Case Title: State v. Sanders

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP002328-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 51 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP2328-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Shaun M. Sanders, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 375 Wis. 2d 248, 895 N.W.2d 41 
PDC No:  2017 WI App 22 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 18, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 5, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Jennifer Dorow and Lee S. Dreyfus, Jr. 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J., concurs, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 
J. (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Craig M. Kuhary and Walden & Schuster, S.C., Waukesha.  
There was an oral argument by Craig M. Kuhary. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Kevin M. LeRoy, deputy solicitor general, with whom on the brief 
were 
Brad 
D. 
Schimel, 
attorney 
general; 
Misha 
Tseytlin, 
solicitor general; and Ryan J. Walsh, chief deputy solicitor 
general.  There was an oral argument by Kevin M. LeRoy. 
 
 
2018 WI 51
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP2328-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2013CF1206) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Shaun M. Sanders, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 18, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals affirming the 
Waukesha County Circuit Court's judgment of conviction1 and order 
denying postconviction relief2 to Shaun Sanders.  State v. 
Sanders, 2017 WI App 22, 375 Wis. 2d 248, 895 N.W.2d 41.   
 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Jennifer Dorow presided over Sanders' trial 
and sentencing. 
2 The Honorable Lee S. Dreyfus, Jr. presided over Sanders' 
postconviction proceedings.  
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Sanders raises a single issue for our review:  do 
circuit courts possess statutory competency3 to proceed in 
criminal matters when the adult defendant was charged for 
conduct he committed before his tenth birthday?   
¶3 
We 
hold 
that 
circuit 
courts 
possess 
statutory 
competency to proceed in criminal matters when the adult 
defendant was charged for conduct he committed before his tenth 
birthday.  The defendant's age at the time he was charged, not 
his age at the time he committed the underlying conduct, 
determines whether the circuit court has statutory competency to 
hear his case as a criminal, juvenile delinquency, or JIPS 
matter.  Consequently, the circuit court in this case possessed 
statutory competency to hear Sanders' case as a criminal matter 
because he was an adult at the time he was charged.  Therefore, 
his counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to raise a 
meritless motion. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The concepts of statutory competency and subject matter 
jurisdiction are often conflated.  Kett v. Cmty. Credit Plan, 
Inc., 228 Wis. 2d 1, 13 n.12, 596 N.W.2d 786 (1999).  We discuss 
the concepts of competency and subject matter jurisdiction in 
greater detail in paragraphs 19-24 below.  Briefly stated, 
statutory competency is the concept that the legislature may 
prescribe how courts may address particular types of cases such 
as those involving juveniles alleged to be in need of protection 
or services, as opposed to those involving criminal defendants. 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
3 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Statutory Background 
¶4 
In order to understand this case, one must understand 
the three forms of statutory competency exercised in Wisconsin 
over those accused of committing criminal conduct. 
¶5 
A person who is 17 years of age or older is subject to 
a criminal proceeding.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.02(10m) (2013-14).4  
A person convicted in a criminal proceeding may be subject to 
confinement in the state prison system or a county jail, fines, 
or probationary supervision.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01, 973.03, 
973.05, 973.09. 
¶6 
A juvenile5 "10 years of age or older who is alleged to 
be delinquent" is subject to a juvenile delinquency proceeding.   
Wis. Stat. § 938.12(1).  A juvenile adjudged delinquent may be 
subject to, inter alia, placement in a juvenile correctional 
facility or juvenile portion of a county jail, forfeiture, 
suspension 
of 
driving 
privileges, 
counseling, 
supervision, 
electronic monitoring, restitution, supervised work or community 
service, or drug testing.  Wis. Stat. § 938.34. 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
5 For purposes of the juvenile justice code, a juvenile is 
"a person who is less than 18 years of age, except that for 
purposes of investigating or prosecuting a person who is alleged 
to have violated a state or federal criminal law or any civil 
law or municipal ordinance, 'juvenile' does not include a person 
who has attained 17 years of age."  Wis. Stat. § 938.02(10m). 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
4 
 
¶7 
A juvenile "under 10 years of age [who] has committed 
a delinquent act" is subject to a JIPS6 proceeding.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.13(12).  A juvenile adjudged in need of protection or 
services may be subject to all of the dispositions available for 
those adjudged delinquent, except placement in a juvenile 
correctional facility or juvenile portion of a county jail, 
forfeiture, suspension of driving privileges (unless the JIPS 
matter involves habitual truancy), and placement in a facility 
for treatment of a developmental disability or mental illness 
unless the juvenile suffers from one of those conditions.  Wis. 
Stat. § 938.345. 
B.  Factual and Procedural Background of Sanders' Case 
¶8 
Starting when Sanders was around eight or nine years 
old, and his younger sister H.S. was six or seven years old,7 he 
would ask for a "peek," which meant H.S. was expected to lift 
her shirt and expose her breasts.  As time elapsed, peeks 
progressed to include Sanders touching and sucking H.S.'s 
breasts, and eventually Sanders forcing oral sex on H.S.  
                                                 
6 JIPS is an abbreviation for "juvenile in need of 
protection or services."  See State v. Jeremiah C., 2003 WI App 
40, ¶1, 260 Wis. 2d 359, 659 N.W.2d 193. 
7 The evidence introduced at trial was unclear as to whether 
the illegal conduct started when Sanders was eight or nine.  
H.S. testified that it began when she was six or seven, which 
would make Sanders eight or nine because he is approximately two 
years older than H.S.  See also infra, ¶¶25-27.  Whether the 
illegal conduct began when Sanders was eight or nine is 
irrelevant because, in either event, he was less than ten years 
old and thus would have been subject to a JIPS proceeding at 
that time.  
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
5 
 
¶9 
The abuse stopped when Sanders was 18 and H.S. was 16.  
H.S.'s boyfriend, R.N., heard Sanders request a peek while R.N. 
was Skyping8 with H.S.  H.S. immediately terminated the Skype 
call, and reconnected approximately one minute later.  H.S. told 
R.N. what it meant when Sanders requested a peek, but swore him 
to secrecy.  R.N. told a school official about the incident a 
few months later.  The school reported the allegations to the 
local police, who then launched an investigation. 
¶10 The district attorney charged Sanders with four counts 
of criminal misconduct:  (1) repeated sexual assault of a child 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.025(1)(a)9 for conduct occurring 
between September 26, 2003, and June 5, 2006; (2) repeated 
sexual assault of a child contrary to § 948.025(1)(e) for 
conduct occurring between September 26, 2008, and September 25, 
2012; (3) incest contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.06(1) for conduct 
occurring between September 26, 2008, and September 25, 2012; 
and (4) child enticement contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.07(1) for 
conduct occurring between September 26, 2008 and September 25, 
                                                 
