Case Title: Fehrenbach v. O'Malley

Citation: 2007-Ohio-971

Docket Number: 20052283 and 20052301

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Fehrenbach v. O'Malley, 113 Ohio St.3d 18, 2007-Ohio-971.] 
 
 
FEHRENBACH ET AL., APPELLEES, v. O’MALLEY ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Fehrenbach v. O’Malley, 113 Ohio St.3d 18, 2007-Ohio-971.] 
Medical malpractice – Loss of consortium – Statute of limitations – R.C. 2305.16 
– Parental loss-of-consortium claim is tolled during period of child’s 
disability. 
(Nos. 2005-2283 and 2005-2301– Submitted November 14, 2006 – Decided  
March 21, 2007.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County,  
No. C-040128, 164 Ohio App.3d 80, 2005-Ohio-5554. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Because a parent’s claim for loss of consortium against a third party for injuries to 
the parent’s minor child is an interest that is “joint and inseparable” from 
the child’s own claim, the parent’s claim may be tolled during the child’s 
disability. (R.C. 2305.16, applied.) 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} On this appeal we are asked to answer the following question, 
certified to this court as a conflict by the First Appellate District:  “Whether the 
provisions of R.C. 2305.16, which toll a statute of limitations for a minor child’s 
negligence claim, inure to the benefit of parents bringing derivative claims for 
loss of consortium and medical expenses by also tolling the statute of limitations 
for those claims.” 
A 
{¶ 2} The minor child, Tara Fehrenbach, suffered permanent injuries as a 
result of bacterial meningitis.  Tara’s parents, appellees Gina and Thomas 
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Fehrenbach (“Fehrenbachs”) eventually sued appellants, Tara’s pediatrician 
Kathryn O’Malley, M.D., and O’Malley’s employer, Suburban Pediatric 
Associates (collectively, “Dr. O’Malley”), alleging medical negligence in failing 
to correctly diagnosis and treat the meningitis.  The Fehrenbachs sued both as 
Tara’s guardian and in their own right for loss of consortium and other claims.  
They do not dispute that the accrual date for Tara’s injuries was not later than 
December 1991. 
{¶ 3} The Fehrenbachs filed their complaint in January 1997, over five 
years after their claims accrued.  Upon Dr. O’Malley’s motion for partial 
summary judgment, the trial court found that the claims for loss of consortium 
and medical expenses were barred by the statute of limitations and entered 
judgment on these claims for O’Malley.  After a jury trial on the other issues, the 
Fehrenbachs appealed the summary judgment in conjunction with other alleged 
errors.  The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that 
“the interests of Tara and her parents were ‘joint and inseparable’ ” and that “the 
tolling provisions of R.C. 2305.16 inure to the benefit of parents pursuing a claim 
for loss of consortium and medical expenses.”  Fehrenbach v. O’Malley, 164 
Ohio App.3d 80, 2005-Ohio-5554, 841 N.E.2d 350, ¶ 66 and 70. 
{¶ 4} We accepted Dr. O’Malley’s discretionary appeal and recognized 
that a conflict exists on the issue certified by the First District Court of Appeals.  
B 
{¶ 5} R.C. 2305.113(A) requires an action alleging medical malpractice 
to be filed within one year after the cause of action accrued.  The limitations 
period is tolled during the plaintiff’s minority.  R.C. 2305.16.  There is no 
question that Tara may assert the tolling provision.  The tolling provision also 
states that “[w]hen the interests of two or more parties are joint and inseparable, 
the disability of one shall inure to the benefit of all.”  R.C. 2305.16.  The 
Fehrenbachs argue that because their claim arises out of the same transaction or 
January Term, 2007 
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occurrence as the claim of Tara, her claim and their claims are joint and 
inseparable, and they, like Tara, should be able to take advantage of the tolling 
provision.  Dr. O’Malley counters that in Ohio, loss of consortium is a recognized 
as a separate and distinct claim, and therefore the Fehrenbachs’ claim is time-
barred under Grindell v. Huber (1971), 28 Ohio St.2d 71, 57 O.O.2d 259, 275 
N.E.2d 614, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
C 
{¶ 6} We begin our analysis by reviewing the nature of a parent’s loss-
of-consortium claim.  In Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr. (1993), 67 Ohio 
St.3d 244, 617 N.E.2d 1052, paragraph one of the syllabus, this court held, “A 
parent may recover damages, in a derivative action against a third-party tortfeasor 
