed, whether due to his 
failure to gather evidence or the action of others to deny him access to objects 
where that evidence may be found. Elston may or may not have discredited 
Thatcher's opinions in part or in entirety. The net result of that attack merely 
places the parties where they have always been before trial - relying on their 
pleadings. Home Insurance alleges negligence and strict liability and Elston 
denies those allegations. All Elston has done in discovering Thatcher's opinions 
or lack of opinions is to arm itself with ordnance to attack him at trial. 
Thatcher's credibility remains for the trier of fact to determine. Elston has 
not shown us, in this summary judgment setting, whether Thatcher's testimony is 
the only evidence on which Home Insurance will rely at 
trial.

[¶17.]  Finding that Elston has failed to 
establish the nonexistence of genuine issues of material fact relating to Home 
Insurance's negligence and strict liability allegations, we reverse the summary 
judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.