8 Skype is a software program that allows users to 
communicate in real time over the internet through video, audio, 
and instant messaging.  
9 The complaint does not specify which version of the 
statutes it applies to Sanders.  We note that the State appears 
to have charged Sanders based on the version of the statutes in 
effect at the time the conduct occurred because the complaint 
lists count one as a class B felony, but count one became a 
class A felony in 2008.  See 2007 Wis. Act 80, § 14.  In any 
event, the specific version of the statutes underlying Sanders' 
charges is not important to our disposition of the issue before 
us. 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
6 
 
2012.  According to the information filed by the State, Sanders 
was 910 through 12 years old during the time period charged in 
count one and 14 through 18 years old during the time periods 
charged in counts two through four.  Sanders was 19 years old 
when the charges were filed.   
¶11 At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Sanders' 
counsel moved for an order to dismiss count one, repeated sexual 
assault of a child contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.025(1)(a) for 
conduct occurring between September 26, 2003, and June 5, 2006.  
Counsel based his motion on lack of evidence.  Specifically, 
Sanders' counsel argued that the State did not present any 
evidence that Sanders had been sexually gratified by peeks 
during the time period charged in count one, when he was either 
eight or nine to 12 years old.11  The circuit court understood 
the issue to be one of jurisdiction, rather than evidence or 
competency, and took the motion under advisement.  The jury 
acquitted Sanders of count one, but convicted him of counts two 
through four.  The circuit court never addressed the merits of 
Sanders' motion to dismiss count one. 
                                                 
10 As noted in footnote 7, there was some discrepancy at 
trial as to whether Sanders was eight or nine when the illegal 
conduct began.  Also as noted in footnote 7, the precise age is 
irrelevant. 
11 In order to convict a defendant of repeated sexual 
assault of a child contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.025(1)(a), the 
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
engaged in sexual contact "for the purpose of sexually degrading 
or sexually humiliating the complainant or sexually arousing or 
gratifying the defendant."  Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5)(a).  
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
7 
 
¶12 Sanders brought a postconviction motion alleging, 
inter alia, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to bring a pre-trial motion to dismiss count one.  Even though 
Sanders was acquitted of count one, he alleged that he was 
prejudiced because the inclusion of count one allowed evidence 
of acts taking place between September 26, 2003, and June 5, 
2006, to be admitted that would have been irrelevant and, 
therefore, presumably excluded, if count one had been dismissed.  
Specifically, Sanders confessed to police and testified at trial 
that he engaged in peeks with H.S. when he was eight to nine 
years old, but the peeks ended after one month and never 
progressed beyond viewing H.S.'s breasts.12  Sanders argued that 
his 
confession 
would 
have 
been 
irrelevant, 
and 
thus 
inadmissible, without count one.  He argued that he was 
prejudiced because the confession added credibility to H.S.'s 
testimony and detracted from what his defense would otherwise 
have been but for count one; specifically, that the peeks never 
happened. 
¶13 The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Sanders' 
postconviction 
motion.  Relying on our reasoning in State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 
2d 453, 484 N.W.2d 138 (1992), the circuit court concluded that 
the defendant's age at the time he is charged, not his age at 
the time the underlying conduct occurred, determines whether 
                                                 
12 In the same police interview where Sanders confessed to 
engaging in peeks for one month, Sanders confessed to further 
sex acts with H.S. However, the circuit court suppressed that 
part of the interview. 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
8 
 
charges 
are 
properly 
brought 
as 
a 
criminal, 
juvenile 
delinquency, or JIPS matter.  Because a pre-trial motion to 
dismiss count one would have been meritless, the court concluded 
that trial counsel did not perform deficiently for failing to 
bring such a motion. 
¶14 Sanders 
appealed. 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
first 
clarified that the issue raised was one of statutory competency, 
not jurisdiction.  Sanders, 375 Wis. 2d 248, ¶¶12-13.  The court 
of appeals next noted that challenges to a circuit court's 
statutory competency can be forfeited.  Id., ¶14.  Thus, the 
court of appeals viewed the case through the lens of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failure to bring a motion to dismiss 
because Sanders' trial counsel never raised competency as an 
issue.  Id.  The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the 
circuit court did have statutory competency to hear Sanders' 
case in adult criminal court for conduct committed before he was 
ten years old.  Id., ¶29. 
¶15 Sanders petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on June 12, 2017. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 Whether circuit courts possess statutory competency is 
a question of law we review de novo.  City of Eau Claire v. 
Booth, 2016 WI 65, ¶6, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738. 
¶17 "Whether a defendant received ineffective assistance 
of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact."  State v. 
Maday, 2017 WI 28, ¶25, 374 Wis. 2d 164, 892 N.W.2d 611.  We 
uphold the circuit court's findings of fact as to what counsel 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
9 
 
did and did not do unless clearly erroneous.  Id.  Whether those 
facts 
constitute 
deficient 
performance 
and 
whether 
such 
performance prejudiced the defendant are questions of law we 
review de novo.  State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 768, 596 
N.W.2d 749 (1999). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶18 We first address whether the issue Sanders raises is 
one of subject matter jurisdiction or circuit court competency.  
We next consider whether Sanders' trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to file a pre-trial motion to dismiss count one.  We 
hold that the circuit court possessed statutory competency to 
hear Sanders' case as a criminal matter.  Thus, his counsel did 
not perform deficiently by failing to file a meritless motion 
seeking to dismiss count one prior to trial. 
 
A.  Sanders Alleges His Attorney was Ineffective for Failing to 
Challenge the Statutory Competency of the Circuit Court to Hear 
His Case as a Criminal Matter. 
 
1.  Sanders raises an issue of statutory competency. 
¶19 At various points throughout his briefing, Sanders 
seems to treat the concepts of statutory competency and subject 
matter jurisdiction as identical.  Though the concepts are often 
conflated, they are distinct.  Kett v. Cmty. Credit Plan, Inc., 
228 Wis. 2d 1, 13 n.12, 596 N.W.2d 786 (1999).  This distinction 
is important because defects in statutory competency can be 
forfeited or waived, but defects in subject matter jurisdiction 
may always be asserted.  Vill. of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 
79, ¶3, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190. 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
10 
 
¶20 Subject matter jurisdiction defines a circuit court's 
"ability to resolve certain types of claims."  Christine M. 
Wiseman & Michael Tobin, Wisconsin Practice Series:  Criminal 
Practice and Procedure § 1:11, n.2 (2d ed. 2017).  Statutory 
competency, on the other hand, defines a circuit court's 
"ability to undertake a consideration of the specific case or 
issue before it."  Id.  
¶21 Subject 
matter 
jurisdiction 
is 
defined 
by 
our 
constitution. 
 
Id. 
 
