Case Title: Ex parte Howard Whited.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1130686

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2015-02-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:02/06/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
____________________
1130686
____________________
Ex parte Howard Carl Whited
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Howard Carl Whited
v.
State of Alabama)
(Blount Circuit Court, CC-07-526;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-09-0909)
BOLIN, Justice.
1130686
Howard Carl Whited was convicted of sodomy in the first
degree, a violation of § 13A-6-63, Ala. Code 1975. The trial
court sentenced Whited to 35 years' imprisonment and ordered
Whited to pay $50 to the Alabama Crime Victims Compensation
Fund and court costs.  The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
Whited's conviction and sentence in a 3-2 per curiam opinion. 
Whited v. State, [Ms. CR-09-0909, March 14, 2014] __ So. 3d __
(Ala. Crim. App. 2014).  Whited petitioned this Court for a
writ of certiorari, contending that the decision of the Court
of Criminal Appeals conflicts with Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984).  We granted the petition, and we reverse
and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
The Court of Criminal Appeals set forth the following
facts:  
"In May 2005, when M.H. was 14 years old, she lived
with her father in an apartment complex in Allgood.
Danny Robertson lived next to M.H. and her father. 
Robertson testified that he had observed Whited at
M.H.'s father's apartment approximately two to three
times per week.  Robertson stated that he could hear
conversations 
and 
noise 
coming 
from 
M.H.'s
apartment, and, specifically, on the evening of May
19, 2005, Robertson went to take a shower and could
hear M.H. saying 'Stop. Don't. No more, please.' 
Robertson stated that, in addition to M.H.'s voice,
he could hear three male voices.  Robertson stated
2
1130686
that after he got out of the shower he could hear
M.H. 'crying--weeping on the floor.'  Robertson
stated that there had been '[q]uite a few' incidents
similar to this and that on those occasions he would
see Whited at the apartment.  After Robertson heard
M.H. 'crying--weeping on the floor' he reported what
he had heard to the Blount County Sheriff's Office
the following morning.
"M.H. testified that in 2005 Whited and another
male--Edward Dunn--would visit her father and that
Whited would be at her house '[e]very now and then.' 
"M.H. stated that one morning in February 2005,
she woke up at approximately 6:00 a.m. and heard
someone knocking on the front door.  M.H. stated
that she answered the door and saw Whited.  M.H.
testified that Whited asked whether M.H.'s father
was home and she went and checked.  When M.H.
returned to the door to tell Whited that her father
was not home, Whited came into the apartment and
shut the door and gave her two pieces of gum.  M.H.
stated that she turned around and placed one piece
of gum on the washing machine and Whited grabbed her
around the waist and started kissing her neck.  M.H.
stated that Whited then 'started talking to [her]
telling [her] that he knows that [she] think[s]
about him a lot and that [she] dream[s] about him.' 
M.H. stated that she told Whited that she did not
'think like that' and told him that she 'needed to
get ready for school and that he needed to get ready
to go to work and he needed to leave.'  M.H. stated
that Whited then told her that 'everybody has got to
grow up sometime' and that 'if [she] ever changed
[her] mind, [she] could call him.'  M.H. stated that
after Whited left she began crying because she
'couldn't believe what had just happened.' M.H.
stated that when she got to school she told the
school nurse what had happened.
"M.H. further testified that in May 2005 she
came home from school and Whited, [Edward] Dunn, and
3
1130686
her father were sitting on the couch 'laughing and
smoking pot.'  According to M.H., 'they were looking
at [her] weird' so she decided to go to her room. 
M.H. stated that she could hear the three men when
she was in her room and that she stayed in her room
until she got up to get something to drink.  M.H.
stated that she then got ready for bed but could not
fall asleep because the three men were too loud. 
M.H. stated that, at some point, the bedroom door
opened and Whited, Dunn, and her father entered the
bedroom.  M.H. stated, however, that '[i]t was dark'
in the bedroom and that she 'couldn't see their
faces.' M.H. stated that Whited then came toward her
and 'grabbed [her] by the leg and he pulled [her]
long ways on [her] bed over to [her] dad's bed.' 
M.H. stated that Whited then 'took [her] panties
off' and 'got on top of [her] and then he stuck his
penis in [her] back side and then somebody took an
electric toothbrush and he stuck it inside [her].' 
M.H. stated that Whited then 'took a back massager
and rubbed it on [her] back and all over. He got off
[her] and someone else got on [her].' M.H. stated
that while this was happening she was on her stomach
and that if she tried to get up 'somebody would hit
[her] on the back of the head.' M.H. further
testified that, at some point, '[t]hey got off and
[Whited] said if [she] told anybody, that he would
kill [her].' 
"After M.H. testified, the State rested and
Whited moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the
circuit court denied.  Whited then presented
evidence that tended to establish the following:
Jeffrey Whited ('Jeffrey') testified that he is
Whited's uncle and that on May 19, 2005, he visited
with Whited at approximately 6:30 p.m. at Jeffrey's
mother's house in Oneonta.  Jeffrey stated that he
remembered visiting with Whited on that date because
he wrote it down in his journal, which, he said, he
keeps for work.  Jeffrey stated that Whited was at
the house when he arrived and that Whited told
Jeffrey that his back hurt.  According to Jeffrey,
4
1130686
Whited 'looked rough.'  Jeffrey stated that he
stayed at the house until approximately 9:00 p.m.
and that Whited did not leave. 
"Deputy 
Sue 
Ashworth 
testified 
that 
she
investigates sexual crimes for the Blount County
Sheriff's Office.  Ashworth testified that on May
26, 2005, she went to M.H.'s father's apartment,
because she had received a complaint from Robertson
about possible sexual abuse.  Deputy Ashworth stated
that on May 26, 2005, M.H. stated that 'her father
had put his penis in her butt' and that Whited and
another person were involved as well.  Deputy
Ashworth also testified, however, that M.H. stated
that she could not see their faces.  Deputy Ashworth
testified that during the interview she did not
notice any marks on M.H. to indicate physical abuse. 
According to Deputy Ashworth, M.H., during a
videotaped 
interview, 
stated 
that 
she 
was
'penetrated vaginally' by both her father and
Whited. Deputy Ashworth testified that, at some
point, she executed a search warrant on M.H.'s
father's apartment and seized sheets, bedding,
toothbrushes, and a massager for the purpose of
having those items tested at the Department of
Forensic 
Sciences 
('DFS'). 
