Case Title: Cruz-Urvina v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 667-2014

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2015-10-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

EDUARDO CRUZ-URVINA, §
§ No, 667, 2014
Defendant Below- §
Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware in and
v. § for New Castle County
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § No. 1306009173
§
Plaintiff Below- §
Appellee. §

Submitted: September 16, 2015
Decided: October 2, 2015

Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and VAUGHN, Justices.
ORDER
(On this 2 day of October 2015, it appears to the Court that:
(1) Defendant-Below/Appellant Eduardo Cruz-Urvina (“Cruz-Urvina”) appeals
from a Superior Court jury verdict finding him guilty of one count of Aggravated
Menacing' and one count of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a

that

 

Felony (“PFDCF")? Cruz-Urvina raises two claims on appeal. First, he cl
the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the
charge of PFDCF, because the State failed to present sufficient evidence to show that

(Cruz-Urvina possessed a gun on the night in question. Second, Cruz-Urvina claims

 

"11 Del. C. § 6020).
PA Del. § 1447A.
that the State's repeated reference to the victims’ eleven-month-old daughter, who

 

‘was present atthe time of the alleged crime, amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.
We find no merit to Cruz-Urvina’s claims and affirm.

(2) On the night of June 9, 2013, David Munoz (“Munoz”), Esli Resendiz
(“Resendiz”), and their daughter returned home from a barbecue. Resendiz went

inside their apartment while Munoz removed their eleven-month-old daughter from

the car. After taking his daughter out of the car, Munoz saw a man walking towards

 

him. Munoz recognized him as Cruz-Urvina. As he approached Munoz, who was
still holding his daughter, Cruz-Urvina pulled a handgun from his blue duffle bag.
Cruz-Urvina then began waving the handgun at Munoz and his daughter. Atthe same
time, he shouted: “I finally got you. I’m going to kill you. I’m going to shoot you
right here.” Cruz-Urvina also made reference to the use of “hollow tips.”

(3) Unaware of the altercation, Resendiz went outside to check on Munoz and

their daughter. Despite his instruction to go back inside, Resendiz continued towards

Munoz, who then told her that there was a man with a gun. Resendiz asked

 

(Cruz-Urvina why he was pointing a gun at her daughter. She then warned him “not

todosomething he [would] regret.”* Munoz informed Resendiz that Cruz-Urvina had

> Appellant's Op. Br. App at 4.
* Attra, Officer Mitchell tstifi
point bullets were found under

* Appellant's Op. Br. App at 95.

that while searching Cruz-Urvina’s residence, several hollow-
bed.

  
been drinking, which caused Resendiz to stop talking. After five to ten minutes,
‘Munoz convinced Cruz-Urvina to leave.
(4) Worried about their safety, Munoz went into his apartment, packed some

items for his daughter, and drove his family to his sister's home in

 

’ington,
Delaware. From his sister's house, Munoz reported Cruz-Urvina’s behavior to the
police. Munoz provided the police with Cruz-Urvina’s name and a link to his
Facebook profile. Munoz also informed the police that Cruz-Urvina was in
possession of a black handgun.

(5) After Munoz and Resendiz identified Cruz-Urvina in a photo lineup, the
police obtained a search warrant for Cruz-Urvina’s residence. Upon their arrival at
the residence, Cruz-Urvina’s mother directed the police to his oom, where they found
hollow-point bullets, spent bullet casings, a revolver holster, a revolver speed loader,
and a letter addressed to Cruz-Urvina. The police also noted that the room looked
similar to the one pictured on Cruz-Urvina’s Facebook profile. Cruz-Urvina was

subsequently arrested and indicted on three counts of Reckless Endangering First

 

Degree,’ five counts of PFDCF,’ and two counts of Aggravated Menacing."
(6) At trial, the State pursued only two counts of PFDCF and two counts of
“11 Del. C. § 604.