Circuit 
courts 
have 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction over "all matters civil and criminal within this 
state . . . ."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 8.  We construe this 
constitutional grant of power to mean "a circuit court is never 
without subject matter jurisdiction."  Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 
¶1. 
¶22 In contrast, statutory competency is established by 
the legislature.  Id., ¶9 ("We have recognized, however, that a 
circuit 
court's 
ability 
to 
exercise 
the 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction vested in it by the constitution may be affected by 
noncompliance with statutory requirements pertaining to the 
invocation of that jurisdiction in individual cases.").  A 
circuit court loses statutory competency when the court or a 
party fails to abide by a statutory mandate.  Id., ¶10.  These 
statutory mandates include time limits, mandatory release plans 
in chapter 980 cases, conditions precedent to modifying child 
support orders, and charging repeat OWI offenders criminally 
rather than civilly.  Id., ¶13 (citations omitted); Booth, 370 
Wis. 2d 595, ¶22. 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
11 
 
¶23 In this case, Sanders raises an issue of statutory 
competency because age limits on criminal, juvenile delinquency, 
and JIPS matters both define and restrict how a circuit court 
may address the specific case before it, and not whether a 
circuit court can hear criminal, juvenile delinquency, or JIPS 
matters generally.  See Weisman & Tobin, supra, ¶20.  
¶24 Unlike challenges to subject matter jurisdiction, 
challenges to statutory competency may be forfeited13 or waived.  
Id., ¶3.  This is so because statutory competency is "a 
'narrower concept' involving a 'lesser power' than subject 
matter jurisdiction."  Id., ¶14 (citing Vill. of Shorewood v. 
Steinberg, 
174 
Wis. 2d 191, 
200, 
496 
N.W.2d 57 
(1993)).  
Consequently, Sanders forfeited his competency challenge when he 
failed to raise it in the circuit court.  See Booth, 370 
Wis. 2d 595, ¶25.  Accordingly, we will consider this issue 
through the framework of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 768.  See infra, ¶¶28-30.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Though we spoke of "waiver" in Mikrut, we have since 
clarified that "forfeiture" is the proper term to describe a 
party's failure to raise an issue in the circuit court.  Brunton 
v. Nuvell Credit Corp., 2010 WI 50, ¶35, 325 Wis. 2d 135, 785 
N.W.2d 302.  Consequently, when "Mikrut says 'waiver[,]' it 
means 'forfeiture.'"  City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, 
¶11 n.5, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738. 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
12 
 
2.  Sanders' counsel never challenged the circuit court's 
statutory competency to proceed on count one on the basis that 
Sanders was eight or nine years old at the time he committed 
some of the alleged conduct in that count. 
¶25 Sanders' counsel had the opportunity, both before and 
during trial, to challenge the circuit court's competency to 
proceed on count one, but failed to do so.  Sanders' counsel had 
sufficient notice that at least some of the alleged conduct 
underlying count one occurred while Sanders was eight or nine 
years old.  The criminal complaint, as well as the information, 
provided notice of the time period during which the conduct 
recited in count one occurred. 
¶26 During 
trial, 
testimony 
from 
Sanders 
and 
H.S. 
confirmed that Sanders was eight or nine years old when the 
conduct underlying count one started.  See Thomas v. State, 92 
Wis. 2d 372, 386, 284 N.W.2d 917 (1979) (quoting Hess v. State, 
174 
Wis. 96, 
99, 
181 
N.W. 
725 
(1921)) 
("[T]he 
prosecution . . . may prove the commission of the offense 
charged on some other day within a reasonable limitation [of 
that stated in the complaint and information].").  Sanders 
testified:  (1) that he admitted to the investigating officer 
that he engaged in peeks, but for only one month approximately 
ten years prior to the interview (the interview occurred in 
March 2013); and (2) that he was "eight or nine" when the peeks 
took place. 
¶27 Further, H.S. testified that the peeks began when she 
was six or seven years old.  Sanders is approximately two years 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
13 
 
older than H.S., which means Sanders was eight or nine when the 
peeks began. 
 
B.  Counsel did not Perform Deficiently by Failing to Challenge 
the Circuit Court's Statutory Competency as to Count One. 
¶28 A criminal defendant's constitutional right to counsel 
is infringed if counsel provides ineffective assistance.  State 
v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶36, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560 
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)).  A 
defendant receives ineffective assistance of counsel if his 
counsel both (1) performs deficiently; and (2) that deficient 
performance prejudices the defendant.  Id.   
¶29 Counsel performs deficiently if his conduct "[falls] 
below an objective standard of reasonableness" for an attorney 
in the same position.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  Counsel 
does not perform deficiently by failing to bring a meritless 
motion.  State v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 747 n.10, 546 
N.W.2d 406 (1996).  In determining whether counsel's performance 
was deficient for failing to bring a motion, we may assess the 
merits of that motion.  See State v. Steinhardt, 2017 WI 62, 
¶43, 375 Wis. 2d 712, 896 N.W.2d 700. 
¶30 A deficiency is prejudicial if there is a "reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceedings would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the [proceedings'] outcome."  Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694.  If the defendant fails to prove one prong of the 
Strickland test (deficient performance or prejudice), then we 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
14 
 
need not address the other.  Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶37 (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 
 
1.  In Wisconsin, it is well-settled that statutory competency 
to hear a case as a criminal, juvenile delinquency, or JIPS 
matter is determined by the age of the accused at the time the 
offense is charged. 
¶31 Wisconsin courts have uniformly held that statutory 
competency is determined by the age of the accused at the time 
charges are filed, not the age of the accused at the time the 
underlying conduct occurred.  Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453; State ex 
rel. Koopman v. Waukesha Cty. Court, 38 Wis. 2d 492, 157 N.W.2d 
623 (1968); D.V. v. State, 100 Wis. 2d 363, 302 Wis. 2d 64 (Ct. 
App. 1981). 
¶32 We 
first 
addressed 
this 
issue 
in 
Koopman, 
38 
Wis. 2d 492.  The State charged Koopman in criminal court for 
conduct that occurred before his 18th birthday.14 Id. at 494.  
Koopman filed a writ of prohibition in which he sought to 
transfer his case to the Waukesha County Juvenile Court.15  He 
did so because he committed the act at an age when he would have 
been subject to a juvenile court proceeding.  Id.   
                                                 
14 At the time State ex rel. Koopman v. Waukesha Cty. Court, 
38 Wis. 2d 492, 157 N.W.2d 623 (1968), was decided, 18 years of 
age was the dividing line for juvenile delinquency and adult 
criminal court competency.  Wis. Stat. §§ 48.02(3), 48.12(1) 
(1967-68).  The legislature lowered this age to 17 in 1995.  
1995 Wis. Act 27, § 2423. 
15 At the time Koopman, 38 Wis. 2d 492, was decided, county 
courts had exclusive jurisdiction over all juvenile matters.  
Wis. Stat. § 253.13(1) (1967-68).  County courts were abolished 
as part of the court reorganization of 1977.  See Wis. Const. 
art. IV, § 2; Wis. Stat. § 753.07(1). 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
15 
 