 
Deputy 
Ashworth
testified that she received a report from DFS
indicating that they were unable to locate any DNA
evidence on the items. Deputy Ashworth further
testified that M.H. received a medical examination
that indicated that she had contracted ureaplasma
urealyticum--a sexually transmitted disease.  Deputy
Ashworth stated that Whited was tested for the
sexually transmitted disease and that his test
result was negative.  Deputy Ashworth testified,
however, that Edward Dunn tested positive for
ureaplasma urealyticum.  Deputy Ashworth stated
that, in July 2005, she interviewed Whited and
Whited denied any involvement with the offense.
"On cross-examination, Deputy Ashworth stated
that M.H. told her that, before May 19, 2005, M.H.
5
1130686
had been molested by her father for a long period
and, on those occasions, would scream for her father
to stop.
"Brad 
Sims, 
a 
child-abuse-and-neglect
investigator for the Department of Human Resources,
testified that he and Deputy Ashworth met with M.H.
in May 2005.  According to Sims, M.H. did not tell
them what occurred on May 19, 2005, but only stated
that she had been molested by her father.  Sims
stated that at that time there was no indication
that anyone but M.H.'s father was involved.  Sims
testified that on June 15, 2005, he and Deputy
Ashworth again met with M.H. and that, during that
meeting, M.H. for the first time mentioned both
Whited and Dunn.  When confronted with his report of
that meeting, however, Sims agreed that the report
did not mention Whited or Dunn and stated only that
'[M.H.] told us again that she had been molested by
her father. She indicated that he had anal sex with
her in the bedroom they shared.' 
"On cross-examination, Sims testified that he
had investigated Whited in February 2005, because
M.H. had alleged that Whited had come to her
father's apartment and kissed her on the neck and
also mentioned to M.H. that he had been having
dreams about engaging in sexual intercourse with
her.  Sims stated that, although Whited did not deny
going to the apartment, he denied any wrongdoing. 
Sims conceded that no charges were brought against
Whited arising out of the events that M.H. alleged
occurred in February 2005.
"Hulan Whited ('Hulan'), Whited's father,
testified that on May 19, 2005, he and Whited were 
"'over at Mr. Owen's house. His lawnmower
had broke down with him. He had to get a
part for it--had to go to Cleveland. We had
to mow Ms. Turley's yard. We worked on it
until noon and got us a sandwich and went
6
1130686
over there and mowed her yard. [Whited]
hurt his back. We got home and he was in
the bed a week.'
"Hulan further testified that on May 19, 2005,
Jeffrey came over to the house at approximately 6:00
p.m. and remained at the house until approximately
9:30 p.m.  According to Hulan, Whited was at the
house the entire evening because Whited hurt his
back and was unable to leave.
"Daniel Stidham testified that in May 2005 he
was employed by Mutual Savings Life Insurance and
that Whited was one of his customers.  According to
Stidham, on May 19, 2005, he 
"'and his sales manager [were] working
Springville Boulevard. That was his first
week of employment. We had went down to
Glenda Torbert's on Woodard Road, and as we
were coming back up, as we approached Ms.
Turley's driveway and the edge of her lawn
here, my sales manager had me to slow down
and stop. He waved at [Whited] and his
father.'
"Stidham testified that he did not know who Whited
was at the time and was only able to recall that he
saw Whited on May 19, 2005, because he had a 'copy
of [his] mandate,' which he kept for work.
"Whited testified in his own behalf, and,
although he conceded that he knew M.H., he denied
that he had anything to do with the events of May
19, 2005.  Whited stated that he knew M.H.'s father
because they had gone to school together and that in
February 2005 he was going to work and noticed that
the hood on M.H.'s father's car was raised. Whited
stated that he then went over to M.H.'s father's
apartment to see if he needed a ride to work. 
Whited stated that M.H. answered the door and
indicated that her father was not home.  According
7
1130686
to Whited, he never entered the apartment and, after
M.H. stated that her father was not home, he left
the apartment and never returned.
"Whited stated that on May 19, 2005, he was
working with his father and his great uncle, Cecil
Owen.  According to Whited, they repaired a
lawnmower that morning and around 12:00 p.m. went to
Ms. Turley's home to cut her lawn. Whited stated
that it took approximately two and a half hours to
cut Ms. Turley's lawn and they left Ms. Turley's
home at approximately 3:00 p.m.  Whited stated that,
at some point that day, he strained a muscle in his
back 'around where [he] had surgery.'  Whited
further testified that he did not have any sexually
transmitted diseases."
Whited, __ So. 3d at __ (footnote and references to record
omitted).
At the close of all the evidence, Whited again moved the
trial court for a judgment of acquittal, which the trial court
denied.  The State then presented a lengthy and impassioned
closing argument.  Jerome Colley, Whited's attorney, waived
his closing argument.  The jury returned a verdict finding
Whited guilty of first-degree sodomy.  On August 31, 2009,
Whited moved for a new trial.  On October 5, 2009, the trial
court set a sentencing date for November 19, 2009. On November
19, the trial court sentenced Whited to 35 years in the
penitentiary.  On that date, the trial court also deferred
ruling on the motion for a new trial until after sentencing
8
1130686
and granted permission to Whited's new attorney, Walter
Kennedy III, to amend the posttrial motion for a new trial
within 30 days after the imposition of sentence.  
On December 14, 2009, Whited filed an amended motion for
a 
new 
trial 
raising 
numerous 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims, including the claim that his counsel was ineffective
in waiving the right to make a closing argument on behalf of
Whited.  Following a continuance by agreement of the parties,
see Rule 24.4, Ala. R. Crim. P., the trial court,  on January
28, 2010, conducted a hearing on Whited's motion.  On February
16, 2010, the trial court denied Whited's motion for a new
trial and made the following entry on the case-action-summary
sheet: 
"The court having considered testimony of witnesses and
argument of counsel, [Whited's] motion for [a] new trial is
hereby denied."