711 Del. C. § 14474.
"11 Del C. § 602(b,
Aggravated Menacing, one alleging Munoz.as the:

 

im, and one alleging Resendiz.
as the victim. As part of its case-in-chief, the State presented evidence of the items
found in Cruz-Urvina's room. Through their testimony, Munoz and Resendiz
identified Cruz-Urvinaas the perpetrator.° Further, Munoz testified that Cruz-Urvina
hada black revolver. Resendiz testified that she clearly saw that it was a large black
‘gun, about eight or nine inches in length.

(7) During its opening statement, the State, without objection, described the
incident, including the fact that the daughter was present at the scene with Munoz.
After both Munoz and Resendiz testified that their daughter was present during the
altercation, Cruz-Urvina objected. Specifically, he objected to Munoz’s testimony,
arguing that the State was attempting to make the jury “feel really, really bad because
there was a one-year-old daughter involved in this.”"” The prosecutor replied that she
was setting the scene of the incident, but was having difficulty developing factual
testimony from Munoz. The trial court permitted the State to continue with the line
of questioning.

(8) At the close of the State's case, Cruz-Urvina moved for judgment of

acquittal as to the two charges of PFDCF. He argued that since no gun was

 

 

‘The State also elicited testimony that confirmed Cruz-Urvina was the same person that Munoz and,
Resendiz identified during the police investigation,
"© Appellant's Op. Br. App. at 38.
recovered, there was no proof that the object in his hand was, in fact, a firearm, and
the State did not sufficiently prove that there was any connection between the items
found in Cruz-Urvina’s room and the night in question. ‘The trial court denied the
motion.

(9) During closing arguments, the State again mentioned that Munoz’s
daughter was “just shy of her first birthday” during the altercation."' Defense counsel
‘objected to this on grounds that it was intended to elicit an emotional response from
the jury. The State argued the fact was relevant to why Munoz and Resendiz acted
the way that they did when threatened by Cruz-Urvina. The trial court cautioned the
State, but allowed further reference to the daughter as long as it pertained to why
‘Munoz called the police. While charging the jury, the trial court gave a standard
sympathy instruction,

(10) Cruz-Urvina first argues that his motion for judgment of acquittal was
improperly denied because the State did not present enough evidence to prove that
he possessed a gun on the night in question.

(11) The denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo."”
This Court must “determine whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the State, could have found the essential elements of the

 

"Appellant's Op. Br. App. at 223.
White v. State, 906 A.24 82, 85 (Del. 2006)
crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” In reviewing the evidence, “we do not
distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence."
(12) A person is guilty of PFDCF when he or she possesses a firearm while

com

 

itting a felony.'* A firearm is defined as “any weapon from which a shot...
may be discharged . . . whether operable or inoperable, loaded or unloaded.”"* A
firearm need not be recovered to support a jury finding that a defendant possessed a
firearm during the commission of a felony.” Mere testimony, even when it is
conflicting, has been sufficient to allow a jury to find that a defendant possessed a
firearm while committing a felony."*

(13) In Poon v, State, the defendant claimed that there was insufficient

ion of a

 

evidence to establish that he possessed a firearm during the commis
robbery." No firearm was recovered.” At trial, the only evidence presented was the
testimony of two witnesses.” Although the witnesses’ testimony conflicted on the

detai

 

of the weapon, this Court held that “it was the jury's prerogative to resolve

a
Poon v. State, 880 A.24 236, 238 (Del. 2005).

"11 Del. C. § 1447A(a),

11 Del. C. § 22212)

"See Poon, 880 A.2d at239 (finding conflicting testimony of two eyewitnesses sufficient); see also
Forttv. State, 767 A.2d 799, 803 (Del. 2001) (affirming a jury verdict finding the defendant guilty
‘of PFDCF where the only evidence thatthe defendant had a weapon was eyewitness testimony).

"* Poon, 880 A.2d at 239.

"Fd, at 237-39.