¶33 We held that Koopman was properly charged in criminal 
court because it was that court that had statutory competency to 
proceed in Koopman's case.  Id. at 499.  Juvenile courts had 
"exclusive jurisdiction . . . over any child who [was] alleged 
to be delinquent because:  (1) he [had] violated any state law 
or any county, town, or municipal ordinance."  Id. at 497 
(quoting Wis. Stat. § 48.12(1) (1967-68)).  We reasoned that 
"'child' is qualified by the clause 'who is alleged to be 
delinquent,' thus setting up two requisites before [juvenile 
court] jurisdiction will attach."  Id. at 498.  Consequently, we 
determined that "the statute [excluded] the class of persons 
over eighteen at the time of the allegations of delinquency."  
Id.  Koopman was properly charged in criminal court because he 
was 18 years old when the State filed charges. 
¶34 We bolstered our holding with two observations.  
First, we drew an analogy between competency to hear a juvenile 
delinquency matter and competency to waive juvenile court 
jurisdiction. 
Because 
a 
juvenile 
court 
could 
waive 
its 
jurisdiction over a juvenile over 16 (thus allowing the juvenile 
to be tried as an adult) based on the juvenile's age at the time 
charged, then the circuit court's competency to hear a juvenile 
delinquency matter in the first place similarly depended on the 
defendant's age at the time charged.  Id. at 499 (citing Wis. 
Stat. § 48.18 (1967-68)).  Second, we noted that other aspects 
of juvenile court jurisdiction, such as "persons who may be 
dependent or neglected," Wis. Stat. § 48.13 (1967-68), applied 
only when "their status was called to the attention of the 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
16 
 
court" 
before 
the 
person's 
18th 
birthday. 
 
Koopman, 
38 
Wis. 2d at 499-500.  These two aspects of the juvenile code are 
consistent with a reading of that section such that it applies 
only to those who are juveniles when charged. 
¶35 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
subsequently 
applied 
the 
reasoning of Koopman in D.V., 100 Wis. 2d 363.  In that case, 
the State filed a juvenile delinquency petition against D.V. 
alleging he committed an armed robbery when he was 11 years old.  
Id. at 365.  However, the State did not file the juvenile 
delinquency petition until D.V. was 12 years old.  Id.  This is 
significant because, at the time, the minimum age for juvenile 
delinquency proceedings (i.e., the cutoff between JIPS and 
juvenile delinquency matters) was 12 years old.16  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.13(12) (1981-82). 
¶36 D.V. argued that the circuit court lacked statutory 
competency17 to hear the juvenile delinquency petition because 
the conduct occurred when his case would have been heard as a 
JIPS matter.  Id. at 364.  The court of appeals concluded that 
the circuit court possessed statutory competency and therefore 
                                                 
16 The legislature lowered the minimum age for delinquency 
proceedings to ten years old in 1995 Wis. Act 77, § 629. 
17 D.V. is among many prior Wisconsin decisions that confuse 
jurisdiction and competency.  See Booth, 370 Wis. 2d 595, ¶14 
(prior "case law did not clearly distinguish between the 
concepts of subject matter jurisdiction and competency").  Thus, 
though the D.V. court used the term "jurisdiction," the decision 
clearly addresses the concept of "competency" and we refer to it 
as such. 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
17 
 
could proceed with the juvenile delinquency matter.  It did so 
based on the long-standing principle that it is the person's age 
at the time of charging, and not the person's age at the time he 
committed the conduct, that determines whether the case will be 
heard as a criminal, juvenile delinquency, or JIPS matter.  Id. 
at 365 (citing Koopman, 38 Wis. 2d at 497-500). 
¶37 Later, we had the opportunity to apply the reasoning 
of Koopman in Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453.  In that case, Annala 
molested an eight-year-old child when he was 15 years old.  Id. 
at 458.  The conduct was first reported to authorities when 
Annala was 20 years old, which is when the State filed charges 
in criminal court.  Id. at 458-59. 
¶38 Annala 
challenged 
his 
conviction 
for 
the 
same 
substantive reason Sanders challenges his:  the circuit court 
lacked statutory competency to proceed because the conduct 
occurred when he was at an age when he would not be subject to 
criminal liability.  Id. at 459-60.  We affirmed Annala's 
conviction because juvenile courts are limited to applying the 
juvenile code to juveniles.  Id. at 462-63.  Simply put, "[t]he 
[statutory competency] of the juvenile court is determined by 
the individual's age at the time charged, not the individual's 
age at the time of the alleged offense."  Id. at 463 (citing 
Koopman, 38 Wis. 2d at 497-500). 
¶39 We bolstered our reasoning with two observations.  
First, to preclude adults from being charged for crimes 
committed when they were juveniles would serve to implicitly, 
but definitively, shorten legislatively-prescribed statutes of 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
18 
 
limitation.  Id. at 465-66.  That is, if the State could not 
prosecute adults for conduct committed as juveniles, then the 
State would be subject to a time limitation (the time between 
commission of the act and the juvenile's 17th birthday), which 
the legislature did not contemplate and our court has not 
authorized.  Id.  We did not 
think that the legislature intended to allow a minor 
who is less than sixteen years old who commits a 
serious felony to cajole or manipulate the victim or 
conceal the crime or conceal suspected culpability for 
the crime until reaching eighteen years of age and 
thereby conclusively frustrating the State's ability 
to hold him or her accountable for the wrongdoing.  
Had the legislature intended to effectuate this 
drastic change in the law, it would have done so in an 
express and clearly understandable manner.   
Id.  Second, we noted that any unfairness to defendants is 
mitigated by protections afforded by the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions.  Id. at 465.   
¶40 As we recognized in State v. Becker, the State 
violates a defendant's right to due process when it delays 
charging as part of "a deliberate effort to avoid juvenile court 
jurisdiction."  74 Wis. 2d 675, 677, 247 N.W.2d 495 (1976).  If 
a 
defendant 
alleges, 
with 
particularity, 
that 
the 
State 
intentionally delayed filing charges to avoid a juvenile 
delinquency proceeding and raises genuine issues of fact, then 
the defendant is entitled to a hearing at which the State must 
prove that any delay "was not for the purpose of manipulating 
the system to avoid" a juvenile delinquency proceeding.  State 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
19 
 
v. Velez, 224 Wis. 2d 1, 9-11, 589 N.W.2d 9 (1999) (quoting 
Becker, 74 Wis. 2d at 678). 
¶41 Other jurisdictions that adhere to the rule that a 
person's age at the time of charging determines whether a 
juvenile or criminal matter is proper apply similar safeguards.  
Samuel M. Davis, Rights of Juveniles, § 2:3 n.13 (2018); see 
also State v. Isaac, 537 N.W.2d 786, 788 (Iowa 1995) ("The due 
process protection in prosecutorial delay cases is available to 
defendants to make sure the State will not employ tricks to gain 
an advantage over a defendant."); State v. Dixon, 792 P.2d 137, 
138 (Wash. 1990) (applying three-part test to determine whether 
delay in charging that resulted in loss of juvenile court 
jurisdiction violated defendant's right to due process). 
 