Whited argued on appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals
that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new
trial based on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
Specifically, Whited argued, among other things, that his
trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to make a
9
1130686
closing argument on Whited's behalf.  The Court of Criminal
Appeals addressed the issue as follows:
"In 
addressing 
Whited's 
contention 
in 
his 
motion
for a new trial that counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by waiving closing argument, the circuit
made the following findings of fact:
"'[T]he Court finds that counsel for
[Whited] did in fact waive the right to
offer a closing argument to the jury.
During the hearing on the motion for a new
trial, trial counsel for [Whited] stated it
was trial strategy in not offering a
closing and to prevent the prosecution from
further commenting on [Whited's] conduct.
"'It is this Court's understanding
that the law requires the Court give
deference to trial counsel's decisions and
strategic choices. And it is the Court's
opinion that the waiver of a closing
argument did not affect the outcome of the
verdict. As such, the Court does not find
that counsel's conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied on
as having produced a just result. And the
Court does not find that [counsel's failure
to make a closing argument] warrants
setting aside the judgment of the jury and
granting a new trial.'
"The record indicates that, at the hearing on
Whited's motion for new trial, trial counsel
testified that his decision to waive closing
argument was trial strategy. When asked specific
questions 
regarding 
his 
strategic 
decisions,
however, 
trial 
counsel 
testified 
that 
his
recollection of the events surrounding Whited's case
was diminished based on the sudden death of his wife
10
1130686
less than two months after Whited's trial. Trial
counsel testified that he could not recall when he
made the decision to waive his closing argument but
stated generally that the decision whether to have
a closing argument is 'part of the attorney's
strategy.'
 
"'"If the record is silent as to the reasoning
behind 
counsel's 
actions, 
the 
presumption 
of
effectiveness is sufficient to deny relief on [an]
ineffective assistance of counsel claim."' Davis v.
State, 9 So. 3d 539, 546 (Ala. Crim. App.
2008)(quoting Howard v. State, 239 S.W.3d 359, 367
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
"'"'An ambiguous or silent record is
not sufficient to disprove the strong and
continuing 
presumption 
[of 
effective
representation]. 
Therefore 
"where 
the
record is incomplete or unclear about
[counsel]'s actions, we will presume that
he did what he should have done, and that
he 
exercised 
reasonable 
professional
judgment."' Chandler v. United States, 218
F.3d 1305, 1314 n. 15 (11th Cir. 2000)(en
banc)(quoting Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d
1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999))."'
"Davis, 9 So. 3d at 546 (quoting Grayson v.
Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1218 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Trial counsel's inability to recall the basis of his
strategic decision to waive closing argument in this
case limits this Court's ability to review counsel's
representation at trial. 
"Not only are we limited in our review by trial
counsel's inability to recall the basis of his
strategic choice to waive closing argument, we are
also limited in our review by the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984).  In Strickland, the United
States Supreme Court cautioned that a court must
11
1130686
indulge a 'strong presumption' that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance because it is all too easy
to conclude that a particular act or omission of
counsel was unreasonable in the harsh light of
hindsight. 466 U.S. at 689. Furthermore, 'it is not
our function to second-guess the strategic decisions
made by counsel.' Smith v. State, 756 So. 2d 892,
910 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), aff'd, 756 So. 2d 957
(Ala. 2000).  Indeed, a review of the prosecutor's
closing argument indicates that the prosecutor made
an emotional plea to the jury that included general
statements about the hideous nature of the offenses
of which Whited had been charged and the plight of
the victim following the incident. It is possible
that trial counsel made a strategic choice to waive
closing argument in order to prevent the prosecutor
from returning on rebuttal and going into specific
detail regarding the evidence presented at trial. It
is this type of decision that the Supreme Court
contemplated in Strickland when it recognized the
presumption in favor of a finding of reasonable
professional assistance when the challenged action
'might be considered sound trial strategy.' 466 U.S.
at 689. 
"It is well settled that a trial counsel's
decision to waive closing argument is not, in
itself, ineffective assistance of counsel. See Young
v. State, 887 So. 2d 320 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) ....
"Although Whited makes a compelling argument
that his trial counsel exercised poor judgment in
waiving 
closing 
argument, 
Whited 
failed 
to
'affirmatively prove prejudice' and 'show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.' Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694. 'The prejudice prong of the Strickland test
requires a showing that a different outcome of the
trial probably would have resulted but for counsel's
allegedly ineffective performance.' Worthington v.
12
1130686
State, 652 So. 2d 790, 796 (Ala. Crim. App.
1994)(internal citations omitted). Whited has not
made such a showing in this case. Accordingly, the
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Whited's motion for a new trial on the basis
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
based on counsel's waiver of closing argument."
Whited, __ So. 3d at __.
Judge Joiner dissented from the main opinion, stating
that he did not "agree that Whited's trial counsel's actions
were within the 'wide range of professionally competent
assistance' when he waived closing argument, see Strickland,
446 U.S. at 689, abandoning 'the last clear chance to persuade
the [jury] that there may be reasonable doubt of [Whited's]
guilt.' Herring [v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975)]."  Whited,
__ So. 3d at __.  Judge Joiner further concluded that, under
the circumstances of this case, Whited was prejudiced by trial
counsel's failure to make a closing argument.  Whited, ___ So.
3d at ___.
Discussion
Whited argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in
evaluating whether his trial counsel's performance was
deficient under 
Strickland because, he says, 
that court 
failed
to adequately consider all the circumstances that existed at
13
1130686
the time his trial counsel waived Whited's right to a closing
argument.  Whited contends (1) that the Court of Criminal
Appeals' conclusion that his trial counsel's decision 
to 
waive
closing argument was based on "trial strategy" is not
supported by the record, (2) that the Court of Criminal
Appeals did not fully consider the effect of the waiver of
closing argument in light of the prosecutor's closing
statement, and (3) that the Court of Criminal Appeals failed
to consider the strong arguments against guilt that were
available to Whited.
The Court of Criminal Appeals aptly set forth the
applicable law:
"'"'"It is well established that a ruling
on a motion for a new trial rests within
the sound discretion of the trial judge.
The exercise of that discretion carries
with it a presumption of correctness, which
will not be disturbed by this Court unless
some legal right is abused and the record
plainly and palpably shows the trial judge
to be in error."'" Hosea O. Weaver & Sons,
Inc. v. Towner, 663 So. 2d 892, 895 (Ala.
1995)(quoting Kane v. Edward J. Woerner &
Sons, Inc., 543 So. 2d 693, 694 (Ala.