* Id a 239,

jd, at 238-39.
2 We held that a rational

   

of fact could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that a defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony based

only on the testimony of two witnesses.”*

 

(14) In the case at bar, there was sufficient

 

snce to permit a rational trier
of fact to determine that Cruz-Urvina possessed a gun during the commission of a
felony. Similar to the evidence presented in Poon, two eyewitnesses testified that
Cruz-Urvina possessed a gun during the altercation. Munoz testified that Cruz-

Urvina threatened him with a black revolver, and Resendiz tes

 

jed that Cruz-Urvina
wielded a large black gun. The speed loader, revolver holster, and hollow-point
bullets found under Cruz-Urvina’s bed were also presented as circumstantial
evidence. As in Poon, the jury could have found that Cruz-Urvina possessed a gun
con the night in question based solely on the testimony of Munoz and Resendiz. It was
for the jury to determine whether to credit the testimony and conclude that all of the
evidence established that Cruz-Urvina was guilty of PFDCF. Accordingly, we find
‘no merit to the Appellant's first claim.

(15) Next, Cruz-Urvina contends that the State committed prosecutorial
misconduct when it referenced the victims’ daughter during trial.

(16)“If defense counsel raised a timely and pertinent objection to prosecutorial

 

® Poon, 880 A.2d at 239.
id
misconduct at trial, . . . we (] review for harmless error.”™ “The first step in the

 

harmless error analysis involves a de novo review of the record to determine whether

 

misconduct actually occurred. If we determine that no misconduct occurred, our
analysis ends there.” “If .. the prosecutor did engage in misconduct, we then
examine whether the improper comments or conduct prejudicially affected the
defendant's substantial rights necessitating a reversal of his conviction.”

(17) When a prosecutor unfairly appeals tothe emotions of a jury, he prejudices
the defendant's right to a fair trial” “A guilty verdict must be based upon the
‘evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, not on an irrational response which
may be triggered if the prosecution unfairly strikes an emotion in the jury."
“Appeals to sympathy and jurors’ emotions are impermissible because they go beyond
the facts of the case and the reasonable inferences from the facts.””

(18) In Hooks v. State,® this Court held that the prosecutor’s comments
regarding hypothetical future victims constituted misconduct, as they strayed too far
% Wynn , State, 93 A.3d 638, 640 (Del. 2014) (quoting Baker v. Sate, 906 A.24 139,148 (Del.
2006)

» Fd. (intemal quotations omitted.

% fd. In order to determine the prejudicial effect of any prosecutorial misconduct, this Court must
evaluate “[1] the closeness ofthe case, [2] the centrality ofthe issue affected bythe (alleged) error,
and [3] the steps taken to mitigate the effects ofthe eror.” 1d.

* Hooks v. State, 416 A.24 189, 205 (Del. 1980).

™ DeShields v State, 34 A.24 630, 642 (Del. 1987).

id
» Hooks, 416 A.24 at 205-06.
away from the facts of the record in an attempt to appeal to the emotions of the
jurors." Conversely, in DeShields v. State, this Court held that no misconduct
occurred when a prosecutor asked the jury to deliver justice to the victim.” This
Court held that, since the comment focused on the evidence in the case, it did not
“impermissibly draw the jury’s attention away from the evidence in [the] case.”

(19) Cruz-Urvina’s prosecutorial misconduct claim is unavailing. Unlike in

 

Hooks, the State’s comments were factual in nature. As in DeShields, the comments
did not draw the jury’s attention away from the evidence in the case and were based
entirely on the evidence presented. References to the daughter were appropriate to
give the jury a complete account of what occurred. We believe that the defendant
underestimates the ability of the jury to carefully and conscientiously consider the
evidence without being influenced by sympathy. We conclude that no prosecutorial
misconduct occurred.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED.

 

Jd, at 205-06, However, this court held thatthe prosecutor's misconduct did not prejudice the
defendant's right to a far trial. 1d. at 206-08.

® DeShields, 534 A.2d at 642.

» fd, (internal quotations omitted).