2.  Our precedent is based upon sound legal reasoning and long-
standing principles of statutory competency. 
¶42 A majority of courts addressing this issue are in 
accord with the long-standing precedent that Wisconsin has 
uniformly applied in these cases.  Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive 
Criminal Law, § 9.6 (3d ed. Oct. 2017); see also H.D. Warren & 
C.P. Jhong, Age of Child at Time of the Alleged Offense or 
Delinquency, or at Time of Legal Proceedings, as Criterion of 
Jurisdiction of Juvenile Court, 89 A.L.R.2d 506, § 2.  LaFave 
draws our attention to two cases, in addition to Annala, for 
this proposition:  United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331 (4th 
Cir. 2009), and State v. Fowler, 194 A.2d 558 (Del. Super. 
1963). 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
20 
 
¶43 In Blake, the defendant challenged his indictment as 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 503218 because he was 17 years old when the 
conduct occurred and 21 years old when he was indicted.  
However, the attorney general never certified his case as 
fitting any of the code's enumerated criteria.  Blake, 571 F.3d 
at 
343. 
 
The 
Blake 
court 
held 
that 
certification 
was 
unnecessary.  Id. at 344.  It noted that the statute applies to 
"a person who 'has not attained his twenty-first birthday,'" not 
a person who "had not" attained his 21st birthday "at the time 
he allegedly violated the law in question."  Id.  The Blake 
court reasoned that the statute's plain meaning requires 
certification only when the defendant is indicted while still a 
juvenile.  Id. (citing United States v. Wright, 540 F.3d 833, 
898-39 (8th Cir. 2008)). 
¶44 In Fowler, the defendant challenged his criminal 
conviction because he was 17 years old at the time the conduct 
underlying the charges took place but 27 years old when charged.  
194 A.2d 558.  The relevant statute established that "[t]he 
                                                 
18 Federal law prohibits prosecution of juveniles for crimes 
carrying a maximum penalty of six months or fewer unless the 
United States Attorney General certifies that (1) no state 
juvenile court has jurisdiction, or the appropriate state 
juvenile court refuses jurisdiction; (2) the state does not have 
available programs and services adequate for the needs of 
juveniles; or (3) the offense charged is a felony with a 
substantial federal interest.  18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2000).   
For purposes of section 5032, a "juvenile" is "a person who 
has not attained his twenty-first birthday".  18 U.S.C. § 5031 
(2000).   
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
21 
 
family 
court 
shall 
have 
exclusive 
jurisdiction 
in 
all 
proceedings . . . (2) concerning any child . . . charged with 
having violated any law of this State or any charter, ordinance 
or regulation of a sub-division thereof."  Id. at 562 (quoting  
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 951(2) (1963)).  The statutes defined 
"child" as "a person who has not yet attained his eighteenth 
birthday."  Id. at 561 (quoting Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 901 
(1963)). 
¶45 The court reasoned juvenile court jurisdiction applies 
only to "[a] child charged."  Id. at 562.  Because Fowler was 
not a child when charged, the court determined that it was not 
improper for the State to bring criminal charges against him.  
Id.  
3.  Application to Sanders 
¶46 Sanders does not argue that the reasoning of Koopman, 
D.V., and Annala is flawed or that they should be overruled.  
Rather, he argues that the reasoning of those three cases does 
not apply to him because the charges in those cases "jumped" 
only one level (i.e., JIPS to juvenile in D.V. and juvenile to 
criminal court in Koopman and Annala), whereas his charges 
"jumped" two levels (i.e., JIPS to criminal court).  Sanders 
views juvenile delinquency and criminal matters to be highly 
analogous because both punish criminal conduct and attempt to 
rehabilitate offenders through various sanctions, including 
confinement.  He contrasts this with JIPS matters, which 
concentrate on rehabilitation, rather than punishment, and do 
not allow for confinement.  Based on these distinctions, he 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
22 
 
argues that the legislature intended ten years to be the minimum 
age for criminal conduct such that a person can never be 
criminally charged for conduct committed before his tenth 
birthday. 
¶47 Sanders bases his conclusion on a distinction that 
lacks a legal difference.  The reasoning that applied to the 
charges that "jumped" one level in Koopman, D.V., and Annala 
applies just as strongly to Sanders for two reasons:  (1) we are 
not persuaded that the legislature intended to leave the State 
with no recourse when criminal conduct committed before a 
person's tenth birthday does not come to light until on or after 
the person has reached his 17th birthday; and (2) the 
legislature's inaction on statutory competency since Koopman, 
D.V., and Annala evinces legislative acquiescence to our 
interpretation of the competency statutes. 
¶48 First, we are not persuaded that the legislature 
intended to leave the State with no recourse when criminal 
conduct committed before a person's tenth birthday does not come 
to light until on or after the person has reached his 17th 
birthday.  We are not persuaded now, just as we were not 
persuaded in Annala, "that the legislature intended to allow a 
minor . . . to cajole or manipulate the victim[,] conceal the 
crime[,] or conceal suspected culpability for the crime until 
reaching [17] years of age and thereby conclusively frustrat[e] 
the State's ability to hold him or her accountable for the 
wrongdoing."  Annala, 168 Wis. 2d at 465-66.  Though Annala 
addressed juveniles over ten years old who are charged as 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
23 
 
adults, the reasoning applies in the present case because, like 
the defendants in Annala and Koopman, Sanders could not be the 
subject of a juvenile delinquency or JIPS matter. 
¶49 Sanders could not be the subject of a juvenile 
delinquency proceeding because he is no longer a juvenile.  The 
structure of the relevant statute for juvenile court competency 
has remained unchanged since Koopman:  "The [juvenile] court has 
exclusive [competency] . . . over any juvenile 10 years of age 
or older who is alleged to be delinquent."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.12(1).  As we reasoned in Koopman, 38 Wis. 2d at 498, 
Sanders is too old for juvenile delinquency proceedings because 
the statute, by its plain language, applies only to a 
"juvenile . . . who is alleged to be delinquent."  Because a 
juvenile is a person younger than 17 years of age and Sanders 
was 19 years old when charged, he could not be the subject of a 
juvenile delinquency proceeding. 
¶50 Similarly, Sanders could not be subject to a JIPS 
proceeding because he is no longer a juvenile under ten years of 
age.  Circuit courts possess statutory competency in JIPS cases 
when a "juvenile is under 10 years of age and has committed a 
delinquent act."  Wis. Stat. § 938.13(12).  Like the juvenile 
delinquency competency statute (Wis. Stat. § 938.12(1)), the 
JIPS 
competency 
statute 
(§ 938.13(12)) 
sets 
out 
two 
prerequisites:  (1) the "juvenile is under 10 years of age"; and 
(2) the juvenile "has committed a delinquent act."  Id.  Because 
Sanders was no longer "under ten years of age" when he was 
charged, he could not be the subject of a JIPS proceeding.  Id.   
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
24 
 