1989), quoting in turn Hill v. Sherwood,
488 So. 2d 1357 (Ala. 1986)).'
"Ex parte Hall, 863 So. 2d 1079, 1081-82 (Ala.
2003). 
14
1130686
"'"'In order to prevail on a
claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, a defendant must meet
the two-pronged test articulated
by the United States Supreme
Court 
in 
Strickland 
v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984):
"'"'"First, 
the
defendant 
must 
show
t h a t  
c o u n s e l ' s
p e r f o r m a n c e  
w a s
d e f i c i e n t .  
T h i s
requires showing that
counsel made errors so
serious 
that 
counsel
was not functioning as
t h e  
' c o u n s e l '
g u a r a n t e e d  
t h e
defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the
defendant 
must 
show
that 
the 
deficient
performance prejudiced
the 
defense. 
This
requires showing that
counsel's errors were
so 
serious 
as 
to
deprive the defendant
of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is
reliable. 
Unless 
a
defendant 
makes 
both
showings, it cannot be
s a i d  
t h a t  
t h e
conviction 
or 
death
sentence resulted from
a 
breakdown 
in 
the
adversary process that
15
1130686
renders 
the 
result
unreliable."
"'"'466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct.
at 2064.
"'"'"The 
performance
component outlined in Strickland
is an objective one: that is,
whether 
counsel's 
assistance,
judged 
under 
'prevailing
professional 
norms,' 
was
'reasonable considering all the
circumstances.'" 
Daniels 
v.
State, 650 So. 2d 544, 552 (Ala.
Cr. App. 1994), cert. denied,
[514 U.S. 1024, 115 S. Ct. 1375,
131 L. Ed. 2d 230 (1995)],
quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
688, 104 S. Ct. at 206. "A court
d e c i d i n g  
a n  
a c t u a l
ineffectiveness claim must judge
the reasonableness of counsel's
challenged conduct on the facts
of the particular case, viewed as
of 
the 
time 
of 
counsel's
conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at
690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.
"'"'The 
claimant 
alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel
has the burden of showing that
counsel's 
assistance 
was
ineffective. Ex parte Baldwin,
456 So. 2d 129 (Ala. 1984),
aff'd, 472 U.S. 372, 105 S. Ct.
2727, 86 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1985).
"Once a petitioner has identified
the specific acts or omissions
that he alleges were not the
result of reasonable professional
judgment on counsel's part, the
16
1130686
court 
must 
determine 
whether
those acts or omissions fall
'outside 
the 
wide 
range 
of
professionally 
competent
assistance.' [Strickland,] 466
U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066."
Daniels, 650 So. 2d at 552. When
reviewing a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, this court
indulges a strong presumption
that 
counsel's 
conduct 
was
appropriate 
and 
reasonable.
Hallford v. State, 629 So. 2d 6
(Ala. Cr. 
App. 
1992), 
cert.
denied, 511 U.S. 1100, 114 S. Ct.
1870, 128 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1994);
Luke v. State, 484 So. 2d 531
(Ala. Cr. App. 1985). "This court
must avoid using 'hindsight' to
evaluate 
the 
performance 
of
counsel. We must evaluate all the
circumstances 
surrounding 
the
case at the time of counsel's
actions 
before 
determining
whether 
counsel 
rendered
ineffective 
assistance."
Hallford, 629 So. 2d at 9. See
also, e.g., Cartwright v. State,
645 So. 2d 326 (Ala. Cr. App.
1994).
" ' " ' " J u d i c i a l
scrutiny of counsel's
performance 
must 
be
highly deferential. It
is all too tempting for
a 
def e nd a nt 
to
second-guess counsel's
a s s i s t a n c e  
a f t e r
conviction or adverse
sentence, and it is all
too easy for a court,
17
1130686
examining 
counsel's
defense after it has
proved unsuccessful, to
conclude 
that 
a
particular 
act 
or
omission of counsel was
unreasonable. 
A 
fair
assessment of attorney
performance 
requires
that every effort be
made to eliminate the
distorting effects of
h i n d s i g h t ,  
t o
r e c o n s t r u c t  
t h e
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
o f
counsel's 
challenged
conduct, 
and 
to
evaluate 
the 
conduct
f r o m  
c o u n s e l ' s
perspective 
at 
the
time. Because of the
difficulties 
inherent
i n  
m a k i n g  
t h e
evaluation, 
a 
court
must indulge a strong
p r e s u m p t i o n  
t h a t
counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range
o f  
r e a s o n a b l e
p r o f e s s i o n a l
assistance; 
that 
is,
the 
defendant 
must
o v e r c o m e  
t h e
presumption that, under
the circumstances, the
challenged 
action
'might 
be 
considered
sound trial strategy.'
There 
are 
countless
ways 
to 
provide
effective assistance in
any given case. Even
18
1130686
the 
best 
criminal
defense attorneys would
not defend a particular
client 
in 
the 
same
way."
"'"'Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689,
104 S. Ct. at 2065 (citations
omitted). See Ex parte Lawley,
512 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Ala.
1987).
"'"'"Even 
if 
an
attorney's performance
is 
determined 
to 
be
d e f i c i e n t ,  
t h e
petitioner 
is 
not
entitled 
to 
relief
unless he establishes
that 
'there 
is 
a
reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors,
the 
result 
of 
the
proceeding would have
been 
different. 
A
reasonable probability
is 
a 
probability
sufficient to undermine
confidence 
in 
the
outcome.' [Strickland,]
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.
Ct. at 2068."
"'"'Daniels, 650 So. 2d at 552.'"
"'Dobyne v. State, 805 So. 2d 733, 742–43
(Ala. Crim. App. 2000), aff'd, 805 So. 2d
763 (Ala. 2001). See also Nicks v. State,
783 So. 2d 895, 918–919 (Ala. Crim. App.
1999).'
19
1130686
"Sheffield v. State, 87 So. 3d 607, 633-35 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2010)."
Whited, __ So. 3d at __.
It is well settled that a trial counsel's decision to
waive a closing argument on behalf of his or her client does
not alone constitute 
ineffective 
assistance 
of counsel.  Young
v. State, 887 So. 2d 320 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); Lawhorn v.
State, 756 So. 2d 971 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); and Floyd v.
