Case Title: State ex rel. Grimes Aerospace Co., Inc. v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 2006-Ohio-6504

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-12-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Grimes Aerospace Co., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 112 Ohio St.3d 85, 2006-
Ohio-6504.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. GRIMES AEROSPACE COMPANY, INC., APPELLANT, v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Grimes Aerospace Co., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 112 Ohio 
St.3d 85, 2006-Ohio-6504.] 
Workers’ compensation — Voluntary retirement does not foreclose award of 
permanent total disability when claimant was diagnosed after retirement 
with an occupational disease that had a long latency period — State ex 
rel. Liposchak v. Indus. Comm. followed. 
(No. 2006-0003 – Submitted October 3, 2006 – Decided December 27, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 04AP-1197, 2005-Ohio-6205. 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} State ex rel. Liposchak v. Indus. Comm. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 194, 
652 N.E.2d 753, provides an exception to the rule that a prior voluntary retirement 
bars permanent total disability compensation.  Under Liposchak, retirement does 
not foreclose compensation when the condition for which compensation is sought 
has a long latency period and arises after retirement.  Appellant, Grimes 
Aerospace Company, Inc., asserts that under Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 
Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, Liposchak should be 
overruled.  We disagree. 
{¶ 2} Wesley W. Miller was a foundry casting inspector for 32 years.  In 
1984, he retired.  In 2000, he was diagnosed with a long-latency occupational 
disease.  Appellee, Industrial Commission of Ohio, found that the condition was 
work-related and, under the “last injurious exposure” rule, a workers’ 
compensation claim was allowed against Grimes Aerospace. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 3} Miller applied for permanent total disability compensation as a 
result of that condition.  Based on a combination of medical and nonmedical 
factors, that motion was granted on March 11, 2003.  The commission specifically 
rejected Grimes’s assertion that Miller was disqualified from compensation 
because he had voluntarily retired.  While Liposchak was not cited by name, the 
commission’s reasoning mirrored that in Liposchak. 
{¶ 4} Grimes turned to the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.  That 
court denied a writ of mandamus after finding that Liposchak controlled and that 
the commission’s order had evidentiary support.  While the action was pending in 
the court of appeals, Miller died, leaving only a closed period of compensation at 
issue. 
{¶ 5} This cause is now before this court on an appeal as of right. 
{¶ 6} Galatis contains three requirements that must be satisfied before a 
decision may be overruled:   (1) the challenged decision must have been wrongly 
decided at the time, or changed circumstances no longer justify continued 
adherence to the decision; (2) the decision defies practical workability; and (3) 
overruling the decision will not create undue hardship for those who have 
previously relied upon it.  Grimes argues only that Liposchak was wrongly 
decided.  It does not assert that the other two requirements have been met.  Its 
proposition therefore fails. 
{¶ 7} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
RESNICK, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR 
and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
__________________ 
Crabbe, Brown & James, L.L.P., and John C. Albert, for appellant. 
January Term, 2006 
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Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Sue A. Wetzel, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
______________________