who intentionally or negligently causes physical injury to the parent's minor child, 
for loss of filial consortium. Consortium includes services, society, 
companionship, comfort, love and solace.” Previous to that holding, we had 
limited a parent’s recovery to loss of services and medical expenses, recognizing 
the claims as separate and distinct from the child’s claim for injury.  We held:  “ 
‘Where a defendant negligently causes injury to a minor child, that single wrong 
gives rise to two separate and distinct causes of action:  an action by the minor 
child for his personal injuries and a derivative action in favor of the parents of the 
child for the loss of his services and his medical expenses.’ ”  Grindell v. Huber, 
28 Ohio St.2d at 74, 57 O.O.2d 259, 275 N.E.2d 614, quoting Whitehead v. Gen. 
Tel. Co. (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 49 O.O.2d 435, 254 N.E.2d 10, paragraph 
three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 7} Gallimore also recognized a minor child’s right to an action for 
loss of consortium for an injury to a parent.  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  
We were later asked to address whether a minor child’s claim for parental loss of 
consortium should be joined with the parent’s claim for damages caused by the 
injury and whether the filing of the minor child’s claim was outside the statute of 
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limitations because it had not originally been joined with the parent’s claim.  We 
held:   
{¶ 8} “ ‘ “This problem has been dealt with in other jurisdictions by 
requiring joinder of all minors' consortium claims with the injured parent's claim 
whenever feasible. * * * We believe that this is a sensible solution to the problem 
and hold that a child's loss of parental consortium claim must be joined with the 
injured parent's claim whenever feasible.” ’ (Emphasis added). Id. [High v. 
Howard (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 82] at 94-95, 592 N.E.2d [818 (Resnick, J., 
dissenting), quoting Farley v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (Feb. 21, 1992), Lucas 
App. No. L-90-323, 1992 WL 32111]. 
{¶ 9} “We find nothing in the record before us to show that joinder of 
[the minor child’s] cause of action for loss of parental consortium to her mother's 
cause of action is not just and feasible. Moreover, since the statute of limitations 
for [the child’s] independent cause of action for loss of parental consortium is 
majority plus four years (see R.C. 2305.09), there is no statute-of-limitations 
problem.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Coleman v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. (1996), 74 
Ohio St.3d 492, 494, 660 N.E.2d 424. 
{¶ 10} We observed that requiring a minor child to join with the parent in 
asserting a loss-of-parental-consortium claim would limit the possibility of 
multiple cases and divergent outcomes.  Id. at 493-494, 660 N.E.2d 424.  We also 
recognized that the minor child’s claim was independent of the parent’s claim, 
thereby allowing the minor child to take advantage of the tolling provisions.  Id. at 
494, 660 N.E.2d 424. 
{¶ 11} The independent nature of the loss-of-consortium claim is based on 
control and ownership of the claim.  In determining whether a husband’s waiver 
of his claim terminated a wife’s loss-of-consortium claim, we held, “The right is 
her separate and personal right arising from the damages she sustains as a result of 
the tortfeasor's conduct. The right of the wife to maintain an action for loss of 
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consortium occasioned by her husband's injury is a cause of action which belongs 
to her and which does not belong to her husband.” Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc. 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 84, 92, 585 N.E.2d 384.  Because the loss-of-consortium 
claim belongs not to the person suffering a physical injury but to another, it is 
independent, and while the claim may be “separate” in the sense that it is a 
distinct and individual claim, it is a derivative action, arising from the same 
occurrence that produced the alleged injury to the other familial party. 
D 
{¶ 12} This understanding of the nature of a loss-of-consortium claim 
comports with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.  Civ.R. 19.1, dealing with 
compulsory joinder, states: 
{¶ 13} “(A) Persons to be joined 
{¶ 14} “A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a 
party in the action, except as provided in division (B) of this rule, if the person has 