State, 571 So. 2d 1221 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989), rev'd on other
grounds, Ex parte Floyd, 571 So. 2d 1234 (Ala. 1990). 
However, the importance of a closing argument cannot be
understated:
"It can hardly be questioned that closing
argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues
for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal
case. For it is only after all the evidence is in
that counsel for the parties are in a position to
present their respective versions of the case as a
whole. Only then can they argue the inferences to be
drawn from all the testimony, and point out the
weaknesses of their adversaries' positions. And for
the defense, closing argument is the last clear
chance to persuade the trier of fact that there may
be reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. See In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 [(1970)].
"The very premise of our adversary system of
criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both
sides of a case will best promote the ultimate
objective that the guilty be convicted and the
innocent go free. In a criminal trial, which is in
20
1130686
the end basically a factfinding process, no aspect
of such advocacy could be more important than the
opportunity finally to marshal the evidence for each
side before submission of the case to judgment."
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).
The Court of Criminal Appeals surmised that one
"possible" strategic reason for trial counsel's waiver of
closing argument in this case was "to prevent the prosecutor
from returning on rebuttal and going into specific detail
regarding the evidence presented at trial."  Whited, __ So. 3d
at __.  Preventing the State from returning on rebuttal to
make a closing argument has been upheld as a strategic
decision that alone does not render counsel's performance
ineffective.  See Floyd, supra, and Lawhorn, supra.  In Floyd,
the defendant claimed that his trial counsel had been
ineffective when trial counsel waived closing argument.  The
trial court addressed the defendant's ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim as follows:
"[Floyd's] second allegation of ineffective
assistance is that his trial lawyer waived closing
argument at the guilt stage. [Trial counsel] did
waive his closing argument pursuant to a strategic
decision.
"[Trial counsel] based his decision to waive
closing argument on two factors. First, [trial
counsel] had no strong arguments available to
21
1130686
dissuade the jury from convicting his client or to
persuade [it] to find petitioner guilty of a lesser
offense. Second, the prosecution's initial closing
argument was very brief and it appeared that the
prosecution was saving its persuasive argument for
last. [Floyd's trial counsel] thought the potential
harm to his client from the prosecution's second
closing argument outweighed any benefit to be
obtained from [trial counsel's] argument. [Floyd's
trial counsel] had made the same decision in other
cases with some success."
571 So. 2d at 1227.  The Court of Criminal Appeals held in
Floyd as follows:
"The testimony of [Floyd's] trial counsel
established that he made a strategic decision to
forgo his closing argument in order to deprive the
prosecution of its main opportunity to argue its
case to the jury. The uncontradicted testimony of
trial counsel was that the prosecutor's initial
closing argument had been quite brief and had
consisted of little more than a reading of the
indictment. In light of this, Floyd's trial counsel
decided that because he had no persuasive arguments,
his client's interest could best be served by
denying the prosecution, who had the burden of
proof, of its chance to argue how that burden had
been met. This is exactly the sort of strategic
decision which the United States Supreme Court has
held to be virtually unchallengeable in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
Furthermore, Floyd did not even suggest a manner in
which his trial counsel could have argued in closing
that would have affected the outcome of his trial.
Thus, Floyd has failed to establish a reasonable
probability that, but for his lawyer's waiving his
guilt-stage closing argument, the outcome of his
trial would have been different. Therefore, the
circuit court's findings were correct."
22
1130686
571 So. 2d at 1227. 
In Lawhorn, the defendant in a death-penalty case argued
in a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., postconviction petition that
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a
closing argument during the penalty phase of his trial.  The
trial court addressed the issue as follows:
"'At the Rule 32[, Ala. R. Crim. P.,] hearing,
[Lawhorn's trial counsel] testified that he made a
strategic decision that he would not make a closing
argument during the penalty phase of the trial. It
was [trial counsel's] understanding that if he
waived closing argument that the district attorney
would not be allowed to argue. [Trial counsel] did
not 
want 
to 
give 
the 
district 
attorney 
an
opportunity on rebuttal to get up and point at
Lawhorn and call him a cold-blooded murderer and
back-shooter. [Trial counsel] wanted to prevent the
district attorney from inflaming the minds of the
jury.
"'....
"'Trial counsel's decision to waive his closing
argument did not render his performance deficient
because it was a strategic decision to keep the
district attorney from making a closing argument.
This Court has watched district attorney Rumsey on
many occasions during closing argument. He is
powerful and effective during closing argument.
Based on this Court's experience, it is not an
unusual tactical decision in Talladega County for
attorneys to waive closing argument to prevent
district attorney Rumsey from making a closing
argument....'"
23
1130686
Lawhorn, 756 So. 2d at 987.  The Court of Criminal Appeals
addressed the issue in Lawhorn as follows:
"[W]e [have] held that it was not ineffective
assistance of counsel when defense counsel made a
strategic decision to waive closing arguments in
order to deprive the prosecution of its main
opportunity to argue to the jury. Similar to the
situation in Floyd, Lawhorn's trial counsel did not
offer closing argument in an attempt to deprive the
prosecution of labeling Lawhorn a 'cold-blooded
murderer and a back-shooter.' 'This is exactly the
sort of strategic decision which the United States
Supreme 
Court 
has 
held 
to 
be 
virtually
unchallengeable in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.' Floyd, 571 So. 2d
at 1227. We agree with the trial court that in this
situation with these particular facts, closing
argument by defense counsel would have had little
impact."
756 So. 2d at 987. 
Thus, in disposing of the waiver-of-closing-argument
issue in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim in Floyd and Lawhorn, the Court of Criminal Appeals took
into consideration whether trial counsel could articulate a
strategic reason for waiving the argument, the strength or
persuasiveness 
of 
the 
defendant's 
arguments 
against 
guilt, 
and
the nature of the State's closing argument. 
The "Trial-Strategy Finding"
24
1130686
Whited first contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals 
"should have, at best, given no weight" to trial counsel's
testimony that the decision to waive closing argument was
based on "trial strategy," because, he says, nothing in the
record indicates that the decision to waive closing argument
was based on "trial strategy." As quoted above, the trial
court found that Whited's trial counsel stated that "'it was
trial strategy in not offering a closing and to prevent the
prosecution from further commenting on [Whited's] conduct.'" 
 Whited, __ So. 3d at __. 