¶51 As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, if Sanders 
could not have been criminally charged for the conduct at issue 
in this case when 19, then he could not have been charged at 
all.  If the legislature had wanted this "drastic" result, "it 
would have done so in an express and clearly understandable 
manner."  Annala, 168 Wis. 2d at 466. 
¶52 Second, our plain reading of Wis. Stat. §§ 938.12 and 
938.13 is bolstered by the legislature's inaction on this issue 
since Koopman, D.V., and Annala were decided.  If, as Sanders 
argues, the legislature intended the minimum age for criminal 
responsibility to be ten years old, it could have enacted a 
statute establishing as much after Koopman, D.V., or Annala.  
State v. Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d 552, 566, 456 N.W.2d 143 (1990) 
("Legislative inaction following judicial construction of a 
statute, while not conclusive, evinces legislative approval of 
the interpretation.").  Legislative inaction is more indicative 
of acquiescence to prior judicial interpretation when other 
provisions within the same section are amended without affecting 
the provision at issue.  See Tucker v. Marcus, 142 Wis. 2d 425, 
434, 418 N.W.2d 818 (1988).  This rule is applicable to Sanders' 
case because the legislature has not substantively changed the 
statutory 
competency 
provisions 
despite 
making 
numerous 
amendments to related provisions——most notably separating the 
juvenile justice code from the children's code.  1995 Wis. Act 
77, § 629; see also, e.g., 2005 Wis. Act 344, § 134 (making 
stylistic amendment to § 938.12); 2005 Wis. Act 344, § 136 
(making stylistic amendment to § 938.13). 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
25 
 
¶53 Even though the legislature has not established a 
minimum age for criminal responsibility, other safeguards are 
built in: 
 Statutes of Limitations:  In situations where the 
general six-year statute of limitations for felonies 
applies (which is the vast majority of felonies), an 
adult 
cannot 
be 
criminally 
charged 
for 
conduct 
committed before the person's tenth birthday.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1).  Mathematically, at least six 
years must elapse between conduct committed before the 
person's tenth birthday and the person's seventeenth 
birthday.   
 Mens Rea Elements:  Intent elements serve to protect 
juveniles who, in the judgment of the jury, could not 
form criminal intent.  See State v. Stephen T., 2002 
WI App 3, ¶13, 250 Wis. 2d 26, 643 N.W.2d 151 ("[T]he 
State must prove as an element of the crime that the 
perpetrator had the specific intent to touch the 
victim 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
sexual 
arousal 
or 
gratification.").  In fact, this protection may have 
benefitted Sanders in this case.  Though we cannot 
know with certainty why the jury acquitted Sanders of 
count one, we observe that the jury sent a note to the 
circuit court during deliberations questioning whether 
a juvenile under 12 years old could form the requisite 
intent to perform an act for his own sexual arousal or 
gratification.  
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
26 
 
 Inappropriate Filing Delays:  Both the United States 
and Wisconsin Constitutions protect defendants from 
intentional delay by the State when that delay is 
calculated to avoid a JIPS or juvenile proceeding.  
Becker, 74 Wis. 2d at 677 (citing Miller v. Quatsoe, 
348 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. Wis. 1972) ("[W]hen the filing 
of 
the 
complaint 
determines 
juvenile 
court 
jurisdiction, then this filing cannot be delayed in 
order to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction unless the 
juvenile is granted a hearing with the necessary 
constitutional safeguards.")). 
¶54 Time has not changed the logic underpinning our prior 
opinions on this issue and so we take this opportunity to 
reemphasize our holdings therein:  the age of the accused person 
at the time of charging, not the time he committed the act 
underlying the charge, determines whether the case is properly 
heard as a criminal, juvenile delinquency, or JIPS matter.  
Consequently, any motion to dismiss count one prior to trial 
would have been meritless because the circuit court possessed 
statutory competency to hear the case as a criminal matter.  
Sanders' trial counsel did not perform deficiently because 
failure to bring a meritless motion does not constitute 
deficient performance.  Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 747 n.10.  
Because 
we 
hold 
that 
Sanders' 
counsel 
did 
not 
perform 
deficiently, we need not consider the prejudice prong of the 
Strickland test.  Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶37. 
 
No. 
2015AP2328-CR   
 
27 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶55 We 
hold 
that 
circuit 
courts 
possess 
statutory 
competency to proceed in criminal matters when the adult 
defendant was charged for conduct he committed before his tenth 
birthday.  The defendant's age at the time he was charged, not 
his age at the time he committed the underlying conduct, 
determines whether the circuit court has statutory competency to 
hear his case as a criminal, juvenile delinquency, or JIPS 
matter.  Consequently, the circuit court possessed statutory 
competency to hear Sanders' case as a criminal matter because he 
was an adult at the time he was charged.  Therefore, his counsel 
did not perform deficiently by failing to raise a meritless 
motion. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2015AP2328-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶56 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the court of appeals that "[w]ithout question, the law did not 
clearly provide that Sanders could not be prosecuted for 
criminal sexual acts he was alleged to have committed prior to 
age ten."  State v. Sanders, 2017 WI App 22, ¶29, 375 
Wis. 2d 248, 895 N.W.2d 41.  Neither the legislature nor the 
courts have addressed this specific issue. 
¶57 As we have previously stated, "failure to raise 
arguments that require the resolution of unsettled legal 
questions generally does not render a lawyer's services outside 
the wide range of professionally competent assistance sufficient 
to satisfy the Sixth Amendment."  State v. Lemberger, 2017 WI 
39, ¶33, 374 Wis. 2d 617, 893 N.W.2d 232 (internal quotations 
omitted).  Accordingly, I concur in the mandate because the 
issue of whether an adult defendant may be charged in adult 
court for offenses committed as an eight or nine-year-old was 
not sufficiently settled in Wisconsin law. 
¶58 I write separately, however, to address the majority's 
resolution of this unsettled question.  Sanders argues that the 
legislature intended ten years to be the minimum age for 
criminal conduct such that a person cannot be subsequently 
criminally charged as an adult for conduct committed before his 
tenth birthday.  The jury's response was consistent with 
Sanders' argument when it determined that Sanders was not guilty 
of allegedly criminal acts engaged in while age eight or nine. 
No.  2015AP2328-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
¶59 The majority, nonetheless, interprets the statutory 
scheme differently.  It concludes that the legislature intends 
that criminal liability attaches to conduct engaged in by 
children under the age of 10, regardless of whether it is age 4 
or 5, 8 or 9, or any other single digit number.  Yet, the 
majority is unable to point to the specific language in the 
statutory scheme that sets forth such a legislative intent. 
¶60 From its faulty analysis, the majority divines a 
legislative intent from no language at all.  In the area where 
the legislature has spoken about a child's capacity——negligence—
—it has indicated that a child under seven is "conclusively 
presumed" to be incapable of negligence.1  How can the majority 
square 
its 
asserted 
legislative 
intent 
here 
where 
the 
legislature has not spoken with the explicit legislative intent 
expressed in Wis. Stat. § 891.44?  It cannot. 
¶61 I determine that it is absurd to conclude the 
legislature intended that criminal liability can attach for acts 
engaged in by children ages zero-ten.  The majority's conclusion 
to the contrary defies the purpose and structure of our 
statutes, as well as the rationale of prior case law. 
I 
¶62 Sanders, now an adult, was charged with repeated 
sexual assault of the same child for acts committed against his 
sister when he was eight or nine years old, as well as three 
                                                 