an interest in or a claim arising out of the following situations:  
{¶ 15} “* * * 
{¶ 16}  “(3) Personal injury or property damage to a minor and a claim of 
the parent or guardian of the minor for loss of consortium or expenses or property 
damage if caused by the same wrongful act.” 
{¶ 17} Thus, under the Civil Rules, if a minor filed a complaint seeking 
damages for injury and the parents have a loss-of-consortium claim, the parents’ 
claim must be filed at the same time as the filing of the child’s complaint.  Our 
case law requires that if a parent has a claim for injury and the minor child has a 
claim for loss of consortium, the minor child’s complaint must be filed at the 
same time as the filing of the parents’ complaint.  Coleman, 74 Ohio St.3d at 494, 
660 N.E.2d 424.  Requiring joinder in these cases promotes judicial economy and 
limits the possibility of conflicting outcomes.  The 1970 Staff Notes to Civ.R. 
19.1 clearly and concisely state the rationale supporting compulsory joinder:   
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{¶ 18} “Rule 19.1 extends the Rule 19 philosophy by requiring a person 
with a separate claim to join his claim with that of another person even though 
under substantive law there may be two independent claims which might be 
pursued separately.” 
{¶ 19} “Current [i.e., pre-Rule] practice allows plaintiffs, at their option, 
to separately pursue these claims. When these claims are separately prosecuted 
defendant is required to defend twice. Much evidence must be repeated and there 
is useless expenditure of, inter alia., court time. Furthermore, since the claims are 
related, difficult questions of collateral estoppel and res adjudicata often arise.  
Frequently, the results are inconsistent and not compatible. Consequently, Rule 
19.1 is designed to obviate these problems and to serve the interests of society and 
of the parties by requiring disposition of the related claims in one action.” 
{¶ 20} This reasoning is especially apropos when applied to the facts of 
this case.  Requiring the Fehrenbachs to litigate their loss-of-consortium claim 
within one year of their injury and allowing Tara many years to bring her claim 
subjects the defendants to multiple lawsuits and potentially conflicting and 
inconsistent results.  By allowing the statute of limitations on the parent’s claim to 
be tolled during the child’s infancy, piecemeal litigation and its inherent problems 
can be avoided. 
E 
{¶ 21} The final question to be reviewed is the application of the word 
“interests” in R.C. 2305.16 (“When the interests of two or more parties are joint 
and inseparable, the disability of one shall inure to the benefit of all”).  When a 
statute does not define or modify a word, we will apply the term in its normal 
customary meaning.  Chari v. Vore (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 323, 327, 744 N.E.2d 
763.  “Interest” means “[a] legal share in something.” Black’s Law Dictionary 
(8th Ed.2004) 828.  The Fehrenbachs have a legal share in Tara’s claim.  The 
Fehrenbachs’ damages and Tara’s physical injury both derive from the same 
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alleged facts and wrongful acts of defendants.  While the Fehrenbachs’ claim 
remains independent and separate in the sense that they alone control it, their 
claim is “joint and inseparable” from Tara’s claim because the Fehrenbachs 
cannot recover damages from defendants if defendants are found not to be liable 
for Tara’s injury. 
F 
{¶ 22} Considering the strong policy reflected in the Civil Rules and our 
precedent in favor of joinder and limiting piecemeal litigation, combined with the 
plain meaning of the word “interests” as found in the statute, we answer the 
certified question in the affirmative.  We hold that because a parent’s claim for 
loss of consortium against a third party for injuries to the parent’s minor child is 
an interest that is “joint and inseparable” from the child’s own claim for purposes 
of R.C. 2305.16, the parent’s claim may be tolled during the child’s disability. 
{¶ 23} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
SHAW, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
STEPHEN R. SHAW, J., of the Third Appellate District, was assigned to sit 
for RESNICK, J., whose term ended on January 1, 2007. 
 
CUPP, J., whose term began on January 2, 2007, did not participate in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
__________________ 
Lindhorst & Dreidame, Michael F. Lyon, and Bradley D. McPeek, for 
appellants. 
John H. Metz, for appellees. 
Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
______________________