At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, Whited's
trial counsel testified that his recollection of the events
surrounding Whited's trial was diminished as a result of the
sudden death of his wife less than two months following the
trial.  When questioned by Whited's appellate counsel,
Whited's trial counsel repeatedly stated that he did not
recall much about the trial.  Whited's trial counsel testified
that he did not recall when he decided to waive  closing
argument and that he did not recall discussing with Whited the
decision to waive closing argument. Although Whited's trial
counsel did not recall specifics about the decision to waive
25
1130686
Whited's right to closing argument at trial, he stated
generally that the decision whether to present a closing
argument is part of the attorney's trial strategy and is
dependent upon the information elicited during the trial. 
Although Whited's trial counsel testified that he could
not recall the specifics surrounding his decision to waive
closing argument, the record indicates that he was able to
recall other aspects of the case.  For example, Whited's trial
counsel testified that his overall strategy was to continue
this case from trial docket to trial docket until the victim
turned of age and "disappeared."   However, Whited's trial
1
counsel testified that, when it became apparent that this case
would proceed to trial, he developed a new strategy. Whited's
trial counsel explained at length that his defense strategy
was to present an alibi for Whited at the time of the assault
through the testimony of family and friends.  He also
testified that Whited's uncle had a document that would have
supported the alibi.  Whited's trial counsel further 
testified
that his strategy included attempting to impeach the victim's
Trial counsel was obviously referring to his thoughts
1
that the victim would ultimately decide not to testify.
26
1130686
testimony, including whether the victim could actually
identify the person or persons who had assaulted her.  
Whited testified during the hearing on the motion for a
new trial that his trial counsel informed him during a recess
immediately before closing arguments were to begin that he was
not going to present a closing argument.  Whited stated that
he responded by stating that he did not know what a closing
argument was but implored his trial counsel to "do what you
are supposed to do for me."   Whited's trial counsel testified
that his practice was to discuss each phase of the trial
process with his clients and that he would have  discussed the
issue of waiving closing argument with Whited before closing
arguments began.  Whited's trial counsel candidly admitted
during the hearing that, at the time he would have had the
conversation with Whited regarding waiving closing argument,
he could not have known what the prosecutor would initially
argue in the State's closing argument.  
A review of the record in this case indicates that
Whited's trial counsel was unable to provide a specific reason
for waiving closing argument.  When questioned on the issue,
Whited's trial counsel was unable to recall specifics about
27
1130686
the decision to waive closing argument, such as when the
decision to waive closing argument was actually made. 
Whited's trial counsel stated only in general terms that
whether to waive closing argument would be part of the
attorney's 
trial strategy based 
on the information elicited at
trial.  Whited's trial counsel did not testify, as the trial
court found, that his decision to waive closing argument was
trial strategy designed to prevent the prosecution from
further commenting on Whited's conduct.  We further note that
Whited's trial counsel informed him before closing arguments
began that he would not make a closing argument. Because
Whited's trial counsel had decided to waive closing argument
before closing arguments had began, it was not possible for
his trial counsel to make a fully informed  "strategic
decision" regarding the waiver of closing argument without
first having heard the complete content and extent of the
State's initial closing argument.  Accordingly, after
reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that it does
not support the trial court's finding that trial counsel's
waiver of closing argument was a strategic decision with the
goal of preventing the prosecution from further commenting on
28
1130686
Whited's conduct during rebuttal.   The failure of Whited's
2
trial counsel to articulate a "strategic" reason for waiving
closing argument distinguishes this case from both Floyd and
Lawhorn. 
Arguments Against Guilt
Whited next argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals
failed to take into consideration the "'strong arguments 
available to dissuade the jury from convicting'" him. Whited,
__ So. 3d at __ (Joiner, J., dissenting)(quoting Floyd, 571
So. 2d at 1227).  The State's case lacked any physical or
forensic evidence linking Whited to the crime.  Whited also
had tested negative for a sexually transmitted disease for
We note, as did the Court of Criminal Appeals, that an
2
appellate court "'"'indulges a strong presumption that
counsel's 
conduct 
was 
appropriate 
and 
reasonable,'"'"
Sheffield v. State, 87 So. 3d 607, 633-35 (Ala. Crim. App.
2010)(quoting Dobyne v. State, 805 So. 2d 733, 743 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2000), quoting other cases), and that where the "'record
is silent as to the reasoning behind counsel's actions, the
presumption of effectiveness is sufficient to deny relief on
[an] ineffective assistance of counsel claim.'" Davis v.
State, 9 So. 3d 539, 546 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008)(quoting Howard
v. State, 329 S.W. 2d 359, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). 
However, the effect of a silent record upon the presumption of
effectiveness afforded Whited's trial counsel's decision to
waive closing in this particular case must be considered in
light of Whited's trial counsel's ability to recall at length
that strategy as it pertained to Whited's defense.  
29
1130686
which both the victim and an alleged co-assailant--Dunn--had
tested positive.  The State's case essentially turned upon the
testimony of the victim. 
Danny Robertson, the victim's next-door neighbor,
testified at trial that on the evening of May 19, 2005,
between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., he could hear voices coming
from the apartment where the victim lived. He testified that
he heard the victim saying "Stop. Don't. No more, please" and
that he could also hear her "crying--weeping on the floor." 
Robertson further testified that, in addition to the victim's
voice, he could hear three male voices coming from the
apartment.  Robertson testified that there had been "[q]uite
a few" incidents similar to this and that on those occasions
he would see Whited at the apartment.  Robertson reported what
he had heard to the Blount County Sheriff's Office the
following morning.
On cross-examination Robertson admitted that he had
previously testified at the trial of codefendant Edward Dunn
in October 2008 that he had heard the voices coming from the
apartment between 5:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.  Robertson further
admitted that he had previously testified that the events
30
1130686
happened in "early fall" when "it was cold" despite it being
undisputed that the events made the basis of this case
occurred in May.  Robertson also testified that the events
occurred at "dusk ... between daylight and dark."  The victim
contradicted Robertson's testimony in that she testified that
there was no light shining through her bedroom window at the
time of the incident because it was dark outside.   