1 See Wis. Stat. § 891.44. 
No.  2015AP2328-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
other offenses.  The district attorney brought the charges in 
adult criminal court. 
¶63 The majority determines that the adult criminal court 
had competency to proceed, despite the fact that Sanders was 
only eight or nine years old at the time of the alleged conduct.  
Majority op., ¶18.  In the majority's view, "[t]he defendant's 
age at the time he was charged, not his age at the time he 
committed the underlying conduct, determines whether the circuit 
court has statutory competency to hear his case as a criminal, 
juvenile delinquency, or JIPS matter."  Id., ¶55.  Further, the 
majority concludes that this was a point of settled law.  Id., 
¶31 (citing State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 484 N.W.2d 138 
(1992); State ex rel. Koopman v. Cty. Court, 38 Wis. 2d 492, 157 
N.W.2d 623 (1968); D.V. v. State, 100 Wis. 2d 363, 302 N.W.2d 64 
(Ct. App. 1981)). 
¶64 The majority opinion tells us that we are not to worry 
about limitless criminal liability for acts committed while 
children because there are "safeguards" built into the system.  
See majority op., ¶53.  Specifically, in the majority's view, 
statutes of limitations, mens rea elements, and the rules 
regarding inappropriate filing delays serve as a buffer to 
inappropriate charges being filed against an adult for conduct 
committed as a child.  Id. 
¶65 Using an illogical progression, the majority reaches 
its conclusion.  Essentially, if A (JIPS) to B (juvenile court) 
No.  2015AP2328-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
is permissible2, and B to C (adult court) is permissible3, then 
why should A to C not be permissible?  But the majority's logic 
does not hold. 
II 
¶66 The 
majority 
would 
have 
us 
believe 
that 
the 
legislature intended to provide for adult criminal liability for 
an act committed between the ages of zero and ten.  See majority 
op., ¶8 n.7 ("Whether the illegal conduct began when Sanders was 
eight or nine is irrelevant because, in either event, he was 
less than ten years old and thus would have been subject to a 
JIPS proceeding at that time.").  The purpose and structure of 
our statutes, as well as the rationale of prior case law, say 
otherwise. 
¶67 The majority's logic in allowing the jump from JIPS 
court to adult court does not hold because it is out of step 
with the purpose of the laws governing children's liability, the 
structure of the JIPS law, and the rationale employed in D.V. 
Accordingly, I address each in turn and determine that the 
majority's result is not what the legislature intended. 
¶68 First, the majority's logic does not hold because it 
is out of step with the purpose of the laws governing children's 
liability.  "The law has historically reflected . . . that 
                                                 
2 See D.V. v. State, 100 Wis. 2d 363, 302 N.W.2d 64 (Ct. 
App. 1981). 
3 See State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 484 N.W.2d 138 
(1992); State ex rel. Koopman v. Cty. Court, 38 Wis. 2d 492, 157 
N.W.2d 623 (1968). 
No.  2015AP2328-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature 
judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand 
the world around them."  J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 
273 (2011). 
¶69 Trends in jurisprudence are increasingly recognizing 
that children must be treated differently.  "Juveniles are more 
capable of change than are adults, and their actions are less 
likely to be evidence of 'irretrievably depraved character' than 
are actions of adults."  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 
(2010).  Parts of the brain involved in behavior control 
continue to mature throughout adolescence.  Id.  The differences 
between the child and adult minds make children less morally 
culpable.  Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012). 
¶70 Our statutory schemes governing civil and criminal 
liability for children reflect these concerns.  As an initial 
point of comparison, the legislature has definitively spoken 
that there is an age at which a child does not have the capacity 
to act negligently, and that age is seven.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 891.44.4  Yet in the majority's view, a person can be held 
criminally liable even after reaching adulthood for an act 
committed at that same age.  It is absurd that a child can be 
ascribed criminal intent at an age where that same child is 
"conclusively presumed" to be incapable of negligence. 
                                                 
4 Wis. Stat. § 891.44 provides:  "It shall be conclusively 
presumed that an infant minor who has not reached the age of 7 
shall be incapable of being guilty of contributory negligence or 
of any negligence whatsoever." 
No.  2015AP2328-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
¶71 As to criminal liability, the statutes evince a 
similar underlying policy.  From their inception, our laws 
addressing juvenile conduct were "not designed as a method of 
punishment for crimes committed by juveniles."  In re Alley, 174 
Wis. 85, 91, 182 N.W.2d 360 (1921).  Rather, "[e]very section 
and paragraph of the statute is permeated with the benevolent 
purpose of improving the child's condition, and not with 
punishing his past conduct.  The whole object and purpose of 
this law will be defeated if it is construed and applied as a 
punitive statute."  Id. at 91-92. 
¶72 Second, the majority's logic does not hold because 
there is no statutory procedure for bringing what would be a 
JIPS case to juvenile court, much less to adult court.  This 
stands in stark contrast to the clearly delineated statutory 
process for moving cases between juvenile court and adult court.  
See Wis. Stat. §§ 970.032, 938.18.  Pursuant to § 938.18, either 
the district attorney or a juvenile may petition to waive 
juvenile court jurisdiction and have a criminal matter against a 
juvenile 14 or older who committed certain crimes be heard in 
adult court.  § 938.18(1) and (2).5  Likewise, pursuant to 
                                                 
5 Wis. Stat. § 938.18 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) Waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction; conditions 
for. Subject to s. 938.183, a petition requesting the 
court to waive its jurisdiction under this chapter may 
be filed if the juvenile meets any of the following 
conditions: 
(a) The juvenile is alleged to have violated s. 
940.03, 940.06, 940.225(1) or (2), 940.305, 940.3
1, 943.10(2), 943.32(2), 943.87 or 961. 41(1) on 
or after the juvenile's 14th birthday. 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP2328-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
§ 970.032, an adult court can send a case to juvenile court if 
certain criteria are fulfilled.6  No analogous process exists for 
moving a case from JIPS court to either juvenile court or adult 
court. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) The juvenile is alleged to have committed a 
violation 
on 
or 
after 
the 
juvenile's 
14th 
birthday at the request of or for the benefit of 
a criminal gang, as defined in s. 939.22(9), that 
would constitute a felony under chs. 939 to 948 
or 961 if committed by an adult. 
(c) The juvenile is alleged to have violated any 
state criminal law on or after the juvenile's 
15th birthday. 
6 Wis. Stat. § 970.032 provides: 
(2) If the court finds probable cause to believe that 
the juvenile has committed the violation of which he 
or she is accused under the circumstances specified 
in s. 938.183 (1)(a), (am), (ar), (b) or (c), the 
court shall determine whether to retain jurisdiction 
or to transfer jurisdiction to the court assigned to 
exercise jurisdiction under chs. 48 and 938. The court 
shall retain jurisdiction unless the juvenile proves 
by a preponderance of the evidence all of the 
following: 
(a) That, if convicted, the juvenile could not 
receive 
adequate 
treatment 
in 
the 
criminal 
justice system. 
(b) That transferring jurisdiction to the court 
assigned to exercise jurisdiction under chs. 48 
and 938 would not depreciate the seriousness of 
the offense. 
(c) That retaining jurisdiction is not necessary 
to deter the juvenile or other juveniles from 
committing the violation of which the juvenile is 
accused under the circumstances specified in s. 
938.183 (1)(a), (am), (ar), (b) or (c), whichever 
is applicable. 
No.  2015AP2328-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
¶73 Finally, the majority's logic does not hold because it 
is inconsistent with the reasoning of D.V., despite its heavy 
reliance on the case.  In D.V., 100 Wis. 2d 363, the court of 
appeals approved the charging in juvenile court of an offense 
committed at the age of 117 based on the juvenile's age at the 
time of charging rather than the time of commission.  The 
court's analysis was driven, however, by the similarities in the 
possible dispositions offered by the two statutory schemes at 
issue.  See D.V., 100 Wis. 2d at 368-70. 
¶74 The D.V. court specified that its conclusion was 
supported by the contention that "the differences between adult 
criminal prosecutions and juvenile delinquency proceedings are 
much more substantial than differences between a juvenile 
delinquency proceeding and a juvenile proceeding affecting a 
child alleged to be in need of protection or services which can 
be ordered by the juvenile court."  Id. at 368.  Following the 
D.V. 
court's 
lead, 
a 
comparison 
between 
the 
available 
dispositions had this case been charged as a JIPS matter and the 
range of punishment for adult criminal charges is instructive. 
¶75 As relevant here, Sanders was charged in count one 
with repeated sexual assault of a child as a class B felony.  
Conviction of a class B felony subjects an adult to up to 60 
                                                 
7 At the time D.V. was decided, a child "[w]ho, being under 
12 years of age, has committed a delinquent act" was considered 
to be a child alleged to be in need of protection or services, 
or CHIPS.  Wis. Stat. § 48.13(12) (1981-82).  The current JIPS 
statute places the dividing line at ten years of age rather than 
twelve.  § 938.13(12). 
No.  2015AP2328-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
years of imprisonment, with up to 40 years of that time being 
initial 
confinement. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.50(2)(b); 
§ 973.01(2)(b)1.  Further, an adult convicted of this offense is 
subject to mandatory sex offender registration.  See § 301.45. 
¶76 In contrast, if the same conduct was addressed in JIPS 
court, there would be no "sentence," but only a "disposition."  
See Wis. Stat. §§  938.34, 345.  These dispositions are oriented 
toward treatment rather than punishment.  See In Interest of 
Reginald D., 193 Wis. 2d 299, 311-12, 533 N.W.2d 181 (1995). 
¶77 In fact, a juvenile adjudged in need of protection or 
services may not be placed in "the serious juvenile offender 
program juvenile correctional facility or a secured residential 
care center for children and youth" or in a "juvenile detention 
facility or juvenile portion of a county jail or in nonsecure 
custody under s. 938.34(3)(f)."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.345(1).  
Further, 
sex 
offender 
registration 
of 
a 
juvenile 
is 
discretionary with the circuit court, rather than mandatory.  
See § 938.345(3).  The dispositions available pursuant to a JIPS 
order are a far cry from 40 years in prison followed by 20 years 
of extended supervision and mandatory sex offender registration. 
¶78 A delay in charging thus has the possibility to vastly 
increase the punishment for the same conduct.  Why should one be 
subject to a 60 year sentence rather than a treatment-oriented 
disposition because more time has passed since the crime? 
¶79 And what of the majority's "safeguards?"  See majority 
op., ¶53.  Do statutes of limitations, mens rea elements, and 
the rules regarding inappropriate filing delays prevent the 
No.  2015AP2328-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
filing of inappropriate charges against an adult for conduct 
committed as a child?  Id.  These "safeguards" are little 
comfort to Sanders.  They did nothing to protect him from being 
charged and tried, even if he was ultimately acquitted of the 
charge related to his conduct as an eight or nine-year-old 
child. 
¶80 I question whether an eight or nine-year-old child has 
the 
capacity 
to 
commit 
an 
offense 
of 
sexual 
assault.  
Specifically, I question that an eight or nine-year-old can form 
the necessary intent for conviction of the sexual assault 
offense charged in this case:  "for the purpose of sexually 
degrading or sexually humiliating the complainant or sexually 
arousing 
or 
gratifying 
the 
defendant." 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.01(5) (2003-04).  But I have no doubt whatsoever that the 
majority gets it wrong when it concludes that the conduct of 
children aged zero-ten may later be subject to criminal 
prosecution. 
¶81 Finally, the majority rests its conclusion in part on 
legislative acquiescence.  See majority op., ¶52.  We have 
stated in the past that legislative acquiescence is a "weak reed 
upon which to lean."  State v. Hansen, 2001 WI 53, ¶38, 243 
Wis. 2d 328, 627 N.W.2d 195; Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. DILHR, 
72 Wis. 2d 26, 36, 240 N.W.2d 422 (1976).  It is even weaker 
when the case law to which the legislature has supposedly 
acquiesced does not stand for the proposition the majority 
ascribes to it. 
No.  2015AP2328-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
¶82 I urge the legislature to provide increased clarity by 
reexamining this area of the law.  The purpose and statutory 
scheme indicate that the legislature did not intend the 
majority's result.  The legislature should act to show its true 
intention, lest its silence be deemed acquiescence with the 
majority's untenable assertion of legislative intent. 
¶83 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶84 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2015AP2328-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1