 The only direct evidence establishing Whited's guilt was
the testimony of the victim indicating that Whited,  Dunn, and
her father entered her bedroom; that Whited "grabbed [her] by
the leg and he pulled [her] long ways on [her] bed over to
[her] dad's bed"; that Whited "took [her] panties off" and
"got on top of [her] and then he stuck his penis in [her] back
side and then somebody took an electric toothbrush and he
stuck it inside [her]"; that Whited "got off [her] and someone
else got on [her]"; and that Whited threatened to kill her if
she told anyone.  This testimony was qualified, however, by
the victim's testimony that the bedroom was dark and that she
could not see her attackers' faces.  We further note that the 
victim testified that she did not know if any of the three
men–-Whited, Dunn, or her father–-present in the apartment
31
1130686
when she came home from school had left or if any additional
men had entered the apartment after she retired to her bedroom
during the intervening period between her entering the
apartment after school and the attack later in the evening. 
The victim did not initially report the attack to anyone.
As stated above, Robertson reported what he had heard in the
adjoining apartment to the authorities the morning after the
incident.  Investigator Brad Sims testified that during the
initial interview with the victim on May 26, 2005, she did not
initially name Whited as one of her attackers and did not
indicate that anyone other than her father was involved in the
attack.  On June 15, 2005, the victim was again interviewed by
Sims and Deputy Sue Ashworth.  Sims testified that at this
interview the victim mentioned Whited and Dunn for the first
time.  However, the report generated following the interview
did not mention Whited or Dunn and stated only that her father
had molested her. 
The victim testified at trial that Whited had penetrated
her vagina with his penis.  However, on June 20, 2015, the
victim was examined by Dr. Earl Stradtman and during this
examination she specifically denied that she had been
32
1130686
penetrated 
vaginally. 
 
Dr. 
Stradtman's 
physical 
examination 
of
the victim revealed no sign of injury to the outer structures
of the vagina or the hymen.  
Whited also presented evidence that he had an alibi for
the period when the attack occurred.  Jeffrey Whited, Whited's
uncle, testified that he maintains a journal for work purposes
in which he stated that he "logged everything down."  Jeffrey
testified that the journal entry for May 19, 2005, indicated
that he  spoke with Whited at Jeffrey's mother's residence3
for about 10 minutes between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. regarding
a job for Jeffrey's son mowing grass.  Jeffrey testified that
Whited complained about his back hurting and that Whited
looked "rough." Jeffrey stated that he remained at his
mother's 
residence til approximately 9:00 p.m. and that Whited
did not leave during that time. 
Hulan Whited, Whited's father, testified that on May 19,
2005, he and Whited mowed "Mrs. Turley's" yard and that Whited
injured his back while doing so, which, according to Hulan,
left Whited "in the bed a week."  Hulan confirmed that Jeffrey
Jeffrey stated that Whited lived at Jeffrey's mother's
3
house.
33
1130686
came over to the house at approximately 6:00 p.m. on May 19,
2005, and remained at the house until approximately 9:30 p.m. 
According to Hulan, Whited remained at the house the entire
evening of May 19, 2005, because he was unable to leave due to
his back injury. 
Daniel Stidham testified that in May 2005 he was employed
by Mutual Savings Life Insurance and that Whited was one of
his customers.  Stidham testified that on May 19, 2005, he and
his sales manager saw Whited and his father at "Ms. Turley's." 
Stidham testified that he was able to recall that he saw
Whited on May 19, 2005, because he had a "copy of [his]
mandate," which he kept for work.
It appears from the record that Whited had several
potentially strong arguments available to him that could have
been presented to the jury in a closing argument.  The State's
case lacked any physical or forensic evidence linking Whited
to the crime.  Whited had tested negative for a sexually
transmitted disease that both the victim and codefendant Dunn
had tested positive for.  The victim's graphic testimony
describing the attack in her bedroom was qualified by the fact
that the bedroom was dark and that she could not see her
34
1130686
attackers' faces.  There were a number of inconsistencies in
the evidence that could have been argued to the jury,
including the testimony from investigator Sims that the 
victim
did not initially name Whited as one of her attackers and the
victim's own testimony at trial that she was vaginally
penetrated after having specifically denied being vaginally
penetrated 
during 
Dr. 
Stradtman's 
examination 
of 
her. 
Finally,
Whited had presented evidence of an alibi that could have been
argued to the jury.  The existence of these seemingly strong
arguments against guilt that were available to Whited and that
could have been presented to the jury during a closing
argument distinguishes this case from Floyd, supra.
The State's Closing Argument
Whited next argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals
failed to fully consider his trial counsel's waiver of closing
argument in light of the content of the State's closing
argument.  The prosecutor stated to the jury during the
State's initial closing argument that "all the stuff you heard
... is not easy to hear" and that it "sure wasn't easy for
[the victim] to get up here and tell it to thirteen
35
1130686
strangers."  The prosecutor then referenced other criminal
activity that was unrelated to the case, stating:
"I flipped on the [television] this morning
about five o'clock on Channel 13 and one of the
first things I see on the news is where a convicted
felon from another state was caught here in Alabama
because he had molested and sodomized a thirteen
year old girl in another state. I thought, 'You
can't get away from it.' It is not something even
though we hear about it and we know in the back of
our mind that it goes on, it is not something we
like to think about or that it goes on in our
society especially here in Blount County."
The prosecutor further stated to the jury that she was a
mother and that she disliked the "things that are going on
...out there." She then informed the jury that she thought
about how to "sugarcoat" the case, even praying for an answer,
but then  determined that "[i]t is what it is," stating that
"there is no easy way to sugarcoat it. It is ugly. It is
nasty. It is repulsive."  The prosecutor stated that she came
to the realization that the case could not be "sugarcoated"
because no one had "sugarcoated" it for the victim.  She
explained:
"When [the victim] was thirteen years old,
 she
[4]
lived here at ---- Godfrey Drive with her dad.  That
The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the victim was
4
14 years old.  Apparently, although it is not clear from the
record, the victim turned 14 around the time of the offense.
36
1130686
was her home. She was supposed to be safe in that
home.  She was supposed to be able to go to bed at
night, get a good night's sleep at thirteen years
old and get up and go to school the next morning and
not have a care in the world.  She is thirteen years
old ...  When I was thirteen, I didn't have a worry
in the world.  My parents saw to that. [The victim]
didn't have that privilege and that luxury.  When
she was thirteen years old, nothing was sugarcoated
especially on that night back in May of 2005 when
these people entered her bedroom--the sanctity of
her bedroom where she slept.  When they came into
her bedroom, they didn't sugarcoat anything for [the
victim]-–nothing. 
 
Those 
three 
men--that 
man
included–-did what they wanted to without thinking
anything about [the victim]. They didn't care what
happened or what happened afterwards.  They did what
they wanted to do. [The victim] was there alone in
her bed.  She had nobody to protect her. We have
already established that her mother was nowhere to
be found.  She even lived in some other county. 
There was nobody.  One of these three men was a man
she trusted.  She trusted him to take care of her. 
What does he do? He went in there with them.  You
heard the testimony. It wasn't sugarcoated.  As
harsh and abrasive as it may be for us to talk
about, I think we had to do that.  We had to hear
those words.  I'm sorry you had to go through it. 
It was something we had to do to make you understand
her story."
The 
prosecutor 
told 
the 
jury 
how 
"painful" 
and
"humiliating" it was for the victim to get on the witness
stand and to relive the events of May 19, 2005.  The
prosecutor then referred to the victim as "my hero" for
choosing to come to court to testify and to relive the events
when she did not have to.  The prosecutor told the jury that
37
1130686
Whited had "humiliat[ed] [the victim], beat[en] [the victim],
[and] hit  [the victim] when she tried to get up" and that
"when he finished doing what he did to her" he said, in a
whisper,  "[i]f you tell anybody, I'm going to kill you."  The
prosecutor, while crying, closed her statement to the jury
stating:
"(Crying) I would ask that when you go back--I'm
so sorry. I was not going to do this. When you go
back in there, just remember it is what it is. And
what it is--is ugly. What that man did to that child
is a crime."
Judge Joiner correctly stated in his dissent that the
prosecutor's initial closing argument "can neither be
characterized as 'very brief,' nor does 'it appear[] that the
prosecution was saving its persuasive argument for last.' 
Floyd, [571 So. 2d at 1227]."  Whited, __ So. 3d at __
(Joiner, J., dissenting).  Instead, he described the
prosecutor's 
 
initial 
closing 
argument 
as 
"lengthy,
persuasive, and emotional,"  Whited, __ So. 3d at __ (Joiner,
J., dissenting), and in that regard this case is further
distinguishable from Floyd, supra, and Lawhorn, supra.  
As stated above, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded
that one "possible" strategic decision for trial counsel's
38
1130686
waiving closing argument in this case was to "prevent the
prosecutor from returning on rebuttal and going into specific
detail regarding the evidence presented at trial."  Whited, __
So. 3d at __.   We must question what "specific detail
regarding the evidence" was left for the prosecutor to delve
into on rebuttal.  The only direct evidence linking Whited to
the crime was the victim's testimony, which she gave in
graphic detail during the trial  and which the prosecutor
characterized 
in her initial closing argument as describing 
an 
offense that was "ugly," "repulsive," and "nasty."  The
prosecutor told the jury that Whited "humiliated" and "beat"
the victim while sodomizing her and that when he was done
"doing what he did to her" he threatened to kill her if she
told anyone.  The prosecutor described the sad circumstances
of the victim's home life and the fact that she had no one to
protect her as she lie alone in her bed as the three men,
including her own father, entered the bedroom to sodomize her. 
The prosecutor further told the jury how humiliating and
painful it was for the victim to relive the events by
testifying as to those events in court and how the victim was
her "hero" for doing so when she did not have to. Finally, the
39
1130686
prosecutor referenced other criminal activity unrelated to
this case in which an assailant had molested and sodomized a
13-year-old girl. 
When Whited's trial counsel chose to waive closing
argument in this case, he forfeited Whited's last chance to
"marshal the evidence" in his favor by presenting to the jury 
the rather strong arguments available to Whited from which the
jury could determine the relative weaknesses of the State's
case and from which the jury could conclude that "there may be
reasonable doubt of [Whited's] guilt." See Herring, 422 U.S.
at 862.  As is the case here, "when Whited's trial counsel
waived his closing argument, he left the jury with only the
tearful, 
emotional[, and persuasive] plea of the prosecutor 
to
find Whited guilty of first-degree sodomy." Whited, __ So. 3d
at __ (Joiner, J., dissenting). 
After evaluating "all the circumstances surrounding the
case at the time of [Whited's] counsel's actions," Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689, including Whited's trial counsel's inability
to provide a strategic reason for waiving closing argument;
the seemingly strong arguments available to Whited from which
the 
jury could 
possibly conclude that reasonable doubt 
existed
40
1130686
as to Whited's guilt; and the length and highly emotional
nature of the State's initial closing argument, we conclude
that trial counsel's decision to waive closing argument was an
"error[] so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed 
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment" 
and
that the waiver of Whited's closing  was deficient under
Strickland.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Thus, Whited has
satisfied the first prong of Strickland.
We next must determine whether Whited was prejudiced by
his 
trial counsel's deficient performance in waiving his 
right 
to a closing argument.  Strickland, supra.   As discussed at
length above, the State's case against Whited lacked any
physical evidence connecting Whited to the crime, there were
inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, the victim and co-
defendant Dunn tested positive for a sexually transmitted
disease for which Whited tested negative, and Whited had a
relatively strong alibi.  By failing to make a closing
argument on Whited's behalf, Whited's trial counsel lost the
final opportunity to present these arguments to the jury in
order "to persuade the trier of fact that there may be
reasonable doubt of [Whited's] guilt." Herring, 422 U.S. at
41
1130686
862.  We conclude that had these aspects of the case been
presented to the jury in a closing argument "there is a
reasonable probability that ... the result of the proceeding
would have been different."   Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
5
Thus, Whited has satisfied the second prong of Strickland. 
Conclusion
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals and remand the case for that court to direct
the trial court to grant Whited's motion for a new trial. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
Stuart, Murdock, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Moore, C.J., and Parker and Shaw, JJ., dissent. 
Main and Wise, JJ., recuse themselves.*
We do not imply that the State's evidence was
5
insufficient to convict Whited of first-degree sodomy.  We
conclude only that, based on the circumstances present in this
case, Whited was prejudiced under Strickland by his trial
counsel's failure to make a closing argument on his behalf.
Justice Main and Justice Wise were members of the Court
*
of Criminal Appeals when that court considered this case.
42